

Encyclopædia

of

Religion and Ethics

Volumes I and II

Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics

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VOLUME I

A—ART

NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
1928

Messrs Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, have the sole right of publication of this
Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics in the United States and Canada.

Printed in the United States of America

PREFACE

THERE is at the present time an unusual demand for works of reference. It may be due partly to a higher general standard of education, increasing the number of readers, and compelling teachers, whether they are writers or speakers, to 'verify their references.' But it may be due also to the great increase of knowledge in our time. We must possess ourselves of dictionaries and encyclopædias, because it is not possible otherwise to have at our command the vast stores of learning which have accumulated.

But the enormous increase of knowledge in our time has not only created a demand for general works of reference; it has also made known the necessity for dictionaries or encyclopædias of a more special character. Musicians have found the need of a Dictionary of Music, painters of Painting, engineers of Engineering, and they have had their wants supplied. The present work is an attempt to meet the necessity for an Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics.

Scope of the Encyclopædia.

The words 'Religion' and 'Ethics' are both used in their most comprehensive meaning, as the contents of this volume will show. The Encyclopædia will contain articles on all the Religions of the world and on all the great systems of Ethics. It will aim, further, at containing articles on every religious belief or custom, and on every ethical movement, every philosophical idea, every moral practice. Such persons and places as are famous in the history of religion and morals will be included. The Encyclopædia will thus embrace the whole range of Theology and Philosophy, together with the relevant portions of Anthropology, Mythology, Folk-lore, Biology, Psychology, Economics, and Sociology. It is a wide field, but its limits are clearly defined. Only once or twice throughout the course of this volume has the question been raised whether a particular topic should be included or not.

Subjects and Authors.

Very great care has been taken to make the list of subjects complete, and to assign each subject to the right author. If mistakes have been made they will be pointed out by readers and reviewers; and the Editor will welcome every suggestion that is offered towards the improvement of the succeeding volumes. In order to

avoid overlapping, and yet to have every topic treated with sufficient fulness, the method has occasionally been adopted of describing a subject comprehensively in one general article, and then taking one or more particular topics embraced by the general article and dealing with them separately and more fully. Thus there will be a general sketch of the Socialistic Communities of America, out of which the Amana Community has been selected to be separately and fully described. Again, there are articles on Aphrodisia and Apollonia in addition to the general article on Greek Festivals; and in the second volume there will be an article on the Arval Brothers, while the Roman Priesthood will be treated comprehensively afterwards.

It is not necessary to draw attention here to the series of comparative articles on such topics as Adoption, Adultery, Ages of the World, Altar, Ancestor-Worship, Anointing, Architecture, and Art.

The important subject of cross-references is referred to in the Index volume.

Editors and Assistants.

How can due acknowledgment be made to all those who have been counsellors and colleagues, and have assisted so willingly to make the Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics an authoritative work of reference throughout the whole of its great and difficult field of study? Professor A. S. Geden, Dr. Louis H. Gray, and Professor D. B. Macdonald have worked over every article from the beginning. Next to them must come Principal Iverach, Canon J. A. MacCulloch, Mr. Crooke, Professor Rhys Davids, Dr. Grierson, and Sir C. J. Lyall. Then follow Professor Wenley, Dr. J. G. Frazer, Mr. Sidney Hartland, Dr. Keane, Mr. W. H. Holmes, Mr. J. Mooney, Mr. E. E. Sikes, Professor Riess, Professor Poussin, Professor Anesaki, Dr. Aston, Mr. Cornaby, Professor Macdonell, Professor Lloyd, Mr. Nutt, Mr. Watson, Mr. Gait, Principal Fairbairn, Professor Jacobi, Professor Takakusu, Professor Bonet-Maury, Colonel Sir R. C. Temple, Bart., Professor Nöldeke, Dr. Moulton, Dr. Macpherson, Baron Friedrich von Hügel, Professor Lawlor, Professor Schaff, Abbot E. C. Butler, Professor Sanday, Professor Hillebrandt, Professor Seth, Professor Sorley, Professor Woodhouse, Principal Stewart, Professor Swete, and Colonel Waddell. These all have suggested authors, read manuscripts, corrected proofs, or in some other way taken a helpful interest in the work. And the list could be doubled without exhausting their number.

Acknowledgment is due also to the Right Hon. the Secretary of State for India and the Librarian of the India Office; to Sir A. H. L. Fraser, K.C.S.I., LL.D., Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal; to the Right Hon. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, G.C.M.G., Premier of Canada; and to the Chief of the Bureau of Ethnology of the Smithsonian Institution, Washington, for the use of valuable books.

After six years' exacting labour this first volume goes forth in the earnest hope that it will be found worthy of a place among the rapidly increasing number of books devoted to the study of Religion and Ethics, and that it will help forward that study along the right lines.

SCHEME OF TRANSLITERATION

I. HEBREW

CONSONANTS

'	א	l	ל
b, bh	ב	m	מ
g, gh	ג	n	נ
d, dh	ד	s	ס
h	ה	'	ע
v, w	ו	p, ph	פ
z	ז	ṣ	צ
ḥ or ch	ח	q or ḳ	ק
ṭ	ט	r	ר
y or j	י	ś, sh	שׂ שׁ
k, kh	כ	t, th	ת

VOWELS

Short.		Long and Diphthongal.		Shᵉvas.		
a	ַ	ā	ָ	ă	ֲ	Composite shᵉvas.
e	ֶ	ē, ê	ֵ, ֵי	ĕ	ֱ	
i	ִ	î	ִי	ŏ	ֳ	
o	ָ	ō, ô	ֹ, וֹ	ᵉ	ְ	(simple shᵉva).
u	ֻ	û	וּ, וּו			

II. ARABIC

CONSONANTS

'	أ	ḍ	ض
b	ب	ṭ	ط
t	ت	ẓ	ظ
th	ث	'	ع
j	ج	gh	غ
ḥ	ح	f	ف
ḫ	خ	q	ق
d	د	k	ك
dh	ذ	l	ل
r	ر	m	م
z	ز	n	ن
s	س	h	ه
sh	ش	v, w	و
ṣ	ص	y	ي

II. ARABIC—*continued*

VOWELS

Short.		Long.		Diphthong.	
a	ـَ	ā	ا ـَ	ai	ـَ ی
i	ـِ	ī	ی ـِ	au	ـَ و
u	ـُ	ū	و ـُ		

III. PERSIAN AND HINDUSTANI[1]

The following in addition to the Arabic transliteration above

p	پ	ẓ	ظ
ṭ	ٹ	ṛ	ڑ
ṣ	ث	zh	ژ
ch	چ	ż	ض
ḍ	ڈ	g	گ

[1] The diacritical marks in this scheme are sometimes omitted in transliteration when absolute accuracy is not required, the pronunciation of ṣ being the same as that of s, while z, ẓ, ż, are all pronounced alike.

IV. SANSKRIT

CONSONANTS

Gutturals—k, kh; g, gh; ṅ (=ng in finger).
Palatals—ch (=ch in church), chh; j, jh; ñ (=n in onion).
Cerebrals—ṭ, ṭh; ḍ, ḍh; ṇ (a sound peculiar to India).
Dentals—t, th; d, dh; n (=n in not).
Labials—p, ph; b, bh; m.
Semi-vowels—y; r; l; v.
Sibilants—ś or sh; ṣ or sh; s.
Aspirate—h.

anunāsika (ँ); anusvāra, ṁ; visarga, ḥ; avagraha (').

VOWELS

Simple.				Diphthongal.	
a	ā	or	â	e	āi
i	ī	or	î	o	āu
u	ū	or	û		
ṛ	ṝ				
ḷ					

LISTS OF ABBREVIATIONS

I. General

A.H. = Anno Hijræ (A.D. 622).
Ak. = Akkadian.
Alex. = Alexandrian.
Amer. = American.
Apoc. = Apocalypse, Apocalyptic.
Apocr. = Apocrypha.
Aq. = Aquila.
Arab. = Arabic.
Aram. = Aramaic.
Arm. = Armenian.
Ary. = Aryan.
As. = Asiatic.
Assyr. = Assyrian.
AT = Altes Testament.
AV = Authorized Version.
AVm = Authorized Version margin.
A.Y. = Anno Yazdigird (A.D. 639).
Bab. = Babylonian.
c. = *circa*, about.
Can. = Canaanite.
cf. = compare.
ct. = contrast.
D = Deuteronomist.
E = Elohist.
edd. = editions or editors.
Egyp. = Egyptian.
Eng. = English.
Eth. = Ethiopic.
EV = English Version.
f. = and following verse or page: as Ac 10^{24} f.
ff. = and following verses or pages: as Mt 11^{20} ff.
Fr. = French.
Germ. = German.
Gr. = Greek.
H = Law of Holiness.
Heb. = Hebrew.
Hel. = Hellenistic.
Hex. = Hexateuch.
Himy. = Himyaritic.
Ir. = Irish.
Iran. = Iranian.
Isr. = Israelite.
J = Jahwist.
J" = Jehovah.
Jerus. = Jerusalem.
Jos. = Josephus.
LXX = Septuagint.
Min. = Minæan.
MSS = Manuscripts.
MT = Massoretic Text.
n. = note.
NT = New Testament.
Onk. = Onkelos.
OT = Old Testament.
P = Priestly Narrative.
Pal. = Palestine, Palestinian.
Pent. = Pentateuch.
Pers. = Persian.
Phil. = Philistine.
Phœn. = Phœnician.
Pr. Bk. = Prayer Book.
R = Redactor.
Rom. = Roman.
RV = Revised Version.
RVm = Revised Version margin.
Sab. = Sabæan.
Sam. = Samaritan.
Sem. = Semitic.
Sept. = Septuagint.
Sin. = Sinaitic.
Skr. = Sanskrit.
Symm. = Symmachus.
Syr. = Syriac.
t. (following a number) = times.
Talm. = Talmud.
Targ. = Targum.
Theod. = Theodotion.
TR = Textus Receptus.
tr. = translated or translation.
VSS = Versions.
Vulg. = Vulgate.
WH = Westcott and Hort's text.

II. Books of the Bible

Old Testament.

Gn = Genesis.
Ex = Exodus.
Lv = Leviticus.
Nu = Numbers.
Dt = Deuteronomy.
Jos = Joshua.
Jg = Judges.
Ru = Ruth.
1 S, 2 S = 1 and 2 Samuel.
1 K, 2 K = 1 and 2 Kings.
1 Ch, 2 Ch = 1 and 2 Chronicles.
Ezr = Ezra.
Neh = Nehemiah.
Est = Esther.
Job.
Ps = Psalms.
Pr = Proverbs.
Ec = Ecclesiastes.
Ca = Canticles.
Is = Isaiah.
Jer = Jeremiah.
La = Lamentations.
Ezk = Ezekiel.
Dn = Daniel.
Hos = Hosea.
Jl = Joel.
Am = Amos.
Ob = Obadiah.
Jon = Jonah.
Mic = Micah.
Nah = Nahum.
Hab = Habakkuk.
Zeph = Zephaniah.
Hag = Haggai.
Zec = Zechariah.
Mal = Malachi.

Apocrypha.

1 Es, 2 Es = 1 and 2 Esdras.
To = Tobit.
Jth = Judith.
Ad. Est = Additions to Esther.
Wis = Wisdom.
Sir = Sirach or Ecclesiasticus.
Bar = Baruch.
Three = Song of the Three Children.
Sus = Susanna.
Bel = Bel and the Dragon.
Pr. Man = Prayer of Manasses.
1 Mac, 2 Mac = 1 and 2 Maccabees.

New Testament.

Mt = Matthew.
Mk = Mark.
Lk = Luke.
Jn = John.
Ac = Acts.
Ro = Romans.
1 Co, 2 Co = 1 and 2 Corinthians.
Gal = Galatians.
Eph = Ephesians.
Ph = Philippians.
Col = Colossians.
1 Th, 2 Th = 1 and 2 Thessalonians.
1 Ti, 2 Ti = 1 and 2 Timothy.
Tit = Titus.
Philem = Philemon.
He = Hebrews.
Ja = James.
1 P, 2 P = 1 and 2 Peter.
1 Jn, 2 Jn, 3 Jn = 1, 2, and 3 John.
Jude.
Rev = Revelation.

III. For the Literature

1. The following authors' names, when unaccompanied by the title of a book, stand for the works in the list below.

Baethgen = *Beiträge zur sem. Religionsgesch.*, 1888.
Baldwin = *Dict. of Philosophy and Psychology*, 3 vols. 1901–1905.
Barth = *Nominalbildung in den sem. Sprachen*, 2 vols. 1889, 1891 (2nd ed. 1894).
Benzinger = *Heb. Archäologie*, 1894.
Brockelmann = *Gesch. d. arab. Litteratur*, 2 vols. 1899–1902.
Bruns-Sachau = *Syr.-Röm. Rechtsbuch aus dem fünften Jahrhundert*, 1880.
Budge = *Gods of the Egyptians*, 2 vols. 1903.
De la Saussaye = *Lehrbuch der Religionsgesch.*[1], 1905.
Deussen = *Die Philos. d. Upanishads*, 1899 [Eng. tr., Edin. 1906].
Doughty = *Arabia Deserta*, 2 vols. 1888.
Grimm = *Deutsche Mythologie*[4], 3 vols. 1875–1878, Eng. tr. *Teutonic Mythology*, 4 vols. 1882–1888.
Hamburger = *Realencyclopädie für Bibel u. Talmud*, i. 1870 (²1892), ii. 1883, suppl. 1886, 1891 f., 1897.
Holder = *Altceltischer Sprachschatz*, 1891 ff.
Holtzmann-Zöpffel = *Lexicon f. Theol. u. Kirchenwesen*[2], 1895.
Howitt = *Native Tribes of S. E. Australia*, 1904.
Jastrow = *Die Religion Bab. u. Assyriens*, 2 vols. 1905–
Jubainville = *Cours de Litt. Celtique*, i.–xii., 1883 ff.
Lagrange = *Études sur les religions Sémitiques*[2], 1904.
Lane = *An Arabic English Dictionary*, 1863 ff.
Lang = *Myth, Ritual and Religion*[2], 2 vols. 1899.
Lepsius = *Denkmäler aus Ægypten u. Æthiopien*, 1849–1860.
Lichtenberger = *Encyc. des sciences religieuses*, 1876.
Lidzbarski = *Handbuch der nordsem. Epigraphik et Ephemeris*, 1898.
McCurdy = *History, Prophecy, and the Monuments*, 2 vols. 1894–1896.
Muir = *Sanskrit Texts*, 1858–1872.
Muss-Arnolt = *A Concise Dict. of the Assyrian Language*, 1894 ff.
Nowack = *Lehrbuch d. Heb. Archäologie*, 2 vols. 1894.
Pauly-Wissowa = *Realencyc. der classischen Alterthumswissenschaft*, 1894.
Perrot-Chipiez = *Hist. de l'Art dans l'Antiquité*, 1881 ff.
Preller = *Römische Mythologie*, 1858.
Réville = *Religion des peuples non-civilisés*, 1883.
Riehm = *Handwörterbuch d. bibl. Altertums*[2], 1893–1894.
Robinson = *Biblical Researches in Palestine*[2], 1856
Roscher = *Lex. d. Gr. u. Röm. Mythologie*, 1884.
Schenkel = *Bibel-Lexicon*, 5 vols. 1869–1875.
Schürer = *GJV*[3], 3 vols. 1898–1901 [*HJP*, 5 vols. 1890 ff.].
Schwally = *Leben nach dem Tode*, 1892.
Siegfried-Stade = *Heb. Wörterbuch zum AT*, 1893.
Smend = *Lehrbuch der alttest. Religionsgesch.*[2], 1899.
Smith (G. A.) = *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*[4], 1896.
Smith (W. R.) = *Religion of the Semites*[2], 1894.
Spencer (Herbert) = *Principles of Sociology*[3], 1885–1896.
Spencer-Gillen[a] = *Native Tribes of Central Australia*.
Spencer-Gillen[b] = *Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, 1904.
Swete = *The OT in Greek*, 3 vols. 1893 ff.
Tylor (E. B.) = *Primitive Culture*[2], 1891.
Ueberweg = *Hist. of Philosophy*, Eng. tr., 2 vols. 1872–1874.
Weber = *Jüdische Theologie auf Grund des Talmud u. verwandten Schriften*[2], 1897.
Wiedemann = *Die Religion der alten Ægypter*, 1890 [Eng. tr., revised, 'Religion of the Egyptians,' 1897].
Wilkinson = *Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians*, 3 vols. 1878.
Zunz = *Die gottesdienstlichen Vorträge der Juden*[2], 1892.

2. Periodicals, Dictionaries, Encyclopædias, and other standard works frequently cited.

AA = Archiv für Anthropologie.
AAOJ = American Antiquarian and Oriental Journal.
ABAW = Abhandlungen d. Berliner Akad. d. Wissenschaften.
AE = Archiv für Ethnographie.
AEGL = Assyr. and Eng. Glossary (Johns Hopkins University).
AGG = Abhandlungen d. Göttinger Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften.
AGPh = Archiv f. Geschichte der Philosophie.
AHR = American Historical Review.
AHT = Ancient Hebrew Tradition (Hommel).
AJPh = American Journal of Philosophy.
AJPs = American Journal of Psychology.
AJSL = American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literature.
AJTh = American Journal of Theology.
AMG = Annales du Musée Guimet.
APES = American Palestine Exploration Society.
APF = Archiv f. Papyrusforschung.
AR = Anthropological Review.
ARW = Archiv für Religionswissenschaft.
AS = Acta Sanctorum (Bollandus).
ASG = Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften.
ASoc = L'Année Sociologique.
ASWI = Archæological Survey of W. India.
AZ = Allgemeine Zeitung.
BAG = Beiträge zur alten Geschichte.
BASS = Beiträge zur Assyriologie u. sem. Sprachwissenschaft (edd. Delitzsch and Haupt).
BCH = Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique.
BE = Bureau of Ethnology.
BG = Bombay Gazetteer.
BJ = Bellum Judaicum (Josephus).
BL = Bampton Lectures.
BLE = Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique.
BOR = Bab. and Oriental Record.
BS = Bibliotheca Sacra.
BSA = Annual of the British School at Athens.
BSAA = Bulletin de la Société archéologique à Alexandrie.
BSAL = Bulletin de la Soc. d'Anthropologie de Lyon.
BSAP = Bulletin de la Soc. d'Anthropologie, etc., Paris.
BSG = Bulletin de la Soc. de Géographie.
BW = Biblical World.
BZ = Biblische Zeitschrift.
CAIBL = Comptes rendus de l'Academie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres.
CBTS = Calcutta Buddhist Text Society.
CF = Childhood of Fiction (MacCulloch).
CGS = Cults of the Greek States (Farnell).
CIA = Corpus Inscrip. Atticarum.
CIG = Corpus Inscrip. Græcarum.
CIL = Corpus Inscrip. Latinarum.

CIS = Corpus Inscrip. Semiticarum.
COT = Cuneiform Inscriptions and the OT [Eng. tr. of *KAT*²; see below].
CR = Contemporary Review.
CeR = Celtic Review.
ClR = Classical Review.
CQR = Church Quarterly Review.
CSEL = *Corpus Script. Eccles. Latinorum.*
DACL = Dict. d'Archéologie Chrétienne et de Liturgie (Cabrol).
DB = Dictionary of the Bible.
DCA = Dict. of Christian Antiquities (Smith-Cheetham).
DCB = Dict. of Christian Biography (Smith-Wace).
DCG = Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels.
DI = Dict. of Islam (Hughes).
DPhP = Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology.
DWAW = Denkschriften der Wiener Akad. der Wissenschaften.
EBi = Encyclopædia Biblica.
EBr = Encyclopædia Britannica.
EEFM = Egyp. Explor. Fund Memoirs.
Exp = Expositor.
ExpT = Expository Times.
FHG = Fragmenta Historicorum Græcorum, coll. C. Müller (Paris, 1885).
FL = Folklore.
FLJ = Folklore Journal.
FLR = Folklore Record.
GA = Gazette Archéologique.
*GB*³ = Golden Bough ² (Frazer).
GGA = Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen.
GGN = Göttingische Gelehrte Nachrichten (Nachrichten der königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen).
GIAP = Grundriss d. Indo-Arischen Philologie.
GIrP = Grundriss d. Iranischen Philologie.
GJV = Geschichte des Jüdischen Volkes.
GVI = Geschichte des Volkes Israel.
HE = Historia Ecclesiastica.
HGHL = Historical Geography of the Holy Land (G. A. Smith).
HI = History of Israel.
HJ = Hibbert Journal.
HJP = History of the Jewish People.
HN = Historia Naturalis (Pliny).
HWB = Handwörterbuch.
IA = Indian Antiquary.
ICC = International Critical Commentary.
ICR = Indian Census Report (1901).
IGA = Inscrip. Græcæ Antiquissimæ.
IGI = Imperial Gazetteer of India ² (1885).
IJE = International Journal of Ethics.
ITL = International Theological Library.
JA = Journal Asiatique.
JAFL = Journal of American Folklore.
JAI = Journal of the Anthropological Institute.
JAOS = Journal of the American Oriental Society.
JASB = Journal of the Anthropological Society of Bombay.
JBL = Journal of Biblical Literature.
JBTS = Journal of the Buddhist Text Society.
JD = Journal des Débats.
JDTh = Jahrbücher f. deutsche Theologie.
JE = Jewish Encyclopedia.
JGOS = Journal of the German Oriental Society.
JHC = Johns Hopkins University Circulars.
JHS = Journal of Hellenic Studies.
JLZ = Jenäer Litteraturzeitung.
JPh = Journal of Philology.
JPTh = Jahrbücher f. protest. Theologie.
JPTS = Journal of the Pāli Text Society.
JQR = Jewish Quarterly Review.
JRAS = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
JRASBe = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Bengal branch.
JRASBo = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay branch.
JRASJ = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Soc., Japan.
JRGS = Journal of the Royal Geographical Society.
JThSt = Journal of Theological Studies.
*KAT*² = Die Keilinschriften und das AT (Schrader), 1883.
*KAT*³ = Zimmern-Winckler's ed. of the preceding [really a totally distinct work], 1903.
KB or *KIB* = Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek (Schrader), 1889 ff.
KGF = Keilinschriften und die Geschichtsforschung, 1878.
LCBl = Literarisches Centralblatt.
LOPh = Literaturblatt f. Oriental. Philologie.
LOT = Introduction to Literature of OT (Driver).
LP = Legend of Perseus (Hartland).
LSSt = Leipziger sem. Studien.
M = Mélusine.
MAIBL = Mémoires de l'Acad. des Inscriptions et Bulletins.
MBAW = Monatsbericht d. Berliner Akad. d. Wissenschaften.
MGH = Monumenta Germaniæ Historica (Pertz).
MGWJ = Monatsbericht f. Geschichte u. Wissenschaft des Judentums.
MNDPV = Mittheilungen u. Nachrichten des deutschen Palästina-Vereins.
MR = Methodist Review.
MWJ = Magazin für die Wissenschaft der Judentums.
NBAC = Nuovo Bulletino di Archeologia Cristiana.
NC = Nineteenth Century.
NHWB = Neuhebräisches Wörterbuch.
NINQ = North Indian Notes and Queries.
NKZ = Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift.
NQ = Notes and Queries.
NR = Native Races of the Pacific States (Bancroft).
NTZG = Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte.
OLZ = Orientalische Litteraturzeitung.
OS = Onomastica Sacra.
OTJC = Old Testament in the Jewish Church.
OTP = Oriental Translation Fund Publications.
PAOS = Proceedings of American Oriental Society.
PASB = Proceedings of the Anthropological Society of Bombay.
PB = Polychrome Bible (English).
PBE = Publications of the Bureau of Ethnology.
PEFM = Palestine Exploration Fund Memoirs.
PEFSt = Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement.
PG = Patrologia Græca (Migne).
PJB = Preussische Jahrbücher.
PL = Patrologia Latina (Migne).
PNQ = Punjab Notes and Queries.
PR = Popular Religion and Folklore of N. India (Crooke).
*PRE*³ = Prot. Realencyclopädie (Herzog-Hauck)
PRR = Presbyterian and Reformed Review.
PRSE = Proceedings Royal Soc. of Edinburgh.
PSBA = Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archæology.
PTS = Pāli Text Society.
RA = Revue Archéologique.
RAnth = Revue d'Anthropologie.
RAS = Royal Asiatic Society.
RAssyr = Revue d'Assyriologie.
RB = Revue Biblique.
RBEW = Reports of the Bureau of Ethnology (Washington).
RC = Revue Critique.
RCel = Revue Celtique.
RCh = Revue Chrétienne.
RDM = Revue des Deux-Mondes.
RE = Realencyclopädie.
REg = Revue Egyptologique.
REJ = Revue des Études Juives.
REth = Revue d'Ethnographie.
RHLR = Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature Religieuses.

RHR = Revue de l'Histoire des Religions.
RN = Revue Numismatique.
RP = Records of the Past.
RPh = Revue Philosophique.
RQ = Römische Quartalschrift.
RS = Revue sémitique d'Epigraphie et d'Hist. ancienne.
RSA = Recueil de la Soc. archéologique.
RSI = Reports of the Smithsonian Institution.
RTAP = Recueil de Travaux rélatifs à l'Archéologie et à la Philologie.
RTP = Revue des traditions populaires.
RThPh = Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie.
RTr = Recueil de Travaux.
SBAW = Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akad. d. Wissenschaften.
SBE = Sacred Books of the East.
SBOT = Sacred Books of the OT (Hebrew).
SK = Studien u. Kritiken.
SSGW = Sitzungsberichte d. Kgl. Sächs. Gesellsch. d. Wissenschaften.
SWAW = Sitzungsberichte d. Wiener Akad. d. Wissenschaften.
TAPA = Transactions of American Philological Association.
TASJ = Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan.
TES = Transactions of Ethnological Society.
ThLZ = Theologische Litteraturzeitung.
ThT = Theol. Tijdschrift.
TRHS = Transactions of Royal Historical Society.
TRSE = Transactions of Royal Society of Edinburgh.
TS = Texts and Studies.
TSBA = Transactions of the Society of Biblical Archæology.
TU = Texte u. Untersuchungen.
WAI = Western Asiatic Inscriptions.
WZKM = Wiener Zeitschrift f. Kunde des Morgenlandes.
ZA = Zeitschrift für Assyriologie.
ZÄ = Zeitschrift für ägyp. Sprache u. Altertumswissenschaft.
ZATW = Zeitschrift für die alttest. Wissenschaft.
ZCK = Zeitschrift für christliche Kunst.
ZDA = Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum.
ZDMG = Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft.
ZDPV = Zeitschrift des deutschen Palästina Vereins.
ZE = Zeitschrift für Ethnologie.
ZKF = Zeitschrift für Keilschriftforschung.
ZKT = Zeitschrift für kathol. Theologie.
ZKWL = Zeitschrift für kirchl. Wissenschaft u. kirchl. Leben.
ZM = Zeitschrift für die Mythologie.
ZNTW = Zeitschrift für die neutest. Wissenschaft.
ZPhP = Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Pädagogik.
ZTK = Zeitschrift für Theologie u. Kirche.
ZVK = Zeitschrift für Volkskunde.
ZVRW = Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft.
ZWT = Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie

[A small superior number designates the particular edition of the work referred to, as *KAT*[1], *LOT*[6], etc.]

ENCYCLOPÆDIA

OF

RELIGION AND ETHICS

A

A AND Ω.—1. The meaning of this phrase is expressed in Rev 21[6] 22[13] as 'the beginning and the end' (ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος). The conception is to be traced to such passages as Is 41[4] 44[6] 48[12]. And it would appear that the thought was taken from the Hebrew rather than from the Septuagint, for in the former each of the three passages expresses finality (אַחֲרוֹן), which is in accordance with Rev 21[6] 22[13]; while in the Septuagint the Greek equivalent, though differing in each case, emphasizes the idea of something further (τὰ ἐπερχόμενα, μετὰ ταῦτα, εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα). The point, though a small one, is significant, as it affords a piece of subsidiary evidence for a Hebrew original of the Apocalypse (see below).

2. The origin of the phrase is to be sought in pre-Christian times. Among the Jews, the first and last letters of the Hebrew alphabet, א ת, were used to express totality; thus in *Yalkut Rubeni*, fol. 3. 2, where the words of Gn 1[1] 'the heavens' (את השמים) are commented upon, it is said that את, which includes all the letters, implies that all the heavens are meant, their beginning and their end; again, it is said that Adam sinned from א to ת, meaning that he was guilty of every sin; or, once more, Abraham kept the Torah from א to ת, *i.e.* he kept the whole Law.* There is a well-known Rabbinical saying, 'The seal of God is *'Emeth*' (אֱמֶת = 'truth'); and in Jerus. *Sanh.* i. 18*a*, *'Emeth* is said to be the name of God, who includes all things: the beginning (א), the middle (מ is approximately the middle letter of the Hebrew alphabet), and the end (ת). אמת might then well correspond to the ὁ ὤν, ὁ ἦν, ὁ ἐρχόμενος, 'who is, who was, who is to come,' of Rev 1[8]. Logically, indeed, the order should be ὁ ἦν, etc.; but to a Hebrew (as the original writer of the book must have been) ὁ ὤν, as being equivalent to יהוה (Jahweh), would probably on that account come first. The Hebrew את, being a well-known formula expressive of entirety, may therefore have been the prototype of AΩ. It is, however, necessary to state that the phrase 'א and ת' is never (in pre-Christian times) used of God in the way that AΩ is; it is once used of the Shekinah in the Talmud,† but as applied to God it occurs first in the Peshiṭta, which in each case renders A and Ω by ܐ ܘ ܬ.

3. It is noticeable that wherever the expression occurs in the Apocalypse it is written τὸ Ἄλφα καὶ τὸ Ὦ, *i.e.* the first letter is written out in full, while the second is represented only by its sign; there must have been some reason for this, and possibly it is to be accounted for in the following way. It is generally held that parts of the Apocalypse were originally written in Hebrew; in this case the form of the expression would be אלף ותו. Now, the Hebrew characters, as used in the 1st cent., might well have appeared to the Greek translator as representing the *'Aleph* written in full, and *the Tau as the letter Omega.* Thus, in 1st cent. script: אלף ותו; the similarity in both languages of the written first letter might have suggested that the second one was intended for an *Omega.* The phrase was thus imitated direct from the Hebrew manner of writing the equivalent expression. This would also account for the fact that in the vast majority of instances (certainly in *all* the earliest) the *symbol* was written Aω, *i.e.* an uncial Alpha and a cursive Omega.

4. *Use of the symbol in the Christian Church.*—A great variety of objects have been found with this symbol inscribed upon them; it figures on tombstones, as well as on other monuments, on mosaics, frescoes, and bricks, also on vases, cups, lamps, and on rings; it appears also on coins, its earliest occurrence on these being of the time of Constans and Constantius, the sons of Constantine the Great.† These all belong to different ages and different countries; in its earliest known form (Rome, A.D. 295)‡ it appears as 'ω et A,' but this is exceptional, and is perhaps of Gnostic origin. The symbol in its usual form is found on objects

* See also *Yalk. Rub.* fol. 17. 4, fol. 48. 4, quoted in Schoettgen's *Horæ Hebraicæ et Talmudicæ*, i. pp. 1086, 1087, and *Yoma* 69*b*, *Sanh.* 64*a*, Jerus. *Yeb.* xii. 13*a*, Jerus. *Sanh.* i. 18*a*, quoted in *JE* i. pp. 438, 439; also *Sanh.* 55*a*.

* 'Particula את quoque est nomen Schechinæ, q.d. Ezech 1[28] Et audivi את vocem loquentem mecum' (Schoettgen, *op cit.* p. 1086). It is interesting to note that אַחֲרוֹן ('the last') is, in Midrashic literature, used as a name of the Messiah, and is identified with the גּוֹאֵל ('Redeemer') of Job 19[25].

† See Cabrol's *DACL*, art. 'AΩ.'

‡ Cf. *PRE*[2], art. 'A und Ω.'

belonging to the 3rd cent. in Rome and N. Africa; on objects belonging to the 4th cent. it has been found in Asia Minor, Sicily, Upper and Lower Italy, and Gaul; by the beginning of the Middle Ages it must have become known in most of the countries of Central Europe.

The combinations in which the symbol is found are very varied,* the most frequent being the following: with a cross, with a cross and the Christ-monogram (A ☧ ω), surrounded by a wreath (symbolic of the victory over death), within a circle (symbolic of eternity), in combination with a triangle (the symbol of the Trinity). It will be seen, therefore, that, generally speaking, the letters are combined with figures which have reference to Christ, not to the other Persons of the Trinity (but see below); so that they were clearly used as inculcating the doctrine of Christ's Divinity; for this reason the letters, in this form, were avoided, as far as our knowledge goes, by the Arians.

Among the Gnostics the symbol was used for figure-jugglery and for mysterious doctrines of various kinds; *e.g.*, when written backwards, Ω and A have the numerical value 801, which is likewise the sum of the letters of the word περιστερά ('dove'); therefore, they taught, Christ called Himself A and Ω because the Holy Spirit came down upon Him at His baptism in the form of a dove.† This is doubtless the reason why Aω is found in combination with a dove; not infrequently two doves figure, one on either side of the letters. Examples of this are the two little golden boxes, found in Vatican graves, which have inscribed on them the device A ☧ ω and a dove (5th cent.).‡ The like device is seen on a silver *capsella*, found at Trêves, belonging to the 4th or 5th cent.; indeed, this combination would almost appear to have been the normal form of the symbol in Trêves, judging by the frequency of its occurrence there.§

5. There is one other point that is worth alluding to. In the Apocalypse A and Ω is explained as signifying ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος, 'the beginning and the end' (21[6]). This is the simplest, and no doubt the earliest, form of explanation; in 22[13] the same form is preceded by a parallel one, 'the first and the last' (ὁ πρῶτος καὶ ὁ ἔσχατος, ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος); these two forms of explanation agree closely with the OT prototype, as seen in Is 44[6] 48[12]; the explanatory clause given in Rev 1[8] (ὁ ὢν καὶ ὁ ἦν καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος, ὁ παντοκράτωρ) is unquestionably a developed, and therefore a later, form. The title with its explanatory clause is applied to Christ, as indicating His eternal Being. Now, it must strike one at first sight as strange that a title should be used for this purpose which contains the idea of finality, the very reverse of eternal being.‖ But on a closer examination of the passages 21[1-7] 22[10-15] it appears that the 'end' is to be the herald of a new *beginning*. We have here, that is to say, the echo of the eschatological belief that the 'last times' shall be parallel to the 'beginning.' This idea is brought out with great clearness in a passage cited (from some unknown work) in Ep. Barn. 6[13] 'Behold, I make the last things as the first' (ἰδοὺ ποιῶ τὰ ἔσχατα ὡς τὰ πρῶτα). He, the Alpha and the Omega, the First and the Last, makes the last things as the first.* Thus, so far from Ω denoting 'the last' or 'the end' in the usual sense of the words, it really implies the beginning of a new era. From this point of view one can well understand the frequency of the symbol AΩ on tombstones; for, when experience had proved that the belief in Christ's imminent *Parousia* was a mistaken one, the hopes of Christians would naturally be transferred to the life beyond the grave.

LITERATURE.—Schoettgen, *Hor. Heb. et Talmud.* (1733-42); N. Müller, art. 'ΑΩ' in *PRE*[3]; F. X. Kraus, *Die christlichen Inschriften der Rheinlande* (1890, 1894); Cabrol, art. 'ΑΩ' in *DACL* (1903 . . .); art. 'Alpha and Omega' in Hastings' *DB* and *DCG*, and in *JE*; *CIL* xiv.

W. O. E. OESTERLEY.

ABANDONMENT.—In considering the ethical and religious uses of this word, we have to remember that abandonment has an active, a reflexive, and a passive meaning. It may signify (1) the action of abandoning; (2) self-abandonment, defined by Murray as 'the surrender of oneself to an influence'; (3) the condition of being abandoned.

1. The abandonment of infants, sick persons, and aged parents, now rightly condemned as immoral, was not always prompted by motives of inhumanity. Westermarck (*The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, 1906, vol. i. ch. xvii.) has accumulated a mass of evidence which proves that practices regarded by us as atrocious, are 'largely explained by the pitiful condition of the invalid, the hardships of a wandering life, and the superstitious opinions of ignorant men.' Amongst the testimonies cited, especially important are those which show that 'the most common motive for abandoning or destroying sick people seems to be fear of infection, or of demoniacal possession, which is regarded as the cause of various diseases.' Abandonment often meant death, but not always; exposed infants were sometimes adopted into families, but they were also sometimes saved for a life of infamy. Justin Martyr, in his *First Apology*, charges (ch. xxix.) those who abandon children with the crime of murder, if the waifs 'be not picked up, but die'; he also dwells (ch. xxvii.) on the wickedness of exposing children to the peril of being kept alive for immoral purposes. See following articles.

2. There may be an abandonment of self to influences good or bad, holy or unholy. Our language testifies against us when, without saying whether there has been surrender to virtue or to vice, we describe a profligate as an abandoned youth, or a harlot as an abandoned woman. Stanhope (*Paraph.* xi. 476) calls Judas 'an abandoned disciple,' not because Jesus had abandoned him, but because the betrayer had surrendered himself to the evil one.

The Mystics understood by abandonment the complete surrender of the soul to the influences of the Divine Spirit, its entire absorption in the contemplation of the Divine glory, and its absolute devotion to the Divine will. In the dialogue narrated by Doctor Eckhart (Vaughan, *Hours with the Mystics*, bk. vi. ch. i.), a learned man asks a beggar, 'Where hast thou found God?' and the answer is, 'Where I abandoned all creatures.' To the scholar's greeting, 'God give thee good morrow,' the poor man's response is, 'I never had an ill morrow.' Whereupon the scholar says, 'But if God were to cast thee into hell, what wouldst thou do then?' The beggar's reply closes with the words, 'I would sooner be in hell and have God, than in heaven and not have Him.' Doctor Eckhart's comment is, 'Then understood this Master that true Abandonment, with utter Abasement, was the nearest way to God.'

3. When abandonment means 'the condition of being abandoned,' the reference is usually to the

* See the exhaustive list of symbols in Cabrol, *op. cit.* I. pp. 7–23.

† Irenæus, *adv. Hær.* I. xiv. 6, xv. 1, quoted in *PRE*[3]. In the Egyptian Museum in Berlin there can be seen, on both papyrus and parchment leaves, magical formulæ in combination with AΩ and a cross; they were most probably worn as amulets.

‡ *Bullett. crist.* 1872, 12 ff., t. 2. 2, 3.

§ See the fine plates in F. X. Kraus, *Die christlichen Inschr. der Rheinlande*, I. (Nachtrag); in one case a horse takes the place of the dove; is this an instance of syncretism?

‖ The later form of explanation (1[c]) was perhaps due to this.

* Cf. Gunkel, *Schöpfung und Chaos in Urzeit und Endzeit*, p. 369.

absence of any consciousness of the Divine presence, such as finds expression in the Psalmist's cry, reiterated by Christ upon the cross, 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?' (Ps 22[1], Mt 27[46]). But the condition of one who is abandoned by his friends also involves moral issues, as, *e.g.*, the degree in which he is himself to blame for his isolation. Martensen treats the subject luminously (*Christian Ethics*, vol. i. [Individual] p. 358 ff.) in the chapter which assigns to domestic happiness and friendship a high place among 'the relative goods of life.' But in proportion to the pleasure, of which our friends may be the legitimate sources, is the pain occasioned, when by those friends 'we are morally abandoned . . . because we, in their consciousness, in their love, as it were, die, and are buried; or, what is the same thing, because we are changed in their idea, and become other than we were before, although in reality we are still the same. Such an abandonment is, in many cases, not without guilt on our side; and, had we a richer measure of love, we would in no case so easily feel ourselves lonely and forsaken.'

The foregoing considerations cast light upon questions involved in the experience of devout souls whose complaint is 'Jehovah hath forsaken me, and the Lord hath forgotten me' (Is 49[14]).* On the one hand, expression is repeatedly given in the OT to the truth which lies at the foundation of the Hebrew religion: 'The Lord will not forsake his people for his great name's sake' (1 S 12[22], cf. Dt 31[6], Ps 9[10] 37[28], Is 41[17] 42[16]). Broad-based on the history of God's dealings with Israel was the 'strength and comfort' which 'fell with weight' upon John Bunyan's spirit, as he took courage from the noble words of Sir 2[10] 'Look at the generations of old and see; did ever any trust in the Lord, and was confounded? or did any abide in his fear, and was forsaken?' (*Grace Abounding*, § 62 ff.). On the other hand, the OT recognizes that God's promise is conditional. The message of God's Spirit through the prophets is, 'If ye forsake him, he will forsake you' (2 Ch 15[2], cf. 24[20]). But this forsaking is not to be understood as implying that God would cast off His people for ever (Ps 94[14], Jer 33[24ff.]); even when He seems to have abandoned 'the sheep of his pasture,' a voice is raised beseeching Him to 'have respect unto the covenant' (Ps 74[1. 20]). The question, 'Will the Lord cast off from age to age?' passes into the more hopeful cry, 'Will he not once again show favour?' (Ps 77[7], cf. Is 54[7]).

The biographies of devout believers bear witness, however, to a sense of abandonment by some who can reproach themselves neither on account of their departing from God, nor on account of their doubting His faithfulness. Martensen (*op. cit.* p. 391 ff.) describes this condition as one in which 'the individual is, in a relative sense, left to himself.' In the religious life he distinguishes two states of holiness: one in which 'the blessing of the Divine grace is perceptibly revealed,' and another in which 'grace, as it were, retires and remains hidden.' The latter state is one of 'inward drought and abandonment,' and may be the result of bodily indisposition or mental weariness. At such times 'we should hold to God's word, whose truth and grace are independent of our changing moods and feelings; and remain confident that even in states of deepest abandonment God the Lord is with us, although with veiled face.'

A sense of abandonment by the Father was the experience of Christ during the darkness that shrouded Calvary; to this fact witness is borne in the earliest Gospel, for St. Mark records none of the Seven Sayings from the Cross save this: 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?' (Mk 15[34], Mt 27[46]). Professor Schmiedel accepts this as one of the five 'absolutely credible passages' in the Gospels concerning Christ (*EBi*, vol. ii. col. 1881). Bengel (*Com. in loc.*) lays stress on the preterite tense of ἐγκατέλιπες, and renders, 'why didst thou forsake me?' In his view, 'at that very instant the dereliction came to an end. . . . In the deepest moment of dereliction He was silent.' This suggestion need not be pressed; the cry itself testifies to an actual feeling of abandonment by Him whose spirit never lost its faith in God. The mystery it expresses is unrelieved unless He who uttered it was the sinless Saviour, who in His infinite love was bearing 'our sins in his body upon the tree' (1 P 2[24]). In a lucid exposition of this Word from the Cross, W. L. Walker says: 'Our Lord felt Himself in this supreme moment forsaken, even by His Father. . . . We here see Christ suffering that which is the last consequence of sin—the sense of separation from God. . . . It is in entire keeping with, and indeed appears as the natural culmination of, His thought of giving His life as "a ransom for many," as a sacrifice for sin, or "a guilt-offering"' (*The Cross and the Kingdom* [1902], p. 138 f.). [See art. 'Dereliction' in Hastings' *DCG*].

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* The words 'abandon' and 'abandonment' are not found in the EV, but the essential thought is expressed in such passages as are quoted above.

ABANDONMENT AND EXPOSURE.

THE most helpless of mankind are those who have just begun life, and those who, through old age or infirmity, are about to leave it. Unable to provide for their own needs, they are entirely dependent upon the love or the compassion of others. Individual cases of neglect of infancy and age are not unknown in any country, but in some cases this neglect passes beyond an individual idiosyncrasy and becomes a national custom. When this neglect of children takes the form of removing them from the mother's habitation and leaving them unprotected to perish by starvation, the elements, or wild beasts, or to be rescued by the chance passer-by, it is called *Exposure*. The similar treatment of the aged and infirm is called *Abandonment*.

1. **Exposure.** — For the exposure of children there are several causes, which require to be treated independently. In different countries different causes often bring about the same result.

(1) In most countries the commonest cause of the exposure of infants is *shame*, the child being the offspring either of an unmarried woman or of a union not recognized as regular by the customs of her country. Less frequently, the shame may be occasioned by some malformation of the infant itself, the parents regarding it as a reproach to them to be associated with a monster. In the legends of most countries great heroes are often represented as having been exposed to conceal the shame of their mothers. The exposure may be the act of the mother herself, as in the case of Evadne exposing Iamos (Pindar, *Olympian.* vi. 44 ff.; cf. the exposure of Ion in Euripides' *Ion*, 18 ff.), or it may be ordered or executed by the parents of the mother. Acrisius, in the fragment of Simonides, sends Danae and Perseus together adrift; in Roman legend, Romulus and Remus, the twin children of Rhea Sylvia, are exposed by the orders of the cruel uncle, Amulius (Livy, i. 4). In cases of this kind children are exposed without regard to sex.

(2) Children are exposed from *fear that the means of subsistence will not be sufficient to maintain a larger population.* Here exposure is often only

one of many methods of infanticide. The populations among which it is most common are those which live by hunting or as nomad herdsmen. Thus, amongst the native tribes of South-East Australia it is usual to kill infants by starvation, first by depriving them of food in the camp, and, when they become peevish, removing them to a distance and leaving them to die. The death, however, is assigned to *muparn* (magic) (Howitt, *Native Tribes of S. E. Australia*, p. 748). In the South Sea Islands the same end is achieved by drowning or burying alive (Turner, *Samoa*, pp. 286, 333). The Koniagas, a tribe of Eskimos, abandon girls in the wilderness after stuffing grass into their mouths (Bancroft, *Native Races of the Pacific States of America*, i. p. 81, cf. pp. 131, 566, etc., and see foll. art.). Amongst the Arabs before Muhammad the same system prevailed, and is referred to frequently in the Qur'ān as a practice to be forbidden. Here sons were preserved, but daughters were usually buried alive. 'They attribute daughters unto God (far be it from Him!); but unto themselves children of the sex which they desire. And when any of them is told the news of the birth of a female, his face becometh black, and he is deeply afflicted . . . considering within himself whether he shall keep it with disgrace, or whether he shall bury it in the dust. Do they not make an ill judgment?' (Qur'ān, *Sur.* xvi. 59. 60; cf. also *Sur.* vi. 43. 81; Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*, ch. iv. and especially note C). In tribes of this kind the carrying about of the weak and helpless causes great difficulty; hence many nomad tribes abandon the old as well as expose the young. Where such practices prevail, if the religion of the tribe includes ancestor-worship, daughters only will be exposed. In the patriarchal system only a son can properly present the sacrifice to the dead ancestors. On the other hand, where wives are purchased, a large family of daughters is a profitable possession, and naturally they will not be exposed. Hence in Homeric Greece, where girls are described as παρθένοι ἀλφεσίβοιαι, 'maidens that win cattle,' because cattle were, at any rate originally, the bride-price, it was only boys that were exposed. The only exceptions are cases like the Arcadian Atalanta, who was exposed by the orders of her father Iasios, because he was disappointed that she was not a boy.* In Sarawak it is considered specially fortunate to have a large family of girls, because the successful suitors for the daughters come to live in their parents' house and work on their sugar plantations, while sons expect their parents to help them with the wedding portion, and leave them in order to work for their father-in-law (H. Ling Roth, *Sarawak*, p. 125). Exposure in Sarawak, presumably of male children, is practised by hanging them up in a basket on a tree (*op. cit.* p. 101, note).

(3) Exposure *for other economic reasons.* Amongst those reasons which prevail especially among agricultural populations, perhaps the chief is the serious drain upon family resources in providing dowries for a large number of daughters. In modern India, exposure and other methods of infanticide have on this account been widely employed to reduce the number of daughters. Although the British Government has made every effort to stop the practice, it is doubtful if it has entirely succeeded (H. H. Risley, *Census of India*, 1901, vol. i. p. 115 f.). Exposure of female infants is common in most parts of the East, nowhere more so than in China, where the foundling hospital is a regular institution. The practice was very prevalent at Rome, where, after the Second Punic War, it was considered unnecessary to have a *praenomen* for the daughters of the family, as generally only one, or at most two, were reared. Full discretion in this matter lay with the father, who took up (*sustulit*) the newborn child laid at his feet, if he wished it reared. If he did not, it was exposed. According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (ii. 15), a law of Romulus forbade the exposing of sons or of the eldest daughter. If five neighbours gave their consent after viewing the child, any infant might be exposed. Otherwise exposure made the father liable to various pains and penalties, including the loss of half his property. In historical times this law had apparently fallen into desuetude. A similar practice prevailed amongst the ancient Germans. If the father did not take up the newborn babe from the floor, it was not reared. When once its lips had been smeared with honey or milk, however, it could not be exposed. By tasting of the family food, it became a member of the family. Even so, in Greek legend, Aristaeus becomes a god by having nectar and ambrosia dropped upon his lips by deities (Pindar, *Pythian.* ix. 68). The exposure was carried out by placing the child under a tree or committing it to the waves in a rude boat (Grimm, *Rechtsalterthümer*, p. 456; Gummere, *Germanic Origins*, p. 188 ff.). In a much more remote antiquity the same practice prevailed among the Hindus. In the Yajur Veda mention is made of exposing female children and of lifting up a son* (Zimmer, *Altindisches Leben*, p. 319 f.). Among most tribes, however primitive, even amongst the natives of Australia, it is the father that decides whether a child is to be reared or not, though he is not infrequently beguiled by the mother (Lumholtz, *Among Cannibals*, p. 272).

(4) *Superstitious reasons* may be of various kinds: an oracle, as in the case of Œdipus, that the child will be dangerous to his sire; a dream, either of the mother, as in the case of Paris, whose mother dreamt that she had been delivered of a firebrand which consumed Troy; or of some other relative, as in the case of Cyrus, founder of the Persian Empire, who was exposed by the orders of his maternal grandfather, Astyages, because Astyages dreamt that his daughter gave birth to a deluge which flooded, and afterwards to a vine which overshadowed, all Asia (Herod. i. 107–108). In modern India, till recently, a child was exposed if it happened to be born on a certain day which the professional astrologer declared to be unlucky (Dubois and Beauchamp, *Hindu Manners*[4], p. 606). In many countries twins are looked upon as ill-omened. Even where, as in Uganda, the birth of twins is regarded as lucky, it is considered 'rather a tempting of providence' (Sir H. H. Johnston, *Uganda Protectorate*, p. 878). Even in mediæval Scotland it was considered impossible that the mother of twins should have been faithful to her husband, for two children implied two fathers. Exposure is sometimes employed in order to avert continuous misfortune. In the Kavirondo country and amongst the Nilotic negroes, a woman who has already lost several children leaves the next child on the road at dawn. Presently it is brought back by a friendly neighbour, who is regarded and looked on henceforth as the child's foster-mother (*Uganda Protectorate*, pp. 748, 793). The exposure of emaciated children for a night on a stone altar, which is still practised, though now only surreptitiously, amongst the Greeks of the island of Melos (Bent, *Cyclades*, p. 64), is a survival of the ancient ἐγκοίμησις in a temple to be cured by the god.

(5) *Care of the race character.* The best known example of this is the practice of Sparta, where children regarded as physically unfit were ex-

* The evidence for this, however, is late; Aelian, *Varia Historia*, xiii. 1.

* But see Jolly, below, p. 6 f.

posed in a ravine called Apothetæ near Mt. Taygetus after they had been examined and rejected by the elders of the tribe (φυλή) (Plutarch, *Lycurgus*, c. 16). A similar procedure is recommended by Plato in the *Republic* (461 C and elsewhere; see Appendix IV. to bk. v. in Adam's edition). In a State like Sparta, where, as Aristotle remarks, all its neighbours were enemies (Aristotle, *Politics*, ii. 9. 3), and where the Spartans proper were only a small governing caste amid a hostile population, the need for such a regulation is obvious. But in a less stringent measure the regulation no doubt existed in other States. At Athens, if the father did not celebrate the *amphidromia* for his child, it was not reared. No State save Thebes, and this apparently only at a late date, forbade exposure (Aelian, *Varia Historia*, ii. 7). The child was to be taken to the authorities, who disposed of it to a person willing to undertake to bring it up as a slave, and recoup himself for his outlay by the child's services when it grew up.

(6) *Luxury and selfishness.* Although luxury is supposed to characterize only States which are highly civilized, selfishness can be found in all lands. Among the native Australians, where the children are often nursed for several years, it is inconvenient for the mother to have a younger child on her hands. Such a child is either killed immediately after birth or left behind when the camp is changed (Spencer and Gillen, *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, 1899, p. 51; Howitt, *The Native Tribes of South-East Australia*, 1904, p. 750). In many countries, ancient and modern, an improvement in the standard of living is accompanied by a disinclination to rear children. From the 4th cent. B.C. onwards, this was conspicuous in Greece, and in Rome it formed a theme of discussion for philosophers and satirists. How common the practice of exposure was, may be gathered from the frequency with which the heroines of the New Comedy, who come before us in the Latin versions of Plautus and Terence, are represented as having been exposed. They are, of course, recognized at the critical moment by the trinkets (*crepundia*) which were attached to the exposed infant. Under the Roman Empire, Musonius Rufus (p. 77, Hense) discusses whether all the children born should be reared; and Pliny (*Epp.* x. 74 f.) consults the emperor Trajan as to the legal position of the exposed children reared by others (*θρεπτοί*) in his province of Bithynia. As the Roman comedy shows, the persons who thus reared exposed children were not moved by philanthropy; their aim was to make them slaves or courtezans (cf. *e.g.* Terence, *Heautontimorumenos*, 640; Plautus, *Cistellaria*, ii. 3. 543–630). Only when a child was exposed for superstitious reasons which made its death desirable, was it exposed where it was not likely to be found. As the Athenians exposed children in a pot (*χυτρίζειν*, *ἐγχυτρίζειν*), and as first-fruits were offered to the household gods in pots, it has been suggested that putting a child in a pot was a way of entrusting it to the gods. This is possible, but there is at present no sufficient evidence to prove it.

Besides these categories, exposure may be due, in isolated cases, to other causes, *e.g.* domestic persecution. This led to the expulsion of Hagar and her child from the family of Abraham, and her temporary abandonment of Ishmael (Gn $21^{15ff.}$). Temporary national persecution also may lead to exposure, as in the case of Moses (Ex $2^{2ff.}$). But neither is an example of a practice pursued by a nation in ordinary circumstances.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works referred to in the text, there is an article upon exposure amongst the Indo-Germanic peoples in Schrader's *Reallexicon der idg. Altertumskunde* (s.v. 'Aussetzung'), and a very full article in Daremberg-Saglio's *Dict. des Antiquités grecques et romaines* (s.v. 'Expositio'). For general treatment of the subject see Platz, *Gesch. des Verbrechens der Aussetzung* (Stuttgart, 1876 [mostly modern legal procedure]), and Lallemand, *Hist. des enfants abandonnés et délaissés* (Paris, 1885). See also Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage* (1891), pp. 311–314; Ploss, *Das Kind*[2] (1884), vol. ii. pp. 248–275.

2. **Abandonment.**—Abandonment of the aged seems to arise simply from dread of the food supply running short, or the difficulty amongst nomad peoples of carrying about with them those who are no longer able to share in the work of the tribe or to shift for themselves. The practice, however, does not prevail amongst all wandering tribes. Among the native Australians the aged and infirm are treated with special kindness and provided with a share of the food (Spencer and Gillen, *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, 1899, p. 51). On the other hand, the natives of South Africa in their primitive state abandoned the old. 'I have seen,' says Moffat (*Missionary Labours and Scenes in Southern Africa*, 1842, p. 132), 'a small circle of stakes fastened in the ground, within which were still lying the bones of a parent bleached in the sun, who had been thus abandoned.' Amongst the American Indians of the Pacific coast the old are generally neglected, and when helpless are abandoned (Bancroft, *Native Races of the Pacific States of America*, i. pp. 120, 131, 205, 390, and elsewhere). Among many tribes the duty of looking after the old belongs only to their own descendants. Hence the members of such tribes pray for large families, in order that when old they may have some one to support them (H. Ling Roth, *Benin*, p. 47). In the Qur'ān, Muhammad combines the injunction to be kind to parents with a warning not to kill the children (*Sur.* vi. 150). Amongst the Indo-Germanic peoples, abandonment of the old is mentioned in the Vedas (Rig Veda, viii. 51. 52 [1020]; Atharva Veda, xviii. 2. 34; Zimmer, *Altindisches Leben*, p. 327 ff.). In ancient Persia and Armenia, cripples were left to shift for themselves; and Strabo, who is supported by other authorities, tells us that the Bactrians left the old and infirm to be eaten by dogs; and the Avesta itself recognizes the practice of setting a portion of food by such persons and leaving them to die (Strabo, xi. 11. 3; Vendīdād, iii. 18 [in this case a person ceremonially impure is thus shut up for life]; Spiegel, *Eranische Altertumskunde*, iii. p. 682). The Caspians allowed those over seventy to die of hunger, and exposed their bodies in the desert to wild animals (Strabo, xi. 11. 3). Still more gruesome stories are told by Herodotus (i. 216, iii. 99, iv. 26) of the Massagetæ, of the Padæi (an Indian tribe), and of the Issedones. Even among the Greeks the removal of the old was not unknown. Most remarkable was the law of Ceos, which prevented 'him who was unable to live well from living ill.' By it all over sixty years of age were poisoned with hemlock (Strabo, x. 5–6). Amongst the Romans, sexagenarians are supposed to have been in early days cast over a bridge (the *pons sublicius*) into the Tiber ('Sexagenarii de ponte,' cf. Cicero, *pro Roscio Amerino*, § 100). The northern nations were equally cruel (Gummere, *Germanic Origins*, p. 203). When, however, such a custom prevails in a nation from time immemorial, its action is looked upon as natural, and is borne with resignation. And even in Britain, till recent times, seventy was regarded as extreme old age, and few reached it. In the New Hebrides, Turner found that the aged were buried alive at their own request (*Samoa*, p. 335), and it was considered a disgrace to their family if they were not. Not infrequently persons in delirium or very ill are abandoned by their relatives (H. Ling Roth, *Sarawak*, i. p. 311), no doubt because they are supposed to be under

the influence of an evil power, generally a ghost (Codrington, *The Melanesians*, p. 194).

LITERATURE. — For the Indo-Germanic peoples a general account is given in Schrader's *Reallexicon der idg. Altertumskunde*, *s.v.* 'Alte Leute.' See also G. H. Jones, *Dawn of Europ. Civilization* (1903), 168 ff.; E. Westermarck, *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, i. (1906) 386 ff.; L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution* (1906), i. 349. P. GILES.

ABANDONMENT AND EXPOSURE (American). — 1. The practice of infant-exposure was widespread throughout North America. The usual motive, especially in the North, was the lack of food, and the consequent difficulty of supporting a family. This practice is recorded among the Eskimos of Smith Sound in the extreme north-east of the American continent, where all children above the number of two are either strangled or exposed to die of hunger or cold, without regard to sex. Infanticide, both before and after birth, which is but another form of exposure, is also common, as when the women of the Kutchins, an Athapascan tribe, kill their female children to save them from the misery which their mothers must endure (Ploss, *Das Kind*, ii. 251, 252). Among the Koniagas, a tribe of the Pacific coast, boys were highly prized, but girls were often taken to the wilderness, where their mouths were stuffed with grass, and they were left to perish. Certain Columbian tribes usually treated both children and the aged with kindness, yet abandoned and even killed them in time of dire need, while exposure was not uncommon among the Yulan tribe of Cochimis in New Mexico (Bancroft, *Native Races of the Pacific States*, San Francisco, 1883, i. 81, 279, 566). That this practice is by no means modern, is shown by the fact that the Indians of Acadia in the 17th cent. frequently abandoned their children for lack of time to take care of them, and in Quebec orphans were often exposed. An interesting case is also recorded of a Huron mother who regarded the circumstances associated with her unborn child as uncanny, and therefore procured an abortion. The fœtus proved, however, to be viable and later she took it back, although it grew up to be a 'medicine-man' (*Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents*, i. 256, ix. 28, xiii. 106).

Abandonment of the sick and the aged, sparing neither sex, rank, nor kinship, seems to have been common among the American Indians of all times and localities. In Acadia (New France), those who were exhausted with age or protracted illness were frequently killed, this act being deemed, as it doubtless was in many instances, a kindness. Old men were abandoned to die, especially when sick; but if they did not expire within three days, they were killed by sucking blood from incisions made in the abdomen, and then dashing quantities of cold water on the navel. During this process and at the first desertion the victims wrapped themselves in their mantles and formally chanted the death-hymn. Among the Hurons and Iroquois the sick were left to their fate, and in the latter tribe even husband and wife deserted each other in an illness deemed mortal. Old women were abandoned among the Hurons, and the Abenakis deserted their medicine-men with equal readiness. The custom of abandoning the sick is said to have been especially common among the Algonquins. Not only the old but the young were deserted in time of serious illness, whether the sick were boys or girls. Such desertions were practised with special frequency in time of sudden alarm or removal, although they were also common for the simple reason that the old and sick were deemed a burden, and the *Jesuit Relations* (63 vols., Cincinnati, 1896–1901) abound in pathetic instances (i. 211, 258, 274, ii. 14, 18, 250, iii. 122, iv. 198, v. 102, 140–142, vii. 280, xiv. 72, 152, xv 134, xviii. 136, xix. 100, xxiv. 42, xxix. 84, xxx. 134, xxxi. 196, etc.). As late as the 19th cent. the Utes abandoned the old and sick when they became encumbrances, while aged parents were murdered in most cold-blooded fashion among the Californian Gallinomeros; and in Lower California the aged sick were abandoned, being killed if they survived their desertion too long (Bancroft, *op. cit.* i. 83, 390, 437, 568).

2. In South America, in like manner, the exposure of infants was and is extremely common. Among the Salivas and the Manaos, malformed children are put to death, since their deformity is supposed to be the work of a demon. Guaycuran women under the age of thirty killed the majority of their children, thus seeking to retain the good will of their husbands, who were denied all marital relations during the long period of suckling, and consequently frequently married other wives. The Abipones put to death all but two children in a family, though girls were given preference over boys, since wooers paid large sums for brides, while sons, for this very reason, were a heavy expense to their parents. In Patagonia the parents decided whether to adopt their children or not; and if the resolve was adverse, the infant was either strangled or exposed to the dogs. (See Ploss, *op. cit.* ii. 252–253). The women of the Amazon tribes frequently procure abortion rather than endure the pangs of childbirth (von den Steinen, *Unter den Naturvölkern Zentral-Brasiliens*, Berlin, 1894, pp. 334, 503); and among the Indians of the Paraguayan Chaco fully half the children born are put to death, especially if they are deformed or posthumous, or if their fathers or mothers die about the time the offspring in question are born; while girls, if born before boys, are invariably killed (W. B. Grubb, *Among the Indians of Paraguayan Chaco*, London, 1904, p. 64). The same tribes abandon the sick or bury them alive, the invalid frequently hastening his own end by refusing food (*ib.* p. 41). Abandonment probably prevails more generally in South America, however, than the relatively scanty data would seem to imply.

LOUIS H. GRAY.

ABANDONMENT AND EXPOSURE (Hindu).—The ancient Sanskrit literature of India appears to have preserved some remnants of the time when the *patria potestas* gave the father a right to abandon and expose his children, especially *daughters*. Thus it is stated in the lawbook of *Vasiṣṭha* (xv. 2), that 'the father and the mother have power to give, to sell, and to abandon their son.' More ambiguous is a text in the Yajur Veda, to the effect that 'they put aside a girl immediately after her birth.' It is by no means certain that this 'putting aside' of a daughter is an equivalent for exposing her, as was supposed by some writers. Others explain the term as referring to the delivery of a girl to her nurse or attendant (see Zimmer, *Altindisches Leben*, p. 328; Böhtlingk's art. 'Pflegten die Inder Töchter auszusetzen?,' in *JGOS* xliv. 494 ff.; also Schrader, *Reallexicon*, p. 53). It is true that female infanticide has been a common practice with some castes up to very recent times, and the barbarous custom of widow-burning (*satī*) would seem to show that sentiment could not have stood in the way if it was thought expedient to do away with female children as soon as born. As regards the desertion of *sons*, there are, particularly, the law-texts referring to the rights and position of the *apaviddha*, or son cast off, one of the twelve species of sons that are enumerated and described by Indian legislators. Thus in the Code of Manu (ix. 171), the *apaviddha* is described as one deserted by his parents or by either of them. The old commentator (Medhātithi) adds that the reason of the desertion may be either extreme distress of the

parents, or the committing of some fault on the part of the boy. If some one else takes pity on the helpless child and brings him up, he is reckoned as his adopted child, though taking a rather low rank in the series of secondary sons. The *pālak-putra* or foster son of the present day may perhaps be viewed as a relic of the ancient usage. On the other hand, there seems to have been a strong feeling against abandoning sons or other relatives without a just cause. *Yājñavalkya* (ii. 237) says: 'Whoever, being father and son, sister and brother, husband and wife, preceptor and pupil, abandon each other when not degraded (put out of caste), shall be fined 100 panas.' Analogous rules are laid down by Visnu, v. 113, and Manu, viii. 389. The practice of buying or selling children is specially reprobated (see Āpastamba, ii. 13. 11). The desertion or repudiation of a *wife* is frequently referred to in the lawbooks as a punishment for misconduct on her part, but it appears that in most cases she was not to be deprived of a bare maintenance. In a modern text, the repudiation of a wife for any offence short of adultery is characterized as a practice no longer fit for the present (or Kali) age. The higher Hindu castes of the present day do not admit divorce or repudiation except for very stringent reasons, if at all; but it is common enough among the lower castes, especially those of Dravidian origin, where the marriage tie is very loose. For the supposed abandonment and exposure of *old people*, Sanskrit literature seems to contain no other evidence than a text of the Atharva Veda (xviii. 2. 34), in which the spirits of exposed ancestors are invoked side by side with those buried or burnt. However, the term 'exposed' (*uddhita*) is ambiguous, and may refer either to dead bodies exposed on the summits of hills or to those on trees, according to Persian fashion. Exposure of old people, in a certain way, may be found in the barbarous custom, suppressed by the British Government, of taking persons supposed to be dying to the banks of the Ganges and immersing them in water.

LITERATURE.—Jolly, *Recht u. Sitte*, Strassburg, 1896; Zimmer, *Altindisches Leben*, Berlin, 1879; Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, Berlin, 1894; *Census of India* 1901, *General Report*, Calcutta, 1903.

J. JOLLY.

There is statistical evidence* that in the Panjab female infant life is still culpably neglected in comparison with male; and that, using the term in a wide sense, female infanticide still prevails in that part of India on a large scale, chiefly among the Jats, and, despite the prohibition of the Sikh teachers, especially among those of that caste who profess Sikhism.

H. A. ROSE.

ABANDONMENT AND EXPOSURE (Japanese).—There is no evidence of the existence in Japan of the custom of abandoning the aged. Isolated cases of the practice of exposure of infants occur in Japan, as in other countries, but it has never approached recognition as a general custom. From the myth of the god Hiruko (leech-child), it may be inferred that the abandonment of deformed infants was not uncommon in the earliest times. The *Nihongi* tells us that when this god had completed his third year he was still unable to walk. His parents therefore placed him in the rock-camphor-boat of heaven and sent him adrift. We may compare the stories of Moses and Sargon.

W. G. ASTON.

ABANDONMENT AND EXPOSURE (Persian).—The data concerning the exposure of infants in Persia are scanty. According to the Avesta (*Vendīdād*, ii. 29), all deformities were regarded as the work of the Evil One. It is not impossible, therefore, that deformed children and viable monsters were exposed with more or less frequency; and this is expressly stated to have been the case with Zal, who was exposed by order of his father Sam, because he was born with white hair, which distinctly marked him, in his parent's eyes, as the offspring of Ahriman (*Shah-Namah*, ed. Vullers-Landauer, pp. 131–135). There is, on the other hand, no reason to suppose that such exposure was the rule. Cyrus the Great, in like manner, according to Herod. i. 107 f., was by his grandfather exposed and ordered to be killed because of a dream which prophesied that the infant would be the future lord of Asia. Nor can it be inferred, from the marked preference given in the Avesta to sons rather than daughters (Geiger, *Ostiran. Kultur*, pp. 234, 235), that the latter were exposed, the entire spirit of Zoroastrianism making such a conclusion most improbable. Even in the case of an illegitimate child, it was regarded as a heinous offence to procure an abortion (*Vendīdād*, xv. 5–16). On the contrary, the prospective mother of an illegitimate child must be carefully protected by the man responsible for her condition, lest some harm might come to the fœtus. This undoubtedly implies that, despite sporadic instances of exposure, the desertion of infants was abhorrent to the noblest minds of Persia. The Pahlavi *Shayast la-Shayast*, dating perhaps from the 7th cent., states that the father of children by a concubine 'shall accept all those who are male as sons; but those who are female are no advantage' (xii. 14). This does not, however, imply that female bastards were exposed. In the book of Arda-Viraf the failure of a father to acknowledge his illegitimate offspring condemned them to a piteous life in hell, while at the feet of such a parent 'several children fell, and ever screamed; and demons, just like dogs, ever fell upon and tore him.' The punishments of hell also awaited the mother who destroyed her infant and threw away its corpse, or left it crying for cold and hunger; while those who, in their greed for wealth, withheld their milk from their own infants that they might act as wet-nurses to the offspring of others, likewise suffered punishment in the future life (ed. Haug and West, xlii–xliv, lix, lxxxvii, xciv).

LOUIS H. GRAY.

ABASEMENT.—Abasement in religious experience is closely connected with Adoration and Humility (see these articles). It appears to be essentially relative, and the essence of it to lie in a recognition of the comparative worthlessness of the self in the presence of a superior. In those religions which give great room to prayer and to the sense of God, abasement has always been an important element: its influence is marked in the Hebrew (see, for instance, the penitential psalms), and in all forms of the Christian, *e.g.* in St. Paul's determination to know nothing but Christ crucified (1 Co 2^2), in Luther's conviction that the soul was weak though Christ was strong (letter to Pope Leo X. concerning Christian liberty), in Thomas à Kempis' warning never to esteem oneself as anything because of any good works (*de Imit. Chr.* bk. iii. ch. 4), in Wesley's demand that the sinner should first and foremost empty himself of his own righteousness in order to trust only in the blood of the Redeemer (*Journal*, 8th Sept. 1746).

Extravagances have been common, and in modern times there has been a great reaction. Ibsen, Nietzsche, Walt Whitman, preach in different ways the need of man's 'pride in himself.' A strong common-sense expression of this feeling is given by Jowett:

'The abasement of the individual before the Divine Being is really a sort of Pantheism, so far that in the moral world God is

* Punjab Census Reports, 1881, 1891, 1901; also Sanitary Commissioner's Reports for the Punjab, 1905 § 22, 1904 § 20, 1901 § 14, 1897 § 20, and earlier Reports.

everything and man nothing. But man thus abased before God is no proper or rational worshipper of Him. There is a want of proportion in this sort of religion. God who is everything is not really so much as if He allowed the most exalted free agencies to exist side by side with Him' (*Life of Jowett*, by Abbott and Campbell, vol. ii. p. 151. London: Murray, 1897).

But this should not blind us to the fact that prayer and the religions of prayer seem bound up with the belief that man *depends on* God, and does not merely exist *side by side* with Him. Now, in the last analysis, humility and the abasement that is its intenser form appear as a reflexion in conduct and emotion of this belief. The sense that man does no good thing of himself alone, but always as flinging himself on the Eternal Love, is, in especial, a leading characteristic of Christianity. The repentant Publican is set above the moral Pharisee precisely because he would not attempt to justify himself (Lk $18^{9.\ 14}$).

Even those religions—those systems of aspiration and effort—which do not recognize this kind of dependence, would still find room for some abasement in the recognition of the gap between what the individual is and what he wishes to be. But, from their point of view, why should not a man pride himself on such good as he has already attained? Yet to the religious consciousness of many the presence of this pride would appear to vitiate it all. The theoretic justification for this must lie in the conviction that man does depend for his goodness on something greater than himself. To a certain extent, no doubt, this might be found in the good elements of the order that has produced and surrounds the individual. But the Christian hatred of self-complacency seems to go further still, and to imply a belief that in the very assimilation by the individual of these good elements another power than himself is active.

It would be idle to deny the difficulties in this conception, or to pretend that they have ever yet been solved. The paradox of St. Paul—'Work out your own salvation . . . for it is God that worketh in you both to will and to work' (Ph $2^{12.\ 13}$)—has remained a paradox even for those who maintain it. But conviction of some truth in the paradox is, at bottom, the same as the conviction of Ruskin that, if the Greeks were great at Thermopylæ, greater still were the Hebrews at the Red Sea, trusting not in the resolution they had taken, but in the hand they held (see *Modern Painters*, Part III. § i. ch. 7). F. M. Stawell.

ABBOT (Christian).—'Abbot,' in Latin *abba* or *abbas* (Old Eng. by-form 12th to 17th cent. *abbat*), from the Syriac ܐܒܐ, meaning 'father' (cf. Mk 14^{36}, Ro 8^{15}, Gal 4^{6}), was used in the earliest religious communities for the older or more venerated monks (cf. Jerome *in Gal.* 4^{6} and *in Matt.* 23^{9}, vol. vii. 451, 185, and the *Collationes* of Cassian, *passim*). The superior was not called abbot, but προεστώς, ἀρχιμανδρίτης or ἡγούμενος, and in the West *præpositus* (Cassian, etc.). The prevailing Byzantine term was ἡγούμενος (translit. *igumenus* in Latin), while an archimandrite was often a superior kind of abbot, and this title was also given to various ecclesiastical functionaries (see *Dict. d'Arch. Chrét. et de Lit. s.v.* 'Archimandrite,' 1906). In the East ἄββας appears as a tr. from the Latin, or as an honorific title, *e.g.* in the Acts of St. Maximus Conf. in the 7th century. In the West, however, *abbas* must have become the regular title of the superior of a monastery during the 5th cent., since this sense is taken for granted by St. Benedict in the first half of the 6th cent., and from that period this usage became universal. St. Benedict assumes that *præpositus* will be understood of the second in command, who was later always called prior, even by Benedictines. The name *abbas* is also applied, it seems, by Gregory of Tours to what we should call a rector with many curates, and it was extended in Merovingian times to chaplains of the king, the army, etc. (*abbas curiæ, palatinus, castrensis*, etc.). A layman holding an abbey *in commendam* in the 9th or 10th cent. was called *abbacomes* or *abbas miles*. When considerable dignity had come to attach to the name, the heads of smaller communities were called priors. The Camaldolese branch of Benedictines called their superior *major*, and neither the Carthusians nor any of the orders of friars which arose in the 13th cent., nor any subsequent religious congregation, have ever taken up the title of abbot, though 'abbess' was retained in the second order of Franciscans (Poor Clares). At the present day the Benedictines (black monks), with their branches, the Cistercians, reformed and unreformed, and the black and white canons regular (canons reg. of the Lateran and Premonstratensians) are governed by abbots.

The first mention of an abbess (*abbatissa*) is said to be in an inscription set up by an Abbess Serena at St. Agnes *extra muros* in 514.

Some heads of congregations have the title abbot general, archabbot, abbot president. The Abbot of Montecassino has the honorific title of archabbot, and in the Middle Ages, when head of a congregation, was called *Abbas Abbatum*. A new title, *Abbas Primas*, was given in 1893 to the Abbot of St. Anselmo, Rome (built by Leo XIII.), as president of the new union of all black Benedictines.

The government of an abbot or an abbess is strictly monarchical. Before St. Benedict (*c.* 530) the abbot was the living rule, guided, if he chose, by the traditions of the Fathers of the desert, by the rules of Pachomius, or Basil, or Augustine, or by the customs of Lerins or Marmoutier. From St. Benedict's time (whose Rule was propagated in Italy by Gregory the Great, and became approximately universal soon afterwards) the abbot's government is constitutional, for he is bound by the Rule (*Regula*, cap. 64), which was gradually supplemented by decrees of popes, and of councils, and by regulations like those in England of Lanfranc. When branch congregations were formed (as Cluniacs, Cistercians, Camaldolese, etc.) of many monasteries, or congregations of black monks (as those of Bursfeld, St. Justina, etc.), the Rule was supplemented by *constitutiones* or commentaries on portions of the Rule, and by the regulations enforced by visitors or general chapters. All this applies also *mutatis mutandis* to the government of the canons regular. But the supremacy of the abbot was never seriously weakened, and the monarchical character of abbatial government is the distinguishing feature of the older orders as compared with the later friars, clerks regular, brothers, etc.

As it gradually became customary for many monks to be clerics, it also became the rule for abbots to be priests—in the East from the 5th cent., in the West from about the 7th. A council under Eugenius II. at Rome in 826 made this obligatory (Mansi, *Conc.* xiv. 1007). It seems that by *ordinatio abbatis* St. Benedict meant the 'appointment,' not the 'ordination,' *i.e.* 'blessing' of an abbot. St. Gregory the Great speaks of a bishop 'ordaining' an abbot (*Ep.* ix. 91), and also of the decision as to the ordination of an abbot being made by the abbot of another monastery (*Ep.* xi. 48). The latter had changed his mind and appointed another man in the afternoon of the same day. Gregory orders him to invite a bishop to 'ordain' the monk first designated during the celebration of Mass. St. Theodore of Canterbury orders that an abbot shall be 'ordained' by a bishop, who must sing the Mass, in the presence of two or three of the abbot's (not the bishop's) brethren, *et donet ei baculum et pedules*. This is the earliest form of the abbatial blessing. The Pontifical of Egbert of York (732–766) gives a *consecratio Abbatis vel Abbatissæ*. There are now two forms provided in the Roman Pontifical for the blessing of an abbot, one for an *Abbas simplex*, the other for a mitred abbot. The former appears to be no longer used. The latter is largely modelled on the order of consecration of a bishop, and the officiating bishop is assisted by two mitred abbots.

The blessing of an abbess is permitted to a priest by Theodore.

The form in the Pontifical is simple, but many abbesses have had, and still have, the privilege of being invested with ring and crozier. When temporary abbots were introduced in the 15th cent., the blessing was dispensed with, but Benedict XIV. severely censured the omission to obtain the blessing on the part of abbots elected for life.

At an early date abbots took an important place in ecclesiastical affairs. In the 5th cent. we find 23 abbots signing the condemnation of Eutyches at the council held by Flavian of Constantinople in 448, and these were probably regular members of the patriarch's *σύνοδος ἐνδημοῦσα*. In Spain and Gaul they appear at councils to represent absent bishops, but in 653 ten abbots are found sitting in their own right at a council of Toledo, and they sign before the representatives of absent bishops (Mansi, x. 1222). It became the custom throughout the Middle Ages for abbots to attend councils. At the Vatican Council of 1869 only those abbots who were heads of congregations were invited, naturally without a vote.

Abbots, being the administrators of the temporal goods of their monastery, attained considerable worldly importance. They were often envoys of monarchs and of popes. They sat in Parliaments, ranking in England next after barons. Like barons, the abbots were originally called to Parliament at the good pleasure of the king, but by custom a certain number gained the right of sitting. On the last occasion when the abbots as a body sat in Parliament (28th June 1539), 17 were present. In the first Parliament of Elizabeth, however, Abbot Fecknam of Westminster had a seat and vote, since that abbey had been restored to all its privileges under Queen Mary.

The worldly grandeur assumed by abbots has been frequently censured,—for instance, by St. Bernard. In England their position as great landowners and peers of Parliament necessitated considerable state. The sons of the nobility were sent to be brought up under their care. Monasteries were hotels, and all guests of gentle birth were entertained in the abbot's hall. The Abbot of Glastonbury administered a revenue larger than that of the Archbishop of Canterbury. The Abbot of Bury St. Edmunds had a mint of his own. Yet such a position was not incompatible with personal sanctity, as may be seen in the case of Richard Whiting (Gasquet, *The Last Abbot of Glastonbury*, 1895, p. 56 f.). This external state of abbots lasted in Austria into the 19th cent., and to some extent is still to be seen.

Exemption of abbots from episcopal control became the rule only when they were joined together in congregations, but it was often granted as an exceptional privilege, and early traces of it are found. A council held at Arles, *c.* 455, exempted Faustus of Lerins from the Bishop of Fréjus, so far as the government of his abbey was concerned (Mansi, vii. 907; Duchesne, *Fastes épisc.* i. 124). Westminster is said to have received the privilege from John XIII. (*c.* 970). Some of the greatest English monasteries were never exempt, as Glastonbury, and only five Benedictine houses had the privilege at the Reformation, apart from the Cluniacs, Cistercians, etc. Christ Church, Oxford, still retains its papal exemption from the bishop. Grants of *Pontificalia*, or episcopal ornaments, mitre, ring, gloves, sandals, were made by the pope to the principal abbots (*e.g.* to Westminster in 1276, to the Prior of the Cathedral Abbey of Ely in 1413). These privileges eventually became general, but were limited by a decree of Alexander VII. in 1659. Since then further privileges have been granted or confirmed. In some cases a number of parishes are subject to an abbot, who acts as their bishop, as at Montecassino, Cava, etc. The small diocese once administered by the Abbot of Westminster is still under the dean and chapter, and is independent of the Bishop of London. In the case of such abbots, who are called *Abbates nullius dioeceseos*, permission is usually given to administer confirmation. Since the monastic state was anciently equivalent to the clerical, and the monastic tonsure to the clerical tonsure, it became the custom to allow abbots to confer tonsure and minor orders on their own subjects, and this is still in force. The Second Council of Nicæa (787) permitted *hegumeni* to ordain *lectores* for their monasteries. Abbots were sometimes also allowed to give the subdiaconate, but this is obsolete. The supposed permission of Innocent VIII. to Cistercian abbots to confer the diaconate is too much opposed to the theological opinions of the period to be probably authentic.

The elections of abbots by their monks were often interfered with by the civil power. St. Benedict permits neighbouring bishops or laymen to interfere if a bad man is elected. Charles Martel gave abbeys to his officers; even Charlemagne disposed of them at will. The king's *congé d'élire* had to be obtained for an election in England. In France and elsewhere abbacies came to be in the royal gift. The habit of giving abbacies to seculars *in commendam* in the 8th to 10th cents. unhappily revived in the 15th to 18th. The goods of the community were usually already divided with the abbot, and the latter had a fine house in which to receive guests. When these were in the hands of seculars, the monasteries were greatly impoverished, and suffered much in regularity. The congregation of St. Justina of Padua (afterwards called the Cassinese) introduced abbots elected for a short period in order to avoid the granting away of abbacies. Other congregations followed. The famous French congregations of St. Maur and of St. Vannes and St. Hidulphe preferred to be governed by priors appointed by the general chapter for the same reason. When it had become the rule for all ecclesiastics of good family to possess at least one abbey *in commendam*, it became customary to presume this in all ecclesiastics, and to address them as Monsieur l'abbé. Hence in France, and to some extent in Italy, even youths in seminaries, not yet in minor orders or even tonsured, are regularly addressed by this title, which in the Middle Ages had been considered too dignified for even the generals of the Carthusians or the Friars.*

LITERATURE.—See further under MONASTICISM. For Canon Law, Ferraris, *Bibliotheca*, *s.v.* 'Abbas,' 'Abbatissa,' and the collections of decrees.

JOHN CHAPMAN.

ABBOT (Tibetan).†—The head of the monastery in Tibet is called 'teacher' or *k'an-po* (the literal equivalent of the Sanskrit *upādhyāya*). He is superior to the ordinary monastic teacher or professor (*lob-pön*), and is credited with being endowed, by direct transmission from saints, with the three prerogatives for consecration, namely, spiritual power (*dbang*), thorough knowledge of the precepts (*lung*), and capability of expounding the same (*k'rid*), which confer on him the authority to empower others. He has under him all the common monks, scholars, and novices, and is strictly the only one entitled to be called a Lama. The lady superior of a convent bears the corresponding title of *k'an-mo*; the most celebrated of these is the 'Thunderbolt Sow,' a Tibetan Circe residing at Samding on the inland sea of Yamdok.

LITERATURE.—H. A. Jäschke, *Tibetan-English Dictionary*, 1882, p. 53; W. W. Rockhill, *Journey through Mongolia and Tibet*, 1894, p. 359; L. A. Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, 1895, p. 172, and *Lhasa and its Mysteries*, 1905, pp. 219, 226, 403.

L. A. WADDELL.

ABBOT OF UNREASON.—This title was given in Scotland to one of the mimic dignitaries who presided over the Christmas revels. In England he had the title of Abbot or Lord of Misrule. In France the Abbé de Liesse held the same office. The Abbé de Liesse was the chief of a confraternity established at Lille. He was appointed by the magistrates and the people. He wore a cross of silver-gilt in his hat, and was accompanied by the officers of his mimic household. A banner of rich silk was carried before him, and his duty was to preside at the games which were celebrated at Arras and the neighbouring cities at the carnival. Ducange in his *Glossarium* says he also bore the titles of *Rex Stultorum* and *Facetiarum Princeps*.

* It may be noted here that for centuries in Ireland the abbots had all ecclesiastical power in their hands; the Church was organized not by dioceses but by tribes, and the bishop was in reality a subject of the abbot.

† The 'Abbot' in Buddhism generally will be described under MONASTICISM (Bud.), and the Muhammadan Abbot under MUHAMMADANISM.

At Rouen and Evreux the leader of the frolics was called *Abbas Conardorum*. Another title was *Abbas Juvenum*. In certain cathedral chapters in France he was called *l'Abbé des Foux*. He was the monastic representative of the Boy Bishop, or *Episcopus Puerorum*, whose office is recognized in the service 'in die Sanctorum Innocentium' in the Sarum *Processionale* of 1555. In some cathedral churches he was styled *Episcopus* or *Archiepiscopus Fatuorum*. In churches exempt from diocesan jurisdiction he had the exalted title *Papa Fatuorum*.

In every case these mimic dignitaries represented the highest authority in the Church. They masqueraded in the vestments of the clergy, and exercised for the time being some of the functions of the higher clergy. The clergy themselves gave their sanction to the mimic rites: 'Deinde episcopus puerorum conversus ad clerum elevet brachium suum dicens hanc benedictionem: Crucis signo vos consigno' (*Sarum Process.* fol. xiv). In the York Inventory of 1530 a little mitre and a ring are mentioned, evidently for the *Episcopus Puerorum*.

These titles are all closely connected with the Feast of Fools, the *Festum Fatuorum*, in the mediæval Church. There is little doubt that their privileges go back to much earlier times. The standard authority for the whole subject is the treatise *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la Fête des Foux*, by M. du Tilliot, published at Lausanne and Geneva, 1741. Du Tilliot, with good reason, traces them back to the Saturnalia, the *Libertas Decembris* of which Horace (*Sat.* II. vii. 5 f.) speaks when he bids his slave Davus exercise his annual privilege of masquerading as master:

'Age, libertate Decembri,
Quando ita majores voluerunt, utere, narra.'

Du Tilliot says:

'Car comme dans les Saturnales, les Valets faisoient les fonctions de leurs Maitres, de même dans la Fête des Foux les jeunes Clercs et les autres Ministres inférieurs de l'Eglise officioient publiquement et solennement, pendant certains jours consacrés à honorer les Mystères du Christianisme.'

The policy of the early Church was to divert the people from their pagan customs by consecrating them, as far as possible, to Christian use. The month of December was dedicated to Saturn. The Saturnalia were originally held on Dec. 17. Augustus extended the holiday to three days, Dec. 17–19. Martial (*ob.* 101) speaks of it as lasting five days. Lucian, in the 2nd cent., says it lasted a week, and that mimic kings were chosen. Duchesne (*Origines*, p. 265) allows that the Mithraic festival of *Natalis Invicti*, on Dec. 25, may have had some influence in fixing the date of Christmas in the Western Church. He hesitates as to the Saturnalia. Yet the Christianized festivities of the Saturnalia were probably slowly transferred to the Christmas season by the appointment of the Advent fast. A relic of this still lingers on in North Staffordshire, where the farm-servants' annual holiday extends from Christmas to New Year.

The Boy Bishop (*Episcopus Puerorum*) was elected on St. Nicholas' Day, Dec. 6, and his authority lasted till Childermas, or Holy Innocents' Day. Edward I., in 1299, permitted him to say vespers in the royal presence on Dec. 7. The Santa Claus of to-day still keeps alive the tradition of the Boy Bishop and the Abbot of Unreason.

The concessions of the early Church did not succeed in checking the abuses which had been associated with the Saturnalia. The 'Liberty of December' extended to New Year and Epiphany, covering the whole of the Christmas festival. The 'Misrule' called forth constant protests. Pseudo-Aug. (*Serm.* 265) condemns the dances, which afterwards became a recognized feature of the Feast of Fools: 'Isti enim infelices et miseri homines, qui balationes et saltationes ante ipsas basilicas Sanctorum exercere nec metuunt nec erubescunt, etsi Christiani ad Ecclesiam venerint, Pagani de Ecclesia reverteruntur.' The sermon has been ascribed to Cæsarius of Arles (*ob.* 547). The description of the Feast of Fools at Antiles in 1644, quoted by du Tilliot from a contemporary letter to Gassendi, shows that the custom was too deeply rooted in the same district to yield to the censures of the Church. The excesses connected with the Calends Brumalia and other festivals were condemned in Can. lxii. of the Council in Trullo in 692. The mimic pageantry of bishop and abbot was specially censured in Sessio xxi. of the Council of Basel in 1435:

'Turpem etiam illum abusum in quibusdam frequentatum ecclesiis quo certis anni celebritatibus nonnulli cum mitra, baculo, ac vestibus pontificalibus more episcoporum benedicunt. Alii ut reges ac duces induti, quod festum fatuorum vel Innocentium vel puerorum in quibusdam regionibus nuncupatur, ut alii larvales et theatrales jocos.'

Tilliot also mentions the condemnation of these abuses by the Council of Rouen in 1435, Soissons in 1455, Sens in 1485, Paris in 1528, and Cologne in 1536. In England they were abolished by proclamation of Henry VIII., July 22, 1542, though restored by Mary in 1554.

In Scotland the annual burlesque presided over by the Abbot of Unreason was suppressed in 1555. The guisers, who in Scotland play the part of the mummers in the Christmas revels in England, wear mitre-shaped caps of brown paper, which are derived either from the Boy Bishops or from the Abbots of Unreason. In fiction, Sir Walter Scott has left a vivid picture of the 'right reverend Abbot of Unreason' in the *Abbot*.

LITERATURE.—Du Tilliot, *Mémoires*; Ducange, *Glossarium*; *Sarum Processionale*, 1555; Sir W. Scott, *The Abbot*, with historical note; Chambers, *Book of Days*; Jamieson, *Scottish Dict.*; *Dict. Larousse*.

THOMAS BARNS.

'ABD AL-QĀDIR AL-JĪLĀNĪ.—1. *Life.*—Sīdī 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī, one of the greatest religious personalities of Islām, ascetic, wonder-worker, teacher, and founder of a brotherhood, was born in 471 A.H. [1078 A.D.]. The Muslims make him a *sharīf* of the blood of the Prophet and a descendant of 'Alī; but this claim has little likelihood, for he was probably of Persian origin. His complete name reads Muḥyī ad-Dīn 'Abd al-Qādir, son of Abū Ṣāliḥ, son of Jenki-Dost al-Jīlī or Jīlānī. Jenki-Dost is a Persian name. Historians, such as Abū-l-Maḥāsin (ed. Juynboll, i. p. 698), tell us that his national name (Jīlānī, 'the Jīlānite') came to him not from the Persian province Jīlān, but from Jīl, a locality near Baghdad. Various legends, however, call him 'the 'Ajamī,' *i.e.* the Persian. He came to Baghdad in 488 to study Ḥanbalite law. He learnt the Qur'ān from Abū Sa'īd al-Mubārak al-Muḥarrimī, and polite literature from Abū Zakarya Yaḥyā of Tabrīz. His master in asceticism was Ḥammād ad-Dabbās; he spent long years in the deserts and among the ruins around Baghdad, leading a hermit's life. In 521 he felt himself called back into the world, and returned to Baghdad, where the Qāḍī, Abū Sa'īd al-Muḥarrimī, gave him charge of the school which he had been directing in Bāb el-Āzaj (Le Strange, *Baghdad*, Map viii. No. 29, and p. 296 ff.). His teaching met with very great success; the school had to be enlarged time after time; it was finally completed in 528, and took the name of Sīdī Jīlānī. He spoke there three times a week—twice in the school, on law, and once in his oratory, on mysticism. He drew many hearers from all parts of Mesopotamia, Persia, and even Egypt. It is affirmed that he converted Jews and Christians. He gave legal decisions, which became authoritative among both the Ḥanbalites and the Shāfi'ites. Among his hearers might be mentioned the jurisconsult Muwaffaq ad-Dīn ibn Qudāma al-Maqdisī and the famous mystic Shihāb ad-Dīn as-Suhra-

wardī. He married and had many children—thirteen, according to a tradition reported by Depont and Coppolani (p. 298); forty-nine, of whom twenty-seven were sons, according to another tradition, which seems to be legendary. Many of his children went, during his lifetime, to preach his doctrine in Egypt, Arabia, Turkestan, and India. He died at Baghdad on the 8th of the month of Rabī' ii., 561 A.H. [1166 A.D.].

2. *Legend.*—Besides the above facts, the numerous traditions which have been preserved concerning 'Abd al-Qādir are for the most part of a legendary character. They deal with his austerities, his visions, and his miracles. Among them are the following:—His mother bore him when she was sixty years old. As a nursling he declined to take the breast in the month of Ramaḍān. When he came to Baghdad to study, the prophet Ḫiḍr appeared to him and prevented him from entering the city; he remained seven years before the walls, practising asceticism and living on herbs. When he withdrew into the deserts around Baghdad, he was visited by the same prophet Ḫiḍr, and was fed miraculously. He also received cakes, herbs, and water from the heavens, on his pilgrimage to Mecca. In the desert he was tormented by Satan, who appeared to him under various forms. From time to time he fixed his abode in the ruins of Aiwān Kisrā, the famous palace of Chosroës (Le Strange, *Eastern Caliphate*, p. 34). One tradition makes him spend eleven years in a tower which ever since bears the name of *Burj al-'Ajamī*, 'the tower of the Persian.' One day Satan tried to seduce him by a false vision. While he stood on the seashore with a great thirst, a cloud sailed towards him from which fell a kind of dew. He quenched his thirst with this dew, and then a great light appeared, and a form, and he heard a voice saying to him, 'I allow thee that which is forbidden.' 'May God preserve us from Satan, the accursed one,' replied the ascetic. At once the light gave place to darkness, and the form became smoke. He was asked later how he had recognized the deceitfulness of this vision. He answered: 'By the fact that God does not advise to do shameful things.' While he taught, he was often seen lifted up from the ground; he would walk a few paces through the air and then return to his pulpit. Once, as he was speaking in the Niẓāmīya school, a Jinnī appeared in the form of a snake, which wound itself around his body and exchanged a few words with him. One year the river Tigris rose high, and the inhabitants of Baghdad, fearing their city would be flooded, came to implore the protection of the wonder-worker. Al-Jīlānī advanced to the bank of the river, planted his stick in the ground, saying, 'Thus far.' From that moment the waters decreased. Many of these legends have a close resemblance to those of Christian hagiography.

3. *Works.*—Many works, mystical treatises, collections of prayers and sermons, are ascribed to him. Brockelmann (*Arab. Litt.* i. 435 f.) mentions twenty-four titles of his books still existing in MS. in the libraries of Europe. The two most important are:—*Al-ghunya liṭālib ṭarīq al-ḥaqq*, 'Sufficiency for the seeker of the way of truth,' and the *Futūḥ al-ghaib*, 'The conquests of the mystery.' The latter work contains his mystical teaching, collected by his son 'Abd ar-Razzāq. It was printed in Persian at Lucknow in 1880; in Arabic at Cairo in 1303 A.H. A collection of sermons (*Ḫuṭab*) and of 'Sessions' (*Majālis*) was printed at Cairo in 1302, a *ḥizb* at Alexandria in 1304. In the language of the dervish orders, a *ḥizb* is a kind of service composed in great part of passages from the Qur'ān. Le Châtelier (*Confr. Musul. du Hédjaz*, p. 23, n. 1) cites also a collection of prayers named in Turkish *Evrādi Sherīfeh*, printed at Constantinople in 1869 A.D. A *wird* (plu. *aurād*; Turk. *evrād*) is a short invocation. His remaining works include exhortations, prayers, a treatise on the Divine names, mystical poems, one of which is on the author's being lifted up into the higher spheres. Ibn Taimīya commented on some of his maxims.

4. *Teaching.*—His teaching may be gathered from the above-mentioned works (cf. also the *Lawāqiḥ al-anwār* of ash-Sha'rānī, ed. of Cairo, 1316, i. pp. 100–105) and from the tradition of his order. It is that of orthodox Muslim mysticism. One cannot fail to recognize a certain Christian influence in it, especially in the importance given to the virtues of charity, humility, meekness, in his precept of obedience to the spiritual director, and in the aim held before an ascetic, which is spiritual death and the entire self-surrender of the soul to God. Al-Jīlānī's respect for Jesus was very great, and the tradition of this respect is still kept in his order. His love of poverty recalls that of St. Francis of Assisi. In all parts of the Muslim world the poor put themselves under his protection, and ask for alms in his name. His mystical teaching is expounded in his book, *Futūḥ al-ghaib*. Among the titles of its 78 chapters, the following are characteristic:—Spiritual death; unconsciousness of created things; the banishment of cares from the heart; drawing near unto God; unveiling and vision; the soul and its states; self-surrender to God; fear and hope; how to reach God through the medium of a spiritual director; poverty. The book contains expressions that are altogether Christian. Commending the excellence of becoming dead to created things and to one's own will, the author says, 'The sign that you have died to your lusts is that you are like a child in the arms of its mother; the sign that you have died to your own will is that you wish nothing but the will of God.' Exhorting the soul to search after God, he hits upon an expression of St. Augustine: 'Rise and hasten to fly unto Him.' A little further on, he appropriates the famous comparison of the corpse: 'Be in the hands of God like a dead body in the hands of the washer.' The effect of this self-surrender of the soul is spiritual clear-mindedness and joy.

It is a custom in Muslim mysticism to ascribe the essence of the teaching of the founder of an order to some anterior personages, by means of a chain of intermediaries who go as far back even as Muhammad. Among the predecessors, thus cited, of al-Jīlānī should be named the famous ascetic Abū-l-Qāsim al-Junaid (died A.H. 268).

Certain traditions attribute to our mystic, especially while on his deathbed, some very proud words which contrast with what we have just said about his feelings and his doctrine. They are thus reported by al-Biqā'ī (Goldziher, *Muh. Stud.* ii. p. 289): 'The sun greets me before he rises; the year greets me before it begins, and it unveils to me all things that shall happen in its course . . . I plunge into the sea of God's knowledge, and I have seen Him with my eyes. I am the living evidence of God's existence . . .' Similar sayings are ascribed to many of the great mystics of Islām. It is probable that they are the work of enthusiastic disciples, and that they express only the close union of the mystic with God in a symbolic fashion.

5. *Order.*—The order, or brotherhood, founded by 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī bears the name al-Qādirīya. It has great importance in Islām. After the death of the founder it was led by his sons and then by their descendants. The majority of his sons became disciples of their father, ascetics, missionaries, and men of learning like him. The eldest was 'Abd ar-Razzāq (A.H. 528–603), the youngest Yaḥya (550–600). It was 'Abd ar-Razzāq

who succeeded his father in the leadership of the order, and who built over the tomb of the founder the mosque with seven gilt domes, once celebrated by historians and poets, but to-day lying in ruins (Le Strange, *Baghdad*, p. 348 f.). Along with the order the posterity of al-Jīlānī's children have spread all over the Muslim world. Branches of this family can be found especially in Baghdad, Cairo, Hamāh, and Yā'ū in the district of Aleppo. A Western tradition claims that one son of al-Jīlānī, 'Abd al-'Azīz (532–602), emigrated to Fez; but this is contradicted by another tradition (*Qalā'id al-jawāhir*, p. 54), according to which 'Abd al-'Azīz emigrated only to the province of Jibāl. Baghdad has remained the moral centre of the order. But the jurisdiction of the mother-house does not extend beyond Mesopotamia, Syria, and Turkey. In the other Muslim countries the brotherhood went through a process of disintegration, and the congregations have ceased to be subordinate to the mother-house. The monastery (*zāwiya*) of Baghdad was destroyed by Shah Ismail, and restored by Sultan Sulaiman.

The branches of the brotherhood reach out as far as the Farther East, into the Dutch East Indies and Chinese Yunnan. In India there are many kinds of Qādirīyas. The Qādirīya Akbarīya, the best-known, founded at the end of the 6th cent. A.H. by Shaiḫ al-Akbar Muḥyī ad-Dīn ibn al-'Arabī al-Ḥātimī, forms a distinct order; the *Bī Nawā* are begging *faqīrs*, recruited from the inferior castes of Muslims, and connected with the Qādirīya. In Arabia the brotherhood is powerful. It possesses important *zāwiyas* in Jiddah and Medina, and has thirty *muqaddims* (prefects of congregations) in Mecca. In Constantinople it owns forty houses (*takyas*). It is widespread in Egypt, at Cairo, all along the Nile Valley; and its missions have advanced as far as Khartum, Kordofan, Darfur, Wadai, Bornu, and Sokoto. There are *zāwiyas* at Tripoli and Ghadames. In Algeria and Morocco the order consists of various decentralized congregations whose membership reaches a high figure. 24,000 are reckoned in Algeria (Depont and Coppolani), and in the province of Oran alone two hundred chapels (*qubbas*), under the name of Sīdī al-Jīlānī, are to be found (Rinn). The brotherhood makes great efforts to convert the Berbers to Islām.

The *dhikr* of the order is nothing but the Muslim confession of faith: *la ilāh illā-llāh*, 'There is no God but Allah.' But according to a usage, probably instituted by al-Jīlānī himself, these words are not always pronounced entirely. During the prayer in common, which is accompanied by motions of the head and of the body, and in which the dervishes endeavour to attain a state of ecstatic excitement, after having already pronounced the whole formula, they say only *Allah*, *Allah*! and finally, when the rhythm becomes more rapid, they pronounce nothing but *hū*, *hī*, *hā*, the sound being sustained until loss of breath.

Many orders or brotherhoods have separated themselves from the Qādirite order. The most famous, besides the above-mentioned Akbarīyas of India, are the Rifā'īyas, commonly called the 'Howling Dervishes,' founded by Aḥmad ar-Rifā'a (died A.H. 570), a nephew of al-Jīlānī; the Badawīyas, an Egyptian order, and the 'Īsāwīyas. The other orders are those of the Bakkā'īyas, Jabāwīyas, Jishtīyas, Baiyūmīyas, Dasūqīyas, Maulanīyas, 'Arūsīya-Salāmīyas, Bū-'Alīyas, 'Ammārīyas (cf. MUHAMMADANISM, § viii.).

LITERATURE.—(1) *ORIENTAL: Bahja al-asrār*, by 'Alī b. Yūsuf ash-Shaṭnūfī (A.H. 647–713), Cairo, 1304; *Qalā'id al-jawāhir fī manāqib ash-Shaiḫ 'Abd al-Qādir*, by Muhammad b. Yaḥya at-Tādifī (died A.H. 963), Cairo, 1303. These two are the most important. Brockelmann (*Arab. Litt.* i. p. 435) mentions three other biographies still in MS. Colas translated a MS by Shaiḫ as-Sanūsī, used also by Rinn. Rinn mentions also the *Anwār an-nāẓir*, by 'Abd allah al-Bakrī aṣ-Ṣaddīqī, and the *Nuzha an-nāẓir*, by 'Abd al-Laṭīf al-Hāshimī. Cl. Huart (*Litt. Arab.* pp. 344, 368) mentions that 'Afīf ad-Dīn al-Yāfi'ī (died 1367 A.D.) and Shihāb ad-Dīn al-Qastallānī (died 1517 A.D.) collected a number of interesting stories relating to Sidi Jilāni. The *Natīja at-taḥqīq*, by Muhammad ad-Dilā'ī, lithographed at Fez, A.H. 1309, is translated by T. H. Weir in *JRAS*, 1903, p. 155 ff. His *Life* by Dhahabi is printed, trans., and commented on by D. S. Margoliouth in *JRAS*, 1907, p. 267 ff.

On the mystics generally see the *Nafaḥāt* of Jāmī, Calcutta, A.D. 1859; the *Wafayāt* of Ibn Ḫallikān, Bulaq, 2 vols., A.H. 1299 (Eng. trans., Paris, 1843–1871); a recent Turkish work on the origin of the principal Muslim orders and their doctrines is *Mir'āt al-Maqāṣid fī daf'i-l-mafāsid*, by Ahmed Rifā'āt Effendi, Constantinople, n.d.

(2) *WESTERN:* Rinn, *Marabouts et Khouan*, Algiers, 1884; Depont-Coppolani, *Les confréries religieuses musulmanes*, published under the auspices of M. Jules Cambon, Algiers, 1897; Le Châtelier, *Les confréries musulmanes du Hedjaz*, Paris, 1887; Carra de Vaux, *Gazali*, Paris, Alcan, 1902; Brockelmann, *Gesch. der Arab. Litt.*, Berlin, 1897. Among older publications, Général de Neveu, *Les Khouans*, 1845; Mercier, 'Études sur la confrérie des Khouan de Sidi Abd el-Kader el-Djilani,' *RSA de Constantine*, iii [1869].

BON CARRA DE VAUX.

'ABD AR-RAZZĀQ.—1. *Life.*—The well-known Ṣūfī, Kamāl ad-Dīn 'Abd ar-Razzāq Abū 'l-Ġhanā'im ibn Jamāl ad-Dīn al-Qāshānī (Kāshānī, Kāshī), was a native of Qāshān (Kāshān), a considerable town in the Jibāl province of Persia, situated about half-way between Teherān and Iṣfahān. The year of his birth is not recorded, but Ḥājjī Ḫalīfa (iv. p. 427) gives as the date of his death A.H. 730 = A.D. 1329–30. Elsewhere he gives A.H. 887 = A.D. 1482–83; but this is manifestly an error due to confusion with the historian Kamāl ad-Dīn 'Abd ar-Razzāq of Samarcand. The former date is confirmed by the following anecdote (Jāmī, *Nafaḥāt al-uns*, Calcutta, 1859, p. 557). On one occasion 'Abd ar-Razzāq was accompanying the Emīr Iqbāl Sīstānī on the road to Sulṭānīya, and asked him in the course of conversation what his shaiḫ—meaning Aḥmad ibn Muṣṭafā Rukn ad-Dīn 'Alā' ad-Daula of Simnān—thought of the celebrated Ṣūfī Muḥyī ad-Dīn Ibn 'Arabī. The Emīr replied that Rukn ad-Dīn regarded him as a master of mystical science, but believed him to be mistaken in his pantheistic doctrine touching the unity of the Divine substance; whereupon 'Abd ar-Razzāq retorted that the doctrine in question was the foundation of Ibn 'Arabī's philosophy, that it was the most excellent he had ever heard, and that it was held by all the saints and prophets. These remarks were communicated by the Emīr Iqbāl to his shaiḫ, Rukn ad-Dīn, who stigmatized Ibn 'Arabī's doctrine as abominable and far worse than avowed materialism. Jāmī has preserved the correspondence which ensued between 'Abd ar-Razzāq and his adversary (*Nafaḥāt*, pp. 558–568).

This dispute enables us to fix the epoch at which 'Abd ar-Razzāq flourished, since the shaiḫ Rukn ad-Dīn, his contemporary, was charged with a political mission to the court of Abū Sa'īd, son of Uljaitu, the Mongol sovereign of Persia (A.D. 1316–1335), and we know, moreover, that he composed one of his works, entitled the *'Urwa*, in 1321 (*JA* for 1873, p. 133). This book was read by 'Abd ar-Razzāq, who addressed to the author a letter on the subject (Nūr Allāh of Shustar in the *Majālis al-mu'minīn*, *ib.* p. 135, also British Museum MSS add. No. 26,716, fol. 331 vo. and No. 23,541, fol. 364 vo.). This letter, with the answer of Rukn ad-Dīn, is extant in the library of Trinity College, Cambridge (*Catalogue of the Arabic, Persian, and Turkish Manuscripts in the Library of Trinity College*, by E. H. Palmer, p. 116). Consequently there can be little doubt that the closing years of 'Abd ar-Razzāq's life fall within the reign of Abū Sa'īd, and he may well have died, according to the earlier date mentioned by Ḥājjī Ḫalīfa, in A.H. 730 = A.D. 1329–30.

Concerning the outward events of his life we

possess scarcely any information. Jāmī states (*Nafaḥāt*, p. 557) that he was a disciple of shaiḫ Nūr ad-Dīn 'Abd aṣ-Ṣamad of Naṭanz, through whom, as appears from the articles on that shaiḫ and his teacher, shaiḫ Najīb ad-Dīn 'Alī ibn Buzghush (*Nafaḥāt*, pp. 554 f., 546 ff.), he traced his spiritual descent to the illustrious ṣūfīs Shihāb ad-Dīn 'Umar as-Suhrawardī and Muḥyī ad-Dīn ibn 'Arabī. It is related by Yāfi'ī (*Rauḍ ar-rayāḥīn*, 106th anecdote: p. 65 of ed. of Cairo, 1315) that one day while 'Abd ar-Razzāq was discoursing in the mosque at Medīna, a dervish among his audience withdrew into a corner and gave himself up to meditation. On being asked why he did not listen like the rest, he answered: 'They are hearing the servant (*'abd*) of the Provider (*ar-Razzāq*),* but I am hearing the Provider, not His servant.'

2. *Writings.*—The most famous work of 'Abd ar-Razzāq is his dictionary of the technical terms of the ṣūfīs, *Iṣṭilāḥāt aṣ-Ṣūfīya*. It is divided into two parts, the first on the technical expressions (*muṣṭalaḥāt*), and the second on the so-called 'stations' (*maqāmāt*). 'Abd ar-Razzāq states in his preface that he composed it for the instruction of his friends who, not being ṣūfīs, could not understand the technical terms which he had employed in some of his other works. The *Iṣṭilāḥāt* was largely utilized by Saiyid 'Alī al-Jurjānī, the author of the *Ta'rīfāt* or 'Definitions,' a well-known treatise of the same kind, and the first part has been edited by Sprenger (Calcutta, 1845). The *Laṭā'if al-i'lām fī ishārāti ahl al-ilhām*, of which Tholuck has made use, is also devoted to explaining the peculiar Ṣūfīistic terminology. Some account will be given below of the *Risālat fī 'l-qaḍā wa 'l-qadar* or 'Tract on Predestination and Free-will,' which has been published, analyzed, and translated by Guyard. 'Abd ar-Razzāq wrote several books of less importance, such as his allegorical interpretation of the 38th chapter of the Qur'ān (*Ta'wīlāt al-Qur'ān*) and his commentaries on the *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* of Ibn 'Arabī, on the *Tā'iyat al-kubrā* of Ibn al-Fāriḍ, and on the *Manāzil as-sā'irīn* of 'Abdullāh al-Anṣārī.

3. *Doctrine.*—Like the later ṣūfīs generally, 'Abd ar-Razzāq finds a basis for his system in the Neo-Platonic philosophy as expounded to the Muslims by Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), and Ghazālī. He is a thoroughgoing pantheist, in the sense that he considers the whole universe, spiritual and material, to be an emanation from God. From the Absolute Being, who alone exists, and who is known solely to Himself, there radiates a spiritual substance, the Primal Intelligence (*al-'Aql al-Awwal*) or Universal Reason, which answers to the νοῦς of Plotinus and the λόγος of Philo. This substance contains the types or ideas of all existing things, and by a further process of emanation these types descend into the world of the Universal Soul, the Plotinian ψυχή, where they become individualized and are transmitted to the material world. Here begins an upward movement by which all individual souls are drawn back to the Primal Intelligence and ultimately reabsorbed. 'Abd ar-Razzāq distinguishes three classes of mankind: the slaves of passion (*ahli nafs*) and sense, who are ignorant of God and of His attributes, and say, 'The Qur'ān is the word of Muhammad,' but are saved from hell if they have faith; secondly, the men of intellect (*ahli qalb*), who attain to the knowledge of the Divine attributes by means of reflexion and argument; and, thirdly, the spiritualists (*ahli rūḥ*), who pierce through the veil of plurality into the presence of the eternal Oneness and contemplate God as He really is (*Nafaḥāt*, p. 559 f.).

Much of this doctrine is not peculiar to 'Abd ar-Razzāq, but belongs to the philosophical school of Ṣūfīism. His originality lies in the fact that he combined his pantheistic principles with an assertion of moral freedom which at first sight appears to be incompatible with them. His theory on this subject is set forth in the *Risālat fī 'l-qaḍā wa 'l-qadar* (see Guyard's article in *JA* VII. i. p. 125 ff.), and may be summarized as follows: Everything that exists in the terrestrial world is the manifestation of some universal type prefigured in the world of decree (*qaḍā*), *i.e.* in the Primal Intelligence, and undergoes a process of creation, development, and destruction which is pre-determined in every particular. How then, we may ask, is it possible for men to have any power over actions emanating from a Divine source, and governed by immutable laws? What is the use of commands and prohibitions, of rewards and punishments, if there is no liberty to choose good or reject evil? 'Abd ar-Razzāq, diverging at this point from Ibn 'Arabī, solves the difficulty by declaring that all actions are the result of direct or indirect causes, themselves predetermined, one of which is Free-will itself. In other words, it is foreknown to God and inevitably decreed that every human act shall be produced by the united operation of certain causes, at a certain time, in a certain place, and in a certain form; but it is also decreed, no less inevitably, that the agent shall exercise his free choice (*iḫtiyār*) in the production of the act. Therefore every act is at once fatal and free. The Qadarites (Mu'tazilites), who maintain that men are the authors of their own actions, regard only the proximate causes; while the Jabarites, who hold that all actions are created by God, regard only the remote causes (cf. MUHAMMADANISM, § ii.). Both parties see but half the truth, which, as Ja'far Ṣādiq remarked, is neither absolute fatalism nor absolute liberty, but something between those two extremes. Hence the utility of religion and morals, whereby men are incited to good actions and deterred from evil. The Prophet said of Abū Huraira: 'The pen which has written his destiny is dry,' meaning that what should happen was already fixed; but to the question, 'Why then do aught?' he replied: 'Nay, do it; every one of you has received the capacity of doing that for which he was created.' 'Abd ar-Razzāq next proceeds to deal with the objection that, if our acts are determined in advance and produced, though willingly, by us, we should all have an equal share of good and evil. He argues that the injustice is only apparent, as, for example, in the story of Moses and Ḫiḍr (Qur. xviii. 59 ff.), and that 'whatever is, is right'; for if God could have created a better world, He would have done so. Moreover, the distinction of good and evil is essential to the perfection of the Divine scheme, which demands all possible varieties of aptitude, disposition, and endowment. If the beggar were a sultan, and if the ignorant knave were wise and virtuous, the harmony of the universe would be destroyed. None is responsible for his natural deficiencies—God pardons an ugly man for not resembling Joseph, the Muslim example of masculine beauty, or a wicked man for not behaving like Muhammad; but those are justly condemned who follow their evil bent in defiance of the promptings of reason and religion. As regards the future life, all shall receive such retribution as they deserve, and shall enjoy that degree of felicity of which each is capable according to his spiritual rank. 'Abd ar-Razzāq affirms that the wicked shall not suffer eternal punishment, though he adds the saving clause, 'unless God will otherwise.'

LITERATURE.—See, in addition to the references in the article, Tholuck, *Die speculative Trinitätslehre des späteren Orients*, Berlin, 1826, pp. 13 ff., 28 ff. [extracts from the *Laṭā'if al-i'lām*, with German translation: see Dozy's *Catalogue of the Oriental MSS in the Library of the University of Leyden*, vol. i. pp.

* *Ar-Razzāq*, 'the Provider,' is one of the names of Allāh.

86–87]. Von Hammer published an analysis of the second part of the *Iṣṭilāḥāt aṣ-Ṣūfiya* in the *Jahrbücher der Literatur*, vol. lxxxii. p. 68. See also art. on 'Abd al-Razzāḳ by D. B. Macdonald in *Moh. Encye.* REYNOLD A. NICHOLSON.

ABDUCTION.—In English law abduction is a term usually, though not exclusively, applied to the taking away or detention of a girl under twenty-one years of age against the will of her parents or guardians; or the taking away and detention by force of a woman of any age with intent to marry or carnally know her, or to cause her to be married or carnally known (*Criminal Law Amendment Act*, 1885). The penalty for such an offence may be either a period of penal servitude not exceeding fourteen years, or a period of imprisonment not exceeding two years. Crimes of this kind are now comparatively rare: in England the number tried at Sessions and Assizes during the ten years ending 1904 amounted only to an annual average of thirteen (*Criminal Statistics*, 1904, p. 29).

It is to be noted that abduction, which is now regarded as a serious crime among all civilized communities, is probably a survival of one of the most primitive forms of marriage, namely, marriage by capture. This primitive form of marriage relationship still prevails among some uncivilized peoples in various parts of the world; it is, in fact, a customary form in which marriage is contracted, and even among communities which have reached a certain stage of culture, as, for instance, the South Slavonians, marriage by abduction was in full force at the beginning of the 19th century. Our Teutonic and Scandinavian ancestors regularly resorted to the forcible abduction of women for wives, and war was often carried on among them for the purpose of capturing wives. The same custom prevailed in the early stages of Greek life, and the Romans of the heroic age were often obliged to resort to surprise and force to secure wives for the community.

Distinct traces of the same custom are to be found in Old Testament literature. The tradition is handed down in the Book of Judges that the men of the tribe of Benjamin were supplied with wives from the virgins who had been captured as the result of a war upon the inhabitants of Jabesh-Gilead (Jg 21^{12}); and when these did not suffice, the sons of Benjamin in their search for wives made a raid upon the daughters of Shiloh, when they were celebrating an annual religious festival, and carried them off (v.$^{19ff.}$) when they came out to dance.

Among some races abduction was the ordinary legal method of procuring a wife, and the parents of the abducted woman were liable to punishment if they attempted to get back their daughter. Among other races abduction led to blood feuds, and it is possible, as Herbert Spencer suggests, that the fear of vengeance led to the offer of compensation by the abductor, and prepared the way for the more advanced matrimonial custom of marriage by purchase. After the decay of marriage by capture, many traces of it still remained in marriage customs and ceremonies. In some cases the bridegroom is expected to go through the form of carrying off the bride by stratagem or force; in other cases the bride conceals herself in a hiding-place, and has to be discovered by her future husband; in some marriage ceremonies it is considered a point of honour with the bride to resist and struggle, no matter how willing she may be to enter into the marriage compact. With the advance of civilization, and more especially in those forms of society where marriage became a matter of mutual consent, and in this way assumed an ethical character, abduction, from being a tolerated custom, descended to the position of a crime. In Chinese legislation abduction is a capital offence, and a marriage taking place as the result of it is null and void. The code of Justinian also nullifies a marriage of this kind. The Church, although condemning the perpetrator of abduction to severe spiritual pains and penalties, refrained till the 9th cent. from regarding the marriage as invalid, but at that period ecclesiastical law was brought into conformity with the jurisprudence of Justinian. Innocent III., however, made the legality of the marriage dependent on the consent of the abducted woman, and the Council of Trent adopted a somewhat similar principle. It declared that, so long as the woman was in the power of the abductor and unable to exercise the freedom of her will, abduction was an *impedimentum*, but if she regained her liberty and freely became a consenting party, the marriage ceased to be invalid. The abductor incurred the penalty of excommunication. The growth of the ethical conception of marriage as a matter of free will and mutual consent on the part of persons who have arrived at the age of maturity, necessarily led to the reprobation of abduction as an act of force or fraud, and involved the enactment of the pains and penalties which are now attached to it by the criminal jurisprudence of civilized peoples. See also MARRIAGE, WOMAN.

LITERATURE.—J. F. M'Lennan, *Primitive Marriage* (1865); H. Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, vol. i. (1877); Edward Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage* (1891); A. E. Crawley, *The Mystic Rose* (1902); A. H. Post, *Grundriss der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz* (1894); C. H. Letourneau, *Condition de la Femme dans les diverses races et civilisations* (1903); L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution* (1906). W. D. MORRISON.

ABELARD.—1. Life.—Master Peter, surnamed *Abailard*,* the commanding figure in the intellectual movements of the 12th cent., was born at Le Pallet (*Palatium*)† in Brittany, a castle 11 miles S.E. from Nantes, about the year 1079. His parents were nobles, whose piety led them in later life to enter the monastic life. Abelard, though the eldest son, renounced his claims, that he might the better devote himself to learning. 'I prefer,' he said, 'the strife of disputation to the trophies of war.' After studying for a while under the extreme nominalist Roscelin, probably at Locminé near Vannes, and trying, though without avail, to learn mathematics under Theodoric of Chartres (Poole, *op. cit.* 365, 115), Abelard was at last attracted to the Notre Dame of Paris by the fame of its master, William of Champeaux, whose crude realism soon provoked Abelard, though not yet twenty, to open combat. The duel, protracted through years, resulted at length in the overthrow of the older man's reputation, and the installation for a while of Abelard as an independent master. When expelled from the Notre Dame by the cathedral authorities, at the instigation of William, Abelard took refuge first at Melun, afterwards at Corbeil, and finally at St. Geneviève, at that time outside the city and free from the jurisdiction of the cathedral. This abbey of secular canons of somewhat lax life thus became the headquarters of philosophic teaching at Paris, round which gathered in the next generation the famous University (Rashdall, *Univ. in M. A.* i. ch. 5).

The next encounter of Abelard with authority was even more revolutionary. Desirous of attaining distinction not merely, as hitherto, in dialectics, but also in theology, perhaps under the influence of the religious revival which led his mother Lucia, whom he visited at this time, to withdraw

* This spelling would seem more nearly to correspond to the original form (see Poole, *op. cit.* 137 n.). For its proposed derivations see Ducange, *s.v.* 'baiare' (cf. Poole, *op. cit.* 364), and the pun on the Fr. *abeille* below. Cf. also Rémusat, *op. cit.* i. 14 n.

† Hence the name by which he was called, *Peripateticus Palatinus* (John of Salisbury, *Metal.* ii. 10).

into a nunnery, Abelard, at the age of thirty-four, put himself under the most famous theologian of the day, Anselm of Laon (*c.* 1113, Deutsch, *op. cit.* 30 n.). The venture, whether due to religious impulse or to ambition, was not a success. A few lectures convinced Abelard that he would find little fruit 'on this barren fig-tree.'

'Anselm,' continues Abelard, 'was that sort of man that if any one went to him in uncertainty, he returned more uncertain still. He was wonderful to hear, but at once failed if you questioned him. He kindled a fire not to give light, but to fill the house with smoke' (*Hist. Cal.* c. 3).

Abelard soon shocked his fellow-students by expressing the opinion that educated men should be able to study the Scriptures for themselves with the help of the 'glosses' alone. (As a matter of fact, the 'gloss' in universal use was his tutor Anselm's amended form of the *Glossa Ordinaria* of Walafrid Strabo († 849) [Poole, *op. cit.* 135 n.]). In proof of his view, he gave, at their request, a series of lectures on *Ezekiel*. Such was his success, if we may accept his own statement, that it was only by expelling him from Laon as an unauthorized teacher, as in theology he certainly was, that the authorities were able to check the rush to his classroom. 'Anselm,' says Abelard, in a characteristic sentence, 'had the impudence to suppress me' (*Hist. Cal.* cc. 3, 4).

On his return to Paris, Abelard resumed his lectures, though whether in the cathedral or in St. Geneviève is uncertain. Scholars from every land (Fulk of Deuil, *Ep. ad Abœlardum* in Migne, *PL* clxxviii. 371, gives an interesting catalogue) hastened to sit at the feet of this wonder of the age—philosopher, poet, musician, and theologian in one. The Church smiled on his success, and appointed him, though not yet a sub-deacon, a canon of Notre Dame (Poole, *op. cit.* 145 n.; Rémusat, i. 39 n.). Abelard had reached the zenith of his fame. Henceforth the story of his life is one of 'calamity,' not the least element in which was his own moral downfall, the conscious deliberateness of which, however, in our judgment, he characteristically exaggerates in his later reminiscences (*Hist. Cal.* c. 6; cf. Rémusat, i. 49, as against Cotter Morison, *St. Bernard*, 263). Into the romance of his connexion with Heloise (Heloïssa = Louise) we need not enter. The repetition of this well-known story distracts attention from the real greatness of Abelard in the history of thought. In spite of the protests of Heloise that 'Abelard was created for mankind, and should not be sacrificed for the sake of a single woman,' Abelard privately married the woman he had seduced, and, when the secret was out, removed her to the convent of Argenteuil, the discipline of which was very lax. In Abelard's opinion, as reported for us by one of his students, marriage was lawful for such of the clergy as had not been ordained priests (*Sententiæ*, c. xxxi.; cf. Poole, 147 n.). We draw a veil over the story of the revenge of Fulbert, his wife's uncle. Abelard in an agony of soul and body fled to St. Denys, while Heloise, on his demand, tried to transfer her passions to more spiritual objects, and took the veil at Argenteuil, chanting, as she did so, a verse out of Lucan's *Pharsalia* (c. 1119). Their boy, to whom the parents had given the curious name of Astrolabe, was left with Abelard's sister, Denys (*Hist. Cal.* c. 8. For his career see Rémusat, i. 269).

Abelard found the abbey of St. Denys worldly and dissolute. He retired in disgust to a cell of the house in Champagne, the exact location of which is a little uncertain (*Recueil*, xiv. 290 n.; Rémusat, *op. cit.* i. 73 n.; Poole, *op. cit.* 156 n.), and opened a school of theology. Very soon the throng of his students made it difficult to procure either food or shelter. His lectures were as daring as they were brilliant. In his *Tractatus de Unitate et Trinitate Divina*, a work recently discovered and edited by Dr. Stölzle (Freiburg, 1891), and afterwards recast into his *Theologia Christiana*, he discussed the great mystery. His line of thought may be gathered from his position: a doctrine is not believed merely because God has said it; but because we are convinced by reason that it is so (cf. *Int. ad Theol.* ii. 18). We need not wonder that he was summoned by the legate, Cardinal Cuno of Preneste, to answer for his teaching before a Synod at Soissons (1121) at the instance, curiously, of his first master, the aged Roscelin (on this see Rémusat, i. 81 n.), and of two rival masters of theology, Alberic of Rheims and Lotulf of Novara, the leading spirits in his former expulsion from Laon. The charge against him of Sabellianism seems to have had little justification (Rashdall, i. 53; Deutsch, 265). In reality the chief cause of offence lay in his appeal to reason. According to Abelard, the Synod, without either reading or inquiring, in spite also of the efforts of bp. Geoffrey of Chartres to secure an adjournment, 'compelled me to burn the book with my own hands. So it was burnt amid general silence.' He was not allowed to justify his orthodoxy. A copy was handed to him of the Athanasian Creed, 'the which I read amid sobs and tears as well as I might.' He was then sent to St. Medard, a convent near Soissons, which had acquired the reputation of a penitentiary through the stern discipline of its abbot Geoffrey and his frequent use of the whip (*Hist. Cal.* cc. 9, 10). 'Good Jesus,' cried Abelard in his distress, 'where wert Thou?' There he suffered much from the zeal of its prior, the rude but canonized Goswin (*Recueil des historiens des Gaules*, xiv. 445), who had previously come into conflict with him at St. Geneviève, 'as David with Goliath' (*ib.* 442). (The student should note that the records of the Synod of Soissons have been lost. We are dependent on Abelard, Otto of Freising, and St. Bernard).

Abelard was soon permitted to return to St. Denys. There his love for truth overwhelmed him in a new calamity. He had been led by Bede (*Expos. in Acts*, xvii. 34) to doubt whether the foundation was indeed due, as the monks proclaimed, to Dionysius the Areopagite. Characteristically Abelard 'showed the passage in a joke to some of the monks.' Alarmed by their threats of handing him over to the king, the patron of the abbey, Abelard fled by night to St. Ayoul's, a priory near Provins in Champagne. Efforts were made to secure his return, if necessary by force. He himself became willing to explain away the authority of Bede (Deutsch, *op. cit.* 38, for a defence of Abelard). Fortunately at this stage abbot Adam of St. Denys died (Feb. 19, 1122). He was succeeded by the famous Suger (1081–1152), at that time not the saint and reformer he became later through the influence of St. Bernard (1127), but one of the king's trusted ministers. At the instance of certain courtiers, Suger gave permission to Abelard to seek any refuge he liked, provided he did not become the subject of any other monastery. Abelard thus became a hermit, or unattached member of the house. But his eager pupils soon found out his retreat. His hut of wattles and stubble 'in a solitude abandoned to wild beasts and robbers' on the Ardusson, near Troyes, became the crowded monastery of the Paraclete. 'The whole world,' wrote Abelard, 'is gone out after me. By their persecutions they have prevailed nothing.' Nor was his monastery one to escape suspicion. It was rather a school of philosophers, where disputations took the place of constant devotions, where there were neither vows nor rigid rules. The very title of Paraclete, 'the Comforter' of his sad life, was an innovation; 'dedications should

be either to the Trinity, or to the Son alone' (*Hist. Cal.* c. 11). That Abelard maintained strict order among his flock is shown, however, by a curious surviving fragment of verse (Rémusat, i. 111).

In 1125, Abelard was invited to be the abbot of the lonely monastery of St. Gildas de Rhuys, near Vannes, the oldest monastery in his native Brittany. Abelard accepted, either urged by his fears of further councils (for Clairvaux, the monastery of the ever vigilant St. Bernard, was at no great distance from Paraclete; while he dreaded also an attack from Norbert of Magdeburg, the founder of the Premonstratensians), or in one of his frequent moods. 'God knows,' he writes, 'that at times I fell into such despair that I proposed to myself to go off and live the life of a Christian among the enemies of Christ.' His life there for the next six, or possibly eight, years (Poole, 158 n.), was one of almost unrelieved misery. The abbey was poor in resources, shameless in its depravity; the monks unscrupulous in their determination to get rid of any reformer. They tried to poison Abelard, first in his food, then in the cup of the Eucharist. After several abortive attempts, Abelard succeeded in flight. But Paraclete was no longer open to him. In 1129 he had formally handed it over—with the added sanction (Nov. 28, 1131) of a Bull, which he had obtained from Pope Innocent II. on his stay at Morigny, near Etampes (*Recueil*, xii. 80)—to Heloise 'the prioress, and the other sisters in the oratory of the Holy Trinity.' Heloise had been expelled from Argenteuil in 1128 (*Recueil*, xii. 215) by the mingled rapacity and reforming zeal of Suger, who had made good at Rome the claims of St. Denys to the convent.

The movements of Abelard for the next three or four years are a little uncertain, the more so as he seems to have maintained the rank and title of abbot of St. Gildas. Probably he lived near Paraclete, engaged in collecting and publishing his writings, including his *Historia Calamitatum*, and in resolving for Heloise the various problems which arose in the establishment of Paraclete as a nunnery. To this period belongs also his famous correspondence with Heloise. To pass from these impassioned letters to the scholastic trifling of many of the *Problemata Heloissæ* is chiefly of interest as a study in repression. He resumed also his teaching at St. Geneviève, though perhaps fitfully. From the enthusiastic description of John of Salisbury in 1136 we learn that the master had lost none of his power (*Metalogicus*, ii. 10, 'contuli me ad peripateticum palatinum'). But for this mention, Abelard's history at this time would be almost a blank. We know, however, that about this date Arnold of Brescia attached himself to Abelard.

When next Abelard appears before us, he is at fatal theological strife with St. Bernard, whom he had first met at Morigny when in quest of the papal grant of the Paraclete (Jan. 20th, 1131). The differences of the two men were fundamental, of the kind that no argument or personal intercourse can remove. That Bernard was a realist goes without saying. Realism in those days was almost identical with orthodoxy. But this was not the difference. The two were representatives of opposing forces. Abelard summed up in himself the spirit of a premature revolt against unreasoning authority. Bernard, the last of the Fathers, was the supreme representative to the age of all that was best in the old faith: a reformer in morals and life, a rigid conservative in creed and ritual. Abelard, profoundly religious in his way, was the representative of a creed full of dry light and clear of cant, but destitute of spiritual warmth; and which had shown, both at St. Denys and St. Gildas, little power in turning men from their sins to the higher life. With all his narrowness of intellectual vision compared with Abelard, put St. Bernard down at St. Gildas, and that abode of loose livers would have felt at once the purifying power of his zeal. Bernard's was that baptism with fire which not only cleanses but warms; but of this the cold, subtle, intellectual religion of Abelard knew little or nothing. To Bernard—

'Faith is not an opinion but a certitude. "The substance of things hoped for," says the Apostle, not the phantasies of empty conjecture. You hear, the substance. You may not dispute on the faith as you please, you may not wander here and there through the wastes of opinion, the byways of error. By the name "substance" something certain and fixed is placed before you; you are enclosed within boundaries, you are restrained within unchanging limits' (*Tractatus de erroribus Abælardi*, iv. 9).

Abelard, on the contrary, argued that reason was of God, and had, as philosophy showed, found God. He argued that 'he that is hasty to trust is light-minded' (Sir 19[4]). Conflict between the two was inevitable; it had already broken out. In one of his letters, Bernard inveighs with his customary rhetoric against 'Peter Abelard disputing with boys, conversing with women . . . who does not approach alone, as Moses did, towards the darkness in which God was, but advances attended by a crowd of disciples' (Bernard, *Ep.* cccxxxii.). On his part, Abelard had attacked the saint for preferring the usual form of the Lord's Prayer to that in use at Paraclete (*τὸν ἄρτον τὸν ἐπιούσιον*, which Abelard translates *supersubstantialem*; see Abelard, *Ep.* x. in Migne, *op. cit.* col. 337). Nor would the attachment to Abelard of his former pupil, the daring revolutionary Arnold of Brescia, tend to lessen the suspicions against him.

The two representatives of systems whose conflict from the nature of things is as inevitable as it is unending, were now to meet in fierce combat at Sens, in the province of whose archbishop both Paris and Clairvaux lay. The challenge seems to have come from Abelard; for we may dismiss as fiction the statement of Bernard's biographer, Geoffrey of Auxerre, that Bernard privately visited Abelard and secured his repentance (*Recueil*, xiv. 370). Abelard felt the need of publicly clearing himself from the charges of heterodoxy brought against him by William of St. Thierry in collusion, as some think, with Bernard himself (Bernard, *Ep.* cccxxvii.). In this challenge Abelard once more shows that neither misfortune nor years had taught him wisdom. 'He entered the lists against authority where authority was supreme—in a general council. At issue with the deep devotional spirit of the age, he chose his time when all minds were excited by the most solemn action of devotion—the Crusade: he appealed to reason when reason was least likely to be heard' (Milman, *Latin Christianity*, iv. 355). His one advantage would appear to have been that Henry le Sanglier, the archbishop of Sens, had a grudge against Bernard (Rémusat, i. 210–211). Perhaps for this reason Bernard at first was unwilling to come to the duel. Such contests, he pleaded, were vain; the verities of faith could not be submitted to their decision (*Ep.* clxxxix. 4). At length Bernard yielded to the representations of his friends and the summons of his metropolitan, and set out for Sens, Whitsuntide 1141 (for date, not 1140 as Poole, Rémusat, see Deutsch, *Die Synode v. Sens*, Berlin, 1880). Hardly had the council opened (June 4), and Bernard demanded the recital of Abelard's heresies, than Abelard, whether from characteristic irresolution, fear of the people of Sens, loss of nerve, or revulsion of feeling, appealed from the very tribunal he had chosen to the judgment of the Pope, and left the assembly to mumble out over its wine-cups its *condemnamus*, already decided upon, it seems, on the previous day (Berengar of Poictiers, *Apologeticus pro Magistro* in Migne, *PL*

clxxviii. col. 1857 ff.; to be read with caution). The folly of Abelard's appeal is shown by the haste with which (July 16, 1141) Pope Innocent II. ratified the sentence of Sens, largely as the result of the invectives of Bernard against 'the French bee' (*abeille*) and 'Goliath's weapon-bearer, Arnold of Brescia' (*Epp.* clxxxviii., cxcii., cxciii., cccxxxi.–cccxxxvi., cccxxxviii., Poole, 166 n.), who seems, in fact, to have appealed to the Pope, even before the condemnation of Abelard—a matter scarcely to the credit of Bernard (Rémusat, i. 223. For the condemnation see Migne, *PL* clxxix. cols. 515–517. The records of Sens have not been preserved).

Abelard had appealed unto Cæsar, but it was before a different tribunal that he was to stand. After lingering some days in Paris, he set off for Rome, but on his way old age came upon him suddenly; so in the monastery of Clugny, 'renouncing the tumult of schools and lectures, he awaited the end.' Through the efforts of the abbot, Peter the Venerable, Abelard was reconciled to St. Bernard (see possibly his *confessio*, Migne, *op. cit.* 105). His increasing weakness led to his removal to the dependent priory of St. Marcel at Chalons-sur-Sâone. There, in the spring of 1142 (April 21), as the abbot wrote to 'his dear sister,' the sorrowing Heloise:—

'The advent of the Divine Visitor found him not sleeping, as it does many, but on the watch. . . . A long letter would not unfold the humility and devotion of his conversation while among us. If I mistake not, I never remember to have seen one so humble in manners and habit. Thus Master Peter finished his days, and he who throughout the world was famed for his knowledge persevered in meekness and humility, and, as we may believe, passed to the Lord' (Peter the Venerable, *Ep. ad Heloissam*, Migne, *PL* clxxix. col. 847 ff.).

His body was secretly conveyed by Peter to the Paraclete, and buried in the crypt of the church. Heloise survived his death 21 years, and was buried near him; not, however, until Nov. 6, 1817, did they rest together in Père Lachaise ('ἀεὶ συμπεφυλεγμένοι,' Rémusat, i. 268).

2. Influence.—Abelard was no heretic, nor was his a deathbed repentance. He always maintained that he was the devoted son of the Church. He was, in the verdict of Peter the Venerable, 'ever to be named with honour as the servant of Christ, and verily Christ's philosopher' (Petrus Ven. *ut supra*). In his last letter to Heloise, Abelard had pleaded: 'I would not be an Aristotle if this should keep me away from Christ' (Migne, *PL* clxxviii. col. 375). He owes his importance not to his heresies, but to his demand for reverent, though thorough, inquiry into matters of religion. Modern Catholics have no hesitation in saying that both the Synods, Soissons and Sens, were conspicuous for zeal rather than knowledge. It is well known also that the work of his disciple, the famous *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, a work that is largely the *Sic et Non* in a more reverent form, became the accredited textbook in theology, the very canon of orthodoxy of the later Middle Ages, though many of its views were those for which Abelard had been condemned. But we need not marvel at the misfortunes of Abelard. In part they were the results of an ill-balanced judgment, always in extremes, in part the necessary outcome of his real greatness.

For Abelard was so great intellectually, so completely in advance of his age, both in the extent of his knowledge and the width of his outlook, that his positions were bound to seem heterodox to a generation that leaned wholly on the past. Abelard, in fact, belonged to the future. The very spirit of Protestantism is contained in his declaration that the 'doctors of the Church should be read not with the necessity to believe, but with liberty to judge' (*Sic et Non*, prol. in Migne, *op. cit.* p. 1347). We seem transported to the 20th cent. when Abelard claims that the interpretation of Scripture may err or the text be faulty (*l.c.*). In the preface to his *Sic et Non*—a collection of contradictory opinions from the Fathers on all the leading disputes of theology, the prologue of which was probably written not later than 1121 (Deutsch, 462)—he lays down a defence of all criticism: 'By doubting we are led to inquire, by inquiry we perceive the truth.' Of those who argue that we must not reason on matters of faith, Abelard asks:

'How, then, is the faith of any people, however false, to be refuted, though it may have arrived at such a pitch of blindness as to confess some idol to be the creator both of heaven and earth? As, according to your own admission, you cannot reason upon matters of faith, you have no right to attack others upon a matter with regard to which you think you ought yourself to be unassailed' (*Introd. Theol.* ii. c. 3, Migne, *op. cit.* col. 1050).

The dilemma of unreasoning pietism has never been better exposed.

The circumstances of the times flung Abelard into conflict with Bernard. Intellectually, the only foeman worthy of his steel would have been Anselm of Canterbury. At first sight there seems to be between these two philosophers an impassable abyss, unconsciously summed up by Anselm in the preface to his *Cur Deus Homo*. Some men seek for reasons because they do not believe; we seek for them because we do believe! 'This is my belief, that, if I believe not, neither shall I understand' (*credo ut intelligam*). The rule of Abelard is the exact opposite. He argues that men believe not because of authority but because of conviction. Doubt is his starting-point, reason his guide to certitude. But a deeper study reveals that the differences between the two may be exaggerated, as in Abelard's own generation they certainly were. Abelard owns that the highest truths of theology stand above the proof of our understanding; they can only be hinted at by analogies, as, for instance, his favourite analogy of the seal and the Trinity. But through knowledge faith is made perfect (Deutsch, *op. cit.* 96 ff., 433 ff.). Anselm was no less anxious to satisfy reason than Abelard, only he wanted to make sure of its limits before he began. Thus the difference between the two great thinkers was one rather of order of thought than real divergence. If the chronological order be regarded, Anselm is right; if the logical, Abelard. In the order of experience faith precedes reason; in the maturer life reason leads up to faith (see some excellent remarks in Fairbairn, *Christ in Mod. Theol.* 120 ff., on the contrast; cf. also Deutsch, *op. cit.* 172). It is in the clear perception of this last that the true greatness of Abelard lies. But, like Bacon, he had to leave his name and memory to the next age, that age which he had done more than any man to usher in. The school in which he taught developed within a generation into the greatest university of Europe, largely through his influence. With Abelard also closes the first period of Scholasticism. In the next generation James of Venice translated the works of Aristotle, hitherto for the most part unknown, into Latin. Henceforth the 'New Logic,' the basis of which in many ways was the same as that which led Abelard in his protests, dominated Europe. In the place of St. Bernard we have Aristotle as the all but canonized leader of the Church.

In nothing is Abelard's influence more visible than in his scholars. Of his pupils, twenty-five, it is said, became cardinals, including Pope Alexander III., and more than fifty were bishops. Through Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, founded on the model of Abelard's *Sic et Non*, Abelard swayed and moulded the theology of the next three hundred years. As Abelard was the incarnation of the new spirit claiming for itself the freedom of thought, so in his pupil Arnold of Brescia we find the leader in the new claim for freedom of will in an ideal Christian republic. Another pupil, William of Conches, made a firm though ineffectual protest

against the growing neglect of literature (John of Salisbury, *Metal.* i. 24 in Migne, *PL* clxxviii. col. 856).

Of particular doctrines which illustrate Abelard's influence or drift, we select the following as of special theological interest :—

(*a*) *Inspiration.*—He limits inspiration to matters concerning 'faith, hope, charity, and the sacraments.' The rest is largely 'for the adornment or enlargement of the Church' (see his Prol. in *Ep. Rom.*, Migne, *op. cit.* 785). Even 'prophets and apostles may err' (Prol. in *Sic et Non*, Migne, *op. cit.* 1345), while a place must be found in the evolution of life and doctrine for revelation given to the heathen philosophers, especially Plato (*Theol. Christ.* lib. ii. *passim*, e.g. Migne, *op. cit.* 1179. Cf. *Epit. Theol. Christ.* c. 11).

(*b*) *The humanity of Christ.*—This he claims to be essentially real. He goes so far even as to claim that it includes 'humanæ infirmitatis veros defectus' (*Epit. Theol. Christ.* c. 25). In his emphasis on the real humanity of Jesus, Abelard is a complete contrast to his age.

(*c*) He claimed that *sin lies in the intention*, the consent of the will to an action which is not of itself evil. Virtue cannot be attained except by conflict. Ignorance in the case of the unenlightened does not constitute sin, and the Jews who ignorantly crucified Jesus must be judged accordingly. (Abelard's doctrine of sin may be best gathered from his *Scito te ipsum*, esp. cc. 2, 3, 13. Its very title shows the emphasis he places on self-knowledge or intention). Original sin is thus the penal consequence of sin and not sin itself. 'It is inconceivable that God should damn a man for the sin of his parents' (*Ep. Rom.*, Migne, *op. cit.* 866 ff.).

(*d*) From this it is an easy transition to Abelard's *moral theory of the Atonement*—Christ's creating within us by His passion a love which itself delivers from sin (*Exp. Ep. Rom.* in Migne, *op. cit.* 836, 859). He rejects totally any theory that makes the Atonement a redemption from the right of the devil (*Epit. Theol. Christ.* c. 23).

Abelard's influence in the field of Logic was very great, amounting almost to a revolution. He struck out a theory which to-day we should call Conceptualism, midway between the Nominalism of Roscelin and the crude Realism of William of Champeaux. He held that we arrive at the general from the particular by an effort of thought. Thus he allowed the reality of the individual, and the reality also of the universals, in so far, that is, as they were the necessary creations of the intellect. Abelard thus returned to the position of Aristotle, probably without any direct knowledge of Aristotle's arguments (Poole, 142 n.). Hence the reputation of Abelard in dialectics in the following centuries, when Aristotle had become dominant. (For a full discussion see Rémusat, vol. ii., or von Prantl, or Ueberweg, i. 392 f.).

Abelard's versatility was very great. In dialectics and theology he was the master without a rival; he also lectured on the great classical law-texts (Rashdall, i. 63 n.). His vernacular songs have perished; the religious hymns (in Migne, 1759 ff.) give little indication of the great power that he exercised in this matter. As a humanist, his qualifications, as also in the case of Heloise, have been exaggerated. His knowledge of Latin literature was considerable, of Greek slight, and of Hebrew nil (Rémusat, i. 30; Deutsch, 58 ff.). Of all mathematics he professes his complete ignorance. His citations from the Fathers are extensive (Deutsch, 69 ff.), as the reader may see for himself by turning over the pages of *Sic et Non*, though many no doubt are second-hand. His eloquence, wit, and charm of manner, added to a culture that covered almost the whole range of knowledge as then conceived, were acknowledged by his enemies. To this we have the witness of his epitaph :—

'Est satis in titulo : Petrus hic jacet Abaillardus
Huic soli patuit scibile quidquid erat'

(Poole, 145 n.; for different and inferior reading, Migne, 103; Rémusat, i. 259 n.).

But the truest estimate of Abelard's greatness is that unconsciously given by William of St. Thierry in his invective against him in 1139 :—

'His books pass the seas, cross the Alps. His new notions and dogmas about the faith are carried through kingdom and province; they are preached before many and publicly defended, insomuch that they are reported even to have influence at the court of Rome' (*Op. Bernard*, Ep. cccxxvi.).

Abelard's spirit lived in the victories and movements of later thought.

LITERATURE.—*A.* The chief source for the life of Abelard will be found in his autobiography, the *Historia Calamitatum*. In addition, we have stray references in Otto of Freising's *de Gestis Frederici* (ed. Pertz, v. 20), esp. i. cc. 47–48, with reference to the Synods of Soissons and Sens; John of Salisbury, *Metalogicus* (in Migne, *PL* v. 199, or Bouquet, *Recueil*, xiv.), and, of course, the *Letters* of St. Bernard. We may add the *Vita b. Goswini* (in Bouquet or Brial, *Recueil des Hist. des Gaules*, xiv.), and Suger's *de rebus in admin. sua gestis* (in Duchesne's *Script. Franc.* iv.). Of modern Lives the best sketch in English is by R. L. Poole in his *Illust. of Hist. of Med. Thought* (1884); Abelard's connexion with the University is judiciously dealt with by Rashdall, *Univ. in M. A.* (1895) i. ch. 1; Compayré's *Abelard and the Origin of Universities* (1893) is altogether misnamed; M'Cabe's *Peter Abelard* (1901) is the work of a partisan; the chapter in Cotter Morison's *St. Bernard* (many eds.) is not altogether satisfactory. In French we have the admirable *Abélard*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1845), of Charles de Rémusat. In German: Deutsch, *Peter Abälard* (Leipzig, 1883), has given us a thorough criticism of Abelard's theology which may be compared by the student with that in Rémusat. Deutsch has added much to our knowledge of Abelard's closing years by his *Die Synode von Sens* (Berlin, 1880). Adolf Hausrath's *Peter Abälard* (Leipzig, 1893) is concise yet full. For the philosophy of Abelard, in addition to the exhaustive discussion in Rémusat, we have Reuter, *Gesch. der relig. Entklärung* (2 vols. 1875–1877); Haurëau, *Hist. de la Philosophie scolastique* (Paris, 1872); and, more especially for his Logic, von Prantl, *Gesch. d. Logik im Abendlande* (4 vols., Leipzig, 1855–1870).

B. Of the works of Abelard we have the following editions: Migne, *PL* v. clxxviii. (1855), but without the *Tractatus de Unitate et Trinitate*, first published by Stölzle (Freiburg, 1891). On p. 875 of Migne's edition there is an amazing suppression of 'what would shock Catholic ears.' Migne's edition contains the *Sic et Non* first edited in full by Henke and Lindenkohl (Marburg, 1851), as also all the works of Abelard, for the first editing of which we are indebted to Victor Cousin: *Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard* (Paris, 1836), and the later *Petri Abaelardi Opera*, ed. V. Cousin, C. Jourdain, and E. Despois (Paris, 1849). Cousin's contributions to our knowledge of Abelard are very great.

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ABETMENT.—In its most general sense 'abetment' means encouragement, countenance, aid; but the word is now used almost entirely in a bad sense as encouragement, counsel, and instigation to commit an offence against the law. When any one 'directly or indirectly counsels, procures, or commands any person to commit any felony or piracy which is committed in consequence of such counselling, procuring, or commandment,' he is described in English law as an accessory before the fact (cf. Stephen, *Digest of the Criminal Law*). In most criminal codes an abettor or accessory is usually described as a person who has in some manner led to, or facilitated the execution of, an offence by rendering material or intellectual assistance. Without being present at the actual perpetration of a crime or an injustice, a man may be useful to the perpetrator of it by assisting him to plan it, or by placing information before him which will facilitate the offence or enable him to escape. Or abetment may take the form of rendering material assistance to the principal agent, such as procuring for him the instruments or physical means by which he is enabled or assisted to commit an offence.

In China, complicity of a purely moral character is punished with the same severity as if the accomplice were the actual agent, and an offender found guilty of counselling the perpetration of murder receives the same punishment (namely, decapitation) as if he had committed it. (Cf. Letourneau, *L'Evolution juridique*, p. 169). In Roman law, in ancient German law, in old French law, and in

English and American law, no distinction is made, in cases of serious crime, between an accessory and a principal. 'Each in English law may be indicted, tried, convicted, and punished as if he alone and independently' (Stephen) had committed the offence (cf. Post, *Ethnologische Jurisprudenz*, 1894, ii. 296 f.). In ancient Jewish law, any one inciting or seducing the people to commit idolatry was ordered to be stoned to death (Dt 13^{6-11}). Idolatry was regarded as an act of supreme treason against the theocracy, and every sort of incitement to commit it was visited with the severest penalties. In primitive penal law, abetment does not appear to have been a punishable offence (Post), and in Talmudic jurisprudence no cognizance is taken of incitement by thoughts or words (*JE*, i. p. 54).

In recent years, certain Italian jurists (*e.g.* Sighele, *Teoria positiva della complicità*, Torina, 1894) have contended that no distinction should be made between accessories and principals, on the ground that a crime committed by persons acting in concert is more dangerous in character than a crime committed by a single individual, and that men united for the common purpose of committing a crime ought to share the responsibility for it in common. Habitual offenders, it is contended, frequently act together; it is often a mere accident which of them shall be the actual perpetrator; therefore all of them ought to be held equally responsible. The supreme object of the law should be to strike at the association, and not merely at the individuals of which it is composed. It is the association that is the danger. W. D. MORRISON.

ABHAYAGIRI.—Name of a celebrated monastery at Anurādhapura, the ancient capital of Ceylon. *Giri* means 'mountain,' and *Abhaya* was one of the names of king Vaṭṭa Gāmiṇī, who erected the monastery close to the *stūpa*, or solid dome-like structure built over supposed relics of the Buddha. It was this *stūpa* that was called a mountain or hill, and the simile was not extravagant, as the *stūpa* was nearly the height of St. Paul's, and its ruins are still one of the sights of Anurādhapura.

There was considerable rivalry from the outset between the monks at this establishment and those at the much older Mahā Vihāra (the Great Minster), founded 217 years earlier. The rivalry was mainly personal, but developed into differences of doctrinal opinion. Of the nature of these latter we have no exact information, and they were probably not of much importance. On one occasion, in the reign of Mahāsena (A.D. 275–302), the Great Minster was abolished, and its materials removed to the Abhayagiri. But the former was soon afterwards restored to its previous position, and throughout the long history of Ceylon maintained its pre-eminence.

LITERATURE.—H. W. Cave, *Ruined Cities of Ceylon*, London, 1900, pp. 91–93, with plates. T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

ABHIDHAMMA.—The title of the third (and last) group, or *piṭaka*, of the Buddhist canonical books; a name also for the specific way in which the Dhamma (doctrine) is set forth in those books. It is in that specific treatment, and not in any distinctive subject-matter, that the real use and significance of these books for early Buddhism are to be found. A myth grew up among 19th cent. Indologists, that the Abhidhamma *piṭaka* was the repository of Buddhist metaphysic. Acquaintance with the contents of the *piṭaka* has dispelled this notion. There is, no doubt, an abstruse and abstract suggestiveness in the titles and opening sentences of the books and their divisions, giving a fictitious suggestion of originality and profundity. But, besides this, there is an ancient tradition of superior erudition and higher standing attaching to those of the Buddhist order who were Abhidhammikas, or experts in Abhidhamma. Thus, in the Mihintale rock inscription, dating from about the commencement of our Middle Ages, tithes from 12 villages or farms are allotted to the cave-recluses there who were Abhidhammikas, as against tithes from 7 and 5 respectively allotted to experts in Suttanta and Vinaya (that is, in the Doctrine and in the Rules of the Order). And whereas mastery of these two was held to establish the expert in *sīla* and *samādhi* respectively (that is, in conduct and meditation), knowledge of Abhidhamma involved the development of *paññā*, — constructive imagination and comprehension,—which ranked among the highest virtues. Once more, in the ancient book translated as *The Questions of King Milinda*, the acquisition by the youthful genius Nāgasena of the contents of the Abhidhamma is acclaimed with wonder and delight in earth and heaven, while his rapid attainment of the remaining *piṭakas* excites no such commotion. Finally, the title itself may have helped to mislead Western, and even Eastern notions. *Abhi* can mean *sur*, *super*, and hence suggests an analogy with Aristotle's *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. Buddhaghosa himself, in explaining the title, gives *ati* ('beyond,' 'above,' 'to excess') as the equivalent of the prefix, inasmuch as Abhidhamma goes beyond the Dhamma, and is distinct from it. But he proceeds to explain that this distinction is due, not to any superior profundity of method, or nature of subject-matter, but to the more detailed analysis given to points of doctrine in the Abhidhamma as compared with the Suttanta methods. There was a legend in his day that the Abhidhamma was first uttered by the Buddha in the Tāvatimsa heaven, whither he had transported himself to preach the Dhamma to his deified mother and hosts of devas. It is not consonant with the Buddhist standpoint, that such an audience should be held capable of benefiting by disquisitions on philosophical problems which had been withheld from the stronger intellects of the Buddha's chief disciples, whom he instructs in the Suttanta. In fact, the legend sprang probably from the orthodox anxiety to invest with a sanction, not inferior to that of the two earlier *piṭakas*, a series of compilations which are manifestly of later date, and the work of elaborating scholiasts.

Let it, then, be clearly understood that our present knowledge of such philosophy as is revealed in the Buddhist Pāli canon would be practically undiminished if the whole of the Abhidhamma *piṭaka* were non-existent. That philosophy is all to be found in the Sutta *piṭaka*. The Abhidhammika may nevertheless be held to have surpassed his Suttantika *confrère* in two ways. It should always be remembered (and the usually wearisome form of the Abhidhamma books never lets the reader forget it) that the canon was compiled, and for generations learnt, as an unwritten composition. In the first two *piṭakas* the memory is aided by episodes giving occasion for the utterance of rule, doctrine, or discussion, and also by frequent verse. The Abhidhamma gives no such aids. It helps only by catechism; in its last and longest books, not even by that. Hence the call for sustained reconstructive and reproductive effort must have been more severe. And, further, since the work is mainly a recount, with analysis and elaborations and comment, of Suttanta doctrines, to know one's Abhidhamma might be said to involve a knowledge of the gist of the Sutta *piṭaka*.

The burden, then, of Abhidhamma is not any positive contribution to the philosophy of early Buddhism, but analytic and logical and methodological elaboration of what is already given. As

such it might have almost equalled, in value to the world, the contents of the discourses. As a fact it is the *reductio ad absurdum* of formalism. It is impossible to estimate the extent to which the exaggeration of the Indian temperament and the temperance of the Greek temperament were due to the absence and presence respectively, during the florescence of each, of the written book. Nowhere as in India do we find imagination so elastic and exuberant, running riot through time, space, and the infinite; and nowhere else is seen such determined effort to curb and regulate it. Abhidhamma training was one of the most noteworthy forms of this effort. It was specially calculated (according to Buddhaghosa, *Atthasālinī*, p. 24) to check those excesses over the normal mind (*dhammachitta*) which, in the Buddha's words, tended to loss of balance, craziness, and insanity. The chief methods of that training were: first, the definition and determination of all names or terms entering into the Buddhist scheme of culture; secondly, the enunciation of all doctrines, theoretical and practical, as formulas, with co-ordination of all such as were logically interrelated; and finally, practice in reducing all possible heterodox positions to an absurdity—a method which is confined to the somewhat later fifth book, the *Kathāvatthu*. Even in these lofty aims, however, the want of restraint, helped by the cumbrousness of purely mnemonic compilation, tends to defeat the very objects sought. The logic of definition is not the same as we have inherited, and the propositions yield strings of alternatives that have often little or no relation to facts.

Of the seven books of the Abhidhamma *piṭaka*, the first five have been published by the Pāli Text Society, viz. *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, *Vibhaṅga*, *Dhātu-kathā*, *Puggala-paññatti* and *Kathāvatthu*; the sixth, or *Yamaka*, is not yet edited; the seventh, the *Paṭṭhāna*, is [1907] in the press. The first book has been translated by the present writer under the title, *A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics*, London, 1900. Besides these seven, there still survive, in Chinese or Tibetan translations, other seven books, which form the Abhidhamma literature of the Sarvāstivādins—a school which split off from the original nucleus of Buddhist culture. A very full index to the contents of these seven is given by Professor Takakusu in *JPTS*, 1905. But the books themselves have not as yet been edited or translated. Their date also is not yet settled, but they are certainly earlier than the Christian era. These works form the basis of the celebrated, but as yet undiscovered, *Abhidharma-kośa*, or Dictionary of Abhidhamma, written in Sanskrit, as well as that of its Commentaries, and other cognate works, some of which survive in Sanskrit and others in Chinese or Tibetan versions, and which carried on the development of Abhidhamma down to the 2nd or 3rd cent. A.D. Professor Bunyiu Nanjio, in his catalogue of Chinese Buddhist literature (Oxford, 1883), gives the titles of no fewer than thirty-seven of these works still extant. In the later developments of Buddhism in India, notably in the so-called 'Great Vehicle,' the use of the term *Abhidhamma* gradually died out. But in other Buddhist countries, where Pāli has remained the literary language, books on Abhidhamma have continued to be written down to the present day, the best known being the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, published in 1884 by the Pāli Text Society.

C. RHYS DAVIDS.

ABHIDHARMA KOŚA VYĀKHYĀ.—One of the most important Buddhist texts preserved in Nepal. It is a commentary, written by a scholar named Yaśomitra, on a classical account of Buddhist metaphysics: *Abhidharma-kośa*, 'the treasure of Abhidharma.' The Sanskrit original of the Kośa seems to be irrevocably lost; but there still exist Chinese and Tibetan versions, of which the Chinese are the oldest. The earliest of these is the work of a Hindu monk, Paramārtha, dated A.D. 563–567; the second, being a revised translation, was made by Hiuen-tsiang, the celebrated pilgrim, A.D. 651–654. The author of the Kośa is Vasubandhu, one of the most illustrious doctors of the Buddhist Church, who flourished about the end of the 5th cent. A.D.

The Kośa itself consists of two parts: (1) a summary account of the doctrine in 602 verses (*kārikās*); (2) an illustrative commentary (*vṛtti*) on these verses. The subject-matter is discussed in eight sections, viz.: the first principles (*dhātus*), the senses (*indriyas*), the worlds (*lokas*), the inclinations (*anuśayas*), the saint (*ārya pudgala*), the science (*jñāna*), the trance (*samādhi*), the individuality (*pudgala*). Vasubandhu belongs to the school of the Sarvāstivādins, who affirm the existence of all things,—a school of the Hīnayāna, or 'Little Vehicle.' The Kośa has nevertheless been admitted as an authority by all schools of Buddhism; the author of the Vyākhyā, Yaśomitra, is a Sautrāntika, and Chinese and Japanese Mahāyānists have always employed it as a text-book. A huge literature of notes and glosses on the Kośa has grown up. In India, before Yaśomitra, Sthiramati, Guṇamati, and Vasumitra wrote commentaries on it, which still exist in Tibetan versions. In China, two pupils of Hiuen-tsiang, Fu-koang and Fa-pao, compiled the lectures and explanations given by their master. It would be easy to-day to fill a whole library with the Kośa literature. That the work achieved so great popularity is due to the rare merits of the author. Familiar with the pedantic intricacies of each school, Vasubandhu elucidates them by the strength of his genius; he brings order, clearness, precision, and cohesion into the whole, combining in a harmonious synthesis the tenets sanctioned by general consent of Buddhists.

SYLVAIN LÉVI.

ABHIṢEKA (literally 'pouring upon' [from *abhi*+*sich*]).—A compound which, without definite ceremonial implications, occurs several times in the Atharva Veda, but not in the Rig or the Sāma. In the White Yajur Veda, and in the three Saṁhitās of the Black Yajur Veda, as well as in several Brāhmaṇas and the *śrauta* ritual of all the four Vedas, we find *abhiṣechanīya* as the name of a rite included in the *rājasūya*, and the last book of the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa has *abhiṣeka* itself for its main topic.

The ceremonial sprinkling, anointing, or baptizing of persons and things is a usage of such antiquity and universality, that its origin and significance could not methodically be made the subject of an inquiry confined to India (see artt. on ANOINTING). If the earliest anointing was with blood, and the object of it to confer vigour, the evidence for the former truth must be sought outside India; and although an invigorating power is in fact ascribed (*e.g.* Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, v. 4. 2. 2) to the rite, the Brāhmanical theologians were quite capable of arriving at such a conclusion without the help of an old tradition.

We may (A) begin by a statement of the actual employment of such a ceremony, so far as it is known to us from narrative sources, and then (B) append an account of the Brāhmanical prescriptions in connexion with *abhiṣeka*, *vājapeya*, and *rājasūya* ceremonies, and the ritual appertaining to them.

A. I. **Subjects of the ceremony.**—The persons who underwent the rite of *abhiṣeka* were in the first place *emperors*. The Aitareya Brāhmaṇa (viii. 15) states as the object of the rite the attainment of paramount power, which it names with a great amplitude of synonyms, and it annexes a list of the famous rulers of former times who had been so distinguished (viii. 21–23). In the Mahābhārata we have two *abhiṣekas* of Yudhiṣṭhira: the first (Sabhā Parvan, cc. 33, 45, esp. 45) is preceded by victorious expeditions in all directions and celebrated as part of a *rājasūya* in the presence of subordinate kings, while the second (Śānti Parvan, c. 40) follows the conclusion of the great war. The Buddhist emperor Aśoka was not crowned until four years of conquest had followed his accession (Mahawanso, Turnour, p. 22), and in the case of

Harṣa Śīlāditya of Ujjain there was a similar postponement (Hiuen-tsiang, *Si-Yu-Ki*, tr. Beal, i. pp. 212–213). An imperial *abhiṣeka* occurs also in Kālidāsa's Raghuvaṁśa, sarga ii., and the inauguration of Naravāhanadatta in the different versions of the Bṛhatkathā (Kṣemendra, xvii. ; Somadeva, xv. 110, esp. v. 89) is that of an emperor ; cf. also *Epigraphia Indica*, ii. 4 ; v. 16.

We have less testimony for the practice in the case of ordinary *mahārājas* or *kings*. But no doubt it would be usual with these also, so long as they retained any measure of independence. For, in the first place, the line between kings and emperors would be very hard to draw, and the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa (viii. 14) plainly contemplates also the *abhiṣeka* of mere kings. Secondly, the Kauśika Sūtra of the Atharva Veda (xvii. 11–13, *ap.* Weber, 'Ueber den Rājasûya,' p. 141) distinguishes the *abhiṣeka* of a simple king (*ekarāja*) from that of a higher (*varṣiyas*). The Mahābhārata (Śānti Parvan, v. 2496, *ap.* Goldstücker, *s.v.* 'abhiṣeka,' p. 280) speaks of the *abhiṣechana* of a king as the most essential matter for any country. The father of Harṣa Śīlāditya, Pratāpaśīla, underwent the rite of *abhiṣeka*, although he was no universal emperor (Harṣa-Charita, ed. Bombay, 1892, p. 132, ll. 9, 10). See also Jātaka, Nos. 456 and 458 ; Jacobi, *Erzählungen aus dem Mahārāṣṭrī*, p. 26, l. 5, ll. 13 ff. ; the various Rājyābhiṣekapaddhatis and prayogas, and esp. Bhaṭṭa Nīlakaṇṭha's Nītimayūkha, where a full ritual is given (*sub init.*).

We may mention here that the Atharva Veda includes a coronation (*rājasūya*) hymn (iv. 8).

The anointing of an *heir-apparent* (*yuvarāja*) by his father is supported by several examples from the Epics (Goldstücker, *op. cit.* p. 282), to which we may add the references in the Harṣa-Charita, c. vi. (ed. Bombay, 1892, p. 223, ll. 12, 13), the Bṛhatkathā (Kṣemendra, vii. 23. 559 ; Somadeva, vi. 34, 107 ff.), *Epigraphia Indica*, iv. p. 120, l. 2, and Kalpasūtra (ed. Jacobi), p. 74, § 211.

The case of Rāma in the Rāmāyaṇa, of which the Ayodhyā-kāṇḍa (cc. 1–17, with Yuddha-kāṇḍa, c. 112) supplies the fullest account of the state and circumstance of a royal inauguration, is peculiar in two respects—the inauguration was initiated as a *yauvarājyābhiṣeka*, though completed after Rāma's final accession, and it was an example of the *puṣyābhiṣeka*, which we find fully described in three texts, namely, Atharva Veda Pariśiṣṭa, No. 4, the Bṛhatsaṁhitā of Varāhamihira, c. 48, and the Kālikā Purāṇa, c. 89. The special feature of this rite was that it took place at the conjunction of the moon with the asterism *puṣya* (December-January), at which time, we are informed, Indra originally conquered the demons (Rām. ii. 14. 46), while, according to the Buddhists, both the anointing of an heir-apparent and the *abhiniṣkramaṇa* (cf. the Jaina *nekkhamābhiṣeka* in Bhagavatī, ix. 33, p. 819, a ref. due to Prof. Leumann) of a Bodhisattva befall at the same hour (Mahāvastu, vol. ii. p. 158, ll. 2–4). This date is many times cited in the passages from the Rāmāyaṇa (*e.g.* ii. 2. 10, 3. 39, 4. 20, 14. 46, vi. 112. 56, 70), which also mentions a specially adorned chariot (*puṣyaratha*), described by Hemādri, i. 283, 284 (cf. Śiśupālavadha, iii. 22, and *Epigr. Ind.* iii. 71), and no doubt identical with the *phussaratha* of the Jātaka (Nos. 378, 445). The ceremony *puṣyābhiṣeka* or *puṣyasnāna*, as described in the Kālikā Purāṇa and Bṛhatsaṁhitā, presents some very interesting features,—it is by no means confined to the inauguration of sovereignty,—and would probably repay anthropological investigation.

Anointing was also practised in the case of certain *ministers of state*. The Harṣa-Charita speaks of 'anointed counsellors of royal rank' (*mūrdhābhiṣiktā amātyā rājānaḥ*, p. 193, ll. 13, 14) ; and for the *purohita*, or state priest, there was a special ceremony called *bṛhaspatisava* connected, though somewhat indefinitely, with the *vājapeya* (Eggeling, *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, iii. p. xxv). The account of the *purohita*, which in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa viii. 24 ff., and Kauśika Sutra xvii. 30 ff., immediately follows *abhiṣeka*, seems not to include a mention of sprinkling. As regards the *senāpati*, or commander-in-chief, Goldstücker has given (*op. cit.* p. 285) quotations from the Mahābhārata (Śalya Parvan, adhy. 46) and elsewhere. From Jaina sources we may cite the case occurring in Prof. Jacobi's *Erzählungen aus dem Mahārāṣṭrī*, p. 17, l. 29.

The anointing of *images* at the time of their inauguration (*pratiṣṭhā*), on occasion of festivals or of distress, or regularly, is a custom still prevalent among the Hindus in India and the Buddhists in Nepal. Rules for it are given in many manuals (Pūjāvidhi's and Pratiṣṭhāvidhi's) ; an earlier allusion to it may be cited from the Harṣa-Charita (ed. Bombay, 1892, p. 171, l. 2). The fluid mentioned in this case is milk ; but a variety of other substances, including water of various kinds, cow-dung, earth from an anthill, etc. etc., are named by the authorities whom Goldstücker quotes.

Finally, the name *abhiṣekabhūmi* is given by the Buddhists to the last of their ten *bhūmis* or stages of perfection (Mahāvastu, i. 124. 20). And further, the word *abhiṣeka* was applied to any ceremonial bathing, such as has always been, and still is, practised by Hindus at sacred fords, tanks, etc. etc. For *abhiṣeka* of neophytes, see Agnipurāṇa, c. 90, Poussin, *Études*, 208 ff., and Rājendralāla Mitra, *Notices of Sanskrit MSS*, No. 1536 ; of barren women, etc., Hemādri, *Vratakhāṇḍa*.

2. **Ritual and occasion of the ceremony.**—This is not the place for enlarging on the varying details of the inauguration ceremony as described in the Sanskrit literature. The reader will find in Goldstücker's Dictionary, *s.v.* 'Abhiṣeka,' ample material, extracted from the Mahābhārata (Śānti Parvan, c. 40), Rāmāyaṇa, Agni-Purāṇa (*c.* 209), and Mānasāra. Although in these works the special priestly aspect of the ceremony is but little developed, Goldstücker finds (p. 280) that the details as given in the Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa show 'that the vaidik ceremony had undergone various modifications at the time of their composition,' while (p. 282) 'the inauguration ceremony at the Paurāṇic period has but little affinity with the vaidik rite ; it is a series of proceedings which are founded on late superstitions, and reflect scarcely any of the ideas which are the groundwork of the ceremony of the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*.' Such changes are, of course, far from unnatural ; but there may also have been special causes at work, such as the neglect of the old *śrauta* ritual, or the necessity of providing new forms for rulers who were without title to *kṣatriya* rites.

The general features of the ceremony seem to be as follows : Prior to the rite (*e.g.* on the previous day) the king undergoes a purification, consisting of a bath, etc., no doubt analogous to the Vedic *dīkṣā*. Essentials* are—(1) appointment of the various ministers of state either before or in the course of the inauguration ; (2) choice of the other royal *ratnas*, a queen, an elephant, a white horse, a white bull, a white umbrella, a white chowrie or two, etc. ; (3) a throne (*bhadrāsana, siṁhāsana, bhadrapīṭha, paramāsana*) made of gold and covered with a tiger-skin ; (4) one or several

* See Rāmāyaṇa, ii. 15. 4–12 ; Kṣemendra, xvii. 38 ff. ; Somadeva, xv. 110. 62 ff. ; Jacobi, *op. cit.* p. 26, ll. 13 ff. ; Śānti Parvan, c. 40.

golden vessels (or one of them golden), filled with water of various special kinds, honey, milk, clarified butter, *udumbara* shoots, and other very miscellaneous ingredients. In the actual ceremony the king is seated with his queen on the throne, surrounded by his chiefs, and he is sprinkled not only by the *purohit*, but also by other priests, by the ministers and relatives, and by the citizens. In the Mahābhārata, Kṛṣṇa is the first to sprinkle Yudhiṣṭhira, representing perhaps the *rājakartṛ* mentioned in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa. The rite is performed with prayer to Indra, or after the manner of Indra's inauguration as king of the gods. After the consecration, the king makes presents (cf. Harṣa-Charita, ed. Bombay, 1892, c. iii. p. 132, ll. 9, 10), and, of course, the officiating Brāhmans receive their *dakṣiṇās*. According to the Agni Purāṇa and the Mānasāra, the king concludes by riding *pradakṣiṇa*-wise round his city. The liberation of prisoners mentioned by the Agni Purāṇa is an incident known in other connexions (*e.g.* the birth of a prince, Harṣa-Charita, c. iv. p. 142, ll. 18, 19).

3. **Time chosen for the ceremony and substances employed.**—In the case of the recorded *abhiṣeka*, the temporal restrictions seem to have been, except as explained above, merely such as were necessary in order to ensure auspicious conjunctions: for details see Goldstücker, *op. cit.* p. 285. For the *rājasūya* and *vājapeya* there were, as we shall see, fixed periods in the year.

The substances, which varied in the different ceremonies, are mentioned under the several heads (*vid. supra* and *infra*). Water, milk, curds, and honey generally recur.

B. 1. Turning now to the sacred literature, we find that only one Vedic work gives rules for a royal consecration as such. This is the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, where we find distinguished two forms of *abhiṣeka*, namely, *punarabhiṣeka* (viii. 5–11) and *aindra mahābhiṣeka* (viii. 12–20). As the former, which takes place after a sacrifice, has apparently no relation to the installation of a sovereign and refers probably to the *rājasūya*, we may reserve it for consideration in that connexion.

The *aindra mahābhiṣeka* is so named because it follows the rites whereby Indra was consecrated king of the gods,—we have already seen that the coronation ceremony continued in later times to be associated with Indra. Thereby a priest who wishes universal victory and paramountcy for his king is to consecrate a *kṣatriya* who is ambitious of those objects (*ahaṁ sarvā jitīr jayeyam ahaṁ sarvāñl lokān vindeyam ahaṁ sarveṣāṁ rājñāṁ śraiṣṭhyam atiṣṭhām paramatām gacheyaṁ sāmrājyam bhaujyaṁ svārājyaṁ vairājyam pārameṣṭhyaṁ rājyam māhārājyam ādhipatyam ahaṁ samantaparyāyī syāṁ sārvabhaumaḥ sārvāyuṣa āntād ā parārdhāt pṛthivyai samudraparyantāyā ekarāṭ*). The requirements for the ceremony are: (1) vessels of *nyagrodha* (*ficus indica*), *udumbara* (*ficus glomerata*), *aśvattha* (*ficus religiosa*), and *plakṣa* (*ficus infectoria*) wood—to be used, no doubt, as in the *rājasūya* (see below); (2) blades of rice of two kinds, *priyaṅgu* (*panicum*), and barley—to be put in the consecration liquids; (3) a throne-seat (*āsandī*) of *udumbara* wood (mentioned also in the Jātaka, No. 283), a cup (or ladle), and a branch of the same; (4) for the consecration fluid—curds, honey, butter, and water of a sunshine shower. After a mantra addressed to the throne-seat, the king is made to mount it, and then proclaimed aloud by the king-makers (*rājakartārāḥ*). The priest then recites a mantra referring to Varuṇa as *samrāj*, etc., and sprinkles the seated king by pouring the fluid through the interposed *udumbara* branch and a golden *pavitra* (plate) over his head. After receiving a gift from him, he hands to him a vessel of *surā* (spirit) to drink, identifying the *surā* with *soma*.

Any comments upon this ceremony, which is preceded by an oath of life-long fealty on the part of the king towards the priest, may be reserved for the end of this article. After the description of it, there follows in the Brāhmaṇa a list of all the famous kings of old who had been consecrated thereby, together with the names of the consecrating priests. These names may be cited here:—

1. **Janamejaya Pārikṣita, consecrated by Tura Kāvaṣeya;**
2. **Śāryāta Mānava, consecrated by Chyavana Bhārgava;**
3. **Śatānīka Sātrājita, consecrated by Somaśuṣman Vājaratnāyana;**
4. **Ambāṣṭya, consecrated by Parvata and Nārada;**
5. **Yudhāmśrauṣṭi Augrasainya, consecrated by Parvata and** Nārada;
6. **Viśvakarman Bhauvana, consecrated by Kaśyapa;**
7. **Sudāsa Paijavana, consecrated by Vasiṣṭha;**
8. **Marutta Āvikṣita, consecrated by Saṁvarta Āṅgirasa;**
9. **Aṅga, consecrated by Udamaya Ātreya;**
10. **Bharata Dauḥṣanti, consecrated by Dīrghatamas Māmateya.**

The following were victorious by mere knowledge of the rite:—

11. **Durmukha Pāñchāla, having learned it from Bṛhaduktha;**
12. **Atyarāti Jānantapi (though not a king), having learned it from Vasiṣṭha Śātahavya.**

For other lists see Goldstücker, *op. cit.* p. 279.

2. Before dealing with the *rājasūya* proper, we may conveniently take into consideration the other ceremony described in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa (viii. 5–11), the *punarabhiṣeka*, which, though widely differing in procedure, is of an analogous character, as it presents the rite of *abhiṣeka* in a ritual routine disconnected from the actual accession of a king. It is not, however, as in the *rājasūya*, imbedded in a composite series of rituals, but placed at the end of a sacrifice.

The name *punarabhiṣeka* implies that the person concerned was an already crowned king, and the object of the rite was probably to reinforce his vigour as such. Thus, it is stated that the royal power is quickened by it (*sūyate ha vā asya kṣatraṁ yo dīkṣate kṣatriyaḥ san*—an expression perhaps implying a knowledge of the word *rājasūya*), and the various substances used are said to restore to the king various powers (*brahmakṣatre ūrg annādyam apām oṣadhīnāṁ raso brahmavarchasam irā puṣṭiḥ prajātiḥ*) which through the sacrifice had passed out of him (§§ 7, 8). It is with this object that the god Savitṛ is invoked in the mantra *devasya tvā savituḥ prasave, etc.* (§ 7), which recurs in the *aindra mahābhiṣeka* and the *rājasūya*.

The actual rites are very similar to those of the *aindra mahābhiṣeka*. The apparatus consists of: (1) a seat of *udumbara* wood with a covering of tiger-skin, (2) a cup and branch of *udumbara* wood, (3) a consecration fluid of curds, honey, butter, and water of a sunshine shower, with grass, sprouts, *surā*, and *dūrvā*-grass. The sacrificial space (*vedi*) is marked out with a *sphya* (wooden sword), and the seat is placed half within and half without the same. Sitting behind the seat with his right knee bent to the ground, the king takes hold of it with both hands and invites the gods to ascend it, in order that he may after them ascend it 'for royalty, paramountcy, etc. etc.' He then ascends, and the priest, having blessed the consecration fluid, sprinkles him through the interposed *udumbara* branch, and hands to him the cup of *surā*, from which he drinks; then he offers the remains to a friend. He descends from the throne, placing his feet on the *udumbara* branch, and, sitting with his face eastward, utters thrice the words *namo brahmaṇe*. He then presents a gift to the priest, expressing a wish for victory, rises and places fuel upon the fire, and with fuel in his hand takes three steps in a north-easterly direction, *i.e.* towards the region of Indra, the invincible (*aparājita*) region, to signify his desire for security (*yogakṣema*) and freedom from defeat. Lastly, he goes home and sits behind his house, while the priest offers in a

certain order oblations from the *surā*-cup and pronounces a prayer for progeny of oxen, horses, and men.

3. The *rājasūya* is an elaborate ritual prescribed for a kṣatriya king desirous of paramountcy. It is brought into connexion with Varuṇa, the first emperor, and after him named *Varuṇasava*. Like the *punarabhiṣeka*, it was applicable to an already consecrated king, although very likely the two ceremonies may have been susceptible of combination. The essential difference between the two is that *abhiṣeka* was a necessary act of State, including priestly rites, while the *rājasūya* was an optional religious rite, undertaken with a certain object, and including a ceremony of consecration. In Sanskrit inscriptions the kings sometimes glory in having performed the rite, which they mention in connexion with the *vājapeya*, *aśvamedha*, etc. (*Epigraphia Indica*, iv. p. 196, l. 3).

Weber holds ('Über den Rājasūya,' pp. 1–6) that the *rājasūya*, like the *vājapeya*, was originally a simpler popular institution, which subsequently found admission, with many elaborations, into the *śrauta* ritual, and Hillebrandt (*Vedische Opfer und Zauber*, pp. 141 and 144) agrees with him. On the analogy of the *devasūhaviṣ* we may explain the word as meaning 'the *rājasū* ceremony (the word *rājasū* occurring in the ritual, see Weber, p. 87), and conclude, in accordance with primitive notions, that the inherent vigour of a king needed from time to time *a reinforcement* (see above, under *punarabhiṣeka*). In that case the earliest *rājasūya* may have been a regularly repeated (*e.g.* annual), or an occasional quickening rite undergone by kings.

The actual *rājasūya* consists of seven rites (*pavitra* or *abhyārohaṇīya*, *abhiṣechanīya*, *daśapeya*, *keśavapanīya*, *vyuṣṭi*, *dvirātra*, *kṣatradhṛti*), to which some authorities add (after *daśapeya* or after *kṣatradhṛti*) an eighth (*sautrāmaṇī*). Concerning the *pavitra* we need only say that it must be taken to cover the preparatory and purificatory ceremonies, beginning in the month Phālguna (Feb.-March), and extending over a whole year. It is stated that according to the Mānavas the rite took place in autumn. The *keśavapanīya* is the formal cutting of the king's hair, which remains unshorn for a whole year after the *abhiṣechanīya*, and the *vyuṣṭi*, etc., need not detain us. Of interest here are only the *abhiṣechanīya* with its preceding *ratnahavīṁṣi* and the *daśapeya*. With the first day of the month Phālguna in the second year commence certain introductory rites (*śunāsīrīya*, *pañchavatīya*, *indraturīya*, *apāmārgahoma*, *triṣaṁyukta ratnahavīṁṣi*), of which the last and most important is a series of sacrifices on 12 successive days in the houses of the king's *ratnas* (see above), who are variously enumerated. The *abhiṣechanīya*, commencing on the first day of the month Chaitra (March-April), occupies five days. After the completion of eight *devasūhavīṁṣi* comes the proclamation of the king by the priest, who, grasping his right arm, pronounces a mantra referring to Savitṛ, Agni, Bṛhaspati, Soma, Indra, Varuṇa, etc., and stating the name of the king, his father and mother, and his kingdom. Next are provided for the sprinkling 17 fluids, namely, 13 forms of water, together with honey, embryonic water of a calving cow, milk, and clarified butter, each in a separate vessel of *udumbara* wood, and having sun-motes mixed with them. These are then transferred into a single *udumbara* vessel, which, together with four other vessels, of *palāśa* (*Butea frondosa*), *udumbara*, *nyagrodha*, and *aśvattha*, is set down before one of the altars. Next day a tiger-skin is placed in front of the four vessels, into which the consecration liquid is poured: the king is specially arrayed for the ceremony and armed with bow and arrows, then announced to gods and people: to avert evil, a piece of copper is put into the mouth of an eunuch standing by. After taking a step towards each of the four points of the compass and also upwards (to signify universal dominion), the king kicks away from the tiger-skin a piece of lead; as he stands on the skin, a gold plate is put under his foot, and another, with 9 or 100 holes, upon his head, and he is made to hold forth his arms facing eastward, while with the four vessels severally he is anointed by the purohita or adhvaryu, a kinsman (brother), a friendly kṣatriya, and a vaiśya. At this point (according to one account) is related to him the story of Śunaḥśepa (a reminiscence of human sacrifice). He then rubs himself with the consecration fluid, after which he takes three steps (reminiscent of Viṣṇu's *trivikrama*) upon the tiger-skin. The remnant of the liquid, poured into the *palāśa* cup, he hands to his dearest son. The latter holds on behind to the adhvaryu, who pours the remnant upon the sacrificial fire, mentioning, and once intentionally confusing, the name of the king and his son. There follow: (1) a symbolical seizure of a cow, one of a hundred, belonging to one of the king's relatives, the king driving against them in a war-chariot and ultimately returning to the sacrifical edifice, where, after assuming shoes of pig-skin, he dismounts; (2) enthroning of the king upon a seat of *khadira* (acacia catechu) wood, placed upon the tiger-skin; (3) beating of the king (who holds five dice) by the priests with sticks, in order to expel his sins, after which he is proclaimed as *Brahman*, *Savitṛ*, *Indra*, and *Rudra*; (4) a symbolical game with dice, in which the king, his brother, his *sūta* (panegyrist or marshal) or *sthapati* ('police magistrate,' according to Weber), a *grāmaṇī* (village-headman), and a relative take part; (5) various minor ceremonies. On the seventh day of Chaitra takes place the *daśapeya*, a ceremony in which 100 persons, including the king, drink in groups of 10 out of 10 cups: a genealogical test is implied, the qualification being that each must be able to cite 10 generations of soma-drinking ancestors. A year later come the *keśavapanīya*, etc.

The above account of the *rājasūya* is taken chiefly from Eggeling's tr. of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* and Weber's translation and exposition of the *Kātyāyana Śrauta-sūtra* ('Über den Rājasūya'), which, as representing the part of the operant priests, is naturally the fullest Sanskrit authority. The *śrauta* ritual of the other Vedas, also cited by Prof. Weber, agrees in the main. The *punarabhiṣeka* of the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, though it has many common features, is distinctly simpler. But it does not follow that the additional matter of the *rājasūya* is necessarily of later origin: that there were various forms of the rite appears from the Āśvalāyana Śrauta-sūtra, which employs a plural—*atha rājasūyāḥ*, ix. 3. 3. 1. Weber, who has elaborately discussed the various incidents, regards the references to Varuṇa and Savitṛ as, from the point of view of Indian religion, remnants of antiquity. Similarly ancient must be the mimic freebooting expedition, game of dice, and *daśapeya*. A general anthropological interest attaches to (1) the association of the king with the *udumbara* tree and with the rain-water, (2) the notion of quickening the royal energy by means of the rite, (3) the reminiscence of human sacrifice in the legend of Śunaḥśepa, which, in connexion with *punarabhiṣeka*, is also related in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa and the Śāṅkhāyana Śrauta-sūtra.

4. The *vājapeya*, which is mentioned in the Atharva Veda (xi. 7. 7) and the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa (iii. 41. 1), and fully described in the *śrauta* ritual of all the Vedas, also includes a form of consecration. At the outset it presents us with a difficulty as to the object with which it was to be celebrated. The Āśvalāyana Śrauta-sūtra (ix. 9. 1) prescribes it for 'one desiring supremacy' (*adhipatyakāma*); the Śāṅkhāyana gives, instead, 'one desiring abundance of food' (*annādya*), explaining

the word *vājapeya* as meaning 'food and drink'; the Lāṭyāyana requires it for 'one promoted by brāhmans and kings' (*yām brāhmaṇā rājānaś cha puraskurvīran sa vājapeyena yajeta*), and forbids those who have celebrated it to rise before, salute, etc., those who have not; the ritual of the White Yajur Veda states that whoso sacrifices with the *vājapeya* wins Prajāpati, and so wins everything. According to Āśvalāyana (ix. 9. 19), it is reserved for kings and brāhmans; Śāṅkhāyana (xvi. 17. 1–4) allows it to the three highest castes, the *bṛhaspatisava* following in the case of a brāhman; Lāṭyāyana (viii. 11. 12) mentions a view that it might be preceded and followed by the *bṛhaspatisava*; while Kātyāyana (xiv. 1. 1), confining it to kṣatriya and vaiśya, orders it to be both preceded and followed by the *bṛhaspatisava*. According to the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (v. 1. 1), the rite originated with Indra and Bṛhaspati, who, both by the aid of Savitṛ, 'won Prajāpati.' The rank of the rite also is variously estimated: Āśvalāyana (ix. 9. 19) would make it a preliminary to the *rājasūya* (for a king) or *bṛhaspatisava* (for a priest), while the White Yajur definitely forbids the *rājasūya* to follow, explaining that the latter is inferior, as the effect is to constitute a king, while by the *vājapeya* an emperor is constituted.

The most reasonable solution seems to be that of Eggeling and Hillebrandt, that the *vājapeya* was originally general for all the ranks, which severally had more special rites, the *rājasūya*, *bṛhaspatisava*, *sthapatisava*, *grāmaṇīsava*, etc. etc. The features of the *vājapeya* itself seem to point to the conclusion of Weber that it was originally a popular celebration of victory or promotion.

The most prominent of these features are (1) *āji*, a mimic race; (2) *roha*, mounting a post; and (3) the recurrence of the number 17.

The *vājapeya* takes place in autumn. There are preliminary *dīkṣā*, soma-purchase, etc., 17 cups of soma and 17 of surā being provided; and the gifts to the priest include 1700 cows, etc., 17 slave-women, 17 elephants, and so on. At the midday ceremony on the final day a racing-car is rolled into the sacrificial area, and to it are yoked four horses, which receive a specially prepared food. Sixteen other cars are arranged outside. Seventeen drums are beaten, the course is marked off by 17 arrow-shots, and an *udumbara* branch serves as goal. The race takes place and the sacrificer wins: the horses of all the cars are fed and, with the cars, presented to the priests. After certain libations, the wife of the sacrificer is brought in and specially dressed. A ladder is placed against the sacrificial post, and the sacrificer, after calling to his wife, 'Come, wife, ascend we to the sky,' mounts until his head overtops the post: he looks forth in all directions, salutes the earth, and descends, alighting on a gold plate placed upon the ground or upon a goat-skin. A subordinate priest covers a seat of *udumbara* wood with a goat-skin, and, taking his arm, seats him thereupon, saying, 'This is thy kingdom.' A mixture of water and milk having been prepared in an *udumbara* vessel and poured in libations, the offerer is sprinkled with the remainder, and thrice proclaimed with the words, 'This man is Samrāj.' There follow 17 mantras of victory (*ujjiti*).

LITERATURE.—For anointing and consecration in general: artt. ANOINTING below; cf. also Frazer, *Lectures on the Early History of Kingship*, London, 1906.

For *abhiṣeka*: *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, viii. 5 ff.; *Mahābhārata Sabhā Parvan*, cc. 33–45, and *Śānti Parvan*, c. 40; *Rāmāyaṇa Ayodhyākāṇḍa*, cc. 1–15, and *Yuddhakāṇḍa*, c. 112; *Agni Purāṇa*, *adhyāya* 209; *Nītimayūkha* and other works cited above, pp. 1544–1546; Goldstücker, *Dict. Sanskrit and English*, Berlin and London, 1856, *s.v.*; Rājendralāla Mitra, *Indo-Aryans*, ii. pp. 1–48; Weber, 'Über den Rājasūya' (*ABAW*, 1893), pp. 114–118.

For the *rājasūya*: *Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā* (ix. 35–x. 34), *Kāṭhaka-S.* (xv. 1–13), *Maitrāyaṇi-S.* (ii. 6. 1–13, iv. 3. 1–4. 10), *Taittirīya-S.* (i. 8. 1–21), *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (v. 2. 2–5. 5), *Taittirīya Br.* (i. 6. 1–8. 10), *Tāṇḍya Br.* (xviii. 8–11); the *Śrauta-Sūtras* of *Āśvalāyana* (ix. 3 ff.), *Śāṅkhāyana* (xv. 12–27, xvi. 18), *Lāṭyāyana* (ix. 1–3), *Kātyāyana* (xv. 1–10), *Āpastamba* (xviii.); the *Vaitāna Sūtra* (xxxvi. 1–13), *Kauśika-Sūtra* (xvii.); various *paddhatis* and *prayogas*; Weber, *op. cit.* pp. 1–158; Eggeling's tr. of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, vol. iii. pp. xxvi, 42–142; Hillebrandt, *Vedische Opfer und Zauber*, pp. 143–147; Rājendralāla Mitra, *op. cit.*

For the *vājapeya*: *Vājasaneyi-S.* (ix. 1–34), *Kāṭhaka-S.* (xiii. 14–xiv. 10), *Maitrāyaṇi-S.* (i. 11. 1–10), *Taittirīya-S.* (i. 7. 7–12), *Śatapatha Br.* (v. 1. 1–2 2), *Taittirīya Br.* (i. 3. 2–9), *Tāṇḍya Br.* (xviii. 6–7); *Āśvalāyana Ś.S.* (ix. 9), *Śāṅkhāyana Ś.S.* (xv. 1 and xvi. 17), *Lāṭyāyana Ś.S.* (viii. 11 and 12 and v. 12. 8–25), *Kātyāyana Ś.S.* (xiv. 1 ff.), *Āpastamba Ś.S.* (xviii. 1–7); *Vaitāna S.* (xxvii.); various *paddhatis* and *prayogas*; Weber, 'Über den Vājapeya' (*SBAW*, 1892, pp. 765–813); Eggeling, *op. cit.* pp. 1–41; Hillebrandt, *op. cit.* pp. 141–143.

F. W. THOMAS.

ABILITY.—Ability (Lat. *habilitat-em*, *habilis*) in its historical usage has two meanings. **1.** It signifies material power, wealth, estate, or resources. In this sense it occurs in both the OT and the NT: *e.g.* 'They gave after their *ability* unto the treasure of the work' (Ezr 2^{69}); 'Then the disciples, every man according to his *ability*, determined to send relief' (Ac 11^{29}). Similarly, Shakespeare has—

> 'Out of my lean and low *ability*
> I'll lend you something' (*Twelfth Night*, III. iv. 351).

In the same sense, the term is used in 16th cent. Poor Law statutes. Thus, by the Act of 1555 the town magistrates, in making orders for the relief of an overburdened parish by its wealthier neighbouring parishes, are directed to 'consider the estate and *ability* of every parish.' The Act of 1601, too, provides for the taxation of every inhabitant of the parish 'according to the *ability* of the parish'—'ability' being interpreted to mean property. Later on, however, 'ability' or faculty came to be measured not by property, but by income or revenue. This is the measure adopted in Adam Smith's celebrated maxim: 'The subjects of every State ought to contribute towards the support of the Government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective *abilities*; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the State' (*Wealth of Nations*, bk. v. ch. ii. pt. 2). And since Adam Smith's day, the adoption of the utilitarian ideal of 'equality of sacrifice,' and the application of the 'law of diminishing utility'—that the more wealth, *ceteris paribus*, a person has, the less, beyond a certain point, is the utility to him of successive equal increments, and, consequently, the less the disutility of the decrements caused by taxation—have led to income being accepted as the criterion of ability, for the purpose of taxation, subject only to exemptions and abatements at the one extreme, and progressive or graduated taxation at the other (cf. J. S. Mill, *Principles of Political Economy*, bk. v. ch. ii. §§ 2, 3; E. R. A. Seligman, *Progressive Taxation*). But, apart from this *quasi*-technical use of the term in Economics, in which 'to give,' 'to contribute,' or 'to pay' is understood, the use of 'ability' in the sense of wealth is obsolete, the latest literary instance being probably that in Goldsmith's *Vicar of Wakefield*, ch. xiv.: 'A draft upon my neighbour was to me the same as money; for I was sufficiently convinced of his *ability*.'

2. It signifies personal power, cleverness, physical or mental, and sometimes a special power of the mind, a faculty (usually, however, in the plural). This usage is also found in both the OT and the NT: 'such as had *ability* in them' (Dn 1^{4}); 'If any man minister, let him do it as of the *ability* which God giveth' (1 P 4^{11}). So with Shakespeare:

> 'Though it be fit that Cassio have his place,
> For, sure, he fills it up with great *ability*' (*Oth.* III. iii. 247).

Again—

> 'Your abilities are too infant-like for doing much alone' (*Cor.* II. i. 35).

The use of 'ability' as denoting physical strength is now obsolete, save in Scotland; and, in its use with reference to mental power, 'ability' denotes active power, as distinct from 'capacity,' which signifies rather latent power or resources. In general, also, natural ability is to be contrasted with acquired skill. 'For natural abilities are like natural plants that need pruning by study' (Bacon, *Essays*: 'Of Studies'). The distinction is important in Economics, in which natural ability is regarded as yielding an income of the nature of rent, while acquired skill yields profits. Again, general ability, natural or acquired, is often contrasted with specialized technical skill. With the growing complexity of industry and the increasing use of machinery, general ability, which is easily transferable from one trade to another, is yearly becoming a relatively more important factor in industrial skill (cf. A. Marshall, *Principles of Economics*[4], 1898, pp. 284–291, 331–342, 657).

In Theology, the terms 'ability' and 'inability' refer to man's power, or want of power, to do the will of God. 'Man by his fall into a state of sin hath wholly lost all *ability* of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation' (*Westminster Confession*). Here the opposition is to be noted between the doctrine of 'original ability,' as based on the Scriptures, and the 'plenary ability' of the Pelagians, the 'gracious ability' of the Arminians, and the 'natural ability' of the New School (or Edwardian) theologians (cf. A. H. Strong, *Systematic Theology*, 1886, pp. 342–345).

ARCH. B. CLARK.

ABIOGENESIS (I.).—*Abiogenesis* (from Gr. ἄβιος, 'without life,' and γένεσις, 'birth') is the theory of the origin of living from not-living matter. It is more commonly known as the theory of 'spontaneous generation.' So far as the beginnings of life on the earth are concerned, the doctrine of abiogenesis is generally accepted by biologists. For, in its passage from the nebulous to the more or less solid state, our globe reached a temperature and general conditions which made possible the evolution of the organic from the inorganic. Life, as Buffon was among the first to suggest, probably originated in the polar regions, these being the earliest to cool. The inter-relation between living and lifeless matter is a fundamental canon of the theory of Evolution, which recognizes no break in continuity, and which also recognizes the ultimate mystery investing all phenomena, whether these be defined in terms of mind or of matter. 'All our philosophy, all our poetry, all our science, all our art—Plato, Shakespeare, Newton, and Raphael—are potential in the fires of the sun,' says Tyndall; and Huxley, while holding abiogenesis to be unproved, added that 'if it were given him to look beyond the abyss of geologically recorded time to the still more remote period when the earth was passing through physical and chemical conditions which it can no more see again than a man can recall his infancy, he should expect to be a witness of the evolution of living protoplasm from not-living matter' (*Coll. Essays*, viii. p. 256). Hence, both physicist and biologist reject the theory of 'Vitalism,' or the existence of a vital principle or energy distinct in kind from other cosmic energies. The problem of abiogenesis is therefore narrowed to this—Given the origin of life from the not-living, do the conditions which resulted in that still prevail, or have they so far passed away that life is now derived only from pre-existing life?—as the phrase has it, *Omne vivum ex vivo*.

Belief in spontaneous generation was unchallenged for above 2000 years. It was on the Ionian seaboard that speculation arose about origins and laws governing phenomena, hence scepticism as to the validity of old cosmogonies and legends. Anaximander (B.C. 610–547), the friend and pupil of Thales, appears to have been the earliest to speak of life as a product of 'the moist element as it was evaporated by the sun.' Aristotle (B.C. 384–322) accepted abiogenesis with limitations, applying it to parasites, certain invertebrates, and a few vertebrates, as eels (the mode of generation of which was, until recent times, a mystery), but not to animals in which sexual organs are apparent. Lucretius (*c.* B.C. 95–51) speaks of 'many living creatures, even now, springing out of the earth and taking form by the rains and the heat of the sun' (*de Rerum Natura*, v. 795, 796).

It was not until the latter half of the 17th cent., nearly fifty years after Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood, that the doctrine of spontaneous generation was assailed, and that by the only effective weapon—experiments. These were started by an Italian scholar-naturalist, Francesco Redi (1626–1698), and, like other methods which have led to momentous results, were simplicity itself. Observing how rapidly dead flesh, exposed to the air, swarmed with maggots, he put some pieces of meat into a jar which he covered with fine gauze, leaving other pieces exposed. In the one case no maggots appeared, while, in the other, they were as numerous as usual. The inevitable conclusion was that the maggots were hatched from eggs deposited by blowflies on the dead stuff. A temporary reaction against Redi's conclusions was brought about by Needham (1713–1781) and Buffon (1707–1788), who adduced the case of animalcules which, after a certain lapse of time, appeared in infusions boiled and hermetically sealed. But Spallanzani (1729–1799) showed that the air had not been wholly excluded from the infusions, the animalcules in which, by reason of inadequate heating, remained undestroyed. The discovery of oxygen (by Priestley, in 1776), the presence of which is essential to life, compelled the repetition of experiments 'under conditions which would make sure that neither the oxygen of the air nor the composition of the organic matter was altered in such a manner as to interfere with the existence of life.' Schultze and Schwann (1836–1837), after boiling the infusions, and supplying air passed through red-hot tubes, the properties of its oxygen being unaffected thereby, although organic matter in it would be destroyed, found no animalcules, which, however, were present in the infusions not supplied with purified air. There followed other experiments, carried on by Cagniard de la Tour, the illustrious Helmholtz, and others, which differed from the foregoing only in completeness of detail, and, therefore, do not need recapitulation in this summary. Each in turn was more effective in destroying whatever agents were essential to the reproduction of life in the infusions. Thus were laid slowly, but surely and abidingly, the foundations of the bacteria or germ theory which has revolutionized old theories of diseases and old methods of attacking them. As recently as 1859, Pouchet reported that he had effected the generation of microscopic animals from inorganic substances. This prompted Pasteur and Tyndall to demonstrate, with a precision hitherto unapproached, that, despite the ubiquity of microbes, their activity and reproduction are rendered impossible where sterilization is effectively performed.

Thirty years ago, Dr. Bastian published a series of volumes embodying results of experiments which, he contends, support abiogenesis. In 1904, M. Dubois, of Lyons, reported the production of living germs in a sterilized medium under the agency of radium, and in 1905 the question was reopened by Mr. Butler Burke, of the Cavendish Laboratory, Cam

bridge, who stated that, as the result of experiments made with radium bromide (which appears to have a destructive effect on micro-organisms) and sterilized beef-gelatine in sealed tubes subjected to a temperature above the boiling point of water, there had appeared minute 'cultures' or growths of globe-shaped bodies, which, on reaching a given stage, subdivided. Mr. Butler Burke inclines to the conclusion that they are organisms on the border lines between microbes and crystals, and, provisionally, he names them 'radiobes.' But their organic character is not established to the satisfaction of competent authorities. The fundamental identity of the living and the not-living being admitted (proof of advance thereto being furnished by the production of organic compounds from inorganic matter in our chemical laboratories), there is no warrant for the contention that abiogenesis is impossible in the present or the future. All that can be said is that the experiments which appear to favour the theory do not wholly exclude doubt as to complete sterilization, and consequent exclusion or destruction, of life-producing germs.

It is the demonstration of the universality of these micro-organisms in their innumerable myriads that has given impetus to antiseptic and prophylactic methods whereby unspeakable benefits have accrued to man and the lower animals. Louis Pasteur—warrior in the noblest of campaigns—was the benefactor not only of France, but of the world, in his application of remedies for diseases in plants and animals which threatened large industries with extinction. In the case of chicken cholera, he reduced the death-rate from ten per cent. to one per cent.; in that of anthrax or woolcomber's disease, which had killed off millions of cattle, the economic gain has been enormous; while perhaps his greatest victory was won in the treatment of those dread evils, rabies and hydrophobia. Lord Lister has acknowledged that Pasteur's germ-theory of putrefaction furnished him 'with the principle upon which alone the antiseptic system can be carried on.' Armed with antitoxins, the physician battles successfully with human ills, and one by one reduces the number of diseases hitherto ranked as inevitable and incurable. See also next art. and BIOGENESIS.

LITERATURE.—Redi, *Esperienze intorno alla Generazione degl' Insetti* (1668); Huxley, 'Biogenesis and Abiogenesis' (1870), *Collected Essays*, vol. viii.; Bastian, *The Modes of Origin of Lowest Organisms* (1871), *The Beginnings of Life* (1872), *The Nature and Origin of Living Matter* (1905); Butschli, *Investigations on Protoplasm* (1894); J. A. Thomson, *The Science of Life* (1899), ch. viii.; René Vallery-Radot, *The Life of Pasteur*, 2 vols. (1901); Chunder Bose, *Response in the Living and Non-Living* (1902); Meldola, *The Chemical Synthesis of Vital Products* (1904); J. Butler Burke, 'The Origin of Life,' *Fortnightly Review*, Sept. 1905.

EDWARD CLODD.

ABIOGENESIS (II.).—During the early phases of the earth's existence, before it cooled and consolidated, the conditions were such that no living creature like any we now know could have then lived there. At an uncertain but inconceivably distant date, after the earth became fit to be a home of organic life, living creatures somehow appeared.

(*a*) Preyer and others have suggested that germs of life, confessedly unlike any we now know, may have existed from the beginning even in nebulous masses, and that the origin of life is as futile a question as the origin of motion. It was not, indeed, the protoplasm we know that was encradled in the fire-mist; it was a kind of movement, a particular dance of corpuscles, different in its measures from inorganic dances. But there does not seem much utility in discussing a hypothetical kind of organism which could live in nebulæ; our conception of organic life must be based on the organisms we know. It is interesting, however, to note that Preyer strongly opposed the view that organic substance could arise or could have arisen from inorganic substance, the living from the not-living; the reverse supposition seemed to him more tenable.

(*b*) As far back as 1865, H. E. Richter started the idea that germs of life are continually being thrown off from the heavenly bodies, and that some of these found lodgment on the earth when it was ready for them. He also could not think of life beginning; his dictum was, 'Omne vivum ab æternitate e cellula.' To Helmholtz (1884) and to Sir William Thomson (Lord Kelvin) the same idea occurred, that germs of life may have come to the earth embosomed in meteorites. 'I cannot contend,' Helmholtz said, 'against one who would regard this hypothesis as highly or wholly improbable. But it appears to me to be a wholly correct scientific procedure, when all our endeavours to produce organisms out of lifeless substance are thwarted, to question whether, after all, life has ever arisen, whether it may not be even as old as matter, and whether its germs, passed from one world to another, may not have developed where they found favourable soil. . . . The true alternative is evident: organic life has either begun to exist at some one time, or has existed from eternity.' On the other hand, we may note that the word 'eternal' is somewhat irrelevant in scientific discourse, that the notion of such complex substances as proteids (essentially involved in every organism we know) being primitive is quite against the tenor of modern theories of inorganic evolution; and that, though we cannot deny the *possibility*, it is difficult to conceive of anything like the protoplasm we know surviving transport in a meteorite through the intense cold in space and through intense heat when passing through our atmosphere. The milder form of the hypothesis associated with the name of Lord Kelvin was simply one of transport; he wisely said nothing about 'eternal cells' or any such thing; he simply shifted the responsibility for the problem of the origin of living organisms off the shoulders of our planet.

So far, then, the suggestions are (*a*) that the physical basis of life is as old as the cosmos, and (*b*) that germs of organisms may have come from elsewhere to our earth. Apart from an abandonment of the problem as scientifically insoluble,—apart, that is to say, from the view that living creatures began to be in some way which we cannot hope to formulate in terms of the scientific 'universe of discourse,'—there is but one other possible view, namely, that what we call living evolved in Nature's laboratory from what we call not-living—a view to which the whole trend of evolutionist thinking attracts us. There are few living biologists who doubt the present universality of the induction from all sufficiently careful experiment and observation—*omne vivum e vivo*; Dr. Bastian is practically alone in believing that creatures like Infusorians and Amœbæ (highly complex individualities in their own way) can now arise from not-living material; but it is quite another thing to say that abiogenesis may not have occurred in the past or may not occur in the future.

But though many thoughtful biologists, such as Huxley and Spencer, Nägeli and Haeckel, have accepted the hypothesis that living organisms of a very simple sort were originally evolved from not-living material, they have done so rather in their faith in a continuous natural evolution than from any apprehension of the possible sequences which might lead up to such a remarkable result. The hypothesis of abiogenesis may be suggested on *a priori* grounds, but few have ventured to offer any concrete indication of how the process might conceivably come about. To postulate abiogenesis

as if it were a matter of course, seems to betray an extraordinarily easy-going scientific mood.

One of the few concrete suggestions is due to the physiologist Pflüger (1875), whose views are clearly summarized in Verworn's *General Physiology* (translation). Pflüger suggested that it is the cyanogen radical (CN) that gives the 'living' proteid molecule its characteristic properties of self-decomposition and reconstruction. He indicated the similarities between cyanic acid (HCNO) — a product of the oxidation of cyanogen — and proteid material, which is admitted to be an essential part, at least, of all living matter. 'This similarity is so great,' he said, 'that I might term cyanic acid a half-living molecule.' As cyanogen and its compounds arise in an incandescent heat when the necessary nitrogenous compounds are present, they may have been formed when the earth was still an incandescent ball. 'If now we consider the immeasurably long time during which the cooling of the earth's surface dragged itself slowly along, cyanogen and the compounds that contain cyanogen- and hydrocarbon- substances had time and opportunity to indulge extensively in their great tendency towards transformation and polymerization, and to pass over with the aid of oxygen, and later of water and salts, into that self-destructive proteid, living matter.' Verworn adopts and elaborates this suggestion. Compounds of cyanogen were formed while the earth was still incandescent; with their property of ready decomposition they were forced into correlation with various other carbon compounds likewise due to the great heat; when water was precipitated as liquid upon the earth, these compounds entered into chemical relations with the water and its dissolved salts and gases, and thus originated extremely labile, very simple, undifferentiated living substance.

Professor E. Ray Lankester, in his art. 'Protozoa' in the *Encyc. Brit.*[9], makes the suggestion, 'that a vast amount of albuminoids and other such compounds had been brought into existence by those processes which culminated in the development of the first protoplasm, and it seems therefore likely enough that the first protoplasm fed upon these antecedent steps in its own evolution.'

Dr. H. Charlton Bastian suggests, in regard to the *first* origin of living matter upon the earth, that the nitrate of ammonia which is known to be produced in the air during thunderstorms, and is discovered in the thunder-shower, may have played an important part in the mixture of ingredients from which the hypothetical natural synthesis of living matter was effected. Mr. J. Butler Burke postulates original vital units or 'bio-elements,' which 'may have existed throughout the universe for an almost indefinite time,' which are probably 'elements possessing many of the chemical properties of carbon and the radio-active properties of the more unstable elements,' and which, by interacting on otherwise present carbon-compounds, probably gave rise to cellular life as we know it to-day.

It must be admitted that, in spite of these and other concrete suggestions, we are still far from being able to imagine how living matter could arise from not-living matter. In postulating possible processes which may have occurred long ago in Nature's laboratory, it seems desirable that we should be able to back these up with evidence of analogous processes now occurring in Nature,—the usual mode of argument in evolutionist discourse,—but these analogues are not forthcoming at present. It is usual to refer to the achievements of the synthetic chemist, who can now manufacture artificially such natural organic products as urea, alcohol, grape sugar, indigo, oxalic acid, tartaric acid, salicylic acid, and caffeine. But three facts should be borne in mind: (1) the directive agency of the intelligent chemist is an essential factor in these syntheses; (2) no one supposes that a living organism makes its organic compounds in the way in which many of these can be made in the chemical laboratory; and (3) no one has yet come near the artificial synthesis of proteids, which are the most characteristic substances in living matter.

We are in the habit of comparing what man can do in the way of evolving domesticated animals and cultivated plants with what we believe Nature has done in the distant past. Why, then, should we not argue from what the intelligent chemist can do in the way of evolving carbon compounds to what Nature may have done before there was anything animate? There is this difference, among others, in the two cases, that in the former we can actually observe the process of Natural Selection which in Nature takes the place of the breeder, while we are at a loss to suggest what in Nature's as yet very hypothetical laboratory of chemical synthesis could take the place of the directive chemist.

Thus Professor F. R. Japp, following Pasteur, pointed out in a memorable British Association address that natural organic compounds are 'optically active' (a characteristic property which cannot be here discussed), that artificially prepared organic compounds are primarily 'optically inactive,' that by a selective process the intelligent operator can obtain the former from the latter, *but* . . . it is difficult to conceive of any mechanism in nature which could effect this. 'No fortuitous concourse of atoms, even with all eternity for them to clash and combine in, could compass this feat of the formation of the first optically active organic compound.' 'The chance synthesis of the simplest optically active compound from inorganic materials is absolutely inconceivable.'

Not content, however, with indicating the difficulty which the believer in abiogenesis has here to face, Professor Japp went on to say—perhaps, in so doing, leaving the rigidly scientific position: 'I see no escape from the conclusion that, at the moment when life first arose, a directive force came into play—a force of precisely the same character as that which enables the intelligent operator, by the exercise of his will, to select out one crystallized enantiomorph and reject its asymmetric opposite.' After prolonged discussion, and in view of various suggestions of *possible* origins, he wrote: 'Although I no longer venture to speak of the *inconceivability* of any mechanical explanation of the production of *single optically active compounds asymmetric always in the same sense*, I am as convinced as ever of the *enormous improbability* of any such production under chance conditions.'

Apart, then, from the fact that the synthesis of proteids seems still far off, apart also from the fact that there is a great gap between a drop of proteid and the simplest organism, we have perhaps said enough to show that the hypothesis of abiogenesis is not to be held with an easy mind, attracted as we may be to it by the general evolutionist argument.

In thinking over this difficult question, there are two cautions which should be borne in mind. We must not exaggerate the apartness of the animate from the inanimate, nor must we depreciate it. On the one hand, we must recognize that modern progress in chemistry and physics has given us a much more vital conception of what has been libelled as 'dead matter'; we must not belittle the powers of growth and regrowth which we observe in crystals, the series of form-changes

through which many inorganic things, even drops of water, may pass; the behaviour of ferments; the intricate internal activity of even the dust. When we consider, too, such phenomena as 'latent life' and 'local life,' and the relatively great simplicity of many forms and kinds of life, we do not find it altogether easy to discover absolute, universal, and invariable criteria to distinguish between animate and inanimate systems, or between the quick and the dead. To some extent, also, the artificial synthesis of complex organic compounds, and the ingenious construction of 'artificial cells' which closely mimic the structure of living cells, though no one supposes that they are in the faintest degree 'alive,' serve to lessen the gap which seems at first so wide.

On the other hand, it is the verdict of common sense and exact science alike that living creatures stand apart from inanimate systems. The living creature feeds and grows; it undergoes ceaseless change or metabolism, and passes through a cycle of changes, yet has a marvellous power of retaining its integrity; it is not merely a self-stoking, self-repairing engine, but a self-reproducing engine; it has a self-regulative development; it gives effective response to external stimuli; it profits by experience; it co-ordinates its activities into unified behaviour, it may be into intelligent deeds and rational conduct; even in very simple animals (Infusorians) there are hints of mind. Allowing for the gradual realization of potentialities in the course of evolution, we cannot but feel that if the living emerged from the not-living then our respect for not-living matter must be greatly enhanced. As a matter of fact, however, we cannot at present re-describe any vital behaviour in terms of physical and chemical categories, and the secret of the organism has to be admitted as such whether we advance to a vitalistic statement of it or not.

Finally, let us suppose that some bold experimenter in the border-land between chemistry and biology, a man like Prof. Jacques Loeb of Chicago, succeeded this year or next year in making, not merely a corpuscle of proteid, but a little living thing, by some ingenious synthesis. What then? (*a*) It is quite likely that the steps leading to this hypothetical achievement might be as unlike those which, on the hypothesis of abiogenesis, once occurred in Nature's laboratory, as the artificial synthesis of, say, oxalic acid is unlike what takes place in the sorrel in the wood. (*b*) At present we cannot assert that the laws of the movements of organic corpuscles can be deduced from the laws of motion of not-living corpuscles,—continuous as we may believe cosmic evolution to have been,—and the artificial production of a living creature would not enable us to make this assertion. What simplification of descriptive formulæ the future has in store for us no one can predict. We may have to simplify the conceptual formulæ which we use in describing animate behaviour, and we may have to modify the conceptual formulæ which we use in describing inanimate sequences, but at present the two sets of formulæ remain distinct, and they would so remain even if a little living creature were manufactured to-morrow. (*c*) If we discovered a method of artificially producing an organism, as Loeb has discovered a method of inducing an egg to develop without fertilization, it would render the hypothesis of abiogenesis more credible. We would then *know*, what no naturalist at present knows, however strongly he may believe it, that what we call not-living has in it the potentiality of giving origin to what we call living. But the hypothetical discovery would in no way affect the dignity and value of living creatures, or of our own life. (*d*) If it came about that we were able to bring materials and energies together in such a way that living creatures of a simple sort resulted, we should still have to remember that we had acted as directive agents in the synthesis. (*e*) Finally, if the experiment succeeded, we should not have arrived at any *explanation* of life. We should be able to say that, given certain antecedent conditions, certain consequences ensue, but we should still be unable to answer the question *how* or *why*. We should have a genetic description of an occurrence, but no explanation of it. For that is what science never supplies.

In conclusion, to quote Principal Lloyd Morgan, 'Those who would concentrate the mystery of existence on the pin-point of the genesis of protoplasm, do violence alike to philosophy and to religion. Those who would single out from among the multitudinous differentiations of an evolving universe this alone for special interposition, would seem to do little honour to the Divinity they profess to serve. Theodore Parker gave expression to a broader and more reverent theology when he said: "The universe, broad and deep and high, is a handful of dust which God enchants. He is the mysterious magic which possesses,"—not protoplasm merely, but—"the world."'

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J. ARTHUR THOMSON.

ABIPONES.—A tribe of South American Indians, of Guaycuran stock, who formerly roved from the head waters of the Rio Grande in Bolivia to the Vermejo in Argentina, although their central habitat was the Gran Chaco, west of the Paraguay River, in Northern Argentina and Paraguay. About 1780 the tribe numbered some 5000, but it is now supposed to be extinct, like the kindred Caduves, Payaguas, Lenguas, and their own destroyers, the Mocovis (J. Deniker, *Races of Man*, London, 1901, pp. 572–573). Practically the only information concerning them is that given by Martin Dobrizhoffer, a Jesuit missionary who resided among them for seven years. They are described as tall and well formed, while in their habits they were nomads and hunters. They were well clad, and were fond of adornment and of painting themselves. Both sexes were tattooed by pricking the skin with thorns and smearing the bleeding wound with fresh ashes, thus leaving an indelible black outline. The males were tattooed with a cross on the forehead, and the women with the cross, as well as an ornamental design, on the face, breast, and arms. This operation was performed at the age of puberty, and was designed to render a girl sufficiently attractive to win a husband, and also to test her courage. Males above the age of seven wore labrets, the most esteemed being of brass or (for the chiefs) of a sort of gum. These adornments came down to the breast; and both sexes distended the lobes of the ears until they almost reached the shoulder. Dobrizhoffer ascribes to them an ethical system of singular attractiveness. Their chastity was remarkable, and they observed the uttermost decorum and modesty in clothing, deportment, and conversation. Their courtesy was invariable; captives were treated with all kindness, and the torture of prisoners was unknown, although for trophies they cut off the heads or skinned the faces of those slain in war. Annual feasts in honour of victories were celebrated with merrymaking and with copious indulgence in wine made of *alfaroba* or

honey, the only vice of the Abipones being intoxication. In temperament they were somewhat phlegmatic, not being reckless in war, despite their undoubted bravery.

Their superb physique was due, in great measure, to the fact that consanguineous marriages were forbidden, and that early sexual excess was said to be unknown, while men did not marry under the age of thirty, or women under twenty. At the birth of a child the father practised the couvade (*q.v.*). Infanticide and abortion were common, each woman killing all her children but two. The custom of infanticide was increased by the suckling of infants for three years, during which time the husband was denied all marital rights, and consequently often married again—marriage being terminable at his will. On the other hand, polygamy was rare, and even when practised the wives were not required to live together lest they should become jealous. Fidelity in marriage was almost invariable. A curious deviation from the ordinary usage of infanticide is found in the fact that girls were killed less often than boys, since parents received large sums for giving their daughters in marriage, while sons were required to pay heavy dowries to the parents of their brides.

In their religion, Dobrizhoffer states that the Abipones had little taste for meditation, speculation, or reasoning, although they were cunning imitators. According to him, they had no word for God, but reverenced an 'evil spirit' (who seems, however, to have had no qualities essentially evil). This deity was called Aharaigichi or Queevet, and also 'grandfather' (Groaperike), and it was he who gave the Abipones valour and the Spaniards riches. Aharaigichi was represented by the Pleiades. When this constellation disappeared from the horizon, the Abipones thought him sick and in danger of extinction; so they celebrated the rising of the Pleiades in May by feasting, dancing, and singing. The cult was maintained by priests (*keebet*), to whom Aharaigichi had given supernatural power. These 'jugglers,' as the good Jesuit calls them, were much feared, since when angry they could transform themselves into invisible and invulnerable tigers. To the malice of the *keebet* was ascribed death, and the Abipones quaintly said that were it not for the *keebet* and the Spaniards, they would never die. Thunder and lightning were supposed to be obsequies of a dead *keebet*, and bones and other relics of these medicine-men were carried by the Abipones in their wanderings. In addition to thunder and lightning, comets and eclipses of the sun and of the moon were objects of terror. Besides the *keebet*, old women, who gathered in bands to perform secret rites with wailing and discordant drumming, were dreaded, especially as they were able to conjure up the dead.

Immediately after death, the heart and tongue of the deceased were boiled and given to a dog to eat, in order that the *keebet* who had caused the dissolution might himself perish. Relatives and friends shaved their heads in sign of mourning, and the women wailed for nine days and nights, the nocturnal lamentations being restricted to those who were specially invited for the purpose. A woman might also wail whenever she remembered a dead ancestor, whereupon all others of her sex who heard her were expected to unite with her in howling lugubriously. All mention of the name of the dead was avoided; his house was destroyed, and his relatives and friends changed their names. The soul was believed to survive the body, although the Abipones had no clear idea of its fate. The ghosts of the dead, however, were the objects of intense dread, and were supposed to enter into small ducks called *ruilile*, which fly in flocks by night, and have a doleful hissing note. On the grave were placed, for the use of the dead, a water-pot, a garment, weapons, and the bodies of his horses and cattle which had been killed at the time of his death. The graves of ancestors were venerated,—thus clearly implying the existence of ancestor-worship,—and their bones were often repeatedly exhumed by the Abipones in the course of their wanderings, and carried from place to place, until they could finally be buried in the family burial-ground which contained the bodies of their kin.

LITERATURE.—M. Dobrizhoffer's *Historia de Abiponibus, equestri bellicosaque Paraguariæ natione* (3 vols., Vienna, 1784; English translation: *Account of the Abipones, an Equestrian People of Paraguay*, by Sara Coleridge, 3 vols., London, 1822).

LOUIS H. GRAY.

ABNORMALITIES (Biological).—In biology, the term 'abnormality' is used in a comprehensive sense to describe forms of life, or parts or structures thereof, differing in appearance or constitution from such of their fellows as are shown by statistics to be so closely similar that for general purposes they may be regarded as identical, or, in other words, normal. It is now acknowledged that all organisms are variable, and that, while we tacitly ignore the smaller degrees of variation from the mean,* yet we do recognize the variations of higher degree, and these we call abnormalities. Once again, abnormalities may be defined as the more aberrant of the variations to which every organism, and every structure, is liable or subject. The most extreme cases of abnormality will be described separately as 'monsters' (cf. art. MONSTERS), though it must be remembered that no true line of distinction exists, and that, as has just been stated, they are really the extreme instances of abnormalities.

With the exclusion of monsters, the field of our subject is somewhat narrowed. It remains to review briefly the classes of these aberrant forms, and to indicate the importance of their study in biology. Abnormalities may be classified in various ways. One of the most comprehensive schemes is that proposed by Professor Macalister in his *Boyle Lecture* (1894). It includes nine categories or classes, viz.: the abnormalities of (1) quantity, (2) material, (3) repetition, (4) cohesion, (5) alternation, (6) position, (7) series, (8) inheritance, (9) new formation. For present purposes it is, however, most convenient to review briefly (1) the origin of abnormalities, and (2) their transmission from parent to offspring.

1. Origin of abnormalities.—In some cases an origin can be discerned and a cause assigned. Thus (*a*) interference with the normal course of development is evidently the determining cause in certain instances. A typical example met with in medical practice is the individual in whom the development of the partitions within the heart has been affected. In such instances the blood is not properly aerated, and the patient has a 'cyanotic' aspect, *i.e.* he looks blue and cold. The study of the developmental history of animals has shown that any interference can produce more profound and extensive changes when acting in the earlier stages of growth than in the later period. And progress in embryological science has shown how some of the observed effects may be produced. Thus in the higher animals, for instance, an aberration of growth can be referred to defects in the body of the embryo itself, though in other cases the membranes immediately surrounding the embryo or the adjacent maternal tissues are capable, if themselves imperfect, of reacting on the embryo so as to modify its form. The effect may seem to be produced either directly or

* In a fuller discussion of this part of the subject, attention would have to be directed to the difference between what are termed respectively the 'mean' and the 'mode' of any series.

mechanically, or yet again, the result may be due to an indirect cause in turn determined by interference with nutrition. Again, (*b*) the nutrition, and the quantity and quality of the food, are alone capable, if altered, of leading to deviations from the ordinary course of events, sufficiently marked to come within the definition of abnormality. Cases of hypertrophy, overgrowth, or gigantism fall under this heading. (*c*) In other cases, no such obvious interference can be detected or held accountable. And among these, even if those examples are eliminated in which by analogy there is a fair show of reason for believing that they fall under heading (*a*) or (*b*) as above (though the acting cause is not quite so clear), there is a remnant of instances in which it does not seem justifiable to invoke causes of this kind. Pending the discovery of a more intelligible explanation, the only course open to biologists in such cases is to recognize in living matter an inherent power, or capability, of producing abnormalities, or, as they are sometimes termed, 'sports.'

2. **Transmission from parent to offspring.**—The transmission of abnormalities from parent to offspring is inconstant and uncertain. The study of this question is inseparably connected with that of the transmission of those more constant features which distinguish the normal individual. The discussion of this problem is beyond the scope of this article, and it will suffice to state that abnormalities can even be classified according as they are constantly transmitted, or not so constantly transmitted, from parent to offspring. It is thus possible to distinguish the former, or constantly transmitted varieties, now termed 'mutations,' from the latter, not so constantly transmitted, now called 'fluctuations.' The importance of this distinction depends on the relation of this subject to the problem of the origin of the species met with in organic nature. In nature the occurrence of abnormalities, and the difference (just remarked) concerning their transmissibility, are facts of observation concerning which there is nothing speculative. But, granted the production of abnormalities, and the greater capability for propagation of some (through inheritance), with, at the same time, the lesser tendency to persistence shown by others, the ground is cleared for the erection of a theory of the origin of organic species through transformation. This seems to depend further upon the postulate that certain kinds of abnormality confer upon the individual exhibiting them an advantage not shared by his congeners. Hence, were the advantage to be maintained, the abnormal stock might in time outnumber the original stock. But the latter would then no longer be the normal stock, for by definition the normal must be in a majority, so that the type of the organism would have changed. Such a process, if it occurred on a large scale, would lead to the production of forms so different from their ancestors that they might well be classified as new species. It is not proposed to embark upon an examination of this position here, the main object in view being to draw attention to the importance of the study of abnormalities in biology.

LITERATURE (selected works in chronological order).—Darwin, *Origin of Species*, etc., 1859; Mendel, *Experiments in Plant Hybridisation*, 1865 (tr. by Bateson in Mendel's *Principles of Heredity*, 1902); Darwin, *Variations of Animals and Plants under Domestication*, 1867; Bateson, *Materials for the Study of Variation*, 1894; De Vries, *Species and Varieties, their origin by Mutation*, 1905; Punnett, *Mendelism*, 1907; Lock, *Recent Progress in the Study of Variation, Heredity, and Evolution*, 1906.

W. L. H. DUCKWORTH.

ABNORMALITIES (Psychological).—Human abnormalities, psychologically considered, are included within the great class of mental affections which owe their origin to arrested development of the brain. The development of the brain may be arrested, as the result of congenital malformation, or from the effect of disease in the earlier periods of existence. As a rule, it is by no means easy to differentiate congenital defect from that arising from interference with the natural course of development immediately before or after birth, but there is reason to believe that congenital malformation accounts for much the larger number of cases of feeble-mindedness.

Congenital mental defect is wholly or in part correlated with the development of the physical organization, especially with that of the nervous system; and it is rare to meet with imperfect congenital structure of the nervous system in the absence of other imperfections of the body. These imperfections of the body are technically known as physical stigmata. They are the outward signs of the nervous imperfections. It is acknowledged on all hands that the more grave the mental defect, the more numerous and the more grave are the physical malformations. Thus, as we pass up the scale from monsters to idiots, imbeciles, and the higher class of the latter, we find a gradually diminishing number of bodily malformations, quantitatively and qualitatively, until they disappear altogether and we emerge upon the apparently normal plane of the race so far as regards mental functions and bodily structure.

Besides the physical stigmata, there are certain well recognized mental stigmata, such as epilepsy, hysteria, alcoholism, chorea, and the various tics and obsessions which are the outward manifestations of underlying defects in the nervous system, especially in the brain. Although we know that every functional peculiarity must have an underlying organic basis, we are still very far from a knowledge of the intimate correlation between structure and function. The most important attempt to correlate mental power with the structure of the cortex cerebri has been made by Dr. J. S. Bolton, writing in Motts' *Archives of Neurology* for 1903. His observations, as yet unconfirmed, show that the pyramidal layer (second layer) of nerve cells in the pre-frontal cortex varies inversely in depth with the degree of amentia or dementia present in each case. This is the only layer that appreciably varies in depth in normal brains; the degree of its development in normal infants and in congenital aments (idiots) varies directly with the mental endowment of the individual, and the degree of its retrogression in demented patients varies directly with the amount of existing dementia.

Idiocy and imbecility are abnormalities connected by gradation with the more pronounced class of human monsters which are either non-viable or, owing to defective organization, unable to survive for any considerable time after birth. As the non-viable monsters and those which, owing to imperfect development, are unable to live through infancy, are all mindless, a description of them does not fall under the scope of the present article.

The present divisions of congenital mental abnormalities are (1) Idiocy, (2) Intellectual Imbecility, and (3) Moral Imbecility. It must be borne in mind that the following descriptions refer to types only, and that the forms of the various classes referred to merge into one another insensibly without any fast dividing differences.

1. **Idiocy.**—For clinical purposes and convenience of description, idiocy is frequently subdivided into (*a*) complete idiocy, and (*b*) ordinary idiocy.

(*a*) *Complete Idiocy.*—The greater number of the members of this group manifest scarcely any signs of psychical life. Their intelligence is of a very low order, and all the ordinary mental faculties are practically absent. There remains at the most a species of local memory, applicable to simple

habitual wants, and to the requirements of the moment. There is no will-power and no faculty of initiative. They have no command of articulate language, but some of them are able to make their few desires known by signs, cries, or sounds understood only by those in immediate attendance upon them. The presence of the ordinary instincts and sentiments is not revealed by such cases. Many of them do not appear even to be conscious of their own existence, much less of the ordinary feelings of pleasure, pain, fear, or love. In the great majority of instances the sexual instinct is absent. The only instinct they exhibit is that of hunger, and it is expressed only when food is presented before them.

On the physical side, the facial expression is marked by the most complete hebetude, relieved only by the occasional appearance of passing emotions of a superficial and vague kind. The general impression left upon the observer of one of these faces is one of a peculiar mingling of youth and old age. The form of the head is very variable, being microcephalic or macrocephalic, and the size of the face is generally disproportionate to that of the head, being in the former case too large and in the latter too small. The lips are thick, the tongue has a swollen appearance, and the saliva constantly overflows. The skin has an earthy colour, and is covered with an oily secretion which gives off an offensive odour. Most of these idiots are unable to walk, and when they can do so, the gait is tottering and uncertain, and all the muscular movements are in-coordinate and ungainly. Among the disorders of motility to which they are subject may be mentioned: general and local spasms, chorea, and epileptic convulsions; while contractures of the limbs, hemiplegia, and local paralyses are very common. They exhibit in abundance the ordinary stigmata of degeneration, such as cleft palate, hare-lip, disordered and irregular dentition, and dwarfism.

(*b*) *Ordinary Idiocy.*—Idiots of this class are, as a rule, fairly conversant with their immediate surroundings. Although they may know their own names and respond when addressed, their command of language is extremely limited; they are able to pronounce only a few words, or at most a few phrases, the correct significance of which they understand. They make particular use of interjections and nouns in conversation. It is impossible to train them either to read or write beyond the simplest words. Some of them show an aptitude for drawing imperfect resemblances of natural objects; but they are unable to count beyond certain limited figures, and arithmetic is entirely beyond their power. A great many idiots possess the faculty of imitation very strongly, but in most of them the imitative art is imperfect and grotesque. Many of them manifest affection to those with whom they live and who treat them kindly, but this feeling bears a stronger affinity to dog-like attachment than to the more reasoned human instinct of friendship. In short, their sentiments are usually confined to a crude appreciation of pleasure and pain, expressed emotionally in an unrestrained barbaric manner. They are, however, capable of a certain amount of training and discipline, as regards external behaviour. Thus, if properly trained, they may learn to dress themselves more or less tidily, to eat inoffensively, and to control their animal impulses; but if for any reason supervision is for long relaxed, they are apt to become degraded and repulsive in their habits.

In this class, as in the former, the body is stunted, and most of the individuals are ungainly and ugly in appearance. A great variety of physical stigmata and malformations are manifested by the subjects. In addition to microcephalism and macrocephalism, the shape of the head may be altered in one or other of the following ways,—namely, flattening of the crania' vertex or occiput, low or swiftly receding forehead, asymmetry of opposite sides of the head or face, prognathism and extreme vaulting, flattening, or asymmetry of the palate. The teeth are liable to numerous malformations; the second dentition may fail altogether, or, if it does occur, the teeth are badly formed and carious. In the eyes, strabismus, astigmatism, and anomalous pigmentation are frequent; in some cases the distance between the eyes is narrowed, while in others, as in the Mongolian type of idiot, they present the true Oriental appearance, being set far apart and almond-shaped. Idiots are subject to various disorders of the gastro-intestinal tract, especially to inflammatory conditions of the mucous membranes. The skin is usually pigmented and unhealthy-looking, and gives off an offensive odour.

About 25 per cent. of all idiots are subject to epilepsy. Most of them exhibit a tendency to instinctive impulses, irritability of temper, and occasionally to maniacal excitement. The physical resistance to disease of all kinds is extremely low, and tuberculosis is one of the most frequent causes of death. Few of them live longer than thirty years; in complete idiocy the duration of life is very much shorter.

2. Intellectual Imbecility.—It is often impossible to detect in early childhood any outstanding difference between imbeciles and normal children. In many instances it is only when education begins to be communicated that a radical difference shows itself in the greater inaptness of the feeble-minded to assimilate ordinary elementary instruction. As imbeciles approach the age of puberty, their mental defects become more apparent; besides being slow of apprehension and dull-witted, they are deficient in ordinary interest, in judgment, and in commonsense. Listlessness, inattention, and a tendency to become absorbed in subjective thought—commonly called 'day-dreaming'—are frequent symptoms of their intellectual feebleness, in addition to the symptoms which result from imperfect cerebral development. In a certain sense it may be said of them that they do not grow old with their years, and when they approach adolescence they do so without any appreciable increase of responsibility. They remain childish, easily satisfied with trifles, and display an interest and curiosity in things which have long ceased to interest people of the same age. The sexual instinct is early developed, and often manifests itself as an exaggeration or perversion of the normal condition. Mental conceptions, the association of ideas, and power of initiative are slow and difficult. Within their somewhat limited sphere of reasoning, which never passes into abstruse consideration, they think and act in a normally logical manner; yet they lamentably fail either in foreseeing the consequences of their actions or in understanding the more complicated actions of their normal fellow-creatures. The moral aberrations are as pronounced as the intellectual. Imbeciles are prone to be egotistic, vain, and sensitively proud. Family ties are apt to be loosely felt; the ordinary affection for relatives is generally feeble, and, although they may be capable of forming strong attachments to individuals, such feelings rapidly yield after short periods of separation. Religious and altruistic ideas as well as moral discrimination are not, as a rule, based upon conviction so much as upon habit and the discipline exercised by other people. Most imbeciles are untruthful and unreliable, more especially in small matters such as the appropriation of trifling articles, the property of other people. They are often irritable, and are subject to out-

bursts of rage or excitement, for inadequate reasons. Many imbeciles are able to earn a somewhat precarious livelihood by ordinary manual labour, or by working at some trade which they may have learned indifferently well, but the technique of which they are able to execute only imperfectly. Whatever work they do requires the active supervision and guidance of others. Their artistic sense is rarely developed to an exceptional degree, although a few of them are musical; while others exhibit an extraordinary memory for detail, or arithmetical powers wholly disproportionate to their general mental development.

Imbeciles are subject to attacks of mental excitement or depression, which have a tendency to recur periodically. It is during these attacks, especially of excitement, that they are prone to commit criminal or morbidly impulsive acts. A considerable proportion of them are afflicted with epilepsy.

The physical characteristics of imbecility are neither numerous nor important. The subjects are usually well developed, and their outward conformation differs but slightly from that of normal individuals. The facial expression, however, usually indicates a want of mental power; and certain speech-defects, such as lisping, stammering, and imperfect pronunciation, are common, to which may be added a tendency to misapply the meaning of certain words, and to misunderstand the grammatical use of certain parts of speech, such as adverbs and the infinitive mood of verbs. The physical resistance is lowered, and the activity of the various bodily functions is much less vigorous than in normal individuals. Hence it is that imbeciles succumb more easily to bodily diseases, especially such as are of infectious origin, and that a considerable number of them die of phthisis.

3. **Moral Imbecility.**—Whether or not congenital moral defect can exist independently of intellectual defect is a disputed question. We have already seen that moral defect is a concomitant of congenital intellectual weakness; but there undoubtedly occur cases of moral non-development in which the intellectual faculties are as vigorous as, or even surpass, those of ordinary individuals. We are therefore compelled to admit that congenital perversion of the moral nature may exist without any apparent intellectual defect. But a closer observation of such cases shows not only that they are non-moral in one or more particulars, but that they also exhibit eccentricities of conduct or singular and absurd habits, or the tendency to perform the common actions of life in an unconventional manner. Moreover, a prolonged observation of such persons reveals a liability in them to various forms of intellectual perversions, such as unfounded suspicions, gross superstitions, obsessions, delusions, hallucinations, and even confirmed insanity.

In the more pronounced forms of moral imbecility without apparent intellectual defect we find a wayward and impracticable temper, an absence of social instincts and of normal affection, which may even express itself as a positive aversion to relatives and friends. Such persons are incapable of realizing the value of truth, and become so notorious in this respect among the people who know them, that their statements on the most ordinary matters of fact are never believed. They steal systematically without shame, the only restraint being the fear of being found out. Perhaps their most prominent characteristic is their cruelty. It is not so much that they are ruthless in the pursuit of objects which they desire, as that they go out of their way to inflict pain presumably for the pleasure of witnessing suffering. They are, however, apt to be extremely resentful of injury to themselves, and seldom forget to avenge an insult. They are also vain, proud, and supercilious. They yield to the worst impulses of their lower nature without any evident desire to resist them, and they never express sincere contrition for any action. As might be expected, they cause endless grief and anxiety to their relatives, and their lives are lamentable failures from the point of view of worldly success. Their intellectual faculties, often very acute, are exercised in the gratification of their selfish desires or in the justification of their conduct, rather than in the pursuit of any continuous honest endeavours. As a rule, their affinity for evil courses leads them to indulgence in habits which tend to accelerate their degeneration and to terminate life prematurely.

In the case of children and young adolescents it is unwise to pass too hasty a judgment, for it may happen that the moral sense is not absent but only tardily manifested. In such cases the children may be bright, intelligent, quickly receptive, often emotionally impressionable,—perhaps to a morbid degree,—but lacking in the very elements of moral perception. Many of these individuals, as they approach adult life, begin to change radically in their moral nature, and some of them have even attained to saintliness and canonization.

There are, finally, many persons who never attain to the average moral sense, and whom no appeal based on moral grounds can touch, yet who are possessed of such clear reasoning powers and self-control, that they successfully conceal their non-morality by a rigid observance of the conventions of their fellow-men.

Pathology.—In congenital mental defect, especially in its more pronounced forms, such as idiocy, the brain convolutions present a simple arrangement suggestive of a tendency to revert to the type of the higher mammalia; thus they may either present few secondary folds, or be small, slender, and curling (*microgyri*). Arrested development of certain convolutions is frequently observed, especially in the frontal and parietal regions, which gives to the brain a peculiar and irregular appearance.

The size of the cerebrum relative to that of the cerebellum may be deficient, so that the latter is not covered over by the occipital lobes, as is the case in the carnivora and higher herbivora. Parts of the brain, most frequently the *corpus callosum*, may be absent, and many inequalities in the development of the two hemispheres have been recorded.

In the second and third layers of the cortex of the ape and in a similar situation in the cortex of the pig, Bevan Lewis (*Text Book of Mental Diseases*, 1899, p. 70) describes a perfectly globose cell, with a single delicate apex process and two or more, extremely delicate basal processes without any angular projection from the rounded contour of the cell. These cells occur in man only in cases of idiocy and imbecility. Hammarberg (quoted by Ireland, *Mental Affections of Children*) found the pyramidal cells fewer in number than in normal man. This confirms to a certain extent the observations of Bolton, referred to at the commencement of this article. If only small portions of the brain presented this paucity of cell development, while the remaining portions were normal, though having fewer cells than usual, the individual was, according to Hammarberg, not idiotic, but imbecile or weak-minded. Where the cells were not only abnormal in shape, but also, generally, very few in number, the idiocy was profound; where the cells were more numerous, though at places globose, badly developed or degenerate, there was more intellectual development, though the individual was still idiotic. Concomitant with these arrests in the development of nerve cells there is a corresponding diminution in cell pro-

cesses, and consequently in the number of the nerve fibres of the cortex. We thus see that the essential pathological condition in idiocy and imbecility is an arrest in the development of the cortical neurous, and that the degree of mental weakness depends upon the extent of the imperfect development of these elements.

JOHN MACPHERSON.

ABOR, ABOR-MIRI.—A title applied to a group of hill tribes of the Mongolian type, on the N. frontier of the Indian province of Assam.

The word *Abar* or *Abor* seems to mean 'barbarous' or 'independent.' The Miris, according to Dalton (p. 22), are so called because they acted as mediators between the Assamese and the more isolated Abors; and he suggests (p. 29) that the word is identical with the *miria* or *milia* of Orissa, which, according to him, has originated the title applied to the Meriah victim by the Kandhs (which see). But this is more than doubtful; and Dr. Grierson, to whom the question was recently referred, with more probability suggests that the word is *Mi-ri*, of which the first syllable in Tibetan means 'man,' and the whole compound may possibly mean 'nobleman' or 'gentleman.'

The Abors or Abars occupy a tract of country on both banks of the Dihang river, which is the upper course of the Brahmaputra. To the W. of this is the Miri country. Most of the Abors live outside British territory, within the Tibetan border, only 321 being recorded as British subjects at the Census of 1901. Of these, 53 were described as Hindus, 7 as Buddhists, and the remaining 261 as Animists. Of the Miris, 46,720 persons were enumerated within British territory at the same Census, of whom about half represented themselves as Hindu and half as Animist. They seem, like the tribes which occupy the hills on both sides of this group, the Mishmis (wh. see) to the E. and the Daphlas (wh. see) to the W., to be little affected by either Hinduism or Buddhism, and to be in the main Animists. Dalton (p. 25) states that when their children are lost, probably being kidnapped by the Mishmis, the Abors attribute their disappearance to the wood-spirits, in whom they firmly believe, and to each of whom some particular department in the destiny of man is assigned. Each disease has a spirit of its own, and, as they have no medicine for the sick, the only remedy is a sacrifice to the spirit to whom the illness is attributed. The favourite haunt of these spirits is a mountain called *Rigam*, which is held in awe by them. No one can return from it, hence its mysteries have never been disclosed. They acknowledge and adore one Supreme Being as the father of all, and have some vague belief in a future state; but their ideas on the subject are ill-defined, and Dalton, who heard them speak of a Judge of the Dead under the name of *Jam*, who is clearly the Hindu *Yama*, reasonably inferred that much of this belief had been borrowed from Hindu sources. Needham (*Assam Census*, 1901, i. 48) adds that the chief of the malignant spirits whom it is the main object of their religion to propitiate, is called *Apom* or *Epom*, and his younger brother *Pomsa*, both of whom inhabit the rubber tree, and must be propitiated in times of sickness. *Urom* is another malignant spirit who resides in unclean places, attacks people after dark, and causes stomachic pains and headaches. He is generally propitiated with an offering of some dry bones and spirits. *Kilū Delē*, who represent the male and female earth spirits of the Dravidians (which see), live underground, and destroy crops and other field produce. A sacrifice of two cooked fowls, rice, and other delicacies must be offered to them under the farm granary. *Nipong* is an evil spirit to whose malignity all female diseases are attributed, and he attacks men also with hæmorrhage and colic, which cause the sufferer to roll about like a woman in travail. He is said to live in plantain groves or amongst stinging nettles, on the seeds of which it is believed that he exists. Dalton notices one peculiarity in their sacrifices, that, when an animal is offered to the spirits, no one is allowed to have a share of the meat except the old and infirm, who may be regarded as being provided for in this way. They have no hereditary priesthood, but there are certain persons called *deodārs* who gain the position of soothsayers, from their superior knowledge of the science of omens. These officials practise divination by observing the entrails of birds and the liver of a pig.

One of these men informed Dalton that the whole human race is descended from a single mother, who had two sons, the elder a bold hunter, the younger a clever craftsman and his mother's favourite. She migrated to the W., taking her younger son with her and all the household utensils, arms, and implements. The people of the land who remained behind thus lost all knowledge of arts and handicrafts, and from them sprang the present Abors. The Western nations, including the English, are descended from the younger son.

The beliefs of the hill Miris closely resemble those of the Abors. But those who have migrated to the Assam plains have, to a large extent, abandoned the more savage beliefs of their wilder kinsmen. They have now come under the influence of the Order of Gusāins (wh. see) or of Brāhman priests, who have induced them to adopt, in some degree, the ordinary Hindu beliefs, but they have failed to wean them from their impure manner of living, such as the eating of fowls, pork, and beef, the use of intoxicating liquor, and the neglect of caste rules in the preparation of their food—all gross offences in the eyes of the Hindu, and much more dangerous than any heretical belief. Allen records that some Miris asserted that they believed in a future life, but they were careful to add that they had never heard of a dead man who returned to this earth. Their belief in the survival of the spirit is shown by the care taken that the dead shall be buried as if equipped for a long journey—with food, cooking utensils, arms, and ornaments suitable to his position in life, so that his rank may be made manifest to the Judge of the Dead. They also attach great importance to the burial of the corpse near the graves of its ancestors, and if a man of rank dies in the plains of a disease not regarded as contagious, they take pains to send his body to the family cemetery in the hills.

LITERATURE.—Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, 21 ff.; *JASB* xiv. 426 ff.; Gait, *Census Report Assam*, 1891, i. 221 f.; Allen, *ib.* 1901, i. 47 f.; Peal, *JASB* xli. 27; Hodgson, *ib.* xviii. pt. ii. 967; Robinson, *ib.* xviii. pt. i. 230.

W. CROOKE.

ABORIGINES.—In the article ETHNOLOGY it is pointed out that the four main divisions of mankind 'have not remained stationary in their respective original homes, but have been subject to great fluctuations during historic times.' But no rigid parting-line can be drawn between the historic and the prehistoric ages, which everywhere tend to merge imperceptibly one in the other. Hence the remark may confidently be extended to all times since early man first began those migratory movements by which he has replenished the earth. We know, for instance, that, during the Stone Ages, Europe was occupied by both long-headed and short-headed races, and Señor F. Outes has now shown that the same two types had already reached Austral-America in Pleistocene times (*La Edad de la Piedra en Patagonia*, 1905). It follows that the two primary divisions recognized by anthropologists have been intimately associated together for countless generations, and consequently that there are no more any pure stocks, except perhaps a few isolated groups, still surviving in some remote and hitherto inaccessible corners of the world, such as the Andamanese Islanders, the recently-discovered Toálas of Celebes, and the Fijian Kai-Colos.

The term 'Aborigines' is therefore generally to be taken in a purely relative sense, and the

claim often made by them to be regarded as true autochthones must be unhesitatingly rejected. They are normally 'mestizos,' in whom the physical and psychic characters of two or more races are intermingled in varying proportions. But the psychic character of primitive peoples finds its chief expression in their religious concepts, since their whole conduct is almost exclusively controlled by their views regarding the unseen world. Put in this way, the statement that their religious systems have been influenced by foreign contact follows of itself, and the inference that, as there are no longer any unmixed races, so there are no longer any unmixed religions, becomes almost a truism. The inference is certainly not quite obvious at first sight, although the analogous somatic mixtures, as between whites and blacks, are often self-evident. But that is only because mental are necessarily more subtle and elusive than material phenomena. The savage may hide his inmost thoughts regarding the supernatural, as he often does to casual visitors; but he cannot hide the constituent elements of his outward form from the searching eye of intelligent observers.

1. Thus the main physical features of the *Australian* aborigines have long been determined, while the source of many of their religious ideas is still the subject of heated discussions between the Spencers, Gillens, Langs, Frazers, and other serious students of primitive psychologies. The Narrinyeri people of South-East Australia have a 'god' or mythical being, Nurunderi, who dwells in a shadowy Elysium in the far west; and to reach this abode of bliss the souls of the dead have to pass under the sea and over a fiery pit, into which the wicked fall while the good escape. But such abodes of bliss and misery form no part of the genuine beliefs of the natives, who do not distinguish between morally good and wicked people; and careful inquiry has now shown that these are merely distorted reminiscences of the heaven and hell preached to the Narrinyeri tribe by the early missionaries.

The same god Nurunderi (Ngurundere) plays a great part in the myths of the kindred Tanganarin people of the Lower Murray River, and also affords a curious illustration of the way in which the Biblical stories get perverted in the minds of the natives.

This great King of Wyir (Heaven) had two wives, who caught a large and a small fish, keeping the first for themselves and giving him the little one. Discovering the fraud, he was very angry, and said, 'You shall die for this, and all Tanganarin shall die; and there shall be fighting and sickness, and evil spirits until then.' Ngurundere had created and done everything for them, giving them knowledge and skill in hunting, fishing, and fighting. But after the sentence of death for the trick played upon him by his wives, he took away their knowledge and power, left them, and ascended into heaven. Then they became ignorant and blind, and lived like the beasts of the field for a long time, till of a virgin was born a good and wise man named Wyungare. He gave them back their lost wisdom and power, and taught them sorcery; and when he had regenerated all the tribe, he was taken up to heaven by Ngurundere, and now reigns there as second King. And when a Tanganarin dies, Wyungare takes his spirit up to heaven, and gets him a good hunting-ground in that place, through his influence with Ngurundere. This might be called the Australian version of the doctrines of the Fall and the Atonement.

The native account of the Creation of the first man is more detailed than that of Scripture. The people of the present Melbourne district say that Punjil, Creator of all things, made two male blacks by cutting three large strips of bark with his big knife, and on one of them kneading a quantity of clay to the required consistency. Then he carried some of the dough to another of the strips, and began to mould it into a man, beginning at the feet and working upwards to the head. This he repeated on the third strip; and being well pleased with his work, he danced round about the two figures. He next made some hair out of stringy bark, curled for one man and straight for the other; and, being again pleased with his work, once more danced round about them. After smoothing their bodies with his hands, he lay upon them and blew hard into their mouths and nostrils until they stirred, when he danced round them a third time. He then made them speak and walk about, and they were finished.

The Dieris tell it differently. In the beginning Mûra-Mûra, the Good Spirit, made a number of small black lizards, and being pleased with them, promised them power over all creeping things. He divided their feet into toes and fingers, and with his forefinger added nose, eyes, mouth, and ears. Then he stood one on end, but it toppled over; so he cut off its tail, after which the lizard walked erect like a man. He did the same with another, which happened to be a female, and so the race was perpetuated. After a time mankind became very numerous and wicked, whereat Punjil, being angry, raised storms and fierce winds, which shook the big trees on the hill-tops. And Punjil went about with his big knife, cutting this way and that way, and men, women, and children he cut into very little pieces. But the pieces were alive, and wriggled about like worms, whereupon great gales came, and blew them about like snowflakes. They were wafted into the clouds, and by the clouds borne hither and thither all over the earth, and thus was mankind dispersed. But the good men and women were carried upwards and became stars, which still shine in the heavens.

Death came in this way. The first pair were told not to go near a certain tree, in which lived a bat which was not to be disturbed. But one day the women were getting fuel, and were tempted to go near the tree. Thereupon the bat flew away, and so death came into the world.

It should be noted that all these Creation myths have been gathered from tribes which have long been in association with the whites, and probably derived the substance and the moral tendency from the missionaries. The local colouring would gradually be supplied as the stories passed from tribe to tribe.

2. Similar Biblical legends are widespread among the *Masai* of East Africa, and here the parallelisms are so striking that Captain Merker can account for them only by supposing that the Masai nomads are a Semitic people who dwelt originally with the kindred Israelites in North Arabia, whence they migrated some 6000 or 7000 years ago to their present domain east of Lake Victoria Nyanza. Surprising coincidences are pointed out between the traditions, myths, legends, and religious observances of the two nations. The Masai *el-Eberet* is equated with *Eber* (Gn 10^{21}); *Hau*, 'Great,' with *Jahweh*; *Nabs* with *Abel*; *Narabâ* with *Abraham*; and it is shown that the Masai have also their ten commandments, the first of which is: 'There is one only God; heretofore you called Him *E'magelani*, "Almighty"; henceforth you shall call Him *Ngai*'; just as in Ex 6^3 *Shaddai* is replaced by *Jahweh*. Here we have unquestionably many Jewish religious notions superimposed on the primitive Masai animism. These were not, however, brought from Arabia thousands of years ago, but are obviously due to contact with the Judaizing Falashas of the neighbouring Abyssinian uplands (cf. M. Merker, *Die Masai*, Berlin, 1904).

3. In *Senaar* there is a curious intermingling of Muslim and animistic beliefs, which corresponds completely with the Negro and Semitic interminglings of its Funj inhabitants. These pass for fairly good Muhammadans; practise circumcision, make the pilgrimage to Mecca, have zealous faqîrs and dervishes (who act as teachers and scribes in the towns), and conform to most of the other Qur'ânic precepts. Yet beneath this thin Muslim veneer these Negroid natives are still sheer pagans, firmly believing in the gross superstitions which are associated with the wer-wolf notions referred to in art. ETHNOLOGY. Their much-dreaded *sâhirs* (magicians) are credited with the power of transforming themselves at night into hyænas and hippopotami, which roam about seeking to destroy their enemies, and inflict injuries even on the most devout Musalmâns. The *marafils*, as the metamorphized human hyænas are called, hold unhallowed cannibal feasts in the recesses of the woodlands, indicating their presence by their terrible howlings, just as wayfarers were stricken with awe by the midnight roar of the transformed human jaguars amongst the Aztecs of pre-Columbian times. In the daytime the *marafils* again

assume their human form, but are still dangerous, since a glance from their evil eye suffices to wither the limbs, the heart, or the entrails of their victims, who thus perish in the most horrible torments. To counteract these dire machinations, the scribes write passages of the Qur'ān on slips of paper, which are then burnt, and the smoke inhaled by those who suppose themselves threatened by the hostile *sāḥirs*. It would be difficult to imagine a more complete fusion of higher and lower religious forms than this inhaling of Qur'ānic texts against evil influences opposed to Qur'ānic teachings (see E. Marno, *Reisen im Gebiete des blauen u. weissen Nil*, 1874).

Featherman aptly remarks that 'Muhammadanism, introduced by the Arabs, has been adopted by some of the Nigritian nationalities of higher mental capacities, but they are Muhammadans *in their own way*. Christianity has also made some converts in isolated localities, but they are Christians *only in name*' (*Social History*, etc., i. p. 12). In some places, as in the West Sudan, the primitive pagan substratum has been partly overlaid by both of these higher religions, with the curious result that, for instance, some of the Senegal Wolofs have charms with texts from the Qur'ān which they cannot read, while others have medals and scapulars of the 'Seven Dolours,' or of the Trinity, which they cannot understand. Other violent contrasts are seen in the lofty conception of *Takhar*, 'god of justice,' associated amongst the neighbouring Serers with lowly household gods, such as the lizard, for whom the daily milk-bowl is set apart. Here again the fusion of higher and lower ideals is obvious enough, and so it is throughout Negroland, wherever the seething masses of heathendom have been touched by higher influences.

4. Turning to *India*, in this fathomless ocean of heterogeneous elements we are at once confronted with perhaps the saddest tragedy ever witnessed anywhere in the whole history of human development. Here are seen, not so much gross anthropomorphic systems leavened by contact with superior ideals, as the very reverse process of these ideals being themselves gradually contaminated and utterly debased by submersion in the great flood of aboriginal heathendom. The present writer has elsewhere shown (*East and West*, April 1905) that the whole of the peninsula, from the Himālayas to Ceylon, was occupied by these aborigines—Kolarians and Dravidians—ages before the advent of the tribes of Aryan (Sanskritic) speech, who may have reached the Panjāb from the north-west, some 5000 or at most 6000 years ago. It is clear from the Vedic texts (see VEDAS) that these proto-Aryans drew their inspiration from above; that their deities—Varuṇa, Indra, Agni, Sūrya, Dyaus, the Maruts—were all personifications of the forces of the upper regions, and were looked upon in the main as beneficent beings, who associated almost on a familiar footing with their votaries, from whom they accepted mild offerings of soma and the fruits of the earth, without exacting any gross or cruel sacrifices. On the other hand, the Dravido-Kolarian aborigines drew, and for the most part still draw, their inspiration from below, and their chthonic gods were really demons, ever hostile to mortals, and to be appeased by sanguinary rites and the sacrifice of everything most prized by the living. But, as the Vedic Aryans ranged farther and farther into the Indo-Gangetic plains, there took place those inevitable religious and racial intermixtures which resulted in the present Hindu populations and in the degraded forms of religion which collectively we call Brāhmanism or Hinduism. Over this monstrous system the triumphant Aryans spread the prestige of their language and general culture; but in the struggle they forfeited their heaven-born pantheon, which was replaced by the chthonic gods of the aborigines. As *Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit*, so here the Vedic Sun-god and Sky-god, Rain-god and Wind-gods were vanquished by the Dravido-Kolarian Viṣṇu, the Preserver, Mahādeva (Śiva, the Destroyer, with his wife Durgā or Kālī), Birmha Devī (the Fire Goddess), the gross symbolism typified by the *liṅga* and the rest. However disguised by a Sanskrit nomenclature, the true parentage of these entities is clearly seen, for instance, in the Śiva of the later Hindu triad, who is evolved out of the later Vedic Rudra, the Roarer or Storm-god, who guides and controls the destroying cyclone.

Thus was constituted the present Hindu system, in which, as we now see, the higher forms have been not merely influenced or modified by, but almost completely submerged in, the lower. Since the expulsion of Buddhism, which had prevailed for about 1000 years (B.C. 250 to A.D. 750), this exceptional process has again been reversed, and during the last 2000 years Brāhmanism has spread over the whole peninsula, absorbing or driving to the uplands all the primitive beliefs, and even attacking them in their last retreats in the Vindhyan range and the extreme southern highlands. Hence it is that even in these less accessible tracts unalloyed primitive forms are gradually disappearing. Still, enough remains to enable us to discriminate between the original Dravido-Kolarian and the intruding Hindu elements. Thus Mr. A. Krishna Iyer writes that the Malayars of Cochin 'are pure animists, but, owing to their association with the low-caste men of the plains and their attendance at the neighbouring village festivals, they have been imbibing the higher forms of worship.' Of their six gods two are demoniacal (chthonic), and four are merely different names for the Hindu Kālī, who was originally borrowed by the Hindus from the natives. From the higher castes are also taken Bhagavatī Bhadrakālī and Nagasāmī, who have penetrated into the neighbouring Kollencode forests, and are there worshipped with semi-Hindu rites, jointly with Muniappan and the other demon-gods, for all these aborigines are still everywhere at heart devil-worshippers. But these demons themselves, as well as all preternatural beings, are really human like the suppliants, only invisible and more potent. Hence 'they are held in fear and pious reverence, and their favour can be sought by sacrifice alone' (Iyer, MS. notes). Much the same account is given of the Eravallers of the Chittur forests, who also include Kālī amongst their demoniacal gods, and seek her protection with like offerings.

Amongst the Bhils, Kols, Gonds, and other *Pahārias* of the Vindhyan uplands, great respect is paid to Mahādeva, to whom have been consecrated the Mahādeo heights east of the Satpuras. He is even confounded with the chthonic Tiger-god, and associated with Bhīma, Arjuna, and other heroes or demi-gods of the Mahābhārata epic. Yet these almost Hinduized hillmen offered till lately human sacrifices to the various members of their limitless pantheon, which includes sun, moon, rocks, trees, torrents, the passing winds, and especially the departed spirits who return in the form of nightmare, sit on the chest, squeeze the throat, and suck the blood, like the vampires of the popular Slav legend (see ETHNOLOGY). So intermingled are the higher and lower forms throughout Gondwāna and the Southern highlands, that the Census agents are often puzzled how to return certain ethnic groups, whether as outcaste Hindus or Hinduized outcastes.

5. But this new field of research is boundless, and we must hasten through Indo-China, where

the superficial Buddhism is everywhere intimately associated with the never-dying animism, eastwards to the *Malay* lands, where analogous associations crop out everywhere between Islām and the still rampant heathenism of Borneo, Celebes, Gilolo, and Mindanao. Much light has recently been thrown on this religious syncretism in Celebes by the brothers F. and P. Sarasin, in whose *Reisen* (Berlin, 1905) the reader will find much instructive matter. The prevalent relations in the hitherto almost absolutely unknown island of Mindanao have also been revealed by N. M. Saleeby in his *Studies in Moro History, Law, and Religion*, vol. iv. of the Philippine Ethnological Survey Publications (Manila, 1905). Here the 'authentic' genealogies of the Moro (Muhammadan) dynastic families are interwoven with curious pagan elements, and we read of orthodox Sultans descended from unions not only with houris sent down from heaven, but also with a native princess found inside a bamboo stalk. This occurred at the time Tabunaway and Mamālu were cutting bamboo to build their fish corral. When the last tree was felled, out came a child who was called Putri Tunīna, and whose little finger was wounded, the *bolo* having cut through the bamboo, and from her sprang Mālang-sā-Ingud, third *datu* (king) of the Bwayan dynasty. The Mindanao Muslims have also assimilated some of the pagan folk-lore, and firmly believe in the Balbal vampire, a huge night bird, whose screech is supposed to be distinctly heard after sunset. It is really 'a human being who transforms at night into an evil spirit which devours dead people,' in this differing from other vampires, which come out of the dead and prey on the living. But so detested is the creature, that in the local Muhammadan code, here published in full, anyone calling another *balbal* is fined one slave or his value (p. 68). Thus in Mindanao it is again the higher Muslim system that is affected by the lower ideals of the aborigines, many of whom have withdrawn to the uplands of the interior, where interesting discoveries await future explorers in primitive psychologies.

6. Once more the balance is redressed in *Oceania*, where the more civilized Eastern Polynesians have inoculated the Western Melanesian cannibal head-hunters with their *mana* and other subtle religious essences. But in the process modifications naturally take place, and the Maori or Samoan *mana* is not, perhaps, quite the same thing as that of the New Hebrides savages. The Maori *mana*, brought from Hawaiki (Samoa?) to New Zealand by the kaka bird, is not easily distinguished from the forest, the human, and the other local *mauri*, and is generally defined as 'power, authority, influence, prestige' (A. Hamilton, *Maori Art*, p. 396). But the Melanesian *mana* is more spiritual, analogous to the Augustinian 'grace,' without which no works avail, but with which all things superhuman can be achieved. Thus a person may have *mana*, but is not himself *mana*,—a force which 'is present in the atmosphere of life, attaches itself to persons and to things, and is manifested by results which can only be ascribed to its operation'; and again: 'a force altogether distinct from physical power, which acts in all kinds of ways for good and evil, and which it is of the greatest advantage to possess or control' (Codrington, *The Melanesians*, pp. 118–119). But however homologous with, or divergent from, the Maori *mana*, this impersonal essence permeates the whole religious thought of the Melanesians, whose religion 'consists, in fact, in getting this *mana* for oneself, or getting it used for one's benefit—all religion, that is, as far as religious practices go, prayers and sacrifices' (*ib.*). And as the principle is admittedly derived from the more highly cultured Polynesians, we have here again a primitive system influenced, and, in this instance, somewhat elevated, by a more advanced line of thought. How primitive in other respects is the Melanesian system, may be seen from the belief current in the Banks' Islands that people may become *talamaur*, a kind of vampire which prowls about at night, and, like the Mindanao *balbal*, devours the bodies of the dead. In this and several other Melanesian groups lycanthropy also (see ETHNOLOGY) is widely prevalent, only here the non-existent wolf is replaced by sharks, owls, eagles, and blow-flies. These last are perhaps the most dreaded, since magicians assuming such minute forms can buzz about, penetrate unseen into the houses, and torment their victims with impunity. How such childish notions can persist side by side with the subtleties of the *mana* doctrine is a psychological puzzle awaiting solution.

7. Perhaps even more inexplicable is the pure animism of the crudest type still everywhere surviving amongst the cool-headed and practical *Chinese*, beneath, or rather almost above, several layers of higher forms, such as ancestor-worship, Buddhism, Taoism, and the common-sense ethical teachings of Confucius. It is impossible here to dwell on these different systems which are elsewhere fully described (see art. CHINA [RELIGION OF]). It will suffice for our purpose to point out that in China the various religions, or so-called religions, are, so to say, stratified or superimposed one on the other rather than intermingled, as mostly elsewhere. Hence the curious phenomenon that the Government recognizes three official religions,—Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism,—to all of which, in virtue of his position, the Emperor himself belongs, and whose observances he scrupulously fulfils, while millions of his subjects simultaneously profess these, and perhaps others, without any sense of incongruity. The several beliefs do not contradict each other, but lie peacefully side by side; and the devout Buddhist, after duly burning his tapers and incense to the innumerable idols of the joss-house, proceeds as an incurable Animist to take active measures to baffle the *Feng-shui* (evil spirits) by effacing the straight lines affected by them, and to encourage the *Fung-shui* (good spirits) by developing the curves along which they prefer to travel.

8. Coming *westwards*, we find the early and the late again amalgamated, and indeed so inextricably that only in recent years have folk-lorists and classical students begun to distinguish between the coarse chthonic gods of the Pelasgians and the bright Aryan deities of the Hellenes, which have so long been merged together in the Greek mythologies, as typified, for instance, by the marriage of the Uranian Aphrodite with the hirsute and deformed cave-dwelling Hephæstus. But the fusion of the pre-Aryan Pelasgians with the proto-Aryan Hellenes was a slow process, lasting for many generations, as is evident from the different social and religious institutions prevailing in various parts of Greece during the early historic period. Thus, of fetishism we find no trace in Homer, who represents the Achæan (Hellenic) side, whereas fetish worship long persisted in Arcadia, Attica, and other distinctly Pelasgic lands. So also with totemism and the dark Poseidon of the Pelasgians, who was finally eclipsed by the fair Apollo, Zeus, and the other Aryan gods of the Achaioi. After, or perhaps during, the fusion, other religious contacts took place, as shown by the Greek Adonis borrowed with *another* Aphrodite (Astarte) from the Semites. The conflicting accounts of these and other deities are but the results of the unconscious efforts of the ancient folk-lorists to harmonize the various legends of

originally distinct personalities, and are themselves a clear indication of the higher Aryan and Semitic influences brought to bear on the primitive religion of the Pelasgian aborigines. But these influences must not be pushed too far, as when Eduard Glaser imports the Vedic *Dyaus* into Greece (Zeus) and Italy (Jove), as well as into Israel (Jahweh). It is clear from the compound forms *Dyauspiter*, (Vedic Sanskrit), *Ζεῦ πάτερ* (Gr.), *Juvepatre*, *Jupater* (Umbrian), *Diespiter*, *Jupiter* (Latin), that this personification of the bright sky had already found expression in the Aryan mother-tongue, and was consequently a common inheritance of all the proto-Aryans who, after the dispersion, brought it *independently* into their Indian, Hellenic, and Italic settlements. Thus we have here no reciprocal influence of Aryans upon Aryans; but as to the same root belong the Avestan *daēva*, the Lithuanian and Lettic *Dēvas*, *Dēws*, 'God,' and other Western variants, it follows that the pantheons of the Iranian and European aborigines were enlarged and otherwise modified in remote prehistoric times by their proto-Aryan conquerors. What other early interminglings of religious systems may have taken place, as between Aryans and Ligurians in Italy, or Aryans (Celts) and Iberians in Spain, Gaul, and the British Isles, is a subject of too speculative a nature to be here discussed. One point, however, seems fairly well established, that the Semitic Phœnicians reached the far west with their Baal, who was adopted as one of their chief deities by the Ibero-Celtic peoples of Britain and Ireland. The expressions *Bal mhaith art*, 'may Baal prosper thee,' and *Bal Dhia dhuit*, 'God Baal be with thee,' were not so many years ago still addressed to strangers on the banks of the Suir in Tipperary (see J. Bonwick, *Irish Druids and Old Irish Religions*; H. O'Brien, *Phœnician Ireland*; D'Arbois de Jubainville, *Cours de Littérature Celtique*).

9. In *the New World*, effectively cut off from the Old most probably since Neolithic times, the interchanges of cultures and religious notions can have been only between the American aborigines themselves. But here also there were very great local developments, in virtue of which some, such as the Aztecs, Mayas, Zapotecs, Chibchas, Peruvians, and Aymaras reached a relatively high degree of civilization, while most of the others lagged behind, and are still at the barbaric or even pure savage state. These last have, till recently, stood for the most part aloof from all extraneous contacts, so that many, such as the Mexican Seris, the Caribs and Arawaks of British Guiana, the Brazilian Botocudos, and the Fuegian Yahgans, afford excellent object-lessons for the study of the earliest types of unmodified religious thought, but for that very reason do not come within the scope of the present inquiry. Thus, in America, the mutual influences are confined mainly to the more advanced cultural peoples, amongst whom interminglings appear to have been more the rule than the exception. Apart from the much discussed subject of the long-extinct Toltecs, it may be stated in a general way that the two great Aztec and Maya cultures betray undoubted proofs of endless borrowings, especially in matters associated with astrology, divination, and religious observances. Who were the givers and who the recipients may still be a moot point, but the contacts are not open to question.

E. Förstemann, who takes the Maya side against Seler and others, holds that 'the Aztecs adopted many things which they learned from the Mayas, especially their deities, whose names they simply translated. The translation of Kukulcan into Quetzalcoatl is a very typical case, for *kuk* and *quetzal* designate the bird *Trogon resplendens*, and *can* and *coatl* mean the snake. The Aztecs first came in contact with the higher civilization not very long before the arrival of the Spaniards, so that they did not have time to establish their supremacy and so absorb the Mayas, but, on the contrary, were absorbed by them' (*Mexican and Central American Antiquities*, Washington, 1904, p. 542). It is also shown that the *tonalamatls* which were common to all Central American cultured peoples, and were not calendars, but horoscopes covering a period of 260 days, the period of gestation, originated with the Mayas, and were slavishly copied by the Aztecs (*ib.* p. 527; see also Keane's Eng. ed. of Seler's *Elucidation of the Aubin Tonalamatl*, 1901).

Dealing with the wall-paintings of Mitla in the Zapotec domain (the present State of Oaxaca), Professor Seler shows that this cultured nation drew many of its religious inspirations from the neighbouring Aztecs. 'The conclusion seems inevitable that the cosmogonic representations referring to Quetzalcoatl, as well as the Olympus with its many personages occurring in the picture-writings, were not strictly national, did not have their roots in the Zapotec country, but represented *a superimposed culture* which owes its origin to the influence of Nahua tribes dating back to prehistoric times' (*Wandmalereien von Mitla*, Berlin, 1895).

On the other hand, the views advanced by the late Mr. Leland in *The Algonquin Legends of New England* regarding the old Norse origin of the north-eastern Indian mythology cannot be upheld. But although they are now shown to be untenable, later European influences have been at work, and Mr. Andrew Lang has found clear traces of Irish, French, and a few Anglo-American strains in many of the Passamaquoddy legends. Still, Prof. J. D. Prince, of Columbia University, holds that what is genuinely native 'stands forth with unmistakable distinctness in some of the Kulóskap tales,' that is, the witchcraft and other stories recorded in *Kulóskap the Master*, the joint work of himself and Mr. Leland. A. H. KEANE.

ABORTION.—See FETICIDE.

ABOULIA.—A mental disorder characterized by loss of volitional control over action or thought. There are three general types of *aboulia*. (1) In the purely ideational field it may occur as a result of the loss of inhibitive powers or of control of attention. In such cases, when a motive or impulse appears in consciousness with a preponderating force, there is an ill-balanced tendency to immediate action. The suggestion is without natural check, and rash and inconsiderate execution of it follows. The limiting cases of such disorder (sometimes termed *hyperboulia*) are to be found in the obsessions of fixed ideas, in hypnotic suggestion, etc., where the force of the suggested idea is so strong that there is no consciousness of competitive motor impulse (and hence none of volition). (2) Distinguished from this, but still in the ideational field, is *aboulia* which takes the form of extreme hesitancy. Where a series of ideas or impulses is presented to consciousness as alternatives, —that is, with equal or nearly equal suggestive power,—the loss of ability to inhibit prevents selection, and irresolution and failure to act at all are the result. It is probable that conduct which is often interpreted as extreme scrupulousness, or conscientiousness in affairs of no real moral moment, taking the form of indecision, is merely a manifestation of this type of *aboulia*. (3) *Aboulia* due to ideomotor derangement should be sharply discriminated from the preceding. It is due not to failure to make rational choice, but to inability to execute the choice made. Its psychical form is failure of the kinæsthetic equivalent, or motor image adequate to action, and its physiological basis is probably lesion or loss of tone in the association tracts. It shows itself in a sort of muscular stammering, repeated efforts being required to perform some ordinarily easy action. *Aboulia* is a characteristic neurasthenic condition, appearing in connexion with multiple personality, automatism, etc. It is the natural pre-condition of excessive susceptibility to suggestion.

LITERATURE.—Ribot, *Les maladies de la volonté* (1883); Janet, *Névroses et des idées fixes* (1898); Duprat, *Morals* (1903); Jastrow *The Subconscious* (1906). H. B. ALEXANDER.

ABRAHAM-MEN.—A class of sturdy beggars, who feigned to have been mad, and to have been kept in Bedlam for a term of years. 'Bedlam'—a lunatic asylum or madhouse—is a contraction for *Bethlehem*, the name of a religious house in London, founded as a priory in 1247, and in 1547 converted into a hospital for lunatics. Originally 'Abraham man' or 'Abraham cove' denoted an inmate of the lunacy ward under the patronage of the patriarch Abraham. On discharge from hospital he wore a badge for identification, and was formally permitted to roam the country as a 'Tom o' Bedlam' and solicit alms.

This character was personated by vagabonds and sturdy rogues, who wandered over England in a disorderly manner, feigning lunacy and preying upon the charitable. Hence the slang phrase, 'to sham Abraham.' Where begging failed they did not hesitate to live by pilfering, and, when detected in any depredation, they would plead the immunities and privileges of a Bedlamite. The character is common in Shakespeare's time, and seems to have survived till the period of the Civil Wars.

For a specimen of the language and demeanour of the Abrahammen, see speech of Edgar in *King Lear*, Act ii. sc. 3; for synonyms, Beaumont and Fletcher's *Beggar's Bush*, ii. sc. 1:—

'And these, what name or title e'er they bear,
Jackman, or Patrico, Cranke, or Clapper-dudgeon,
Fraier, or *Abram-man*, I speak to all.'

Cf. Awdeley's *Fraternitye of Vacabondes*, 1565: 'An Abraham man is he that walketh bare-armed and bare-legged, and fayneth himself mad, and carryeth a pack of wool, or a stycke with baken on it, or such lyke toy, and nameth himself "Poor Tom"' (ed. Early Eng. Text Soc. p. 3). See also Dekker's *Belman of London*, 1608: 'Of all the mad rascalls the Abraham man is the most phantastick. . . . The fellow that sat half naked (at table to-day) is the best Abraham man that ever came into my house, the notabiest villain: he swears he hath been in Bedlam, and will talk frantickly of purpose: you see pinnes stuck in sundry places of his naked flesh, especially in his arms . . . onely to make you believe he is out of his wits: he calls himself by the name of Poore Tom. . . . Of these Abraham men some be exceeding merry, and doe nothing but sing songs: some will dance: other will doe nothing but laugh or weep: other are dogged and so sullen both in look and speech, that, spying but small company in a house, they boldly and bluntly enter, compelling the servants through fear to give them what they demand, which is commonly bacon or something that will yield ready money.'

The great authority is Harman's *Caueat, or Warening for Common Corsetors*, 2nd ed., 1567.

W. W. FULTON.

ABRAVANEL (or ABARBANEL), Isaac (1437–1508).—Statesman and author, Don Isaac Abravanel shared in the general expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492. He had been in the service of King Alfonso v. of Portugal and Queen Isabella of Castile, and after his banishment acted as finance minister in the states of Naples and Venice. His fame now rests chiefly on his Commentaries on the Bible. He wrote on the Pentateuch, the Historical Books, and the Prophets, but not on the Hagiographa. Among the characteristics of his Commentaries, mention must be made first of his general prefaces to the various books. In this respect he deserves to be considered 'a pioneer of the modern science of Bible propædeutics' (Ginzberg). In addition, his Commentaries are remarkable for the use made of the knowledge of the world which the author had acquired in the vicissitudes of his public career. He thus takes account, in his exegesis of the Biblical histories, of political conditions and social life, and attempts to explain the Bible from the standpoint of its actual contemporaries. In this respect, too, Abravanel was an innovator, for he anticipated the modern principle which relies not solely on literary exegesis, but calls into play all available historical and archæological materials. Again, Abravanel makes free use of Christian Commentaries; he quotes Jerome, Augustine, Nicholas of Lyra, Paul of Burgos, and others. Thus he deserves credit for perceiving that there is room for an unsectarian exegesis—for an exegesis which shall attempt to explain Scripture without theological prejudice.

In all these points Abravanel's services were appreciated by Christians as well as Jews. 'No less than thirty Christian writers of this period—among them men of eminence, like the younger Buxtorf, Buddeus, Carpzov, and others—occupied themselves with the close study of Abravanel's exegetical writings, which they condensed and translated, and thus introduced to the world of Christian scholarship' (Ginzberg). Certainly Abravanel gains by compression, for his works are very prolix. They were often written in great haste. Thus his long Commentaries on Joshua, Judges, and Samuel occupied him only six months. Yet these Commentaries include some of his very best work.

The philosophical works of Abravanel are of less importance than the exegetical. His *Rōsh Amānāh* ('Pinnacle of Faith') is a treatise which aims at dissociating Jewish theology from philosophy; he upheld, against Maimonides, the view of miraculous inspiration. His Messianic books were very popular, and were often reprinted. In these he disputes alike the views of Christian and of Jewish rationalists. His *Yeshuoth Meshicho* ('Salvation of His Anointed') is a clear and full account of the Rabbinic doctrines concerning the Messiah. Abravanel himself claimed descent from the royal house of David.

LITERATURE.—Graetz, *History of the Jews*, Eng. tr., vol. iv. ch. xi.; M. H. Friedlander, *Chachme ha-Dorot* (1880), 136-150; L. Ginzberg in *Jewish Encyc.* vol. i. (1901) pp. 126–128 (where an alphab. list of A.'s works will be found); I. Abrahams, *A Short History of Jewish Literature* (1906), ch. xxi.; S. Schechter, *Studies in Judaism* (1896), ch. on 'The Dogmas of Judaism.'

I. ABRAHAMS.

ABRENUNTIO.—The renunciation of the devil at baptism is a custom which goes back certainly to the 2nd century. At first, as we see from the Patristic references, the renunciation was thought of as intellectual as well as moral, as a repudiation of heathenism with its teachings as well as with its vices and abuses; while later, after the triumph of Christianity (and so at the present day), the renunciation is thought of almost entirely as moral, as a promise to lead a good life.

The custom of interrogating the candidates to see whether they really gave up heathenism and believed in Jesus Christ probably goes back to Apostolic times; it would be a necessary precaution which could scarcely be dispensed with. Perhaps the earliest certain reference to it is the gloss of Ac 8^{37} AV, the confession of faith by the Ethiopian eunuch, which, though probably no part of the original text, is found in Irenæus and Cyprian, and must therefore reflect the usage of at least the 2nd century. It is quite probable, however, that the 'interrogation (*ἐπερώτημα*, not *ἐπερώτησις*) of a good conscience' in 1 P 3^{21} refers to the practice in question.

For our present purpose it is more important to know how the early Church interpreted 1 P 3^{21} than how it was intended by its writer; but as to the early interpretation we have no evidence. The commentators vary in their views. Almost all take *εἰς θεόν* with *συνειδήσεως ἀγαθῆς ἐπερώτημα*, and so the Peshiṭta ('not washing away . . . but confessing God with a clear conscience') and the Vulgate ('conscientiæ bonæ interrogatio in Deum'); some, like Alford, denying any reference to the baptismal interrogations, and rendering 'inquiry of a good conscience after God' (so RVm; cf. 2 S 11^{7}),—but if so, one would expect *ἐπερώτησις*; and others taking *ἐπερώτημα* to be the baptismal questions, as Œcumenius (11th cent.?), Hooker (*Eccles. Pol.* v. 63), Estius (*Com. in loc.*), de Wette, and others. Dr. Bigg (*ICC, in loc.*) also upholds the reference to the baptismal questions, but gives a strong argument for taking *εἰς θεόν* with *σώζει*, as corresponding to *εἰς ἣν διεσώθησαν*, just as *δι' ἀναστάσεως* corresponds to *δι' ὕδατος*. The translation in that case would be: '. . . the ark into which few . . . were brought safely through water, which also after a true likeness doth now bring you safely to God, even baptism (not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the interrogation of a good conscience), through the resurrection of Jesus Christ.'

Turning to the Patristic evidence, we may notice that Justin Martyr speaks (*Apol.* i. 61) of those who are being prepared for baptism 'promising to

be able to live according [to the truth].' The first witness for renunciations, however, is Tertullian. He says (*de Spect.* 4):—

'When entering the water, we make profession of the Christian faith in the words of its rule, we bear public testimony that we have renounced the devil, his pomp, and his angels. Well, is it not in connexion with idolatry, above all, that you have the devil with his pomp and his angels? . . . Our renunciatory testimony in the laver of baptism has reference to the shows, which through their idolatry have been given over to the devil and his pomp and his angels.'

Elsewhere (*de Idol.* 6) he says that idol-making is prohibited to Christians by the very fact of their baptism. 'For how have we renounced the devil and his angels if we make them?' In *de Cor.* 3, after describing the act of disowning 'the devil and his pomp and his angels,' he says: 'Hereupon we are thrice immersed, making a somewhat ampler pledge than the Lord has appointed in the Gospel.' So in the *Canons of Hippolytus*, which probably represent Roman or Alexandrian usage early in the 3rd cent., the candidate for baptism turns to the West and says: 'I renounce thee, Satan, with all thy pomp.' He is then anointed by the presbyter, and before being baptized turns to the East and says: 'I believe and bow myself in thy presence and in the presence of all thy pomp, O Father, Son, and Holy Ghost' [for the meaning of 'pomp' see below]. Other 3rd cent. writers mention the interrogations, but not the renunciations in particular. Cyprian (*Ep.* lxix. 2, [Oxford ed., lxx.] *ad Januarium*) gives the interrogations thus: 'Dost thou believe in eternal life and remission of sins in the holy Church?' So Firmillian (Cyprian, *Ep.* lxxiv. 10, [Oxford, lxxv.]) speaks of a prophetess in Cappadocia, 22 years before, who had baptized many, 'making use of the usual and lawful words of interrogation.' And Dionysius of Alexandria, writing to Pope Xystus (*ap.* Euseb. *HE* vii. 9), speaks of the questions and answers (*τῶν ἐπερωτήσεων καὶ τῶν ἀποκρίσεων ὑπακούσας*). It is clear, then, that in the 3rd and probably in the 2nd cent. the candidates made an act of submission to God at baptism as well as a renunciation of the devil.

The same thing is also evident in the 4th century. The act of submission might be the recital of a creed ('redditio symboli'), which had been taught to the candidates during their catechumenate ('traditio symboli'); or it might be a simple formula, or both the formula and the creed. In Cyril of Jerusalem (*Cat. Lect.* xix. 2–9) we read of the candidate first facing West, because 'the West is the region of sensible darkness,' and Satan, 'being darkness, has his dominion also in darkness,' whereas the East is 'the place of light.' He says, stretching out his hand: 'I renounce thee, Satan, and all thy works, and all thy * pomp, and all thy service (*or* worship, *λατρείαν*).' The word 'pomp' is explained as being the shows, horse races, hunting, and all such vanity; the word 'service' as idolatry, prayer in idol temples, etc. Then the candidate faces East and says: 'I believe in the Father, and in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost, and in one baptism of repentance,' and is anointed and baptized. The renunciation and submission are pronounced in the outer chamber; the anointing and baptism follow in the baptistery, where the candidate is again asked whether he believes in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost (xx. 4). It does not appear that at Jerusalem in Cyril's time the Creed was recited *at baptism*. Of the 4th cent. *Church Orders* we may first cite the Egyptian and Ethiopic *Orders*, which are almost alike. The candidate says: 'I renounce thee, Satan, and all thy service and all thy works' (Ethiopic: 'all thy angels and all thy unclean works'); he is then anointed, and a long creed takes the place of the formula of submission. Turning to the West and East is not mentioned in these two *Church Orders*. In the corresponding part of the *Verona Latin Fragments of the Didascalia* (ed. Hauler) there is a lacuna. In the *Testament of our Lord* (ii. 8) the candidate turns to the West and says: 'I renounce thee, Satan, and all thy service (lit. 'military service'), and thy shows (lit. 'theatres'), and thy pleasures, and all thy works.' After being anointed, he turns to the East and says: 'I submit to thee, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost,' etc.* In the *Apostolic Constitutions* the form is somewhat different (vii. 41). The renunciation is: 'I renounce (*ἀποτάσσομαι*) Satan, and his works, and his pomps, and his worships, and his angels, and his inventions, and all things that are under him.' This is immediately followed by the act of submission: 'I associate myself (*συντάσσομαι*) with Christ, and believe and am baptized into one unbegotten Being,' etc. (a long creed); then come the anointing and baptism. Turning to the West and East is not mentioned; but later, after confirmation, the neophyte is directed to 'pray towards the East' (vii. 44). We have some confirmatory evidence from other 4th cent. writers. St. Basil (*de Spir. Sancto*, xi. [27]) says: '[Apostates] have set at naught their own confessions . . . belief in the Father, and in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost, when they renounced the devil and his angels, and uttered those saving words.' The *Pilgrimage of Silvia* (or *of Etheria*) does not mention the renunciation, but says that the 'redditio symboli' was made publicly. Pseudo-Ambrose in *de Sacramentis* (ii. 7, *c.* 400 A.D.?) also does not mention the renunciation, but gives the interrogations at the time of the trine immersion: 'Dost thou believe in God the Father Almighty?'—'Dost thou believe also in our Lord Jesus Christ and in His cross?'—'Dost thou believe in the Holy Ghost?'

When the candidates were too young to make the answers to the interrogations and to say the renunciations themselves, this was done for them by the sponsor, or the parents, or a relation (*Canons of Hippolytus*, 113; *Egyptian Church Order*, § 46; *Testament of our Lord*, ii. 8; for sponsors see also Tertullian, *de Bapt.* 18, and the allusion to them—'inde suscepti'—in *de Cor.* 3).

The custom of renouncing the devil has persistently remained. Duchesne (*Origines du culte chrétien*, Eng. tr. ['*Christian Worship*'] p. 304), gives the form long in use at Rome. At the seventh and last scrutiny, after the 'Effeta' and anointing on the breast and back, the candidate was asked: 'Dost thou renounce Satan?'—'And all his works?'—'And all his pomps?' To each question he answered, 'I renounce (*abrenuntio*).' The candidate recited the Creed publicly, but in the 8th cent. the priest recited it for him.

In the Gallican use, the candidate, facing West, was asked: 'Dost thou renounce Satan, the pomps of the world and its pleasures?' The candidate replied, entered the font, and answered a threefold interrogatory on the faith with 'I believe,' and was baptized (*Missale Gallicanum*, see Duchesne, *op. cit.* p. 324).

In the *Sarum Manual* the renunciations were as at Rome (see above); after the anointing the priest asks the candidate a threefold interrogatory which is a short form of the Apostles' Creed, to each part of which he answers 'I believe,' and the baptism follows (Maskell, *Monumenta*[1], i. 22 f.).

The custom in the Eastern Churches is much the same as in the West. In the Orthodox Eastern Church the renunciations come in the 'Office for

* Cyril has 'his' here, probably by error.

* In the *Testament*, the *Verona Fragments*, and in the *Canons of Hippolytus*, a form of the Apostles' Creed is put before the candidates in the shape of three questions at the act of baptism

Making a Catechumen,' which is separate from the baptismal service. The candidate, or (if he be a 'barbarian or a child') his sponsor, is asked thrice: 'Dost thou renounce Satan, and all his works, and all his angels, and all his service, and all his pomp?' and answers: 'I renounce.' He is thrice asked: 'Hast thou renounced Satan?' and answers: 'I have renounced,' and is bidden to blow upon him and spit upon him. Then he is thrice asked: 'Dost thou join Christ?' The Nicene Creed follows here, and after some repetition of the same question the candidate says: 'I bow myself to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost, to the consubstantial and undivided Trinity' (Shann, *Book of Needs*, p. 19; Littledale, *Offices of the H. E. Church*, p. 134). In the Armenian baptismal rite the catechumen says: 'We (*sic*) renounce thee, Satan, and all thy deceitfulness, and thy wiles, and thy service, and thy paths, and thy angels.' He is asked, with some repetition, if he believes in the Holy Trinity, and the Nicene Creed is said in full (Conybeare-Maclean, *Rituale Armenorum*, p. 92; Denzinger, *Ritus Orientalium*, i. 385, also p. 392, where there is a longer profession of belief). The Coptic and Ethiopic customs are almost the same (Denzinger, i. 198, 223; see a shorter form at p. 234, where the renunciation is explained as a purely moral one, without reference to heathenism). For the Jacobite Syrians see Denzinger, i. 273, 321 (the latter is the 'rite of St. Basil'). In the 6th cent. James of Edessa describes the catechumens as renouncing 'Satan and all that belong to him,' and as professing their belief (*ib.* i. 279); and Severus of Antioch gives the form as, 'I renounce Satan, and all his angels, and all his works, and all his worship,' followed by an act of submission (*ib.* p. 304). For the Maronites see Denzinger, i. 340, 354. In all these rites the turning to the West and East is emphasized, and the acts of renunciation and of submission are recorded.

Meaning of 'pomp.'—The word πομπή (from πέμπω) means properly 'a sending under an escort,' and so 'a company,' and then 'a solemn procession' (Liddell and Scott). It was taken into Latin (*pompa*) as meaning 'a procession,' and so (*a*) 'a train' or 'suite,' and (*b*) 'parade,' 'display.' Both these last meanings are found in the formulas of renunciation. In Tertullian and the *Canons of Hippolytus* the meaning is apparently neutral, 'a retinue'; it is used in the *Canons* in a good sense, 'the pomp (*i.e.* retinue) of God' (see above). But from the 4th cent. the bad sense of the word, 'display,' 'pride,' comes to the front, as in Cyril of Jerusalem and the later *Church Orders*; the plural is often used with this meaning to this day in the phrase 'pomps and vanities of this wicked world' of the Book of Common Prayer. A late Latin usage of *pompa* is recorded by Ducange; it was used for a kind of cake given on Christmas Eve by sponsors to their godchildren until they grew up, apparently (says Ducange, *s.v.*) to remind them of their having renounced the pomps of the devil.

Thus we see a most persistent survival of a formula which dates back at least to the 2nd century. The case is exactly parallel with the survival of the *Sursum Corda* in the Eucharistic Liturgy. There is, however, one exception to the universal use of the Renunciation. The Nestorians or Eastern Syrians appear not to have it. Their baptismal service is drawn up in a form closely resembling the Eucharistic Liturgy, with lections, creed, *Sursum Corda*, invocation, etc., and presents many unique features. The Renunciation among the Nestorians probably formed part of a separate office (as in many other Churches), and this office has now perished and the Renunciation with it. But the Nicene Creed, recited in the baptismal service on the analogy of the Liturgy, serves the purpose of a profession of faith.

A. J. MACLEAN.

ABSOLUTE.—1. Meaning of the term.—The term 'absolute' (*absolutum* = 'unrestricted,' 'set free,' and hence what can subsist by itself in that condition, what is complete as it stands) is used either as an adjective or as a substantive, and, in either case, takes on a variety of allied but distinct meanings. It seems probable that the adjectival use is grammatically prior. One of the first writers to use the term is Cicero, who (in *de Finibus*) employs it to describe a characteristic of the blessed life, and also a form of necessity. As an adjective it may be predicated of any substantive which has or can have the qualification of subsisting by itself. This qualification may be given either negatively, in the form of the absence of all relation of dependence on anything else; or positively, when stress is laid on its internal coherence and self-sufficiency. We find it employed not merely in philosophy, but in science and in everyday experience. Characteristic uses in science are, *e.g.*, 'absolute temperature,' 'absolute alcohol,' 'absolute position,' or again 'absolute space.' In common thought it is found in the expressions 'absolute fact,' 'absolutely false.' As a substantive it is primarily a philosophical term, and is in general used to designate the basis or fundamental principle of all reality, that which in some sense is or contains all the variety that exists. It is with the philosophical use of the term that we are mainly concerned here; but it will be of service to introduce the discussion of its philosophical significance by a general analysis of its various meanings.

The meaning of the term may be brought out negatively or positively, or both. Sometimes one is emphasized, sometimes another, as circumstances require. This is possible, because the term has, even etymologically, a negative nuance, and a negative qualification implies a positive ground. In general, it seems safe to say that the negative aspect is the more prominent. That is 'absolute' which does not require for its existence, or for its meaning, that supplementary facts or factors should be brought into consideration. And any one using the term will in general be satisfied to take it as simply equivalent to 'without qualification,' *i.e.* without positive relation to something which lies beyond what is described or stated, and limits or restricts its meaning. In such a case, what is spoken of as 'absolute' can appear in a variety of settings, and yet be unaffected by the process. This is always implied when the negative character is emphasized. What is absolute is not merely so at a given time and in given circumstances; but, however it is shifted about, it will remain permanently what it is, it will preserve its content, and defy internal alteration by external associations. 'Absolute' here means simply *out* of relation. An example is the expression 'absolute freedom,' as employed, *e.g.*, by indeterminists. Sometimes this is true only up to a certain point; sometimes it is held to be true indefinitely. Thus, when it is said that such and such is an 'absolute fact' or is 'absolutely true,' it is not always implied that, no matter where the 'fact' is placed, it will remain unaltered, but that within a certain range of reality or range of truth it will defy alteration. It is clear that something particular may be, in this sense, quite legitimately spoken of as an 'absolute fact'; *e.g.* 'the accident is an absolute fact,' *i.e.* something that has an independent place of its own in a certain range of history, no matter whether we look at it in association with other particular events or not. Of course, when we go beyond a certain range, and put this 'accident' in a wide and comprehensive system, its individual independence will disappear, and we shall then in general speak of it, not as an 'absolute fact,' but as one whose nature and meaning are constituted by other related elements. There are, however, aspects or factors of experience to which the adjective 'absolute' could and would be applied indefinitely. When we speak, for example, of an Absolute Being, Absolute Reality, here it is implied that no amount of change

of relation whatsoever will alter its permanent independence. In the long run, as we shall see, this is the only consistent form in which the term can be used, and is indeed the basis for all other uses of it. But, when describing common usage, it is desirable to indicate other ways in which the term is employed.

This independence of alteration by external association, to which we have referred, already contains within its negative expression the positive character which the term 'absolute' also possesses, and which in certain cases is more particularly emphasized. By 'absolute' is then meant that quality in virtue of which an object can stand by itself, has an internal constitution of its own, is controlled and determined from within by its very nature. This positive character is really the ground of that negative meaning above described; and the latter is in strictness inseparable from the other. But for certain purposes it is of importance to lay special stress on the positive character *per se*. In this case, the term 'absolute' refers to what is included rather than to what is excluded; to the inner nature of the object so qualified rather than to its possible relation to other objects; to its individual constitution rather than to its connexion with other individuals. Examples of this use would be such expressions as an 'absolute system,' an 'absolute unit,' 'absolute equality.' This positive significance may be taken in specifically different senses. It may refer simply to what, in virtue of the internal constitution of the object, can stand by itself or hold good; and we may know its internal constitution so completely as to justify us in applying the term 'absolute' to it. This is one meaning of the expression, 'Such and such is an absolute possibility,' or 'absolutely possible.' Its contents, the predicates we can apply to the object, are internally consistent. This is the least we can say of anything which we can think—its lowest claim to be something *per se*. This is 'absolute' as opposed to 'relative.' On the other hand, we may mean that the object maintains its being, not in spite of relation to all other things, but *in* every possible relation to other objects in which it may stand. We may compare it with other objects as we please, may subject it to any condition, and find its meaning unaffected. This is 'absolute' as opposed to 'comparative.' The expression 'absolutely possible,' in this sense, is the utmost we can say of anything when taken by itself. Other examples of this sense are: the 'absolute impenetrability' of matter; 'absolute dominion' over individuals in a society; 'absolute simplicity' of physical elements; an 'absolute subject,' *i.e.* a subject which, in every possible sphere, remains a subject, and cannot be a predicate of anything. Sometimes, indeed, we may use the term to cover simultaneously both of the forms of its positive meaning. But in general they would not be true together; for while, *e.g.*, the least we could say of anything can also be said of it if we first state the most we can say of it, the reverse of this would not be true. The expression, an 'Absolute Being,' taken positively, is a case in point. Another, and an important positive use of the term, is when it is employed to designate not what has being simply by itself, or what maintains its being in every possible relation, but what is the ultimate ground of all possible relations. This is the meaning often attached to the expression 'Absolute Reality.' The use of the term 'Absolute Space' to signify that which is the ground of the possibility of all determinate spatial relations, of phenomena appearing in spatial form, is another example. Here 'absolute' is nearly equivalent to 'ultimate,' or the logical prius. The object in question here *contains* all relations, and is absolute in that sense. In the other positive senses an object was absolute either as existing by itself in spite of relation, or as subsisting throughout all relation.

The foregoing analysis of the negative and positive significance of the term has already, no doubt, indicated that neither sense alone is really adequate as a complete expression of its meaning. Each is in strictness one-sided. Indeed, each implies the other, and is more or less consciously present when, for certain purposes, stress is laid on one side rather than another. It is clear that 'absolute,' in the sense of 'out of relation,' 'without qualification,' is predicable of a particular object only *in virtue of* relation. A negative relation is still a relation, and a relation cannot exist unless both terms constituting it are affected and involved. Strictly, 'absolute' is never meant to convey that the object is really outside all relation; but either that the effect of the relation may be ignored or that the object has so secure a place in a general system, that the whole system stands and falls with its individual subsistence. Thus, when a particular statement is said to be 'absolutely true,' we shall find that one or other of these assumptions is made. But it is evident that 'absolute' in this sense really implies relations which are merely unexpressed. In short, since 'absolute,' negatively considered, means simply *without* the qualifications which specific relations would bring, these qualifications, and therefore these relations, must be *there* to give it its meaning. Relation thus enters into the constitution of the term in its negative aspect; and, with it, the positive content which the term related must possess to enter into a relation at all. In the limiting case, when by hypothesis there is no other term with which to constitute a relation, the positive aspect explicitly coincides completely with the negative. This is found when we speak of the 'absolute whole.'

Similarly, when we take the positive meaning by itself and apply it to a specific object, it contains, as part of its significance, a reference to other objects. An object cannot be conceived as something *in itself* without *ipso facto* implying a distinction from other things. What it is in itself logically implies others from which it is at least abstracted in order to be by itself. This is still more obvious when, as in the case, *e.g.*, of 'absolute simplicity' above mentioned, it is what it 'absolutely' is only through relation to other things. The same is true again when it is the 'ultimate ground' of other things. In the limiting case the positive explicitly coincides with its negative, when the reality contains all possible otherness, and is in itself, not through others, but through itself.

If, then, the negative meaning in this way implies the positive and *vice versâ*, we seem forced to the conclusion that what is really involved in either use of the term is the whole which contains both aspects, and that this alone is truly absolute. For, between them, positive and negative in strictness exhaust all that is to be said. When we predicate the term 'absolute' positively or negatively, it is implied that there is no restriction as to what is excluded or included. Absolute in the sense of, *e.g.*, without qualification, is in principle unrestricted in its range of negations. If, therefore, the positive, fully understood, involves the entirety of what is negated and conversely, this means that it is a whole, and one and the same whole, that is implied in every use of the term 'absolute.' This whole, then, is what the use of the term 'absolute' in any given case refers to, and this alone is absolute. If this is not admitted, we are bound to conclude that the predicate 'absolute' is in every case through and through affected by relativity. But a relative absolute is a contradic

tion in terms; and if this is meant, we must give up the use of the term altogether, except as a way of being emphatic. Otherwise we must accept the view that in every strict use of the term it is logically a single whole that is involved, and that this is alone absolute.

The above analysis certainly compels us to accept this interpretation. If we admit it, we can at once give a logically valid meaning to the use of the term in its positive form and in its negative form. For in either case it means that the object so qualified has a necessary place in the one whole, and that without it also the whole would not be what it is. Or, in other words, the whole and the parts stand together. The predication of the term 'absolute' of any specific part is thus merely our way of affirming our conviction of its necessary place in the one totality, the one systematic unity. The whole being the absolute, each part, of whose place in it we are assured, can be 'absolutized.' And this is done by us in a negative or a positive way according to circumstances. If we apply this interpretation to any current use of the term, we shall find that it gives an intelligible and justifiable meaning to the idea we have in mind. The denial of this view involves the denial of all absoluteness in experience. This is the position of those who maintain the doctrine of thoroughgoing *Relativity*.

2. Philosophical application of the term.—So far we have merely considered the various uses of the term, and have not considered the application of the conception of absoluteness to specific philosophical problems. There are two such problems which are historically important and philosophically fundamental: (1) the problem of absoluteness in human knowledge, which raises in part the question of the 'relativity of knowledge'; (2) the problem of the Absolute in metaphysics. We must deal with each of these separately, so far as they can be separated.

I. *ABSOLUTE AS APPLIED TO HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.*—There are two distinct ways in which the term 'absolute' may be applied to human knowledge. Both start from the position that in all knowledge we aim at an ideal, and that the consummation of our knowledge would be the explicit articulation of that ideal in systematic form. The term 'ideal,' however, may or may not be used, and may be variously interpreted.

(*a*) We may call it 'complete' truth, and regard this as the complete 'agreement' of our thoughts with the 'nature of things.' If we attempt to express with systematic fulness what this ideal as such contains, to give in some sense the whole truth, the knowledge so supplied would be spoken of as 'absolute' knowledge. In general it is also implied that in such a case we are at the point of view of the whole ideal as such; that we do not rise to it gradually and give the content of the ideal at the end of our journey, so to speak, but rather that we *start* our exposition of what the ideal contains by occupying at the outset the position of an absolute knowing mind. We interpret the ideal as an objective system of truth in virtue of our taking up an objective or trans-individualistic attitude, where all the perspective of specific individual minds is eliminated. This point of view is essential, because an ideal of knowledge in this sense involves the disappearance of finite qualifications and reservations.

This conception of absolute knowledge may be regarded in two ways. (*a*) It has been taken to mean an exposition of the general elements constituting the supreme or whole truth, a systematic development of the fundamental conceptions or principles involved in, and making possible, the different forms of knowledge. Spinoza's *Ethics* or Hegel's *Logic* would be an illustration of absolute knowledge in this sense. (*β*) It has also been taken to mean an exposition of the whole truth both in its general content and in its particular details—a system, in fact, not simply of principles, but of conceptions *with* their details in all their manifold form. Absolute knowledge in this sense has generally been considered impossible of achievement, and certainly there is no historical example of a single system which claims to give so much. These two senses of the term 'absolute knowledge' may be conveniently characterized in the language of a recent philosophical work (Laurie's *Synthetica*) as, respectively, knowledge which gives a 'synthesis of the absolute,' and knowledge which gives an 'absolute synthesis.'

(*b*) Another use of the term as applied to knowledge is found when we speak of knowledge in a given case being 'absolute knowledge,' or conveying 'absolute truth.' This need not refer directly or even at all to any absolute system of knowledge. It can be applied to any case where, as we sometimes say, we are 'absolutely certain,' or where the judgment does not contradict itself or any other judgment. From this point of view, many or most of the judgments making up our knowledge can be spoken of as absolute, whether the knowledge be given in the form of a scientific statement, like 'two and two are four'; or even in the case of a judgment of perception: 'this paper is white.' The latter may be said to be as 'absolutely true,' to convey as absolute knowledge of this specific area of perceptive experience, as the former type of judgment. Indeed, the assertion of any ultimate fact, from this point of view, becomes an 'absolute truth,' a case of 'absolute knowledge'; and all the steps in the attainment of the complete truth, the complete systematic ideal of knowledge, are at least capable of being characterized in this way, whether we ever attain to the complete system or not. Hence the term can be applied in this second sense to knowledge without any implication of the possibility of 'absolute knowledge' in the first sense. Indeed, it may be denied in the latter sense, and asserted only in the former.

In considering the question as to the validity of the idea of absolute knowledge, we have to bear in mind this difference in the use and application of the term. It may, no doubt, be said with some truth that absolute in the second sense really implies in the long run the admission of absolute in the first sense. But, at any rate, that is not explicitly maintained, and can even be fairly denied. This comes out in the controversy between 'absolute' and 'relative' truth. It is often held that all our knowledge is relative to us, and *therefore* absolute knowledge is impossible to man. By this is meant that the attainment of an 'absolute system of truth' is impossible, and not that our knowledge, 'so far as it goes,' is not absolutely true. Thus relativity of knowledge may be maintained along with the assertion that we do possess absolutely valid knowledge. This is in general the position of the narrowly scientific mind. Relativity may, indeed, also be asserted of all forms of our knowledge. In this case absolute knowledge is denied in *both* senses of the term. Relativity, then, logically leads either to pure scepticism or to individualistic anthropomorphism. It is thus important, in discussing the 'relativity' of knowledge, to determine both what kind of relativity is asserted and with what kind of absoluteness it stands in contrast. Nothing but confusion can result, *e.g.*, when defending relativity in opposition to absoluteness of knowledge, if one disputant is using 'absolute' in the first sense and the other in the second.

Justification of (*a*).—The argument in defence of absolute knowledge, in the sense of a complete

system of the fundamental conceptions constituting the ideal of knowledge, rests on the simple proposition that knowledge as such can be an object of knowledge. When knowledge is itself an object of consideration, all that it implies must be offered up without reserve for critical analysis. If this cannot be done, the discussion of knowledge as such is futile; for to assert at the outset that we can know only a part of an object which we set out to know, is to check our knowledge in advance by the hand of scepticism. We should never attempt to know any object if we consciously assumed as a fact that in its entirety it could not be known. The edge would be taken off the seriousness of the problem at once, and neither common sense nor the scientific mood would sanction the effort. But, indeed, it would require an interpretation of knowledge to prove such an assumption to be valid: and hence this hypothesis may be dismissed as logically impossible, because self-contradictory. But if knowledge as such can be an object of knowledge, it must have the rounded completeness of a determinate object to justify the attempt. That completeness lies in the ideal unity of knowledge and nowhere else. This ideal, therefore, must be capable of analysis, of criticism, and, because a unity, of systematic expression. It may very well be that we are incapable of exhausting its content in all its manifold detail. For the limitation of our command over the particulars of our experience is one form in which finitude of intelligence appears. There still remain, however, the ground principles which constitute the general or typical forms in which the unity of knowledge is specifically realized. These we may grasp and systematically arrange. They may be as general, and as numerous, or as few, as the growth of the various sciences and the advancement of human intellectual activity determine. But, as such, they are an expression in every case of the general forms in which this ultimate unity is realized. To state in some connected way, therefore, the constituent general conceptions which the ideal unity of knowledge contains, is always a possible achievement. That ideal unity is at once the logically implied beginning and the final end of all knowledge in its various forms. The knowledge of it is the self-knowledge of knowledge; and that is absolute knowledge in both the negative and positive senses of the term 'absolute.' This kind of knowledge may, of course, be supplied in different ways, and with different degrees of success. These must always vary with the variation which is at once the privilege and the limitation of the individual thinker. But such peculiarities do not concern the question as to the *possibility* of truly achieving the result. What relation exists between the various forms which absolute knowledge in this sense has historically assumed, is a further question, which lies beyond that of the justification of its possibility.

Justification of (*b*).—The position that knowledge may be absolute without being at the same time a finished system, or without at least waiting till a finished system is obtained, rests on different grounds. It is maintained that every true judgment is absolute as knowledge, just as it stands. An isolated judgment is absolutely valid without any other judgment being implied to guarantee or ratify its truth. The addition of other judgments may or may not modify its truth, but it will only be in so far as it is *not* true that it is capable of supplementation. And, even at the worst, this will always leave what truth it does contain unaffected. It is maintained that this does not involve relativity in the sense of scepticism or individualism; for there is a distinction between a judgment which stands in a relation and judgment which is relatively valid. The first may, in virtue of the internal coherence of its content, hold a necessary and unalterable place in a series, or in a whole, from which it is inseparable; in the second, the content is incompletely determined, and therefore the judgment is only approximately coherent: its stability is liable to be disturbed by external agencies. The first may well be described as absolute, since, on the one hand, such judgments are not subject to alteration, but only to supplementation; and, on the other, it is out of such judgments that any system, even one claiming to be the complete ideal, has to be built up, if there is to be a system at all. Such judgments do not require to wait for the complete system to be evolved before claiming to be absolute, and hence, it is held, they possess that character whether or not the system be ever arrived at. A type of these judgments is found in mathematical truth; but, indeed, any scientific judgment tends to claim this attribute. That such judgments may be absolute *per se*, can also be justified by pointing out that, even if it be a system that makes them in the long run absolutely true by giving them a place in the absolute system, then each is absolutely valid at least by means of it, and may therefore legitimately be spoken of as an absolute judgment. A system must be a system of different parts, and the character of the whole is present in each part. This, however, would not justify the claim to regard each as absolute independently of a system. For it seems clearly paradoxical to maintain that a judgment can be absolute both because of its place in a system and yet *in spite of* that system. It is only in the case of certain judgments that the attribute can be applied. And it will be found that only when a judgment has an individuality of its own does it possess that completeness and internal coherence which justify the use of the term 'absolute.' Individuality, however, is precisely the characteristic of system, whether the range of the system be all-comprehensive or not. Moreover, it is impossible to state a judgment which is definite and restricted in meaning without at the same time by implication excluding from its content other equally definite judgments. What it does *not* say determines its meaning as well as what it does affirm. To be, therefore, completely true, it involves and is maintained by a wider whole than it *explicitly* asserts.

II. *The Absolute in Metaphysics.*—This must be treated apart from the question just considered. The term is applied in metaphysics to the whole of 'Reality,' and whether or not it is true that knowledge contains or covers all Reality, certainly it is true that Reality as a whole includes knowledge.

Hitherto the term has been discussed mainly as an attribute of a subject. In metaphysics it is used as a subject of all possible predication, and therefore itself incapable of being a predicate. The transition to the substantive use of the term is fairly obvious. It consists simply in transforming a supreme quality into the name for the supreme subject of all qualities, much as is done in the case of 'cause'; for example, when we speak of the 'first cause.' When we use the term 'absolute' in this connexion, we have in mind primarily the general ideas of 'all-containing,' 'ultimate,' in the sense of logical prius, the 'one ground of all finitude,' and such like,—all of them, in the long run, implying that the Reality so described combines in itself those positive and negative characteristics above mentioned. The Absolute so understood may be said to be the vaguest of terms, and little better than meaningless. But that criticism is over hasty, since it is the aim of a metaphysical theory to determine what the full meaning of the

term is; and obviously that meaning cannot be given in the mere description of the signification of a word, which can in point-of fact be used by a great variety of theories. Indeed, to regard the term as wholly and essentially indeterminate, is legitimately possible only as the result of a theory.

When the Absolute, then, is said to be the object-matter of metaphysics, we have to understand the term as the designation of the one all-inclusive uniting principle of whatever experience contains. From the point of view of metaphysical knowledge it is, at least to begin with, little or nothing more than the existential counterpart of the unity of experience, which such knowledge postulates as a precondition of its progress, and the elucidation of which constitutes the achievement of the aim and ideal of metaphysics. It is therefore at the outset quite colourless; any more definite specification of its nature is possible only in virtue of a metaphysical theory. Thus for metaphysics it is simply a problem, and not an assumption, whether the Absolute is 'personal' or a 'cause,' or 'real' or an 'appearance,' or all or none of these. Only metaphysical inquiry can determine legitimately how far the Absolute contains any of these features, and which of them, if any, it is primarily. It is evident that this must be so, when we reflect that if it were not true, the mere meaning of the Absolute would give a solution to all metaphysical questions. Certainly we sometimes find more, and sometimes less, imported into the idea. But if this is done *before* the inquiry, we must regard the fact as merely a peculiarity of the thinker, which does not affect the principle here laid down; while, if it is done at the *end* of the inquiry, that is quite legitimate, a necessary result, indeed, of having a theory at all.

If we bear this in mind, we can see at once the distinction between the metaphysical conception of the Absolute and the religious idea of God. The latter always involves personality—at least, spirituality in some form or other; the former does not. Both name the whole, and the same whole. But whereas religion is bound to do it by a certain category, to satisfy certain human needs, metaphysics is not committed to any category at all. It may well be that the legitimate conclusion of metaphysics satisfies the demands of the religious consciousness. But it may not. Hence the possibility of conflict between the two, which we find historically as a fact. In the long run, the term 'God' in religion and 'the Absolute' in metaphysics must, if the religious mood is valid, be the same in meaning; if not, one of them will inevitably condemn the claims of the other, for both seek to express the same whole. But it has to be borne in mind at the outset, that while the God of religion must be the Absolute, the Absolute of metaphysics may or may not be conceived of as the God that will satisfy the religious mind: that will depend entirely on how the Absolute is interpreted by metaphysics.

The metaphysical problem, then, regarding the Absolute, resolves itself into the question how to conceive the nature of the principle which is at once single and realized in the manifold ways that make up experience. The problem is one of interpretation, not of discovery; for it is assumed that knowledge by which we conceive and think the nature of the Absolute itself falls within its compass. To try to demonstrate the actual existence of the Absolute, which a process of discovery seeks to do, is thus logically absurd. At the same time, since the knowledge, which interprets, falls by hypothesis within the one-all, the relatively subordinate question, regarding the relation between our knowledge and the whole which contains it, may well press for solution before the interpretation of the whole in the strict sense is given. Thus, in general, the metaphysical problem is found to have two parts—(1) The relation of our knowledge to the Absolute; (2) the nature of the principle constituting the Absolute.

(1) *Relation of knowledge to Absolute Reality.*—On this point different views have been held. We must be content here to indicate the source of these differences.

(*a*) In the first place, it is held that, because our knowledge falls within the whole, is a factor or process in it, and works by its own peculiar conditions, it is not merely unequal to grasping the whole, but that it is logically meaningless to attempt the task. We can think it possible only by making the Absolute a part with which our knowledge, as another part, stands in relation. But the Absolute, being the whole, cannot logically be treated as a part in any sense. Or the same position is maintained when it is said that the unity of the whole cannot be itself an object for the subject thinking or knowing. The distinction between subject and object is fundamental for knowledge, and the object must in some sense be 'given' to the subject before it can be known. But a whole which *includes* by hypothesis the subject cannot be presented or given in this way. Therefore the Absolute cannot be known consistently with the nature and naming of knowledge. And since here is no other way of knowing than by way of a relation between subject and object, the attempt to know the Absolute in any sense is logically impossible.

The issue here is what may be called metaphysical agnosticism resting on the basis of epistemological 'criticism.' A recent representative of this view is Adamson (see *Development of Modern Philosophy and other Lectures*). It admits only empiricism or 'naturalism' and epistemology within the range of positive human knowledge. The line of argument against this position would be—(1) That the distinction and relation of subject and object must itself imply in some sense a unity between them, which is not simply imagined as *outside* the two terms, but is constitutive of this connexion, and necessary to it; (2) that the apprehension of this unity cannot logically be denied, asserted, or criticised by reference to the relational process which this unity constitutes; (3) that the unity is, from our point of view, an ideal; and an ideal in the nature of the case cannot be *given or presented* as a fact, either at the beginning of experience as such, or even at the end as such: for it determines and embraces the entire content from first to last, and must therefore be grasped in that sense.

(*b*) Another view of the relation of knowledge to an Absolute which contains it, is that which regards the subject-mind and its processes, among which falls knowledge, as forming an ultimate element in the unity of the whole. The other element, in itself generically distinct from the former, may be described as the object world of 'nature' and natural processes. These two between them exhaust the content of the Absolute so far as our experience is concerned. The Absolute *per se* is not one any more than the other; it is both, but may be either one or other. In any case it is known only in and through these aspects or appearances; but it still has a nature of its own behind the appearances, its being *per se*. Our knowledge belongs to and has to do with the sphere of appearances only. There is no ground for supposing it adequate to what the Ultimate Reality is *per se*; on the contrary, its origin and its processes necessarily

confine it to the phenomenal. Still, the absence of knowledge does not involve an entirely negative attitude to the Absolute. The mere fact that knowledge belongs to the sphere of appearance points the way towards, or indicates the need for, the actual existence of an attitude distinct from knowledge, and one which can be concerned with the Absolute *per se*. We may call this attitude belief, or mystical intuition, or what not, so long as we bear in mind that its purport is to deal with this Ultimate Reality. Hence, while from the point of view of reflexion or knowledge in its various forms, scientific or otherwise, there is no approach to the Absolute, there is a way open in another direction, and this may constitute a specific mood of our lives, the mood, *e.g.*, of religion.

This is the point of view of metaphysical agnosticism, which appeals for its justification to the anthropomorphic character of knowledge, and rests, on the one hand, upon a psychological analysis of knowledge, and, on the other, upon the necessary limitations of scientific reflexion by which alone knowledge is to be had. One of its best-known representatives in recent times is Spencer (see his *First Principles*). The argument against this view takes the form of showing (1) the radical contradiction in the twofold-aspect conception of an Ultimate Reality, in the idea of appearances *per se*, which leave the noumenal reality unrevealed, *i.e.* appearances of what does *not* appear; (2) that the Absolute is so far known in that it is *conceived* to have certain characteristics, and at least to be related to its appearances in a certain way; (3) that the psychological history of knowledge, and even the essential anthropomorphism of knowledge, do not necessarily prove either that Spirit may not express the Ultimate Reality more truly than Force, or that Spirit and Force have equal value as forms of the Absolute.

(*c*) A third view of the relation of knowledge to the Absolute finds a typical expression in the interpretation developed by Bradley in his *Appearance and Reality*. Basing his conception of knowledge partly on psychological, partly on logical and epistemological considerations, he insists that knowledge strictly understood is relational in character. It requires for its operation something given, an existential fact over against thought or the ideal process. This antithesis and duality of the terms in the process of knowledge both creates and limits the range of the value in experience of the function of reflective knowledge. It can, for example, never exhaust the given, the 'that,' without *ipso facto* destroying the very condition of its own operation and so disappearing. If it had the 'that' within itself, the operation would be both unnecessary and impossible. Since this falls without itself, there always remains, so far as reflective knowledge is concerned, a surd in our experience. The distinction between knowledge and the real never passes into an existential continuity of content. 'Knowledge is unequal to the real': it is relational, is not inherently self-complete, is not self-sufficient; it is an 'appearance' of the Absolute. Hence by reflective knowledge the Absolute cannot be expressed. But just as psychologically there is an infra-relational level of feeling-experience out of which knowledge arises, by the development of the distinction of the 'what' from the 'that,' so there is a supra-relational level of experience which transcends knowledge. This supra-relational level is akin or analogous to the infra-relational level, in that positively there is in both a direct continuity of experience, and negatively both are realized apart from the distinctions which characterize relational thought. But, while the former has the character of mere feeling, the latter consists rather of mystical insight or intuition. At this highest level the apprehension of the Absolute as such is possible and is attained. It does not abolish the distinctions determined by the procedure of relational thought; it retains them, not, however, as distinctions, but as elements or constituents in the unique acts which characterize the intuitive apprehension of the whole as such. Hence, while the Absolute is thus beyond knowledge, it is not beyond conscious experience at its highest level. It gives us the Absolute with and in its appearances, and not apart from them.

The general objection to this view of the relation of knowledge to the Absolute is its emphasis on the discontinuity between relational and supra-relational 'thought.' It seems to refuse with one hand what it gives with the other. A supra-relational thought transcending the conditions of that critical reflexion which works by distinctions, lays itself open to the attack of sceptical negation by its very attempt to transcend it. Either it is justified or it is not. In the former case it cannot adopt the methods of systematic reflexion to defend its position; in the second, there is nothing to distinguish its attitude from caprice and mere dogmatic assertion. Moreover, even the apprehension of the 'higher unity' must prove itself coherent. But a coherent whole is a whole of parts distinct from one another and claiming recognition as distinct. The privileges of mere mysticism are inseparable from the dangers of pure individualism. From mysticism, as the professed negation of knowledge, the transition is easy to sheer scepticism, which makes the same profession.

(2) *The nature of the Absolute.*—The metaphysical interpretation of the Absolute is determined in the long run by the emphasis laid on the essential factors involved in the problem of construing its meaning. The factors are: subject in relation to object within a unity which holds those ultimate elements in their relation, whatever that relation be. The problem is to determine this unity *with* the elements which stand thus related. We shall merely indicate the different interpretations given, without developing those interpretations into any detailed system. The systems in all their detail constitute the various metaphysical theories which make up the history of philosophy.

(*a*) We may take our stand on the subject with its activity and processes, and from this basis show that the object-world falls within the range of the subject's activity, which by implication, therefore, also contains all that constitutes the unity in virtue of which object and subject are bound up together. We may accomplish this result in various ways, but the essential principle is the same. (α) We may so resolve the object into the being of the subject as to destroy even the semblance of distinction, and certainly all the opposition they may *prima facie* present. This is the position adopted by pure *Solipsism*. (β) We may again seek to secure to the object its claim to be distinctive, but may endeavour to show that the ground of that distinctiveness which it possesses, falls within the scope of the activity of the subject and is determined altogether by the action of the subject. This is the position of *Subjective Idealism*. It may take two forms. (αα) We may regard the objectivity of the object as a *fact*, and resolve its characteristic nature into ideal elements in the subject's life. This has been done primarily in the case of the external world revealed to 'outer' perception, which presents a peculiarly stubborn problem to Subjective Idealism. The historical representative of this form of Subjective Idealism is Berkeley. (ββ) On the other hand, we may regard the objectivity as a *result*, and 'deduce' it from an ultimate act of spontaneity on the part of the subject. Objectivity

is here conceived in a much wider sense than that involved in the case of the external world. It embraces all forms of objectivity, that of other selves, and society, as well as the 'outer world' found by perception. The last, in fact, is merely a particular realization of a more fundamental objectivity which we meet with primarily in the social order of 'free wills.' This more thoroughgoing and more comprehensive expression of Subjective Idealism is found in Fichte.

(*b*) Again, we may start from the basis of the object as such, and resolve the subject's life, and with that the unity containing subject and object, into the forms and processes of the object-world. Everything will here depend on what constituents of the object-world are regarded as ultimate and primary. This will determine the form assumed by the interpretation. The strongest case historically has been made for the theory which takes physical matter and physical energy as the fundamental elements with which we have to deal. The developed expression of this view takes the form of what is called variously *Materialism*, *Naturalism*, or *Physical Realism*.

(*c*) Once more, we may start explicitly by laying primary stress neither on the subject nor on the object, but on their unity as such. This may take different forms. (*α*) We may take subject and object to be, from the point of view of the unity, of equal significance in its constitution. The unity being neither specially, is *as such* equally indifferent to each. But since these, nevertheless, are all it does contain, it is *per se* indeterminate; it is the indifferent neutrum in which both merely subsist. So far as any interpretation of it is to be given, we can express its nature either from the side of the object or from the side of the subject. Either point of view is equally valid, since a neutral unity, which is indifferently one factor as much as the other, is equally both. It must be expressible in either way, for, if it were neither, it would be nothing. This is in the main the position of Schelling.

(*β*) Again, we may start from the unity and develop an interpretation of it by taking the unity to be one factor *more than* the other. In this case there is for the unity an inequality of value between the two elements which constitute it. It is therefore not one as much as the other, and is not indifferent to either. It is one more than the other. It is thus not a colourless neutrum, but a concrete whole, of which each is a distinct mode or level of realization. It is not interpretable in two forms, distinct or even separate from one another, as in the former case; but in one form, and that form is adequate and complete as an expression of the entire concrete unity. From this point of view it is clear that there may be two ways of stating its meaning, according as we take the object side to be primary, or the subject side. Either view will present the whole concretely; but will interpret it in a different manner, and the dominant principle or category for determining the whole will be different. Starting from the object side, we will look on the whole as determinable by objective categories, and the kind of connexion amongst the parts of the whole will have the character which objective categories require. The supreme form of objectivity is what we call the order of 'Nature'; the supreme objective category that of 'Substance'; and the primary form of connexion among the parts will be that of relation by external necessity. The unity will thus be conceived of as nature in its totality, as working by natural processes of connexion, physical and spatial—*natura naturans*. The various elements constituting it will be the realization of this supreme unity in its phenomenal character, as a product in natural form of natural activity—*natura naturata*. The subject world will be a mode of this realization—one way in which Nature is phenomenalized or made determinate. But Nature as such is, in its very meaning, a resolution of differences into a single continuous identity, the identity of the one substance, the one 'nature.' Relatively to this all else is accident, an essentially negative moment, not a permanent expression. All explicit specific determination is implicit universal negation. There are no differences of degree in the contents; all are on the same footing *relatively* to the *whole*, and therefore relatively to one another. There are merely different modes of manifesting the one and only Reality. *Inter se*, these modes are generically distinct, and hence, in their modal manifestation of the one Reality, are merely side by side, parallel to one another, converging only at infinity, where they disappear or coincide. The external necessity, connecting the parts in each mode and the modes in the whole, involves, and is merely a finite expression of, this essential continuity into which they are dissipated. This interpretation of the Absolute finds its great historical representative in Spinoza.

(*γ*) But we may also conceive the problem in the same concrete way, and take the subject factor as primary, and the object reality as subsidiary. Here we shall proceed by another principle, by another category, and by another method of connecting the elements involved. We lay stress, not on the impersonal attitude towards objectivity, which characterizes the physical and mathematical consideration of the object-world, and which dissipates the subject-life into its processes, but on the personal attitude, which is found in its highest expressions in morality and religion. In these the object-world, so far from being primary, is subsidiary to personal or spiritual ends. We shall therefore take the principle to be, not Nature, but Spirit. The ultimate category will be not 'Substance,' but 'Subject.' The essential method of establishing connexion with the whole will be not external necessity, but internal necessity, the necessity of ideals and purposes, the necessity which is Freedom. The process of connecting the factors inside the unity of the whole will be that which, accepting the ethical and religious insistence on the subordination of the object-world, shows the latter to be in its essence an imperfect realization of the nature of Spirit, and shows Spirit therefore as at once arising out of, rising above, realizing and so retaining the true significance of Nature. This will be done by showing the content of the whole in its different moments to be simply the logically necessary evolution of the one final principle; which would not be itself unless it manifested itself in varying degrees of completeness of expression. These degrees form distinct and seemingly separate areas of reality to finite experience, but to the one supreme Reality they are merely stages in the realization of its single and self-complete spiritual existence. Such an interpretation, expressed essentially in the same general form by Plato, Aristotle, and Leibniz, finds its most impressive historical representative in Hegel.

These various ways of construing the meaning of the Absolute have doubtless each its value and place in the history of man's higher spiritual life, and amongst them seem to exhaust the possible interpretations of the supreme unity of experience. It would be out of place here to try to consider their respective merits, since we are not concerned to give a metaphysical theory of the Absolute, but to indicate what theories have been propounded.

LITERATURE.—The literature on the Absolute is almost co-extensive with the history of philosophical speculation.

I. *THE TERM 'ABSOLUTE.'*—A discussion of the meaning of the term, and of the relation of the Absolute to knowledge, will be found in Hamilton's *Discussions on Philosophy and Literature*; see also Laurie's *Synthetica*, vol. ii. p. 392 ff.

II. *'ABSOLUTE' AS A PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLE.*—(*a*) DISCUSSIONS.—Bosanquet, 'Time and the Absolute' in *Proc. of Aristot. Society*, 1896; Braun, 'La Logique de l'Absolu' in *Revue Philosophique*, xxiv. [1887]; Haldar, 'The Conception of the Absolute' in *Philos. Review*, viii. [1899]; James, 'Absolutism and Empiricism' in *Mind*, O. S. ix. [1884]; Joachim, 'Absolute and Relative Truth,' *ib.*, Jan. 1905; Logan, 'The Absolute as Ethical Postulate' in *Philos. Review*, viii. [1899]; Powell, 'The Absolute and the Relative' in *Science*, iii. [1896]; Renouvier, 'Les Catégories de la raison et la métaphysique de l'Absolu' in *L'annee philosophique*, vii. [1897]; Rogers, 'The Absolute of Hegelianism' in *Mind*, N. S. ix. [1900]; Russell, A., on 'The Absolute' in *CR* xvii. [1871]; Schwarz, 'Die verschied. Fassung d. Substantialität d. Absoluten' in *Ztschr. f. Philos. u. phil. Krit.* xxiii. [1853]; Vaihinger, 'Der Begriff d. Absoluten mit Rücksicht auf Spencer,' *ib.* xxiii. [1853]; Watson, 'The Absolute and the Time Process' in *Philos. Rev.* iv. [1895].

(*b*) INTERPRETATIONS.—Aristotle, *Metaphys.*; Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*; Fichte, *Wissenschaftslehre*; Hegel, *Encyclopädie*; Plato, *Timæus*, *Republic*; Royce, *World and the Individual*; Schelling, *Transcendental Idealismus*, *Naturphilosophie*; H. Spencer, *First Principles*; Spinoza, *Ethics*. For further literature see Baldwin, *DPhP* iii. pt. ii. 597.

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ABSOLUTE (Vedāntic and Buddhistic).—In India a broad conception of the Absolute is first met with in the Upaniṣads, compiled about B.C. 500. There Brahma, the All-pervading Being, is described as the One Reality, or the Absolute, who is self-supporting and self-existent.

'He has no hands or legs, but He can catch and move; He has no eyes, but He can see, has no ears but can hear; He knows all, but there is none who knows Him; He is called the Good and Great Being. Upon Him the sun cannot shine, nor the moon nor the stars; the lightning cannot flash on Him, how can the fire? They all reflect His radiant light, and through His light they are illumined.'*

Since B.C. 500 the doctrine of the Absolute has been considerably developed in the Vedānta and Buddhist systems of philosophy. In the Brahmasūtra, the first work of the Vedānta philosophy composed before the Christian era, Brahma is spoken of as the pure 'Being' who, associated with the principle of illusion (*māyā*), is enabled to project the appearance of the world, just as a magician is enabled to produce illusory appearances of animate and inanimate beings.† When the veil of illusion is withdrawn, the phenomenal world vanishes, and Brahma asserts himself in his true nature, which is nothing but the Self-existent Absolute Being. In the Vedānta philosophy the doctrine of the Absolute is styled monism (*advaitavāda*). It underwent further developments at the hands of Śaṅkarāchārya (A.D. 785), Rāmānuja (12th cent. A.D.), Madhvāchārya (13th cent. A.D.), Vallabhāchārya (A.D. 1479), and others.

But the philosopher who most firmly grasped the doctrine of the Absolute was Buddha-Śākya-Siṁha, the eminent founder of Buddhism, who flourished about B.C. 500. In the Sutta and Abhidhamma *piṭakas* of the Pāli Scriptures, supposed to have been delivered by Buddha himself, the doctrine of the Absolute is designated as the philosophy of the Void (*śūnya-vāda*) or the Middle Path (*majjhimā paṭipadā*), according to which the world is neither real nor unreal, nor both, nor neither.‡ In the Sanskrit works of the Mahāyāna Buddhists, such as in the Mādhyamika-Sūtra (of Nāgārjuna, about A.D. 200), Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra (about A.D. 400), Lalitavistara (about A.D. 100), Prajñāpāramitā (about A.D. 200), etc., the doctrine has been further developed, and has often been styled the 'phenomenal doctrine' (*nairātmavāda*) or the 'perfection of wisdom' (*prajñāpāramitā*).§

In order to understand the Buddhist doctrine of the Absolute, we may suppose that Indian philosophers are mainly divided* into three classes: (1) Realists (*āstika*), (2) Nihilists (*nāstika*), and (3) Absolutists (*advayavādin*). Some sections of the Chārvākas, who maintain that the world is not permanent, not real, and not existent,—that is, who emphasize the negative aspect of the world, —are designated Nihilists or Negativists. The propounders of the six orthodox systems of Hindu philosophy, viz. the Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṁsā, and Vedānta, who maintain that the world is somehow permanent, real, and existent,—that is, who emphasize the positive aspect of the world,—are designated the Realists. According to them, there is at least one reality on which the fabric of the world stands. Thus the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika hold that the material atoms, sky, space, and time, are the permanent entities in the external world, while the souls are the eternal realities in the internal world. The Sāṅkhya and Yoga maintain that nature (*prakṛti*) is the permanent reality in the external world, while the souls (*puruṣa*) are the eternal realities in the internal world. The Vedānta school affirms that Brahma, the All-pervading Being, is the one eternal reality in the external as well as in the internal world. So we find that the various branches of the Realistic philosophy, in spite of their mutual differences in other respects, agree in maintaining that there is at least one permanent reality on which the whole world hinges.

The Buddhists, who maintain† that the world is neither real nor unreal, that it is neither an existence nor a non-existence, but transcends both, —that is, who emphasize neither the negative nor the positive aspect of the world, but go beyond both, — are designated the Transcendentalists, Absolutists, Phenomenalists, Voidists, Agnostics, or the Followers of the Middle Path.

The world, according to the Buddhists,‡ is an aggregate of conditions or relations. Things come into existence in virtue of these relations or conditions. There are infinite kinds of relation, such as the relation of substance and quality, part and whole, cause and effect, etc. Taking the relation of substance and quality, we find that the substance exists only in relation to its qualities, and the latter exist only in relation to the former. Take, for instance, a table. It has a certain weight, colour, taste, smell, size. The table exists only as the repository of these qualities, and the latter exist only as inherent in the former. We cannot conceive a table which has no size, weight, colour, etc., nor can we think of size, weight, etc., apart from the table in which they inhere. Arguing in this way, we find that the parts exist only in relation to the whole, and the whole exists only in relation to the parts. So the eye exists in relation to the colour, and the colour exists only in relation to the eye. Similarly, the fire exists in relation to the fuel, and the fuel exists in relation to the fire. Proceeding in this way, we find that the whole world is resolvable into infinite kinds of relation or condition. The relations or conditions themselves are dependent upon one another. The very notions of 'existence' and 'non-existence' are interdependent, for the one is possible only in relation to the other.

Origination and cessation, persistence and discontinuance, unity and plurality, coming and going—these are the eight principal relative conceptions which are the fundamental faults of ignorant minds, from which most of our prejudices and wrong judgments arise. People think that the law of coming and going actually operates in the world, that there are in reality persistence and

* Śvetāsvatara-Upaniṣad and Kaṭhopaniṣad.
† Thibaut, Introd. to *Vedanta Sūtra*, i. p. xxv (*SBE*).
‡ Cf. *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*², Cowell and Gough's tr., 22 f.
§ *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, p. 1; *Aṣṭa-sāhasrikā Prajñā-pāramita*, p. 1

* *Mādhyamika-vritti*.
† *Ib.* ch. xv.
‡ *Ib.* ch. i. (Cf. also Vidyabhusana in *JBTS* iii. pt. 2).

discontinuance of things, that things do really undergo the states of origination and cessation, and that things are really capable of being counted as one or many; but they are wholly unconscious of the fact that all those ideas are limited, relative, conditional, and therefore not the truth, but merely the production of our imperfect subjective state. There nestles in those ideas the principle of misery, and as the people cling to them, their life is a perpetual prey to the changing feelings of exultation and mortification.

The world is nothing but an aggregate of conditions.* Now, the conditions themselves are not self-existent, but are dependent upon one another. Those which do not possess self-existence are not real, but merely illusory. Therefore the whole world, as an aggregate of conditions, is a mere illusion. To look upon the world as real is mere folly on our part.

Where conditionality is, there is no truth; truth and conditionality are incompatible. Therefore, to attain to truth, conditionality must be completely cast aside. The eight conditional notions mentioned before must be thoroughly removed, and we should try to see the world as freed from all conditions. When our subjective mind is purified from the taint of conditionality, our ignorance will vanish away and the serene moonlight of 'Such-ness' or 'Transcendental Reality,' otherwise known as the 'Absolute,' will illumine us.

Here questions may be raised as to whether there is actually anything called 'Such-ness,' 'Transcendental Reality,' or the 'Absolute.' In answer to these questions, the Buddhists have said † that 'is' and 'is not'—that is, 'Being' and 'Non-being' or existence and non-existence—are conditional terms. The Transcendental Reality or the Absolute, which lies beyond all conditions, cannot be expressed in terms of 'is' and 'is not.' The Absolute lies beyond both 'Being' and 'Non-being.' It is, in fact, the unification or harmonization of the two. As the Absolute cannot be cognized in terms of our notions of the sense, understanding, or reason, we must be satisfied with describing it in our imperfect language as 'Unnameable' and 'Unknowable' (*avācḥya* and *avijñaptika*).

The Nihilists, we have found, say ‡ that there is no permanent reality underlying the world. The Realists, on the other hand, affirm that there is at least one eternal Reality from which the world has emanated. The Buddhists, who abhor all sophisms, say that the Nihilists and Realists are holders of extreme views. The philosophy of 'is' or Being and the philosophy of 'is not' or Non-being are equally false. As the Buddhists avoid the philosophy of 'Being' as well as 'Non-being,' and choose a middle path, their ethical doctrine is often called the Middle Path Doctrine.

The Middle Path is to be understood from four standpoints: (1) the Middle Path in contradistinction to one-sidedness, (2) the Middle Path as the abnegation of one-sidedness, (3) the Middle Path in the sense of the absolute truth, and (4) the Middle Path as unity in plurality.§

The philosophy of Being held by the Realists and the philosophy of Non-being held by the Nihilists are both of them one-sided and therefore imperfect, because neither the Being nor the Non-being is possible, independently of the other. The doctrine of the Middle Path stands free from one-sidedness, as it repudiates and avoids the two extremes of Being and Non-being. This is the first aspect of the doctrine.

A Middle Path reveals itself when the two extremes are completely out of sight; in other words, the harmonization or unification of them leads to the perfect solution of existence. Neither the philosophy of Being nor the philosophy of Non-being should be adhered to. They condition each other, and anything conditional means imperfection, so the transcending of one-sidedness constitutes the second aspect of the Middle Path.

But when we forget that the doctrine of the Middle Path is intended for the removal of the intellectual prejudices, and cling to or assert the view that there is something called Middle Path beyond or between the two extremes of Being and Non-being, we commit the fault of one-sidedness over again, by creating a third statement in opposition to the two. As long as the truth is absolute and discards all limitations, clinging even to the Middle Path is against it. Thus we must avoid not only the two extremes but also the middle, and it should not be forgotten that the phrase 'Middle Path' has, from the deficiency of our language, been provisionally adopted to express the human conception of the highest truth.

The final aspect of the Middle Path is that it does not lie beyond the plurality of existence, but is in it underlying all. The antithesis of Being and Non-being is made possible only through the conception of the Middle Path, which is the unifying principle of the world. Remove this principle and the world will fall to pieces, and the particulars will cease to be. The Middle Path doctrine does not deny the existence of the world as it appears to us; it condemns, on the contrary, the doctrine which clings to the conception of Absolute Nothing. What the doctrine most emphatically maintains is that the world must be conceived in its totality—in its oneness, that is, from the standpoint of the Middle Path.

Nirvāna, according to the Vedāntists, is the absorption of the self into the Absolute. The Absolute, we have found, is something which is free from all contradictions, and which cannot be expressed in terms of 'is' and 'is not.' As soon as one reaches the Absolute, conditionality vanishes. This state is called Nirvāna. It is the harmonization of all contradictions. In this state, unity is harmonized with plurality, origination and cessation are accomplished in one and the same way, persistence is unified with discontinuance, and one and the same law operates in the acts of coming and going. It is, in fact, an unconditional condition in which Being and Non-being are unified. All conditionality having disappeared, our veil of ignorance is withdrawn. The fabric of the world, including that of the self, breaks up, leaving us to be identified with the Infinite, the Eternal, the Uncreated, the Unconditioned, the Formless, the Void. This is the state of Nirvāna. The finite mind altogether fails to comprehend this state, and no language can give adequate expression to it.

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SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA.

* *Mādhyamikā-vritti*, ch. i.

† *Lalitavistara* (Rājendralāl's ed., Calcutta, p. 510; *Samādhirāja-sūtra* (*CBTS*), p. 30.

‡ *Mādhyamikā-vritti* (*CBTS* ed.), p. 41, etc.

§ J. Suzuki in *JBTS*, vol. vi. pt. 4.

ABSOLUTION (religious and ethical value of). —**1.** The idea of Absolution, as it appears in the Christian Church, is closely connected with two other ideas—the idea of sin, and the idea of the Church as a society. It is maintained, and may be true, that many of the practices and associations connected with Absolution took their origin in a state of mind to which ceremonial uncleanness seemed the thing most to be dreaded; but this fact, if it be a fact, does not affect the Christian view of Absolution. To the Christian mind, absolution is required when sin has been committed; *i.e.*, when some deliberate and voluntary defiance has been given to a moral law, which expresses the will of God, and the breach of which tends to separation from God. A soul, when it has sinned, requires to be forgiven; otherwise it remains in a permanent condition of alienation from God; and the authoritative declaration of its freedom from guilt, and reconciliation with God, is its absolution.

2. It is important that this should not be confused with the consciousness in the sinner that his sin is forgiven. The declaration of his freedom, however conveyed, may fail to carry conviction to his mind; or, again, he may have the strongest possible sense of forgiven sin without any decisive declaration of absolution at all. In other words, authoritative absolution and consciousness of forgiveness do not necessarily coexist: they may do so, but it is not necessary that they should.

3. It is obvious that, so far, we have considered only the relation of the individual soul and God. We have imagined the soul standing, as it were, alone in the world before the eyes of God, and receiving from Him the declaration of absolution. We have abstracted altogether this one relation from all its concomitants, the nature of sin, the ground of forgiveness, and the like. But it is plain that this abstract isolation is not the normal condition of any human soul. Every soul has an environment, which it affects, and by which it is affected; and no question of guilt or innocence, forgiveness or condemnation, is limited to the individual by himself. This truth, which goes far back into the history of man's ideas about himself, is emphatically presented in the Bible. Thus Ps 51, which gives expression most poignantly to the sense of personal guilt, also represents the sinner as born in a sinful environment: and again, Isaiah (6^5) is conscious not only that he is a man of unclean lips, but that he dwells among a people of unclean lips. Not only is sin a personal act of rebellion, but it produces a sinful atmosphere, a condition of alienation from God. In like manner, the absolution or declaration of freedom from sin cannot concern the individual alone: it must have an eye also to the society in which he lives and to his relations towards it.

4. We are not here concerned with the nature or process of forgiveness, or even with the conditions of it as regards God. The idea of Absolution brings forward only the place of sin and forgiveness in the Christian Society. It is not hard to illustrate this from the NT. We may notice, at once, the following points:—(1) It can scarcely be questioned that the Christian Society set out with an ethical purpose. Admission to it was by repentance, and by submitting to the rite which figured forth the remission of sins; and those who had become members of it were expected to lead a new life, abstaining from the sins which beset them in their 'former conversation.' It is but the corollary of this to say that sin after baptism involved a breach of the principle upon which the society was founded, no less than an outrage upon the Divine Law. All sin is lawlessness, the breach of some commandment enacted by God; and sin within the Church is more than this: it is a wilful disloyalty to the gifts which come through union with Christ, and, if carried on persistently, may place a man outside the reach of the sacrifice for sin (He 6^{4-6} $10^{26.\ 27.\ 39}$). (2) It is not less plain that the existence of post-baptismal sin forced a problem upon the attention of the Church with which its representatives were not slow to deal. In doing so, they doubtless rested for their authority upon words of Christ, such as we find in Mt $18^{15.\ 19}$ or Jn 20^{23}. The Epistles of St. Paul give instances of directions on disciplinary matters (1 Th 5^{14}, Ro 16^{17-20}, 1 Ti 4^{11-16}, and the like). St. Paul clearly contemplates the action of the Society in repressing evil, and even excluding evil-doers. But, of course, the clearest and most fully described case is that of the incestuous man at Corinth (1 Co 5). Here we find that the Corinthian Church had at first shown laxity in leaving the sin unrebuked. St. Paul, in the most solemn way, announces his decision in the matter (1 Co 5^{3-5}); the Corinthians clearly give effect to it in some way not recorded; and St. Paul (2 Co 2^{5-11}) exhorts them to comfort and restore the offender on his submission. The language used by St. Paul is not free from ambiguity. Though absent, he claims to act as if present at Corinth in association with the Church as a whole. And his judgment is to deliver 'such a one unto Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord' (1 Co 5^5) It is not clear what exactly is meant by this delivery to Satan, either here or in 1 Ti 1^{20}; but in both cases it seems to have been intended for discipline—for reformation with a view to restoration, not a final severance from the Society. Though, therefore, we cannot give any detailed description of the disciplinary measures of St. Paul, it is perfectly clear that he claimed to exercise such powers, that in so doing he assumed the co-operation of the Church, and that he regarded his judgments as valid: they are not merely strong expressions of reprobation, but judgments which will have consequences.

5. It has been necessary to approach the subject of Absolution indirectly as a special case of the exercise of discipline, because there is no direct discussion of it in Scripture, and the actual word never occurs. We do find, however, cases in which the Society exercises functions of discipline, such as those above alluded to, and these, when they take the form of a declaration of freedom from sin, correspond with the idea of Absolution. With these in view, it becomes necessary now to ask, what indications there are, if any, as to its meaning and validity. In answer to this we think that the following points may be safely asserted:

(1) The acts of the Society in discipline, and so in the exercise of Absolution, are spiritual acts, and have validity in the spiritual world. So much as this appears to follow from such words as Mt 18^{18-20} and Jn 20^{23}: what is bound on earth is bound in heaven: whosesoever sins the Society remits or retains, they are remitted or retained. It is true that the overt indication in the world of this disciplinary power consists merely of the confirmation or the withdrawal of the privilege to use the advantages of membership of the Society, to participate in the sacraments and so forth. But the functions of the Society cannot be limited to this. It is a spiritual society formed of persons held, in Christ, in certain close spiritual relations: not a loose aggregate of people individually in union with Christ, and casually connected in an outward society in the world. Such a division of the inward and outward relations of men in Christ is not Scriptural: the Church is a spiritual society of which the acts take place in the spiritual world: they have effect upon occasion in the world of sense, because they are already spiritually valid not *vice versa*.

(2) The view of sin which makes the whole conception of Absolution possible is ethical and not legal. That is, the Church considers as requiring Absolution not merely overt acts which carry legal consequences in the State, but inward conditions, of which there is nothing more to be said than that they imply a tendency to rebellion against God. The State, like the Church, condemns thieves and murderers, because they are detrimental to its interests: the Church condemns also those who walk disorderly, who are proud, or impure in heart. If it were merely a casual aggregate of persons on its outward and social side, it could have no more concern with these things than the State: it claims that inward sins of the heart must be put away before the man can enjoy its privileges, because it is a spiritual society acting in the spiritual world.

(3) The exercise of discipline upon such conditions as these depends upon the voluntary acquiescence of the members of the Society. The Church is, no doubt, at liberty to say that it will not grant membership except upon condition of such acquiescence, and will punish any disloyalty to the principle. But it must trust ultimately to the voluntary submission of its members to the rule. The mode in which the rule is administered may vary widely from time to time: it is carried out by a general formula of confession and absolution, by a private particular confession to, and absolution by, an accredited minister, or by open individual confession and absolution in the public service of the Church. But the Church cannot, so long as it claims to be a spiritual society, disclaim or relinquish responsibility for the spiritual condition of its members.

It lies outside the scope of this article to consider the various casuistical questions which have arisen in the course of history over this matter. We will only add here the following remarks: (1) It in no way conflicts with the view here adopted that absolution may be, and has been, fraudulently administered. The whole problem of the visible Church is, and has always been, to make the outward order correspond with the spiritual reality it expresses: and it has always been impeded by sin. The individual who seeks absolution without penitence, or the priest who fraudulently declares him absolved, commits a great sin: just as Ananias and Sapphira or Simon Magus committed a great sin. But the fact that insincere penitence or fraudulent absolution has occurred in the Church no more disturbs its general character and principles, than did the fraud of Ananias and Sapphira or the base motive of Simon Magus. The action of St. Peter on the two occasions shows the place of such disorders in the outward history of the Church.

(2) It is impossible to deny that the gravest evils have come from the misuse of the disciplinary power of the Church, especially of one particular mode of administering it: and the existence of these has brought the whole subject into disrepute. At the same time, it is difficult to read the Epistles of St. Paul, especially those chapters in which he lets us see into the internal conditions of the early Societies of Christians, without feeling how largely the Church depended for its advance upon a strong discipline, fearlessly exercised over its members. The case at Corinth, to which we have already referred, was, we may hope, exceptional. Yet a very serious situation would clearly have arisen if it had not been for St. Paul's action. The sin was one which public opinion among the pagans condemned (1 Co 5[1]), but the machinery of the Church, as it was, provided apparently no means of dealing drastically with it: St. Paul's strong denunciation was required to rouse the Corinthians to the necessary severity. It is easy to see from this, and the impression is continually confirmed by early Church history, that a weak discipline implies a feeble consciousness of the Church's moral standard, and allows the existence within its pale of a variety of lower and more worldly ideals beside its own. It would be difficult to deny that the almost total absence of discipline of any kind in modern Christian communities bears a similar implication.

LITERATURE.—See under CONFESSION and PENITENCE.

THOMAS B. STRONG.

ABSOLUTISM.—(*a*) *In philosophical speculation*: a method of interpreting reality which starts from the point of view of, and constructs a system by direct reference to, the complete unity of the whole. This self-contained unity is in metaphysics named the Absolute (q.v.). (*b*) *In æsthetics*: a view of the nature of Beauty which regards the quality of the beautiful as a constitutive character of the object as such, and in itself, independently of the judgments or emotions of the subject. This is 'æsthetic absolutism.' (*c*) *In politics*: a form of political government from, or by means of, a single supreme source of authority concentrated in the will of a specific individual, and executing its demands from itself and for itself, with or without the consent of the will of the community. It is in the main identical with Despotism (see GOVERNMENT).

J. B. BAILLIE.

ABSTINENCE.—See ASCETICISM.

ABSTRACTION (*abs-trahere*, 'to draw off *or* separate') is the separation or detachment of one part or element in a total experience from the whole to which it belongs. To abstract is thus to isolate any portion of the content of experience from its setting, and to consider it for the time being as it is in itself, 'loose and separate' from the structural and functional relations which belong to it in the concrete conscious life. Psychologically, Abstraction is the necessary condition and accompaniment of Attention (which see). To attend to one object of experience implies the withdrawal of attention from other objects.

Professor James (*Princ. of Psychology*, i. 403) says: Attention 'is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, concentration, of consciousness is of its essence. It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others.' Similarly, Sir William Hamilton (*Logic*, Lect. vii.) writes: 'The result of Attention, by concentrating the mind upon certain qualities, is thus to withdraw or abstract it from all else. In technical language, we are said *to prescind* the phenomena we exclusively consider. *To prescind*, *to attend*, and *to abstract* are merely different but correlative names for the same process; and the first two are nearly convertible. When we are said to prescind a quality, we are supposed to attend to that quality exclusively; and when we abstract, we are properly said *to abstract from*, that is, to throw other attributes out of account. I may observe that the term *abstraction* is very often abusively employed. By Abstraction we are frequently said to attend exclusively to certain phenomena—those, to wit, which we abstract; whereas the term *abstraction* is properly applied to the qualities which we abstract from; and by abstracting from some we are enabled to consider others more attentively. Attention and Abstraction are only the same process viewed in different relations. They are, as it were, the positive and negative poles of the same act.'

In spite of Hamilton's protest against using the term 'abstraction' as applying to the elements to which we attend,—a protest previously made by Kant (*Logik*, § 6),—the usage has persisted. As we shall presently notice, abstraction plays a part in the formation of concepts or general ideas. It is usually said that by abstraction the identical or similar elements or attributes in a number of different objects are singled out and combined into a general concept. Thus by abstracting from the objects denoted by man, horse, bird, fish, etc., the common property or identity of structure, we form the concept of 'vertebrate.' Without now raising the question whether concepts are formed solely by abstraction, we may notice that the essential element in abstraction is not the omission of the characteristics which are unlike, but the focussing of consciousness on what is similar in the different cases. This Kant himself admits, and in applying the term 'abstraction' to the process of separating out the common elements, the usage of logic agrees with that of grammar and of ordinary life.

It is essential in considering the nature of abstraction, to distinguish carefully the psychological from the logical discussion of the subject. We may describe abstraction psychologically as a process of isolation, closely correlated with active attention, and go on to exhibit its various forms and characteristics in terms of the structural mechanism of the conscious elements. From the logical point of view, however, abstraction has to be considered as playing a part in knowledge. Here we have to deal, not with its psychological form or

structure, but with its function or purpose in the development of the intellectual life. This distinction of standpoint does much to clear away the difficulties and confusions which attended the older discussions of the subject. For example, it puts in a new light the point at issue between Locke and Berkeley regarding the existence of abstract general ideas. It is possible to grant Berkeley's contention that abstract ideas must exist psychologically as particulars in individual form, and at the same time to maintain that as functions of the knowledge-process, *i.e.* as logical ideas, they necessarily transcend their individual mode of existence and are real universals.

The question then arises as to the relation of the knowledge-process to the ideas viewed as psychical content. Can the psychological states of consciousness be regarded as the original form from which the logical idea is derived by abstraction? This has been very commonly maintained. Mr. F. H. Bradley tells us that a logical meaning 'consists of a part of the content (original or acquired) cut off, fixed by the mind, and considered apart from the existence of the sign.' The whole trend of modern logic (including Mr. Bradley's own work) shows conclusively, however, that it is impossible to begin with 'mental states' and pass by way of abstraction to logical ideas. The view of the cognitive side of consciousness, as at first made up of particular images or ideas, is now acknowledged to be a fiction. And similarly we must reject the *quasi*-mechanical account of the formation of general ideas which is based on this fiction, according to which we are said first to abstract the common element from the particular images and then proceed further to generalize it, thus in some mysterious way transforming it into a logical idea. But we cannot derive knowledge from an anoetic process, and therefore must postulate that consciousness is from its first beginnings a process of interpretation and generalization. It starts from a content that is a vague presentation continuum, lacking both differentiation and integration, and, as such, not yet either particular or universal. It is the work of intelligence to transform this into a coherent system of parts. Now it must constantly be borne in mind that it is within this total knowledge-process, and as contributory to it, that abstraction finds its function and justification. It is not the end or essence of thinking, but a process or method which thought uses in the accomplishment of its own ends. The purpose which it fulfils is closely related to that of Analysis, though the specific method of abstraction has its own differentia. 'The reflective idea which guides it,' says Bosanquet, 'is the equivalent in general knowledge of the mathematical axiom that if equals be taken from equals the remainders are equal.' But, as within any real whole the withdrawal of one part never leaves the other parts unaffected, the guiding idea of abstraction is only provisional. 'It amounts to no more than this, that within known wholes known changes may appear to leave remainders known *as unchanged*' (*Logic*, ii. 22 f.).

Abstraction as a specific process is thus only a provisional expedient; and, unless corrected by a more adequate conception of the nature of the whole, it is likely in most fields to lead to error. But thinking proceeds both by concretion and abstraction, and these two moments are never entirely distinct and separate. Aristotle, and the formal logicians following him, have seemed to oppose Abstraction (ἀφαίρεσις) and Determination (πρόσθεσις). When, however, we emphasize the unity of the intellectual process within which both these functions operate, we see that the opposition can never be more than relative. Abstraction and Determination, like Analysis and Synthesis (within which they may be said to be included), imply each other as complementary moments of real thinking. The goal which thought seeks is not to be gained by passing to the highest abstraction; for this is the emptiest of all thoughts. Nor can it be reached by the determination of a plurality of particulars. But the methods of abstraction and determination must unite in defining experience in terms of a concrete universal. It is against the abuse of abstraction, against making isolation and mutilation the final goal of thinking, and thus neglecting the organic wholeness and unity of things, that Hegel's criticism is chiefly directed. The process of abstraction is for him never an end in itself, but only a means in the progress towards greater unity and concreteness.

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J. E. CREIGHTON.

ĀBŪ (Mount).—A famous mountain and place of Hindu and Jain pilgrimage, rising like an island out of the great plain of Rājputāna, in the native State of Sirohi. The name is derived from its Skr. title *Arbuda*, 'a serpent,' 'a long round mass,' perhaps from the root *arḍ*, 'to go,' 'to hurt,' probably with reference to its form. Its summit, *Guru Śikhara*, 'Peak of the Teacher,' rises to a height of 5,653 feet above the level of the sea.

'It is hardly to be wondered at,' writes Fergusson (*History of Indian and Eastern Architecture*, ed. 1899, p. 234), 'that Mount Ābū was early fixed upon by the Hindus and Jains as one of their sacred spots. Rising from the desert as abruptly as an island from the ocean, it presents on every side inaccessible scarps 5000 ft. or 6000 ft. high, and the summit can be approached only by ravines cut into its sides. When the summit is reached, it opens out into one of the loveliest valleys imaginable, 6 or 7 miles long by 2 or 3 miles in width, cut up everywhere by granite rocks of the most fantastic shapes, and the spaces between covered with trees and luxuriant vegetation. The little Nucki Talao (properly Nakhī Talāo, as it was supposed to have been excavated by the nails (Skr. *nakha*) of the gods) is one of the loveliest gems of its class in India, and it is near to it, at Dilwarra, that the Jains selected a place for their Tirth (Skr. *tīrtha*) or sacred place of rendezvous. It cannot, however, be said that it has been a favourite place of worship in modern times. Its distance and inaccessibility are probably the causes of this, and it consequently cannot rival Palitāna or Girnār in the extent of its buildings.'

Tod styles Mount Ābū 'the Olympus of India,' because in olden times it was reputed to be the favourite residence of the gods, and was believed to be the scene of two famous events in Hindu mythology. Here the *munis* (or sages), of whom Vasiṣṭha, a worshipper of Śiva, was the leader, practised austerities, living on milk and the fruits of the earth. There was then no mountain, but only a cleft in the plain, into which the cow that supplied the wants of the sage fell, and was miraculously floated out by a rise of water from beneath. To prevent the recurrence of such an accident, the sage prayed to Śiva, then enthroned on the Kailāsa peak of the Himālaya. He called on the sons of Himāchal, the deified mountain range, to relieve the saint. The youngest son of Himāchal volunteered to exile himself, and, mounted on the serpent Takshaka, he journeyed to the holy land. At the behest of the sage he leaped into the cleft, embraced, as he fell, by the serpent god. Within the cleft the snake writhed so violently that Vasiṣṭha appealed again to Śiva, who from the depths of Pātāla, the nether-world, raised his toe until it appeared at the top of the mountain, which was thus formed by the god. Hence, under the title of *Achala Iśvara*, 'Immovable Lord,' Śiva has become the patron deity of the hill. But in accordance with the eclectic spirit of Hinduism, this does not prevent the place from becoming a site sacred both to Vaiṣṇavas and Jains. The second legend tells of the creation of the *Agnikula*, or 'fire-born' septs of the Rājputs. The *Daityas*, or demons, it is

said, disturbed the performance of the rites of Siva on the hill. Viśvāmitra, another sage, appealed to the gods, who proceeded to the spot, and out of the *Agnikuṇḍa*, or fire-pit, in which the fire-sacrifice was performed, created the four *Agnikula*, or 'fire-born' septs—Chauhān, Parihāra, Solanki, and Pramāra, who destroyed the Daityas, and restored the cult of Śiva. Both these legends seem to indicate some early conflict of rival cults, the nature of which is unknown.

The chief Hindu religious sites are, first, the crowning peak of Guru Śikhara, where in a cavern are to be seen the footprints of the saint Dātuvrija, presided over by some dissolute-looking Gaṇapati priests, and those of Rāmānanda, the great apostle of the Vaiṣṇava cultus. At the temple of Achala Īśvara, which is now, according to Cousens, in a state of deplorable decay and neglect, is shown the toe-nail of Śiva in a cleft of the rock. His female counterpart is worshipped as Adharā Devī and Arbuda Mātā, the Mother-goddess of the hill. The sage Vasiṣṭha is honoured at a shrine called *Bastonjī*, or *Gaumukha*, 'Cow-mouth,' where a fountain falls from a spout shaped like a cow's head. To the W. of this is the shrine of the saint Gotamjī, or Gautama Ṛishi, containing two images, one of Viṣṇu and the other of a female beside a male bearded figure. The temples at Devāngan, 'Court of the Gods,' have not been fully described, if they have ever been visited, by an European, the approach being over rugged, dangerous rocks. The largest is dedicated to Viṣṇu, and close to it is Narasiṁha, the fourth Avatāra, or incarnation of the god, said to be one of the finest images on the hill.

Of the Jain temples at Delvāda or Devalvāḍa, 'place of temples,' two are described by Fergusson as 'unrivalled for certain qualities by any temples in India.' The first was built by Vimala, a merchant Jain prince, about A.D. 1032, two years after the death of that arch-raider Mahmūd of Ghazni, who desecrated the older temples. It is dedicated to Ṛishabhadeva, the first Jaina *arhat*, or saint. The original image was destroyed by the Musalmāns, and that now in the temple is the second or perhaps the third in succession. The second great temple was built by the brothers Tejapāla and Vastupāla between A.D. 1197 and 1247. It is in honour of the 23rd *arhat*, Pārśvanātha, the only one in the series readily identifiable by the many-headed serpent's hood which rises above him. Both these temples are built of white marble, though no quarry of this material is known to exist within 300 miles of the spot, and the stone could have been conveyed up the rugged slopes of the hill only by incredible exertions and at enormous cost. Both these remarkable buildings have been fully described by Fergusson, whose account is supplemented and in part corrected by that of Cousens.

Ābū was once the haunt of a colony of those loathsome ascetics, the Aghorīs, but they have long since disappeared.

LITERATURE.—Tod, *Annals of Rajasthān*, Calcutta reprint, i. 96 ff., *Travels in W. India*, 101 ff.; Fergusson, *Picturesque Illustrations of Architecture in Hindostan*, 39 f., *Hist. of Indian and Eastern Architecture*, ed. 1899, 234 ff.; Cousens, *Progress Report, Arch. Survey of W. India*, for 1901, p. 2 ff.; Rowland, *Indian Antiquary*, ii. 249 ff. In the editor's note to the last article, some of the Ābū inscriptions are given as a supplement to those recorded by H. H. Wilson, *Asiatic Researches*, xvi. 284 ff. The place has been well described by Major C. A. Baylay in *Rājputāna Gazetteer* (1880), iii. 129 ff., to which this article is largely indebted.

W. CROOKE.

ABUSE, ABUSIVE LANGUAGE (Gr. λοιδορεῖν; Lat. *contumeliâ afficere, conviciari*; Ger. *schimpfen, lästern*; Fr. *maudire*).—Abuse in general denotes an evil use of a thing caused by excess or injustice; in law it denotes 'to injure, diminish in value or wear away by using improperly.' Examples of such abuse are signified in the phrases 'abuse of authority,' 'abuse of confidence,' 'abuse of privilege,' 'abuse of legal process,' in all of which the *use* is assumed as determined by corrective justice, and its opposite, the *abuse*, is a departure, either in the way of defect or excess, from the mean laid down by corrective justice. In this article we are concerned, however, only with a narrower signification of the term 'abuse,' viz. that which deals with the improper use of language, and yet more narrowly with such an improper use as tends to the injury or harm of another human being. Abuse in this narrower and colloquial sense, then, denotes all that class of injuries which are inflicted on others by the means of language, under the sway of passion or any other motive opposed to the principle of justice, or of love, or of both. It ranges from blasphemy at the one end to the 'jesting which is not convenient' at the other, and varies according to the spirit which produces it or the means adopted for its manifestation. It is usefully classed by Aquinas under the heads of contumely (*contumelia*), detraction (*detractio*), backbiting (*susurrus*), ridicule (*derisio*), and cursing (*maledictio*).

1. **Contumely** is an injury inflicted in words, whereby there is denied to a man some good quality on account of which he is held in honour, or whereby some concealed fact to his discredit is unnecessarily and uncharitably made public. If, for example, it is said of a man that he is blind, this is abuse indeed, but of less gravity than if he were charged with being a thief. Another and more venial form of abuse is to reflect needlessly on a man's defect, as, *e.g.*, that he is of lowly birth, or that he has been badly educated, or that he spent a wild and profligate youth, such things being said in order to deprive the person of whom they are said of some honour he has won for himself by virtuous conduct or public service. Such language is to be placed under the general head of *contumely*, as a form of abusive language which has its root in anger and has pride for its foster-mother. It is a kind of revenge, and is indeed the readiest and easiest form in which revengeful feelings find expression.

2. **Detraction** differs from contumely both in its object and in its source. It does not seek so much to rob a man of his honour as to blacken his reputation, and it springs from envy rather than from anger. It effects its purpose (1) directly by bringing a false charge, by exaggerating a fault, by revealing a hidden defect, or by imputing an evil motive; and (2) indirectly by denying, concealing, or minimizing what is meritorious. 'He that filches from me my good name robs me of that which not enriches him, and makes me poor indeed.' The words used may not be contumelious—in the case of Iago they included both contumely and detraction—but they are abuse, and abuse of the worst kind.

3. **Backbiting**, whispering, or innuendo is another form of abusive language which has for its object the separating of friends. The detractor abuses language by saying what is evil about his neighbour *simpliciter*; the whisperer injures him *secundum quid*, viz. by saying of a man what will alienate his friend. 'Sin against our neighbour is so much the greater as the greater loss is inflicted, and the loss is the greater as the good taken away is greater. But the loss of a friend is a great loss, and therefore the whisperer is a great sinner.'

4. **Ridicule**, when apart from love, is a further abuse of language. The three forms of abuse mentioned above tend to deprive a man of some external good, such as honour, reputation, or friends. Derision, however, goes to deprive a man of his inward peace, the testimony of a good conscience. It is to be classed with contumely, de

traction, and whispering as abusive language, but it differs from them in its end. It holds a man up to scorn for some evil in him or some defect, and springs from contempt for him,—a contempt which is rooted in pride and finds enjoyment in the contrast between the person who is ridiculed and the ridiculer. It is this special form of abusive language which is condemned by Jesus Christ in the sayings (Mt 5^{22}) in which He forbids contempt for a man's intellectual qualities (expressed by *raca*), or for his moral qualities (expressed by *moreh*).

5. Cursing is abusive language whereby evil is pronounced against a man in the imperative or the optative mood. Words which inflict deserved punishment (as in the case of Gehazi, 2 K 5^{27}), or state a fact (as in the case of Adam and Eve, Gn $3^{16ff.}$), or express abhorrence of evil in itself (as David and the mountains of Gilboa, 2 S 1^{21}), or are used symbolically ('*Dominus maledixit ficulneum in significationem Judææ*'), do not come under this definition, and are not, therefore, of the nature of abusive language. To curse is 'to pronounce against anyone, in the name of religion, or under the impulse of some violent movement of the soul, words of reprobation or of condemnation.' God's name is either explicitly used, or lies implicit in the current forms, especially those in use among the more uncultured classes. To this it seems necessary to add that in these classes sexual processes or aberrations are largely drawn on for the purpose of supplying the vocabulary of abuse, a fact which serves the purpose of demonstrating incidentally the close connexion between sensual indulgence and contempt or hatred or scorn of our fellows. The peevishness which finds expression in abusive language directed against others is at bottom a deep-seated discontent with self.

The subject of blasphemy (q.v.) is beyond the scope of this article, and the only remark to be made here about it is that cursing any creature as a creature comes under that head.

Abusive language, when it is used in the hearing of several persons in a public place (even when the name of God is not uttered, but words importing an imprecation of future Divine vengeance only), may constitute profane swearing, and is a nuisance at common law. Blasphemy and profane swearing differ at law only in this, that blasphemy is a word of larger meaning.

LITERATURE.—Thomas Aquinas, *Summa*, II. ii. 13 and 72–76; Aristotle, *Eth. Nikom.* viii. 9; Grimm, *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, *s.v.* 'Schimpfen'; Migne, *Encyc.* tom. xxxii. col. 263 ff.; *American and English Encyc. of Law*, *s.v.* 'Abuse'; Profane Oaths Act, 1745; Stephen, *Com. on the Laws of England*, iv. 198–194; Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, § 28.

W. F. COBB.

ABYSS (ἄβυσσος).—The Greek word, of which our 'abyss' is a transliteration, occurs in the classics as an adjective signifying 'bottomless,' 'boundless.' It is composed of the intensive ἀ, and βυσσός = βυθός, 'depth.' In the LXX it represents *tĕhōm* (תְּהוֹם) and *ṣūlāh* (צוּלָה). Most of the passages in the Bible where it is employed belong to the poetical books, and are of late date. Seeing also that the Pentateuch was the first part of the Bible to be turned into Greek, we must regard Gn 1^2 as the earliest instance of its use, so far as our investigation is concerned. What, then, is the meaning of *tĕhōm* (תְּהוֹם), the word for which it stands? The answer must be sought outside the limits of our extant Heb. literature. Dillmann and others have, indeed, been inclined to derive it from *hūm* (הוּם), 'to roar *or* rage'; but it is so obviously cognate with the *Tiāmat* of Bab. cosmogony that we must look on the *t* as part of the root. Jensen's suggestion (adopted in *KAT*[3] 492) is that the root is *tāham* (תָּהַם), 'to stink.' The *Oxf. Heb. Lex.* argues that תהם is probably the root, 'in view of As. *tiâmtu*, *tāmtu*.' In any case, *Tĕhōm*, like *Tiāmat*, was a proper noun, 'Deep,' not 'the deep.' Frequent as are its appearances in the OT, it is almost invariably without the article. Turning now to that Babylonian conception, of which the Heb., if a derivative,* is a greatly modified one, we find that *Tiāmat* was the dark and watery chaos, the primeval undifferentiated matter, out of which gods and men, heaven and earth sprang. Berosus (*c.* 275 B.C.) conveys the idea (τὸ πᾶν σκότος καὶ ὕδωρ), and Wis 11^{17} has the same in view (ὕλη ἄμορφος). Such a chaos is postulated in the myths of Egyptians, Phœnicians, Indians, and Greeks. Hesiod, *e.g.*, *Theog.* 115, asserts: ἤτοι μὲν πρώτιστα χάος γένετ' *κ.τ.λ.* The well-known Bab. legend opens thus:

'When on high the heavens were unnamed,
Beneath, the earth bore not a name;
The primeval ocean (*apsū rēštû*) was their producer;
Mummu Tiamtu was she who begat the whole of them.
Their waters in one united themselves, and
The plains were not outlined, marshes were not to be seen.'
(Pinches, *Old Test.* etc., p. 16).

There is a substantially correct reproduction of this legend in the Syrian writer Damascius (6th cent. A.D.), who states that the Babylonians believed in two principles of the universe, Tauthé and Apason, the latter being Tauthé's husband. Apason, here, is evidently the same as *Apsū* (= the waters under, around, and above the earth, especially the sweet waters in contrast to Tiāmat, the salt), whilst Tauthé (Berosus, Θαμτέ) is *Tiāmat*. The latter also sometimes bears the name *Bahu* (the בֹּהוּ *bōhū* = 'emptiness,' of Gn 1^2, LXX ἀκατασκεύαστος), the Phœnician *Baau*, mother of the first men. Here we have the origin of the Heb. idea of the abyss. Gunkel (*Schöpf. u. Chaos*, 15) has pointed out that such a picture of the primal state of the universe would naturally present itself in a land like Babylonia, where the winter rains pour down from heaven and, uniting with the streams and rivers, turn all things into chaos: only when spring returns do land and water take their separate places. This idea reached the Hebrews through the medium of Phœnicians and Canaanites, and was reinforced by a similar Egyptian idea of a boundless primeval water (*Nun*), which filled the universe and contained the germ of all existence. We may therefore say, with Trevisa (1398): 'The primordiall and fyrste matere in the begynnynge of the worlde not dystinguyd by certayn fourme is called Abyssus.' In it were the potencies of the life that would hereafter appear.† The process, according to the Bab. theory, was one of evolution; according to Gn 1, it was determined wholly by the creative fiat of God.

The memory of the original abyss was kept up by the 'seas' and 'abysses' which were common in the temples of Babylonia. Urninā of Lagaš (*c.* 4000 B.C.) set up a greater and a smaller *apsū* (Gunkel, pp. 28, 153). Argum (*c.* 17th cent. B.C.) placed a *tamtu*, or sea, in Marduk's shrine. 'This was, no doubt, a large basin or "laver," similar to the brazen sea of Solomon's temple which stood upon twelve oxen' (King, *Bab. Rel.* (1899) p. 109).

The recalcitrancy of matter and the struggle of darkness against light are portrayed in the myth of *Tiāmat*, as a dragon-like monster, fighting with Marduk, but slain by him. Out of one half of her body he constructed a vault (the earth), the two ends of which rest on the ocean (*apsū*). A similar picture of the position of the earth is present to the Heb. poet's mind when he declares that

* A. Jermias declares (*Das AT im Lichte des Alten Orients*) that borrowing on either side, or direct dependence, is not to be thought of.

† Didron (*Christian Iconog.* ii. 127) copies a miniature from a 10th cent. MS—a small, conical mound, divided into stages by spiral bands. The lowest zone contains birds, the next fishes, then vegetation, finally a human head issues from the summit. By the side is written 'Abissus.'

Jahweh has 'founded it upon seas and established it upon floods' (Ps 24[2]). The disc of the earth rests on the all-surrounding ocean, and the 'waters under the earth' are called *tĕhōm* or *tĕhōm rabbā*, 'abyss,' 'great abyss' (Gn 7[11] 8[2], Dt 8[7] 33[13], Am 7[4], Pr 3[20] 8[24]), whose fountains are broken up at the Flood, from which well up the sources that fertilize the land and (Ezk 31[4]) refresh the trees. It is in this sense that Clem. Rom. (I. xx.) speaks of the inscrutable depths of the abysses (*ἀβύσσων τε ἀνεξιχνίαστα*). Trevisa also says: 'Abyssus is depnesse of water vnseen, and therof come and springe welles and ryuers.'

Tĕhōm or 'Abyss' is a frequent designation of the oceans and seas, without any reference to their being 'under the earth.' And although there is no trace of the refractoriness of matter in the narrative of Gn 1, this comes out strongly in many references to the sea (Is 50[2] 51[10], Jer 5[22], Ps 77[16] 104[6-9] 106[9] 107[24] 135[6] 148[7], Pr 8[29], Job 7[12] 26[12] 38[8ff.], Sir 43[23], Pr. Man 3, En 60[7-9], Rev 21[1]).

The question has been raised whether the תְּהֹמוֹת of Ps 71[20] should not be corrected to מִקְצוֹת (cf. Ps 63[10] 139[15], Is 44[23]). However that may be, the LXX has 'abysses' (*ἄβυσσοι*), which word, either in the sing. or the plur., became one of the names for Hades. In the verse in question it points to the profound depths of the invisible world, from which the persecuted are to be brought back again. The Bab. scheme of the universe also locates the abode of the dead in the heart of the earth, making the entrance thereto lie in the extreme west (*KAT*[3] 636), designating it 'the country whence none return,' dividing it into seven zones, corresponding to the seven planetary spheres (Lenormant, *Chald. Magic*, 165, 169); cf. Mt 12[40], Ph 2[10]. Enoch (17[6]) sees in the west the great streams and the great flood, and enters into the great darkness [of Hades], into which all flesh comes. In the only classical passage where *ἄβυσσος* is a noun, it is employed for Hades (Diog. Laert. *Epig.* iv. 27, *χοῦτω κατῆλθες εἰς μέλαιναν Πλουτέως ἄβυσσον*).

To take yet another step is easy. קְצוֹת יָם (Job 41[23]) is represented in the LXX by *τὸν δὲ τάρταρον τῆς ἀβύσσου*. This is a free translation by an Alexandrian Hellenist, who knew his classics (Swete, *Introd. to OT in Greek*, pp. 256, 318), and remembered that Tartarus was a prison, a murky pit, into which Zeus threatens to cast any god who may venture to oppose him (*Il.* viii. 11–16), as far beneath Hades as this is below the earth (cf. *Τάρταρά τ' ἠερόεντα μυχῷ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης*, Hes. *Theog.* 120). Now at Job 38[16] *Sheol* is at the bottom of the sea, and we here (41[23] LXX) find hell in the same locality, for the sea-monster Leviathan considers the Tartarus of the abyss his captive. The Book of Enoch often speaks of the abyss as a place of punishment. The traveller reaches a deep abyss, in which are lofty pillars of fire, some of them prostrate (18[11-16]). Here is the prison of the rebellious angels; he sees a place with a cleft or chasm (*διακοπή*) running down into the abyss. Uriel informs him that the angels are imprisoned there for ever (21[7-11]); judgment began with the stars, which were found guilty and cast into an abyss full of fire (90[24]). English writers have freely used the word as an equivalent for 'hell.' Lydgate (1413) says: 'This pytte is the chyef and the manoyr of helle that is clepid Abissus.'

We pass to the NT. The abyss is the ordinary abode of demons who, having been permitted to take temporary possession of a man, now deprecate being remanded to their own place, because their power of doing mischief is thus terminated (Lk 8[31]); it is Hades, where the spirits of the departed dwell, where Christ spent the interval between death and resurrection (Ro 10[7]). 'Ipsa anima fuit in abysso' (Ambrose). The impression conveyed by St. Paul's language is of the vastness of that realm, as of one that we should vainly attempt to explore. The abyss communicates with our earth by a pit or shaft (*φρέαρ*), Rev 9[1-11], with which the *διακοπή* of En 21[7] should be compared. According to the Tractate *Sukkah* of the Talmud, the mouth of this pit is under the foundations of the temple, and can be closed by magical formulæ: 'Qua hora David fodiebat fundamenta templi, exundavit abyssus mundum submersurus. Dixit David: Estne hic, qui sciat, an liceat testæ inscribere nomen ineffabile, et projiciemus illam in abyssum, ut quiescat?' (Bousset, *Die Offenbarung Johannis*, p. 251). When the *φρέαρ* of Rev 9 is opened, there issue from it poisonous, stinging locusts, which cause exquisite anguish to men. Over them is a king, 'the angel of the abyss,' whose Greek name, *Apollyon*, represents pretty accurately his Heb. title *Abaddon*. This is a different point of view from that of En 20[1], where *Uriel* is designated the holy angel who presides over both the angelic host and Tartarus. At Pr 15[11] 27[20] etc., Abaddon is parallel to Sheol, and the Rabbis make it a name of the lowest pit of hell. The abyss, then, in the present passage, as in Lk 8[31], is the abode of the ministers of torment, from which they go forth to do hurt. In the Bab. documents, demons and spirits of disease proceed from hell:

'They, the productions of the infernal regions,
On high they bring trouble, and below they bring confusion.'
(Lenormant, *Chald. Magic*, p. 30).

The Rabbis, too, represent Sammael and his angels as emerging thence (Eisenmenger, *Entdeckt. Jud.* ii. 336 f.). The abyss of Rev 11[7] 17[8] is put in the same light: a beast which occasions calamities to the saints arises out of it. The dragon, 'that old serpent, which is the devil, and Satan,' is shut up therein, and its mouth is sealed for a thousand years (20[3]). The language in which this is set forth should be compared with Prayer of Manasses 3:

ὁ κεδήσας τὴν θάλασσαν τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ
προστάγματος αὐτοῦ,
ὁ κλείσας τὴν ἄβυσσον καὶ σφραγισάμενος
αὐτὴν τῷ φοβερῷ καὶ ἐνδόξῳ ὀνόματί σου.

In the *Rituale Romanum*, part of the formula of Exorcism runs: 'Cede Ergo Deo + qui te, et malitiam tuam in pharaone, et in exercitu ejus per Moysen servum suum in abyssum demersit': with this cf. Jubilees 48[14].

The Gnostics, as might have been expected, made an altogether different use of the idea of the abyss. Their special name for it was *Βυθός*, *Bythus*, and by this they meant the Divine first principle, the fountain of all existence, the infinite, unfathomable, inscrutable abyss of Deity:

'A vast, unfathomable sea,
Where all our thoughts are drowned.'

Λέγουσι γάρ τινα εἶναι ἐν ἀοράτοις καὶ ἀκατονομάστοις ὑψώμασι τέλειον Αἰῶνα προόντα· τοῦτον δὲ καὶ [προαρχὴν καὶ] προπατόρα καὶ βυθὸν καλοῦσιν (Iren. *adv. Hær.* i. 1: 'For they say that in the invisible and nameless heights there is a certain perfect, pre-existing Æon. And they call him [first principle and] progenitor and Bythus'). Hippolytus (vi. 37) bears the same testimony: speaking of Valentinus, he says: *ὑπεστήσατο τὸν πάντων βασιλέα ὃν ἔφη Πλάτων, οὗτος πατέρα καὶ βυθὸν καὶ [προαρχὴν ?] τῶν ὅλων αἰώνων* ('He whom Plato spoke of as King of all, this man postulated as father and Bythus and first principle [?] of all the æons'). The Valentinians held that by a process of self-limitation the *Bythus* evolved a series of pairs of æons, male and female, any pair of which may be called the *pleroma*, the latter name being also given to the whole series taken together, which then stands to the *Bythus* in the feminine relation, as *Tiāmat* did to *Apsū*. But Gnosticism never formed a homogeneous body of opinion. There were, as Hippolytus warns us,

many varying opinions concerning the *Bythus* itself. According to some thinkers, he was outside the *pleroma*: others held him to be within it, but separated from the rest by *Horus* (Ὅρος), a personified boundary (Lightfoot, *Coloss.* p. 332). There were some who actually deposed him from his place at the head of the series, and made him follow the first ogdoad. Some thought of him as unwedded, and neither male nor female; whilst others again gave him *Sigē* as his consort, or the two powers Thought and Will (Hippol. *loc. cit.*). The relation of Gnostic speculation on the *Bythus* to later philosophical thought is perhaps sufficiently indicated in one sentence of Irenæus, *ap.* Epiphan. xxxii. 7: Οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἄζυγον λέγουσιν, μήτε ἄρρενα, μήτε θήλειαν, μήτε ὅλως ὄντα τι. ('For some say that he is unwedded and is neither male nor female, nor, in fact, anything at all'). He was exalted above all contrarieties — the Absolute, identical with Nothing, the Being of whom even existence might not be predicated. No wonder that the Mystics took up both the thought and the term: 'I saw and knew the being of all things, the Byss and the Abyss, and the eternal generation of the Holy Trinity, the descent and original of the world and of all creatures through the Divine wisdom' (Jacob Behmen, quoted by James, *Varieties of Rel. Experience*, p. 411).

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works mentioned above, see Jensen, *Kosmogonie der Babylonier*; Sayce, *Hibbert Lectures*, 1887; Smythe Palmer, *Tĕhôm and Tiâmat*, 1897, and art. in *Guardian*, Feb. 6, 1907; Driver on *Genesis*, 1904; Neander, *Hist. of the Christian Church*, vol. ; ii. (for the Gnostics); *New English Dictionary* (for the words 'Abime,' 'Abysme,' 'Abyss' in Eng. literature).

JOHN TAYLOR.

ABYSSINIA.—The peoples of Abyssinia belong to three distinct races, viz. the African aborigines, the Hamitic (Cushitic) tribes, and the Semitic immigrants.

(*a*) The *African aborigines* are now found only in the western and north-western part of Abyssinia; they are called by the other Abyssinians *Shangalā* or *Shangelā*. Originally the name of a certain tribe, this has come to be a generic term for all non-Semitic or non-Hamitic people of probably negro origin. The largest aggregation of these Abyssinian 'negroes' are the Kunamas or Bāzēns, and the Bāriās, whose languages also are entirely different from those of the Cushites and the Semites. They inhabit the country around the Takkazē and the Gash Rivers, mostly in the present Italian Colonia Eritrea. The Christian Abyssinians call them sometimes by the derogatory term 'mouse-eaters'; *bāriā* in Amharic means also 'slave,' because these aborigines are taken as slaves all over Abyssinia. This part of the population is, to a large extent, pagan; others, like the Bāriās, have become Muhammadans; some of them, especially the slaves among the Christians, have adopted the Christian faith.

(*b*) The *Hamitic* or *Cushitic* tribes form the stock of the population of Abyssinia. They immigrated into that country at some remote period of which we have no record. There is scarcely a part of Abyssinia where the Semites, who imposed their language almost everywhere, did not intermingle with them. In the south the Semitic blood was almost absorbed by the Hamitic; in the north the Hamitic tribes seem to have been kept a little more separate. The main tribes of the Cushites or Abyssinian Hamites are the Somalis and the Gallas in Southern Abyssinia; the 'Afar (called by the Arabs *Danakil*, perhaps of Arab origin, but speaking a Cushitic language) in the east; the Agaos (with several subdivisions) all over the centre; the Sahos in the north-east, the Bogos (also called Bilin after the name of their language, of Agao origin), finally, the Bedawīn in the north, who extend into the Egyptian Sudan. The Gallas, or Oromos, are very numerous, and are divided into many tribes, some of which extend as far as the equatorial lakes. Their language is a Hamitic one, and the Abyssinians make a distinction between them and the Shangalās. Since, however, many Gallas whom the writer has seen (in Northern Abyssinia) have pronounced negroid features, it may be that a part of this nation is of negro origin and has adopted a Hamitic language. Similar cases occur very frequently, as, for instance, with the Celts in Bavaria, who speak German, and the negroes in the United States of America, who have adopted the English language. The Gallas are partly pagan, partly Muhammadan. Some of them became Christians, but the wholesale baptism of Galla people by King Theodore I. (1855–1868) met with little success. The Somalis and the 'Afar are practically Muhammadan; the Sahos and the Bedawīn are Muhammadan; the Bogos partly Christian, partly Muhammadan.

(*c*) The *Semitic* population of Abyssinia is strongest in the north, *i.e.* in the region of the ancient kingdom of Aksum. There is no doubt that these Semites came to Abyssinia from Arabia. The bulk of them may have come within the last cents. B.C., but the Semitic immigration never stopped. It was rather, as Renan has said, a 'gradual infiltration,' and even in our days an Arab tribe, the Rashāida, has crossed to the other side of the Red Sea and is beginning to be nationalized in Africa; they still speak Arabic, but have commenced to use the Tigrē language as well. The Semites have been, beyond doubt, the civilizers of, or at least the bearers of some civilization to, Abyssinia. They founded an empire, they built temples, palaces, and entire cities, as well as dams and reservoirs; they originated and carried on the only literature that Abyssinia ever had. When they came they were, of course, pagan, but after some centuries they became Christian; and, whatever their Christianity is, or may have been, it has always tended to a higher state of morals and religion than that which native Africa, south of Egypt and the other countries along the north shore, has ever been capable of producing. The Semitic language which was first written (after the Sabæan) is the Ethiopic or Ge'ez. A few pagan and Christian inscriptions and almost the entire Christian literature are committed to writing in this language, which must have died out before the 10th cent. A.D. At present there are three main Semitic languages in Abyssinia: Amharic, Tigriña, and Tigrē. Amharic is the language of the south and the centre; Tigriña that of the region of the old Aksumitic kingdom; Tigrē is spoken by the half-nomadic tribes of the north, and has been adopted by many of the Hamites of that region. The majority of those who speak Amharic and Tigriña are Christians; Tigriña is often called *zārāvā kheshtān* (in Tña) or *hīgā kestān* (in Tē), *i.e.* the language of the Christians. The Tigrē tribes are now mostly Muhammadans, but about half of the Mānsa' tribe have retained Christianity.

We have therefore, in speaking of the religions of Abyssinia, to deal with Paganism, Islām, and Christianity. Paganism is at the bottom of all of them, and even the religious ideas of the common people in Christian and Muhammadan districts are more like pagan superstitions than like the ideas of the founder of Christianity or of the prophet of Islām. We may here dispense entirely with official Islām or Christianity. It will suffice to record the following facts: Islām in Abyssinia is Sunnite, the Muhammadans living in Christian surroundings are called Djabartī, the people who do missionary work there at present are mostly of the Senūsī order. The Confession

of the Christian Church of Abyssinia is that of Jacobus Baradæus,—in other words, the Abyssinians are Monophysites. A few remarks on the history of Christianity in this country will be found below.

Still another religion exists in Abyssinia,—the country of many races, languages, and religions,—viz. *Judaism*. There are a number of Jewish communities, mainly in the region between Aksum and Gondar. They are called Falashas, and they speak an Agao dialect; their books are in Ge'ez. Their origin is altogether unknown to us. According to Abyssinian tradition, the Queen of Sheba, who was a princess of Aksum, was at Jerusalem instructed in the Jewish religion by Solomon and then introduced it into her own country. This is, of course, legendary, for the oldest inscriptions prove—if we need any proof—that the official religion of the Aksumitic kingdom, before it became Christian, was pagan. But this curious legend seems to reflect some historical events of which no other records have come down to our time. For a number of OT practices and ideas are integral parts of Abyssinian Christianity, and, what is more significant, the Aramaic loan-words in Ge'ez, mostly denoting religious ideas and objects, are probably of Jewish-Aramæan, not of Christian-Aramæan, origin.

I. *Pagan Abyssinia.*—1. Pagan religion of the African aborigines.—As far as we know the religion of the Kunamas, it may be characterized as animistic or as ancestor-worship. For the spirits or the souls of their forefathers play the most important rôle in their religious life. Above all spirits there is the unknown Great Spirit, with whom man comes little into contact. This idea of one mysterious, almighty, supernatural being seems to pervade almost all pagan religions. The Great Spirit is far away, the other spirits are near, and are in a way mediators between mankind and the Great Spirit. He it is that gives rain, the most important and vital thing for the agricultural Kunamas, and he is probably the god of heaven, just as Wāq is among the Gallas (see below). To him only the chief of the tribe may sacrifice. At the beginning of the ploughing season the chief has a revelation bidding him immolate a red goat and a white sheep, and in return promising abundance of rain. The animals are killed, the blood is sprinkled on the ground, and the chief says: 'Behold, thou hast the blood that we have offered; now give us rain.' After that, the chief and priest eat the meat in communion with the spirits, whereupon mankind and spirit world are reconciled and friendly.

It is only upon important occasions that the priest or chief enters into action: the religious affairs of everyday life are in the hands of sorcerers and witches, *i.e.* men and women who are believed to have communication with the spirits, or even to be possessed by them. Sorcerers and witches are in contact with, or in the service of, either good or evil spirits. The latter form no separate caste; certain persons are believed to be poisoners or to have the evil eye. Against their power the people take refuge, or protect themselves by using a branch of the 'ghost-tree.' Naturally, members of the sorcerers' caste sometimes make ill use of their power,—and then the same remedies are used against them; but generally their work is that of prophesying, healing, and doing other miracles; in general, mediating between the people and the spirits.

The sorcerers wear women's clothes, decorate themselves with necklaces, bracelets, anklets, rings, beads, and pearls of many colours. They receive revelations from the spirits about diseases, ordinary perils, and the like, and they remedy them—or not—in return for high payment. The witches do their duty only at a certain period, viz. the harvest time. Then the people wish to 'greet' their ancestors and to give them mead. These demoniac women all of a sudden are possessed by the spirits, fall to the ground in a state of ecstasy, and begin to speak and sing in foreign tongues. After that, they put on their trinkets, and the people 'greet' their ancestors and pour mead for them. When all have done so, a special sacrifice is offered to free the women from their possessors, and every one returns to his usual life.

Remedies against the influence of malevolent spirits are incantations and the twigs of the ghost-tree. The spirits and the tree have the same name, and in this identity of name lies the power of the latter. For instance, at the time of childbirth twigs of this tree are placed crosswise over the door of the house to protect the child. The first night after someone has died, all the spirits visit the house of the dead and drink mead: the living sit outside, with the magic twigs around the neck or the arms. Again, the next day, when a libation is offered at the grave, they protect themselves in the same way. Other trees or bushes are used to protect the cattle or the crops. The spirits of the ancestors rule and regulate the entire life of these people. They have established the laws of social and political life; in other words, these laws are based on tradition and custom. For this reason the spirits watch over the laws and punish transgressions,—above all, the omission of taking blood-vengeance.

2. Pagan religion of the Hamites. — The pagan religion of the Hamitic tribes of Abyssinia does not seem to differ essentially from that of the aborigines. According to our sources, however, it appears that the Gallas, who nowadays are practically the only pagan Hamites in Abyssinia, have outgrown the stage of crude animism, and have developed a sort of polytheism with one highest god, and that with them, partly at least, true religiosity has taken the place of torpid fear and awe. That highest god is called *Wāq* (or Wāqayo), and many say he is their only god. This being seems to be 'deity' or *numen* in general, in a way to be compared, therefore, with the Semitic אֵל. The noun *wāq* originally means 'heaven,' and thus the god Wāq is also named *Guraća*—a word which, as an adjective, denotes 'dark-blue,' and as a substantive 'heaven' or 'sky.' Wāq is the god of heaven, but he is omnipresent; he is everywhere in nature; he lives on mountain peaks, in high trees, near springs, in rivers, and in caves. In all these places he is worshipped with sacrifices and prayers. There are various kinds of offerings, but it seems most natural to assume that the communion between men and their god is the main idea of these offerings. This communion is effected by (*a*) the blood covenant; (*b*) the sacrificial meal. The blood is, on the one hand, poured out for the deity; on the other hand, it is smeared on the doorposts and on the foreheads of the offerers (in a line or crosswise), or sprinkled on them. The sacrificial meal is shared by deity and men: for a part is burned, the rest is eaten by men. The sacrificial animals are cattle and sheep; we even hear of 'expiatory cows.' There is also a recollection of human sacrifices among the people. The libations consist of milk and mead. All sacrifices are offered by the *pater familias*,—the head of the family,—who is at the same time their priest. On special occasions the chief of the tribe takes his place. After the animal is killed, the *ogēsa*,—'the wise man,'—the *haruspex*, comes in order to inspect the entrails and to interpret the omen. These 'wise men' form a kind of sacerdotal caste, and officiate at all important political affairs; they also interpret the flight of birds; they are *haru*

spices and *augures* at the same time. Of course, they consider themselves much better than the ordinary sorcerers. There seem to be certain sects among them, *e.g.* the sect of Abba Muda, who lives in a mysterious cave with a serpent to which offerings are made. When the members of this sect make pilgrimages to the famous cave, they wear women's clothes, let their hair grow, and perform some well-known religious duties. An example of a Galla prayer is the following: 'Thou hast made the corn to grow, and shown it to our eyes; the hungry man beholdeth it and is consoled. When the corn is ripening, thou sendest caterpillars and locusts into it, locusts and pigeons. Everything cometh from thee, thou allowest it to happen: why thou doest this, thou knowest.'

Besides Wāq, there is a host of lesser deities, who fall into two groups, viz. the 'good spirits,' named *ayāna*, and the 'evil spirits,' named *jinni*. The *ayāna* live in all places where Wāq lives, especially in rivers; but they also comprise the house-gods (*penates*) and the souls of the ancestors (*manes*). Even in a newly built house there is an *ayāna*, and crumbs are thrown on the floor for him when the people first enter the house. Individual members of this class of gods are *Kilēsa*, the god of war and of the winds; and *Atēte*, the goddess who protects women, like the Greek Eileithyia. It seems that even the personified Sabbath, called Sambata, is known as a goddess to the pagan Gallas, who must have borrowed her worship from the Falashas. Among the 'evil spirits' the *buda*, or the devil- of the evil eye, is the most feared. It is well known that this superstition, so common over all Southern and Eastern countries, is particularly deep-rooted in Abyssinia. Other evil demons seem to be the monsters *banda* and *bulgu*. The former is the wolf, a demoniac animal among various peoples; the latter is explained as 'man-eater.' A special caste of sorcerers has to do with these evil spirits. Among them there are different degrees and specialists, some of whom predict the future, others cure diseases by driving out the devils, and others know the art of making good weather and of producing rain.

Sacred animals are, among others, the hyæna, the snake, the crocodile, and the owl. The hyænas eat the dead, and thus the souls enter their bodies; hence the spirits who are in the hyænas enter living men, and men—especially blacksmiths, who know magic art—change into hyænas. The snake is worshipped by almost all primitive peoples. The crocodile is sacred because it lives in the sacred rivers. Again, a certain owl is believed to be the bird of the dead; these owls are the souls of people who died unavenged. Life after death is, according to the belief of the pagan Gallas, a shadow-like existence in a sort of Hades or Sheol, called *ekerā* (taken from the Arabic *al-āḫira*, 'the other,' *scil.* world, but adapted to Galla ideas).

3. PAGAN RELIGION OF THE SEMITES.—What we know about the religion of the Semitic conquerors of Abyssinia is very little indeed—scarcely anything more than a few names. Our sources are the ancient inscriptions and native tradition. According to the famous Greek inscription copied at Adulis by Kosmas Indikopleustes, the king of Aksum, who had this inscription written (1st cent. A.D.), sacrificed τῷ Διὶ καὶ τῷ Ἄρει καὶ τῷ Ποσειδῶνι and erected a throne in honour of his god Ἄρης. The next earliest document is that of King Aizanas, who reigned about A.D. 350. This inscription is carved in Greek, Sabæan, and Old Ethiopic. The Greek part speaks only of the god Ἄρης, the Sabæan of Maḥrem, 'Astar and Beḥēr, the Old Ethiopic of Maḥrem, 'Astar and Medr. A Greek fragment from Abbā Pantaleon, a Christian shrine near Aksum, built over an ancient Sabæan sanctuary, mentions the Ἄρης ἀνικητός of Aksum. But in only one case are all these gods found together, viz. in the first inscription of (Tā)zānā, written perhaps about A.D. 450. There the throne is dedicated to 'Astar, Beḥēr, and Medr; and thanks are rendered to Maḥrem, the god 'who begat the king.' From this it appears that the Semites who came from South Arabia to found the Aksumitic empire worshipped the ancient triad of Heaven, Sea, and Earth. 'Astar in Tigrē means 'heaven,' and Atar-Samain (Atar, *i.e.* 'Astar in Aramaic, of the heavens) as well as Ištar bēlit šamā (Ishtar Lady of the Heavens) are known in Semitic mythology. Thus 'Astar is the Aksumitic god of heaven translated into Greek by Zeus. *Medr* is the Ethiopic word for 'earth,' and here it must necessarily mean the god (or goddess) of the earth. Now, if the Adulitan inscription mentions Poseidon together with Zeus, the conclusion is unavoidable that Beḥēr is the god of the sea, in spite of the fact that the Ethiopic word *beḥēr* means 'land,' and is even used in this sense in our inscriptions. We must connect it with the word *baḥr* ('sea'), and assume that, being a proper name, it retained its ancient meaning even after the common noun corresponding to it had received a different meaning of its own. Besides this triad, Ares-Maḥrem, the tribal or ancestral god of the kings of Aksum, was worshipped. Since they fought many wars to establish their empire and to protect their dominions, it was most natural that they should identify Maḥrem with Ares, the war-god. From the inscription of (Tā)zānā it seems that bulls and captives were sacrificed to this god. From other texts it appears that 'thrones' and statues were erected to him and the other gods. [Drawings and photographs of the thrones will be found in the publications of the German Expedition to Aksum].

In a way Maḥrem-Ares may be connected with the native tradition. For the Abyssinians tell that before their ancestors adopted King Solomon's religion they worshipped a dragon, and that this dragon was their king. According to Greek mythology, Ares begat, in a cave near Thebes, a dragon, his own image. It is therefore not impossible that a similar association existed between Maḥrem-Ares and the dragon, but of this no record has come down to us thus far. (A study of the Abyssinian dragon legends was published in the writer's *Bibliotheca Abessinica*, i. pp. 17-31).

Another hint with regard to the cult of the ancient Aksumites may be taken from the great monuments of Aksum. Hitherto they have been called 'obelisks,' but they should rather be termed 'stelæ,'—stelæ, it is true, of huge dimensions, as may be seen from the illustrations in the late Mr. Bent's book, *The Sacred City of the Ethiopians*, and in the publications of the German Expedition. The stele is an integral part of a South Semitic tomb, and there is a certain mysterious connexion between the stone and the personality of the dead, for the stele is called *nephesh* ('soul'). If, then, at Aksum we find a large number of such stelæ, and among them huge highly decorated monoliths, ranging in height from 15 to 33 metres, and in front of them, or rather around them, large slabs representing, in all likelihood, altars, we may conclude, with a certain degree of probability, that these monuments served for 'ancestor-worship,' that form of religion which, as we have seen, is at the bottom of the pagan religions of Abyssinia.

II. *CHRISTIAN ABYSSINIA.*—Christianity became the religion of the Aksumitic empire about A.D. 450. The king (Tā)zānā was the Constantine of Abyssinia; for in his first inscription he is pagan, in the second he is Christian. In the latter he speaks of only one god, the 'Lord of Heaven,' or the 'Lord of the Land' (*'egzi'a beḥēr*,—in Ethiopic the word for the Christian God), who enthroned him and gave him victory over his enemies. But in the king's own mind this 'Lord of Heaven' was probably not very different from 'Astar. We have no contemporaneous records of the first appearance of Christianity in Abyssinia, nor do we know whether the Jewish communities were older, or whether they had anything to do with preparing Abyssinia for the Christian faith. However this may be, the Christian kings soon regarded themselves as the protectors of the new faith, and when

the Christians in South Arabia were persecuted by a king who had adopted Judaism, a king of Aksum fought against the latter, although his main object was probably to aggrandize his empire. South Arabia had been partly Christianized by Syrian missionaries, and it is most likely that Abyssinia, too, received its Christian religion from Syria. The first missionaries are said to have been Ædesius and Frumentius from Antioch, and the 'nine saints,' who about A.D. 500 strengthened Christianity, probably came from Syria. They may even have influenced the style of church architecture, since basilical plans are to be recognized in some of the most ancient churches of Abyssinia. The ancient shrines were now changed into Christian sanctuaries, the high places were dedicated to saints, and the sacred sycamore trees to the Virgin Mary. Within the first centuries of its history in Abyssinia, Christianity probably did not spread beyond the borders of the kingdom of Aksum, and it scarcely reached as far south as the Ṭānā Lake. In the 7th or 8th cent. great political changes must have taken place; but the history of Abyssinia, from about 650 until 1270, is shrouded in darkness. During this time many wars must have been fought between Christians and pagans, and also between Christians and Muhammadans. The outcome was that political conquest and missionary activity spread far to the south, and that the centre of the empire was transferred to the southern provinces. Abyssinian legendary history tells of many miracles performed by the saints who converted the pagan Hamites and negroes. Among them Takla Hāimānōt (Plant of Faith), and Gabra Manfas Qeddūs (Servant of the Holy Ghost), were the most famous and popular. Meanwhile Abyssinia had been cut off from South Arabia, which had become Muhammadan, and had sought and found close contact with the Coptic Church of Egypt. In the Abyssinian empire itself Christianity has been the official religion ever since, and many conquered tribes have been forced to be baptized. But outside of these limits Islām made rapid progress, and at present the Christians are surrounded by Muhammadans on all sides. Many Muhammadans even live among the Christians, although the building of mosques is not allowed. The country has seen many internal quarrels concerning dogmas or ecclesiastical and secular power, and has also witnessed repeated struggles against Roman Catholicism (about 1550–1635). The greatest dangers that the Church experienced were the wars waged by Muḥammad Grāñ, the Muhammadan conqueror who overran Abyssinia from 1525 to 1540. From these perils Abyssinian Christianity was finally saved by the Portuguese.

The Christian religion of Abyssinia became more and more degenerate, the more it was shut off from the rest of the civilized world, and the more the Semitic element was absorbed by other races. From time to time a king or a patriarch who was more enlightened and energetic than his fellow-countrymen tried to introduce reforms; but although they did their best, it was not very much. An altogether exceptional case is that of the monk Zar'a-Ya'qōb (1599–1692), who evolved a rationalistic system of religious philosophy (pub. and tr. by the present writer under the title *Philosophi Abessini*, Paris and Leipzig, 1904).

In conclusion, it may be stated that at present there are three main divisions in the Ethiopian Church. These are: (*a*) those who profess *ya-segā lej* ('son of the flesh'), *i.e.* that Jesus was in the flesh Son of Mary only, not of God, and that the Divine nature was later infused into Him by God, but do not admit Christ's Divinity as a man; (*b*) the followers of the *qeb'at* ('unction'), who profess that Christ, when He was anointed with the Holy Ghost in the Jordan after His baptism, became a participant of Divinity, even as man; (*c*) the true Monophysites or followers of the *tawāḥedō* (unity) doctrine.

Possible Jewish traces in Abyssinian Christianity.—As has been said above, there seems to be some connexion between Judaism and Christianity in Abyssinia. The Aramaic words in Ethiopic denoting religious ideas were apparently taken from the Jewish Aramaic rather than from the Christian Syriac. Besides this, there are traces that may indicate a Jewish influence, unless they be regarded as general Semitic, or more specially Sabæan. These are chiefly (*a*) the observance of the Sabbath ('Sanbat' has even been personified, and is considered a female saint. In a church at Adua, the picture of a woman with a halo, soaring in the sky over a crescent, with an angel on either side, was by some declared to be 'Sanbat,' whereas others asserted that this was the picture of the assumption of Mary); (*b*) the distinction between clean and unclean animals, in the main following the OT; (*c*) the idea of ritual uncleanness of persons who have had sexual intercourse (even if legitimate) during the day, or of women during menstruation; (*d*) the duty of a man to marry his deceased brother's wife, if this brother dies without a son. Among the Christians a man who has his own and his brother's wife is not considered or treated as a bigamist. On the other hand, the practice of circumcision is general, being Semitic and Hamitic (even the girls are circumcised and infibulated), and the sacred dance may just as well be pagan as Jewish. With regard to images, the Ethiopian Church allows painted pictures, but no graven images.

Pagan traces in Abyssinian Christianity and Islām.—The excessive and unbounded cult of the Virgin Mary, which even the Muhammadans share to some extent, must in a way reflect the cult of a deposed pagan goddess. Mary lives on high mountains, at springs, and in the sycamore trees, which in ancient Egypt were sacred to Hathor. Who the pagan prototype of Mary was we cannot determine; she may have been Allāt of the Arabs, or 'Earth Mother,' scarcely Ishtar, the 'Lady of Heaven,' since 'Astar was a male deity in ancient Abyssinia. Furthermore, there is a large number of saints who have performed, and still perform, miracles of all sorts; one of them, the famous Gabra Manfas Qeddūs (see above), commonly called Gāber, even opposed successfully the will of God. Again, the Christians and Muhammadans believe in a host of evil spirits in the same way as the pagans do. These spirits live in dark places or near the cemeteries; they gather around the doors or haunt barren spots where no grass grows (like the elves in Northern Germany), or, finally, they possess animals, like the hyæna, the wolf, and the snake, and especially human beings. The devil that usually enters into people and makes them mad or sick is called *Waddegennī* (demon's son) among the Tigrē, and *Tegertī* (probably of African origin) in Tigriña. Then there is the famous Abyssinian Lilith, called *Werzelyā*, the demoness who makes a business of killing little children, etc. These spirits are driven out by burning the root (or a branch) of the ghost-tree. They are 'smoked out,' or they are exorcised by incantations. Magic prayers, written on scrolls or small booklets, and carried in little leather cases around the neck or the arms, are exceedingly common in Abyssinia. They deal with all possible dangers, and are good not only against many different diseases caused by the demons, but also against snakes, leopards, hyænas, drought, hail, locusts, and the like. Even the animal world has to suffer from devils in its midst, for the *debbī* or *dübbʷī*, described as somewhat smaller than a

dog, drives every other animal away wherever it goes.

It deserves to be mentioned also that among the Tigrē tribes, tales about the doings of certain stars —star-myths, so to speak—are to be found which may possibly reflect ancient star-worship. The remnants of moon-worship among the same people are more pronounced.

A very conspicuous remnant of paganism is the idea of a nether world, where the shades live until the Day of Judgment. The shades or 'people of below' (*sab taḥat* in Tigrē) often appear to the living in dreams, or they punish a man by beating him, if he does not fulfil his duty of blood-vengeance, or is niggardly enough not to offer the proper sacrifices to the dead. The souls of those who die unavenged or before they have attained their desires, are changed into a kind of owl (*gān* in Tigrē), and howl and screech until they are avenged, or until some descendant or relative carries out their designs.

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E. LITTMANN.

ACADEMY, ACADEMICS. — The Academy ('Ακαδήμεια, older form 'Εκαδήμεια, later 'Ακαδημία), so called from the local hero Akademos or Hekademos, was one of the three great gymnasia outside the walls of Athens, the others being the Lyceum and the Cynosarges. It was situated less than a mile from the Dipylon Gate, off the road which ran N.W. through the outer Ceramicus, among the olive groves below Colonus Hippius. As a gymnasium it already existed in the time of the Pisistratids, but it was Cimon that laid it out as a public park with shady avenues of plane trees (Plut. *Cim.* 13). Here was the precinct of Athena with the twelve sacred olives (*μορίαι*), and the ancient pedestal (*ἀρχαία βάσις*) with representations of Herakles and Prometheus, which formed the starting-point of the torch-race at the Lampadēdromia (Apollodorus *ap.* schol. Soph. *Œd. Col.* 57). This last worship gave rise to several features of the Prometheus myth.

It was in the Academy that Plato founded the first Athenian philosophical school, the idea being doubtless suggested to him by the Pythagorean societies, such as those of Thebes and Phlius (cf. the *Phædo*), and possibly by that of his friend Euclides at Megara. The school possessed a shrine of the Muses (*μουσεῖον*), at which votive statues (*ἀναθήματα*) were dedicated (Diog. Laert. iii. 25, iv. 1, 19), and Antigonus of Carystus (*ap.* Athen. xii. 547 f., 548a) spoke of a 'sacrificer' (*ἱεροποιός*) and an 'attendant of the Muses' (*Μουσῶν ἐπιμελητής*) as officials of the school. He also spoke of the monthly common meals (*συσσίτια*) as religious acts (*ἵνα φαίνωνται τὸ θεῖον τιμῶντες*). From all this it has been inferred by Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (*Philol. Unters.* iv. 263 ff.) that the legal status of the Academy was that of a religious association (*θίασος*). That, indeed, was the only form which a corporation could take at Athens, and it was of great importance that membership of such associations was open to others than Athenian citizens.

The original property of the society was a house and garden, in which Plato and most of his successors lived. It is not quite certain whether the place of teaching was here or in the actual gymnasium; for the name 'Academy' is given to both. A semicircular marble bench (*exedra*, *sessio*) still existed in Cicero's days, which was at least as old as the scholarchate of Polemo (Cic. *de Fin.* v. 2, 4). It is not certain whether the scholarchs (*σχόλαρχοι*) were elected or selected by their predecessors. The official title seems to have been *diadochus* (*διάδοχος*, 'successor'). After the siege of Athens by Sulla (86 B.C.), the suburbs became unhealthy, and the school was moved into the town; but the house and garden remained in its possession to the end.

From an early date it was customary to distinguish the Old and the New Academy, though Philo (see below) objected to this (Cic. *Acad.* i. 13). The Old Academy includes the immediate followers of Plato, the New begins with Arcesilas, who introduced the sceptical doctrine for which the school was best known from the 3rd to the 1st cent. B.C. Later writers speak of three Academies, beginning the Middle with Arcesilas and the New with Carneades. Others added a fourth consisting of Philo and his followers, and a fifth consisting of Antiochus and his (Sext. *Pyrrh.* i. 220). All these divisions only mark stages in a continuous history.

I. The 'Old Academy' carried on the discussion of the problems which Plato had raised in his oral teaching. In the main, these were mathematical, and concerned with the distinction between continuous and discrete quantity. The former Plato calls in the *Philebus* the 'unlimited' (*ἄπειρον*), but we know from Aristotle that in his oral teaching it was called 'the great-and-small' (*τὸ μέγα καὶ μικρόν*). The problem was to show how discrete or 'ideal' numbers (*εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοί*) could arise from this, and similarly how 'magnitudes' (*μεγέθη*) could arise from continuous and infinitely divisible space by the introduction of limit (*τὸ πέρας*). If once we get to magnitudes, it may be possible to give at least a tentative mathematical construction of the 'elements,' and even of the things of sense.

The true glory of the Old Academy is the impulse which it gave to mathematical science by the study of these problems. Solid geometry, trigonometry, and conic sections all took their rise from this source, and the new conception of continuous quantity led to the solution of many old difficulties. Eudoxus of Cnidus and Heraclides Ponticus, both members of the Academy in Plato's time, attacked the problem of the solar system with extraordinary boldness, and prepared the way for the great discovery of the sun's central position by Aristarchus of Samos (*c.* 150 B.C.) It is unfortunate that most of our knowledge of the Old Academy comes from Aristotle, who was not in sympathy with the mathematical movement of his time.

Plato was succeeded by his nephew Speusippus (scholarch 347–339 B.C.). Xenocrates and Aristotle at once left Athens, the former returning later to succeed Speusippus, the latter to found a rival society.

Speusippus regarded number as arising from the union of unity (*τὸ ἕν*) and plurality (*τὸ πλῆθος*), but he made no attempt to derive magnitudes and other forms of reality (*οὐσίαι*) from numbers. He explained them instead as parallel series formed on the analogy of number. Magnitudes, for instance, arose from the union of 'something like unity' (the point) with 'something like' plurality, and so on with souls and sensible things (Arist. *Met.* 1028*b*, 9 ff., 1075*b*, 37 ff., 1085*a*, 31 ff., 1090*b*, 13 ff.). His most characteristic doctrine, however, was his denial of the identity of the Good and the One. The Good was not 'in the beginning' (*ἐν ἀρχῇ*), but reveals itself (*ἐμφαίνεται*) in the process of development. As in the case of plants and animals, it is only in the 'full-grown' (*τὸ τέλειον*) that we see the Good (Arist. *Met.* 1072*b*, 30 ff., 1091*b*, 14 ff.). Speusippus is thus the originator of the 'teleologi-

cal' (derived from τέλειον, 'full-grown') or evolutionary view of the world, and this explains the fact that he wrote chiefly on biological subjects. We know from the quotations of Athenæus that in his ten books of 'Similars' (Ὅμοια) he discussed shellfish and mushrooms. It is in accordance, too, with this evolutionary standpoint that he regarded sense-perception as rudimentary science (ἐπιστημονικὴ αἴσθησις), and that he defined happiness (εὐδαιμονία) as the 'full-grown state' (ἕξις τελεία) of those in a natural condition (ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν). It was not pleasure; for pleasure and pain were two evils, opposed to one another, and also to the middle state of 'imperturbability' (ἀοχλησία), which is the happiness aimed at by good men (Clem. *Strom.* ii. 21).

Xenocrates of Chalcedon (scholarch 339–314 B.C.) spoke of the limit and the unlimited as the 'unit' (μονάς) and the 'indeterminate dyad' (ἀόριστος δυάς), and he reverted to the strictly Platonic view of the 'ideal numbers' (εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοί). It is characteristic of him that he was fond of religious language, calling the unit the Father, and the dyad the Mother, of the gods. The heaven of the fixed stars was also a god, and so were the planets. When we come to the 'sublunary' (ὑποσέληνος) sphere, however, we find 'demons' (δαίμονες)—beings who, like Eros in the *Symposium*, are intermediate between gods and men. The souls of men were also 'demons' (Arist. *Top.* 112*a*, 37), though the scientific definition of a soul was 'a self-moving number.' This theory of 'demons' had, of course, an enormous influence upon later theology, both Platonist and Christian, and marks Xenocrates as the originator of the 'emanationist' view of the world, as opposed to the 'evolutionary' view of Speusippus. It is important to notice, however, that he was quite conscious of the allegorical character of this doctrine. He asserted that his account of the creation was only a device intended to make his theory clear for purposes of instruction. Really, the creation of the world was eternal or timeless, a view which, he maintained, had also been that of Plato (Plut. *An. Procr.* 3).

Like Speusippus, Xenocrates was inclined to attach much value to rudimentary forms of knowledge. He distinguished φρόνησις as the wisdom possible to man from σοφία or complete knowledge, and he thought that even irrational animals might have the idea of God and immortality. In his ethics he was less ascetic than Speusippus, and attached importance to the possession of the power which ministers to goodness (ὑπηρετικὴ δύναμις), that is, to 'external goods' (Clem. *Strom.* ii. 22, v. 13).

The next two scholarchs, Polemo and Crates, seem to have busied themselves almost entirely with popular ethics. The most distinguished member of the Academy in their time was Crantor, who wrote a much admired treatise on mourning (Περὶ πένθους). He was a disciple of Xenocrates, but died before Crates, and was never scholarch.

2. The 'New Academy' ('Middle Academy' according to those who reckon the New from Carneades) begins with Arcesilas (scholarch 270?–241 B.C.), who made use of the weapons provided by scepticism to combat the Stoic theory of 'comprehension' (κατάληψις) as a criterion of truth intermediate between knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) and belief (δόξα). As he appears to have left no writings, we cannot tell how far his scepticism really went, though Cicero certainly states that he denied the possibility of knowledge (*Acad.* i. 44). On the other hand, Sextus Empiricus says that his Pyrrhonism was merely apparent, and that he taught Platonic dogmatism to the inner circle of his disciples, quoting in support of this a verse of his contemporary Ariston of Chios, describing him as a sort of Chimæra, 'Plato in front, Pyrrho behind, and Diodorus in the middle.' In any case, we must remember that Plato himself had denied the possibility of knowledge as regards the world of sense, and it was quite natural that this side of his teaching should become the most prominent in an age of dogmatic materialism. The next scholarch, Lacydes (241–215 B.C.), continued the tradition of Arcesilas. Of his successors, Telecles, Euander, and Hegesinus, we know nothing.

The most distinguished head of the New Academy was Carneades of Cyrene (214–129 B.C.), who threw himself whole-heartedly into the attack on Stoicism as represented by Chrysippus. In 156 B.C. he came to Rome as ambassador, with the Stoic Diogenes and the Peripatetic Critolaus, and astonished the Romans by his power of arguing both for and against justice and the like (*in utramque partem disputare*). Like Arcesilas, he wrote nothing, but his arguments were preserved by his successor Clitomachus. They were directed against all theories which admitted a 'criterion' of truth; but, on the other hand, he himself set up three criteria of probability as necessary for practical life and the pursuit of happiness. In ordinary matters we take 'probable impression' (πιθανὴ φαντασία) as our criterion; in important matters the impression must also be 'incapable of distortion' by other impressions (ἀπερίσπαστος), while in those which pertain to our happiness, it must also be 'tested and approved' (διεξωδευμένη). The Stoic doctrine of 'assent' (συγκατάθεσις) to a 'comprehending impression' (καταληπτικὴ φαντασία) can yield no more than this.

Carneades died in his eighty-fifth year (129 B.C.), and was succeeded by Clitomachus of Carthage, who was succeeded by Philo of Larissa. During the Mithridatic war (88 B.C.), Philo took refuge at Rome, where he had Cicero as an enthusiastic student. Sextus tells us distinctly (*Pyrrh.* i. 235) that he held things were in their own nature 'comprehendible' (καταληπτά), though 'incomprehendible' (ἀκατάληπτα) so far as the Stoic criterion went. His disciple Antiochus of Ascalon broke with the tradition of Carneades altogether, and even with the teaching of Philo, whom he succeeded. He held that all Stoic doctrines were to be found in Plato, and that the differences of the Peripatetics and Stoics from the Academy were merely verbal. Cicero heard him at Athens in 79 B.C., and it was on his teaching that he based his own Academic eclecticism.

After Antiochus the history of the Academy is a blank for many generations. Neoplatonism did not originate within it, and was not introduced into it till the 5th cent. A.D. by Plutarch of Athens († *c.* 430 A.D.). His successor Proclus is an important figure in the history of philosophy and religion, but he does not concern us here. The school produced in its last days some distinguished commentators on Plato and Aristotle, notably Simplicius the Cilician and Damascius the Syrian. Damascius was the last scholarch; for, in 529 A.D., Justinian closed the school and confiscated its revenues, amounting to 1000 gold pieces, of which Plato's garden brought in only three. Damascius, with Simplicius and some others, took refuge at the court of Chosroës, king of Persia, who was supposed to be devoted to philosophy. They were disappointed in him, however, and returned on the conclusion of peace, when Chosroës made it a condition that they should not be molested in their religious faith and observances (Agath. *Hist.* ii. 30). Simplicius speaks with excusable bitterness of Christian theology; but the best of Platonism, as then understood, had already been absorbed by that very theology, and the work of the Academy was done, at least for the time. When Justinian closed it, it had lasted over nine hundred years.

LITERATURE (in addition to the histories of philosophy).—On the topography, see Wachsmuth, *Stadt Athen.* i. 255 ff., 270 f., 590 f.; on the organization, *Academicorum philosophorum index Herculanensis*, ed. Bücheler (Greifswald, 1869–1870); Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Philol. Unters.* iv. 263 ff. For Speusippus, see Ravaisson, *Speusippi de primis rerum principiis* (Paris, 1838); for Xenocrates, Heinze, *Xenokrates* (Leipzig, 1892); for New Academy, Hirzel, *Untersuchungen zu Cicero's philosophischen Schriften*, Leipzig, 1877–1883.

JOHN BURNET.

ACCEPTANCE.—'Acceptance,' as a Scriptural and theological term, may be said to denote a state of favour in the sight of God which men may enjoy when they fulfil the conditions upon which such favour depends. The gracious purpose of God which the mission of His Son fully reveals, has in view the establishing of a state of reconciliation in which men may find abiding acceptance for themselves and their service, and share in all the benefits of redemption. But the idea of acceptance, as presented in Scripture, does not depend either upon redemption actually accomplished, or upon any prescribed measure of knowledge or of character. It is everywhere taken for granted that the way to the Divine favour has always been open, and that it may be secured everywhere by a true heart and an obedient spirit, in which there is always the pledge that all available means will be used to attain to a life well-pleasing to God. There can be no barrier to forgiveness and acceptance but in the sin and unbelief of men.

Yet the actual conditions in which this state is reached in Scripture cover a wide field of experience, and belong to all stages of revelation, and are described in various terms which give prominence to different aspects of the conception. A cursory glance at the numerous instances in which the persons or the conduct of men are spoken of as finding acceptance with God, will show that this favour has been open to men in all ages and in all conditions of human life. Yet there are special means calculated to secure it which revelation seeks to make known, along with the objective grounds upon which, in the economy of redemption, it is established and guaranteed to men. The full knowledge of these was not possible before Christian times, yet it is clear that God has always and everywhere been gracious and friendly in His relations with men. Nowhere is it taught that He is by nature hostile, as heathen gods were often supposed to be, or that His favour can be procured by costly gifts or sacrifices. On the contrary, the gift and sacrifice of His Son are the highest proof of His love that could be given (Jn 3^{16}, Ro 5^{8}).

(1) There is the wide sphere of religious experience which the worship of God by sacrifice may be said to cover; of which Gn 8^{21} may be taken as a type. Of Noah's sacrifice it is said: 'The Lord smelled a sweet savour; and the Lord said in his heart, I will not again curse the ground any more for man's sake.' This language shows the favour with which this sacrifice was regarded, and the effect it had upon the future course of the world. It was an act which consecrated a new world. Similar phraseology is frequently used, both of the purpose which sacrifice had in view, and of the result which it effected in procuring favour for the worshipper. Whether all worship in the earlier ages was expressed by sacrifice or not, it is obvious that sacrifice constituted the central and essential feature of it, and genuine piety would naturally seek satisfaction in the faithful observance of all prescribed forms. This tendency exposed the worshipper to the danger of externalism and mere work-righteousness. The religious consciousness in its OT form was based on the thought that sacrifice was the appropriate form for acknowledging God and mediating His favour. In the different kinds of offerings and in a ritual appropriate to each, the Law provided for a wide variety of religious need; and in the faithful observance of what the Law had prescribed, the true Israelite could assure himself of acceptance in the presence of Jahweh.

(2) To what extent the character of the worshipper was an essential element in acts of sacrifice in early times, it is not easy to determine. It is not likely that the religious acts even of primitive men would stand out of all relation to their habitual life. With the advance of culture, however, increased importance would come to be attached to the spirit of worship as contrasted with the form. And once it became clear that the two might be not only different but even opposed, as was manifest in the time of the Prophets, then the call would begin to be made for mercy and not sacrifice, for righteousness in life and conduct rather than multitudes of sacrifices. Yet the maxim that obedience is better than sacrifice (1 S 15^{22}, Is $1^{11ff.}$, Mic 6^{8}) was not new in the time of Isaiah. It was an element in the regulation of worship from the first, and its importance increased with a deepening sense of the inner character of religion; especially when it began to be felt that the outward forms of worship were subject to change. The movement to restrict worship by sacrifice to one central sanctuary, whenever or however it originated, is a sure sign of the decadence of the old belief, and shows that sacrifice was unsuitable as a general and universal medium of worship. That the Prophets were against all sacrifices, wherever they might be offered, cannot be made out. Yet the old corruptions of the high places, which had invaded the Temple in their day, gave point to their loud rebukes and increased the longing for a new and better time. It cannot be said, however, that the Prophets taught indifference to sacrifice as such. In any case, the worth of the latter as a religious act was always dependent upon the moral state of the worshipper, and this circumstance explains their insistence upon moral conditions, upon 'clean hands and a pure heart' as necessary to acceptance with God.

(3) The broad principle of acceptance in its widest universality may be inferred from the spiritual nature of God, as in Christ's words to the woman of Samaria (Jn 4^{24} 'God is spirit, and they that worship him must worship in spirit and in truth'). It is well expressed by St. Peter in the case of Cornelius (Ac $10^{34.35}$ 'Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons: but in every nation he that feareth him, and worketh righteousness, is accepted with him').

(4) But, while the broad principle of acceptance is contained implicitly in the revealed character of God, and was boldly proclaimed by the Prophets, it is never realized as a living experience except in the life of faith and obedience, in the life which, based on the redeeming work of Christ, seeks for and accepts all available helps both to know and to do the will of God.

LITERATURE.—Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, vi. (Eng. tr. 1899) pp. 196 f., 308 ff.; Morris, *Theology of the Westminster Symbols* (1900), p. 442 f.; A. Stewart in Hastings' *DB*; E. B. Pollard in *DCG*. See also ACCEPTILATION, ACCESS, ATONEMENT, FORGIVENESS, JUSTIFICATION.

A. F. SIMPSON.

ACCEPTILATION is a term which, like many others, has passed from Roman law to Christian theology. According to its derivation, *acceptilatio* means 'a reckoning as received,' *acceptum* being the proper name for the credit side of the ledger. In Roman law, however, the term had a special technical use. It meant the discharge of an obligation by the use of a solemn and prescribed form of words, in which the debtor asked the creditor if he had received payment, and the creditor replied that he had—no real payment, however, having taken place. Gaius consequently says that acceptilation

resembles an imaginary payment. This method of discharge was properly applicable only to obligations contracted verbally by stipulation, *i.e.* by the use of a similar solemn form of words, in which the creditor asked the debtor to own his debt, and the debtor did so. Obligations contracted in other ways could, however, be transformed into verbal obligations by the use of a special stipulation invented for the purpose, named the Aquilian, and could thus be made terminable by acceptilation. See Gaius, *Inst.* iii. 169; Justinian, *Inst.* iii. 29. 1 and 2, *Digest.* 'de Acceptilatione,' xlvi. 4.

In Christian theology, the term 'acceptilation' is commonly used in a loose sense to denote the principle of that theory of the Atonement, in which the merit of Christ's work is regarded as depending simply on the Divine acceptance, and not on its own intrinsic worth. This theory was taught by Duns Scotus, who says that 'every created offering is worth what God accepts it at, and no more,' and further, that Christ's human merit was in itself strictly limited, but God in His good pleasure accepted it as sufficient for our salvation (Com. *in Sent.* lib. iii. dest. 19). Fisher accordingly says of Duns Scotus: 'He holds to what is termed the theory of "acceptilation." The Saviour's work becomes an equivalent (for the debt of sin) simply because God graciously wills to accept it as such' (*Hist. of the Chr. Church*, 1894, p. 222). Ritschl has sharply criticised the description of the doctrine of Duns as one of acceptilation. He says: 'It is incredible, but it is a fact that the expression "acceptilatio" is used almost universally as equivalent to "acceptatio," as though it presupposed a verb *acceptilare*. For instance, Schneckenburger (*Lehrbegriffe der kl. prot. Kirchenparteien*, p. 18) speaks of the acceptilation of the merit of Christ in Duns Scotus' (*Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*[3], i. p. 328, note). The theory of Duns Scotus is certainly not very suitably spoken of as one of acceptilation. In the solution of an obligation by acceptilation there is no payment at all; whereas, in the theory of Duns there is a payment, though it is accepted beyond its intrinsic value. But the usage of applying the name 'acceptilation' to Duns's theory is probably too confirmed to be done away with. It is to be understood, then, that the term is used only loosely. The danger of such usage is, however, shown by the fact that Shedd (*Hist. of Christ. Doct.* 1862, vol. ii. p. 348) not merely states that Duns Scotus taught a doctrine of acceptilation, but actually speaks of him as having transferred the term 'acceptilatio' to the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction—a statement which is historically quite inaccurate.

The confusion which has gathered round the term does not, however, end here. It has been used even more indefensibly than in the case of Duns Scotus to describe the doctrine of the Atonement taught by Socinus. The only excuse for this is that Socinus states his preference for the view of Duns Scotus just described, in contrast to the orthodox Protestant view according to which the death of Christ was a strict satisfaction for sin ('de Jesu Christo Servatore,' Pars Tertia, cap. vi. in *Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum*, 1656). His positive teaching is, however, quite different. 'Jesus Christ is our Saviour because He announced to us the way of life eternal, confirmed it (by His miracles and His death), and showed clearly in His own Person, both by the example of His life and by His resurrection from the dead, that He would give us life eternal, if we put faith in Him' (Pars Prima, cap. i.; cf. cap. iii.). Grotius, however, accuses Socinus of applying the legal word 'acceptilation' to the remission of sins, which God grants us, and then waxes eloquent upon the fallacies involved in such usage (*Defensio Fidei Catholicæ de Satisfactione Christi*, cap. iii. Oxon. 1637). The only explanation of the language of Grotius seems to be that he had misread or misunderstood a passage in Socinus, where he criticises Beza for using the word 'acceptilation' in explaining St. Paul's doctrine of imputation ('de Jesu Christo Servatore,' Pars Quarta, cap. ii.). The Socinian theologian Crell points out the mistake in his 'Responsio ad Grotium' (ad cap. iii. in *Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum*, 1656); it is he who tells us that it was Beza whom Socinus had in view. Crell, however, did not succeed in preventing the general impression that Socinus taught a doctrine of acceptilation. We still find Turretin saying (*de Satisfactionis Christi Necessitate*, Disp. xx. cap. x.): 'We admit no Socinian acceptilation'; though his Disputations on the Satisfaction of Christ did not appear till 1666 (enlarged edition, 1687; see Turretin's *Works*, Edin. 1848, vol. i. p. xlii).

ROBERT S. FRANKS.

ACCESS.—'Access' is the term used in the NT to denote the privilege and right of approach to God which men have through Jesus Christ. The term occurs in three places (Ro 5^2, Eph 2^{18} and 3^{12}), and in each of these as the tr. of προσαγωγή. The importance of the conception may be inferred from the circumstance that the article accompanies the term in two of these instances, indicating that the thing spoken of has an acknowledged and familiar place in Christian faith. In classical literature the transitive use of προσαγωγή is by far the more common; and several commentators of note maintain that it should be so read in the texts cited. It would thus = 'introduction,' and, so taken, the term will have a narrower meaning than that associated with 'access.' The usage of courts in which access to kings was obtained through a προσαγωγεύς or *sequester*, if taken to explain our 'introduction' to the Father, does certainly suggest something less than seems implied in the above given texts.

It is quite true that the word is often used both of persons and things in the sense of *leading up* to or towards, and this much at least Christ accomplishes for us in bringing us to God. Yet the introduction which we have in Him implies not a passing event or incident at the beginning of the Christian life, but something which is always valid, and which establishes and secures for us an open way of approach together with all the privileges of children of God. Even if we hold strictly to the transitive meaning of the term, we must so explain it as to imply the further blessings and privileges which introduction brings and secures; and this Meyer readily does. This consideration has doubtless inclined most commentators to favour the intransitive sense of the word and to render it by 'access.' This use of προσαγωγή, though rare, is not without support (see Plutarch, *Æmil. P.* 13; Polyb. x. 1. 6). Most of the versions take this view; the RV adhering to 'access' of the AV; and the same view appears in some of the older English versions. Tindale has 'a way in through faith,' 'an open way in'; Cranmer and the Genevan, 'an entrance,' 'an open way in.' The Rheims version, like the RV, adheres to 'access.' Luther and various German versions render by *Zugang*, similar in meaning to 'access'; and this term is now consecrated by long usage in English, and could not easily be supplanted by another.

Though the passive aspect of the conception is more prominent in 'access,' as the active is in προσαγωγή, there is in the associations of the word a blending of the two which must be kept in mind in order to realize the full force of the Apostle's use of it. The essential points in the conception are obvious in the three texts where the word stands.

(1) In Ro 5^2 it is used of the entrance upon, or the introduction to, the state of grace, or the Christian state, which in the context is described as that of justification, of acceptance and peace. This state is a new relation to God which is established and constituted by the Redeemer's gracious and atoning sacrifice, the benefits of which are immediately secured by faith. These benefits embrace the whole content of the Christian salvation—justification, acceptance, all the privileges of Divine sonship, with the hope of coming glory.

Our access to this state has been established through the incarnation and death of the Son of God, who bears away the sins of men and gives them power to become sons of God. It is not merely an open way; it is an actual leading of men into this blessed state by One who takes them in hand and conducts them into the blessedness and peace of the Divine kingdom.

(2) In Eph 2^{18} it is clear that much more is meant than the open way to God. It is an actual and effectual introduction of a personal kind which begins a state of friendship and fellowship by means of the indwelling spirit common to all believers. In the former text the Christian state as a whole is in view, as that to which Christ introduces us; here we are shown the still higher sphere of Divine fellowship, of filial privilege and power which Christ opens up to us, and into which He conducts us. Jew and Gentile have their *access* to the Father through the Son by one Spirit. All outward differences which separate and divide men fall away in presence of the higher unity which is produced by the life of God mediated by Christ and the Spirit of Christ.

(3) In Eph 3^{12} *access* is viewed as a standing condition of the life of faith, a state of exalted confidence, boldness, and freedom which faith in Christ ever sustains and renews. It secures all the possibilities of a free and joyous fellowship, and provides the power by which the energies and needs of the higher life may be sustained and filled. The filial spirit is nourished and enlarged from the fulness of the Divine life and love.

The idea of access to God through Christ differs in many respects from that access which must be open to man as a spiritual being. This latter is never denied but rather taken for granted in Scripture. Compared with the former, however, it can never come into competition with it, or supply its place. In the light about God which Christianity reveals, it soon becomes clear that none but Christ can lead us to Him. The Father whom the Son reveals can never be known or approached through any save the Son. The incarnation and mission of the Son, accepted and believed, must henceforth determine the character of our access to God. This St. Paul has very clearly perceived, and he has brought the thought to clear formal expression. It appears in various parts of the NT: in the Fourth Gospel as a general principle of Christianity (Jn 14^{6}), in Hebrews and 1 Peter in closer relation to St. Paul. As a broad principle, we readily see that we cannot have real access to God except amid the conditions which Christianity has established, both as to the character of God and the way of acceptable service and worship. Yet it is important to keep in mind that the NT ascribes our access specifically to the great sacrifice which removes the barrier of sin and establishes peace and friendship between God and men (He $10^{19.\ 20}$, 1 P 3^{18}).

A use of the word 'access,' different from, but related to that given above, is found in some liturgical writers, by whom the term is employed to characterize and describe certain prayers in the old Liturgies and in the Roman service of the Mass. It is applied to one of the prayers offered by the officiating priest in approaching the altar at the commencement of the service, and also to brief prayers for people and priest which immediately precede the act of communion. In some editions these prayers are noted in the margin as 'Prayer of Access' or 'Prayer of humble Access.' The prayers in question express generally deep humility in presence of the Divine greatness, and ask for the necessary preparation. It is to be noted, however, that the term does not stand in the text of the Liturgies, either in the prayers or in the rubrics which direct the order of the service. It is a word of the editors and commentators, and one has difficulty in discovering the special aptness of the term with reference to the prayers which are so described, there being many others of the same character throughout the service. The explanation probably is that the approach of the priest to the altar at the commencement, and the nearing of the worshippers to the Divine presence in the consecrated and now transformed elements, are the two points in which access to Deity now present in the great Sacrament begins and culminates. In this sense the term is apt enough, as it expresses the view of the Supper which is already latent in the old Liturgies and is seen fully developed in the Roman Missal. (See Hammond's *Liturgies Eastern and Western*, Clarendon Press, 1878).

LITERATURE.—J. O. F. Murray in Hastings' *DB* i. 22; D. A. Mackinnon in *DCG* i. 12; the Comm., esp. B. F. Westcott on *Hebrews* and J. A. Robinson on *Ephesians*; *Expos.* IV. [1890] ii. 131, II. [1882] iv. 321; W. Robertson Nicoll, *The Church's One Foundation* [1901], 43; J. G. Tasker, *Spiritual Religion* (Fernley Lect. 1901), pp. 102, 128; W. P. Du Bose, *The Gospel acc. to St. Paul* (1907), 143.

A. F. SIMPSON.

ACCIDENT (*accidens*, συμβεβηκός).—1. *One of the five Predicables* (*accidens prædicabile*).—According to Mill, under *accidens* 'are included all attributes of a thing which are neither involved in the signification of the name, nor have, so far as we know, any necessary connexion with attributes which are so involved' (*Logic*, vol. i. p. 149). This, allowing for the Nominalist standpoint of Mill, is the same view as that contained in Aldrich's definition, 'that which is predicated as contingently joined to the essence,' as contrasted with *proprium* which is predicated as necessarily joined. Some such definition or its equivalent is given by most writers on Logic, and is, according to Mansel, (*Aldrich*, 4th ed. p. 25), found in Albertus Magnus (*de Prædicat.* Tract ii. cap. 1).

The view taken by Aristotle is different. The attribute of a triangle, that its three angles are equal to two right angles, which on the ordinary view would be a *proprium*, is by him regarded as an accident (*Metaphys.* iv. 30). The distinction between property and accident in Aristotle turns on the convertibility or non-convertibility of the attribute. It is essential to the Aristotelian property (τδιον) that it should be present in certain objects and in them alone. If present in other objects, it is either identical with the genus, or it is not. If not, it is an accident. The test of an accident is that it is common to heterogeneous things. Aristotle at the same time recognizes that that which, simply considered, is an accident may become in a certain relation and at a certain time a property. He gives two definitions of 'accident': (1) 'that which is neither definition nor property nor genus, but is in the thing'; (2) 'that which is able to be in and not to be in one and the same individual' (*Top.* i. 5). Porphyry gives a third definition: 'that which is present and absent without destruction of the subject' (*Isagoge*, v.).

Aristotle recognizes two classes of 'accidents': those which are necessarily connected with the essence and deducible from it (συμβεβηκὸς καθ' αὑτό); and those which are not (cf. Ueberweg, *Hist. of Philos.*, Eng. tr. vol. i. p. 155, and Grote's *Aristotle*, vol. i. p. 142 note). Sanderson in his *Logic* (*Works*, vol. vi. p. 10) distinguishes separable and inseparable accident thus: Separable—that which can be actually separated from its subject, as cold from water; Inseparable—that which cannot be separated except in the intellect, as wetness from water. Aldrich gives a similar distinction. Mansel and most logicians define the inseparable accidents of a class as those accidents which, though not connected with the essence either by way of cause or consequence, are as a matter of fact found in all the members of the class; the separable accidents as those found in some members of the class and not in others. The inseparable accidents of an individual are those which can be predicated of their subject at all times; the separable only at certain times.

2. *Accident, Fallacy of.*—This fallacy is generally considered as arising when we infer that whatever agrees with a thing considered simply in itself agrees with the same thing when qualified

by some accident. Aristotle's view of the fallacy was different. He defines it as arising 'when it is held that anything belongs in a similar way to a subject and to the accident of that subject.' This definition does not mean merely that the attribute is assumed to exist along with both subject and accident, but that the mode of attachment is the same (*Soph. Elench.* v.). The condition of valid reasoning which Aristotle here lays down, is precisely the same as Herbert Spencer (*Psychology*, vol. ii. ch. v.) has in view when he speaks of 'connature.' Aristotle regards the nine categories which follow substance as accidents, and the classification itself may be regarded as a classification of 'connatures.'

3. *Accident in relation to substance.*—Sir W. Hamilton (*Lectures*, vol. i. p. 150) says 'accident' is employed in reference to a substance as existing; the terms 'phenomenon,' 'appearance' in reference to it as known. The Scholastics distinguished 'accident' in this sense as *accidens prædicamentale* or categorical accident from *accidens prædicabile* or logical accident (Aquinas, *Summ. Theol.* i. q. 77, a. 1–5). The former is the wider term. 'Accident' in this sense is defined as *ens entis*, or *ens in alio*, substance being *ens per se*. Thomas Aquinas (*ib.* iii. q. 77, a. 1) says the proper definition is not actual inherence in a subject, but aptitude to inhere. The chief reason of this definition is that in the doctrine of Transubstantiation the accidents of bread and wine remain when the substance is changed. The substance of the body and blood cannot be affected by the accidents, therefore these must be capable of existing apart from their substance, being supported by Divine power. This has led to a distinction of three kinds of accidents: (1) *metaphysical*, accident which, although we may conceive the substance without it, is nevertheless identified with it. There is a *distinctio rationis ratiocinatæ* between them. Opposed to this is physical accident, which, if different from the substance itself as thing or entity, is (2) *absolute* or real, as quantity, motion. If it signifies merely a state of being, as to sit or stand, it is (3) a *modal* accident. It is for the absolute accidents that the capacity of being miraculously sustained in the Eucharist is claimed (Zigliara, *Summa Philos.* i. 441; Pesch, *Institutiones Logicales*, Pars II. vol. ii. p. 281). Aquinas maintained the real distinction of absolute accidents from the substance of both mind and matter. (For list of opponents with regard to mental faculties, see Sir W. Hamilton, *Lectures*, ii. pp. 5–8. The question is still disputed by Roman Catholic theologians). Leibnitz supported the view of Aquinas (*System of Theology*, tr. by Russell, pp. 112–114; *Opera Philosophica*, ed. Erdmann, pp. 680, 686, etc.). He distinguishes mass as an absolute accident from substance (*System of Theology*, p. 115).

Accidents, according to Locke, are qualities which are capable of producing simple ideas in us (*Essay*, bk. ii. ch. xxiii.).

According to Kant, accidents are the determinations of a substance which are nothing else than its particular modes to exist; or the mode in which the existence of a substance is positively determined (*Werke*, ed. Rosenkrantz, vol. ii. p. 160).

In Hegel, accidents are the determinations which unconditioned Being has in so far as it has immediate existence (*Philosoph. Propädeutik*, p. 105).

4. *'Accident' in the sense of that which happens by chance*, is defined by Aristotle as that which occurs neither always, nor from necessity, nor for the most part (*Metaph.* x. (xi.) 8). Elsewhere (*Metaph.* iv. (v.) 30) he gives, as illustration, finding a treasure when digging a hole for a plant.

LITERATURE. — Aristotle, *Organon*, *Metaphysics*; Petrus Hispanus, *Summulæ Logicales*, with exposition of Versorius; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*; Sanderson, *Logic* (*Works*, vol. vi.); Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*; Mansel, *Aldrich's 'Artis Logicæ Rudimenta'*; J. S. Mill, *Logic*; Schouppe, *Elem. Theol. Dogmaticæ*.

G. J. STOKES.

ACCIDENTALISM.—The theory that events may happen without a cause. This is a view of the world which characterizes a pre-scientific period of thought. With the rise of the scientific method and spirit all events come to be regarded as connected in a causal manner, and no single event whatsoever is conceived as possibly falling without the closed circle of cause and effect relations. Chance or accident, therefore, is not to be considered as opposed to the idea of causation, so that it could be possible to say, 'This event happened by chance, but that event was evidently the effect of some cause.' There is no such antithesis, for every event is caused. The accidental event is merely one whose cause is so complex that it cannot be determined, and, therefore, it affords no basis for any exact prediction of the re-occurrence of the event in question. It becomes a matter of treatment according to the theory of probability. Chance, in the theory of probability, means always a complex combination of possible causal relations, whose interaction sometimes produces a certain event, and sometimes fails to produce it. The interacting causes may co-operate and reinforce, and, again, may oppose and neutralize one another, and therefore the resulting combinations are not predictable. This is the scientific view of chance, which is not free in any sense of the law of causation.

In the early Greek philosophy the idea of a certain kind of accidentalism in the world of events was a very persistent one. It appears in Plato, and even in Aristotle; and it was not until the Stoics emphasized the scientific view of the universe that the unscientific nature of accidentalism became fully recognized. Aristotle held that single events may be referred to universal laws of cause and effect, but he did not commit himself to this conception wholly without reservation. He ascribes events to a causal order 'for the most part' (ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ), and insists upon the contingent in nature, that which is without cause and without law (*Met.* 1065*a*, 4). Plato finds a place for chance in the economy of the universe. 'God governs all things, and chance and opportunity co-operate with Him in the government of human affairs' (*Laws*, iv. 709). And yet among the Greeks there was an instinctive shrinking from the idea of chance as the antithesis of cause and law. The Fates were, after all, the daughters of Necessity. Of them Plato remarks: 'Lachesis or the giver of lots is the first of them, and Clotho or the spinner is the second of them, and Atropos or the unchanging one is the third of them; and she is the preserver of the things of which we have spoken, and which have been compared in a figure to things woven by fire, they both (*i.e.* Atropos and the fire) producing the quality of unchangeableness' (*Laws*, xii. 960). This quality of unchangeableness is opposed alike to the caprice or whim of a goddess, and to the chance control of the destinies of man.

Moreover, accidentalism in the field of ethics appears in the theory of indeterminism. Epicurus, for instance, regards the uncaused will of man as analogous to the accidental deviation of atoms from the direct line of their fall. The uncaused event and the uncaused will both present the same general characteristics and the same difficulties also.

JOHN GRIER HIBBEN.

ACCIDENTS (from the theological point of view). — Accidents, to a teleological theology, must be not merely what they are to logic, viz. occurrences which do not fall under a general law of nature. The laws of nature are, from the teleo-

logical point of view, rules expressing the purposes of a conscious Being, and accidents will be occurrences not conforming to such purposes.

The theologian who adopts the theory that contingency in the natural world is an illusion due to our ignorance of general causes, must hold that there is no event not in conformity with Divine design; the very illusion of contingency must itself be the result of purpose. The difficulties that attend this subject are the same as surround the problem of Evil (wh. see). Practically, the belief that there are real influences in the world thwarting the Divine design is an incitement towards activity; the opposite doctrine—that accidents are, after all, part of the Divine purpose, gives consolation in failure. On the whole, Christian theology tends to maintain that the solution of such difficulties falls outside the province of reason, and does not attempt such a synthesis of contradictory opinions as constitutes the Hegelian treatment of the contingent. G. R. T. Ross.

ACCIDENTS (Injurious).—Accidents, in the general sense of the term as popularly employed, may be defined as unforeseen occurrences in human experience. Obviously the accidental character of events will thus be relative to the knowledge and reasoning power of different individuals. In order to mitigate the consequences of *injurious* accidents, the method of insurance (wh. see) is the most effective. By this means the consequences of an injurious accident, in so far as they can be expressed in terms of money, may be entirely deprived of their momentary and future effect by a previous economy, much less in most cases than would be necessary to equalize, as a sum of payments, the damage sustained. Not only so, but the diffusion of the evil results of contingency over a lengthened period, and their transference to a corporation, prevent them from having that cumulative effect which may lead to further disaster of new and increasing nature.

Injurious accidents may lead to legal action, wherever the occurrences so styled are the result of the agency of at least one individual other than the sufferer, and that other agency can be distinguished from society in general.

(*a*) In the first class of such suits—actions for damages at common law—the first plea to be established by the prosecutor is substantially the proposition that the occurrence, which relatively to him was accidental, was not so to the defender, but fell within the scope of the latter's knowledge and foresight. But there are numerous circumstances which might neutralize the effect even of the establishment of such a contention.

(*b*) Claims for compensation may be brought in cases where the injurious accident occurs in an enterprise concerning which there was a previous contract or agreement between the litigating parties. In numerous classes of such joint enterprise the extent to which the risk of accident is borne by either party is laid down by law. For each species of relation a different rule may obtain. Thus in British law the liability for damage to goods entrusted to their care differs in the cases of warehousemen and of common carriers. The relation involving joint enterprise to which Parliamentary enactment has most recently extended delimitation of the risk of the contracting parties, is that of employer and employed. In consequence of the Workmen's Compensation Acts of 1897, 1900, and 1906, in a great number of industries, and not merely in those involving an unusual amount of danger to workers, the employer now bears the risk of injury to his workmen. Every workman may claim compensation from his employer for injury through accident, unless the accident be caused by his own serious and wilful misconduct. The result of these enactments is practically to make the employer bear the cost of the insurance of his employees against accident. It is only to be expected, however, that, though the immediate consequence will be a diminution of the revenue of employers, in time the expense of this system will fall partly upon the workmen, in the shape of a diminution or absence of increase in wages.

LITERATURE.—Willis, *Workmen's Compensation Acts, 1897 and 1900*, 8th ed. pp. 1–7; Baylis, *Workmen's Comp. Acts*[7] (1906); Emery, *Handbook to Workmen's Comp. Act, 1906*.

G. R. T. Ross.

ACCIDIE.—The obsolete 'accidie,' from ἀκηδία, *incuria, torpor* (Hippocr.), through med. Lat. *accidia* (as if from *accidere*), was once current as the name of a quality related on one side to sloth, which has superseded it in some lists of the principal vices. Chaucer in the *Parson's Tale*, dilating upon the 'Seven Mortal Sins,' *Superbia, Invidia, Ira, Accidia, Avaritia, Gula, Luxuria*, writes of the fourth: 'Agayns this roten-herted sinne of Accidie and Slouthe sholde men exercise hem-self to doon gode werkes, and manly and vertuously cacchen corage well to doon' (Skeat, *Student's Chaucer*, p. 700). In Dante see *accidia* and adj. *accidioso* (*Purg.* xviii. 132; *Inf.* vii. 123). The Patristic uses of ἀκηδία rest upon the Old Testament. The earliest of them is not noticed by the authorities mentioned below. The correct Latin form is *acedia*. Bp. Hall is quoted for 'acedy' (1623).

'Ακηδία, ἀκηδιᾶν are found as below in the LXX: the renderings in brackets are from the Vulgate. (1) Ps 118[28] ἐνύσταξεν ἡ ψυχή μου ἀπὸ ἀκηδίας (*præ tædio*). (2) Is 61[3] ἀντὶ πνεύματος ἀκηδίας (*maeroris*). (3) Sir 29[5] ἀποδώσει λόγους ἀκηδίας (*tædii*). (4) Ps 60[3] ἐν τῷ ἀκηδιάσαι τὴν καρδίαν μου (*dum anxiaretur*). (5) Ps 101[1] Προσευχὴ τῷ πτωχῷ ὅταν ἀκηδιάσῃ (*cum anxius fuerit*). (6) Ps 142[4] καὶ ἠκηδίασεν ἐπ' ἐμὲ τὸ πνεῦμά μου (*anxiatus est*). (7) Dn 7[15] LXX, ἀκηδιάσας ἐγὼ Δανιήλ, Theod. ἐφρίξεν (*horruit*). (8) Bar 3[1] ψυχὴ ἐν στενοῖς καὶ πνεῦμα ἀκηδιῶν (*anxius*) [Schleusner, *s.v.* ἀκηδία, *anxiatum*]. (9) Sir 6[25] μὴ προσοχθίσῃς (*ne acedieris*). (10) Sir 22[13] καὶ οὐ μὴ ἀκηδιάσῃς (*non acediaberis*).

The phrase 'spirit of acedy' is from (2) above; Antioch. *Hom.* 26 alludes also to (1), (4), (6), (8); and (9), (10) in the Latin are cited by Alardus Gazæus on Cassian.

In *Vis.* iii. of *Hermæ Pastor* it is explained that the Church appeared first as old, 'because your spirit was aged and already faded and powerless from your ailings and doubts. For as the aged, having no hope any more to renew their youth, expect nothing but their last sleep; so ye, being weakened by worldly affairs, yielded yourselves up to *acedies* (τὰς ἀκηδίας), and cast not your cares upon the Lord, but your spirit was broken, and ye were worn out with your griefs (λύπαις).' Thus acedy is associated with sadness (λύπη), one of the four *plus* eight principal vices in *Sim.* ix. 15; which is *more wicked than all the spirits*, and destroys the power of prayer (*Mand.* v., x.). The parable of the Unclean Spirit which takes to it *seven other spirits more wicked than itself* (Mt 12[45], Lk 11[26]) serves as a proof-text for the number *eight* (afterwards *seven*) of the *principalia vitia*. Nilus of Sinai calls them the 'Eight Spirits of Wickedness' (Zöckler, *op. cit. inf.* p. 65).

In Cassian's *Collat.* v. 'De octo principalibus Vitiis,' which embodies the teaching of Serapion, the eight vices are said to be *Gastrimargia, Fornicatio, Philargyria, Ira, Tristitia, Acedia* sive tædium cordis, *Cenodoxia, Superbia*. They are referred to in Lk 11[24ff.], and they correspond to the like number of nations hostile to Israel. Why eight vices, when Moses enumerates only seven such nations? (Dt 7[1]). Egypt, corresponding to the first vice (Nu 11[5]), makes up the number: the land of Egypt was to be forsaken, and the lands of the seven taken. Acedy, the besetting sin of the monk, was of two kinds: it sent him to sleep in his cell, or drove him out of it. The same vices

attack all men, but not all in the same manner and order. This remark foreshadows the disagreement of later moralists in their accounts of the vices, which are all more or less subjective.

Cassian, in *Cœnob. Inst.* x. 'De Spiritu Acediæ' (cf. Evagr. *ap.* Zöckler; Antioch. *Hom.* 26), details the effects of acedy, beginning: 'Sextum nobis certamen est quod Græci ἀκηδίαν vocant, quam nos tædium sive anxietatem cordis possumus nuncupare.' It is akin to *Tristitia*; is most felt by recluses; and attacks chiefly about the sixth hour, so that it has been called the 'midday demon' (Ps 90^6). Then, heated and famished, the monk is as if wearied by long travel or toil, or as if he had fasted two or three days. Impatient for the repast, he leaves his cell again and again to look at the sun, which seems to 'hasten too slowly to its setting.' Through 'not-caring' he is remiss at his tasks, and finds it a weariness even to listen to the voice of the reader. Solitude impels him to gad about visiting the brethren or the sick. Discontented with his surroundings, he vainly imagines that he would do better in some distant monastery.

To replace the complex acedy by sadness or sloth is to evade a difficulty. In Serapion's octad it is distinct from *Tristitia* and different from mere *pigritia*. Briefly, it was the state of mind of a monk who had mistaken his vocation: the natural effect in him of the 'religious' life, with its fastings from food and 'from the world.'

LITERATURE.—*Oxford New English Dictionary*, *s.v.*; *Encyc. Brit.*[9] art. 'Ethics' (by H. Sidgwick); E. Moore, *Studies in Dante*, ser. 2 (1899); O. Zöckler, *Die Tugendlehre des Christentums* (1904); F. Paget, *Spirit of Discipline* (1891), 1; C. J. Vaughan, *Authorized or Revised?* (1882), 115; T. B. Strong, *Christian Ethics* (1896), 231, 255, 263 f.; J. O. Hannay, *Christian Monasticism* (1903), 153 ff.; Sir J. T. Coleridge's *Memoir*, 66, 68; J. S. Carroll, *Prisoners of Hope* (1906), 224 ff.

C. TAYLOR.

ACCOMMODATION (in Biology and Psychology). — The process of organic or psychological adjustment understood in an individual and functional sense. The concept of accommodation has arisen in the group of genetic sciences by a process of growing specialization of problems. The old problem of 'adaptation' (*q.v.*) was one concerned with the adjustments of organisms to their environment, understood in a very static or agenetic way. Each adaptation was looked upon largely as a definite structural arrangement whereby the organism responded effectively to the conditions of the world. The theory of evolution, and with it that of individual development, has made necessary a more functional statement of the whole series of problems involved in the notion of adaptation. The description of the 'organs' involved and the 'ends' they serve—as in the case of the eye—has given place to the functional problem of the reactions and evolving functions through which the organ has come to be part of the endowment of the organism. This has given rise to a distinction between 'adaptation' proper and 'accommodation.' Adaptation is, by the terms of this distinction, restricted to the congenital adjustments for which the organism inherits structures adequate and fit; accommodation is applied to the adjustments which the organism, in the lifetime of the individual, achieves and perfects. Instinct in the animals is, in many cases, an adaptation; the adjustments of the senses to their appropriate stimulations are likewise adaptations: such processes, on the contrary, as modifications of instinct to meet special conditions, the special reactions learned by the individual, such as handwriting, together with the functional effects of conditions in the environment upon the organism, are accommodations.

The importance of the problem of accommodation is seen in Biology in all cases in which the endeavour is made to interpret the influence of individual behaviour and individual modification upon the organism and upon the next and following generations. As early as the work of Lamarck, this factor was made very prominent in evolution theory, in the Lamarckian hypothesis that the results of accommodation—of 'use and disuse'—were inherited. This was also maintained by Darwin, as subsidiary to his main principle of Natural Selection. Weismann and the neo-Darwinians reject this direct influence of the accommodation factor; they deny its hereditary transmission, but still admit its importance as a constant process in successive generations of essential learning, whereby the individuals of each generation grow up to be competent and fertile—this position being that known as 'Intra-Selection' (Weismann). A more recent theory, called by the present writer 'Organic Selection,' discovers the importance of accommodations in *directing* the line of evolution. It is pointed out that, even though the modifications due to accommodation are not inherited, they still so effectively aid and protect individuals against the action of natural selection, that certain lines of adaptations and correlated characters are preserved and accumulated rather than others. The trend of evolution is thus in the lines marked out in advance by accommodations, natural selection following up and clinching the results first secured by accommodation.

The effects of accommodation on the structure of the organism are technically known as 'modifications'; they are contrasted with 'variations,' which are differences of structure of the 'adaptive' and congenital sort. Individuals are born different by variation; they become different during their lives by modification.

In Psychology the theory of accommodation is of even greater importance. The remarkable range and importance of the learning processes are never made matter of question. The problem of accommodation becomes therefore in Psychology—as also in Biology—that of the possibility of learning anything new. Thus stated, the fact of accommodation is set over against that of 'habit.' If we call all those functions, of whatever sort, that the individual is already able to perform, his 'habits,' it then becomes necessary to explain the process by which habit is modified, cancelled, and added to: this is accommodation.

The present solutions of this problem are in line with the requirements of genetic science as science of function. It is no longer considered possible that an individual may simply, by an act of will, do a thing that he has not learned to do; only certain fixed instincts work in that way, and that because they are fixed as habits by the gift of heredity. No muscular combination is possible, even when it involves the voluntary muscles—as, for example, those for moving the ear in man—that has not been learned, and the process of learning is a slow and effortful one. The theory most current, and having the greater weight because held by both biologists and psychologists, is that known as 'theory of excess discharge,' of 'trial and error,' or of 'persistent imitation,' etc. In effect it considers any act of accommodation or learning as due to the excessive and varied exercise of habits already formed, the element of learning arising from the modifications that come through the happy hits, the successful imitations, the pleasurable results, etc., of the muscular or other combinations thus set in movement. The writer has illustrated this in many ways, treating of the acquisition of handwriting as a typical case in *Mental Development in the Child and the Race* (1895). Spencer and Bain worked out a similar conception. In Biology, the movements of unicellular organisms, as well as the accommodations of grosser function

in higher animals, are being fruitfully interpreted in accordance with this view (see Ll. Morgan, *Animal Behaviour*; Jennings, *Behaviour of the Lower Organisms*).

In the higher reaches of psychic function, the analogous problem is that of 'Selective Thinking,' together with the theory of adjustment to various non-physical environments. There is the social life, to which each individual must be accommodated; there is the environment of truth, to which all our processes of thinking selectively must conform. All this carries the problem of accommodation up into the realms of Social Psychology, Ethics, and Theory of Knowledge.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works cited in the text, see the general discussions of evolution, such as Conn, *Method of Evolution* (1901); Gulick, *Evolution Racial and Habitudinal* (1905); Headley, *Problems of Evolution* (1901). On Organic Selection see Lloyd Morgan, *Habit and Instinct* (1896); and Baldwin, *Development and Evolution* (1903), and *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, where lists of selected works are given under artt. 'Accommodation,' 'Adaptation,' 'Evolution,' etc.

J. MARK BALDWIN.

ACCUMULATION.—'Accumulation' (Lat. *ad* 'to,' *cumulus* 'a heap') signifies (1) a heap, mass, or pile; (2) the process of growing into a heap, *e.g.* the growth of a debt, or of a deposit at the bank, through the continuous addition of interest to principal; (3) the action of heaping, piling or storing up, amassing, as in the case—important from the standpoint of the present article—of the growth of capital.

The accumulation of capital is the result of saving. This, however, does not necessarily imply abstinence, privation, or sacrifice, in the ordinary sense. Saving on the part of the great capitalist involves no personal abstinence from immediate consumption, no sacrifice of present gratifications. His immediate expenditure is limited only by his tastes. Often the pleasure of accumulation is greater than that of careless extravagance, and at times the dominant idea is the increase of wealth for the sake of power. 'Abstinence here means abstinence from senseless waste; it is a negative not a positive merit' (E. R. A. Seligman, *Principles of Economics*, p. 320). This much must be conceded to Karl Marx and his followers. Hence the neutral term 'waiting' has been suggested as a substitute for 'abstinence.'

In the case of smaller incomes the subordination of present to future utility often involves real sacrifice, forbearance, prudence, forethought. But even here it must be borne in mind that anything that increases the productive power of labour so far increases the amount which can be saved. 'To increase capital there is another way besides consuming less, namely, to produce more' (J. S. Mill, *Principles of Political Economy*, Bk. I. ch. v. § 4). Thus, in general, all that we can say is that saving implies an excess of production over consumption—a favourable state of that balance 'which, according as it happens to be either favourable or unfavourable, necessarily occasions the prosperity or decay of every nation' (Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, Bk. IV. ch. iii.).

To say that capital is the result of saving does not mean that it is not consumed. Saving is not hoarding. All capital is consumed. It fulfils its primary function—the satisfaction of future needs—only in being consumed, that is, used; but it is not immediately consumed by the person who saves it. Saving thus simply implies that productive power is directed to the satisfaction of prospective or future needs. In general, this is done through saving 'money,' not, however, as a hoard, but as giving, through the banking system, the power of directing national industry into particular channels. In this way, saving gives an increase in the productive power, and consequently in the consuming power of the society (see Nicholson, *Principles of Political Economy*, Bk. I. ch. xii. § 4).

In this connexion, Mill points out the erroneous nature of the popular idea that the greater part of a nation's capital has been inherited from the distant past in which it was accumulated, and that no part was produced in any given year save that year's addition to the total amount. The fact, he says, is far otherwise. 'The greater part in value of the wealth now existing in England has been produced by human hands within the last twelve months.' The growth of capital is similar in many respects to the growth of population. Each is kept in existence, and increases from age to age, not by preservation but by perpetual consumption and reproduction. It is only the value of the capital that remains and grows; the things themselves are ever changing (see Mill, *Principles*, Bk. I. ch. v. § 6).

This consideration helps us to understand the, at first sight, amazing rapidity with which countries often recover from the effects of a devastating war. The material capital destroyed or removed would, for the most part, have required reproduction in any case; while the land and its *quasi*-permanent improvements subsist. So long, therefore, as the country has not been depopulated, and the necessaries of a working life remain, the character and skill of the people being unchanged, there are all the essential conditions of a speedy recovery (*ib.* Bk. I. ch. v. § 7).

Here the relatively greater importance of what is known as *personal* or *immaterial*—*i.e.* mental and moral—capital, as compared with material capital, is apparent. It is indeed this immaterial capital that constitutes our great inheritance from the past. 'The present state of the nations,' says List, the German protectionist, 'is the result of the accumulation of all discoveries, inventions, improvements, perfections, and exertions of all generations that have lived before us; they form the mental capital of the present human race' (*National System of Political Economy*, Eng. tr. p. 140). The economic condition of a country depends far more on the mental and moral qualities of its inhabitants than on their accumulation of dead material capital.

It is thus with reason that Adam Smith includes the acquired skill of the people in the fixed capital of the nation. 'The improved dexterity of a workman may be considered in the same light as a machine or instrument of trade which facilitates and abridges labour, and which, though it costs a certain expense, repays that expense with a profit' (*W. of N.*, Bk. II. ch. i.). The successors of Adam Smith, however, lacked his comprehensive grasp of the realities of industrial life; and much of the popular antipathy to the teaching of the English economists of the early part of the 19th cent.—the followers of Ricardo—may be traced to their use of narrow and faulty abstractions, and in particular to their intensely materialistic conception of capital, which ignored altogether the skill of the worker. The force of attention was thus misdirected. Regard was had to the quantity rather than to the quality of labour, and consequently the influence of efficiency on wages was overlooked. Every proposed reform, *e.g.* the Factory Acts, was judged by reference to its probable immediate effect on the accumulation of dead material wealth. It was not seen that the capital of a country may be as profitably invested in the physical, mental, and moral training of its inhabitants as in the accumulation of dead material wealth in the shape of machinery, factory buildings, and the like.

To take but one other example of immaterial capital, and that a characteristic product of the mental and moral qualities of the people of these

islands, the British money market—that marvellous banking and credit organization through which the capital of the country finds its way into the hands of those who can turn it to the most productive purposes—has been described by Bagehot as 'the greatest combination of economical power and economical delicacy that the world has ever seen' (see *Lombard Street*, ch. i.).

Some idea of the relative importance of immaterial capital is given by Professor Nicholson, who estimates the 'living capital' of the United Kingdom as worth about five times the value of its dead material capital (see *Strikes and Social Problems*, pp. 97–116). Enough has been said to show that, for an explanation of the rise and fall of nations, we should look to the growth and decay of their immaterial rather than their material capital.

To return to material capital, the state of the balance of production and consumption, or, in other words, the accumulation of capital—which in a modern industrial society, with its vast and increasing variety of forms and substitutes, is necessarily measured in terms of money—depends on causes which naturally fall into two groups, those, namely, which determine the amount of the fund from which saving can be made, or, in other words, the *power to save*, and those which determine the strength of the dispositions which prompt to saving, or, in brief, the *will to save*.

1. The power to save is necessarily limited to the amount of the national dividend or real net produce of the society, *i.e.* the surplus of the annual produce over what is required to supply the efficiency-necessaries of the producers, including those engaged in replacing raw material, repairing the auxiliary capital (*e.g.* machinery, buildings, etc.), and keeping up the consumption capital (*e.g.* dwelling houses, museums, etc.). The amount of this national dividend depends on (*a*) the *natural resources* of the country, (*b*) the *state of the arts of production* in the widest sense, including not only the means of communication and transport, but also the machinery of exchange; for under the modern system of division of labour production involves exchange, and thus the state of the credit institutions must also be considered.

The causes embraced under these two heads together determine the amount produced within the country. But the amount of the national dividend is further affected by (*c*) the *state of foreign trade*, which determines the amount of imports obtained in return for exports. (*d*) The *amount taken by Government for public purposes*, whether in the form of taxes or burdens like conscription, must also be considered (see Nicholson, *Elements of Political Economy*, p. 86).

These causes determine the annual national dividend or maximum which can be saved. But the amount annually added to capital always falls short, and generally far short, of this, depending as it does on the *will to save*.

2. The will to save is the resultant of a complexity of causes, amongst the most important of which are: (*a*) *Security*. To induce saving there must be some reasonable expectation that the owner will be allowed to enjoy the fruits of his saving. This involves protection *by* the Government against force and fraud, which includes the enforcement of freely made contracts; and protection *against* the Government, *e.g.* against oppressive and, above all, arbitrary taxation (see Mill, *Principles*, Bk. I. ch. vii. § 6; Nicholson, *Principles*, Bk. I. ch. xii. § 3). The importance of security in both these forms finds abundant illustration in the history of all nations and ages. Compare, for example, Egypt or India under British rule with Armenia or Macedonia under the dominion of the Turk, or the present state of Russia under the government of the Czar. The British credit system, already referred to, is the outcome of security and good government, just as the hoarding so prevalent in the East is the natural fruit of the uncertainty so often associated with Oriental systems of taxation and government. Even in India the influence of the *pax Britannica* has not yet sufficed to eradicate from the native mind the traditional tendency to hoard, engendered by centuries of turbulence and insecurity.

There must also be a sense of security against the violence of the powers of nature. In balancing the advantages of present and future utilities the uncertainty of the future is an important factor. Where a country has an unhealthy climate, and is liable to plagues, or is subject to earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tornadoes, or other physical disasters, the consequent uncertainty of life does, so far, tend to check accumulation by lessening the will to save, apart altogether from the influence of such disasters on the power to save. On the occasion of great plagues, popular practice follows the maxim of pagan philosophy: 'Let us eat, drink, and be merry, for to-morrow we die.'

(*b*) The effect of *the rate of interest* on saving is somewhat complex. A high rate, security being unchanged, affords a greater reward for saving, and thus, so far, a greater inducement to save. But the higher the rate of interest the lower, *ceteris paribus*, the rate of wages; and thus a high rate may react on the efficiency of labour and may check enterprise, and thus lessen the power to save. At the same time, those who merely wish to obtain a certain annuity need save less if the rate of interest is high. In general, however, a fall in the rate of interest will tend to check accumulation. But some accumulation would go on even if the rate of interest became negative (see Nicholson, *Principles*, Bk. I. ch. xii. § 3; Marshall, *Principles of Economics*, Bk. IV. ch. vii. §§ 8, 9).

(*c*) The accumulation of capital is affected also by the existing *facilities for investment*. The multiplication of branch banks in Scotland has undoubtedly contributed to increase both the power and the will to save. The more recent extension of savings banks and the growth of joint stock companies with limited liability have also greatly stimulated saving throughout the community.

(*d*) *The distribution of national wealth* amongst the different economic classes has likewise a certain influence on accumulation. When the bulk of the wealth of England was in the hands of the feudal landowners, extravagance prevailed, as explained by Adam Smith (*W. of N.* Bk. III. ch. iv.), and it is only after the revolution of 1688 that, with the rise of the mercantile class, we find a rapid accumulation of wealth. Similarly in France the contrast is striking between the extravagance of the *ancien régime* and the thrift of the peasantry in modern times. Amongst the latter the effective desire of accumulation appears to be excessive. The living or immaterial capital is sacrificed to the dead. 'In England,' says Lady Verney, 'thrift appears to be a great virtue. Here one hates the very mention of it. . . . The sordid, unclean, hideous existence which is the result of all this saving and self-denial, the repulsive absence of any ideal but that of *cacher de petits sous dans de grands bas* as object for life, is incredible if it is not seen and studied' (*Peasant Properties*, p. 151).

(*e*) The *effective desire of accumulation* is compounded of many elements, intellectual and moral, including the development of the 'telescopic faculty' (Marshall), the growth of the family affections, the hope of rising in the world, and the

social and other advantages attendant on the possession of wealth. The strength of this desire may be weak from intellectual deficiency. The wants of the present are vividly realized, those of the future are but dimly imagined. There is frequent lack of the power of imagination necessary to the proper appreciation of the importance of future benefits, as in the case, mentioned by Dr. Rae, of the Indians on the banks of the St. Lawrence, who, when a speedy result was to be obtained, would toil even more assiduously than the white man, but would undertake no work for which the return was at all remote (see Rae, *The Sociological Theory of Capital* [ed. Mixter, pp. 71–73]; also Mill, *Principles*, Bk. I. ch. xi. § 3). As we go lower in the scale, this weakness becomes more pronounced. The Australian native, in respect of foresight in providing for the future, is inferior to many of the lower animals (see Letourneau, *Property*, Eng. tr. p. 30).

Often, however, the effective desire of accumulation is weak, not so much from intellectual as from moral deficiency. Even in the most highly civilized nations, there are too many instances of men of the most vivid imagination—men who are in no way defective in the telescopic faculty—who yet, through lack of will power, interest in others, family affection or sense of independence, are unable to resist the temptations of the present sufficiently to provide for the clearly foreseen needs of the future, or unwilling to make any provision for the welfare of wife and children or for their own independence in old age or disablement. Amongst the unskilled labour class in this country the average degree of providence and self-restraint is not much above that of uncivilized man. It is this that constitutes the chief difficulty of the problem of unemployment. But amongst the professional, manufacturing, trading, and skilled artizan classes, on the other hand, the effective desire of accumulation is strong. The vastness of the sums yearly paid as premiums to life insurance companies—only one form of saving—affords sufficient proof of this.

The movement of progressive societies from status to contract, emphasized by Sir Henry Maine (*Ancient Law*, p. 170), accompanied and promoted, as it has been, by the extension of money payments in place of services and payments in kind, has greatly contributed to the accumulation of capital. The introduction of a money economy made it possible for a person to store up capital which would yield him an income in money, and was therefore capable of being turned to the satisfaction of any want whatever. At the same time, the displacement of a state of things in which a man's position in society is fixed at his birth according to the rigid rule of caste, by a state in which he makes his own position in society by contract with his fellow-men, has enormously increased the inducement to save, by affording full scope for that hope of raising oneself and one's family in the social scale, than which there are few stronger incentives to energy, enterprise, and the accumulation of wealth. 'The principle which prompts to save,' says Adam Smith, 'is the desire of bettering our condition, a desire which, though generally calm and dispassionate, comes with us from the womb, and never leaves us till we go into the grave' (*W. of N.* Bk. II. ch. iii.).

Mill asserts that to get out of one rank in society into the next above it is the great aim of English middle-class life, and that to this end it is necessary to save enough to admit of retiring from business, and living on the interest of capital (*Principles*, Bk. I. ch. xi. § 4). In America, on the other hand, success in business itself is often the dominant idea. Many of the most successful business men in the United States seem to be wholly absorbed in the acquisition and accumulation of capital, simply and solely as a necessary condition of pre-eminence in the world of business. They know no other goal. In some cases, indeed, the means is mistaken for the end, and the mere accumulation of wealth becomes the mainspring of life; or it may be that the habit of accumulating, acquired in time of need, maintains its sway when the need has passed.

But though the effective desire of accumulation is thus sometimes in excess of what reason would justify, there is much more danger in the other extreme. Nations may be ruined by extravagance, never by parsimony.

The popular idea of the social effects of extravagant expenditure is based on reasoning the fallacious nature of which has often been exposed. Saving is identified with selfish hoarding, while the spendthrift is regarded as benefiting all around him. It is admitted that he may be ruining himself and his family, but it is not generally recognized that he is almost equally the enemy of society. The lavish outlay of the spendthrift makes money circulate, and increases the profits and wages of wine-merchants, tailors, domestic servants, and others. That is *what we see*. What we *do not* so readily *see* is that, had the money not been thus squandered, the capital which it represents would not have lain idle, but would have found its way, through the medium of our banking organization, into the hands of some manufacturer or shipbuilder, say, to be employed by him in productive industry. The spendthrift, then, does not benefit trade, or give employment to labour; he simply alters the direction of the employment of capital, and he renders the nation poorer by the amount of the wealth he thus wastefully consumes. The saving person, on the other hand, creates a fund which, in its consumption, affords an equal employment for labour, and yet is continually renewed (see Mill, *Principles*, Bk. I. ch. v. §§ 3, 5). Economy, in short, enriches, while extravagance impoverishes, the individual and the nation.

And in this, as in most other cases, good economy is good morality. The accumulation of wealth implies, in the normal case, forethought, self-restraint, energy, and enterprise on the part of the individual, and it is an essential condition of his economic freedom. For the nation, it is an essential prerequisite of the highest civilization. It means increased scope for Division of Labour. 'As the accumulation of stock must, in the nature of things, be previous to the division of labour, so labour can be more and more subdivided in proportion only as stock is previously more and more accumulated' (Adam Smith, *W. of N.*, Bk. II. Introd.). It thus means increase in man's power over nature, with consequent economy of human effort in the satisfaction of the primary needs, and increased leisure for the culture of Art and Science and Literature. Nations, like men, may grow rich without culture, but the highest civilization is impossible in the absence of a sound economic basis of accumulated capital.

ARCH. B. CLARK.

ACHÆMENIANS.— A dynasty which ruled in Persia from B.C. 558 to 330, and whose religion is important for the study of the development of Zoroastrianism. The monarchs of the line were as follows: Cyrus the Great (558–530), Cambyses (530–522), Darius I. (522–486), Xerxes I. (486–465), Artaxerxes I. (465–424), Xerxes II. (424), Sogdianus (424), Darius II. (424–404), Artaxerxes II. (404–358), Artaxerxes III. (358–337), and Darius III. (337–330). The scanty data concerning their religion are contained in classical writings, in inscriptions in Babylonian, Egyptian, and Greek, and above all

in their own inscriptions, which were written in Old Persian, with Babylonian and New Elamitic translations. The only kings of this dynasty who come into consideration here are Cyrus, Cambyses, Darius I., Xerxes I., and Artaxerxes II. and III.

1. **Cyrus the Great.**—The material for a knowledge of the religion of this monarch is restricted to the *Cyropædia* of Xenophon, the OT, and the Babylonian inscriptions. The *Cyropædia*, as is well known, is a historical romance, and its statements, therefore, can be accepted only with caution, unless they can be controlled by the Avesta or other sources. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that Xenophon had exceptional opportunities for observing the Achæmenian religion, through his long association with Cyrus the Younger, so that under his apparent Hellenic veneer there may lurk some true elements of Achæmenian belief. In this romance Cyrus is repeatedly represented as offering sacrifices, and it is noteworthy that he invokes the assistance of the magi (iv. 5. 14, vi. 5. 57, viii. 1. 23). The deities to whom he rendered sacrifice appear under the Greek nomenclature of Zeus, Helios, Ge, and Hestia (i. 6. 1, iii. 3. 22, viii. 7. 3), and in addition to them he worshipped 'the other gods' or 'all the gods' (the latter phrase is interesting as being a striking, though doubtless accidental, parallel with a phrase of similar meaning in the Old Persian inscriptions of Darius) and the tutelary divinities (ἥρωες) of Assyria, Syria, Media, and Persia. With this list must be compared the statement of Herodotus (i. 131) and of Strabo (xv. 3. 13) that the Persians worshipped the sun, the moon, earth, fire, water, the winds, Aphrodite, and, above all, the sky, which they called Zeus. It thus becomes evident that the worship ascribed to Cyrus by Xenophon was a nature-worship closely akin to the Iranian cult which finds its revival in the so-called Younger Avesta. The deities honoured by him were doubtless identical with Ahura Mazda, Mithra, Atarš (the sacred fire), and Anahita (apparently identified with the earth as being a goddess of fertility). The identification of Hestia with the sacred fire receives its confirmation in the rôle ascribed to fire in the sacrifice recounted in *Cyrop.* viii. 3. 12, but the equation of Ge with Anahita is more doubtful. This goddess is represented by the Aphrodite of Strabo, and the divine personification of earth in Iranian mythology was Spenta Armaiti (Gray, *ARW* vii. 364–370). If, however, the identification here proposed be accepted, it finds a striking parallel in the collocation of Ahura Mazda, Mithra, and Anahita in the Old Persian inscription of Artaxerxes II. The tutelary divinities whom Cyrus is represented as worshipping are none other than the *fravashis*, who were originally the ghosts of the dead, yet who later came to be protecting godlings, and are thus invoked in *Yasna*, xxiii. 1: 'I invoke to worship those *fravashis* who aforetime were of the houses, and of the villages, and of the districts, and of the lands; who sustain the heaven, who sustain the water, who sustain the earth, who sustain the kine, who sustain children in the wombs to be conceived that they die not.' In the instructions of the dying Cyrus concerning the disposal of his body, on the other hand (*Cyrop.* viii. 7. 25), he departed widely from Zoroastrian usage when he requested that he be buried in earth, a request whose accuracy is confirmed by the elaborate description of his tomb as given by Strabo (xv. 3. 7), which agrees strikingly with the so-called Tomb of Cyrus at Pasargadæ. It may be noted in this connexion that the Achæmenian kings were entombed in rock sepulchres, as is evidenced by their tombs at Persepolis and elsewhere; while Herodotus (i. 140) states that the Persians, after exposing the corpse to birds or dogs, coated it with wax and placed it in the ground. It would seem, therefore, that the data of Xenophon concerning the founder of the Achæmenian dynasty are not so valueless as is sometimes supposed. They agree remarkably with the statements of the Younger Avesta, which, despite its comparatively late date, doubtless represents in its main outlines the religion of the Iranians before the reform associated with the name of Zoroaster.

Turning to the Babylonian inscriptions of Cyrus, we find that the religion of Cyrus is mentioned in the two texts of the Nabuna'id-Cyrus Chronicle and the Cylinder Inscription. In both Cyrus declares that Nabuna'id, the last native sovereign of Babylon, had brought the gods of Sumer and Akkad from their own temples to his capital, while he, on the other hand, as the chosen of Marduk, restored them to their homes. The view has been advanced that Marduk and his son Nabu, who are mentioned in close association in both these inscriptions, were regarded by Cyrus merely as other names for Ahura Mazda and his son Atarš (the sacred fire). This theory seems, on the whole, scarcely tenable; and a general consideration of the character of the Achæmenian, so far as it can be traced, leads to the interpretation that he acted as a clever politician, and not as a religious leader. Nor can the famous passage in Is 44^{28}–45^{4} be construed as casting any real light on the religion of Cyrus. Though the Persian king is addressed as 'the shepherd of Jahweh,' as His 'anointed,' before whom all nations should be subdued, and as the one whom Jahweh had called and in whom He took delight, this implies nothing more than a recognition of the close sympathy existing between Israel and Persia, and the conviction that the conqueror of Babylon would free the Jews from their exile. It is, in other words, the eulogy of the enthusiastic and hopeful prophet in honour of the politic victor.

Of these three sources, the Greek, even making all allowances for possible inaccuracies, seems to be the most reliable. The most that can be said, in the light of the data now available, is that the religion of Cyrus approximated closely to that contained in the Younger Avesta. There is no evidence whatever to show that he was a Zoroastrian.

2. **Cambyses.**—The religious records concerning this monarch are extremely scanty. Herodotus (iii. 16) mentions his impiety in burning the corpse of Amasis, 'since the Persians regard fire as a god . . ., saying that it is not right to give the corpse of a man to a god.' Both in Persia and in the home of the Avesta the defilement of the fire by contact with dead matter was regarded as a most grievous sin (cf. *Vendīdād*, vi. 73–81). The only other document which throws light on the religion of Cambyses is an Egyptian text on a naophoric statue in the Vatican. According to this inscription, the strangers had intruded within the precincts of the goddess Neit at Sais and had placed various obstructions there. In answer to a petition received by him, Cambyses commanded that the fane be purified and that its worship be restored. He himself then went to Sais, restored all offerings to the goddess and also to Osiris, while he likewise 'worshipped before the holiness of Neit with much devotion, as all the kings had done; he made great offering of all good things to Neit, the great, the divine mother, and to all the gods who dwell in Sais, as all the pious kings had done' (Petrie, *History of Egypt*, 1905, iii. 361, 362). Though Cambyses was, as is universally acknowledged, a madman, his policy with regard to this temple was thoroughly in accord with that pursued by Cyrus before him and Darius after him. His stabbing of the Apis bull, on the

other hand, was the act of a maniac's cruelty, and was not inspired by any devotion to religious tenets of his own.

3. Darius I.—The chief source for a study of the religion of this monarch is furnished by his inscriptions in Old Persian, with their Babylonian and New Elamitic versions. The texts are found at Behistun, Persepolis, Naqš-i-Rustam, Elvand, Susa, Kirman, and Suez. In his inscriptions the king constantly ascribes the source of his authority to the 'grace of Ahura Mazda,' declaring: 'Auramazda brought me the kingdom; Auramazda bore me aid until this kingdom was held; by the grace of Auramazda I hold this kingdom' (Bh. i. 24–26). All evil in the realm is regarded as due to the malignant influence of the 'Lie' (*drauga*), which is to be compared with the *druj* of the Avesta. The 'Lie' was the cause of rebellion, while the power of Darius was due, in his opinion, largely to the fact that he had not been a 'liar.' The 'Lie' is thus closely parallel with the Aŋra Mainyu of the Avesta, and it is not impossible that it is a euphemistic term for the arch-fiend, thus accounting for the omission of all mention of Aŋra Mainyu in the Old Persian inscriptions. The fact that the Pahlavi translation of *Yasna*, xxx. 10, identifies the *druj* with Ahriman cannot, however, be cited in support of this hypothesis. Ahura Mazda is frequently described in the texts of the Achæmenian kings as 'a great god who created this earth, who created yon heaven, who created man, who created peace for man, who made Darius [or, Xerxes, Artaxerxes] king, the one king of many, the one ruler of many.' This passage is very similar to the Gāthā Avesta *Yasna*, xxxvii. 1: 'Here praise we Ahura Mazda, who created both kine and holiness, and created waters, created both good trees and light, both the earth and all good things.' This is but one of a number of parallels between the Old Persian texts and the Avesta which might be cited (cf. Windischmann, *Zoroastr. Studien*, 121–125); yet, on the other hand, an equal mass of coincidences exists between the Achæmenian inscriptions and the Assyr.-Bab. records (cf. Gray, *AJSL* xvii. 151–159).

It has been suggested that Ahura Mazda was regarded, in a sense, as the author of evil as well as of good, since Darius says (Bh. iv. 57–59): 'If thou hidest this tablet, (and) tellest it not to the people, may Auramazda be thy slayer, (and) may thy family be not.' This is not, however, altogether certain, for Ahura Mazda, as the god of the king, might fairly be invoked to destroy his enemies, such an act scarcely being regarded as evil. On the other hand, the only direct allusion to Ahriman in connexion with an Achæmenian monarch is found in Plutarch's Life of Themistocles, iii., where Xerxes prays that Ἀριμάνιος may always give the Greeks the mad impulse to drive their best men from them. Yet one can hardly give much weight to an isolated statement of a late and somewhat rhetorical author, especially as he was well acquainted with orthodox Zoroastrianism (see his *de Iside et Osiride*, xlvi.).

The course which the upright man should pursue is termed 'the right path' *paθim* (*tyām rāstām*), an idea which recurs not only in the Avesta (*Yasna*, lxxii. 11; *Yašt*, x. 3, 86; *Vendīdād*, iv. 43), but also in the OT, the Veda, and especially in Buddhism. In this spirit Darius declares, in a much-disputed passage, that 'I walked according to rectitude' (*upariy arštām upariyāyam*, Bh. iv. 64; for the establishment of this text see Jackson, *JAOS* xxiv. 90–92), the Arštā here mentioned being doubtless identical with the Arštāt of the Younger Avesta, 'who furthereth creatures, prospereth creatures, giveth health unto creatures' (*Yašt*, xi. 16). If these two beneficent powers are represented both in Old Persian and in the Avesta, the two sources agree in their view of the demon of drought, for the Dušiyārā against whom Darius invokes the protection of Ahura Mazda is to be identified with the Dužyāiryā, for whose destruction, according to the Younger Avesta (*Yašt*, viii. 50–56), Tištrya, the Dog-Star, was especially created by Ormazd (note also the mention of the 'horde,' Old Persian *hainā*, Avesta *haēnā*, in both texts in close association with 'drought').

It is thus evident that the Old Persian inscriptions of Darius represent him as a worshipper of Ahura Mazda and as filled with abhorrence of the 'Lie.' One beneficent godling (Arštā) and one maleficent fiend (Dušiyārā) are mentioned under the same names in the Younger Avesta. The stylistic parallels which may undoubtedly be traced between the Achæmenian texts and the Avesta, on the other hand, are counterbalanced by the Assyr.-Bab. inscriptions from which Darius and his successors manifestly drew. His policy towards other faiths than his own was that of Cyrus. In his reconstruction of the kingdom on his accession, he states that he 'restored the places of worship which Gaumata had digged down' (Bh. i. 64). He thus appears as an opponent of rigid Magian orthodoxy, for the 'places of worship' (*āyadanā*) are shown by the Bab. version to have been 'houses of the gods' (*bītāti ša ilāni*). That these were fire temples, like the Magian structures described by Strabo (733) as existing in Cappadocia, seems less probable than that they were temples of the gods of non-Persian peoples.

This view receives confirmation from a Greek and an Egyptian inscription of Darius. In the former text, found in 1886 at Deirmenjik (ed. Cousin and Deschamps, *BCH* xiii.), the king reproves his subject Gadates, who had sought to efface all traces of the royal attitude towards the gods, which, Darius expressly states, had been that of his predecessors, and who had exacted a tax from the priests of 'Apollo.' Who 'Apollo' was is doubtful. Cousin and Deschamps, somewhat strangely, identify him with Atarš (the sacred fire), who appears in Greek, as noted above, under the name of Hestia. He is probably, however, the Greek divinity Apollo, who in times past had given a favourable oracle to Cyrus, perhaps during his Lycian campaign, and who was consequently honoured by the Achæmenian dynasty. At all events, the inscription is non-Zoroastrian in tone.

Still more polytheistic is the stele of Darius at Tell el-Maskhutah (ed. Golénischeff, *RTAP* xiii. 106–107), which contains the following words: '(Darius) born of Neit, the lady of Neit, the lady of Sais, image of the god Ra who hath put him on his throne to accomplish what he hath begun . . . (master) of all the sphere of the solar disc. When he (Darius) was in the womb (of his mother) and had not yet appeared upon earth, she (the goddess Neit) recognized him as her son . . . she hath (extended) her arm to him with the bow before her to overthrow for ever his enemies, as she had done for her own son, the god Ra. He is strong . . . (he hath destroyed) his enemies in all lands, king of Upper and Lower Egypt, Darius who liveth for ever, the great, the prince of princes . . . (the son) of Hystaspes, the Achæmenian, the mighty. He is her son (of the goddess Neit), powerful and wise to enlarge his boundaries.'

Devout and noble though his inscriptions show him to be, Darius seems to have been by no means a strict monotheist. This statement is borne out by the old Persian texts themselves, which show that he felt merely that Ahura Mazda was, as he himself says, 'the greatest of gods.' A Persepolitan inscription thrice contains the words *hadā viθaibiš bagaibiš*, which were formerly rendered 'with the clan-gods,' but which are now regarded as meaning 'with all the gods.' This interpretation is confirmed by the Bab. *itti ilāni gabbi* and the New Elamitic *annap marpepta-itaka* ('with all the gods') in texts of closely similar content and phraseology. The plural of *baγa* ('god') occurs in the Avesta only in *Yašt*, x. 141, which states that Mithra 'is the wisest of gods,' but its Pahlavi form occurs at least thrice, an undoubtedly Zoroastrian passage (*Dēnkart*, viii. 15. 1) being especially interesting in this connexion, since it speaks of the 'worship of Auharmazd, the highest of divinities.' This phrase is strikingly similar to passages in the inscriptions of Darius and Xerxes which describe Ahura Mazda as 'the greatest of gods.' That such a phrase is not necessarily polytheistic is clear from such passages of the OT as Ps 82^1 95^3 and 97^9. In the New Elamitic version, however, occurs the statement, which may be significant, that Ahura Mazda was 'the god of the Aryans.' If stress may be laid on this (a fact which is by no means certain),

it may serve as a partial explanation of the policy pursued by the Achæmenians with regard to the gods of the Babylonians, Egyptians, and Greeks. This view of Ahura Mazda as a national deity in the eyes of the Persian kings may readily be paralleled from other Oriental nations of antiquity. It may also explain the collocation of Ahura Mazda 'with all the gods,' of whom he was the greatest. In the light of this, the epithet *πατρῷος*, applied by Cyrus, according to Xenophon, to Zeus (Ahura Mazda) and Hestia (Atarš, the sacred fire), possibly likewise becomes explicable (cf., however, the same epithet given by Greek poets to Æther, Apollo, Hekate, Hermes, and Zeus; see Bruchmann, *Epitheta Deorum quæ apud Poetas Græcos leguntur*, Leipzig, 1893). Under any explanation it is a far cry from the nationalistic Ahura Mazda of the politic Achæmenians to the god of the Avesta, who brooks no rivals and urges his follower to 'convert all men living' (*Yasna*, xxxi. 3).

4. **Xerxes I.**—The chief source for a knowledge of the religion of Xerxes I. is Herodotus, who states (vii. 43, 53, 54) that this king, when he arrived at the Hellespont in his expedition against Greece, sacrificed a thousand oxen to 'Athene of Ilium,' and also made a libation to the sun, and gave an offering to the sea. 'Athene of Ilium' seems to be the Persian Anahita, who is mentioned in the inscriptions of Artaxerxes II., and to whom were offered, according to the Younger Avesta (*Yašt*, v.), 'a hundred stallions, a thousand bulls, and ten thousand sheep.' The correspondence in the number of oxen offered in both accounts is surely noteworthy. The homage to the sun (Mithra) and the waters is too well known to require further elucidation (cf. Strabo, xv. 3. 13). If Herodotus may be believed, moreover, Xerxes sacrificed at a place called Nine Roads nine Greek boys and nine Greek girls, and he adds (vii. 114) that it was customary for the Persians to offer victims by burying them alive. In view of the fact that this custom is mentioned nowhere else, and of the defilement of the sacred element earth which it would cause, the statement of the Greek historian seems too improbable to be accepted as authentic. A passage of much interest, however, is that in which Herodotus says (vii. 40) that Xerxes was accompanied in his march by the 'sacred chariot of Zeus,' which was drawn by eight white horses, whose driver went on foot, 'for no man mounteth on this throne' (cf. Quintus Curtius, iii. 8–12). This 'chariot of Zeus' was, it may be conjectured, none other than the shrine in which dwelt Ahura Mazda, the national deity, who thus escorted the king to victory quite as Jahweh did in His ark carried by the Israelites.

5, 6. **Artaxerxes II. and III.**—The brief texts of Artaxerxes II. and III. are interesting solely as adding the names of Mithra and Anahita to that of Ahura Mazda. That this was a real innovation seems far from probable, in the light of the religion ascribed by the allusions in the classics to Cyrus and Xerxes. It is noteworthy, in this connexion, that Plutarch, who was by no means unacquainted with true Zoroastrianism, confirms the testimony of the inscriptions. In his Life of Artaxerxes II. he mentions the king's worship of Anahita, his oaths in the name of Mithra, as well as his coronation in a temple of 'Minerva' (a deity of uncertain identification).

The Achæmenians are curiously, and perhaps significantly, ignored in the Middle Persian writings. The theory has been advanced that Artaxerxes I. Longimanus is mentioned in the Pahlavi texts under the name of 'Ardashir the Kayan, whom they call Vohuman, son of Spend-dad,' who, according to *Bahman Yašt*, ii. 17, 'separates the demons from men, scatters them about, and makes the religion current in the whole world.' This hypothesis lacks all foundation. The Zoroastrian Artaxerxes was the son of Spend-dad; the Achæmenian was the son of Xerxes; al-Bīrūnī rightly distinguishes between them, and the identification of the two in the *Shāh-Nāmah* and other sources is properly regarded as contrary to history, since it is due to the accidental coincidence that the grandfather of each was named Darius. Again, according to the *Dēnkarṭ* (iv. 23), 'Darai, son of Darai, ordered the preservation of two written copies of the whole Avesta and Zand.' This Darius, who was the son of Darius, is identified with the Achæmenian Darius III. Codomanus, who was the son of Arsanes. Al-Bīrūnī once more carefully distinguishes between the two, and it is not unlikely that he is right in so doing (cf. Nöldeke in Geiger-Kuhn's *Grundriss der iran. Philologie*, ii. 141), even though other Oriental sources identify the two. At all events, the equation is too doubtful, with the data now available, to serve as a basis for any hypothesis, either for or against the Zoroastrianism of the Achæmenians.

In this connexion, however, mention may be made of the very plausible hypothesis of the Parsi scholar Desai, who supposes (*Cama Memorial Volume*, Bombay, 1900, 37) that this Darius and his immediate predecessors were transferred from the one dynasty to the other by the Pahlavi writers 'in their attempt to palm off some of the last kings of the Achæmenian house mentioned above, as the last Kayanian monarchs, the successors of king Gushtasp.' If this may be accepted (and it is by no means improbable), it would readily follow as a matter of course that the undoubted Zoroastrianism of the dynasty of Vishtaspa should be attributed to the added kings, whatever their own faith may have been. The lack of agreement between the monarchs recorded in the Pahlavi texts and the dynasty of the Achæmenians must, however, be taken into account in any attempt to solve this problem.

In the light of what has been said, it would appear that the Achæmenians were pre-eminently worshippers of Ahura Mazda, though they did not refuse to recognize other Iranian deities, such as the sun, the fire, and the waters, or even hesitate to honour the divinities of other countries, rebuild their temples, and restore their cult. Ahura Mazda was to them a purely national god, surrounded by subordinate deities who were clearly nature-divinities. Numerous parallels may be drawn, both in concept and in phraseology, between the Old Persian inscriptions and the Avesta, although it is most significant that these coincidences are with the Younger Avesta, with its probable recrudescence of the pre-Zoroastrian nature-cult, rather than with the Gāthās; and it must also be remembered that equally striking analogues exist between the Old Persian and the Assyr.-Bab. texts. The Old Persian inscriptions must be supplemented by all available sources, whether in Greek, Egyptian, Babylonian, or New Elamitic. From a careful study of all these documents, it becomes clear that the only conclusion which can safely be reached concerning the religion of the kings of this dynasty is that they were Mazdayasnians, not Zoroastrians.

LITERATURE.—Spiegel, *Altpers. Keilinschriften*[2] (Leipzig, 1881); Weissbach-Bang, *Altpers. Keilinschriften* (Leipzig, 1893); Bezold, *Achämenideninschriften* (Leipzig, 1882); Weissbach, *Achämenideninschriften zweiter Art* (Leipzig, 1890), also, 'Die altpers. Inschriften' in Geiger-Kuhn's *Grundriss der iran. Philologie*, ii. (Strassburg, 1904); Schrader, *KIB* iii. pt. 2 (Berlin, 1890); Brugsch, *Thesaurus inscrip. Egyp.* (Leipzig, 1883–1891); Brisson, *De regio Persarum principatu* (ed. Lederlin, Strassburg, 1710); Kleuker, *Anhang zum Zend-Avesta*, iii. pt. 3 (Leipzig, 1783); Rapp, 'Relig. u. Sitte der Perser und übrigen Iranier nach den griech. und röm. Quellen,' in *ZDMG* xix., xx. (Eng. tr. by Cama, Bombay, 1876–1879); Justi, *Iran. Namenbuch* (Marburg, 1895); Jackson, 'Iran. Religion' in Geiger-Kuhn, *op. cit.*; Lehmann, 'Die Perser' in Chantepie de la Saussaye's *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*[3] (Freiburg, 1905); Jackson, *Zoroaster, the Prophet of Ancient Iran* (New York, 1899); Spiegel, *Eran. Alterthumskunde*, ii. (Leipzig, 1873); Rawlinson, *Fifth Great Oriental Monarchy* (London, 1862); Justi, 'Gesch. Irans bis zum Ausgang der Sāsāniden,' in Geiger-Kuhn, *op. cit.*; Meyer, *Geschichte des Alterthums*, iii. (Stuttgart, 1901); de Harlez, *Avesta, livre sacré du Zoroastrianisme* (Paris, 1881); Darmesteter, *Le*

Zend-Avesta, iii. (Paris, 1893); Windischmann, *Zoroastr. Studien* (Berlin, 1863); Stave, *Einfluss des Parsismus auf das Judenthum* (Haarlem, 1898); Tiele, *Gesch. van den Godsdienst in de Oudheid* (Amsterdam, 1901), also *Kompendium der Religionsgeschichte*[3] (Breslau, 1903); Orelli, *Allgemeine Religionsgeschichte* (Bonn, 1899); Röth, *Gesch. unserer abendländ. Philosophie*[2], i. (Mannheim, 1862); Cheyne, *Origin and Religious Contents of the Psalter* (London, 1891); Modi, *Glimpse into the Work of the B.B.R.A. Society during the Last 100 Years, from a Parsee Point of View* (Bombay, 1905); Mills, *Zarathushtra, the Achæmenids, and Israel*. For additional bibliographical references to briefer articles, see Jackson, *Iran. Religion*, and *JAOS* xxi.

LOUIS H. GRAY.

ACHELOUS.—The name of the greatest river in Greece. Flowing from the watershed of Pindus in a southerly direction, it forms in its lower waters the boundary-line between Ætolia and Acarnania before falling into the Ionian Sea. The river-god who presided over it was reputed the son of Oceanus and Tethys (Hes. *Theog.* 340); he was the eldest of 3000 brothers and supreme amongst them, in power second only to Oceanus himself (Acusilaus fr. 11*a*, *Fragm. Hist. Gr.* i. 101). Other legends, after the manner of Euhemerus, represent him as a man in consequence of whose sorrows the river first gushed forth as a divine solace (see, *e.g.*, Prop. ii. 25, 33). Tradition regarded him as the king of streams, from whom are derived the waters of all other rivers (Zenodotus on Hom. *Il.* xxi. 195), and as such he was worshipped throughout the Greek world, from Athens and Oropus as far as Rhodes and Metapontum. Thus it is not surprising that smaller streams besides the Ætolian river bore his name—in Thessaly, Achæa, Arcadia, and elsewhere. Further, we find the word Achelous generalized in the sense of water (Eur. *Bacch.* 625, etc.); this occurs especially in the ceremonial phraseology of sacrifices and oaths—proving that the identification is not a poetical refinement, but the survival of an old religious formula (Ephorus fr. 27; *Fragm. Hist. Gr.* i. 239). Again, Achelous is the father of a numerous progeny of water-nymphs, such as Peirene, Castalia, and Dirce, the guardian spirits of local Hellenic streams. The appropriateness is less obvious when the Sirens appear as his daughters (Pausan. ix. 34, 2): perhaps they are so viewed in their aspect as the windless calm of the southern sea in summer (cf. *Od.* xii. 168). For it has been held that Achelous was not only a river-god, but, as signifying water in general, also the lord of the sea (Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Eur. *Herakles*[2], i. p. 23). His most famous appearance in mythical story is as the suitor of Deianeira, who was vanquished by Herakles after a fierce struggle. Like Proteus, he possessed the power of metamorphosis, and in this battle he assumed the form of a wild bull (Soph. *Trach.* 9 ff., 507 ff.). In the course of the fight, one of his horns was broken off by Herakles, and, according to one account, he ransomed it from his conqueror by giving in exchange for it the horn of Amaltheia or cornucopia (Apollod. *Bibl.* II. 7, 5). The ancients gave a rationalistic explanation of the story: Herakles represents the growing power of civilization, which reclaimed the marsh-land for agriculture by damming and diverting the wild exuberance of the river (Strabo, x. p. 458). It seems rather as if Achelous was a name consecrated in primitive ritual to express the principle of moisture as the source of life and growth. Further, since to a nation of cowherds the bull is typical of generative power, the fostering river-god was worshipped in bull form. Whatever be the explanation, it should not be forgotten that the bull shape is common to all river-gods and is not limited to Achelous (cf. Eur. *Ion* 1261). A symbolical connexion between the two aspects of divinity was found in the horn of plenty, which, as we have seen, was mythically associated with Achelous.

In art, Achelous is represented either as an old man with horns, as a sea-serpent with human head and arms and bull's horns, or as a bull with human face and long dripping beard.

The etymology of the word is unknown, and inferences based merely upon conjectural explanations of it should be unhesitatingly rejected.

LITERATURE.—Artt. by G. Wenzel in Pauly-Wissowa, and by H. W. Stoll in Roscher; O. Gruppe, *Griech. Mythol. u. Religionsgesch.* (1897) pp. 343, 828, etc.; Jane E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* (1903), p. 435; J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias*, ii. p. 527.

A. C. PEARSON.

ACHILLES was extensively worshipped throughout the Hellenic world. Numerous guesses have been made at the derivation of his name both in ancient and in modern times, but the etymology remains quite uncertain. Nor does it appear possible to attribute to him with confidence any exclusively naturalistic significance, though he has been claimed as a river-god, as a god of light, and even as a moon-god; for us, he is merely the chief of the heroic figures of Greek myth who were deified by later generations as transcending the normal powers of humanity. Nevertheless, there are certain prominent features in his worship which claim recognition.

He appears most conspicuously as a sea-god, whose temple was placed on promontories or navigable coasts, and whose help as a pilot would secure a safe anchorage, or, in time of stress, would assuage the violence of the storm. The contrary winds, with which his spirit visited the Greeks after the capture of Troy, ceased when Polyxena had been sacrificed (Eur. *Hec.* 109, 1267). In this capacity his name was perpetuated, and honours were paid to him at harbours, as at Tainaron and Skyros. The popularity of his worship amongst the Greek settlers in Asia Minor accords with this; at Miletus a spring was called by his name, and in his temple at Sigeum in the Troad offerings were made to him as a hero. But the most significant testimony to the high estimation in which he was held is the extension of his cult to the shores of the Euxine, where he was honoured as Pontarches (*CIG* ii. p. 87 n. 2076). To this neighbourhood it seems to have been carried by the earliest Greek navigators in their adventurous voyages of discovery. His chief temple in this region was situated at Olbia on the mouth of the Hypanis, where a college of priests was devoted to his service (Dio Chrys. xxxvi. 80 ff.); facing the narrowest part of the Cimmerian Bosporus a village settlement had grown up round another of his precincts (Strabo, xi. p. 494). The most interesting and celebrated of his local cults was connected with the lonely shrine in the uninhabited island of Leuke (or Achilles Island, sometimes confused with Ἀχίλλειος δρόμος, which Strabo places at the mouth of the Borysthenes), opposite to the mouth of the Danube (Eur. *Andr.* 1260; Pind. *Nem.* iv. 48). Here the only ministrants were the sea-birds, and though navigators, for whom the temple served as a beacon, might land to sacrifice, they were obliged to leave at sunset. Here also Helen and Achilles were believed to consort together; for sounds of high revelry and the noise of armed men were heard by night, proceeding from the sanctuary, and filling with awe and amazement those who had been rash enough to anchor near (Philostr. *Her.* xx. 32–40).

In another aspect, Achilles was recognized as a god of healing (Gruppe, see below). This is inferred from the association of his worship with that of Asklepios, from the healing properties of his spear, from his connexion with healing-goddesses such as Medea and Iphigenia, from his detection of the magician and thief Pharmakos, and from his victory over the Amazons. There are also distinct traces of his beneficent power in cases of ceremonial purification: the clearest is to be found in the story of Poimandros, who successfully obtained his help

when suffering from the pollution of accidental homicide (Plut. *Quæst. Gr.* 37, p. 299 C–E).

LITERATURE.—Artt. by C. Fleischer in Roscher, and by J. Escher in Pauly-Wissowa; O. Gruppe, *Griech. Mythol. u. Religionsgesch.* (1897) § 223, pp. 616–618; J. B. Bury in *CR* xiii. (1899) p. 307. A. C. PEARSON.

ACOSMISM (Gr. *a* privative, and *κόσμος*, 'the universe,' in the sense of an ordered or arranged whole).—This term belongs primarily to the field of Ontology, *i.e.* the theory of the ultimate nature of Being and Reality; but it has ethical bearings also. Allowing for several possible differences of theoretical interpretation, the doctrine of Acosmism implies that the universe, as known to human experience, possesses no reality in itself, but is dependent upon, or is a manifestation of, an underlying real being. In a word, the universe must be viewed as a semblance. In the history of modern thought the classical example of the doctrine may be described as the metaphysical parallel to Hume's psychological scepticism. For Hume, *Cogito, ergo videor esse.* And just as he thus fixes illusion upon the experience of the individual man, so the acosmist holds the universe as a whole to be illusory. This conclusion, while defensible, as in Spinoza's case, from the standpoint of the historical and speculative conditions of the time, may be controverted on the strictly theoretical side. For it is obvious that the reality constituting the substratum of the universe must be regarded as *the* real; it is no less obvious, however, that the only reality attributable to it must be derived, as concerns human experience, from the universe already declared to be illusory. For example, Spinoza's Absolute Substance—the reality underlying the universe—is known to man in the two 'attributes' Thought and Extension. These in turn differentiate themselves into 'modes,' each mode of Thought being the correspondent of a mode of Extension. God is, therefore, at once the 'Thing' which thinks and the 'Thing' which is extended. Hence (as the conditions of his age prevented him from seeing fully) any attribute of God, whether known to man or not, is a *method* of perceiving substance. 'By attribute I understand what intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence' (cf. *Ethics*, ii. 21, Schol.). Between this conclusion and Hegelian idealism there may be, doubtless, a distinction, but without fundamental difference. And the reason lies open. Only from human experience can Spinoza, or any one, derive reality and meaning to inject into the so-called substratum or 'Unknowable.' In other words, either the reality underlying the cosmos is nothing, or it achieves reality just to the extent to which it may be viewed as an effective component of human experience.

One need not do more than indicate the importance of this as bearing upon theological problems, especially those raised by the religions of India; or upon ethical questions, particularly those connected with Quietism (wh. see).

The *feeling* of the overwhelming nature of the Ultimate Being tends naturally to Acosmism; so, too, does undue emphasis upon the transcendence of Deity. In both cases, however, the conclusion follows usually from a more or less vague ethical attitude, rather than from metaphysical analysis and logical argument.

LITERATURE.—G. B. Jäsche, *Der Pantheismus nach seinen verschiedenen Hauptformen* (1826–32), vol. iii.; Dorner, *Syst. of Chr. Doct.* (Eng. tr.) vol. i. 340 f., vol. ii. 247 f.; F. Paulsen, *Einleitung in d. Philosophie*, 239 f.; F. C. S. Schiller, *Riddles of the Sphinx*, ch. x.; A. E. Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, 101 f.; Hegel, *Encyclopædia*, § 50 ('Logic of Hegel,' tr. W. Wallace, 102 f., 2nd ed. 1894); H. L. Mansel, *Prolegomena Logica*[2] (1860), 298; J. Martineau, *Essays* (1890), vol. ii. 223; R. A. Duff, *Spinoza's Political and Ethical Philosophy* (1903), ch. v.; R. Flint, *Anti-Theistic Theories* (1879), 409 f.; G. H. Lewes, *Hist. of Philosophy*, vol. ii. 176 (ed. of 1867); the *Histories of Modern Philosophy* (under 'Spinoza') of J. E. Erdmann (Eng. tr.), Kuno Fischer (German only), W. Windelband (Eng. tr.), H. Höffding (Eng. tr.); *Mind* (O. S.), vol. iii. 203 f., *ib.* (N. S.) vol. v. 151 f.; P. Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads* (Eng. tr. 1906), 38–50, 226 f. See PANTHEISM.

R. M. WENLEY.

ACOSTA.—Uriel (or, as he was originally named, Gabriel) da Costa is an interesting but overrated personality. Interest in his career is due mainly to the similarity between his life and that of another Amsterdam Jew of the same period—Spinoza. It may even be said that the harsh treatment which the latter received from the Jewish community was the result of the vagaries of Acosta; but there was no real parallel between the two men. Acosta did not possess the strength or originality of character which enables a religious thinker to stand alone, yet he was gifted with enough independence to render it impossible for him to submit to the restraint of authority. Acosta was born about 1590 at Oporto, of a Marano family, *i.e.* a family of Jewish origin forced to conform to Roman Catholicism. Carefully educated in the new faith, he had every prospect of advancement; but, as he tells us, his studies of the OT left him dissatisfied with Catholicism. Determined to resume Judaism, Acosta with other members of his family contrived to escape to Amsterdam in 1617. Here he lived openly as a Jew; but, as was to be expected, he found Judaism less ideally perfect than he had dreamed. He soon came into conflict with the Synagogue as he had done with the Church, was excommunicated, recanted, again defied the authorities, was again excommunicated, and finally submitted to a public and degrading penance in the Synagogue, shortly after which he shot himself. This was probably in 1647; Spinoza was a boy of fifteen at the time.

Gutzkow, author of the well-known drama on the subject, represents Uriel Acosta as a youth at the time of his suicide: he was certainly over 50; and if the dates given above be correct (as is most probable), he was nearer 60. Thus we are not dealing with a persecuted youth, but with a man of advanced years, who deserves sympathy rather for what he was than for what he endured. His brief autobiography, written just before his death, is indeed a pathetic document. He called it *Exemplar humanæ vitæ*; it was published in Latin by Philip Limborch on pp. 346–354 of his *de Veritate Religionis Christianæ* (Gouda, 1687, since reprinted), and in a German translation by H. Jellinek in *Acostas Leben und Lehre* (Zerbst, 1874). In this autobiography he tells us most of what we know of his career. He abjures both Christianity and Judaism, expressing himself with peculiar bitterness against the latter, whose teachers he repeatedly terms Pharisees. The only authority that he admits is the 'lex naturæ,' thus placing himself among the Deists. Nature, he says, teaches all human virtue and fraternity, while revealed religion produces strife. He speaks sympathetically of Jesus. Strangely enough, he finds all necessary rules for conduct in the Noachian laws formulated by the Talmudists: these were seven in number; and though the details differ in different Rabbinic sources, they include belief in God, the avoidance of adultery, murder, and robbery. These Acosta considers to be 'laws of nature.'

As a contributor to religious thought, Acosta was not original. But he belongs to the direct line of rationalists who were subsequently to attain to so much significance in religious history. He lived in an age when tolerance was little understood even in free Amsterdam, and though his troubles were mainly self-inflicted, he must always enjoy the sympathy of those who condemn the attempt of public authority to regulate belief and compel conformity. As a champion of freedom,

Acosta must be honoured, but his championship was fantastic rather than robust.

LITERATURE.—Whiston, *The Remarkable Life of Uriel Acosta, an Eminent Freethinker* (1740); *Uriel Acosta's Selbstbiographie* (1847); I. da Costa, *Israel en de Volke* (1849); H. Jellinek, *Acosta's Leben und Lehre* (1874); F. de Sola Mendes in *JE* i. 167 (1901). I. ABRAHAMS.

ACROSTIC.—An *acrostic(h)* is etymologically an extremity of a line or verse, lit. 'row' (στίχος). *Apost. Const.* ii. 57 prescribes an antiphonal chanting of psalms in which a single voice begins the verses, and the congregation sing *the acrostics* (τὰ ἀκροστίχια). Epiphanius (*Migne*, xlii. 365) calls the numeral *iota* the 'acrostic' (ἀκροστιχίς) of the name Jesus. But an acrostic is usually a poem in which the initials of lines or sections spell a word or words or an alphabet. An abecedary acrostic is sometimes called simply an alphabet.

1. Bickell and others find fifteen complete alphabets or remains of them in the Heb. OT and Sirach, viz. in the following Psalms or chapters: (1–8) Pss 9–10. 25. 34. 37. 111. 112. 119. 145; (9) Pr 31; (10–13) La 1. 2. 3. 4; (14) Nah 1–2; (15) Sir 51.*

(1) Pss 9–10 (LXX 9).—Remains of an alphabet spelt by the first letters of alternate verses (Ps $9^{2.4.6}$ . . . 10 . . . $^{14.15.17}$). With פיהו and עיניו from $10^{7.8}$ as initial words we should have פ before ע, as in other cases noted below. The order מסעצ brings somewhat similar letters together.

(2) Ps 25.—An alphabet *minus* ק, with a letter from each verse, except that the ו is included in the ה verse. To restore the ק, begin v.^{18} with 'Arise' (Ps 10^{12}). An appended פדה כל makes up the number of the verses to the alphabetic twenty-two. 'Carmina *alphabetizantia*,' like Ps 33, La 5, etc., are such as have that number of verses or sections, but are not alphabets (Bickell).

(3) Ps 34.—An alphabet like (2), the added verse beginning פודה. EV and LXX have in v.^{18} '*The righteous* cry (*or* cried),' for Heb. צעקו. But with ם before ע (vv.$^{17.16}$) there would be no need to repeat 'The righteous.'

(4) Ps 37.—An alphabet *minus* ע, formed like (1). To complete it, read in v.^{28} לעולם (עולים) נשמרו with *daleth* for *resh*, the word in brackets for LXX A ἄνομοι. In v.^{30} ותשוחח *minus* ו gives the ת.

(5. 6) Pss 111. 112.—Alphabets with their letters from the halves of the verses, of which three at the end are numbered as two (9.10).

(7) Ps 119.—Known as א"ב רבתא, 'the great alphabet' (Buxtorf, *Lex. s.* √ אלף). Eight verses begin with *aleph*, eight with *beth*, and so on. The names of the letters are given in the English Bible, but not in the LXX. Note, however, that the Psalm is missing in B; and see the variants from the Psalters R and T (Swete).

(8) Ps 145.—An alphabet *minus* נ, with a letter from each verse, one beginning נאמן יהוה (LXX πιστὸς K.) having fallen out before סומך יהוה כל (v.^{14}).

(9) Pr 31^{10-31}.—An alphabet with a letter from each verse; but in LXX B the ם verse precedes the ע verse.

(10) La 1.—An alphabet like (9), with the letters in the usual order. The LXX gives their names, some of them in B in strange forms. With Ταδή for צ cf. Aquila's Greek for 'Sion' in Ps $102^{17.22}$ (*Cairo Geniz. Palimpsests*, p. 81).

(11. 12. 13) La 2^{1-22} 3^{1-66} 4^{1-22}.—Three alphabets, of which every verse gives a letter, that in (12) being of the form AAA, BBB, etc. Heb. ם before ע; but in the LXX, which here also names the letters, B gives Ἀιν and Φή wrongly as titles of the *pe* and *ayin* verses.

(14) Nah 1*f.*—On the supposed traces here of an alphabet arranged 'exquisito artificio,' see Bickell's *Carm. V.T.*, and art. 'Nahum' in Hastings' *DB* and in *EBi*.

(15) Sir 51^{13-29}.—From the Versions, before the discovery of the Cairene Hebrew, Bickell saw that Ben Sira's poem on Wisdom was an alphabet, but he did not satisfactorily determine all the letters. In the LXX B (ed. Swete) supplies materials for the beginnings of all but the *yod* verse in their right order. In v.^{18} begin ומסתי (διενοήθην); in v.^{19} מפחתי (ἐξενέτασα); and supply the *yod* line from the Hebrew. The other letters may then be found without difficulty. Comparing (2) and (3), Bickell retranslated v.^{30} as an added *pe* line, but in the Heb. it begins rightly or wrongly with *mem*.

2. Evidently the alphabeticism of a composition is not without critical importance: it enables us in places to detect and emend errors, or to supply deficiencies. Sometimes at least it connotes completeness, as in Pr 31^{10-31}, where the praises of the virtuous woman exhaust the alphabet. In the NT compare 'I am the ALPHA and the O.'

3. Alphabets and other acrostics are found in Jewish Prayer Books and secular writings. Famous names were shortened acrostically, as in RaMBaM for Rabbi Moses Maimonides (ben Maim.). A name given by acrostic verses may settle a question of authorship, as in the case of R. Jacob Ben Shimshon's commentary on *Aboth*, often found ascribed to a better known writer. The mistake may have arisen partly from his name having been written ר"י for *Rabbi Jacob Shimshoni*, and then read רש"י *Rashi*.

4. Syriac acrostics abound in Service Books and other early writings. Aphraates prefixed the letters of the alphabet to his twenty-two *Homilies*. Ephraim wrote alphabetic hymns, two of which may be seen transliterated at the end of Bickell's *Carm. V.T.*

5. That acrostics were used in oracles is thought to be indicated by their occurrence in the pretended oracles of the Sibyl. These make the name Ἀδάμ an acrostic of east, west, north, south in the line Ἀντολίην τε Δύσιν τε Μεσημβρίην τε καὶ Ἄρκτον (iii. 26, viii. 321; cf. ii. 195, xi. 3). Romulus and Remus are alluded to by the word ἑκατόν (xi. 114), the Greek R standing for *a hundred*. The initials of the lines viii. 217–250 give the Greek for 'Jesus Christ God's Son Saviour Cross,' whence, without *Cross*, as an acrostic of an acrostic, comes ΙΧΘΥΣ, 'fish,' a mystic name of Christ (Aug. *Civ. Dei*, xviii. 23).

6. Otfried's metrical rendering of a form of the *Diatessaron* into Old High German (9th cent.) is preceded by the acrostics, 'Ludovico (Luthovvico) Orientalium Regnorum Regi sit Salus æterna,' 'Salomoni Episcopo *Otfridus*,' and followed by a longer one to the effect, '*Otfr. W.* monachus H. et W. Sancti Galli monast. monachis.' Thus again acrostics testify to authorship.

7. Professor H. A. Giles, of Cambridge, informs the writer that 'the Chinese have several forms of the acrostic. The simplest is that in which the hidden sentence is revealed by taking the first word in each line of a short poem. This form is often still further elaborated by using, not the actual words required to make sense, but homophones of a more or less misleading character; Anglicé, "*Boughs* are made," etc., where *Bows* is required for the sense. Other kinds of acrostic are produced by the dissection of words, to which the Chinese script readily lends itself, much as we form charades.'

LITERATURE.—Gustav Bickell, *Carmina Vet. Test. Metrice* (1882), and art. 'Ein alphabetisches Lied Jesus Sirachs' (1882) in *ZKT*; art. 'Acrostic' in Oxford *New Eng. Dict.*; I. Abrahams, art. 'Acrostics' in *JE*; Lagarde, *Symmicta*, i. 107 (1877); Bingham, *Works*, Bk. xiv. i. 12 (vol. v. 17, Oxford, 1855); Driver, *LOT*, ch. vii.; Karl Krumbacher, *Gesch. der Byzant. Litteratur*, § 287 (1897), and Index, *s.vv.* 'Akrostichis,' 'Alphabete'; *Orac. Sibyll.* ed. Rzach (1891), Geffcken (1902); *JPh*, No. lix. art. 'The Alphabet of Ben Sira' (1906); Appendix (1900) to C. Taylor's *Sayings of the Jewish Fathers*, p. 93 f.; *Otfrids von Weissenburg Evangelienbuch*, ed. Johann Kelle, vol. i. (1856), see, after the Introduction, pp. 3 f., 12 f., 389–394; Wilhelm Braune, *Althochdeutsches Lesebuch*[4] (1897), pp. 40 f., 82–88, 167, 176 f. C. TAYLOR.

ACT, ACTION.—The English word 'action' is used very widely. We speak of the 'action' of one body upon another as readily as of a man's action, and we have no word like the Greek πρᾶξις or the German *Handlung*, *das Handeln*, to designate human agency as such, both in general and in the particular instance. In the word 'conduct' we have a general term for human action as such, when we speak of it in a more or less comprehensive way, but in speaking of the particular instance

* Some find the names *Pedahel*, *Pedaiah*, *Simon* in Pss 25^{22} 34^{23} 110^{1-4}. *Pesikt. Rab.* detects *Moses* in Ps 92^{1}, and so from Ps. 96^{11} we may spell out יהוה יהו. The Midrash knows also of Greek ἀλφαβητάρια.

we must have recourse to the words 'act' and 'action.' Hence, when we wish to designate the agency of man in its peculiar character, we must prefix the epithet. The peculiar character of human action, as the phrase is ordinarily used to mark the distinction from any sort of physical action, is that the former is an expression of consciousness. But in making this broad distinction we must notice, first, that it applies equally to all animal action as distinguished from physical and merely physiological action; and, second, in the discussion of human action the phrase is often used more widely to include unconscious actions exhibited by the human organism. The fact is, of course, that the human organism exhibits all grades of action, physical, animal, and human in the strictest sense. The only physical actions of the organism, however, which concern us in relation to our study of conscious actions, are those which are like the latter in depending directly upon the nervous system, but unlike them in not expressing consciousness, whether in the form of feeling or purpose. Of such actions of the nervous system, not expressive of consciousness, two grades are distinguished: the simple Reflex action, and the more complex Instinctive action in which a number of movements are co-ordinated in the production of a single result—though it should be observed that the range of true instincts is very limited in the case of man. When we say that these actions are not expressive of consciousness, we do not necessarily imply that they have no conscious accompaniments, but only that the nature of the action is not determined by these conscious accompaniments even when present. The reflex action of sneezing is not determined by the sensations which accompany it. And similarly, though an instinctive action may be accompanied by sensation and feeling, the purposive character which it displays is not due to conscious forethought.

Of human actions, in the stricter sense, which are expressive of consciousness—or which, to use the technical term of psychology, are 'conations'—the most obvious type is the purposed action, in which the performance of the action is preceded by an idea of the thing to be done. But it is evident that such purposed action cannot be psychologically primitive, since those ideas or images of movements to be executed, which are implied in purposed action, could have been formed only after previous experience of the same movements brought about in some other way. Consequently, either we must fall back upon reflex actions for a beginning, or we must hold that, in the most primitive phase of conation, a change of sense-perception, or the feeling which accompanies it, finds immediate expression in movement. To the former course, which is apt to be favoured by physiologists, there is the objection that reflexes, even though they may be primitive for the individual in the sense of being inherited nervous arrangements, must have been developed at some time in the experience of the race. In our present experience of the formation of a habit, we can trace the degradation of conative action into action that resembles the reflex type. And unless we are prepared to assume that our inherited reflexes were originally formed by some similar process of degradation, the beginnings of action are left psychologically inexplicable. From the psychological point of view, then, we must prefer the other course, and regard as the original type of action that in which a change of sense-perception or feeling finds immediate expression in movement (cf. Ward's art. 'Psychology' in *EBr*, vol. xx. pp. 42–43). And this view will appear all the more plausible if we remember two points. First, such 'impulsive' action, as we call it—the terminology of the subject is very confused—although as a rule definite enough in the adult (*e.g.* in warding off a blow), is to be conceived as having been originally vague, diffused, and uncertain, as the movements of an infant are in comparison with those of an adult. Second, it is now recognized, and has been shown experimentally, that all mental states have this impulsive quality, this tendency to affect movement, although in our present experience these motor effects are to a great extent either quite inappreciable or else inhibited (cf. James, *Principles of Psychology* [1890], ii. ch. xxiii.). And the difficulty of a psychological theory of action is thus greatly diminished when we see that action does not begin with particular and isolated definite movements, but that these, whether they be inherited reflexes or acquired impulses, must have been developed by the progressive restriction or specialization of movement that was originally more diffused.

Although it is with purposed rather than impulsive action that the moralist is mainly concerned, it seems a mistake to confine the epithet 'voluntary' to the former, and the practice of those psychologists is rather to be followed who tend to apply the epithet widely to all action that is expressive of consciousness. There are, of course, objections to such a usage. We use the noun 'will' in a much narrower sense. And the term 'voluntary' no doubt seems paradoxical as applied to the simpler expressive movements which are hardly to be distinguished from mechanical reactions. But we have to remember that the impulsive actions of the adult are usually of a higher type. The hasty words of an angry man may burst from him without any previous distinct idea of what he is going to say, and yet there accompanies his utterance a consciousness of its meaning, in virtue of which we hold him responsible for what he has said. The more definite and significant an impulse is, the more it must be regarded as an expression of character. One man will say things in anger which would be impossible to another however enraged. And the very fact that he permits himself to go on, that he is not brought to a halt by the consciousness of what he is saying, shows a basis for the impulse in the man's general character which forbids us to regard the outburst, however devoid of previous purpose, as simply involuntary. What we must rather say, then, is that all impulsive action is also in a broad sense voluntary action, but that voluntariness has many degrees, and that, the lower down we go in the scale, the less possible it becomes to distinguish voluntary from involuntary action in character.

Before proceeding to the consideration of purposed action, we may refer very briefly to a general conception of human action, which, if true, would profoundly modify the significance to be attached to the element of conscious foresight in man's life. It is a conception which is apt to find a ready acceptance with those who look upon human conduct from the point of view of biological evolution, or, again, from the point of view, not very dissimilar, of a philosophy like Schopenhauer's or v. Hartmann's, which sees in blind will the ultimate principle of all existence. Human action, it is sometimes argued, is not really determined by the transient desires, the petty motives and calculations of interest, of which an introspective psychology makes so much. All this constant fluctuation and transition from one object of desire to another is only so much surface play. The true forces lie far deeper, in the strong instinctive tendencies of man's nature. It is these that have the real shaping of his life, these that use for their own hidden ends all the superficial activity of

desire and feeling and calculating intellect, to which the reflexion of the individual naturally but mistakenly attributes the direction of his life. Now, such a conception of human life may have an appearance of profundity, but it conveys no real insight. It does not aid, on the contrary it obstructs, the work of scientific analysis and explanation. To appeal to instinctive tendencies is only to involve ourselves in empty mystery, unless we can definitely characterize these tendencies, and show how they operate, and why they manifest themselves in just such ways as they do. Yet for such concrete analysis we must, of course, return to the very surface processes of consciousness which we had affected to despise, and must seek in their definite modes of interconnexion, and not in the vague and mysterious depths of instinctive tendencies, the definite explanation of the course of human life.

When these two conditions are fulfilled, first, that definite movements have begun to emerge from the earlier stage of diffused movement—an emergence which may be greatly facilitated by the existence of inherited nervous co-ordinations; and, second, that images have begun to be formed, then the higher stage of purposed action becomes possible, in which the idea or image of a movement to be executed precedes and directs its actual execution. The idea of movement may be prompted by a present object (with whose attainment or avoidance the movement must, of course, have been already associated), and, as so prompting, the object is an object of desire or aversion. But the range and significance of desire are vastly widened when not merely present objects, but objects that are themselves represented only in idea or imagination, are sufficient to prompt ideas of movement. For the agent is thereby delivered from his former bondage to the immediate present, and is enabled both to modify his present situation by the aid of ideas derived from his past experience, and to anticipate the future by present preparation. With the development of such desire-prompted action there is bound to emerge the situation described as a conflict of desires, with its need for a voluntary decision between them. This decision has often been represented by psychologists and moralists of the Associationist school as brought about in a *quasi*-mechanical way: it is the strongest desire that prevails, and the conflict is simply a conflict of opposed intensities. Now it is true that, as in the case of impulse, so here, if we take desires of a very simple kind, the epithet 'voluntary' seems hardly to mark any essential peculiarity of the process so described. The voluntary decision between two desires of a very simple kind, depending as it does merely on their relative strength, seems hardly to be distinguished in character (save for the fact that the process goes on in consciousness) from the mechanical result of a conflict between two forces. But here, too, we must remember that the simplest type of choice, say the choice of a child between an apple and an orange, is not really representative of the more important choices which the adult has constantly to make. And it is just in proportion as the 'conflicting' desires are not simple or low-grade, but complex and significant, that the choice becomes an expression of character, and becomes therefore in a fuller degree voluntary. Now, the more complex and significant the desires are, the less is it possible to picture their 'conflict' as a mere collision between two forces of different intensities. The man who has to decide whether he will continue in his present accustomed vocation or accept a new career that has opened out for him, is not simply distracted between a love of ease and a love of gain. He is deciding ultimately between two complex schemes of life, and to represent such a decision in terms of a simple quantitative difference would be a caricature. The factors which do admit of quantitative measurement in money value may even be the least influential of all.

It is evident, of course, that in an example like this we have gone far beyond the range of the desires that merely reproduce past experience in imagery. We are at a level at which conceptual thinking has long been at work upon the materials which memory supplies, a level at which the agent habitually thinks in terms of generalized purposes, to which he refers, and by which he guides, his particular actions. The desires of the adult are nearly always more or less significant. That is to say, the desired object is desired not merely for its own sake, but because it fits in with some wider purpose. And the more intelligent and thoughtful the agent is, the more his desires and purposes will be organized in this way, and rendered subservient to the scheme or type of life in which he sees the completest realization of his powers.

We must indicate the psychological processes involved in this higher development of conation and action. One practical relation that must soon be forced upon the attention of an agent trying to bring about an ideally represented state of things, is that of means and end. With the fuller recognition of this relationship among objects comes the process of deliberation, in which the agent seeks to discover the means of attaining an end, or to determine which of two or more ways of attaining it is the best. In Aristotle's classical analysis of the deliberative process (*Nic. Ethics*, III. iii), choice is expressly characterized as choice of the means. Such a view of choice will not, however, apply to all cases without straining. For, although in every choice between two objects or courses of action some end or criterion is implicitly assumed, there is an obvious difference between the case in which the end or criterion is explicit from the start of the deliberative process, and the case in which it emerges only as a balance of advantage at the end. And we must further recognize the possibility, of which Aristotle takes no account, that even where we start with a certain end explicitly before us, our deliberation may, by bringing out other elements of significance in our end which we had not before fully appreciated, cause us to modify or abandon it altogether. In short, the more important the matter for decision is, the more does the choice tend to express, not an isolated desire for a particular end, but the whole character of the agent, or, what is the same thing, his ultimate and all-inclusive desire for the kind of life which is to him best. And the more strenuously a man lives, the more will the unity of his character tend to work itself out in even the simpler actions of his daily life.

It is for choices of a more or less deliberate kind that the term 'will' is often reserved in psychological and ethical discussions. But we must not suppose that the new term denotes a new faculty or energy of mind. The expression 'fiat of will' often used in this connexion is very misleading. The man who seriously sets himself to deliberate must mean to come to a decision. He starts, that is to say, with some sort of decision already vaguely outlined in the shape of possible alternatives, and the only function of deliberation is to eliminate what is doubtful and make the proper course of action clear. This being done, nothing more is needed: if the man was impatient to act, the obstacles in his way have now been removed, and he will act at once. The general purpose of acting was present all through, and by means of the deliberative process this general purpose takes shape in a definite volition. A fiat of will, additional

and subsequent to the phase of conation in which the deliberative process was complete, would be otiose if it merely gave its consent, and wholly arbitrary if it withheld it. For, if any reason remained for withholding consent, the deliberation could not have been complete, and it is only a sense of such incompleteness that could make the agent hesitate and hold himself back from action. Thus, if we are to give this notion of a fiat of will any meaning at all, we must regard it as merely emphasizing the last or finally decisive element in the deliberative process itself, the thought that clinches the slowly forming decision and issues at once in action.

In our consideration of the development of conation in the individual, we have so far been abstracting from those aspects of the individual's action which depend upon the essentially social character of human life. In point of fact, however, the actions of the individual for the most part do either explicitly contain or not remotely imply a reference to other persons, and to their agency in relation to himself as well as to his own agency in relation to them. And this social factor in individual action manifests itself not merely in the social content of the action, but in the definite control which social influences exert over the will of the agent. The child is no sooner able to understand a particular prohibition or command, than he begins to experience this social control, which in varying forms is to continue all through his life. At first it comes to him from without as a constraint upon his desires, but more and more it tends to become an internal factor in his own will and character, and so not more society's law than that of his own nature. At first it comes to him in the form of particular injunctions to refrain from particular objects or to do particular acts, and his obedience is an obedience given merely to particular persons, but more and more it tends to take the generalized and impersonal form of rules of action to be obeyed merely as such. These rules become concrete, of course, only in the personal claims and expectations which they warrant, but their control reaches out beyond every particular case, and pervades the whole practical thinking of the individual. Hence the important consequence that action constantly expresses, not a consideration of means and ends at all, but a simple obedience to rule, and that, even where it does express a consideration of means and ends, this consideration itself is controlled through and through by the habitual regard which we pay to social rules in all our practical thinking.

To complete our sketch, we may ask as a final question, how far we can bring the whole development of conation and action under a single formula. Various attempts have been made to find an explanatory formula applicable to action at all stages. Many psychologists and moralists have sought such a formula in the connexion of action with feeling, *i.e.* with pleasure and pain. This connexion has been asserted in two forms which it is important to distinguish clearly from each other. On the one hand, it may be held that feeling is the efficient cause of action. This doctrine is applied over the whole range of human action, and means that between various impulses, desires, or aims, that one will always tend to be realized which gives the greatest present pleasure or relieves the greatest present uneasiness. And we must, of course, observe that present pleasure or uneasiness may be caused not merely by present events and objects, but also by the mere images or thoughts of distant events and possibilities. On the other hand, it may be held that feeling is the end or final cause of action. This doctrine (technically known as Psychological Hedonism) is obviously narrower in range, since it applies only to purposed and not to impulsive action. It means that of various possible courses of action represented before the mind, that one will always be chosen which promises most future pleasure or least future pain, pleasure being thus regarded as the only real object of desire. This doctrine is now almost universally abandoned in psychology and ethics. For it is quite evident that there is a great deal of purposed action, at all levels of conduct, which is not determined by calculations of future pleasure and pain at all. The hungry man seeks food not for the pleasure of eating, but for the mere satisfaction of his hunger. The honest man desires to pay his just debts not for the pleasure of having been honest, but merely because he is honest and wants to remain so. The other form of doctrine, according to which we do what continues present pleasure or relieves present uneasiness, is more plausible (cf. the change of view in the chapter on 'The Idea of Power' in Locke's *Essay*, Fraser's ed. vol. i. p. 332). Nevertheless it is open to objection on grounds both of fact and of principle. The objections of fact are: (1) that action often goes on for a considerable stretch in a practically neutral state of feeling, (2) that we may persist in painful actions in spite of their painfulness. Now we may, of course, to save our theory, attribute this persistence to the greater uneasiness experienced on stopping. But such uneasiness would seem itself to imply a direct interest of corresponding strength in the object of our action, and it is surely simpler, therefore, to refer the persistence to this interest directly. Moreover, as a matter of principle, it seems impossible to explain in terms of merely quantitative variations of feeling the definite forms which action takes. What we have to explain is not simply varying degrees of one fundamental type of action, but many actions of widely different types, and the particularity of the action can be explained only by the particularity of the interest which it expresses. There is thus a good deal to be said for a view which seems to be finding increasing favour with recent psychologists (*e.g.* Stout, *Analytic Psychology* (1896), i. 224 ff.; Titchener, *Outline of Psychology*[3] (1898), § 38), viz., that pleasure and pain, agreeableness and uneasiness, are not so much factors in the causation of activity as the feeling-tone which accompanies and reflects its varying fortunes.

Another well-known formula for purposed action affirms that in all choice the object or course of action chosen is conceived as realizing what is there and then the agent's good (so, *e.g.*, Green in his *Prolegomena to Ethics*). The same meaning is negatively expressed in the Socratic maxim, that no one willingly chooses what is evil; and this famous paradox, when rightly interpreted, only says what cannot well be denied, that a man's actions, not his professions, are the test and index of his real convictions. The formula, as it stands, however, is not sufficiently comprehensive, for many actions are done without any *explicit* reference to the agent's personal good at all, *e.g.* assistance given to a person in distress from the mere pity felt on seeing it.

The defect of such formulæ is apt to be that they are framed with a too exclusive regard for special types of action. If we want a formula which applies to all human action, we must fall back on the more generalized conception used above, and say that all human action is as such expressive of consciousness, and that in proportion as the immediate consciousness expressed, be it impulse, desire, or general aim, is intelligent and significant, in the same proportion is the action voluntary and expressive of character.

LITERATURE.—In the text-books of psychology the various phases of conation or action are apt to be treated in detached

sections. For a comprehensive and continuous account, see Sully, *Human Mind* (1892), vol. ii. H. BARKER.

ACTION SERMON.—The designation given by Presbyterians in Scotland, and where Scottish communities exist, to the sermon which immediately precedes the celebration of the Lord's Supper.* The name is derived directly from John Knox's *Book of Common Order*† and from the Westminster *Directory for the Public Worship of God*.‡ In both these works the celebration of the Holy Communion is described as 'the Action.' The use of the phrase in the earlier document may be traced partly (1) to the Liturgy of Calvin, which was largely the basis of the *Book of Common Order*, and in which the section entitled 'Mode of celebrating the Lord's Supper' contains this rubric: 'The ministers distribute the bread and the cup to the people . . . finally, *on use d'action de grâce*';§ (2) to the pre-Reformation use of the word *actio* to denote what was regarded as the essential part of the Eucharist, the Sacrifice of the Mass, wherein 'Sacramenta conficiuntur Dominica.'‖ Knox, of course, and those who followed him, while retaining the word 'Action,' used it with a different signification, applying it to the celebration as a whole, or to the sanctification and distribution of the sacred symbols, without reference to any 'sacrifice.' While Calvin's 'action de grâce' was probably the chief cause (although indirectly) of the term 'Action Sermon' being *introduced* in Scotland, the long and popular *retention* of this term is due, doubtless, to the broader application of the word 'action' to the entire sacramental celebration; for the designation 'Eucharist' (Thanksgiving) has never been widespread among Scottish Presbyterians.

The employment of the phrase 'Action Sermon,' while still frequent, has within living memory declined, owing (1) to the somewhat diminished *relative* importance now attached to the pre-Communion sermon, as compared with the devotional parts of the pre-Communion service; (2) to the prevalence in towns of additional Communion services (in the afternoon and evening), which are not immediately preceded by any sermon.

LITERATURE (in addition to works quoted).—**Du Cange, *Glossarium*; Jamieson, *Scottish Dictionary*, *s.v.***

HENRY COWAN.

ACTIVITY (Psychological and Ethical).—No definition can be given of Activity which does not involve the term itself in some concealed or overt form; we can only (1) indicate the wider class of things or events to which it belongs; (2) describe the general conditions of its genesis or occurrence, and the general nature of its expressions or consequences; (3) distinguish one form of activity from another, as bodily from mental; and (4) describe the conditions of our knowledge of that form with which we are concerned.

1. (*a*) Activity belongs, within the world of existence, to the class not of things and qualities, or substances and attributes, but of events, processes, or changes: an activity has a beginning and an end; it occurs in time, it has prior conditions and subsequent consequences, and does not occur independently; a pure activity, in the sense of one which expresses itself without conditions and is not subject to time, is therefore a contradiction in terms. On the other hand, a process is always relative to a thing or things, a substance or substances, *in* or *to* which it takes place; all change implies something relatively permanent, as Kant pointed out, as a condition not only of its being known, but also of its existence. The activity of a fragment of radium must be referred either to the visible substance itself, or to the physical atoms (however conceived) the interaction of which gives rise to the observed effects. These, in the last resort, are the permanent entities in which the activity inheres. The activity does not occur, however, except under conditions, viz. the presence of other similar or opposite particles, or the like. So mental activity, being a process, is inherent in a substance,—either in the organism as a whole, the union of mind and body, or in the soul or mind as a reality independent (relatively at least) of the body. But neither thinking, nor willing, nor attending, nor any other form of mental activity, occurs without conditions which call it forth, and to which its expression is subject; and these conditions may be either mental or bodily, or both. Activity is not merely a more general 'faculty' in which the other faculties—sensation, memory, imagination, and the rest—are contained (Stout, *Manual of Psychology*, bk. i. ch. 3). The only faculty which really exists in the psychical world is the soul itself, or the individual, as a complex resultant of congenital dispositions and consolidated experiences. On the other hand, processes may be more or less complex, and the problem of mental activity involves the question (5) whether there is any ultimate or fundamental or simple form of activity to which the others may be reduced.

(*b*) What distinguishes an activity from any other kind of process or change? In actual practice we apply the term (i.) to persistent or repeated process; (ii.) to a process of which the conditions are wholly or partially *within* the subject of the activity; (iii.) to a process which is transmitted from the active being to others.

(i.) The term may be applied to light, heat, gases, etc., because their action, under given conditions, is continuous; they represent not stores which can at any time be tapped, but supplies which are always running; special conditions only increase or decrease the available flow. In the same way, mental activity is, during waking life, a process which is always going on; it may take different forms and different expressions, but whatever description we apply to it must apply to every phase of waking consciousness. According to some, mental activity is continuous not only during wakefulness, but during life. Sir Arthur Mitchell (*Dreaming, Laughing, and Blushing*, 1905, p. 44, etc.), for example, is of opinion that there 'is no such thing as dreamless sleep'; 'that thinking is involuntary—to the extent at least that we cannot cease to think under any order of the will'; that 'thinking never ceases during life, and is essential to the continuance of life.' And the same conception is to be found in Leibniz, *Monadology*: the function of the monad is to represent or mirror the universe in all its changes, therefore each monad must be continuously having perceptions, although not always conscious perceptions. In another view, the activity of the individual is the outflow of an energy of which the sum is constantly increasing or decreasing, sleep representing the period of maximum recuperation and minimum activity. For this sum of energy the mind is dependent wholly upon the body; it itself determines only the form of the

* Two notable examples of the designation being used may be quoted. (1) In 1674, during the persecution of the Covenanters, John Welsh, great-grandson of John Knox, is stated to have 'preached the Action Sermon' at a conventicle held near the bank of the Whitadder, in Teviotdale (see Blackadder's contemporary *Memoirs*, p. 205). (2) In the diary of Edward Irving for 1825, the entry occurs, 'I addressed myself to write my Action Sermon' (see Mrs. Oliphant's *Life of Edward Irving*, vol. i. p. 368).

† Chapter on the 'Manner of the Administration of the Lord's Supper.'

‡ Chapter entitled 'Of the Celebration of the Communion.'

§ *Corpus Reformatorum*, vol. xxxiii. p. 199; cf. Iren. *adv. Hær.* IV. xviii. 4, 'panem in quo gratiæ actæ sint.'

‖ Walafrid Strabo, *de Rerum Eccles. Exordiis*, c. 22. *Agere* is used even in classical Latin to denote a sacrificial act (Ovid, *Fasti*, i. l. 322). Honorius of Autun (*Opera*, i. 103) and others derive the sacramental use of *actio* (with less probability) from its employment in legal processes: 'Actio dicitur quod causa populi cum Deo agitur.'

activity or the expression of activity, and the amount to be put forth at any moment (Fechner, *Psychophysik*, 1860; Höfler, *Psychische Arbeit*, 1895). The activity is continuous because of the constant shocks which the equilibrium of the organism receives from the play of the environing forces. It may be doubted, however, whether the term 'activity' would be applied, *e.g.*, to the movement of a body according to the law of inertia, as Dr. Stout suggests (a body tending to continue its motion with the same velocity in the same direction) (*Analytic Psychology*, i. 146; but cf. 148). Such a body would be described as active only when it impinges upon another body and transmits its own motion, wholly or partially, to the latter. The 'activity' in the continuous movement of the first body would be referred rather to the initial impulse of that force which sent it on its way.

(ii.) The second criterion is that as to the conditions of activity being within the active body. From this point of view, a body is active so far forth as its changes are determined from within itself. Thus Condillac wrote of his statue: 'It is active when it recalls a sensation, because it has *in itself* the cause of the recall, viz. memory. It is passive at the moment when it experiences a sensation; for the cause which produces the latter is outside of it (the statue), *i.e.* in the odoriferous bodies which act upon its organ.'* (At this stage the statue was supposed to have only one sense—that of smell). Substantially, Condillac's statement, that 'a being is active or passive according as the cause of the effect produced is in it or without it,' would be accepted to-day. The difficulty would be (1) to determine what *is* the cause of a given change, and (2) to determine whether the discovered cause is within or without the active being. If, for example, we refer all actions of the body to purely physical causes,—brain and nerve processes and the rest,—and regard the soul or consciousness as a mere spectator or accompanist of these central processes, without causal efficacy, then there is no such thing as mental activity, but only mental passivity.† The mind would not determine even its own changes, and so be active with respect to them, for the conscious change is always a by-product of certain physical changes. Of theories with regard to the relation of mind and body, neither automatism nor psychophysical parallelism is consistent with the existence of mental activity; the latter is compatible only with spiritualism on the one hand, the interaction theory on the other. The second difficulty—that of determining what is and what is not *in* the active being—may be illustrated from the controversy as to the existence of mental or psychical dispositions, or tendencies towards action, as opposed to merely physical dispositions, *i.e.* special arrangements or structures of the brain. Probably nine-tenths of the conditions of any mental act—an act of seeing, for example, or of hearing; an act of imagination or memory, or volition—lie beyond consciousness, or below the threshold of distinct consciousness. Our visual perception at any moment is determined largely by our own experience in the past and the general direction of our interests: the purely sense element, —what is *given*,—the affection of the retina, or the feeling of the ocular movements, is infinitesimal as a contribution to the resultant perception. Yet the latter appears instantaneously and as a single act. Are the submerged factors wholly physical—the excitation of special cortical arrangements which in their turn are the direct product of past experience, or are there also mental tendencies actually present, although out of distinct consciousness, and which are re-excited by the given sensation? (Stout, *Manual of Psychology*, bk. i. ch. 2, and *Analytic Psychology*, ch. 2). The analysis of a complex tone into its partials is given as an instance:

'Dr. Lipps holds that the unanalyzed note is a simple experience. The new tones which analysis discovers are, according to him, not in any sense precontained in the original presentation. The analysis itself brings them into existence, not only as distinguished differences, but as felt differences. According to him, what is analyzed is not an actual experience, but an unconsciously complex mental disposition corresponding to a complex physiological modification of the brain substance' (*Analytic Psychology*, vol. i. p. 61).

The value of the argument here is to show that our idea of mental activity will differ according as we interpret the disposition or tendencies from which acts of perception, of memory, of association flow as psychical or physiological, or both; if they are physiological merely, as many hold, then, not being *in* the mind, they cannot be regarded as internal causes of mental changes or effects, and therefore the mind is not active so far as their effects are concerned.

(iii.) The third characteristic is much more controversial than either of the others. A being is active, in popular speech, only so far as the effects or consequences of changes in it are transmitted to other beings; in other words, activity is *transient* causality, not *immanent*. In a body moving under the law of inertia, it may be said that the cause of its motion, in a given direction, with a given velocity, at any one moment, is its motion in the same direction and with the same velocity at the previous moment (Stout, *Analytic Psychology*, i. p. 146). Hence its motion at any moment is self-determined, *i.e.* both cause and effect are within the same being. And, according to many, mental activity exists only when there is self-determination in this full sense. It may be questioned, however, whether immanent activity in this sense ever falls within the scope of human experience: the continuance of a body under the law of inertia is not activity; it is absolute passivity, the movement *as a whole* being the effect of the original impulse. In mental activity, again, we never find that all the intermediate factors, in a case of self-determination, are within the mind. The volition to recall a name, for example, works itself out only when the necessary physiological substratum is present and uninjured. Even the moral resolution must make use of similar physical aids. It does not appear, then, that immanent activity, so far as our experience goes, is ever anything but indirect: the mind does not act upon itself, except by exciting physiological processes, to which presentations correspond. This conclusion may seem to render introspection, internal perception, or self-observation an impossibility, since knowledge is a form of action. Comte's arguments against introspection are indeed irrefutable, so far as pure introspection is concerned (cf. Miss Martineau's edition of the *Positive Philosophy*, vol. i. pp. 9, 81); but introspection on the basis of experiment is free from these objections, and is, in fact, the first method not of psychology alone, but of all science (Wundt, *Philos. Stud.* iv. 1886). This introspection is merely the analysis of presentations, whether primary (sensations) or secondary (memories, etc.), through repeating the conditions of the experience itself which has given the presentation: introspection is thus in no sense a turning of the mind upon itself, it is not a different process from external perception, it is only *a more accurate* and detailed perception, so as

* Condillac, *Traité des Sensations*, ch. ii. § 11. The note may be added here: 'There is in us a principle of our actions which we feel, but which we cannot define: it is called force. We are active alike in respect of all that this force produces in us and outside of us. We are active, for example, when we reflect, or when we cause a body to move. By analogy we suppose, in all bodies which cause change, a force of which we know still less, and we are passive with regard to the impressions they make upon us. Thus a being is active or passive according as the cause of the effect produced is in it or without it' (*ib.* note *a*).

† See Huxley's essay on 'Animal Automatism' (*Coll. Essays*, 1893).

to bring out elements not previously or directly experienced. Introspection is thus, as a form of mental activity, indirectly immanent; directly, it is an interaction between the mental and the physical. The first effect of the action is a change in the physiological process (see below); this in turn reacts upon the mind, and a new and modified presentation results. All activity is of this type,—a moving body would be described as active only when it effects a change in another body: no doubt, in such a case, the original body suffers a change, but *this* change is not that in which the activity is thought to result, or which is referred to the activity. In itself activity is essentially transitive. This does not exclude, of course, the possibility that the highest forms of activity are those which are indirectly immanent, *i.e.* in which the outcome of the activity is a change in the subject itself or self-determination.

2. *The general conditions of mental activity* are partly physical and partly psychical. Among the former must obviously be included the nature of the cortical systems present, their degree of nutrition, and the like. Among the latter fall all presentations and feelings. The mind is wholly passive, so far as its direct presentations are concerned: it may select among them, give prominence to some and reject others, but their immediate condition is always a cortical process. What is true of presentations is true also of feelings and emotions: a feeling represents on the subjective side the attitude of the individual as a whole in a given situation, while a presentation is representative of changes in his environment, directly or indirectly affecting him. In both, the mind itself is passively affected, but each may be stimulative or directive of its activity. Feeling especially has been throughout mental evolution the stimulant of activity, becoming deeper or more intense or more persistent as the presentational side of mental life received greater expansion and greater differentiation. The activity itself has no presentational or feeling-side. Although an element, it is not one of which the subject himself can be directly aware. The immediate *effects* of mental activity, on the other hand, are cortical changes and bodily movements, in primitive life diffuse, indefinite, uncoordinated; later, as experience moulds the organism, becoming definite, coordinated, and centralized. It is only through these bodily changes that mental activity produces changes in the mind itself, effecting there the recall of past impressions, or the building up of new and creative mental syntheses. The formation of a moral character, for example, is impossible without the constant practice of moral actions. These outward actions are reflected in the physical organization, and thereby the mental organization as a whole is modified in accordance with them. Without action, a character cannot be formed; nor, being formed, can it be maintained.

3. *The contrast between bodily and mental activity* has been already discussed in what has been said above. We have assumed that body acts upon mind, giving rise to presentations, and mind upon body, producing bodily movements, which in their turn may lead to changes in the cortical system, and thus indirectly to changes in the presentational field. Whether there is any real causation in the one case or the other is a metaphysical question on which we do not touch.

4. It will follow that *mental activity cannot be directly apprehended either through feeling or in any other way.* All that is apprehended is the sequence of conditions and of effects, so far as the latter are represented in consciousness. There is no more ground for assuming a primitive *consciousness* of activity as the basis of the *conception* of activity than there is for assuming such in any other case of symbolic knowledge,—for example, that of chemical affinity. There are, of course, primitive experiences on which these conceptions are based, but the conceptions are built upon them, not drawn out of them. The most complete description of the phenomena on which our knowledge of mental activity is founded is that of Wundt: 'If we try to find for the "striving" in the will-process itself a substrate corresponding in some degree to this expression, we always come to certain feelings, belonging principally to the class of strain and excitement feelings, and which may most fittingly be called feelings of activity' (*Physiolog. Psychologie*, iii. 249). These 'mediate the consciousness of activity, which is known to all from self-observation, and which, under whatsoever circumstances we find it, whether accompanying an external action, or an act of attention directed upon the contents of consciousness themselves, appears of a uniform nature' (*ib.* 252). It may be defined as a total-feeling, composed of partial feelings of tension and excitement, following a regular course from beginning to end, the completion being the sudden conversion of one of the partial feelings (that of strain or tension) into its contrast-feeling (*ib.* 253). They accompany every form of mental activity from the simplest upwards. Thus experiments have shown that an impression requires a certain time in order to penetrate to the focus of consciousness—its 'apperception,' in Wundt's terminology. During this time we always find, according to him, the above-mentioned feeling of activity. It is the more vivid the more the mental vision is concentrated, and continues until the idea has reached perfect clearness of consciousness. It is more distinct, however, in the state of active thought or tension towards some expected impression or idea. In such a case there are always certain sensation-elements accompanying or entering into it,—those of the muscular strain of accommodation of the sense-organ in attention, which Fechner has described (*ib.* 337; cf. Fechner, *Psychophysik* [2nd ed. 1889], ii. p. 475). There is no such thing as an abstract activity, always the same, but turned, like a searchlight, in different directions, of which, moreover, we are directly aware. What is always the same and is always found, in every case of volition or mental activity, is just the peculiar complex of feelings and sensations referred to. The feeling as a whole is a direct contrast to that which we have when an external impression, or a memory-image, arises, which does not harmonize with or correspond to the *present* disposition of the attention, but suddenly compels it into a direction opposed to that of its activity up to that moment; this feeling is the feeling of passivity. Each as a whole is simple and indefinable, but each belongs, at the same time, to several of the general classes of feeling, of which Wundt recognizes six (*ib.* 332). It is clear that for Wundt, as for others, the activity itself, the inward act, is not directly cognized at all; the complex of feelings is merely an index or sign by which we infer the activity to be taking place. With Dr. Ward this is still more definitely stated.

'There is, as Berkeley long ago urged, no resemblance between activity and an idea; nor is it easy to see anything common to pure feeling and an idea, unless it is that both possess intensity. —Instead, then, of the one *summum genus* state of mind or consciousness, with its three coordinate subdivisions,—cognition, emotion, conation,—our analysis seems to lead us to recognize three distinct and irreducible facts,—attention, feelings, and objects or presentations,—as together in a certain connexion, constituting one concrete state of mind or *psychosis*' (*Encyc. Brit.* art. 'Psychology' [1886], p. 44[a]).

Neither activity (attention) nor feeling can accordingly be presented to the mind; we know them only by their presentational conditions, accompaniments, or effects.

'Our activity as such is not presented at all: we are, being active; and further than this psychological analysis will not go. There are two ways in which this activity is manifested

the receptive or passive, and the motor or active in the stricter sense; and our experience of these we project in predicating the causal relation. But two halves do not make a whole; so we have no complete experience of effectuation, for the simple reason that we cannot be two things at once' (*ib.* 83[a]).

Activity and feeling are present in all states of consciousness, they show no differentiation of parts, possess therefore no marks of individuality by which they may enter into association with other activities, feelings, or presentations: and as they cannot enter into associations, so they cannot be reproduced or recalled in any sense analogous to that in which presentations are recalled (*ib.* 44[b]). It might perhaps be said that, on Dr. Ward's view, activity is a simple unanalyzable phase of experience, but can never be an object or *content* of experience. Professor James has argued with great force against the conception that there is any peculiar consciousness of activity, more especially in the form of a *feeling of innervation* as it has been called—the feeling of the current of outgoing energy, in volition or attention or other active states,—which is defended by writers otherwise so diverse as Bain, Helmholtz, and Wundt (*Principles of Psychology*, ii. 492 ff.; cf. i. 299 f.). What is *in the mind* in ordinary volition before the act takes place is simply a kinæsthetic idea of what the act is to be—'a mental conception, made up of memory images' of the muscular sensations defining which special act it is. All our ideas of movement, including those of the effort which it requires, as well as those of its direction, its extent, its strength, and its velocity, 'are images of peripheral sensations, either "remote," or resident in the moving parts, or in other parts which sympathetically act with them in consequence of the diffuse "wave"' (*ib.* 494). Wundt himself, as James points out, has come to admit that there are no differences of quality in these feelings of innervation, but only of degree of intensity. 'They are used by the mind as guides, not of *which* movement, but of *how strong* a movement it is making, or shall make. But does not this virtually surrender their existence altogether?' (*ib.* 500). The fundamental form of mental activity, according to James, is attention, and the fact of attention is known partly through changes undergone by the idea to which we attend, and partly by muscular sensations, in the head and elsewhere, which accompany the strain of accommodation, sensory and mental. Dr. Stout has rightly pointed out that James here separates activity from the process which is active, and makes it consist in another collateral process. It 'is like identifying the velocity of a moving body with the motion of some other body' (*Anal. Psychol.* i. p. 163). James does not, however, identify the activity with the sensations by which we become aware of it; they are indexes of something which directly we cannot know. By Dr. Stout himself this is precisely what is denied: an idea must be based upon some direct experience or sentience—'The thought of succession in time must be based on the direct experience of time-transience, as the thought of red colour is based on the corresponding sensation.' 'The cardinal antithesis between mental activity and passivity is not merely a group of relations ideally cognized by the reflective intelligence. Mental activity exists in being felt.' It may readily be admitted that change or transition is given as a direct experience; but an activity is much more than a transition. It involves (1) direction or tendency of the transition towards an end, and (2) some feeling or knowledge of *effectuation* in the successive phases of the realization of the end. It is impossible to see how either a tendency towards an end, or the effectiveness of a process in furthering the tendency, can be a direct experience or feeling of the mind. Causality cannot 'exist in being felt,' and causality is an essential feature of activity. We conclude, then, (1) that there is no direct consciousness of activity; (2) that the conception of activity is a symbolic knowledge, founded on certain complex groups of feelings and presentations, in which similar elements and arrangements of elements constantly recur.

5. *What is the simplest or primary form of mental activity?* At least three possible answers may be given: (1) Effectuation of physical change, (2) Attention, (3) Apperception. The first identifies activity with conation simply, of which the lowest form is impulse to movement; the second reduces the mental element in conation to the movement of the attention; the third, to the play of apperception. In the first, which is that adopted above, mental activity is self-determination only in an indirect way; the mind cannot act immediately upon itself; it can produce a desired change only by subjecting itself to certain physical conditions or circumstances through which the change may be effected. The question of Liberty and Determinism does not turn in the least upon this of the relation of mental activity to bodily. As has been said, 'Whatever be our opinion about our liberty or our determinism, we accord to the different moments of our mental life a decisive influence upon the nature of the following moments. We consider our actual modifications as acting upon our future modifications.' Even those who feel themselves subject to an inflexible necessity do so not because their will is without efficacy, but, 'on the contrary, because the efficacy of every idea, every feeling, every volition is such that it does not leave the smallest place to contingence' (van Biéma, *Revue de Métaphys. et Morale*, 1900, p. 286). But an idea has efficacy not in itself, but only in so far as it excites feeling, and thereby stimulates activity or striving. Both Dr. Ward and Professor James, from different points of view, regard *attention* as the primary and fundamental phase of mental activity. 'The effort of attention is thus the essential phenomenon of will' (James, ii. p. 562); but 'this *volitional* effort pure and simple must be carefully distinguished from the muscular effort with which it is usually confounded. The latter consists of all those peripheral feelings to which a muscular "exertion" may give rise.' The attention is kept strained upon an object of thought which is out of harmony with the prevailing drift of thought, 'until at last it grows so as to maintain itself before the mind with ease. This strain of the attention is the fundamental act of will. And the will's work is in most cases practically ended when the bare presence to our thought of the naturally unwelcome object has been secured. For the mysterious tie between the thought and the motor centres next comes into play, and, in a way which we cannot even guess at, the obedience of the bodily organs follows as a matter of course' (*ib.* p. 564). 'Consciousness (or the neural process which goes with it) is in its very nature impulsive' (*ib.* p. 535). Now, it is in precisely this impulsiveness, this transition from thought to bodily action, that we have sought the primitive or essential form of the activity of mind. The retaining or strengthening of an idea in attention is only an instance of it. Attention is not a pure activity which can be called now to one idea, now to another: it is the interaction between the mind and its presentations, the degree and form of attention being proportional to the mental organization; and the effect of attention is never directly upon the idea, the content of consciousness itself, but upon the motor centres by which the physiological process underlying the idea is strengthened or heightened, and thus the idea itself brought indirectly into clearer consciousness. As Volkmann has

said, 'The willing to hold a presentation fast is not the willing of the presentation itself—and cannot therefore be directed immediately upon the presentation, but must take the roundabout way through renewing the stimulus or keeping up the activity of auxiliary (*i.e.* associated) ideas' (Volkmann, *Lehrbuch der Psychologie*[4] [1894], ii. p. 205). With Wundt, the elementary process is 'the apperception of a psychic content' (*l.c.* iii. 307), or the bringing of a presentation into the *focus* of consciousness. Consciousness and will belong together from the beginning onwards, and external action as a volition-process differs from the internal action of apperception only in its consequences, not in its immediate psychological nature. Considered as a phenomenon of consciousness, the former consists in nothing but 'the apperception of an idea of movement' (*ib.*; on Wundt's 'Theory of Apperception' see Villa, *Contemporary Psychology*, p. 211 ff.). If we analyze this process of apperception, we find there are three steps: (i.) the idea is perceived or enters consciousness; (ii.) it acts as a motive or stimulus, through the feelings connected with it, upon the internal will; (iii.) the will reacts upon it, and it is 'apperceived.' The sole effect of the will upon the ideas is to raise them into the focus of consciousness: all that follows springs from the mechanism of the ideas themselves. Volkmann objects to the theory that it implies a will hanging above the ideas, and striking in among them, but which in itself is wholly inert,—a will which wills nothing, but must wait for stimulation from without (*l.c.* p. 194). The latter objection holds only if we suppose that perception precedes apperception in time, as Wundt indeed assumes: it fails if we regard the analysis as that of a single process into constituents which can be held apart only by abstraction, but which have no separate conscious existence. The former objection is, however, conclusive: a will which acts upon our ideas and affects them directly is non-existent. We conclude that attention and apperception are alike modes of the more fundamental form of mental activity which consists in the response of the mind to a presentation, through feeling, by effecting some bodily change.

6. *The essence of moral activity* is to be found in that form of mental activity in which an idea is retained before the mind, in spite of its incongruity with tendencies or dispositions already present. In such cases there is a choice or selection of one idea among several possible ones, for realization: to realize an idea is to give it bodily form, or *real* existence—in other words, to carry out the actions which the idea involves. But it is only when an idea is sufficiently strengthened (centrally or peripherally) that it acquires this impulsive force. 'Consent to the idea's undivided presence, this is effort's sole achievement. Its only function is to get this feeling of consent into the mind. And for this there is but one way'—*i.e.* to keep it steadily before the mind until it *fills* the mind—'To sustain a representation, to think, is, in short, the only moral act, for the impulsive and the obstructed, for sane and lunatic alike' (James). The consent of which James writes is a somewhat mythological process—it is a *fiat* of the mind, a resolve that the act shall ensue (*l.c.* pp. 501, 567 ff.), 'a subjective experience *sui generis* which we can designate but not define.' Perhaps an ultimate analysis would show it to be not an apparently unmotived act of the mind, but a function of the ideas themselves in their relation to the mind as an organized system of dispositions and tendencies. The ethical or metaphysical problem of freewill or determinism belongs elsewhere; for psychology the problem does not exist.

7. *Historical.*—The first philosophical treatment of mental activity occurs in Plato's theory of Ideas. The Ideas, as the ultimate and only realities, have movement and life, soul and intelligence. The finite soul has both a transient and an immanent causality, the former as the cause of the motion and life of its body, the latter through its faculty of knowing, by which it participates in the life of the Ideas and assimilates their active power. Passivity of mind consists in the affecting of the mind by the body, through its senses; passivity thus comes to mean imperfect, inaccurate, confused and inadequate knowledge. The soul is most active when detached from the body, and in the ecstatic union with the infinite and eternal Idea of the Good.

'The soul reasons best when disturbed by none of the senses, whether hearing or sight, or pain or pleasure: when she has dismissed the body and released herself as far as possible from all intercourse or contact with it, and thus, living alone with herself so far as possible, strives after real truth' (*Sophistes*, 248 A ff., *Republic*, vii. 532 ff., *Phædo*, 65; cf. Zeller, *Phil. der Griechen*, ii. p. 436).

The dualism of soul and body is already partly overcome in Aristotle: it is not the soul in man that thinks or learns of itself, but man thinks through the soul; *i.e.* the man is an organic whole. On the other hand, the dualism returns within Reason or Intelligence, which is of two kinds, passive and active. All human knowledge depends upon experience, and rational truths are merely the highest inductive generalizations from experience; the mind is passive in the double sense: (1) that it is dependent upon the body for its material, and even the forms into which the material is moulded, through successive impressions; (2) that the separate phases of consciousness are transitory and fleeting. On the other hand, the possibility of these empirical generalizations implies the co-operation of an Active or Creative Intelligence which gives the ideas their reality, as eternal, imperishable existences. This Active Reason is separate from the body, as from all matter, whereas the Passive Reason is merely the essence or form of the body itself: the Passive Reason perishes with the body, the Active Reason is the eternal element in man (*de Anima*, iii. Cf. Siebeck, *Gesch. der Psychologie*, i. 2, pp. 64 f., 72). The difficulties of the theory are: (1) that the Active Reason appears to be simply identical with the Divine Consciousness itself, by which the finite mind is passively affected, so that there is no real activity of the finite consciousness; (2) that from another point of view the Active Reason as a *separate* principle means simply Truth, as an ideal system of knowledge, of which our every thought is a partial realization. It has validity, not real existence. Aristotle's theory suggested, however, that the mind is *active*, the human understanding at work, in *all* knowledge, from sense-experience onwards. This conclusion was brought out first by Alexander of Aphrodisias —2nd cent. A.D.—(*ib.* p. 202). In Plotinus also (3rd cent.) consciousness is not merely the passive spectator of its own experiences, but a synthetic activity, grasping together, holding together and moulding the impressions it receives (*ib.* pp. 333, 337). Throughout the Mediæval Period controversy as to mental activity resolved itself mainly into the relation of soul to body, or the problem of the relation of the finite to the Divine mind. In Avicenna (A.D. 980–1038) the intelligence is wholly unattached to any bodily organ, and its objects are wholly distinct from those of sense; on the other hand, he distinguishes, with Aristotle, between an active and a passive principle within the intelligence itself. The latter is only in the individual soul and perishes with it; the former is distinct and separate from the individual soul, is universal, one and the same in all, and it alone is immortal (Stöckl, *Gesch. d. Philosophie des Mittelalters*, II. i. § 12).

The question of ethical activity in its modern form first emerges in Averroës (A.D. 1126–1198). He distinguishes between beings which are active, *i.e.* act upon other beings, by *nature*, and those of which the activity is conditional upon *desire*. 'The powers of the former are determined to one thing, and must, when the corresponding conditions are given, necessarily enter into the act. The latter—beings which act from desire or choice—do not enter into activity necessarily, when a fitting object is presented, but are in themselves indifferent to the object, and may desire or choose the one or the other,' *i.e.* their choice is an activity acceding to the object and independent of it (*ib.* § 21). Some of the Muslim dogmatists denied that any source of activity exists in man or in any other finite being: all movement and activity in the created world depends directly and solely upon an external cause—*viz.* God. That definite events appear to follow upon definite causes is due to the fact that God observes the *habit* of allowing it so. Each process is an accident, momentarily created by God, according to the custom He has prescribed to Himself. Man does not really will or act, God creates in him the volition and the act; man is thus wholly passive, the blind instrument of God's will. His activity is an illusion. These ideas return in Geulincx and the Occasionalists. The doctrine of the soul as a substance, and therefore a *source of activity*, was upheld by Albertus Magnus (13th cent.) and Thomas Aquinas (*ib.*), and prevailed, along with a side current of scepticism, until Descartes (1596–1650). In his metaphysical theory Descartes makes mind the diametrical opposite of body; the former alone is active or free, the body a pure automaton: the soul is nothing that is not spiritual, unextended, immaterial; no intercourse, therefore, is possible between soul and body, except by the Divine interference. The soul produces its sensations from itself, *on occasion of*, but not through, the bodily excitations. In his Psychology, however, as Weber has pointed out (Weber, *Hist. of Philosophy*, tr. Thilly, p. 316; cf. Descartes, *Traité des Passions*, *Traité de l'Homme*), Descartes entirely contradicts these principles and speaks of the soul as united to the body, and as acting upon it and acted upon by it in its turn. In both Spinoza and Leibniz the special activity of the soul is knowledge; it is passive just in so far as its ideas or perceptions are inadequate or confused. With Malebranche, as later with Schopenhauer, but from a totally different standpoint, the centre of activity is transferred to the *will*—the mind in relation to the outward world. In the English Psychologists it is jointly placed in the will and in the inward power of combining, synthesizing, and transforming the ideas. In modern psychology, as we have tried to show above, the tendency has been to reduce one of these different forms of mental activity to the other.

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ADAM.—1. The name.—The Heb. אָדָם (*'ādhām*) is properly a common noun denoting 'mankind' or 'human being,' *homo* as distinguished from *vir*. In Gn $1^{26\text{-}28}$ (P), *'ādhām* = 'mankind'; in 2^{4}–4^{26} we have *hā-'ādhām* = 'the man,' *i.e.* the first man;* in $5^{1\text{-}5}$ it is used as a proper name. The etymology of 'Adam' is uncertain; Gn 2^{7} 'Jahweh Elohim formed man (*'ādhām*) of the dust of the ground' (*'ădhāmāh*) is not to be taken as a scientific derivation. The usual words for 'man' in the Semitic languages generally are not cognate with *'ādhām*. 'Adam' has been connected with an Assyr. *adum* 'child,' 'one made,' 'created'; with the Heb. root *'dm* 'red,' the name having originated in a ruddy race; Dillmann on Gn 1. 2 suggests a connexion with an Eth. root='pleasant,' 'well-formed,' or an Arab. root='to attach oneself,' and so='gregarious,' 'sociable.' Any connexion with *Adapa*, the hero of a Babylonian myth, is most improbable.

2. Adam in the OT.—The only references to Adam are in Gn 1–5, and in the dependent passage 1 Ch 1^{1}. The common noun *'ādhām* is misread as the name in AV of Dt 32^{8} and Job 31^{33}; RV corrects Dt. but retains Adam in the text of Job, putting the correction 'after the manner of men' for 'like Adam' in the margin. In view of the OT habit of playing upon words, there may be a secondary reference to Adam in Job and possibly elsewhere; but as 'man' or 'mankind' gives a satisfactory sense, there is not sufficient ground for recognizing a secondary meaning.

In the Priestly narrative (P) of Creation (Gn 1^{1}–2^{4a}) Elohim creates 'mankind' (*'ādhām*) in His own image, in two sexes, makes man supreme over all living creatures, bids him multiply, and gives him the fruits and grains for food. He blesses man. But whereas it is said separately of each of the other groups of creatures, 'God saw that it was good,' there is no such separate utterance concerning man; he is simply included in the general statement, 'God saw everything that he had made, and, behold, it was very good.' In $5^{1\text{-}5}$ Adam is the ancestor of the human race; when he is 130 years old he begets Seth 'in his own likeness, after his image.' Afterwards Adam begat other children, and died at the age of 930.

In the Prophetic (J) narrative (Gn 2^{4b}–4^{26}) Jahweh Elohim moulds 'the man' out of dust, gives him life by breathing into his nostrils the breath of life, and places him in Eden to dress and keep it. Jahweh Elohim also makes the animals out of the soil (*'ădhāmāh*) in order that 'the man' may find a helpmeet; 'the man' names them but finds no suitable helpmeet, and at last Jahweh Elohim builds up a woman out of a rib taken from 'the man' while he slept: the woman proves a suitable helpmeet. Jahweh Elohim had forbidden 'the man' to eat of the fruit of a certain 'tree of the knowledge of good and evil' planted in the midst of Eden; but, tempted by the serpent, the woman ate of the forbidden fruit, and also persuaded the

* RV has 'Adam' as proper name in three passages, following MT; but in two ($3^{17.21}$) the pointing should be slightly altered, and in the third (4^{25}) the article should probably be inserted, changing it in each case to 'the man.'

man to eat. Thereupon Jahweh Elohim drove them out of Eden, and men became subject to death. After the expulsion the man and the woman became parents of three sons; one of these, Abel, was murdered by his brother Cain; while the other two, Cain and Seth, became the progenitors of the human race.

These two narratives differ markedly in form; the Prophetic narrative is frankly anthropomorphic, but the Priestly narrative minimizes the anthropomorphic element. Both are adapted from ancient Semitic traditions;* but here again in Gn 1 the mythological element is reduced to language and framework, and is altogether subordinated to the teaching of revelation; whereas in Gn 2–4 the author is evidently glad to retain a picturesque story for its own sake as well as for the sake of its moral. In other words, he uses an ancient tradition as a parable, and we have no right to extract theology from all the details.

The two narratives agree in their pure monotheism, in representing man as the immediate creation of God, without intervention of angels, æons, or other intermediate supernatural beings; in representing him as a creation of God, and not as born of God by any *quasi*-material process; and in representing the human race as descended from a single pair. They are also substantially at one in other points: man is Godlike; in the Priestly narrative he is made 'in the image and likeness' of God, and passes that 'image and likeness' on to his descendants (Gn $1^{26f.}$ $5^{1ff.}$, cf. below); in the Prophetic narrative man's life is the breath of God (Gn 2); in the Priestly narrative man is given the dominion over all other creatures; in the Prophetic narrative the animals are specially formed for the service of man, and receive their names from him.

It is characteristic of the Priestly narrative that its express moral is found in two points of ritual: man is to be vegetarian, and to observe the Sabbath. The Prophetic narrative, on the other hand, is concerned with the moral life: the marriage tie is to be permanently binding, and marriage is spoken of in terms which imply a preference for monogamy. Man is under a Divine law; God has provided for his welfare, and ordained his abode, his work, his food. There is moral retribution; the disobedience of the man and the woman, wrongdoing, murder on the part of Cain, are punished; but even while Jahweh Elohim punishes, He still cares for men; He clothes the man and the woman, and protects Cain from being put to death.

Passing to other features of the Prophetic narrative, we note the inferior position of woman, corresponding to her status in the East, suggested by her formation after man, from his body, and for his service; she is also the instrument of his ruin. Again, man enjoys immediate fellowship with God; and this is not terminated by the expulsion from Eden, for Jahweh converses in the same fashion with Cain as He does with Adam; and the dwelling-place of the first family *outside* Eden is still thought of as being in the special presence of God. When Cain leaves this dwelling-place, he goes 'out from the presence of Jahweh' and feels that he will 'be hidden from his face' (Gn $4^{14.\ 16}$).

The original sin of man, the fatal source of all his misery, was inordinate desire, indulged in contrary to the Divine prohibition. This desire is comprehensive. It is sensual: the woman sees that the tree is 'good for food'; it is æsthetic: 'it was a delight to the eyes.' The desire is also intellectual: the tree is 'the tree of the knowledge of good and evil'; the serpent promises that by eating it 'their eyes shall be opened . . . to know good and evil,' and the woman sees that the tree is 'to be desired to make one wise.'* But the desire for 'the knowledge of good and evil' is not merely intellectual, it is also a desire for a deeper, more varied, more exciting experience of life, a desire to 'see life,' to use popular language. And as the serpent promises that by eating they shall become 'like gods,' this desire included ambition. In other words, the first sin consisted in defying God by giving the reins to the various impulses which make for culture and civilization. Similarly, in Gn 4^{16-24} progress in civilization is due to the evil race of Cain.

The author of the source which the Prophetic narrator follows regards the life of man as accursed, a life of sordid toil, poorly rewarded, embarrassed by shame arising out of the sexual conditions of human existence, burdened for woman by the pain of travail and by her subjection to her husband. These evils are the punishment of the first sin, the consequences of the unholy appetite for luxury and culture, knowledge and power. Smend (*Alttest. Rel.-Gesch.* 121 f.) has pointed out that this conception of life does not control the patriarchal stories or the other portions of the Prophetic narrative; hence the author must have taken it over from older tradition, and it does not represent his formal and complete judgment on life, though he retains it as expressing one side of the truth.

Similarly, there are other theological implications which might be discerned by pressing details; but such implications are no part of the teaching which the Prophetic narrator intended to enforce; such details also are merely retained from ancient tradition; *e.g.* the feud between man and the serpent is retained as corresponding to the facts of life, but in the original story it was probably a reminiscence of the contest between Marduk and the primeval Dragon.

Again, the story serves to explain the miserable estate of man and the sense of alienation from God; but it does not profess to explain the origin of evil or of sin. It is indeed implied that sin did not originate in man or from man, but was due to suggestion from outside.

Obviously we are not intended to deduce doctrines by combining features of the two narratives, otherwise we should be confronted by the difficulty that the serpent would be included amongst the creatures whom God pronounced 'very good.'

In the Priestly narrative the fact of sin is not mentioned till the time just before the Flood, when we are told that the earth was corrupt and full of violence (Gn 6^{11}); no account is given of the origin of this corruption. It is noteworthy that we are told that Adam transmitted the Divine likeness to Seth (cf. 5^{1} and vv.$^{3-4}$); but no such statement is made as to Adam's other children. Possibly the Divine likeness was a birthright transmitted from eldest son to eldest son, till it reached Noah, but not possessed by other men, hence their corruption; or again this likeness may have been shared by the descendants of Seth, but not possessed by other races. The Book of Chronicles simply traces the genealogy of Israel from Adam.

3. Adam in the Apocrypha and later Jewish literature.—As the first man, Adam occupies a prominent place in theology and tradition. An immense body of tradition gathered round the brief Scripture narratives. The notices of Adam in the Apocrypha, however, are for the most part mere references to the accounts in Genesis. Thus 2 Es 3^{4-10} is a summary of these accounts, followed in v.^{21} by the comment, 'For the first Adam, bear-

* As far as the Fall and Cain and Abel are concerned, only uncertain hints of such stories have yet been discovered in the inscriptions of Western Asia; but the character of Gn 3–4 shows that the author is adapting ancient tradition.

* Not as in RVm 'desirable to look upon,' cf. Dillmann.

ing a wicked heart, transgressed, and was overcome; and not he only, but all they also that are born of him.' The author does not explain how the immediate creation of God came to have a 'wicked heart'; but perhaps the term is used proleptically—a heart that became wicked through the Fall. Again, 6^{54-56} refers to Adam as the ancestor of the human race (cf. also $7^{11.\ 70}$); and in 7^{46-56} Esdras laments the sin and punishment which Adam has brought on mankind.*

It is remarkable that when Jesus ben Sirach sets out to 'praise famous men' (Sir 44–50), he passes over Adam and begins with Enoch; then he reviews the series of OT heroes, concluding with Nehemiah, and then (49^{14-16}) reverts to Enoch and Joseph, and at last by way of Shem and Seth arrives at Adam: 'Above every living thing in the creation is Adam.'

The position of Sir 49^{14-16} suggests that this paragraph was either an afterthought of Ben Sira, or an addition by a later writer who had noticed the absence of Adam and others. Perhaps Ben Sira felt that the Fall rendered Adam unfit to figure in a list of ancient worthies.

Adam plays a considerable part in the other Apocalyptic literature. In the *Book of the Secrets of Enoch* ($30^{8ff.}$),† for instance, Adam is made of seven substances: his flesh from the earth, his blood from the dew, his eyes from the sun, his bones from the stones, his veins and hair from the grass, his thoughts from the swiftness of the angels and from the clouds, his spirit from the Spirit of God and from the wind. He is 'like a second angel,' endowed with the Divine Wisdom. His name Adam was constructed from the initials of the [Greek] names of the four quarters of the earth: *Anatole* (E.), *Dusis* (W.), *Arktos* (N.), *Mesembria* (S.). He fell through ignorance, because he did not understand his own nature.

We read of a Jewish *Book of Adam*,‡ but it is not now extant.

The other branch of later Jewish literature, Talmud, Midrashim, etc., embellishes the Scripture narrative with a variety of fanciful legends. In the famous *Baraitha* of the Talmud on the origin of the books of the OT, Adam is one of the ten elders who contributed to the Psalter. Ibn Ezra explains the birth of children to Adam by suggesting that when he found that the permanent continuance of the race in his own person would be prevented by death, he provided for its continuance by begetting children. Rabbinical traditions also state that the tree of knowledge was a fig-tree, that Eve gave the fruit to the animals, etc. etc.§ Philo expounds and allegorizes the Biblical narratives in *de Opificio Mundi*, *Sacrarum Legum Allegoriæ de Cherubim*; pointing out, for instance, that the statement that man was made in the image of God must not be understood in a material sense; it means that the mind in man corresponds to God in the cosmos (*de Opif.* 23); and the narrative of the Fall is an allegory of the disastrous consequences of lust (*ib.* 57, 58).

Josephus (*Ant.* I. i. 2) merely puts the Biblical narrative into what he conceived to be a better literary form, expanding, for instance, the few words of Jahweh Elohim into a speech. It is noteworthy, however, that he speaks in his preface of some of the Mosaic narratives as being allegorical.

The Jewish development of this subject reaches its climax in the mediæval mysticism called the Qabbālā, where the Sephīroth, or emanations by which God creates, are grouped sometimes as the tree of life and sometimes as Adam Qadmon, the primeval man.

* 2 Esdras (so Eng. Apocrypha; Vulg. 4 Esdras) is the work of a Palestinian Jew, A.D. 81–96, with Christian interpolations.

† Morfill and Charles attribute the work to a Hellenistic Jew (A.D. 1–50).

‡ See Hastings' *DB*, i. 37, art. 'Adam, Books of.'

§ Hershon, *Rabbinical Commentary on Genesis.*

4. **Adam in the NT.**—Adam is mentioned in Lk 3^{38} as the ancestor of Jesus, thus emphasizing the Incarnation, the reality of our Lord's humanity. In 1 Ti $2^{13.\ 14}$ the authority of the husband over the wife is deduced from the fact that Adam was 'first formed'; and that it was Eve, not Adam, who was deceived by the serpent. The idea that Adam was not deceived probably rests on some Rabbinical exegesis, *e.g.* the suggestion that Adam did not know that the apple Eve gave him came from the tree of life. Jude [14] has the casual reference, 'Enoch also, the seventh from Adam.' Also, 1 Co 11^{2-16} supports the current etiquette as to the way in which women wore their hair, and as to their wearing veils, by the fact that the first woman was created from the man, and for the sake of the man, and not *vice versa*.

But the most important NT passages are Ro 5^{12-21} and 1 Co $15^{20-22.\ 45-49}$, which state a parallel and a contrast between Adam and Christ. To a certain extent, Adam and Christ stand in the same relation to the human race; in each case the nature and work of the individual affects the whole race; Adam 'is a figure of him that was to come' (Ro 5^{14}). But while the one man Adam's one sin introduces sin and guilt and death, the one Christ's one act of righteousness justifies the guilty, restores them to righteousness, and enables them to reign in life. This 'one act of righteousness' is also spoken of as 'the obedience of the one'; the general tenor of St. Paul's teaching identifies this 'act' with the death of Christ (Ro 5^{12-21}, 1 Co 15^{20-22}). St. Paul does not make it clear how, or in what sense, Adam's sin became the cause of sin, guilt, and death to his posterity. The statement of Ro 5^{14}, that 'death reigned from Adam until Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the likeness of Adam's transgression,' suggests that men were involved in the guilt and punishment of Adam apart from their own sins.

1 Co 15^{26-49} is not *prima facie* quite consistent with Romans; and there is nothing to show that St. Paul had correlated the two sets of ideas. In Corinthians, mankind inherits from Adam limitations; and Christ enables mankind to transcend these limitations. 'The first man is of the earth, earthy,' merely a living 'soul' (ψυχή); and such were his descendants until Christ came. 'The last man,' 'the second man from heaven,' was 'a life-giving spirit' (πνεῦμα), and apparently communicates this *pneuma* to Christians, who are 'heavenly' like their Master, and bear His image. In other words, by the Incarnation human nature was raised to a higher plane. But again it is doubtful how far St. Paul would have been prepared to affirm all that his words imply.* The idea of a higher and a lower Adam, of a heavenly and an earthy or earthly man, is found in Philo, in some of the Gnostic systems,† and in the Qabbālā.‡

5. **Adam in Christian literature.**—The Patristic commentaries on the stories of the Creation and the Fall largely follow Jewish precedents; they often allegorize and ornament the narrative by legendary additions; while the Gnostic cosmologies anticipate and pave the way for the mysticism of the Qabbālā. Adam becomes a Gnostic Æon.§ The Ophites speak of 'the spiritual seed or ὁ ἐσω ἄνθρωπος as an efflux ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀρχανθρώπου ἄνωθεν Ἀδαμάντος,'‖ Greek equivalents of the Adam Qadmon or Adam Elyon which figure in the Qabbālā.

* Franz Delitzsch, in his *Brief an die Römer in das Hebräische übersetzt und aus Talmud und Midrasch erläutert*, quotes from Martini a passage from *Sifrê* (an early Midrash) which contrasts the effects of Adam's sin with those of the vicarious sufferings of the Messiah.

† Harvey's *Irenæus*, i. 134 n. 2.

‡ *Dict. of Christ. Biogr.*, art. 'Cabbalah' by Ginsburg. Philo (*Leg. Allegor.* i. 16) speaks of a higher and a lower man introduced into Paradise; the lower is expelled, the higher remains.

§ Harvey's *Irenæus*, i. 224, n. 1. ‖ Harvey, i 134, n. 2.

To derive these Gnostic ideas from the Qabbālā is an anachronism; both are developments from Rabbinical mysticism. Mediæval and Protestant divines, especially Calvin following Augustine, develop the doctrine of Original Sin from St. Paul's teaching. Thus Calvin:* 'He (Adam) not only was himself punished . . . but he involved his posterity also. . . . The orthodox, therefore, and more especially Augustine, laboured to show that we are not corrupted by acquired wickedness, but bring an innate corruption from the very womb. It was the greatest impudence to deny this.' †

6. **Adam in Islām.**—The Muhammadans accept the Christian Scripture subject to the necessary correction and interpretation; they have also borrowed many of the Jewish legends. Adam, therefore, is an important person in their religious system; and they have adorned his story with legends of their own. For instance, on the site of the Ka'ba at Mecca, Adam, after his expulsion from Eden, first worshipped God in a tent sent down from heaven for the purpose; and Eve's tomb may be seen near Mecca; it shows the outlines of a body 173 ft. by 12 ft.; the head is buried elsewhere.‡

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ADAM'S BRIDGE, or *Rāmasetu*='Rāma's causeway.'—A chain of sandbanks over 30 miles in length, extending from the island of Rāmesvaram off the Indian coast, to the island of Manar off the coast of Ceylon. These sandbanks—some dry and others a few feet under the surface of the water—seem to connect India with Ceylon; and this fact has given rise to the tradition that they are portions of a causeway which was constructed by Rāma, the hero of the ancient Indian Epic called the *Rāmāyaṇa*.

The story of the Epic is well known. Rāma, the prince of Ayodhya or Oudh, was banished by the king, his father, for fourteen years, and came and lived in a forest near the sources of the Godāvarī, accompanied by his wife Sītā and his younger brother Lakṣmaṇa. During the absence of the two brothers from their cottage, Sītā was taken away by Rāvaṇa, king of Ceylon. After long search Rāma got news of Sītā, and determined to cross over from India to Ceylon with a vast army of monkeys and bears to recover her. It was for this purpose that the causeway across the ocean is said to have been constructed. Rāma crossed over with the army, defeated and killed Rāvaṇa, recovered his wife, and returned to Oudh. The period of exile had expired; Rāma's father was dead; and Rāma ascended the throne.

The building of the causeway across the ocean is described at great length in the epic poem. And after Rāma had killed his foe and recovered his wife, he is described as sailing through the sky in an aërial car—all the way from Ceylon to Oudh. The whole of India was spread below; and few passages in the epic are more striking than the bold attempt to describe the vast continent as seen from the car. It was then that Rāma pointed out to his wife, who was seated by him in the car, the great causeway he had constructed across the ocean.

'See, my love, round Ceylon's island
How the ocean billows roar,
Hiding pearls in caves of coral,
Strewing shells upon the shore,
And the causeway far-extending,—
Monument of Rāma's fame,—
Rāmasetu unto ages
Shall our deathless deed proclaim!'

The Hindus regard Rāma as an incarnation of Viṣṇu, the second of the Hindu Trinity—the god who preserves and supports the universe. The island of Rāmesvaram, from which Rāma is supposed to have crossed to Ceylon over the causeway built by him, is therefore a sacred place of pilgrimage, visited by thousands of pious Hindus every year from all parts of India. The famous temple of Rāmesvaram, with its pillared corridors, 700 feet long, is perhaps the finest specimen of Dravidian architecture in India.

LITERATURE.—*Rāmāyaṇa* (Griffith's tr. and Romesh Dutt's condensed tr.). For an account of the temple of Rāmesvaram, see Fergusson, *Indian and Eastern Architecture*.

ROMESH DUTT.

ADAM'S PEAK.—This is the English name, adopted from the Portuguese, of a lofty mountain in Ceylon, called in Sinhalese *Samanala*, and in Pāli *Samanta-kūṭa* or *Sumana-kūṭa*. It rises directly from the plains, at the extreme south-west corner of the central mountainous district, to a height of 7420 feet. The panorama from the summit is one of the grandest in the world, as few other mountains, though surpassing it in altitude, present the same unobstructed view over land and sea. But the peak is best known as a place of pilgrimage to the depression in the rock at its summit, which is supposed to resemble a man's footprint, and is explained by pilgrims of different religions in different ways. It is a most remarkable, and probably unique, sight to see a group of pilgrims gazing solemnly at the depression, each one quite undisturbed in his faith by the knowledge that the pilgrim next to him holds a divergent view—the Buddhist thinking it to be the footprint of the Buddha, the Śaivite regarding it as the footprint of Śiva, the Christian holding it to be the footprint of St. Thomas, or perhaps admitting the conflicting claims of the eunuch of Queen Candace, and the Muhammadan thinking he beholds the footprint of Adam. The origin of these curious beliefs is at present obscure. None of them can be traced back to its real source, and even in the case of the Buddhist belief, about which we know most, we are left to conjecture in the last, or first, steps.

The earliest mention of the Buddhist belief is in the *Samanta Pāsādikā*, a commentary on the Buddhist Canon Law written by Buddhaghosa in the first quarter of the 5th cent. A.D. This work has not yet been published, but the passage is quoted in full, in the original Pāli, by Skeen (pp. 50, 51). It runs as follows: 'The Exalted One, in the eighth year after (his attainment of) Wisdom, came attended by five hundred Bhikshus on the invitation of Maniakkha, king of the Nāgas, to Ceylon; took the meal (to which he had been invited), seated the while in the Ratana Maṇḍapa (Gem Pavilion) put up on the spot where the Kalyāṇi Dāgaba (afterwards) stood, and making his footprint visible on Samanta Kūṭa, went back (to India).' Seeing that Adam's Peak is a hundred miles away from the Kalyāṇi Dāgaba, the clause about Adam's Peak seems abrupt, and looks as if it had been inserted into an older story written originally without it. But it is good evidence that the belief in the Adam's Peak legend was current at Anurādhapura when the passage quoted was written there about A.D. 425. The whole context of the passage is known to have been drawn from a history of Ceylon in Sinhalese prose with mnemonic verses in Pāli.* Those verses were collected in the still extant work, the *Dipavaṁsa*, written probably in the previous century. That work (ii. 52–69) gives the account of the Buddha's visit to Maniakkha. It mentions nothing about Adam's Peak. Ought we to conclude that the legend arose between the dates of the two works? Probably not. The argument *ex silentio* is always weak; and in another passage of the *Samanta Pāsādikā*, where this visit of the Buddha is mentioned,† nothing is said about Adam's Peak. Neither can it be an interpolation; for in the *Mahāvaṁsa* (i. 76, p. 7), written about half a century later,‡ also at Anu-

* *Institutes*, Bk. II. ch. i. § 5.

† For Christian Apocrypha connected with Adam cf. Hastings' *DB* i. 37 f. For the legend (as old as Origen) that Adam was buried on Golgotha, see Wilson, *Golgotha and the Holy Sepulchre*, 1906, p. 2 ff.

‡ Hadji Khan and Sparrow, *With the Pilgrims to Mecca*, 105, 106.

* Geiger, *Mahāvaṁsa und Dipavaṁsa* (Leipzig, 1905), p. 78.

† Printed in Oldenberg, *Vinaya Piṭaka*, vol. iii. p. 332.

‡ Sir E. Tennent, *Ceylon*, ii. 133, dates it 'prior to B.C. 301'!

rādhapura and also on the basis of the lost Sinhalese history, the Adam's Peak legend is referred to in almost identical words and in the same abrupt manner. If, then, the few words about Adam's Peak and the footprint have been inserted in a previous story, they must have been so inserted already in the lost Sinhalese *Mahāvaṁsa*. It seems curious that we hear no more of the legend, or of pilgrimages to the footprint, for many hundred years. Then in the continuation of the *Mahāvaṁsa* (ch. 64, line 30) the footprint is curtly mentioned in a list of sacred objects; and again (ch. 80, line 24), King Kitti Nissaṅka, A.D. 1187–1196, is said to have made a pilgrimage to Samanta-kūṭa. But as much of the literature of the intervening period has been destroyed, and as what survives is still buried in MS., this should not be deemed so surprising as it looks at first sight. It should perhaps be added that the local tradition, which the present writer heard when a magistrate in the adjoining district of Sītāwaka, was that the footprint was discovered by King Walagam Bāhu (B.C. 88–76) during his exile in the southern mountains in the early years of his reign. But we have found no literary record of this. It remains to say with regard to the Pāli evidence, that there is a poem called the *Samanta-kūṭa-vaṇṇanā*, written at an uncertain date, and probably by an author Wideha (who also wrote a popular collection of stories in Pāli, and an elementary grammar in Sinhalese), who seems more careful of little correctnesses and little elegances than of more important matters.* This work contributes nothing of value to the present question.

Fa Hian, who visited Ceylon about A.D. 412, mentions the footprint; and Sir Emerson Tennent (*Ceylon*, i. pp. 584–586) gives, on the very excellent authority of the late Mr. Wylie, quotations from three mediæval Chinese geographers who speak reverentially of the sacred footmark impressed on Adam's Peak *by the first man*, who bears, in their mythology, the name of Pawn-ku. It would seem probable that these geographers may have derived this idea from the Muhammadans. For there were large settlements of Arabs, or at least Muhammadans, in China, before they wrote; the Arab traders were rightly regarded as good authorities in matters relating to foreign countries, and they had already the idea of connecting the footprint with Adam. This idea has been traced back in Arab writers to the middle of the 9th cent.,† and occurs frequently afterwards. Ibn Batūta, for instance, who saw the footprint of Moses at Damascus, gives a long account of his visit to the footprint of Adam on Adam's Peak. Whence did they derive the belief? Sir Emerson Tennent (vol. i. p. 135) is confident that it must have been from Gnostic Christians.

His combination is, shortly, as follows. It is well known that the Muslims regard Adam in a peculiarly mystic way, not only as the greatest of all patriarchs and prophets, but as the first vice-regent of God. This idea is neither Arabian nor Jewish; but the Gnostics, with whom the early Muhammadans were in close contact, rank Adam as the third emanation of God, and assign him a singular pre-eminence as Jeu, the primal man. Now they also say, as recorded in the *Pistis Sophia*,‡ that God appointed a certain spirit as guardian of his footprint; and in Philo Judæus, in his pretended abstract of Sanchoniathon, there is also reference to the footstep of Bauth (? Buddha) visible in Ceylon. So far Sir Emerson Tennent; and we will only say that now, when so much more is known of the *Pistis Sophia* and Philo Judæus, it is desirable that these curious coincidences should be examined by a competent scholar.

The evidence as to the Śaivite belief is much later. Ibn Batūta (*circa* 1340) mentions that four Jogis who went with him to the Peak had been wont yearly to make pilgrimage to it; and the *Pærakum Bā Sirita* (Parakkama Bāhu Charita), which is about a century later, mentions a Brahman returning from a pilgrimage to Samanala, the Sinhalese name of the Peak. But neither of these authorities says that the footprint was Śiva's; and indeed the latter says that the deity of the spot was Sumana. But in the Mahāvaṁsa (ch. 93[88f.]) it is stated that King Rāja Siṁha of Sītāwaka (A.D. 1581–1592) granted the revenues of the Peak to certain Śaivite ascetics. Rāja Siṁha had slain his father with his own hand; the Bhikshus had declared they would not absolve him of the crime; the ascetics said they could; so he smeared his body with ashes and adopted their faith, that of Śiva. The *sanna* or grant, issued by King Kīrti Śrī of Kandy in 1751, making a renewed grant to the Buddhist Bhikshu at the Peak, calls these Śaivite faqīrs Āndiyas.* Possibly the Śaivite tradition may date from this event. But it may also be somewhat older. In the *Thatchana Kailāsa Mānmiyam*, a Tamil legendary work on Trinkomali, it is said that rivers flow from the Peak out of Śiva's foot there. The date of this little work is unknown, and the present writer has seen only the extract given by Skeen (p. 295).

Whatever opinion they hold about the footprint, both Tamils and Sinhalese consider the deity of the place to be Saman Dewiyo, as he is called in Sinhalese, or Sumana (also Samanta) as he is called in Pāli. His shrine still stands on the topmost peak just beneath the pavilion over the footprint, and his image has been reproduced by Skeen (p. 258). Skeen also gives (p. 206) a ground plan and woodcut of the buildings on the Peak in 1880; Tennent (ii. 140) gives a ground plan and woodcut of them as they appeared in 1858; and Dr. Rost, in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1903, p. 656, gives two woodcuts, one of the upper pavilion and one of the footmark. On the little rock plateau at the top of the mountain—it is only about 50 by 30 ft.—there is the boulder on the top of which is the footprint covered by a pavilion, the shrine of Saman Dewiyo, a shrine containing a small image of the Buddha recently erected, and a hut of wood and plaster work occupied by Buddhist Bhikshus. The four who were there when Rost visited the Peak told him that they had not been down from the mountain for four years. They complained of the cold, but said that otherwise they were quite contented, and had much time for study, and showed him their palm-leaf books. Rost says that the depression in the rock is now 5½ ft. long by 2¾ ft. broad, and that the heel of the footprint is well preserved, but the toes are not visible, being covered by the wall of the pavilion.

LITERATURE.—Tennent and Rost as cited above, and William Skeen, *Adam's Peak*, Colombo, 1880.

T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

ADAPTATION.—Almost every detail of inherited structure and congenital behaviour shows fit adjustment to the needs and conditions of life, and may be spoken of as an adaptation. Wherever we look throughout the wide world of animate nature, we find illustrations of particular fitness to particular conditions. The size, the shape, the colour of an organism, the structure of parts in relation to their use and in their relations to other parts, the everyday behaviour and the only occasional activities, *e.g.* those concerned with reproduction, — almost every detail of structure and function is *adaptive*. The term may be used simply as a descriptive adjective, implying that the structure or function in question is fit, effective, well-adjusted, making for the preservation or well-being of the individual or of the species; but in biological usage it has also a theoretical implication, that the detail in question—if it be more than an individual accommodation, more than an individually acquired modification—is *the result of a process of evolution*. It was not always as it is now, it has a history behind it, it is a product of the factors of evolution, whatever these may be (see EVOLUTION).

The structure of a long bone in a mammal is adapted to give the utmost firmness with the minimum expenditure of material; the unique pollen-basket on the hind legs of worker-bees is adapted to stow away the pollen; the colours and patterns on the wings of leaf-insects are adapted to harmonize with the

* James D'Alwis, *Sidat Saṅgarawa*, p. clxxxiii., puts him in the 14th cent.; Wijesinhe, *Sinhalese Manuscripts in the British Museum*, p. xvii., in the 13th century. This may be the same as the *Sumana-kūṭa-vaṇṇanā* assigned at p. 72 of the *Gandha Vaṁsa* (*JPTS*, 1886) to Vācissara, who belongs to the 12th cent. A.D.

† Reinaud, *Voyages Arabes et Persans dans le ixme siècle*, vol. i. p. 5 f. It is also found in Tabari.

‡ Schwartze's translation, p. 231.

* A full translation of the *Sanna* is given by Skeen. See p. 290.

foliage on which they settle; the parts of flowers are often adapted to ensure that the insect-visitors are dusted with pollen, and thus to secure cross-fertilization; the leaf of the Venus Fly-Trap is adapted to attract, capture, and digest flies; the peacock is adapted to captivate the pea-hen; the mother mammal is adapted for the prolonged pre-natal life of the young; the so-called 'egg-tooth' at the end of a young bird's bill is adapted to the single operation of breaking the egg-shell, —and so on throughout the whole of the animate world. It is indeed a mistake to dwell upon signal instances of adaptations, since (apart from degenerative changes in old age, morbid processes, perverted instincts, rudimentary or vestigial structures, and certain 'indifferent' characters which are not known to have any vital significance) almost every detail of structure and function may be regarded as adaptive.

To gain a clearer idea of what is one of the most difficult and fundamental problems of biology, it may be useful to consider briefly—(1) effectiveness of response; (2) plasticity; (3) modifiability, which lead on to the conception of adaptiveness.

1. **Effectiveness of response.**—One of the characteristics of organisms, as contrasted with inanimate systems, is their power of *effective response* to environmental stimuli. The barrel of gunpowder can respond to the external stimulus of a spark, but it responds self-destructively; the living creature's responses tend to self-preservation or to species-preservation. A piece of iron reacts to the atmosphere in rusting, it becomes an oxide of iron and ceases to be what it was; a living organism also reacts to the atmosphere, every muscular movement involves a rapid oxidation, but in spite of this and many another change the organism retains its integrity for a more or less prolonged period. Its reactions are effective. Not that the organism can respond successfully to all stimuli, *e.g.* to a strong current of electricity, for it is not able to live anywhere or anyhow, but only within certain environmental limits which we call the essential conditions of its life. We cannot account for this primary and fundamental power of effective response; it is part of our conception of life. In some degree it must have been possessed by the first and simplest organisms, though it has doubtless been improved upon in the course of evolution. Without wresting words, it cannot be said that inanimate systems ever exhibit effectiveness of response. A river carves through a soft rock and circles round a hard one, a glacier circumvents a crag, a crystal may mend itself, but it cannot be said that there is any advantage to river, glacier, or crystal in the way it behaves. The biological concept is plainly irrelevant. The nearest analogues, perhaps, to organic effectiveness of response are to be found in automatically regulated machines, but the analogy is little more than a pleasing conceit, since the machine is a materialization of human ingenuity and without any intrinsic autonomy.

2. **Plasticity.**—But in addition to the primary inherent power of effective response, we must also recognize that living creatures are in different degrees plastic. That is to say, they can adjust their reactions to novel conditions, or they can, as we seem bound to say, 'try' first one mode of reaction and then another, finally persisting in that which is most effective. Thus, Dallinger was able to accustom certain Monads to thrive at an extraordinarily high temperature; thus Jennings reports that the behaviour of certain Infusorians may be compared to a pursuance of 'the method of trial and error'; thus some marine fishes are plastic enough to live for days in fresh water. How much of this plasticity is primary or inherent in the very nature of living matter, how much of it is secondary and wrought out by Natural Selection in the course of ages, must remain in great measure a matter of opinion. Each case must be judged on its own merits. It is certain that many unicellular organisms are very plastic, and it seems reasonable to suppose that, as differentiation increased, restrictions were placed on the primary plasticity, while a more specialized secondary plasticity was gained in many cases, where organisms lived in environments liable to frequent vicissitudes. It is convenient to use the term '*accommodation*' for the frequently occurring functional adjustments which many organisms are able to make to new conditions. When a muscle becomes stronger if exercised beyond its wont, we may speak of this temporary individual acquisition as a functional accommodation. See ACCOMMODATION.

3. **Modifiability.**—Advancing a third step, we recognize as a fact of life that organisms often exhibit great *modifiability*. That is to say, in the course of their individual life they are liable to be so impressed by changes in surrounding influences and by changes in function, that, as a direct consequence, modifications of bodily structure or habit are acquired. 'Modifications' may be defined as structural changes in the body of an individual organism, directly induced by changes in function or in environment, which transcend the limit of organic elasticity and persist after the inducing conditions have ceased to operate. They are often inconveniently called 'acquired characters.' Thus a man's skin may be so thoroughly 'tanned' by the sun during half a lifetime in the tropics, that it never becomes pale again, even after migration to a far from sunny clime. It is a permanent modification, as distinguished (*a*) from a temporary adjustment, and (*b*) from congenital swarthiness.

It is admitted by all that both temporary adjustments and more permanent modifications may make for survival or for an increase of well-being that favours survival in the long run. But they may also be indifferent (as far as we can see), or they may even be injurious to the organism as a whole, *e.g.* when an important organ, in response to inadequate nutrition or stimulus, is arrested at a certain stage in its development. In themselves, however, they seem always in the direction of at least local effectiveness. It is difficult to bring forward any instance where the reaction is in itself in the wrong direction. It may spell degeneration, when judged by the normal level attained in other members of the species or in antecedent species, but the degeneration is in itself an effective response to the conditions thereof. A growing organ which does not receive adequate nutrition and the appropriate liberating stimuli, may stop growing; but while this *may be* injurious to the organism as a whole, it may be actually beneficial, and in any case it is the most effective response the organ as such could give. The change-provoking stimuli may imply conditions with which the organism cannot possibly cope, but the parts primarily affected may be said to do their best within the limits of their modifiability. Even a pathological process like inflammation, set up in response to intrusive microbes, is an effective reaction, and sometimes a life-saving one.

When a mammal taken to a colder climate acquires a thicker coat of hair, when a plant similarly treated acquires a thicker epidermis, when an area of skin much pressed upon becomes hard and callous, when a shoemaker in the course of his trade develops certain skeletal peculiarities, —and hundreds of examples might be given,—we call the results *adaptive modifications*. The changes are effective, useful, fit,—they may even make for the preservation of the individual, when the struggle for existence is keen. And yet these adjustments are not what are usually meant by 'adaptations.' For this term (used to denote a result, not a process) is most conveniently restricted to racial adjustments, that is, to characters which are inborn, not

acquired; which are expressions of the natural inheritance, not individual gains. It goes without saying that though these adaptations are potentially implicit in the germinal material — in the fertilized ovum—they cannot be expressed without appropriate 'nurture'; that is a condition of all development. But they are theoretically—however difficult the distinction may be in practice—quite different from acquired adaptive modifications, which are not innate though the potentiality of their occurrence necessarily is. According to the Lamarckian hypothesis, adaptations are due to the cumulative inheritance of individually acquired modifications; but as satisfactory evidence of the hereditary transmission of any modification as such or in any representative degree is, to say the least, far to seek, and as it is difficult to conceive of any mechanism whereby such transmission could come about (see HEREDITY), some other origin of adaptations must be sought for.

4. Origin of adaptations.—Within the limits of a short article it is impossible to discuss adequately a problem so difficult as that of the origin of adaptations. Like the correlated, but really distinct problem of the origin of species, it is one of the fundamental — still imperfectly answered — questions which the interpreter of animate nature has to face. We cannot do more than indicate the general tenor of the suggestions which evolutionists have offered.

(*a*) According to the Lamarckian theory, racial adaptations are due to the cumulative inheritance of individual adaptive modifications. But there is a lack of evidence in support of this interpretation, plausible as it seems; it is difficult to conceive of any internal mechanism whereby a change acquired by a part of the body can affect the germinal material in a manner so precise and representative that the offspring shows a corresponding change in the same direction. Moreover, there are many known cases where any such transmission of modifications certainly does *not* occur.

(*b*) The general Darwinian theory is that adaptations are due to the selection of those inborn and heritable variations which, by making their possessors better adapted to the conditions of their life, have some survival value. It is a fact of observation that in many groups of organisms the individuals fluctuate continually in various directions. These fluctuating variations appear as if they followed the law of chance. It is also a fact of observation that some of these variations increase the survival value of their possessors. It is inferred that the cumulative inheritance of these favourable variations, fostered by selection in any of its numerous forms, and helped by the elimination—gradual or sudden—of forms lacking the variations in the fit direction, or having others relatively unfit, may lead to the establishment of new adaptations. The greatest difficulty in this argument is to account for the origin of the fit variations, and this has to be met by the accumulation of observational and experimental data bearing on the origin and nature of variations. It is also necessary to accumulate more facts showing that selective processes — acting directively on fluctuating variations—do really bring about the results ascribed to them. To many, furthermore, it appears that more emphasis should be laid upon the power that many animals have of actively seeking out environments for which the variations they possess are adapted. Here, too, it is necessary to refer to the probable importance of some of the many forms of *Isolation*.

(*c*) The work of recent years—notably that of Bateson and De Vries—has made it plain that, besides the continually occurring 'fluctuating variations,' there are 'discontinuous variations' or 'mutations,' where a new character or group of characters not only appears suddenly, but may come to stay from generation to generation. It cannot be said that we understand the origin of these mutations, in some of which the organism in many of its parts seems suddenly to pass from one position of organic equilibrium to another; but that they do occur is indubitable, and their marked heritability is also certain. Mendel has given at once a demonstration and a rationale of the fact that certain mutations, when once they have arisen, are not likely to be swamped, but are likely to persist, unless, of course, selection is against them. In horticulture, in particular, artificial selection has operated in great part on mutations. If this interpretation be confirmed and extended, it will not be necessary to lay such a heavy burden on the shoulders of selection. But more facts are urgently needed, and how and under what conditions mutations—whether adaptive or non-adaptive—occur, remains an unsolved problem.

(*d*) In his theory of Germinal Selection, Weismann has elaborated an attractive subsidiary hypothesis. Supposing that the germinal material consists of a complex—a multiplicate—of organ-determining particles (the determinants), he postulates a struggle going on within the arcana of the germ-plasm. Supposing limitations of nutrition within the germ, he pictures an intra-germinal struggle in which the weaker determinants corresponding to any given part will get less food and will become weaker, while the stronger determinants corresponding to the same part will feed better and become stronger. Thus the theory suggests a hypothetical internal selection which will abet the ordinary external selection of individual organisms, and it makes the rise, if not the origin, of adaptations more intelligible. Or, to put it in another way, the theory suggests a possible mechanism by which the survival of any form with a favourable variation may influence the subsequent variational direction of that form. The determinants are supposed to be variable—everything living is; for each character separately heritable there are in the germ multiple determinants (paternal, maternal, grand-parental, ancestral): these are not all of equal strength; there is a germinal struggle and selection, the strongest asserts itself in development, and the resulting determinate corresponds in character to the victorious determinant. If the character of the resulting determinate is of survival value, those organisms which have that character tend to survive, and their progeny will tend to keep up the same strain. But while the external selection is proceeding, it is being continually backed up by the germinal selection. Thus nothing succeeds like success.

(*e*) Various evolutionists—Professors Mark Baldwin, H. F. Osborn, and C. Lloyd Morgan—have suggested that although individual adaptive modifications may not be transmissible, they may have indirect importance in evolution, by serving as life-preserving screens until coincident inborn or germinal variations in the same direction have time to develop. As Lloyd Morgan puts it—(1) 'Where adaptive variation v is similar in direction to individual modification m, the organism has an added chance of survival from the coincidence $m+v$; (2) where the variation is antagonistic in direction to the modification, there is a diminished chance of survival from the opposition $m-v$; hence (3) coincident variations will be fostered while opposing variations will be eliminated.' As Groos expresses it, in reference to some instinctive activities—Imitation may keep 'a species afloat until Natural Selection can substitute the lifeboat heredity for the life-preserver tradition.' As Mark

Baldwin states it, the theory is 'that individual modifications or accommodations may supplement, protect, or screen organic characters and keep them alive until useful congenital variations arise and survive by natural selection.'

Finally, in thinking over this difficult problem of adaptations, we must remember the importance of the active organism itself. As Professor James Ward has well pointed out, it may seek out and even in part make its environment; it is not only selected, it selects; it acts as well as reacts. And although the details and finesse of this may have been elaborated in the course of selection, the primary potentiality of it is an essential part of the secret of that kind of activity which we call Life.

LITERATURE.—J. Mark Baldwin, *Development and Evolution*, New York, 1902; W. K. Brooks, *The Foundations of Zoology*, New York, 1899; C. Lloyd Morgan, *Animal Behaviour*, London, 1900, *Habit and Instinct*, London, 1896, *The Interpretation of Nature*, London, 1905; T. H. Morgan, *Evolution and Adaptation*, New York, 1903; H. Münsterberg, *Die Lehre von der natürlichen Anpassung*, Leipzig, 1885; R. Otto, *Naturalistische und religiöse Weltansicht*, Tübingen, 1904 (Eng. tr. London, 1906); Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Biology*, revised ed. 1898, Part II. ch. v.; A. Weismann, *The Evolution Theory*, 2 vols. (Eng. tr. London, 1904).

J. ARTHUR THOMSON.

ADELARD.—Adelard of Bath (*Philosophus Anglorum*) occupies a distinctive position among the schoolmen of the 12th cent., as a chief representative of the philosophic doctrine of 'Indifference.' This was one of the mediating theories in the great mediæval conflict as to the nature of universal conceptions (genera and species) and their relation to the individuals comprehended under them. It lies between the extreme Realism on the one hand, which attached substantiality only to the universals, and the extreme Nominalism on the other, according to which generic conceptions were mere names, while reality belonged only to the individuals. It tends, however, to the side of Nominalism, inasmuch as it gives up the substantiality of universals, and makes the universal to consist of the non-different elements (*indifferentia*) in the separate individuals, which alone subsist substantially. Everything depends on the point of view from which the individuals are regarded: according as attention is fixed on their differences or their non-differences, they remain individuals or become for us the species and the genus. Thus Plato as Plato is an individual, as a man the species, as an animal the subordinate genus, as a substance the most universal genus.

This doctrine of Indifference was probably first stated in Adelard's treatise *de Eodem et Diverso*, composed between 1105 and 1116. [It has recently been edited by H. Willner in *Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Philos. des Mittelalters*, ed. by Cl. Bäumker and G. v. Hertling, Münster, 1903.] Adelard seeks to reconcile Plato and Aristotle, and says:

> 'Since that which we see is at once genus and species and individual, Aristotle rightly insisted that the universals do not exist except in the things of sense. But since those universals, so far as they are called genera and species, cannot be perceived by any one in their purity without the admixture of imagination, Plato maintained that they existed and could be beheld beyond the things of sense, to wit, in the Divine mind. Thus these men, though in words they seem opposed, yet held in reality the same opinion.'

The doctrine of Indifference was also represented by Walter of Mortagne (died as bp. of Laon, 1174), whom some indeed have regarded as its originator, while others again have traced it to a supposed late view of William of Champeaux.

Besides the above-mentioned tractate, Adelard wrote also *Quæstiones Naturales*. He had travelled widely and acquired great physical learning, especially from the Arabs, out of whose language he translated Euclid. He teaches that the knowledge of the laws of nature should be united with the recognition of their dependence on God's will. He says: 'It is the will of the Creator that herbs should grow from the earth, but this will is not without reason.' Mere authority he compares to a halter, and desiderates that reason should decide between the true and the false.

LITERATURE.—Art. 'Scholasticism' in *EBr*[9] xxi.; Erdmann, *Grundriss der Gesch. d. Philos.*[4] [Eng. tr. 1890] i. § 160; Windelband, *Lehrbuch der Gesch. d. Philos.*[3] (1893) § 23; Ueberweg-Heinze, *Grundriss der Gesch. d. Philos.*[9] (1894–8) ii. § 25, which see for a fuller bibliography

R. S. FRANKS.

ADIAPHORISM.—Three meanings of this word are given in the dictionaries: (1) the theory that some *actions* are indifferent, *i.e.* neither bad nor good, not being either commanded or forbidden by God, either directly or indirectly; so that they may be done or omitted without fault; (2) the theory that certain *rites or ceremonies*, not having been either commanded or forbidden by God, may freely be used or omitted without fault; (3) the theory that *certain doctrines of the Church*, though taught in the word of God, are of such minor importance, that they may be disbelieved without injury to the foundation of faith. (Although this use of the word can be found in good authors, it is a question whether it is accurate).

1. Actions.—Very early in the history of the Christian Church the gospel began to be conceived as a *new law*. Perhaps the wider meaning of the word 'law' had something to do with this. But it was to be expected that those who had grown up under a system of rigid prescription, not only of rites and ceremonies, but also of domestic observances and the details of personal conduct,—a prescription, moreover, that had Divine authority,—should be unable to conceive any other method of moral life. It is not strange, therefore, that St. James (1[25]) speaks of the gospel as 'the perfect law of liberty.' The early converts to the gospel had been heathen; the customs in which they had been bred were abhorrent to a Jew; they were corrupting; and therefore those new-made Christians had to be taught and drilled in the first principles of morality. In the Early Church, before the books of the NT had been written and for many years afterwards, the OT was the word of God read in their assemblies for worship; and its prescriptions for conduct, its rules of common life, and its religious institutions became authoritative. It seems likely that a legalistic conception of Christianity must always preponderate in a community recently won from heathenism. Such converts remain under tutelage, and discipline must be rigidly exercised, until the fundamental principles of right living are wrought into their conscience.

Marcion urged the rejection of the OT Law. As the Church began to spread through all classes of men, and to have part in the whole of their daily life, it began insensibly to accommodate its ascetic rules to the necessities of the case. Gradually there grew up a distinction between a law of morals incumbent upon all men and a higher rule of life voluntarily assumed, but when once assumed, of lasting obligation, and by the observance of which a man might earn a higher reward than was due to the simple observance of the commandments of God (*consilia evangelica*), and might even deserve enough of God to be able to transfer some of his merit to others (*opera supererogativa*). An ascetic life was looked upon as holier than the observance of the duties of one's calling in the world. To the commandments of God were added the commandments of the Church.

The Reformation assailed this notion of an esoteric and artificial righteousness. The moral injunctions of Jesus and His holy example are for all alike. The works of our calling are the sphere in which to serve God. No one can fulfil the law of God, much less can any one exceed it. All are

dependent upon God's mercy; and, forgiven for Christ's sake, depending upon that grace and thankful for it, are to go forth to the performance of daily duty, pleasing Him by childlike faith, not by the excellence of what they do.

It has been charged that the immediate result of the Reformation was a deterioration of morals, especially in regions where the Lutheran doctrine was taught, no efficient external discipline being at hand to take the place of the ecclesiastical rules and jurisdiction of the older time (see Döllinger, *Reformation*). A more successful effort was made under Calvin to introduce in Geneva a complete censorship of morals. The Puritans of England revived the conception of the gospel as a law. The Pietistic movement in Germany forbade as inconsistent with the Christian name all mere enjoyment and all the merely artistic activities of life. To do everything to the glory of God forbade all play. There was a revival of asceticism, which was taken up by the early Methodists in England (see Ritschl, *Geschichte des Pietismus*, 3 vols., 1880–6). In our own day there are many sects, notably the Second Adventists, who regard the OT Law as still in force in all its regulations, even concerning meat and drink.

To appreciate the answer which Christ gave to this question, we must bear in mind that the Pharisaism which He refuted endeavoured to secure the law of God by 'putting a fence around the Law,' consisting of inferential and artificial rules of life. Those who vigorously observed these the Pharisees accounted meritorious; and they put such stress on these comments and additions that by them they made the law of God of no effect. Our Lord rebuked the substitution of a human law for the simple law of God, and also the exaltation of human rules of life to the same sanctity as belonged to the revealed law. He required the inward service of the heart. Jesus was not an ascetic in the usual meaning of that word. He accepted invitations to the table (Lk 7^{36}), He honoured a wedding-feast (Jn $2^{1ff.}$), He spoke sympathetically of the children playing in the streets (Lk 7^{32}), He commended Mary's sacrifice of precious ointment (Mt $26^{6ff.}$, Jn $12^{2ff.}$), He submitted to be called a wine-bibber and a glutton (Mt 11^{19}). Neither was St. Paul an ascetic. It is evident that he did not consider it essential to his personal salvation to make distinctions of meats (Ro $14^{2.\ 6.\ 14}$, 1 Co 8^{4}, 1 Ti $4^{4.\ 5}$), to forego the use of wine (1 Ti 5^{23}), to raise anxious questions about the material of entertainments (1 Co 10^{27}), or to avoid social pleasures (*ibid.*); and he could look upon and talk about the games of Greece with no word of abhorrence or disapproval (1 Co 9^{24-27}). In writing to Timothy (1 Ti 4^{3-5}) he foretold those errorists who would 'forbid to marry, and command to abstain from meats, which God created to be received with thanksgiving by them which believe and know the truth. For every creature of God is good, and nothing is to be refused, if it be received with thanksgiving: for it is sanctified through the word of God and prayer.' 'Meat will not commend us to God,' he says (1 Co 8^{8}); 'neither, if we eat not, are we the worse; nor, if we eat, are we the better' (see also 1 Co $7^{26.\ 38}$, and cf. He 5^{14}). It is evident that a sphere is left for Christian freedom, in which a man may, nay must, use his own judgment, and in reference to which good men may differ, and no man may condemn his brother. Here we have the justification of what are described as merely æsthetic activities of human life, in which the natural delight of man in simple enjoyment has place, and where the law of beauty is supreme rather than the law of duty. No doubt St. Paul would have barred these out, because of 'the present distress' (1 Co 7^{26}); but his 'opinion' in contradistinction from 'the commandment of the Lord' allows them, though with the important qualifications we have yet to allude to. They derive a sanction from the constitution of man. Under this category we put the drama, music, art, all recreation. We therefore assert that there is a sphere for the freedom of a Christian. He is not under a positive law which extends to every corner of his life. He does not move in the sphere of a moral necessity. He must exercise judgment and choice. He must abound more and more in knowledge and all discernment, and prove the things that differ (Ph $1^{9f.}$). It is wrong for him to hinder and lame his conscience either by the cultivation of rigid unreasoning habits or by the adoption of a formal law (Frank, *Theologie der Concordienformel*, IV. x. 16 ff.).

But Christian freedom has its limits. These limits are external and internal. Our liberty may not 'become a stumblingblock to the weak, sinning against the brethren, wounding their conscience when it is weak' (1 Co 8^{9-12}). Some things that are lawful edify not (10^{23}); they contribute nothing (6^{12}). We are not to live in the moment, wasting the material of everlasting life (7^{30}). 'All things are lawful for me, but I will not be brought under the power of any' (6^{12}, Gal 5^{13}). To watchfulness on his own account the Christian must add a watchful love of his fellow-man.

LITERATURE.—See besides works quoted, writers on Christian Ethics, such as Harless, Wuttke, Martensen, Luthardt, *Gesch. der Christl. Ethik*; Gottschick in *PRE*^{3}, and Kübel in *PRE*^{2}.

2. Rites and ceremonies.—If we take up the second definition of our subject, we find that the same causes led the Early Church to believe that its rites and ceremonies had been commanded by God. The ceremonial laws of the OT doubtless do reveal the essential principles of the worship of God. These principles were enshrined in forms suitable to primitive times and prophetic of the realities by which the redemption of mankind was accomplished by our Lord Jesus Christ. But the OT, applied to forms of worship by way of illustration and explanation, became normative; so that gradually the Church came to have a priesthood, altars, and sacrifices of its own, with vestments and a ritual, and feasts and days; the observance of which was regarded as essential to the validity of its sacraments, and therefore to salvation, and the neglect of which was as deadly as a violation of the Decalogue. This view persists in parts of the Christian Church, and is invoked for the defence of existing institutions and privileges.

The Reformers acknowledged that the Church had a right to institute rites and ceremonies, and even ascribed to the Church the hallowing of the first day of the week instead of the seventh; but they denied that the Church had a right to claim for its institutions the unchangeableness and sanctity of the institutions and commandments of God. Christ left few ordinances—His Word, the two Sacraments, a ministry of the Word and Sacraments, His assured presence with the assembly of His people, the Lord's Prayer, these are all—and for the rest the Church was left to develop its forms of government and its forms of worship to suit the times and places in which it might be found. But what do we mean by 'the Church' in this statement? The clergy only? Or those who have attained to a headship of the clergy? Or, in countries where the State controls the Church, the ministry of worship? Or duly authorized Councils? Or representatives chosen by clergy and laity, expressing their preference by the vote of a majority? None of these. The judgment of the Church may finally decide a matter which has been approved with the concurrence of all these. A rite that once was significant and edifying may fall out of use, or may become harmful in the

lapse of time and under changing circumstances. All rites and ceremonies instituted by men are subject to the judgment of Christian conscience enlightened by the word of God.

In the Silver Age of the Reformation a warm controversy among Lutheran theologians was precipitated by the attempt of Charles v. to compromise the differences between the Evangelical Churches and the Roman Church, in the *Augsburg Interim* of 1548. The controversy raged about the permissibility of a vague formula which might be interpreted in two ways, and the revival of usages which the one side had rejected because they served error, and the other regarded as sacred and necessary. Flacius was the protagonist on the one side; Melanchthon was the target. The matter and the true position cannot be set forth more clearly than is done in the *Formula of Concord*, 1580.

'For the settlement of this controversy, we believe, teach, and confess, with one consent, that ceremonies or ecclesiastical rites (which had been neither commanded nor forbidden by the Word of God, but instituted only for the sake of decency and order) are not of themselves Divine Worship or any part of it. For it is written (Mt 15^9): "*In vain do they worship me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men.*"'

'The Churches of God everywhere throughout the world, and at any time, have the right to change such ceremonies according to the occasion, in whatever way it may seem to the Church most serviceable for its edification.'

'But in so doing all levity should be avoided and all offence, and especially should care be taken to spare those weak in faith (1 Co 8^9, Ro 14^{13}).'

'In times of persecution, when a clear and steadfast confession is required of us, we ought not to yield to the enemies of the Gospel in things indifferent. For the Apostle says (Gal 5^1): "*Stand therefore in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage*"; and (2 Co 6^{14}): "*Be not unequally yoked together with unbelievers. For what fellowship is there between light and darkness?*" etc.; also (Gal 2^5): "*To whom we gave place by subjection, no, not for an hour; that the truth of the gospel might continue with you.*" For in such a state of things the dispute no longer is about things indifferent, but concerning the truth of the Gospel and the preservation and protection of Christian liberty, and how to prevent open idolatry; and the protection of those who are weak in faith against offence. In matters of this sort we ought not to yield anything to our adversaries, but it is our duty to give a faithful and sincere confession, and patiently to bear whatever the Lord may lay upon us and may permit the enemies of His Word to do to us.'

'No Church ought to condemn another because that Church observes more or fewer of outward ceremonies which the Lord did not institute, if only there be between them consent in all articles of Doctrine and in the right use of the Sacraments. Well and truly was it said of old: "*Disagreement as to fasting does not dissolve agreement in faith.*"'

'We repudiate and condemn these false teachings, as contrary to the Word of God, viz.: that human traditions and constitutions in matters ecclesiastical are to be considered by themselves a Worship of God or a part of such worship; that such ceremonies and constitutions should be forced upon the Church of God as necessary, against the Christian liberty which the Church of Christ has with reference to outward things of this sort; that in time of persecution, when a clear confession is required, the enemies of the Gospel may be placated by the observance of things of this sort that are in themselves indifferent, and that it is permitted to agree and consent with them—a thing detrimental to heavenly truth; that outward ceremonies, because they are indifferent, should not be observed, as if the Church of God were not free in Christian liberty to use this or that ceremony which it may deem useful for edification.' (See Planck, *Gesch. des Prot. Lehrbegriffs*, iv.; Jacobs, *Book of Concord*, ii.; Bieck, *Das Dreyfache Interim*).

There remains the question whether each person has a right to change the ordinances of the Church according to his own judgment and taste, observing such as he pleases, and omitting those of which he disapproves. Inasmuch as these rites and ceremonies are things indifferent, he should conform to the custom of the Church, lest he be disorderly (2 Th $3^{6.11}$, 1 Co 11^{16}). Again, it may be asked by what test a rite or ceremony handed down in the Church is to be estimated. The *Augsburg Confession* teaches (Art. vii.) that rites should be observed that contribute to unity and good order, and the *Apology for the Confession* (iv. 33), 'that the Church of God of every place and every time has power, according to circumstances, to change such ceremonies *in such manner as may be most useful and edifying to the Church of God.*'

A further question may be raised, as to the authority of good taste, of æsthetic canons, in regard to the forms and accessories of Christian worship. In this matter, without doubt, edification is of more value than artistic merit, and all must yield to the instinct of Christian love.

3. Doctrines.—In order to answer the question suggested by the third definition, the distinction between a 'dogma,' a 'doctrine,' and 'the faith' must be clearly apprehended. *Dogmas* result from an analysis of the faith, and the word is properly restricted to those statements of Christian truth which have been finally declared by the authorities of the Church and accepted by the Church in its Confessions. A dogma is always subject to examination and challenge. Not even a Council of the Universal Church is infallible. Even the Œcumenical Creeds must justify themselves to the Christian consciousness by their evident agreement with the word of God. *Doctrine* is an explanation and elaboration of the faith which has not yet crystallized into dogma. *The Faith* is the gospel—the 'faith once delivered to the saints' (Jude ^{3}).

Dogmas can be understood either in the original sense in which they were approved and confessed by the Church, or in the sense in which they are apprehended by any age. It is conceivable that a student may discover a deflection of popular and universal faith from the idea which the original authors of a Confessional formula meant to set forth in it. Every dogma must be understood in relation to the entirety of the faith. Each age gives especial attention to different aspects of the faith. The 'spirit of the age,' its conception of human duties and human rights, its philosophical notions, colour its explanations of Divine truth and cause the emphasis laid upon different aspects of it to vary. From its own standpoint every age and clime develops first doctrine, then dogma. That, finally, is recognized as Christian dogma *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creditur. Securus judicat orbis terrarum.*

EDWARD T. HORN.

ĀDIBUDDHA (the theistic system of Nepāl, including its Buddhist antecedents, Dhyānibuddhas, etc.).—*Introduction.*—Abel Rémusat stated in 1831 that 'the learned of Europe were indebted to Mr. Hodgson for the name of Ādibuddha.'* And it might almost be said with truth still that nowhere else do we find such a systematic and complete account of the theory of the theistic Buddhists of Nepāl (*Aiśvarikas*) † as Hodgson has given in his *Essays*.

Unitarian and theistic Buddhism, after having aroused keen interest,‡ fell later into neglect, when attention was drawn to primitive or ancient Buddhism, especially by the works of Spence Hardy and Burnouf. The result of the iconographic discoveries and the Tibetan studies of the last few years seems to have been to bring it again into greater prominence. It is well worth examining, because, although more 'Alexandrian' than Buddhist, Buddhist in fact only in name and in so far as it employs Buddhist terminology, it nevertheless is, as it were, the consummation of the philosophical, mystical, and mythological speculations of the Great Vehicle, and differs from several other systems, widespread in the Buddhist world, only by its markedly 'theistic' colouring. The system of the *Aiśvarikas* is, in effect, merely the half-*naiyāyika* (*i.e.* theistic), half-*Śaivite* (*i.e.* pantheistic) interpretation of the ontological and religious speculation of the Great Vehicle in the last

* See Hodgson, *Essays*, p. 110.
† From *Īśvara*, the personal and supreme god. (See THEISM)
‡ See Schmidt, *Grundlehre*; Burnouf, *Introduction*.

stage of its development. It differs from it sufficiently clearly, however, to justify Burnouf in recognizing in the system of the *Ādibuddha* a new kind of Buddhism — a third (or a fourth) Buddhism*; and, in order to give the reader a just appreciation of the significance of this new interpretation of Buddhism, before unheard of, it will suffice to state that the old formula, 'Of all that proceeds from causes the Tathāgata has explained the cause,' was transformed into, 'Of all that proceeds from causes the Tathāgata *is* the cause.'†

A further characteristic of the *Aiśvarikas* of Hodgson, in which they stand apart from Hindu or Nepalese thought, is the absence from their theology of every feminine, tantric, and magical element. It is well known that Hodgson had recourse for his information to native scholars, whom he ceremoniously styles 'living oracles,' and who, in support of their statements, supplied him with fragments of texts, which were not all authentic. These mutilated testimonies, this tradition arranged with a view to meet questions conceived in an altogether European spirit, are, as far as the absence of the above-mentioned element is concerned, confirmed by the Svayambhūpurāṇa, which is not very tantric. We do not, however, believe that, even apart from the wide and comprehensive nature of its mythology, Nepalese theism has in reality ever been quite free from intermixture of Saivite thought.

Plan and division.—As the problem has not been examined in its entirety for a long time, and as much light has been thrown upon it by recent research, we propose to state it here, as completely as possible, from the doctrinal point of view, of course; for we shall willingly dispense with legendary, iconographic, and ritual details.‡

The interest of *Ādibuddha* systems (for there are at least two of them) lies chiefly in their relation to genuine Buddhism and to Hinduism. It will be most convenient (I.) to give a brief account of those Ādibuddha systems which are more or less well known, and (II.) to inquire into their antecedents, often obscure and problematic, beginning with the sources, so that we may be able in this way (III.) to 'locate' the systems in question, doctrinally and historically, and to present a more accurate appreciation of them.

As most of these antecedents will demand separate treatment (see AVALOKITEŚVARA, LOTUS OF THE TRUE LAW, MAHĀYĀNA, MAÑJUŚRĪ), a brief reference will here suffice. We shall confine ourselves to Buddhist ground, for, although this long elaboration of the elements of the Buddhist systems of Ādibuddha may be inexplicable without Hinduism, it will be sufficient to note, in passing, the points of contact.

I. *ĀDIBUDDHA SYSTEMS.*—1. *Aiśvarika system* (Hodgson's sources). — There is an *Ādibuddha* or *Paramādibuddha* (Tib. *dañ-poi saṅs-rgyas, mchog-gi daṅ-poi . . .*, § *thog-mai . . .* ‖), *i.e.* first Buddha, primary Buddha, Buddha from the beginning, Buddha unoriginated.¶ He exists by himself, and in fact is called *Svayambhū*,** like Brahmā, and is worshipped under this name in his great temple at Kāṭhmaṇḍu.* He has never been seen;† he is in *nirvāṇa*. Nevertheless, he is 'pure light'; he issues from the 'void' (*śūnyatā*); and his names are innumerable. It is said that prayers are not addressed to him; yet he is worshipped in his temple. He dwells in the *Akaniṣṭhabhuvana*, that is, in the upper region of the world of forms,‡ symbolized by the apex of the *chaitya*, as if it had been forgotten that in the Buddhist cosmology there are numerous formless heavens.§ He has, besides, like every divinity, a *maṇḍala*,‖ or mystic circle, for conjuratory or mystical purposes.

By five acts of his contemplative power (*dhyāna*), the Ādibuddha or Mahābuddha creates five Buddhas called Buddhas of contemplation or *Dhyānibuddhas.*¶ They are Vairochana, Akṣobhya, Ratnasambhava, Amitābha, and Amoghasiddha.** These are in the world of becoming (*pravṛtti*). Prayers are not addressed to them (so Hodgson); but they have temples called *chaityas*, like those of Ādibuddha. By the twofold power of knowledge and contemplation, to which they owe their existence, they give birth to 'Bodhisattvas of contemplation,' *dhyānibodhisattvas*,†† viz., Samantabhadra, Vajrapāṇi, Ratnapāṇi, Avalokita or Padmapāṇi, and Viśvapāṇi respectively. These are the actual creators of the physical universe, but the worlds which they produce are perishable, and three of these creations have already ceased to exist. That of which we form a part is the fourth, *i.e.* it is the work of Avalokiteśvara, the fourth Bodhisattva, the 'Providence' of the present; and has as its special Buddha, 'protector' and 'conqueror' (*nātha, jina*) Amitābha, who is enthroned in the midst of his elect. For its instructor it has had Śākyamuni, the fourth human Buddha. There are five human Buddhas (*mānuṣibuddhas*),‡‡ who correspond to the

Even in late texts we find Svayambhū explained as follows: *svayambhavati svayambhūr bhāvanābalād bhavatīty arthaḥ* (Nāmasaṅgīti, 10); *svayambhūḥ sarvavikalparahitatvāt* (*ib.* 60). See Aṣṭasāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā, 2 ff., 10; *tathāgatatvaṃ buddhatvaṃ svayambhūtvaṃ sarvajñatvaṃ.*

* The temple is described in Fergusson, *Hist. of Ind. Arch.* fig. 170; Wright, *Hist. of Nepāl*; Bendall and S. Lévi, *Népal*. It is represented in the miniatures of MSS of the 11th cent. (Foucher, *Icon. Bouddhique*, i.). Köppen (ii. p. 367) recalls the fact that, according to Kirkpatrick (*An Account*, p. 148), the Great Lāma for a long time maintained relations with the temple.

† The Ādibuddha is sometimes called *Viśvarūpa*, 'who takes every form,' and is so represented (Hodgson, *Essays*, 83; Foucher, *Catalogue*, pp. 12, 18).

‡ The world to which those saints ascend, who, being comparatively little advanced, must wait many centuries before attaining to *nirvāṇa*, although they are not on that account condemned to a new earthly existence; they are the fifth class of the *Anāgāmins*, according to the Little Vehicle.

§ It is not clear that the Ādibuddha of the Nepalese extends his reign beyond the present *Kalpa* (Age of the World). He is father of five Buddhas only. It seems to be forgotten that there are millions of Kalpas and millions of Buddhas.

‖ That is a *nakṣatramaṇḍala*, a 'constellation circle.' Recalling the triad, Buddha, Dharma, Saṅghamaṇḍala (*Svayambhūpurāṇa*), Ādibuddha is *triratnamūrti*, 'the three gems embodied.'

¶ The present writer has never, in any Sanskrit or Tibetan text, met with the expression 'dhyānibuddha.' The five Buddhas are called the 'five Jinas' or the 'five Buddhas' in the Sanskrit texts as well as in Tibet, in Cambodia, and in Java. He is inclined to believe that we have to do here either with an invention due to Hodgson's pandits or with a very late source. As the St. Petersburg Dictionary observes, *Dhyānibuddha*, if rightly contrasted with *Mānuṣibuddha* (human Buddha, cf. *mānuṣikanyā*) ought to mean 'Buddha born of meditation [of Ādibuddha]' and not 'meditating Buddha' = Dhyānin-buddha = dhyānibuddha. We know of Jñānabuddhas, Jñānabodhisattvas (*ye-śes saṅs-rgyas, ye-śes byaṅ-chub-sems-dpa*), who cannot be distinguished from the Vajrabuddhas. They correspond to the five jñānas or mystic sciences. These are the five so-called Dhyānibuddhas, regarded from the tantric point of view (*jñānam bhagam iti smṛtam*).

** Sometimes a sixth, Vajrasattva, who creates (or causes to be created) immaterial substances, while the five others create corporeal forms.

†† The same may be said of them as of the 'Dhyānibuddhas'; since the Bodhisattvas are not in *Dhyāna*, the word can only mean 'born of dhyāna.'

‡‡ There is a list in the Little Vehicle of seven human Buddhas who are also worshipped in Nepāl (Wilson ii., Bauddha tracts).

* *Introduction*, p. 581.

† For the ancient formula see Kern, *Manual*, pp. 25, 49; Hodgson, *Essays*, p. 111.

‡ See NEPĀL, LĀMAISM, ICONOGRAPHY (BUDDHIST).

§ Csoma's and Grünwedel's sources (Mongol. *Angh'an burh'an*).

‖ Waddell's sources.

¶ Urbuddha (Lassen, *Ind. Alt.*² ii. 1103), Buddha of the Buddhas (Wass. p. 134); ādibuddha = ādau buddha (Nāmasaṅgīti, 100), or = anādibuddha. He appears at the beginning of time (at the commencement of the *Kalpa*), the crystal jewel in the lotus (*maṇi . . . padme*). Ādinātha = Ādibuddha; it is also the name of a more or less historical (?) personage (Wilson, i. 214; see AVALOKITEŚVARA, note *ad fin.*).

** Svayambhūlokanātha, 'self-existing protector of the world,' also Sambhū (a name of Śiva), and Ādinātha, 'first protector.' See a beautiful hymn addressed to him, Svayambhūpurāṇa, p. 56. The term Svayambhū has been from ancient times an epithet of Buddhas, because Buddhas have obtained Buddhahood without any external help, and also because Buddhahood is uncaused.

five Buddhas of contemplation. They are not, however, incarnations of them, but rather 'reflexes,' *pratibimba*, 'magical projections,' *nirmāṇakāya*.

2. It is difficult to date Hodgson's sources.* The same difficulty exists with regard to the poetical version of the Kāraṇḍavyūha, of which the *terminus a quo* will perhaps be supplied by the date of the Tibetan translation of the prose version of the same text. In this prose edition, the only one which the Tibetans have known or have cared about, there is, indeed, a passage wanting, namely the passage of the verse edition where Ādibuddha, Svayambhū, Ādinātha (first protector) appears at the beginning (ādisamudbhūta) in the form of light (jyotirūpa). He gives himself to 'meditation on the creation of the universe,' and begets Avalokiteśvara as demiurge. It is not said that he creates the Buddhas, but rather that he is 'made up of the parts of the five Buddhas.' †

3. The name 'Ādibuddha' or 'Paramādibuddha' appears in more ancient documents. According to Csoma, who was the first and only one to determine this chronology, this name and the system to which it is attached are closely connected with the Śrīkālachakratantra, a tantra openly Śaivite in its inspiration, which was probably 'introduced (?) into India in the 10th cent. and into Tibet in the 11th century.' ‡

Now, however, it is a recognized fact that the Tantras are much older than used to be thought. § It should at least be noticed that Mañjuśrī (*q.v.*) is called Ādibuddha in the Nāmasaṅgīti (vv. 55. 100), a book undoubtedly earlier than the 10th cent., if it is the case, as Tāranātha believes, that Chandragomin, a contemporary of Chandrakīrti (7th cent.) wrote a commentary upon it. ‖ It is not necessary to discuss the question whether the interpretation, given in the commentaries of the Nāmasaṅgīti and numerous tantric works, ¶ was accepted at the time when, according to this tradition, the work itself was composed.

There were good reasons for ascribing to Mañjuśrī the character of an Ādibuddha, inasmuch as he is the personification of the knowledge whence Buddhas originate, and since he is more than a Bodhisattva, viz., a 'Jñānasattva,' in other words the *Dharmakāya* (see below) or the *Dharmadhātuvāgīśvara*. His attributes, in iconography, are the sword which destroys ignorance and the book of the Prajñāpāramitā, 'the supreme book.' King of sages (Vādirāj), Lord of the Holy Word (Vagīśvara), he is in his eternity (*trikāla*) a symbolic Ādibuddha, with a symbolism transparent enough, in the same way as the Prajñāpāramitā (later known as the Ādiprajñā) in very orthodox texts is called the mother of the Buddhas. Even if, as the texts inform us, he is 'made up of a part of the Tathāgatas,' or, conversely, the five Buddhas emanate from his person; or if the icons place the five Buddhas on his head, or in the halo of radiance with which he is crowned; if his four faces, together with the fact that he is the spouse of Sarasvatī, bring him singularly close to Brahmā,* these are conceptions which do not alter his original character any more than does his accidental identification with Anaṅga, the god of Love, or with Śiva, etc. Mañjuśrī is Ādibuddha, because he is the king of the Prajñā. †

4. Although in certain documents Mañjuśrī is a tantric Ādibuddha, his origin is on the side of purely philosophical speculation. The Tantras have an Ādibuddha of a different nature, nearer to Śiva-Brahmā than to Brahmā or Viṣṇu, viz. Vajrasattva-Vajradhara, whom later on we shall have occasion briefly to discuss.

II. *ANTECEDENTS OF THE ĀDIBUDDHA SYSTEM.* —By more or less well-defined steps we can follow the evolution of Buddhism from its origin (Little Vehicle) down to the conceptions which have just been discussed. There remain for examination the conceptions of the Buddha in nirvāṇa, and of the Bodhisattva, the confusion of the Buddha and the Bodhisattva, the doctrine of the three bodies and the Dhyānibuddhas.

1. *Buddha in quasi-nirvāṇa.*—(1) We shall see (AGNOSTICISM [in Buddhism]) that, according to the doctrine of the Vaibhājyavādins, and perhaps the Sthaviras, *nirvāṇa* can scarcely be anything else than annihilation. The canonical texts, however, are much less definite. It is said that 'the Buddha in *nirvāṇa* evades the grasp of the intelligence, just as it is impossible to measure the waters of the ocean, they are too many.' From this the conclusion may be, and has been, drawn that *nirvāṇa* is an undefinable state, but very different from nothingness. This is, moreover, the old meaning of the word *nirvāṇa*.

(2) It is not, however, necessary, as a matter of fact, to sift the question of *nirvāṇa*, and to solve it in an unorthodox and Brāhmanical way, in order to people the heavens with divine Buddhas. For a 'sutta' of the first order represents Śākyamuni as possessed of the power of prolonging his earthly existence to the end of the *kalpa* (see AGES OF THE WORLD [Buddhist]). There is no doubt that it was early believed that he continued to live 'invisible to gods and men,' and the new theology proved less timid than the old. According to the Sukhāvatī (§ 2), a Buddha lives for a hundred thousand *niyutas* (millions) of *koṭis* (ten millions) of kalpas, or more, without the beauty of his complexion being marred. Śākyamuni did not live eighty years! Only the Tathāgatas understand the vast duration of his life. ‡

(3) The Mahāvastu relates that Śākyamuni, and as a rule any Buddha, or even a future Buddha

* Especially the Svayambhūpurāna (ed. *Bibl. Indica*). See on its date Haraprasād Śāstrī, *JBTS* II. 2, p. 83, and Lévi (later than 1460); and for the contents Rājendralāl, 249; Hodgson, 115; Burnouf, 539, 540; Lévi, *Népal*, I. 212; Foucher, *Cat. des peintures népalaises*, pp. 17 ff. Hodgson mentions also the Nāmasaṅgīti, Sādhanamālā, Bhadrakalpāvadāna, Divyāvadāna.

† See Burnouf, *Introd.* pp. 211–230.

‡ See Bendall, *Catalogue*, p. 69; Cowell and Eggeling, *Catalogue*, No. 49; Kandjur, *Rgyud*, I. 8: Paramādibuddhodhṛtaśrīkālachakra nāma tantrarājaḥ (Csoma-Feer, p. 292); the *Essays* by Csoma; Rémusat, *Mélanges*, p. 421; and, on a Hindu *Kālachakra*, Haraprasād, *Cat. Durbar Library*, 1905, p. IX.; last, but not least, Grünwedel, *Myth.*, pp. 44, 45, 60. Suchandra, who has the title of Kulika (*rigs-ldan*), the title of the Zhambhala kings, received it from Buddha at Dhānyakaṭaka (Orissa), and, returning to his own country, he composed the Kālachakra mūlatantra in 965 A.D. The Śambhala (Grünwedel has Zhaṃbhala; the Tibetan is *bde-ḥbyun*, corresponding to *bde-byed*, Śaṅkara; then *ḥbyuṅ=bhava=bhala* (Dr. P. Cordier); see Sarat Chandra, *Tib. Dict.* pp. 1231 and 6/0; MS Hodgson, *RAS*, 49, I., st. 26, 150, 156, etc.] should be located on the Jaxartes. It is from that country that the Tibetan calendar comes, and every one admits the influence of Upper Asia (Khotan, etc., or Mahāchina, as the Chinese say) on the fate of Buddhism. According to Grünwedel, the book presents a distinctly Vaiṣṇavite appearance; the date is fixed by the mention of Islām and Muhammad (Madhumati), and of Mecca (Makha), where the religion of the Barbarians (*mlechha*) is prevalent. Tāranātha, p. 305.

The whole of the text preserved in the London and Cambridge MS (*Śrīdvādaśasāhasrikādibuddhoddhṛte śrimati kālachakre*) is composed in a complicated metre, and professes to be only a recension of the Ādibuddha [tantra]. It ascribes to this book the honour of being the first to explain the *kulīśapada*, and therefore gives to it the title of *tantrottara*. The god Kālachakra receives the titles of *jinapati*, *jinendra*, *viśvabhartṛ*, *jinajanaka*, Father, King, Teacher of the Buddhas, Bearer of the Universe; but this Ādibuddha is at the same time the son of all the Buddhas, just as he remains young in spite of his old age, *vṛddho 'pi tvam kumāraḥ sakalajinasuto 'py ādibuddhas tvam ādau*.

§ Haraprasād Śāstrī, *Report*, 1895–1900; *Proc. Be. RAS*, 1900, August (Niśvāsasattvasaṃhitā, about 800 A.D.).

‖ Tāranātha, p. 152.

¶ Namely, in the Piṇḍikrama, published as the first chapter of the Pañchakrama (Ghent, 1896).

* *Devātideva: brahmātmakatvāt*, elsewhere *devendra: viṣṇusvabhāvatvāt*.

† See Foucher, *Iconographie bouddhique*, Part II., and Jñānasattvamañjuśrī-ādibuddhasādhana, *Rgyud* 61. Mañjuśrī is also the patron of arts, architecture, and image-makers; see Haraprasād Śāstrī, *Cat. Durbar Library*, lxvii.

‡ He is *nityakāya*. As regards the office and work of a Buddha before nirvāṇa, according to the Little Vehicle, see *Divya*, 150, 17; *Mahāvastu*, I. 51; compare and contrast the vows of Amitābha in the Sukhāvativyūha.

(Bodhisattva) during his last existence, has the appearance of hesitating, thinking, speaking, acting, suffering as we do. This, however, is wholly due to his condescension. In reality this marvellous being is superior to all such emotions, and remains a stranger to them. To maintain the contrary is heresy. The body of the future Buddhas is entirely spiritual. There is nothing 'mundane' in them. A Bodhisattva has really no father, no mother, no son, etc.

This 'hyperphysical' system (*lokottaravāda*) is more precisely set forth in the Vetulyaka school. According to their teaching, Śākyamuni did not appear in person in the world, but deputed an image of himself to represent him (cf. DOCETISM).

(4) The Mahāvastu says that many ages ago Śākyamuni took the vow of Bodhi in the presence of another ancient Śākyamuni. The same book speaks of eight thousand Buddhas of the name of Dīpaṅkara, . . . of three hundred millions of Śākyamunis.* If we identify this ancient Buddha with ours, make all the Dīpaṅkaras, all the Śākyamunis, all the Dhvajottamas, etc., into one single Dīpaṅkara, one single Śākyamuni, and adopt the docetic theory of the Vetulyakas, we obtain the system of the 'Lotus of the True Law.' Countless ages ago, nay rather in the beginning, Śākyamuni became Buddha; his appearances on earth, in which he seems to become Buddha, to enter into *nirvāṇa*, etc., are purely magical.†

Although it was quite late when the Mahāvastu received its final shape, the characteristics to which we have drawn attention seem to be ancient. For the Lotus the *terminus ad quem* is A.D. 265. As for the docetic theory, it is held to have been condemned at the Council of Pāṭaliputra (*circa* B.C. 246). Although the historical existence of the Council may be doubtful, the impression remains that the Buddhists had early reached the following conceptions:—

(*a*) Śākyamuni survives his earthly *parinirvāṇa*, and prolongs the 'trance' (*dhyāna*), from which he has never in reality issued since the moment that he became Buddha. There is no occasion, therefore, for reference, in addition, to the moment when he will enter really into *nirvāṇa*. 'The Blessed Buddhas, well equipped with knowledge and merit, fields of benevolence and compassion, shelters of the multitudes of beings, holding a perpetual concentration of mind, are neither in the *saṁsāra* world of becoming) nor in *nirvāṇa*' (*saṁsāra-nirvāṇavimuktāḥ*). So it is said in the Dharmasaṅgītisūtra.‡

(*b*) In the orthodox theory (Vaibhājyavādin), Śākyamuni on becoming Buddha entered '*nirvāṇa* with residue,' the residue being the body without an active 'soul' or thinking organism, which nevertheless continues to live and speak. But no speaking is possible in *dhyāna*, therefore this body is only magical. Very probably the Buddhists soon came to believe that Śākyamuni during the whole of his earthly existence had only been the magical substitute of the real Śākyamuni, who had long since entered into eternal Buddhahood.

The steps are as follows:—The Bodhisattva comes from the heaven of the Tuṣitas to enter a human womb. The Buddha remains in the Tuṣita heaven [Is it there that he became Buddha? We do not know], and produces a double of himself. The Buddha, who has been Buddha from all time, or for such a long time that it comes to the same thing, reigns high up far beyond the Tuṣitas; if he acts and saves creatures, it is because he is not deprived of all compassion by becoming Buddha, and is, in fact, still a 'Bodhisattva'* (cf. Waddell, 'Sambhogakāya,' in *Buddhism of Tibet*, pp. 127, 347).

2. *The celestial Bodhisattvas.*—It will be seen that one of the principal doctrines of the Great Vehicle is that of the Bodhisattva, a compassionate being, who, out of pure love, refrains from entering into nirvāṇa in order to save created beings and to act the part of Providence (see BODHISATTVA and AVALOKITEŚVARA). In strict orthodoxy, the worship of a Buddha produces spiritual results only by a process which is entirely subjective and in which the Buddha counts for nothing; for the Buddha is either extinct or plunged in egoistic *dhyāna*. It is different with the Bodhisattvas, and Chandrakīrti says in so many words that, just as the new moon is celebrated and not the full moon, so must the Bodhisattvas be worshipped and not the Buddhas, even though the latter are of greater dignity. The Buddhas have more majesty, the Bodhisattvas more influence.†

The Buddhas derive their origin from the Bodhisattvas. For, in the first place, every Buddha has been a Bodhisattva before becoming a Buddha; and secondly, it is through the intervention of the celestial Bodhisattva (Mañjuśrī) that the future Buddha takes the vow to become a Buddha.‡

On the other hand, the Bodhisattvas are sons of the Buddhas (*jinaputra*), for, unlike the Pratyekabuddhas, they owe their knowledge of the Buddhist truth to the teaching of the Buddhas; they are, 'spiritually' speaking, begotten by the Buddhas.

In the doctrine of the Little Vehicle every future Buddha receives from a Buddha the announcement that he is to become a Buddha (*vyākaraṇa*). It is the mere statement of a fact. To the *vyākaraṇa*, however, might be, and has been, assigned an effective share in the attainment of the end in view. In the Laṅkāvatāra the Bodhisattva receives not only an announcement but a consecration (*abhiṣeka*). Conversely, it will be noticed in the Gāndhāra sculptures that the Bodhisattvas bear the phial which is to become the phial of consecration; and in the later iconography the same Amitābha, sometimes in the form of the meditating Buddha, sometimes in the form of Bodhisattva, is seen carrying the same phial.§

In theory, every Buddha begets innumerable Bodhisattvas to a spiritual life. But the Bodhisattvas, the usual companions of a Buddha, his associates in the spiritual administration of a *Buddhakṣetra*, a 'field of Buddha,' do not very often appear as his spiritual sons; they are, we might rather say, younger brothers, since they commence their long term of existence as Bodhisattvas about the same time that the future Buddha enters upon his career.

In certain texts which recall the two great Śrāvakas of the Little Vehicle, every Buddha has two chief Bodhisattvas (Karuṇāpuṇḍarīka). The Amitāyurdhyānasūtra connects Avalokiteśvara (*q.v.*) and Mahāsthānaprāpta with Amitābha; and Śākya at Buddh Gayā is represented between Avalokita and Maitreya. Sometimes a Buddha is seen surrounded by eight Bodhisattvas; and even when the system of the five 'Dhyāni-

* See Kern, *Manual*, 66, n. 2. The buddhology and mythology of the Mahāvastu are confused; see, for instance, iii. 508, where the five (human) Buddhas are confronted with the thousand Buddhas. Cf. Barth, *Journ. des Savants*, 1899.

† The same doctrine is found in the Suvarṇaprabhāsa.

‡ Śikṣās, p. 322. Cf. *na buddhaḥ parinirvāti na dharmaḥ parihīyate* (Suvarṇaprabhāsa). The identification of 'nirvāṇa' with some state of beatific meditation is clearly indicated by the *Lotus of the True Law*, ch. xi; cf. Kern, *Geschiedenis*, ii. 145. Elsewhere *dharmakāya* = *samādhikāya*.

* Celestial Buddhas are, in fact, no more real than their magical reflexes. From the very moment that a Bodhisattva becomes Buddha he is merged in 'nirvāṇa' or 'voidness'; but, owing to his merits, he still appears as a brilliant body among the Bodhisattvas who behold him. Thus it can be said with Waddell (*Buddhism of Tibet*, p. 357) that the Buddhas have two 'real' bodies, a *nirvāṇa*-body (= a non-body) and a glorious body. See art. MAHĀYĀNA.

† The Bodhisattvas tend to become real gods, superior to the Buddhas, bearing the same relation to the Buddhas as Śākyamuni bore to the Arhats.

‡ Contrast *Lalita*, 184. 19, where the Bodhisattva has to be 'excited' by the Buddhas of the ten regions.

§ Concerning the phial *kalaśa*, see Grünwedel, *Buddh. Art in India*, p. 191 ff.; Foucher, *Art bouddhique*, p. 34. The consecration of a Bodhisattva as crown-prince is the fifth and last duty of a Buddha (*Mahāvastu*, i. 51. 5).

buddhas' was fixed, the number was not very uniformly observed. At one time eight or nine Bodhisattvas of the first rank are shared very unequally among the Buddhas; at another, each Buddha has a single Bodhisattva, whose name is usually colourless and seems to be derived from the sculptures.

3. *Confusion of the Buddha and the Bodhisattva.*—From the preceding discussion it follows that the relations between Buddhas and Bodhisattvas are complex and do not lend themselves to precise definition; there is often a confusion between the two concepts, and traces of this confusion are early found. In the Mahāvastu the Bodhisattvas, from the very first stages of their spiritual development, receive the title of 'perfect Buddhas.' In the Bodhicharyāvatāra, the work of a very careful theologian, the *Jinas*, or the Buddhas who have attained Buddhahood and are in enjoyment of a *quasi-nirvāṇa*, endeavour to save the world; they are entreated to delay their *parinirvāṇa*. Avalokita, a Bodhisattva by nature, is at least once termed Bhagavat, and there are numerous texts in which the Buddhas are active. Perhaps, however, it is necessary to come down as far as the Kāraṇḍavyūha (p. 91, 8) to read in so many words that *nirvāṇa* is accompanied by thought.

We have seen that, spiritually regarded, the Buddhas are at the same time the fathers and the sons of the Bodhisattvas. This relationship, from the mystic and ontological point of view, may be, and has been, interpreted upon a twofold principle. The first, which is at one and the same time Buddhist and Brāhmanical (see p. 98[a]), is that of the identity of the Jina and the Jinaputra; the second, genuinely Hindu, is that of procession or emanation (see p. 100). These two principles are in other respects very closely connected.

Concerning this mysterious relationship between the Buddhas and the Bodhisattvas there is valuable information to be got, on the one hand, from the sculptures of Gandhāra, Magadha, etc.; and, on the other, from texts clearly related to iconography, whether they inspired the latter or were themselves inspired by it. We shall begin with the evidence of the texts.

In the Amitāyurdhyānasūtra, Avalokita, who is only a Bodhisattva, besides the hundreds of 'magical' Buddhas (see p. 98[a]) radiating from his body, bears on his head a colossal Buddha, also magical, that is to say, emanating from Avalokita. Mañjuśrī, a Bodhisattva raised to the dignity of Ādibuddha, sometimes bears on his head small figures of the five Dhyānibuddhas, to signify that he proceeds from them and comprehends them. Conversely, the five Buddhas separate themselves from him (*sphuratpañchatathāgata*); and the carving that illustrates this expression actually represents them ranged above his head, following the profile of the statue; which is merely another way of setting them in order in the generating halo.*

On the other hand, the ancient sculpture places five Buddhas in the attitude of meditation in the frieze above five Bodhisattvas.† It is, we think, reasonable to recognize in these five Buddhas Śākyamuni, his three predecessors, and Maitreya, *i.e.* the 'historical' Buddhas of our age.‡ They are not saints who have attained *nirvāṇa*, for the Lotus distinguishes clearly between the Buddhas who have passed away and of whom only stūpas remain,§ and the Buddhas 'provisionally eternal,' whose contemplative existence is indefinitely prolonged, such as Amitābha and Śākyamuni. Some would recognize in them the so-called Dhyānibuddhas, and assign to one of them the name of Amitābha. This seems to be a hazardous inference, even when the idea of 'procession,' which is wrongly attached to the word Dhyānibuddha, is rejected, and it is in harmony with the doctrines of the Lotus to suppose that the Buddhas are here represented in the *quasi*-nirvāṇa which is their rational state. If, further, they assume the attitude of teaching, this is referable to their human double (see p. 98[a]); and if they act and save creatures, it is because a Buddha always preserves some of the characteristics of a Bodhisattva.

This activity, however, is not their proper function; and the Bodhisattvas, placed below them in the relief, are their servants for the present and their successors in the future, having entered later and independently of them on the road that leads to Buddhahood. Nevertheless, in these motionless saints, placed above the Bodhisattvas and provided with lotus and thunderbolt, we have the prototypes of the Jinas and Dhyānibodhisattvas of Hodgson.

Somewhat later, apparently, we find in sculpture a symbol which draws closer the bonds between the Buddha and the Bodhisattva. We refer to the practice (perhaps of Greek origin, for it is met with at Palmyra) of placing a miniature image of a Buddha in the tiara of the future Buddha. It was, we believe, first employed in the case of Avalokita, who bears on his head a small figure of Amitābha. We shall see that Avalokita is not even the spiritual son of Amita, but rather his right arm, who provides his paradise, an active Amitābha. The small image, which is perhaps not without some connexion with the colossal Buddha which emanates from the head of Avalokita in the Amitāyurdhyāna, is not that of a Buddha-father, but rather that of a Buddha-patron. And this interpretation, which we believe is founded on the literature, justifies that which we have propounded above regarding the Buddhas in the Gāndhāra frieze.

If we come down to the time attested by the *sādhanas*, or tantric incantations, and perhaps it will not be necessary to come down very far, the practice of thus placing a small figure in the tiara has become classical, and the position of the five Dhyānibuddhas is fully established.* They are seen on the heads of numerous divinities, especially upon those of the Tārās, where undoubtedly they figure as husbands rather than fathers. A sixth Buddha, Vajrasattva, also appears (see p. 99[b]). In the case of Mañjuśrī, as we have seen, the five Buddhas are all united in a single head-dress.

4. *Doctrine of the Three Bodies.*—The contradictory data which have just been set forth are fused into a theology, or rather a Buddhology, which, taking them all into account, justifies especially the antithesis of the Dhyānibuddha, the so-called human Buddha, and the Bodhisattva. But this theology goes beyond the mythological and polytheistic conceptions of the Buddhism of the Great Vehicle, and tends towards the unitarian systems which form the subject of this article.

The Buddhology of the Great Vehicle is summarized in the doctrine of the 'three bodies' (*trikāya*). This doctrine has been alluded to above, and we shall now state it in its least unorthodox form, which is undoubtedly the most ancient.

Buddha has three bodies: *dharmakāya, sambhogakāya, nirmāṇakāya.*†

* Foucher, *Iconographie*, ii. 34.

† See Burgess, 'Élura Cave Temples' in *ASWI*, vol. 5, pl. 20; Grünwedel, *Buddh. Kunst*[2], p. 170 (Eng. trans. p. 196).

‡ Cf. *Mahāvastu*, iii. 330. When the Bodhisattva is going to preach the Law, five thrones miraculously appear.

§ Kern, *Lotus*, p. 412.

* For the five Dhyānibuddhas in Japan, see *Si-do-in-dzou*, Musée Guimet, 1899; at Java, in 779, *Minutes of the Batavian Society*, April 1886, and Takakusu, *I-Tsing*, p. xlviii.

† The Tantras, however, assign to him four or five (see TANTRAS). This doctrine of the three bodies was stated for the first time by Schmidt, *Grundlehre des Buddhaismus*. See also Kern, *Inscriptie uit Battambang* (Fr. trans. *Muséon*, 1906, 1), and the present writer's essay in *JRAS*, 1906, p. 943 ff. *Trikāya* (=*trimūrti*) is a name of the Buddha (Trikṣ.). The Buddha, as identified with the Hindu Trimūrti (Brahmā-Viṣṇu-Iśvara), is called Tripuruṣa (Kern, *Vermenging*, 32). But, in the present writer's opinion, this conception of the Triad (Dharma, Buddha

The *dharmakāya*, or 'body of the law,' is the real identical nature of every Buddha, and of every being. The ancients, without using the word, gave to the thing the name of *dharmāṇām dharmatā*, 'the manner of being of that which is,' that is to say, of being produced by a cause and of being transitory. The Mādhyamika, one of the two branches of the scholastic Great Vehicle, and evidently the older, made it clear that by this term must be understood the 'void,' *śūnyatā*. There is no difference between *nirvāṇa* and *saṁsāra*, the latter expressing the successive existence of phenomena which have no true reality. Every character, every individuality, is mere appearance. On entering *nirvāṇa* the individual takes possession of his *dharmakāya*, which is, as we have seen, the 'void.' But under the name of 'void,' which was identical with the 'element of things' (*dharmadhātu*), it was easy to understand a real substratum, free from any form which could be understood or expressed in words. The Mādhyamikas themselves are not always on their guard;* and the Yogāchāras, who form the other great school of the Great Vehicle, have no hesitation in taking 'void' to mean 'unreality of the phenomena,' 'reality of the absolute,' or the 'mere thing' (*vastumātra*).† Admitting the existence of thought alone, they saw in the *dharmakāya*, which is the 'womb of the Tathāgatas' (*tathāgatagarbha*) and the identical nature of all beings (*bhūtatathātā*, *dharmadhātu*), thought in its quiescent state (*ālayavijñāna*), whence issue, by a series of illusions, all individualities and all characters.

The *nirmāṇakāya*, or magical body, like the different illusions which every magician can produce, is the body which Śākyamuni displays to men from the moment when he became Buddha.‡

The 'real' body of the Buddhas (the body of the law not being a body at all) is the body of bliss (*sambhogakāya*), a supermundane body, marked with the thirty-two signs, etc., in which the Buddhas enjoy their full majesty, virtue, knowledge, and blessedness. It is the privilege of saints to perceive this body, which belongs to the world of form, in the same way as the human Kṛṣṇa (who is only a *nirmāṇakāya*) showed his 'true' form to Arjuna. It is a marvellous sight, a symphony of light and jewels, a symphony of knowledge and sound, for it ceaselessly proclaims the voice of the True Law (*rutarāśi*). It is the source of the joy of the Bodhisattvas. Its home is in the *Akaniṣṭha* (*Akaniṣṭhabhavana*, elsewhere *Sukhāvatī*, Vulture Peak, etc.). Yet the first person, from a chronological point of view, to whom a *sambhogakāya*, a 'body of bliss,' is ascribed, is not, as the present writer understands it, a Buddha, but a Bodhisattva, viz. Avalokita. And it is remarkable that the classical doctrine of the three bodies is silent upon the glorious form of the Bodhisattvas in general. These distinctions, however, on which our Western philology is wont to dwell, are, in reality, of no importance. All these conceptions merge into one another, and in exact theology the *sambhogakāya* is just as illusory, on its side, as the *nirmāṇakāya*. The latter is a transient illusion imposed upon men; the former is the cosmic illusion, which embraces the Bodhisattvas also, and is similar to the representation which the one Being makes to himself. It is the *ālayavijñāna*, 'quiescent intelligence,' the great and unique substratum, hidden under a glorious and eternal disguise, while ordinary creatures are the same *ālayavijñāna* separated into individual consciousnesses (*prativikalpavijñāna*).*

5. *Dhyānibuddhas.*—At first, however, the progress made in mythological and religious speculation is neither so great nor so rapid as in ontological. Śākyamuni was at first regarded as a man in whom every germ of rebirth had been by himself destroyed; who survived the destruction of the germ of rebirth as the 'living emancipated one,' and at death entered into *nirvāṇa*, nothingness or mystery. He was afterwards assigned a place among the 'never-reborn saints,'† termed in Pāli *Akaniṭṭhagāmins*, who attain *nirvāṇa* after having ascended from one heaven to another to the summit of the world of forms. He therefore possessed an acquired and perishable *sambhogakāya*. When it was understood that he had been Buddha almost from the beginning of time, and when the theory of the *kalpas* (Ages of the World) had been largely manipulated to suit this view, the *sambhogakāya* became his permanent and natural body. Mystic speculation, however, did not all at once arrive at unanimous conclusions. In principle there has never been but one *dharmakāya*, while the worlds are inhabited by millions of Buddhas, who have a right to this *dharmakāya*, and succeed more or less in appropriating it, and who in their *sambhogakāya* are so many celestial Jinas or Dhyānibuddhas. Each of them, as such, has control of a 'Buddha field' (*Buddhakṣetra*), of a world more or less blessed according as he has conceived his mission as Bodhisattva. Moreover, every Buddha in his own domain appears, when he pleases, in his magical body (*nirmāṇa*), or is replaced for this purpose by a worthy Bodhisattva.‡

The imagination which runs riot through the universe is subordinated to religious instinct. There must be gods, but there need not be too many. Among the innumerable Buddhas§ there is one, Amitābha, the Buddha of the setting sun, the god of Infinite Light, who, thanks to his ancient vow, has won for himself the happy office of presiding over a universe in which there is no 'evil destiny.' The men of that country are equal to the gods of ours. There are none but Bodhisattvas, and only a few Arhats. That world is a

Saṅgha) has nothing to do with the Three Bodies. An icon is raised to the dignity of representing the dharmakāya by a special consecration, and particularly by the introduction of relics, of bands covered with *dhāraṇīs*, etc. (Grünwedel, *Myth.* 112).

* This *śūnyatā* is termed *vajra* in the mystic and tantric school.

† 'The real extremity' or 'end of the being,' *bhūtakoṭi*, the place where the being ceases, that is, the *śūnyatā*, *nirvāṇa*. But at the same time it is the crown of things and their first principle (primary cause). Compare what the Chinese have made of the *śūnyatākoṭi*, 'apex of nothingness,' a creator who resembles Ādibuddha (De Groot, *Sectarianism*, i. 176).

‡ It is clear that this body, since it has neither blood nor bones, cannot leave any remains; its *nirvāṇa* is only illusion, as *buddhaḥ parinirvāti* (Suvarṇaprabhāsa).

* For further details see *JRAS*, 1906, p. 943 ff. The one *brāhman* is at once Śiva, the various forms of Śiva, and the multitude of created beings. It is worthy of note that, according to Wassilieff, the Sautrāntikas (of the Little Vehicle) acknowledge the *sambhogakāya*.

† Köppen (ii. 26) is of opinion that there is some relation between the five so-called Dhyānibuddhas on the one hand and the four trances and the Anāgāmins (never-reborn saints) on the other. There is no evidence in support of this view. But the Anāgāmins seem to furnish a good illustration of what a Buddha may be after his 'apparent' *nirvāṇa* on this earth.

‡ The doctrinal theories, therefore, undergo several modifications. Amitābha, a visible form, is *sambhogakāya*. He is, however, described as *dharmakāya*, a qualification which belongs to him only in so far as he is *Vajradharma*, according to the passage cited by Foucher, *Iconographie*, ii. 24; and, regarded as *sambhoga*, he receives the name of Amitāyus. In the same way Akṣobhya is the name of the *dharmakāya*, whose beatific appearance is called *Vajrasattva*. Again, there are distinguished two Vairochanas and two Ratnasambhavas. A very unorthodox relationship is thus established between the three bodies and the three worlds of formlessness, of form, and of desire (*arūpa*, *rūpa*, *kāma*). But the *dharmakāya* is in principle quite a different thing from the *arūpa*.

§ Among the most curious enumerations, that of the thousand Buddhas of our age, published by Schmidt (*Mém. Ac. de St. Pet.*, 6th ser. ii.), in which Vairochana recurs four times (Nos. 20, 167, 851, 999), gives a fairly clear idea of the system of the reincarnations of a similar *quasi*-eternal Buddha. The thousand Buddhas are well known to the Chinese pilgrims (Beal, *Buddhist Records*, lxxviii. 99; and *JBTS* iii. 1). See further, *Mahāvastu*, iii. 330, where Vairochanaprabha is the most glorious Buddha.

'Happy Land,' a *Sukhāvatī*, or, as the Viṣṇupurāṇa says, a *Sukhā*. Although Maitreya has a paradise,* our true paradise is the land to which Amitābha calls his elect, and to which he conveys them with the help of his two 'Great Bodhisattvas.' Amiṭābha, at one time quite distinct from an eternal Śākyamuni (*Lotus of the True Law*), comes to be regarded as the *quasi*-eternal Buddha who was incarnated under the illusory appearance of the human Śākyamuni. He will be the *Jina* or *dhyānibuddha* of Śākyamuni. By the side of Amitābha there are four other Buddhas who at different times attracted the attention, now of religion, now of mythology, or again of mysticism. From among the myriads of Buddhas they are chosen to represent at one and the same time the *dharmakāya* and the *sambhogakāya*. As they are connected with the five human Buddhas, the five magical appearances of our age, it may easily be inferred that the number five originates in this ancient enumeration; and that just as the human Buddhas, as such, have no further ontological or religious importance, so their human names seemed ill fitted to designate their sublime 'substrata.'† In the same way as Śākyamuni, as eternal, bears the name of Amitāyus, and as uncreated light, of Amitābha, so also Kanakamuni will be called Akṣobhya, and Maitreya Amoghasiddhi.‡ But Kern has warned us repeatedly that it is dangerous to be too euhemeristic; and as the Dhyānibodhisattvas have taken the place of Bodhisattvas, much better attested in literature and more historical, so the Dhyānibuddhas, who are called the Brilliant (Vairochana), the Imperturbable (Akṣobhya), the Jewel-born (Ratnasambhava), the Sure-Success (Amoghasiddhi), are in the first instance 'names' (*nomina, numina*). Seeing that there are five Indras, five Rudras, five Kuśikas, Kern suggests that for the same reasons there are five Dhyānibuddhas. And we are quite willing to believe that it is in mysticism, in idolatry, in the solar cosmogony, etc., that we must look for the predominating factors in this divine *πεντάς*.§

Such is the polytheistic system of the Dhyānibuddhas. Even when Vajradhara is given only a secondary place, as the second body of Akṣobhya, the tantric element always constitutes an integral part of it. Every Buddha, at least in his 'blissful' form (*sambhoga*), has a wife, and begets a Bodhisattva; he is brought into relation with a *maṇḍala*, with a *dhāraṇī*, an element, etc.

III. Harmony was attained in various ways, either by raising to the presidency one of the five Buddhas, usually Vairochana,‖ the god of the Zenith,¶ or by interposing a sixth person, whether Mañjuśrī (as we saw above), or Vajradhara, or merely the Ādibuddha, not otherwise defined. The two last-mentioned conceptions demand a further brief consideration.

1. Vajradhara, 'Holder of the Thunderbolt,' is the *dharmakāya*; Vajrasattva, 'Thunderbolt-being,' is his beatific form; but the two names and the two things become confused (Wassilieff, 187). On the other hand, Vajrapāṇi, 'Thunderbolt in hand,' is the Bodhisattva.'* In every instance, however, in the iconography, and usually in magic, the last-named takes the place of his doubles. He is a Bodhisattva of fairly ancient date; for it is certainly he that is represented on a gigantic scale, with four other Bodhisattvas, placed beneath five Buddhas on a Gāndhāra monument. The same sculpture regarded him essentially as merely an acolyte, and the personal attendant of Śākyamuni. He is also an entirely orthodox Bodhisattva, for Śāntideva invokes him with great energy. But he is not a Bodhisattva like the others, since he is by birth the bearer of the thunderbolt. In his person, moreover, the lexicons and Grünwedel recognize Indra.† He is a deity adopted by Buddhism, and not an original Buddhist saint. Vajradhara-Vajrasattva is the same individual raised to the dignity of a Buddha, and a supreme Buddha—the result, in fact, of the word *Vajra*.

'Vajra,' hard as adamant, clear as 'emptiness,' thunderbolt and weapon against the demons, and also a mystic synonym of the *liṅga*, has taken the place of Dharma and of Bodhi.‡ The Tāntrikas superimpose the Vajrakāya upon the Dharmakāya, and without hesitation replace the Bodhisattvas or the Śrībodhisattvas by Vajrabodhisattvas. The Vajra is a divine and supernatural thing; Vajradhara, or better still Vajrasattva, who is his incarnation, is a tantric Brahman.

The various Buddhas or Bodhisattvas are, in reality, only this Vajrasattva in different rôles.§ He is, moreover, self-sufficient. To Vairochana and his brethren there correspond an element, a *skandha*, a sense, an object of sense, a wife, a mythological and mystic family (*kula*), accessory divinities and formulæ, and above all a special part of the body, a 'vital breath,' knowledge (*jñāna*), and a particular sensation (*ānanda*) of the *maithuna*. Here, then, we are chiefly concerned with the *chakras*, or regions delineated on the body, with *prāṇāyāma*, regulation or suppression of the respiration, and with *lingayit* rites. Vajrasattva is, according to circumstances, a sixth element, a sixth *skandha*, a sixth joy (*ānanda*), a sixth Buddha, or at times a combination of the five elements, the five *skandhas*, or the five Buddhas. His wife is Vajradhātviśvarī. The whole of this system may ultimately be reduced to a psychology which is essentially practical, with its physiological presumptions quite clearly defined, and aiming at the reinstatement of the faithful into his true nature, and his transformation into Vajrasattva. He has but to take possession, by means of the combined rites, of the 'body of bliss' (*ānandakāya*), or of the 'thunderbolt-body' (*vajrakāya*) in its most perfect form.‖

2. The Ādibuddha system consists, properly speaking, in superimposing on the five or six Buddhas (Vajrasattva included) a Being who, however invisible and inactive he may be in principle, is recognize that Buddha, *i.e.* Vairochana, is identical with Śiva. On Vairochana as an *Asura*, see Vyut, 171, 5; as a *Nīlakāyika* god in Lalitavistara, see Monier-Williams' *Dict.* p. 1025. On the pre-eminence of Vairochana consult also Eitel, *Handbook*, p. 179, and *Si-do-in-dzou*; on the Japanese sects, Tendai et Singon, 1272 A.D. (Musée Guimet, *Bibl. d'Études*, t. viii.).

* It is into the paradise of Maitreya that Hiuen-Tsiang would fain be reborn. Sometimes Śākyamuni appears to be the king of Sukhāvatī (Csoma-Feer, p. 333).

† Vipaśyin appears at least once in a list of the Dhyānibuddhas.

‡ We have Amitābha (*snaṅ-ba-mtha-yas*), Amitāyus (*tshe-dpag-med*), Amitābha (*hod-dpag-med*)—Grünwedel, *Myth.* 120, 211, n. 81, *Buddhist Art in India*, p. 195.

§ There are sometimes six or seven Dhyānibuddhas, a double or triple Akṣobhya (see Foucher, *Catalogus*, pp. 15, 29). On the other hand, in the Suvarṇaprabhāsa (p. 4) there are four Dhyānibuddhas, viz. Akṣobhya (an ancient Dharmachāṇaka), Ratnaketu, Amitābha, and Dundubhiśvara.

‖ The universal 'illuminating' Vairochana, or Virochana (*sarvāsām parsadām madhye virochyate dipyata iti vairochana*). It is a name of the sun.

¶ In the Vairochanābhisambodhitantra (Wass. p. 187), Vairochana is a great deity who gives to Siddhārtha (?) the Vajrābhiṣeka, and who by meditation creates Vajrabodhisattvas of many kinds (Vajrapāṇi, etc.; Vajrapāśabodhisattva, etc.); but who worships Vajradhara 'of the hundred names,' learns the maṇḍalas from him, etc.

In the Nāmasaṅgīti, Vairochana with his circle (*chakra*) of 181 Buddhas and Bodhisattvas has no priority over the other Jinas.

In the Javanese book Kuñjarakarṇa, Vairochana is not only the *primus inter pares*, but he is supreme lord to whom other Jinas give heed. The doctrine he teaches is that of identity: 'I am You, You are I'; and if there are, in fact, so few monks who attain emancipation, the reason is that they refuse to recognize that Buddha, *i.e.* Vairochana, is identical with Śiva. On Vairochana as an *Asura*, see Vyut, 171, 5; as a *Nīlakāyika* god in Lalitavistara, see Monier-Williams' *Dict.* p. 1025. On the pre-eminence of Vairochana consult also Eitel, *Handbook*, p. 179, and *Si-do-in-dzou*; on the Japanese sects, Tendai et Singon, 1272 A.D. (Musée Guimet, *Bibl. d'Études*, t. viii.).

* According to Waddell, 'the established church of Tibet' regards Vajrasattva-Vajradhara as a reflex from Śākyamuni, as a god analogous to the Ādibuddha of the old (?) school. Waddell himself, however, on the other hand, represents them as 'bodhisat-reflexes' from Akṣobhya (*Lāmaism*, p. 352).

† *Buddhist Art in India*, pp. 38, 90 f.

‡ See especially Senart, 'Vajrapāṇi dans les sculptures du Gandhāra,' in *Congrès d'Alger*.

§ Śākyamuni = Mahāvairochana = Vajradhara (Nāmasaṅgīti, v. 23).

‖ This is the more easy because the Guru, *Vajraguru* or *Vajrāchārya*, is Vajrasattva incarnate. He gives the Vajravrata, the Vajrasattvābhiṣeka, to whomsoever he pleases. In the ultimate analysis, therefore, the whole is comprised in the Gurvārādhana, in the worship of the teacher, the initiator, the master of the novices.

The Svayambhūpurāṇa gives some information about the Ādibuddhamaṇḍala. The commentaries of the Nāmasaṅgīti (25) describe in full the magical performances: *idānīṁ tasyādibuddhasya hṛdaye prajñāchakraṁ vibhāvayet. . . .* The *chakra* has four girdles (*mekhalā*) and is divided into six sections, the whole crowded with gods and formulæ.

nevertheless a god. His body, which is a 'body of law,' is called *samantabhadra*, 'universally propitious,'* a title borrowed from the Bodhisattva of that name. There are attributed to him the thirty-two marks, etc., of the Buddhas and of Great Men, which are, as we saw, the characteristics of the beatific body.† More fortunate than Brahmā, he is worshipped.‡ The ordinary Buddhas, etc., are not his 'reflections' in an inferior world; he is different from them, for they proceed from him at a fixed moment of his existence. In place, therefore, of the underlying and scarcely veiled identity of the tantric or purely ontological system of the five Buddhas, there is substituted emanation or creation by means of dhyāna.

It is evident that such a doctrine of the Ādibuddha is as much theistic as Buddhistic.

We must not, however, be led astray by words. If there is a shade of difference here, it is only a shade. True theism, as far as Buddhism knew it, is to be found not in the Ādibuddha creed of the *Aiśvarikas*, but in the worship of the celestial Bodhisattvas.

The doctrine of emanation, although it has its connecting links and its ultimate origin on the side of Hinduism, has, nevertheless, a *raison d'être* in Buddhism. Here we see the final step of the speculations which transformed Śākyamuni into a magician, and Avalokiteśvara, Vairochana, etc., into still greater magicians, Yogīśvaras, 'lords of the Yogis.' This character becomes evident when it is noticed that cosmic emanation is fashioned on the pattern of the creations by means of *dhyāna*.

What, then, is the ultimate difference between the system of emanation and the orthodox doctrine of the Great Vehicle? The Great Vehicle taught identity and the essential nothingness of things; but, while thus far very orthodox, it considered individual beings to be distinct from their very beginning. The *saṁsāra* has no beginning; it is the result of ignorance (*avidyā*), which is primeval. The *saṁsāra* is the same thing as nirvāṇa, but nirvāṇa will not be realized until the end.§

On the other hand, the Great Vehicle does not confuse magical creations (*nirmitakas*) with real 'beings.' The latter do not actually exist under the form which they adopt and by which they are known. But at least they are known, and they are truly existent illusions; while there is no real thought in magical creations.

As regards the first point, however, nothing was more logical than to suppose the 'womb of the Tathāgatas' originally virgin, to make the cosmos issue therefrom, and to represent it as returning again in *nirvāṇa*. The Brāhmans had paved the way, and this system fitted in admirably with the doctrine of cosmic revolutions in the course of the ages. And, as far as the second point is concerned, although ancient speculation, comparatively sober and self-confident as it was, refused to ascribe thought to the magical creations of magicians, it is doubtful whether we are justified in drawing the same conclusion when the magician is the *dharmakāya* personified under the form of a meditative Buddha. What he sees in his meditation is real and, as it were, autonomous, since nothing exists except this meditation and we ourselves are thought.‖ The absolute idealism of the Yogāchāras and the nihilistic monism of the Mādhyamikas entail all these consequences whenever they are brought into cosmogonic mythology.

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L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

ADMIRATION.—1. An emotional reaction or feeling in regard to some agent who manifests unusual excellence or worth in the region of human activities. An individual is admired solely on account of his intrinsic worth, and this is determined by reference to an ideal of conduct which is approved in and for itself. Strength or force of will is implied in worth, but mere force of will, regardless of the end to which it is directed, does not excite admiration. The emotion thus indicates the existence of an ultimate ideal of conduct in whose realization we are interested. It concentrates attention on concrete examples, and in this way exercises an important influence on conduct. Wonder is usually a concomitant of admiration, but is not an integral part of the emotion as such. It is a purely intellectual state occasioned by anything striking or unusual. It may, for instance, be aroused by unusual unworthiness, and may therefore be associated with scorn as well as with admiration. See also RESPECT.

2. The term 'admiration' sometimes signifies æsthetic approval. The intimate relation which exists ultimately between the ideals of beauty and goodness partly accounts for this use of the word. See SCORN.

LITERATURE.—Bain, *Emotions and Will*[3] (1875), ch. vii.; Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*[2] (1886), 152–160; Ribot, *Psychology of the Emotions* (1897), Pt. II. ch. xi.; Martensen, *Chr. Ethics* (*Indiv.*), [Eng. tr. 1881] § 109. DAVID IRONS.

ADMONITION.—Among the repressive measures resorted to by all kinds of societies for the protection of themselves and the discipline of their members, the lightest is the admonition of the offender. Admonition, when addressed to one who has committed an offence, is a punishment of a purely moral character. It does not deprive the offender of his property, like a fine; it does not deprive him of his liberty, like imprisonment; it inflicts no temporary or permanent indignity on his person, like corporal punishment. It is an appeal, a warning, a censure addressed solely to the highest elements in his character,—his reason and conscience. The value and limitations of admonition as an instrument of social order and discipline are admirably expressed in the religious

* At least in the Tibetan 'ancient sects,' according to Grünwedel, *Myth.* p. 143; Waddell describes them as 'the wholly unreformed section or the old school.'

† On the other hand, Ādibuddha resembles Brahmā. The Tantras issue from his five mouths, as the four Vedas from the four mouths of Brahmā, etc.

‡ Under the name of Svayambhū.

§ In the language of the Brāhmans, it is the system of the *Advaita*, with a *vivarta* conceived as primitive.

‖ In the language of the Brāhmans, the system of the *dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi*.

philosophy of the Hebrews: 'A rebuke entereth deeper into one that hath understanding than an hundred stripes into a fool' (Pr 17^{10}).

1. Admonition, as a means of maintaining social discipline, whether in the family or in larger social groups, has occupied a place among the laws and customs of peoples in almost all stages of civilization. It exists among the primitive races of the Indian peninsula; it is a recognized part of Muhammadan penal law, and it held a place in the penal code of ancient Rome (Post, *Ethnol. Jurisprudenz* (1894), ii. 28). When the Christians of Apostolic times began to form themselves into organized communities, admonition was one of the principal methods of upholding and enforcing ecclesiastical discipline. Admonition was a duty that devolved upon all Christian teachers and all Christian communities (Gal 2^{14}, 1 Th 2^{2}, 1 Ti 4^{13}, 2 Ti 4^{2}; Hermas, *Vis.* ii. 43), and it was incumbent on every believer to admonish a brother overtaken in a fault (1 Th 5^{14}). Admonition in the primitive Church was of two kinds: (*a*) private, pastoral admonition, and (*b*) public admonition before the assembled congregation. Public admonition consisted either in a solemn exhortation to the offender to amend (2 Co 2^{6}), or, in extreme cases, in a warning to leave the Church (1 Clem. *ad Cor.* 54. 2; Sohm, *Kirchenrecht*, 33 f.). The object of admonition in the primitive Church was to perfect the Christian character (Col 1^{28}), and it was to be administered not in anger, but in a spirit of anxious, paternal, affectionate solicitude (1 Co 4^{14}).

2. When we consider the extent and importance of admonition in the primitive Church, as well as the existence of this principle in the ancient Roman penal code, it is natural to expect that admonition would find a place when the Church of later ages ultimately elaborated a complicated and comprehensive legal code of its own. Admonition formed a part of Canon Law; it was not regarded in this system of law as a punishment, but as a warning. This warning preceded the actual punishment, which consisted in the excommunication of the offender, and it was usual in ordinary cases to repeat the warning three days before resorting to the final act of excommunication (*Corpus juris canonici*, Editio Romana, 1582 [editions of Richter, 1839, and Friedberg, 1881]; Kahl, *Lehrsystem des Kirchenrechts und der Kirchenpolitik*, Freiburg, 1894, p. 142; *Actes du Congrès pénitentiaire international*, Rome, tome i. 182–183). Admonition holds a more or less definite place in the ecclesiastical constitution of most Protestant Churches.

3. Admonition as a means of dealing with offences against the secular law exists in several modern penal codes. The old Italian and French systems of criminal law admitted the principle of admonition, and at the present time it exists in a more or less restricted form in the penal codes of a considerable number of European communities. In some States admonition is applicable only when the offence has been committed by a juvenile, in others it is applicable in the case of adults as well. As used in penal law it is not the advice, warning, reprimand or exhortation which a judge is always at liberty to give when a prisoner is before him, whether he has been acquitted or convicted. It is to be regarded as a real punishment, solemnly pronounced by a judicial tribunal, and requiring a proper observance of all the rules of legal procedure. Admonition in this sense does not exist in English law [Prins, *Science pénale* (1899), p. 468; Alimena, *Revista penale*, xxvii. p. 557].

Admonition is a form of punishment which must always be of very limited application in cases which come before the criminal courts. Most cases which are of so trivial a character that they can be satisfactorily disposed of by a resort to admonition, are cases which are seldom brought before a judge at all. Owing to this fact, admonition is very little used in some of the countries where it exists as a penalty on the statute book. The prominence which the practice of admonition has acquired in recent years is to be attributed to a great and growing reaction against the abuse of short terms of imprisonment for petty and insignificant offences. Many of these offences are not, strictly speaking, criminal in character; they are for the most part offences against highway acts, police regulations, education acts, municipal regulations. The growth of large cities has increased offences of this kind enormously, inasmuch as crowded populations require a much more complicated network of regulations than thinly populated communities; and the growth of regulations is always accompanied by an increase in the number of petty offences. Petty offences of this kind are usually dealt with by the infliction of a fine; and when the offender is able to pay the fine, or when the fine falls upon himself, this penalty is perhaps the best and most effective method of dealing with them. But many cases occur in which the offender is unable to pay a fine, or, as in the case of juveniles, in which the fine falls upon the parents; in most of these cases the only alternative to a fine is imprisonment, and imprisonment, inflicting as it does a stigma which can never be removed, is felt to be too severe a penalty for the trivial nature of the offence. Hence the demand for some form of punishment which will avoid the odium of imprisonment for offenders unable to pay a fine. To some extent English law does deal with such cases. For example, where a charge is proved against an accused person, but the offence is so trivial that it is inexpedient to inflict punishment, the court may dismiss the information altogether, or it may convict the offender and discharge him conditionally on his giving security, with or without sureties, to be of good behaviour, or to appear for sentence when called upon (Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, sec. 16; Probation of First Offenders Act, 1887, sec. 1). These humane provisions of the English criminal law to a great extent supply the place of judicial admonition as used in some Continental States, but they do not succeed in abolishing short sentences of imprisonment, which are the bane of all existing penal arrangements, and which perhaps produce more evils than they cure.

W. D. MORRISON.

ADOLESCENCE (*adolescere* = 'to grow up').—The period of growth that intervenes between mere childhood and complete adulthood or maturity. The term was formerly restricted to the latter part of this period (from 18 to 25), but later writers have followed a suggestion of Clouston (*Clinical Lectures on Mental Diseases*, Philadelphia, 1884, p. 375 [3rd ed., Lond. 1892]) that the term should be extended so as to cover the entire transition. Accordingly, adolescence extends from about the age of 12, when premonitory mental symptoms of puberty appear, to about 25 for males and 21 for females, when the reproductive powers are ripe. The phenomena of these years display a sufficiently definite progression to justify a subdivision of the period into early, middle, and later adolescence, the middle sub-period covering the two or three years from about the age of 15 during which the transition is most rapid and the mental life most inchoate. All these age-boundaries are necessarily only average and approximate.

1. The most obvious mark of adolescence is the attainment of reproductive power. But this is only a centre for a remarkable group of phenomena. The curve of growth, both for weight and for

height, takes a new direction; the proportions of bodily parts and organs change; hereditary tendencies crop out; new instincts appear; there are characteristic disorders, particularly of the mind and nervous system; new intellectual interests and powers spring up spontaneously; the moral sense is more or less transformed; emotion greatly increases in quantity and variety; and appreciations (literary, artistic, ethical, religious) multiply in number and depth.

These phenomena have the deepest significance for both the organic and the personal life. In respect to the personal life, which is here our chief concern, adolescence presents a peculiar state of flux or plasticity of all the faculties, followed by the assumption of a new type of organization. As a general rule the 'set' that character now takes remains through life. Even the vocational and other special interests that distinguish one's mature years commonly take their rise here. It is a time of peculiar responsiveness to religious impressions, and conversely it is the period when nearly all careers of criminality, viciousness, or incompetency are begun. [The practical importance of adolescence for moral and religious growth is so great that a special article will be devoted to this topic. (See GROWTH [MORAL AND RELIGIOUS, PERIODS OF]). Certain abnormal tendencies of adolescence will be treated in the article on MORBIDNESS. The remainder of the present article offers only such general description as may assist towards a correct perspective for the manifold problems of morals and religion that have their centre here].

2. For *physiology* the importance of adolescence lies in the ripening of a new organic function, that of sex. If we carry forward this physiological notion in the direction of biology, we perceive that adolescence marks a change in the relation of an individual to the species. The significant fact now becomes the attainment of racial, as distinguished from merely individual, functions. Extending our horizon, in the next place, from biology to sociology, we note that adolescence is the period in which individual life becomes socialized. Here begins the possibility of the family and of all the derivatives from family life that are summed up in the terms 'society' and 'the State.' But the genesis of complete social existence is likewise the genesis of complete individuality. In infancy and childhood, though individualistic impulses predominate, there is dependence upon others for nutrition, protection, and knowledge; the mind is receptive rather than critical; conscience is dominated by external authority; and, though spontaneous activities are numerous, in only a minor degree are they self-consciously guided or organized. With the adolescent all this changes. He becomes free from parental control, attains to complete responsibility under the laws of the State, under popular governments acquires the franchise; and all these external facts normally have, as their mental side, a decided access of intellectual and ethical independence, and of self-conscious purposes of relatively wide sweep.

3. Advancing, now, to the *ethical* aspect of these relations, we may say that adolescence tends toward the attainment of complete ethical personality, through release from a predominantly egoistic motivation of life. Self-realization now advances beyond a series of particular egoistic satisfactions (a characteristic of childhood), and requires the organization of the self into a larger whole as a member of it. This involves at once increased self-guidance, yet a deeper sense of obligation; a heightened individualism, yet an individualism that is transfigured into social self-realization. This movement outward from the merely particular self is of the highest importance for religion. For the movement may, and, wherever adolescence has been carefully studied, does go on to include the individual's relations not only to human society, but also to nature, and to God or the gods. It is characteristic of adolescence to become interested in the whole 'other-than-myself,' to feel its mystery, and to endeavour to construe it in terms of selfhood and sympathy.

Viewed from the standpoint of the Christian consciousness, adolescence is the normal period for attaining complete individual existence in and through the organization of the self into larger social wholes such as the family, society, the State, humanity, and the all-inclusive social relationship that Jesus called the Kingdom of God. But this is only the culmination of a view of adolescence that is present, more or less clearly, in all religions. The custom of signalizing the arrival of puberty by initiation into the tribe and its religion by means of symbolic ceremonies, bodily markings and mutilations, or by other civil and religious exercises, is world-wide, and it reaches through all strata of cultural development (see Hall, *Adolescence*, ch. xiii., and an art. by A. H. Daniels, 'The New Life,' in *Amer. Jour. Psy.* vol. vi. p. 61 ff.).

4. The close time-relation here existing between sexual development and the growth of the highest sentiments and impulses cannot be a mere coincidence. It is too constant, and the parallel between the biological and the psychological transformation is too close to permit a serious doubt that these two lines of growth need to be included under a single concept. Living organisms display two fundamental functions, nutrition and reproduction, the former of which attains its immediate end in the individual, the latter in the species. They are the physiological bases of Egoism and Altruism respectively. The physiological and the ethical here present a single law manifesting itself on two planes. In infancy and childhood we have a type of life that, in the main, presents on the physiological side a predominance of the nutritive function, and on the ethical side a predominance of self-regard, while in adolescence nutritive and reproductive functions are blended and unified, just as are also egoistic and social impulses. Of course, childhood is not exclusively egoistic, for family training and the pressure of a social environment guide conduct and even habits of feeling into social channels; but the inner, emotional, self-conscious realization of one's social nature waits for adolescence. Now, the mental states that characterize this change directly reflect the new physiological condition, though they pass beyond it, as though it were only a door of entrance. The new interest in the opposite sex tends to humanize the adolescent's whole world. All heroism becomes lovely, not merely the heroic devotion of a lover; Nature at large begins to reveal her beauty; in fact, all the ideal qualities that a lover aspires to possess in himself or to find in the object of his love,—all the sympathy, purity, truth, fidelity,—these are found or looked for in the whole sphere of being. Thus the ripening of sexual capacity and the coming of the larger ethical and spiritual capacities constitute a single process going on at two distinct levels.

The evidence of this connexion thus derived from normal growth is strengthened by abnormal and pathological phenomena. Persons who are made eunuchs in childhood commonly display a peculiar insensibility to social and religious motives. Further, nothing tends more positively towards the production of morbid moral and religious states during adolescence than defective physiological

conditions or misuse of physiological power (see MORBIDNESS).

The tendency of all these data is towards the view that sexual capacity is in general the physiological basis of all the higher and finer qualities of personality, both ethical and religious. This does not reduce religion to terms of physiology, or subordinate it to something more nearly primary. Rather, it reveals in the biological and physiological realm a spiritual law that tends to transfigure the whole notion of life. We must interpret the whole biological development in the light of its highest stages, and physiological functions by their place in the highest self-consciousness.

The only serious objection to this view has been raised by Henry Drummond, who makes conjugal affection merely a secondary product of maternal affection (*The Ascent of Man*, London, 1894, chs. vii., ix.). However maternal affection originated, it can hardly be the sole origin of the higher sentiments. In the first place, the relation between a mother and a helpless infant lacks too much of mutual responsiveness or reciprocity to be the source of the humanizing of the world, to which reference has been made. Again, a large mass of evidence goes to show that this humanizing process does spring directly from the relationship of sex as its ideal expression. In addition to the evidence already adduced from adolescence, it will be appropriate to add an item from the general evolution of sex. Geddes and Thomson, tracing the evolution of the reproductive process, declare that, from its beginning in simple cell-division, 'the primitive hunger and love become the starting-points of divergent lines of egoistic and altruistic emotion and activity' (*The Evolution of Sex*, London, 1890, ch. xiii.). Consequently, as Mercier says, 'the sexual emotion includes as an integral, fundamental, and preponderating element in its constitution, the desire for self-sacrifice' (*Sanity and Insanity*, London, 1895, p. 220). In the adolescent period this universal law of life comes to self-consciousness, rises to the ethical plane, and goes on to complete itself in the all-inclusive ideas, aspirations, and self-consecrations of religion.

LITERATURE.—Although from of old the bloom-time of youth has been a favourite subject of literary art, scientific analysis of adolescent phenomena goes back little more than two decades. The stimulus for such analysis has come partly from pathology (see work of T. S. Clouston already cited; also his *Neuroses of Development*, Edinburgh, 1891, and his art. on 'Developmental Insanities and Psychoses' in Tuke's *Dictionary of Psychological Medicine*, London, 1892; likewise chs. i.–vii. of Hall's *Adolescence*), but more largely from educational needs and the general extension of psychology in physiological and biological directions. In the spheres of education and psychology, the study of adolescence has been greatly stimulated by G. Stanley Hall, President of Clark University, at Worcester, Mass., U.S.A. The *American Journal of Psychology* and the *Pedagogical Seminary*, both founded by him and published at Worcester, have devoted much space to articles on adolescence, largely from Dr. Hall and his immediate pupils. These publications, and others of a more popular sort, have represented and stimulated an extensive child-study movement in America. This movement, which has adolescence as one of its chief foci, is one cause of an extremely active ferment of educational reform. The very large literature of this subject is listed and indexed from year to year since 1898 by Louis N. Wilson in a *Bibliography of Child-Study*, also published at Worcester. In 1904 appeared G. Stanley Hall's *Adolescence: Its Psychology and its Relations to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion, and Education*, in two large volumes (New York). The wide range of this work, the fulness of its materials, its abundant citations from sources, and the stimulating points of view of the author (though they often display the heat of an educational reformer), combine to make this by far the most notable product of the movement for the study of adolescence. In addition to these few very general references, consult the Bibliography appended to the articles on GROWTH and MORBIDNESS already referred to.

GEORGE A. COE.

ADOPTIANISM.—The name Adoptianism should, strictly speaking, be confined to a heresy which arose in Spain in the 8th century. But the wide circulation of Harnack's *History of Dogma* has familiarized us with the idea of tracing an Adoptianist Christology to an earlier period. We propose, therefore, to treat of Adoptianism in the broadest sense, bringing under this head all writings which speak of Christ as the adopted Son of God.

1. The keynote of the Christology of the 2nd cent. is struck in the opening words of the ancient homily known as *2 Clement*: 'Brethren, we ought so to think of Jesus Christ, as of God, as of the Judge of quick and dead.' *Ignatius* asserts the Divinity of the Lord no less emphatically than His true manhood; *e.g. ad Eph.* 18: 'For our God, Jesus the Christ, was conceived in the womb by Mary according to a dispensation, of the seed of David but also of the Holy Ghost.'

Harnack, however, contrasts with such teaching, to which he gives the name 'Pneumatic Christology,' the teaching of such a writer as *Hermas*, whom he claims as a teacher of Adoptianist Christology. Whereas Ignatius and Clement and others carry on the tradition of a pre-existent Christ on the lines of NT writings (Ep. Hebrews, Ephesians, Johannine writings), Harnack regards Hermas as a witness to a truer doctrine. According to the *Shepherd* of Hermas (see *Sim.* v. and ix. 1. 12), in Harnack's words (*Hist. of Dogma* [Eng. tr.] i. 191 n.):

'The Holy Spirit—it is not certain whether He is identified with the chief Archangel—is regarded as the pre-existent Son of God, who is older than creation, nay, was God's counsellor at creation. The Redeemer is the virtuous man chosen by God, with whom that Spirit of God was united. As He did not defile the Spirit, but kept Him constantly as His companion, and carried out the work to which the Deity had called Him, nay, did more than He was commanded, He was, in virtue of a Divine decree, adopted as a son and exalted to *μεγάλη ἐξουσία καὶ κυριότης*.'

We may agree with Lightfoot and others that Hermas sometimes confuses the Persons of the Son and of the Spirit, but this is as far as the evidence leads us. Is it surprising that an obscure shopkeeper without philosophical training should make slips in the work of analysis of Christian experience, which is the great task of Christian theology? In *Sim.* v. Hermas distinguishes accurately enough between the Lord of the vineyard; the Servant, under which figure Hermas speaks of the Son; and the Son, referring to the Holy Ghost. And when he writes (vi. 5) that God sent the Holy Ghost to dwell in the flesh of Christ, he does not mean that the Holy Ghost is the power of the Godhead in Christ, but that the pre-existent Christ was 'a spirit being.' Such teaching is found in Ignatius (Aristides, *Apol.*) and in later writers (Irenæus, *adv. Hær.* v. 1, 2; Tertullian, *Apol.* 21, *adv. Prax.* 8. 26).

As Dorner (*Doct. of Person of Christ* [Eng. tr.], I. i. 131) writes:

'So far is Hermas from Ebionism . . . that he rather seeks in part to retract the representation of the Son as a servant in the Similitude, and even to represent His earthly work as power and majesty; whilst what remains of His humiliation, such as His sufferings, he treats as the work of His free love, as the means of the taking away of our sins, and as the point of passage to a higher perfection.'

What Harnack reads into the Christology of Hermas is really the teaching of a much later writer, Paul of Samosata. No doubt it is true that the pre-existence of Christ was ignored or denied in some quarters. One class of Ebionites held a low conception of the Person of Christ, regarding Him as an ordinary man though superior to other men (Euseb. *HE* iii. 27). Some writers held that the Baptism was the beginning of His Divine Sonship.

2. This tendency to minimize the Divine glory of Christ reached a climax in the writings of *Paul of Samosata*, a rationalist Monarchian, who laid stress on the unity of God as a single Person, denying any distinction of the Wisdom or Word

of God. 'A real incarnation of the Logos was thus impossible; He existed in Jesus not essentially or personally, but only as a quality. The personality of Jesus was entirely human; it was not that the Son of God came down from heaven, but that the Son of man ascended up on high' (Bethune-Baker, *Hist. Christian Doctrine* (1903), p. 101). Whether He was deified after His Baptism or His Resurrection was not clearly taught, but the union between God and Christ was, according to this view, one of disposition and will only.

3. The truth is that this tendency to minimize, which comes out again in the later Arians, Nestorians, and Adoptianists, was in continual conflict with its opposite extreme, which recurs in Sabellianism, Apollinarism, and Eutychianism. But between the two extremes the Church held on her 'tranquil way,' and the ultimate test of her belief in Christ's Divinity lies in the fact that she never ceased to offer prayer to Christ with the Father.

4. We find in the teaching of *Theodore of Mopsuestia* a connecting link with the later Adoptianism as well as the basis of Nestorian teaching, because it is probable that Latin translations of his works were read in Spain from the 6th century.

Theodore discusses the indwelling of God in Christ, in his work 'On the Incarnation.' What is in holy men an indwelling of approval only, was in Christ not merely of a higher degree, but brought Him into a close relation to God on a higher plane. From His Birth the co-operation of the Divine Word with the man Jesus raised Him to the level of perfect virtue. 'The Man Christ . . . is thus the visible image of the invisible Godhead; and on account of His union with the true Son of God, He possesses the privileges of a unique adoption, so that to Him also the title of Son of God belongs' (Swete, *Theod. of Mopsuestia on Minor Epp. of S. Paul*, I. lxxxi). Theodore seems to prefer the term 'conjunction' of natures rather than 'union,' and uses the metaphor of the union of husband and wife in marriage to express the union of two Natures in one Person. But in his desire to avoid Apollinarian error he opened the way for the theories of Nestorius, who taught that there was only 'a conjunction of the two Natures, an indwelling of the Godhead in the manhood united morally or by sympathy.' Such a union is mechanical, not vital. 'I separate the natures,' said Nestorius, 'but the reverence I pay them is just.' The strong point in his theory was the recognition of the Lord's true manhood. As Bright puts it, 'Nestorianism was really Trinitarian in one aspect, but in another it was inevitably, under whatever disguise, Humanitarian, or, in modern phrase, "Adoptianist"' (*Age of the Fathers* (1903), ii. 268).

5. We pass on to consider *the links which bound the later Spanish Adoptianism to earlier heresies.* There seems no doubt that Muhammadan rulers were inclined to patronize Nestorian Christians as more enlightened than their brethren. When the Arabs overthrew the Persian kingdom, they found Nestorian Christians strong. Muhammad himself is said to have cultivated the literary friendship of a Nestorian monk Sergius, and he gave privileges to Nestorians. They followed the Arabs everywhere, the Khalifs appreciating their learning, and probably followed the Moors into Spain. Gams (*Kirchengesch. Spaniens*, ii. 2. 264) suggests that the mysterious 'Brothers of Cordova,' whom Elipandus, the first teacher of the heresy, quoted as writing much to him (he wrote to Felix in 799), were Nestorians. Alcuin traces the origin of the new error to Cordova (writing to Leidrat, he says: 'Maxime origo hujus perfidiæ de Corduba civitate processit'). And if they were not fully persuaded Nestorians, they may very well have been students of Theodore of Mopsuestia, whose works were read in the West. Gams also points out (*op. cit.*) that in his controversy with Migetius, Elipandus quoted Efren (=Ephraim the Syrian), suggesting that knowledge of his works seems to imply the presence of Nestorians in Spain.

6. *Elipandus*, Metropolitan of Toledo, was an old man when the trouble began (*c.* A.D. 780). It appears that he had successfully opposed the obscure heresy of Migetius, in which we can trace a lurking remnant of Priscillianism. Migetius taught that God was revealed in David (as Father), in Jesus (as Son), in St. Paul (as Holy Ghost), on the basis of an absurdly literal exegesis. (Thus he quotes David in Ps 44^2 (45^1), 'Eructauit cor meum uerbum bonum'). From this extreme Elipandus turned to its opposite, and taught what with vehemence he declared to be the teaching of all the Fathers and of the Councils. Both he and his abler ally, Felix, bp. of Urgel, intended to teach the unity of Christ's Person while strictly distinguishing the Natures. They found the term 'adoption' in common use in their Spanish Liturgy,* and they argued that it was a fitting term to express the raising of the human nature to the dignity of Divinity. They taught that the Son is 'adoptive in His humanity, but not in His Divinity.'

It does not appear that the term 'adoption' in the Liturgy meant more than 'assumption.' Elipandus was rightly concerned to guard the reality of the human nature assumed, but overstated the case in his antithesis, teaching a double Sonship: as God, Christ is Son *genere et natura*; as man, He is Son *adoptione et gratia*. He roundly accused his opponents of teaching Eutychianism, that the manhood was derived from the being of the Father.

7. *Felix* followed on the same path. He transferred to the Person what was true of the nature. He taught that Christ as a servant needed grace, was not omniscient or omnipotent. As the Only-begotten Son, Christ says, 'I and the Father are one' (Jn 10^{30}). As the 'First-born among many brethren' (Ro 8^{29}) He is adopted with the adopted sons. Only thus can we be certain of our adoption.

Felix applied the phrase 'true and peculiar Son' (*uerus et proprius filius*) to the God-Logos alone, and did not shrink from the proposition 'the Son is believed one in two forms'; he distinguished between 'the one' and 'the other,' 'this one' and 'that,' nay, he called the Son of Man God by adoption (*nuncupatiuus deus*: meaning that He became God). He taught a dwelling of God in man, of the man who is united with Deity (Harnack, *op. cit.* v. 285). The Son of Man has two births, a natural birth of the Virgin, a spiritual birth by adoption and grace, begun in Baptism, completed in the Resurrection. Felix, indeed, taught that Christ was sinless, but that 'the old man,' *i.e.* our sinful nature, is regenerated in Him. Alcuin (ii. 18) found it difficult to believe that Felix was sincere when he seemed to regard Christ as needing regeneration.

8. When Elipandus published his theory in letters, the Abbot *Beatus* and the Bishop *Etherius* (Eterius, Heterius) entered the lists against him. He was amazed at their rashness. Toledo was not accustomed to take lessons from Asturias! He called his opponents names, of which 'servants of Antichrist' is a mild specimen. The controversy extended from Spain to France; and the Pope, Hadrian I., was drawn into it, not unwilling to deal with an independent Metropolitan. When Felix joined in the fray, the Synod of Regensburg was summoned, in A.D. 792. Felix defended himself in the presence of Charles the Great, but was vanquished in debate, and was sent in the company of Abbot Angilbert to the Pope. In Rome he signed a recantation; but when he returned to Urgel he repented of it, and fled into Saracen territory.

9. On his return from England, *Alcuin* wrote his first treatise against Felix. About the same time Elipandus and the Spanish bishops sent a treatise to the bishops of Gaul, Aquitania, and Asturias, and appealed to Charles to reinstate Felix. The Council of Frankfort met in the summer of A.D. 794, and was attended by representatives of the Pope as

* In the first passage quoted by Elipandus the text was doubtful (Alcuin, *adv. El.* ii. 7). In others the word did not mean more than *assumptio*. In *Missa in ascensione Domini*: 'Hodie saluator noster post adoptionem carnis sedem repetiit Deitatis Hodie hominem suum intulit patri, quem obtulit passioni.'

well as by English theologians. It produced two dogmatic treatises—one by Frankish and German bishops; the other by the bishops of Upper Italy, led by Paulinus of Aquileia. They were sent by Charles to Elipandus, together with a treatise of Pope Hadrian. He begged him not to separate from the unity of the Church. In the spring of A.D. 798, Alcuin received a treatise from Felix, and asked Charles to invite replies from Paulinus of Aquileia, Richbod of Trèves, and Theodulf of Orleans, preparing also a reply of his own.

10. In the meantime Leidrat of Lyons, who with Nefridius of Narbonne and Abbot Benedict of Aniane had been conducting an active mission against the heresy in the district, met Felix and persuaded him to come to Court. In June A.D. 799 he met Alcuin at Aachen, and, after much discussion, was received back into the Church. He was put in charge of Leidrat, and remained at Lyons till his death. But Leidrat's successor, Agobard, after the death of Felix, found a posthumous treatise, in which some of the old errors were restated, and published a refutation, dealing particularly with the erroneous speculations of Felix on our Lord's ignorance (Agnoetism).

The heresy soon died out in the 9th cent. in the Frankish empire, though it is mentioned in the letters of Alvar of Cordova as surviving in his neighbourhood (*c.* A.D. 850). In the 11th and 12th cents. it was revived by some of the schoolmen, but did not become popular.

11. The chief result of the controversy was the fateful legacy of a theory of transubstantiation of the human personality in Christ, which the orthodox writers bequeathed to their successors, preparing the way for a theory of transubstantiation in the Eucharist. Alcuin (*c. Felic.* ii. 12) taught that '*in adsumptione carnis a deo, persona perit hominis, non natura.*' The idea was inherited from the Gallican Faustus of Riez, who had taught: '*Persona personam consumere potest*' (under the name Paschasius, *de Sp. sco.* ii. 4, quoted by Hooker in a famous passage, *Eccl. Pol.* v. 52. 3). Faustus had the legal conception of personality = ownership, most probably, in his mind, not a sort of semi-physical conception of consumption, as when the wick of a candle is consumed in the flame. There is danger in all such metaphors if they are pressed too far.

In every Christological controversy sacramental teaching has been involved. In Arian times, Hilary of Poitiers (*de Trin.* viii. 13) pleaded standard Eucharistic doctrine as a witness against error. Etherius and Beatus were right to show that the assumptions of their opponents brought about serious misunderstandings in Eucharistic teaching. But Harnack overstates their position when he argues that 'even in the instance of Beatus, the realistic conception of the Lord's Supper turns out to be a decisive motive against Adoptianism' (*op. cit.* v. 291).

12. In conclusion, it is pleasant to note that Alcuin (*Ep. ad Elip.*) wrote warmly in praise of the character of Felix, whose charm was also admitted after his death by Agobard (*op. cit.* 2).

LITERATURE.—Letters of Elipandus, *Espaňa Sagrada*, v. 524; *Etherii et Beati adv. Elip.* Lib. 2 [Migne, *Patr. Lat.* 96]; Alcuinus, *adv. Elip., adv. Felic.* [Migne, 100, 101], Paulinus, Lib. 3 [Migne, 99], Agobardus [Migne, 104]; Gams, *Kirchengeschichte Spaniens*, ii. 2, 261 ff.; Baudissin, *Eulogius u. Alvar*; Möller, art. 'Adoptianismus' in *PRE*[3].

A. E. BURN.

ADOPTION.

ADOPTION (among lower races).—1. Artificial kinship is a well-recognized and widely practised mode of strengthening societies founded, as savage and barbarous societies are, on real or pretended community of blood. By means of artificial kinship, strangers are adopted into a clan or kindred. Various methods are employed for this purpose, of which the most celebrated is the Blood Covenant (wh. see). In all societies based on blood-kinship, children are a common asset of great value, for the continuance of the society depends on them. Wealth of children is the supreme desire of families, and it matters comparatively little whether they are legitimate, or even whether they really have the family blood in their veins or not. Where natural means of obtaining children fail, therefore, artificial means are often freely resorted to. Moreover, the importance of children to the society leads to their being regarded with special tenderness and consideration; and even where there is no want of issue, children are adopted from motives of compassion. This is the case, to mention only two examples, among peoples as widely severed by race, environment, and culture as the Papuans and the North American Indians. Of the natives of Logea, an island off the coast of British New Guinea, we are told that on the occasion of a blood-feud after a successful raid, when it is customary to torture to death and eat the prisoners, the leader of the raid, being the owner of the prisoners, will sometimes save their lives and adopt them, according to sex and age, as father, mother, brother, sister, or child (Colonial Rep., No. 168, *Brit. New Guinea Annual Rep.* 1894–1895, p. 51). Elsewhere in New Guinea and the adjacent islands the purchase of children for adoption by women, either childless or with only small families or widows, or by families with children of one sex only, is a common practice (Kohler, in *ZVRW*, xiv. 365). So among the Osages and Kansas of North America 'children and women taken prisoners are preserved and adopted, especially into such families among their captors as have lost any of their members, either by sickness or war' (Hunter, *Memoirs of a Captivity*, 249). The Omahas practise adoption when a child, grandchild, nephew or niece has died, and some living person bears a real or fancied resemblance to the deceased (Dorsey, in 3rd Report of *BE*, 265).*

2. The effect of adoption is to transfer the child from the old kinship to the new. He ceases to be a member of the family to which he belongs by birth. He loses all rights, and is divested of all duties with regard to his real parents and kinsmen, and instead enters upon new duties and acquires new rights as the child of the family to which he is transferred, and of which he is now regarded in all respects as a native-born member. Very early in the development of the family as a social unit, in addition to the care of a parent during sickness and old age, the due performance of his funeral ceremonies and the cult of the ancestral *manes* were reckoned among the most important duties of a child. These are not always mentioned by ethnographical writers among the reasons for adoption; yet, where the religion of the people described lays stress upon them, they must always be taken into account. Thus the old Moravian writer Crantz, in describing the customs of the Eskimos

* Some of the North American tribes occasionally extended the practice of adoption so as to make it by analogy a transaction between entire groups of persons. Thus the Five Nations adopted the Tuscarora on their expulsion from North Carolina, about the year 1726, and admitted them, first as a boy, then through successive stages, as if they had been a single person, up to full equality. The Iroquois seem to have adopted the Delawares in a similar manner. In both cases the object was purely political, and the form of alliance (for such in effect it was) was probably dictated by circumstances (Hewitt in *Handbk. Amer. Ind.*, art. 'Adoption').

of Greenland, assigns as the only reason for adoption of children that the family has no children or only little ones, and that the husband in such a case adopts one or two orphan boys 'to assist him in providing food and to take care of his family in future times,' adding that 'the wife does the same with a girl or a widow' (Crantz, *History of Greenland*, i. 165); whereas we know from his own statements elsewhere in the book (pp. 205, 237), as well as from others, that an elaborate burial was given to a deceased Eskimo, that ghosts manifested themselves in various ways, asking for food by a singing in the ears; and that the dead were 'a kind of guardian spirits to their children and grandchildren' (Rink, *Tales and Traditions of the Eskimo*, 44, 63). Hence we may be led to infer that the reasons enumerated by Crantz were by no means the only reasons for adoption in Greenland. The inference is greatly strengthened by the express testimony of a careful observer about the Eskimos of Behring Strait, that 'a childless pair frequently adopt a child, either a girl or a boy, preferably the latter. This is done so that when they die there will be some one left whose duty it will be to make the customary feast and offerings to their shades at the festival of the dead. All of the Eskimos appear to have great dread of dying without being assured that their shades will be remembered during the festivals, fearing that, if neglected, they would thereby suffer destitution in the future life' (Nelson, in 18th Report of *BE*, 290).

3. Whatever may be the case among the Eskimos of Greenland, therefore, it is quite certain that those of Behring Strait practise adoption for reasons which include the perpetuation of the cult of the ancestral *manes*. At the other end of the habitable world the Bantus are distinguished by their devotion to the worship of ancestors. The race is so prolific that it rarely happens that a man dies without issue. When among the Baronga of Delagoa Bay the head of a kraal passes away without leaving a son, it is said that his village has departed, his name is broken. This is regarded as a supreme misfortune; and to avoid it the childless man has one means at his disposal, namely, the adoption of his sister's son. He gets a sister who is expecting to become a mother to come to his village, and there to give birth to her child. If a boy be born, he is made the heir, and is said to have restored his grandfather's village. For this purpose a chief may, it seems (though one below the rank of chief cannot), even adopt a stranger (Junod, *Les Baronga*, 121). The misfortune involved in the breaking of the name by the failure of children appears more clearly from a Zulu prayer to the family *manes*.

> The worshipper says: 'Ye of such a place, which did such and such great actions, I ask of you that I may get cattle and children and wives, and have children by them, that your name may not perish, but it may still be said, "That is the village of so-and-so yonder." If I am alone, it may be I shall live long on the earth; if I have no children, at my death my name will come to an end; and you will be in trouble when you have to eat grasshoppers; for at the time of my death my village will come to an end, and you will have no place into which you can enter; you will die of cold on the mountains' (Callaway, *Religious Syst. of the Amazulu*, 224).

The Zulus are a people closely related, as well as geographically contiguous, to the Baronga. From what is here explicitly set forth concerning Zulu ideas, it may be legitimately concluded that the underlying motive for adopting a son in the manner practised by the Baronga, is that of providing for the worship of the dead by means of the sacrifices to be offered from time to time by the adopted son and his descendants.

4. It is, however, among races of higher civilization than the Eskimos or the Bantus that the connexion of adoption with the family cult is most clearly visible. Without anticipating what will be said below in special articles, it may be noted that the adoption ceremony often bears witness to this connexion. In Cambodia a solemn ceremony, though not absolutely essential to the validity of adoption, is often performed, and plays a great part in Cambodian custom. It is needless to relate the ceremony in detail. Suffice it to say that the following invocation is therein repeated:

> 'To-day, at a propitious hour, this man who, in consequence no doubt of a mistake on the part of nature, was born of other entrails, asks to be the son of so-and-so. Let so-and-so be his father, so-and-so his mother! It becomes us now to inform you of the matter, O deceased ancestors! Give us your benediction! Grant us favours and prosperity!' The formal adoption then takes place by the adoptive father or some other person on his behalf asperging the adopted son with water, counting nine, and crying: 'Come hither, run, O nineteen vital spirits!' Finally, the cotton threads with which the water has been sprinkled are bound to the wrists of the son thus admitted into the family (Aymonier, in *Excursions et Reconnaissances*, xiv. 189).

5. The ceremony of adoption has varied greatly. There is reason to believe that it originally consisted of a formal simulation of the natural act of birth, or of suckling. The former, as appears from the legend of the adoption of Herakles by Hera, recounted by Diodorus, was known in early times in Greece, and the same writer expressly tells us that it was still the practice of the barbarians. The Roman form seems to have been similar. It is still observed by the Turks in Bosnia; and a Slavonic folksong exhibits an empress as taking the son to be adopted into the palace and passing him through her silken vest that he might be called her heart's child (Krauss, *Sitte und Brauch der Süd-slaven*, 599 f.). The symbolism is, if crude, so natural that we need not be surprised at finding it very widespread. A story of the Tsimshians, a British Columbian tribe, represents a woman who purposed to adopt a child as sitting down and having the child placed between her legs, as if she had just given birth to it (Boas, *Indianische Sagen*, 275). Some of the Indian castes place the child in the lap of the person adopting it (Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the N.W. Provinces and Oudh*, i. 59, 89). Saint Dominic was the adopted son of the Blessed Virgin. Accordingly, Roman Catholic painters have not hesitated to represent 'the whole countless host of Dominicans crowded under her dress' (Milman, *History of Lat. Christianity*[4], vi. 22 note). Although in England adoption has not been recognized within the historical period, a vulgar belief, which is said to have lingered into recent times, that a mother might legitimate her children born before marriage by taking them under her clothes during the marriage ceremony, seems to point to the existence at an earlier period of a rite of adoption simulating the act of birth.

6. Among the races of the North of Africa the ancient rite was by suckling. It is constantly alluded to in Berber and Kabyle stories. It is mentioned in stories told to-day in Egypt, and was probably the usual form among the ancient Egyptians (Basset, *Nouveaux Contes Berbères*, 128, 339; Wiedemann in *Am Urquell*, iii. 239). The development of the paternal at the expense of the maternal line of descent has in Africa and elsewhere transferred the rite to the man who adopts a son. Among the Gallas at Kambat, in the Eastern Horn of Africa, the son to be adopted sucks blood from the breast of his adoptive father (Paulitschke, *Ethnographie Nordost-Afrikas*, i. 193). In Abyssinia the son to be adopted takes the hand of the adoptive father and sucks one of his fingers, declaring himself to be his child by adoption. Sir George Robertson was thus constituted his adopted father by an old Kafir in the Hindu-Kush. On another occasion a man desirous of being his adopted son smeared butter on his left breast and sucked it (Robertson, *Kafirs of the*

Hindu-Kush, 203, 30). The Circassians practise adoption by the suckling rite. The woman offers her breast to the son to be adopted. So far is this carried, that if a murderer can by any means, even by force, succeed in sucking the breast of the mother of one whom he has slain, he becomes her son; and it ends a vendetta if the offender can simply manage to plant three kisses on the breast of the mother of the injured man (Darinsky, in *ZVRW*, xiv. 168; *L'Anthropologie*, vii. 229).

These crude ceremonies, of course, disappeared from the higher culture long before the custom of adoption itself passed away.

E. SIDNEY HARTLAND.

ADOPTION (Chinese).—Adoption is in China principally a religious institution, based upon ancestor-worship, which demands perpetuation of the family and the tribe.

The most sacred duty of a child, inculcated by the ancient classics, consists in absolute obedience and submission to the will of its parents, combined with the highest degree of affection and devotion. This duty, called *hiao*, naturally does not terminate with death. Father and mother, having entered the spiritual state, then become the patron divinities of their offspring. They reside in their tombs, and also at home on the altar, in wooden tablets inscribed with their names. The sons and their wives have to feed and clothe them by means of sacrifices prescribed with great precision by formal customary law, in order to protect them from hunger and cold, privation and misery, and themselves from punishment and misfortune. The *hiao* extends also to grandparents, and still more remote ancestors of the family, who likewise are tutelary divinities. Lest the sacrifices should cease, it is both a necessity and a duty for everybody to have sons, in order that they may continue the ancestor-worship. The saying of Mencius, 'Three things are unfilial, and the worst is to have no sons,' is a dogma of social and religious life to this day. Daughters are of no use in this respect; for, in accordance with the peremptory law of exogamy dominating China's social life probably from the earliest times, a daughter leaves her paternal tribe to enter that of her husband, and this secession means the adoption of her husband's ancestors.

A married man who has no son, either by his principal wife or by a concubine, is therefore bound to obtain one by adoption. According to ancient custom, confirmed by the laws of the State, he may adopt only a son of his brother, or a grandson of his father's brother, or a great-grandson of his paternal grand-uncle, and so on; in other words, an adopted successor must be a member of the same tribe, and thus a bearer of the adopter's tribe-name; and moreover, he must be a member of the generation following that of the adopter.

An adopted successor holds the position of a genuine son: he possesses the same rights, and has the same duties to perform.

Adoption is unusual, and at any rate not necessary, for those who have sons of their own; and it is unlawful for any man who has only one son to give him away for adoption.

The adoption of a son may, of course, be sealed by means of a written contract, but in most cases no such contract is made. It is an important event for the family, and, like all such events, is superintended by the elders of the family, whose tacit sanction is necessary. The intervention of the authorities is neither asked nor given, and so long as no glaring transgression of the laws of adoption is committed, and no complaints are lodged by the elders, they will not interfere. The consummation of the event is in the main religious, being solemnly announced to the soul-tablets in both homes by the respective fathers; and the son has, with prostrations and incense-offering, to take leave of those in his father's house, and in the same way to introduce himself to those in the house of his adoptive father. Should his natural father and his adoptive father have the same family-altar, there is, of course, only the one announcement before it.

J. J. M. DE GROOT.

ADOPTION (Greek).—**1. Origin and meaning of the institution.**—In the minds of the Greeks and Romans there were three things closely, and at first inseparably, connected,—the family organization, the family worship (that is, the worship of the dead ancestors of the family back to the common ancestor of the group of families constituting the clan or *γένος*, *gens*), and the family estate. It was the rule in both Greek and Roman law that the property could not be acquired without the obligations of the cultus, nor the cultus without the property or some share in it (Plato, *Laws*, v. 740, calls the heir *διάδοχος θεῶν*; Isæus, vi. 51: *πότερον δεῖ τὸν ἐκ ταύτης τῶν Φιλοκτήμονος εἶναι κληρόνομον καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ μνήματα ἰέναι χεόμενον καὶ ἐναγιοῦντα*; Cic. *de Leg.* ii. 19). It was imperative that the family should not die out, and the family cultus thus become extinct. To ordinary Greek sentiment, neglect in the grave was a calamity almost as much to be dreaded as the total omission of sepulchral rites (Eur. *Suppl.* 540: *δειλίαν γὰρ εἰσφέρει τοῖς ἀλκίμοισιν*, *sc.* to lie unburied). Hence the prayer of the pious for children, as a guarantee that the spirit should not be 'an unfed and famished citizen of the other world, for lack of friends or kinsmen on earth' (Luc. *de Luct.* 9). In the perpetuity of the family the corporation of the *gens* and the State itself were both directly interested (Is. vii. 30: *νόμῳ γὰρ τῷ ἄρχοντι τῶν οἴκων, ὅπως ἂν μὴ ἐξερήμωνται, προστάττει τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν*—according to the usual interpretation, which is, however, very doubtful). It was, however, a principle equally fundamental that the family and the cult could be continued only through males; a daughter could not continue the cult, because on marriage she passed into her husband's family. A legitimate son was therefore the prime object of marriage. It was from these principles that the regulations concerning inheritance and the institution of adoption sprang.

The institution of adoption was thus a necessary outcome of the desire to perpetuate the family and the family cultus. 'Adoption is the factitious creation of blood-relationship' (Maine, *Anc. Law*, new ed. 1906, p. 206), and is the earliest and most extensively employed of legal fictions (*ib.* p. 133). For Greece, adoption is apparently ascribed by Aristotle to Philolaos,* a Corinthian who migrated to Thebes and 'gave the Thebans laws respecting parentage, the laws of adoption (*νόμοι θετικοί*) as they are called . . . which were meant to preserve the number of allotments without change' (Ar. *Pol.* ii. 9, p. 1274*b*). In Athens adoption is older than Solon's legislation (B.C. 594), as is clear from the important law several times cited by the orators (*e.g.* Demos. xlvi. 14: *ὅσοι μὴ ἐπεποίηντο, ὥστε μήτε ἀπειπεῖν μήτε ἐπιδικάσασθαι, ὅτε Σόλων εἰσῆλθε τὴν ἀρχήν*, *κ.τ.λ.*). In Sparta it is older than Herodotus (about B.C. 480), who cites the regulation that adoptions must take place before the kings (vi. 57); in Crete it is older than the great inscription known as the Code of Gortyna,† which was inscribed about B.C. 450, but contains much earlier matter. Isæus (ii. 13) speaks of the right of adoption as being founded upon Solon's law of testament; but this is to invert the order of development. The institution is, in fact, much older than we have records to show, and was one of the most primitive factors in ancient life. Our knowledge of its regulations being derived mainly from the extant orations, especially those of Isæus and those ascribed to Demosthenes, in cases of disputed inheritance, is chiefly limited to Athenian law; but the Code of Gortyna shows considerable differences, and makes it probable that there were wide divergences in details in the various Greek States.

2. Adoption a form of will.—The primitive idea of the institution—that of an authorized fiction of direct descent, 'demanding of religion and law

* The date of Philolaos was about B.C. 725.

† Fabricius in *Mittheil. Ath.* 1885, p. 362 f. The regulations concerning adoption are given in full, with tr. and comments, in Roberts, *Introd. to Greek Epigraphy*, Part I. p. 326 f.

that which Nature had denied' (Cic. *pro Dom.* xiii. 14)—is frequently expressed by the orators (cf. Is. ii. 10: *ὃς τις ζῶντα τε γηροτροφήσοι καὶ τελευτήσαντα θάψοι αὐτὸν καὶ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον τὰ νομιζόμενα αὐτῷ ποιήσοι. Id.* ii. 46: *ἄπαιδα δὲ τὸν τελευτήσαντα καὶ ἀνώνυμον βούλεται καταστῆσαι, ἵνα μήτε τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ πατρῷα ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου μηδεὶς τιμᾷ μήτ' ἐναγίζῃ αὐτῷ καθ' ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτόν,** *ἀλλ' ἀφαιρῆται τὰς τιμὰς τὰς ἐκείνου*). Nevertheless, this idea became overlaid with others as rationalism prevailed. The Athenian of the days of Isæus adopted a son, in very many cases at least, primarily in order to leave him property, or for other reasons. In other words, adoption, gradually losing to a large extent its early significance as a means of supplementing nature (Demos. xliv. 43: *ὅπως ἂν ὁ οἶκος μὴ ἐξερημωθῇ*), was used as a means of testamentary bequest, thereby overcoming a legal disability. For it must be remembered that 'Intestate Inheritance is a more ancient institution than Testamentary Succession' (Maine, *op. cit.* p. 207), and that normally (*i.e.* if he had a legitimate son) an Athenian could not make a will†—so the law is usually stated, but it may be doubted whether it was strictly enforced, at least in the 4th cent. B.C. (cf. Meier u. Schömann, *Der attische Process*[2], p. 591 f.; Wyse on Is. iii. 42 and vi. 28). If he died without legitimate male issue, and without a will, the relatives of the deceased, in an order fixed by law, were his heirs. The Athenian will, therefore, though only an 'inchoate testament' (Maine, *op. cit.* p. 208), together with adoption, which was the form in which testamentary disposition of property was as a rule made, interrupted the ordinary course of descent of family and property. In other words, an Athenian, availing himself of the right of adoption *inter vivos* or by testament, very often was actuated by the desire of *disinheriting* some one of his possible heirs-at-law (Demos. xliv. 63: *ὁρᾶτε γὰρ ὅτι ταῖς κολακείαις οἱ πλεῖστοι φυγαγωγούμενοι καὶ ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους διαφοραῖς πολλάκις φιλονεικοῦντες ποιητοὺς υἱεῖς ποιοῦνται*). This fact explains not only the frequency of disputes over wills and inheritances at Athens, but also the method of handling such followed by the pleaders, *e.g.* Isæus. The impression gathered from the speeches is that it was perhaps impossible for an Athenian to safeguard the heir of his choice against the assaults of disappointed relatives. And, herein a great contrast to the Roman courts, the tendency of Athenian juries was to 'vote for the relatives rather than for the will' (Arist. *Prob.* xxix. 3).

3. **Methods of adoption.**—In Athens there were three methods of adoption: (1) adoption *inter vivos*, i.e. during lifetime (cf. Is. ii. 14: *διδόντων οὖν τῶν νόμων αὐτῷ ποιεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄπαιδα, ἐμὲ ποιεῖται, οὐκ ἐν διαθήκαις γράψας, μέλλων ἀποθνήσκειν, ὥσπερ ἄλλοι τινές*); (2) adoption by will, taking effect only on death of the testator (see quotation above); (3) 'posthumous adoption,' by which if a man died without legitimate male issue, and without having adopted a son, the next-of-kin succeeding to the estate, or his issue, was adopted into the family of the deceased as his son. (The rules of this mode of adoption are not known, and our evidence is meagre. Instances are the following—Is. xi. 49, vii. 31; Demos. xliii. 11, this last an example of such adoption deferred for many years, and performed in the end simply as a manœuvre in view of a lawsuit. See Wyse, note on Is. x. 8). In Gortyna the procedure of adoption is of archaic simplicity, the act being public and oral, as its name there (*ἀνφανσις*, 'announcement') denotes—'Announcement of adoption shall be made in the Agora, when the citizens are assembled, from the stone from which speeches are made. And the adopter shall give to his *ἑταιρία* a victim and a pitcher of wine.' The Spartan mode (Herod. vi. 57) must have been similar.

4. **Conditions regulating adoption.**—The conditions under which adoption in Athens was possible were as follows. Since adoption was in reality a sort of willing, it could be performed only by him who was competent to make a will, that is, by a man only, not by a woman, nor by a minor* (*i.e.* one under the age of eighteen—Ar. *Ath. Pol.* 42). The adopter must be in full possession of his faculties, and not acting under undue influence (the vagueness of this last condition afforded a loophole for litigation, cf. Ar. *Ath. Pol.* 35). The proviso that the adopting citizen should have no legitimate son living, or, if he had, that he might then effect only a provisional adoption by will, followed directly from the underlying idea of the institution (Demos. xlvi. 24: *ὅ τι ἂν γνησίων ὄντων υἱέων ὁ πατὴρ διαθῆται, ἐὰν ἀποθάνωσιν οἱ υἱεῖς πρὶν ἐπὶ διετὲς ἡβᾶν, τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς διαθήκην κυρίαν εἶναι*. Cf. Plato, *Laws*, xi. 923 E). The adopted son must be a citizen of citizen parents, acting with his own consent, if of age, or that of his guardian (*κύριος*) if a minor. Neither party must stand under accountability to the State (*ὑπεύθυνος*) for conduct of office (Æschin. *in Ctes.* 21). Penal loss of civic rights (*ἀτιμία*) on either side would practically prevent adoption, especially as certain forms of such disfranchisement (*e.g.* the disabilities of a debtor to the Treasury) were transmitted to children and heirs until their removal (Demos. xliii. 58. Cf. the decree against Antiphon and his associates—*καὶ ἄτιμον εἶναι Ἀρχεπτόλεμον καὶ Ἀντιφῶντα, καὶ γένος τὸ ἐκ τούτοιν, καὶ νόθους καὶ γνησίους· καὶ ἐὰν ποιήσηταί τινα τῶν ἐξ Ἀρχεπτολέμου καὶ Ἀντιφῶντος, ἄτιμος ἔστω ὁ ποιησάμενος*). Hence men who had reason to fear condemnation involving such *ἀτιμία* were fain to secure previous adoption of their sons (Æschin. *in Ctes.* 21; Is. x. 17: *ἕτεροι μέν, ὅταν περὶ χρήματα δυστυχῶσι, τοὺς σφετέρους αὐτῶν παῖδας εἰς ἑτέρους οἴκους εἰσποιοῦσιν, ἵνα μὴ μετασχῶσι τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς ἀτιμίας*). The field of choice was legally unrestricted, at any rate after the time of Solon, though probably most men naturally looked for an adoptive son within the circle of their relatives.

5. **The formalities of adoption.**—As regards the ceremonies of adoption, the following procedure is spoken of by the orators, but it was perhaps neither universal nor legally enjoined (Is. vii. 15). The adoptive son was introduced to the members of his adoptive father's *phratry*—probably on the third and last day of the *Apaturia* (=October, roughly), as was the case with children of the body. The father offered the customary sacrifice (*μεῖον*), and took oath that his adoptive son was a genuine Athenian citizen; thereafter, with the consent of the assembled *phratries*,† the son's name was enrolled on the register of the *phratry* (*κοινὸν* or *φρατορικὸν γραμματεῖον*; cf. Demos. xliv. 41). Subsequently (and if the adopted son was a minor, not until he came of age), and purely as a civic, not religious, act, the name was entered by the head of the father's *deme* on the *deme* roll (*ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον*) with the consent of the members of the *deme* (Demos. xliv. 39). These two enrolments, the one *quasi*-religious, the other purely political, gave the necessary opportunities for interference on the part of those who on public or private grounds had reason to oppose the adoption. The

* For these annual offerings to the dead, see Wyse, *The Speeches of Isæus*, note *in loc.*

† So in Gortyna testaments are unknown, even in the rudimentary form introduced at Athens by Solon. The code seems, in fact, concerned to combat the tendencies which produced the testament.

* These two conditions of sex and age are insisted upon in the Gortynian Code.

† At Gortyna there is no hint that the citizens are anything but witnesses, or that the *ἑταιρία* has any right of refusal of entry of the adopted son.

adopted son usually retained his old name, altering only the name of his father in writing his full signature, and if necessary that of his *deme* (see Keil in *Rhein. Mus.* xx. [1865] p. 539 f.).

6. **Rights and duties of an adopted son.**—The adopted son stepped at once from the family of his natural father into that of his adoptive father; he lost his relationship to his natural father, and all rights inherent therein (Is. ix. 33: *οὐδεὶς γὰρ πώποτε ἐκποιητος γενόμενος ἐκληρονόμησε τοῦ οἴκου ὅθεν ἐξεποιήθη, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπανέλθῃ κατὰ τὸν νόμον*); but he did not lose his relationship to his mother (if we may trust the statement of Is. vii. 25: *μητρὸς δ' οὐδεὶς ἐστιν ἐκποίητος, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ὑπάρχει τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι μητέρα, κἂν ἐν τῷ πατρῴῳ μένῃ τις οἴκῳ κἂν ἐκποιηθῇ*—which would seem to mean that an adopted son still retained his rights of next-of-kin so far as they belonged to him through his mother). He became the legal and necessary heir of his adoptive father, taking up and continuing the *sacra* of his new family, and possessing the right of burial in its sepulchre. Like a legitimate son of the body, he was entitled to enter without legal formalities into possession of his estate upon his adoptive father's death (Demos. xliv. 19: *ἐνεβάτευσεν οὕτως εἰς τὴν οὐσίαν ὡς ὑπ' ἐκείνου ζῶντος ἔτι εἰσποιηθείς*). Collaterals (*ἀγχιστεῖς*) and testamentary heirs, on the other hand, were forbidden to enter on occupation before their claim had been established in a court of law (*ἐπιδικασία*. Cf. Is. *frg.* iii. 6: *οὐ δεῖ τὸν ἐπίδικον κρατεῖσθαι κλῆρον πρὸ δίκης. Id.* vi. 3: *λαχόντος δὲ τοῦ Χαιρεστράτου κατὰ τὸν νόμον τοῦ κλήρου, ἐξὸν ἀμφισβητῆσαι Ἀθηναίων τῷ βουλομένῳ*, and cf. *ib.* iii. 60). Like a son of the body, an adopted son had no option of refusal of the inheritance, as had heirs-at-law (Demos. xxxv. 4. *Att. Proc.*[2] 573, *n.* 252).* Even if legitimate male children were born to his adoptive father subsequently to the adoption, the adopted son ranked with them for equal share of the property according to the law of inheritance (Is. vi. 63: *καὶ διαρρήδην ἐν τῷ νόμῳ γέγραπται, ἐὰν ποιησαμένῳ παῖδες ἐπιγένωνται, τὸ μέρος ἑκάτερον ἔχειν τῆς οὐσίας καὶ κληρονομεῖν ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέρους. Id.* vi. 25: *τοῦ νόμου κελεύοντος ἅπαντας τοὺς γνησίους ἰσομοίρους εἶναι τῶν πατρῴων*).†

The inheritance of a son adopted *inter vivos* could not be diminished, for after the act of adoption the father's limited power of testamentary disposition was, theoretically at least, *ipso facto* abrogated; only in the case of a testamentary adoption could any control over the disposition of the property be exercised, and that only in a general way (Is. v. 6: *καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ τρίτῳ μέρει τοῦ κλήρου Δικαιογένης δδε τῷ Μενεξένου Δικαιογένει υἱὸς ἐγίγνετο ποιητός*). If the adopted son left behind him a legitimate son of his body (*γνήσιος υἱός*) in the house of his adoptive father, thereby fulfilling the object of his adoption, he might return to his natural father's house, and there resume all the rights and duties of a son, relinquishing all such claims in respect of his adoptive father's estate (Harpocr. *s.v. ὅτι*: *ὅτι οἱ ποιητοὶ παῖδες ἐπανελθεῖν εἰς τὸν πατρῷον οἶκον οὐκ ἦσαν κύριοι, εἰ μὴ παῖδας γνησίους καταλίποιεν ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ τοῦ ποιησαμένου*). He could not, however, so leave behind him an adopted son; he had, in fact, no power himself of adoption, either in his lifetime or by will, so long as his own status was that of an adopted son; he transmitted the estate only to an heir of his body (Demos. xliv. 63: *οὐ δίκαιον δήπου τὸν ποιητὸν υἱὸν ποιητοὺς ἑτέρους εἰσάγειν, ἀλλ' ἐγκαταλείπειν μὲν γιγνομένους, ὅταν δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπιλείπῃ, τοῖς γένεσιν ἀποδιδόναι τὰς κληρονομίας. Id.* 68: *τοῖς δὲ ποιηθεῖσιν οὐκ ἐξὸν διαθέσθαι, ἀλλὰ ζῶντας ἐγκαταλιπόντας υἱὸν γνήσιον ἐπανιέναι, ἢ τελευτήσαντας ἀποδιδόναι τὴν κληρονομίαν τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς οἰκείοις οὖσι τοῦ ποιησαμένου*). Nor, on the other hand, could he restore the line of his natural father by putting back one of his own sons; he must return himself if he wished to keep alive his father's house (Is. x. 11). In this way the law protected the rights of the next-of-kin (*ἀγχιστεῖς*). If the adopted son died without male issue, or by consent of his adoptive father returned to his natural family, the *οἶκος* of his adoptive father fell at the death of the latter to the heirs *ab intestato* (*ἀγχιστεῖς*), as before the adoption—provided that no new adoption had been made either *inter vivos* or by testament (Demos. xliv. 68, and xliv. 47: *ὁ δ' ἐγκαταλειφθεὶς ὑπὸ τούτου τελευταίος ἁπάντων τῶν εἰσποιηθέντων τετελεύτηκεν ἅπαις, ὥστε γίγνεται ἔρημος ὁ οἶκος καὶ ἐπανελήλυθεν ἡ κληρονομία πάλιν εἰς τοὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐγγύτατα γένους ὄντας*).* Apparently mutual consent was necessary for the repudiation of an adoption once made; it is doubtful how far an adoptive father could act alone herein, *e.g.* in case of unfilial conduct (in fact, a father's right of repudiation—*ἀποκήρυξις*—of a son, either adoptive or child of his body, may be a pure fiction; in any case, it is certain that he could not disinherit him by testament).† It seems that the Gortynian Code allowed one-sided repudiation of the bond; this is in accord with its whole treatment of the institution.

The law protected the rights not only of the next-of-kin, as above, but also of the female children of a father who adopted a son. The estate could not be willed away from a daughter, either by testament or by adoption; it must go 'with her' (Is. iii. 68: *ὁ γὰρ νόμος διαρρήδην λέγει ἐξεῖναι διαθέσθαι ὅπως ἂν ἐθέλῃ τις τὰ αὑτοῦ, ἐὰν μὴ παῖδας γνησίους καταλίπῃ ἄρρενας· ἂν δὲ θηλείας καταλίπῃ, σὺν ταύταις. οὐκοῦν μετὰ θυγατέρων ἔστι δοῦναι καὶ διαθέσθαι τὰ αὐτοῦ· ἄνευ δὲ τῶν γνησίων θυγατέρων οὐχ οἷόν τε οὔτε ποιήσασθαι οὔτε δοῦναι οὐδενὶ οὐδὲν τῶν ἑαυτοῦ*. Cf. Is. x. 13; Demos. xliii. 51). On the other hand, a daughter was incapable of performing the worship which was a condition of tenure of the estate. From the conflict of these two principles sprang the strange regulations concerning heiresses (*ἐπίκληροι*, lit. 'those on the estate'). He who took the estate (*κλῆρος*) took also the daughter who was 'on the estate' (*ἐπίκληρος*). A son, therefore, adopted during lifetime, generally espoused a daughter of his adoptive father, if there was one of marriageable age, even if it were not legally required of him to do so (Demos. xli. 3); a son adopted by will was legally bound to marry the testator's legitimate daughter, otherwise the will and the adoption became invalid, and a door was opened to the claim of the next-of-kin both to the daughter and the estate (Is. iii. 42, x. 13). We do not know what a father could lawfully do if, his daughters being already married, he wished to adopt a man who was not his son-in-law. The son, not the husband, of an heiress became heir to the estate of her father, but the husband enjoyed the usufruct until the son came of age (Demos. xlvi. 20: *καὶ ἐὰν ἐξ ἐπικλήρου τις γένηται, καὶ ἅμα ἠβήσῃ ἐπὶ διετές, κρατεῖν τῶν χρημάτων, τὸν δὲ σῖτον μετρεῖν τῇ μητρί*. Cf. Is. iii. 50). Posthumous adoption of the heir into the house of his maternal grandfather as his son was probably usual, but cannot be proved to have been a legal obligation.

* The Gortynian Code allows the adopted son to repudiate his inheritance.

† The Gortynian Code treats the adopted son less generously, giving him only the rights of a daughter when the adoptive father leaves legitimate children; that is to say, if there are other sons, he is to receive half a son's portion; if there are daughters only, he is to share equally with his adoptive sisters. The Code is concerned to depose the artificial son from a position of equality with natural heirs.

* So in the Gortynian law.

† Consult Mitteis, *Reichsrecht und Volksrecht*, p. 336; also Ramsay, *Histor. Com. on Galatians*, pp. 337 f. and 349 f. But the latter makes several sweeping assertions which are hardly capable of proof, or at best based upon the Roman-Syrian Law-Book of the 5th cent. A.D. Even the quotation from Lucian, *Abdic.* 12, can hardly prove anything for Athens of the 4th cent. B.C.

It is obvious that by adopting a daughter's son a man could guard against contentions for the hand of his daughter, and defeat the designs of rapacious relatives; nevertheless, instances of adoption of a grandson (son of a daughter) on the part of a grandfather are rare (Wyse on Is. viii. 36).

7. Decay of the institution of adoption.—Was it possible under Athenian law to adopt a daughter? A woman could not perpetuate in her own person the house and its cult, which was one of the main objects of adoption. Nevertheless, examples of the adoption of a daughter are found. Isæus furnishes two examples of the adoption of a niece by will (xi. 8 and 41); but in the first case the niece was perhaps also heiress *ab intestato*, apart from the adoption, and it is also doubtful whether the adoption was not *inter vivos*. A third example puzzles the lawyers (Is. vii. 9: *διέθετο τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ ἔδωκε τῷ ἐκείνου μὲν θυγατρὶ, ἐμῷ δὲ μητρὶ, αὐτοῦ δὲ ἀδελφῷ, διδοὺς αὐτὴν Λακρατείδῃ*). It is generally taken to mean that in his will Apollodoros adopted his half-sister, who was also his heiress *ab intestato*, thus acquiring the right of a father to dispose of his daughter in marriage (*Att. Proc.*[2] 505, *n.* 75). But Apollodoros had not become the adoptive father of the girl when he made his will and settled the marriage, since the adoption was only to take effect in the event of his death on foreign service (an event which did not occur).

The adoption of a daughter (*θυγατροποιΐα*), certainly not contemplated in earlier times, but never expressly forbidden, probably grew to be practised (though to what extent we know not) largely as a family manœuvre, as public sentiment became less strict, and the definitely religious aspect of the institution tended to fade from view. There are other traces of this change. Thus in the fragmentary speech of Isæus in defence of Euphiletos there is a reference to the adoption of non-Athenians irregularly for personal reasons (Is. xii. 2: *διὰ πενίαν ἀναγκαζομένους ξένους ἀνθρώπους εἰσποιεῖσθαι, ὅπως ὠφελῶνταί τι ἀπ' αὐτῶν δι' αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίων γεγονότων*). Similarly, the necessity of providing a male descendant came to be felt less strongly. It is clear that many Athenians in the 4th cent. B.C. died unmarried and without troubling to adopt a son (Is. xi. 49; Demos. xliv. 18). The Code of Gortyna exhibits the same change. It is by no means certain that by it adoption was not permissible even when a man already had both sons and daughters. Its less stringent regulations concerning heiresses (*πατρωιῶκοι = ἐπίκληροι*); the fact that the next-of-kin might, as at Athens, shirk his spiritual duties to the deceased if he cared to waive his claim to the estate; the ease with which the bond created by adoption could be broken (by simple announcement from the stone in the Agora before the assembled citizens); and, above all, the fact that the adopted son might eventually decline his inheritance (which was his only on the express condition that he took over all the spiritual and temporal obligations of the deceased)—all testify to the gradual transformation and decay of the old institution.

W. J. WOODHOUSE.

ADOPTION (Hindu).—The adoption of a son (*putrasaṅgraha*) amongst the Aryan Hindus, as observed by Sir R. West, is essentially a religious act. The ceremonies in an adoption, as described in the Sanskrit lawbooks, resemble the formalities at a wedding; adoption consisting, like marriage, in the transfer of paternal dominion over a child, which passes to the adopter in the one case and to the husband in the other. One desirous of adopting a son has to procure two garments, two earrings and a finger-ring, a learned priest, sacred grass, and fuel of sacred wood. He has next to give notice to the king (or to the king's representative in the village), and convene the kindred, no doubt for the purpose of giving publicity to the transaction, and of having the son acknowledged as their relative by the kindred. The adopter has to say to the natural father, 'Give me thy son.' The father replies, 'I give him'; whereupon the adopter declares, 'I accept thee for the fulfilment of religion, I take thee for the continuation of lineage.' After that, the adopter adorns the boy with the two garments, the two earrings, and the finger-ring, and performs the *Vyāhṛti-Homa* or *Datta-Homa*, *i.e.* a burnt-sacrifice coupled with certain invocations, apparently from the idea that the conversion of one man's child into the son of another cannot be effected without the intervention of the gods. The learned priest obtains the two garments, the earrings, and the finger-ring as his sacrificial fee. Where the ceremony of tonsure [see TONSURE (Hindu)] has already been performed for the boy in his natural family, a special ceremony called *putreṣṭi*, or sacrifice for male issue, has to be performed in addition to the burnt-sacrifice, in order to undo the effects of the tonsure rite. The motive for adoption assigned in the Sanskrit commentaries is a purely religious one, viz. the conferring of spiritual benefits upon the adopter and his ancestors by means of the ceremony of ancestor-worship. The Code of Manu (ix. 138) has a fanciful derivation of the word *putra*, 'a son,' as denoting 'the deliverer from the infernal region called *put*.' In the same way, it is declared by Vasiṣṭha (xvii. 1) that 'if a father sees the face of a son born and living, he throws his debts on him and obtains immortality.' Another ancient text says, 'Heaven awaits not one who has no male issue.' These and other texts, laudatory of the celestial bliss derived from the male issue, are cited by eminent commentators in support of the obligation to adopt on failure of male posterity. The importance of this practice was enhanced by writers on adoption, who declared as obsolete in the present age (*Kaliyuga*) the other ancient devices for obtaining a substitute for a legitimate son of the body, such as appointing a widow to raise issue to her deceased husband, or a daughter to her sonless father, or legitimatizing the illegitimate son of one's wife, etc. These writers are unanimous in declaring that none but the legitimate son of the body (*aurasa*) and the adopted son (*dattaka*) are sons in the proper sense of the term and entitled to inherit. Adoption, no doubt, has continued, down to the present day, one of the most important institutions of the Indian Family Law, and its leading principles, as developed in the writings of Indian commentators, are fully recognized by the British courts, and form the basis of the modern case-law on the subject. On the other hand, it must not be supposed that the religious motive for adoption in India has ever in reality excluded or prevailed over the secular motive. The existence of adoption among the Jainas and other Hindu dissenters, who do not offer the oblations to the dead that form the foundation of the spiritual benefit conferred by sons, proves that the custom of adoption did not arise from the religious belief that a son is necessary for the salvation of man. In the Panjāb, adoption is common to the Jats, Sikhs, and even to the Muhammadans; but with them the object is simply to make an heir.

LITERATURE.—Stokes, *Hindu Law Books*, Madras, 1865; G. Bühler, 'The Sacred Laws of the Aryans,' part ii. in *SBE*, vol. xiv.; West and Bühler, *A Digest of the Hindu Law*[3], 2 vols., Bombay, 1887; Mayne, *Hindu Law and Usage*[6], Madras, 1900; G. Sarkar, *The Hindu Law of Adoption*, Tagore Law Lectures, Calcutta, 1891; Jolly, *Recht und Sitte*, Strassburg, 1896. See Hindu section of artt. SLAVERY, LAW AND LAW-BOOKS, INSTITUTIONS.

J. JOLLY.

ADOPTION (Japanese).—Adoption, now widely prevalent in Japan, is not a native institution. It

was first introduced from China for a political purpose during the rule of the Hōjō Regents (1205–1333). Its importance is chiefly social and legal. The legal unit in Japan is the family and not the individual; hence, when there is no natural-born heir, adoption becomes necessary in order to provide a representative in whose person it shall be continued. But the religious point of view is by no means overlooked. The adopted son, on the death of his foster-father, takes charge of the family tombs and attends to the domestic religious observances, whether Shinto, Buddhist, or ancestral, just as if he were the real son. Their neglect, for want of an heir, would be considered a great calamity. There is no ceremony of adoption, but registration at the public office of the district is essential.

LITERATURE.—Gubbins, *Civil Code of Japan*, pt. ii.; Lloyd, 'A Japanese Problem-play' in the *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, 1905. W. G. ASTON.

ADOPTION (Muhammadan).—In Arabia, in the days of Muhammad, a man could adopt another person as his son (Arab. *tabannā*, تبنّى). The Prophet himself adopted Zaid ibn Ḥāritha. The latter was carried away in his youth as a slave and came into Muhammad's possession in Mecca. Some of his own tribesmen recognized Zaid and told his father Ḥāritha, who went to Mecca to offer a ransom for his son. Zaid, however, chose to remain with the Prophet, upon which the latter gave him his freedom and adopted him as his son, saying, 'He shall be my heir and I his.' Since that time he was called Zaid ibn Muhammad.

Many other instances of adoption are known in Arabic literature. But as a rule it does not appear that in Arabia adoption was practised exclusively for the purpose of saving the family from extinction. Often the idea apparently was merely to incorporate a certain person into a family, for one reason or another; as, *e.g.*, when a man, on marrying a woman who already had children from a former marriage, adopted her children as his own. Children of slave girls, begotten by the owner, were regarded as slaves, but it sometimes occurred that the father adopted them as his own children (as was the case with the famous poet 'Antara when he had given proof of ability). He who, having shed blood, fled from his tribe and found a protector in another tribe, was sometimes adopted by his protector as a son. Miqdād ibn al-Aswad, for example, who belonged to those who had accepted Islām in the very beginning of Muhammad's preaching, had fled originally from his tribe Bahrā, and later on was adopted in Mecca by al-Aswad, his protector. His real name was Miqdād ibn 'Amr. (Cf. Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*[2], 1903, pp. 52–55, 135 ff.).

It is to be understood that at that time an adopted son was regarded as in all respects the equal of a real son. The following event, however, caused Muhammad to abolish the old rule, and to declare that adoption was only a fiction and did not entail any consequences as regards rights. Zainab, the wife of the above-named Zaid, Muhammad's adopted son, had aroused the Prophet's passion to such a degree, that he persuaded Zaid to repudiate her, upon which he married her himself. This caused great scandal. It was objected that by the law laid down in the Qur'ān (*Sura*, iv. 27) it was incest for a father to marry a woman who had been his son's wife. Then the verses of Qur'ān xxxiii. 1–5 and 37 were revealed, in which it was expressly announced to the faithful, that an adopted son (Arab. *da'ī* دعيّ) was not a real son, so that to call an adopted son a real son was wrong, inasmuch as the process of adoption could never create any bonds of blood-relationship. Marriage with the repudiated wife of an adopted son was therefore not contrary to the will of Allah.

This passage in the Qur'ān has been the accidental cause of adoption not being regarded in the canonical orthodoxy of Islām as a valid institution with binding legal consequences.

TH. W. JUYNBOLL.

ADOPTION (Roman). — The remarks made above concerning the importance attached by the Greeks to the perpetuation of the family and the family worship must be understood to apply with equal force to Rome, at least in her earlier history. The general idea of adoption, and the general effects of the act, were the same in Rome as in Athens,* but some modification in details was introduced by the peculiarly Roman conception of paternal authority (*patria potestas*), and also by the Roman distinction between agnatic, or legal, and cognatic, or natural, relationships and rights. Their more sharply defined conception of legal status also led the Romans to a multitude of corollaries or regulations concerning adoption which find, so far as we know, no parallel in Greece, and opened up several questions which taxed the ingenuity of lawyers.

I. *TWO DISTINCT METHODS OF ADOPTION IN ROME.*—There were two entirely distinct methods of adoption among the Romans during the Republican period, according as the person adopted was, or was not, *sui iuris*, i.e. independent of his father's legal control (*patria potestas*). Although Cicero, for example, uses the word *adoptio* (*adoptatio*) to cover both methods, the proper term for the adoption of one who is *sui iuris* is that used by Gaius and A. Gellius—*adrogatio* (*arrogatio*), the term *adoptio* being properly restricted to the adoption of one who is under *patria potestas* (Gell. v. 19: 'quod per prætorem fit, adoptatio dicitur; quod per populum, adrogatio').

1. Adrogatio.—Adrogation, therefore, was the method by which the head of a family voluntarily submitted himself to the *potestas* of another. It involved a preliminary investigation on the part of the priestly college touching the purity of the reasons for the adoption, its suitability to the dignity of the families interested, and, above all, the security for the maintenance of the family and clan worship (*sacra domestica* and *gentilicia*) of the house which was about to lose its representative (Cic. *de Dom.* 34: 'quæ deinde causa cuique sit adoptionis, quæ ratio generum ac dignitatis, quæ sacrorum, quæri a pontificum collegio solet').

The adoption, by this method, of P. Clodius by M. Fonteius, a much younger man, is evidence of the way in which in the decay of the Republic the old safeguards of the institution could be misused, in the interests of political manœuvring; for the object of Clodius, a patrician, in securing adoption by Fonteius, a plebeian, was to become eligible for the Tribunate of the Commons.

If the priestly college approved the adoption, there followed the *detestatio sacrorum*, a public renunciation of the cultus of the family (and *gens*) of his birth on the part of him who was about to pass into a new family, and perhaps a new *gens* (Serv. on Verg. *Aen.* ii. 156: 'consuetudo apud antiquos fuit, ut qui in familiam vel gentem transiret, prius se abdicaret ab ea in qua fuerat et sic ab alia acciperetur'). Next, a bill (*rogatio*) authorizing the transition was introduced to the Assembly of the Curiæ (*Comitia Curiata*) by the Pontifex Maximus and voted upon in the usual manner.

Such was the procedure followed under the Republic, even when the Curiate assembly was a mere form, being represented

* Cf. Cic. *de Legibus*, ii. 19, 'ritus familiæ patrumque servanto.'

only by thirty lictors (Cic. *Leg. Agr.* ii. 31). For the words of Tacitus (*Hist.* i. 15 : 'si te privatus lege curiata apud pontifices, ut moris est, adoptarem'—used by Galba) cannot be made to justify the view that the formalities of *adrogatio* at that date took place before the pontifices alone. This ancient method continued in use into Imperial times. Augustus so adopted Tiberius (Suet. *Aug.* 65 : 'Tiberium adoptavit in foro lege curiata'; cf. Suet. *Tib.* 15; Tac. *Hist.* i. 15); the last example is that of Hadrian's adoption of Commodus (νόμῳ, says Dio Cass. lxix. 20).

An easier mode of *adrogatio* was gradually adopted. The first example of this was given by Galba, who adopted Piso by simple declaration (*nuncupatio pro contione*), before the army (Suet. *Galb.* 17 : 'filiumque appellans perduxit in castra ac pro contione adoptavit'; Tac. *Hist.* i. 15 f.; and Dio Cass. lxviii. 3, Trajan's adoption by Nerva). This innovation, partly due to the Emperor's autocratic power, was assisted by the fact that the Emperor was also Pontifex Maximus (see Greenidge, *Roman Public Life*, p. 350). The method was extended to other cases, and the older formalities were largely abandoned in favour of a mode of adrogation effected by Imperial rescript (*per rescriptum principis*) and issued after preliminary investigation before a Prætor (or before the Governor in the Provinces, where adoption by Roman forms now first becomes possible). The older method indeed long survived, for Gaius mentions a rescript addressed by the Emperor Antoninus Pius to the pontifices, permitting the adrogation of a minor under certain regulations which need not here be specified. It was not until A.D. 286 that a Constitution of Diocletian entirely abolished the old method and substituted for it the Imperial rescript.

(*a*) *Some effects of adrogatio.*—The effect of adrogation was the loss of his own *patria potestas* on the part of the adopted, and immediate subjection to that of his adoptive father, whose legal son (*iustus filius*) he became. It conferred upon the adopter immediate universal succession to the property * and rights of the adopted. Seeing that, technically, *adrogatio* involved a certain loss of legal personality (*minima capitis deminutio*),† some rights vested in the adopted perished at once, *e.g.* any usufruct vested in him, or sworn obligation of service on the part of freedmen. In the same way, from the strictly legal point of view, all personal debts of the adopted were extinguished by his adoption (but here the prætorian equity gave his creditors the right to sell his property to the amount of their claims); if the debt was owing as a burden upon an estate to which the adopted had succeeded as heir, it was transferred with it to his adoptive father. Personal dignities of the adopted (*e.g.* magisterial powers) remained entirely unaffected in all their consequences. It is obvious that adrogation would annul any will previously made by the adopted. If the person adrogated had himself children under his *potestas*, these also fell into subjection to the adopter, and became legally his grandchildren. Hence Tiberius was compelled to adopt Germanicus before he himself was adopted by *adrogatio* by Augustus (Suet. *Tib.* 15 : 'coactus prius ipse Germanicum fratris sui filium adoptare. Nec quicquam postea pro patre familias egit aut ius, quod amiserat, ex ulla parte retinuit. Nam neque donavit neque manumisit, ne hereditatem quidem aut legata percepit ulla aliter quam ut peculio referret accepta').

(*b*) *Adrogatio originally and always confined to patricians.*—It must be remarked that the above mode of adoption was essentially a religious mode, and applicable only to patricians, who alone were organized in true *gentes* (cf. Greenidge, *op. cit.* p. 9), as is evident from the fact that the assembled *Curiæ* and the priestly college were the chief actors in the ceremony. On the other hand, the restriction of this mode of adoption to those who were *sui iuris* cannot be regarded as a primitive characteristic, for the reason that the prime end of adoption, the continuation of the family cultus which was in danger of extinction through failure of natural heirs, could just as well be effected through the adoption of a *filius familias*, i.e. one who was still under *patria potestas*, provided that he had reached the age of puberty, for on the death of his adoptive father he would himself become the *pater familias*. And again, it is impossible to believe that the Rome of the regal period actually possessed no means of adoption save of those who were *sui iuris*—rather would it be probably of somewhat rare occurrence that one already *sui iuris* should put himself by *adrogatio* in the *potestas* of another. If, then, the ceremonies of *adrogatio* were originally also not applicable to sons still subject to their father's *potestas*, we shall be driven to confess that the mode of adoption of such, sanctioned by patrician law, is totally unknown to us; for the earliest method that we hear of as applicable to persons *alieni iuris*, is the purely civil and probably originally plebeian form by threefold sale hereafter described. Originally, then, *adrogatio* was probably applicable both to those who were *sui iuris* and to those who were under *patria potestas*. In historical times, however, it had come to be restricted to the former and relatively much less frequent case, while for the other the fictitious sale offered a more ready means of adoption.

2. **Adoptio properly so called.**—Adoption in its more proper sense, that is to say, the transference of a *filius familias* from the *potestas* of his natural father to that of an adoptive father, was accomplished by the aid of legal fictions in two distinct acts—(1) the dissolution of the link with the natural father, by means of fictitious sale, *mancipatio*; (2) the transference of the son to the *potestas* of the adoptive father by the procedure called *cessio in iure*.

According to the law of the Twelve Tables, a son thrice transferred by his father to another, under the solemn forms of the *mancipatio*, or sale *per æs et libram*, 'by the copper and the scales,' was freed from paternal control ('pater si filium ter venum duit, filius a patre liber esto'). The father, therefore, so sold his son to the person adopting, or to another; the son being forthwith emancipated by his purchaser, fell back under his father's *potestas*. The ceremony was immediately repeated with the same result. By a third sale the father finally destroyed his paternal rights over his son, who now remained in the lawful possession (*in mancipio*) of the purchaser. The usual custom was for the purchaser then to remancipate (*remancipare*) the son to his natural father, who thus for a moment held him in his turn *in mancipio* * (no longer as *filius familias*, subject to his *potestas*). Then followed the second act, completing the adoption. This took the form of a fictitious process of law (*legis actio*) before a magistrate—the Prætor at Rome, the Governor in the Provinces. The adoptive father instituted a *vindicatio filii in potestatem*, claiming him as his son. He who was holding him for the moment *in mancipio* (the natural father, therefore, if *remancipatio* had taken place) making no demur to the claim,

* Justinian allowed the adoptive father only the usufruct, unless the adopted son died not having been emancipated from his adoptive father's control.

† Gaius, i. 162 : 'minima capitis deminutio est, cum et civitas et libertas retinetur, sed status hominis commutatur; quod accidit in his qui adoptantur.'

* If this were not done, the father would, of course, take no further part in the ceremony, his place being taken for the second act of the proceedings by the third person, to whom the *mancipatio* had been made. It was a deduction of the lawyers, from the words of the Twelve Tables, that a single sale sufficed to break the bond of *patria potestas* in the case of a daughter or grandson. See Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, iii. 87².

the magistrate adjudged (*addixit*) the adopted to the claimant as his *filius*, subject to his *patria potestas*. Hence this form of adoption is spoken of as *adoptio apud prætorem*, as contrasted with *adrogatio*, which is *per* (or *apud*) *populum*. It is this form of adoption that is alluded to by Cicero (*de Fin.* 24: 'in eo filio . . . quem in adoptionem D. Silano emancipaverat'), and by which Augustus adopted Gaius and Lucius, his grandsons, in B.C. 17 (Suet. *Aug.* 64: 'Gaium et Lucium adoptavit, domi per assem et libram emptos a patre Agrippa').*

These complicated forms were gradually simplified, and finally Justinian made simple declaration on the part of the two principals before a magistrate sufficient, the son to be adopted also being present and consenting.

Some effects of adoptio.—Like *adrogatio*, true adoption involved a *capitis deminutio*, destroying the agnatic rights of the adopted in his natural family; but he still retained his rights as a cognate therein, and as such was entitled to succeed in the third degree to the estate of an intestate natural father. In his adoptive family he gained the rights both of an agnate and of a cognate; but if he were emancipated by his adoptive father, he reverted to the position and rights of an emancipated son of his natural father. Justinian altered this to the effect that (except in cases where the adopter was grandfather of the adopted) the adopted son remained in his natural family and under the control of his natural father, the adoption conferring on him simply the right of intestate succession to his adoptive father (*adoptio minus plena*).

The children, if any, of a son adopted before the prætor did not, as in *adrogatio*, pass with him into the *potestas* of his adoptive father. Emancipation of an adopted child broke all connexion between him and his adoptive family, save that marriage between the adopter and an adopted daughter or granddaughter, even after emancipation, remained illegal. Readoption by the same person was impossible.

II. *Regulations concerning Adoption.*—A person might be adopted, not into the place of a son, but into that of a grandson; the same applies to the adoption of a female. If he was adopted as grandson, the natural sons, if any, of the adopter became legally uncles of the adopted; but one of them might consent to stand as father to him, in which case that son's children became legally the brothers and sisters of the adopted. It was also open to the adopter to give his adopted son in adoption to a third person.

1. Age.—A debated question was as to the proper relative ages of the father and the adopted son. In the notorious case of the adoption of P. Clodius by M. Fonteius the adopted son was older than the adopter, and Cicero makes a point of this (Cic. *de Dom.* 35 f.: 'Factus es eius filius contra fas, cuius per ætatem pater esse potuisti'). The original idea was that adoption should imitate nature (cf. Cic. *ib.* 36: 'ut hæc simulata adoptio filii quam maxime veritatem illam suscipiendorum liberorum imitata esse videatur'), and this was the view of the later jurisconsults, who decided that the adopter should be older than the adopted by at least eighteen years (*plena pubertas*). In the case of *adrogatio* it was held that the *adrogator* should be sixty years of age, except in special cases of health or intimacy. Until the time of Antoninus Pius, a person under the age of puberty (*impubes* or *pupillus*) could not be adopted by *adrogatio*; but if under *patria potestas*, true *adoptio* was, of course, applicable to him.

2. Adoption of females.—Women properly could not adopt, either by *adrogatio* or by *mancipatio*, as they could not possess *patria potestas*. But in A.D. 291 Diocletian allowed a woman to adopt her stepson (*privignus*) to replace deceased children. The adopted in this case acquired rights of inheritance. Females of any age could be adopted, originally not properly by *adrogatio*, though not for the reason assigned by Aulus Gellius ('cum feminis nulla comitiorum communio'), but because the marriage ceremony of *confarreatio* provided for them a mode of entrance into another family. Finally, however, *adrogatio* by Imperial rescript became applicable to women also.

The permission to adopt a female marked, it is clear, a decaying sense of the real significance of the institution. For if, as was, perhaps, most often the case, the adopted daughter was of marriageable age, she would, if subsequently given in marriage, by certain forms, at any rate, fall into the *potestas* of her husband, and become a member of his family and *gens* (see Greenidge, *op. cit.* p. 17). The same evidence of decay is seen in the abuse of the institution for political purposes by Clodius, which assuredly could not have happened had the feeling of the community been seriously concerned. Under the early Empire, adoption was practised to enable persons to escape the penalties of childlessness and to qualify under the provisions of the Lex Julia and Papia Poppæa, which prescribed that a candidate for office who had children, or who had more children, was to be preferred to one who had none or fewer (see Tac. *Ann.* ed. Furneaux, vol. i. p. 439 f.). In A.D. 62 it became necessary for the Senate to decree that pretended adoption for this purpose (manumission having at once followed the adoption) should be null and void (Tac. *Ann.* xv. 19: 'percrebuerat ea tempestate pravissimus mos, cum propinquis comitiis aut sorte provinciarum plerique orbi fictis adoptionibus adsciscerent filios, præturasque et provincias inter patres sortiti statim emitterent manu, quos adoptaverant').

The general impression given is that, at Rome, as compared with Greece, the institution of adoption more rapidly and completely lost its connexion with religious thought and practice.

3. Name.—Among the Romans, adoption introduced a peculiar modification of the name. The person adopted laid aside his original names and assumed those of his adoptive father, adding, however, an epithet to mark the *gens* out of which he had passed; that is to say, he retained his gentile name in an adjectival form. Thus C. Octavius, when adopted by the will of his maternal grand-uncle Cæsar, became 'C. Julius Cæsar Octavianus.' But the system was not uniformly observed, and in a few cases the epithet is derived from the name of the *Familia*, not from that of the *Gens*. The case of M. Junius Brutus is an example of another anomaly.

4. Imperial adoption.—The power of continuing the family by adoption gained a peculiar significance in connexion with the early Empire. For theoretically the *princeps* could not name his successor, though he might do much to guide the choice of the Senate and army. Neither designation nor heredity was recognized. Constitutionally, however, it was open to the *princeps* to appoint a consort in the Imperial power, who, on the death of the reigning Emperor, would have a practical, though not a legal, claim to be elected his successor. The natural course was to appoint a son to that position; but if the Emperor had no son, he could adopt whomsoever he chose as his virtual successor, the danger of such a course being minimized by the paternal control he possessed over his adopted son. The act of adoption by the *princeps* is figuratively called, therefore, by Tacitus, *comitia imperii* (*Hist.* i. 14); but the custom hardly attains its full significance until the adoption of Trajan. The accident of the childlessness of Augustus gave the institution its prominence in early Imperial history (cf. Suet. *Aug.* 64, 65; Tac. *Ann.* xii. 26: Suet. *Galb.* 17; Dio Cass. lxviii. 3).

5. Adoptio testamentaria.—There remains to be noticed a species of adoption spoken of by Pliny as *adoptio testamentaria*. The most conspicuous

* Gell. v. 19: 'Adoptantur autem cum a parente in cuius potestate sunt, tertia mancipatione in iure ceduntur, atque ab eo qui adoptat, apud eum apud quem legis actio est vindicantur.'

example is the will of Julius Cæsar adopting Octavius (Suet. *Cæs.* 83: 'in ima cera C. Octavium etiam in familiam nomenque adoptavit'). The adopted in such a case could not fall under the *patria potestas* of the adopter, who was dead; hence the adopted could not become heir or acquire agnatic rights, and had, in fact, no claim to the deceased's estate, except in so far as the will specifically granted such. The only legal effect, then, was to permit the adopted to bear the name and call himself son of the testator (*adsumere in nomen*). Octavius, it is true, availed himself of his testamentary adoption by Cæsar to secure a *privilegium* from the *Curiæ* adrogating him to the testator (Appian, *Bell. Civ.* iii. 94: ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν θυσιῶν, ἑαυτὸν εἰσεποιεῖτο τῷ πατρὶ αὐθις κατὰ νόμον Κουριάτιον. . . . Γαΐῳ δ' ἦν τά τε ἄλλα λαμπρὰ, καὶ ἐξελεύθεροι πολλοί τε καὶ πλούσιοι, καὶ διὰ τόδ' ἴσως μάλιστα ὁ Καῖσαρ, ἐπὶ τῇ προτέρᾳ θέσει, κατὰ διαθήκας οἱ γενομένῃ, καὶ τῇδε ἐδεήθη. Cf. Dio Cass. xliv. 35, xlv. 5, xlvi. 47); but his is an exceptional case. By his will Augustus so adopted Livia (Tac. *Ann.* i. 8: 'Livia in familiam Juliam nomenque Augustae adsumebatur'), and at the same time constituted her and Tiberius his heirs. In later times this species of adoption took the form of devising an inheritance under condition of bearing the testator's name. This mode was, in fact, in use as early as Cicero's time and before it (cf. Cic. *Brutus*, 212: 'Crassum istius Liciniæ filium, Crassi testamento qui fuit adoptatus'). Atticus, the friend of Cicero, was adopted by the will of his uncle, and so became Q. Cæcilius Pomponianus Atticus, his uncle's name having been Q. Cæcilius; he also got 10,000,000 sesterces (Cic. *ad Att.* iii. 20). Dolabella was so adopted by a woman, but Cicero had his doubts as to the propriety of this—though, as he humorously remarks, he will be better able to decide when he knows the amount of the bequest (Cic. *ad Att.* vii. 8: 'Dolabellam vides Liviæ testamento cum duobus coheredibus esse in triente, sed iuberi mutare nomen. Est πολιτικὸν σκέμμα, rectumne sit nobili adulescenti mutare nomen mulieris testamento; sed id φιλοσοφώτερον διευκρινήσομεν, cum sciemus, quantum quasi sit in trientis triente'). Whether Dolabella accepted the bequest we do not know; at any rate he did not change his name. Later, Tiberius found no difficulty in accepting an inheritance without observing the condition (Suet. *Tib.* 6: 'Post reditum in urbem a M. Gallio senatore testamento adoptatus, hereditate adita mox nomine abstinuit, quod Gallius adversarum Augusto partium fuerat'). For other examples of this method of adoption, see Suet. *Galb.* 4; Dio Cass. xl. 51; Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* xxxv. ii. 2.

LITERATURE.—Meier-Lipsius, *Der Attische Process*, 589 ff.; *Speeches of Isæus*, ed. Wyse, Cambr. 1904, *pass.*; L. Beauchet, *Hist. du droit privé de la répub. Athén.*; E. Hruza, *Beiträge zur Gesch. des griech. und röm. Familienrechtes*; Caillemer, *Droit de succession légitime*; Ihering, *Geist des röm. Rechts*; Scheurls, *de modis liberos in adoptionem dandi*, Erlangen, 1850; artt. 'Adoptio' and 'Adrogatio,' in various Dictionaries of Classical Antiquities.

W. J. WOODHOUSE.

ADOPTION (Semitic).—

I. Adoption in Babylonia.—In the great Babylonian Law Code (Code of Ḥammurabi), adoption of various kinds is referred to and regulated.

(1) *Reasons for the custom.*—An obvious reason for the custom might seem to exist in its meeting the needs of childless persons, who desired to provide themselves with an heir, that the family patrimony might not be alienated. But in Babylonia, as in old Israel, a man whose wife was childless could take a concubine, or might, with his wife's acquiescence, enter into relations with a maid-servant for this purpose. And these alternatives sufficed in Israel to meet such cases so well that adoption was entirely unknown. Besides, adopted children in Babylonia were sometimes taken into a family where sons and daughters were living. Johns* suggests that 'the real cause most often was that the adopting parents had lost by marriage all their own children and were left with no child to look after them. They then adopted a child whose parents would be glad to see him provided for, to look after them until they died, leaving him the property they had left after portioning their own children.' But this was by no means the only operative cause. Sometimes children were adopted where an heir was desired, sometimes as a matter of convenience;† in some cases a child was apparently adopted as an apprentice; slaves could be taken for the purposes of adoption, and in the process gained their freedom; and not only sons, but daughters, could be thus secured.

(2) *Method.*—Adoption was effected and legally safeguarded by a deed in the usual form of a 'tablet of adoption' or 'sonship' (*duppu aplutišu, marutišu*). This was sealed by the adoptive parents, duly sworn to, and witnessed. The rights and obligations of the contracting parties were fully set forth, and so long as the tablet remained unbroken, and the seal intact, the position of the adopted child was secure. In cases of informal adoption, where no deed had been properly drawn up, the relationship was not legally binding, and the child could return to its own father's house. An exception was, however, made in the case of an artisan who took a child to bring up, and taught him a handicraft. Under these circumstances the child could not be reclaimed.

The term *aplûtu* is interesting. It is the abstract of *aplu*. 'son,' and therefore lit. = 'sonship.' It was, however, used to denote the filial relation generally (being applied to that of a daughter to a parent), and thus came to have the general meaning 'share' (that which belonged to a son or daughter by inheritance). *Aplûtu* might be granted by a father to a son during the lifetime of the former, the father handing over his property to the son, only stipulating for maintenance during his life.

(3) *Conditions and kinds of adoption.* — The conditions were fully set forth in the 'tablet of adoption' or defined by the Code. The obligation resting on the child might be to support the adoptive parent (details of the 'sustenance' to be supplied in such cases are given in many tablets); or one of service (as when a lady adopts a maid to serve her for life and inherit a certain house‡). The adoption of a child (*e.g.* a daughter) by a lady of fortune was evidently regarded as a good settlement for the child. Certain classes of people appear to have had no legal claim to their own children. These were the palace-favourite (or warder?) and the courtezan.§ If the children of such, after being adopted, attempted to repudiate their adoptive parents, the action was punished with the greatest severity (*C.H.* §§ 192, 193). In other cases, however, the possibility of repudiation of the relationship on one side or the other was contemplated. It appears that a clause implying repudiation (on the part of parents of a son, or *vice versâ*) was regularly inserted in the contract, though it could be enforced only by direct appeal to a law-court. Thus parents, according to the contracts, could repudiate adopted sons if they so

* *Babylonian and Assyrian Laws*, p. 154.

† The complicated issues that might arise may be well illustrated by a case cited by Mr. S. A. Cook (*Laws of Moses and Code of Hammurabi*, p. 131 f.): 'Bel-kāṣir, son of Nādin, who had been adopted by his uncle, married a widow with one son: he has no children, and proposes to adopt the stepson. The uncle, however, objects, since under this arrangement his property would pass through Bel-kāṣir into the hand of strangers, and it is accordingly agreed that if the marriage continues to be without children, Bel-kāṣir must adopt his own brother as heir.'

‡ Cited by Johns, *op. cit.* p. 159.

§ *C.H.* (= *Code of Ḥammurabi*) § 187, cf. Cook, *op. cit.* p. 134, note.

wished, the son taking a son's share and departing. This looks like an attempt to contract outside the law. Failure on the part of the adopted child to carry out his obligations was good ground for disinheritance; but the penalty could be inflicted only with the consent of the judges, who felt bound, in the first place, to do all in their power to reconcile the parties. With this object in view, judgment was sometimes reserved.

The votary and the courtezan formed a class by themselves, and were the subject of special legislation. 'They were not supposed to have children of their own, but possessed the right to nominate their heir within limits. In return for exercising this right in favour of a certain person, they usually stipulated that such person shall maintain them as long as they live and otherwise care for them' (Johns, *op. cit.* p. 153*).

2. Adoption not practised by the Hebrews.—As has already been pointed out, no mention of the practice of adoption occurs in any of the Hebrew Law Codes. No term corresponding to *υἱοθεσία* exists in Hebrew,† nor does the Greek term (*υἱοθεσία*) occur in the LXX, while in the Greek Testament it occurs only in the Pauline Epistles. In fact, the practice of adoption would have endangered the principle of maintaining property in the possession of the original tribe, which was the object of such painful solicitude in the Mosaic Code (cf. Nu 27^{8-11}). It is obvious that the reasons which operated in Babylonia were not active in Hebrew life. Babylonian civilization was much more complex and highly developed. Among the Israelites the risk of childlessness was met in the earlier period by polygamy, in the later by facility of divorce. [See, further, MARRIAGE].

In the Biblical history of the patriarchs the practice of polygamy is explicitly attested. Sarah, being barren, requests Abraham to contract a second (inferior) marriage with Hagar (Gn 16^{2}); cf. also the case of Rachel and her maid Bilhah, and Leah and Zilpah (Gn $30^{4.\ 9}$).‡

Isolated cases of possible adoption, or something analogous, are, however, met with in the OT literature. Thus, (1) three cases of informal adoption can plausibly be said to occur in the OT—those of Moses, adopted (Vulg. *adoptavit*) by the Egyptian princess (Ex 2^{10}); of Genubath, possibly (1 K 11^{20}); and of Esther, who was adopted (Vulg. *adoptavit*) by her father's nephew Mordecai (Est $2^{7.\ 15}$). It is noticeable that in all three cases the *locale* is outside Palestine, and the influence of foreign ideas is apparent. Further, (2) something analogous to adoption seems to be implied in the case of Ephraim and Manasseh, sons of Joseph, to whom Jacob is represented as giving the status of his own sons (Gn 48^{5} 'And now thy two sons . . . are mine; Ephraim and Manasseh, even as Reuben and Simeon, shall be mine'). As a full son of Jacob each receives a share in the division of the land under Joshua, Joseph thus (in the person of his two sons) receiving a double portion. This, however, is not really a case of adoption, but one where the rights of the firstborn were transferred (for sufficiently grave reasons) to a younger son (cf. Gn 49^{4} for the sin of Reuben, vv.$^{22-26}$ for Joseph's elevation). To Joseph in effect are transferred the privileges of the eldest son; cf. further 1 Ch $5^{1.\ 2}$. (3) The levirate law has also some points of contact with adoption. The brother of a man dying without children entered into a union with the widow, in order to provide the dead man with an heir. The firstborn in this case received the name and the heritage of the deceased. Some of the Church Fathers (*e.g.* Augustine) have actually given the name of 'adoption' to this Mosaic ordinance. But the two things are obviously distinguished by fundamental differences. In real adoption the adopting parent exercises an act of deliberate choice. Thus the levirate law is not a case of adoption in any real sense, but 'the legal substitution, made for sufficient reasons, of a fictitious for a natural father' (Many).

3. Legal adoption unknown among the Arabs.—Of adoption as a recognized institution among the Arabs no clear and certain traces exist. The practice of polygamy was sufficient to meet cases where the need of adoption might have been felt. See, further, art. ADOPTION (Muhammadan), above.

4. Theological application of the idea of adoption.—Adoption as an institution was evidently unfamiliar in Palestine during the NT period. None of the NT writers uses the technical Greek term *υἱοθεσία* except St. Paul. He doubtless employed the term because, having been born in Cilicia, he had received a partially Greek education, and was acquainted with the institutions and terminology of the Greeks, among whom adoption was commonly practised.

Among Gr. profane authors, from Pindar and Herodotus downwards, *θετὸς υἱός* or *θετὸς παῖς*, 'adopted son,' is regularly found.

Theologically the conception of adoption is applied by St. Paul to the special relation existing between God and His people, or between God and redeemed individuals. For the former sense, cf. Ro 9^{4} ('Israelites . . . whose is the *adoption*, and the glory, and the covenants, and the giving of the law, and the service of God, and the promises'). Here the people of Israel as a whole is thought of. The redemption from Egyptian bondage was specially associated with the thought of Israel's becoming a nation and Jahweh's son. In this sense the people is sometimes called Jahweh's son (cf. Hos 11^{1}, Ex $4^{22f.}$ 'Israel is my son, my firstborn,' etc.). The same thought is also prominently expressed in the Synagogue Liturgy (esp. in the Thanksgiving for redemption from Egypt which immediately follows the recitation of the *Shema'*: cf. Singer, *Heb.-Eng. Prayer-Book*, pp. 42–44, 98–99). In the four other passages in St. Paul's Epp. where the word *υἱοθεσία* occurs, it has an individual application, and an ethical sense, denoting 'the nature and condition of the true disciples of Christ, who by receiving the spirit of God into their souls become the sons of God' (Thayer), cf. Ro 8^{15}, Gal 4^{5}, Eph 1^{5}; in Ro 8^{23} the phrase 'to wait for the adoption' (*ἀπεκδέχεσθαι υἱοθεσίαν*) includes the future, when the full ethical effects of having become God's adopted sons will be made manifest in their completeness.*

Adoption in this sense implies the distinction that exists between the redeemed and Christ. 'We are sons by grace; He is so by nature.' 'Adoptionem propterea dicit,' says Augustine, 'ut distincte intelligamus unicum Dei filium.'† The thought of ethical adoption is finely expressed in Jn $1^{12.\ 13}$.

In later ecclesiastical language *υἱοθεσία* became a synonym for baptism (cf. Suicer, *s.v.*). According to Suicer, Hesychius thus defines the term: *ὅταν τις θετὸν υἱὸν λαμβάνῃ, καὶ τὸ ἅγιον βάπτισμα.*

LITERATURE.—C. H. W. Johns, *Bab. and Assyr. Laws* (1904), ch. XV. ('Adoption'); Vigouroux, *Dict. de la Bible*, vol. i. (1895) art. 'Adoption' (by S. Many); S. A. Cook, *The Laws of Moses and the Code of Hammurabi* (1903), pp. 131 *f.*, 134 *f.*, 140; *EBi*, art. 'Family,' § 14 (cols. 1504–1506); the Gr. Lexx. *s.v. υἱοθεσία* (esp. Grimm-Thayer and Cremer); the Comm. (esp. Ramsay, *Historical Com. on Galatians*). Reference should also be made here to the great Syrian-Roman Law Code, edited by Bruns and Sachau (*Syr.-Röm. Rechtsbuch aus dem fünften Jahrhundert*, Leipzig, 1880). G. H. BOX.

ADORATION.—As this word is used, both in literature and in common practice, it seems to imply, on the one hand, admiration of qualities that are good and beautiful, and, on the other, a recognition of power in what possesses them. Further, it usually carries with it the idea that the object of adoration is immensely greater than the being who adores.

* Cf. S. A. Cook, *op. cit.* pp. 134, 147 *f.*

† In Delitzsch's *Heb. NT* it is rendered משׂמת הבנים (*e.g.* Ro 9^{4}).

‡ See further on this point *EBi*, *s.v.* 'Family,' § 7 (vol. ii. col. 1502).

* In Galatians, adoption of the Greek type may be in the Apostle's mind; in Romans, of the Roman type.

† Lightfoot on Gal 4^{5}.

It is natural to speak of adoring God or a god, and of adoring Nature: somewhat less natural to speak of adoring another human being: hardly natural at all to speak of adoring a mere ideal, unless—and this is important—the ideal is conceived of as in some way possessing an intrinsic force of its own. Kant, for instance, might possibly have adored his Categorical Imperative, 'the Moral Law within,' which he compares in majesty to 'the starry heavens without,' for he seems to conceive it as something more than that which apprehends it.

The etymology,—*ad oro*, 'I pray to,'—is, in short, still felt in the word. Prayer, however, commonly implies the belief in some gain to him who prays, and this need not be felt in adoration. Indeed, it may be said that the pre-eminent characteristic of the adoring mood is the merging of self in the rapt contemplation of other goodness. The whole temper of the word is admirably illustrated in Browning's lines about the

> 'love that spends itself
> In silent mad idolatry of some
> Pre-eminent mortal, some great soul of souls,
> That ne'er will know how well it is adored.'
> *Paracelsus*, part iii. *ad fin.*

It is well to note expressly that admiration must reach a certain pitch before the term 'adoration' is felt to be appropriate. The bare recognition of power is, of course, never enough. Admiration of some kind must always be an element, even if it is only the admiration of such power, as in devil-worship. It is, indeed, this element of admiration that appears to give the principle of division between magic and religion. But in the lower forms of worship, as in the one just mentioned, the admiration being incomplete, the adoration is felt to be incomplete also. For its completion we seem to require, on the one hand, an embodiment of all that would satisfy our own ideal, and, on the other, the presence of a force that is more than ourselves.

The types of adoration, therefore, complete and incomplete, are as diverse as the diverse types of those religions that definitely worship a power beyond the worshipper. Strictly speaking, it would appear that religions such as Buddhism, which do not recognize such a power, should be excluded from this class, and that adoration, as we have defined it, has no place in them. But for the Semites and the Europeans at least, history plainly shows how vital an element it has been in their religious development. The whole growth of Hebrew monotheism out of the surrounding idolatry, until its final sharp separation, is one struggle to get away from weak and unworthy objects into the presence of what was truly to be adored.

Lack of power on the one hand, lack of righteousness on the other, are sure signs that the true God has not been found. Anything that suggests either deficiency must be cut away. The gods of the heathen are but the work of men's hands (Is 37^{19}); and Israel must not turn His glory into 'the similitude of an ox that eateth grass' (Ps 106^{20}). The god that makes a man's son pass through the fire is Molech, not Jahweh (Jer 7^{31}). No such god may stand beside Him.

It is this belief in a completely satisfactory object of worship, and this passion to show it to other men, that have been among the great moving forces in Muhammadanism, as in every missionary enterprise since missions began. But the Hebrews, above all nations, have felt the rapture of this mood, and have given it the most complete expression in poetry.

The break-up of Greek religion was directly due to the fact that the old mythology provided images too imperfect to satisfy the heart's longing to adore. Plato and Euripides show the bitter dissatisfaction with their forefathers' imaginings, and the search, never fully satisfied, for something better (see, *e.g.*, Plato, *Euthyphro*; Euripides, *Bacchæ*, *Troades*).

The same dissatisfaction and the same search are manifest during the early days of the Roman Empire, only in a far more prosaic form, inasmuch as the age was far less imaginative. The eager acceptance of strange worships at Rome, and the attempt of Augustus to set up the worship of the Emperor above them all, are proofs of this, as pitiful as they are ludicrous.

Christianity, it might be thought, would have solved all these difficulties for those who accepted it. And it is noteworthy that perhaps the only expression of pure adoration in literature worthy to be set beside the Hebrew, is to be found in the vision of the Christian Paradise at the end of Dante's poem. It may be added that the liturgies of the Church have always been particularly successful in the place they have given to praise as distinguished from prayer. But not to speak of the profound and complicated controversies on the Trinitarian and Unitarian conceptions, it is clear that the fierce quarrels over the use of images and the honour due to the Saints exhibit the essential features of former struggles. The Iconoclasts and Reformers fear any devotion to what is not absolutely the highest, as tending to weaken the powers of real adoration. The Roman Catholics, on the other hand, deny that the reverence paid to the Saints is the same as, or in any way conflicts with, the worship of the one God.

Thus art. 'Saints,' by Mattès, in *Dict. Encyc. de la Théol. Cathol.* (Paris, 1870): 'The Saints are not honoured like God, and are not adored, but they are more honoured, more reverenced, than any men alive on earth. . . . Gradually the term δουλεία, *veneratio*, was fixed upon to denote the cult of the Saints, as distinct from λατρεία, *adoratio*, the word used to denote the worship offered to God, as distinct from the varying forms of expression that may indicate the respect, the deference, the homage paid to men on earth.'

A word should perhaps be said in conclusion about the attitude of those outside the Churches in the present day. For the vast majority of these there is no object of complete adoration, and this because of the divorce that is feared to exist between Power and Goodness. The cosmos, as known to Science, shows power, immense and overwhelming, but is the power good? The ideals of man—justice and mercy and love—are good, but have they a force in themselves? Only those can adore in the full sense who, like Wordsworth, definitely make the leap and unite Nature with God.

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F. MELIAN STAWELL.

ADORATION (Biblical).—**1.** One of the simpler and lower forms of a sentiment approaching to adoration is that which is felt in presence of a fellow-man mightier and more majestic than oneself. Kings and conquerors, in the days when might was right, were always anxious to inspire their subjects with a profound dread of their person, and insisted on a cringing, self-debasing attitude in their presence. Ages of tyranny and submission made servile fear and abjectness almost universal in Oriental lands. Dread in the presence of conscious superiority produced homage indicative of lowly self-abasement. We see this in the case of Ruth before Boaz (Ru 2^{10}); the Shunammite before Elisha (2 K 4^{37}); Abigail (1 S 25^{23}), Mephibosheth (2 S 9^{6}), and Joab (2 S 14^{32}) before David; and in the 'reverence' paid to Haman by all the king's servants save Mordecai (Est 3^{2}).

2. These instances do not seem to furnish us with any sentiment higher and worthier than mere dread of power: and in presence of the indications of power *in nature* men have ever been wont to pay homage akin to that rendered to rulers and lords. The sun is certainly the most wonderful object in nature, and has called forth adoration in every age. Though this was discouraged and forbidden by the monotheistic leaders of Israel (Dt 4^{19} 17^{3}), it could not be entirely suppressed. Even in the times of the Exile, in the

Temple at Jerusalem, there were those who turned their faces to the east and worshipped the sun (Ezk 8^{16}); and in 'the Oath of Clearing' Job protests that when he beheld the sun and moon, his heart had *not* been secretly enticed, and he had not kissed his hand to them ($31^{26f.}$). The stars also, which move through the heavens in silent majesty, and evoke incessant wonder and awe, have for millenniums received devout adoration, and have been believed to rule the destinies of men. Even in Israel 'the host of heaven' received worship in the time of the kings (2 K 17^{16} 21^{3}). Similarly, when anything mysterious suddenly occurred, it was regarded with dread and reverence, especially when it was conceived of as the manifestation of a terrible Power behind all things. At the dedication of the Tabernacle, when fire came forth and consumed the burnt-offerings upon the altar, all the people fell on their faces (Lv 9^{24}). And in Elijah's time, when fire fell and consumed the prophet's burnt-offering and the wood and the stones, the people fell on their faces and cried, 'Jahweh, he is God' (1 K $18^{38f.}$). Similarly, Ezekiel fell on his face when he beheld the cherubim (1^{28}); and when he saw the glory of the Lord returning from the east to inhabit again the visionary Temple (43^{3}); and especially when 'the glory of the Lord filled the house of the Lord' (44^{4}).

3. The appearance of angels is stated on several occasions to have caused great dread and the outward manifestations of adoration: as when Abraham (Gn 18^{2}), and also Lot (19^{1}), bowed themselves with their faces to the earth. So when Manoah and his wife saw the angel 'ascend in the flame of the altar,' they fell on their faces to the ground (Jg 13^{20}). The same is narrated of Balaam after his eyes were opened and he saw the angel of the Lord standing in the way (Nu 22^{31}), and of the women at the tomb of our Lord when they saw the 'two men in dazzling apparel' (Lk 24^{4}). It was a sentiment more of abject terror, with less of reverence, that caused Saul to 'fall straightway his full length upon the earth' when he saw what he considered to be the ghost of Samuel (1 S 28^{20}).

4. Idolatry evoked in Israel the same outward signs of servile adoration as in other nations. The image was believed to be indwelt by the genius or divinity, and was usually treated with deep reverence; as when the vast multitudes on the plains of Dura prostrated themselves before the image which Nebuchadnezzar set up (Dn 3), and when Naaman spoke of bowing himself in the house of Rimmon (2 K 5^{18}). If not a deterioration from reverence, it must be a survival of a very early stage of idolatry, when we read of men *kissing* the image (Hos 13^{2}, 1 K 19^{18}; cf. the *stroking (f) the face* referred to in 1 S 13^{12}).

5. The loftier our conception of God becomes, the more profound is our sentiment of adoration. So long as men conceive of God as such an one as themselves, their adoration of Him is closely akin to that of a ruler or monarch; but as God recedes beyond our comprehension, the more sincere and profoundly reverent does our homage become. And when at length the term 'boundless,' or 'infinite,' employed either in a spatial, temporal, or ethical sense, is applied to God, then adoration reaches its ideal. There is an excellent drastic influence in the conception of Infinitude. 'Mystery,' as Dr. Martineau says, 'is the great redeeming power that purifies the intellect of its egotism and the heart of its pride' (*Essays* (1891), iii. 217). But the contemplation of the abstraction, 'the Infinite' or 'the Absolute,' can scarcely evoke adoration. It is when we realize that Infinitude is not a void, but is permeated with the energy of an Eternal Mind, that we prostrate our souls in holy adoration. When the OT saints could rise to the attitude of conceiving of God as 'the high and lofty One that *inhabiteth eternity*, whose name is Holy' (Is 57^{15}); and when in the prayer of Solomon we read 'heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain thee; how much less this house that I have builded' (1 K 8^{27}), we have as sublime instances of adoration as the OT furnishes.

6. Mystery is the mother of adoration. It is true that in a sense adoration is based on knowledge: 'we worship what we know': but it is an essential of sincere adoration that we should *not fully* know. Even on the lower human plane, what we revere is higher than we. If there is any one before whom we are inclined to bow the knee, and yield the veneration of hero-worship, it is the man of overpowering intellect, transcendent wisdom, or superlative goodness. Similarly, the very mysteries of the Divine foster adoration and evoke worship. The writer of Ps 8 was in a genuine state of adoration when he considered the heavens the work of God's fingers, the moon and the stars which He had ordained, and then exclaimed, 'What is man!' Self-abasement in the presence of majesty is an essential element in adoration, and the magnificence of God's work suggested to the Psalmist the incomparable magnificence of the Workman. This finds sublime expression in that most beautiful of the Nature-Psalms, Ps 29. The subject is a thunderstorm which gathers over Lebanon, and passes southward until it dies away in the wilderness of Paran. The storm-cloud is Jahweh's chariot, and as the advancing cloud tips one after another the mountain-tops of Palestine, the Psalmist sees therein Jahweh treading on His high-places, and causing the mountains to quake before Him. As the storm dies away, the setting sun gilds the gathering clouds with tints of preternatural splendour, and to the Psalmist it seems the very entrance to the temple and palace of God. The beauty of the scene entrances him. He sees a door opened in heaven. In imagination he is with the angels, who, like himself, have been enraptured with the marvellous spectacle, and he exclaims, 'In his temple everything saith, Glory.' It is to these celestial beings, who, like himself, are filled with adoration at the majesty of God, that the Psalmist addresses the words, 'Give unto Jahweh, O ye sons of the mighty, give unto Jahweh glory and strength.'

Equally sublime is the adoration of the Divine omniscience in Ps 139. The consideration of the intimacy of God's knowledge of him, wherever he is and whatever he does, produces in the mind of the Psalmist the self-abasement which prompts him to hide himself from God's presence (v.^{7}); the fascinating sense of mystery: 'Such knowledge is too wonderful for me' (v.^{6}); and also of adoring love: 'How precious also are thy thoughts unto me, O God' (v.^{17}).

The most worship-filled of the Psalms is a group of seven, containing 93 and 95–100. They have a common theme: the recent enthronization of the Divine King on Zion; and one might say that the keynote of the entire group is to be found in the words: 'O come, let us worship and bow down; let us kneel before the Lord our Maker' (95^{6}). This group contains the passage which most readily comes to our lips when we desire to express the *mystery* of God's dealings and yet wish to 'comfort ourselves against sorrow': 'Clouds and darkness are round about him: righteousness and judgment are the foundation of his throne' (97^{2}), and it gives to us the ideal of adoration: 'O worship the Lord in the beauty of holiness' (96^{9}). The attributes of God which evoke the adoration

of the author, or authors, of these Psalms are these: (1) *The majesty of God*: 93^{1} 95^{3} $96^{3f.}$ 99^{1-3}; (2) *His providential care*: $95^{7ff.}$ 99^{6-8} 100^{3}; (3) *His creative power*: 95^{5} 96^{10} 100^{3b}; (4) *His righteousness and holiness*: 97^{6} $98^{2f.}$ $99^{3.5}$.

7. The effect of the contemplation of the Divine *holiness* is best seen in the vision of the youthful prophet Isaiah (ch. 6). The sight of the holiest beings in heaven, veiling their faces with their wings in view of the eternal Light of the excellent Glory, filled Isaiah with profound awe; and the sound of the antiphonal song of these holy ones, celebrating the infinitely superior holiness of God, filled him with such abasement that the only words he could utter were, 'Woe is me, for I am undone.' It was at his lips that the consciousness of his own impurity caught him. 'I am a man of unclean lips,' he cried; and it was there that the cauterizing stone from off the altar was applied—after which he felt able to join in the worship of the holy ones, and to become a messenger of the Lord of Hosts.

8. In the NT there is no very marked advance in the adoration rendered to God, because the attributes of God which usually evoke our adoration were almost as fully revealed in the OT as in the NT. We note, however, that the disparity between God and man is more completely realized, so that the prostration of adoration is considered to be fittingly rendered to God only, and is refused by others on that ground. When Cornelius was so much overawed by the mysterious circumstances in which Peter was sent for and came to Cæsarea, that he fell down at Peter's feet in lowliest reverence, Peter refused such obeisance as being excessive to a fellow-man. 'Peter raised him, saying, Stand up; I myself also am a man' (Ac 10^{26}); and in the Apocalypse of John, an angel rejects the same obeisance, on the ground that he is a fellow-servant with John and with all who obey God's words, significantly adding, 'Worship God' (Rev 22^{9}). And yet we find that the Lord Jesus never refused lowly homage, which implies the consciousness that adoration was fittingly paid to Him. The recorded instances of reverence paid to Christ are deeply interesting, especially the consideration of the motives which prompted it. There was probably a conflict of feelings in Peter's mind when he fell down at Jesus' knees, saying, 'Depart from me; for I am a sinful man, O Lord' (Lk 5^{8}), but it is clear that he was impressed by Christ's superior holiness. When Mary 'fell down at his feet, saying, Lord, if thou hadst been here, my brother had not died' (Jn 11^{32}), the sentiment was one of adoring love, which invests its beloved one with undefined power. The sense of need clinging vehemently to One who, they believe, has love and power enough to reach to the depth of their misery and need, was the sentiment most apparent in those who came to Jesus for His miraculous help, *e.g.* the leper (Mt 8^{2}), Jairus (9^{18}), the Syro-Phœnician woman (15^{25}), and the Gadarene demoniac (Mk 5^{6}), respecting all of whom we read that they 'came and worshipped him': while of the father of the demoniac boy we read that 'he came kneeling down to him' (Mt 17^{14}). Adoration of superhuman power was the feeling uppermost in the minds of the disciples, when, after Christ had come to the ship, walking on the sea, they 'worshipped him, saying, Of a truth thou art the Son of God' (14^{33}). Not only power but love also was present to the thoughts of the blind beggar who had been excommunicated from the synagogue when he paid adoration to the Lord Jesus (Jn 9^{38}). Jesus heard that they had cast him out, and sought the poor outcast; and when Jesus revealed Himself to him as the Son of God, he said, 'Lord, I believe,' and worshipped Him (*ib.*). And there was a deep adoring love in the minds of the disciples when they were met by the risen Lord, and they 'held him by the feet and worshipped him' (Mt 28^{9}).

9. Adoration of the Lord Jesus became more profound in the Christian community as their knowledge and faith increased. It was with devout adoration that the dying Stephen beheld Jesus standing at the right hand of God, and said, 'Lord Jesus, receive my spirit' (Ac $7^{55.59}$). There was incipient adoration in the words of St. Paul, who, when he saw the ascended Christ, 'fell to the earth, and trembling and astonished said, Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?' (9^{4-6}). There was a deeper adoration when in the Temple he prayed so long and so fervently that in ecstasy he saw his Lord again, and received from Him the definite commission to devote his life to the Gentiles (22^{17-21}). But how much richer was the knowledge, and more intense the love, and more profound the adoration, when he could say to the Ephesians: 'For this cause I bow my knees unto the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, that ye, being rooted and grounded in love, may . . . know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge' (Eph $3^{14ff.}$).

The Revelation of St. John is filled with adoration to 'him who sitteth on the throne, and to the Lamb.' The vision of the exalted Lord as walking among the candlesticks caused the seer to fall at His feet as dead (Rev 1^{17}). In ch. 4 we read of the living creatures and the elders before the throne of God, who habitually adore and worship God. The four living creatures adore the holiness of God, and the elders habitually adore the creative power and wisdom of God, and cast their crowns before the throne in lowly reverence; but when the Lamb appears in the midst of the throne, bearing the marks of His suffering and death, they both break off from their accustomed song, and join in a '*new* song,' celebrating the greater wonders of redemption ($5^{9f.}$). This is followed by the song of adoration of the angels, who are equally impressed by the wonders of Christ's death, and join in the song, 'Worthy is the Lamb that was slain,' etc. ($5^{11f.}$). In ch. 7 we have two other songs of adoration: first, that of the redeemed, the 'multitude which no man could number' ($7^{9f.}$), and then that of the angels, who fall before the throne on their faces and worship God ($7^{11f.}$). In $11^{16f.}$ we again read of the lowly adoration of the 24 elders, and in 14^{3} we read of the song of the 144,000 'who had been redeemed from the earth.' All through this book partial knowledge, eagerness for more knowledge, and withal a profound mystery, combine to produce the loftiest type of adoration which the creatures of God, terrestrial or celestial, can experience and render.

10. It remains now that we should tabulate the various attitudes of adoration which are mentioned in the OT and NT. They are the same as are found in other Oriental countries. (1) *Prostration* (Heb. הִשְׁתַּחֲוָה, Gr. *προσκυνεῖν*), in which the one who was paying homage lay down abjectly with his face on the ground, as if to permit his lord to place his foot on his neck (Jos 10^{24}, Ps 110^{1}). This attitude is mentioned in 1 S 25^{24}, 2 K 4^{37}, Est 8^{3}, Mk 5^{22}, Lk 8^{41}. (2) *Standing*, as slaves stand in presence of their master. The Pharisee '*stood* and prayed' (Lk 18^{11}), and many of the Pharisees prayed standing in the corners of the streets (Mt 6^{5}). (3) *Sitting*, *i.e.* kneeling with the body resting on the heels or the sides of the feet. It was thus that 'David *sat* before the Lord' when he was filled with amazement at the message of Nathan, announcing the eternal establishment of his kingdom (2 S 7^{18} ‖ 1 Ch 17^{16}). (4) *Kneeling* (Heb. כָּרַע [2 Ch 6^{13}, Ps 95^{6}], עָרַץ [1 K 8^{54}, Jos 7^{6}, Ezr 9^{5}], Gr. *γονυπετεῖν*)

with the body erect, or bent forward so that the head touched the ground. Solomon, at the dedication of the Temple, 'knelt on his knees, with his hands spread forth towards heaven.' The prediction of Messianic days is that 'every knee shall bow' to the Lord (Is 45^{23}, Ro 14^{11}, Ph 2^{10}). The Lord Jesus in Gethsemane 'kneeled down' (Lk 22^{41}), and also 'fell on the ground' (Mk 14^{35}). St. Paul kneeled in the building used as a church at Miletus (Ac 20^{36}), and also on the beach at Tyre (21^{5}). (5) *Bowing the head*, so as to rest the chin on the chest (Heb. קָדַר, Gr. κλίνειν): used of Eliezer when he found that God had directed his way (Gn $24^{26.\ 48}$); of the elders of Israel when Moses told the story of the burning bush (Ex 4^{31}), and when they received injunction as to the celebration of the Passover (12^{27}); of Moses when Jahweh proclaimed His Name before him (34^{8}); of Balaam (Nu 22^{31}) and of Jehoshaphat (2 Ch 20^{18}). (6) *Uplifting the hands*: used of Solomon at the dedication of the Temple (1 K $8^{22.\ 54}$; cf. also Is 1^{15}, La 3^{41}, 1 Ti 2^{8}). Then, as we have said, there is one reference to 'kissing the hand' to the sun or moon as a sign of adoration (Job 31^{27}).

LITERATURE.—Art. 'Adoration' in Hastings' *DB* and *Single-vol. DB*, *Jewish Encyc.*, Smith, and Kitto; art. 'Anbetung' in Herzog, and Schenkel; also Marti, *Isr. Rel.* § 10; Benzinger, *Heb. Arch.* (1894) § 68; Macfadyen, *Messages of the Psalmists* (1904), p. 83. J. T. MARSHALL.

ADORATION (Jewish and Christian, post-Biblical).—I. **Jewish.**—(1) The *outward posture* of adoration did not differ from what had gone before (see above), only in post-Biblical literature its various forms were more strictly prescribed. This was a natural consequence of the predominance of the Pharisaic party, with its love of the details of ritualistic observance. It was ordered that on entering the Sanctuary the worshipper should make thirteen prostrations (הִשְׁתַּחֲוָיוֹת), a form of adoration which consisted in the spreading out of hands and feet while the face had to touch the ground. Another outward act of adoration was kneeling with the head bent forward so that the forehead touched the ground; a like posture, accompanied by kissing the ground, was an intensifying of the act. The most exaggerated form of adoration, however, was when, on the Day of Atonement, the high priest uttered the Holy Name of God (Jahweh); at the mention of this name every one present threw himself prostrate upon the ground, face downwards (Jerus. *Yoma* iii. 40 *d*).* The importance attached to the outward expression of adoration is also exemplified by the dispute that took place at the beginning of the Christian era between the Hillelites and the Shammaites as to the posture which ought to be assumed while reciting the *Shema'*. The Shammaites, who regarded standing as the most fitting attitude, won the day, and at the present time the Jews recite it standing. The same position is assumed during the saying of the *Shemônê 'Esrê* (the 'Eighteen Benedictions'), which is one of the central parts of the Jewish liturgy;† indeed, its technical name is *'Amidah* ('Standing'), because, as it is one of the chief acts of adoration, the most appropriate attitude is that of standing while it is being recited (cf. for the position assumed during prayer, Mt 6^{5}, Lk 18^{11}). Throughout the Middle Ages, down to the present day, the Talmudic prescriptions regarding attitudes of adoration have been observed. Thus, the throwing of oneself at full length upon the ground took place only on the Day of Atonement,‡ while at other times it consisted in bowing the head or standing, or, less frequently, kneeling.* A notable exception to this is, however, afforded by the Karaites; these professed in all things to reject Rabbinical traditions and to revert to Biblical usage only; they regarded eight external attitudes in adoration as indispensable, *viz.* 'bending the head, bending the upper part of the body until it touched the knees, kneeling, violent bowing of the head, complete prostration, raising the hands, standing, and raising the eyes to heaven.'† It will be noticed that kissing the ground or any object is not included among these, no doubt because in the OT this act of adoration was usually connected with non-Jahwistic worship (see preced. art. § 4).

(2) God alone is adored by the Jews, though the veneration paid to the *Torah* ('Law') both as an abstract thing of perfection,‡ and also in its material form ('the scroll of the Law'), reaches sometimes an extravagant pitch. One can see not infrequently in the Synagogue, worshippers stretching out their hands to touch the roll of the Law when carried in solemn procession to and from the 'Ark.' The hand that has touched the sacred roll is then kissed; moreover, during the ceremony of the *Haqbaa*, *i.e.* the 'elevation' of the scroll of the Law, the whole congregation stands up in its honour; this act is regarded as a special privilege or *miṣwah*.§ There are certain intermediate beings between God and men to whom great veneration, bordering on adoration, is paid; indeed, in some passages these intermediate beings are identified with God, and in so far can truly be said to be worshipped; but the later Jewish teaching on these beings is so contradictory—sometimes they are spoken of as personalities, at other times as abstract forces, at other times as Divine attributes—that it would be precarious to regard them definitely as objects of adoration. They are: *Metatron*, the *Memra* ('Word') of Jahweh, the *Shekhinah*, and the *Ruaḥ ḥaḳḳodesh* ('Holy Spirit');‖ to these must be added the Messiah, in so far as He is represented as the incarnation of the Divine Wisdom, which existed before the world was created.¶

2. **Christian.**—(1) The *attitudes* of adoration among the early Christians were borrowed, as one would expect, from the Jews; an instance of how minutely the Jewish custom was followed is seen in Tertullian's description of Christian worship, given in *de Corona Militis* iii. He says that on Sunday and the whole week of the festival of Pentecost, prayer was not to be said kneeling. This is thoroughly in accordance with Jewish precedent, for 'the synagogal custom (*minhag*), as old as the first Christian century, omits the prostration on all festivals and semi-festivals.'**

(2) Adoration among Christians, almost from the commencement, has not been confined to the adoration of the Deity. It is true that in the Roman Catholic Church degrees of adoration are officially recognized (see above, p. 116[b]), but in actual practice this differentiation has not always been observed. Apart from worship offered to God, adoration is offered in the following instances:—

(*a*) *Adoration of the Eucharistic elements.*—The doctrine of Transubstantiation was held centuries before it was officially declared to be a dogma of

* *JE* i. 210; Weber, *Jüd. Theol.* . . .[2] pp. 41, 42. The whole of the first five sections of the tractate *Berakhoth* deal with prayer and its accompanying posture, mental preparation, etc.

† Singer, *Authorized Daily Prayer-Book*, pp. 44–54.

‡ This is, however, now done on New Year's Day as well.

* This refers to European Jews; those who live in the East follow, like the Muhammadans, the practice of prostration as in earlier ages.

† *JE* i. 211.

‡ A very small acquaintance with the Jewish religion will show that this is no exaggeration.

§ In the Synagogue this word is used in the technical sense of 'privilege,' not in the Biblical sense of 'command' (cf. *bar-Miṣwah*). See, further, Oesterley, *Church and Synagogue*, viii. (1906) p. 1 ff.

‖ *Ib.* vii. p. 153 ff. viii. pp. 70 ff. 112 ff.

¶ Cf. Hamburger, *RE* i. 739 ff.

** *JE* i. 211.

the Roman Catholic Church; from it followed of necessity the adoration of the 'Eucharistic Christ.'* Roman Catholics, of course, maintain that inasmuch as the elements of bread and wine in the Mass become the actual body and blood of Christ, they worship Christ, and Him alone, in the Mass. The adoration of the elements takes place at their elevation, *i.e.* after the consecration;† and the adoration is of the highest kind, viz. *cultus latriæ*. Communities, many in number, exist for the purpose of offering perpetual adoration to the consecrated elements; day and night, at least one person has to be present before these in prayer and silent adoration. In these communities‡ each member has a particular hour assigned to him or her at which regular attendance is required for this purpose in the church or private chapel. The *raison d'être* of this perpetual adoration is that it should be in imitation of the holy angels and glorified saints who serve the Lamb 'day and night in his temple' (Rev 7^{11-15}).

(*b*) *Adoration of the Cross.*—As early as the time of Tertullian the Christians were accused of worshipping the Cross;§ and the evidence of Cassian (d. 435) points to a tendency which, as the witness of later writers shows, soon became a settled practice. He says: 'Quod quidam districtissimi monachorum, habentes quidem zelum Dei sed non secundum scientiam, simpliciter intelligentes, fecerunt sibi cruces ligneas, easque jugiter humeris circumferentes, non ædificationem, sed risum cunctis videntibus intulerunt.'‖ St. Aldhelm (7th cent.) speaks of certain Christians as *Crucicolæ*, and, indeed, not without reason, if it be true that Alcuin, who lived at the same period, was in the habit of saying before the Cross: 'Tuam crucem adoramus, Domine, tuam gloriosam recolimus passionem; miserere nostri.'¶ Moreover, stone crosses have been found at Mainz, belonging to the second half of the 8th cent., bearing the inscription: 'S̄ca Crux nos salva.'** It was, therefore, not without reason that *latria* to the Cross was forbidden by the second Council of Nicæa (787).†† Two festivals in honour of the Cross were observed in very early days, and are kept up to the present day. The one is the 'Invention of the Cross,' which is observed on May 3 in memory of the alleged finding of the true cross by Queen Helena; the fact of the 'Invention' is testified to by Rufinus, Socrates, Sozomen, and Theodoret.‡‡ According to the story, Helena sent the nails, the inscription, and part of the Cross to Constantine; the rest was kept at Jerusalem in a silver case, which was carried in procession and worshipped by the faithful on certain days in the year. This custom had died out by the time of the patriarch Sophronius (d. 640); it was, however, continued in St. Sophia's at Constantinople till the 8th century. The other festival is that of the 'Exaltation of the Cross,'§§ kept on Sept. 14, in memory of the Emperor Constantine's vision of the Cross.‖‖ At the present day supposed pieces of the true Cross are possessed by some churches; the piece of wood (sometimes very minute) is placed in a glass case, resembling a 'monstrance,' which is sealed up by the Pope or the Bishop; the glass case is kissed and adored by the faithful, and is also used for blessing the congregation. What must have materially contributed to the adoration of crosses and crucifixes was the custom of putting relics inside them, for veneration.

In spite of Conciliar prohibition, St. Thomas Aquinas taught that the Cross was to be adored with *latria*, *i.e.* supreme worship, and argued that one might regard a cross or an image in two ways: (1) in itself, as a piece of wood or the like, and so no reverence is given to a cross or to an image of Christ; (2) as representing something else, and in this way we may give to the Cross *relatively*—*i.e.* to the Cross as carrying on our mind to Christ—the same honour as we give to Christ *absolutely*, *i.e.* in Himself.*

(*c*) *Adoration of the Sacred Heart.*—This cult originated with the mystic, Margaret Mary Alacoque (d. 1690). In the year 1675 she announced that she had had a vision, and that our Lord had Himself appeared to her, and showed her 'His most holy heart upon a throne of flames, encircled with thorns, and over it a Cross'; that it had been revealed to her that Christ desired that His heart should be specially honoured, as satisfaction for the many offences that had been committed against Him in the Holy Sacrament; and that special adoration should be offered to it on the Friday after the octave of the festival of Corpus Christi.

The idea of the adoration of the heart of Christ had, however, already been expressed, for in the 16th cent. the Carthusian monk Lansperg had recommended pious Christians to assist their devotion by using a figure of the Sacred Heart.† The cult was at first vehemently attacked,—the term *cardiolatræ* was applied to those who practised it; but in spite of this it grew in popularity, and in 1765 a special office and Mass were accorded it,‡ with the condition that the 'Heart of Jesus' was to be regarded only as the symbol of His goodness and love, '. . . intelligens hujus missæ et officii celebratione non aliud agi, quam ampliari cultum jam institutum et symbolice renovari memoriam illius divini amoris, quo Unigenitus Dei Filius humanam suscepit naturam, et factus obediens usque ad mortem, præbere se dixit exemplum hominibus, quod esset mitis et humilis corde.'§ A little later, an explanation of the principle underlying the cult was put forth in the bull 'Auctorem fidei' (1794), in which it is said that the faithful worship with supreme adoration the physical heart of Christ, considered 'not as mere flesh, but as united to the Divinity'; they adore it as 'the heart of the Person of the Word, to which it is inseparably united.' Stress is laid on the distinction between 'objectum formale et materiale.'‖ The cult became more and more popular under the influence and through the activity of the Jesuits; through their instrumentality the whole month of June was dedicated to the Sacred Heart. In 1856, at the desire of the French bishops, Pius IX. raised the festival of the 'Heart of Jesus' to a *Festum duplex majus*, and ordered it to be observed by the whole Church. In August 1864, Margaret Mary Alacoque was canonized, an act which still further popularized the cult.

* *Cf.* the words of St. Ambrose: 'It is the flesh of Christ . . . which we adore to-day in these mysteries,' quoted in Wetzer-Welte's *Dict. Encycl. de la Théol. Cath.* (1878) i. 78.

† Cf. the ancient Jewish custom, according to which the priest prostrates himself after he has offered a sacrifice.

‡ The most celebrated of these was that founded at Marseilles in the 18th cent. by the Dominican monk Antoine Le Quien.

§ *Apol.* 16. The word 'adore' with respect to the Cross occurs in Lactantius, as quoted by Benedict XIV. in *de Fest.* i. § 329, referred to in Addis-Arnold's *Catholic Dictionary*[6], *s.v.*

‖ Quoted by Bingham, *Antiq. of Christian Church*, ii. 362 (Oxford, 1855).

¶ *Cf.* Lingard, *Antiq. of Anglo-Saxon Church*, p. 174.

** Kraus, *Die Christl. Inschriften*, ii. 107.

†† Landon, *Manual of Councils*, Nic. 2.

‡‡ See Fleury, *Hist. Eccles.* xi. 32 (Paris, 1722–1738).

§§ Called 'Holy Cross Day' in the Calendar of the English Prayer-Book.

‖‖ Eusebius, *de Vita Const.* i. 27–32.

* Quoted from his *Works* (III. XXV. a. 3 et 4) by Addis-Arnold, *op. cit.* art. 'Adoration of the Cross.'

† Addis-Arnold, *op. cit.* p. 426.

‡ By Pope Clement XIII.

§ N. Nilles, *De rationibus Festorum sacratissimi Cordis Jesu et Purissimi Cordis Mariæ, e fontibus pure asceticis eruitis*, Libri IV. . . . Innsbruck, 1885, quoted by T. Slater in *PRR*[1] vii. p. 778.

† *Cf.* Addis-Arnold, *op. cit.*, *s.v.*; Wetzer-Welte, *op. cit. s.v.*

In spite of the fact that officially a distinction is made between the material and the symbolic, and that the whole cult is declared to be only an expression of the dogma of the adoration of Christ's humanity united with His Divinity in the heart, it is certain that among very many devout, though uncultured, believers the adoration of Christ's heart is characterized by gross materialism; for the heart which is adored is spoken of as that which was pierced by the spear upon the Cross; and, in urging the excellence of this devotion, the late Bp. Martin of Paderborn (d. 1878) wrote thus: 'The real object of meditation concerning the most holy heart of Jesus, as the name itself implies, is the actual heart of Jesus,—the actual heart of Jesus, and not merely His love symbolized by this heart. . . . It is the real, bodily heart of Jesus which is placed before my eyes as an object of adoration (*Verehrung*) by means of the ordinary bodily representation of the same.'*

(*d*) *The adoration of the Heart of Mary Immaculate.*—It was inevitable that this should follow the adoration of the Sacred Heart. This devotion was first propagated by John Eudes, who founded a congregation of priests called, after him, Eudists; it was accorded official recognition in 1799. As with the Sacred Heart, so in this case it is explained that 'the physical heart is taken as a natural symbol of charity and of the inner life.'† The heart of St. Mary is adored with *Hyperdulia*, and what was said under the foregoing section as to materialistic conceptions applies here also.

(*e*) *The adoration of Saints and Images.*—According to the second Council of Nicæa (787), δουλεία (*veneratio*) is offered to the Saints, as distinct from λατρεία (*adoratio*); and in the Greek Orthodox Church it is said (*Conf. Orthod.* iii. 52): ἐπικαλούμεθα αὐτοὺς (*i.e.* τοὺς ἁγίους) οὐχὶ ὡς θεούς τινας, ἀλλ' ὡς φίλους αὐτοῦ (*i.e.* θεοῦ). In the same way, according to the Council of Trent, 'veneration' is offered to the Saints in their images and relics. It is insisted that Saints are not honoured like God, or adored, though they are more honoured and more venerated than any living man on earth. The Council of Nicæa, furthermore, ordered that respect and honour were to be accorded to the *images* of Saints, only in so far as they brought to mind their prototypes; in the same way the Greek Orthodox Church orders that worship is not to be offered them: οὐ μὲν τὴν κατὰ πίστιν ἡμῶν ἀληθινὴν λατρείαν, ἣ πρέπει μόνῃ τῇ θείᾳ φύσει.

But here again, whether it be to the Virgin Mary, or to St. Joseph (a more modern cult), or to any lesser Saint, however carefully official documents may differentiate between what is due to God alone and what is due to Saints or their images, it is no exaggeration to say that among the ignorant‡ the Virgin Mary and the Saints take the place of God Almighty in the popular worship; and the images and relics of Saints are believed to possess miraculous powers in not a few cases, and receive adoration accordingly. In numbers of agricultural districts of European countries, the system of Saint-worship does not differ materially from that which obtained in pre-Reformation days, and that was in many cases an adaptation of heathen cults.§ English documents of the Reformation period prove conclusively that among the things protested against were the rendering to the Virgin Mary and the Saints the honour that was due to God alone; the belief that these were able to give gifts which are in reality Divine; the belief that the ears of the Saints were more readily opened to the requests of men; and, finally, the practice of regarding Saints as tutelary deities.‖

One other point must be briefly referred to: the word 'adoration' is used in reference to a newly elected Pope. Immediately after election the Pope is placed upon the altar; the Cardinals, who then come and render him homage, are said to go 'to the Adoration.' Again, when a Pope is elected spontaneously and unanimously, without the 'scrutiny' having been made beforehand, he is said to be elected 'by adoration.'¶

W. O. E. Oesterley.

ADULTERATION.—Adulteration may be defined as the use of cheaper materials in the production of an article so as to transform it into an inferior article which is not by the purchaser or consumer readily distinguishable as inferior. There is not necessarily in the production the intention to deceive; and the substitute is not necessarily deleterious. Indeed, in some cases the technically inferior article may be more wholesome than the poorer qualities of the counterfeited article, as in the case of margarine and other substitutes for butter. The essential point is that the consumer does not get what he is paying for and intends to buy. We must, however, carefully distinguish between what by improved processes of production is really cheaper and what merely seems so; for it is the craze for cheapness that is largely responsible for the extent to which adulteration is practised. Owing to imperfect education and an often consequent misguided social ambition which lead people to ape the habits of those better off than themselves, without either the taste or the means to indulge in those habits, there is a very great demand for substitutes or imitations of articles of luxury, which gives the opportunity to the dishonest dealer, already disposed by self-interest and by pressure of competition and by the difficulty of detection, to adulterate.

The evil is not entirely modern. Even in the Middle Ages, under the guild system, regulations were required to secure that for a fair price an honest article was given. Night work, for instance, was forbidden, and a workman was required to show evidence of skill before he was permitted to practise his trade. Publicity was in the main the remedy against dishonest dealing, and owing to the simplicity of wants and to the simple character of the processes of manufacture, and to the close relation of producer and consumer, the remedy was tolerably effectual. In modern times these conditions are absent, and the practice is so prevalent, that, in defiance of the doctrine *caveat emptor*, legislation has been required to protect the consumer. The ignorance of the consumer, the impossibility of educating a taste that is continually being debased by the consumption of adulterated articles, and the frequent danger to life and health, have necessitated this departure from the doctrine of *laissez faire*, particularly with regard to articles of food. The consumer is still at the mercy of the vendor of shoddy clothes, etc., but in food and drugs at least he is protected, although it must be admitted that the penalties inflicted are often inadequate and the laws ineffective, owing to the absence of a standard quality (cf. the recent prosecutions for adulteration of brandy). Mr. Devus (*Political Economy*, p. 70) quotes a public analyst's report to the effect that of samples of milk 43 per cent., of mustard 16, of coffee 14, of spirits 11, of butter 11, and of disinfectants 75, were adulterated.

Legislation against adulteration takes various forms, of which the activity of the public analyst, through official inspectors who take samples, is perhaps the best known and most effective. It is unfortunate that the use of preservatives for milk and meat especially is not subject to precise regulation, for the repeated addition by successive dealers of preservatives to milk, for instance, converts what might be a laudable and economic practice into a deleterious adulteration. Fiscal legislation is often used for the purpose of excluding, or at least restricting, the use of poorer qualities and adulterated goods. Thus Canada increases the taxation on molasses as the quality deteriorates, for the avowed purpose of excluding 'black jack,' as it is called, which a paternal finance Minister declared 'no man should put into his mouth and think he is taking molasses.' In other ways, *e.g.* by prescribing that all goods and packages should be marked with the country of origin, the Government inter-

* Quoted in *PRE*[2] vii. 780.

† Addis-Arnold, *op. cit.* p. 427.

‡ The reference is to Roman and Greek Catholics.

§ For a popular presentation of the facts, see the earlier volumes of Freytag's *Die Ahnen*, a work which may be regarded as a classic.

‖ See the article on the subject in the *Church Times*, Aug. 31, 1906.

¶ Migne's *Troisième Encyc. théol.* ('Dict. des Savants et des Ignorants') xlvi. 87, Paris, 1859.

feres to prevent fraud and adulteration. This plan ('made in Germany,' etc.) has in the United Kingdom not been very successful, for the alleged poorer quality of goods imported has not been established, and the result has in some cases been an advertisement for the foreign producer.

It is necessary, in considering the demand for legislation to suppress adulteration, that we should be on our guard against class interests which may demand the prohibition or regulation of the sale of some cheaper but not less useful article than that which they produce. Thus in some agricultural countries the importation or manufacture of margarine is prohibited in the interests of the farmers, and the importation of live cattle from Canada into Great Britain is [1907] forbidden on the alleged ground that disease exists among Canadian herds. See Ashley's *Economic History* for mediæval regulations and ideas, and Marshall's address to the Co-operative Congress, 1889. J. DAVIDSON.

ADULTERY.

ADULTERY (Primitive and Savage Peoples). —1. Woman in primitive society.—A survey of the notions entertained by savage peoples regarding adultery tends to show that, in the earliest times, it could not have been regarded in any other light than as the interference of another with the woman over whom a man had, or conceived himself to have, certain rights. It was not considered as an act of impurity, for the idea of purity had not yet been evolved. Nor was it a breach of contract, for it is improbable that anything corresponding to marriage rites was yet in use. Nor was it a breach of social law, for men were not yet organized in social groups. Woman being conceived as belonging to man, any interference with her would immediately outrage man's instinctive sense of property, and would at once arouse his jealousy. He would, therefore, try to recover his property from the thief; and this could be done only by assaulting or killing him, in other words, by punishing him for his theft. Recognizing, too, that the woman, differing from other possessions of his, was a sentient being, and therefore to some extent a consenting party to the theft, he would also vent his anger upon her, even putting her to death in cases of extreme rage. Among animals precisely similar ideas with respect to the females may be found. Where an animal collects a number of females round him, as in the case of certain apes, he acts as a despot over them; young males born to him are, after a time, expelled, and the approach of a possible rival is at once resented (Darwin, *Descent of Man*, 591). Thus it must be admitted that, at the earliest stage of human history, adultery could have been nothing but a breach of proprietary rights, to be followed, when discovered, by a more or less savage act of private revenge upon both the culprits. Among most existing savages hardly any other idea of it exists, as we shall presently see. Woman before and after marriage is the property, first of her father or guardian, next of her husband. Among peoples who allow licence before marriage, none is permitted after it, when the husband assumes proprietary rights over the woman. And where such licence is not allowed, any unchastity is punished by inflicting a fine or death on the man who has depreciated the value of the woman in her guardian's or prospective husband's eyes. This idea of a husband's proprietary rights in the woman would be increased where she was the captive of his bow and spear, or where he had to undergo a period of servitude for her, or, much more usually, had to acquire her by purchase. Here it may be remarked that adultery is not confined to cases where a ceremony of marriage exists: wherever a man and a woman enter into a union more or less lasting, and the man treats her as his property, it may occur. But it need not be inferred that it is a common occurrence among all savage races. It is abhorrent to some peoples, *e.g.* the Andamanese, with whom conjugal fidelity is the rule (Man, *JAI* xii. 135), the people of Uea in the Loyalty Islands (Erskine, *Western Pacific*, 341), the Abipones (Dobrizhoffer, *Account of the Abipones*, ii. 153), and others.

Certain facts are often alleged against the idea that woman is not a free agent in primitive or savage society. Thus, a woman's consent is often required before marriage: yet even here the consent of her guardian is also necessary, and this right of choice on her part need not argue anything as to her future freedom of action, while it is counterbalanced by the overwhelming weight of evidence regarding the woman's position as a being owned first by her guardian, then by her husband. Again, in cases where, after marriage, the woman has considerable influence over her husband or in the tribe, this hardly affects the fact that her legal status is not that of the man, nor does it give her equal rights with him. This influence may frequently arise from the fact that women have their own sphere of action, that they have been the earliest civilizers, that they possess much of the tribal lore, and that they are feared as dangerous (magically) at certain crises of their lives. All this limits the husband's power in many ways; but so far as concerns interference with her sexually, his power is unlimited. Here, any attempt at independence on her part arouses at once that jealousy, that underlying fact of man's proprietary rights in the woman, which her innate superiority or her occasional influence does not abate. Even where the matriarchate exists, and where the man goes to live with the woman's people, this seldom takes away his power of life and death over her, especially where adultery is concerned (Haddon, *Head-Hunters*, 160, says that though in the Torres Straits islands a woman asks the man to marry her, and he goes to live with her parents, he can kill her if she causes trouble; cf. Powers, *Tribes of California*, 882). In effect all such exceptional cases are overruled by the fact that universally the woman's power of licence ceases at marriage, that universally unchastity on her part is regarded by the husband as a breach of his proprietary rights, that frequently the husband has the power to kill his wife for any such breach, that well-nigh universally he can lend his wife to another man, and that generally adultery on the husband's part cannot be punished in any way by the wife.

2. Adultery under different conditions of marriage.—It is now generally admitted that *promiscuity* was not the earliest form of human sexual relations. But even had it been so, the idea of adultery based upon jealousy and the sense of property would still have been conceivable. Men and women being collected into groups for the sake of defence or of facilitating the supply of food, the men would resent the approach of members of other similar groups, while any interference with the women of the group would be jealously guarded against by all the males of the group, to whom *ex hypothesi* all the females of the group belonged in common. Promiscuity, however, as a theory of marriage, is baseless, and has frequently been confused with what is known as *group marriage*, an entirely different thing. In this case, found in actual practice among certain Australian tribes, the men of one definite group are potential husbands of the women of another definite group; the husband of any one woman has only a preferential right in her, and the men of his group may have access to her on certain occasions. But here the husband's consent must first be given; and though it is practically never withheld, and a man is looked upon as churlish who does withhold it, this points to the existence of individual marriage underlying this mixed polyandrous and polygamous system, rather than to its being a systematized form of earlier promiscuity. The consent of the husband being necessary implies a certain proprietary right in the woman on his part; he sanctions her union with other men only on certain ceremonial occasions. If the woman dared to consort with a man

not of the group, this would be resented by her actual and potential husbands; it would be incest rather than adultery (see § 5; Spencer-Gillen[a], 62, 63, 110, do.[b] 73, 140; Howitt, *JAI* xx. 53). Again, where *polyandry* exists, adultery is still possible, since the husbands of the woman are usually well defined, and their rights over her are arranged according to strict rule. Where, as in the Tibetan type of polyandry, a woman is the wife of several brothers, it is obvious that they will resent the approach of any other man to their wife, while contrariwise the woman is extremely jealous of her own conjugal rights (*Hist. Univ. des Voyages*, xxxi. 434). The story told by Strabo (xvi. 4. 25) of the custom of fraternal polyandry among the ancient Arabs, shows that adultery with another man was punishable, and similar cases might be cited (see § 4, Tibet). Among the Nairs, with whom polyandry assumes another form, the woman is not allowed to have any later sexual relations with the man who first consummates the marriage, while any relations with a man not of her caste is *ipso facto* adultery, and was formerly punished by death (Reclus, *Primitive Folk*, 162, 164).

A modified form of polyandry exists where the custom of providing a 'secondary husband' (the cicisbeate) exists. In this case, the secondary husband must contribute to the support of the household, and takes the place of the husband with the wife only in his absence. This is found among some Eskimo tribes (M'Lennan, *Studies in Ancient History*, 2nd ser. 376; Reclus, 66), where frequently the secondary husband is a younger brother. With them, therefore, the system is akin to that of the Todas, where the eldest of a group of brothers is the husband, but the younger brothers have rights over the wife also (*TES* vii. 240). It occurs among some Polynesian peoples (*ZVK*, 1900, 334) and others, as it did in ancient Sparta (Xenophon, *Rep. Lac.* i. 9). Sometimes, where adultery takes place, a man is forced to become a secondary husband, to do the work of the house and obey the husband, while he may now associate freely with the wife, as among the Konyagas (Reclus, 67).

3. **Adultery under polygamy and monogamy.**—But it is especially among peoples with whom polygamy or monogamy is the rule that we see the working of jealousy and the idea of property in the woman existing most emphatically. Jealousy of their wives exists among the lowest savages, and with them and among higher savage and barbaric tribes the utmost precautions are taken to prevent the approach of another man. Dire punishments are frequently meted out to the wife even on the slightest suspicion, or, as among the Negroes of Calabar, the wives are at intervals put through a trying ordeal to test their faithfulness (Miss Kingsley, *Travels in W. Africa*, 497). The universality of the feeling of jealousy among the lower races, the rigour of its action, and its extreme vigilance, go far to show, as Westermarck (*Human Marriage*, 117 ff.) points out, that there never was a time when man was devoid of it, and that it is a strong argument against the existence of a primitive promiscuity. When adultery has actually taken place and has been discovered, the husband, with few exceptions, can himself punish the offending woman and her paramour, without necessarily invoking the local tribunal. Indeed, that tribunal or the tribal custom expects him to do so, or fully approves his act, though in some instances he may be retaliated upon by the relatives of the woman or the man, where he has killed either or both. Punishment varies, but very frequently death is meted out in cases of detected adultery; in other places the woman is disfigured or mutilated by shaving off her hair, cutting off her nose, ears, etc., or she is chastised more or less seriously, or she is repudiated or divorced, or treated as a prostitute. In such cases the husband's jealousy or anger turns against his offending property, even though his act of revenge deprives him of his wife, or of her attractive qualities. Towards the offending man who has invaded his rights of property his attitude varies: he may kill him, emasculate, mutilate, wound, or flog him, or make him his slave, or force him to pay a fine, or to have his wife outraged in turn. Especially noticeable is the idea of theft in adultery, where, as in Africa, the man's hands are cut off, as if he were a thief (Waitz, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, ii. 472); in the fact that in the Torres Straits there is no word for adultery apart from theft (*puru*), and all irregular connexion was called 'stealing a woman' (*Camb. Exped. to Torres Straits*, 275); and that among the Arunta a man who commits adultery with a woman of the class from which he might choose a wife is called *atna mylkura*, 'vulva-thief,' because he has stolen property (Spencer-Gillen[a], 99). The same idea also emerges where, as among some Negro tribes, it is held to be adultery for a man to lay his hand on or brush accidentally against a chief's wife (Miss Kingsley, *Travels*, 497). The conception of the wife as property is also seen, not only in the common custom of slaying her at her husband's death, but, where she is allowed to survive him, in the belief entertained by savage and barbaric peoples that second marriage is wrong, or, if permitted, that any unchastity during a certain period after the husband's death is equivalent to adultery, or should be punished as such (Amer. Indians, Kukis, Patagonians, Ainus, etc.). Among some Amer. Indian tribes, the widow cannot even appear in public without being regarded as an adulteress (Adair, *Amer. Indians*, 186). For a certain time at least, sometimes for the rest of her life, the woman is still her husband's property; and as ghosts have power over the living, it may be presumed that the dead husband might still retaliate in case of any transgression.

4. **Punishments for adultery.**—The following examples will show the nature of the punishments for adultery meted out among different races by the outraged husband, or permitted to him by common consent or actual law:—

Among the Wotjobaluk of Victoria both the woman and her lover are killed; among the Yerkla-mining of S. Australia the woman was branded with a firestick for the first offence, speared in the leg for the second, and killed for the third; among some tribes the punishment consisted in handing her over to all comers (Howitt, *Nat. Tribes of S.E. Aust.* 245, 257, 207). A childless wife who misconducted herself could be repudiated in W. Victoria (Dawson, *Aust. Aborigines*, 33). In Tasmania the most cruel punishments were meted out to the woman (Bonwick, *Daily Life of the Tasmanians*, 72). In the Andaman Islands adultery is rare, but when it occurs it is punished by the husband, on whom, however, the friends of the injured party may retaliate (*JAI* xii. 135). In New Guinea adultery is capitally punished (Waitz-Gerland, *Anthrop. der Naturvölker*, vi. 661); elsewhere throughout the Indian archipelago it is a cause, and frequently the only cause, of repudiation (*Cambridge Exped. to Torres Straits*, 246; Westermarck, *Marriage*, 437, 523). With the Melanesian tribes the woman was brutally treated, and the paramour was killed by the husband or executed, though he was sometimes fined for what was regarded as a robbery, or had his wife violated by all the men of the village (De Rochas, *Nouv. Calléd.* 262; *BSAP*, ser. iii. vol. viii. 861). Death was the usual punishment in New Zealand (*Voyage of the Astrolabe*, 360); in other Polynesian islands the woman was variously punished. With the Hottentots the woman was killed or flogged (Alexander, *Exped. into Interior of Africa*, i. 98; *ZVK*, 1902, 344); and killing the guilty wife, and frequently her paramour also, is usual among both Bantu and Negro tribes (*Kafirs* [M'Lean, *Kafir Laws*, 111], *Wakamba* [Decle, *Three Years in Savage Africa*, 487], *Waganda* [Wilson and Felkin, *Uganda*, i. 201]). Lesser punishments were here also administered—chastisement, disfigurement, or repudiation of the woman, marrying her to a slave, and fining the guilty man (Post, *Afrik. Juris.* i. 401, ii. 80; Bowdich, *Miss. to Ashanti*, 170; Du Chaillu, *Afrique Equat.* 67, 435; Johnston, *Uganda Protec.* 590, 689, 746, 882; Waitz, ii. 110, 115). Death, mutilation and disfigurement, abandonment, and delivery of the woman to the men of the tribe, were common among the N. Amer. tribes, with whom also the aggressor was killed, mutilated, or fined (Bancroft, *Native Races*, i. 350, 412, 514; *Ann. Rep. BE*, iii. 364; Schoolcraft, ii. 132, v. 683 ff.). Tortures and death were meted out to both parties in Yucatan (Bancroft, ii. 674); in Mexico the woman had her nose and ears cut off, and was stoned to death (Herrera, *W. Indies*, iv. 338; Prescott, *Peru*, 21); in Guatemala the woman was repudiated and her paramour fined (Bancroft, ii. 673); in Nicaragua she could be divorced for nothing but adultery (Waitz, iv. 278). Among the Fuegians the husband could kill his wife, but was liable to be killed in turn by her family (Hyades and Deniker,

apud Hobhouse, I. 46). Woman and paramour might be killed by the husband among many of the native tribes of India (Dalton, *Eth. of Bengal*, 45; M'Pherson, *Memor. of Service in India*, 83). Among the nomad Tatars the woman is frequently killed and the man forced to pay the husband a number of cattle; elsewhere in Tibet the woman is punished and the man pays a fine to the husband or group of husbands (*Hist. Univ. des Voyages*, xxxi. 437, xxxiii. 341). In Japan, woman and paramour are killed by the husband, the law supporting his act (Letourneau, 217). In China the law permits this punishment if it is meted out on the spot, otherwise the husband would be punished for the crime; but where adultery is proved he can repudiate or otherwise punish his wife (Alabaster, *Chinese Criminal Law*, 187, 251; Pauthier, *Chine Moderne*, 289).

Frequently, too, the gravity of the offence is proportionate to the rank of the husband with whose wife it is committed; in other words, the value of the woman belonging to him is greater. In New Caledonia, death was meted out to a man who merely looked at the wife of a chief. Among the Banyoro (Bantu), with whom the male delinquent was usually fined, in the case of adultery with a chief's or king's wife, he was put to death (Johnston, *op. cit.* 590); while in Uganda, where whipping was the usual punishment, the king's wife and her paramour were chopped to pieces (*ib.* 669); in Ashanti, intrigue with the king's slaves is punished by emasculation (Ellis, *Tshi-speaking Peoples*, 237). So in Peru, where death was the ordinary punishment, adultery with the Inca's wife resulted in the burning of the guilty man, the death of his parents, and the destruction of his property (Letourneau, *Evol. of Marriage*, 215). Similarly, adultery with the wife of a prince among the Tatars involved the punishment of the man's relatives as well as himself: generally speaking, this distinction holds good among most savage peoples, while a further distinction may be made between adultery with the principal wife and with a subordinate wife—the value of the former being, of course, greater.

The punishment of adultery among savage and barbaric peoples is thus largely in the hands of the aggrieved husband, and evidently originated out of the desire for personal revenge. But what was at first a mere arbitrary personal vengeance has now generally become an act which is supported by tribal custom. The husband slays the aggressor, but he knows that in so doing he will be backed by public opinion, and may even call in others to assist him. He is allowed or expected to administer punishment. Frequently, too, adultery is taken cognizance of as an offence by the laws of a tribe or people, whether administered by the old men, a council, a chief, or by the State. In such cases the husband might appeal to any of these to decide what the punishment should be or to administer it. Thus in Australia, among the Kamilaroi, the husband's complaint is carried before the headman, who gives sentence; and among the tribes of N. S. Wales a similar process is found (Howitt, *op. cit.* 207; Fraser, *Abor. of N. S. Wales*, 39). Other instances of adultery being punishable judicially rather than by private revenge among peoples who also punish it in the latter way, are found among the Kanakas of New Caledonia, where the aggressor is led before the chief and his council, and executed by their sentence (De Rochas, *Nouv. Caléd.* 262); among the Caribs, Samoans, Mishmis, in New Guinea, and in parts of Negro Africa (Steinmetz, *Rechtsverhältnisse*, 727 ff.; Turner, *Samoa*, 178; Chalmers, *Pioneering in N. G.* 179; Letourneau, 211). In such cases, however, the law may simply order the husband to execute the punishment, as in parts of ancient Mexico and in Central America (Bancroft, ii. 465; Biart, *Les Aztèques*, 168). And even where the offence is strictly a legal one, should the husband take the matter into his own hands, and, *e.g.*, slay both offenders at once, he would still be considered to be acting within his own rights, or would be subject only to a slight penalty, as in China, Japan, ancient Peru (where it was held that Manco Capac had decreed death to adulterers, Garcilasso, *Royal Comm.* i. 81). Or if the husband does not act according to the judicial sentence, he himself may suffer. Thus among the Tatars, if he does not punish his wife, the chief takes the cattle which her accomplice has paid the husband (Letourneau, 216); and in China, if he does not repudiate his wife he is whipped (Pauthier, *op. cit.* 239). But we also find that, where the offence is a legal one, there is a tendency to stay the husband's desire for the worst acts of vengeance. This has probably originated the frequent system of compensation by fine; it also accounts for cases, as among the Kafirs or the Bakwiri, where the husband must not kill the offending wife, and if he does so is punished as a murderer (M'Lean, *op. cit.* 117; Post, *Afrik. Jurisp.* i. 401); and, as among the Wakamba and other peoples, where the husband is allowed to slay the parties only when taken *flagrante delicto*.

The birth of twins is with many savage peoples regarded as uncanny, and one or both are put to death. The reason for this belief is not always certain, but in some cases it is thought, probably as a result of the further belief that a man can be the father of no more than one child, that a god has had intercourse with the woman. Such a belief is found among the Negroes (some of whom, however, regard the birth as lucky for this reason), South American tribes, and Melanesians (Ellis, *Yoruba-speaking Peoples*, 67; Codrington, *Melanesians*, 235). In such cases we have the idea that the wife has committed adultery with a divinity or spirit, as in the Greek myths of Alcmene and Leda. But it is sometimes held as a proof of adultery with another man (*S. American tribes* [Waitz, iii. 394, 480], *Teutons* [Westermarck, *Moral Ideas*, i. 408]). See Rendel Harris, *Cult of Heavenly Twins*.

5. Adultery within the prohibited degrees.—Among all races, marriage or sexual union is absolutely forbidden between certain persons, whether blood-relations or members of the same group, clan, totem, or tribe, as the case may be. Any offence against such a law is, to the savage mind, one of the worst forms of adultery; indeed, it should rather be called incest. It is not a trespass upon another's property, but a breach of tabu, and thus approaches our idea of impurity; while it is believed to bring ill-luck or disaster upon the family, clan, or tribe. As any breach of such a law is thus believed to affect the whole group, it is therefore punished by the group or by those to whom the administration of justice is delegated. There is no question of private revenge. Any such offence is regarded as so horrible, so disgraceful, and even so obnoxious to the gods (Turner, *Samoa*, 92), that it is usually unheard of, and no one thinks of committing it. But where it is committed, the punishment is usually death to both offenders, as in Australia, New Britain, New Hebrides, and among the Amer. Indians (Spencer-Gillen[a], 15, do.[b] 140; Westermarck, *Marriage*, 300; *JAI* xviii. 282; Macdonald, *Oceania*, 181; Frazer, *Totemism*, 59). In Yucatan the man was looked upon as an outcast (Bancroft, ii. 665); and a fine was levied among the Dyaks, Chukmas, and others (St. John, *Forests of the Far East*, ii. 198; Lewin, *Wild Races of S.E. India*, 186).

6. Adultery of the husband.—That, at the lower stages of civilization, adultery is regarded as an offence against the proprietary rights of the husband, is borne witness to by the fact that it is an offence only from the husband's point of view. With the rarest exceptions has the wife any redress when the husband himself offends, and it is only at higher levels of civilization that she has any general *right* to complain. Of course, where the husband commits adultery, he is always in danger of death or fine at the hands of the guardian or husband of his paramour, but this does not affect his wife's position in the matter. Where the wife has the power of complaining to a tribunal or of causing the husband to be punished (and probably wherever the woman has any influence at all, she will complain freely to her husband), the cases are probably to be classed with those where she can obtain redress for other offences, *e.g.* ill-usage. But the cases are so exceptional that no law can be framed from them, though they may foreshadow the dawning of the idea of the equal rights of wife and husband, and of the ethical belief that adultery is wrong.

Among the people of W. Victoria the wife can get an adulterous husband punished by complaining to the elders of the tribe, who send him away for a short period (Howard, *Matrim. Inst.* i. 229; Nieboer, *Slavery*, 18). In Africa, the husband in Great Bassam pays a fine to the wife for unfaithfulness (Post, *Afrik. Juris.* ii. 72), and among the Mariana he is severely punished (Waitz, ii. 106). With the Khonds of Orissa, where polyandry exists, and the woman can set a higher price upon herself, the husband cannot strike her for infidelity, whereas he is punished or is held to have dishonoured himself (Westermarck in *Sociol. Papers* (1904), 152). The Omaha wife could revenge herself on the husband and his paramour; and among the Sioux and Dakotas she could leave her husband for unfaithfulness (Dorsey, *BE*, 1885, 364; Howard, i. 239). Divorce for unfaithfulness on the husband's part might be obtained by the wife occasionally, as among some of the peoples of the Indian archipelago, the Shans, and others (Westermarck, *Marriage*, 527). But with these few exceptions savage mankind has scarcely recognized the fact that the adultery of the husband is a wrong done to his wife. Though it might be thought that the matriarchate would give the wife some power over her husband's infidelities, this is not supported by evidence, save in a few particular cases. These are where the royal succession was through a woman, who usually married a man of lower rank than herself, and remained his superior. His adultery was punishable, but she claimed greater licence. Thus among the Tænsas of North America, where the chief was looked on as a demi-god, his sister's son succeeded him. She, being thus also divine, treated her husband as a slave, killed him if he were unfaithful, but allowed herself great licence (M'Lennan, 420). Similarly in Loango a princess might be licentious, but would have her husband's head chopped off if he even looked at another woman (Pinkerton, xvi. 569). This did not apply to any other classes, and is on a level with the severity of the punishment meted out to a man committing adultery with the wife of a chief. It should be noted, however, that with a few peoples, the wife may have a ground for divorcing her husband if he takes a second wife or a concubine (Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, i. 136); while, even where polygamy is practised, the feeling of jealousy on a wife's part, though it may not affect her husband directly or stay his desire of introducing another wife to his household, is frequently directed against the new-comer to her hurt, and in some cases the wife will commit suicide (Westermarck, *Marriage*, 497 ff.).

7. **Permissible adultery.**—Adultery among the lower races is considered wrong, *viz.* an offence against the rights of the husband, when it is committed apart from his will. There are occasions on which he commands or sanctions it, or when it is, so to say, legalized by social or religious custom. The custom of lending wives either to friends or strangers emphasizes once more the view that the wife is the husband's property. Here she acts at his will, as in the other case she infringes his rights. Here for the time the feeling of jealousy is in abeyance, even where it exists most strongly, and the husband decides that the wife may commit adultery. We thus see that adultery has not the precise meaning to the savage which it has to the civilized man.

The custom of lending wives is well-nigh universal among savages (Westermarck, *Marriage*, 74, 130), but various reasons exist for it, nor is it always to be explained as the outcome of hospitality. (*a*) In cases where a wife is lent to a friend, it may be done out of sheer friendliness or as an act of gratitude, but generally the lender will expect a similar favour to be shown to him. In other words, there will be reciprocity, as among the Columbian Indians, who barter wives as a sign of friendship (*Hist. Univ. des Voy.* xiii. 375), the Eskimos, Polynesians, and others (M'Lennan, *Studies*, 2nd Ser., 376; Letourneau, 212). The practice of lending wives is sometimes reduced to a system, as in those Australian tribes with whom group marriage prevails, and generally there are limits to the system of lending among most Australian peoples. Thus, where individual marriage prevails, the man can lend his wife only to men belonging to his own group, *i.e.* to those alone to whom his wife would have been marriageable (Spencer-Gillen[b], 141). This applies also to the tribes actually practising group marriage, the Urabunna and Dieri, since here the right of access to the woman to whom one man has a 'preferential right' is strictly limited to the men of his own group (*ib.* 73, 140). Some cases of polyandry, as where a brother permits relations with his wife to younger brothers, as well as the system of secondary husbands, might rather be classed as instances of lending.

(*b*) Sometimes it is done by way of sealing a covenant of friendship between two men, who then exchange their wives, as in Timor (*Deutsche Geog. Blätt.* x. 230); or after a quarrel between tribesmen, as in N. S. Wales (*JAI* xiv. 353). In all such cases the friends would belong to the same tribe or clan, and the act would have a more or less sacred significance.

(*c*) Where the custom of lending a wife to a stranger is concerned, it is usually assumed that hospitality alone is the cause (Westermarck, *Marriage*, 74); and though this may frequently be true, it is doubtful whether it covers all such cases, or if the husband would for this reason alone relinquish his rights over his wife. The reason is perhaps to be sought in the common idea that the stranger is, *ipso facto*, a dangerous person. Magical and other ceremonies are often used on his arrival to neutralize the danger (*GB*[2] i. 299 ff.), and respectful treatment throughout his stay is necessary for the same end. Thus the extremely common custom of lending a wife or other woman to a stranger may justly be assumed to be but one of many acts which are intended to ward off his evil powers. It tends to placate him, while, by bringing him into direct relation with the man who offers his wife, it makes him one with him. This view seems to be confirmed by the fact that among the Merekedeh, an Arab tribe, the stranger who would not accept the woman offered him was driven away by the women with hoots and contumely (*Hist. Univ. des Voy.* xxxii. 380). It was desirable to get rid of a guest who was not only dangerous, but evidently disposed to act dangerously. This custom of lending wives to strangers is found practically among all savage tribes (Letourneau, *op. cit. passim*).

(*d*) Occasionally the idea that the woman was ennobled by the embraces of a stranger may have prevailed, especially where he was a white man. This was believed by the Tasmanians (Wake, *Evol. of Morality*, i. 77), and probably underlies the fact that many peoples—Australians, Negroes, Sandwich Islanders, and some Eskimos—who are jealous of their own tribesmen, show no jealousy of white men, and freely allow them to have intercourse with their wives (Westermarck, *Marriage*, 131). On the whole, this idea corresponds to the custom of allowing the medicine man or priest to cohabit with the wife, to ensure offspring, or to confer magical or religious virtues. This is found among the Eskimos, who believe that it is an honour for wife and husband that the *angekok* should have intercourse with the former (Egede, *Descr. of Greenland*, 140), among the Kalmuks (Moore, *Marr. Customs*, 182), in the Philippines, India, and Egypt (Reclus, *Prim. Folk*, 172–178). It is perhaps an extension of the custom of defloration by another than the husband, frequently a priest or chief, or of allowing several persons to have access to the newly-married virgin, in order to lessen the danger of sexual tabu for the husband (Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 347 ff.; Spencer-Gillen[a], 93 ff.; Teulon, *Orig. de la Famille*, 69; Westermarck, 76 ff.)—a custom not to be confounded with the claim made by a chief or feudal lord over all marriageable women, the *jus primæ noctis*.

(*e*) Another cause which will override the feeling of jealousy is the love of gain—the husband trading with his wife to strangers or others. The Yumas of New Mexico and other Amer. Indians, the tribes of tropical S. America, the Eskimos, the Tahitians, and other Polynesian tribes, Negroes, Australians, and others (Bancroft, i. 218, 514; Powers, *Tribes of California*, 413; *ZVRW*, 1898, 297; Lisiansky, *Voyage Round World*, 82, 128; Bosman in Pinkerton, xvi. 525) freely offer their wives for money or its equivalent. But it is to be observed that this revolting practice, though not unknown as between savages themselves, has frequently been introduced or largely increased through contact with men of a higher civilization (Nansen, *Eskimo Life*, 166; Westermarck, 131).

(*f*) Adultery is further sanctioned by social and religious custom, especially at festivals or at other times, when a wife is lent or a general exchange of wives takes place. This apparent promiscuity has usually a distinct end in view, very frequently of a magical character—to ensure the smooth working of the ceremonies about to be observed, or by way of beginning a new life by, so to say, exchanging identity for the time being, or to procure fertility for the soil, or to avert trouble or sickness, or to insure the unified relationship of those practising this promiscuity. Such general exchange is found in Australia (Spencer-Gillen[a], 98, do.[b] 137, 141), in Fiji (*JAI* xiv. 28), among the Eskimos (*Ann. Rep. BE*, vi. 693), and among other peoples (Crawley, *op. cit.* 286). It has probably been of universal occurrence at such times, and in Europe relics of it are found in the folk-festivals, at which considerable licence still prevails.

(*g*) Religious prostitution usually occurred before marriage, and was associated with the worship of divinities of fertility; but in some cases a wife had to devote herself occasionally for this purpose and in order (as in a province of China) to secure

magically the fertility of the land (Eusebius, *Vita Const.* iii. 58; Marco Polo, Yule's ed. i. 212).

See also for lending of wives, Starcke, *Primitive Family*, 122; Waitz, ii. 105, iii. 111; Post, *Afrik. Jurisp.* i. 471–472.

8. Adultery as an offence against purity and religion.—It has been seen that, to the savage, adultery is mainly a breach of the husband's proprietary rights. Whether any further ethical idea was imported into it, making it an act of impurity, is a question which it is difficult to answer. But it is not improbable that savages, who are quite aware that it is wrong, may attach some idea of impurity to its committal. If so, this conception may have arisen out of the idea of sexual tabu, the danger existing in intimate relations between man and woman—a danger existing even in marriage. This danger, implying a material contagion, would naturally be increased where a man had no right of access to a woman; it is most dangerous of all where adultery occurs within the forbidden degrees (§ 5). Out of this danger and material contagion the idea of sin and of impurity might easily arise; and we can hardly doubt that, in the evolution of moral ideas, it has so arisen (Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 214). On this ground, therefore, it might be claimed that adultery is known by savages to be an act of impurity. They certainly believe that there are occasions when it is magically dangerous; that certain penalties will befall the transgressor, either automatically or, possibly, by the act of higher powers.

Ethical teaching among savages has hardly been made the subject of inquiry by actual observers, yet it is curious to note that among some of the lowest races—Australians and Andamans—adultery is held to be a grave moral offence, and, with the former, is taught to be so to the youths at initiation, while with both it is obnoxious to their high god, and will be punished by him (Man, *JAI* xiii. 450, 459; Howitt, *JAI* xii. 156–157, *Native Tribes*, 500). Elsewhere, as among the Indians of Guiana, the fear of spirits prevents them 'from offending against the rights of others,' and this would probably include adultery (*JAI* xi. 382). With the Fuegians, also, 'adultery and lewdness are condemned as evil' (Westermarck, 58). We cannot say, however, that it is with these peoples an offence against purity. Perhaps only at a higher stage is this conception really reached: thus it is said to have been a maxim in ancient Mexico that 'he who looks too curiously on a woman commits adultery with his eyes' (Sahagun, *Hist. gen. de las cosas de Nueva Espagna*, ii. 147), and both in Mexico and Peru a more ethical view of sin obtained. Among the rare cases where savages believe that in the future life retributive justice will follow their evil actions, it is also likely that adultery would be included in such actions. In those cases where the sins of the living are annually transferred to an animal or a human victim, or where this is done on behalf of a dead person as part of the funeral rites, adultery is frequently one of those sins, as among the Niger tribes, the Todas, and Badagas, and others (Crowther and Taylor, *Gospel on Banks of Niger*, 344; Reclus, 208). At the bush festival of the Creek Indians, men who had violated the marriage law were not allowed to take part in the fast, and the new fire was believed to atone for all crimes except murder (Frazer, *GB*[2] ii. 330). In such cases, however, sin is rather a material than a spiritual contagion, though the particular sin may involve the idea of incipient ethical impurity, and, as such, be obnoxious to higher powers. Again, the magical view of the danger of adultery at certain times is generally mixed up with the danger of lawful connexion at such times, but occasionally a distinction is made. During hunting, fishing, and especially in time of war, men are in a state of tabu, and must have no intercourse with women—a rule found among most savages, and one which must not be broken, lest ill-luck follow. The danger is here magical; but it is interesting to find it becoming more or less religious, as with the Aleuts, who fear that their own or their wives' unfaithfulness during whale-fishing would be punished by the whale, which is an object of reverence to them (Reclus, 52); and with some Amer. Indian tribes, *e.g.* the Dakotas, who think that the violation of captives would be resented by the spirits of the dead; and the Winnebagos, who observe continence because it was commanded by the 'Great Spirit' (Schoolcraft, *Ind. Tribes*, iv. 63; Drake, *Ind. Tribes*, i. 188). A saying of the Eskimos at Angmagsalik may also be cited, that 'the whale, the musk-ox, and the reindeer left the country because men had too much to do with other men's wives' (Nansen, *Eskimo Life*, 173). Occasionally, too, the vengeance of a mysterious god worshipped by males in their private mysteries is invoked, to deter women from adultery among certain Negro tribes, with whom a man representing the god enters the assembled crowd by night, seizes a suspected woman, and scourges her (Letourneau, 128).

It should be noted that the frequent appreciation of the chastity of unmarried women entertained by many savages, while connected with the idea that they are the property of their guardians or prospective husbands, may also be due to respect for sexual tabu. With some peoples, unchastity is considered absolutely disgraceful, and both parties are punished; while in Loango it is held to bring ruin on the country, and with some of the Sea Dyaks it is believed to be offensive to the higher powers (Pinkerton, xvi. 568; St. John, *Forests of Far East*, i. 52).

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ADULTERY (Buddhist).—The last of the five Precepts binding on a Buddhist layman is not to act wrongly in respect of fleshly lusts (*Anguttara*, 3. 212). In a very ancient paraphrase of these Precepts in verse (*Sutta Nipāta*, 393–398), this one is expressed as follows: 'Let the wise man avoid unchastity as if it were a pit of live coals. Should he be unable to be celibate, let him not offend with regard to the wife of another.' This is evidence not so much of Buddhist ethics as of the general standard of ethics in the 6th cent. B.C., in Kosala and Magadha. In the Buddhist Canon Law we find a regulation to be followed by members of the Order, when on their rounds for alms, in order to prevent the possibility of suspicion or slander in this respect (*Pācittiya*, 43, translated in *Vinaya Texts*, i. 41). An adulterer taken in the act might be wounded or slain on the spot. This explains the implication of the words used in *Samyutta*, 2. 188. But adultery was also an offence against the State, and an offender could be arrested by the police, and brought up for trial and judgment (Commentary on Dhammapada, 300). In such texts of the law administered in Buddhist countries as have so far been made accessible to us, the view taken of adultery is based on these ancient customs. So, for instance, of the Sinhalese, Panabokke says (*Niti Nighanduwa*, p. xxix) that adultery, unless committed in the king's palace, was seldom punished by the Kandian judges; (1) because the husband was loath, by complaint, to publish his disgrace; and (2) because he was allowed to take vengeance himself if the offender were caught under such circumstances that adultery was presumable. (See also Richardson, *The Dhammathat*, Burmese text and English translation, Rangoon, 1906). Nothing is said in the Buddhist law-books of any punishment to be inflicted, either by the husband or by the State, on the adulteress. Buddhist influence in this matter, except in so far as it mitigated severity against the woman, was therefore confined to the maintenance of pre-Buddhistic ideas and customs.

T. W. Rhys Davids.

ADULTERY (Egyptian).—That adultery with a married woman was looked upon as a sin in Egypt is shown by the Negative Confession (part of ch. 125 of the Book of the Dead, a chapter that has not yet been found earlier than the 18th Dyn.). Here, in the 19th clause, we read, 'I have not defiled the wife of a husband' (*v.l.* 'the wife of another man'). That it was also against the law is implied by a text of the reign of Ramses V. (*c.* 1150 B.C.) containing a long list of crimes charged against a shipmaster at Elephantine, amongst them being that of adultery with two women, each of whom is described as 'mother of M. and wife of N.' (Pleyte, *Pap. de Turin*, pl. li ff.; Spiegelberg, *ZÄ*, 1891, 82). The didactic papyri warn against adultery as well as fornication. Ptahhotep says, 'If thou desirest to prolong friendship in a house which thou enterest as master, as colleague, or as friend, or whereso-ever thou enterest, avoid approaching the women; no place prospereth where that is done. . . . A thousand men have been destroyed to enjoy a short moment like a dream: one attaineth death in knowing it' (*Prisse Pap.* ix. 7–12; Gunn, *Instruc-*

tion of Ptahhotep, p. 49). This text is not later than the Middle Kingdom. Another, of the period of the Deltaic dynasties, charges the youth to remember that 'the woman whose husband is afar off (or possibly 'the woman whose husband has freed himself from her,' *i.e.* 'divorced her'), behold she adorneth herself for thee daily. If there is no witness with her, she standeth and spreadeth her net. O crime worthy of death if one listens!' (*Pap. de Boulaq*, i. 16; Erman, *Life in Ancient Egypt*, 155). The story of Ubaaner turns on the infidelity of his wife with a peasant, who is eventually handed over to a magic crocodile to devour, the woman being taken to the north side of the palace (evidently a place of public assembly) and burned, and her ashes cast into the river (Erman, *Pap. Westcar*, p. 1 ff.; Petrie, *Tales*, i. p. 97; Maspero, *Contes Pop.*[3] p. 24). One of Herodotus' Egyptian tales is of king Pheron, who gathered his unfaithful wives into one town and destroyed all together by fire (Hdt. ii. 111). But it would not be safe to conclude that burning was ever the established penalty for adultery. In the New-Kingdom Story of the Two Brothers (Petrie, *Tales*, ii. p. 36; Maspero, p. 1), Bito, the younger brother, is solicited by the wife of the elder brother Anûp, like Joseph by the wife of Potiphar, and reproves her with the words, 'thou art as a mother unto me, and thy husband as a father.' Anûp, when convinced of her guilt—which was double-dyed, since in her fear she had accused Bito to him, and endeavoured to persuade him to kill Bito—slew her and cast her to the dogs. What the legal penalty for adultery was in real life, or by whom it was exacted, is not known. In two contracts of the time of the 26th Dyn., the earliest marriage contracts yet discovered in Egypt, the husband declares, 'If I leave the woman N., whether desiring to leave her from dislike (?) or desiring another woman than her, apart from the *great crime* that is found in woman, I will restore to her' the dowry, etc. The implication is that the husband had at least no obligation to the wife if he had divorced her for adultery. These contracts were written at Thebes in 589 and 549 B.C. respectively. Later marriage contracts, those of the reign of Darius and the numerous Egyptian contracts of Ptolemaic date, contain no definite reference to adultery (for all these see Griffith, *Catalogue of the John Rylands Papyri*, pp. 114 ff., 134 ff.); on the other hand, in the rarer Ptolemaic contracts written in Greek (Grenfell and Hunt, *Tebtunis Papyri*, i. 449) adultery and all forms of conjugal infidelity are forbidden to both husband and wife. The penalty for the husband is the forfeiture of the dowry, but that for the wife is not specified; perhaps one may gather that she was left absolutely at her husband's mercy. The contracts of Roman date, all of which are written in Greek, prescribe a blameless life on both sides, but in less detail.

A chapter of the very ancient Pyramid texts, as found in the pyramid of Unas (Onnos), after describing the divinity of the dead king and the continued activity of his bodily functions, ends strangely: 'Unas is a generator who carrieth off women from their husbands to any place that he wisheth, when his heart moveth him.' This idea is hardly to be reconciled with a highly developed moral sense in the nation, unless the divinity of kings invested them with special privileges that would be contrary to all good manners for their subjects.

F. Ll. GRIFFITH.

ADULTERY (Greek).—In Athens, adultery (μοιχεία) on the part of the wife implied criminal intercourse with any man other than her husband. On the part of the husband it was, strictly speaking, criminal intercourse with the wife, sister, or mother of a fellow-citizen, or with his concubine, if she were a native Athenian (Dem. *Aristocr.* p. 637, § 53).

This strict interpretation was in the classical period widened so as to include offences committed against maidens and widows. On neither side is the offence regarded as a violation of the sanctity of a binding obligation, but as an offence against the family. Hence the special severity with which the wife was treated as compared with the husband. Any act of misconduct on her side might introduce alien blood into the family and pollute the worship of its ancestors. Marital infidelity involved no such dangers to a man's own family, and was condoned by law, except in so far as it infringed the rights of other families. There are traces, however, which show that the best opinion condemned it (Isocrates, *Nicocles*, § 42; Aristot. *Pol.* 1336*a*. 1; Plaut. *Merc.* 817 f., where the reference is to Greek and not Roman life).

1. Punishment of the man.—If the husband caught the offender *flagrante delicto* (ἀρθρ' ἐν ἄρθροις ἔχων, Lucian, *Eun.* 10), he might kill him at once (Dem. *Aristocr.* § 53). That this law was no mere antiquated survival can be seen from Lysias, *de cæde Eratosth.* § 23 ff., where an account will be found of the killing of the adulterer Eratosthenes by the injured husband Euphiletus, who, it should be noticed, is careful to secure the presence of witnesses to his act. The husband, however, might content himself with punishment short of death, *e.g.* παρατιλμός and ῥαφανίδωσις (Suid. *s.v.* ῥαφανὶς and Λακιάδαι; Schol. Aristoph. *Nub.* 1083, *Plut.* 168, *Eccl.* 722); or he might agree to accept a sum of money in compensation for the wrong done to him. He was allowed to keep the offender prisoner until satisfactory guarantees were given that the sum promised would be paid ([Dem.] *in Neær.* § 65; Lys. *de cæde Eratosth.* § 25: ἱκέτευε μὴ ἀποκτεῖναι ἀλλ' ἀργύριον πράξασθαι). If the alleged adulterer denied the offence, he could bring an action for unjust detention (ἀδίκως εἰρχθῆναι ὡς μοιχόν) before the Thesmothetæ. Should he fail to prove his case, the Court directed his sureties to hand him over to the offended husband, who might inflict whatever chastisement he chose within the precincts of the Court, provided that sword or dagger was not used (ἄνευ ἐγχειριδίου, *in Neær.* § 66). If the offender escaped, or had not been taken in the act, the husband or, in the case of maidens and widows, the guardian (κύριος) could bring an action for adultery (γραφὴ μοιχείας) before the Thesmothetæ. It is doubtful if any one unconnected with the family could bring such an action. It is not known exactly what penalty was inflicted, but in all probability it was disfranchisement (ἀτιμία), either total or partial.

2. Punishment of the woman.—If misconduct was proved, the husband was required to repudiate his wife, under the penalty of himself suffering ἀτιμία. She was excluded from public temples, and, if she refused compliance, could be expelled with impunity by any citizen. Such assailant might tear off her clothes and ornaments, but might not maim or kill her (*in Neær.* § 87; Æschin. *in Timarch.* § 183). Heliodorus (*Æthiop.* i. 11) is mistaken in stating that an adulteress was punished by death.

Little is known of the practice of other Greek communities in dealing with adultery. That it was everywhere regarded as a grave crime is clear from Xen. *Hiero*, iii. 3, where it is stated that many cities allowed the adulterer to be killed with impunity. Zaleucus, the Locrian legislator, ordained the punishment of blinding (Æl. *Var. Hist.* xiii. 24. 5); at Cyme and in Pisidia the adulteress was paraded on an ass (Plut. *Quæst. Gr.* 2; Stob. *Anth.* xliv. 41); and at various other cities, *e.g.*

Lepreon, Gortyn, and Tenedos, the offenders were either fined, pilloried, or disfranchised.

LITERATURE.—Meier and Schömann, *Der Attische Process*, ed. J. H. Lipsius, pp. 404–409; W. A. Becker, *Charikles*, ed. Göll. iii. p. 394 ff.; L. Beauchet, *Hist. du droit privé de la Répub. Athén.* i. p. 232 f. The chief passages from Greek authors are collected in I. B. Téify, *Corpus Juris Attici*, No. 1169–1184.

F. W. HALL.

ADULTERY (Hindu). — The view which Hindus take of adultery is founded upon their conception of the nature of woman and marriage. The whole of Hindu literature is pervaded by the pessimistic idea of the inconstancy of the female character, by complaints of woman's unbridled indulgence of passion, and by demands for the maintenance of a strict oversight upon her. The practice of polygamy, which has existed from ancient times in India by the side of monogamy, and the consequently slight esteem in which the Hindu woman has been held up to the present day, must necessarily have led to the occurrence of adultery, and to a lenient judgment being passed upon the fault. On the other hand, it should be noted that we do find, even if not so frequently, an especially high value set upon the wife who proves true to her husband (*pativratā*), and that the law threatens adultery with severe punishment.

As early as the oldest historical period, the Indian people, on the testimony of the Rigveda, are by no means found, as is sometimes represented, in a condition of patriarchal simplicity and of austere moral habit. The word 'adultery' is unknown to the Veda. But numerous indications point to the fact that the highly developed culture did not fail to produce its ordinary consequences in corruption of character and moral laxity. Women who betray their husbands (*patiripaḥ*) are mentioned by way of comparison in Rigv. iv. 5. 5: 'Evil-doers . . . who walk in evil ways, like women who betray their husbands, shall be consumed by Agni.' In verse 4 of the didactic poem Rigv. x. 34, it is said that 'others lay hands on the wife of the man who abandons himself to the dice.' If from these passages we may infer on the one hand a censure upon the transgression of the marriage vow, on the other hand matrimonial infidelity is spoken of as something in itself intelligible and of daily occurrence. To this effect are the numerous stories which relate the intrigues of the gods with married women, *e.g.* of Indra with the wife of Vṛṣaṇaśva (Rigv. i. 51. 13, combined with Sāṭyāyana-Brāhmaṇa by Sāyaṇa *in l.c.*; Ṣaḍviṁśa-Br. i. 1. 16; Maitrāyaṇīsaṁhitā ii. 5. 5), with Apālā Ātreyī (Rigv. viii. 91, and Sāṭy. Br. in *l.c.*), and with Ahalyā, the wife of Gautama (Ṣaḍv. Br. i. 1. 19–20); of the Aśvin with Sukanyā, the wife of Chyavana (Śatap. Br. iv. 1. 5), etc. The conduct of the gods is not here made a matter of reproach; and as little in other passages is adultery regarded from the ethical standpoint. It is because the Brāhman is in possession of the secret whereby he can by his curse inflict harm, that *therefore* men must refrain from illicit intercourse with the wife of a Brāhman (Śatap. Br. xiv. 9. 4, 11; Bṛhadār. vi. 4. 12; Pārask. Gṛh. Sūt. i. 11. 6). Adultery is mentioned in a similar connexion in the Atharvaveda, *viz.* in the magical spells and imprecations by which, for example, wives soothe the jealousy of their husbands, or keep their rivals at a distance, or by which the husband seeks to win back his unfaithful wife (Atharv. vi. 18; iii. 18; vi. 77).

The following passages throw a light that is altogether unfavourable on the ethical conditions of the Vedic period:—

In the *varuṇapraghāsa* the wife of the sacrificer is required by the priest to name her paramour.* 'Who cares whether the wife is unchaste (*paraḥpuṁsā*) or no?'** In Ts. v. 6. 8, 3 a special penance is appointed for the man who for the first time has performed the sacred *agnichayanam*; he is not again to have intercourse with a *rāmā* (the wife of a Śūdra). And he who has performed it for the second time must abstain henceforth from intercourse with the wife of another man.† Such conditions, comparable with hetairism, must have exercised an unfavourable influence on the purity of the race, and have rendered illusory the detailed pedigrees which were essential for ancestor-worship and other ritual purposes. That men were conscious of the actual unreliability of the lists of ancestors is shown by Nidānasūtra, iii. 8: 'Inconstant are the ways of women. Of whomsoever (as father) I shall call myself the son before both gods and men as witnesses, his son I shall be; and those whom I shall name as (my) sons, they will be my sons.' The attempt, however, was of course made in ancient times to provide against this ignorance by strict oversight of the woman; for the begetting of a son of the body (*vijāvan*) is regarded even in the Rigveda as necessary for the preservation of the race.‡ A proof of this is afforded by an ancient *gāthā* quoted in Āpastamba, ii. 13. 7, and Baudhāyana, ii. 3. 34, which is taken from a dialogue between Aupajandhani, a teacher of the white Yajurveda, and the mythical king Janaka: 'Now am I jealous for my wife, O Janaka, though (I was) not before; for in Yama's house the son is awarded to him who begat him. The begetter leads the son after his death into the dwelling-place of Yama. Therefore they protect their wives carefully, who dread the seed of strangers. Watch jealously this propagation of (your) race, let no strange seed fall on your field. When he passes into the other world, the son belongs to him who begat him; it is in vain that the husband (the nominal father) accomplishes this perpetuation of his race.'

A contrast between an earlier period of laxity and a later of austere morals can hardly be derived from the passages quoted. Even when in later times a strict marriage law was developed, and in the *Smṛtis* legal regulations were formulated with regard to adultery (*strīsaṅgrahaṇa*), polygamy and prostitution continued to exist, and the frequent mention of the son 'born secretly,'§ who may be heir to his mother's husband, though he is her illegitimate son by some other man, does not testify to a high regard for the marriage vow. A change of view was effected in course of time only so far as under the increasing influence of priestly theories adultery was seen to involve a danger to the caste system established by the Brāhmans, and an attempt was made to obviate this by the threat of severe punishments. It is essentially from the standpoint of caste distinctions that adultery is condemned in the *Smṛtis*. 'Whatever woman betrays‖ her husband, proud of her beauty and her descent, the king shall cause to be torn in pieces by dogs in an open place. The paramour shall be roasted on an iron bed; brushwood shall men throw (upon the fire); there shall the evil-doer be consumed.'¶ If these words implied merely the condemnation of adultery in general, they would be in contradiction to the comparatively lenient punishments prescribed later on.** The crime which demands an expiation so terrible is certainly the intercourse of a Brāhman woman with a man belonging to one of the three lower castes. This is proved by the similar regulations of other lawgivers,†† and the parallel passages of the Mahābhārata and Agnipurāṇa:

'Whatever woman abandons the nobler husband (*i.e.* a Brāhman, according to the commentator Nīlakaṇṭha) and seeks another inferior marriage couch (*svavarṇān nichavarṇam*, 'inferior as regards caste,' Nīlakaṇṭha), the king shall cause to be torn in pieces by dogs in an open place.'‡‡ 'Whoever being lower (in caste) has sexual intercourse with a woman higher (in caste) deserves death. But the woman, who betrays her husband, shall he (the king) cause to be torn in pieces by dogs.'§§

* *Kena charasi*, 'with whom do you go?' Śat. ii. 5. 2, 20; cf. Kāty. v. 5. 6–10.

* Yājñavalkya in Śat. i. 3. 1, 21.

† *Na dvitīyaṁ chitvā 'nyasya striyam upeyāt.*

‡ Rigv. iii. 1. 23, vii. 4. 7. § *Gūḍhaja, gūḍhotpanna.*

‖ *Laṅghayet*, properly 'sets herself up above'; according to the commentators, *anyapuruṣagamanena* (Nārāyaṇa), *puruṣāntaropagamanena* (Kullūka), deceives him 'by intercourse with another man.'

¶ Manu, viii. 371 f. ** Manu, viii. 374 ff.

†† Āpastamba, ii. 10. 27, 8, 9; Gautama, xxiii. 14, 15; Yājñavalkya, ii. 286.

‡‡ *Śreyāṁsaṁ śayanaṁ hitvā yānyam pāpam nigachchhati, śvabhis tān vadayed rājā saṁsthāne bahuvistare*, Mahābh. xii. 165. 64.

§§ *Uttamāṁ sevamānaḥ striṁ jaghanyo vadham arhati, bhartāraṁ laṅghayed yā tāṁ śvabhiḥ saṅghātayet striyam*, Agni-Pur. 227 42

By the side of these savage penalties the punishments assigned in the following verses of the Agni-P. in expiation of adultery seem altogether ludicrous: 'The woman misused by a man belonging to an equal caste shall be allowed to eat only sufficient to sustain life; the woman misused by a man of a higher caste shall have her head shaved. A Brāhman for intercourse with a Vaiśya woman, a Kṣatriya for intercourse with a woman of lower caste, a Kṣatriya or a Vaiśya for the first offence of intercourse with a Śūdra woman, shall be fined.'

The punishments in Manu are similarly graded according to the caste to which the offenders belong. For adultery with the wife of a man of one of the three higher castes, a Śūdra is to be punished with confiscation of property and the cutting off of his organ of generation; if she were guarded,—a condition to which great importance is attached,—the penalty may even be death. In this latter case a similar punishment overtakes the Vaiśya or Kṣatriya who is guilty with a Brāhman woman; otherwise they escape with heavy fines, imprisonment, shaving of the head, and watering of the head with urine. A Brāhman, on the contrary, who is guilty of a similar offence, is only condemned to fines, which are lower than in the case of a Kṣatriya.*

The wife guilty of adultery may justly be repudiated, and expulsion from caste also usually follows. Since, however, divorce is opposed to the principle of Hindu law, which regards it as a sin for husband and wife to be separated on the ground of mutual aversion,† and according to the testimony of al-Bīrūnī did not occur,‡ we must assume that, as a rule, the adultery was not allowed to come to light, and that the rule of Viṣṇu was observed, according to which the tribunals were to interfere only when the husband was unable without assistance to manage his wife.§ In the view of certain *Smṛtis* also, absolute repudiation of the wife was not always the consequence of adultery. Pāraskara ordains that repudiation is to be resorted to only where the adulterous connexion has not been without result, or the woman has separated herself permanently from her family.‖ Hārīta even declares himself expressly against the repudiation of the adulteress.¶ Other passages make mention of merely temporary and insignificant penances, such as the use of inferior food and clothing, sleeping on the ground, and performance of the servile tasks of scouring and sweeping.**

Statements which appear strange, but which are based upon the inferior position of the Hindu woman and the restraint to which she is subjected, regard as adultery conversations in an improper place or at an improper time, personal contact, playing and jesting, even the rendering of attentions and gifts of clothing, ornaments, flowers, etc.††

Undoubtedly more of theory than reality underlies these legal prescriptions. How little they corresponded to generally accepted ideas of morality is shown, for example, by the paragraph of the Kāmasūtra which treats of intercourse with married women. Among the reasons which deter a woman from adultery, regard for morals is mentioned only in the last place. Even the stern penalties which the law ordains for adultery between those belonging to different castes are to be ascribed, in the first instance, to the endeavour of the Brāhmans to give support to the social order which they had themselves evolved, and to assert the precedence to which they laid claim. Actual examples, nevertheless, of the infliction of savage punishments upon adulteresses are found in the popular literature. Instances are on record where the king is enjoined to have the nose and ears of the adulterous wife cut off.‡‡ In a narrative of the Pañchatantra §§ the aggrieved husband himself administers correction by cutting off his wife's nose and repudiating her. This kind of penalty seems to have been quite usual in the Middle Ages, even as it is to-day. It meets us again, at least as a threat, in the legendary literature of the Buddhists. 'And of this evil woman cut off the ears and nose from her living body.'* As here the threatened punishment is not carried out, so elsewhere throughout the Jātakas a very mild conception of adultery is presented. In the Pabbatūpatthara Jātaka† the king begs his wife, whom he loves, and the minister with whom she has had guilty intercourse, not to sin again, and forgives them. Another king, who has been betrayed by his wife with all the sixty-four messengers whom he has sent to her during the campaign, gives orders for the guilty parties to be beheaded. The future Buddha, however, obtains their pardon by pointing out to the king that the men were led astray by the queen, and that she has only followed her nature, since women are insatiable in the indulgence of their passions.‡ Elsewhere a minister who has transgressed in the royal harem, and is caught *flagrante delicto*, is banished from the realm.§

This lenient judgment of adultery as it is found in the Jātakas is, nevertheless, not to be traced to an intentional relaxation on the part of the Buddhists of the Brāhman law of marriage, but rather to the fact that the narratives, which arose in popular circles and were transmitted orally, reflect the Hindu view better than the Brāhman theory as formulated in the *Smṛtis*. Among the peoples, moreover, who adopted Buddhism, marriage law and custom, like prescriptive rights and usages in general, underwent no essential change. Abstinence from adultery was one of the rules the observance of which was enjoined by the Congregation on the youths of the laity.‖ 'The taking of life,' it is said in the Sīgālovādasutta, which minutely describes the duties of the laity, 'the appropriation of another's possessions, and falsehood are named (as offences); the wise do not commend intercourse with the wife of another man (*paradāragamanam*).'

According to the traditional accounts of the indigenous customary law of Ceylon, open punishment for adultery was usual only when the wives of the king were involved. In other cases the husband was at liberty, if he had caught the seducer in the act, to beat, wound, or even kill him. If the husband laid a complaint on the ground of adultery, the accused, in the absence of proof, was to be dismissed with reproof and warnings; but if convicted, to be condemned to light bodily punishment, with imprisonment and fine.¶

The legal principles, also, which are in force in Burma, and which are traceable to Hindu law but little modified by Buddhism, do not in general recognize the severe penalties threatened in the Brāhman law-books. Members of the lower castes guilty of adultery with a Brāhman woman are to be punished with 100 blows of a stick, but with 1000 blows in case of intercourse with a Kṣatriya. More stern punishments, however, such as burning alive, may be inflicted.** In other cases fines suffice for expiation, the amount varying with the caste of the parties concerned. Should the offender, however, be unable to pay, he is reduced to slavery. The seducer must further apologize, and give his promise not to repeat the offence. Should he break his promise, he is excluded, if a Kṣatriya, from intercourse with his relatives; if a Brāhman, he is excommunicated from his caste, and reduced to the condition of a Chaṇḍāla.†† According to another passage of the

* Manu, viii. 374–378. † Nārada, xii. 90. ‡ *India*, ii. 154.
§ Viṣṇu, v. 18. ‖ Pār. x. 15. ¶ Hār. iii. 13.
** Gautama, xxii. 35; Vasiṣṭha, xxi. 8, 35; Yājñavalkya, i. 70; Nārada, xii. 91.
†† Nārada, xii. 62–68.
‡‡ *e.g.* Kathāsaritsāgara, 61. §§ Pañch. iii. 16.

* Cullapadumajāt. 193. † Pabb. 195.
‡ Akālarāvijāt. 119.
§ Ghatajāt. 355, and similarly Seyyajāt. 282.
‖ *Michchhācharā virāmo*; cf. Dhammikasutta, Sutta Nipāta, 66 *f.*
¶ *Niti-Nighaṇḍuva*, Introd. p. xxix *f.*
** Menu Kyay, vi. 30. †† *Ib.* vi. 8.

same law-book,* which exhibits in general a remarkable contrast to Hindu law, the Brāhman who is guilty of adultery with a woman of his own caste shall have his head shaved and be banished, or excommunicated from his caste.

The husband may separate himself from his adulterous wife, and may retain all her possessions.† The right to leave the unfaithful husband belongs also to the wife,‡ but she has no claim to the whole property.

In modern India adultery is regarded in the same light as in ancient times, since the regulations of the Brāhman law-books are still valid, and the social position of woman has undergone little change. It is true that even by the Hindu of today the chaste wife who remains loyal to her husband is looked upon as the incarnation of Lakṣmī, the goddess of wealth and good fortune;§ but how little confidence the Hindus place in the faithfulness of their wives is shown by the close watch to which now, as formerly, they are subjected. The fear of punishment is regarded at the present time also as the best security for the observance of the marriage vow. 'No punishment is thought too brutal for unfaithfulness, and of this fact the women are well aware. I have myself seen instances, especially in the North-West Provinces, where a husband has cut off the nose of his wife, not even upon actual proof, but upon mere suspicion. Hands are sometimes cut off, and other horrible forms of mutilation are resorted to. . . . The woman, robbed of her fair looks, is ruthlessly cast out.'‖ Even if this picture is overdrawn, yet other travellers confirm the fact that stern jurisdiction is sometimes exercised by the husband. In Nepāl the aggrieved husband has the right openly to cut down the seducer when found guilty; and here, as well as among certain Chittagong Hill Tribes, a wife whom infidelity has betrayed into guilt is deprived of nose and ears.

Divorce on the ground of adultery is allowed, according to the Madras Census Report for 1891. The Census Report, also, of the North-West Provinces and Oudh for 1901 mentions that the lower as well as the higher castes permit the divorce of the wife for unchastity. If, nevertheless, instances of divorce are rare, the cause is to be found less in a lofty morality than in the endeavour of the Hindus to withdraw their family life as much as possible from publicity.

LITERATURE.—J. Jolly, 'Recht u. Sitte,' in *GIAP* ii. 8, Strassburg, 1896, pp. 66, 121, 128; H. Zimmer, *Altindisches Leben*, 1870, pp. 306 ff., 331 f.; A. Weber, *Indische Studien*, x. 1868, p. 83 f.; Pischel and Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, i. 1889, p. xxv; E Hopkins, 'Social and Military Position of the Ruling Caste in Ancient India,' in *JAOS*, vol. xiii. 1889, pp. 107, 367; *Nitti-Nighaṇḍuva*, or *Vocabulary of the Law in the Kandyan Kingdom*, tr. by Le Mesurier and Panabokke, 1830, p. xix f.; Jardine and Forschhammer, *Notes on Buddhist Law*, Rangoon, 1882; Rich. Schmidt, *Liebe u. Ehe im alten u. mod. Indien*, 1904, p. 433; J. A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*[2], tr. by H. R. Beauchamp, 1889, p. 313; S. C. Bose, *Hindoos as they are*[2], 1883, p. 288; M. F. Billington, *Woman in India*, London, 1895, p. 123; K. Boeck, *Durch Indien ins verschlossene Land Nepal*, 1903, p. 286; E. Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage*, 1891, p. 122.

R. FICK.

ADULTERY (Jewish).—The substitution of monogamy for polygamy made no change in the Jewish law on adultery. From the time of the Babylonian Exile, monogamy became the prevalent custom in Jewish life. But the law continued to regard as adultery only the intercourse of a married woman with any man other than her husband. Thus a married man was not regarded as guilty of adultery unless he had intercourse with a *married* woman other than his wife. For in theory he might have several wives, and an unmarried woman with whom he had intercourse might become his wife. In fact, according to the Rabbinic law, such intercourse might be construed into a legal marriage. But concubinage was severely condemned (*Leviticus Rabba*, ch. xxv.). Yet the difference between the legal position of the male and the female adulterer (using the term in its now current sense) was considerably affected by the abolition of the Jewish power to pronounce or inflict capital punishment. This occurred, according to the Jewish sources (Jerus. *Sanh.* 18*a*, 24*b*; Bab. *Sanh.* 41*a*), forty years before the destruction of the Temple (*i.e.* in the year A.D. 30); but whatever be thought of this exact date, there is no doubt that the death penalty was neither pronounced nor inflicted for adultery in the time of Christ. Hence it is generally conceded that the case of the woman taken in adultery (Jn 8^{1-11}) does not imply that the woman would actually have been stoned. In the first place, the law of Moses does not prescribe stoning except where a betrothed virgin had intercourse with a man other than her affianced husband (Dt $22^{23.\ 24}$). In other cases (Lv 20^{10}, Dt 22^{22}) the method of execution is not defined, and in all such cases, according to Jewish tradition, the criminal was executed not by stoning, but by strangulation (Mishna *Sanh.* xi. 1). Secondly, it will be observed that the woman had not yet been tried by the court. Finally, as indicated above, the death penalty had long ceased to be inflicted for adultery. The point of the incident in the Gospel of St. John was just the attempt to put Jesus into a dilemma, as the commentators point out. It may well be that the irregularities indicated above were an intentional aggravation of the record.

The punishment for adultery was modified into the divorce of the woman, who lost all her rights under the marriage settlement; the man was scourged. The husband of the adulteress was not permitted to cohabit with her; he was compelled to divorce her (Mishna, *Soṭa* vi. 1; Maimonides, *Hilch. Ishuth*, xxiv. 6). The adulteress was not allowed to marry her paramour (*Soṭa* v. 1). In case of the man's adultery, he was compelled to grant a divorce on his wife's application; the woman, of course, could not initiate divorce proceedings, but in the view of some of the mediæval authorities the Court would compel the husband to divorce her in case of his habitual licentiousness (*Eben ha-Ezer*, § 154, 1 gloss). The 'ordeal of the bitter waters' (Nu 5^{11-31}) was abolished by Jochanan ben Zakkai during the Roman invasion (Mishna, *Soṭa* ix. 9), though Queen Helena of Adiabene—a proselyte to Judaism in the 1st cent. A.D.—sought to restore it (Mishna, *Yoma* iii. 10; Tosefta, *Yoma* ii. 3). Of the ordeal itself, R. Akiba (2nd cent. A.D.) remarks: 'Only when the (suspicious) husband is himself free from guilt will the waters be an effective test of his wife's guilt or innocence; but if he has himself been guilty of illicit intercourse, the waters will have no effect' (Sifrē, *Nasō*, 21; *Soṭa*, 47*b*). Mr. Amram (*Jewish Encyc.* vol. i. p. 217) comments on this passage as follows: 'In the light of this rabbinical dictum, the saying of Jesus in the case of the woman taken in adultery acquires a new meaning. To those asking for her punishment, he replied: "He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her" (Jn 8^{7}).' The abolition of the ordeal is attributed in the Mishna to the great prevalence of adultery; and it may be that in the disturbed conditions due to the Roman régime laxity of morals intruded itself.

But if so, it was but a temporary lapse. The records of Jewish life give evidence of remarkable purity in marital relations (cf. Abrahams, *Jewish Life in the Middle Ages*, 1896, 90 f.). The sanctity of marriage was upheld as the essential condition for social happiness and virtue. The moral abhorrence felt against the crime of adultery is shown in many

* Menu Kyay, vi. 31.
† *Ib.* xii. 43.
‡ Manoo Woonnana Dhammathat, 176.
§ Bose, p. 288.
‖ Billington, *Woman in India*, p. 123.

Rabbinical utterances. Not all a man's other virtues would save him from Gehenna if he committed adultery (*Soṭa*, 4*b*). Even lustful desire was condemned as a moral offence (*Eben ha-'Ezer*, § 21; cf. Mt $5^{27.\ 28}$). Perhaps the most remarkable testimony to the Jewish detestation of the crime is to be found in the Talmud (*Sanh.* 74*a*). In the year A.D. 135, at the crisis of the disastrous revolt against Hadrian, a meeting was held at Lydda. The assembly was attended by several famous Rabbis (including Aḳiba), and the question was discussed as to the extent of conformity with Roman demands which might justifiably be made rather than face the alternative of death. It was decided that every Jew must surrender his life rather than commit any of the three offences, idolatry, murder, or *gillui 'ărāyôth* (גִּלּוּי עֲרָיוֹת). This latter phrase includes both adultery and incest (Graetz, *Hist. of the Jews*, English tr., ii. ch. xvi.).

LITERATURE.—Z. Frankel, *Grundlinien des Mosaisch-Talmudischen Eherechts* (Breslau, 1860); D. W. Amram, *Jewish Law of Divorce* (1896); and the same author's art. 'Adultery' in *Jewish Encye.* vol. i.

I. ABRAHAMS.

ADULTERY (Muslim).—In the year 4 of the Hijra, the Prophet was accompanied on one of his military expeditions by his wife, 'A'isha. One day, at the removal from the camp towards night, she remained behind and reached Muhammad's caravan only on the following morning, in the company of a man. This circumstance caused great scandal. Even the Prophet at first suspected his wife of adultery. Afterwards, however, it was revealed to him that she had been falsely accused, and he was again reconciled to her. The verses of the Qur'ān that have reference to this occurrence, namely, *Sūr.* xxiv. 1–5, contain, amongst other statements, the following words: 'As for the whore and the whoremonger, scourge each of them with a hundred stripes, and do not let pity for them take hold of you in Allah's religion. . . . But as for those who cast (imputations) on chaste women and do not bring four witnesses, scourge them with eighty stripes, and do not receive any testimony of theirs for ever' (cf. Th. Nöldeke, *Gesch. des Qorâns*, p. 156; A. Sprenger, *Das Leben und die Lehre des Mohammad*, iii. 63 ff.; D. S. Margoliouth, *Mohammed and the Rise of Islam*, p. 341; *The Koran*, Sale's Eng. tr., ed. 1825, ii. 180).

In Islām, therefore, according to these verses of the Qur'ān, incontinence should be punished with one hundred stripes. Originally, however, Muhammad had commanded that those who had been found guilty of this misdemeanour should be put to death by stoning—a punishment which he had probably derived from Judaism. In the Muslim tradition, various instances are mentioned in which this punishment is said to have been inflicted at Muhammad's command (cf. A. N. Matthews, *Mishkâtul-Maṣâbîh*, ii. 182–186, Calcutta, 1810; I. Goldziher, 'Mohammedanisches Recht in Theorie und Wirklichkeit' (*Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswissensch.* viii. 466 ff.). It may thus be understood that the Prophet had designedly mitigated the punishment attached to adultery out of affection for 'A'isha.

After Muhammad's death, a difference of opinion arose amongst the faithful with respect to this point. Many thought that the punishment of stoning to death was abrogated by the verses of Qur'ān xxiv. 1–5. But the second Khalīf, 'Umar, set his face very strongly against this view. According to him, adultery in Islām should be punished with stoning. 'Thus hath the Prophet ordained it,' said he, 'and thus have we acted on his command. Some people say that they find no injunction to this effect in Allah's book; but in the days of Muhammad we were accustomed in the recitation of the Qur'ān to recite also a verse in which the punishment of stoning was undoubtedly denounced against the violator of the marriage bond.' Indeed, according to Muslim tradition, such a verse is said to have formed originally a part of the thirty-third *Sūra* (cf. Nöldeke, *op. cit.* p. 185).

In the Muslim law-books, both punishments, stoning as well as scourging, are found threatened against the offence of fornication (Arab. *zinâ*). By this offence, the Muslim jurists understand not only adultery, but any sexual intercourse between two persons who do not stand to one another in the relation of husband and wife or master and slave. For those who are not yet married, if they render themselves guilty of this offence, scourging is thought sufficient; all others must in that case be put to death by stoning. An individual belonging to the latter group of persons is in Arabic called *muḥṣan*. The original signification of this word is 'well-guarded,' but in Arabic it came to be employed metaphorically to signify a married woman, and later a married person in general (cf. J. Wellhausen, 'Die Ehe bei den Arabern,' *Nachrichten der königl. Gesellsch. der Wissensch. in Göttingen*, 1893, No. 11, p. 447). According to the jurists, however, a person remains *muḥṣan*, even though his marriage may have been dissolved at a later period. If he thereafter renders himself guilty of *zinâ*, he must be stoned. In Islām, stoning is thus not a punishment exclusively of adultery, as was often incorrectly supposed (cf. Snouck Hurgronje, review of E. Sachau's *Mohammedanisches Recht* in *ZDMG* liii. 161 ff.).

On various matters of detail, as, for example, the question whether those who are to be stoned must also be scourged, etc., many go into different scholastic minutiæ. The evidence of *zinâ*, however, according to Qur'ān xxiv. 1–5, cannot be presented except by the testimony of four male witnesses, who are able to confirm the truth of the accusation by details. In fact, a condemnation for *zinâ* is thereby rendered impossible, unless the guilty person makes a confession, and thus becomes willingly subjected to the punishment.

When a man takes his wife in the act of adultery, he may put her to death at once, along with her paramour. If he suspects her of adultery, he is not required to bring forward any witnesses. The law permits him to take an oath that his wife has been unfaithful to him. When, however, the wife on her part swears under oath that she is innocent, she is not punished. Nevertheless, the marriage is then dissolved; and if the wife brings a child into the world, the legitimacy can be disowned by the husband. The swearing of this oath is in Arabic called *li'ân*. Cf. Qur'ān xxiv. 6–9: 'They who accuse their wives (of adultery) and shall have no witnesses (thereof) besides themselves, the testimony (which shall be required) of one of them (shall be) that he swear four times by God that he speaketh the truth and the fifth time (that he imprecate) the curse of God on him if he be a liar. And it shall avert the punishment (from the wife) if she swear four times by God that he is a liar and if the fifth time (she imprecate) the wrath of God on her if he speaketh the truth.'

Slaves are not stoned for *zinâ*, but only punished with fifty stripes.

LITERATURE.—E. Sachau, *Mohammedanisches Recht nach Schafiitischer Lehre*, pp. 14, 73 ff., 809, 815 ff., and other translations of Muslim Law Books; J. Kreśmárik, 'Beiträge zur Beleuchtung des islamitischen Strafrechts mit Rücksicht auf Theorie und Praxis in der Turkei,' *ZDMG* lviii. 101 ff.

TH. W. JUYNBOLL.

ADULTERY (Christian). — **1. Teaching of Jesus and the Apostles.** — It is sometimes said that the Law of Moses deals only with outward actions, while the Sermon on the Mount teaches us to think of the inward disposition, and the motives that prompt to action. The Decalogue, it is said, like other ancient codes of laws, forbids

the sinful act by which the marriage bond is violated, but takes no account of the character or disposition. Jesus, on the other hand, shows us that the inward disposition which renders the sinful act impossible is the one thing of importance in the sight of God. A moment's consideration will convince us that, whatever element of truth there may be in this statement, it cannot be taken as a complete and satisfactory account of our Lord's comment on the Seventh Commandment (Mt 5^{27-30}), inasmuch as it is simply untrue to say that the Decalogue takes no account of inward disposition or motives. The command, 'Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife,' goes behind the outward act, and condemns the sinful desire which leads to adultery. It is true, nevertheless, that in this passage in the Sermon on the Mount our Lord goes beyond the teaching of the Decalogue, and gives a new and deeper meaning to the command, 'Thou shalt not commit adultery'; that He does not merely recall to men's minds the teaching of the Tenth Commandment, which had been overlooked or forgotten in the Jewish schools, but that He lays down a great principle of the righteousness required in the Kingdom of heaven, from which obedience to the letter of the command will follow as a matter of course. The Tenth Commandment forbids the sinful desire, mainly because it tends to conduct which will injure one's neighbour; it is a safeguard against injury, and the thought of the injury done to one's neighbour is the prominent thought. In the passage in the Sermon on the Mount, on the other hand, our thoughts are centred on the moral injury to the man himself. 'If thy right eye causeth thee to stumble, pluck it out, and cast it from thee: for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body be cast into hell.' The indulgence in sinful thoughts and desires is not a minor offence tending to the injury of others, but is already the soul-destroying sin of adultery committed in the man's own heart.

It is now easy to understand why it is that, while throughout the NT sins of the flesh are unsparingly denounced, we have no detailed classification of such sins; and very little account is taken of the various distinctions—as between adultery, fornication, *stuprum*, etc. etc.—which are so often treated of at unedifying length in writings on these subjects. The word used most frequently in the NT for such sins is πορνεία, 'fornication.'* This serves to include all those 'lusts of the flesh which war against the soul' (1 P 2^{11}); and but little account is taken of the distinction between fornication and what we naturally regard as the graver offence of μοιχεία, or adultery proper, which involves the violation of the marriage bond. Some writers in modern times have found a difficulty in our Lord's words which forbid the dissolution of the marriage bond—παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας (Mt 5^{32}), μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ (19^{9}); and Döllinger (*Christenthum und Kirche*) made a not very successful attempt to show that the word πορνεία in these passages must refer to some offence committed before marriage, rendering the marriage itself null and void *ab initio*. It is a sufficient refutation of this view that such an interpretation was not thought of by the writers of the first four centuries, and that no difficulty was found in recognizing πορνεία as a general term, including in itself all sins of the flesh, and in this particular instance applying to adultery.

The passage in 1 Th 4^{6}, in which St. Paul deals directly with the sin of adultery, may be placed side by side with these passages from Mt., as affording an interesting illustration of the same principle. The Apostle does not ignore our duty towards our neighbour. Adultery is sinful because it is a kind of theft (τὸ μὴ ὑπερβαίνειν καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν ἐν τῷ πράγματι τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ). But he seems to dwell on this aspect of the matter only in passing, while his exhortation is occupied mainly with the need for purity and sanctification, and the danger of that fornication (τῆς πορνείας—note the use of the article) which was so common a feature in the life of the Græco-Roman world. St. Paul, no doubt, would have been quite ready to acknowledge that adultery, as inflicting a more grievous or irreparable wrong, was a graver offence than simple fornication, just as he recognized fully the gravity of the case of incest in Corinth (1 Co 5^{1}); but, in general, the object of the gospel was not primarily to develop a system of casuistry, but to call men to newness of life, and to produce a character which should make sin in all shapes and forms impossible. For the Christian, therefore, the Seventh Commandment is, before everything else, a law of chastity, and the sin of adultery includes every kind of unlawful sensual indulgence, whether in thought or deed. Marriage is, first of all, a spiritual union between those who are 'heirs together of the grace of life' (1 P 3^{7}); and all other objects must be considered as subordinate to the promotion of that social life which is absolutely necessary to man's well-being.

2. **Ecclesiastical discipline.** — The case of the incestuous Corinthian (1 Co 5) gives us our first example of the exercise of ecclesiastical discipline by a Christian community; and the Epistles to the Corinthians make it plain that, while the Christian Church from the very beginning was accustomed to exercise a stern discipline over the lives and conduct of its members, the idea that the offence of adultery necessarily involved final and irrevocable exclusion from the Church was unknown in the days of the Apostles.

Tertullian's statement, therefore, that from the beginning gross sins of the flesh were visited with final exclusion from the Church, must be regarded as an exaggeration, so far as the Apostolic age is concerned. Indeed, all the evidence goes to show that we have here rather the ideal picture of the glories of the primitive age, as conceived by the enthusiastic Montanist, than a sober statement of fact.*

Towards the close of the 2nd cent. there seems to be no doubt that the discipline in the Churches of Africa and Italy, with which Tertullian was most familiar, was exceedingly strict; but the evidence available appears to show that there was no uniform or clearly defined system of discipline established throughout the whole of Christendom.

Irenæus (*c. Hær.* I. i. 13) tells us of certain women in the Church of Lyons who had been found guilty of adultery, and subjected to penance. As he speaks of only one of these as not being finally restored to communion, it may be inferred that the others had been received back; hence we may conclude that the system of discipline in the Gallic Church was somewhat less strict than that which prevailed in Italy or Africa. During the whole of the sub-Apostolic age, and down, at all events, to the close of the 2nd cent., the high standard of morality which we find in the Apostolic age was well maintained throughout the Christian communities. If any Christian fell away to vicious or immoral courses, he would in all probability forsake the Church and relapse to heathenism. Hence cases of grave offences calling for ecclesiastical censure would be of rare occurrence, and the conditions required for the establishment of a well-defined system of penitential discipline would not arise.

With the expansion of the Church and also, perhaps, as a consequence of the fading away of the early enthusiasm, it became necessary, if the Church was to maintain her position and carry on her work in the world, to relax somewhat the extreme severity of discipline, to make provision for the restoration of penitent sinners, and, at the same time, to make the Church's rules on such matters clear and distinct.

* St. Paul uses πορνεία and derivatives about eighteen times: μοιχεία does not occur, while μοιχός (and derivatives) occurs only five times in his Epistles, and two of these instances are quotations from the Decalogue, viz. Ro 2^{22} 13^{9}.

* *adv. Marc.* iv. 9. Tertullian here enumerates 'seven deadly sins which exclude from communion,' viz. *idololatria, blasphemia, homicidium, adulterium, stuprum, falsum testimonium, fraus*

Pope Calixtus I. (*c.* 220) was probably neither the monster of iniquity depicted by his enemies, nor yet an enthusiastic exponent of evangelical principles, but simply a ruler of practical wisdom and foresight, who saw clearly what was required by the circumstances of the time. His famous edict: 'Ego et mœchiæ et fornicationis delicta iunctis pœnitentia dimitto,' however, provoked a stormy controversy, and was assailed with much vigour and bitterness by Tertullian in his treatise *de Pudicitia*. In this contest, and in the Novatian dispute which followed, the victory remained with those who maintained the laxer policy, and experience showed that the high but impracticable ideals of what seemed to be the more strictly religious party were unsuited to the new conditions and circumstances of the Church.

From the beginning of the 4th cent. down to the very close of the Middle Ages, a long series of Conciliar decrees and other authoritative enactments bears witness to the fact that throughout this period the Church was called upon to deal practically and effectively with a widely prevalent immorality, and to solve the problem of combining due severity against sinners with the mercy enjoined by the gospel.

The Canons of the Council of Illiberis (Elvira in Spain), which met A.D. 305, seem to have furnished a type and regulating principle for the ecclesiastical legislation of succeeding ages, and may well serve to indicate the conditions with which the Church had to deal and the principles adopted in dealing with them.

Canon 9 declares that a woman who has divorced her husband for adultery ought not to marry again during the husband's lifetime. Should she do so, she is to be excluded from communion until after the first husband's death, at all events unless she should be seized with a dangerous illness.

Canon 13 decrees perpetual exclusion from communion in the case of *consecrated* virgins who have fallen, and who show no true sense of the seriousness of their loss (*non intelligentes quid amiserint*). Such virgins, if repentant, may be restored to communion in the hour of death.

Canon 14. *Virgines sæculares*, guilty of fornication, to undergo a year's penance and to marry their seducers.

Canon 15 condemns marriage with Jews, pagans, or heretics as akin to adultery.

Canon 18 condemns adultery committed by a clergyman. Bishops, priests, or deacons found guilty of adultery are never, even to the end of their lives, to be restored to communion, both because of the enormity of the offence and because of the scandal to the Church ['et propter scandalum et propter nefandum crimen'].*

Canon 69 imposes five years' penance for a single act of adultery.

Canon 64 imposes ten years for adultery persisted in for any length of time, and enacts that there must be no restoration to communion so long as the sinner persists in the sinful life.

Canon 72. A *widow* who commits *adultery* (sic) must undergo a penance of five years, and, if practicable, must marry her seducer.

It is worth noting that in these decrees the words *mœchia* and *adulterium* are used in the broad NT sense to include sins of the flesh of every description.

3. Christianity and the civil law.—It may or may not have been a mistaken zeal for Christian religion and morality that induced Constantine and Constans to revive the old capital penalties for adultery which had been obsolete since the days of Augustus Cæsar.† In any case, it seems certain that the attempt to return to barbarous methods was a failure, since we find that in the time of Theodosius I. a milder, if scarcely less degrading, method of dealing with adulteresses was prevalent, at all events in the city of Rome. We learn from the Church historian Socrates (*HE* v. 18) that in the time of the Emperor Theodosius the Great these unhappy sinners were punished by confinement in the public brothels under circumstances of shameful and disgusting ignominy. The Emperor is praised for putting a stop to this barbarous practice on the occasion of his visit to the capital. Under Justinian the death penalty was finally abolished, and the Lex Julia restored with certain modifications. By this legislation the guilty wife, if not received back by her husband within two years, was condemned to be shut up for life in a convent.

Whatever we may think of the influence of Christianity upon the civil law of the older Empire, we can have no doubt that its influence upon the laws of the new nations that overran the Provinces of the Empire in the 5th and following centuries was wholly beneficent. The barbarous severities of the old national laws against adultery were mitigated. Divorce, pecuniary fines and—for guilty women—confinement in convents gradually took the place of the death sentence or the infliction of cruel mutilations.

The code of Theodoric decreed death for adultery. A married man who seduced a virgin was mulcted in a third part of his property as damages. The unmarried seducer was bound to marry his victim and endow her with a fifth of his estate. In the Burgundian code the adulterer was punished with death, and the adulteress, if not put to death, was treated as an infamous person. By the Visigothic code the adulteress and her paramour were given up to the injured husband to be punished with death or otherwise—according to his free pleasure. Flogging, mutilation, and other barbarous punishments were in force amongst the Danes and Saxons. In England the death penalty was not formally abolished until the reign of Canute. (See Milman, *Hist. of Latin Christianity*, Bk. III. ch. v.).

There was, indeed, one custom of the Northern nations which yielded very slowly, and only after many conflicts, to the influence of Christian teaching. In general the tone of morality—especially in all that relates to married life—amongst those nations was very high, much higher than in the Roman world which they conquered. Monogamy was the rule, and conjugal fidelity was strictly enforced. An exception, however, was made in the case of princes, who, as a mark of dignity, were allowed to maintain a plurality of wives or concubines. It is perhaps not wonderful that after their conversion these rude chiefs found it hard to accept the Christian view, and to regard this practice as sinful adultery, or that zealous Christian teachers should have often found the task of contending against this practice beset with much difficulty and danger.

4. Divorce.—The adultery of the wife has at all times been regarded as a sufficient ground for divorce; but differences of opinion have prevailed as to whether the same rule applies to the case of adultery committed by the husband. By the civil law of England, a wife cannot obtain a decree for divorce on the sole ground of the husband's adultery: there must be other circumstances, as, *e.g.*, cruelty or neglect. In Scotland, on the other hand, the adultery of either partner is itself a sufficient ground for divorce. The subject of divorce will be more fully treated in a separate article. For the present it may be sufficient to note that in the Roman Catholic Church, and by the canons of the English Church, divorced persons, whether innocent or guilty, are not allowed to marry again during the lifetime of the other partner. Remarriage is permitted in the Greek Church and in most Reformed Churches.

LITERATURE.—Von Dobschütz, *Christian Life in the Primitive Church* (Williams & Norgate, 1904); Lecky, *History of European Morals*; Harnack, *Gesch. der altchristl. Literatur* (Leipzig, 1893); Funk, *Altchristl. Bussdisciplin* (Paderborn, 1897); see also Letourneau, *L'évolution du mariage et de la famille*, Paris, 1888 [Eng. tr. in *Contemporary Science* series]; Westermarck, *Hist. of Human Marriage* (Macmillan, 1891); art. 'Adultère' in Cabrol's *Dict. d'Archéol. Chrét.* etc., and in Vacant's *Dict. de Théol. Catholique*.

W. M. FOLEY.

ADULTERY (Parsi).—The ancient Iranians attached much importance to marriage, and hence they looked upon adultery with horror. In the Gāthā Ushtavaiti (*Yasna*, liii. 7) there is a carefully worded warning against what Mills calls

* The refusal of absolution implies that the offence committed is one with respect to which the Church has no authority to promise the Divine pardon, but does not imply a claim to limit God's power to grant forgiveness, and must not be taken as a declaration that the guilty person will *certainly* be finally lost.

† The law of Constantine condemned the adulteress to death, but the penalty might be mitigated to banishment. The paramour was to be beheaded if a freeman, and if a slave, burned to death (Cod. Justin. I. ix. tit. 11). Constans decreed against both guilty parties the penalty inflicted on parricides, viz. to be burned alive, or else drowned in a sack (*id.* I. vii. tit. 65).

'solicitations to vice,'* etc. The female Yazata Ashi (*Yasht*, xvii. 57–60) inveighs bitterly against this vice. She says that it 'is the worst deed that men and tyrants do,'† when they seduce maidens from the path of virtue. In some parts of the Avesta and in the Pahlavi books adultery is personified as 'Jahi.' The Yazata Haoma is entreated to withstand the evil influence of vicious women, whose lustful, wavering mind is like a cloud, which changes the direction of its motion according to the direction of the wind (*Yasna*, ix. 32). The Amesha Spenta *Asha Vahishtā* ('Best Righteousness') is similarly appealed to (*Yasht*, iii. 9). An adulterer or adulteress is, as it were, an opponent of Gao, the good spirit of the earth or the animal creation, the idea being that such a person comes in the way of the progress of the world (*Vendīdād*, xxi. 1). The progress of the world in the different spheres of activity, physical and mental, acts against these evil-doers (*ib.* xxi. 17). Eredat-Fedri is the name of a good, pious maiden who is considered as a prototype of maidenly virtue, and whose guardian spirit is invoked to withstand the evil machinations of Jahi, the personification of adultery (*Yasht*, xiii. 142).

In the Pahlavi *Bundahish* (ch. iii.) this Jahi (Pahlavi *Jēh*) is said to be an accomplice of Ahriman himself. Her work is 'to cause that conflict in the world, the distress and injury from which will become those of Auhurmazd and the archangels.'‡ In the Pahlavi *Daṭīstān-ī-Dēnīg* (71st question)§ adultery is spoken of as one of the most heinous sins. The mother of Zohāk is said to be the first woman in the world who committed this offence. It is described as a sin which disturbs all lineage, which puts an end to all self-control and to the legitimate authority of a husband. It is more heinous than theft or spoliation (77th question).‖ It is a crime which leads at times to murder, because the woman sometimes brings about abortion.¶ There is another way in which adultery leads to murder. It is noted in the account of pregnancy** that sexual intercourse during pregnancy is prohibited, because it is understood that it leads to injury to the life of the child in the womb. Now, a woman who yields to lust and gives herself up to an adulterous life is likely to commit adultery even in pregnancy. Such intercourse may cause the loss of the life of the child in the womb.††

Adultery is a canker in society in another way. When a man commits adultery with a woman, according to the injunction of the *Vendīdād* he is bound to support the woman whom he has seduced and the children that may be born of the illicit intercourse. It is his duty to bring up his illegitimate children along with his legitimate children. But then the company of the illegitimate children is likely to spoil the good manners and morals of the legitimate children. And, on the other hand, if he does not bring up the illegitimate children properly, if he does not give them proper training, he is responsible for, and guilty of, all the wrongful acts and sins that the children may commit in their childhood or when they are grown up.

The sin of adultery was too heinous to be fully atoned for. But what little atonement could be made for it was directed to be done by the following good acts (*Daṭīstān-ī-Dēnīg*, lxxviii. 17–19):

(*a*) The guilty person, especially the adulterer, must help, *i.e.* by money or otherwise, in bringing about the marriage of four poor couples. (*b*) He must assist with money poor children who are not cared for by others, and bring them up decently and educate them. (*c*) If he sees others in society leading a vicious life, he must do his best to retrieve them. (*d*) He must perform certain religious rites, like those of the Dvāzhdah-Hōmāst.

In the *Vīrāf-Nāmak* the adulterer is represented as punished by being thrown into a steaming brazen caldron (ch. lx.), the adulteress as gashing her own bosom and breasts (ch. lxii.).* The adulteress who brings about abortion meets with worse punishment (ch. lxiv.). In all cases of adultery the *Vendīdād* (xv. 18) requires that the person seducing a woman, whether married or unmarried, shall maintain her and the children that may be born of her until they come of age. Any attempt at abortion was considered a great sin (*Vend.* xv. 11–14).

JIVANJI JAMSHEDJI MODI.

ADULTERY (Roman).—1. Under the Republic.—The word *adulterium* is a noun-derivative of *adulterare*, which is probably *ad alterum* (*se convertere*). The offence on the part of the wife is sexual intercourse with any man other than her lawful husband. On the part of the husband it has a narrow meaning, and is confined to misconduct with married women, misconduct with other than married women being designated by the general term *stuprum*. The unequal treatment of husband and wife is bluntly expressed by Cato in Aul. Gell. x. 23: 'In adulterio uxorem tuam si prehendisses, sine iudicio impune necares: illa te, si adulterares . . . digito non auderet contingere, neque ius est.' From this passage it is clear that the old right of self-help survived into the times of the Republic. There is no evidence, however, that the adulterer could be killed as well as the woman, if taken in the act. Originally the offence was dealt with not by the State (except in cases where it passed all bounds, and became, like open immorality, a matter for the police jurisdiction of the censors and ædiles), but by the *iudicium domesticum*, or family council, in which near relatives took part, with the head of the family as president in virtue of his *patria potestas*. This council could inflict what punishment it chose (Dionys. ii. 25; Suet. *Tib.* § 35. Cf. Plin. *HN* xiv. 13 ff.: 'matronam a suis inedia mori coactam,' where the charge brought is intemperance). If a wife was divorced on the ground of adultery, it was left to a civil court to decide what part of her dowry she should retain. Such a trial was termed a *iudicium de moribus*. The procedure followed is not accurately known, and cannot be recovered with any certainty from the evidence of the later lawyers, who are our only authorities.

2. Under the Empire: *The Lex Julia.*—By the end of the Republic, owing, among other causes, to the absence of effective legislation, immorality became so rife at Rome that the Government became alarmed at the prospect of a shrinkage in the population of Italy. In consequence of this, Augustus in 736/18 carried through the measure known (though the title is doubtful) as the *Lex Julia de adulteriis coercendis* (Hor. *Car.* iv. 5. 21–24; Suet. *Aug.* § 34). This, as its opening clause shows ('*ne quis posthac stuprum adulteriumve facito sciens dolo malo*'), was directed against immorality in general as well as against adultery. But now for the first time Roman law recognized adultery as an act done in contravention of the law of the State, and allowed others than the father or husband of the adulteress to prosecute. For this purpose a new court (*quæstio perpetua*) was established (Dio, liv. 30). The fragments of the law that survive will be found in Bruns, *Fontes Juris Antiqui*[6], p. 114. Adultery on the part of wife or concubine was declared punishable by the law, while marital misconduct was taken to include offences knowingly (*dolo malo*) committed against

* *SBE* xxxi. 189.
† *Ib.* xxiii. 281.
‡ *Ib.* v. p. 15.
§ *Ib.* vol. xviii. ch. lxxii. § 5.
‖ *Ib.* ch. lxxviii. § 3.
¶ *Ib.* § 5.
** See BIRTH.
†† *SBE*, vol. xviii. ch. lxxviii. § 9.

* Hoshangji and Haug, *Vīrāf-Nāmak*, pp. 186, 187.

any *matrona honesta*, as well as against a married woman (*materfamilias*). It should be noticed that the *concubinatus*, or inferior marriage, though of great antiquity, was now for the first time recognized as a permanent legal relationship, doubtless in order to prevent such connexions from being penalized under the clauses against *stuprum*. The law fined the adulteress in one half of her dowry and one third of her property. The adulterer lost the half of his property. Both were interdicted fire and water, a punishment soon replaced by exile or deportation to an island. There is no ground for supposing that the death-penalty was sanctioned by the original terms of the *Lex Julia* (Paul. Sent. ii. 26. 14). Conviction entailed *infamia* (Dig. iii. 2. 2, 3), and the condemned became incapable of giving evidence (*intestabiles*, Dig. xxii. 5. 14, 18). The adulteress could not marry again (Dig. xxiii. 2. 26), but she was not debarred from entering the condition of *concubinatus* (Mart. vi. 22). The dissolution of the marriage was a necessary preliminary to any action taken against the wife or her paramour, and if her husband did not divorce his wife, he rendered himself liable to the charge of procuration (*lenocinium*). For sixty days after the dissolution of the marriage the right to prosecute was reserved to the husband or father of the woman (Dig. xlviii. 5. 2, § 8). If these took no action within this period of time, any one unconnected with the family (*extraneus*) could prosecute (Tac. *Ann.* ii. 85). Both offenders could not be prosecuted at once, and the trial of the one had to be completed before that of the other was begun. If the man was acquitted, the woman could not be charged. A period of limitation was prescribed within which an action must be brought, — six months in the case of the woman, five years in the case of the man. The ancient right of self-help was never entirely abolished, but the exercise of it was severely restricted. A father who surprised his daughter *in ipsa turpitudine* might kill her and her paramour, if he did so *in continenti*, which was held to mean 'almost by one and the same blow.' The husband's right to kill his wife when taken in the act was withdrawn. Here we seem to see an attempt to abolish the right of self-help by restricting it to the person least likely to act on the impulse of the moment. The only fragment which the husband retained of his former power was the right to kill the adulterer if a freedman of the family or a *persona vilis* (*e.g.* an actor), and if found in the house. The husband could detain the adulterer for twenty hours in order to secure evidence of the offence (*rei testandæ causa*).

The *Lex Julia* formed the basis of all subsequent legislation against adultery. It was not seriously modified till Constantine, under the influence of Christian ideas, introduced the penalty of death for the adulterer, and, by a curious reaction, once more confined the right of prosecution to the near relatives of the adulteress. The death penalty was maintained during the reigns of succeeding emperors. It was confirmed by Justinian (*Inst.* iv. 18. 4), who imposed on the adulteress the penalty of lifelong imprisonment in a nunnery, unless the offended husband cared to reclaim her within two years.

LITERATURE.—W. Rein, *Das Criminalrecht der Römer*, 1844, p. 835 ff.; Th. Mommsen, *Röm. Strafrecht*, 1899, p. 688 ff.; A. du Boys, *Hist. du droit criminel des peuples anciens*, 1845, pp. 400 ff., 677 ff.

F. W. HALL.

ADULTERY (Semitic).—The treatment of infidelity among the Semites can be illustrated by a great variety of evidence, extending from the codified legislation of Ḥammurabi, king of Babylonia (*c.* 2250), to the unwritten, though no less authoritative, tribal laws of the present day. So far as women are concerned—and, as elsewhere, the infidelity of the man was only tardily recognized as blameworthy—it must be understood that the offence implies a particular type of marriage, since it is obvious that where the woman has liberty of choice, does not leave her own kin, and may receive her suitors when or as long as she will, adultery is out of the question. Such a union is entirely one of a personal character, and gives the man no legitimate offspring.* But the prevailing type in the Semitic world is that wherein the woman follows the husband, who has paid a 'bride-price' (Arab. *mahr*, Heb. *mōhar*) to her kin, whereby he has compensated them for the loss of her services, and has acquired the right of possessing sons who shall belong to his tribe. By this act the man has practically acquired the exclusive property-rights, and deprives the woman of the right of disposing of her own person. Further, it must be recognized that this does not imply that paternity always meant what it does to us. The evidence goes to show that the man is at first only the father of all the children of the woman he has taken; and he might transfer or dispose of her temporarily in a way that is quite repugnant to all ideas of chastity. At this stage, therefore, a distinction could be, and was, drawn between authorized and unauthorized laxity, and in the circumstances the term 'adultery' could be applied only to those acts of infidelity which were done without the husband's consent or knowledge. It required a great advance before any breaking of the union between husband and wife could be regarded as a desecration.† See MARRIAGE.

In tracing the growing strictness of ideas of chastity in the Semitic world, it is to be observed that there was a gradual development of institutions of law and justice. Primarily, all offences against a man are matters for him and for his kin or tribe to settle; adultery may thus be privately avenged, and it is not until society has taken many steps forward in government that the matter is taken out of private hands and referred to a judicial inquiry. There is a great social gap, therefore, between the parental authority of Judah in Gn 38, and the recognition that immorality is an offence to be punished by judges, in Job 31^{11}.

It is undeniable that there was much in early Semitic life that cannot be judged in the light of modern ideas, and that primitive usages which were hardly thought to be dishonourable (Gn 19^{24}, cf. Jg $19^{22f.}$)—for which parallels could easily be found—bespeak a lack of refinement which leads to the inference that adultery, if recognized at all, could only have been the unauthorized infidelity referred to above. But a general advance in custom can be traced, and is peculiarly illustrated by three stories of the patriarchs: there is a distinct growth in morals in the account of Isaac's adventure at Gerar (Gn 26) as compared with the duplicate narrative of Abraham in Egypt (ch. 12), and these stories from the Jahwist or Judæan source are overshadowed by the Elohist or Ephraimite account of Abraham at Gerar (ch. 20), where the iniquity of adultery is forcibly realized.

Under the ordinary type of marriage, known as the *baal* or marriage of subjection, the Semitic woman, if unmarried, is entirely under the authority of her father; if betrothed or married, of her husband. It is necessary, therefore, to observe that, if adultery is primarily an infringement of the husband's rights, seduction is no less a matter for the father of the unbetrothed virgin. According to the old Hebrew law (Ex $22^{16f.}$), the man who was

* See Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*[2], pp. 79–99.

† Robertson Smith's researches are supplemented by Wellhausen (*GGN*, 1893), who has observed that among the Arabs mistrust and jealousy spring less from love or ethical considerations than from ideas of property.

guilty of seduction was obliged to pay the *mōhar* or bride-price and marry his victim;* the later code (Dt $22^{28f.}$) fixes the amount at fifty shekels, and characteristically prevents the man from turning his newly-made wife adrift, by removing from him the right of divorce. How the law worked in ancient Israel can be gathered from the account in Gn 34, where, although little of the oldest narrative has been retained, it seems clear that compensation was required, and dispute or high-handed action would lead to furious intertribal conflicts.† The usual penalty for adultery was compensation, but frequently the offender was put to death. Modern custom permits the guilty pair, if caught, to be killed at once, or, at the sentence of the sheikhs, all the men take an equal share in the execution. The last point is important, since bloodshed according to primitive thought is a responsibility which all members of the community must share. The old form of exacting the death-penalty is parallel, as Robertson Smith has observed, to the ancient ritual of sacrifice. In both, every member of the kin should as far as possible participate in the act.‡ The particular form of death-penalty may vary between stoning, strangling, impaling, burning, and—at the present day—even shooting.

Mere suspicion of adultery is not enough, and terrible consequences may result from unsupported denunciation. Hebrew law required two witnesses, and (by an extension of the *talio*) the false accuser would bring upon himself the punishment his charge would have entailed upon another. It is noteworthy that the law in Dt 22^{2} specifically provides that the guilty ones are 'found' in the act. The law in question belongs to a group which reflects that stage where moral ideas have become so advanced that the husband attaches importance to the chastity of his newly-married wife (the restrictions of Lv $21^{7, 14}$ apply only to the priests). The procedure (Dt 22^{13-21}) is detailed, and states that if the accusation of impurity brought against the bride is true, she is stoned to death by 'the men of the city'; if false, the man must pay a hundred shekels to the father, and is not permitted to divorce his wife.§ It is intelligible that, in the former event the girl is treated as an adulteress, since from the time that she was betrothed she is regarded *de facto* as a married woman. The same code in its treatment of betrothed women makes a noteworthy distinction in the *scene* of the offence. Should it be committed in the city, both are stoned; whereas, if it be in the open country, the woman goes free, since it is assumed that she cried for help and found no protector (vv.$^{23-27}$).‖

The Babylonian code of Ḥammurabi implies a more advanced state of culture than the oldest Hebrew. The position of the married woman was secured by a contract which could specify the penalty for her infidelity and possibly vouched for her purity at the time of marriage.¶ The following laws require notice:—The man who is caught ravishing a betrothed virgin who is living in her father's house is put to death, whilst she herself goes free. If she was betrothed to his own son, a distinction is drawn dependent upon whether the marriage had or had not been consummated. In the latter event, the man must pay half a mina of silver and give her her personal property, and she is free to marry whom she will. In the former event, the man is strangled; the treatment of the girl is uncertain in the text.* Drowning was the ordinary legal penalty, although, according to a somewhat obscure law, the man might pardon his wife and the king the adulterer at their will. The Babylonian procedure in cases where absolute proof was not at hand is characteristic. In all ordinary cases the wife could take an oath and swear her innocence, and was allowed to return (or was sent?) to her (father's) house; but 'if the finger had been pointed at her on account of another,' and she is obviously the subject of scandal, she must undergo ordeal by water. Robertson Smith has cited the Arabian story of Hind bint 'Utba, whose husband sent her back to her father on suspicion of unchastity, and it appears that the case could not rest there, her treatment being clearly regarded as an insult; and from another incident it would seem that suspected wives could be conducted under ignominious circumstances to the Ka'ba and there swear seventy oaths.† The ordeal and oath reappear in the antique ordeal preserved in a late source, Nu 5^{11-31}, where the suspected wife is conducted to the priest, who brings her in humiliating attire before Jahweh. There the priest charges her by an oath which she accepts with the formula 'Amen,' and prepares a potion of holy water and the dust of the floor of the sanctuary,‡ in which have been washed the words of the oath. The procedure, which does not prescribe any punishment for unjust accusation, is treated at greater length in the Mishna (*Soṭa*; cf. also Jos. *Ant.* III. xi. 6), and is said to have been abolished towards the close of the 1st cent. A.D. (cf., further, OATH, ORDEAL).

The old Babylonian code handles acts of adultery in the case where the husband is a captive away from home. If he had left means of livelihood (lit. maintenance), and the wife enters the house of another, she is condemned to be drowned,—his family perhaps bring the charge,—whilst, failing these means, her desertion is not blameworthy; only, should the man regain his city she must leave the second husband (and children, if any) and return. Not unconnected with the subject is the further law that the woman who brought about her husband's death in order to marry another is to be killed. In Talmudic law, moreover, the adulteress who is divorced may not marry her accomplice. The charge against the widow in Gn 38, as the narrative shows, comes under the case of betrothed women, but the penalty (burning) is exceptional.§ When the woman was of low standing, *e.g.* a slave, the death-sentence was not demanded (Lv $19^{20ff.}$).

Naturally, the extreme sentence was not always carried out. Usage varied according to the tone of public opinion and private interests. A man might not care to parade his wife's disgrace (Mt 1^{19}), and the woman in Jn 8 who was taken in adultery ultimately departs unpunished. Cosmopolitan life in Palestine in the last centuries of the pre-Christian era was scarcely conducive to purity, and the writer in Pr $6^{32ff.}$ emphasizes not so much the immorality as the folly of the man who provokes the jealousy and wrath of the husband in a way which is likely to have unpleasant consequences for himself (cf. also Sir 23^{18-26}). No doubt the teaching of the Hebrew prophets always outstripped contemporary morals.

* The payment, 'according to the bride-price of virgins,' which the man must make in the event of the father's refusal, is apparently an additional compensation.

† Cf. Doughty, *Arabia Deserta*, ii. 114 (see Bennett, *The Century Bible*, 'Genesis,' p. 318 f.).

‡ *Religion of the Semites*[2], pp. 285, 485 ff.

§ See, further, Driver, *ICC*, 'Deut.' p. 255.

‖ Cf. with this Boaz and Ruth (Ru $2^{8, 9, 22}$).

¶ See the contract, Pinches, *The Old Testament*[2] (1903), p. 178. It will be noticed that in Dt $22^{15ff.}$ the accusation of impurity is regarded as a distinct reflexion upon the parents.

* For 'one shall cast *her* into the water' we should probably read '*him*' (Scheil, Winckler, Harper, etc.); see S. A. Cook, *Laws of Moses*, etc. (1903) 100 f. In that case 'strangled' should preferably be 'bound.'

† *Kinship*[2], p. 123; *Rel. Sem.*[2] p. 180.

‡ For Semitic parallels cf. the Syriac *ḥenānā* and *sheyāgtā*, and see *JQR*, 1902, p. 431; *JRAS*, 1903, p. 595.

§ For daughters of priests (Lv 21^{9}), for all cases of immorality (Jub 20^{4} $41^{25f.}$) and for incest (Code of Ḥammurabi).

The great advance upon primitive thought was the insistence upon the fact that adultery is as immoral in the husband as in the wife; previous to this the adulterer suffered only in so far as he had been the object of the injured husband's revenge. Accordingly the Decalogue and related teaching mark a great step in ethics in denouncing adultery, and in their warning against the covetousness from which lust springs (cf. the development of the truth in Mt $5^{27f.}$).

The peculiar character of Nature-worship and the native cults of Baal and Ashtoreth were direct incentives to impurity, and whatever may have influenced growth of refinement in this scattered field, it is evident that the purer conception of Jahweh among the Hebrew prophets went hand in hand with the refinement of moral ideas in Israel. The relation between worshipper and God was typified by the marriage-relation, and Jahweh was His people's *baal* even as the husband was the *baal* of his wife. It was impossible not to perceive that intercourse with aliens tended inevitably to participation in foreign rites, and the symbolical use of such terms as 'jealousy,' 'fornication,' or 'adultery' becomes characteristic of the religious life of Israel, bound as it was to its God as surely as the wife was bound to her husband. Hosea's doctrine was thus in accordance with well-established belief, and lays stress upon the fact that, whatever may have been the customary attitude towards adultery in everyday life, Jahweh had neither destroyed nor utterly forsaken His adulterous people, but was willing to receive them again and pay the betrothal price of 'faithfulness.'

LITERATURE.—A. B. Davidson, art. 'Hosea' in Hastings' *DB*; *PEFSt*, 1897, p. 126 ff., 1901, p. 175 ff., 1905, p. 350; and the works referred to in the course of the above article. For the OT laws consult C. F. Kent, *Messages of Israel's Lawgivers* (1902), p. 92.

STANLEY A. COOK.

ADVAITA.—*Advaita*, derived from *a* privative and *dvaita*, 'duality' or 'dualism' (from Skr. *dvi* = 'two'), in its philosophic applications means *non-dualism*, and is used to designate the fundamental principle of the Vedānta (see art. VEDĀNTA), which asserts that the only reality is *brahman*; that the dualism set up between self and the world, between spirit and matter, is the result of illusion (*māyā*), or of ignorance (*avidyā*). The manifold world with its changing phenomena is unreal; the only reality is *brahman*, which is identified with *ātman* or self. The view which accepts as real both the Ego and the non-Ego in their distinction and opposition is *dvaita* or dualism; that which denies this dualism is *advaita*.

It is important to note the negative form of this philosophic term. It would have been easy to find a positive term if the intention had been to assert dogmatically the oneness of all reality as a positive conclusion. The *advaita* does not positively assert this oneness; it simply denies the dualism which presents itself in our ordinary thinking. This distinction is not only of importance in defining the precise meaning of the *advaita*, but it also throws light on the process of development by which Indian philosophy arrived at this result.

Just as the ideal philosophy of Greece was preceded by attempts to reach the basis of things along quite other lines, so the *advaita* solution of the Indian problem was the culmination of a long series of philosophic systems. These are generally described as the six *darśanas*, the six recognized systems.

The predominant interest in all of these was religious, not philosophic. The Nyāya taught its logic in order that man by finding out truth might attain to the bliss of emancipation through the favour of *īśvara* (God), whose existence can be demonstrated by inference. The Vaiśeṣika school sought to enlarge our means of knowledge by an elaborate classification of existence. The Sāṅkhya called in question these classifications, and reduced all existences to *one*, which it called *prakṛti*, dead matter, out of which all other substances were formed by the spontaneous action of its three qualities (see art. SĀṄKHYA). The explanation of life it sought in a *puruṣa* (soul), always in, but not of, *prakṛti*. Unwilling to admit the presence of a Creator, it thinks to secure the same result by the joint action of this *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. *Puruṣa* cannot create; *prakṛti* cannot move; the one is lame, the other is blind. But the cripple and the blind work together for the benefit of the cripple. *Puruṣa* believes himself to be miserable as being bound in *prakṛti*; but when, by the destruction of *karma* (action), he is set free from the influence of *prakṛti* and attains to a correct understanding of the course of nature, he is set free from misery. The Yoga restored to this atheistic system the idea of a self-existent *īśvara*, through whose guidance alone *puruṣa* could find his way to salvation. This result, however, could be achieved only through a long process of physical discipline based on a knowledge of the occult processes of nature (see art. YOGA). The Pūrva Mīmāṁsā was a return to the authority of Vedic ritual and ceremony, while the Uttara Mīmāṁsā devoted itself to an exposition of the rationalism of the Upaniṣads, in which are found the germs of those conceptions which are peculiar to the *advaita* teaching (see art. VEDĀNTA).

This latest of the six schools, basing itself on revelation (*śṛti*), asserts that revelation not justified by reason and not corroborated by common sense experience will not lead to any real knowledge. It addresses itself to a criticism of the creation theory, and the evolution theory of the Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṅkhya systems above mentioned. It calls in question the very nature of our perceptions of *prakṛti*, and asserts that we are never conscious of anything beyond our own consciousness of phenomena, whether objective or subjective. Thought and being are, in fact, so inseparably united, that the attempt to separate the one from the other is like trying to mount on one's own shoulders. Thought can never transcend thought, and all we are cognizant of is *thought*. Real existence (*sat*) is the same as thought (*chit*). We are cognizant of phenomena under various forms, and we ascribe to them various names, but that of which they are the names and forms we do not know. The *substratum* of phenomena is *per se* incapable of definition, it is indescribable (*anirvachanīya*). Nor can it be maintained that these phenomena are evolved from thought, for to assert that thought changes itself into phenomena would be to contradict our experience of the essential nature of thought as one and the same in all states and under all conditions.

Abandoning, therefore, the theories of creation and evolution, the *advaita* has recourse to what it calls *vivarta*, the mere unaccountable assumption of the phenomenal in thought. Thought and Being having been shown to be inseparable, the supreme genus is a compound of both, which is named *brahman*. Thus the *advaita* proclaims itself a philosophy of non-dualism. It recognizes *phenomena* as *phenomena*; but it refuses to penetrate into the ultimate nature of their *substratum*, which it declares to be a profound mystery. Matter without mind and mind without matter are alike unthinkable. *Dvaita*, duality, is an entire misconception. The philosophical accuracy, therefore, of the term *advaita*, which was selected to designate this philosophical position, is apparent. It does not assert that all is *one*; it denies duality without asserting the convertibility of mind and matter. According to the *advaita* doctrine, the test of supreme or ultimate reality is unchangeableness. The eye does not change with the phenomena which it perceives; but it can be cognized as phenomenal by the mind, which can discern the changing conditions of the eye, the mind itself remaining unchanged throughout the process. But the mind, with its various phenomena of reason, volition, feeling, etc., is cognized as phenomenal by something which cannot be cognized by anything else, for it is unchanging and unique. This something is the ultimate self-cognizant and constant fact in all our perceptions. In and through it everything is. It is unconditioned, and therefore indescribable. It is neither *he* nor *she*: it is *it*.

Of it is all real being (*sat*), all thought (*chit*), all joy (*ānanda*). Hence the formula which defines *brahman—sach-chid-ānanda* = being, thought, joy.

It is to be noted that the *advaita* does not deny the existence of matter, it simply regards it as *per se* unknowable, and therefore indescribable. We can know it only in the forms in which it is phenomenally present in thought. All our knowledge contains two elements, one constant and eternal, which is the true, the real; the other changing and transitory, which is the untrue, the unreal.

The precise meaning of *māyā* becomes clearer when regarded from this point of view. *Māyā* is illusion, but not illusion without a basis. This basis is not thought which is changing, but the indescribable, the unknowable substratum of phenomena. That this unknowable must exist is a necessity of thought. Some metaphysicians speak of it as if it were an illusion out and out, sent forth from within the bosom of thought itself; but this is a view which is not necessitated by the teaching of the *advaita* as expounded above. *Māyā* cannot mean illusion out and out, but only so far as the phenomenal presentation is concerned. The *Advaitin* is concerned only in maintaining that thought and being are inseparable; it is quite in harmony with this position to maintain that a substratum of phenomena, regarding which nothing is or can be known, exists.

The name given to the complex whole, thought and being as reality, *brahman*, has been variously explained. (See art. BRAHMAN). The most satisfactory explanation is that which traces it to the rise of the term in the Rigveda to describe the elevating and inspiring power of prayer, resulting in an elevation of spirit which seems to lift the soul out of the consciousness of its individual separate existence. It is also designated *ātman* (self), not as implying individuality, for the consciousness of individuality must vanish in the contemplation of *brahman*, but because the sphere within which these higher processes of thought, which rise above the phenomenal self, have their being is that of the thinking subject. *Brahman* is the Supreme, the unconditioned Self, transcending all individuality. The relation of this *brahman* to the illusions that present themselves in our consciousness is illustrated by familiar examples—the mirage assumed to be water, the rope assumed to be a snake, etc. As in some of these instances want of proper light is the source of the illusion, so want of right knowledge is the cause of our mistaking phenomena for realities.

The *Advaitins* were fully conscious of the gravity of the problem which still remained unsolved, viz. the real origin of these illusions. In many of their attempts at explanation they contradict the fundamental principle of their system. We are told that *māyā* is only a creation of the mind; the mind is led away to these false notions. But this explanation, which seems to give definite objective existence to these false notions, is subversive of advaitism. The attempt is made to evade this difficulty by asserting that the mind has within itself from eternity ideas which it only reflects or dreams out. It thus only perceives itself. But eternal ideas seem also to constitute a separate reality. Others find the origin of *māyā* in the limitations imposed upon the unlimited. These limits, which give rise to the phenomena of perception, are the creation of the individual as an individual; in *brahman*, the unlimited, there is no individualization. To be emancipated from all sense of separate individuality is real knowledge, real bliss. This is the emancipation which finds expression in the formula *tat-tvam-asi*, 'thou art it.'

Others, again, have recourse to the theory of reflexion, viz. that the varying phenomena of perception emerge through the reflexion of *brahman* in nature. But what is it that reflects? Here again we have duality. The most generally accepted solution is that which despairs of the solution, which contents itself with saying that separate existence in every form is false, all is as it is, all is *brahman*. It illustrates its position by the story of Yājñavalkya, the ancient sage, who, when asked by one of his pupils in a question, thrice repeated, to describe the *advaita*, gave no answer; and, when pressed, replied that the *advaita* is best described by silence, for all describing means *dvaita* or dualism.*

Religion having furnished the chief stimulus to Indian philosophic thought, we naturally expect to find the root and germ of its leading conceptions in the Indian sacred writings. A line of thought leading up to the Vedāntic or *advaita* conception can be distinctly traced in the Brāhmaṇas based upon the Vedas, and in subsequent writings reckoned as inspired scripture.

Starting from a worship of personified nature-powers, the religious mind of the ancient Indians pressed on to seek that on which the gods and the worlds depended for their creation and their support. It found it in that elevation of soul experienced in prayer, which enabled it to transcend its individual existence, to which it gave the name *brahman*.

In the Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa, 2, 8, 9, 6, the question of the Rigveda, 'Who is the supporter of the bearers of the world?' is answered. *Brahman* is declared to be 'that out of which earth and heaven have been formed, and that which upholds the bearers of the world.'

In the Kāṭhaka-Upaniṣad, v. 1–3, which represents a later stage in this process of thought, the *brahman* is described as the most inward and the noblest element in all the manifestations of nature, 'the sun in the firmament, God in the heavens,' as dwelling everywhere, as born everywhere, and he only is free from suffering and sure of salvation who reveres 'the unborn, the unchangeably spiritual' that dwells within him.

In the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad is set forth in the clearest terms this exaltation of the *ātman*, or self, in its identification with *brahman*. 'This Universe is *brahman*. Its material is spirit, life is its body, light its form . . . all-embracing, silent, undisturbed—this is my soul (*ātman*) in the inmost heart, smaller than a seed of grain—this is my soul in the inmost heart, greater than the earth, greater than the heavens, greater than all these worlds . . . this is *brahman*; to it shall I, when I go hence, be united.'† The self in this sense is 'the real,' 'the one without a second (*advitīya*).' It is that out of which the whole world has been formed, of which the world is a mere transformation. He who knows *the one* knows *all*.

The parallel movements of thought in the ancient and modern philosophies of the West have been frequently pointed out. The early Greek philosophy was inspired by the longing to discover a principle of unity in the manifoldness of the phenomenal world. The earlier attempts resulted in the assumption of some one common physical principle, out of which this variety was developed; the later attempts sought it in a spiritual cause. Xenophanes proclaimed the unity of the Divine, and his disciple Parmenides, denying to this Divine principle personality and change, reduced it to *Being*. To the unity thus reached by the path of pure abstraction he opposed the world of phenomena as *non-being* (τὸ μὴ ὄν). The correspondence between these successive stages in Greek thought and the course of Indian thought outlined above is interesting and suggestive. The other parallel is that presented by the Kantian philosophy. By a different path from that of mere abstraction, Kant pursued the same metaphysical quest. Having subjected to a minute critical analysis the faculties of human knowledge, he arrived at the result that 'the thing in itself' (*das Ding an sich*) is not accessible to human knowledge, as all knowledge of the external objective world is realized through the application of certain categories of thought, the categories of space, time, and causality, which inhere in the mind of the thinking subject. Reality in itself, therefore, so far as these faculties are our means of knowledge, is unknowable.

One cannot fail to recognize here also a remarkable similarity between Kant's critical position and the real *advaita* doctrine. But there is this important difference to be noted in regard to

* Śankara on *Brahmasūtra*, iii. 2. 17; Deussen, *Upanishads*. Eng. tr. (1906) p. 156 f

† Chând.-Up. iii. 14, cf. Śatap.-Br. x. 6. 3.

method. The *advaita* presents us with no critical analysis of the process of knowledge, for we can scarcely dignify with such a name the arbitrary and fanciful methods above indicated, by which the *Advaitin* sought to explain the fact of *māyā* in our perception of phenomena. So far as the *advaita* is to be regarded as a philosophy, it is a philosophy of a purely abstract and speculative nature. By one supreme effort of mind it advances to a position which other philosophies have sought to establish by a patient and laborious examination of the facts of experience. In its religious aspect it exhibits similar characteristics, and its religious aspect is more important than its speculative interest. It is a doctrine of salvation through the attainment of the true *knowledge*, and this knowledge is to be realized in the *advaita* conclusion. By a purely intellectual effort the emancipation of the soul from evil is to be achieved. In this solution of a deep moral problem we see the same impatience of facts, the same summary method of reaching the desired goal, as marks the speculative side of this philosophy. How far this philosophy has sounded the depths of the problem may be gathered from the illustration which it employs to describe it. One who wears a jewel round his neck is distressed when, forgetting that he has it, he searches here and there to find it. His peace is restored when he discovers that it has never been lost. So, we are told, the distressed soul finds salvation in the knowledge that there is no diversity, no evil, no separateness. Pleasure and pain are merely the results of this false sense of individuality and separateness. The mind of the individual may be conscious of evil and of suffering; but the great mind *brahman* knows nothing of these. Identification with *brahman* is the source of all bliss, the sense of separateness is the root of all evil.

LITERATURE.—See art. VEDĀNTA. The view of Advaitism given above will be found fully expounded in M. N. Dvivedi's *Monism or Advaitism?* Bombay, 1889.

D. MACKICHAN.

ADVOCATE.—The etymological meaning of 'advocate' (Lat. *advocatus*) is *one called to, i.e.* one called to another's aid. It may be used of one called in to assist another in any business, as, *e.g.*, when an official appointed to defend the rights and revenues of the church was called *advocatus ecclesiæ*. In legal phraseology an advocate is one called in to assist another's cause in a court of justice. The Lat. *advocatus* had a wider significance than 'advocate' connotes in modern English; in Cicero's time it denoted a backer, hence any legal assistant: not an advocate as in later authors (cf. *Phil.* i. § 16, *pro Cæc.* §§ 24, 43). Like παράκλητος in classical Greek, *advocatus* might refer to any 'friend of the accused person, called to speak to his character, or otherwise enlist the sympathy of the judges (or, as we should call them, the jury) in his favour.'

Field (*Notes on Translation of NT*, 1899, 102) supports the above statement by the following apposite quotation from Asconius, *ad Cic. in Q. Cæcil*: 'Qui defendit alterum in iudicio, aut *patronus* dicitur si orator est; aut *advocatus*, si aut ius suggerit, aut præsentiam suam commodat amico.' For a similar use of παράκλητος he refers to Dem. *de F. L. init.* p. 341. 10; Diog. Laert. *Vit. Bionis*, iv. 50. In Philo, *de Opif. M.* § 6 'the office intended is that of a *monitor* or *adviser* . . . but still preserving the leading idea of *amicus advocatus in consilium*.'

'Advocate,' as a judicial term, now generally signifies *pleader*. This is a natural development of meaning, for assistance in courts of law usually takes the form of speaking on behalf of one who is accused. As thus employed the word practically corresponds to the English 'barrister,' whose office it is to plead the cause of his client.

Five uses of advocate fall within the limits of this article, viz.:—

1. In the New Testament:
   (*a*) Jesus Christ 'an Advocate.'
   (*b*) The Holy Spirit 'another Advocate.'
2. In Church History:
   (*a*) *Advocatus ecclesiæ.*
   (*b*) *Advocatus diaboli.*
   (*c*) *Advocatus Dei.*

1. *'ADVOCATE' IN NT.*—(*a*) Jesus Christ 'an Advocate.'—There is general agreement that in 1 Jn 2^1 ('If any man sin, we have an Advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous'), 'Advocate' is a better rendering of παράκλητος than either 'Comforter' or 'Helper,' the alternatives suggested in RVm. Wyclif, following the Vulgate, has 'We han an aduocat anentis the fadir.' In considering the NT use of this word, Jewish as well as classical authors should be consulted. In Rabbinical literature *pʿraqlîṭā'*—the Aramaic transliteration of παράκλητος (cf. 'paraclete')—is not infrequently found. Buxtorf quotes 'An advocate is a good intercessor before a magistrate or king' (cf. *JE* vol. ix. p. 514 f.). Doubtless the word sometimes occurs in Jewish writers with a wider meaning, as in the Targum on Job 16^{20} and 33^{23}, where it represents the Hebrew word for 'interpreter' (*mēlîṣ*); but its use to designate 'pleader' is well established. The antithesis between advocate and accuser is, for example, clearly marked in *Pirqe Aboth*, iv. 11: 'He who performs one good deed has gotten to himself one advocate [paraclete], and he who commits one transgression has gotten to himself one accuser.' Field (*op. cit.*) has good grounds for saying that Rabbinical writers use *paraclete* 'precisely in the same way as St. John in his Epistle, and as the Latin *patronus* which they also adopt.' This judgment accords with the conclusion already drawn from the history of the word. Though there is no evidence that the *patronus* was ever called *advocatus*, 'advocate' was, in its later usage, extended in meaning so as to include the function of the Roman *patron*, who was liable to be called to the side of his *client* 'to represent him before the tribunals when he became involved in litigation' (Muirhead, *Roman Law*, p. 9). Clement of Rome (1 *Ep. ad Cor.* i. 36) applies to our Lord the title προστάτης=*patronus*.

In 1 Jn 2^1 the thoughts suggested by the comparison of Christ to the Advocate must be interpreted in harmony with the context. When the believer is charged with having sinned, and Satan presses the charge in the presence of the 'Father . . . who judgeth' (1 P 1^{17}), Christ pleads for the accused; because He is 'righteous' His advocacy is well-pleasing to the Father; and His plea that God would show forth His righteousness in the sinner's forgiveness is based upon the fact that He Himself is more than the sinner's Advocate, even the 'propitiation' for his sins (1 Jn 2^2, cf. Ro 3^{25}). 'Faith in the forgiveness of sins cannot be religiously and ethically innocuous unless it is associated with faith in the propitiation' (Rothe, *ExpT*, i. [1890] p. 209).

(*b*) **The Holy Spirit 'another Advocate.'**—There has been much controversy in regard to the rendering of παράκλητος in Jn $14^{16.\ 26}$ 15^{26} 16^7. In all four places Wyclif and the chief English versions translate it 'Comforter'; the Rhemish has 'Paraclete.' In RVm 'Advocate' is the first alternative. Beza, however, has *advocatus* both in the Epistle and in the Gospel; he rightly explains its application to the Holy Spirit 'by a reference to St. Paul's words (Ro 8^{34}) about the Spirit as making intercession for us. The same explanation is given by Pearson on the eighth article of the Creed' (Hare, *The Mission of the Comforter*, 1846, note k. Hare's own preference is for 'Comforter,' not in its secondary sense as Consoler, but in its primary sense as Strengthener). Amongst modern scholars there

is a growing consensus of opinion in favour of 'Advocate' as a title of the Holy Spirit as well as of Jesus Christ.

'Christ is our Advocate on high,
Thou art our Advocate within.'

The arguments in support of this view are succinctly stated by Field (*op. cit.* p. 103): '(1) "Another Advocate," *i.e.* besides Myself. (2) The word is only known from St. John's writings, here and in 1 Jn 2[1], where "advocate" is, by general consent, the right word in the right place. (3) Etymologically, advocate and παράκλητος are identical. (4) This is the only rendering which accounts for the passive form.'

The question is, 'Does the work of the Holy Spirit as described in the above four passages correspond to the functions of an advocate?' In three of them (Jn 14[16. 26] 15[26]) the Holy Spirit is the 'Advocate within' the hearts of Christ's disciples; as an Advocate he 'pleads the truth and makes reply to every argument of sin' (14[16]); His pleading is with power because He brings to remembrance the Saviour's words, unfolds their teaching (14[26]), and bears witness to His glory (15[26]). No strain is put upon the context of these passages by this interpretation; the disciples themselves will be 'judges against their own unbelieving hearts, and Christ will be triumphantly acquitted and declared to be the Son of God with power' (Hastings, *ExpT*, x. [1899] p. 170). The remaining passage (16[7]) describes the Holy Spirit's work in convicting the world. He is Christ's Advocate, and 'for the Apostles themselves the pleading of the Advocate was a sovereign vindication of their cause. In the great trial they were shown to have the right, whether their testimony was received or rejected' (Westcott, *Com. in loc.*).

Zahn (*Einleit.* vol. i. p. 45) finds a difficulty in accepting the rendering 'another Advocate' in Jn 14[16]. 'Another,' he argues, implies that Christ Himself had already been His disciples' Advocate, whereas He had rather been their Teacher or their Interpreter. But there is no need to give precisely the same meaning to 'Advocate' when it is applied to Christ's earthly intercourse with His disciples and to His heavenly intercession on their behalf. The difficulty seems to be sufficiently met by saying that on earth Christ was ever pleading God's cause with the men who had been given Him out of the world, whilst in heaven He is ever pleading their cause with God (cf. Cremer, *Bibl.-Theol. Lex. of NT Gr.* p. 337).

All admit that 'Advocate' does not adequately represent the varied work of the Holy Spirit. As a descriptive general title rather than as a precise tr. of the word in the passages discussed above, the felicitous suggestion of Dr. E. A. Abbott may be gladly accepted: 'Perhaps the best periphrasis of Paraclete for modern readers would be "The Friend in need"' (*Paradosis*, 1413*a*).

2. '*ADVOCATE' IN CHURCH HISTORY.*—(*a*) **Advocatus ecclesiæ.**—The 'Church's advocate' was a civilian officially charged with the duty of defending ecclesiastical rights and revenues. At the sixth Council of Carthage (A.D. 401) it was resolved (Canon 10) that 'the Emperors shall be prayed to appoint, in union with the bishops, protectors (*defensores*) for the Church.' At the eleventh Council of Carthage (A.D. 407) it was decreed (Canon 2c) that 'for the necessities of the Church five *executores* or *exactores* shall be demanded of the Emperor to collect the revenues of the Church' (Hefele, *Hist. of Church Councils*, vol. ii. pp. 425, 442). At different periods the duties of the *advocati ecclesiæ*—sometimes designated as *agentes, defensores*, or *exactores*—included not only the defence and maintenance of the secular and legal rights of the Church, but also the protection of the poor and of orphans, the exercise of jurisdiction, including police functions and the power to levy soldiers from among the vassals of ecclesiastics who claimed immunity from the service of the State.

At first the office of *advocatus ecclesiæ* was not hereditary, but Hinschius states (*PRE*[3] i. 199) that before the end of the 9th cent. founders of monasteries, etc., sometimes stipulated that it should be retained for themselves and for their heirs. In Charlemagne's time the right of nomination belonged to the king; but to some ecclesiastical corporations the power of free choice was given, with the proviso that the secular authority of the district—the duke or count—had the right to reject the nominee of the Church.

When the office of advocate was held by unscrupulous men, it became an instrument of oppression and extortion. Historians record many charges brought against these officials of plundering the property of the Church and misappropriating its revenues. Kurtz does not overstate the facts when he says: 'Many advocates assumed arbitrary powers, and dealt with the property of the Church and its proceeds just as they chose' (*Church History*, § 86). Hinschius (*op. cit.*) says that it was Pope Innocent III. who, in his negotiations with Otto IV. and Frederick II., first secured a promise that the State should protect the Church against the oppression of the *advocati ecclesiæ*.

(*b*) **Advocatus diaboli.**—In the Roman Catholic Church, when it is proposed to honour a departed saint by Beatification or Canonization,* it is the duty of the 'Devil's advocate' to plead against the proposal and to bring forward every possible objection to it. These objections may lie either against the saint's reputation for 'heroic' virtue, the orthodoxy of his writings, or the genuineness of the miracles with which he is credited. They may also have reference to technical errors of procedure, or to flaws in the evidence.

Von Moy, in an article which has the approval of the Roman Catholic authorities, says that papal canonizations are not certainly known to have taken place before the time of Pope John XV. (A.D. 993). At first bishops sanctioned beatifications without consulting the Pope, but in consequence of abuses Pope Alexander III. decreed (1170) that henceforth papal consent should in all cases be obtained. This decree, known as *Audivimus* (the word with which it begins), is the basis of the present regulations in regard to Beatification and Canonization. The edict of Pope Urban VIII. (1634) made it beyond dispute that it is the Pope's exclusive prerogative to beatify as well as to canonize, these acts being forbidden not only to bishops, archbishops, etc., but even to a papal legate, a council unless it has the Pope's consent, and the college of cardinals assembled when the papal throne is empty (Wetzer-Welte, *Kirchenlexikon*[2], vol. ii. p. 140 ff.).

In the process of Beatification a preliminary inquiry is instituted by the bishop of the diocese concerned. If the result is favourable to the *postulatores* who desire the Beatification, the proposal is forwarded to the *congregatio rituum* in Rome. At the various meetings of this congregation the *advocatus diaboli* or *promotor fidei* is required to bring forward all the objections that can be urged against the proposition of the *postulatores*. The decision is taken after both sides have been fully heard. Between the first and second meetings of the *congregatio rituum* ten years must elapse. The Beatification of a saint cannot take place less than fifty years after his death. Canonization may follow after an interval, if it can be shown that 'since beatification at least two miracles have been wrought by God in answer to the intercessions of the saint' (Von Moy, *op. cit.*). In the processes preliminary to Canonization the 'Devil's advocate' discharges the duties of his office in the manner already described.

The official regulations under which the *advocatus diaboli* acts provide for the strict application of the most stringent tests to the claims of the saint whom it is proposed to beatify or to canonize; moreover, the final decision, as in all *causæ majores*, rests with the Pope. It is claimed that 'in modern times the court of Rome has shown itself extremely averse to promiscuous canonization; and since the days of Benedict XIV., the promoter of the faith,

* Beatification differs from Canonization in that it permits but does not enjoin the honouring (*cultus*) of a saint, and that it applies to a particular diocese, province, or order, but not to the whole Roman Catholic world.

popularly known as the devil's advocate, has exercised extreme severity in sifting the claims of aspirants' (Foye, *Romish Rites*, p. 406 f.). This statement, however true of the procedure under some Popes, needs qualification. Alzog, an orthodox writer of 'correct' opinions, testifies that Pius IX. 'performed more beatifications and canonizations than any of his predecessors'; and Nippold, who quotes this testimony, adds that the Beatifications of this Pope show him to have been 'entirely in the hands of the Jesuits,' and that the biographies of the worthies beatified by him are 'full of unnatural asceticism and unnatural miracles.' The same historian states that the virgin Clara of Montefalco was canonized by Leo XIII. on the ground that 'not only was the body of the saint well preserved since her death in 1308, but that more especially her heart showed traces of the instruments of the passion.' At the public celebration of Dec. 8, 1881 there were exhibited in the gallery connected with the Vatican 'twelve pictures, of which six treated of the miracles performed by Clara' (*The Papacy in the Nineteenth Century*, Schwab's tr., pp. 128, 147, 198).

(*c*) **Advocatus Dei.**—In the Roman Catholic Church this title is given to the *procurator* whose duty it is to refute the objections raised by the *advocatus diaboli* against the Beatification or Canonization of a saint. Von Moy (*op. cit.*) states that 'God's advocate' is always a man of high rank, and that he is chosen from the province or from the order to which the saint belonged. Just before the solemn moment of canonization, the *advocatus Dei* approaches the papal throne, accompanied by an advocate of the consistory, who, from the lowest step of the throne, presents to the Pope, in the name of 'God's advocate,' an earnest request that it may please His Holiness to canonize the saint.

LITERATURE.—For 'Advocate' in NT see bibliography given in art. HOLY SPIRIT. Of special value is Westcott's Additional Note on Jn 14^{16} in his *Com.* on this Gospel. For *advocatus ecclesiæ* the best sources are mentioned by Hinschius (*PRE*^{3} i. 198). Amongst them are Böhmer, *Observationes juris canonici*, Obs. vi.; Happ, *de Advocatia Ecclesiastica*; Brunner, *Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte*; Lamprecht, *Deutsche Wirthschaftsgeschichte*. For *advocatus diaboli* and *advocatus Dei* the chief authority is Prosper de Lambertini (Benedict XIV.), *de Servorum Dei Beatificatione et Beatorum Canonizatione*. This work is the only source mentioned by Von Moy in his art. 'Beatification und Canonization' in Wetzer-Welte's *Kirchenlexikon oder Encykl. der kathol. Theol. und ihrer Hülfswissenschaften*. See also Du Cange, *Glossarium*, *s.v.* 'Canonizare'; Milman, *Hist. of Lat. Christianity*, vol. ix. p. 71*f.*; Alban Butler, *Lives of the Saints*; F. W. Faber, *Essay on Beatification, Canonization*, etc.

J. G. TASKER.

ÆGEAN RELIGION.—By this is meant the religion of the coasts and isles of the Ægean Sea in the Bronze and earlier Ages. 'Ægean' civilization was commonly known till recently as 'Mycenæan.' Now, however, that Mycenæ has been shown to have been probably neither the centre of it nor the scene of its earlier developments, the wider and non-committal name 'Ægean' has come into use, to include the 'Mycenæan' of Schliemann, the 'pre-Mycenæan' of his earlier critics, the 'Cycladic' of Blinkenberg and others, and the 'Minoan' of Evans. The first revelation of this forgotten civilization occupied the last quarter of the 19th cent., and begot, as was inevitable, more wonder and curiosity than science. Scholars were not able all at once to comprehend and co-ordinate the mass of novel raw material accumulating on their hands; and it took time to make the necessary comparisons between the Ægean civilization and other civilizations, contemporary and posterior. Among its institutions none remained so long obscure as the religious. Up to almost the end of the century no sacred building had been recognized among Ægean remains, and no undoubted idol of a divinity. Of the small number of unquestioned cult objects discovered, almost all were still ascribed by many scholars to foreign importation. The few ritual scenes represented on intaglios were, some of them, not observed to be religious at all, while others were ill understood for want of known parallels and of a sound general conception of Ægean cult. Perrot and Chipiez in their volume on the Art of Primitive Greece, issued in 1895, found hardly anything to say on religious representations; and Evans, when about to show in 1900 how much light could be thrown on the religion by certain classes of small objects, not till then adequately remarked, had to confess that 'among the more important monuments of the Mycenæan world' very little was to be found 'having a clear and obvious relation to religious belief.'* Since that date, however, the inquiry has been revolutionized by the exploration of Crete; and we now have a mass of monumental evidence upon Ægean religious belief, cult, and ritual from which knowledge of the broad principles and much ritual detail have been obtained. Upon this class of evidence any general account of the religion of a prehistoric civilization must of necessity be based; and only in the second instance should contemporary and posterior cults be introduced into the inquiry. For the present purpose no account will be taken of possible racial changes during the Ægean period, since the civilization evidently remained of one type throughout, and the popular religion shows development only, not essential change.

i. GENERAL NATURE OF ÆGEAN RELIGION.—We have ample evidence that Ægean religion and ritual had originally both a *natural aniconic* and an *artificial aniconic* character. In the first state, man, conscious of a dominant unseen Spirit, and impelled by his instinct to locate it in some visible object in permanent relation to his own daily life, finds its dwelling in imposing features of Nature, *e.g.* the sun, a mountain, a wood, a stream, and even a single tree or rock. In the second, he attempts to take the Spirit under his own control, and to bring it into particular and exclusive relation to himself by placing its dwelling in smaller and even portable objects: in stones of singular natural appearance, or fashioned by himself into pillars; in trees or bushes of his own planting, weapons, animal forms, and all kinds of object known to us as fetishes. The transition from these to idols is easy. Having become familiar with the Spirit, and conceiving it more and more in his own image, he passes to the *iconic* state, and in that will remain till the advanced point of mental development at which he ceases to demand a visible home for his god.

These states, however, are not to be regarded as always successive. With primitive man they are often contemporaneous, the usages and ritual proper to one coexisting with those proper to another, and making his religious life more full and various. The facts of an early state can therefore be learned from a later; and this is fortunate for the student of an extinct religion, since man seldom reaches the point of making monumental records of his cult before he has passed almost out of the primitive states. Nor can the peculiar character of his religion become certainly intelligible to us till he has expressed his conception in some theoanthropic presentation. In the case of the Ægean religion, our monumental evidence hardly begins until the full iconic state is well in sight. But from that point it is sufficiently full and intelligible to

* 'Mycen. Tree and Pillar Cult' in *JHS*, 1901, p. 99 (hereinafter referred to as *TPC*).

inform us not only how the deity was conceived and how worshipped from the beginning of theoanthropism, but how worshipped previously, before being endued with human attributes on the monuments, or perhaps with any very precise attributes whatever in the minds of worshippers. Moreover, more than most religions, the Ægean remained to the end full of aniconic cult-practices.

Ægean religion, then, was from the first a Nature cult, in which the heavenly bodies and imposing terrestrial features were objects of worship, while at the same time a Divine Spirit was understood to have its dwelling therein. From this state there survived in the Ægean religious art of a later stage such cult objects as the solar disc, the lunar crescent, the star symbol passing into various forms of cross,* the rocky mountain, and the grove; while from the other state, the artificial aniconic, persisted the single tree or group of trees, generally three in number, the pillar, single, triple, or many, sacred animals, weapons, conspicuously the *bipennis*, or double war-axe (chosen as a fetish very probably from its obvious likeness to the star dwelling), the large body shield, and other objects, notably a pair of horns, perhaps a trophy, symbolic of a sacrificial bull. All these accidents of the primitive religion will be dealt with more fully below in the section on the Cult; but in order to discern its essential idea, dependent as we are for all first-hand information on artistic monuments, we must pass at once to the iconic stage and inquire how Ægean man, so soon as he had clearly conceived the Divine Spirit, represented it in terms of his own nature.

ii. THE DEITY.—It has been said that, previous to the exploration of Crete, no idol or icon of a deity had been certainly recognized among Ægean remains. It must be borne in mind that in dealing with novel monuments of a prehistoric civilization, it is not legitimate to presume that a representation of the human figure is intended to be Divine until and unless it be found with clear concomitant indications of the supernatural—unless, for

FIG. 1.—GOLD RING FROM MYCENÆ.

example, it be represented as emitting light, or accompanied by wild beasts, such as lions or large serpents, fatal to ordinary humanity, or, again, of superhuman relative stature, or, lastly, receiving adoration. In the cult-scenes found first, *e.g.* those on the bezel of a gold ring found in the Acropolis treasure at Mycenæ (fig. 1), on impressed glass plaques, on a painted stela from the same site, and on other monuments, a manifest deity was not generally recognized, although there were undoubted religious votaries, even monstrous demonic forms,* and at least one figure accompanied by doves. Acute observers, however, familiar with the monuments of other Near Eastern religions, had already noted the prominence of female figures in these cult-scenes, and begun to guess that the Ægean peoples embodied their principal conception of the deity in feminine form. In particular, Evans had been observing a class of gem and ring subjects which showed a female between lions, goats, etc.† As the excavation of Knossos proceeded, this female form, represented under circumstances implying divinity, appeared with increasing frequency on a class of objects first found there, and of great value in this connexion, viz. well-preserved clay impressions of intaglio gems. On several such impressions the female figure is seen seated (fig. 1), while other figures stand in attitudes of adoration or pour libations before it; on one found in 1901 the figure is standing on a mountain peak, while lions mount guard on either hand and an adorer stands below; on another the figure in flounced dress lays her hands on the backs of two lions;‡ on another the figure, holding a spear, is accompanied by a lion regardant;§ on another the figure bears on her shoulder the sacred *bipennis*.‖ This female figure with the axe appears also on a schist mould found in East Crete. And, lastly, on one found by Halbherr at Haghia Triadha, in the south of Crete, a female of relatively gigantic stature stands between two smaller females before a shrine.¶ In the third year of the Cretan excavations the discovery of actual shrines began. In the first found, a miniature shrine of early date, there were no idols, but among other obviously sacred objects was a triad of terra-cotta 'bætylic' pillars with doves perched atop; and presently, in the same season, an actual chapel, very small, but sufficient for its purpose, which was no doubt domestic, was opened and found to contain, in company with sacred axes on pedestals and 'horns of consecration' (see below), three feminine idols in painted terra cotta and semi-anthropomorphic, of which the largest had a dove perched on her head. In the same year other and ruder idols of the same sex and type, but with snakes coiled about them, were brought to light at Gournia, an Ægean site in eastern Crete, dug by Miss H. A. Boyd, and also at Priniás in the Cretan Messará. This snake-goddess was not found at Knossos till 1903, and then she appeared as a faience idol, which is among Mr. Evans' greatest prizes. Three serpents coil about her and form her girdle, while a fourth rears its head above her tiara (fig. 2). That this figure, whether shown on intaglios or as an idol, is a goddess there is no manner of doubt; and that she is one and the same, whether accompanied by doves or serpents, has been conclusively proved by excavations in East Crete carried out in 1904. At Palaikastro the remains of a shrine were discovered wherein a goddess held a triple snake in her arms, while votaries danced round her, and doves perched on pillars hard by.**

This goddess, however, is not alone. In a much smaller number of intaglio impressions a youthful male figure has been observed, accompanied by

* The '8wastika' (*crux gammata*), the cross *patée*, and the plain Greek cross.

* The latter, often observed on gems, were not credited with much significance owing to doubts, not only of the indigenous nature of the objects on which they appeared, but also of their being other than human votaries engaged in a theriomorphic ritual. Cf. A. B. Cook in *JHS* xiv. p. 81.

† *TPC* § 22, figs. 44, 45. Cf. Annual Brit. School at Athens (*BSA*), vi. p. 43 n.

‡ *BSA* vii. pp. 18, 19, 29, 101.

§ *Ib.* ix. fig. 37.

‖ *Ib.* viii. fig. 59.

¶ *Mon. Antichi*, xiii., *Resti*, etc. fig. 37. Cf. the gigantic seated female on a Zakro seal, *JHS* xxii. p. 77, fig. 2.

** *BSA* x. p. 223. This ritual dance seems also to be figured on an impression from Haghia Triadha (*Resti*, etc., *cit. supra*, fig. 33).

lions, and sometimes armed (fig. 3).* On a gold signet of Knossos such a figure with hair flying loose behind is seen in the upper field, and is supposed by Evans to be the deity descending on his shrine.† But no actual idol of a god has come to light, unless the male of short stature offering a dove to the goddess in the little chapel at Knossos‡ is to be interpreted as a Divine figure.

FIG. 2.—SNAKE-CROWNED GODDESS FROM KNOSSOS.

This list is not exhaustive. The goddess is probably to be recognized in many other intaglio scenes, *e.g.* those wherein a female holds up goats by the legs,§ as elsewhere she holds lions; and perhaps in certain other feminine idols. But it includes all undoubted representations of a deity so far found, and is more than enough to prove how the Ægean peoples, when they arrived at the iconic stage of religion, conceived divinity. They personified the Supreme Principle as a woman, to whom was subordinated a young male, less in honour and probably later in time. There is no evidence for more deities than these. The religion was what may be called a Dual Monotheism.

iii. CULT.—There is evidence for several classes of cult-objects, considered to be dwelling-places of the Divine Spirit, and surviving through the theoanthropic age as fetishes; for inanimate accessories of various kinds, of which the origin and later significance are often obscure; and for animate accessories of cult, perhaps also at first dwelling-places of the Spirit, but tending more and more to be regarded as symbolic. These all played a part in a customary ritual, of whose practices, strikingly uniform over the Ægean area, we have many illustrations.

FIG. 3.—SEAL IMPRESSION FROM HAGHIA TRIADHA.

1. **Dwelling-places of the Spirit** (fetishes). — (*a*) *Bætyls* (sacred stones or pillars, Gr. *βαίτυλος* or *βαιτύλιον* = esp. the stone swallowed by Kronos, which was really Zeus in his bætylic form, but also others, *e.g.* the black Cone of the Sun at Baalbek = Sem. *Bethel* ?). The character and use of Ægean sacred stones have been very fully treated by Evans in *TPC*, and subsequent Cretan discoveries have added little but confirmation. There can be small doubt that, as cult-objects, they represented in a convenient fetish form the original Divine *mountain*, still seen in intaglio cult-scenes of a late period. They themselves became in time the origin both of altars and of iconic statues, passing through gradations of rude shaping. A remarkable example of this transition has come to light latterly at Knossos in the large building to the west of the palace, where lay several natural stone freaks, roughly resembling human forms, and evidently carefully preserved in a shrine. Whether pillars or wooden posts, descended from sacred trees, eventually acquired a symbolic significance as *phalli*, is less certain. An upright object impaling a triangle occurs in any case in gem-scenes, and is strongly suggestive of a *phallus* in connexion with a *vulva*. Further, there is reason to think that bætyls originated upright tombstones, which from being Divine or ghostly dwelling-places became merely commemorative in a late age.

Bætyls passed in Ægean cult through various modifications, retaining their significance as dwelling-places of the Spirit. At first unshaped single rocks or cairns, we find them developed in the majority of earlier Ægean cult-scenes into pillars, monolithic or built up. The Divine pillar stands alone, sometimes, as over the Mycenæ Gate, between sacred animals, a position wherein it precedes the iconic figures of a later period; often also in front of a shrine, while a votary adores before it; and it is very often associated with trees. Almost equally often it does not appear singly, but in groups of three, and less commonly of more.* Occasionally the dove is seen either descending towards it or perched upon it; more rarely rays issue from it. Thereafter the pillar, from standing free, becomes a support,—a 'pillar of the house,'—but is still bætylic, and its double function is sometimes shown by the free pillar bearing a fragment of superstructure. It is seen rising from behind 'horns of consecration' in fresco pictures of the façades of shrines, and in one case bearing sacred axe-heads affixed to its capital;† and it props up 'tables of offering,' with accessory supports round it.‡ It is possible that such sacred 'pillars of the house' have actually been found in certain chambers at Knossos and elsewhere, which seem too small to have needed a central prop for purely architectural reasons, and the probability is heightened by the fact that the blocks of which two such pillars in the Knossian palace are made, are marked with the sacred sign of the double axe.§ There is reason to think that the original Ægean sanctity of pillar supports has something to do with the later Greek fashion of using a redundancy of columns in sacred architecture.

(*b*) *Triliths* (dolmens).—These are much less frequently represented than *bætyls*, but sufficiently often to leave no doubt that the triad of stones forming a free standing portal had a sacred character in Ægean as in so many other lands.‖ They are seen framing a bætyl or standing before a sacred tree. On a remarkable gem impression from Zakro ¶ in East Crete, such a trilith is well shown with lions couchant on either hand.

(*c*) *Trees* (Sem. *ashera*).—These, being perishable, are now to be looked for only in cult representations, and especially on intaglio impressions. There they are as frequent as bætyls, and they

* *TPC* fig. 43; *BSA* ix. fig. 38, vii. p. 101. Cf. Haghia Triadha seal (*Resti*, etc. fig. 40).
† *TPC* fig. 48.
‡ *BSA* viii. p. 100, fig. 56.
§ *e.g.* Zakro (*JHS* xxii. p. 77, fig. 3), Vaphio (Furtwängler, *Ant. Gem.* pl. ii. 25), Haghia Triadha (*Resti*, etc. fig. 42).
* *BSA* viii. 29, fig. 14. † *BSA* x. fig. 14 and pl. 2.
‡ *TPC* figs. 7, 9. These objects are supposed to be the origin of the sacred tripods of Greek cult.
§ *TPC* fig. 5. ‖ See *TPC* § 26.
¶ *JHS* xxii. 87, fig. 28.

occur singly or in triads (very common) or in groves. They are often seen growing out of the shrine itself, or in close proximity to an altar. The goddess sometimes sits under the shade (fig. 1); at other times she plucks the fruit. Many botanical varieties can be distinguished, the palm, the fig, the cypress, the pine, the plane, the vine; but the first three are most frequent. As has been said already, the tree occurs very often in the same scene with the pillar, a coincidence frequently observed in the case of megalithic monuments elsewhere.

(*d*) *Weapons.*—The great *body-shield*, curved inwards at the waist, which is so often used as a decorative motive in Ægean relief work, occurs in cult-representations as an independent object, lying before a shrine, or suspended in mid-air. Compare two gem-impressions from Zakro, which show shields lying, in the one case, before a group of five pillars (probably not towers, as stated in the text); in the other, before the façade of a shrine.* The most decisive monument is a small painted *stela* found at Mycenæ, whereon is depicted a great shield between two adoring votaries.† Miniature shields in clay and ivory, found at Knossos, were evidently cult-objects or amulets.

Figures of both the goddess and the god bear *spears*, but we have no evidence yet for the use of either that weapon or the *sword* as a cult-object.

With the *bipennis* or double-axe the case is very different. The evidence for its cult-use is overwhelming. It is seen in the field of a gem-impression with a votary adoring;‡ it forms the central object of a cult-scene painted on a clay coffin found at Palaikastro; and is being adored in both the chief scenes on the great Haghia Triadha sarcophagus,§ where it is seen in conjunction with sacred palm-trees and doves, and stands upright on a stepped pyramidal base, similar to the basis with socket for a staff, found in the palace at Knossos. In the small chapel on the latter site, it evidently stood between the sacred 'horns of consecration,'‖ a position in which it is often shown on intaglios (cf. fig. 4). Sometimes it appears in a reduplicated form, as in a steatite example from the small shrine at Knossos; on the gold signet from Mycenæ (fig. 1); and on the schist mould from East Crete, mentioned already: and, *à propos*, Evans recalls the fact that, since it appears in the hand of the goddess on a Knossian gem, and in company with her idols in the small shrine, it was at least as much her weapon as the god's. The dual axe is, he thinks, the fetish of a bi-sexual god. Miniature axes in bronze have often been found on Cretan sites, *e.g.* in the lower part of the holy cave on Mt. Dicte, and were evidently very common fetishes or cult-offerings. The sign of the axe is found more often than any other on Knossian blocks, whether as a symbol of consecration or as a mason's mark. It is not impossible that its name *labrys* is to be detected in that of the Cretan *labyrinth*.¶

2. Other inanimate accessories of cult.—Certain other objects are represented in cult-scenes, or have actually been found in connexion with shrines, about which it is less safe to say that they were dwelling-places of the Spirit. Even if originally so, and long in use as fetishes, they seem in the iconic stage to have become rather articles of ritualistic furniture.

(*a*) '*Horns of consecration.*'—These long misunderstood objects, of commonest occurrence in gem and fresco cult-scenes, and found modelled in stucco, clay, terra-cotta, and stone, were almost certainly fetishes at the first. They consist simply of a base with two erect horns, which, in the more elaborate examples represented, bend outwards at the tips, like the horns of oxen (fig. 4).* They are seen either on the top of a shrine or altar,† or beside sacred pillars or trees, which in some cases seem to rise out of them (cf. figs. 5, 6). Also they support in the same way the sacred *bipennis*, actual examples having been found in the small shrine at Knossos with sockets for axe-shafts. Upon a vase from Enkomi (Old Salamis) in Cyprus the picture shows not only one *bipennis* so rising from these horns, but two other axes fixed between the horns of actual *bucrania*, depicted in full (fig. 5).‡ This seems to confirm the inference, which in any case suggests itself, that the conventional sacred horns are a convenient reduction of an original *bucranium*, itself a reduction of the entire bull, known from abundant evidence to have been a sacred animal, and probably a Divine



FIG. 4.—FRESCO FROM KNOSSOS.

dwelling. The horns-object serves to stamp any scene as religious, and its very frequent appearance is of great importance as a clue to the sacred character of other objects.

(*b*) *The knotted tie or zone.*—A representation of a knotted scarf or tassel seems also to have sacred significance. Found modelled in alabaster by Schliemann in the Mycenæan Acropolis graves, and supposed to be merely a fragment of wall decoration, it turned up again in the small shrine at Knossos as an independent object. It is possible that this 'tie' is a votive model of a zone, dedicated with a sexual significance, as in later Hellas. On a ring found at Mycenæ these knots are seen suspended from the capital of a lion-guarded pillar; and on a gem from the Argive Heræum they perhaps appear on either side of a bucranium.§

(*c*) *The cross.*—A cross in marble was found in a Knossian shrine; and the cross sign is common on gems and seal impressions.

* *JHS* xxii. figs. 29, 30.
† Perrot-Chipiez, *Hist. de l'Art*, 'La Grèce Prim.' fig. 440.
‡ From Zakro, *JHS*, *l.c.* fig. 5.
§ Paribeni, *Rendiconti R. Acc. Lincei*, xii. fasc. 70, p. 30.
‖ *BSA* viii. 100.
¶ So Kretschmer and Max Mayer quoted by Evans, *TPC* p. 109, n. 6.

* See, *e.g.*, the coloured plate appended to *TPC*, showing a fresco painting of a Knossian shrine.
† Paribeni, *l.c.* p. 5. Model altars with horns attached were found in the sacred Temenos near the royal villa of Haghia Triadha.
‡ *TPC* fig. 3.
§ Halbherr doubts this (*Resti*, etc. p. 42), preferring to interpret the objects as corslets.

3. Animate accessories of cult. — What are known in late stages of religion as animals sacred to such and such a divinity, in art appearing as mere attributes, and in real life devoted to the Divine pleasure, whether by being preserved as 'tabu' in the sacred precincts, or by being sacrificed that they may pass to the world invisible, have probably all a common origin as Divine dwelling-places or fetishes. In Ægean cult there were many such sacred animals:

(*a*) *Serpents*, seen twined about the person of the goddess (fig. 2), or held in the hands of her votaries. These were probably her original dwelling-place as an earth (chthonian) spirit.

(*b*) *Doves*, settled on her person or offered by votaries; also settled on, or seen approaching, bætyls, shrines (fig. 6), trees, and axes. They represent probably her original dwelling-place as a spirit of the sky.

(*c*) *Lions and lionesses*, which, in the iconic stage, are represented as the companions, guardians, or supporters of the deity.

(*d*) *Bulls, cows, and calves.*—The bull is most frequent. He is seen crowned with the sacred axe (fig. 5). In a magnificent relief, he guarded the main portal of the Knossian palace, and both there and at Tiryns appears again and again in fresco or on intaglios charging and tossing maidens and youths. Evans interprets these as circus scenes (the later ταυροκαθαψία); but it is possible that what was represented was not so much a comparatively harmless sport as a scene of the devotion of maidens and youths to the Divine beast. It is inevitable in this connexion to recall the tradition of the Knossian Minotaur, the semi-Divine and monstrous bull to which an annual tribute of maidens was devoted. Monstrous figures

FIG. 6.—GOLD SHRINE FROM MYCENÆ.

of minotaur type actually appear on Ægean intaglios,* proving that the legend is of prehistoric Ægean origin.

The cow and calf, very frequent on intaglios, seem to have typified the goddess's maternity.

(*e*) *Goats, nannies, and kids.*—The goat is very frequently held by the leg in the hand of the goddess, or accompanies her. A clay goat was found in the west shrine at Knossos. The nanny and kids seem to have the same significance as the cow and calf.

(*f*) *Deer and eagles* are frequent intaglio subjects; but beyond the fact that all Ægean engraved gems were probably in some degree amulets, we cannot adduce evidence of the sacred character of these animals.

(*g*) *Fishes* appear in fresco paintings at Knossos and Phylakopi in Melos, in two cases at least in possible connexion with shrines, recalling their

FIG. 5.—VASE PAINTING FROM SALAMIS, CYPRUS.

well-known connexion with the Semitic goddess.

(*h*) *Monstrous animals.* — Not only the *Minotaur*, but the *Griffin*, the *Sphinx* (two sphinxes draw a chariot on the Haghia Triadha sarcophagus), and various *composite monsters* appear in intaglios and on frescoes. Lion-headed demons are seen performing ritual acts, as, *e.g.*, pouring libations. Human figures with heads of *asses*, *lions*, *goats*, *birds*, and *bulls* occur, *e.g.* on a carved shell found at Phæstos.* A procession of ass-headed figures bearing a pole on their shoulders, in a Mycenæan fresco painting, has been interpreted as a scene of votaries wearing skins and engaged in *theriomorphic* rites; but this is an unsupported guess. An extraordinary variety of wildly monstrous combinations was found on intaglio impressions at Zakro; but it is possible that these were the product of heraldic fancy, and owed their variety to the necessity of differentiating signet types.

4. Temples and ritual. — There is no good Ægean evidence as yet for the existence of such large free-standing structures, having no relation to domestic buildings and devoted to Divine worship, as were the temples of the Hellenic period, although intaglio scenes show *small shrines*, either isodomic or of the dolmen type, standing apparently within enclosures or *temenoi*, and containing bætyls, sacred trees, and 'horns of consecration.' Such constructed shrines as have actually been found are *small plain chambers* enclosed in palace blocks, as at Knossos, and, possibly, at Palaikastro and Phylakopi in Melos. These, if they do not contain a sacred pillar, show only a ledge or platform at one end, upon which fetishes, idols, and other sacred objects stood. Such domestic 'shrines,' even if beautifully decorated with frescoes like the Melian chamber, can be regarded as little more than mere repositories for *sacra*. As for the representation of shrines, characterized by bætyls and horns, seen through openings in the façade, and in almost all cases tripartite, it is very doubtful if they are intended to show distinct temples,

* Knossos, *BSA* vii. figs. 7 b, c; Zakro, *ib.* fig. 45.

* *JHS* xxii. p. 92.

and not rather parts, or the whole, of a palace or other domestic structure. We have such representations in the Knossian frescoes, on intaglios, and in beaten metal (the gold miniature dove shrine of Mycenæ, fig. 6). It seems clear that certain parts of the Knossian Palace had a peculiarly sacred character;* and if it be admitted that the whole block of this 'Labyrinth' was the sacred house of the 'Labrys,' and that Minoan rulers were priest-kings (which is very probable), *the whole palace is perhaps to be regarded as a temple*, and we may assume that palaces and temples had not yet been differentiated. *Cave-sanctuaries* there certainly were, wherein Nature often provided bætyls ready made in the form of stalactites and stalagmites, as in the lower grotto of the Dictæan Cavern. Crete has supplied the most notable instances of caves so far; but parallels to the Idæan and Dictæan grottoes, and those near Sybrita and Kamares (southern face of Ida) and the mouth of the Knossos river, will probably be found ere long on the Greek mainland and in other islands. Such discoveries as the Temenos near Haghia Triadha and the deposits of votive objects found by Myres at Petsofa on the hills near Palaikastro, seem, however, to show that there were sacred places, distinct from domestic buildings, where cult was practised and votive objects were dedicated: but whether these were marked by constructed shrines or were mere enclosures (*temenoi*), or, again, open spots, possibly sanctified by a sacred tree or natural bætyl, we do not yet know. The evidence now available is rather in favour of the last alternative.

Free-standing *altars*, probably evolved from the bætyl, and retaining, perhaps, its self-contained sanctity and its significance, were, however, in ritual use. One, hewn out of rock, stands before the Idæan Cave; the foundations of three were found within the Knossian Palace on three sides of a quarter apparently indicated by its contents as peculiarly sacred; and they are often shown on intaglios and reliefs,† sometimes crowned with 'horns of consecration,' like the actual models found in the Temenos of Haghia Triadha (see above). Altars appear in pictures as rectangular structures of moderate height (fig. 7). The cupped 'table of offerings,' found, as has been already said, in some cases superimposed on a bætyl, is a convenient reduction of the altar.‡

We have no good evidence yet for a class of *priests* or *priestesses*; but it is quite possible that certain figures shown in such cult-scenes as those on the Haghia Triadha sarcophagus are intended to be sacerdotal.

As to *ritual*, various acts are represented. Votaries pour libations, raise hands in postures of adoration, call down the Divinity to his fetish dwelling by blowing through a triton shell, dance round the goddess (the 'Chorus of Ariadne'), brandish *sacra* (as does the faience votary of the snake-goddess of Knossos), play on stringed and wind instruments (Haghia Triadha sarcophagus), offer flowers and perhaps fruit (fig. 1), doves, etc., and slay animals in sacrifice (an ox on the Haghia Triadha sarcophagus, and perhaps goats, as in many intaglio scenes). There is no good evidence for *burnt* sacrifice; and the question of *human* victims cannot be determined at present. It depends on the interpretation of the ταυροκαθάψια scenes and of the Minotaur legend.

Dedication both of real articles of personal property and of *simulacra* was extensively practised. The Dictæan Cavern yielded hundreds of spear-heads, arrow-points, knives, sword-blades, razors, tweezers, hairpins, rings, and other bronze objects, taken off the persons of worshippers and offered to the Deity. It also yielded *simulacra* of weapons, *e.g.* especially the double-axe, a miniature chariot, miniature oxen, sheep, and goats, and figures of men and women. The latter figures belong to a large and widespread class of Ægean remains, found in silver, bronze, lead, terra-cotta, ivory, and faience, and of every grade of art. They are conventional representations of worshippers, dedicated to the Deity and placed in the Divine precinct to ensure Divine protection and a share in the Divine life for the dedicator. Even when placed in tombs, as at Kampos in Laconia, such statuettes were probably not *ushabti* (servants to answer the dead man's call in another world), but *simulacra* of surviving relatives who wished to be under the protection of the deceased and the Deity to whom he had gone. Less common objects of *ex voto* dedication are models of garments, *e.g.* skirts and girdles (found in the faience deposit at Knossos), and of human limbs, birds, and vermin (found in terra-cotta at Petsofa near Palaikastro). The Temenos of Haghia Triadha yielded a great variety of *simulacra* of all kinds.

FIG. 7.—PYXIS FROM KNOSSOS.

Perished *vegetable* substances have often been observed in little clay cups, in one locality (a 'pillar room' in a private Knossian house) lying *under* up-turned cups, disposed in orderly rows round the pillar. Certain long-stemmed vases with a spreading bowl, often richly painted, and always perforated to allow liquid to run away, which have been found on many Ægean sites (*e.g.* Knossos, Phylakopi), and were of frequent occurrence in the Dictæan Cave deposit, are supposed to have served for offerings of fruit. Corn was found in the cists containing the faience objects at Knossos. *Animal* remains lay thick in all strata of the Dictæan Cave, being chiefly the horns and bones of oxen, sheep, goats, and birds, which must be assumed to have been dedicated, cooked or raw; and stags' horns occurred with the sacred faience objects at Knossos.

It remains to be added that on the sarcophagus of Haghia Triadha, a scene is represented which has been interpreted as an act of worship to the mummified corpse of a dead man. The particular interpretation is not certain; but we have long had evidence of a practice of *ancestor worship* in the shape of the altar found above the Acropolis graves

* Evans in *BSA* ix. pp. 9, 35.

† *E.g.* on the steatite pyxis from Knossos, *TPC* fig. 2, fig. 7 above.

‡ See the specimens from the Dictæan Cave (*BSA* vi. pl. xi.) and Knossos (*BSA* ix. fig. 20).

at Mycenæ. Such a cult is quite compatible with that of the Divine Spirit, however personified, and indeed is almost always found as a subordinate practice in primitive religions. The dead, who are gone to the Great Mother or the Great Father, acquire a derivative sanctity, and are considered as able to exert powerful influence with the Deity for their surviving kin, and upon the lives of that kin. It would appear that the dead, who were not burned in the Ægean Age, and not certainly mummified, were supposed to continue to live as spirits in their tomb-houses on earth. Hence magnificent sepulchres were constructed, such as the great 'bee-hive' tombs of Mycenæ.

iv. SIGNIFICANCE OF ÆGEAN RELIGION.—The religious character and use of a great body of Ægean cult-objects having now been established, without reference to alien evidence, we may safely inquire whether a comparison of neighbouring and succeeding cults will explain the significance of the religion to which they pertained—a religion, be it remembered, which has no literary history of its own, and no literary records that can yet be deciphered. In this place the comparisons must be very briefly made. First, in regard to the Ægean *Divine Spirit* itself, personified in the iconic stage as a goddess and a young god, the student of comparative religion finds himself on very familiar ground. A goddess with a young subordinate god is known in early times on every coast of the Mediterranean which looked towards Crete. In Punic Africa she is Tanit with her son; in Egypt, Isis with Horus; in Phœnicia, Ashtaroth with Tammuz (Adonis); in Asia Minor, Cybele with Attis; in Greece (and especially in Greek Crete itself), Rhea with the young Zeus. Everywhere she is *παρθένος*, *i.e.* unwed, but made the mother first of her companion by immaculate conception, and then of the gods and all life by the embrace of her own son. In memory of these original facts, her cult (especially the more esoteric mysteries of it) is marked by various practices and observances symbolic of the negation of true marriage and obliteration of sex. A part of her male votaries are castrated; and her female votaries must ignore their married state when in her personal service, and often practise ceremonial promiscuity. As there is no ordinary human birth, so there is no ordinary human death. The Divine son Tammuz, Attis Melicertes, or Zeus himself in Crete (where his tomb was shown), dies, but comes again to life, as does Nature from summer to winter and winter to summer. The goddess is therefore the Spirit of Nature, constantly renewing herself in her own offspring. Of this universal Deity of all the Near East the Ægean goddess with her son was, beyond all question, a manifestation. If we are to give a name to her, it must be *Rhea*;* and if to her son and companion, it must be Zeus, remembering that, by Hellenic tradition, the coming into being of Zeus was laid peculiarly in Crete. In the primitive story he embraces his own mother.† Knossos, as Diodorus Siculus indicates,‡ was associated from dim antiquity with Rhea; and a curious piece of direct evidence connecting the Ægean goddess with the cult of Rhea has lately been adduced. A clay vessel of very peculiar form, the *kernos*, is stated by an ancient commentator§ to have been for the use of worshippers of Rhea. The only vessels answering his description have come to light on Ægean sites, and one in particular was found at Palaikastro, in Crete, among the hoard of sacred objects accompanying a snake-goddess described above.

The spiritual community between Ægean and other Near Eastern religions being so close, it is not surprising that almost every recognizable cult-feature in the former can be paralleled in the latter. The indwelling of the Deity in stones, whether natural *bætyls*, cairns, pillars, or triliths, and in trees, is a most familiar Semitic belief, and one which left numerous traces on Hellenic worship. A cult of weapons appears to have existed in early Asia Minor among the Hittites of Pteria and the Carians of Labranda, not to go so far afield as the Alani on the Eastern Euxine, who in a late age adored a standing blade.* The 'horns of consecration' are seen in Semitic sacred representations, and appear in Hebrew ritual as 'horns of the altar.' The 'sacred animals' are all widely related. The serpent as an embodiment of chthonian Divinity is not only Greek but Egyptian (snake-form of Nekhebst); the dove as the vehicle of the Divine spirit from on high has survived from Semitic literal belief into the symbolism of Christianity. The great *felidæ* were guardians and supporters of Anatolian Cybele. The bull, as a dwelling of Divinity in Egypt, has his counterpart in the Greek legends of Zeus: and the cow of Hathor is known to all. The infant Zeus is wrapped in the goat-skin, and the goat continued to a late time peculiarly sacred in the cult of western Asia Minor. The monsters of Ægean cult-scenes have so many affinities with the Egyptian (those on the Phæstian shell actually carry the Nilotic life-sign, the *ankh*) that they have all been referred to an Egyptian original, the maternity personification, Thueris, the hippo, reared on her hind-quarters. The parallelism in ritual observance is too extensive and obvious to need detailed mention.

It is not to be understood, however, that such parallelism implies the derivative character of Ægean religion, least of all derivation from any single civilization, such as the Semitic or the Egyptian. If there be parentage between Semitic and Ægean civilization, it is the former that is the offspring, given the comparative youth of its art and its system of writing;† while, as for Egyptian religion, though there is good reason to think that it came to exercise a considerable influence on Ægean iconic representation, and even a little on the ideas which that in turn produced, no one, comparing the complexity of early Egyptian cult with the simplicity of the early Ægean, could suppose the one derived bodily from the other. It is needless, indeed, to look for the derivation of the essential features of Ægean cult at any later epoch than that of the primeval expansion of mankind. Its fundamental religious ideas were those of a vast proportion of the common human stock, and they continue to be so to the present day. The Ægean race sought Divinity in the life principle of Nature, spontaneously originated and reproducing itself to eternity. It placed that Divinity in great features of Nature visibly related to human life. When it came to define its idea in terms of man, being yet in that social stage in which man in relation to reproduction held his naturally subordinate place, it represented the principle of life as an unwedded woman, its property of reproduction as a son unbegotten, and its relation to the humanity resultant from this woman and man as an unseen Spirit, descending on wings and indwelling in certain material objects, the choice of which was to some degree determined by their inherent suggestion either of great natural features or human organs of life. From these fundamental

* But she unites many attributes afterwards distributed between different impersonations of the mother-goddess, *e.g.* Demeter-Erinys; Eileithyia, known in East Crete as Dictynna-Britomartis, and Aphrodite-Ariadne.

† Cf. Clem. Alex. *Protrept.* ii. p. 76. ‡ v. 66.

§ Gloss on Nikander, *Alexipharmaka*, v. 217. See Dawkins in *BSA* x. p. 221.

* Amm. Marc. xxxi. 2, 21; cf. *TPC* p. 9.

† Some influence actually passed from Crete to Philistine Gaza, commemorated by a cult of Zeus Kretagenes.

ideas all the features of Ægean cult representation and ritual practice known to us can very well have proceeded naturally and independently.

D. G. Hogarth.

AEGIS.—In Greek mythology, the aegis is an attribute of magic power, which seems to belong originally to Zeus, the supreme god, who is therefore called *αἰγίοχος*. It seems to have the power both of protecting its wearer and of inspiring terror in his enemies; and for this purpose, according to Homer, it is borrowed both by Athene and by Apollo. Its form is not easy to realize in the earlier descriptions, of which we find the fullest in *Il.* v. 738, where Athene puts it on.

'About her shoulders cast she the tasselled aegis terrible, whereon is panic as a crown all about, and strife is therein, and valour and horrible onslaught withal, and therein is the dreadful monster's Gorgon head, dreadful and grim, portent of aegis-bearing Zeus.'

Here it appears to be some sort of defensive mantle, like what is worn by Athene in later art; it is provided with 'a hundred tassels of pure gold' (*Il.* ii. 448), and is also described as *ἀμφιδάσεια*, fringed all round or hairy on both sides, as if it were a skin of some sort, but it was made by the smith-god Hephæstus (xv. 309); when it is shaken, it scatters terror on all around. It is used by Apollo (xxiv. 20) to wrap round the dead body of Hector, and so protect it from injury.

The views both of the Greeks themselves and of modern mythologists as to the form and meaning of the aegis have been greatly influenced by opinions as to the etymology of the word. The Greeks often associated it with *αἰγέα* or *αἰγίς*, 'a goat-skin'; and Herodotus (iv. 189) suggests that the aegis of Athene was derived from the tasselled goat-skins worn by the Libyan women near Lake Tritonis. It was interpreted by later Greek mythologists as either the skin of the goat Amalthea, which had suckled Zeus in his infancy, or that of a monster slain by Athene. Modern mythologists have usually preferred the connexion with *ἀΐσσειν*, 'to rush,' *αἰγίς* or *καταιγίς*, 'a squall'; but their interpretation of it as symbolical of the thundercloud, though found in many modern books, is not supported by any satisfactory evidence of early date; though Zeus thunders while he shakes the aegis (*Il.* xvii. 593), the two actions are not necessarily related as cause and effect; for a clear example of the aegis as causing a thunderstorm no earlier authority can be quoted than Silius Italicus (xii. 720); Virgil (*Æn.* viii. 352) connects it with clouds. Such instances are, of course, of no mythological value, but represent later theorizing.

In artistic representations the aegis regularly appears as the attribute of Athene; there is no certain example of its being associated with Zeus, and the restoration of the Apollo Belvedere as holding it is more than doubtful. In early representations of Athene it is a kind of scaly cloak, fringed with serpents, and with the Gorgon's head fixed in it; it extends over the left arm, and so can be held up as a shield. In other cases it takes the form of a short breast-plate with similar adjuncts, and this is the usual form in later art; sometimes it is abridged to a mere band across the breast of the goddess.

Ernest A. Gardner.

ÆONS (Gr. *αἰῶνες* = 'ages,' 'periods,' 'dispensations,' probably related to *ἀεί* = 'always,' 'for ever').—This term was employed by the opponents of Gnosticism, and by some of the Gnostics themselves, to designate the successive emanations from the Absolute Being. The problem of accounting for the existence of the actual world-order, when it is regarded as unreal and illusory, without ascribing it directly to the Absolute One, is common to all Oriental theosophical systems; and the philosophers of most of them attempted its solution by an evolutionary (devolutionary) series of æons or emanations. Close parallels to the Gnostic æons may be found in Japanese Shintoism, Mahāyānistic Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, the Platonic *Ideas*, Philo's *Powers*, the Stoic *Logoi*, etc. The Shinto system (as set forth in the *Kojiki*) seems to rest upon pure pantheism. To gain a starting-point for the devolutionary process, the infinite becomes differentiated into the male and female principles Izanagi and Izanami, personified and conceived of as grossly lustful. These procreative æons are thought to be derived from certain abstract deities that are merged in the infinite. These produce, first, three other deities (æons), representing the great powers of nature; and these still others, some working for the good and some for the evil of man. In the Buddhism of the Northern School the Ādibuddha (*q.v.*) produces the five 'Buddhas of Contemplation,' Vairochana, Akṣobhya, Ratnasambhava, Amitābha, and Amoghasiddhi; from whom, in their turn, emanate five 'Future Buddhas of Contemplation,' the sources of the five worlds which successively make up the universe. This number five may perhaps be compared with the five elements, earth, water, fire, air, and ether, of orthodox Brahmanism. Zoroastrianism has a similar, but twofold, system of æons in the Kingdom of Light and the Kingdom of Darkness, the head of the former being Ahuramazda and that of the latter being Ahriman. From each of these is evolved a graduated host of personified powers of nature, those proceeding from the former working for good, and those proceeding from the latter working evil, the two hosts being in perpetual conflict the one with the other. Philo, who regarded the Supreme Being as exalted above all possibility of contact with matter, which he characterized as 'lifeless, erroneous, divisible, unequal,' and hence as fundamentally evil, sought to bridge over the gulf between God and the world by the hypothesis of certain 'creative and regulative Powers.' These Powers are represented as God's thoughts, as the heavenly archetypes of earthly things, as that which gives life, reality, and durability to matter, as the breath of God's mouth. He sometimes seems to regard them as personalities. His Logos doctrine is particularly significant in relation to Gnostic æons. The Logos is designated 'Eternal Wisdom' (cf. the Gnostic æon *Sophia*), and 'the Sum of the Thoughts of God' (Gnostic æon *Ennoia*, or *Synesis*).

Plato (*Timæus*, 37 D) applies the name *αἰών* to the eternal Being which has Time as its counterpart in the world of sense. Aristotle in like manner describes the ultimate principle which sums up in itself all existence, as *αἰών* (*ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ εἶναι*, *de Mundo*, i. 9. 11). These and similar speculations of Greek metaphysic exercised a profound influence on later Gnostic theory; but it may now be regarded as almost certain that the Gnostic doctrine of the Æons was immediately derived from Mithraism. At the head of the Mithraic hierarchy, as in the earlier Zarvanite heresy of Zoroastrianism, from which this trait in it is derived, stood Infinite Time. This supreme god, inconceivable and ineffable, was worshipped under the name of *Aion*, and was represented in sculpture as a figure whose body was inscribed with the signs of the Zodiac and encircled by a serpent, which typified the course of the sun in the ecliptic.

The earlier Gnosticism, like the cult of Mithra, appears to have known of only a single Æon, which was conceived impersonally—sometimes as the Absolute itself, sometimes as the sphere of the Absolute. Thus in the account of the 'Gnostics' (specifically so called) which is given by Irenæus (*adv. Hær.* i. 30) we read of an ascent *εἰς τὸν ἄφθαρτον αἰῶνα*,—and similar language is employed

by Epiphanius (*Hær.* xxxviii. 1) in his description of the Cainites. Traces of this original doctrine continue to reappear in the more highly developed Gnostic systems. Valentinus himself (Frag. 5) speaks of the 'living Æon' as of a unity, although he discovers a principle of distinction within this primordial unity. It belongs, indeed, to the essence of Gnostic speculation that the Æons remain ideally one, while they manifest themselves as a plurality.

In later Gnosticism the Æons are represented as a system or confederacy of Divine existences, which proceed in pairs of male and female (syzygies) from the supreme Father. Each pair originates another, and each descends in dignity as it stands more remote from the source of being. The doctrine of syzygies has its analogies in Mithraism as in the other Eastern religions mentioned above; but it was no doubt borrowed by the Gnostics from that Babylonian tradition to which they were indebted for so many details in their cosmology. In Gnosticism, however, the Babylonian idea of a physical generation is softened and rationalized. The successive pairs are not begotten, but are projected or emanated. They are the self-unfolding of the Divine nature; and in their totality they form its perfect manifestation. Hence they constitute the Pleroma,—the 'fulness' in which the Godhead exhausts its hidden potentialities. The Pleroma, composed of the several Æons, is the world of Light or higher reality; and is divided by a great gulf from the 'darkness' of phenomenal being.

The different Gnostic systems are widely at variance in their accounts of the number and arrangement of the Æons. Basilides (if we accept Irenæus and Hippolytus I. as our authorities for his teaching) would seem to acknowledge only six (Πατήρ, Νοῦς, Λόγος, Φρόνησις, Δύναμις, Σοφία). The *Pistis Sophia* assumes thirteen, and conceives of the Æons as the spheres inhabited by the Divine powers, rather than as the powers themselves. Valentinus enumerates thirty Æons, which are grouped in three divisions—the Ogdoad, the Decad, the Dodecad. Ideas of a geometrical nature are probably involved in this grouping; while the number 30 is apparently suggested by the thirty *yazatas* (angels) of Zoroastrianism. In the various systems which branch off from the main stem of Valentinianism, the Pleroma of 30 Æons is normative, but this number is subject to continual modifications.

A brief account of the system of Valentinus will suffice to illustrate the general character of the Gnostic Æonology. He starts with *Bythos* (depth) the Absolute One, and *Sige* (silence) as his female companion. These generate *Nous* (mind) and *Aletheia* (truth). These in turn project *Logos* (word) and *Zoe* (life), and these *Anthropos* (man) and *Ecclesia* (church). *Nous* and *Aletheia* afterwards produce ten æons (a perfect number) as an offering to the Father. *Logos* and *Zoe* follow in the production of æons, but produce twelve (not a perfect number), including Faith, Hope, Love, and the Lower Wisdom (*Achamoth*). This last, being unduly ambitious, and aspiring to produce æons without conjunction with a male æon, brought forth a 'formless and undigested substance' (the Demiurge), which evolved into the present order of things, with its mixture of good and evil, and with man in whom spirit is enslaved by matter. This disturbance of the Pleroma alarmed the other æons and deeply distressed Achamoth. In response to the tears of Achamoth and the supplications of the other æons, the Father permitted Nous and Aletheia to project Christ and the Holy Spirit for the restoration of form, the destruction of the Demiurge, and the comfort of Achamoth. These have for their task the separation of the life and light that have become imprisoned in humanity, from dead, evil matter, through a long series of magical rites (mysteries), and through the promotion of ascetical living.

In Gnosticism generally, as in the teaching of Valentinus, the creation of the lower world is explained by the hypothesis of a disturbance within the Pleroma. The error, or the undue ambition, of one of the Æons results in the origin of an inferior power, who in his turn originates others, until a whole world of darkness and illusion comes into being. Nevertheless, since the process has its beginning within the Pleroma itself, some portion of the higher essence becomes intermingled with the baser elements, from which it yearns to be delivered. The Redemption, according to the Gnostic thinkers, consists in the sifting out of this higher essence and its restoration to the Pleroma. In order that this may be accomplished, an Æon of supreme dignity descends into the phenomenal world and becomes identified, really or in seeming, with the man Jesus.

The Æonic theory, as we have seen, was in the first instance derived from the Zarvanite idea of Infinite Time as the ultimate fact in nature. Thus it was allied from the beginning with speculations of a purely physical character, and from these it never succeeded in entirely freeing itself. The greater Gnostics, and Valentinus more especially, sought to resolve the Æons into spiritual facts or processes. They were construed as modes of the Divine Being, activities in which the Absolute One unfolds and manifests His inward life. It proved impossible, however, to effect a complete transformation of a theory which was, in its essence, physical. Valentinus himself wavers in his conception of the Æons,—regarding them now as ideas, now as heavenly Persons, now as creative forces. His philosophical construction loses itself at every turn in primitive astrology and cosmical speculation. To this may be attributed the eventual failure of Gnosticism, alike as a philosophy and as a religion. While it professed to open a way out of the bondage of the natural world, it was itself grounded in ideas derived from nature-worship. See, further, GNOSTICISM.

LITERATURE. — Cumont, *The Mysteries of Mithra* (Eng. tr. 1903); Hilgenfeld, *Ketzergesch. des Urchristentums* (1884); Mead, *Fragments of a Faith Forgotten* (new ed. 1906); Schmidt, *Die Gnosis* (1903); Liechtenhan, *Die Offenbarung im Gnosticismus* (1901), pp. 105–141; E. Buckley, *Universal Religion* (Chicago, 1897).

ALBERT H. NEWMAN and ERNEST F. SCOTT.

ÆSCHYLUS.—Æschylus, son of Euphorion, an eupatrid of Eleusis, was born B.C. 525, commenced as a dramatist *c.* 499, gained his first victory in 484 and his last (with the *Oresteia*) in 458, and died at Gela in 456. He fought at the battles of Marathon, Artemisium, Salamis, and Platæa. From about 476, when he composed for Hiero of Syracuse *The Women of Ætna* at the foundation of that town, he was frequently in Sicily. There is no satisfactory explanation of the statement of Heraclides Ponticus that he was tried on a charge of revealing the Mysteries in a play, and acquitted on the ground of ignorance (cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* iii. 2); the further details are probably unauthentic. Partizanship in politics can hardly be imputed to him on the strength of the supposed reference to Aristides in the description of Amphiaraus (*Sept.* 592–594),* still less on the theory that Prometheus, *son of Themis*, stands for Themistocles. His eulogy of the Areopagus, however, in the *Eumenides* (esp. 681–706) testifies to conservative sentiments. In the same play (754–777), as well

* All references are to the text of Sidgwick (*Script. Class. Bibl. Oxon.*), whose numbering hardly differs from that of Dindorf, Wecklein, and most modern editors. Hermann, Paley, and a few others use their own special notation.

as in the *Supplices*, he approves of the democratic friendship between Athens and Argos. He expresses the strongest detestation of tyranny in all forms (*Pers.*, *Prom.*, *Ag.* 953–955, *Eum.* 185–190); but has no objection to constitutional monarchy (*Supp.* 398, 517, 600), or to moderate democracy (*Pers.* 242, *Supp.* 485–489). His general ideal is a balance of order and liberty (*Eum.* 526–528).

Æschylus may be called the Father of Tragedy (Philostr. *Vita Apoll.* p. 220), in the sense that he first perceived the possibilities of the drama as a branch of literature, rather than as ritual or ceremonial, for the expression of views as to life and character. His plays are τεμάχη τῶν Ὁμήρου μεγάλων δείπνων, because the personages are derived mainly from the Epic cycle; but he drew upon other 'sagas' as well, and upon contemporary history; and he dealt very freely with the plots. He was evidently acquainted with Hesiod and other cosmological writers. In a few cases he cites the gnomic moralists (*Prom.* 890); more often (*Sept.* 439, *Ag.* 1331, *Cho.* 60, *Eum.* 529) he expresses similar sentiments about wealth, fortune, pride, moderation, etc. He has much in common with his contemporary Pindar; and his general attitude towards the popular mythology was almost certainly influenced by the poems of Solon and Theognis. The common statements that he was indebted to Orphic or to Pythagorean doctrines cannot be seriously supported from the extant plays or fragments.

Of the 80 to 90 plays attributed to Æschylus, many of which can be grouped in trilogies or tetralogies, the majority are cited only by the lexicographers; little is known of their plots or the views contained in them, except in the case of the *Prometheus Solutus*. The *Danaids*, *Myrmidons*, and *Niobe* seem to have dealt with various aspects of the passion of love. Certain gnomic fragments (Nos. 70, 156, 159, 161, 177, 255, 266, 301, 353, 395, 401, 475, Sidgwick), which are striking aphorisms about the nature of the gods, good and evil, life and death, do not necessarily express the mind of the poet himself. His own moral and religious doctrines must be sought in (1) the general tendencies, (2) the choric odes, (3) the emphasized speeches of the favoured characters, in the seven extant plays. The selection of these, made apparently not later than the 5th cent. A.D., if not entirely accidental, may be due partly to celebrity and partly to special reasons. The *Oresteia* (*Agam.*, *Choëph.*, and *Eum.*) constitutes his masterpiece in all respects. The *Persae* and the *Septem contra Thebas* are cited by Aristophanes for their literary and patriotic qualities. The structure and style postulate an early date for the *Supplices*, though the theology is already remarkably mature; either of these features may have saved it. The *Prometheus Vinctus*, which might easily have aroused popular suspicions of impiety, appealed to the popular fancy for the marvellous in spectacle and narration. From these plays, after all allowances for the exigencies of dramatic form and popular taste, there emerges a body of gradually developed views attributable to Æschylus himself. His philosophy, in which the ethical cannot be sharply demarcated from the theological, may be discussed in the order of its development, as it deals with (1) the Divine nature, (2) the Divine agencies, (3) the moral nature and action of man, (4) the special questions of responsibility and heredity, the family curse, and the blood-feud, while (5) the nature of the problem dramatized in the *Prometheus* requires separate consideration.

1. In the earlier plays the Olympian gods are invoked jointly as a πανήγυρις (*Sept.* 220), or a κοινοβωμία (*Supp.* 222); they are θεοὶ ἐγχώριοι, γενέθλιοι, πολισσοῦχοι, ἀστικοί, ἀγώνιοι, with temples, altars, and images (βρέτη). The Theban maidens pray to Pallas, Poseidon, Ares, Cypris, Lyceius, Artemis, Hera, Apollo, and the local Pallas Onca (*Sept.* 126–180), as παναρκεῖς, τέλειοι, λυτήριοι, but also Διογενεῖς, under Zeus as the πατὴρ παντελής (116); Eteocles adds Earth and the Ἀρὰ Ἐρινύς of Œdipus (70). Popular language is used of augury, oracles, sacrifice, river-gods, and Hades (26, 379, 618, 269, 272, 854–860). But the same play finely describes Justice as the virgin daughter of Zeus (662); both the piety of Amphiaraus and the impiety of Polynices have moral elements; no δαίμων could involve Eteocles in ἄτη but for the ὕβρις of his determination to defend the gate attacked by his brother (677–708, 949–956). Similarly, in the *Supplices* the fugitives appeal to Artemis, Ares, Poseidon, Apollo, Hermes, and especially (*Supp.* 1034–1042) to Aphrodite, by whom Hypermnestra was perhaps defended (*Fr.* 44); also to Zeus as ξένιος, σωτήρ, αἰδοῖος, ἱκέσιος, κλάριος, κτήσιος, etc.; and to local deities, as the hero Apis (117, 263). With the ὕπαιοι θεοί are coupled the βαρύτιμοι χθόνιοι θῆκας κατέχοντες (24–25); if Artemis is deaf, the suppliants will turn 'to the Zeus of the earth below, the host of all those whose work is done, if we fail to reach the Olympian gods' (154–161). But the coarser side of the myth of Io seems to be treated sarcastically (291–315); it is tentatively moralized by the insistence on Zeus as the eventual deliverer and founder of a royal race (574–593). The chthonian Zeus, who 'judges the sins of men by final judgments among the dead' (230), is deliberately identified with the Zeus who is τέλειος, γαιάοχος, and παγκρατής (816), who is also the son of Earth (892) and allied with Themis (360). The slightest association of injustice with the gods is impiety (921; cf. 395); and everywhere the lyrics extol the power and righteousness of Zeus, with the fervour of Hebrew prophecy. He is 'king of kings, most perfect in strength of the powers that make perfect' (524–526); 'hospitable in the highest, he directs destiny by venerable enactment' (673); 'he beholds violent deeds not gladly, but with eyes of justice' (812); 'the beam of his balance is over all' (822); 'what is fated, that will be; there is no transgressing the mighty, the limitless will of Zeus' (1047–1049). This is not merely poetical optimism:

> 'The desire of Zeus is not made to be easily grasped. Everywhere it glows, even in the gloom, with fortune that is sombre to mortal races. . . . For dark and dusky wend the ways of his mind, unobservable by human gaze. He hurleth men to utter destruction from their towering hopes, though he array no force against them; deity does nothing with labour. What his spirit has once designed, he works out withal, from above, from his holy seat' (87–103).

Such theology is in essentials that of the *Oresteia*, though the more ethical conceptions are tentative and far from correlated.

The theology of the *Persae* (?472 B.C.) is dramatically Oriental. Zeus and Phoebus and the Sun are invoked; Pallas has favoured Athens. The ritual of the dead (οἱ φθιτοί, *Pers.* 219, 523, 607–622) is supplemented by appeals to Earth, Hermes, and Hades-Aïdoneus, who λαβεῖν ἀμείνονς εἰσὶν ἢ μεθιέναι (690), though Darius as a δαίμων or even θεός has a δυναστεία below. The repeated *ex parte* allegations of a Divine Nemesis or φθόνος, arbitrarily afflicting excessive wealth or happiness (163, 354, 373, 842), are akin to the fatalism of Herodotus's famous legends; and all the characters arraign a deity who deludes men to their ruin (ἀπάτη θεοῦ, 93, cf. *Fr.* 301; νόσος φρενῶν, 750; ἔψευσας φρενῶν, 472), or at least abets their folly (ἀλλ' ὅταν σκεύδῃ τις αὐτὸς, χὠ θεὸς συνάπτεται, 742). But both Darius and the Persian elders charge Xerxes with provocative ὕβρις in binding the sacred Hellespont (745, 72), and in destroying images and temples (807–815, 830), and blame him rather than the alleged

δαίμων (924 *v.* 910, 933). It is insolence (ὕβρις) which 'flowers and is full in the ear with ruin (ἄτη), from which it reaps a harvest of lamentation' (821). Cyrus was right-minded and so was not afflicted (*θεὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἤχθηρεν, ὡς εὔφρων ἔφυ*, 722). Athens survives as the higher civilization.

So far the moralization of Homeric or popular theology has not been violent. In the *Oresteia* there is a marked advance in boldness of expression: 'le polythéisme subsiste, mais épuré, moralisé, presque purgé d'anthropomorphisme' (E. de Faye, p. 34). The allusions to Uranus and Kronos (*Ag.* 167–172, 640) possibly indicate development in the Universe; the chthonian cults of Earth, Night, the Dead and their agents (*Cho.* 399; *Eum.* 115, 321) are subordinated to the conception of deity as moral and rational. Sacrifices and ceremonies of purification are little in comparison with the observance of justice and self-restraint. Venerable legends of conflicting divinities are even re-written (*Eum.* 1–19). Of the Olympians, Apollo as the giver of oracles and ἐξηγητής of rites, and Athene as the inspirer of political wisdom, retain some genuine personality with impaired divinity; perhaps Hermes also and Artemis, for whose interference with the winds at Aulis Æschylus attempts to provide a decent motive (*Ag.* 134–155). Zeus is too great for the stage, even in the Prometheus plays. Theology is to be sought not in mythology, but in history (*πάρεστι τοῦτό γ' ἐξιχνεῦσαι, Ag.* 368), and in conscience (*μνησιπήμων πόνος, Ag.* 180; cf. 975–983). The supreme deity is not only all-powerful but all-just; thus Electra craves for Orestes the support of 'Strength and Justice with him who is the third (*i.e.* Ζεὺς σωτήρ), Zeus the greatest of all' (*Cho.* 244). To Zeus are applied not the old departmental names, but such epithets as πανόπτης, παγκρατής, πάντα κραίνων, παναίτιος, and δικηφόρος. There is surely more than an 'illusion du monothéisme' in the first theological passage of the *Agamemnon* (160–178):

> 'Zeus, whoe'er he be, if by this name 'tis his pleasure to be called, this name I address to him. Weighing all things well, I can conjecture nought but Zeus, if the burden of this vanity is in truth to be cast off from my mind. . . . But whoso heartily giveth titles of victory to Zeus shall hit the mark of wisdom full; even to Zeus, who hath guided mortals in the ways of wisdom, who hath established "learning by suffering" as an ordinance for ever.'

To those only who have learnt on these lines to know and do justice, 'Zeus the all-seeing and Fate (Μοῖρα) have condescended' (*Eum.* 1046).

Thus, in harmony with the conception of deity as normally personal, there emerges the conception, increasingly impersonal, of universal order. As physical law this is Μοῖρα, *τὸ μόρσιμον, τὸ πεπρωμένον, ἡ πεπρωμένη, αἶσα, ἀνάγκη*; as moral law it is *θέμις, δίκη, νόμος θεῶν*; but these terms admit of many degrees of personification, and not only overlap, but not uncommonly involve the *circulus in definiendo* to which idealistic systems are liable. The statement that Zeus is weaker than the Μοῖραι and Ἐρινύες (*Prom.* 515–518) is isolated and controversial; generally the established order is the expression not so much of the will of God as of His being. God is subject only to the law of His own nature as consistent and just. He *cannot* be on the side of evil (*κρατεῖται δέ πως τὸ θεῖον τὸ μὴ δύσεργεῖν κακοῖς, Cho.* 957); He must be partial (ἑτερορρεπής) *morally* either way (*νέμων εἰκότως ἄδικα μὲν κακοῖς, δίκαια δ' ἐννόμοις, Supp.* 403). The working of this supreme authority is described in many combinations of terms, personally and impersonally. When in defiance of Right (Θέμις) men trample on the majesty of Zeus (*Διὸς σέβας*), then 'Justice sets up her anvil and Destiny forges the sword' (*προχαλκεύει δ' Αἶσα φασγανουργόν, Cho.* 641–647). 'For each fresh deed of injury, justice is whetted by Fate (Μοῖρα) upon a fresh whetstone' (*Ag.* 1535, 1536). The *μεγάλαι* Μοῖραι are besought (*Cho.* 306–314) 'to grant success from Zeus to that cause to which Justice (*τὸ δίκαιον*) has gone over. For words of hate let words of hate be rendered; so Justice proclaims aloud as she exacts her due. For a bloody stroke let him repay a bloody stroke. That "the doers must suffer," there speaks a saying thrice ancient.' Even Clytæmnestra's 'thoughtfulness not overcome by sleep shall order justly everything that has been foreordained with Divine sanction' (*δικαίως σὺν θεοῖς εἱμαρμένα, Ag.* 912). Themis the Titaness and the *παλαιγενεῖς* Μοῖραι administer the *νόμος θεῶν* (*Eum.* 171) no less than Justice, the daughter of Zeus.

2. The determinations of this supreme authority are intimated to man not only in history and in conscience, but by direct agencies. Positively, Æschylus attaches importance to dreams; the visions of Atossa, Io, and Clytæmnestra reflect popular beliefs. 'For the mind in sleep is bright in its vision, though in daytime Fate is undiscernible by mortals' (*Eum.* 104). His attitude towards oracles is ambiguous. There seems to be some *arrière-pensée* in his treatment of the relations between Apollo and Orestes; Athens and not Delphi has the final word in the termination of the blood-guilt of the house of Atreus.* Negatively, the Erinyes are all-important. The meaning of the word fluctuates considerably in the extant plays, and evidently has a long history behind it. It is hardly likely that Æschylus himself first identified the Avengers of the underworld with the Benign or Venerable earth-goddesses of Athens and Sicyon (Εὐμενίδες or Σεμναί); but he certainly accentuated both factors of this conflation,† and, while first investing the Furies with the archaic horrors of Gorgons, etc. (Paus. i. 28, 6), was also conscious of a development from objective to subjective associations, from punishment as retributive to punishment as remedial. The Ἐρινύς is the activity of Divine justice in the presence of lawlessness. Zeus is a constant *θεωρός* (*Cho.* 246); even for birds robbed of their young, 'a god on high, some Apollo or Pan or Zeus, hears the shrill complaint of his denizens; and sooner or later sends on the transgressors a Fury of requital' (*Ag.* 55–59). Much less for Paris's breach of the laws of hospitality will Zeus shoot an arrow in vain, either short of the mark or too high in heaven (*Ag.* 365). 'One said that the gods do not deign to trouble about men by whom the honour of sacred things (*χάρις ἀθίκτων*) is trampled on; but he was not pious' (*Ag.* 372). Helen herself becomes for the house of Priam 'by the sending of Zeus, the lord of hospitality, a Fury of weeping to other brides' (*Ag.* 749). The Erinyes apply the laws of retributive and educational suffering. 'We deem ourselves,' sings their chorus (*Eum.* 312–320), 'to be direct in the course of justice. On the man who holds out pure hands, there comes no wrath from us; unscathed he traverses the way of life. But if one in guilt, like this man, hides his gory hands, we appear as honest witnesses for the dead, and visibly to the uttermost exact from him the price of blood.' Again, 'Great power have the awful Erinyes both with the gods immortal and with those below the earth; and in their dealings with men they fully and visibly bring things to pass, to some giving songs of joy, but to others a life blurred by tears' (950–955). As the play draws to a close, they serve to link Μοῖρα and Δίκη; and in their final metamorphosis there is as much conscious symbolism as the dramatic form permits.

3. If, then, innocence is rewarded and guilt punished, at any rate, in the long run (*Ag.* 750–771; *Eum.* 526–565), human morality must be based on

* See U. von Wilamowitz-Möllendorf's Introduction to the *Choëphoroi*, 1896.

† See Harrison and Verrall, *Mythology and Monuments of Ancient Athens*, pp. 558–564, and Haigh, pp. 120, 121

universal law as applied to the life of the family and the city. By Æschylus, as by Dante, types of good and bad character are exhibited rather than analyzed. The dignity of individuality is drawn on a grand scale even in the case of Clytæmnestra, without casuistry or sophistry. There is the same note of distinction about the characters which are presented for admiration, the king of Argos, Eteocles as patriot, Orestes, Electra, and, above all, Prometheus. The whole range of Greek piety is displayed in the choruses of the Oceanids, Danaids, captive women, Persian and Argive elders. The fine series of contrasts in the *Septem* shows the poet's concurrence in the normal Greek ideas of *αἰδώς*, *αἰσχύνη*, *σωφροσύνη*, and *εὐσέβεια*; also in the connexion of morality with religion. He does not absolutely avoid the popular language which makes *ἁμαρτία* a disease of the intellect (*νόσος φρενῶν*, *Pers.* 751; *σὺν φοίτῳ φρενῶν*, *Sept.* 661; *παραφορὰ φρενοδαλής*, *Eum.* 330; *ἀποσφαλεὶς φρενῶν*, *Prom.* 473); but in his own view passion at least is bestial in character and originates where there is no law. The lustful 'have the tempers of random and unholy brutes' (*Supp.* 762); and 'the inordinate love which masters the female mind *both in brutes and in men* wins a perverse victory over the fellowship of wedlock,' and involves calamities (*Cho.* 598–601). Generally sin is *ὕβρις*, immorality *plus* impiety, as the wilful transgression (*παραβασία*) of the fixed limits of human action. It is *ἄνομον* and *μάταιον*, and its fruit is *ἄτη*, the criminal infatuation which is its own punishment. *Ατη* is *δόλιος*, *μελανόζυξ*, *ὑστερόποινος*; the moment of its supervention may be inevitable, but it is neither less nor more voluntary than happiness as the reward of virtue (*Eum.* 532–537). Moral pathology has never been more convincingly expounded than in the *locus classicus* on *ὕβρις* (*Ag.* 750–771):—

'An ancient saying has been fashioned in the generations of old, that a man's prosperity, when it has waxed great, brings forth and does not die without issue, but that out of good fortune springs up for the family an insatiate misery. But I hold my own mind apart from the rest on this. 'Tis the impious deed that gives birth to more after it, more, and like to their own breed; but the fate of righteous houses has ever a fair progeny. But old insolence is wont to beget an insolence with the vigour of youth in mortal ills, this day or that, when the time of birth has come due, yea and a fiend, against whom there is no battle, no war, unholy boldness; and these are the black banes (*ἀραί*) unto mansions, and like are they to their progenitors.'

Nor has the moral ever been drawn more relentlessly than by him:—

'Reverence the altar of Justice, nor trample it down at the sight of gain with godless foot; for retribution will ensue. The right issue abides in force. Wherefore let a man put in the place of honour, piety towards parents, and pay reverence to the claims of strangers to hospitality. He who is just of his own will without constraint, will not be unprosperous; utterly ruined he will never be. But I say that the transgressor who dares to offend, and is laden with goods all amassed without justice, shall perforce in time haul down his mainsail, when trouble seizes him and his yardarm is splintered. And he calls on those who hear him not and struggles in the midst of the swirl; but the god mocks at the hot-headed man, seeing him who boasted he should never be powerless now in helpless woes nor able to weather the point. And so, for ever wrecking his former prosperity on the reef of justice, he perishes unwept, unseen' (*Eum.* 539–565).

A religious moralist is sure to emphasize the inevitableness of *ἄτη* (*e.g. Ag.* 1566; *Cho.* 1076), but there are careful *caveats* against fatalism:—

'Instruct my son plausibly,' says Darius, 'warned from heaven as he has been to be wise in time, that he leave off from offending against God in overboastful boldness' (*Pers.* 831).

The murderers of the house of Atreus are even freer agents than the avengers. But if there has been no repentance and no purification, vengeance pursues the sinner even to the world below:—

'For this office has piercing Fate allotted to us to hold for ever, that all mortals to whom befall wanton deeds of blood, we should attend, until the guilty pass beneath the earth; but even in death he is not over free' (*Eum.* 334–340).

Æschylus's allusions to life after death are marked by a reserve unusual in poetical descriptions of Hades; as to continued consciousness he is perhaps consistent (*Cho.* 517); but he recognizes the possibilities of prolonged retribution and of remorseful memory, such as that indicated in Clytæmnestra's terrible sarcasm about Iphigenia's reception of her father (*Ag.* 1555–1559). Apart from the functions of an Alastor (*Supp.* 416) or an Erinys (*Eum.* 267), there may be a judgment in Hades by a presiding deity (*Supp.* 228–231). The ghost of Orestes will punish or reward his countrymen according as they deal with Athens (*Eum.* 767–777). The curses of the slain subsist by the survival of their personalities (*ἴδεσθε πολυκρατεῖς ἀραὶ τεθυμένων*, *Cho.* 406); the Erinyes themselves are called *Ἀραί* in the underworld (*Eum.* 417).*

4. But the more vividly sin is pictured as prolific and its effects as incalculable, the more difficulty there is in escaping from fatalistic theories, such as those implied in the popular ideas of the ancestral curse and the *jus talionis* developing into a blood feud. These subjects specially fascinated the mind of Æschylus. In the *Supplices* there is a simple warning of the danger of starting a curse: 'For your children and your house, in whichever way you determine, it remains to pay in full a corresponding penalty' (433–436); and in the sequel there was some purification from blood-guilt. In the *Septem* the children of Œdipus are involved in a curse not clearly defined as invoked or inherited by him (832–833), nor always alluded to in the same way (for the various phrases see *Sept.* 70, 654, 695, 709, 720–726, 887, 977–979). The curses (*ἀραί*, *κατεύγματα*) produce in the *γένος* a criminal propensity (*ἄτη*), sometimes personified as an evil spirit (*δαίμων*, *ἐρινύς*, *ἀλάστωρ*, even *μοῖρα* or *κήρ*) hounding it to destruction and infectious by its *ὁμιλία κακή*: 'the field of criminal folly produces a harvest of death' (*Sept.* 601). The chorus, indeed, makes Eteocles a responsible agent on account of his savage desire to shed unlawful blood (*αἵματος οὐ θεμιστοῦ*, 689–694), but to the question *τίς ἂν καθαρμοὺς πόροι*, the poet has not yet found his solution: *οὐκ ἔστι γῆρας τοῦδε τοῦ μιάσματος* (682), unless one is indicated in the self-sacrifice of Antigone. But ten years later the double problem of hereditary criminality and blood-guiltiness is treated in the *Oresteia* with a breadth of design which is not only poetic but 'prophetic.' There is little reason to suppose that early tragedy was necessarily written in trilogies, but the scheme is admirably suited to Æschylus's exposition of the origin, transmission, and extinction of a *πρώταρχος ἄτη* (*Ag.* 1192). The principal terms, *ἀρά*, *ἐρινύς*, *ἄτη*, are developing specific meanings; beside them are vaguer phrases (*μῆνις*, *Ag.* 155; *μύσος*, *Eum.* 378; *ἄγος*, *Cho.* 155; *παρακοπή*, *Ag.* 218; *πῆμα*, *Ag.* 346; *ποινή*, *Cho.* 947, etc.). The phenomena are best stated in *Cho.* 400–405: 'Law it is that drops of gore spilt upon the ground demand the shedding of other blood. For Havoc cries on the avenging Fury, who brings up from those slain before calamity (*ἄτην*) to attend upon calamity'; and then 'who will expel from the house the breed of the curse?' *κεκόλληται γένος πρὸς ἀρᾷ* (*Ag.* 1566). The story of the house of Pelops is not laboured; but a sufficient number of points—the adultery of Thyestes, Atreus's horrid revenge, the sacrifice of Iphigenia—lead up to the murder of Agamemnon. At each point the chain might have been broken, but each link is fresh riveted: 'Where will the force of this *Ἄτη* make an end? where will it cease and be lulled to rest?' (*Cho.* 1075). Has the curse acquired a personality as the *τριπάχυντος δαίμων γέννης* (*Ag.* 1476), demanding new blood before the old is dry, or as the *παλαιὸς δριμὺς ἀλάστωρ* (*Ag.* 1501), masquerading as the murderous adulteress, and yet all

* If the Areopagus is really the Hill not of Ares but of the Arae (Harrison and Verrall, p. 563), the Erinyes as well as the Eumenides have their ancient home in its chasms.

along the instrument of justice? (*Cho.* 641). Yet among the consequences may come a deed which, though terrible, is really innocent, an ἀνεπίμομφος ἄτη (*Cho.* 830); and the chorus of elders, even while declaring that the house is 'fast-bound,' grasps the truth that saves the morality of the situation. All retribution is and must be *deserved*; 'The robber is robbed, the murderer makes payment in full. There abides, while Zeus abides on his throne, the rule that the doer must suffer; this is the eternal law' (*Ag.* 1562–1564). The curse, then, is not an overwhelming fatality, but a hereditary predisposition which may be worked out in the race and even in the individual. The original transgressor was free to sin, and his descendant is free to adopt the prescribed means of purification. The actual development of this theme in connexion with the traditional obligation of the blood-feud is perhaps confused by a political motive; and the special pleading in the *Eumenides* about the nature of kinship is certainly frigid, as also the insistence on legal forms (*ἀνάκρισις, μαρτυρία, σύνδικοι*). The idea of blood for blood was so deeply rooted in popular sentiment and religious institutions, that Æschylus, no less than the legislators of his time, may have been puzzled to discriminate degrees of guilt, except by instinct. If the law is simply *τοὺς κτανόντας ἀντικατθανεῖν* (*Cho.* 144), Clytæmnestra may be allowed to swear that she sacrificed her husband to the Δίκη, Ἄτη, and Ἐρινύς of their daughter (*Ag.* 1433). If not, how can Orestes ever say that his mother's blood 'sleeps and is fading away from his hand, and the pollution is being washed out'? (*Eum.* 280). No libations are of any use (*Cho.* 521), especially if the blood is *κοινόν* (*Cho.* 1038); the spirit of the dead is not tamed by the funeral fires, *φλογὶ δ' ὕστερον ὀργάς* (*Cho.* 326); and the feud would go on for ever, or till the family became extinct. In Æschylus's solution of the problem there are really two stages, of which the latter is the more important. Orestes can plead innocence because he acts under the 'interpretation' (*ὁ μάντις ἐξηγεῖτό σοι ματροκτονεῖν, Eum.* 595) and even threats (*Cho.* 283–298) of Apollo-Loxias, and is ready to perform the ritual purifications (*Cho.* 1059); and the Delphic oracle had since the 8th century really exercised an ethical and educational influence in Greece. On the other hand, Æschylus felt that neither the payment of blood-money nor the performance of ritual can quiet the conscience or carry civilization very far. It is perhaps too much to say that Apollo is 'kein guter Gott'; but the ultimate and really moral solution is to be found in the judicial decision of Athene on the divided vote of the Areopagus, which she herself represents as the victory of the *vox populi* regarded as the *vox Dei*; *ἀλλ' ἐκράτησε Ζεὺς ἀγοραῖος* (*Eum.* 978). The *Oresteia*, then, is certainly a 'tendency' poem to this extent, that it expresses a view in the moral and religious speculations of the age as to heredity and responsibility, though it is not merely didactic on any particular question of justice or equity.*

5. In the *Oresteia* the final reconciliation is provided by the gods; in the *Prometheus* they sustain the whole drama. Except in a few details attributable to a re-reading of his *Supplices*, the surviving play of the set (probably *two* tragedies with a satyric play) is totally opposed to Æschylus's theology in all its stages. Prometheus, son of Themis or Earth (212), secured Zeus's triumph over the older dynasty (221), but is now tortured for having saved the human race by the gift of fire, the chief instrument of civilization, of augury and medicine, and of other means of providing for the future, and of Hope as the mainspring of effort (249–256, 442–506). All who visit the victim, whether as Zeus's agents—Strength, Hephaestus, and Hermes—or as sympathizers—the Oceanids, Oceanus, and Io—have suffered more or less in person or in character from Zeus, who is a *νέος τύραννος*, governing gods and men arbitrarily (*παρ' ἑαυτῷ*, 189; *ἰδίοις νόμοις*, 404), unjustly (*ἀθέτως*, 150; *πέρα δίκης*, 30), and odiously (975). But Prometheus, by virtue of his parentage, knows a secret; if Zeus contracts a certain marriage,* his son will be greater than the sire (768, 907–927); in this respect Zeus is weaker than the Fates and Erinyes (515–520). The fragments of the *Solutus* indicate close parallelism in form and episodes to the *Vinctus*; in the solution Zeus and Prometheus meet one another half-way in a reconciliation, of which the agents are Heracles and Chiron the Centaur (cf. *Prom. Vinct.* 188–194, 1026–1029). Now this conception of a Zeus, inferior both in righteousness and in power, is out of all relation to the *Supplices* and the *Oresteia* alike, and no theory of the poet's meaning can be accepted which minimizes this fact. Apart from purely fanciful explanations of the plays as political or scientific allegory, two views have been very commonly held.

(*a*) A tragedian was at liberty to develop his dramatic situations freely, provided he kept to the main lines of some recognized myth. Æschylus found Hesiod's story of Prometheus suitable for the exhibition of character as affected by injustice, and susceptible of brilliant episodes about geography, anthropology, etc. This view, as developed by (*e.g.*) Patin and Paley, may be called the literary explanation. Wecklein's theory, that Zeus is in the right and Prometheus violent and shortsighted, but a tragic hero by virtue of a certain dignity of character, like Milton's Satan, comes under the same head. But no such theory really explains the boldness of the idea, the conflation of myths, or the intensity of the passion with which the hero is supported.

Accordingly, (*b*) most modern scholars, including E. de Faye, regard Æschylus as deliberately inculcating the position that even the supreme personal authority in the Universe is itself subject to the eternal laws (Μοῖραι) which constitute the ultimate necessity (Ἀνάγκη). Prometheus, the mythical representative of these forces, is, then, really in the right, and Zeus is in the wrong with him and with Io; but Zeus's submission is effected by the educational value of time (*ἀλλ' ἐκδιδάσκει πάνθ' ὁ γηράσκων χρόνος*, 981); and Prometheus, too, can yield without loss of dignity to an improved Zeus. This view gives an adequate meaning to the play as a whole, but it seems to lay undue stress on lines occurring in mere dialogue and not specially emphasized, and also to ignore the human personality of the protagonist. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine the author of the *Oresteia* and its epithets for Zeus acquiescing even temporarily in the idea of such development in the godhead.

Those, therefore (*c*), who hold the view first enunciated by a brother poet, Shelley, that Prometheus stands for Man, anxious to be moral and religious as well as rational, but convinced that he is the victim of forces incompletely understood, of the *de facto* supremacy of 'Nature,' prefer to trace in this drama the Greek parallel to the Book of Job. Æschylus was too great a poet to be a mere allegorist; but when his mind was occupied with *the problem of undeserved evil*, he found in the arch-allegorizer Hesiod that the origin of evil was the gift of fire and the creation of woman by Prometheus. He selected with a free hand from

* This view of the *Eumenides* seems less liable to objections than that which makes the Furies represent law, Apollo and Zeus equity, and Athene mercy, in a special question of moral casuistry. For that view see Haigh, p. 119.

* This is a marked instance of Æschylus's syncretism; the story of Peleus and Thetis has even less connexion than Io with the myth of Prometheus, which was apparently an ætiological explanation of certain fire ceremonies.

this and other myths the more dramatic parts of the symbolism. The mention of Heracles may have suggested the insertion of his ancestress Io, the passive as a foil to the actively-resisting victim. The anthropology and geography are not episodical if they bring out the dignity of human reason and the universality of human suffering. The heroic sympathy of the Oceanids illustrates the value of simple and instinctive morality. The philosophical answer seems to be indicated in the words *αὐθαδία*, repeated at every point of the play (see 64, 79, 436, 907, 964, 1012, 1034–1038), and *εὐβουλία*, the special quality of Themis, set in antithesis to it in the last lines of the dialogue. In the two recitative passages assigned to the hero in the Exodos, the boast *πάντως ἐμέ γ' οὐ θανατώσει* (1053) must have special significance as balancing the protest *ἐσορᾷς μ' ὡς ἐκδίκα πάσχω*. But it is likely enough that the solution of the problem, like the conclusion of the Book of Job, was too formal a compromise to be altogether satisfactory; and that may be the reason why it has perished. The whole tendency of Æschylus's mind is so strongly optimistic in theology, that it would right itself naturally after a reactionary period of what is *pessimism* rather than *scepticism*, however dramatically intensified.

Æschylus's originality as a thinker consists, then, in his attempts to moralize the traditional beliefs, embodied in myths and institutions, by the light of certain religious presuppositions and certain moral convictions which have been illustrated above. In his main ideas there is little variation, except in their poetical expression; in the detailed application of them his language fluctuates too much to admit of exact and consistent analysis. His doctrines left hardly any mark, though his dramas continued to be popular for their antique simplicity and dignity; even Aristophanes's vindication of his literary merit against the criticism of the next generation takes lower ground than it might. Neither the piety of Sophocles nor the impiety of Euripides felt the force of his protest against a fatalistic theory of morals. In philosophy, intellect and state-law took the place of conscience and Divine law so completely, that Plato could employ the myth of Prometheus without reference to a treatment of the subject which the modern world has long considered one of the most sublime efforts of poetic genius.

LITERATURE.—Besides the introductions to editions of Æschylus, sections on him are to be found in all the general works on Greek literature or theology. The most useful summary in English is A. E. Haigh's *Tragic Drama of the Greeks*, ch. ii. (1896). Of the innumerable essays on Æschylus those by J. A. Symonds (*The Greek Poets*, 2nd series) and E. Myers (*Hellenica*) are best known. Of older books the most frequently referred to are K. O. Müller's *Dissertations on the Eumenides* (Eng. tr. revised, 1853), F. Welcker's *Griech. Götterlehre* (1857), and K. F. Nägelsbach's *Nachhomerische Theologie* (1857). The principal monographs are Klausen's *Theologumena Æschyli* (1829); G. Dronke's *Religiöse und sittliche Vorstellungen des Æschylos* (*und Sophocles*) (1861); E. Buchholz's *Sittliche Weltanschauung des* (*Pindaros und*) *Æschylos* (1869); and E. de Faye's *Étude sur les Idées religieuses et morales d'Eschyle* (1884).

HERBERT E. D. BLAKISTON.

ÆSTHETICISM (*αἴσθησις*, 'sense perception'). —The theory of life which fails to distinguish moral from æsthetic values, or subordinates the moral to the æsthetic. Ordinarily the term is not used as a distinctive title for specific theories, but as denoting a tendency of theories otherwise named. Three usages of the term may be conveniently distinguished:

1. Æstheticism may denote *the identification of moral goodness with beauty*, such as is suggested in the common Greek phrase 'beautiful and good.' Morality and art may be looked upon as the realization of a common principle, that of order or harmony. The good man, like the musician to whom Aristotle is fond of comparing him, is the man who can introduce harmony into his subject, who can maintain that balance and symmetry of parts essential to the highest music, whether of conduct or of sound. The musician works with a different material from the good man, but their purpose and principle are the same, the good life is a work of art. And the impulse toward creation may also be the same. The artist works from love of the beautiful, from an instinctive passion for the beautiful itself. He recognizes no compulsion in his work, for he has no other desire than to create. So, too, the moral man creates from love of the good, from his instinctive desire to realize a complete and perfect life. Morality does not come to him in the form of a law constraining him to walk contrary to his nature. The good life is the life which realizes all the possibilities of man, the most completely human life. The good man is beauty realized in flesh and blood and action rather than in stone, but he is beautiful none the less.

That æstheticism in this sense characterized the Greek view of life is to a certain extent true, but not unreservedly so. It is true that the Greeks did not work out a clear distinction between the beautiful and the good. Aristotle (*Metaph.* xiii. 3) notes that the term 'good' is limited to certain actions, whereas beauty pertains also to that which is unmoved, but he gives no more exact *differentia*. Yet it is far from true that the Greeks altogether ignored the more severe, dualistic aspect of the moral life. To Plato, certainly, moral development is not a mere unfolding of the life of instinct, but the acquiring of a rational control over desires. The good is a reality recognized by reason, and independent of the individual's appreciation of it. As such an independent reality it stands over against the individual as the law of his action, demanding realization in his life. The moral life shows struggle and discord rather than the calm unity of a work of art. But this difference fails to find adequate expression in Greek theory, and as a consequence the fields of ethics and æsthetics remain confused. Were one to characterize this condition, it would perhaps be truer to say, not that their moral theory is æsthetic, but that their æsthetics is moralistic.

This confusion of the two fields is continued in the English Moral Sense School, which inherits the Platonic tradition, but in these later writers the Utilitarian principle is beginning to supplement the more æsthetic aspect. This is partially true of Shaftesbury, but more completely so of Hutcheson and Hume.

2. Æstheticism may also be used to denote the theory that *all ultimate values are æsthetic*, moral good being a means towards an ultimate æsthetic good. Under this conception the moral life is not itself beautiful, but it exists for the sake of æsthetic enjoyment. Morality, with its sense of obligation, is a result of mal-adjustment, in consequence of which we are compelled to do much which we do not value for its own sake, but as the necessary means towards an enjoyment which itself has no further use.

This conception finds literary expression in the writings of Mr. Walter Pater, in which the end of life is stated as richness of experience. This richness of experience is best realized in the life of æsthetic enjoyment.

3. Æstheticism also denotes *the divorce of art and morals*, usually implied in the popular use of the phrase 'art for art's sake.' Beauty is held to be independent of goodness, the technical aspect of a work of art being emphasized at the expense of its human significance. Art thus becomes a kind of higher morality, free from the objective laws which hold in the lower. The immoral may thus enter into the beautiful on the ground of its immediate value for perception.

LITERATURE.—Zeller, *Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics* (1897), ii. ch. xv.; Muirhead, *Chapters from Aristotle's Ethics* (1900), ch. v. § 5; Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*[2] (1886), i. bk. i. branch 1; Santayana, *Sense of Beauty* (1896), pt. 1; Pater, *The Renaissance* (1873), conclusion, also *Marius the Epicurean* (1885); Shaftesbury, *Characteristics* (1711); Bosanquet, *History of Æsthetic* (new ed. 1900), ch. iv.

NORMAN WILDE.

ÆSTHETICS.—Æsthetics is the philosophical study of beauty regarded in itself and in its application to art and nature. (1) *Meaning of the word.*—Considered solely from the etymological point of view (*αἰσθησις*, *αἰσθάνομαι*, to perceive by the senses), the word means the study of sense-per-

ceptions. Kant remains faithful to this etymological acceptation when he applies the name of 'Transcendental Æsthetics' to the chapter of his *Critique* in which he discusses the sense-perceptions Time and Space. Baumgarten was the first to use the word 'Æsthetics' for the science of the beautiful; and the change that has taken place in the history of the term may be understood when it is recollected that, according to Baumgarten, the beautiful exists in the obscure regions of the lower consciousness, that it belongs to the rank of sensations, and is opposed to the 'clear thinking' of the intellect. To-day the term 'Æsthetics' has lost this connexion with *sensation*, and denotes in general the philosophy of the beautiful.

(2) *Place of Æsthetics in philosophy.*—The philosophy of the beautiful is bound up with and forms an integral part of a general system of philosophy. But Æsthetics is one thing in Plotinus or Thomas Aquinas, and quite another in Kant or Taine, because the philosophical systems of these scholars are so widely divergent. In the opinion of the present writer, Æsthetics is a mixed science, borrowing its principles from both metaphysics and psychology; so that (see art. BEAUTY) it includes two classes of questions, the one class bearing on the *subjective* feeling that beauty produces in the person affected by its charm, and the other relating to the *qualities of the things* to which we ascribe beauty.

(3) *History.*—Ancient writers devoted special attention to the objective side of beauty. Plato and Aristotle consider the beautiful as identical with order and proportion; Plotinus and the Neo-Platonic school make it an attribute of everything that exists *as such*. The Middle Ages changed the aspect of the doctrine of Æsthetics. While sharing largely in the *objective* theories of the beautiful, they supplemented them by a study of impression or *æsthetic pleasure*. Modern philosophy, on the contrary, takes its stand almost exclusively on the psychological side of beauty, and regards it as a purely *subjective* phenomenon. With Kant, for instance, beauty does not belong to the object itself, but only to our perception of it. Contemporary Æsthetics perpetuates and emphasizes these ultra-subjective tendencies.

LITERATURE.—See under BEAUTY.

MAURICE DE WULF.

ÆTHER.—Derived from a root signifying *to burn*, Æther is a term appropriated in Greek literature to the blue vault of the upper firmament, as contrasted with *aër*, which is applied to mist and vapour. In Homer æther is the abode of Zeus (*Il.* ii. 412, etc.). In Hesiod (*Theog.* 124) Æther and Day are the offspring of Night, and in at least one of the Orphic cosmologies, Æther, as representing light or fire, is contrasted with Chaos, and proceeds from Kronos (see Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, Eng. tr. 1901, i. 92f.). Pherecydes, who occupies the borderland between the mythical and the scientific, traces the origin of all things to Zeus, Earth, and Kronos, and identifies the first of these with æther (Diels, *Vorsokratiker*, p. 508, No. 71, A 9).

The current conception of æther passed into the keeping of the philosophers, by whom it was variously defined and modified. In the Fragments of Parmenides æther is found as the region of the fixed stars (*Fr.* 10. 1, Diels), and as the fiery element of which their substance is composed (*Fr.* 11. 2, Diels); and although Aëtius indicates a distinction between æther as the outermost covering of the universe and the subjacent fiery heaven, we cannot attach much weight to his authority (ii. 7. 1; cf. ii. 15. 7, and see Krische, *Forschungen*, pp. 114, 115). Empedocles treats æther as a synonym of aër, except in one doubtful passage (*Fr.* 38. 4, Diels). On the other hand, Anaxagoras regarded aër and æther as the two primary differentiations of being—the cold and dark contrasted with the bright and warm (*Fr.* 1. 2, Diels). Indeed, we are informed that he employed æther as synonymous with fire (A 73, Diels). In the formation of the world, the dense, wet, cold, and dark sank into the centre, while the rare, hot, and dry went to join the enveloping æther (*Fr.* 15, Diels). From Anaxagoras it is convenient to pass to Euripides, who is said to have been largely influenced by his teaching (Diod. i. 7. 7.). There are various references to æther in Euripides, which may be the reflexion either of popular fancies or of current science, or of both. Thus the identification of Zeus with æther carries us back to Pherecydes, and anticipates the pantheism of the Stoa (*Fr.* 935; cf. Æsch. *Fr.* 65*a*). The conception of Æther as the husband of Earth, quickening all things into life by his fertilizing showers, is the common property of many poets and philosophers (Eur. *Frs.* 488, 836; and see Munro on Lucr. i. 250). Similar to this is the notion that the vital breath is derived from æther, and that the soul, retaining its consciousness after death, is absorbed in the source from which it sprang (*Hel.* 1014; *Suppl.* 531; cf. Lucr. v. 318). Though it has often been supposed that Euripides was here borrowing from Anaxagoras, it is noteworthy that the same thought is found in the inscription over those who fell at Potidæa (*CIA* i. 442), and may well be due, as has been recently suggested (*ClR* xv. 431), to a popular belief which arose in connexion with the practice of cremation. The soul of the dead man was thought to ascend with the smoke which rose from the burning corpse.

By the side of the four elements generally recognized in philosophy, from the time of Empedocles onwards,—fire, air, water, and earth,—æther ultimately came to be admitted as a fifth; but it is still open to question whether this view was derived by the Platonic school from the Pythagoreans (Zeller, *Pre-Socratics*, vol. i. p. 318, n.). Plato, in the *Timæus*, does not adopt this position (58 D); and though there is strong evidence that it formed part of his oral doctrine (Xenocrates, *ap.* Simplic. *Physic.* 268*a*), and it is accepted by the author of the *Epinomis* (981C), its definite establishment is generally connected with the name of Aristotle, from whose statement of the theory through the scholastic *quinta essentia* is derived our word *quintessence*. Eternal and immutable, providing the substance of the heavenly spheres and stars, ceaselessly rotating round the world, but transcending the strife of the terrestrial elements (*de Caelo*, i. 2. 269*a* 30. i. 3. 270*a* 13, *b* 1), æther was at once material and divine. The Stoics took a further step by identifying the substance of æther with God. It is described as fiery breath or creative fire, the rarest and most subtle of all bodies (Chrysipp. *ap.* Ar. Did. *Fr.* 31, Diels), which produces out of itself the phenomenal world, passing through the medium of the elements. The universe, subject to a law of ceaseless flux and reflux, moves either in creative progress or towards periodic conflagration. When everything is consumed by fire, the world-soul and the world are united in the single essence of æther (Chrysipp. *ap.* Plut. *Comm. Not.* 36). But when, by the equipoise of its constituent forces, the created world is in existence, the ruling power resides in the outermost periphery of æther (Diog. Laert. vii. 139; Ar. Did. *Fr.* 29, Diels). Then, as the world-soul, it permeates every part of the universe, and is the immanent cause of all individual existence (Diog. Laert. vii. 138). Thus may be justified the summary assertion of Chrysippus, that æther is everything, being at once father and son (Philodem. *de Piet.* c. 13, p. 80. 26 G).

A. C. PEARSON.

ÆTIOLOGY (*αἰτιολογία*). — The doctrine of causes. The latter part of the *Categories* of Aristotle (chs. 10–15), early suspected, but possibly compiled from Aristotelian fragments (Zeller's *Aristotle*, Eng. tr. vol. i. p. 66), contains the *Post-prædicamenta* which give the clue to the subsequent position and treatment of ætiology. In the treatises on *Metaphysics* which are based on the scholastic philosophy, 'General Metaphysics' is distinguished from 'Special Metaphysics,' notwithstanding the difference of standpoint, precisely as 'General Philosophy' is distinguished from 'Special Philosophy' by H. Spencer (*First Principles*, § 38). General metaphysics treats of—(1) Being and its properties; (2) the highest kinds of beings, *i.e.* the categories; (3) the relations of beings to each other. The third head embraces the same subject as the *Post-prædicamenta*, the whole division being foreshadowed by the *Ante-prædicamenta* (due to Abelard), *Prædicamenta* and *Post-prædicamenta* of the mediæval logic. Of the five relations treated of in the *Post-prædicamenta* — *oppositio*, *prioritas*, *simultas*, *motus*, and *habere*— two, *prioritas* and *simultas*, are especially concerned with causality. The first two divisions of general metaphysics, dealing with universals, the six transcendents, the nature of being, the supreme classes of finite beings, are sometimes regarded as constituting Ontology. The third division, which deals with the relations of finite beings to each other and to the Infinite, will thus contain as its most important part the doctrine of causes—Ætiology.

If we turn to modern philosophy, the position of ætiology is not different. In the contents of Burgersdyk's *Institutiones Metaphysicæ* (Mansel, *Metaph.* p. 288), the doctrine of causes occupies a similar position. It holds a like place in Wolf's *Ontologia*. K. Rosenkranz (*Wissenschaft d. log. Idee*) divides metaphysics into Ontology, Ætiology, Teleology (Erdmann's *Hist. of Philosophy*, tr. vol. iii. § 346. 11). E. von Hartmann (*Kategorienlehre*), under the categories of speculative thought, puts Causality (Ætiology), Finality (Teleology), Substantiality (Ontology).

We do not propose to enter into an examination of the various forms and shades of meaning which ætiology assumes in these several systems. Nor does it belong to this article to view the subject of causation from the point of view of the theory of knowledge and of the criticism of the causal concept. We shall confine ourselves to considering simply the leading forms of the theory of the nature and classification of causes in the successive periods of the history of philosophy. For this purpose the history of philosophy may be considered as divided into three periods—the ancient, the mediæval, and the modern. The leading characteristic of each of these periods is as follows: in ancient philosophy (Greek) the antithesis of subject and object, of mind and matter, as two substances over against each other, is absent. Thought and being, the one and the many, are equally objective. In the second period, owing to the development of Greek philosophy itself, and the spread of the Roman conceptions of authoritative law and duty, but above all, owing to the influence of Christianity, the spiritual and material are conceived as antithetically opposed existences, and the attempt is made under this altered point of view to retain the Greek solution of the problem. The substance of this solution is dogmatically affirmed in Scholasticism. What is not shown is that it is possible under the changed point of view. Modern philosophy consists in the constant effort to prove the possibility of the solution, to explain the manner in which spiritual and material being interpenetrate, affect, and condition each other. In modern philosophy, not the dogmatic result itself, but the way in which it is obtained, is the leading interest. The ætiological problem becomes an essentially different one in each of these periods.

In Greek philosophy the antithesis of subject and object is absent. Nature is instinct with motion, life, reason. The notion of personality is undeveloped, but at the same time the tendency to personification is omnipresent (see Jowett's *Plato*, vol. i. p. xiv). Thought is not a modification of a conscious mind, but consciousness is the accident, a ripple on the surface of nature (see Martineau's *Types of Ethical Theory*, vol. i. p. 23). From this point of view the antitheses with which Greek philosophy dealt—the one and the many, the real and the apparent, thought and being—are all reconcilable by one concept—that of mixture. 'There is only a mingling, and then a separation of the mingled' (Empedocles, v. 38). This mingling, or, as Plato termed it, 'participation' (*μέθεξις*), when conceived as the union of the one and the many, of form and matter, *εἶδος* and *ὕλη*, gives the well-known fourfold classification of causes of Aristotle — the formal, material, efficient, and final (*ἡ οὐσία καὶ τό τι ἦν εἶναι· ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον· ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως· τὸ οὗ ἕνεκεν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν* (*Metaph.* i. 3)). The principles intermingled are form and matter; the agency by which the composition is effected, and the end to be realized by the process, are the efficient and final causes. The latter causes, however, are never considered as distinct from the principles intermingled. The individual Greek thinkers illustrate this position. Aristotle has pointed out that the early ætiologists recognized only the material cause (*ib.*). The water of Thales, the air of Anaximenes, were material principles; but the active forces, the causal energies, are either the living matter itself, or its rarefaction and condensation. The same is true of the fire of Heraclitus (Zeller, *Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, Eng. tr. vol. i. pp. 222, 223, vol. ii. pp. 27, 28). In like manner, even when the efficient cause begins to receive distinct recognition, as in the love and hate of Empedocles, or the *νοῦς* of Anaxagoras, it still is not separate from the material cause. The *νοῦς* of Anaxagoras must not be conceived as a mere prime mover, a distinct agency detached from the universe to which it communicates motion. It passes into things. It is in all essences entirely homogeneous. It is not mixed with them in the coarse sense, but it permeates them (cf. Zeller, *Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, vol. ii. pp. 343 ff.). When Socrates, in the *Phædo*, complains that Anaxagoras did not make full use of his principle (Aristotle makes the same complaint), this is not an *ignoratio elenchi*, as Lewes (*Hist. of Philosophy*, vol. i. p. 84) represents it. Socrates does not desiderate a physico-teleological theory of the universe in the modern sense. It is only to be expected that *νοῦς*, in moving the universe, should impart something of its own sublime rational nature to things, should more or less pass over into them. The Platonic idea does no less. Socrates and Plato thus bring to light the formal cause.

As is well known, the causal activity of the ideas is the crux of the Platonic philosophy. In one of its forms, at any rate, the formal cause is naturally regarded as the moving principle. The efficient cause is identified with the form, the Idea. The demiurge in Plato is most probably to be viewed, not as the exclusive activity of the highest idea, the idea of the Good, the One (as by Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, vol. i. pp. 45 ff.), but as the personification of the principle of activity or efficiency flowing from the Good, and pervading the whole world of ideas. We thus see that efficiency, action, may be identified with either the matter or the form.

When Aristotle brought down form from the far-off *τόπος νοητός*, or intelligible world of Plato, and incorporated it in matter, the problem still remained, to which side action, efficiency, was to be attributed, and Aristotle is generally interpreted as assigning it exclusively to form. In favour of this view is his celebrated definition of the Absolute as *νόησις νοήσεως*, the thought of thought; but the interpretation is probably one-sided. There is much in Aristotle to lead us to regard the Absolute as dwelling in a sort of supersensuous sensuous world, as related to the real world—which in all its various grades is a *σύνολον*, a compositum of matter and form—not merely through the element of form, but also through that of matter. In *Metaph.* viii. (ix.) 8, end, the argument against the ideal theory contends that the ideas, as such, are mere potentialities (*δυνάμεις*). This view would help to solve the ancient controversy as to the pantheism or monotheism of Aristotle, the immanence or transcendence of the *νοῦς*.

In the Neo-Platonic philosophy the ideal world of Plato and the Divine *νοῦς* of Aristotle are hypostasized into a series of personal beings. This philosophy represents the innate tendency of Greek philosophy itself to pass over into that antithesis which dominates Christian philosophy—the antithesis of subject and object, spirit and nature. St. Augustine views the Platonic ideas no longer as independent substances, but as ideas in the mind of God. The hierarchy of ideas and emanations yields to the heavenly hierarchy. With this change of view the combination or composition of form and matter, of idea and reality, becomes a most difficult problem. The community of idea and reality, the intercourse of mind and matter, can no longer be conceived as a mere mingling or composition of the two, if the idea as universal dwells in a separate substance—mind. The great controversy of the Middle Ages, of Realism and Nominalism regarding universals, is the struggle with this problem. Yet in regard to ætiology, the real interest does not lie in this problem, but in a greater one connected with it. Granting that reality is the union of matter and form, which factor in this union is the active one? Thomas Aquinas answers, 'form': 'Forma est agendi principium' (Stöckl, *Gesch. der Philos. des Mittelalters*, vol. ii. p. 451). It is diverse views of the relation of the causal power in the universe to those principles of matter and form, the union of which to the Scholastic as much as to Aristotle constitutes the nature of things, that underlie the great rival systems of Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, and from which their other differences proceed. In Scotus the union proceeds from the side of the matter, not the form. The latter is the efficient, the causal factor (de Gérando, *Systèmes de Philosophie*, vol. iv. p. 577; Rousselot, *Études sur la Philosophie dans le Moyen Age*, iii. p. 56). Duns Scotus's philosophy here encounters the same difficulties as have been urged against H. Spencer. In both Aquinas and Scotus, however, the source of the efficiency is transcendent, whether it be the Divine intellect or will which determines it.

Modern philosophy, from Descartes and Spinoza to Hegel and Hartmann, Spencer and Lewes, is engaged on the problem of explaining how the intercommunication of mind and matter, spirit and nature, takes place. It has been remarked by Bayle and Rousselot that Spinoza's philosophy is contained in that of Scotus. This is true in a sense. But the ultimate causal principle is in Scotus transcendent, in Spinoza immanent. This difference is characteristic of modern philosophy. The solution is no longer taken from the transcendent sphere. If the Absolute is called in, it is, as in Spinoza, Leibniz, Schelling, Hegel, an immanent, not transcendent Absolute.

Of the problem thus handed down it cannot be said that the solution has yet been reached. In the Monadology of Leibniz and the Absolute Idea of Hegel it is form, the ideal side, that contains the principle of all causal agency throughout the universe. These principles differ from the Platonic idea in this, that they are subjects, have the objective world over against them, even if that world have no being apart and be a nullity or contradiction at the core. In Schopenhauer and Hartmann only the Will, the material side, actualizes the representation or idea. The 'willing to will' of Hartmann answers to the *materia primo-prima* of Duns Scotus. It is the same in our English philosophy. Out of the unknowable Absolute of Spencer, and the known Absolute of Lewes, the material, organic, and mental worlds proceed. Yet the relation of these higher forms to the primordial matter and motion is unsolved. Psycho-physical parallelism is but the statement of the enigma. The question remains, Which is the efficient—form, matter, or both? In what ways do they co-operate, and how? The ætiological and teleological problems are still unsolved.

LITERATURE. — Aristotle, *Organon* and *Metaphysics*; H. Ritter et L. Preller, *Hist. philos. Gr. et Rom.*; Fairbanks, *First Philosophers of Greece*; Ferrier, *Lectures on Gr. Philosophy*; Zeller, *Philos. der Griechen*; Stöckl, *Gesch. der Philos. des Mittelalters*; Fichte, *Wissenschaftslehre*; Schelling, *Syst. des transcend. Idealismus*; Hegel, *Logik* (*Werke*, iii., iv., v.); Karl Rosenkranz, *Syst. der Wissenschaft*, *Wissenschaft der logischen Idee*; von Hartmann, *Philos. des Unbewussten*, *Religion des Geistes*, *Kategorienlehre*.

GEORGE J. STOKES.

AFFECTION. — That aspect of psychic life which comes to consciousness as concrete states of Feeling (which see); the abstract *quale* of feeling consciousness. In the newer divisions of the fundamental or rudimentary aspects of conscious process it has been found necessary to distinguish the concrete given states of mind, characterized as Knowledge, Feeling or Emotion, and Will, from those abstract and largely hypothetical *quales* which, although never found alone, nevertheless serve to define the concrete states. For example, a state of feeling is always or usually one both of knowledge of an object and of active tendency or will. Since never realized in its purity, it becomes necessary, therefore, to define such a state by what it would be if so realized. The characteristic aspect of consciousness whereby it is not knowledge or will, but feeling, is what is called 'affection.' It is the differentia of a state of feeling or emotion. Similarly, a state of knowledge is never feelingless nor will-less; its differentia as knowledge is its reference to an object; it is called 'cognition.' With active process, or in a large sense Will, the same sort of distinction leads us to the determination of its *differentia* as a certain active quality called 'conation.' Affection, cognition, and conation are therefore the three fundamental aspects of conscious process, considered as irreducible phases of what in a case of concrete happening is, usually at least, all three. Cf. Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, artt. 'Affection,' 'Cognition,' 'Conation,' and 'Classification of the Mental Functions' (by Stout).

J. MARK BALDWIN.

AFFIRMATION.—1. In *legal parlance* an affirmation is distinguished from an oath in that no penalty is invoked upon himself for false witness by the person affirming. It seems to have arisen in the scruples of those who felt the danger of invoking the name of the Deity in case a mistake of memory or statement led to unforeseen consequences. Courts, seeing that testimony from persons of this character might be quite as reliable as any supported by an oath, finally accepted

affirmation in lieu of more strongly attested allegations. The tendency to substitute affirmation for an oath will be proportioned to the decline of the belief that oaths have any more sacredness than a simple asseveration, and to the decline of the belief that the invocation of the Deity affects the efficacy of an oath. Where an appeal to the Deity and His punitive disposition or habits is supposed to influence human veracity, the oath will prevail; but it is not necessary where veracity is respected for itself. No doubt the efficacy of the oath in one period of human history was much influenced by a belief in future punishment, but that has ceased to exercise the influence it once possessed, and the community must rely upon one of two motives to assure veracity. The first is natural human penalties, and the second is respect for the truth. In either of these there will be no necessity for the oath where any scruple exists about invoking the Deity.

2. Affirmation, in *logical and philosophical diction*, is distinguished from negation or denial. It thus means the statement of a fact. It may represent nothing more than a belief that a given thing is a fact, but, so long as it takes the form of a positive statement, it is called an affirmation. To assert, to posit, to asseverate, to declare are the equivalents of affirmation, and, of course, mean at least the formal assurance that the thing affirmed is a fact. In formal logic, affirmation is a name for a certain type of judgment which is distinguished by the grammatical form or mode of statement, and not by the meaning or content of the sentence, or by the particular state of mind out of which the statement issues. Psychologically speaking, however, affirmation denotes a degree of tenacity in conviction which looks towards assurance, and it expresses that state of mind. Negation or denial expresses the same kind of mental state, while doubt is the opposite of both affirmation and negation. Hence psychologically there is no difference between affirmation and negation, in so far as assurance is concerned, but only a difference in reference to the relation between the ideas involved in the mental process of comparison and judgment. That is, the difference between affirmation and negation concerns the content of the judgment, and not its mental state of conviction. Affirmation implies a certain kind of connexion between subject and predicate, and negation excludes it.

JAMES H. HYSLOP.

AFGHANISTAN.—Afghanistan (lit. 'land of the Afghans') is a country of south-central Asia, whose location and political importance have led to its playing a part in the religious history of the Orient from the time of Zoroaster to the appearance of Muhammad. The present boundaries of this mountainous land are political rather than geographical, as they are largely defined by the fact that Afghanistan is a buffer-country between the English empire of India on the south and south-east and the Russian provinces of Bokhara and Turkistan on the north, while Persia and Baluchistan limit its western and southern frontiers.

In the first chapter of the Avesta (Vd. i. 7) the ancient northern capital Balkh (Bākhdhi) is referred to as a beautiful city with banners floating from its high walls, and there is a persistent tradition that the city was a strong religious centre, the abode of Lohrasp, the father of Vishtasp, patron of Zoroaster, and that Zoroaster himself was slain there when the Turanians stormed Balkh during the Holy War which Iran had started against Turan. The modern capital Kābul (Kāvul in the Pahlavi treatise *Shatroihā-i Airān*, 34) appears in the Avesta (Vd. i. 9) as Vaēkereta, and the region of the Helmand, the chief river of Afghanistan, the Etymandros of the Greeks, is called Haētumant (Phl. Hētūmand) in the same Zoroastrian law-book (Vd. i. 13). The modern lowland district of Seistan in south-western Afghanistan was the home of the Zoroastrian dynasty of the Kaianians and the place of the holy lake Kansaoya (mod. Hāmun) of the Avesta, from whose waters the Saviour (Av. Saoshyant) was to arise at the Millennium. Zoroastrianism appears also to have prevailed in the land during the Parthian and Sasanian eras, from B.C. 250 to A.D. 650, although some Greek religious influences may have followed in the wake of Alexander's invasion. Buddhism made some progress in Afghanistan, being traceable chiefly to Indians who emigrated from the Indus to the Helmand region after the Scythian invasion, and who carried with them, among their sacred treasures, the water-pot of the blessed Buddha himself. This relic was preserved in a shrine near the ancient site of Kandahar, and is described by Bellew, who saw it, as 'a huge bowl carved out of a solid block of dark green serpentine' (see *Races of Afghanistan*, p. 22).

The conquest of the country by the Arabs in the 7th cent. destroyed all previous religious foundations, and cleared the ground anew for the building up of Islām. Muhammadanism became the national faith of the Afghans, and has remained, mainly in its Sunnite form, their creed and chief bond of union, although they acknowledge the political headship of an Amir over their loosely connected tribes.

The Afghan nation consists of a number of tribes considerably divergent in their character, with a population variously estimated at between 3,000,000 and 6,000,000. Most important are the Afghans and Paṭhāns, who constitute the chief element of the population, together with the clans known as Ghilzais in the east, Yusufzais and Afridis on the Indian border, the Duranis to the west, and the Tajiks, Hazarahs, Usbegs, and Aimaks, mostly showing traces of Mongolian blood, to the north and north-west. The great majority of the Afghans belong ethnologically to the Iranian stock; and although there is an intermixture of blood, especially on the borders, there is no good reason for accepting the view that they were of Semitic origin, while they may preserve some such tradition from a later date and show certain slight Semitic traces.

The language of the country is generally called Afghan, but often Pukhtun or Pushtun, the former (Pukhtun) being North Afghan, the latter (Pushtun) South Afghan. The literature of the people is but scanty, and no monuments have been traced farther back than the 16th century. Most interesting among the remains are the Afghan folk-songs, a collection of which has been made by the French scholar Darmesteter, and among these ballads are a number that deal with religion.

LITERATURE.—A comprehensive bibliography of works relating to Afghanistan, its language, history, and religion, will be found in the German work by Geiger and Kuhn, *Grundriss der Iranischen Philologie*, i. pt. 2, 201–230 (Geiger), ii. 612–15 (Jackson). Of general interest are: Elphinstone, *Account of the Kingdom of Caubul*, London, 1815; Spiegel, *Eranische Alterthumskunde*, i. 307–25, Leipzig, 1871; Bellew, *The Races of Afghanistan*, 1880; Roskoschny, *Afghanistan*, 2 vols. Leipzig, 1885–6; Darmesteter, *Chants populaires des Afghans*, Paris, 1888–90; Forbes, *The Afghan Wars*, London, 1892; Roberts, *Forty-Nine Years in India*, London, 1897; Yate, *Northern Afghanistan*, London, 1888, *Khurasan and Sistan*, London, 1900; Sultan Mahomed Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2 vols., London, 1900; Hamilton, *Afghanistan*, London, 1906.

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The name 'Afghan,' first appearing in literature in al-Bīrūnī's *India* (tr. Sachau, i. 208), is of uncertain signification; and the Afghans themselves prefer the designation Pushtūn or Pukhtūn, older form Pashtūn, Pakhtūn (whence their Indian name

Paṭhān)—a term which Lassen (*Ind. Altertumskunde*[2], Leipzig, 1867, i. 513) connected with the Πάκτυες of Herodotus (iii. 93, 102, iv. 44, vii. 68); while Darmesteter (*Chants populaires des Afghans*, Paris, 1888, i., Introd. 182) has suggested that the Afghans may also be implied by the Παρανῆται of Ptolemy (vi. 18. 3, 20. 3). At all events, the native appellation Pushtūn signifies 'mountaineers,' and may be implied by the passage in Arrian's *Anabasis*, iii. 8. 4: Βαρσαέντης δὲ Ἀραχώτων σατράπης Ἀραχώτους τε ἦγε καὶ τοὺς ὀρείους Ἰνδοὺς καλουμένους. Several other names are given by Dorn (ii. 62–64), the most interesting being Sulaimānī (doubtless from their residence in the Koh-i-Sulaiman), Banī Aṣif (Aṣif being the cousin of Afghāna), Banī Isrāīl, and, of course, Rohillas ('mountaineers').

Though pre-Islāmitic Afghanistan has no real history, it is rich in legends of its origin. The best known of these traditions, to which allusion has already been made in the preceding article, is preserved in a Persian history of the Afghans by Ni'amat Allah, an author of the 16th cent. (tr. Dorn, *History of the Afghans*, 2 vols., London, 1829–36). According to his account, the eponymous hero of the Afghans was Afghāna ibn Irmia ibn Ṭālūt (Saul). Afghāna himself was the commander-in-chief of Solomon's army, and through his executive ability he was enabled to complete the Temple at Jerusalem. When, however, the Israelites were scattered abroad by Nebuchadrezzar, Afghāna and his children (numbering forty) were also dispersed; and some settled around Ghor and others near Mecca, where they remained for fifteen hundred years, obeying the Torah in all things. With the advent of Muhammad, the contemporary head of the Afghans or 'Israelites,' Khalid ibn Valid, embraced Islām, and after a long and victorious career, which included exploits in Persia, sent letters to the Afghans at Ghor concerning the coming of Muhammad, whereupon several of their chiefs, headed by Kais, went to Medina and there accepted the new faith, spreading it in Afghanistan on their return. The historic worthlessness of this legend is beyond question; and equally absurd is the tradition recounted by Firishta, tracing the Afghans to descendants of Pharaoh's nobles, who, after his fall, emigrated to India and settled in the Sulaiman Mountains. Many joined Abraha in his attack on Mecca, but were converted, and later returned to the neighbourhood of their early home.

Turn from legends to facts. Afghanistan was traversed by Alexander the Great in his march to India, and it is alluded to by Strabo (p. 699) as Γανδαρίς. This latter term is of particular interest, in that it represents the Sanskrit *Gandhāra*, which 'lay on both sides of the Kabul river, immediately above its junction with the Indus' (McCrindle, *Ancient India as described in Classical Literature*, Westminster, 1901, p. 31, n. 4). After Alexander, this region came under the sway of his successors, and thus formed part of the dominions of the Græco-Bactrian and Indo-Scythian dynasties. With the latter line of kings a new religious influence was introduced into Afghanistan, particularly by Kanishka (1st cent. A.D.)—the faith of the Buddha. By this time nearly all trace of Zoroastrianism had probably disappeared, though even in the middle of the 19th cent. local tradition at Herat told of the destruction of a fire temple there by Muhammadans in the reign of the Ṭāhirid Abdallah (d. 844) (Ferrier, *Caravan Journeyings and Wanderings*, London, 1857, p. 181); while Zoroastrians seem to have flourished in the Pamirs as late as the 13th cent., ruins of three forts ascribed to them still existing in Wakhan (Gordon, *Roof of the World*, Edinburgh, 1876, p. 141), where the natives even now treat fire with reverence, being reluctant to blow out a light (Wood, *Journey to the Sources of the River Oxus*, new ed., London, 1872, p. 333). Buddhism, however, has left not only many small figures at Hidda and Kabul (Vigne, *Personal Narrative of a Visit to Ghuzni, Kabul, and Afghanistan*, London, 1840, p. 207), but also some sixty topes, dating mostly from the 4th and 5th cent. A.D., and found chiefly at Darunta, Chahar Bagh, Hidda, Kabul, Koh Daman, and Kohwat; as well as ruins of elaborate monasteries at Jamalgiri, Takht-i-Bahi, and Sahri Bhalol, which show distinct influence of Greek art. Sculptures of the Buddha have also been found at Bamian (Wilson, in Vigne, *op. cit.* pp. 187–192); and the Chinese travellers Fa Hsien (tr. Legge, Oxford, 1886, pp. 33–40) and Hiuen Tsiang (tr. Beal, London, 1884, i. 98–103) both describe Kanishka's magnificent dagoba at Peshawar.

Modern Afghanistan, as noted in the preceding article, is wholly Muhammadan. Besides official Sunnite orthodoxy, however, there exists a mixture of Semitic and Indian folk-belief. To this category belongs the vast number of saint-shrines (*ziārat*), which consist either of the domed tomb of some saint or of a heap of stones, enclosed by a wall and usually surrounded by trees or bushes (Bellew, *Journal of a Political Mission to Afghanistan*, London, 1862, pp. 70–71, 107–109, 386)—a religious phenomenon common amongst both the modern Semites and Hindus (Curtiss, *Primitive Semitic Religion To-day*, New York, 1902, *passim*; Crooke, *Popular Religion and Folk-Lore of Northern India*, Westminster, 1896, i. 183–185, 189–229). Again, levirate marriage is practised, and it is a grievous affront not to ask the brother's consent if the widow be again married, though, if she have children, it is considered more honourable for her to remain unwedded (Elphinstone, *Account of the Kingdom of Caubul*, London, 1815, i. 236). Amongst some tribes, moreover, it is customary for the suitor to serve the father of his would-be bride for many years, as Jacob served Laban for Rachel's sake (*ib.* p. 240; Bellew, *Journal*, p. 27). The blood-feud, as amongst the Semites, is a sacred duty (Elphinstone, *op. cit.* i. 220–221; Conolly, *Journey to the North of India*[2], London, 1838, ii. 163–165); and blasphemers, as amongst the Hebrews, are stoned to death (Bellew, *Journal*, p. 68). In time of pestilence a buffalo or cow is led through or around the village or camp. The sins of the community are then ceremonially transferred to the victim's head, after which it is either slaughtered and its flesh divided between the priests and the poor, or it is driven into the wilderness (Bellew, *loc. cit.*). This practice, familiar from the Hebrew scapegoat, is also found extensively in Northern India (Crooke, *op. cit.* i. 142, 166–167, 169–170).

Dreams, the evil eye, exorcism, ordeals, and omens are, of course, attentively regarded by the Afghans; so that a high wind for three days is a sign that a murder has been committed, since, when Cain slew Abel, there was a similar commotion of the elements (Conolly, *op. cit.* ii. 137–146). The popular demons of Afghan folk-belief are *jinns*, *peris*, *āls*, and *parṛaīs*. The *jinns* and *peris* are common to all popular Muhammadan mythology, but the *āls* and *parṛaīs* (the latter word a semasiologic variation of *parī*, 'peri') are plainly Indian in origin. The *āl*, described as a woman about twenty years of age, with long teeth and nails, eyes curving down the side of the nose, feet turned heel foremost, and feeding on corpses (Vigne, *op. cit.* pp. 211–212), is manifestly the *churel* of Northern India (Crooke, *op. cit.* i. 269–271; *Calcutta Review*, No. cliii. p. 180 ff.), who, though

she may assume a beautiful form, is in reality 'very ugly and black, breastless, protruding in stomach and navel, and feet turned back' (Steel and Temple, *Wide-Awake Stories*, Bombay, 1884, p. 318). In Armenian folk-lore the *āl* is also found, though differing materially from the Indo-Afghan concept (cf. Abeghian, *Armen. Volksglaube*, Leipzig, 1899, pp. 118–120). The *parrāī*, a huge monster, with flabby breasts thrown back over her shoulders, stretching out her hairy arms to any length, and devouring those who answer her plaintive cry for help (Darmesteter, *op. cit.* i. 254–255), is clearly the Indian *rakshasī* (Crooke, *op. cit.* i. 246–253), who plays an important part in Hindu folk-tales. Though the Afghans are essentially an Iranian people (Deniker, *Races of Man*, London, 1901, p. 420), they thus exhibit a total loss of Iranian concepts, for which they have substituted an amalgam of Semitic and Indian beliefs.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works cited in the previous article, mention may be made of Lassen, *Ind. Altertumskunde*², i. 503–515, ii. 289–360 (Leipzig, 1867–74); Masson, 'Topes and Sepulchral Monuments of Afghanistan' in Wilson, *Ariana Antiqua*, pp. 55–118 (London, 1841); Fergusson, *Hist. of Indian and Eastern Architecture*, pp. 72–79, 169–184 (London, 1876); Bellew, *Journal of a Political Mission to Afghanistan*, pp. 46–77 (London, 1862); Conolly, *Journey to the North of India*², ii. 136–150 (London, 1838); Ni'amat Allah, *Hist. of the Afghans* (tr. Dorn, 2 vols., London, 1829–36); Modi, 'The Afghanistan of the Amir and the Ancient Mazdayaçnāns' in *East and West*, 1907; Raverty, *Poetry of the Afghans* (1862), and *Notes on Afghanistan* (1881); Malleson, *Hist. of Afghanistan* (1879); Sultan Mahomed Khan, *The Constitution and Laws of Afghanistan* (London, 1900); Ibbetson, *Punjab Census Report* (Calcutta, 1882) [for the Afghans in British India or on its border].

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AFRICA.—[The purpose of this article is to give a *general* account of the ethnology, religions, and ethics of Africa. A detailed description of the various religions will be found in the following articles: BANTUS AND S. AFRICA, BERBERS AND N. AFRICA, HAMITES AND E. AFRICA, NEGROES AND W. AFRICA].

A line drawn from the mouth of the Senegal river, through Timbuktu, eastwards to Khartum, then southwards to the equator, and along the equator again eastwards to the Indian Ocean, will roughly divide Africa into two main ethnical sections of nearly equal areas—*Caucasic* in the north and *Ethiopic* or *Negro* in the south (for the sense in which these and other general ethnical terms are here taken see art. ETHNOLOGY [Conspectus]). Of the northern section, which comprises the Mediterranean seaboard from Morocco to Egypt, the Saharan and Libyan deserts from the Atlantic to the Red Sea, Abyssinia and the Galla, Masai and Somali lands, there are two great divisions—the *Hamitic Caucasians*, who are here indigenous, and the *Semitic Caucasians*, who are later immigrants from Asia, but have long been almost everywhere in the closest contact with the Hamitic aborigines. Most probably the two races originally constituted a single Hamito-Semitic group, whose primeval home was North Africa, whence some moved in remote times across the Red Sea to South-West Asia, and here became specialized as Semites; while others—Iberians, Ligurians, Pelasgians—ranged northwards into Europe by the land-connexions still persisting in the Old and New Stone Ages at various points across the Mediterranean. In those days the Saharan wastes were not a marine bed since upraised, as is popularly supposed, but, on the contrary, a plateau which was higher than at present, enjoyed a genial climate, was traversed by great rivers (now reduced to dry wadys), and clothed with a rich subtropical vegetation; in a word, a region in every way suited for the evolution of the highest (Caucasic) division of the human family. In North Africa this evolution has from prehistoric times been represented by the ancestry of the present Hamitic populations, who are still found in possession of all the inhabitable parts, either exclusively or in association with their Semitic kindred who have returned at different times to the common cradle-land.

The Hamites, who are called *Libyans* (Africans) by Herodotus, and recognized by him as the one autochthonous people in the north (iv. 197), have throughout all recorded time formed not merely the substratum but the great majority of the inhabitants between the Atlantic and the Red Sea, and from the Mediterranean to the Sudan. They are the *Tamahu* of the Egyptian temple-inscriptions (B.C. 1500–1300), and the *Maxyes* of Herodotus (iv. 191, 193), this term and its later forms as given by Ptolemy, *Masices*, *Mazices*, being identical with *Amzigh* (plur. *Imazighen*), 'free' or 'noble,' which is still the collective name of all the Mauritanian Hamites. There are three well-defined divisions, which, with their chief sub-groups, may here be tabulated:

I. EASTERN HAMITES:
- *Ancient Egyptians and Copts*; Nile valley from the Delta to Nubia.
- *Bejas* (Ababdeh, Bishāri, Hadendāwa, Homrān, Beni-Amer); from Upper Egypt to Abyssinia, between the Nile and the Red Sea.
- *Afars* (Dankali, pl. Danākil); the steppe between Abyssinia and the Red Sea.
- *Agaos, Khamants, Falashas* (?), *Funji*; Abyssinia, Senaar.
- *Gallas* (Ilm'orma), *Somali*; Galla and Somali lands.
- *Turkanas, Masai, Wa-huma*; Lake Rudolf, Mau plateau, Uganda.

II. WESTERN HAMITES:
- *Imazighen* (Atlas or Mauritanian Berbers), *Kabyles, Rifs, Shluhs, Shawias, Zenagas, Mzabs, Khumirs, Haratins, Wajila*; Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, Tripoli, Siwa oasis.
- *Tuaregs* (Saharan Berbers); *Askar* (Azjar) group, *Ahaggar* (Hoggar) group, *Kel-Owi* group, *Kel-Geres* group, *Awelimmiden* group, *Trarsas* and *Braknas*; Western Sahara.

III. CENTRAL HAMITES:
- *Tibus* (Tedas, Dazas, Baeles, Zoghawas); Tibesti uplands, Ennedi, Wanyanga, Borku, Kanem.

During the historic period the Semites have been represented in North Africa by the Phœnicians from Syria, the Jews from Palestine, the Himyaritic Arabs from Yemen, and the Muslim Arabs from Central and North Arabia. The *Phœnicians*, founders of Carthage, Leptis, Utica, and numerous other settlements on the north coast, have long been extinct. The *Jews*, who began to arrive some time after the Babylonian captivity, are still found in small communities along the seaboard, from Egypt to Morocco. In Tripolitana some have become troglodytes, dwelling in the limestone caves of the Ghurian uplands, south of Tripoli. These subterranean habitations appear 'to have originated principally with the Jews, who from time immemorial had become intimately connected with the Berbers, many of the Berber tribes having adopted the Jewish creed' (Barth, *Travels*, i. p. 48). The Jews also penetrated at an unknown date into the heart of Abyssinia, where they are supposed to be still represented by the Judaizing *Falashas* of the Simen district, who claim to be of the 'House of Israel,' and are often called the 'Jews of Abyssinia.' But these Falashas—that is, 'Emigrants'—can no longer be called Jews, since they are now completely assimilated in speech and appearance to the surrounding Agao Hamites. They have no knowledge of Hebrew, and even their Bible is the Ge'ez (Himyaritic) version common to all the Abyssinian Christians.

This term *Ge'ez*, properly *Aga'zi*, has reference to Aksum, capital of the Aksumite empire, founded probably about the beginning of the Christian era by the *Himyaritic Semites*, who had already crossed over from South Arabia, and have since then been politically dominant in Abyssinia. Aksum soon became a great centre of Himyaritic culture, which was further developed under Hellenic influences about 450, when Christianity was introduced by

the apostle Frumentius from Alexandria. Then the Bible was translated into Ge'ez (*v. supra*), which was at that time the current, as it is still the liturgical, language of the country; and this tongue has preserved some early Christian documents, the Greek or Syriac originals of which have been lost.

Having received its teachings from Alexandria, the Abyssinian Church is a branch of the Coptic, and consequently professes the Monophysite doctrine of Eutyches accepted by the Alexandrian patriarchs in the 6th cent. The *Abuna*, or spiritual head of the Abyssinian Christians, is always consecrated by the patriarch of Alexandria, and for the last 700 years has even been of Coptic nationality. But his possibly dangerous political influence is neutralized by the *Etsh'ege*, a kind of national high priest at the head of the regular clergy, and of the *debtura*, or men of letters. These literati, although laymen, enjoy special ecclesiastical privileges, and thus serve to check the action both of the *Abuna* and of the religious orders, which are very numerous, and own a large part of the land. Like the mosques in Muhammadan lands, the churches and monasteries are the schools of the country, and over these the *debtura* have complete control. But education is in a rudimentary state, and the only art still cultivated is painting, which was introduced in Byzantine times, and is employed exclusively for the decoration of the churches. A traditional canon of the art requires all orthodox Christians, saints, and good people to be represented in full face; all others in profile. Among the latter are included all their enemies, the Jews, the devils, and especially the Falashas, who are popularly believed to be magicians, capable, like the European wer-wolves, of assuming the guise of dangerous animals, such as lions, panthers, or hyænas. These and many other old pagan notions are still rife beneath the thin lacquer of Abyssinian Christianity.

After the 6th cent. the Aksumite empire disappeared from history, and was successively followed by those of *Tigrē* in the north, *Amhara* in the centre, and *Shoa* in the south. Menilek, present king of Shoa, rules the whole land in absolute sovereignty, and all his Himyaritic subjects are being slowly merged in a single Abyssinian nationality, differing little in their physical and mental characters, and speaking two distinct modern forms of the old Ge'ez language—Tigriña in the north and Amharic in the south, the parting line being the Takkazē river. But all these historical Himyarites of the plateau are to be distinguished from the *Zabalat Himyarites*, who probably preceded them in this region, and have been settled from time immemorial in the district between the Blue Nile and its Dender affluent east of Senaar. These Zabalats never came under Hellenic or later Muslim influences like their Funji neighbours, and hence are neither Christians nor Muhammadans, but appear still to practise the same Semitic rites as their Minæan and Sabæan forefathers. They are called 'fire-worshippers,' but do not worship the fire itself, which they regard only as a great purifier and as an emblem of a Supreme Being, who reveals himself in this element as well as in the heavenly bodies. Hence they turn in prayer to the stars or towards the rising and the setting sun, and kindle great fires over the graves of the dead. But there is also a supreme demon, whose wrath has to be averted by offerings and sacrifices. The two principles of good and evil would thus appear to be recognized, as in so many other religions which can have had no direct contact with the old Zoroastrian system. The Zabalats differ from the Muslim Arabs in many other respects, being strict monogamists, keeping no slaves, and recognizing no hereditary sheikhs.

Even before the great Muslim irruptions of the 7th and later centuries, the northern *Arabs*, mostly, no doubt, Bedawîn from the Nejd plateau, had ranged into North Africa, and mention is made of the *Ruadites*, who had already penetrated westwards to Mauritania before the rise of Islām. But the great movements which have made the Arab race, language, and religion dominant throughout North Africa, began with the conquest of Egypt in the 7th century. Later came the peaceful but ethnically more important immigration of North Arabian tribes, instigated by Ahmed ibn-Ali, who died in 1045. Then took place that tremendous dislocation of the indigenous populations during which a large section of the Berbers withdrew from the plains to the Mauritanian uplands, while others retired to the Saharan oases. Here they were followed later by the Arabs themselves; so that at present the pure Arab and mixed Arabo-Berber tribes form the great majority of the inhabitants of Tripoli, Mauritania, and the Sahara; while the Arab language and the Muslim religion prevail almost exclusively amongst the native populations in all the large towns along the Mediterranean seaboard, from Marakesh and Fez to Cairo and Alexandria. The old Hamitic languages, however, still persist amongst the Muhammadans of the Sahara (Tuaregs, Tibus), the tribes of the Siwa and Aujila oases (Cyrenaica), and many of the Berber groups in the Atlas uplands.

Islām, long the exclusive religion of Arabs, Berbers, and Tibus, presents few special features, except where it assumes a political aspect, as among the *Senūsīya* brotherhood, or else becomes affected by the primitive beliefs and superstitions of the aborigines, as in Tibesti and Senaar. There are numerous small groups which enjoy great repute either as *shurfa* (pl. of *sharīf*, 'noble,' 'high-born,' a title assumed by those claiming descent from the Prophet), or *marabouts* (saints, recluses, charlatans, claiming supernatural powers like shamans or medicine-men), or *khwān*, the literati, who now constitute the *Senūsīya* confraternity, a politico-religious body which has acquired immense influence throughout the Muhammadan world. It is so named from the Algerian sheikh Senūsi, who set up as a zealous preacher or reformer, first in Mecca, then at Bengazi in 1843, and in 1855 removed to the Faredgha oasis, where he died 'in the odour of sanctity.' Since then the brotherhood has continued to flourish under his successors, the Mahdi ('guided'), who are destined to restore the power of Islām to its former splendour. Numerous *zawiyas* (convents), each a little centre of religious fervour, industry, and even culture, have sprung up in Tripoli and the Saharan oases, and the Faredgha 'mother-house'—convent, mosque, school, hospital, and stronghold combined—has thus become the headquarters of a powerful organization, which numbers millions of devoted adherents, and makes its influence felt from Mauritania to Mesopotamia. The society continues to expand throughout North Africa; and although it looked askance at the late Nubian Mahdi and his Khalīfian successor at Omdurman, that was only through jealousy, and because its time had not yet come.

Of the strange interminglings of Muhammadanism with primitive religions, some instances are given in art. ABORIGINES. The same tendencies may be observed amongst the Saharan *Tibus*, who represent the ancient Garamantes, and were nearly all pagans till they became at least nominal Musalmāns in the 18th century. Some still practise heathen rites openly, and amongst the Baeles of the

Ennedi district Allah has not yet been dethroned by Yīdo, the native name of the Supreme Being. In the same district a kind of *mana* or supernatural virtue is ascribed to the *kūntok*, a species of mottled stone of somewhat rare occurrence in the country. During the prayers addressed to Yīdo this stone is sprinkled with flour and with the blood of a sacrificed sheep, and it then secures for its fortunate owner the success of all his projects and confusion to all his enemies (Nachtigal, *Sahāra u. Sudan*, ii. p. 176). Polygamy is not controlled by the Qur'ānic law, the number of wives being merely a question of ways and means, while the son is obliged to marry all his father's wives except his own mother. Matriarchal custom persists, as is shown by the fact that the wife continues to reside in her parents' home till the birth of the first child, and permanently if there is no issue; in which case the husband receives back the camels paid to his father-in-law for his bride.

Although passing for good Muhammadans, the *Tedas* (Northern Tibus) do not abstain from *lakbi* (palm wine), and now and then sacrifice a goat for rain or other favours. All wear amulets attached to various parts of the body, and think that ailments may be cured by drinking the water used for washing out Qur'ānic texts written on the inside of a cup. Similar texts contained in little leather bags make their spears and other weapons more deadly, and also protect horses and camels from the evil eye. Their half-Arabized Fezzanese cousins put great faith in the marabouts, who are more numerous and influential in Fezzan than elsewhere. They are much employed as sorcerers in thwarting the machinations of the great demon Iblis or Shaitān and the innumerable other wicked jinns, common enemies of mankind, against whom Allah appears to be powerless. In the Timbuktu district the marabouts are, or were formerly, replaced by the *santons*, a sort of African shamans, who employed music to work themselves into a state of ecstasy, in which they pretended to hold communion with the souls of departed Muslim saints. From these they received instructions as to the proper animals—a white or red cock, a hen, a gazelle, a goat, or an ostrich—to be sacrificed for the recovery of the sick. In such cases incense was burned, and the cooked meat was served to the patient and those present, the blood, the bones, and feathers being buried as a sacrificial offering to the dead saint.

Amongst the Muslim *Tuaregs* the belief is universal that below the surface the Sahara is everywhere peopled by a class of supernatural beings called *Ahl at-Trab*, who delight in playing mischievous pranks on wayfarers in the desert. They seize and pull down the camels' feet, causing them to sink in the soft sands; they gnaw off the roots of the desert plants, thus killing the scanty vegetation; on the approach of the thirsty traveller, they drink up the water of springs and wells; they even come to the surface and assume bodily forms to deceive and torment the living. All unexplained natural phenomena, such as the pillars of sand raised by the whirlwind, are referred to invisible agencies, and the mysterious droning heard on a still night in many parts of the wilderness is the voice of the jinns conversing among themselves (Harding King, *A Search for the Masked Tawareks*, pp. 39, 42).

Although little influenced by the teachings of Islām, the moral character of the Tuaregs and Mauritanian Berbers is greatly superior to that of their Arab neighbours. Apart from the blood-feuds, vendettas, and predatory expeditions permitted by tribal usage, 'the vices so common amongst the Moors are unknown in the homes of the Berbers. They seem to possess none of that uncontrollable passion that is so large a feature in the Arab character, and its place is taken by affection and sincerity. No doubt, to a great extent the moral character of the Berbers is due to the fact that their women are allowed entire liberty, do not veil their faces, and mix on almost all occasions with the men' (W. B. Harris, *Tafilet*, p. 160). The Arab, still a nomad herdsman, who holds that the ploughshare and shame enter hand in hand into the family, remains a fanatic ever to be feared, because he blindly obeys the will of Allah proclaimed by his prophets, marabouts, and mahdis. He is ruled by a despotic and theocratic sheikh, in accordance with the precepts of the Qur'ān; whereas the agricultural Berber, with his *jam'a* (public assembly) and unwritten code, feels himself a freeman, is a born sceptic, cares little for theological dogmas, and is far less of a fatalist than his Semitic neighbour. Although many of the Mauritanian tribes have adopted the Arabic language, the process of assimilation appears to be arrested, and the Berber is now everywhere gaining on the Arab. 'He is the race of the future, as of the past' (Dr. Malbot).

In a remarkable ethnological generalization, Herodotus tells us (iv. 197) that the Africa known to him was occupied by four distinct peoples,—two indigenous, the Libyans (our Hamites) and the Ethiopians (our Negroes); and two intruders, the Phœnicians and the Hellenes. Since then other intruders (*ἐπήλυδες*), such as the Romans, Vandals, Bulgarians, and Cherkesses, have come and gone, while other later arrivals—Arabs, Jews, Turks, Italians, Iberians, French, Britons, Dutch, Belgians, Germans—have settled round the seaboard, and, by occupying their respective 'Hinterlands,' have made nearly the whole continent a political dependency of Europe. But these movements have scarcely affected the ethnical relations, and the statement of Herodotus regarding two indigenous races (*αὐτόχθονες*)—Libyans in the north and Ethiopians in the south—still holds good. Thus the Libyan (Hamitic) domain, as above described, is everywhere conterminous with the Ethiopic (Negro), which comprises the section of the mainland south of the parting line indicated at the beginning of this article, together with the adjacent island of Madagascar. Amid the great mass of black humanity there are extensive and long-standing interminglings,—Arabo-Berbers and Fulahs in the north, Malayans in Madagascar,—and also some aberrant elements, such as the Negritoes in the forest zone of the Congo, the Bushman-Hottentots in the southern steppe lands, and the utterly degraded Vaalpens of the Limpopo basin. But, taken as a whole, these Negro and Negroid populations present sufficient uniformity in their physical, and still more in their mental, characters to be grouped together as one main division of mankind. More, perhaps, on linguistic than on ethnical grounds, they are usually divided into two great sections: *Sudanese Negroes*, of diverse speech, north of the equator; and *Bantu Negroes*, of one speech, thence southwards.

Sudan—that is, the region which stretches south of the Sahara between the Atlantic Ocean and Abyssinia—is commonly regarded as the original home of the Negro stock; hence its Arabic name, *Bilād as-Sūdān*, 'Land of the Blacks,' the Nigritia or Negroland of our early writers. Although it has been largely encroached upon by Hamites and Semites from the north and east, here are still found many of the most typical Negro populations, such as the Serers, Felups, Timni, and Krumen of the West Coast; the Tshi, Ewe, and Yorubas of the Gold and Slave Coasts; the Bauchi, Mosgus, Michi, and Yedinas of Central Sudan; the Igarras, Ibos, and Benins of Southern Nigeria; the Mabas, Nubas, Denkas, Golos, Shilluks, Bari, Bongos, and Nuers of East Sudan and the White Nile; and the Zandehs (Niam-niam), Mangbattus, Monfus, A-Barambos, and A-Babuas of the Welle basin. These are all

uncivilized pagans, who speak a great number of radically distinct Negro languages, and exhibit Negro physical traits, often to an exaggerated degree. These traits, which prevail with marked uniformity over wide areas, were already specialized in remote times, as we see from the portraits depicted on the early Egyptian monuments, and as we find them graphically summed up in the description of a negress attributed to Vergil (*Moretum*, 32–35):

> 'Afra genus, tota patriam testante figura,
> Torta comam labroque tumens et fusca colore,
> Pectore lata, iacens mammis, compressior alvo,
> Cruribus exilis, spatiosa prodiga planta.'

Standing out in marked contrast to all these primitive peoples are the relatively civilized Hamito-Negro or Semito-Negro nations, such as the Mandingos, Songhais, and Fulahs in the west; the Hausas, Kanuri, Baghirmi, and Mabas of Wadai in the centre; and the Furs and Nubians in the east, who are all Muhammadans, and of diversely modified Negroid type, but still speak independent languages of Negro stock. From these striking contrasts between the pure Negro and the mixed Negroid peoples the inference has been drawn that the Negro left to himself remains a Negro in every sense of the term, and without miscegenation is incapable of making any advance beyond a low social and intellectual level. For this arrest of progress seen everywhere in Africa and the New World (West Indies, Southern United States), a physiological explanation has been sought in the early closing of the cranial sutures, preventing any further expansion of the brain after puberty. 'A cet arrêt intellectuel doit correspondre la soudure de la boîte cervicale; le développement du crâne s'arrête et empêche le cerveau de se dilater davantage' (Binger, *du Niger au Golfe de Guinée*, ii. p. 246). Hence it is that the Negroes often display in early life a degree of intelligence even superior to that of European children. 'They acquire knowledge with facility till they arrive at the age of puberty, when the physical nature masters the intellect, and frequently completely deadens it. This peculiarity has been attributed by some physiologists to the early closing of the sutures of the cranium, and it is worthy of note that throughout West Africa it is by no means rare to find skulls without any apparent transverse or longitudinal sutures' (Ellis, *The Ewe-Speaking Peoples*, p. 9).

The chief subdivisions of both the Sudanese and the Bantu sections will be found in art. ETHNOLOGY (Conspectus). Between the two sections the most conspicuous difference is the linguistic confusion which prevails in Sudan and the linguistic unity which is the dominant feature in Bantuland. Except in the south-western Bushman-Hottentot territory, in Madagascar, where a Malayo-Polynesian tongue is exclusively spoken, and perhaps amongst the Negritoes of the forest zone, all the current idioms are closely related members of a common stock language. And as the tribes themselves are not so closely related, but, on the contrary, often present considerable physical differences, it follows that Bantu is far more intelligible as a linguistic than as an ethnical expression. In fact, a Bantu is, strictly speaking, nothing more than a full-blood or more often a half-blood Negro of Bantu speech. In general, all are mestizos, showing every shade of transition between the Negro and the Caucasic (Hamitic and Semitic) elements. The Negro has apparently everywhere formed the substratum, which has, so to say, been leavened in diverse proportions by very old and later Caucasic infiltrations from the north. These interminglings have resulted in endless modifications of the physical characters, but have left the original Bantu form of speech untouched, as is always the case where two or more races are merged in one. The ethnical groups form new combinations by miscegenation, while the languages, being incapable of miscegenation, all perish except one. Hence it is that in the Bantu domain we have many physical blends with only one unblended form of speech. 'There are many mixed races; indeed, all races are mixed; but there are no mixed languages, but only mixed vocabularies' (A. H. Keane, *Ethnology*, 1896, p. 199; also M. L. Lapicque: 'Les langues se tuent; les peuples se mêlent,' MS note). For details see art. BANTUS AND S. AFRICA.

From the religious and ethical standpoints there is not much to choose between the pagan Sudanese and the Bantu peoples. Everywhere amongst both sections are met the same crude animistic notions, gross superstitions, cruel practices associated with ancestor-worship, ordeals, omens, witchcraft, fetishism, human sacrifices, and other observances which are specially characteristic of all primitive African cults. Everywhere also is noticed the clear line of demarcation which is drawn by all the natives between their religious practices and their rules of conduct. Here is plainly seen how religion and morals belonged originally to two different orders of thought, and how the one is made subservient to the other, as when the invisible powers are asked to aid and co-operate in deeds of violence, murder, vendetta, rape, theft, plunder, and other acts regarded as immoralities in higher social systems. Thus on the Gold Coast 'religion is not in any way allied with moral ideas, whose source is indeed essentially distinct, although the two become associated when man attains a higher degree of civilization. Murder, theft, and all offences against the person or against property are matters in which the gods have no immediate concern, and in which they take no interest, except in the case when, bribed by a valuable offering, they take up the quarrel in the interests of some faithful worshipper. The most atrocious crimes, committed as between man and man, the gods can view with equanimity. These are man's concerns, and must be rectified or punished by man' (Ellis, *The Tshi-speaking Peoples*, p. 11). In fact, all these gods are themselves originally malignant superhuman beings, born of fear, and authors of all evil, as is even indicated by some of their names, such as that of the Ashanti god *Bohsum*, said to mean 'Producer of Calamities.' Hence sickness, death, and all other miseries are attributed to them, either directly, or indirectly through witchcraft, since 'it is from them that wizards and witches obtain assistance and mysterious knowledge' (*ib.* p. 13). From such venal deities no correct views of right and wrong could ever have been acquired, and it must be obvious that 'moral ideas flow from an essentially different source than religion,' that both 'cannot have sprung from a common root' (Th. Waitz, *Introd. to Anthropology*, Eng. ed. i. 279).

Ancestor-worship appears to be the most outstanding feature of all African primitive religious systems. That the spirits of the dead are the gods of the living is a formula that applies equally to the Sudanese natives of Upper Guinea, and to the Bantu populations of Uganda, the eastern coastlands, and Damaraland. Amongst the Gold and Slave Coast peoples there are many local and general personifications of the powers of nature; but these were held in slight esteem compared with the ancestral gods to whom hecatombs of human victims were immolated at the periodical 'Customs' during the flourishing days of the kingdoms of Ashanti, Dahomi, and Benin. It was the same in Uganda, where the former kings of the national dynasty were revered as demi-gods. Their souls were supposed to dwell in and inspire the witch-

doctors; shrines were raised over their graves, the maintenance of which was a religious duty, and here were offered the human sacrifices, as many as two thousand by the late King Mtesa. The demon Ndaula, whose abode is on the Gambaragara heights, whence he plagues the people with small-pox and other evils, is also a departed spirit, identified with one of the early members of the Uganda dynasty. The trees planted round the ancestral graves were sedulously tended by wise women, whose oracles, like those of the Pythian priestess, were taken as decisive in certain political crises. The course of events was thus still controlled by the deceased rulers of the land, while the very trees overshadowing their tombs gradually acquired that sacred character which led eventually to general tree-worship.

Along the eastern seaboard the dominant spirit was Munkulunkulu, who ruled, under endless variants, from the Tānā river round the Cape to the Cunene. He is often spoken of as the 'Supreme Being'; but such a concept was not grasped by the African aborigines, and the fundamental idea is revealed in the root *inkulu* = 'old,' 'great' (cf. Lat. *alt-us*, cognate with Teutonic *alt*, 'old'); so that the word really connotes a deification of the great departed, and is thus a direct outcome of the universal ancestor-worship. This is also fully in accordance with the view of Bleek, who holds that the term originally meant 'great ancestor.' Thus, as in Celebes, where *empung* (= 'grandfather') is the generic name of the gods, *Unkulunkulu* becomes the Divine progenitor of the Zulu-Xosa Bantus; while of *Mulungu*, the form current in Nyasaland, the Rev. Duff Macdonald writes: 'In all our translations of Scripture where we found the word "God" we used *Mulungu*; but this word is chiefly used by the natives as a general name for spirit. The spirit of a deceased man is called Mulungu, and all the prayers and offerings of the living are presented to such spirits of the dead. It is here that we find the great centre of the native religion. The spirits of the dead are the gods of the living' (*Africana*, i. p. 59). And again: 'Their god is not the body in the grave, but the spirit [Mulungu], and they seek the spirit at the place where their departed kinsman last lived among them. It is the great tree at the verandah (*kwipenu*) of the dead man's house that is their *temple*; and if no tree grow here they erect a little shrine, and there perform their simple rites' (*ib.* p. 60). Here we have the very incipient stage itself of ancestor-worship again closely interwoven with the tree element. Then comes a further development, in which the departed spirit reveals himself first in dreams, and later through the *juakuweweta*, the priestess or prophetess, as in Uganda and Hellas. 'The god comes to her with his commands at night. She delivers the message in a kind of ecstasy. She speaks (as her name implies) with the utterance of a person raving with excitement. During the night of the communication her ravings are heard sounding all over the village in a high key' (*ib.* p. 61). We seem to be reading an extract from Pausanias on the Delphic Oracle. And the broad statement is made that 'the spirit of every deceased man and woman, with the solitary exception of wizards and witches [who become hyænas], becomes an object of religious homage. The gods of the natives, then, are nearly as numerous as their dead' (p. 68).

In some parts of Nyasaland, as in Uganda and elsewhere, ancestor-worship eventually became associated with human sacrifice. 'If the deceased owned several slaves, an enormous hole is dug for a grave. The slaves that were caught immediately on his death are now brought forward. They may be either cast into the pit alive [being made fast to slave-sticks], or the undertakers may cut all their throats. The body of their master or their mistress is then laid down to rest above theirs, and the grave is covered in' (*ib.* p. 107). We know from Commander Cameron and most other early travellers that similar and even worse atrocities were of constant occurrence all over the Bantu lands, before their suppression by the European Powers in 1884. It is thus again seen that in these respects the Bantus stand on the same low social level as the Sudanese negroes.

On the West Coast nature-worship was, as a rule, perhaps more prevalent than on the east side. Here Munkulunkulu was generally replaced by *Nzambi*, who also has many variants, and is similarly described by some observers as a 'Supreme Being.' But this is denied by the Rev. W. H. Bentley, our best authority on the subject, who rejects the far-fetched explanations of Kolbe and others, adding that 'the knowledge of God is most vague, scarcely more than nominal. There is no worship paid to God' [in Kongoland] (*Dict. and Gram. of the Kongo Language*, p. 96). Farther south, Mulungu reappears, under the form *Mukuru*, amongst the Bantu Hereros of Damaraland, and it is noteworthy that here also ancestor-worship prevails almost exclusively. 'The best missionaries who have worked among the Hereros could find nothing going beyond the simplest ancestor-worship. Their chief deity, Mukuru, that is, the "Ancient," is a spirit whose dwelling is placed in the Far North. His grave is regarded as a sacred spot in many places. Every tribe has its own Mukuru [exactly as in Nyasaland], to whom all superstitious usages and customs are referred. Above all, he sends rain and sunshine. Mukuru's "grave" certainly points to the weight assigned to ancestor-worship among these people, and many other facts confirm this' (Ratzel, *Hist. of Mankind*, ii. 358). Here also the worship is connected with trees, since 'the Hereros in their sacrifices use sacred sticks from trees or bushes consecrated to the ancestors. Many keep these sticks, which are perhaps the last relics of ancestor-worship, in bundles, hung with amulets, upon the branches of the bush makera, which stands at the place of sacrifice, and represents the altar' (*ib.* p. 361). Farther on, the highly-developed tree-cult of the Hereros is shown to be 'a direct offshoot of ancestor-worship, for it ultimately leads to the tale that a sacred tree gave their origin to the Ovaherero, the Bushmen, oxen, and zebras' (*ib.* p. 481). One particular species is specially reverenced, and, when seen from afar, is hailed with the words, 'Holy art thou, our ancestor.' The evolution is thus obvious. A given tree is first respected for the sake of the man who was attached to it when alive, or else buried beneath its shade in death. Then the tribe during its wanderings meets the same tree elsewhere, and by association of ideas transfers to it the reverence or worship formerly paid to the now perhaps forgotten ancestor. But a tree is always something visible and tangible. Hence, under changed conditions, tree-cult may well outlive the ancestor-worship in which it originated. Here it may be noted that the selection of the bush *makera* for special homage was probably due to a popular etymology confusing this term with *Mukuru*, the Herero form of *Mulungu*, the 'Ancient.'

Other more or less characteristic features of the African religious systems and superstitions—fetishism, human sacrifices, omens, ordeals, talismans, cannibalism, were-animals, witchcraft—are dealt with in separate articles.

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ĀGAMA.—In the oldest Buddhist writings this is the standing word for 'tradition' (*Vinaya*, ii. 249; *Aṅguttara*, ii. 147). This usage is maintained in the *Milinda* (215, 414) and in the *Mahāvastu* (ii. 21). But from the 5th cent. A.D. onwards the word means usually a division of the Sutta Piṭaka—the same portion as was, in the older phraseology (*Vinaya*, ii. 287), called a *nikāya*. The reason for this change was that the latter word (*nikāya*) had come to be used also in the sense of a division of disciples, a school or sect, and had therefore become ambiguous. In Buddhist Sanskrit books this later use of *āgama* seems to have supplanted entirely the use of *nikāya*; but our edited texts are not sufficient in extent to enable us, as yet, to state this with certainty.

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AGAOS.—1. The Agaos or Agows, a name applied to various groups of Hamites who do not possess any collective name, form part of the primitive Hamitic population of Abyssinia. Formerly they occupied a large extent of the plateau, but were gradually driven, in prehistoric times, towards the south and west by incoming peoples—the Himyaritic Semites speaking the Ge'ez tongue. The latter are now divided into the Tigrē and Amhara branches, but the Amhara, who crossed the Takkazē, are much mixed with the Hamitic element, while their Ge'ez speech has been greatly modified by the primitive language, if indeed it is not that primitive speech itself modified by the Semitic language of the conquerors. At present the Agaos, whose name means 'the free,' are composed of several groups scattered throughout the region between the Takkazē and the Abai, mainly in subjection to the rule of the Negus Negust, but retaining their own customs and speech. They are found chiefly in the province of Lasta, on the upper Takkazē (where they were completely reduced only in the 17th cent. by the Emperor of Abyssinia), and in the districts to the south-west of Lake Tānā or Tzana (where they give their name to one province, Agaomidir or Agao-land, which is almost entirely peopled by them). They are characterized by broad faces and high cheek-bones, yellow complexion, and strong, coarse, straight hair, and are of the Caucasic type, like their Semitic conquerors, from whom they do not differ much in appearance. The name Agaos is probably to be found in the *Athagaō* of the inscription at Adulis, dating from the beginning of the 2nd cent. A.D., discovered and preserved by Cosmas. This may be the district of Addago on the Takkazē, with a population of Agao blood. Cosmas (A.D. 523) refers to the Ἀγαῦ, and says they acknowledged the authority of the kings of Aksum. About 400 years later, the Agaos of Semen, under their queen, Judith, were strong enough to expel the Menilek dynasty from the throne of Aksum (*JA*, 1863). The Agao speech is said by Beke to be the language of the people of Abyssinia, as Amharic is that of the court, the army, and commerce. It is spoken from the Sanhait district in the N.E. to Gojam and Shoa in the south, under different names and in a variety of dialects, and in some provinces is almost exclusively in use. By the people themselves in Lasta it is known as *Khamtinja*; this group also call themselves *Hamra*, now found in the name Amhara borne by the district between the Takkazē and the Abai, and suggesting that the present Himyaritic Amhara people may have borrowed their name from that of some of the Hamitic aborigines. D'Abbadie calls the Lasta Hamites *Khamta*—a word connected with *Khamtinja* (*Athenæum*, 1845, 359); while Beke (*JRGS* xiv. 56) calls their language *Hhamera. Khamta*, still borne by the Khamants of Lake Tānā, and *Hhamera* were probably names of earlier dominant Agao tribes.

2. The principal divisions of the peoples who may be classed as Agaos are the Agaos of Lasta (Bruce's 'Tcheratz Agaos'), including the Khamants; those of Agaomidir and the surrounding districts enclosed in the sweep of the Abai as it issues from Lake Tānā; and the Falashas. Both the first groups are divided into seven tribes, probably from some sacredness in this number. The second group call themselves Aghaghā, according to Beke (*JRGS* xiv. 10). The Falashas, whose language closely resembles the Agao, are found scattered through the province of Semen and neighbouring districts, as well as in Agaomidir. They claim to be descended from Jews who came from Judæa with the Queen of Sheba, and follow the rites of Judaism. Hence they are frequently called the Jews of Abyssinia. But they are certainly not Jews by descent, nor are their features Semitic, since in physiognomy they closely resemble the Agaos. Possibly their Jewish faith is the survival of some earlier diffusion of Judaism through Abyssinia before the introduction of Christianity, as there is no record of their conversion. They are divided into three sects, each with its high priest; they hold themselves aloof from the other peoples of the land, do not practise polygamy, and never marry out of their own tribe. Entering a Christian house is strictly forbidden; when this has been done, ritual purification is necessary. Their places of worship or *masjīds* are distinguished by a red earthenware pot placed on a pinnacle. They are divided into three compartments, each of different sanctity, as in the Jewish tabernacle, and admission to each is strictly regulated by the Levitical law. Behind is a small enclosure with a stone on which sacrificial victims are slaughtered. Though they have incorporated with their customs several ceremonies drawn from Christian sources, they carefully observe the Law, especially in the ritual of purification and of feasts and keeping the Sabbath. Some of their sacrifices, however, differ from those of the Jewish law. They observe great ritual scrupulosity. The dying and the unclean are taken to a hut set apart for this purpose. They fast twice a week, as well as for forty days before Easter. Their ideas about the Messiah are vague, but they believe that Jerusalem will again be rebuilt. The priests must observe several tabus from which the people are free; some of them are great ascetics, passing years in dismal swamps, and sometimes in a frenzy throwing themselves into the waters. As a people the Falashas are inoffensive. They are devoted to agriculture, are metal-workers, and furnish skilful artisans in various towns of the province (see D'Abbadie in *Nouvelles Annales des Voyages*, iii. 84 ff.; Stern, *Wanderings among the Falashas*, 1862; Beke, *JRGS* xiv. 8).

3. The other branches of the Agaos were pagans, or possibly pagans with a veneer of Judaism, as the name of their queen, Judith, would suggest, until the advent of the Portuguese missionaries in the 16th and 17th centuries. By them they were in part converted to Christianity of a nominal type, and the process was probably completed by their final subjugation to the Abyssinian emperors. Like the rest of the Abyssinians, they are of the Monophysite sect, and assert their orthodoxy as strongly as any; but it is probable that, beneath their nominal adhesion to the faith, there are many

survivals of their earlier paganism with its cult of sun and moon, trees, rivers, and animals, of which the cow was the chief. No complete account of that primitive paganism is now available, but it was evidently nature-worship of no high order, and in its observances the fertility of the land was aimed at. Hence the worship of rivers, and especially of the Takkazē and Abai, was prominent. Survivals of these rites are described by Lobo and Bruce. The springs from which the Nile rises were the scene of an annual gathering of the tribes for this cult. A small mound formed the altar upon which the sacrifices were placed. To this place once a year, on the appearance of the star Sirius, the *shum* or priest called the heads of the Agao clans. A black heifer which had never borne a calf was slain, its head cut off and plunged into one of the springs, and then wrapped up in the hide, which was sprinkled with the sacred water. The carcase was laid on the mound, washed with water, and divided into as many pieces as there were heads of clans. Each head received a piece, and the flesh was eaten raw, with draughts of the Nile water. Lobo says that each then sacrificed one or more cows. The bones were collected into a heap, and the priest, having anointed himself with the fat, sat down on the heap, which was then set on fire. As the flames increased, he harangued them, the fire doing him no injury. When all was consumed, each person present made him an offering. The head of the animal was carried to a cave, where other ceremonies were performed, apparently for the purpose of ensuring rain and good seasons. The spirit of the river was called by the highest Divine names—Eye of the World, the Everlasting God, etc., and the priest told Bruce that it had appeared to him in bodily shape like a venerable man (Lobo, *Voyage to Abyssinia*, Eng. tr. 1735, 99; Bruce, *Travels*, iii. 730). This cult is obviously based upon the importance of the river to the whole region through which it passes, and is not unlike the rites performed by the ancient Egyptians at the rising of the Nile and the appearance of Sirius, the star of Isis (Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, 228). Similar rites were practised by other tribes (*La grande Encyc.* i. 177), and human sacrifices to river-divinities are also spoken of; these also occurred in Egypt (Johnston, *Travels in S. Abyssinia*, 119). A modified form of these rites still prevailed in Beke's time (1804), and sick persons are still brought to the sources of the Abai, and left there for seven days in hope of their recovery (Beke, *JRGS* xiv. 13). Serpent-worship was prevalent in Abyssinia in earlier times, and a great serpent called Arwē figures in the early history of the people. Some remains of this cult are found among the Agaos. The preservation of serpents was prayed for; they were believed to give oracles, and in some cases they were kept in the houses of the people and fed. If the animal did not eat, ill-luck was at hand (Bruce, iii. 732–4). Miraculous stories of serpents are found in the legendary lives of Abyssinian saints (Parkyns, *Life in Abyssinia*, 298). Other relics of earlier animal-worship may be seen in the claim of the Agaos of Lasta to understand the language of birds, by the interpretation of which they regulate their affairs (Plowden, *Travels in Abyssinia*, 124). The Falashas, on account of their skill in metal working, and some of the Agaos, are regarded as sorcerers and *bandas* or wer-wolves. They are believed to take possession of their victims, who exhibit curious symptoms of hysteria, and try to get into the forest, where their persecutor, in hyæna shape, devours them (see LYCANTHROPY).

4. The Khamaants, scattered through Amhara and Shoa, claim descent from Moses, but are regarded as pagans by both the Falashas and the Abyssinians. They are said to believe in God and in a future state, but are called worshippers of forests from the rites performed by them under trees. Other 'secret acts of devotion' at certain rocks are also spoken of. A scheme of King Theodore's for their compulsory conversion was overruled by his advisers (Stern, 43; *La grande Encyc.* i. 177; Reclus, *Univ. Geog.* x. 147). It is uncertain whether the Waito, dwelling on the eastern shore of Lake Tānā, belong to the Agao race. They speak the Agao language, but are an extremely primitive people, supporting themselves by hunting and fishing, and eating animals regarded by the other tribes as unclean. By them, therefore, they are called 'idolaters,' a vague term, but they call themselves Christians (Keane, *Africa*, 494; St. Martin, *Géog. Univ.* i. 36).

LITERATURE.—F. Jer. Lobo, *Voyage to Abyssinia*, 1735; James Bruce, *Travels to discover the Source of the Nile*, 1790; C. T. Beke, various papers in *JRGS*, vols. x. xii. xiv.; Antoine d'Abbadie, papers contributed to various Journals; H. A. Stern, *Wanderings among the Falashas in Abyssinia*, 1862; V. de Saint-Martin, *Nouveau Dict. de Géog. Universelle*, 1879, *s.v.* 'Agaos'; A. H. Keane, *Africa*, vol. i. 1895, *Ethnology*[2] 1901.

J. A. MACCULLOCH.

AGAPE.—

i. Summary of theories.
ii. Evidence for Christian common meals and for their connexion with the Eucharist:
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  2. Ecclesiastical writings to the end of the 3rd cent.; *Didache*; Ignatius; Pliny; Justin Martyr; Celsus; Minucius Felix; Lucian; *Epistle to Diognetus*; *Acts of Paul and Thecla*; *Acts of Perpetua and Felicitas*; Irenæus; Clement of Alexandria; Tertullian; *Canons of Hippolytus*; *Acts of James and Marianus*; Origen; Cyprian; *Acts of Pionius*; the older *Didascalia*.
  3. Writings of 4th cent. and later: 'Church Orders'; Councils of Laodicea, Carthage No. 3, Gangra; pseudo-Pionius; Chrysostom; pseudo-Jerome; Theodoret; Augustine; Socrates; Sozomen; Trullan Council.
  4. Funeral and commemorative Agapæ.
  5. Archæological and epigraphic evidence.
iii. Review of the evidence.
  (*a*) General deductions.
  (*b*) Relative order of Agape and Eucharist when united.
  (*c*) The name 'Agape.'
  (*d*) Materials for the Agape.
iv. Origin of the Agape.
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i. SUMMARY OF THEORIES. — The Christian Agape or Love-Feast is one of those subjects which are apparently easy, but which are shown by careful study to be exceedingly difficult. At one time there was little doubt about its origin and history; but in the last few years it has attracted much attention, not only in Great Britain and in Germany, but also more especially in France; and views which were formerly held almost as a matter of course have been emphatically called in question, with the result that there is at present nothing like unanimity among scholars as to the origin and history of this curious custom of Christian antiquity. It may be well, by way of preface, to state briefly, and as far as possible in general terms, the views that have been put forward, classing together those which differ only in minor details. (*a*) The view which was almost universal, and which is still by far the most common, is that from the first the Christians celebrated the Eucharist and also a common meal to which some liturgical importance was attached, and which was called, from at least the latter part of the 1st cent., the 'Agape'; that the Eucharist and the Agape were at first united, but that, by reason either of abuses or of external persecution, they were disjoined at some time in the latter half of the 1st or the first quarter of the 2nd cent., though the time of the separation was not the same in all countries. (*b*) An entirely different view has lately (1902) been published by Mgr. Batiffol, who thinks that the Agape itself did not exist till the 3rd cent.,

beginning as a private charity supper, and becoming a more public organization in the 4th cent.; that though in the earliest ages the Christians sometimes had meals in common, these did not, except as an abuse, have any connexion with the Eucharist, and that the name 'Agape' in writings of the first two centuries was another designation of the Eucharist itself. (*c*) A view which has found much favour in Germany is that the Agape was the original institution, and that the Eucharist itself grew out of it, or that there was no real distinction between them (Spitta, Jülicher). (*d*) Ladeuze and Ermoni consider that both the Agape and the Eucharist are Apostolic, but that they were in reality perfectly distinct rites, though sometimes joined as in 1 Co 11. (*e*) Dean Armitage Robinson and a writer in the *Church Quarterly Review* (July 1902) hold a somewhat undefined but perhaps intermediate position, being dissatisfied with the first of the views enumerated above. Dr. Robinson (*Encyc. Bibl. s.v.* 'Eucharist') suggests that every meal was probably hallowed by Eucharistic acts, especially the daily meal for the poor (Ac 6[1]), but that these should be distinguished from formal Eucharists like that in Ac 20[7]. The Christians had stated charity suppers, he thinks, parallel to those of Greek guilds; these cannot always be distinguished from Eucharists. The Eucharist was gradually separated from a common meal; the original institution developed in two ways, liturgically into the Eucharist, and socially into the Supper; and the more these two sides developed, the more decided became the separation. Such are the various theories that have been maintained; we shall return to them when we have cited the evidence.

ii. Evidence for Christian common meals and for their connexion with or separation from the Eucharist.—It is proposed to gather together here all the evidence; for it seems unreasonable to put out of view, as is suggested by the *Church Quarterly* Reviewer, all evidence of suppers where the word 'Agape' is not found. We shall discuss later the name 'Agape' itself; here it may be remarked that the most important matter to be considered is the thing implied. The name need not necessarily have been universal; or, if it was universal, there is no special reason why it should have been mentioned in all the authorities, many of whom allude only incidentally to the custom now under discussion.

1. The New Testament.—(*a*) We may first take Acts, as indicating the earliest Christian customs, though the book itself was written later than 1 Corinthians, which we will next consider. In neither of these books is the *name* 'Agape' mentioned, but in Acts probably, and in 1 Corinthians certainly, there are allusions to a common meal having some connexion with the Eucharist. In Ac 2[42] we read that the Christians continued steadfastly in the Apostles' teaching and fellowship (*κοινωνία*) — or perhaps 'in fellowship' — in the breaking of bread and the prayers (*τῇ κλάσει τοῦ ἄρτου καὶ ταῖς προσευχαῖς*), and in v.[46], that they 'day by day continuing . . . in the temple, and breaking bread at home (*κλῶντές τε κατ' οἶκον ἄρτον*), did take their food (*τροφῆς*) with gladness and singleness of heart, praising God,' etc. The expression 'to break bread' is found also in Ac 20[7. 11], where St. Paul, at Troas, after preaching till midnight on the 'first day of the week,' and after the Eutychus incident, broke bread and ate (*κλάσας τὸν ἄρτον καὶ γευσάμενος*), and 'talked with them . . . till break of day'—apparently an Eucharist with or without a meal, though Alford (*Gr. Test. in loc.*) and Bp. J. Wordsworth (*Ministry of Grace*, p. 316) think that *γευσάμενος* certainly means a meal (cf. Ac 10[10]),—and in Ac 27[35] where an ordinary meal is almost certainly spoken of. The phrase was used by the Jews (Jer 16[7], La 4[4]), and we find it, or the corresponding substantive, in NT in connexion with the Feedings (Mt 14[19] 15[36] and ‖ Mk.), the meal at Emmaus (Lk 24[35]), and the Eucharist (Mt 26[26] and ‖ Mk. Lk. and 1 Co 10[16] 11[24], in the last of which verses, however, *κλώμενον* agreeing with *σῶμα* must doubtless be omitted, with ABCℵ). In view of these facts, we must conclude that 'to break bread' (*κλάσαι ἄρτον* or *τὸν ἄ.*) was used in the Apostolic age sometimes of an ordinary meal and sometimes as a technical name of the Eucharist, or perhaps of the Eucharist and a meal combined. In Ac 2[42] the article ('*the* breaking of bread') shows that an ordinary meal is not meant, and we have to take the reference to be to the Eucharist, with or without a religious meal eaten in common, and the word 'food' (*τροφή*) in v.[46] will probably lead us to think that the Eucharist *with* a meal is meant. The Peshitta reading in v.[42] ('the breaking of the Eucharist') goes the other way, but seems to be a mere gloss due to later ideas. The phrase *κατ' οἶκον* in v.[46] (*i.e.* 'at home' or 'in a private house') has probably no bearing on the matter, as being merely opposed to 'the Temple'; it is not likely that there is any reference to a supposed custom of going from house to house to partake of a common meal.

(*b*) In 1 Co 11[17-34] we have an undoubted reference to a meal taken in common (*δεῖπνον*, probably, though not necessarily, an *evening* meal) and combined with the Eucharist, when the Corinthians were in meeting assembled (*ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ*, v.[18]); abuses of greed and drunkenness are censured, and St. Paul promises to 'set the rest in order' whensoever he comes. From this passage most writers have concluded that the earliest custom was for the Christians to combine the Eucharist with a meal taken in common. Lightfoot (*Apost. Fath.*[2] pt. 2, ii. 313) and Duchesne (*Origines*, p. 48, in Eng. ed. p. 49 n.) further deduce that the meal came first and the Eucharist 'at a late stage in the entertainment'; this (apparently) being suggested by the emphasis laid by St. Paul on our Lord's having taken the Eucharistic cup 'after supper' (*μετὰ τὸ δειπνῆσαι*, v.[25]). Batiffol (*Études*, 1st ser. p. 281) thinks that the union of meal and Eucharist was an innovation of the Corinthians, and that it is the union itself that St. Paul censures. If so, we cannot argue any common custom from this passage. Against this view, Ermoni (*L'Agapé*, p. 9 ff.) truly remarks that St. Paul does not attack the thing itself, but only the abuse of greed and drunkenness, seeing that each one ate what he had brought, not partaking with others. St. Paul would not, Ermoni says, have bidden them wait for one another if the meal itself, in union with the Eucharist, were the thing condemned. All knew that the Eucharist began when the community were assembled. And, further, the Fathers who comment on the passage all see in it the Agape and Eucharist combined, — Chrysostom, Theodoret, Augustine, Jerome,—though Chrysostom, imbued as he is with the discipline of his own time (of fasting communion), puts the Eucharist first; Augustine says that it was St. Paul that gave the rule of fasting communion in consequence of the abuse at Corinth (*Ep.* cxviii. [liv., Bened.] *ad Januarium*, § 8).

(*c*) In Jude, and probably in 2 Peter, we have the first trace of the *name* 'Agape.' In Jude[12] we read of 'hidden rocks in your love-feasts when they feast with you, shepherds that without fear feed themselves' (*οἱ ἐν ταῖς ἀγάπαις ὑμῶν σπιλάδες, συνευωχούμενοι, κ.τ.λ.*). The reading *ἀγάπαις* (BKLℵ, etc.) is no doubt correct, and is supported by the

Vulgate (*epulis*) and the Syriac (ܒܢܝܗ̈ܘܗ̇ܝ), but AC have ἀπάταις, influenced by the *v.l.* in 2 P 2^{13}. Here, then, we have a common feast called Agape, but nothing is said of the Eucharist. There is no necessary connexion of the feast with the Eucharist in Jude, nor yet any necessary separation. Batiffol endeavours to get over this witness to the Agape by translating ἀγάπαι by 'love,' saying that Jude elsewhere has ἀγάπη in this sense (v.[21]; cf. ἀγαπητοί, vv.[3. 17]), and that he uses plurals for singulars elsewhere,—in v.[8] δόξας (Vulg. *majestatem*, Syr. also has singular), and in v.[13] αἰσχύνας (Vulg. *confusiones*, but Syr. has singular). There is, however, no reason for taking these plurals as singular in meaning; in the former case 'dignities' makes the only good sense, and in the latter the plural, as meaning 'each his own shame,' is very suitable. Thus Batiffol's translation in v.[12] can hardly be accepted. But in any case the common feast itself (if not the name 'Agape') is borne witness to by Jude. In the parallel passage 2 P 2^{13} we have at least one variation: 'Spots (σπῖλοι) and blemishes, revelling in their love-feasts (ἀγάπαις) while they feast with you' (συνευωχούμενοι ὑμῖν). Here we note the variation of σπιλάδες and σπῖλοι; and the reading ἀγάπαις, which is supported by B and by the A corrector, the Vulgate, Pocock's Syriac (the Peshitta does not contain Jude or 2 Peter), Sahidic, and Ethiopic, is disputed by A*C, which have ἀπάταις both here and in Jude. Deissmann (*Bibl. Stud.* p. 365) and Batiffol (*op. cit.* p. 283) assume the latter to be the true reading without even mentioning the former; and Batiffol builds an argument on ἀπάταις—that the writer of 2 Peter did not see any reference to the Agape in the Jude passage that was before him. On the other hand, Lightfoot (*op. cit.* ii. 313) and Bigg (*Internat. Crit. Com. in loc.*) treat ἀπάταις as an obvious error; and this is probably true, ΑΓΑΠΑΙΣ passing very easily into ΑΠΑΤΑΙΣ.

2. Ecclesiastical writings up to A.D. 300.—(*a*) We may pass over Clement of Rome (though his mention in § 44 of the presbyters 'offering the gifts of the episcopate' is thought by Lightfoot to include contributions to the Agape) and come to the *Didache*, which, in common with almost all writers, we may date very early in the 2nd century. In this work (§ 9) we find, after instructions on baptism, fasting, and prayer, directions for the 'Eucharist' (περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐχαριστίας οὕτω εὐχαριστήσατε), with thanksgivings first over the cup and then over the 'broken bread' (κλάσμα); to the latter is attached a prayer that the Church may be gathered together. In these formulas we have no reference to our Lord's words at the Last Supper, or to the sacrament of His body and blood; nor is there anything in common between them and the Eucharistic passages of Ignatius and Justin Martyr. After them follows a prohibition against any of the unbaptized eating and drinking of the 'Eucharist,' and we then read (§ 10): 'After ye are *satisfied* (μετὰ τὸ ἐμπλησθῆναι), thus give ye thanks,' and the thanksgiving is for God's holy name, for the 'knowledge, faith, and immortality made known,' for God's power, and because the Creator had given food and drink for enjoyment (εἰς ἀπόλαυσιν), and had bestowed spiritual food and drink and eternal life. A prayer is added for the protection and gathering in of the Church, ending with 'Hosanna.' Then comes a 'fencing of the tables' and 'Maranatha.' But prophets may 'give thanks' as much as they desire (εὐχαριστεῖν ὅσα θέλουσιν). Of all this there are many interpretations. Batiffol (*op. cit.* p. 284) thinks that the Eucharist alone is here referred to; he takes the words 'after ye are satisfied' metaphorically, as a souvenir of Jn 6^{12} (though that tells against his view). He considers that as only the cup and the bread are mentioned, we cannot have here an Agape; while in the thanksgiving after 'being satisfied' spiritual nourishment is spoken of, which would be inapplicable to an Agape. Dom Leclercq also (*Dict. d'Archéol. Chrét., s.v.* 'Agape,' col. 792) thinks that the *Didache* does not mention the Agape, but that it does not contradict the supposition of its existence; he does not, however, consider that the first formulas are the words used to *consecrate* the bread and wine. Mr. Box likewise (*JThSt*, iii. 363 ff.) holds that the *Didache* formulas are for the Eucharist, but he believes that the Agape followed the Eucharist and must be inserted before the words 'after ye are satisfied.' Prof. Ermoni, on the other hand, holds (*op. cit.* p. 17 ff.) that, as the *Didache* in § 14 speaks of the Sunday Eucharist ('gather yourselves together and break bread and give thanks,—*or* celebrate the Eucharist, εὐχαριστήσατε,—first confessing your transgressions, that your sacrifice may be pure'), the earlier sections must speak only of the Agape; and he concludes that the two ordinances were then separate, all the baptized being allowed to attend the Agape, but only the pure and holy (§ 15) the Eucharist. He takes εὐχαριστία in §§ 9, 10 as meaning no more than 'thanksgiving.' None of these theories appears to be so probable as that of Bp. Lightfoot (*op. cit.* ii. 313) and Dr. Keating (*The Agape*, p. 53), that the *Didache* writer means that the Agape was joined on to and preceded the Eucharist. The reference in §§ 9, 10 would then be to the two combined; the mention of the Sunday *synaxis* in § 14 does not really militate against this. The Agape probably, in the *Didache* as in 1 Co 11, came first, with the formulas given there as graces before and after meat (so Bp. J. Wordsworth, *Holy Communion*, p. 46); and after the people were satisfied came the fencing of the tables (§ 10 *s.f.*), which, as Zahn (*Forsch. zur Gesch. des NT Kanons*, 3rd pt. p. 293 f.) suggests, would be the connecting link between Agape and Eucharist. The prayers for the Eucharist, on this view, are not given; but prophets might use any words which they thought suitable. It is not improbable that the earliest Eucharistic worship was, in the main, extemporaneous. This theory makes εὐχαριστία in the *Didache* include the Agape. As the common meal was holy and so closely joined to the Eucharist, there was not in the thought of the writer such a sharp distinction between the two that one name might not be applied to both (cf. Ignatius below), or that the meal itself should not be conceived of as giving a spiritual blessing, as in the thanksgiving 'after being satisfied.' It is remarkable that the writer of the *Apostolic Constitutions* (vii. 25 f.), owing to the changed conditions of his day, in adapting the *Didache* turns this thanksgiving into a thanksgiving 'after partaking' (μετάλημψιν) of the Eucharist.—There is another passage in the *Didache* (§ 11) which should be noticed. A prophet who 'orders a table (ὁρίζων τράπεζαν) in the Spirit' must not eat of it. The Eucharist therefore cannot be referred to. The phrase may be applied to an Agape, but Batiffol is probably right in thinking that merely gifts to the poor are meant, and that there is nothing liturgical about this passage.

(*b*) Ignatius (*c.* 110 A.D.) speaks (*Ephes.* 20) of 'breaking one bread, which is the medicine of immortality and the antidote that we should not die but live for ever in Jesus Christ'; and in *Rom.* 7 says: 'I desire the bread of God, which is the flesh of Christ . . . and for a draught I desire His blood, which is love (ἀγάπη) incorruptible' (see below, iii. *c*). In *Smyrn.* 8 he says: 'Let that be a valid Eucharist which is under the bishop . . . it is not lawful apart from the bishop either to baptize or

to hold a love-feast (*οὔτε ἀγάπην ποιεῖν*).' In the first two passages Ignatius clearly speaks of the Eucharist, and it is remarkable that he uses *ἀγάπη* in connexion with it; while the most obvious interpretation of the last passage is that *ἀγάπη* includes both the love-feast and the Eucharist, which would therefore be held together in Ignatius' time. This is Lightfoot's conclusion (*op. cit.* i. 400 f., ii. 312 f.). But Batiffol takes *ἀγάπη* here of the Eucharist, 'par une abstraction,' and thinks that the metaphorical use of the word in *Rom.* 7 bears out his view. He denies that 'Agape' was at this early time used of a feast. He also says that the 4th cent. interpolator of Ignatius took the words in question to mean the Eucharist [the interpolator being probably the writer of the *Apostolic Constitutions*, see Brightman, *Lit. E. and W.* p. xxxiv ff., though Lightfoot gives an argument to the contrary, *op. cit.* i. 265 n.]. The interpolator has, 'not to baptize, nor to make an oblation (*προσφέρειν*), nor to offer (*προσκομίζειν*) sacrifice, nor to celebrate a feast (*δοχήν*).' Here the Eucharist and the love-feast are spoken of as quite separate. This was obviously the case in the 4th cent., and the interpolator is only introducing the customs of his own day; but this has no bearing on the sense of the true Ignatius [*δοχή* = *ἀγάπη* frequently in the 4th cent., see, *e.g.*, Lightfoot, ii. 312, and below (*r*)]. Robinson (*Encyc. Bibl. s.v.* 'Eucharist') does not think that Eucharist and Agape are in Ignatius convertible terms; if, he says, the Agape required the presence or sanction of the bishop, *a fortiori* so would the Eucharist. This does not really explain why Ignatius should join baptism and the Agape without mentioning the Eucharist, as would be the case if his *ἀγάπη* does not include the Eucharist. Lightfoot's opinion, then, seems to be by far the most probable. The phrase 'to baptize and hold the Agape' would be nearly equivalent to Tertullian's 'to dip and offer.' A woman may not, that Father says, 'tinguere nec offerre,' *i.e.* baptize or celebrate the Eucharist (*de Virg. Vel.* 9; cf. *de Exh. Cast.* 7: 'et offers et tinguis et sacerdos es tibi solus').

(*c*) Pliny's letter (*Ep.* xcvi.) to Trajan (A.D. 112) may next be considered, so far as it bears on the Agape. He says that certain Christian renegades had stated to him that the Christians were wont on a fixed day (*stato die*) to assemble before dawn and to repeat antiphonally a hymn to Christ as to a god, and to bind themselves by an oath (*sacramento*) not to commit any wrong . . . ; which done, they had been accustomed to separate and to come together again to take food, but that ordinary and innocent (*promiscuum tamen et innoxium*); and even this they had ceased to do after [Pliny's] edict, in which he had forbidden guilds (*hetærias*) according to [Trajan's] command. Thus there was a morning religious service and a meal later in the day (which, however, was innocent, and gave no countenance to the charge of indiscriminate immorality made against the Christians), and the second meeting was given up. Various views of the meaning of this passage have been held. With Lightfoot (*op. cit.* i. 13 ff., 50 ff.,—a long and careful account,—ii. 313) and Probst (*Lehre und Gebet*, p. 350 f.), we may consider the morning service to have been the Eucharist, and that there is some confusion between the double meaning of the word *sacramentum* ('oath' and 'sacrament'), or that the two sacraments of baptism and the Eucharist are confused; while the later meeting was for the Agape, which, in consequence of Trajan's action, was given up in Bithynia. The separation between Agape and Eucharist would either have taken place some time before Pliny,—perhaps, as Probst thinks (following Augustine), in St. Paul's time,—or else have been recent, and due to Trajan's well-known hostility to clubs. It is inconceivable that the Christians should have given up the Eucharist, and this consideration is against Batiffol's idea (*op. cit.* p. 288), that the first meeting was only for praise and prayer, and the second only for the Eucharist,—that being the meaning, he says, of 'ordinary and innocent food,'—the Agape not yet existing. He thinks that the Eucharist no less than the Agape would be contrary to Trajan's edict; and that, had the Eucharist been celebrated at the morning meeting, the apostates would have said so, for they had no reason for hiding anything. Dr. Armitage Robinson thinks (*op. cit.* § 17) that we cannot deduce from Pliny's letter that the Eucharist and the Agape had once been united, and that they were at that time, or had been at some previous time, separated; he considers that the renegades had given up the common meal, but that the Christians, as far as we know, had given up nothing. The renegades, however, had given up Christianity altogether, and they spoke of what had been given up before the persecution broke out,—they can hardly refer to any but the whole body of Christians in Bithynia. Dom Leclercq (*op. cit.* col. 795) thinks that the early meeting was the one which was given up; but the Latin will hardly bear this construction. None of these criticisms seems to the present writer to have shaken Lightfoot's position,

(*d*) Justin Martyr (*Apol.* 65–67) openly describes the Eucharist; for, as Batiffol shows (*Etudes*, 1st ser. p. 18), the *disciplina arcani* hardly existed in his day; but he does not mention the Agape. Leclercq (*op. cit.* col. 796) thinks that his silence does not exclude it, for he had only to defend what was attacked. But surely the Agape was a ground of attack? Keating (*op. cit.* p. 59) thinks that it had been given up generally, because of Trajan's edict; and with this opinion we may agree. The unessential nature and partial existence of the Agape are the conclusions to which the early evidence points.

(*e*) The date of Celsus is disputed. Keim, Funk, Aubé, Renan, and Mozley place it *c.* 177 A.D. For a careful discussion see Lightfoot, *Ap. Fath.* pt. 2, i. 530 f.; he gives reasons for thinking that the date should be put before A.D. 161. Origen (*c. Cels.* i. 1) says that Celsus' first accusation against the Christians was 'that they were accustomed to hold secret meetings among themselves, forbidden by the laws (*ὡς συνθήκας κρύβδην πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιουμένων, κ.τ.λ.*). . . . And he would calumniate the so-called Agape of the Christians among themselves (*καὶ βούλεται διαβαλεῖν τὴν καλουμένην ἀγάπην Χριστιάνων πρὸς ἀλλήλους*) as taking its rise from the common danger,' etc. Batiffol (Letter in the *Guardian*, Jan. 7, 1903) argues that *ἀγάπη* must mean 'love' here, since *πρὸς ἀλλήλους* follows. No doubt the phrase 'Agape among themselves' is not an elegant one, but Batiffol's interpretation makes *καλουμένην* meaningless; 'so-called love' has no sense. The expression is parallel to the phrase above (*συνθήκας κρύβδην πρ. ἀλλ.*). May there not be a *double entendre* in the second phrase, the word *ἀγάπη* being used in its technical sense, with an ironical reference to the primary one? Celsus would mean 'the so-called Agape of the Christians, the feast of mutual love.' He could not intend to condemn Christian love as 'arising from the common danger and having a power that transcends oaths.' Origen clearly understands him to refer to the Agape, and this seems to be the only possible meaning of his words.

(*f*) Minucius Felix (for the date see Lightfoot, *op. cit.* i. 534, who puts it at *c.* 160 A.D.; and Salmon in Smith-Wace, *Dict. Chr. Biog.*, who puts it at 234; Keim gives 177) combats accusations of the heathen with regard to Christian assemblies. He

says (*Octavius*, xxxi. 5): 'The feasts (*convivia*) which we hold (*colimus*) are chaste and temperate; we neither indulge ourselves in luxurious repasts (*epulis*) nor protract our feast (*convivium*) with strong drink, but we blend cheerfulness with gravity.' This can only refer to a meal, not to the Eucharist, to which the accusations of drunkenness and greed could not refer, though Batiffol thinks that Minucius is here alluding to it alone.

(*g*) Lucian in his satire *de Morte Peregrini*, § 12 (written probably not long after A.D. 165, Lightfoot, *op. cit.* i. 141, 345), says that when Peregrinus was in prison, 'old women—widows they are called—and orphan children might be seen waiting about the doors of the prison. . . . Then various meals were brought in and sacred formularies (λόγοι ἱεροί) of theirs were repeated.' Whether Lucian was primarily satirizing the Christians or the Cynics, we have probably here, as elsewhere, allusions to Christian history and customs, and in this case to the Agape (see below, *i*).

(*h*) The *Epistle to Diognetus* (date uncertain; probably *c.* 170 A.D., though some argue for a later date) says of the Christians that 'they partake of the same table, not of the same bed' (τράπεζαν κοινὴν παρατίθενται, ἀλλ' οὐ κοίτην), evidently alluding to the accusation of Œdipodean incests made against the Christians. As Leclercq (*op. cit.* col. 796) observes, this accusation seems to refer to the Agape, while that of Thyestean banquets refers to the Eucharist, the feeding on the body and blood of Christ being misunderstood; and the τράπεζα κοινή would apply less to an Eucharist than to a repast where the guests lay at meat, there being a paronomasia between κοινή and κοίτη.

(*i*) In some texts of the *Acts of Paul and Thecla* (§ 25), in connexion with a meal of bread with vegetables, salt, and water, we read: 'There was within the tomb a great Agape' (or 'much love,' ἀγάπη πολλή, Lat. *gaudium magnum*). But in the uncertainty as to the date of the writing, which has probably a very early substratum, though in its present form it is a late work, we can lay no stress on this quotation, especially for the name 'Agape' (see Ramsay, *Ch. in Rom. Emp.* ch. xvi.; also Conybeare, *Mon. of Early Christianity*, p. 75, who strangely takes this meal for a primitive Eucharist). —In the *Acts of Perpetua and Felicitas* (§ 17, Ruinart, *Act. Mart. Sinc.*[2] p. 100), which must be dated probably at the very end of the 2nd cent., we have a reference to the custom of publicly entertaining at a free meal those condemned to wild beasts (cf. Tertullian, *Apol.* 42 [*Patr. Lat.* i. 556]). Perpetua and her companions turned the entertainment into an Agape ('non cœnam liberam sed agapen cœnarent').

(*j*) Irenæus does not mention the Agape. Dom Leclercq (*op. cit.* col. 796) thinks that this does not exclude its existence in Gaul; this Father's treatise being an exposition of Christian doctrine, no mention of the Agape is to be expected. And Dr. Keating comes to the same conclusion, believing that no connexion between Agape and Eucharist had survived in Gaul. But Batiffol takes Irenæus' silence as disproving the existence of the Agape anywhere.

(*k*) Clement of Alexandria undoubtedly refers to meals taken in common, and to their being called 'Agapæ.' He denounces the drunkenness and greed which disgraced some such repasts (*Pæd.* ii. 1): 'They . . . dare to apply the name Agape to pitiful suppers redolent of savour and sauces, dishonouring the good and saving work of the Word, the consecrated Agape, with pots and pourings of sauce. . . . Gatherings for the sake of mirth . . . we name rightly suppers . . . but such entertainments (ἑστιάσεις) the Lord has not called Agapæ.' So in *Strom.* iii. 2 he denounces the licentiousness of the feasts of some heretics (perhaps the cause of the heathen slanders), and says that he will not call them 'Agapæ.' According to the *Church Quarterly* Reviewer (July 1902, p. 500), Clement protests against the use of the word 'Agape' at all for common meals, and not only against its application to these feasts of drunkenness and revelling; but this hardly appears from Clement's own words. A more probable interpretation is that meals taken in common were ordinarily called 'Agapæ' in his time, and that he would not allow the name where abuses were rife. In any case, he is a witness for the ordinary use of the name, whether he approved of it or not. For Clement and the Agape see Bigg's *Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, p. 102 f. He inclines to the idea that the Eucharist and the Agape were celebrated together in Clement's time at Alexandria, in the evening. In connexion with the passages from Jude and 2 Peter, Dr. Bigg points out (*Internat. Crit. Com. in loc.*) that Clement uses εὐωχία of the Agape (*Pæd.* ii. 1), which he also calls ἡ ἐν λόγῳ τρυφή (*ib.* 12, aliter 1), using τρ. in a good sense as opposed to ἡδονή, the pleasure of eating and drinking; though it is also just possible, as Dr. Keating suggests (*The Agape*, p. 86), that Clement is referring by this latter phrase to the Eucharist as preceding the Agape ('public banquets *after* the rich fare which is in the Word,' μετὰ τὴν ἐν λόγῳ τρυφήν). But see below, iii. (*b*).

(*l*) Tertullian refers more than once to the Agape, or as he also, translating, calls it, 'dilectio.' He gives a full account of it in *Apol.* 39 (*Patr. Lat.* i. 531 ff.), and says: 'Among the Greeks our supper is called *dilectio*.' In § 9 he had dealt with Thyestean banquets; in § 39 he returns to the heathen accusations, dealing with the charge of incest, and the words used (*e.g.* 'triclinium,' 'discumbere,' 'cœnula') show that a meal in common is referred to, though Batiffol understands him to be speaking symbolically of the Eucharist throughout. In the treatise *ad Martyres* (§ 2, *Patr. Lat.* i. 696), Tertullian speaks of the consolations of Christians in prison 'through the care of the Church, the brethren's Agape' (cf. *Acts of Perpetua*, above); but here the meaning probably is 'love' merely, though the Greek word is used. In his Montanist days he brings against the Catholics the very accusations which he had refuted in his *Apologeticus*. In *de Jejuniis*, 17 (*Patr. Lat.* ii. 1029, *c.* 217 A.D. ?), he accuses them of licentiousness in the Agape: 'Apud te agape in cacabis fervet: fides in culinis calet, spes in ferculis iacet. *Sed maior his est agape*, qui per hanc adolescentes tui cum sororibus dormiunt,' etc. This cannot possibly refer to the Eucharist.—Tertullian's style is so difficult that it is not surprising if scholars do not agree in interpreting his words; but it is hard to escape the conclusion, especially from the *Apologeticus* passage, that the Agape, as we generally understand the term, was in common use in his time. We read here of preliminary prayers, sitting at meat, handwashing, the lighting of the lamps, psalms and hymns, prayer and dismissal; a collection was taken for the poor. This description shows that the Agape was held in the evening. On the other hand, the Eucharist in Tertullian's time was in the morning (*de Cor. Mil.* 3 [*Patr. Lat.* ii. 99], *etiam antelucanis coetibus*, where *etiam* perhaps means that the usual custom was to celebrate the Eucharist *after* dawn, save in time of persecution; cf. *de Fuga in Persec.* 14 [*Patr. Lat.* ii. 141], where the same is implied; see J. Wordsworth, *Min. of Grace*, p. 317). For a full discussion of Tertullian and the Agape, see Keating, p. 62 ff., Batiffol, p. 291 ff., Leclercq, col. 802 ff.; Ermoni, p. 28 ff.

(*m*) There is not much that need detain us after

this till the end of the 3rd cent., but the *Canons of Hippolytus* are important as introducing a whole series of 4th cent. 'Church Orders,' which are, as some think, derived from these *Canons*, or more probably are their collateral descendants. For the date, etc., see Achelis, *Die Canones Hippolyti* (*TU* vi. 4), p. 212 ff., and Funk, *Didasc. et Const. Ap.*, 1906. The latter thinks that the *Canons* are of the 6th cent. or later, and derived from *Apost. Const.* bk. viii.; but most writers take them to be a somewhat interpolated work either of the Roman or of the Alexandrian Church early in the 3rd cent. (so Achelis, Duchesne, J. Wordsworth, Brightman, Morin). We know the work only in an Arabic translation. In these *Canons* (§§ 164–177, ed. Achelis), the Agape, 'if there is one,' is to be on Sunday at lamplighting, the bishop being present and praying, and psalms being sung; the people are to be dismissed before dark. The feast is described as 'prepared for the poor.' The catechumens receive the 'bread of exorcism' but are forbidden to eat at the 'meal of the Lord.' Christians are to eat and drink to satiety, not to drunkenness or scandal. The exhortations of the bishop at the meal (he speaks sitting) are referred to. It is not, however, correct to say that the *Canons* use the *name* 'Agape' ('in agapis κυριακαῖς,' Achelis, Haneberg); for, as Riedel (*Die Kirchenrechtsquellen des Patr. Alex.*, 1900, p. 221 ff.) points out, the Arabic *wâlîmah* does not mean anything more than a meal or feast; it is not equivalent to the technical 'Agape.'

(*n*) In the *Acts of James and Marianus* († 259 A.D.), James, speaking of the heavenly banquet and a martyr Agapius, says: 'Ad Agapium cæterorumque martyrum beatorum pergo convivium. . . . Quo cum . . . quasi ad agapen spiritu dilectionis et caritatis raperemur,' etc. (Ruinart², p. 228). Here the heavenly feast is the antitype of the earthly Agape.

(*o*) Origen, except in the quotation from Celsus given above, hardly refers to the Agape, but deals at length with the Eucharist. Probably the Agape was, at least for the time, less common in his day. We find, however, in a work ascribed to Origen, references to the funeral agapæ, for which see below, § 4.

(*p*) Cyprian (*Ep.* lxii. [lxiii.] 16, *c.* 253 A.D.) explains why the Eucharist (*dominicum*) is celebrated in the morning and not after supper. While it was right, he says, for Christ to 'offer [the mingled cup] about the evening of the day, that the very hour of sacrifice might symbolize the setting and the evening of the world,' yet 'we celebrate the resurrection of the Lord in the morning.' Elsewhere (*ad Donatum*, 16) Cyprian describes the supper in common, the 'temperate meal' (*convivium sobrium*) resounding with psalms. Thus the Agape and the Eucharist were quite distinct in his day. For other allusions to the Agape in Cyprian, see Keating, *op. cit.* p. 102 f.

(*q*) In the *Acts of Pionius*, § 3 († 250 A.D.; see Ruinart², p. 140), we read of what appears to be a Saturday Agape with solemn prayer ('facta ergo oratione solemni cum die sabbato sanctum panem et aquam degustavissent'). The 'bread and water' could not be the Eucharist.

(*r*) The older form of the *Didascalia* (as given by Dr. Hauler in the *Verona Fragments*, xxvi. p. 38), which perhaps belongs to the 3rd cent. or the beginning of the 4th, speaks of the Agape by name. It is a feast given to old women (*aniculis*); a portion is to be given to the bishop (*sacerdoti*), even if he be not present at the Agapæ and distributions (*in agapis et erogationibus*), and so also to the other clergy. Similarly the Syriac *Didascalia*, edited by Mrs. Gibson (Eng. tr. p. 48), which has 'widows' for 'old women'; and also the parallel passage of the *Apostolic Constitutions* (ii. 28, *c.* 375 A.D.), which has 'agape or entertainment' (*ἀγάπην ἤτοι δοχήν*, cf. the Ignatian interpolation above, 2 (*b*)), and expands the *Didascalia* without adding to the sense.

3. Evidence of the 4th cent. and later.—It is not disputed that in the 4th cent. there was a custom of having meals in common and of calling them 'Agapæ'; and also that the Eucharist was absolutely distinct from them.

(*a*) The 'Church Orders' make this plain. [For a description of them and for their dates, see Cooper-Maclean, *The Testament of our Lord*, pp. 7 ff., 25 ff.; Funk believes that the dates of most of them are later than those there given]. The *Egyptian Church Order* (*c.* 310 A.D.), found in the *Sahidic Ecclesiastical Canons* or *Egyptian Heptateuch*, the *Ethiopic Church Order* (*c.* 335 A.D.), found in the *Ethiopic Statutes* (lately published by Mr. Horner), and the Latin *Verona Fragments* (*c.* 340 A.D.), edited by Dr. Hauler, and the *Testament of our Lord* (*c.* 350 A.D.; some think that it was edited in its present form *c.* 400 A.D., though this seems less likely), all speak of the common meal, which the *Egyptian Church Order* and the *Verona Fragments* call 'the Lord's Supper.' They all forbid the catechumens to partake of it, though they allow them to receive the 'bread of exorcism' [Ethiopic: 'of blessing'] and a cup (the bread and cup are omitted in the *Testament*). The bishop presides and exhorts; all eat abundantly, but soberly and in silence; drunkenness is strongly forbidden, and scandal is not to be brought on the host. We must also notice that the Egyptian and Ethiopic books say that the people are each to receive a portion of bread, and 'this is a blessing, and not an Eucharist like the body of the Lord' (the *Testament* has a similar phrase). This partaking of *eulogiæ* ('blessings'), or loaves given by the people at the offertory in the Eucharist, but not consecrated, afterwards became and still is very common in the East, and it is just possible that it may be a relic of the Agape. Perhaps the 'bread of exorcism' is something of this sort. In these Church Orders the Agape is a feast provided by the rich for the whole community; but it is not represented as being merely a 'charity supper' or a form of alms to the poor.

(*b*) The Agape is mentioned in three 4th cent. Councils. That of Laodicea in Phrygia (*c.* 370?) forbade the 'so-called Agape' to be held in the Lord's houses (*κυριακοῖς*) or in churches (*can.* 28), probably because of the prevalent abuses. The Third Council of Carthage (A.D. 397) made the same rule (*can.* 30, aliter 29; following one which orders that the 'sacrament of the altar shall always be celebrated fasting' except on Maundy Thursday). The Council of Gangra in Paphlagonia (date uncertain) endeavoured to restore the Agape to its former dignity, and forbade any to despise those who in the faith solemnized it (*can.* 11). This shows that the abuses of the Agape were leading to its discontinuance in Asia Minor.

(*c*) Pseudo-Pionius' *Life of Polycarp* can be used as evidence only for the 4th cent. (see Lightfoot, *Ap. Fath.* pt. 2, iii. 429 f.). The writer relates how Polycarp visited a certain bishop named Daphnus, who made an offering in his presence to a number of brethren, and set a little cask full of wine in the midst of them, which miraculously remained full though they drank from it. Here an Agape seems to be meant.

(*d*) The comment of Chrysostom on 1 Co 11 (*Hom.* 27) does not appear to give us any sure indication about the ordinary Agape in his own day. He uses the past tense, and from his language here, if taken alone, we might have supposed that the Agape had ceased in his time. In

Hom. 22 he describes how, after instruction, prayer, and 'communion of the mysteries,' the rich had been accustomed to bring materials for a feast from their houses to the church, and to entertain the poor there. Pseudo-Jerome and Theodoret in their comments on 1 Co 11 follow Chrysostom. Their evidence is good for what was the tradition of former custom, though not necessarily for that of Apostolic times (see above, § 1). In the same *Hom.* 27 and in *Hom.* 31 Chrysostom refers to the funeral-Agape of his own day (see below, § 4).

(*e*) Augustine speaks of the Agape in his own time as a charity supper (*c. Faust.* xx. 20). Faustus the Manichæan had represented the Christians as converting the heathen sacrifices into their Agapæ. Augustine denies this, and says that the Agape is a feeding of the poor ('agapes enim nostræ pauperes pascunt') with fruits or flesh meat. But whether the Agape was in his day celebrated regularly, or only as a funeral feast (see below § 4), we cannot say.

(*f*) The Agape in Egypt in the 5th cent., united with the Eucharist, is apparently attested by Socrates and Sozomen. The former says (*HE* v. 22): 'The Egyptians near Alexandria and the inhabitants of the Thebaid hold their religious assembly on the sabbath, but do not participate in the mysteries in the manner usual among Christians in general; for, having eaten and satisfied themselves with food of all kinds, making their offering (προσφέροντες, *i.e.* celebrating the Eucharist, as often) in the evening they partake of the mysteries.' Sozomen (*HE* vii. 19) says: 'There are several cities and villages in Egypt where, contrary to the usage established elsewhere, the people meet together on sabbath evenings, and, although they have dined previously, partake of the mysteries.' [For the Saturday Agape cf. the *Acts of Pionius*, above, 2 (*q*)]. Dom Leclercq (*op. cit.* col. 822) thinks that in Socrates and Sozomen there is no trace of an Agape, only of an Eucharist. But the words 'eating and satisfying themselves' certainly point to one, and the whole object of this exceptional custom would appear to be to keep up the example of the Last Supper.

(*g*) We notice, lastly, that as late as the Trullan Council (A.D. 692) the 'African practice of receiving the Eucharist on Maundy Thursday after a meal' is disapproved (*can.* 29), and Agapæ within the churches are forbidden (*can.* 74).

4. Funeral and Commemorative Agapæ.—These should probably be treated separately from the ordinary Agapæ, as being quite distinct in origin, and as having arisen later (Duchesne, *Origines*, p. 49 n., Eng. tr.). It will be a question whether some of the references already given should not have been placed under this head. The commemorative Agape was a Christianized form of the heathen *parentalia* or festival in honour of dead relatives (cf. Augustine, *Ep.* xxix. 9 *ad Alypium*); and the custom probably was, first to celebrate the Eucharist with prayer for the departed, and later in the day to hold an Agape. In the references to this custom in Tertullian and Cyprian, the Eucharist alone is explicitly mentioned; but probably an Agape is intended as well, as the Hippolytean *Canons* show. The custom seems to have spread as the veneration for the martyrs grew.

In the *Martyrdom of Polycarp* (§ 18) the Smyrnæans look forward to 'celebrating the birthday of his martyrdom, for the commemoration of those that have already fought in the contest,' etc. But we are not told *how* the commemoration was to be celebrated. The Leucian *Acts of John* (Gnostic; *c.* 170 A.D.? or perhaps earlier) speak of going 'to the tomb to break bread' (ed. Zahn, p. 231). This may be an Agape or the Eucharist. Tertullian (*de Cor. Mil.* 3 [*Patr. Lat.* ii. 99]), immediately before describing baptism and the Eucharist, says: 'We make oblations for the departed annually for their birthdays'; and in *de Monogam.* 10 (*Patr. Lat.* ii. 992) the widow 'prays for his [her husband's] soul . . . and offers (*i.e.* the Eucharist) on the anniversary of his falling asleep.' So in *de Exhort. Cast.* 11 [*Patr. Lat.* ii. 975], addressed to a widower about his departed wife, we read: 'For whose spirit thou prayest, and for whom thou offerest annual oblations.' The *Canons of Hippolytus* (above, 2 (*m*)) have this direction (§§ 169, 170): 'If there is a memorial of the dead, before they sit (at meat) let them partake of the mysteries, though not on the first day of the week ('neque tamen die prima'). After the oblation, let the bread of exorcism be distributed to them before they sit down.' This comes after the directions for the Sunday Agape, and before general rules for meals taken in common. We may notice here that the parallel passage in the *Apostolic Constitutions* (*c.* 375 A.D.), which follows an office for the departed, refers to the commemorative feasts *only*, not to the Sunday Agape (viii. 44; Lagarde, p. 276), and rebukes faults of drunkenness. In Cyprian (*Ep.* xxxiii. [xxxix.] 3, *ad clerum* [*Patr. Lat.* iv. 323]) we read of sacrifices being offered ('sacrificia offerimus') for martyrs and their anniversaries kept, and the last words probably refer to an Agape (so elsewhere in the Epistles). For many years after Cyprian's death they danced and sang round his grave, till this was stopped by Aurelius, bishop of Carthage (Augustine, *Serm.* cccxi. 5 [*Patr. Lat.* iv. 328 f.]); a feast is probably implied. The *Commentary on Job*, ascribed to Origen (Bk. iii. p. 238, ed. Lommatsch), speaks of these commemorations of the departed as being an opportunity for feeding the poor. In the 4th cent. we have an obscure canon of Elvira in Spain (*c.* 305 A.D.), forbidding lights in cemeteries 'per diem,' as disturbing the souls of the dead (*can.* 34). This may refer to a funeral Agape; the lamplighting rather points to this. Later, Gregory of Nazianzus (*Orat.* vi. 4 ff.) and Chrysostom (*Hom.* 47, *On Julian the Martyr*) bewail the drunkenness that was rife at these entertainments (cf. also Chrys. *Hom.* 27 *in* 1 *Cor.* 11, *Hom.* 31 *in Mt.* 9). Augustine tells us of the pious custom of his mother Monica at Milan, of bringing food 'ad memorias sanctorum,' as was usual in Africa; but that Ambrose had forbidden it (*Confess.* vi. 2), no doubt because of the 'revelries and lavish repasts in cemeteries,' which Augustine himself deplores (*Ep.* xxii. 6, *ad Aurelium*). He forbade these commemorative feasts himself in A.D. 392, and says that they were not universal in Italy, and that where they were customary they were abolished by the bishops (*ib.* 4, 5). Theodoret, however, in the 5th cent., tells us of yearly feasts in honour of martyrs; and the sermons ascribed to Eusebius of Alexandria (5th or 6th cent.? see Smith-Wace, *Dict. Chr. Biog.* iii. 305 f.) describe banquets given to the poor on Saints' days, 'the hosts considering that they are entertaining the martyrs themselves.' These sermons speak of the disorders and drunken revels going on till daybreak; 'while aside the priest prays for them and consecrates the body of Christ, they separate' (Migne, *Patr. Gr.* lxxxvi. 357 f., 364 f., quoted by Leclercq). At the funeral itself feasts were common. Paulinus (*Ep.* xiii. 11, A.D. 397) tells us of a funeral banquet at Rome called an Agape, given for the poor in the basilica of St. Peter, by Pammachius.

In Syriac writers Agapæ are called *nyāḥāthā*, lit. 'rests' or 'refreshments'; so in Jude and 2 Peter. This word, however, has no special reference to the dead, nor can it be argued from it that the Syriac translator of Jude and 2 Peter took the

meaning of ἀγάπαι to be 'commemorations of the dead.' On the other hand (see Payne-Smith, *Thesaurus Syriacus*, *s.v.*), the word is often in Syriac writings coupled with *dūkhrānē*, the ordinary word for 'Saints' days,' and then the reference is without doubt to commemorative Agapæ.

5. Archæological and epigraphic evidence.—This seems to the present writer not to carry us far. It is too vague, and the dates are too uncertain to lead us to any sure conclusion about the Agape. Reference may, however, be made to Dom Leclercq's art. in the *Dictionnaire d'Archéologie Chrétienne*, where this side of the subject is treated very fully with excellent illustrations. It will suffice here to mention one or two examples of evidence adduced by the author. There is a fresco in the Capella Greca of the Cemetery of St. Priscilla near Rome, discovered in 1893. The multiplication of the loaves and fishes is represented as a banquet, with seven persons lying at meat. Dom Leclercq thinks that this shows that at the time of the fresco the Agape and the Eucharist were united. But this is very precarious. Of inscriptions alluding to the heavenly Agape may be mentioned πίε ἐν Θεῷ (Leclercq, *op. cit.* col. 832) and 'Anima dulcis pie zeses in Deo: dulcis anima pie zeses vivas,' where probably 'pie'=πίε, 'zeses'=ζήσῃς, and perhaps 'vivas'='bibas' (*ib.* col. 833).

iii. Review of the evidence.—(*a*) General deductions.—Looking back at the quotations and references detailed above, we may obtain some idea of the history of the Agape. To the present writer it appears, after a careful consideration of what has been written in the last few years, that Bp. Lightfoot's view of the matter has not, in the main, been shaken. The evidence seems to point to the Apostles, probably because of the precedent of the Last Supper, having combined the Eucharist with a common meal, which before long was called the Agape. Yet the Agape was not universal. It was dropped, in some places earlier than in others, and then resumed under somewhat different forms. At first, as the evidence seems to show, the Agape was a meal for the whole community. To call it always a 'charity supper,' as it undoubtedly became in some or in most places later on, is a little misleading. It was a supper for all, rich and poor alike, though no doubt provided almost entirely by the rich, a sign of Christian unity and marked by liturgical forms. Later, the thought of the rich providing for the poor and of the Agape being a charity became prominent; and this was perhaps largely due to the rise of funeral or commemorative feasts, in which the relatives of the deceased gave in his honour, or rich people generally gave in honour of a martyr, a banquet to the poor. These commemorative feasts and the ordinary Agapæ seem to have been confused, at least in many places, during the 4th century. It is important to bear in mind that the custom of the Agape, being a non-essential, varied in different countries. Perhaps it was never quite universal; certainly it was of only partial adoption for the greater part of the first four centuries.

To summarize the evidence, we may say that in Acts and 1 Corinthians the Eucharist and the Agape seem to have been combined; in Jude and 2 Peter perhaps dissociated. In the *Didache* and Ignatius they were probably combined, and perhaps also in Bithynia quite up to the time of Pliny, when they were separated and the Agape dropped. In Justin the Agape does not seem to have been actually existent, perhaps on account of Trajan's Edict. In Celsus, Minucius Felix, and the *Epistle to Diognetus* it is found existing. In Gaul, at the end of the 2nd cent. it had probably been dropped, as it is not mentioned by Irenæus. Lucian's satire and the *Acts of Perpetua* probably testify to the custom of a 'prison Agape.' Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Cyprian, the *Canons of Hippolytus*, and some *Acts of Martyrs* in the 3rd cent., attest the Agape as existing and separate from the Eucharist; the old *Didascalia* describes it as a feast to old women. In the 4th cent. 'Church Orders' the Agape is a common meal, not *only* a charity supper; it is entirely separate from the Eucharist. From the canons of the Councils of Laodicea, Gangra, and Carthage (No. 3), we gather that it was held in churches; perhaps the evidence shows a tendency for it to disappear at this time. Augustine treats it as a charity supper, 'a feeding of the poor.' In the 5th cent. there is the remarkable testimony of Socrates and Sozomen to the exceptional case of Agape and Eucharist combined in Egypt; but there is nothing to show that this custom had always existed there. It may, on the one hand, be a relic of old custom; or, on the other, it may be a revival, a piece of out-of-date antiquarianism. In the 7th cent. the Trullan Council shows that the Agape still existed.—Funeral or commemorative Agapæ are probably referred to by Tertullian, the *Acts of John*, and Cyprian, certainly in the *Canons of Hippolytus*, in the *Commentary on Job* (by Origen?), by Gregory of Nazianzus, Augustine, Chrysostom, and others.

(*b*) Relative order of Agape and Eucharist when united.—Did the Agape or the Eucharist come first? On the one hand, we have the precedent of the Last Supper, where the Eucharist followed the meal, and the suggestion in 1 Co 11 that the Corinthian Agape came first (see above, ii. 1). In the *Didache*, if the view taken above (ii. 2) be right, the Agape precedes, and the 'fencing of the tables' is followed by the Eucharist. In the exceptional case in the Thebaid in the 5th cent., the Agape (if there was one) clearly came first. On the other hand, in Ac 20^{11} we have the order, 'breaking bread' and 'eating.' If the former means the Eucharist and the latter the Agape, the order is reversed. It is quite possible, however, that 'breaking bread' and 'eating' are here one and the same thing, and refer to the Eucharist and the meal combined; in which case we can make no deduction from the words. As has been seen, Chrysostom, in his homily on 1 Corinthians, makes the Eucharist precede, *i.e.* not in his own day merely, but in the primitive ages. We need perhaps lay no great stress on the late evidence of the Thebaid on the one hand, or of Chrysostom on the other. The Fathers of the 4th or 5th cent. probably had no more knowledge of Christian antiquities in this department than we have. Chrysostom was no doubt influenced in his view of the Apostolic age by the customs of his own day, and the Christians of the Thebaid may have been merely trying to follow what appeared to them to have been the custom at the Last Supper. Confining ourselves, then, to the early evidence of NT and the *Didache*, it certainly seems more probable than not that the Agape came first, and that the Eucharist immediately followed. This is Bp. Lightfoot's view. Dr. Lock (in Hastings' *DB*, *s.v.* 'Love-feasts') inclines the other way; and so, more decidedly, does Mr. Box (*op. cit.*).

(*c*) The name 'Agape.'—It is important to consider why this word was applied to a meal. The Greek ἀγάπη is apparently first found in the LXX. Before NT it is exclusively found in Jewish documents. It is not, however, *only* biblical. Deissmann (*Bibl. Stud.* p. 199, Eng. tr.) quotes a passage in Philo (*Quod Deus immut.* § 14), who probably took the word from the LXX; the meaning is 'love to God.' ἀγάπη is also found in a scholium on Thucydides, but we do not know if the glossator was a Christian or not (see Deissmann, *op. cit.* p. 200). In OT and NT, except in

the two passages Jude [12], 2 P 2[13], the word always means 'love.'

How, then, did it acquire its technical sense? Dr. Keating (paper in the *Guardian*, Dec. 24, 1902) suggests that it was because of the new commandment given at the Last Supper (Jn 13[34] ἵνα ἀγαπᾶτε ἀλλήλους); and this may very probably be the case. At any rate, the feast would be called 'love,' because it was the bond which united Christians together; and when (as in Ignatius) the name was applied to the Eucharist and the meal jointly, it would be especially suitable, because Christians are thus united to their Saviour. That this was the main idea of the name is confirmed by the phrase 'kiss of love,' φίλημα ἀγάπης (1 P 5[14]; cf. φίλ. ἅγιον, Ro 16[16], 1 Co 16[20], 2 Co 13[12], 1 Th 5[26]), which was no doubt in early times as in later ages, and as it is still in the East, one of the most significant features of Christian assemblies; by it the worshippers reminded themselves of their brotherhood. As the idea of a charity supper became prominent, after the separation of Eucharist and Agape, the name came to imply 'benevolence' rather than 'brotherly love.' Sometimes in Latin, and perhaps in Greek, *agape* came to mean no more than 'alms.' Thus Jerome speaks of widows being fond of display at Rome—'cum ad agapen vocaverint, præco conducitur' (*Ep.* xxii. 32, A.D. 384), and in the *Apostolic Constitutions* ἀγάπη is used of a charitable gift to a widow, apart from a supper. But this is not certain. The degeneration of the word is exactly parallel to that of our English 'charity.'

It is noteworthy that the name 'Agape' is very seldom given to commemorative feasts. In the passage of Paulinus given above (ii. § 4), however, the feast is so called.

As will be seen from the evidence produced above, the name 'Agape' is applied to a meal taken in common, if the deductions made in this article are correct, in the following: Jude, 2 Peter (probably), Ignatius, Celsus (probably), *Acts of Paul and Thecla* (perhaps), *Acts of Perpetua and Felicitas*, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Origen (quoting Celsus), *Acts of James and Marianus*, the older *Didascalia*, and in the 4th cent. writers *passim*.

As in the case of other technical terms, it is probable that a double reference was not uncommon. Just as 'Agape' was used of a meal with an implied reference to Christian love, so it and its corresponding verb were sometimes used of Christian love with an implied reference to the love-feast. Thus in the Celsus passage (above, ii. 2 (*e*)) the reference is probably double. So in Ignatius, *Rom.* 7 (above, ii. 2 (*b*)), an Eucharistic passage ('I desire His blood, which is love incorruptible'), the primary reference is to love, but there is probably a secondary one to the Agape. And similarly in *Smyrn.* 7, the passage which immediately precedes that already quoted (ii. 2 (*b*)), though the words συνέφερεν δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀγαπᾶν must probably be rendered: 'It were expedient for them to have love,' and not, as Zahn and others suggest, 'to celebrate the Agape' (as if ἀγαπᾶν were equivalent to ἀγάπην ποιεῖν), yet the passage would seem to have an indirect allusion to the combined Eucharist and love-feast (see Lightfoot's note, *op. cit.* ii. 307).

(*d*) **Materials for the Agape.**—As to these we have very little evidence. In the *Didache* only a cup [of wine] and bread are explicitly mentioned. In the *Acts of Paul and Thecla*, § 25, 'five loaves of bread, with vegetables and salt besides, and water' are spoken of (Conybeare, *Monuments of Early Christianity*, p. 75); in the *Acts of Pionius*, only bread and water. Later on, Augustine mentions meat, poultry, cheese, milk, honey (*c. Faust.* xx. 20). Dean Plumptre (Smith-Cheetham, *Dict. Chr. Ant. s.v.* 'Agapae') suggests, from archæological evidence, that fish was commonly used. He adds that 'bread and wine were of course indispensable'; but this, as far as the wine is concerned, is not obvious, except when the Eucharist was combined with the Agape.

iv. ORIGIN OF THE AGAPE.—Many suggestions have been made on this subject. Most writers have seen in the custom an endeavour to follow the precedent of the Last Supper, when the Eucharist was combined with a meal. It is also thought that the early Christians were copying the Jews, who had social meals, or the Greeks and Romans, who had clubs, of which banquets were a prominent feature. The origin of the Agape has also been looked for in the funeral feasts which were common among both Jews and Gentiles. Or it has been thought to have arisen simply from the early communism of the Apostolic Church (Ac 4[32]).

These suggestions are not all mutually exclusive, and probably all of them have a solid foundation. It would be difficult to deny all association with the Last Supper. In that action of our Lord the Christians would find ample justification for joining their Agape to the Eucharist, or for making the Eucharist a part of the Agape. But then it is necessary to ask, What was the exact significance of the Supper celebrated by Jesus? This question is made difficult by the apparent discrepancy between the Gospel accounts, St. John suggesting that the Supper was celebrated some twenty-four hours before the Paschal lambs were killed, while the Synoptists would lead us to think that the Supper was the Passover itself. This difficulty cannot be fully considered here (see the discussion in Dr. Sanday's article 'Jesus Christ' in Hastings' *DB* ii. 633 ff.—the article has been republished in book form, 1904—and the literature enumerated there, *ib.* p. 638), but whatever view be taken of the Last Supper, that observance cannot fully account for the rise of the Agape. For, first, suppose that our Lord ate the real Paschal Supper on Maundy Thursday; if the Apostles had instituted the Agape in imitation of the Last Supper, it seems almost certain that the love-feast would have been held only once a year, at Easter. [We cannot use this as an argument for the Johannine account of the disputed chronology, for the connexion between the Agape and the Last Supper is assumed. But it is probable for other reasons (see Sanday, *loc. cit.*) that the Last Supper did not synchronize with the regular Paschal meal]. Next, suppose that the Last Supper was an anticipated Passover; then, if the Agape depends entirely on it, the difficulty just mentioned as to its being frequent instead of annual would not be taken away. Thirdly, let us take Mr. Box's suggestion (*JThSt*, iii. 360 ff.), that the Last Supper had its origin in the Jewish *Qiddūsh* or weekly sanctification of the Sabbath, an ancient Rabbinical observance, and still a feature of the home life of the Jews. The family sit at table after the synagogue service at the beginning of the Sabbath (*i.e.* our Friday evening), and on the table are placed two loaves and wine. The father blesses the cup, and all the family drink of it; handwashing follows, and the bread is blessed and distributed. Then follows the Sabbath meal. This ceremony is not confined to the Sabbath, but also precedes other festivals, such as the Passover. This is certainly an attractive suggestion, and one which, if the Agape depended solely on the Last Supper, would account for its frequent, instead of annual, occurrence in the Christian Church. But there are several objections to it. Dr. Lambert (*JThSt*, iv. 184 ff.) has brought forward some of them. Two considerations seem fatal to it. It assumes

that the Eucharist followed by the Agape (for Mr. Box believes the Eucharist to have come first) represented the Jewish *Qiddūsh* followed by a festive meal. But at the Last Supper the Eucharist certainly *followed* the meal (1 Co 11^{25}); and the balance of the argument appears to be against the order required by this theory for the Christian Agape (see above, iii. (*b*)). And, further, the Paschal character of the Last Supper seems too prominent for us to be convinced that it was not *in some sense* a Paschal meal. If so, our difficulty as to the origin of the Agape remains, and we must look elsewhere for it, without indeed denying the influence of the Last Supper on the custom under discussion.

The environment of the Apostolic Church must certainly be considered in judging of the origin of the Agape. To the Jews common meals were quite familiar. The Essenes made a practice of them, living a sort of community life (Philo, *Quod omnis probus liber*; Jos. *BJ* ii. 8; Hippolytus, *Ref. Hær.* ix. 18 ff.). For other Jewish illustrations see Keating, *op. cit.* p. 20 ff. We may also cite the allusion to the heavenly banquet in 2 Es 2^{38}, 'Behold the number of those that be sealed in the feast of the Lord.' The guilds and associations in the heathen world at the beginning of our era were also very common; of these, banquets were usually a prominent feature (Lightfoot, *op. cit.* i. 18 ff.; Keating, p. 1 ff.). Funeral feasts were common in the heathen world (Tacitus, *Ann.* vi. 5, *Hist.* ii. 95; cf. Tertullian, *de Res. Carn.* 1 [*Patr. Lat.* ii. 841]); they were part of the obsequies, and were offerings to the dead. They were common in Egypt, Asia Minor, and indeed throughout the countries touched by Christianity. The Jews were familiar with them (2 S 3^{35} was a delayed funeral banquet; cf. Jer 16^{7}, Ezk 24^{17}, Hos 9^{4}, To 4^{17}, Bar 6^{32}). For a full account of them see Dom Leclercq's article, which, however, appears to make them too exclusively the origin of the Christian Agape. He seems to look on the Last Supper as a funeral banquet, celebrated before our Lord's death, and on the Agape as having that aspect throughout. The evidence does not show this. We do not read of Christian funeral or commemorative feasts till the time of Tertullian, at least; and there is nothing to connect them with the Eucharist or with the Last Supper. They would seem rather to have arisen after the almost total separation of Agape and Eucharist.

The most probable account of the origin of the Agape would seem to be that the Christians of the Apostolic age, desirous of showing their unity and brotherly love, imitated the Jewish and heathen custom of having common meals; they could not join the heathen guilds because of the idolatry that would be involved in doing so, and therefore they had what corresponded to these guilds among themselves, namely, the Agapæ. The connexion with the Eucharist—which in itself was quite a distinct act—would be a further step. They remembered that our Lord had associated the first Eucharist with a meal, and this was their justification in joining the Agape with it, so that the name 'Eucharist' could be said to include the Agape, as in the *Didache*, or the name 'Agape' the Eucharist, as in Ignatius. Indeed, in this way they would seem to be carrying out our Lord's injunction most fully. That the meal partaken of by our Lord was a Paschal meal—probably one specially instituted by Him in anticipation, but that is immaterial—would not affect the matter. There was nothing Paschal about the Agape, but the point of similarity between it and the Last Supper would be the connexion with the Eucharist. These two points, then, seem to stand out—(1) the frequent Agape was at first due to the early communism of the Church at Jerusalem, and carried on by the Gentile Churches in imitation of those without; (2) its connexion with the Eucharist was based on the fact that our Lord instituted that sacrament after a common meal. That the origin and history of the Agape are plain cannot for a moment be maintained; but that the explanation here given fits the known facts, appears to be at least probable.

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A. J. MACLEAN.

AGAPĒMONE ('Abode of Love'). — Henry James Prince, the founder of Agapēmonism, was born January 13, 1811. After being articled to a medical man in Wells, Somerset, he resolved to take Holy Orders in the Church of England. In his 26th year he entered St. David's College, Lampeter (March, 1836). The connexion with the Welsh college led to the new sect being called the 'Lampeter Brethren.'

This, however, was misleading, for the Lampeter Brethren, eleven alumni of that institution, were a devout and earnest band of Episcopalian ministers who met for mutual edification, but who afterwards felt 'compelled to come to the calm, deliberate, and final, though most distressing, conclusion that Prince is awfully in error.'

During his college course Prince was an exemplary student. His brother-in-law and fellow-student, Rev. A. A. Rees, wrote that, till 1843, he never saw or heard of an individual more thoroughly devoted to God.

Prince was ordained in 1840 to the curacy of the agricultural parish of Charlynch, near Bridgwater, Somerset. The rector's name was Starky.* The careers of these two men now became identified. Starky, like Prince, was a man of extraordinary gifts of speech, but the rector soon acknowledged his curate as the very voice of God. His zeal on behalf of Agapēmonism led to its adherents in Weymouth and other parts of the south country being called 'Starkyites.' A wonderful revival of religion began in Charlynch and the district in October 1841. Prince published a record of it in 1842. It is a diary of most earnest work on behalf of souls. In six months the whole parish had professed conversion. Yet we find that, as early as May 4, 1841, the Bishop of Bath and Wells had revoked Prince's licence to preach, on the ground of his labouring in neighbouring parishes, admitting

* His Christian name appears to have been lost. In the B.M. Cat. the name stands 'Starky (——),' and on the title-page of his book in the Museum it is given as Br. Starky.

to the Lord's Table before Confirmation, and refusing the Sacrament to persons of evil lives. The diary is an instructive and edifying book, but it reveals the subtle and almost hypnotic power of Prince over his rector and the parishioners. While so absorbed in seeking the salvation of his people that he can think of nothing else, the emotion he expresses strikes the reader as unpleasant and unnatural. *The Charlynch Revival* was published because Prince thought it 'calculated, under the Divine blessing, to stir up the hearts of the Lord's people, and especially of His ministers, to expect great things from God.' With a few emendations it might be reissued as a model of pastoral labours. Before its publication in August 1842, Prince had already sent out two small works, *Letters to his Christian Brethren in St. David's College, Lampeter*, and *Strength in Jesus*, both of which ran to more than one edition.

The date of the beginning of his delusions seems to have been early in 1843. In May of that year he wrote to Mr. Rees a long letter in which he expounded the steps by which the Holy Ghost came to be settled and fixed in the personality of H. J. Prince. In the same year he desired his Lampeter brethren to believe (1) that he was the Holy Ghost personified; (2) that the Holy Ghost suffered and died in him; (3) that this suffering and death obtained for them what he called 'my spirit,' or, as he also phrased it, 'a modification of the Holy Ghost.' About the same time he also published *Testimony Hymns*, religious parodies on certain popular ballads, to back up his own pretensions,—wretched doggerel, like almost all his hymns,—in which he seemed to be losing all consciousness of other things and persons than himself. This was the beginning of his own self-proclaimed apotheosis.

Prince had been inhibited by the Bishop of Bath and Wells, and presently the same lot befell him at the hands of the Bishop of Salisbury. When he attempted to officiate as curate at Stoke-by-Clare, in Suffolk, he suffered once more at the hands of the Bishop of Ely. He appealed to the Archbishop, but could get no redress. Then, to use his own words, 'prevented from preaching *within* the pale of the Established Church, Bro. Prince, after some months' waiting on God for guidance in faith and prayer, proceeded to preach *without* it.' He became most energetic in denouncing priestcraft, but apparently without having observed that there were fellow-Christians who felt as strongly as himself upon this subject. Starky and Prince began to preach in barns at Charlynch. What was practically a Free Church was formed at Spaxton, a mile away. Crowds came to hear them. The twain asserted that they were the Two Witnesses of Rev 11, and Prince published several brochures in regard to the 'Two Anointed Ones.' He declared that community of goods was still binding on believers. Thereupon they sold their lands, and brought the money, 'laying it at Bro. Prince's feet.' About this period also he asserted that he was the prophet Elijah, that this had been made known to him by direct revelation, and that 'people were not to consider what they heard from him as an ordinary sermon, nor to think of him as an ordinary preacher; on the contrary, he was come from the courts of heaven, from the bosom of eternity.'

A crop of opposing pamphlets immediately sprang from the press, written for the most part by men who had been his personal friends. It is clear from some of his actions at this time, and particularly from the ballads which he penned and made his congregation sing, that his phenomenal self-love had passed beyond eccentricity into unsoundness of mind.

Prince and Starky now set up the Agapēmone, which they opened in 1849 at the entrance to the village of Spaxton. Money was poured into the treasury by their credulous followers. Freehold land was bought, and a beautiful and spacious residence erected upon it (for a description of it see Hepworth Dixon, *op. cit. infra*). The whole of the Princeite propagandism centred in the Agapēmone. It was the residence of Prince until his death on January 5, 1899, when he had almost completed his 88th year.

Throughout the movement it was very noticeable that Prince acquired influence over wealthy persons. They renounced the world, deposited their money at the Bank of England in the name of Brother Prince, and took up their abode at the Agapēmone. A wave of fanaticism seemed to sweep across the district about Bridgwater. Many intelligent persons believed him when Prince announced himself as the Final Revelation of the will of God to mankind. Christ had come again in the person of His messenger, first to judgment, and then to convince the world of righteousness. In him the Holy Ghost was to destroy the works of the flesh, and to cast out the devil. Whether he took the title of 'Lord,' or only accepted it, without deprecating its application to himself, seems uncertain. Some who retired from the Agapēmone blame his followers as much as they do Prince. Said one of them, 'They were simply mad about him, and were ready to fall down and worship him as if he were God.' Letters passed through the post addressed to 'Our Holy Lord God at Spaxton.' There is no evidence that Prince objected to this profane and wicked adulation. He stood at his throne in the auditorium, defying all the powers of evil,—sin, death, hell, the devil,—speaking as if he were master of all, until the doubters among the assembly quailed and trembled lest sudden judgment should fall upon him and upon them. He announced that neither he nor any that attached themselves to him could die, or suffer grief or sickness, because the Lord had come in his person to redeem the flesh. He began to set up royal state. Having purchased the Queen-Dowager's equipage and four cream-coloured horses, he was accustomed to drive rapidly about Bridgwater and the neighbourhood, accompanied by bloodhounds, whose presence lent the element of fear to the spectacle. In 1851, when he brought a party of believers to see the Great Exhibition, he drove about the parks and streets in an open carriage, preceded and attended by outriders, all of them bareheaded because they were in the presence of 'The Lord. After the catastrophe which we have now to relate, he fixed upon the title of 'The Beloved' as his own, because we are 'accepted in the Beloved.' His books and tracts were signed with a 'B,' as the initial letter of his pontifical title. Presentation copies bore the words 'From Beloved,' and the inscription, 'I have chosen you out of the world.'

It was inevitable that a movement begun in pride and profanity should develop into ungodliness. The habit of ostentation, luxury, boisterous hilarity, drinking to excess, gaiety, amusements, and the pursuit of wealth had become the order of the day. Disturbances arose out of lawsuits brought by some who seceded from the Agapēmone, horror-stricken at what they had witnessed and suffered there. One of these cases, *Nottidge* v. *Prince* (British Museum, Vol. Law Reports, 29 L.J.Ch. 857) brought about a complete exposure of the methods by which Prince and his henchmen 'crept into houses, leading captive silly women,' and 'turning the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ into licentiousness.' The suit was heard before Vice-Chancellor Stuart in the Court of Chancery, and occupied in hearing June 4–8, and July 25, 1860, when judgment was given. The bill was filed to recover from Prince £5,728, the property of Louisa Jane Nottidge, and the like amounts on behalf of two of her sisters. The report of the trial is the most trustworthy and complete history of the shameful condition of the Agapēmone from 1848 to 1860, when Prince was at the summit of his power and arrogance.

Whether Prince proclaimed or allowed 'free-love' at the Agapēmone cannot be proved. But the cross-examination in Court revealed the fact that, up to 1856, at any rate, grave disorders occurred, and the Vice-Chancellor referred in the strongest terms to the disgraceful revelations.

We have said that there is much in Prince's writings that is commendable and edifying. In the *Journal* of three years' spiritual experience he bows low before God under the sense of sin, or enjoys ecstatic communion with his Saviour. *The*

Man Christ Jesus is an enthusiastic review of the life of the Lord, though verbose, dreamy, obscure, and exclamatory,—exhausting all the Orientalism of Holy Scripture that can be used in a luscious and erotic sense to express devotion to Christ. *Leaves from the Tree of Life*, and *The Shutters taken down from the Windows of Heaven* contain much that needs to be said in regard to spiritual, as opposed to sacerdotal, religion. But the books, like the man himself, are stealthy and deceptive. While devout Christians can approve large portions of his writings, the latter are completely marred by the sudden introduction of his own theories, and by the application to himself personally of the words used by our Lord about His own nature and work. Next to the *Journal* the most important book is *The Counsel of God in Judgment, or Br. Prince's Testimony to the Closing of the Gospel Dispensation*, published when he was 77 years old. It declares the doom of Christendom, the fulfilment of all grace in Prince, his rejection by the Church, and the consequent withdrawal of the Holy Ghost from the Church and the world to Prince and the Agapēmone. But he will have to be judged by *The Little Book Open*. The note to the copy in the British Museum, 4th October 1856, is that an order went forth from the Agapēmone that all copies should be destroyed,—so strong was the public sentiment about it. It consists of a collection of the 'Voices.' In one of them Prince profanely manipulates Holy Scripture to cover and justify his own adulteries. All this loathsome uncleanness stands dressed in fervid and glowing language which vainly endeavours to conceal its crime.

After the trial in the Chancery Court, comparative silence fell upon the Agapēmone. Prince lived a very retired life. The funds of the brotherhood also seemed to be failing them, until in the late eighties a windfall came in the person of a wealthy London merchant, who presented to Prince all his property, and served the brotherhood in the humble capacity of butler. For the last ten years of his life Prince was very feeble. He outlived all his principal followers. He was buried on the 11th of January 1899, in the grounds behind the Agapēmone.

In 1890 and for a few years later there was a remarkable recrudescence of this fanaticism. Several prominent members of the Salvation Army cast in their lot with Prince. A mission to Norway was reported to be very successful. But, above all, Clapton, in the N.E. of London, became the scene of this renewed activity. The 'Children of the Resurrection,' as they named themselves, built, in 1892, 'The Ark of the Covenant,' an elaborate structure, seating about 400 persons, at a cost of £16,000. The preacher, at its opening in 1896, was the Rev. J. H. Smyth-Pigott, the official successor of Prince. Smyth-Pigott, who is of good family, was formerly a curate of St. Jude's, Mildmay Park. He has also served in the Salvation Army. In his opening sermon he declared he expected Christ to come that very day to judgment, but did not explain why, in that case, this expensive church was being dedicated. In September 1902, Smyth-Pigott proclaimed himself to be Jesus Christ; with the result that most riotous scenes took place for several weeks.

Since the tumultuous scenes which accompanied the making of this announcement, Smyth-Pigott has lived in retirement at his house in Upper Clapton, or at the Agapēmone at Spaxton, worshipped as Divine by the little company who accept his pretensions. 'The Ark of the Covenant' remained closed to the public during 1903 and 1904, private services being held at rare intervals. It needs only to be added that the present tenants of the Agapēmone are a quiet, blameless, and elderly company, numbering about 35 persons, whose praise is sung throughout the whole neighbourhood for their unquestioned piety and fervent charity [1907].

LITERATURE.—Prince's own *Journal: or, An Account of the Destruction of the Works of the Devil in the Human Soul, by the Lord Jesus Christ, through the Gospel*, published in 1859, but relating to the period between 1835 and 1839, also *The Charlynch Revival: or, An Account of the Remarkable Work of Grace at Charlynch*, 1842; J. G. Dick, *A Word of Warning: The Heresy of Mr. Prince*, London, 1845; Rees, *The Rise and Progress of the Heresy of Rev. H. J. Prince*, Weymouth, 1845; O. Piers, *The Door not Shut: or, Three Reasons for not believing Mr. Prince to be a True Prophet*, 1846; Hepworth Dixon *Spiritual Wives*, chapter on Visit to the Agapēmone, 1868; Prince, *A Hook in the Nose of Leviathan*, 1877, also, *A Sword in the Heart of Leviathan*, 1877, and *The Man Christ Jesus*, London, 1886; *The Counsel of God in Judgment: or, Br. Prince's Testimony to the Closing of the Gospel Dispensation, and the Revelation of Jesus Christ as the Son of Man*, 1887; also a variety of pamphlets of a painful nature, printed for private circulation only.

EDWIN J. DUKES.

AGAPĒTÆ.—A name applied to female Christian ascetics who lived together with men, although both parties had taken the vow of continency, and were animated with the earnest desire to keep it. They were also known by the nickname of *Virgines Subintroductæ* or *Syneisaktoi*, which arose at a comparatively late date, after the custom had fallen into disfavour, and has tended not a little to confuse the judgment regarding this form of sexual asceticism. In reality, this spiritual marriage was one of the most remarkable phenomena which asceticism called forth on Christian soil—a fruit of overwhelming enthusiasm for the ascetic ideal. Our sources justify us in saying that the custom was widespread during the whole of Christian antiquity. In Antioch the bishop Paul of Samosata had several young maidens in his immediate neighbourhood (Eusebius, *HE* vii. 30. 12 ff.). At the time of Cyprian, virgins who were dedicated to God lived in the most intimate relationship with confessors, priests, and laymen (*Epist.* 4. 13. 14); and the rigorous Tertullian advises well-to-do Christians to take into their houses one or more widows 'as spiritual spouses,' who were 'beautiful by their faith, endowed with their poverty, sealed by their age.' . . . 'It is well pleasing to God to have several such wives' (*de Exhort. Castit.* 12; *de Monog.* 16). We hear the same regarding heretics: several heads of the Valentinian sect lived together with 'sisters' (Irenæus, *Hær.* i. 6. 3), the Montanist martyr Alexander was united in spiritual marriage with a prophetess (Euseb. *HE* v. 18. 6 ff.), and the Marcionite Apelles had in the same way two spiritual wives, one of whom was the prophetess Philumene (Tertullian, *de Præscr.* 30).

As spiritual marriage arose from ascetic motives, it had its proper place in monasticism, and has there preserved its original form. From the first initiators or forerunners of the monastic life onwards — among the Encratites of Tatian, the Origenists and Hieracites—to the anchorites whom Jerome and Gregory knew, we hear again and again that many monks lived together with women, and we need not wonder if we meet with traces of Syneisaktism proper on monastic soil till late in the Middle Ages. In the desert, where the ascetic was alone with his companion, the relation often took the form of the woman becoming his servant, and assisting him in the many varied ways in which the man of antiquity allowed himself to be waited on by his servants. We must not, however, on this account allow ourselves to be misled as to the main point, viz. that the reason why the monk and the nun had retired into the desert is to be sought in their ascetic ideal, which they had in common, and which they aimed at realizing in separation from the world. In the struggle for life and in the conflict against their own flesh they

sought power in a union of souls, which was supposed to bring them nearer to God.

The old Irish Church had made this kind of asceticism a foundation-pillar of its organization. According to the primitive Christian custom, no difference was then made between man and woman (cf. Gal 3^{28}), and both were allowed to take part in Church functions. In the monastic houses, moreover, the priestly monks lived together with the priestly nuns, according to an old anonymous reporter, up to the year 543: '*Mulierum administrationem et consortia non respuebant, quia super petram Christi fundati ventum tentationis non timebant*' (Haddan-Stubbs, *Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents*, ii. 2, p. 292). At the time, too, when the Irish, with their mission, undertook a forward movement towards Brittany, the Gallican bishops found it especially blameworthy in the incomers that they were accompanied by women, who, like the men, assumed to themselves sacramental functions (cf. the letter of the three bishops in the *Revue de Bretagne et de Vendée*, 1885, i. p. 5 ff.); they did not know that the Irish-Breton Church had preserved customs and principles of the most ancient Christian Church.

After the well-to-do circles in the large cities had become Christian, there was developed a new form of spiritual marriage. It happened frequently that rich widows and young women, in accordance with the tendency of the time, refused marriage, and in order to provide a master for their large houses, caused clergymen or monks to bind themselves to them in spiritual marriage. This is a variety of Syneisaktism, but an unfortunate one. The rôles seem to be reversed. The woman had the upper hand, because she remained the mistress of her large possessions, and in addition she enjoyed the repute of virginity. On the other hand, the position of the priest was difficult, and often precarious. However seriously asceticism and the union of souls might be taken, still the fact could not be lost sight of that the priest was a subordinate, and his position may have varied between house steward, domestic chaplain, and spiritual lover. This is the rôle which the *abbé* in France had in the 17th and 18th centuries. At the time of Chrysostom this evil custom was widespread in Constantinople (Migne, xlvii. col. 495 ff.); likewise at the same time in Gaul, as Jerome (*Ep.* 117) discloses. It is therefore to be regarded as a peculiar product of Christianity.

The spiritual marriage of the clergy is most frequently mentioned, and therefore best known; so much so that it has been widely believed that only the clergy of the ancient Church lived with Syneisaktoi. And it cannot be denied that the custom, just as in the case of Monasticism, found its especial home here. It stands parallel with celibacy, which, in like manner, in Christianity was not created for the clergy, but none the less became a ruling custom among them, and at a later date was elevated to a law, because people judged marriage to be inferior, and imposed the highest and most ideal demands on the clergy. Now, as the clergy who withdrew from marriage became more numerous, their choice of a companion for spiritual wedlock, in order professedly to live a life of asceticism, was of much more frequent occurrence. And as time went on, the ideal nature of the relationship seems to have disappeared in face of practical motives. Out of the ascetic and the bride of the soul there arose imperceptibly the housekeeper, who was suspected to be also the mistress. No doubt the common judgment on this form of asceticism had changed in course of time. Men's minds had become more alert and sane, and the priest who lived together with a woman was looked on with other eyes than at an earlier date. It seems, however, as if Syneisaktism itself had degenerated. The housekeepers of the clergy were called *mulieres extraneæ*, and placed on the same footing as servant maids. Spanish synods, about the year 600, even ordered that the *extraneæ* should be sold as slaves, and the proceeds given to the poor (*can.* 5 Toledo, 589; *can.* 3 Hispalis, 590; *can.* 42, 43 Toledo, 633). In the Decretals of Gregory IX., iii. 2, *de cohabitatione clericorum et mulierum*, the concubinage of the clergy is forbidden. In the East the same development can be proved. Even in the later synods the Syneisaktoi are alluded to; but it is evident that it was really a question of female servants of the clergy; and to the Greek canonists of the 12th cent. the name Syneisaktos means no more than the housekeeper of a clergyman. Syneisaktism must, therefore, have undergone a transition. Even in the later centuries clergy lived together with women without being married to them, just as in earlier times; but people regarded this living together differently. In the early times man and woman had taken the vow of virginity, and had struggled in a union of souls to attain the common ideal; in later times the practical requirements of life came to the front. The clergyman needed a woman to look after his household, who was faithful and devoted to him. The natural way of marriage was barred to him by the ordinance of celibacy; but if he took a young woman into his house without marrying her, he was exposed to evil report. Without doubt, even in later times the ideal motives of the community of life may in many cases have been alive, as formerly. On the whole, the development which has been sketched is thoroughly natural. An ascetic enthusiasm which proposes to itself such high aims must, in the course of time, evaporate and make room for the sober realities of the day. Such an heroic ideal may perhaps be suitable as a way to heaven for a few specially favoured natures; but it becomes questionable, and even pernicious, as soon as it is made a rule to be followed by a large class of men.

The different forms of Syneisaktism arose under the influence of social conditions. In the loneliness of the desert, the nun became the maid-servant of the hermit; in the cities and villages, the soul-friend of the well-to-do priest degenerated into his housekeeper, just as, on the other hand, rich widows assigned to their spiritual friends the rôle of steward; and if in Ireland monks and nuns lived together in large companies, that was caused by the peculiar conditions of the Irish missionary church, which was a monastic church. The difference of the forms, however, allows us to see plainly the original form. The original motive was in all cases a religious one—more precisely, an ascetic one; brotherly love was supposed to take the place of the love of marriage. Syneisaktism was the natural product of two opposing tendencies in ancient Christianity. On the one hand, brotherly love, in all its forms of expression, was most highly prized, so that it was declared to be the proper palladium of religion (cf. 1 Co 13), and the exclusiveness of the small and intimate congregations favoured the rise of a narrow social life and close friendly relationship between Christians who were widely separated in age and social position. We can see, from the example of the Irish religious houses, how great an influence the idea of community must have had. On the other hand, there was a strong aversion, based on religious feelings, to sexual intercourse. Marriage was regarded as a not very honourable concession to the sensual nature of mankind, and people revered the ascetics without inquiring what sacrifices they paid for their ideals. Owing to the conflict of social ideals, which bound men most closely with each

other and yet threatened to estrange man and woman, there arose the unnatural combination of asceticism and brotherly love, which meets us in Syneisaktism. A form of intimate social life of the sexes was created, which was not marriage either in reality or in intention, and was blind to its own dangers, because those who adopted it trusted everything, even the quite impossible, to the power of the Spirit animating the Christian.

Thus it is only natural that it was just the spiritually elevated Christians, the leaders of the communities — the prophets, confessors, bishops, and clergy—who lived in spiritual marriage. In the same way the *uxores spirituales* of the earlier times were always such women as enjoyed a special position of honour in the community as 'brides of Christ,'—the virgins, widows, or even prophetesses. What they undertook was not hidden in a corner, but was generally admired as a glorious example of Christian love and continency. But in course of time the judgment of the ancient Church regarding the Syneisaktoi changed.

Hermas seems to regard spiritual marriage, in all its forms, as a precious characteristic of the life of the Christian community (*Simil.* x. 8). Irenæus does not disapprove of it (*Hær.* i. 6. 3 *fin.*). Tertullian regards it as the most desirable form of cohabitation of man and woman (see above). Paul of Samosata values it highly, and practises it himself. His opponents at the Synod of Antioch (Eusebius, *HE* vii. 30. 12 ff.), and, shortly before that, Cyprian (*Ep.* 4. 13. 14), are the first to express themselves against it. The Synods of the 4th cent.—Elvira *can.* 27, Ancyra *can.* 19, and Nicæa *can.* 3—forbid the clergy to have women in their houses, and after that date prohibitions of Syneisaktism are never absent from the Church ordinances. In cases of disobedience the clergy are punished or even deposed. In the case of laymen or monks, strict admonitions are, as a rule, regarded as sufficient.

The different attitudes taken up by the Church on the question are explained by the development which she had undergone. In the first three centuries she had spread very widely, and the communities had in places become very numerous. There were many elements in her that did not take the moral precepts of Christianity seriously. The strict prohibitions regarding sins of the flesh were, owing to the necessity of the case, weakened and modified in the 3rd century. The Roman bishop Callistus likened the Church to Noah's ark, in which there were clean and unclean beasts (Hippolyt. *Philos.* ix. 12). Then such a custom as spiritual marriage had to be abolished,—a custom which, if feasible at all, was so only in small intimate communities, where each one knew the other and all were under supervision and discipline. It proved, however, excessively difficult to root out Syneisaktism, as we may learn from the ever repeated prohibitions, which become more and more strict as time goes on. How very deep the opposition to it went can be gathered from the fact that the later bishop of Antioch, Leontius, castrated himself in order to be permitted to retain his house companion. Yet people were in many places convinced of the innocence and the justice of such a relationship, and even produced proofs from writers who justified the Syneisaktoi by quoting Biblical examples from the Old and New Testaments (Achelis, *Virg. Subintrod.* p. 42 f.).

That spiritual marriage was in course of time regarded in a different light, is proved further by the changes of designation.

Tertullian calls the female ascetic, who lives with a man, his *uxor spiritualis*—which is the appropriate name in the sense of early days. Then there occurs the term *conhospita*. The spiritual marriage seems to have been called ἀδελφότης. On the other hand, the inhabitants of Antioch invented for the female friends of Paul of Samosata the nickname *συνείσακτοι*, and this name afterwards stuck to female ascetics who lived together with like-minded male friends. The term was carried over into the Latin Church in the translation *subintroductæ* (Roman Synod *a.* 743 in Mansi, xii. 381). More frequently still the general designation, *mulieres extraneæ*, is used.

In regard to the question of the age of spiritual marriage, the *Shepherd* of Hermas comes especially under consideration. Hermas knows the custom of Christian men and women being united to each other by a bond of special affinity, even when they are separated from each other by all kinds of relationships in life (*Vis.* i. 1. 1); he presupposes that virgins find shelter in the houses of Christian brothers (*Sim.* x. 3); and, finally, knows the intimate forms of intercourse which were usual between the spiritually betrothed (*Sim.* ix. 11. 3, 7). He reports, of course, not facts but visions, but he would not have been able to introduce the situations he describes in such a matter-of-fact way, if he had not regarded them as characteristics of Christian brotherly love, of which he was proud.

The passage 1 Co 7 has also to be considered, since it has been brought by Ed. Grafe into connexion with the question of the Syneisaktoi. According to the interpretation suggested by Grafe, 1 Co 7[36] refers to the awakening love between a Christian householder and a young girl residing in his house, who are bound by a common vow; the Apostle recommends that an end be put to the precarious situation by marriage. But, on the other hand, in v.[37] he praises the Christian who, in the like situation, understands how to control himself; while v.[38] unites both decisions. The matter, then, does not concern father and daughter, as has generally been held by exegetes, but is a case of spiritual marriage—the same situation as we found above in the case of the bishop and clergy of Antioch, as we must presuppose in Hermas, and as we saw in the letters of Cyprian. What was so inevitable took place at Corinth (although it was avoided in other places), viz. that the peculiar relation between the guardian and his spiritual bride became too intimate to be endurable for any length of time. According to Grafe, St. Paul advised both to marry, while the present writer finds it more in accordance with the wording of the text (cf. the repeated *γαμίζων*) and also with the supposed situation, to think that he advised the young woman to leave the house and be married to some other Christian. If the words of St. Paul have a concrete case of Syneisaktism in view, such as prevailed at the episcopal court of Antioch, that is almost the only conceivable solution. In ancient times young girls were married without much ceremony, and for a female ascetic, who had had a disappointing experience, a marriage was certainly the best way. It must, however, be granted that this interpretation of the passage in Corinthians is not beyond question, especially as the text is not quite certain.

Lastly, the *de Vita Contemplativa* must be mentioned. This may be regarded as a genuine work of Philo. The Therapeutæ in Egypt, who are there described, and who tabued marriage and sexual enjoyment, lived in union with female companions, just as the Christian monks did at a later date. It is the same combination of sexual asceticism and brotherly communion as in Syneisaktism, only that the personal intimacy between the individual pairs is wanting; the brotherly love is just the specifically Christian factor in the spiritual marriage. This makes it possible to place the beginnings of Syneisaktism in the Apostolic Age. The ascetic cohabitation of man and woman had already had its prototype in Hellenistic Judaism. It can, however, on more general grounds, hardly be doubted that spiritual marriage with its extravagances belongs to the earliest Christian times, when 'the Spirit' ruled the community, and the 'first love' still burned. At that time the communities were small and intimate, and had had no disappointing experiences with regard to themselves; asceticism made its way into the Church; and so all the conditions for the rise of Syneisaktism were present. This must be so if Syneisaktism is conceived of, as it has been by us above, as

an attempt to substitute for marriage Christian brotherly love. If we seek to derive it, in the way formerly adopted, from the celibacy of the clergy or from Monasticism, then we are driven to a much later date for its origin. But in face of the testimony of the most ancient Christian authors, that can hardly be maintained.

LITERATURE.—The question was first raised by Henry Dodwell, *Dissertationes Cyprianicæ*, iii. (Oxford, 1682). Thereupon a small literature on the subject grew up. The titles of the contributions are given by J. E. Volbeding, *Index dissertationum* (Lipsiæ, 1849), p. 167. So far as is known to the present writer, all the authors held Syneisaktism to be an error of the corrupt Church of the 3rd century. The above mentioned discussion of 1 Co 7[36-38] by Ed. Grafe, 'Geistliche Verlöbnisse bei Paulus,' followed a notice of Weizsäcker, and appeared in *Theol. Arbeiten aus dem rheinischen wissenschaftl. Prediger-Verein*, N.S., iii. (Freiburg, 1899). This interpretation has found considerable approval. The conception of Syneisaktism given above is proved in detail by H. Achelis, *Virgines Subintroductæ; Ein Beitrag zu* 1 *Cor.* 7 (Leipzig, 1902).

H. ACHELIS.

AGARIĀ, AGAR, AGARĪ.—An Indian tribe which, at the Census of 1901, numbered 270,370, of whom the vast majority are found in Bombay, the Central Provinces, and Bengal, with a few in other parts of N. India. The ethnography of this tribe is very obscure, and, as collected under one heading in the Census returns, it includes at least three different communities, who may, however, agree in being of common Dravidian or Mundā origin. In Chota Nāgpur and the adjoining district of Mirzapur the Agariā practise the old rude Dravidian method of smelting iron. In the Tributary Mahāls of Bengal and in the Sambalpur district of the Central Provinces they are a fair, good-looking race, who claim to have once been Rājputs in the neighbourhood of Agra, whence they say they derive their name. The legend runs that they refused to bow the head before the Muhammadan emperor of Delhi, and were compelled to leave their original settlements and migrate southwards. These the Census returns describe under the name of *Agharia*, in order to distinguish them from the *Agariā*, who are pure Dravidians. In the Mandla district of the same province they are described as a subdivision of the Gonds (wh. see), and among the laziest and most drunken of that race. In Bombay another branch practise in some places the business of salt-making, and derive their name from the pit (Hind. Mahr. *agar*, Skr. *ākara*, 'a mine') in which the brine is evaporated.

It is only the tribe in Chota Nāgpur and the immediate neighbourhood that preserves its original beliefs. Generally they have a well-marked totemistic division into sub-castes; a vague form of ancestor-worship, which is confined to propitiating the dead of the preceding generation; and a respect for the Sāl tree (*Shorea robusta*), which is used at their marriages. In Mirzapur they neglect the ordinary Hindu gods, and have a special worship of Lohāsur Devī, the Mother-goddess who presides over the smelting furnace. To her the *baigā*, or village officiant, sacrifices a goat which has never borne a kid, and burns a few scraps of cake, the meat and the remainder of the bread being consumed by the worshippers. In Palamāu, according to Forbes, their worship is of a still lower type. 'They appear,' he writes, 'to have no deities, and to have no knowledge of the Supreme Being, though some of them appear to have heard of the universal Devī; but I do not think they worshipped her in any way. On certain days of the year they offer up sacrifices to propitiate the spirits of the departed members of the family.' This ceremony is called Muā,' *i.e.* 'the Dead.' They generally also worship the Dih or local gods of the village in which they happen to settle. In Bengal their women have the reputation of being notorious witches. Dalton was told that 'in Gangpur there are old women, professors of witchcraft, who stealthily instruct the young girls. The latter are all eager to be taught, and are not considered proficient till a fine forest tree, selected to be experimented upon, is destroyed by the potency of their "mantras" or charms, so that the wife a man takes to his bosom has probably done her tree, and is confident in the belief that she can, if she pleases, dispose of her husband in the same manner if he makes himself obnoxious.'

A closely allied tribe of the E. Mundās in Lohārdaga—the Āsurs, who speak the same language as the Agariā—worship Andhariyā Devatā, the Earth-god. The sacrificer places a fowl with its head on the anvil, and, holding it in position with the forge pincers, strikes its head with a hammer, praying that the goddess will protect the worshipper from injury by the sparks which fly from red-hot iron. These people also worship Bor Pahārī Bongā, the great Hill-god, with the sacrifice of a brown goat, and Pandrā Devatā, the Sun, with a mottled fowl.

The Agariā of the Central Provinces and the allied tribe in Bombay are practically Hindus, worshipping in particular Hanumanta, the monkey-god, and all the village gods and goddesses. But they still preserve traces of the original pre-Aryan beliefs in representing these deities by stones and white ant hills, and by performing their worship through their own headman, and not by a Brāhman officiant.

LITERATURE.—For Bengal and the United Provinces: Dalton, *Ethnology of Bengal* (1872), 196, 322 ff.; Forbes, *Settlement Report on Palamāu*, quoted in *North Indian Notes and Queries*, iv. 43; Crooke, *Tribes and Castes* (1896) i. 1 ff. For Central Provinces: *Census Report*, 1901, i. 196, 322 f.; *Gazetteer*, i. 273 f. 457. For Bombay: *Gazetteer*, xv. pt. i. 360. For the Asurs: *JASB* lvii. pt. i. 8; *Census Report*, 1901, i. 283.

W. CROOKE.

AGASTYA (or Agasti).—The reputed author of some Vedic hymns (*Rigveda*, i. 165–191). In the Rigveda he is sometimes mentioned, and some particulars are alluded to, notably his miraculous origin and his relation to Lopāmudrā, his wife (see E. Sieg, *Sagenstoffe des Rigveda*, i. 105–129). In Hindu mythology* he is regarded as the patron saint of Southern India, where places sacred to him abound; still, his hermitage was shown on the Yamunā near Prayāga.† He originated from the seed of Mitra and Varuṇa, which they had dropped into a water-jar on seeing the heavenly nymph Urvaśī.‡ From his double parentage he is called Maitrāvaruṇi, and from his being born from a jar he got the names Kumbhasambhava, Kalaśayoni, and similar ones denoting 'jar-born.' A Vedic name of Agastya is Mānya.

Agastya, growing old as an ascetic, was admonished by his ancestors to beget a son in order to save himself and them from perdition. He therefore produced, by magic power, a beautiful maiden, Lopāmudrā, from the best part of all creatures, and gave her to the king of Vidarbha to be his daughter. Nobody daring, on account of her supernatural beauty, to pretend to her hand, Agastya at last demanded her in marriage. The king, fearing his wrath, acceded to his wish, and Lopāmudrā became the wife of the ascetic. When, however, after a course of penances in Gangādvāra, Agastya desired to embrace his wife, she refused to do his will unless she was decked out in such splendid robes and costly ornaments as she had been accustomed to in her father's house. In order to satisfy her demand, Agastya applied to different kings for treasures; but he ascertained that their budgets were just balanced, so that they might not bestow wealth on him. On their advice and in their company he went to the king of Maṇimatī, the Dānava Ilvala, who was famous for his riches.

* See Holtzmann's paper on Agastya in the *Mahābhārata* in *ZDMG* xxxiv. p. 589 ff.
† *Mahābhārata*, iii. 87.
‡ *Bṛhaddevatā*, v. 30; *Rāmāyaṇa*, vii. 57.

Now Ilvala, an enemy of the Brāhmans, had a brother, Vātāpi, whom, on the arrival of a Brāhman, he used to kill and then to prepare as a meal. When the unsuspecting guest had finished his dinner, Ilvala, by his magical power, called Vātāpi to life again, and in this way killed his victim. The Dānava tried this trick on Agastya, but his incantation failed to revive Vātāpi, whom Agastya had already completely digested. So Ilvala was fain to give Agastya such treasures as satisfied the desires of Lopāmudrā. According to the *Rāmāyaṇa* (iii. 11. 66), however, Agastya, on this occasion, reduced the Dānava to ashes by fire issuing from his eye. The Ṛiṣi had by Lopāmudrā a son called Dṛḍhasyu or Idhmavāha.*

Another famous deed of Agastya was his having caused the fall of Nahuṣa.

When, after vanquishing Vṛtra, Indra, polluted with the sin of *brahmahatyā*, or killing of a Brāhman, fled and hid himself, the gods made Nahuṣa ruler of the skies. But Nahuṣa soon became overbearing and desired to make Śachī, Indra's wife, his own. She, however, would not consent unless he came to her on a car drawn by the seven Ṛiṣis. Nahuṣa therefore yoked them to his car, and made them draw it. During his ride, he, for some cause, differently stated in different places, kicked Agastya on the head, whereupon the Ṛiṣi turned him, by his curse, into a serpent, until Yudhiṣṭhira should release him from the curse.†

Most frequently Agastya is mentioned in Sanskrit works as having stayed the abnormal growth of the Vindhya range, and as having drunk up the ocean.

The Vindhya was jealous of Mount Meru, round which sun and moon and stars were always revolving. In order to force the heavenly bodies to go round him too, Vindhya began to grow, and rose to such a height that the gods became alarmed. They therefore asked Agastya to prevent the mountain from obstructing the path of the sun. Accordingly the Ṛiṣi went with his family to the Vindhya, and, pretending to have something to do in the South, he asked the mountain to cease growing till he should return; and when the Vindhya had agreed, he passed on and took up his abode in the South for ever.‡ His hermitage was near the Godāvarī and Pampā, where Rāma and Sītā were his guests.§ The Rāmāyaṇa, however, takes apparently no heed of Agastya's resolve never to leave the South, for in Bk. vii. it is related that he visited Rāma in Ayodhyā, and there told him the early history of Rāvaṇa and Hanuman.

The drinking up of the ocean is thus related in the *Mahābhārata* (iii. 103 ff.):

The Kālakeyas or Kāleyas, a class of Asuras, had fought under Vṛtra against the gods. After the death of their leader they hid themselves in the ocean where the gods could not reach them, and determined to extirpate the Brāhmans and holy men; for thus, they thought, they would bring about the end of the world. The gods, alarmed by their raids, were advised by Viṣṇu to implore Agastya for help. The Ṛiṣi, accordingly, drank up the water of the ocean and thus laid bare the Kālakeyas, who were then slain by the gods. The ocean continued a void till Bhagiratha led the Gangā to it and thus filled it again with water.

A curious trait of our saint is that he was a famous hunter and archer. For this reason, probably, Manu (v. 22) adduces Agastya as an authority for killing deer and birds for sacrificial purposes and for servants' food.

After his death Agastya was placed among the stars‖ as Canopus, the most brilliant star in the southern heavens except Sirius. The heliacal rising of this star, while the sun is in the asterism Hastā, marks the setting in of autumn after the close of the rains.¶

Agastya seems, in popular belief, to represent that force of nature which makes an end of the monsoon,—in mythological language, drinks up the waters of the ocean,—and which brings back the sun, temporarily hidden by the clouds of the rainy season, or, turned mythologically, stays the growth of Vindhya obstructing the path of the sun. As a rain-godling, 'who is supposed to have power to stop the rain,' he is still invoked in Muzaffarnagar.*

In Southern India, Agastya 'is venerated as the earliest teacher of science and literature'; he is the reputed author of many Tamil works; 'he is believed to be still alive, though invisible to ordinary eyes, and to reside somewhere on the fine conical mountain in Travancore commonly called Agastya's hill, from which the Porunei, or Tāmraparṇī, the sacred river of Tinnevelli, takes its rise.'† See also VEDIC RELIGION (4 B b).

H. JACOBI.

AGE.—In most animals there is a normal specific size to which the great majority of the adult members of the species closely approximate. In a large collection representing a species there may be a few giants and a few dwarfs, but most of the members show a close approximation to the same limit of growth, and there are good reasons for believing that the normal specific size is *adaptive*, *i.e.* that it has been slowly established in the course of selection as the fittest size for the given organization and the given conditions of life. In some cases, *e.g.* many fishes, there is no such definite limit of growth; thus haddocks are often found as large as cods.

Similarly, in many animals that have been carefully studied, we find that there is a normal potential duration of life,—an age which is rarely exceeded, though it may be seldom attained. This normal 'lease of life' is in most cases known only in a general way, though in many cases we are able to say that the living creature in question never lives *longer* than a few months, or a year, or a few years. Statistics from forms kept in captivity are obviously vitiated by the artificial conditions, and the life of animals in their natural conditions is so often ended by a 'violent death'—coming sooner or later according to the varying intensity of the struggle for existence—that it is difficult to say what the normal potential duration of life really is. But a critical survey of a large body of facts led Weismann in his essay on 'The Duration of Life' (1889) to the conclusion that this, like size, is an adaptive character, gradually defined by selection in relation to the external conditions of life.

Attempts have often been made to correlate the duration of life with certain structural and functional characteristics of the type discussed, *e.g.* with size, with the duration of the growing period, with rapidity or sluggishness of life, but none of these correlations can be generalized, and there is much to be said for Weismann's more cautious thesis, that the length of life is determined in relation to the needs of the species. Given a certain rate of reproduction and a certain average mortality, the duration of life that survives is that which is fittest to the conditions. (See ADAPTATION.) In the same essay Weismann pointed out that unicellular organisms, which have no 'body' to keep up, which can continually make good their waste by repair, and which have very simple inexpensive modes of reproduction, are practically 'immortal,' *i.e.* they are not subject to *natural* death as higher organisms are. Epigrammatically expressed, natural death is the price paid for a 'body.'

In the case of man, we must clearly distinguish between the *average specific longevity*, about 34 years in Europe—but happily raisable with decreasing infantile mortality, improved sanitation, decreasing warfare, increasing temperance and carefulness,—and the *potential specific longevity*, which for the present race is normally between

* *Mahābhārata*, iii. 96–99.
† *Mahābhārata*, v. 17 ff., xii. 342 ff.; and, with some variations, xiii. 99 ff.
‡ *Mahābhārata*, iii. 103.
§ *Rāmāyaṇa*, iii. 11 f.; *Kādambari*, ed. Peterson, p. 21 ff.
‖ *Taittiriya Āraṇyaka*, i. 11. 2.
¶ *Varāha Mihira*, *Bṛhat Saṁhitā*, xii. 7 ff.

* Crooke, *The Popular Religion and Folklore of Northern India*, i. 76.
† Caldwell, *Compar. Gram. of Dravidian Languages*², 119 f.

seventy and one hundred years. There is no warrant for fixing any precise limit, either for the past or the future. All that we can scientifically say is that there are few well-established instances of a greater human longevity than 104 years. Sir George Cornewall Lewis did good service (1862) in destructively criticising numerous alleged cases of centenarianism, the occurrence of which he at first regarded as quite unproved, but even he finally admitted that men do sometimes reach a hundred years, and that some have reached one hundred and three or four. The famous cases of Thomas Parr, Henry Jenkins, and the Countess of Desmond, said to be 152, 169, and 140 respectively, were ruled out of court by Mr. Thoms, who edited *Notes and Queries* at the time when Sir G. C. Lewis's wholesome scepticism created much stir. As man is a slowly varying organism, as regards physical characters at least, it is extremely unlikely that his longevity was ever much greater than it is now. Monsters in age and monsters in size are alike incredible.

Prof. E. Metchnikoff is one of the few modern biologists who would deal generously with Biblical and other old records of great human longevity. He apparently thinks there has been some misunderstanding in regard to Methuselah's 969 years and Noah's 950, but he accepts the great ages of 175, 180, and 147 years ascribed to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Similarly, he accepts the 185 years with which St. Mungo of Glasgow has been credited. And as he is generous in regard to the past, he is hopeful in regard to the future, believing that a more careful and temperate life, as well as an enlightened recognition of the disharmonies of our bodily frame, may bring about a time when man will no longer, as Buffon says, 'die of disappointment,' but attain everywhere 'a hundred years.' 'Humanity,' Metchnikoff says, 'would make a great stride towards longevity could it put an end to syphilis, which is the cause of one-fifth of the cases of arterial sclerosis. The suppression of alcoholism, the second great factor in the production of senile degeneration of the arteries, will produce a still more marked extension of the term of life. Scientific study of old age and of the means of modifying its pathological character will make life longer and happier.' He also quotes the theoretically simple conclusion of Pflüger's essay on 'The Art of prolonging Human Life':—'Avoid the things that are harmful, and be moderate in all things.'

A fact of much interest is the statistical evidence that such a subtle character as 'longevity,' that is to say, a tendency to a certain lease of life, be it long or short, is heritable like other inborn characters, though it rests, of course, to some extent with the individual or his environment to determine whether the inherited tendency is realized or not. Just as stature is a heritable quality, so is potential longevity, but the degree of expression is in part determined by 'nurture'—taking the word in the widest sense.

There is, as we have hinted, reason to believe that natural death is not to be regarded simply as an intrinsic necessity—the fate of all life; we can carry the analysis further, and say that it is incident on the complexity of the bodily machinery, which makes complete recuperation well-nigh impossible, and almost forces the organism to accumulate arrears, to go into debt to itself; that it is incident on the limits which are set to the multiplication and renewal of cells within the body, thus nerve-cells in higher animals cannot be added to after an early stage in development; and it is incident on the occurrence of organically expensive modes of reproduction, for reproduction is often the beginning of death. At the same time, it seems difficult to rest satisfied with these and other physiological reasons, and we fall back on the selectionist view that the duration of life has been, in part at least, punctuated from without and in reference to large issues; it has been gradually regulated in adaptation to the welfare of the species.

It seems to us suggestive to recognize four categories of phenomena in connexion with age. The first is that of the immortal unicellular animals which never grow old, which seem exempt from natural death. The second is that of many wild animals, which reach the length of their life's tether without any hint of ageing, and pass off the scene—or are shoved off—victims of violent death. In many fishes and reptiles, for instance, which are old in years, there is not in their organs or tissues the least hint of age-degeneration. The third is that of the majority of civilized human beings, some domesticated, and some wild animals, in which the decline of life is marked by normal *senescence*. The fourth is that of many human beings, not a few domesticated animals, *e.g.* horse, dog, cat, and some semi-domesticated animals, notably bees, in which the close of life is marked by distinctively pathological *senility*. It seems certain that wild animals rarely exhibit more than a slight senescence, while man often exhibits a bathos of senility. What is the explanation of this?

The majority of wild animals seem to die a violent death, before there is time for senescence, much less senility. The character of old age depends upon the nature of the physiological bad debts, some of which are more unnatural than others, much more unnatural in tamed than in wild animals, much more unnatural in man than in animals. Furthermore, civilized man, sheltered from the extreme physical forms of the struggle for existence, can live for a long time with a very defective hereditary constitution, which may end in a period of very undesirable senility. Man is also very deficient in the resting instinct, and seldom takes much thought about resting habits. In many cases, too, there has come about in human societies a system of protective agencies which allow the weak to survive through a period of prolonged senility. We cannot, perhaps, do otherwise in regard to those we love; but it is plain that our better ambition would be to heighten the standard of vitality rather than merely to prolong existence, so that if we have an old age it may be without senility. Those whom the gods love die young.

LITERATURE.—Ebstein, *Die Kunst das menschliche Leben zu verlängern*, Wiesbaden, 1891; Flourens, *De la Longévité humaine*[2], Paris, 1885; G. M. Humphry, *Old Age, and Changes incidental to it*, Cambridge, 1885; E. Ray Lankester, 'Centenarianism,' in *The Advancement of Science*, London, 1890, also *Comparative Longevity in Man and Animals*, London, 1870; Lejoncourt, *Galerie des centenaires anciens et modernes*, Paris, 1842; E. Metchnikoff, 'Études Biologiques sur la Vieillesse,' in *Annales Inst. Pasteur*, i. (1901) p. 865, ii. (1902) p. 912, also *The Nature of Man* (tr. 1903), esp. ch. x., 'The Scientific Study of Old Age'; Karl Pearson, *The Chances of Death*, vol. i., London, 1897; Pflüger, *Ueber die Kunst der Verlängerung des menschlichen Lebens*, Bonn, 1890; W. J. Thoms, *Human Longevity*, 1873; J. Arthur Thomson, 'On Growing Old,' in *London Quart. Rev.*, April 1903; H. de Varigny, art 'Croissance' in Richet's *Dict. de Physiologie*, iv., 1900; August Weismann, 'The Duration of Life,' in *Essays upon Heredity*, Oxford, 1889.

J. ARTHUR THOMSON.

AGED.—See ABANDONMENT AND EXPOSURE, OLD AGE.

AGES OF THE WORLD.

Primitive (L. H. Gray), p. 183.
Australian.—See Alcheringa.
Babylonian (A. Jeremias), p. 183.
Buddhist (L. de la V. Poussin), p. 187.
Christian (G. Bonet-Maury), p. 190.
Egyptian (F. Ll. Griffith), p. 192.
Greek and Roman (K. F. Smith), p. 192.
Indian (H. Jacobi), p. 200.
Jewish (E. N. Adler), p. 202.
Muhammadan.—See Cosmogony (Muh.).
Teutonic.—See Cosmogony (Teut.).
Zoroastrian (N. Söderblom), p. 205.

AGES OF THE WORLD (*Primitive and American*).—1. The conception of a series of cosmic eras, mutually related, yet separated from each other by cataclysms destroying the entire known world and forming the basis for an essentially new creation, is peculiar to a high degree of religious development. The idea of creation is common to practically all religious systems (see art. Cosmogony), and at a later, though still relatively primitive, period is evolved the notion of a cosmic cataclysm which is to annihilate the world. Still later, it would seem, comes the doctrine that after this cosmic annihilation there is to be a new world, a belief which is found, for instance, in systems so divergent as the Iranian and the Norse. Closely connected with the belief in the regeneration of the world is the well-nigh universal doctrine that the entire earth has already been destroyed by a flood (see Deluge). The theory of Ages of the World has been carried still further by the phase which holds that the present cosmic era has been preceded by others, and the Greek, Hindu, and Buddhist systems have even evolved a series of cycles each of which contains four Ages, and which have been and are to be repeated in infinite succession.

2. The most familiar example of the belief in Ages of the World is, of course, the philosophized Greek view presented by Hesiod (*Works and Days*, 109–201), according to whom there have been four Ages—golden, silver, brass, and iron—each worse than the one preceding. Equally pessimistic is the Hindu system of Ages, where the four *yugas*, or Ages of a 'day of Brahma' (12,000 years), are successively shorter in duration and increasingly degenerate. Among primitive peoples such a series of Ages of the World seems to be unknown, yet it is noteworthy that among the South American Indians it is generally held that the world has already been destroyed twice, once by fire and again by flood, as among the eastern Tupis and the Arawaks of Guiana. In like manner, the ancient Peruvians fancied not only that two cosmic cataclysms had occurred, but that the world was again to be destroyed, so that they stood in terror of every lunar and solar eclipse.

3. Outside the great culture nations of Asia, Northern Africa, and Europe, however, only the Aztecs of ancient Mexico, perhaps under the influence of the still more highly developed Mayas of Yucatan, evolved a doctrine of Ages of the World. This marvellous people held that the present era, which bore no special name, was preceded by four Ages or 'Suns': the Sun of Earth, the Sun of Fire, the Sun of Air, and the Sun of Water. Each of these cycles had been terminated by a fearful and universal cataclysm, and the Aztecs looked forward with dread to the end of the present era. At the close of each cycle of fifty-two years they were filled with special fear; every fire was extinguished, and all the priests, followed by the people, marched in solemn procession to a mountain two leagues from the capital. There they watched with bated breath for the rising of the Pleiades, and when this constellation was seen, the priests rekindled fires by the friction of two pieces of wood, one of which was placed on the breast of a human sacrifice, while the multitude rejoiced in the assurance that the world would surely survive for another cycle of fifty-two years. It is noteworthy that Aztec sources vary widely with regard to both the length and the sequence of the cosmic eras, the latter being given not only as stated above, but also as Water, Air, Fire, Earth; Earth, Air, Fire, Water; Water, Earth, Air, Fire; and Water, Air, Earth, Fire. In like manner, the order of the cataclysms which terminated the several eras varies according to the different sources, but it is certain at least that the Sun of Earth was terminated by famine, the Sun of Fire by conflagration, the Sun of Air by a hurricane, and the Sun of Water by a flood.

4. The basis of this Aztec belief in Ages of the World is not altogether certain. It has been suggested that it was due, at least in part, to the tremendous natural phenomena of a tropical country, and also to the political and social revolutions which took place in ancient Mexico. The former explanation is doubtless the one to be preferred, implying a reminiscence of some remote catastrophe, mythopoetically magnified by successive generations, especially as this hypothesis also explains the characteristic South American belief in a twofold destruction of the world by fire and flood.

Literature.—Waitz, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, iv. 161–163 (Leipzig, 1864); Brinton, *Myths of the New World*[2], pp. 229–233 (New York, 1876); Réville, *Native Religions of Mexico and Peru*, pp. 113–118 (London, 1884); Ehrenreich, *Mythen und Legenden der südamer. Urvölker*, pp. 30–31 (Berlin, 1905).

Louis H. Gray.

AGES OF THE WORLD (*Babylonian*).—Even before the discovery of the cuneiform inscriptions, it was known that the Babylonians had reflected on the course of the world's history, and that they regulated the Ages of the World according to the movements of the planets. Seneca* reports a statement of Berosus, who under the rule of the Seleucids was priest in the Marduk temple of Babylon, and whose lost historical work *Chaldaica* was intended to prove the commencement of a new world period under the Seleucids or under Alexander.

'Berosus says that everything takes place according to the course of the planets, and he maintains this so confidently that he determines the times for the conflagration of the world and for the flood. He asserts that the world will burn when all the planets which now move in different courses come together in the Crab,† so that they all stand in a straight line in the same sign, and that the future flood will take place when the same conjunction occurs in Capricorn. For the former is the constellation of the summer solstice, the latter of the winter solstice; they are the decisive signs of the zodiac, because the turning-points of the year lie in them.'

These accounts of Berosus have here, as well as in the narratives of the Creation and the Flood, been proved thoroughly reliable. The teaching which underlies them regarding the course of the world corresponds to the accounts which we can read from the cuneiform inscriptions.

* *Fragm. hist. Græc.* ii. 50.

† The sign of the Crab in the zodiac is the turning-point of the summer sun, if the vernal equinox lies in the Ram; the corresponding turning-point of the winter sun is Capricorn. Our calendar has retained the designations, although the vernal equinox has long ago moved into the Fish.

The Babylonian doctrine, which we find popularized in myths, dramatic and festive customs, and games, inquires into the origin of things and the development of the world from its beginnings in chaos to its renewal in future æons. The doctrine has spread over the whole world. We find it again in Egypt, in the religion of the Avesta, and in India; traces of it are discovered in China, as well as in Mexico and among the savage nations of South America. To refer these phenomena back to 'elementary ideas' (Bastian, *Völkeridee*), such as may arise independently among different peoples, will not hold good in view of the circumstance that we have to do with ideas connected with definite facts which rest on continued astronomical observations. Babylonia was, moreover, according to a constant tradition, the home of astronomy ('Chaldean wisdom'), and there the science of the stars formed the basis of all intellectual culture.

In the Babylonian conception of the universe, which regards everything earthly as a copy of a heavenly prototype, the zodiac is considered the most important part of the whole universe. The zodiac (*šupuk šamê*) is the broad 'Way' on the heavens, *c.* 20 degrees, upon which the sun, the moon, Venus and the four other moving stars (planets) known to antiquity, trace out their course; while the other stars, the fixed stars, seem to stand still on the ball of the revolving heavens. The moving stars were regarded as interpreters of the Divine will. The heaven of fixed stars was related to them like a commentary written on the margin of a book of revelation.

The rulers of the zodiac are the sun, the moon, and Venus. In a mythological text (*WAI.* iv. pl. 5) we are told that Bel placed them to rule the *šupuk šamê*. The four remaining planets, Marduk-Jupiter, Nebo-Mercury, Ninib-Mars, and Nergal-Saturn, correspond to the quarter appearances of the three, and have their special place of revelation at the four quarter points of the cycle, or, speaking in terms of space, at the four corners of the world. Every one of the astral divinities represents the whole Divine power. 'Polytheism rests on myth, which popularizes the teaching, and on worship, which again is a product of the mythology. The temple-teaching at every place of worship serves to prove that the divinity reveals itself at a particular place in a definite form and shape, such as result from the relation of that place to the corresponding sacred region of the heavens (τόπος, *templum*). The local god is *summus deus* for the region; the other gods are like wonder-working saints.

Seeing, however, that the Divine power reveals itself in the zodiac, the theory involves a triadic conception of the godhead. The triad—sun, moon, and Venus—in their relation to each other, as well as each of these three bodies individually, comprehends the whole being of the godhead. In the case of every mythological phenomenon, the question must be raised whether the divinity in the particular place or in the expression of its worship stands for the sun, the moon, or the Venus-(Ištar-) character. In each case, however, the deity represents at the same time the whole cycle, which repeats its phenomena in every microcosm of the natural world. The same is true of Marduk, Nebo, Ninib, and Nergal. In the teaching of Babylon, which is best known to us, the chief points in the sun's track belong to them in a special sense as well as the quarter appearances of the sun's course. They can thus be designated sun-gods, but they can equally well be represented as forms of the moon or of Venus as they appear in their course. In like manner, they are representatives of the course of the cycle of nature (Tammuz in the upper and under world), which runs parallel with the astral phenomena in the changes of the year. Marduk and Nebo as the embodiments of the spring and harvest phenomena, or Ninib and Nergal as the embodiments of the phenomena of summer and winter, could occupy the place of Tammuz in both halves of his cycle.

The Babylonian sages reached the profound conception that time and space are identical.* Both are revelations of the Divine power, and have therefore the same principles of division.

The course of the world cycle is consummated in the struggle of the two powers of the world system, light and darkness, the upper and the under world, the summer of the world and the winter of the world. In the myths the sun and the moon are the combatants. The moon is, according to the Babylonian teaching, the star of the upper world (the reverse holds in Egypt). She dies and rises again from the dead (*inbu ša ina rammaniša ibbanû*, 'fruit, which produces itself out of itself'); she symbolizes the power of life from the dead. The sun, which, in opposition to the moon, stands at the low point, and in which the stars disappear, is the power of the under world. 'Ištar desires to become the queen of heaven.' In the myth she is the heavenly virgin (in the zodiac she is represented by the figure of the Virgin with the ear of corn or with the child) who gives birth to the sun-child or the moon-child, which then overcomes the dragon of darkness and thereby brings in the new era,—but then at the highest point of the course dies and sinks down into the under world; or she is the Venus, who descends into the under world and brings up the fallen ones. The four planets of the four points of the world, which indicate in the gyration the turning-points of the sun (Ninib and Nergal) and the equinoctial points (Marduk and Nebo), are made use of in the mythology in the following manner: Marduk is the bringer in of the new time (the spring sun), Nebo (Hermes with the balance of the dead) is the guide to the dark half of the lower world, Ninib (Mars) brings the doom of the change of the summer sun (death of Tammuz by the boar, the sacred animal of Ninib), Nergal is lord of the dark half of the under world. Thus Marduk and Nebo exchange places under the precedence of Babylon, whose local god is Marduk. The rôle of bringing in the new time belongs in reality to Nebo. His name indicates that he is the 'prophet' of the new time (Nebo-Mercury is the morning-star; in the word lies the root of the official name *nebî'*, 'prophet,' *i.e.* one who announces the new age).†

The change of the arc of day and the arc of night, the summer and winter courses of the stars, and the related change of life and death in nature, result in the doctrine of the *change of the Ages*. The change of the seasons corresponds to the succession of day and night. According to the principle that the microcosm everywhere reflects the macrocosm, the year is a copy of the greater period of time, in which the evolution of the world is consummated, and the seasons correspond to Ages of the World.

The acceptance of Ages of the World must go back to the observation of the stages of the sun's course. Before we speak of these Sun Ages of the World, we shall give a survey of traces of Ages of the World in which the connexion with these stages is not at first apparent.

The cuneiform texts mention 'kings before the Flood' in opposition to 'kings after the Flood.' They are thought of as in past time:—

* The Assyr.-Bab. '*ûlam*, 'world,' is the Heb. *ôlām*, 'primeval time,' 'eternity.'

† Jupiter, as a planet, has in itself no claim to special emphasis. In our order of the days of the week it occupies the fifth place (Thursday, *Jeudi*, *Jovis dies*). The fact that the classical peoples raise him to the rank of *summus deus* is an indication of the wide diffusion of the Babylonian conception of the world.

1. *Lam abûbi*, 'the time before the Flood.' In the time before the Flood there lived the heroes, who (according to the Gilgameš Epic, which on the 11th table tells the story of the Flood) dwell in the under world, or, like the Babylonian Noah, are removed into the heavenly world. At that time there lived, too, the (seven) sages. Ašurbanipal speaks of inscriptions of the time before the Flood. A magical text mentions a saying of an old sage before the Flood. *WAI.* v. 44, 20*a*, speaks of 'kings after the Flood.' Berosus indicates along with the sages the early kings, who together lived 120 years.

1. Aloros (= Bab. *Arûru*?).
2. Alaporos (Adaporos) = *adapa*, i.e. Marduk, the son of Ea in the heroic age, who, as the bringer in of the new age (cf. Ἀδὰμ μέλλων), Marduk as fighting with the dragon, will introduce the new age of the world.*
3. Amêlon = *amêlu*, 'man.' As Adapa corresponds to the Biblical patriarch Seth, Amêlon in like manner corresponds to Enoch (i.e. man).
4. Ammenon = *ummânu* ('workmaster') = Cain (Cainan), 'smith' (cf. Aram. *qaînâya*—'smith').
5. Megalaros = ?.
6. Daonos = ?.
7. Evedorachos = *Enmeduranki*, 'favourite of the great gods,' who taught his son the secret of heaven and earth; i.e. Enoch, who walked with God, and after a life of 365 years (the number of the sun) was taken away. The Jewish feast of the turning of the winter sun (*Ḥânukkah*, 'feast,' later applied to the dedication of the Temple) was connected with Enoch. Jubilees (4[21]) says of him: 'Enoch was among the angels of God six jubilees; and they showed him all that the *rule of the sun* is in heaven and on the earth, and he wrote it all down.'
8. Amempsinos = *amel-Sîn*, 'man of the god Sin' = Methuselah. There is a Babylonian text which communicates 'the secrets' of Amel-Sin.
9. Otiartes (Opartes?) = *Ubara-Tutu*, father of the Babylonian Noah (Utnapištim, Ḥasisatra, in Berosus *Xisuthros*).

Berosus relates that Kronos before the Flood had ordered Xisuthros to engrave with letter-signs all things according to their beginning, middle, and end (engraving on tablets with cuneiform letters is meant), and to deposit them in Sippar. After the Flood his children and relatives had gone to Babylon, taken the writings from Sippar, and circulated them among the people.

2. The historic period, which again unfolds itself in Ages. The division of the Ages into periods before and after the Flood is also connected with the course of the stars. The Golden Age of early times corresponds to the time in which the vernal equinox in the zodiac goes through the dominion of Anu (four figures). The Flood brought the course of the world through the dominion of Ea (four figures, water-region); the historical period corresponds with Bel's realm of the zodiac. For the track of the zodiac is portioned out to Anu, Bel, and Ea, the triad of Divine power in the whole universe of space, corresponding on the zodiac to Sin, Šamaš, and Ištar. The restoration of the world after the Flood corresponds to the fashioning of the world after the original chaos, which also appears as the power of the waters (in the myth the water-dragon had been subdued); the world after the Flood corresponds to the primeval world after the Creation.†

The application of Ages of the World to the periods of the evolution of the æon of mankind is connected in a special way with the teaching about the calendar, which is based on observation of the *precession of the equinoxes*.

By the precession of the equinoxes is meant the gradual displacement of the same point of day in the ecliptic, the middle line of the zodiac, which the sun's track marks out. The inclination of the axis of the earth to the plane of the sun is variable. In accordance with this, the point of intersection of the apparent plane of the sun and of the equator recedes for the spectator For the observation of the ancients this resulted in the following phenomenon: The position of the sun in the same spring days recedes from year to year farther towards the east. In 72 years the displacement amounts to a day, in every 2200 years therefore, about a figure in the zodiac. The vernal equinox traverses once in 12×2200 years the water-region (Flood) and the fire-region. On this fact rests the teaching of Berosus given above (p. 183[b]).

In the region of further Asia, the earliest historical time of which we can find traces in the original sources had placed the cult of the god of the moon in the forefront. Sargon says, in his State inscription of the king of Meluḫḫa, that his fathers had, from distant times, since the æon of the moon-god (*Adî Nannar*), sent no more messengers to his predecessors. In the scheme of the partition of the world between the moon and the sun (moon = star of the upper world, sun = the star of the under world; see above, p. 184[b]), Nebo would, in the pre-Babylonian order, correspond to the moon, Marduk to the sun. Nebo, too, in accordance with his character, is the 'prophet'; and, according to the nature of the doctrine regarding him, also the victor over the power of darkness, the bearer of the tablets of fate. Under the influence of the supremacy of Babylon he has exchanged his rôle with Marduk; and this, by the way, agrees with the principle of the Babylonian doctrine, according to which opposites pass over into one another (east and west, south and north, summer and winter, day and night, exchange their rôles). We could thus speak of an *Age of the moon* or an *Age of Nebo*, to which in the epoch of the supremacy of Babylon an *Age of the sun* or an *Age of Marduk* would correspond. But if there was a theory which reckoned in this way, still the latter is at least subsequently regarded as the Age of the moon; i.e. the Nebo Age, which preceded the rule of Marduk of Babylon, has been transposed in the teaching of the calendar, which was reckoned according to the precession.

(*a*) *Age of the Twins.*—In the Age before the rise of Babylon (about B.C. 5000–2800) the sun stood in the zodiacal sign called the Twins. If we were to make additional use of this circumstance in the theory of the Ages of the World, as we are inclined to do, the two phases of the waxing and waning moon would in harmony with it correspond to these twins. The moon also is called repeatedly *ellamonš*, i.e. 'twins'; and the hieroglyphics of the zodiac, which even to-day indicate the Twins in the calendar, consist of the picture of the waxing and waning moon, just as the Romans represented Janus, who bears the character of the moon, as the two half-moons with human faces.

This Age of the Twins was for Babylon the age of the settlement of the Semitic Babylonians.

The Twins (*Dioscuri*) thus supply the ruling motive for all the myths which indicate the beginning of a new epoch (Cyrus, Cambyses, Romulus, Remus, etc.). And if any one in the time of the Assyrian predominance wished to dispose of the claims of Babylon, he went back to the archaic form of calculation. Either Nebo was deliberately raised to a more prominent place than Marduk, or (*e.g.*, under Sargon) Sivan, the month of the moon-god, was regarded as the first month of the year. In the same way the Roman calendar was made archaic by beginning the year with Janus (January), although the last month was called December (i.e. the tenth month).

* Marduk and Adapa are both *abkallu*, i.e. 'sages' in the Divine sense. Sennacherib, who, by the destruction of Babylon and the raising of Nineveh into prominence by violent means, sought to inaugurate a new era, allows himself to be glorified as Adapa. He says (*K.* 270, 1*a*): 'Assur spoke in a dream to the grandfather of the king, my lord "*abkallu*"; "the king, the king of kings (Ašurbanipal), is the grandson of the *abkallu* and Adapa."' See p. 186[b] for the inauguration of a new Age with Ašurbanipal.

† The Biblical story of the Flood still shows traces of the notion found in the Babylonian narrative of the flooding of the whole world. The mountain where the ark landed is originally the mountain of the world. The report of the Priests' Code (Gn 8[cf. 13]) gives the precise height of the mountain. On its top stands the tree of life (olive tree) from which the dove brings the leaf. The ark of the Indian Flood also lands on the mountain of the world.

One would expect an Age of the sun to follow an Age of the moon (the sun and the moon are also twins). As a matter of fact, the reckoning of the calendar, which was changed about B.C. 2800, on the basis of the precession into the next figure of the zodiac, was so adjusted that in the zodiac the figure of the Bull followed the Twins.

(*b*) *Age of the Bull.*—This reform of the calendar was assisted by the actual state of affairs. The time of its introduction corresponds with the period in which Babylon became the metropolis of the world. Marduk, the god of the city of Babylon, the 'farmer of Babylon' (Nebuchadrezzar calls himself *Ikkaru ša Babili*, as representative of the god on earth), is symbolized by the bull, which corresponds to the figure of the Bull in the heavens.* In this way the Age of the sun came at the same time to its rights, for Marduk as the representative of the Divine power is in an especial sense the sun-god. Ḫammurabi took advantage of the reform of the calendar to glorify his rule as a new epoch of the world. He says that he has succeeded in 'exalting Marduk.' The priests of Babylon celebrate Marduk as the fighter with the dragon and as the demiurge, and found the claim of Babylon to world empire on the rôle of Marduk as creator of the world. The honour which belonged to Nebo as the lord of the destinies is transferred to Marduk. He determines on New Year's day the fate of the world. Nebo, who in the older teaching carried the tablets of fate, is now recorder of the destinies.

The calendar which corresponded to the Age of the Bull must have reckoned the beginning of the year a month earlier, so that the year began with Iyyar and closed with Nisan; for the world-epoch embracing a sign of the zodiac corresponds to the course of the sun through a sign of the zodiac, *i.e.* one month. That it was so reckoned can, of course, be proved only indirectly. The king of Assyria allowed himself to be invested in office in the month Iyyar. The investiture is a ceremony which took place also in Babylon, and therefore according to Babylonian law. The king seized the hands of Bel-Marduk, and by this act his rule obtained its ratification and consecration. This inauguration was still observed in Iyyar after Nisan must have long been regarded as the first month. Under Sargon and Nebuchadrezzar the inauguration took place in Nisan. The new calendar had thus in the meantime secured recognition for its claims.

The mythological motives of the Age of the Bull had to be taken from the myths of Marduk. Seeing that Marduk is regarded as the child of the sun (the ideogram signifies 'son of the sun'), the motive of the mysterious birth is connected with his appearance as well as the motive of the persecution by the dragon (exposure and rescue). The myths of Marduk which are as yet known have not supplied evidence for his birth from the virgin queen of heaven (see above, p. 184[b]). But the myths tell of the marriage of Marduk. The child of the sun in the course of the cycle becomes the lover and the husband of the queen of heaven (Ištar). Every historical celebrity who, in the Bull age, was distinguished as a ruler of the world, a founder of dynasties, etc., was furnished with the Marduk motive, if some antiquated method corresponding to the age of the Twins did not prefer the motive of the Dioscuri (see above, p. 185[b]). In this way we can explain the mythical setting of the history of Sargon I., who founded Babylon, and in all probability was the first to introduce the Marduk method of reckoning.

'Sargon the mighty king of Agada am I. My mother was a vestal,* my father of the lower class. . . . My vestal mother conceived me, in secret did she bear me. She laid me in an ark of bulrushes, closed my doors with pitch, laid me in the river. . . . The river bore me downwards to Akki, the water-carrier. Akki, the water-carrier, received me in the friendliness of his heart, brought me up as his child, made me his gardener. During my activity Ištar fell in love with me. . . . For years I enjoyed sovereign power.'

It is related of the hero of the Babylonian Gilgameš Epic how Ištar seeks to win his love. Ælian, however (*Hist. Anim.* xii. 21), says his mother had been a king's daughter, who conceived the hero by means of an insignificant man.

Gudea, the South Babylonian priestly prince, says to the goddess, who stands by his side, 'I have no mother, thou art my mother; I have no father, thou art my father; in a secret place hast thou borne me.'

Ninib appears in an epic poem as the hero, who will allow his royal power to extend to the bounds of heaven and earth. He is a child of Ištar, he is called 'My father know I not.'

Ašurnaṣirpal allows the following story to be told of himself:

'I was born in the midst of mountains, which no man knoweth; thou hast, O Ištar, with the glance of thine eyes chosen me, hast longed for my supremacy, hast brought me forth from the mountains, and called me as ruler of men.'

Ašurbanipal wishes to be regarded as a child of Ištar, who had once nourished him. The writers of his tablets represent his Age as the Golden Age of the world (cf. p. 187[b]).

(*c*) *Age of the Ram.*—The recognition of the fact that the calendar must now be arranged according to the Ram as the vernal equinox, and the fixing of it so, give to the otherwise unimportant king Nabonassar (Nabû-nasir, 797–734) a special significance. The framers of the calendar in his time have dated a new age from Nabonassar. Syncellus relates (*Chronographia*, 207) that Nabonassar, according to the testimony of Alexander Polyhistor and Berosus, destroyed all historical documents relating to his predecessors, in order that dates might be reckoned only according to his time (*συναγάγων τὰς πράξεις τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ βασιλέων ἠφάνισεν, ὅπως ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἡ καθαρίθμησις γένηται τῶν Χαλδαίων βασιλέων*).

The breaking of the tablets is not to be taken literally. It is the same as the *burning of the books* in reforms of other ages, in Persia under Alexander, in China, B.C. 213, under Chin-shi-hoang. In the case of the burning of the libraries of Alexandria, too, this motive must be taken into consideration. It signifies the beginning of a new era of Islâm in Egypt under Omar.

This is the reason why the Babylonian chronology contained in the extant inscriptions begins with Nabonassar. The Ptolemaic canon, too, which, as is well known, did not follow historical ends, but represented a calendar with astronomical limits,† had begun with Nabonassar. The misunderstanding of Syncellus can also be explained in this way; the *Chronographia* (267) says the Babylonians had from the time of Nabonassar written down the periods of the courses of the stars (*ἀπὸ Ναβονασάρου τοὺς χρόνους τῆς τῶν ἀστέρων κινήσεως Χαλδαῖοι ἠκρίβωσαν*).

In Babylon itself the reform of the Age of the Ram never obtained full recognition, because the Age of Nabonassar coincided with the fall of Babylon. The old Babylonian reckoning kept its hold here. Still Berosus, under the rule of the Seleucids, reckons, as we saw (p. 183[b]), with the Age of the Ram. The new reckoning seems to have found its chief support in Egypt. Just as the Bull Age received recognition by emphasizing Marduk of Babylon, in the same way the Age of the Ram served the purpose of glorifying Jupiter Amon, who is represented with the head of a

* In the Babylonian ideogram of the planets, Jupiter signifies 'bull of the sun,' and is explained as the 'furrow of the heavens' which the bull of the sun ploughs.

* *Entu*, the 'sister of god,' in the Code of Ḫammurabi, the priestly representative of the sister-wife of Marduk, Ištar.

† It was carried further for several centuries after Christ. Claudius Ptolemæus is by no means the author; he had collected the traditions and preserved them in their true form.

ram, although he is in his nature identical with Marduk. Alexander the Great, who allowed himself to be celebrated by contemporary writers as lord of worlds, and to be painted by Apelles as Jupiter, consulted the oracle in the oasis of Jupiter Amon. Manetho says that under Bocchoris 'a ram (ἄρνιον) spoke.'

The doctrine of the Ages of the World, as may already have been inferred from the preceding explanation, is connected with the expectation of a deliverer. As deliverer there appears the Divine power, which reveals itself in the spring equinox. It is Marduk-Adapa, it is the 'ram,' which, according to the Age, overcomes the power of darkness. In 4 Ezra (11^{44-46}) the seer reflects on the ways of the Highest:

'Then the Highest looked at his times; lo, they were at an end, and his æons (*sæcula*) were full. . . . Now the earth will be refreshed and return . . . and trust in the judgment and mercy of her creator.'

In these words lies the fundamental religious idea of the doctrine of the Ages of the World. 'The æons were full.' 'The time is fulfilled.'*

The connexion of the doctrine of the Ages of the World with the expectation of a deliverer produces the following characteristic opinions, which meet us at once as axioms:

1. *The Age of perfection lies at the beginning.* Just as pure knowledge, revealed by the godhead, lies at the beginning, so that it is the task of science to discover the original truth by observation of the book of revelation written down in the stars, and to obtain freedom from the errors which have crept in through human guilt, so also the Age of pure happiness lies at the beginning.

This fundamental idea has produced a special theory regarding the doctrine of the Ages of the World which is based on the connexion of the planets with the *metals*. Silver is the metal of the moon, gold the metal of the sun,† copper the metal of Ištar. According to the reckoning which begins with the Age of the moon, the silver must have been the first Age, on which a less valuable then followed. We know from classical antiquity the succession: Golden, Silver, Copper (Iron) Ages (Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 90 ff., and Ovid, *Metam.* i. 89 ff.). The succession of the Ages of the World lies also at the basis of the Book of Daniel. The commencement with the Golden Age points to Egypt, where the sun predominates (see above, p. 184[b]). It may, however, point to the Babylonian conception, which gives the first place to Marduk as a sun-phenomenon, just as the planetal series of our days of the week places Sunday before Monday. The Golden Age is also called the Age of Saturn. Owing to the change of the heptagram into a pentagram, Saturn is represented by the sun, as Mars is by the moon; and an astronomical text of the Babylonians, which has been handed down to us from the time of the Arsacids, expressly says that Saturn and the sun are identical.‡ As far as the rest are concerned, the order of succession corresponds to the astral theory. The third, the Copper Age, corresponds to Ištar-Venus, the third figure among the rulers of the zodiac.

The succession gold, silver, copper, brings the second characteristic at the same time into view. It is as follows:

2. *The times are becoming worse.*—This is much more strongly expressed when the theory departs from the scheme provided by the planets with regard to the fourth Age, and allows an *Iron* Age, corresponding to the distress of the present time, to follow after the Golden, the Silver, and the Copper Ages. The end of these evil times, which precedes the destruction of the world, is a time of cursing, a time of tribulation, and the reversal of the natural order. The Babylonian omens often speak of this time of cursing, which stands in opposition to the time the deliverer brings (see above): 'When such and such things happen in heaven, then will the clear become dull, the pure dirty, the lands will fall into confusion, prayers will not be heard, the signs of the prophets will become unfavourable.' In a form of curse which speaks of princes who do not obey the commands of the gods, we have the following:

'Under his rule the one will devour the other, the people will sell their children for gold, the husband will desert his wife, the wife her husband, the mother will bolt the door against her daughter.'

In the Atarhases myth, the text of which originates in the 3rd mill. (the time of Ammizaduga), the distresses which precede the Flood are related. In the Ira myth the coming of the deliverer after the time of cursing is expected:

'The seacoast shall not spare the seacoast, Mesopotamia shall not spare Mesopotamia, nor Assyria Assyria, the Elamite the Elamites, the Carsite the Carsites, the Sutæan the Sutæans, the Cutæan the Cutæans, the Lulubæan the Lulubæans, one land another land, one man other men, one brother another, but they shall strike each other dead. But after that shall come the Akkada, who shall lay them all low and overwhelm them severally.'*

Signs in the sun and in the moon proclaim the end. In a hymn we have the following:

'Oh, father Bel . . . oh, lord of the land, the ewe rejects her lamb, the she-goat her kid. How much longer in thy faithful city shall the mother reject her son, the wife her husband? Heaven and earth are laid low, there is no light with us. The sun does not rise with his radiance over the land, the moon does not rise with her light over the land. Sun and moon do not rise with their radiance over the land.'

The time of the curse corresponds to the rule of the powers of the lower world. It is like the time of the descent of Ištar to Hades. When Venus is in the lower world, all life is dead. As it is in the small year, so is it in the world year.

But then comes the great revolution:

3. *The happy time of the beginning comes back.* The Babylonian texts seldom speak of this time of blessing. It is only from the description of the happy rule of kings, who are praised by the writers of the tablets as the bringers in of a new Age, that we can extract the motives of the time of blessing. Especially is this the case with Ašurbanipal.

'Since the time the gods in their friendliness did set me on the throne of my fathers, Ramman has sent forth his rain, Ea opened the springs; the grain was five ells high in the ear, the ears were five-sixths ells long, the harvest was plentiful, the corn was abundant, the seed shot up, the trees bore rich fruits the cattle multiplied exceedingly. During my reign there was great abundance, under my rule rich blessing streamed down.'

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ALFRED JEREMIAS.

AGES OF THE WORLD (Buddhist).—The views of the Buddhists on periods of cosmical destruction and renovation were matters of vivid interest to the first Orientalists, as will be seen from the bibliography on p. 190. This interest has rather languished since the publication of the *Religion des Buddha* of Köppen, the last who has dealt thoroughly with this topic.

* *Ūmê imlû*, 'the days are full,' are the words in an oracle which Ašurbanipal receives in Susa, according to which he is said to have been prophesied 1635 years before as the saviour of Nana, the queen of heaven.

† Therefore the relation of the value of silver and gold in antiquity is 1 : 13⅓, i.e. the relation of the course of the moon to that of the sun (27 : 360). The remains of colours, which Rawlinson found on the planet steps of the Nebo temple in Borsippa, were for the moon silver (white), for the sun golden, for Venus light-yellow.

‡ Cf. for this, the present writer's *Das AT im Lichte des alten Orients*, p. 12.

* Note how the whole world is embraced in the range of vision.

The fanciful theories of the *Kalpas* or *Ages of the World* do not appear to be essential to Buddhism, whether looked upon as a religion or as a philosophy. Nor are they of mythological moment, being rather matter of 'secular knowledge,' or, as a Buddhist would say, *lokāyatika*. Nevertheless, as they can be proved to be very old; as they are made use of when the myriads of Buddhas of the Great Vehicle are honoured, and have been duly recorded by the Buddhists of every country, Sinhalese as well as Mongolian; as, moreover, some bits of philosophical or religious reflexion are interwoven with them, we may be allowed to consider the subject in all its aspects.

There is no beginning of transmigration (or *saṁsāra*); there will be no end to it: on these two points all Buddhist schools agree. But, without mentioning that speculations on the beginning or the end of the cosmos are forbidden by the Buddha in some texts (see AGNOSTICISM [Buddhist]), it must be observed that there is an end to transmigration for the Arhats, who rightly say at the time of dying, 'This existence is for me the last one.' Moreover, in the Buddhism of the Great Vehicle, Avalokita, for instance (see AVALOKITA), resolved to postpone his entering into Nirvāṇa till every creature should, by his own really divine exertion, have been carried into the peace of salvation. The problem, where the texts are silent, or rather, contradictory, will probably have to be solved as it has been by the Sāṅkhya: the number of the souls being infinite, there will never come a time when all will have attained Nirvāṇa. Hence there need be no despondency, for *we* can be among the elect, if only we care for it.

Theories on the revolutions of the world are said, in the *Brahmajālasutta*, to be extraneous to Buddhism, and even alien to its spirit. But they soon became naturalized; and, while originally very like the Brāhmanical theories, they were worked after a new plan.

There is mention in the fourth edict of Aśoka of the next destruction of the Universe. 'The pious king hopes that his sons and grandsons, and so on, will maintain good practices till the age of cosmical destruction (*saṁvaṭṭakappa*).' This text does not, however, prove that the belief in the very speedy disappearance of Buddhism was still unknown.

The canonical Pāli texts do not furnish us with the complete theory now to be stated. These afford only hints or allusions, from which it is difficult to draw any conclusion as to the conditions of the elaboration of the doctrine. These hints, however, will be carefully pointed out. So far as the Buddhism of the South is concerned, we derive our knowledge from the Commentaries, of which the materials are much older than Buddhaghoṣa, their official compiler; and for the Buddhism of the North from Mongolian, Tibetan, and Chinese sources, confirmed by the *Abhidharma* literature.

The general lines are as follows:

A 'Period' (*kappa*), or 'Great Period' (*mahākappa*, *kalpa*) of cosmical evolution, is to be divided into four 'Incalculables' (*asaṅkheyya*) or 'Incalculable Periods' (*asaṅkheyyakappa*, *asaṅkhyeyakalpa*). These last are always mentioned in the following order: (1) Period of destruction (*saṁvaṭṭakappa*, *saṁvartakalpa*); (2) of duration of the destruction (*saṁvaṭṭatthāyin*, *saṁvartasthāyin*, when the world remains destroyed); (3) of renovation, or rather revolution (*vivaṭṭa*, *vivarta*); (4) of duration of the world renovated (*Aṅguttara*, ii. 142, iv. 100; *Majjh.* i. 35).

How long is an 'Incalculable' period? The answer given by Buddha himself is a very good one: It is difficult, *i.e.* impossible, to exhaust an 'Incalculable' by numbering hundreds of thousands of years. In *Saṁyutta*, ii. 181–2, there is a simile which has found its way into the Chinese and Sinhalese records: 'Suppose a mountain of iron to be touched every hundred years by a muslin veil; the mountain will be destroyed before the Incalculable is at an end—and the *saṁsāra* has no common measure with the Incalculables, nay, with hundreds of thousands of Incalculables': the *saṁsāra* being 'infinite,' as we should say, and the 'Incalculables' indefinite.

The same problem occurs in the *Mahāvastu* (i. 77). It is said that the future Buddha must, before becoming a Buddha, pass through 'stages' or 'terraces' of immeasurable duration (*aparimita*, *aprameya*). 'If it be so,' asks Kātyāyana, 'how will the future Buddha ever attain the higher stage?' Answer: 'It is the same with the Ages of the World: each of them is immeasurable, and nevertheless there are many Ages.'

Notwithstanding these very clear statements, Buddhists and moderns have tried to calculate the 'Incalculable.' 'Asaṅkhyeya,' like many other words of the same meaning (and there are plenty of words in Sanskrit to express 'incalculable'), has been used to indicate an exact number. But the lists of 'high numbers,' the so-called *paṅkti*, are constructed on different principles: the progression being sometimes by multiples (10, 100, 1000; or 10, 10,000, 1,000,000 . . .), sometimes by squares, and the *asaṅkhyeya* does not always hold the same place in the lists. A. Rémusat said that an 'Incalculable'=1 followed by 17 ciphers (100,000,000,000,000,000) years. But these figures give a *parārdha*, not an *asaṅkhyeya*. From the *Dhammapadīpikā*, Burnouf and Hardy admit 1 followed by 97 ciphers; and there is, according to the first named, a very ingenious combination of the first 'nombres premiers' in the formation of this number. Joinville (Sinhalese unnamed sources) has 1 followed by 63 ciphers. From Burmese sources, Pallegoix has 1 followed by 168 ciphers, and Burnouf, 1+140 ciphers. According to the Northern *Abhidharma* list, *asaṅkhyeya* being the 53rd of a geometric progression (1, 10, 100 . . .), we have 1 followed by 52 ciphers. Lastly, the *Buddhāvataṁsaka* list gives a much larger number of ciphers. Given a progression, $10, 10^2, 10^4, 10^8, \ldots$ *asaṅkhyeya* is the 104th term: to write the number thus described we should require 352 septillions of kilometres of ciphers, allowing that one cipher occupies a length of 0.001 m. That suggests in some degree the vastness of an 'Incalculable.'

Theoretically, each 'Incalculable' is divided into twenty *Antarakalpas* (°*kappa*) or 'Intermediate Periods.' But the advantage of this division is not very clear, except in the third Incalculable.

When the Great Period begins, of which the Destruction Age is the first part, the average duration of human life is 80,000 years. Gradually there is moral deterioration, with a corresponding decrease in the age of man (see *infra*, p. 189[b]). The destruction is near at hand. A hundred thousand years before it is to begin, a *Deva* or Angel (a 'Buddhist Noah,' as he has been called) gives to the world of conscious creatures a warning about the forthcoming calamity.* In course of time all the creatures, with the exception just to be noted, attain reincarnation in higher worlds, *i.e.* in spheres which will not be overtaken by the destruction. The time for a higher reward may be said to have come for the great majority of creatures, after numerous migrations amongst ordinary good and bad births. They alone 'in whom the root of merit is destroyed' by adhesion to wrong views, and for whom 'the word of deliverance has utterly perished,' cannot by any means ascend into the higher realms; and as the hell in which they are tormented is going to be annihilated, they will take rebirth in the hell of some universe whose destruction is not imminent. Elsewhere it is said that there are self-made hells for them. In the old sources it would seem that only Devadatta, the cousin and rival of Śākyamuni, will endure 'for an age,' or 'for ages' (*kappaṭṭha*) in a state of pain.

This gradual disappearing of the animate world (*sattaloka*) fulfils the first Intermediate Period of the Age of Destruction. Now begins the Destruction of the 'receptacle-world' (*bhājanaloka*) itself, by fire (*tejaḥsaṁvartanī*), by water (*ap*°), or by wind (*vāyu*°).† There is a complete set of 64 Great Periods, in regular succession; seven destructions by fire, then one by water, then seven by fire, then one by water, and so on, the last, *i.e.* the 64th, being by wind. We are told that the destruction by fire does not reach so high in the various spheres of the cosmos as does the destruction by water; and the

* All the gods called Lokabyūhas hold this office of Noah, according to the *Visuddhimagga* (Warren, p. 322).

† *Visuddhimagga*, xiii.; āposaṁvaṭṭa, tejo°, vāyu° (*JPTS*, 1891, p. 118). For the Brāhmanical speculations, see 'Matsyapurāṇa,' *ap.* Aufrecht, *Cat. Oxoniensis*, p. 346; Böhtl.-Roth, *s.vv.* 'Saṁvarta, Saṁvartaka.'

destruction by wind is greater than the destruction by water (*saṁvaṭṭasīmā*, limit of destruction).*

But there are discrepancies between the European authorities, and probably also between the sources. Köppen has a very ingenious theory, stating that there are great, mean, and little destructions by fire, and so on. He goes so far as to ascertain the order in which they will succeed, though he confessedly fails to find any authority to support his views. Does the destruction by fire annihilate only the worlds up to the abode of the Mahābrahmans, including the sphere of the first meditation? Or does it annihilate the two abodes immediately superior belonging to the second Dhyāna (*Parittaśubhas* and *Apramāṇābhas*)? Does the Water-Destruction, which in any case destroys the three second Dhyāna abodes, destroy also the two first third Dhyāna abodes?† Hardy, misunderstood by Köppen, gives a third opinion: the water destroys the first third Dhyāna abode. Lastly, there seems to be a general agreement as regards the Wind which overthrows the worlds up to the second fourth Dhyāna abode. The matter would be a little too fanciful to detain our attention if we did not find in the *Brahmajāla*, the first Sutta of the *Dighanikāya*, the origin of the contest. Buddha, explaining the origination of the universe, states that, during the period of destruction, beings have mostly been reborn in the World of Radiance (*i.e.* in the third second Dhyāna abode)—hence the opinion that the fire (the fire must be meant, as it is the more frequent) reaches up to the second second Dhyāna abode; but Buddha adds that, at the origin of time, the Palace of Brahmā with Mahābrahmā appears, this being fallen from the World of Radiance. There is no mention here of the two first second Dhyāna abodes, which would have been necessary steps of decadence; hence the opinion that the destruction does not go higher than Brahma Palace—*i.e.* the apex of the second meditation.

We may conclude that the theory of the celestial abodes was not perfectly elaborated when the *Brahmajāla* was compiled.

Details ‡ are given of the destruction by Fire, wrought by seven suns, well known in the Brāhmanical literature. All water is dried up, beginning with the small rivers; and the appearance of the seventh sun gives rise to the general conflagration. As regards Water, the *Śikṣāsamuchchaya* is the only text to give us the names of the four Dragon-Kings who pour drops always increasing in size, each for five Intermediate Periods: Iṣādhāra, Gajaprameha, Acchinnadhāra, Sthūlabinduka.§ It treats the matter from a philosophical point of view: 'Whence comes the water?' it is asked. 'From nowhere.' 'And where does it go when the deluge is at an end?' 'To nowhere.' The destruction is also said to reach the Brahma-heaven, but it is not said to go higher. The destruction by winds is parallel. The Pāli commentator gives the name of one of them, *prachchanda*.

Nothing is known of the Second Period. The world remains chaotic, or, if we prefer it, a pure nothing: 'The upper regions of space become one with those below, and wholly dark.' There are no ashes left by the fire; no dust by the wind. One would assume that the water (which, being very acid, disintegrates the Iron or Crystal Mountains) does not annihilate itself. On the contrary, 'the water does not settle so long as anything remains, but everything becomes impregnated with water and then suddenly settles and disappears.'

When the time of renovation is come again, *i.e.* when the former merit of the beings born in higher abodes is exhausted, and they have to be reborn in inferior regions, first (in the case of destruction by fire) appears the abode of Brahmā (Brahmavimāna), with its threefold division of inhabitants, coming from the Ābhāsvara abode; then in order the three Deva abodes of the Parinirmitavaśavartins, the Nirmāṇaratis and the Yāmyavimāna (gods, Yāmas, the Tuṣitas, etc., are not named); then the Circle of the Wind (*vāyumaṇḍala*) on which is established the Circle of Water, etc., with Mount Meru and its heavenly inhabitants, with the sun and the moon, etc.: all this is called the *bhājanaloka* or the 'receptacle-world.' And that is the end of the first Intermediate Period of the 'Incalculable of Renovation.'

During the nineteen following periods the inferior parts of the *bhājanaloka* are successively peopled by men, and so on. First the men are said to be *aparimitāyu*, *i.e.* 'of immeasurable life.' Such they remain to the end of the Period of Renovation, according to the *Abhidharmakośa*. The sources known to Hardy and Köppen agree in stating a decrease to 80,000 or 84,000 years. When the infernal beings have appeared, the Incalculable Period of Renovation (*vivartamānāvasthā*) is finished.

The following Period of Duration (*vivṛttāvasthā prārabdhā*) is divided into twenty well-characterized Intermediate Periods. During the first, the whole of which is of decrease, the average duration of human life falls from 'immeasurable length' (or from 80,000 years) to ten years. The eighteen following are divided into two parts: the first of increase (*utkarṣakalpa*, *ūrdhvamukha*), during which life increases from ten years to 80,000 years; the second of decrease (*apakarṣakalpa*, *adhomukha*) inversely to the first. The twentieth and last is only of increase. We do not know if the first and the last are shorter than the remaining ones, but that seems probable.

Here the Brāhmanic theory of the Four *yuga*s finds a place: the increasing will be divided into the Iron, Bronze, Silver, and Golden Ages; and the decreasing will be parallel (Kali, Dvāpara, Tretā, Kṛta). We are now (A.D. 1907) in the Iron Age of the first Intermediate Period of the Period of Stability (this Intermediate is only decreasing). From a hundred years, the highest attained in the Iron Age, life is declining to ten.

When the decreasing Kali Age begins, the five calamities (*kaṣāya*) begin to prevail; but when life is reduced to ten years (*daśavarṣāyuḥ kalpaḥ*) the destiny of men is worse. At the end of every Intermediate Period (except the last, or the 20th, which is only of increase) the greater number of living beings pass away by hunger, epidemics, and sword. Some say that these three plagues work together, some that they appear in succession, as in the *Abhidharmakośa* and the *Mahāvyutpatti*; and this same diversity of opinion manifests itself in the Mongolian and Chinese sources. Spence Hardy establishes a connexion between prevailing vices, plagues, and forthcoming destruction: Love, Epidemic, Fire; Hate, Sword, Water; Delusion, Hunger, and Wind. It would follow, as Destruction is coming only after many Intermediate Periods, that during the whole of the 'Incalculable,' every Intermediate has epidemics, etc., according to the final modes of passing away.* The majority of the creatures being dead, the remaining ones are 'converted,' and the age of man increases again. A new intermediate Age has begun.

If we except the speculations on the 'creation' by the united merit of all sentient existence, and on the 'repopulation' of the worlds, which are perfectly free from pantheistic views, and, being built on the doctrine of *karma*, are perfectly Buddhistic, there is not much Buddhism in the cosmogony we have studied. We must add some details which are part of the Buddhist's own mythology.

Periods (*i.e.* great Periods) are said to be 'void' (*śūnyakalpa*) if no Buddha appears in them. They are 'non-void' or 'Buddha-periods' in the opposite

* To understand the following, the reader is referred to the Cosmology. We give below the necessary ideas:

Above the world of desire (*i.e.* the four continents, Mount Meru with its divine inhabitants) begins the world of form, consisting of three (or two) heavens of the first meditation, three of the second, three of the third, eight of the fourth. Above are the four heavens of non-form. The worlds are organized in such a way that the second meditation realms are established above a thousand first meditation realms (Little Chiliocosm); that the third meditation realms cover a thousand second meditation realms (Middle Chiliocosm); that the fourth meditation realms cover a thousand third meditation realms (Great Chiliocosm). For one universe, in the proper sense of the word, there are 1,000,000,000 first meditation abodes (Brahmaheavens), 1,000,000,000 Mount Merus. One universe is the 'field of a Buddha.' The authorities are not very consistent. For instance, we learn that the destructions by fire, etc., destroy the same number of worlds (1,000,000,000). 'In lateral expansion the world-cycle always perishes to the extent of a Buddha's domain' (*Visuddhim.* xiii., in Warren, p. 321).

† The latter opinion is better supported by the texts at our command (*JPTS* 1891, p. 118).

‡ For particulars see Spence Hardy, *Manual*; Köppen and Warren, *locc. citt.*

§ In the 'Matsyapurāna,' *Cat. Oxon.* 347*b*, 33, there are seven clouds 'to give the destruction-water'; the first is named destruction' (*saṁvarta*).

* See Köppen, 282, n. 1. He adds that, according to 'some,' these plagues appear only in the Intermediate Period immediately preceding the Destruction.

case. Sometimes a great Period elapses between two appearances of a Buddha; sometimes an incalculable number of great Periods; sometimes, on the contrary, there are in the same period many Buddhas. We have 'substantial'-periods (*sāra*°), with one Buddha; 'curd'-periods (*maṇḍa*°), with two; 'excellent' (*vara*°), with three; 'substantial-curd'-periods (*sāramaṇḍa*°), with four; 'auspicious' (*bhadra*°) or 'greatly auspicious,' with five. Such is the present Period. There have been twenty-nine 'void' Periods before it. So far the old tradition. The redactors, moreover, of the *Mahāvastu* (iii. 330), the Chinese Buddhist pilgrims, etc., are already aware that in the Bhadrakalpa a thousand Buddhas are wanted.

At the beginning of the Universe, when the primordial water (see above, 189[b]) is about to give way for the appearance of the solid world, a lotus appears at the place where the sacred tree of Buddha has been and will be.* There is no flower if the period is to be void; there are as many flowers as forthcoming Buddhas.† Compare the Brāhmanical flower.

Another point of interest is the description of the first men, or, as it has been called, the Buddhist Genesis.‡ Originally, falling as they did from the Ābhāsvara-abode, human beings retained the attributes of their former existence. Born by 'apparitional-birth,' self-radiant, with joy as their only food, and with spiritual bodies, such beings are evidently meant by the 'men of immeasurable life' referred to above (see p. 189[b]). There is neither sun nor moon. As time goes on, earth appears on the surface of the primeval ocean. It is a savoury earth, and, as it were, a foam. Men eat it, and their radiance is lost for ever. Sun and stars furnish some light. Then follows the eating of some honey-moss, of creepers, of a marvellous rice. It is a long decadence. When this last has become a regular food, organs of sex appear; and with the institution of marriage, of private property, and of caste, begins the organization of human society. Interesting for general folklore (especially the details on marriage), the story is certainly very old, and was adapted before the classification of the celestial abodes. That in falling from the Ābhāsvara-abode the beings do not go through the heavens of Brahmā and the Devas, and that these are utterly ignored, are significant facts. But it is more astonishing that the 'self-appearing' men do possess the attributes of the Ābhāsvaras. We might assume that there was originally no connexion between these first men and any sort of degenerated gods. The first men were regarded as *ābhāsvaras*, *i.e.* 'resplendent,' and the Ābhāsvara gods themselves may be derived from this old conception.

LITERATURE.—1. Deshauterayes, 'Recherches sur la Religion de Fo' in *JAS* viii. 281; A. Rémusat, 'Essais sur la Cosmographie et la Cosmogonie des Buddhistes,' 1831, in *Mélanges Posthumes*, pp. 65–131, 'Fo-Koue-Ki'; I. J. Schmidt, 'Über die Tausend Buddhas' in *Mem. Acad. St. Petersburg*, 6, ii. p. 41; G. Turnour, 'An Examination of the Pāli Buddhistical Annals,' *JASB* vii., No. 3, 686–701; Burnouf, *Lotus de la bonne Loi*, pp. 314, 324–329; R. Spence Hardy, *Manual of Budhism*[2], 1830, pp. 1, 5–8, 28–35, 94–97, *Legends* (1881), pp. 80, 153; C. F. Köppen, *Die Rel. des Buddha* (1857–9), i. 266–289; Childers, *Pāli Dict.* p. 185; Eitel, *Hand-book* (1888), 68.

2. Indian Sources.—*Visuddhimagga*, xiii., trans. by Warren, *Buddhism in Translations* (1900), p. 321 ff.; the Sarvāstivādin treatise entitled *Lokaprajñapti*, known in the Tibetan version (*hjigrten-gdags-pa*, Tandjur, Mdo. lxii. 1–107), regarded by the Vaibhāṣikas as forming part of the Scriptures, but in reality constituting a *Śāstra*; the *Lokaprajñapti-abhidharma-śāstra* (Nanjio 1297), said to be closely related to it (see Takakusu 'On the Abhidharma Lit.' in *JPTS*, 1905, pp. 77 n., 143); neither the Tibetan nor the Chinese treatise seems to have been directly studied. It is the tradition of these books of *Abhidharma*, doubtless, that is found in the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, fol. 262 of the MS. of the French Asiatic Society, which has been consulted for the present article.

L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

AGES OF THE WORLD (Christian*).—The poets and the philosophers of pagan antiquity have, as a rule, represented the evolution of man as a gradual but inexorable decay, putting the happy era at the beginning, and asserting that the world would end in complete destruction. The Christian idea is exactly the opposite; and this is quite natural, for Jesus Christ caused a great hope to shine on humanity, groaning in the darkness of paganism. The prophets of Israel had already flung out some rays of this hope, in foretelling the coming of the Messiah, who would establish on earth an era of true religion, of peace and happiness. In short, while pagans placed the Golden Age in the past, Christians put it in the future; they have described the history of the world as an ascent, if not continuous, at least intermittently progressive, and finally triumphant, towards good and happiness. The writer of the Apocalypse (ch. 20) describes in an imaginative style the last phases of this historical drama.

St. Augustine is the first Father of the Church who explicitly mentions Seven Ages in the history of man, and all the theologians who followed him were more or less inspired by his idea. His plan is derived from the 'Days of the Creation' in Genesis. The passage is *de Civitate Dei*, xxii. 30 *ad fin.*

Paulus Orosius, a Spanish priest (d. 418), the friend and admirer of St. Augustine, to whom he dedicated his *Historiæ*, besides trying to prove incidentally the Bishop of Hippo's theory of the government of God in history, divided his work into seven books, which, however, correspond to different epochs. He had clearly come under the influence of Roman history. The founding of Rome, the taking of the city by the Gauls, the death of Alexander, the taking of Carthage, the Servile War, the reign of Cæsar Augustus, with which he makes coincident the birth of Jesus Christ,—these are the memorable events which form the boundaries of his periods.†

The Venerable Bede (d. 735), who in his *Chronicles* owes much to Paulus Orosius, also adopts seven Ages, and surmises that the last one, ending with the year 1000, will mark the end of the world.

Adson, abbot of Montier-en-Der, in his treatise,

* On the intervention of the *vajrāsana* see Beal, *Buddhist Records*, ii. 116.

† In the late records a thousand lotuses appear at the beginning of the Bhadrakalpa.

‡ By Prof. Rhys Davids, *Dial. of the Buddha*, p. 105, and by A. J. Edmunds, 'A Buddhist Genesis,' *Monist*, xiv. 207–214. The text is the *Aggaññasutta* (Digha xxvii.); it is translated from the Chinese by S. Beal, *Four Lectures*, pp. 151–155, and it is found in the *Mahāvastu* (Sacred Book of the Mahāsāṅghikas), i. 338–348. See E. Hardy, *Buddha*, p. 81.

* [As the Jews were accustomed to distinguish the age before, from the age after, the advent of the Messiah, so the majority of NT writers distinguish ὁ αἰὼν οὗτος from αἰὼν ὁ μέλλων. In both cases an ethical is always superimposed upon the temporal meaning. The former age is the period which shall elapse before the appointed Parousia of Christ, 'the period of instability, weakness, impiety, wickedness, calamity, misery' (Thayer); the latter is the age after Christ has come again in power to establish the Kingdom of God definitively, with all its blessings. It is inaugurated by the resurrection of the dead, and it answers, in scope and nature, to the completed work of Christ. The present world, as being material and transient, is under subjection to angels, who mediate the Law; the world to come (ἡ οἰκουμένη ἡ μέλλουσα, He 2[5]), on the other hand, is viewed as already existent, in a sphere transcending this earth, out of which it will come down as a new and divine order of things. The term 'world' (οἰκουμένη) expresses the constitution of that state of things which as 'age' (αἰών) is viewed more in relation to its development in time. The tone of the NT in speaking of the present age is almost invariably one of censure. The gulf between the two ages, however, is not conceived as being quite absolute. 'The powers of the age to come' (He 6[5]) project themselves in manifold ways into the present age, diffusing harmony and order throughout what is otherwise a chaos, and preparing ultimately to supersede the laws of the present dispensation. H. R. MACKINTOSH.]

† See the Anglo-Saxon version of the *Historiæ* of Orosius by Alfred the Great, ed. Bosworth, London, 1859.

de Antichristo, dedicated to queen Gerberge (954), sketches the preliminaries of the final judgment, which will follow the apostasy predicted by St. Paul, and the struggle against Antichrist; and he puts off the end of the world until this epoch.

Bernard, a hermit of Thuringia (d. 960), announces, on the contrary, that the end of the world is near. He and a great number of preachers in the 10th cent., through their allegorical interpretation of the Apocalypse, spread the belief in the immediate coming of Antichrist and the end of the world. Nevertheless their position was combated as an error by Abbo, abbot of Fleury-sur-Loire, the most learned monk of his time.

Scotus Erigena (d. *circa* 890) groups the first six Ages into three epochs, each marked by a different priesthood. The first epoch, comprising the first five Ages of St. Augustine, was contemporary with the patriarchs and priests of the OT. The second, beginning with Jesus Christ, was marked by the priesthood of the NT. Erigena foretells a third in the everlasting life, when all the faithful will serve as priests, and will see God face to face.

Joachim of Floris (d. 1202), the famous visionary hermit of Calabria, in his book, *de Concordia*, adopts Erigena's division into three Ages or religious conditions, and places each under the control of one person of the Trinity; but, differing from his predecessors, he holds that these periods overlap each other. The Age of the Father extends, according to him as well as to Scotus Erigena, from Adam to Christ. The Age of the Son starts from Elisha, and reaches as far as 1260. The last Age, that of the Holy Spirit, takes its origin from St. Benedict and the establishing of the monks in the West, and will last until the end of the world.

'The first era,' says Joachim, 'was that of knowledge, the second that of wisdom, the third will be that of complete intelligence. The first was servile obedience, the second was filial servitude, the third will be liberty. The first was the trial, the second action, the third will be contemplation. The first was fear, the second faith, the third will be love. The first was the age of slaves, the second that of sons, the third will be that of friends. The first was the Age of old men, the second that of young people, the third will be that of children. The first passed under the light of the stars, the second was the dawn, the third will be broad daylight. The first was winter, the second the beginning of spring, the third will be summer. The first bore nettles, the second thorns, the third will yield wheat. The first gave water, the second wine, the third will give oil. The first is connected with Septuagesima, the second with Quadragesima, the third will be Easter. The first Age refers, then, to the Father, who is the originator of all things; the second to the Son, who condescended to put on our clay; the third will be the Age of the Holy Spirit, of whom the Apostle has said, *Where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty*' (*de Concordia*, lib. v. c. 84).

Dante does not number the Ages of the World, but, borrowing the form of his prophecy from the figures of the Apocalypse, foretells the vengeance of God against the Dragon, which has broken the wheel of the Chariot of the Church, and announces that the one sent by God, whose number is 510 (=DVX), will kill the foul thief and the giant who sins with her (*Divina Commedia*, Purg. xxxiii. 43 ff.).

Bossuet, in his *Discours sur l'histoire universelle* (1681), returns to the seven Ages of the *City of God*, but considerably modifies the divisions of St. Augustine. According to him, the first Age, from Adam to Noah, comprises the creation and the beginnings of man. The second, from Noah to Abraham, was marked by the Flood and the first punishment of man, and opens the era of the bloody conquests. The third Age, from Abraham to Moses, was contemporaneous with the beginning of the OT. The fourth stretches from Moses to the building of the Temple at Jerusalem by Solomon. The fifth goes to the end of the captivity of Babylon; the sixth runs from Cyrus to Jesus; the seventh, and last, reaches from the Nativity up to our time. It is evident that Bossuet looked only at the past; he did not borrow the Bishop of Hippo's beautiful prophecy of a seventh Age,—the Age of rest and of face to face contemplation of God, when Christ has triumphed over His enemies, and God is all in all.

The Neapolitan Vico (d. 1744), in his *Scienza Nuova*, distinguishes three Ages in the history of the different nations. The Divine Age, or, so to speak, the infancy of man, where all is divinity and authority, belongs to the priests; the Heroic Age, where the conquerors rule by brute force; and the Human Age, the period of civilization, after which men will return to their primitive state. Mankind, according to him, will turn round perpetually in this circle—a theory similar to that of the Stoics.

It was the privilege of a Frenchman, more famous as an economist than as a theologian, to return to the Christian idea of a progressive development. Turgot, a prior in the Sorbonne, at the age of twenty-three (1750), in his *Discours sur le progrès successif de l'esprit humain*, established the contrast between the pagan notion of a Golden Age at the beginning of the world, and the idea of the perfecting of mankind. In the same way as sons and heirs profit by the knowledge and advantages acquired by their fathers and grandfathers, so, according to Turgot, there is a heritage of truth, of intellectual, moral, and economic progress, which, in each new generation, enriches the patrimony of humanity. Hence comes progress.

In the 18th and 19th cents. the idea of the development of the Ages of the World, *i.e.* of mankind, by analogy with the ages of human life, was renewed by some Christian philosophers. J. G. Herder, in *Ideen zur Philos. d. Gesch. der Menschheit* (1784), admits that there are in the evolution of races and nations, as in the life of plants, periods of growth and blossoming, of fruit-bearing, and, lastly, of withering. Mankind tends, by the reciprocal influence of the nations, to the realization of that blessed Age announced by Christ under the name of the 'Kingdom of Heaven.'

The founder of positivism, Auguste Comte (d. 1857), thinks that religion is contemporary with the infancy of humanity.

'Following the very nature of the human mind,' he says, 'each branch of knowledge must pass through different stages: the theological stage, which is the age of fiction; the metaphysical stage, which is that of abstraction; and the scientific stage, which is the positive age' (*Cours de philosophie positive*, iii., Appendix, p. 77).

Henrik Ibsen maintains that man evolves in turn through three phases:

'the kingdom founded on the tree of knowledge; the kingdom founded on the tree of the Cross; and, lastly, the kingdom founded on these two trees at once, for the sources of its life are in the paradise of Adam and at Golgotha' (*Emperor and Galilæan*, 1st Part, Act iii.).

Drummond, in his *Ascent of Man* (1894), distinguishes three ages in the evolution of the world: the first, in which the Vegetable Kingdom was led to produce the flowering plants; the second, the evolution of the Animal Kingdom, where the possibilities of organization were exhausted in the Mammalia; lastly, the third, which comprises the ascent of man and of society, and is bound up with the struggle for the life of others. 'This is the Further Evolution, the page of history that lies before us, the closing act of the drama of Man' (p. 443).

This is a short sketch of the Christian theories of the Ages of the World. In opposition to the pagan conception of a fateful decay of man, ending in annihilation, the Christian conception, derived from the Messianic idea of the Hebrews, shows the ascent, the progress of man, though not without falls, towards more truth, more justice, and more happiness. The socialists of the present day have unwittingly adopted the Christian idea of the 'Millennium.'

Pascal summed up the Christian conception of the Ages of the World very well when he said: 'The whole race of men, during the course of so many centuries, ought to be considered as being the same man always living and continually learning' (*Fragment d'un traité du Vide*, Paris, 1897, p. 436).

LITERATURE.—Rev 20; Augustine, *de Civitate Dei*, xxii. 30 *ad fin.*; Paul Orosius, *Historiarum mundi, libri vii. adversus paganos, sive Ormesta*; Bede, *Chronicus, sive de sex ætatibus mundi*; Scotus Erigena, *Homilia in prologum Johannis evangelii*; Joachim de Floris, *Liber de Concordia*, v. 84; Vico, *Principj di una Scienza Nuova d'intorno alla comune natura della nazioni* (1725); Turgot, *Discours sur le progrès de l'humanité* (1750); J. G. Herder, *Ideen zur Philosophie der Gesch. der Menschheit* (1784); Auguste Comte, *Cours de philosophie positive* (1830–42), iv., App. 77; H. Ibsen, *Emperor and Galilæan* (1873); Jules Roy, *L'an mille*, Paris (1885); Drummond, *The Ascent of Man* (1894).

GASTON BONET-MAURY.

AGES OF THE WORLD (Egyptian).—In their literature the Egyptians have not left any formal description of the world and its ways as they imagined it to have been in past ages. Manetho (*c.* B.C. 300), enumerating the rulers of Egypt, records in the period before Menes two dynasties of gods, followed by four others the character of which is not defined, and finally a dynasty of νέκυες, demi-gods. The fragments of the Turin Papyrus of kings prove that such a view was already established in the 14th cent. B.C., although the details cannot yet be recovered. Hephæstus, the creator-god, heads the list in Manetho, and he is immediately succeeded by the sun-god. These two correspond in Egyptian to Ptaḥ and Rê', the latter being the organizer of the world. An inscription of the Tenth Dynasty says of the temple of Siut that it was 'built by the fingers of Ptaḥ and founded by Thoth for Ophois,' the local god; and a Ptolemaic text ascribes to the sun-god, during his reign on earth, the building of most of the Egyptian cities and their shrines. Stories of the time of the rule of the gods on earth are seen in the mythology (*e.g.* the myth of Osiris, and the legend of Hathor's massacre, and the Heavenly Cow) and in the popular tales (vaguely in the story of the Two Brothers). 'Since the time of the god' and 'since the time of Rê'' are old formulas for expressing immemorial antiquity; so also is 'since the time of the worshippers of Horus.' These last correspond to Manetho's νέκυες, and have been shown by Sethe to be historical personages, representing the kings of Upper and Lower Egypt before Menes united the two lands. Their records, when they had not perished altogether, were written in so primitive a style as to be undecipherable to the Egyptians of the third millennium B.C., and these 'worshippers of Horus' entered early into the realm of the legendary. The Turin Papyrus appears to give $23{,}200 + x$ years to the god-kings, and $2100 + x$ years to a dynasty of 19 'worshippers of Horus.' The wise Ptaḥḥotep, in his rather cryptic proverbs dating from the Old Kingdom, seems to refer to 'the counsels of them of old, of them who listened to gods'; and the 'worshippers of Horus' are the type of virtue rewarded in the same collection of proverbs: 'An obedient son is like a worshipper of Horus, he hath happiness in consequence of his obedience; he groweth old, and attaineth to the honour of great age.' Thus there was some idea of a more perfect condition having prevailed in primeval times. None the less, the myths show rebellion, deceit, and wickedness of all kinds appearing amongst both gods (*e.g.* Seth) and men in the age of Divine rule.

LITERATURE.—Meyer, *Ægyp. Chronol.* p. 115; Sethe, *Beitr. z. älteste Gesch. Æg.* i. p. 8; Maspero, *Dawn of Civilization*[4] (1901) p. 160.

F. LL. GRIFFITH.

AGES OF THE WORLD (Greek and Roman).*—The Greeks, and after them the Romans, were especially interested in this subject, and it is largely to their speculations that we owe those familiar references to the Ages which we find in the literary tradition of our Western civilization. In the Græco-Roman world this theme was actively discussed for nearly a millennium. During that long period the theory of the Ages was worked over again and again by the various schools of philosophy, by manifold attempts to harmonize conflicting authorities or to incorporate new ideas, by the lore of the people, by the fictions of the poets, even by the embellishments of mere rhetoric. The result is that a complete and detailed examination of the question is not to be expected in the space at our command.

Every theory upon this subject belongs to one of two types. The first assumes that man has risen from his former estate; the second, that he has fallen. Both of these occupy an important position in the history of ancient thought, but, so far as the present inquiry is concerned, the theory of descent, that belief in the progressive degeneration of mankind which is cherished by the folk of many races, was at all times the dominating type. The well-known lines of Horace (*Odes*, III. vi. 46–48),

> 'Ætas parentum, peior avis, tulit
> Nos nequiores, mox daturos
> Progeniem vitiosiorem,'

are the expression of a view which recurs again and again in the Græco-Roman world, from the Homeric poems (*Il.* i. 272, v. 304; *Od.* ii. 276, etc.) to the last words of Classical Literature.

A strictly chronological development of our subject is impracticable. The blanks in our surviving tradition are so large, especially in the departments most important to us, that no definite date for the inception of any one article of doctrine may be assumed with safety. Indeed, practically every idea by which the later tradition is distinguished will be found upon examination to possess a high antiquity. We may assert, however, that three periods of formative influence are especially prominent. The first is represented by Hesiod, the second by the Stoics and their predecessors, the third by the revival of Mysticism in the 2nd cent. B.C.

1. **Hesiod.**—The position of Hesiod was always paramount. The influence of Hesiod upon our theme is very much the same as was the influence of Homer upon the form and content of Greek Literature. The account of the Ages which we find in his *Works and Days* (109–201) is our earliest classical authority upon the subject. It is, also, to a remarkable extent, the centre and ultimate source of the later development. There were several other accounts of the early history of man, and some of them were evidently folk-legends of a high antiquity. None of them, however, is of any great importance to us. A few have contributed a detail here and there to the development of the Hesiodic norm, but most of them languish in comparative obscurity. Such being the case, it will be advisable to make Hesiod our basis, and to begin with a summary of his famous account.

First of all, the Olympian gods made the 'Golden Race of men.' These men lived when Kronos was king in heaven. They fared like the gods themselves, always making merry, and untroubled by toil or care, for the teeming earth bore of its own accord an abundance of all good things, and there was no old age. Even death itself, when at last it came, stole upon these men like a pleasant slumber. When this race passed away, Zeus made them the good spirits that live above the earth and are the invisible guardians and helpers of mortal man.

Then the Olympians made a second race, the men of the Silver Age. These were far inferior to the Golden Race, for they remained little children a hundred years, and when they finally reached maturity they straightway perished by their own folly, for they slew each other and refused to worship the immortals as men ought to do. Therefore Zeus was wroth, and put them

* There is no extended treatment of this subject as a whole. Among the three or four briefer accounts, the only one of any real value is by O. Gruppe, in his *Gr. Mythol. und Religionsgesch.*, Munich, 1902, pp. 447–450 (Müller's *Hdb. der Klass. Altertumswissensch.* vol. v.).

away. But even these men were honoured, for they were made the good spirits that live below the earth.

Then Zeus made another and a third race, the men of the Brazen Age. They were sprung from the ash-trees, and were strong and terrible, eating no corn, lovers of war and violence, and knowing nought of pity. Their weapons and their houses were of bronze, and they wrought in bronze. There was no iron. These men, too, fell by the work of their own hands and fared to Hades, nameless and unhonoured. Mighty they were, but dark death laid hold of them, and they left the bright light of the sun.

Then Zeus made a fourth race, better and more just. These were the Heroes of the elder days, such as fought at Troy and at Thebes. We call them the Demigods. And when they perished, Zeus gave them a life and an abiding-place at the ends of the earth. There they dwell in careless ease in the Isles of the Blest, hard by the deep-eddying stream of Ocean, and thrice a year the earth bears them fair fruit.

Would that I had not been allotted to the fifth period, but might have died earlier, or else have been born later! For this is the Age of Iron. There shall be no surcease from labour and sorrow by day or by night, and the gods will lay bitter burdens upon us. But, even yet, not all will be bad. This race shall Zeus destroy, when men are born with hoary hair, when fathers strive with sons and sons with fathers, guest with host and friend with friend; when brothers cease to be dear, when goodness, justice, and piety are no longer regarded. . . .

Then Aidos and Nemesis, whose fair bodies are clothed in pure white raiment, shall depart to heaven, and men shall find no succour in their grievous calamity.

The inconsistencies in this account were perceived by the ancients themselves, and in modern times an extensive literature has gathered about the subject.* For our present purpose, however, it is enough to say that these inconsistencies are due to the fact that Hesiod's version is a composite structure, the main support of which is an ancient division of the history of mankind into four Ages. No reference to this version is found in the Homeric poems, but, even at that early period, some form of it was probably current among the Greeks.

The designation of these four Ages by the four metals—gold, silver, bronze, iron, in the order named—is, in itself, an indication that the theory of descent is the fundamental idea of the legend. True, the causes and symptoms of descent, the coefficients of degradation, so to speak, are by no means clear at first sight. This, however, is, in itself, a striking proof of the high antiquity of the theory. Our long familiarity with the later phases of the legend naturally suggests the ethical *motif* as the standard of measurement here. But in the primitive stages of a myth like this, neither morality nor moral responsibility is of much account. The Golden Age is a replica of heaven, a mortal reflexion of the glory of the immortals. The men of those days were superior to us simply because they were made so. They were nearer the gods than we. Their position was a matter of powers and privileges, not of character. The long descent from those happier days has been measured by the gradual loss of those powers and privileges. The causes of it are in the will of the gods themselves. The idea of moral responsibility as a factor in the problem belongs to a period of more mature reflexion, and we see the first beginnings of it in Hesiod's own account. Peace and plenty in the first Age are followed by brutish anarchy and violence in the second. The third sees organized violence and deliberate cruelty; the fourth, crime of every sort and description. The steps, however, are none too clear, and the old description of the Ages was not yet in harmony with the new standard.

During the subsequent history of our discussion, more and more emphasis was given to the ethical *motif*. The basis of it continued to be the assumption of a descent from innocence and happiness to guilt and misery, the adumbration of which has already been observed in Hesiod. More specific details of the process frequently reflect the philosophical tenets of the writer, and may, also, be freely manipulated in the interests of rhetoric or for other purposes.

The principal difficulty with Hesiod's account arises from the fact that there was no place in the old four-fold scheme for the Heroic Age. As a matter of fact, the Heroic Age belongs to another and a different account of the development of mankind. Neither of these accounts, however, could be neglected, and in Hesiod we see the first known attempt to combine and harmonize the two. The deduction upon which it was based seems tolerably clear. According to the old four-fold system, the Brazen Age immediately preceded our own. On the other hand, it was also generally accepted that the Heroic Age immediately preceded our own. Consequently, the Heroic Age of the one scheme ought to coincide with the Brazen Age of the other. This, however, is impossible, as any one may see by comparing the two. Hesiod, therefore, inserted the Heroic Age between the Brazen and the Iron Ages of the old scheme, and re-numbered accordingly. The result was a system of five Ages, the inconsistency of which was usually clear enough to the ancient critics themselves.* For example, the famous accounts given by Aratus and Ovid indicate a full realization of the fact that the only way of harmonizing the two systems was either to revise Hesiod's conception of the Four Ages in such a way that the Heroes could find a place in the last of them, or, better still, to shift all four Ages to the past. In that event, our own race, of which the Heroes are, in any case, the earlier and better exemplars, may be assigned to the period between the close of the Iron Age and the present day.

As we have already seen, the presence of the Heroic Age in Hesiod's account upsets the principle of progressive degeneration, a fundamental idea of the old four-fold scheme. It also runs counter to the belief that each one of the Ages is represented by its own separate and distinct race of men. It was not until the rise of the Cyclic Theory that this idea was in any way disturbed, and, even then, the process was one of revision rather than destruction. Much less was the doctrine of successive races affected by the later intrusion of the Flood Legend. At first thought, we might esteem ourselves the descendants of Deucalion and Pyrrha, who were themselves survivors from the previous Age. But the story itself reminds us that we are really *terrigenæ*, a new race sprung from the earth.

We now come to one of the most notable and, doubtless, one of the most ancient features of our legend. This is the significant association of it with the great dynastic change of Olympus. The Golden Age was under the sway of Kronos. Since then, his son Zeus has ruled the world in his stead. On this basis, the Four Ages are sometimes reduced to two, the Age of Kronos and the Age of Zeus, the old régime and the new, the happy past and the unhappy present. This may well be an older and a simpler version. But it occurs only in the later writers,† and, so far as they are concerned, is probably for brevity, or to score a rhetorical point.

Real variations from this feature of the old account are especially characteristic of the philosophers, and may best be taken up in connexion

* Preller, *Gr. Mythol.* p. 87; E. Rohde, *Psyche*[3], i. 91–110; Bergk, *Gesch. der Gr. Lit.* i. 947 ff.; Alfred Nutt, *Voyage of Bran*, i. 269 ff.; Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, ch. ii. Among the older authorities the most important are: K. F. Hermann, *Verhandl. d. Philologenversammlung*, etc., *zu Gotha*, iii. 62 ff.; Bamberger, *Rhein. Mus.*, new ser., i. 524–534; Schömann, *Opuscula*, ii. 305–319; Buttmann, *Mythologus*, ii. 1–27.

* Rohde, *l.c.*, contends that the principle followed by Hesiod in his classification and discussion of the Five Races was not their condition in this world, but their status in the world to come. This view has not met with approval, and in any case it has no direct bearing upon the points which are of real importance to us.

† *e.g.* Vergil, *Georg.* i. 121 f.; Tibullus, i. 3. 35; Dio Cassius, lxxi. 36; Maximus Tyr. xxxvi. 2; Ausonius, xvi. 2. 27 (p. 178 ed. Schenkl).

with the Cyclic Theory. But the Hesiodic version of this *motif*, above all, the primitive association of Kronos with the Golden Age, persisted until a late date, not only in the genuine folk-tradition to which it really belongs, but also, to a large extent, in the literature. In fact, the Golden Age is often designated simply as 'the Age of Kronos,' 'the Days when Saturn was King,' etc.*

THE GOLDEN AGE.—No part of our subject has been so thoroughly investigated by modern scholarship as the Golden Age.† It is, perhaps, the most important element in Hesiod's own account, and, for obvious reasons, the theme was extremely popular in the literary tradition of later times.‡ And, with the exception of certain details to be taken up in another connexion, these descriptions all bear a strong family resemblance to each other. Not less striking is their resemblance to what we hear about Elysium, the Garden of the Gods, the Hyperboreans, and similar conceptions.§ Indeed, as Dieterich has shown in his interesting monograph, *Nekyia*, the traditional *motifs* common to all these themes passed over to the early Christian writers, and were applied by them to their descriptions of heaven.

The main reason for such a similarity is, of course, not far to seek. In all cases, the theme is ideal happiness, and whether we locate it in the past or somewhere in the present, in this world or in the next, the details which make up the vision of unfulfilled desire are, for the average man, very much the same. Nor should we fail to remind ourselves that in the speculations of the folk there is no impassable barrier between our life and the life of those beyond the grave. Nothing was more certain than that the Golden Age and the race who had lived in those happier days had both passed beyond our ken; but that they still existed somewhere, and that, even now, a mere mortal man might be able to find them again, was not felt to be utterly beyond the bounds of possibility. Odysseus had returned alive from Hades, and it is a well-known historical fact that the gallant Sertorius‖ was, at one time, actually on the eve of setting sail for the Fortunate Isles in the Western Ocean, just as, many centuries later, Ponce de Leon took the same direction in his search for the Fountain of Youth. The same association of ideas is clearly seen in Hesiod's account. In fact, this is one of the most ancient and primitive aspects of the legend. Hesiod's Golden Age, when Kronos ruled a race of men who have since departed, is in all essential particulars a mere replica of Hesiod's Isles of the Blest, where dwell those sons of the gods who have passed alive beyond the grave. Moreover, the foundation of both is material which had long been traditional, even at the time when the Homeric poems were composed.* Indeed, even as Hesiod tells the story, it still reflects with remarkable fidelity the old folk-tale of a Lost Paradise before the simple beauty of the legend had been marred by the intrusion of moral lessons and specific philosophical doctrines. Men lived long, never grew old, and died a painless, *i.e.* a natural death. Meanwhile, they passed their days like the gods, in innocence, peace, and fabulous plenty, making merry continually, and knowing nothing of labour, disease, or sorrow.

Such are the principal *motifs* of the old legend of the Golden Age, and they usually form the basis of all versions. The variations or additional details which we find in later accounts are, for the most part, due either to philosophical speculation, the incorporation of allied myths, or manipulation for literary purposes.

By far the most important of these is the first. In fact, the growing prominence of the ethical element, the most notable feature in the later development of the Golden Age, is very largely due to the philosophers. The earliest of them were the Orphics of the 6th cent. B.C. The body of doctrine developed by these nameless mystics was probably long the possession of a few, and, when we consider the strange figures of speech in which its real meaning was often concealed, we can hardly wonder that it was long misunderstood or derided by the many. The kernel of it, however, the great idea for which they were slowly preparing, was destined to grow in strength, and, in the far future, to bear abundant fruit. This was the belief that not alone the sons of the gods, but, by a lifetime of merit, the sons of men, might find their reward, even in the dark house of Hades. Naturally, therefore, not only among the Orphics and their disciples, but also among their opponents, the ideal of the Lost Paradise became more and more prominent. Discussion or description of the Golden Age, more especially of its analogue beyond the grave,—the Golden Age, so to speak, of the future—continued to grow in importance and interest. We hear many echoes of it in Plato. But, especially, to the writers of the Old Comedy the Orphics and their doctrines were a never-failing subject for parody and satiric comment.

One of the plainest signs of Orphic influence upon this discussion was the marked improvement in the present position of Kronos. According to the popular belief, old 'King' Kronos had been in the Golden Age a sort of divine *Roi d'Yvetot*, afterwards consigned to nethermost Tartarus, and, ever since then, a synonym of extreme old age and harmless senility.† This view, however, was deliberately opposed by the Orphics. Their teaching was that Kronos had long since been freed from his shameful captivity. Moreover, he is not old and weak. On the contrary, he is for ever young and vigorous, and now rules in Elysium, the land of those who have gone hence. There, in a world of eternal youth and joy, he is surrounded not only by the heroes of old, but also by the spirits of just men made perfect—after the Orphic pattern—and, indeed, as some say, by a remnant of men from those golden days when he was king in heaven.‡

Piety and justice as *motifs* in the ideal of happiness had been ascribed, long before Hesiod's time, to peoples living beyond the limits of the known world. Such were Homer's *Abioi* (*Il.* xiii. 6), 'the most righteous of men,' and, to give one more

* *e.g.* Plato, *Polit.* 269 A, 271 C, 276 A, *Hipp.* 269 B; Philodemus, *de Pietate*, p. 51; Vergil, *Ecl.* iv. 6; Tibullus, i. 3. 35; Propert. ii. (iii.), 32. 52; Ovid, *Amor.* iii. 8. 35, *Heroid.* iv. 132, etc.

† See esp. Eichhoff, *Jahrbüch. f. Philol.* cxx. 581 ff.; E. Graf, 'ad Aureæ Ætatis Fabulam Symbola,' *Leipz. Stud. z. Class. Philol.* viii. (1885) 1–85; A. Dieterich, *Nekyia*, Leipzig, 1893; E. Rohde, *Psyche*, Leipzig, 1903, i. p. 106 ff.; A. Nutt, *Voyage of Bran*, London, 1895.

‡ The earliest known reference after Hesiod is a line quoted by Philodemus from the old epic, *Alcmæon* (see Kinkel, *Epic. Græc. Fragm.*, Leipzig, 1877, p. 313). Theognis, 1135 ff., is the source of Ovid, *F.* i. 6. 29. The author of the *Ætna*, writing in the 1st cent. A.D., says that descriptions of the Golden Age may be expected from every poet, and are so common that—

'Non cessit cuiquam melius sua tempora nosse.'

The present writer has noted nearly a hundred references to it during the course of this investigation.

§ The result is that in cases where only a fragment of description has survived, it is sometimes impossible to decide which conception the author had in mind. Compare, *e.g.*, Solon, frag. 38, ed. Bergk; Cratinus, frag. 160, ed. Kock; Crates, frag. 223, ed. Kock; Lucilius, 978 ff., ed. Marx. See also Dieterich's *Nekyia*, and Waser in Pauly-Wissowa, v. pp. 2470–2475.

‖ Sallust, *Hist.* frag. 192, 193, ed. Maurenbrecher; Horace, *Epod.* xvi. 42, and schol.; Plutarch, *Sertorius*, 8.

* *e.g.* Homer, *Il.* xiii. 5, *Od.* iv. 85, vii. 201 and 88, iv. 563, vi. 41, ix. 108. See Graf, *l.c.* p. 4 ff.

† See M. Mayer in Roscher, ii. 1456 ff.

‡ Pindar, *Olymp.* ii. 124, *Pyth.* iv. 291; Æschyl. frag. 190, ed. Nauck; Teleclides, frag. 1, ed. Kock; Varro, *de Re Rust.* iii. 1, 5; Horace, *Epod.* xvi. 63; *Orphica*, frag. 245, ed. Abel.

example, the Hyperboreans,* so long famous in the literature and legend of the Græco-Roman world. This idea was now emphasized in the analogous legend of the Golden Age—the ideal world of the past—and on the basis of it not only the Orphics but other schools of philosophy exploited their specific views regarding the nature of righteousness and the indispensable conditions of happiness. In other words, as the Golden Age ceased to be an article of faith, it became, more and more, the field in which these thinkers aired their theories of what the world ought to be. From this sort of thing it was only a step to that long line of Utopian romances which were quite as characteristic of late antiquity as they are of the present day.†

Among the various bits of specific theory imported into the Golden Age by the philosophers, one of the oldest and most important was the doctrine of vegetarianism.‡ This doctrine doubtless goes back to the elder Orphics, but the most prominent representatives of it in antiquity were the Pythagoreans. The earliest reference to it now surviving is a fragment of Empedocles (127 D), and the most complete discussion of it in connexion with the Golden Age is Ovid, *Met.* xv. 96 f.§ In this famous passage Ovid introduces Pythagoras himself as the expounder of his own doctrine. The essence of it is that, in the Golden Age, men lived upon the fruits of the earth, and that the degeneration of later Ages is marked by the departure from this rule.

That the Golden Age was distinctively the era of perfect love and peace is easily inferred from Hesiod's account, but the later development is marked by a much stronger emphasis upon this feature. This was partly due to the influence of the Cyclic Theory, in which, as we shall see later, it was the necessary result of the Platonic conception of harmony. The first to lay stress upon it—and probably in this connexion—was Plato's predecessor Empedocles.‖ This, no doubt, is the reason why he made Aphrodite instead of Kronos ruler of the Golden Age.

Among those not interested in any cyclic theory—poets, for the most part—the favourite method of bringing out the peace and harmony of the Golden Age was to emphasize the contrast with later times by dilating upon war, violence, and bloodshed as both causes and symptoms of degeneration in the succeeding ages of mankind. This diatribe on war first comes to the front during the Alexandrian age. It is characteristic of Roman poetry, especially of the Elegy, and, in the end, became a mere rhetorical commonplace.¶

Another important line of development in later times was inspired by the varying use and interpretation of one of the most persistent and characteristic peculiarities of the genuine folk-legend. We refer to the belief that in the Golden Age all the imaginable blessings of life come of their own accord. In this way we have an ideal combination of fabulous plenty with luxurious idleness.

When treated seriously, either for literary or for didactic purposes, this *motif* led directly and inevitably to the conclusion that the ideal condition of human society was communism.* Several commonplaces which the Roman poets inherited from the Alexandrian age might be included here.† We know, too, for example, that this theme was developed at some length by the historian Ephoros in his account of the idealized nations of the North.‡

When treated by the satirists and by other people of a less serious turn of mind, the same *motif* led quite as directly to one of the most important and interesting developments in the literary history of this legend. This is the treatment of the Golden Age or its analogues in this world and the next as a comic theme. It makes its first appearance in the writers of the Old Comedy, and was primarily intended by them to satirize the peculiar tenets of the Orphics. But the story of Topsy-Turvy Land (*das Märchen des Schlaraffenlandes*, as the Germans call it) was certainly not invented by the Comic Dramatists. It is rather a folk-variation of the old story of the Golden Age, and references to it turn up now and then from the old Comedy of Greece to the present day.§ The comedy in these descriptions is usually produced by pushing the automatous element, occasionally too, the theory of communism, to its perfectly logical, and yet, at the same time, its utterly absurd conclusion. The result is a Lost Paradise of the *bon-vivant*, the votary of ease, and the irresponsible bachelor. The nearest congener of this type is the conception of the Golden Age especially affected by the idyllic-erotic poets of the Alexandrian age and by their Roman imitators. The same automatous and communistic features are prominent, and the examples by which they are illustrated are sometimes so nearly the same that the difference between the two departments is hardly more than a matter of mood.¶ At first sight this is surprising. It ceases to be so, however, as soon as we remind ourselves that the pathetic exaggeration so characteristic of the idyllic-erotic sphere is largely due to the fact that the author himself is rarely more than half convinced of the truth, or even of the possibility, of his own statements. It is an easy step from this state of mind to that ironical extravagance of humorous unbelief—and this, too, has its pathetic side—to which we are indebted for the old tale of Topsy-Turvy Land.

On the philosophical side, the growing distrust of everything in Hesiod's account that savoured of the supernatural served to bring out still another aspect of the Golden Age more and more clearly. Before taking up this point, however, we should remind ourselves that the counter-theory of ascent was, meanwhile, being supported by a party of such activity and intelligence that it could not be ignored.** The theory of ascent was also backed by folk-legends of great antiquity, and for centuries all classes seem to have been interested in discussing the various inventions by which the rise of mankind from utter savagery to our present stage of civilization has been marked.

It is evident that until the account of Hesiod was revised the two parties were utterly irreconcilable. If one did not believe Hesiod, the most

* See esp. O. Crusius in Roscher, i. p. 2895 ff., and the references.

† Henkel, *Philologus*, ix. 402, gives a long list, beginning with the *Republic* of Protagoras. See E. Rohde, *Der Gr. Roman*[2], Leipzig, 1900, p. 210 ff. with references.

‡ See Graf, *l.c.* p. 20 ff., for an extended discussion, and cf. Porphyr. *de Abstinentia*, ii. 21 ff.; Plato, *Leg.* vi. 782 E. Seneca, *Epist.* cviii. (Sotion); Clemens Alex. *Strom.* vii. 32, etc. For similar ideas in the East, Gruppe (*Gr. Mythol.* p. 448, note 2) refers to Gn 1^{29} 2^{16}; cf. Windischmann, *Zoroastr. Stud.* p. 212. Connected with this discussion is the old tradition that men talked with the animals in the Golden Age. The references to it are, Crates, 14, ed. Kock; Plato, *Polit.* 272 B; Xen. *Mem.* ii. 7, 13; Babrius, *procem.*

§ See esp. Schmekel, *de Ovid. Pythag. Adumbratione*, Diss., Greifswald, 1885.

‖ So, too, Aratus, 108, and freq. in the Roman poets, *e.g.* Vergil, *Ecl.* iv. 18, *Georg.* i. 125 and ii. 539; Tibullus, i. 10. 7; Ovid, *Met.* i. 97; Seneca, *Her. Œt.* 1056; Juvenal, xv. 168; Claudian, *de Raptu Proserp.* ii. 25, *procem., Laud. Seren.* 70; Sidon. Apoll. *Pan.* 105, etc.

¶ *E.g.* Aratus, 131; Vergil, *Ecl.* iv. 32, *Georg.* ii. 540, and Servius; Tibullus, i. 3. 36 and 47; Juvenal, xv. 168; Ovid, *Met.* i. 99, etc.

* See Graf, *l.c.* p. 60, and compare such passages, *e.g.*, as Plato, *Critias*, 110 C, but esp. the *Republic*, 415, 417, 424, 451–465, with the notes and references in the edition of Adam, Cambridge, 1902. Plato went further in this respect than any of his predecessors. He looked upon communism as one of the indispensable conditions of an ideal State, and the reflexion of this view may be seen in what he has to say of the Golden Age.

† Vergil, *Georg.* i. 126, *Æn.* ix. 569, and Servius; Tibullus, i. 3. 43, ii. 3. 73; Ovid, *Met.* i. 132; Juvenal, vi. 18; Seneca, *Phædra*, 539, *Epist.* xc. 41; Justinus, xliii. 1. 3, etc.

‡ Frag. 76 in Müller's *Fragm. Histor. Græc.* vol. i. p. 256.

§ Friedländer, *Sittengesch. Roms*[5], i. 537, Leipzig, 1888; O. Crusius, 'Märchenreminiscenzen im antiken Sprichwort' in *Verhandlungen der 40ten Philologenversammlung*, 1890, pp. 31–47; Rohde, *Psyche*, i. 315. 2, *Griech. Roman*[2], p. 206, n. 4; J. Pöschel, *Das Märchen vom Schlaraffenland.* The version best known to us, through numerous imitations, is the one given by the old Trouvère in his lay of the 'Land of Cocagne' (text in Barbazan, *Fabliaux et Contes*, 1784 [new ed. by Méon, 1880, ii. p. 175], tr. by G. L. Way, *Fabliaux or Tales*, etc., London, 1800, ii. p. 81; abstract by Legrand d'Aussy, *Fabliaux ou Contes*, etc., Paris, 1829, i. p. 302).

‖ Teleclides, 1 ed. Kock; Pherecrates, 108 K; Cratinus, 165 K; Crates, 14 K; Eupolis, 277 K; Athen. vi. 267 E; Lucilius, 978, ed. Marx; Petronius, 45; Lucian, *Sat.* 7, *Vera Hist.* i. 7, etc.

¶ Vergil, *Georg.* i. 132, *Ecl.* iv. 21; Horace, *Epod.* xvi. 49; Tibullus, i. 3. 45; Ovid, *Met.* i. 111; Dioscorides, *Anth. Pal.* vii. 31, etc.

** Rohde, *Griech. Roman*[2], p. 216, n. 2; Eichhoff, *l.c.* p. 587; Graf, *l.c.* p. 57; Æschylus, *Prom.* 440–455; Moschion, frag. 7, ed. Nauck; Critias, frag. 1, ed. Nauck; Athen. frag. 1, ed. Kock; Democritus, p. 237, ed. Mullach; Aristotle, *Met.* i. 2, and Zeller, *Phil. der Griechen*[4], i. p. 826. 3; Lucretius, v. 925; Diodorus, i. 8 and ii. 38; Horace, *Sat.* i. iii. 99; Lucian, *Amores*, 33. 34; Aristides, i. p. 32, ed. Dind.; Ovid, *Ars. Amat.* ii. 473; Tibullus, ii. i. 39; Cic. *pro. Sext.* 42; Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, p. 246 (*Orphica*).

logical course was to agree with the Epicureans, who denied the account of Hesiod *in toto*, and replaced it by their own view, which is the nearest approach in antiquity to our modern theory of evolution. This denial, which lies implicit in the famous passage of Lucretius (v. 925 f.), is stated positively, for example, by Diodorus, who (i. 8 f.) describes the theory of Epicurus upon this point, and (v. 66 f.) implies that the Golden Age was a mere invention of the Cretans. But this summary disposition of the difficulty is of no value to us. We are more interested in the process of reconciliation. The most important force in this process, so far as it was accomplished at all, was a gradual realization among thoughtful men of the fact that the ideal of life traditionally associated with the Golden Age, though it seemed attractive, was, in reality, unfit to pose as the highest development in any theory of descent.

2. Cynics, Stoics, etc.—At this point, certain Stoic modifications of Cynic doctrine are of especial value to us. The great representative passage to be considered in this connexion is Aratus, *Phænomena*, 97–140.* The version of the Ages by this famous Alexandrian poet of the 3rd cent. B.C. was one of the best known in the ancient world, and undoubted traces of its influence are to be found in most of the later accounts. Briefly described, it is a revision of Hesiod under Stoic influence. The object of the author was not only to reconcile the discrepancies of the old version, but also to remove whatever was irrelevant to a theme which he proposed to treat not as an independent account, as Hesiod had done, but as a rhetorical episode suggested by his mention of the constellation Virgo, *i.e.* Astræa, whom Aratus, following an old tradition, identifies with the Nemesis of Hesiod, and calls *Dike*.

Dike was comparatively unimportant in Hesiod. Owing to the exigencies of rhetoric, she now becomes the central figure. Moreover, after the true Stoic fashion, she is made to assume the functions of both Zeus and Kronos in the traditional version. The five ages of Hesiod are reduced to three—an Age of Gold, of Silver, and of Bronze.

The men of the Golden Age are described as peaceful tillers of the soil, with no knowledge of civil strife or of the vexations of the law. Moreover, they were far removed from the perils of the sea. In those days there were no ships to bring the luxuries of life from abroad. The goddess mingled freely with these simple souls, and taught them how men should live with reference to each other.

The Silver Age was more sophisticated. Nevertheless, the goddess still remained upon earth, although she now retired to the mountains, and was seen but rarely.

The Brazen Age saw the first swords, and the first slaughter of the oxen for food. Then *Dike*, utterly hating that race of men, finally departed to heaven and took her place among the stars.

It will be seen that one of the most notable signs of revision here is the disappearance of the old folk-element of marvel. In its place we have a conception in which the Stoics are mainly responsible for the emphasis laid upon the ethical *motif*, especially upon the relation of man to his fellows, to the world about him, and to the State.

The underlying principle in such a theory of the Ages is the conclusion that the ascent of man in the arts of civilization is accompanied, at all events beyond a certain point, by a corresponding descent in moral and even in physical fibre. Why is this the case? The reply was that to be healthy in mind and body, and therefore, happy, we must live in harmony with nature. But civilization beyond a certain point is not in harmony with nature. Accordingly, beyond a certain stage of civilization, we can be neither healthy, virtuous, nor happy. Now, as journeying into the future should bring us finally to a state of ideal misery, so journeying into the past should take us back finally to a state of ideal happiness. That state of ideal happiness was, of course, the Golden Age. The Golden Age of the past was, therefore, the ideal simple life of the past.

Such in substance was the general drift of the Cynic argument as modified by the Stoics, and, as a matter of fact, the Golden Age of Aratus is really an idealization of the agricultural and pastoral stage of human society*—a theme which always comes to the front in any period of overcultivation, as soon as men begin to stagger under the burden of their own inventions. So conceived, the theory of the Ages was not only quite consistent with the evolution of civilization from the crudest beginnings, but agreed with the Epicureans in presupposing such a process. But, as regarded the various inventions and discoveries by which that process has been marked, it loved to dwell upon those very devices, and to lay great stress on the view that they had been the most conspicuous cause of the downfall of man himself. The favourite examples are those chosen by Aratus. They are the first sword and the first ship.

The first sword† is a characteristic introduction to the topic of war which we have already mentioned. The first ship is also a favourite way of connecting the discussion of the Ages with the diatribe on navigation so frequently found in the later writers, especially among the Romans. In fact, it is a commonplace of modern criticism that the Romans were afraid of the sea. As, however, the opinion is a generalization, founded, for the most part, upon these very passages, we need not take it too seriously. The sailor's impious challenge of the treacherous and relentless deep was a subject inspired not so much by national character as by literary tradition. It is fully developed in the *Works and Days* of the old Bœotian poet, a conventional theme of the Greek epigram at all periods, a regular *motif* in the poetry of the Augustan age, and by the 1st cent. of our era a mere rhetorical commonplace.‡

In order to understand better the attitude of the Epicureans towards the theory of the Ages, as presented, for example, by Aratus, we must return for a moment to the underlying principle upon which, according to Stoic reasoning, that theory was founded. We mean the conclusion stated above, that advance in the arts of civilization is at the expense of the character, health, and happiness of the individual. Now, when we consider the Stoic argument by which this conclusion was made to yield the theory that the Golden Age of

* Another representative passage is Seneca, *Epist.* xc. 5 ff., in which he quotes from Posidonius the description of an ideal past of the Stoics, in which the philosophers take the place of Kronos.

* Horace, *Epod.* ii.; Propert. iii. 13. 25; Seneca, *Medea*, 333; Plutarch, *de Nobil.* 20, etc. etc. This interpretation of the Golden Age was especially welcome to the Romans, not only because of their temperamental Stoicism, but because it agreed more nearly with their own tradition of early times and with the character and attributes of Saturn before he was identified with the Greek Kronos.

† *e.g.* Vergil, *Georg.* ii. 540; Ovid, *Met.* i. 99; Juvenal, xv. 168; Tibullus, i. 3. 47. The rhetorical question of Tibullus (i. 10. 1) states a maxim of the philosophers which is often repeated. See, *e.g.*, Seneca, *N.Q.* v. 18. 15: 'Nihil invenimus tam manifestæ utilitatis quod non in contrarium transeat culpa. So Ovid, *Met.* xv. 106, speaking in the person of Pythagoras. Opponents of the theory of descent, especially the Epicureans, contended that the sword merely marked one period in the long chronicle of homicide. It was the successor of the club and the large rough stone (Lucretius, v. 966). Cf. also Hor. *Sat.* i. 3. 100; Valer. Flacc. v. 145, and esp. Plato, *Rep.* 358 E (war the natural condition of mankind), and the commentary of Adam.

‡ Among the most important of the numberless references are, Stobæus, 57 (who gives a number of quotations); Hesiod, *W. and D.* 236; Sophocles, *Antig.* 332; Seneca, *Medea*, 301 and 607; Tibullus, i. 3. 37 and ii. 3. 39; Propert. i. 17. 13 and iii. 7. 29; Ovid, *Amor.* ii. 11. 1; Statius, *Thebaid*, vi. 19 and *Achilleid*, i. 62; Claudian, *de Raptu Pros.* i., *proœm.* The final conclusion, after generations of discussion, was that the one great cause of the downfall of man had been his greed and his selfishness. It was clear to the poets and philosophers themselves, especially to the Romans, that all their commonplaces on the fall of man were really just so many illustrations of this one *motif*. It drove him to war, it suggested the first ship, it urged him on to explore the earth for treasures better hid, it devised the vexations of the law and brought about the injustice of wealth and poverty; through crime and self-indulgence it has made him acquainted with sorrow, disease, and all the ills that flesh is heir to. The result is that he has not only shortened his life by his own devices, but, what with anxiety, dyspepsia, and a bad conscience, with marriage a failure and children a burden, the little life he has left is no pleasure to him.

the past was the ideal simple life of the past, we perceive that it is founded on two assumptions. The first is that this conclusion, that advance in the arts is at the expense of the individual, is a truth of universal application, and not to be modified. The second is that the twin process to which it refers has operated continuously, and will go on doing so. The Stoics could make these assumptions without hesitation, since both of them followed, inevitably, from that cyclic theory of the Ages to which this school of philosophers gave its enthusiastic support. Not so the Epicureans. The Epicureans agreed that the growth of civilization had been accompanied by certain signs of degeneration in man himself, but they denied that the principle was capable of universal application. They insisted that every stage of civilization, in its own particular fashion, has been unfavourable to the individual. In other ways it has been favourable. There is no such thing, therefore, as progressive degeneration in the strict sense of the word. Such a theory would imply a period of ideal happiness at one extreme, followed by a period of ideal misery at the other extreme. Both are superhuman, and therefore impossible. In other words, there never was a Golden Age, even if we adopt the Stoic revision of the old legend.

Another method of reconciling the difficulties in Hesiod's account is illustrated by Vergil, *Georg.* i. 121 ff. The primary purpose of this version was to enhance the dignity of labour. The history of mankind is divided into two periods—the Age of Saturn, and the Age of Jove. The Golden Age, when good old Saturn was King, agrees entirely with Hesiod. The second period, however, is not an age of degeneration, but an age of reform. Jupiter, the divine father of our race and of all our higher aspirations, purposely did away with the *far niente* of the old régime, not out of a petty resentment against Prometheus—as the old folk-legend (*e.g.* Hesiod, *W. and D.* 42 f.) would have us believe—but rather,

'curis acuens mortalia corda,
Nec torpere gravi passus sua regna veterno,'

because he was well aware that, unless men have difficulties to meet and overcome, they can never grow strong in any sense. In this characteristically noble conception, it is interesting to see to what an extent Vergil succeeded in meeting the demands of contemporary thought without sacrificing the traditional account of the Golden Age so dear to the poets.

The famous account of the Ages which Ovid gives in the first book of his *Metamorphoses*, 89–162, and the version best known to the modern world, is one of the earliest surviving attempts to incorporate the Flood Legend. Otherwise, it is chiefly remarkable as an illustration of the poet's characteristic skill in combining and harmonizing the views of preceding thinkers. The Four Ages (Gold, Silver, Bronze, and Iron) are all in the past. The Age to which we belong is a fifth. The Flood is the great catastrophe by which the wicked and godless race of the Iron Age was destroyed. The history of our own race, therefore, begins with the earth-born children of Deucalion and Pyrrha. In this way, the Flood Legend, the theory of descent, the theory of ascent, the traditional account of the Golden Age, the Heroes, and, with only a slight modification, even Hesiod's quintuple division of the Ages, were all made to dwell together in peace and unity.

CYCLIC THEORY.—Let us now turn our attention to the Cyclic Theory, the most important element, in the long run perhaps the one really vital and vitalizing element, in the history of our subject. The Cyclic Theory of the Ages was founded on the belief that, after the analogy of day and night, of the waxing and waning of the moon, and of the eternal round of the seasons, the entire Universe itself is subject to an ever-recurring cycle of change. This ancient Babylonian doctrine* of the world-year, the *magnus annus*, as it was called by the Romans, makes its earliest known appearance on Greek soil with Heraclitus,† was thoroughly discussed by the later philosophers, and finally became known to the world at large. Indeed, it may be called the prototype of some of our most recent views suggested by the nebular hypothesis.‡

The association of this idea with the old folk-legend of the Ages was inevitable, and appears at a very early period in the history of Greek speculative thought. In fact, it has often been stated, though without sufficient warrant, that belief in a cyclic theory of the Ages is the explanation of Hesiod's wish that he had died earlier or could have been born later.§ The fragments, however, of Empedocles show, in spite of their scantiness, that at that time the process had already begun.‖ But the most important discussion, so far as we are concerned, the one, too, which had the strongest influence upon later times, is developed or touched upon in various dialogues of Plato,¶ more especially in the *Polit.*, *Timæus*, and *Republic*.

According to Plato's definition,—and this much, at least, appears to have remained unchanged in later times—a *magnus annus* means the period which elapses before the eight circles, each revolving about the earth in an orbit of its own, arrive simultaneously at the point from which they started at the beginning of our cycle.** Further details of the Platonic theory—and these underwent considerable revision in later times—apparently rest on the assumption that each complete revolution of the Universe is followed by a counter revolution in the opposite direction. A motion forward, as it were, is followed by a motion backward. The history of mankind is directly affected by this motion, and especially by the alternation of it.

The motion forward is the Age of Kronos and the direction of harmony. During all this period the great Helmsman of the Universe is at his post, and we have the Golden Age of the poets. As the motion is the reverse of that which prevails in our time, it is naïvely assumed that the conditions of life are to a large extent the opposite of those with which we are familiar. The men of that age are born old, with hoary hair,†† and instead of growing older continue to grow younger, until they finally disappear. Moreover, they are born from the earth, and the earth feeds them. There is no toil, no pain, no war, there are no women‡‡ and no children of women. Yet with all their advantages these men do not attain unto wisdom.

When the forward motion is completed, the Helmsman retires from his post, and the Universe, left to itself, yields to the force of gravity, as it were, and begins its backward revolution, which is in the direction of discord. The point at which the motion is reversed is always signalized by fire, flood, or some other cosmic upheaval, involving a terrific destruction of organic life. The few men who survive cease growing young and begin to grow old, those just born from the earth with hoary hair die, and return to the earth from which they came. Men are no longer born from the earth, as before, but even as

* Gomperz, *Griech. Denker*, Leipzig, 1896, i. p. 115, with note and references on p. 438; Lenormant-Babelon, *Hist. de l'Orient*, v. 175; *supra*, p. 183 ff.

† Gomperz, *l.c.* pp. 54 and 428; Diels, *Herakleitos von Ephesos*, Berlin, 1901, frag. 66 (26, Bywater).

‡ Gomperz, *l.c.* p. 117.

§ Hesiod, *W. and D.* 174–5. See the editions of Rzach, Leipzig, 1902, p. 158, and of Goettling-Flach, Leipzig, 1878, p. 201, with notes and references; Graf, *l.c.* p. 11; Schoell-Studemund, *Anecdota Graeco-Latina*, ii.

‖ Diels, *Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta*, Berlin, 1901, pp. 88 and 112 ff.

¶ Plato, *Polit.* 269 C, *Tim.* 39 D ff., *Rep.* 545 C ff.; Cic. *Timæus*, 34 ff. For a good discussion of this theory and of the Platonic Number with which it is closely associated, and also for a selected bibliography of the enormous literature which has gathered about it, see Adam's ed. of the *Republic*, ii. p. 264 ff.

** *Tim.* 39 D; Cic. *Timæus*, 33; Macrob., *Som. Scipionis*, ii. 2, 19; Stobæus, *Eclog.* i. 264 (vol. i. p. 107, Hense). See esp. Usener, *Rhein. Mus.* xxviii. 395; Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Philos. Græc.*, Gotha, 1888, p. 404; Reitzenstein, *Poimandres*, Leipzig, 1904, p. 50, n. 2.

†† The likeness to Hesiod, *W. and D.* 180 ff., has been pointed out and discussed by Adam in the *CR* v. 445.

‡‡ *Polit.* 271 F; *Leg.* iv. 713 C ff. It has been observed by Eichhoff (*l.c.* p. 589) and others that the story of Pandora as told by Hesiod (*Theog.* 570, and *W. and D.* 70) implies that there was no woman in the Golden Age, and that it was through her that this happy period came to an end. See also, Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*, p. 540.

the Universe is now left to itself, so are all and several of its parts; and each race is propagated in the manner familiar to us who belong to that period. The continuance of the motion backward increases and accelerates the process of disorganization, until, by the time the Universe again reaches the point of departure, it is ready to fly off at a tangent and disappear for ever in the infinite space of discord. At this point, however, the Helmsman again resumes his post, reverses the direction of the Universe, and with the change again to harmony the Golden Age necessarily returns as before. The few who survive from the preceding period suffer change in sympathy with the whole. Again the old begin to grow young, and continue to do so until they finally disappear. Again the new generations are born with hoary hair, and not from each other, but from the earth. In fact, it is those who died in the preceding period of discord and were buried in the earth that now rise again from the dead, and in their turn are born old, grow young, and finally vanish.

It will be seen at once that, according to this remarkably suggestive theory, which, of course, owes much to earlier thinkers,* the sum of human experience is measured by two world-years. During the first the Universe moves forward, during the second, backward, to the place of beginning. Each *magnus annus* is therefore one of the two Ages into which the history of mankind is divided; and this alternation of Ages will continue so long as the Universe endures. As with the whole, so with each and all of its parts. The Ages of man, the life of man himself, are closely connected with this eternal oscillation of the Universe. All move in a cycle. The Golden Age of the long ago will surely come again some day. Moreover, every one of us shall rise again to another life in that Golden Age. Thus, regret for the past was balanced by hope for the future. In the later history of our theme, this association of ideas was of the utmost importance, and served to identify the theory of the Ages more and more closely with its ancient analogue, the doctrine of a future life beyond the grave.

The Stoic theory† of cycles occupies an important place in their systems. Here, their acknowledged dependence upon Heraclitus is clearly seen in the prominence they give to his doctrine of ἐκπύρωσις, the elemental fire into which the world is periodically resolved, and from which it is periodically born anew.

After the old world has been completely consumed, the four primal elements,—fire, air, water, earth,—which are indestructible, gradually assume their previous relations to each other, and in this way a new world comes into being exactly like the old. As soon as the proper point is reached in the process of reconstruction, every sort of living thing is born from the earth, and from that time proceeds to increase after its kind.‡ Man, too, is here, 'knowing nothing of wrong and born under better auspices.' But this Golden Age of innocence is never for long. 'Villainy steals on apace. Virtue is hard to find out: it needs a leader and a guide. The vices are learned without a master.'§ So the process of degeneration goes on until the time comes for the next ἐκπύρωσις. Then the world is destroyed and built anew, as before.

An ἐκπύρωσις occurs each time that the eight circles are in conjunction at the place of beginning.‖ For the Stoics, therefore, every *magnus annus* is the measure of one complete life, as it were, of the Universe. It follows that the totality of human experience must, also, lie between those impassable barriers of flame by which every great year is divided from its fellows. The soul outlives the body, but even the soul of the ideal Stoic¶ cannot survive the ἐκπύρωσις. Nothing emerges from this trial by fire except the primal elements from which all things are made.**

In one sense, however, we all have a personal interest in every period of the world's existence, for the reason that, according to the Stoic doctrine of εἱμαρμένη,* the history of every *magnus annus* is, necessarily, the exact counterpart of the history of every other *magnus annus*. The chain of existence and of consciousness is parted by the ἐκπύρωσις; but all begins anew, just as it did in the previous epoch; and every thing down to the slightest detail is exactly repeated.† To quote a favourite illustration of the Stoics themselves, every *magnus annus* will see Socrates. In every *magnus annus* he will marry Xanthippe, drink the hemlock, and die.‡

In the later stages of the Cyclic Theory we have also to reckon with the manipulations of the Orphic philosophers.§ It is extremely difficult to extract a definite answer to any question connected with the history of this movement. The *floruit* of the elder Orphics was not far from the 6th cent. B.C. With the great revival of Mysticism, four or five hundred years later, the old doctrine of the Orphics again came to the front, and was more or less revised or extended in conformity with similar ideas in other systems of thought—more especially Plato, the Stoics, and the Orient. Both periods were characterized by great literary activity. Unfortunately, however, our present knowledge of it is, for the most part, confined to chance quotations in the Neo-Platonists and the still later scholiasts, and their references are generally so vague and indefinite that, in the absence of other testimony, it is often impossible to distinguish the earlier product from the later. We may be fairly certain, however, that the two following theories, both of which are ascribed to the Orphics, are not a product of the earlier school.

The first is mentioned by Servius on Vergil, *Ecl.* iv. 10. In this note, Nigidius Figulus (*de Diis*, lib. iv.) is quoted for the statement: 'According to Orpheus, the ruler of the First Age is Saturn; of the Second, Jupiter; of the Third, Neptune; of the Fourth, Pluto.' An apparent reference to the same theory is found in two hexameters quoted from some Orphic poem by Lactantius, *Instit.* i. 13. 11 (Abel, *Orphica*, frag. 243).

As we shall see shortly, the four gods in this system are merely personifications of the four elements. The number points either to the Stoics or to the common source of both. Moreover, the formal association of the four elements with the Four Ages of man is an item of speculation which, so far as the Greeks are concerned, cannot be carried back beyond the Alexandrian period. Finally, this is certainly a cyclic theory, and it cannot be shown that the elder Orphics ever carried their doctrine of the re-birth of the soul any further. The extension of it to a periodical re-birth of the Universe itself, and the establishment of a close connexion between the two, belong to a subsequent development in the history of the Orphic movement.

The second theory is much more Orphic in character. The substance of it is given by Proclus in a note on Plato's *Republic*, 38. 5, ed. Schöll.

'The theologian Orpheus,' he says, 'taught that there were three Ages of man. The first or Golden Age was ruled by Phanes. Most mighty Kronos was ruler of the second or Silver Age. The third is the Titanic. The ruler of it is Zeus, and it is called Titanic because the men of that age were created by him from the remains of the Titans. The idea of Orpheus is that these three periods comprise every stage in the history of the human race.'

The Orphic elements in this account receive their best illustration from an Orphic theogony, the fragments of which are arranged and discussed by Gruppe in Roscher, iii. 1139 ff. The naïve crudity of the imagery in this poem strongly reminds one of the teleological speculations of the savage or semi-barbarous races.‖ The underlying thought, however, seems to be clear enough. It is a belief that the creation of the Cosmos was brought about by a series of emanations from the universal essence (Phanes), and that from time to time the Cosmos returns to its primeval form. The souls of men themselves are so many sparks which trickle down, as it were, from the divine fire above. But we are much more remote from the first Phanes, the primal All-Soul, than the first men were. Since then the backward path has steadily grown longer and more indirect. At all events, this seems to be what Proclus means when he says (*Orph.* frag. 244, ed. Abel) that, according to Orpheus, the men of the Golden Age lived κατὰ νοῦν μόνον, the men of the Silver Age κατὰ τὸν καθαρὸν λόγον; whereas all that we can appeal to is that small portion of Dionysus-Phanes which the

* See the two preceding notes, and Adam, *Repub.* ii. p. 296, n. 6, p. 297, n. 1-4, and references.

† Ritter and Preller, *l.c.* pp. 28 ff. and 398-405; Zeller, *Grundriss der Gesch. der Gr. Phil.*, Leipzig, 1905, p. 214; Zeno, frag. 107-109, and Chrysippus, frag. 596-632, in von Arnim's *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, Leipzig, 1905.

‡ Cleanthes, frag. 497, ed. von Arnim.

§ Seneca, *N.Q.* iii. 30. 8.

‖ Nemes. *de Nat. Hom.* 38 (quoted by Ritter and Preller, *l.c.* p. 404).

¶ Diog. Laert. (vii. 156) says that 'the Stoics claim that the soul is the spirit which is a part of ourselves. It is, therefore, corporeal, and though it survives our death, it is not immortal. . . . Cleanthes, therefore, thinks that all souls, Chrysippus, that only souls of the "wise," last until the ἐκπύρωσις.' Cf. also Aëtius, 151; *Doxographi Græci*, 393, ed. Diels, etc.

** But see Ritter and Preller, *l.c.* p. 401 B.

* Diog. Laert. vii. 147 ff., and Ritter and Preller, *l.c.* p. 412.

† Eudemus, ed. Spengel, Berlin, 1866, pp. 73-74; Chrysippus, frag. 623-627, ed. von Arnim; Gomperz, *l.c.* pp. 113 and 116 ff.

‡ Nemes. *de Nat. Hom.* 38.

§ See esp. O. Gruppe in Roscher, iii. 1117-1154, who discusses the subject at length, and refers to all the important literature connected with it. A new edition of the Orphic remains is much needed. The latest edition, and the only one now generally available, is Abel, *Orphica*, Leipzig, 1885. This, however, is not entirely satisfactory, and does not supersede the monumental work of Lobeck (*Aglaophamos*).

‖ See Gomperz, *l.c.* pp. 193 and 109 ff.

Titans had eaten before they were slain by Zeus, and which, therefore, still lingered in the remains from which we of the third race were afterwards created.

The coefficient of descent in this version of the Ages is the ever-increasing distance from that to which the gods themselves owe their being. On the whole, we may characterize the account which Proclus summarizes as a theory of double emanation, the chief object of which was to lead up to the birth of Dionysus, the Orphic redeemer. In other words, we have the somewhat vague idea of a cyclic theory of the Universe attached to a much more highly developed doctrine of the re-birth of the soul and of the means whereby it may some day return to the god who gave it.

The doctrine of an *ἐκπύρωσις*, irrespective of its philosophical meaning, makes a strong appeal to the imagination. It was at all times, therefore, one of the most prominent features of the Cyclic Theory. By the 2nd cent. B.C., owing to the widespread activity of its most enthusiastic exponents, the Stoic popular preachers, no item of philosophical speculation could have been more familiar to the average man. Finally, together with much else that had been identified with the Stoics, it passed over to the Christian thinkers; and, long after the period with which we are here concerned, we find the Church Fathers undertaking to derive the doctrine of the *ἐκπύρωσις* from the Book of Genesis.*

But, long before the Stoics, the *ἐκπύρωσις* had begun to be associated with other great cosmic disasters of a different nature. The origin and progress of this development are better understood as soon as we observe the process of reasoning by which they were inspired and directed. In the first place, the cycle of the Universe had been called a year. This led to the natural but quite illogical assumption that, for that very reason, it must necessarily possess all the attributes of its prototype and namesake, the solar year. Second, the present condition of the world depends upon the maintenance of the elements in a certain state of equilibrium. Any disturbance of it is at once reflected in the world about us. If the disturbance is sufficiently severe, the result is cosmic disaster. The character of the disaster is determined by whichever one of the elements has gained the upper hand. Finally, great significance was attached to the fact that there were four Elements, four Seasons, four Ages of man.

The conquests of Alexander drew the East and the West closer to each other than they had ever been before, and this *rapprochement* was not disturbed by the Imperial policy of Rome. The phase of our subject now under consideration is especially marked by the more or less direct influence of Oriental speculations. Conversely, therefore, this aspect of the Cyclic Theory did not become especially prominent until the Alexandrian age. The first step was to associate the Flood Legend with the Cyclic Theory, and to set it over against the *ἐκπύρωσις* as a second recurrent catastrophe of the *magnus annus*. This doctrine of the regular alternation between a destruction by fire and a destruction by water was already an old story in the time of Plato (*e.g. Tim.* 22, C). There are no signs of this doctrine in the fragments of Zeno, Cleanthes, and the earlier Stoics. We know, however, that it was familiar to their contemporaries. Moreover, as early at least as Cicero's time, the doctrine had been adopted by the Stoics themselves, and henceforward we hear much of it.† Compare, for example, the vivid description of the great cyclic *diluvium* which Seneca gives us in his *Nat. Quæst.* iii. 27 ff.

The idea that these two contrasted disasters occur at certain definite points in the *magnus annus* is also of Oriental origin, and, doubtless, of a high antiquity. On the Greek side, the first to mention it is Aristotle. The quotation, which we owe to Censorinus, xviii. 11, was probably from Aristotle's lost *Protrept.*, the model of Cicero's famous dialogue, the *Hortensius*, which is also lost.* No doubt it was largely through the *Hortensius* that the Romans became familiar with Aristotle's observation that the two disasters of the *magnus annus*, or, as he termed it, the *maximus annus*, occur at the solstices: the *conflagratio* at the summer solstice, the *diluvium* at the winter solstice.† In other words, the solar year has solstices; it also has summer and winter—the one, hot and dry, the other, cold and wet. Therefore the great year has the same peculiarities. This being granted, the *conflagratio* is put in the great summer, simply because the great summer is hot and dry, and the *diluvium* in the great winter, because the great winter is cold and wet.

We should not expect this sort of logic from Aristotle, and, as a matter of fact, the idea was not his own. Indeed, as the *Protrept.* was a discussion in the form of a dialogue, we do not know that he approved of the view at all. That his information went back to some Eastern source is indicated by a fragment from the voluminous history of his much younger contemporary, the Chaldæan priest Berosus. The passage is quoted by Seneca, *Naturales Quæstiones*, iii. 29. 1 ff. 'Berosus,' he says, 'qui Belum interpretatus est,' insists that he can set the time for the *conflagratio* and the *diluvium*. The earth will burn up, he claims, when all the stars, which now move in different orbits, are in conjunction in the constellation of Cancer. The Flood will take place when the same stars reach conjunction in the constellation of Capricorn. 'Illic solstitium, hic bruma conficitur.' Conjunction in Cancer produces the *conflagratio*, conjunction in Capricorn the *diluvium*. This touch of astrology makes the statement very impressive, and these Chaldæans were nothing if not impressive. But, as Gomperz has already observed,‡ the actual foundation of the statement is nothing but the fact that the summer and winter solstices of the ordinary solar year are presided over by Cancer and Capricorn respectively. When this flimsy assumption of profundity is removed, the theory of Berosus is probably identical with the one mentioned by Aristotle.

Now that fire and water had acquired a definite and important position in the cyclic scheme, it followed inevitably that the two remaining elements, air and earth, ought to be put on the same plane. The line of development followed was largely suggested by the fact that there were four Elements, four Seasons, four Ages of man. The four seasons of the ordinary year are spring, summer, autumn, and winter—a series which has always been associated with man's own descent from youth to hoary eld, from strength and happiness to weakness and sorrow. So the four seasons of the great year are the four Ages of man, another series with which the idea of descent had always been associated. As the springtime of the little year of our life is the golden youth of man, so the springtime of that greater year was the golden youth of all mankind.§ Finally, the traditional order of the four elements—fire, air, water, earth—is also one of descent from the lighter to the heavier, from pure spirit to the earth, earthy.

If, now, we associate the four elements in their regular order with the corresponding Ages of man in their regular order, the dominating element during the Golden Age will be fire, during the Silver Age, air, during the Brazen Age, water, and during the Iron Age, earth. The conclusion of this is that the descent of man himself is due to his ever-increasing distance, so to speak, from the Divine fire. We are thus brought back to the Orphics again, and, as a matter of fact, the Stoic-Orphic theory reported by Nigidius Figulus, in which, as we have already seen, the *magnus annus* was equipped with four seasons, each ruled by the appropriate element, is a complete illustration of the tendencies we have just been discussing.

A theory ascribed to the Magi by Dio Chrysostom and partially reported by him (xxxvi. 43 ff.), should also be mentioned here. The Magi tell us, he says, that the Lord of the world rides in a chariot drawn by four horses which are sacred to Zeus, Hera, Poseidon, and Hestia respectively. In other words, the four horses are the four elements, fire, air, water, and earth. As a rule they are tractable. Now and then, however, the first steed becomes restive and sets fire to the other three. This is the origin of the story of Phaethon told by the Greeks. Again it is the steed of Poseidon that becomes

* See Windischmann, *Zoroastr. Stud.* p. 259.

† Cic. *Rep.* vi. 23, cf. Macrob. *Som. Scip.* ii. 10. 10 ff.; Lucret. v. 338; Luc. vii. 812, as interpreted by the *Commenta Lucani*, ed. Usener, p. 252 (frag. 608, vol. ii. p. 186, ed. van Arnim); Seneca, *Dial.* vi. 26 6, etc.

* Usener, *Rhein. Mus.* xxviii. 391 ff.

† For an echo of this statement see the *Meteorologica*, i. 14.

‡ *Griechische Denker*, i. 115.

§ Vergil, *Georg.* ii. 336 ff.; Ovid, *Met.* i. 107; *Pervigilium Veneris*, 2 ff. etc.

restive, and the drops of his sweat are sprinkled upon the other three. This, again, is the source from which the Greeks derived their story of Deucalion's flood.

If one were to insist upon completing the analogy between the four Elements, the four Ages of man, and the four Seasons of the great year, the Ages presided over by air and by earth, as was already the case with the Ages of fire and water, should each be marked by a cosmic disaster appropriate to its nature. We know that this was actually done, but as these attempts lie outside the sphere with which this article is concerned, they do not require discussion here.*

3. Revival of Mysticism in 2nd cent. B.C.—The last important stage in the long history of our subject is the era of the prophets. The rapid growth of Mysticism which began early in the Alexandrian age reached its culmination in the 2nd cent. B.C. One of the most striking features of the movement, and a significant comment upon the mental and spiritual condition of the entire Græco-Roman world, was the rapid production of apocryphal works. It is probably fair to assume that the production of this literature was much encouraged, if not actually suggested, by the then widespread belief that the life of mankind moves in cycles. At all events, one of the most characteristic features of all these visions and prophecies was the emphasis given to some cyclic theory of the Ages. It would be quite unnecessary here, even if they were still available to us, to examine these works in detail. Their chief importance to us would be derived not from their contents, but from the point of view which, by virtue of their very nature, they all possess in common. These visions and prophecies, like all other works of the same class, appealed more to faith and the emotions than they did to reason and the understanding. The author tells his readers that this last Age has nearly run its course, and that the great change is near at hand. He does not state it as an opinion or a theory, capable of being discussed as such. He states it as oracular utterance, as inspired prophecy, the truth of which is already foreshadowed in current events and cannot be questioned. In this way the Cyclic Theory of the Ages was transformed from a rhetorical and philosophical theme into a Divine assurance of the joy soon to come. As a class, these compositions contributed almost nothing to the development of the Cyclic Theory itself. A word or two, however, should be given to the Sibyl.

The *Oracles of the Sibyl* have been ascribed to about the middle of the 2nd cent. B.C. They were well known to the Romans for the next 200 years; but at the time when the collection now bearing that name† was composed, the earlier had apparently ceased to exist. Meanwhile, however, they had won a sort of secondary immortality through the influence they had exerted upon the fourth *Eclogue* of Vergil,‡ the most famous literary work ever inspired by any aspect of our theme. From this poem and the ancient comment upon it, it appears that the Sibyl adopted the Stoic-Orphic identification of the Four Ages of man with the four seasons of the *magnus annus*. In addition to this, she—or her authority—was inspired by the analogy of the ancient solar year to divide the great year into ten great months, each of which was the length of a *sæculum* and presided over by a god. Ever since the time of Sulla there had been rumours afloat that the Sibyl's last *sæculum* was drawing to a close, and that the Golden Age was at hand. One cannot read the fourth *Eclogue* without feeling that Vergil was himself impressed by a prophecy so much in harmony with the aspirations of his own lofty soul. Nevertheless, we must not forget that the poem is really a poem of congratulation upon the birth of a son, into which, as Marx has clearly demonstrated,* Vergil introduced the topic of the Ages in accordance with the specific suggestion of the rhetoricians for poems of this type, and developed it in strict conformity with the rules laid down by them. The most famous line in the poem,

'Iam nova progenies cælo demittitur alto,'

is a clear reflexion of the cyclic theories which we have just been discussing. That, in itself, it should also foreshadow quite as clearly the great central article of the Christian faith, is an excellent illustration of the fact that there has never been any break between ancient and modern culture. The foundation of the most enlightened Christian thought, quite as much as the foundation of Vergil's thought, was that gradual blending of the Orient with the speculations of the Greek philosophers, more especially Plato and the Stoics, which moulded the doctrine of the Ages in its final form, and which, ever since then, has played such an important part in the mental and spiritual consciousness of the civilized world. It is, therefore, no matter for surprise that for more than 1500 years this last great document in the long history of the Cyclic Theory of the Ages was firmly believed to be a prophecy of the coming of Christ.†

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AGES OF THE WORLD (Indian).—The Hindu doctrine of the Ages of the World (*yugas*) is combined with that of two other great periods, the *manvantaras* and *kalpas*, into a fanciful system of universal chronology, which passes for orthodox. Its basis is the yugas; they are, therefore, treated here in connexion with the other elements of the chronological system. Orthodox Hindus recognize four Ages of the World (*yugas*), roughly corresponding to the Gold, Silver, Brass, and Iron Ages of the ancients. They are called *kṛta*, *tretā*, *dvāpara*, and *kali* after the sides of a die; *kṛta*, the lucky one, being the side marked with four dots; *tretā* that with three; *dvāpara* with two; *kali*, the losing one, with one dot. These names occur in the period of the Brāhmaṇas as names of throws at dice, and in one verse of the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa (7, 14) they are already referred, by the commentator, to the yugas. In the epics and the Purāṇas the belief with regard to the four yugas has become a fully established doctrine. The general idea, the same in all Brāhmanical sources, is that the character, or, if the expression may be used, the proportion of virtue, and the length of each yuga conform to the number on the side of a die, after which it is named. In the *kṛtayuga*, virtue (*dharma*) was fully present in men, with all four feet, as it is expressed, but it diminished by one quarter or foot in every succeeding age, till in the *kaliyuga* only one foot of dharma remains. The same proportion holds good with regard to the duration of the several Ages. The kṛtayuga lasts 4000 years, to which a dawn and a twilight of 400 years each are added; the same items in tretā are 3000 and 300, in dvāpara 2000 and 200, in kali 1000 and 100 years. Thus the period of the four yugas together, technically called a *mahāyuga* or *chaturyuga*, though commonly a *yuga*, lasts 12,000 years (Manu, i. 69 ff. =

* O. Gruppe, *Gr. Mythol.* p. 450, n. 1, also his *Gr. Kulte und Mythen in ihren Beziehungen zu den orient. Religionen*, Leipzig, 1887, p. 670, n. 8, and 695, n. 22, with references.

† The two modern editions of the *Oracula Sibyllina* are by Rzach, Vienna, 1891, and by Geffcken, Berlin, 1902. See also Christ, *Gesch. der Gr. Lit.*, Munich, 1905, p. 822, and references.

‡ O. Gruppe, *Gr. Kulte*, etc., p. 687 ff., and references: A. Cartault, *Étude sur les Bucol. de Virg.*, Paris, 1897, p. 110 ff.; W. W. Fowler, *Harvard Studies*, xiv. 19 ff. etc.

* F. Marx, *Neue Jahrbüch. f. das klass. Altertum*, i. (1898), pp. 105–128.

† Comparetti, *Virgilio nel medio evo*, 1896, i. 129–138, and ii. 90–99; Mayor, etc., *Virgil's Messianic Eclogue*, 1907.

Mahābhārata, iii. 12,826 ff.). The years in this statement are interpreted as Divine years, consisting each of 360 human years, giving thus a total of 4,320,000 years in each *mahāyuga*, and this interpretation, once adopted in the Purāṇas, became a dogma. The usual descriptions of the kṛta- (or satya-) yuga reveal to us a happy state of mankind, when life lasted 4000 years, when there were no quarrels nor wars, when the rules of caste and the precepts of the Vedas were strictly obeyed, when, in short, virtue reigned paramount. In the kali- (or tiṣya-) yuga just the reverse prevails. There is a confusion of castes and *āśramas*. The Veda and good conduct gradually fall into neglect; all kinds of vices creep in; diseases afflict mankind; the term of life grows shorter and shorter, and is quite uncertain; barbarians occupy the land, and people kill one another in continual strife, till at the end of the yuga some mighty king extinguishes the infidels. From these extremes the character of the intermediate yugas may be imagined.* The dawns and twilights of the several Ages are periods of transition from one Age to the next, when the character of the one is not yet entirely lost, and that of the other not yet fully established.

It seems natural to presume that originally the mahāyuga comprised the whole existence of the world; indications, indeed, of such a belief are not wanting, as will be noticed later. Still, the common doctrine is that one mahāyuga followed on another, one thousand of them forming a single *kalpa*. The kalpa, then, is the length of time from a creation to a destruction of the world. The belief in periodical creations and destructions of the world is very old; and its existence in the Vedic period may be inferred from Atharvaveda, x. 8. 39, 40. It is combined as follows with that in the four Ages. In the first kṛtayuga, after the creation of the earth, Brahman created a thousand pairs of twins from his mouth, breast, thighs, and feet respectively. They lived without houses; all desires which they conceived were directly fulfilled; and the earth produced of itself delicious food for them, since animals and plants were not yet in existence. Each pair of twins brought forth at the end of their life a pair exactly like them. As everybody did his duty and nothing else, there was no distinction between good and bad acts. But this state of things changed at the end of the Age; the first rain fell and trees grew up. These produced honey and whatever the primitive people desired. In the first tretāyuga, mankind consisted no longer of pairs of twins, but of men and women. Being now for the first time subject to cold and heat, they began to build houses, and they quarrelled about the miraculous trees. The trees, however, disappeared, and herbs became the food of men. Now trade was introduced, and personal property, unknown before, caused the social distinctions. Then Brahman established the four castes and the four *āśramas*, and fixed the duties peculiar to each of them. Afterwards he created spiritual sons, who were the ancestors of gods, demons, serpents, inhabitants of hell, etc.† At the end of the last kaliyuga of a kalpa, the heat of the sun becomes fierce and dries up the whole earth; and by it the three worlds are set on fire and consumed. At last enormous clouds appear and rain for hundreds of years, and deluge the whole world till the waters inundate heaven.‡ As the latter signs are frequently alluded to, in the form of similes in the Epics, etc., as occurring at the end of a yuga (instead of at the end of a kalpa), it is most probable that originally the yuga ended with the destruction, and consequently began with the creation of the world. A similar belief seems to have been expressed by the term 'kalpa,' but perhaps with this difference, that the concept of a yuga was intimately connected with the idea of the four stages through which mankind must pass, analogous to the four ages of man, viz. childhood, youth, adult life, and old age, while this idea was not necessarily implied in the concept of the kalpa. The combination of both these popular beliefs, with regard to the kalpa and the yuga, in the form described above, was probably due to the systematizing efforts of the Paurāṇikas.

There is still a third kind of long period, the *manvantara*, fourteen of which go to the kalpa. Each manvantara contains 71 mahāyugas, and 14 manvantaras are therefore equivalent to 994 (14 × 71) mahāyugas. The remainder of 6 mahāyugas required to make up the kalpa (= 1000 mahāyugas, *sup.* p. 200) is so distributed that the first manvantara is preceded by a dawn of the length of one kṛtayuga (= 0·4 mahāyuga), and each manvantara is followed by a twilight of equal length (15 × 0·4 = 6 mahāyugas). The twilight of the manvantara is, according to Sūrya Siddhānta, i. 18, a deluge (*jalaplava*). This artificial system of the manvantaras was probably introduced in order to account for the different patronymics of Manu, such as Vaivasvata, Svāyambhuva, Sāṁvaraṇa, which occur already in different Vedic works. These early caused a belief in the existence of several distinct Manus.* The Paurāṇikas systematized these notions as described. Since Manu was thought to have introduced the social and moral order of things, and to have played a part in the creation of gods and men, 'the seven Ṛṣis, certain (secondary) divinities, Indra, Manu, and the kings, his sons, are created and perish' in each manvantara;† and the details of these recurring events in each manvantara are given, *e.g.*, in the same Purāṇa.‡ Artificial as these manvantaras appear to be, still they are given as one of the five characteristic topics of the Purāṇa in a verse found in several Purāṇas.§ And the whole system of yugas, etc., is regarded as orthodox to such a degree that all the astronomical works, the Siddhāntas, have adopted them, except the Romaka Siddhānta, which for that reason is stigmatized as not orthodox.‖

The astronomical aspect of the yuga is that, in its commencement, sun, moon, and planets stood in conjunction in the initial point of the ecliptic, and returned to the same point at the end of the age. The popular belief on which this notion is based is older than Hindu astronomy.¶ The current yuga is the 457th of the present varāha-kalpa, or kalpa of the Boar, the 28th of the present manvantara (that of Manu Vaivasvata), which itself is the 7th of this kalpa. We are now in the kaliyuga, which began Feb. 17, B.C. 3102, the epoch of the still used era of the kaliyuga. At the end of the last tretāyuga lived Rāma, the son of Daśaratha, and at the end of the last dvāparayuga took place the great war of the Pāṇḍavas and Kauravas, described in the Mahābhārata.

A kalpa is called a day of Brahman, and his night is of equal length. At the close of the night he creates the world anew. Of such days and nights a year of Brahman is composed; and a hundred such years constitute his whole life. This longest period is called a *para*, half of which, a

* Cf. J. Muir, *Original Sanscrit Texts*[2], vol. i. p. 143 ff.
† Vāyu Purāṇa, i. 8. ‡ Viṣṇu Purāṇa, vi. 3 *al.*

* Cf. *SBE* xxv. p. lxiv f.
† Wilson, *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, i. p. 80.
‡ Wilson, *l.c.* iii. p. 1 ff.
§ Wilson, *l.c.*, Pref. p. vii, note 1.
‖ Thibaut, *Pañchasiddhāntikā*, Introd. p. xxviii.
¶ See *Actes du X. Congrès International des Orientalistes*, p. 104. For details of the astronomical use of the yugas, the reader is referred to the translation of the Sūrya Siddhānta, *JAOS* vi. p. 15 ff.

parārdha, had elapsed at the beginning of the present kalpa.*

The notions of the Buddhists about the Ages of the World (*yugas*) and about the larger periods (*kalpas*) are similar to those of the orthodox Hindus, but still more fanciful. The names of the four yugas are the same, but their arrangement is different. They begin with kaliyuga and go up to kṛtayuga,† and then, in reversed order, go down to kaliyuga.‡ Thus, instead of a mahāyuga of four Ages, the Buddhists assume a period of eight Ages, which is called an *antarakalpa*. An *antarakalpa* is 'the interval that elapses while the age of man increases from ten years to an *asaṅkheyya* (*asaṅkheyya* = $10{,}000{,}000^{20}$), and then decreases again to ten years; this period is of immense length.'§ According to some authorities, it has a length of 1,680,000 years.‖ Together with the age, the moral state of mankind increases and decreases. Twenty antarakalpas form one *asaṅkheyya kalpa* (Pali *asaṅkheyya kappa*), and four asaṅkhyeya kalpas constitute one *mahākalpa*. The first asaṅkhyeya kalpa is called *saṁvarta* (P. *saṁvaṭṭa*), during which a world or sphere (*chakravāla*, P. *cakkavāla*) is completely destroyed by fire, water, or wind. In the second (*saṁvartasthāyin*, P. *saṁvaṭṭaṭṭhāyin*) the state of void continues. In the third (*vivarta*, P. *vivaṭṭa*) the world is being built up again; and in the fourth (*vivartasthāyin*, P. *vivaṭṭaṭṭhāyin*) the world continues to exist.

It is during this last period that the world becomes first inhabited, by *ābhāsvara* gods of the Brahmaloka being born on earth. These self-luminous beings lost their lustre when they first began to feed on a delicious juice produced by the earth. They then created the sun, the moon, and the stars. While these beings gradually degenerated, the earth ceased to yield this first kind of food, and produced a kind of cream-like fungus. This was followed by a climbing plant, and this again by an extraordinary kind of rice. When this rice was used as food, sexual intercourse began. The rice deteriorated, and at last ceased to grow of itself. At the same time other vices were introduced, and personal property, till at last the present order of mankind was established.¶ Then comes the period of the twenty antarakalpas, described above. A hundred thousand years before the end of the mahākalpa, a god appears and warns mankind of the coming event, exhorting them to amend. And after that time the destruction of the earth—nay, of a billion of worlds or *chakravālas*—sets in by fire, water, or wind.** The mahākalpas are either empty (*śūnya*) kalpas—those in which there is no Buddha—or Buddha kalpas. The latter are of five kinds, *sāra-*, *maṇḍa-*, *vara-*, *sāramaṇḍa-*, and *bhadrakalpas*, according as one, two, three, four, or five Buddhas appear. The present kalpa is a bhadrakalpa; for four Buddhas have already appeared—Krakucchanda (Kakusandha), Kanakamuni (Koṇāgamana), Kāśyapa (Kassapa), and Gotama; and the fifth, Maitreya (Metteyya), has yet to come (see above, pp. 187–190).

The notions of the *Jainas* about the Ages of the World are not quite unlike, yet curiously different from, those described above. The Jainas liken time to a wheel with twelve spokes; the descending half of the wheel is called the *avasarpiṇī* period, the ascending half *utsarpiṇī*. Each half is divided into six Ages (*āra* = 'spoke'). The *āras* are, in avasarpiṇī, the following:—(1) suṣamasuṣamā, the duration of which is 400,000,000,000,000 oceans of years (*sāgaropamā*); (2) suṣamā, 300 billions of oceans of years; (3) suṣamaduṣamā, 200 billions of oceans of years; (4) duṣamasuṣamā, 100 billions of oceans of years, less 42,000 common years; (5) duṣamā, 21,000 years; (6) duṣamaduṣamā, likewise 21,000 years. The same Ages recur in the utsarpiṇī period, but in reversed order. In the first Age men lived three *palyas* or *palyopamās*, a long period not to be expressed in a definite number of years (one billion of palyas go to one ocean of years), and men grew to a height of three *gavyūtis*, a *gavyūti* being about two miles. Men were born in pairs, and each pair gave birth to a pair of twins, who married. There were ten kinds of miraculous trees (*kalpavṛkṣa*), which furnished men with all they wanted. The earth was as sweet as sugar, and the water as delicious as wine. This state of things continued through the first three Ages, but gradually age after age the length of life declined, and was only two *palyas* at the beginning of the second, and one *palya* at the beginning of the third Age, while correspondingly the height of the body diminished to two and one *gavyūti*. Furthermore, the power of the trees and the quality of earth and water deteriorated at the same rate. In the third Age the trees more slowly satisfied the wants of men, who therefore claimed them severally as personal property. Vimalavāhana was appointed to keep order among men, and he became the first patriarch (*kulakara*). The seventh patriarch, Nābhi, was the father of Ṛṣabha, who was anointed the first king, and who introduced the principal institutions of mankind. Ṛṣabha became the first *tīrthakara*, or prophet of the Jainas. His nirvāṇa occurred 3 years 8½ months before the end of the third Age. In the fourth Age the order of things was similar to the present one, except, of course, that everything gradually deteriorated with the lapse of time. The life of man lasted a krore of *pūrvas* (a *pūrva* = $8{,}400{,}000^2$ years) at the beginning, and diminished to a hundred years at the end of the Age; and, similarly, the height of men decreased from 2000 cubits to 7 cubits. 23 *tīrthakaras* were born in the fourth Age, the last of whom, Mahāvīra, died 3 years 8½ months before the beginning of the fifth Age, which began in B.C. 522. In the fifth and sixth Ages length of life will diminish down to 16 years, and the height of men to 1 cubit. There will be no *tīrthakaras* in the last two Ages of the avasarpiṇī period. In the succeeding utsarpiṇī period the same Ages will recur, but in reversed order. In this way an infinite number of avasarpiṇīs and utsarpiṇīs follow each other.*

The idea on which the notion of these periods seems to be based is apparently the year. The avasarpiṇī and utsarpiṇī correspond to the two *ayanas*, the southern and northern course of the sun; and the six *āras* of each period to the six months of the *ayana*.† On the other hand, the first three *āras*, with their pairs of twins, with the miraculous trees for their subsistence, much resemble the first kṛtayuga of the Purāṇas, while the remaining three *āras* may be compared to the tretā, dvāpara, and kali yugas. A peculiar feature of the Jaina system, however, is the great disparity in length between the last two Ages and the first four, while the relative length of the four yugas is reproduced in the *āras*, if we consider the fourth, fifth, and sixth *āras* as one.

On the whole, there is an unmistakable family likeness between the notions of the orthodox Hindus, the Buddhists, and the Jainas, as described above, though they have developed on different lines.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works referred to throughout this article, consult the Literature given at the end of the article AGES OF THE WORLD (Buddhist).

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* Wilson, *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, i. p. 53.
† *Utsarpaṇi yugas*; see Hardy, *Manual of Budhism*, p. 7.
‡ *Arpaṇi*, apparently for *avasarpiṇi*, *ib.*
§ Childers, *Pali Dictionary*, *s.v.* 'Kappa.'
‖ Burnouf, *Lotus de la bonne Loi*, p. 324 f.
¶ Hardy, *l.c.* p. 64 ff. ** Hardy, *l.c.* p. 26 ff.

* Hemacandra, *Ādīśvara-charitra*, 2. 113 ff.
† Cf. *SBE* xlv. p. 16, note 1.

AGES OF THE WORLD (Jewish).—**1.** The Heb. word *yôm* (יום), 'day,' is frequently applied in both Biblical and post-Biblical literature in a sense closely allied to that of an Age of the World. *Levit. Rab.* 19 and *Sanh.* 19, referring to Ps 90[4], say God's 'day' is a thousand years. Philo in *de Opificio Mundi*, i. 3, etc., treats 'the Days of Creation' as covering an epoch. He denies that the story of Genesis is to be taken literally as meaning an actual creation in six ordinary days. Creation was not in time: the six days described the arrangement or order of creation, much in the same sense as scientists talk of the geological orders. Midrash *Ber. Rab.* xii. deals with the time occupied in creation. 'The day of the Lord' (Mal 4[5]) 'that day' (היום ההוא, Zec 14[9]), 'the great day' (Mal 4[5]), 'the day of judgment,' 'the day of vengeance' (Jer 46[10]), 'the day of rebuke' (Hos 5[9]), are all expressions for the Last Judgment, sometimes covering the future world (עולם הבא) which will succeed it. יומנא, 'our day,' is used as a synonym for עולם הזה, 'this world' (Targum for 'days' in Ps 34[12]). 'The days of the kings' (Dn 2[44]) means the everlasting kingdom of the future world. 'The days of the Messiah' (*Sanh.* 99*a*) is used in the Talmud and Midrash for the Messianic Age; 'the days of the life of the world to come,' for the future world which follows. 'The day which is all Sabbath,' 'the day which is altogether good,' 'the day which is altogether long,' 'the day whereon the righteous sit with crowns upon their head and enjoy the splendour of the Divine presence,' are expressions in the Jewish Liturgy (in the grace after meat for Sabbaths and Festivals, especially Passover) which also connote the future world.

2. Before this world existed there had been successive creations (*Gen. Rab.* 1, *Ab. R.N.* xxxvii.). 'Seven things were created before the world was created, and these are they: the Law, Repentance, the Garden of Eden, Gehenna, the Throne of Glory, the Temple, and the Messiah's name' (*Pes.* 54*a*). There were 974 generations before Adam, which with the 26 generations between Adam and Moses make up a thousand (*Shab.* 88*b*, *Ḥag.* 13*b*, 14*a*). The Mishna discourages such cosmogonic speculations. 'Two together should not study the Creation nor even one the Chariot' (*Ḥag.* cap. ii.). The Gemārā *ad loc.* (*ib.* 11[b]) forbids inquiry into what was before the world was, basing this on the limitations of Dt 4[32].

3. In the Bible narrative there are traces of a Golden Age in the account of the Garden of Eden, where Adam dwelt till the Fall. As to the length of his sojourn the Rabbis differ. The Bible narrative presents some striking parallels to the Assyrian story, just as the post-Biblical does to Zarathushtrian speculations. But, as Goldziher points out in his *Mythology among the Hebrews*, even if its cosmogony had been derived from Iranian sources, it is an essential part of *their* system, whereas the Pentateuch makes no further use of it. It is notable that the later Jewish view is that *Gan Eden* (Paradise) will be the reward for good conduct after death. This is no devolution from a Golden to an Iron Age (for traces of which in Dn 2, see below), and no evolution in an opposite sense, but rather a sort of endless cycle; 'the thing that hath been, it is that which shall be' (Ec 1[9]).

4. The Pentateuch is almost exclusively concerned with the history of Israel, and the first age of persecution (afterwards known as a גָּלוּת, *gālūth*, or 'captivity') is that of Egypt. According to Gn 15[13], Abraham's seed is to be afflicted 400 years. In Jg 11[26] a period of 300 years is given as the interval between the Exodus and Jephthah, during which the children of Israel were left in undisturbed possession of the other side of the Jordan. In 1 K 6[1] the period between the Exodus and the building of the Temple is fixed at 480 years.

5. The Prophets, before the Assyrian captivity, are concerned only with the immediate future. They deal with practical politics, and warn the people to repent in view of disasters that are imminent. The Day of the Lord, which in the post-captivity literature of the Bible becomes the Day of Judgment, occurs already in Amos (5[16-20]), the earliest of the later prophets, as well as in Isaiah (cf. W. R. Smith, *Proph.* 131 f.).

6. In the post-exilic literature of the Bible we first meet with a distinct promise of an ultimate, not immediate, Messianic Age, in which all wrongs will be righted. The return under Zerubbabel had proved a disappointment. The autonomy of the Jews had not been satisfactorily re-established. The Jews did not occupy their proper position in the world. The people were dissatisfied with their leaders, and thus the notion of an ideal Messiah rather than a political one seems to have become evolved. Zechariah (ch. 14), when he proclaims: 'One day which shall be known to the Lord, not day, nor night . . . there shall be no more the Canaanite in the house of the Lord of Hosts,' represents a Messianic Age distant but sure. Malachi is much more practical. He preaches against the sins of his day, but even he does not threaten with immediate disaster. His 'day that I [the Lord] do make' (Mal 4[3])—the great and dreadful day of the Lord (4[5])—is the Day of Judgment, and here first is Elijah the prophet promised as a precursor of that day. Daniel is written in a different spirit. Despite its mysticism, it is a political pamphlet. It is almost certainly late, and intended to encourage those who were suffering under the Syrian oppression. Ben Sira is perhaps earlier. He, too, prays for redemption (ch. 36), and, like some of the Psalms and post-exilic prophets, looks forward to the Kingdom of God. The Apocalyptic literature, of which Enoch is certainly, and the Book of Jub. is perhaps, pre-Christian, is overweighted by the gloomy events of the time. The Messianic Age is increasingly needed, and national impatience insists on fixing its date.

7. The destruction of Jerusalem gave a mighty impetus to apocalyptic literature. The era of Messiahs and Prophets produced such men as Theudas in B.C. 44, under Fadus; 'the Egyptian' was another such under Felix; under Hadrian appeared Bar Cochba 'the Son of the Star,' who persuaded even an 'Aḳiba to join him in insensate revolt against Rome; and so on through a long succession of pseudo-Messiahs down to Sabbatai Zebi (whose advent in the mystic year 1666 caused such excitement both in and out of Jewry), and even to Mari Shooker Kohail, an impostor who so lately as 1870 excited wild hopes among some Arabian Jews of Aden. The Diaspora seemed to lay stress on individual rather than national hopes of reward and punishment after death. But Messianic hopes are traceable even in Philo, who looks to a future re-assembly of the Diaspora in Palestine, and echoes of this view are to be met with in the 4th *Eclogue* of Vergil. The Kingdom of God and His people (see Ps 145[11], Wis 10[10]) is of the future (cf. Is 52[7], Mic 4[4], Zec 14[9]). Contrast the national view of Is 24[23], 'The Lord of Hosts shall reign in Mount Zion, and in Jerusalem,' with the universalistic concept of *Orac. Sib.* iii. 767, 'His everlasting Kingdom shall be over all creatures,' and the Jewish Liturgy for the New Year and Atonement, 'all works shall fear thee . . . joy to thy land . . . shining light to the Son of Jesse thine anointed . . . when thou makest the dominion of Arrogance to pass away from the earth' (Singer's *Prayer Book*, 239). But such universalistic ideas are comparatively rare. God's

Kingdom is also that of His people (Dn 2^{44} 7^{27}). And this idea prevails throughout the Jewish apocalyptic writings, *e.g.* Assump. Mos., Enoch (Eth. and Slav.), 4 Ezra: God's enemies, whole peoples, will be previously destroyed. It is perhaps based on Ezekiel's Vision of Gog and Magog (38 and 39) as the first prophecy of this stage. After this world-war comes the Judgment (Jl 3^{12}). Meantime the people of Israel will be hidden away in safety (Is 26^{20}, Zec 14^{5}, Apoc. Bar 29^{2}, and Mk 13^{14-20}). The precursors of the Messiah are Elijah (Mal 4^{5}, Sir 48^{10-12}, *Orac. Sib.* ii., *Edujoth*, viii. 7), Moses (Dt 18^{15}), Enoch (Gn 5^{24}, Eth. Enoch). The Messianic Kingdom is predominatingly particularistic. The Diaspora will be reunited, Jerusalem rebuilt, the heathen converted.

8. In the Apocalyptic literature, and first in Daniel, we get the universalist idea of 'this world' and 'the next' as parallel to the tribal idea of the Present Age and the Messianic Age. The Æon of עולם הוה (ὁ νῦν αἰών, 1 Ti 6^{17}) is 5000 years in Assump. Mos.; 10,000 in Eth. En 16^{1} 18^{16} 21^{6}, Jub 1^{29}; 7000 in *Sanh.* 97*a*, where R. Katina says the world will last 6000 years and in the seventh will be destroyed; of the 6000, 2000 years are 'Tohu' (chaos), 2000 Torah, and 2000 Messianic. This theory is based on the 6 days of Creation. 'As the sabbatical year is remitted once in 7 years, so is the world remitted 1 chiliasm in 7' (cf. Bacher, *Agada der Tannaiten*, i. 139 ff. [2nd ed. 133 ff.]).

Daniel's theory of year-weeks (ch. 9) is based on the 70 of Jer 25^{12} 29^{10}. (The Babylonian year was divided into 72 weeks of 5 days each). Daniel's 4 metals (ch. 2) and his 4 great beasts (7^{3}) seem based on the classical conception of this world's division into the Gold, Silver, Bronze, and Iron Ages. Eth. Enoch also divides the period of the 70 shepherds into 4 ages ('*cursus alter*' is divided into 4 *horæ*, meaning perhaps 4 Roman Emperors).

9. The division into 7 millenniums for the duration of 'this world' is made in Eth. Enoch, Test. Abr., R. Katina (*Sanh.* 97*a*). The preceding tribulations of the Messiah are to last 7 years, says R. Simeon ben Jochai (*Der. Eretz zut.* 10). In $3\frac{1}{2}$ periods (Dn 12^{7}) 'all these things shall be finished.' 4 Ezra divides the world into 12 portions. All these figures, 4, 7, ½, 70 (72), and 12 have an astronomical basis, and correspond to the seasons, the days of the week, the weeks of the Babylonian year, and the signs of the Zodiac.

10. The mathematical determination of the end of 'this world' and the beginning of the next was eventually discarded by the Rabbis after all such calculations had proved false. 'Rab says, All the terms (קצין) have ceased, and the matter resteth only upon repentance and good works' (*Sanh.* 97*b*, cf. Am 5^{18}). Before God renews His world (מחדש עולמו), the Messianic Age will come. It is interpolated between this world and the next. The time of Messianic tribulations (חבלי משיח) is the precursor of the change of Æon. Men will be weaker (4 Ezr 5^{54-55}). They will suffer terrible diseases (*Orac. Sib.* iii. 538), children will be born with white hair (Jub 23^{25}), women will be barren (*Orac. Sib.* ii. 164). Fields will not fructify (4 Ezr 6^{23}), poverty and famine will prevail (Eth. En 99^{5}, Apoc. Bar 27), universal war will rage (4 Ezr 9^{3}), the wise shall be silent and fools shall speak (Apoc. Bar 70^{5}). Then will come the Judgment (יום הדין), when God will weigh sins and virtues, but even here the Messiah, Prince of Peace, emerges (Apoc. Bar 29 and 73); and after all this travail the time of the Messiah shall be revealed, though He is here no longer the national hero but the renewer of Paradise, the restorer of the Golden Age. Next will follow the Resurrection of the Dead (Is 26^{19}). God will destroy death (Dn 12^{2} 'Many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake'). En 51^{1-5}, 4 Ezr 7^{32}, and Apoc. Bar 50^{2} point to a universal resurrection. Others limit this to the righteous (*Test. of Judah*, xxv., cf. Jos. *Ant.* xviii. § 14 [ed. Niese]). The Rabbis throughout their literature rebuke the scepticism of the Sadducees who deny this dogma (*Sanh.* xi. 1: 'He hath no portion in the world to come who denies that the Resurrection of the Dead is in the Torah'). The righteous obtain eternal life (חיי עולם, *Baba Bathra* 11*a*). After the Resurrection comes the Renewal of the World. Is 65^{17} foretells the creation of 'new heavens and a new earth'; Jub 1^{29} speaks of the New Creation; *Mekhilta* 51*b* on Ex 16^{25} describes this עולם חדש, 'the new world.'

11. The discordance of ideas between the earthly Paradise of the Messianic Kingdom and the transcendental New Jerusalem induced a belief in an interregnum (cf. Eth. En 91). The Ages of the World are 10 weeks; the 8th, that of the sword and rebuilding of Jerusalem, is the Messianic period. The 9th and 10th are those of the Last Judgment, at the end of which comes the New Creation. In the Apocalypse of John (ch. 20) this Messianic interregnum is to last 1000 years, whence the Christian doctrine of the Chiliasm (cf. *Orac. Sib.* iii., 4 Ezra, and Apoc. of Baruch). In 4 Ezr 7^{28} the Messianic period lasts 400 years, after which Christ returns to heaven, and the general Resurrection follows.

In the Talmud the Messianic period is to last a 'fixed time (*Zebaḥim* 118*b*, *Arakhin* 13*b*, *Pes.* 68*a*). Periods mentioned are 40, 70, 365, 400, 1000, and 2000 years. Only Ben Zoma in *Ber.* i. 5 contrasts this world with the Days of the Messiah. But in the 2nd cent. a clear distinction is drawn between the Days of the Messiah and the Future World (cf. *Shab.* 151*b*, *Pes.* 68*b*, *Sanh.* 91*b*, *Ber.* 34*b*). The Samaritan Messiah, Ta'eb, dies 'after a long reign.' 'All the prophets,' say R. Chijja bar Abba and R. Jochanan, 'prophesied only as to the days of the Messiah, but, as for the Future World, no eye but thine, O Lord, hath seen it' (*Ber.* 34*b*).

Maimonides in his *Yemen Epistle* gives the following order: Resurrection, Future World, Death, and a second Resurrection. In his *Moreh* II, 29, and 30 he endeavours to prove that the world is eternal, and in his *Mishne Torah* on 'Repentance' (8) he declares that the future world is already existent. Nachmanides (in his *Torath Adam*, 'Reward and Punishment,' שער הגמול) and the Raabad dispute this, and declare that Gn 8^{22} 'while the earth remaineth' suggests its destruction. The world is to return to *tohu bohu* (chaos), and the Almighty will renew it. So too Azaria de Rossi (*Meor Enayim*, xliv. 54). When Ecclesiastes says (1[4]) 'the world abideth for ever,' he only means the world Jubilee. Bahya ben Asher in his Com. on Lv 25^{2}, 'then shall the land keep a Sabbath unto the Lord,' takes this to support the view of the Qabbālā as referring to the destruction of the world (חד חריב). The rest eternal is the future world after the Resurrection. In Lv 25^{8}, 'seven times seven years,' the second seven 'hints' (רמז) at the Great Jubilee, which is the end of the world. The Qabbālā, though the idea predominates therein of the world-wheel (*gilgal*), implying the endless recurrence of all things, is directed less to time than to space. The notion of space is older than that of time. Even beasts distinguish things by their space. The discrimination of things by time does not follow till relatively late. But even the mysticism of the Qabbālā has a bearing on the Jewish view of the future life. It is, without doubt, Christologically tinged, and, though highly venerated by the Eastern Jews, is practically neglected nowadays by those of the West.

In the *Zohar* on Gn 26^{1} it is said that Adam should have lived 1000 years, but gave up 70 for David (alluding to Ps 21^{4}).

12. Bible chronology has always presented difficulties. The discrepancies between the chronology of the Massoretic and Samaritan texts and the Septuagint are dealt with by Dr. Jacob of Göttingen. He explains one chief variation as due to a desire to date Noah exactly 1000 years after Adam. *Pirqe Aboth* (v. 2, ed. Taylor) draws attention to the fact that there were ten generations from Adam to Noah, and ten from Noah to Abraham. The chronology of Genesis would seem to have been based on years according to the solar system, but the Jews reverted to the lunar system after the Exodus, as seen from Ex 12^{14}.

13. The conservative Jewish view is still expressed in the following passages in its Liturgy. The 12th Creed expresses belief 'in the coming of the Messiah, and, though he tarry, I will wait

daily for his coming'; the 13th, 'that there will be a resurrection of the dead at the time when it shall please the Creator' (Singer's *Prayer Book*, p. 90); in the *Qaddish* (*ib.* p. 37), 'May he establish his Kingdom in your days . . . speedily!' (cf. *Orac. Sib.* iii. 767). In the Sabbath Morning's Service (*ib.* p. 129) the following antitheses bring out Jewish belief in the four cosmic stages or Ages of the World: 'There is none to be compared unto thee, O Lord our God, in this world, neither is there any beside thee, O our King, for the life of the world to come; there is none but thee, O our Redeemer, for the days of the Messiah; neither is there any like unto thee, O our Saviour, for the resurrection of the dead.'

LITERATURE.—Bacher, *Agada der Tannaiten*, vol. I. 1884; Bousset, *Rel. d. Judentums*[2], 1906, pt. iv. pp. 233–346 (cf. the list of authorities cited by him); Schürer, *GJV*[3], ii. 496–556; R. H. Charles, *A Crit. Hist. of the Doct. of a Future Life in Israel*, London, 1899; Loewy, 'Messiaszeit and Zukünftige Welt' in *MGWJ*, 1897, 392–409; *Sanh.* c. 11; Maimonides, אגרת תימן, *Yemen Epistle*; Nachmanides, *Torath Adam*, 'Sha'ar Ha Gemul'; Maimonides, *Guide to the Perplexed*, ii. 29, 30, also his *Mishne Torah*, *Hilchot Teshubôh*, viii.; Azaria di Rossi, *Meor Enayim*, xliv. 54; Lipschütz, *Mishna*, תפארת ישראל; An Excursus on the Future Life (based on *Nezikin*).

E. N. ADLER.

AGES OF THE WORLD (Muhammadan).—See COSMOGONY (Muhammadan).

AGES OF THE WORLD (Teutonic).—See COSMOGONY (Teutonic).

AGES OF THE WORLD (Zoroastrian).—1. By far the most detailed account of Iranian cosmology is afforded by the Pahlavi *Bûndahishn*, a work which, though dating in its present form from the post-Muhammadan period, undoubtedly contains material of far greater antiquity. According to it, Aûharmazd (Ormazd) 'produced spiritually the creatures which were necessary for those means [his complete victory over evil], and they remained three thousand years in a spiritual state, so that they were unthinking [or invulnerable] and unmoving, with intangible bodies' (i. 8). . . . 'And Aûharmazd spoke to the evil spirit thus: "Appoint a period, so that the intermingling of the conflict may be for nine thousand years." For he knew that by appointing this period the evil spirit would be undone. Thus the evil spirit, unobservant and through ignorance, was content with that agreement; just like two men quarrelling together, who propose a time thus: "Let us appoint such-and-such a day for a fight." Aûharmazd also knew this, through omniscience, that within these nine thousand years, for three thousand years everything proceeds by the will of Aûharmazd, three thousand years there is an intermingling of the wills of Aûharmazd and Aharman, and the last three thousand years the evil spirit is disabled, and the adversary is kept away from the creatures' (i. 18–20, West's tr.). Then Ahura Mazda (Pahlavi *Aûharmazd*) recited the *Ahunavar*, and exhibited to the evil spirit his own triumph in the end; the evil spirit, perceiving his own impotence and the annihilation of the demons, became confounded and remained three thousand years in confusion, that is, the second trimillennium of time. During the confusion of the evil spirit, Ahura Mazda created Good Thought (Pahlavi *Vohûman*), as well as the five other archangels. Ahriman (wh. see) produced in opposition to them six corresponding evil powers. Of the creatures of the world Ahura Mazda produced first, the sky (and the light of the world); second, water; third, earth; fourth, plants; fifth, animals; and sixth, mankind (*ib.* i. 21–28). The spirits of men, their *fravashis* and their consciousness, had already been created in the beginning. Now Ormazd deliberated with them, asking them if they would assume a bodily form in order to contend with the fiend Ahriman, and in the end become wholly immortal and perfect for ever, whereupon they consented (ii. 10–11). According to the third chapter, the confounding of the evil spirit and his demons was due to 'the righteous man,' a phrase which doubtless designates Gayamaretan (Pahlavi *Gâyômarṭ*), the primeval man, who existed undisturbed, during the same second trimillennium, with the primeval ox.

The evil spirit now rushed into creation, and the seventh millennium, or the third trimillennium, began. The elements, the primeval ox, and the primeval man were successively attacked by the Evil One. But the appointed time for Gayamaretan had not yet arrived. He lived and ruled for thirty years more, although the destroyer had come (iii. 22 f.). Attacked by Ahriman, the ox fell to the right; from his body and his limbs the plants were produced, and the animals from his seed (iv. 1, x. 1–3, xiv. 1–3).* Gaya-maretan fell on the left side in passing away, and from one portion of his seed received by the earth the first human couple, Mâshya and Mâshyôî, grew up for forty years as a plant, and were then changed into the shape of a man and a woman (iv. 1, xv. 1–5). The history of mankind, which then began, occupies the second half of the 12,000 years.

The 34th chapter of the original *Bûndahishn* sums up the first two trimillenniums of the creation as follows: 'Time was for twelve thousand years; and it says in revelation, that three thousand years was the duration of the spiritual state, where the creatures were unthinking, unmoving, and intangible; and three thousand years was the duration of Gâyômarṭ, with the ox, in the world.' Those three millenniums are immediately connected with three of the constellations of the zodiac: Cancer, Leo, and Virgo.

The first millennium of the human race is distributed as follows in the same chapter:—

Gâyômarṭ, 30 years.
Mâshya and *Mâshyôî* growing up during 40 years (*Bûnd.* 15. 2).
" " living without desire for intercourse, 50 years.
" " living as husband and wife, 93 years, until
Hôshyang (Av. *Haoshyangha*), great-grandson of Mâshya, came, 40 years (and six months, according to Windischmann).
Takhmôrup (Av. *Takhma-urupa*; Shâh-nâmah *Tahmûras*), great grandson of Hôshyang, 30 years.
Yim (Av. *Yima*; Shâh-nâmah *Jamshîd*), brother of Takhmôrup, 616 years and six months, until the divine power or glory of the Iranian rulers left him, in the shape of a bird, because he took pleasure in words of falsehood and error (*Yasht*, xix. 34), and made himself something more than a man.
Then he lived in concealment for 100 years.
Total, 999 years and six months (or 1000 years).

The next millennium, the second of human history, and the eighth of the creation, was under the sway of Dahâk, whose lineage on his mother's side is traced, by *Bûnd.* xxxi. 6, nine degrees from the evil spirit himself. Dahâk is the Azhi Dahâka, the dragon with three heads, of the Avesta, who tried to seize the kingly power-substance, the *khwarenah*, as it left Yima, who had become too proud owing to his happy paradise-reign; but Atar, the fire, saved it (*Yasht*, xix. 47 ff.).

According to another tradition in the same *Yasht* (xix. 35), the *khwarenah*, in leaving Yima, went in three parts: one to Mithra; the second to Thraêtaona, who killed the dragon Azhi Dahâka; and the third to Keresâspa, the great hero, who is to be the successful adversary of the dragon at the end of the time. Those three guardians of the 'kingly glory' are regarded as succeeding each other, so that Mithra preserves it during the reign of the fiend, until Thraêtaona comes—as, in the other version, just mentioned, Atar is said to save the kingly glory, which takes refuge in the waters of the sea Vouru-Kasha.

After the millennium of Dahâk, who is assigned

* The twenty-seventh chapter of the *Bûndahishn* presupposes the existence of plants before the attack of the fiend: 'It says in revelation, that, before the coming of the destroyer, vegetation had no thorn and bark about it.'

by *Bûnd.* xxxiv. 5 to Scorpio, the sovereignty devolved on Frêṭûn, the Thraêtaona of the Avesta, the Frîdûn of the Shâh-nâmah, who killed the terrible usurper and introduced the third millennium of mankind and of the third trimillennium of creation. This millennium is assigned by the *Bûndahishn* to Sagittarius, and contains the names of the heroic legends of ancient Irân. The *Bûndahishn* makes the following calculation (xxxiv. 6–7) :—

Frêṭûn, contemporary of the 12 years of Airîc, 500 years.
Mânûshcihar (Av. *Manushcithra*), contemporary of the Turanian adversary Frâsiyâb, the Franhrasyan of the Avesta, who made Mânûshcihar and the Iranians captive in the mountain-range Padashkhvâr, south of the Caspian, 120 years.
Zôb, Aûzôbô (Av. *Uzava;* Shâh-nâmah *Zav*), grandson of Mânûshcihar, expelled Frâsiyâb from Iran, and reigned 5 years ; adopted
Kaî-Kabâṭ (Av. *Kavi Kavâta*), founder of the most renowned royal race of Iran, the Kavis, who retained the *khwarenah*, the spiritual substance of the kingship of Irân, during several generations, 15 years.
Kaî-Kâûs (Av. *Kavi Usadhan*), grandson of Kaî-Kabâṭ, 150 years.
His grandson Kaî-Khûsrâv (Av. *Kavi Husravah*), who was received into heaven without death, 60 years.
Kaî-Lôrâsp (Av. *Kavi Aurvat-aspa*), 120 years ; and his son
Kaî-Vishtâsp (Av. *Kavi Vishtâspa*), the protector of Zarathushtra, until the coming of the religion, 30 years.
Total, 1000 years.

So far the last chapter of the *Bûndahishn*. It accordingly gives only a short chronology of the millennium of the Zarathushtrian faith,—ruled by Capricorn,—in which period the present generation is thought to live. After the coming of religion it reckons (xxiv. 7–9) :—

For the Achæmenians . . .	258	years.
„ Alexander	14	„
„ the Ashkânians (Arsacides) .	284	„
„ the Sasanians	460	„
Total	1016	„

Then the sovereignty is said to have fallen to the Arabs (cf. the somewhat older list of the Iranian kings in the Mandæan *Ginzâ* ; Louis H. Gray, 'The Kings of Early Irân according to the *Sidrâ Rabbâ*,' in *ZA*, xix. 272 ff.).

In this chronological table the successors of Alexander and the Parthian kingdom until Ardashîr, the founder of the Sasanian dynasty, occupy only 284 years, instead of at least 547. On the other hand, the Sasanians have too many, 460 years instead of 425 or 427. This double mistake is perhaps unintentional. Although the total of the historical chronology is thus shortened by the writer of *Bûndahishn*, xxxiv., the millennium should be finished and the expected Saviour should have come, as we have seen, sixteen years before the Arabs. This millennium, which must contain the whole history since the revelation to Zarathushtra, has been a puzzle to the Zarathushtrians. The *Bahman Yasht* (Pahlavî), which has, in its present form, a complicated literary history behind it, shows the difficulty caused by the old traditional statement of the sacred writings that a son of the prophet should be born in a supernatural way and appear a thousand years after the beginning of the new dispensation. The popular belief awaited rather a valiant warrior, Bahram Varjâvand, the Iranian Messiah. Indeed, we read in the Pahlavi *Bahman Yasht*, iii. 44 ('Pahlavi Texts,' tr. by E. W. West, *SBE* v. p. 231) : 'Regarding Hûshêṭar it is declared that he will be born in 1600.' This must mean 1600 years after Zarathushtra. That is 600 years too late—but it brings us only to the beginning of the 13th cent. A.D., according to the traditional Zarathushtrian chronology. (See the introduction of E. W. West to his tr. of *Bahman Yasht* ; and Bousset, 'Beiträge zur Gesch. der Eschatologie' in *Ztschr. f. Kirchengesch.*, xx. 122 ff. ; N. Söderblom, *La Vie future*, 271 ff. ; and art. Eschatology [Parsi]).

It is evident, as E. W. West has pointed out in his most important introduction to vol. v. of his tr. of Pahlavi Texts (*SBE* xlvii.), that this system of chronology must have been made before the year that should finish the millennium of the actual history of mankind after Zarathushtra. The first revelation to the prophet being dated by the Pahlavi tradition 300 years before Alexander, or about 630 B.C., that means about 370 A.D.

Amongst other statements and calculations to be found in Pahlavi writings about the first thousand years of the last or fourth trimillennium, besides the short notice at the end of the *Bûndahishn*, two have an interest for our present purpose.

(1) The period of mankind being fixed at 6000 years, Zarathushtra, who was born thirty years before the end of the former 3000 years, and whose first intercourse with the celestial beings begins the second trimillennium, makes his appearance in the middle of human history. According to the *Sad Dar*, lxxxi. 4–5, it is declared in revelation that the Creator spoke to Zarathushtra thus (*SBE* xxiv. 345) :

'I have created thee at the present time, in the middle period ; for it is three thousand years from the days of Gâyômard till now, and from now till the resurrection are the three thousand years that remain. . . . For whatever is in the middle is more precious and better and more valuable, . . . as the heart is in the middle of the whole body, . . . and as the land of Irân is more valuable than other lands, for the reason that it is in the middle.'

(2) The *Dînkarṭ*, ix. 8, a compilation of the 9th cent., renders the contents of the seventh *fargarṭ* of the now lost *Sûṭkar Nask* of the Sasanian Avesta thus (*SBE* xxxvii. 181) :

'The seventh *fargarṭ* is about the exhibition to Zaratûsht of the nature of the four periods in the millennium of Zaratûsht. First, the golden, that in which Aûharmazd displayed the religion to Zaratûsht. Second, the silver, that in which Vishtâsp received the religion from Zaratûsht. Third, the steel, the period within which the organizer of righteousness, Âtûrpâṭ, son of Mâraspend, was born [or Adarbâd, the great champion of orthodoxy in the 4th cent., who offered to undergo the ordeal of pouring molten brass on his chest in order to prove the truth of the Mazdayasnian faith]. Fourth, the period mingled with iron is this, in which there is much propagation of the authority of the apostate and other villains, as regards the destruction of the reign of religion, the decay of every kind of goodness and virtue, and the disappearance of honour and wisdom from the countries of Irân.'

It is not possible to say how much of this account belonged to the text of the *Sûṭkar Nask* and what is taken from its 'Zend' (its translation and Pahlavi paraphrase, used by the compiler). The events described need not come down later than the time after the death of the great Shâhpûhr II. in 379. His grandson Yazdgard I. (399–420) was called by the priests the 'sinner' because of his tolerance in quarrels about religion. At all events, it is scarcely likely that the whole scheme of the four [Metal] Ages, known in India, Greece, Rome, etc., should have been wholly introduced by the Pahlavi paraphrase. In the Pahlavi *Bahman Yasht*, i. 6, it is expressly said that the appearance of the accursed Mazdîk [the heretic who flourished during the reign of Kôbâd (488–531), and who was put to death by his son Khûsrô Nôshîrsân] during 'this time' (the Iron Age), is mentioned in the lost Zend commentary on three *Yashts* of the Avesta, although the two of these three *Yashts* still extant (the Avesta *Bahman Yasht* being lost) do not contain anything about the matter.

In the same context of the Pahlavi *Bahman Yasht* the historical standpoint is a later one than in the *Dînkarṭ's* rendering of *Sûṭkar Nask*, and three of the four Ages are applied to other epochs. That of Gold means the conversation of Ahura Mazda and his prophet, and King Vishtâspa's acceptance of the religion. That of Silver is the reign of the Kayanian *Arṭakhshîr*, generally identified with Artaxerxes Longimanus (465–424)—perhaps including the reigns of Xerxes II., Darius II., and Artaxerxes Mnemon (404–358). That of Steel is the reign of the glorified Khûsrô, son of Kôbâd (531–579), the greatest of the Sasanians, during whose reign the Pahlavi literature flourished (F. Justi in *Grundriss der iran. Philologie*, ii. 539). In ii. 21–22 there is allusion to the great merit of the Steel Age king : 'when he keeps away from this religion the accursed Mazdîk. . . . And that which was mixed with iron is the reign of the demons with dishevelled hair of the race of Wrath, when it is the end of the ten-hundredth winter of thy millennium, O Zaratûsht, the Spîtâmân !' The speaker is Ormazd.

In another passage of our Pahlavi commentary or paraphrase of the *Bahman Yasht* (ii. 15–22) the Metal Ages are increased to seven. Zarathushtra had seen in a dream a tree with seven branches ; one golden, ore of silver, one bronze, one of copper, one of tin, one of steel, and one mixed up with iron. The Lord explains the dream thus : The seven branches are the seven periods to come. The Golden one means the reign of King Vishtâsp ; that of Silver is the reign of Arṭashîr the Kayân (= Artaxerxes Longimanus) ; the Bronze Age represents the first two Sasanian monarchs, Arṭashîr (226–241) and his son Shâhpûhr I. (241–227), and the restorer of true religion, Âtarô-pât Mâraspand ('with the prepared brass'), under Shâhpûhr II. (309–379). The Copper Age is evidently out of its order, as it puts us back from the Sasanian dynasty to the Parthians, to 'the reign of the Ashkânian king' [we do not know which] who removes from the world the heterodoxy which existed ; while the wicked *Akandgar-i Kilisyâkîh* [probably = 'Alexander the Christian,' an anachronism that need not surprise us on the part of a Pahlavi writer, who identifies the two great enemies of the Mazdayasnian faith coming from the West (Alexander the Great and

the Christian Roman empire)] is utterly destroyed by this religion, and passes unseen and unknown from the world. The Tin Age brings us to the powerful Sasanian monarch, Bahrâm v. (420–438), 'when he makes the spirit of pleasure and joy manifest, and Aharman with the wizards [*i.e.* the heretics] rushes back to darkness and gloom.' The Steel Age represents the persecutor of Mazdîk, King Khûsrô, and the one mixed with Iron is characterized as in the first chapter.

As we have seen, the four original Ages are the same, but between the Silver one (= Artaxerxes I. and II.) and the Steel one (= Khûsrô Anoshirvan) three supplementary periods are intercalated. The Copper Age is out of place, and should probably be put before the Bronze Age. The number four is thus changed into seven.

At the end of Zarathushtra's millennium Ukhshyatereta (Pahlavi *Hûshêṭar*), 'the one who makes piety grow,' shall be born, in a marvellous way, from the prophet's seed. When thirty years old, he enters on his ministry to restore the religion (*Bûndahishn*, xxxii. 8; *Bahman Yasht*, iii. 44; *Dînkarṭ*, vii. 8, 51–60). The second millennium of the post-Zarathushtrian trimillennium begins. In the 5th cent. of that millennium (*Dînkarṭ*, vii. 9, 3 [*SBE* xlvii. 108]) the wizard Mahrkûsh, mentioned in an extant fragment (*Westergaard*, viii. 2) of the Avesta as Mahrkûsha, will appear for seven years, and produce a terrible winter, that will, 'within three winters and in the fourth,' destroy the greater part of mankind and of animals.

Those winters are mentioned in the second *fargarṭ* of the *Vendîdâd* without the name of Mahrkûsha, the demon or the wizard of frost and snow. Yima, the paradise-king, is told by Ormazd to prepare an enclosure, a *vara*, and to live in it himself with a chosen host of men, animals, plants, and fires, in order to be preserved during the winters that will invade the earth.

When in Hûshêtar's millennium the enclosure made by Yima is opened, mankind and animals will issue from it and arrange the world again, and there will be a time of fulness and prosperity (*Dînkarṭ*, vii. 9, 3 f.; *Mainôg-î Khraṭ*, xxvii. 27–31). New beings thus come back miraculously for the restoration of the world (*Dâṭistân-î Dînîk*, xxxvii. 95 [*SBE* xviii. 109–110]).

A thousand years after Hûshêtar, a second son of Zarathushtra will be born, Ukhshyatnemah, 'he who makes the prayer grow' (Pahlavi *Hushêṭarmâh*). When thirty years old, he will confer with the archangels. That is the beginning of the last millennium of the world (*Bûndahishn*, xxxii. 8; *Dînkarṭ*, vii. 9, 18–23). After its end the third miraculous son of the prophet shall be born in the same way by a third virgin, pregnant from the water of the lake Kansava, which holds the seed of Zarathushtra (*Bûndahishn*, xxxii. 8; *Dînkarṭ*, vii. 10, 15–18).

The usual translation of his name *Astvat-ereta*, 'he who raises the [dead] bodies,' seems very unlikely. The second part of the name, *ereta*, which means in the name of the first son of the prophet 'righteousness,' being the Iranian equivalent of the Skr. *ṛta* (which appears otherwise in the Avesta as *asha*), would then be a verbal form in the third name. More probable is Bartholomæ's rendering (*Altiran. Wörterbuch*, col. 215), 'he who is the personified righteousness' or 'piety.' But the analogy with the former two names: *Ukhshyat-ereta* and *Ukhshyat-nemah*, makes one think that the first half also of this third name is a verbal form, an act. particip. of *stav-*, 'to praise,' with a preceding *ā*. If, indeed, the initial *a* were long, the name might be translated, 'he who praises righteousness.'

More frequently the third expected restorer of religion is called *Saoshyant* 'the saviour,' 'the helper,' originally and generally in the Avesta an appellative applied to the zealous Mazdayasnians and promoters of religion.

Now the last conflict breaks out; resurrection and purification open the way to eternal blissful existence. The time preceding the coming of the three restorers of faith will be marked by misery and impiety (*Spend Nask*, according to *Dînkarṭ*, viii. 14, 11 ff.). We recall the four Ages that mark a successive deterioration in Zarathushtra's millennium. The Pahlavi apocalyptics paint the time before Hûshêtar's coming in dreadful colours borrowed from history. At the end of the last thousand years Azhi Dahâka will break his fetters But, on the other hand, the end of those three Ages is described as an advance towards the glorious consummation (*Dînkarṭ*, ix. 41, 4–8). We have seen how the opening of the gate of Yima's enclosure will produce a new prosperity before Hushêṭar-mâh's appearance. After the 5th cent. of Hûshêtar's millennium two-thirds of the population of Irân are righteous and one-third wicked (*Dînkarṭ*, vii. 9, 13). In the last millennium 'no one passes away, other than those whom they smite with a scaffold weapon, and those who pass away from old age. When fifty-three years of that millennium of his still remain, the sweetness and oiliness of milk and vegetables are so perfect, that, on account of the freedom of mankind from desire for meat, they shall leave off the eating of meat, and their food becomes milk and vegetables. When three years remain, they shall leave off even the drinking of milk, and their (food and drink become water and vegetables' (*Dînkarṭ*, vii. 10, 7 ff.). The milk of one cow shall be sufficient for a thousand men. As hunger and thirst diminish, men shall be satisfied with one meal every third day. Old age shall not be weak any more and life shall become longer. Humility and peace shall be multiplied in the world.

The Greeks were acquainted with the optimistic Mazdayasnian doctrine of the spiritualizing of mankind towards the end. Men, at the end of the world, will need no food, and they will cast no shadow (Theopompus-Plutarch). The eighteenth *fargarṭ* of the *Varshtmânsar Nask* of the Sasanian Avesta told, according to *Dînkarṭ*, ix. 41, 4, 'about the triumph of the sacred beings over the demons at the end' of the three last periods of the world.

These 12,000 years form the long period of creation, divided into four great Ages. It is bounded by eternity on both sides, by 'time without end.' The 'Great,' or 'Iranian,' *Bûndahishn*, which appears to be a later development of the more commonly known *Bûndahishn*, says about Time (Darmesteter, *Le Zend Avesta*, ii. 310–311): 'It was without limits up to the creation, and it was created limited to the end, that is, to the reducing of the evil spirit to impotence. After this, Time resumes its infiniteness for ever and ever.' This later theological speculation about the personified Time (*Zrvan*) is found in the Avesta itself, which distinguishes between 'Time without limits' (*Zrvan akarana*), and the 'Time long, self-determined' (*Zrvan dareghô-khvadhâta*) (*Nyâish*, i. 8). In *Vendîdâd*, xix. 9, Zarathushtra answers the Evil One: 'The beneficent spirit created in the time without limits.' 'Time without limits' was made later on, in order to weaken the dualism to an eternal Divine Being, from whom the two opposite spirits emanate.

The distribution of *Time* into the endless Time before and after the 'long, self-determined Time' has its exact *local* equivalent in the strictly organized Mazdayasnian theology. The region of light where Ormazd dwells is called 'endless light.' The region where the Evil Spirit resides is called the 'endless dark.' 'Between them was empty space, that is, what they call "air," in which is now their meeting' (*Bûnd.* i. 2–4) [cf. Plutarch's words, *de Is. et Os.* 46, about Mithra as μεσίτης between the two 'gods']. The air or atmosphere, *Vayu* (Pahlavi *Vâi*) is deified as well as *Zrvan* (Time), and is designated exactly as Time: *dareghô-khvadhâta* (*Nyâish*, I. 1), 'long, self-determined.' The Great *Bûndahishn* (Darmesteter, *loc. cit.*) distinguishes between the good Vâi and the bad Vâi—space as well as time being divided according to the dualistic principle. Already the Avesta knew such a distinction, *Yasht*, xv. invoking 'that part of thee, O Vayu, which belongs to the Good Spirit.'

2. Date of the Zoroastrian system of Ages of the World.—(*a*) As we have already seen, most of the names and legends and ideas that belong to the Pahlavi accounts of the Ages of the World are to be found in the Avesta. As to the system itself divided into four periods, the principal contents of the lost *Dâmdâṭ Nask*, the book 'about the production of the beneficial creatures,' of the Sasanian Avesta, from which the *Bûndahishn*, 'the original

creation,' is derived, are very shortly reproduced in the following terms in the *Dînkarṭ*, viii. 5 (*SBE* xxxvii. 13–14).

'Amid the *Dâmdâṭ* are particulars about the maintenance of action and the production of the beneficial creatures. First, as to the spiritual existence, and how much and how is the maintenance in the spiritual existence; and the production of the worldly existence therefrom, qualified and constructed for descending into the combat with the destroyer, and accomplishing the associated necessity for the end and circumvention of destructiveness' (West's tr.).

An extant Avesta fragment, quoted in the Pahlavi *Vendîdâd*, ii. 20, runs: 'How long time lasted the holy spiritual creation' (*cvantem zrvânem mainyava stish ashaoni dâta as*). It shows that the complete Avesta knew the system of four times three thousand years.

Except for the events at the end of Zarathushtra's millennium, the Sasanian Avesta must have known all the principal features of the world-chronology now described, with its environment of 'the endless time.'

(*b*) Plutarch brings us further back, to about 300 B.C., but speaks only of two or three of the four periods (*de Is. et Os.* 47), expressly quoting Theopompus, Philip of Macedon's historian:

Θεόπομπος δὲ φησὶ κατὰ τοὺς μάγους ἀνὰ μέρος τρισχίλια ἔτη τὸν μὲν κρατεῖν τὸν δὲ κρατεῖσθαι τῶν θεῶν, ἄλλα δὲ τρισχίλια μάχεσθαι καὶ πολεμεῖν καὶ ἀναλύειν τὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου τὸν ἕτερον· τέλος δ' ἀπολείπεσθαι τὸν Ἅιδην, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους εὐδαίμονας ἔσεσθαι, μήτε τροφῆς δεομένους μήτε σκιὰν ποιοῦντας· τὸν δὲ ταῦτα μηχανησάμενον θεὸν ἠρεμεῖν καὶ ἀναπαύεσθαι χρόνον, καλῶς μὲν οὐ πολὺν τῷ θεῷ, ὥσπερ δ' ἀνθρώπῳ κοιμωμένῳ μέτριον.

Bernardakis, in his edition of the *Moralia*, reads after χρόνον: ἄλλως μὲν οὐ πολὺν ὡς θεῷ, etc.

The first part of this quotation* agrees with the Mazdayasnian record of the last nine thousand years (*Bûnd.* i. 20).

Lagrange ('La Religion des Perses' in *RB*, 1904, p. 35) understands ἀνὰ μέρος as indicating *two* periods: one with Ahura Mazda as ruler, another with Angra Mainyu as ruler; then follows their fight in a third and last period, ended by the defeat of evil. It is possible to translate ἀνὰ μέρος in that way. But, as the phrase runs, it is more natural to apply the two 'turns' to the two different trimillenniums mentioned. ἀνὰ μέρος belongs to both the following statements. The μάχεσθαι καὶ πολεμεῖν comes, as the second 'turn' of the two gods' relation, after τὸν μὲν κρατεῖν τὸν δὲ κρατεῖσθαι. The tr. of Lagrange has another drawback. It would be quite an isolated statement in opposition to all other records about Mazdayasnian chronology.

Some slight misunderstanding may easily have been perpetrated either by Theopompus or by Plutarch in quoting him. But it seems impossible not to recognize (1) the impotence of Ahriman, (2) the conflict, and (3) the victory of Ormazd—making up the well-known Mazdayasnian scheme.

The second part of the quotation from Theopompus offers some difficulty. The last words after χρόνον have been more or less ingeniously changed by various conjectures. The phrase should mean: 'The god who has brought about these things [the defeat of Hades (identified with Ἀρειμάνιος also by Diog. Laërt. *Proœm.* 6) and the blessed state of mankind] keeps still and reposes himself during a period not very great for the god, as [it would be] moderate for a sleeping man.' But the end of the phrase is not tolerable Greek, and must be corrupted in some way. The meaning compels us to think of a rest of Ahura Mazda after the consummation of the destiny of the world. Such an idea is not necessarily inconsistent with the opposition of later Mazdayasnian theology (*Shikand-gûmânik vijâr*, xiii. 102–105 [*SBE* xxiv. 217]) to the Jewish doctrine of a rest of God after the *Creation*. But we know nothing of a Divine repose after the *Frashôkereti*, the fulfilment at the end. Theopompus is supposed to have thought of another being, Keresâspa, who is to awake from his long sleep in order to kill the unfettered Azhi Dahâka; or of Saoshyant, 'sleeping' as the prophet's holy seed in the lake Kansava waiting for his virgin mother; or of Yima, expecting in his *vara* the end of the desolation caused by the great winter—but not reposing! The context excludes, as far as the present writer can see, the introduction of a *third* god, after the two enemies spoken of. But it might be that the Greek author has applied to Ahura Mazda some misunderstood statement regarding another figure in the final drama.

(*c*) The elder Pliny writes (*HN* xxx. 2. 1): 'Eudoxus, qui inter sapientiæ sectas clarissimam utilissimamque eam intelligi voluit, Zoroastrem hunc sex millibus annorum ante Platonis mortem fuisse prodidit. Sic et Aristoteles.' Thus Greek authors of the 4th cent. B.C. placed Zarathushtra 6000 years before B.C. 347. Hermodorus, in the same century, and Hermippus, a century later, put him 5000 years before the Trojan war. Xanthus of Lydia, perhaps a century earlier, seems to have stated that the prophet lived 6000 years before Xerxes. These fanciful dates are the more astonishing the older they are, — that is, the nearer they approach to Zarathushtra's lifetime, which the Mazdayasnian tradition places in the 7th cent. B.C., and which can scarcely have been many centuries earlier at least.*

A. V. Williams Jackson ingeniously suggests that the placing of Zarathushtra 6000–7000 years before Christ is due to the Greeks having misunderstood the statements of the Persians, according to which the spiritual prototype of Zarathustra was created several thousands of years before the prophet himself. ('On the Date of Zoroaster,' in *Zoroaster, the Prophet of Ancient Iran*, p. 152 ff.). This view has been supported by West, 'Pahlavi Texts,' v. [*SBE* xlvii. p. xl ff.].

Dînkarṭ, vii. 2, 15 *f.*, in rendering the contents of *Spend Nask*, tells: 'Again, too, revelation says that, when the separation of the third millennium occurred, at the end of the 3000 years of spiritual existence without a destroyer (after the creatures were in spiritual existence, and before the arrival of the fiend), then the archangels framed Zaratûsht together, and they seated the guardian spirit [the *fravashi*, already in existence for 3000 years] within, having a mouth, having a tongue, and the proclaimer of the celestial mansions' (cf. *Dînkarṭ*, viii. 14, 1). Thus the spiritual body of Zarathushtra is framed together two trimillenniums before his birth, at the end of the ninth millennium, *i.e.* B.C. 6630, according to Mazdayasnian tradition. If this striking explanation of the fanciful Greek dates for Zarathushtra be right, even this special feature of the Mazdayasnian chronology—the pre-formation of Zarathushtra's body 6000 years before his birth—must have been heard of by Greek writers as early as the 5th cent. B.C., which does not seem very probable. At all events, nothing is to be found in these Greek records about 'the holy spiritual creation,' the first of the four trimillenniums.

3. **Composite character of the Mazdayasnian system of Ages of the World.**—This is evident. The means are lacking for the reconstruction of its formation. But certain points may be noted.

(*a*) The whole Yima legend must drop out. Originally it was an independent scheme of Ages of the World, like the old Norse Fimbulvetr, 'great winter,' which ends this Age and brings about a new mankind, whose ancestors, Lîf and Lîfthraser, are hidden during the desolating winter in Mimir's grove. Mahrkûsha's winter and the new humanity arising from Yima's *vara* have evidently no *raison d'être* whatever in the complete historical system of the Avestan theology. It has been rather awkwardly put aside in Ukhshyat-ereta's millennium, because it must not be omitted. The Yima legend in *Vendîdâd*, ii., does not know the 12,000 years' system, and excludes it, at least in its complete form, although the old mythic Yima has been duly transformed into a forerunner of Zarathushtra.

The blessed paradise-reign of Yima was a very popular legend in old Irân. Several Avesta texts mention it (*Yasna*, ix. 4 *f.*; *Yasht*, ix. 9 ff., xiii. 130, xv. 15 *f.*, xvii. 29 ff., xix. 32 ff.), besides *Vendîdâd*, ii. Under his rule death and sickness and all adversities were unknown. The older tradition gives him a thousand years. In the *Vendîdâd* he enlarges the earth by one-third of its space, 'the cattle and mankind and dogs and birds and red burning fires' being after 300 years too crowded. After another 300 years he has to repeat the enlargement. When he has done this three times, that is, after 900 years, the tale passes on to the preparation of the *vara* for the coming winters. The analogy—300 years after each enlargement—should give us 1200 years. But the author might have imagined a hundred years after the third enlargement for the making of the enclosure, thus keeping the old tradition of a happy age of a thousand years in the old time. The later learned chronological system in *Bûndahishn*, xxxiv. 4, and *Mainôg-i Khraṭ*, xxvii. 24, 25, gives 616 years and 6 months.

The Yima legend gives three Ages of the World: the paradise-Age; the present time, which will close with a catastrophe; the frost-demons' win-

* 1. 'One of those gods reigned and the other was under his dominion during three thousand years. 2. During another three thousand years they battle and fight and destroy each other's works. 3. At the end Hades (Angra Mainyu, who was indeed originally probably a god of the infernal regions and of the dead) succumbs, and men shall be happy, needing no food and throwing no shadow.'

* Pliny also mentions another Zarathushtra, who is said to have lived shortly before B.C. 500.

ters, and the restoring of the living world from Yima's *vara*—after the well-known scheme :

> 'Past and to come seems best ; things present worst' (*2 Henry IV.* I. iii. 108).

It is impossible to say whether this system of three Ages ever existed as a theory by itself. But there are several traces of the greater importance of Yima Khshaêta, 'the radiant,' Jamshîd in pre-Zarathushtrian legend (cf. Blochet, *Le messianisme dans l'hétérodoxie musulmane*, p. 126 f.). He seems to have been once considered as the first man and the first ruler. For further discussion see Söderblom, *La Vie Future*, 175–187.

(*b*) The heroic lore of Irân knew a list of heroes and old rulers, which is preserved in the extant parts of the Avesta, especially in the fifth *Yasht*, consecrated to the goddess Ardvî Sûra Anâhita, in the dramatic history of the *khwarenah* (the spiritual substance-power of the Iranian kingship), as given in *Yasht*, xiv., and in the ecclesiastical lists of saints of the *Yasht*, xiii. These legends have been, *tant bien que mal*, amalgamated with and adopted into the Zarathushtrian system.

(*c*) The division of the present millennium into the common Metal Ages is a combination of two systems, of which the Mazdayasnian tradition evidently adopted or borrowed the second one at a later period.

(*d*) The real existence of mankind from Mâshya-Mâshyôî until the coming of the Saoshyant comprises only 6000 years,—as in Talmudic and Christian literature (Böklen, *Die Verwandschaft der jüd.-christl. mit der pars. Eschatologie*, 82–84), where the duration of the world is fixed on the analogy of the six days of creation, a thousand years being with God as one day. Theopompus-Plutarch also seems to reckon 6000 years, but in a different way : 3000 for Ahura Mazda's supremacy (=Gâyômart's trimillennium), and 3000 for the conflict (=until Zarathushtra), the two periods being ended by the final victory and eternal bliss (and the rest of God, which looks like a Jewish-Christian Sabbath of the world ; cf. Ep. Barn. 15).

The last trimillennium, from Zarathushtra to the Saoshyant, of the final Zarathushtrian chronology seems to have been understood by Theopompus as the time of fulfilment, rather than as a new period. It is possible that the doctrine had this aspect earlier. That would better suit the spirit of the *Gâthâs*, where the final renovation of the world seems, in some texts at least, to be soon expected. In any case, Theopompus' record agrees, as to the main contents, with the last 9000 years of the *Bûndahishn*. Those 9000 years *alone* are mentioned in the *Arḍâ Vîrâf Nâmah*, xviii. and liv. : the damned souls complain that they are not delivered from hell although 9000 years have gone —one day or three days in hell seeming to them as long as the whole duration of the world. The author of the *Arḍâ Vîrâf Nâmah* must have known the first trimillennium, as the period of 'the holy spiritual creation' is mentioned in the Avestan fragment Pahl. *Vend.* ii. 20. But it is not unlikely that *Arḍâ Vîrâf's* 9000 years, which are to be compared with Theopompus' statement, represent an older chronology containing three parts : (1) a good ruler, (2) the present intermingled state, and (3) the great restoration, corresponding to our reconstruction of the Yima legend. The first of the four great epochs will then have been added in order to get the number four, or the twelve thousand years.

We are not sufficiently acquainted with the old Babylonian divisions of the existence of the world. But probably the 12,000 years of the *Bûndahishn*—as well as the same age of the world predicted by Mani (Kessler, *Mani*, i. 343 ; the number 12 is fundamental in Mani's doctrine, see Kessler, art. 'Mani' in *PRE*[3]), and by the Etrurians [according to Suidas], like the 12 parts of the existence of the world in 2 Es 14[10ff.] and Apoc. Bar 53, are derived from a Babylonian cycle. This probability comes very near demonstration when we remark that both the Etrurian belief, as reported by Suidas, and the *Bûndahishn* combine the twelve millenniums with the zodiacal signs. The Mazdayasnian theologians owed their astronomical science to the Babylonians and to the Egyptians (J. Marquart, *Philologus*, Sup. x. 1. 192 ff.).

(*e*) The *Gâthâs* represent an epoch in which this doctrine of periods did not belong to the Zarathushtrian faith. If periods were already known in Irân, this must have been outside the Zarathushtrian reform. The long waiting is incompatible with the preaching of the *Gâthâs*. Time, as in both Jewish and Christian prophecy and apocalyptics, is rather sharply divided into two Ages : the present era of struggle and difficulty, and the happy reign of theocracy and justice after the longed-for separation by fire.

4. Meaning of the periods.—The beliefs outlined in the foregoing pages represent the original and characteristic feature of the Mazdayasnian system of Ages of the World, and must be derived from the Zoroastrian idea, expressed in the *Gâthâs*, of Ahura Mazda as the ruler of the future destiny of mankind. The division into Ages does not imply merely a distinction between the present and the old time—as *e.g.* in the *alcheringa* (wh. see) of the Australians. Nor does it signify a deterioration, as, for example, in the Ages of Hesiod and Ovid. Something resembling a pessimistic view of the course of time might be gathered from three phases of the Mazdayasnian religion : (1) the monster of the old myth will be unfettered ; (2) the sharp opposition implied in the Zarathushtrian reform, and the earnest appeal to choose the way of Asha, sometimes give a dark colouring to the Gâthic view ; (3) several thousand years later, when the glorious line of history was already pointed out by Avestan and Pahlavi theology, the tragic events under the last Sasanians and after the Arabian conquest taught a sombre lesson of the end of Zarathushtra's millennium before the advent of the expected helper, who never came. The four Ages of Gold, Silver, Steel, and Iron were adopted, at first probably by an orthodox compiler, during the early controversies with Manichæism and other heresies ; then history filled out the Iron-mingled Age in different ways. The Great *Bûndahishn* kept open its chapter 'On the calamities which have invaded Irân in different ages' (Blochet, *l.c.* 45). But the Metal Ages are only episodes in *one* millennium, and give no idea of the destiny of the world. In both cases the general optimistic character of the Zarathushtrian faith prevails : the victory of Ormazd is the surest thing in the world, known and predicted since the beginning. The worldly corporeal existence and human affairs are no enemies of piety, but pure elements and duties, the diligent fulfilment of which formally constitutes each Mazdayasnian a fellow-worker with Ormazd, a helper, saviour (*saoshyant*), and *frashôcaretar*, 'a renewer' of humanity and of the world. These functions he discharges in company with the great heroes, from Kaî-Khûsrâv—without whose destruction of the idolatrous temples behind the lake of Caêcasta the renovation of the world could never have been carried out (*Maînôg-î Khraṭ*, ii. 95)—to the last *saoshyant*. The world is a realm of conflict, where impurity constantly threatens and demons are ever on the watch. But it is a noteworthy fact that the period of confusion and strife is not *the present Age*. That period ended with the appearance of Zarathushtra. We already live in the Age of the victory of Ormazd.

The Persian periods do not imply an eternal repetition, as in the developments of Aryan speculation and religion in India and Greece, and sometimes in modern thought (*e.g.* Nietzsche, and, in a less pedantic way, Sv. Arrhenius)—the same causes combining to produce in eternal cycles the same effect—

> 'When this world shall be *former*, underground,
> Thrown topsy-turvy, twisted, crisp'd, and curl'd,
> Baked, fried, or burnt, turn'd inside-out, or drown'd,
> Like all the worlds before, which have been hurl'd
> First out of, and then back again to chaos,
> The superstratum which will overlay us.'
> —(*Don Juan*, canto ix. stanza xxxvii.).

Nothing can be more characteristic than the placing of the Metal Ages and this Iron Age only in one, the present, Mazdayasnian millennium, while the millenniums form together a progress towards an end, whereas in the Indian conception the four

yugas and the present evil *kali* Age form the constant feature of periods which emerge and pass away in endless similarity. The system of periods in Irân did not unite, as in India, with the popular belief in the transmigration of souls — a belief worked out into a fundamental philosophical doctrine in Indian systems of periods.

The Mazdayasnian scheme expresses, in a somewhat scholastic way, the idea implied in the word *history*: that is to say, 'something happens in what happens' (E. G. Geijer), so that the intricate mass of events has a meaning and a goal beyond the actual combinations and situation. The real kernel of history is a 'forward,' not a 'see-saw,' and not a 'backward,' although it may seem so to human eyes. This profound conception has arisen only twice in the history of human thought—in the only two ancient prophetic religions, one Aryan, one Semitic—in Zarathushtrianism and in Mosaism. Neither seems to have borrowed it from the other. Christianity inherited it from Mosaism, and it has become prevalent in the Western civilization in the form of belief in a Divine purport in history, in progressive evolution, or in a redeeming crisis, and constitutes one of the most significant features and influential factors in the civilization of Europe and America, as distinguished from the great civilizations of India and of the Far East. It is so deeply rooted in the Western mind, that even so sincere and acute an admirer of and believer in the Indian conception as Schopenhauer unconsciously yields to it (cf. his *Sämmtliche Werke*, v. 224). To have originated faith in the significance and purpose of history may fittingly be called Zarathushtra's greatest gift to mankind.

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NATHAN SÖDERBLOM.

AGHORÎ, AGHORAPANTHÎ, AUGAR, AUGHAR. — These are names applied to a sect of ascetics in India who have for a long time attracted attention on account of their habit of cannibalism and other abominable practices.

1. *Meaning of name.*—Their name indicates connexion with the cult of Śiva, being derived from Skr. *a-ghora*, 'not terrific,' one of the euphemistic titles of the god. *Aghorapanthî* means 'one who follows the path' (Skr. *pantha*) or cult of Śiva in this form. The worship of Śiva as Aghoriśvara, 'the non-terrific Lord,' is practised at a fine temple at Ikkeri, in Mysore, and in many other places.

2. *Distribution.*—The present distribution of the sect is a question of some difficulty. According to the Census of 1901, they number within the Empire 5580, of whom the vast majority (5185) are found in Bihâr or W. Bengal, the remainder in Ajmîr-Mhairwâra and Berâr, with 2 convicts in the Andaman Islands. This differs widely from the Census figures of 1891, when 630 Aghorî and 4317 Augars were recorded in the United Provinces, 3877 Aghorî in Bengal, and 436 Augars in the Panjâb. The explanation of this discrepancy lies partly in the fact that, like all ascetics of the kind, they are constantly wandering from one part of the country to another to attend bathing fairs and visit places of pilgrimage. Secondly, the unpopularity of the sect doubtless induces them at the time of the Census to record themselves under other and more reputable titles. The chief centres of the sect, where a monastery (*maṭha*) of some kind was assigned to them, used in former times to be Mount Âbû, Girnâr, Bodh Gayâ, Benares, and Hinglâj — the last the most western point to which Indian polytheism extends. But they have now disappeared from Mount Âbû, and they seem to have no recognized establishments at any of the other holy places, which, however, they still occasionally visit.*

3. *History of the sect.* — The first account of ascetics following the rule of the modern Aghorî is found in the *Travels* of the Buddhist pilgrim, Hiuen Tsiang. He speaks of 'naked ascetics, and others who cover themselves with ashes, and some who make chaplets of bones, which they wear as crowns on their heads' (Beal, *Si-yu-ki, Buddhist Records of the W. World*, i. 55; Watters, *Yuan Chwang's Travels in India*, i. 123). In another passage he speaks of the Kâpâladhârin, or 'wearers of skulls,' some of whom have no clothes, 'but go naked (*nirgranthas*); some wear leaf or bark garments' (Beal, *op. cit.* i. 76; Watters, *op. cit.* i. 149). When we come to later times, we have more particular accounts of these Kâpâlika or Kâpâladhârin (Skr. *kâpâla*, 'a skull,' *dhârin*, 'carrying'). Ânandagiri, in his *Saṅkara-vijaya*, thus describes the Kâpâlika: 'His body is smeared with ashes from a funeral pile, around his neck hangs a string of human skulls, his forehead is streaked with a black line, his hair is woven into the matted braid, his loins are clothed with a tiger's skin, a hollow skull is in his left hand (for a cup), and in his right hand he carries a bell, which he rings incessantly, exclaiming aloud, "Ho Śambhu, Bhairava, ho lord of Kâlî!" titles of Śiva' (H. H. Wilson, *Essays*, i. 264 n.). Again, the poet Bhavabhûti, who wrote in the first half of the 8th cent. A.D., in his drama *Mâlatî and Mâdhava*, Act v., gives a vivid account of the rescue by Mâdhava of his mistress from the clutches of the Aghora Ghaṇṭa, who is about to sacrifice her at the altar of the goddess Châmuṇḍâ, who represents Devî in one of her most terrible forms. Within the temple the human-sacrificing priest circles in his Tantric dance round his victims, while he invokes the goddess, round whose neck is a garland of human skulls (Wilson, *Theatre of the Hindus*, ii. 55; Frazer, *Lit. Hist. of India*, 289 ff.). A vivid description of this Kâpâlika-vrata, or worship of the terrific forms of Śiva and his consort Durgâ, is given in the *Prabodha Chandrodaya*, or 'Moon of Intellect' (Eng. tr. J. Taylor, 38 ff.). In the *Dabistân* (Eng. tr. Shea-Troyer, ii. 129), the author of which died about 1670, we have an account of the 'sect of the Yogîs, who know no prohibited food. . . . They also kill and eat men. . . . There are some of this sect who, having mixed their excretions and filtered them through a piece of cloth, drink them, and say that such an act renders a man capable of great affairs, and they pretend to know strange things. They call the performance of this act *Atilia* and also *Akhori*. They have all originated from Gorakhnâth. The author of this work saw a man, who, singing the customary song, sat upon a corpse, which he kept unburied until it came into a state of dissolution, and then ate the flesh of it; this act they hold extremely meritorious.' Gorakhnâth is the great mediæval Hindu saint, of whom many

* Havell, in 1905, found an Augar at Benares seated in a stone cell raised high above the burning-*ghât*. The sect still maintains here its evil reputation, but this black-robed ascetic, who is shown in the photograph studying a sacred book, proved to be quite inoffensive. He bestowed his blessing upon the prying tourist, but contemptuously refused to accept a present (*Benares, The Sacred City*, 119 f.).

marvellous tales are told, and from whom some of the *yogī* Orders trace their origin.*

4. *The sect in modern times.*—There are numerous accounts of the disgusting practices of these ascetics in modern times. M. Thevenot, whose *Travels* were republished in London in 1687, alludes to what was apparently a community of Aghorī cannibals, who during his time were established at a place which he calls 'Debca,' in the Broach district of the Bombay Presidency; but his statements must be received with caution. Ward (*View of the Hindoos* [1815], ii. 373) mentions, among other ascetics, the 'Ughoru-punthee.'

'These mendicants, born in the western parts of Hindoos'thanu, wander about naked or nearly so, carrying in the left hand a human skull containing urine and ordure, and a pan of burning coals in the right. If these marks of self-denial do not extort the alms they expect, they profess to eat the ordure out of the skull, in the presence of the persons from whom they are begging.'

Tod (*Travels in W. India* [1839], p. 83 ff.) gives a vivid description of a colony of Aghorī at Mount Ābū (wh. see). One of the most famous of them, named Fatehpurī, was finally, by his own instructions, immured in the cave which he had occupied for many years. A native gentleman informed Tod that a short time previously, when he was conveying the dead body of his brother to the burning-ground, an Aghorī begged to be allowed to remove the corpse, saying that it would make excellent chutney (*chatnī*), the relish used with curry. He further refers (p. 383) to the terror felt regarding such wretches, who resided near the shrine of Kālikā Mātā, the Mother-goddess, another form of Devī, where a stranger visiting the place was met by a personage, who after a while explained that she was the dread Mother-goddess herself. But this was really the disguise of an Aghorī cannibal, who captured his victims in this way. Buchanan (Martin, *E. India*, ii. 492 f.) tells of an Aghorī who appeared at Gorakhpur in the United Provinces early in the 19th century. He thrust himself into the house of the local Rājāh, whom he bespattered with filth. The Rājāh complained to Mr. Ahmuty, the judge of the district, who ordered the expulsion of the Aghorī from the place. But soon after, when Mr. Ahmuty himself fell sick and the Rājāh's heir died, every one of the Hindu population attributed these misfortunes to the curse of the offended saint.

The same feeling of horror caused by the practices of these wretches is graphically pictured in a curious book, *The Revelations of an Orderly*, published at Benares in 1849. The author (reprint 1866, p. 66) speaks of the *ghāṭs*, or bathing-steps, on the river Ganges at Benares being frequented by—

'Aghorpunth faqueers (Anglicé, ogres), practical philosophers, who affect to disbelieve that there is any difference between things, and to avow that any difference depends upon the imagination. A cuff or a kick is as immaterial to them as a blessing. They go about *in puris naturalibus* with a fresh human skull in their hands (off which they have previously eaten the putrid flesh, and from which afterwards with their fingers they scoop out the brain and eyes), into which is poured whatsoever is given them to drink. They pretend to be indifferent whether it be ardent spirits, or milk, or foul water. Their food is the first thing that offers, whether it be a putrid corpse, cooked food, or ordure. With matted hair, blood-red eyes, and body covered with filth and vermin, the Aghorī is an object of terror and disgust to everybody. He looks rather like a wolf, ready to destroy and devour his prey, than a human being. I once saw a wretch of this fraternity eating the head of a putrid corpse, and as I passed by he howled and pointed to me; and then scooped out the eyes and ate them before me. I had my matchlock in my hand, and was within an ace of putting a ball into his head; for I deemed him a wolf, and, in fact, he was a brute.'

The author, really a European in the disguise of a Hindu, ends by appealing to the Government to suppress such abominable exhibitions. Since the time when this book was written, the custom of ascetics wandering about nude has been repressed by police regulations, and, as will be seen later on, the habit of cannibalism, as practised by the Aghorī, has been prohibited by special legislation within British territories. But as late as 1887 we have an account of a gang who appeared at a fair held at the sacred city of Ujjain in the native State of Gwālior in Central India. 'On demanding some goats from the authorities, they were refused. On this, they proceeded to the burning-*ghāt*, and, taking a corpse from the pile, began to devour it. The horrified spectators summoned the police, but the naked fanatics only desisted on being promised the goats which had been before refused them' (*Panjāb Notes and Queries*, iv. 142).

5. *Life history of an Aghorī.*—A full account of the life history of a modern Aghorī, based on inquiries by an Indian Medical Officer, Drake Brockman, was contributed by H. Balfour (*JAI* [1897] xxvi. 340 ff.). This man was by caste a *lohār*, or blacksmith, from the Native State of Patiāla, in the Panjāb. He started life as a beggar, and was adopted as a disciple by an Aghorī. He wandered to the Śaiva shrine of Badarinārāyan in the lower Himālaya, and thence to Nepāl. He then made a pilgrimage to Jagannāth in Orissa, and came finally to Mathura and Bharatpur, at which last place he was found and examined. 'I now receive,' he stated, 'food from every caste and tribe, and have no caste prejudices. I can eat from every one's hand. I do not myself eat human flesh, but some of my sect have the power to eat human flesh and then make it alive again; some have success with charms, and they eat the flesh of the human body; but I have not this power, as I was not successful with the charms. This much I do, I eat and drink out of a human skull. I also eat the flesh of every dead animal, with the exception of the horse, which we are forbidden to devour; all my brotherhood eat the flesh of all dead animals but the horse.'

It has been a subject of much debate why the flesh of the horse is specially prohibited. Some have believed that the reason is that the Hindī name of the horse (*ghoṛā*) may be connected by its members with the title of the sect. But this seems hardly probable. On the other hand, the horse has long been a sacred animal in India, and its sanctity possibly dates from a period earlier than that of the cow. In the Aśvamedha or horse-sacrificial rite, it was regarded as an emblem of Virāj, the primeval and universally manifested Being, and even at the present day there is considerable evidence of the sanctity of the animal (Colebrooke, *Essays*, ed. 1858, 36; Crooke, *Pop. Religion*, ii. 204 ff.). As a coincidence it may be noted that Pliny (*HN* xxviii. 9) specially points out that when a horse was sacrificed at public ceremonials the *flamen* was forbidden to touch it.

6. *Relations of the Aghorī to other Hindu sects.*—The Aghorī are naturally so reticent about their sectarial organization that their relation to other Hindu sects is as yet imperfectly known. The sect in modern times, or at least that branch of it which has its headquarters at Benares, assigns its origin to one Kinna Rām, who was initiated by one Kālu Rām, an ascetic from Girnār, towards the close of the 18th cent. (Crooke, *Tribes and Castes*, i. 26). Hence they are sometimes known under the title of Kinnārāmī. In religious belief the Aghorī is closely allied to the Paramahaṁsa, who

'is solely occupied with the investigation of Brahma, or spirit, and who is equally indifferent to pleasure or pain, insensible to heat or cold, and incapable of satiety or want. Agreeably to this definition, individuals are sometimes met with who pretend to have attained such a degree of perfection; in proof of it they go naked in all weathers, never speak, and never indicate any natural want; what is brought to them as alms or food, by any person, is received by the attendants, whom their supposed sanctity or a confederation of interest attaches to them, and by these attendants they are fed and served on all occasions, as if they were as helpless as infants' (Wilson, *Essays*, i. 282).

Another sect of the same class, which displays an equal disregard of the decencies of life, is the Sarbhangi (Crooke, *op. cit.* iv. 292). But the dis-

* For the Kāpālika, also, see Monier-Williams, *Hinduism and Brāhmanism*, p. 59; Barth, *Religions of India*, Eng. tr., p. 59; Wilson, *Essays*, i. 21, 264; Buchanan, in Martin, *Eastern India*, ii. 484.

regard of the ordinary needs of life shown by these two sects is very different from the abominable practices of the Aghorī. Their relations, again, to the Aughar *yogīs* of the Panjāb have not been clearly ascertained. It would seem that to the general licence of the latter, the former add the occasional eating of human flesh and filth.

7. *Cannibalism and eating of filth.*—The questions of importance in connexion with the Aghorī are: first, the eating of human flesh and filth; secondly, the use of the human skulls from which they eat and drink. The practice of human sacrifice and cannibalism in India has always been chiefly associated with the Tantric rites of the Śākta worshippers of Devī, the Mother-goddess, in one or other of her various forms, as Kālī, Durgā, Chāmuṇḍā, and others. This cult is supposed to have had its origin in E. Bengal or Assam about the 5th cent. A.D. The Kālika Purāna distinctly recommends the immolation of human beings, for which at the present time pigeons, goats, and, more rarely, buffaloes are substituted. It may be suspected that Hinduism, in this form, assimilated some of the rites of the non-Aryan races; but from the place of its origin it is more probable that these practices were adopted from the E. tribes rather than from the Bhīls, to whom they have been attributed by Hopkins (*Rel. of India*, 490, 533), and others (Gait, *Census Rep. Bengal*, 1901, i. 181 f.). Human sacrifice in this ritual form still prevails in dark corners of the land, as in Assam, and the more remote forest tracts of the Central hill ranges (Gait, *Census Rep. Assam*, 1891, i. 80; Crooke, *Pop. Rel.* ii. 169 ff.). With this side of Hinduism the Aghorī sect is closely connected. There are, again, as in the case of the Śrāddha, or annual Hindu feast of the dead, fairly obvious survivals of the primitive custom of the sacramental eating of the dead, as well as that of devouring the bodies of old or eminent persons for the sake of keeping in the family their valour or other virtues (Hartland, *Legend of Perseus*, ii. 278 ff.). But none of these motives accounts for the cannibalism of the Aghorī.

It is perhaps possible to account for these practices in another way. We find among some savage races instances of wizards or medicine-men eating substances which are in themselves disgusting and revolting, or poisonous or medicinal in nature, with a view to enhancing the spiritual exaltation of the eater.

Thus, according to Haddon (*Report Cambridge Exped.* v. 321), at Mabuiag in Torres Straits, the Maidelaig, or sorcerer, 'made a practice of eating anything that was disgusting and revolting in character, or poisonous or medicinal in nature, not only during the course of instruction, but subsequently whenever about to perform a special act of sorcery. For instance, they were said frequently to eat flesh of corpses, or to mix the juices of corpses with their food. One effect of this diet was to make them "wild" so that they did not care for any one, and all affection temporarily ceased for relatives, wife, and children; and on being angered by any of them they would not hesitate to commit murder.' In parts of Melanesia, according to Codrington, *Mana*, or spiritual exaltation, is gained by eating human flesh; and in this way people obtain the power of becoming vampires, the ghost of the corpse which was eaten entering into friendly relations with the eater (*JAI* x. 305; *Melanesians*, 222). In Central Africa, according to Macdonald, witches and wizards feed on human flesh, and any one tasting a morsel of such food becomes himself a wizard (*JAI* xxii. 107). Among nearly all the Bantu negro races there is a lingering suspicion that the sorcerer, or person desiring to become a sorcerer, is a corpse-eater, a ghoul who digs up the bodies of dead persons to eat them, either from a morbid taste, or in the belief that this action will invest him with magical powers. In Uganda, as well as in many parts of Bantu Africa, there is believed to exist a secret society of such ghouls, who assemble at midnight for the purpose of disinterring and eating corpses. People cursed with this morbid taste are in Uganda called *baseźi* (Johnston, *Uganda*, ii. 578, 692 f.). The same story is repeatedly told of witches in India, who frequent cemeteries, and by eating human flesh gain the power of flying in the air and performing other wonders (Tawney, *Katha-sarit-sagara*, i. 158, ii. 450, 594). Stories of the same kind are still told in India (*Panjāb Notes and Queries*, ii. 75; Temple-Steel, *Wideawake Stories*, 418). Even at the present day the Oḍi magicians in Malabar are said to eat filth as a means of acquiring power (Fawcett, *Bulletin of the Madras Museum*, iii. 311).

Belief of this kind may have been the real origin of the practice, and the explanation which the modern Aghorī gives, that according to the Śaiva rule all things are equal and all immaterial, may be a recent development.

8. *Use of human skulls as cups and vessels.*—The same motive possibly accounts for the use of the human *calvaria* for purposes of eating and drinking. In many places the skull used in this way is believed to possess special magical qualities. Thus, among the Wadoe of E. Africa, at the appointment of a chief, a stranger is killed, and the skull of the victim is used as a drinking-cup at the inauguration rite (*Man*, ii. 61). The new priest of the king of the Baganda drinks out of the skull of his predecessor, whose ghost thus enters into him (*JAI* xxxii. 45). In the same way the Zulus make the skull of a noted enemy into a bowl for holding the 'charming-medicine' with which the war-doctor sprinkles the soldiers before a campaign (*ib.* xix. 285). Similarly, in the Indian Himālaya, the skulls of some women killed in a snowstorm were made into drums for summoning devils (Waddell, *Among the Himalayas*, 401). In these and in many other instances of the practice collected by Balfour (*JAI* xxvi. 347 ff.), it is clear that the skull has been carefully selected as that of some eminent or notorious person, or of one whose death has occurred under tragical circumstances. The custom of the Aghorī, if it originated in this way, appears, therefore, in a debased form, for they do not seem to exercise any special care in selecting the skulls which they use. Several bowls of this kind, procured in India, Ashanti, Australia, China, Tibet, and the lower Himālayas, have been figured and described by Balfour (*JAI* xxvi. 357). Waddell gives a picture of one used in Tibetan devil-worship, as well as a drawing of a modern Tibetan hermit, an exact representation of the Aghorī, drinking out of such a bowl (*Lhasa and its Mysteries*, 220, 239, 243, 370).* In fact, Tibet, with its remarkable colony of immured hermits described by Waddell (*op. cit.* 237 ff.), appears to exhibit more closely than even modern India the course of austerity practised by the early Hindu ascetics. The fat, comfortable appearance of the modern *yogī* or *sannyāsī* proves that austerity is not a part of his way of life.

This habit of using skulls as drinking-cups shows itself even in Europe. It was a custom of the old Germans, and Livy (xxiii. 24) tells the same tale of the Celts. Paulus Diaconus (*Hist. Langob.* ii. 28 in Gummere, *Germ. Orig.* 120) tells how Alboin met his death when he insisted on his queen drinking out of a cup made of the skull of her father. It is still a common belief that epilepsy may be cured by drinking out of a cup made from the skull of a suicide (*Folk-lore*, vii. 276, xiv. 370; Mitchell, *The Past in the Present*, 154; Rogers, *Social Life in Scotland*, iii. 225). The powder made from human skulls, and even the moss growing on them, are valued as a styptic in cases of hæmorrhage (Black, *Folk Medicine*, 96).

9. *Punishment of Aghorī.*—There are numerous cases of members of the sect convicted in modern times by Indian courts of law, on charges of outraging and eating human corpses. In 1862 the Sessions Judge of Ghāzipur in the United Provinces convicted and sentenced an Aghorī to one year's rigorous imprisonment, under sections 270–297 of the Indian Penal Code, on a charge of dragging a corpse along a road. A similar case, in which cannibalism was proved, occurred at Rohtak in the Panjāb in 1882, and in Dehrā Dūn of the United Provinces in 1884. In 1884 two Europeans detected an Aghorī eating human flesh on an island in the Ganges. Several skulls, one of which had been recently severed from the trunk, were found

* In Nepāl, Buchanan Hamilton saw people of the Got or gardener caste, in the worship of Bhawānī in the Tantric form, drinking spirits out of human skulls, until they danced in a state of drunken excitement, which was supposed to proceed from inspiration (*Account of the Kingdom of Nepal*, 35).

impaled on bamboo posts round his hermitage (*PASB* iii. 209 f., 300 ff.).

10. *Initiation rites of the Aghorī.*—Ascetic Orders usually guard as secret the methods of initiation and the formula which is whispered in the ear of the neophyte. Hence the accounts of the initiation rites of the Aghorī are, from their general unpopularity, to be received with some degree of caution. According to one, and that perhaps the most authoritative account, the *guru*, or head of the Order, blows a conch-shell accompanied by rude music performed by a hired band. He then micturates into a human skull and pours the contents over the head of the candidate, whose hair is then shaved by a barber. The neophyte next drinks some spirits and eats food which has been collected as alms from the lowest castes, and assumes the ochre-coloured, scanty waist-cloth, and the stick of the ascetic. During the rite the *guru* whispers mystic formulæ (*mantra*) into the ear of his disciple. In some cases it is reported that eating human flesh is part of the rite, and two necklaces, one made of the tusks of the wild boar and the other of the vertebræ of the cobra, are placed round the neck of the disciple (*PASB* iii. 241 f.). According to another account, five glasses filled with spirits in which meat has been mixed with flowers are placed upon the altar. A piece of cloth is tied over the eyes of the neophyte; he is then led before two *gurus*, who light a lamp; the cup of initiation is served to all present; his eyes are opened, and he is told to look for the 'divine light,' while the spell (*mantra*) is whispered into his ear (*North Indian Notes and Queries*, ii. 31). According to a third account, the initiation takes place in Benares at the tomb of Kinna Rām, the founder of the Order, on which cups of hemp liquor (*bhang*) and spirits are placed. Those who wish to retain their caste drink only the hemp; those who solicit complete initiation drink both the hemp and spirits. A sacrifice of fruits is then made on the holy fire, which has continued lighted since the days of Kinna Rām, and an animal, usually a goat, is sacrificed. It is believed that the victim often comes to life, and that the cups on the tombstone miraculously raise themselves to the lips of the candidates for admission into the Order. The rite ends with the shaving of the head of the neophyte, the hair being previously moistened with urine, and a feast is given to the assembled brethren. Full admission to the Order is said to be granted only after a probation lasting twelve years.

11. *Dress and appearance.*—The Aghorī, of whom photographs were collected by Leith for the Anthropological Society of Bombay, is represented as covered with ashes taken from a funeral pyre. He seems to wear frontal marks denoting the unity of the deities Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva. He wears the rosary of Rudrāksha beads made of the seeds of the tree *Elæocarpus ganitrus*, a necklace made of the bones of a snake, and the tusks of a wild boar, and carries a skull in his hand. Some members of the Order are said to wear necklaces made of human teeth (*PASB* iii. 348 ff.).

LITERATURE.—The chief authorities have been quoted in the course of this article. The most complete accounts of the sect are those of H. Balfour, 'The Life History of an Aghorī Fakir,' *JAI* xxvi. [1897] 340 ff.; H. W. Barrow, 'Aghoris and Aghorapanthis,' from the MS collections of E. T. Leith, *PASB* iii. [1893] 197 ff.; Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the N.W. Provinces* [1896], i. 26 ff.

W. CROOKE.

AGITATION.—1. The methods of the agitator are usually considered to be a modern phenomenon, and although this is not an entirely accurate view of the case, it is at least so far true that the conditions of social life have recently become such as to bring his labours into startling prominence. It is possible to trace the rudiments of this device far back into the past, since the ringer of the tocsin bell, the lighter of the beacon-fire, and the bearer of the flaming torch may fairly be regarded as forerunners of a Mazzini or a Shaftesbury. But there is a pregnant distinction. The message of the tocsin bell in mediæval Florence was an agitating one, but it was single, definite, and predetermined, announcing a bare fact, but conveying no new idea. A developed agitation, on the contrary, depends almost entirely on popularizing a new thought; it applies fresh moral judgments to facts which may have been familiar enough. The present writer has elsewhere described this instrument of collective action as 'an attempt to act mediately on social abuses by acting directly on a social conscience' (*History of Eng. Philanthropy*, p. 172). Even in this, its developed form, agitation can be discovered in so-called ancient as well as in modern history. Whether judged by its results or by the splendid vigour of its onset, no greater agitation has been witnessed than the reconstruction of Western society by the enthusiastic promulgation of the Christian faith. Nor is any more instructive description of the effect of the agitator's art to be found than 'These that have turned the world upside down are come hither also' (Ac 17^6).

Nevertheless, agitation is characteristically modern. There is not much opportunity for its successful use, unless a 'public opinion' exists to which its appeal can be directed. Public opinion itself has existed in some shape for many centuries, but it continually gains in power and effectiveness. In the more definite form of what Professor Dicey calls 'law-making public opinion' it is not yet evolved except in the more progressive nations. The formation of public opinion in its modern sense has been referred to the era of the first printing-presses, and its mature growth to that of the periodical press (Tarde, *L'Opinion et la Foule*, pp. 7–9). This is also the period of democracy, and it is precisely in democratic societies that agitation is found to be a potent and familiar weapon. We have to appraise its ethical value. If we are to do this with any precision, we shall be compelled to limit the range of the discussion, and to treat not all agitations, but only one leading group. The present article, then, is immediately germane to agitation as an instrument of the humanitarian spirit, and may require some modification in details before being applied to purely political movements, as for the franchise, or class struggles, as of Trade Unionism.

2. The most obstinate labour of public life is to make institutions (*e.g.* laws or customs) match with the ethical ideal. The agitator's function is to facilitate the task. Accordingly, any good agitation should possess the following characteristics. (1) It is *the antithesis of quietism*, for it is necessarily based on the conviction that objects of social concern are the proper concern of the individual also; it denies the distinction between public and private interests, and asserts the duty of each to share in the life of all. It is directed to the removal of abuses; but, so far from being caused directly by the *existence* of a wrong, it springs from the *perception* of the evil. Successful agitation is, therefore, an index of moral sensitiveness. Men treated animals with cruelty long before the Kindness to Animals campaign began (Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, A.D. 1824). (2) Agitation is a leading method of *popularizing higher moral standards*. In the instance just referred to, the matter of judgment was simple enough. Frequently, however, the full significance of the end to be pursued is discovered only in the course of the agitation itself. This was notably the case with Prison Reform and

Factory Legislation, so that what was at first a goal to be reached becomes repeatedly the starting-point for fresh effort. (3) Agitation *appeals to the unselfish impulses and strengthens the social imagination.* Most of us live largely in a world of personal aims purified and enriched only by consideration for the aims of a few neighbours. Into this mind marked by narrow (not necessarily poor) sympathies strikes the impetus of a larger claim. It may be a Dreyfus affair, the appeal for justice to one;* or Emancipation, the appeal of the enslaved Negro race; or the ideal of Italian unity. In every instance individuals are driven into the larger realm of public sympathy. (4) *Agitation is a means of social peace.* This is in the nature of paradox, because the first result is always controversy and strife. But even in the turmoil something is gained when social imagination is stirred. Through the effort to remove particular wrong there emerges forefeeling of and admiration for the ideal human society in which remediable wrongs will be remedied. Opposition to the bad is one form of loyalty to the good, and those who enter on the conflict prepare the type of mind fit for the better life of social peace.

3. So far we have rather ignored the foibles, prejudices, and inconsistencies of actual men. No agitation proceeds with much sweet reason, and there is something in strong zeal which accentuates our native quarrelsomeness. In other words, agitation is not a perfect instrument in the hands of imperfect men. Agitators even for worthiest ends are not immune from bitter envying and strife in their hearts. Of course, there are drawbacks, but the only question which need now detain us is whether they are of such a kind as to discredit the use of a powerful instrument of ethical gain. Two serious criticisms are adduced, neither of which can be entirely rebutted. (1) Agitation is rooted in exaggeration, and appeals to an unhealthy sensationalism. Thus the higher powers of the intelligence are swamped under orgiastic emotion. This is the danger of all enthusiasm. It would be more than serious enough if Le Bon's indictment of the 'crowd' could be accepted. Agitation does appeal to half-instructed emotions with incalculable results. Yet such an appeal may very well lead to right conduct, and even to truer thought. For in respect of the disinterested response of the 'public' it must be noted that (*a*) it is set to ponder larger issues; (*b*) its thinking (or feeling) becomes more incisive; (*c*) the thought may not be very clear, but were its sympathies not warmly engaged, it would hardly think at all on great affairs of ethical concern. (2) Popular movements, it is objected, are liable to be vitiated by the ignorance of those to whom appeal is made. Agitation which is effective as a stimulant is inapt for instruction; it is certainly no method for producing philosophers. This fact is serious chiefly as it affects the results of agitation. Something is accomplished, but the whole thought is rarely worked out before the fervour begins to fade. Agitation can achieve more in the field of criticism than in that of construction, or, to finish with a truism, agitation cannot be the only instrument of reform. But it has its function. A final judgment as to its precise worth will depend on the value attached to 'correct thinking' and 'the good will' respectively. The difficulty of improving and perfecting this instrument is a part of the general problem of how to maximize correct thinking and good will in the same persons at the same time and for a single ideal end.

* It is instructive to contrast this world-wide agitation with Voltaire's similar effort on behalf of Calas when popular interest was less largely evoked. The difference marks the enhanced modern facility for agitation.

LITERATURE.—A. V. Dicey, *Law and Public Opinion in England*, 1905; B. K. Gray, *History of Eng. Philanthropy*, 1905 (esp. ch. viii. 'The Philanthropist as Agitator'); G. Le Bon, *Psychologie des Foules*, 1899; G. Tarde, *L'Opinion et la Foule*, 1899 (esp. § I. 'Le Public et la Foule'); I. Taylor, *Nat. Hist. of Enthusiasm*, 1842.

B. KIRKMAN GRAY

AGNOIOLOGY.—A term coined by Professor J. F. Ferrier in his *Institutes of Metaphysics* (1854), to denote the Theory of Ignorance in contrast to Epistemology (*q.v.*), also a term apparently coined by him (p. 48) to denote the Theory of Knowing. The conception of Agnoiology, as well as the name, was originated by Ferrier (pp. 50–51, 406, 435). Agnoiology is intended to meet the plea by which Ontology is often baffled, that Absolute Being—that which truly is—may be something of which we are ignorant (pp. 50, 406–408). This plea is met by showing that ignorance is an intellectual defect, and must, therefore, admit of a possible remedy. Consequently we cannot be ignorant of anything which cannot possibly be known. We cannot, for example, be ignorant of two straight lines enclosing a space. To be ignorant of them would imply that our ignorance might possibly be removed, and that they might thus be known. But they cannot be known, for they are contradictions, absurdities; and therefore also they cannot be things of which we are ignorant. For the same reason, matter by itself, that is, an object which is not related to any conscious intelligence, contradicts the very nature of knowledge. It is something which we cannot possibly know, and therefore cannot be ignorant of. Accordingly the conclusion of Agnoiology is that the only object of which we can be said to be ignorant is, like the real object of all knowledge, not what is commonly spoken of as an object in contradistinction from a subject, but that object in relation to an intelligent subject by whom it is known. Thus matter *and* mind, some object *plus* some subject, is the complete object of all ignorance as well as of all knowledge (p. 432). From this the ontological inference is that, as Absolute existence must be either that which we know or that of which we are ignorant, it can never be an object by itself or a subject by itself, but must always be a synthesis of the two (pp. 511–521).

The Agnoiology of Ferrier is thus by anticipation a critique of the system which soon afterwards came to be known as Agnosticism (*q.v.*). Ferrier's work appeared six years before Spencer's exposition of Agnosticism in his *First Principles*, and double that period before Huxley gave the system its unclassical name. Yet neither of these writers has attempted to grapple with Ferrier's critique, and in the vast literature of Agnosticism the critique has failed to receive the recognition which it certainly deserves. There is, therefore, no work to be consulted for Agnoiology besides the *Institutes of Metaphysics*. The above references are to the pages of the 3rd edition (1875).

J. CLARK MURRAY.

AGNOSTICISM.—1. **Meaning.**—The origin of the term is described by Huxley as follows:—

'When I reached intellectual maturity, and began to ask myself whether I was an atheist, a theist, or a pantheist; a materialist or an idealist; a Christian or a freethinker, I found that the more I learned and reflected, the less ready was the answer; until at last I came to the conclusion that I had neither art nor part with any of these denominations, except the last. The one thing in which most of these good people were agreed was the one thing in which I differed from them. They were quite sure they had attained a certain "gnosis"—had more or less successfully solved the problem of existence; while I was quite sure I had not, and had a pretty strong conviction that the problem was insoluble. And, with Hume and Kant on my side, I could not think myself presumptuous in holding fast by that opinion. This was my situation when I had the good fortune to find a place among the members of that remarkable confraternity of antagonists, long since deceased, but of green and pious memory, the Metaphysical Society. Every variety of philosophical and theological opinion

was represented there, and expressed itself with entire openness; most of my colleagues were *-ists* of one sort or another; and, however kind and friendly they might be, I, the man without a rag of a label to cover himself with, could not fail to have some of the uneasy feeling which must have beset the historical fox when, after leaving the trap in which his tail remained, he presented himself to his normally elongated companions. So I took thought, and invented what I conceived to be the appropriate title of "agnostic." It came into my head as suggestively antithetic to the "gnostic" of Church history, who professed to know so much about the very things of which I was ignorant; and I took the earliest opportunity of parading it at our Society, to show that I, too, had a tail, like the other foxes. To my great satisfaction, the term took; and when the *Spectator* had stood godfather to it, any suspicion in the minds of respectable people that a knowledge of its parentage might have awakened was, of course, completely lulled' (*Collected Essays*, vol. v. pp. 239, 240).

Mr. R. H. Hutton has given a slightly different account; he states that the word was 'suggested by Professor Huxley at a party held previous to the formation of the now defunct Metaphysical Society, at Mr. James Knowles' house on Clapham Common, one evening in 1869, in my hearing. He took it from St. Paul's mention of the altar to "the Unknown God"' (Murray's *New English Dictionary*).

These accounts demand a few brief comments. The inscription on the altar was 'the unknown,' not 'the unknowable God' (ἀγνώστῳ, not ἀγνωστικῷ θεῷ), and the term 'agnostic' is said to be linguistically incorrect. The Gnostics of Church History were so called in contempt because they opposed their extravagant speculations to the historical testimony of the Church; and in opposing Agnosticism to the knowledge of God claimed by Christian theism, Huxley suggests that it is an equally baseless fabric. There was no necessity for the introduction of the new term, as the familiar term 'scepticism' is almost synonymous with it, although Agnosticism restricts its doubt to a narrower sphere; not the possibility of all knowledge is denied, but only the possibility of any knowledge of ultimate reality. This restriction the term does not, however, indicate; nor has Huxley proved his right to impose on the term this arbitrary restriction. The flippancy also of the account must produce a painful impression.

It is as a refuge from the dread of Materialism that Huxley offers us this doubt of Agnosticism.

'For what, after all,' he asks, 'do we know of this terrible "matter," except as a name for the unknown and hypothetical cause of states of our own consciousness? And what do we know of that "spirit" over whose threatened extinction by matter a great lamentation is arising . . . except that it also is a name for an unknown and hypothetical cause, or condition, of states of consciousness? And what is the dire necessity and "iron" law under which men groan? Truly, most gratuitously invented bugbears. . . . Fact I know, and Law I know; but what is this necessity save an empty shadow of my own mind's throwing—something illegitimately thrust into the perfectly legitimate conception of law?'

Refusing to attempt any solution of the problem of ultimate reality, he very confidently declares the terms in which the immediate reality is to be interpreted.

'It is in itself of little moment whether we express the phenomena of matter in terms of spirit, or the phenomena of spirit in terms of matter—each statement has a certain relative truth. But with a view to the progress of science, the materialistic terminology is in every way to be preferred. For it connects thought with the other phenomena of the universe . . . whereas the alternative, or spiritualistic, terminology is utterly barren, and leads to nothing but obscurity and confusion of ideas. Thus there can be little doubt that the further science advances, the more extensively and consistently will all the phenomena of Nature be represented by materialistic formulæ and symbols' (*Collected Essays*, i. p. 159 ff.).

In the supposed interests of science he is prepared to sacrifice the real interests of morality and religion, although in determining the mode of explaining the world these supreme interests of the life of man have surely a prior right to be taken into consideration. Not only so, but he assumes that from the standpoint of 'spirit,' science will not get its due, whereas an idealist philosophy has no interest in traversing the conclusions of science in its own sphere—the explanation of phenomena. It is only when science attempts to be a philosophy of ultimate reality as well, that it comes into necessary conflict with a spiritualistic interpretation of the Universe. If all the phenomena of the Universe are known only as they exist for thought, it is not necessary to connect thought with these phenomena by reducing it to them, for there must ever be the essential connexion between it and them of the subject which knows and the objects which are known. Thought is not an alien in the Universe to be made at home only by a proof of its kinship with the material phenomena it knows. Nay, rather it alone holds the secret of relationship among all these phenomena; for Huxley is entirely without warrant in his assumption that a complete and adequate and consistent account of the Universe, even as phenomenal, can be given in the materialistic terminology. Life and Mind alike cannot be resolved into matter and force. This line of criticism belongs to the article on MATERIALISM; but it was necessary to indicate it so far in order to show on what unproved assumptions Huxley's agnosticism rests. The materialistic explanation, even he recognizes, cannot be accepted as a solution of the problem of ultimate reality. It is because he refuses to treat as seriously as it deserves, on account of its own sufficiency as well as for the interests it protects (morality, religion, etc.), the spiritualistic explanation, which does offer the solution, that he is compelled to assume, and even to make a boast of, his attitude of nescience.

2. Hume.—To understand *Agnosticism* as the modern phase of scepticism, it is not necessary to go further back than Hume, to whom Huxley confidently appeals: 'The fundamental doctrines of materialism, like those of spiritualism and most other "isms," lie outside the limits of philosophical inquiry; and David Hume's great service to humanity is his irrefragable demonstration of what these limits are.' Whether the demonstration is as irrefragable as Huxley thinks, we may inquire. Hume reduces all the contents of consciousness to 'perceptions,' and divides perceptions into 'impressions' and 'ideas.' The former include 'all our sensations, passions, and emotions' which are given us with a peculiar 'force and liveliness' by which we distinguish them from the latter, which are but their faint copies. In thinking, we connect impressions and ideas with one another, by such conceptions as causality and substance and subject. These cannot be derived from our sensations, the ultimate and exclusive source of knowledge. How does Hume account for these conceptions? He derives all such conceptions from custom. 'Because we are accustomed to see that one thing follows another in time, we conceive the idea that it *must* follow, and *from* it; of a relation of succession we make a relation of causality' (Schwegler's *Hist. of Philos.* p. 183). That any such connexion necessarily exists we have no right to affirm. 'All events,' Hume says, 'seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another, but we can never observe any tie between them. They seem conjoined, but never connected' (*Works*, A. & C. Black, 1854, iv. p. 84). 'Necessity,' he says elsewhere, 'is something that exists in the mind, not in objects' (i. p. 212). Without attempting to offer an ultimate reason for this custom, he recognizes it as a *universal principle of human nature*. Substance is explained in a similar way. 'The idea of a substance as well as that of a mode, is nothing but a collection of simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have a particular name assigned to them, by which we are able to recall, either to ourselves or others, that collection' (i. 31, 32). A consequence of this definition of substance is the denial of the reality of the external world. 'The opinion of external existence, if rested on natural instinct, is contrary to reason, and, if referred to reason, is

contrary to natural instinct, and carries no natural evidence with it to convince an impartial inquirer' (iv. 177). The subject fares no better. 'What we call a mind,' he says, 'is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with perfect simplicity and identity' (i. 260). Such radical scepticism could not offer any solid basis for a rational theism. While Hume expressed his satisfaction that 'our most holy religion is founded on Faith, not on Reason,' and personally professed belief in the existence of God; yet in his *Natural History of Religion* he sought to trace back the origin of belief in God to ignorance and superstitious fears; and in his *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* there can be little doubt he endeavoured to throw discredit on the theistic evidences. This apparently inconsistent position may be explained by the fact that his own scepticism, in spite of his philosophical principles and the conclusions which he so frankly and boldly drew from them, was not absolute, but mitigated; for he recognized, in practical life at least, 'the strong power of natural instinct' as lending sanction to common beliefs, for which no rational proof could be given.

3. Kant.—Although Kant set himself the task of answering Hume, yet his answer was so incomplete that Huxley claims Kant as well as Hume on his side. Opposed to Hume's scepticism in regard to the forms of sense and the categories of the understanding, Kant himself becomes sceptical as regards the ideas of reason.

'He conclusively showed that knowledge could not be reduced to sensations, and that intelligence implied in all its operations necessary conditions as well as contingent impressions, and so far he substantially disposed of the scepticism of Hume by proving its dependence on an inadequate and erroneous psychology. But when he proceeded to argue that the constitutive principles involved in knowledge have to do only with phenomena or states of conscious experience, but are wholly incapable of placing us face to face with things; that they have a merely subjective and relative value, but give us no information as to external reality; that, while useful in coordinating and unifying our perceptions, they in no degree justify our affirming that there is anything corresponding to these perceptions,—then he virtually undid his own work, and became not the conqueror, but the lineal successor of Hume' (Flint, *Agnosticism*, p. 141).

Into the details of Kant's criticism of Hume's scepticism it is unnecessary to enter (see KANT). Suffice it to say that Kant has shown once for all that the connective principles, by which the contents of consciousness are combined in an intelligible, rational unity, belong of necessity to the mind itself. Sensation does not give them; custom cannot bring them into being; the very possibility of consciousness depends on them; they are not casual results of, but necessary conditions for, any experience. Nevertheless he distinguishes the 'thing-in-itself' from the thing as it is for our knowledge; and thus the necessary constitution of the mind makes a knowledge of the reality as it is impossible. This sceptical element appears more prominently in Kant's treatment of the ideas of the reason. 'The mind from the very nature of its intellectual constitution necessarily assumes the unity of the soul, the existence of the universe (the totality of phenomena), and the reality of a First Cause' (*ib.* p. 163), and nevertheless the ideas are only *regulative*, and not *constitutive*. By them we can give the rational unity to our experience which is the aim of all thinking; but we are not at liberty to regard these ideas as clues to reality, or as proofs of the existence of world, self, or God. Kant's criticism of the rational theology of the age (the cosmological, teleological, and ontological arguments) will be duly taken account of in the treatment of Theism. Here it need not further concern us. It is true that in his *Critique of the Practical Reason* he restores the ideas of God, freedom and immortality, as postulates of the moral consciousness; yet his conception of reason as theoretical is in its final issue sceptical. German idealism laid hold on the antisceptical aspect of the Kantian philosophy; but in more recent Neo-Kantian movements the sceptical aspects have again come to the front. Against Kant's position it may be urged that the reason which, by its very constitution, is debarred from knowing reality as it is, and which in its final unifying exercise is necessarily illusive, is so grotesque a conception, that so great a thinker can be excused its creation only on the ground that, as a pioneer in new ways of thinking, he could not himself realize whither he was allowing himself by his tortuous reasoning to be led. The division of the mind into sense, understanding, reason, is an unreal abstraction; the separation of the pure from the practical reason is opposed to more recent developments of psychology, which recognize the control of the *cognitive* by the *conative* aspect of personality. If mind be a unity, the illusiveness of the ideas of the pure reason would attach to the postulates of the practical reason; and the categories of understanding and forms of sense must fall under the same condemnation. What the Hegelian Logic does is to develop the most concrete conceptions out of the simplest, and to identify this mental process with the evolution of the Universe—some interpreters would say even of God Himself. If here 'vaulting ambition doth o'erleap itself,' yet, with greater modesty, it may be claimed that experience itself warrants the assumption that in the process of thinking the mind does penetrate more deeply into the reality of things; for the system of nature which science builds is not contradicted, but confirmed, by the course of nature itself. That the world is one and the self is one is an assumption that is ever finding verification in experience. Not only is the self one as the subject of consciousness, but it is one as a character which is being formed, as a personality which is being developed. If this be so, then the practical as well as the theoretical need of a final unification of the world and life in the conception of God, fully justifies the assumption of God's existence. What makes reality as we know it most intelligible cannot, without an absolute scepticism, such as the positive elements of Kant's analysis forbid, be denied reality. Kant should have been more, or not at all, sceptical.

4. Comte.—The positivism of Comte is necessarily agnostic; but as it is discussed in another article (see POSITIVISM), all that need be said about it in this connexion may be put in a few sentences. Both the theological and the metaphysical explanations of the world are condemned as superseded stages in the development of human thought. The positive stage does not connect phenomena by the principles of causality and substance; it only observes sequences and resemblance. The custom, which Hume recognizes as universal, of thus connecting phenomena is in positive thought to be expressly avoided. Nevertheless, Comte assumes the uniformity and constancy of the laws of phenomena, as taught by experience, although what warrant can be given for such an assumption, if no objective connexion of phenomena may be asserted, it would be impossible to discover. With glaring inconsistency he resolves mental into material phenomena, thus applying the category of causality which he himself had relegated to the metaphysical stage. Kant's vindication of the necessity for thought of these connective principles is a convincing answer to Comte's positivism.

5. Hamilton.—Hamilton, although in his general philosophical position a follower of Reid, had read Kant without thoroughly understanding him,

and developed the sceptical elements in his system. While the Divine nature cannot be known, the Divine existence may be believed, as our moral nature and the Scriptures testify. We can believe *that* God is, without knowing *what* He is. He goes so far as to affirm that 'to think that God is as we can think Him to be is blasphemy. The last and highest consecration of all true religion must be an altar *ἀγνώστῳ θεῷ*, To the unknown and unknowable God.' That there is no warrant for such an application of the inscription on the altar at Athens, has already been shown. If the endeavour to think what God is is blasphemy, then not only all theology but even all religion must be convicted of it. The recognition in all humility and sincerity that God cannot be perfectly known by the imperfect mind of man is characteristic of all genuine piety; but that does not involve the admission, which is something altogether different, that God cannot be known at all. Hamilton must turn elsewhere than to religion, and theology as its interpreter, for a justification of his sweeping statement. From his own philosophy he draws the following arguments: (1) As all knowledge is relative in two senses, all objects being related to one another, and also related to the subject knowing, God as the absolute, out of all relations, cannot be known. But to think God as absolute is not to think of Him as out of all relations, but as Himself constituting all His relations; and His relation as object to the thinking mind as subject is not necessarily one in which He, as He really is, is concealed and not revealed; for, as Creator, it is more likely He would make mind capable of knowing Him. As has already been insisted on in criticising Kant, the thing-in-itself, reality as it is, has not a foreign distorting and obscuring element added to it when it is known; but even from the data of sense the thinking mind can construct the object as it is. The *phenomenal* as perceived is completed in the *noumenal* as conceived, and in the latter reality is known as it is, which is not the case in the former. (2) As the only possible object of knowledge and positive thought is the conditioned and the limited, the Infinite as *the unconditionally unlimited*, and the Absolute as *the unconditionally limited* cannot be known or positively thought. But is there any justification for so defining the Infinite and Absolute, and still more for identifying such verbal abstractions with the conception of God? God has a definite nature, distinct attributes, characteristic operations, and to think God is not to think an abstraction at all. His infinitude and absoluteness mean self-limitation and self-conditioning. Since for our knowledge and our thought all existence, save God, is conditioned and limited by other existence, the mind cannot find rest until it conceives such self-limitation and self-determination. It may be said that the mind not only can but must think the Infinite and Absolute, that is, God. (3) As has already been indicated, the Infinite and Absolute are both so defined as to be a mere 'negation of thought'; but as the necessity and legitimacy of so defining these terms have been challenged, his conclusion that God as Infinite and Absolute cannot be known or thought falls to the ground. Both are positive conceptions, and both are necessary to complete our positive thinking about the world as conditioned and limited. As correlative conceptions, finite and infinite, relative and absolute, may claim to be equally known and mutually illuminative. (4) He concedes that although by reason we may not know God, yet we believe that God is an authority, which yields us 'the original data of reason.' This faith rests on 'a mental impotency.' To state his amazing argument in his own words: 'The conditioned is the mean between two extremes—two inconditionates exclusive of each other, neither of which can be conceived as possible, but of which, on the principle of contradiction, and excluded middle, one must be admitted as necessary. We are thus warned from recognizing the domain of our knowledge as necessarily coextensive with the horizon of our faith. And by a *wonderful revelation* we are thus, in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the relative and the finite, *inspired with a belief in* the existence of something unconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensible reality' (*Discussions*, p. 15). It has already been shown that the Infinite and Absolute are not *inconditionates*; but if they were, how can positive thought be the mean of notions that are 'a mere negation of thought'? How to these can there be applied any of the laws of thought? If we cannot define these notions, how can we affirm that they contradict or exclude one another? Or, in fact, how can we base any sort of argument on the unknowable and unthinkable? One cannot but feel that most of this argument is merely verbal jugglery.

6. Mansel.—Nevertheless, Hamilton found a follower in Mansel, who adopted his philosophy so far as he could use it for an avowedly apologetic Christian purpose. He believed that he could best cut the ground from under the feet of any objectors to the Christian revelation, by showing that in these matters human reason was quite incapable of offering an opinion. He set himself to answer in the negative this question: 'Whether the human mind be capable of acquiring such a knowledge as can warrant it in deciding either *for* or *against* the claims of any professed revelation, as containing a true or a false representation of the Divine Nature and Attributes?' (1) The first argument Mansel advances is that reason is not entitled to criticise the contents of revealed religion unless it can prove itself capable of conceiving the nature of God, that is, of constructing a philosophy of the Infinite and the Absolute. This is an extravagant demand. The moral insight and spiritual discernment which qualify a man to judge of a doctrine, whether it be of God or not, are very much more general and simple than the speculative capacity, not to say audacity, which can and dares undertake to find out God unto perfection. (2) Having made this demand, he seeks in his second argument to prove that neither psychologically—from a study of the mental faculties of man—nor metaphysically—from the knowledge man can get of the nature of God—can it be met. This second argument loses its validity with the disproof of the first. Both by looking within and by turning without can man get such glimpses of God as make real religion possible; and he need not, therefore, concern himself about the question whether he can or can not construct a philosophy of the Infinite and Absolute. (3) Having demanded a philosophy of the Infinite and Absolute, and demonstrated its impossibility, Mansel next concentrates attention on the conceptions of the Infinite and Absolute, and seeks to show how contradictory they are. How can human thought distinguish in the Absolute, as one and simple, a plurality of attributes? If the Infinite is free of all possible limitations, how can it coexist with the finite? The conception of God as First Cause, as involving the limitation of its effect, is irreconcilable with the conception of the Infinite. But all this playing with words fails to mislead, if we look steadily at realities and keep our eyes off abstractions. If we define, as we may and should, the Infinite and Absolute as the fulness of being, life, mind, power, which is distinguished from relative and finite existence in that it is self-conditioned and self-limited, not determined either positively

or negatively by that which is not itself, this whole scholastic structure falls to the ground. (4) Turning from these conceptions, Mansel then seeks by an analysis of the universal conditions of human consciousness to prove that the Infinite and Absolute cannot be its object. 'Consciousness is the relation of an object to a subject and to other objects, but the idea of the Absolute precludes all such relation. Further, our consciousness is subject to the laws of space and time, and cannot therefore think the thought of a Being not likewise subject to them' (Pfleiderer's *Development of Theology*[2], 1893, p. 327). But to be known by a mind which He has endowed with the capacity of knowing Him is no limitation of God's Infinitude. As the Absolute, God is not without relations, but only as related to Him do all things exist, consist, persist. Man's consciousness of time and space implies the correlative conceptions of eternity and immensity. This argument, further, is inconsistent with the claim that man may and should believe *that* God is, even although he cannot know *what* God is, as belief is a state of consciousness, even as knowledge is. (5) Mansel denied, to state briefly some of his conclusions, the moral likeness between God and man, and therefore the possibility of man's judging by reason or conscience what claimed to be the revealed mind and will of God; he admitted the possibility of moral as of physical miracle, that is, the suspension of the laws of right as of force; he rested the claim of the Scriptures to be accepted entirely on external evidences; he thus sought to protect the orthodoxy of his time from attack by a moral and religious scepticism, which, if taken seriously, would be fatal alike to goodness and godliness.

7. **Herbert Spencer.**—Herbert Spencer attaches himself in some of his arguments to Hamilton and Mansel; but his interest is altogether different from theirs. He is not seeking to protect revealed religion against attack from philosophy, but to vindicate the materialistic method of modern science as the only valid method of interpreting the Universe. His motive is not, however, irreligious, as his desire is to reconcile religion and science, and he is confident that he has called a truce to their age-long conflict. As the most influential of the exponents of Agnosticism, he claims a fuller treatment and closer criticism than any of the writers already mentioned. Following step by step his discussion of the Unknowable in his *First Principles*, we must consider the following questions:—(1) Does he correctly indicate the relation of science and religion, so as to be warranted in his assumption of the conception which alone can reconcile them? (2) Does the inconceivability of the ultimate religious and scientific ideas lie in their very nature, or only in his statement of them? (3) Is his use of the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge valid, and does it strengthen his conclusion that God is unknowable? (4) Does this reconciliation of science and religion do justice to religion?

(1) In the first chapter Spencer argues that science and religion are co-ordinate, the sphere of the former being what is known, and of the latter that which, though in consciousness, yet transcends knowledge; that each must 'recognize the claims of the other as standing for truths that cannot be ignored'; and that a reconciliation can be effected only by the discovery that what is the ultimate fact, and the first principle of each, is common to both. It is in the most abstract truth of religion and the most abstract truth of science that, he holds, the two coalesce. His claim that science occupies the whole realm of the knowable, so that for religion is left only the region of the unknowable, must at once be challenged. For the self-conscious personality the categories of science—force, matter, law—are not adequate; and within the realm of the knowable even categories—life, mind, will—must be employed to which physical science does not do justice. Religion contributes a conception, God, to the interpretation of the knowable, which cannot be got rid of by this arbitrary division of the provinces of science and religion. Not a truth common to science and religion is what we have to look for, still less the most abstract truth; but, on the contrary, the abstract categories of science must be supplemented and corrected by the much more concrete categories of philosophy, morality, and religion. It is the same reality which science explains and religion interprets; but the explanation of science is completed in the interpretation of religion. Matter, force, law are less intelligible conceptions than mind, will, personality, God; for the self-conscious spirit of man finds itself in the latter as it cannot in the former. To confine knowledge to objects of sense and such connexions between them as the understanding, with its categories of quantity, quality, relation (substance and causality), may constitute, and to exclude from knowledge the larger and loftier conceptions of a teleology of nature, of a personality in man, and, above all, of the all-embracing, all-sustaining, all-directing, and all-illuminating reality, God, is altogether an arbitrary proceeding. It has already been criticised in dealing with Kant's scepticism regarding the ideas of the pure reason. To deny all value to the knowledge religion claims is necessarily to challenge the validity of the knowledge allowed to science.

(2) Spencer's proof in the second chapter, that science must end in nescience, and religion must be content with awe of the Unknowable, is as follows:

(*a*) Conceptions are symbolic, when their whole content cannot at once be represented to the mind. These are legitimate, if we can assure ourselves 'by some cumulative or indirect process of thought, or by the fulfilment of predictions based on them,' that there are actualities corresponding to them. Otherwise they are to be condemned as vicious and illusive, and cannot be distinguished from pure fictions. Here, it is evident, he tries to limit conception to representation (*Vorstellung*), and to exclude the idea or notion (*Begriff*). But regarding this restriction, which, it must be emphatically stated, the world's greatest thinkers have not denied because it never occurred to them that it could be made, there are some questions which may reasonably be asked. Is man's thought to be limited to what he can image to himself? Having started from sense-objects, is that alone knowledge for him which can be referred to sense-objects? Or, beginning with these, has he not the right, nay, does it not rest on him as a necessity of his mind, to bring into clearness of consciousness all that is implied in this rudimentary knowledge, whether the ideas so attained have corresponding images or not? Does not his own inner life furnish him with spiritual conceptions, which, although they have no corresponding sensible actualities, are not only bound up with his most real and permanent personal interests, but even make more intelligible to him the world of sense around him, and help him to discover its meaning, worth, and aim? As Kant has surely conclusively shown, the mind has its own connective principles, which, underived from and inexplicable by experience, are yet necessary to experience. If knowledge were as Spencer restricts it, the conditions of its possibility would be excluded from it.

(*b*) Having prejudged the question by this definition of the conceivable, Spencer proceeds to deal

with the ultimate religious conceptions concerning the origin and the nature of the Universe, and maintains that 'a critical examination will prove not only that no current hypothesis is tenable, but also that no tenable hypothesis can be framed' (p. 30). The Atheistic hypothesis of a self-existent Universe is inconceivable, as it explains one mystery by another; so is the Pantheistic, for 'really to conceive self-existence is to conceive potential existence passing into actual existence by some inherent necessity, which we cannot do.' As regards the Theistic hypothesis, the analogy with human art is properly set aside, as this does not produce its own materials. 'The production of matter out of nothing is the mystery.' Granted an 'external agency,' that must be accounted for; and we must assume 'self-existence,' and that is 'rigorously inconceivable.'

This statement calls for several comments. *First*, it is altogether illegitimate to identify the ultimate religious conceptions with theories of the origin of the Universe; for these theories hold an altogether secondary place in religion, and religion possesses an inward witness of kinship and fellowship with God which is quite independent of them. *Secondly*, what Spencer calls the theistic solution is rather the deistic, for which God is an 'external agency,' and the solution of Christian theism combines the thesis of pantheism (immanence) and the antithesis of deism (transcendence) in the synthesis of a conception of God as unity-in-difference—a conception which certainly does not conform to Spencer's arbitrary rule of conceivability, but which for many thinkers of clear vision is altogether luminous. *Thirdly*, theism is not required to conceive the production of matter out of nothing, as it is not committed to the assertion of an ultimate, absolute dualism of matter and mind, but can conceive the possibility of matter as in God as Spirit. *Lastly*, that 'self-existence is rigorously inconceivable' is an unwarranted assertion, as dependent existence inevitably leads thought to conceive an existence on which there is dependence, but which is not itself dependent. It is because the existence that explains itself can alone satisfy our thought that we are led, by the application of the category of causality, to seek for existence that does not so explain itself an explanation beyond itself.

(*c*) After having thus endeavoured to show that all theories of the origin of the Universe are untenable, Spencer fixes his attention on the nature of the Universe. We must assume a First Cause, which is Infinite and Absolute; and, nevertheless, these concepts, all equally necessary, are yet mutually contradictory. Here he borrows freely from Mansel, and indulges in the same verbal jugglery, the futility of which has already been shown. The conclusion, which is supported by such arguments, is put forward as having the support of the religious consciousness itself. 'Not only is the omnipresence of something which passes comprehension that most abstract belief which is common to all religions, which becomes the more distinct in proportion as they develop, and which remains after their discordant elements have been mutually cancelled, but it is that belief which the most unsparing criticism of each leaves unquestionable, or rather makes it ever clearer' (p. 45). Although it may be admitted that the conception of God has changed, as it necessarily must, since man's thought is dependent on experience, yet it must be maintained that the progress has been mainly positive and not negative. Growing knowledge of self and of the world does necessarily correct the conception of God, bringing it into closer harmony with experience; but this conception of God is not less but more rational, moral, spiritual; it answers the question of the mind, the longings of the heart, and the needs of the life more and not less adequately. The religious consciousness will assuredly not sustain the contention that 'this deepest, widest, and most certain of facts that the Power which the Universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable.'

(*d*) It is not necessary for the present purpose to follow Spencer in his proof, in the third chapter, that the ultimate scientific ideas are also inconceivable; a closer examination would show that all the difficulties are due to an inadequate method of thought, which tries in vain to reduce the concrete complexity of existence to an abstract simplicity of conception. To give but one instance, he tries to prove that the self which knows cannot itself be known, for the relativity of knowledge involves as ultimate the distinction of subject and object. But that subject and object may be discriminated, it is necessary that both be embraced in the unity of consciousness; in self-consciousness that unity is still unity-in-difference, as the self is object to itself as subject; and it is mere word-play to affirm that the self cannot both be intelligible and intelligent. In fact, self-consciousness is the ideal knowledge, the perfect accord of thinking and being. Assuming for the sake of argument that the ultimate ideas of science are inconceivable, why does Spencer not draw the same conclusion for science and religion? Science with inconceivable ultimate ideas possesses the realm of the knowable; religion with inconceivable ultimate ideas must content itself with the unknowable. How can a system of knowledge be based on inconceivable ideas in one case, and nescience be the necessary result in the other? The proximate ideas of religion—the phenomena of the religious life—have as much claim to be treated as data of knowledge as the perceptions of the outer world with which science occupies itself. This scepticism regarding ultimate ideas undermines science as much as religion.

(3) The argument in the fourth chapter, based on the relativity of knowledge, is borrowed from Hamilton and Mansel. 'The inference,' says Spencer, 'which we find forced upon us when we analyse the product of thought as exhibited objectively in scientific generalization, is equally forced upon us by an analysis of the process of thought as exhibited subjectively in consciousness' (p. 74).

(*a*) The analysis of the product of thought leads to this conclusion. 'Of necessity, therefore, our explanation must eventually bring us down to the inexplicable. The deepest truth which we can get at must be unaccountable. Comprehension must become something other than comprehension before the ultimate fact can be comprehended.' This ultimate fact, he assumes, will be 'some highly general fact respecting the constitution of matter of which chemical, electrical, and thermal facts are merely different manifestations.' The method of explanation here taken for granted is entirely false. To discover what is common to all phenomena, and to ignore their differences from one another, is not to explain them. The logical universal does not at all account for the particulars it embraces. The abstraction man does not help us to comprehend Cæsar, Paul, Luther, Napoleon. It is the most concrete unity—that which combines the most numerous and varied differences in a system within itself—that is the ultimate fact which not only explains all, but is itself explicable. Not in the divorce of existence and intelligence can thought be brought to a halt; but only in such a conception as makes reality most fully rational can its goal be found. Spencer, in looking away from concrete differences to an abstract unity, is looking in the wrong direction for the ultimate fact. Explanation, to be adequate, must be synthetic and not analytic; it must end not in a generalization, but in a system.

(*b*) In the analysis of consciousness, the relativity of knowledge is said to imply two kinds of relation—the relation of object to subject, and the relation of objects to one another. Because a thing is known only in such relations, Spencer argues that it cannot be known in itself, whatever that may mean. This assumption, that the knowledge of reality adds to reality an element so foreign that

consequently as known it is other than it is as unknown, is an absurdity which has already been sufficiently exposed. Spencer adopts Hamilton's objection, that God as the Absolute must be known either as subject or as object, or as the indifference of both. But what forbids our thinking of God—the object of our knowledge—in so far as God Himself has distinguished our consciousness from His own—as the subject which thinks all things as existent by His will? We as subjects knowing God are, for God, objects which do not limit His infinitude, or determine His absoluteness, because He knows us as existent in distinction from Himself by His own self-determination and self-limitation. Our intelligence which seeks God as its object, and which, on the assumption that the Universe is a manifestation and not a concealment of God, believes that it knows God, must be by God's act delusive, if God does not manifest Himself as He is. It would require much more cogent arguments than these verbal juggleries of Spencer to convince us that God made intelligences in such wise that He Himself could never become intelligible to them. Enough has already been said also about the second sense in which the relativity of knowledge is used. To conceive God is not to think a Being out of all relations, but a Being whose reality is revealed in His relations, constituted by Himself.

(*c*) While agreeing with Hamilton in this argument from the relativity of knowledge, Spencer differs from him in asserting that the unrelated, though inconceivable, is yet a constituent element of thought. 'Our notion of the Limited,' he says, 'is composed, firstly, of a consciousness of some kind of being, and, secondly, of the consciousness of the limits under which it is known. In the antithetical notion of the Unlimited, the consciousness of limits is abolished, but not the consciousness of some kind of being. It is quite true that in the absence of conceived limits this consciousness ceases to be a concept properly so called, but it is none the less true that it remains as a mode of consciousness' (p. 90). He then tells us that this something is constituted by 'combining successive concepts deprived of their limits and conditions' (p. 95). Here a logical abstraction is supposed to be a reality, and even the reality that explains all; but, as has already been shown, God, to explain the Universe, must be conceived as the concrete unity which embraces all differences, and relates them to one another.

(4) Spencer hopes, in the fifth chapter, that 'in the assertion of a Reality utterly inscrutable in nature,' science and religion will be reconciled. Science is to admit the existence, religion the inscrutable nature of this reality. He thinks that this will not be a vain appeal, as his understanding of the history of religion is that it is developing in this direction. How mistaken he is needs no proof. The religious consciousness does recognize that the abysmal depths of the Divine cannot be fathomed by the human mind; but it does not admit that the truth about God it claims to possess is an illusion. Religious knowledge is valid and valuable, though imperfect and incomplete. Spencer requires religion to give up the conception of God as personal. 'It is just possible,' he says, 'that there is a mode of being as much transcending Intelligence and Will as these transcend mechanical motion.' Nevertheless, he insists on interpreting the Universe which is the manifestation of the ultimate reality as mechanical motion. Rejecting the highest conceivable category as too low for the reality, he insists on applying to its manifestations the lowest conceivable category. He represents the inscrutable mystery as *causal energy*, while declining to describe it as Intelligent Will. His system is materialistic rather than idealistic. He gets rid of the personality of religion to substitute not a higher but a lower conception in interpreting the Universe. In surrendering the personality of God, religion surrenders everything; in admitting the existence of this reality, science is in no way restrained in its explanation of the world in terms of matter and motion. In this reconciliation religion loses, science gains, everything.

In the criticism of the authors passed in review the objections to Agnosticism have been stated. But a brief summary may be allowed at the close. The materialistic explanation for which it seeks to find room is inadequate to account for life, mind, morality, religion. The idealistic explanation which it seeks to shut out not only does justice to the highest interests of life, but makes more intelligible the whole process of the Universe as an evolution of spirit. The theory of knowledge on which it rests is sceptical in its result, and this scepticism must extend to science as well as to philosophy and theology. The trust in the reason of man, on which the proof of God's existence rests, is as necessary to give validity to the conclusions of science. The arguments from the relativity of knowledge, the conditionateness of thought, the negative character of the conceptions of the Infinite and Absolute, have the futility of scholastic abstractions and verbal subtleties, and show no direct contact with any intelligible reality. The religious consciousness is altogether misrepresented when it is claimed as confirming the conclusion of the inscrutable nature of the alternate reality. More recent philosophical developments encourage the expectation that Agnosticism will soon be a superseded mode of thought.

LITERATURE.—The works of the authors discussed should be consulted; also Leslie Stephen's *An Agnostic's Apology* (1893). In all books of Christian Apologetics some attention is given to the subject. Specially to be commended are Flint's *Agnosticism* (1903), and Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism*[2] (1903).

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

AGNOSTICISM (Buddhist). — One of the most important and, in some ways, most obscure questions in Buddhism is whether the Buddha was an agnostic, in the sense that he refused to express an opinion upon a future life (transmigration) and on the state of the Buddha after death, and preached only the attainment of '*nirvāṇa* upon earth.' We propose, in the first instance, to describe the authorities bearing upon this question, then to discuss them, and finally to draw conclusions.

I. Authorities.—1. When Buddha is asked by King Ajātaśatru what are the actual fruits of a 'religious life' (or life of a monk, *śrāmaṇya*),* he gives an answer in which there is nothing metaphysical. He regards the question, as his interlocutor desires, from the point of view of the present life. In the first place, the monastic state confers a great dignity on the person who assumes it. The slave who has become a monk is honoured by his former master; in the same way the free man is relieved from private cares. There is, however, something better: good conduct, mastery over oneself, food and clothing in sufficiency but without excess, produce a rich contentment.† And there is something better still: the practice of successive 'trances' (*dhyāna*), the knowledge which accompanies them, and the annihilation of all passion, the attainment, in a word, of the state of an *arhat* or of *nirvāṇa* upon earth—these are the sublime fruits of the monastic life.

* See the *Sāmaññaphalasutta*, Dīgha, i. pp. 47–86, translated by various scholars, and recently by Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, pp. 56–95, with an Introduction.

† There are many charming descriptions of the happiness of life in the forest among the trees, which are more kindly and complaisant than men (see *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*, ch. ix.).

2. This sketch of the monastic life will perhaps be more correctly understood if compared with the sentiments expressed by the Buddha when he is questioned on metaphysical subjects. The examples are numerous, and at times widely divergent. We shall confine ourselves to a discussion of the most remarkable. Perhaps the most characteristic is that related in the *Mahāvagga*.* The Buddha is addressed as follows: 'You are said to teach the doctrine of annihilation [that is to say, that there is no life after death, and no future retribution for the deeds done upon earth]. Is that true?' 'I teach,' replied the master, 'the annihilation of desire. . . .' There is thus a kind of play upon words; and this passage, in which the problem of the future life is curtly dismissed, confirms the impression left by the dialogue as summarized above.

3. In the 'Net of Brahmā'† the Buddha enunciates a series of propositions, of which some at least are of historical and doctrinal worth. They are presented as strange and alien to Buddhism; and, while some are more specifically condemned, the series as a whole is rejected. The following is the order:—

(1) (*a*) The universe and the soul are eternal (*śāśvatavāda*) in the sense that they have had no beginning,—a belief founded upon the fact that some saints have memory of their previous existences.

(*b*) The universe and the soul are, at one and the same time, eternal and non-eternal, either because Brahmā, the creator of the universe, has neither beginning nor end, while other beings are perishable, or because the soul is eternal and the body perishable.

(2) The universe is (*a*) limited in space, (*b*) unlimited, (*c*) unlimited at the sides and limited towards the top and the bottom, (*d*) neither limited nor unlimited [the contradiction is not explained].

(3) It is possible to refuse to choose between four propositions (affirmation, denial, simultaneous affirmation of the affirmative and negative, simultaneous denial of the affirmative and the negative) with reference to (*a*) the existence of another world, (*b*) the reality of 'apparitional beings,'‡ (*c*) the fruit of actions, (*d*) the renewed life of the man who is set free from desire, *i.e.* of the *arhat*. This refusal is said to be a sign of stupidity and sophistry. Teachers of such doctrine are 'slippery as eels.'

(4) The soul has no cause, that is, it appears in the present world without having passed through a previous existence. In the same way the present evolution of the universe has had no antecedents.§

(5) The soul has, after death, (*a*) conscious existence, conceived under sixteen different aspects; (*b*) unconscious existence, under eight different aspects; (*c*) existence neither conscious nor unconscious, under eight different aspects; or (*d*) it is annihilated at death (seven distinct theories, corresponding to seven classes of souls).

(6) Some maintain that *nirvāṇa* is attained in this life (*diṭṭhadhammanibbāna*), conceived as the possession either of the pleasures of the senses,* or of the first, etc., up to the fourth ecstasy (*dhyāna*).†

These opinions regarding the past and the future are theories (*dṛṣṭi* = *θεωρία*).‡ The Buddha knows the consequences which they entail upon those who adopt them; they form the net in which the ignorant are caught, beginning with Brahmā, who believes himself to be eternal! The Buddha knows far better things, viz., the origin and the end of sensations, and the means of escaping them. He ends by saying that he has destroyed every germ of re-birth in himself; so long as his body lives, it is seen by gods and men; after his death neither gods nor men will see him.

4. Of all the questions raised in the 'Net of Brahmā' only ten appear in the *Majjhima Nikāya*, i. 426.§ These are especially important, for with slight modifications they constitute the list of fourteen questions to which no reply is allowed.‖

(1) Eternity of the universe: Is it eternal? Is it non-eternal?

(2) Infinity of the universe: Is it infinite? Is it finite?

(3) The vital principle (*jīva*) and the body: Are they identical? Are they non-identical?

(4) Continued life of the Tathāgata, *i.e.* the *arhat*, the saint, 'he whose thought is emancipated': Does he survive death? Does he not survive? Must we assert of such an one at the same time survival and non-survival of death? Must we deny both?

Māluṅkya is sufficiently curious to insist on obtaining an answer to these questions, which he regards as fundamental. The Buddha refuses to reply. He has withheld information on the questions of the eternity or otherwise of the universe,

* vi. 31; trans. in Vinaya Texts, *SBE* xvii. p. 108 ff.

† *Brahmajālasutta*, Dīghanikāya, i. pp. 1–46, trans. by Rhys Davids, *Dialogues*: 'The Perfect Net.' A Sanskrit redaction of this sūtra is known by a quotation in the *Abhidharmakośa*, see Minayeff, *Mélanges Asiatiques de St. Pétersbourg*, vi. 577 ff. The sūtra seems to get its name from the fact that it explains how Brahmā, believing himself to be the creator, is caught in the net of error. On the same principle a series of errors is explained. Possibly the Sanskrit sūtra did not contain the first part of the Pāli edition, as it is quoted as *śīlaskandhikā* (*JRAS*, 1906, pp. 444–446), and occurs in several suttas of the Dīgha.

‡ Those that appear without being begotten according to ordinary laws. Either they issue from lotuses, as was the case with the heroes of numerous legends, or the reference is to the first beings, or the inhabitants of such and such a paradise, etc. . . . or perhaps the Bodhisattva in his last birth, as he takes up his abode of his own free will in the womb of Māyādevī. In the later dogmatism, to deny the other world, apparitional beings, actions (good or bad), or the arhat, is *mithyādṛṣṭi* (heresy), which destroys the roots of merit.

§ The Brāhmans very often object to Buddhism that it admits the production of being out of not-being (*asataḥ sat jāyate*). But this objection is not supported by any Buddhist authorities.

* As a matter of fact, the pseudo-Buddhism of the Tantras identifies supreme bliss or *nirvāṇa* with sexual enjoyment.

† Strictly speaking, the possession of the fourth trance is not '*nirvāṇa* upon earth,' because this possession is a momentary one. But we may assume that this definition of '*nirvāṇa* upon earth,' is very like the orthodox conception.

‡ That is to say, erroneous views and speculations; not that there may not be, in a certain sense, a past and a future, a conscious future life, a '*nirvāṇa* upon earth,' but this past and this future are not the past and future of an *ego* given as permanent. This comment follows the *Madhyamakavṛtti*, ch. xxvii., and the dogmatic teaching of the Pāli Suttas.

§ *Chūla-māluṅkya-ovāda*, translated by Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, p. 117, and by Oldenberg, *Buddha*, p. 274 f. See also 'Mahālisutta,' in *Dialogues*, p. 187.

‖ The fourteen 'unelucidated topics' (*avyākṛtavastu*) of the Sanskrit Buddhist literature are the same as these, with the addition of four concerning the eternity and the infinity of the universe (viz., Is it at one and the same time eternal and non-eternal? or is it neither eternal nor non-eternal?), and the difference that the questions concerning the Tathāgata precede those on the vital principle (see below, p. 224, note ‡).

Oldenberg has proved that, in many cases, 'world' must be interpreted as the 'ego' (*Buddha*, p. 271, Fr. trans.[2] p. 263). In any case *loka* means *sattvaloka*, world of the living, and not *bhājanaloka*, world-receptacle of living beings. On the other hand, we have seen that 'eternal' is equivalent to 'without beginning.' It is noteworthy that the Sanskrit authorities define 'infinite' as 'having no end in time,' contrary to the interpretation of the Sutta quoted above. The questions, then, regarding infinity will be understood as follows: Will all beings attain *nirvāṇa*? Will no being attain *nirvāṇa*? Will some beings attain *nirvāṇa*, while others will not? Is it false to say that some beings attain *nirvāṇa* and that others do not?

As regards the relations of the *jīva* and *śarīra*, it is difficult to determine the original meaning of the words and the bearing of the question. Certainly nothing is more alien to Buddhist doctrine than to identify the 'vital organ' or 'vital principle' (*jīvitendriya*) with the body. By *jīva* Buddhism understands the personal and so-called permanent principle denoted by the technical word *pudgala*. *Śarīra* denotes the *rūpaskandha*, 'the element of form,' and, by extension, the other *skandhas* (bodily elements under different aspects: sensation, etc.). From the very remarkable fact that the Buddha, on the subject of the *jīva-śarīra*, condemned both the denial and the affirmation of their identity, but was silent upon the doctrines of 'identity and non-identity' and 'neither identity nor non-identity,' the

etc., because knowledge on this point does not help in any way towards the annihilation of the passions.

5. In the 'Dialogue of Vaccha'* we observe a slightly different attitude on the part of Buddha. When questioned as to the ten points above specified, he condemns the ten 'theories'; they produce suffering, and do not help towards the annihilation of the passions. He himself has no 'theories' (*diṭṭhi*); his teaching (*diṭṭha*, his knowledge) embraces the *skandhas* only (Pāli *khandhas*), the constituent elements of beings, their beginning and their end. In fact, as has been pointed out, all the 'theories' connected with the past or future, and the identity or survival after death of the Ego, presuppose the existence of the Ego. But this Ego does not exist in itself; there is only an aggregation, a complex of *skandhas*.

Vaccha insists, and returning to the four questions concerning the existence after death of the Tathāgata, who is here denoted by a descriptive term, *vimuttachitta*, 'he whose thought is set free,' he receives a formal answer: 'It is wrong to say that the Tathāgata exists after death, wrong to say that he does not exist, wrong to assert survival and the contrary, wrong to deny both.' Vaccha fails to comprehend this, and the Buddha explains: 'Can it be said of an extinguished flame that it has gone to the right or to the left . . . ? Similarly in the Tathāgata there exists no matter, no *skandha* which one could name when speaking of the Tathāgata; and being alien to every conception of matter and *skandhas*, the Tathāgata is deep, immeasurable,† unfathomable, like the great ocean. It is wrong to say that he exists after death, wrong to say that he does not exist . . .'

That is to say, if we understand correctly, it is impossible either to assert or deny, or to say anything about what does not exist, in so much as it is not an object of knowledge. But the *skandhas* are the only objects of knowledge, and the *skandhas*, which constituted the man 'whose thought is set free,' have no existence after death, the emancipation of the thought consisting in this, that the thought does not reconstitute the *skandhas* in a new grouping.

6. This comparison of the Tathāgata with the great ocean is repeated in a passage in which it seems to be interpreted in a mystical sense.‡ 'Why has the Buddha not revealed whether he exists or not . . . after death?' To this question, asked by King Pasenadi, a learned nun replies: 'Hast thou a mathematician who could measure the water of the ocean? . . . The ocean is deep, immeasurable, unfathomable. In the same way there exists no matter in the Tathāgata . . .' (as above, § 5).

On examining the comparison more closely, however, we see that it does not hold. The water of the ocean evades measurement because it is too vast, while the Tathāgata after death cannot be calculated, measured, or fathomed because there no longer remains in him anything capable of being calculated or measured, or, more exactly, anything capable of being known and described.

But why is it heresy to maintain the annihilation of the Tathāgata? Because there is no opportunity of distinguishing between the Tathāgata living and the Tathāgata after death.* And just as it is wrong to assert that the Tathāgata, during his lifetime, is either distinct from or identical with the *skandhas* either united or singly, — the Tathāgata, even during life, cannot be 'really apprehended,' there is nothing real in him, Buddha is only a name,—so what is true of the Tathāgata is true of the Ego, of any Ego whatever; the Ego does not exist in itself.† This way of looking at the problem is precisely that adopted by the *Nāgārjuna* and the *Mādhyamika* schools. The Tathāgata has no further existence, because there is no Tathāgata. It is the same *in reality* with all the other so-called Egos. The Buddha has nothing to say about them, because it is impossible to speak about what does not exist.‡

II. Discussion.—We have thus given an account of the chief authorities on which the study of the problem of agnosticism ought to be based. These documents, the agnostic statements of the Buddha bearing upon various problems, and assuming slightly different forms, admit apparently of three different, and even contradictory, interpretations: (1) They furnish us with the ultimate underlying belief in the mind of the Buddha assumed to be an agnostic, and with the official doctrine of the Order, which is 'positivist' in the modern sense of the word. (2) They conceal, for reasons of a practical kind, an implied affirmation touching the future life of ordinary men quite as much as the existence after death of the 'emancipated.' (3) They constitute a formal denial both of the existence of the 'emancipated' and of the Ego.

It is obvious that in itself the strange system, which consists in distinguishing four hypotheses,—affirmative, negative, affirmative and negative, neither affirmative nor negative,—and whose earliest application appears in the passages quoted, is capable of this threefold interpretation. It is a method either (1) of evading an answer, the policy of the 'slippery eel,' as Buddha says, or (2) of asserting the existence of the mystery, but forbidding its discussion, or (3) of denying both the existence and the conceivability of the object in question by closing up 'all joinings and loopholes by which the true facts of the case might escape being caught in the logical net.' §

Let us examine the three interpretations.

1. *Agnosticism.*—The first constitutes one of the most remarkable amongst the numerous systems that Western analysis has recently disentangled from those precepts of the Buddha which are more or less faithfully preserved in the Pāli writings. It is remarkable quite as much for its own sake as for the contrast which it presents to the pre-

Sammitiyas, not without reason, drew the conclusion that the *pudgala* exists, without any one being able to state what relation it bears to the *skandhas*. This is the theory of *avāchyatva* ('inexpressibility'), which is controverted by the *Abhidharmakośa* and the *Mādhyamikas* (see next col. note †). Buddha (*Sam. N.* iv. 400) refuses to say whether there is, or is not, a self (see IDENTITY).

* *Majjhimanikāya*, i. p. 483; translated by Warren, p. 123. The reason of the silence is explained in *Saṁyuttanikāya*, iv. 400; on the Ego, cf. Oldenberg, pp. 272, 273.

† *Appameyyo*, 'immeasurable,' also means 'not within the range of knowledge.' The context, however, does not seem to allow this acceptation of the term here. Plays upon words are very frequent in Hindu metaphysics, and the simile of the ocean is the justification in the present instance.

‡ *Saṁyuttanikāya*, iii. 109; Warren, p. 138; also Oldenberg, p. 280. Although the conception of the present article, even more than its conclusions, departs from the views expressed by this eminent Indian scholar, it is the writer's duty to acknowledge to the full the obligation under which he lies to him.

* Dialogue between Yamaka and Sāriputta, *Saṁyuttanikāya*, iii. p. 112; Oldenberg, *Buddha*, p. 281 f., Fr. tr. p. 279; Warren, p. 138; cf. *Saṁyuttanikāya*, iv. 380. *Anupalabbhamāna*, according to Oldenberg (*Buddha*, Fr. tr. p. 272, note), means 'not to be conceived,' and Warren renders 'you fail to make out and establish the existence of the saint in the present life' (p. 141). In Buddhist logic, *anupalabdhi* is 'the non-perception of what ought to be perceived'; there is no jar because, all the conditions necessary to the perception of a jar being fulfilled (light, proximity, acuteness of sight, etc.), I do not perceive a jar.

† According to another school, that of the *Sammitiyas*, the Ego stands in no definite relation to the *skandhas*, but none the less exists, though 'unnameable' (*avāchya*).

‡ We have seen that all Buddhists do not deny the reality of the self, and that the Buddhists who believe in a self call it *pudgala*—the commonest word in the sacred literature for 'somebody,' 'an individual'—in order to avoid the suspicion of heresy which the use of the Brāhmanical word *ātman* would necessarily involve.

§ Oldenberg, *Buddha*, p. 278. It is thus that the 'four-branched syllogism' is dexterously employed by the *Mādhyamikas*, the best example of which has reference to the origin of things. An object is not produced by itself, nor by anything else, nor by itself together with something else, nor without causes; therefore no object is ever produced. The two last hypotheses, affirmative and negative, neither affirmative nor negative, are usually rejected as absurd, being self-contradictory.

vailing spirit of Hindu religions. Amid the luxuriant mythological, dogmatic, mystic, penitential, and ritualistic growth which the period of the Brāhmanas and the Upaniṣads, and of Jainism exhibited, the Buddha had established his Order with stern simplicity and as a strictly moral régime.* As a matter of fact, mysticism, with the four famous ecstasies (*dhyāna*), which were regarded by the early Buddhists as older than Buddhism,† is one of the chief features of this régime. Buddhists, however, do not claim that *dhyāna* by itself affords any valuable superior knowledge, any supernatural virtue or insight into the Divine. Without disparaging the 'divine eye,' the memory of former births, the passing through walls, etc., which are the natural results of ecstasy, their chief aim is to produce by mental rather than physical means a state of mind full of restfulness and moral insight, to the reality of which experience should testify, and which, in the classical country of the *yogīs*, a 'positivist' doctrine, whose only concern is moral happiness, need not be ashamed to own.

The point of view ascribed to the Buddha is exactly that of Ajātaśatru: 'Of what use in the present world is the monastic life, and in general the practice of virtue, the excellent practice?' To this question by itself the reply will be that the importance of the monastic life is essentially in 'this visible world.' It is indeed possible, Buddha seems to say, that virtue may be beneficial in another existence, but experience has clearly proved that, practised as I teach it, and following a middle course between excess and the sorrowful life of penance which Nigaṇṭha (founder of the order of the Jainas) preaches, being possessed of all that is necessary,—for the attainment of the condition of an *arhat* is difficult and requires bodily vigour,‡—then virtue produces perfect happiness upon earth. What more do you wish? If you are not satisfied, go elsewhere; sham physicians are legion.

Such, in broad outline and apart from the theory of ecstasy, is the essence of the Buddhism which our neo-Buddhists preach. These conclusions can be reached only by 'doctoring' tradition, and by ignoring in particular all that our authorities say concerning the reward of actions in future births; and *that* is certainly genuine Buddhism.

It should be noted further (and this gives special colour to his so-called agnosticism) that Buddha never says, 'I do not know.' He sometimes says, 'You are to know nothing about it.' That is entirely different.§ The tradition consistently claims that the Buddha was omniscient (*sarvajña*) not only in the narrow sense of the term, possessing the knowledge of what was necessary for salvation, knowledge of the means which lead to the emancipation of thought—a knowledge which he shared with the Pratyekabuddhas, etc.—but also universal omniscience (*sarvākārajñatva*), the knowledge of all that was and is and is to come.‖

2. *The agnostic statements may conceal positive affirmations.*—(1) The texts themselves invite us to study the reasons, opportune or otherwise, which justified the Buddha in refusing to answer certain questions of a cosmological or metaphysical nature.

On one occasion the Buddha declares that the world is inconsistent with him, but that he is not inconsistent with the world; that he assents to all to which the world assents, so far as it is based on sound reasons. And, in fact, he sometimes affirms that, since discord and quarrelling are the worst evils, and the absence of discord is the essential characteristic of a monk, one ought to refrain from expressing any opinion.* Moreover, moral therapeutics, directed towards the emancipation of thought, demands the regular purification of the mind, progressive suppression of all the ideas to which the mind can cling, extending even to unconsciousness of the end in view, since this can be attained only in the suppression of thought. 'To long for nirvāṇa is sheer folly and an invincible obstacle to its attainment.' Thus, on the one hand, the Buddhist should try to win the favour of all, and to choose the more advantageous course or that which involves less evil. 'Just as it is necessary to speak to each in his own language, and to preach to barbarians in the language of the barbarians,' so it is necessary to avoid hurting or offending any one, and to guide each on that path of progress which he is capable of following, to the neglect even of the real truth, that is to say, even by inexact statements. And, on the other hand, the belief, the 'view' (*dṛṣṭi*), which is in itself perfectly justified, that we have passed through innumerable existences before arriving at the present one, must be abandoned, because it is inimical to salvation, inasmuch as it suggests the idea of the permanence of the individual. It is, moreover, in reality false, the test of the truth of any proposition being its accord with the end in view.

(2) Two points, moreover, of capital importance rest upon the most definite testimony. It is certain, on the ground of tradition, that Buddha adopted a very distinct attitude towards the question of action (*karma* [which see]), and consequently the question of existence after death. To quote the texts would be impossible, and perhaps it is of greater interest to recall the historical example of the friendly relations existing between the Order and the sects (Aggikas, Jaṭilas) who accepted the doctrine of the fruit of works.†

The early Buddhists believed in retribution for actions, in the influence which earlier existences exercised upon the present, and in a future life conditioned by the accumulated and imputable effects of previous actions.

There is no less evidence that they believed in the possibility of escaping from the circle or whirlpool of existence to the rest of *nirvāṇa*. 'In the language of that time,' as a very competent judge affirms, 'the word *nirvāṇa* always denoted supreme happiness, apart from any idea of annihilation.'

* From the very beginning Buddhism claims to be a 'middle way.' This middle way, according to many authorities, consists in avoiding the two goals (or extremes) of doctrine—affirmation and denial of a self, existence after death, etc. But the word, in its earlier use, seems to refer to disciplinary or penitential moderation. The Buddhist monk does not indulge in sensual pleasures, but he keeps himself free from the morbid exaggerations of asceticism. See Rhys Davids, *Dialogues*, p. 207.

† Rhys Davids, *Dialogues*, p. 51, n. 1.

‡ See *Dialogues*, p. 209.

§ This remark, the interest of which is evident, was pointed out to the present writer by A. Barth.

‖ The only passage within the writer's knowledge in which a contrary opinion is suggested is the discussion in the *Tantravārttika*, a work by the Brāhman Kumārila, on the omniscience of the Buddha. Kumārila maintains that all knowledge is derived from the Veda, and not from the teaching of Buddha. And he represents the Buddhist, his antagonist, responding to him in words to this effect: 'Granted that the Buddha does not know the number of the insects, etc., what does that matter? He knows, and he alone was able to impart to us, saving truth' (see *JRAS*, 1902, pp. 363 ff.).

It will be noticed that, in the older narrative, Buddha, having attained to *bodhi*, thinks of three persons in succession who are worthy to be the first to receive his teaching. The gods have to inform him of the death of these three persons, of which he is ignorant. Moreover, Buddha hesitates to preach the law, and has to be encouraged by Brahmā. These discrepancies were afterwards explained to have been mere affectation on the part of Buddha, who was anxious to comply with 'worldly ways' (*lokānuvartana*).

* Burnouf, *Introduction*, p. 458; Kern, *Geschiedenis*, i. p. 276.

† *Mahāvagga*, i. 38. 11 (Vinaya Texts, *SBE* xiii. p. 190): 'If fire-worshippers and Jaṭilas come to you, O monks, they are to receive the ordination (directly), and no noviciate period is to be imposed upon them. And for what reason? These, O monks, hold the doctrine that actions receive their reward, and that our deeds have their results (according to their moral merit).' From this it may be inferred that the chief dogmatic tenet of the primitive Church was the doctrine of *karma*.

It seems, indeed, quite probable that, in the dogmatics of Buddhism, the conception of *nirvāṇa* had been identified, or almost so, with that of annihilation, certain reservations being always made; but that, however far, from the very first, the Buddhists diverted the word *nirvāṇa* from its ordinary acceptation, the ancient definition held its ground—supreme happiness, subject to no re-birth or renewed death.

In spite of the texts which attach a peculiar importance to the conception of '*nirvāṇa* upon earth,' or, as the Brāhmans say, 'of emancipation during this life' (*jīvanmuktī*), it would be an unjustifiable limitation of Buddhism and departure from the normal conditions of Indian religions to restrict the word altogether, or, for the most part, to the attainment of that perfect calm denoted by the name of *arhat*-ship, or '*nirvāṇa* upon earth.' *

One text declares: 'The disciple who has put off lust and desire, rich in wisdom, has here on earth attained deliverance from death, repose, nirvāṇa, immortality.' It is undoubtedly right to say that *nirvāṇa* is not merely the hereafter which awaits the emancipated saint, but the perfection which he enjoys in this life. But if the Buddhist aspires to this release from the passions, in which *arhat*-ship consists, it is, above all, because, like the *jīvanmukti*, this is the pledge of true and final *nirvāṇa*. If the monk 'whose thought is emancipated' is said to have attained deliverance from death, it is really by anticipation, for it does not imply that he will not die: 'All life ends in death'; this really signifies that after death he will enter the abode where death is no more.†

It cannot be denied that Buddhism has a very definite theory concerning a hereafter, the nature of which cannot be explained. Whatever the everlasting abode may be, it is the aim and the essence of religion. It may be conceived as a prolongation of the state of the *arhat*. All other good is said to be purely negative, the removal or the alleviation of suffering, but *nirvāṇa* is good absolute. Would this be so, however, if it were nothing more than *arhat*-ship doomed to extinction at death, which, moreover, according to the ancient texts, does not prevent former wicked deeds from receiving their due punishment?

(3) If, then, Buddha at times refuses to answer, it is not in the manner of the evasive sophist who is slippery as an eel. Nor is it that he himself is ignorant or wishes his disciples to remain in ignorance. But the essential point is that his disciples should learn to distinguish profitable knowledge and thoughts. What is the use of indulging in those idle dreams concerning the universe, past or future existence, or *nirvāṇa*? In the same way the author of the *Imitation*, who assuredly subscribed to the Nicene creed, cuts short his meditations on the Trinity: 'What is the use of being trained in the mysteries of the Trinity if you sin against the Trinity?' What can the Buddha tell concerning the manner of life of the emancipated saint, when emancipation can be attained only by ridding the mind of all thought and all desire? He refuses to satisfy useless curiosity, for *nirvāṇa* is a state essentially indefinable.‡

* The present writer will not conceal his opinion that the expression 'nirvāṇa upon earth' (*diṭṭhadhammanibbāna*) possibly conveys a meaning very different from that skilfully pointed out by Carpenter, Rhys Davids, and Oldenberg. It signifies, in contradistinction to the *nirvāṇa* to be attained during a future life, etc. (*upapadyanirvāṇa*, *antarāparinirvāṇa*, etc.), the *nirvāṇa* to be attained at the end of the present existence. With regard to the state of an *arhat*, it should be observed (1) that there is not actual cessation of suffering (*dukkhavūpasama* = nibbāna, *Sumaṅgalavilāsini* vii. 121), and (2) that it is called 'nirvāṇa with a residue,' in contrast to the real nirvāṇa.

† Cf. Oldenberg, *Buddha*, p. 264 *f.*, whose judgment, according to the present writer, ought to be slightly modified. From the earliest texts we are led to think that the Tathāgata and the saints in general were able to prolong their life for an 'age of the world' [see AGES OF THE WORLD (Buddhist)]. This is very like immortality. On the Vedic beliefs concerning the immortality of the soul and the gradual formation of the doctrine of renewed death (*punarmṛtyu*, *i.e.* transmigration), see A. M. Boyer's very instructive art. in *JA*, 1901, ii. p. 451 ff. He states that ordinary immortality means 'long life after death,' and that everlasting immortality is reserved for the saints (p. 474).

‡ At least so far as human powers of understanding are concerned. The intelligent Buddhist sometimes examines the topics of religion, and sometimes adheres to them without pondering over them: 'These matters are understood only by the Tathāgata.' 'Only the Tathāgata knows, we do not know' (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*).

On the remaining 'non-elucidated topics' it may be said:—

(1) As regards the existence of the Ego and of the universe from eternity, all the texts and the best attested dogmas entirely dismiss the idea that the Ego and the universe are uncaused.

(2) As far as the 'infinity of the universe' is concerned, the text quoted (p. 221) understands by infinity (*ananta*) 'limitless extension in space.' It is very probable that this is the original meaning of the word, and that the word *śaśvata*, 'eternal,' refers to the future as well as the past. In fact, Buddhist cosmology is acquainted with an infinite number of universes. By the term *ananta* the Mādhyamikas mean 'endless duration in time' (cf. *Saṁ. N.* i. 62; Oldenberg, p. 263). *Anta* is 'end' as contrasted with *ādi*, 'beginning.' The orthodox reply is that the world will continue until the last being has attained emancipation. This moment will probably never come. But in each individual 'the end of the world' (*lokasya anta*) may be achieved by the emancipation.

(3) As to the relation between the *jīva* and the *śarīra*, it will be noticed that in the list of the fourteen non-elucidated questions, only the two hypotheses of identity and non-identity are examined. The scholastic doctrine explains *jīva* as equivalent to *sattva*, *pudgala*, *ātman*, permanent principle; and denies its existence, in the course of a discussion of its relations, not with the body (*śarīra*), but with the *skandhas*. It acknowledges also *jīvitendriya*, vital faculty, which is not destroyed with the body in the sense that existence is prolonged by the 'vital faculty' of the succeeding life (except where the re-birth has taken place in certain heavens).

* See above, p. 221[b], n. ‖, and 222[b], n. ‡.

3. *The agnostic statements are formal denials.*—In the two preceding pages tradition has been treated selectively; the theory of the *skandhas* has been laid aside. This theory is found in connexion with almost all the ancient and modern texts. It is consistent with the denial of an Ego. It admits the existence of a phenomenal Ego, which prolongs its existence as long as thought is not 'emancipated.' After emancipation the phenomenal Ego dissolves, the *skandhas* are no longer associated to form the illusory Ego; there no longer exists anything.

The Tathāgata, therefore, does not exist after death; so that the assertions relating to the Tathāgata after death must be understood in the sense of a radical denial, as has been done by the writers of the various dialogues in the *Majjhima* and the *Saṁyutta* above mentioned.

Moreover, if there is no Ego in the emancipated Tathāgata, there is none in Tathāgata living,—there is no Ego in any being. All speculation concerning the future and the past of the Ego is, therefore, absurd, and what is said about the eternity of the world, etc., must be understood as a formal denial. This is the system of the Mādhyamikas openly professed in the *Suttantas*.

It seems clear, then, that if we admit the primitive character of the theory of the *skandhas*, and assume the absolute consistency of the early Buddhist speculations, we must ascribe a purely negative value to the Buddha's statements. Thus is obtained a doctrine entirely coherent, identifying *nirvāṇa* with annihilation. All the statements on the one side or the other will find their explanation in practical considerations. On the other hand, the agnostic hypothesis, as far as it concerns the future existence of ordinary men, will be set aside, for the theory of the *skandhas* implies the teaching with regard to actions and transmigration. The question is whether, by such an exegesis, we are not building a new Buddhism on old principles, as the Mādhyamikas have confessedly done.

III. Conclusion. — Of the three systems expounded above, the third is the system of a large number of *Suttantas*, that is to say, the orthodox doctrine of the Pāli canon, and of the Mādhyamikas. The second is very probably that of popular Buddhism and of the 'pudgalavādins'; * while the first has nothing to support it save the texts above cited and the sympathy of several European scholars. The present writer does not conceal his preference for the second. In order to establish it, or rather to reconcile it with traditional assumptions, a comparative estimate is needed. To this let us finally proceed.

It is generally believed that the earliest Bud-

dhism did not lay any claim to originality of doctrine; it shared with the whole of India the belief in the imputation and the retributive effects of action (*karma*), the concatenation of causes, and the possibility of attaining *nirvāṇa*. Nor is there anything to prove that by *nirvāṇa* the Buddhists understood something different from what all others understood by it—a state certainly very difficult to define, but quite distinct from nothingness. Moreover, the Buddha was distinguished, as the texts studied lead us to believe, by a certain contempt for speculation; whence we may conclude that the theory of the *skandhas*, if it existed in germ, had not attained its final form. In the Order there were monks who were opposed, as no doubt the Buddha himself had been, to cosmological or metaphysical speculations; there were also philosophers and 'Abhidharmists,' and it is to these Abhidharmists that we owe the Pāli writings as well as the writings of the Sarvāstivādins.

The question of *nirvāṇa* having been raised, the earliest documents (from Buddha himself ?) had given the reply that nothing could be asserted on the subject, either existence or non-existence, etc.—an answer perhaps childish from the Aristotelian point of view, but sufficiently frank to declare at one and the same time that it is a mystery and that inquiry into it is unnecessary. Such a rejoinder is, in any case, parallel to that suggested with regard to the eternity of the universe; and the former no more seeks to deny the existence of the Tathāgata after death than the latter the actual existence of the universe, or even its eternity. Buddha's only wish, as is said in so many words, was to forbid idle or harmful speculations. It was the philosophers who developed the doctrine of the *skandhas*, the direct result of which is the denial of the Ego (*Suttantas*), and the indirect result the denial of all phenomena in themselves, and the 'universal void' (*Mādhyamikas*). It is no wonder that the philosophers put an entirely new meaning into the old answer:—Nothing can be said of the Buddha after his death, because there is no longer any Buddha, because there never has been a Buddha even during his lifetime; the two things go together, as the *Suttanta* expressly states. It is scarcely conceivable that this was the original Buddhist doctrine. But if it had been, it is most probable that a less ambiguous formula would have been found for its expression.

The Buddhist who accepts the revealed texts as they stand cannot have any doubt as to his choice. He must adhere to the third interpretation, the only one which is orthodox and in harmony with accepted teaching. The choice of the historian of religions is more difficult, for it is modified by the manner in which he conceives the orthodox view to have grown up. The present writer confesses to a reluctance to exercise a definite option, but if a choice be required,—which is by no means the case,—he believes that the second interpretation is to be preferred. L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

AGRA, the famous Mughal capital, is situated on the right bank of the R. Jumnā, in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. Agra does not appear to have been a sacred place to the Hindus, and its religious interest depends on a splendid series of mosques and tombs. On the left bank of the river stood an ancient Hindu town, of which little now remains but traces of the foundations. The Muhammadans first occupied the place in the time of Sikandar Lodi (A.D. 1505). Bābar, the founder of the Mughal Empire, died here in 1530, but neither he nor his son Humāyūn left any monument of their reigns. Akbar founded the modern city in 1558, and the splendid buildings which now adorn it are the work of himself, his son Jahāngīr, and his grandson Shāhjahān. Akbar built the Agra Fort about 1566, and four years later commenced the erection of his new capital at Fathpur-Sīkrī, 23 miles from Agra, which was occupied for only seventeen years and then abandoned. The site was selected because a famous Musalmān ascetic of the place, Sheikh Salīm Chistī, resided there, and Akbar believed that it was through his intercession that he obtained an heir in Prince Salīm, afterwards known as the Emperor Jahāngīr. At Agra no important religious buildings survive which were the work of Akbar; but to him we owe the splendid Jāmi' Masjid, or 'Cathedral Mosque,' at Fathpur-Sīkrī, and its magnificent gate, the Buland Darwāza, or 'High Portal,' with a touching inscription, which were completed respectively in 1571 and 1602.

Akbar died at Agra in 1605, and was buried at Sikandra, 5 miles from the capital, in a splendid mausoleum, which he himself had commenced. It differs in plan from every other Mughal monument, the design, according to Fergusson, being borrowed from a Hindu, or more probably from a Buddhist, model. Akbar's revolt from orthodox Islām is marked by the fact that the head of his tomb is turned towards the rising sun, not towards Mecca. The original design was modified by Jahāngīr, and the building in its present shape gives the impression of incompleteness. It was finished in 1613. The beautiful tomb of Itmād-ad-daula, Mirza Ghiās Beg, on the left bank of the Jumnā opposite Agra, was the work of his daughter, the famous Nūr Mahal, the favourite queen of the Emperor Jahāngīr. But it is to the Emperor Shāhjahān, the son of Jahāngīr, that we owe the famous buildings which are now the glory of Agra. The **Tāj Mahal** was erected by him as the mausoleum of his beloved wife, Arjumand Banū Begam, better known as Mumtāz-i-Mahal, 'Eminent of the Palace,' who was married to him in 1612, and died in childbirth at Burhānpur in the Deccan in 1630. It was commenced soon after her death, but was not finished till 1648. This splendid structure is too well known to need further description here. Another beautiful religious building erected by Shāhjahān is the famous Motī Masjid, or 'Pearl Mosque,' which was intended to be the Court Chapel of the Palace. To his eldest daughter, Jahānārā Begam, who tended her unhappy father in the troubles of his later years, is due the Jāmi' Masjid, or 'Cathedral Mosque' of Agra, built opposite the Delhi Gate of the Fort. This was completed in 1644. On the accession of Aurangzeb, who deposed his father Shāhjahān in 1658, the architectural history of Agra closed.

LITERATURE.—Fergusson, *Hist. of Indian and E. Architecture*, 569 ff.; Havell, *Handbook to Agra and the Taj*; Führer, *Monumental Antiquities and Inscriptions of the N.W.P. and Oudh*, 53 ff.; Heber, *Journal*, ed. 1861, ii. 9 ff.; Sleeman, *Rambles and Recollections*, ed. V. A. Smith, i. 377 ff.

W. CROOKE.

AGRAULIDS.—Euripides, in *Ion* 23 and 496, speaks of the three 'daughters of Agraulos,' who, according to Apollodorus (iii. § 180), are called Aglauros,* Herse, and Pandrosos. A rich banquet, the *Deipnophoria*, was offered to them together (Bekker, *Anecdota*, i. 239). They danced, Euripides tells us (*l.c.*), on the northern descent of the Athenian Acropolis, on the green meadow before the temple of Athene, beside the Apollo grotto and the seat of Pan, who piped to them. This is the picture which the votive-reliefs represent, some of which have been found on the spot in question (*Athen. Mitth.* iii. 200). In fact, there lay there beside each other the caves of Apollo and Pan under the Erechtheum, and the temple of Athene;

* Aglauros or Agraulos—both forms have been used throughout the article. It will be observed also that in the spelling of proper names the Greek forms have been employed, except in familiar words like Erechtheum, Cecrops.

and there, too, lay the sanctuary of Agraulos Pausanias, i. 18. 2; Herodotus, viii. 53; Jahn-Michaelis, *Arx Athenarum*, Table vii. and xvi. 3). In it the Attic youth swore allegiance to the standard, calling, above all, on Agraulos (Pollux, vii. 106).

Aglauros is thus an ancient and very sacred goddess of Athens. Her name and her connexion with Pandrosos and Herse, the dewy sisters, show that she was a goddess of agriculture. Later she is, in the same way as Pandrosos, so united with Athene that both appear as secondary names of Athene, or that Agraulos is designated the first priestess of Athene. At quite an early date their connexion was very close; the dismal feast of atonement and cleansing sacred to Athene, the *Plynteria* in Thargelion (May), stood also in relation to Agraulos (Hesych.; Bekker, *Anecdota*, i. 270); the *Arrhephoria* or *Hersephoria* was associated with Athene and Herse (Istros in scholium to Aristophanes, *Lysistrate*, 642); and the Pandroseion, with the sacred olive tree of Athene, was closely connected with the Erechtheum (Pausanias, i. 27. 2). Athene herself had once been a goddess of agriculture. Aglauros, however, is also united with Demeter, and is regarded as a secondary name for her (*CIA* iii. 372). This proves that Aglauros was originally an independent goddess, who, however, disappeared more and more in consciousness, and for this reason was united with a greater related goddess. This was the case with many other deities who were originally independent. Their memory was, in the end, preserved only in secondary names of related divinities. The important signification of Aglauros is seen, too, in the fact that at Salamis in Cyprus, where she, along with Athene and Diomedes had a common sanctuary, human sacrifice was down to a late date offered to her (Porphyry, *de Abstinentia*, ii. 54). In Athens there were secret rites in her worship (Athenagoras, *Leg. pro Christ.* 1), which the family of the Praxiergidoi seems to have practised (Töpffer, *Attische Genealogie*, p. 133).

In accordance with the serious nature of the feast of Agraulos, the *Plynteria*, her secret rites, and her human sacrifices, is the legend which has developed out of her worship. This we find in a threefold form. (1) Agraulos, along with Herse and Pandrosos, receives from Athene the boy Erichthonios in a chest, with the command not to open it. Aglauros and Herse open it notwithstanding, and in maddened frenzy cast themselves down from the Acropolis (Pausanias, i. 18. 2; Apollodorus, iii. 189). This is obviously meant, too, to explain the situation of their sanctuaries below the Acropolis, while that of Pandrosos was on the top. (2) Aglauros casts herself from the Acropolis in order that she may, in accordance with an oracle, secure the victory for her country against Eumolpos; for this reason a sanctuary to her was founded there (Philochoros, *Frg.* 14). (3) Aglauros is changed by Hermes into a stone, because, being incited by Athene to jealousy, she had refused him access to her sister (Ovid, *Metam.* ii. 708 ff.).

From all this we have as the result that the Agraulids resemble the Horæ and the Graces. They nurse the child Erichthonios, the seed-corn, entrusted to them by Athene, just as Demeter does Triptolemos. In the month Thargelion (May), when the dew ceases and the harvest begins, Aglauros dies.

Aglauros appears in the tradition twice: (1) as the mother of the Agraulids, daughter of Actæus; (2) as their oldest sister, and daughter of Cecrops. Connected with Aglauros are Alkippe, her daughter by Ares, who was seduced by Halirrhothios the son of Poseidon, and Keryx, her son by Hermes, the head of the Eleusinian family of the Kerykes, who is, however, also called the son of Pandrosos or Herse (Töpffer, *Attische Genealogie*, 81 ff.).

LITERATURE.—Preller-Robert, *Griech. Mythologie*, i. 199 ff.; Robert in *Commentationes Mommsen.* 143 ff.

E. BETHE.

AGRICULTURE. — 1. Until recently the theory was held that the human race passed from the life of the hunter to that of the nomad shepherd, and from that again to the life of the tiller of the ground. As a sweeping generalization it is no longer possible to hold this theory; that it is not altogether untrue is shown by what is happening to the Bashkir Tatars at the present day. In their case agriculture has been forced upon them by the danger of starvation. Russian civilization has encroached upon them from the north and west, and the Ural Cossacks from the east, so that the area of their pasture lands, and, as a consequence, the amount of live stock they are able to maintain, have much diminished. Before resorting to agriculture themselves, they employed Russians to farm for them, and farmed part of their land on the *métayage* system. But when the virgin soil is exhausted, the master, who loves the easy life of the shepherd and disdains the hard toil of agriculture, is no longer able to pay for hired labour, and perforce must himself put his hand to the plough (Wallace, *Russia*, new ed. i. p. 265 ff.). The same observation was made regarding the Tatars of the Crimea in 1794 (Pallas, *Travels*, Eng. ed. 1802-3, ii. p. 383). In those parts of the world, however, which are best known to us, there is evidence of a settled agricultural population from the earliest period. Not only in Neolithic times, but from the earlier Stone Age, there is evidence, supplied largely by the excavations of Ed. Piette in various cave-shelters in France, that agricultural plants, and animals at least partially domesticated, were well known (see DOMESTICATION). In Egypt and in Babylon there is evidence of agriculture going back, at a moderate calculation, to the early part of the third millennium B.C., and possibly to a much earlier period. Mesopotamia is the only area for which there is good evidence that some kinds of common cereals grow wild [de Candolle, *Origin of Cultivated Plants*, 1884, p. 358 (common wheat); p. 364 (spelt)]. It is in countries with a rich alluvial soil, like Egypt and Mesopotamia, that we should *a priori* expect agriculture to begin. In Egypt a primitive agriculture along the banks of the Nile would be possible merely by casting seed upon the mud left behind by the river when it subsides after flood. Agriculture in the earliest times was probably thus practised before the invention of the plough, the seed being left to sink into the soft mud, or, as represented on Egyptian monuments, being trodden in by cattle.

It is, however, to be remembered that when we consider primitive agriculture, we must discard all generally accepted notions as to its practice. Agriculture at the present day, as practised in most countries of Europe, may be defined as (1) the regular cultivation by the plough and other well-known implements, and with the addition of manure, of (2) definite areas of (3) arable land, held as (4) freehold or (5) on a legally defined tenancy, (6) such cultivation being for the most part in the hands of males. But if we may deduce primitive methods from the practice of such tribes in modern times as combine some agriculture with hunting, and appear to be only in the first stages of agricultural development, primitive cultivation preceded all implements except those of stone and wood. Thus the Navajos and many tribes of New Mexico, who grow [Indian] 'corn, beans, pumpkins, melons, and other vegetables, and also some wheat,' and make some attempts at irrigation, dibble the

ground: 'with a short sharp-pointed stick small holes are dug in the ground, into which they drop the seeds, and no further care is given to the crop except to keep it partially free from weeds' (Bancroft, *Native Races of Pacific States*, i. p. 489; cf. H. Ling Roth, *Sarawak*, i. p. 402). In Northern Honduras at an earlier period, the natives, according to Herrera, cleared the ground with stone axes, and turned the sod by main strength with a forked pole or with sharp wooden spades (Bancroft, i. p. 719). Dibbling alone is found sufficient in the Amazon area, the ground never being turned up or manured (Wallace, *Travels on the Amazon*, p. 335). In Melanesia, where horticulture rather than agriculture is the form of cultivation, and has reached a high degree of excellence, adzes of stone or shell were used before the introduction of metals. In the New Hebrides and in most of the Solomon Islands the natives use stone; 'the Santa Cruz people, Torres islanders, and Banks' islanders used shell, for adzes the giant clam shell' (Codrington, *The Melanesians*, p. 313). Stone adzes, which may have been used by the early inhabitants of France, were found by Piette (*L'Anthropologie*, vii. p. 1 ff.), and stone sickles have been discovered in many places. Early Egyptian stone adzes are figured by De Morgan (*Recherches sur les origines de l'Egypte*, ii. p. 96).

Nor are definite areas of arable land held by individuals. The savage is regularly communistic in his ideas; the land tilled belongs in the first instance to the tribe, though, when a man reclaims virgin forest, what he reclaims is his own heritable property (*Sarawak*, i. p. 419 ff.). Areas that are reclaimed from the primeval forest by the joint efforts of the community are naturally regarded as joint property. How this is done is well described by Wallace (*Travels on the Amazon*, p. 217): 'Imagine the trees of a virgin forest cut down so as to fall across each other in every conceivable direction. After lying a few months they are burnt; the fire, however, only consumes the leaves and fine twigs and branches; all the rest remains entire, but blackened and charred. The mandioca is then planted without any further preparation.' If the ground continues to be cultivated and roughly weeded, the trees soon rot, so that they can be removed; grass then springs up, which, if kept grazed, remains open (Wallace, p. 334). In other countries, however, it is not so; in Sarawak new land of this nature has to be planted every year, as the tough grass which succeeds a crop of paddy is too difficult for the Dayak to break up till the land has once more become jungle (*Sarawak*, i. p. 397 ff.). The landholding systems of the peoples of antiquity and the Teutonic three-field system are descended from a similar system of communistic landholdings (Maine, *Village Communities*, Lect. iii.).

But even wandering tribes may engage to some extent in agriculture. Waitz (*Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, vol. i. p. 406) observes that in North America such tribes would plant a crop, wait to gather it, and go on again. And, even where they are more settled, tribes must from time to time change their habitations, because, as they do not manure their lands, these gradually become exhausted.

From all this it is clear that five of our conditions of modern cultivation (p. 226[b]) do not hold for primitive times, as illustrated by the last survivors of uncivilized races. Nor is the sixth point more true. Primitive agriculture is not altogether, nor to any large extent, in the hands of males. As von den Steinen remarks of the Bakairi of Central Brazil, it is woman that has invented agriculture. Its beginnings, no doubt, arose where hunting and fishing were difficult or unproductive. Just as we have seen that it is with the greatest reluctance that a pastoral people becomes agricultural, so is it with the change from hunting to agriculture. Amongst the most primitive of the native tribes of America it is noticeable that where game is scanty, or the men are ineffective hunters, agriculture is most developed. Dibbling with a pointed stick and hoeing with a stone axe were possible for the women and children in the neighbourhood of their huts, while the men wandered farther afield as hunters or on the war-path. Hence agriculture reaches an advanced stage before the women hand over the greater part of the operations to the men. The Dayak men of Sarawak help in sowing the seed and in reaping the harvest; the hard intermediate toil of weeding is left to the women and children (*Sarawak*, i. p. 405). Amongst the South Sea islanders local custom settles the respective shares of the men and women in the garden work (Codrington, p. 303). If a man has another occupation, he regularly leaves a large part of the agricultural work to the women, as may still be seen in the Peloponnese and elsewhere in Eastern Europe and in the West Highlands of Scotland. In more advanced parts of the British Isles it is only the rapid development of agricultural machinery in the last forty years that has gradually banished women from field-work. But the agricultural duties of primitive woman also brought her important rights. Her labour gave her a right to the soil, which, as the importance of agriculture became more marked, brought her many other privileges in its train, and these privileges had the greatest influence upon the history of family relations (Grosse, *Die Formen der Familie und die Formen der Wirthschaft*, p. 159 ff.). Superstition also recommended leaving agriculture in the hands of women. 'When the women plant maize,' said an Indian to the Jesuit Gumilla, 'the stalk produces two or three ears. Why? Because women know how to produce children. They only know how to plant corn to ensure its germinating. Then let them plant it; they know more than we know' (J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, p. 272, quoting from Payne, *History of the New World*, ii. p. 7). This side of agriculture has been worked out in much greater detail by E. Hahn in *Demeter und Baubo* and elsewhere. (For Africa, see the references in Jevons, *Introduction to the History of Religion*, p. 240).

2. The earliest cultivated plants are not easy to define. The carvings on reindeer horns figured by Piette in his *L'Art pendant l'âge du Renne* (plates 17 and 14), and from him by Hoops (*Waldbäume und Kulturpflanzen*, pp. 278–9), come from Meso-Palæolithic strata, and undoubtedly represent ears of corn. From a late Palæolithic stratum representations of an ear of winter barley (*escourgeon*), as still grown in France, have been discovered (Piette, in Hoops, *op. cit.* p. 280). In the rock-shelter of Mas-d'Azil, on the left bank of the Arise, Piette found in a transitional stratum between Palæolithic and Neolithic a small heap of short oval grains of wheat, the precise character of which could not be determined, as, on being exposed, they turned to dust (Hoops, p. 281). From another transitional stratum at Campigny, in the north of France, the print of a grain of barley has been found on a potsherd. From this period stones for grinding corn have also been discovered. From the Neolithic pile-dwellings at Wangen, on the Lake of Constance, 'two varieties of wheat and the two-rowed barley were distinctly recognized both in whole ears and in the separate grain, the latter in quantities that could be measured in bushels' (Munro, *Lake Dwellings of Europe*, p. 497). Before the end of the Stone Age three species of wheat (*Triticum vulgare, dicoccum, monococcum*), probably three species of barley (*Hordeum hexastichum*,—this was the most widely spread,—*distichum, tetrastichum*), and two species of millet (*Panicum miliaceum* and *italicum*), were grown in Europe—naturally in greater variety in the south than in the north of Central Europe. Not only was flax cultivated, but weaving was practised [the fabrics are figured in Forrer and Messikommer's *Praehistorische Varia* (Zürich, 1889), [plates iv. and x.]. Vegetables—lentils, peas, beans, parsnips, and carrots—and poppies were cultivated, as well as vines and fruit trees (Heer, *Pflanzen der Pfahlbauten*; and, more recent and more general, Hoops as above, and Buschan, *Vorgeschichtliche Botanik*). The precise characters of the grain figured on early Egyptian monuments cannot, it is said, be identified. But both in Egypt and in Chaldæa it early became the practice to express the value of land in terms of wheat (Maspero, *L'Orient classique*, i. p. 761, n. 2). As already pointed out, botanists regard Mesopotamia and the countries bordering upon it as probably the original home of wheat and barley. As the earliest cultiva-

tion of them in Europe appears in the warmer intervals between successive ages of ice, in the earlier of which ice probably extended as far as the Alps, in the latter to the latitude of London and Berlin, they clearly must have been introduced from the Mediterranean basin. It is hardly to be expected that evidence of grain cultivation will be found in the British Isles or other parts of Northern Europe in strata corresponding to those in which Piette has found them in the south of France, for, as Nehring has shown (*Über Tundren und Steppen der Jetzt- und Vorzeit*, 1890), a period when these countries consisted of *tundras* and steppes like those of modern Siberia must be postulated as existing for some considerable time after the end of the Ice Age. In such an area, where ice still exists below the surface, agriculture would be impossible. Importation, moreover, from Asia through Russia would have been equally impossible at this period, the Caspian then extending much farther to the north and west, while the northern Ægean did not exist (see Ratzel's map in *SSGW*, 1900). From the earliest literature of the Indo-Germanic peoples—the Vedas—it is clear that, though the early Hindus of this stock had large flocks and herds, they also practised agriculture. But the meaning of the word *yava-s* which they apply to grain, and which is etymologically identical with the Greek ζειά, 'spelt,' is hard to define. Its modern representative in Persia, Baluchistan, and India seems always to mean barley. A word for *corn*, however, is very likely to vary its meaning according to latitude. Thus, in English, *corn* means to an Englishman wheat, to a Scotsman oats, to an American of the United States maize. The same word amongst other peoples of the same stock is variously applied, meaning to a North German rye, and in Scandinavia barley. The Greeks knew and cultivated wheat, barley, and two kinds of millet. In the classical period the Romans cultivated the same cereals, though the poets write of *far*, 'spelt,' as being the grain which formed the food of the early Romans. The Roman word for wheat, *triticum*, is in origin an adjective, and must have originally meant the threshed or milled grain, from *tero*, 'rub, pound.' Oats and rye are not suitable for warm countries, and were not cultivated by the Greeks and Romans. Oats (βρόμος) and rye (βρίζα) were both known to the Greeks from Thrace. From the former, Dionysos, who came into Greece from Thrace, got the epithet of βρόμιος, as being in his northern home a god of beer, not, as in Greece, of wine (J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena*, p. 416). Schrader (in Hehn's *Kulturpflanzen und Haustiere*[7], p. 553) quotes Dieuches, a doctor of the 4th cent. B.C., for oat meal, which was regarded as superior to barley meal. In both Greece and Rome, probably, barley played a great part in early times. It is to be noticed that *far* is etymologically identical with the English *bere* and *bar*-ley. The most plausible explanation of the name of the Greek goddess Persephone or Pherrephatta (the name occurs in a great variety of forms in the different Greek dialects) was 'the barley-killer,' the first element in the name being from the same root as *far* and *bere*. This harmonizes well with the functions of Persephone, who is queen of the under world during the four months which elapse between the planting of the autumn-sown grain and spring.

3. Implements.—The operations of the farmer vary according to the season of the year, and the character of the implements varies according to the nature of the operations. For Europe the earliest description is given by Homer. On the shield of Achilles four rural scenes are depicted, three of which represent the seasons when the farmer's life is busiest (*Iliad*, xviii. 541 ff.). On the first is shown a rich fallow in which many ploughmen are driving their teams this way and that: *many* because, according to Professor Ridgeway's explanation of the scene (*JHS* vi. p. 336), the land that is being ploughed is the common land of the community, and the ploughing must be begun by all the holders at the same time—an ancient practice which is still commemorated in England by Plough Monday, the first Monday after Twelfth Night. The field is broad, and is for triple ploughing (εὐρεῖαν τρίπολον, 542). When the ploughers reach the headland (τέλσον ἀρούρης), a man comes forward and offers them a drink. 'They then turn their team along the furrow, eager to reach the headland of the deep fallow.' This eagerness is sometimes explained, rather naïvely, as arising from the prospect of a drink at the other end. More probably the emphasis rests upon the epithet *deep*. A fallow speedily becomes covered with grass and weeds, which, with the very ineffective plough that is still used in Greece, makes ploughing a hard task, even for a strong man. In modern times, even with the best plough, the breaking up of old pasture (which with improved implements would be a task of a similar nature) is a very difficult matter. The threefold ploughing was required partly, no doubt, because the ancient plough was so ineffective. In Egypt, where the ploughing was done in a much more yielding soil, a man is represented (not in the earliest art) as preceding the plough with a mattock, for the plough has no coulter. That Homer looked upon ploughing fallow as very hard work is clear from other passages, in which we are told that 'he who has been holding the plough (πηκτὸν ἄροτρον) in a fallow all day is glad when the sun goes down and he can hie him home to supper, though his knees totter beneath him as he goes' (*Od.* xiii. 31–34). The oxen in the yoke also feel the strain (*Il.* xiii. 705). Hence, with the development of the plough and of a system of tillage, agriculture of necessity passed more into the hands of men. Moreover, when a pastoral people turns to agriculture, it objects to women having to do with the cattle. 'Among the Bechuanas the men never allow the women to touch their cattle. The ploughs cannot be used except by the help of cattle, and therefore the men have now to do the heavy work' (E. Holub, *JAI* x. p. 11). In countries where cultivation is carried on in gardens rather than in fields, the hoe or mattock remains the regular implement of cultivation. Such countries are the South Sea Islands and a great part of China. So also in the world of the gods, Demeter handed over agriculture, so far as ploughing was concerned, to Triptolemus, who, as the Homeric hymn to Demeter tells us, till then was but a prince (θεμιστοπόλος βασιλεύς, 473) of Eleusis. Henceforth his name, whatever its original meaning, is identified with τρίπολος, the word for the triple ploughing. It is, however, probably only Athenian pride that makes ploughing take its rise in the little plain of Eleusis. In such little plains in the Hebrides, the *caschrom*, the little crooked spade, is hardly yet extinct. The plough, in all probability, took its origin in larger areas with deeper soil. Such an area was Bœotia, from which comes the earliest European poem on agriculture, Hesiod's *Works and Days*. A still better example of an area suited for the plough is Thessaly, the bed of an earlier inland sea, drained when the Peneus cut its way through the vale of Tempe. Eleusis had traditions of a connexion with the far north of Greece and Thrace, and it is significant that the word *Triptolemus* by its *pt* instead of *p* preserves a feature which, in historical names, is specially characteristic of Northern Greece.

It is unnecessary to suppose that the *plough* was invented only in one place. Its simplest form is a forked stick with one

of the limbs cut off short. The stump with its sharp point forms the sole and the cutting edge of the plough, the long branch forms the handle. In this form, pushed along by the handle, the plough is able only to make a shallow groove. The next stage in its development is either to find a tree with two branches so arranged that one may form the handle * and the other penetrate the ground, while the trunk forms the pole, or to attach to the simpler forked stick another branch at right angles. This forms the pole, and by means of it some powerful pulling force may be applied. This force may either be boys, as in an Egyptian representation of ploughing, or some of the lower animals,—cows, bullocks, buffaloes, or mules. In Egyptian art the ass is never represented in the plough; but Varro (i. 20. 4) says the ass was used in Campania. The Greeks preferred the mule to the ox as speedier, according to Homer (*Il.* x. 352–353). In Sarawak a wooden plough is drawn by a buffalo. Its action is like that of a pointed stick dragged through the land to a depth of four inches (*Sarawak*, i. p. 422). The Greeks had not discarded the plough made of a forked stick (αὐτάγγον) in Hesiod's time, though both he and Homer know a more elaborate form, the mortised plough (πηκτὸν ἄροτρον). Hesiod (*W. and D.* 432–434) advises the farmer to have one of each kind in case of accidents. The more primitive form is to be of holm-oak, which is fitted into a shoe (ἔλυμα), to the front end of which the share, when it had been discovered, was attached. In Hesiod's time the pole was connected to the rest of the plough by wooden pegs; in the Egyptian plough it is simply bound fast by a rope (for full details of the Egyptian plough, see an article by H. Schäfer in the *Annual of the British School at Athens*, x. p. 127 ff.). The wood for the plough is to be cut in the autumn, because it is then less likely to suffer from dry-rot. A piece of the proper shape may not be easy to find. The pole is to be of bay or elm, the shoe of oak. Hesiod is a cautious farmer, and wishes everything to be steady. His yoke of oxen are to be nine years old, his ploughman forty. Such oxen will not be restive, such a ploughman will attend to his work and not gaze after his comrades (444).

To a similar or even less advanced stage of civilization belong the primitive ploughs which are represented in rock drawings on the borders of France and Italy and in Sweden. In these the plough consists of (1) a bent branch to which (2) the pole is attached. Near the end of the pole a cross-bar is attached which crosses the foreheads of the oxen, and, as in ancient Greece and Egypt, and largely in the East still, is fixed to the horns (see the figures in Sophus Müller's *Urgeschichte Europas*, p. 147). There are no reins; as is shown in one of the scenes represented, a second man leads the oxen. By the time of the Roman writers the form of the plough had developed considerably. Cato and Varro give no details, but the elder Pliny was acquainted with the coulter and with several varieties of ploughshare. In his time a recent improvement had been made in Rhætia by adding two wheels. A plough of this kind is figured by Dr. E. B. Tylor (*JAI* x. p. 79). As he says, the modern English plough 'improves upon this rather in details of construction and material than in essential principle.' But the descendant of this is the 'grubber,' or the drill plough; the ordinary plough arises from the first type by the addition of a mould-board.

Needless to say, this and all other operations of husbandry were regulated by the stars. Certain days were fortunate for certain operations, and others not, as is expounded in the latter part of Hesiod's *Works and Days*, and is observed in all countries.

The earliest form of harrowing is, no doubt, represented by the man with a mattock, who follows the Egyptian ploughman and breaks the clods. 'Let the slave who follows a little behind,' says Hesiod of the same practice in his country, 'give the birds some trouble by covering the seed.' Pliny says the Egyptians once trod in the seed with swine (xviii. 47). In Egyptian art only sheep are so represented (Erman, *Life in Ancient Egypt*, p. 429), though Herodotus (ii. 14) says that below Memphis swine were regularly so used. On the Isthmus of Panama it is possible to dispense with harrowing, because the brushwood is left lying on the ground, and the seeds are scattered amongst it (Bancroft, i. p. 759). In St. Kilda, Martin observed that the harrow, which was entirely of wood, had teeth only at the front end, because wood was so scarce. The place of others was taken by 'long tangles of sea-ware tied to the harrow by the small ends; the roots hanging loose behind scatter the clods broken by the wooden teeth' (*A Voyage to St. Kilda* (*1753*), p. 18). Pliny (xviii. 20) recognizes both a hurdle and a mattock (*rastrum*) for this purpose.

The scene upon the shield of Achilles to represent summer is the cutting of the corn on a prince's private estate (τέμενος βασιλήϊον, 550). Some were cutting with *sickles* (δρεπάνας), others were engaged in binding into sheaves the handfuls which boys brought them from the reapers. Similar scenes are represented in Egyptian art, where the sickle was serrated. Such serrated sickles go back to the Stone Age (Flinders Petrie, *Illahun, Kahun, and Gurob*, Pl. vii. Fig. 27). The early Greek sickle must also have been serrated, as χαράσσω is the verb used of sharpening it in Hesiod (see *Works and Days*, 387, with Paley's note). Some Egyptian figures are represented as pulling the grain up by the roots. This may have been to avoid wasting the straw, which, according to Pliny (xviii. 47), was only about a cubit long, owing to the dry sandy subsoil. In St. Kilda, according to Martin, the corn was pulled up by the roots in order to have it as long as possible for thatch. As a rule, in ancient times, most of the straw was left on the ground, and this when set on fire or ploughed in helped to manure the ground. Pliny observed (xviii. 72) that the stubble was left long except where straw was required for thatch or for fodder.

Between seedtime and harvest in most countries *hoeing* has to be done. Where the crops have to be hoed, this work is often left to women. In Greek agriculture, at least of the 5th and later centuries B.C., this work was done by men, and to leave it undone was regarded as very bad farming (Xenophon, *Oeconomicus*, xvii. 12; Theocritus, x. 14).

For all the operations of husbandry a *cart* or waggon is of importance. The employment of the cart is slower in developing than that of the plough, partly because extended use of it demands good roads. The prudent Hesiod advises the farmer to have his cart ready in good time against the spring, 'for it is easy to say, "Let me have a pair of oxen and a cart," and it is easy to answer, "No, my oxen have field work to do." The man wise in his own conceit says he will make a cart for himself, poor fool, and does not even know that there are a hundred pieces of wood in a cart, which he must take care to have in store by him beforehand' (*op. cit.* 453–457). Yet in some parts of the British Islands which are now famous for agriculture there were few or no carts as late as the middle of the 18th century. In Aberdeenshire, crops were even then carried from the field and manure from the farmyard in *currachs*, a sort of wicker panniers hung on either side of a *crook saddle*, while corn was taken to the mill or the seaport in sacks upon horseback (Pratt, *Buchan*[2], p. 19). Pennant observed in Caithness that the beasts of burden were the women. 'They turn their patient backs to the dunghills, and receive in their *keizes*, or baskets, as much as their lords and masters think fit to fling in with their pitchforks, and then trudge to the fields in droves of sixty or seventy' (*Tour in Scotland in 1769*, 3rd ed. p. 168). The first mechanical method of transporting heavy weights was, no doubt, upon a sled, a rough frame of wood with stout cross-bars, or a hurdle. A good specimen of the Egyptian sled for carrying corn-sacks is figured in H. Schäfer's article in the *Annual of the British School at Athens*, x. p. 139). Varro tells us that manure was taken to the fields upon hurdles for the purpose (*crates stercorariae*, i. 22, 3). This was an old Roman practice, as the list of necessaries for a farm which he is quoting is taken from Cato (*de Agricultura*, x.). Cato, however, also provides three asses with panniers for this purpose (*asinos ornatos clitellarios qui stercus vectent tris*), so that the *crates*, as they are mentioned next to the *irpex*, a kind of rake, may have been used for harrowing in the manure after it was spread upon the fields.

A cart without wheels was formerly widely used in the mountainous parts of Britain, and is still used in Ireland, the shafts being continued to form the frame, with their ends resting on the ground. The body of the cart was formed by two semicircular bows of wood, the ends of which were fastened to the shaft poles. These bows were kept in position by a bar running between their apices. The shaft poles were kept in position by cross-bars, and the bows also had cross-pieces; so that the shape of the body was that of a tilt-cart (these are illustrated in Dr. Haddon's *Study of Man*, 165 ff.).

A great advance in the development of the cart is marked by the introduction of wheels. The early history of the wheel is not clear. As, in the early heavy waggon, the axle and wheels turn together, it is obvious that wheels and axle in one block might have developed out of rollers. This view is adopted by Dr. Tylor (*JAI* x. p. 79), and doubtfully by Dr. Haddon (*Study of Man*, p. 173). Such a primitive arrangement is still to be found in Portugal. On the other hand, Professor Ridgeway contends (*Origin and Influence of the Thoroughbred Horse*, p. 488) that the war chariot with spoked wheels is earlier than the ox cart, which

* In Sir C. Fellows' sketch (*Journal written during an Excursion in Asia Minor*, p. 71), the stump is the part on which the share is fitted. The same kind of plough is still used in some of the Greek islands.

was modelled upon it. The body of the cart was a creel of wicker work, which could be removed at will. Of farm carts the Romans had two kinds—two-wheeled (*plaustrum*) and four-wheeled (*plaustrum maius*). Since they are termed *stridentia plaustra* (Virgil, *Georgics*, iii. 536), it is evident that they moved with much creaking, like the 'groaning' or 'singing' carts of Spain and Portugal (Haddon, *Study of Man*, p. 186 ff.). The noise is caused by 'the friction of the axle against the wedges in the floor of the waggon which keep it in its place' (Haddon, p. 189). The cattle were harnessed to the pole by a yoke which was fastened by a pin near the end of the pole, and lashed tightly with a thong or cord. Some kind of strap was fastened across under the neck of the animals. The modern forms are figured by Sir C. Fellows (*Journal*, p. 71), the ancient Egyptian by Schäfer in the article already mentioned.

4. Since in the countries round the Eastern Mediterranean the corn harvest comes on in May and June, the industry of autumn is the ingathering of tree fruit and the making of wine and olive oil, just as the making of cider is a characteristic autumn occupation of England, and on the Saxon font at Burnham Deepdale, in Norfolk (which has twelve scenes representing the months), is taken as the typical occupation for October. Hence the vintage is taken for the autumn scene upon the shield of Achilles. The young men and maidens carry the fruit in wicker baskets, a lad plays on the lyre and sings to them, and they join in singing and dancing (*Il.* xviii. 561 ff.). The vine grows wild round the Mediterranean, and in Asia as far as the Himalayas. Grape seeds have been found in pile-dwellings of the later Stone Age in Italy, and of at least the Bronze Age in Switzerland, and vine leaves have been discovered in the tufa round Montpellier and Meyrargue in Provence (de Candolle, *Cultivated Plants*, p. 192). The use of wine was probably introduced to the Greeks from Asia Minor or Thrace. Hesiod contemplates that his farmer may make a voyage after harvest, but adjures him not to wait for the new wine, in case of bad weather (*op. cit.* 663 ff.). Such a voyage from Bœotia would probably be to Lesbos, or the adjacent mainland, which was famous for its wine. According to all tradition, the use of wine and the culture of the grape were later in Italy, still more so in the countries north of the Alps (Schrader, *Reallexikon*, *s.v.* 'Wein').

The last of the crops which had more than a local importance was that of the *olive*. According to de Candolle (*Origin of Cultivated Plants*, p. 283), 'its prehistoric area probably extended from Syria towards Greece.' At Athens, till the development of the mines at Laurium, the trade in olive oil was the only important export industry, the soil being thin and ill adapted for agriculture. The olive, indeed, was supposed to be the special gift of the patron goddess Athene, and the sacred olive trees were protected from harm by heavy penalties. No doubt in early times such heavy penalties alone protected all produce, whether of domesticated plants or animals, against the instinct of primitive savagery to seize it for immediate use without regard to future loss (see TABU and TOTEMISM). The olive, as the Latin form of the word shows, spread from Greece to Italy, and from Italy again to the north of Europe. It is clear from Cato and Varro that in their time the vine and olive crops were regarded as of much greater importance than the growing of cereals. This was the result of the second Punic war. Hannibal devastated rural Italy; the agricultural population had to flee to the towns for protection, and stay there for half a generation while the war lasted, and the farmers themselves were drafted into the army. When the war was over, the rustics had no capital wherewith to restore their farms; the State was unable to help them, and the wealthy quietly annexed the derelict farms of the poor. With the development of an Empire outside Italy, corn came in payment of taxes from the subject States. With curious lack of economic insight, Gaius Gracchus, who was anxious to restore the rural population, caused this imported corn to be sold at less than its market value, with the result of making it impossible to grow corn for sale in Italy.

It is impossible to enter here into the more advanced departments of agriculture, the use of *irrigation*, which developed early in Egypt and Mesopotamia, and which is also recognized by Homer; and the cultivation of fruit trees by pruning and grafting. Wallace observed (*Travels*, p. 335) that the natives on the Amazon never pruned or did anything else to their fruit trees. On the other hand, the labourers imported from Melanesia into Queensland were much surprised to find black men who had no garden. In the Melanesian islands, in Sarawak, and elsewhere, irrigation has long been practised (Codrington, *The Melanesians*, p. 303; *Sarawak*, i. p. 406).

After the corn harvest was finished, the corn had to be *threshed*. This was done by oxen treading it out on the hard threshing-floor [for the making of which Varro and Virgil (*Georgics*, i. 178–180) give careful directions], or by dragging over it a sledge or heavy toothed plank, as was the Roman practice, and as is still done in Asia Minor (Fellows, *Travels*, p. 51). (Prehistoric methods were probably much simpler, the corn possibly being stripped from the ear by hand). The corn was stored for winter use in carefully plastered underground chambers, so as to escape, as far as possible, the ravages of vermin. As we have seen, corn was stored even in the Stone Age.

The last task in the preparation of corn for food prior to cooking it was the *making of it into meal or flour*. Piette found rubbing stones in a late stratum of the Palæolithic Age (Hoops, p. 280), though these were not necessarily used for corn. Bancroft's description (i. 653) of the methods of the aborigines of Yucatan probably represents approximately very ancient practice. The grain is first soaked, and then bruised on the rubbing stone and wetted occasionally till it becomes soft paste. From the rubbing stone develop the pestle and mortar of later times, which are often mentioned in the life of ancient Athens. But the handmill, with its heavy under stone and its lighter upper stone, which turns upon the other, goes back to the Stone Age (Hoops, p. 301 f.; Schrader, *Reallexikon*, *s.v.* 'Mahlen'). As they are often found in the graves of women, it is evident that this also was one of the duties of early woman, as indeed is clear from the literature of all countries from the earliest times.

LITERATURE.—For Mesopotamia and Egypt the representations in art: Perrot-Chipiez for both; the illustrations in Wilkinson (the text is out of date) and Lepsius, *Denkmäler aus Aegypten*; and the books mentioned in the text. For Greece: Hesiod, and incidentally Homer; Theophrastus, *Hist. of Plants*, etc, and *de Causis Plantarum*; with many allusions in Aristotle, Xenophon, and elsewhere (the *Geoponica* belongs to the late Roman Empire, but contains information from earlier sources). For Rome: Cato (its present is not the original form of the work); Varro, who professes to have read Phœnician, Greek, and Latin works on the subject, and was himself competent; Virgil, who, as a farmer's son, and himself a farmer, writes in the *Georgics* with knowledge and interest, though not, of course, in technical fashion [the *Moretum* attributed to him gives an excellent account of a day in the life of a simple rustic]; Columella, elaborate but inexact; Palladius, the greater part of whose work is arranged as a farmer's year, and had much influence in the Middle Ages. Detailed accounts of Greek and Roman agriculture will be found in Baumeister's *Denkmäler des klass. Altertums*, *s.v.* 'Ackerbau;' Smith's *Gr.-Rom. Ant.*, and Pauly, *s.v.* 'Ackerbau' [this, though old, still contains much that is useful]. The agriculture of the Semitic nations is treated in the various Bible Dictionaries; Indian agriculture

in the Vedic Age by Zimmer, *Altindisches Leben*. General accounts, specially for the Indo-Germanic peoples, are given, with full references to literature, in Schrader's *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte* [a new edition is in course of publication] and *Reallexikon der indogermanischen Altertumskunde*. Cf. also Behlen, *Der Pflug und das Pflügen bei den Römern und in Mittel Europa in vorgeschichtlicher Zeit* (Dillenburg, 1904); Meringer, *Indo-germanische Forschungen*, xvi. 183 ff., xvii. 100 ff. (with many illustrations). The cultivated plants are treated by de Candolle (*Origin of Cultivated Plants*, 1884), by Hehn (*Kulturpflanzen und Hausthiere*[7] (ed. by Schrader, 1902), and by Hoops (*Waldbäume und Kulturpflanzen im germanischen Altertum*, 1905). These works give full references to other literature. The origins of agriculture are treated also by Hahn, *Die Haustiere*, 1896, *Demeter und Baubo*, 1896, and *Das Alter der wirthschaftlichen Kultur der Menschheit*, 1905; by Sophus Müller, *Urgeschichte Europas*, 1905; and by Hirt, *Die Indogermanen*, i., 1905. Mucke's book (*Urgeschichte des Ackerbaues und der Viehzucht: Eine neue Theorie*, 1898) must be used with caution.

P. GILES.

AHERIA (Skr. *akheṭika*, 'a hunter').—A Dravidian tribe of hunters, fowlers, and thieves, found in North India to the number of 35,447, of whom the majority inhabit the United Provinces and the Panjāb. Their religion is of the animistic type, and they worship a host of minor gods or godlings, and spirits not included in the orthodox Hindu pantheon. Some, who are more influenced by Hinduism, follow Devī, the Mother-goddess; but in the United Provinces their tribal god is Mekhāsura (Skr. *mesha-āsura*, 'the ram spirit'), of which they can give no account, but which probably represents a primitive form of theriolatry. Gūga or Zāhir Pīr, the famous saint round whom has been collected a curious cycle of legend, is worshipped by the agency of a Musalmān officiant (Crooke, *Popular Religion*, i. 211 f.). Another Muhammadan saint worshipped by them is the Miyāṅ or Mīrāṅ Sāḥib of Amroha in the Morādābād district, of whom also strange legends are told (Shea-Troyer, *Dabistān*, iii. 235; Crooke, *op. cit.* i. 217). In a lower stage of animism is Jakhiya, who is apparently a deified sweeper, a member of which caste attends his shrine. To him a pig is sacrificed, and the sweeper officiant rubs a little of the blood upon the foreheads of children to repel evil spirits. Barai and Chāmar, two of the common village godlings, are also worshipped. To the latter the offering is a cake of wheat, but in serious cases a ram is offered, the flesh of which is then and there consumed in the presence of the god. It is a curious fact that the Aherias have appropriated as their patron saint Vālmīki, the mythical compiler of the epic of the Rāmāyaṇa. The sacrifices to the tribal godlings are generally performed by a member of the family which makes the offering, not by a regular priest. In some cases where the victim is not actually slain, it is released after blood has been drawn from its ear. The Aherias stand in great fear of the ghosts of the dead; and when they cremate a corpse, they fling pebbles in the direction of the pyre as they return home, in order to prevent the spirit from accompanying them.

LITERATURE.—Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, 1896, i. 45 ff., *Popular Religion and Folklore of Northern India*, new ed. 1896, ii. 57.

W. CROOKE.

AHIṀSĀ.—*Ahiṁsā* is the Indian doctrine of non-injury, that is, to all living things (men and animals). It first finds expression in a mystical passage in the Chāndogya Upanishad (3. 17), where five ethical qualities, one being *ahiṁsā*, are said to be equivalent to a part of the sacrifice of which the whole life of man is made an epitome. This is not exactly the same as the Hebrew prophet's 'I will have mercy and not sacrifice,' but it comes near to it. The date of this document may be the 7th cent. B.C. This was also the probable time of the rise of the Jains, who made the non-injury doctrine a leading tenet of their school. (See, for instance, Āchārānga Sutta 1. 4. 2, translated by Jacobi, *Jaina Sūtras*, 1. 39). It is the first of the five vows of the Jain ascetics (*ib.* p. xxiii.); and they carried it to great extremes, not driving away vermin from their clothes or bodies, and carrying a filter and a broom to save minute insects in the water they drank or on the ground where they sat (*ib.* p. xxvii).

The doctrine has been common ground in all Indian sects from that time to the present. But each school of thought looks at it in a different way, and carries it out in practice in different degrees. The early Buddhists adopted it fully, but drew the line at what we should now call ordinary, reasonable humanity. It occurs twice in the eightfold path,—no doubt the very essence of Buddhism,—first under right aspiration, and again under right conduct (Majjhima iii. 251 = Saṁyutta v. 9). It is the first in the Ten Precepts for the Order (*sikkhāpadāni*), and therefore of the five rules of conduct for laymen (*pañcha sīlāni*), which correspond to the first five of the Precepts (Vinaya i. 83, Aṅguttara iii. 203). It is the subject of the first paragraph of the old tract on conduct, the Sīlas, which is certainly one of the very oldest of extant Buddhist documents, and is incorporated bodily into so many of the Suttantas (Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, i. 3, 4). Aśoka made it the subject of the first and second of the Rock Edicts in which he recommended his religion to his people, and refers again to it in the fourth. But he had long been a Buddhist before, in the first Edict, he proclaimed himself a vegetarian. The rule of the Buddhist Order was to accept any food offered to them on their round for alms; when Devadatta demanded a more stringent rule, the Buddha expressly refused to make any change (*Vinaya Texts*, ii. 117, iii. 253); and a much-quoted hymn, the Āmagandha Sutta (translated by Fausböll, *SBE* x. 40), put into the mouth of Kassapa the Buddha, lays down that it is not the eating of flesh that defiles a man, but the doing of evil deeds. The Buddhist application of the principle differs, therefore, from the Jain.

It would be a long, and not very useful, task to trace the different degrees in which the theory has been subsequently held. It is sufficient to note that the less stringent view has prevailed. At the end of the long Buddhist domination the practice of animal sacrifices had ceased, and though with the revival of Brāhman influence an attempt was made to restore them, it failed. The use of meat as food had been given up, and has never revived. But the Indians have not become strict vegetarians. Dried fish is still widely eaten; and though there is a deep-rooted aversion to taking animal life of any other kind, the treatment of living animals, draught oxen and camels for instance, is not always thoughtful. Nowhere else, however, has the doctrine of *ahiṁsā* had so great and long-continued an influence on national character.

T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

AHIQĀR, THE STORY OF.—In several versions of the *Thousand and One Nights*, the story of the sage Aḥiqār (Ḥaikār, Ḥikār, etc.; cf. on the original form of the name, Lidzb. in *ThLZ*, 1899, col. 608) is to be found. The tale is derived from a compilation which was circulated especially among the Christians of Syria (cf. Lidzb. in *ZDMG* i. 1896, p. 152). The contents of the story are as follows:—Aḥiqār is minister of Sennacherib, king of Assyria. He is already sixty years old, and has sixty wives in sixty palaces, but no son. He has recourse to the gods (in the Armenian version, to Belshim, Shimil and Shamin; cf. on this Lidzb. in *Ephem.* i. p. 259) and prays for children, but receives the reply that they have been denied to him, and is advised to adopt his nephew Nadan, and to bring him up instead of a son. Aḥiqār does so, devoting the greatest care to the physical and intellectual culture of his nephew, but the young man

turns out a failure. He squanders the property of Aḥiqār and commits all kinds of crimes. When he is on this account called in question by Aḥiqār, Nadan seeks to devise means to remove his uncle. He contrives an intrigue to represent him as a traitor to the king. The king is deceived, and condemns Aḥiqār to death. However, Aḥiqār and his wife Ashfeghni succeed in influencing the executioner to spare his life, and to execute in his stead a slave who had been condemned to death. Aḥiqār is kept concealed by his wife, and is generally supposed to be dead. The news, too, reaches the ears of Sennacherib's rival, Pharaoh of Egypt, and encourages him to impose on Sennacherib the task of building him a palace between heaven and earth. If Sennacherib should be able to carry out this demand, he would pay to him the income of his empire for three years; but if not, Sennacherib must do the same to him. Of all the advisers of the king, no one is able to comply with the demand of Pharaoh—least of all, Nadan. The king is in the greatest extremity, and bitterly repents the removal of Aḥiqār. Then the executioner discloses the fact that he, at the time of the command of the king, did not carry out Aḥiqār's execution, and that he is still alive. On hearing this, the king is highly delighted, releases Aḥiqār, and sends him to Egypt. He easily solves all problems proposed by Pharaoh, and the latter has to pay the tribute and still other sums to Sennacherib. After his return home, Aḥiqār is again installed in his old position, and his nephew is unconditionally handed over to him. Aḥiqār reproaches him for his actions, and the effect on Nadan is so strong that he 'swelled up like a skin' and burst asunder.

The importance of this narrative, from the side of the history of religion, consists in the fact that, in all likelihood, it belongs to the lost literature of the Aramæans of the pre-Christian era (cf. Lidzb. in *ThLZ* and *Ephem. l.c.*). That the story had arisen in ancient times can be concluded from the consideration that the contents of the tale, with the names of both the principal heroes, are alluded to in the Book of Tobit (14^{10}). The connexion of this passage in the Book of Tobit with the story of Aḥiqār was first recognized by G. Hoffmann (*Auszüge aus syrischen Akten persischer Märtyrer*, p. 182), but he adopted the view that the story took its rise first in the Middle Ages under the influence of the passage in Tobit. However, the various versions of the story discovered since then make this supposition untenable, and the priority of the story of Aḥiqār is now generally recognized. The heathen character of the tale, too, cannot be mistaken, and this is especially prominent in the Armenian version. Among the gods mentioned in the text, the 'God of heaven' takes the first place. He is B'elšamin, whose worship was widely diffused among the Semitic peoples in the last centuries B.C. and the first A.D. Especially instructive is the passage in which Aḥiqār emphasizes the ascendency of B'elšamin as the 'God of heaven' over Bel, sun and moon (cf. *Ephem.* i. p. 259).

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works mentioned in the text, cf. Benfey, *Kleinere Schriften*, iii. p. 186 ff.; Salhani, *Contes arabes* (1890), p. 1 ff. (Arabic version); Jagič, *Byzant. Zeitschr.* i. (1892) p. 107 ff. (Slavonic version); Kuhn, in the same, p. 127 ff.; Meissner, *ZDMG* xlviii. (1894) p. 171 ff.; Lidzbarski, in the same, p. 671 ff.; Lidzbarski, *Die neuaramäischen Handschriften der Kgl. Bibliothek zu Berlin* (1896), i. ii. p. 1 ff. (Arabic and new Aramaic version); Dillon, *The Contemp. Rev.* lxxiii. (1898) p. 362 ff.; F. C. Conybeare, J. Rendel Harris, and Agnes Smith Lewis, *The Story of Aḥikar*, London, 1898 (Syriac, Arabic, Armenian, and Slavonic versions); Cosquin, *RB* viii. (1899) p. 50 ff., 510 ff.; Th. Reinach, *REJ* xxxviii. (1899) p. 1 ff.; Halévy, *RS* viii. (1900) p. 23 ff.; Gaster, *JRAS*, N. S. xxxii. (1900) p. 301 ff. (Roumanian version); J. Dashian, *Kurze bibliographische Untersuchungen u. Texte*, ii. (1901) p. 1 ff.; *JE* i. (1901) p. 287 ff.; P. Vetter, *Theol. Quartalschrift*, lxxxvi. (1904) pp. 321 ff., 512 ff., lxxxvii. (1905) pp. 321 ff., 497 ff.; Bousset, *ZNTW* vi. (1905) p. 180 ff.; de Moor, *Muséon*, N. S. ii. (1901) p. 445 ff.

M. LIDZBARSKI.

AHĪR.—An important tribe of agriculturists and breeders of cattle, which at the Census of 1901 numbered 9,806,475, of whom the vast majority are found in Bengal (where it is by far the largest caste), the United and Central Provinces, and in smaller numbers throughout N. India. Their name connects them with the Abhīras, a people occupying the Indus valley; and Lassen's view, that the Śūdras, or servile caste of the Hindu polity, with the Abhīras and Nishādas, were a black, long-haired Indian race, occupying what is now the valley of Sind, is perhaps correct. Another suggestion, which would connect them with a Scythian tribe, the Abars, who are believed to have entered India in the 1st or 2nd cent. B.C., is less probable. In N. India their traditions connect them with Mathura, the holy land of Krishṇa; and the Jādūbansī, one of their subdivisions, claim descent from the Yādava tribe to which Krishṇa is said to have belonged; while another, the Nandbansī of the United Provinces, the Nanda Ghosh of Bengal, claims as its ancestor Nanda, the foster-father of the divine child.

1. *Bengal.*—In Bengal the caste is known as Goālā (Skr. *gopāla*, 'a cowherd'), and in accordance with the legend of their descent they are generally worshippers of Krishṇa, and therefore members of the Vaishnava sect. But their cult is of a much lower type than the pietistic form of Vaishnavism associated in Bengal with the teaching of Chaitanya. Thus, they have a special feast, known as the Govardhan-pūjā, which takes its name from the holy Mathura hill associated with the cult of Krishṇa, at which they pray to a heap of boiled rice which is supposed to represent the hill, and make an offering of food, red-lead, turmeric, and flowers to every cow which they possess. In other parts the worship is paid to a mass of cowdung made to represent a human form, presumably that of Krishṇa. A still more primitive rite is that described by Buchanan (in Martin, *E. India*, i. 194), when at the *Divālī*, or Feast of Lamps, they tie together the feet of a pig, and drive their cattle over the wretched animal until it is killed, after which they boil and eat the flesh in the fields, though on other occasions they are not permitted to taste pork. Here the pig was probably originally a sacred animal, and is sacramentally slain to promote the fertility of the fields (Frazer, *Golden Bough*², ii. 366 ff.).

It is a curious proof of the sympathy which even Hindus of high caste and social position exhibit towards the coarser side of Hinduism, that when, in 1895, the English officer in charge of the Santāl country prohibited this brutal rite, a protest was immediately made in the Legislative Council of Bengal by one of its members. It is satisfactory to find that the Lieutenant-Governor supported the action of his subordinate (*North Indian Notes and Queries*, v. 38).

In W. Bengal they have special reverence for the hero Lorik, round whom a cycle of curious legend centres, and for Kāśī Bābā or Kāśīnāth, the ghost of a murdered Brāhman, which is greatly feared. If he be not propitiated, he brings disease upon the cattle; and Risley describes how, when the plague appears, 'the village cattle are massed together, and cotton seed sprinkled over them. The fattest and sleekest animal being singled out, it is severely beaten with rods. The herd, scared by the noise, scamper off to the nearest shelter, followed by the scape-bull; and by this means it is thought the murrain is stayed.'

2. *United Provinces.*—In the United Provinces, those members of the caste who are initiated into any of the orthodox sects are either Vaishnavas or Śaivas, the former preferring the cult of Krishṇa, the latter that of Śiva or of his consort Devī in some one of her many forms, in preference the goddess known as the Vindhyabāsinī Devī, who has her temple at Vindhyāchal in the Mirzapur district, and is supposed to be the guardian goddess

of the Vindhyan Hills. In Sahāranpur they have two deities who preside over marriage—Brahm Devatā and Bar Devatā, the former representing the great Hindu god Brahmā, who has an image of gold in human form; the latter the banyan tree (Hind. *bar*, Skr. *vaṭa*). On the night of the wedding the image of Brahm Devatā is brought by the goldsmith and placed upon the marriage-platform. When the binding portion of the rite has been performed, the bride and bridegroom offer to the image sandalwood, rice, flowers, incense, sweetmeats, and cakes, and light lamps before it. The women of the household then bury the image in the kitchen, and raise an earthen platform over it. The members of the family worship this daily by pouring water over it, and on feast days offerings of milk and rich cakes are made to it. This is done until a second marriage takes place in the family, when it is dug up and removed, and its place is taken by a new image. This is a very curious survival of Brahmā worship among a people where we were unlikely to suspect its existence. Except in a few temples specially dedicated to this, the head of the Hindu triad, his cult has now largely fallen into disuse. The worship of the banyan tree is closely connected with the custom of tree-marriage (Crooke, *Popular Religion and Folk-lore of N. India*, ii. 115). Among the Ahīr the bridegroom marks the trunk of the tree with vermilion at the same time as he marks the parting of the bride's hair with the same substance—a rite which is an obvious survival of the blood-covenant, marking the reception of the bride into a new kith and kin different from her own.

They also worship the Pāñchoñpīr (see PACHPIRIYAS) and various minor local gods, the most popular of whom is Kāśīnāth, a deified ghost, at whose festival pots of milk are set to boil for the refreshment of the godling; and one man, becoming possessed by the deity, pours the contents over his shoulder, and is said never to be scalded. Their special cattle-god in the eastern parts of these Provinces is Bīrnāth (Skr. *vīra-nātha*, 'hero-lord'), who is represented by a collection of five wooden images rudely carved into human form.

3. *Central Provinces.*—A similar quintette of gods of disease is worshipped in the Central Provinces. Here their principal deities are Dūlhā Deo, said to be a deified bridegroom who died on his wedding-day (see DRAVIDIANS), and Budhā Deo, the chief god of the Gonds. As in Bengal, their chief festival is the Divālī, when they go about bedecked with strings of cowry shells, singing and dancing. They also pay much respect to a deified man, Haridās Bābā. He is said to have been a *yogī* ascetic, and to have possessed the power of separating his soul from his body at pleasure. One day he went in spirit to Benares, and left his body in the house of one of his disciples, an Ahīr. As he did not return, and the people ascertained that a dead body was lying in this house, they insisted that it should be burned. After this was done, Haridās returned, and when he found that his body had been burned, he entered into another man, and through him informed the people what a terrible mistake had been made. In atonement for their error, they worship him to this day. We have here an excellent example of the world-wide belief in the separable soul. The beliefs of the Ahīr in this Province are of a very primitive type, and Russell points to obvious survivals of totemism in the titles of some of the sub-castes.

4. *Deccan.*—In the Deccan the Ahīr are known as Gāvlī, which is the equivalent of *Goālā*, explained above. Here they are worshippers of the ordinary Hindu gods,—in particular of Śiva—and their priests are *jaṅgams*, or officiants of the Lingāyat (wh. see) sect. Those known as Marāṭha Gopāls worship the Mother-goddess, the Devī of Tuljapur in the Nizām's dominions, Kānhoba, Khandoba of Jejuri in the Poona district, and Mahāsoba, with offerings of sandal paste, flowers, and food. Each family dedicates a she-buffalo to Kānhoba, or Krishṇa, rears her with care, and does not load her or sell her milk and butter, but presents these to a Brāhman. Further south in Kānara, the Gollar, a kindred tribe, worship Krishṇa, Śiva under the form of the terrible Kāla Bhairava, and his consort Pārvatī. The rites in honour of these deities are performed after the Lingāyat rule.

5. *Gaddī, Ghosī.*—In N. India, when Ahīr are converted to Islām, they are known as *Ghosī* ('a shouter,' Skr. *ghush*, 'to shout after cattle') or *Gaddī*, and follow the Muhammadan rule, with some admixture of Dravidian animism. In Bombay they use many Hindu rites at marriage and birth, worship an image of the goddess Devī at the Dasahrā festival, and of Lakshmī, the goddess of good luck, at the Divālī, when they also adore the Tulasī or holy basil plant, as at the Holī they worship the castor-oil plant.

Quite distinct from these are the Gaddī of the Panjāb Hills, of whose beliefs Rose has given a full account. They are nominally Hindus by religion, worshipping Śiva by preference, and, in addition to him, Nāgas or serpent gods, Siddhas or deified ascetics, Bīrs or heroes, and Devīs or Mother-goddesses. The Nāgas, probably as representing the earth in serpent form, receive an offering of beestings, male kids and lambs, first-fruits of all crops, incense, and small cakes. The Siddhas, as befits their wandering life, are presented with a sack, stick, crutch, sandals, and thick bread cakes; the Bīrs receive a he-goat, a thick woollen cloak, waistband, cap, and fine bread. They and the Siddhas are thus conceived as living a life in another world, much the same as that which they enjoyed on earth. The Devīs, as female deities, receive vermilion and trinkets beloved by women, ardent spirits, and a goat. Women have their special worship of Kailū, who is a Bīr and the *numen* of abortion. Kailung is one of the chief Nāgas or serpent gods. Like Śiva, he is adored under the form of a sickle, which the god always carries when grazing his flocks. Besides these objects of worship, there are the *autārs* (Skr. *avatāra*, 'an incarnation of one of the greater gods'), a term here applied to the ghost of a person who has died childless, and who therefore is malignant and causes sickness. To propitiate this spirit, the sick person puts on clothes which are specially made for him, and wears an image of the spirit round his neck. Thus clad, he worships the *autār*, an image of which is always kept near a stream. The clothes and image are worn as a memorial of the dead man, to keep him in mind and conciliate him. Besides these, they worship a host of malignant spirits—*bātal*, the sprites of rivers and streams; *yoginīs*, or rock spirits; *rakshanīs* and *banasats*, who are here regarded as akin to the *yoginīs*, but are probably in their origin female demons (Skr. *rākshasī*); and spirits of the wood (Skr. *vanaspati*, 'king of the wood'). This would be quite in accordance with the belief of forest tribes, who naturally worship the spirits of trees, rocks, or rivers by which they are surrounded. Chungū is another demon who inhabits trees. He sucks the milk of cattle, and is propitiated with an offering of a coco-nut—a frequent form of commutation of the original human victim, the coco-nut representing the skull—, a plough handle, almonds, and grapes—the usual farmer's gifts. His effigy is made in flour, and to this incense is offered. Gungā, the demon who causes cattle disease, is propitiated by setting aside a griddle cake of bread until the final offerings can be made. Then a piece of iron, something like a hockey stick, is made, and the deity

emb died in this is taken into the cattle shed, where he is worshipped by the sacred fire on a Thursday. A he goat is killed, and a few drops of the blood sprinkled on the iron. At the same time cakes are offered, and some are eaten by *one* member of the household, but not by more than one, or the scourge will not abate; the rest are buried in the earth. Every fourth year the deity is worshipped in the same fashion. Kailū is a demon worshipped by women after childbirth, by putting up a stone under a tree, which is sanctified by magic formulæ (*mantra*) and then worshipped. A white goat, which may have a black head, is offered up to the demon by making an incision in the right ear and letting the blood fall on a white cloth—a good example of the commutation of the blood sacrifice. The woman eats some coarse sugar and dons the cloth, which she must wear until it is worn out, thus maintaining a sacramental communion between the demon and herself. If any other woman should happen to wear the cloth, it would cause her divers bodily ills. These facts regarding Gaddī religion are specially interesting, as being one of the best extant accounts of Indian animism as shown in the Panjāb Hills.

LITERATURE.—For Bengal: Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology*, 314 f.; Risley, *Tribes and Castes*, i. 289; Buchanan Hamilton, in Martin, *Eastern India*, i. 194 f., ii. 133. For the cult of Lorik and Kāsi Bābā: Gait, *Bengal Census*, 1901, i. 197; Crooke, *Popular Religion and Folk-lore*, ii. 160; Risley, *op. cit.* i. 132; *North Indian Notes and Queries*, v. 77. For the United Provinces: Crooke, *Tribes and Castes*, i. 63, ii. 370, 419. For Rājputāna: *Census Report*, 1901, i. 139. For the Central Provinces; *Census Report*, 1901, i. 80, 189; *PASB* lviii. pt. i. 297. For the Deccan and Concan: *Bombay Gazetteer*, xv. pt. i. 297, xvii. 151, 184; *PASB* i. 42. For the Panjāb: Rose, *Census Report*, 1901, i. 119 ff. W. CROOKE.

AHMADĀBĀD, AḤMEDĀBĀD.—Chief city of the district of that name in the province of Gujarāt; founded in A.D. 1413 by Aḥmad Shāh, from whom it takes its name, and during the 16th and 17th cents. one of the most splendid cities of W. India. The religious buildings illustrate the conflict of the Muhammadan style with that of the Jains to which it succeeded.

'The truth of the matter,' writes Fergusson, 'is, the Mahomedans had forced themselves upon the most civilized and most essentially building race at that time in India, and the Chalukyas conquered their conquerors, and forced them to adopt forms and ornaments which were superior to any the invaders knew or could have introduced. The result is a style which combines all the elegance and finish of Jaina and Chalukyan art, with a certain largeness of conception which the Hindu never quite attained, but which is characteristic of the people who at that time were subjecting all India to their sway.'

Among these buildings the Jāmi' Masjid, or Cathedral Mosque, though not remarkable for size, is one of the most beautiful mosques in the East. This and other buildings of the same class, following 'the most elegant and instructive of Indo-Saracenic styles,' were built during the century and a half of independent rule (A.D. 1413–1573). Their tombs are equally remarkable, that of the King Mahmūd Begadā being one of the most splendid sepulchres in India.

LITERATURE.—Fergusson, *Hist. of Indian and Eastern Architecture*, 526 ff.; *Bombay Gazetteer*, iv. 262 ff., ix. pt. i. 131. W. CROOKE.

ĀHOMS.—The Āhoms are Shāns belonging to the great Tai family of the human race. This family extends from the Gulf of Siam northwards into Yün-nan and thence westward to Assam. It comprises several divisions, viz. the Siamese, Laos, Shāns, Tai Mau or Tai Khē (Chinese Shāns), Khāmtī and Āhom.* According to Dr. Grierson, the Tai race, in its different branches, is beyond all question the most widely spread of any in the Indo-Chinese Peninsula, and even in parts beyond the Peninsula, and it is certainly the most numerous. Its members are to be found from Assam to far into the Chinese province of Kwang-si, and from Bangkok to the interior of Yün-nan.* The Āhoms used to call themselves not 'Āhom,' but, like the Northern Shāns, 'Tai.' Regarding the etymology of the word 'Āhom' there has been some discussion, and various views have been expressed. Dr. Grierson seems to incline to the opinion that the word is a corruption of *Ashām*. *Shān* is the Burmese corruption of *Shām*, which is the true spelling and pronunciation of the name of the well-known tribe. We have not, however, been able to ascertain what is the force of the initial A. The Muhammadan historians called the Āhoms 'Āsām.' They say, when mentioning them, that 'Āsām did this and that.' If this suggestion is correct, 'Āhom' must be a, comparatively speaking, modern corruption.† It is very probable that this tribe gave the modern name to our Province of Assam, the old name for the country being Saumarpīṭh.‡

History.—Gait, in his extremely valuable work, *A History of Assam*, gives a detailed historical account of the tribe. All that need be stated here is that the Āhoms invaded Assam, under the leadership of Chukāphā, from the Shān States in the 13th century. The Āhom *buranjis*, or chronicles, give the exact date, which has been computed by us from their reckoning to be A.D. 1228. The conquest of Yün-nan by Khūblai Khān took place in the year A.D. 1253,§ but it is possible that the Chinese inroads into Yün-nan began some years previous to the final conquest of the country, and the general disturbance of the people which took place in consequence caused some of the Shāns to migrate to other countries, as was the case with the Āhom branch. Probably, however, the Āhoms required but little encouragement to shift their quarters, for the Shāns are restless by nature, and are constantly moving from place to place, even in times of peace. The Āhoms, passing over the Pātkai‖ range, which divides Assam from Upper Burma, subdued in turn the different Bārā tribes, *i.e.* the Morāns, Borāhis, and Chutiyās, which they found in possession of the Brahmapūtra valley. Although it would seem that the Āhoms, when they first appeared in the Province, were not large in numbers, they must have increased considerably afterwards, for they gradually extended their dominions until in the time of Rudra Singha (1696–1714) they were in possession of practically the whole valley of Assam, and were, moreover, able more than once to repel the Muhammadans who had invaded the country on several occasions, and to defeat the great Kachāri king Nara Nārāyaṇ, as well as the Raja of Jaintia. The Āhoms probably received a certain number of recruits from their Shān relatives beyond the Pātkai; but they seem to have admitted the Bārā people of the country largely into their tribe, and by this means also they probably increased their numbers. At the Census of 1901 those who returned themselves as Āhoms amounted to 178,049, the greater portion of this number being resident in the two upper Assam districts of Sibsagar and Lakhimpur.

The Āhom legend that two brothers, Khūnlūng and Khūnlai, from whom they claim descent, came down from heaven and established themselves at a place called Müng-Ri-Müng-Rang, seems to be identical with the Shān legend mentioned by Dr. Cushing,¶ except that the *habitat* of the Shāns is said to have been the Shweli valley. Müng-Ri-Müng-Rang is thought by Sir George Scott to have some connexion with Möng-Hi-Möng-Ham, a place in the Hsephsawng Panna on the bank of the river Mekong in the Chinese Shān States. Wherever may have been the exact abode of the Āhoms before they entered Assam, it is very probable that they formed one of the tribes included in the Shān kingdom of Müng Mau, which at that time was very large and powerful.** This kingdom was probably identical with what was known to the Manipuris as the kingdom of Pong.††

Physical Characteristics.—The description of the physical characteristics of the Shāns given by Dr. Cushing‡‡ is equally applicable to the Āhoms, except that it should be stated that the Āhoms of the Assam valley, owing to intermarriage with the Bārā tribes, which are of Tibeto-Burman origin, exhibit probably fewer Shān characteristics than the people of the Shān States. The statement of the Muhammadan historian, quoted on p. 139 of Gait's *History of Assam*, that the Āhom women are 'very black,' is scarcely accurate, for the Āhom women are among the fairest in Assam, and show a pleasing contrast to the

* Introduction to Dr. Cushing's *Shān Grammar* (Rangoon, 1871).

* General Introduction to 'Tai Group' in *Linguistic Survey of India* (Calcutta, 1904), vol. ii. p. 59.

† In Assamese, *s* and *sh* become a guttural *h*.

‡ See p. 61 of General Introduction to 'Tai Group' in *Linguistic Survey of India*, vol. ii.; also pp. 240, 241 of *A History of Assam* (E. A. Gait).

§ Dr. Cushing's note in the *Burma Census Report* of 1891, p. 201.

‖ Said to take its name from the Āhom words *pāt*, 'to cut,' and *kai*, 'fowl,' it being the Āhom custom to seek auguries by examining the legs of fowls.

¶ *Burma Census Report*, 1891, p. 202.

** See note by Dr. Cushing in the *Burma Census Report* of 1891.

†† For derivation of '*Pong*' see *Burma Census Report*, 1891, p. 203.

‡‡ Cushing in *Burma Census Report*, 1891.

ordinary Kachāri * woman of the plains, whose skin is frequently dusky in hue, and whose features are hard and ill favoured. Though more muscular, and certainly more capable of bearing fatigue than the Assamese Hindu of Aryan or semi-Aryan extraction, the Āhom, by long residence in the steamy plains of Assam, and by inordinate use of opium, has physically deteriorated, and has become as incorrigibly lazy as the ordinary Assamese *rāyat*. Āhoms are heavy drinkers, consuming large quantities of rice beer, called by them *lau*,† which they brew in their own villages. The *Bihus*, or harvest and sowing festivals, are celebrated by more than usually heavy potations.‡ The *deodhais*, or Āhom priests, distil a spirit from rice in out of the way localities, often in defiance of the Excise laws. The evils of the gambling habit, which affect other races of Indo-Chinese origin,§ do not, so far, appear to have spread among them. In educational matters the Āhoms are more backward than even the ordinary Assamese Hindus, which is saying a good deal. In consequence, both the Āhoms and the Assamese Hindus stand in great danger of being elbowed out of all Government as well as industrial employment by the people of Eastern Bengal. The condition of the old Āhom aristocracy becomes worse and worse each year, owing chiefly to the failure of its members to realize the new conditions of life. Families in Sibsagar which a generation or two back held positions of power and comparative wealth at the Āhom Rāja's court are now practically destitute.

Dress.—The dress of the Āhom tribesman at the present time possesses nothing to distinguish it from that worn by the Assamese cultivator. It was the Āhoms, however, who probably introduced into Assam the large broad-brimmed hat or *jhāpi*, which is an adaptation of the Shān head covering. The dress of an Āhom nobleman used to consist of a turban of silk or a cap called *jema*, a short coat, *mirjai*, made of Assamese *mūgha* or *pāt* silk, reaching to the waist, a long coat, also of silk, worn over the *mirjai* reaching down to the ankles, and a *churiā* or silken waist cloth. Āhom females dress in a similar manner to ordinary Assamese women, wearing either silk (varying in texture) or cotton, according to the circumstances of the wearer. All this silk is spun and woven in the Assamese homesteads. Women as well as men nowadays wear the *jhāpi*, a specially large and gaily decorated hat being reserved for the bride on her wedding-day. Formerly the *jhāpi* was an emblem of authority, and none but the great were allowed to wear it in the presence of the Rāja. Jewellery is much the same as that ordinarily met with in the valley, although the different articles are sometimes called by different names. The girls of the Deodhai, or priestly clan, tattoo star-shaped devices on their hands and arms, the dye used being prepared in the Āhom or Norā villages. Tattooing takes place when a girl has reached about ten years of age. The Norās, another Shān tribe of Assam, who possess a few settlements in the valley, observe a similar custom.

Houses and Villages.—Āhom villages do not differ from those of the ordinary cultivator of the valley, but the houses of the priests (Deodhais), who are in all matters more conservative than the rest of the tribe, are built on piles about 5 to 6 ft. from the ground, the dwelling of the ordinary cultivator being either set up on an earthen plinth or flush with the ground. The Deodhai houses are divided into three compartments, *maren* or cook-room, *chāngku* or sleeping-room, and *chāmku* or dining-room. The spaces immediately below these three chambers are used for the loom, cowshed, and pig-sty respectively.

Food and drink.—Pigs and fowls abound in the Deodhai villages. Āhoms who have not been Hinduized, sometimes even those who have become the disciples of Vaisnavite gosains, eat pork and fowls, and drink rice beer and rice spirit, much to the scandal of their sanctimonious Assamese Hindu neighbours, who regard them with horror. The Āhoms cultivate rice in the same fashion, using the same primitive plough, as the other peasants of the valley, but, owing to their extremely lethargic habits, fail to reap anything like full benefits from the magnificently rich soil. A large quantity of grain is used up by them in the manufacture of *lau* (rice beer), and they spend probably quite as much money in buying opium as in paying the Government land revenue.

Exogamous groups.—The Āhoms are divided into a number of exogamous groups called *phoids* or *khels*, the principal ones being seven in number, hence the term *sātgharīā* ('belonging to seven houses')‖ which is nowadays applied to them. The composition of these seven principal divisions has varied from time to time, but they are said to have originally consisted of the following: the Royal Family, the Buragohain, Bargohain, Chiring, Deodhai, Mohan, and Bailong *phoids*.‖ The whole of the superior exogamous groups are divided, further, into two main divisions, called Gohains and Gogois, but there are some decidedly inferior *phoids*, such as the Chaodangs, who were the public executioners in the old days, as well as Likchans, Gharfaleas and others, with whom Āhoms of the upper classes will not intermarry. For a description of the Āhom system of government, State and social organization, and particularly the *pāik* system, the reader is referred to ch. ix. of Gait's *History of Assam*.

Marriage.—Āhoms who have become Hindus observe a modified Hindu marriage ceremony, but the real Āhom rite is the *saklang*. The ritual is contained in a holy book called the *saklang pūthi* (unfortunately no longer available). As the actual ceremony is conducted with some secrecy, and as it is said to be forbidden to divulge its details to anyone but an Āhom, the writer had considerable difficulty in finding out what actually occurs on the occasion; but two reliable authorities, Srijuts Kanakeswar Borpatra Gohain and Radha Kanta Sandikai, E.A.C., were good enough to give him the following description. The bridegroom sits in the courtyard; the bride is brought in, and she walks seven times round the bridegroom. She then sits down by his side. After this both rise and proceed to a room screened off from the guests. Here one end of a cloth is tied round the neck of the bride, the other being fastened to the bridegroom's waist. They walk to a corner, where nine vessels full of water have been placed on plantain leaves, the Chiring Phukan (or master of the ceremonies) reads from the *saklang pūthi*, and three cups containing milk, honey and ghee, and rice frumenty, are produced, which the bride and bridegroom have to smell. Some uncooked rice is then brought in a basket, into which, after the bride and bridegroom have exchanged knives, rings are plunged by bride and bridegroom respectively, unknown to one another, it being the intention that each should discover the other's ring and wear it on the finger. The exchange of the knives and the rings is the binding part of the ceremony. Bride and bridegroom are then taken outside and do *seva* (homage) to the bride's parents and to the people assembled, and the marriage is complete.

Āhoms used to be polygamous, but one wife is said to be more correct now. Āhom girls are not married till they reach a nubile age—sometimes much later. The marriage expenses seem to be quite out of proportion to the means of the people; for instance, a Deodhai marriage in Sibsagar was reported to the writer to have cost more than Rs. 200 (bridegroom's expenses).

Death.—Āhoms generally bury their dead; formerly they invariably did so, but now those who have accepted the Hindu religion resort to cremation. The following is a brief description of the old Āhom rites. The corpses of the poor are buried in the ground without coffins. Those of the rich are reverently laid in boxes; a water-pot, cup, *dā* (stick), *jhāpi* (or large hat), and a *pirā* (or wooden stool) are put inside the box with the corpse. These articles are intended for the use of the deceased's spirit in the next world. The coffin is then lowered into the grave, which is filled in, a large earthen tumulus (*moidām*) being thrown up over it. The Āhom kings were buried at Choraideo in the Sibsagar district, their funeral obsequies being of a much more elaborate nature. A *buranji*, (Āhom chronicle) describes how at the funeral of Rāja Gadādhar Singha, who died in A.D. 1696,* a number of living persons, who had been the deceased's attendants, were interred with the corpse, together with many articles of food and raiment, and ornaments. It is stated that sometimes horses and even elephants were interred alive with a dead king.

Religion.—As the Āhoms are now almost entirely Hinduized, and there are very few of the old

* Kachāris call themselves Bārā.

† Assamese *lao pāni*.

‡ The *Bihus* are Bārā festivals which the Āhoms have adopted.

§ *E.g.* the Khassis.

‖ This statement is made on the authority of Srijut Golab Chandra Barua, late Āhom translator to the Government.

* Gait, *History of Assam*, p. 163.

Deodhais (the only persons who possess any knowledge of the ancient ritual) who remember the ancient religious customs, it is well-nigh impossible to give an accurate and connected account of the Āhom religion.

The writer has been unable to trace Buddhistic influences. Possibly Buddhism had not penetrated so far as the Upper Mekong before the Āhoms left Müng-Ri-Müng-Rang, their ancient site; or Buddhism had become so inextricably mixed with the worship of the gods of earth and sky as to become indiscernible. Apart from the god Chumseng or Chung Deo, whose worship was conducted by the Āhom king, assisted by the Chiring Phukan, as will afterwards be described, the Āhoms possessed various gods, amongst whom the following seem to have been the more important: Along or Phu-Ra-Ta-Ra (God the creator), Lengdon (god of heaven, the Hindu Indra), Kaokham (god of water, the old Vedic deity Varuṇa), Lengbin and Lengdin (god and goddess of the earth), and Phai (god of fire, Hindu Agni). Chumseng, who was daily worshipped at the king's house, was not regarded as a god himself; for, according to Āhom tradition, Chumseng was given to the Āhom progenitors, Khūnlūng and Khūnlai, by Lengdon, god of heaven. Chumseng was worshipped more as a fetish—something supernatural, possessing the power to do good to the king and his people. Chumseng was perhaps an ammonite, something of the nature of the Hindu *sālgrām*, or even a precious stone (which the etymology of the name, i.e. *chum* = 'precious' and *seng* = 'stone,' would certainly suggest). The stone or image, whatever it was, could not have been large, as at the coronation ceremony it was hung round the king's neck. The worship was conducted with secrecy, none but the king being allowed to view Chumseng. The king could see him only twice a year. The mysticism attached to the Chumseng worship accounts for the doubt as to what Chumseng actually is. Old people say that Chumseng lies concealed somewhere in Assam at the present day.

The Āhoms performed ceremonies called *saifa* and *umpha* for the good of the crops and the State, the latter being on a grander scale than the former, and conducted by the king himself. A ceremony called *sarkai*, the object of which was the scaring away of evil spirits from the country, was also performed, the peculiarity of this observance being that a man who had lost several wives by death was offered up as a sacrifice. The *rikkhwan*, or expiation ceremony (lit. *rik* = 'call,' and *khwan* = 'life'), was 'generally performed at the installation of a new king, in times of danger, or after a victory. The procedure was as follows. The king sat in full dress on a platform, and the priests and astrologers poured holy water over his head, whence it ran down his body through a hole in the platform on to the chief *bailong* or astrologer, who was standing below. The king then changed his clothes, giving those which he had been wearing and all his ornaments to the chief *bailong*.'* Gait says that the same ceremony, on a smaller scale, was also frequently performed by the common people, and still is, on certain occasions, *e.g.* when a child is drowned. Much the same ceremony seems to have been celebrated in Manipur State.

Priesthood.—The priests, as has already been stated, were called *deodhais*. Probably this name was applied to them after the conversion of the king and his court to Hinduism, for in the Āhom language the priests were called *sāngmun*. The Deodhais claim descent from Laokhri, who is said to have been the companion of the two princes Khūnlūng and Khūnlai when they descended from heaven to earth, and to have acted in the dual capacity of priest and councillor. Although in the old days of Āhom rule the Deodhais composed the king's Privy Council, they were afterwards restricted to priestly duties and to divining events, the latter being thought by the Āhoms a matter of very great importance. Tradition runs that the heavenly princes brought from above the *kai-chan-müng*, or heavenly fowls; hence the sanctity which is attached to these birds. Some Deodhais near Luckwa (in Sibsagar district) once performed the divination ceremony for the writer's benefit. It was as follows. An altar of plantain trees and bamboos was set up (*mebenga*); plantain leaves and fruit, rice, sugar-cane, and liquor (*lau*) were brought, and a lamp. Three fowls and three fowls' eggs were placed upon the altar. The officiating priest sprinkled holy water on the spectators with a sprig of *blāk singpha* (the King flower). Prayers were then offered up to Jasingpha (the god of learning), and the fowls' necks were wrung. The flesh was scraped off the fowls' legs until the latter were quite clean, and then search was made for any small holes that existed in the bones. When the holes were found, small splinters of bamboo were inserted in them; and the bones were held up, with the bamboo splinters sticking in them, and closely compared with diagrams in a holy book which the priest had ready at hand. This book contained diagrams of all sorts of combinations of positions of splinters stuck in fowls' legs, and each meant something, the meaning appearing in verses written in the Āhom character, which were duly droned out by the Deodhai. The Āhom kings placed great faith in such omens, and the position of diviner was one of no small profit. Even now many Āhoms consult such soothsayers.

Coronation.—The Royal Coronation ceremony was celebrated with great pomp at Choraideo hill in the Sibsagar district, the *Swargadeo** and his principal queen riding on elephants. On such occasions the sacred Chumseng was brought out from the Royal *arcana* and hung round the neck of the king, who was girt about with the sword *hengdang* (the Āhom 'excalibur'), three feathers of the sacred birds (*kai-chan-müng*) being placed in his turban. After planting two banyan trees on Choraideo hill, the king returned and took his seat on a bamboo stage (*holong ghar*), under which had been placed a specimen of every living creature, including man. The king was bathed with holy water, which fell upon the collection below. Then the king, taking the sacred sword, killed a man, a criminal being selected for the purpose.† A great feast was afterwards given to the people, all of whom assembled to do homage to the new king.

As Gait says, 'The Āhoms were endowed with the historical faculty in a very high degree; and their priests and leading families possessed *buranjis* or histories, which were periodically brought up to date. They were written on oblong strips of bark, and were very carefully preserved and handed down from father to son.'‡

A detailed description of the Āhom system of chronology will be found on p. 361 of Gait's *History of Assam*. It is interesting to find that it is of like character to that employed by the Chinese, Japanese, and other Mongols. This fact is another link in the chain of evidence in favour of China having been the cradle of the Shān race.§

It is beyond the province of this article to give a sketch of the Āhom language, nor, indeed, is this necessary, since the treasures of the 'Linguistic Survey' of India have been made available to the student. Not only in vol. ii. of this series, but also in a separate monograph,‖ Dr. Grierson has fully described the language. According to Dr. Grierson, Āhom is one of the oldest forms, if not the oldest, of the Shān languages. It is more akin to Siamese than any of the more modern Shān vernaculars.

* Gait, *History of Assam*, p. 86.

* Lit. 'god of heaven,' a title given to the kings by their subjects. It is a literal translation of the Āhom *chaopha*—cf. the Shān title of *tsawbwaw*.

† Raja Rudra Singha substituted a buffalo. This was the custom also afterwards.

‡ Gait, *History of Assam*, p. 4.

§ Dr. Cushing very clearly states this theory in his note on the Shāns (*Burma Census Report*, 1891, pp. 201–204).

‖ *Notes on Āhom* (1902).

What is extraordinary, considering the power which the Ahoms wielded, and that they were for centuries the ruling race in Assam, is the completeness with which their language has disappeared. In the present Assamese language, we have it on the authority of Dr. Grierson, there are barely fifty words in common use which can be traced to an Ahom origin. From the time when the Ahom kings accepted Hinduism and imported Hindu priests from Nadiya in Bengal and elsewhere, the Ahom language commenced to disappear, slowly at first, but in the end very rapidly, until at the present day there are probably not more than a few dozen men all told who possess even a smattering of the ancient tongue. It is perhaps due to the irony of fate that Assamese, the language which displaced Ahom, seems also fated to share the same destiny; for, since the addition to Assam of Eastern Bengal with its teeming millions of Bengali-speaking inhabitants, it seems impossible that a weak vernacular like Assamese will be able to withstand a powerful Bengali onslaught, unless special measures are taken to protect it from being crushed out.

LITERATURE.—E. A. Gait, *A History of Assam* (1906); G. A. Grierson, *Linguistic Survey of India* (1904), ii. 59–140, also 'Notes on Ahom' in *ZDMG* (1902) lvi. 1–59, and 'An Ahom Cosmogony' in *JRAS*, April 1904; J. M. Foster, 'Note on Ghargaon' in *JASB*, vol. xli. (1872); E. A. Gait, 'Abstract of the Contents of one of the Ahom Pūthis,' *ib.* vol. lxiii. (1894) pt. i. pp. 108–111, and 'Notes on some Ahom Coins,' *ib.* vol. lxiv. (1895) pt. i. pp. 286–289; *Assam Census Reports* of 1881, 1891, and 1901; *Burma Census Report* of 1891; Nathan Brown, 'Comparison of Indo-Chinese Languages' in *JASB* vi. (1837) 1023 ff. (contains an account of the Ahom alphabet, and a comparison of the language with others of the group. It also contains an Ahom account of the Cosmogony, of which a translation, together with a verbal analysis by Major F. Jenkins, is given in *JASB* xli. 980); B. H. Hodgson, 'Aborigines of the North-East Frontier,' in *JASB* xix. (1850) 309 ff., reprinted in *Essays relating to Indian Subjects* (1880), ii. 11 ff. (contains an Ahom vocabulary); E. T. Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal* (1872, with Vocabulary on p. 69 ff.); P. R. Gurdon, 'On the Khāmtis' in *JRAS* xxvii. (1895) 157 ff., 163 (contains a brief list of words compared with Shān, Khāmti, Lao, and Siamese) For a fuller bibliography, see *Toung Pao*, No. 2, May 1906.

P. R. GURDON.

AHRIMAN.—The later Persian designation by which the devil, or principle of evil, is known in the religion of Zoroaster. The ancient form of the name is *Angra Mainyu* in Gâthic Avesta *Aŋra Mainyu* in Younger Avesta, *Ahraman* in Pahlavi, and *Ahriman* in Modern Persian, whence the current designation 'Ahriman.' The Greeks, as early as Aristotle, were familiar with the Persian appellation as 'Αρειμάνιος, which the Latins adopted as *Arimanius*. The original meaning of the term appears to be 'Enemy-Spirit,' 'Spiritual Foe' (*aŋra*, 'inimical,' *mainyu*, 'spirit'), although the exact etymology of the title *aŋra* is not yet clear.

In the Gâthâs, *Angra Mainyu* generally stands in opposition to *Spenta Mainyu*, the 'Holy Spirit' of *Ahura Mazda*. But in the Younger Avesta this distinction between the Holy Spirit and God is not preserved, both being identified, so that the opposition thenceforth stands between *Aŋra Mainyu* and *Ahura Mazda*. *Angra Mainyu* is not mentioned in the Old Persian inscriptions, but the evil principle is there designated by *Drauga*, 'Falsehood' (*Bh.* i. 34, iv. 34, 37; *Dar. Pers.* d. 17, 20).

Although Aŋra Mainyu is coeval with Ahura Mazda (*Dâṭistân-î-Dênîg*, xxxvii. 21, 26), he is not regarded as being co-eternal with him, for it is he who will cease to be (*Bûndahišn*, i. 3). The nature of Ahriman, as portrayed in the Zoroastrian scriptures from the earliest to the later times, is that of the very essence of evil, an entity (more or less personified) that chooses by preference to do wrong and oppose the spirit of goodness, because of being ignorant, deceitful, malicious, and perverse (*e.g. Yasna*, xxx. 3–6, xlv. 1–2, xlvi. 7, xxxi. 12). He arose from the abyss of endless darkness (*Bûndahišn*, i. 9), his abode being in the northern regions (*Vendîdâd*, xix. 1). He did not know for some time of the existence of Ormazd (*Bûndahišn*, i. 9; *Zâṭ-Sparam*, i. 2); nor, being ignorant and blind (*Bûndahišn*, i. 19), did he foresee his future doom (*Dînkarṭ*, tr. Sanjana, p. 258). Accordingly, being absolutely unaware of what is to befall him at the end of time, he is unable to adopt any means to guard himself (*ib.* p. 462). He is absolute evil without any goodness (*Zâṭ-Sparam*, i. 17; *Dâṭistân-î-Dênîg*, xxxvii. 28; *Sad Dar*, lxii. 3), but he is not a fallen angel, like his counterpart in Christianity. His standing epithet is 'the demon of demons' (*Vendîdâd*, xix. 1); and he is the destroyer of the world (*Arṭâ-Vîrâf Nâmak*, ch. c.) and full of malice (*Bûndahišn*, i. 10). As a pernicious power, Ahriman is represented, especially in the Younger Avesta and the Pahlavi books, as thwarting the beneficent influence of Ormazd by means of antagonistic creations (*e.g. Vendîdâd*, i. 1 f.; *Yasht*, xiii. 77; *Yasna*, ix. 8; *Bûndahišn*, i. 1–28), and as in constant struggle with the spirit of light (*e.g. Yasht*, x. 97, xiii. 13, xviii. 2, xix. 46, 96; *Yasna*, x. 15). He strives to persuade men to be hostile to Ormazd and win them over to his own side (*Bûndahišn*, i. 14; *Zâṭ-Sparam*, i. 8), and his greatest victory consists in inciting a human soul to rebel against Ormazd. His complete satisfaction is found in securing a human soul on his side (*Dînâ-î-Maînôg-î-Khraṭ*, xlvi. 4, 5). So mighty is he, moreover, that even the Yazatas, or 'Angels,' did not succeed in overpowering him, and it was only Zarathushtra who confounded him (*Yasht*, xvii. 19, 20; *Vendîdâd*, xix.; *Dînkarṭ*, vii. 4, 36–41). From Ahriman proceeds all disorder, and he is the source of all disease and of death (*Yasna*, xxx. 5; *Vendîdâd*, xx. 3, xxii. 2, ii. 29; *Yasht*, iii. 13–14). He attacks the creations of Ormazd, and introduces imperfections, disease, and death. He killed *Gâyômarṭ*, the primeval man, and *Gôshûrvan*, the primordial ox (*Bûndahišn*, iii. 17; *Zâṭ-Sparam*, iv. 3; *Dâṭistân-î-Dênîg*, xxxvii. 82); he introduced all physical and moral imperfections into creation; he created hosts of demons to accomplish his work of destruction in the kingdom of goodness (*Bûndahišn*, i. 10, 24, 27); he formed Azhi Dahâka for the destruction of the world of righteousness (*Yasht*, ix. 14, xvii. 34). Ahriman is the head of a ribald crew of demons, fiends, and arch-fiends, who are mentioned hundreds of times as *daēvas* (Mod. Pers. *dîv*, 'demon') and *drujas* in the Avesta and later literature, and conceived of as abiding in hell, in 'endless darkness,' 'the worst life, the abode of Deceit and of the Worst Thought' (*Yasna*, xxxi. 20, xxxii. 13; *Vendîdâd*, iii. 35). The final defeat of Ahriman and his evil progeny is to be brought about by man. At the resurrection, Ahriman, being impotent and helpless, will bow down before the good spirits (*Yasht*, xix. 96), and his doom, according to the later books, is to be utter annihilation (*Dâṭistân-î-Dênîg*, xxxvii. 20, 59, 71, 114, 120), for the Zoroastrian religion postulates the ultimate triumph of good over evil and the final eradication of sin from the world (*Dâṭistân-î-Dênîg*, xxxvii. 120–122). At that time Ahriman will be driven from mankind (*Dînkarṭ*, tr. Sanjana, p. 445), and, rushing to darkness and gloom in his impotence (*Bûndahišn*, xxx. 30), will be forced to seek refuge in the earth (Westergaard Fragments, iv. 3), where he will be imprisoned (*Dînkarṭ*, tr. Sanjana, p. 151) or destroyed (*Cama Memorial Volume*, 128–129).

Attempts have been made to trace resemblances between Ahriman and Ahi, the sky-serpent of ancient India, as also with the Māra of Buddhism, but these are too few and too remote to deserve much consideration. The nearest resemblance is that between Ahriman and Satan.

Owing to the emphasis which the Avesta and later books lay upon recognizing the principle of evil as an active agent in the life of the world, Zoroastrianism is frequently spoken of as Dualism. The Parsis, or modern followers of the faith, however, vigorously reject the application of the term to their religion, and their most advanced teachers deny attributing any personality to Ahriman except as a principle or force. Further discussion of this problem, and the attitude in ancient as well as

modern times with regard to the subject, is reserved for the article on DUALISM. See also ORMAZD, ZOROASTRIANISM.

LITERATURE.—For detailed bibliographical references on the subject, consult Jackson, 'Die iranische Religion' in Geiger and Kuhn's *Grundriss der iran. Philol.* ii. 646–668, including also Spiegel, *Eranische Alterthumskunde*, ii. 119–126, Leipzig, 1873; Darmesteter, *Ormazd et Ahriman*, Paris, 1887; Casartelli, *The Mazdayasnian Religion under the Sassanids* [tr. from French into English by Firoz Jamaspji], pp. 50–68, Bombay, 1889; Tiele, *Gesch. der Religion im Altertum*, ii. 153–163, Gotha, 1898, and *Geschiedenis van den Godsdienst in de Oudheid*, ii. 264–271, Amsterdam, 1901; Stave, *Über den Einfluss des Parsismus*, p. 235 ff., Haarlem, 1898; Rustomji Peshotanji Sanjana, *Zarathushtra and Zarathushtrianism in the Avesta*, Bombay and Leipzig, 1906; *JE* i. 294–297.

A. V. WILLIAMS JACKSON.

AHUNA-VAIRYA.—A formulated name* taken from the first words of a prayer or solemn declaration, collected from scattered parts of the *Gāthās*, and always held in the highest veneration by the followers of Zarathuštra. It is of much factitious and also of much real importance, for it has received unusual attention both from experts in Zend philology and from non-experts interested in the history of theological doctrines,—this last owing to the erroneous supposition that it represents the original of the Philonian-Johannine Logos. Its chief occurrence, as our texts now stand, appears at the close of *Yasna* xxvii., just preceding the beginning of the *Gāthā Ahunavaiti*. It consists of three lines which may once have numbered twenty-one words, and may still be so reckoned by counting the particles. These twenty-one words were supposed, or were later made, to correspond to the twenty-one *nasks*, or books of the Avesta, most of which, as complete documents, have now perished.

1. **Dialect and other characteristics.**—The *Ahunavēr* is composed in the so-called *Gāthic* dialect, or, more correctly, in the original Avestan language, of which all outside of the *Gāthās* should be considered a dialect; but the differences are not very great, particularly now that we have begun to discover† that the *Avesta* forms themselves partake somewhat of that multiphonous character which leaves the Pahlavi language at times so inscrutable. The *Ahunavēr* preserves the metre of the *Gāthā Ahunavaiti*, which, though properly the original of both the substance and metre of this brief piece, yet curiously enough derives its name from its own offspring. For the *Gāthā* from which these lines were collected bears their name, and is called *Ahunavaiti*, i.e. 'having the Ahuna with it,' probably referring to the accidental position of this formula in the fixed course of the *Yasna* recital.

Though preserving unmistakable traces of having been somewhat artificially constructed, both as to metre and contents, the little group of words is well worthy of its parentage in the *Gāthā*. A careful translation of it would be as follows, all discussion being here omitted:—

'As the Ahū is to be chosen,
So (let) the Ratu (be) from every legal fitness,
A Creator of mental goodness,
And of life's actions done for Mazda;
And the kingdom (be) to Ahura,
Whom (the Ahū, or the Ratu) He has appointed as nourisher to the poor.'

The immediate sources of the expressions may be said to be such as *Yasna* xxix. 6, xxxi. 8, 16, 21, xxxiv. 5, xliv. 4, liii. 9—all being Gāthic passages.

2. **Interpretation.**—*The moral idea in the Ahunavēr as a testimony to its presence elsewhere.*—In view of their priority in age and of other circumstances, the *Gāthās* have been supposed to be the original sources of the moral idea as well as of the now accepted eschatology. They have been confidently held to be the most prominent early literature in which those conceptions are manifested. And apart, perhaps, from our Semitic Scriptures, they most certainly possess this claim, especially when it is remembered that the Hebrew exilic Scriptures have been widely and reasonably thought to have been influenced by those Persian ideas which are most incisively expressed in the *Gāthās* and the rest of the genuine Avesta. They (the *Gāthās*) therefore constitute a principal focus of light for the history of religious experience. But we must by no means take all their high claims at once for granted without the most searching investigation at every step. They do indeed prove to be what at the first glance they seem to be; and they stand almost isolated in this respect, as being in their day among the most serious records of religious conviction and sentiment. But they imperatively demand all possible corroboration as to their value in regard to the vital consideration in question. Now the *Ahunavēr* is one of their most important supports. Hence the high scientific value of its interpretation. The facts relating to the *Ahunavēr*, as also to the *Gāthās*, certainly prove that the moral idea prevailed extensively in Iran as well as in India. This is extremely interesting simply as a matter of psychological experience; but it implies beyond all question a widely felt and practical religious influence of the moral idea upon the sentiments and lives of the populations amidst which this lore prevailed. Here we have a point of momentous consequence, which possibly explains also why Cyrus was so ready to further the religious as well as the political prosperity of the Jews, with all that this entailed in the return of the people and in the restoration of their sacred Temple with their established faith.

It is apparent from the translation given above that all ideas save the moral one are actually and instinctively excluded from the lines. Neither Aša, nor Vohuman, nor Khšathra is here used even in its high secondary sense as the name of one of the archangels themselves, each a personification of the supreme ideas of Truth, Benevolence, and Lawful Order,—while the closing words refer to the first altruistic act of the moral instinct—the care of the afflicted; and, almost strange to say, there is not a trace of any allusion to ceremonies. If we are correct in placing the *Ahunavēr* next after the *Gāthās* in order of time, say about one hundred years later, then their exclusively moral point of view tends to prove the vital energy of the moral idea in the *Gāthic* hymns themselves—a matter of extreme scientific interest in view of the facts.

3. **Later sanctity.**—The *Ahunavēr*, having acquired a singular sanctity for the reasons given, was freely used by the religious fancy of a somewhat later age. Like the 'sword of the Spirit,' it becomes a weapon in the hand of saints and angels. *Zarathuštra* himself, in his later traditional rôle, and in his Temptation, repels *Angra Mainyu* with it, while *Sraoša* wields it as his *snaithiš*, *i.e.* as his 'halbert.' It would, however, be precarious simply to assert that the above-noted characteristic of the formula was the effective and immediate cause of the somewhat excessive importance afterwards attributed to it. Its sacrosanct character, if one might so express it, was probably owing to its brevity plus its allusions to the *Gāthās*, or even to some purely accidental intellectual circumstance, and it was doubtless often used perfunctorily like the *Pater Noster*, if not indeed almost as a potent instrument of magic.

4. **Relation of the Ahunavēr to the History of Religion.**—The allusions to this formula which occur in the commentary upon it in *Yasna* xix.

* *Ahunavēr*, *Honover*, are Pahlavi and Parsi abbreviations, *ahuna* representing *ahū*, and *-vēr* representing *vairyō* (some would write *-vair*, *ahunavair*).

† See *ZDMG* liii. (1898) 436 ff.

have been widely exploited in critical and semi-critical studies upon the subject of the *Philonian-Johannine Logos*; and it certainly constitutes a secondary factor to be reckoned with in our decision as to the history of exegesis at the places indicated. Such expressions as the *Ahunavēr* being 'the word uttered before the heaven, the earth,' etc., do indeed recall the terms in the Prologue of St. John: 'In the beginning was the Word.' It has been supposed that these expressions in *Yasna* xix. gave the idea to this 'Word' of St. John. Oppert, we believe, first suggested the connexion. But *possible* as such an initiative might be, the present writer does not regard it as at all *probable*, in view of the Greek *Logos* with which Philo was so familiar. Besides, there is no saying what the date of *Yasna* xix. may be; it may even have been Sasanian. Commentary of course appeared almost as soon as a text was issued; and our Pahlavi commentary texts, however late they received their present forms, as 'edited with all the manuscripts collated,' cannot fail to have preserved hints from the very earliest ages. Naturally, these were sometimes much covered up by over-growths; and this *Yasna* xix. must certainly have had predecessors. Philo may also have acquired some information as to Avestan doctrine from the semi-Persian books of the Bible, from the Apocrypha, and from the exilic Talmud, so far as they were then current, and from the many related documents of which we have never known even the existence; for echoes of such religious doctrines must have reached both Jerusalem and Greek Egypt; but to suppose that *Yasna* xix. influenced this Philonian-Johannine Logos of the Prologue seems to us utterly out of the question, in view of the history of Philo's development. See artt. LOGOS and PHILO JUDÆUS.

LITERATURE.—The texts of the Avesta at *Yasna* xxvii.; the Pahlavi text of *Yasna* xxvii. (see Spiegel's text, tr., and Com.); Anquetil du Perron, *Zend-Avesta*, i. pt. 2, p. 81; Oppert, 'L'Honover, le verbe créateur de Zoroastre' in *Annales de la philos. chrét.*, Jan. 1862; Kossowicz, *Decem Zendavestæ excerpta*, 1868; Justi, *Handbuch der Zendsprache*, p. 258; Haug, *Essays on the Parsis*[3], p. 141, n. 2; Haug and West, *Glossary . . . of Arda Viraf*, pp. 256–257; *Avesta, Livre Sacré du Zoroastrianisme*, tr. by C. de Harlez, p. 301; Roth, *ZDMG*, xxxviii. 437; Bartholomae, *Altiran. Wörterb.* cols. 282, 707, 778, and refs.; Darmesteter, *SBE* v.[2] 129, xxiii. 23, Zend-Avesta, i. 162 ff.; L. H. Mills, *SBE* xxxi. 281 (somewhat modified above in the article, more point being seen in *aśāt̰ōīt hacā*); West's translation of the Pahlavi text of the Ahunavēr (Ahunavair) in *SBE*, xxvii. 5–6, note; Zartoshti, *Meher*, 1273 A.H. No. 3, p. 253; K. F. Geldner, *SBAW* xxxviii. (1904); H. G. Smith in *ARW* vi. 233–243.

L. H. MILLS.

AHURA MAZDA.—See ORMAZD.

AINUS.

[J. BATCHELOR].

1. The Ainu habitat.—The few Ainus now living—and at the present time there are less than 20,000 of them left—may be looked upon as the very last remnant of a great pre-historic race, which was, without doubt, once spread over an area extending from Siberia in the north down to the southernmost limits of old Japan. An indisputable proof of this lies in the fact that very many geographical names in Siberia and throughout the whole of the Japanese empire, Formosa excluded, are discovered to be of Ainu origin.* Moreover, Japanese mythology, as contained in their book entitled *Kojiki*, or 'Records of Ancient Matters,'† and Japanese history as found in their *Nihongi*, or 'Chronicles of Japan,'‡ both of which works date back to the 8th cent. A.D., bear unmistakable evidence to the fact of the Ainus being an aboriginal race of Japan.

2. The Ainu religion pre-historic.—There is no great difficulty in determining the descent, nature, and relationship of such religions as have arisen during historical times; such as, for example, Judaism, Muhammadanism, Christianity, Brāhmanism, Buddhism, Taoism, and others of less importance. But a vast majority of ancient religions, of which there are still to be found some living examples left among scattered tribes and races, had their origin in pre-historic times, concerning which neither specific documents nor trustworthy traditions are to be had. The Ainu religion is one of these. Indeed, like indigenous Japanese Shintoism, it is a religion without any known historical beginning, and has no recognized founder.

3. The native religion still unchanged.—That the Ainu religion is the same to-day in all essentials as it was in pre-historic times, may be inferred from the inherent genius of the language, as well as gathered by way of auxiliary from the customs of the people and their present-day practices of rites and ceremonies. It is on record that in the year 1620 the Jesuit Father Hieronymus de Angelis paid a visit to the Island of Saghalien (the whole of which was then reckoned part of the Japanese empire), from Nagasaki; and from his description of the Ainus, written two years later, it is found that their manners and customs were the same then as those of their descendants now. Also, in June 1643, Captain Vries of the ship *Castricum* saw them, and his report bears the same testimony as that of the Jesuit Father. The *Matsumæ Manuscripts*, the *Ezo Isan Monogatari*, and other Japanese works also speak to the same effect. Ancient and modern lists of words, whether written in English or German, Japanese or Russian, and dating back hundreds of years (Batchelor, *Dict.* 5), show that the language of this race has not materially changed since they were collected.

The name of the famous mountain *Fuji* itself is not Japanese, as many have supposed it to be, but is of Ainu origin, like so many other places in its locality. It is a name which carries us back to pre-historic times, and plunges us at once right down into the very heart of Ainu religion. As written by the Japanese, who do so, it should be remembered, by means of Chinese hieroglyphics used phonetically and without the least regard to meaning, *Fuji* is generally made to mean 'Mountain of wealth,' 'Peerless,' or 'Not-two.' In Ainu, however, *Fuji* means 'fire,' and is the name especially applied to this element when being worshipped. *Fuji* is, in truth, the name of the goddess of fire. Hence it may well be concluded that in pre-historic times this beautiful, peerless *Fuji no yama* was regarded by the Ainus as one of their nature-deities, and, as such, worshipped. Volcanoes are also frequently worshipped by this race at the present day. Furthermore, *Fuji* is a dormant volcano. To-day fire is worshipped upon the hearth in every Ainu hut (where the occupants are not Christian), and when worshipped, always has the appellation *Fuji*, or *Huchi*, or *Unji*, according to dialect, applied to it. The common word for 'fire' in its ordinary uses is *Abe*.

4. The Ainu religion originally monotheistic.—*The term for 'God' defined.*—Although the Ainu religion, as now developed, is found to be extremely polytheistic, yet the very word in use for 'God,' being of the singular number, seems to indicate that in its beginning it was monotheistic in nature. This word is *Kamui*. This is a compound of three distinct roots, the chief of which is *ka*, whose meaning is 'over,' 'above,' 'top,' and so forth. It is like *super* and *ὑπέρ*. It occurs in *kando*, 'heaven,' 'sky'; and is found in many words where the sense of *super* is to be conveyed. The fundamental meaning of *mu* is 'spreading,' 'creeping'; and *kamu*, which is the oldest Japanese word for 'God,'* means, in Ainu, 'covering,'

* See Batchelor, *An Ainu-Eng.-Jap. Dict. and Gram.*, Tokio, 1905, pt. ii. pp. 15–77.

† See tr. by Chamberlain, *TASJ*, Supplement, 1882.

‡ *TASJ*, Supplement, 1896, by W. G. Aston.

* Aston in his *Shinto*, London, 1905 p. 7, gives practically the same derivation for the Japanese word *kami*, stating that it is probably connected with *kaburu*, 'to cover,' and has the general meaning of 'above,' 'superior.'

'creeping over.' *I* is a particle which has the power of changing some parts of speech into nouns, as well as being a personal pronoun meaning 'he, 'she,' or 'it.' Thus by derivation *Kamui* means 'that which' or 'he who covers' or 'overshadows.' And so our thoughts are made to revert to the *οὐρανός* of the Aryans and to the *Tien*, 'heaven,' of the Chinese.

The term *Kamui* is of wide application, and may be used as a noun or adjective at will. But, however employed, it never loses its root meaning of chief in station, quality, or power. Thus, used as an adjective, it has the following shades of meaning. *Kamui nupuri*, 'a great or high mountain'; *Kamui rera*, 'a strong' or 'mighty wind,' or 'a beautiful wind'; *Kamui nonno*, 'a pretty flower'; *Kamui chikoikip*, 'a large animal,' and so forth. When used as a suffix, *Kamui* is always a noun, *e.g. Nupuri Kamui*, 'the gods of the mountains'; *Chikuni Kamui*, 'the gods of trees.' Also *Ya-un-Kamui*, 'gods upon the land'; *Rep-un-Kamui*, 'gods in the sea.' It is not the mountain or tree or flower or land or sea that is called 'God' and worshipped, but the spirit or spirits supposed to dwell in these objects. Otherwise the construction of the term would have to be changed; as, for example, *Nupuri Kamui* should be changed into *Nupuri-ne-kamui*, and *Chikuni Kamui* into *Chikuni-ne-kamui*.

5. **The Supreme God distinguished.** — After monotheism had given place to polytheism, it became necessary for the Ainus to distinguish between the deities. Making gods many rendered it imperative to have some term by which to designate the Supreme God. Hence, when speaking of the 'God of Gods,' the Ainus gave Him the name of *Pase-Kamui*, 'Creator and Possessor of heaven.' All the rest are termed *Yaiyan Kamui* or 'common deities,' also 'near' and 'distant deities.' *Pase* is an adjective, and points to rank and authority, its first meaning being 'weighty,' 'true,' and 'superior in rank.' And so *Pase Kamui* may well be translated by the word 'chief' or 'true God'; or, as the Hebrews would have said, 'God over all.'* Thus far, then, we have reached a real basis for two articles of Ainu belief, viz. (*a*) 'I believe in one supreme God, the Creator of all worlds and places, who is the Possessor of heaven, whom we call *Pase Kamui*, "The true God," and whom we speak of as *Kotan kara Kamui, Moshiri kara Kamui, Kando koro Kamui*'; (*b*) 'I believe also in the existence of a multitude of inferior deities (*Kamui*), all subject to this one Creator, who are His servants, who receive their life and power from Him, and who act and govern the world under Him.'

6. **Special names given to the Creator.**—In asking for proof of the existence of a Creator, the Ainus point to the flash of lightning and call it the shining forth of God's glory, and to the thunder and say it is the sound of His voice. The Milky Way is called His river. Two specially favourite names one sometimes hears applied to Him are *Tuntu* and *Shinda*. The first of these, *Tuntu*, may be translated by 'brace,' 'support,' 'pillar,' 'sustainer,' 'upholder.' God is addressed by it often in prayer when the thought uppermost in the mind of the worshipper is that of God as the upholder and sustainer of all things. The second word, *Shinda*, means 'cradle.' The Creator is so named because He is looked upon as the God in whose hands we rest. He is also called upon as 'our nourisher' (Batchelor, *The Ainu and their Folklore*, London, 1901, p. 582 ff.).

7. **Evil spirits called Kamui.**—Bearing the meaning it does, it is not surprising to find that the term *Kamui* is applied to evil spirits as well as good. Satan and all his angels are called *Nitne Kamui*. *Nitne* means 'stiff,' 'oppressive,' 'heavy' as dough. Evil spirits are thus naturally looked upon as the oppressors and enemies of mankind. Indeed, as the Ainus quaintly put it, 'they are very difficult to get along with.' They are extremely numerous and quite ubiquitous. And they even are expressly said to inhabit the very same objects, in many instances, as the better deities themselves. Hence the good and evil genii of trees are brought to notice. Tree-blight and all accidents from trees, for example, are caused by the evil genii; while the buds, leaves, flowers, and useful fruits grow, it is supposed, through the favour of the good ones.

8. **Special meanings of the term Kamui.**—A careful analysis of the word *Kamui*, taken in connexion with the various objects to which it is applied, makes the following facts clear: (*a*) When applied to spirits supposed to be good, it expresses the quality of being useful, beneficent, divine. (*b*) When referred to supposed evil spirits, it indicates that which is bad and most to be dreaded. (*c*) When applied to reptiles, devils, and evil diseases, it signifies the most hateful, abominable, repulsive, and harmful. (*d*) When applied especially as a prefix to animals, fishes, or birds, it represents the greatest or most fierce, or the most useful for food or clothing, as the case may be. (*e*) When applied to persons, it is a mere title of respect expressive of honour, dignity, and rank. But it should be noted that, because an object has the term *Kamui* applied to it, this in no way implies that it is looked upon as divine or as necessarily worshipped. Demons are called by this term, but many of them are not even revered, though, out of fear, they may be propitiated with offerings. Men are often called *Kamui*, but they never have divine worship paid them.

9. **God and Creation.**—It has been seen (§ 5) that the supreme God is sometimes spoken of as Creator. But, to save confusion of thought, the method of creation should be explained. According to Ainu ideas, matter of all kinds is considered to have existed from all eternity, and other things to have been evolved out of it. *Ex nihilo nihil fit* is the motto of this people, so that one is prepared to find certain ideas connected with the metamorphistic cult lurking in their theories anent the origin of things. But with the Ainus metamorphism is by no means a natural change, for upon examination it is found to partake in some instances of the nature of special creative acts performed for the specific purpose of stocking the earth, while in others it is made to take place as a predetermined punishment by a stronger power for some evil done.

Thus, for example, deer and fishes of some kinds are said to have been made to develop out of hairs, bones, and scales of similar creatures cast out of heaven after a celestial feast (427, 298).* Some snakes, so theory asserts, came out of a pole, and others out of a log of wood (364); one woman, we learn, was changed into a frog as a punishment for some misdemeanour (26), another into a flower (260), and a child into a goat-sucker (183); the hazel-hen came from a piece of deer skin (447), and a Japanese who had lost his way in the mountains was metamorphosed into a green pigeon (444); some bears, demons, foxes, and cats were developed, so we are informed, from sparks of fire and ashes (467, 501), while hares were evolved from hairs cast out of heaven (514); in some instances, eels, we learn, came out of twisted grass (525), and in others from a piece of wood (365); squirrels, the Ainu would have us believe, were made to come out of a pair of old cast-away sandals (500); gnats, mosquitoes, and gadflies are said to have been evolved from the ashes of a goblin (74), and so on.

God and the production of dry land.—The legend concerning the first appearance of dry land is peculiar, and, inasmuch as a bird is supposed to have assisted in bringing it forth by hovering over the original substance, it is worth quoting. In the beginning the world was a great slushy quagmire. The waters were hopelessly mixed up with the earth, and nothing was to be seen but a mighty ocean of bare sloppy swamp. All the land was mixed up with, and aimlessly floating about in, the endless seas. All around was death and stillness. Nothing existed in this chaotic mass, for it was altogether incapable of sustaining animal life; nor were there any living fowls flying in the airy expanse above. All was cold, solitary, and desolate. However, the clouds had their demons, and the Creator lived in the highest heavens, with a host of subordinate deities. At last, the true God determined to make the earth habitable. He therefore made a water-wagtail, and sent him down from heaven to produce the earth. When this bird saw the dreadful condition the world was in, he was almost at his wits' end to know how to perform his allotted task. He fluttered over the water with his wings, trampled upon the muddy matter with his feet, and beat

* See Batchelor, *Dict.* pt. ii. p. 20, *s.v.* 'Kamui.'

* The numbers refer to pages of *The Ainu and their Folklore* hereafter cited as *AF*.

it down with his tail. After a very long time of hovering, trampling, and tail-wagging, dry places began to appear, and the waters gradually became the ocean. And so the worlds were in time raised out of the waters, and caused to float upon them. Therefore the Ainus call the earth by the name *Moshiri*, i.e. 'floating land,' and hold the wagtail in great esteem.

10. Animism the root of Ainu polytheistic notions.—It was stated in § 4 that there are grounds for concluding the Ainu religion to have been monotheistic in nature at the commencement, and to have gradually developed later into polytheism. The moving cause of this evolution of dogma becomes very apparent when it is taken into consideration that the one great principle underlying Ainu theological notions in all their parts may be summed up in the one word, *Animism*—not animism as formerly employed in biology simply to denote the theory, of which Stahl is the chief exponent, that the soul (*anima*) is the vital principle, and the cause both of the normal phenomena of life and also of the abnormal phenomena of disease. It is this and very much more. Animism is here used in the wide sense given it by E. B. Tylor (*Prim. Cult.* chs. xi.–xvii.), as including the whole doctrine of souls and other spirit-entities, whether they be conceived of as being good, bad, or indifferent in nature and action.

According to universal Ainu ideas, not only are men and women, beasts, fishes, and fowls, trees and all plants, supposed to be animated with soul-life, but all other objects as well. Indeed, animism, as found to be developed among this people, is as uniform and comprehensive as the great τὸ πᾶν of the pantheistic creed, for it holds all nature in its embrace; yet so multiform is it, that it allows a distinct individual race and class of spirits to every order of phenomena. Accordingly, almost every conceivable object, whether visible or invisible, animate or inanimate, organic or inorganic, is endowed with a distinct personal, intelligent, and never-ending life. It is this conscious entity which works in and through it, that governs it and keeps it in its normal condition. Hence the bubbling spring and rippling rivulet, the rushing torrent, the flying clouds, whistling winds, pouring rain, roaring storm, and restless ocean,—all such things, together with animal and vegetable life, have their governing spirits within them, which must be treated with due respect by all men. This philosophy also asserts as one of its dogmas that even such objects as rocks and stones, lumps of clay, and grains of sand and dust, all have their separate class-life; and manufactured articles also, such as clothing and weapons, farming and fishing implements, eating and drinking utensils, and even entire huts, are supposed to have separate governing spirits of their own, which will live in the other world. This is not pantheism proper, for there is no trace of such a thing being thought of as one life naturally and of course swallowing up another; spiritual immortality is with them a personal immortality, and *Nirvāṇa* is quite unknown in their midst.

It is part of the animistic creed to look upon spirit-entities as having various degrees of intellect and higher and lower qualities of moral nature. And the more intelligent or the more beneficial to mankind any supposed spirit is thought to be, the higher is his station as a deity; while the less beneficent such an entity is conceived to be to the world in general, and, among men, to the Ainus in particular, and the more practical harm he does or is thought to be capable of doing, the greater demon is he considered to be. Thus, as beneficent objects said to contain personal, intelligent entities, springs of cool drinking water and sulphur baths are held in especial esteem; while, inasmuch as storms and diseases do damage and work death and destruction, they are looked upon as containing demons, some of a higher and some of a lower degree of moral nature and power.

11. All things supposed to be of dual parts.—According to Ainu statements, the people imagine all things to have two parts: the one inner, invisible, and ethereal in nature, and the other (corresponding to it) an outer, visible, and substantial, though not necessarily material, form—a form by which it reveals itself, through which it acts, and by which it makes itself felt. These two naturally go together, though they may be separated for a while at times (as in dreams, for example, when the soul is supposed to leave the body for a time), owing to special causes or for particular purposes. But the normal condition is for them to act together, the inner essence through the outer form. Further, the inner spirit may, if necessary to carry out some extraordinary purpose, even assume the outer form of an object not belonging to its class, and make itself seen and heard through it. In this we discover the basis for the thought of demoniacal or other possession.

12. Ainu ideas about anthropomorphism.—Nuttall, in his Standard Dictionary, defines anthropomorphism as being the ascription (*a*) of a human form to deity, (*b*) of human qualities and affections to deities, and (*c*) of human faculties to the lower animals. This definition is quite Occidental. An Ainu would not think of putting it in that way. He would certainly change the order by making it clear that man is the recipient and God the giver. He does not say, for example, that the deities are anthropomorphic, but that man is theomorphic in so far as his higher nature is concerned, and demon-like in everything that is evil about him. To all spirit-powers superior to man, whether in good or evil, are ascribed the most beautiful and the most hideous attributes of mankind. But it must not be supposed that because the people think of an object as being endowed with a personal, conscious life which can think and will and act for good or ill as it pleases, it is therefore in every instance anthropomorphic in structure. The inward and outer forms differ, and both will, it is thought, differ for ever. The outward form will always remain the same, whatever may be thought of the spirit form. It will be the same with all animals and trees, or with a blade of grass or a stone. As they are here, so will they be for ever in the next world. There is to be no change in form, and no extinction. The only *natural* change that can take place will be in the qualities of good and evil, for then evil will become more evil and goodness better.

13. The word for 'spirit' defined.—In discussing Ainu religion, it is always necessary to keep in mind the meaning of the word in use for 'spirit' or 'soul.' The term is peculiarly interesting, and deserves careful consideration. Its root has nothing whatever to do with such expressions as רוח, σκιά, *umbra*, 'shade,' 'breath,' and so forth. It suggests quite a different set of ideas. It is *ramat* or *ramachi*, to which the Japanese term *tamashii* or *tama* is in all probability allied. But the root of *ramat* is *ram*, which is a noun meaning 'mind,' 'understanding,' 'intellect,' and then 'spirit,' 'soul,' 'essence,' the 'meaning of a word.' The final *at*, which at times is heard as *chi*, signifies existence, the root being *a*, 'to be.' Hence it is that gods and devils, elves, fairies, gnomes, goblins, and all spirits, of whatever race or order they be, are looked at from the side of intelligence rather than that of life alone (cf. § 10).

14. The sun a nature-god.—The Ainu religion, then, being thus animistic (see § 10) and anthropomorphic (see § 12) in principle, and each spirit agency being necessarily conceived of as endowe

with *mind* or understanding (§ 13), the process of religious development becomes natural and easy, and nature-gods may be created both *ad libitum* and *ad infinitum*. The sun above us, for example, is seen to move; there is nothing haphazard about him; he rises and sets with the utmost regularity, and shines with surpassing splendour and with the evident good purpose of dispensing his welcome light and genial heat to the world. There is, therefore, it is thought, a living light-giving spirit (*ramat*) within the body or *num*,* i.e. 'ball,' of the sun, by whose influence he shines and by whose power he moves. He is one, indeed, who reminds us much of the Egyptian *Ra*,† for he too was supposed to be directed by a divine agency and personal will. In his own sphere among the lesser lights of heaven this stupendous and mysterious orb is chief and king, and the region of the east, whence he rises, is held sacred.

Inferior to the Creator (see § 5) yet superior to the sun in power is another spirit, malignant in nature. It is he who is supposed to be the cause of solar eclipses, and he is thought to be the very incarnation of diseases and other bodily evils. When the sun is eclipsed, this orb is supposed to be dying. That is to say, his intelligent life—*i.e.* his *ramat*—is departing from the outer visible substance and leaving the *num* black, cold, and dead. Yet he is never allowed quite to die, for a good superior spirit, who is either the Creator himself or His deputy, always, out of a kindly regard for mankind, graciously brings him back to his normal condition.‡

15. The moon.—The moon, who is said to be the wife of the sun, is not worshipped. There is a legend about her which runs as follows:

'The sun and moon are husband and wife. They are divine beings whose province it is to rule the heavens and the earth. The male is appointed to do his work in the daytime only, and the female at night. Sometimes, however, they may be seen travelling across the heavens in company. The divine sun is the larger of the two, has the brightest and best clothing to wear, and shines the most clearly. The moon is round like a cake of millet, and is clothed in dark and white garments which are worn one over the other. Now, the moon is sometimes invisible. When this is the case, it is because she has gone to visit her husband.'

16. Dualism.—In mentioning the supposed cause of solar eclipses (see § 14) we were brought face to face with the fact that dualistic ideas are rampant in the Ainu religion. Indeed, they are as much in evidence there as they are in the Avesta, where the struggle between Ormazd and Ahriman is so clearly depicted; or as they are in the Rig Veda, where Indra and Vṛtra form so constant a burden. The basis of dualistic ideas may be found (in so far as the Ainus are concerned) in their conception of spirit as defined in § 13, and of anthropomorphism as explained in § 12, taken in connexion with the antitheses of nature. The Ainus see so many contrary things ever present both within and outside of themselves, fighting, as they suppose, so much and so often against one another. Thus, light gives place to darkness, and bad weather to fine; rejoicing may be with us to-day, but to-morrow men must weep; this morning a child is born, and in the evening it dies; disease follows health, and good is succeeded by evil. Why, the Ainu asks, is this so? The explanation is simple. He who is the origin of light and life, of health and all good, is Himself the good true God (*Pase Kamui*, see § 5); while the source of disease, death, and all harm and evil in every degree and kind is naturally thought to be the *Nitne Kamui*, and all his agents the demons (see § 7).

No clearer illustration of the doctrine of dualism can be found than that exhibited by Ainu notions of the *Kamui* or superior spirits of the sea. The chief of these are two in number, named *Mo-acha* and *Shi-acha*. They are exactly the opposite of each other in character, and together with all the spirits of the ocean are called *Rep-un-Kamui*, i.e. 'deities in the sea.' *Shi-acha* i.e. 'wild,' 'rough,' 'strong Uncle,' is always restless, and is continually pursuing his brother *Mo-acha*, i.e. 'Uncle of peace,' or 'calm.' *Mo-acha* is good, and is beloved and worshipped; while *Shi-acha* is dreaded and disliked as being evil. Though he is not thankfully worshipped, he is often propitiated by means of adulatory speeches and offerings. *Shi-acha* is said to be the cause of all harm done by and upon the sea, while his brother rules the calm. Another good illustration of this subject is afforded by the account the Ainus give of the devil's attempt to swallow the sun. (See *AF* 69).

17. Fire-worship.—It has already been pointed out in § 14 that the greatest visible nature deity of the heights is the sun. Of like nature is the chief deity of the terrestrial globe, fire. The personal essence of fire, that is to say, its supposed spirit, when upon the hearth, is said to be of the feminine gender, and, besides being called *Fuji*, *Unji*, or *Huchi* as the case may be (see § 3), is also named *Iresu-Kamui*, *i.e.* 'the divine being who rears us,' and *Iresu-Huchi*, i.e. 'the ancestress who rears us'—*Fuji* or *Huchi* meaning 'grandmother' or 'ancestress,' and *Iresu* 'to sustain' or 'to bring up.' She is the chief in her sphere and class, and is sometimes spoken of as a disease-destroying and body-purifying spirit. As she is of so great importance, and holds so high a position, it is not surprising to find that fire is in comparison most often worshipped. Indeed, so high is she supposed to be, that she is sometimes spoken of as the 'Governor of the world.' With respect to her, there are several tabued things which go to show how she is reverenced. Thus, for example, a burning log must not be struck with anything; the ashes must not be knocked out of a pipe into it; nothing must be taken out of it with a knife; a pair of scissors must not be placed near it; nail parings, saliva, and refuse of any kind must not be suffered to fall into it. That this goddess is looked upon as superintending matters connected with the house in which she dwells and is burning, may be gathered from such a prayer as the following: 'O thou divine goddess of fire, have mercy upon us and take care of this house.' And that she is thought to attend to the wants of the family is proved by the following address and prayer made to her at the time of a marriage: 'We have now settled to marry our son and daughter; therefore, O thou goddess of fire, hear thou and be witness thereto. Keep this couple from sickness, and watch over them till they grow old.' And that she is feared is proved by the fact that she is supposed to be the chief witness for or against a person in the day of judgment (see § 40). When that takes place, it is said that she will present the great Judge of all with a perfect picture of every word spoken and action done by each individual being, and from her there can be no appeal.



INUMBA-SHUTU-INAO OR REFINING-CLUB FETISH

But not only are prayers said to the goddess of fire, offerings also are sent to her by means of fetishes, and libations are poured out for her acceptance. Whenever beer is brewed, which is mostly done at the end of the millet harvest, and immediately before the seed-sowing time, the Ainus always make a kind of *inao* or fetish out of wood, which they call *inumba*

* The Samoyedes believe in a supreme God of heaven called by this very name. The Tibetan name for God is *Nam*. Is it possible that these are all connected?

† Hardwick, *Christ and other Masters*, London, 1863, p. 443.

‡ For an account of an eclipse of the sun and the Ainu method of curing it, see *TASJ*, vol. xvi. part i. 1887.

shutu-inao, i.e. 'refining-club fetish.' This instrument is used as a messenger to the spirit of fire, and is sent to her with some lees at the time of refining. It will be seen in the illustration here given that a hollow place is left at the top of the fetish. This is called the 'seat' or 'nest,' and is made so as to hold the lees presented. When these have been put on the 'seat,' drops of beer are offered to the various deities, and the fire is worshipped as follows: 'O divine grandmother, we drink beer to thee; we offer thee *inao*. Bless this household, and drive evil away. O keep us from all harm.' After this, prayer is offered to the spirit of the fetish itself thus: 'O refining-club fetish, take the lees now placed upon thee to the goddess of fire, and thank her on our behalf for all the blessings she has bestowed upon us. Tell her of our estate and welfare, and solicit her continual help and favour.' After having been thus offered and addressed, the fetishes are sometimes reverently burnt upon the hearth while prayer is being said, and so, in a way, the manes are sent to the spirit world. Sometimes, however, they are not burnt, but set up by the doorway as offerings to the deities of doors. The husband of the goddess of fire, that is to say, 'the household *inao*' mentioned in § 24, is also associated with his consort in the prayers said on such occasions.

18. Various nature-deities.—Before treating of the subject now incidentally mentioned, viz. fetishism, it will be well to mention some other nature-deities. After the goddess of fire, the chief of these seems to be one called *Toi-kuru-puni-kuru*, or 'He who rises from the surface of the earth.' He is said to have a wife who is called *Toi-kuru-puni-mat*, or 'She who rises from the surface of the earth.' These, it may be said, represent that class of deities whose province it is to attend to the well-being of vegetation. They are said to be of a good nature and disposition, and are consequently worshipped. This couple seem to represent the male and female principles of nature. The natural law by which rain descends and clears away is represented by one called *Pe-konchi-koro-guru*, or 'He who wears the water-cap.' The Ainus say that this deity appears as a great rain-cloud. He is considered good, and ought therefore to be worshipped. There is a legend concerning him which runs as follows: 'Once upon a time the Ainus were at war. The enemy had pressed them very hard, and had set fire to their houses. Upon this, the people called upon all the deities they could think of for deliverance. Soon a large cloud arose from the mountains, and, floating directly to the burning village, rained heavily upon it and extinguished the flames. They then learned for the first time that this cloud was a god. He has been worshipped ever since this event, and the name "He who wears the water-cap" was then given him.' Another class is represented by one called *Ikoro-koro-guru*, or 'He who possesses great treasure.' Another name given him is *Nupuri-koro-Kamui*, or 'The divine possessor of the mountains.' He has yet a third name by which he is known, and that is *San-ru-e-poro-Kamui*, or 'The divinity with the large footprints.' This deity is the representative of such animals as are worshipped. When he makes himself visible, he is said to come always in the bodily form of a bear, and it is supposed to be his special business to attend to the wants and general welfare of the forests and mountains.

19. The spirits of the air.—Like the gods of the earth, the deities of the air are found to be very numerous. And they too may in some cases be regarded as personifications of the laws of nature. After the god of the sun mentioned in § 14 comes one called *Shi-nish-e-ran-guru*, or 'The person who comes down to the highest clouds.' He has a consort whose name is *Shi-nish-e-ran-mat*, or 'She who comes down to the highest clouds.' These are both worshipped, and they are supposed to move the clouds which they inhabit. Then follow *Nochiu-e-ran-guru* and his consort *Nochiu-e-ran-mat*, i.e. 'He' or 'She who comes down to the constellations.' It is their joint duty to attend to the shining and well-being of the stars. These also are worshipped. The last class to be mentioned is supposed to attend to the lower clouds and fogs, and is represented by a pair called *Urara-e-ran-guru* and *Urara-e-ran-mat*, i.e. 'He' or 'She who descends in fogs.' They are said to be worshipped by some.

20. The demons of land and air.—In all things the Ainus are firm believers in an almost co-ordinated array of hostile deities who manifest their malignant nature by creating disease, death, and every kind of evil. Speaking of these matters, an Ainu once said to the present writer: 'As the demons of the air are so near this earth, it is possible for them to pay us frequent visits, and even to dwell among us. This accounts for so much that is evil in the world.' Referring to the dryads of the forests, he said: 'There are a great number of them. The genii who work evil to men are part of these; and though dwelling in the forests and mountains, they have their real home in the air around us. They are the servants of the prince of devils.' Whirlwinds also, however small they may be, are looked upon as embodiments of evil spirits.

One of the chief demons of the earth is called *Nitat-unarabe*, or 'Aunt of swamps *or* marshes.' And she, as her name implies, is supposed to have her home in fens, moors, and other damp places. Very many of the evilly disposed demons, ghosts, and ghouls are thought to be her offspring, and those which owe their origin to her go by the name of *Toi-hekunra*. The following legend gives a fair idea as to what the people consider them to be like:

All ghosts are closely related to the demon of swamps. They are very large and have extraordinarily big heads, while their hair is always rough. When seen, it is nearly always found to be standing upright. However, as they appear only after dark, and are but dimly seen, one cannot tell exactly what they are like. When they reveal themselves, it is only in order to bewitch people, and to do them harm. They are dreadful creatures, and, as they are true demons, are much to be feared. They came by their origin in this way. After God had finished making the world, He threw His mattocks away among the mountains, and left them there to rot. But as they decayed, they changed themselves into demons and ghosts. They should be carefully avoided, for if a person catches but a glimpse of one, possession immediately follows, even though the demons themselves should not see the persons who have observed them. These ghosts walk only at night; it is, therefore, best for all people not to go out of doors after dark. Such, indeed, is the command of the ancients. Now, if a person should have the misfortune to meet one of these creatures, he should hasten to say the following words: 'O you demon, I have been desiring to see and speak with you for a very long time, and now at last we have fortunately met. What I wanted to tell you is this. At the other end of the world there is a certain demon called *Moshiri-shinnai-sam* who has been most grievously backbiting you. He says: "There is a demon inhabiting the marshes who is unbearably proud. She had better be careful, for if ever I come across her path, I will give her such a sound whipping that she will never forget it." Now, therefore, hasten away, for if he catches you, you will be flogged, and it will go hard with you, for he is a mighty one.' If one addresses the demon in this way, she will believe it and set out at once, filled with wrath, to take vengeance. These words are spoken to deceive the demon, and so frustrate her evil designs; and, unless they are said in her hearing, the person to whom she appears will immediately fall down and die. So say the ancients. This legend, when stripped of all verbiage, and considered in connexion with the general run of Ainu thought, shows the demon of the swamps to be merely malaria and ague personified.

After the evil principle which is supposed to reside in marshes, the chief of the demons appears to be one called *Kina-shut-un-guru*, or 'The person dwelling among the grass roots.' The demons which follow are very difficult to define,

and are very numerous. *Toi-pok-un-chiri*, i.e. 'The underground bird,' is especially called upon for help by hunters in times of danger; but whom he represents, no one appears to know. Akin to this one is *Toikunrari-kuru*, with whom is associated his wife *Toikunrari-mat*. These names mean 'He (or She) close upon the surface of the earth.' These two are looked upon as the friends of hunters, and are called upon in times of danger. *Hopokike-ush*, who stands next in order, is said to be the demon who causes stones to rattle down the cliffs and mountain sides. These are but classes of demons, for such creatures are very numerous indeed. They inhabit all kinds of places, such as the tops and bottoms of mountains, the flat surfaces of rocks, all kinds of flora, stony places, and localities where dust or sand prevails. The winds also have their demons, good and bad, and so have rain, mist, snow, hail, sleet, frost, ice, etc. (see *A F*, ch. 51).

21. Gods and demons of the sea and rivers.—All the larger kinds of fishes and sea animals have divine honours paid them, as, for example, whales, sea-leopards, sea-lions, sword-fish, salmon, trout, sea-tortoises, and so forth. These are all worshipped. So far as one can learn, the principal deities of the sea are as follows:—*Rep-un-riri-kata inao uk Kamui*, 'The god upon the waves of the sea who receives fetishes.' Whenever he allows himself to be seen, it is said to be in the form of a whale. He is looked upon as the head of all sea-deities, and has many servants, of whom the tortoise and the albatross are his favourites. Prayers are said to this god quite frequently, and the two servants just mentioned are said to act as go-betweens. Messages are conveyed through them and offerings of fetishes and beer are sent by them to him. The heads of these creatures are often to be seen kept as charms, and worshipped by the fishermen. The deity who is supposed to be next in order is called *Kai-pe-chupka-un-kuru*, i.e. 'The person who resides in the eastern surf.' As the name implies, he is said to have his home somewhere near the shore towards the east. We are informed that in bodily form he is like a large fish of some kind; but what kind of fish is not now known. He is supposed to be very good, and is therefore often worshipped, and given presents of fetishes and beer. The spirits next in order are the *Shi-acha* and *Mo-acha* mentioned in § 16.

There is an Ainu controversy about this couple, for by some the two names are said to represent one object only, and that object the whale! *Mo*, meaning 'peace' or 'calm,' is made to apply to the lee side of him, and *shi*, which means 'great' or 'rough,' is said to be his weather side. Or, some say again that he is called *mo* because he is gentle, and *shi* because he is very large. A legend regarding him is as follows. 'Once upon a time two Ainus were out at sea fishing, when they were suddenly overtaken by a severe storm. As their boat was in great danger of being swamped, they gave themselves to earnest prayer. Every known god of the sea was called upon for help, but all to no purpose. At length a very large whale, a whale as big as a mountain, was seen to rise out of the water, and gradually came to the side of the boat. It remained there till the storm was over, sheltering the boat from the wind and waves. This was no other than *Mo-acha* or *Shi-acha*. He was not known before that time, but has ever since been honoured with the prayers of the Ainu fishermen.' Other names given him are *Mo-acha-ahunge-guru*, 'The bringer in of the uncle of peace,' and *Shi-acha-ahunge-guru*, 'The bringer in of the uncle of roughness' or 'storm.'

The next deity of the sea is a goddess who is known by the name of *Chiwash-ekot-mat*. This name means 'The female possessor of the places where the fresh and salt waters mingle.' It is said to be her duty to watch at the mouths of rivers and allow the fish, particularly the spring and autumn salmon, to go in and out.

The specially evil demons of the sea are numerous. The name of the chief is *Ko-notu-ran-guru*, or 'He who descends upon the calm sea.' He, it is said, causes storms. Any abnormal fish, whether it be abnormal in form or colour, is supposed to be unlucky, and to belong to this demon. When caught, such fish are immediately tossed back into the sea. They are called *Ikonnup*, or 'things of misfortune.' This demon is married, and his wife's name is the same as his own, excepting that it has a feminine suffix. All mermaids are supposed to be her offspring, and are called *Ruru-koshinpuk* and *Atui-koshinpuk*.

These names mean 'Salt-water' and 'Sea-mermaids.' A young fisherman gave the present writer the following fact illustrating this matter. He said that he and his father while fishing once caught a kind of tortoise which the Ainus call *kinapo*. On examination it was found to have one foot very much whiter than the others, and this the father considered ought not to have been. On making the discovery, the old man declared it to be 'a misfortune-giving thing.' He therefore cut the foot off, and, letting the tortoise drop into the sea, said, '*Nani Ko-notu-ran-guru akore na, pirika no eyam yan*; 'O Ko-notu-ran-guru, I give this directly to you, take good care of it.' Next follows the demon called *Kai-pok-un-guru*. He is married, and together with his consort is said to 'reside under the surf' upon the seashore. *Ota-patche-guru* and his wife come next, and they are supposed to be the spirits who 'make the sand fly.'

The river demons are also very numerous, and their names indicate their work. They are: *Konupki-ot-guru*, or 'dwellers in muddy places.' They are said to reside specially near the river banks. *Chiuka-pinne Kamui rametok* ('the brave and divine male current') comes next. Then there are *Chiu-range guru* and his wife ('they who send the current'), and *Kochiu-tunash guru* with his wife, *i.e.* 'persons of the swift current,' and others too numerous to mention. The river deities are called *Wakka-ush-Kamui* ('water gods'). All rivulets and tributaries are said to be their offspring. They are named *Kamui poteke*, i.e. 'the little hands of the deities,' and *Kamui matnepo*, *i.e.* 'daughters of God.' Then there is *Petru-ush-mat* ('the female of the waterways'), together with *Pet-etok-mat* ('the female source of rivers'). Mermaids are called *Pe-boso-ko-shinpuk*, i.e. 'mermaids who pass through the water.' They are also called *Mimtuchi* and *tumnunchi*, i.e. 'fat' and 'fleshy devils.'

22. The demons of diseases.—Although, as was shown in § 20, many demons are supposed to have their origin and homes in marshes, yet the Ainus believe that demons of disease come in great measure from the sea, as the following lore shows:

'Various diseases from time to time attack the body. Such, for example, are ague, fever, heavy colds, stomach-ache, and consumption. Now, when these complaints arise, the men should meet together and go to the villages up and down the rivers, and take from each hut a small quantity of millet, fish, tobacco, skunk-cabbage, and cow-parsnip. These should all be brought to an appointed place, where the men should also come together and pray. After prayer they should carry them to the seashore, and, having made fetishes, reverently place them by their side. When this has been done, they should pray, saying, "O ye demons of sea harbours, have mercy upon us. O ye demons of disease, ye are fearful beings: we have, therefore, with one accord met together and decided to enrich you with fetishes and various kinds of food. Do ye wait upon those of your kind who have afflicted us, and on our behalf entreat them to take their departure. We present these articles of food for you to eat, and the fetishes are paid as fines. O all ye demons who watch over the harbours, cause the demons of disease to be taken away from our village."'

23. Fetishism.—The specific doctrines of Ainu religion as relating to the nature of their supposed superior spirits being such as that now stated (see especially §§ 10–13, 16, 17), the way to fetishism is short, direct, and logical. But fetishism is a term which has its difficulties, and must, to save confusion of thought, be defined before going further. The name is a Portuguese term derived from *feitiços*, and has long been in use in Portugal to designate the relics of saints, amulets, and charms in general use by the Roman Catholics. It was applied by Portuguese merchants to objects of many varieties to which the natives of the West Coast of Africa paid religious honour.* In

* See Jevons, *Introduction to the History of Religion*, London, 1896, p. 169.

Rouquetti's Portuguese Dictionary *feitiços* is explained by the French equivalent *sortilège, maléfice, enchantement, charme.* The term *Fétichisme,* as the name of the corresponding religion, was first employed by President de Brosses in his *Du culte des Dieux Fétiches* (1760). Among the Ainus a fetish is looked upon as a medium employed by a person by which one spirit (*ramat*, see § 13) is caused to act upon another for good or ill. It may be, and often is, by way of courtesy called a *Kamui* ('deity'), but it is only a deity of a lower order, and simply used as a go-between. Thus, for example, should a man desire to worship a good river deity or to propitiate an evil one, or should he wish to harm another person or have him blessed, he would make some fetishes out of sticks of wood or other substance and send them with messages to the gods or demons. This is the use of fetishes among the Ainus. They may, therefore, well be called media, for they are just as much media as persons who take verbal messages from one to another. The term by which the principal fetishes are known in Ainu quite agrees with this definition. It is *inao*, i.e. 'message-bearer.' Its roots are *ina* ('message,' 'request'), and *o* ('bear,' 'contain'). It appears to lie at the root of the word for prayer, which is *inonno* in Ainu and *inori* in Japanese. It is curious to remark that in ancient Japanese *inori* meant 'to curse.' As the word carries this meaning, we are not at all surprised,—nay, we should rather expect to find Ainu fetishes used for both good and evil purposes, and sent to gods and demons alike.

24. Fetishism in Ancestor-worship.—One of the most important and relatively highest fetishes the Ainus possess—and every family must have this one—is called *Chisei koro inao* ('the fetish who possesses the house'), also called *Chisei epungine ekashi* ('ancestral caretaker of the house'). It is the province of the spirit of this fetish to assist the goddess of the fire (see § 17) in looking after the general well-being of the family. His special abiding-place is in the sacred north-east corner of the hut, at the back of the family heirlooms. He is not only worshipped where he stands, but is also sometimes brought out from his abiding-place and stuck in a corner of the hearth, where prayers are actually addressed to him as the husband of the fire, which in its turn is called the 'ancestress,' i.e. *fuji* or *huchi*. The way this fetish is made is as follows: A piece of hard wood, such as lilac, say an inch or two in diameter, is taken. This is to form the stem, and is usually about two feet in length. One part is shaved with a sharp knife from top to bottom to represent the front. Near the top a gash is cut across in imitation of a mouth, and a little below this the so-called heart is carefully bound in. This heart, when first given to it, consists of a warm black cinder freshly taken from the hearth and firmly tied with a string made of twisted willow shavings to the stem, which is called the *netoba*, i.e. 'body.' After the heart has been bound in, a number of willow shavings are hung all round so that the stem with its mouth and heart is quite hidden from view. After it has been respectfully made, it is reverently stuck in the ground by the fireside, and the following dedicatory prayer is devoutly said to it: 'O fetish, you are henceforth to reside in this house with the goddess of fire; you are her husband, and your place will be in the treasure corner. Please help her to watch over us, and do you bless us.'

All this reminds us forcibly of the *Lares* and *Penates* of the ancient Romans, the one great difference being that the 'fire' and 'household' gods of the Ainus are more clearly defined by their names. At the present day the Ainus do not seem to look upon this as ancestor-worship; they do not, indeed, know what it is. But the names given them go to show that in its origin it was such.

A curious thing about the fetish is the fact that it is thought to be connected in some psychological way with the present living head of the family in which it has been dedicated. The following piece of lore explains this:

'The chief fetish should be made, in so far as its stem is concerned, of lilac, because this is found to be a hard kind of wood and does not quickly decay, even if stuck in the damp ground out of doors. It is not considered wise to use any other wood than lilac for this purpose, for in olden times a certain man made one of *cercidiphyllum*, the end of which rotted after a short time, so that it fell over. Not many months after, the owner himself became weak and died. This was owing to the influence of the fetish having been withdrawn. For this reason it is now known that the stem should be made of lilac only, that being the most durable wood of all. However, should a person happen to be in a place where he cannot obtain lilac, he may use either willow or *cercidiphyllum*, but these must not be kept long for fear they should rot away. When they become a little old, they should either be cast right away into the forest or reverently burnt upon the hearth before they have a chance of decaying. Others should then be made in their place.'

THE STEM.

THE HOUSEHOLD FETISH.

25. Ancestor-worship in general.—Prayers to the dead form a fairly strong feature in Ainu religion. The necessity for them is taught the people thus:

'If a person cultivates a spirit of selfishness, and offers nothing by way of food and drink to his deceased ancestors, the elders of the people should warn him, saying, "Foolish and wicked person, thou art a fool, and thou dost not understand; thou shalt die a hard death." If this be said, all the people, young and old alike, will be careful to worship the dead.' Another short counsel runs thus: 'Should a person leave his home and go away and die in a strange land, some of his relatives must surely go to his grave and there worship and offer libations. The dead observe all deeds, good and bad. Those who do what is right are blessed, and those who do what is evil are cursed by them.'

Women are not allowed to take part in religious exercises in so far as the deities are concerned, but they are commanded to make offerings to their deceased husbands and ancestors. The words they are usually taught to say on such occasions are as follows: 'O ye honourable ancestors, I am sent to present this beer and food to you.' On being asked why this ceremony should take place, an Ainu gave this piece of lore:

'The divine *Aioina* said, "If the people do good while upon the earth and not evil, though they die young they go to heaven. When there, they have good hunting." It is good for people on this earth to offer those who have gone before to Paradise food, beer, and lees. Not to do so shows lack of filial respect. Those who have departed still live and take an interest in those left behind. They should, therefore, be reverenced; unless respect is paid to them, they will come to this earth again and bring misfortune. When, therefore, ye have food, remember your ancestors. This will please them, and they will send you good health and prosperity! So spake *Aioina*.'

The ceremony of ancestor-worship is called *shinnurappa*, i.e. 'libation-dropping,' and takes place outside the huts by the east-end window and a little towards the west. Fetishes and beer are offered, and a prayer such as this said: 'O ye ancestors now dwelling in the underworld, we offer you beer and lees; receive them and rejoice.

Your grandchildren have met together specially to offer these things. Rejoice. Watch over us, and keep us from sickness. Give us a long life so that we may continue to offer such gifts.'

26. Private or tutelary fetish.—The fetish mentioned in § 24 was shown to belong to the family as a whole, but there is another very important one which is quite personal. It is always made of willow. Why it is regarded as of so high importance the following legend will show: 'When God made man, He formed his body of earth, his hair of chickweed, and his spine of a stick of willow.' And so, the backbone being regarded as the principal part of the human body, it is looked upon as the seat of life. It is said that no warrior of old could be killed unless his spine was injured.

When a child has been born, some very near blood relative of the male sex gets a nice clean stick of willow and shapes it into a fetish. When it is made, he proceeds to worship it, after which he reverently carries it to the bedside, and there



TUTELARY FETISH.

sets it up as the tutelary deity of the child. The accompanying illustrations show what it is like. That marked (1) is the willow stick itself, and is called the *shutu*, i.e. 'club'; that marked (2) is the club with the willow shavings attached, which are called *inao-kike*, i.e. 'fetish shavings'; the bundle of reeds marked (3) is called *Kamui-set*, 'the divine seat' or 'throne.' The end is stuck into this so as to keep it dry, and thus prevent it from rotting. That this fetish may be rightly called the angel of the child's growth the following folklore makes clear:

'As the backbone of man is made of willow wood, the men should hasten to make *inao* of this tree as soon as a child has been born. After it has been properly whittled, it should be addressed thus: "As thou, O fetish, art divine, we worship before thee. When God formed man in the beginning, He made his spine out of a piece of willow wood. We therefore call upon thee, O willow fetish, to watch over this child while he is growing up. Guard him and give him strength, together with long life." After this prayer has been said, the fetish should be reverently stuck in its "seat" and placed by the child's side. When the child has grown up, he should frequently procure beer and worship this, his guardian angel.' As might be expected, this fetish is particularly worshipped in time of sickness by the individual for whom it was made. The following is a prayer taught some children for their use on such an occasion: 'O thou willow god, as thou art my spine and backbone, do thou hasten to heal me and make me strong. O thou dear deity, I am ill, and my body is weak; pray help me soon.' If this prayer is said devoutly, it is supposed that the sufferer will soon recover from his malady.

So, too, when older people fall sick, willow fetishes are made by the old men and worshipped, after which some of them are sent to the Creator and other superior deities with messages. And, when all is done, they are taken outside to the sacred place at the eastern end of the hut. Here they are carefully stuck in the ground, and libations of beer offered them. It is, therefore, not surprising to find that the Ainus formerly used to reverence the willow almost as much as the Papuans did the *waringen* tree; who, we are told, had such an affection for it that the wilder tribes of Ceram used to lodge, and almost live, among its branches (Earl, *Papuans*, 116, 160).

NITNE-INAO, OR 'EVIL FETISH.'

27. Demon-worship.—The worship of demons is one of fear among this people, and is as a rule performed by way of propitiation. This becomes very clear when a certain kind of fetish called *nitne-inao* or *nitne-hash-inao*, i.e. 'evil fetish' or 'evil bush fetish,' is made and used. The purpose of it may be gathered from the prayer which follows. This kind of fetish is used especially in times of sickness, for on such occasions an afflicted person is supposed to be possessed by a demon of disease. It is called an evil fetish, not because it is itself regarded as being of an evil nature, but rather because the occasion on which it is used is a bad one. It is sent to the wicked demon of disease; this is why it is called evil. When it is made, a kind of stew called *nitne-haru*, i.e. 'evil stew,' is prepared and offered with it. This consists of bones of fish, some vegetables, and the remnants of any kind of food, mixed together and well boiled. When all has been prepared, the fetish is stuck in the ground upon the hearth, and the stew, which has by no means an inviting smell, is placed before it. Then a so-called prayer is said as follows:

'O evil fetish, take this evil food, together with the disease of this sick person, and also the demon who has possessed him, and go with them to hell. When you arrive there, please make it so that the demon will not return to this earth again.

NUSA, OR CLUSTER OF INAO.

I have supplied you with food; take it to the demon and propitiate him; please feed him with it.'

After this the patient is beaten with *takusa*, a bunch of grass; and if the fetish is successful in his errand, it is supposed that a cure will follow. After the worship has been performed, the fetish is taken outside the hut and stuck up at the *nusa* place, where the stew is set before it. Here the following prayer is said to the demon of the rubbish-heap: 'O thou angry demon, O thou demon of the rubbish-heap, accept this fetish and food; make

haste and heal this sick person.' The man who officiates at this ceremony then returns to the hut, where he again exorcizes the demon by brushing the patient down with the *takusa* mentioned above.

Fetishes of the following shape are also sometimes used for this purpose. The present writer has several times seen them set up in the huts of sick people, and very earnestly worshipped. After having been prayed to, the spirit of the fetish is supposed to wander about in the earth and visit the various demons of evil on behalf of the sick man, and, after having found them, is said to consult with them as to what is best to be done for the patient.

SHUTU-INAO, *i.e.* 'CLUB FETISH.'

28. Special fetishes for epidemic disease.—In the event of any village being attacked by an epidemic disease, but more especially if the disease be of a severe and dangerous nature, as, for example, smallpox, the Ainus of the villages immediately surrounding the infected one get sticks of elder or cladrastis, about four feet in length, and make them into fetishes or charms. These instruments are called *chikappo-chiko-mesup*, i.e. 'little carved birds,' by some, and *rui-shutu-inao*, i.e. 'thick club fetish,' by others. They are also named *kotan-kikkara-inao*, i.e. 'fetishes for village defence.' As soon as set up they are devoutly worshipped, when the people call upon them to drive the dread disease away. They are supposed to represent the eagle-owl, which is thought to have power over this particular evil. The slit in the top of the fetish given in the illustration is said to represent the mouth, and the shavings left on the sides are intended for feathers. Food is sometimes placed in the mouth as an offering to the demons to whom the fetish is sent. That which the writer has seen consisted in one case of putrified fish mixed with brimstone, and in another of *cynanchum Caudutum*. It is said that the

CHIKAPPO-CHIKO-MESUP, OR 'LITTLE CARVED BIRDS.'

demons, being unable to withstand the smell of these things, will flee from them.

29. Fetishes for the sea-gods.—The fishermen have one kind of fetish which is a special favourite with them. It is called *hash-inao*, i.e. 'bush fetish. This kind is made by cutting a short stick, and either splitting it at one end and inserting a shaving in the opening so made, or else by cutting a few gashes in it in an upward direction, as shown in the illustration. The gashes cut across the top are said to represent the mouth. Though willow is the favourite wood used, yet they may be made of dogwood, lilac, cercidiphyllum, ash, magnolia, or oak—indeed, of almost any wood which happens to be nearest to hand. When being set up, a good representative prayer said to them runs thus: 'O ye gods who govern the waters, O ye water deities, we are now about to go fishing. Please accept

HASH-INAO

these fetishes and watch over us. Grant that we may catch many fish to-day.'

30. Religious charms.—In so far as their purpose is concerned, the dividing line between the fetishes mentioned in the preceding sections and the various kinds of charms in use among this people is not very clearly defined, so that it is often most difficult to distinguish between them; that is to say, he would be a bold person who should venture to put his finger first on one and say, 'This is a fetish,' and then on another and say, 'This is a charm'; for either may be both, and both either, according to the time and purpose for which they are made. The charms are very numerous, and are used for many purposes. Among other objects, rocks *in situ* and also stones of various shapes and sizes may be found employed both for purposes of personal protection against evil, and as a means for working harm to others (*AF* 398); the skins, bones, feathers, and beaks of birds are sometimes kept as love-charms (75, 76); snake skin is thought to be a special talisman, energetic, if properly treated, in working good in the storehouses and garden seeds (209); birds' eggs and nests are special cereal charms, while the heads of some kinds of birds are kept and used for driving away disease (219); the heart of the 'dipper' is a charm supposed to bestow eloquence and quick sight (336), bears' eyes swallowed whole are said to produce long and clear sight in hunters. The skulls of bears, foxes, bats, falcons, owls, kites, and the fore-feet of hares are also all worshipped at times and used as charms (*AF*, ch. 34). The horns of deer, and the stones sometimes found in the bladders of animals, are also thought much of as charms supposed to bring good luck to the happy finder and possessor (401).

31. Magic.—Following close upon the subject of fetishes and charms, and very nearly related to these objects in principle and nature, comes magic, sometimes called sympathetic magic. This has been defined by Zimmern as 'the attempt on man's part to influence, persuade, or compel spiritual beings to comply with certain requests or demands' (see Aston's *Shinto*, London, 1905, p. 327). Bearing in mind the meaning of the word for 'spirit' (*ramat*; § 13), and that all things are supposed to have spirit in them, and remembering the definition of *Kamui* (God) and the various objects to which this term is applied (§ 4), and not forgetting the fact that the Ainus do not so much worship the visible objects to which their prayers are addressed, as pray to the spirits, good and evil, supposed to animate them, we find this

definition very apt in so far as this people is concerned.

The Ainu terms for magic are *ichashkara*, i.e. 'a shutting up,' or 'enclosing in a fence,' and *ishirishina*, i.e. 'binding up tightly,' and it usually implies the binding together with a curse of two objects, a person and some selected fetish supposed to be evil. The following are some common methods in vogue among the Ainus of practising this art. The effigy of an enemy may be made of mugwort or straw, then cursed and either buried head downwards in a hole in the ground or placed under the trunk of a fallen and rotting tree. This kind of effigy is called *inoka*, i.e. 'the image.' When it is buried, the devil should be called upon to lay hold of the soul (*ramat*) of the person it is supposed to represent and take it to hell. By this act it is supposed that the person will sicken so that his body will gradually die as the image decomposes (*AF*, chs. 30, 31). Sometimes the effigy is found to be not buried but fastened to a tree with nails or wooden pegs driven into its head and other parts of the body. Again, another plan is to make an *inao* fetish of the guelder-rose and ask it to depart at once with the soul to the region inhabited by the demons. Sometimes a little boat is made of rotten wood, and the effigy of an enemy is placed in it together with an idol supposed to be a demon. When made, the demon is worshipped and asked to row the soul of the cursed one to hell. Sometimes, again, the head-dress of a person is taken, wrapped up in a bag in the shape of a corpse prepared for burial, and placed in a hole in the ground to rot. It is supposed that as this decomposes, the enemy to whom it belonged will sicken and die. The demons of some kinds of trees are also at times asked to curse one's enemies by seizing their souls and turning them into devils.

But magic, as one would naturally expect, may also be used for good purposes. Thus, for example, upon returning one very cold night from a journey with the Ainu head of a family, we found some convolvulus roots set up in a warm place before the fire upon the hearth. Upon making inquiries as to the meaning of this, we were informed that it was intended as a charm to prevent our feet from being frozen during the journey. Of the frequent use of trees in magic, a full account may be found in *AF*, ch. 30; cf. also § 33 below.

32. Bewitching, divination, and exorcism.—That bewitching people, exorcizing demons, and finding out things by divination are integral parts of Ainu religious superstitions cannot be doubted. A case of bewitching, by cutting holes in the garments of another person with a pair of scissors, which came under the writer's own observation, will be found in *AF*, p. 341 ff. Similarly a case of divination, by means of a fox's skull, is recorded (*ib.* pp. 350, 379 ff.). A case of exorcism by means of a tree, together with cutting clothes and beating with mugwort, will be found described on p. 315 of *AF*; while an account of a curious method of exorcizing the demon in madmen, by cutting their bodies with a sharp stone, shell, knife, or razor, and then thoroughly dipping them in a river, will be found set forth on p. 312. Cats are supposed to bewitch people in some instances (294, 507); dogs in some (507); and birds, such as the cuckoo, woodpecker, night-hawk, goat-sucker, and owl, in others (409); while such animals as hares (515), squirrels (500), otters (512), and various kinds of fish (522) are also supposed to possess this power. Indeed, there is no reason to suppose that there is any living creature in the earth which cannot bewitch, should it desire to do so.

33. Tree-worship.—The Ainus suppose not only that every tree has its own personal spirit (*ramat*), but that the roots also, the stem, bark, wood, heart, forks, knots, buds, leaves, twigs, crown, and every other part as well, are themselves each peopled with innumerable spirits, some of a good, and others of an evil, disposition. That the willow is regarded as a deity, and as such worshipped, has already been shown in § 26. Other kinds of trees also, such as the actinidia and grape vines, which are supposed to have had their origin in Paradise (156–158), dogwood, oak, spruce, spindle-wood, prunus, hornbeam, black alder, lilac, magnolia, yew, ash, azalia, cercidiphyllum, chestnut and mulberry, and others, are all worshipped on occasion (380). Some of these, as has already been shown in §§ 31, 32, are also used in cursing people and for the purpose of witchcraft, being at such times entreated to bring misfortune to one's enemies. For this purpose the guelder-rose, alder, poplar, elm, birch, hydrangea, and walnut are particularly employed (331, 332, 281). There are, however, other purposes, and those good religious ones, to which the Ainus put trees. The general name one usually hears applied to this cult is *Kim-o-chipaskuma*, i.e. 'the doctrine of the mountains,' and this particular part of it is named *Chikuni-akoshiratki orushpe*, i.e. 'news about preservation by trees.' Regarding this the Ainus say: 'When those Ainus who are acquainted with the cult of the mountains are about to start on a hunting expedition, they first, after having worshipped at the *nusa** cluster, go and select a large tree and worship its spirit, saying: "O thou great possessor of the soil, we are about to go and kill animals, pray help us; O see that we meet with no accidents, and prosper us." After this has been done, they set out fully expecting to come across much game.' This is tree-worship in its baldest form (cf. also § 26), and we see by it that the hunters regard the tree genii, for the time being, as their tutelary deities and guardians. In times of sickness, also, trees are worshipped. On such occasions the tree genii are called upon under various names, as, for instance, *Topochi*, 'the wise one,' and *Shirampa*, 'the one upon the earth.' Or, in case of an attack from a bear or wolf, they are worshipped under the name *Niashrange guru*, 'the person of the standing tree,' and *Kisara-range shinupuru Kamui*, 'the precious demon of the rough bark' (*AF*, ch. 33).

34. Cereal worship.—Like trees and other vegetable life, cereals also are supposed to contain living spirits (*ramat*), some of which are thought to be of the masculine and others of the feminine gender (*AF* 204), and the worship of them often takes place. Never are the gardens sown with seed without prayer being first made to the Creator (see § 5), then to the sun, and lastly to the very seed itself. Many years ago, Cicero asked, in his *de Natura Deorum*, whether any one was mad enough to believe that the food we eat is actually a god. The Ainus would answer, 'Yes,' and 'What else, indeed, can it be?' The prayer used at the ceremony of eating new millet at the harvest thanksgiving is very interesting, and shows clearly that it is the spirit of the food partaken of that is worshipped, and not God, the Giver of all good gifts. The prayer runs thus:

'O thou cereal deity, we worship thee. Thou hast grown very well this year, and thy flavour will be sweet. Thou art good. The goddess of fire will be glad, and we also shall rejoice greatly. O thou God! O thou divine cereal! do thou nourish the people.' The person who officiates then continues, 'I now partake of thee. I worship thee and give thee thanks.' After having thus prayed, the persons present take a cake and eat it among them, and from this time the new millet is common food. Commenting on this, Aston says (*Shinto*, p. 160): 'Gratitude in the first place to, and then for, our daily bread, is an important factor in the early growth of religion. Without it

* See illustration under § 27.

we should have had no Roman Ceres, no Mexican Maize-god Centliotl, and no Ukemochi' (cf. also p. 277, Nihi-name).

But eating the god is by no means limited to cereals among the Ainus, for the bear sacrifice partakes of quite the same nature, to which subject we shall now proceed.

35. **The bear festival.** — Although animals of many kinds, and birds also (see *AF*, chs. 36–39), even down to a tiny sparrow, are at times first worshipped and then killed in sacrifice, it is (when considering this phase of the subject) to the bear festival that we must look for the highest expression of Ainu religion. The general name given for 'sacrifice' is *iyomande*, which means 'to send away,' so we must expect that when a living object is sacrificed, the spirit is supposed to be 'sent' somewhere, and for some purpose. And here it may be well to ask, To whom is the bear sent, and why? To this question it must be replied in the first place that, so far as can be ascertained, there is now (whatever there may have been in olden times) no idea of substitution underlying the practice; nor, secondly, is it piacular, for the people know nothing of the 'shedding of blood for the remission of sins.' All thoughts, therefore, connected with the old Jewish notion of sacrifice must be left out of the question when considering Ainu ideas concerning it. The very essence of Ainu religion consists in communion with the greater powers, and the people imagine that the most complete communion they can possibly hold with some of their gods—animals and birds, to wit*—is by a visible and carnal partaking of their very flesh and substance in sacrifice. At the time of offering, the living victim is said to be sent to his ancestors in another place. Still, at the same time, the bear festival is a kind of mutual feast—a feast of friendship and kinship—in which Bruin himself also participates. Indeed, the bear is offered to himself and his worshippers in common, and they are supposed to have a good happy time of communion together. But as this is a very difficult and, in some ways, a very important subject, it has been thought best to give a simple description of the festival as now practised, and let it speak for itself.

That the Ainus rear bear cubs in cages and often pay them divine honours is a well-known fact. The present writer once visited a village where as many as ten cubs were caged. After they have come to the age of two, or rarely three, years, and it has been decided that a sacrifice is to take place, the owner sends out an invitation to the people, which runs thus: 'I, so and so, am about to sacrifice the dear little divine thing from among the mountains. My friends and masters, come ye to the feast; we will then unite in the great pleasure of *iyomande*, "sending the god away." Come.' This is certain to be heartily responded to. When the guests have all arrived, the men make many fetishes (*inao*), stick them in the hearth, and perform worship. When this has been properly done, most of the *inao* are reverently taken up and carried by the men to the *nusa* place outside the hut and there stuck up. Next, two long, thickish poles are carefully laid at their base. The men now come reverently out of the hut, ornamented with their crowns, and solemnly approach the cage containing the bear. The women and children follow singing, dancing, and clapping their hands, for all are in anticipation of having a jolly time. Having reached their appointed place, all sit in a circle, the old men in front and the women and children behind. After all this has been arranged, an Ainu is chosen, who, having approached the bear, sits down before it and tells it that they are about to send it forth to its ancestors. He prays pardon for what they are about to do, hopes it will not be angry, tells it what an honour is about to be conferred upon it, and comforts it with the consolation that a large number of *inao* and plenty of wine, cakes, and other good cheer will be sent along with it. He also informs it that if it be a good and proper bear, it will appear again later to be treated in like manner. The last address we heard of ran thus: 'O thou divine one, thou wast sent into the world for us to hunt. O thou precious little divinity, we worship thee; pray hear our prayer. We have nourished thee and brought thee up with a deal of pains and trouble, all because we love thee so. Now, as thou hast grown big, we are about to send thee to thy father and mother. When thou comest to them, please speak well of us and tell them how kind we have been; please come to us again, and we will once more sacrifice thee.' After such a prayer the bear is taken out of its cage with ropes and made to walk about in the circle formed by the people. Here it is shot at for some time with blunt arrows called *hepere-ai*, i.e. 'cub-arrows,' and so teased till it becomes quite furious. After this the poor animal is securely tied to a stake for the last scene before its death. This stake, which is ornamented at the top with tufts of arundinaria, is called *tush-op-ni*, *i.e.* 'tree with rope affixed.' After it has been further worried, a young Ainu previously selected suddenly rushes forward and seizes the brute by the ears and fur of the face, while at the same time a second man rushes behind and lays hold of its hind quarters. Next a third man runs forward with a stick, about two feet in length and two inches in diameter, which he thrusts between the jaws of the cub. Next two other men come and catch hold of the two hind legs while others seize the forefeet. When all this has been done, the two long poles which were laid by the *nusa*, and which are called *ok-numba-ni*, i.e. 'poles for the strangling,' are brought forward. One of these is placed under the brute's throat, and the other upon the nape of its neck. A good shot with the bow now comes forward and shoots an arrow into the beast's heart, and so ends its misery. In some instances, however, the bear is shot before its head is placed between the poles. But this seems to be the case only when the animal is dangerous. Care has to be taken so to strike the bear that no blood is allowed to fall upon the earth. Should any be spilled, it must be quickly wiped up with some of the sacred willow shavings.

HEPERE-AI. TUSH-OP-NI.

* The same principle holds good with regard to cereals; see § 34.

Why the shedding of blood should be thus tabued no one seems to know.* In some instances, however, the men (particularly those who are hunters) catch the blood in their cups and drink it while reeking warm. This is said to be done with the object of thereby obtaining the courage and other virtues possessed by the victim. On one or two occasions some of the blood taken at a feast has been sent, sprinkled on paper, to sick Ainus staying in our house! It has been smelled and licked with great eagerness, the recipient expecting to receive great bodily and spiritual good from it. Indeed, even the writer himself has, to his great astonishment, had some reserved and sent him.

As soon as dead, the victim is skinned and its head cut off, the skin, however, being left attached to the head. This is taken to the east window and placed upon a mat called *inao-so*, and ornamented with shavings, ear-rings, beads, and other things. On one occasion the present writer even saw a Japanese mirror placed before it, and some old sword hilts and guards! After all this has been performed, a piece of the animal's flesh is cut off and placed under its own snout. This is called *Not-pok-omap*, i.e. 'that under the jaw.' Then a piece of dried fish called *Sat-chep-shike*, i.e. 'the bundle of dried fish,' and a moustache lifter, with some millet dumplings, some strong drink,



IMOKA-SHIKE.

either rice or millet beer, and a cup of its own flesh boiled, are placed before it. The cup of boiled meat is called *Marapto-itangi*, i.e. 'the cup of the feast.' This having been finished, a man worships, saying: 'O Cub, we give you these fetishes, cakes, and dried fish; take them to your parents, and say: "I have been nourished for a long time by an Ainu father and mother, and have been kept from all trouble and harm. As I am now grown big, I am come to thee. I have brought these *inao*, cakes, and dried fish. Please rejoice." If you say this to them, they will be very glad.' This prayer is only representative; others are said, but all are after the same model. Next, millet dumplings are threaded on sticks and placed by the head. These are said to be for the feast in the new world, for it would never do for the cubs to appear before their ancestors without a small present to provide viands for another meal. They are called *Imoka-shike*, i.e. 'remnants of the feast.' This having been finished and the dancing over, the people return to the hut, where new fetishes (*inao*) are made and placed reverently upon the bear's head. In the meantime some of the cub's flesh has been boiled. A cup of this is now taken and set before the beast's snout, and he is then said to be partaking of the *marapto-itangi*, 'the cup of the feast,' and *ipuni-itangi*, 'the cup of offering.' After a little time has elapsed, the man who presides at the feast says: 'The little divinity has now finished eating; come, ye friends, let us worship.' He then takes the cup, salutes it, and divides the contents—to every guest a very small portion—for it seems to be absolutely essential that each person should take a little. Other parts of the beast are stewed and eaten, while the entrails are cut up fine, sprinkled with salt, and eaten raw. This, like the drinking of the blood, is said to be for the purpose of obtaining the prowess and other virtues of the bear. For the same reason also some of the men besmear themselves and their clothes with blood. This latter custom is called *yai-isho-ushi*, i.e. 'besmearing oneself with good sport.'

The head of the brute is at length detached from the skin and taken to the *nusa* heap, where it is set up upon a pole called *Ke-omande-ni*, i.e. 'the pole for sending away.' All the skulls of animals set up along with that of the bear, and there are many of them, are called *Akoshiratki Kamui*, i.e. 'Divine preservers,' and are at times worshipped. The feast lasts several days as a rule; indeed, it is not quite over till the whole of the cub has been devoured and all the strong drink swallowed.

KE-OMANDE-NI.

36. Totemism. — The word 'totem' is said to be derived from the Ojibwa (Chippewa) word *totam* (see *EBr*, art. 'Totemism'). 'As distinguished from a fetish, the totem is never an isolated individual, but always a class of objects, generally a species of animals or plants, more rarely a class of inanimate natural objects, very rarely a class of artificial objects.' Judging from the very few survivals of totemism still in existence among this people, and from their language, one is led to the conclusion that this cult never attained the proportions among them that it did among Africans, or South Australians, or the North American Indians. The Ainus, for example, are very seldom heard to speak of themselves or others as belonging to a bear, a wolf, a turtle, a snipe, a hawk, or an eagle clan, and never of any vegetable clan. Still, there are some grounds for believing that their faith was, in the distant past, somewhat tinged with the totemistic superstition. But it was a totemism which differed from that of the Indians and many others, inasmuch as the Ainus in some instances think it a praiseworthy act to kill and eat their totem if it be an animal (see § 35), and cook and eat it if it be a cereal (see § 34; and cf. *AF* p. 206). According to the general ideas of totemism as practised elsewhere, this ought not so to be. For among the Indians it was thought that, the connexion between the man and his totem being mutually beneficent, the totem protecting the man and the man respecting the totem, it should not be killed if it was an animal, or cut if it was a plant. But the Ainus consider it a very great mutual benefit to kill and eat their totem where possible. Indeed, by feeding upon it they imagine they can get the closest communion with it,—their totem and their god,—sometimes, for example, the bear.

The clearest instance of a genuine belief in totemistic descent the present writer has ever come across among the Ainus was that of a young man who held that his forbears were, one or

* The same tabu is found in other religious systems, and seems based on the belief that the ground is rendered tabu by the sacred blood falling upon it (Jevons, *Introduction to the History of Religion*, pp. 73–74; Frazer, *GB* i. 178 ff.).

both, descended from an eagle. (The account of this will be found on p. 10 of *AF*). Just as the bear may very possibly have represented the national totem of the Ainus, so the present illustration may be an example showing the eagle to have been the totem of a family. An example of the individual totem is found in the willow tree, with which it is shown the Ainus consider themselves to be very closely connected (*AF* 83 ff.). The vines, grape and actinidia, used for ear-rings (156), also seem to have been looked upon as totems; while the images of foxes, wolves, birds, and fish sometimes found carved on the moustache lifters used by the men when drinking, and upon the crowns worn by them at their feasts (158–159), may point to clan totemism.

37. **Ophiolatry.**—Although snake-worship is still practised to some extent among the Ainus, there is not sufficient evidence to go upon to justify us in saying that this cult ever attained such elaborate proportions of worship as that among the Danhglwe in the serpents' house at Dahomey,* or among the Indians, or even among the ancient Japanese.† Nevertheless, that which is now seen is probably the last remnant of what was once a somewhat complete system.

According to Ainu ideas, the first snake that ever was, belonged not to this earth but came down from heaven, though others of the ophidian tribe had their origin otherwise. In this we are reminded of St. John in Rev 12^{7-9}; and also of Zoroastrian mythology, in which Ahriman descended earthwards in the form of a serpent.‡ But among the Ainus the original serpent is supposed to have been a good being, and in this respect differs from that of both St. John and the Persians (*AF*, ch. 32).



IMOKA KAMUI, OR IMAGE OF SNAKE USED FOR WORSHIP.

Serpents are worshipped most frequently at the time of childbirth, but especially when there is any difficulty in the matter. On such occasions the image of a snake, which is called *Imoka Kamui*, i.e. 'the divine image,' is made out of sedge (*Carex rhynchaphysa*), worshipped, and then suddenly placed upon the shoulders of the patient. The reason given for this is said to be that, according to Ainu belief, all such difficulties are brought about by the king of the evil offspring of serpents himself; and they say that rather than propitiate the evil one, they should go directly to the chief serpent and ask him to keep his wicked subordinates in check and remove the evil they have done.

In cases of ague also snake-worship has taken place, as well as in instances of snake-bite. These reptiles are also sometimes worshipped as a means for cursing people, being asked to bite one's enemies. The prayer said to them on such an occasion takes some such form as the following:

'O snake, I have a word to say to you: pray listen. I have an enemy So-and-so by name. Remember the name. If you ever see him coming along this road, please bite him, possess him, poison him, and kill him. I will then make *inao* out of walnut wood, and also offer you many libations. Pay attention to what I say.'

Snake-possession is called *okokko-parat*, i.e. 'snake punishment,' and the women especially are very much afraid of it. There is no particularly specified manner in which it shows itself, for almost any disease may, so they think, be owing to possession by one or more of these reptiles.

Ophiomancy also appears to have left traces behind. The writer of this article once knew of a woman who professed to foretell future events by means of the image of a snake she kept stowed away in a box near by. She called it her guardian angel, and used to pray to it frequently. By its inspiration she professed to be able to tell the reasons for any sickness people were afflicted with, and to discover the proper remedies for them. But, so far as real ophiomancy is concerned, we have never yet heard of any Ainu, man or woman, who professed to predict future events by means of a genuine serpent, dead or alive, whether by its manner of eating or by its coils.

38. **Tabu.**—Besides the various small matters forbidden in relation to one's attitude towards fire (see § 17), the Ainus have other tabus of a religious and semi-religious nature which should be mentioned. Thus the blood of a bear must not be spilt at a bear-feast (see § 35); a woman must not pronounce the name of her husband lest she thereby cause him harm in some way (*AF*, 252); the cry of certain birds, as, for instance, the cuckoo, woodpecker, night-hawk, goat-sucker, and owl, should not be imitated for fear of being bewitched by them (409, 427); at childbirth also *couvade* is practised, during part of which time the father of the child is forbidden to eat and drink except very sparingly; nor must he worship the gods, hunt, fish, or work till after the purification of the wife, which takes place on the seventh day after parturition (235–241).

39. **The future life.**—There is no idea more firmly fixed in the Ainu mind than the notion that the spirit is appointed to live for ever in another world—a world which, for the good, is the counterpart of this, only much better, and free from pain, and, for the evil, is dark, wet, cold, and dreary. The very word in use for the spirit (*ramat*) demands that such a place as heaven should exist, for a living being can neither, it is thought, lose his life nor get rid of his own proper personality for ever (see § 13). But the spirit is there supposed to be clothed with a spiritualized body resembling the present, and to exist under like conditions to those of the present life. In the other world the spirit will require a house to live in, tools to work with, as well as boats and hunting and fishing implements. That the Ainus really think this is proved not merely from their words, but also from some of their customs practised at the time of death. The most common word for 'to die' is *ra-i oman*, i.e. 'a going to the lower place.' This does not necessarily mean that the spirit is in every case supposed to descend into the bowels of the earth (*pokna moshiri*, 'the lower world') when it leaves the body, though sometimes it may do so;* and, to hear the people talk, one might be tempted to believe that the Ainus think heaven itself to be in Hades. But, according to their expressed cosmological ideas, they really suppose there are six (*AF* 60) heavens above and six hells (ᾅδαι) below us, and that the best place is in heaven above and the worst in Gehenna below. *Ra-i oman*, 'a going to the lower place,' is not the only term for death. There are others, such as 'to pierce the skies'; 'to make a clearance'; 'to have space for thought'; 'to sleep the other sleep,' and so on (548).

When a person is about to be buried, whether it be a man, woman, or child, the spirit is still spoken to as if it were present in the corpse, and is supposed to partake of the burial feast together with

* Bouley, *Religions of the Africans*, p. 46.

† Griffis, *The Religions of Japan*, New York, 1895, pp. 30, 33, 278.

‡ Hardwick, *Christ and other Masters*, p. 553.

* Stories of supposed journeys to Hades may be seen recorded both in *AF* (570, 572) and in 'The Language, Mythology, and Geographical Nomenclature of Japan viewed in the light of Ainu studies,' *Memoirs of the Literature College, Imperial University of Japan*, No. 1.

the mourners. Many of the possessions belonging to the deceased, such as bows and arrows, clothing, means for obtaining fire, pipes, tobacco boxes, knives, cups, ornaments, and so forth, are killed (!) by being cut or broken, and so sent to the nether world for future use (*AF* 554–566). Huts too, which, as has already been pointed out, are supposed to be living creatures (117–132), are sent off to the other world by being burned; they are to be for the use of those who occupied them in this life.

40. The future judgment.—After death the Ainus assuredly look for judgment. All must appear, they say, before the tribunal where God the Creator is said to be the judge of all men, and the goddess of fire the chief witness for or against them (see § 17). Those who are accounted worthy go to the happy land, called *Kamui-kotan* or *Kamui-moshiri*, i.e. 'the land' or 'country of the gods'; while the wicked must be sent to *Tei-nei-pokna-moshiri*, i.e. 'the wet underground place,' where they will be for ever unhappy and perhaps frozen up in a block of ice. Whether the punishment will be in reality fire, ice, or swamp, the Ainus are not certain and do not pretend to know; but that their Gehenna is not the same as the hell of the Buddhist is very clear, for there are no purgatorial fires thought of among them.

LITERATURE.—No books have been specially devoted to Ainu religion, though notices of the subject occur in almost all works which touch upon the Ainus. In the year 1893, A. H. Savage Landor published his *Alone with the hairy Ainu*. This book is sometimes quoted as authoritative on the matter, and, were all his remarks true to fact, it would be of the utmost importance. In ch. xxviii. Landor says that the Ainus recognize no 'supreme God and no intelligent creator.' . . . 'The Ainu worship nothing.' . . . 'The Ainu have no religion.' . . . 'They are decidedly not moral, for nothing is immoral with them,' and much more to the same effect. On p. 282, again, he says: 'The Ainu language is as poor in words as the Ainu brain is deficient in thoughts. Thus it is no easy matter to explain to an Ainu what is meant by "religion," by "divinities," and by "worship."' But the Ainu language is by no means so deficient in words as Landor imagined. Dobrotvorsky gives as many as 10,930 words and phrases in his *Ainsko-Russkiĭ Slovar* (Kazan, 1875), while nearly 14,000 words alone are to be found in Batchelor's *Ainu-Eng.-Jap. Dictionary*[2] (Tokio, 1905). Landor's idea of the Ainus as a non-religious people will not bear looking into.

A much less pretentious, but far more reliable, work on the subject is that written by B. Douglas Howard, in 1893, and entitled *Life with the Trans-Siberian Savages*. This is a pleasantly written little book of 209 pages, and treats mostly of the Saghalien Ainus. The account therein contained shows the religion of these people to be the same as that of the Yezo Ainus; and subsequent personal contact with them has shown Mr. Howard to be correct in his description and generally reliable in his deductions. Indeed, so much alike did he find the two tribes in the matter of religion and religious practices, that he was, by reading the present writer's work, *The Ainu of Japan*, able to give the 'probable meaning' of what he saw and heard on that island (Howard, p. 17).

Miss Bird also, in her very pleasantly written *Unbeaten Tracks* (1885, abridged, Letter 37, pp. 273, 277), speaks of Ainu religion. She says, 'There can be nothing more vague and destitute of cohesion than Ainu religious notions.' . . . 'They have no definite ideas concerning a future state, and the subject is evidently not a pleasing one to them.' . . . 'Such notions as they have are few and confused.' All this is not quite correct; and it would be unreasonable to suppose that Miss Bird could—even had she claimed to do so—in the short three weeks she was actually with the Ainus, have explored every dark nook and corner in the mind of the people. She laboured under the great disadvantage also of being obliged to obtain all her information at second hand through a Japanese interpreter; and if there is any one thing the Ainus are naturally reticent and secretive about before strangers, it is their religion.

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AIR and GODS OF THE AIR.—Here it is proposed to deal only with those invisible beings who are supposed to hover between heaven and earth,—that is, whose proper abode is the circumambient atmosphere. They are called *Air-gods* rather than *Sky-gods*, the better to distinguish them from the true celestial deities who dwell aloft in the ethereal regions, either in or above the blue vault of heaven, and have no direct contact with the earth and its enveloping waters. But the air is the least stable of the elements, ever fluctuating to and fro, with upward and downward contacts, and restlessly filling all the intermediate spaces, so that the world itself was by our imaginative forefathers called the *middangeard*—the middle region floating in the boundless ether. Hence there are necessarily continuous overlappings and interminglings everywhere, and it often becomes difficult or impossible to draw a clear line between the aërial and celestial deities on the one hand and the aërial, the earthly, and even the underground gods on the other. How true this is may be seen in the protean forms attributed by the ancients to the Olympian Jove himself. Although Zeus was primarily a sky-god, he also filled many other functions, as shown by such epithets as Χθόνιος, Ὄμβριος, Θαλάσσιος (Earth-, Rain-, Sea-god), while Homer speaks even of the Ζεὺς καταχθόνιος, the 'Underground Zeus' (*Il.* ix. 457). So also his consort, the earth-goddess Dione, whose 'variations show how readily sky-goddess, sea-goddess, and earth-goddess might pass from one province into another' (A. B. Cook, *CR*, April 1903, where the subject is dealt with fully).

Of the aërial beings proper, such as those spirits dismissed by Prospero 'into air, into thin air,' or those others who 'on the beached margent of the sea . . . dance their ringlets to the whistling wind,' or those again who 'hover through the fog and filthy air,' the genesis appears to be twofold, as partly suggested in Hemsterhuis's oft misquoted epitaph (in his *Lucian*):

> 'Bis duo sunt homines; manes, caro, spiritus, umbra;
> Quatuor has partes tot loca suscipiunt.
> Terra tegit carnem, tumulum circumvolat umbra,
> Orcus habet manes, spiritus astra petit.'

First come the *manes*, a euphemistic expression meaning the 'Good Ones,' like the Greek *eumenides*, the 'Well-disposed,' *i.e.* the Erinyes or Furies, and the Irish *Duine Matha*, 'Good People,' *i.e.* the mischievous fairies who would resent being spoken of disrespectfully. These *manes*, originally the ghosts of the dead, and worshipped by the greater part of mankind, constitute, with the following *umbra* and *spiritus*, the first great category of aërial beings. Many were consigned to Orcus, as already noted, and many to the grave; but others remained to hover round the tombs (*umbra*), or to be wafted aloft as the 'other-self' (*spiritus*), and fill the aërial spaces with good and evil genii. (For these distinctions between the personal soul and the other associated entities, see art. ETHNOLOGY, § 9).

Here it should be noted that the *umbra*—the human shadow—was originally regarded as a distinct being, and the belief still survives, even amongst cultured peoples, as in the English saying, 'No man can escape from his shadow.' So also Lucian: 'They [the shadows], when we die, become accusers and witnesses against us, and convictors of crimes perpetrated during life, and they have the reputation of being exceedingly trustworthy, since they are always associated with and never separated from our bodies' (*Menippus, or the Oracle of the Dead* in H. Williams' *Lucian*, p. 273).

Naturally these arbiters of human destinies eventually received divine honours, although it was found impossible to assign any fixed abodes either to them or to the other spirits of the air belonging to the first category, that is, those representing departed souls and their concomitants. They are, however, very numerous, and the Talmudists, who have taken the trouble of counting them, find that the bad ones (only about 7,406,000) are vastly outnumbered by the good, who are roughly estimated at 1 quadrillion, 64 trillions, and 340 billions.

If not so numerous, the aërial gods belonging to the second category, *i.e.* those derived directly from the air itself, may be regarded as by far the more important of the two classes. These may, by contra-distinction, be called the Wind-gods in a pre-eminent sense, and among them must be included the winds themselves. Thus the very

first of the six groups mentioned by Epicharmos are the winds: Ὁ μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναι λέγει ἀνέμους, ὕδωρ, γῆν, ἥλιον, πῦρ, ἀστέρας (Stobæus, *Floril.* xci. 29), and the deification of the four quarters whence blew the chief winds formed the very basis of the religious systems of many primitive peoples.

This was specially the case in the New World, wheret he Virginian Algonquians had only five gods, and of these four were the 'Four Winds which keep the four corners of the earth' (see art. AMERICA). Constant reference is made to these four deities of the cardinal points, the fundamental idea being that they are the props of the universe, controllers of the seasons and the weather, and senders of rain and sunshine, on whom, in fact, all good and evil things depended. Hence in *Hiawatha* (xiv):

> 'Gitche Manito the Mighty,
> He, the Master of Life, was painted
> As an egg, with points projecting
> To the four winds of the heavens';

and to him is opposed

> 'Mitche Manito the Mighty,
> He the dreadful Spirit of Evil,' etc.

Ratzel, a leading authority on these questions, remarks comprehensively that 'in the place held by the winds among the precursors of creation, based upón the association between breath (or soul) and wind, the pervading sanctity of the number four in the quarters of the heaven, and generally the elements of astronomy and meteorology are alike conspicuous. The Winnebagoes [a Siouan people] say that the Great Spirit created four men and one woman, and that the former created the four winds, the latter the earth. Everywhere they are among the beneficent creative spirits, and often they precede in time even sun, moon, and stars. As to the sun, so also to the four quarters of the world, tobacco is offered from the sacred pipe. The winds, as messengers of the sun, who bring rain, growth, and refreshment, have their share of veneration next after the moon. We further meet with four servants of the Mexican Air- and Sun-god (Quetzalcoatl), four supporters of the earth, who survived the deluge, four corners of the world—whence the Sioux get their pipe of council, four brothers who produced the floor [read vault, sky]—as in the Arawak legend, and so forth. Hence was developed the universal notion of the sanctity of four and its multiples, and hence the cross on American monuments' (*Hist. of Mankind*, ii. p. 146). In their creation legend the Hare Amerinds, members of the Athapascan family, tell us how the Father dwells overhead, and the Mother underfoot, while the Sun moves up and down in mid-air between them, and thus becomes an aërial god. One day, during his wanderings in the heavens, he noticed the earth, a mere islet lost in boundless space, and thereupon cried out: 'O my father on high, kindle thy heavenly fire for my brothers on that little island who have long been unhappy. Look on them, father, and take pity on men.' Then the sun became the day-star, and gladdened the sight of mortals. Amongst other Amerinds the encompassing air is peopled, not by pure spirits, but by disembodied souls, which flit about, for example, above the Chiloe Islands, while in French Guiana the Rucuyenne Caribs send the good to the haven of bliss and envelop the wicked in the clouds as in a kind of purgatory.

In the myths and traditions of the Hopi (Moqui) Pueblos, leading parts are played by the great cloud-god Cotokinuñwû, who dwells in the firmament, and by the four quarters, which have their animal embodiments—Puma, Bear, Wildcat, and Wolf—for N., W., S., and E., with the corresponding colours, yellow, green or blue, red, and white for the several cloud-gods. Thus, in the myth of the Maiden and the Coyote, the Yellow Cloud Chief, the Blue Cloud Chief, the Red Cloud Chief, and the White Cloud Chief try, each in his turn, to win the heroine of the story, but all without success (H. R. Voth, *The Traditions of the Hopi*, p. 157).

But it was in Mexico and Central America, where astronomic lore had made such marked progress, that these notions acquired their greatest expansion and almost formed the very framework of the more advanced religious systems. Everywhere the *teocalli* (temples always erected on pyramids) faced the four cardinal points which supported the heavens; in the Aztec cosmology one of the four cataclysms was caused by the air; and Orozco y Berra identifies Quetzalcoatl himself with *el dios de los vientos* ('the god of the winds'), since he was often represented as moving through the air laden with a wind-bag which was always inflated with destructive gales, and he was born of the cloud-snake Mixcoatl, or at least of his consort Coatlicue—she of the 'snake-robe.'

To Quetzalcoatl corresponds the Kukulcan of the Mayas, a universal deity of many functions, enthroned on the clouds of heaven and on the cross-shaped tree of the four points of the compass, also figured in the pictorial codices as dwelling in the air, above rain, storm, and the death-bringing clouds from which the lightning falls. He is associated, too, with the four colours—yellow, red, white, and black—which, as in the Hopi myth (see above), though in a different way, correspond to the cardinal points—yellow, air; red, fire; white, water; black, earth. 'Kukulcan,' writes Dr. P. Schellhas, 'is represented with all the *four cardinal points*; he appears as ruler of all the points of the compass; north, south, east, and west, as well as air, fire, water, and earth are subject to him' (*Deities of the Maya MSS*, p. 17). Here we see the interminglings of divers functions and provinces above referred to. It may be added that Kukulcan shares his many-sidedness with three other Maya gods, one unnamed who is connected with the symbolic colours of the cardinal points, a second the war-god, of frequent occurrence in the codices, and a third identified by Förstemann with a storm-deity, whose features are intended to symbolize the blast of the tempest. Thus each of the four winds would appear to have been originally deified, or presided over by divinities whose functions and ethereal realms afterwards became confused.

Lastly, the Cakchiquels, one of the most cultured Maya-Quiché nations of Guatemala, paid special homage to the four wind-gods, to whom even human sacrifices were offered. 'Sanchēz y Leon states that the most usual sacrifice was a child. The heart was taken out, and the blood was sprinkled toward the four cardinal points, as an act of adoration to the Four Winds, copal being burned at the same time as an incense' (*Historia de Guatemala*, quoted by Brinton in the *Annals of the Cakchiquels*, p. 45).

In Madagascar the Four Winds are, or were, fully recognized, and, as amongst the northern Amerinds, worshipped in their order next after the supreme deity. Little is now heard of them, and they are scarcely mentioned in the missionary records; but in Robert Drury's time (early in the 18th cent.) they were invoked in all solemn oaths, thus: 'I swear by the great God above, by the Four Gods of the Four Quarters of the World, by the Spirits of my Forefathers, that,' etc. (*Journal*, p. 103 of Oliver's ed.). And Drury tells us that at their meals the people 'take a bit of meat and throw it over their heads, saying, "There's a bit for the Spirit." Then they cut four more little bits, and throw to the lords of the four quarters of the earth' (*ib.* p. 280).

It is, however, to be noted that this belief may have been introduced by the later (Hova) immigrants from Malaysia, where the worship of the wind-gods had long been established under Hindu influences. In the island of Bali, east of Java, where alone Brāhmanism and Buddhism still persist, the four have expanded, as later in Greece (Aristotle, *Meteorologia*), to eight, that is, the eight gods or demi-gods of the Rāmāyana — Indra, Yama, Sūrya (for Nirriti), Chandra (for Ishāni), Anila, Kubera, Varuna, and Agni. Of these, however, only three — Indra, Yama, and Varuna —are still worshipped, and these as forms of Śiva, and since in Bali the worship of Śiva has in a way absorbed that of all the other gods of the Hindu pantheon, the eight cardinal points themselves are now also attributed to corresponding forms of Śiva. Of the three specially mentioned, Indra has been raised to the heights of Olympus, just as Jupiter has become a chthonic and katachthonic god (see above). Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to regard Indra as the supreme object of adoration in the Vedic system, and he still remains a true rain and air god with his cortège of maruts and storm devas, since his heaven (Indraloka or Svarga) lies beneath that of Viṣnu, and Viṣnu's beneath that of Śiva, where at last the soul attains repose and release from transmigration. In fact, Svarga still has earth contacts athwart the empyrean; its inhabitants are liable to become mortal again, and Indra himself is only the prince of these devas, who need the *amṛta* (ambrosia) to keep them alive, yet may still be attacked and vanquished by demons, or by ascetics who acquire supernatural power by self-mortification.

In North Celebes the four wind-gods are held in honour, and play a great part in the local cosmogonies.

Lumimuüt, mother of mankind, met the rock-born priestess Kareima, who ordered her to turn her face to the south. 'While she did this the priestess prayed, "O Cause of the East Wind, fertilize this woman." Lumimuüt, however, perceived nothing. Then, on the command of the priestess, she turned to the east, to the north, and finally to the west, and each time the priestess prayed that the deity of the wind would fertilize her. Her prayer was answered, and Lumimuüt by the god of the west wind begat a son named Toar. When Toar grew up, Kareima took two sticks, one of the plant called *tuis* and one of the plant called *assa*, and cutting them of the same length gave one (tuis) to Lumimuüt and one (assa) to Toar, saying, "See, here are two sticks of the same length. Go you, Lumimuüt, to the right, and you, Toar, to the left, and whenever you meet any one measure sticks. Then if they are of the same length you are mother and son, but if one is longer than the other come to me immediately at the centre of the earth."' Both went on their way, but after a time Lumimuüt and Toar met without knowing one another, and on measuring sticks they found that Lumimuüt's was longer than Toar's, for the tuis stick had sprouted out and grown. Thereupon they returned to Kareima, and when she had measured the sticks she said, 'You are not mother and son, therefore you must become man and wife. Be fruitful and populate the earth.' So Lumimuüt and Toar begat many children, twice nine, three times seven, and once three. The three are the Pasijowan, of whom one was the priest at Warendukan *in the air*; from the other two the people of Minahassa [North Celebes] trace their descent. This legend of the origin of the earth and its people is full of interest to the student of cosmologies. The story of the conception of Lumimuüt by the god of the West Wind exhibits traces of the very common myth of the marriage of Heaven and Earth. Lumimuüt is the earth goddess, the fruitful mother of all things; the West Wind is the one which brings the rain and fertilizes the earth (S. J. Hickson, *A Naturalist in North Celebes*, p. 241).

In Celebes, besides the four wind-gods, there are numerous aërial beings, which are somewhat vaguely described as 'free wandering spiritual forms of various ranks, powers, and capabilities for good or evil.' These are distinguished from the spirits by which certain trees, rocks, waterfalls, and other objects are supposed to be animated, and, as 'the religion of the Minahassers was a differentiated form of Animism' (*ib.* p. 247), it may be conjectured that the wandering forms are believed to be disembodied souls of the dead rather than spirits derived directly from the air. This view is strengthened by the further statement that the spiritual world is inhabited by the souls of deceased chiefs, who live for ever 'in the form of wandering ghosts haunting the scenes of their former triumphs and experiences. They believed in a series of ancestral ghosts of the rank of first-class gods, and in a crowd of lesser deities, protecting spirits and demons' (*ib.* p. 248). And as all alike were called *Empung*, the generic name for the gods, but literally meaning a 'grandfather' (cf. the African *Munkulunkulu*, which has the same meaning), it is obvious that ancestor-worship prevailed over pure psycholatry in Celebes, and that the ancestral spirits dwelt to a great extent in the ethereal regions. In fact, four heavenly villages were expressly set apart as their residence, and these villages—Kasosoran, Kalawakan, Kasendukan, and Karondoran—were so contiguous to the earth that formerly the empungs would often return and mingle with mortals, rich blessings ever following in their footsteps. In these celestial villages rice was grown, and it was from this source that the cereal now thriving in Minahassa was orginally procured.

Now, the return of the departed spirits is dreaded, and at funerals the relatives blacken each others' faces with charcoal. This custom is called *mahawuwuringan*, and the object is to prevent any recognition by the ghosts who may be hovering about the graves or returning to their former abodes. Obviously for the same reason black peoples, such as the Australians and Andamanese, often try to disguise themselves by daubing their faces with white bands or patches, and white is the mourning colour in China. On this subject Hickson aptly remarks that 'whatever they may be intended to express in civilized communities, there can be little doubt that the customary suits of solemn black originated, not in grief or respect for the departed friend, but in the fear of his returning spirit. At the funeral the priest drives it away with a sword, and the maiden who sits upon the bier [in Minahassa] frightens it by the sound of bells. Then everything is done to confuse the spirit if it attempts to return to its accustomed haunts. The ghost is always supposed to come back to the house by the same route by which the corpse was taken away. We can see the reason, then, why the corpse is let down through a hole in the floor and carried three times round the house before being conveyed to the grave. The spirit is so much more perplexed in finding its way back home by this circuitous route. Then, again, the nearest relatives do not attend the funeral, in order that the ghost, if it is hovering around, may not suspect that it is its own funeral that is taking place. Care must be taken, too, that if the spirit should return to the house, it should not recognize the inmates. The friends and relatives, therefore, disguise themselves by painting their faces black [the Minahassers are Indonesians of a light brown or cinnamon colour], by wearing black hats, leaving their hair loose and unkempt, and in other ways. It must not be supposed that black is the universal mourning colour. Among white and fair-skinned people it naturally is, because it affords them the most effectual disguise. Among the black-skinned Andamanese white is the mourning colour. They paint themselves with stripes of white paint. The Spaniards at the time of the conquest of the Philippines found that many of the inhabitants used white as a mourning colour. Many of the races of Luzon and the Sulu islands use white to the present day for this purpose' (*op. cit.* p. 299).

Another curious survival—the almost universal custom of whistling for the wind—finds its explanation in the belief of the Minahassers that the souls of the living as well as of the dead may at times take refuge in the surrounding atmosphere. This

is especially the case with sick people, whose ailments are supposed to be caused by their spirits leaving the body and fluttering about somewhere in the neighbourhood. Then the *walian* (priest or shaman) is sent for to diagnose the patient, while all his friends go out to the fields and villages to look for his soul. They make a fire in a likely spot, and entice the spirit back by cooking rice and chicken, or by whistling and calling as they would for a dog, whilst the priest goes through the list of gods and gives the ceremony a religious character. This goes on for some time; a rich patient who can afford many chickens has usually to wait a longer time for his spirit to return than a poor one. At last the walian sees it! It shows itself clearly here or there by a movement in the grass or by some other sign. The walian advances with the greatest caution, and catches it in a sarong [the broad Malay cloth worn as a wrap], just as a schoolboy catches a butterfly in his hat. They now turn homewards; a child leads the way, carrying a woka leaf (*Livistonia*) to prevent the priest and spirit from getting wet; the priest follows, carrying the spirit in the sarong, and then another priest armed with *sago-sago* and *mumu* [swords and sticks], which he swings backwards and forwards to keep away the spiteful *sakits* [demons of the air] who wish to recapture the patient's spirit. When they have reached the chamber, the priest opens the sarong over the head of the patient, and says with great satisfaction and assurance, "Now is your soul returned." This being done, the patient should get well again, but if he does not, it is a sign that his time has come, and his spirit can no longer be retained' (*ib.* p. 295). Thus we see that whistling for the wind, still practised by all seafaring peoples, from the English captain to the Malay skipper, originally meant whistling for the truant souls lurking in the wind. Innumerable other survivals, could they be traced to their source, would also be found to be deeply rooted in the superstitious beliefs of primitive man.

Nowhere can this be seen better than in China, where the aërial spaces still swarm with countless good and evil spirits, the belief in which has influenced the development of the very arts, especially of architecture. The fundamental notion is that the good spirits move through the air in curved, the bad in straight, lines. Hence the former are welcomed, the latter baffled by the curved form given to the roofs of the houses, pagodas, gateways, and all other conspicuous structures. For the same reason, no straight highways can be laid down, and partly on this ground great objections were for years raised against the development of railway enterprise. The danger of desecrating the ancestral graves was also urged; but both difficulties were overcome when it was pointed out that the burial-places could be avoided by cleverly designed curves, and that these curves would at the same time serve to thwart the wicked and encourage the beneficent genii.

So also in Korea the air is infested by many malevolent beings, such as the smallpox devil, the typhus devil, and the cholera devil. As after death some of these might again enter the corpse and revive it to kill the living, they are scared off by the vigorous beating of gongs, drums, pots and cans, which is kept up incessantly for three days and nights after the funeral. These demons always travel on the north wind, and the good spirits on the south wind. Hence the graves are usually situated on the sunny slopes of a hill, whither all good influences are wafted on the balmy southern breeze. The family vaults of the better classes are also sheltered from the evil spirits by horseshoe-shaped mounds turned northwards, that is, towards the quarter whence come the demons riding on the icy arctic blasts. Here again we seem to divine why the horseshoe is still a lucky object even among the cultured peoples of the West, where it is nailed to the stable door to protect the farmyard from evil influences. Originally there were no horseshoes; hence it was not the shoe itself, but its peculiar shape, that was regarded as propitious, because earthworks so constructed may have been thought favourable to the good and adverse to the evil genii.

That the demons of epidemics wander about in mid-air is a belief not confined to Korea, but pervading the religious thought of the whole Eastern world. To the Chins of Upper Burma cholera and smallpox are real devils who 'hover through the fog and filthy air,' and when some of the tribe visited Rangoon in 1895 they carried their *dahs* (knives) unsheathed to scare off the pestilent *nat*, and passed the day hiding under bushes to escape its notice. Some even wanted to pacify it by the sacrifice of a slave boy, but were talked over to substitute a few pariah dogs (Carey and Tuck, *The Chin Hills*, i. *passim*). So also in India, the belief in the same cholera and smallpox demons, who 'are supposed to be always wandering about in mid-air' (*Census Report* for 1901), is almost universal amongst the Kolarian and Dravidian aborigines. For details the reader must be referred to art. ASIA.

In Greece the four chief winds were known to Homer, who in the *Iliad* groups them in pairs (Εὖρός τε Νότος τε, ii. 145; Βορρῆς καὶ Ζέφυρος, ix. 5), and in the *Od.* (v. 295–296) mentions them consecutively:—

Σὺν δ' Εὖρός τε Νότος τ' ἔπεσον Ζέφυρός τε δυσαὴς
Καὶ Βορέης αἰθριγενέτης, μέγα κῦμα κυλίνδων.

Here all are personified poetically, but not yet deified, unless the 'ether-born' Boreas is already to be taken as an air-god. Even their king Æolus is still only the 'friend of the gods,' as in *Od.* x. 2:—

Αἴολος Ἱπποτάδης, φίλος ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν

whereas in the *Æneid* he is enthroned amongst the Immortals ('celsa sedet Æolus arce, sceptra tenens,' i. 56–57), although still subordinate to Neptune ('Non illi imperium pelagi, sævumque tridentem, sed mihi, sorte datum,' i. 138–139). But in the interval between Homer and Virgil the rich Hellenic mythology was developed, and then, of course, divine or semi-divine origins and genealogies were discovered for all the winds personified by Homer. Thus Herodotus tells us (vii. 189) that by his marriage with Oreithyia, daughter of their (legendary) king Erechtheus, the Athenians claimed kinship with Boreas, and that they invoked and offered sacrifices both to him and to his consort (ἔθυόν τε καὶ ἐπεκαλέοντο τόν τε Βορῆν καὶ τὴν Ὠρειθυίην). Another highly honoured wind-god was balmy *Zephyrus*, bearer of fruits and flowers, who, with *Notus* and others, was born of the Titan Astræus and the goddess Eos (Aurora). To Zephyrus the Athenians raised a temple, where his effigy was that of a gentle winged youth wreathed in flowers. Later, under the discriminating analysis of Aristotle, the four became eight and even twelve (*Meteorol.* 2–9). Of the last four little is afterwards heard; but the eight appear to have retained their rank as air-gods at Athens, where was raised to them the still existing octagonal Horologium of Antonius Cyrrhestes, popularly known as the 'Temple of the Winds.' On each of the eight walls a bas-relief symbolizes the wind which it faces, and 'an additional element of interest is supplied by the dress and accompaniments of these figures, by which the character attributed by the Greeks to the winds which they represent is described. Boreas, for instance, is depicted as a bearded man of stern aspect, richly clad and wearing strong buskins, and he blows a conch shell as a sign of his tempestuous character. Cæcias, another cold and inclement wind, carries a shield, the lower part of which is full of hailstones. Notus, the most rainy wind, holds an inverted urn, the whole contents of which he is pouring out upon the earth. Zephyrus, on the other hand, who is the

harbinger of spring, appears as a graceful youth, almost unclothed, with the fold of his robe filled with flowers' (H. F. Tozer, *Hist. of Anc. Geography*, p. 195).

Italy also had its complete category of wind-gods, quite independently of the Greek, as shown by their old Italic names, such as *Corus, Aquilo, Auster*, and *Favonius*. To Zephyrus corresponded Favonius, of whom Horace sings (*Od.* I. iv. 1) that

'Solvitur acris hiemps grata vice veris et Favoni,'

and whom Plautus contrasts with 'rainy Auster': 'Hic Favonius serenu'st, istic auster imbricus: hic facit tranquillitatem, iste omnis fluctus conciet' (*Mercator*, v. ii. 35, 36). From this we see that Auster answers to the Greek Notus, while Virgil makes it equally clear that Aquilo represents Boreas, as in *Geor.* iii. 196—

'Qualis Hyperboreis Aquilo cum densus ab oris
Incubuit, Scythiaeque hiemes atque arida differt Nubila.'

It may here be stated that in Italy, as in Greece, Olympian Jove himself had at an early date extended his sway to the earth, or rather to the nether world. Of Umbrian, a sister language of Latin, some lengthy liturgical texts survive on the seven *Tabulæ Iguvinæ* found in 1444 at Gubbio, where they are still preserved in the town-hall. On Tab. II., which may date from B.C. 500, the epithet *hunte* is twice applied to Jove (*Hunte Iuvie ampentu*, l. 21; and *Hunte Iuvie vestikatu*, l. 35), and this epithet, being clearly connected with *hondra* = infra, means 'Infernus,' so that Hunte Iuvie answers exactly to the Homeric *Ζεὺς καταχθόνιος*. With this compare the stem *huntro-*, which in Oscan, another sister tongue, means *inferus*, leaving no doubt as to the force of Hunte (*The Curse of Vibia*, l. 11 in R. S. Conway's *Italic Dialects*, i. p. 127).

A few miscellaneous references may now be given to complete the subject, and show how thickly primitive peoples packed the encompassing atmosphere with gods, demons, and spirits of all kinds. These are nowhere more numerous and varied than in Arabia and surrounding lands, where the most dreaded are the ghouls (properly غول = *ghul*), who, however, are denizens not so much of the air as of woods and deserts. They assume divers shapes and colours, and show a certain kinship with both the wer-wolf and the vampire, being supposed to devour men, animals, and dead bodies. These ghouls range through Persia and Muslim India into the Malay lands, where there is a special 'storm fiend who rides the whirlwind,' and also 'a vile fiend called *penangalan* who takes possession of the forms of women, turns them into witches, and compels them to quit the greater part of their bodies, and fly away at night to gratify a vampire craving for human blood. This is very like one of the ghoul stories in the *Arabian Nights' Entertainments*' (Miss Bird, *The Golden Chersonese*, p. 354).

The other supernatural beings of the Arabs, and now generally of all Muslim peoples—Iblis 'Prince of Darkness,' the afrits, sheitāns, and the whole host of jinns—existed in pre-Muhammadan times, as is evident from Job 1[6], where הַשָּׂטָן is rendered ὁ διάβολος in LXX and *Satan* in the Vulgate. So universal was the belief in their existence, that they had to be admitted with modifications into the Muhammadan system, which recognizes three created intelligences under Allah—the angels formed of light, the jinns of subtle fire, and man of the dust of the earth. The jinns are commonly supposed to be mischievous goblins hostile to man. Some, no doubt, are wicked elves or demons, whose chief is the fallen angel Iblis. These reside in the lowest firmament, that is, the surrounding air, and haunt the caves, the wells, the woods, the hill-tops, and the wilderness. They have the power of putting on any form they please, but not grosser than the essence fire and smoke, and of thus making themselves visible to mortals. They may even take possession of living people, from whom they have then to be exorcised by charms and incantations. But others bear a good character, and frequent the habitations of man in a friendly way; they are addressed by him in kindly language; and they, too, in virtue of their subtle essence, pervade the solid mass of the earth and the whole space of the firmament. They are also believed to inhabit rivers, wells, ruined houses, ovens, and other places, and in letting down a bucket to a well, or in lighting a fire, the magic formula is pronounced, 'Permission, ye blessed' (Featherman, *Social Hist. of the Races of Mankind*, iv. p. 388). Jaffeer Shurreef, who speaks from personal knowledge, goes so far as to say that the belief of the Indian Muhammadans is that it is not a jinn, but a sheitān, who does evil deeds (*Moosulmans of India*, pp. 324–325). This, however, does not apply to Arabia, where the bad certainly predominate over the good genii, and where the above-quoted 'soft words' may be merely euphemistic. In any case, both classes belong to our second category, inasmuch as they are not of human origin but are directly created by Allah.

In general, witches and magicians, who have the power of assuming strange forms, everywhere infest the air as well as the land and water. In Aurora, Pentecost, and other Melanesian Islands, they fly about disguised as owls, eagles, or even blow-flies, and then they are most dangerous. 'In Lepers' Island the wizards who practise it [the magic art] are believed to have the power of changing their shape. The friends of any one suffering from sickness are always afraid lest the wizard who has caused the disease should come in some form, as of a blow-fly, and strike the patient; they sit with him, therefore, and use counter-charms to guard him, and drive carefully away all flies, lest his enemy should come in that form' (R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, p. 207). This observer mentions the case of Molitavile, a noted magician who turned himself into an eagle, or rather whose soul went out of him, and in this shape flew a long way after a ship which had carried off some natives of Lepers' Island, and in that way was able to tell their relatives what had become of them. He reported that all had fared well except one who had died. 'Long afterwards, when some of those who were then on board returned, they said that he had brought back the truth, one of them by that time had died' (*ib.* p. 208).

In Guiana, not only the sun and moon, but also the wind and storms are deified, or, it would be more correct to say, are 'humanized' by indwelling spirits of an essentially anthropomorphic type. 'On one occasion, during an eclipse of the sun, the Arawak men among whom I happened to be rushed from their houses with loud shouts and yells. They explained that a fight was going on between the sun and moon, and that they shouted to frighten and so part the combatants. In many other countries exactly this proceeding of making a noise to separate the sun-spirit and the moon-spirit, or the sun-god and the moon-god, has been noticed; and it is generally supposed that in such cases a high degree of authority is attributed to these spirits. But I see nothing in this or in anything else which shows that savages distinguish, by attributing greater authority to them, such beings as sun and moon, and very many other natural phenomena, as wind and storms, from men and other animals, plants and other inanimate objects, or from any other being whatsoever. All beings—and under this heading are included all personified natural phenomena—are, in fact, of the same kind, each with a body and a spirit. It is the old story—they differ from each other only in that some are more powerful than others in the mere matter of brute force, and none have any sort of authority over others' (E. im Thurn, *Among the Indians of Guiana*, p. 364). By the Brazilian Botocudos the air is well stocked with spirits, mostly of a malevolent disposition—thunder-gods, storm-gods, and the moon itself, the 'night-fire' (*toru-guenket*), which they look upon as a sort of evil principle. All baneful manifestations are attributed to the moon, which causes the thunderstorm, and is supposed at times itself to fall on the earth, crushing the hill-tops, flooding the plains, and destroying multitudes of people. During storms and eclipses arrows are shot upwards, not, as by the Caribs and Arawaks, to frighten the sun, the 'day-fire' (*toru-shompek*), which for the Botocudos is the beneficent principle of good, but to scare away the demons of the air, just as the Indo-Chinese wild tribes shoot skyward at the devouring dragon trying to swallow both sun and moon in the mid-day darkness (A. H. Keane, 'The Botocudos,' in *JAI*, Nov. 1883).

Among the Eskimos the air, usually reserved for departed souls, is replaced by the surrounding ice-fields as the chief abode of the hosts of wicked trolls and goblins. The Greenlander especially has a superstitious terror of the inland ice-cap. 'It is the home of his evil spirits, his ghosts, his apparitions and shades (*tarajuatsiak*), his trolls (*timersek* and *erkilik*), his ice-men who are supposed to be twice as tall as ordinary people, and a whole host of other supernatural beings' (Brögger and Rolfsen's *Fridtiof Nansen*, p. 130). In pagan times there were numerous *bugalak*, or good genii, whom the Western Greenlanders, since their conversion to Christianity, have degraded to evil spirits now inhabiting the lower regions of the atmosphere and the nether world, while Torngarsuk, the Great Spirit, has become the Christian Satan. Elsewhere the souls of the departed sometimes lead a restless existence in their aërial abodes, and during their hunting expeditions the Alaskan Eskimos often see phantoms gliding over the heights; these are the ghosts of the departed returning to scare or injure their living relatives. The people of the Barrow Point district are much troubled by such apparitions, as also by Kiolya, the demon of the aurora borealis, and by Tunya, the Eskimo Zeus, who, like his classical prototype, reigns in the earth, the water, and the heavens. This is one of those numerous instances of overlapping where it becomes impossible to distinguish clearly between chthonic, celestial, and air gods.

LITERATURE.—There appears to be no work specially devoted to the subject of this article. Hence the references must be to a few of the more important treatises in which incidental mention is made of the gods of the air. Such are—A. B. Cook, 'Zeus, Jupiter, and the Oak,' in *CR*, April 1903; Lucian, ed. Hemsterhuis and H. Williams; Stobæus, *Florilegium*; F. Ratzel, *Hist. of Mankind*, Eng. ed. 4 vols. 1897; H. R. Voth, *The Traditions of the Hopi*, 1905; P. Schellhas, *Deities of the Maya Manuscripts*, 1905; D. G. Brinton, *Annals of the Cakchiquels*, 1885; R. Drury, *Madagascar Journal*, etc., ed. P. Oliver, 1890; S. J. Hickson, *A Naturalist in North Celebes*, 1889; T. Belt, *A Naturalist in Nicaragua*, 1874; Brögger and Rolfsen, *Fridtiof Nansen*, 1896; R. Friedrich, 'Bali' in *Papers relating to Indo-China*, 1887; *Anales del Museo Nacional de Mexico*, 1900–1907; Carey and Tuck, *The Chin Hills*, etc. 1896; H. F. Tozer, *A Hist. of Anc. Geography*, 1897; R. S. Conway, *The Italic Dialects*, 2 vols. 1897; A. Featherman, *Social Hist. of the Races of Mankind*, 4 vols. 1885–1891; R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, 1885; E. im Thurn, *Among the Indians of Guiana*, 1883; A. H. Keane, *The Botocudos*, and *Man, Past and Present*, 1900; H. Rink, *The Eskimo Tribes*, 1887.

A. H. KEANE.

AIYANAR.—Among the most widely known and popular of the deities of the village, the *grāma-devatā*, of Southern India is Aiyanar, the tutelary god of the fields, who protects the crops from harm and drives off from them by night the evil spirits of blight and ruin. His name and worship seem to be little, if at all, known north of the Deccan. In the south, however, almost every village has its shrine dedicated to Aiyanar, where offerings are presented and prayers made for the safety of the crops from drought and disease. Grouped around the shrine, and near the village, are usually to be found rude models in terra-cotta of horses, often life-size, or more rarely of elephants, on which Aiyanar with his troop of attendants is supposed to ride when in mad career he chases away the demons. The Indian villager avoids approaching the shrine of Aiyanar after dark, lest he should be mistaken for a demon and slain.

The god is represented roughly carved in human form, either seated with crown and sceptre, or on horseback, and is sometimes accompanied by his two wives, Pūraṇī and Pudkalā, who join him in the rout of the evil spirits. He is also propitiated in times of distress or pestilence, when animal sacrifices are offered on rude stone altars in front of the shrine and libations are poured out. The priests who officiate belong invariably to the lowest castes. The clay models of the horses are presented by the villagers in acknowledgment of aid rendered, as thank-offerings for recovery from sickness, or in fulfilment of a vow. Except, however, at harvest-time, there do not seem to be any regular festivals held in his honour, or any definite periods of worship prescribed. Sir Monier Williams' account of his visit to Aiyanar's shrine at Parmagudi, on the road from Madura to Rāmnād, may serve in general as a description which would apply to the majority of the places sacred to the god in Southern India.

> The shrine 'was situated close to a grove of small trees not far from the village. Under a rough stone canopy was a rudely-carved stone male idol. . . . About twenty-five toy-like terra-cotta horses, some as large as life, were ranged on each side. . . . I saw no signs of any recent offerings, nor was a single worshipper of the god to be seen anywhere. I noticed, indeed, that all the shrines of A. had a deserted appearance, the fact being that he is never worshipped, in our sense of the word. He is only propitiated in emergencies. Every year after harvest-time a festival is kept in his honour, when numerous animals are sacrificed, and images of the god are decorated with ornaments, and drawn about through the village streets on the rude clay horses' (*Brāhmanism and Hinduism*[4], p. 219 *f.*).

The name *Aiyanar* is said to be a combination or corruption of the two names *Hari-Hara*, or Viṣṇu-Śiva; and the god is popularly regarded as the son of Śiva by Viṣṇu, when the latter had assumed a female form. It is more probable, however, that he represents a primitive Dravidian deity, recognized and more or less adopted by the incoming Āryans, and provided with an orthodox parentage. A figure of Ganeśa, one of the other two sons of Śiva, sometimes stands near his shrine. But, unlike his brother, Aiyanar does not seem ever to be invoked in the strict sense of the term, or to have prayers addressed to him for blessing or positive good.

LITERATURE.—Papers on Religious Reform, I. *Popular Hinduism*, Madras, 1887, p. 8*f.*; Monier Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hinduism*[4], London, 1891, pp. 209, 218–220, 245; W. Crooke, *Popular Religion and Folk-lore of Northern India*, new edition, 1896, vol. i. pp. 97, 262, quoting from Oppert, 'Original Inhabitants,' p. 505.

A. S. GEDEN.

AJANTA.—Ajanta is the Anglo-Indian form of the native name Ājūṇṭhā, a village and ravine celebrated for its cave temples, situated in N. lat. 20° 32′ 30″, E. long. 75° 48′, near the frontier of the British province of Berār, but within the dominions of the Nizām of Hyderābād. It lies at the head of one of the passes (*ghāṭ*) that lead down from the Indhyādrī hills, dividing the table-land of the Deccan from the British district of Khāndesh in the valley of the Tāptī. The only early reference to the caves is that of the Buddhist pilgrim Hiuen-Tsiang, or as Watters, the latest translator and editor of his journal, transliterates his name, Yüan Chwâng. He writes, speaking of the kingdom of Mo-ha-la-cha (Mahāraṭṭha): 'In the east of this country was a mountain range, ridges one above another in succession, tiers of peaks and sheer summits. Here was a monastery, the base of which was in a dark defile, and its lofty halls were quarried in the cliff and rested on the peak, its tiers of halls and storied terraces had the cliff on their back, and faced the ravine. This monastery had been built by the A-chē-lo (Āchāra [or perhaps rather Achala]) of Western India.' The pilgrim then relates the circumstances in Āchāra's life which led to the building of the monastery. 'Within the establishment,' he adds, 'was a large temple above 100 feet high, in which was a stone image of the Buddha above 70 feet high; the image was surmounted by a tier of seven canopies unattached and unsupported, each canopy separated from the one above it by the space of 3 feet. The walls of this temple had depicted upon them the incidents of the Buddha's career as Bodhisattva, including the circumstances of his attaining Bodhi, and the omens attending his final passing away; all, great and small, were here delineated. Outside the gate of the monastery, on either side north and

south, was a stone elephant, and the pilgrim was informed that the bellowing of these elephants caused earthquakes' (Watters, ii. 239 f.).

Burgess and other authorities believe that this account, dated A.D. 642, refers to the Ajanta caves. Watters admits that this view is probable, but he doubts whether the Achala of the inscription recorded by Burgess is the A-chē-lo of the pilgrim's narrative. This inscription merely states that 'the ascetic Sthavira Achala, who glorified the faith and was grateful, caused to be built a mountain-dwelling for the Teacher, though his wishes were fulfilled.'

The place was visited for the first time by Europeans in 1819, and the earliest account of its monuments, by Alexander, appeared ten years later (*Trans. R. A. S.* 1829). The first scientific survey was made by Fergusson, and appeared in the same journal in 1843. His account of the wall-paintings aroused much interest, and led to an appeal to the Indian Government that careful copies of them should be made. This was done by Major R. Gill; but his drawings, except the five last executed, were unfortunately destroyed in a fire at the Crystal Palace, where they were being exhibited, in 1866. All that remains of his work now seems to be small copies, in Mrs. Spiers' *Ancient India*, of two of his pictures and of eight detached fragments from others. In 1872 the work of copying the frescoes was started afresh by Griffith, and his work, in two splendid volumes, was published by the Secretary of State for India in 1896–97.

The caves are excavated in the face of an almost perpendicular rocky scarp, about 250 feet high, sweeping round in a semicircle, and forming the north side of a wild glen traversed by a small stream, the Vāghur. Above the caves the valley terminates abruptly at a waterfall with seven leaps, the total height being about 200 feet. The site is lonely and picturesque, and, at the same time, close to a main line of ancient traffic, thus combining the three leading characteristics which guided the excavators of the rock caves of Western India in selecting places for their establishments.

The series consists of 24 monasteries (*vihāra*) and 5 temples or meeting-halls (*chaitya*) According to Burgess, who has made a careful survey and compiled an exhaustive report on the caves (*Arch. Survey Reports, W. India*, iv. 43 ff.), the earliest group consists of two Chaitya caves (numbered IX., X., according to Fergusson's plan of the site) and two Vihāras (XI., XII.), all of which were excavated certainly before the commencement of the Christian era. Of the later caves, Burgess forms two groups. Nine (VI., VII., VIII., XV. to XX.) range in date from the 5th to the end of the 6th cent. A.D. The second group (I. to V., XXI. to XXVII.) were all excavated, or at least finished, within the limits of the 7th century. This second, and by far the largest, series belongs to the Mahāyāna school of Buddhism, and can be distinctly marked off from those of the earlier group. Cave No. I. is specially to be noted. Burgess describes it as the most handsomely ornamented Vihāra at Ajanta, or, indeed, in all India, and at the same time it is one of the most modern, having been constructed probably in the beginning of the 7th cent., and not completely finished before A.D. 650.

The most interesting and valuable of the remains at Ajanta are the series of frescoes in the caves. These generally represent passages from the legendary history of Buddha, and from the Jātakas, or stories of the Buddha's former births, the visit of Asita to the infant Buddha, his temptation by Māra and his forces, legends of the Nāgas, or serpent race, hunting scenes, battle pieces, the carrying of the relics to Ceylon, and other incidents in the Buddhist legend. Many of the frescoes represent incidents taken from the Jātakas, of which some twelve have been identified by S. F. Oldenburg (*Journ. American Oriental Society*, xvii. 183 f.; *JRAS*, 1896, p. 324). Of these, perhaps the most important are the Ummadantī Jātaka of king Sibi or Sivi (Cowell's Cambridge trans. v. 107 ff.) and the Chaddanta Jātaka, or tale of the six-tusked elephant (*ib.* v. 20 ff.). A recent discovery in one of these caves has brought to light a picture which depicts the Nidānas, or Causes, in concrete form. This picture, supplemented by Tibetan versions and Lamaistic explanations, is certainly a diagram of human life in the form of the wheel (Waddell, *JRAS*, 1894, p. 367; *Buddhism of Tibet*, 105 ff.). In the mountain scenery of the frescoes are depicted figures of birds and monkeys, and sometimes of Bhils and other forest tribes, and the fabled inhabitants of the hills—Guhyakas, Kirātas, and Kinnaras, the last of whom are musicians to the mountain gods, with human busts and legs and tails of birds. The whole series of frescoes is of the greatest historical value as illustrating the religious and social life of India between the 3rd and 8th cents. of the Christian era.

All critics have fully recognized the artistic value of these frescoes. 'The condition of mind,' writes Griffith (in Burgess, *Notes*, 4 f.), 'which originated and executed these paintings at Ajanta must have been very similar to that which produced the early Italian paintings of the 14th cent., as we find much that is common to both. Little attention paid to the science of art—a general crowding of figures into a subject; regard being had more to the truthful rendering of a story than to a beautiful rendering of it; not that they discarded beauty, but they did not make it the primary motive for representation. There is a want of aërial perspective, the parts are delicately shaded, not forced by light and shade, giving the whole a look of flatness, a quality to be desired in mural decoration. Whoever were the authors of these paintings, they must have constantly mixed with the world. Scenes of everyday life, such as preparing food, carrying water, buying and selling, processions, hunting scenes, elephant fights, men and women engaged in singing, dancing, and playing on musical instruments. Many are most gracefully, and all most graphically depicted upon these walls; and they could only have been done by men who were constant spectators of such scenes; by men of keen observation and retentive memories.' Of the famous painting of the 'Dying Princess,' in cave XVI., the same authority writes: 'For pathos and sentiment and the unmistakable way of telling its story, this picture, I consider, cannot be surpassed in the history of art. The Florentine could have put better drawing, and the Venetian better colour, but neither could have thrown greater expression into it' (*ib.* 58 f.).

In many of the paintings there is ample evidence of Sasanian or Persian influence. One wall scene (Griffith's drawing No. 5) appears to represent the reception of a Persian embassy at the Court of an Indian king, and, according to Burgess (*ib.* 27), can hardly be earlier than the 7th cent. of our era.

LITERATURE.—The literature dealing with the Ajanta caves and their wall-paintings is very extensive. References to the older accounts of travellers and the comments of critics upon their narratives have been collected by Campbell, *Bombay Gazetteer*, xii. 480, where a good account of the site will be found. The later and better authorities are: J. Burgess, *Notes on the Bauddha Rock-Temples of Ajanta*, Bombay, 1879, in *Archæological Survey of Western India*, No. ix.; J. Fergusson and J. Burgess, *The Cave Temples of India*, London, 1880, pp. 280–347; J. Burgess and Bhagwanlal Indraji, *Inscriptions from the Cave-Temples of Western India*, Bombay, 1881; J. Burgess, *Report on the Cave-Temples and their Inscriptions*, London, 1883; L. A. Waddell, 'Note on the Ajanta Paintings' in *Indian Antiquary*, xxii. 8 ff. The wall-paintings are reproduced by J. Griffith, *The Paintings in the Buddhist Cave-Temples of Ajanta, Khandesh*, 2 vols., London, 1896–97.

W. CROOKE.

ĀJĪVIKAS.*

[A. F. R. Hoernle].

1. Introduction.—The sacred books, both of the Buddhists (*e.g. A.N.* iii. 276; *Dial.* pp. 71, 220) and the Jains, inform us of the existence, contemporary with the foundation of Buddhism and Jainism, about the end of the 6th cent. B.C., of a community of religious mendicants, whom they call Ājīvikas. From certain Jain Scriptures we further learn that the founder of this community was a man called Gosāla Maṅkhali-putta (Pāli *Makkhali-putta*, Skr. *Maskari-putra*). In the seventh Aṅga (*U.D.* ii. 133), a man, Saddāla-putta, is said to have been received by Gosāla into the Ājīvika community, and the *Bhagavatī Sūtra*, the fifth Aṅga, gives us an account of the life of Gosāla, as the acknowledged head of that community. Though the Buddhist Scriptures (*e.g. M.N.* i. 198, 250, 515; *S.N.* i. 68, iv. 398; *D.N.* i. 52; *Jāt.* v. 246) also frequently mention Gosāla Makkhali-putta as one of the leaders of the six religious mendicant communities whom Buddha singles out for special animadversion, they never explicitly connect him with the Ājīvikas, or state that he was their leader. But that on this point the Buddhist tradition did not really differ from the Jain, is shown by the fact that both attribute to him the holding of the religio-philosophical doctrine of the negation of free will and moral responsibility.

On the exact signification of the name 'Ājīvika' we have no information. The Skr. word *ājīva* means the mode of life, or profession, of any particular class of people, whether they live as 'householders' in the world or, as religious mendicants, have renounced the world. Thus 'right-livelihood' (*samyag-ājīva*) was in the Buddhist system (*Dial.* 221; *B.S.* 147; O.B. 146) one of the eight 'paths' incumbent on the mendicant. The word *ājīvika*, being a derivative of *ājīva*, means one who observes the mode of living appropriate to his class. We shall see in the sequel that there is some ground for believing that Gosāla held peculiar views as to the *ājīva* of a mendicant who was truly liberated from the fetters of *karma*. It was probably for this reason that he and his adherents came to be known as *Ājīvikas*, or the men who held the peculiar doctrine of *ājīva*. All the indications that we have tend to show that, as usual in such cases, the name was not taken by themselves, but given to them by their opponents, and that in their mouth it was meant to be opprobrious. As we shall see, Gosāla, by his conduct, laid himself open to the charge of insincerity, in that he practised religious mendicancy, not as a means of salvation (*mokṣa*), but as a means of gaining a livelihood, as a mere profession (*ājīva*). The name 'Ājīvika,' it appears, was originally meant to stigmatize Gosāla and his followers as 'professionals'; though, no doubt, in later times, when it became the distinctive name of a mendicant Order, it no longer carried that offensive meaning.

2. Personal History of Gosāla.—The fifth Aṅga of the Jains, commonly known as the *Bhagavatī Sūtra*, gives us a fairly connected and detailed account of the life of Gosāla (*Bh.S.* xv. 1, tr. in *U.D.* App. 1). According to this account, Gosāla's father was a *maṅkha*, a kind of professional beggar, whose name was Maṅkhali. Hence he was known as the *Maṅkhali-putta* or the son of Maṅkhali. His other name, Gosāla, he received from the circumstance of having been born in a cowshed (*gośālā*), in which his parents, failing to obtain any other refuge during a certain rainy season, had taken shelter. When he grew up, he adopted his father's profession of a *maṅkha*. In the course of his journeyings he repeatedly fell in with Mahāvīra, who, just about that time, had commenced the wandering life of a *Niggaṇṭha** ascetic. Seeing the great respect in which Mahāvīra was held by the people, Gosāla determined to attach himself to him. Though at first repulsed, he succeeded at last by his importunity in being accepted as a disciple by Mahāvīra. But the two men were so different in character and temper, that after six years, owing to the insincerity and trickery of Gosāla, the companionship was dissolved. Gosāla now set up as the rival leader of a separate community of religious mendicants, called *Ājīvikas*, and with his followers established his headquarters on the premises of a potter woman in the town of Sāvatthī (Śrāvastī). After the lapse of sixteen years, Mahāvīra, who never in the meantime appears to have met his former companion, happened to visit Sāvatthī, and, hearing of the influence which Gosāla was wielding there, he took occasion to expose the false character of the professing ascetic. On learning this, Gosāla, threatening vengeance, at once proceeded with his followers to where Mahāvīra with his Nigganthas was lodging. Here he began the dispute by putting forward an ingenious argument to prove that Mahāvīra was mistaken in his identity, and that, in reality, he was a totally different person from the Gosāla whom Mahāvīra had once known as his companion. On Mahāvīra contemptuously brushing aside this sophistry, the infuriated Gosāla grossly abused his adversary; and the two rival factions came to blows. In the fight two of Mahāvīra's disciples were disabled, but in the end Gosāla, being discomfited by Mahāvīra in a personal encounter, was compelled to retire in disgrace. The taunts of his rivals, and the consequent distrust of the townspeople, now made Gosāla's position in Sāvatthī untenable. This preyed on his mind so much that it became utterly unhinged, and, throwing aside all ascetic restraint, he gave himself up to drinking, singing, dancing, soliciting the potter woman, and besprinkling himself with the cool muddy water of the potter's shop. Six months of this riotous living brought on his end; and with it came a momentary return of

* Also spelled *Nigaṇṭha*; see *J.S.* ii. p. xiv, footnote 8.

* The following special abbreviations are used in this article:

A.N.	=	Aṅguttara Nikāya.
A.S.	=	Ācārāṅga Sutta.
B. and R.	=	Böhtlingk and Rieu's edition of the Abhidhāna Chintāmaṇi.
B.S.	=	Buddhist Suttas, in *SBE*, vol. xi.
Bh.Rep.	=	Bhandarkar's Report on the Search for Sanskrit MSS, 1883–84.
Bh.S.	=	Bhagavatī Sūtra, Calcutta edition.
C.B.	=	Bp. Copleston's Buddhism.
D.N.	=	Dīgha Nikāya.
Dial.	=	Dialogues of the Buddha, translated by T. W. Rhys Davids.
Ep.Ind.	=	Epigraphia Indica.
J.S.	=	Jaina Sūtras, Parts i. and ii., in *SBE*, vols. xxii. and xlv.
Jāt.	=	Jātakas.
K.Mah.	=	Kielhorn's edition of the Mahābhāshya.
K.S.	=	Kalpa Sūtra, ed. Hermann Jacobi.
M.N.	=	Majjhima Nikāya.
N.R.	=	Neumann's Reden Gotama Buddhas.
N.S.	=	Nirayāvalīya Sutta, ed. Dr. S. Warren.
O.B.	=	Oldenberg's Buddha.
Oman	=	The Mystics, Ascetics, and Saints of India, by J. C. Oman.
R.L.B.	=	Rockhill's Life of Buddha[4].
S.A.	=	Smith's Aśoka, in Rulers of India Series.
S.I.Inscr.	=	South Indian Inscriptions, in Archæological Survey of India.
S.I.P.	=	Senart's Inscriptions de Piyadassi.
S.K.	=	Sūtra-kṛtāṅga, in Jaina Sūtras, Part ii.
S.N.	=	Saṃyutta Nikāya.
S.V.	=	Sumaṅgala Vilāsinī.
T.Mv.	=	Turner's ed. of the Mahāvaṁśa.
Tr.C.O.	=	Transactions of the Sixth International Congress of Orientalists.
U.D.	=	Uvāsaga Dasāo, ed. by R. Hoernle, in the Bibliotheca Indica.
V.O.J.	=	Vienna Oriental Journal.
V.P.Tr.	=	Vinaya Piṭaka, tr. in *SBE*, vols. xiii., xvii., and xx.
W.I.St.	=	Weber's Indische Studien.
W.M.H.	=	Wilkin's Modern Hinduism.

reason and the sense of remorse. His last act was to acknowledge to his disciples the truth of Mahāvīra's statement respecting himself, and to instruct them to bury him with every mark of dishonour and publicly to proclaim his shame. The disciples, it is added, refrained from carrying out the dying instructions of their master.

Such is the substance of the story of Gosāla's life in the Bhagavatī Sūtra. The Buddhist references to his life are much briefer. Buddhaghoṣa (*c.* 410 A.D.), in his commentary on the Dīgha Nikāya (*S.V.* pp. 143, 144, tr. in *U.D.* App. II.), tells us that Maṅkhali was the name of Gosāla, and that the latter name was given to him because he was born in a cowshed. Having broken an oil vessel through carelessness, and fearing chastisement from his angry master, who had caught him, he broke away, leaving his garments in his master's hands. He fled naked to a village, where the people offered him clothes; but he refused them, hoping to make a better living as a naked *arhat*, or holy man.

The two accounts—so far as we are able to judge—are quite independent of each other. One is Buddhist, the other is Jain; and the Buddhists and Jains, being antagonistic sects, would not adopt each other's views. Moreover, Buddhaghoṣa wrote in Ceylon, while the Jain Scriptures, as we now have them, were composed probably in Western India. All the more valuable are the two accounts, both in respect of the points in which they agree and in which they differ. They agree in two points: first, that Gosāla was born of low parentage in a cowshed, and subsequently took up the profession of a naked religious mendicant; and, secondly, that this profession of his was not sincere, but adopted merely for the sake of getting an idle living. The ground for the belief in Gosāla's insincerity, as will be shown in the sequel, was, according to both the Buddhists and the Jains, that Gosāla not only taught but also practised antinomian doctrines.

The point on which the two accounts differ is the meaning of the name 'Maṅkhali' or 'Maṅkhali-putta.' According to the Jains, Maṅkhali is the name of Gosāla's father, and a derivative from *maṅkha*. According to the Buddhists, it is the name of Gosāla himself. The derivation from *maṅkha* is indefensible. The Prākrit word *maṅkhali* is the equivalent of the Skr. word *maskarin*; but there exists no word *maska*, the equivalent of *maṅkha*. The latter word, in fact, has not been found anywhere but in the passage of the Bhagavatī Sūtra which adduces it as the source of the name Maṅkhali, and it is presumably an invention *ad hoc*. Moreover, the meaning of the hypothetical word *maṅkha* was not certainly known to the old commentators. Thus, while Abhaya Deva (*c.* 1050 A.D.), in his commentary on the Bhagavatī Sūtra, explains it to mean 'a kind of beggar that tries to extract alms from the people by showing them pictures of (malignant) deities which he carries about with him,' Hemachandra (*c.* 1140 A.D.), in his commentary on the Abhidhāna Chintāmaṇi (B. and R. verse 795), says that it is a synonym of the well-known word *magadha*, 'a bard.' The truth, no doubt, is that *maṅkhali-putta* is a formation like *Nāya-putta*, 'a man of the Nāya-clan' (the epithet of Mahāvīra), or *Niggantha-putta*, 'a mendicant of the Niggantha Order.' It describes Gosāla as having originally belonged to the Maṅkhali, or Maskarin, class of religious mendicants. The very early existence of this kind of mendicant in India is proved by the fact that the celebrated grammarian Pāṇini (*c.* 350 B.C.), in his *Grammar* (vi. 1, 154), explains the formation of the name. According to him, a Maskarin was so called because he carried in his hand a bamboo staff (*maskara*). On account of this practice of carrying a staff, he was known also as *Eka-daṇḍin*, or a 'one-staff-man.' Patañjali, in his comments on Pāṇini's statement (K.Mah. iii. 96), further explains that this kind of wandering mendicant (*parivrājaka*) was called Maskarin not so much because he carried a staff, as because he professed to have renounced all activities. The reference in these two statements is to the fact that there were two grades of these Maskarins or *Eka-daṇḍins*. In the lower grade, the ascetic carried an actual staff, in addition to a begging bowl and a strip of loin-cloth (*kaṭi-bandhana*). In the higher grade of *Paramahaṁsa*, he abandoned even these three possessions, claiming absolute renunciation as his only staff of reliance (W.I.St. ii. 174–75).

In ancient India, at one time, the tendency appears to have been very prevalent to adopt the life of a homeless wandering ascetic. Often this life was adopted from sincere religious motives; but probably as often it was due to a mere love of vagrancy and dislike of honest work. It was not limited to any particular class of people; but it was probably more prevalent among the lower classes. Among the upper classes (the so-called 'twice-born') the Brahmanic law-givers attempted to regulate it by enacting that the early years should be devoted to education and the middle years to rearing a family and pursuing a profession, while only the declining years might be given up to the ascetic life. It may be doubted whether this wholesome regulation ever was much observed in Indian society; the tendency to devote the whole life to religious mendicancy was too strong among the people. The Maskarin, as a rule, led a solitary life, and the adoption of this manner of life was open to very grave abuses. Hence some men of commanding personality conceived the task of regulating the tendency to the ascetic life, not by checking it, or restricting it to a certain period of life, but by organizing the mendicants into communities governed by strict rules of conduct. Such men were the founders of Buddhism and Jainism. Gosāla, from all accounts, was hardly a man of that stamp. He seems, by natural disposition, to have belonged to the baser sort of Maskarins, who made religious mendicancy a pretext for an idle and self-indulgent life. The existence of this baser sort of mendicants in ancient India is vouched for by a curious piece of folklore. It occurs in the Tittira Jātaka (No. 438 in *Jāt.* iii. 542). The verses occurring in the Buddhist Jātakas embody the most ancient folklore—of a much older date than Buddhism itself. In the 12th and 13th verses of that *Jātaka* a mendicant of the baser sort is described, among other things, as carrying a bamboo staff (*vetāchāra*), which shows that he must have belonged to the class of mendicants who were known as Eka-daṇḍins, or Maskarins. But what gives particular significance to this notice is that the much later commentary identifies that mendicant as an Ājīvika. It is clear that in the mouth of the Buddhists, 'Ājīvika' was a term of reproach applicable to a Maskarin or Eka-daṇḍin of the baser sort. This seems to explain why it was that both Buddhists and Jains call Gosāla a Maṅkhali, and say that he was a leader of Ājīvikas; and very possibly he was not only himself a Maṅkhali, but also, as the Jains say, the illegitimate son of a Maṅkhali.

It is difficult to determine the motive which induced Gosāla to attach himself to Mahāvīra. It may be that the contact with that religious enthusiast temporarily woke up the better instincts in Gosāla's nature; or it may be that, as the Jain account suggests, he hoped to learn from Mahāvīra more potent 'tricks of his trade.' In the former alternative, his association with Mahāvira had no permanent effect on him. There seems to be no reason seriously to question the truth of the Jain statement that Gosāla took up his headquarters on the premises of a potter woman. That act of open defiance of one of the strictest rules of religious mendicancy, confirmed as it is by Buddha's well-known abhorrence of Gosāla, throws an informing light on the real character of the man. There is, no doubt, something tragic in the closing scene of Gosāla's life: the open exposure of his shame by Mahāvira in the face of his own disciples and fellow-townspeople, the consequent mental derangement, and the final momentary remorse. But the feeling of pity will be measured by the view taken of Gosāla's real character.

The Bhagavatī Sūtra (fol. 1250*a*, 1269*a*) states that Mahāvīra survived Gosāla sixteen years. It also states that Gosāla's death was coincident with the great war which King Kuṇiya (Ajātaśatru) of Magadha waged with King Chedaga of Vaiśālī for the possession of an extraordinary elephant (*U.D.*, App. I. p. 7). From these two statements the year of Gosāla's death may be approximately determined. The traditional date of Mahāvīra's death is B.C. 527. This would place Gosāla's death in B.C. 543. But that date is rather too early. The elephant above mentioned was given by King Seniya (Bimbisāra) of Magadha to his younger son Vehalla in disregard of the superior claim of his elder son Kuṇiya. It may be assumed as certain that Kuṇiya only awaited his entrance into the exercise of regal power before commencing the war for the possession of the elephant. Now Seniya made over the throne to his son Kuṇiya some years before the latter

murdered him by a slow course of starvation. This murder happened in the year B.C. 490, or eight years before the death of Buddha, which itself took place, as is now practically certain, in B.C. 482. Mahāvīra died some time, it is not known how long, before Buddha. But Gosāla died sixteen years before Mahāvīra, in the year of the war, and that war must have taken place in the year of Kuṇiya's accession to regal power, and that accession cannot well be placed at a very long interval before the murder of Seṇiya. All these conditions are best satisfied by assuming that Mahāvīra died in B.C. 484, two years earlier than Buddha, and that consequently the death of Gosāla and the war took place in B.C. 500, sixteen years before the death of Mahāvīra, and ten years before the murder of Seṇiya. Accordingly that year, B.C. 500, may be taken as the approximate date of the death of Gosāla.

3. Doctrines and practices of Gosāla.—Neither Gosāla nor any of his Ājīvika followers has left us any record of their doctrines and practices. Accordingly we are reduced to the necessity of forming our opinion on those two points from the occasional references to them in the records of their rivals, the Buddhists and Jains. Their statements must, of course, be accepted with some caution; but their general trustworthiness is guaranteed by their agreement in all essential points. This agreement possesses all the more value, as the statements, coming from two mutually hostile sects, constitute two independent sources of information.

In the Buddhist Majjhima Nikāya (i. 514ff., N.R. ii. 284) there occurs a very instructive statement. Buddha is represented as dividing the ascetic systems which differed from his own into eight classes. Four of these he condemns as 'living in incontinency' (*abrahma-charya-vāsa*); of the four others he says only that they are 'unsatisfying' (*anassāsika*). Among the latter he classes the system of Mahāvīra, while among the former he places the system of Gosāla. The distinction is clear. Buddha objected to Gosāla on ethical grounds—for holding principles theoretically and practically immoral. His system, indeed, he conceived to be the most mischievous (*A.N.* i. 286; O.B. 82, 199; *Dial.* 71), and its author he stigmatized as 'the bad man' (*mogha-purisa*), who, like a fisherman, caught men merely to destroy them.

The fundamental thesis of the system of Gosāla is stated, in the Buddhist and Jain Scriptures alike, in slightly varying but substantially identical phraseology. The Jain Uvāsaga Dasāo (i. 97, 115, ii. 111, 132) gives it as follows: 'There is no such thing as exertion or labour, or power, or energy, or human strength; all things are unalterably fixed' (cf. *S.N.* iii. 210; *A.N.* i. 286). In the Buddhist Dīgha Nikāya (p. 53; *Dial.* 71) the pith of Gosāla's system is more fully stated as follows:

'There is no cause, either proximate or remote, for the depravity of beings; they become depraved without reason or cause. There is no cause, either proximate or remote, for the purity of beings; they become pure without reason or cause. Nothing depends either on one's own efforts or on the efforts of others; in short, nothing depends on any human effort, for there is no such thing as power or energy, or human exertion or human strength. Everything that thinks (*i.e.* the higher animals), everything that has senses (*i.e.* the lower animals), everything that is procreated (*i.e.* all animals), everything that lives (*i.e.* all plants), is destitute of force, power, or energy. Their varying conditions, at any time, are due to fate, to their environment, and their own nature; and it is in accordance with their position in one or other of the six classes (see below, p. 262[a]) that men experience ease or pain.'

How this system, in its theoretical aspect, was worked out in detail, we do not know. The Buddhist and Jain Scriptures give us no further information. It is evident, however, that, in principle, it was a thorough-going kind of determinism, denying the free will of man and his moral responsibility for any so-called good and evil. It is equally obvious that, if carried out in practice, the principle would be most mischievous. Both the Buddhists and the Jains agree that Gosāla did carry his principle into practice. Buddha, as before stated, charged him with incontinency. Mahāvīra is equally emphatic. He accuses him of teaching that 'an ascetic commits no sin if he has intercourse with women' (*J.S.* ii. 411). He charges his followers with being 'the slaves of women' (*ib.* ii. 270), and says that 'they do not lead a life of chastity' (*ib.* ii. 245). To this charge Gosāla laid himself open by his own action in choosing for his headquarters the premises of a woman.

From the fact that the Jain Scriptures maintain that originally Gosāla was a disciple (*śiṣya*) of Mahāvīra, it would appear that, beyond his determinism with its practical application, there was, in the main, no difference between his doctrines and those of Mahāvīra. This conclusion is also suggested by the statement of the Jain Bhagavatī Sūtra (*U.D.*, App. I. p. 4), that Gosāla's system was 'taken from the eight Mahānimittas, a portion of the Puvvas.' These Puvvas (*Pūrvas*), or 'Originals,' were believed to be the original sacred texts taught by Mahāvīra himself to his disciples (*IA* xvii. 280, xx. 170, 171). The general identity of Gosāla's system with that of Mahāvīra is further confirmed by a curious scheme of classification of 'all beings' (*sarva-sattva*), which in the Buddhist Dīgha Nikāya (p. 54; *Dial.* 72) is attributed to Gosāla. The extreme conciseness with which the scheme is stated makes it very difficult to understand it, and to compare it effectively with the system of Mahāvīra as set forth at large in the Jain Scriptures. But two important particulars can be definitely identified which are specially claimed by the Jains as doctrines of Mahāvīra.

In this connexion it is worth noting that the very same scheme, with the exception of Gosāla's concluding moral, is, in the Buddhist Majjhima Nikāya (*M.N.* i. 517, N.R. ii. 289) and Saṁyutta Nikāya (*S.N.* iii. 211, 212), attributed to the religious mendicant Pakudha Kachchāyana, and in the Tibetan Dulva (R.L.B. p. 103) to the religious mendicant Ajita Kesa-kambala. These two men, together with Gosāla Maṅkhali-putta, belonged to that group of six mendicant leaders whom Buddha often prominently names as his rivals. The other three were Mahāvīra Nātaputta, the leader of the Nigganthas, Pūraṇa Kassapa, and Sañjaya Belatthi-putta. It would appear, therefore, that that classificatory scheme was in reality common to all the six mendicant leaders, but that each gave to it an application peculiar to himself. In the case of Gosāla the application took the determinist line; and this, indeed, is explicitly suggested by the determinist moral appended to the scheme in the Dīgha Nikāya. With regard to one item of the scheme,—that which refers to the 'conscious soul' (*saññi*, Skr. *saṁjñi*)—its general agreement, with differences in detail, is directly affirmed by the Buddhist Scriptures. In the Majjhima Nikāya (iv. 398), as explained in the Dīgha Nikāya (p. 31; *Dial.* 44, 45), it is stated that all the six mendicant leaders alike taught, in opposition to Buddha, that the conscious soul continues to exist after death, though they differed among themselves as to the exact mode of existence. Gosāla is said (by Buddhaghoṣa) to have held that the soul 'had form' (*rūpi*), while Mahāvīra held that it was 'formless' (*arūpi*), but what these terms exactly imported we do not know.

The scheme of classification itself is as follows (*D.N.* 54; *Dial.* 72; cf. *U.D.*, App. II. pp. 17–29): 'There are 1,400,000 principal sorts of birth, and again 6000 (or 60,000 according to the Dulva, R.L.B. p. 103) others, and again 600. There are 500 sorts of *karma*, and again 5 (according to the 5 senses), and again 3 (according to act, word, and thought); and there is a whole *karma* and a half *karma* (the whole being a *karma* of act or word, the half a *karma* of thought). There are 62 modes of conduct, 62 periods, 6 classes (*abhijāti*) among men, 8 stages of a man's life, 4900 sorts of livelihood (*ājīva*), 4900 sorts of wandering mendicants, 4900 regions inhabited by Nāgas, 2000 faculties, 3000 purgatories, 36 dust depositories, 7 productions from conscious souls (*saññi*), 7 from unconscious beings, and 7 from parts between two joints (*e.g.* of sugar-cane), 7 sorts of devas, 7 of men, 7 of *paiśāchas* (goblins), 7 of lakes, 7 large and 700 minor precipices, 7 important and 700 unimportant

dreams. There are 8,400,000 great periods during which both fools and wise alike, wandering in transmigration, shall at last make an end of pain.' To this scheme Gosāla is represented as appending his own determinist warning: 'Though the wise should hope that by some particular virtue or performance of duty or penance or righteousness he may make mature the (inherited) *karma*, that is not yet mature, or though the fool should hope by the same means to get rid of *karma* that has matured, neither of them can do it. The ease and pain, measured out as it were with a measure, cannot be altered in the course of transmigration; there can be neither increase nor decrease thereof, neither excess nor deficiency. Just as a ball of string, when it is cast forth, will spread out just as far as and no farther than it can unwind, so both fools and wise alike, wandering in transmigration exactly for the allotted term, shall then, and only then, make an end of pain.'

The two items in the foregoing scheme which can definitely be identified in the Jain system are —(1) the division of all living beings into those possessing one, two, three, four, or five senses, which is fully set out in the Jain *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra* (*J.S.* ii. 213, 219; also *ib.* i. 3, footnote 2); and (2) the division of mankind into six classes (*abhijāti*). The latter division, as held by Gosāla, is explained by Buddhaghoṣa in his commentary on the Buddhist *Dīgha Nikāya* (*S.V.* 162, tr. in *U.D.*, App. II. p. 21). According to his account, Gosāla distinguished the six classes by six colours—black, blue, red, yellow, white, and supremely white. The black class were the hunters, butchers, murderers, thieves, in short, all evil-doers. The blue were the mendicants known as Bhikṣu, that is, the Buddhist monks. The red were the mendicants known as Niggantha, who wore (at least) a strip of loin-cloth. The yellow were the lay adherents of the mendicants known as Achelaka, that is, those mendicants who wore no clothing whatsoever. The white were the mendicants, male as well as female, who were known as the Ājīvikas. The supremely white were the leaders of the latter: Nanda Vachchha, Kissa Saṅkichcha, and Gosāla Maṅkhali-putta.

In Mahāvīra's system, the six classes, which he termed *leśyā*, were also distinguished by a series of six colours differing but slightly—black, blue, grey, red, yellow, and white (*J.S.* ii. 196). In the interpretation of these colours, the two systems, on the first view, seem to differ considerably; but the underlying principle is, on closer inspection, seen to be the same. According to Mahāvīra, the black are those who injure living beings, *i.e.* those who contravene the first of the five vows of the Law (*ahiṁsā*). The blue are those who indulge their greed or their passions, *i.e.* those who contravene the fourth and fifth of the vows (*akiñchana* and *brahma-cḥarya*). The grey are those who are deceitful and thieving, *i.e.* those who contravene the second and third of the vows (*satya* and *asteya*). The red are those who strive to control themselves so as to keep the law, *i.e.* the lay adherents. The yellow are those who are firm in controlling themselves, *i.e.* the 'professed' mendicants. The white are those who have attained absolute self-control, *i.e.* the so-called *Jina-kalpika*, like Mahāvīra himself (*J.S.* ii. 199, 200). Gosāla's interpretation is practically the same, with the exception that he illustrates his meaning by quoting types. Thus for him the Buddhists, or Bhikṣus, are the type of the blue class: for among their rivals the Buddhists had the reputation of being 'the preachers of ease' (*sāta-vādin*) who favoured 'the way of comfort' (*puṣṭi-mārga*, *J.S.* ii. 269, footnote 3; and *V.O.J.* iii. 332, footnote 2). The Nigganthas were the type of the red class; for they were superior to the Buddhists in renouncing comfort, but inferior to the Ājīvikas in adhering to a loin-cloth. The lay adherents of himself, the Achelaka, or 'totally naked' leader, were the type of the yellow (or Mahāvīra's red) class. The 'professed' adherents of himself, the so-called Ajīvikas, who apparently also walked totally naked, were the type of the white (or Mahāvīra's yellow) class. He himself, and other leaders, who walked totally naked, were the type of the supremely white class. In this connexion it is interesting to note that Buddhaghoṣa's interpretation of Gosāla's classification is based on the Aṅguttara Nikāya (iii. 383), where, however, it is attributed to the mendicant leader Pūraṇa Kassapa. If this is not a mere textual error, it confirms the observation already made that the classificatory scheme was common to all the six prominent rivals of Buddha (cf. *Mahābhārata*, xii 280, v. 33 ff.).

It has already been stated (above, p. 261[b]) that, in the main, there was no doctrinal difference between Gosāla and Mahāvīra. There was, however, one point on which, according to the Jain tradition, there was a marked difference between them. They both accepted the so-called *Puvvas*, or Original Sayings. These were, later on, embodied in the *Dṛṣṭivāda*, or the twelfth Aṅga of the Jains. The first portion of this Aṅga is said to have explained 'the preparations necessary to grasp the meaning of Mahāvīra's system correctly' (*IA* xx. 173). With respect to this preparatory discipline (*parikamma*) we are told that some counted six, while others counted seven groups. The former count was that of the orthodox Jains, while the latter belonged to certain schismatics, called Ājīvikas or Terāsiyas, that is, as Abhayadeva (*c.* 1050 A.D.) explains, to the sect (*pāsaṇḍa*) founded by Gosāla. These men had their name *terāsiya* (Skr. *trairāśika*) from their practice of treating everything under three aspects (*tray-ātmaka*)—assertion, negation, and indifference. Thus they would say, *e.g.* that a thing may be true, or untrue, or partake of both while being neither (*sat*, *asat*, *sad-asat*). This tenet, technically known as the *syādvāda*, or the 'it may be' principle, is distinctive of the Jains generally. It follows that the Terāsiyas must have made use of it in some special way, and that this special way constituted their seventh group of preparatory discipline (*parikamma*). It may further be surmised that this seventh group was concerned with the *ājīva*, or 'profession' of men; and that for this reason the Terāsiyas had received their alternative name of Ājīvikas, or 'Professionals.' The substance of their teaching on this head is explained by Śīlāṅka (*c.* 876 A.D.) to have been that, besides the two states of man (admitted by Mahāvīra), in which he was 'bound' by *karma*, and in which he was 'liberated' from *karma*, there was a third state in which he was neither truly bound nor truly liberated (*J.S.* ii. 245, footnote 2). The men of the 'bound' state were those who lived in the world. To the intermediate state belonged those who had renounced the world (like Mahāvīra); but these men, owing to their spiritual arrogance, were not truly liberated; they had yet to pass through an innumerable series of transmigrations before they could reach that state of true liberation from *karma* which Gosāla claimed himself to have attained. In the Bhagavatī Sūtra (fols. 1237–1252; R.L.B. p. 253; *U.D.*, App. II. p. 18; see also *Dial.* 72) the latter is represented as himself explaining his theory of transmigration.

'According to my doctrine,' he says, 'all those who have become, or are now becoming, or will hereafter become, perfected, have to finish 8,400,000 great periods (*mahākalpa*), during which they have to be born, in regular alternation, seven times as a deva in a firmament (*saṁjūha*) and seven times as a 'conscious being' (*saṇṇigabbha*, man) on earth, finishing up with seven reanimations in seven different bodies; and having, in the course of these re-births, rid themselves of the effects of the five sorts of *karma*, and of the three sorts of *karma*, and of the fraction of a *karma* (see above, p. 261[b]) in the proportion, respectively, of 100,000 and 60,000 and 600 (of the 8,400,000 great periods) they attain final perfection.'

To give an idea of the immeasurable length of time involved in this process, Gosāla adds:

'The bed of the river Ganges measures 500 *yojanas* in length, half a *yojana* in breadth, and 50 *dhanu* in depth (a *yojana* = 4½ miles, a *dhanu* = 6 feet). Taking a series of seven Ganges rivers of which each succeeding has seven times the dimensions of the preceding, the last of the series is equal to 117,649 Ganges rivers. If now every hundred years one grain of sand be removed, the time required to exhaust the whole of the sand of those seven Ganges rivers would be one *saras* period; and 300,000 of such *saras* periods make one *mahākalpa*, or great period' (*U.D.*, App. II. p. 27, footnote 21).

In the course of its last conscious existence on earth, the soul has to pass through seven changes of body by re-animation; that is to say, the soul successively passes into, and thus re-animates, the

dead body of seven different persons. In his own case, Gosāla explains, he left near the town of Rājagiha the body of Udāī Kuṇḍiyāyaṇīya (when the latter died), and passed into the (dead) body of Enejjaga, re-animating it for the space of 22 years. When the latter died, he passed into and re-animated the body of Mallarāma for 21 years. Similarly, he re-animated in succession the four dead bodies of Maṇḍiya, Roha, Bhāraddāī, and Ajjunaga Goyamaputta for the space of 20, 19, 18, and 17 years respectively. 'Finally,' Gosāla continues, 'with the seventh change I left in Sāvatthī, on the premises of the potter woman, the body of Ajjunaga, and entered that of Gosāla Maṅkhali-putta for the space of 16 years. So I have fulfilled the seven changes in the course of 133 years, according to my doctrine.'

This insistence by Gosāla on the theory of re-animation being his own doctrine is of particular importance. It is one of those theories which Jain tradition states to have been quite peculiar to Gosāla, and to have originated in connexion with certain incidents in his life. It is clearly a somewhat incongruous supplement made by Gosāla to his general theory of transmigration. It must have been added for a particular purpose. What that purpose was is practically admitted by Gosāla himself. It was to refute Mahāvīra's aspersions on his character. In the Bhagavatī Sūtra (fol. 1237; *U.D.*, App. I. p. 5) we are informed that, in his last encounter with Mahāvīra in Sāvatthī, Gosāla said to him:

'You have called me your pupil, but that pupil of yours, Gosāla Maṅkhali-putta, is long since dead and re-born in the world of Devas, while I, who am really Udāī Kuṇḍiyāyaṇīya, have only in the seventh of the changes of body entered into the re-animated body of Gosāla, which body I am still retaining.'

This repudiation of identity certainly seems to suggest that the dissolution of the early companionship of the two men had taken place not so much by reason of a mere theoretical difference in doctrine, as on the ground of some course of conduct which was regarded by Mahāvīra, as well as by the people generally, as discreditable and unworthy of an ascetic.

Though the theory of re-animation was employed by Gosāla for the purpose of repudiating his identity, the incident which suggested it to him occurred, according to the Bhagavatī Sūtra (fol. 1214 ff.; *U.D.*, App. I. p. 3), at an earlier time, when Gosāla was still associated with Mahāvīra.

Once, while wandering together from Siddhatthagāma to Kummagāma, the two men passed a large sesame shrub in full bloom. Seeing it, Gosāla asked Mahāvīra whether or not the shrub would perish, and where its seeds would reappear. Mahāvīra replied that the shrub would perish, but that seeds would form in seed-vessels of the same shrub. Gosāla would not believe it; so, thinking to prove him a liar, he quietly returned to the shrub, tore it up by the roots, and threw it away. As chance would have it, just then a shower of rain fell. In consequence of it, the shrub was able again to take root; and so the seeds after all formed in its seed-vessels. In the meantime the two men had passed on to Kummagāma. On their return some time afterwards they passed the identical sesame shrub; and seeing it, Gosāla reminded Mahāvīra of his prophecy, adding that it was clear that the shrub had not died, and that the seeds had not formed. Mahāvīra replied that his prophecy had come true; for the shrub had perished, seeing that Gosāla himself had pulled it out by the roots and thrown it away, but that owing to a timely fall of rain the shrub had come to life again, and the seeds had formed in the seed-vessels. He added that similarly all plants were capable of re-animation. Still Gosāla would not believe it, and went up to the plant to examine its seed-vessel; but finding, on opening it, that Mahāvīra had been correct, he drew the further conclusion that not only plants but in fact all living beings (*jīva*, 'souls') were capable of re-animation. To this generalization of the theory of re-animation, however, Mahāvīra would not assent.

In this connexion another doctrine may be mentioned which is stated in the Bhagavatī Sūtra (fols. 1254, 1255; *U.D.*, App. I. p. 7) to have been quite peculiar to the Ājīvika followers of Gosāla. It was known as 'the Eight Finalities' (*aṭṭha charamāiṁ*), that is, the doctrine of the last drink, the last song, the last dance, the last solicitation, the last tornado, the last sprinkling elephant, the last fight with big stones as missiles, and the last Tirthaṅkara, viz. Maṅkhali-putta himself. The incidents which gave rise to this doctrine are those which attended the closing days of Gosāla's life. The first four were his last personal acts as related already in the story of his life (above, p. 259 f.). The next three are said to have been remarkable events which happened just about the time of Gosāla's death. The tornado refers to one of those fierce cyclonic storms, accompanied with torrential rain, which still occasionally visit Bengal, but which are almost unknown in other parts of Northern India. The 'sprinkling elephant' is said to have been a huge creature which had been trained to amuse the ladies of the royal harem when they bathed in the river Ganges, and the claim to the possession of which, as has already been related, occasioned a war between the kings of Magadha and Vaiśālī. In this war those stone missiles are said to have been employed (*N.S.* § 17 ff.) which evidently must have been thrown by some kind of powerful catapult. The *raison d'être* of this curious doctrine, no doubt, is that the dubious death of their master was felt by his disciples to require investment with some kind of rehabilitating glamour.

The incidents attending Gosāla's death gave rise to another peculiar doctrine, reported in the Bhagavatī Sūtra (fol. 1255 ff.; *U.D.*, App. I. pp. 8, 9). In the heat of his feverish excitement, Gosāla is said to have held a mango in his hand, and to have wetted himself with the muddy water which is always present on a potter's premises. This action is said to have suggested the doctrine of 'the Four Potables and the Four Impotables' (*chattāri pāṇagāiṁ, chattāri apāṇagāiṁ*), that is, the four things that may be used as drinks, and the four things that may be touched, but may not be drunk. The former refer to what is excreted by the cow, what is soiled by the hand (*e.g.* water in a potter's vessel), what is heated by the sun, and what drips from a rock. The latter refer to such things as water-jars, mangos, beans, etc.

With regard to the practices of the Ājīvikas, we have an instructive statement in the Buddhist Majjhima Nikāya. In the 36th chapter (*M.N.* i. 238; N.R. i. 376), Sachchaka, a member of the Niggantha community, is represented as explaining to Buddha the practices observed among the adherents of Gosāla Maṅkhali-putta and his friends Nanda Vachchha and Kissa Saṅkichcha. These three men, as we have seen (above, p. 262[2], also below, p. 267[2]), were the leaders of the Ājīvikas. Respecting them and their adherents, Sachchaka says:

'They discard all clothing (*achelaka*); they dispense with all decent habits (*muttāchāra*); they lick their food out of their hands (*hatthāpalekhaṇa*, p. 265[2]); they listen to no call to come or wait for food; they permit no food to be brought to them, or to be specially prepared for them, or to be received by them on invitation; they accept no food from the mouth of the pot or pan in which it is cooked, nor food placed within the threshold or among the firewood or among the pestles, nor food from a couple eating together, or from a woman with child, or a woman giving suck, or a woman in intercourse with a man; nor food which is reduced (in times of drought), or when a dog is standing by, or where flies are swarming round; they will not eat fish or flesh, nor drink liquor made from rice or the flowers of *Woodfordia floribunda*, nor sour gruel made of unhusked barley; some of them beg only at one house and accept but one handful of food, others beg at two houses and accept two handfuls, others beg at seven houses and accept seven handfuls; some subsist on one gift of food, others on two, others on seven; some take food only once a day, others only once every two days, others only once every seven days, others only once every half-month; in this manner they observe various routines of fasting.'

In the Digha Nikāya (p. 166; *Dial.* 227) this account of the Ājīvika practices is placed in the mouth of a naked ascetic

(*achelaka*) Kassapa. This may refer to the mendicant leader Pūraṇa Kassapa (above, p. 261[b]), one of the six rivals of Buddha; and it may indicate that the practices in question were more or less common to all those six rival communities of religious mendicants, thus confirming what has already been said with regard to their common doctrines. In any case, with respect to Mahāvira and his Nigganthas, the identity of several of their observances with those of the Ājivikas has been pointed out by Professor Jacobi in his Introduction to the Jaina *Uttarādhyayana* (*J.S.* ii. p. xxxi).

Another point is worth noticing in connexion with Sachchaka's statement of the Ājivika practices. When he had finished it, Buddha inquired whether the Ājivikas were really able to sustain life on such conditions, and Sachchaka contemptuously replied that, of course, at other times they indulged in copious and excellent food and drink, and thus regained bodily vigour and grew fat. This remark is significant of the repute in which the sincerity of Gosāla and his Ājīvikas was held by their contemporaries. It only serves to confirm the suspicion of Gosāla's insincerity on the far more serious point of sexual conduct, which, there is good reason to believe, caused the rupture between him and Mahāvīra.

From the way the Terāsiyas, or Ājīvikas, with their peculiar doctrine respecting the seventh group of preparatory discipline (above, p. 262[b]), are spoken of, it is clear that they were not regarded as outside the pale of the Niggantha community. Their doctrine might not be acceptable to the majority, it might even be schismatic, but it was not condemned as heretical. It might cause friction between its propounder, Gosāla, and his associate, Mahāvīra, who rejected it; but it would not have caused that total separation and intense hostility which we see taking the place of the early association of the two men. For this change clearly there must have existed a special cause not essentially connected with the Terāsiya or Ājivika doctrine. What this cause was we are nowhere explicitly told. The Buddhists are silent on the point. Buddha, we know, disliked Gosāla, but he had never been in personal touch with him, and the quarrel of Gosāla with Mahāvīra did not greatly interest him or the Buddhists. It was different with Mahāvīra. In the earlier years of their ascetic life he and Gosāla had been associates. The subsequent difference and total separation could not but be a matter of importance to the Jains. Yet even in their Scriptures—so far as we know them at present—no explicit statement of the cause or reason of the separation is recorded. We are left to draw conclusions from some indirect indications; nor are these at all obscure in their suggestiveness. The reported choice of Gosāla's headquarters on the premises of a woman, and his attempt to repudiate his identity, clearly point to, not a doctrinal, but a practical ground of separation, to some discreditable feature in the conduct of Gosāla. What this feature was is plainly enough indicated in the Sūtra-kṛtāṅga (*J.S.* ii. 245). Answering the contention of Gosāla (above, p. 262), that men who, like Mahāvīra, had renounced the world belonged to the intermediate state, and were still liable to be involved in *karma*, just as clarified water again becomes defiled, while he, Gosāla himself, had reached the state of perfect liberation, Mahāvīra points to the conduct of Gosāla and his followers: 'These men do not lead a life of chastity.' That fact, he means to say, should be enough to satisfy 'a wise man' as to the truth, or otherwise, of Gosāla's contention. In this connexion it may be noted that, in the Bhagavatī Sūtra (fols. 1275–1291; *U.D.*, App. I. pp. 11–14), Mahāvīra is represented as ironically applying to Gosāla his own doctrine of transmigrations, and showing how Gosāla, instead of being in the state of true liberation, had after his death to pass through an interminable transmigratory series, the several steps of which he specifies, before he really attained perfection.

There is, however, a passage in the Sūtra-kṛtāṅga which is even more explicit in its suggestiveness. It records (*J.S.* ii. 409–413) a disputation which Ārdraka, a follower of Mahāvīra, held with Gosāla respecting the points on which the latter differed from Mahāvīra. These are, first, a charge of inconsistency against Mahāvīra, that he at first wandered about as a single monk, but afterwards surrounded himself with many monks; secondly, a charge of misplaced severity, that he insisted on four restrictions which Gosāla rejected; thirdly, a charge of spiritual arrogance as well as spiritual cowardice. The four restrictions refer to:

(1) Drinking of cold water.
(2) Eating of (unboiled) seeds.
(3) Accepting things specially prepared.
(4) Having intercourse with women.

Mahāvīra forbade these actions as sinful, but Gosāla maintained that an ascetic committed no sin in doing them. The same four restrictions are mentioned in another place of the same Sūtra-kṛtāṅga (*J.S.* ii. 267), though with a notable difference. Here they run as follows:

(1) Drinking cold water.
(2) Eating (unboiled) seeds.
(3) Accepting things specially prepared.
(4) Serving a sick brother with food brought to him in the vessel of a householder.

The ethical item of sexual intercourse is here replaced by the ceremonial item of eating from the vessel of a lay adherent. The significance of this difference will be explained in the sequel (p. 267[a]). At this point it is important to notice only that none of the matters in dispute is concerned with doctrine; they are all concerned with conduct.

Considering that it was the conduct of religious ascetics that was in question, the most striking point in dispute is that respecting sexual intercourse. To understand the position, we must remember that Pārśva, the precursor of Mahāvīra, had enjoined only four vows (*vrata*) on his followers (*J.S.* ii. 121). These were—(1) not to injure life (*ahiṁsā*), (2) to speak the truth (*sūnṛtā* or *satya*), (3) not to steal (*asteya*), (4) not to own property (*aparigraha* or *akiṁchana*). That is, Pārśva enjoined the vows of kindness, truth, honesty, and poverty. To these Mahāvira added the fifth vow of chastity (*brahma-charya*, *ib.* ii. 91, 109, 139, 204). His reason for making this addition is explained in the Uttarādhyayana Sūtra (*ib.* ii. 122, 123). Before Mahāvira it had been understood that chastity was implicitly enjoined by the other vows; but in reality they left a loop-hole. The wife being accounted a species of property, marriage was forbidden by the vow of poverty, and adultery by the vow of honesty; but the case of fornication was left open. On this specious ground, laxity of morals crept in among the intellectually or morally weaker members of the Niggantha community founded by Pārśva. Mahāvīra's fifth vow of chastity was designed to reform that evil. On this point he encountered the opposition of his associate, Gosāla. The latter sympathized with the lax party; and he appears to have justified his own and their laxity of morals by the double argument that the truly 'liberated' ascetic could commit no sin, and that, as there was no free will, there was no moral responsibility. Indeed, there is good ground for believing that it was this very laxity of conduct on the part of Gosāla that gave the occasion to Mahāvīra to introduce the fifth vow, and thus to force the withdrawal of Gosāla. It will be noticed that the two statements of the four restrictions, above quoted, have the first three restrictions in common, while they vary with respect to the fourth. This points to something peculiar in those three restrictions. Now, in one place of the Sūtra-kṛtāṅga (*J.S.* ii. 313) these particular three restrictions (regarding cold water, seed, and non-acceptance of specially prepared food) alone are mentioned, and in the Āchārāṅga Sūtra (*J.S.* i. 63) we find Mahāvīra described as 'the wise man who enjoined three restrictions' (*yāmā tiṇṇi**). On the other hand, in the Buddhist Dīgha Nikāya (p. 57; *Dial.* 74), Mahāvira is made to describe himself as 'the man of four restrictions' (*chatur-yāma*). The explanation of this discrepancy which suggests itself is that Mahāvira originally enjoined only three restrictions on his followers, and that he added the fourth at a later time when he quarrelled with Gosāla. This fourth restriction respecting intercourse with women is, in fact, identical with Mahāvira's fifth vow of chastity, which, as has already been remarked, is an addition made by him to the four vows of Pārśva. If the surmise is correct that it was Gosāla who provided the occasion for the institution of the fourth restriction (*yāma*), that is to say, the fifth vow (*vrata*) of Mahāvira's system, it goes a long way to prove that it was Gosāla's laxity

* In *J.S.* i. 63 the phrase is wrongly translated by 'three vows,' following herein the commentators; but *vrata*, 'vow,' is something different from *yāma*, 'restriction.'

of morals that was the real cause of Mahāvīra's separation from him. Speaking on the ascetic's duty to avoid intercourse with women, Mahāvīra is represented in the Sūtra-kṛtāṅga (*J.S.* ii. 273) as saying concerning Gosāla: 'In the assembly of the monks he pronounces holy words, yet secretly he commits sin; but the wise know him to be a deceiver and great rogue.' It was Gosāla's hypocrisy in the matter of sexual conduct that caused the breach between him and Mahāvīra.

This, then, was the main cause; but, no doubt, there were other subsidiary causes which exacerbated the friction between the two men. They had reference to the three restrictions regarding the use of cold water and unboiled seeds, and the acceptance of specially prepared food. In order to realize the significance of these seemingly trivial matters, we must remember that among all Indian ascetics abstention from action (*karma*) was held to be the paramount rule of conduct, because *karma* bound the soul in the cycle of transmigrations. But to this rule there was one exception: seeing that without the body one cannot go through the whole of the discipline which secures salvation (*mokṣa, nirvāṇa*), such actions as are necessary for the preservation of the body (*dharm-ādhāra-śarīra-rakṣanāya* in the commentary to *S.K.* ii. 6, § 7, in *J.S.* ii. 411), *e.g.* the begging and eating of food, are innocuous and do not operate as a fetter (*karma-bandha*; see Bh. Rep. pp. 94, 99). Every vow (*vrata*) or restriction (*yāma*) taken on himself by the ascetic was considered tacitly subject to that rule and its exception. The differences among the ascetics arose when it came to the practical application of this tacit reference. Thus, while all agreed that storing food was forbidden, but that begging one's daily allowance of food was permitted, some ascetics qualified that permission by certain restrictions (*yāma*). Mahāvīra forbade the use of cold water and of seeds in their natural state, lest injury should be done to any 'life' (*jīva*) in either; both should be used only after boiling, or other safeguarding process. He also forbade the acceptance of any food specially prepared for the mendicant, lest the privilege of begging should degenerate into indulgence. Gosāla, on the other hand, rejected these three restrictions.

Again, while all ascetics were agreed that besides the body the ascetic should own no other possessions, Mahāvīra permitted the possession of a bowl for the reception of the begged food. Gosāla denied the justice of this permission, because the ascetic could and should make use of his hand for that purpose (cf. *J.S.* i. 57, footnote 2, and ii. 267, footnote 2). The food should be received into the bowl made by the palms of the joined hands, and out of this natural bowl it should be licked up. Hence ascetics of this stricter observance were known as the 'hand-lickers' (*hatthāpalekhana*, *D.N.* 166; *Dial.* 227). If food, however, was required for a sick monk, it was to be carried to him in the vessel of the householder. Mahāvīra objected to this practice as open to the risk of injury to any 'life' that might be in the householder's vessel (*J.S.* ii. 303).

In this connexion the treatment of the question of clothing may be mentioned. Some ascetics (like Pārśva) permitted the use of wrappers; others permitted only the irreducible minimum of a pudic cover (*kaṭi-bandhana*); while, again, others went about absolutely naked. To the second class appear to have belonged the Nigganthas, or the immediate followers of Mahāvīra (*J.S.* i. 73), who, accordingly, are called by Gosāla the 'one-strip men' (*eka-sāṭaka*), and placed in his red class (above, p. 262[a]). Though conceding to his Nigganthas the use of a loin-cloth, for himself Mahāvīra discarded the use of all clothing. On this point there was no difference between him and Gosāla; both were mendicants of the *achelaka*, or 'clothless,' class. Indeed, it is just possible that on this point Mahāvīra may have been influenced by Gosāla. For we are told in the Jain Scriptures that at first, when Mahāvīra adopted the ascetic life, he attached himself to the clothed community of Pārśva; it was only in the second year of that life, about the time when he fell in with Gosāla, that he adopted the strictest observance of absolute nakedness. The coincidence suggests that Mahāvīra adopted that observance from Gosāla, and that it was this circumstance that formed the bond of their early companionship, until the discovery of Gosāla's hypocrisy caused the subsequent and final separation. It appears probable, however, that within the Niggantha community the general rule was to wear the loin-cloth, and the practice of total nakedness was limited to that section of it which formed the party of Gosāla, and had adopted his doctrine on *ājīva* as formulated in the seventh group of the preparatory discipline (above, p. 262[b]), and which hence was known as the Ājīvikas.

On this point there is an instructive story related in the Buddhist *Vinaya Piṭaka* (i. 291; *V.P.Tr.* ii. 216 ff.). Once, when Buddha was staying in Sāvatthi, he and his Bhikṣus were invited by a wealthy woman, Visākhā, to a meal in her house. When the meal was ready, she sent her maidservant to call her guests. While the maid went on her errand, a heavy shower of rain fell, and on her arrival at Buddha's lodging she found the Bhikṣus standing disrobed and enjoying the rain. Thinking that there was a mistake, she returned to inform her mistress that at the place to which she had been directed there were no Bhikṣus, but Ājīvikas. The misunderstanding, of course, was cleared up; but the incident, which happened at Sāvatthi, shows that the Ājīvikas were naked monks, and that they were the followers of Gosāla, who, as we have seen, had established his headquarters at Sāvatthi, after he had separated from Mahāvīra. The same point is illustrated by Gosāla's sixfold classification of men (above, p. 262[a]), in which the white class is represented by his own party, the naked Ājīvikas, while the red class is typified by the party of Mahāvīra, the one-strip 'Nigganthas.' Total nakedness, however, must have been the mark of the whole Ājīvika party among the Nigganthas; not only of that portion which seceded with Gosāla, but also of the other portion which continued in the connexion. For, as will appear in the sequel, it was the latter that formed the nucleus, from which, at a later date, the Digambara Order took its rise (below, p. 266[b]).

It remains briefly to consider the two other charges preferred by Gosāla against Mahāvīra (above, p. 264[b]). The reference in the first of these is not quite clear. Mahāvīra is accused of having first 'wandered about as a single monk,' but having afterwards 'surrounded himself with many monks' (*J.S.* ii. 409,410). On the other hand, Gosāla claims to 'live alone and single' (*ib.* p. 411). As a fact, however, Gosāla also was 'surrounded by many monks,' who were known as the Ājīvikas. It is clear, therefore, that the mere fact that a leader wandered about or lived with a company of personal disciples did not count as an offence. The gravamen of Mahāvīra's procedure, in the eyes of Gosāla, appears to have been that, like Buddha, he instituted an Order (*saṅgha*) of monks. The followers of Mahāvīra were scattered in various places in larger or smaller groups, but they were all organized in one community, under one Law, and one leader (Mahāvīra). Gosāla's followers formed but a small group that always accompanied its leader. There were, indeed, other groups of ascetics of a similarly dubious character who also bore the name of Ājīvikas, or 'Professionals,' but they lived apart under separate leaders, the names of two of whom, Kissa Saṅkichcha and Nanda Vachchha, are recorded in the Buddhist Scriptures (*M.N.* i. 238, 524; *A.N.* iii. 384). But the Ājīvikas of this dubious kind, who must be distinguished from the later Ājīvika Order of monks (below, p. 268), formed no organized community like the Nigganthas (or Jains) and Buddhists. It is obvious that the antinomian tenets and practices of Gosāla, and other men of his way of thinking, would form a natural bar to the formation of a widespread public organization. It may have been the consciousness of his disability in this respect that prompted Gosāla's accusation against his more successful rival.

The second of the two charges against Mahāvīra accused him at once of spiritual arrogance and spiritual cowardice. The reference in this charge is to Gosāla's theory of the three spiritual states of men (see above, p. 262[b]). According to him, Mahāvīra was in the intermediate state; his soul, though free from *karma* in a sense, was not truly liberated, for it was full of spiritual arrogance in thinking that his system alone was correct and condemning those who differed from him (*J.S.* ii. 411, §§ 11–14, and Śīlāṅka's comment on Sūtra-kṛtāṅga, i. 1, 3, § 12; *J.S.* ii. 245). It was also full of spiritual cowardice in being eager to win converts among the common people, but afraid to meet learned men who might refute him (*J.S.* ii. p. 412, §§ 15–18, and p. 413, §§ 19–25). The advocate of Mahāvīra replies that, first, his master only teaches, as others do, what he believes to be true and right, and while condemning false doctrines, he does not condemn those who entertain them. Secondly, he never refuses to meet honest and worthy opponents, and is void of hypocrisy himself, while trying to win people for his doctrines.

4. **History of the Ājīvikas.**—The earliest mention of the Ājīvikas occurs in a brief record incised on the walls of two rock-hewn caves on Barabar Hill near Gayā (*IA* xx. 361 ff.; S.A. 144). According to its own statement, it was made in the 13th year of the reign of the Emperor Aśoka, that is to say, in B.C. 251. It runs as follows: 'King Piyadassi, in the 13th year of his reign, bestowed this cave on the Ājīvikas.'

The next mention occurs in the seventh of the celebrated Pillar Edicts of the same Emperor Aśoka, incised in the 28th year of his reign, or in B.C. 236 (S.I.P. ii. 82, 97; *Ep. Ind.* ii. 270, 272, 274; S.A. 155). It runs as follows: 'I have arranged that my Censors of the Law of Piety shall be occupied with the affairs of the Buddhist Order (*saṅgha*) as well as with the Brāhman (ascetics), the Ājīvikas, the Nigganthas, and, in fact, with all the various mendicant communities (*pāsaṇḍa*).'

A further early mention occurs in a brief record, incised on the walls of three rock-hewn caves on Nagarjuni Hill in the first year of the reign of Aśoka's successor Daśaratha, that is, in B.C. 227 (*IA* xx. 361 ff.; S.A. 145). It runs as follows: 'This cave was bestowed by his Majesty Daśaratha, immediately after his accession, on the venerable Ājīvikas, to be a dwelling-place for them as long as the sun and moon endure.'

After this we meet with no mention of the Ājīvikas till we come to the 6th cent. A.D. In that century, about A.D. 550, Varāha Mihira, in his astrological works Bṛhaj-jātaka (xv. 1) and Laghu-jātaka (ix. 12), names them as one of seven classes of religious mendicants. These are—(1) the Śākyas or Raktapaṭas (men of the red robe), *i.e.* the Buddhist monks; (2) the Ājīvikas, or, as the commentator Bhaṭṭotpala (*c.* 950 A.D.) explains, the Ekadaṇḍins, or 'men of one staff'; (3) the Nirgranthas, or Jaina monks; (4) the Tāpasas (ascetics) or Vanyāśanas (eaters of wild fruits), *i.e.* Brāhmans of the third *āśrama*, living as hermits in the forest; (5) Bhikṣus (mendicants), *i.e.* Brāhmans of the fourth *āśrama*, living as homeless wanderers, and following, according to the commentator, the Mīmāṁsā system; (6) the Vṛddha-śrāvakas; and (7) the Charakas, who appear also to have been two kinds of wandering religious mendicants. That these seven classes of devotees, and therefore the Ājīvikas among them, were actually existing in Varāha Mihira's time, is evident from the fact that he teaches that a person is destined to enter into one of them according to the indications of his horoscope.

In the 9th cent. we have the testimony of the great Jain commentator Śīlāṅka (*c.* 876 A.D.) to the continued existence of the Ājīvikas. And here we first meet with the interesting fact of the identity of the Ājīvikas with the Digambara Jains. Commenting on the objection made by some to Mahāvīra's four 'restrictions' in the Sūtra-kṛtāṅga (*J.S.* ii. 267), Śīlāṅka states that the reference is to the Ājīvikas or Digambaras. Seeing that, in his comment on another passage of the same work (*ib.* ii. 245), he identifies the followers of Gosāla, that is, the Ājīvikas, with the Terāsiyas (Sanskr. Trairāśikas), it follows that in Śīlāṅka's view the followers of Gosāla, the Ājīvikas, the Terāsiyas, and the Digambaras were the same class of religious mendicants.

In the 10th cent. we have a further testimony to the identity of the Ājīvikas and the Digambaras. In his vocabulary, called the Abhidhāna Ratnamālā (ii. 189, 190), Halāyudha (*c.* 950 A.D.) enumerates a large number of names of the two Jain divisions, the Śvetāmbaras (or white-clothed ones) and the Digambaras (or sky-clad, *i.e.* naked ones), or, as he calls them, the Śvetavāsas and Digvāsas. The latter, he says, are also known as the Ājīva, which is only a shorter form of Ājīvika.

Lastly, in the 13th cent. we have, in certain temple records, a mention of the Ājīvikas as a sect then actually existing in South India. These records are inscriptions on the walls of the Perumāl Temple at Poygai near Virinchipuram (*S.I.Inscr.* i. 88, 89, 92, 108). They refer to grants of land to the temple together with 'the tax on Ājīvikas,' made by the Chola king Rājarāja in the years A.D. 1238, 1239, 1243, 1259. By the editor of the inscriptions these Ājīvikas are, on the authority of modern Tamil dictionaries, identified with the Jains. This, of course, means the Digambara sect of the Jains; for it is this sect whose principal seat, in those times, was in Southern India, and colonies of them are still to be found there (*IA* xxxii. 459; *JGOS* xxxviii. 17). The statements on the subject in the Tamil dictionaries appear to be based on the Tamil literature, and possibly on modern usage. The older Tamil literature (*teste* Dr. Pope) certainly uses the term Ājīvika in speaking of the Jains, *i.e.* the Digambaras. There can be no doubt, therefore, that since the 6th cent. A.D., when Varāha Mihira used the term, the name has signified the Digambara sect of the Jains.

As to Varāha Mihira's use of the term, it is to be noted that his commentator Bhaṭṭotpala, whose date is about A.D. 950, identifies the Ājīvikas with the Ekadaṇḍins. This identification is based on a Prākrit verse which he quotes from a Jain writer called Kālakāchārya. That writer, who lived about A.D. 450, that is, about a century earlier than Varāha Mihira, names the same seven classes of ascetics with the one exception that he writes Ekadaṇḍins for Ājīvikas (*Tr.C.O.* iii. 2, p. 553). Bhaṭṭotpala on his own part adds that the Ekadaṇḍins or Ājīvikas are devotees of Nārāyaṇa, that is, of Viṣṇu. On the other hand, Śīlāṅka, speaking of the Ekadaṇḍins in another connexion, declares them to be devotees of Śiva (*J.S.* ii. 245, 417). It is clear from this apparent discrepancy that what these two commentators had in their mind was the class of ascetics who are still known as the Daṇḍins, or 'Men of the Staff.' These ascetics are usually classed as belonging to the Śaivite division of Hindus; but they are rather eclectics, in that they invoke not only Śiva but also Viṣṇu as Nārāyaṇa. They carry a staff (*daṇḍa*) with a piece of reddish cloth attached to its top, wear only a narrow strip of cloth or go entirely naked, and are enjoined to live solitary. They hold Vedāntist doctrines; and any man, caste or no caste, may join them (*BG* ix. pt. i. 542). They must not be confounded with the Daśanāmi Daṇḍins, who are a comparatively modern class of ascetics, having been founded by the reformer Śaṅkarāchārya and his disciples in the 9th cent. A.D., and who live in convents (*maṭha*), and pay some regard to caste in the matter of admission (*JBAS* lix. 55, note).

From the fact that Gosāla is called Maṅkhaliputta, or Maṅkhali (Maskarin), *i.e.* the man of the bamboo-staff, it is clear that originally he belonged to the class of Ekadaṇḍin (or Daṇḍin) ascetics; and, though he afterwards joined Mahāvīra and adopted his system, he held some dis-

tinguishing tenets of his own, and also retained his old distinguishing mark, the bamboo-staff. On account of these distinctions his party within the Niggantha community was known as the Terāsiya or Ājīvika (above, p. 262), and apparently also as the Ekadaṇḍin, or the One-staff men. Still later, by reason of his evil life, when it was discovered, Gosāla was expelled by Mahāvīra from the community; and with him, it would appear, were ejected also a few others of the Ājīvika party who were his intimate friends and shared his evil practices. The Buddhist Scriptures name two of these friends, Kissa Saṅkichcha and Nanda Vachchha (above, p. 263[b]). These three men, after separating from Mahāvīra, appear to have lived a comparatively solitary life at Sāvatthī at the head of small groups of like-minded followers. But there is no reason to believe that, with the expulsion of the black sheep, the Ājīvika or Terāsiya party as such ceased to exist within the Niggantha Order. In fact, whatever evidence there is points the other way. Thus, in this connexion, the difference already noted (above, p. 264[b]) between the two versions of the 'four restrictions' possesses a peculiar significance. The reference to sexual delinquency occurs in that version which is concerned more especially with Gosāla and his faction; while the other version, which substitutes the reference to the use of the householder's vessel, is, according to the commentator Śīlāṅka, concerned with the Ājīvikas or Digambaras. The discrimination, in the two versions, tends to show that there was a portion of the Ajīvika party within the Niggantha Order which was not implicated in the antinomies of Gosāla's faction. As a matter of fact, the Digambaras differ, to the present day, from the Śvetāmbaras on the points implied in the four restrictions. Thus the restrictions respecting the use of cold water and natural seeds were intended to enforce extreme regard for any kind of 'life' (*jīva*); but the Digambaras are said to be 'only moderately careful of animal life,' while the Śvetāmbaras are extremely so (*IA* xxxii. 460). With respect to the fourth restriction, while both sects insist on the vow of chastity, they differ in regard to the possession of the alms bowl. While the bowl belongs to the regular outfit of the Śvetāmbara monks, the Digambaras are not permitted to carry it, but must receive their food in the palms of their hands (Oman, p. 151). As to the point of nakedness, the difference between the two divisions is sufficiently indicated by their names.

Further evidence in the same direction is afforded by the subsequent revival of the Terāsiya trouble within the Niggantha community, and by the retention to this day of the distinguishing mark of the staff among the Digambaras. On admission, we are told, 'the novice is supplied with the articles allowed to an ascetic by the Jain Scriptures, a black rod or *daṇḍ* about five feet long,' etc., and 'the Sādhu (or professed monk) always carries his staff (*daṇḍ*)' (*BG* ix. pt. i. p. 107).

The case, then, stands thus: Ekadaṇḍin is a general term for a class of ascetics which includes two subdivisions, the orthodox Śaivite Daṇḍins and the heterodox Jain Ājīvikas or Digambaras. The Jain writer Kālakāchārya, of course, meant to indicate the latter by the word Ekadaṇḍin; and Varāha Mihira, therefore, to preclude misunderstanding, substituted the more definite term Ājīvika. The orthodox commentator, Bhaṭṭotpala, misunderstanding the position, confused the heterodox Ājīvika with the orthodox Daṇḍin.

According to the tradition of the Digambaras, an acute antagonism between their own party and the party of the Śvetāmbaras arose during the life of Bhadrabāhu, who appears to have been the last head of the united Niggantha, or Jain community (*JGOS* xxxviii. 14, xl. 92; *IA* xxi. 80). Soon after his death, about B.C. 314 (*i.e.* 170 years after Mahāvīra's demise in B.C. 484, above, p. 261[b]), the differences between the two parties grew into a final and definite rupture, which the Śvetāmbara tradition in the Kalpa Sūtra (*J.S.* i. 290) ascribes to a man called Chhaluka Rohagupta. This man is said to have been a disciple of Mahāgiri, who was at the head of the Śvetāmbaras from 269 to 239 B.C., and it was he who is said to have founded the Terāsiya schism. The Terāsiyas, as we have seen (above, p. 262), are the same as the Ājīvikas, and the latter are identical with the Digambaras. It follows, therefore, that the Ājīvika or Digambara Order was already in existence in B.C. 251, when Aśoka dedicated the Barabar Hill cave to the Ājīvikas. As to Aśoka's successor Daśaratha (or Samprati, as the Jains call him), we are expressly told that he was converted to Jainism. It is true that the Śvetāmbaras claim him as a convert of their own leader Suhastin (*K.S.* 10; *J.S.* i. 290), a contemporary (B.C. 269–223) and co-leader with the above-mentioned Mahāgiri (*JGOS*, xxxvii. 501). But from the fact that Daśaratha dedicated, in B.C. 227, the Nagarjuni Hill caves to the Ājīvikas, perhaps his conversion is to be placed to the credit rather of the Digambaras; although, of course, he may, like his predecessor Aśoka, have distributed his favours impartially to the principal mendicant Orders of his time. Of Aśoka we know from his seventh Pillar Edict that he was a patron equally of the Buddhists, Nigganthas, Ājīvikas, and Brāhmaṇas. It is evident now, from what has been said, that the terms Niggantha and Ājīvika denote the two Jain Orders which are known to us as the Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras. It has been asserted (by Professors Kern and Bühler, *Ep. Ind.* ii. 274, *IA* xx. 362) that the term Brāhmaṇa in the Edict qualifies the Ājīvikas, describing them as being a 'Brāhmanical' Order. Irrespective of the difficulty whether at that early time there existed any orthodox Brāhmanical Order similar to the Buddhist and Jain (Niggantha), the Edict speaks of 'Brāhmaṇas.' That word does not mean 'a person connected in some way with Brāhmanism,' but it denotes 'a person of the Brāhman caste,' and in the context of the Edict it means 'a Brāhman ascetic,' that is, a person of the Brāhman caste who had adopted the rule of the fourth Brāhmanic *āśrama* or way of living. Such a person took on himself to live a homeless wandering life as a religious mendicant. The appeal to the statement of Bhaṭṭotpala, as has been already shown (above, p. 266), is unavailing. A Vaiṣṇava or Śaiva ascetic may belong (or rather, may have belonged before joining) to any caste (W.M.H. pp. 59 ff., 83 ff.). These men may be said to be 'Brāhmanical' ascetics because they profess to be devotees of Brāhmanical deities, but no Indian would call them 'Brāhmaṇas.' The word 'brāhmanical' expresses a Western idea, quite foreign to the word *brāhmaṇa*.

The history of the Ājīvikas may be briefly summed up as follows: Gosāla commenced his ascetic life as a Maṅkhali, or Maskarin, that is, as an individual of the ancient well-known class of religious mendicants which was distinguished by the carrying of a bamboo staff. After a time he made the acquaintance of Mahāvīra, who belonged to another class of religious mendicants known as the Nigganthas, or Unfettered Ones (*i.e.* unfettered from the bonds of *karma*), the followers of Pārśvanātha. The two men, holding kindred views on the stringency of ascetic requirements (*e.g.* on the point of nakedness [*achelaka*]), associated, and elaborated a common system, to which, however, Gosāla added some particulars of his own. Each of them had his own party among their common following; and Gosāla's party was known as the Ājīvikas, or 'Professionals,' on account of its leader's peculiar views on the *ājīva*, or 'profession,' of a religious mendicant. In course of time Gosāla developed antinomian proclivities; and this produced ill-feeling between the two associates and ultimately led to a total rupture. Gosāla departed, together with those of the Ājīvika party who actively sympathized with him. There is no reason to suppose that the seceders formed a large group, or that as a group they survived the death of their leader Gosāla. The others of the Ājīvika party who had not shared Gosāla's antinomian tenets and practices remained within the Niggantha community; but they retained their peculiar views on the points of total nakedness, non-possession of a bowl, imperfect regard for life, distinctive mark of a staff, and probably other matters. On account of these differences, there no doubt existed some amount of friction between the Ājīvika party and the rest of the Niggantha community. It manifested itself especially in the time

of Bhadrabāhu, whose sympathies appear to have been rather with the Ājīvikas. But the friction came to a head only in the earlier part of the 3rd cent. B.C., when that party, which was known also as the Terāsiya (Trairāśika), definitely and finally separated to form the distinct Order which is now known as the Digambaras. It thus appears that the Jain division into Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras may be traced back to the very beginning of Jainism, it being indirectly due to the antagonism of the two associated leaders, Mahāvīra and Gosāla, who are the representatives of the two hostile sections.

It remains only to notice a few detached references to Ājīvika mendicants occurring in the Buddhist Scriptures and elsewhere. The Vinaya Piṭaka (i. 8; *SBE* xiii. 90) and Majjhima Nikāya (i. 170; N.R. i. 271, ii. 454) relate how Buddha, immediately after his enlightenment, met an Ājīvika of the name of Upaka, who, however, received Buddha's account of his spiritual experiences rather contemptuously. The Majjhima Nikāya (i. 31; N.R. i. 45) further relates the story of an Ājīvika Panduputta who had been originally a carriage-builder, and who was converted by Buddha to his own belief. In the Vinaya Piṭaka (ii. 284; *SBE* xx. 370) we are told also of an anonymous Ājīvika mendicant who gave the Buddhist monk Kassapa the first information of his master's death. These three men probably were members of the Ājīvika party in the Niggantha community. In another place the Vinaya Piṭaka (ii. 130; *V.P.Tr.* xx. 132) relates how on one occasion certain Ājīvikas, meeting with some Buddhist monks who walked under the protection of sunshades, jeered at the un-ascetic conduct of their rivals. In the Mahāvaṁsa (T.Mv. 67) there is a curious notice of a group of Ājīvikas which existed in Ceylon in the time of King Pandukabhaya about B.C. 426, and on whose behalf that king is said to have built a house (*gaha*). This notice, however, considering the very early date to which it refers, must be accepted with much reserve. Another very curious notice of the Ājīvikas occurs in a little book on *Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan*, by Sadajiro Sugiura (ed. by Mr. Edgar A. Singer, jr., in the Philosophical Series [No. 4] of the Publications of the University of Pennsylvania).

In the Introduction, p. 16, the author says: 'Two more schools are frequently included by Chinese and Japanese authors among the great ones (*i.e.* the well-known six Indian). They are called Nikendabtra and Ashibika, and are quite similar to each other. They both hold that the penalty of a sinful life must sooner or later be paid; and since it is impossible to escape from it, it is better that it should be paid as soon as possible, so that the life to come may be free for enjoyment. Thus their practices were ascetic: fasting, silence, immovability, and the burying of themselves to the neck (*Nyakuron-so*, i. 22), were their expressions of penance. They were probably offshoots of the Jainist or some other Hindu sect.'

The 'Nikendabtra and Ashibika' of this statement are obviously the Nigganthas and Ājīvikas, that is, the Śvetāmbara and Digambara Jains.

LITERATURE.—There exists no connected account of the Ājīvikas; but, in addition to the works mentioned in the text, short detached remarks on the sect occur in the following works:—Bühler, *Epigraphia Indica* (Calcutta, 1894), ii. 272, 274, 323, and *IA* xx. 361 ff.; Burnouf, *Lotus de la bonne loi* (Paris, 1852); Grimblot, 'Sept Suttas Pâlis' in *IA* (Bombay, 1879), viii. 312; Jacobi, 'Jaina Sûtras,' *SBE*, vols. xxii. and xlv. (Oxford, 1884–95), pt. i. pp. 16, 18, pt. ii. pp. 19, 22–26, 29–32, and *IA* ix. 161 ff.; H. Kern, *Hist. de Bouddhisme*, i. (Paris, 1901–3), 15, 121, 151, ii. 6,41, 337, and *Manual of Indian Buddhism* (Strassburg, 1896), pp. 72 and n. 2, 74, 82, 112, 116; Leumann, *V.O.J.* iii. (Vienna, 1889), 328 ff., *Actes du Sixième Congrès Or.* 1883, pt. iii. p. 554 ff., and *Aupapâtika Sûtra* (Leipzig, 1883), pt. i. p. 80, par. 120; Oldenberg, *Buddha* (4th ed., 1903), pp. 82, 93, 199; O. Schrader, *Stand der Ind. Philosophie* (Strassburg, 1902), pp. 12, 34 ff.; Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India* (London, 1903), pp. 143, 146, 200, and *Dialogues of the Buddha* (London, 1899), pp. 71, 219, 220, 227, 232; Rockhill, *Life of the Buddha* (London, 1884), pp. 101, 249 ff.; Senart, *Inscriptions de Piyadassi* (Paris, 1886), ii. p. 209 ff.; V. A. Smith, *Asoka* (Oxford, 1901), pp. 106, 144 f.; Weber, *Catalogue of the Royal Library, Berlin, Index*, p. 1280 (1892).

A. F. R. HOERNLE.

AJMĒR, AJMĪR (the *meru*, or sacred mountain, of Ajayarājā, who is said to have founded the city in the 2nd cent. A.D.).—The capital of the British district of Ajmēr-Mhairwārā, in the province of Rājputāna. It is noted for two important religious buildings, a mosque, and the shrine of a noted faqīr, or Musalmān saint. The former, which bears the name of Arhāī Din kā Jhoñprā, 'the shed of two and a half days,' is a converted Jaina temple; and the most probable explanation of the name is that the Sultān Quṭb-ad-dīn of Altamsh, when he visited the place, ordered that within that period the original Jaina temple should be converted into a mosque for his devotions. It is now the finest existing specimen of the early style of Musalmān mosque in India. Inscriptions fix the date of its erection between A.D. 1211 and 1236, in the reign of Altamsh. It is thus of the same age as the celebrated mosque near the Kuth Minār in Old Delhi, and Cunningham supposes that both were probably planned by the same architect and erected by the same body of workmen.

The faqīr's shrine, or *dargāh*, marks the resting place of the famous Musalmān saint, Khwājah Mu'īn ad-dīn Ḥasan Chishtī (A.D. 1142–1236), who was born in Sijistān or Sīstān, eastern Persia, whence he journeyed to India in 1193, and retired to the seclusion of a hermitage at Ajmēr. In the mass of hagiologic literature which has grown up round this personage, many wonders and miracles wrought by him are recorded. The Emperor Akbar made a pilgrimage to his tomb, and to the present time the merchants of the Dargāh Bāzār, which adjoins the tomb of the saint, daily lay their keys on the steps of the shrine before they open their shops. The custody of the shrine is in the hands of the eldest lineal descendant of the holy man, and all the descendants of the Khwājah still enjoy such consideration throughout India that the Nizām of Hyderābād will not sit in their presence, and even the Hindu Mahārājās of Jaipur, Gwālior, and Jodhpur place them on the same seat with themselves. The annual festival of the Saint is held in the month Rajab, when enormous cauldrons of rice, butter, and other condiments are filled at the expense of rich pilgrims to the shrine, and while the food is still in a state of boiling heat it is scrambled for by the mob of fanatical devotees who attend the fair, and who highly value even a small particle of the sacred food. It is counted among the miracles of the Saint that no lives have been lost on such occasions, though burns are frequent.

LITERATURE.—La Touche, in *Rajputana Gazetteer* (1879), ii. 61 ff.; Fergusson, *Hist. of Ind. and Eastern Architecture* (1899), 263, 510 ff.; *Indian Antiquary* (1897), xxvi. 164. For the history of the saint, *Ain-i-Akbari*, tr. Jarrett (1894), iii. 361.

W. CROOKE.

AKĀLĪS.—The sect of the *Akālīs* differs essentially from all the other Sikh orders in being a militant organization, corresponding to the Nāgas or Gosains among the Hindus. Their foundation is ascribed to Guru Govind* himself, and they steadfastly opposed Banda's attempted innovations. The term *akālī*, or 'immortal,' is said† to be derived from *akālī-puruṣa*, 'worshippers of the eternal,' but probably it is a self-assumed title, bearing its obvious meaning. The Akālīs wear blue chequered dresses,‡ with bangles or bracelets of steel round their wrists, and quoits of steel in their lofty conical blue turbans, together with miniature daggers, knives, and an iron chain.§

* The tenth and last Guru of the Sikhs, 1675–1708.

† Murray's *Hist. of the Panjāb*, i. p. 130; Cunningham's *Hist. of the Sikhs*, p. 117. But *akāl* means 'deathless,' *i.e.* 'God,' and *Akālī* is simply 'God's worshipper.'

‡ Malcolm points out that Kṛṣṇa's elder brother, Bala Rām, wore blue clothes, whence he is called Nīlāmbar, or 'clad in dark blue,' and Sitivas, or 'the blue clad' (*Asiatic Researches*, xi. p. 221).

§ A few Akālīs wear the *jaṭā* or top-knot, but not all. Those who do not, only use '*dur* and *loṭa*' water; and also smoke,

In their military capacity the Akālīs were called Nihangs, or reckless,* and played a considerable part in Sikh history, forming the Shahīds, or first of the four *dehras*. At the siege of Multān in 1818 a few Akālī fanatics † carried the fausse-braye by surprise, and precipitated the fall of that fortress. The career of Phūlā Singh illustrates both their defects and their qualities. This Akālī first came into notice as the leader of the attack on Metcalfe's escort at Amritsar in 1809. He was then employed by Ranjīt Singh, who stood in considerable awe of him, as a leader in the Indus valley, where he was guilty of atrocious cruelty towards the Muhammadan population, and in Kashmīr.‡ Finally, Phūlā Singh and his Akālīs contributed to, or rather virtually won for Ranjīt Singh, the great Sikh victory over the Yūsufzais at Terī in 1823. In this battle Phūlā Singh met with a heroic death, and his tomb at Naushahra is now an object of pilgrimage to Hindus and Muhammadans alike.

Under Phūlā Singh's earlier leadership, and perhaps before his rise, the Akālīs had become a terror to friends and foes alike, and they were dreaded by the Sikh chiefs, from whom they often levied contributions by force.§ Ranjīt Singh, after 1823, did much to reduce their power, and the order lost its importance.

The Akālī headquarters were the Akāl Būnga‖ at Amritsar, where they assumed the direction of religious ceremonies ¶ and the duty of convoking the Gurūmatā; indeed, they laid claim to exercise a general leadership of the Khālsa. Since Ranjīt Singh's time Anandpur has been their real headquarters, but their influence has to a large extent passed away, and some of them have degenerated into mere buffoons.

As an order the Akālīs are celibate. They have, says Trumpp, no regular chief or disciple, yet one hears of their *gurus*, whose leavings are eaten by their disciples (*sewak* or *chela*). They do not eat meat or drink spirits, as other Sikhs do, but consume inordinate quantities of *bhang*.

LITERATURE.—The general histories of the Sikhs, see art. SIKHS; J. C. Oman, *Mystics, Ascetics, and Saints of India*, London, 1903, pp. 153, 198–201; A. Barth, *Religions of India*[2], London, 1889, p. 248 f.; Monier Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hinduism*[4], London, 1891, p. 175; W. Crooke, *Things Indian*, London, 1906, p. 431; Panjāb Census Reports, Sir Denzil Ibbetson (1881) and E. D. Maclagan (1891).

H. A. ROSE.

AKBAR.—**1.** *Life.*—The emperor Akbar, whose full name was Abū-l-fath (or Abū-l-Moẓaffar) Jalāl-ad-dīn Akbar Ghāzī, was born at Umarkoṭ ('the fort of Umar') in Sind on 15 Oct., O.S., 1542. His birthday was on a Sunday, a circumstance to which importance was afterwards attached, as it seemed to connect him with the sun and with the Messiah, whose birth was traditionally said to have taken place on that day. He was the son of Humāyūn, the second king of India of the Moghul dynasty, and grandson of Bābar, the conqueror of India. His mother, Ḥamīda Bānū, was of Persian origin, and was descended from the famous saint Aḥmad of Jām, and she was also related to Sulṭān Ḥusain Baiqara, the celebrated king of Herāt. But though of noble lineage, her father was neither rich nor distinguished, and was in the service of Mīrzā Hindāl, a younger brother of Humāyūn, as a religious teacher.

After his father's defeats by the Afghans and flight from his brother 'Askarī, the infant Akbar was left behind in camp, and was taken possession of by his uncle 'Askarī and conveyed to Kandahār. He was then about fifteen months old, and did not see his parents again till he was four or five years of age. This was when Humāyūn succeeded, with the aid of the king of Persia, in defeating his brothers and in establishing himself in Afghanistan. When Akbar was twelve or thirteen years of age, he accompanied his father on his expedition to India, and was present at the decisive battle of Machīwārah, Jan. 1555, when Humāyūn, or rather his general Bairām Khān, defeated the Afghan Sikandar Sūr. This was followed by Humāyūn's entry into Delhi and his resumption of power; but his good fortune was not of long continuance. In Jan. 1556 he was killed by falling down the steps leading from the roof of his library, and Akbar, who was then in the Panjāb with his guardian Bairām Khān, was crowned at Kalānūr on 14 Feb. 1556. On 5 Nov. following, Akbar and his guardian Bairām Khān won a victory at Pānīpat—the Indian Armageddon—over Hemū, the Hindu general of the Afghan king; and though the boy Akbar refused, like Gideon's sons, to slay Hemū with his own hands, he earned the title of *ghāzī*, or 'holy warrior,' and retained it to his death, in spite of all his changes of creed. For some years after this Bairām was regent; but in 1560 a palace-intrigue enabled Akbar to rid himself of his guardian and to assume direct power. For a time, however, he deferred greatly to his nurse Māham Anaga, a Turkish lady of great ability. But the misconduct and punishment of her son Adham Khān put an end to her power and her life in 1561, and after this Akbar became really his own master. From that time forward his career was one of almost uninterrupted success. He gradually became master of Upper India, including Kashmīr and Afghanistan, as well as of Bengal, Bihār and Orissa, Gujarāt and Sind, and part of the Deccan. He died, after a reign of fifty years, on his birthday or the day following, in 1605, at Agra, and was buried at Sikandra.

2. *Religious opinions.*—This side of Akbar's character has received what is perhaps a disproportionate amount of attention. No doubt the question of his beliefs is a most interesting one, but the almost exclusive attention which has been paid to it has tended to obscure the emperor's real greatness. After all, Akbar was a king immersed in affairs, and religion was only the occupation of his leisure hours. He was a great conqueror and administrator, and was more in his place at the head of his troops, or when engaged in revenue-reforms, than when seated in his Hall of Worship. It is certain, too, that he never seriously entertained the idea of becoming a Christian, and that the devoted Italian and Portuguese missionaries were sadly deceived in their hopes about him.

Father Goldie very sensibly remarks: 'How far Akbar was sincere in his search for truth, how far he had towards it a

which the *jaṭā*-wearers may not do. Others, again, wear a yellow turban beneath the blue one, so as to show a yellow band across the forehead. The story goes that a Khatrī of Delhi (Nand Lāl, author of the Zindagā-nima) desired to see the Guru in yellow, and Govind Singh gratified his wish. Many Sikhs wear the yellow turban at the Basant Panchmi. A couplet erroneously ascribed to Bhai Gurdās says:

Siāh, sufed, surkh, zardāe,
Jo pahne, soi Gurbhāī.

'They who wear dark blue (the Akālīs), white (the Nirmalas), red (the Udāsis), or yellow, are all brothers in the Guru.'

* Ibbetson, § 522. Cunningham (p. 379) says *nihang* = 'naked' or 'pure,' and it has that meaning literally (cf. Platts, *s.v.*); but in Sikh parlance the word undoubtedly means 'free from care,' 'careless,' and so 'reckless.' In Hinduism it bears its original meaning.

† They were headed by one Jassa Singh, called Mālā ('rosary') Singh, from his piety. 'He denied himself the use of *bhang*, the only intoxicating drug in use among the Akālīs.' See Carmichael Smyth's *Reigning Family of Lahore*, p. 188.

‡ Prinsep, on the *Sikh Power in the Panjāb*, p. 111, and *Phoola Singh, the Akālī*, in Carmichael Smyth, *op. cit.* 185–192.

§ Contemporary writers had a low opinion of their character. *E.g.* Osborne describes their insolence and violence (*Court and Camp of Ranjīt Singh*, pp. 143–146, 181).

‖ One of the *takhts*, or thrones, of the Sikhs.

¶ M'Gregor (*Hist. of the Sikhs*, i. 238) says that on visiting the *temple* (*sic*) of the Akālīs at Amritsar, the stranger presents a few rupees, and in return receives some sugar, while a small mirror is held before his face so as to reflect his image. This practice, if it ever existed, is now obsolete.

feeling akin to the agnosticism of our day, or whether he was merely bent, from the very first, on making for his subjects an eclectic religion, which would fuse into one the various creeds under his sceptre, and over which he determined to place himself as the supreme prophet and infallible teacher, it is hard to say. Certain it is that Blessed Rudolf, to whom such universal toleration was a new experience, very naturally made the same mistake about Akbar that many a zealous foreign priest makes about English non-Catholics when first he meets with them, and is captivated by their courteous respect for his views, and their kind interest in his work. The sovereign was quite willing to pay homage to the Holy Scriptures, and pleased to see the 'ulamā beaten on their own ground. But from this to submission in heart and deed to the authority of the Church was a long step, and one of which he very probably never dreamt.'

Akbar's religious opinions have been discussed by Hindus, Muhammadans, Parsis, Christians, and freethinkers, and we have details about them in the Akbar-Nāmah, Badayūnī, the Dabistān, and in the writings of Du Jarric, Bartoli, Vans Kennedy, Wilson, Elphinstone, Rehatsek, Blochmann, Count Noer, General Maclagan, and others. We have also Tennyson's poem *Akbar's Dream*. Undoubtedly Akbar has received more credit than he deserves for the depth and fervour of his religious feelings. He had an active mind and delighted in discussions. As he himself said, 'Discourses on philosophy have such a charm for me that they distract me from all else, and I forcibly restrain myself from listening to them, lest the necessaries of the hour should be neglected.' But he was the reverse of a fanatic or an enthusiast. He was, before all things, a man of the world.* His real belief was that forms of religion were of little consequence. He saw that men were good or bad from causes quite remote from their religious tenets, and that there were good men in all religions. He had no overpowering conviction that there was salvation or destruction in any creed; and not being a one-sided enthusiast himself, he could not establish a new religion or make any ardent proselytes. He was a sincere inquirer after truth, but he was not a profound thinker, and his book-knowledge was exceedingly small. Altogether, he was very badly equipped for religious or philosophical discussions; for, as Badāyūnī says, though he had an acute† mind and was a seeker after truth, he was exceedingly ignorant. He had not, like Julian the Apostate, studied in the schools, and was not competent, therefore, to arbitrate between contending sects. At the same time he was wiser and less superstitious than Julian, and did not, like him, try to turn the clock back and to revive a dead paganism. Julian was a fanatical polytheist, and disliked freethinkers as much as he disliked Christians; but Akbar was made of calmer stuff.

Though Badāyūnī in one place (Lowe, 312) ascribes Akbar's heresies to his having been associated from boyhood with Hindus and to his early marriages with Rajput princesses, there seems to be no doubt that Akbar, like many other freethinkers, began by being pious after an orthodox fashion. But perhaps Badāyūnī, by his jingling expression *Hinūd ranūd*, does not mean so much that the Hindus with whom Akbar associated were men of bad character, as that they were devotees and ascetics, for *ranūd* is the plural of *rand*, a word which has a double meaning, and signifies both a libertine and a devotee. In this sense the charge is true, for Akbar was from his youth up fond of the society of *yogīs* and *sannyāsīs*. Writing of the sixth year, when Akbar was still under twenty,

* On one occasion he remarked, 'Divine worship in monarchs consists in their justice and good administration'; and added that mortifications of the body and spirit were for the elect (Jarrett, iii. 399).

† '*Jauharī nafīs u ṭālib-i-ḥaqq būd ammā amī maḥz*,' lit. 'He was a rare jeweller (*i.e.* a connoisseur), and a seeker after truth, but totally ignorant.' Akbar was ambitious of the character of a prophet or an apostle, and seems to have flattered himself that his own ignorance was an advantage for playing such a part. One of his sayings (Jarrett, iii. 385) is: 'The prophets were all illiterate. Believers should therefore retain one of their sons in that condition.'

Abū-l-Faẓl tells us that one night Akbar went out from his palace in Agra incognito, in order to mix with the crowd of good and bad people who were assembled together to make a pilgrimage to Bahraich in Oudh to the shrine of Sālār Mas'ūd. He was nearly recognized by one of the vagabonds, but escaped by improvising a squint. In the same year he went off one night from Agra on a hunting expedition, and at Mandakhor, a place between Agra and Fatḥpūr, he fell in with some singers who were chanting in Hindu ballads the praises of Mu'īn ad-dīn, the great saint of Ajmīr. He had often listened to tales of this saint, and now the songs inspired him with a desire to visit his tomb. He felt what Abū-l-Faẓl calls *jāzibat tawajjuh*, or 'attraction towards visiting'; and in that same year he accomplished the journey to Ajmīr, in spite of the remonstrances of his courtiers. For many years afterwards he paid an annual visit to the same shrine. Though in both these instances the gathering was ostensibly Muhammadan, yet then, as now, many Hindus took part in it, and doubtless Akbar met many Hindus on such occasions.

In 983 Hijra (A.D. 1575), Akbar built his '*Ibādatḥāna* or Hall of Worship. Badāyūnī tells us that the cause of this was that Akbar had been filled with gratitude to God for his successes.

'Victory had followed upon victory, and the extent of his empire had increased daily. Not a single enemy remained. He associated much with *faqīrs*, and spent much time in discussions about the Word of God and the word of the Prophet. He engaged in questions about *Ṣūfiism* and theology, and spent many nights in repeating the name of God (*Zikr*) and in uttering the words *Yā Hū* and *Yā Hādī*, "O He" and "O Guide," in which exercises he had become skilful.'

At this time too Akbar would often seat himself in solitude on a stone bench near his palace in Fatḥpūr, and spend the hours of the early dawn in prayer and contemplation.* It seems that Akbar, who was always of an imitative turn of mind, was induced to make these exercises by what he heard about Sulaimān Kararānī,† the able ruler of Bengal, Bihār and Orissa, who used to spend the later hours of the night in prayer and in the company of 150 *sheikhs* and *'ulamā*. He was also influenced by the news that his aged relative, Sulaimān Mīrzā of Badakhshān, was coming to visit him. Sulaimān was an old warrior who had fought seventy-two battles with the Uzbegs, but he became a *ṣūfī* in his later years, and used to discuss points of ritual with Badāyūnī.

In the following year, 984 (or 1576), Akbar's devotion carried him so far that he wished to make a pilgrimage to Mecca, and was restrained only by the remonstrances of his officers. As it was, he made a show of going, polled his hair, bared his head and feet, donned the pilgrim's dress, and walked some distance with the caravan. He also appointed a *mīr ḥajj*, or superintendent of pilgrims, supplied him with funds, built or purchased pilgrim-ships, and otherwise assisted his subjects to go to Mecca. In 1575 he had also shown his interest in pilgrimages by enabling his aunt Gulbadan Begam, and one of his chief wives, Selīma Begam, and other ladies to proceed to Mecca *via* Surat.

In the 23rd year of his reign, May, 1578, Akbar

* The Jesuits, who had studied Akbar carefully, reported of him that 'Il était mélancolique de sa nature et sujet au mal caduc, tellement que pour se tenir joyeux il s'entretenait en divers exercices, plaisirs et récréatifs, comme à voir combattre des éléphants, etc.' (Du Jarric). Compare also Akbar's saying, 'On the completion of my twentieth year, I experienced an internal bitterness, and from the lack of spiritual provision for my last journey, my soul was seized with exceeding sorrow' (Jarrett, iii. 38[b]). [The reading seems doubtful, and perhaps the 20th year means the 20th year of the reign]. Cf. also Jarrett, iii. 388: 'One night my heart was weary of the burden of life.'

† Sulaimān Kararānī died in 980, some three years before the '*Ibādatḥāna* was begun. So Badāyūnī must either be confusing things new and old, or he must be referring to some posthumous accounts of Sulaimān's behaviour.

had a remarkable experience which is described as a case of *jaẓba*, or attraction. He had gone out to the banks of the Jhelum—the Hydaspes of Alexander—to enjoy hunting, and had appointed officers to organize an immense *qamargāh*, or battue. It was to extend over some fifty miles of country from Girjāk—supposed to be the Bucephala of Alexander—to old Bhera. They were ten days engaged in driving the game, and had nearly completed the work, when something came over Akbar, and he suddenly broke up the hunt and set free all the animals, even, says Abū-l-Faẓl, to the finches. Niẓām ad-dīn, who by mistake puts the event into the 24th year, calls it a case of a strong attraction (*jaẓba qawī*), and says that Akbar bestowed alms on *faqīrs* and others, and ordered a garden to be laid out and a house built on the spot where he had sat under a tree and experienced the call. Shortly afterwards he made a rapid ride to Ajmīr, in order to pay his annual visit to the shrine and to be present at the anniversary of the saint's death. In this year also he revived the discussions in the '*Ibādatḫāna*, and we are told that the Ṣūfī, the philosopher, the rhetorician, the lawyer, the Sunnite, the Shī'ite, the Brāhman, the Yātī, the Buddhist, the atheist, the Christian, the Jew, the Sabæan, the Zoroastrian, and others enjoyed the pleasure of seeing Akbar place himself in the pulpit and preside over the debates. The date given for the commencement of these discussions is 20 Mihr A.H. 986 or 3 Oct. 1578. Abū-l-Faẓl puts Father Rudolf Acquaviva's appearance in the Hall of Worship into this year, and tells an apocryphal story about the Father's challenging the Muhammadan doctors to the ordeal of fire; but unless Abū-l-Faẓl is giving a consecutive account of the discussions and so has departed from a chronological order, there is a mistake in his narrative, for Acquaviva did not arrive at Fatḥpūr till February, 1580. According to Abū-l-Faẓl, Akbar spoke at one of the meetings as follows:

'Formerly, from assenting to the opinions of specious, wicked men, we thought that outward conformity and the letter of Muhammadanism profited even in the absence of inward conviction. Hence we by fear and force compelled many believers in the Brāhman (*i.e.* Hindu) religion to adopt the faith of our ancestors. Now that the light of truth has shone upon our soul, the brilliant illumination has possessed us that in this distressful spot of contrarieties (the world), where the darkness of understanding and the blackness of presumption are gathered together, fold upon fold, a single step cannot be taken without the torch of proof, and that creed only is profitable which is adopted with the approval of the intellect. To repeat the words of a creed, to remove a patch of skin (*i.e.* to become circumcised), and to place the extremity of one's bones (*i.e.* the adoring head) on the ground out of dread of the Sultan is not the seeking after God.

'Obedience is not the placing your forehead in the dust;
Put Truth forward,* for sincerity does not dwell in the forehead.

'The first step in this perilous desert is with a high courage and a lofty resolve to do battle with the protean and presumptuous carnal soul, and by rigorous self-knowledge to bring Anger and Lust into subjection to Sultan Reason, and to erase from the soul the images of evil habits. Mayhap the Sun of Proof shall emerge from behind the veil of Error and convert one into a worshipper of the Truth. Afterwards, he may by inward influences draw to himself some inquirer after the Path. Such loadstones are quarried in the mines of asceticism. Or he may, by virtue of a talisman and might of incantations, bring him into his circle. Should the latter, by an error of judgment, fall into the pit of heresy, assuredly he shall not be stained with the dust of blame. We blame ourselves for what we did in accordance with old rules and before the real truth about Faith had been made known to us.'

These words may be compared with two sentences in Akbar's Memorabilia at the end of the '*Aín*. 'Formerly,' he states, 'I persecuted men into conformity with my faith and deemed it Islām. As I grew in knowledge, I was overwhelmed with shame. Not being a Muslim myself, it was unmeet to force others to become such. What constancy is to be expected from proselytes on compulsion?' . . . 'The first step in this long road is not to give the rein to desire and anger, but to take a measured rule and align one's actions thereon.'†

Akbar went on to introduce the subject of the tenets of opposed religions, and described their various excellences. He gave no weight, says Abū-l-Faẓl, to the foolish talk of the vulgar, but seized upon whatever was good in any religion. He often said, 'He is truly a man who makes Justice his leader in the path of inquiry, and who culls from every sect whatever Reason approves of. Perchance in this way that lock whose key has been lost may be opened.' In this connexion he praised the truth-choosing of the natives of India, and eloquently described their comradeship in the day of disaster, and how they played away, in the shade of Fidelity, Goods, Life, Reputation, and Religion—those four things which are prized above all others in the world's market. He also dwelt on the wonderful way in which the women of India reduce themselves to ashes whenever the day of calamity arrives. To the learned Christians he said:

'Since you reckon the reverencing of woman part of your religion, and allow not more than one wife to a man, it would not be wonderful if such fidelity and self-sacrifice were found among your women. The extraordinary thing is that it occurs among those of the Hindu religion. There are many concubines, and many of them are neglected and unappreciated, and spend their days unfructuously in the privy chamber of chastity, yet in spite of such bitterness of life they are flambeaux of love and friendship.'

In the 24th year of his reign, in the month of Bahman, Jan. 1580, he sent a force under Quṭb ad-dīn to capture the ports held by the Portuguese, on the ground that they hindered the pilgrims on their journey. Probably this refers to the exactions which the Portuguese made under the guise of the issue of safe-conducts, and also to their issuing tickets bearing representations of the Virgin and Child. Zealous Musalmāns objected to these as being marks of idolatry. A remarkable thing is that at about the very time that Akbar was organizing this expedition against the Portuguese, Rudolf Acquaviva, the Italian priest, and his companions were, at Akbar's request, journeying from Goa to his court, and were indulging in fond hopes of his conversion! His invitation had been received in Sept. 1579, and they left in November of that year and arrived at Fatḥpūr in Feb. 1580. They came therefore too late to make any impression on Akbar, or at least too late to persuade him to be a Christian. The great year of Akbar's change was 1579, when he mounted the pulpit one Friday at Fatḥpūr Sīkrī and recited a stanza of Faiẓī's, and when he obtained a document from the '*ulamā* certifying that he was more than a *mujtahid* and that the people were bound by his religious decrees. Apparently the pulpit-incident took place in June 1579, and the signing of the document was in September of the same year. According to Abū-l-Faẓl, the idea of becoming supreme pontiff occurred to Akbar at an even earlier period. In describing the events of the 23rd year (986 or 1578), he says that about this time the idea of the primacy (*peshwāī*) of the spiritual world took possession of him. He seems to ascribe this to the influence of music. Further on in the same chapter he mentions the wonderful effect produced upon Akbar by the singing of one Bakhshū, or Bachū, who was perhaps the famous minstrel of Bahādur Shāh of Gujrāt.

The document seems to have been signed by the 'ulamā on 2 September 1579. Copies of it are given by Niẓām ad-dīn and Badāyānī, but Abū-l-Faẓl contents himself with giving a short abstract of it, and, curiously enough, he says nothing about his father Mubārak's share in it, though, according to Badāyūnī, he was the prime mover in the matter, and the person who drafted the paper. It certainly was an extraordinary document, and one which did little credit to Mubārak as an honest man. It declared that Akbar (who could neither read nor write) was a most learned theologian (*'alam ba Allah*), and that, if *mujtahids* differed in opinion about any religious point, he could decide between them, and that his decision was final; also that if he issued any new order, the nation was bound to obey it, provided that it was not opposed to the Qur'ān, and should be for the public benefit. If any one opposed such an order, he would be ruined spiritually and physically, and be subject to final damnation.

Badāyūnī tells us that the '*ulamā*, with the

* There is a play here on the words *pesh* and *peshānī*.
† Jarrett, iii. 384.

exception of Mubārak, signed this document unwillingly, but that Mubārak added to his signature the statement that he was heart and soul in agreement with the paper, and that he had for years been awaiting its execution. Badāyūnī adds that after Akbar had procured this document, the road of *ijtihād* (decree-giving) became open, the supremacy of the *imām's* intellect was established, and no place remained for opposition. There was an end to the resolving of questions and to prohibitions. The intellect of the *imām* became the Law, and Islām was called bigotry.

Abū-l-Faẓl's account of the execution of the document and of its effects is naturally very different from Badāyūnī's. According to him, all the doctors were eager for its execution, and the reluctance was on the part of Akbar, who was unwilling, as he expresses it, to come out from behind the veil. He yielded to their entreaties only because he came to perceive that, in leaving his position as commander of the spiritual world, and accepting the rank of *mujtahid*, he was in reality placing a veil over himself. The result of the document was, he says, that the wanderers in the desert of doubt attained certitude, and that distracted souls obtained repose. Almost immediately afterwards, however, he admits that Akbar's conduct gave rise to many misconceptions, and that he was accused of claiming the Godhead, of disliking the Muhammadan religion, and of being a Hindu. He says that one special reason for such ideas was the appearance of Christian philosophers in the meetings, and the discomfiture by them of the pretenders of learning.

It was probably in order to counteract these ideas that Akbar, shortly after this, paid a visit to the shrine at Ajmīr* (he did not go there at the usual time, that is, at the saint's anniversary), and that he paid extraordinary reverence to a stone which was brought from Mecca and was said to bear an impression of the Prophet's foot. Abū-l-Faẓl tells us that the impression was not genuine and that Akbar knew this, yet that he completely silenced calumnies by his politic conduct on this occasion.

Akbar's innovations in religion, added to his interference with the fief-holders, led to the rebellion of Bihār and Bengal. Maulānā Muhammad Yezdī, the chancellor of Jaunpūr, issued a decree to the effect that it was a duty to rebel against Akbar. Akbar retaliated by having him and another leading rebel—Mu'izz al-mulk of Mashhad—arrested, and contrived that they should be drowned in the Jumna. This rebellion made Akbar proceed more carefully with his new religion, and the Christian missionaries found him less disposed to listen to them. After the rebellion was suppressed, however, he advanced further in the path of heresy, and formally instituted the Divine Faith and practised sun-worship. At the same time he was intolerant to some heretics. A sect calling themselves *Ilāhīs* sprang up, but Akbar had the members seized and sent off to Sind and Afghanistan, where they were bartered for horses!

Akbar had a theory that the Muhammadan religion could last for only a thousand years from its origin. This was apparently a part of the Mahdavī movement which, as Blochmann's preface to the translation of the *'Ain* shows, began in A.H. 900, that is, at the beginning of the 10th cent. (Muham.). In accordance with his belief in the approaching termination of the Muhammadan religion, Akbar proceeded in the year A.H. 990 still further with his innovations. Among other things, he ordered a history to be written which he called the *Tārīkh Alfī*, or 'Chronicle of a thousand years.' At this time only ten years were wanting to complete the chiliad according to the ordinary reckoning from the Flight to Medina, but Akbar disliked this era, on the ostensible ground that the word 'Flight' was of ill omen, and that it implied the success of the enemies of the Faith. He therefore directed that the history should begin ten years later, from Muhammad's death. It appears, however, from a passage in the *Dabistān*, that he was also inclined to date the thousand years from the commencement of Muhammad's apostleship, *i.e.* when he was forty years old. If this were the date, then the thousand years would begin in A.D. 610; and so in 1582 the thousand Muhammadan years were more than complete, for each of them is eleven days shorter than the solar year. Next, he prohibited the killing of cows, and interdicted, or at least greatly restricted the use of, beef. In the same year, also, he wrote to Goa, asking for missionaries and for copies of the Pentateuch, the Psalms, and the Gospels in Arabic and Persian. This letter has been translated by Rehatsek in the *Indian Antiquary*, but it first appeared in an English dress in James Fraser's *History of Nadir Shāh*, London, 1742.

Elphinstone remarks that Akbar's religion seems to have been pure Deism, in addition to which some ceremonies were permitted in consideration of human infirmity. This, however, is too favourable a view of the matter. Akbar mixed up a good deal of Hindu and Parsi superstition with his Deism, and, like Muhammad, he was unable to dispense with what Gibbon terms a necessary fiction. If his creed was that there was only one God, he added to it that Akbar was God's Vicar. He even went further than Muhammad, for he claimed to have the power of working miracles. In the beginning of his religious career, indeed, he had the good sense to refuse to pray for rain, on the ground that God knew, without being asked, what men had need of. But flattery gradually corrupted him, and he claimed to have the power of healing diseases, of causing rain to fall or to cease, and allowed it to be said of him that he had spoken in his cradle. This last was intended as a proof that he was like Jesus Christ (*Masīḥwār*, 'like the Messiah'), regarding whom a similar tradition existed. It would seem that Akbar was ambitious of establishing the fact of such a resemblance. He was born on a Sunday, which was the traditional birthday of Jesus Christ, and he styled his mother, or at least approved of her being styled, *Miriam-makānī*, i.e. 'of the household of Mary.' It must also be said that Akbar carried the principle of being all things to all men very far. His biographer, Abū-l-Faẓl, *more suo*, makes this a virtue, saying in *Akbar-Nāmah*, iii. 260, that Akbar kept such a guard over himself that every one, whether a secularist or a spiritualist, thought that he was his own peculiar leader. But most people will regard it as a proof that he was not strongly attached to any form of religion. The letter to the Jesuits at Goa is immediately preceded in the collection of Abū-l-Faẓl's letters, by one to the *sharīfs* at Mecca, in which he expresses great reverence for Muhammad, etc., and indignantly repudiates the charge that some one had addressed an unorthodox writing to him. The juxtaposition of these two letters does not prove that they were written about the same time, but this is evident from other circumstances. The letter to the Jesuits was written in Rabi'-al-awwal, A.H. 990,* Apr. 1582;

* On his way back from Ajmīr, Akbar seems to have been ostentatiously pious, fitting up a large tent furnished with prayer-niches, and praying in the congregation five times a day. Cf. extracts from the *Żubdatu-t-Tawarīkh* (Elliot, vi. 189).

* The date of the letter to the Jesuit Fathers is, however, not quite certain. One MS. (B. M. Add. 16, 844) gives the date as 999, and if it be true that Jerome Xavier was sent in consequence of this letter, this date is likely to be correct.

that to the *sharīfs* is not dated, but it evidently was written about the same time, for it refers to the year 989 as having passed away.

Some years afterwards, viz. in A.H. 994 (1586), we find him writing a letter repelling the charge of impiety brought against him by 'Abdullāh Khān, the ruler of Transoxiana. 'Abdullāh had been so dissatisfied by the reports about Akbar's heresies that he had dropped correspondence with him. In reply Akbar wrote two long letters to him, denying the charge and asserting his orthodoxy. Blochmann (p. 468) represents Akbar as contenting himself with sending an Arabic quatrain which 'Abdullāh could construe into a denial of his apostasy; but the letter goes farther than this, and is a serious denial, backed by supposed proofs, of the charge that he was no good Muslim. In it he appeals to his temporal successes as proofs of his being sound in the Faith, for otherwise God would not have favoured his arms; he refers to his having introduced Islām into places where it was previously unknown, and speaks of churches and temples of infidels and heretics having been turned by his instrumentality into mosques and holy shrines for the orthodox. He also speaks of his great desire to destroy the Feringhis, *i.e.* the Portuguese, who oppressed the pilgrims to Mecca. The truth probably is that, though Akbar had become disgusted with the *'ulamā* on account of their greed and their quarrels among themselves, and also because they held that he had more wives than the Law allowed, and though he was determined to be the head of the Church and the supreme arbiter in religious matters, he never entirely divested himself of his early religious beliefs. He was a *dipsychus*, like his secretary and panegyrist Abū-l-Faẓl, who, while professing a new religion, and presiding over a fire-temple, was yet secretly engaged in the pious work of multiplying copies of the Qur'ān, and was sending copies of his father's commentary thereon to foreign princes. Akbar, too, was before all things a politician and a man of the world, and was in no mood to endanger his sovereignty for the cause of religious truth. He was willing that his followers should exhibit what he called the four degrees of devotion, *i.e.* to sacrifice Life and Property, Religion and Reputation for him, but he showed no eagerness to make such sacrifices himself. He was not an enthusiast about the Divine Religion, and hence, though he was a mighty monarch, he was far less successful than his humble contemporary Bayāzīd in making proselytes, and founded no enduring school.

In the *Dabistān-al-Mazāhib*, a singular work written in the time of his grandson Dārā Shikoh by a Sūfī who apparently professed Muhammadanism, but was at heart a Parsi or a follower of the *Dīn Ilāhī* of Akbar, we have what purports to be a specimen of the disputes which were carried on in the *'Ibādatkhāna*, but they are probably imaginary. For real accounts of them we must go to Badāyūnī and Abū-l-Faẓl. The chapters in the *'Ain* (Blochmann's tr.) which bear on the point are the *'Ain* 18 of the 1st book, on 'Illuminations,' and *'Ain* 77 of the same book on 'His Majesty as the Spiritual Guide of the People.' To the latter there is a short supplement entitled 'Ordinances of the Divine Faith.' There are also two valuable chapters on the subject in the third volume of the historical part of the *Akbar-nāmah*. The gist of them is Monotheism, but then this was combined with a worship of light and fire, especially as represented by the sun, which is not to be distinguished from the religion of the Parsīs. Indeed, it was Parsis from Nausārī in Gujrāt and from Persia who taught Akbar. Upon this point the interesting article on 'The Parsis at the Court of Akbar' by Jīvānji Jamshedjī Modi, Bomb. Branch of the *RAS* (1902 f.) may be consulted. Reference, too, may be made to the chapter in the *Dabistān* on the worship of the constellations and planets. As Blochmann remarks in a note (p. 210), the author gives prominence to the idea that the successes of Chingiz Khān and his descendants were due to their worship of the stars, and that conversion to Islām brought about their decline.

Akbar never published any catechism of his religion, and, though Abū-l-Faẓl meditated writing a separate book on the subject, he never did so. We therefore have to draw our knowledge of his tenets from scattered passages in Badāyūnī and from the short section in the *'Ain* entitled 'Ordinances of the Divine Faith' (Blochmann, 166). Akbar called his religion *Dīn Ilāhī*, or 'the Divine Faith,' and also the *Tauḥīd-i-Ilāhī*, or 'Divine Monotheism,' in allusion to his leading doctrine of the Oneness of the Deity. With this, however, he coupled the statement that Akbar was God's *Khalīf*, or Vicar. Badāyūnī writes: 'His Majesty had now (A.H. 987, or A.D. 1579) determined to use publicly the formula "There is no God but God, and Akbar is God's representative." But as this led to commotions, he thought better of it, and restricted the use of the formula to a few people in the Harem.' Akbar also adopted the doctrine of transmigration, and observed: 'There is no religion in which the doctrine of transmigration has not taken firm root.' Perhaps, in making this remark, he was thinking not only of the Hindu and Buddhist religions, but also of the Nuṣairis, who, as we learn from the work of Réné Dussaud (p. 120), have always strongly held the doctrine. At p. 271 of the *Akbar-nāmah*, vol. iii., Abū-l-Faẓl refers to the presence at Fathpūr of adherents of Nuṣair, and says that the language used by them led some people to suppose that Akbar was claiming to be God. Certainly the expressions used by Abū-l-Faẓl and his brother might well give rise to Mullā Sherī's sarcasm—

'The King this year has laid claim to be a Prophet;
After the lapse of a year, please God, he will become God.'

Akbar paid homage to the sun, and it is difficult to say that he did not worship it. Abū-l-Faẓl says in the *'Ain* (Blochmann, p. 48): 'His Majesty maintains that it is a religious duty and Divine praise to worship fire and light; surly, ignorant men consider it forgetfulness of the Almighty, and fire-worship. But the deep-sighted know better.' He also believed that Royalty was a light emanating from God, and a ray from the sun. 'Modern language calls this light *farr-īzidī*, "the Divine light," and the tongue of antiquity called it *Kiyān Khwarah*, "the sublime halo"' (Blochmann, iii.). Evidently Persia and the old Persian religion had a strong influence over him. Parsīs came to him from Nausārī in Gujrāt, and he also sent to Persia and fetched a learned Zoroastrian named Ardashīr. He adopted the Persian Naurūz (New Year) festival and some twelve others, and enjoined their observance on his provincial officers (see his *firmān* of A.H. 992 [1584], *Akbar-nāmah*, iii. 10, and his instructions to the viceroys and to the police [Jarrett, iii. 41, etc.]). In the *firmān* he also gives his reasons for establishing a new era, which he called the Divine era, and in his instructions to the kotwal (Jarrett, iii. 43) he becomes so bigoted in his asceticism as to direct that whoever should eat or drink with a butcher should lose his hand. If the association did not go so far as this, the penalty was the loss of a finger. This, as Elphinstone well remarks, was a law worthy of Manu, and no doubt it was prompted by the zeal of his Hindu advisers who wished to put down the killing of cows. Widows were not to be compelled to perform *satī*, but were not to be prevented from voluntary immolation. Circumcision was to be deferred till the age of twelve, the object being not to make children Musalmāns until they could judge for themselves.

Some of the flatterers suggested that he should introduce the New Faith by force, but his natural mildness and tolerance prevented him from following their advice. As Badāyūnī says, 'His Majesty was convinced that confidence in him as a leader was a matter of time and good counsel, and did not require the sword.'

The mode of initiation into the new religion is described in the *'Ain* (Blochmann, 165). Akbar, we are told, did not readily admit disciples, but if one showed earnestness of purpose he was accepted, and the ceremony took place on a Sunday when

the sun was in the meridian. In the *Akbar-nāmah*, iii. 354, one instance of such initiation is recorded. Fath Dost, the son of the Bārbegī or Master of Requests, importuned Abū-l-Faẓl and Akbar to be admitted, and at length Akbar consented and recited over him the formula 'The pure *shast* and the pure glance err not.' But the initiation was not a success, for two days afterwards Fath Dost was caught and killed under such disgraceful circumstances that his father declined to prosecute (Iqbālnāma).

Father Rudolf Acquaviva left when he found Akbar bent on establishing a new faith. He and other missionaries saw they made no impression on Akbar, who refused to accept Christianity unless the mysteries of the Trinity and of the Sonship of Jesus Christ were made intelligible to him. He also withdrew from their society when he found that his alleged heresies were provoking a rebellion in Bengal. He returned to playing with the subject when the danger was over, and Father Jerome Xavier was with him to the end, and wrote for him a Life of Christ and a Life of St. Peter, and also some controversial tracts. But Akbar never was so well-disposed to Christianity as his son Jahāngīr, and died as he had lived—a sceptic.

LITERATURE.—*Akbarnāma*, Bib. Ind. ed. iii. pp. 252, 263; *'Ain-Akbari*, Blochmann and Jarrett's tr.; Badayūnī, Lowe's tr.; *Dabistān-al-mazāhib*, Shea and Troyer's tr.; Abū-l-Faẓl's *Letters*, book i.; *Khāfī Khān*, Bib. Ind. ed. i. 197; Elliot, *Hist. of India*, vi. 59 and 189; Pierre Du Jarric of Toulouse, *L'Histoire des choses plus mémorables*, etc., Bordeaux, 1608–1614; *Missione al Gran Mogol dal Daniello Bartoli*, Piacenza, 1319; Jerome Xavier, *Hist. Christi, etc., Latine reddita a Ludovico de Dieu*, Leyden, 1639; S. Lee, *Controversial Tracts on Christianity and Muhammadanism*, Cambridge, 1824; Father Goldie, *First Christian Mission to the Great Mogul*, Dublin, 1897; artt. by General Vans Kennedy in *Transact. Bomb. Lit. Soc.*, and by H. H. Wilson in *Calcutta Quarterly Oriental Magazine*; art. 'The Parsīs at the Court of Akbar,' by Jīvanjī Jamshedji Modī in Bomb. Branch of *RAS* for 1902, and App. 1903, p. 537, also published separately, Bombay, 1903; General Maclagan, 'Jesuit Missions to the Emperor Akbar and Observations thereon,' in *JASB* for 1896 and 1904; Graf von Noer, *The Emperor Akbar*, tr. by Mrs. Beveridge, Calcutta, 1890; Shamsu-l-ulama Maulvī Muhammad Husain, *Darbār-Akbari* (*Urdu*), Lahore, 1898. H. BEVERIDGE.

AKIBA BEN JOSEPH (50–135 A.D.).—A great Rabbi who largely modified Jewish thought after the destruction of Jerusalem, and was not without influence on the early Christians. Graetz describes Akiba as beyond doubt the most gifted and influential of the Tannaim. Much legendary material clusters round his early history. He was a great traveller. He went to Rome in the autumn of 95 as one of an embassy to dissuade Domitian from a cruel edict, only stopped by the emperor's death. His companions were Gamaliel, Eliezer ben Asaria, and Joshua (*Erubin*, 84; and *Sukka*, 23). When on board ship, he erected a tabernacle, which was blown down in a gale, and his companions laughed at him for being over-righteous. At Rome he was in favour at the court of the Emperor Nerva, where Flavius Clemens (consul and Domitian's nephew) and Domitilla and Akylas (or Aquila), afterwards Akiba's pupil, became proselytes. But when Trajan succeeded, bad times arose for the Jews, and he returned to Palestine. Thence he went to Babylon, and preached and taught in Nehardea (see *Jebamoth, ad fin.*). Afterwards he lived at Gazakha (*'Ab. Zara*, 34*a*).

Before the outbreak of Bar Cochba's rebellion, Akiba made a final journey throughout Parthia and Asia Minor, and spread the Messianic propaganda, preaching against Hadrian and his legions. We read of him as in Phrygia, Galatia, Galicia, and Cappadocia (*Rosh Hashanah*, 26*a*; *Jebamoth*, 121*a*; *Baba kamma*, 113*a*; *Sifre*, Nu 5[8]). The earthquake which had just destroyed Cæsarea inspired Akiba and the Jewish rebels with confidence; for as its rise had coincided with Jerusalem's fall, so should its fall result in the restoration of the Jewish capital.

The disastrous failure of Bar Cochba's rebellion resulted in Akiba's imprisonment and execution by the Romans.

E. A. Abbott, in *From Letter to Spirit*, quotes the Talmudic description of his martyrdom. The Talmud Babli (*Berakh.* 61*b*) tells how, when Akiba 'was being led out to execution, it was the time for reciting the Shema' ("Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is ONE GOD"), and they were combing his flesh with combs of iron; but he persisted in reciting it. His disciples remonstrated with him, saying that he had endured enough. Akiba replied, "All my days I have been troubled about this verse: Thou shalt love the Lord with all thy soul (or life), even if He should take away thy spirit (or breath). When, said I, will it be in my power to fulfil this? Now that I have the occasion, shall I not fulfil it?" As he was lengthening out the word ONE, till he expired at ONE, the Bath Kol went forth, saying, "Happy art thou, Akiba, that thy spirit went forth at ONE."'

It is interesting to compare this with the account in the Jerus. Talmud (*Berakh.* ix. 7): 'R. Akiba was on the point of undergoing the extremity of the law in the presence of the impious Turnus Rufus, when the moment arrived for reciting the Shema'. He began it, and it filled him with joy. "Old man, old man!" cried the pro-consul, "art thou a sorcerer (so that thy tortures cause thee no suffering), or dost thou defy me by showing joy in the midst of thy pains?" "Calm thyself," replied Akiba; "I am neither sorcerer nor mocker; but all my life long I have read this verse of the Pentateuch, and sorrowfully said to myself, When shall I fulfil the three ways of worshipping God set forth in this profession of faith: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy powers? I have proved that I love him with all my heart and with all my means, but I had not yet undergone the test of love with all my soul, as I undergo it at this moment, and that is the moment in which I thus recite the Shema'. I delight in this occasion of proving my faith; and I have shown my joy." With these final words he gave up his soul (to God).'

The story of the 'ten martyrs,' including Akiba, still forms the theme of a touching *Seliha*, and of an elegy in the Jewish ritual for the Day of Atonement and the Fast of the Ninth of Ab.

But legend does not leave Akiba with his death. As with so many saints, there is something miraculous about his burial. A Midrash, quoted by Jellinek (vi. 27. 8), tells how, after Akiba's execution, Elijah, accompanied by Akiba's faithful disciple Joshua, entered the prison where the body lay, removed it thence, and, escorted by many angels, brought it to Cæsarea. They entered a cavern containing a bed, table, chair, and lamp, and laid the body on the bed. No sooner had they left the cave than it closed of its own accord, and no man has ever seen it since. A hundred years after Akiba's death, about 250, we get the first mention of a Messiah ben Joseph, in contradistinction to the Messiah ben David. R. Dosa tells of this in *Sukka*, 52*a*. The Messiah ben Joseph must die first, and then will be the advent of the real Messiah. This idea is perhaps due to the legendary talk which encircled either Jesus or Akiba, and genuine Jewish folk-lore is at the bottom of it.

Akiba was much opposed to the new Christian heresy, and it is not surprising that Jerome puts him at the head and front of the offending Rabbis.

'Duas domus Nazarei—duas familias interpretantur Saummai et Hillel ex quibus orti sunt scribæ et Pharisæi, quorum suscepit scholam Achibas (quem magistrum Aquilæ proselytæ autumant) et post eum Meir cui successit Johanan filius Zachai et post eum Eliezer, et post ordinem Delphon (=Tarphon) et rursum Joseph Galileus, et usque ad captivitatem Jerusalem Josue.'

Perhaps his most famous pupil was Aquila, whose literally literal translation of the Hebrew text of Scripture was held in high esteem by all Jews, though Jerome sneers at it. Every enclitic את is translated by συν. And the Talmud of Jerusalem (*Kidd.* i. 59[a]) says: 'Aquilas the proselyte made his Targum (תרגם) in Akiba's presence.' This was because of his practice of Akiba's theory, and accounts for the popularity of his translation amongst the Jews, who in Talmud and Haggādah quote Aquila no less than fourteen times (see de Rossi, *Meor Enaiim*, vi. 45). But that popularity did not preserve his Targum, for the Jews soon forgot their Greek; and it was not till 1903 that Burkitt was able to rescue and identify an important fragment out of the Cairo Genizah. Of Akiba's other pupils, we must mention the Jewish Æsop, Meir, who was the link between his Mishna and

ours, and Simeon ben Jochai the mystic, to whom the foundation of the Ḳabbala is attributed.

With mysticism, however, as with gnosticism, Akiba had no sympathy. He is the only one of the four Rabbis who is said to have entered the פרדס, the mystic garden, and come out again without hurt. One died, one became insane, and one an apostate —probably to Christianity. The last was the famous Aher, Elisha ben Abuyah. There was much coquetting with Christianity in those times. Even the famous Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, Akiba's teacher, was taunted with being a Christian because he listened with pleasure to a parable recited to him in the name of Jesus. But Akiba's was an exact science which left no room for eschatological speculations. He sought for mathematical proofs of his principles of the Jewish religion, and found them in the apparently superfluous terms, words, letters, and ornaments of Scripture upon which tradition and usage were to found new legislation. This method he derived from his teacher, Nahum of Gimzo, but Philo had applied it a century earlier to the relations of ethics and philosophy. Akiba applied it to Halākhah, and Akiba's view ultimately prevailed in the Talmud. It is in reference to this doctrine that Mt 5^{18} and Lk 16^{17} record that 'till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law' (*ἰῶτα ἓν ἢ μία κεραία* and *τοῦ νόμου μίαν κεραίαν πεσεῖν*). Sharpe translates *κεραία* by 'one tip of a letter.'

Akiba's chief antagonist was R. Ishmael. The two are throughout Rabbinical literature regarded as opponents, like Hillel and Shammai, and other pairs such as those described in *Aboth*, cap. 1. The fundamental distinction between them was in their treatment of pleonasms in Scripture: Ishmael regarded these as the mere rhetoric of ordinary language, Akiba held them to be essential portions of the Law. He never took the particle את as a sign of inflexion, but 'expounded (דורש) all the את in the Torah,' and his pupil Nehemiah of Emmaus seceded from his school in consequence of the risk which such an interpretation involved in such a passage as 'Thou shalt fear (את) the Lord thy God,' which, according to R. Akiba's view, implied fearing somebody or something *with* the Lord. Akiba said this meant the Torah, but, objected his pupil, it might just as well mean another god. Another of such rules was that dealing with the word 'saying' (לאמור): 'Wherever the word לאמור is used it must be expounded' (*Sifre*, Nu 5^{6}). Finally, he interpreted the letters ה and ו wherever they seemed pleonastic in the text. 'R. Akiba expounded the ירח' (*Jebamoth*, 58b). A further difference between the men was that whereas R. Akiba did, R. Ishmael did not allow himself to treat conclusions out of Scripture as the premises for further conclusions (Jerus. *Ḳidd.* i. 2, and *Nazir*, 57*a*).

It was in opposition to this perhaps extravagant mode of interpretation that the more sober R. Ishmael altered all rules of interpretation to his famous 13 *Middoth*, so that he represented logic and his great opponent allegory. These thirteen principles are really based upon the seven rules laid down by Hillel.

The *Middoth* were originally drawn up as abstract rules by Hillel, and were variously interpreted and modified by his successors, but Akiba and Ishmael and their scholars specially contributed to their definition, Akiba on the grammatical and exegetical side, and Ishmael on the logical. In their final form these *Middoth* are seven of the thirteen exegetical principles by which the Law is expounded, and which constitute the *Baraitha de R. Ishmael* to be found in the Jewish Daily Prayer-Book.

(1) The inference from minor to major.
(2) The inference from similarity of phrases.
(3) and (4) A general law derived by induction from a common feature in (*a*) the same passage, (*b*) different passages.
(5) If an enumeration of particulars succeeds a general proposition, such general proposition is limited to articles *ejusdem generis*, but if it precedes, the general proposition may be extended.
(6) Interpreting a passage according to one of similar content in another place.
(7) Deducing a passage from its context.

In (5) and (7) Akiba and Ishmael disagree. Where two Scripture passages conflict, a third passage would be adduced to confirm one of the two conflicting dicta and reject the other, but Ishmael would thereby modify both such dicta. This opposition of the two schools gradually decreased and finally vanished, so that the later Tannaim do not discriminate between Akiba's axioms and Ishmael's.

The effect of Akiba's system was epoch-making. He really gave his contemporaries a new point of view. The Temple had been destroyed, the country vanquished, and the Jews of the time were like sheep without a shepherd, having lost all hope and all belief. Scripture seemed insufficient to provide for one's daily needs or satisfy anybody's ideals. The Oral Law was doubted. It had enemies without and within. The forces of barbarism and Rome had conquered, and Christianity was a redoubtable foe from within, which, with its Messianic mysticism, must have offered comfort to the hopeless exiles. Then came R. Akiba, and showed that there was authority for all the Oral Law. He gave the solid rock of Scripture as the foundation for all the structure of observances, rules, and usages prevalent in his time, and at the same time enabled his pupils and followers to build up afresh. No wonder he surprised and dazzled his contemporaries, and even his teachers, so that R. Joshua, once his teacher, could ask (*Sota*, 27*b*), 'Who will remove the earth from the eyes of R. Jochanan ben Zaccai, so that he may see how vain was his fear that Halākhah would have to be abandoned because it wanted Scripture support. Behold R. Akiba hath found Scripture support.' Everybody agreed that, but for R. Akiba, the whole Law must have been forgotten or, at any rate, neglected. Akiba's literalism not only justified tradition, it enabled the Oral Law to be rounded off and ordered and completed, and thus he is the true Father of the Talmud. His mnemonic method was twofold: first, to divide the laws according to their subject-matter, property, marriage, divorce, Sabbath, and so on, each such division constituting a treatise (*Masekhta*); and, secondly, to arrange the material for each treatise according to numbers, so as to make them easier to remember. Thus there are *four* kinds of damage to property, there are *five* classes of people who may not enjoy the Priests' *terūmah*, *fifteen* women are excluded from the levirate, *thirty-six* crimes are punishable with excision. This arrangement of the Halākhah was called *Mishna*, afterwards known as R. Akiba's Mishna, to distinguish it from the Mishna now extant, and this was translated by the Christian theologians, such as Epiphanius, as Akiba's *Deuterosis*. There had been other Mishnas earlier in date, but Akiba's superseded all. Thus it is frequently stated in the Talmud that 'This (meaning the dogma there set forth as the Law) is R. Akiba's Mishna, but the first Mishna said . . .' (cf. *Sanhedrin*, 27*a*, and *Rosh Hashanah*, 17).

Mnemonic grouping, into numbers, was applied by Akiba to his ethical sayings also. These, collected by Bacher in his *Agada der Tannaiten*, throw considerable light upon the social conditions of the Palestine of Akiba's time. Some of them are culled from Sirach, an interesting fact, when it is remembered that Akiba was one of the Rabbis who settled the canon of Scripture, and objected to the use of extraneous books, including Ben Sira. In something like the spirit of Omar he said that Scripture was enough. If books contravene Scripture, destroy them; if they support Scripture, they are not needed. Some of Akiba's logia are given in the 3rd chapter of *Aboth*, but his ethics is scattered throughout Talmud and Midrash. Specimens of these are the following:—

'Three people are happy, and their consciences may be tranquil, namely, (1) he whose prayer is glib in his mouth, for prayer must come free from the heart, not from the mouth; (2) he in whom men have satisfaction, God has satisfaction, and he in whom men have not satisfaction, God has not satisfaction; (3) he who is satisfied with that he possesses, that is a good sign for him; but he who is dissatisfied, that is a bad sign.

As for sin, at first it is like a thread of a spider's web, but in the end it is as strong as a ship's rope. He who in anger tears his clothes and breaks his crockery, he will serve idols in the end, for this is how the evil inclination works. It says to-day "tear thy clothes," and to-morrow "serve idols."'

Akiba is very hard upon passionate anger. 'He who in anger throws his bread on the ground and scatters his money, he will not leave the world before he has had to beg his neighbours for bread and for money.' Akiba mocked at the weaklings who could not withstand the inclination to sin, but there is an Aramaic legend to the effect that he himself had once nearly succumbed to temptation (*Kidd.* 81*a*), when Satan presented himself to him in the guise of a lovely woman.

Like Hillel's, Akiba's great principle was that of Lv 19[18], 'Love thy neighbour as thyself,' and this principle he applied with characteristic ingenuity to marriage. An unequal match he condemns as offending against this principle. 'He that marries a wife who is not fitting to him commits five sins. He transgresses the three commandments, not to bear a grudge, or hate his brother in his heart, as well as the two as to loving one's neighbour. If he hates his wife, he defeats the object of marriage.' It is better to save one's own life rather than that of a stranger, because it is said, 'Fear thy God that thy brother may live with thee.' 'The greatest sin is usury, the greatest virtue visiting the sick.' At Gazaka Akiba noticed three things that pleased him much. 'The Medians carve at table, they kiss the hand only, their meetings are in the open field.' (These preferences reflect his fears as a conspirator against Rome).

'There are five persons whose sin can never be forgiven: (1) he who is always repenting and repeating his sin; (2) he who sins much; (3) he who sins in pious times; (4) he who sins in order to repent; (5) he who desecrates God's name by his sin.'

Akiba was no laughing philosopher. He lived in serious times, and therefore it is that he says laughter and levity lead to immorality, and, further, that tradition is a fence for the Law, vows for piety, silence for wisdom.

To his son Joshua he gave the following seven rules of life (*Pesahim*, 112*a*): (1) 'Do not live in the heights of the city; (2) do not live in a city whose ruler is a learned man; (3) do not enter a house suddenly—either a stranger's or thine own; (4) do not walk barefooted; (5) eat an early breakfast, in summer because of the heat, in winter because of the cold; (6) better do without a Sabbath meal than take charity from thy neighbours; (7) keep friendly with the man whose hour smiles upon him.'

Five rules he gave to his pupil Simeon ben Jochai when he was in the Roman prison: (1) 'If thou wouldst hang thyself, hang on a large tree; (2) teach thy son out of a correct book; (3) do not cook in a pot in which thy neighbour has cooked; (4) seek to keep thy capital and have an income besides; (5) it is both mirth and pleasure to have a wife and children.' In *Aboth de R. Nathan* other six rules are laid down: (1) 'Go not into the society of mockers, lest thou learn from their actions; (2) eat not at the table of a priest who is an idiot, lest he give thee that which is not holy; (3) be not free with thy promises, lest thou break thine oath; (4) accustom not thyself to be a guest with others, lest thou have to eat at the kitchen of the poor; (5) commit not thyself to doubtful things, lest thou art found wanting in that of which there is no doubt; (6) go not to foreign countries, lest thou be tempted to serve strange gods.'

With regard to diet he advised (*Sanh.* 17. v), 'Live only in a city where there is fruit, for fruit is good for the eyes. He that eats foods that disagree with him transgresses three commandments. He disgraces himself, he disgraces the food, and he makes a *Berākhah* (blessing) in vain.'

'Shameful is he who allows his daughter to remain at home unmarried.'

'Take heed of him who gives advice without being asked for it.'

LITERATURE.—*Talmud* and *Midrash* and Wünsche, *Bibliotheca Rabbinica*; Schürer, *HJP*[3], vol. ii.; Graetz, *Hist. Jews*, vol. iv.; Bacher, *Agada der Tannaiten*; I. H. Weiss, דור דור ודורשיו, *zur Geschichte der Jüdischen Tradition* (Vienna, 1871–1887); Gastfreund, *Toldoth R. Akiba* (Lemberg, 1871); Strack, *Einleitung zum Talmud.* E. N. ADLER.

ALAKHNĀMĪS, ALAKHGĪRS, or ALAKHIYĀS (Skr. *alakṣya*, 'unseeable,' and *nāman*, 'name'; hence Hindūstānī *Alakh-nāmī*, 'one who calls upon the name of the Unseeable.' In *Alakhgīr*, *gīr* = Skr. *giri*, an honorific title employed by one of the orders of the *Dasnāmī* Śaiva sect. *Alakhiyā* is simply a Hindūstānī derivative of *Alakh*, meaning 'a follower of the Unseeable').—A name applied in Northern India to various sects of Śaiva mendicants. The name *Alakhiyā* is applied to all, but *Alakhnāmī* is generally reserved for those who claim to be a subdivision of the Purī division of the Dasnāmī sect, while *Alakhgīr* is reserved for those belonging to the Gīrī division. They are all popularly known as *Alakh-kō jagānēwālē*, or 'Wakers of the Unseeable,' in allusion to their habit of crying out His name. Adherents of other Śaiva forms of belief also call themselves Alakhiyā, but the true Alakhiyās consider themselves as belonging to a sect apart, and do not follow customs (such as slitting the ears among Gōrakhpanthīs [*q.v.*]) which are retained by Alakhiyās of other professions.

All these Alakhiyās have tenets much in common, based on the central idea that the Supreme Deity is incomprehensible, or, as they say, 'unseeable.' In this respect Powlett's account (see Literature at end) of the Alakhgīrs of Bīkānēr in Rājputānā may be taken as applying to all. This particular sect was founded by a Chamār (or low-caste leather worker) named Lāl, to whom his followers gave the title of Lāl-gīr. He denounced idolatry, and taught his followers to call only upon 'the Unseeable.' Their sole worship consisted in repeatedly ejaculating the name *Alakh*. Charity was to be practised; the taking of life and the use of meat as food were forbidden; asceticism was encouraged. His doctrine was that there is no future state. All perishes with the body, which is finally dissolved into the elements. The sole rewards which he held out to his disciples were confined to this life, and consisted in the attainment of purity, untroubled contemplation, and serenity. There being no future life, heaven and hell (or, in other words, happiness and misery) were within the man himself.

Alakhiyās wear a peculiar garb, consisting of a long blanket coat and a round, or high conical, cap. Although mendicants, they never beg directly. They come to a man's door and raise their characteristic cry of '*Alakh kahō; Alakh-kō lakhō*,' 'Tell of the Unseeable; see the Unseeable.' If alms are then offered, they accept them; otherwise they go away at once. They are looked upon as a quiet, harmless class of beggars.

Lāl-gīr's date is unknown, nor is there any record of the origin of the special theory which is the basis of the religion. That the Supreme Deity is indiscrete, void of all qualities, and incomprehensible, is a commonplace of nearly all phases of Hindu belief, but this has been materially qualified during the past thousand years by the spread of the Bhakti-mārga [*q.v.*], which superadds to it the idea of devotion to a personal God, who is the Supreme Deity become incarnate in cognizable form out of pity for man's weakness and sin. The greatest exponent of the Bhakti-mārga, Tulsī Dās (1532–1623 A.D.), was never weary of dwelling on the incomprehensible nature of the Supreme Deity, and arguing from the fact that He was *mana-krama-bachana-agōchara* (*i.e.* beyond the reach of thought, act, and speech) to the conclusion that the only way of salvation open to finite beings was the exclusive worship of a personal incarnation of that Deity under the form of Rāma. The tenets of the Alakhiyās, based as they are upon the rejection of the idea of a personal God, may well have been put forward as a protest against the view of the Bhakti-mārga, and as a counter attempt to popularize the idealistic theology of the *advaita* Vedānta philosophy, the aim of which is knowledge of the unknowable, rather than the adoration of the comprehensible. In this connexion the termination *gīr* in 'Lāl-gīr,' 'Alakh-gīr,' is important, as, amongst Śaivas, it is employed only by those who claim spiritual descent from Śaṅkarāchārya [*q.v.*], the great founder of the *advaita* Vedānta. Lāl-gīr was also probably influenced by the doctrine of the Jains (with which his teaching has much in common), who are a

numerous and influential body in Rājputānā. Still more striking is the agreement of his teaching with some of the doctrines of Buddhism, but we have no reason to suppose that he can have been alive when that religion flourished in India. The earliest mention of the Alakhiyās that the present writer has seen is in a short poem attributed to Tulsī Dās. That reformer is said to have entered into a controversy with one of them, and his argument, as contained in the poem, was that the only way to 'see the Unseen' was to see him through the personality of Rāma.

A modern sect, akin to the Alakhiyās, was founded about the year 1850, in Orissa, by one Mukund Dās, who was, according to his followers, an incarnation of Alēkh (*sic*) himself. He, however, claimed only to be in special communication with this Alēkh, whom he described as a formless, spiritual being, omnipresent and omniscient. In other respects his teaching was identical with that of the Alakhiyās of Northern India. He died in 1875, and the sect then dwindled, but is still in existence in some force in the district of Sambalpur, immediately to the west of Orissa.

LITERATURE.—Regarding Lāl-gīr, see p. 195 of the *Gazetteer of Bīkānēr*, by Major P. W. Powlett (1879); also W. Crooke, *The Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh* (1896), i. p. 78 (mostly based on Powlett); cf. also H. H. Wilson, *Essays on the Religion of the Hindus* (ed. 1861), i. pp. 235, 236, 238; and the present writer's 'Notes on Tulsī Dās' in *Indian Antiquary*, xxii. (1893) p. 271. As for the followers of the Alēkh sect, see *Proceedings of the Bengal Asiatic Society* for 1882, p. 2ff. GEORGE A. GRIERSON.

ALAKNANDĀ (Skr. *alaknandā*, 'a young girl').—A sacred river in the district of British Gaṛhwāl, one of the tributaries of the Ganges. It has several sacred junctions (*saṅgama*) along its banks, at which religious bathing fairs are held—Nandprayāg, where it is joined by the Nandākinī; Karnaprayāg, by the Pindar; Rudraprayāg, by the Mandākinī; Devaprayāg, by the Bhāgīrathī, after which it is styled the Ganges (which see). Though the Alaknandā in volume and position is superior to the Bhāgīrathī, the latter is popularly regarded as the source of the sacred river.

LITERATURE.—Raper in 11th vol. of *Asiatic Researches*; Oakley, *Holy Himalaya* (1905), 141 f. W. CROOKE.

ALBIGENSES.—A sect which derived its name from the cathedral city of Albi (Lat. *Albiga*), situated on the south bank of a confluent of the Garonne in France called the Tarn, which gives its name to the modern department. The 'civitas' of the bishopric was conterminous with those of Carcassonne and Toulouse, all the three dioceses being in the province of Narbonne, and owing a common allegiance to the metropolitan of that city (Longnon, *Géog. de la Gaule*, pp. 520–521; Devic and Vaissète [ed. 1872], vi. 6). The associations of Albi were consequently chiefly with the country to the south; but when, in the 11th cent., it was placed under the rule of a vicomte, his jurisdiction extended north as far as the course of the Aveyron. Its earlier history, however, like that of Toulouse, is connected mainly with that of Septimania, the extensive region between the Rhone and the Pyrenees.

As early as the 5th cent. St. Amarand had been the patron saint of Albi, and with his worship was associated that of Eugenius, the bones of both being interred at Vieux, some 18 miles west of the city. Diogenianus, its third bishop, is the first with respect to whom we have any information; he is referred to by Gregory of Tours (*Hist. Franc.* ii. 12) as one of the ablest guardians of the faith in the first half of the 5th century. Septimania, from the 5th to the 8th cent., was ruled by the Visigoth, who had his capital at Toulouse, and the territory is consequently, at this period, often referred to as Gothia. The Goths professed the Arian faith, and supported it, although not coercively, among the populations whom they had reduced to subjection, but whom they aimed at assimilating rather than effacing. They were themselves industrious cultivators of the soil, and understood the working of metals; the Roman cities remained intact beneath their sway, and the Roman law was administered concurrently with their own. The chief impediment to peaceful relations between the two races was the pertinacity with which the Catholic bishops of the conquered opposed the religious creed of the conquerors. Arianism, however, continued to spread, and, during the reign of Theodoric II. (453–466), became the national faith of the Suevi in northern Spain and of the populations of Cantabria and the Spanish March. If, indeed, the same conciliatory spirit towards the Roman clergy as was shown by Theodoric the Ostrogoth in Italy, had been shown by the Catholic bishop towards the upholders of the Arian creed in Septimania, it is probable that the Albigensian crusade would have been averted. In the 5th cent., under King Euric, the Visigoths had extended their rule over the greater part of the Spanish peninsula, while in Gaul it reached the Loire; but the persistently aggressive policy of the Catholic towards the Arian clergy roused the latter to a retaliatory course of action, which still further embittered the relations between the respective adherents of the two chief religions of Western Christendom. In the following century, on the other hand, the envoy of the Ostrogoths in Italy to Belisarius, could defy their enemies to prove that their monarch had ever resorted to unprovoked aggression on those professing the Catholic faith (Procopius, *de Bell. Goth.* ii. 6), while the rule of Theodoric the Great was characterized by such exceptional tolerance towards his Jewish subjects as to make them his firm supporters against the common enemy (Vaissète, *Hist. de Languedoc*, i. 656–660; Dahn, *Urgesch. d. german. u. roman. Völker*, i. 362–368, 240–250; Milman, *Lat. Christianity*[4], bk. iii. ch. 3).

It is to be noted, again, that political aims weighed considerably with Clovis, the Frankish monarch, when, after his defeat of the Alemanni in 496, he embraced the Catholic form of the Christian belief. Ten years later, when he marched against the Visigoths, it was as 'Arian heretics' that he proposed to sweep them out of the land (Gregory of Tours, ii. 27), and the immediate result, consequently, was to rouse the Burgundian and other Teutonic monarchies, which professed Arianism, to a common resistance. From the struggle which ensued, Theodoric emerged lord of Provence as well as of Italy, while Gothia became yet more closely allied to the Visigothic power in Spain. In both these great monarchies, aversion from, and a spirit of resistance to, the Frankish invader became a tradition alike with the Teutonic conqueror and the native element—an element which in turn was largely modified by ethnic admixture.

The Albigeois, probably recovered by the Goths in the early part of the 6th cent., was again wrested from them a few years later, and the capture by the Franks of Alais, Uzès, Lodève, (*Luteva*), and Carcassonne followed shortly after. The last-named city was thus constituted a Catholic see,—Sergius, the first bishop, afterwards appearing as a supporter of the Roman creed at the third Council of Toledo in 589, over which Reccared, the Visigothic monarch, presided. Reccared had recently been converted to Catholicism; and, stimulated by his example, and aided by the great preponderance of the ecclesiastical over the lay element, the Roman party secured on that

memorable occasion an easy victory, eight bishops of Septimania, those of Maguelonne, Lodève, Agde, Beziers, Narbonne, Carcassonne, and Elne, headed by the metropolitan of Nîmes, making their submission and subscribing the condemnation of their former Arian tenets. Reccared's example was reluctantly followed, however, by many of his subjects, and in Septimania frequent risings ensued [Mansi, *Concilia* (ed. 1644), xiii. 128–130; Dahn, *op. cit.* i. 393–394].

Early in the 8th cent. the kingdom of the Visigoths was overthrown by the Saracen, and the new conqueror maintained his ground in Gothia for fifty years. In certain features, Muhammadanism and Arianism are alike, especially in their common denial of the Divinity of Christ, and also in the aversion with which both regarded the innovations which were then taking place in the Roman Church, in the direction of saint-worship and the concomitant veneration of images and relics. The new conquest was attended also by another racial admixture which would imperceptibly incline the population of Septimania to listen favourably to the discourse of those Paulician teachers from whom many of them were, before long, to imbibe the doctrines of Manichæism. Fauriel has pointed out how, during this period, the industries, architecture, language, and learning of Septimania were modified by the influence of the dominant race (*Hist. de la Poésie Provençale*, iii. 312–316). Of this approximation between the two races, an historical incident and a traditional reproach afford alike a noteworthy illustration. In the following century, a leader of the Paulicians is to be found advancing to battle side by side with a Saracen emir, to join in the defeating of the forces of the Catholic Greek beneath the walls of Samosata (Cedrenus, ii. 153; Zonaras, ii. lib. xiv.). In the 12th cent., the Catholic persecutor could assume it as a recognized fact that, in consequence of the Gothic and Saracen occupations, the inhabitants of Septimania, and more especially those of the Toulousain, had inherited a taint of heresy from which many of them were still unpurged (Peter de Cernay, Migne, *PL* ccxiii. 541; Milman, *op. cit.* v. 439; Luchaire, *Innocent III., la Croisade des Albigeois*, 159).

The obscurity which attaches to the history of the different Italian States in the 10th cent. and the earlier part of the 11th renders it impossible to trace with precision the dates and circumstances of those successive migrations of Paulicians (or 'Publicani,' as they are frequently termed), who, quitting their homes in Bulgaria (or Thrace), appeared at this era in Italy and from thence passed on to Western and Central Europe. The connexion between these emigrants from the Eastern Empire (or its dependencies) and the Albigenses of a later period, was first pointed out by Ussher, and more fully afterwards by Limborch (*Hist. Inquisitionis*, Amsterdam, 1592; tr. by Chandler, 1731), who also explained the features of divergence or agreement between the Albigenses and the Waldenses. But a more critical account of both sects and of the literature relating to them appeared in 1832 from the pen of S. R. Maitland, who, following up the line of inquiry indicated by Gibbon (in his 54th chap.), argued from evidence derived from *place*, *time*, and *name*, that 'the persons called Albigenses, in the south of France, were Paulician emigrants' (*Facts and Documents*, p. 92). 'In all essentials,' says Lea, 'the doctrine of the Paulicians was identical with that of the Albigenses' (*Hist. of the Inquisition in the Middle Ages*, i. 91). A recent critic, however—Professor Karl Müller of Giessen—is of opinion that the tenets of the Cathari (as we must now term them) are to be regarded as the outcome of a fusion of Paulician doctrines with those of the Euchites, a process which he considers had been brought to completion in Thrace (or Bulgaria), and subsequent to which the same emigrants, proceeding westward, carried with them doctrines which had a Gnostic-dualistic tendency (*ThLZ* (1890) p. 355).

As early as 1012, when the Emperor Henry II. was at Mainz, 'refutata est insania quorundam hæreticorum,' whom Hauck (*Kirchengesch.* iii. 431) assumes to have been Manichæans (Pertz, *Monumenta Germ. Hist.*, iii. p. 81); but the earliest authentic instance appears to belong to 1017, when certain canons of Orleans and other ecclesiastics of that city, thirteen in number, were brought before a specially convened Synod, and on being convicted of Manichæan tenets, which they refused to abjure, were burnt outside the city gates. Various features gave to this case a peculiar interest,—the fame of Orleans as a seat of learning, the facts that King Robert himself caused the inquiry to be instituted, that the heresy had been imported from Italy and Perigueux, and not least that it was by artifice, on the part of a Norman knight, that the necessary evidence was ultimately obtained from the admissions made by the victims themselves. The heresies to which they confessed—as involved in the denial of the Virgin-birth of Christ, of the efficacy of baptism, and of prayers to the saints, of the Real Presence in the Eucharist, and of the lawfulness and duty of marriage (in opposition to the Petrobrusians) —were unquestionably those of the Albigenses (D'Achéry [1723], i. 604–605; Döllinger, *Beiträge*, i. 62–65; Bouquet, *Recueil*, x. 36–38).

There is, however, strong presumptive evidence of the existence of such doctrines in northern France before the 11th century. In 991, the eminent Gerbert, on being consecrated to the archbishopric of Rheims, made solemn declaration of his belief in the articles of the Catholic faith, at the same time expressly specifying certain other tenets which he accepted with no less sincerity,—the resurrection of Christ and also that of all mankind, the Divinely inspired origin of both the OT and the NT, the existence of an evil spirit (which was evil *non per conditionem sed per arbitrium*), the lawfulness of marriage and of second marriage, and of the eating of meat, the remission of original sin by the rite of baptism (*Gerberti Epistolæ*, ed. Havet, 161–162; *ib.* ed. Olleris, 245–250; Schmidt (C.), *Hist. et Doct. des Cathares ou Albigeois*, i. 33). As all these were tenets specially repudiated by the Cathari, it is difficult not to concur in the view of Schmidt, Havet, and others, that Gerbert's declaration was designed as a protest against the growing activity of the sect in the province which he had been called upon to administer. As uttered by the metropolitan of the French kingdom, Gerbert's pronouncement acquired special importance and it is probable that any manifestations of such heresy within the royal domain were repressed with exceptional rigour. But all around the comparatively circumscribed limits of the realm of France in those days, we have evidence that the doctrines of the Cathari were spreading rapidly. At Arras, in Flanders (whose counts rendered to the French Crown a homage that was purely external), there appeared in 1025 an Italian named Gundulf, whose preaching attracted so large a following that Reginald, the bishop of the city, ordered his arrest. He succeeded, however, in effecting his escape, and the bishop decreed it politic to deal mercifully with the perverts. He condescended to argument, but was baffled by the discovery that they admitted no written authority in doctrine save the NT, while they altogether rejected the OT. His inquiries failed to elicit any expression of opinions which could be pronounced

Manichæan, a fact which Schmidt (i. 36) explains by supposing that the humble *textores* of Arras were not yet fully initiated. Yielding to Reginald's gentle persuasions, they abjured their errors and implored forgiveness, whereupon they were again admitted to the fold. Among the tenets to which they confessed was the denial of the worship of the Cross and of its use as a sign—an early instance of opposition to this feature in the Roman ritual (Mansi, *Concilia* (1759), xix. 423; Schmidt, *op. cit.* i. 35; Döllinger, *Beiträge*, i. 66–67). In 1043, we find Roger, bishop of Chalons-sur-Marne, consulting Wazon, bishop of Liège (an ecclesiastic in high repute both for his learning and piety), with respect to certain *secret meetings* frequently held by the Cathari in his diocese, especially at the fortress of Montwimer, near Chalons. Wazon advised that, in the first instance, Roger should limit his interference to simply instructing the faithful throughout his diocese to abstain from communion and intercourse with such as were known to attend the gatherings. As, however, no satisfactory result followed, the Council of Rheims, in 1049, determined to issue a sentence of excommunication against not only those who were known to be members of the sect, but also against all who should encourage or protect them (Mansi, *op. cit.* xix. 742). This stringent measure appears to have had the designed effect; and, for some sixty years after, all traces of Catharists in northern France entirely disappear.

The above instances may here suffice to exemplify the treatment of heresy under the earlier Capets—a treatment far more rigorous than that to be noted, in the 11th cent., elsewhere. Both Hugh and his son Robert II. were strenuous supporters of the Church, while the archbishops of Rheims and Sens were immediate feudal lords of not a few of the civil magnates in the French kingdom. In Burgundy, Normandy, and Aquitaine, on the other hand,—provinces which in the 11th and 12th cents. were held by their rulers in what was virtual independence of the French Crown,—although there is evidence of a continuous growth of Catharist doctrines, the evidence that would have necessarily resulted from active measures for their repression appears to be comparatively rare. A decree of the Council convened at Toulouse by Calixtus II. in 1119, and reenacted at the Lateran Council of 1139, throws considerable light on the general situation. The 'secular powers' are thereby enjoined to take active measures against those whom the Church has visited with its anathema; should they, on the contrary, endeavour to protect them, they are to be regarded as accomplices (Mansi, *op. cit.* xxi. 226, 532). The researches of Luchaire supply an excellent commentary on those edicts. The attitude of the seigneur in his fief, as well as that of the citizen in his walled town, was at this time becoming less and less friendly towards the Church; the former often found his territorial claims in conflict with those of the bishop, or with those of some adjacent monastery exempted from local control by virtue of papal charter, while the latter's chief pride was in the newly acquired freedom and privileges of his *ville franche*; both were thus inclined to sympathize with the persecuted sectary rather than with the imperious persecutor. In 1147, Bernard of Clairvaux, accompanied by the cardinal legate of Ostia, made a progress through Septimania, in the hope that, by means of his powerful oratory, he might succeed in winning back the population to the paths of orthodoxy. He found the churches deserted, for the most part, by their congregations, and in many cases by their clergy. The laity, on the other hand, whether seigneurs or artizans, were firm supporters of heresy, if not actually professed schismatics, while the powerful count of Toulouse and the almost equally powerful vicomte of Beziers could only be regarded as sympathizers with the movement [*Opera* (ed. 1719), i. 238]. According, indeed, to William of Neuburg, writing in 1160, the Cathari, 'commonly called Publicani,' existed in 'countless numbers' not only in France, but also in Spain, Italy, and Germany (*Hist. Rerum Anglic.*, ed. Hamilton, i. 120). And at nearly the same time, Hildegarda, the 'inspired' abbess of St. Rupert's Mount, near Bingen, addressed to the clergy of Mainz and Cologne her fervid appeals; enjoining them, 'if they would not that destruction should come upon them,' to eject from their territories these 'nefarious men, worse than Jews, and like unto the Sadducees,' whom she further describes as 'contemptuous of the Divine command to increase and multiply,' 'meagre with much fasting and yet addicted to incestuous lusts,' and 'despisers not only of God's commands as made known through Moses and the Prophets, but also of those of Christ' (Migne, *PL* xcvii., *Epp.* 47 and 48, pp. 247–253; Trithemius, *de Viris Illus. Ord. S. Benedicti*, ii. 119). At the Council of Tours in 1163, like tenets are described as emanating from Toulouse and extending over southern France, and bishops are enjoined to use all possible means to prevent their flocks from being brought under the influence of the preachers of such heresy (Mansi, *op. cit.* xxi. 1177). At the Lateran Council of 1179, Alexander III. enacted a sentence of excommunication against both preacher and pervert, and commanded the secular power to proceed against these heretics,—'quos alii Catharos, alii Patrinos, alii Publicanos, alii aliis nominibus vocant'—while all are forbidden, under peril of incurring an anathema, to give them shelter, either in their houses or on their lands (Mansi, *Concilia* [1644], xxvii. 460–461). If we may trust the Church History published at Leyden in 1599 with the sanction of the Vigniers, large numbers of heretics, *bearing the same appellations*, were burned in Flanders and various parts of France about the year 1183 (Vignier, *Hist. de l'Église*, p. 391). Two years later, we find the cardinal bishop of Albano placing himself at the head of an armed force with a view to their forcible suppression. But the first organized measures of this kind date from the decree of the Council of Verona in 1184, where, although the Cathari are indicated only in general terms, the doctrines prescribed are those by which they were especially distinguished, and the bishop of each diocese is instructed to *search out heretics*, and, on due further inquiry, to hand them over to be dealt with by the secular authorities (Lavisse and Rambaud, ii. 272).

It was not, however, until the pontificate of Innocent III. (1198–1216) that the decree of the Council of Verona appears to have been put into execution. A member of an illustrious Roman house, he applied himself with singular ability and penetration to the task of building up a spiritual despotism. Even Otto IV. was constrained to promise his co-operation in a religious Crusade before he could receive his imperial crown in Rome (Oct. 1209), and by that time the dangers which confronted the Church had assumed a yet more menacing aspect, for the Catharists now represented a movement which threatened the Roman pontificate itself with overthrow. From their various centres in southern Europe, following the courses of the great rivers,—the Danube, the Rhone, the Rhine, and the Saone,—they appeared, in yet greater numbers than before, in Picardy and Flanders. Industry, and especially the weaver's craft, attracted them to the more important industrial centres,—the desire of con-

vincing their foes by argument, to the famous schools of Paris, Chartres, Chalons, Orleans, Rheims, and Soissons (Hauréau, *Innocent III.*, p. 12). In Spain, it was rumoured, they were seeking to form an alliance with the Saracen against Christianity, and, like Hildegarda, the pontiff in Rome and the troubadour in Languedoc alike denounced their heresy as the worse of the two (Joachim *in Apocalyp.*, f. 134; Fauriel, *Hist. de la poésie provençale*, i. 77).

It is now that the territory of the Albigeois, having become their chief centre in Languedoc, appears first to have given its name to the sect; but in distant centres or districts they were still generally known as Cathari, and often, specifically, by some local name, wherever they congregated in large numbers—in Flanders and Picardy, for example, as *Piphili*, a corruption of Pauliciani; farther south, as *Bulgari* or *Bougres*. But their most widely spread designation, after that of Cathari, was Patarini, the name which they had brought with them from Italy, where again, at certain centres, they sometimes bore a local appellation, such as *Concorricci*, from Concorrazzo near Monza, *Albanenses*, from Alba in Piedmont, and *Bagnolenses*, from Bagnolo near Brescia. Even Agen, though but a few miles distant from the Albigeois, gave them a distinctive appellation,—*Agennenses* [see in Döllinger's *Beiträge* (ii. 53-84), the text of a MS compiled in 1235, and entitled *Supra Stella*].

It does not, however, appear that these widely scattered communities were at variance among themselves, as was notably the case, in the 17th cent., with those Puritan representatives of the Cathari who settled, as exiles, in Holland and in Germany. They are rather to be regarded as successive waves of a great exodus from Hungary, Croatia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, and Dalmatia, breaking now on the north-western shores of the Adriatic (where Venice became their chief centre), and now on the coast of Apulia, but finding, both among the rising communes of Lombardy and the unruly barons of the south, a sympathy which deepened into admiration and bore fruit in numerous converts to their doctrines. The state of the Catholic Church, indeed, whether in the lands which these exiles had quitted or in those in which they settled, was not such as to inspire them with much reverence for its institutions. In Bosnia there was but one Catholic bishop, and the clergy were poor and ignorant. In Hungary, a public official might be a Jew, a Muhammadan, or a pagan; and the monasteries there, which professed the Benedictine rule, were fain to seek their novices in Germany and Italy, and existed in almost complete isolation from the surrounding populations. Those of the Greek Church, on the other hand, while regarded with dislike by the Latin clergy, often sheltered within their walls not a few for whom the refined subtleties of the Manichæistic dualism possessed almost a fascination; while over those rude natives to whom the Perfects of the Cathari were able to preach in the vernacular, their simpler faith and ascetic life exercised a scarcely less potent influence. Among those of them who became converts to Bogomilism (see BOGOMILS) the aversion from the doctrines and example of the Old Rome was so strong that large numbers became converts to Muhammadanism. The Paulicians, however, who formed an important body in the New Rome, migrated to Italy and to France. With regard to what might there be observed of the life of the higher ecclesiastics and the state of discipline in the Church at large, it may here be sufficient to cite the declarations of a contemporary Pope and the candid admissions of a living Catholic prelate. It was in May, 1204, that Innocent III. addressed to his legate in Narbonne a letter calling attention to the demoralized condition of the clergy in that province, a state which he attributes largely to the misrule of the metropolitan, Berenger II. He describes the superior clergy as 'dumb dogs who had forgot how to bark, simoniacs who sold justice, absolving the rich and condemning the poor, themselves regardless of the laws of the Church, accumulators of benefices in their own hands, conferring dignities on unworthy priests or illiterate lads.' '*And hence*,' he adds, '*the insolence of the heretics* and the prevailing contempt both of seigneurs and the people for God and for His Church.' 'Nothing,' he goes on to say, 'was more common than for monks even, and regular canons, to cast aside their attire, take to gambling and hunting, consort with concubines, and turn jugglers or doctors' (*Epist.* bk. vii. No. 75, Migne, *PL* ccix. 355–357). 'We are bound, in good faith, to admit,' writes Mgr. Douais, 'that the clergy of the 12th cent. were not simply wanting in the power to withstand the revolutionary designs of the new Manichæans, *but themselves afforded them at once a pretext and an excuse*' (*Les Albigeois*[2] [1880], p. 287). In the year in which Innocent himself was elected Pope, the citizens of Lodève, in the territory of Beziers, had plundered the palace of their bishop, and compelled him, by threats on his life, to grant them fresh privileges (Luchaire, *Innocent, III.*, p. 27). It is, indeed, undeniable that at this time most of the chief seigneurs in Languedoc regarded Catholicism with indifference, if not hostility, and were friendly at heart to the Catharists; while, if their arch-accuser, Peter of Cernay, may be credited, the counts of Foix, Beziers, Toulouse, and Béarn took special delight in encouraging the desecration of churches and in offering insults to the officiating clergy (*Historia Albigensium*, Migne, *PL* ccxiii. cols. 565, 566, 579, 600–602). That such outrages were instigated by the Catharists themselves, or that they were the result of their teaching, is, however, at least doubtful, although there certainly are instances of similar action on their part under extreme provocation. But, generally speaking, by the admission of the same writer, they were known among their supporters as the *boni homines*, the 'bons hommes,' whose simple blameless life offered, in most respects, the strongest contrast alike to the self-seeking and self-indulgent habits of the clergy, and to the dissolute and reckless careers of the majority of the seigneurs (*ib.* col. 553).

Prior to the reign of Louis VII. (1130–1180), the counts of Toulouse had been among the most independent of all the vassals of the French Crown; but in 1154 the marriage of Raymond V. with Constance, the sister of Louis, ushered in a material change in these relations. Shortly after, and for the first time within a century, a French monarch visited Languedoc in person; in 1158 his aid was invoked to repel the forces of Henry II. of England from the Toulousain. From that day, it became the policy of Louis and of his successor, Philip Augustus, to cultivate direct and friendly relations with the clergy of these southern provinces; and a series of charters granted to the bishops of Maguelonne, Narbonne, Nîmes, Uzès, and Agde, and to the churches and abbeys of Toulouse, raised them to comparative independence of the local seigneurs with respect to their temporalities,—the King and the Pope thenceforth representing their suzerains (Luchaire, *Instit. des premiers Capétiens*, ii. 281).

It was at the time when this important political change was becoming operative, about the year 1167, that the chief leader of the Paulicians in Constantinople, whose name was Nicetas (or Niquinta), arrived in the Toulousain to preside

over a Synod of the teachers of the Catharists which had been convened in St. Felix de Caraman near Toulouse. His account of the prospects of the sister Churches in the East was well calculated at once to reassure those whom he addressed, and to rouse the apprehensions of those of the local Catholic clergy to whose ears it might come. His own church of Melangia, in close proximity to Constantinople, stood firm; as also did each of four others, among which he had made a visitation before crossing the Mediterranean: (1) that known as the Drugurian, (2) that in Roumania, (3) the Bulgarian (with Philippopolis as its centre), (4) the Dalmatian,—at the head of each being its duly appointed bishop, duly fortified for the spiritual life by the reception of the *Consolamentum*. Before he left the Toulousain, Nicetas had either confirmed or instituted five new bishops for Septimania and the adjacent counties, among whom was Sicard Cellerier, bishop of Albi (Vignier, *Histoire de l'Église*, 1601; Döllinger, *Beiträge*, i. 116, 121, 123 and n.).

According to Döllinger (*ib.* p. 200), the above-named Synod reasserted the Manichæistic doctrines of the sect in their most aggressive form; and in 1201, another 'Perfectus,' one Julian of Palermo, a teacher of the same school, appeared at Albi. He had long been known by his labours among the warlike race which sheltered in the gloomy gorges of Albania, and his fervid oratory now so wrought upon the Albigenses, that almost the entire population accepted his teaching, while his emissaries were received with open arms in most of the chief towns of Septimania. It is to be noted, accordingly, that at the very time when Innocent resolved upon the Crusade in Languedoc, the doctrines of the Cathari had assumed a form which can only be described as subversive, not merely of the teaching of the Western Church, but of Christianity itself.

The Church of the Cathari most resembled, perhaps, that of Rome, with respect to its organization. It appears to have had its Pope, although this is somewhat doubtful (see Schmidt, *Histoire*, ii. 145); but it is certain that, in the New Rome, Niquinta had been styled 'Papa,' and Julian of Palermo, known as *Maior Hæreticorum*, appears to have been regarded as his successor. The functions of the Catholic bishop were vested in the Perfectus, the person in each separate community or congregation of *credentes* who, by virtue of a lengthened course of ascetic discipline which included periods of complete isolation from society, had won for himself the recognized right to bear a designation which implied his superiority to human frailties and passions. Under his teaching his flock learned to repudiate the Divinely instituted ordinance of marriage and to ignore the rights of individual proprietorship, the ties of social existence and of civic organization being alike thus cast aside. Self-detachment from the world, while engaging in secular duties and pursuits, appears, indeed, to have been their dominant conception of the religious life, all contact with the material involving a certain defilement, while life itself was a kind of purgatory, of which the Catharists rejected the Roman doctrine, maintaining that the soul, after death, entered forthwith into a state either of perfect happiness or of eternal suffering (see Eckbertus, Migne, *PL* clxxii. col. 15). Their abstention (of Manichæistic origin) from all animal food included even milk and eggs, all matter being regarded as the creation of the Spirit of Evil, but especially that which was the outcome of sexual propagation. Labour was justifiable so far as it served to sustain life; carried beyond that point, it was useless for those who were debarred from the possession of anything that could be called personalty (Schmidt, ii. 84, 85). Such was the creed imposed by the Perfectus on the believers (*credentes*); but besides the believers there were the 'hearers' (*auditores*), who listened to the words of the teacher but failed adequately to put in practice what he taught. With regard to their theology, the evidence is perplexing, not to say contradictory. Their Christology, while evidently influenced by Arianism, differed from it in some important respects. Christ, they held, was not God, but a creation of the Divine Nature, and one with it only in respect of will and intention,—an Archangel among the angels and appearing upon earth in this celestial form (see DOCETISM), but neither Incarnate nor Ascended, the very miracles which He wrought being explained away as purely metaphorical, and designed simply to symbolize the power of the spiritual over the earthly nature. At the time of the commencement of the Crusade, indeed, the dualistic and anti-materialistic theory had obtained such influence in Languedoc, owing, possibly, to the teaching of Nicetas and Julian, that, according to some teachers, the Christ of the Evangelists was really an emanation of the Spirit of Evil, permitted to appear on earth as the Tempter, seeking to lead mankind astray and to undo that work of man's salvation which was being accomplished by the true Christ in heaven (Peter of Cernay, *op. cit.* col. 546; Schmidt, ii. 37). The views inculcated with respect to the Third Person in the Trinity, so far as discernible, are not altogether intelligible, and the dualist can hardly but have found his main theory accompanied with exceptional difficulties in connexion with this question.

If the above tenets were calculated to scandalize and alarm the devout Catholic, the theory of the *Consolamentum* must have added yet further to his dismay, supplanting as it did the ordinances of the Church in relation to baptism, to the Eucharist, and to absolution. This singular and elaborate ceremony, described at length by Schmidt (ii. 119–129), commencing with the renunciation of the Church of Rome and followed by a declaration of acceptance of the Catharist faith, and a solemn promise to observe all the conditions imposed with regard to chastity, diet, and companionship, terminated in the formal admission of the believer into the number of the Perfecti. He then, after a rigid fast extending over three days, retired for forty days more into complete solitude. In cases where the *Consolamentum* had been granted to one who was seriously ill, the individual, we are told, would not infrequently refuse all food, and either voluntarily or at the behest of the Perfecti submit himself to the *endura*, so as to die of starvation, and thereby expedite his immediate passage into eternal felicity (*Liber Sentent. Inquisitionis Tolosanæ*, p. 134; Schmidt, ii. 102, 129). With the *Consolamentum* were associated two other doctrines which may be said to have completed the alienation of the Catharist from all that savoured of Roman Catholicism,—the above-mentioned repudiation of the doctrine of Purgatory, and the theory that the efficacy of the ceremony would be lost, if the officiating Perfectus were not himself pure from sin. The admiration, indeed, with which the teaching of the Perfecti was listened to, alike by the seigneurs of Septimania and the citizens of Milan and Toulouse, is largely to be attributed to the fact that the Perfecti actually exemplified in their lives the austere virtues which they inculcated, thereby presenting a marked contrast to the life and aims of the great majority of the Roman clergy. The attitude, again, of the Catharist towards those who were not of his persuasion cannot be described as intolerant; he

preached and he prayed, but he did not persecute; and here, again, he contrasted favourably with the Catholic, and won the sympathy of the seigneur. It is, indeed, implied by William of Puylaurens (*Chronica, passim*), that under the protection of the knights of Languedoc a man could profess almost any religion that he pleased. To Innocent III., however, such laxity of belief and diversity of tenets appeared only to call imperatively for intervention; and his experiences, since his accession, in his own dominions might well seem to show that such intervention, if judiciously carried out, might be relied upon to accomplish the desired results. In Italy itself the increasing numbers of the Patarini and the defiant attitude of many of their leaders had already roused him to active measures. At Verona, on the petition of the archbishop, he had promulgated a sentence of excommunication, but it had been treated with contempt (Baluze, ed. Mansi, i. 191). It was yet more ominous when, within the limits of the Patrimony itself, a succession of cities had given evidence of like infection. At Orvieto, in 1200, his intervention having been solicited by the Catholic party, he had sent Parentio, a high-spirited young Roman noble, to assume the office of *podestà;* but the unsparing severity with which his representative had exerted his authority had given rise to a conspiracy, and Parentio had been dragged from his house and put to death outside the city walls (*Acta SS.* vol. lxviii. Mai). At Viterbo (one of his favourite residences), in 1205, several Catharists had been elected consuls, and their Perfectus, one John Tiniosi, had been returned for the office of papal chamberlain. Remonstrances having proved ineffectual, Innocent himself, in 1207, had repaired to the city; the leaders fled on his approach; he commanded that their houses should forthwith be demolished and their property confiscated; while the podestà and the consuls were compelled to swear that, in future, they themselves would mete out like punishment to all heretics (*Epist.* x. Nos. 105, 130, 139; Migne, *PL* ccxv. cols. 1200, 1220, 1231). Like punishment was inflicted on Orvieto, and with the close of the year 1207 the submission of the cities was complete, and penitent Viterbo had been raised to the rank of a cathedral city; while Innocent was now able to direct his attention to where it seemed most required, namely, to Languedoc. His intervention in that province was materially aided by a political change which had taken place since his accession (Schmidt, i. 148–149).

In 1137, the kingdom of Aragon had been acquired by the count of Barcelona, Raymond-Berenger IV., and the crown had become hereditary in his house. In 1204, his descendant, Pedro II., following the example of the French monarch, had proclaimed himself the vassal of the Roman pontiff; and, in consequence, various fiefs which had before done homage to the counts of Toulouse (among them those of Carcassonne, Albi, and Nîmes) became detached from their former fealty to that of the kings of Aragon, the first two cities, it is to be noted, being in the same episcopal province, with Narbonne as their common metropolis (B. Hauréau, *Bernard Délicieux*, p. 12).

It was now, therefore,—when the Fourth Crusade had resulted in the reduction of the Eastern Empire to the condition of a French dependency, when the disastrous ten years' war between France and Germany had been ended, and Otto IV., under solemn promise to restore the lands which he had wrested from the Holy See, was looking forward to his coronation in Rome,—that the time seemed to have arrived for effective measures in the Toulousain.

Throughout his letters, Innocent lays emphasis on the fact that his great aim is the conversion of the heretic, not his destruction; and in Nov., 1206, three legates had been sent by him from Rome to Narbonne instructed to make yet another attempt to bring the Cathari to reason by force of argument. They were at the same time directed to lay aside all pomp and ostentation, and to aim at winning the sympathy of observers by a humble demeanour, to go meanly clad, imitating the poverty of their great exemplar, and by the force of their own example and convincing speech (*documentum sermonis*) to recall the heretic from his errors (*Epist.* ix. No. 185). It is noted by Luchaire that four months before this letter was written, Diègo de Acevedo, the bishop of Osma in Spain, accompanied by Dominic de Guzlan, the founder of the Dominican Order, had had audience of Innocent in Rome, and on their return journey had, by accident, fallen in with the above three legates (one of whom was Peter of Castelnau) at Castelnau, when the bishop of Osma had given them much the same advice as that which soon after reached them as a mandate from Rome. As Dominic was one of the bishop's chapter, and was present when this advice was given, we may fairly accept the assertion of Vignier that the self-denial, self-devotion, and fervid oratory which distinguished the Dominican friars were, to a great extent, evoked by the urgent necessity of combating the success which had attended the exhibition of the same characteristics on the part of the teachers of the Catharists (*Histoire de l'Église*, p. 405; Luchaire, *Innocent III.*, 90–91). Dividing themselves into little bands, the Dominicans now appeared at different centres,—Servian, Beziers, Verfeil, Montréal, and Pamiers,—inviting the leaders of the Catharists to amicable disputation on the chief points of disagreement. At each of these centres the disputation extended over from seven to fourteen days, and was listened to with intense interest by crowded audiences; but as the only accounts which have come down to us are those preserved in Catholic sources, they can hardly be supposed to be impartial. But if it be true that at Montréal, Oton, the Catharist protagonist, affirmed and maintained as his *quæstio* the identity of the Church of Rome with the Babylon of the Apocalypse, and even ventured to style the former 'the Synagogue of the Devil' (Vignier, pp. 407, 410), the Catharist can hardly be credited with any real desire to conciliate his opponent [Devic and Vaissète (1879), vi. 249]. At the expiration of two years thus spent, Dominic is recorded to have expressed himself deeply chagrined at the small result of their collective labours (Pierre de Cernay, *op. cit.* cc. 1–5; Schmidt, i. 211–217; Luchaire, *Innocent III.*, 92–99).

But however sanguine Innocent may originally have been of their success, he had already determined on the employment of other means, and, early in 1207, Peter of Castelnau had received instructions to urge upon certain seigneurs of Septimania (of whom Raymond of Toulouse himself was one) that they should lay aside the feuds which, unhappily, were rife among themselves, and combine in a Crusade against the heretics. That it was designed, by this proposal, to isolate Raymond admits of little doubt, and he was himself fully aware of the net that was now closing round him. The other barons, allured by the prospect of rich plunder, to be reaped at small risk, readily assented; but the count of Toulouse, apart from his open sympathy with the Cathari, who composed a large proportion of his own subjects, recoiled from the prospect of seeing his own domains overrun by the enemies of his house, and very naturally refused. Thereupon Peter pronounced him excommunicate, and placed his

territory under an interdict, at the same time justifying this extreme course by alleging the count's laxity and extortion in the administration of his seigneury,—laxity, as shown in his partiality to Jews and heretics; extortion, as attested by his encroachments on the temporalities of the Church (Vaissètte, iii. 146; Devic and Vaissètte [1879], vi. 249-250). Innocent followed up the action of his legate by confirming the sentence of excommunication, and, addressing to Raymond a letter in which he upbraided him with seeking 'to preserve peace with his neighbours while he allied himself with the foes of Catholic truth' (*Epist.* x. No. 99; cf. Devic and Vaissètte, *op. cit.* vi. 255–257).

In the first instance, Raymond is said to have feigned submission, but he failed to give practical effect to the promises which he is alleged to have made; and Innocent now, for the fourth time, proceeded to invoke the aid of King Philip, entreating him to come in person and place himself at the head of the Crusade. The latter, although himself involved in hostilities with John Lackland, at length feigned compliance, but in doing so he stipulated that Innocent, in turn, should undertake to bring about a two years' truce between France and England, and should also decree the levying of a subsidy from the clergy and nobles of the French kingdom to defray the expenses of the Crusade. This, however, was altogether beyond Innocent's power; and it was while he was probably hesitating as to the course he should next pursue that his perplexities were suddenly terminated by the assassination of Peter of Castelnau, when on his way to St. Gilles, by one of Count Raymond's officers. The incident itself is enveloped in obscurity, and not less so the extent of the count's complicity in the deed. But, according to the statement made by Innocent to King Philip, Raymond, feigning penitence, had invited Peter to St. Gilles, there to receive his submission, and had then contrived the murder. But this statement is invalidated, to a certain extent, by the pontiff's admission, when referring to the subject some four years later, that positive proof was wanting (*Epist.* xi. No. 26, xii. No. 106). His immediate action, however, assumed the count's complicity, and in a circular letter (10 March, 1208) to the churches of Languedoc, Raymond was again excommunicated, his person and his territory were declared to be no longer under the protection of the law, and his subjects and allies alike absolved from their vows of fidelity or compact (*Epist.* xi. No. 26). Should he, however, give proof of his penitence, he might even yet be received again into the bosom of the Church, but only on condition that he expelled the heretic from his dominions (*ib.* Migne, *PL* ccxv. col. 1557).

A Crusade was then proclaimed, Arnold Amalric being appointed chief leader, with Simon de Montfort as his lieutenant, while all who refused to listen to the summons were forbidden the enjoyments of social life and interdicted from Christian burial at their death. To the Dominicans was confided the duty of preaching the great expedition throughout the realm, and for the fifth time an appeal was made to Philip (Devic and Vaissètte, vi. 263–267). The king, however, still stipulated that the two conditions which he had before specified should be carried out, while he at the same time intimated (in a letter subsequently erased from the royal registers) that, as he was advised by his councillors (Raymond's guilt as a heretic being still unproven), the pontiff had exceeded his powers in declaring his lands subject to confiscation. Such, indeed, was the attitude which he continued to maintain until his death, influenced partly by his disinclination to appear personally as the abettor of religious bigotry, but still more by the desire to employ the military resources at his command for other purposes, and not least by the apprehension lest, under the rule of a too powerful vassal, Languedoc might recover its former virtual independence (Luchaire, *u.s.* 126–127).

The first phase of the Crusade, accordingly, was that of a religious war, directed mainly by the papal legate and headed by French nobles, among whom, next to de Montfort, the duke of Burgundy, and the counts of Nevers, Auxerre, St. Pol, and Geneva, were the most conspicuous,—the Dominican, like Peter the Hermit more than a century before, lending his aid as an orator to rouse the enthusiasm of the multitude, while his efforts were seconded by the Troubadour, who, in his *Chanson de la Croisade*, vaunted that more than 20,000 fully armed knights and 200,000 foot had rallied to the standard of the Cross (*ib.* p. 129). Raymond himself, completely dismayed, now again made his submission, and (18 June, 1209), after a humiliating ceremony, was reconciled to the Church by the papal legate in the cathedral at St. Gilles; he was compelled to swear on the Gospels and in the presence of holy relics that he would treat all heretics as personal foes, expel the Jews, proclaim a Truce of God, and himself take part in the Crusade (for the oaths taken by Raymond and Milo, the legate, on this occasion, see Devic and Vaissètte, vi. 277–279; Migne, *PL* ccvi. cols. 90–91). A like submission made by the vicomte of Beziers was not accepted, although he was a nephew of Raymond and brother-in-law of Peter, the king of Aragon. In July, Beziers itself was taken by storm, when a general massacre of the inhabitants took place. Raymond Roger, the vicomte, fled to Carcassonne, and shortly after died a prisoner in the fortress, not without suspicion of foul means having been employed. It was at the capture of Beziers that Arnold, the papal legate, on being appealed to by the soldiery to guide them in the work of butchery (for fear that loyal Catholics might otherwise perish unrecognized) is narrated to have made reply, 'Slay them all, the Lord will recognize his own.' The story, however, is at least doubtful (Hurter, *Gesch. Pabst Innocenz des Dritten*², ii. 343; Devic and Vaissètte, vi. 288–289, 313; Migne, *PL* ccxvi. cols. 138–141). Narbonne saved itself from a like fate only by an anticipatory execution of a number of the Cathari. Montpellier, owing to its long and approved loyalty to the Church, altogether escaped; but Innocent could vaunt that 500 towns and castles had been wrested from the enemies of the Faith, while the greater part of Septimania was reduced to the appearance of a desert. So great, indeed, was the scarcity of supplies, that the French leaders, having completed their forty days' term of service, and seeing no prospect of further plunder, were fain to return home. Simon de Montfort, fourth earl of Leicester, alone remained. In the Île de France he held only a petty seigneury, and having been appointed successor to Raymond Roger in the viscounty of Beziers and Carcassonne, he found himself virtually an autocrat in the government of the desolated province. Although he was by education and conviction an ardent Catholic, his religious enthusiasm was probably fanned by a sense of personal wrong. In 1107 he had been mulcted by John of England of all the estates which he inherited through his mother in that country. Raymond of Toulouse, on the other hand, had married Joan, John's sister, and daughter of Eleanor of Aquitaine. If we add to these considerations the fact that King John of England was at this very time excommunicate, owing to his maltreatment and defiance in England of that same episcopal order whose power de Montfort was pledged to restore in Languedoc, we

cannot but see that hatred of heresy can hardly have been the sole motive which urged on the stern Norman knight in his merciless career. Before the year 1210 had passed, John himself received intimation that his own barons were plotting to place the crown which he wore on the head of Simon de Montfort].

The circumstances under which Simon was now called upon to administer his territory were, however, sufficiently discouraging. Funds began entirely to fail him, and this at the very time when the few knights who had remained with him were demanding double pay, to indemnify them for the absence of the plunder which the country no longer afforded. In his difficulties he appealed to Innocent. The pontiff, already overburdened by the demands consequent upon the Fourth Crusade (see CRUSADES), was unable to respond with pecuniary aid, but wrote to the Emperor Otto, the Kings of Aragon and Castille, and 'numerous powerful knights and ladies,' to invoke their assistance (Migne, *PL* ccvi. cols. 141–157). At the same time, we find him gratefully acknowledging the service which Simon had rendered in restoring to the papal exchequer the hearth tax of three pennies *per annum* which the lawless barons of Languedoc had, in many cases, been diverting to their own uses.

In the meantime, Raymond, sorely pressed by the demands imposed on him by the papal envoys, was reduced almost to desperation by being for a third time excommunicated, the sentence having been pronounced by a Council at Avignon, 6 Sept., 1209. He resolved on a personal appeal to Innocent, before whom (Jan., 1210), having been admitted to an audience in the Lateran, he laid a statement of his grievances. Accounts differ with regard to what actually took place on this occasion; but it is probable that the pontiff deemed it prudent to disown, to some extent, the relentless proceedings of his legates, one of whom, Milo, had just died, and he now enjoined that Raymond, who had complied with all the conditions originally imposed, should be reinstated in possession of his castles, and that his lands should be relieved from further requisitions (Migne, *PL*, *ib.* cols. 171–173). His instructions, however, either arrived too late, or were wilfully disregarded by his legates, to whom Toulouse was now called upon to surrender its count. But the dwellers in the city and in the faubourg alike, holding themselves bound by their oath of allegiance to their seigneurs, refused compliance; and it was with difficulty that the archbishop of the city, a staunch supporter of Simon, succeeded in inducing a certain number of the citizens to support the latter, under whose leadership there now ensued, throughout the Toulousain and Septimania (June, 1210 to Sept., 1212), a long series of plunderings and massacres, accompanied by almost unprecedented atrocities, wherever the defenceless victims refused to abjure their errors. At the strong fortress of Minerve, near Narbonne, 140 Perfecti were hurled or threw themselves on to the burning pyre (Devic and Vaissète, vi. 329–331). At Lavaur, taken after a stubborn defence, the well is still shown into which the widowed 'Lady of the City,' the bounteous Giralda, and her daughter, were flung, and stones rolled down upon their bodies. The governor and eighty knights were either suspended on the gallows or put to the sword. Termes, Castres, and other towns were the scenes of similar horrors, Toulouse and Montauban being, eventually, the only two which remained in the possession of Raymond [Guillelmi de Podio Laurentii *Hist. Albig.*, cc. 17, 18 [in Duchesne (A.), *Hist. Franc. Script.*, v.]; Devic and Vaissète, vi. 342, 356–358, 384; Peter of Cernay, Migne, *PL* ccxiii. cc. 37, 52, 53; *La Chanson de la Croisade*, stanzas lxvii.–lxxiv. (ed. Paul Meyer, ii. 83–91); *Voyage en France* (35ème série), 269].

The war itself must now be regarded as assuming another phase, and Innocent himself became aware that a reaction was setting in throughout Languedoc, as, to quote the expression of Paul Meyer, 'it became clear that the Crusade was designed to accomplish nothing less than the substitution of some enterprising adventurers from France for the ancient seigniorial families of the South' (*La Chanson*, etc., Introd. p. xxiv; Fauriel, *Hist. de la Croisade*, Introd. pp. xlviii–l).

The doctrines of the Catharist were again openly espoused, as a powerful incentive to renewed resistance. The Count de Foix, Raymond Roger, reverted to his former defiant attitude. The Catholic leaders, on the other hand, perceiving how closely political supremacy was involved in the suppression of heresy, began to assert their position with increased emphasis. Arnold Amalric, the abbot of Citeaux, usurped to himself the title of duke of Narbonne (Luchaire, *Innocent III.*, p. 188), and imposed oaths of fidelity and homage on the former subjects of Raymond of Toulouse. Simon, however, with his habitual astuteness, professed, in the first instance, to ignore his own position, and, writing to Philip (Aug., 1211), said that he had instructed his envoys to assume possession of all the territory wrested from Raymond, and to hold the same until the rightful owner should be declared (*ib.* 178). By the middle of the following year, however, his representatives in Rome preferred the demand for his recognition as lord of Languedoc; in a charter of 14 Sept., 1212, granted by the abbot of Moissac, that dignitary expressly declared that 'God has justly assigned to Simon de Montfort the territory of his adversary' (*ib.* 189). In the following December, Simon himself convened an assembly at Pamiers, to which the seigneurs, the clergy, and the citizens of the province were alike summoned,—the great political revolution which was in process being thinly disguised by their being themselves invited to become members of the Commission which was then appointed, and by whose action the 'customs' of Paris, the 'use' of Northern France, and the supremacy of the Church (acting through its ecclesiastical courts), were substituted for the feudal liberties and the civic freedom which had before existed. As Luchaire points out, however, Simon de Montfort posed as the saviour of the land, whose mission it was to establish order, centralization, and peace; and for a time there were those who firmly believed that they should obtain these blessings at his hands.

The king of Aragon was still Simon's suzerain, and, with the support of Innocent, was able to assert his rights. He regarded with no small alarm his great vassal's monopoly of influence and the impending political changes. As soon, accordingly, as the Crusade was pronounced by Innocent to be at an end (Jan., 1213), Peter's first endeavour was to submit to a Council convened at Lavaur (16 Jan.) a memorandum, drawn up with the design of showing that Raymond himself had never been proved a heretic, and that neither he nor his cousin, the count of Comminges, nor the count of Foix, nor Gaston de Béarn, had ever accepted the Albigensian doctrines. It was the design of the Council, however, to complete the count's ruin rather than to afford him the opportunity of regaining the confidence of Innocent, and counter-representations were made at the Lateran, couched in terms of such urgency, that the pontiff, notwithstanding his distrust of Simon and the Norman party, was prevailed upon

to change his attitude completely. 'The supporters of heresy' he now wrote to King Peter, 'are more dangerous than the heretics themselves,' at the same time plainly intimating that further obduracy would be visited with another Crusade (*Epist.* xvi. No. 48; Migne, *PL* ccxvi. col. 851). Soon after, hostilities were resumed; and Peter, along with his allies, now appeared at the head of a great army outside the walls of the strong fortress of Muret, where Simon, with a small body of knights, awaited their attack. The disastrous defeat which the confederates there sustained, involving, as it did, the death of the king and the dispersion of his forces (12 Sept., 1213), sealed the fate of Raymond's party. He himself is next heard of at the court of John Lackland, at Périgueux, proffering a now worthless homage. Simon's son, Amaury, now married Beatrice, the heiress of Dauphiny; Toulouse surrendered to Montfort, and the whole of southern France became incorporated with the French kingdom. Towards the close of the year, the Troubadour, William of Tudela, gives place (line 2768) to his successor in the *Chanson*, which henceforth becomes of primary value as a contemporary historical source, being at once highly original and always to be trusted (P. Meyer, Introd. vol. i. xci–xciii).

In 1214, Innocent rescinded the prohibition to preach the Crusade, and in the course of the year a hundred thousand 'pilgrims' poured into Languedoc. Their first military achievement was the capture of Maurillac, on which occasion we find a reference to the Waldenses, seven of whom were burnt 'with great joy' as incorrigible in the attestation of their errors (Devic and Vaissète, vi. 445). Concurrently with this movement, the victory achieved by the royal forces over Otto IV. at Bouvines (27 July, 1214) broke the power of the barons throughout the realm, and was hailed by the clergy as an auspicious triumph for the cause of unity in the Church. At the Council of Montpellier (8 Jan., 1215), Simon was unanimously elected 'prince and sovereign' of Languedoc; and in the following April, Prince Louis, accompanied by the new lord of the province and by Peter of Beneventum, the new papal legate, set out on a progress through the scenes of the war. The towns, still secretly hostile to de Montfort, threw open their gates to the representatives of the Crown and the Holy See. Innocent, however, although he formally acknowledged the new governor of the conquered territory, would never recognize him as its rightful lord, and subsequently, when called upon to arbitrate in the fierce contention between Simon and the abbot Arnold for the dukedom of Narbonne, gave his decision in favour of the monastic dignitary.

At the memorable Lateran Council of Nov., 1215, Raymond was once more, and finally, confronted with his accusers; and here, again, we find the pontiff strongly urging that the exiled count should be reinstated in the Toulousain. His advice was supported by a small minority of bishops, whose counsel Peter of Cernay does not scruple to stigmatize as that of an 'Ahithophel' (*Hist. Albig.* c. 83; Migne, *PL* ccxiii. col. 700), and it was rejected by a vast majority. The brief allusion of the monkish chronicler to the fact of this divergence of opinion is illustrated at length by the contemporary Troubadour, in a manner which brings home to us the fact that this famous Council, to quote the language of Fauriel, was really 'nothing less than a great political congress, at which the passions, ideas, ambitions, and secular aims of the time are to be discerned, for the moment, in actual open conflict' (*Hist. de la Poésie Provençale*, iii. 159). In the sequel, Innocent himself was under the necessity of issuing a decree whereby Raymond was adjudged to have forfeited his right to govern, and condemned to pass the remainder of his life as a penitent, only a small annuity being granted him, which, together with his wife's dowry, was deemed sufficient for his maintenance. The Council assigned to de Montfort all the territory which he had wrested from the heretics, along with Toulouse and Montauban, but it was ordered that the unconquered lands 'in Provincia' (beyond the Rhone) should, for a time, be held in commission, and that in the event of the count's only son (a youth of fifteen, against whom no imputation of heresy had been preferred) giving proof, by his 'fidelity and upright conversation,' of genuine merit, provision should ultimately be made for him therefrom (*Hist. Albig.*, col. 701; Guill. de Pod. Laur., c. 34; Vaissète, iii. 280; Devic and Vaissète, vi. 475, 477).

To all outward seeming, Raymond was now permanently excluded from a public career. The decisions of the Lateran Council had, however, been received throughout both the Toulousain and Provence with a general dissatisfaction which emboldened both father and son to sail, in the spring of 1216, for Marseilles, where they were received with enthusiasm, and a rising in their favour took place, which forthwith extended up the Rhone and into Aragon, while large subsidies arrived from England. A conflict ensued, of which the Provençal poet supplies us with an animated description, but the incidents of which are of military rather than religious interest; though it is deserving of notice that the weapons of ecclesiastical approval and censure were wielded by both parties, in entire contempt for the attitude of the Roman pontiff. At Beaucaire (*Bellum-quadrum*) the insurgents, after capturing that important fortress, were stimulated to the work of reconstructing the defences by the promise of indulgences held out by Raymond's chaplain, and both knights and ladies applied themselves assiduously to the toil; while, in the following year, when Simon de Montfort appeared outside the walls of revolted Toulouse, he stood scarcely in happier relations to the Church than Raymond himself, having been excommunicated by his own ecclesiastical superior, Arnold, duke of Narbonne, on some pretext arising out of their bitter contention for the dukedom (Fauriel, *Hist. de la Croisade*, 3995–4014; Lea, *Hist. of the Inquisit.* i. 184). As Innocent had died in the preceding year (July, 1216), and his successor, Honorius III., sustained his policy in Languedoc with increased vigour, it is evident that the broader questions at issue were almost lost sight of in those of purely local importance.

On commencing operations, for the third time, against Toulouse, Simon prayed that if he failed to recapture the city he might perish in the attempt, while, if successful, he vowed that he would reduce it to ashes (Fauriel, *ib.* 7835–7855). The citizens, on the other hand, conscious that mercy was not to be looked for at his hands, repelled his attacks with a desperate energy, which, after a siege of nine months, was rewarded by his being killed (25 June, 1218) by a huge stone hurled from the wall by a mangonel, his brother Guy having only a minute before fallen by his side,—*Ez escridan la joya, car es Dieus mercenars* ('shouts of joy arise, for God is merciful'), exclaims the Troubadour (*ib.* 8434–8456, 8475; Meyer, i. 342, also ii. 421; Sandys, *Hist. of Classical Scholarship*[2], i. 549). At the news of the tyrant's death, the Catharists and their supporters now flew to arms throughout Languedoc; and Honorius, alarmed at the prospect, addressed to Philip an urgent remonstrance, which resulted

n the appearance of Prince Louis at the head of an army, whose achievements in the field are remembered only by the massacre at Marmande, when 5000 men, women, and children were put to death by order of the bishop of Saintes, on the sole ground of their assumed heretical beliefs, and the city itself was burnt (Guill. de Pod. Laur. p. 685; Fauriel, *ib.* 9306–9320). An endeavour to inflict like exemplary punishment on Toulouse was baffled, and, after laying siege to the city for forty days, on 1 Aug., 1219 Louis struck his camp and returned to France. The Albigeois took fresh heart, and many of the towns which had been wrested from them by the sword of Simon were now recovered. Eventually, after a war extending over two more years, Amaury de Montfort was fain to bribe the French monarch to renewed interference, by offering to surrender to him the entire territory which had been adjudged to his late father. It was at this juncture that Raymond VI. died (Aug., 1222); his interment in consecrated ground was forbidden; and for nearly a century and a half the remains, denied the rites of burial, were exposed to sight within the precincts of the Hospital of the Knights of St. John, outside Toulouse (C. Molinier, *L'Ensevelissement de Raimond VI.*).

During Simon's rule, large numbers of the Catharists had fled to Bulgaria and Croatia,—to return, at his death, inspired with renewed zeal by the exhortations of their Pope, or metropolitan, in those regions,—while they were encouraged and sustained in the renewal of the conflict in the Narbonnaise by the teachings of his delegate, one Bartholomew of Carcassonne (Devic and Vaissète, vi. 567–568). The disputations with the Catholics were again held; and in the years 1225–1226 the famous Franciscan, Antony of Padua, had appeared in the Toulousain and the Narbonnaise to urge on the persecutor the resumption of hostilities (*ib.* vi. 591–595). In the national archives of Paris are still to be seen the letters, written in 1227 by the metropolitan of Sens and the bishop of Chartres, offering contributions towards a new Crusade against the Albigenses (Lea, *Hist. of the Inquisition*, i. 201). Eventually, after a long and gallant struggle, Raymond VII. submitted; and was compelled, by the Treaty of Meaux (1229), to accept a series of onerous and humiliating conditions — the demolition of the greater part of the walls of Toulouse, the cession to the French Crown of territory amounting to two-thirds of his father's dominions (of which, however, a part had been included in the surrender, above mentioned, by Amaury), the cession to the Roman See of the marquisate of Provence (the portion of Provence on the left bank of the Rhone), while in Toulouse itself he was required to institute a school of studies, which subsequently developed into the university, but was now conceived on lines designed to ensure the predominance of strictly Catholic teaching (Martin, *Hist. de France*[4], iv. 149–150).

In assenting to the foregoing conditions, Raymond can have been actuated by no other sentiment than a conviction of the political unwisdom of prolonging a racial conflict against forces which were overwhelming; but in promising his active and unsparing co-operation in the extirpation of heresy, and subsequently befriending the two great Mendicant Orders (he is said even to have urged on the papal legate in the work of organizing the Inquisition within his own diminished territory), it is probable that he was giving expression to a contrite sense of the paternal folly which had brought such ruin on his house, and that the manner in which Innocent had compassionated his helpless boyhood may have instilled into the young count a genuine admiration of his protector, and sympathy with his designs. That sagacious pontiff had seen very clearly, some years before his death, that, however effective fire and sword might prove in the temporary effacement of heresy, something more was needed to prevent the recrudescence of an ancient faith sincerely, however wrongly, held. Notwithstanding his habitual tendency to temporize, he had accordingly drawn up a series of instructions which represent an important innovation upon preceding methods (Douais, *L'Inquisition*, 1906, p. 6). The mode of procedure in a judge's court, at that time, was still that of the old Roman tribunal; the magistrate always awaited the appearance of an accuser before he intervened to punish the malefactor. But, however adequate such a method might be found in dealing with offences against the person or against property, Innocent perceived that it failed altogether to reach a particular class of citizens, distinguished generally by their blameless life and inoffensive conduct, but lying under grave suspicion owing to their abstention from the prescribed forms of public worship, and their secret gatherings. If such conduct were really a shelter for rumoured malpractices, it was certain that stronger motives were required to induce the *accusator* to come forward, and hence the institution of the *inquisitio*, a system of inquiry, authorized in legal form and terminology, for bringing home to the offender a definite charge. As early as 1183, Lucius III. had enjoined upon the bishop of each diocese the necessity of seeking out and passing sentence on heretics (Mansi [1644], xxviii. 6), although Luchaire appears to be in error in supposing that his instructions were actually formulated as a decretal (Douais, *op. cit.* pp. 18–20); the *inquisitio*, moreover, postulated the *inquisitor*, and it was not until the wide-spread activity and devotion of the Dominican Order had become manifest that Innocent could discern the instrumentality for which he had been looking. Between the years 1204 and 1213 he issued four decretals [subsequently re-enacted by Gregory IX. (1227–1241)], in which the system of *secret inquiry* was formally recognized (*ib. op. cit.* 6, 7), and direction given that investigations should be instituted throughout the province of Arles, and in the dioceses of Agde, Lodève, Vercеil, Tarragona, and Geneva (Potthast, *Regesta*, 2516, 2672, 2876, 4628). It is, however, maintained by Douais that even these instructions were general in their scope, specifying, as they do, no particular offence or persons. But when the dioceses to which they were sent (as specified by himself, pp. 6–8), together with the time of their promulgation, are considered, it is difficult not to infer that they must have been directly aimed at the Albigensian heresy. By the machinery thus brought into operation, the Inquisition (which may be considered to date from the year 1229) obtained the evidence on which its first proceedings were grounded, and was enabled to arrogate to itself a function beyond the power of the already existing ecclesiastical courts; while the Inquisitor, if we accept the view of Douais, represented an authority which the supreme pontiff alone had the power to delegate (*L'Inquisition*, pp. 9–13).

From the year 1229, accordingly, the history of the Albigenses becomes mainly associated with the proceedings of the Inquisition, and will be found treated under that heading; while for an admirable illustration of this later period, the experiences of *Bernard Délicieux*, as described by B. Hauréau (1877), should also be consulted With the advance of the fourteenth century, the Catharist almost disappears in Western Europe,

although occasionally showing a bold front against the Dominicans in Toulouse. In the East, in their ancient home in Bosnia, on the other hand, they more than held their ground, even compelling the Franciscans to retire from the kingdom (see BOGOMILS); and so recently as 1875 a paragraph in *Le Temps* stated that members of the sect were still to be found in that country. They were also to be met with, long after the Inquisition had done its work, secluded in the valleys of the Pyrenees; but for the last four centuries they have often been confused with the Waldenses, and their independent existence becomes, in consequence, more difficult to trace. In Germany the Catharist becomes lost in the 'Ketzer' [Schmidt, *Hist.* i. 141, ii. 232–233; Lombard (Alex.), *Pauliciens*, etc. (1899), 269–275]. In Albi itself, their final disappearance may, perhaps, be inferred from the fact that in 1404 the bishop of Amboise is to be found giving orders that the bones of St. Amarand should be brought from Vieux (*supra*, p. 277[a]) and deposited in the cathedral church of St. Cecilia, as in a city no longer tainted with heresy (Gregory of Tours, ed. Ruinart, col. 787–788 n.).

LITERATURE.—I. *CONTEMPORARY.*—(i.) **Anna** Comnena, *Alexias*, lib. iv. ch. 4, xiv. cc. 8 and 9, xv. ch. 8. (ii.) Peter of Vaux-Cernay (Petrus Sarnensis), *De factis et triumphis Simonis comitis de Monteforti* (to Simon's death in 1218), Migne, *PL* ccxiii., Paris, 1855. Peter was the nephew of Guy, the abbot of the monastery of Vaux-Cernay, with whom he went to Provence in 1206; he was the partial admirer of Simon, and is his apologist throughout. (iii.) William de Puylaurens (Guillelmus de Podio Laurentii), *Historia Albigensium* (to the year 1272). William was chaplain to Count Raymond VII., and wrote long after the Crusade. Although not always strictly impartial, he is entitled to the highest credit as an accurate and honest writer. (iv.) *La Chanson de la Croisade contre les Albigeois*, first made known and edited by C. Fauriel (Paris, 1837). This edition is altogether superseded by that of Paul Meyer (2 vols., Paris, 1875–1879); the editor in his Preface (i–cxix) has established the following conclusions: (1) The *Chanson* is the production of two writers, differing considerably in their diction, style, and ideas, the former being one William of Tudela (in Navarre), an ardent partisan of the Crusaders; the latter, who commences line 2768 and carries on the narrative to the siege of Toulouse (June, 1219), was a native of that city, and shows himself throughout a devoted adherent of the party of the seigneurs who opposed the Crusade. Notwithstanding some important omissions, he supplies us with a narrative of the highest value in relation to the subject and of great historical merit. (2) In the course of the 15th cent. the whole poem was reproduced in a prose version (which, like the original, is in a mixture of Provençal and Romanic). This version is generally cited as by *L'Anonyme*, and is printed by Devic and Vaissète among the *Preuves* (vol. viii. 1–203). It has small literary merit, and, since its claim to be regarded as an original production has been thus refuted, can no longer be regarded as of any historical value. (v.) The Letters, or Registers, of Innocent III. (Migne, *PL* ccxiv.–ccxvii.) are of primary importance. (vi.) The treatise by Eckbert, abbot of Schaunang, in the diocese of Trèves, entitled, *Sermones XIII. adversus pestiferos fœdissimosque Catharorum damnatos errores et hæreses* (Migne, *PL* cxcv. 11), and the Letter of Everwein of Steinfeld to Bernard of Clairvaux, *De hæreticis sui temporis* (Migne, *PL* clxxxii. 676), both written *circ.* 1150, are recognized sources for the doctrinal belief of the Catharists of that period. That of Alanus de Insulis, bishop of Auxerre, *De Fide Catholica contra hæreticos sui temporis* (*ib.* ccx. 305) deals specially with the Albigensian heresy. It appeared towards the close of the century, and was shortly followed by the *Libellus contra Catharos* (*ib.* cciv. 772–792) of Bonacursus, a heretic who had returned to the Church, and who gives, along with the doctrines of the Catharists, the recognized arguments for their refutation. It was owing to a conviction that the arguments advanced by Monéta in his *adversus Catharos et Waldenses Libri V.* (Rome, 1743) were also largely applicable to Lutheran tenets, that the Dominican Ricchini first published this treatise, together with two noteworthy dissertations on the Catharists and Waldenses. The *Summa de Catharis et Leonistis* of Reinerius Sacchoni (*cir.* 1300) is printed in Martène et Durand, *Thesaurus Novus*, vol. v.; and another text, largely interpolated and with a different title, is given by the Jesuit Gretser (*Opera*, XII. ii.).

II. *MANUSCRIPTS.*—Chiefly the collection Doat, now in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, forming 258 vols. in folio; these relate solely to the proceedings of the Inquisition. For critical account of same, see Molinier (Chas.), *L'Inquisition, etc. Étude sur les sources de son Histoire*, Paris, 1881.

III. *MODERN LITERATURE.*—Catel (G. de), *Histoire des Comtes de Toulouse*, Toulouse, 1623; Benoist (Jean), a Dominican, published at Paris in 1691 his *Histoire des Albigeois et des Vaudois*, 2 vols. [a eulogium of persecution, containing, however, important documents]; Limborch (Phil.), *Historia Inquisitionis*, Amsterdam, 1692; D'Achéry, *Spicilegium veterum aliquot Scriptorum*, ed. de la Barre, 3 vols., Paris, 1723; Jas (P.), *de Waldensium secta ab Albigensibus bene distinguenda*, Leyden, 1834; Maitland (S. R.), *Facts and Documents illustrative of the History, Doctrine, and Rites of the ancient Albigenses and Waldenses*, London, 1838; Compayré, *Études historiques et documents inédits sur l'Albigeois*, etc., 1841; Hurter (Fried.), *Gesch. Pabst Innocenz des Dritten*, 4 vols., Hamburg, 1842; Schmidt (C.), *Histoire et doctrine de la Secte des Cathares ou Albigeois*, 2 vols., Paris, 1849; Teulet and de Laborde, *Layettes du Trésor des Chartes*, 3 vols., Paris, 1863–1875; Devic and Vaissète, *Histoire générale de Languedoc*, 1872–1890, 10 vols., Toulouse, 1873 [this edition refers to the corresponding passages in the edition of 1733–1755, and embodies in the *Preuves* a large amount of new material]; the *Annuaire* for 1879 of *Bull. de la Soc. de l'Hist. de France* (pp. 233–285) contains *Le Débat d'Izarn et de Sicart de Figueiras* with Introd., notes, and tr. by Paul Meyer. The 'disputation' (in Provençal) is between an Inquisitor (Izarn) and a heretic bishop (Sicart), and turns successively on nine of the chief Catharist tenets held heretical by the Church; Hauréau (B.), *Bernard Délicieux et L'Inquisition Albigeoise*, Paris, 1877; Lombard (Alex.), *Pauliciens, Bulgares et Bons-Hommes en Orient et en Occident*, Geneva, 1879; Molinier (Charles), *L'Inquisition dans le Midi de la France au xiiie et au xive siècle*, Paris, 1881; Douais (Mgr.), *Les Albigeois, leurs Origines*[2], etc., Paris, 1880, *L'Albigéisme et les Frères Prêcheurs à Narbonne au xiiie siècle*, Paris, 1894, *L'Inquisition: ses Origines, sa Procédure*, Paris, 1906; Lea (H. C.), *History of the Inquisition in the Middle Ages*, 3 vols., London, 1880; Luchaire (Achille), *Innocent III., Rome et Italie*, Paris, 1905; *Innocent. III., la Croisade des Albigeois*, Paris, 1905; Cartellieri (Alex.), *Philipp II. August.* vols. i. and ii., Leipzig, 1906; Guirand (J.), *Cartulaire de Notre-Dame de Prouille*, 2 vols. Paris, 1907 [the first volume contains an *Étude sur l'Albigéisme Languedocien aux xiie & xiiie Siècles* by M. Guiraud, grounded chiefly on the MSS Doat, with criticisms on the original sources, and also notes on the following questions:—The distinctive features of the Albigenses and the Waldenses; the latter, the writer points out, sometimes upheld the teaching of the Church in opposition to the former (pp. xxix–xxx); the universal belief of the Catharists that there was no salvation within the pale of the Jewish Church, not excepting even the Patriarchs (xlix–lvii); their estimate of the Catholic Church as absolutely corrupt and incapable of originating either what was morally good or socially salutary (xlix, lx); the *endura*, as a faintly disguised mode of suicide,—although the writer admits that such a charge finds no support in the indictments of the Inquisition (lxiii); he holds, however, that the Catharists, by their rejection of the sacraments of the Church and their denial of the lawfulness of marriage, of oaths, and of capital punishment, undermined the foundations of social life as conceived in the Middle Ages (lxxx–lxxxiv). In the sixth ch. he defines more precisely the limits and activity of the Catharist Churches both in France and in Germany; in the ninth he represents the whole movement as originating in the ancient faiths of the East, through the media of Gnostic and Manichæistic teaching]; *Acta Aragonensia: Quellen zur Kirchen- u. Kulturgeschichte aus der diplomatischen Korrespondenz Jaymes II.* (1291–1327), ed. H. Finke (Berlin, 1907).

J. BASS MULLINGER.

ALCHEMY (Greek and Roman).—At present our knowledge of ancient alchemy is based upon a collection of chemical recipes in a Leyden Papyrus (X, ed. Leemans, *Papyri Musei Lugduno-Batavi-ensis*, ii., 1885), and a number of manuscripts in several libraries, containing a Byzantine and Mediæval collection of chemical treatises. Chief among these are a Marcianus in Venice, dating from the 10th or 11th cent., and a Parisinus in the Bibliothèque Nationale, written in 1473. The material contained in these manuscripts was edited by Berthelot and Ruelle in the *Collection des Alchimistes Grecs*, Paris, 1888. Unfortunately, this latter edition is without any critical value, not only as regards the constitution of the text, but as regards the writings of the most important among the authors contained in the collection. For, instead of retaining the order, or at least the treatises as they are given in the MS, the editors have attempted an arrangement by ages; and to attain this aim they have cut up the collection, so that it is with the greatest difficulty that one can obtain an idea of the treatises as they were given in the original collection. The difficulty is increased by the fact that even our best manuscript, the Marcianus, is in reality a second edition, with omissions and additions, of an earlier collection, perhaps of the 9th cent., while the younger codices contain much material of very doubtful character. A final judgment must therefore be postponed until some

scholar has re-edited the *Corpus Chemicorum* in a manner to conform to modern demands. (On this question compare W. Meyer, *Verzeichnis der Handschriften im preussischen Staate*, i. 1, 5, 1893).

The notices of the ancients themselves in regard to the history of alchemy are scarce. The alleged mentions of the 'science' in the poet Manilius (under Tiberius), iv. 243 ff., and in Pliny's *HN* xxxiii. 79, referring to an attempt of Caligula to make gold, are more than doubtful. The first authentic testimony points to the time of Diocletian. According to Suidas (Διοκλητιανός and Χημεία), the emperor ordered all Egyptian books on the making of gold and silver to be burnt. We are thus taken back to the beginning of the 3rd cent. of our era, a period which teemed with secret, magical, and astrological writings. To the same time points a notice of the Byzantine historian Georgios Synkellos (8–9 cent.), that Julius Africanus mentioned the science of chemistry (676, 10, ed. Bonn). During the 4th cent. the possibility of alchemy was denied by Themistius (*Or.* iv. 214, ed. Petau), and Æneas of Gaza (5th cent.) is undoubtedly well acquainted with its existence. None of these authors, however, uses the modern name. This was formerly believed to be secured by a passage in the astrologer and Christian writer Firmicus Maternus (5th cent.), but the passage is a late interpolation (cf. the edition by Kroll-Skutsch, Leipzig, 1898).

The notice in Suidas points to Egypt as the original home of alchemy. To the same country the legendary history of the pseudo-science also points. The ancient alchemists knew a great many stories about the mystic origin of their art. It was said to have been taught by the fallen angels, by Isis, by Miriam the sister of Moses (the last trace of that legend has been preserved in the 'bain-marie' of modern chemistry), and so forth. But even their best tradition ascribed the invention of the 'holy mystery' to the philosopher Democritus of Greece. This tradition takes us at once to Alexandria, where a luxuriant growth of forgeries under the name of the atomistic philosopher had sprung up, largely ascribed to a certain Bolos of Mendes, living about the beginning of our era. (The literature in Berthelot, *Hist. de l'alchimie grecque*, Paris, 1885; cf. Pauly-Wissowa, i. *s.v.* 'Alchemie'). To Egypt the very name also points (Hoffmann, *Hdwtb. der Chemie*, ii. 516 ff., and Wissowa, *l.c.*).

The extant works on alchemy fall into two classes, roughly represented by the Leyden Papyrus and by the Collection. The former class is purely technical, not yet infected by mystical ideas, and designed for practical purposes. The second class starts likewise from practical work, but from the outset is indissolubly interwoven with mystical thoughts. As time went on without bringing the alchemists any nearer to the solution of the eagerly sought mystery, speculations and fantastic hallucinations overlay the practical nucleus in ever increasing masses, until towards the end of the Middle Ages the writings of the adepts had become one vast farrago of allegories, each one in its turn calling forth a still more allegorical commentary, until the 18th cent. brought about a revolution and a return to practical work, and began the modern science of chemistry.

We shall now rapidly pass in review the extant works. The Leyden Papyrus belongs to a group of papyri found together in Egypt in the early part of the 19th cent. and purchased by the Leyden Museum. Among these, three stand out prominent as a related group. They are known by the letters X (our papyrus), V, and W. The last two have of late come into greater prominence by the excellent treatment to which they have been subjected by Albrecht Dieterich ('Papyrus Magica V' in *Jahrb. f. Philologie*, Suppl. xvi.; *Abraxas, Studien zur Religionsgesch. des späteren Altertums*, 1891). They are our most valuable source for studying the syncretistic religion of later antiquity as reflected in the mind of the vulgar. With these our X must be grouped, as it was found with them. The great mass of its recipes, it is true, contain nothing but prescriptions for the apprentices of some cheating gold- and silver-smith. But these prescriptions are interspersed with others referring to superstition. Small wonder, for the art of the metal-worker from the earliest times was considered to be specially connected with magic; witness the legends of the miraculous creations of Hephæstus, of his Telchines and Daktyloi (see on these Roscher's *Lex. der gr. u. röm. Mythologie*, *s.v.*), and the northern legends of the smith Wieland. Traces of this belief have lasted into our own times. Even to-day the village blacksmith is usually 'the wise man,' if not actually the wizard, of his village.

Alchemy in the proper sense of the word cannot be said to be found in X. But a large number of its recipes have for their end to produce an alloy of baser metals which cannot be distinguished from the genuine article, so much so that even a member of the guild shall not be able to detect the fraud. But two of its prescriptions use a 'never-ending material' and a special kind of *asemon*. This *asemon*, originally the Egyptian name (*asem*) of an alloy of gold and silver, perhaps the so-called *elektron*, is here conceived as a material which can give the *qualities* of the precious metals to the base ones. It acts, so to speak, as a leaven, changing the base foundation into gold as leaven changes flour into bread; in other words, we are face to face with a real *chemical* action.

At this point the second group of chemical literature sets in. Its most important, nay fundamental, treatise indeed, that of 'Democritus,' bears in its recipes the closest resemblance to the prescriptions of the papyrus (cf. Berthelot's analysis, both in the *Histoire* and in the Introduction to the *Collection*). In close analogy to the papyrus, this treatise also included originally not only the science of commutation of metals, but likewise that of imitating precious stones, and of dyeing cloth. The mystic element, however, is already in full force. Not only is the technical part proper introduced by a fabulous tale, giving the miraculous history of the alleged recovery of the treatise from a secret vault, but it repeats again and again, in the fashion of a refrain, the mystic saying: 'Nature rejoices in nature, nature conquers nature, nature rules over nature'—a saying to which we shall return later on. Other pieces, too, in the *Collection*, according to Berthelot's expert analysis, are more or less closely related to the papyrus, but as some of them do not occur in the oldest MS, we shall leave them undiscussed. One step forward, it is true, has been taken by the author of the pseudo-Democritean work; he is no longer conscious of the fraudulent character of his practices, but honestly believes in the possibility of transmutation.

We have called the above work fundamental. And so, indeed, it must be called, in view of the fact that after its existence nothing new was written, and that all successors either had no higher ambition than to comment upon it, or started from it as their basis. Here belong the works of Synesius (not the Cyrenæan bishop of this name, although a contemporary of his), of Olympiodorus (of doubtful age, but perhaps living under Justinian), and of Zosimus (the most important of them all, though the most elusive). The question of the latter's personality, as well as of his time, is so perplexing because for his writings more than for anything else the editorial method of the French Collection has been confusing. In the several hundred quarto pages filled by pieces ascribed to him, many parallel and even contradictory pieces from old as well as from new codices are jumbled together. This much is sure, however, and borne out by the Index of the Marcianus, that of all the commentators he was the most important. Certain indications in his writings allow us to conjecture that he lived after the philosopher Porphyrius, and before Olympiodorus. He also seems to allude to Mani, the founder of Manichæism. We shall therefore not err very much one way or the other, if we assign him to the early years of the 4th cent. of our era. Suidas (*s.v.*) tells us that he came from Panopolis in Egypt, and lived in Alexandria.

The later Greek alchemists can find only a passing mention in this article. Such are Stephanos, contemporary of the emperor Heraclianus, and the alchemistic poets, four in number, who in Byzantine trimeters revamp the scanty ideas of Stephanos. Numerous smaller treatises, preserved in MSS, cannot even be mentioned here. The question of their value is indissolubly bound up with that of the value of our tradition.

We shall now be able to trace in a very few words the development of alchemy. Starting from the purely practical basis of fraudulent craftsmanship, in Egypt, famed from olden times for her knowledge of metalwork and crude chemical knowledge (cf. the Egyptian porcelains and glasses), it found its further development in that home of all mystic humbug, Alexandria. Here it fell under the influence of that mixture of religions, of mysticism, and of philosophy which we call either Syncretism or Gnosis, and pursuing that kind of knowledge found its 'Bible' in the forged treatise ascribed to Democritus. Also in the manner of that kind of literature, counter-claim met claim; hence the various traditions as to the real inventors of alchemy. Conforming partly in ideas and in expressions to Christianity, it escaped the

fate of other superstitions,—the condemnation of the Church,—was carried to Constantinople, and there vegetated in peace in the dust of libraries. On the other hand, through Syrian translations it found its way to the Muslims, was by them carried to the West, and so reached Europe, where it was received with credulous avidity, and flourished until superseded by truly scientific methods, thus finally flowing into the broad stream of true and modern chemistry.

It remains now to speak of the relations between alchemy and philosophy and religion. The researches of Usener (*Religionsgeschichtl. Untersuchungen*, Bonn, 1889–1897), of Dieterich (*l.c.*), and of Schmekel (*Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Mittlern Stoa*) have shown how enormous was the influence of the Stoic school on the development of popular beliefs in the last cent. B.C. and the 1st cent. A.D. In regard to alchemy, however, the proof had been furnished as early as 1856 by Prantl (*Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift*, 1856) in an article which still contains the best exposition of the philosophical elements in ancient alchemy. The Stoics, in their endeavour to prove that the whole cosmos was permeated by the Divine, and that all phenomena of life were only emanations of it, could not afford to reject any claim to the supernatural raised by these pseudo-sciences, and so they became the ardent defenders of magic, alchemy, and astrology (for the latter see Bouché-Leclercq, *Hist. de l'Astrologie grecque*). *Vice versa* these sciences gratefully adopted the apparent aid to be got from the Stoic arsenal of proofs. When the Democritean theory constantly harps on the refrain: 'Nature overcomes nature, nature rejoices in nature, nature rules over nature,' the alchemists simply followed Stoic precedent. Nay, this very tenet is considerably older than the extant works on gold-making. It is ascribed to the mythical Egyptian king Nechepsos, the patron saint of astrology, whose forged works found their entrance into the world of letters about the beginning of our era. The maxim, too, upon which the Leyden Papyrus bases its prescriptions, that a little leaven leavens a whole loaf, belongs here. When later, in the 2nd and 3rd cents. of our era, that jumble of all philosophies, from the Ionians to Neo-Platonism, which we call Hermetic philosophy, gained ascendency, it too was eagerly adopted by the alchemists. Hermes now becomes the great protagonist and inventor of the science. Nor were the alchemists averse to borrowing from other pseudo-sciences. They were deeply indebted to Astrology, again under the influence of Stoic ideas. Not only do some treatises take account of favourable planetary aspects, but the theory that the planets exercise a profound sympathetic influence over the component parts of the universe found its expression in the small but significant fact that the metals are written in the manuscripts by a sort of planetary notation: for gold they wrote the sign of the sun, for silver that of the moon, and for quicksilver that of Hermes, whence the English name 'mercury.' No less strong is the influence of that syncretism which we are accustomed to call Gnosis. The greatest of all commentators, Zosimus, explains the title of his last chapter, *Omega*, by telling us that it belongs to the sphere of Kronos, but only *κατὰ ἔνσωμον φράσιν*, while the *ἀσώματος φράσις* is known only to the great and hidden Nikotheos. Not only the name itself is Gnostic, but still more so the distinctions between a corporeal and an incorporeal expression; for this distinction between Jesus in the body and without a visible body forms the very foundation of Gnostic speculations.

This leads us into the sphere of religion. Now we must not expect to find in the alchemists any new information about the religious speculations of their time. These men, locked up as they were in their narrow laboratories, were simply receptive, and only reflected what was saturating the air around them. In this sense only may we go to the alchemists as a source of religious information. And here we find what we should expect. All religions have been jumbled into a great chaotic mass. Everything is 'One and All.' But nevertheless, individual deities, like Hermes, Kronos, Aphrodite, play their part. Nor were the alchemists averse to calling in the help of Judaism, and of Christianity as it appeared to them. Zosimus embodied in his commentary a piece containing highly interesting speculations about Adam. But, on the whole, we may repeat what Usener says about the speculations of the Gnosis: like a sultry breath of air carrying to us wondrous scents from an unapproachable garden, such is the impression of the Gnostic (and alchemistic) teachings.

LITERATURE.—Kopp, *Beiträge zur Gesch. der Chemie*, 1869; Leemans, *Papyri Græci Musei Lugduno-Batavensis*, ii. 1885; Dieterich, 'Papyrus Magica V,' *Jahrb. f. Philologie*, Suppl. xvi., and *Abraxas*, 1891; Berthelot, *Origines de l'Alchimie*, 1885, *Journal des Savants*, 1884, 1893; Berthelot and Ruelle, *Les Alchimistes Grecs*, 1888 (partly reprinted, with independent pagination, in Berthelot, *La Chimie au moyen âge*); Hoffmann in Ladenburg, *Hdwtb. der Chemie*, ii. under 'Chemie'; Tannery, *Revue des Études Grecques*, iii.; Jahn, *Revue de Philologie*, xv.; Bouché-Leclercq, *Hist. de l'Astrologie Grecque*; Schaefer, *Die Alchemie*, 1887; Pauly-Wissowa, I. *s.v.* 'Alchemie.'

E. RIESS.

ALCHEMY (Muhammadan). — **1. Authors.** — The most ancient Arabic author who wrote about alchemy was a royal personage — Ḫālid, son of Yazīd, son of Mu'āwīya—who died A.H. 85 (A.D. 704). There are three letters on alchemy ascribed to him; his master is said to have been a Syrian monk, Morienus or Marianus, and to have dedicated a treatise on alchemy to him: *Liber de compositione Alchemiæ, quem edidit Morienus Romanus Calid regi Ægyptorum*, tr. in 1182 by Robert Castrensis (cf. Leclerc, i. 64). Compositions ascribed to Ḫālid and translated into Latin are published in the *Theatrum Chemicum* and in the *Bibliotheca Chemica*; the Arabic text of these is not extant.

The historian Ibn Ḫaldūn, in his *Prolegomena* (iii. 207 in de Slane's Fr. translation), questioned the authenticity of the alchemical works of Ḫālid the Umayyad, on the ground that this prince was a Bedawī Arab who lived before the time of the scientific activity of the Arabs, and that therefore he could not have been acquainted with such a complicated science as alchemy. However, the tradition is very exact, both in the *Book of Songs* (*Kitāb al-Aghāni*, xvi. 88–98), and in Mas'ūdi (*Les Prairies d'or*, ed. and tr. into Fr. by Barbier de Meynard, viii. 176). This historian says that alchemists acknowledge Ḫālid, son of Yazīd the Umayyad, as one of their elder brothers.

The second name to be mentioned is that of Geber. This famous person, who became illustrious and legendary in the Christian Middle Ages, is known under the Arab name of Abū Mūsā Jābir, son of Ḥaiyān; his tribal name is 'the Azdite'; from the place of his birth he is named 'of Ṭūs' or 'of Ṭarṭūs'; he is sometimes called al-Ḥarrānī, which agrees with the tradition connecting him with the Sabæans of Ḥarrān. The surname 'al-Umawī, the Umayyad,' which is sometimes given him, represents a tradition according to which he had Ḫālid, son of Yazīd, as master; but other accounts describe him as a pupil of Ja'far aṣ-Ṣādiq, who is also credited with a profound knowledge of occult sciences, and to whom bibliographers ascribe works on science and divination (cf. Ḥajjī Ḫalfa, v. 277, 280; Ibn Ḫalliḫān, No. 130). Lastly, there is occasionally coupled with the name of Geber the epithet 'Ṣūfī'; this is explained by the fact that Geber, having been converted from Sabæism to Islām, is said to have exhibited great zeal for the Musalmān faith; the title must have been added, however, at a later period.

We should clearly pay no heed to a view mentioned in the *Fihrist* (p. 354 ff.), according to which

Geber is a mythical personage. This famous alchemist did certainly exist; but very little is known about his life. A reliable tradition represents him as usually residing at Kūfa; he is sometimes connected with the Barmecides (*Fihrist* and Ḥajjī Ḫalfa, iii. p. 588). He flourished about the year A.H. 160 (A.D. 776). A whole series of works is attributed to him; their titles are generally symbolical, and their number exceeds two hundred. There are twenty-two Arabic works placed under his name in our libraries. Berthelot and Houdas have published five of these treatises under the titles of: *Book of Royalty; Small Book of Balances; Book of Mercy*, a work revised by a pupil; extracts from the *Book of Concentration*; and *Book of Oriental Mercury*. The Latin treatises ascribed to Geber do not correspond to the Arabic works; besides, they exhibit a more advanced stage of chemical science. Some of these are: *Geberi regis Arabum summa perfectionis ministerii*, Gedani (Dantzig), 1682; *Geberi philosophi de alchemia libri iii.*, Nuremberg, 1545 (cf. Steinschneider, *ZDMG* xiii. 649). The Latin treatise, entitled *Book of the Seventy* of Jo (John), is the only one which seems to have preserved some fragments of Geber or his pupils, judging from the resemblance between the titles of its chapters and those of a work of the same name which the *Fihrist* mentions and ascribes to Geber (Latin MS 7156, Paris; cf. Berthelot, *La Chimie au moyen âge*, i. 323).

There were several alchemists in the 3rd cent. A.H.; the two most famous are the ascetic Dhū-n-Nūn al-Miṣrī of Ikhmīm (d. 245 = A.D. 859) and Ibn al-Waḥshīya, the imaginative author of the *Nabatæan Agriculture*, who wrote during the second half of that century. We possess three works of Dhū-n-Nūn on alchemy—in poetry, dialogue, and miscellany (cf. R. A. Nicholson in *JRAS*, 1906, p. 311 ff.). We have various works of Ibn al-Waḥshīya, especially a *Treasury of Wisdom* or *Secrets* (*Kanz al-ḥikma* or *Kanz al-asrār*), which is a system of alchemy. We may add to these names that of Muḥammad, son of Umail (rather than Amyal) at-Tamīmī, who composed, among other things, an essay on ancient Egyptian paintings; and that of Uthmān, son of Suwaid al-Ikhmīmī, who disputed with Ibn al-Waḥshīya.

In the 4th cent. (10th A.D.) appears the medical philosopher 'Razes,' Abū Bakr Muḥammad, son of Zakarīya ar-Rāzī. He was an enthusiastic student of alchemy, and almost a martyr to this science. As he had dedicated his famous book on medicine, *al-Manṣūri*, to the Sāmānid prince Abū Ṣāliḥ Manṣūr, son of Isḥāḳ, he afterwards also presented him with his plea, 'The Establishment of Alchemy' (*Kitāb ithbāt al-kīmīya*). The prince asked him to verify some of his experiments, and, finding him unable to do so, he struck him across the face with a whip, and blinded him. He died in A.H. 311 or 320. We may mention his *Kitāb al-asrār*, 'Book of Secrets,' on alchemy; a *Preparatio Salis Aromatici*, placed under his name, is published in the *Theatrum Chemicum*, iii. No. 64.

To the same century belongs another important writer, Maslama al-Majrīṭī, *i.e.* of Madrid. This learned encyclopædist (d. 395 or 398 = A.D. 1004 or 1007), after travelling in the East, brought thence to his native country a collection of the famous works of the 'Brethren of Purity,' of which he probably made a new recension. Being skilled in alchemy, he wrote specially on this subject a *Kanz al-faḍā'il*, 'Treasury of Accomplishments,' dated 348.

We may mention in passing another prince, who was reputed to be an alchemist, the celebrated Fāṭimid Ḫalīfa al-Manṣūr al-Ḥākim (d. 411 = A.D. 1020), the founder of the religion of the Druzes. The only famous names that we find after him are those of Ghazzālī the great philosopher, Ṭughrā'ī, and Jildakī. Ghazzālī (451–505 = A.D. 1111) believed in alchemy, and wrote some articles on the subject; one of them is extant at Berlin, *Maqāla al-fauz*, 'Lecture on Preservation.' Ṭughrā'ī (al-Ḥasān, son of 'Alī), who died about 515, wazīr of the Seleucid Sultan Mas'ūd at Mosul, became famous as an alchemist, wrote on alchemy, *Jāmī al-asrār*, 'Compendium of Secrets,' an article on the philosopher's stone, and a commentary on Geber's *Book of Mercy*. Jildakī ('Ali, son of Aidamur, son of 'Alī), who died in 743 = A.D. 1342), is the author of several works on alchemy and the search for 'the elixir' (cf. on this author S. de Sacy, *Notices et extraits*, iv. 108; Leclerc, ii. 280).

Alchemical studies continued in Islām during the time of the literary decline and down to the present day. In the 10th cent. A.H. (16th A.D.) authors like Muṣliḥ ad-Dīn Bostān Efendi of Aidīn, or 'Alī Beg of Iznīq, are found writing 'Alchemies,' and in the 11th cent. the physician Maulā Ṣāliḥ, son of Naṣrallāh al-Ḫalabī, adapted Paracelsus. It is said that there are still alchemists in Morocco and at Mecca.

2. **Doctrine.**—The doctrine of alchemy appears among the Arabs under very philosophical aspects; it implies certain ideas on the nature of physical matter which are derived from general philosophy. This connexion with philosophy is so very close, that we come upon treatises beginning with real philosophical introductions; *e.g.* the 'Treatise on Concentration' goes so far as to speak expressly of the doctrine of the 'categories,' which it ascribes to Pythagoras, saying that there are ten things which form the universe: essence and its nine accidents.

It is not difficult to see with what philosophical school the alchemists are, as a rule, connected. It is with the great school of Neo-Platonic origin, which developed in the Musalmān world when the Greek sciences were being studied there, and attained its height about the 10th cent. of the Christian era (4th A.H.). The alchemists are connected more especially with the branches of this school which professed the so-called 'illuminative' doctrines. In these sects a disposition to syncretism prevailed: according to them, truth was possessed in the different nations by wise men who expressed it in different ways, and who are at one time mythical personages, at another well-known philosophers of very different opinions. The same inclination towards syncretism is shown in the alchemical writings. The alchemistic authors do not know whether they owe their art to Egypt rather than Persia, or to India rather than China. The ancestors whom they claim are at one time quite mythical, *e.g.* Hermes and Agathodæmon; at another historical or semi-historical, *e.g.* Qārūn, the Korah of the Bible, brother-in-law of Moses, whose treasures are mentioned in the Qur'ān (xxviii. 76, 79, xxix. 38, xl. 25); or, again, queen Cleopatra, the emperor Heraclius, or Bilqīs, the queen of Sheba. To these soothsayers and kings the alchemists add the philosophers and scholars of classical antiquity, especially Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Democritus, Dioscorides, and Galen. This grouping would not give any very clear information, if we did not know from the history of philosophy that the list is framed according to the usage of the Alexandrians and the Sabæans, and that therefore it was in these two groups of scholars that the Muslims found their masters. As regards the Sabæans, we have already remarked that Geber probably belonged to their sect; they carried the practice of syncretism to a great length; they collected and fixed a large number of legends of various origins. The addition of the Talmudic legends of Qārūn and of Bilqīs, of the Persian names of Jāmāsp and of

Maghis the sage, to the Egyptian legends of Hermes and Agathodæmon, must have been their work. More especially Alexandrian are the legends, of frequent occurrence in the alchemical writings, which refer to the Pyramids and the great ruins of Egypt, and represent these monuments as ancient laboratories, or at least as having been used as deposits for the secrets of the sciences. The tradition which makes Cleopatra a scientist is undoubtedly Alexandrian, as is also the one which represents another woman, Mary the Copt, as lecturing on alchemy in the presence of various learned men (cf. Kopp, *Beiträge*, i. p. 402; Steinschneider, *Mathem.* § 140; Berthelot, *La Chimie au moyen âge*, iii. *passim*). One of the Arabic treatises published by Berthelot and Houdas bears the name of an Egyptian sage Ostanes.

Another tendency which appears from time to time in the alchemical writings certainly arises from Neo-Platonism, viz. the tendency to mysticism. It makes itself evident in two ways: (1) by founding the art of alchemy on a revelation which was received by the ancient prophets, *e.g.* by Hermes or by Qārūn; or (2) by making moral conditions intervene in the production of the great work: God co-operates in the undertaking, and the alchemist must prepare himself for this Divine co-operation by purity of heart. Even in the cases in which this condition is not formally laid down, the alchemistic writings bear a strongly religious stamp.

It is a very wide-spread custom among writers on occult subjects to connect the metals with the planets. Gold is held to correspond with the sun, silver with the moon; the other metals, mercury, iron, tin, lead, correspond respectively to Mercury, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn. This connexion was made long ago, but the Muslims ascribe it more especially to the Sabæans; and this provides a new proof of the important part which that sect took in the transmission of ancient ideas, Greek as well as Jewish and Chaldæan.

The part played by Syrian scholars in this work of preserving and handing down scientific knowledge was greater even than that of the Sabæans; and it is better known. It was through Syrian works that the Muslims became acquainted with the chief Greek alchemists, especially Zosimus (cf. Berthelot, *La Chimie au moyen âge*, ii.).

Now, what exactly is the doctrine, or rather the postulate, on which alchemy is based? This postulate, in its essential elements, is very simple. It holds that metals differ from each other in degree, but not in nature, and that any one of the baser metals, like lead or copper, may be transmuted into a more perfect metal like silver or gold. This postulate is connected with or implies a curious idea frequently expressed by alchemists, that of the 'life' of the mineral. The metal or the mineral is really regarded as a living being, which is engendered and develops in the womb of the earth, where it is subjected to various conditions, such as help or hinder its perfection. This theory is expressed, *e.g.*, in the treatise of the 'Brethren of Purity' devoted to mineralogy. Dieterici, the editor of that treatise, remarks that it is conceived on Aristotelian, one might say rather, Neo-Platonic principles, and that it is inserted in a series of treatises based on those of Aristotle, although we do not know any work on minerals by that philosopher.

In that treatise the doctrine is presented thus. From the elements which lie like potentialities in the womb of the earth, there are first of all formed, as energies, mercury and sulphur; from those two there are afterwards formed, as entelechies, metals which are good or bad, noble or base, according to circumstances. It is only in consequence of certain injuries undergone that the material does not become silver or gold instead of lead or tin. Alchemy endeavours to repair these injuries (Dieterici, *Die Abhandlungen der Ikhwān es-Safā*, Leipzig, 1886, Vorwort, p. 13, and text, p. 137). The same idea is expressed in the *Cosmography* of Qazwīnī (ed. Wüstenfeld, i. p. 207), and in this work also it is ascribed to Aristotle: the metals in their mines undergo certain injuries which cause their imperfections: *e.g.* lead is a kind of silver which has three defects—an unpleasant odour, softness, and a disagreeable sound. In this book also, means of getting rid of these defects are suggested.

In the works of Geber published by Berthelot, and especially in the *Book of Mercy*, whose authenticity appears most certain, this notion of the life of metals is consistently expounded; a regular anthropomorphic theory is applied to mineralogy; not only the idea of 'generation' applies to metal, but also the ideas of 'marriage, pregnancy, and education'; all these conditions, it is said, are necessarily the same as in the case of a human being. This doctrine is expressed with equal force in the treatise by al-Ḥabīb, published in the same collection and apparently quite ancient. According to these various alchemists, the formation and the life of metals require time, like our own; to bring the metal in the womb of the earth to its perfect state, which is the state of gold, nature takes a very long time, more than a thousand years, according to the most wide-spread alchemistic tradition; the work of alchemy is to imitate nature, and at the same time to discover more rapid means than hers for the development of the metal.

The anthropomorphic theory of alchemists has one more aspect; it applies to chemical bodies the ideas of life and death, of body and soul, of matter and mind. In this sense the idea of occult forces is very interesting; these subtle, intangible, invisible forces are compared to 'spiritual forces'; the force of the magnet, which attracts iron through other materials, and that of poison, which permeates the organism, are called 'spiritual forces' (Berthelot, *Geber: 'Traité de la miséricorde,'* p. 175). In bodies there are some substances earthly and gross, and others pure and light; the former are called 'dead,' the latter 'living'; these notions of death and life are also employed in a relative way: *e.g.* sulphur and arsenic are living when they are mixed with substances inferior to them, such as talc; but they appear earthly and dead when they are united with live mercury (*ib.* p. 178). In every body, and *a fortiori* in every combination, it may be supposed that there is a material part and a spiritual part, a soul and a body. The soul is infused into the body; its nature is superior to that of the body, refines it, and gives it a kind of immateriality. A common task for chemists consists in giving a soul to each body, by first purifying souls and bodies, and then infusing into each body the soul which suits it. Geber, still following the idea that there were certain injuries caused by nature, even speaks of 'restoring' to the body the soul which 'has gone out of it'; this is another aspect of a chemical operation; thus, mercury is the soul which suits gold and the other metals. The spirit also is capable of a sort of education; not only must it be fit to unite forcibly with its body, and for that reason be pure, but it must also be firm, it must resist fire, and to this end must, as far as possible, partake of the nature of fire.

In practice, the aim of the alchemist's efforts is to find the substance, a living substance, 'elixir' or spirit, which, when combined with the body of the imperfect metal, previously prepared and purified, will change it into perfect metal. Alchemists use various means, and look in various places to find this substance; they do not regard it as exclusively mineral; they even make use of organic bodies in its preparation; they discuss whether it is 'excrement, blood, hair, or egg'; as a rule, they describe it as a stone; it is 'the Philosopher's stone, the very precious stone.' This stone is afterwards ground down, and during the grinding it is sprinkled with

water mixed with drugs and simples. The liquid obtained in this way is the 'elixir.'

3. Discussions of the doctrine. — During the course of Arabic literary history, various persons assumed an attitude of opposition to the alchemical doctrine. This opposition led to discussions. It must, however, be stated that the objections raised were not directed against the study of bodies and their properties, but only against the assumption peculiar to alchemists, concerning the possibility of the transmutation of metals. In the 3rd cent. A.H. the philosopher al-Kindī declared himself against the alchemists. He wrote a treatise on 'the error of those who think that gold and silver can be obtained otherwise than in their mines,' and another on 'the deceits of alchemists.' A pupil of al-Kindī, Dubais, took up the cause of the alchemists, however, and wrote two treatises on their science, cited in the *Fihrist*. Razes composed a 'refutation' of the objections of al-Kindī. Fārābī believed in alchemy, but Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), was opposed to it (see AVICENNA). Ṭughrā'ī afterwards defended alchemy against Avicenna.

Avicenna's chief objection consisted in saying that the seven metals differ in their specific qualities, each of them forming a definite species with real characteristics; Fārābī believed, on the contrary, like the alchemists, that all metals were of the same species, and he considered their qualities merely as accidents. Ṭughrā'ī, bringing in the Divine power, observes, in addition, that it is not a question of producing a specific difference in the metal treated, but of making it fit to receive this difference from its Creator. Avicenna also objects, like al-Kindī, that it is incredible that there can be a shorter way of bringing metals to their perfect state than that which is followed by nature.

The other objections brought forward against alchemy are: that no one has ever been pointed out with certainty as having achieved the great work; that it is especially poor people who study alchemy; that alchemists circulate counterfeit gold, and in that way wrong the public, and are liable to punishment by law. This latter accusation refers to the cases in which alchemists succeeded in giving to metal what they called a dye, *i.e.* in covering it with a layer which had the appearance and some of the properties of gold. The alchemists replied, weakly enough, it is true, to these objections, by saying that this 'dye' was fast, and would last several centuries.

The cosmographer Dimishqī (ed. Fraehn, p. 97) and the historian Ibn Ḫaldūn (*Prolegomena*, de Slane's Fr. tr. iii. 207 ff.), opponents of alchemy, speak in an interesting way about alchemists, and relate the objections which were raised against them.

4. Special contribution of Muslims to alchemy. —It is very difficult to determine exactly the share due to Muslims in the progress of chemical discoveries. It was, apparently, very slender. The most ancient Arabic works are adaptations of, or commentaries on, Greek works; that of Crates is typical. The discoveries which Western tradition has ascribed to Geber, those of *aqua regalis*, of sulphuric acid, nitric acid, and nitrate of silver, are not found in the Arabic works placed under this alchemist's name, but only in some Latin pamphlets at the end of the 13th cent.; it seems, therefore, that the admiration affected by the Western peoples for Muslim alchemists is due not so much to their real worth, as to the general custom of looking to the East for masters, especially of the occult sciences.

It is probable, however, that Muslims made progress in chemistry as applied to medicine, in dyeing, and in the art of enamelling. Al-Kindī, besides others, wrote about colouring matters, glass-making, the processes of removing stains from cloth, and other similar subjects. These particular industries have not yet been studied minutely enough.

Every one knows that our languages are indebted to Arabic chemistry for certain words, which are in some cases Arabic words, in others Greek words preceded by the Arabic article; *e.g. alchemy, alembic, aludel, alcohol, elixir*. The word *alchemy* has been derived from χυμεία, 'mixture.' Wiedemann has shown that this word originally denoted the very substance which has the property of accomplishing transmutation, the elixir, and not the sum of the ways which help to find it (Wiedemann, *Beiträge*, ii. p. 351; J. Gildemeister, *ZDMG*, 1876). The *kohl*, which has given its name to alcohol, was originally a very fine powder; it is the black powder which Oriental ladies use for blackening round their eyes. The use of the word was generalized and extended to various powders and to liquids. *Elixir* is said to be derived from Greek ξήριον, 'dry powder' (J. Gildemeister, *l.c.*); it is possible, however, from the point of view of the grammatical form, that it is an Arabic word and belongs to the root *kasara*, 'to grind,' *al-iksīr* being 'the thing ground,' 'the powder.'

LITERATURE. — Berthelot, *La Chimie au moyen âge*, 1885, pt. i., *Essai sur la transmission de la science antique au moyen âge*, Paris, 1893, pt. iii. with the collaboration of O. Houdas, *L'Alchimie arabe*, 1893; Eilhard Wiedemann, *Beiträge zur Gesch. der Naturwissenschaften*, i.–iv., Erlangen, 1904–1905. On the Arabic authors see Brockelmann, *Gesch. der arab. Litteratur*, 2 vols., Weimar and Berlin, 1897–1902. Latin works on alchemy given as translations from Arabic are found in the following collections: *Theatrum Chemicum*, 6 vols., Strassburg, 1659–61; *Bibliotheca Chemica*, Geneva, 1702; *Artis auriferæ quam chemiam vocant duo vol.*, Bâle, 1572; *Artis chemicæ principes*, Bâle, 1572. A famous work, entitled *Turba philosophorum*, is found in two different versions in the collection *Artis auriferæ*; an 'Alchemy' ascribed to Avicenna, *Liber Abuali Abincinæ de anima in arte Alchimiæ*, is found in the *Artis chemicæ principes*. On several of these works and on mineralogy, cf. F. de Mély, *Les Lapidaires de l'antiquité et du moyen âge*, pt. iii. No. 1, Introduction, Paris, 1902. BON. CARRA DE VAUX.

ALCHEMY (European).—The study of alchemy in Europe is traceable to the schools of Spain. J. Ferguson, in his notes to the 'Catalogue of the Alchemical, Chemical, and Pharmaceutical books of James Young of Kelly and Durris,' notes which form the latest storehouse of information on the history of alchemy in Europe, says, under the head of Michael Scott: 'It was in Spain, to which it had been brought by the Arabs, that the art first found place in Europe' (*Bibliotheca Chemica*, Glasgow, 1906).

The Khalifate of Cordova reached its highest splendour under the rule of Abderrahman III. (A.D. 912–961) and Al-Ḥakam II. (961–976). The libraries of the rulers, the nobles, and persons of importance, numbering in some cases 400,000 volumes, attracted students from all parts of Europe (Rafael Altamira of Crevea, *Historia de España*, i. 275).

1. Among the first to profit by this revival of learning was **Gerbert**, afterwards Pope Sylvester II. (999–1003). While still a student in the Abbey of Arvillac in Auvergne, he attracted the attention of Borel, Count of Barcelona. He returned with him to Spain, and is said to have visited Cordova during the reign of Al-Ḥakam II. It was in the schools of Spain that he studied the sciences of arithmetic, geometry, astrology, and chemistry, which at a later date brought him into disrepute as a wizard. During the Papacy of John XIII. (965–973) he visited Rome in the company of Count Borel and Hatto, Bishop of Vich. He then made the acquaintance of the Emperor Otho I., and was recommended by him to the notice of Adalbero, Archbishop of Rheims. By Otho II. (973–983) he was

appointed Abbot of Bobbio. Driven from Bobbio by the neighbouring nobles, he returned to Rheims, where he taught the 'whole range of human science.' On the degradation of Arnulf, he was made Archbishop of Rheims in 991. Forced to resign the see in 996, he took refuge at the Court of Otho III. (983–1002), and by his influence in 998 he became Archbishop of Ravenna. In the following year he succeeded to the Papacy. Thus by the close of the 10th cent. the learning of Spain was introduced into France and Italy and the Imperial Court (Milman, *Lat. Chr.* iii. pp. 331–345).

2. The influence of Gerbert did not end with his death. His pupil, Fulbert of Chartres (1007–1028), carried on his work. Adelmannus, Bishop of Brescia, in a letter to Berengarius, speaks of their joint studies 'in Academia Carnotensi, sub nostro illo venerabili Socrate, nempe Fulberto' (Bar. *Ann. Eccl.* 1004, 6). The Schools of Berengarius in Tours and Angers to some extent carried on the same work. Behind the theological controversy of the early Scholasticism of the 11th cent., the tradition of the wide learning of Gerbert may be traced as one cause of the recognition of the philosophical studies of Spain in the 12th cent. (Neander, *Gesch. der Chr. Rel. u. Kirche*, iv. 283).

3. The fall of the Khalîfate of Cordova in 1031 did not check the progress of learning in Spain. The kings of Seville, Cordova, Malaga, Granada, Almeria, Denia, Zaragoza, Toledo, and Badajos vied with one another in the patronage they gave to philosophy and science. The studies of the former period were continued, and special attention was given to the natural sciences—medicine, chemistry, botany, and astronomy. Ibn al-Baiṭar of Malaga made a large collection of minerals and plants, and under the Muwaḥḥid Khalîf Ya'qûb al-Manṣûr (1196) the Giralda of Seville became the chief observatory in Europe. In philosophy, Averroës of Cordova (1126–1198) won a European reputation as the commentator of Aristotle and Plato.

4. The conquest of Toledo by Alfonso VI. of Castile in 1085 was another step in the propagation of the Arabic learning in Europe. A school of translators was founded at Toledo which reached the highest point of its fame in the reign of Alfonso VII. (1130–1150). Among those who were attracted to Spain were Hermann of Dalmatia and Hermann of Germany, Gerard of Cremona, the Englishmen Daniel of Morlay, Robert the Archdeacon, and Michael Scott (Raf. Altamira Crevea, *op. cit.* i. 484–514). It was in 1182 that Robert Castrensis translated the *Liber de compositione Alchemiæ*, associated with the names of Ḫâlid and Morienus. To the same period belongs the teaching of Alain de Lille, known as 'Doctor universalis,' who had been a monk at Clairvaux, and was afterwards Bishop of Auxerre.

5. Michael Scott was among the first to bring alchemy into prominence in Europe under the patronage of Frederick II. (1194–1250). He dedicated his *de Secretis* to Frederick in 1209. He studied Arabic in Sicily, and spent ten years in Spain. At Toledo he translated Aristotle's treatise on Natural History from the Arabic, with the help of a Jew. In 1217 he translated an Arabic work on the sphere. This is a link with the studies of Gerbert, who in a letter to Remigius, a monk of Trèves, excuses himself for not sending a sphere, owing to his time being occupied with civil business.

'Sphæram tibi nullam misimus, nec ad præsens ullam habemus, nec est res parvi laboris tam occupatis in civilibus causis. Si ergo te cura tantarum detinet rerum, volumen Achilleidos Statii diligenter compositum nobis dirige, ut Sphæram, quam gratis propter difficultatem sui non poteritis habere, tuo munere valeas extorquere' (Gerberti *Ep.* 134, *ap.* Duchesne, *Hist. Franc. Script.* ii. 820).

From Toledo he went to Cordova; in 1220 he returned to Sicily, and in 1230 he was at Oxford. He died in 1235. Ferguson says of him:

'At Toledo he learnt magic for which the city was famous—natural magic or experimental physics or jugglery, as well as black magic, involving the invocation of the infernal powers. There, too, he experimented in Alchemy' (*Bibl. Chem.*, art. 'Michael Scott').

His *Liber de Alchimia* is the result of these studies.

6. Albert the Great has the merit of having brought the study of alchemy as a branch of philosophy into touch with the Scholasticism of the Middle Ages. The Great Chronicle of Belgium in 1480 speaks of him as 'magnus in magia, major in philosophia, maximus in theologia.' Born at Lauingen in Swabia, he studied at Paris and Padua, and in the early part of the 13th cent. taught in the Schools at Cologne. In 1228 he was called to Paris, but after three years returned to Cologne. He was the most distinguished amongst the Dominicans of Germany. In 1260 he was summoned to Rome by Pope Alexander IV., and was made Bishop of Ratisbon. He resigned the see after three years, and retired again to his studies and his lectures at Cologne, where he died in 1280. He was the master of Thomas Aquinas (Milman, *Lat. Chr.* ix. 122). His *Libellus de Alchimia* (Alb. Magn. *opp. omn.*, Paris, vol. xxxvii.) is a practical treatise on the transmutation of metals, the structure of furnaces, and the various methods to be used in the study of alchemy. The Preface is valuable as indicating the wide-spread interest which was then shown by all classes in the study:

'Inveni multos prædivites litteratos, Abbates, Præpositos, Canonicos, Physicos, et illiteratos, qui pro eadem arte magnas fecerunt expensas atque labores, et tandem deficiebant quoniam artem investigare non valebant.'

He persevered where others had failed:

'Ego vero non desperavi, quin facerem labores et expensas infinitas' (*Lib. de Alch.*, Præf.).

He considers it a true art:

'Probat artem Alchimiæ esse veram' (*l.c.* c. 3).

He believes all metals can be transmuted into gold and silver, represented in astrological terms as Sun and Moon:

'Et ut breviter dicam, omnia metalla transubstantiantur in Solem et Lunam' (*ib.* c. 10).

He speaks of the Elixir:

'De his quatuor spiritibus fit tinctura quæ dicitur Elixir arabice, fermentum latine' (*ib.* c. 10).

Fermentation and chemical reaction seem to be used as equivalent terms.

7. Thomas Aquinas was the pupil of Albert the Great at Cologne and at Paris. He, like his master, was a member of the Dominican Order. He graduated at Paris, and taught not only at Cologne under Albert, but at Paris, at Rome, and at other cities in Italy. He refused the Archbishopric of Naples, and died at the Abbey of Fossa Nuova near Piperno on his way to the Council of Lyons in 1274. Ferguson, in his *Bibl. Chem.*, discusses the authenticity of the *Thesaurus Alchemiæ secretissimus ad fratrem Reinaldum* which is attributed to him, and leaves it an open question. The *Summa* contains one or two passages which directly or indirectly refer to alchemy, although his similes are drawn from animal and plant life rather than from the mineral world. The principle of the transmutation of metals may be inferred from one of the earliest definitions of the *Summa*:

'Respondeo dicendum quod solus Deus est omninò immutabilis, omnis autem creatura aliquo modo est mutabilis. Sciendum est enim, quod mutabile potest aliquid dici dupliciter. Uno modo per potentiam, quæ in ipso est. Alio modo per potentiam, quæ in altero est' (*Summa*, pt. i. qu. ix. art. ii.).

God alone is immutable; all else is mutable, in different ways. In one place Aquinas refers to the relation that exists between the minerals and the stars:

'Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod effectus aliquis invenitur assimilari causæ agenti dupliciter. Uno modo secundum

eandem speciem, ut homo generatur ab homine, et ignis ab igne. Alio modo secundum virtualem continentiam: prout scilicet forma effectus virtualiter continetur in causa. Et sic animalia ex putrefactione generata, et plantæ et corpora mineralia assimilantur soli et stellis, quorum virtute generantur' (*Summa*, pt. i. qu. cv. art. i.).

In discussing the question of the sale of adulterated goods, he says that to sell gold and silver made by the alchemist, if it have not the nature of true gold and silver, is a fraudulent transaction. If, however, this gold of the alchemist is true gold, the transaction is lawful. He recognizes the possibility of fraud, but at the same time witnesses to his belief in the production of gold by the art of the alchemist. The passage is sometimes only partially quoted. It is of importance in its bearing on the alchemical knowledge of Thomas Aquinas:

'Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aurum et argentum non solum cara sunt propter utilitatem vasorum, quæ ex eis fabricantur, aut aliorum hujusmodi; sed etiam propter dignitatem et puritatem substantiæ ipsorum. Et ideo si aurum vel argentum ab alchimicis factum, veram speciem non habeat auri et argenti, est fraudulenta et injusta venditio; præsertim cum sint aliquæ utilitates auri et argenti veri, secundum naturalem operationem ipsorum, quæ non conveniunt auro per alchimiam sophisticato. Sicut quod habet proprietatem lætificandi, et contra quasdam infirmitates medicinaliter juvat. Frequentius etiam potest poni in operatione, et diutius in sua puritate permanet aurum verum quam aurum sophisticatum.'

This contrast between real gold and counterfeit gold implies some knowledge and experience of the art of alchemy:

'Si autem per alchimiam fieret aurum verum, non esset illicitum ipsum pro vero vendere, quia nihil prohibet artem uti aliquibus naturalibus causis ad producendum naturales et veros effectus: sicut August. dicit in 3. *de Trinit.* de his quæ arte dæmonum fiunt.'

The art of alchemy is not unlawful if it confine itself to the investigation of natural causes and natural effects, though some think it demoniacal (pt. ii. 2, qu. lxxvii. art. ii.).

8. Roger Bacon, born about 1214, spent his youth at Oxford before joining the Franciscan Order. He began his studies in alchemy and the kindred sciences before 1250, and by 1267 had spent more than 2000 libræ 'on secret books and various experiments and languages and instruments and tables.' He left Oxford for Paris some time before 1245, and returned to Oxford soon after 1250. About 1257 he was exiled, and placed under strict supervision at Paris for ten years. On June 22, 1266, Clement IV. wrote to him, bidding him send him his works secretly and without delay, notwithstanding any restrictions of the Order. Within fifteen or eighteen months he sent to the Pope the *Opus Majus*, the *Opus Minus*, and the *Opus Tertium*. By the Pope's influence he returned to Oxford and began to labour at a great Summa Scientiæ, the *Compendium Philosophiæ*. In 1278 he was condemned 'propter quasdam novitates,' and remained in prison for fourteen years. His last known work was written in 1292.

The *Opus Majus* is silent on the subject of alchemy. The *Opus Minus*, of which only fragments exist in the Bodleian (Brewer, *Opera Inedita*, 311–390), deals with practical alchemy in pt. ii., and speculative alchemy, or *de rerum generationibus*, in pt. v. There is no reference to it in the *Opus Tertium*, but in the *Compendium Philosophiæ* it is the subject of bk. iii. of vol. iii. Speculative alchemy, according to the definition of Roger Bacon, is the science of the generation of things from elements; practical alchemy teaches 'how to make noble metals and colours,' and 'the art of prolonging life.' Some other works of his on alchemy are regarded as genuine.

The different titles of the *Breve Breviarium* give some idea of the scope and aim of his work; it is entitled, *De naturis metallorum in ratione alkimica et artificiali transformatione*, or *Cœlestis alchymia*, or *De naturis metallorum et ipsorum transmutatione*. The date is uncertain. On the subject of old age is the *Libellus Rogerii Baconi . . . de retardandis senectutis accidentibus et de sensibus conservandis*. It is assigned to the year 1276. The *Antidotarius* is a second part of this work. The *De consideratione quintæ essentiæ*, the *Speculum alchemiæ*, the *Speculum secretorum*, the *Secretum secretorum naturæ de laude lapidis Philosophorum*, the *Semita recta alchemiæ*, and the *Thesaurus spirituum*, are wrongly attributed to Bacon (Little, 'The Grey Friars in Oxford,' *Oxf. Hist. Soc. Publ.* vol. xx. pp. 191–211).

9. The most prominent names among the alchemists of the last part of the 13th cent. are Raymondus Lullius and Arnold of Villanova. The former of these, the Raymond Lully of the later English alchemists, was born of noble parentage in Catalonia, and held, in his early years, a high position in the Court of Aragon. Disappointed in a romantic attachment, he renounced the world, and gave himself up to a life of study and mission work in Africa. His work witnesses to a remarkable combination of spiritual devotion and scientific research, with a passionate enthusiasm for the conversion of the Moors. He devoted himself at first to the study of Arabic. He undertook his first mission to Africa in 1271, but met with little success. He was at Paris in 1281, where he became acquainted with Arnold Villanova. In 1287 he visited Rome, and in 1291 Montpellier. During these years he wrote his great works, the *Ars Generalis sive Magna* and the *Libri xii. Principiorum Philosophiæ contra Averroistas*. In 1292 he went to Africa a second time, and was imprisoned at Tunis. In 1293 he was in Naples; and after journeying to Cyprus and Armenia he was again in Paris in 1308, where he is supposed to have met Duns Scotus. In 1309 he made another missionary journey to Africa, and succeeded in converting seventy disciples of Averroës at Bona, the ancient Hippo, the see of St. Augustine. Once again, as an old man of eighty, he made a last journey to Africa, in 1315, to be stoned and maltreated at Bugia. He lived only to see the shores of the island of Majorca, where he was buried in a chapel on one of his own estates. In his last will, the *Codicillus seu Vade Mecum quo fontes alchemicæ artis ac philosophiæ reconditioris traduntur*, he says that he converted 22 tons of quicksilver, lead, and tin into gold. The tradition that he was brought from Rome by Cremer, Abbot of Westminster, and that he coined the rose-nobles for Edward III., does not seem to rest on historical fact (Ferguson, *Bibl. Chem.*).

Arnold of Villanova, his contemporary, was probably also a Spaniard. He was born in 1245, and died in 1310. He studied amongst the Arabs of Spain; and it is stated, on the authority of John André, that he succeeded in the genuine conversion of iron bars into pure gold at Rome (*Bibl. Chem.* p. 95). At least these alchemists of the 13th cent. in their researches seem to have discovered the secret of a long and useful and strenuous life. Albert the Great died at the age of 87, Roger Bacon at about 78, Raymond Lully at 80, and Arnold Villanova at 65, at a period when the average life was not so long as it is now.

10. The most distinguished pupil of Lully and Villanova was Pope John XXII. (1316–1334), who also lived to the age of 90. He worked at alchemy in the Papal palace at Avignon, and is said to have left behind him 25,000,000 florins. At the same time he wrote a letter in which he censured the black magic which was practised 'in nostra curia' by certain clergy,—Joannes de Lemovicis, Jacobus dictus Brabantinus,' and a barber-surgeon, described as 'Joannes de Amanto, medicus,' or, in another place, 'barberius' (Raynald, *Ann. Eccl.* 1317, 53).

11. The practice of the art of alchemy was continued throughout Europe in the 14th cent. on the lines laid down by the masters of the 13th cent. John Cremer, Abbot of Westminster, after studying the art for thirty years, worked at Westminster in the reign of Edward III. (1327–1377). John

Rupecissa, or Jean de Roquetaillade, was a Franciscan of Aurillac in Aquitaine. He was imprisoned by Innocent VI. in 1356–1357. He quotes Geber, Lullius, and Villanova. In his *Liber lucis* is the picture of a furnace, in which was practised 'the incubation of the philosophic egg whence issued the marvellous quintessence.' Petrus Bonus of Ferrara was the author of the *Preciosa Margarita novella de Thesauro ac pretiosissimo Philosophorum Lapide*. It was written in 1330, and published at Venice in 1546. The term 'fermentum,' used by Albert the Great as the Latin of elixir, is applied by Petrus Bonus to the philosopher's stone. It is also used as the means of perfecting it:

'Apud philosophos fermentum dupliciter videtur dici: uno modo ipse lapis philosophorum et suis elementis compositus et completus in comparatione ad metalla; alio modo illud quod est perficiens lapidem et ipsum complens.'

The chemical reactions due to it are compared with the working of yeast:

'De primo modo dicimus quod sicut fermentum pastæ vincit pastam et ad se convertit semper, sic et lapis convertit ad se metalla reliqua. Et sicut una pars fermenti pastæ habet convertere partes pastæ et non converti, sic et hic lapis habet convertere plurimas partes metallorum ad se, et non converti' (Petrus Bonus, *ap.* P. Schützenberger, *On Fermentation*, p. 11). Schützenberger adds: 'This property of transmitting a force to a large mass without being itself weakened by the process was precisely that which ought to characterize the philosopher's stone, which was so much sought after.' Since these words were written, the discovery of radium has given to chemistry an element which also appears to have the property 'convertere plurimas partes metallorum ad se, et non converti.'

Nicolas Flamel belonged to the latter part of the 14th century. He was born in Pontoise about 1330, and died in 1418 at the age of 88. His discovery of the elixir of life in 1382 seems to have met with its reward.

12. Among the prominent names of the 15th cent. are **Basil Valentine** and **Isaac of Holland**. The former is considered the author of the *Triumphal Car of Antimony*, but there is considerable doubt as to the facts of his life and the authorship of the works attributed to him. The chief fact is a record in an Erfurt Chronicle under the year 1413: 'Eadem ætate Basilius Valentinus in Divi Petri monasterio vixit.' There is a similar doubt as to the identity of Isaac of Holland. The life of **Bernard, Count of Treviso**, covers the whole century. Born in 1406, he died in 1490 at the age of 84, another instance of the secret of long life won by the alchemists probably by means of study, method, and application to work. He distinguishes between the results of the labour of the true alchemist and the counterfeit products of sophistical alchemists. Here there is some echo of the phrase of Thomas Aquinas: 'aurum sophisticatum.'

England produced three prominent alchemists in this century. **George Ripley** was born about 1415, and was a Canon Regular of St. Augustine at Bridlington. He visited Rome in 1477, and returned in 1478 after having discovered the secret of transmutation. He is the author of *The Compound of Alchemy, or the Ancient Hidden Art of Alchemie: Containing the right and perfectest Means to make the Philosopher's Stone, Aurum potabile, with other excellent Compounds.* His Twelve Gates of Alchemy give some insight into the methods of the art in England in the 15th century. They are: Calcination, Solution, Separation, Conjunction, Putrefaction, Congelation, Cibation, Sublimation, Fermentation, Exaltation, Multiplication, Projection. He died in 1490 at the age of 75. **Thomas Dalton** lived in the middle of the century, and received a powder from a Canon of Lichfield under a promise not to use it until after his death. **Thomas Norton of Bristol** wrote his *Crede Mihi*, or *Ordinal of Alchemy*, in 1477. He says:

'I made also the Elixir of life,
Which me bereft a merchant's wife;
The Quintessens I made also,
With other secrets many moe,
Which sinful people took me fro
To my great pain and much more woe.'

13. The 16th cent. saw a further development of alchemy into the more exact sciences of chemistry and medicine. **Paracelsus**, in his student wanderings an alchemist, became by practice a physician, by experience a chemist. He was at once adept and wizard, sceptic and critic. He wrecked his work by his bombast, his life by his self-indulgence. At the same time, to use Browning's words, 'the title of Paracelsus to be considered the father of modern chemistry is indisputable.' Gerardus Vossius says of him: 'Nobilem hanc medicinæ partem, diu sepultam avorum ætate, quasi ab orco revocavit Th. Parcelsus' (*de Philosophia et Phil. sectis*, ix. 9). It appears also from his treatise *de Phlebotomia* that he had discovered the circulation of the blood. Lavater says that 'though an astrological enthusiast,' he was 'a man of prodigious genius' (*de Natura Rerum* Holcroft's tr., vol. iii. p. 179). There is a reference to his use of laudanum on the evidence of his secretary, Oporinus:

'Alii illud quod in capulo habuit, ab ipso Azoth appellatum, medicinam fuisse præstantissimam aut lapidem Philosophicum putant' (Melch. Adam). Browning adds: 'This famous sword was no laughing matter in those days, and it is now a material feature in the popular idea of Paracelsus. . . . This Azoth was simply "laudanum suum." But in his time he was commonly believed to possess the double tincture—the power of curing diseases and transmuting metals. Oporinus often witnessed, as he declares, both these effects, as did also Franciscus, the servant of Paracelsus, who describes, in a letter to Neander, a successful projection at which he was present, and the results of which, good golden ingots, were confided to his keeping.'

Paracelsus, otherwise Philippus Aureolus Theophrastus Bombastus ab Hohenheim, was born at Einsiedeln in 1493. He studied medicine under his father at Villach, and alchemy under Tritheim, Bishop of Spanheim, at Würzburg. The character of his studies at Würzburg is best seen in the letter dedicatory, written in 1510, by Agrippa to Tritheim:

'Quam nuper tecum, R. P. in cœnobio tuo apud Herbipolim (Würzburg) aliquandiu conversatus, multa de chymicis, multa de magicis, multa de cabalisticis, cæterisque quæ adhuc in occulto delitescunt, arcanis scientiis atque artibus una contulissemus,' etc.

It was partly in rebellion against these traditional methods, partly to gain as wide an experience as possible, that Paracelsus spent his early life in travel:

'Patris auxilio primum, deinde propria industria doctissimos viros in Germania, Italia, Gallia, Hispania, aliisque Europæ regionibus, nactus est præceptores' (Melch. Adam, in *Vit. Germ. Medic.*). The passage illustrates the wide interest in alchemy throughout Europe at the close of the 15th century.

Under the patronage of Sigismond Fugger, Paracelsus learnt much in the mines of Bohemia, and himself speaks of his researches into folk-lore:

'Ecce amatorem adolescentem difficillimi itineris haud piget, ut venustam saltem puellam vel fœminam aspiciat' (*Defensiones Septem adv. æmulos suos*, 1573: 'de peregrinationibus et exilio').

In 1526 he was called to a chair of physic and surgery at Basel. Here his over-bold denunciation of Avicenna and Galen made him many enemies. In 1528 his fall was brought about in the case of a canon of Basel named Liechtenfels. This man was cured by Paracelsus, but refused to pay the recognized fee. His refusal was supported by the magistrates, and Paracelsus fled to Colmar. He was at Nuremberg in 1529, at St. Gall in 1531, at Pfeffers in 1535, and at Augsburg in 1536. He then visited Moravia, Arabia, and Hungary. In 1538, when at Villach, he dedicated his 'Chronicle' to the States of Carinthia, in gratitude for the many kindnesses with which they had honoured his father. He died at Salzburg in 1541, at the early age of 48. He seems to have been generous in the practice of medicine. His epitaph says of him: 'Bona sua in pauperes distribuenda cælio-

candaque erogavit.' A sceptic and fierce critic in alchemy, he appears to have been no less so in theology. Quenstedt says of him: 'Nec tantum novæ medicinæ, verum etiam novæ theologiæ autor est' (*de Patr. Doct.*). Delrio places him among those who were: 'partim atheos, partim hæreticos' (*Disquis. Magicar.* i. 3). At the same time, Browning is justified in the last words he places in the mouth of Paracelsus:

'If I stoop
Into a dark tremendous sea of cloud,
It is but for a time; I press God's lamp
Close to my breast; its splendour, soon or late,
Will pierce the gloom: I shall emerge one day.
You understand me? I have said enough?'

An inventory taken at his death shows that the only books he left were the Bible, the New Testament, the Commentaries of St. Jerome on the Gospels, a printed volume on medicine, and seven manuscripts. His works were published by F. Bitiskius in 3 vols. fol. in 1658; the Hermetic and Alchemical writings by A. E. Waite in 2 vols. in 1894. Jules Andrieu says of him: 'He is the pioneer of modern chemists, and the prophet of a revolution in general science' (*Encyc. Brit.* art. 'Alchemy'). Browning sums up his study of Paracelsus in the words:

'Meanwhile, I have done well, though not all well.
As yet men cannot do without contempt;
'Tis for their good, and therefore fit awhile
That they reject the weak, and scorn the false,
Rather than praise the strong and true, in me:
But after, they will know me.'
(*Paracelsus*, 1835, and notes).

The new influence in the 16th cent. is shown by the violent death of Beuther, who was alchemist to the Elector Augustus of Saxony from 1575 to 1582, and in the title of Libavius' great work published in 1595—*Alchymia recognita, emendita, et aucta.* It has been called the 'first text-book of chemistry.' It contains a chapter on the philosopher's stone. In England, Thomas Charnock published his *Breviary of Philosophy* in 1557, his *Exigue of Alchemy* in 1572, and his *Memorandum* in 1574. He was instructed in the use of gold-making powder by Bird, who received it from Ripley. It was only those who were well-to-do who could carry on these experiments. The furnace alone cost Charnock £3 a week. The *Alchemical Testament* of John Gybbys of Exeter in the time of Elizabeth has been published by James O. Halliwell (London, 1854).

There does not seem to have been much interest taken in alchemy at Oxford in the early part of the century. The Day Book of John Donne in 1520 contains but few references to alchemical works. There is one copy of the *Commentum Arnoldi de Villanova* (fol. 3, a. 1); there are three copies of a *Chiromantia de manu* (fols. 1. a. 1, 8. b. 2, 13. a. 1), and two copies of Albertus, *de mineralibus* (13. a. 1, 13. b. 2). There is also a copy of *Theoretica planetarum* (15. b. 1) (Fletcher, *Collectanea Oxf. Hist. Soc.* vol. v. p. 71 ff.). In the catalogue of books belonging to William Grocyn, drawn up by his executor, Linacre, in the same year, there is the same absence of such books (Mont. Burrows, *Collect. Oxf. Hist. Soc.* vol. xvi. p. 317 ff.). Oxford had at this time other interests, especially the new learning associated with the names of Grocyn, Linacre, Foxe, and others. The training of Linacre, the founder of the English College of Physicians, the friend of Politian and Chalcondylas, and the great Venetian publisher, Aldus Manutius, is in marked contrast to the restless wanderings of Paracelsus.

14. It was long before the new sciences cut themselves altogether adrift from the ideas of the alchemists. In the early part of the 17th cent. the brotherhood of the Hermetic philosophers known as the Rosicrucians (wh. see) brought the occult mysteries of the earlier alchemists again into notice. The brotherhood claimed descent from Christian Rosencreutz in 1459; but no evidence for this exists beyond their own publications. The controversy centred round a work entitled, *Chymische Hochzeit Christiani Rosencreutz anno 1459*, written by Johann Valentin Andreä in 1616, and published at Strassburg. Among the most prominent of the Rosicrucian brotherhood was Michael Maier, physician to the Emperor Rudolph II. (1576–1612). He published *Examen fucorum Pseudochymicorum* in 1617, *Atalanta fugiens* in 1618, *Symbola aureæ mensæ* in 1617, and the *Tripus aureus* containing three treatises—the *Basilii Valentini Practica ex Germanica*, the *Crede Mihi seu Ordinale* of Thomas Norton, and the *Testamentum* of Cremer, Abbot of Westminster. Robert Fludd introduced the brotherhood to the notice of English physicians. Born in Kent in 1574, he matriculated at St. John's, Oxford, on November 10, 1592, and took his M.A. degree in 1598. One of the three questions discussed by him for Inception in Medicine in 1605 was: 'Chymicum extractum minus molestiæ et periculi affert quam quod integrum et naturale' ('Reg. Univ. Oxon.,' *Oxf. Hist. Soc.* vol. ii. pt. i. 193, ii. 191, iii. 194). In the same year is discussed in Comitiis: 'Incantatio non valet ad curam morbi.' Fludd went abroad and studied the works of Paracelsus and the mysteries of the Rosicrucians. On his return he practised as a physician in London, and died in 1637.

The Hon. Robert Boyle, one of the first promoters of modern chemistry, and a leading member of the Royal Society on its incorporation in 1662, believed in the transmutation of metals. In 1659 he brought to Oxford 'the noted chemist and Rosicrucian, Peter Sthael of Strasburgh.' Anthony Wood began a 'course of chemistry' under him April 23, 1663, paying 30s. in advance, and the balance of 30s. at the conclusion of the class, May 30, 1663. 'A. W. got some knowledge and experience; but his mind was still busy after antiquities and music.' Among the members of this famous chemistry class at Oxford was 'John Lock, a man of turbulent spirit, clamorous, and never contented,' and 'Mr. Christopher Wren, afterwards a knight, and an eminent virtuoso.' In 1664, Mr. Sthael was called away to London, and became operator to the Royal Society; and continuing there till 1670, he returned to Oxford in November (Clark, 'Wood's Life and Times,' *Oxf. Hist. Soc.* vol. xix. pp. 290, 472). The *Sceptical Chemist*, by Robert Boyle (Oxford, 1680), contains the first statement of the molecular or atomic idea in chemical philosophy (H. C. Bolton, *Catalogue of Works on Alchemy and Chemistry*, exhibited at the Grolier Club, New York, 1891). He was made 'Dr. of Phisicke' in 1665, and died in 1691.

The Rosicrucian ideas and alchemistical methods survived to some extent at Oxford. Elias Ashmole was the contemporary of Robert Boyle at Oxford, but as a member of Brazenose, and not as 'a sojourner.' In 1650 he edited a work of Dr. John Dee, who died *c.* 1608, of whom Wood says: 'I have heard some say that he was a mere mountebank in his profession' ('Wood's Life and Times,' *Oxf. Hist. Soc.* vol. xix. p. 308). In 1654, Ashmole wrote *The Way to Bliss in three books.* 'The author says that motion is the father of heat, and doth beget and purchase it of nothing, theoretically anticipating modern doctrines' (Bolton, *Catalogue*). Bk. iii. ch. ii. treats of the Philosopher's Stone. In 1677 he offered his curios and MSS to the University, on the condition that it would build a Museum and Chemical Laboratory. The foundation-stone was laid September 14, 1679, and the building was finished March 20, 1682–1683.

The inscription describes this first public laboratory in Oxford: 'Musæum Ashmoleanum: Schola Naturalis Historiæ: Officina Chemica.' The three largest rooms were public: 'The uppermost . . . *Musæum Ashmoleanum*. The middle room is the *School of Natural Historie*, where the professor of chymistry, who is at present Dr. Robert Plot, reads three times a week. The lower room, a cellar . . . is the Laboratory, perchance one of the most beautiful and useful in the world' ('Wood's Life and Times,' *ib.* vol. xxvi. p. 55).

It was thus under the direction of Ashmole, perhaps the last of the Oxford alchemists, that the study of chemistry was placed on a sound and public footing. Ashmole died in June 1692, a year after Robert Boyle.

In the sister University, at the same period, Newton, who became Fellow of Trinity in 1667, directed his studies for some little time to alchemistical methods, and investigated the Philosopher's Stone. But at Cambridge, as at Oxford, the newer scientific methods set aside the dreams and theories of the older alchemists, and opened the way to modern chemistry.

15. In the 18th cent. alchemy was finally discredited in the person of Dr. Price of Guildford, the last of the alchemists, a distinguished amateur chemist, and Fellow of the Royal Society. In May 1782 he professed to transmute mercury into silver and gold in the presence of a select company. Some of the gold thus obtained was presented to George III., and Price was made M.D. of Oxford. The Royal Society then pressed him to repeat the experiments in their presence. He hesitated, refused, and only on the pressure of the President, Sir Joseph Banks, at last reluctantly consented. He withdrew to Guildford, prepared an ample amount of laurel water, and then began to manufacture his projection powder. On the 3rd of August he invited the Royal Society to Guildford. Only three Fellows responded to the invitation. He received them, and then committed suicide in their presence.

In Germany, alchemy was laughed out in the person of Semler. He received the 'Salt of Life' from Baron Hirschen, and, treating it as the Philosopher's Stone, was surprised to find gold deposited in the crucible. Klaproth analyzed the 'Salt of Life,' and found it to consist of Glauber's salt and sulphate of magnesia. In the 'Salt' sent by Semler, however, Klaproth discovered gold, though not in combination. Klaproth again consented to analyze Semler's solution before the Court, when, instead of gold he found a kind of brass called tombac. On further investigation, it was discovered that Semler's old servant, eager to humour his master, had slipped pieces of gold leaf into Semler's chemical mixtures. The servant entrusted the secret to his wife, that in his absence she might purchase the gold leaf as before. She, however, bought brass instead of gold, and spent the balance on drink. In this way alchemy was laughed out of Germany (Chambers, *Book of Days*, i. 602).

The theories of the alchemists did not die out at once. They were still held by the adepts at the close of the 18th century. The Antiquary says that Dousterswivel 'exhibits himself as a perfect charlatan—talks of the *magisterium*—of sympathies and antipathies—of the cabala—of the divining-rod—and all the trumpery with which the Rosicrucians cheated a darker age, and which, to our eternal disgrace, has in some degree revived in our own' (Scott, *Antiquary*, ch. xiii.). The *Lives of the Adepts in Alchemystical Philosophy* was published in London in 1814, and contained reports and extracts of many works on alchemy. Bulwer Lytton's *Zanoni* was written in 1842 as a study in the mysteries of the Rosicruciana.—George Eliot in 1871 wrote: 'Doubtless a vigorous error vigorously pursued has kept the embryos of truth a-breathing: the quest of gold being at the same time a questioning of substances, the body of Chemistry is prepared for its soul, and Lavoisier is born' (*Middlemarch*, vol. iii. ch. xlviii.).

16. But it was the establishment of the Atomic Theory by Dalton in the beginning of the 19th cent. as a working hypothesis in practical chemistry that set on one side the theories of the alchemists:

The observation of the Law of Equivalents and the Law of Multiples 'led to the idea that the elementary bodies are made up of indivisible particles called *atoms*, each having a constant weight peculiar to itself; and that chemical combination takes place by the juxtaposition of these atoms, 1 to 1, 1 to 2, 1 to 3, 2 to 3, etc., a group of atoms thus united being called a *molecule*. This is the atomic hypothesis of Dalton' (H. Watt, *Inorganic Chemistry*, 1883, p. 267).

Immutability has been the recognized law of the elements:

'Our molecules, on the other hand, are unalterable by any of the processes which go on in the present state of things, and every individual of each species is of exactly the same magnitude. . . . In speculating on the cause of this equality, we are debarred from imagining any cause of equalization, on account of the immutability of each individual molecule. It is difficult, on the other hand, to conceive of selection and elimination of intermediate varieties, for where can these eliminated molecules have gone to, if, as we have reason to believe, the hydrogen, etc., of the fixed stars is composed of molecules identical in all respects with our own?' (Clark-Maxwell, *Theory of Heat*, 1885, p. 331).

Thus, under the most advanced theory of Chemistry and Physics in the 19th cent., the transmutation of elements was inconceivable. Yet there were masters of chemical philosophy who entered a caution against the exclusion of possibilities.

Tilden writes: 'The molecular theory has been adopted in a somewhat rigid form, not by reason of any special conviction of my own regarding its permanence as a scientific truth, but because I am satisfied by long experience that, whatever form it may ultimately assume, it is even now a most important and almost indispensable aid to teaching chemistry' (*Introd. to Chemical Philosophy*, London, 1876, p. vii). In treating of the Periodic Law and Mendelejeff's Table, he says: 'This table requires a few remarks. In the first place, there are some elements, as, for instance, copper, silver, and gold, for which a place cannot readily be found. Silver is undoubtedly allied, though not very closely, with sodium, whilst it is also connected with copper on the one hand and with mercury on the other. Gold again is unquestionably triad, whilst the platinum metals to which it is most nearly related exhibit even atomicity' (*ib.* p. 243). There still remained something behind which was not altogether clear, and this, too, in the important metals, silver and gold.

17. The discoveries of the Becquerel rays and the isolation of the element radium by M. and Mme. Curie in the opening years of the 20th cent. have opened up far-reaching possibilities, and have induced many leading chemists to conceive the idea of the transmutation of the elements. At the Leicester Meeting of the British Association on Aug. 1, 1907, Lord Kelvin challenged these inferences. He maintained that it was almost absolutely certain that there are many different kinds of atom, each eternally invariable in its own specific quality, and that different substances, such as gold, silver, lead, iron, etc., consist each of them of atoms of one invariable quality, and that any one of them is incapable of being transmuted into any other. He thus combated the recent assertion regarding the transmutation of metals, and continued to regard an atom as the ultimate indivisible unit of matter, and the electron, or electrion, as an electrical atom.

The discussion on 3rd Aug. 1907 was an event in the history of chemical science. Professor Rutherford, in opening the debate, held that the discovery of the electron had not as yet disproved the atomic theory. All attempts to find an electron with a positive charge of electricity had failed. 'Though we can liberate the electrons of matter very freely, there is no evidence that the liberation of the electron tends to the disintegration of an atom.' Sir William Ramsay, as a chemist, disagreed with Lord Kelvin and Professor Rutherford. The latter had said that there was no evidence that the loss of electrons altered the atom. Perhaps not. *But there was evidence that the gain of electrons did so.* He declared that, by placing radium hermetically closed in a glass vessel, the electrons, emanating from the radium through the glass, and falling on a nickel bar placed in juxtaposition, had the effect, after a certain time, of covering the bar with a film of radioactive matter, which could be separated by chemical treatment. His conclusion was that some kind of transmutation took place, converting the nickel into some other substance, this being characterized by its radio-activity. Lord Kelvin, in his reply, said that the discovery of the properties of radium had been most suggestive, and had opened our eyes to other discoveries, never suspected or dreamed of. Sir William Ramsay then announced a further discovery. He had proved that when radium was isolated in a bottle, after a lapse of time it gave off an emanation, and the new gas helium. When again that emanation was isolated, it produced helium and something else, which is conjectured on possible grounds to

be lead. Again, when that emanation was dissolved in copper solution it produced the new element called argon, but now, when the radium emanation was dissolved in water, and the gases were extracted from the water, the resulting production was not helium, but its kindred element neon. These marvellous properties of radium thus described by Sir William Ramsay seem almost to realize the ancient dreams of the alchemists. Has it after all been reserved for the chemists of the 20th cent. to find in radium the Philosopher's Stone, and to prove it to have the power of transmuting yet unknown elements into gold?

LITERATURE.—M. Berthelot, *Les Origines de l'Alchimie*, Paris, 1885; J. Ferguson, *Bibliotheca Chemica: a Catalogue of the Alchemical, Chemical, and Pharmaceutical books in the Collection of the late James Young of Kelly and Durris, Esq.*, 2 vols., Glasgow, 1906; H. C. Bolton, *Catalogue of works on Alchemy and Chemistry exhibited at the Grolier Club*, New York, 1891; Anon., *Lives of the Adepts in Alchemystical Philosophy*, London, 1814; A. E. Waite, *The Hermetic and Alchemical Writings of Philippus Aureolus Theophrastus Bombast, of Hohenheim, called Paracelsus the Great*, 2 vols., London, 1894. THOMAS BARNS.

ALCHERINGA.—The name applied by the Arunta, Kaitish, and Unmatjera tribes of Central Australia to the mythical past in which their ancestors were formed, and their ceremonies and regulations instituted. According to Spencer-Gillen (*Nor. Tr.* p. 745), the word *alcheri* means 'dream' (but cf. *FL* xvi. 430), and *Alcheringa* is equivalent to 'Dream Times.' Analogous beliefs are found in other tribes to the north of the Arunta; the Warramunga term corresponding to *Alcheringa* is *Wingara*.

1. In the Alcheringa existed at the outset, according to the Arunta myth, the ancestors whose spirits they regard as incarnated in the men of the present day; they were at most semi-human, but possessed more than human powers, and are credited with the formation of natural features such as the Macdonnell Ranges; in the Alcheringa period these amorphous *inapertwa*, who were transformed into human beings and later underwent initiation ceremonies, travelled over the country in totem companies, each carrying a *churinga* (see AUSTRALIANS), and at the spots where they camped are the present *oknanikilla*, or local totem centres. The Arunta distinguish four Alcheringa periods: (*a*) creation of man from the *inapertwa*; (*b*) institution of circumcision with the stone knife; (*c*) of the *arilthа* or mica operation; (*d*) of regulations regarding marriage. Originally the country was covered with salt water, which was withdrawn towards the north; two *ungambikula* (= 'self-existing') in the western sky saw to the east some *inapertwa*; with their knives they released the half-formed arms and legs, slit the eyelids and so on; after circumcising the men they became lizards. Some of the uncircumcised men were eaten by *oruncha* (evil spirits), who were killed by men of the lizard totem. In the next two stages an *oknirabata* (sage) introduced circumcision with the stone knife, and taught the little hawk totem group to perform the operation; they also formed the four intermarrying classes, but without associating them with marriage regulations. More *inapertwa* were transformed; men of the wild cat totem instituted the mica ceremony, and the order of the initiation ceremonies was arranged. Finally, the Emu people introduced the present marriage restrictions. According to the Unmatjera and Kaitish, the *inmintera* (the Arunta *inapertwa*) were formed into human beings by an old crow; he returned to get his stone knife with which to circumcise them, and in his absence two lizard men from the south circumcised and subincised the men, and performed the corresponding operation on the women. Another Kaitish tradition makes the transformers two boys to whom Atnatu (a god) sent down stone knives. Some of the ancestors were men (*ertwa*) when they were first formed. In the Kaitish tribe the travels of the groups of totemic ancestors are almost wanting, or possibly forgotten; the various spots are said to have been peopled by one or two ancestors, who sometimes carried *churinga*.

2. The Urabunna, the neighbours of the Arunta on the other side, also have their mythic period, named Ularaka; the ancestors of the totemic groups were semi-human and lived on the earth or beneath it; they had superhuman powers. The ancestors of each totemic group at the present day were few in number, and there is no myth of the *churinga* being carried. The Urabunna belief thus differs widely from that of the Arunta and Kaitish, and comes near that of the Warramunga (see below). The semi-human ancestors wandered about the country putting *mai-aurli* (spirit individuals) into rocks and pools, and these subsequently became men and women, who formed the first totem groups. These *mai-aurli* are continually undergoing re-incarnation; as a rule, with the Arunta they inhabit different localities according to their totem; but in the Urabunna and other tribes those of two or more totems may inhabit the same place. Each re-incarnated individual is held to change his phratry, totem, and sex on re-incarnation; after death he goes back to the spot where he was left in the Ularaka, and this regardless of the totem to which he may for the time being belong. In the Wonkgongaru tribe, north-west of Lake Eyre, the Urabunna beliefs prevail, with the exception that they accept the Arunta belief as to the *inapertwa*.

3. The Unmatjera hold that every totemic ancestor had his class as well as his totem; the totem changes in their belief, as in that of the Arunta, in successive incarnations, the class seldom or never.

4. The Warramunga, Walpari, Tjingilli, and other tribes hold that every one is the incarnation of a Wingara ancestor; but these latter are regarded as having been fully formed men, and all the members of a totemic group at the present day are looked on as the descendants of one ancestor who wandered over the country leaving spirit children in trees and rocks; they believe that if a woman strikes one of these trees with an axe, the spirit child will enter her body. The ancestor began his travels under ground, and then came up to the surface; *churinga* are known in this tribe, but not associated with individuals. These beliefs are shared by the Umbaia and Gnanji, but the latter hold that women have no *moidna*, or spirit part; consequently spirit female children, though they exist, do not take human form. The Binbinga also hold that one totemic ancestor formed members of a group, and left Ulanji spirits which emanated from his own body.

5. In the Arunta tribe at the present day a man marries a woman of his own or any other totem; in the other tribes totemic exogamy is enforced. Tradition says that in the Alcheringa times men invariably married women of their own totem; the classes, too, were originally non-exogamous, and the present regulations came down from the north. It seems clear that the progress of social changes from north to south corresponds with the facts; but there is much division of opinion as to the value of the remainder of the myths. They are treated as mere ætiological myths by Andrew Lang and others, as genuine historical traditions by Spencer and others. It seems clear that some part of them cannot be historically true; for the totem groups are represented as living exclusively upon their totems; and some of these, such as grubs and plants, are not in season for more than a portion of the year.

LITERATURE.—Spencer-Gillen, *Native Tribes*, 1899, pp. 119–127, 387–422, *Northern Tribes*, 1904, pp. 145–175, etc. *FL* xvi. 428–433, gives the views of the Southern Arunta. For remarks on the Alcheringa legends see Lang, *Social Origins*, 1903, and *Secret of the Totem*; Durkheim's art. in *ASoc* iii. (1901) 20, etc.; see also Van Gennep, *Mythes et Légendes d'Australie*, 1906, p. xlvi f. N. W. THOMAS.

ALCOHOL.—The use of alcohol in some form or other has been familiar to man from a very early period in his race-existence; in all ages of which we have any record, in all climates, amongst tribes of the most varied degrees of culture, it has been and still is an agent with marked effects on the individual and the race. The name is Arabic in origin (*al-kohl*, 'collyrium,' the fine powder used to stain the eyelids).

Alcohol, as we know it in ordinary use, is properly named 'ethyl alcohol,' and is one of a series—distinguished in their properties from one another by their boiling point, their specific gravity, and their poisonous effect—consisting of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen. Their names and chemical formulæ are:—Methyl alcohol (CH_3OH), ethyl alcohol (C_2H_5OH), propyl alcohol (C_3H_7OH), butyl alcohol (C_4H_9OH), and amyl alcohol ($C_5H_{11}OH$). Methyl alcohol is obtained from distillation of wood, and, being nauseous in taste, it is added to ethyl alcohol, so that the latter may be sold for industrial purposes without tax as methylated spirits. Fusel oil contains amyl and ethyl alcohol as well as other by-products of fermentation, and is usually present along with other analogous substances in distilled alcoholic liquors; but as their amount is small and their action subsidiary, they will not be further referred to.

Alcohol is formed from sugar by the action of the yeast-fungus, a unicellular organism which excites fermentation in saccharine solutions. A molecule of sugar is thus split up into alcohol and carbonic acid (along with some collateral products). There is a natural limit to the strength of the alcoholic liquor which is thus formed (apart from the amount of sugar present); when alcohol reaches a strength of 16 p.c. by volume, it stops further fermentation. Most 'natural' wines, such as claret, contain only from 8 to 12 p.c. alcohol, as it is but rarely that the grape-juice is sugary enough to allow of the formation of alcohol to the highest possible extent. Stronger wines, such as port and sherry, are 'fortified' by the addition of alcohol. It should be noted that mankind has in all ages made naturally fermented drinks from any available material. By more complicated processes, beer or ale is produced either from barley-malt or some substitute, the strength in alcohol varying from 3 p.c. or less up to 8 or 9 p.c. The strongest drinks, such as brandy, whisky, rum, gin, and liqueurs, are manufactured with the aid of distillation.

1. **Physiological effects of alcohol.**—Alcohol is a poison for protoplasm, that is, for the soft plastic material which is the essential constituent of every one of the minute cells that make up living organisms, whether animal or vegetable. Its poisonous effect in very dilute solution is easily shown on lowly organisms (Ridge, *Med. Temp. Review*, 1898, vol. i. p. 148; Woodhead, 'Pathology of Alcoholism' in Kelynack's *Drink Problem*, pp. 52–56), and the more finely organized cells are most susceptible (Overton, *Studien über die Narkose*, Jena, 1901). Let us briefly trace the effects of alcohol when taken into the human body in moderate quantity.

(1) With the feeling of warmth in the stomach, there is an increased secretion of gastric juice such as is produced by any irritant. Of the two constituents of the gastric juice, it is not so much the pepsin as the hydrochloric acid that is thus secreted, and recent research indicates that the digestive quality of the secretion depends very largely on the nature of the stimulus. Hence it is probable that alcohol is of but slight value as a digestive aid. By quickening the movements of the stomach and intestines, it helps the expulsion of gases. If taken in concentrated form or in too great quantity, it decidedly retards digestion, and frequent repetition of such doses is apt to bring on gastric catarrh.

(2) Alcohol passes in about 15 minutes into the blood and lymph vessels, and is thus rapidly diffused through the various tissues; it forms a compound with the colouring matter of the blood which takes up and gives off oxygen less readily (Woodhead, *l.c.* p. 57). Hence the normal changes in the tissue cells are interfered with, and this is one of the causes of the accumulation of fat in certain alcoholics. The waste products are apt to be retained too long by the cells.

(3) The nerve-cells of the brain, the most highly organized and delicate of the tissues, very early show the effect of alcohol. Many of the best observers of their own mental processes, such as Helmholtz and Huxley, have expressed themselves strongly as to the harmful effect of minute doses of alcohol on brain work. It would seem that the 'stimulating' effect is really due to paralysis of the very highest nerve-centres, so that cheerfulness, wit, and recklessness have freer play. Large numbers of psychometric experiments under conditions of the greatest accuracy prove that alcohol in small dietetic doses exercises a distinctly paralyzing effect on the working of the brain. Some mental processes are quickened for a short time, and then a retarding effect shows itself, which is prolonged and much more than cancels the apparent beneficial result. With the early facility there is apt to be loss of accuracy (Horsley, 'Effects of Alcohol on the Human Brain,' *Brit. Journ. of Inebriety*, Oct. 1905; Rüdin, *Psychol. Arbeiten*, ed. E. Kraepelin, 1901–1902; Neild, 'Psychometric Tests on the Action of Alcohol,' *Brit. Journ. of Inebr.*, Oct. 1903). The greater the demands made on psychic activity, the more marked is the interference caused by alcohol. An invariable result is that the person experimented on has the delusion that he is doing better with alcohol than without it. The depressing results of a slight intoxication may last from 24 to 36 hours (Fürer, *Transactions of the Internat. Anti-alcohol Congress*, Basel, 1906). The effect of the regular consumption of alcohol—say 1 to 2 litres of lager beer *per diem*—is distinctly prejudicial to all kinds of intellectual effort (Kürz and Kraepelin, *Psychol. Arbeiten*, 1900); and in general the more difficult mental operations are more impaired than the easier. As for the idea that habituation produces a certain immunity to alcohol, this is probably due to a blunting of the nerves. Such a result is apt to be associated with a dangerous tendency to augment the dose in order to experience the agreeable effect, just as with morphine (Kraepelin, *Münch. Med. Woch.*, 17th April, 1906). Experiments on the *sensory* functions (sight, hearing, simple touch, etc.) show, from the first, diminution in accuracy and rapidity. The *motor* functions of the body are generally influenced favourably by alcohol at first (Frey, *Alcohol und Muskelermüdung*, Leipzig, 1903; Schnyder, Pflüger's *Archiv*, 1903; Destrée, *Journ. Méd. de Bruxelles*, 1897); the amount of work is increased, and is more easily performed; but after a brief period extending at most to 20 or 30 minutes, there comes a prolonged reaction, so that the total effect is distinctly disadvantageous. The popular belief that alcohol strengthens and increases working capacity is accountable for a vast amount of drinking among the working classes.

(4) The effect of alcohol on the circulation (Monro and Findlay, 'Critical Review of work on Alcohol and the Cardio-Vascular System,' *Med. Temp. Rev.* 1903–1904; Abel, 'Pharmacological Action of Ethyl Alcohol,' *Med. Temp. Rev.* 1904–1905) is to cause first a dilatation of the small vessels, especially of the skin, shown by flushing of the face and a feeling of warmth. A slight acceleration of the pulse is frequently, but not always, produced by small doses, but the average for the whole day may be lowered. If the pulse tension is low to begin with, alcohol will not raise it. On the whole, experiments show that alcohol does not

strengthen the heart, but rather the reverse. There may be a short stimulating effect through reflex action just after its administration. Large doses are strongly depressive.

(5) The tissues, we have seen, have their oxidation interfered with by alcohol. There is, further, increased loss of heat from the body, with lowering of temperature through the dilatation (paralysis) of the blood-vessels. Hence comes quickened and deeper respiration, so that alcohol is indirectly a respiratory stimulant (Binz, *Therapie d. Gegenwart*, 1899).

(6) The *nutritive* value of alcohol is still the subject of keen discussion (Rosemann, Pflüger's *Archiv*, 1901, vol. 86, also vols. 94, 99, and 100). All admit that large quantities of alcohol are poisonous, and it would seem that the most minute doses that have any demonstrable effect act prejudicially on the nervous tissues. Still it is conceivable that in other ways alcohol may be serviceable to the body. In small doses, from 90 to 98 p.c. is oxidized ; heat is thereby produced, and alcohol, it is said, can thus take the place of other materials, such as fat or carbohydrate (Atwater and Benedikt, *Experiments on Metabolism of Matter and Energy*, Washington, 1898). The same may be said about glycerine, or fusel oil (amylic alcohol), whose total effect is distinctly poisonous. Alcohol can neither build up nor repair the tissues, and any favourable action that it has in producing energy is probably much more than counterbalanced by its poisonous effect, either directly or by means of intermediate products, while the tissues are dealing with it (Schäfer, *Textbook of Physiology*, vol. i. p. 882). This conclusion of physiological science is in harmony with the experiences in actual life of army leaders, travellers, climbers, employers of labour, etc. The good effects of alcohol are similar to those obtained from other more or less dangerous stimulants and narcotics.

2. Acute alcoholism (Intoxication). — When enough alcohol is taken to produce intoxication, judgment, self-control, perception, and the other higher faculties are affected first. With greater facility in thought and speech, there is a certain disregard of the environment ; a quiet person may become lively and witty, unwonted confidences are given, and there may be assertiveness and quarrelsomeness. Singing, shouting, and other noisy demonstrations indicate the free play of the emotions ; then comes motor impairment, shown by indistinct speech and staggering gait ; drowsiness, muscular paralysis, and even coma may supervene ; the temperature may become dangerously low, and in the worst cases respiration and circulation may be paralyzed. Short of this, after 6 to 12 hours the man awakens from his drunken sleep with furred tongue, loss of appetite, thirst, flushed face and eyes, headache, and mental confusion. These phenomena vary according to the amount, strength, and purity of the liquor, the time occupied in consuming it, and the stability or resisting power of the person imbibing. Persons with a special cerebral susceptibility may develop wild maniacal excitement with a comparatively small dose. Such persons may suffer from an insane or alcoholic heredity, epilepsy, injuries to the head, or antecedent insanity. An automatic dream-state, in which complicated, it may be criminal, actions are performed quite unconsciously, is sometimes induced by acute alcoholism (Sullivan, *Alcoholism*, pp. 41–43).

3. Chronic alcoholism.—Excess has been defined as anything over that amount of alcohol which the body can completely dispose of in 24 hours, but a complete definition must include cases where any permanent mischief is produced during a lifetime. Since 1864, when Anstie declared 1½ oz. of absolute alcohol to be the physiological limit, the tendency amongst scientific writers has been steadily towards reduction of this. Abel (*l.c.* Sept. 1905, p. 275) concludes that the 'moderate' or average permissible quantity of alcohol is represented by one, or at most two, glasses of wine (10 p.c.) in the 24 hours ; that is about half an ounce of absolute alcohol at the outside. Others (*e.g.* Max Grüber, quoted by Woodhead, *Brit. Journ. of Inebriety*, Jan. 1904, p. 166) hold that as even such a small quantity may impair function, it would be rash to assert that this would be harmless to the vast majority of mankind if taken habitually and indefinitely. The ordinary signs of chronic alcoholism are due to the habitual taking of much larger quantities. Such are loss of appetite, especially for breakfast, foul tongue, bad breath, with often a peculiar easily recognizable odour, morning vomiting, expectoration of yellow tough mucus, dyspeptic and intestinal disorders. Very fine tremors, most marked in the morning, are present in tongue, fingers, and lower limbs. Sleeplessness is frequent ; speech shows a loss of crispness ; memory, especially for names, is defective ; there is a difficulty in coming to a decision or in concentrating the attention, and a disinclination for bodily or mental exertion. The victim of alcohol shows a want of initiative, and may give promises with the intention, but without the power, of keeping them. Self-respect becomes impaired, and by selfishness, neglect of wife, children, and other dependants, loosening of self-control and want of truthfulness, the moral deterioration is signalized.

Dipsomania, or periodical inebriety, is more frequently shown in women than in men. After an interval of abstinence, complete or relative, comes an overmastering impulse to drink. The time of recurrence may be quite irregular, in other cases it may be every week, fortnight, month, or at even longer intervals, and the duration of the attack is also variable. We are all subject to periodicity, even in regard to our brain force, and in dipsomaniacs there is usually a more than average instability of nerve. They show a close analogy to the condition found in epileptics.

Delirium tremens is a form of acute alcoholism supervening almost invariably on a chronic condition. There may have been a period of specially heavy drinking without taking food, or the onset may have been precipitated by some shock to the nervous system (mental, physical, or acute disease such as pneumonia). A frequent early symptom is distaste for drink, whilst hallucinations, with restlessness, nervousness, and insomnia, become more and more marked. The hands are constantly at work, picking at the bedclothes, going through the actions of some occupation, etc. Tremors become coarser, and are present all over the body. The mind is incessantly active, talking incoherently, seeing horrifying visions, hearing whispers, plottings, insults. Terror and suspicion are constant ; the bodily functions are all deranged, the temperature is raised, and complicating diseases are apt to supervene. After an acute stage of 3 or 4 days the patient usually falls into a refreshing sleep, and awakes a different man. But the risk of a fatal result increases with each succeeding attack. *Delirium tremens* is comparatively rare in women, and is much more common amongst drinkers of spirits than amongst those who take wine or beer. Closely allied to *delirium tremens* is a form of continuous alcoholic delirium (*delirium ebriosum, mania a potu*), which often sends patients to asylums. *Alcoholic dementia* is not uncommon as the final state of chronic drinkers of alcohol ; the symptoms point to an exaggeration of the ordinary mental state, developed by alcohol, as described above. Loss of memory, irritability, lowering of

mental tone, and loss of self-control may become so marked as to require asylum treatment.

Besides those definite forms of alcoholic insanity, alcohol may be the *exciting* cause in various forms of mental disorder. It is probably the most powerful *predisposing* factor, after syphilis, in causing general paralysis of the insane. Kraepelin (*Münch. Med. Woch.*, April 1906) argues that 80 p.c. of cases of general paralysis would not occur if alcohol were banished from the world. The exact percentage of asylum inmates due to alcohol is somewhat difficult to ascertain, owing to varying ways of compiling statistics, and difficulties in getting at the facts of the patients' history. From 15 to 20 p.c. of the insane are so through drink, and in recent years this percentage has tended to increase, especially in large cities (Clouston, *Mental Diseases*[6], p. 483). The proportion of women to men thus afflicted is in Italy 1 to 11, in Germany 1 to 16, in Austria 1 to 5, in New York City 1 to 2, in Paris and Edinburgh about the same. Taking Great Britain all over, the proportion of women to men is about 1 to 2½, significant evidence of the amount of drinking amongst women in this country (Hoppe, *Tatsachen*, etc. p. 274 ff.; Rowntree and Sherwell, *Temp. Problem*, Appendix, p. 465). Allowance must be made for the likelihood that many who succumb to alcohol would in its absence break down mentally in some other way, in virtue of their unstable nervous system, and it has been noted that the habitual inebriates of the London police courts rarely become certifiably insane (Carswell, *Scottish Med. and Surg. Journ.* 1903, ii. p. 385). Genuine epilepsy may be produced by alcohol; if present already, it is inevitably made worse by drink. Not seldom one sees cases of epileptiform convulsions coming on after a long course of inebriety; they are induced by a specially severe bout. Not the brain only, but the other divisions of the nervous system, are very apt to be damaged by chronic alcoholism. Most characteristic is *multiple neuritis*, an inflammation of the nerves beginning in the feet and hands, and advancing upwards if the cause persists, till a fatal result occurs. There are changes in sensation, such as numbness, 'needles and pins,' pains, great muscular tenderness, diminished sensibility to touch; there is loss of power going on to complete paralysis, and there is mental deterioration. The disease may be brought on by alcohol in any form; it is often associated with the steady secret drinking of women. It is much aggravated by small quantities of arsenic, as was shown in an epidemic which occurred recently in Liverpool, Manchester, and other towns in the north of England. The cause here was the excessive drinking of beer manufactured from invert-sugar, in which arsenic was present as an impurity. Several other neuralgic and spinal-cord affections are caused or aggravated by chronic alcoholism.

4. Tissue changes caused by alcohol.—Most of the disorders that we have been describing are associated with pathological changes, easily recognized through the microscope. The various parts of the body are able to recover from the poisonous effect of even a large dose of alcohol. And, so far, the functional disturbance in the cell eludes the best methods of examination that we possess. If, however, the poisonous dose is repeated indefinitely, there comes a time when organic changes occur, and these are usually irremediable. Thus degeneration, indicated by changed microscopic appearance, may be found in the cells of the brain, cord or spinal nerves, in the heart muscle, the walls of the blood-vessels, the liver-cells, etc.; and at the same time there may be an increase of fibrous tissue, 'the lowest structure in the body' (Woodhead in Kelynack's *Drink Problem*).

5. The effect of alcohol on morbidity.—Besides the purely alcoholic forms of disease, such as cirrhosis of the liver and alcoholic neuritis, a large proportion of the illness found in hospital and in private practice is indirectly due to alcohol (Jacquet, *Presse Méd.*, 1899, p. 338). Not only are the tissues directly damaged, but the resisting power of the body to disease is greatly lowered by excessive drinking.

Acute pneumonia, for instance, is more apt to occur, and more likely to be fatal, in alcoholic persons. If the body is weakened in its resisting power, by starvation, by chill, or by a poison such as alcohol, microbes get a lodging in the system. Pneumonia in drinkers is about 3 times as fatal as amongst the temperate. So also with cholera, plague, yellow fever, malaria, and other microbe diseases. As for tuberculosis, the great mass of present-day medical opinion is opposed to the view that alcohol diminishes the likelihood of its onset. If the nervous system is lowered in tone, alcohol greatly helps the development of the disease. This is proved by the death-rate from phthisis in alcoholic insanity (R. Jones). Amongst traders in drink, tubercle is from 1½ to 3 times more frequent in every organ of the body liable to it than amongst persons following other occupations (Dickinson, *Transactions of Path. Soc.* vol. xl. 1889). When one further takes account of the unhealthy conditions in which chronic alcoholics live, one cannot doubt that drink is largely responsible for the wide-spread prevalence of tuberculosis. Venereal diseases are very frequently acquired in the intoxicated state, when the lower passions become supreme. In the army they are much less frequent among abstaining soldiers than among non-abstainers. In their treatment, abstinence from alcohol is usually enjoined. Syphilis is much more destructive among chronic drinkers. From the *surgeon's* point of view, the worst cases for operation are those of chronic drinkers. They take anæsthetics badly, their tissues do not heal well, and they are liable to septic complications. Clinical experience is confirmed by numerous experiments on animals; rabbits, guinea-pigs, fowls, etc., have been shown, if treated for a time with alcohol in even moderate doses, to be much more susceptible to the germs of tetanus, splenic fever, tuberculosis, diphtheria, etc., than non-alcoholized animals (Abbot, Déléarde, Laitinen—work summarized by Woodhead in *loc. cit.*).

Certain Friendly Societies in the United Kingdom consist entirely of total abstainers, and the amount of sickness amongst them is, to a marked degree, less than in Societies where abstinence is not compulsory, although in both classes the men are medically selected, and show, by the very fact that they join those Societies, that they are prudent and careful. The average duration of sickness per member among abstainers (Rechabites, Sons of Temperance, etc.) is only from a half to a third of that in other Societies. Alcoholics, when once put on the books of Trade Societies, whether through disease or injury, are notoriously slow in recovering.

6. Alcoholism and mortality.—The mortality returns of the United Kingdom give a very imperfect idea of the number of deaths due to alcohol (Vacher, *Practitioner*, Nov. 1902). Seeing that certificates of death are not treated as confidential documents belonging to the State, deaths are often attributed to diseases of the liver, kidneys, lungs, or nervous system, instead of to their primary cause—alcoholism. The Swiss returns of mortality, on the other hand, are reliable, and they show a death-rate from alcoholism, amongst men, of 10 p.c. or more. In Swiss communities of over 5000 inhabitants, there dies between the ages of 20 and 40 every seventh or eighth man directly or indirectly from alcohol, and between 40 and 60 every sixth, and above 60 every seventeenth man (Hoppe, p. 230). It is estimated that in this country alcohol accounts for 100,000 to 120,000 deaths per annum (Kerr, *Inebriety*, p. 381).

Certain British Insurance Societies have separate columns for abstainers and non-abstainers. In both sections the members are drawn from precisely the same class in all essential and important particulars, and the non-abstainers assured are good average lives. But the abstaining section in all cases shows a very much greater longevity. Thus in the United Kingdom Temperance and General Provident Institution the mortality in the general section has been, on an average, 36 p.c. higher than in the temperance section (Whittaker, 'Alcoholic Beverages and Longevity,' *Contemp. Rev.*, March 1904). Of course the 'general section' represents an average which includes at one end of the scale men who are extremely moderate, and at the other those who are free drinkers. In the absence of any accepted standard of moderation, the class of 'moderate drinkers' must suffer statistically.

7. Alcoholism and crime.—There is universal testimony as to the close relationship between excessive drinking and breaches of the moral law and the laws of the State. This is a direct consequence of the paralysis of the higher faculties, intellectual and moral, and the resulting free play given to the lower inclinations. Alcohol is not only a direct cause of crime, but it acts powerfully along with other conditions, such as hereditary nervous weakness or instability of the brain. Again, crime may be due to loss of work, poverty, and starvation, so often the results of indulgence in alcohol.

A distinction has rightly been drawn between the lighter and the graver violations of the law which are due to drink. It is fortunately true that the great majority are of the former class. To them, however,—in order to give some idea of the degrading effect of excessive drinking,—we must add the vast number of cases where similar offences are committed with impunity, escaping the notice of the police through the sheltering influence of friends. Moreover, these offences are so common that there is a disposition on the part of the police, magistrates, the public generally, and the relatives to regard them with the utmost leniency. The large proportion of habitual inebriates charged time after time shows that many, perhaps most, of the petty offences are really due to chronic alcoholism plus a heavier bout than usual. In 9 cases out of 10, the drunkard of our police courts figures also as the wife-beater, the beggar, the prostitute, or the thief. As for the graver offences, the bulk as crimes of acquisitiveness are not connected with alcoholism. On the other hand, alcoholism is probably the cause of some 60 p.c.

of homicidal offences, and of a smaller, though still considerable, proportion of crimes of lust. Nearly always in homicidal crimes, and very frequently in sexual crimes, the alcoholic condition which generates the criminal impulse is chronic intoxication and not casual drunkenness. (Sullivan, *Alcoholism*, 1906, ch. ix.).

8. Alcoholism and the future of the race.—Alcohol is specially dangerous to children, as their delicate tissues are highly susceptible to the poison. Most disastrous results follow its administration in the early years of life—a practice which is far from uncommon amongst the ignorant. Besides the direct effects, such as stunting of growth, blunting of intellectual and moral faculties, and organic changes, we must attribute to alcohol the multifarious evil influences of the social environment in drinking families. Hence the incidence of sickness and mortality in the families of parents who are one or both given to drink is extremely heavy.

The Report on Physical Deterioration (1904) remarks on the increase of drinking amongst women of the working-classes, with consequences extremely prejudicial to the care of the offspring, not to speak of the possibility of children being born permanently disabled. If the mother drinks heavily during lactation, the quality of her milk is much impaired, and there may be present in it a certain amount of alcohol. Still more serious for the child is drinking on the part of the mother during pregnancy. Not only is the fœtus badly nourished, but alcohol is found to pass freely into its blood from the mother's. Hence we find in such conditions a great predisposition to abortion and premature labour; and if the infant is born viable, it is apt to be the subject of disease or deformity. There is passed on in many cases not only a nervous excitability, but a tendency to give way to drink sooner or later. While it may be true that 80 to 85 p.c. of all children are born apparently healthy, whatever the antecedent condition of the mother, it is highly probable that the first 10 or 15 years of life, even under the best conditions, would reveal diseased tendencies that were present in a latent condition from the first. Notwithstanding the ancient and wide-spread belief that the condition of intoxication in one or both parents at the time of conception has a malign influence on the germ-plasm, this cannot be said to be scientifically proved. The prevailing scientific view is that no acquired characters can be transmitted from parents to child; but when poisons are circulating in the blood, such as the syphilitic or alcoholic, it is practically certain that they have a modifying effect on the germ-cells (Saleeby, *Heredity*, p. 73). On the other hand, the tendency to degeneration through alcohol would be at once arrested by the removal of the cause, and civilized races would rapidly improve in physique. Races that have been accustomed only to their own fermented drinks, such as the North American Indians and the West Africans (Külz, *Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellsch. Biologie*, ii. 1905), have shown a tendency to die out when habitually taking imported distilled liquor. Previously there was no race alcoholism under conditions which had lasted for hundreds of years, their relatively weak drink being obtainable only at special seasons of the year, and on special occasions. The undoubted increase in insanity in this and other countries is largely due, according to the best authorities, to alcoholism. Mott's investigations (*Alcohol and Insanity*, London, 1906) show clearly that those who become insane in this way have their balance upset by an amount of alcohol much less than can be taken with comparative impunity by persons of more stable nervous system. In such cases alcohol reveals some latent defect, just as in other cases the imbecile, the epileptic, or the degenerate, through marked susceptibility to alcohol, join the criminal classes. *Suicide* (Sullivan, *Alcoholism*; Prinzing, *Trunksucht und Selbstmord*, Leipzig, 1895) has become more frequent in recent years in almost all civilized States, its rate being specially heavy amongst persons who are exposed to alcoholism. Great Britain has a larger proportion of women suicides than other lands, this being connected with the greater amount of female drunkenness. 80 p.c. of all cases of attempted suicide in England are alcoholic, while only 30 p.c. of cases of completed suicide are so classified. Alcoholic suicide may result from one of the diseased mental states, such as *delirium tremens*, melancholia, the automatic dream-state, or some other condition associated with hallucinations; or it may come from the poverty, misery, and indifference to life that alcohol is apt to produce. The association of alcohol with *accidents* of all sorts is brought home to us by the daily newspapers and otherwise, but no statistics can show the vast number of cases where lowering of the mental functions by alcohol without admitted excess, is responsible for some catastrophe. Many railway companies in America have an absolute rule against drinking on the part of their officials, and more or less strict measures of this nature are taken by British companies. Comparatively slight impairment of attention, presence of mind, and efficiency in the railway servant may endanger hundreds besides himself. The more strict the rule against drinking on any particular railway, the more free is it from accident. Again, accidents are much more common on Saturdays and holidays; any hospital can prove this, and also that the reason for this is drink. Accident insurance societies often give abstainers a discount of 10 p.c.

9. Alcoholism and poverty.—Drink, according to Charles Booth (*Pauperism and the Endowment of Old Age*), is the most prolific cause of pauperism, and it is the least necessary. From one-third to one-half of those who receive poor relief owe their position directly to drunkenness as the principal cause. (The total cost of poor relief in England and Wales annually is about £12,000,000). To this should be added a large percentage in which drink is the indirect cause of pauperism, through disease or injury; and besides this, just above the pauper class is the enormous amount of comparative poverty from misspent earnings, loss of working time, and general impairment of efficiency. It is calculated that at least half the taxes accruing from drink are expended by the State in preventing, punishing, and repairing evils which are the direct consequence of the consumption of that drink. Of the £170,000,000 or so annually spent in this country on liquors, about £100,000,000 come from the pockets of the working-classes. Many working men spend 6s. or 7s. a week on drink, and some very much more. The average drink expenditure per head in 1905 was £3, 15s. 11½d., and per family of 5 persons £18, 19s. 9½d.; but it must be remembered that millions of adults drink no alcoholic liquor, and that over 15,000,000 of the population are children. Hence amongst those who take drink to excess the expenditure is enormous, and means such a deduction from an income which is little better than a living wage, that not enough is left for food, clothing, good housing, etc. Here we are face to face with the tremendous waste of earnings, which, spent productively, would raise the general standard of living, check physical deterioration, provide better houses, clothing, food, furniture, and stimulate the desire for healthier and higher recreations. Greater demands on the genuine productive industries of the country would have to be satisfied, and the tremendous addition to the national efficiency would help to solve the grave social and industrial problems with which we are confronted.

10. Treatment.—In dealing with *acute alcoholism*, the skill of the physician and attendants is often severely taxed. Apart from purely medical measures, the main reliance is to be placed in complete withdrawal of alcohol, administration of liquid nourishment in abundance, and the procuring of mental and bodily rest. In *chronic alcoholism* the patient may be helped by full explanations of the action of alcohol on the body, by appeals to his better nature, by any measure that will strengthen the will power, whether religious or social (such as joining a temperance society), or by being removed for a sufficiently long time (one to three years) from temptation. In the way of prevention much is to be hoped for from the wider diffusion of scientific knowledge, along with the spread of education (see 'The Teaching of Temperance,' by E. Claude Taylor in Kelynack's *Drink Problem* [a good bibliography of teaching manuals is given]). Improvements in housing and domestic cookery, higher rates of pay, and the consequent bettering of bodily, mental, and moral health, all favour temperance. Total abstinence should be enjoined on certain classes: those who are hereditarily predisposed, through inebriety in parents or in grandparents, or through want of nerve stability; those whose occupations are closely associated with a heavy drink mortality; those who have given way to drink; persons who have suffered from diseases of the brain or nerves, or injuries to the head; and all children and juveniles. See also artt. DRUNKENNESS, INEBRIATE ASYLUMS.

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J. MACKIE WHYTE.

ALEUTS.—1. The religion, mythology, and folk-lore of the natives of the Aleutian Islands—the 'stepping-stones' from Alaska to Kamtchatka—and of the north shore of the long narrow peninsula of Alaska as far as the river Ugashik, are especially important, since their long isolation in a peculiar environment has caused them 'to develop in particular directions more than any other known branch of the Innuit (Eskimo) stem,' this variation being 'especially evident in their language, religious exercises, and certain details of handiwork, such as embroidery and grass-fibre weaving' (Dall). The language is rich in verbal forms and has many peculiarities of vocabulary, but is, nevertheless, undoubtedly Eskimoan in type, not 'transitional between Samoyed and Eskimo' (Henry). The harpoon attains in the southern portions of the Aleutian area '*a finesse* in structure and appearance nowhere else seen'; the arrow also is 'delicately complex,' neat and beautiful; and the 'exquisite weaving' displayed in the Aleutian beach-grass work 'will compare with that of any basketmakers in the world' (Mason). The *kayak*, the characteristic skin-boat of the Eskimo men, reaches the minimum in size and height among the Aleuts. The lamp, which with the Eskimos generally is the analogue of the fireplace, or the hearth, with many other peoples, is crudest and rudest among the Aleuts,—'the most primitive lamps on earth are those of the ancient Aleuts; many of them are merely unmodified rock fragments' (Hough). Yet the modern Aleuts use small lamps in their fishing boats at sea for warming chilled hands and bodies. They seem to have used the lamp mostly outside the house, preferring, when possible, a fire in the open air, though they are said to have done much less cooking than the other Eskimo tribes. When first discovered by the whites, both men and women among the Aleuts wore labrets, or lip-ornaments, a custom borrowed, perhaps, from the adjacent American Indians, and primarily confined to the female sex. Dall reports the practice of wearing labrets as having 'died out within two generations' (*ante* 1878). Besides labrets, the Aleuts possessed masks, which figured in their dances and religious ceremonies, and were also placed on the faces of the dead. In physical type the Aleuts differ somewhat from the Eskimos proper, being rather brachycephalic and of darker complexion; in facial expression also some difference has been noted. Their constant use of the *kayak* and the cramped position they are forced to assume for long hours have affected their gait and the condition of their limbs. In the management of these boats the Aleuts have been very skilful. Veniaminov, the Russian priest who was among them in the early part of the 19th cent., styled them 'sea Cossacks, riders of marine mares'; they were bow-legged, too, like the famous horsemen of the Czar. The Aleuts have been in their present environment, into which they came from the interior of Alaska (the probable scene of the primitive dispersion of the Eskimo race, or, at least, of a considerable part of it), for a very long time. Dall's investigations of the ancient village-sites, shell-heaps, mummy-caves, etc., of the Aleutian Islands demonstrate the continuity of occupation of the region by this people, and their apparent progress through three periods of culture (littoral, fishing, hunting). The earliest forms of some of their art-objects (*e.g.* labrets) are preserved in the burial-caves and shell-heaps, and their variations may be traced down to the times of the modern Aleuts and the advent of white influences, in consequence of which their ancient culture has tended more and more to disappear.

Like the Eskimos of continental Alaska, the Aleuts seem to have been influenced in several ways by the peoples of north-eastern Asia. To such contact Dr. Franz Boas attributes the use of property-marks on arrows, harpoons, etc., something as yet unrecorded of the Eskimo tribes outside of Alaska (*Amer. Anthrop.* vol. i., N.S., 1899, p. 613). By inspection of the harpoons in a dead, stranded whale, it is possible to discover the community to which the killer belongs, who, when notified, takes possession of the animal, dividing it with the finders. These property-marks 'occur almost exclusively on weapons used in hunting, which, after being despatched, remain in the bodies of large game,' and 'in each village the natives of a certain group—a boat's crew, family, house community, or any other social unit—use a certain decoration for their implements, which, in connexion with certain lines, forms their property-mark.' From the Russians, through the Siberian natives, and not from the Indians, the Aleuts and Alaskan Eskimos acquired the knowledge and use of tobacco, according to Murdoch (*Amer. Anthrop.* vol. i., 1888, p. 328). The modern Aleuts 'use nothing but civilized methods of smoking,' and are great smokers. The absence of ceremonial connected with the use of tobacco among the Aleuts, is another evidence of the non-American mode of its introducton. On the other hand, the Aleuts have adopted something from the American Indian tribes, as, *e.g.*, in all probability, the habit, just mentioned, of wearing lip-ornaments, some art-*motifs*, etc. The institution of slavery prevailed among them as it did among certain Indian tribes of the North Pacific coast.

2. The *puberty-ceremonies* and *marriage-customs* of the Aleuts are of special interest. When a girl reaches the age of puberty, she is isolated from the rest of the community in a small *barrabarra*, or hut, and no one except her slave, if she possesses one, is permitted to visit her. This confinement lasts seven days, and the breaking of the tabu by a man is the theme of one of the most wide-spread tales, which has many variants.

The couple concerned are often brother and sister, and sometimes the woman is forcibly ravished, while at other times she yields consent readily enough. After the discovery of the offence the two young people flee, pursued by their parents and others (who resent the infraction of the tabu as an unpardonable crime), and ultimately hurl themselves from a cliff into the sea, becoming the first two sea-otters, or (in some versions) hair-seals. In one version of the tale, reported by Golder, the girl, who is ravished in the dark, after the fire has gone out, cuts the sinews of her assaulter's legs as he escapes

through the roof. The man, who dies from a fall on the rocks, turns out to be her own brother. She finds him dead on the floor of her parents' house, with all his friends mourning. Instead of taking part in the mourning herself, she sings a joyous song, the burden of which is, 'Get up, my brother, get up!' and, approaching her brother's corpse, uncovers herself. Gradually movement returns to him; first, his toes wriggle, then, as she dances and sings again, the life-colour re-enters his cheeks; and, when she has gone through her conjuration a third time, he suddenly jumps up and seeks to embrace her. She flees, pursued by him, and both followed by the people, until, reaching a cliff overhanging the sea, the brother and sister are compelled to leap from it into the water, and, when they are caught sight of again, they have become two sea-otters, the first of those creatures known in the world. In another tale, the first sea-otters are represented to be a woman and her paramour (the nephew of her husband), with whom she has sworn to die. The sun and moon legend of the Greenland Eskimos seems to belong, partly at least, to this cycle. It is curious to find among the Aleutians that improper sexual relations are connected with the violation of the tabu of girls at the age of puberty. The version of the legend with this theme is perhaps the oldest, as it is the most detailed form. The early Aleuts, Veniaminov informs us, looked upon incest with horror (later accounts disagree on this point), esteeming it the worst of crimes. Such intercourse was believed to result always in monstrous offspring (children disfigured with the tusks and beard of sea-animals, etc.). They had no prejudice against the intermarriage of cousins.

The Aleuts had no marriage ceremony, apparently, though children were sometimes betrothed to each other. The recognition of the marriage came with the birth of a child. The primitive custom seems to have been for a man to take to wife a young woman from the next village (or one not his own), but not to set up housekeeping with her until she had borne him a child. Until that event happened, the woman remained at the house of her father, where she was visited from time to time by her husband. Among the early Aleuts, girls, or married females, giving birth to illegitimate children, were put to death, and their bodies hidden away, so much was such conduct despised. Infanticide was regarded as something likely to cause great misfortune to the whole community. Wives were exchanged sometimes for food, clothes, etc., and were often lent as a mark of hospitality. They could also be divorced or sent home, when unsatisfactory to the husband. In some cases, the children were taken by the mother. The re-marriage either of widowers or widows was not permitted until some time had elapsed since the death of their consorts. Both polyandry and polygamy seem to have occurred among the Aleuts. With those of Unalaska, in cases of polyandry the husbands agreed amicably to the terms upon which they were to share the woman, or, the first married was the chief husband, the second, and inferior, being 'a hunter or wandering trader.' Since polygamous families depended for their maintenance upon the wealth of a single husband, it appears to have been permissible for him to return his wives to their parents, if his fortune decreased to such an extent as to make it impossible for him to support them all properly. Wives could be obtained by purchase and by rendering services to the father; but, in the case of purchase, certain other relatives besides the father had to be compensated. Marriage by capture was reported by Coxe, at the close of the 18th cent., among the natives of Unimak, the largest island of the Archipelago. With certain of the Aleuts (*e.g.* those of Atkha) the man took the widow of his dead brother, such action being compulsory rather than facultative. Among these natives great jealousy is said to have existed. From various parts of the Aleutian area the existence was reported of men who adopted the ways and habits of women, dressing like them, etc., and never marrying.

3. The *burial customs* of the Aleuts also deserve special mention, by reason of the great care often bestowed on the disposal of the dead. Memorial feasts, lasting sometimes for several days, were held, and, according to the details in the stories, slaves were often sacrificed. The bodies of the dead were sometimes hung up in the hut, or suspended in the open air from a pole to which the cradle or mat was attached. When the bodies were laid away in some rock-shelter, protective masks were often put over their faces to guard them from the too inquisitive glances of the spirits. The bodies of certain rich individuals and people of importance in the tribe were washed in running water after the entrails had been removed, then dried, wrapped in furs, grass-matting, etc., and hung up in some cave, or other place dry and sheltered from the rain. Some of these mummies are very old, being found with all the marks of great age. Sometimes the dead Aleuts were placed in these caves and rock-shelters in lifelike postures, dressed and armed, as if active in some favourite occupation—hunting, fishing, sewing, or the like; and with them were placed figures representing the animals of the chase, wooden imitations of their weapons, etc. According to Elliott, the mummified bodies of celebrated whale-hunters used to be removed from their resting-places in the caves and dipped in the running water of streams, those about to venture forth on the hunt drinking of the water that flowed over the remains, to obtain the good-luck and the skill of the dead. It is also said that sometimes the body of a celebrated whale-hunter, who had died, was cut into small pieces, each living hunter taking one, which, when carefully dried, was kept for the purpose of rubbing the head of the whale-spear. The Aleuts seem to have had other superstitious proceedings of a similar nature connected with the transference of the qualities of the great dead to the living. Famous hunters and mighty chiefs were especially honoured in this way.

4. The early Aleuts had very many *songs*, the old stories being nearly always accompanied by or containing some. According to Veniaminov and Golder, there were historical songs, songs of ancestors and heroes, songs used only on religious occasions (strictly religious songs accompanying the spirit-ceremonies, etc.), and songs dealing with the ordinary affairs of life. Very often songs were extemporized. Golder is of opinion that the democratic shamanistic *régime* which 'allowed any Aleut to think he could compose a song,' is 'a condition of degeneracy as compared with the earlier time when the making of the songs was more or less in the hands of shamans of distinction'; but this is hardly the case. As both men and women could be shamans, they were likewise both song-makers. There were numerous conjuring-songs for hunting, fishing, 'raising the dead,' calling and dispersing the spirits, etc. Songs were accompanied by the drum, the only musical instrument of the Aleuts. Stories were usually accompanied by one or more songs, but the Aleuts of to-day have forgotten the songs, though they continue to narrate some of the stories.

5. The early Aleuts were very fond of *dances* and *dance-festivals*, some of which were carried out by the whole village, with other villages as guests, or participants to some extent. After the evening meal the men are said sometimes to have danced naked until exhausted. Dances of naked men, and of naked women, from which the other sex was rigidly excluded on pain of death, and masked dances of various kinds were in vogue. Successive dances of children, naked women, and women in curious attire, which were followed by shamanistic incantations, feasting, etc., are also reported as having occurred among the Aleutians. The dances in which the sexes took part together are reputed to have been more decorous. Their most

remarkable performance of this sort, however, was the great moonlight dance held in December, which had considerable religious significance. In connexion with these dances, wooden figures or images were set up, one for the women and one for the men. The sexes danced apart from each other, masked and naked, on the snow under the moonlight. The huge masks employed on these occasions were so made that the wearer could look only at the ground, since to see or look at the images, upon which the spirits were believed to descend during the ceremonies, was death to the individuals so doing. After the dance was over, the images and masks, which seem generally to have been made for the particular occasion, were broken in pieces and thrown into the sea. Although mention is made of wooden figures carried from island to island, and associated with certain ceremonies, permanent 'idols' and 'temples' hardly existed. There were, it appears, certain 'sacred' high places, or rocks, where, with mysterious ceremonies, old men, or men only (women and youths not being allowed to approach these spots), made offerings. Events like the casting up of a whale on the beach were the cause of dancing and other festivities. In some of the dances the participants put on all their ornaments and finery, while in others they danced naked, except for the large wooden masks, which came down to their shoulders, and often represented various sea-animals. The masks used in the ordinary dances were different from those used in religious ceremonies, the former being evidently copied from the Aleut type of face, while the others, when human faces are represented, seem to differ much from it. The dancing-masks are often grotesque. Some of the carved masks used in certain ceremonies were deposited in caves. Masked ceremonies were also connected with the spring-time festivals.

6. Besides their religious dances and like ceremonies, the Aleuts had others of a *dramatic* and *educational* nature. Myths and legends were acted out in pantomime and dance by the members of one village, who would invite the inhabitants of another to witness the 'play.' On such occasions special songs would be composed and sung. In these 'plays' men and animals alike were imitated and represented. Similar events on a smaller scale took place in individual huts, the larger ones in the 'village-house.' Veniaminov and Golder give an account of a performance called *kugan agalik*, or 'the appearance of the devils,' the object of which was to frighten the women into obedience and 'keep them under' properly. The essentials of the performance were as follows: —When it was thought necessary to impress the women and girls, certain of the men left the village on a pretended hunt. At night, after they had been gone a few days, the men at home made believe some calamity was about to overtake the community, and, by pretending great fear, made the women remain in the huts. While they were thus frightened, strange noises were heard, and the 'devils' arrived, against whom the men made the show of a valiant defence. After the 'devils' had been driven away, it was found that one of the villagers was missing, and a woman, previously agreed upon, was carried out as a ransom for him. By and by both were brought back, the man apparently dead. He was gradually revived by being beaten with inflated bladders, addressed with invocations, etc., and was given by his relatives to the woman who had saved him. The lost hunters then came in and expressed surprise at what had occurred. This 'play' is clearly analogous to the 'Mumbo Jumbo' ceremonies of the Negroes of West Africa and to the initiation rites of the Australian aborigines.

7. The early Aleuts had very many *stories* and *legends* and much *folk-lore*. According to Veniaminov and Golder, their tales and legends were chiefly of three kinds: purely narrative, satiric or moralizing, and mythological. Comparatively few of the stories of the Aleuts have been preserved,—of those recorded nearly all are due to Veniaminov (1820–1840), and Golder at the close of the last century.

One of the Aleutian ancestor stories tells of the adventures, so disastrous to the people, of Chief Agitaligak of Adus and his son Kayulinach. Another is concerned with the doings of the son of 'the woman fond of intestines.' One of the origin-legends ascribes the beginnings of the Aleuts to a being who fell down from the sky in the form of a dog. Another version of this myth of canine ancestry, found also elsewhere in the Eskimo territory, makes the Aleuts descend from a female dog belonging to Unalaska and a great dog which swam over to her from the island of Kadiak. Still another account traces them back to the dog-mother, called Mahakh, and an old man named Iraghdadakh, who came from the north to visit her. Another legend makes the ancestors of the Aleuts two curious creatures, male and female, half-man and half-fox,—the name of the male being Acagnikakh. Some legends also attribute to the 'Old Man' the power to create human beings by throwing stones on the earth; birds, beasts, and fishes being made by throwing stones over the land, into the water, etc.

Golder calls attention to the fact that the Aleutian stories are very realistic, there being 'not a single story that could not have happened in real life.' Supernatural incidents occur, to be sure, but they come in only at the end of the tale. It is, as Golder remarks, 'as if the gods were called in to help out the story-teller, when he gets into a tight place.'

8. As may be seen from their religious ceremonies and other practices, as well as from the evidence in their tales and legends, the Aleutians had much *spirit-lore*. The shamans were able to obtain the assistance of spirits by their incantations, and the spirits (*kugan*) of power descended into the 'idols' during the great religious dances. The Aleuts believed that their dead relatives acted as guardian spirits, helping them out in all dangerous situations and trying conditions. They also relied much upon these spirits in their schemes of revenge, etc. Belief in amulets of various kinds was common,—the warrior, *e.g.*, wore a belt of sea-weed with magic knots. Mention is also made of the *tkhimkee*, a marvellous pebble, which all animals were unable to resist when it was thrown into the sea. The Aleuts of to-day have little of the rich mythology and folk-lore of their ancestors, the conversion to the Greek Church, which took place in the time of Veniaminov, and the course pursued by the Russian priesthood having resulted in the passing away of institutions and beliefs, ceremonies, customs, and habits of the olden time. To this process the Aleuts appear to have taken somewhat readily, a fact which further hastened the disappearance of what was purely national and racial.

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ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN.

ALEXANDER OF ABONOTEICHOS in Paphlagonia owes his fame to a treatise of Lucian, who was his contemporary. The piece is full of the minutest details of Alexander's life. But Lucian makes no concealment of the contempt and hatred which he felt for one whom he regarded as a venal and impudent impostor, trading on the selfish superstition of an ignorant and credulous people. In his war against the credulity of his age, Lucian has evidently exerted all his art to blacken the character of one who seemed to him to represent its worst excesses of superstition. Yet, apart from the charges against Alexander's morals, Lucian's life of Alexander is probably more trustworthy than his life of Peregrinus.

Alexander was a Greek of Abonoteichos, with splendid gifts of mind and body, and a charm of manner which, Lucian admits, left on casual acquaintances the impression of a high and simple character. He began his career with a wizard physician connected with the circle of Apollonius of Tyana. On his death, Alexander formed a partnership with a Byzantine adventurer, and during their travels in Macedonia, the pair, seeing the passion of the time for any means of forecasting the future, determined to exploit its hopes and fears by founding an oracle which should rival the fame and wealth of the old seats of prophecy. They brought a tame serpent from Macedonia, and in the precincts of Apollo at Chalcedon they buried two tablets, predicting that Asklepios would come to Pontus with his father, and make his home at Abonoteichos. Alexander knew his countrymen. The promise of the epiphany soon spread, and the people of Abonoteichos at once began to build a temple for the coming god. Soon Alexander appeared among them, with white tunic and purple cloak, and a scimitar in his hand, reciting an oracle which proclaimed him 'the seed of Perseus, dear to Apollo.' Fits of prophetic frenzy still further raised the general excitement. One morning at dawn, almost naked and scimitar in hand, he bounded into the market-place in all the orgiastic excitement of a votary of the Great Mother, leapt upon the altar, and, with a strange jumble of Hebrew or Chaldæan phrases, announced the coming of the god. He then rushed to a ditch which ran round the foundations of the new temple, fished up a goose's egg in which a young snake had been skilfully enclosed, broke the shell, and displayed to the awestruck crowd the nascent deity.

Multitudes thronged to Abonoteichos, and Alexander, sitting on a divan, held a levée, in which he displayed, coiled about his shoulders, the trained serpent from Macedonia, to which a very simple art had attached a human head. Crowds poured through the darkened room, jostling one another to see the new god so miraculously mature, so human and so divine. The great miracle drew crowds from Bithynia, Thrace, and Galatia, and even from remote barbarian regions. Artists flocked to the spot to express the likeness of the new deity in colours, or bronze or silver, 'Glycon the third of the seed of Zeus, a light to men.'

Alexander had studied the system of the older oracles, and he determined to found a new one, while he carefully displayed a reverence for the ancient seats of Claros or Didyma. For a small fee of 2 obols he received on stated days sealed packets, which he ceremoniously returned apparently unopened, with the needed answer. A hot needle and a delicate hand concealed the imposture, although Lucian by means of an obstinate seal once exposed the fraud. The oracle, like so many of the time, was mainly one of healing, and, skilfully managed, with an army of officials and interested envoys and missionaries to spread the fame of its efficacy throughout the Empire, it gathered in a revenue of nearly £7000 a year. Its fame spread to Rome, and great nobles like Severianus the governor of Cappadocia, and Rutilianus, one of the most experienced statesmen of the age, were drawn into the net. Alexander had many questions of a dangerous political curiosity put to him, which would not bear disclosure. Rutilianus, at the mature age of sixty, even condescended to marry Alexander's daughter, his boasted offspring by an amour with Selene, who had been captivated as by another Endymion.

In the great plague of A.D. 167, a magical verse, dictated by the new oracle, was inscribed over the doors of houses throughout the Roman world. Even the circle of the philosophic Emperor yielded to the imposture. When the Marcomannic war was at its height, an oracle from Abonoteichos was received at headquarters, ordering two lions to be thrown into the Danube. The ceremony was followed by a disaster to the Roman arms, which was glibly explained by classical precedent.

Alexander, with all his daring and ingenuity, was scrupulously conservative in adhesion to ancient forms. He crowned his achievements by establishing mysteries on the approved model, from which Christians and Epicurean freethinkers were excluded under a solemn ban. The ceremonies lasted for three days. Scenes from old and new mythologies were presented with striking effect—the labour of Leto, the birth of Apollo and Asklepios, the epiphany of Glycon, and the celestial origin of Alexander himself. Lucian believed that the new religion was tainted with the foulest immorality. Alexander had many enemies, and there is no doubt that he was surrounded by large numbers who, like Lucian, scorned and derided the superstition of the time. They openly assailed the new oracle, and strove to convict it of deceit. For his own scornful incredulity, Lucian once nearly paid with his life. And Alexander, by the mouth of the god, ordered that the blasphemies of the atheists should be punished by stoning. He finally triumphed over all opposition, and rose even to divine honours. His statue was an object of worship at Parium in the time of Athenagoras. Inscriptions of Dacia and Mœsia attest the wide extent of his influence. In the third century, the religion of Glycon still flourished at Ionopolis, the new name which Alexander had given Abonoteichos, and which still survives under altered form. Coins of Nicomedia and Ionopolis bear the device of the serpent with a human head.

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S. DILL.

ALEXANDER THE GREAT (his place in the history of religion and ethics).—**1. Synopsis of his reign.**—Alexander III., afterwards surnamed the Great, was born at Pella, B.C. 356. He was the son of Philip II., king of Macedonia, and Olympias, a Molossian princess. In 336 he succeeded to the throne, and two years afterwards set out on his Eastern expedition. S.W. Asia was subdued by his victories at the Granicus (B.C. 334) and at Issus (B.C. 333). His attention was then turned to Egypt, and in the course of the expedition an opportunity occurred for a visit to Jerusalem, which may perhaps be regarded as historical. Alexandria was founded in B.C. 331. Campaigns against the northern provinces of Bactria and Sogdiana followed, and gradually all the districts over which the kings of Persia exercised sovereignty were subdued. Alexander then forced the Khyber Pass, or, more probably, another pass 80 miles to the north-east, crossed the Indus, and occupied the Panjāb; but his further designs were thwarted by

the discontent of his army, and in 323 at Babylon his brief and meteoric career was brought to a close.

2. **Preparations for Alexander's work.**—Alexander's greatest work was the spread of Greek influence, less from set purpose than as a result of his methods of recruiting his armies and organizing his conquests, and in ways that made this influence permanent and controlling. The conception of such spread may be found before his day as a part of the political theories of men who were feeling the defects of the various kinds of autonomy prevalent within Greece, or were eager for a fuller and richer life than was possible there. Isocrates in his letter to Philip of Macedon transcends the limits of city patriotism, and contemplates the spread of Greek culture, possibly also of the Greek race, by means of conquest. The school of Socrates was familiar with wide views, and impatient of parochial strife and politics. Xenophon was one of his disciples, who never ceased to be a Greek, but yet considered travel and military service abroad, with eventual settlement in some district where he might at once rule in comfort and disseminate his own views, as the natural career for a man of ambition or leisure. The employment of Greek soldiers as mercenaries by Eastern sovereigns was an ancient practice in the days of Cyrus; and, whilst among these soldiers poor Greeks formed the more numerous section, there were included also adventurers from the leading cities, who were men of parts as well as enterprise. Whatever their treatment was at first, they had ceased before the days of Alexander to be regarded merely as means of defending a weak satrap or adding to the dominions of a strong one. To Cyrus and his associates and successors they were friends to be courted; and a Persian policy of encouraging Greek settlements coincided with the increasing Greek demand for expansion. Emergence from the narrow area and narrower interests of the little native cities was becoming a necessity. Agesilaus might have effected it but for the dissensions and rivalries that showed the impossibility of Greek overlordship on any large scale. And in political theory on the part of thinkers, both as a practical means of escape from the *impasse* to which the affairs of Greece had been brought, and as the continuation of a process that had been going on for several generations, a preparation for Alexander's schemes of conquest was laid long before he was born

3. **Policy of Alexander, and its general results.**—The rapidity of Alexander's conquests was too great to allow of the establishment of a fully organized administration in the districts which he traversed and subdued. At first he appears to have appointed merely a military governor and a fiscal agent, who were supported by a small band of veterans capable of acting as minor officials in the maintenance of order, in the collection of the taxes, and in the training of recruits. As opportunity served, this temporary arrangement was supplemented and made effective by the foundation of a number of settlements or cities, each of which was designed to serve as a centre of defence or influence. Seventy such cities, ranging from Kandahar to Alexandria, were founded by Alexander himself, and claim in various dialects to perpetuate his name. The inhabitants were partly Macedonian and partly Greek,—veterans, discontented troops, camp followers,—with natives swept in from the neighbouring villages or transported from remote and unmanageable lands. Some of these cities were intended to be outposts or garrison towns, others were placed as convenient marts upon the great trade routes; but all were invested with the privileges of partial autonomy. In military affairs the Macedonian element predominated, whilst the Greeks were put in charge of the local administration, and made themselves felt supremely in matters of thought and culture. A similar policy was followed by Alexander's successors, with the difference that the distinction between Macedonian and Greek gradually disappeared. One result was that Greek became the language of politics, trade, and intellectual intercourse from Macedonia to Persia and from Bactria to Egypt. Before his birth Greece had supplied Macedonia herself with the standard of excellence in taste and civilization; and at his death the joint Græco-Macedonian influence was the rising factor in the whole evolution of private life, and strengthened the bond of union supplied in the Eastern world by a common language.

4. **The philosophical schools, and their relative influence.**—Amongst the changes of position in philosophic thought and its estimation during this period, two are of special importance in the history of the process of Hellenization. (*a*) On the one hand, the philosopher, though neither ceasing to indulge in abstract speculation, nor allowing himself to be drawn into the thick of political strife, becomes the adviser of all parties, and the person to whom appeal is addressed in emergency. Aristotle was one of the teachers of Alexander, but does not appear to have been consulted by the king in any difficulty; and the *Politics*, with its catalogue of one hundred and fifty political constitutions, was conceivably an object of amusement to the practical man. Yet two philosophers were selected to rouse the king out of the gloom and remorse into which he was plunged by the murder of Clitus. Xenocrates took no active part in the faction strife of Athens; yet the Athenians more than once chose him as their emissary to Philip, just as afterwards they used him in a similar capacity during the Lamian war. In later times the practice continued. The leading philosophers thus became a class or group of men outside the political arena and above it; they were consulted in practical emergency as well as in speculative perplexity, and their influence in spreading the culture they represented was both detached from dangerous entanglements and quickened by association with general human interests. (*b*) The period of Alexander witnessed a considerable change in the relative amount of attention given to the principal philosophic groups. Metaphysic for a time yielded the ground to ethic. Plato and Aristotle proved less attractive than men who were inferior to both in range and keenness of intellect, but who touched actual life at more points that the ordinary busy man could appreciate. The retirement of the princely thinkers was but temporary, and before many centuries passed they re-emerged in new guises or relationships, of which the number is not yet exhausted. They were both theorists and transcendentalists; and what the Greek world wanted at a time when it was busily engaged in spreading and rooting itself everywhere was not so much speculation as experience, a law of duty rather than a guide to exact thought. As soon as the conditions of life became favourable, for Plato and for Aristotle alike a splendid revival was fated; but the philosophy of Hellenism in its first progress eastwards, as in its later subjugation of Rome and Italy, was of another type.

5. **Pyrrhonism, Stoicism, Epicureanism.**—Pyrrho is said to have taken part in Alexander's expedition to India (Diog. Laert. ix. 63), but it is not until afterwards that traces of his teaching can be found to any extent in Greek thought. The rise of the New Academy, with its blending of the two schools of Plato and Pyrrho, is in reality the date when the Greek mind began to take refuge in conclusions that were other than positive; for the appeal of scepticism is of necessity met in a practical age with a tardy response, and the discomfort caused

by the disturbance of earlier beliefs is an unwelcome diversion when the mind is bent on activities. Pyrrho's importance in this period is twofold. He scattered seed, of which the fruit was late in appearing; but, when it did appear, the crop was plentiful; and the sceptical or captious inquirer, interested in every form of thought but captivated by none, became a not infrequent product of the Hellenistic genius. And he illustrates the reflex influence upon Greek culture of the beliefs of some of the districts which Alexander traversed or visited. That Pyrrho learnt his theories in Persia or India rests upon the statement of an early writer, whose name alone is known, and is probably incorrect (Diog. Laert. ix. 61). With more confidence it may be asserted that his natural equanimity was raised by his Eastern experiences into the worship of imperturbability. The Greek joyousness was transformed into a careless immobility, upon which in part may well be based alike the fatalism of various later creeds and the independence of external circumstance which the Stoic coveted and the Cynic mingled with bitterness.

During Alexander's reign the only schools of philosophy that could be regarded as of appreciable present value were the Stoic and the Epicurean, of which the former, especially, gradually became identified with the extension of Greek culture. Epicurus was a dozen years younger than Alexander, but, according to his own account, he entered seriously upon his philosophical studies at the age of fourteen. He claimed to be independent of his predecessors, but was certainly influenced by the teaching of Democritus, and he articulated in a system conceptions and tendencies that were floating in the air and creating the intellectual climate of the Greek world in Alexander's days. Zeno, too, was probably a little younger than the great king; but his teaching also links itself on to that of Socrates and the Cynics, and, as developed by his immediate successors, it soon became the standard of Greek ethical thought in its spread among the nations. Both schools indulged but little in abstract speculation, but endeavoured to teach men how to secure the happiness which was, in their view, a better and more natural end than knowledge. Epicureanism denied the existence of anything like Providence, declined to anticipate a judicial readjustment of experiences after death, and bade the sage carefully balance all possible present pleasures, and choose the path of prudence. Stoicism, on the other hand, had an elementary theology as well as an ethic. Other knowledge was held to be attainable than that given by the senses. The so-called gods were manifestations of a Supreme God, who ruled over human lives and ordained for each man the part he should play in the world. Happiness was to be reached indirectly by the discharge of duty, without much consideration of conditions or consequences. Wisdom and peace lay in keeping touch with the Divine ruler and plan of life; in which case a man became, whatever his outward circumstance, royal and free. Such a philosophy, unlike the Epicurean, involved the fusion of all distinctions of creed or race or custom, and was exactly appropriate to a period when civilizations also were fusing, and a rule of life was in request that could survive national decay and still serve for guidance in any change of fortune. Stoicism may be regarded as the leading philosophy in the Greek culture that became cosmopolitan. It succeeded in establishing itself at length on the banks of the Tiber, and penetrated even through the thick shell of Hebraism, affecting the thought and the phrases of St. Paul himself.

6. **Alexander and the Jews.**—Though Alexander possibly visited Jerusalem, according to the tradition preserved in the Talmud as well as by Josephus (*Ant.* IX. viii. 3–6), and though he enrolled Jews in his armies, granted them special privileges, used them as an intelligence department, and settled many favourably in his new towns and colonies, there are no indications of any direct or immediate influence upon their creed or practice. Indirectly, he opened or reopened the channels of communication by which the East and the West were brought into contact both with one another and with Egypt and Cœle-Syria. Along those roads, in subsequent ages, came teachers from India and Persia as well as from Greece; but the Hebrew did not readily assimilate any foreign belief or custom. The cause is to be found in the strictness of his monotheism as well as in the exceptional solidarity of the race. The Greek language was tolerated and even adopted in the course of time, but Greek culture was regarded with abhorrence in the inner circles where Jewish traditions were most sacredly preserved; and the complete coalescence of Hellenism with Hebraism proper has not yet taken place.

LITERATURE.—Freeman, *Hist. Essays*, 2nd ser. (4th ed. 1892). Essay 5 discusses the sources of Alexander's history. For the Rabbinical traditions see Derenbourg, *Hist. de la Pal.* (1867) i. 41 ff.; Hamburger, *RE* ii. (1883) 44 ff.; and *JE* i. 341–343. For relations with India see *JRAS* (1903) 685 ff. and (1894) 677 ff. Droysen, *Gesch. Alex. des Grossen* (1837) and *Gesch. des Hellenismus* (1877) are of special value. Wilamowitz, *Antigonus von Karystos* (1894), is brilliant for some of the philosophical tendencies. Add Mahaffy, *Gr. Life and Thought* (1896), *Progress of Hellenism in Alexander's Empire* (1905), and *Story of Alexander's Empire* (1900) (elementary, but well supplied with maps); Bevan, *Jerus. under High Priests* (1904); and Susemihl, *Lit. der Alexandrinerzeit* (1892).

R. W. Moss.

ALEXANDRIAN THEOLOGY.

[W. R. Inge].

Scope of the Article.—Some of the best-known histories of 'Alexandrianism,' or 'the School of Alexandria,' have been really histories of Neo-Platonism. This is a mistake. Neo-Platonism, which will be dealt with in this Encyclopædia under its own name, is the latest stage in the development of Greek thought. Its connexion with Alexandria is less than is commonly supposed. In this article the local limit will be observed.

Secondly, this article will deal with theology, not with philosophy. Although Neo-Platonism was essentially a religious philosophy, and Alexandrian theology a philosophical religion, it is possible to maintain the distinction. And we may speak of an Alexandrian theology, though not of an Alexandrian philosophy.

Thirdly, the Hellenic schools of religious thought which flourished at Alexandria are omitted, as belonging rather to the precursors of Neo-Platonism than to our present subject. The justification for omitting them lies in their subordination of positive religion to philosophy, which was almost an axiom among the Pagans; *e.g.* Galen expresses surprise that some Christians, who cannot follow philosophical arguments, 'have progressed as far in self-control and the ardent pursuit of virtue as genuine philosophers.' Moreover, in spite of the resemblance in metaphysical and especially in ethical principles between these Hellenic schools and the Judæo-Christian Alexandrians, their attitude towards Greek tradition and culture is decisive. There is a great cleavage in this respect even between Clement and Plotinus. In reformed Pagan circles it seems to have been a matter of good taste not to mention Christianity, and Judaism was regarded with equal contempt. It is very doubtful whether the Jewish-Alexandrian theology had any direct influence upon Neo-Platonism. In fact, national and, still more, religious prejudices counteracted the cosmopolitan tendency of thought which began under the successors of Alexander. In spite of the common parentage of many ideas, and the parallelism of development under similar conditions, the separa-

tion is sharp between the three forms which religious philosophy assumed in the 2nd and 3rd centuries: (1) Jewish and Christian Platonism, both of which stand on the basis of Jewish monotheism; (2) the Hellenic religious philosophy, of which the best representative is Plotinus; (3) the barbaric Platonism of the Gnostics. In all these systems or schools there appear the following characteristics, though often qualified by other tendencies: (*a*) an abstract notion of God as the transcendent, absolute Unity, (*b*) a tendency to call in intermediary powers (the Logos, spirits, etc.) to bridge over the chasm between God and the world, (*c*) a tendency to connect matter with the evil principle, (*d*) self-discipline as a means to clearer vision of Divine truths. But the emphasis which was laid on these several doctrines differed widely in the three classes above named.

This article deals only with the first—Jewish and Christian Platonism, as developed at Alexandria. And the three representative names, round which our discussion must range, are Philo, Clement, and Origen.

1. **Precursors of Philo.**—It was inevitable that the Judaism of the Diaspora should diverge further and further from the Palestinian tradition. In Egypt especially, where the Jews comprised nearly half the population of the capital, and were numerous throughout the country, a vigorous independent life was sure to appear in all departments of mental activity. The Egyptian Jews could not maintain an attitude of aloofness from the secular culture of the world around them. To say that they were Hellenized is only to say that they were not self-excluded from the civilization of the period, for Hellenism was a factor in all the religion, philosophy, and ethics of the lands where Greek culture penetrated. But when we speak of the Hellenizing of Judaism, we mean more than the pervasive influence of the secular civilization. There was a definite attempt made by the Jews to interpret their own religion in a form acceptable to the Greeks, from which cannot be separated an attempt to interpret Hellenism to themselves by stretching it upon a framework of Jewish orthodoxy. This latter design was rendered necessary by the rapid decay of faith in the statutory Judaism among the educated, a decay which was exhibited both by the increasing inwardness and spirituality of the really religious, and by the increasing externality and hypocrisy of the cult among the official class. In the Diaspora, a liberal Judaism sprang up which was merely a cultured Unitarianism with strong ethical convictions. The old dream of a theocracy was forgotten, and Messianism aroused no interest. The Greek doctrine of immortality was given a moral turn by conceiving of the future life as primarily the scene of rewards and punishments; and the national hatred of Rome (after the Roman conquest of the East) was gratified by the belief in a day of universal destruction, ushering in the great assize. The statutory basis of this religion was furnished by the Old Testament, which was asserted to contain the sum total of all Divine and human wisdom. The 'books of Moses,' in particular, were treated with unlimited reverence.

The *Septuagint* is perhaps our earliest specimen of Jewish-Alexandrian literature, for the traces of Greek influence in Sirach are very disputable. Dähne has shown that the translators frequently modify the naïve anthropomorphism of the Old Testament, substituting, *e.g.*, the 'power' for the 'hand' of God, and His 'glory' for His 'robe' in Is 6^1. In Gn 1^2 they seize the opportunity to introduce the Platonic distinction of matter and form, and in Ps 51^{12} the Stoical ἡγεμονικόν intrudes itself. The third book of the so-called *Sibylline Oracles*, which probably dates from the middle of the 2nd cent. B.C., is a remarkable proof of growing respect for Greek thought and religion, since the main object of the composition is to support Jewish monotheism and Jewish national hopes, under the form of heathen prophecy. But the characteristic features of Alexandrianism, enumerated above, are not prominent in the *Sibylline Oracles*. Neither allegorism, nor ecstasy, nor asceticism, can be found in them. In the so-called *Wisdom of Solomon*, though the form is that of Hebrew poetry, the matter is far more Hellenic. The half-personified 'Wisdom' is almost identical with Philo's Logos, and the 'Spirit' is also half-personified, being, indeed, only 'Wisdom' itself under a slightly different aspect. The 'Word,' on the other hand, is used, as in the Old Testament books, for the expression of the will of God; there is no approximation to the Philonic use of 'Logos,' even in 18^{14-16}, where there is a poetical personification. On Messianic hopes the author is silent, like the other Wisdom-writers; the book was not written for Palestinian Jews, and was not accepted by them as Scripture. The influence of Greek (Platonic and Stoic) philosophy appears chiefly in the conception of a harmonious and beautifully ordered world directed by an immanent principle (Wisdom). The most striking deviation from orthodoxy is to be found in the doctrine of pre-existence, which is clearly stated in $8^{19.\ 20}$ 'I was a child of comely parts, and had obtained a good soul; or rather, being good, I entered into an undefiled body.' This can only mean that the soul has displayed goodness in a previous state of existence. The body is thus no essential part of the personality, a view which leads easily to the notion that it is, if not the source of moral evil, yet the 'muddy vesture of decay' which presses down the soul. The eschatology is vague. There will be no bodily resurrection; but the souls of the righteous will be rewarded, at the 'inspection,' with everlasting felicity, while those of the wicked will be excluded from their true life, and cast into eternal darkness.

2. **Philo.**—Passing by the Letter of the pseudo-Aristeas, a manifest forgery, and the fragments of Aristobulus (a Jewish Peripatetic who lived in the middle of the 2nd cent. B.C.), which have also been suspected, we come to Philo. Philo (born about 20 B.C.) was a member of a well-known Alexandrian family, being brother of Alexander the Alabarch, the head of the Jewish community in the Egyptian capital. Philo himself lived a life of retirement and contemplation, until an outbreak of anti-Jewish fanaticism, fomented by the Roman governor Flaccus, led to his being sent to Rome with a deputation from the Jewish community (A.D. 39–40). He was then elderly, and had already written most of his books.

Philo believed himself to be, and was accepted by his contemporaries as being, an orthodox Jew. He is an apologist, who wishes to defend Judaism against atheism, polytheism, and scepticism. More particularly, since Judaism for the Alexandrian Jew was a book-religion, he was concerned to prove that the highest forms of revelation and of human wisdom were contained within the compass of the Old Testament. Disrespect to the sacred text is in his opinion a crime of the deepest dye: he knows of an impious man who, after laughing at some story in Genesis, soon after hanged himself for no particular reason—a manifest judgment (*de Mut. Nom.* 8). His theory of inspiration is that God speaks through the prophet, who is merely a passive instrument. This inspiration takes place when the instrument is in a kind of trance, such as Philo himself has experienced. His mind suddenly becomes full of images, and ideas pour forth from it, while he is insensible to all externals (*de Migrat.*

Abrah. 7). The description resembles Böhme's account of his manner of writing. At the head of all the prophets is Moses, who alone had seen God face to face. In his writings the sum of human wisdom is contained.

This conception of revelation, as given once for all in its entirety, led Philo into great difficulties. If he had been content to argue that the more spiritual faith of his day was contained implicitly, in germ, in the Pentateuch, he might have made out a good case. But the doctrine of development, even in the limited application afterwards made by St. Paul, was unknown to him. He can admit no inferiority in Genesis as compared with Isaiah. And since the OT, understood in its natural sense, contained many things which could not but shock the conscience as well as the intelligence of a cultivated Alexandrian acquainted with Greek philosophy, the expedient of *allegorism* was necessary (see ALLEGORY). This method was no invention of Philo, or of his contemporaries. Greek moralists had long treated Homer in this way, quoting lines from him as we quote verses from the Bible, to enforce moral truths. The system was elaborated by the Sophists, and still more by the school of Anaxagoras; but it is rejected by Plato, who will not admit unedifying myths into his State, 'either with or without allegories.' It may be said that to a certain extent this kind of exposition is justified. In the higher kinds of literature, the perception of some sort of allegory or double meaning is almost necessary. The mere literal or grammatical sense cannot satisfy the student of any poetry or imaginative prose. But when Homer is made by the Stoic to prove such philosophic theses as that virtue can be taught, or that the sage is 'apathetic'; by the Pythagorean to teach that silence is golden, and by the Epicurean that pleasure is the guide of life; and when Moses is made by Philo to indicate the eternal motion of the heavens under the figure of the cherubim's flaming sword, we have a right to protest. So arbitrary and unscientific an exegesis is a fatal obstacle to understanding the religious books of mankind—a task in which we cannot succeed unless we realize that the thoughts of the past are relative to the past, and must be interpreted by it. Philo himself calls it the method of the Greek mysteries. In these rites everything was represented as being at once a thing and the covering of a thing, an outward sign and an inward truth.

Allegorism, then, is simply the sacramental method applied to history and literature. It was becoming the common property of all the higher religions, and was the easiest refuge for educated men who wished to belong to an established religious body, without forcing themselves to accept immoral or absurd beliefs. The general view was that all revelation is a Divine cryptogram, which serves the double purpose of concealing the truth from those who are unworthy to receive it, and of magnifying it, for the choicer spirits, by an indirect and mysterious mode of presentation (*ἡ κρύψις ἡ μυστικὴ σεμνοποιεῖ τὸ θεῖον*).

The following summary of Philo's principles of exegesis may give some idea of the method in practice. (1) When nouns are repeated, a hidden meaning is indicated. In Lv 18[6] 'man,' 'man,' shows 'that what is meant is not the man possessed of body and soul, but he only who is possessed of virtue.' Similarly, pleonasms are significant. In Gn 15[5] *ἐξήγαγεν ἔξω* means that Abraham was delivered from the trammels of the flesh. There can be no tautology in Scripture, and no change of a word without meaning. If Moses says 'shepherd' in one place, and 'keeper of sheep' in another, he means to distinguish between a good and a bad kind. (2) Plays on words are frequent, *e.g.* *ὄνος* is meant to indicate *πόνος*, and *πρόβατον* to indicate *προβαίνειν*. (3) Double meanings of words often give the clue to the higher meaning, *e.g.* since 'rib' is sometimes used for 'strength,' the words about Adam's rib mean that the *αἰσθητικὴ δύναμις* comes forth out of the *νοῦς*. (4) Numbers are always important: *one* is the number of God, *two* of the creature, *three* of the body, *four* of potential completeness, *five* of the sensuous life, and so on. (5) Animals are symbolic: the camel of memory, the ass of the irrational nature, the snake of lust. Inanimate objects are treated in the same way. (6) The proper names in the Pentateuch are allegorized according to their fancied etymological affinities. Philo speaks of allegorism as the 'moral,' as opposed to the 'natural' interpretation.

It is plain that the principle of allegorism offered great temptations to evading the letter of the Mosaic law. This misuse of the method is condemned by Philo, who protests against those who thus 'spiritualized' the ceremonies enjoined in the Pentateuch (*de Migrat. Abrah.* 16). He also distrusts the symbolic study of nature, as raising more problems than it solves. We shall learn more by studying our own minds, and the sacred literature.

In considering Philo's theology, we must expect to find the Greek and Hebrew elements imperfectly fused. It would surpass the genius of any man to harmonize the logical, analytic thought of the Greek with the vague, indefinite intuitions of Hebrew prophecy. But the way had been prepared for him by approximations from both sides. The Jews of Alexandria had universalized Jahweh till He had lost the characteristics of the tribal God of the Hebrews; and, on the other hand, Greek thought was now more favourably disposed to the transcendence of God than when Stoicism reigned supreme. Philo has no difficulty in explaining the anthropomorphisms of the Pentateuch as mere accommodations. God is, in truth, not a Being who can feel anger, jealousy, or repentance. He is without body, invisible, the most universal of beings, above goodness, above knowledge, above even the absolute Good and Beautiful. We apprehend His existence partly by analogy: as we have an invisible mind, which is sovereign over the body, so must the Universe be guided by an invisible mind, which is God (*de Mundi Opif.* 23). Also, the world shows traces of design; but the principle of causality cannot reside in matter, which has nothing noble in itself, but only the potentiality of becoming all things (*de Mundi Opif.* 5).

A higher mode of apprehending God is by spiritual intuition, which under certain conditions culminates in knowledge of Him. But, since like only can know like, we are precluded by the limitations of our finitude from forming an adequate conception of the mind of the Universe. We cannot get out of ourselves, and underived existence is incomprehensible to us. 'We must first become God, which is impossible, in order to be able to comprehend God' (*Fragm.* ii. 654). We approach most nearly to the truth when we strip off from our idea of God all that is characteristic of finite existence. This process still leaves Him with the attributes of goodness, freedom, and activity. Creative activity (*τὸ ποιεῖν*) is as characteristic of God as receptivity (*τὸ πάσχειν*) is of the creature, and God 'never ceases working.' The *via negativa* logically leads to a God who is without qualities (*ἄποιος**); but Philo here takes refuge in agnosticism. 'God has revealed his nature to none, and we cannot say that the First Cause is material or immaterial, with or without qualities' (*Leg. All.* iii. 73). The bare fact of His existence (*ψιλὴν ἄνευ χαρακτῆρος ὕπαρξιν*, *Quod Deus immut.* 11) the mind can apprehend, but no more. He was revealed to Moses as the Nameless Existing. Nevertheless, we can without contradiction ascribe to God the attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, and the like, which can be applied only to the Supreme Being; and such attributes as goodness, which in their full meaning can be applied only to Him. 'Those things which among men are called truth and justice, are symbols only; but those which are

* But properly *ἄποιος* means not 'having no attributes,' but 'incapable of being classified': God does not belong to any class or order of being, but is above all classification, being unique.

so with God are prototypes or ideas.' God is 'the most generic' as excluding nothing; but He transcends even the highest genus, τὸ λογικόν. He is 'older than the monad'; by which Philo means that the unity of God is not merely the negation of plurality, but that His nature is the archetype of the mathematician's unity.

One of the most difficult parts of Philo's system is the doctrine of the Divine 'Powers.' These Powers could be fully apprehended only by pure Intelligence; to us they are revealed in their action. They are not, however, exhausted in the created world, for they are infinite, like God Himself. Their function is to give to matter those forms in virtue of which we are able to say that things exist. In themselves, the Powers are the eternal forms of God's thought; their activity is stamped on the whole order of nature, which in the regularity of its changes reflects the persistence of the creative ideas. These Powers, or ideas, are not of equal rank. The highest of them is the Logos, which stands nearest to the Godhead, even as the reasonable soul of man is that part of him which reaches most nearly to the Divine.

It has been usual with critics of Philo to condemn with great severity this conception of 'Powers.' It is said that he uses them as an expedient to mediate between two irreconcilables, God and the world, and that the contradiction reappears, in no way softened, in the qualities assigned to the mediating agencies. The Powers are sometimes identified with God, and sometimes separated from Him. They are (it is said) a transparent device to bring God again into contact with the finite, from which He has been jealously excluded by another line of argument. It is perhaps worth considering whether any theistic system which regards God as something more than a finite spirit among other spirits, has succeeded in explaining how an almighty, omnipresent, and eternal Being can really act in space and time. Philo is possibly not more successful than others who have attempted to do so; but a fair estimate of his teaching will acquit him of the puerile expedient of creating substitutes to act in God's place. 'God, being outside creation, has none the less filled the universe with *Himself*,' he says in one place (*de Post. Cain.* 5); and this is not an isolated acknowledgment of the Divine immanence in the world. He 'extends' His Powers over creation just as man is said to 'extend' the energies of his soul to God. It is true that we read that 'the Blessed One must not come into contact with indeterminate matter; and this is why He used the immaterial Powers, whose real name is ideas, that every genus might be taken possession of by its proper form.' But surely this is merely to assert the transcendence of God, without denying His immanence. The notion of the Powers as subordinate *persons* is quite foreign to Philo's mind, and cannot even be discussed without wandering far from his standpoint. Drummond quotes a very apposite parallel from Athanasius: 'The Logos is, as it were, *in* all creation, outside of the whole in his essence, but in all things by his powers . . . containing the whole of things and not contained, being wholly and in all respects *within* his own Father, and him only.' Both in Philo and Athanasius the phrases denoting spatial externality and its opposite are well understood to be metaphors. In the same way, when the Powers are symbolized as the agents and ministers of God, the poetical form ought not to have been misunderstood as a literal statement of fact. Philo is extremely fond of personification: *e.g.* for him 'all the virtues are virgins,' just as, *par revanche*, the wives of the patriarchs are 'not women but virtues.' Nothing can prove more strongly that Philo did not ascribe personality to the Powers, than the fact that he everywhere distinguishes them from the angels (in spite of Zeller and others). The angels are incorporeal souls, created, finite, and localized: they are 'powers,' no doubt, doing God's will, but they are entirely different from 'the Powers' or Divine Ideas. These latter are the active manifestations of the energy of God, which give to creation all the reality, as well as all the order and beauty, which it possesses.

In the hierarchy of Powers, the Logos of God is, as already remarked, second to God Himself (*Leg. Alleg.* ii. 21). The name Logos comes from Stoicism, but for the content of the word Philo is more indebted to Plato. The Stoical notion of Logos as active and quickening force is less prominent than the Platonic expressions 'idea of ideas' and 'archetypal idea.' The Logos of Philo, in fact, coincides with the Platonic Νοῦς, and the intelligible world is the mode which he assumes in creating: 'in the Logos are inscribed and engraved the constitutions of all other things.' As the principle of orderly differentiation in the natural world, he is called the 'Cutter' (τομεύς). The inferior ideas, gathered up in the Logos, constitute the multiplicity in unity of God's creation. A difficult question is raised by the distinction between the inward (ἐνδιάθετος) and the uttered (προφορικός) Logos in man, which corresponds to a distinction in the universal Logos. 'The Logos is double both in the universe and in the nature of man' (*Vit. Mos.* iii. 13). The 'seal' of the Logos upon matter—the expressed thought of God—is not called the 'uttered Word'; but the distinction in the universal Logos seems to be between the thought of God in itself and the same thought made objective.

Another problem is the relation of the Logos to the half-personified 'Wisdom' of the early Jewish-Alexandrian literature. Philo disliked the gender of 'Wisdom'; and though he explains that 'its nature is masculine, not feminine,' he found the word less dignified as well as less plastic than Logos. 'Wisdom' is chiefly used by Philo of the Logos as informing the human soul, hardly ever of God's creative power. The word 'Spirit' is sparingly used of the Logos or Wisdom inhabiting the soul of man. The question as to the personality of the Logos is better undiscussed. Neither Philo nor any Greek cared to define personality, a concept which has no name in the Greek language. He sometimes speaks of 'Logoi' in the plural, with no more hesitation than when we speak indifferently of 'the law' or 'the laws' of nature. For this very reason he employs poetical or mythical personification quite freely. The Logos is the constitutive principle of human individuality; he is not himself an individual. The Logos-doctrine of Philo is therefore nearer to what, in Christianity, became Monarchianism than to the Arianism with which it has been compared, or to Athanasian orthodoxy. See, further, the article LOGOS.

As the Logos of God is the archetype of human reason, the mind of man is nearer to God than any other created thing. The human soul is the only worthy temple of God; those in whom God dwells may justly be called His sons. Knowledge of God, gained by imitation of Him and likeness to Him, is the highest good for man. Evil consists in separation from God, and ignorance of Him; the cause or fountainhead of moral evil is selfishness (φιλαυτία), especially when combined with arrogance and conceit (μεγαλαυχία). 'To speak, like Esau, of "*my* birthright" and "*my* blessing," is proof of boundless ignorance, and of a mean, servile disposition; for it belongs to God alone to say "Mine"' (*Leg. Alleg.* iii. 70). Philo does not identify evil with ignorance; for he clearly teaches that sins committed in ignorance are pardonable; but he is careful to distinguish between the ignorance which we cannot help and that which is due to pride or selfishness. The corruptible body always tends to press down the soul; not that it is evil in itself, for matter has no moral significance, good or bad, apart from our use of it; but, as a matter of experience, the bodily needs and appetites are a clog upon spirituality. The 'powers' of sense, though Divine gifts, are irrational, urging us to their own gratification without thought of consequences; but to make this gratification our object is wrong and ruinous. The passions (πάθη) for the most part operate in opposition to reason, and are therefore bad; but the good man is not destitute of such μισοπόνηρα πάθη as pity and love.

The great helper of mankind in the ascent to God is the Logos; and here Philo tries to unite his Jewish reverence for the written 'Word' of God with his Platonic idealism. His description of the virtuous life is on the whole very modern in sentiment. Self-discipline is not an end in itself. Such exercises as fasting, abstinence from the bath, and sleeping on the ground are useless and unprofitable labours, which injure the soul as well

as the body (*Quod. det. pot.* 7). It is true that we have a war to wage, 'the most difficult and troublesome of all wars,' against our bodily appetites, and that in practice we must often regard our bodies as by nature evil; but Philo advises neither ascetical austerities nor withdrawal from the world. 'The serpent, pleasure, bites us in the wilderness'; it is safer to live in the world, to accept responsibilities and dignities, and show how such a career can be followed without contamination and to the good of others. 'Those who assume a squalid and melancholy appearance, and say that they despise glory and pleasure, are hypocrites.' Unworldliness is to be gained only by knowledge of the world. At the same time, such luxury as was prevalent among the wealthier classes in Egypt is wrong. The good things of the world should be used sparingly, that the soul may not be entangled in the corruptible elements. Truthfulness in speech is strongly insisted on, and taking oaths is deprecated as needless for an honourable man, whose word ought to be sufficient. The only acceptable worship is that of the soul, and truth the only sacrifice (*Quod. det. pot.* 7); ceremonial observances and rich offerings do not make a man pious. Piety and justice seem to share the throne as the chief of the virtues. The soul is in its essence immortal, and will be rewarded or punished in a future state for its life here; but Philo discourages this line of thought; virtue and vice are their own reward and punishment; heaven and hell are within us. To enjoy an innocent and quiet mind, free from unruly passions; to feel the presence of the Holy Spirit of Wisdom within us; to share at last in the peace which passes all understanding, and to see God as He is—this is the goal which Philo sets before himself and his readers. 'The climax of blessedness is to stand steadfastly and steadily in God alone.' A resurrection of the body has no place whatever in his creed.

Philo has been very variously estimated as a thinker. Dähne treats him with contempt; Zeller thinks that his whole system is vitiated by a fundamental contradiction—the attempt to achieve union with a Being whose very notion makes such union impossible. Such a scheme, he suggests, could be the creation only of a consciousness at discord with itself and the world. Vacherot emphasizes the inconsistency of borrowing now from Plato and now from the Stoics, the result being an 'incoherent syncretism' dragged into the service of Judaism. Siegfried is impressed by his complete abandonment of the old Jewish religion, which nevertheless he affects to defend in words. 'No Jewish writer contributed so much to the dissolution of Judaism. The history of his people becomes in his hands mainly a didactic symbolic poem, by which he inculcates the doctrine that man attains to the vision of God by mortifying the flesh. The God of Philo was an imaginary Being, who, in order to gain power over the world, had need of a Logos, to whom the palladium of Israel, the unity of God, was sacrificed.' E. Caird, criticizing Philo's whole system from the Hegelian standpoint, shows that he had no conception of a historical process of evolution, and objects that his world is regarded as related to God, but not God to the world. (For a consideration of this criticism, which affects Plotinus more than Philo, see the article on NEO-PLATONISM). A more favourable estimate than any of these is given by Drummond, whose exhaustive treatise takes rank, with Siegfried's book, as the most valuable exposition of Philo's theology. No sane critic could place Philo in the same rank as a great original thinker like Plotinus; but the unfavourable estimates of him have proceeded mostly from critics who extend their condemnation to the school of Plato generally, in the interests of some rival system. The 'inconsistencies' which have been so freely attributed to Philo are mainly the difficulties which all who believe in a God at once transcendent and immanent must be prepared to face, though some of them are mere misunderstandings due to an unsympathetic and sometimes superficial study of his writings. His belief in the possibility of immediate communion with 'the first God' in visions is the result of personal experience. He describes, modestly and clearly, 'what has happened to himself a thousand times' (*de Migrat. Abrah.* 7). In the face of this passage it is difficult to maintain that in Philo God 'is not related to the world,' or, with Dähne, that he 'robs the human race of their God.'

The extent of the influence exercised by Philo's writings in the first century, and early part of the second, is very difficult to determine. As regards pagan philosophy, he remained both then and afterwards outside the pale. Neo-Platonism, so far as we can judge, is not directly indebted to him. The question whether St. Paul and the author of the Fourth Gospel had read Philo has not been decided. As regards the latter, a strong case may be made out on either side. That the author of the Gospel was steeped in the philosophy of the Jewish Alexandrian school is certain; but his standpoint differs from that of Philo in several particulars, and many of the most characteristic Philonic words are absent from the Gospel, so that direct dependence cannot be proved. The same may be said of the Epistle to the Hebrews. The Epistle of Barnabas, as Siegfried shows, follows the Philonic rules for allegorical interpretation. Justin Martyr's Logos-doctrine is nearer to Philo's than that of the Fourth Gospel; and there are parallels which suggest a direct knowledge of Philo's writings. It is probable also that he was read by some of the Gnostics of the 2nd century. Clement was well acquainted with Philo, and seems to borrow from him not only many fanciful applications of the allegorical method, but several characteristic theological and philosophical terms; though these latter may be part of the common stock of ideas at Alexandria. The same may be said of Origen, between whom and Philo many correspondences are discovered by Siegfried. Eusebius frequently quotes Philo; and, to come to the Latin Fathers, Ambrose conveys whole sentences from him into his writings, so that a Jewish commentator has (much too strongly) called Ambrose 'Philo Christianus.' Jerome is also much influenced by Philo's interpretations of the Old Testament.

LITERATURE.—**Text of Philo:** Richter (1851–53). The best critical expositions of his system are in Dähne, *Geschichtl. Darstellung der Jüdisch-alexandrinischen Religionsphilosophie* (1834); Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, iii. 2 (1881); Siegfried, *Philo von Alexandria* (1875); J. Drummond, *Philo Judæus*, 2 vols. (1888). Of these the most trustworthy are Siegfried and Drummond. Dähne's book is marred not only by want of sympathy with his subject, but by some strange errors, *e.g.* that Philo anticipated the Johannine identification of the Logos with the Messiah. There is an excellent article on Philo in the *Jewish Encyclopedia* (x. 6–18).

3. Alexandrian Christianity.—Until the age of Clement, the Christian Church at Alexandria lay in obscurity. Our information is so scanty that we cannot even say whether the ideas of Philo and his school were a factor in Alexandrian Christianity during the greater part of the 2nd century. The Church in the Egyptian capital retained a democratic constitution until Clement's lifetime, perhaps even consecrating its patriarchs by the hands of its college of presbyters. It had at this period no fixed liturgy, and no definite distinction between the Eucharist and the Agape. In contrast with this primitive organization, there grew into importance,

in the later half of the century, the remarkable Catechetical School, the earliest διδασκαλεῖον in close relation to the Church. (The schools of the Apologists — Justin, Tatian, etc. — were private ventures). The oldest Gnostic schools for the study of religious philosophy were in Egypt, and the Christian Catechetical School may have been modelled partly upon these and partly upon the Jewish high schools (cf. Euseb. *HE* v. 10, ἐξ ἀρχαίου ἔθους διδασκαλείου τῶν ἱερῶν λόγων παρ' αὐτοῖς συνεστῶτος). The school emerges from darkness under Pantænus; but we know very little about its management either under him or under Clement. There were no class-rooms or collegiate buildings. The head of the school gave informal instruction in his own house, sometimes by lectures, sometimes by conversation classes (Orig. *c. Cels.* vi. 10). The usual course was three years (*Const. Ecc. Egyp.* iii. 42). No fees were charged. The lecturer was supported by free gifts from rich students. The education was on much the same lines as that advocated by Philo. The aim was the acquisition of γνῶσις—the higher theology and religion. The preparation consisted partly of moral discipline and partly of the study of philosophy, to which must be added the art of expounding, in accordance with the principles of allegorism, the books which contain the special revelation. The Christian teachers placed Greek philosophy and the Old Testament Scriptures side by side as propædeutic to the higher knowledge; and among philosophers, though the Platonists and Stoics were most studied, none were excluded except the 'godless Epicureans.' The commentaries of Origen show that Biblical study held a very important place in the course. The list of Heads of the School is given as follows:— Pantænus, Clement, Origen, Heraclas, Dionysius, Pierius, Theognostus, Serapion, Petrus, Macarius (?), . . . Didymus, Rhodon. (Arius, according to Theodoret [*HE* i. 1], was catechist; but it is very unlikely that he was ever Head of the School). The Catechetical School lost its importance during the Arian controversy, and was further weakened by the attacks upon Origen's orthodoxy. It was destroyed in the unhappy struggle between Theophilus of Alexandria and the barbarous orthodoxy of the Egyptian monks.

(*a*) **Pantænus**, the first Head of the School, is said by Eusebius to have been a Stoic, by Philip of Side to have been 'an Athenian, a Peripatetic.' In any case, he was learned in Greek philosophy, and, according to a doubtful tradition, visited India as a missionary before his appointment at Alexandria. The notices of his teaching indicate that he led the way in the allegorical interpretation of Scripture. His work seems to have been more catechetical than literary, and the most interesting fragment of his teaching has been preserved in the form of question and answer. 'Pantænus, being asked in what manner Christians suppose God to know reality, replied, He neither knows sensible things by sense, nor intelligible things by intellect. For it is not possible that He who is above the things that are should apprehend the things that are according to the things that are. We say that He knows things that are as acts of His own will' (ὡς ἴδια θελήματα, Maximus Conf., *Schol. in Greg. Naz.*). Clement was almost certainly a hearer of Pantænus (not *vice versa*, as Philip of Side says); and it is highly probable that Pantænus is the 'Sicilian bee' whom Clement discovered 'hiding himself' in Egypt, and in whom he 'found rest.'

(*b*) **Clement of Alexandria.** — Titus Flavius Clemens was born about A.D. 150, not at Alexandria; perhaps at Athens (Epiphanius). After many years of leisurely travelling in Italy, Greece, and the East, he came to Alexandria, where, about 200, he succeeded Pantænus as Head of the Catechetical School. In 202 or 203 he was compelled by the persecution under Severus to quit Alexandria, probably for Palestine and Syria. He was still living in 211, but dead in 216. We do not know at what period of his life he embraced Christianity, or what were the stages of his conversion.

The works of Clement are—

(1) The Λόγος Προτρεπτικὸς πρὸς Ἕλληνας, an exhortation to the Greeks (not 'Gentiles,' as Jerome mistranslates it) to abandon paganism. This treatise was probably written about 190. (2) The Παιδαγωγός, written after the last-named, a practical instruction dealing chiefly with the conduct of social and personal life. The 'Tutor' is Christ Himself, the great Instructor of all mankind. (3) The Στρωματεῖς (title in full κατὰ τὴν ἀληθῆ φιλοσοφίαν γνωστικῶν ὑπομνημάτων στρωματεῖς, *Strom.* i. 29), *Miscellanies*, a much longer treatise, in seven, or eight (Photius, Jerome) books. (The fragment of a logical treatise called Book viii. does not seem to belong to the Στρωματεῖς,* and the end of Book vii. promises another treatise rather than another Book: ἀπ' ἄλλης ἀρχῆς ποιησόμεθα τὸν λόγον). The *Miscellanies*, which are issued 'in studied disorder,' that the mysteries of knowledge may not be made too plain to readers who are unfit for them, expound the principles of a reasonable and philosophic faith. The treatise was probably designed to lead up to another, which Clement intended to be called Διδάσκαλος. (This intention is implied in *Pæd.* ii. 76, iii. 97, and other places). This would have completed the series begun in the Προτρεπτικός and continued in the Παιδαγωγός, initiating the reader into the higher γνῶσις. But Clement probably found that he could not publish such a work without violating his principle of reserve in communicating religious truths. Some have identified the Στρωματεῖς with the promised Διδάσκαλος; but de Faye and Mayor have shown that several promises are unfulfilled in the Στρωματεῖς, and that the work has no appearance of finality. It was probably a sort of *hors d'œuvre*, forming no part of the original scheme. (4) Ὑποτυπώσεις or *Outlines*, in eight books. These were notes and comments on the Old and New Testaments, including, says Eusebius, contested books such as Jude, Barnabas, Apocalypse of Peter, but not the whole of the Old Testament. Photius passes some severe strictures on this work, in which Clement, he says, teaches that 'matter is timeless,' that the Son is a creature, that there were many worlds before Adam, that there are two Λόγοι, of whom only the lower, a Power or Effluence of the Divine, was incarnate; together with metempsychosis and docetism. (5) Τίς ὁ σωζόμενος πλούσιος, still extant; an interesting sermon, ending with the well-known story of St. John and the robber. (6) Several other treatises are mentioned by Eusebius and Jerome, and (as subjects on which he intended to write) by Clement himself.

The view adopted above as to the character of the *Miscellanies* and the non-fulfilment of the design for a *Didascalus* is of great importance for the understanding of Clement's theology. In *Strom.* iv. 1 he announces his intention, after dealing with other subjects, of introducing his readers to the 'true gnostic science of nature,' initiating them first into the lesser and then into the greater mysteries. But from such initiation he carefully refrains in the *Miscellanies*, for, as he says, 'to put everything into a book is as bad as to put a sword into a child's hand.' We have, then, to conclude that Clement has suppressed what he considered the highest part of his teaching. It is safest, he says, to learn and teach such things orally. What was this esoteric teaching? It is safe to guess that it was mainly connected with Biblical exegesis. Clement believed in an authoritative tradition of interpretation, handed down from Christ Himself through Peter, and James, and John, and Paul. It probably allegorized narratives which the *simpliciores* treasured as bare facts. Besides this, the 'Gnostic' doubtless allowed himself to develop a mystical philosophy of religion, which could not be fully imparted or even made intelligible to the public.

The conception of the earthly life of Christ as a grand symbolic drama or Divine mystery-play for the enlightenment of humanity, was quite in accordance with Alexandrian philosophy. And though no objection was taken to the supernatural element, as such, in either the OT or the NT, the esoteric teaching undoubtedly was that certain details in the former which were morally objectionable had only a symbolical truth. With regard to the philosophy of religion in its wider aspects,

* The critical problems raised by this fragment, the *Eclogæ*, and the *Excerpta ex Theodoto*, have been discussed with different results by Zahn, Ruben, von Arnim, and de Faye.

it is seldom necessary to read between the lines in Clement. He was not a profound thinker, but a well-read and able man, who accepted in an intelligent manner the syncretistic philosophy popular in learned circles at Alexandria. He has been called cloudy and rhetorical, and has been accused of taking his quotations from anthologies of elegant extracts. But the obscurity is rather of arrangement than of thought, and the rhetoric is not often obtrusive. In Clement an ardent and impetuous imagination is joined to a serene soul and a clear intelligence. In fact it is worth observing, in view of the often repeated statement that rhetoric, 'the evil genius of Greece,' infected Greek Christianity, that Minucius and Tertullian are much more 'rhetorical' than Justin or Clement.

Clement, as a Christian philosopher, is aware that he has to encounter prejudice and mistrust. Gnosticism, at this time, was much more dreaded in the Church than fifty years earlier, when it was really a formidable intellectual force. At the end of the 2nd cent. the Christians were better educated, and the growth of rationalism and speculation in the Church alarmed many. Tertullian argues that, since 'hæreses a philosophia subornantur' (*de Præscript.* 7), philosophy should be banished from the Church; and Clement is well aware that the majority agree with him. 'Philosophy,' he protests, 'is not a goblin who wants to run away with us, as the vulgar think' (*Strom.* vi. 10). It is not the privilege of the few; 'with us, philosophers are those who love Wisdom, the Author and Teacher of all things' (*Strom.* vi. 7). But he feels that the obscurantists, with their cry of *μόνη καὶ ψιλὴ πίστις* (*Strom.* i. 43), are formidable: he must even vindicate his right to publish a book at all! Must literature be left only to pagans and atheists?, he asks. Must teaching be only by word of mouth? His doctrine is not his own, but handed down from the Apostles; and, lastly, people are not obliged to read him. Such a defence throws much light on the Christian distrust of culture even at Alexandria.

To turn to Clement's theology. God is a Being (*οὐσία*), but above space and time, 'beyond even the One and the Monad,' and strictly nameless, though we are obliged to give Him names. In a doubtful fragment (on which see Bigg, *Bampton Lectures* [1886], p. 64) he has been thought to deny to God consciousness of the external world; but probably Clement only means that God knows reality *not* as external to Himself. He certainly does not teach that the Father has no consciousness except through the Son. God takes pleasure in our salvation, and in that only (*Strom.* vii. 3; *Protrept.* 94, 95, 116): His nature is profoundly *moral*: He is good because He *wills* to do good, not like fire, which radiates heat automatically (*Strom.* vii. 42, and esp. *Strom.* vi. 104, *ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ θεὸς οὐχ ᾗ φύσει ἀγαθός ἐστι, ταύτῃ μένει μακάριος καὶ ἄφθαρτος . . . ποιῶν δὲ ἰδίως ἀγαθά, θεὸς ὄντως καὶ πατὴρ ἀγαθὸς ὤν*). Such passages must be considered as well as those in which he tries to outdo Plato in emphasizing the transcendence of God.

Nevertheless he insists that no man cometh to the Father except through Christ, the Logos. He rejects the Stoic pretension to 'resemble God' (cf. however, *Strom.* vi. 113, quoted below), and quotes very pertinently the words of Christ Himself, 'It is enough for the disciple to be as his master.' His Logos-doctrine, which is the basis of his Christology, is less metaphysical and more religious than that of Philo. Although the direct dependence of Clement on Philo, as regards his conception of the Logos no less than in his principles of allegorism, has been conclusively established by Siegfried, it is plain that, while Philo is mainly preoccupied with the desire to explain the formation and government of the universe, Clement is much more interested in religious psychology. In the 150 years which elapsed between the two writers, the centre of gravity in 'philosophy' had changed from metaphysics and cosmology to religion and ethics (*ὅσα εἴρηται . . . δικαιοσύνην μετὰ εὐσεβοῦς ἐπιστήμης ἐκδιδάσκοντα, τοῦτο . . . φιλοσοφίαν λέγω*, he says). The immanent Logos of the Stoics was now more thought of than the Platonic 'Idea of Ideas.' Clement's attempt to combine the two conceptions may be the excuse for Photius' charge that he taught 'two Logoi.' Or perhaps Clement was perplexed by problems about the Father's consciousness while the Son was incarnate. But the 'two Logoi' do not appear in his extant treatises. The Logos in Clement is the instrument in creation (He is often called 'creator'); He introduces harmony into the universe, of which He is the 'pilot.' He created man in His own image. He is spoken of as 'the Will of God,' 'a power, or energy, of God,' and in particular as 'Saviour,' a term to which, we think, there is no parallel in Philo. He was a 'lover of mankind' from the beginning (*Protr.* 6); it was He who revealed Himself in the OT theophanies. Since the Incarnation, He has been the 'Saviour,' 'Tutor,' and 'Teacher' of Christians, of those, that is, who have been 'initiated' by the laver of illumination (*Pæd.* i. 26) into the true mysteries. In his soteriology, baptism is decidedly more prominent than redemption by the blood of Christ. Very characteristic is the presentment of salvation as an *educational* process, by the side of the other conception—equally characteristic of the period—of salvation as the acquisition of immortality.

Of the Third Person of the Trinity, Clement says but little. The Alexandrians, in point of fact, hardly needed a Third Person; for the functions of the World-Soul, the Third Person of the Platonic Trinity and the God of the Stoics, were discharged by the Logos in addition to those of the Platonic *Νοῦς*; and, were it not so, there was no close resemblance between the Holy Ghost of Christianity and the Neo-Platonic Psyche. Clement makes the orthodox statements about the Person of the Holy Ghost, and, for the rest, puts the subject aside as a *θαῦμα μυστικόν*.

Clement's psychology is Platonic. There are three parts of the soul—the irrational soul, the rational soul, and the *σπέρμα πνευματικόν*. The third is evidently identical with the *κέντρον ψυχῆς* of Plotinus, and the *synteresis* of mediæval mysticism. But Clement ascribes so much Divine inspiration to the rational soul that the tripartite classification seems hardly necessary. Origen discards it. Clement guards himself against the common tendency to associate evil with matter. The body is not naturally evil, he says, nor is the soul naturally good. Rather the soul is that which wills, the body that which acts. On pre-existence there is no definite statement. It was regarded as an open question in the Church, and probably Clement, like Origen, was inclined to believe it, though without accepting the Platonic doctrine of metempsychosis. He admits no hereditary guilt. God punishes only voluntary sins; the sins forgiven in Baptism are actual transgressions; infant Baptism is not mentioned (Bigg, p. 81).

The most distinctive feature of Clement's ethics is his doctrine of the Two Lives. This classification was common to most of the religious and philosophical teaching of the time, and was exaggerated into an absolute difference by the Gnostics. Clement is as much opposed to Gnosticism as he is anxious to utilize and harmonize Platonic and Stoic doctrine. Faith and knowledge, the principles of the lower and higher life respectively,

are necessary to each other, and closely related. Faith is defined as 'a voluntary anticipation (*πρόληψις*) of things unseen,' 'an uniting assent to an unseen object,' 'the foundation of rational choice.' 'Voluntarily to follow what is useful is the first condition of understanding it.' Unless knowledge is based on faith, it remains merely intellectual assent, and is neither stable nor effective. The motive powers of faith are hope and filial awe. 'God is just, because He is merciful.' Faith, however, must go hand in hand with inquiry (*ζήτησις*): it is the nature of living faith to develop into knowledge (*γνῶσις*). The perfect Christian, therefore, is the 'Gnostic,' a word which Clement will not abandon to the sectarians who at last monopolized it. The portrait of the Gnostic is given in *Strom.* vii. It is of supreme importance for the understanding of Clement as a teacher, because it anticipates the final part of his scheme, which was never executed. He does not expound his Gnosticism, but he does show us its fruits. The Gnostic is the man whose character has been formed by the complete religious philosophy for which the earlier books of the *Stromateis* are a preparation only.

The aim of the Gnostic is to 'become like to God.' Clement is not afraid, speaking as a Greek, to say that he *μελετᾷ εἶναι θεός* (*Strom.* vi. 113). The Divine attribute of which he is thinking in such expressions is the higher knowledge, that which has for its object the 'intelligible world.' In one place (*Strom.* ii. 47) he says in more Christian language that the highest contemplation is knowledge of God, which is inseparable from likeness to Him. In Stoical form he says (*Strom.* iv. 39) that Gnosis is the purification of the ruling faculty of the soul; and everywhere the necessity of moral even more than intellectual training is insisted on. In the seventh book the 'canons' of the Gnostic character are said to be 'gentleness, kindness, and noble devoutness,' and the 'achievements of the Gnostic faculty' are 'to know what is right, to do what is right, and to help others to do it.' 'He is the true athlete, who in the great stadium, this beautiful world, is crowned for the great victory over all his passions.' 'He is persuaded that for souls that have chosen virtue, progress is always towards something better, till they are brought to the Great High Priest, in the vestibule of the Father.' Especial prominence is given to the two words *ἀπάθεια* and *ἀγάπη*, the former of which is the perfected work of temperance, when the passions are no longer even felt: *οὕτως ζῆσαι ὡς ἄσαρκος* (*Strom.* vii. 79; and still stronger *Strom.* vi. 75): and the latter is the climax of the whole Christian life, the end which, like the beginning, faith, is not matter of teaching (*τὰ ἄκρα οὐ διδάσκεται*). The statement that Clement exalts the intellect above the affections is untrue. The words *κυριωτάτη πάσης ἐπιστήμης ἀγάπη* (*Strom.* vii. 68) are typical. The 'intellectual love of God' affords perfect satisfaction to all our faculties, and unifies the entire personality. 'Conduct follows knowledge as surely as the shadow the body.' The will is not neglected. Faith in the first instance is an affair of the will, and is the necessary foundation of knowledge, the superstructure (*Strom.* ii. 11, v. 2, vii. 55): 'but both are Christ, the foundation and the superstructure too.' Faith exists in a higher and a lower form—*πίστις ἐπιστημονική* and *π. δοξαστική* (*Strom.* ii. 48).

As a thinker, Clement is most important as the author of a syncretistic philosophy of religion, fusing Platonism and Stoicism in a Christian mould. In Stoicism he found a natural religion, rationalism, moralism, and a predominant interest in psychology and apologetics, in Platonism a cosmology, doctrines of revelation, redemption and salvation, and contemplation as the highest state. 'In Clement,' says Hort, 'Christian theology in some important respects reaches its highest point. . . . There was no one whose vision of what the faith of Jesus Christ was intended to do for mankind was so full or so true' (*Ante-Nicene Fathers*, p. 93).

LITERATURE.—The best edition of the text of Clement is in Stählin, *Gr. christl. Schriftsteller der drei ersten Jahrhunderte* (1905). Important for the study of Clement are Zahn, *Forschungen zur Geschichte des Neutestamentlichen Kanons*, etc., vol. iii. (1884); Bigg, *Christian Platonists of Alexandria* (1886); P. M. Barnard, *Quis Dives Salvetur* (1897); de Faye, *Clément d'Alexandrie* (1898); Capitaine, *Die Moral des Clemens von Alexandria* (1903); Hort and J. B. Mayor, *Clem. of Alex. Miscellanies*, Book vii. Cf. also an article by the present writer in *Church Quarterly Rev.* for July 1904.

(*c*) Origen (Origenes Adamantius—the latter a real name) is said by Epiphanius to have been 'an Egyptian by race,' which probably does not mean a Copt. Porphyry calls him 'a Greek,' and his father, the martyr Leonides, has a Greek name. He was born about 185, was carefully brought up as a Christian, became a pupil of Pantænus and Clement, and already in his 18th year occupied informally the position of Head of the Catechetical School, the older teachers having been scattered by the persecution under Severus. For many years he was occupied in laborious study and teaching, mainly on the Bible; but he attended the lectures of Ammonius Saccas, and was himself consulted by many non-Christians. In 215 he was driven from Egypt by mob-violence, and taught for some time at Cæsarea, even preaching in the churches, though still a layman, till Demetrius recalled him to Alexandria. On his return he devoted himself mainly to writing Biblical commentaries, leaving to his coadjutor Heraclas most of the catechetical teaching. Meanwhile his relations with Demetrius became strained, and he availed himself of invitations to visit Palestine, Greece, and Asia Minor (about 227). In Palestine he received orders from the bishops there, without the consent of Demetrius. That prelate resented his action as contumacious, and Origen left Alexandria for the last time in 231. The Egyptian Synod condemned him, and even declared his priesthood invalid; but the sentence was disregarded in Palestine, where Origen laboured (at Cæsarea) for the last twenty years of his life. He was tortured and imprisoned in the Decian persecution (250), and, broken in health, died at Tyre in 253.

A complete list of Origen's works would occupy too much space here. The following are the probable dates of the most important treatises:

220–228. Commencement of *Hexapla*. Com. on Canticles.
228–231. Commentaries on St. John, Genesis, etc.; *Miscellanies*; *de Principiis*.
232–238. Commentaries continued; *Exhortation to Martyrdom*.
238–240. Commentaries on Ezekiel.
240. *Letter to Julius Africanus*; Commentaries on Canticles (10 books).
241–248. Homilies on OT; New Testament Commentaries; *Hexapla* finished.
249. The eight books *contra Celsum*.

Of these the most valuable for an understanding of Origen's theology and philosophy are the *de Principiis*, the *Commentary on St. John*, and the *contra Celsum*; to which may be added the beautiful treatise *On Prayer* (date uncertain; before 231), and the collection of extracts from his writings called *Philocalia*, made by Gregory of Nazianzus and Basil.

Principles of exegesis.—Allegorism in Origen is an instrument of apologetics, and at the same time a device to gain freedom of thought. He insists that no word or letter of Scripture can lack a profound meaning, and that every historical text has a body, soul, and spirit, *i.e.* a literal, moral, and spiritual sense. History is compared to a ladder, of which the literal facts are the lowest rungs (in *Joh.* i. 20).

This metaphor would bind us to do justice to the literal meaning first. But Origen, like Philo, at times expresses almost contempt for the literal narrative. 'What man of sense,' he asks, 'will suppose that the first and second and third day, and the evening and morning, existed without a sun and moon and stars? Or that God walked in a garden in the evening, and that Adam hid himself under a tree? Or that the devil took Jesus into a high mountain, whence He could see the kingdoms of the Persians and Scythians and Indians?' (*de Princ.* i. 16). All such passages are valuable only for their higher meanings. 'There are some passages,' he says, 'which are not literally true, but absurd and impossible' (*de Princ.* iv. 18). So 'some of the laws of Moses are absurd and others impossible.' Moses orders the sacrifice of an animal (the τραγέλαφος) which does not exist in nature. 'I should blush to admit that God has given such commands, which are inferior to many human enactments.' 'Scripture contains an unhistorical element, inwoven with the history,' in order that the worthlessness of the latter may drive us to seek the spiritual meaning.

We may wonder that Origen did not make more use of the theory of a progressive and gradual revelation, which he asserts in several places. But his main object was to save the OT (which was attacked and ridiculed by the Gnostics) for the Church, while at the same time repudiating the obligation to obey the Law, which was still pressed on the Christians by the Jews. The allegoric method served both ends. It must also be remembered that the 'homily,' as established by custom at Alexandria, necessitated a very plastic treatment of the text. The preacher or lecturer was expected to go straight through some book of the OT, extracting something edifying from each chapter. What could he say about Joshua but that the Canaanite kings were 'non tam reges quam vitiorum nomina'? The tone of these interpretations is often half-ironical, though the moral lesson is pressed home with all seriousness. His treatment of NT difficulties shows even greater boldness, and is quite startling. The discrepancies between the four Evangelists are, he thinks, fatal to their credit unless we look for their truth in the 'spiritual sense.' There is (so Jerome makes him say) an Eternal Gospel, of which the actual Gospel is only the shadow. We must separate the αἰσθητὸν εὐαγγέλιον from the νοητὸν καὶ πνευματικόν. Thus he interprets the Fourth Gospel as a symbolic treatise, much as Loisy and others do now. But in his eyes all this exegesis was not the work of human ingenuity, but the gift of the Holy Spirit. Much of it was traditional: Clement seems always to copy, not to invent, his allegorisms. Origen, without making any boastful claim, believes himself to be illuminated.

Doctrine of God.—As 'Spirit' and 'Light,' 'God is a simple intellectual nature, in whom is no greater nor less, higher nor lower, the Monad, Unit, Mind, and Fountain of all Mind' (*de Princ.* 1). As against the Christian Stoics, he asserts that God is incorporeal, and he is more careful than Clement to avoid Stoical phrases savouring of materialistic pantheism. God is spaceless and timeless, 'everywhere and nowhere,' 'natura simplex et tota mens.' Being unchangeable, He cannot feel anger, hatred, or repentance. Punishment is not His work, but the necessary consequence of sin. And yet He is long-suffering, merciful, and pitiful: He has 'the passion of love' (*in Ezech. Hom.* vi. 6, Bigg, p. 158). God is not infinite, but self-limiting (*in Matt.* xiii. 569); His almightiness is limited by His goodness and wisdom (*c. Cels.* iii. 493). Origen has not solved the problem of reconciling these moral attributes with the Platonic transcendence; for a fine but vague passage on the subject see *in Num. Hom.* xxiii. 2. He has less confidence than Clement in the *via negativa* as a path to reality; the most intimate knowledge of God is gained not by abstraction, but by direct revelation; grace is implanted in the soul μετά τινος ἐνθουσιασμοῦ. On this side he is more of a mystic than Clement. Moreover, by emphasizing the attribute of Goodness (ἀγαθότης) rather than that of self-existent Being, he gives the idea of God a richer and more ethical content.

But the doctrine of God in Origen involves at every point the problem of the Trinity. The Son or Logos is the centre of his theology. He is co-eternal and co-equal with the Father. 'There never can have been a time when He was not. For when was the Divine Light destitute of its effulgence? . . . Let him who dares to say there was a time when the Son was not, consider that this is the same as to say there was a time when Wisdom, the Word, and life were not' (*de Princ.* iv. 28). But we must distinguish between those attributes (ἐπίνοιαι) which belong to the Son essentially, and those which are assumed for the purpose of redemption. To the former class belong Wisdom, Word, Life, Truth; to the latter, Firstborn from the dead, Propitiation, Light, Shepherd. The former class are νοητά, the latter αἰσθητά. 'Happy are they who need the Son of God no longer as Physician, Shepherd, Redemption, but as Wisdom, Word, Justice, and the other perfect attributes' (*in Joh.* i. 22). He is willing to identify the Logos with the Platonic κόσμος νοητός (*in Joh.* xix. 5; *c. Cels.* vi. 63), only protesting against subjective idealism (*de Princ.* ii. 3, *mundum in sola phantasia et cogitationum lubrico consistentem*). The Son is therefore essentially eternal and unchanging, not merely the λόγος προφορικός of God; He '*was* (not 'became') with God,' as St. John says. He is absolute Truth, Righteousness, and Wisdom; but the text, 'none is good save one, that is God,' forbids us to call Him the absolute Good, though 'in regard to us He is the absolute Good.' Prayer may be addressed to the Son or to the Spirit, but the highest prayer is that which is addressed to the Father in Christ's name.

The charge of subordinationism in Origen's Christology cannot be maintained. It is unlikely that he used the word ὁμοούσιος, in the Nicene sense, of the Son, because for a Platonist it is hardly correct to speak of the οὐσία of God, who is ὑπερούσιος; but words like οὐ κατὰ μετουσίαν ἀλλὰ κατ' οὐσίαν ἐστὶ θεός (*Sel. in Psalm.* 135) should have been enough to establish his orthodoxy on this side. The doctrine of ἐπίνοιαι (see above), varying with the grade of spirituality attained by the believer, explains some apparent inconsistencies of expression, and his reverence for Scripture (*e.g.* 'My Father is greater than I') explains others. The subordination which he teaches is one of person and office, not of essence. 'The Son is less than the Father, as reaching only to rational beings; while the Father, holding all things together, reaches to everything. The Holy Spirit is less [than the Son], as extending to the saints only' (*de Princ.* i. 3). In the Incarnation the Son united Himself with a soul which had remained absolutely pure in its pre-existent state (*de Princ.* ii. 6). Like other souls, it was eternally united to the Word. It was free, like other souls, but so perfectly and inseparably did it cleave to the Word from the beginning, that the union of the two is like a molten mass of metal always radiating a white heat. By this union it was saved from all possibility of sin. His body was also pure and perfect. It was real flesh and blood, but of transparent beauty to those whose spiritual sight was purged. He rose from the dead, not in this flesh, but with that 'spiritual body' of which St. Paul speaks. 'Origen's view of the God-Man—a term which he first employed—differs from the ordinary view, generally speaking, only in so far as it is conditioned by his opinions of the pre-existence of the Soul and of the nature of the resurrection body' (Bigg, p. 189).

Origen speaks with much hesitation about the nature and office of the Holy Spirit. As a Person of the Trinity, He is co-eternal and co-equal with the Father and Son. 'The Spirit of the Father and

the Spirit of the Son is one and the same' (*in Rom.* vi. 13). He understood St. Paul well enough to observe that no distinction is made by him between the action of the Spirit and of the Son (*de Princ.* i. 3). But in one remarkable passage (*in Joh.* ii. 6) he raises the question whether the Spirit came into being through the Word (διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐγένετο), or whether He has no separate essence (ἑτέραν οὐσίαν) from the Father and the Son. These speculations are so inconsistent with the strong Trinitarian doctrine elsewhere maintained, that they cause surprise. They show how fluid dogma still was when Origen wrote. But the influence of his teaching (in spite of the charges brought against him) certainly operated *against* subordinationism. With some hesitation he pointed to the true view that the sources of Essence, of Revelation, and of Inspiration must be completely equal—must be God in the same degree. The opposite view removes the supreme God from life and experience, and makes Him finally unknowable. Other significant *dicta* about the Trinity are that 'the Father begets, the Son comprehends, the Holy Ghost penetrates all'; and that 'things derive their essence from the Father, reason from the Son, and holiness from the Holy Ghost' (*in Rom.* vii. 13; *de Princ.* i. 3).

Cosmology and Psychology.—The world began in unity, and will end in unity. In this sense the end will be 'like the beginning,' but not identical with it, inasmuch as the beginning is the desire for a perfection which is only implicitly contained in the scheme, as designed by perfect Wisdom. God created the world 'out of nothing': matter, the lowest of the creatures, was created by Him immediately after the 'fall of the souls,' to prevent the world from being dissolved' (*de Princ.* ii. 1). God is neither the whole nor a part of the whole: the former conception contradicts His simplicity, the latter His sovereignty. His Spirit is no all-pervading subtle element, like the Stoic πνεῦμα. The world is distinct from God; it is His creation. It is eternal in the sense that it had no beginning in time; the entire scheme that we know is only a brief phase in an innumerable series of worlds. The original creation, Origen teaches, was of innocent spirits, who shared 'accidentally' or precariously the perfection which God possesses 'essentially.' Their fall from perfection was voluntary. Some (the angels and the stars, to which Origen attributes souls) remained in their first estate; others (sinful men and evil spirits) fell in various degrees, and can be restored only through the discipline of suffering. This world is constructed as the appropriate scene of their training, affording scope for the treatment proper to every degree of guilt. The fall of the souls was thus antenatal, but Origen teaches no metempsychosis. The story of the Fall in Genesis he is disposed to treat as mere allegory (*c. Cels.* iv. 40). The most succinct statement of his doctrine is in *de Princ.* ii. 8, ending νοῦς πως οὖν γέγονε ψυχή, καὶ ψυχὴ κατορθωθεῖσα γίνεται νοῦς, words which throw light on his psychology. 'Soul' is 'mind' in a fallen state; it is an adventitious principle, intermediate between 'flesh' and 'mind' or 'spirit.' In reality his psychology is dichotomic, though out of respect to St. Paul he preserves in words the distinction between 'soul' and 'spirit' (see esp. *in Joh.* xxxii. 2; *in Levit. Hom.* ii. 2).

The discussion as to whether Origen teaches the immateriality of the soul has been conducted on wrong lines. The soul for Origen is certainly immaterial, but it implies a body. 'The spirit,' he says, 'is with the soul as a master and director, associated with it to remind it of the good, and to accuse and punish it for its faults. If the soul is disobedient and obstinate in revolt, it will be divided from the spirit after it leaves the body' (*in Rom.* ii. 9). The soul which is exalted by following the spirit, and not only following but being transformed into spirit, must put off its nature as soul, and become spiritual (*de Orat.* 10). Here the 'spirit' resembles the impersonal νοῦς of Neo-Platonism; but the question whether it belongs or does not belong to our *ego* can be answered neither for Origen nor for any other mystical thinker. It is an essential part of his teaching that the existence of God and other fundamental truths of religion are 'sown in the soul' as matters of immediate apprehension (αἰσθησις). 'So long as we keep them, the Logos never leaves us' (*in Joh.* xix. 3). This θεία αἴσθησις is made to cover such sensuous experiences (of sight, hearing, smell) as the later Catholicism accepts under the name of mystical phenomena (*c. Cels.* i. 48); but such communications, though from a Divine source, are only externalized by our minds; 'God never speaks to us from outside' (*in Psalm.* xxvii. 1). From these 'seeds' spring the flowers and fruits of Divine knowledge, Christ revealing Himself under various aspects as the soul is able to receive Him. Corresponding to this psychological dispensation is the historical economy which, after the partial theophanies of OT, culminated in the Incarnation. The two are parallel aspects of the same Divine plan; it is meaningless to ask whether the historical Incarnation is the 'cause' of the soul's restoration. At the same time it must be admitted that Origen has a less firm grasp of the ideas of progress and development than Clement. He gives too much importance to the 'fall of Adam,' and in consequence his philosophy of history is both gloomier and less scientific than Clement's. His view of secular culture is also much less sympathetic.

Eschatology.—Clement had represented men in the future life as placed in different grades according to their moral deserts. The wicked will be subjected to disciplinary punishments till they are forced to own their guilt. Origen developed further the notion that all punishment must be disciplinary, since 'God can hate nothing,' and it is no part of His nature to render evil for evil. Moreover, immortal spirits (νοεραὶ φύσεις) cannot be consigned to perdition.

Here it is plain that Origen encountered great difficulties in reconciling his philosophy with the traditional Church teaching on the resurrection, last judgment, heaven, and hell. It is clear, he says, that the Gospels must not be understood literally. 'The stars' could not 'fall from heaven' upon the earth, for they are much larger than the earth. Our material bodies, which are dispersed among other organisms, cannot be reconstituted in the resurrection. Can we suppose that the damned will literally 'gnash their teeth'? No, he says; it is the 'spark,' or vital principle, which survives, and will make a new abode for itself, the resurrection body. Even when the soul becomes pure spirit, it will need a kind of body, for God alone is incorporeal spirit. Purgation must continue after death; 'even Paul or Peter must come into that fire.' But will any remain in torment for ever? Origen hopes and thinks not, but will not dogmatize; he remembers the guest who was cast into outer darkness, with no promise of pardon. There are passages in Origen which imply at least a *pœna damni* never to be made good; but he would himself have disclaimed any certitude on the subject. Only he insists that promises like 'love never faileth,' 'God shall be all in all,' must somehow be fulfilled. Even the devil *might* find salvation, as a spirit made in the image of God, though, as devil, he would be destroyed (*in Rom.* v. 8). The final consummation is complete likeness to God: 'God shall be all in all'; *i.e.* He will be all in each individual (*de Princ.* v. 6). Then there will be no more diversity, when all shall have reached the highest degree of perfection.

Esoteric Christianity.—Origen believes that the Logos enlightens all men according to their capacities. Current Christianity is the best that the average man can assimilate. It includes mythical stories, which exist both in OT and NT; it offers rewards and punishments as inducements to virtue, and communicates truths in veiled forms and images. But it is not a matter of indifference what symbols are presented to the 'common man'; it is the religion of Christ alone which must be accepted by

all, though under different aspects. The Gnostic learns that the objects of religious knowledge have only a supramundane history: the 'eternal' or 'spiritual' Gospel 'places clearly before men's minds all things concerning the Son of God, both the mysteries shown by His words, and the things of which His acts were the riddles' (*in Joh.* i. 9).

Such passages have been harshly interpreted as implying that the Gnostic has no further need of the historic Christ; but this is true only in the same sense in which it might be said of St. Paul—in other words, the statement is quite misleading. The innate knowledge of God, which he asserts, is the work of the Logos-Christ, who first fully disclosed Himself in the historic Incarnation. On the actual effect of the death of Christ, as a transaction, Origen suggests various views, already current, in a tentative manner: among others, the idea of a ransom paid to the devil, which was popular at this time. He certainly did not regard the historic work of Christ as a mere appearance or exhibition, though, for the Gnostic, Christ *in* us is far more important than Christ *for* us.

Influence of Origen.—The double achievement of Origen (carrying on what Clement began) was to destroy Gnosticism, and to give philosophy a recognized place in the creeds of the Church. The second was the price which the conservatives had to pay for the first. Henceforth the Church possessed a theology and a philosophy of religion which were far more attractive to the educated mind than the barbaric Platonism of the Gnostics. It was, of course, neither possible nor desirable to teach the philosophy to the masses, for whose benefit the Catholic system, with its apparatus of cultus, miracle, and sensuous symbolism, was developed side by side with the progress of scientific theology. In their relation to tradition, the Alexandrians mark a stage in a conflict which ended in a compromise. The great Gnostics of the 2nd cent. had been unable to maintain their footing in the Church. Clement succeeded in doing so, though not without suspicion; Origen, after much hesitation, was condemned. The Cappadocians endeavoured to reconcile faith and knowledge by mutual concessions, a process which was completed, after a fashion, by Cyril of Alexandria and by the theologians of the 6th century (Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, iii. 5).

The first conflict in which Origen's theology was deeply involved was against Sabellianism. Dionysius, bishop of Alexandria, in attacking the Monarchians fell under the charge of Tritheism, the Roman see pronouncing against him, and laying down a *via media* between the Alexandrian and the Sabellian doctrines. This condemnation had no effect at Alexandria, where the school of Origen flourished almost unchallenged till the end of the 3rd century. Modifications, however, were introduced, involving a doctrine of subordination in the Trinity of the Neo-Platonic type, and upholding continence (ἐγκράτεια) as the great original contribution of Christianity to ethics. Gregory Thaumaturgus (who is said to have called the Son a κτίσμα) taught the Trinitarian doctrine of Origen in a form nearer to Monarchianism than to Tritheism.

The first serious attack on Origen was that of Methodius, who, however, in spite of his bitterness, seems only to advocate a compromise between his teaching and the rule of faith. In the controversies that followed in the 4th cent., which need not be described in detail, we mark a gradual hardening and crystallizing of theological thought under the chilling breath of authority. Origen's teaching was disintegrated, selections being made from it without regard to consistency, and he himself was at last condemned as a heretic. After Athanasius the Logos-doctrine began to decay in importance, as the notion of an economic and relative Trinity gave place to that of an absolute Trinity. The identification of the Logos-Christ with the spirit of the cosmic process fell more and more out of sight. This change may also be described as part of a transition from Platonism to Aristotelianism in the Church. The school of Antioch led a revolt against the Alexandrian exegesis of Holy Scripture, and founded a more critical method, in which the literal sense was always at least considered, and the Messianic allusions in OT very much curtailed. Origen's idea of pre-existence had still many supporters in the 4th cent., but was more and more discredited, till it was finally condemned at Constantinople in 533. The rival theories—that the soul is begotten with the body, and that God creates souls and plants them in the embryos—were left to contend with each other. The doctrine of the Fall of Man, based on Genesis, resumed its importance when the theory of an extramundane Fall was excluded. The question whether Christ would have become incarnate if Adam had not sinned is never, we think, discussed at length except by those who answer it in the negative; but the idea of an Incarnation as an essential part of the Divine plan is certainly in accordance with Alexandrianism, and has been revived by modern thinkers (*e.g.* Westcott), who are in general sympathy with Clement and Origen. It was part of the teaching of Pelagius, and may have been discredited on that account.

One of the most important of Origen's contributions to theology was his teaching on the death of Christ, which combined rather than reconciled the notions of expiatory sacrifice—of a propitiatory death of God vanquishing the death decreed by Him—and of the revelation of a redemption really effected in the eternal world. Both ideas were familiar to the Greek mysteries. The idea of *substitution* could not be emphasized by an Alexandrian; the Logos-doctrine makes it meaningless, but after Cyril it became prominent.

In the long Arian controversy the name of Origen played a curious part. The Adoptianist theory of a Jesus who gradually becomes God was totally at variance with Origen's doctrine; but Arius found in the Neo-Platonic cosmology a support for his theory of a *mediating* Logos, between the inaccessible Father and the world. But in denying to the Logos any *essential* unity with the Father he abandoned decisively the Alexandrian Christology. 'With Arius, Christ belongs in every sense to the world of created things' (Harnack); with Athanasius He belongs in every sense to God, the cosmical aspect being virtually shelved. Athanasius was not a scientific theologian, and the restatement of Alexandrian theology, necessitated by his labours, fell to the Cappadocians, of whom Gregory of Nyssa is most in sympathy with Origen. This writer avoids some of the most obnoxious speculations of his master, but on the whole reproduces his teaching, which in this way has found and maintained a footing in the Catholic Church, for Gregory of Nyssa has never been condemned.

But the growing power of 'tradition' had already begun to kill religious philosophy; and the progressive degradation of Christianity into a religion of cultus affected Christian Platonism in precisely the same way in which Neo-Platonism suffered between Plotinus and Jamblichus. Dionysius the Areopagite is the representative of this application of Alexandrian allegorism to ritual and dogma. The first vogue of this extraordinary writer coincided with a reaction in favour of Origen. Among later developments of Christian Platonism, which owed some of their inspiration to the Alexandrian theology, it is necessary to mention only the philosophical mysticism of Eckhart and his successors, the 'Cambridge Platonism' of the 17th cent., and in our own day the theology of F. D. Maurice, Westcott, etc. Among philosophers, Leibnix has many points of resemblance to Origen.

LITERATURE.—Redepenning, *Origenes* (1841–1846); Denis, *De la Philosophie d'Origène* (1884); Westcott, art. 'Origenes' in *Dict. Christ. Biogr.*; Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte*; Bigg, *Christian Platonists of Alexandria* (1886); text: Lommatzsch (1831–1847).

Permanent value of the Alexandrian Theology.—Was the attempt of the Alexandrians to Christianize the current philosophy of their age legitimate? The question has been very diversely answered. Writers like Deissmann, Wernle, and Hatch, and the Ritschlian school generally, regard the 'Hellenizing' of Christian doctrine as an alien graft upon the enthusiastic revivalism of primitive Christianity, and deplore, with Harnack, the 'secularizing' and 'depotentiation' of the religion which they ascribe to the influence of Alexandria. On the other side, it has been pointed out that, unless we ignore St. Paul's Epistles, the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the Fourth Gospel, there is much of 'Hellenism' in the NT; and also that philosophy in the first two centuries had ceased to be 'secular' and had become religious. The later Stoics and Platonists were 'not far from the kingdom of God,' and were by no means inclined to undervalue strictness of conduct. Moreover, the fusion of Greek and Jewish thought was so inevitable that to deplore it is to take a pessimistic view of human development. Finally, revivalism is in its nature a brief phase; an intellectual system must follow it, or the whole effects of the movement must disappear. The Alexandrians satisfied the legitimate need of their age by providing 'a scientific doctrine of religion which, while not contradicting the faith, does not merely support or explain it in a few places, but raises it to another and higher intellectual sphere, namely, out of the province of authority and obedience into that of clear knowledge and inward intellectual assent emanating from love to God' (Harnack, *History of Dogma*, Eng. trans., vol. ii., pp. 324 f.). This recognition, from a writer whose view of religion is strongly anti-intellectualist, is remarkable, and it does no more than justice to the great constructive effort of Clement and Origen, by which the best of Platonism and Stoicism was incorporated in Christianity. The permanent value of their syncretistic schemes will always be differently judged, while men continue to be 'born either Platonists or Aristotelians'; those who would oust metaphysics from theology can have but scanty sympathy with the Alexandrians. But if speculation on Divine truths is permissible or even necessary, no Christian theologians deserve a higher place than Clement and Origen, who made a serious and not unsuccessful attempt to combine in their creed the immanence and transcendence of God, universal law and human freedom, the universal and the particular in revelation, a lofty standard of practical ethics and world-forgetting contemplation. Hort's opinion of Clement's contribution to Christian theology has been quoted. Westcott says of Origen, 'We have not yet made good the positions which he marked out as belonging to the domain of Christian philosophy' (*Rel. Thought in the West*, 252).

W. R. INGE.

ALGONQUINS.

ALGONQUINS (Eastern).—1. Divisions.—The existing representatives of the Algonquin or Algic race may be separated linguistically into three divisions: the Blackfeet of the extreme western part of North America, whose idiom differs most from that of all the other Algonquin tribes; the Cree-Ojibwas of the middle west, whose language embraces a number of closely allied linguistic variations; and the so-called *Wabanaki* races of the north-eastern American coast, with whom the present article is especially concerned.

The term *Wabanaki* or *Oñbanaki* means both 'land of the dawn *or* east' and 'man *or* person from the east.' The name is at present applied to five distinct clans; viz., the Passamaquoddies, Penobscots, Canadian Abenakis or St. Francis Indians, Micmacs, and Delawares, all of whom are plainly descended from one common family which probably first established organized tribal relations along the Canadian and New England north-eastern coast. There is no reason to consider that the term 'Easterners = *Wabanakis*' has any meaning going farther back than this into the origin of these peoples, who, in all probability, came eastward at a comparatively early date from some unknown western *habitat*. Unless modern Americanists are to be driven to accept the impracticable theory that the eastern tribes crossed from Europe by way of some long since vanished land-bridge, the theory of a western origin for all the Indian coast-races is literally forced upon us. It will be seen, therefore, that the name '*Wabanakis* = Easterner' must have for us a geographical rather than a racial-historical signification.

(1) The Passamaquoddy Indians of Pleasant Point, Maine, now numbering about 500 in all, are identical with the Milicetes or Etchemins of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, Canada. The name *Passamaquoddy* is a purely local term, meaning 'spearers of pollock-fish' (*peskátum*). The correct form is *Pestumokádyik*, which has been corrupted by the whites into *Passamaquoddy*. These Indians are by far the most interesting remnant of the Wabanakis, as they still retain an unusually extensive oral literature, including love poems, legends, and historical tales of considerable value. It should be stated that the nucleus of the material relating to the primitive religious conceptions of the *Wabanakis* has been collected by the present writer from the Passamaquoddies primarily, and secondarily from the Micmacs.

(2) The Penobscot Indians of Maine now number not more than 350, most of whom live at the Indian village of Oldtown on Penobscot River near Bangor, Maine. These people still speak a characteristic Algonquin language, which is more closely allied to the idiom of the Abenakis of St. Francis, near Pierreville, Quebec, Canada, than it is to that of the geographically nearer neighbours of the Penobscots, the Passamaquoddies. In short, there can be no doubt that both the Penobscot and the Abenaki dialects are sister idioms which have sprung from a common original at a very recent date (cf. the present writer in *Kulóskap the Master*, p. 30).

(3) It is well known that the Abenakis of Canada are the direct descendants, of course with some admixture of French and other blood, of the majority of the savages who escaped from the great battle of the Kennebec in Maine, when the English commander Bradford overthrew their tribe on 3rd December, 1679. Many of the survivors at once fled to French Canada, where they established their *habitat* at their present village of St. Francis, near Pierreville, Quebec. Others again may have wandered into Canada at a slightly later date. There can be no doubt that the Indians now called Penobscots, from their residence near the river of that name, are the descendants of those of the early Abenakis who eventually submitted themselves to their English conquerors. The Canadian Abenaki is the only one of the Wabanaki clans which calls itself generically by the comprehensive name *Wabanaki* (*Kulóskap*, p. 31).

(4) The Micmacs are the easternmost and by far the most numerous to-day of the Wabanaki remnants. They are to be found in various places in the Canadian provinces of Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward's Island, and Newfoundland. Their grade of intelligence is much lower than that of the other members of the same family, but they still possess a vast store of folk-lore, legends, and poems, which is perishing for want of interested collectors. Their language differs so greatly from the dialects of the Passamaquoddies, Penobscots, and Abenakis, that the members of these clans always use French or English when communicating with their Micmac neighbours, while an intelligent Passamaquoddy can without difficulty be understood by a Penobscot or Abenaki, if the dialect is pronounced slowly.

(5) The story of the enforced westward wanderings of the ill-fated Delawares or *Lenâpe* has been told in detail by a distinguished authority, the late Dr. D. G. Brinton, in his comprehensive work, *The Lenâpe and their Legends*, pp. 122–126. At the present day, this famous tribe, around which a certain glamour of romance has been cast by the well known American author, Fenimore Cooper, in his *Leatherstocking Tales*, is scattered literally to the four winds of heaven. The three Delaware clans, the *Minsi*, the *Unami* and the *Unalachtigo*, who were once the dominant native race in Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and parts of New York State, are now represented by a few bands living in Indian Territory, in Western Canada, and in Ontario, Canada. The Delawares of Indian Territory, numbering about 500 persons, have quite lost their tribal identity, as they have been incorporated by the Cherokee nation, by whose chief and council they are governed. In Ontario there are only about 300 in all: 100 situated at Hagersville on the Reserve of the Six Nations (Iroquois), 100 at Munceytown, and the same number at Moraviantown, which is the seat of a Moravian mission.

2. **Religious conceptions.** — All the Wabanaki clans at present existing, save only the Delawares, are, with very few individual exceptions, of the Roman Catholic faith, a fact which is most fortunate for students of comparative religion, as the Catholic priests have made little if any effort to stifle the ancient ideas regarding witchcraft and spirits, which formed the chief elements of the earlier shamanistic faith. For this reason, nearly all our material, upon which this and other studies of Algonquin religious ideas are based, comes from the Catholic tribes, and not from the Delawares, who are all Protestants, belonging for the most part to the Church of England or to the Moravians.

The religious system of the primitive eastern Algonquins was, as already indicated, purely shamanistic, viz. a faith which, although admitting in a vague way the existence of a Supreme Being, laid its chief stress on the government of the world by an indefinite number of secondary spirits or deities, both benevolent and malevolent towards man. These beings, in whose hands lay the real power, had therefore to be propitiated by all sorts of magic rites and spells, which gave rise to a caste of conjurors and wizards, who were themselves endowed with preternatural powers. In the lore of the Wabanakis, the general principle of good may be said to be represented by the rather clown-like being known to the Passamaquoddies as *Kulóskap* and to the Penobscots as *Klúskâbe*, who, as Mr. Leland has aptly put it, personifies the principle of good nature rather than of goodness. *Kulóskap's* twin brother, *Malsum* the wolf, was the evil genius of the Indians, and may perhaps be called the *Ahriman* of the Wabanakis, although this is almost too dignified a term. It is highly interesting to notice that these twins were born from an unknown divine mother, the good *Kulóskap* in the natural manner, and the evil wolf through the woman's side, a method which he maliciously chose in order to kill his mother. In spite of his name, which means 'the liar,' the tendency of *Kulóskap* was essentially benevolent (*op. cit.* p. 34). He was called 'the deceiver,' not because he deceived or injured man, but because he was clever enough to lead his enemies astray—the highest possible virtue to the early American mind.

Kulóskap was at once the creator and the friend of man, and, strangely enough, he made the Indian (or man—the terms are synonymous) out of the ash tree. The present writer, in collaboration with the late Charles Godfrey Leland, has published a work entitled *Kulóskap the Master* (New York, 1902), which gives in translation a number of songs and narrative poems relating to this being's career and exploits. In this collection, which gives the history of *Kulóskap* almost in epic form, it will be noticed that the hero or demi-god is born from a divine mother, and that he is the creator of man and all the animals, a special poem being devoted to the origin of the rattlesnakes, who were primitively bad Indians. *Kulóskap* then named the animals, and discovered that man was the lord of them all. Traces of Christian influence are so evident even in the titles of these poems as to need little elaboration. It will be noticed, however, that although the general outline has undoubtedly been affected by the teachings of the missionaries, the details remain distinctly native. *Kulóskap* then became the kindly teacher of man, who came into the world an absolutely ignorant being. When man was first created, there was no light at all, and the god's first act was to bring about the 'daybreak and the dawn.' Here again we see Biblical influence. *Kulóskap* at once proceeded to instruct man in hunting, fishing, and trapping, and in the arts of building huts and canoes. He showed man the hidden virtues of 'plants, roots, and blossoms.' He taught him the use of weapons, and even the names of the stars, and the origin of the planets. He recounted to his apt pupils 'all the wonderful stories and the very old traditions,' thus becoming the Indian father of history. He was prodigal in magic gifts to his special favourites, and became, in short, a veritable demiurge, whose special care was the welfare of mankind.

The epic, if so loosely connected a series may be so called, concludes with a number of tales relating to the magic power of the god, who, although almost omnipotent, was on one occasion conquered by an unusual enemy—the baby! When the god was boasting of his powers to a certain woman, she replied: 'One there still remains whom no man has ever yet overcome in any strife,' indicating her baby who sat 'upon the floor in baby peace profound, sucking a piece of maple sugar sweet; greatly content and troubling nobody.' The Master then proceeded to attempt to cajole the baby to come to him, using at first all his blandishments. When these failed, for the baby remained immovable, he had recourse to sorcery, 'and used the awful spells, and sang the songs which raise the dead, and fright the devils wild, and send the witches howling to their graves.' But the baby 'peacefully as ever kept his place' (*op. cit.* p. 107). This story, which seems to be a genuine native production, is a good illustration of the Indian sense of humour, which, contrary to accepted opinion, is very highly developed.

In the end, owing to the evil ways of man, *Kulóskap* 'sailed away over the water, the shining waves of Minas; and they looked in silence at him, until they could see him no more. Yet when they had

ceased to behold him they still heard his voice in song, the wonderful voice of the Master! But the sounds grew fainter and fainter and softer in the distance, till at last they died away. Then over them all was silence, till a wonder came to pass: for all the beasts, which before had used but one common language, now talked in different tongues!' Here again we seem to have a perverted echo from the missionaries. After *Kulóskap* had left the land, the bird which had loved him most, the Great Snowy Owl, 'went far into the North, into the deep dark forest, where to this day his children sing to the night "Kûkûskûûs," which meaneth in our language "sorrow, sorrow, sorrow." And the loons who had been his huntsmen go back and forth o'er the waters, seeking in vain for their master, the lord whom they cannot meet; ever wailing, wailing sadly, because they find him not' (*op. cit.* p. 216). Micmac tradition in various forms still associates Kulóskap (or Glooscap, as he is there called) with Cape Blomidon, a bold headland projecting into the Bay of Minas, Nova Scotia.

It will be evident even from the above very brief sketch, that *Kulóskap*, as he at present exists in the memories of his former children, is a mixture of traditions. The element of the Christian God has entered very markedly into this lore, curiously compounded with what are undoubtedly native elements. For example, it is quite clear that all the stories of the exploits of the demi-god are based on the conception that he was a supernatural Indian and the father of all the conjurors, a class which still exists among the Catholic Wabanakis. This same culture-hero appears in the legends of the entire Algonquin family, although often under another name. It is highly probable, therefore, that the idea of a great Divine man was brought by these eastern Indians from their primitive western home.

The Wabanakis saw a spirit in every tree and waterfall, and a malignant or benevolent influence in many animals; and, in order to propitiate these beings, the class of sorcerers became, of course, a positive necessity. These people, who are called by the Passamaquoddies *m'deolinwuk*, 'drum-beaters,' from their methods of exorcism, had very peculiar powers. We see from the tales that the conjuror could transform himself into an animal at will; that he could cast a spell on an enemy, even though the latter might also be a *m'deolin*; that he could violate the laws of nature so far as to walk in hard ground, sinking up to the ankles or knees at every step; and, finally, that the wizards could communicate with each other telepathically. One need hardly comment on the first two or the fourth of these wonders, as they are common among all shamanistic conjurors; but the third phenomenon, the power to sink into hard ground while walking, seems to be characteristically American. Rink states that this is not an unusual feat among the conjurors of the Greenland Eskimos, who frequently sink into rocky or frozen ground 'as if in snow.' The trick is probably done by some peculiar method of stooping, or else is merely suggested by means of hypnotic influence. Leland compares here, however, the Old Norse statements regarding their wizards, who occasionally sank into the ground, and who had power to pass through earth with the same ease as through air and water (*Algonquin Legends*, p. 342). It seems hardly permissible to draw a parallel between the ancient Norsemen and the northern Indians on this account, as the case Leland cites is that of a conjuror who disappeared into the ground head downwards when stabbed at by a foe. The present writer has been told by old Passamaquoddies that they had personally seen conjurors 'soften the ground' without any apparent means of performing the wonder. On this account, the theory of suggestive hypnosis seems the most acceptable one.

Religious cannibalism appears also to have existed among the Wabanakis. In one tale, the wizards eat their murdered comrade, evidently with the idea of absorbing into themselves some or all of his power. As is well known, the Fijis and the New Zealand Maoris often ate their enemies with the same object in view; viz., to become as brave as the fallen foe had been. All authorities tend to show, however, that cannibalism was extremely rare among the American races, and was resorted to only in isolated cases such as the one here noted. In one Delaware tale, the wizard, who is also an evil spirit, desires to devour a very old worn-out man. This seems to be a relic from primitive times, when it was probably not unusual to devour the aged, perhaps for a double purpose: both to get rid of them, as was the case until recently among the islanders of Tierra del Fuego, and also possibly to absorb sacramentally into the living members of the family the essence of the dead parent, whose soul is thus prevented from becoming entirely extinct.

Especial attention should be called at this point to the remarkable ideas prevalent among the Wabanakis regarding the cohabitation of women with serpents (*Kulóskap*, p. 225). Such a conception may seem strange, coming as it does from a land where there are no ophidians large enough to warrant such a superstition. Although running the risk of seeming fanciful, the present writer deems it not impossible that we have in these hideous tales some relic of far distant pre-historic days when huge serpents were not unknown. It should be added, moreover, that in every case of such sexual relations between serpents and human beings among the Wabanakis, the serpent was always a wizard in disguise,—a fact which shows that, in the later superstition at least, the unusual character of such monstrous serpents was fully appreciated.*

It will appear evident from this sketch of the religious ideas of the Eastern Algonquins, that the legends of these people are well worthy of preservation, from the point of view both of primitive poetry and of science. Mr. Leland, in his preface to *Kulóskap the Master* (p. 14), remarks on the very common reproach of Europeans, that Americans have a land without ancient legends or song. He adds: 'We bewailed our wretched poverty when we had in our lap a casket full of treasure which we would not take the pains to open.' The fact is that almost every hill and dale of New England has or had its romantic native legend, its often beautiful poem or curious myth. Many of these fancies have disappeared for ever through the deliberate ignorance of the average white settler, who even to-day, when the Indian has almost vanished from the land, is inclined to preserve the old feeling that 'the only good Indian is a dead Indian.' Rand's *Legends of the Micmacs* (New York, 1894), Leland's *Algonquin Legends of New England* (Boston, 1885), *Kulóskap the Master*, and the present article must perhaps suffice, then, to present to the English-speaking public a few interesting and characteristic specimens of the religious traditions of the rapidly disappearing race of the Wabanakis,—a race which, fifty years hence, will, in all probability, have hardly a single living representative who shall know its language or lore.

J. DYNELEY PRINCE.

*It may be noted that similar marital relations between serpents and mankind, though generally with a different *motif*, are found not only among other stocks of North and South America, but also in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Polynesia (cf. MacCulloch, *The Childhood of Fiction*, London, 1905, pp. 253-259, 264-267).

ALGONQUINS (Prairie Tribes, viz. the Kickapoos, Pottawatomies, Sacs, and Foxes).—These tribes, together with their Algonquin allies, the Chippewas, and their Siouan friends, the Osages and Iowas, have their strongest bond of union in their return, between the years 1880 and 1884, to their ancient beliefs. Many of them had been, in name at least, Roman Catholics, a few were Presbyterians and Methodists, though all, except the Pottawatomies, revered the clan totems as saints, and all continued to wear their medicine-bags, and to guide their actions by their dreams. Those who remained heathen in name as well as in practice had seemed to have forgotten the old gods, and merely showed a superstitious faith in the power of their 'medicine,' as their fetishes were called, the incantations of their *shamans* or wizards, the 'warnings' of their dreams, and a vague impression that somewhere, above the firmament or in the bowels of the earth, dwelt a company of immortal, gigantic animals—the totems, or ancestors—from whom the various clans of the tribes were descended.

As early as the middle of the 17th cent., the Jesuits endured every sort of hardship and danger to convert these peoples, who, at that time, were living at the head of the Green Bay of Lake Michigan (Parkman, *La Salle and the Discovery of the Great West*, p. 34), and they had some reason to believe that they had succeeded. In 1673, Father Marquette wrote that, when he and M. Joliet went among the tribes of the Green Bay Indians, he was rejoiced to find in one of their villages a great cross set up, adorned with white skins, red girdles, and bows and arrows, as votive offerings (Marquette, *A Discovery of some New Countries and Nations in the Northern America*, printed as an appendix to Hennepin's *America*, p. 323)—a proof to him of the success of the mission of Allouez and Dablon, established in 1669–70. Hennepin, the Franciscan friar, had, however, not much confidence in these conversions. He avers that these 'salvages' would 'suffer themselves baptized six times a Day for a Glass of *Aqua Vitæ* or a Pipe of Tobacco' (*America*, pt. ii. p. 56), and adds this statement as to what they really did believe: 'Some of 'em acknowledge the Sun for their God. . . . Others will have a Spirit that commands, say they, in the Air. Some among 'em look upon the Skie as a kind of Divinity, others as an Otkon or Manitou, either good or evil. . . . Dreams with them supply all other defects, and serve instead of Prophecy, Inspiration, Laws, Commands, and Rules, either for undertakings in War, Peace, Trade, or Hunting. Nay, they are a kind of Oracles in their Eyes. You would say, to see 'em at their Devotion, that they were of the Sect of the Pretended Inspir'd. The Belief they have in their Dreams imposes upon them a kind of Necessity of believing likewise, that they are forewarned by an Universal Mind of what they ought to do or avoid. Nay, this Infatuation prevails upon 'em so far that if they were persuaded in their Dreams to kill a Man, or commit any other Enormous Crime, they would immediately do it with the greatest alacrity, and make Atonement for it by the means which we shall hereafter relate. Parents' Dreams generally serve for the Observation of their Children, and Captains' for those of their Villages. There are some among 'em as pretend to interpret Dreams. . . . When they meet with any great Fall of Water, which is either difficult to pass or dangerous to avoid, they throw into it a Bever's skin, Tobacco, Porcelane, or the like, by way of Sacrifice, to appease and engage the Deity that there presides. . . . There is no nation among 'em which has not a sort of Juglers or Conjurers, which some look upon to be wizards. . . . They are, in a Word, extremely bewitch'd of these Juglers, though they so plainly and frequently appear to deceive 'em. These Impostors cause themselves to be reverenced as Prophets which fore-tell futurity. They will needs be looked upon to have an unlimited Power. They boast of being able to make it Wet or Dry; to cause a Calm or a Storm; to render Land Fruitful or Barren; and, in a Word, to make Hunters Fortunate or Unfortunate. They also pretend to Physic and to apply Medicines, but which are such that they have little or no Virtue at all in 'em. . . . It is impossible to imagine the horrible Howlings and strange Contortions that these Juglers make of their Bodies, when they are disposing themselves to Conjure, or raise their Enchantments. . . . They will do nothing without either Presents or Hire. But however 'tis certain that if these Impostors have not skill enough to procure themselves Credit, or to find something to say in case of a Failure in their Art by their Patients' Death, 'tis ten to one but that they are killed on the spot without any further formality.

'These poor blind Wretches are, moreover, engaged in several other Superstitions, which the Devil makes use of to Ensnare 'em. They believe there are many living Creatures which have Rational Souls. They have a very unaccountable veneration for certain Bones of Elks, Bevers, and other Beasts, and therefor never give them to their dogs, but lay 'em up in Repositories with a great deal of Care: These they never throw into Rivers but with great Reluctancy. They say that the Souls of these Animals observe how they deal by their Bodies, and consequently advertise both the Living and the Dead of that kind thereof, so that if they treat 'em ill, they must not expect that those sorts of Beasts will ever suffer themselves to be taken by them either in this or the other world' (*America*, pt. ii. pp. 56–60). In addition, there are scattered through the two parts of the book descriptions of the various feasts and dances for the living and the dead, which might have been written to-day, so little change has time wrought, and on p. 112 the author says of the 'medicine' or fetish: 'These people admit of some Sort of Genius in all things: they all believe there is a Master of Life, as they call him, but hereof they make various Applications: some of them have a lean Raven, which they carry along with them, and which they say is the Master of their Life; others have a Bone or Sea-Shell, or some such thing.' He also details at some length the story of the woman who fell down from Heaven and bore two sons, one of whom, after a time, retired to Heaven. This, of course, is a fragment of the legend of Hiawatha, Manibosho, or Nanabush (all names of the same supernatural personage).

The revival of the old religion, either modified by contact with Christianity or else having always had observances which had escaped the notice of the missionaries, was brought about by the Chippewas. According to their story, a band of their people was surprised by the Sioux and exterminated. From the setting of the sun till its rising all lay dead, but when its beams fell on the Woman—her name is too sacred to be spoken—she revived, and heard a voice saying to her, 'Get up and take the drum.' When this command had been four times repeated, she rose up and found a drum and twelve drumsticks beside her. She took a stick and began to beat on the drum, and immediately the other sticks began to beat as if hands held them. At once her strength was restored, and her scalp-lock, which had been torn away, was renewed,—a most important miracle, as the soul is supposed to be in the small bulb which lies at the roots of the scalp-lock, and one is a slave in the spirit iand to the holder of the scalp. Then the voice

spoke again, 'Go to the other band of the Chippewas and to all who will be my friends'; so she set out, travelling night and day, feeling no need of food or rest, and listening to the instructions of the Voice. Thus she travelled for eighty days, at the end of which time she reached her people, called them together by the roll of her drum, and told them that Geechee Manitou wished them to take leave of the gods of the white people, politely, and turn again to him. He desired a dance house built for him, and a dance, to be called the Remembrance or Religion dance (*Ow-wah-see-chee*), to be performed in it by strong young men, without physical blemish, who had practised, prayed, and denied themselves all pleasures for eighty days. This dance was to continue four, seven, or twenty-one days, to the accompaniment of the drum and songs of praise to the manitou (pronounced 'manito-ah' by the Indians), while all the people feasted and made offerings of the smoke of tobacco and the steam of cooked food, beginning with the offering of a white dog. In addition, all the old customs were to be revived, and an effort was to be made to induce all other Indians to conform to them again. When the people had purified themselves by fasting and by being sweated in the sweat-lodge (a small close hut having a great stone in it which is heated and then drenched with cold water to produce a vapour in which the devotee stands naked to have the devils that produce disease or wickedness sweated out of him while he recites his prayers); and after they had built a dance house, and had honoured Geechee Manitou by prayers and praises, she taught them the Religion dance, put them in mind of some forgotten beliefs, and then disappeared, no one knew whither; nor did she ever return. At once the Chippewas had a great revival of old practices, to which they invited their relatives the Pottawatomies, who in turn proselytized the Kickapoos and their friends and neighbours, the Osages, Sacs, and Foxes. A little later the Sacs won over the Iowas and Otoes, but in spite of strenuous efforts they have never been able to add any other Siouan tribes to this coalition.

Besides Geechee Manitou, these tribes believe in three great gods. He is the first, the creator, and he lives in a golden boat, which we call the sun. Meechee Manitou is the god who lives in the cold, wet, slippery cavern in which the souls of the wicked wander and shiver for ever. He is not now very active in mischief, but he is the father of an innumerable number of devils that produce war, pestilence, famine, aches, pains, quarrels, and all other ills of body and soul. Some of these are the offspring of witches with whom he has consorted; others sprang from his breath, his sweat, his saliva, even his words and the scent of his footsteps. The Brothers, 'twin sons of the woman who fell down from heaven,' spend their time, one in ruling over the happy hunting-ground, or place of the happy dead; the other in sitting in the road the ghosts go over, at the point where it divides, his business being to show the good their way to the happy hunting-ground, and the bad their way to the cavern of Meechee Manitou. These Brothers lived a long time on earth, destroyed many devils and wizards (some tribes were in the world before these two gods, and had become very wicked), received additional physical and spiritual power from the totems, founded the Fox tribe, and then took their way—one to the spirit land, the other to the road that leads to it. The occasion of their leaving the world was this: on account of the good works of the Brothers, the devils and wizards endeavoured to destroy them, and succeeded in killing the younger, Cold Hand; but when the elder, Hot Hand, mourned so terribly as to flood the earth with his tears, and draw it, which had hitherto been flat, into hills and valleys by his sobs, the devils and wizards, terrified by the commotion, worked four days and nights with their enchantments to 'make the dead alive.' When he was made alive, he went to his brother, but Hot Hand was not pleased. He said he was ashamed, because he had been heard to mourn so terribly, and he went into his wigwam and shut Cold Hand out. Presently he thrust forth a kettle, fire-sticks, tobacco, and a whistle to call ghosts. Cold Hand took these things and went away. He sat down on the edge of the world to dream. When he came out of his dream, he 'made a place for good souls. Before that they had no place; they blew about in the wind. Since that time, death has been better than life' (M. A. Owen, *Folk-Lore of the Musquakie Indians*, p. 15).

The totems are patron saints. Each clan or subdivision of the tribe is named from the giant animal from which it is supposed to be descended. Judging from the old legends told by tribe historians, all the tribes at one time had many clans, each with its clan Secret Society which did homage to its totem, as its *shaman* or medicine-man directed; but so many clans were exterminated by their wars with white and red men that in some tribes the totemic system is only a memory, and in others there are many more sticks to the sacred drum than there are drummers to hold them—each clan having but one drummer playing at a time.

The hereditary chief is the high priest of the faith, nominally, but he does nothing without first consulting the *shamans*, who are presidents of the totem societies, prophets, physicians, and exorcists all in one, besides filling some other offices (referred to by Hennepin). When it is understood that the earth and air are supposed to be peopled with an infinite number of malignant devils and sprites, as well as vampire ghosts, which are always on the alert to do mischief except when rendered torpid by extreme cold, and as only the *shamans* know the secret of casting them out or spell-binding them, it will be readily comprehended that, so long as the ancient beliefs prevail, the *shamans* will be the real autocrats of the tribes. Generally a son succeeds his father, as in the case of the chieftainship, but sometimes the son is not clever enough to be a *shaman*; in that case, any boy in the clan may be selected to be trained, thus keeping the succession in the family, as everyone in the clan is related. Sometimes, when an especially clever boy is found in another clan, the *shaman* takes possession of him, and, in rare cases, a boy has been brought from another tribe. In the latter case he is adopted by a member of the *shaman's* tribe who has lately lost a son of about the same age.

The white witches of the tribe are the 'women-with-spots-on-their-faces.' These spots are round daubs of vermilion, and each one stands for a Religion dance given for the woman-with-spots-on-her-face, at puberty, by her father. These dances and the severe usage to which she is subjected from a very early age, make her a healer and a bringer of good fortune. She insures safe delivery to women in childbirth, not by being present, but by chanting and praying at a distance and refusing to hear all entreaties to be present; she names the newborn infants after something that belongs to the father's clan (this is the real name, not much used, not the nickname given from some exploit or peculiarity); she heals the sick, and interprets the confused dreams of the women; any one with whom she is friendly is lucky, any one with whom she is unfriendly may look for misfortunes.

The ceremonials of the faith may almost be described by a word—'dancing.' There are fasts,

prayers, and hymns before dancing, and feasts, prayers, and hymns during dancing; these are parts of the same thing. There are dances for planting and dances for harvest, dances to bring rain and to cause it to cease, for peace, for war, for puberty, to restore health, and to honour the dead, totem dances, and dances for every great event in the life of the tribe and individual except birth, marriage, and the too frequent divorces.

Kickapoos.—The Kickapoos consider themselves foreigners. 'This is the only tribe among all our Indians who claim for themselves a foreign origin,' says Thomas L. M'Kenney, formerly of the Indian Department, Washington, U.S.A., speaking of the Shawnee tribe, of which the Kickapoo is a division. 'Most of the aborigines of the continent believe their forefathers ascended from holes in the earth; and many of them assign a local habitation to these traditionary places of the nativity of their race; resembling, in this respect, some of the traditions of antiquity, and derived, perhaps, from that remote period when barbarous tribes were troglodytes, subsisting upon the spontaneous productions of the earth. The Shawanese believe their ancestors inhabited a foreign land, which, for some unknown cause, they determined to abandon. They collected their people together, and marched to the seashore. Here various persons were selected to lead them, but they declined the duty, until it was undertaken by one of the Turtle tribe. He placed himself at the head of the procession, and walked into the sea. The waters immediately divided, and they passed along the bottom of the ocean until they reached this "*island*"' (M'Kenney, *North American Indians*, vol. ii. pp. 263–264). This writer goes on to state, what the traditions of the Kickapoos confirm, that the Shawnees were, in their days of power, divided into twelve tribes, and these again into 'families,' such as the Eagle, the Turtle, etc., each named from its totem or ancestral animal; but two of the tribes were annihilated, six were merged, and four kept their names and tribal government. These four were the Kickapoos, Pickaways, Chilicothes, and Makostrakes.

It is not known exactly when these people were driven, by the Iroquois, southward to the Savannah river, nor is it known when they left that region and separated the tribes. In 1673, Father Marquette found the Kickapoos on a river which flowed into the Bay of Puans (the Green Bay of Lake Michigan, or, as it was then called, the Lake of the Illinois), and he refers to Father Allouez as having a mission among them. He adds that, in comparison with their neighbours, the Miamis, they are boors (Marquette, *A Discovery of some New Countries and Nations in the Northern America*, in Hennepin's *America*, pt. ii. p. 323). On Hennepin's map, published in 1698, they are north of Lake Winnebago, but, in his account of the retreat of Tonti when he was endeavouring to lead his little company back to M. La Salle after the destruction of Fort Crèvecœur (A.D. 1680), he speaks of their home as being on the west side of the Bay of Puans (*America*, pt. i. ch. 75, headed 'The Savages Kikapoux murther Father Gabriel de la Ribourde, a Recollect Missionary'), though bands of their young men were wandering in the south-east in the hope of surprising small companies of their enemies, the Iroquois. Hermann Moll's map, published before 1716, shows them on the west side of the bay. In 1763, when they were engaged in the conspiracy of Pontiac to form a federation of all the Indian tribes with the intention of preventing the encroachments of the whites or destroying them, they were living on the Miami and Scioto rivers (Parkman, *Conspiracy of Pontiac*, vol. ii. p. 198 and map). Colonel Bouquet reported, when he had forced the Indians to sue for peace (1764), that the 'Kickapoux' had three hundred warriors and a total population of fifteen hundred. He placed them on the 'Ouabache' (Wabash) river (*19th Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology*, p. 1108). On May 22, 1804, Captain William Clark, of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, wrote as follows: 'This tribe resides on the heads of the Kaskaskia and Illinois rivers, on the other (east) side of the Mississippi, but occasionally hunt in Missouri' (Elliott Coues, *The History of the Lewis and Clark Expedition*, vol. i. p. 7); but this could have been but one band of them, for, in 1808, the Pottawatomies and Kickapoos gave to Tecumseh and his brother, the Prophet, a tract of land in Indiana, lying along the Tippecanoe river. These two most distinguished Kickapoos, Tecumseh, or Flying Panther, and the Prophet Tens-kwau-taw-waw, endeavoured to form a confederacy like the one Pontiac projected, and, in 1811, became engaged in a war with the whites, which terminated disastrously for the Indians at the battle of Tippecanoe, much to the surprise of the red men, who had believed that the incantations of the Prophet had rendered them bullet-proof. In the war of 1812, Tecumseh and his people joined forces with the British (Eggleston and Seelye, *Tecumseh*, chs. xxii.–xxxiii.). Catlin visited the Prophet and his people in Illinois in 1831, but his map, printed in 1840, shows them on the west side of the Missouri river. During the Civil War, one band, with a band of Pottawatomies, went to Mexico, but have since returned. *Smithsonian Report*, pt. ii. p. 185, states: 'Kickapoos at Pottawatomie and Great Nemaha Reservation, in Brown County, Kansas, August 20, 1885, 235. Kickapoo, Mexican (mixed band with Pottawatomie), Indian Territory, 346.' The numbers are at this time much smaller, so that the report of the Commissioner for Indian Affairs for 1901 gives the number of Kickapoos in Kansas as 199, and of Mexican Kickapoos in Indian Territory as 221. It is a dying people.

The Kickapoos are sickly, melancholy, and severely religious. In addition to a dance house, they have a 'house of silence'—a wooden structure which was built, as a chief was commanded in a dream, in silence and fasting. It is used for prayer and praise, but not for dances. Another revelation of late years causes them to flog their children for misdemeanours—something unknown in other tribes, where children are whipped only at puberty as a trial of endurance. A flogger is chosen once a year by lot, and his duty is to make the rounds of the wigwams every Saturday with a mask over his face. In consequence, no one is at home on Saturday but the culprits; the rest of the family sit among the bushes on the river bank and weep. The culprits do not weep during this (supposedly) religious exercise. These people have but one council-fire and three totems. This refers to the Brown County Kickapoos, not to the Mexican, who prefer to be considered Pottawatomies. They pay more reverence to the Rain Serpent than other Indians, and this may partly account for their sickliness, as their reservation is so infested with venomous reptiles as to render cattle-raising almost an impossibility, in consequence of which their staple flesh diet is pork. (It is well known that the bite of a serpent has no effect on a hog). As an antidote for themselves and their ponies, they make use of a tea and wash of infused leaves, roots, and blossoms of the arrow-leaved violet (*Viola sagittata*). Violet was once a maid, sister to Rattlesnake, and as good as he was wicked; whomsoever he poisoned, she healed. In rage at this he killed her. Geechee Manitou, compassionating her and those she could befriend, changed her into this healing plant. It grows wild

in great abundance all over the reservation. Another cause of their inferior physique may be their marrying in the clan—something contrary to the religious scruples of most other Indians. Their tribal name means 'smooth,' and undoubtedly refers to some stream by which they have lived, and not to their tempers.

Pottawatomies.—These people have no legend of ever having lived anywhere but in the North-West. The French missionaries and fur traders found them, during their first explorations, in what is now the State of Michigan. 'Early in 1600 the Pottawatomies were occupying the lower peninsula of Michigan, in scattered bands, whence they were driven westward by the Iroquois, and settled about Green Bay. The French acquired much influence over them, whom they joined in their wars with the Iroquois' (*Smithsonian Report, 1885*, p. 135). The *Jesuit Relation*, 1658, refers to them as being the nearest tribe to the settlement of St. Michael, near the head of Green Bay. A band of them accompanied Marquette when, in 1674, he set out to found a new mission, the Immaculate Conception, at the principal town of the Illinois; and it was the Ottawas, the elder branch of this family of Indians, that, in 1676, carried the bones of Marquette to St. Ignace in a grand procession of thirty canoes, and took part in the funeral services (Parkman, *La Salle and the Discovery of the Great West*, pp. 68–71). It is evident, therefore, that they were considered Christians; but when they joined in Pontiac's conspiracy, nearly a hundred years later, reliable witnesses declared that they ate the bodies of their most valiant enemies. Again, in the war of 1812, they were guilty of the same practices. One of the best attested instances is that of Captain Wells, who was killed after the capture of Chicago in 1812. 'This man, who had been a long time among the Indians, having been taken prisoner by them at the age of thirteen, had acquired a great reputation for courage, and his name is still mentioned as that of the bravest white man with whom they ever met. He had almost become one of their number. . . . At the commencement of hostilities . . . he sided with his own countrymen . . . Wells was killed. . . . His body was divided, and his heart was shared as being the most certain spell for courage, and part of it was sent to the various tribes in alliance with the Pottawatomies, while they themselves feasted upon the rest. . . . Mr. Barron has seen the Pottawatomies with the hands and limbs of both white men and Cherokees, which they were about to devour. . . . Among some tribes cannibalism is universal, but it appears that among the Pottawatomies it is generally restricted to a society or fraternity, whose privilege and duty it is, on all occasions, to eat of the enemies' flesh; at least one individual must be eaten. The flesh is sometimes dried and taken to the village. Not only are the members of this fraternity endued with great virtues, but it is said they can impart them, by means of spells, to any individual they wish to favour' (W. H. Keating, *Keating's Narrative*, compiled from the notes of Major Long and Messrs. Say, Keating, and Calhoun, vol. i. pp. 102, 103).

Since Keating's narrative was written (1825), missionaries have again laboured among these people, and with considerable success. Among those who still cling to tribal life there are Methodists, Presbyterians, and Roman Catholics, as well as worshippers of the Manitous; but it is impossible to tell what proportion of the tribe has responded to the efforts of Christian teachers, as some appear to participate in the exercises of both religions. Another reason for the apparent predominance of the heathen element is that the Christian contingent leaves the tribe and is lost among the whites. This is the reason, also, why the tribe appears so small, —never numbering quite fifteen hundred,—although the Pottawatomies are large, handsome, healthy, prolific people, and not in any sense victims of encroaching civilization. One band is at the Sac and Fox Agency, Indian Territory; and another at the Pottawatomie and Great Nemaha Reservation, Kansas; while possibly three hundred are in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Iowa. When the tribe disappears, it will be from disintegration, owing to the fact that these extraordinarily keen traders do not care to hold their goods in common. Their boast is that they have followed and bartered with the whites from the time they met the first French fur-traders, and always to their own advantage, except when they sold the site of the city of Chicago. Briefly put, trading brings segregation, segregation civilization, civilization Christianity, an unusual conversion, but one likely to be permanent. The name *Potta-wat-um-ees* signifies 'those-who-make-or-keep-a-fire,' and refers to their having started a council-fire for themselves when they and the Ojibwas, or Chippewas, separated from the Ottawas. They seem to have no totems, though the old people recite folk-tales which indicate that there was a time when they possessed them, and a few have claimed that they are descended from a dog. This is not to be taken seriously, as they partake of the dog feast, and no Indian eats the animal named from his totem.

Sacs and Foxes.—These people are classed as one tribe in Government reports, very much to their dissatisfaction. They have never been under the same chieftainship, but have kept up their separate council-fires, and have a different number of totems (the Sacs have one that the Foxes consider unworthy of any descendants but women, the Tree or Dryad totem). Their traditions of migration from the Atlantic seaboard to the region of the Great Lakes are about the same, and so are their accounts of reverses at the hands of the Iroquois on the east and the Sioux on the west; but the Foxes have a legend of a mysterious white buffalo leading them to join forces with the Sacs, which the latter ridicule. The Jesuits found them living as distinct tribes in the neighbourhood of Lake Michigan. Both tribes fought the Hurons and Illinois. In 1712 the Foxes, or, as they were generally called, the Outagamies or Musquakies, with their allies, attacked the French at Detroit, but were defeated with great slaughter, by the aid of the Sacs, Hurons, Ottawas, Mascoutins, Illinois, and other tribes (Parkman, *A Half-Century of Conflict*, pp. 279–286). In 1732 another determined effort was made by the French and their Indian allies to destroy these terrible fighters; and it was so nearly successful that, about 1736, eighty warriors and their families joined themselves to the Sacs, these being all that were left of this 'scourge of the West,' as they had long been called. Jonathan Carver, in 1766, found the two tribes in neighbouring villages on the 'Ouisconsin' (Wisconsin) river. He describes the Saukie town as the best Indian town he ever saw, having ninety houses, each large enough for several families, well built of hewn plank, and having sheds before the doors. The streets were wide, he adds, and the land round about so well cultivated that traders made this an outfitting station. The principal business of the warriors was to engage in forays among the Illinois and Pawnees for the purpose of procuring slaves. This appeared to him to be the reason the tribe did not increase in numbers more rapidly, for their adversaries quickly retaliated. The Outagamie or Fox town was almost deserted (Carver, *Travels*, pp. 46–49). Both tribes were too busy fighting the Sioux and Chip-

pewas to take part in the war of the Revolution, but the Foxes and part of the Sacs were on the side of the British in the war of 1812. The same division took place in the Black Hawk War (1831–32), when the band of Sacs under Keokuk refused to fight the U.S. There are at the present time between four and five hundred Sacs in Indian Territory, whose last recognized chief Ke-wah-ko-uk (Keokuk) died in Aug. 1903, and about two hundred on the Pottawatomie and Great Nemaha Reservation, in Kansas, under Margrave, a Pennsylvania German, to whom they gave the place of the hereditary chief, deposed for drunkenness. The Foxes are at Tama, Iowa: a small, rich tribe, numbering scarcely more than three hundred, if we exclude visiting Pottawatomies. As to this division, the agent wrote, August 1885: 'Our Indians, the Sac and Fox of the Mississippi, disclaim any connexion whatever with the Sac tribe, and claim most earnestly that they are Foxes only.' Later, the Sacs expelled the few Foxes in their midst. The Sacs are more agreeable than pious, the Foxes more pious than agreeable. The Sacs are great lovers of fun, the Foxes great sticklers for dignity. The Sacs are stalwart, and with a leaning towards civilization; the Foxes sickly, and with a profound regard for the wisdom of their ancestors. The Sacs have eight totems from which they are descended; the Foxes have seven totems from which they are not descended, since they trace their lineage to a boy and girl, one of whom came from the shoulder of one of the Brothers, the other from the side of his twin. *Saukie* is said to mean 'yellow clay,' while *o-saukie* means 'mouth of the river,' and *Outagamie* connotes 'red clay.' *Musquakie*, the name by which the Foxes call themselves, means 'fox.'

LITERATURE.—Jonathan Carver, *Travels through the Interior Parts of North America in the Years 1766, 1767, and 1768*, London, 1778; Elliott Coues, *The History of the Lewis and Clark Expedition*, New York, 1893; Edward Eggleston and Lillie Eggleston Seelye, *Tecumseh and the Shawnee Prophet*, New York, 1878; Louis Hennepin, *A New Discovery of a Vast Country in America*, London, 1698; W. H. Keating, *Keating's Narrative*, London, 1825; Father Jaques Marquette, *A Discovery of some New Countries and Nations in the Northern America*, printed as an Appendix to Hennepin's *America*, London, 1698; Thos. L. M'Kenney, *North American Indians*, Philadelphia, 1874; *Jesuit Relations* (Thwaite's translation), Cleveland, 1896–1901; M. A. Owen, *Folk-Lore of the Musquakie Indians*, London, 1904; Francis Parkman, *A Half-Century of Conflict, Conspiracy of Pontiac*, and *La Salle and the Discovery of the Great West*, Boston, 1894; *19th Report of the American BE*, Washington, U.S.A.; *Smithsonian Report*, 1885; *Bulletin 30 BE*, pp. 38–43.

MARY A. OWEN.

ALLĀH is the proper name of God among Muslims, corresponding in usage to Jehovah (Jahweh) among the Hebrews. Thus it is not to be regarded as a common noun meaning 'God' (or 'god'), and the Muslim must use another word or form if he wishes to indicate any other than his own peculiar deity. Similarly, no plural can be formed from it, and though the liberal Muslim may admit that Christians or Jews call upon Allāh, he could never speak of the Allāh of the Christians or the Allāh of the Jews. Among Christians, too, a similar usage holds. In the current Arabic Bible versions, 'God' (אלהים) is uniformly rendered *Allāh*, but when 'the Lord God' (יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים) occurs, it is rendered *ar-rabbu-l-ilāhu*, 'the Lord, the *Ilāh*,' where 'the *Ilāh*' is an uncontracted form, retaining its force of a common noun with the article, from which *Allāh* has been shortened through usage. The Muslim, too, who usually derives and explains *Ilāh* as meaning 'worshipped,' uses it and its plural *Āliha* in the broadest way, of any god, explaining that such is possible because worshippers believe that their god has a claim to worship, and 'names follow beliefs, not what the thing is in itself' (*Lisān*, xvii. 358). But more ordinarily, in referring to the gods of the heathen, a Muslim speaks simply of their images or idols, *aṣnām*, *authān*.

The origin of this goes back to pre-Muslim times, as Prof. Nöldeke has shown below (art. ARABS [RELIGION OF THE ANCIENT]). Muhammad found the Meccans believing in a supreme God whom they called Allāh, thus already contracted. With Allāh, however, they associated other minor deities, some evidently tribal, others called daughters of Allāh. Muhammad's reform was to assert the solitary existence of Allāh. The first article of the Muslim creed, therefore,—*Lā ilāha illā-llāhu*,—means only, as addressed by him to the Meccans, 'There exists no God except the one whom you already call Allāh.'

Naturally, this precise historical origin is not clear to the Muslim exegetes and theologians. But that Allāh is a proper name, applicable only to their peculiar God, they are certain, and they mostly recognize that its force as a proper name has arisen through contraction in form and limitation in usage.

At-Ṭabarī (d. A.H. 310 = A.D. 923), the greatest commentator on the Qur'ān of the old traditional school, seems to have very little on the word. He gives only one derivation, namely, that it means 'the worshipped, the served,' and contents himself with proving the existence of such a root in Arabic and the possibility of the contraction of *al-ilāh* to *Allāh* (*Tafsīr*, i. 40). Apparently neither the etymological nor the metaphysical question had become important for his time. It is very different in the next greatest Qur'ān commentary which we have, that by ar-Rāzī, the great systematic theologian, who died in A.H. 608 (= A.D. 1209). He deals with it twice, in one passage considering whether God can have a known proper name (*Mafātiḥ al-ghaib*, i. 61), and in another, the meaning, derivation, etc., of Allāh (i. 83 ff.). The first position, he says, the earlier philosophers denied. The object of a name was to distinguish the thing named from other things; but if the thing named could not be known, as in the case of the peculiar essence of God, there was no use for the name. Certainly, if God gave knowledge of Himself to some particularly chosen beings, He might have a name for them. As this name, then, would be the greatest of all names, he who knew it could control all things and beings, material and spiritual. It would be, in fact, the Most Great Name of God, the ineffable name of the Jews, by which miracles could be wrought, and of which Muhammad had evidently heard. That such a name exists ar-Rāzī believes; traditions from Muhammad assert its existence among the names given in the Qur'ān, but are vague and contradictory as to which it is; and as it cannot be a name involving a quality, but must be the name of God's essence, it can be nothing else than Allāh, God's proper name. His consideration, then, of Allāh he divides into five sections (i. 83 ff.). 1. The preferable view is that Allāh is a proper name of God, and has no derivation; this he defends with arguments based on the undoubted usage of the Qur'ān and the impossibility of making a common noun apply to an individual only. 2. The various derivations alleged by those who hold that it comes from a common noun. Eight of these are given, with theological and metaphysical refutations of an *a priori* kind; the facts of the language have little consideration. 3. The linguistic possibility of derivation. Some held that it was from Hebrew or Syriac; but it was known by the Arabs in the time of Muhammad as a plain Arabic word, and as such most accept it. Of the others, those who say it is a name need no derivation, and those who derive it are of two schools, on which a reference to Lane, *Lexicon*, pp. 82*b* ff., will suffice. 4. Broadly, Allāh is used of the true God only, as also, in the first instance, *al-ilāh*; but the latter can by extension be applied to any god, as Allāh Himself applies it in the Qur'ān. [This, of course, is a complete reversal of the historical fact.] 5. Certain peculiarities of this Divine Name which distinguish it from all other names of God; *e.g.* as letter by letter is cut from it, the remainder continues significant for God, and the formal confession of the Muslim faith can take place only through this name, and not through any of the descriptive epithets, such as 'the Merciful One,' 'the Holy One,' etc.

With the Qur'ān commentary of Baiḍāwī (d. A.H. 685 = A.D. 1286) we reach, again, saner air. Modelled on that of az-Zamakhsharī (d. A.H. 538 = A.D. 1143)—a combination of rationalism and precise grammatical and lexicographical interpretation—it has no room for *a priori* theories or dreams of a wonder-working Name. Allāh is a contraction of *al-ilāh*, and has come to be used as a proper name, though a common noun in origin. A number of possible derivations are given with examples of such transformation. It is shown that God's essence in itself, taken without reference to some other thing, real or imagined, is unintelligible to mankind, and so cannot be indicated by a separate word, even though especially revealed to His saints, as ar-Rāzī suggests; nor does derivation from a root involve *shirk* in the theological sense, one thing having part in another; it means only that the two expressions have part in a common idea and formation. The Syriac derivation is mentioned without criticism.

Other commentaries give modifications only of the two abo

tudes of ar-Rāzī and al-Baiḍāwī. Thus Abū-s-Su'ūd (d. A.H. 982 = A.D. 1574) paraphrases and elucidates al-Baiḍāwī. The following statement from him (margin of *Mafātiḥ al-ghaib*, i. 19) shows how far this interpretation could attain: 'Know that what is meant by the negation in the first article of the creed, *Lā ilāha illā-llāhu*, is that He is the rightfully worshipped One, and the sense of that article of the creed is, "No rightfully worshipped individual exists except that rightfully worshipped One."' Similarly, Niẓām ad-Dīn al-Naisabūrī (d. *circ.* A.H. 710 = A.D. 1310) abbreviates from ar-Rāzī, but is disposed to regard the difference as verbal (*lafẓī*) only, a hard saying (margin of aṭ-Ṭabarī's *Tafsīr*, i. 53 ff. and 63 ff.). All these are generally accepted and respected commentaries. See art. God (Muslim).

Literature.—There is little in Western languages on this subject. Cf. Fleischer, *Kleinere Schriften*, i. 154, 170; Sprenger, *Leben und Lehre des Mohammad*, i. 286 ff., ii. 33; Palmer's *Qur'ān*, i., xii. ff., lxvi.; Hughes, *Dictionary of Islām*, *s.vv.* 'God,' 'Da'wah'; Grimme, *Mohammed*, ii. 36.

D. B. Macdonald.

ALLĀHĀBĀD.—An important Indian city, capital of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. The original Hindu name of the place is Prayāga, '*the* place of sacrifice,' a name which is applied to three other sacred bathing-places on the Alaknandā (wh. see), one of the upper waters of the Ganges. Allāhābād is specially holy, as it is supposed to be the triple junction (*triveṇī*) of three sacred rivers—Ganges (Gangā), Jumnā (Yamunā), and Saraswatī, the last being supposed to have an underground connexion with the others. The name *Allāhābād*, 'abode of Allāh,' was conferred upon the place by the Emperor Akbar, who in A.D. 1572 built his fort commanding the junction of the two rivers, and named it *Illāhābās*, which was changed to Allāhābād by his grandson Shāhjahān. But the place had been regarded as sacred from the very earliest times. It first appears in history as the site where Aśoka erected one of his edict-pillars about B.C. 240. Fa Hsien, the Buddhist pilgrim, about A.D. 414 found it included in the kingdom of Kośala; and the name Prayāga appears in the *Travels* of his successor, Hiuen-Tsiang in the 7th century. He found Buddhism prevailing here side by side with Brāhmanism, and he notes that in the midst of the city was a famous temple of the latter faith, in front of which was a large tree with wide-spreading branches, which was said to be the dwelling of an anthropophagous demon. This tree was surrounded with human bones, the remains of pilgrims who, according to immemorial custom, were in the habit of sacrificing their lives by jumping from its boughs into the holy stream. This tree is now almost certainly represented by one of its successors—the Akshaya Vaṭa, or 'undying Banyan-tree,' which is still one of the chief objects of Hindu worship. It stands in an underground temple, probably part of the edifice described by Hiuen-Tsiang, or built on the same site. This building is now within the Fort, and owing to the accumulation of rubbish the whole of the lower part has disappeared underground. Early in the 14th cent. the historian Rashīd-ud-dīn mentions the sacred tree 'of Prāg' at the confluence of the Ganges and Jumnā. About the time of Akbar, 'Abd al-Qādir speaks of 'the tree from which people cast themselves into the river.' From these accounts it is clear that in the interval between the time of Hiuen-Tsiang and Akbar the rivers had cut away the land near their junction so that the sacred tree, once in the centre of the city, had been brought close to the water. This accounts for the fact that, except the famous Pillar of Aśoka, no relics of the Buddhist and Brahmanical monuments described by the traveller of the 7th cent. now survive.

The chief bathing fair at Allāhābād is what is called the *Māgh Melā*, Māgh (Jan.-Feb.) being the month in which it is held. The chief bathing day is that of the new moon (*amāvasyā*), and the fair is held in the sandy bed at the river junction, which is left dry at the close of each rainy season. Every twelfth year here and at Hardwār, when the sun is in the sign of Kumbha or Aquarius, bathing is specially efficacious, and enormous crowds of pilgrims assemble from all parts of India. To these are added large numbers of ascetics, and beggars who display their infirmities to the charitable parties of bathers. Specially remarkable are fanatics like the *ūrdhvabāhu*, who extend one arm or both arms above the head until the muscles become withered through disuse, and the *ākāśamukhin*, who keep their necks bent back looking at the sky. To these are added numbers of traders and sellers of all kinds of goods who supply the wants of the pilgrims. The maintenance of sanitation and the prevention of outbreaks of epidemic disease are in the hands of a special European staff. This is the chief danger resulting from gatherings of this kind, the attendance at which has greatly increased since the railways offered facilities to the pilgrims. The people are so orderly and law-abiding that little work falls upon the police force. The bathing at these fairs is controlled by a body of local Brāhmans, who take their name, *prayāgwāl*, from the place, and have a bad reputation for insolence, rapacity, and licentiousness.

Literature.—Cunningham, *Archæological Reports*, i. 296 ff., abstracted and supplemented by Führer, *Monumental Antiquities and Inscriptions of the North-western Provinces and Oudh*, 127 ff.; *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, *s.v.*

W. Crooke.

ALLEGORY, ALLEGORICAL INTERPRETATION.—The word 'allegory' is derived from the terminology of Greek rhetoric, and means primarily a series of metaphors ('Iam cum fluxerunt continuæ plures tralationes, alia plane fit oratio. Itaque genus hoc Græci appellant ἀλληγορίαν': Cicero, *Orator*, xxvii. 94; cf. *de Oratore*, iii. 166). Seeing that the later classical poets studied in the schools of rhetoric, it is not surprising that Horace, in the ode in which he compares the State to a ship (*Od.* i. 14), had an allegory in view, as is recognized by the rhetorician Quintilian (viii. 6, 44). Thus we see that the conception of allegory as formulated in rhetoric, and, owing to the close connexion between ancient rhetoric and hermeneutics, as used also in explaining a work of literature, has a rather narrow range. The term is by no means applied in that wide sense which it has to-day when we speak, for instance, of allegorical figures in art. On the contrary, we must keep in view that allegory is a form of representation which a reader believes himself to find in a piece of writing which is more or less in need of interpretation. As such an interpretation, however, is in reality justified only where the author of the writing, as, for instance, Horace, or Goethe in the second part of *Faust*, had a secret meaning in mind, the rule comes to be that in allegorical interpretation an entirely foreign subjective meaning is read into the passage which has to be explained. In this way allegory is almost always a relative, not an absolute, conception, which has nothing to do with the actual truth of the matter, and for the most part springs from the natural desire to conserve some idea which, owing to its age, has come to be regarded as sacred.

These remarks are necessary for the proper understanding of allegory among the nations of antiquity. It is a misuse of the word to find in Homer and the poets of the subsequent period unconscious allegorical ideas, as is done, *e.g.*, by Decharme (*La critique des traditions religieuses chez les Grecs des origines au temps de Plutarque*, p. 279 ff.). The use in Homer (*Il.* ii. 426), in Archilochus (*Fragm.* 12), or in Sophocles (*Antig.* 1007) of "Ηφαιστος for fire is neither allegory nor a conscious substitution of the gift of the god for his name (Plutarch,

Quom. adol. poet. aud. deb. p. 23*ab*), but a direct identification of the god with his earliest form of earthly manifestation. Hephæstus is here, to adopt Usener's terminology, the 'divinity of the moment' (*Götternamen*, p. 279 ff.). A similar explanation must be given of the Cyclops—Brontes, Steropes, Arges (Hesiod, *Theog.* 140), and of Scamander, which in Homer is both god and stream, as well as of Uranos, Gaia, Demeter, Chaos, etc. There are figures, which in the later evolution unite themselves to the elementary divinities, whose names and natures are identical, *e.g.*, Eris (*Il.* iv. 440, v. 518, 740, xi. 3 f., xviii. 535, xx. 48; Hesiod, *Op.* 16, 24, 28, 804, *Theog.* 225, etc.), Phobos, Deimos, Kydoimos (*Il.* iv. 440, xiii. 299, xv. 119, v. 593, xviii. 535), Zelos, Nike (Hesiod, *Theog.* 384), and others. Only the most superficial consideration, however, can call such a usage allegorical. It is simply owing to the difficulty we have in analyzing such a pantheon of abstract conceptions and such a theology, and for want of a better term, that we call them personifications. It is quite impossible in such cases to speak of an allegory, seeing that in Homer and Hesiod we are dealing with a world of ideas still comparatively naïve. Allegory is much more the child of a reflective epoch.

The assertion that piety is the mother of allegorical explanation is entirely correct (cf., *e.g.*, Gomperz, *Griechische Denker*, i. 305). The 6th cent. before Christ rejected the gods of Homer and Hesiod. Xenophanes (*Fragm.* 11, 12, Diels), Pythagoras (Diog. Laert. viii. 19, 21), and Heraclitus (*Fragm.* 42 D) attack with all their energy the religious views of their predecessors and contemporaries. But the piety of the faithful was not brought by means of these attacks to give up its ideals then any more than it is to-day; it had recourse to the method, so often practised since, of reading a new meaning into the sacred tradition, and thus protecting it from the satire of its critics. Quite a number of men meet us in this connexion, who sought, often by very childlike or indeed childish means, to succour the ancient tradition, but who themselves regarded their undertaking with religious earnestness. The oldest of these was Theagenes of Rhegium, who flourished at the time of Cambyses (Tatian, *adv. Græcos*, 31). He wrote an 'Apology' for the Homeric poetry (Schol. Hom. *Il.* xx. 67), and probably (cf. Schrader, *Porphyrii quæstionum Homericarum ad Iliadem pertinentium reliquiæ*, Leipzig, 1880, p. 384) sought to save the battle of the gods in the twentieth book of the Iliad by a physical and ethical interpretation. Others are said to have made similar attempts. The philosopher Anaxagoras interpreted Homer's poetry in a purely ethical way (Favorinus in Diog. Laert. ii. 3. 11), and his pupil Metrodorus of Lampsacus followed a similar method in his physical explanation of the Homeric figures. For him Demeter was the liver, Dionysus the spleen, Apollo the gall; Hector signified the moon, Achilles the sun, Agamemnon the earth, Helena the air (cf. the passages in Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, p. 339). Diogenes of Apollonia went on similar lines (Philodem. *de Piet.* c. 6*b*) when he found in Homer not myths but truth, and identified Zeus with the air. Democritus of Abdera too, an enthusiastic admirer of Homer (*Fragm.* 18, 21, Diels), inclined to an allegorical interpretation of the gods (*Fragm.* 30 D). When we consider, further, how much interest religious questions excited in Athens in the middle of the 5th cent., how, for instance, Aristophanes ridiculed the new doctrines of philosophy (*Nub.* 828, 380 ff.), and when we remember that the rationalistic historians from Hecatæus and Herodotus onwards had stripped the old miraculous legends as far as possible of their supernatural character, it is easy to understand that a related, if not an entirely identical, movement had to make itself felt in poetry as well. Euripides, the pupil of Anaxagoras (cf. *Fragm.* 487, 839, 877, Nauck), is by no means an allegorist, although he, too, resolves Zeus into ether (*Troades*, 884; *Fragm.* 941). The true allegorist, as we have seen, has a fixed system. The poet Euripides, moved as he is by doubts, appears now as a believer, and again as a sceptic. In his later years he wrote the *Bacchæ*, in which he gives a purely rationalistic explanation of the birth of Dionysus (vv. 286 ff.). This is also a way of saving the old tradition, but it is not, properly speaking, allegorical. In the place of a silly fable we find a new and no less silly myth. Such a proceeding, however, is not allegorizing (cf. also Decharme, *l.c.* 295).

Up to this point we have constantly spoken of 'allegory,' as if this expression were found in the philosophers themselves. This is, however, by no means the case. We find a number of writers giving allegorical interpretations, who never use the word itself. The older expression, which was used till 'allegory' occurs in the 1st cent. B.C. (cf. Cicero, *Orator*, 94; Plutarch, *Quom. adol. poet. aud. deb.* p. 19 f.), was *ὑπόνοια*. Thus Xenophon uses the word in the well-known passage of his *Symposium* (iii. 6), where he adduces Stesimbrotus of Thasos and Anaximander (cf. also Plato, *Ion*, 530 D, who mentions Glaucon by the side of Metrodorus and Stesimbrotus) as teachers of Antisthenes in this method of explaining Homer. As a matter of fact, the Cynical school had with conscious purpose reduced the allegorical interpretation of Homer to a system. The writings of Antisthenes were largely occupied with the poetry of Homer and the figures it contained (Diog. Laert. vi. 1, 17 f.); and we learn from the fifty-third oration of Dio Chrysostom (p. 276 R), that he distinguished in Homer between *δόξα* and *ἀλήθεια*, and that he allegorized the poet (cf. Schrader, *l.c.* 387 f.; Dio Chrysost. viii. 283 R; Xenoph. *Memor.* i. 3. 7; Dümmler, *Antisthenica*, 22 ff.) In spite of their utter denial of the existence of a plurality of gods, and their emphatic rejection of the figures of mythology, the Cynics were quite unable to free themselves from the spell of the Homeric poetry. Plato is the opponent of Homer and Antisthenes; he often treats with playful sarcasm the attempts of the 'great Homer experts' to interpret the names and actions of the gods allegorically (*Cratyl.* p. 407 A; *Phædr.* 229 C; *Repub.* 378 D, where again the word *ὑπόνοια* appears).

Thus the beginning of a system of allegorizing had been made. The Stoics undertook its completion, and their views passed on later to the Jews and the Christians, and thence more or less directly to our own time. The passage from Dio referred to above mentions the Stoic Zeno as the follower of Antisthenes in his method of explaining Homer, and the fragments we possess from the hand of the founder of the Stoical school bear witness to his allegorical point of view (Arnim, *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, i. pp. 43, 167 ff.). Chrysippus, the head of the Stoical school, has, of course, taken great delight in working out the method.

Zeus is for him the Logos, who orders all things; he derives his name from his life-giving activity (*ζῆν*). Male and female divinities do not exist: Ares is war, Hephæstus fire, Kronos the stream, Rhea the earth, Zeus ether, Hermes reason. Almost all the names of the gods suggest such an interpretation, as Rhea comes from *ῥεῖν*, Themis from *θέσις*, Kronos from *χρόνος* or *κρᾶν* (*κιρνᾶν*), Apollo from the circumstance that he was *οὐχὶ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ φαύλων οὐσιῶν τοῦ πυρός* (cf. Arnim, *l.c.* ii.; *Fragm.* 1076, 1079, 1084, 1087, 1090, 1095).

It serves no purpose to refer to the many (often self-contradictory) interpretations of the Stoics (cf. Chrysippus), but we may mention in passing that in the person of Crates of Mallus this method of

interpretation extended itself to the exposition of Homer as a whole (Wachsmuth, *de Cratete Mallota*, p. 62). Two unsatisfactory though not uninteresting writings which are still extant, the *Allegoriæ Homericæ* of Heraclitus and the *Theologiæ Græcæ compendium* of Cornutus, prove to us the wide diffusion of these views, and show of what excesses the allegorical method of interpretation is capable. Of the two, Heraclitus is the less annoying; he at least has some feeling; he hates Plato and Epicurus (cap. 4), in fact all those who are not enthusiastic admirers of his beloved Homer. Accordingly, he endeavours to meet the old objections raised against the weakness and sins of the Homeric gods.

Thus the chaining of Hera (*Il.* iii. 277) is explained as the union of the elements (23); the hurling of Hephæstus through the air (i. 592) signifies the earthly fire, which is weaker than the heavenly flame (thus Hephæstus is χωλός) (26); the wounding of Aphrodite and of Ares (v. 336 ff., 858 ff.) is to be understood as the defeat of the barbarian army (ἀφροσύνη='Αφροδίτη), which sends forth unearthly noises (30, 31); the union of Aphrodite and Ares (*Od.* viii. 266 ff.) is the combination of love and strife in harmony. These interpretations are so general that even Apollodorus, the great Athenian student of Greek religion, grants them his recognition (Cornutus, p. 49, 4; Münzel, *Quæstiones mythographæ*, p. 17). Other testimonies to the allegorical usage are given, for instance, by Strabo (p. 18), and by the author of the pseudo-Plutarchic writing, *de Vita et poesi Homeri*; but it would serve no purpose to follow this out in detail.

In spite, however, of the strength of this movement, it had by this time reached a very definite limit. Plato, as we saw above, derided the attempts of Antisthenes to defend Homer allegorically. His followers, the members of the so-called Middle Academy, along with the Epicureans, made use of sceptical arguments, and renewed the conflict against the Stoics, the successors of the Cynical school. The chief representative of this line of thought is Carneades, who practically advocated the views of his teacher, Arcesilaus; his attack is contained in the third book of Cicero's *de Natura Deorum*, and in Sextus Empiricus, *adv. Mathem.* ix. He regarded the interpretation of the myths as entirely meaningless, and reproached the Stoics for regarding as wise the inventors of such disreputable stories (Cicero, *l.c.* iii. 24, 62). The Epicureans expressed themselves to the same effect; they found all those allegorical gods of the Stoa nothing but absurdities, and they applied the term 'godless' to the mode of procedure of the sect, for the effect of these very interpretations was to make the gods appear as perishable (Philodem. *de Piet.* cap. 18). These opinions were then, to a large extent, taken over by the Christians, although they, in like manner, early fell under the spell of allegory.

The attack was keenly maintained, but a great movement has never yet been checked by harsh contradiction. The 1st cent. before and after Christ is the great era of the Stoa, which at a later date even occupied the Imperial throne in the person of Marcus Aurelius. But, what is more important, these views made their way into Judaism. The Wisdom of Solomon is under the influence of the Stoa, and the allegorical interpretation of the Jewish law is found in the letter of Aristeas (§ 143 ff.), just as symbolical explanations occur among the Essenes (Philo, *Qu. omn. prob. lib.* ii. p. 458, Mangey). Philo, however, is the chief representative of this direction of thought. Attempts have been made to trace back his allegorical exposition of the Scriptures to the Haggada. And this much, at any rate, is certain, that there were interpreters before Philo who made use of the same method of explanation, for he frequently refers to such expositions of the Old Testament.

Those 'Physicists' had explained Abraham as the νοῦς, and Sarah as virtue (Philo, *de Abrah.* ii. 15, Mangey); again, the king of Egypt was the νοῦς as ruler of the body (*de Jos.* ii. p. 68, Mangey); they interpreted the rite of the Passover as referring either to the purification of soul or to the creation of the world (*de Septen.* ii. 291); and in this way a number of Scripture passages obtained a moral interpretation (*e.g.* Gn 21^{23}, Dt 25^{11}; cf. *de Plant. Noë*, i. 337; *de Spec. Leg.* ii. 329); there were even definite rules for this exegesis (*de Somn.* i. 631, 611, 660).

But Philo not merely followed in the footsteps of his predecessors; his aim rather was to reduce the allegorical explanation to a kind of system. There is no writer who shows more clearly than he the origin of the allegorical method. Philo tells us often of the different attacks which the opponents of the Scriptures, *i.e.* the Greeks, made on the Biblical narratives. He reprimands the detestable people who express amazement at God's changing His opinion, and writes against them the pamphlet, *Quod Deus sit immutabilis*; he is well aware that the same persons mock at the tower of Babel (*de Conf. Ling.* i. 405), smile at the serpent in Paradise (*de Mund. Op.* i. 38), explain the swearing or wrathful God of Israel as a monster (*Leg. all.* i. 128; *Quod Deus s. imm.* i. 282), and make merry over Joseph's dreams (*de Jos.* ii. 59). This Greek criticism, which lasted from the days of Philo till the fall of paganism, compelled the Jews, and after them the Christians, to give an allegorical meaning, a ὑπόνοια, to the sacred Scriptures, just as, at an earlier date, it had compelled the faithful among the pagans. But, besides that, by Philo the Scriptures are best regarded as an allegory (*de Jos.* ii. 46; here, again, the term ὑπόνοια is used); the allegorical exposition is the soul of the sacred text, the literal meaning only its body (*de Migr. Abr.* i. 450), a comparison which Origen later adopts (see below). The literal meaning of a passage would, according to Philo, lead to absurdity and impiety,—here, too, Origen is his pupil,—and literal obedience to the precepts of the Law would be preposterous (*e.g. Leg. all.* i. 44; *de Conf. Ling.* i. 425; *de Somn.* 634; *de Spec. Leg.* ii. 329; *de Agric.* i. 324, etc.). We cannot here go on to speak of the reasons which, according to Philo, caused the Deity to give such incomplete representations of Himself, nor is it possible to introduce a large number of individual allegories. The history of allegorical exegesis is tedious enough owing to the want of diversity in the method. Accordingly it may suffice to give a few instances, which any one can easily amplify for himself, from Siegfried's book, *Philo von Alexandria als Ausleger des AT.* pp. 160–272.

Philo recognizes in Paradise the ἡγεμονικόν of the soul, in the tree of life the fear of God, in the tree of knowledge the φρόνησις (*de Mund. Op.* i. 37; *Leg. all.* i. 56); the four rivers of Paradise are the four cardinal virtues (*de Post. Caini*, i. 250; *Leg. all.* i. 56); Abel is pure piety without intellectual culture, Cain the egoist, Seth the virtue which is imbued with wisdom (*Qu. det. pot. ins.* i. 197; *de Sacrif. Ab.* i. 163; *de Post. Caini*, i. 249), Enoch hope (*Qu. det. pot. ins.* i. 217; *de Præm. et Pœn.* ii. 410), etc.; Hagar signifies the ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία, Sarah virtue and wisdom (*de Cherub.* i. 139 f.); Joseph is the type of the statesman (*de Jos.* ii. 41); his coat of many colours indicates that his political policy is intricate and difficult to unravel (*Qu. det. pot. ins.* i. 192); in the Law (Dt $21^{15\text{-}17}$) the one beloved wife is pleasure, the other who is hated is virtue (*de Sacrif. Ab. et Caini*, i. 167); and so on.

Seeing that the allegories crowd in on Philo in such a way, it is natural for him to interpret the same passage in different allegorical ways (*de Prof.* i. 572); moreover, the same facile hand occasionally changes the text, just when it suits his allegory to do so (*Qu. det. pot. ins.* i. 200).

The Jewish method of interpretation was carried over into *Christian* exegesis, although the influence of Philo did not make itself particularly felt till the 2nd and 3rd centuries. Thus St. Paul, as well as the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, makes ready use of allegorical exegesis (cf. Gal 4^{24} 3^{16}, 1 Co 9^{9}); and the Epistle of Barnabas, with its search for a spiritual meaning behind the letter, is a product of the Jewish tradition. This need of allegorizing is seen still more plainly in the Apologists.

This is particularly true of Justin Martyr, who interprets a number of Old Testament prophecies in a most daring fashion: thus Gn 49^{11}, 'he hath washed his garments in wine, and his vesture in the blood of grapes,' means that he will purify the faithful in whom the Logos dwells, with his blood, which, like the juice of the grape, comes from God (*Apol.* i. 32); when it is said, 'the government shall be upon his shoulder' (Is 9^{6}), the meaning is that Christ would be hung on the cross. The Gnostics go still further. They allegorize in their Oriental manner not only the Old Testament, but also the New, discovering in the simplest words and incidents ever anew their 'Demiurge,' their 'Bythos,' their 'Achamoth,' and their 'eternal Wisdom' (Irenæus, i. 1. 17, 15; Hatch, *Influence of Gr. Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church*, p. 75).

The enormous syncretism of the 2nd cent. drew allegory into its circle. When we see Greeks and Christians contending with one another, we become quite bewildered with the confusion of terms. The Apologists unite with the Sceptics in their opposition to allegory (Aristides, xiii. 7, Seeberg; Tatian, *adv. Græc.* 21; pseudo-Clem. Rom. *Hom.* vi. 17, etc.); but they themselves calmly use allegorical interpretation. Celsus is perfectly justified in his attack on this method, which he designates as a retreat of shame at the immoral stories of the Bible (Origen, *c. Cels.* i. 17, iv. 48 ff.). But, again, Celsus is an allegorist himself (*l.c.* vi. 42), and so both parties, Greeks as well as Christians, tread the same erroneous path.

Allegory had, in fact, become to the men of this time a religious requirement. Although Irenæus and Tertullian scornfully reject the Gnostic interpretations, yet the method took firmer hold, and, along Philo's lines, developed just as luxuriantly as in the Græco-Judæan empire. The language of Clement of Alexandria, revelling as it does in symbolic pictures, at once betrays the allegorist; but it is not worth our while to go into his individual allegorical interpretations here (*Strom.* i. 3. 23, vi. 11. 94; *Pæd.* ii. 8. 62), as they do not essentially differ from those of other Theosophists. Then, Hippolytus is an allegorist, in the full sense of the term, in his commentary on Daniel (cf. i. ch. 13 ff.), and especially in the Canticles, where the interpretation follows that of the Jewish Rabbi Akiba. Origen gave the allegorical method a kind of scientific basis. He also commented on the Canticles, and here we see the influence of Philo more definitely than in his predecessors (cf. p. 8). For it is with the influence of Philo that we have here to deal, not that of Cornutus, as Porphyry, the opponent of Origen, asserts (Eusebius, *HE* vi. 19. 8). According to Origen, then, as to the Hellenistic Jews, there is a threefold conception of Scripture, —the simple man is edified by means of the 'flesh' of the Bible, the advanced by means of its 'soul,' the perfected by the pneumatic *νόμος*, which has a shadow of good things to come (*de Princ.* iv. 11). Thus the understanding of Scripture stands in the most intimate relationship to human nature. There are, however, in Scripture all kinds of *σκάνδαλα*, *προσκόμματα*, and historical impossibilities. Origen, well instructed in the heathen polemics, agrees that there could have been no days before the creation of the stars, and that God could not, like a gardener, plant trees or take walks. It was also impossible to talk of God's face, from which Cain hid himself. Then the Gospels, as well as the OT law, contain precepts which are not to be literally followed (*e.g.* Lk 10^{4}, Mt $5^{39.\ 29}$; cf. 1 Co 7^{18}). And there is no lack of stories which are absurd when taken literally, as, *e.g.*, that Satan brought Jesus to the top of a high mountain (Mt $4^{8ff.}$). Now it would be quite false to reject the whole on account of such peculiarities; on the contrary, where the literal meaning is unworthy of the wisdom of revelation, it is the proper thing to look for the *ὑπόνοια*. The *πνευματικόν*, but not the *σωματικόν*, goes through the whole of the Scriptures; in some passages the latter is impossible. Thus the allegorical wisdom received its academical consecration, and it made little difference that Porphyry, the passionate opponent of Christianity, declared himself against the method (Eusebius, *HE* vi. 19. 4), seeing he himself, as is well known, did no better (cf. the case of Celsus, above). A more threatening opposition arose from another quarter, from the camp of the Christians themselves. We know quite a succession of ecclesiastical writers who declared themselves against Origen's allegorical system. These are the representatives of the school of Antioch (Julius Africanus): Lucian, Eustathius of Antioch (*de Engastrimytho*, ed. Jahn, *Texte und Untersuchungen*, ii. 4; cf. especially ch. xxi. f.), Diodorus of Tarsus (*τίς διαφορὰ θεωρίας καὶ ἀλληγορίας*), Isidorus of Pelusium, and, above all, Theodore of Mopsuestia, who wrote, among other works, five whole volumes against the allegorists (cf. for him, Kihn, *Theodor von Mopsuhestia und Junilius Africanus als Exegeten*). These men, of course, did not think of bluntly rejecting the pneumatical exegesis as unjustified; they only sought, by calling in question the sole supremacy of the allegorical interpretation, to restore the historical basis which had been destroyed by the allegorists. This they did by attempting to disclose the *typical* meaning after having ascertained the verbal signification. But they could not in this way really reach consistency. The allegorical method was, after all, more logical than the exegesis of the school of Antioch, which, in recognizing typology and in distinguishing a double meaning in Scripture, again came nearer to the allegorical interpretation, and, particularly by accepting Messianic passages in the OT, made its own position untenable. Theodore himself is the best example of this. It is quite refreshing to learn his opinions regarding the Book of Job and the Canticles (Migne, *Patrologia Græca*, lxvi. 697 ff.): the former resembles a Greek drama, the latter a love poem, in which Solomon celebrates his marriage with an Egyptian woman. The Psalms, too, were explained historically by Theodore. But then, again, comes the reaction. Although Theodore does not deny that, *e.g.*, Zec 9^{9-10} refers to Zerubbabel, and although he expresses himself strongly against those who interpret one part of the prophet's words as applying to him, and another part as referring to Christ, still he finds a kind of mediation in the thought that a considerable part of the prophetic message is to be understood 'hyperbolically,' *i.e.* its full truth was first found in Jesus Christ (cf. *Comment. in Zach.* ix. p. 554 f. 11). Similarly, too, he interprets Ps 54 as referring to Onias, but, at the same time, as being a *σκιαγραφία* (cf. above, Origen, and Theodore himself [p. 555]) of the sufferings of our Lord. Another excellent example (Jl 2^{28-32}) is given more fully by Kihn, *loc. cit.* 137. Theodore's exegesis continued to flourish in the school of Nisibis, and obtained, by means of Julius Africanus, an entrance into the West (Kihn, *loc. cit.* p. 215 ff.).

The allegorical method was not emphatically enough combated by this new method, which in the place of the one *ὑπόνοια* only set another, notwithstanding the vigour with which the champions of the doctrine of Antioch in thoroughly Greek style carried on the conflict. It was now no longer possible to overthrow the system; it had already become far too necessary an element in Greek thought. Gregory of Nyssa seems to have quite made up his mind not to reduce the Scriptures to an allegory (*Hexæmeron*, i. p. 6. 42, 43); but then, again, he takes a delight in all allegorical representations, and gives some himself, particularly in his explanation of the Canticles. Gregory of Nazianzus, who, like all the Apologists, opposes the heathen allegories, wishes to adopt in the interpretation of Scripture a *via media* between

the παχύτεροι τὴν διάνοιαν and the allegorists (*Orat.* xlv. 12), but he also declares: ἔνδυμα τῆς ἀσεβείας ἐστὶν ἡ φιλία τοῦ γράμματος (*Orat.* xxxi. 3).

Allegorical interpretation flourished also in the West. Its rules had been taught at an early date in the rhetorical schools (Jerome, *Com.* on *Ep. ad Gal.* ii. 4. 24). Alongside of Hilary and Ambrose, the great name to be mentioned here is that of Jerome, who lays down the maxim (*Comment. in Mal* 1^{10a}, vi. 952, Migne): 'Regula scripturarum est: ubi manifestissima prophetia de futuris texitur, per incerta allegoriæ non extenuare quæ scripta sunt,' but who at the same time explains Leah as Judaism, Rachel as Christianity (*Ep.* cxxiii. 13, i. p. 910, Migne), and declares (*ad Am.* lib. i. 2. 1 ff., vi. 238, Migne): 'Qui legit introiisse Judam ad Thamar meretricem et ex ea duos filios procreasse, si *turpitudinem* sequatur *litteræ* et non ascendet ad decorem *intellegentiæ spiritalis*, comburat ossa regis Idumææ.' Augustine here, as in all other departments, occupies a prominent place. He follows in his writing, *de Doctrina Christiana*, the seven hermeneutic rules of the Donatist Tychonius (iii. 30), and gives a lively and delightful representation of the duties of the expositor. In spite, however, of the breadth of his view, he too appeals to the old text, 2 Co 3^6, that the letter killeth (iii. 5); and thus we kill our souls when, in following the letter, we subject our *intellegentia* to the flesh (cf. Origen, above). But Augustine in many Biblical passages recognizes not so much an allegorical meaning as *figurata locutio* (xi. 15): 'Servabitur ergo in locutionibus figuratis regula huiusmodi, ut tamdiu versetur diligenti consideratione quod legitur, donec ad regnum caritatis interpretatio perducatur.' It requires, however, no more than these seven rules of Tychonius to show us that Biblical exegesis was threatened with a schematism which, in a short time, prevailed. Cassiodorus, who in like manner makes use of Tychonius, postulates in his book *Institutiones divinarum et sæcularium literarum* six *modi intellegentiæ*; and Eucherius proceeds according to the same example in his *Formulæ spiritalis intellegentiæ*, which now furnish us with a copious table of individual allegories. Thus a special meaning is afforded when Scripture speaks of the features of God—the eyes of God are His insight, His mouth is His speech, and so on.

But, in addition to that, every individual thing has its definite meaning: the ice is = *durities peccatorum*; the winds = *animæ sanctorum*; the shadow = *protectio divina*; the stones = either Christ or *sancti*; roses are = *martyres a rubore sanguinis*; the fishes = *sancti*; the raven = *nigredo peccatoris vel dæmonis*; the lion = *dominus*; the bear = *diabolus aut duces sævi*, but the wolf and the wild boar are also representations of the devil; the tiger is = *feminea interdum interrogantia*; the camel = *divites rebus sæculi onusti vel moribus distorti.*

After winning these triumphs, the Middle Ages fell asleep, and it is impossible for us here to trace the vagaries of allegorical interpretation further. The interpretation, which finds expression in the following well-known couplet, becomes quite a fixed rule:—

'Littera gesta docet, quid credas *allegoria*,
Moralis quid agas, quo tendas analogia.'

Bernard of Clairvaux is an enthusiastic allegorist of the Canticles. Thomas Aquinas (*Summa Theol.* i. art. 10) distinguishes the *sensus historicus vel litteralis* from the *sensus spiritualis, qui super litteralem fundatur et eum supponit*, and this distinction prevailed for centuries. It was not till the Reformation that this way of interpreting was called in question. Luther, who confesses that as monk he had allegorized everything, seeks, along with the other Reformers, only for the *sensus litteralis* (Heinrici, in Hauck, *PRE*^{3}, vii. art. 'Hermeneutik'). Of course he still interprets Canticles allegorically, but does not express himself so enthusiastically regarding it as either the theologians of the Middle Ages or many later exegetes. The Canticles, in fact, have been to a large extent the test for the later Biblical interpretation. Generally speaking, the allegorical method has in modern times fallen into disuse. Men like Cocceius belong to the exceptions, and Biblical criticism on a historical and grammatical basis has, particularly since the end of the 18th cent., almost annihilated allegorical exegesis. Still the interpretation of the Canticles, which held its place in the Canon, has again and again raised up friends of the old method. Although H. Grotius, as early as the 17th cent., treated the poem to a large extent historically and grammatically, and Herder, at the end of the 18th cent., offered a purely historical and literary explanation, still there have been even in our times men like O. von Gerlach and Hengstenberg, who have more or less preferred the old interpretation of the Canticles as referring to Christ and the Church. This is the exegesis which still prevails in the Roman Catholic Church.

A few words remain yet to be said with regard to the Jewish allegorists. The 2nd cent. of our era produced quite a succession of these exegetes. We have already noted above (p. 330^a) that the allegorical interpretation of the Canticles is due originally to R. Akiba. Among the Jews, no less than among the Christians, keen controversies have raged, and the 13th cent. in particular is remarkable for the passions which this dispute called forth. Among the Jewish interpreters of the Bible at the present day the allegorical method is the method of interpretation which finds most general favour.

JOH. GEFFCKEN.

ALL FOOLS' DAY.—This has been authoritatively defined as a humorous name for the First of April, the day which has been popularly appropriated to the custom of playing the fool by means of practical jokes at the expense of a person's credulity. The term is of comparatively modern use; the practice is wide-spread, but of obscure origin.

The phrase is used by Swift in 1712: 'A due donation for All Fools' Day' (Hone's *Every Day Book*, i. 205). It occurs in 1760 in *Poor Robin's Almanack*: 'The First of April some do say Is set apart for All Fools' Day' (Brand, *Pop. Antt.*). Charles Lamb uses the expression: 'All Fools' Day. The compliments of the season to my worthy masters.'

The custom is wide-spread. Hearne, in his diary, under April 2, 1712, writes: 'Yesterday being the first of April (a day remarkable in England for making of April Fools),' etc. (Hearne's *Collection*, vol. iii. Oxf. Hist. Soc. 1888). Congreve in 1687 refers to the fools'-errands practised on the First of April: 'That's one of Love's April-fools, is always upon some errand that's to no purpose.' There is also in the *Oxf. Eng. Dictionary* a reference as early as 1609, from Dekker's *Gull's Hornebook* (ed. Grosart, ii. 209): 'To the intent I may aptly furnish this feast of Fooles.' There is no distinct reference to the practice in Shakespeare, unless, in the light of the Congreve quotation above, the following from *As You Like It* may be taken as an allusion to it:

'*Ros.* Now tell me how long you would have her after you have possessed her.
Orl. For ever and a day.
Ros. Say "a day" without the "ever." No, no, Orlando; men are April when they woo, December when they wed.'—IV. i. 143.

Brockhaus (*Konv. Lexikon*) says that the practice is unknown to German antiquity, and appears to have been introduced from France.

The origin of the practice is obscure. It is clear from Dekker that it was widely prevalent at the close of the 16th century. It seems difficult,

therefore, to accept the theory that it was due to the transference of New Year's Day from the First of April to the First of January. In France this is said to have been due to an order of Charles IX. in 1564, and it is suggested that for the *étrennes*, or New Year's gifts which were transferred to the First of January—

'on ne fit plus que des félicitations de plaisanterie aux personnes qui s'accommodaient avec regret au nouveau régime. On fit mieux encore; on s'amuse à les mystifier par des cadeaux simulés ou par des faux messages, et finalement, comme au mois d'avril le soleil quitte le signe zodiacal des Poissons, nos aïeux donnèrent à ces simulacres le nom de poissons d'avril' (*Nouv. Dict. Larousse Illust.*).

But is not this itself a *plaisanterie*? New Year's gifts were, at least in England, given at the beginning of January before 1564. It is on record that they were presented to Henry VI. between Christmas Day and 4th Feb. 1428 (Rymer's *Fœdera*, x. 387). And 'Sol in piscibus' stood of old in the calendars much as the phrase 'Sun enters the sign Pisces' stands in the calendar for 1907 against 19th Feb. The *poissons d'avril* were caught under the Ram. They cannot even come under the category of the Irish Bull.

Other suggestions have been made as to the origin of this practice of making an April-fool, or 'hunting the gowk,' as it is termed in Scotland. Some have seen in it a parody of the changeableness of April weather. Others regard it as a reminiscence of the solemn fooling in the Miracle Plays. Another sees in it a relic of the Roman *Cerealia*, held at the beginning of April.

'The tale is that Proserpine was sporting in the Elysian meadows, and had just filled her lap with daffodils, when Pluto carried her off to the lower world. Her mother Ceres heard the echo of her screams, and went in search of the voice; but her search was a fool's errand,—it was hunting the gowk or looking for the echo of a scream' (Brewer, *Dict. of Phrase and Fable*).

May not this be numbered among the fables, the *Cerealia* being kept from April 12 to 19?

Fooling similar to that which characterizes the First of April takes place at the Holī Festival in India; and Maurice (*Ind. Ant.* vi. 71) says:

'The First of April in England and the Holi Festival in India had their origin in the ancient practice of celebrating the Vernal Equinox.'

The similarity of the fooling in India and the Celtic lands of Western Europe, taken together with affinities in religion and folklore, illustrated by the cross-legged figure of the Celtic deity Cernunnos in the Bordeaux Museum, points to a common origin in very early times, and supports Maurice's conclusion. The same conclusion is expressed in other words in Brockhaus' *Konvers. Lex.*:

'dass er der Rest eines alten heidnischen vielleicht altkeltischen Festes ist, welches mit dem Beginn des Frühlinges im Zusammenhange stand.'

In whose honour this old Celtic Festival was held, and what religious mystery or rite underlay the fooling, has yet to be traced. It is only possible to suggest the lines along which the solution may be found.

Two points have to be noted. The rite—if such fooling may be dignified by the name of rite—must be performed at the passing of March, *i.e.* on the First of April. It must also be finished before noon. These points are confirmed by two rhymes. In North Staffordshire, if the joke is played in the afternoon, those who are trying to practise the joke are met with the retort:

'March is gone, and April come;
You're a fool, and I'm none.'

In South Staffordshire the rhyme runs:

'April-fool's dead and gone,
You're ten fools to make me one.'

These rhymes, preserved in a district still strongly versed in old Celtic folklore, point not only to the antiquity of the custom, but to its being associated with some ancient pagan rite, celebrated between the evening of the last day of March and the morning of the First of April.

Is there any means of tracing the origin and affinity of the rite? The First of April was kept in ancient Rome as the Feast of Venus and Fortuna Virilis. Ovid says that Fortuna Virilis was worshipped by women that she might preserve their charms, and thus enable them to please their husbands (*Fasti*, iv. 145–149). How the men occupied themselves during the time the women were worshipping at the shrine of Fortuna Virilis, or whether they suspected they were being fooled by the women, cannot be known. As Fortuna Virilis was also the goddess of boys and youths, it is not impossible that the old game of 'blind-man's buff,' or 'hoodman-blind,' as it is in Shakespeare, may be a relic of the rite practised by the men on the occasion of this Festival. Or the fooling may be specially associated with this Spring Festival of Venus. It is on record that Q. Fabius Gurges, the Consul, at the close of the Samnite War, founded the worship of Venus Obsequens and Postvorta (Smith, *Class. Dict.* art. 'Venus'). Fuller details may be found in Livy (*Hist.* xi.).

It is to some Celtic form of this worship of Venus on the First of April that the origin of All Fools' Day must be traced. Rhys in his Hibbert Lectures shows an affinity between Venus and the maiden-mother Arianrhod, the daughter of Don.

'These remarks on the parallelism between the Celtic Sun-god and Balder would be incomplete without a word respecting the latter's mother, Frigg. She is proved, by the Anglo-Saxon word Frigedæg, now Friday, and by the old Norse habit of calling the planet Venus Frigg's Star, to have been treated to a certain extent as a counterpart of the Latin Venus. Her dwelling in a mansion called Fensal, the Hall of the Fen or Swamp, recalls Lleu's mother, Arianrhod, and her sea-girt castle' (Rhys, *Hibb. Lect.* p. 543).

And perhaps it is not merely accident that some of the most exquisite fooling in the *Mabinogion* is in 'Math, the son of Mathonwy.' Arianrhod was the mistress of the Culture Hero, Gwydion, son of Don. By her he had two sons, Llew or Lleu, the Sun-hero of Celtic mythology, and Dylan. The boy Llew was reared at Dinas Dinlle, on the Carnarvon coast near the southern end of the Menai Straits. A little distance to the south-west is a sunken reef known as Caer Arionrhod, the sea-girt Castle of Arianrhod in the *Mabinogion*. This was the scene of the magic fooling by which Gwydion won a name for his son Llew, and forced Arianrhod to invest him in the armour in which he was to shine. Llew's twin-brother was christened by order of Math, and immediately made for the sea. 'He swam as well as the best fish in its waters, and for this reason was called Dylan, the son of the wave' (Guest's *Mabinogion*, ed. Nutt, pp. 66–71). His name is commemorated in the headland Maenddulan on the same coast.

Llew and Dylan are held by Rhys to represent the principles of light and darkness, and it would be natural that any rite connected with the victory of the Sun-god Llew over Arianrhod and his twin-brother Dylan should be associated with the First of April. This suggestion also affords an explanation of the French phrase. Those who were fooled on the First of April, and suffered the discomfiture of Dylan, would suitably be named after his fish-like propensities, 'poissons d'avril.'

All Fools' Day may therefore be the relic of a Spring Festival of Llew. In the shining armour of the Sun, which he had won by his magic from Arianrhod, he triumphed at this season of the year over the cold gloom of the winter sunlight personified in his brother Dylan. These early myths took shape in religious rites, and were preserved in folklore and in popular rhymes and customs. Rhys, writing of the feast held on the First of August in honour of Lug, another name of the Sun-hero Llew, says:

'Look at the position of these places [Lyons, Laon, Leyden, all variants of the older Lugdunum] on the map, and take into

account those of Dinlleu in Arvon and Dinlle in the Wrekin district of Shropshire, also the places where the Lugnasad were celebrated in Ireland, and you will readily admit that the name Lugus, Lug, or Lleu was that of a divinity whose cult was practised by all probably of the Celts both on the Continent and in these islands' (*Hib. Lect.* p. 420).

Such a cult would almost of necessity involve a Spring Festival in which Llew would be associated with Arianrhod and his brother Dylan. And it may be noted that it is within sight of the Wrekin that the North Staffordshire rhyme runs:

'March is gone, and April come;
You're a fool, and I'm none.'

The lines point to the triumph of Llew and the discomfiture or fooling of Dylan.

LITERATURE.—Murray, *New Eng. Dict. s.v.*; Larousse, *Nouv. Dict. Illust.*; Brockhaus, *Konv. Lexikon*; Brewer, *Dict. of Phrase and Fable*; Chambers, *Book of Days*; Rhys, 'Celtic Heathendom,' *Hib. Lect.*, 1886; Guest, *Mabinogion*[2] (1904).

THOMAS BARNS.

ALMSGIVING.—See CHARITY.

ALTAR.

Introduction (L. H. GRAY), p. 333.
African, American (L. H. GRAY), p. 335.
Arabian.—See Semitic, p. 351.
Aramæan.—See Semitic, p. 352.
Assyrian.—See Semitic, p. 353.
Babylonian.—See Semitic, p. 352.
Canaanite.—See Semitic, p. 353.
Celtic (L. H. GRAY), p. 337.
Chinese (W. G. WALSHE), p. 337.
Christian (H. L. PASS), p. 338.
Egyptian (F. Ll. GRIFFITH), p. 342.
Greek (E. A. GARDNER), p. 342.
Hebrew.—See Semitic, p. 353.
Hindu (J. JOLLY), p. 345.
Japanese (W. G. ASTON), p. 346.
Persian (E. EDWARDS), p. 346.
Phœnician.—See Semitic, p. 353.
Polynesian (L. H. GRAY), p. 348.
Roman (E. A. GARDNER), p. 349.
Semitic (G. A. BARTON), p. 350.
Slavonic (L. LEGER), p. 354.
Teutonic (C. J. GASKELL), p. 354.

IN the most general sense of the term, an altar may be defined as a surface, usually elevated, but occasionally level with the ground, or even depressed beneath it, prepared or adapted to receive a sacrifice. It is thus, by implication, intimately connected with sacrifice (*q.v.*), and has seemingly been developed as a ritual adjunct to the oblation. Sacrifices are, however, not uncommonly made to natural objects by casting the offering into them. Thus, amongst the Nicaraguans, the human sacrifices to the volcano Masaya or Popogatepec were cast into the crater of the mountain, and amongst the Hurons tobacco was thrust into the crevice of a rock in which a spirit was believed to dwell (Tylor, *Pr. Cult.*[3] ii. 207–208); while, in similar fashion, pins and other trifles are dropped into holy wells in Cornwall and Armenia; and in Swabia, the Tyrol, and the Upper Palatinate, meal is flung into the face of the gale to placate the storm-demon (*ib.* pp. 214, 269; cf. also pp. 210–211; and Abeghian, *Armen. Volksglaube*, Leipzig, 1899, p. 58). The common Greek practice of making offerings to water deities, even to Poseidon himself, by permitting the blood of the sacrifice to flow immediately from the victim into the water, is too well known to require more than an allusion, and it is again exemplified both in Guinea and North America; while, in like manner, offerings are made to the earth by burying the sacrifice, as amongst the Khonds of Orissa (a mode of sacrifice which also occurs elsewhere in offerings to the dead), and to the fire by casting the offering into it, as amongst the Yakuts and the Carinthians (Tylor, *op. cit.* ii. 377–378, 407–408). Sacrifice to the dead may be made simply by casting the offering away at random, as in Melanesia (Codrington, *Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 128).

Sacrifices may also be offered either by placing the offering simply on the ground, as amongst the Indians of Brazil and the African negroes (cf. Jevons, *Introd. to Hist. of Rel.*, London, 1896, pp. 134–135); or by hanging the oblation on trees or poles, as amongst the ancient Swedes and the modern Semites, Armenians, Hindus, and some of the African tribes (cf. Tylor, *op. cit.* ii. 228; Curtiss, *Prim. Semit. Rel. To-day*, New York, 1902, pp. 91–92; Abeghian, *op. cit.* p. 59; Crooke, *Pop. Rel. and Folklore of N. India*, London, 1896, ii. 99–100, 102; Ellis, *Ewe-Speaking Peoples*, London, 1890, p. 42).

In considering the primitive purpose of the altar, it may not be amiss to discuss the etymology of the words denoting it in Semitic and Indo-Germanic. In the former group of languages 'altar' is represented by the Hebrew *mizbēaḥ* (Arab. *madhbaḥ*), a derivative of זבח (Assyr. *zibû*, Arab. *dhabaḥa*, etc.), 'to slaughter,' thus clearly indicating that the Semitic altar was for the slaughtered victim or its blood, not for the burnt-offering (the burnt-offering being of later development amongst the Semites; cf. W. R. Smith, pp. 350 ff.); and this is curiously confirmed by the fact that amongst the modern Semites there are no burnt-offerings, but only the slaughter of victims without burning (Curtiss, *op. cit.* p. 229).

But if we turn to the Indo-Germanic words for 'altar,' a striking diversity of terms awaits us. First and foremost is the Latin *altāre*, borrowed in many languages (*e.g.* Old High German *altāri*, Old Pruss. *altars*, Old Church Slav. *olŭtarĭ*, Lith. *altõrius*, Russ. *altarĭ*), and defined by Festus as follows: 'altaria sunt in quibus igne adoletur.' The word is commonly derived from *altus*, 'high'; but this must be rejected, since not only is the meaning unsatisfactory, but linguistic evidence is against it, *-āris* (*-ālis*) being used in Latin only to form an adjectival or nominal derivative from a noun (cf. *limināris* for an inferred *limināli*s, 'relating to the threshold,' from *limen*). It should plainly be connected with *ad-oleo*, 'to burn a sacrifice,' unaccented Lat. *a* in post-tonic syllables (the primitive form of *adoleo* being *ădaleo*) becoming *o* before *l* and labials, and probably stands, by dissimilation, for an inferred *altālis*, 'fiery' (cf. for this etymology and other Indo-Germanic cognates, Walde, *Lat. etymol. Wörterbuch*, Heidelberg, 1906, p. 9; the *t*, however, makes the derivation of *altāre* from the root *alē* very difficult, unless one may assume in it the presence of a 'root-determinative' *t* [cf. Persson, *Wurzelerweiterung und Wurzelvariation*, Upsala, 1891, pp. 28–35], though this method of etymologizing is rejected by many scholars). The second Lat. term for 'altar' is *ara*, Oscan *aasa*, Umbrian *asa*, which is most probably connected with *areo*, 'burn' (Walde, *op. cit.* p. 40).

The Greek terms for 'altar' are *βωμός*, *θυμέλη*, and *θυσιαστήριον*. The first of these, which stands in *Ablaut*-relation with Doric *βᾶμα* (Attic *βῆμα*), 'step,' itself occasionally means 'step' (*e.g. Odyss.* vii. 100); while the last two are both connected with *θύω*, 'to sacrifice,' especially by burning (cf. Latin *suf-fio*, 'fumigate,' etc.). Finally, in Germanic we have the Icelandic *stalli*, Anglo-

Saxon *weofod* or *wihbed*, and Gothic *hunslastaþs*, the first being etymologically akin to the Eng. *stall*, 'place,' the second denoting 'idol-table,' and the third 'place of sacrifice, housel-stead.' Finally, it may be noted that a modern Russian term for 'altar,' *žertveniikŭ*, also means 'place of sacrifice,' being a derivative of *žertva*, 'sacrifice'; but it must be borne in mind that this root is ultimately connected with Skr. *gar*, 'to praise,' so that the Slav. group, including Old Church Slav. *žrěti*, 'to sacrifice,' *žrŭtva*, 'sacrifice,' and *žrĭrĭcŭ*, 'priest,' seems to have regarded the sacrifice primarily as praise (cf. Miklosich, *Etymol. Wörterbuch der slav. Sprachen*, Vienna, 1886, p. 410)—a concept which is, perhaps, borrowed from Christianity.

It is thus evident that amongst the Semites the altar was primarily the place where the victim was slaughtered, and amongst the Indo-Germanic peoples the place where it was burnt.

It is clear from what has already been said that the altar, essentially an adjunct of the sacrifice, has been evolved later than the oblation, for many peoples have sacrificed, or made their offerings, and still do so, without altars; and there are considerable areas, particularly in Africa and South America, where the altar is entirely unknown, while the late development of the altar amongst the Indo-Germanic peoples is a commonplace (cf. Schrader, *RE der indogerm. Altertumskunde*, Strassburg, 1901, pp. 855, 861), and receives a striking exemplification in the relatively late evolution of the Indian *vedi* (see ALTAR [Hindu]). The latter represents, indeed, a curious type of altar, in that it is primarily a fire altar in a trench strewn with grass, evolving later into the common form of a raised altar for burnt-offerings. Its development thus shows all three forms of the altar — depressed below the ground, practically level with the ground, and elevated above the ground (cf. Ludwig, *Der Rigveda*, iii., Prague, 1878, p. 364 f.; Hillebrandt, *Ritual-Litteratur*, Strassburg, 1897, p. 14).

Allusion has already been made to the widespread custom of hanging offerings on sacred trees, and oblations are likewise placed on sacred stones. The best example of the latter phenomenon is perhaps found in the case of the Heb. *maṣṣēbāh*, 'upright stone, pillar' (from נצב, 'to take one's stand'; cf. Arab. *naṣaba*, 'to set up,' *nuṣb*, 'object set up, idol': for other cognates and for literature, cf. *Oxf. Heb. Lex.* pp. 662–663), which was regarded as a Divine abode and anointed with oil (*e.g.* Gn 28[18]). In like manner the Arab. *anṣāb* (plural of *nuṣb*, 'idol,' which is derived from *naṣaba* = נצב, and is thus linguistically connected with *maṣṣēbāh*) were anointed with blood (W. R. Smith, pp. 184, 321).

It is held by many that the sacred stone or tree and the altar 'originally were identical in use and purpose' (cf. Jevons, *op. cit.* pp. 134–135); but this view seems at least open to question, despite the support given to it by the history of the Semitic altar. Though the distinction may be deemed academic and subtle, the present writer feels that, while the deity is believed to be in the sacred stone or the sacred tree, he is never held to dwell in the altar. The altar is, in other words, from its very inception, the table on which the offering to the god is slaughtered, burnt, or deposited. The oil and blood on the sacred stone please and feed the deity, the rags on the sacred tree adorn him; but the offerings on the altar are taken by him, not placed upon him. In no sense, then, can the sacred tree or stone be considered identical with the altar, unless one is ready to regard the Ægæan Sea as an altar because offerings were cast into it in honour of Poseidon, or the crater of Mauna Loa as an altar since human sacrifices to Pele were hurled into its depths; for there seems to be no differentiation of kind between the besmearing of the sacred stone and the casting of an oblation into the ocean or into a crater.

The evolution of the altar will be considered more fully in the following sections devoted to it amongst individual peoples, but a brief allusion may be made to two forms of altar not always recognized as such. In the opening sentence it has been stated that the altar may sometimes be 'level with the ground, or even depressed beneath it.' In the former case we have a very primitive type indeed—but a step removed from the mere placing of offerings on the ground by interposing a layer of sand which serves as an altar. The typical example of this form is the Hopi altar, which is discussed in ALTAR (American), though an analogue may be traced in the Semitic use of the threshold as an altar (see Trumbull, *The Threshold Covenant*, London, 1896, *passim*), or in the mat-altars of the ancient Egyptians; as well as in the herbs on which the flesh of slaughtered victims was laid by the Persians (Herodotus, i. 132; Strabo, p. 732 f.).

The altar depressed below the ground is more than the mere trench which often surrounds the altar to receive the blood which flows from the sacrifice slaughtered upon it (cf. 1 K 18[32]; Wellhausen, *Reste des arab. Heidentums*[2], Berlin, 1897, p. 105), even as the altar itself frequently has hollows artificially made or modified in its upper surface to receive or carry off the blood (cf. Curtiss, *op. cit.* pp. 235–236). This form of depressed altar was particularly appropriate in sacrificing to the *manes*, and is admirably exemplified in the sacrifice made by Odysseus in order to enter Hades (*Odyss.* xi. 24–47; cf. Lucian, *Charon*, 22; Pausanias, x. 4–10); or again in the ancient Persian form of sacrifice to water (Strabo, *loc. cit.*), where, as in the Indian *vedi* (see above), we find the trench combined with the *quasi*-mat (for further instances of the Indo-Germanic trench-altar see art. ARYAN RELIGION). With all this may be compared the distinction in Chinese ritual between the victims sacrificed to earth and those offered to Heaven, the former being buried and the latter burnt.

The trench-altar is interestingly combined with the more usual form in the round altar with a hollow centre, through which the blood might flow immediately into the earth, found at Mycenæ, and corresponding with the hollow, round ἑσχάρα, 'hearth,' level with the ground, ἐφ' ἧς τοῖς ἥρωσιν ἀποθύομεν (Pollux, *Onomasticon*, i. 8; see Schuchhardt, *Schliemann's Excavations*, tr. Sellers, London, 1891, pp. 156–157); while the connecting bond between the two forms seems to be given by an altar discovered by Schliemann at Tiryns, consisting of a quadrangular block of masonry laid on the ground, with a round hole in the centre, lined with masonry to a depth of three feet, beneath being a rough earthen pit (Schuchhardt, *op. cit.* p. 107).

The probable general development of the altar may, in the light of what has been said, be sketched briefly as follows. Offerings were originally set upon the ground before the divinity, or placed upon the object in which he was believed to dwell, but as yet there was no altar. With the further evolution of the concept of sacrifice as a meal, either exclusively for the divinity or to be shared by him with his worshippers (for full details see art. SACRIFICE), and with the development of the idol-concept (see art. IMAGES AND IDOLS), natural objects, chiefly poles and stones, of appropriate shape were placed before the idol in which the deity was held to reside, and there received the offerings; or a thin substance was placed upon the ground to remove the offering from direct contact with the ground—thus giving the most primitive forms of the altar, which

might also be made of a pile of stones, or even of earth. As the shrine or temple (*q.v.*) was evolved, the altar was placed at first outside it, because of the small dimensions of the primitive shrine; but later it resumed its original place in front of the object in which the divinity was believed to dwell, or which symbolized the deity to whom sacrifice was made. With the development of art, the altar, which had long ceased to be left in its natural shape, despite the conservative character of religious ritual (cf. Ex 20^{25}), became varied in form, and was ornamented in accord with the best abilities of those who constructed it. The theory of the altar, however, is unchanged, whether victims be slaughtered on it, or whether it be used for burnt-offerings, or to receive and bear animal, vegetable, or other oblations (as in the Roman *lectisternium*, the Jewish table of shewbread, or many Polynesian altars), these distinctions belonging properly to the subject of sacrifice (*q.v.*). The human body has been used in at least two cults as an altar. In the Aztec Ochpaniztli, or broom feast, the woman who was to be sacrificed by decapitation was held by a priest on his back, he thus constituting an altar (*Bulletin 28 BE*, p. 174); while in Satanism (*q.v.*) the body of a nude woman forms the altar on which the Mass is parodied.

LITERATURE.—Jevons, *Introd. to Hist. of Rel.* (London, 1896) pp. 130–143; and see at end of following articles.

LOUIS H. GRAY.

ALTAR (African).—Nowhere, except in South America, is there so general a lack of the altar as in Africa—a phenomenon which closely corresponds to, and is in part indicative of, the primitive religious conditions of that continent, and also finds a partial explanation in the simplicity characterizing fetishism (*q.v.*), the prevailing type of religion there; though temples, or 'fetish huts,' are by no means unknown, even amongst tribes which have no altars, such as the Bantu Basogas (cf. Waitz, *Anthropol. der Naturvölker*, ii., Leipzig, 1860, pp. 184–185; Johnston, *Uganda Protectorate*, London, 1902, pp. 717–718). Thus, amongst the Hottentots, and even the Hovas of Madagascar, we find no traces of the altar (Waitz, *op. cit.* pp. 342, 440); while amongst the tribes of the West Coast, whose religion has been perhaps the most carefully studied, this feature of the cult plays relatively a very minor rôle. Attention should here be directed, however, to the sacrifices which are made by the Ewe-speaking peoples to Legba, the phallic deity, to whom 'on extraordinary occasions a human sacrifice is offered, the victim is disembowelled, the entrails placed in a dish or calabash before the image, and the body suspended on a tree or post in front of the shrine, where it is suffered to remain till it rots and falls to pieces' (Ellis, *Ewe-Speaking Peoples*, London, 1890, p. 42). Here both the dish and the tree (or post) represent a primitive form of altar, and in like manner we may regard the post on which a girl was impaled at Lagos to secure fertility for the ensuing year (Waitz, *op. cit.* p. 197) as a crude altar.

On the other hand, in the 'customs' of Dahomey (cf. Ellis, *op. cit.* pp. 120–138), the sacrificial victims were merely slaughtered on the ground; nor can the usage of burying living human beings when houses or villages were set up in Grand Bassam, Yarriba, and Dahomey (cf. the same custom in Polynesia), or the practice of staking out a victim in the path of a threatened invasion, where he was left to starve to death to deter the foe, be cited as referring in any way to the altar. Nevertheless, in Dahomey a rude form of altar is found in the small piles of earth placed at the foot of trees, the turning of roads, the entrance to houses or villages, and in open spaces, on which are set manioc, maize, palm-oil, and the like, as offerings to the spirits (Schneider, *Rel. der afrikan. Naturvölker*, Münster, 1891, p. 115).

Amongst the Tshi-speaking peoples of the Guinea Coast the country stool (*egwah*) of the god, 'which is the local symbol of authority,' is washed with the blood of human victims sacrificed in honour of the deity, whose own image receives a similar ablution, this being expressly recorded of the divinities Bobowissi, Ihtúri, Bons'ahnu, Behnya, and Prah (Ellis, *Tshi-Speaking Peoples*, London, 1887, pp. 23, 51–53, 65). But neither the stool nor the image can properly be termed an altar, any more than the elevations on which the idols are set in Dahomey temples, where 'the images of the gods are placed inside, usually on a raised rectangular platform of clay; and before them are the earthen pots and vessels, smeared with the blood, eggs, and palm-oil of countless offerings' (Ellis, *Ewe-Speaking Peoples*, p. 81).

Against this rather negative material may be set at least one African altar of a degree of development approximating to that found, for instance, in Polynesia. This is the one in the 'ju-ju house' at Bonny, thus described by de Cardi (in Mary Kingsley's *West African Studies*, London, 1899, p. 515):

> 'The altar looked very much like an ordinary kitchen plate rack with the edges of the plate shelves picked out with goat skulls. There were three rows of these, and on the three plate shelves a row of grinning human skulls; under the bottom shelf, and between it and the top of what would be in a kitchen the dresser, were eight uprights garnished with rows of goats' skulls, the two middle uprights being supplied with a double row; below the top of the dresser, which was garnished with a board painted blue and white, was arranged a kind of drapery of filaments of palm fronds, drawn asunder from the centre, exposing a round hole with a raised rim of clay surrounding it, ostensibly to receive the blood of the victims and libations of palm wine. To one side, and near the altar, was a kind of roughly made table fixed on four straight legs; upon this was displayed a number of human bones and several skulls; leaning against this table was a frame looking very like a chicken walk on to the table; this also was garnished with horizontal rows of human skulls—here and there were to be seen human skulls lying about; outside the ju-ju house, upon a kind of trellis work, were a number of shrivelled portions of human flesh.'

LOUIS H. GRAY.

ALTAR (American).—1. Among *the Indians of N. America* the altar played an important part, although, curiously enough, the Jesuit missionaries in New France make no mention of this adjunct of religious cult. This silence may be explained, at least in part, not only by the fact that these heroic and devoted souls were not trained observers, but also by the circumstance that the Algonquian and Iroquoian stocks among whom they laboured were essentially nomadic, and thus had neither temples nor altars sufficiently striking to attract the missionaries' attention. We know, however, that the Indians of Virginia had 'altars, which they call Pawcorances, placed in their fields, where they sacrifice blood and fat of savage beasts, and offer tobacco when they return from war or the chase' (de Laet, *L'Hist. du Nouveau Monde*, Leyden, 1640, iii. ch. 18). The Natchez, moreover, had a large temple, in the centre of which was an altar with a perpetual fire; while the Cadoan Assinai temples contained a wooden altar, on which stood leathern coffers, filled with leather dishes and musical instruments (Waitz, *Anthropol. der Naturvölker*, iii. 204, 220–221). The perpetual fire, it may be noted, was also maintained in Louisiana and amongst the Muskhogees (*ib.* pp. 203, 208).

Altar-mounds, found in connexion with many of the structures of the 'mound-builders,' contain altars of clay or, more rarely, of stone. They vary greatly in size and shape, but are seldom over twenty inches high, and are near the ground in the centre of the mound; while in their top is

a basin-shaped hollow, usually filled with ashes (Bancroft, *Nat. Races of the Pacif. States*, iv. 774; cf. Thomas, *RBEW* v. pp. 57–58 [West Virginia]; Holmes, *ib.* xx. pp. 36–37). Here, again, numerous variations from the general type are known. Thus, on the top of a mound near Sterling, Ill., was found 'an oval altar 6 ft. long and 4½ wide. It was composed of flat pieces of limestone which had been burned red, some portions having been almost converted into lime. On and about this altar I found abundance of charcoal. At the sides of the altar were fragments of human bones, some of which had been charred' (Holbrooke, quoted by Yarrow, *Introd. to Study of Mortuary Customs among the N. Amer. Indians*, Washington, 1880, p. 23).

In his *Mœurs des sauvages amériquains* (Paris, 1724, ii. 327) the Jesuit Lafitau advances the theory that the calumet, or 'pipe of peace,' was an altar. This statement, perhaps surprising at first, is not so absurd as it may appear, for the calumet certainly contains, in some instances, a burnt-offering in honour of a deity. Among the Southern Talapouches and Alabamons the head priest went forward each morning before sunrise with the calumet, and blew the first puff of smoke towards the east. The Natchez custom was very similar, except that the head priest thrice prostrated himself to the east, and honoured not only that quarter, but also the three others with whiffs of smoke. Like customs are found amongst many N. American Indian tribes, such as the Kisteneaux, Sioux, Shoshones, Omahas, Poncas, Blackfeet, Pottawatomies, and Hopis (M'Guire, 'American Aboriginal Pipes and Smoking Customs' in *Report of the United States National Museum*, 1897, pp. 351–646, especially pp. 563–571).

By far the most elaborate modern N. American Indian altars, however, are those of the Hopis and kindred Pueblo tribes, whose snake, antelope, and flute altars have been carefully described by Fewkes (*RBEW* xv. p. 270; *ib.* xvi. pp. 278–279, 287–288, 290–292; xix. pp. 966–969, 980–983, 989–996, 1001–1002). These altars are of special interest in that, unlike any others known, they embody primarily the principle of sympathetic magic, especially as 'at present the ritual is performed for the purpose of bringing abundant rain and successful crops' (Fewkes, *ib.* xix. p. 963, cf. pp. 1009–1111). The Hopi altar, which, of course, presents unessential variations in different places and ceremonies, is composed of sand, the square interior white, with bordering strips of yellow, green, red, and white, symbolizing the four cardinal points. At the top of the central square are four symbolic figures of each of the four rain-clouds, from which depend four serpents, typifying lightning, while on the top outer white sand border are lines of black sand, representing rain. At the bottom of the altar are four water-gourds (the number again typifying the four quarters of the sky), separated by ears of maize, and at the top is a vase with maize-stalks. Rattles and bull-roarers, symbolizing thunder, are scattered around the edges of the altar, and a pouch of tobacco (the smoke typifying the rain-cloud), a water-gourd, and a 'medicine-bowl,' into which an aspergill is dipped to symbolize the falling rain, are also prominent features. The lines of meal drawn across the sand seem to represent the fertilization proceeding from the rain-clouds to the external world; while *tipones*, or totemistic emblems of the clans celebrating the ritual, form the most sacred objects of the altar. Figures of aquatic animals are also found frequently, together with other objects whose precise significance is not yet fully known.

Many of these Hopi-Zuñi altars, it should be noted, have a more or less elaborate reredos, that of the Cakwaleñya ('Blue Flute' society) at the Tusayan pueblo of Mishongnovi, for example, being described by Fewkes (*RBEW* xix. pp. 991–992) as consisting 'of uprights and transverse slats of wood, the former decorated with ten rain-cloud pictures, five on each side, one above the other. These symbols had square outlines, each angle decorated with a figure of a feather, and depending from each rain-cloud figure, parallel lines, representing falling rain, were painted. The transverse slat bore a row of nine rain-cloud figures of semicircular form. Four zigzag sticks, representing lightning, hung from the transverse slat between the vertical or lateral slats of the reredos. Two supplementary uprights were fastened to the main reredos, one on either side. These were decorated at their bases with symbolic pictures representing maize, surmounted by rain-cloud figures. The ridge of sand between the uprights of the altar supported many smaller rods and slats, the one in the middle being decorated with a picture of an ear of corn.' Despite the elaborate character of these reredoses, however, they are obviously subordinate to the sand-altars placed before them, and of which they are palpable imitations; even though, as in some of the Zuñi altars described by Mrs. Stevenson, the reredos is *quasi*-permanent, while the sand-altar must be remade for each ceremony.

Amongst the Zuñi, as already intimated, we likewise find elaborate altars showing the same general type as their Hopi congeners. In all of them the principle of sympathetic magic seems to be present, as is clear from Mrs. Stevenson's detailed description of them (*RBEW* xxiii. pp. 245–246, 428, 432–434, 454, 491, 529, 543, 550, 551).

2. Turn to *Mexico* and *Central America*. The altar in the great temple at the City of Mexico in honour of Huitzilopochtli, the god of war and the chief Aztec deity, was a green block, probably of jasper, 5 ft. long by 3 broad and high, curved convexly on the top, so that the human sacrifice slaughtered upon it might be in the best position for the excision of the heart (Bancroft, *Nat. Races of the Pacif. States*, ii. 582–583). The Aztec altar, moreover, had an adjunct, not found elsewhere, in the sacrificial yoke, a heavy stone of green jasper, curved in a ∩-shape, and placed over the neck of the human sacrifice at the time of his immolation, to assist the priests who held his arms and legs, to keep him in a proper position for the chief celebrant.

Our general knowledge of the details of the Aztec altar must, however, be drawn from the sacrificial stones of neighbouring peoples, which may be inferred to have been analogous. The Maya altars, as found in the ruins of Copan, Honduras, and of Quirigua, Guatemala, are 6 or 7 ft. square and about 4 ft. high, taking a variety of forms and being covered with sculpture somewhat less elaborate than the statues of the divinities themselves (Bancroft, *op. cit.* ii. 689, iv. 94). As in many Semitic altars, their tops were intersected with grooves to receive the blood of the sacrifices offered upon them (*ib.* iv. 94–99, 111–114, 541). Besides formal altars, the ancient Mexicans, Mayas, and Guatemalans also had braziers and small altars in which copal, which here corresponded to the Oriental incense, was burnt in honour of the gods, one of these smaller structures, found at Palenque in the Mexican State of Chiapas, being 16 in. high and 4 ft. in circumference (*ib.* i. 697, ii. 584, 690, iii. 336, iv. 345–346). Like the 'mound-builders' of N. America, the Mayas erected altars on the graves of the dead (*ib.* ii. 799), and in Nicaragua flat stones have been discovered which apparently served as altars (*ib.* iv. 32, 61–62).

Both in Mexico and in Central America generally, the altar, like the temple itself, was placed on the summit of the *teocalli*, or 'god-house,' a pyramid of considerable elevation; so that it has been not inaptly said that 'a Mexican temple was essentially a gigantic altar, of pyramidal form, built in several stages, contracting as they approached the summit' (Réville, *Native Religions of Mexico and Peru*, London, 1884, pp. 47–48). In places, however, as at Quemada, in the Mexican State of Zacatecas, a small structure, 5 ft. high and with a base 7 ft. square, was set in front of a pyramid, apparently as an altar (Bancroft, *op. cit.* iv. 587–588).

3. In *South America* the altar seems to be unknown, thus giving yet another proof of the cultic inferiority of the South American Indians to those of North and Central America. Even the archæological remains of Peru present no example of the

altar, so seeming to confirm the words of Garcilasso de la Vega (*Royal Commentaries of the Yncas*, iii. 20, tr. Markham, London, 1869, i. 271) that 'these Indians did not know anything of building an altar.' Nevertheless, there are not infrequent allusions to sacrifice, in the works of the early Spanish *conquistadores*, both of fruits and animals, so that it would seem, in view of the high civilization of the empire of the Incas, as though the Peruvians may very probably have known of the altar, despite the lack of archæological evidence.

LITERATURE.—Hough in *Handbook of American Indians* (*Bulletin 30 BE*), i. 46–47 (Washington, 1907); Waitz, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, iii. (Leipzig, 1862); Bancroft, *Native Races of the Pacific States*, iv. (San Francisco, 1883).

LOUIS H. GRAY.

ALTAR (Celtic). — The data concerning the Celtic altar are extremely scanty, since all native records of the pre-Christian period are lacking, while the altars still preserved date from the Roman period, and are modelled upon Roman originals. The chief sources, then, for a knowledge of the altar, as of other portions of Celtic cult, are a few early classical authors. Cæsar, in his brief account of Druidism (*de Bello Gallico*, vi. 13–18), makes no mention of any altar, and is followed in this silence, which may not be without significance, by Strabo (iv. 4. 4–5). On the other hand, Tacitus (*Annales*, xiv. 30) distinctly states that the Druids of Mona 'held it right to besmear the altars with captive blood'; and this practice is extended to the whole of Gaul by Pomponius Mela (iii. 18). By far the most famous passage, however, in this connexion, is found in Lucan's *Pharsalia* (i. 443–445):

> 'Et quibus immitis placatur sanguine diro
> Teutates, horrensque feris altaribus Hesus,
> Et Taranis Scythicæ non mitior ara Dianæ.'

(On the identification of these divinities, see Rhys, *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion as illustrated by Celtic Heathendom*, pp. 44–47, 61–73). The same poem contains a brief description of a Druid temple (iii. 399–452) at Marseilles, which was destroyed by Cæsar. It seems to have consisted simply of a gloomy wood, the oak being mentioned as one of the trees, which contained 'altars built with offerings to the dead' (*structæ sacris feralibus aræ*) and rude, artless images of the gods, roughly hewn from logs. Although Cæsar expressly states that the Gauls differed widely from the Germans in cult (*de Bello Gallico*, vi. 21), Lucan's description of the temple of Marseilles recalls involuntarily the statement of Tacitus (*Germania*, 9), that the ancient Teutons made neither images nor temples for the gods, but worshipped them in groves.

A large number of Celtic altars of the Roman period have been preserved, but are practically valueless, as being modelled entirely on classical prototypes. It was supposed by older archæologists that the dolmens or cromlechs, formed by laying a flat stone across two or three others which had been placed erect, were Druidical altars, a hypothesis now abandoned, since these structures are rather sepulchral chambers which were frequently covered to a greater or less extent with earth. It is probable, moreover, that the dolmens date from the neolithic period, and it is impossible, therefore, to state that they are specifically Celtic. The only conclusion which can be reached, in the light of the data now available, concerning Celtic altars is that the Druids probably had simple structures placed in their sacred groves and used for sacrifice, though the altar was not indispensable, since the wooden and osier cages filled with men and other victims and burned as a holocaust (Cæsar, *de Bello Gallico*, vi. 16; Strabo, iv. 4. 5) could scarcely have been offered on any but a special structure or on the ground.

LITERATURE.—De Belloguet, *Ethnogénie gauloise*, iii. (Paris, 1868); D'Arbois de Jubainville, *Introduction à l'étude de la littérature celtique* (Paris, 1883); O'Curry, *Manners and Customs of the Ancient Irish*, ii. (London, 1873); Dottin, *Manuel pour servir à l'étude de l'antiquité celtique* (Paris, 1906).

LOUIS H. GRAY.

ALTAR (Chinese).—The Chinese sacred books inform us that burnt-offerings were made to Shang-ti, the Supreme Ruler, upon mountain-tops from time immemorial; and the fact that, even to the present day, the worship of Heaven or Shang-ti is conducted upon a circular mound would seem to be a reminiscence of this ancient practice. As early as the days of the Emperor Shun (B.C. 2300), a distinction appears to have been made between the 'round' altar upon which the sacrifices—arranged in a circle, and hence called the '*round sacrifice*'—were offered to God, *i.e.* Shang-ti, and the '*spread-out sacrifice*,' and others, which were associated with the worship of subordinate deities or spirits, and which, as the names imply, were arranged in other ways. The distinction between the shape of the altar of heaven and that of earth is observable even now in China, and may serve to illustrate the early methods as represented in the classical books.

The celebrated 'Altar of Heaven,' in the Chinese quarter of Peking, stands in a beautiful park some 3 miles in circuit, and is a magnificent structure of white marble, 27 feet high, composed of 3 circular terraces, the lowest of which is 210 feet in diameter, the middle 150, and the upper 90 feet.* It is approached by 4 flights of steps, corresponding to the 4 points of the compass. Each terrace is protected by a marble balustrade. The top is paved with marble slabs arranged in concentric circles, the innermost slab being round in shape,—corresponding to the shape of Heaven,—around which is arranged a circle of slabs, 9 in number, and, outside of this, other circles in multiples of 9 until the square of 9 is reached in the outermost ring. Five marble stands support the altar furniture, consisting of censers, candlesticks, and vases. Close to the altar there is a furnace of green tiles, 9 feet high by 7 feet wide, approached by steps on three sides, intended for the reception of the sacrificial offerings which are here burned on the great occasions when the Emperor represents the whole nation in his high-priestly capacity. In the chapels adjoining, where the tablets of Shang-ti and the Imperial ancestors are preserved, this circular arrangement is also maintained.

The 'Altar of Earth,' as described in the *Law of Sacrifices*, was a square mound in which the victims were buried, while those offered to Heaven were burnt. The passage reads as follows: 'With a blazing pile of wood on the grand altar they sacrificed to Heaven; by burying in the grand mound they sacrificed to the Earth.' The Great 'Altar of Earth,' in the Chinese quarter of the city of Peking, consists of 2 terraces of marble, each 6 feet high. The lower terrace is 100 feet square, and the upper one 60 feet. The altar is situated in a park on the north side of that which contains the 'Altar of Heaven' above described. The coping of the wall which encloses the park is of yellow tiling, corresponding to the colour of earth.

The 'Altar of Prayer for Grain,' popularly known as the 'Temple of Heaven,' is separated by a low wall from the 'Altar of Heaven.' It also is circular in shape, but is protected by a triple roof of blue tiling, 100 feet in height.

The local altars on which sacrifices to Earth are periodically offered consist of low mounds of earth, about 5 feet square, and perhaps a foot high. They

* An engraving of the altar, from a photograph, is given in *Bible in the World*, March 1907, p. 79.

are not ornamented or distinguished in any way, except at the time of sacrifice, when they are specially prepared for the occasion.

In Chinese temples, whether Confucian or Buddhist, the altar usually consists of a stone table, rectangular in shape, the proportions varying with the size of the building. The altar furniture includes a censer, two candlesticks, and sometimes a pair of vases of bronze, porcelain, or stone. When Ancestor Worship is conducted in private houses, the offerings are laid out upon ordinary dining tables placed close together.

Permanent altars are erected in front of tombs for the half-yearly sacrifice to the spirits of the dead. They consist of a single stone slab supported by two others, thus forming a table. A smaller altar of similar construction is found at grave sides, intended for the sacrifices to the local spirits or demons.

In the majority of Chinese dwellings there are to be seen miniature altars, where incense is burned, and small offerings of food presented, either to the spirits of deceased relatives, or such popular divinities as the 'God of Wealth.'

LITERATURE.—*Chinese Classics*, trans. by J. Legge, vol. iii., 'Shu King, or Book of Historical Documents,' Oxford; also 'Texts of Confucianism,' *SBE*, vols. iii. xvi. xxvii. xxviii.; S. W. Williams, *Middle Kingdom*, revised ed., 2 vols., London, 1883; E. H. Parker, *China and Religion*, London, 1905, and the literature there cited; H. A. Giles, *Religions of Ancient China*, London, 1905, pp. 38 f., 45; G. Owen, 'Confucian Classics in Relation to the World,' March 1907, p. 79 ff.; Mrs. Archibald Little, *Intimate China*, London n. d., p. 34 ff. [description of worship at the Temple of Heaven]; P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*[3], Tübingen, 1905, vol. i. pp. 60 ff., 88 ff.

W. GILBERT WALSHE.

ALTAR (Christian).—1. Nomenclature.—(*a*) *GREEK.*—St. Paul, in a passage dealing with the Eucharist, uses the phrase τράπεζα Κυρίου (1 Co 10^{21})—a term frequently employed by the Greek Fathers after the 3rd cent., and constantly by Eastern liturgical documents, as a designation of the Christian altar. The word θυσιαστήριον—the ordinary equivalent of LXX for מִזְבֵּחַ—occurs in his writings (1 Co 9^{13} 10^{18}), but only with reference to the altar of the old dispensation. The writer, however, of the Epistle to the Hebrews may refer to the Eucharist when he says, 'We have an altar (θυσιαστήριον), whereof they have no right to eat which serve the tabernacle' (He 13^{10}); but most commentators explain this passage otherwise (*cf.* Rev 8^{3-5}). There is no other reference to the Christian altar in the NT.

(See Probst, *Liturgie der drei ersten christlichen Jahrhunderte*, pp. 30, 81, 87, 88; F. E. Warren, *Liturgy and Ritual of the Ante-Nicene Church*, pp. 78–81; Westcott, *Heb.* 404–406).

In the sub-Apostolic age it is difficult to find any direct reference to the altar. The *Didachè* is silent on the point, but in the letters of Ignatius the word θυσιαστήριον occurs in passages dealing with the Eucharist; and this writer in at least one passage (*ad Philad.* 4) appears definitely to apply this word to the Eucharistic altar.

(See *ad Philad.* 4, *ad Magnes.* 7, cf. also *ad Ephes.* 5, *ad Trall.* 7 [in these last-mentioned passages θυσιαστήριον is applied figuratively to the Christian community]; see Lightfoot, *Philippians*, p. 268).

Later in the same century, Irenæus (*c. Haer.* iv. 18. 6) writes that the sacrifice of bread and wine should be frequently offered on the altar. Eusebius designates the altar of the basilica at Tyre, dedicated in the year A.D. 314, as ἱερὸν βῆμα θυσιαστήριον (*HE* x. 444), and speaks in the same place of the altars (θυσιαστήρια) erected throughout the world after the Peace of the Church. The word τράπεζα also is defined by pseudo-Athanasius as θυσιαστήριον (*Disput. cont. Arian* xvii.).

τράπεζα, not θυσιαστήριον, is the term usually employed in the liturgies; it is also common in many of the Greek Fathers. Sometimes the word stands alone—ἡ τράπεζα, 'the table' *par excellence* (*e.g.* Chrys. *Hom. iii. in Epist. ad Ephes.*). Sometimes, as in 1 Co 10^{21}, it is τράπεζα Κυρίου (*e.g.* Orig. *c. Cels.* viii. 24). But very often adjectives are added, such as ἱερά, ἁγία, μυστική, and the like.

Βωμός, as contrasted with θυσιαστήριον, is used in the OT for heathen altars: *e.g.* 1 Mac 1^{59} ἐπὶ τὸν βωμὸν ὃς ἦν ἐπὶ τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου (note the use of the word in Ac 17^{23}—the only place in which it occurs in the NT). This usage is generally followed by Christian writers. Exceptions, however, are met with, *e.g.*, in Synesius (*Katastasis*, 19 [Migne, *PG* lxvi. coll. 1572, 1573]), who speaks of βωμὸς ἀναίμακτος. Clement of Alexandria and Origen also use the word βωμός, but in a figurative sense, when they say that the soul of the faithful is the true Christian altar.

(Clem. Alex. *Strom.* vii. 31–32; Orig. *c. Cels.* viii. 17; for τράπεζα see Dionys. Alex. *Ep.*, *ap.* Eusebius, *HE* vii. 9).

In the passage just quoted from Origen he expressly admits the charge of Celsus that Christians had no material altars. This admission, coupled with the fact that so few references to the altar are to be found in early Christian literature, might suggest that the altar was not in early times an adjunct of Christian worship. Nor is Origen alone in his admission; other writers say practically the same thing. But the prevalence of the *Disciplina Arcani* during this period sufficiently accounts for the reticence of ecclesiastical writers on this as on all other subjects connected with Christian worship and the administration of the sacraments. Further, it must be remembered that the same writers, who appear to deny the existence of altars, deny also the existence of temples, stating that God can be worshipped in any place, and that His best temple is in the heart of man. It would appear, then, that the same arguments could be used to disprove the existence of churches in the period now under discussion, and we have positive evidence in disproof of any such statement (see Duchesne, *Christian Worship* [Eng. tr.], ch. xii.). The object of these writers, no doubt, was to differentiate between the pagan sacrifices and the 'unbloody sacrifice' of the Church. In the pagan sense, it is true, Christians had neither temples nor altars.

(The passage cited from Orig. may be compared Minucius Felix, *Octavius*, c. x., Arnobius, *adv. Gent.* vii. 6).

The word *madhbḥâ* is employed by the Syrians, both Jacobites and Nestorians, *mamadhbḥâshâ* by the Copts, and *khorun* by the Armenians, to designate the altar (see Brightman, *Lit.* i. 569).

(*b*) *LATIN.*—The term usually employed by the Latin Fathers and Western liturgical documents to designate the altar is *altare*. This word is used already by Tertullian, who describes the Lord's Table as *altare de Eucharistiâ Christi*, ch. 19). Cyprian also frequently uses this term, and applies to it an exclusively Christian significance, contrasting 'aras Diaboli' with 'altare Dei' (*Ep.* 64 [63]); nevertheless, in one passage of his writings we find the phrase 'Diaboli altaria' (*Ep.* 59 [60]). *Altare* is also commonly used by Ambrose (*e.g. de Virgin.* ch. 18) and Augustine (*e.g. Serm.* 359, par. 1). The appellation *Mensa Dominica* or *Mensa Dominica* is also employed by Augustine (*e.g. Serm.* 90, par. 5) and other Latin Fathers.

Ara, the Vulg. rendering of *Βωμός*, is not applied to the Christian altar by any early ecclesiastical writer except Tertullian, who uses the phrase 'ara Dei' (*de Orat.* 14 [19]). The word *ara*, however, used consistently in inscriptions; *e.g.* in one generally supposed to be of Christian origin and of early date—ARAM DEO SANCTO ÆTERNO (*CIL*, vol. viii. n. 9764). Minucius Felix, in a well-known passage, writes: 'Delubra et aras non habemus' (*Oct.* ch. 32). Prudentius uses *ara* as the designation of the base of the altar: 'Altaris aram funditus pessumdare' (περὶ Στεφάνων, x. 49); and in

this usage he is followed by other writers. The plural *altaria* is sometimes used with the significance of a singular. The singular *altarium* is used sometimes by late writers for *altare*. *Altarium* is also used as a designation of the free space around the altar.

The word *mensa* came to be applied to the slab itself on which the Elements were placed.

Altaria occurs, *e.g.*, in Cæsarius of Arles, *Hom.* vii.: the elements to be consecrated '*sacris altaribus imponuntur.*' Possibly the plural is used in this way by Ambrose [*Ep.* 20, *ad Marcellinam*] in a passage which has been quoted to prove that his church contained more than one altar (see below, § 4). For *altarium*, cf. Council of Auxerre (A.D. 578), *can.* 10: Mass is not to be said more than once a day, '*super uno altario.*' For the use of *altarium* to designate the space around the altar, cf. Greg. Tur. (*Hist.* ii. 14), who speaks of a church having *fenestras in altario triginta duas*; cf. also Mone, *Messen*, p. 6.

2. Material and form of the altar.—Altars were constructed of wood, stone, or metal.

(1) *Altars of wood.*—It is generally agreed that the earliest altars were made of wood. This would appear from the following considerations. The earliest churches were, no doubt, ordinary dwelling-houses adapted to the special requirements of Christian worship (see Duchesne, *op. cit.* ch. xii. p. 399 ff.), and it would seem probable that in the beginning the Eucharist was celebrated at the tables usually to be found in such houses. It is also known that at the beginning of this era such tables were usually made of wood, either square or round in shape. This view is supported by certain very early frescoes which have survived, and which have for their subject the consecration of the Eucharist. One of these, known as the *Fractio Panis*, is attributed to the first half of the 2nd cent.; and another, discovered in the cemetery of Calixtus, belongs to the latter half of the same century.

[Reproductions of both these frescoes will be found in vol. i. of *DACL.* The *Fractio Panis* is reproduced as Fig. 172, the fresco from the cemetery of Calixtus as Fig. 1123].

From both these frescoes it would appear that in very early times the Eucharist was consecrated at a small three-legged table, similar in form to those in use at the period for purposes of repast. No doubt, at a comparatively early date, special tables were reserved for the Eucharist, and their form was differentiated from that of those ordinarily in use; but for this period of transition we have no definite evidence. That these tables were made of wood is further attested by certain relics preserved at Rome in the churches of St. John Lateran and St. Pudenziana. These are alleged to be the table used at the Last Supper, and altars used by St. Peter. For our purpose the only point which deserves attention is that these relics are of wood, thus evidencing the traditional belief that the earliest altars were of that material. A number of passages of an incidental character in the writings of both Greek and Latin Fathers give the ultimate confirmation of this view. Optatus, Augustine, and Athanasius all mention altars of wood.

[See Optat. *de Schism. Donatist.* vi. 1, where he says that the Donatists used the altars of the Catholics as firewood; also Aug. *Ep.* 185, par. 27, who states that the orthodox bishop Maximianus was beaten with the wood of the altar. Athanasius, *ad Monach.*, expressly states of the altar destroyed at Alexandria by the Count Heraclius, that it was of wood (ξυλίνη γὰρ ἦν); these words, however, may imply that he was familiar with altars made of other materials].

It will, then, seem fair to conclude that in the earliest period altars were of wood, round or square in shape, and resembling the ordinary tables used for domestic purposes, from which they were gradually differentiated.

It was not till after a considerable period that wooden altars were altogether superseded by those of stone or metal. Although condemned by the local Council of Epaona (A.D. 517), they continued in some places to be used for several centuries later. In England it is related that the ancient wooden altars were demolished by the order of St. Wulstan, bishop of Worcester (A.D. 1062–1095), and there is evidence of their occasional retention in France and Spain at a later period.

In the East the material of the altar does not seem to have been regarded as of great importance; it is, however, stated that the use of altars of wood was forbidden by the Nestorian Patriarch, John bar-Algari, at the end of the 9th century.

[See Council of Epaona, *can.* 26—the earliest decree on the subject; also Capitulary of Charlemagne (A.D. 769), c. 14 [Migne, *PL* xcvii. 124]. For England, William of Malmesbury, *de Gestis Pontif. Angl.*, who relates the demolition by St. Wulstan of '*altaria lignea jam inde a priscis diebus in Anglia.*' For France, see the anonymous author of the *Miracula S. Dionysii* quoted below, p. 341b, and the case of the altar of the monastery of St. Cornelius quoted by Dom Martène, *de Antiquis Ecclesiæ Ritibus*, i. p. 111. For Spain, Hardouin, *Concilia*, vi. *a* col. 1026. For the East, Assemani, *Biblioth. Orient.* iii. p. 238].

(2) *Altars of stone.*—It is certain that from a very early date stone altars were in use, and it is scarcely to be doubted that there is a very close connexion between them and the tombs of martyrs. It would seem that probably, during the same period at which the Eucharist was celebrated at the wooden tables described above, in the houses which served in early times for the purposes of Christian worship, it was also celebrated on the stone slabs (*mensæ*) which covered the relics of martyrs and formed part of their tombs (*arcosolia*). That the celebration of the Eucharist in cemeteries was a custom of great antiquity is indisputable; it is expressly ordered in the *Apostolic Constitutions*, where (iv. 17) the faithful are commanded to assemble in the cemeteries for the reading of Scripture and recitation of Psalms (*i.e.* for the observance of the nocturnal vigil) for the martyrs, saints, and all the faithful departed, and also to offer the Eucharistic sacrifice in churches and cemeteries. It is possible that the same custom is referred to as early as A.D. 155 in the *Letter of the Smyrneans* relating the martyrdom of St. Polycarp. After mentioning that they have placed the relics of the martyr in a suitable place, they pray that they may be permitted to gather themselves together in that place, and to celebrate the anniversary of his martyrdom (*Martyr. Polycarp.* c. 18). In the *Liber Pontificalis* it is stated of Pope Felix I. (A.D. 269–275): 'Hic constituit supra memorias (*al.* sepulcra) martyrum missas celebrari.' It seems, however, probable that this means only that he regulated an already existing practice. (See *Lib. Pontif.*, ed. Duchesne, i. p. 156). The cemeteries themselves afford abundant evidence of the existence of altars, but it is impossible here to enter into any discussion of the many disputed points arising from the investigation of these monuments. It is certain that not all the tombs (*arcosolia*) now existing were used for the celebration of the Eucharist, but it is agreed on all hands that many were used for this purpose; and instances occur of the slab covering the tomb being provided with rings, which would enable it to be drawn out for the purpose of the Eucharist. The intimate connexion between altars and the relics of martyrs is evidenced by such passages as the words of the author of the treatise *de Aleatoribus*, who writes: 'Martyribus præsentibus supra mensam Dominicam' (*CIL* i. pt. 3, p. 103); or of Augustine, who thus writes of the altar erected on the site of the martyrdom of Cyprian: 'Mensa Deo constructa est: et tamen mensa dicitur Cypriani . . . quia ipsa immolatione sua paravit hanc mensam, non in qua pascat sive pascatur, sed in qua sacrificium Deo, cui et ipse oblatus est, offeratur' (Aug. *Sermo* cccx. p. 2, in *Nat. Cyp.* 2). In this connexion may also be quoted the famous lines of Prudentius on the altar and tomb of the martyr Hippolytus:

'Talibus Hippolyti corpus mandatur opertis,
Propter ubi adposita est ara dicata Deo.

Illa sacra ramenti dominatrix mensa eademque
Custos sida sui martyris ossa tegit
Servat a[illegible]
Pascit item[illegible]
(Prudent. περὶ Στεφ. xi. 169–174).

During the era of persecution, while the churches were for the most part in private houses, it was necessary for the faithful to betake themselves to the cemeteries and catacombs for the purpose of celebrating the Eucharist at the time of interment, or on the anniversaries of the martyrdoms. But after the Peace of the Church the custom arose of building churches immediately over the sites of the martyrdom of famous saints, or of translating their relics to churches prepared for their reception; as also, at a somewhat later period, of burying ecclesiastical personages beneath or in proximity to the altar in already existing churches. It was not considered necessary to possess the entire body of a saint or martyr; fragments of it would suffice, or even a piece of linen soaked in his blood. These relics were placed within the altar, so that its tomb-like character was for the most part preserved. In later times it was considered unlawful to consecrate an altar without relics; and if these could not be obtained, a leaf of the Gospels, or even a consecrated Host, was placed within it. (See Duchesne, *op. cit.* p. 403, and *canon* 2 of Council of Celichyth [Chelsea] quoted there).

Two forms of stone altar appear to have existed in early times—the one square, resembling a table; the other oblong, and resembling a tomb. It appears, however, that from the 4th cent. onwards many forms were in use. We meet with several instances of the table form supported by one or more columns, and sometimes with a combination of tomb and table form. An instance of this latter is the altar of St. Alexander, consisting of a table-like structure, the *mensa* of porphyry supported on columns of marble, having a substructure, in the form of a tomb, containing the relics of the saint. Generally speaking, however, the altar was probably of the form of a cube, and in the East it has retained this form. The present oblong form, common in the West, dates from the period when it was customary to place relics of saints in a sarcophagus situated at right angles to the altar and immediately behind it, having its end looking westward and supported by the altar itself. (See § 3, and Ed. Bishop, *On the History of the Christian Altar*, p. 14 ff.).

[A very full description of large numbers of these altars will be found in the *DACL*. Much information will be found in the art. 'Autel,' but more detailed accounts are given under the names of the localities where the particular altars are preserved. See, *e.g.*, 'Auriol (Autel d'),' i. col. 3151 ff., with its representation of the famous one-legged stone altar preserved there. See also the bibliography at the end of the present article].

(3) *Altars of metal.*—The earliest notice of an altar of metal is probably to be found in Sozomen (*HE* ix. 1), who mentions the altar of gold presented to the Church of St. Sophia at Constantinople, by Pulcheria, daughter of Arcadius, in the early part of the 5th century. In the next century we have a very full account of the magnificent altar presented by Justinian to the new basilica of St. Sophia, constructed by him between the years 532 and 563. We are indebted for this description to Paul the Silentiary, who tells us that the Holy Table was of gold, adorned with precious stones, resting upon pillars of gold, and that it was surmounted by a dome or *ciborium*, supported by pillars of silver gilt, and terminating in a great cross of gold (Paul Silent., *Descript. St. Sophiæ*, ed. Bona, vv. 682 ff.). In the West also, at about the same date, we have mention of altars of precious metal; but it is not clear whether they were constructed of metal or of wood which was covered with metal. These notices occur in the ***Liber Pontificalis***, and date probably from the latter half of the 5th century. Especially worthy of mention in this connexion is the altar of St. Ambrose at Milan, probably erected before the year A.D. 835. It is 7 ft. 3 in. in length, 4 ft. 1 in. in height, and the *mensa* is 4 ft. 4 in. wide. The front is of gold, the back and sides of silver, and it is decorated with panels containing subjects in relief and with enamel work. It is probably the most elaborate specimen of its kind which has survived.

[For a reproduction see *DACL*, fig. 1130; and for the extensive literature connected with this altar see the same work, vol. i. col. 3171, n. 8].

3. Site and accessories of the altar.—The earliest Christian churches were of the form of a basilica, and the altar was usually placed on the chord of the apse. Around the apse were arranged the seats for the clergy, the bishop's throne being placed in the centre, behind the altar. Sometimes, however, it was placed more forward, nearer the centre of the church; but this was not common. Usually it was raised on steps, and separated from the body of the church by a low screen or railing, not of sufficient height to hide it from the view of the congregation. In later times, beneath the steps of the altar, was constructed a small vault (*confessio*) to contain the relics of a saint. It became customary from an early date for the altar to be covered by a canopy, usually dome-shaped and supported on pillars, called the *ciborium* (κιβώριον). The *ciborium* was made of metal or stone, and richly ornamented. It served a double purpose. Firstly, being provided with curtains hung between the pillars, it served to veil the altar at certain points in the service. Secondly, it did honour to the altar, providing it with a canopy or *umbraculum*, as in that period was customary with the seats of great personages. The date of the introduction of the *ciborium* is uncertain; it must, however, have been considerably earlier than the 6th century. A distinction must be made between the custom of the East and the West. In the West it had been, and for the most part is, customary to allow the altar to stand well in view of the people. In the East, at least from the 4th cent. onwards, the reverse has been the case. The *ciborium* with its veils is found in the West probably from about the 6th cent. onwards, and possibly owing to Byzantine influence. Among other reasons which tended to cause its disuse was the change in the shape of the altar, and the custom of placing a shrine containing relics upon it. The *ciborium* was well suited to the original cube-like altars, which, as we have seen, were in use in early times, but quite unsuited to the oblong altars evolved in the Middle Ages in the West. The *ikonostasis*, or heavy screen, hiding the *bema* from the rest of the church, and in general use in the East at the present day, represents to some extent the veil of the *ciborium*.

In early times nothing was placed upon the altar except the cloths and sacred vessels necessary for the Eucharist, and the book of the Gospels. Not even relics or the reserved Sacrament might be placed upon it. This custom appears to have prevailed in the West for some centuries, but in the 9th cent. a homily or pastoral charge, attributed to Leo IV. (A.D. 855), permits a shrine containing relics, the book of the Gospels, and a pyx or tabernacle containing the Lord's body, for purposes of the viaticum. From this period onwards, in the West, the ornaments which had formerly decorated the *ciborium* were transferred to the altar. At first these appear to have been placed on the altar only during the celebration of the liturgy, but gradually it became customary to place them there permanently. Thus the cross,

which had surmounted the dome of the *ciborium* and had depended from it, was placed on the altar itself. In the same way with lights, first a single candlestick was placed on one side of the altar opposite to the cross, later two candlesticks are found, one on either side of it. All this had been accomplished by the 13th century. Meantime, the *ciborium* having practically disappeared in the West, and the altar becoming more and more loaded with tabernacle reliquaries, candles, etc., and having generally been placed as far back as possible against the east wall, the reredos begins to make its appearance,—as also the small canopy now generally in use,—which may be regarded as directly descended from the *ciborium* and all that we now have to represent it.

[The earliest description of the interior of a Christian church is a passage in the *Didascalia Apostolorum*, incorporated in the *Apostolic Constitutions*, bk. ii. c. 57. For the ancient custom with regard to relics, cf. St. Ambrose (*Ep.* xxii. 13): 'Ille [Christus] super altare . . . isti [martyres] sub altari.' The homily attributed to Leo IV. is probably a document of Gallic origin, and is the ground-work of the address of the presiding bishop in the *Ordo ad Synodum* of the present Roman pontifical. It will be found in Migne, *PL* cxv. 677. For this section see especially Edmund Bishop, *On the History of the Christian Altar*].

4. Number of altars.—The primitive custom appears to have been that each church should have only one altar. This custom has prevailed in the East to the present day, although altars are found in παρεκκλησίαι, or side-chapels—these being regarded as separate buildings. In the West the multiplication of altars has been common from a comparatively early date.

[Cf. Ignat. *ad Philad.* 4, cited above: σπουδάσατε οὖν μιᾷ εὐχαριστίᾳ . . . ἓν θυσιαστήριον ὡς εἷς ἐπίσκοπος . . . Eusebius mentions only one altar in his description of the great basilica at Tyre (*HE* x. 4). The passage from Augustine, sometimes quoted in this connexion, proves nothing. He speaks of the existence of two churches in one town (*civitas*) as a visible sign of the Donatist schism (*in Epist. Joh. ad Parthos*, Tract. iii. 5), but his words obviously refer to schismatic worship in general. Contrast St. Basil (*Hom.* xix.), who speaks of more than one altar in a single town. For Eastern custom, cf. Renaudot, *Lit. Orient. Collect.* i. pp. 164, 311, 477, 499; also G. M. Neale, *Introd. to the Hist. of the Holy Eastern Church*, p. 183].

It has been suggested that the multiplication of altars in a single church originated in the cemetery chapels, in some of which several *arcosolia*, or altar tombs, are to be found. But it is dangerous to draw any inference from this fact, because it is generally agreed that many of these *arcosolia* were never used for the purpose of celebrating the Eucharist. More probably the reason is to be sought, on the one hand, in the growth of the Christian population subsequent to the Peace of the Church, and an attempt to meet their increasing needs; and, on the other hand, in the increasing desire of the clergy to celebrate, rather than only to communicate, as often as possible. It is, however, difficult to find passages which imply the existence of more than one altar in a single church earlier than the 6th century. It is not till the time of St. Gregory the Great that we have definite evidence; but it is clear that by that time the custom was well established, because at the request of a correspondent, Palladius, bishop of Saintonge, the pope sent relics for the consecration of four of the thirteen altars which Palladius had set up in his church (Greg. Magn. *Epist.* vi. 49). From this time onward the evidence for the multiplication of altars in a single church is abundant.

[The passage from St. Ambrose, cited above, p. 339a, is inconclusive: 'militis irruentis in altaria, osculis significare pacis insigne' (*Ep.* 20); cf. also St. Paulinus of Nola, *Ep.* xxxi. par. 6. For later evidence see Greg. Tur. *de Gloria Martyrum*, i. 33; Bede (*HE* v. 20), who states that Acca, bishop of Hexham (deposed A.D. 732), having collected a number of relics of apostles and martyrs, exposed them for veneration, 'altaria, distinctis porticibus in hoc ipsum intra muros ejusdem ecclesiæ.' In the 9th cent. the plan of the church of St. Gall, in Switzerland, provided for the erection of seventeen altars. See also Council of Auxerre, *can.* 10, quoted above; Walafrid Strabo, *de Reb. Eccl.* c. xxi.; *Capitularia Regum Francorum*, ed. Baluze, i. 422].

5. Portable altars and 'antimensium.' — The oldest example of a portable altar which has survived is that which was found with the bones of St. Cuthbert, and is now preserved in the Cathedral Library at Durham. It measures 6 in. × 5⅜ in., and is made of wood covered with very thin silver. On the wood are found two crosses and part of an inscription, IN HONOR . . . S . . . PETRV. The earliest writer who certainly refers to portable altars is Bede, who relates (*HE* iii. 10) that, in the year 692, two English missionaries to the Saxons on the Continent carried with them an altar stone ('tabulam altaris vice dedicatam'). The following description is given of the portable altar of St. Willebrord: 'Hoc altare Willebrordus in honore Domini Salvatoris consecravit, supra quod in itinere Missarum oblationes Deo offerre consuevit, in quo et continetur de ligno crucis Christi, et de sudore capitis ejus' (Brower, *Annal. Treviren.*, an. 718, p. 364). From this and other passages it would appear that portable altars contained also relics. Portable altars are designated *altaria portabilia*, *gestatoria*, *viatica*. Sometimes *ara* is used for a portable altar.

[It has been suggested that portable altars were in use in the time of St. Cyprian, but the passage quoted from his writings (*Ep.* iv. 2), in which he makes provision for celebration in the prison, is inconclusive. A portable altar is preserved at Rome in the church of St. Maria, in Campitelli, said to have belonged to St. Gregory of Nazianzus; but it is not regarded as authentic. We also find other portable altars mentioned at a fairly early date, as that of St. Wulfran (*circ.* 740), the apostle of Frisia (Surius, *Vitæ Sanctorum*, ii. 294) and of St. Boniface. Mention is also made of a wooden board, covered with a linen cloth, used by the monks of St. Denys, who accompanied Charlemagne in his campaign against the Saxons (*Mirac. St. Dionys.* i. 20; *Acta SS. OSB.*, ed. Paris, 1672, vol. iv. p. 350)].

In the East, in place of a portable altar, the *antimensium* (Gr. ἀντιμήνσιον, a word of somewhat doubtful origin) is used. It consists of a piece of cloth consecrated, with various ceremonies, at the time of the consecration of a church. It is to be used apparently in oratories which do not possess a properly consecrated altar, and in other places where it is doubtful if the altar has received consecration.

[See Bona, *de Reb. Lit.* I. xx. 2 (end); Neale, *op. cit.* p. 186 f.; Goar, *Euchologia*, p. 648. See also Suicer, *Thesaurus*, *s.v.*, and the authorities there cited; also Renaudot, *op. cit.* i. 182].

6. Consecration of altars.—It would appear that prior to the 6th cent. the dedication of a church was accomplished simply by the solemn celebration of the Eucharist in it. No special form of consecration existed. But in the case of churches destined to contain relics,—and in the latter part of this period nearly all churches possessed them,—these had to be solemnly enclosed in the altar before the celebration of the first mass in the church. Indeed it is possible that the later forms of dedication originated to a great extent in the ceremonial accompanying this *depositio* of the relics (*pignora*) of saints, and, as these rites illustrate the history of the altar, they may be briefly mentioned here. A study of the earliest liturgical documents, dealing with the consecration of churches with their altars, reveals the fact that in the West two types of service existed side by side—the Roman and the Gallican; the latter, as might be expected, closely resembling the Byzantine formulæ of dedication. Briefly it may be said, with regard to the ceremonies of the consecration of the altar, that the Roman rite is of a funerary character, while the Gallican and Eastern rites resemble the ceremonies of Christian initiation. In the latter the altar is first consecrated by lustration with holy water and anointing with chrism, these corresponding to the rites of baptism and confirmation. These cere-

monies having been performed by the bishop in the presence of the people, he leaves the church and proceeds to the spot where the relics are awaiting him. Having brought them to the church, he takes them to the altar. But before the *depositio* a veil is let down, so that the concluding ceremony of enclosing the relics within the altar is not witnessed by the people—who meanwhile chant the Psalm, *Cantate Domino canticum novum* with the Antiphon *Exultabunt Sancti in gloria*. In the Roman rite, which is of a funerary character, the bishop first enters the church and washes the altar once with water, then, returning to the door of the church, receives the *pignora*, and, accompanied by the people, proceeds to the altar, where he performs the ceremonies of the *depositio* in a far more elaborate fashion, these constituting the main feature of the consecration.

[See Duchesne, *op. cit.* p. 399 ff. (cf. the letter from Pope Vigilius to Profuturus of Braga cited on p. 97). The earliest *Ordines* of consecration are: (1) that published by F. Bianchini, *Anastas. Bibliothec.* iii. p. xlviii; and (2) the *Ordo of S. Amand*, published by Duchesne, *op. cit.* p. 478; cf. also the Gelasian *Sacramenta Muratori*, i. p. 635; see also *Monumenta Liturg.* Ambr. vol. i.; and for the Eastern rites, Goar, *Evcholog.* p. 832].

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ALTAR (Egyptian).—According to the sculptures, offerings were laid on mats or stands. A common form of the latter was a pillar-shaped upright of wood or stone, on which a bowl, censer, or tray could rest, and sometimes the bowl or tray was made in one piece with the upright. In tombs and temples the typical scene of offering shows a tray-stand covered with sliced loaves of bread , or with meat, vegetables, and other food, placed before the deceased man or the god; such stands are often accompanied by a variety of food on mats. At el-Amarna the stands of provisions to which the sun-god Aton stretches his radiating hands are often surmounted by flaming bowls, perhaps censers, perhaps lamps. The food, drink, incense, and water were provided for the god or the deceased, as they would have been for the banquets of a living man; most flesh and vegetables seem to have been eaten raw, but in the standard lists of offerings roast meat was included. Amongst the varieties of the symbol *khêwi*, 'altar,' in the New Kingdom, is , the picture of a stand with a flaming vessel upon it; and in the scenes of that age the offerer sometimes presents such a stand in his hand, with a plucked goose in the midst of the flames. Possibly this represents a kind of burnt sacrifice rather than a summary kind of cooking. The root of the name *khêwi* is spelt by the figure of a bivalve shell , which suggests that a shell may sometimes have replaced the bowl as the receptacle for the offering. Another kind of stand for offerings—a wooden frame to hold jars of liquid —was named *uthu*, this name being equally applied to those used at banquets.

In early tombs a flat slab for offerings, commonly called a 'table of offerings,' was placed before the niche containing a statue of the deceased, or in some other place corresponding. The table was oblong, with a projection like a spout in front. It was generally sculptured with , a loaf upon a mat, and often with a number of offerings in detail. The special name for this type was probably *hotep*. Such tables are also found in the ruins of temples, where they may have been placed for the service of the dedicator's statue rather than for that of the god. The type persisted down to the Roman period; it is rare during the New Kingdom, but was revived after its fall.

Temple altars on a large scale are very rare in Egypt. Down to the present time only four examples have been discovered, and none have survived in the Ptolemaic temples. The earliest is of the Fifth Dynasty, in the temple of the Sun at Abusir (Borchardt, *Das Re-Heiligthum des Königs Ne-Woser-Re*, i. pp. 14, 43). It is formed of five great blocks of alabaster; in the middle is a slightly raised circular slab, with four around it, oriented precisely to the cardinal points. Its extreme measures are some 15 ft. each way. Most of the surroundings are now destroyed to the level of the ground. The altar stood in a court before the great obelisk-shaped monument, and was raised only a few inches above the level of the floor; beside it was an area specially prepared for the slaughter and cutting up of victims. At Karnak, in an upper chamber close to the Festal Hall of Tethmosis III., is a great oblong rectangular altar or altar-base of white felspar, bearing the name of Rameses III. (Dyn. xx.), having each side shaped as a *hotep*. Tethmosis himself is recorded to have dedicated a similar one.

A different type of temple altar is a raised rectangular platform, reached by a flight of steps. There is a well-preserved example in the temple of Hatshepsut at Deir el-Bahari (Naville, *Deir el-Bahari*, i. Pl. 8; see also plan of temple in *Archæological Report*, 1894–95, or in Baedeker's *Egypt*). It measures about 16 by 13 ft., and stands in the centre of a small court about 5 ft. above the floor. The usual Egyptian cavetto cornice runs round it, and the top is flat except for some slight coping or cresting near the edge. Built of white limestone, it is dedicated to the sun-god, and is called a *khêwi* in the inscription, like the stands of offering. Another raised altar is at Karnak, dedicated by Tethmosis III.; and a third is stated to be in the largest temple of Gebel Barkal, dating from the early Ethiopian Kingdom in the 8th or 7th cent. B.C. (Borchardt, *l.c.*). These are all that are known to exist. The sculptures in the tombs of el-Amarna show the chief altars of Aton to have been of this form (Lepsius, *Denkmäler* iii. 96, 102; Davies, *El Amarna*, i. Pl. 12, 25, 27–28, ii. Pl. 18, iii. Pl. 8, 10). It seems as if the sun-gods in particular (Re, Aton, Amen-Re) were honoured by great altars.

F. LL. GRIFFITH.

ALTAR (Greek).—The altar, in Greek religion, is a raised place, usually an artificial structure, which is used for the purpose of making offerings to a god or gods. It is thus to be distinguished, on the one hand, from a sacrificial *trench* or *pit*, such as was often used for offerings to the dead, to heroes, or to the infernal deities; and, on the other, from a *table* for offerings such as was often placed in a temple or before a god at a ceremonial banquet.

But there is no very strict line of demarcation in either case. The distinction sometimes made between βωμός as an altar for the Olympian gods and ἐσχάρα for offerings to heroes, though laid down by Pollux (i. 8) and others, is not strictly observed by classical authors. And, on the other hand, a portable altar, such as was often used for incense or minor offerings, is not easy to distinguish from a sacred table.

A more essential distinction, at first sight, might seem to depend on the *nature of the offerings* for which an altar was used,—whether, for example, it was only for bloodless libations, for incense, and for gifts of fruit and flowers, or for the slaughter of victims, of which portions were burnt upon it. The ritual and offerings admissible in each case were prescribed by the nature of the deity worshipped and by the sacred regulations of the local cult, and the shape and construction of the altar must have depended upon these. But, apart from purely practical considerations, there does not seem to be any essential distinction observed in the form of the altar according to the various purposes for which it was intended.

Some confusion of thought is found in the case of sacred stones or other objects that were anointed with offerings of blood, oil, or other liquids, bound with sacred woollen fillets, and otherwise treated in much the same way as altars. This fact has led some writers to assert that an altar was sometimes regarded not merely as the symbol of the god, but as having him immanent in it. These sacred stones, which are a survival from primitive religious beliefs, are not, however, properly to be regarded as altars, though they may have been sometimes so thought of when religious thought had advanced to less crude conceptions of the deities.

Apart from these, an altar seems to derive its sanctity merely from its association with a god, or its dedication to him. There was nothing in Greek religion to prevent a sacrifice being made to a god on any occasion or in any place; and, in such cases, the convenience of the sacrifice would suggest the use of any outstanding rock or natural mound, or, in the absence of such help, the piling together of stones or sods to make an improvised altar (αὐτοσχεδία ἐσχάρα, Paus. v. 13. 5); and a similar primitive form, often heaped together out of the ashes of victims, was retained by many of the most famous altars, such as those of Zeus at Olympia and of Hera at Samos. This, however, implies the repetition of sacrifices at the same place; the selection of such places was due to various causes. These may best be classified, according to Hermann's well-known division, as natural, social, and historical; but before we examine instances of these three classes, it is necessary to consider the relation of the altar to other objects connected with worship, especially the precinct, the image, and the temple.

The normal equipment of a sacred place in Greece consisted of a *temple*, an *altar*, and a *precinct*. In later times the temple was the most conspicuous and the most important, and usually contained the image of the god; but even then the altar was the essential thing for ritual purposes. If possible, it was placed in front of the temple, and in its main axis; but so that the person sacrificing faced east, with his back to the temple. Examples of this are numerous; *e.g.* the altars in front of the temples of Aphæa at Ægina, of Apollo at Delphi, and of Aphrodite at Naucratis. Often, however, it was difficult or inconvenient to place the altar in this position, and it was placed elsewhere in the neighbourhood, as in the case of the altar of Zeus at Olympia, and of Athene on the Acropolis at Athens. In addition to the main altar, there might be others in the precinct, whether dedicated to the same god as the main altar or to other deities. An extreme case is offered by Olympia, where as many as 69 other altars are recorded as existing in the sacred *Altis* of Zeus. There was usually, in all probability, a small altar for incense and small offerings within the temple; traces of such altars have rarely been found (an example is in the temple of Sarapis on Delos [*BCH* vi. 299]); but they may often have been small portable ones.

It must always be borne in mind in this connexion that a temple in Greece was not usually intended for the performance of services or ritual acts, much less for congregational use; it served chiefly to house the image of the god and his most precious offerings. Assemblies and services, including sacrifices of all kinds, took place for the most part outside, around the altar which was their real centre; provision was sometimes made close to the altar for the accommodation of worshippers or spectators. Thus at Oropus there are curved steps above the altar in the Amphiaræum, and at Olympia there was accommodation for spectators near the great altar of Zeus. Round the altar of Artemis Orthia at Sparta, where the ceremonial flogging of the Spartan youths took place, a regular amphitheatre was erected in Roman times. An earlier and more important example of the association of an altar with the provision of accommodation for spectators is the θυμέλη placed in the orchestra of the theatre. Here the altar was the original centre round which were placed first provisional seats, and afterwards the great buildings which we find as theatres on numerous Greek sites. At Priene, where alone the *thymele* is still extant, it is placed on the side of the orchestra farthest from the stage.

Altars were, however, not always associated with temples. An altar might be set up on any sacred spot, with or without a precinct of some sort around it; and altars were also connected with the life of men, especially in domestic and civil surroundings. It was usual to have an altar of Zeus Ἑρκεῖος, the protector of the enclosure, in the courtyard of every house; traces of such an altar are found even in the palace at Tiryns. Here it was usual for the head of the house to offer sacrifice, especially on festival days. In addition to this there was the *hestia* or hearth, usually circular, and sacred to the goddess of the same name. Such a hearth is usually found in the hall of palaces of the Mycenæan age: its position in the house of historical times is doubtful. We should expect to find it in the *pastas* or open recess opposite the entrance, according to Galen's description of the primitive house; but some suppose it to have been placed in the ἀνδρών or dining-room. The hearth was the centre of domestic life, and it was accordingly sought by a suppliant who claimed the right of hospitality; at a wedding, fire from it was carried to the *hestia* in the new home by the bride's mother, thus ensuring the continuity of the domestic worship. The hearth of the royal palace was the centre of the worship and hospitality of the State in monarchical times. It was natural that, with the growth of democratic feeling, this should be transferred to the hearth of the State as the focus of civic life; such a hearth, itself usually circular, was often enclosed in a circular building called a *tholos*; and the Prytaneum, where public hospitality was dispensed, was associated with it. The original character of the public hearth as an altar of Hestia was not, however, lost sight of; the Prytanes at Athens regularly offered sacrifice there. On the sacred hearth in the Prytaneum at Olympia the fire was always kept burning day and night. It was also customary to set up altars in a market-place (*agora*), a gateway, or other places of concourse; and the sacrifices which preceded any assembly for political or other purposes implied the provision of an altar for offering them. Such altars frequently stood by themselves, without being attached to any particular temple or precinct.

This summary of the relation of altars to other appliances or conditions of religious or social life suffices, to a great extent, as a comment on the classification of the reasons that led to the choice of various places for altars. We may assign to natural causes the erection of altars on mountain-tops or in groves, beneath sacred trees, in caves, beside springs, or in other situations distinguished

by their natural surroundings; to the same category may be assigned altars dedicated to Zeus Καταιβάτης where lightning had struck, and others in commemoration of extraordinary phenomena; *e.g.* the altar to Phosphorus—perhaps an epithet of Artemis—dedicated by Thrasybulus in honour of the miraculous light that led his adventurous band from Phyle to Munychia. Examples of altars which owe their origin to social causes have already been given, especially those of the house and of the agora. In addition to the usual gods of the market-place (ἀγοραῖοι θεοί) we sometimes find altars of more abstract ethical significance, such as the altars of Ἔλεος (pity) and of αἰδώς (sense of honour) at Athens. Many of the altars attached to temples or in precincts would belong to this class. Altars that owe their origin to historical causes are not so common; a good example is the altar dedicated by the Greeks to Zeus Eleutherius at Platæa after their victory over the Persians. This class might be indefinitely enlarged if we include in it all altars that were set up for a special sacrifice and left as a memorial of it. Such were especially common in later times; a familiar example is offered by the 'taurobolic' altars of Roman date.

The *form* and *size* of altars vary very greatly, from a small portable block or table to a structure a stadium in length, and from a mere mound of earth to an elaborate combination of architecture and sculpture like the great altar at Pergamus. The form of a round or oval mound, with the addition probably, in larger examples, of a retaining wall of some sort to hold it together, was to be found in many of the oldest and most sacred altars. That of Zeus at Olympia, which was constructed of the ashes of victims, including those brought from the sacrifices on the sacred hearth at the Prytaneum, had a circumference, on its lower platform, of 125 ft., and of 32 on its upper portion, and a total height of 22 feet. The altar of Apollo at Delos, which was counted one of the seven wonders of the world, was said to be constructed of the horns of victims (κεράτινος βωμός). The other form of altar which may be regarded as primitive is an upstanding mass of rock, either in its rough state or cut to a rectangular form. The great altar of Athene on the Acropolis at Athens was a tract of natural rock, quite uneven on the top, but cut to a more or less square shape at the sides; it was about 80 or 90 feet square. Another rock-cut altar, of a more regular shape, with a platform and steps, is that in the middle of the Pnyx from which the orators addressed the people. Altars were, however, more frequently made of stone or marble, cut from a single block if they were small, or built up like any other structure if they were large. Small altars might be either round or rectangular; there does not seem to be any ritual distinction between the two, except that the hearth (ἑστία) was usually circular; and so, perhaps, were the low altars suitable to heroes, and called by later authorities ἐσχάραι; but rectangular altars to heroes were not unusual, *e.g.* that in the Heroum at Olympia.

When the altar was of any size and importance, the rectangular form prevailed; and the altar was usually mounted on a basis which projected on one side, and so provided a platform (πρόθυσις) on which the sacrificer stood. This was usually so placed that he faced towards the east; thus, in the normal positions of altar and temple, he would turn his back on the image of the deity in the temple,—a fact which alone would suffice to prove that the altar was the most primitive and most essential object in religious rites. This platform was of considerable extent in great altars, and was the place where the victims were slaughtered, the portions that were selected to be burnt being consumed on the altar itself. Altars intended for the sacrifice of many victims at once, or for hecatombs, were necessarily of very large size. The dimensions of the great altar built by Hieron II. of Syracuse (which is about 215 yards in length and about 25 yards in width), of the altars of Zeus at Olympia and of Athene at Athens, have already been mentioned; another example, of medium size, is an altar near the theatre at Megalopolis, which measures about 36 ft. by 6 ft. 6 inches.

Where stone was not readily available, an altar might be constructed of other materials; thus at Naucratis the altar, with its steps and *prothysis*, in the precinct of Aphrodite, is built, like the temple, of unbaked brick and faced with stucco. Altars of any considerable size usually consisted of a mere outer shell of masonry, the inside being filled with rubble or with the ashes from sacrifice; they thus offered a convenient surface on which to kindle the sacrificial fire. In the case of small stone altars which were used for burnt-offerings, some special arrangement was necessary to place on the top. As a rule, extant small altars are flat on the top. Sometimes they are hollowed into basins, as if to hold libations or drink-offerings; occasionally we find a drain to let the liquid run away, as in the altar found at Paphos (*JHS* ix. 239). Sometimes an altar had the form of a table supported upon stone legs. A good early example of this type was found in the early Dionysion west of the Acropolis at Athens. The Bœotians used to build an altar of wood on the summit of Mount Cithæron, and to let it be consumed together with the sacrifice.

It was usual to give some architectural form to an altar, if only in the step or steps on which it was raised and the moulding that ornamented it at top and bottom. Where something more elaborate was attempted, it often took the form of Ionic volutes at each end of the top moulding; these were often joined at the sides by rolls such as we see on the capitals of Ionic columns. Large built altars are sometimes ornamented by a Doric frieze of triglyphs and metopes, occupying the whole height of the structure; an example of this occurs in the large altar already mentioned at Megalopolis. Often in later times the decoration of an altar, in architecture and sculpture, became more elaborate. The altar of Athene at Priene was decorated with an attached Ionic colonnade, and with figures in relief between the columns. The altar of Artemis of Ephesus is said to have been full of the work of Praxiteles. The great altar of Asklepios at Cos was an elaborate structure; but the chief example of this kind was the great altar of Zeus at Pergamus. This consisted of a great basis, about 100 ft. square, ornamented with the well-known frieze of the gigantomachy. A broad flight of steps on the west side led up to the top of this basis, which was surrounded by a colonnade; in this space was the altar proper, consisting of heaped up ashes. An even larger altar than this is said to have existed at Parium on the Propontis. A remarkable architectural development of the circular altar is to be seen in the *Tholos* or *Thymele* (its official name) at Epidaurus; it has the form of a circular temple, with colonnades inside and outside.

Inscriptions are not usually found on altars in Greece. An early example is the altar with ἡρῶος or ἡρώων painted on its stucco face in the Heroum at Olympia. The chief altar attached to a temple or precinct would not require any such means of identification, though, where it was a special dedication, this might be recorded, *e.g.* the great altar of Apollo at Delphi states that it was dedicated by the Chians, and a smaller inscription on its corner adds that the Chians received the privilege

of προμαντεία for their gift. In the case of altars to other gods than the one to whom the precinct belonged, inscriptions would be useful, but were by no means universal. They would be required also on altars in public places; *e.g.* the inscribed altar in the Dipylon gateway at Athens, dedicated to Zeus Herkeios, Hermes, and Acamas. Where the object of an altar was commemorative rather than for practical use, the inscription would of course be essential. But ritual ordinances as to sacrifices were usually inscribed, not on the altar itself, but on a stela or slab set up beside it, or on some other convenient place in its immediate vicinity.

For the ritual of sacrifice, and the manner in which altars were used in connexion with it, see SACRIFICE. But it should be added here that an altar was usually dedicated to the service of a particular god, and was not used for offerings to any other. A good example of this is seen in the sixty-nine altars of Olympia, each of which had its proper destination, and was visited in its proper turn in the monthly order of sacrifices. This rule did not, however, preclude a common dedication to several gods of one altar (σύμβωμοι, ὁμοβώμιοι θεοί). There existed altars of all the gods, or of the twelve gods; an interesting example, probably to ensure the worship of some powers that might otherwise be overlooked, is offered by the altar of 'the unknown gods' at Olympia. The example of this title quoted by St. Paul at Athens (Ac 17^{23}) was, however, in the singular. Frequently two gods were worshipped at the same altar; a classical instance is provided by the six twin altars mentioned by Pindar in *Ol.* v. 12 (see Schol. *ad loc.*). In Athens, Poseidon and Erechtheus shared a common altar in the Erechtheum, and in the Amphiaræum at Oropus the altar has been enlarged so as to accommodate several deities (Πρακτικὰ Ἀρχ. Ἑτ. 1804, p. 91).

In addition to their use for the ritual of sacrifice, altars were also sought by *suppliants*, who often sat upon the steps, and especially by *those seeking sanctuary*. The altar in a house, whether the *hestia* or that of Zeus Herkeios, often served this purpose; and in a temple a suppliant would naturally place himself under the protection of the god either by clasping his image or by seating himself on the altar or beside it. It does not, however, appear that in Greek religion there was any peculiar power in this connexion that belonged to the altar more than to any other part of a temple or precinct. The right of sanctuary usually had clearly defined limits within which it was inviolable. It is worthy of note that when Cylon's followers had to go outside these limits, it was to the early image, not to the altar, that they attached the rope to which they trusted for protection.

LITERATURE.—See end of art. ALTAR (Roman).

ERNEST A. GARDNER.

ALTAR (Hindu).—Altars, or raised platforms, play an important part in the Hindu ceremonial. The Sanskrit for a Hindu altar is *vedi*, which is defined as 'an altar or raised place made of Kuśa grass, or strewed with it, and prepared for an oblation, for placing the vessels used at a sacrifice, a place or ground prepared for sacrifice' (Monier Williams, *s.v.*). The original *vedi* was a trench of varied shape, in which the sacrificial fires were kept, dug in the sacrificial ground. In early times in India, when the gods were worshipped by each man at his own fireplace, it was a duty incumbent on every householder to keep the sacred fire in the altar, from the very day on which the ceremony of the Agnyādhāna, or the setting up of sacrificial fires, had been performed. On that important occasion the sacrificer chose his four priests, and erected sheds or fire-houses for the Gārhapatya and the Āhavanīya fires respectively. A circle was marked for the Gārhapatya fire, and a square for the Āhavanīya fire; a semicircular area for the Dakṣiṇāgni or southern fire, if that also was required. The *adhvaryu* or officiating priest then procured a temporary fire, either producing it by friction, or obtaining it from the village, and, after the usual fivefold lustration of the Gārhapatya fireplace, he laid down the fire thereon, and in the evening handed two pieces of wood, called *araṇi*, to the sacrificer and his wife, for the purpose of producing by attrition the Āhavanīya fire the next morning.

There were different *vedis* for different kinds of offering, as, *e.g.*, the large Soma altar (*mahāvedi*) and the *pāśuki vedi*, used for animal sacrifice, which resembled the *uttarā vedi*, or 'northern altar'; the latter was an altar raised with earth excavated in forming what is called a *chātvāla*, or hole. The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa compares the shape of an altar to that of a woman: 'The altar should be broad on the western side, contracted in the middle, and broad again on the eastern side; for thus shaped they praise a woman.' The shape of sacrificial altars was considered a matter of so much importance that there were special manuals in Sanskrit, called Śulbasūtras, which form part of the ancient Śrautasūtras, and give the measurements necessary for the construction of the altars. The different shapes in which brick altars might be constructed are mentioned as early as in the Taittirīya Saṁhitā. Thus there is a falcon-shaped altar built of square bricks, or an altar of the shape of a falcon with curved wings and outspread tail; a heron-shaped altar with two feet; one of the shape of the forepart of the poles of a chariot, an equilateral triangle; another of the form of two such triangles joined at their bases; several wheel-shaped or circular altars, tortoise-shaped, etc. The area of the earliest species of altars was to be 7½ square *puruṣas*, the term *puruṣa* denoting the height of a man with uplifted arms. The area remained the same when a different shape of altar was required. This and other changes could not be effected without a considerable knowledge of geometry. As stated by Thibaut, 'squares had to be found which would be equal to two or more given squares, or equal to the difference of two given squares; oblongs had to be turned into squares and squares into oblongs . . .; the last task, and not the least, was that of finding a circle the area of which might equal as closely as possible that of a given square.' The result of these operations was the compilation of a series of geometrical rules which are contained in the above mentioned Śulbasūtras.

A lively controversy has been going on as to whether these geometrical rules are of Indian growth, or due to Greek influence, the numerous coincidences between the Sanskrit texts and the writings of Heron favouring the latter view, whereas the apparent antiquity of the Śulbasūtras, and their close connexion with the ancient sacrificial rites of the Brāhmans, would seem to render their native origin the more probable alternative.

Though offerings in the ancient Vedic fashion have become very rare in India, various kinds of altars continue in common use for religious purposes. Thus the present writer saw a square *vedi* made of earth or clay, on which an open fire for oblations of butter had been kindled, at the consecration of a public tank near Calcutta. Hindu altars are also erected at some of the Saṁskāras or family celebrations of the Brāhmans. Thus among the Deshasth Brāhmans in Dharwar, it is customary, a few days before the ceremony of thread-girding, to raise a porch in front of the house, on the western side of which an altar is set up facing east. On the day of the ceremony the boy is bathed and is seated on a low wooden

stool which is placed upon the altar, and his father and mother sit on either side. The chief priest kindles on the altar a sacred fire, into which he throws offerings. On the occasion of a marriage in the same caste, an altar about six feet square and one foot high is raised. The bride and bridegroom are led to the marriage altar, and two men hold a cloth between them. At the lucky moment the cloth is drawn aside, and each for the first time time sees the other's face. Afterwards the priest kindles a sacred fire on the altar, and clarified butter and parched grain are thrown in. The married couple walk thrice round the fire. Seven heaps of rice are made on the altar, and a betel-nut is placed on each of the heaps. The bridegroom lifting the bride's right foot places it on each of the seven heaps successively. Among the Deshasth Brāhmans of Bijāpur, boys on their initiation are led to an altar called *bahule*, where the priest girds them with the sacred thread, to which a small piece of deerskin is tied.

LITERATURE.—Eggeling's transl. of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa in *SBE*, vols. xii. xxvi. (1882, 1886, with plan of sacrificial ground with *vedi*); R. C. Dutt, *History of Civilization in Ancient India*, 3 vols., Calcutta, 1889–1890; J. Thibaut, 'On the Śulvasūtras' in *JRASBe*, vol. xliv., 'Astronomie, Astrologie, und Mathematik' in *GIAP*, Strassburg, 1899; A. Hillebrandt, 'Ritual-litteratur,' *ib.*, Strassburg, 1897; A. Bürk, 'Das Āpastamba-Śulba-Sūtra' in *ZDMG*, vols. lv. lvi., 1901, 1902; *BG*, vol. xxii. Dharwar, and vol. xxiii. Bijāpur; Monier Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hinduism*⁴, London, 1891, p. 308.

J. JOLLY.

ALTAR (Japanese).—In Japan little distinction is made between the table and the altar. No special sanctity attaches to the latter. In Buddhist temples there is a stand on which incense is burnt, called *kōdan* or *kōdzukuye* ('incense-table'). Shinto offerings are placed on small tables of unpainted wood. The old ritual prescribed that in the case of Greater Shrines the offerings should be placed on tables (or altars); in the case of Lesser Shrines, on mats spread on the earth.

Each house may have its Buddhist domestic altar, or rather shrine (*butsudan*)—a miniature cupboard or shelf where an image of a Buddha is deposited, or a Shinto altar (*kamidana*) where Shinto tokens, pictures, or other objects of devotion are kept.

W. G. ASTON.

ALTAR (Persian).—**1.** In none of the ancient Persian records, whether literary or inscriptional, do we find a generic term for 'altar.'* Nevertheless, to infer from the absence of such a term in the extant records that no kind of altar was employed in the Zoroastrian ritual during the period represented by the Inscriptions and the Avesta, would be to press the argument from negative evidence too far. Moreover, if the limited vocabulary of the Inscriptions contains no *word* for 'altar,' yet the royal sculptor has left an unequivocal witness of the existence of altars in the Mazdaism of the early Achæmenians, in the representation of the altar itself in bas-relief over the entrance of the tomb of Darius Hystaspis on the rocks at Naksh i Rustam.†

The statements of Greek and Roman authors as to the absence of altars, and of temples and images, in early Persian worship, would seem, on the first view, more difficult of a satisfactory explanation.‡ Herodotus, claiming to speak from personal observation and research, states (i. 131 ff.) that the Persians 'think it unlawful to build temples or altars, imputing folly to those who do so.' Therefore, 'when about to sacrifice, they neither erect altars nor kindle fire.' Strabo (born *c.* 60 B.C.), writing some four hundred and fifty years later, reiterates (xv. iii. 13) the testimony of Herodotus, though, in regard to the phenomena of his own time, he afterwards modifies its application (see *loc. cit.* §§ 14–15).

It is generally agreed, however, by this time, that the kind of altar with which Herodotus, as a Greek, was familiar—a raised platform in masonry, with steps to ascend, erected in front of the temple and under the shadow of the sculptured statue of the deity to whom the temple was dedicated, and upon which animal sacrifices were immolated—was quite unknown amongst the Persians for a long period after Herodotus wrote his *History*. This is not intended to imply that animal sacrifices as well were foreign to the Persian worship of the 5th cent. B.C. For, in the same passage, Herodotus describes the customs observed in such sacrifices: 'If any intends to sacrifice to a god, he leads the animal to a consecrated place.' 'Then dividing the victim into parts, he boils the flesh, and lays it upon the most tender herbs, especially trefoil.' The herbs must certainly be regarded as serving the purpose of an altar, upon which the flesh is presented for the acceptance of the deity; for while it lies there, the *Magus*, we are told, performs the religious service (cf., in some respects, the use of the altar of peace-offering amongst the Hebrews).

The same custom was observed in the cult of certain Persian divinities even in Strabo's time. 'They sacrifice to water by going to a lake, river, or fountain; having dug a trench, they slaughter the victim over it . . .; then they lay the flesh in order upon myrtle or laurel branches' (*loc. cit.* § 14). Here we meet with an Iranian substitute for the Greek *βωμός*, or raised altar for immolating the victim, namely, the *trench*, which, indeed, is highly suggestive of the antiquity of the method of sacrificing to some of these natural divinities. We have before us what is, probably, a relic of an ancient method of sacrificing which goes back to the Indo-Iranian period, the trench being the Zoroastrian counterpart of the *vedi* of the Vedic ritual.*

There is another fact in connexion with ancient Persian substitutes for altars mentioned by Herodotus, which is interesting, and not, it would appear, without its significance. 'The consecrated places' in the open air whither the victims for some of their sacrifices were led for slaughter, were on the tops of the highest mountains.† Remembering this and the fact that the chief god of the Persians was a sky-god, do we not here perceive their true reason, or, at least, an additional reason on their part for reproaching with folly, as they did, those who erected artificial platforms for sacrificing? In these mountains the pious Zoroastrians saw the altars which their God had provided, which dwarfed and rendered superfluous all other altars, and upon which He seemed ever to dwell as they gazed upon them from their distant homes.

On the other hand, the bas-relief sculpture over the royal tomb at Naksh i Rustam does not represent a sacrificial altar, or indicate any substitute whatsoever for the Greek *βωμός*, such as the trench was. Its purpose and significance are entirely different. If we wish to find amongst another people anything like a parallel to it, we must turn, not to the Greeks, but to the ancient Hebrews. Like the Ark of the Covenant amongst the Israelites, it was not an instrument for presenting anything to the deity, but the resting-place of the most perfect

* The *dāitya gātu* of the Avesta (*Vendīdād*, viii. 81, 85; xiii. 17) forms no real exception; for, etymologically, it means no more than 'legal or consecrated place,' and is synonymous rather with *temple* than with *altar*. See, however, Jackson, *Grundr. iran. Phil.*, ii. 701; *Persia, Past and Present*, p. 303, by the same author.

† See Dieulafoy, *L'Acropole de Suse*, p. 392.

‡ See art. TEMPLES.

* See 'Das Āpastamba-Śulba-Sūtra: Übersetzung von Bürk; Die altindischen Altäre und das geometrische Wissen welches ihre Konstruktion voraussetzt,' *ZDMG*, vol. lv. p. 543 ff., vol. lvi. p. 327 ff.

† Compare the use of 'high places' (*bāmōth*) amongst the Hebrews (1 K 3^4, 2 K 17^{11}. See also Gn 22^{14}).

symbol and truest visible manifestation of the presence of that divinity, namely, the sacred fire. The figure on the rock is, therefore, a Fire-altar, attesting the use of such altars amongst the Persians long before the death of Darius.

Of the fact that the Persian reverence for fire goes back to a very early period, there can be no doubt.* The prominence of the *Agni*-cult amongst the Indians as well as the Iranians shows conclusively that it was part of that common heritage which the Indo-Iranian period bequeathed to them. And the reform of Zoroaster had, no doubt, as one of its results, the intensification and extension of the reverence for that element.†

When we remember that the divine flame had to be preserved with the most scrupulous care from all possibility of contamination,‡ as well as maintained ever unextinguished, it is natural to conclude not only that from early times there must have been a protection from climatic and atmospheric dangers, in the form of roofed and walled edifices (see TEMPLES), but that it would be equally necessary to circumscribe it in some vessel, and raise it sufficiently high from the floor, so as to guard it from being polluted by dust or insects. And in the representation on the rock these conditions are fulfilled.

In formation, judging from the bas-relief altar,§ the Achæmenian Fire-altar seems to have consisted of (*a*) a massive plinth or pedestal, with (*b*) what appears like a stone slab, of some inches in depth, resting upon it, and which may very naturally be regarded as the prototype of what is now so well known as the *Ádōsht*;‖ (*c*) crowning all, the sacred urn, now called the *Âtash-dān*, the 'fire-container,' wherein the divine and eternal fire burned.

Even in those early days, probably, just as in the time of Strabo ¶ and Pausanias ** (*c.* 180 A.D.), and in modern Fire-temples, this sacred vessel was full to its utmost capacity with the ashes of preceding days, and upon these the sacred flame was kept burning day and night with incense and sandal-wood.

Moreover, from the days of Cyrus onwards the divine fire burned, not only in the sacred vase concealed in the seclusion of the *Âtash-gāh*, but it, or at least an inferior form of it,†† invariably formed part of the religious processions and royal progresses of the Persian kings. Xenophon, in describing these processions (*Cyrop.* VIII. iii. 11–13), tells us that 'after the third chariot men followed carrying fire on a large altar' (*ἐπ' ἐσχάρας μεγάλης*).

In what respect, if at all, the *ἐσχάρα* differed in form from the altar of the *Âtash-gāh*, we are unable to say. The word *ἐσχάρα*, which Xenophon employs, is variously translated in passages where it occurs as 'hearth,' 'unraised altar,' 'brasier.' One would scarcely think that this portable altar would include the massive support which seems to have characterized the temple altar * (but see on Sasanian altars, below, § 2).

Sebēos (wrote *c.* 650–675 A.D.) states that the portable altar was less elaborate than that in use in the *Âtash-gāh*.* Quintus Curtius (*c.* 64 A.D.), however, asserts that these royal altars were made of silver.† The latter statement may refer only to the *Âtash-dān*. Tabari, the Arabic historian (*b.* 839 A.D.), relates how Yazdijird III., the last of the Sasanian kings, carefully deported with him the sacred fire, in its fit receptacle, from place to place in his hurried flight before the conquering Arabs.

From the representations on the coins of the period,‡ we learn that the sacred fire was not extinguished upon the altar during the Parthian domination (B.C. 250–A.D. 226). Unfortunately, these coins do not assist us very materially in ascertaining the conformation of the altar at this time. Although the Fire-altar is a common type on the reverse of the pieces of the period, they contain only the *Âtash-dān*, having as support the lower part of the Fire-temple or *Âtash-gāh*; that is, it is only a convention. Still they serve sufficiently to show that in its main element, the *Âtash-dān*, the Fire-altar of the Achæmenians had persisted and survived the shock given to Zoroastrian ritual by the conquest of Alexander and the rule of the Arsacids.

It is possible, though this is by no means certain, that it was during this period§ that the sacred places on the high mountains, under the influence of foreign cults, gave room to temples, in the classical sense (*ἱερόν*), and consequently there arose the accompanying altar (*βωμός*) for animal sacrifices (cf. Strabo, *loc. cit.* § 15, also XI. viii. 4; Pausanias, *loc. cit.*).

Other high authorities‖ are strongly inclined to assign what are, admittedly, the extant remains of one of these temples, the famous temple at Kangavar, to the time of Artaxerxes II. (Mnemon) (404–358 B.C.), when, as we learn from several sources, there was a serious decadence from orthodox Zoroastrianism, and a recrudescence of ancient cults (cf. J. H. Moulton, *Thinker*, 1892, vol. ii. pp. 498–499). The last word on this matter is yet to be written.

On any theory, we are certain that in the first century before our era two classes of altars, at least, were used in Zoroastrian ritual, namely, the Fire-altar of the *Âtash-gāh*, and the sacrificial altar attached to the temples erected to specific Persian divinities.

Was there not yet another altar in use at this period? Certain statements in the terse account which Strabo gives (*loc. cit.*) of the religious practices of the Persians would seem to justify the inference.

We know that the temples of those Persian

* See von Ferdinand Justi, 'Die älteste iranische Religion und ihr Stifter Zarathustra' in *Preussische Jahrbücher*, vol. lxxxviii. pp. 84, 85, 86. Also, Shahrastani, ed. Haarbrücker, Halle, 1850, i. pp. 281, 298; and Gottheil, 'References to Zoroaster in Syriac and Arabic Literature' in *Classical Studies in Honour of Henry Drisler*, pp. 44–47.

† See Jackson, *Zoroaster, the Prophet of Ancient Iran*, pp. 98–101.

‡ See Dieulafoy, *L'Acropole de Suse*, p. 392, n. 1.

§ There is no reason to think that the two large real Fire-altars hewn out of the rock at Naksh i Rustam were typical of those in use in the regular worship at any period in the history of the Zoroastrian religion. (See Jackson, *Persia, Past and Present*, p. 303, and illustration, p. 305).

‖ 'Ádōsht, Pehlevi âtûshto (Dâdistân 48. 15), probablement formé de *âtar-sta*, "où se tient le feu"' (Darmesteter, *Le Zend Avesta*, vol. i. p. lxi, note 3).

¶ 'In the middle of these (the fire-temples) is an altar, on which is a great quantity of ashes' (Strabo, *loc. cit.* § 15).

** 'In the temples of the Persians there is a room where ashes of a colour other than that of ordinary ashes are found. . . . He puts dry wood upon the altar . . . the wood is to be ignited on the ashes without fire' (Pausanias, v. 27. 5).

†† Dieulafoy, *L'Acropole de Suse*, p. 399; Tiele, *Geschiedenis van den Godsdienst in den Oudheid*, Deel ii. 2de Stuk, pp. 363–4, Amsterdam, 1901.

* 'Outre les somptueux pyrées construits dans les villes, il existait encore des pyrées ambulants pour lesquels on disposait une tente spéciale, et le roi n'entrait jamais en campagne autrement qu'accompagné de mages et de pyrées' (*Journal Asiatique*, 1866, p. 113 [Sebēos, p. 50]). For a somewhat different version of this passage, see Dr. Heinrich Hübschmann, *Zur Geschichte Armeniens und der ersten Kriege der Araber (aus dem Armenischen des Sebēos)*, Leipzig, 1873, p. 7, n. 1.

† 'Ordo autem agminis erat talis. Ignis, quem ipsi sacrum et æternum vocabant, argenteis altaribus præferebatur. Magi proximi patrium carmen canebant' (iii. 3, 9 *f.*).

‡ These coins were not part of the national issues, but belonged, probably, to the semi-independent kings of Persis—Persia in the narrower sense. See *Numismata Orientalia*, 'Parthian Coinage,' by Percy Gardner, p. 20; *Num. Chron.* vol. vii. pp. 237, 242, 244; and especially Justi, *Grundr. iran. Phil.* ii. pp. 486–87; *Corolla Numismatica*, Oxford, 1906, *Étude sur la Numismatique de la Perside*, pp. 63–97, Pl. iii. by Allotte de la Füye; Dorn, *Collection des monnaies sassanides de feu le lieutenant-général J. de Bartholomæi*, St. Petersburg, 1873, *passim*.

§ See Dieulafoy, *L'Art Antique de la Perse*, pt. v. 7–8, 10–11, 207.

‖ See Jackson, *Persia, Past and Present*, pp. 236–242.

divinities were separate and distinct from the Fire-temples or *Ātash-gāhs* (Strabo, *loc. cit.* § 15). But Strabo adds that to whatever divinity the Persians sacrificed, they first addressed a prayer to fire, all their devotions then, as now, being performed in the presence of the sacred element. Further, in describing the sacrifice to water as mentioned above, he adds that they took great care lest any of the blood should spurt into the fire. The fire, in this case, cannot have been that of the *Ātash-gāh*, but a fire on some kind of altar or brasier present at the place of sacrifice (§ 14). This fire would naturally be of an inferior grade to that used in the *Ātash-gāh*, and consequently it is quite conceivable that it may have served both for boiling the flesh* and for representing the fire of the *Ātash-gāh* as the symbol of the nature and presence of the deity. (See below, § 3).

If the inference is correct, we have here the parent, so to speak, of the Fire-altar employed at the present day in the *Izashnah-Gāh*, or place where the religious rites are performed.

2. On Sasanian coins of all periods, the Fire-altar is a constant type, modified, as it is, from time to time. On some of the earlier pieces we observe that there are, attached to the sides of the altar, metal feet† in the form of lions' paws, which seem to rest upon what were probably intended for handles wherewith to carry the altar. It is, however, conceivable that these were a feature of only the movable altar already described, but were not characteristic of the altar of the *Ātash-gāh*. However, in the later coins of the period this feature disappears, and we have merely the central support in the form of a short column with a base, and crowned, as in the older coins, by the *Ādōsht*, which, in turn, supports the *Ātash-dān*.‡

Whether it was the great reform of Zoroastrianism inaugurated and developed by the Sasanian kings that abolished the practice of animal sacrifice, or whether it had fallen into disuse before the rise of that dynasty (cf. Dieulafoy, *L'Acropole de Suse*, p. 402, Note 2), there can be no doubt that from Sasanian times onwards no places for real sacrifices are to be counted among Zoroastrian altars.

The *dāitya-gātu* was no doubt more extensive than a mere shrine for the *Ātash-dān* of the Bahram Fire, but its remaining part was the shelter of another, only inferior, Fire-altar, already conjectured to exist in earlier times, namely, the small Fire-altar of the *Izashnah-Gāh* (as witness of this, see the elaborate ritual of Avesta, *Vend.* v. 39, etc.). These are the two classes of altars in use among the Zoroastrians of Persia and the Parsīs of India at the present day.

3. Modern Fire-altars, while always retaining the two most essential out of the three parts of which Sasanian and, probably, as we have seen, earlier altars consisted, namely, the *Ādōsht* and the *Ātash-dān*, vary somewhat in the form of the latter from those found on the coins and sculptures.

The *Ātash-dāns* seen by Anquetil du Perron at Surat (see *Zend Avesta*, ii. pl. x.; Darmesteter, *Le Zend Avesta*, i. pl. iii.), consisted of large round vases of metal, much like our garden flower-vases, with a foot like a goblet and widening upwards, the larger one measuring three and a half feet in height, and three in diameter at the brim. Each stood upon its *Ādōsht*, about six inches in height. The size and degree of elaboration which characterize the *Ātash-dān* depend in the first place upon the wealth of the community worshipping at its shrine, and especially upon the quality of the fire it contains: whether it is the Bahram Fire, the purest and most sacred of all earthly fires, or the *Ātash i Ādarān*, the fire of the second grade, or only that used in the *Izashnah-khānah*.

The larger of the two fire-altars which Anquetil saw was that of an *Ātash i Ādarān*, placed, of course, in the *Ātash-gāh*; the smaller one was that in use in the *Izashnah-Gāh*. The latter contains the lowest grade of the hierarchy of sacred fires; it is the representative, though not the equal, of the fires of the *Ātash-gāh* (Darmesteter, *Le Zend Avesta*, i. p. lxiii). In front of this altar the priestly rites and religious ceremonies are performed (see SACRIFICE and OFFERINGS). In large temples, such as that at Kolaba, described by Darmesteter (*op. cit.*), there are as many as six of these small altars, where as many pairs of priests are able, simultaneously, to perform their ministrations. This is the class of altar found in the numerous *dādgāhs*, or small chapels, which have no *Ātash-gāh* attached.

Unlike the sacred fire on the altars of the *Ātash-gāhs*, the fire of these altars may be allowed to go out, and be kindled again whenever the faithful Zoroastrians assemble to perform their devotions and ceremonies. A small altar of this class is found also in all pious and orthodox Zoroastrian homes (see Dieulafoy, *L'Acropole de Suse*, Pl. xvi.).

LITERATURE.—The principal works have already been referred to in the body of the article. Dieulafoy's *L'Acropole de Suse*, p. 350 ff. (Paris, 1890–92), is the only work which treats, with anything like fulness, of *ancient* as well as *modern altars*. Scattered references in Greek and Roman authors have been collected and translated by (1) Wilson, *Parsi Religion*, p. 182 ff., Bombay, 1843; (2) Haug, *Essays on the Sacred Language . . . and Religion of the Parsis*, p. 7 ff., London, 1884. These two works contain other relevant matter. On *modern altars*, see Anquetil du Perron, *Zend Avesta, Ouvrage de Zoroastre*, vol. ii. pp. 531, 568–71, Pl. x., Paris, 1771; C. de Harlez, *Avesta, Livre Sacré des Sectateurs de Zoroastre*, vol. ii. p. 10 ff.; Darmesteter, *Le Zend Avesta*, vol. i. p. lix–lxiii, Pl. ii.–iv., vi., Paris, 1892.

E. EDWARDS.

ALTAR (Polynesian).—The Polynesian altar, or *fata*, was essentially a table for the gods, and was constructed of wood, thus forming a striking contrast to the stone altars found in practically all other parts of the world. In Tahiti, the altar was situated either before or in the *marœ*, or temple (Moerenhout, *Voyages aux îles du Grand Océan*, Paris, 1837, i. 470–471); while in Hawaii, where the pyramidal *marœ* was replaced by the *heiau*, the figure of the god was put in the inner apartment to the left of the door, with the altar immediately in front of it (Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, 2nd ed. London, 1832–1836, iv. 89). The usual type of the Polynesian altar is admirably described by the missionary William Ellis, as follows (i. 344–345; cf. Cook, *Troisième Voyage*, Paris, 1785, ii. 152–153, 350, iii. 388): 'Domestic altars, or those erected near the corpse of a departed friend, were small wicker structures; those in the public temples were large, and usually eight or ten feet high. The surface of the altar was supported by a number of wooden posts or pillars, often curiously carved and polished. The altars were covered with sacred boughs, and ornamented with a border or fringe of rich yellow plantain leaves. Beside these, there were smaller altars connected with the temples; some resembling a small round table, supported by a single post fixed in the ground. Occasionally, the carcase of the hog presented in sacrifice was placed on the large altar, while the heart and some other internal parts were laid on this smaller altar, which was called a *fata aiai*. Offerings and sacrifices of every kind, whether dressed or not, were placed upon the altar, and remained there till decomposed.' A Tahitian altar is described and pictured by Wilson (*Missionary Voyage to the Southern*

* See Rawlinson, *Five Great Monarchies of the Ancient Eastern World*, vol. iii. p. 359, London, 1871.

† See *Num. Chron.*, New Series, vol. xii. 'Sasanian Coins,' Pl. i.

‡ See *Num. Chron.* vol. xii. pl. ii.–v, and, in general, Dorn, *op. cit.*

Pacific Ocean, London, 1799, p. 211) as being forty feet long and seven wide, and resting on sixteen wooden pillars eight feet in height. It was covered with thick matting which hung down the side in fringes, and on it was a rotting pile of hogs, turtles, fish, plantains, coconuts, and other offerings. Since the Polynesians had no burnt-offerings, and since the sacrifices to the gods were, of course, *tabu*, this unsavoury procedure was unavoidable. In Tahiti, the victim was usually dead when placed on the *fata*, and there were also stone altars on which the heads of human victims were placed. The type of altars here described did not differ materially from the class represented by the Hawaiian *rere*, on which human victims were laid face downward, covered with sacrifices of sacred pig, and left to decay (Ellis, iv. 162).

The same distinction which prevails among the Melanesians (wh. see), is found in the Polynesian altars, which include not only the *fata* here described, but also the *fata tupapau*, or altar for the dead, which was six or seven feet in height, and received a corpse immediately after death. This *fata tupapau* was covered by a cloth which protected the dead body from the elements (Moerenhout, i. 470–471, 547); to the corpse food was offered daily for six weeks or two months. This covering is also extended in the Marquesas, where altars to the *tikis* and spirits of the dead are frequent along the roads and by the houses (Waitz-Gerland, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, vi. 387, Leipzig, 1872; cf. Cook, ii. 301), to the small *maræ* (Seraut in *L'Anthropologie*, xvi. 475–484). At the *maui fata*, or altar raising, the altar was decorated with mero branches and coconut leaves, while the offerings were pigs, plantains, and the like, but not human sacrifices (Ellis, i. 349).

LITERATURE.—Waitz-Gerland, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, vi. 378, 384, 387–388 (Leipzig, 1872).

LOUIS H. GRAY.

ALTAR (Roman).—Much of what has been said about altars in Greek religion applies to Roman religion also, especially in the case of customs or rituals borrowed from Greece. Indeed, most treatises or articles do not make any distinction between the two. Here only those cases will be mentioned as to which we have independent evidence for Roman practice, or in which Roman practice differed from Greek.

1. As to *names*, Varro (as quoted by Servius, *Æn.* ii. 535) asserts: 'Diis superis altaria, terrestribus aras, inferis focos dicari.' But this distinction, like that between *βωμός* and *ἐσχάρα* in Greek, is by no means universally observed by Latin writers, though there seems to be a general impression, in accordance with the etymology, that *altaria* are usually higher structures than *aræ*. Lofty altars were thought suitable to Jupiter and the gods of heaven, low ones to Vesta and Earth. Natural or improvised altars, especially those built of turf, are familiar in Latin literature (*e.g.* Horace, *Od.* III. viii. 3–4: 'Positusque carbo in cæspite vivo'). Such altars were set up all over the country, especially in connexion with sacred groves or trees; but they tended, as Greek influence spread, to be superseded by altars of stone or marble. Some of the earliest and most sacred altars in Rome seem not to have been attached to any particular temple; among these were the *ara maxima*, sacred to Hercules, and the mysterious subterranean altar of Consus, which was uncovered only once or twice in the year during festivals.

2. When altars are associated with temples, their *position* varies. Vitruvius (IV. viii.) states that altars ought to face east, and should be placed on a lower level than the images of the gods in the temple, in order that the worshippers may look up to them. The orientation of temples being much more varied in Italy than in Greece, that of the altar varies also. Roman temples are usually raised upon a high substructure approached by steps; and the altars at Pompeii are usually placed either in the open area in front of the steps or on a platform part of the way up. The sacrificer appears, from the position of the altars, to have stood, in some cases, with his side to the temple, in some cases with his back to it. Here, as in Greece, the usage seems to show that sacrifices offered to a god on his altar were not directly offered to the image which symbolized his presence,—that, in short, we have not cases of genuine 'idolatry.' But, in the scenes of sacrifice frequently represented on Roman reliefs, it is common for either a recognizable temple or a small statue of a god to be indicated behind the altar, probably as an artistic device to show to whom the sacrifice is offered.

3. There were also altars in Roman *houses*. It appears that, in primitive houses in Italy, the hearth served both for sacrifices to the domestic gods and for cooking purposes; this must have been in the atrium or central living-room. In farmhouses, where the kitchen with its hearth was still the principal room, we find a survival of this arrangement in the shrine for the household gods affixed to the wall close by the hearth; an example occurs in the villa at Bosco Reale. In Pompeiian houses the hearth has been transferred, for practical purposes, from the atrium to the kitchen; and that its religious functions accompanied it is shown by the fact that here also a shrine or painted figures of the domestic gods are often found in the kitchen near the hearth. More frequently, however, the household worship was more conveniently carried on at a small shrine provided for the purpose, either in a special room or in various positions in the atrium, peristyle, or garden. Such shrines usually consisted of a niche, with either statuettes or painted images of the domestic gods, the *lares* and *penates*, the genius of the house, and serpents; and in front was placed a small altar of a usual type. In one case a small fixed altar was found in a dining-room; probably portable altars were generally employed for the offerings which usually accompanied all meals, when they were no longer held in the common living-room or kitchen.

4. Of the *common hearth of a city* we have the most familiar example in that of Vesta at Rome, where the undying fire was tended by the Vestal Virgins. This was, doubtless, circular, as was the temple that contained it. Small altars were commonly placed in the streets, usually with a niche, or at least a painting on the wall behind, to indicate the gods to whom the altar was dedicated—sometimes the *lares compitales* or street gods, sometimes other deities.

5. As regards the *form* of altars in early Italian religion, we have not much information. The Ara Volcani, discovered in the recent excavations of the Forum, was an oblong mass of natural rock, with its sides scarped away; it was restored with stone and covered with stucco after some damage in quite early times, possibly at the Gallic invasion. Among the primitive objects of cult found underneath the famous black stone was a rectangular block, which was probably an altar. Roman altars were probably influenced in form considerably by Etruscan custom, which seems, from vase paintings and other evidence, to have favoured some curious and fantastic shapes. But we have little evidence of this in Roman monuments. From Imperial times the evidence is abundant; the forms are in their origin dependent upon those of Greece, though they soon enter on an independent development of their own. The magnificent architectural structures of Hellenistic times found a counterpart in the Ara Pacis Augustæ, which was surrounded by

reliefs with allegorized and ceremonial scenes, and is perhaps the most characteristic example of the sculpture of the Augustan age. Smaller altars, both round and square, are provided with artistic decoration in the naturalistic garlands carved in the marble, where the Greeks would have hung real ones, and in the reliefs, frequently representing sacrifices, but including many other appropriate subjects. In these it is possible to trace a development which, however, concerns the history of sculpture rather than that of religion. Simpler architectural decorations follow the Greek models; raised rolls at each end, faced by Ionic volutes, and bands of triglyph ornamentation, are very common. We also find sometimes on reliefs an ornamental canopy built on the top of an altar. In Roman custom, altars were far more frequently than in Greece erected merely in commemoration of a sacrifice, whether actually made upon them or not; in such cases the inscription was the essential thing, the altar form being little more than a convention. On the other hand, altars for actual use were frequently supplied with arrangements convenient in practice, such as basins to receive libations, and ducts to carry away the liquids.

6. Smaller *portable* altars, either for incense or for minor offerings, were frequently used; some have been found at Pompeii and elsewhere, but they are not easy to distinguish from tripods or other tables. It is doubtful whether the *gartibulum* or marble table, frequently found behind the impluvium in the atrium of Pompeiian houses, should be considered as an altar in origin. If, as has been suggested, it originally stood beside the hearth, it may have served this purpose, though it may have been merely a dresser. A peculiar interest attaches to this table in the matter of religious evolution, if we accept its sacred significance; for it plays an important part in the theory of the development of the plan of the primitive Christian church from the atrium of the dwelling-house.

'Between the tablinum and the open part of the atrium stood an ornamental stone table, the only reminder of the sacred hearth. It is a very striking fact that this is precisely the position of the holy table in the basilica; when we take into account the similarity of many of these tables with the most ancient [Christian] altars, we can hardly fail to admit a close relation between them' (Lowry, *Christian Art and Archæology*, London, 1901, p. 100).

7. The association of altars with *tombs* in Roman custom is somewhat confusing. Tombs frequently take a form resembling an altar (*cippus*); and it is natural to associate this with offerings to the dead, even if the altars be merely commemorative and not intended for actual use; the word *ara* is even applied to tombstones in inscriptions. On the other hand, Vergil describes a funeral pyre as 'ara sepulcri' (*Æn.* vi. 177). This altar, on which offerings to the dead were consumed together with his body, may be symbolically represented by the altar-tomb.

LITERATURE.—The fullest and most recent account of altars, Greek and Roman, is that by Reisch in Pauly-Wissowa, *s.v.* 'Altar,' where references to earlier authorities are given. An article with illustration is in Daremberg-Saglio, *Dict. des Antiquités*, *s.v.* 'Ara.' For Pompeiian altars see Mau, *Pompeii*, 1899; for the decoration of Roman altars, Mrs. Strong, *Roman Sculpture*, 1907. See also the Handbooks of Antiquities, such as Hermann, *Lehrbuch*, ii. 'Gottesdienstliche Alterthümer'; Iwan Müller, *Handb. der klass. Altertumswissenschaft*, v. 3 'Griech. Sakralaltertümer' (Stengel, pp. 10–15), v. 4 'Religion und Cultus der Römer (Wissowa), and Indexes of these works. See also A. de Molin, *De Ara apud Græcos* (Berlin, 1884).

E. A. GARDNER.

ALTAR (Semitic).—1. Primitive conditions.—The primitive Semites regarded trees, crags or rocks, and springs as deities, and in the earliest times brought their gifts into direct contact with the god by hanging them on the tree, rubbing them on the rock, or throwing them into the spring or well. Evidences of the survival of these customs in Arabia, the primitive Semitic home, are known, and some of them survive even beyond its borders. Both in Arabia and in Palestine trees are found hung with the relics of such offerings.* Gifts were thrown into the Zemzem at Mecca,† and into other springs.‡ That they were also brought into contact with rocks, appears from the ritual of the *maṣṣēbāh* described below. The simplest altar was a natural rock, the top of which contained a channel by which the blood was conveyed to a sacred cave below, as was the case with the sacred rock in the Mosque of Omar at Jerusalem. Such rocks are still used by the Arabs as places of sacrifice (see Curtiss, *Bibl. World*, xxi. 255, 256). Sometimes the blood was conveyed by a rivulet to a sacred well. Such a rivulet was the *Ghabghab* at Mecca, which flowed into the Zemzem.§ No doubt in the earliest times the deity was supposed to dwell in or be identical with a crag, one part of which was taken as an altar because of its natural formation. Out of these primitive conditions there were two lines of development, one of which produced the altars of later times, and the other the *maṣṣēbāh*.

2. Stone altars.—The earliest altar of artificial construction was apparently a rough heap of stones, which represented a mountain-top or a crag in which the god had been thought to dwell. Such altars were made of unhewn stones, and were sometimes surrounded by artificial trenches (1 K 18^{32}). Traces of such altars are found among the Israelites and the Aramæans (cf. 2 K $16^{10ff.}$, Ezk 43^{13}, and 1 Mac $4^{45ff.}$). They were probably at first rude cairns, which suggested a mountain peak. The remains of such cairns may still be seen at Suf and on Mount Nebo, as well as in many other parts of the East (see Conder, *Heth and Moab*, 181 ff.; and Barton, *A Year's Wandering*, 143).

3. Altars of earth.—In lieu of such an altar as this, it was possible in early times to make an altar of earth. Such an altar is permitted in the 'Book of the Covenant,' Ex 20^{24-26} (E), though we have no description of one in the OT. Possibly Macalister is right in thinking that he discovered an altar of this type at Gezer, for in connexion with the high place there he found a bank of earth about 11 ft. in length, which was baked so hard that it was exceedingly difficult for the workmen to cut through it.‖ Underneath this bank were a number of human skulls. As human sacrifice formed a part of early Semitic worship, it is possible that this bank once served as such an altar. Though by no means certain, this is a suggestive possibility. Light on the altar of earth may possibly be obtained from the Samaritans. The writer in 1903 saw their preparations on Mt. Gerizim for the Passover, and when he asked if they had an altar, they said 'yes,' and showed him a hole dug in the ground—perhaps 18 in. in diameter and 10 in. deep. From this a conduit of oblong shape led off. Over the hole the sheep were killed, and the blood flowed into the conduit to be soaked up by the earth. Analogy with the rock-cut altar at Petra described below shows, however, that this is not a complete altar, but only the slaughter-place. The complete earthen altar was a mound of earth, plus one of these earthen slaughter-places.

4. Maṣṣēbāhs.—Another development from the primitive crag was the Arabic *nuṣb* or Hebrew *maṣṣēbāh*. This was a stone pillar of conical shape, frequently resembling in a rough way a phallus, in which the god was supposed to dwell. The fat and oil of sacrifices were smeared on this

* See Doughty, *Arabia Deserta*, i. 449 ff.; and Barton, *A Year's Wandering in Bible Lands*, 162.
† See Barton, *Semitic Origins*, 235.
‡ Cf. W. R. Smith, *Rel. of Sem.*[2], 177.
§ See Wellhausen, *Reste arab. Heidentums*[2], 103 ff.
‖ *Bible Side-Lights from the Mound of Gezer*, 56.

stone, so that it served at once as an emblem of deity and as an altar. It was a *bethel* (Gn 28[17ff.]). Sometimes such a pillar stood alone, sometimes one or two honorific stones were placed by it,* sometimes the number of stones was made seven,† and at Gezer the whole number of these standing pillars was ten.‡ High places adorned with such stones have in recent years been discovered at Tell es-Safi,* at Petra,§ at Megiddo,§ and at Gezer.‖ When the number of stones is more than one, it is usually easy to identify the *bethel*, as it is worn smooth from the contact of offerings. These pillars were common to both the Hamitic and the Semitic world,¶ and developed in course of time into the Egyptian obelisk.

5. **Meat cooked in a pot hung on three sticks.**—At this early time probably the larger part of each sacrifice was cooked and eaten by the worshipper, as in 1 S 1[4. 5f.] 2[13-16]. Probably in the earliest period the flesh was boiled in a pot, as described in Samuel, and as represented on some early Bab. seals and in an early hieroglyphic Bab. inscription.** The Bab. pictures represent the pot as resting in the crotch of crossed sticks, as in course of time the fashion of roasting the meat instead of boiling it came in. The transition in Israel is noted in 1 S 2[14-16]. It is quite probable that this transition marked a stage of culture which was attained at different periods in different parts of the Semitic world, and that one of its consequences was the institution of burnt-offerings—or offerings consumed by fire, of which the deity was supposed to inhale the smoke. This transition led to the creation of fire-altars. These were ultimately of several kinds, and the evolution of them proceeded along two lines.

6. **Ariels.**—One way of making a fire-altar was to add a fire-hearth to a *maṣṣēbāh*. This was actually done at Aksum in Abyssinia, where such structures have been found.†† Perhaps the 'ariels' of Moab, mentioned in 2 S 23[20] and on the Moabite Stone (lines 12 and 17), were structures of this nature. They were structures which could be dragged away, and were connected with the shrines of Jahweh, as well as with those of other deities. This is evident from line 17 of the Moabite Stone, and from Is 29[1. 2. 7], where the name is figuratively applied to Jerusalem.

W. R. Smith supposed that the pillars of Jachin and Boaz, which stood before the temple of Solomon at Jerusalem, were used as fire-altars also.‡‡ Herodotus (ii. 44) tells us of two similar pillars at Tyre, one of emerald and the other of gold, which shone brightly at night. This latter fact was possibly due to some sort of fire, fed either by burning fat or some similar substance, connected with them. Possibly all these pillars were developed, like the altar-*maṣṣēbāhs* of Aksum, out of the primitive pillar.

7. **Rock-cut altars.**—Another development from the primitive mountain crag was the rock-cut altar. This represents a later stage of culture than the altar of unhewn stones. That was an artificial imitation of a mountain crag, but it was built of stones on which man had lifted up no tool. Human labour had placed the stones one upon another, but was confined to that alone. Rock-cut altars, on the other hand, are projections of native rock which human hands have fashioned into a form better suited to the purposes of sacrifice. One such was unearthed by Sellin at Taanach.* This consists of a stone about half the height of a man, roughly rounded at the top, but square at the base. At the corners rude steps have been cut in the stone, and the top is slightly hollow. It appears to have been used for libations only, and never for fire offerings.

Another example of a rock-cut altar is found in the rock-cut high-place which was discovered at Petra in the year 1900.† This altar is 9 ft. 1 in. long, 6 ft. 2 in. wide, and 3 ft. high. It is approached on the east side by a flight of steps, on the top of which the officiating priest could stand. On the top of the altar is a depression 3 ft. 8 in. long, 1 ft. 2 in. wide, and 3½ in. deep. This was apparently the fire-pan of the altar. On three corners of this altar there are depressions cut, which have suggested to some the possibility that, when complete, it was adorned at the corners with horns of bronze. This is, of course, only conjectural.

Just to the south of this altar, and separated from it only by a passage-way, is a platform which seems to have been used for the preparation of sacrifices. It is 11 ft. 9 in. long from north to south, 16 ft. 6 in. wide, and 2 ft. 9 in. high. It is ascended by four steps at the north-east corner. In the top of this platform there are cut two concentric circular pans, the larger of which is 3 ft. 8 in. in diameter and 3 in. deep, and the smaller 1 ft. 5 in. in diameter and 2 in. deep. From the lower pan a rock-cut conduit, 3 ft. 2 in. long, 2 in. wide, and 3 in. deep, leads away. This platform was, no doubt, used for the slaughter of the victims, and these basins were designed to catch the blood, and the conduit to conduct it away.‡

When we remember the importance attached to the blood by the early Semites, and their feeling that it should be offered to the deity (cf. 1 S 14[33. 34] and Dt 12[16. 23-25. 27]), it becomes clear that this platform was as important a part of the altar as the other. Some scholars have called it, because of the circular basins cut in it, the 'round altar.'§ Analogy makes it clear that the trench of the Samaritans, referred to above, is in reality a part of an altar. Probably every altar of earth in ancient times was accompanied by a slaughtering-place similar to the one seen on Mount Gerizim.

8. **Altars of incense.**—A still later form of the altar—later from the standpoint of cultural development—was a small portable altar carved out of a stone. Such altars were developed in many parts of the Semitic world, and are described more fully below in connexion with the altars of the different nations. They were used for the burning of fat or of sweet-smelling incense, and probably came into use at a time when, in ordinary sacrifices, such parts of the offering only were given directly to the deity, the other and more edible parts becoming the property of the priests.

9. **Bronze altars.**—At the farthest remove culturally from the primitive Semitic altar stands the bronze altar. Not made of an unmanufactured product like stone, it is an altar of a civilized, and not of a primitive, people. Such altars are found among the Babylonians, Assyrians, Phœnicians, and Hebrews. Our knowledge of their forms is set forth below in describing the altars of these nations.

10. **Arabian altars.**—The only large altar that can in any sense be called Arabian which has, so far as the writer knows, been studied by Europeans,

Cf. Bliss and Macalister, *Excavations in Palestine*, 32.

† See Herod. iii. 8, who says the Arabs had seven.

‡ Macalister, *op. cit.* 57.

§ See Robinson, *Biblical World*, xvii. 6 ff.; Curtiss, *PEFSt*, 1900, 350 ff.; Libbey and Hoskins, *Jordan Valley and Petra*, ii. 17*b*–187. For Megiddo, cf. *Nachrichten der Zeit. Deut. Palās. Ver.*, 1903, 47.

‖ Macalister, *Bible Side-Lights from the Mound of Gezer*, 50.

¶ See the Fifth Dynasty temple restored in Erman's *Ägypt. Rel.* 45.

** See Scheil, *Délegation en Perse*, ii. 130, and compare Barton in *JAOS* xxii. 122 n. 31, and 128 n. 9. A similar scene is figured on a seal in the writer's possession.

†† See Theodore Bent, *Sacred City of the Ethiopians*, 180 ff.

‡‡ *Rel. of Sem.*[2], 488 ff.

* See Sellin, *Tell Ta'anek*, p. 36.

† Cf. *PEFSt*, 1900, p. 350 ff.; *Bibl. World*, vol. xvii. p. 6 ff.; Brünnow and Domaszewski, *Provincia Arabia*, i. 241, 242; and Nielsen, *Altarab. Mondreligion*, 172–177.

‡ See the references in note †.

§ So Wilson and Robinson; see Brünnow and Domaszewski, *op. cit.* p. 243.

is the great altar at Petra, described above (§ 7). That rock-cut altar may, however, be an Edomite or Nabatæan work, and indicative of their civilizations rather than of the civilization of the Arabs. Indeed, the use of tools upon it makes it probable that it was constructed by people who had lost the primitive simplicity and poverty of thought which attached to all things Arabian in early times.

The purely Arabian altars were, as they still are, spurs of natural crags, or stones containing hollows to receive the blood (see Curtiss, *Bibl. World*, xxi. 255, 256).

From South Arabia a very interesting altar of incense has come, which is now in the Berlin Museum.* It is a little over 2 ft. high. It tapers slightly as it rises, until within about 7½ in. from the top. At this point a slight shoulder projects, above which the stone broadens again. On one side, in an ornamental framework carved in stone, rises a pyramid, the blunt apex of which is surmounted by the thin crescent of the moon. The horns of the crescent are turned upward, and a star or representation of the sun-disc occupies its centre.

Petrie discovered three such altars of incense in the temple at Serabit el-Khadem in Sinai.† It is true that this was ostensibly an Egyptian temple, but there can be little doubt that Semitic customs and practices found their way into it. Of the altars found here, the highest was 22 inches. It had on the top a cup hollow, 3½ in. wide and 1 in. deep. One of these altars presented on the top a burnt surface, about ¼ in. deep, and its sides were blackened. All of them were cut so as roughly to resemble an hour-glass in shape, though one of them continued to taper well up to the top.

11. **Aramæan altars.**—In 2 K 16[10ff.] we are told of an altar in Damascus which the Judæan king Ahaz saw, and which so pleased him that he had one made like it and placed in the Temple at Jerusalem. Probably the altar described by Ezekiel (43[13-17]) is a description of it. If so, it was built of stones, and consisted‡ of a base 27 ft. square and 18 in. high, along the top of which ran a moulding 9 in. wide. On this arose a square of 24 ft., which was 3 ft. high; on this a square of 21 ft., which was 6 ft. in height; and above this arose the hearth of the altar, 16 ft. square and 6 ft. high. It was approached by steps on the east side. The whole structure was about 17 ft. high, and at its corners were projections of some kind called 'horns.' It is only by inference that we carry these dimensions back to the altar at Damascus. Of course, between Ahaz and Ezekiel there may have been modifications, but when the influence of religious conservatism is taken into account, our inference seems to be justified.

As noted above (§ 10), the altar at Petra was perhaps a Nabatæan structure. If so, it should be counted an Aramæan altar.

A few smaller Nabatæan altars, of the kind called altars of incense above, have been discovered. One such was found at Kanatha, and bears a Nabatæan inscription. On one side of it a bullock is carved in a rather primitive type of art.§ Another Nabatæan altar of similar type from Palmyra has two hands carved on its side below an inscription.‖ A fragment of a basaltic altar found at Kanatha, carved with the head of a bullock,* betrays such excellent artistic workmanship that it can hardly be Nabatæan, but is probably Greek. Another Nabatæan altar, found by the Princeton expedition, is pictured by Littmann.† It consists of a straight stone, the shoulders of which are rounded as the top is approached. This is set in a larger base. The upper edge of the base is carved into a moulding. Another Palmyrene altar‡ has straight sides, and at its top an ornamental moulding projects, making the top larger than the body of the altar. Altars of similar structure, probably of Nabatæan workmanship, may now be seen in Muhammadan cemeteries at Palmyra.§ All these Nabatæan incense-altars known to the present writer have a perpendicular pillar-like form. None of them is shaped like an hour-glass, as are the Arabian altars. Sometimes the base is larger than the stem of the altar, and sometimes a moulding makes the top larger, but the lines of the intervening part are perpendicular.

12. **Babylonian altars.**—Our knowledge of early Bab. altars comes in part from the pictures on old Bab. seals. These altars may not be purely Semitic, as the Semites there were mixed with the Sumerians,‖ but the Semites were in the country before the dawn of history and early mingled with the Sumerians, so that it is often difficult to disentangle the strands of their civilization.¶ The earliest altars pictured may be Sumerian in origin, but they were employed by Semites at so early a time that we shall treat them as Semitic.**

At the very dawn of Babylonian history the only altars pictured belong to the class called above 'altars of incense.' They are of two forms, each of which appears on seals as archaic as those picturing the other. One of these was apparently a block of stone, shaped thus ⌐. The seals which portray it represent the notch as a kind of hearth in which the fire was built. Probably the high portion was hollowed out. One seal represents this style of altar as constructed of large bricks.††

Equally ancient, so far as appears, was the altar of the hour-glass shape.‡‡ These were not all exactly alike. Sometimes the middle of an altar was small, sometimes it was large; sometimes the top was larger than the bottom, and sometimes the reverse was the case; sometimes the narrowest portion was almost at the top, sometimes it was nearer the bottom; but the hour-glass form describes them all.

A third altar, figured on a seal of the de Clercq collection,§§ is perhaps older than either. It consists of flat stones, or possibly large flat bricks, placed above one another in a simple pile.

Still other forms appear on later seals. One such altar ‖‖ is of stone, and is triangular in form, broad at the base, sloping toward the top, and surmounted by a fire-pan. Just below the fire-pan runs an ornamental ledge. That the Babylonians had bronze altars is made probable by another seal, showing a low structure supported by three legs, on which a sacrificial fire burns.¶¶

That the Babylonians had larger altars corresponding in function to the rock-cut altar at Petra is not only probable *a priori*, but is confirmed by the explorations of Dr. Haynes at Nippur. This

* See Merrill, *East of the Jordan*, 42.
† *Op. cit.* p. 66.
‡ Littmann, *ib.* p. 80.
§ *Ib.* p. 82.
‖ Cf. Meyer, *Sumerien und Semiten in Babylonien*.
¶ See Barton, *Semitic Origins*, ch. v.
** The best description of these is by William Hayes Ward in Appendix G of S. I. Curtiss' *Primitive Semitic Religion Today*.
†† See Ward, *op. cit.* 267–269. For the brick altar, fig. 3, p. 268.
‡‡ Cf. Ward, *ib.* pp. 270–275.
§§ No. 141.
‖‖ *Collection de Clercq*, No. 308.
¶¶ *Ib.* No. 392.

* See Mordtmann, *Himjar. Inschriften und Alterthümer*, Pl. iii.; and Nielsen, *Altarab. Mondreligion*, 135.
† See Petrie, *Researches in Sinai*, 133–135.
‡ Cf. Toy, 'Ezekiel,' p. 101 in Haupt's *SBOT*.
§ See Sachau, *SBAW* (1896) 1056 and Pl. x.; Clermont-Ganneau, *Recueil d'archéologie orientale*, iii. 75 and Pl. i., also *ib.* ii. 108 ff.; Littmann, *Semitic Inscriptions*, p. 84.
‖ Cf. Clermont-Ganneau, *op. cit.* i. 117 and Pl. i.

excavator found a structure built of sun-dried bricks, 13 ft. long and 8 ft. wide. A ridge of bitumen 7 in. high ran around the top. The structure was covered with a layer of white ashes several inches deep, and was separated from the surrounding space by a low wall or curb. Near it was a bin containing several bushels of ashes. Dr. Haynes rightly regarded this as an altar. He found it 3 ft. below the pavement of Naram-Sin, so that it belongs to the pre-Sargonic period.*

Herodotus (i. 183) bears witness to the fact that two kinds of altars stood in the temple at Babylon. He says the smaller altar was of gold, but is silent as to the material of which the larger altar was constructed. These correspond to the 'altar of burnt-offering' and the 'altar of incense.'

13. Assyrian altars.—The altars of the Assyrians consisted, no doubt, of the two varieties employed by the Babylonians. Those which explorations have brought to light belong to the smaller type, or the class of 'altars of incense.' These are sometimes of stone and sometimes of bronze.

The stone altars are of three forms. The oldest is from the time of Adad-nirari III. (B.C. 812–783), and is in the British Museum. It consists of an oblong stone 55 cm. long and of the same height, so carved that the top presents the appearance of a sofa without a back. The lower part is ornamented by a few horizontal symmetrical lines.† The second type is made of a block of stone so carved that its base is triangular, and is ornamented by two horizontal ledges. At the corners between these ledges a lion's foot is carved. This base is surmounted by a circular top.‡ The third altar is shaped much like the Nabatæan altars, but with a castellated top.‡ Both these last are from the palace of Sargon (B.C. 722–705), and are in the Louvre.

The Assyrian bronze altar is pictured for us on the bronze gates of Balawat,§ on a sculpture of Ashurbanipal,‖ and on other sculptures.¶ These altars, in spite of variations in detail, were built on the same pattern. Each was a table-like structure, sometimes half the height of a man, sometimes a little higher. The legs at each corner were moulded, somewhat like the legs of a modern piano. The legs were joined to one another by horizontal bars. Sometimes there was one, sometimes two, and sometimes three of these, and their distance from the ground was determined by the fancy of the maker. From the middle of the side of the altar (or from the centre of it, the perspective is so imperfect that it might be either) a leg descended to the lowest of these cross-bars. The top of the table was slightly hollow and formed the fire-pan. One of the representations shows the sacrifice burning on it. Such an altar could be taken with the army on a campaign, as is shown by the bronze gates of Balawat.

14. Canaanite altars.—In ancient Canaan the altars of burnt-offering were sometimes of native rock, as at Taanach (see § 7), sometimes structures of unhewn stone (§ 2), and sometimes heaps of earth (§ 3). These have already been sufficiently described (§§ 2, 3, 7). A Canaanite altar of incense was, however, found at Taanach, which is unique. It was made of earth moulded into a rounded trunk, broad at the base and tapering considerably toward the top. It was ornamented by many heads—both human and animal—in relief.**

15. Phœnician altars.—The Phœnician altars which have survived are all 'altars of incense.' They present a variety of forms. Sometimes they are square with a large base and top, the central portion, though smaller, being of the same size all the way up.* Sometimes they are of the same general shape except that they are round, and the base and top join the central portion in an abrupt shoulder instead of being tapered down to it. Such is an altar found at Malta.† Another altar found at the same place has its central portion carved into panelled faces in which a vine is cut for ornamentation.‡ Still others are variations of the hour-glass form.§

Bronze altars are mentioned in Phœnician inscriptions as having been erected at Gebal, Kition, Larnax Lapethos, at the Piræus, and in Sardinia,‖ but we have no knowledge of their form. Perhaps they were made on the pattern of Assyrian bronze altars. We know that in many ways the Phœnicians copied Assyrian art.

16. Hebrew altars.—According to Ex 20^{24-26}, early Israelitish altars were constructed either of earth or stone. These have been described in §§ 2, 3. Solomon, when he erected his temple, introduced a brazen altar after Phœnician fashion. The description of this has been omitted by redactors from 1 K 6, because it was not made of orthodox material (so Wellhausen and Stade). Its presence is vouched for by the story of 2 K $16^{11ff.}$ and by the late and confused insertion (so Kittel), 1 K 8^{64}. The Chronicler (2 Ch 4^{1}) makes it a gigantic structure 30 ft. square and 15 ft. high, and modern scholars have often followed his statements.¶ As the altar had perished long before the Chronicler's time, and as it was smaller than the large stone altar which Ahaz built near it (2 K $16^{14.\ 15}$), and which was but 27 ft. square at the base, we may conclude that the Chronicler's measurements are unhistorical. It is much more likely that Solomon's brazen altar was of the Assyrian pattern. If it was, we can better understand why king Ahaz was so eager to supplant it with a stone altar which would be better adapted to the offering of large sacrifices. This bronze altar had disappeared by the time of the Exile. The stone altar of Ahaz is described above (§ 11). Such an altar, built of unhewn stones, continued to exist down to the destruction of the Temple by Titus (cf. 1 Mac 4^{45-47} and Jos. *BJ* v. v. 6).

According to 1 K 6^{22} 7^{48}, a golden altar, apparently of incense, stood before the Holy of Holies in Solomon's temple, but we have no description of its form.

The altars described in the Priestly document as made for the Tabernacle were the altar of burnt-offerings (Ex 27), made of acacia wood and overlaid with bronze, and the altar of incense (Ex 30) made of acacia wood and overlaid with gold. Modern scholars regard both of these as fancies of priestly writers, as it is clear that neither of them would stand a sacrificial fire. The altar of incense of this passage was possibly patterned on that of the Temple. If so, it gives us its dimensions. It was 18 in. square and 3 ft. high.

17. Horns of the altar.—Various explanations have been offered for the 'horns of the altar.' Stade** suggested that they arose in an attempt to carve the altar into the form of an ox, while W. R. Smith†† believed that they were substituted for the horns of real victims, which at an earlier time had been hung upon the altar. Josephus (*BJ* v. v. 6) says of the altar of Herod's temple that 'it

* See Clay, *Light on the OT from Babel*, 110.
† Cf. Perrot and Chipiez, *Hist. de l'art dans l'antiquité*, ii. 260.
‡ Perrot and Chipiez, *ib.* p. 268.
§ See Birch and Pinches, *Bronze Ornaments from the Palace Gates of Balawat*, Pl. B 1 and 2; cf. also Ball, *Light from the East*, 164; Perrot and Chipiez, *op. cit.* 429 ff.
‖ Cf. Ball, *op. cit.* 200.
¶ *e.g.* cf. Layard, *Nineveh and its Remains*, ii. 354.
** See Sellin, *Tell Ta'anek*, 75.

* See Renan, *Mission de Phénicie*, 163.
† Cf. Perrot and Chipiez, *op. cit.* iii. 304 (fig. 220).
‡ *Ib.* fig. 228.
§ *Ib.* 252 (fig. 191); Renan, *op. cit.* 229.
‖ See *CIS* i. Nos. 1, 10, 95, 118, 143
¶ So Benzinger, *Heb. Arch.* 388.
** *Gesch.* i. 465.
†† *Rel. of Sem.*[2] 426.

had corners like horns,'* suggesting that the term was figuratively applied to some ornamentation which surmounted the corners. As no horns appear upon any Semitic altar yet discovered, but the altar frequently appears surmounted with ornaments, it is probable that, as in Jer 17[1], the word 'horns' is figurative.

The Hebrew 'table of shewbread,' a counterpart to which is figured in Assyrian reliefs, might in one sense be called an altar, but, strictly speaking, it is an altar only in a secondary sense.

LITERATURE.—Nearly all the literature has been mentioned above. In addition, mention may be made of art. 'Altar' by Addis in *EBi*, that by Kennedy in Hastings' *DB*, and that by Barton in the *JE*; also Nowack, *Heb. Arch.* (1894) ii. 17 ff.; Benzinger, *Heb. Arch.* (1894) 378 ff.; Curtiss, 'Places of Sacrifice among the Primitive Semites' in *Biblical World*, vol. xxi. 248 ff.; Greene, 'Hebrew Rock Altars,' *ib.* vol. ix. 329 ff.; and W. H. Ward, 'Altars and Sacrifices in the Primitive Art of Babylonia' in Curtiss' *Primitive Semitic Religion To-day* (1902), Appendix G. GEORGE A. BARTON.

ALTAR (Slavonic). — There is a considerable number of texts relating to the temples of the Baltic Slavs, but they do not furnish any details about altars. The words denoting 'altar' among the Slavonic nations are borrowed, through the Old High German *altāri*, from the Latin *altare*. The Old Church Slavic *žrŭtva*, 'sacrifice' (cf. *žrĭcĭ*, 'sacrificer, priest'), compared with its Russian derivative *žertveniikŭ*, which is employed in the sense of 'altar' in the Biblical texts, seems to indicate that the altar was the place in the temple where the victims were sacrificed. Perhaps it is simply the translation of the Greek *θυσιαστήριον*. The entire group of words associated with *žrŭtva* primarily means only 'praise' (Vondrák, *Altkirchenslavische Grammatik*, Berlin, 1900, p. 129). Mention may likewise be made of Old Church Slavic *trĕbiště* (connected with *trĕba*, 'negotium'), 'altar, *θυσιαστήριον, σέβασμα*'; and *krada*, 'rogus, fornax.'

LITERATURE.—Miklosich, *DWAW* xxiv. 18.

L. LEGER.

ALTAR (Teutonic). — There seems to be no doubt that in heathen times the Teutonic peoples made use of altars; but our information with regard to these is very meagre, since the majority of the references give no details.

The bulk of the evidence is obtained from the Icelandic sagas. In these *stalli* appears to be the regular term for an altar within a temple: we are told that the *stalli* was set up in the centre of the sanctuary [the *afhús*—see TEMPLES (Teutonic)]; and it is described by the Christian writer of the Eyrbyggia Saga as 'like unto an altar.' The materials of its construction are nowhere stated, and there is practically no indication as to whether it was built of earth, stone, or wood. There are references in the sagas to a custom among the Icelandic settlers of carrying with them from Norway 'the earth under the altar'; and in the Kialnesinga Saga the *stalli* is described as made with much skill, and covered above with iron. If the material was wood, the iron would be necessary, since the writer goes on to say that upon the *stalli* burnt the sacred fire that was never allowed to go out. There is some evidence that the figures of the gods stood upon the *stalli*; it is certain that it carried the oath-ring and the great copper bowl (the *hlaut-bolli*) into which was collected all the blood of the victims slain at the sacrifice. Within the bowl were the *hlaut* twigs, by means of which the walls of the temple, within and without, were sprinkled with the blood, and the altar reddened all over.

We hear further of altars within sanctuaries in England and elsewhere: in Anglo-Saxon the regular Christian term for 'altar' was *wihbed* (earlier form, *weofod*), which had probably come down from heathen times. In Gothic the word for 'altar' is *hunslastaþs*, lit. 'place of sacrifice.'

There is mention also in the sagas of a sacrificial stone, called Thor's stone, which stood in the midst of the place of assembly, and on which the men who were sacrificed to Thor had their backs broken. With this we may compare the altars mentioned by Tacitus (*Ann.* i. 61) in the forest of Teutoburgium, where the officers of the army of Varus were sacrificed by the Cherusci in A.D. 9. We hear elsewhere of sacred stones, especially in the Dane Law in England.

Many writers have supposed that the *hörg* of the sagas was some kind of stone altar, mainly on the strength of the passage in Hyndluliódh, where Ottar is said to have built for Frey a *hörg* of stone, which he made glassy with the blood of cattle. But other passages clearly indicate that the *hörg* was of the nature of a room; while the Old German glosses give the corresponding form *haruc* as a translation of *lucus* and *nemus* as well as of *ara*. It is perhaps safer, therefore, to regard the *hörg* simply as a sanctuary. It was apparently often in the charge of women, and seems to have been used especially in connexion with the cult of the dead, while the sacrifices at it took place, sometimes at least, by night.

C. J. GASKELL.

ALTER.—The social 'other,' fellow, or *socius* of the personal 'ego.' In current social Psychology and Ethics the 'alter' is the fellow of the social environment or situation in which the personal self finds itself. It is a contrast-meaning with 'ego.' The term 'altruism' shows historically an earlier use of the same word, meaning conduct or disposition favouring or advancing the interests of another rather than those considered advantageous for oneself. The development of less individualistic views in Sociology, Psychology, and Ethics has rendered important, indeed indispensable, the notion of personality as in some sense more comprehensive than individualism was able to allow. Various views of collectivism, social solidarity, general will and self, rest upon a concept of the 'ego' which essentially involves and identifies itself with its social fellow. The present writer has developed (reference below) such a view in detail, using the term 'socius' for the bipolar self which comprehends both 'ego' and 'alter.' On such a view, the 'ego' as a conscious content is identical in its matter—and also, in consequence, in its attitudes, sympathetic, emotional, ethical, etc.—with the 'alter.' The self-thought is one, a normal growth in the interplay of the influences of the social *milieu*; and the individual is not a social 'unit,' to be brought into social relationships, but an 'outcome' of the social forces working to differentiate and organize common self-material. The altruistic or 'other-seeking' impulses are on this view normal and natural, because in fact identical with the 'ego-seeking'; both are differentiations of the common group of less specialized movements in the process that constitutes personal consciousness in general. Recent work in Social Psychology has shown the place of imitative and other processes whereby the 'ego-alter' or 'socius' meaning is developed.

LITERATURE.—Rousseau, *Contrat social*; Bosanquet, *Philosophical Theory of the State* (1899); Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations* (1897), and *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, in locis*. J. MARK BALDWIN.

ALTRUISM.—The use of the term 'Altruism' is due to Comte, who adopted it to describe those dispositions, tendencies, and actions which have the good of others as their object. He contrasted it with 'Egoism' (wh. see), which has self-interest

* κερατοειδεῖς προανέχων γωνίας.

as its direct object. Comte maintained that 'the chief problem of our existence is to subordinate as far as possible egoism to altruism.' Herbert Spencer adopted the term, and gives considerable space in his *Data of Ethics* to the discussion of the contrasted elements of Egoism and Altruism, and to their reconciliation. Briefly, the contrast set forth in the terms 'Egoism' and 'Altruism' was indicated by former writers on Psychology and Ethics by the distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding, that is, benevolent or disinterested tendencies.

The two terms have been widely used by more recent writers. We may distinguish between the use of the terms in Psychology and in Ethics. In Psychology 'Altruism' means the disposition which has as its object the good of another. Some are disposed to limit the meaning of the word to those dispositions which are consciously directed towards an object, and to deny the application of the term to mere spontaneous and unreflective action. In other words, they limit Altruism to conscious beings, and to them when they have attained to powers of reflexion, and have learned to constitute objects for themselves. They exclude from the sphere of Altruism also the gregarious and instinctive grouping together of animals for attack and defence. In Ethics, 'Altruism' is used to denote those dispositions and actions which have the welfare of others or another for their motive and object. It lays stress here, of course, on the ethical aspect of the disposition.

While many would limit the use of the terms 'Egoism' and 'Altruism' to dispositions and actions which arise only within a self-conscious being, and arise as the outcome of a process of reflexion, there are others who strive to trace the origin of egoistic and altruistic tendencies backwards to those instincts of love and hunger, the rudiments of which seem to be present in all forms of life. The conception of Evolution and the acceptance of it as a working hypothesis, at least, by all manner of workers, tend to lay great stress on this line of investigation. Evolutionists tend to regard the behaviour of each species of animals as illustrative of an ethical code relative to that species; and some of them, like Professors Geddes and Thomson, look on the processes of life as a 'materialized ethical process.' Professor Henry Drummond laid stress on the two great struggles; namely, the struggle for the life of self, and the struggle for the life of others.

Writers on this topic from the point of view of Evolution may be divided into two classes. There are those who, with Professor Huxley, describe the process of Evolution as a gladiatorial show, and nature as 'red in tooth and claw with ravin.' They affirm that the very existence of ethical life depends on the possibility of man's ability to combat the cosmic process. In popular literature, in scientific articles, in learned treatises, it has been affirmed that the animal world consists of a struggle between half-starved animals striving for food. 'Woe to the vanquished!' was put forward as the universal cry. Competition was described as strongest between animals of the same kind, and it was through this competition and the premium set on success that species was supposed to advance. On the other hand, there were those who questioned the reality of the struggle, and who questioned whether the struggle for existence is the only law of life and the only rule of progress. While the followers of Darwin laid stress on the struggle for existence, developed it, and painted it in ever darker colours, they apparently forgot that he had written in other terms in the *Descent of Man*. In this work he had set the problem before him of tracing the evolution of man from simpler forms of life, and an evolution of all the features of human life, physical, psychological, ethical. Thus he was led to lay stress on the social character of many animals, on their co-operation, on the evolution of sympathy and mutual helpfulness, until in certain parts that kind of struggle which was prominent in the *Origin of Species* tended almost to disappear. The unit in the struggle changes before our eyes; it is no longer the individual who struggles, gains an advantage, it is 'those communities which included the greatest number of the most sympathetic members that would flourish best, and rear the greatest number of offspring' (*Descent of Man*², 163). Even from Darwin's point of view here is a new factor introduced into the struggle for existence. Sympathy, mutual help, or union between members of the same species for attack or defence, has been recognized as a decisive factor in the evolution of life. The community has taken the place of the individual, and mutual help is as much a fact of life as mutual competition.

While many evolutionists had apparently forgotten that Darwin had set forth the great influence of the social factor in the evolution of higher forms of life, others took up the hint, and traced the various forms and kinds of social mutual helpfulness in the lower forms of life, and their influence on the development of altruistic affections. Nature did not appear to them to be a mere gladiatorial show; it was a sphere of co-operation, in which each was for all, and all for each. They delighted to trace co-operation throughout the sphere of life, they pointed out to men such forms of co-operation as *symbiosis*, as the co-operation of bacteria with wheat, with various forms of trees, alliances between trees and insects, and generally they were able to show that, competition notwithstanding, the world was a system that worked together. Then they pointed to the evolution of socialistic tendencies in gregarious animals. They showed us a herd of cattle banded together for defence, with the cows and calves in the centre, and the bulls to the front. They showed us a pack of dogs under the rule of a leader, organized for hunting, with the social order dominating the individual, and obeyed by the individual, with sanctions for obedience and penalties for disobedience. Then they traced for us the evolution of those psychological qualities the ethical character of which we distinctly recognize when they appear in self-conscious beings. Trust, obedience, recognition of the order of the pack, or of the herd, consciousness of fault and expulsion from the herd if the order is disregarded, are all depicted by those who trace for us the social evolution of life.

Stress has been laid by some on the relation of parents and children, on the care for offspring as the source of social affection; and attention has been called to the fact that a prolonged infancy calls forth a great development of parental care. As individuation increases, fertility lessens, and with the increase of individuation there goes the increase of the period of helplessness in infancy; and thus they are able to indicate an increase of social affection. Still this source of Altruism does not carry us very far, for the relation of parent and offspring is only temporary, and does not form the basis of a lasting relationship.

It is in the aggregation of animals together for mutual benefit that most evolutionists look for the source of Altruism. It is not possible to enter here into the controversy between those who hold that acquired qualities can be transmitted through heredity, and those who maintain that such transmission has never been proved. It is an important question in itself and in its consequences. But

for our purpose it is not needful to take a side on the question. For the present purpose, the denial of the possibility of a transmission of acquired qualities has directed attention to, and stimulated inquiry into, the possibility of social transmission of acquired attainments from generation to generation. Is there a tradition among animals? Is there social transmission of the mental and intellectual gains of a species? Or is the only way of transmission that of organic change inherited from parents by their offspring? We quote the following from Professor J. Mark Baldwin:

'Wallace and Hudson have pointed out the wide operation of imitation in carrying on the habits of certain species; Weismann shows the importance of tradition as against Spencer's claim that mental gains are inherited; Lloyd Morgan has observed in great detail the action of social transmission in actually keeping young fowls alive and so allowing the perpetuation of the species; and Wesley Mills has shown the imperfection of instinct in many cases, with the accompanying dependence of the creatures upon social, imitative, and intelligent action.' He adds: 'It gives a transition from animal to human organization, and from biological to social evolution, which does not involve a break in the chain of influences already present in all the evolution of life' (*Development and Evolution*, 1902, p. 148).

Nurture, imitation, social transmission seem to count for something in the evolution of life, and specially of social life among animals. While it is true that a chicken almost before it has shaken itself free from the shell will peck at a fly and catch it, yet there is evidence to show that in other forms of life the young have to learn from parental example; and it even appears that direct instruction of a kind is given. There is sufficient evidence, at all events, to affirm that the higher animals, whose young need parental care for some time ere they can provide for themselves, have to learn how to make their living. Parent birds teach their young to fly, and teach them to recognize the approach of danger. On this there is no need to dwell, save to remark that in such races of life, where parents and offspring are for a time associated, where parents care for offspring and offspring depend on parents, there is room and there is need for the exercise of what may be called social affections. Nor need we object to the fact that we find in lower forms of life the germ and the promise of what comes to flower and fruit in self-conscious beings. We have learnt that life is one, and that the laws of life are similar in all the ranges of life. It seems to proceed on one plan, and we need not be surprised that rudimentary forms of the higher may be found in the lower layers of life. But the full meaning of the social relations between living beings does not appear till we come to self-conscious beings who can look before and after, and reflect on their own experience.

While, therefore, we receive with gratitude the testimony of the students of life to the existence of the germs of social life in the lower spheres of living beings, it must be insisted on here that the advent of self-conscious beings into the world has made a great difference. The advent of rationality has given a new meaning to all the phenomena of life as these are manifested in beings lower than man. Appetites, passions, desires, affections are no longer what they were in lower forms of life. Appetite is a different thing in an animal which eats only for the sake of hunger, and drinks only to assuage thirst, from what it is in civilized man, who brings the wealth of his artistic nature and the powers of his memory and imagination to enhance the beauty of his festival. Even into appetite the wealth of his whole nature may enter. If this is the case with appetite, it is still more true of the emotions, such as fear, desire, and so on. Take *surprise*, and we find that while we call by the same name the similar phenomena of an animal and a man, yet surprise is relative to the experience of the individual. We are not surprised at railways, telegraphs, telephones, motor cars; these have become the commonplaces of civilization. Thus Comparative Psychology has in all its comparisons to remember what a difference self-consciousness has made in the character of the feelings, and to make allowance accordingly.

Thus in the discussion of Egoism and Altruism, while help of a kind can be obtained from a study of the lower life, that help does not carry us very far. In the lower forms of life the individual is sacrificed to the species: in a beehive the hive seems to be all-in-all, and the individual bees whatever their function is, are steadily sacrificed to the good of the whole. Numerous other illustrations are at hand. But in a human society such a solution must be found that neither shall the individual be sacrificed to the whole nor the whole to the individual. The individual has a claim on the whole for the opportunity of living a full, rich, and gracious life; and society has a claim on the individual for devoted and whole-hearted service.

Looking at the history of our subject, and at the actual history of man, we find many curious things. Early societies steadily sacrificed the individual to the tribe, and the individual scarcely seemed to have any but a tribal consciousness. The discovery of the individual seems to be a late discovery. The individual must not in any way depart from the custom of the tribe; he must believe their beliefs, follow their customs, wear their totem, and in no way think or act spontaneously. Individual worth and freedom were neither recognized as desirable, nor tolerated, because inimical to the welfare of the tribe. Late in history, and mainly through religious influences, the worth and value of the individual won recognition, human life was recognized as sacred, and freedom found a place amid human worths and interests. In truth, we find in history the pendulum swinging from one extreme to another; now the individual is in bondage to society, and then the individual tends to make society impossible. Here there are long stretches of history where the authority of society dominates the individual, and then a reaction, when men regard the individual as the sole reality and society as a tyranny and trouble. If any one casts his eye back to the beginning of modern philosophy and reads Hobbes and Descartes, and follows out the principle of individualism to the French Revolution, its culminating period in modern history, he will find that the individual in all his naked simplicity, in all the grandeur of his so-called rights, is the object of all study, the beginning of all speculative thought. He is real, his rights are his own, and he is prepared to defend them against all comers. He is in a state of war, he is a free and independent creature, and if he is to live in society he will do so only when he has made terms with his neighbour. So he makes a social contract, he surrenders so much, and he obtains a guarantee for the others. He is supposed to be naturally selfish, egoistic, and to regard others only as instruments for his own good.

Looking at man from this point of view, those who hold it are laid under the heavy burden of attempting to derive Altruism from Egoism, and it need hardly be said that they have failed in the task. Altruism can no more be derived from Egoism than Egoism can be derived from Altruism. The truth seems to be that each of them goes down to the very foundations of life, and life can scarcely be conceived in the absence of either. If it be true that life comes only from life, then life must be sacrificed in order to produce fresh life. That is Altruism, whether it is conscious Altruism or not. It is vain to ask for the genesis of Altruism, it is as deep as life; it is vain to ask for the beginning of Egoism, for it is

proverbial that self-preservation is the first law of life. In fact we are here, as we are so often, the victims of our own abstractions. We cannot really separate the individual from society, or society from the individual.

It may be well, at this stage, to point out that what we may distinctively call the Ego feelings have also a social reference. In one sense all feelings which refer to the interests of the individual are Ego feelings. Personal pains and pleasures, desires and aversions, exist only for him who feels them. It would on the whole be an improvement in our use of words if we limited the title 'Ego feelings' to those feelings which belong to a self-conscious subject, and which depend not upon consciousness, but on self-consciousness. 'Ego feelings' thus would mean, not passive pain or pleasure, but feelings actively related to our self-esteem, to our self-assertion, or to any manifestation of the activity of the self by which the impression of its own worth is enhanced. In these feelings the Ego is at once the subject which feels them and the object of which they are qualities.

Limiting Ego feelings to those which thus refer to the self, we observe that it is precisely this reference to self that determines the value of an experience in our mental life. Pleasures and pains depend largely on being connected with self as their subject. Any worthy achievement, any feat performed, is estimated not by the passive sensations accompanying it, or by the physical endurance, but by the exaltation of self-feeling which is aroused. The man who does a daring deed, or performs a notable task, has a sense of power and efficiency, and delights in the deed as his own. Men delight in deeds and rejoice in things accomplished, not so much for their inherent worth, as for the fact that the deeds are their own. Our experiences are of value, and we account them of abiding worth, not because they gratify our sensibility, but because we have put so much of ourselves, of our personality, into them. Thus we can never form pleasures into a sum and measure their value quantitatively as Hedonism tries to do. All values in experience are constituted by their reference to self in self-consciousness.

Self-knowledge, self-reverence, self-control, the activity of self in constituting its objects, are thus determining elements in pleasure and pain. The passive pleasures are almost without value; one chooses the nobler part, though the choice may bring pain with it. A slave may have little of the anxiety, the care, the hardship of the free man, but then a slave can never have the exaltation of self-feeling and self-respect which comes from knowledge and freedom and manhood. It is, then, the reference to self that gives to rational pleasure its distinctive note. But it is next to be observed that even the reference to self has its social aspect. It always refers, even in its most egoistic mood, to a social standard. In fact, the social reference enhances the significance of pain and pleasure in an immeasurable degree. Man sees himself as with the eyes of others. 'As Nature teaches the spectators to assume the circumstances of the person principally concerned, so she teaches this last in some measure to assume those of spectators' (Adam Smith, *Moral Sentiments*, p. 29). The self looks at itself from a spectator's point of view, and estimates itself accordingly. Thus it may have an added misery: social slights, feeling of poverty, looked at from a spectator's point of view and reflected by the self on itself, enhance the feeling of misery till it may become unbearable. On the other hand, a sense of social appreciation, a looking at one's self through the eyes of others, may enhance pleasure till it becomes ecstasy. Pride, vanity, ambition, and other Ego feelings of the same kind need the reference to self for their justification, and yet without the social reference the reference to self would lose its value.

Without the reference to self, values would cease to have a meaning, and pleasure would be merely of the passive sort. As, however, pleasure and pain, the meaning of life and the worth of life, can exist for each person only in his own consciousness, and without the conscious possession of these in his own life a man can never enter into sympathy with others, so a full, broad, intense Ego life is the condition of a full, deep, and wide social life. The chief problem of our life is thus not, as Comte said, 'to subordinate egoism to altruism,' but to develop Egoism to its proper proportions, in the belief that the higher and fuller a personality is, the more he has to contribute to the happiness of mankind. Selfishness does not consist in a man valuing himself according to his intrinsic and social worth, but in ignoring or denying the rights, claims, and worth of others: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.'

Egoistic feelings would lose their value without the social reference. So also the social feelings would lose their value were there not the reference to the self to give them value. There is no necessity for any lengthened reference to the abstract man who has figured so picturesquely in philosophical treatises from Hobbes downwards. Nor is he quite dead yet. This abstract man is a being endowed only with egoistic impulses. Self-preservation is for him the only law of life: his natural life is a state of war. How is such a being to be constrained to live in society? He may be made social in various ways: by a force from above or from without urging him, by means he does not know, to become social even when his reason compels him to think that selfishness is his highest interest. But usually the way to make a selfish being social is to endow him with a desire for approbation, to make him seek society to win approval, or to make him see that others are needful to him if he is to carry out his purposes; and a wise selfishness takes the form of benevolence. The attempt is very subtle and very penetrating, but it is a failure. Men never became social in that way. They are social from the beginning. All that can be said is that man is naturally selfish and naturally social, and the field for the exercise of the Ego feelings and of the social feelings is to be found in society alone.

Look at the individual from any point of view we please, everywhere we meet the social reference. Begotten by social union, born within society, he grows up within society, and is equipped by society for the battle of life. The achievements of society form his inheritance. Social customs are learned by him before he is aware of the process; social beliefs become his beliefs, thought becomes possible because it is embodied in the action, in the language, in the converse of the people with whom the individual lives. In this social sphere the individual lives, here he learns, makes himself heir to the treasures of learning, science, and knowledge, without which individual life would be only rudimentary. A human being in isolation would not be a human being at all.

Jeremy Bentham in the beginning of his *Principles of Morals and Legislation* says, 'A community is a fictitious body, composed of individual persons who are considered as constituting, as it were, its members.' It is a characteristic definition. Nor does that phase of thought appear in Jeremy Bentham alone. It is characteristic of the century in which it appeared. No body of any kind is constituted by the members alone. Any unity

has to be looked at from two points of view, and is never the sum of its parts. Regard must be had to the wholeness of the whole as well as to the parts. But society or a people is not a fictitious body, of which individuals are the fictitious parts or members; a people is a unity, an organic whole, and the individuals are so in relation to the whole.

'Just as the organs are produced by the whole and exist in it alone, so the individuals are produced by the people, and live and move in it alone; they function as its organs, they speak its language, they think its thoughts, they are interested in its welfare, they desire its life; they propagate and rear offspring and so perpetuate the race. And this objective relation of the individual to the whole manifests itself subjectively in his volitional and emotional life. Everywhere the circles of the ego and the non-ego intersect. The fact is universally accepted; only in moral philosophy we still find persons who do not see it, but insist on regarding the antithesis between altruism and egoism as an absolute one. I should like to show how little the facts agree with this view; in our actual life and practice there is no such isolation of individuals; the motives and effects of action are constantly intersecting the boundaries of egoism and altruism' (Paulsen, *A System of Ethics* [Eng. tr.], pp. 381–3.

Professor Paulsen proceeds to show that every duty towards individual life can be construed as a duty towards others as well. Care of one's own health might appear to be purely selfish, yet on reflexion it appears that the possession of good health may add to the happiness of a community.

'The ill-humour which results from an improper mode of life, or a neglect of self, is not confined to the guilty person; he is cross and irritable, and his moodiness and moroseness are a source of annoyance to the whole household. In case of serious illness the family becomes uneasy and anxious, and perhaps suffers materially from a diminished income and an increase of expenditure. When the patient is an official, his colleagues are made to suffer; they have to do his work; if he has absolutely ruined his health, he becomes a pensioner, and so increases the public burdens' (*ib.* pp. 383–4).

It is not possible really to separate self-interest from the interest of society. The worths, values, and interests of the individual are inseparably bound up with those of society. It is society that gives life, warmth, and colour to the Ego feelings, and the life, warmth, and colour of the Ego feelings, their intensity and their sweetness, are needed for the vitalization of society. The analogy of the organism holds good with regard to the social organism. But the idea of a social organism as a systematic whole, indeed the idea of a world as a systematic whole, can exist only for a being who is conscious of the unity of his individual life as connected with an organism which is a unity. But to pursue this further would open up issues wider than fall to be discussed here. The observation has been made to show that from the metaphysical point of view, as well as from the psychological and the ethical, the individual cannot be severed from the whole, and that the antithesis between Egoism and Altruism is both misleading and ultimately unthinkable.

It is not our purpose to name, far less to discuss, the various forms of Hedonism. It may be observed, however, that from Butler's time an enlightened self-regard is recognized to be a legitimate form of moral sentiment; while a regard for the welfare of others enters also into all forms of virtue. A rational regard for the welfare of others expresses itself in every one of what by way of eminence are called the cardinal virtues;—in courage, temperance, and constancy; in wisdom, justice, and truth; in kindness and benevolence. But, again, these virtues are concrete facts which have their being in some individual person. They are not something in the air, or something that has merely an abstract existence. And then, just as they belong to some individual, so they flourish only as he finds himself rooted in society. The higher features of human character, which make these virtues possible in the individual, have emerged in human history through the social effort of man. The higher faculties of man, and the virtues evolved with them and through them, grew in him as a social being,—a being who must live with his kind, who works with his mates, who can come to himself and to his fruition only in fellowship with his fellow-men.

The antithesis may be put, finally, in another way. The individual seeks his own good, his own happiness, his own satisfaction. But what does he mean by these terms? A desire for good is not a desire for mere pleasant feeling. It is a desire for self-satisfaction, for a better, truer, more real self; for a self which shall approach nearer to that ideal of a self which has dawned upon his intelligence. A wider thought and a truer thought, a deeper and a purer feeling; a power of activity which shall bring his ideal to reality—these express some aspect of the good a man desires. But it is only through the social bond and by means of social effort that the making of such a self is possible. It is not too much to say that it is only through social effort and through social life that man becomes a living soul.

It is in virtue of the social solidarity of mankind that the individual man enters into the inheritance of all the past. It is through this social bond and effort that he has subdued the earth and made it his servant. It is in his social life that man has come to the conclusion that he is the crown and sum of things, that the cosmos has toiled and worked upwards towards him, and in him has become conscious of itself and its meaning. In association man feels that he can make physical powers fetch and carry for him, make the winds his messengers, and harness the lightning to his carriage. It is not necessary to enumerate the social achievements of man. But there is not one of them which has not originated in the thought of a solitary mind, and then become the common possession of many minds. Yet the thought would never have come to the solitary thinker unless he had previously been prepared to think through his social environment, and by the great tradition of the ages. It is on this fact that we lay stress as the reconciliation of Egoism and Altruism, for it is the refutation of the idea which persists in so many quarters that man is inherently selfish, and has regard only to his self-interest, that he is naturally egoistic, and altruistic only in a secondary and fictitious fashion. Even Reason has been so spoken of, and the Synthetic Reason has been described as a selfish, analytic, destructive faculty, a weapon cunningly devised to enable its possessor to survive in the struggle for existence.

LITERATURE.—Butler, *Sermons*; Adam Smith, *Moral Sentiments*; Darwin, *Descent of Man*[1], 1871; H. Spencer, *Data of Ethics*[1], 1879; Stephen, *Science of Ethics*, 1882; Ladd, *Philosophy of Conduct*, 1902; Mackenzie, *Introduction to Social Philosophy*[2], 1890; Bowne, *Introduction to Psychological Theory*, 1886; Paulsen, *System of Ethics*, 1899. See also the works of J. S. Mill, Sidgwick, and Bain; and specially Albee, *History of English Utilitarianism*, 1902, and Villa, *Contemporary Psychology*, 1903.

JAMES IVERACH.

AMANA SOCIETY.—The Amana Society, or Community of True Inspiration, is an organized community of about 1800 German people who live in seven villages on the banks of the Iowa River in Iowa County, Iowa. This unique society owns 26,000 acres of land, which, together with personal property, is held in common. Indeed, the Amana Society is thoroughly communistic both in spirit and in organization. And yet it is in no sense a product of communistic philosophy. Primarily and fundamentally the Community of True Inspiration is a Church, organized for religious purposes, to work out the salvation of souls through the love of God (Constitution of the Society, Art. I.). The communism of Amana, therefore, is neither a political tenet, nor an economic theory, nor yet a social panacea, but simply a means of

serving God 'in the inward and outward bond of union according to His laws and His requirements' (*ib.* Art. I.).

1. **History.**—As a Church, or distinct religious sect, the Community of True Inspiration traces its origin back to the year 1714 and to the writings of Eberhard Ludwig Gruber and Johann Friedrich Rock, who are regarded as the founders or 'Fathers' of the 'New Spiritual Economy' of True Inspiration. Both Gruber and Rock were members of the Lutheran Church who had become interested in the teachings of the early Mystics and Pietists. Having studied the philosophy of Spener, they endeavoured to improve upon and formulate especially the doctrines of that little band of Pietists whose followers during the last quarter of the 17th cent. were called 'Inspirationists,' and who are said to have 'prophesied like the prophets of old' (cf. Perkins and Wick, *Hist. of the Amana Soc.*).

The unique fundamental doctrine of the founders of the 'New Spiritual Economy' was *present-day inspiration*. To be sure, Gruber and Rock believed profoundly in the inspiration of the Bible; but they argued:

'Does not the same God live to-day? And is it not reasonable to believe that He will inspire His followers now as then? There is no reason to believe that God has in any way changed His methods of communication; and as He revealed hidden things through visions, dreams, and by revelations in olden times, He will lead His people to-day by the words of His Inspiration if they but listen to His voice' (Gruber, *Characteristics of the Divine Origin of True Inspiration*).

Divine inspiration did not come, however, to all members of the Community, but only through those who were especially endowed by the Lord with the 'miraculous gift of inspiration.' These especially endowed individuals, called *Werkzeuge* ('Instruments'), were simply passive agencies through whom the Lord testified and spoke to His children (Gruber, *Divine Nature of Inspiration*).

The nature of the 'new word and testimony,' as revealed through the *Werkzeuge*, and its relation to the earlier revelations of the Heb. prophets are clearly set forth by Gruber in these words: 'Its truths are in common with the written word of the prophets and the apostles. . . . It aspires for no preference; on the contrary, it gives the preference to the word of the witnesses first chosen [prophets and apostles] just after the likeness of two sons or brothers, in which case the oldest son as the first-born has the preference before the younger son who was born after him, though they are both equal and children begotten of one and the same father.' Again he says: 'Both the old and the new revelation, of which we here speak, are of divine origin and the testimonies of one and the same Spirit of God and of Jesus Christ, just as the sons mentioned above are equally children of one and the same father though there exists through the natural birth a slight difference between them' (Gruber, *Characteristics of the Divine Origin of True Inspiration*).

Not all, however, who aspired to prophecy and felt called upon to testify were to be accorded the privilege. For there were false as well as true spirits. Gruber, who wrote much concerning true and false inspiration, records in his *Autobiography* his own sensations in detecting the presence of a false spirit:

'This strange thing happened. If perchance a false spirit was among them [the congregation] and wished to assail me in disguise, or if an insincere member wished to distinguish himself at our meeting in prayer or in some other manner, then I was befallen by an extraordinary shaking of the head and shivering of the mouth; and it has been proven a hundred times that such was not without significance, but indeed a true warning, whatever he who is unskilled and inexperienced in these matters may deem of it according to his academic precepts and literal conclusions of reasons' ('Articles and Narrations of the Work of the Lord' given in *Inspirations-Historie*, vol. ii. p. 33).

That the appearance of false spirits was not uncommon is evidenced by the many instances given in the *Year Books*, or *Testimonies of the Spirit of the Lord*, where aspiring *Werkzeuge* are condemned, and by the fact that Gruber's son was 'especially employed [by the Lord] to detect false spirits wherever they made themselves conspicuous, and to admonish them with earnestness to true repentance and change of heart' (*IH* * ii. 41).

* *IH* will be used in this art. for *Inspirations-Historie*.

Gruber and Rock, who had 'the spirit and gift of revelation and inspiration . . . went about preaching and testifying as they were directed by the Lord.' They travelled extensively through Germany, Switzerland, Holland, and other European countries, establishing small congregations of followers. Those desiring to share in the 'New Spiritual Economy' and enjoy the blessings of 'True Inspiration' were asked such questions as—

(1) 'Whether he (or she) intends to behave as a true member of the Community of Jesus Christ towards the members, and also in respect to the public Prayer Meetings and the arrangement of the same? (2) Whether he (or she) be ready to suffer all inward and external pain, and to risk cheerfully through the mercy of God everything, even body and soul? (3) Whether he (or she) had obtained Divine conviction with regard to the work and word of inspiration, and whether he for his purification and sanctification would submit to the same? (4) Whether he (or she) was in a state of reconciliation, or in some disagreement with some brother or sister; also if he had anything to say against any one, or if any one had anything to say against him' (*IH* i. 50).

Although the number of congregations established during the time of Rock and Gruber was not large, considerable religious fervour was aroused by their teachings. Moreover, their attacks upon 'the utter hollowness and formality' of the established Church, and their bold denunciation of the 'godless and immoral lives' of many of the clergy of that day, aroused the authorities of the orthodox Church to active opposition. They also encountered the opposition of the political authorities, because they refused to perform military service or to take the required oath of allegiance. They refused to 'serve the State as soldiers, because a Christian cannot murder his enemy, much less his friend.' On the other hand, they refused to take the legal oath as a result of their literal adherence to the commands given in Mt $5^{34.\ 37}$: 'But I say unto you, Swear not at all'; and 'Let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.'

Concerning the arrest of himself and his companions, because they would not upon one occasion take the prescribed oath, the younger Gruber, writing in 1717, says: 'Before the city gate the executioner untied us in the presence of the sheriff. The latter held in his hand a parchment with the oath written upon it and bade us to raise three fingers and to repeat it. We replied that we should not swear. He urged us forcibly with many threats. The brother (H. S. Gleim) repeated again that we should not swear; we should give a promise with hand-shake and our word should be as good as an oath, yet he would leave to me the freedom to do as I pleased. I affirmed then likewise I should not swear, since our Saviour had forbidden it' (*IH* ii. 124).

Furthermore, both the Church and the Government were irritated by the refusal of the Inspirationists to send their children to the schools which were conducted by the Lutheran clergy. Opposition soon grew into persecution and prosecution. And so the believers in 'True Inspiration' were fined, pilloried, flogged, imprisoned, and stripped of their possessions. In Zürich, Switzerland, 'their literature was by order of the city council burned in public by the executioner' (*IH* i. 65). Naturally, as their persecution became more severe, the congregations of Inspirationists sought refuge in Hesse—one of the most liberal and tolerant of the German states of the 18th century.

The *Tagebuch* for the year 1728 records that on Dec. 11, 'after a blessed period of two times seven years spent in the service of this Brotherhood and Community into which the Lord through His holy Inspiration had led him, the time came to pass when it pleased the Lord to recall His faithful worker and servant E. L. Gruber from this life and to transplant him into a blissful eternity.' Twenty-one years later, on March 2, occurred the death of J. F. Rock, which is recorded in this characteristic fashion: 'The time of his pilgrimage on earth was 10 times 7, or 70 years, 3 months and 3 days. In the year 1707, when he was 4 times 7 years old, he emigrated with Brother E. L. Gruber from

his native country. In the year 1714, when he counted 5 times 7 years, there came to him the gift of the Spirit and of Prophecy, and he made until 1742, in 4 times 7 years, over 100 lesser and great journeys in this service. In the year 1728, when he was 7 times 7 years old, he lost his faithful brother, E. L. Gruber. And in 1742, when he counted 9 times 7, or 63 years, he ceased to travel into distant countries and spent the remaining 7 years (of his life) largely at home' (*Testimonies of the Spirit of the Lord*, 1749).

With the death of Rock in 1749 the congregations of the 'New Spiritual Economy' began to decline. Left without a *Werkzeug*, the members relied chiefly upon the writings and testimonies of Rock and Gruber for guidance and spiritual consolation.

'At the beginning of the 19th cent. but few of the once large congregations remained; even these few had fallen back into the ways of the common world, more or less, preferring the easy-going way to the trials and tribulations suffered by their fathers' (Noe, *Brief Hist. of the Amana Soc. or Community of True Inspiration*, Amana, Iowa, 1900, p. 6).

The decline continued until 1817, when it is recorded that 'a new and greater period dawned for the Community' (*IH* i. 429), and that 'Michael Kraussert was the first *Werkzeug* which the Lord employed for the now commencing revival.'

The 'Revival,' 'Awakening,' or 'Reawakening' of 1817 began with the testimonies of Kraussert, whose first inspired utterance was given to the congregation at Ronneburg on September 11, 1817, as a summons in these words: 'Oh Ronneburg, Ronneburg, where are thy former champions, the old defenders of faith? They no longer are at this present day, and effeminates dwell in the citadel. Well, then! Do ye not desire to become strong? The eternal power is offered to you' (*Testimonies of the Spirit of the Lord*, 1817).

Michael Kraussert was a journeyman tailor of Strassburg, who had been converted to the faith of the Inspirationists through the writings and testimonies of Rock. With great zeal and much religious fervour he seems to have played an important part in the 'Reawakening.' And yet it is recorded that he lacked courage in the face of persecution; that 'at the arrest and subsequent examination at Bergzabern he showed fear of men and resulting weakness'; that in the presence of hostile elders he 'became timid and undecided, and ran, so to speak, before he was chased'; and that 'through such fear of men and reluctance for suffering he lost his inner firmness in the mercy of the Lord, went gradually astray from the Divine guidance, and soon fell back into the world' (*IH* iii. 34, 429).

After the 'fall' of Kraussert (whose connexion with the Inspirationists was therewith severed), the spiritual affairs of the Community were directed by the *Werkzeuge* Christian Metz and Barbara Heinemann, who came to be regarded as the founders and leaders of what is sometimes called in the records the 'New Community.'

When Michael Kraussert, Christian Metz, and Barbara Heinemann appeared as *Werkzeuge* at the time of the 'Reawakening,' a century had elapsed since Gruber and Rock preached the doctrines of the 'New Spiritual Economy.' But the persecution of independents in religious thought had not ceased; and so these new prophets were repeatedly arrested, and their followers 'were attacked and insulted on the streets and elsewhere' (*IH* iii. 70).

As a century before, so now the growing congregations of Inspirationists sought refuge in Hesse, where on October 31, 1831, it is recorded, 'the Lord sent a message to the Grand Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt as a promise of grace and blessing because he had given protection to the Community in his country' (*IH* iii. 96). It was at this time that the far-sighted Christian Metz conceived the idea of leasing some large estate in common which should serve as a refuge for the faithful, where each could be given 'an opportunity to earn his living according to his calling or inclination.'

And so, in the year 1826, 'it came about through the mediation of the Landrath of Büdingen that a part of the castle at Marienborn was given in rent by the noble family of Meerholz, which was very convenient for the Community, since it lay near Ronneburg,' the home of the principal elders (*IH* iii. 68).

In all, four estates were rented, and to the administration of these four estates, located within a radius of a few miles and placed under one common management, are traced the beginnings of the communistic life of the Inspirationists. Communism, however, formed no part of their religious doctrines. It was simply a natural development out of the conditions under which they were forced to live in their efforts to maintain the integrity of their religion. Under a common roof they hoped to live simply and peacefully the true Christian life. And so rich and poor, educated and uneducated, professional man, merchant, manufacturer, artizan, farmer, and labourer met together as a religious brotherhood to worship and plan the labours of the day.

But independence and prosperity were not yet fully won. The day of complete religious and economic freedom for which they hoped had not come. Cherished liberties relative to military service, legal oaths, and separate schools were still denied. Rents became exorbitant, while excessive heat and drought destroyed the harvests.

It was in the midst of their depression that 'the Lord revealed through His instrument, Christian Metz, that He would lead them out of this land of adversity to one where they and their children could live in peace and liberty' (Noe, *Brief History*, p. 15). Indeed, this 'hidden prophecy,' uttered by Christian Metz on May 20, 1826, was now recalled: 'I proceed in mysterious ways, saith thy God, and my foot is seldom seen openly. I found my dwelling in the depths, and my path leadeth through great waters. I prepare for me a place in the wilderness, and establish for me a dwelling where there was none' (*Testimonies of the Spirit of the Lord*, 1826).* This was interpreted as pointing the way to America. And so there was much discussion concerning emigration to the wildernesses of the New World. Finally, there came through the *Werkzeug*, Christian Metz, these words from the Lord: 'Your goal and your way shall lead towards the west, to the land which still is open to you and your faith. I am with you, and shall lead you over the sea. Hold Me and call upon Me through your prayers when storms or temptations arise. . . . Four may then prepare themselves' (*TSL*, July 26, 1842). Thereupon Christian Metz and three others were named through inspiration to visit America; and they were given 'full power to act for all the members, and to purchase land where they deemed best' (Noe, *Brief History*, p. 15).

After a voyage of many hardships and privations, the committee of Inspirationists reached New York City on October 26, 1842. After three months of careful deliberation they purchased a tract of five thousand acres of the Seneca Indian Reservation lands in Erie County, New York. Within four months of the purchase the first village of the Community was laid out and peopled. They called it Ebenezer.

Other villages were soon founded, and under the name of 'Ebenezer Society' the Community was

* Hereafter referred to as *TSL*.

formally organized with a written constitution. It is recorded that during 'the planting and building of the new home' the Lord 'gave precepts, directions, and explanations concerning the external and internal affairs of that time' through His 'holy word and testimony' (*IH* iii. 329).

With the transplanting of the Community of True Inspiration to America there came a serious consideration of communism as a plan for organizing and conducting the economic life of the Society. To live simply as a Christian congregation, or church, was, of course, the fundamental aim of the Community. But they had found the practice of communism conducive to that end. Besides, 'the Lord had gradually announced more and more clearly that it was His intention and pleasure, nay His most holy will, that everything should be and remain in common' (*IH* iii. 367).

It was in the midst of the discussion over communism that 'a very important revelation occurred again at Mittel Ebenezer on October 23, 1850, in which the Lord expressed His grief and displeasure over the discontent of many members with regard to common possession' (*TSL*, 1850). And on March 19, 1852, the 'Lord testified most emphatically and earnestly to put to shame those who would not believe and trust in the Lord and the Brethren. He announced that it was not His holy will, and never should be, that communism should be abolished; and He pronounced His curse upon all those who would attempt it, but gave a most gracious promise to those who would faithfully preserve it.' This testimony, which was given through Christian Metz, reads in part as follows: 'As truly as I live, saith the Lord, it is at no time my will to dissolve the ties of the Community in such manner, or to suffer its dissolution, neither through artful devices or skill and diplomacy, nor cunning or power of men. Nay, the faith which hath love and the bond of peace for its essence and foundation shall continue to exist. And there shall come eternal disgrace, shame, and disfavour upon those who cause it; their children shall suffer want and be without blessing in time and eternity. Their material possessions shall melt away, and the divine treasure they have disavowed; therefore the Lord is against them' (*TSL*, 1852, No. 12). And thereupon the erring Brethren 'did repent concerning it,' and signed the amendment to the Constitution providing for the adoption of absolute communism. This amendment, moreover, was incorporated in the new constitution adopted in the State of Iowa, and communism has ever since been one of the fundamental principles of the Community.

Thus it is evident that the object of the Community of True Inspiration is the worship of God in freedom according to their peculiar faith. Communism was adopted as one of the means to that end, but not in accordance with any understanding on the part of the Inspirationists of the social theories of Jesus. It has solved the problem of furnishing remunerative labour to the members, and has given them leisure 'to think upon the things that are of the Lord.'

Although more than eight hundred members had come from Germany to Ebenezer, many had remained in the old home. Those who came were largely of the peasant class. But they were men and women of character who were possessed of the enthusiasm born of moral earnestness. In their new home they enjoyed spiritual freedom, and were rewarded with a large measure of material prosperity.

As time went on, however, certain undesirable features of the location of their villages became more and more evident. In the first place, they suffered no little molestation from the Seneca Indians, who were tardy in leaving the Reservation. Then the rapid growth of the city of Buffalo (only five miles distant) caused such an advance in the price of real estate that the purchase of additional land to accommodate the growing Community was out of the question. And, finally, it became evident that the young people of the Community were too near the worldly influence of Buffalo to persevere in the injunction of Gruber, who said: 'Have no intercourse with worldly minded men, that ye be not tempted and be led astray.'

And so a committee was directed to go to the new State of Iowa, and there inspect the Government lands which were for sale. Out of one of the garden spots of Iowa they selected and purchased eighteen thousand acres of contiguous land.

A better selection for the new home could scarcely have been made. Through it meandered the beautiful Iowa River, bordered with the black soil of its fertile valley. On one side of the river the bluffs and uplands were covered with timber for fuel and building. Quarries there were of sandstone and limestone, while the clay of the hills was unexcelled for the making of brick. On the other side of the river stretched the rolling prairie land. To this splendid new domain, all ready for the plough and axe, the Inspirationists brought enthusiasm, industry, moral earnestness, and religious zeal.

The first village on the Iowa purchase was laid out during the summer of 1855. 'The time had now come,' writes Gottlieb Scheuner in his *IH*, 'that the new settlement in Iowa was to receive a name.' When the Community emigrated from Germany and settled near Buffalo in the State of New York, the Lord called that place Ebenezer, that is, 'Hitherto hath the Lord helped us.' Now He again led them out from there to a new place, which, as the work proceeded, was to be called 'Bleibtreu.' This had been laid into the heart of the *Werkzeug*, Christian Metz, who later poured it forth in a song beginning thus:

'*Bleibtreu soll der Name sein*
Dort in Iowa der Gemein.'

Since, however, it was difficult to express this word or name in English, it was proposed instead to use the Biblical name 'Amana,' which signifies *glaub' treu* ('believe faithfully') (cf. Song of Sol. 4^8). To this, it is recorded, the Lord gave His approval in a song on September 23, 1855. Henceforth the new home of the Community was known as Amana (*TSL*, 1855).

The removal from the old home to the new, from Ebenezer to Amana, covered a period of ten years. In addition to the first village, which had been given the name Amana, five additional villages were laid out by the year 1862—West Amana, South Amana, High Amana, East Amana, and Middle Amana. It was at this time that the Society, in order to secure railroad facilities, purchased the small village of Homestead. Twelve hundred members had come from Ebenezer; and by the time the sale of the Ebenezer lands had been completed, the Society's territory in Iowa consisted of twenty-six thousand acres.

In the year 1859 the Community was incorporated in accordance with the Laws of the State of Iowa under the name of 'The Amana Society.' The Constitution, which was also revised, came into force on the first day of January, 1860. This instrument is not a 'Declaration of Mental Independence,' nor a scheme for a 'One World-wide Socialistic Fraternal Brotherhood,' but a very simple, business-like document of ten articles.

On July 27, 1867, six years after the establishment of the last of the seven Iowa villages, and two years after the completion of the Ebenezer sale and the removal of the last detail of the Community to the new home in the West, Christian Metz, the *so hoch begabte und begnadigte* brother, 'through whom the weightiest and greatest things were wrought and accomplished,' was, after 'fifty years of effort and labour, recalled from the field of his endeavour' at the age of 72 years, 6 months, and 24 days (*IH* iii. 878).

Half a century—the most eventful years of the Community's inspiring history—bridges the interval between the 'bestowal of God's mercy' on Michael Kraussert at the time of the 'Reawakening' and the 'blessed departure and release' of Christian Metz in 1867. During that period the Community was never without a *Werkzeug*. 'Great undertakings and changes occurred,' and material progress unparalleled in communistic history was theirs.

After the death of Christian Metz 'the work of grace' was carried on by Barbara Heinemann, now Landmann (who lost her gift at the time of her marriage in 1823, but regained it in 1849 and retained it to the time of her death in 1883 at the age of ninety), and by the elders in whom the 'Lord manifested Himself so strongly and powerfully during the last illness of Brother Christian Metz.' Since the death of Barbara Landmann no *Werkzeug* has been called in the Community; but, as in the

period following the death of Rock, 'well founded Brethren endowed with divine mercy, who are still living witnesses of the great blessing of Inspiration, carry on the work of the Lord in the Community.' How long the coming generations will 'fill the widening gap' with no *Werkzeug* for their spiritual guidance, and with the breaking of the link in the 'passing into eternity of these faithful witnesses and Elders,' which binds them to the past with its inspiring history, 'is ordained only in the hidden counsel of God.'

2. **Religion.**—Although communism may appear to the casual observer to be the most characteristic feature of the Amana Society, a careful study of the history and spirit of the Inspirationists reveals the fact that the real Amana is Amana the Church — Amana the Community of True Inspiration. Religion has always been the dominating factor in the life of the Community.

The basal doctrine of the Amana Church is *present-day inspiration and revelation.* That is, to use the words of the *Werkzeug* Eberhard Ludwig Gruber, 'God is ever present in the world, and He will lead His people to-day as in olden times by the words of His Inspiration if they but listen to His voice.' Indeed, it is the belief of these people that, ever since the beginning of the 'New Spiritual Economy,' the spiritual and temporal affairs of the Community have been immediately under Divine direction according to the 'decisive word of the Lord' as revealed through His specially endowed instruments the *Werkzeuge.* And so it appears throughout their history that in all 'important undertakings and changes, nay in the whole external and internal leadership of the Community, the *Werkzeug* had to bear the bulk of the burden and care, since the Lord ordained and directed everything through him directly.' Thus Divine inspiration and revelation came through the *Werkzeuge* (*IH* iii. 878).

Perhaps the best exposition of the nature of Inspiration, as understood by the Inspirationists, is found in Eberhard Ludwig Gruber's *Divine Nature of Inspiration*, where, in reply to the charge that he was an 'instrument of the Devil,' he sets forth his own 'convictions' as follows:

'Because I have not light-headedly and without test and experience come to the approval of these things.

'Because the testimonies of the inspired persons, although being at first adverse to me, have not in the least troubled me, nor aroused and stirred my emotions, as certainly would have happened to some extent if they had originated from a wicked and dark spirit.

'Because I have not been hindered thereby in the usual quiet introspective prayer granted to me by the mercy of God.

'Because during such a deep and earnest self-examination all scruples and objections to this matter were, without effort on my part, so completely removed and dispersed that not one remained which irritated me or which I could not comprehend.

'Because such prayer, which was absolutely without prejudice in the matter, has again won for me the precious gift of tears, which had become almost unknown to me.

'Because the Spirit of Inspiration penetrated into and laid bare those things which occurred in the most hidden corners of my heart, so that no creature could know them, and because it (the Spirit of Inspiration) also approved and commended those ways of mercy and sanctification in which the Lord had hitherto led me in affairs external and internal.

'Because the promises pronounced in regard to myself have not dazzled me or made me vain.

'Because at the same time the extinguished love was again renewed in the hearts of many.

'Because the assemblies of prayer recommended by the Spirit, and up to that time vainly striven for, were at once established to our joy and bliss, and without opposition of the then well-disposed individuals.

'Because I was led into the severest struggle for purification, instead of expecting at once the fulfilment of the great promises given me.

'Because this struggle searched my innermost self and has deeply impressed upon me the most vivid lessons of complete denial and negation of myself.

'Because in this matter also all external hindrances were removed, and I indeed was made willing and confident to throw them behind me, and to take upon me all the disgrace and suffering of this service, often confirming my faith under tests and with proofs not mentioned here, but known to God and also to others.

'Because the inner word was laid open and led forth from the depths of my heart, whither no divine creature, much less a satanic spirit, could reach, deeper and more abundantly than I ever possessed it before.

'Because those inner emotions known to me from my youth, but now become stronger and more numerous, have ever either held me back from some evil deed, or encouraged and urged me to some good act.

'Because they (inner emotions) often must with certainty reveal to me the presence of hidden false spirits rising against me or others.

'Because in all this I do not found my conclusions on the inspiration alone, as may be the case with others, but upon the undeniable work of God in my soul, which has gone on there for long years out of sheer mercy, and which under this new economy and revival is becoming ever more powerful.

'Because my son, together with many others, has been brought into a state of deepest repentance and wholesome anxiety of mind through the powerful Testimony of the Spirit in the inspired persons.

'Because the Word of the Lord was unsealed to him (the son) by the very first emotions (of the inspired one).

'Because the Spirit of Inspiration promptly appeared, as when it had been foretold that a certain married woman (*die Melchiorin*) would testify on the day mentioned in Bergheim.

'Because my son came to testify (make utterance) with great fear and trembling, nay even through the severest struggle, and surely not through his wish and vain desire.

'Because he was enabled and compelled in his first testimony, as a foreshadowing of the future, to denounce with great certainty an impure spirit, to the sincere humiliation of the latter.

'Because he (the son) was led in these ways of Inspiration, contrary to inclination and habit of his youth, to deep introspection and seclusion, and was also endowed with many extraordinary gifts of mercy.

'Because he made, far beyond his natural abilities, such pure, clear, and penetrating statements (utterances) that many well learned in divine and natural things were led to wonder.'

According to the belief of the Community of True Inspiration, the word and will of the Lord are communicated to the faithful through the specially endowed *Werkzeuge*, whose inspired utterances are in fact the *Bezeugungen*, that is, the Testimonies of the Lord. These are either written or oral. The gift of oral prophecy or testimony (*Aussprache*), being regarded as the highest form of inspiration, was not enjoyed by all the *Werkzeuge.* Indeed, the 'miraculous gift of *Aussprache*' was sometimes preceded by the humbler gift of *Einsprache*, when the *Werkzeug*, unable to give voice to his inspiration, committed his testimonies to writing. Thus the 'specially endowed' *Werkzeug*, Christian Metz, seems to have entered upon the 'service of the Lord' with simply the gift of *Einsprache*, which was later followed by the gift of *Aussprache*, and still later by the combined gifts of *Einsprache* and *Aussprache.* Sometimes the *Werkzeuge* were deprived of the gracious gifts of *Einsprache* and *Aussprache*, which were restored only after a period of deepest humility.

The inspired testimonies of the *Werkzeuge*, as recorded in the *Year Books*, or *Testimonies of the Spirit of the Lord*, vary in length from a few sentences to many pages. Some were uttered in rhyme; and there are instances where a testimony is given through two *Werkzeuge* speaking alternately. Under the date of Jan. 12, 1819, such a testimony was given by Michael Kraussert and Barbara Heinemann (*TSL*, 1819). From the records it appears that testimonies were addressed sometimes to the whole congregation of the Community, and sometimes to individual members.

As to content, the Testimonies touch a great variety of subjects, from the routine affairs of daily existence to impassioned admonitions to live the holy life. Many contain promises of the love and mercy of the Lord. Others take the form of appeals of the 'God of Salvation' for more spiritual life. Some are warnings against *Lichtsinn*, pride, self-righteousness, and self-will; and especially are the *selbstständig* and *eigenmächtig* warned against the wrath of God. There are vigorous denunciations of the wicked, and there are threats of 'the hellish torture' and the 'gloomy abyss' for those who do not repent. But many more there are that teach and preach humility, obedience to the will of the Lord, self-negation, and repentance. Throughout, the testimonies suggest a wide familiarity with the language of the Bible, especially of the Old Testament.

The testimony of Christian Metz, given as a warning and admonition to Kraussert, is typical of the utterances of the *Werkzeuge.* It runs thus:

'Thus speaketh the eternal God: I will give a word of testimony to my servant Kraussert, who knoweth not now how to

begin, so bewildered he is. But listen, then. What hath prompted thee to act and deal thus according to thine own inclinations? Thou hast run before thou wast sent away, saith the almighty God of Love. Alas, how troubled is my spirit, that thou hast failed thus, and dost not want to be found again! Oh come back again and resign thyself in and to the faithful tie of brotherhood which I have established, and which I have again strengthened through thee. Thou runnest about thus, and art like a hireling who hath seen the wolf and hath abandoned to him his flock and deserted. Is this the true faithfulness of the shepherd? Do faithful servants act thus, when the wolf cometh that they run away and step not into the gap to ward off harm? . . . Canst thou, then, say that I have deserted thee a single time, when thou wast persecuted for holy causes alone? Have I not ever helped thee again and satisfied thee? . . . Hear, then, what the God of Eternal Love furthermore testifieth in regard to thee: Thou art, then, not as faithful in thine office and service as thou wast, and thou dost not sufficiently submit thyself in and to my will; thou hast become too self-willed, and thou dost not want to heed the others, whom, too, I have summoned, and through whom I instruct thee. Alas, I do not wish to make known and have recorded all that I have to record against thee, saith the mighty God. But, nevertheless, thou shalt never succeed in this manner if thou returnest not soon and quickly again in and to the training of my love, and dost not more carefully tend my flock than at present. Oh, I still love thee and see thee in thine erring state; return, then, and care more diligently for the souls whom I have called.

'Indeed I shall help and always have helped thee! Why, then, dost thou lose courage now and desert ere thou wast sent away? Hath it ever been heard of, that my witnesses whom I have called from time to time have not also thus believed that they knew no fear? And though the whole world should rise and appear in the field against them, and they themselves should be so weak that they could hardly stand on their feet, I will still be their God and their mighty protector, if they trust me in all things. Thus thou mayest see that I take no pleasure at all in thy present course of action.

'Alas, my soul is troubled that the wild beasts have broken in in such number. Wilt thou then, too, turn a hireling and scatter the sheep which I so miraculously have led together? saith the mighty God. Alas, return then again and lead them on as a faithful servant and shepherd; with the staff of the true love of the shepherd seize firmly upon faith; then I will assist thee again and give back the inward peace, love, and simplicity. Submit cheerfully to this punishment, for it is my will that it may become known thus that no mortal may boast of his importance' (*TSL*, 1819).

The giving or uttering of oral testimonies by the *Werkzeug* seems to have been accompanied by a more or less violent shaking of the body (*Bewegung*), which is described by one of the scribes in these words:

'With regard to the *Bewegungen*, the *Werkzeuge* were not alike; although they were all moved by one Spirit, there was considerable difference in regard to their gifts and commotions or convulsions. When they had to announce punishments and judgments of God, they all did it with great force, majestic gestures, strong motions, and with a true voice of thunder, especially if this occurred on the public streets or in churches. But when they had to speak of the love of God and the glory of the children of God, then their motions were gentle and the gestures pleasing; but all, and in all attitudes assumed by them, spoke with closed eyes. Often they had, some time previous to the *Bewegung*, a feeling of its approach. Again they were seized suddenly, often at their meals, by day and by night. At times they were aroused from their slumber, and had to testify frequently on the public highways, in fields and forests. In short, they were instruments in the hands of the Lord, and had no control over themselves.

'Violent as the commotions of the body often were, still they did no harm to the body; on the contrary, they served often as remedies if the *Werkzeuge* were ill, as on the occasion of the *Werkzeug* who on a journey lay seriously ill at Halle, Saxony, and was very weak in body, when he suddenly, to the terror of those present, was seized with violent convulsions and had to testify. In the utterance he received orders to start on the journey, at which all were surprised. After the testimony the *Werkzeug* arose and was well at the very moment, and on the following day they departed' (*IH*, ii. 295).

The belief in the genuineness and Divine nature of the *Bewegungen* is set forth in an account of an interesting interview which took place between the younger Gruber and his *Schreiber* and two Jewish Rabbis in a synagogue at Prague. The account, which is recorded under the date of Jan. 30, 1716, is a comparison of the manner of prophesying by the *Werkzeuge* of the Inspirationists and the old Hebrew prophets. It reads in part:

'Hereupon came two old grey-headed Rabbis and questioned us. This is the reason why I have recorded the happenings. They asked, in the first place, where we had our home. Answer: Near Frankfort. Question: Of what religion? Answer: We call ourselves Christians. They said they believed that, and that they knew full well that not all are Christians who call themselves Christians, just as, among themselves, not all were Jews who called themselves Jews; and that they asked only for the sake of the outer distinction. Thereupon I replied that one of us had been reared in the Reformed Church, the other among the Lutherans. They asked: Which of you is, then, the Prophet of the Lord? I pointed to Gruber. Now they questioned further: How does the word of the Lord come to this Prophet? Does it come through an external voice into the ears, or from within? Reply: Not from without, but from within, and, to be explicit, in the following manner: The *Werkzeug*, or the Prophet, feels at first in his innermost being a gentle and pleasant glow, which gradually becomes more intense and also fills the external body; thereupon results an inflation of the nose and a trembling of the whole body; at last, violent motions of the whole body, often attended by kicking with hands and feet and shaking of the head; and in the centre of this internal fire the word of the Lord is born; and the Prophet is enabled, through the *Bewegungen*, to pronounce the word of the Lord without fear or awe, such as it was born in him, at times syllable by syllable, at times word by word, now slowly, now rapidly, so that the *Werkzeug* has no choice of his own, but is used solely as a passive instrument in the hand of the Lord.

'Now you will be able to inform us,—we said to them—since you are better acquainted with the Hebrew language than we, whether the old Prophets among the people of Israel also announced the word of the Lord through such strange gestures of the body and through *Bewegungen*? They replied, in kindness and humility: The word of the Lord had not been made known to them otherwise than from within; and if you should have said that the word of the Lord came to the Prophets of the present day from without, we should have rejected it. Nor do the commotions of the body surprise us at all, since this has been a positive characteristic of the old Prophets; for he who spoke without these commotions of the body was not considered a true Prophet; wherefore we, in imitation of the Prophets of old, unceasingly move when we sing our psalms' (*IH*, ii.).

Ever since the time of the founders (Rock and Gruber) of the 'New Spiritual Economy' the testimonies of the *Werkzeuge* have been 'correctly written down from day to day and in weal or woe' by specially appointed scribes. Indeed, the *Werkzeug* was usually accompanied by a scribe, whose duty it was faithfully to record all inspired utterances. Moreover, the testimonies of the *Werkzeuge* have been printed by the Community in yearly volumes, entitled: 'Year Book of the Community of True Inspiration, or Testimonies of the Spirit of the Lord wherewith the Lord has Blessed and Endowed His Community Anew, Revealed and Uttered through,' etc., with the name of the *Werkzeug*, the year, and the number of the collection (*Sammlung*). In these volumes, which have been distributed only among the members of the Community, each testimony is numbered and briefly introduced as:

'No. 54 (20th Collection).—*Nieder Ebenezer*, October 12, 1845. Sunday afternoon, in the meeting of the Sisters, Brother Christian Metz fell into inspiration while an old testimony was being read, and he had to utter the following testimony from the Lord to the members of this meeting.' Or—

'No. 39 (53rd Collection).—*Heimstätte*, February 27, 1878. When on the afternoon of this day all the elders from the other settlements had met with the elders of this place and Sister Barbara Landmann, in order to begin the examination (*Unterredung*) still to be held in this Community, Sister Barbara Landmann fell at the very start into inspiration, and there occurred a decision through the word concerning Brother —— because of his attachment to the teachings of Swedenborg. Then followed an admonition to the other elders to work in harmony, and to promote the work of the Lord in the same spiritual love of souls.'

The Community of True Inspiration is without a creed, but professes the 'literal word of God' as found in the Bible and in the Testimonies of the *Werkzeuge*. As to its ethical and religious standards of conduct, these are, perhaps, best set forth in the 'One and Twenty Rules for the Examination of our Daily Lives,' by Eberhard Ludwig Gruber, published in 1715, and in the 'Twenty-four Rules for True Godliness,' revealed through Johann Adam Gruber in 1716, 'according to which the new communities were established and received into the gracious covenant of the Lord.' The 'Rules for the Examination of our Daily Lives' are as follows:

'I. To obey God without reasoning, and, through God, our superiors.

'II. To study quiet, or serenity, within and without.

'III. Within, to rule and master your thoughts.

'IV. Without, to avoid all unnecessary words, and still to study silence and quiet.

'V. To abandon self, with all its desires, knowledge, and power.

'VI. Do not criticize others, either for good or evil, either to judge or to imitate them; therefore contain yourself, remain at home, in the house and in your heart.

'VII. Do not disturb your serenity or peace of mind—hence neither desire nor grieve.

'VIII. Live in love and pity toward your neighbour, and indulge neither anger nor impatience in your spirit.

'IX. Be honest and sincere, and avoid all deceit and even secretiveness.

'X. Count every word, thought, and deed as done in the immediate presence of God, in sleeping or waking, eating, drinking, etc., and give Him at once an account of it, to see if all is done in His fear and love.

'XI. Be in all things sober, without levity or laughter, and without vain and idle words, deeds, or thoughts, much less heedless or idle.

'XII. Never think or speak of God without the deepest reverence, fear, and love, and therefore deal reverently with all spiritual things.

'XIII. Bear all inward and outward sufferings in silence, complaining only to God; and accept all from Him in deepest reverence and obedience.

'XIV. Notice carefully all that God permits to happen to you in your inward and outward life, in order that you may not fail to comprehend His will and to be led by it.

'XV. Have nothing to do with unholy, and particularly with needless, business affairs.

'XVI. Have no intercourse with worldly-minded men; never seek their society; speak little with them, and never without need; and then not without fear and trembling.

'XVII. Therefore, what you have to do with such men, do in haste; do not waste time in public places and worldly society, lest you be tempted and led away.

'XVIII. Fly from the society of women-kind as much as possible, as a very highly dangerous magnet and magical fire.

'XIX. Avoid obeisance and the fear of men; these are dangerous ways.

'XX. Dinners, weddings, feasts, avoid entirely; at the best there is sin.

'XXI. Constantly practise abstinence and temperance, so that you may be as wakeful after eating as before.'

The 'Twenty-four Rules for True Godliness' appear as a part of a lengthy testimony in which the Lord commands a renewal of the Covenant 'before my holy face and in the presence of my holy angels and of the members of your community,' which ceremony is still observed in the community by shaking hands with the presiding elder in open meeting. The concluding paragraph of the admonitory introduction and the 'Twenty-four Rules for True Godliness' are as follows:—

'Hear then what I say unto you. I, the Lord your God, am holy! and therefore ye, too, shall be and become a holy community, if I am to abide in your midst as ye desire. And therefore you shall henceforth resolve:

'I. To tear all crude and all subtle idols out of your hearts, that they may no longer befool you and mislead further to idolatry against your God, so that His name be not defamed and He go not suddenly forth, and avenge and save the glory of His name.

'II. I desire that ye shall have nought in common with the fruitless works of darkness; neither with the grave sins, and sinners, nor with the subtle within and without you. For what relationship and likeness hath My holy temple with the temples of pride, unchastity, ambition, and seeking for power, and of the useless, superfluous, condemning prattling, which stealeth time away from me? How could the light unite with the darkness? How can ye as children of the light unite with the ungodly, the liars and their works, the scoffers and blasphemers, who are nothing but darkness?

'III. Ye shall henceforth in your external life conduct yourselves so that those standing without find no longer cause for ill reports and for defaming My name. Rather suffer wrong if ye are abused. But above all flee from associations which hinder you from growing in godliness. All mockers and scoffers, and those who recommend you unto vanity, ye shall shun, and have no dealings with them.

'IV. Ye shall also perform your earthly task the longer and more according to the dictates of your conscience, and gladly desist from that which My Spirit showeth you to be sinful —not heeding your own loss, for I am the Lord, Who can and will care and provide for the needs of your body—that through this ye may not give cause for censure to the scoffer. The time which I still grant you here is very short; therefore, see to it well that My hand may bring forth and create a real harvest within you.

'V. Let, I warn you, be far from you all falseness, lying, and hypocrisy. For I say unto you that I will give the spirit of discernment and shall lay open such vices unto you through Him and the Spirit of Prophecy. For to what end shall clay and metal be together? Would it not make for me a useless vessel, which I could not use and should have to cast away with the refuse? Behold, my children, I have chosen you before many, many, many, and have promised to be unto you a fiery entrenchment against the defiance of your inner and outer enemies. Verily! Verily! I shall keep My promises, if ye only endeavour to fulfil what ye have promised and are promising.

'VI. Ye shall, therefore, none of you, strive for particular gifts, and envy the one or the other to whom I give, perchance, the gift of prayer or maybe of wisdom. For such the enemy of My glory seeketh ever to instil into you, especially into the passionate and fickle souls, to impart to you thereby a poison destructive to the soul. Ye shall, all, all, all of you be filled with My pure and holy Spirit when the time shall come to pass, if ye shall let yourselves be prepared in humility and patience according to my will. Then ye, too, shall speak with tongues different from the tongues ye now speak with. Then I shall be able to communicate with you most intimately.

'VII. Put aside henceforth all backbiting, and all malice of the heart toward each other, which ye have harboured hitherto! None of you are free from it. Behold I shall command the Spirit of My love, that He, as often as ye assemble for prayer in true simplicity of heart and in humility, be in your very midst with His influence and may flow through the channels of His love into the hearts he findeth empty.

'VIII. Ye must make yourselves willing for all outer and inner suffering. For Satan will not cease to show unto you his rancour through his servants and through his invisible power. It is also pleasing to Me and absolutely necessary for you that ye be tried through continuous sorrow, suffering, and the cross, and be made firm and precious in My crucible. And he who doth not dare—but none must be indolent himself in this—to exert all his physical and spiritual powers through My strength, let him depart, that he may not be later a blemishing spot upon My glory.

'IX. Do not in future lend your ears to suspicion and prejudice and, because of your lack of self-knowledge, find offence in each other, where there is none. But each one among you shall become a mirror for the other. Ye shall, moreover, also endeavour to stand every day and hour before the Lord as a unity, as a city or a light on a high mountain, which near and far shineth bright and pure.

'X. At the same time practise more and more outer and inner quiet. Seek ever, though it will be for the natural man which is inexperienced in this a hard death, to hide yourselves in humility in the inner and undermost chamber of your nothingness, that in this soil I may bring to a befitting growth My seed, which I have concealed therein.

'XI. Behold, My people! I make with you this day a covenant which I bid you to keep faithfully and sacredly. I will daily wander amongst you and visit your place of rest, that I may see how ye are disposed toward Me.

'XII. Guard yourselves! I, the Lord, warn you against indifference towards this covenant of grace and against negligence, indolence, and laziness, which thus far have been for the most part your rulers and have controlled your heart. I shall not depart from your side nor from your midst, but shall Myself, on the contrary, reveal Myself ever more powerful, holier, and more glorious through the light of My face in and among you, as long as ye will bring forth to meet Me the honest and sincere powers of your will. This shall be the tie with which ye can bind and hold Me. Behold I accept you this day as slaves of My will, as free-born of My kingdom, as possessors of My heart. Therefore let yourselves gladly and willingly be bound with the ties of My love, and the power of love shall never be wanting unto you.

'XIII. And ye who are the heads and fathers of households, hear what I say unto you: The Lord hath now chosen you as members of His community, with whom He desireth to associate and dwell day by day. See therefore to this, that ye prove truly heads and lights of your households, which, however, always stand under their faithful Head, your King. See that ye may bring your help-mates to true conduct and fear of God through your own way of living, which ye shall strive to make ever more faultless, more earnest, and manly.

'XIV. Your children, ye who have any, ye shall endeavour with all your power to sacrifice to Me and lead to Me. I shall give you in abundance, if ye only keep close to Me inwardly, wisdom, courage, understanding, bravery, and earnestness mingled with love, that ye yourselves may be able to live before them in the fear of God, and that your training may be blessed, that is, in those who wish to submit to My hand in and through Me. But those who scorn you and do not heed My voice, in and through you and otherwise, shall have their blood come upon their own heads. But ye shall never abandon hope, but wrestle for them with earnest prayer, struggle, and toil, which are the pangs of spiritual birth. But if ye neglect them through indifference, negligence, half-heartedness, and laziness, then every such soul shall verily be demanded of such a father.

'XV. Do now your part as I command you from without and frequently inwardly through My Spirit; do not desist, just as I never cease to work on you, My disobedient children; then ye shall abide in My grace and save your souls. And such women and children shall bear the fruits of their sins as do not wish to bow themselves under you and Me. I will henceforth no longer tolerate those grave offences among you and in your houses about which the world and the children of wrath and disbelief have so much to say; but I have commanded the Spirit of My living breath that He pass through all your houses and breathe upon every soul which doth not wantonly close itself to Him. The dew of blessing shall flow from the blessed head of your High Priest and Prince of Peace upon every male or head among you, and through them it shall flow upon and into your help-mates, and through both man and wife into the offspring and children, so that all your

seed shall be acceptable, pure, and holy before the Lord, since He Himself hath nourished and will nourish the same among you.

'XVI. And none of your grown-up children shall be permitted to attend your meetings who have not previously received from their parents a good testimony according to the truth, not appearance, and without self-deception, as also from the elders and leaders, especially from the one who with his fellow-workers hath to watch over the training of the children, which is to be carried on with earnestness and love, but without severity and harshness. This training is to be watched over with all earnestness, and should the parents be negligent and the case require it, then shall the latter be temporarily excluded [from the prayer meetings] for their humiliation.

'XVII. Prove yourselves as the people whom I have established for an eternal monument to Me, and whom I shall impress upon My heart as an eternal seal, so that the Spirit of My Love may dwell upon you and within you, and work according to His desire.

'XVIII. And this is the word which the Lord speaketh of these strangers who so often visit you and cause so much disturbance. None whom ye find to be a scoffer, hypocrite, mocker, sinner, derider, and unrepenting sinner, shall ye admit to your community and prayer meetings. Once for all they are to be excluded, that My refreshing dew and the shadow of My love be never prevented from manifesting themselves among you. But if some should come to you with honest intentions, who are not knowingly scoffers, hypocrites, and deriders, though it be one of those whom ye call of the world, if he to your knowledge doth not come with deceitful intentions, then ye may well admit him. I shall give you, My faithful servants and witnesses, especially the spirit of discrimination, and give you an exact feeling whether they are sincere and come with honest intentions or otherwise.

'XIX. If they then desire to visit you more frequently, ye shall first acquaint them with your rules, and ask them whether they will submit to these rules and to the test of the elders. And then ye shall read to them My laws and commands, which I give unto you; and if ye see that they are earnestly concerned about their souls, then ye shall gladly receive the weak, and become weak with them for a while, that is, ye shall, with them and for them, repent and make their repentance your own. But if a scoffer or mocker declare that he repenteth, him ye should admit only after considerable time and close scrutiny and examination of his conduct, if ye find the latter to be righteous. For Satan will not cease to try to launch at you his fatal arrows through such people. Be therefore on your guard, and watch lest the wolf come among you and scatter, or even devour, the sheep.

'XX. And those who pledge themselves with hand and mouth after the aforesaid manner to you shall make public profession before the community, and also make an open confession of their resolve, and I shall indeed show you if this latter cometh from their hearts; the conduct of those ye shall watch closely, whether they live according to their profession and promise or not, lest the dragon defile your garments.

'XXI. (To the elders.) Thus my elder and his fellow-workers shall frequently visit the members of the community and see how things are in their homes and how it standeth concerning their hearts. I shall give to you My servant (the *Werkzeug*) and to your brothers keen eyes, if ye only pray for it. And if ye find that one is in uncalled sadness, or liveth in negligence, impudence, licentiousness, or the like, then ye shall admonish him in love. If he repent, ye shall rejoice. But if after repeated admonition he doth not mend his ways, then ye shall put him to shame openly before the community; and if even this doth not help, then ye shall exclude him for a while. Yet I shall ever seek My sheep, those who are already excluded and those who in future, because of their own guilt, must be excluded, and I shall ever try to lead them in their nothingness into My pasture.

'XXII. And to all of you I still give this warning: let none of you reject brotherly admonition and punishment, lest secret pride grow like a poisonous thorn in such a member and torment and poison his whole heart.

'XXIII. Ye shall not form a habit of anything of the external exercises (forms of worship) and the duties commended to you; or I shall be compelled to forbid them again. On the contrary, your meetings shall make you ever more fervent, more earnest, more zealous, in the true simple love towards each other, fervent and united in Me, the true Prince of Peace.

'XXIV. This the members and brethren of the community shall sincerely and honestly pledge with hand and mouth to My elders, openly in the assembly, after they have carefully considered it, and it shall be kept sacred ever after' (*TSL*, 1819–1823).

From the records it appears that the members of the Community of True Inspiration are graded spiritually into three orders (*Abtheilungen*) according to the degree of their piety. Ordinarily, the spiritual rank of the individual is determined by age, since piety increases with years of 'sincere repentance and striving for salvation and deep humility of spirit.' Nevertheless, it remains for the Great Council of the Brethren at the yearly spiritual examination to judge of the spiritual condition of the members irrespective of age, and to 'take out of the middle order, here and there, some into the first, and out of the third into the second, not according to favour and prejudice, but according to their grace and conduct' (*The Supper of Love and Remembrance of the Suffering and Death of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ for 1855*). Moreover, reduction in spiritual rank follows the loss of piety, or as a punishment for evil doing. During the days of the *Werkzeuge* this spiritual classification of the members into *Abtheilungen* was made with 'great accuracy' through Inspiration.

There are three important religious ceremonies which are observed by the Community of True Inspiration with great solemnity. These are the renewing of the covenant (*Bundesschliessung*), the spiritual examination (*Untersuchung* or *Unterredung*), and the Lord's Supper or Love-feast (*Liebesmahl*).

Formerly the ceremony of renewing the covenant (*Bundesschliessung*) was appointed and arranged by the *Werkzeuge*; but it is recorded in *IH* iii. 872 that in 1863, 'when the annual common Thanksgiving Day [ordinarily the last Thursday of November] of the land came round, the Lord gave direction through His word that henceforth this day should annually be observed solemnly in the Communities as a day of Covenant, which has been and is still observed.' Every member of the Community, and every boy and girl fifteen years of age or more, take part in this ceremony. Following the usual religious exercises of hymn, silent prayer, reading from the Bible, and an exhortation by the head elder, the elders pass in turn to the head elder, who gives them a solemn shake of the hand, signifying a renewed allegiance to the faith and a pledge to 'cleave unto the ways of the Lord, that they may dwell in the land which the Lord sware unto their fathers.' Then the brethren one by one and according to age and spiritual rank, come forward and similarly pledge themselves by shaking the hand of the head elder and his associates. Finally, the sisters come forward, and in the same manner renew their allegiance to the work of the Lord.

The spiritual examination (*Untersuchung*), which is held annually, seems to be based upon the words of the Bible (Ja 5^{16}), which read: 'Confess your faults one to another, and pray one for another, that ye may be healed.' It serves as a preparation for the Love-feast (*Liebesmahl*) which follows. This ceremony of confession, with its sanctification and purification, seems to be participated in by every man, woman, and child in the Community. It is now conducted by the first brethren, although formerly it was the office of the *Werkzeuge* to ask the appropriate questions and to judge of the spiritual condition of each individual. Nor did the *Werkzeuge* hesitate to condemn the shortcomings of the members as revealed in this examination. And frequent were the exhortations to holier living, such as: 'Oh that ye were not given to the external, and that your eyes were directed inward! Pray the Lord, the God of your salvation, and live more sincerely for the true spirit of humility' (*TSL*, 1845).

Through the *Untersuchung* the people of the Community were prepared for the most elaborate and solemn of all the ceremonies of the Inspirationists, namely, the Lord's Supper or Love-Feast (*Liebesmahl*), which is now celebrated but once in two years. A special feature of the Love-feast as carried out by the Community of True Inspiration is the ceremony of foot-washing, which is observed at this time by the higher spiritual orders. Gottlieb Scheuner, the scribe, records, in reference to a particular Love-feast, the following:—

'The entire membership, excluding the young people under 15, was divided into three classes according to the conviction

and insight of the brethren and the *Werkzeug* (Barbara Landmann) concerning the spiritual state of the respective people. Likewise the servants for the foot-washing, for the breaking of the bread, and for the distribution of bread and wine, also those who were to wait at the supper, as well as the singers and scribes, had to be chosen and arranged. . . . The number of those who were to serve had to be determined in proportion to the great membership. Thus there were appointed for the foot-washing at the first Love-feast 13 brothers and 12 sisters. . . . For the second Love-feast likewise 13 brothers and 14 sisters from the first class. . . . For the breaking of the bread and the passing of the wine two times 12 brethren were selected. . . . For the leading and the support of the singing 8 brethren and 4 sisters were chosen. Besides those, many of the best singers among the brethren and sisters of their respective class were selected and joined to the leaders, so that the whole choir consisted of 20, sometimes 22, persons, who in the afternoon during the meal had their place at a separate table in the middle of the hall. To write down the testimonies of the Lord, those then being teachers at the different communities were appointed' (*IH* iv. 57).

The regular or ordinary religious exercises of the Community of True Inspiration are extremely simple, for the Inspirationists believe that 'forms and ceremonies are of no value, and will never take a man to heaven.' In the several villages prayer meetings are held every evening in rooms set aside for the purpose. On Wednesday, Saturday, and Sunday mornings the people meet by orders (*Abtheilungen*), while on Sunday afternoon there is held from time to time a general meeting. Thus, exclusive of special exercises, there are eleven religious services held each week in the Community.

With the exception of the prayer-meetings, all the religious gatherings are held in the churches, of which there is one in each village. The church is very much like the ordinary dwelling-house, except that it is longer. The interior is severely plain. White-washed walls, bare floors, and unpainted benches bespeak the simple unpretentious faith of the Community. In the general meetings the elders sit in front facing the congregation, which is divided—the men on one side and the women on the other.

The services are all solemn, dignified, and impressive, and never accompanied by excitement. There is no regular pastor or priest. In the exercises, which are conducted by the elders, there is really nothing peculiar. The silent prayer is followed by a hymn sung by the congregation. Then the presiding elder reads from the Bible or from the testimonies. Again there is prayer, which is sometimes given extemporaneously and sometimes read, or else is given in the form of supplicatory verses by the members of the congregation. The presiding elder announces a chapter in the Bible, which is read verse by verse by the members of the congregation. There is, of course, no sermon—simply a brief address of exhortation from an elder. After the singing of a hymn and the pronouncing of a benediction by the presiding elder, the people leave the church, the women going first and the men following. Nothing could be more earnest, more devout, more reverent, more sincerely genuine than the church services of the Community of True Inspiration.

As texts for religious instruction, the Community has published two Catechisms, one for the instruction of the youth, the other for the use of the members of the Community. The former was re-edited in the year 1872, and the latter in 1871. The title-pages are almost identical, and read: 'Catechetical Instruction of the Teachings of Salvation presented according to the Statements of the Holy Scriptures, and founded upon the Evangelic-Apostolic Interpretation of the Spirit of God for the Blessed Use of the Youth (or Members) of the Communities of True Inspiration.'

The one supreme object of 'the pilgrimage on earth' in the Inspirationist's system of theology is the salvation of the soul. The Community is but a school of preparation for the next world. The awful fate, after death, of the soul that has not been thoroughly purified and sanctified during its earthly sojourn is perhaps best described in an old *Bezeugung*, which reads: 'Such souls will wander in pathless desolation; they will seek and not find; they will have to endure much torment and grief, and be wretchedly plagued, tortured, and tormented by misleading stars' (*TSL*, 9th Collection, 2nd ed. p. 104).

'Behold how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity,' said Gruber to his congregation of followers two centuries ago. And nowhere, perhaps, is this simple Amana doctrine of 'brothers all as God's children' more impressively expressed than in the Amana cemetery, where there are no family lots or monuments, but where the departed members of the Community are buried side by side in the order of their death, regardless of natural ties. Each grave is marked by a low stone or a white painted head-board, with only the name and date of death on the side facing the grave. There lies the great-hearted Christian Metz by the side of the humblest brother.

3. **Religious and moral instruction.**—The stability of the Community of True Inspiration and the perpetuity of the faith of the 'New Spiritual Economy' for nearly two centuries are due in a measure to the instruction and training of the youth; for the Inspirationists have always insisted on training their children in their own way according to the faith of the fathers (*Urgrosseltern*).

To-day there is in each village of the Community a school organized under the laws of the State and sharing in the public school fund. But since the whole of Amana Township is owned by the Society, the Society levies its own school tax, builds its own school houses, chooses its own school directors, and employs its own teachers. Thus the education of the youth of Amana is under the immediate guidance and direction of the Community.

To preserve the earnestness and religious zeal of the fathers (*Urgrosseltern*) is the real mission of the Community school. Here learning is of less account than piety. 'What our youth need more than text-book knowledge,' says the *Kinderlehrer*, 'is to learn to live holy lives, to learn God's commandments out of the Bible, to learn submission to His will, and to love Him.' Indeed, 'to love the ways of humility and simplicity,' and never to reject or despise the good and sincere admonitions of the brethren, constitute the foundation of the ethical and religious training of the Amana child, who, between the ages of five and fourteen, is compelled to attend school six days in the week and fifty-two weeks in the year. In addition to the branches that are usually taught in grammar schools outside of the Community, there is daily instruction at the Amana schools in the Bible and the catechism. Nor is this religious instruction slighted or performed in a perfunctory manner. Said one of the Community schoolmasters: 'It is my profound belief that no other children on the whole earth are more richly instructed in religion than ours.'

The spirit as well as the scope and character of the instruction and training of the youth of Amana is beautifully expressed in the 'Sixty-six Rules for the Conduct of Children' which are given in the catechism. To live up to these rules is indeed the first step towards salvation.

In order to ascertain and promote the spiritual condition of the youth in the schools, there are held each year two 'solemn religious meetings,' which are conducted by the first brethren. One of these meetings, the *Kinderlehre*, consists of a thorough review of the principles and doctrines of the Com-

munity and of the supreme importance of keeping the faith. The other, called the *Kinder Unterredung*, is indeed the children's part of the yearly spiritual examination (*Untersuchung*).

Graduation from the schools of the Community, which may take place either in the autumn or in the spring, is attended with solemn religious exercises. The children who are about to leave the schools are carefully examined as to their knowledge of both spiritual and temporal things. It is at this meeting that each child reads his 'graduation essay,' which is a simple child-like review of his school life, of his faults, of his aspirations, and of his intentions as a member of the Community.

Graduation from the schools is, in a sense, a preparation for the *Bundesschliessung* which follows, and in which the children are first permitted to take part at the age of fifteen. It is not, however, until the boys and girls come to the legal age of twenty-one and eighteen respectively that they are admitted as full members of the Society.

4. Membership.—Besides those born in the Community, who become members by signing the Constitution when they have arrived at the legal age, any outsider may join after a probation of two years, during which he agrees to labour faithfully, abide by the regulations of the Community, and demand no wages. If, at the close of this period, the candidate gives 'proof of being fully in accord with the religious doctrines of the Society,' he is admitted to full membership, after conveying to the Society all his property, taking part in the *Bundesschliessung*, and signing the Constitution. Members who 'may recede from the Society either by their own choice or by expulsion, shall be entitled to receive back the moneys paid into the common fund and to interest thereon at a rate not exceeding 5 per cent. per annum from the time of the adjustment of their accounts until the repayment of their credits' (Constitution, Art. VIII.). Few, however, withdraw from the Society; and most of those who do leave return in the course of time. The records show that formerly many outsiders (from Germany) were admitted; but in recent years the increase is almost wholly from within.

'Every member of the Society is,' according to Art. VI. of the Constitution, 'besides the free board, dwelling, support, and care secured to him in his old age, sickness and infirmity, further entitled out of the common fund to an annual sum of maintenance for him or herself, children, and relatives in the Society; and these annual allowances shall be fixed by the Trustees for each member single or in families according to justice and equity, and shall be from time to time revised and fixed anew.'

5. Government. — The entire conduct of the affairs of the Amana Society rests with a board of trustees consisting of thirteen members, who are elected annually by popular vote out of the whole number of elders in the Community. The members of the board of trustees are the spiritual as well as the temporal leaders of the Community of True Inspiration, and as such are called 'The Great Council of the Brethren.' Out of their own number the trustees elect annually a president, a vice-president, and a secretary.

With a view to keeping the members informed concerning the business affairs of the Society, the board of trustees exhibits annually in the month of June to the voting members of the Community a full statement of 'the personal and real estate of the Society.' The board itself meets on the first Tuesday of each month. Besides its general supervision of the affairs of the Community, the board of trustees acts as a sort of court of appeal to which complaints and disagreements are referred. With their decision the case is finally and emphatically closed.

Each village is governed by a group of from seven to nineteen elders, who were formerly appointed by Inspiration, but who are now (there being no *Werkzeug*) appointed by the board of trustees. Each village has at least one resident trustee, who recommends to the Great Council, of which he is a member, a list of elders from the most spiritual of the members of his village. From these lists the Great Council appoints the elders for each village according to spiritual rank. The governing board of each village is known as the 'Little Council,' and is composed of the resident trustee and a number of the leading elders, who call into conference the foremen of the different branches of industry and such other members of the Community as may, on occasion, be of assistance in arranging the village work.

It is this Little Council of the village that appoints the foremen for the different industries and departments of labour, and assigns to any individual his apportioned task. To them each person desiring more money, more house room, an extra holiday, or lighter work, must appeal; for these allotments are, as occasion requires, 'revised and fixed anew.'

The highest authority in matters spiritual in the village is the head elder; in matters temporal, the resident trustee. And although the trustee is a member of the Great Council itself, which is the spiritual head of the Community, in the village church the head elder ranks above the trustee.

Each village keeps its own books and manages its own affairs; but all accounts are finally sent to the headquarters at Amana, where they are inspected, and the balance of profit or loss discovered. The system of government is thus a sort of federation, wherein each village maintains its local independence, but is under the general supervision of a central governing authority, the board of trustees.

6. The Amana Villages.—The seven villages of the Community of True Inspiration lie from a mile and a half to four miles apart; but all are within a radius of six miles from 'Old Amana.' They are connected with one another, as well as with most of the important towns and cities of the State, by telephone. Each village is a cluster of from forty to one hundred houses arranged in the manner of the German *Dorf*, with one long straggling street and several irregular off-shoots. At one end are the village barns and sheds, at the other the factories and workshops; and on either side lie the orchards, the vineyards, and the gardens.

Each village has its own church and school, its bakery, its dairy, and its general store, as well as its own sawmill for the working up of hard wood. The lumber used is obtained largely from the Society's timber land. At the railway stations there are grain houses and lumber yards. The station agents at the several Amana railway stations and the four postmasters are all members of the Society. The establishment of hotels, in no way a part of the original village plan, has been made necessary by the hundreds of strangers who visit the villages every year.

7. The Amana Homes.—The homes of the Amana people are in two-story houses built of wood, brick, or a peculiar brown sandstone which is found in the vicinity. The houses are all quite unpretentious; and it has been the aim of the Society to construct them as nearly alike as possible, each one being as desirable as the other. The frame-houses are never painted, since it is believed to be more economical to rebuild than to preserve with paint. Then, too, painted houses are a trifle worldly in appearance. The style of architecture is the same throughout the entire Community—plain, square (or rectangular) structures with gable roofs. There are no porches, verandas,

or bay windows; but everywhere the houses are (in the summer time) half hidden with grape vines and native ivy. The uniformity is so marked that it is only with the aid of an inconspicuous weather-beaten sign that the stranger is able to distinguish the 'hotel' or 'store' from the school, church, or private dwelling. Grass lawns are not maintained about the buildings, but in season they are surrounded with a riotous profusion of flower beds.

In the private dwelling-house there is no kitchen, no dining room, no parlour—just a series of 'sitting rooms' and bed rooms, which are furnished by the Society in the plainest and simplest manner. Each house is occupied by one, two, or sometimes three families. But each family is assigned certain rooms which constitute the family home; and in this home each member has his or her own room or rooms. There is no crowding in the Amanas; for the same spirit which led the Society to adopt the village system has led it to provide plenty of house room for its members.

8. Domestic Life.—At the time of its inception the 'New Spiritual Economy' does not seem to have had rigid precepts relative to marriage. But with increasing religious fervour among the Inspirationists celibacy came to be regarded with much favour; while marriages were in certain special cases prevented by the *Werkzeuge*. It does not appear, however, that marriage (although discouraged) was ever absolutely prohibited. To-day there seems to be no opposition; and the young people marry freely, notwithstanding the admonition that 'a single life is ever a pleasure to the Lord, and that He has bestowed upon it a special promise and great mercy' (*TSL*, 1850, No. 74). The newly married pair are, indeed, still reduced to the lowest spiritual order. A young man does not marry until he has reached the age of twenty-four years, and then only after permission has been given by the Great Council of the brethren one year in advance. Marriage in the Community of True Inspiration is a religious ceremony which is performed in the church by the presiding elder.

Divorce is not recognized in the Community of True Inspiration. The married couple are expected to abide by the step they have taken throughout life. But if, for good and sufficient reason, such a life union is impossible, 'then one of them, mostly the man, is told to separate himself from the Community and go into the world.' Second marriage is not regarded with favour.

The number of children in the Amana family is never large—ranging usually from one to four. Indeed, with the birth of each child the parents suffer a reduction in spiritual rank. There are, however, very few childless families in the Community.

The newly married couple begin their home life in rooms which are provided and furnished by the Society. Housekeeping with them, however, is a very simple matter, since there are neither meals nor cooking in the home. At more or less regular intervals in each village there is a 'kitchen house,' at which the meals for the families in the immediate neighbourhood are prepared and served. At each of these common eating places provision is made for from sixteen to forty persons. The preparation of the food and the serving of the meals are done by the women.

In their dress the members of the Society are and always have been very 'plain.' There is nothing distinctive about the clothes of the men. Their 'best clothes' are made by the Community tailor, but ordinarily they wear ready-made garments—except a few of the elder brethren, who still wear trousers with the old-fashioned broad fall front, and a coat without lapels. With the women utility and comfort (instead of adornment) are chiefly regarded. Plain calicoes of gray or blue or brown are worn for the most part. The bodice is short and very plain; while the skirt is long and full. An apron of moderate length, a shoulder-shawl, and a small black cap complete the summer costume. The only headdress is a sun-bonnet with a long cape. The winter dress differs from this only in being made of flannel; while a hood takes the place of the sun-bonnet. Every woman makes her own clothes; and every mother makes the clothing for her children.

9. Industrial Life.—Agriculture, which is one of the chief industries of the Community, is carried on, with the German proneness for system, according to the most modern and scientific methods. The general plan of the field work is determined by the board of trustees; but a field 'boss' or superintendent is responsible to the Society for the proper execution of their orders. He sees that the farm machinery is kept in good condition, he appeals to the elders for more men to work in the fields when necessary, and he obtains from the 'boss' of the barns and stables the horses that are needed. From fifteen to eighteen ox teams are still used for the heavy hauling.

The Amana Society is perhaps best known in the business world through its woollen mills, which have been in active operation for forty-two years. Over half a million pounds of raw wool are consumed in these mills annually. It has always been the aim of the Society to manufacture 'honest goods,' and they have found a ready market from the Atlantic to the Pacific coast. The hours of labour in the woollen mills during the greater part of the year are the usual Amana hours of 7 to 11 in the morning and 12.30 to 6 in the afternoon. But during the summer months, when the orders for the fall trade are being executed, the mills run from half-past four in the morning to eleven at night (the factories being lighted throughout by electricity).

In spite of the long hours and the busy machinery, there is a very unusual factory air about the Amana mills. The rooms are light and airy. There is a cushioned chair or stool for every worker 'between times.' An occasional spray of blossoms on a loom frame reflects the spirit of the workers. Here and there in different parts of the factory are well-equipped cupboards and lunch tables, where the different groups of workers eat their luncheon in the middle of each half-day. In the villages where the factories are located the boys of thirteen or fourteen years of age who are about to leave school are employed in the mills for a few hours each afternoon 'to learn.' If the work is congenial, they are carefully trained and are given every opportunity to 'work up'; but if this employment is not agreeable, they are at liberty to choose some other line of work.

In Old Amana there is a calico printing establishment, where four thousand five hundred yards of calico are dyed and printed daily. The patterns for the calico are designed and made by a member of the Society. This 'colony calico,' as it is called, is sold throughout the United States and Canada, and is quite as favourably known as the woollen goods.

The industrial efficiency of the operative in the Amana mills and factories is noticeably great even to the casual observer. Each worker labours with the air of a man in physical comfort and peace of mind, and with the energy of a man who is working for himself and expects to enjoy all the fruits of his labour.

Besides these mills and factories, the Society owns and operates seven saw mills, two machine shops, one soap factory, and one printing office

and bookbindery. The job work for the stores and mills, the text books used in the schools, the hymn books used in the churches, and other religious books commonly read in the community, are all printed at the Amana printing office. The Society publishes no newspaper or magazine, official or otherwise, although it subscribes for several trade journals.

In three of the villages there are licensed pharmacies. The quantity of drugs prepared for the outside market is not large, as no effort has ever been made to build up a drug trade. As a rule, only special orders are executed. Some physicians of the State prefer to get their supplies here rather than to send farther east for them. The Society were the first people west of Chicago to manufacture pepsin, and their manufacture is still considered one of the best in the market.

In addition to the aforenamed industries, each village has its shoemaker, tailor, harness-maker, carpenter, blacksmith, tool-smith, waggon-maker, etc. These tradesmen, as a rule, do not devote their entire time to their occupations, but only make and repair what is needed in their line by the people of the village. During the busy season they stand ready to be called to the factory or the field as circumstances demand. The physicians, pharmacists, and mechanics are trained at the expense of the Society.

LITERATURE.—*Constitution and Bye-Laws of the Community of True Inspiration; Life and Essays* of Eberhard Ludwig Gruber; *Autobiography* of Johann Friedrich Rock; *Year Books* of the Community of True Inspiration [published by the Society each year during the lifetime of the *Werkzeuge* and containing the *Bezeugungen* in the order of their utterance, with brief introductions relating the circumstances under which the *Bezeugungen* were given]; *Brief Relation of the Circumstances of the Awaking and the first Divine guidance of Barbara Heinemann; Historical Description of the Community of True Inspiration . . .* recorded by Brother Christian Metz. *Extracts from the Day Book* of Brother Christian Metz; *Inspirations-Historie*—compiled from various accounts, some of them printed, some written by Gottlieb Scheuner, 4 parts or vols. :—[Vol. I.] Historical account of the founding of the Prayer-Meetings and Communities; [vol. II.] Various articles and narrations of the work of the Lord in His ways of Inspiration; [vol. III.] Historical Account of the New Revival, Gathering, and Founding of the Community of True Inspiration; [vol. IV.] Description of the works of the mercy of the Lord in the Communities of True Inspiration; *Catechetical Instruction of the Teachings of Salvation*, part I. for the youth of the Community, part II. for the members; *Psalms after the manner of David for the Children of Zion: . . . particularly for the Congregation of the Lord; The Supper of Love and Remembrance of the Suffering and Death of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ* [published during the lifetime of the *Werkzeuge* after each Love-Feast, and containing a full account of the meetings and the *Bezeugungen* uttered during the solemn ceremonies]; numerous pamphlets and essays found only in the records and libraries of the Society. These works are all in German, and printed chiefly at Ebenezer, N.Y., and Amana, Iowa. Reference may also be made to Nordhoff, *Communistic Societies of the United States*, pp. 25–59 (New York, 1875); Hinds, *American Communities*, pp. 263–286 (Chicago, 1902); Knortz, *Die wahre Inspirationsgemeinde in Iowa* (Leipzig, 1896); and Perkins and Wick, *History of the Amana Society* (Iowa City, Ia., 1891).

BERTHA M. H. SHAMBAUGH.

AMARĀVATI,—A small town (lat. 16° 34′ 45″ N., long. 80° 24′ 21″ E.) on the south bank of the Kistna (Krishṇā) River in the Kistna District, Madras Presidency, the ancient Dharaṇikoṭa, or Dhānyakaṭaka. It is famous as the site which has supplied a multitude of fine sculptures, chiefly bas-reliefs, of the highest importance for the history of both Indian art and Buddhist iconography. The sculptures, executed almost without exception in white marble, formed the decorations of a *stūpa*, which was totally destroyed at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th cents. by a local landholder, who used the materials for building purposes. The surviving slabs are only a small fraction of the works which were in existence about a century ago. Most of the specimens rescued from the lime-kiln are in either the British Museum or the Madras Museum. The body of the *stūpa* was cased with marble slabs and surrounded by two railings or screens, of which the outer and earlier stood 13 or 14 feet in height above the pavement, the inner and later one being only six feet high. The casing slabs, and every stone of both railings, including the plinth and coping, were covered with finely executed bas-reliefs. The basal diameter of the *stūpa* was 138 feet, the circumference of the inner rail was 521 feet, and that of the outer rail 803 feet. It is estimated that the separate figures on the outer rail must have numbered 12,000 or 14,000. The multitude of figures on the inner rail, carved on a minute scale suggesting ivory work, was still greater. The outer rail was constructed of upright slabs connected by three cross-bars between each pair of uprights, which stood on a plinth and supported a coping about two feet nine inches in height. On the outer face each upright was adorned with a full disc in the centre and a half-disc at top and bottom, with minor sculptures filling the interspaces. Similar but ever-varying discs decorated the cross-bars, and the coping was ornamented with a long wavy flower-roll carried by men, numerous figures being inserted in the open spaces. The plinth exhibited a frieze of animals and boys, generally in comic or ludicrous attitudes. The decorations on the inner side were even more elaborate, the coping presenting a continued series of bas-reliefs, and the central discs of both bars and pillars being filled with beautiful sculptures, treating every topic of Buddhist legend. The Amarāvatī railings are by far the most splendid examples of their class, and the sculptures, even in their present fragmentary state, are invaluable as documents in the history of both art and religion. Fortunately, their date can be determined with a near approach to precision. Dedicatory inscriptions recorded during the reigns of the Āndhra kings Puḷumāyi (A.D. 138–170) and Yajña Śrī (A.D. 184–213) fix the time of the erection of the outer rail as the middle or latter part of the 2nd cent. A.D. This inference agrees well with the statement of Tāranāth, the Tibetan historian of Buddhism (Schiefner, *Tāranāthas Gesch. d. Buddhismus in Ind., St. Petersburg*, 1869, pp. 71, 142), that the Buddhist patriarch Nāgārjuna surrounded the great *chaitya* of Dhanaśrīdvīpa or Śrī Dhānyakaṭaka with a wall or screen (*Mauer*). The ecclesiastical rule of this patriarch, who is said to have been contemporary with Kanishka, is placed by Dr. Eitel between A.D. 137 and 194; and the most probable scheme of Indian chronology assigns Kanishka to the period A.D. 120–150. We may therefore assume with confidence that the great outer rail was erected and decorated between the years A.D. 140 and 200. Of course, the work must have occupied many years. The inner rail is somewhat later in date, and may not have been finished before A.D. 300. A few fragments of ancient sculpture prove that the *stūpa* in its original form dated from very early times, about B.C. 200.

The Indian art of relief sculpture drew its inspiration from two sources, Alexandria and Asia Minor. The ancient school (B.C. 250–A.D. 50), of which the Bharhut (*q.v.*), Sānchi, and Bodh Gayā works are the leading examples, evolved a thoroughly Indianized adaptation of Alexandrian *motifs*, so completely disguised in Indian trappings that the foreign origin of the art has not been generally recognized. The composition is characterized by excessive crowding and compression, and the execution by extreme naïveté and realism, the purpose of the sculpture being directed to edification rather than to making an æsthetic impression. The works of this school were produced from the time of Aśoka (B.C. 250) down to about the Christian era, or a little later. The so-called Græco-Buddhist art of Gandhāra, or the Peshāwar region, on the contrary, was influenced

not directly by Alexandria, but chiefly by the schools of Pergamum and other cities of Asia Minor, which practised a cosmopolitan style of art, sometimes designated as Græco-Roman. The balanced composition of the Gandhāra reliefs closely resembles that of many Roman works, Pagan or Christian, and is as much superior to that of the ancient Indian school as is the execution of individual figures. The Gandhāra draperies follow classical models, and are often treated with much skill. The special value of the Amarāvatī sculptures to the historian of art is that they form a connecting link between the two schools above named. Their basis is the old Indian art of Alexandrian origin, but that is freely modified in respect of the composition, execution, and drapery by the influence of the contemporary Gandhāra school, the best work of which may be assigned to the period A.D. 100–300. From the religious, as from the artistic, point of view the sculptures of Amarāvatī occupy a position intermediate between those of Sānchi and Gandhāra. The artists of the ancient school never attempted to delineate the figure of the Buddha, and were content to indicate his felt but unseen presence by the empty chair, the print of his footsteps, or other significant symbols. Gandhāra art, on the other hand, is characterized by inordinate repetition of the image of the Master, sitting, standing, or engaged in various incidents as related in the books of legends. The Amarāvatī sculptures frequently made use of the symbolical notation of their predecessors at Sānchi and Bharhut, but also freely adopted the foreign innovation, and often introduced isolated images of the Buddha, either standing or sitting, clad in Greek drapery. Such images seem to be more common on the later inner rail than on the earlier outer one. Scenes representing the Buddha in action are rare at Amarāvatī.

LITERATURE.—The sculptures are fully illustrated and described by Fergusson, *Tree and Serpent Worship*[2] (1873), and Burgess, *The Buddhist Stūpas of Amarāvatī and Jaggayyapeta* (being vol. vi. of the New Imp. Ser. of Archæol. Rep., London, 1887). Full references to special reports are given by Sewell, *Lists of the Antiquarian Remains in the Presidency of Madras* (1882), i. 63. See also Fergusson, *History of Indian and Eastern Architecture* (1899); Grünwedel, *Buddhist Art*, tr. Burgess and Gibson (1899); and Foucher, *L'Art Bouddhique du Gandhāra*, i. (1905). The evidence proving the Alexandrian origin of the ancient Indian art has not yet been fully published.

VINCENT A. SMITH.

AMARKAṆṬAK (Skr. *amara-kaṇṭaka*, 'peak of the immortals').—A hill in the Bilāspur district of the Central Provinces, India, lat. 22° 40′ 15″ N., long. 81° 48′ 15″ E. It is on the watershed of Central India, three great rivers having their sources from it,—the Narbada, flowing westward to the Indian Ocean; the Johilla, shortly joining the Son, one of the tributaries of the Ganges; while the Arpa mingles with the Mahānadi, which drains the plain of Chhattīsgaṛh, and, like the Ganges, flows eastward into the Bay of Bengal. As the source of the Narbada, which local legend declares will by and by surpass the sanctity of the Ganges, Amarkaṇṭak is an important place of pilgrimage.

'If the peninsula,' writes Sir R. Temple, 'may be imagined as a shield, and if any spot be the boss of such a shield, then Amarkaṇṭak is that spot. South of the Himālayas there is no place of equal celebrity so isolated on every side from habitation and civilization. To the east and to the north, hundreds of miles of sparsely populated hills and forests intervene between it and the Gangetic countries. On the west there extend hilly, roadless uplands of what are now called the Sātpura regions. To the south, indeed, there is the partly cultivated plateau of Chhattīsgaṛh, but that, after all, is only an oasis in the midst of the great wilderness. It is among these mighty solitudes that the Narbada first sees the light' (*Cent. Prov. Gaz.* 346 f.).

Formerly difficult of access, it has now been rendered approachable by the railway between the Bilāspur and Katni Junctions, and cultivation has rapidly advanced in Chhattīsgaṛh. The place where the Narbada rises is enclosed by a wall of masonry, and, as the name of the site implies, it is surrounded by temples dedicated to the cult of Śiva.

LITERATURE.—Forsyth, *Highlands of Central India*[2] (1889), 403; *Central Provinces Gazetteer* (1870), 347.

W. CROOKE.

AMARNĀTH or AMBARNĀTH (Skr. *amaranātha*, 'the immortal Lord,' a title of Śiva).—A place situated in the Thāna district of the Bombay Presidency, famous as the site of an ancient Hindu temple. The temple is without history, written or traditional. An inscription translated by Bhau Daji (*JRASBo* ix. 220) gives its date as A.D. 860; but it seems probable that the existing building is a restoration, or has been rebuilt from the materials of that erected in A.D. 860. It faces west, with doors to north and south in a hall in front of the shrine (*maṇḍap, antarāla*), supported by four pillars, elegant in conception and general beauty of details. At the west entrance is a defaced bull (*nandi*), showing that the shrine was dedicated to Śiva. The roof of the hall is supported by columns, of which the sculpture is so rich and varied that no description can give a correct idea of its beauty. The temple is remarkable for a three-headed figure, known as a *trimūrti*, of a male with a female on his knee, probably representing Śiva and his spouse Pārvatī. The sculpture, as a whole, shows a degree of skill that is not surpassed by any temple in the Bombay Presidency. It has been fully described, with a series of plates, by J. Burgess (*IA* iii. 316 ff.).

W. CROOKE.

AMAZONS.—**1.** The Amazons were a mythical race of women, dwelling in the northern part of Asia Minor, or still farther north, who had proved their prowess in conflict with the greater heroes of Greece. Something about the conception of feminine warriors made it very attractive to the Greek story-teller. Women who had asserted their independence of conventional bonds, and who kept their power by maiming or blinding their male children; women who wore a man's short *chitōn*, and who had cut away the right breast that they might the more freely handle arms; withal beautiful women to inspire with love those Greek heroes who fought against them—such were the Amazons. According to Pherekydes (*frag.* 25), their nature was explained by the fact that they were descended from Ares and the naiad nymph Harmonia; Hellanikos (*frag.* 146) makes them a race of women living apart from men and perpetuating their kind by visits to neighbouring people. Thus they were both 'man-haters' (Æsch. *Prom.* 724) and 'manlike' (Hom. *Il.* iii. 189).

In the epics they use the same arms as do other warriors. Pindar (*Ol.* xiii. 125) and Æschylus (*Suppl.* 288) speak of them as skilled with the bow, and in art they ordinarily wear a quiver. Their proper weapon in later myth was the axe—either the axe with blade and point, such as Xenophon found in use in the mountains of Armenia (*Anab.* iv. 4. 16), or the double-headed axe, *πέλεκυς* (Plut. *Quæst. Græc.* 45, 301 F.). The Latin poets (*e.g.* Virg. *Æn.* xi. 611) refer to them as fighting from war-chariots, but Greek poetry and art represent them as going into battle on horseback (Eur. *Hipp.* 307, 582, etc.).

The story of their mutilated breasts is probably due to a false etymology (*α-* privative and *μαζός* 'breast'). What the name did originally mean is not quite clear; with some probability Göttling (*Comment. de Amaz.* 1848) has suggested that it referred to their unfeminine character in that they have nothing to do with men (*α-* and *μάσσειν*). The names of individual Amazons are in the main genuine Greek names, added as the myth found favour among the Greeks.

2. The *Iliad* mentions two wars in which the Amazons were involved—a war with the Lycians,

which led the king of the Lycians, Isobates, to send Bellerophon against them (vi. 186), and a war with the Phrygians, in which Priam fought on the side of the Phrygians (iii. 189). Strabo (xii. 552) notes the inconsistency of this story with the account of Penthesileia and her companions. According to the later epic, the *Aithiopis* of Arktinos, she came to Troy after the death of Hector to aid the forces of Priam. Achilles inflicted a mortal wound on Penthesileia, only to be touched with love at her beauty as she lay dying in his arms.

The story of Herakles and Hippolyte is a later myth about an earlier generation. It was one of the twelve labours of Herakles to fetch the girdle of Hippolyte, queen of the Amazons, for Admete, Eurystheus' daughter. According to Apollodorus (*Bibl.* ii. 5. 9. 7), the queen fell in love with Herakles, and gave him the girdle; but as he went to board his ship the other Amazons, invited by Hera, attacked him. Suspecting treachery on the part of Hippolyte, Herakles shot her with an arrow and sailed away. In the more common form of the story, sometimes connected with the Argonautic expedition, Herakles made war on the Amazons, overcame them in battle, and triumphantly carried off the girdle (Diod. Sic. iv. 16; Apoll. Rhod. ii. 967).

A somewhat similar story is told of Theseus and Antiope, namely, that Theseus made an expedition against the Amazons, and either by love or by force won Antiope to be his bride. The importance of this expedition was that it furnished the occasion for the expedition of the Amazons against Athens. As the story is told by Plutarch (*Thes.* 27), its form is determined by several Amazon shrines at Athens, by the position of the Areopagus in front of the Acropolis, and by a place called *Horkomosion*, where a treaty of peace was made. In this war Antiope met her death, and was buried by the Itonian gate of Athens. The story was significant in that it furnished Attic orators and artists with another instance of the superiority of civilization to barbarism, as in the battle of gods and giants and in the war between Athens and Persia.

3. *Locality.*—On the north coast of Asia Minor and well towards the east, the town of Themiskyra by the river Thermodon was the generally accepted seat of the Amazons. Rarely were they located farther to the north or north-east. It should be noted, further, that either one Amazon or a band of Amazons finds a place in the local legends of very many cities on the north coast and the west coast of Asia Minor. 'Herakles turned over to the Amazons the region between Pitane and Mykale' (Herakleid. Pont. *frag.* 34); and such cities as Smyrna and Ephesus are most important local centres of Amazon legend. In Greece proper, on the other hand, there are graves of Amazons and places which they visited, but they are present only as visitors from outside.

4. *Explanation.*—Any effort to understand the Amazons must start from three facts. (1) The Amazons were warriors, armed with weapons such as the Greeks associated with eastern Asia Minor and regions still farther to the east and north. They were closely associated with the 'Thracian' god Ares; he was their reputed father, they sacrificed horses to him, and their camp at Athens was on the hill of Ares. (2) They were also connected with Artemis, especially the Ephesian Artemis. It is said that this cult was established by the Amazons, and that here they performed war dances and choral dances in honour of the goddess (Paus. vii. 2. 7; Kallim. *Hymn to Artemis*, 237 f.; cf. *Il.* ii. 814). (3) The legends of the Amazons are in the main connected with the coast towns on the north and west of Asia Minor.

K. O. Müller suggested (*Dorier*, i. 390 f.) that the conception arose from the large number of *hierodouloi* connected with the worship of Artemis at Ephesus and elsewhere in Asia Minor. It is more probable that the presence of women with these peculiar weapons in the armies of northern and eastern races started the legends, that incursions of these races into Asia Minor determined the locality with which they were associated, and that war dances performed by women in the worship of Ares, Artemis, etc., aided the growth of the legends. To bring the Amazons into conflict with Bellerophon, Achilles, Herakles, and Theseus was the natural means of emphasizing the prowess of feminine warriors.

LITERATURE.—Bergmann, *Les Amazones dans l'histoire et dans la fable*, Colmar; W. Stricker, *Die Amazonen in Sage und Geschichte*, Berlin, 1868; Klugmann, *Die Amazonen in der alten Litteratur und Kunst*, Stuttgart, 1875.

ARTHUR FAIRBANKS.

AMBĒR.—An ancient, now ruinous, city in the native State of Jaipur in Rājputāna. Formerly it was held by the non-Aryan Mīnās, from whom the Kachhwāhā sept of Rājputs conquered it in 1037 A.D. It then became their capital, and so continued to be until 1728, when Jai Singh II. founded the present city of Jaipur, and Ambēr became deserted. It was in olden days much frequented by pilgrims from all parts of India, but its glory has departed. At a temple of Kālī within the ruined city a goat is daily sacrificed, a substitute, as is believed, for the human victim offered in former times to the goddess.

LITERATURE.—For the history: Tod, *Annals of Rajasthan*, Calcutta reprint, 1884, ii. 881 ff. For a description of the remains: Major Baylay, in *Rājputāna Gazetteer*, ii. 154 f.; Rousselet, *India and its Native Princes*, 1890, ch. xx.; Fergusson, *Hist. of Indian and Eastern Architecture*, 1899, p. 480.

W. CROOKE.

AMBITION.—'Ambition,' derived from Lat. *ambitio*, the 'going round' of a candidate for office canvassing for votes, signifies primarily a desire for a position of power or dignity; thence a desire for eminence of any kind, and so, by an easy but well-defined and recognized extension (in the absence of any other word to cover the idea), the will to attain, obtain, or perform anything regarded by the user of the word as high or difficult. The same term thus becomes applicable to Jaques' 'ambition for a motley coat,' and the desire of Milton to write something which the aftertimes would not willingly let die. It is obvious that almost any desire may in certain circumstances become our 'ambition' in this third sense, which may, therefore, be dismissed at once—especially as in default of a qualifying term one of the first two is always intended. The present article will accordingly be confined to these. The motive in question holds a unique position for two reasons: its moral position is more uncertain in general estimation than that of any other, and it is reported by tradition to have been the first sin. These points will be taken in order.

1. Bacon, in his essay, 'Of Ambition,' says of it that it 'is like choler, which is an humour that maketh men active, earnest, full of alacritie, and stirring, if it be not stopped; but if it be stopped and cannot have his way, it becommeth adust, and thereby maligne and venomous.' Spinoza (who defines it, however, as 'an excessive love of glory') says: 'Ambition is a Desire by which all the Affections are nourished and strengthened; and on that account this particular Affection can hardly be overcome. For so long as a man is influenced by any Desire at all, he is inevitably influenced by this' (*Ethics*, pt. iii. Appendix). The opinions of these high authorities imply no particular censure. A reference to any Dictionary of Quotations, however, will reveal it indeed as

'divine' and 'accursed,' 'blind' and 'eagle-eyed,' 'base' and 'sublime'; but for one epithet of honour ten will be found of blame. At the same time, this proportion does not appear accurately to represent the average man's feeling towards it, which may be described as two parts of fear and distrust to one of secret admiration. Now, amid this clash of opinion, it is clear that ambition is in itself non-moral; for power is never, in the last analysis, desired for itself, but always from an ulterior motive, namely, for the *opportunities* it affords, whether for enhanced activity, for the exercise of peculiar faculties possessed, for the furtherance of a desired end, or the gratification of vanity. Logically, therefore, it should be judged by the motive behind; and, in fact, the soundest defence of it may be based upon this consideration. But such a plea avails little against the prosecutor, whose main, if often unrealized, ground of attack (apart from religion) rests upon the means by which the ambitious are tempted to gain their ends.

The reasons for the conflicting views entertained on the subject may be summed up thus, the attitude of religion being reserved for separate treatment. From the point of view of society, it is natural and right that public opinion should be directed to check rather than to encourage ambition, as the danger of an excess of it is greater than that of a deficient supply. Morally, such a desire can in no case be generally considered virtuous, in view of the obvious personal advantages which power, from whatever motive sought, confers upon the possessor. To many philosophers, again, it is especially anathema as a chief enemy of that peace of mind and independence of externals which is the Nirvāna of their creed. These reasons apply to the desire for power in any degree of development; but what is after all perhaps the chief cause of the invidious sense attaching to the word 'ambition' lies in a subtle implication which modifies the meaning, without equally restricting the use, of the term itself. In the words of Aristotle (*Ethics*, ii. 7), 'There is such a thing as a due and proper desire for distinction; the desire may also be excessive or defective: the man who is excessive in this desire is called "ambitious," the man who is deficient, "unambitious"; *for the middle state there is no name.*' This desire is, in fact, present in some degree in almost all members of the white races, and hence the definite term 'ambitious' is applied only to those in whom it is prominent, and therefore over-developed. It stands, in short, self-condemned as excessive, in which condition it is pregnant with danger alike to the State, the neighbour, and the morality of its subject, and lies justly under the censure of political, ethical, and philosophic thought. At the same time it is viewed by many, even when in excess, with a certain reluctant admiration as the infirmity of a *noble* mind. For, whatever its own demerits, it is generally found in company with the qualities most admired in Western civilization — ability and energy. It implies also a certain length and largeness of view, in themselves admirable, and in many cases can only with difficulty be distinguished from its twin-virtue — aspiration. Finally, it is a motive with which, though perhaps faulty, the world, in the present condition of religion and morals, could ill afford to dispense; for positions of power are after all generally given to those who not only desire, but also in some degree at least deserve them, and the noble actions, prompted either wholly or in part by ambition, fill not a few of the most distinguished pages in history. 'Licet ipsa vitium sit, tamen frequenter causa virtutum est' (Quintilian).

The verdict of religion upon worldly self-aggrandizement could hardly be doubtful, and in all countries it is unanimous in condemnation. For Greek religious thought it was the direct forerunner of ὕβρις, which is visited upon the children to the third and fourth generation; in Buddhism it is a wile of *māya*, entangling the soul in the world of becoming and desire; for Confucius it is an enemy of peace; to the Muhammadan it is a choosing of this present life and its braveries, for which there is nothing in the next world but the fire.

In the Bible the word itself does not occur, and in the OT hardly even the idea. The Jewish historians confined themselves practically to the acts of kings, lesser men being introduced only when they came into contact or conflict with the king. But a violent change in the kingship of a people essentially and always theocratic, in the view of the writers, was ascribed as a rule to the direct intervention of God using a man as His instrument; and any private motives of such an instrument were disregarded. Thus it is not unlikely that such men as Jeroboam or Jehu were ambitious, but they are set in action by the word of a prophet. The Prophets again scourge the sins of the people, of which ambition was not one. The absence of any reference to it in the 'Wisdom-literature' of the nation (Proverbs, etc.) is more remarkable. Even Ecclesiastes, in considering the vanity of human wishes, travels round the idea rather than refers to it directly, in a way which suggests that power as a direct object of desire was unfamiliar to the author. The view of the NT, so far as expressed, is uncompromising. In the Christian community there is no room for ambition. The 'Kingdom of Heaven,' or Church of Christ, is for the poor in spirit (Mt 5^3); 'Whosoever would become great among you shall be your minister' (20^{26}); 'Set not your mind on high things, but condescend to things that are lowly' (Ro 12^{16}). Quotations need not be multiplied: the humility and renunciation of the things of the flesh, which are the badge of the followers of Christ, leave little room for the self-assertion inseparable from ambition. What (if any) modifications of this rigorous doctrine may be involved in or justified by the transition of Christ's Church from a limited and purely religious community to the creed of nations, it is not within the province of this article to discuss.

2. It is a current belief that ambition was the first sin which disturbed the harmony of heaven. 'Cromwell, I charge thee, fling away ambition: by that sin fell the angels' (*Henry VIII.* III. ii. 440). The origin of this tradition, which has no authority in the Bible, is obscure; but it may perhaps be traced to the old identification of the 'king of Tyre' in Ezk 28 with Satan. ('Thine heart is lifted up, and thou hast said, I am a god, I sit in the seat of God' [v.^{2}]. 'Therefore . . . strangers . . . shall bring thee down to the pit' [vv.^{7,8}]. 'Thou hast been in Eden, the garden of God . . . thou wast the anointed cherub that covereth' [vv.^{13,14}], etc.). According to the more elaborate version of Milton, however (*Paradise Lost*, v. 660 ff.), pride claims precedence. For it was jealousy of Christ, whose begetting threatened the archangel's pre-eminence in heaven, that stirred Satan's ambitious aim against the throne and monarchy of God. Dante appears to adopt the same tradition ('di cui è la invidia tanto pianta,' *Par.* ix. 129; 'principio del cader fu il maladetto superbir di colui,' etc., *ib.* xxix. 55). (For an elaborate discussion of the point see the *Dict. Encyclopéd. de la Théol. Cathol.*, *s.v.* 'Diable'). It is worth noting in this connexion that the first step in the process of declension of Plato's ideal State is marked by the appearance of

a ruffling and ambitious spirit (*φιλονεικίαι καὶ φιλοτιμίαι*, *Repub.* viii. 4).

LITERATURE.—Besides the works mentioned, reference may be made to Fowler and Wilson, *Principles of Morals* (1894), 43 ff., 169; A. H. Strong, *Christ in Creation and Ethical Monism* (1899), 480; Dobschütz, *Chr. Life in the Prim. Church* (Eng. tr. 1904), 215, 221; J. B. Lightfoot, *Camb. Sermons* (1890), 317; A. L. Moore, *From Advent to Advent* (1892), 239; J. T. Jacob, *Christ the Indweller* (1902), 185.

C. D. ROBERTSON.

AMBROSE OF MILAN.—I. Life.—Ambrose was born, probably, at Trèves, the seat of government of his father, the Prætorian prefect of the Gauls. The family was noble; his father was one of the four highest officers in the empire; his elder brother Satyrus became the governor of a province, name unknown (*de excessu Satyri*, i. 49, 58). The family was also Christian in sympathy; Ambrose's great-aunt Sotheris had suffered as a martyr in the persecution of Diocletian (*de Virgin.* iii. 7; *Exhort. Virg.* xii. 82). The year of Ambrose's birth is a little uncertain. Either 333 or 340 A.D. will suit the data given in his letters (*Ep.* lix. 3, 4; see *PL* xiv. 68, for a full discussion). But probably 340 best meets all the circumstances. On the death of his father, his mother removed with her family to Rome (352), and there Ambrose received the usual liberal education. Of Latin authors Vergil was his favourite; he was also well read in Greek literature. In the doctrines of Christianity he was instructed by Simplicianus, whom he loved as a father (*Ep.* xxxvii.; not to be confused with the Simplicianus who succeeded him). Adopting the law as a profession, he rose very rapidly. When he was but little over 30 (372), Valentinian I., on the advice of the Christian Probus, the prefect of Italy, appointed him 'consular' of Liguria and Æmilia, an office which he discharged with great ability and integrity. In 374 both Dionysius the Catholic and Auxentius the Arian bishop *de facto* died. Both parties strove hard to secure the election of the successor, for at that time Milan was perhaps the first city in Europe in population and importance. Ambrose, in whose province it lay, went to preside at the election, and to suppress the customary tumults. But while the consular was addressing the people in the church on the duty of maintaining order, a voice was heard proclaiming, 'Ambrose is bishop.' The cry, according to Paulinus, first started by a child, was taken up by Arians and Catholics. In spite of the protests of Ambrose—on which Paulinus enlarges *con amore*, with disregard both to truth and to the good name of his hero, judged, that is, by modern ideas—the sanction of Valentinian was given to this irregular election, which won the approval also of the bishops of East and West (Basil, *Ep.* lv.; for Ambrose's statements about the election see *de Offic.* i. 1, 4, *Ep.* lxiii. 65, *de Pœnit.* ii. 8, 72. Ambrose says that Valentinian promised him 'quietem futuram,' *Ep.* xxi. 7). Ambrose was as yet only a catechumen; he had shrunk from baptism under the common feeling of the day which led so many to postpone the same until near death—the dread lest he should lose the baptismal grace. Within eight days of his baptism he was consecrated bishop (Dec. 7, 374, Migne, xiv. 71). His first step was to give his property to the poor and the Church. The administration of his household was handed over to Satyrus († 379), who left his province that he might serve his younger brother (*de excessu Satyri*, i. 20 f.)

Ambrose's life as a bishop was one of incessant work. His moments of leisure were filled with self-culture in theology, which, however, for the most part he learned by teaching (*de Offic.* i. 1, 4). Throughout his diocese Arianism almost ceased to exist, largely through his constant preaching and the care he bestowed on the preparation of catechumens. The Arians, thus bitterly disappointed in the bishop they had elected, found an opportunity for attacking him in his sale of Church plate to provide funds for the release of Roman prisoners captured in Illyricum and Thrace by the Goths, after their great victory at Adrianople (Aug. 9, 378). Ambrose's reply was characteristic: Which did they consider to be the more valuable, church plate or living souls? (*de Offic.* ii. c. 28).

Of his life at this time Augustine has given us a delightful picture (*Conf.* vi. 3, *Ep.* xlvii. 1):

'He was surrounded by an army of needy persons who kept me from him. He was the servant of their infirmities, and, when they spared him a few minutes for himself, he gave his body the food necessary, and nourished his soul with reading. . . . Often when I entered his retreat I found him reading softly to himself. I would sit down, and, after waiting and watching him for a long time in silence (for who would have dared to disturb attention so profound?), I would withdraw, fearing to importune him if I troubled him in the short time he rescued to himself out of the tumult of his multifarious business.'

In his opposition to the Arians, Ambrose did not limit his efforts to his own diocese. At Sirmium in 380, in spite of the threats of Aviana Justina, the Arian widow of Valentinian I. († Nov. 17, 375), Ambrose succeeded in carrying the election of the Catholic Anemius to the see. In 381 the young emperor Gratian—who from 378–381 lived chiefly at Milan, and followed in most things the advice of Ambrose, whom he called his *parens*, and who composed for his instruction (see *de Fide*, i. prol. iii. 1) his treatise against Arianism, entitled *de Fide* (378)—summoned a Western council, which met in September at Aquileia. Through the influence of Ambrose, who presided, the council deposed two more Arian bishops, Palladius and Secundinus [see the *Gesta Conc. Aq.* inserted in Ambrose, *Op.* after *Ep.* viii. (Migne, xvi. 916), or, more fully, Mansi, iii. 599 ff., and cf. *Epp.* i. ix.–xii.]. If in the following year he attended the abortive council at Rome, he seems to have taken no part in its deliberations. (For this somewhat uncertain council, see Mansi, iii. *s.v.*).

The murder of Gratian, who had estranged the soldiers by foolish and unpatriotic conduct, at Lyons (Aug. 25, 383) by the agents of the British usurper Maximus, led Justina, acting for her young son Valentinian II., to persuade Ambrose to journey to Trèves as her ambassador (*de Obitu Valent.* 28). As the result of his visit (winter, 383), or rather of the delays caused thereby, and the knowledge that behind Ambrose would be, if necessary, the forces of Theodosius, Italy seems to have been secured for Valentinian II., Spain, however, falling to the usurper (*Ep.* xxiv. 6, 7).

On his return to Milan, Ambrose came into collision with Q. Aurelius Symmachus, the prefect of Rome, Pontifex Maximus, Princeps Senatus, the leader in the Senate of the conservative and pagan majority (on this question of the majority, Ambrose, *Ep.* xvii. 10, 11, is untrustworthy). In 384, Symmachus had sought from Valentinian II. the restoration to the Senate of the ancient golden statue and altar of Victory, whose removal had been ordered by Gratian (382). This *Relatio Symmachi* (*Op. Sym.*, ed. Seeck, x. 3, in M.G.H.; see also Migne, *PL* xvi. 966), or defence of paganism, followed the usual line of argument of the times. Symmachus traced the greatness of Rome to the help of the gods; her decline and recent disasters, including a famine in the previous year, to the new creeds. He eloquently appealed to the charm of old traditions and customs. Ambrose's answer (*Ep.* xvii. a hasty appeal to Valentinian; *Ep.* xviii. more matured; cf. *Ep.* lvii. 2, 3) is not altogether happy in its claim that Rome owed her greatness not to her religion, but to her own intrinsic energy—a weak concession to secularism. For

the rest, he dwells on paganism as the world's childhood, Christianity as the evolutionary and progressive factor and result. The request of Symmachus was refused, as also were three other similar requests [382 to Gratian, 388 or 391 to Theodosius, 392 to Valentinian II. (Amb. *Ep.* lvii. 5)], chiefly through the zeal of Ambrose and the zealous orthodoxy of Theodosius. To Theodosius we owe the final triumph of Christianity by the series of his edicts which prohibited pagan rites, culminating, so far as sacrifices were concerned, in the deadly *nullus omnino* of Nov. 8, 392 (*Cod. Theod.* xvi. t. x. §§ 12, 13). The difficulties which the usurpation of Eugenius (see *infra*) threw in the way of the carrying out of this edict in the West explain Ambrose's antagonism to this shadow of an emperor.

But the great conflict of Ambrose was with the Arian court. Under the influence of a Scythian Arian, Mercurinus, better known by his name of Auxentius, adopted from the Arian bishop whom Ambrose had succeeded, the empress Justina demanded from Ambrose (Easter, 385) the surrender, first of the Portian basilica, now the Church of St. Victor, then of the new basilica (see *infra*), for the use of the Arians. Ambrose refused this, as well as all later requests (*Epp.* xx. xxi.). On Jan. 23, 386, Justina retorted by a decree drawn up by Auxentius, giving the Arians full freedom to hold religious assemblies in all churches. The edict was a failure. So Justina sent orders that Ambrose should either allow the dispute between Auxentius and himself to be settled by (secular) arbiters, or should leave Milan. Ambrose declined to do either. To employ the people who guarded the Portian basilica, in which he was in a way imprisoned, Ambrose introduced among them at this time the Eastern custom of antiphonal song [*Sermo de basilicis tradendis* (Migne, xvi. 1007), esp. c. 34; August. *Conf.* ix. 7].

Ambrose's victory over Justina was completed by the miracles (especially the alleged healing of a blind butcher named Severus) attending his discovery of some gigantic bones, which he believed to be those of two brother martyrs, Protasius and Gervasius, and of whose location he had a 'presage' or vision. The discovery of these relics was welcomed with enthusiasm by a church somewhat barren of local martyrs. In spite of Arian sneers, they were solemnly deposited under the altar of the new basilica then awaiting dedication, which Justina had claimed, and which Ambrose now called by their name [*Ep.* xxii.; August. *Civ. Dei*, xxii. 8, *Conf.* ix. 7; Paulin. *Vita*, cc. 14, 15; for Ambrose's view of the miracles, *Ep.* xxii. 17–20].

Realizing its hopelessness, Justina abandoned the struggle, the more readily that she needed the bishop's help. In 387 she requested Ambrose again to act as her ambassador with Maximus (*de Obitu Valent.* 28). It was probably on this second visit to Trèves that Ambrose refused to communicate with the followers of the Spanish bishops Ithacius and Idatius, because they had persuaded Maximus to sentence and torture to death Priscillian and certain of his followers as heretics (see PRISCILLIANISM), and also because they held communion with Maximus, the slayer of Gratian. We see the same resoluteness in his refusal to give Maximus at the first interview the customary kiss of peace, and in his demand for the body of Gratian. We need not wonder that his embassy was unsuccessful, and that Ambrose was 'himself thrust out' of Trèves [*Ep.* xxiv.; and for Ithacius, etc., cf. *Ep.* xxvi. 3).

Maximus crossed the Alps (Aug. 387), and for a short time occupied Milan itself. During this usurpation Ambrose withdrew from the city, while the death at that time (Bury's *Gibbon*, iii. 177 n.) of the exiled Justina rid the bishop of all further trouble from the Arians. As regards Ithacius, it may be added that Ambrose presided in the spring of 390 over a council of bishops from Gaul and Northern Italy at Milan which approved of his excommunication.

After the defeat and execution of Maximus at Aquileia (Aug. 27, 388), the great Catholic emperor Theodosius took up his abode at Milan. Emperor and bishop were soon in conflict. The first struggle is of some moment in the history of the growth of intolerance. The Christians of Callinicum in Mesopotamia had burnt down a conventicle of the Valentinians and a Jewish synagogue. Theodosius ordered the bishop of Callinicum to rebuild the same at his own expense. Ambrose protested in a long letter written at Aquileia (*Ep.* xl.); he seemed to glory in the act; for the Church to rebuild the synagogue would be a triumph for the enemies of Christ. On his appealing to Theodosius in a verbose and rambling sermon at Milan (in *Ep.* xli.), the emperor yielded. 'Had he not done so,' Ambrose wrote to his sister, 'I would not have consecrated the elements' (*Ep.* xli. 28). In such incidents as these we see the beginnings of the claims which culminated in Hildebrand and Innocent III. Of almost equal importance is it to notice the intolerance which treats the Valentinian village chapel as if it were no better than a heathen temple (*Ep.* xl. 16), and considers the death of Maximus to be the Divine retribution for his ordering in 387 the rebuilding of a synagogue in Rome (*Ep.* xl. 23).

Whatever may be thought of his arrogance and intolerance in this matter of Callinicum, in his next conflict with Theodosius Ambrose was grandly in the right. The story is too familiar to need much detail. Angered by the murder of Botherich, the barbarian governor of Illyria, by the people of Thessalonica, Theodosius gave orders, retracted all too late, that the whole populace should be put to death. The gates of the circus were closed; for three hours the massacre went on of those within (April 30, 390). According to Theodoret, 7000 perished. On learning the news, Ambrose wrote to Theodosius a noble and tender letter exhorting him to repentance (*Ep.* li.). What answer Theodosius returned we know not; but on his presenting himself at Milan at the door of the church (*S. Ambrogio*), Ambrose met him in the porch, rebuked him for his sin, and bade him depart until he had given proofs of his penitence. For eight months, if we may trust Theodoret, Theodosius absented himself from all worship (Theodoret, v. 18). He felt his exclusion bitterly. 'The Church of God,' he said to Rufinus his minister, 'is open to slaves and beggars. To me it is closed, and with it the gates of heaven.' The intercession of Rufinus was in vain; so Theodosius laid aside his pride, and, prostrate on the floor of the church, confessed his sin, a forerunner in a worthier struggle of Henry IV. at Canossa and Henry II. at Canterbury. On receiving absolution, Theodosius mounted the chancel steps to present his offering. Ambrose refused to allow him to remain. 'The purple,' he said, 'makes emperors, not priests.' Ambrose claimed the chancel for the clergy alone. In all this we see not merely the final triumph of the Christian religion over the Empire, but the beginnings of the subjection of the laity to the priesthood. [On this Thessalonican matter and Ambrose's action, see Ambrose, *Ep.* li.; Theodoret, v. 17, 18 (needs care); Sozomen, vii. 25; Rufin. ii. 18; August. *Civ. Dei*, v. 26; Paulin. *Vit. Amb.* 24; and for the penance of Theodosius, Amb. *de obitu Theodos.* 34].

The relations of Theodosius and Ambrose were

henceforth undisturbed. During the usurpation of Eugenius (392–394), whom Arbogast the Frank, after strangling Valentinian II. at Vienna (May 15, 392), had elevated from the professor's chair to the purple, Ambrose retired to Bologna and Florence and stood loyally by Theodosius, in spite of all the friendly overtures of Eugenius. In Eugenius he rightly detected the danger of the recrudescence of paganism, as part of his political programme (*Ep.* lvii.; Paulin. *Vita*, 26, 31). No one, therefore, rejoiced more than Ambrose in Theodosius' victory over the puppet emperor at Heidenschafft (or Wipbach ?), Sept. 6, 394 (*Epp.* lxi. and lvii.; *Enarr. in* Psalm xxxvi. 22; Paulin. *Vita*, 26–34; August. *Civ. Dei*, v. 26), though he was careful to intercede with Theodosius not to punish the people in general. A few months later Theodosius died at Milan (Jan. 17, 395), in his last hours sending for Ambrose and commending his sons Arcadius and Honorius to his care (Amb. *de Obitu Theod.* 35). It was Ambrose also who in the presence of Honorius pronounced over the dead Theodosius the funeral oration. The death of Ambrose two years later (Good Friday, April 4, 397) was more than the passing of a great bishop: 'It is a death-blow for Italy,' exclaimed the valiant but ill-fated Stilicho (Paulin. *Vita*, 45). Ambrose was buried under the altar of the great church which he had built and consecrated to Protasius and Gervasius (see *supra*), but which now bears his own name (S. Ambrogio).

2. **Influence.**—The reputation of Ambrose must always rest upon his courage and skill as a practical administrator of the Church in most troublous times. In spite of sacerdotal claims which later were to bear much fruit, few would grudge him the tribute of their admiration. He combined the loftiest qualities of the Roman senator with the goodness and self-denial of the true Christian. Though his methods may not always commend themselves to our modern notions, in his results Ambrose was usually in the right. He saved Italy from Arianism, and restored her to the faith. Even the growth of sacerdotal claims was not without its services. In the approaching barbarian deluge it was no small gain to civilization that there was a power before which tyranny should quail. This is one side of his famous saying at the Council of Aquileia, 'Sacerdotes de laicis judicare debent, non laici de sacerdotibus' (*Gesta Conc. Aquil.* 51; see *supra*, p. 373[b]). The other side is its development into the deeds and theories of Hildebrand.

By his introduction of antiphonal singing (on the details of which see Groves' *Dict. Music*, new ed. *s.v.* 'Antiphony, Ambrosian, Gregorian'), Ambrose enriched the Western Church for ever. His own hymns, though repeatedly imitated in later days (see the full list of hymns falsely attributed to Ambrose, Migne, *PL* xvii. 1171–1222), are few in number, according to the Benedictine editors not more than twelve in all (printed in Migne, xvi. 1410), but of great interest and value. Their construction is uniform: 8 strophes in Iambic acatalectic dimeter (∪—∪—∪—∪—). The ascription to him of the *Te Deum* as composed at the baptism of St. Augustine is a legend of late growth. His morning hymns, *Æterne rerum conditor*, *Splendor paternæ gloriæ* ('O Jesu, Lord of heavenly grace'), his evening hymn, *Deus creator omnium*, his Christmas hymn, *Veni redemptor gentium*, and his hymn, *O lux beata Trinitas*, are permanent possessions of the Church universal (Trench, *Sacred Lat. Poetry*, 80–86; Julian, *Dict. Hymn.* 56 and *s.v.*).

The reputation of Ambrose as a writer and thinker must not be rated high, in spite of his being regarded as one of the four Latin Fathers of the Church. Gibbon is correct: 'Ambrose could act better than he could write. His compositions are . . . without the spirit of Tertullian, the copious elegance of Lactantius, the lively wit of Jerome, or the grave energy of Augustine' (iii. 175 n.). As a thinker he is completely overshadowed by his great convert St. Augustine, whose baptism in S. Ambrogio, at his hands, is one of the great spiritual events of the world (April 25, 387). But his influence was strongly exerted in certain directions, some of which we may deplore, all of which had later developments. His extravagant regard for relics (Gervasius, *supra*), and his enthusiasm for virginity (see especially the three books *de Virginibus* addressed to his sister Marcellina) and asceticism were signs of the times and indications of the future. His theory of the Sacraments (*de Sacramentis libri sex*) tended to the emphasis of materialistic conceptions; for instance, he praises his brother Satyrus for tying a portion of the Eucharist round his neck when shipwrecked (*de excessu Satyri*, i. 43, 46). He deduces the necessity of daily communion from the clause of the Lord's Prayer (ἐπιούσιος; *supersubstantialis*, Vulg. *quotidianus* [*de Sacr.* vi. 21], a view much developed in mediæval theology; cf. ABELARD, *supra*, p. 16[b]). His sermons are remarkable for their manliness and sober practicalness, enforced at times by felicitous eloquence. His letters are more valuable as materials for the historian than because of any charm or personal revelation. His exegetic writings, as we might expect from his lack of special study, contain little that is original, and are excessively allegorical after the fashion introduced by Origen (cf. August. *Conf.* vi. 4). But his knowledge of Greek enabled Ambrose to enrich Latin theology with many quotations from the Eastern Fathers, *e.g.* Basil and Gregory of Nyssa. Jerome, in fact, by reason of his dependence on these sources, especially Basil, compares him to a crow decked out in alien feathers (Rufinus, *Invect.* ii.). We see this dependence in his *de Bono Mortis* (the Blessing of Death), written about 387, in which his exceedingly mild view of the future punishment of the wicked is plainly indebted to *Fourth Esdras*. 'It is more serious,' he writes, 'to live in sin than to die in sin' (*op. cit.* 28). Nevertheless he 'does not deny that there are punishments after death' (*ib.* 33).

As a moral teacher Ambrose is seen at his best. His *de Officiis Ministrorum*, founded on the *de Officiis* of Cicero, is an attempt to establish a Christian ethic on the basis of the old philosophic classification of four cardinal virtues (*virtutes principales*)—*prudentia* or *sapientia*, *justitia*, *fortitudo*, and *temperantia* (*l.c.* i. 24). Of these he identifies *prudentia* with a man's relation to God ('pietas in Deum'; *de Offic.* i. 27). The classification is essentially faulty, as it leaves no place for humility, a grace unrecognized by pagan writers, and which Ambrose has difficulty in bringing in (*de Offic.* ii. 27). Virtue, he claims, is not the *summum bonum* of the Stoics, but rather the means to it. Ambrose further follows the Stoics in distinguishing between perfect and imperfect duties ['officium medium aut perfectum'; *consilia evangelica* and *præcepta* (*de Offic.* i. 11, 36 ff.; iii. 2)], a doctrine later developed into the mediæval 'works of supererogation.' His exegesis of the Sermon on the Mount is literal. The taking of interest is unconditionally rejected; the Christian should not even defend himself against robbers (*l.c.* iii. 4), though, remembering his Old Testament, he does not go so far as absolutely to condemn the soldier (*l.c.* i. 40). As was usual in the early Church, he disapproves of capital punishment, though he shows that he was somewhat embarrassed by the position

in the matter of Christian judges (*Ep.* xxv.). We see his leanings to monasticism in his declaration that private property is *usurpatio* (*de Offic.* i. c. 28); charity is thus the partial adjustment of a wrong, and, as such, able to cancel sin (*de Elia et jejunio*, c. 20, from Tobit 12^9; *Sermo de eleemosynis*, 30, 31). We see the new note of humanity in his declaration that strangers must not be expelled from a city in time of famine (*de Offic.* iii. 7).

LITERATURE.—*A.* For the life of Ambrose we are dependent on the materials to be found in his own works (first arranged by Baronius) and on the *Vita* of Paulinus, his secretary. This work, dedicated to Augustine, is most unsatisfactory, and full of the absurdest prodigies [with which cf. the contemporary Sulpic. Severus, *Vita Martini* (ed. Halm, *CSEL*), cc. 1, § 9; 7, 8, 16; *Dial.* i. 24, 25, ii. 4, iii. 5, § 5]. It will be found in Migne, *PL* xiv. 27–46, or ed. Bened. App. An anonymous life in Greek (Migne, *PL* xiv. 46–66) is valueless. Other sources of knowledge from Augustine, etc., are indicated in the text.

B. The chief editions of the works of Ambrose, including a great many that are spurious, are (1) the editions of Erasmus, esp. the Basel ed. of Froben in 1527; (2) the Roman ed. in 6 vols. 1580–1587; (3) the Benedictine ed. of du Frische and le Nourry, Paris, 1686–1690; (4) Migne, *PL* xiv.–xvii. [the last vol. mostly spurious; Migne has excellent notes]; (5) the new ed. in progress (text only) in the Vienna *CSEL* (the Epp. unfortunately as yet [1907] not printed); (6) the ed. of Ballerini (Milan, 1875).

C. Of modern works, mention may be made of Th. Förster, *Amb. B. v. Mailand* (1884); Ihm, *Studia Ambrosiana* (1889); Pruner, *Die Theol. d. Amb.* (1862); Deutsch, *Des Amb. Lehre von d. Sünde und Sündentilgung* (1867); P. Ewald, *Der Einfluss der stoisch-ciceron. Moral auf die Ethik bei Amb.* (1881). For the historic setting, Gibbon, ed. Bury; and Hodgkin, *Italy and her Invaders* (1880, vol. i.), are indispensable.

H. B. WORKMAN.

AMERICA (Ethnology, Religion, and Ethics*). —Although many of the ethnical questions presented by the *Amerinds* or *Amerindians*, as some now propose to call the American aborigines, wrongly named 'Indians' by the Spanish discoverers, still await solution, the more fundamental problems affecting their origin and cultural development may be regarded as finally settled. Little is now heard of the 'Asiatic school,' which derived the Amerinds and all their works from the Eastern Hemisphere in comparatively recent times, that is, when the inhabitants of the Old World—Egyptians, Babylonians, Malays, Hindus, Chinese, Japanese—were already highly specialized. Such an assumption necessarily gave way when a more critical study of the American physical and mental characters, religious and social systems, failed to discover any close contact with those of the Old World, but pointed rather to independent local growths, owing nothing to foreign influences except the common germs of all human activities. Direct contact or importation might, for instance, be shown by the survival of some language clearly traceable to an Eastern source; or some old buildings obviously constructed on Egyptian, Chinese, or other foreign models; or any inscriptions on such buildings as might be interpreted by the aid of some Asiatic or European script; or some sailing craft like the Greek trireme, the Chinese junk, or Malay prau, or even the Polynesian outrigger; or some such economic plants and products as wheat, barley, rice, silk, iron; or domestic animals such as the ox, goat, sheep, pig; or poultry; things which, not being indigenous, might supply an argument at least for later intercourse. But nothing of all this has ever been found; and the list might be prolonged indefinitely without discovering any cultural links between the two hemispheres beyond such as may be traced to the Stone Ages, or to the common psychic unity of mankind. Mention is made of the oil-lamp, which, however, is confined to the Eskimo fringe, and was no doubt borrowed from the early Norse settlers in Greenland. There are also the Mexican pyramids, which have been likened to those of Memphis by archæologists who overlook the fundamentally different details, and forget that the Egyptians had ceased to build pyramids some 3000 years before the Mexican teocalli were raised by the Toltecs. Lastly, recourse is had to the Aztec and Maya calendric systems, although they prove, not Oriental borrowings, as Humboldt wrongly thought, but normal local developments on lines totally different from those of the Eastern astronomers.

Mainly on these grounds, the late J. W. Powell finally rejected the Asiatic theory, holding that there is no evidence that any of the native arts were introduced from the East; that stone implements are found in the Pleistocene deposits everywhere throughout America; that the industrial arts of America were born in America; that the forms of government, languages, mythological and religious notions were not derived from the Old, but developed in the New World (*Forum*, Feb. 1898). Mr. F. S. Dellenbaugh goes even further. He sets back the peopling of the continent to the Pre-Glacial epoch, while the climate was mild; and concludes that the Amerind race was 'early cut off on this hemisphere from intercourse with the remainder of the world, and held in isolation by a change in land distribution and by the continued glaciation of the northern portion of the continent'; and thus 'welded into an ethnic unity, which was unimpressed by outside influences till modern times' (*The North Americans of Yesterday*, 1901, p. 458). Hence the general homogeneity of type, customs, social and religious institutions, 'which separates the Amerindian races from the rest of the world, and argues an immense period of isolation from all other peoples' (*ib.* p. 358).

Recent exploration, especially in South America, supports the view that this 'general homogeneity' is not primordial, but the result of a somewhat imperfect fusion of two original elements—long-headed Europeans and round-headed Asiatics—which reached the New World in pre- and interglacial times by now vanished or broken land connexions. The Europeans, who most probably came first by the Faroe-Iceland-Greenland route available in the Pleistocene (Quaternary) Age, occupied the eastern side of the continent, and ranged in remote times from the Eskimo domain to the extreme south, where they are still represented by the Botocudos, Fuegians, and some other long-headed isolated groups. Thus the veteran palæo-ethnologist, G. de Mortillet, suggests that the Palæolithic men, moving with the reindeer from Gaul northwards, passed by the then existing land bridge into America, where they became the ancestors of the Eskimos. This view is anticipated by Topinard on anatomical grounds, and now confirmed for South America by A. Nehring and F. P. Outes. Nehring produces a long-headed skull from a Brazilian shell-mound at Santos, which presents characters like those both of the European Neanderthal and of the still older Javanese *Pithecanthropus erectus* (*Verhandl. Berlin. Anthrop. Ges.* 1896, p. 710). And in Patagonia, Outes describes eight undoubted Palæolithic stations and two Pleistocene types,—a long-headed arriving from the North-east and a short-headed from the North-west (*La Edad de la Piedra en Patagonia*, Buenos Ayres, 1905, section ii.).

The two streams of migration—Asiatic short-heads (North-west) and European long-heads (North-east)—are thus seen to commingle in the extreme south as early as the Old Stone Age; that is, prior to any marked somatic and cultural specializations

* This art. is offered as a general introduction to the Religion and Ethics of the American tribes. The tribes of North America will be grouped under the titles NORTH PACIFIC COAST; CALIFORNIA; MIDDLE AND SOUTHERN PLAINS; PUEBLOS; ALGONQUINS; DENES; ATLANTIC SEACOAST; ESKIMOS AND THE N.W. COAST; and some important tribes will be more fully described under their own names. An art. on the Mexican tribes will be found under MEXICO. The present art. is followed by a separate sketch of the religion of the South American tribes; on which see, further, ANDEANS, etc.

in the Eastern Hemisphere. The Asiatics, following the still bridged Bering route, appear to have arrived a little later, but in larger bodies, which explains the predominance of round heads along the Pacific seaboard from Alaska to Chili. But interminglings were inevitable, and the result is that the Amerinds as a whole are a composite race, in which the Mongolic (Asiatic) characters are perhaps more marked than the Caucasic (European). Thus the complexion is reddish-brown, coppery, olive or yellowish, never white; while the hair is uniformly black, lank, often very long and round in section, like that of all Mongols. The high cheek-bones, too, point to Mongol descent, as does also the low stature—5 feet and under to 5 feet 6 inches—in the west (Thlinkets, Eskimos, Haidas, Pueblos, Aztecs, Peruvians, Aymaras, Araucanians). On the other hand, the large convex or aquiline nose; the straight though rather small eyes, never oblique; the tall stature (5 feet 8 inches to 6 feet and upwards), especially of the Prairie Redskins, the Brazilian Bororos, and the Patagonians, as well as a curious Caucasic expression often noticed even amongst the Amazonian aborigines, bespeak a European origin, more particularly for the eastern and central groups. The constituent elements of the Amerinds would therefore appear to be proto-Europeans of the Old Stone Age—that is, a somewhat generalized primitive Caucasic type—and proto-Asiatics of the early New Stone Age,—that is, a somewhat generalized primitive Mongolic type,—both elements still preserving many features of the common Pleistocene precursors (see art. ETHNOLOGY, § 4).

Coming now to the *mental qualities*, as illustrated by language, the industrial arts, social and religious institutions, and ethical standards, we shall find that in all these respects the Amerinds show far greater divergences from their Eurasian progenitors than is the case with their somatic characters. The reason is obvious. The physical traits brought with them from the East are, so to say, indelible and, apart from slight modifications due to miscegenation, climate, and heredity, necessarily persist as witnesses to their ethnical origins. But the mental phenomena and cultural processes were all in a rudimentary state when the Amerinds were cut off from the Eurasians in the Ice Age, and since then the very rudiments have almost been obliterated during their normal evolution in the New World. Dellenbaugh deals fully with such industries as basketry, pottery, carving, weaving, and, without any reference to Eastern prototypes, is able to follow their regular development in America from the rudest beginnings to the finished Pueblo and Californian waterproof wickerwork, and the highly artistic earthenware and basalt carvings of the Chiriqui district, near Panama. And that these are all purely local products, uninspired by any extraneous influences, is evident from the fact that, as we shall see, they are exclusively 'dominated by the customs and religious ideas of the Amerind race, which were practically the same everywhere in different stages of development. As in picture-writing we trace the growth of letters, so by the aid of Amerind sculpture and carving we have a line of art progress from infancy to the present time' (*op. cit.* p. 192 f.).

Perhaps even a stronger proof of independent growth in a long-secluded region is presented by the Amerind languages, not one of which has yet been traced to a foreign source. From all other forms of speech they differ not merely in their general phonetic, lexical, and structural features: they differ in their very morphology, which is neither agglutinating, inflecting, nor isolating, like those of the Old World, but holophrastic or polysynthetic, with a tendency to fuse all the elements of the sentence in a single word, often of prodigious length. Here culture makes no difference, and the same holophrastic character is everywhere presented by the rudest as well as by the most highly cultivated tongues current between Alaska and Fuegia, by Aztec, Mayan, and Quichuan (Peruvian) no less than by Eskimo, Algonquin, Cherokee, Amazonian, Ipurina, and Tehuelche of Patagonia. Yet of this remarkable linguistic phenomenon not a single instance is to be found anywhere in the Eastern Hemisphere. There is incorporation with the verb, as in Basque and the Mongolo-Turkic family, always limited, however, to pronominal and purely formative elements. But in Amerind speech there is no such limitation; and not merely the pronouns, which are restricted in number, but the nouns, with their attributes, which are practically numberless, all enter necessarily into the verbal paradigm. Thus the Tarascan of Mexico cannot say *hoponi*, 'to wash,' but only *hopocuni*, 'to wash the hands,' *hopodini*, 'to wash the ears,' and so on, always in one synthetic form, which is conjugated throughout, so that the conjugation of a Dakotan, Cree, Aztec, or any other Amerind verb is endless. Specimens only can be given, and they fill many pages of the native grammars without even approximately exhausting a theme for which six or eight pages suffice, for instance, in English or Danish. The process also involves much clipping and phonetic change, as in the colloquial English *hap'oth* = 'halfpenny worth,' *I'd* = 'I would,' etc., forms which give just a faint idea of the Amerind permutations.

It is obvious that such a linguistic evolution from a common rudimentary condition of speech, as in the Pleistocene Age, implies complete isolation from foreign contacts, by which the cumbrous process would have been disturbed and broken up, and also a very long period of time, to expand and consolidate the system throughout Amerindia. But time is perhaps still more imperiously demanded by the vast number of stock languages which form another remarkable feature of the American linguistic field. Some are known to have died out since the Discovery; but many others, variously estimated at from one to two hundred, or perhaps more than are found in the whole of the Eastern Hemisphere, are still current, all differing radically in their phonology, vocabulary, and general structure—in fact, having little in common beyond the extraordinary holophrastic mould in which they are cast. But even this statement conveys a far from adequate idea of the astonishing diversity of speech prevailing in this truly linguistic Babel. Powell, who has determined nearly sixty stocks for North America alone, shows that the practically distinct idioms are far more numerous than might be inferred even from such a large number of mother-tongues. Thus in the Algonquian family there are quite forty members differing one from the other as much as, and sometimes even more than, for instance, English from German: in Siouan, over twenty; in Athapascan, from thirty to forty; and in Shoshonean, a still greater number (*op. cit.* and *Indian Linguistic Families of America North of Mexico*, Washington, 1891). For the stocks Powell adopts the convenient ending *-an* attached to a typical or leading member, such as *Algonquin*, which for the whole group becomes *Algonquian*; and the principle has been extended by Dr. N. León to the Mexican and Central American families, and by A. H. Keane to those of South America. León's list, based on the latest information, comprises seventeen stocks, including the great and widespread Nahuatlan (Aztecan) and Maya-Quichéan families, and ranging from Lower California and the Rio Grande del Norte southwards

to Panama (*Familias Linguisticas de Mexico*, etc., Museo Nacional, 1902). The imperfectly explored South American section has already yielded over fifty stocks, of which the more important are the Quichua-Aymaran, the Tupi-Guaranian, the Cariban, Arawakan, Gesan, and Araucan. But some of these are lumped together in large groups, such as the Ticunan, Moxosan, and Purusan, each of which will, on more careful analysis, probably be found to comprise several stocks (Keane, *Central and South America*, 1901, vol. i. ch. ii.).

So uniform are the physical characters, that systematists have failed to establish an intelligible classification of the Amerind races on strictly anthropological data. Hence all current classifications are mainly linguistic, and make no claim to scientific accuracy. Thus Sir E. im Thurn declares that for Guiana, where 'it is not very easy to describe the distinguishing physical characters,' and where 'there are no very great differences other than those of language,' this factor 'must be adopted as the base of classification' (*Among the Indians of Guiana*, 1883, p. 161). At the same time, the linguistic grouping is convenient, and often even informing, as we see in the northern fringe, where, owing to the astonishing tenacity with which the Eskimos cling to their highly polysynthetic language, their pre-historic migrations may still be easily followed from Greenland and Labrador round the shores of the frozen ocean to Alaska, and even across the Bering waters to the opposite Asiatic mainland. So with the Algonquians, whose cradle is shown to lie about the Hudson Bay lands, where Cree, the most archaic of all Algonquian tongues, still survives.

Perhaps even more striking is the case of the Siouans (Dakotans), hitherto supposed to have been originally located in the prairie region west of the Mississippi, but now proved to have migrated thither from the Atlantic slope of the Alleghany uplands, where the Catawbas, Tutelos, Woccons, and other Virginian tribes still spoke highly archaic forms of Siouan speech within the memory of man. So also the Niquirans, Pipils, and others of Guatemala and Nicaragua, who are known to be of Nahuatlan stock, not from their somatic characteristics, but solely from the corrupt Aztec language which they have always spoken.

As the tribe is thus identified only or mainly by its speech, it becomes important to determine the distribution of the Amerind tongues in their several areas. It is noteworthy that the great majority of Powell's families, about forty altogether, are crowded in great confusion along the narrow strip of seaboard between the coast ranges and the Pacific from Alaska to California: ten are dotted round the Gulf of Mexico from Florida to the Rio Grande, and two disposed round the Gulf of California, while nearly all the rest of the land—some six million square miles—is held by the six widely-diffused Eskimoan, Athapascan, Algonquian, Iroquoian, Siouan, and Shoshonean families. Similarly in Mexico, Central and South America, about a dozen stocks—Opata-Piman, Nahuatlan, Maya-Quichéan, Chorotegan in the north; Cariban, Arawakan, Tupi-Guaranian, Tapuyan (Gesan), Tacanan, Aymara-Quichuan, Araucan in the south—are spread over many millions of square miles, while scores of others are restricted to extremely narrow areas. Various theories have been advanced to explain this strangely irregular distribution, and, at least in the North American prairie lands, the Venezuelan savannahs, and the Argentine pampas, a potent determining cause must have been the scouring action of fierce, predatory steppe nomads, so that here, as in Central Asia, most of the heterogeneous groups huddled together in contracted areas may perhaps be regarded as 'the sweepings of the plains.' The chief stocks, with their more important sub-groups, will be found in art. ETHNOLOGY, *Conspectus*.

None of the Amerind languages has ever been reduced to written form except by the missionaries, and in one instance by a Cherokee native (Sequoyah or George Guest), working under European influences and on Old-World prototypes. Even the cultured Peruvians had nothing but the *quipo*, knotted strings of varying thickness, colour, and length, used for recording dates, statistics, and events. The more artistic, but less serviceable, Algonquian *wampum* sometimes answered the same purpose, as in the historical treaty between Penn and the Delaware Indians. But various rude pictographic systems, inscribed or painted on rocks, skins, earthenware, or calabashes, were almost universal, ranging from the extreme north (Eskimos) to Argentina and Central Brazil. The Matto Grosso aborigines, recently visited by the Bohemian explorer, V. Fric, have developed quite an ingenious method of 'taking notes,' using dried calabashes for the purpose. Everybody goes about with one of these, which may be called his diary, all important incidents being inscribed on it pictorially. The art is perhaps the most perfect of the kind anywhere devised, since the scratchings are quite legible, and handed round to be read as we might hand round printed or written matter. True perspective and proportion are observed, as by the Bushmen in their cave paintings; and the evil spirits which swarm everywhere are also thwarted by being sketched in fanciful forms on the calabashes (*Science*, July 1906).

Far more advanced than any of these primitive methods are the Aztec, the Zapotec, and especially the Maya pictorial codices, painted in diverse colours on real native (maguey) paper, and mainly of a calendric or astrological character. Several have been reproduced in facsimile with long commentaries by Förstemann and Seler, but still remain undeciphered, although they express numerals quite clearly. They had also reached the *rebus* state, but apparently fell short of a true phonetic system, despite the claim of Bishop Landa's 'alphabet' to be regarded as such. There are also long mural inscriptions on many of the temples and other structures at Palenque, Uxmal, Chichen-Itza, and elsewhere in Chiapas, Yucatan, and Honduras. But these also have so far baffled the attempts of Mr. Cyrus Thomas and others to interpret them, although the calculiform ('pebble-like') characters present the appearance of a real script. It is admitted that many have phonetic value, but only as rebuses, and the transition from the rebus to true syllabic and alphabetic systems had apparently not been made by any of the Amerinds. But even so, these codices and wall writings, believed to embody calendric systems on a level with the reformed Julian, represent their highest intellectual achievements, while the palaces and temples in the above-mentioned districts rank as their greatest architectural triumphs, rivalled only by those of the Chimus, Quichuas, and Aymaras in Peru and on the shores of Lake Titicaca.

Elsewhere there is nothing comparable to these monumental remains of Central and South America, and the less cultured Amerinds of North America have little to show of æsthetic interest beyond their beautiful ceramic and wickerwork products, the earth-mounds thickly strewn over the Ohio valley and some other parts of the Mississippi basin, and the *casas grandes* of the Pueblo Indians in New Mexico and Arizona. On the origin of the *casas grandes*—huge stone structures large enough to accommodate the whole community—no question arises. They are undoubtedly the work of their present occupants, the Hopi (Moki), Tañoan,

Keresan, and Zuñian tribes, driven to the southern uplands by the Apaches, Navajos, and other predatory nomads of the plains. Their communal houses or strongholds grew out of the local conditions, and the complete adaptation of Pueblo architecture to the physical environment is quite obvious. The circular chambers called *estufas* or *kivas* occurring in some districts are still the council houses and temples, the 'medicine lodges,' in which the religious and social affairs of the community are transacted, and their very form recalls the time when the tribe dwelt in round huts or tents on the plains. Some are very old, some quite recent; yet the structures do not differ from one another, and in all cases 'the result is so rude that no sound inference of sequence can be drawn from the study of individual examples; but in the study of large aggregations of rooms we find some clues. The unit of Pueblo construction is the single room, even in the large many-storied villages. This unit is quite as rude in modern as in ancient work, and both are very close to the result which would be produced by any Indian tribes who came into the country and were left free to work out their own ideas. Starting with this unit, the whole system of Pueblo architecture is a natural product of the country and of the conditions of life known to have affected the people by whom it was practised' (Cosmos Mindeleff in Sixteenth An. Report of *BE*, Washington, 1897, p. 192).

This applies with equal force to the *cliff-dwellings* of the neighbouring Colorado cañons, in which the same peaceful Pueblo peoples have taken refuge against the same marauding Prairie Indians. 'Along the cliff lines slabs of rock suitable for building abound; and the primitive ancients, dependent as they were on environment, naturally produced the cliff-dwellings. The tendency towards this type was strengthened by inter-tribal relations; the cliff-dwellers were probably descended from agricultural or semi-agricultural villagers who sought protection against enemies, and the control of land and water through aggregation in communities' (*ib.* p. 94).

In the same way many of the Ohio mounds, which often present the aspect of fortresses, may have been raised by the more settled Cherokee (Iroquoian) tribes as earthworks against the lawless nomads of the surrounding plains. In any case the long controversy regarding their origin may now be taken as closed, and the view that they were constructed, not by any unknown pre-historic race, but by the present Amerinds, is generally accepted as beyond reasonable doubt. Mr. W. K. Moorehead, one of the best observers, recognizes two distinct mound-building races, the earlier long-heads of the Muskingum valley, and the later round-heads whose chief centre lay about the sources of the Ohio river. From the sepulchral and other mounds of the long-heads have been recovered pottery, slate and hematite objects, copper bracelets and other ornaments, all generally inferior to those of the round-heads. Fort Ancient, the largest of the earthworks in Ohio, is nearly a mile long with over 10 miles of artificial knolls, and Chillicothe on the Scioto river is the centre of several extensive groups, such as the Hopewell and Hopeton works, and the Mound City, that have yielded potteries of artistic design, finely wrought flints, and some copper, but no bronze or iron implements—another proof that nearly the whole of America was still in the Stone Age at the time of the Discovery. Moorehead concludes that none of the mound-builders attained more than a high state of savagery; that they were skilled in several arts, but excelled in none; that they were not even semi-civilized, much less possessed of the 'lost civilization with which they have been credited' (*Primitive Man in Ohio*, 1892, *passim*). Hence the general inference of Cyrus Thomas that there is nothing in the mounds that the Amerinds could not have done, that many have been erected or continued in post-Columbian times, consequently by the present aborigines, and that there is therefore no reason for ascribing them to any other race of which we have no knowledge (Twelfth An. Report of *BE*, Washington, 1894). Taking a broader view of the whole horizon, Dr. Hamy ventures to suggest that the mound-builders, the Pueblo Indians, and the cliff-dwellers 'all belong to one and the same race,' whose prototype may be a fossil Californian skull from the Calaveras auriferous gravels assumed to be of Pleistocene age (*L'Anthropologie*, 1896, p. 140).

For most of these Northern Amerinds a higher moral standard may perhaps be claimed than for the more civilized Central and South American peoples. Our general impression of the native American, writes Mr. Dellenbaugh, who knows them well, is that he is a kind of human demon or wild animal, never to be trusted, unable to keep a compact, and always thirsting for blood. But it is not so. If treated fairly he may nearly always be trusted. The Iroquois League maintained the 'covenant chain' with the British unbroken for over a century; the Delawares never broke faith with Penn; and for two hundred years the Hudson Bay Company have traded all over the northern part of the continent, without a serious rupture with any of the Chipewyan, Cree, and other rude Athapascan and Algonquian tribes.

'We are blind to our own shortcomings, and exaggerate those of the Amerind. In estimating their traits we do not regard them enough from their own standpoint, and without so regarding them we cannot understand them. His daily life in the earlier days was by no means bloodthirsty, and the scalping-knife was no more the emblem of pre-Columbian society than the bayonet is of ours. In most localities he achieved for all, what all are with us still dreaming to obtain—"liberty and a living," and his methods of government possessed admirable qualities' (*op. cit.* p. 353 f.).

The aborigines, however, were not free from the taint of cannibalism, which, if it assumed a somewhat ceremonious aspect in the north, was widely practised by many of the Brazilian, Andean, Colombian, and Amazonian tribes in the south, without any such religious motive. Thus the nearly extinct Catios, between the Atrato and Cauca rivers, were reported, like the Congo negroes, to 'fatten their captives for the table.' Their Darien neighbours stole the women of hostile tribes, cohabited with them, and brought up the children till their fourteenth year, when they were eaten with much rejoicing, the mothers ultimately sharing the same fate (Cieza de León). The Cocomas along the Rio Marañon ate their own dead, grinding the bones to drink in their fermented liquor, and explaining that 'it was better to be inside a friend than to be swallowed up by the cold earth' (Markham, *JAI*, 1895, 235 f.). The very word *cannibal* is a variant of *caribal*, derived from the man-eating Caribs; and so universal was the custom in New Granada, that 'the living were the grave of the dead; for the husband has been seen to eat his wife, the brother his brother or sister, the son his father; captives also are eaten roasted' (Steinmetz, *Endokannibalismus*, p. 19). But the lowest depths of the horrible in this respect were touched by what J. Nieuwehof relates of the wide-spread East Brazilian Tapuya savages, although something nearly as bad is told by Dobrizhoffer of some of the primitive Guarani tribes in Paraguay (*ib.* pp. 17–18). The Seri people of Sonora, most debased of all the Northern Amerinds, are certainly cannibals (McGee). But elsewhere in the north, anthropophagy has either long since died out, or else survives here and there apparently only as a ceremonial rite. 'Cannibalism of this

kind prevailed in many tribes; *always, ostensibly,* a religious ceremony, not a means of satisfying hunger. The victims were often richly feasted and generously treated for some time before being executed' (Dellenbaugh, p. 368). Yet Payne declares that the Aztec custom of consuming captives at religious feasts was in reality a means of procuring animal food resulting from the limited meat supply, and that perpetual war was waged mainly to obtain prisoners for this purpose (*History of the New World,* etc., ii. pp. 495, 499, 501).

The more favourable picture presented by the northern aborigines is specially applicable to the Iroquois, in many respects the finest of all the Amerinds, — unsurpassed, says Brinton, by any other on the continent, 'and I may even say by any other people in the world. In legislation, in eloquence, in fortitude, and in military sagacity they had no equals. They represented the highest development the Indian ever reached in the hunter state. Crimes and offences were so infrequent under their social system that the Iroquois can scarcely be said to have a criminal code. Theft was barely known, and on all occasions, and at whatever price, the Iroquois spoke the truth without fear and without hesitation' (*The American Race,* p. 82). Even in the literary sphere they rank high, as attested by Sequoyah's most ingenious syllabic script (see above), and by the stirring poetic effusions of Miss Pauline Johnson (Tekahionwake), who can thus sing of the departed Amerind's 'Happy Hunting Grounds':

> 'Into the rose-gold westland its yellow prairies roll,
> World of the bison's freedom, home of the Indian's soul.
> Roll out, O seas, in sunlight bathed,
> Your plains wind-tossed, and grass-enswathed. . . .
> Who would his lovely faith condole?
> Who envies not the Red-skin's soul
> Sailing into the cloudland, sailing into the sun,
> Into the crimson portals ajar when life is done.'
> (*The White Wampum,* 1906).

This vision of a cloudland, the glorified abode of departed souls, is a purely anthropomorphic notion common to all the primitive Amerind peoples. It has nothing to do with the supernatural, or with rewards and penalties after death, or even with the immortality of the higher creeds, but is to be conceived as a purely natural continuation of the present life, freed from its cares and troubles. Skyland is only a distant part of this world, which is better than the tribal territory, and in which the departed continue to live in a state of absolutely material comfort and happiness, exempt from all present anxieties, and, so to say, without a thought for the morrow.

'The key to the whole matter may be provided by remembering that these [Guiana] Indians look on the spirit-world as exactly parallel to, or more properly as a part of, the material world known to them. Spirits, like material beings, differ from each other only, if the phrase be allowed, in their varying degrees of brute force and brute cunning, and none are distinguished by the possession of anything like divine attributes. Indians therefore regard disembodied spirits not otherwise than the beings still in the body whom they see around them' (Sir E. im Thurn, *Among the Indians of Guiana,* 1883, p. 358).

Such is the first stage of the purely animistic religions common to the more primitive Amerind peoples in North and South America. The essential point is that men remain men in the after world, where they continue to follow their ordinary pursuits under more pleasant conditions. Thus the Eskimo has his kayak, his harpoons, and great schools of cetaceans; the prairie redskin his tomahawk, his bow and arrows, and countless herds of bisons, and so on. Thus is explained the secondary part played by ancestor-worship, and also the great variety of burial rites amongst the Amerinds. If a man remains a man, he cannot be deified or worshipped; and if he is still interested in human pursuits, he needs attendance and attendants. The Guiana native is buried in his house, which is then deserted, so that he may visit his former dwelling without interference from his survivors. He will also need his hammock and other necessaries, which are accordingly buried with him. In the northwest he was accompanied by a slave, who, if not dead in three days, was strangled by another slave. In Mexico, the custom of burying live slaves with the dead was general. Elsewhere they were wrapped in fine furs, or in less costly grasses and matting, to keep them warm. Then there were burials in pits, mounds, cists, caves; also cremation, embalming, and sepulture in trees or on scaffolds, or in the water, or in canoes that were then turned adrift. In Tennessee, old graves are found which were made by lining a rectangular space with slabs of stone, exactly as during the reindeer period in France. And in Ancon, on the coast of Peru, whole families were mummified, clothed in their ordinary garb, and then put together in a common tightly corded pack with suitable outward adornments, and all kinds of domestic objects inside (Reiss and Strübel, *The Necropolis of Ancon in Peru,* A. H. Keane's Eng. ed. 3 vols., 1880–1887).

In the evolution of the Amerind Hades, the next step is the recognition of two separate departments, — one for the good, usually left in cloudland; the other for the wicked, more often consigned to the nether world, but both at times relegated to the same shadowy region of difficult access beyond the grave. Thus the Saponi (eastern Siouans) hold that after death both good and bad people are conducted by a strong guard into a great road, along which they journey together for some time, till the road forks into two paths — one extremely level, the other stony and mountainous. Here they are parted by a flash of lightning, the good taking to the right, while the bad are hurried away to the left. The right-hand road leads to a delightful warm land of perennial spring, where the people are bright as stars and the women never scold. Here are deer, turkeys, elks, and bisons innumerable, always fat and gentle, while the trees yield delicious fruits all the year round. The rugged left-hand path leads to a dark and wintry land covered with perpetual snow, where the trees yield nothing but icicles. Here the wicked are tormented a certain number of years, according to their several degrees of guilt, and then sent back to the world to give them a chance of meriting a place next time in the region of bliss (J. Mooney, *The Siouan Tribes,* etc. p. 48).

This discrimination between the two abodes thus obviously coincides with the growth of a higher ethical standard, such as is seen even amongst the pitiless Aztecs with their frightful religious orgies. If the Spanish historian, Sahagun, can be trusted, their moral sense was sufficiently awakened to distinguish between sin and crime, and they even recognized a kind of original sin, which was washed away by cleansing waters. Xochiquetzal, the 'Mexican Eve,' the 'first sinner,' was depicted weeping for her lost happiness, when driven from Paradise for plucking a flower; and the Earth-goddess Tlaçolteotl was represented as an embodiment of sin, which was 'from the beginning of time.' Hence the newborn babe is subjected to a ceremonial washing, with the words, 'My son, come unto thy mother, the Goddess of Water, Chalchiuhtlicue, thy father, the Lord Chalchiuhtlatonac; enter the water, the blue, the yellow; may it cleanse thee from the evil which thou hast from the beginning of the world' (E. Seler, *Aubin Tonalamatl,* A. H. Keane's Eng. ed., 1901).

A further development of the after-life, still in association with a corresponding growth of the moral sense, is seen in the beautiful vision of the Araucanian people, who consign the departed spirits, not to an invisible heaven or hell, but to the visible

constellations of the starry firmament. Their forefathers are the bright orbs which move along the Milky Way, and from these ethereal heights are still able to look down and keep watch over their earthly children. Under their ever vigilant gaze, these Southern Amerinds had a far higher motive than the hope of reward or the fear of punishment, to avoid wrong-doing and to practise all the virtues, that is, all the tribal usages sanctioned by tradition. Thus, without any legal codes, pains, or penalties, the social interests were safeguarded, while even personal conduct was controlled; for who would dare to wrong his neighbour beneath the glittering eyes of his ancestors? Scarcely any more complete fusion of the ethical and religious systems has elsewhere been realized (*RAnth*, 1884).

It will be seen at once that these Araucanian ancestors, though wafted aloft, still remained human, with human cares and interests, and hence could not be worshipped as gods. The Delawares also would say to a dying man, to comfort him, 'You are about to visit your ancestors,' or, as we might say, to join the majority, without attaching any sense of an apotheosis to the expression. So it is nearly everywhere amongst the Amerinds, and Herbert Spencer's broad generalization that all religions have their origin in ancestor-worship ('ghost propitiation') does not apply at all to the New World. His further statement (*Eccles. Institutions*, p. 687), that 'nature-worship is but an aberrant form of ghost-worship,' has here to be reversed, since the prevailing Amerindian religions were various forms of what American writers designate as *zoötheism*, that is, the deification, not of men, but of animals. Dellenbaugh says emphatically: 'Savage races worship animal gods and natural objects personified as animals . . . as in the case of the thunder and lightning generally attributed by the Amerinds to the mysterious "thunder-bird"' (*op. cit.* p. 393). In their creation myths the aborigines themselves are sprung from animals: three, say the Mohegans, a bear, a deer, and a wolf; one, say the Delawares, the 'Great Hare,' called the 'Grandfather of the Indians.' Their personal and totemic gods were everywhere conceived to be in the form of animals, and to these various acts of homage were made, thus leading up to the universal zoötheism common to most Amerinds.

But there is no absolute uniformity, and amongst some of the more advanced nations there occur instances of what may be called hero-worship, resulting, as elsewhere, in some form of apotheosis or ancestor-worship. Thus the Aztecs have their *Quetzalcoatl*, answering to the Mayan *Kukulcan*, both meaning the 'bright-feathered snake,' and both appearing under two forms, as a deity and as an historical person. Hence they may very well have been real men who arose as teachers and civilizers amongst their people, and became deified as their good deeds became traditions and memories. To them corresponded the Quiché *Gukumatz* (same meaning), one of the four chief gods who created the world; *Votan*, the eponymous hero of the Tzendals; the Algonquian *Michabo*; the Iroquoian *Ioskeha*, and many others. But the Amerind pantheon was essentially limited. In the three extant Maya codices—the Dresden, Paris, and Madrid—Dr. P. Schellhas could find only 'about fifteen figures of gods in human form and about half as many in animal form,' and these figures 'embody the essential part of the religious conceptions of the Maya peoples in a tolerably complete form' (*Deities of the Maya Manuscripts*, 1905, p. 7). Most of the gods here figured—the Death-god, Itzamná (the Maya culture hero), the Moon-, Night-, Sun-, War-, Snake-, Water-, and Storm-gods—find their counterpart in the Aztec Olympus, which may have a few others of its own. But the more primitive Amerind religions cannot boast of more than five or six; and in 1616, before contact with Europeans, the chief of the Potomac Algonquians told Captain Argoll that they had only 'five gods in all; our chief god appears often unto us in the form of a mighty great hare [see above]; the other four have no visible shape, but are indeed the four winds, which keep the four corners of the earth' (W. Strachey, *Historie of Travaile into Virginia*, p. 98). Frequent mention occurs of these four deities of the Four Cardinal Points, or of the Four Winds, or of four invisible powers, bringers of rain and sunshine, rulers of the seasons and the weather, with a fifth represented as greater than all, 'who is above,' and is identified by Brinton with the god of Light, of whom 'both Sun and Fire were only material emblems' (*The Lenâpé and their Legends*, 1885, p. 65). This is the *Manitou* of the early writers, who is described by the missionaries as the Creator, the Supreme Being, the true God of the really monotheistic aborigines. But this Manitou with many variants is the Devil of the New Jersey natives (*Amer. Hist. Record*, i. 1872), and in the Delaware *Walam Olum*, edited by Brinton (Philadelphia, 1885), there are all kinds of Manitous—a Great Manitou who speaks 'a manitou to manitous,' who was 'a manitou to men and their grandfather,' and 'an evil Manitou,' who makes 'evil beings only, monsters, flies, gnats,' and so on. The claim of this Manitou, the 'grandfather' of the Delawares, to rank as the *Ens Supremum* must therefore be dismissed with the like claims of the Dakotan 'Wakanda' and other Amerindian candidates for the highest honours. On the general question of a Supreme Being it is pointed out by Gatschet that the deities of the early Algonquian natives are better known than the so-called 'gods' of most of the present North American aborigines. This is due to the observations made by Capt. John Smith, Strachey, Roger Williams, and a few other pioneers prior to Christian influences. The first preachers translated 'God' and 'Jahweh' by the Algonquian terms *manit*, *mundtu*, 'he is god'; also *manittw* (whence our *manitou*), which simply means 'ghost' or 'spirit,' so that the plural form *manittowok* served to express the *gods* of the Bible. Here *m* is an impersonal prefix which is dropped in polysynthetic composition (see p. 377[b]), leaving the root *anit*, *ant*, *and*, i.e. any spirit, not *the Spirit* in a pre-eminent sense. It was equally applicable to one and all of the *genii loci*, and to restrict it to *one* was reading into it a meaning puzzling to the natives, though required for the right understanding of the Christian and Biblical concepts. One of these genii was *Kaut-antow-wit*, the great south-west spirit, to whose blissful abode all departed souls migrated, and whence came their corn and beans. The same root appears in *Kehteanit*, the 'Great Spirit, which by the epithet *kehte* (='great') acquired sufficient pre-eminence to be used by the missionaries for 'God' and 'Jahweh.' But *great* is relative, not absolute, and does not necessarily involve the idea of an *Ens Supremum*. *Kehteanit* again is the *Kiehtan* of Eliot's Massachusetts Bible, and also the *Tantum* (contraction of *Keitanitom*, 'our great god') of the Penobscots, who associated him with *Hobbamoco*, the Evil One, thus suggesting the two principles of good and evil as more fully developed in the *Walam Olum*, and among the Araucanians and others. E. Winslow (*Good News from New Eng.*, 1624) thinks *Kiehtan* was the chief god of the Algonquins, maker of all the other gods, and himself made by none. But if there were other gods, by whomsoever made, then *Kiehtan* was merely the head of a pantheon, the Zeus or Diespiter of the New World. Hence he

naturally dwells above, in the heavens towards the setting sun, whither all go after death. But he had a rival, *Squantam*, 'whom they acknowledge,' says Josselyn, 'but worship him they do not.' In any case he was more to be feared than loved, for *squantam* comes from the verb *musquantam* (='he is wrathful'), which explains the Narraganset remark at any casual mishap, *musquantam mánit*, 'God was angry and did it' (*JAFL* vol. xii.).

Respecting the Dakotan *Wakanda*, also supposed to rank as the Supreme Being, W. J. McGee clearly shows that he is not a personality at all, much less a deity, but a vague entity, an essence, a virtue, a subtle force like the Polynesian *mana*, which inheres in certain objects and renders them efficacious for good or evil. 'Even a man, especially a shaman, may be wakanda. So, too, the fetishes, and the ceremonial objects and decorations, — various animals, the horse among the prairie tribes, many natural objects and places of striking character, — though it is easy to understand how the superficial inquirer, dominated by definite spiritual concepts, perhaps deceived by crafty native informants, came to adopt and perpetuate the erroneous interpretation' (Fifteenth An. Report of *BE*, Washington, 1897, p. 182).

Nobody pretends that the sublime notion of a Creator had been grasped by the Pueblos with their undisguised animal-cult, ceremonial snake dances, and gross symbolism; or by the Cheyennes, Poncas, and allied groups, whose elaborate animal and sun dances have been so fully described by G. A. Dorsey (*Field Columbian Museum Publications*, Chicago, 1905). Hence nothing more is heard of a Supreme Deity till we are confronted by the Mexican Tonacatecutli who was represented as the one true god of the Aztecs, the maker of the world, the supreme Lord, to whom no offerings were made because he needed none. But in so describing him it is suggested that the early interpreters were biassed by Biblical conceptions. A more plausible view, advanced by Seler, is that Tonacatecutli was a later invention of the Nahuan rationalists, 'the outcome of philosophic speculation, of the need of a principle of causality, such, for instance, as the God of our modern theosophistic systems' (Seler, *Aubin Tonalamatl*, 39). The Mayas also, however advanced in other respects, were but indifferent theologians with whom the local tutelary deities still survived under Christian names. Appeal is likewise made to the 'Feather-Snake' god of the Huaxtecs, creator of man, but also father of the Tlapallan people, and founder of the Tollan empire, whereby his universal godhead is destroyed (see art. TOLTECS); and to Piyexoo, chief deity of the Zapotecs, the Creator, the uncreated *Pitao-Cozaana*, who, however, was only the first amongst many patrons of all the virtues and of all the vices, to whom horrible sacrifices were made (de Nadaillac, *Prehistoric America*, p. 363). The *Bochica* of the Chibchas was almost certainly an eponymous hero (see art. CHIBCHAS), and this Colombian nation were really Sun-worshippers, like the neighbouring Quichuas (Peruvians), amongst whom it would be idle to look for an *Ens Supremum*. We are indeed told that one of the Incas had his doubts about the divinity of the sun, while a mysterious being, a *Deus ignotus* or supreme god, is spoken of who was worshipped under the name of *Pachacamac* or *Viracocha*, the sun, moon, and stars being merely the symbols under which he revealed himself to his creatures. But for the mystification involved in this conception the reader must be referred to art. VIRACOCHA.

Thus a rapid survey of the whole field has failed to discover an *Ens Supremum* amongst the Amerinds, whose primitive beliefs were essentially animistic, the worship of animals greatly predominating over that of ancestral spirits, which plays a very subordinate part in the American systems. Conspicuous features are totemism and shamanism in the north, true polytheism in the higher religions of Mexico and Central America, solar worship in those of South America, and various forms of lycanthropy everywhere. These subjects have here been barely touched upon, as they will be found fully treated in special articles.

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A. H. KEANE.

AMERICA, SOUTH.—The religious ideas of the savage peoples of South America are, in comparison with those of the North Americans, strikingly undeveloped. They have not advanced beyond the crudest forms of belief in ghosts, such as are produced by the vague fear of the souls of the dead, or of the demons, which express themselves in certain natural occurrences. Their religious beliefs are thus not essentially superior to those of the Australians or the Papuans. The want of a belief in gods, in the proper sense of the term, speaks less for the low stage of religious culture than the almost total absence of forms of worship that are no more than mere magic practices, as, *e.g.*, prayers, sacrifices, idols, and sanctuaries. The few undoubted traces of a real cult belong to tribes in whose case we are inclined to suspect that influence has been brought to bear on them from the side of the civilized and half-civilized peoples of the region of the Andes and of Central America.

We find such traces among the Arhuacos (Kŏggaba) of Colombia, the Tainos of the Antilles, the Tacanas of Eastern Bolivia, the Araucans and several nations of the Chacos and the Pampas, which are in connexion with them, especially the Guaycuru group, who have also adopted numerous elements of Peruvian culture.

Of course the mythology of the South Americans can tell us of creators and world figures, but still these are without the character of gods. They are legendary figures without religious significance, without influence on man and his fate, and thus also devoid of religious worship or veneration. The Peruvian religion was the first to raise the heroes of the legends, so far as they were personifications of the sun or moon, to the position of divinities. Among the Chibchas of Colombia are to be found the first approaches to this.

The earliest reports regarding the religious ideas of the savage tribes of the time of the Conquest and the first missionaries are, in general, obscure and contradictory. While some deny all religious feeling to the Indians, others tell of reverence for God, or at least of devil-worship, and others again of the dualistic opposition of a good and an evil spirit.

On the other hand, reverence for one all-ruling highest being was expressly ascribed to many tribes.

In particular the following are named: Tupan among the eastern Tupis, Sume among the southern Tupis or the Guaranis, Pillan among the Araucans, Gualichu among the Puelches, Queevet among the Abipones, Soychu among the Patagonians, and others. As a matter of fact, we have in all these cases by no means to do with more elevated ideas of God. These beings are, on the contrary, mere natural demons or deified ancestors or heroes of the tribe.

Without doubt, the demonic figures which took part in the masked dances of the Indians have

often been regarded by the missionaries as gods or devils. The festive huts, the houses of the community or of the bachelors, in which the masks were preserved, were supposed to be 'temples.' And yet, all the contemporary observers even at that date emphasize the absence of specific actions of worship (prayer and sacrifice), except in the above-mentioned cases of probable foreign influence from regions of higher culture. Still, the masked dances might be regarded as the first traces of a primitive culture. As the analogies among other savage peoples teach us, the ceremonies are in the main directed towards exerting a magical influence on animals or animal spirits (in the sense of an allurement, defence, or multiplication), or towards driving out destructive demons that manifest themselves in natural phenomena.

Often too, of course, they are primitive dramatic representations of achievements of the tribe and of the legends of the heroes, as, *e.g.*, those connected with the Yurupari or Izi mysteries of the tribe of the Uaupés, and probably those of the Passé and Tikuna, and those of the Chiquitos of Bolivia, which were described at an early date. The sacred dances of the Tainos in Cuba and Hispaniola (Haiti), the so-called Areitos, were of this nature.

These masquerades seem to be especially important at the initiation ceremony of the young men, at funeral celebrations, and at the laying out of new settlements. The use of masks seems to have been confined to the basin of the Amazon. In Guiana and Venezuela, the Orinoco region, the east coast, and farther south than 15° south latitude their existence has not been proved.

We know more particularly only those of the Marañon (Tikuna), those of Uaupé and Yapura (Tariana and Betoya tribes), those of the upper Xingu (Bakairi, Mehinaku, Auetö, and Trumai) and of Araguay, those of the Karaya (which present a striking resemblance to the so-called dukduk masks of New Britain).

Idols of wood and stone belonging to a more ancient period are frequently mentioned in the Antilles, in Darien, Venezuela, and on the Amazon; still, we are ignorant of their appearance or signification. Only with regard to the Tainos do we know that they represented their ancestral gods (*Zemes*) in grotesque figures of wood and cotton, of which a few have been preserved. On the lower Amazon various peculiarly formed sculptures of men and animals have been found, whose style points to the Columbian sphere of culture (according to Barboza Rodriguez and R. Andree). The so-called idols of the Takana of Eastern Bolivia have not yet been more closely investigated. The wooden 'Santos' of the Caduves (Guaycuru) are in all probability representations of ancestors, but perhaps influenced by Christianity.

In the older literature actual divinities of individual peoples are mentioned; in particular Tupan, the 'god of the eastern Tupi,' whose name was adopted in the popular language as the general designation of God, and, through the influence of religious instruction carried over to many tribes of the interior. Thus he frequently obtained the signification of 'the God of the white man.' In reality *Tupan* is simply 'the flash,' *i.e.* a thunder-demon of the Tupis, who, however, pay him all sorts of worship. In the magic rattle (*maraka*) his worshippers believed that they heard his voice, and so it came about that Hans Staden pronounces this rattle to be nothing else than the god of the tribe. In his nature he has absolutely nothing to do with the one God in the Christian sense of the term.

In other cases the supposed divine beings are of a purely mythical nature, the ancestors of the tribe, or culture-heroes, who are active as demiurges, like Tamoi or Sume of the Tupi-Guaranis, whom even the missionaries identified with St. Thomas, who in some mysterious fashion was reported to have been the first to bring religion and civilization to America.

Other similar figures are Quetzalcoatl and Kukulcan in Central America, Bochica in Colombia, and Viracocha in Peru. The same is also true of Aguarachi of the Abipones, the Rueevet or Huecubu of the Puelches and Araucans, and the fox-god of the Chiriguanos (according to Campana).

We can thus gather exceedingly little positive information from the older references. The more recent material for observation is also still scanty and incomplete. The following may be regarded as certain, so far as it goes. The belief in souls (animism) forms for these peoples the basis of all their supernatural ideas. The spirits of the dead are thought of as demons which are for the most part hostile, or at least terrifying—seldom indifferent,—or good spirits stand over against these evil demons.

Of such a nature are the Opoyen and Mapoyen of the Caribbean Islands, the Anhangas of the Tupis, the Kamyry of the Ipurinas. Only among the Tainos do we find a completely systematized spirit worship of the *Zemes*, which are represented by idols.

The belief in the incarnation of the souls of the dead in animals is widely diffused. Jaguars, snakes, and in particular birds like *araras*, hawks, eagles, are such soul-animals. Besides these there are everywhere spiritual beings of an indefinite nature; cobolds, which appear in animal or in grotesque human forms, but as a rule invisible to the eye, manifest themselves in certain natural sounds, such as in the echo, in the rustling of the wood, or in nightly sounds of an indefinite kind, or have their seat in remarkable rock formations. The best known are the forest demons of the Tupis —Kaapora, Kurupira, and Yurupari—which were adopted in the popular superstition of the colonists. Similar beings dwell in the water as gigantic snakes or crab-like monsters.

Where a special 'land of the fathers' in heaven, or more seldom in the lower world, is accepted, the souls of the dead return to it. Among the Chaco tribes the stars are the souls of warriors, which combat one another in the thunder-storm. As falling stars, they change their places. Certain constellations—in particular Orion, the Cross, Pleiades, the Milky Way—are regarded as representations of beings or objects of mythical significance belonging to the primeval time. They illustrate in this way incidents in the activity of the culture-heroes in the cosmogonical legend.

These peoples have not advanced to a deification of cosmic bodies and natural powers. Even the sun and the moon have remained, in spite of their personification in the myth, without significance for the religious ideas. Atmospheric phenomena, too, have been little observed, a fact which probably is connected with the great regularity of the rainfall and thunderstorms throughout the whole continent. In a few cases proof can be given that demons or spirits of nature were supposed to manifest themselves in these phenomena.

Among the eastern Tupis, Tupan reveals himself in the lightning flash; among the Machakalis, Akjanam shakes the rain out of his beard. The Caribbean islanders know demons who control the sea, the wind, and the rain. The rainbow, too, is widely regarded as an evil spirit that brings sickness (*yolok*, 'devil,' of the Caribbean peoples of Guiana). Among other peoples he is a mythical animal, snake (*Ipurina*) or electric eel (*Karaya*).

Tendencies towards the development of actual divinities and divine cults are to be found among the Tainos, who, besides the spirits of their ancestors, revered the sun and the moon; and probably also among the old tribes of Darien and of the north coast (according to Peter Martyr, Oviedo, Gomara, and others). In later times, among the Takanas of Eastern Bolivia, gods of water, of fire, of sicknesses, etc. are mentioned, and their images were worshipped in temples by means of sacrifices and dances (according to Col. Labre and P. Armentia). But these details have not yet obtained scientific confirmation. Again, with

regard to the sacrifice of horses which the Patagonians or tribes of the Pampas are said to offer, we have no exact information. In individual cases the mighty phenomena of volcanic action have led to divine worship of active volcanoes.

Thus the Jivaro of Ecuador are supposed to look upon the volcano Cayambé as the seat of a mighty spirit, to whom they offer prayer. Among the Araucans, Pillan is the god of thunder and of volcanoes. Subordinate to him are the Cherruves, the inciters of the summer lightning, who in like manner are thought of as dwelling in volcanoes.

The cause of this imperfect development of the belief in gods is probably to be sought, in the entirely primitive condition of agriculture in the whole of South America, with the exception of the slopes of the Andes. Agricultural rites of a magical nature, from which, as a rule, divine cults are developed, do not easily arise among tribes who, though practising primitive agriculture, may yet be said to follow an almost purely hunting or fishing life, and owing to the perfectly regular change of kinds of weather and the certainty of copious showers, do not require heavenly helpers. Only under the more niggardly natural conditions of the high lands of the Andes in Peru and Bolivia did the farmer recognize his dependence on higher powers, at the head of which he placed the sun-, or light-god.

The *mythology* of the South Americans, now unfortunately only partially known to us, seems to have been more plentiful than might have been expected from their crude religious ideas. The most that we know comes from more recent times; still, even from the 16th cent. we possess a comparatively complete cosmogony and cycle of heroic legend of the eastern Tupis, related by Thevet, *Cosmographie*, Paris, 1574 (in extracts in Dénis' *Fête brésilienne*, Paris, 1851). Further, we have fragments of a creation-legend of the Tainos, according to Peter Martyr. The subsequent missionary period has supplied us only with scattered and unreliable material.

It was not till recent times that more valuable sources were again furnished by the investigations of travellers, such as D'Orbigny (for the Yurakaré of Bolivia), Brett and E. im Thurn (for the tribes of Guiana), Cardus (for the Guarayos of Bolivia), von den Steinen and Ehrenreich (for the Bakairis, Paressis, and Karayas of Central Brazil), Lenz (for the Araikans), Borba (for the Kaingang of the Ges linguistic stock of South Brazil), and others. Of great importance is the so-called Iurupari myth of the Uaupé tribe, communicated by Stradelli (*Bol. soc. geogr. Ital.*, Rome, 1890), the only complete legend handed down regarding the worship of a secret society. A critical collection of all the materials discovered up to the present time was given by Ehrenreich in his *Mythen und Legenden der südamer. Urvölker*, Berlin, 1905. The myths deal in the main with cosmogony, the work of creation of the culture hero or heroes, conceived of as brothers, who bring to mankind the useful plants, fire, and other possessions, and appoint the course of sun and moon. The sun or highest heavenly being, thought of as a magician, is placed at times, as the procreator of the heroes, at the beginning of the genealogy, *e.g.* Monan of the Tupis, Kamushini of the Bakairis. A destruction of the world by flood or by world-conflagration occurs more than once (see Andree, *Flutsagen*). The story of the birth of the hero brothers with the motive of the immaculate conception, the death of their mother, their combats with monsters and with one another, their ascension into heaven or descent into the lower world, offers many parallels with myths of the old world. Still, these can be explained from the similarity of the view of nature lying at the basis of all these myths, which is always connected with the sun and moon and their relation to each other. The heroes themselves are often immediately recognizable as personifications of these stars, as, *e.g.*, the pair of brothers Keri and Kame among the Bakairis.

On the other hand, there are undoubtedly many North American and even East Asiatic legendary elements which have wandered to South America, probably following the Pacific Coast. In like manner there are common elements in the stories of the heroes of Peru and Eastern Brazil which can be explained only by immediate influence of the one people on the other.

LITERATURE.—J. G. Müller, *Gesch. der amerikan. Urreligionen*, Basel, 1867; E. im Thurn, *Among the Indians of Guiana*, London, 1883; Barboza Rodriguez, *Paranduba amazonense*, Rio, 1890; K. von den Steinen, *Unter den Naturvölkern Zentralbrasiliens*, Berlin, 1893; P. Ehrenreich, *Mythen und Legenden der südamericanischen Urvölker*, Berlin, 1905. This work contains abundant bibliographical material. For older literature, see Waitz, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, iii. Leipzig, 1862; cf. also the various anthropological manuals, *e.g.* Keane, *Man Past and Present*, Cambridge, 1900, p. 416 ff.

P. EHRENREICH.

AMESHA SPENTAS.—A designation for a specific class of beings in the Zoroastrian religion, corresponding to the idea of archangels in Judaism and Christianity. The name literally means 'Immortal Beneficent Ones,' from Av. *ameša* (read *ameręta-*), 'undying' and *spenta*, 'bountiful, beneficent' (from root *su-*, 'to increase, benefit'), and the form appears in Pahlavi as *Amhraspand*, read in later Persian as *Amshaspand*. As a class-designation the title *Amesha Spenta* does not occur in the metrical Gāthās, although the Amesha Spentas themselves are constantly referred to singly, or in company, throughout these older hymns; but the actual title does occur in the prose Gāthā of the Yasna Haptanghāitī (*Yasna*, xxxix. 3; cf. xlii. 6), and is met with often in the Younger Avesta and in the subsequent Zoroastrian literature.

The Amesha Spentas are conceived of as attendant ministers waiting as servitors upon their supreme lord and sovereign, Ahura Mazda, or Ormazd (cf. Phl. *Yōsht-ī Fryānō*, ii. 55–59; *Bahman Yasht*, iii. 31), with whom they make up a sevenfold group, to which number the divine being Sraosha is also often added (cf. *Yasht*, ii. 1–3, xix. 16=xiii. 83, x. 139, iii. 1; *Yasna*, lvii. 12; *Bundahishn*, xxx. 29). In later usage the term *Amshaspand* is more loosely employed, and some of the angels are called by this designation. Besides Sraosha, who is admitted to the group, and who works in unison with them (*Bundahishn*, xxx. 29), Ātar, the Fire of Ahura Mazda, is spoken of as an Amshaspand (*Yasna*, i. 2). Gōšūrvan, the soul of the primeval ox, though usually spoken of as an angel, is called an Amshaspand in *Shāyast lā-Shāyast*, xxii. 14. A later 'Kusti' formula even speaks of *sī u se*, 'thirty-three,' Amshaspands. Their nature is that of virtues and abstract qualities personified, and their names are *Vohu Manah* 'Good Thought,' *Asha Vahishta* 'Perfect Righteousness,' *Khshathra Vairya* 'Wished-for Kingdom,' *Spenta Armaitī* 'Holy Harmony,' *Haurvatāt* and *Ameretāt* 'Saving Health and Immortality.' The Greek writer Plutarch, in the 1st cent. A.D., alluded to them as 'six gods' (ἐξ θεούς, *de Is. et Os.* 47), and rendered their names respectively as εὔνοια, ἀλήθεια, εὐνομία, σοφία, πλοῦτος, ὁ τῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς ἡδέων δημιουργος (see Tiele, 'Plutarchus over de Amšaspands,' in *Feestbundel Prof. Boot*, pp. 117–119, Leyden, 1901). He once mentions Ameretāt by name as Ἀμάρδατος (miswritten as Ἀνάδατος), and a century earlier Strabo (xi. 8. 4, xv. 3. 15) unquestionably refers to Vohu Manah under the name Ὠμανής (see Windischmann, 'Die persische Anahita, oder Anaïtis,' in *Abhandlungen d. bayr. Akad.*, phil.-philol. Classe, viii. part 1, p. 36, Munich, 1856), all which

goes to prove that the conception was well known at that period. This latter fact, among numerous others, is of weight in disproving the theory advanced by Darmesteter, that the conception of the Amesha Spentas in Zoroastrianism was late, and owed its origin to the influence of Philo Judæus.

The various attributes which the Zoroastrian scriptures apply to the Amesha Spentas are in harmony with the spiritual qualities represented by these allegorical personifications. This will be manifest at a glance, if reference be made to the Avesta (*e.g. Yasna*, xxxix. 3; *Visparad*, ix. 4, xi. 12; *Yasna*, iv. 4, xxiv. 9, lviii. 5; *Yasht*, xiii. 82–84). The Gāthic adjectives *vohu* 'good,' *vahišta* 'best,' *vairya* 'wished-for,' *spenta* 'holy,' which are the most common titles of the first four Amesha Spentas in the earlier period of the religion, become in later times standing epithets, practically indispensable to the qualities to which they are added by way of nearer definition. The last two personifications, Haurvatāt and Ameretāt, have no standing attributes, but are commonly mentioned together as a pair.

The Amesha Spentas were Ahura Mazda's own creation (*Yasht*, i. 25; *Dīnkarṭ*, tr. Sanjana, p. 103), and their function is to aid him in the guidance of the world (*Yasht*, xix. 16, i. 25, ii. 1–15; *Vendīdād*, xix. 9; *Bundahišn*, i. 23–28). They are invisible and immortal (*Dīnkarṭ*, tr. Sanjana, pp. 47–48), good rulers, givers of good, ever living and ever bestowing (*Yasna*, xxiv. 9). They have their Fravashis, which are invoked (*Yasht*, xiii. 82). They receive special worship in the ritual, and are said to descend to the oblations upon paths of light (*Yasht*, xiii. 84, xix. 17). They dwell in paradise, where at least one of them, Vohu Manah, sits on a throne of gold (*Vendīdād*, xix. 32); but they are not infinite and unproportioned like their Lord, Ormazd (*Dīnkarṭ*, tr. Sanjana, p. 114). They are spoken of as the givers and rulers, moulders and overseers, protectors and preservers of the creation of Ormazd (*Yasht*, xix. 18). For that reason the guardianship of some special element in the universe is assigned to each. To Vohu Manah is entrusted the care of useful animals; to Asha Vahishta, the fire; to Khshathra Vairya, the supervision of metals; to Spenta Armaitī, the guardianship of the earth, whose spirit she is; and to Haurvatāt and Ameretāt, the care of water and vegetation (*Shāyast lā-Shāyast*, xv. 5; *Great Bundahišn*, tr. Darmesteter, in *Le Zend-Avesta*, ii. 305–322). The precise nature of the relation, in each case, between tutelary genius and element, has been variously explained, according to the stress laid upon the physical or the spiritual side of the concept; but it is certain that the association and the double nature are old, because the twofold character may be seen foreshadowed in the Gāthās, and becomes pronounced, in the later texts especially, on its physical side. Each Amesha Spenta has a special month assigned to his honour (*Bundahišn*, xxv. 20). Each has a special day as holy day (*Sīrōzā*, i. 1–7). Each has a special flower, *e.g.*, white jasmine sacred to Vohu Manah, the 'basil-royal' to Khshathra Vairya, musk to Spenta Armaitī (*Bundahišn*, xxvii. 24). It is impossible here to enter into a detailed discussion of the functions of each of the Amesha Spentas, the first three of which celestial group are males (or rather, neuter according to the grammatical gender, not sex), and the last three females; but it is sufficient to indicate the fact that these exalted personifications play an important rôle as archangels throughout the entire history of the Zoroastrian religion, and are opposed (more particularly in the later development of the faith) by six antagonists, or corresponding archfiends, *Aka Manah*, *Indra*, *Sauru*, *Nāonhaithya*, *Tauru*, and *Zairi* (*Vendīdād*, x. 9–10, xix. 43; *Yasht*, xix. 96). The Amshaspands will, nevertheless, vanquish these opponents at the time of the resurrection (*Yasht*, xix. 96; *Bundahišn*, xxx 29).

To draw parallels between the conception of the Amesha Spentas as a spiritual band higher than the angels (Av. *Yazatas*), yet lower than the Supreme Being, Ahura Mazda, and the Biblical doctrine of archangels, is natural and has been done by some scholars, while others have emphasized the likenesses to the idea of the Ādityas in ancient India. Opinions vary as to whether the resemblances are due to borrowing, or to some common source, or, again, to natural developments. It is premature, as yet, to attempt to give a decision on this question, which is but a part of the whole problem of the influence of Zoroastrianism on other religions or its kinship with them.

LITERATURE.—Fuller references will be found in Jackson, *Die iranische Religion*, in Geiger and Kuhn's *Grundriss der iran. Philologie*, ii. 633–640; Spiegel, *Eranische Alterthumskunde*, ii. 28–41, Leipzig, 1873; Darmesteter, *Haurvatāt et Ameretāt*, Paris, 1875, *Ormazd et Ahriman*, pp. 38–43, 246–249, Paris, 1879, *Le Zend-Avesta, traduction nouvelle*, Paris, 1892–93; C. de Harlez, *Des Origines du Zoroastrianisme*, pp. 49–93, Paris, 1878–79, *Avesta traduit*, Introd. pp. 90–94, Paris, 1881; Casartelli, *Mazdayasnian Religion under the Sasanids* [tr. from French into English by Firoz Jamaspji], pp. 42–49, 74–75, Bombay, 1889; Justi, 'Die älteste iranische Religion' in *Preuss. Jahrb.* 88. 72–77; Tiele, *Gesch. der Religion im Altertum bis auf die Zeit Alexanders des Grossen*, ii. 139–155; Lehmann, *Zarathustra*, ii. 44–62; Gray, 'The Double Nature of the Iranian Archangels' in *ARW* vii. 345–372.

A. V. WILLIAMS JACKSON.

'AM HA-AREṢ (עַם הָאָרֶץ). — A term used in Rabbinic Hebrew to designate, either collectively or individually, those who were ignorant of the Law, and careless as to its observance. It is almost invariably a term of reproach. Its literal meaning, 'people of the land,' may suggest that its origin is similar to that of the words 'pagan' or 'heathen.' In the OT it occurs several times, but never with the significance which it afterwards acquired (cf. 2 K 24^{14}, Ezr 9^{1}, Neh 10^{31}).

Our chief authority for the use of the term is the Mishna, where it frequently occurs (see list of passages given below), and in these passages the *'Am ha-areṣ* is, as a rule, contrasted with the *Ḥābhêr* (companion) who had bound himself to a very strict observance of the Law. In all matters regarding questions of tithe or of 'clean and unclean' the *'Am ha-areṣ* is not to be trusted. Thus we find it stated in the Mishna: 'He who takes it upon himself to be a *Ḥābhêr* sells neither fresh nor dry fruits to the *'Am ha-areṣ*, buys from them no fresh, does not enter into their house as a guest, or receive them as guests within his walls' (*Demai*, ii. 3). The majority of the passages in the Mishna deal with similar topics in connexion with the *'Am ha-areṣ*, viz. the fact that he must not be trusted in matters concerning the agrarian laws and ritual purity. One passage, however, is a notable exception to this, and is of peculiar interest as showing the feelings of the earlier Rabbis on this point. It is the well-known saying of Hillel: 'No boor (בּוּר) is a sin-fearer, nor is the *'Am ha-areṣ* pious' (*Aboth*, ii. 6). In order, however, to obtain a definition of the *'Am ha-areṣ*, we must turn to the Bab. Talmud, where the following passage occurs (*Bᵉrākhōth*, 47*b*):

'"Who is an *'Am ha-areṣ*? One that does not eat his ordinary food in a state of ritual purity." These are the words of R. Meir; but the Ḥᵉkhāmîm say, "He that does not tithe his fruits properly." "Who is an *'Am ha-areṣ*? One that does not read the Shema' morning and evening." These are the words of R. Eliezer. R. Joshua says, "One that does not put on the phylacteries." Ben Azzai says, "One that has not the fringes on his garment." R. Nathan says, "One that has not a Mezuza on his door." R. Nathan ben Joseph says, "One that has children, and does not educate them in the study of the Law." Others say, "Even if he have read and learnt, yet if he have not associated with wise men he is an *'Am ha-areṣ*."' (Cf. also Bab. *Soṭa*, 22*b*, *Gittin*, 61*a*, where this passage occurs with some variations).

From this passage it would appear that the *'Am ha-areṣ* was regarded by the Rabbis as a person who was accustomed to neglect the various enactments of the Law, and the general attitude of the Pharisees towards him was one of contempt and hostility. As we have seen, the *Ḥābhêr* is warned against having intercourse with him, and it naturally followed that intermarriage between the two classes was regarded with the greatest disfavour. 'One that gives his daughter in marriage to an *'Am ha-areṣ*,' R. Meir used to say, 'is as if he had bound her and set her before a lion' (Bab. *Pesaḥ*, 49*b*). In another place it is stated that the *'Am ha-areṣ* is disqualified for acting in certain capacities, which are enumerated under six heads, viz. (1) he must not be appointed to receive evidence; (2) his own evidence is not to be accepted; (3) a secret must not be confided to him; (4) he must not be appointed as the guardian to orphans; (5) he must not be appointed as overseer of the charity box; (6) it is not right to accompany him on a journey (Bab. *Pesaḥ*, 49*b*, and Rashi's comment, *ad loc.*). The attitude of hostility was apparently mutual, as would appear, among other passages, from the saying of R. 'Aqiba which occurs just before the passage cited above. He is reported to have said, 'When I was an *'Am ha-areṣ* I used to say, "Would that I had a *talmîd ḥākhām* ('disciple of the wise,' 'scholar'), and I would bite him like an ass."' Or again, a little later, 'The hatred with which the *'Am ha-areṣ* hates the *talmîdê ḥᵉkhāmîm* is greater than the hatred with which the heathen hates Israel' (Bab. *loc. cit.*). These passages offer a sufficient explanation of the words in Jn 7[49] 'This people who knoweth not the law are accursed,' in which we may probably see a reference to the attitude of the Pharisees towards the *'Am ha-areṣ*. Some difference of opinion exists as to the identity of the *Ḥābhêr*, with whom the *'Am ha-areṣ* is so frequently contrasted in the Mishna. Schürer and others identify the *Ḥābhêr* with the Pharisees, making the two terms practically synonymous. Others are rather inclined to regard the *Ḥābhêr* as a member of some kind of religious guild bound to a strict observance of the Law. But one thing is perfectly clear, viz. that the *Ḥābhêr* was not necessarily himself a *talmîd ḥākhām*, though he might incidentally be one. This would appear from the following passage: 'He who would take upon himself the decrees of the association (*ḥabheruth*) must do so in the presence of three *ḥăbhêrîm*; even if he is a *talmîd ḥākhām*, he must do it in the presence of three *ḥăbhêrîm*' (Bab. *Bekhor.* 30*b*).

Two passages may be cited which appear to indicate a less hostile attitude towards the *'Am ha-areṣ*. The first one is from *Aboth de R. Nathan* (ed. Schechter, p. 64*b*), the other is from the Midrash *Shir ha-Shirim Rabba*. In the first of these we are told that it is not right for a man to say, 'Love the wise man, but hate the disciples, love the disciples, but hate the *'Am ha-areṣ*'; but love them all, and hate the heretics and apostates and informers.

An attempt has been made to mitigate the severity of the statements concerning the *'Am ha-areṣ* which have been quoted above, by suggesting that in reality they refer to informers and political enemies (see Montefiore [*Hibbert Lectures*] and Rosenthal, cited below), but sufficient evidence for this is not forthcoming; and the quotation given above from *Aboth de R. Nathan* seems to point in the contrary direction. This also appears to be the view of the writer in the *JE*, who states as his opinion that 'there can be no doubt it was this contemptuous and hostile attitude of the Pharisaic schools towards the masses that was the chief cause of the triumphant power of the Christian Church.' A new and independent investigation of many points connected with the *'Am ha-areṣ* is to be found in the recently published work of A. Büchler, cited below.

Literature.—Mishna, *Demai*, i. 2, 3, ii. 2, 3, iii. 4, vi. 9, 12, *Shebiith*, v. 9, *Ma'aser sheni*, iii. 3, iv. 6, *Ḥagiga*, ii. 7, *Giṭṭin*, v. 9, *Eduyoth*, i. 14, *Aboth*, ii. 5, iii. 10, *Horayoth*, iii. 8, *Qinnim*, iii. 6, *Toharoth*, iv. 5, vii. 1, 2, 4, 5, viii. 1, 2, 3, 5, *Makhshirin*, vi. 3, *Tebul Yom*, iv. 5; Jerus. *Hor.* iii. 48*a*; Bab. *Berākh.* 47*b*, *Shab.* 32*a*, *Soṭa*, 22*a*, *Giṭṭin*, 61*a*, *Baba mez.* 85*a*, *Baba bath.* 8*a*, *Leviticus Rabba*, 37, *Aboth de R. Nathan*, ed. Schechter, 16, 64; *Shir ha-Shirim Rabba*; Schürer, *GJV*[3] ii. p. 520 ff.; Hamburger, *RE* 54–59; Geiger, *Urschrift* (1857), 151; Rosenthal, *Zeit u. Schule R. Akibas* (1885), 25–29; Montefiore, *Hibb. Lect.* 1892, pp. 497–502; *JE*, *s.v.*; Friedländer, *Entstehungsgesch. d. Christenthums* (1894), ch. ii.; Ad. Büchler, *Das galiläisch 'Am ha-areṣ* (1906).

H. Leonard Pass.

AMIABILITY.—The adjective 'amiable' is obviously the Lat. *amabilis* modified in transmission through the French. It is thus etymologically equivalent to *lovable*, denoting that which is adapted to excite the sentiment of love in any of its varied forms. It has therefore been occasionally applied even to things, as, *e.g.*, in Ps. 84[1], 'How amiable are thy tabernacles!' But now it is used almost exclusively to describe persons and personal characteristics. In this use it has fortunately never degenerated by application to characteristics that are loved by corrupt minds. Thus, in its psychological aspect, amiability comprehends both the natural dispositions and the acquired habits which, being themselves of the nature of love, are calculated to evoke the same sentiment in others. In ethical and religious value amiability may therefore claim the rank that is accorded to love; and the evolution of moral intelligence has always tended towards that ideal in which love is recognized as the supreme principle and inspiration of all morality.

J. Clark Murray.

AMITĀYUS or APARIMITĀYUS (Tibetan *Tśe-dpag-med*), 'The Boundless or Everlasting Life,' is one of the mystical or superhuman Buddhas invented in the theistic development of Buddhism in India. His worship was wide-spread in India in the Middle Ages, although hitherto unnoticed, for the writer found his image frequent in the ruins of mediæval Buddhist temples in mid-India. In Tibet, where the cult of a class of divinities with similar attributes, namely, the Sages of Longevity, had long been prevalent, his worship has become very popular as a supposed means of prolonging the earthly life of votaries. His image is to be seen in nearly every temple in Tibet; it is also worn in amulets, and carved on rocks by the wayside. He is specifically invoked in the prayer-flags which flutter from every point of the compass, and he is specially worshipped in that sacramental rite, the so-called 'Eucharist of Lāmaism,' where consecrated bread is solemnly partaken of by the congregation.

He is considered to be an active reflex or emanation of the divinely meditative Buddha, Amitābha (see Adibuddha), who sits impassively in the Western Paradise (*Sukhāvatī*).

He is represented in the same posture as his prototype Amitābha, not, however, as an ascetic Buddha, but crowned and adorned with thirteen ornaments, and holding in his hands the vase of life-giving ambrosia, which is one of the eight luck-compelling symbols (*mangala*) of ancient India, and the vessel for holy water on Tibetan altars.

Literature.—E. Schlagintweit, *Buddhism in Tibet*, Lond. 1868, p. 129; L. A. Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, Lond. 1895, pp. 348, 352, 444, also *Lhasa and its Mysteries*, Lond. 1905, pp. 86, 214, 393.

L. A. Waddell.

'AMM, 'AMMI.—The word *'amm* (עַם, عم, ʿam, etc.) is common to all the Semitic languages.

and must have been found in the original tongue from which they are sprung. A comparison of its meanings in the dialects, together with a study of the social organization and religious beliefs of the several races, leads to the conclusion that the word denoted originally a male relative in the preceding generation. The Semites passed once through a stage of fraternal polyandry, and in such a society the distinction between father and paternal uncle is impossible. The mother's polyandrous husband, who might be either father or uncle, was known by the child as *'amm*. Cf. Gn 19^{38} where *Ben-'ammi* is equivalent to 'son of my father,' and the phrase נאסף אל עמיו which alternates with נאסף אל אבותיו. The name 'uncle' was naturally applied to male deities, as 'father' was in later times. Long after polyandry had passed away *'amm* continued to be used as a title of deity; and as it lost its primitive associations, it tended more and more, like Baal, Adon, Melek, and other epithets, to become a proper name. The Ḳatabân people in South Arabia designate themselves in their inscriptions as 'Children of 'Amm' (ולד עם), just as their neighbours the Sabæans designate themselves as *Walad Ilmaḳah*, showing that among them *'Amm* had become a Divine name (cf. Hommel, *ZDMG*, 1895, p. 525; Glaser, *Mitteilungen der vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft*, 1899, ii. p. 21). According to II. Rawl. 54, 65, V. 46, 11, Emu (=Nergal) was a god of the land of Suḥi on the west side of the Euphrates (cf. Sayce, *RP*, 2nd ser. iii. p. xi; *KAT*[3] 481). According to King (*Ḥammurabi*, iii. p. lxv), Ḥammu = 'Ammi is written with the determinative for 'god' in the name of the king Ḥammurabi. The proper name Dur-'Ammi, 'Fortress of 'Amm,' also indicates that 'Amm is regarded as a deity (*ib.* p. 252). A trace of this meaning also lingers in Heb. in the formula לחי עם, 'by the life of the Uncle,' which is parallel to חי יהוה and לחי ראי.

How far this process went can be determined only by a study of the proper names compounded with *'amm* in all the Semitic dialects. Here the problem is complicated by the fact that *'amm* has developed a number of secondary meanings, and so it is not easy to determine what is its significance in any given compound. When fraternal polyandry gave place to monogamy and polygamy, and the father became a recognizable relative, *abu*, which hitherto had meant 'husband' (cf. Jer 3^4, and old Bab. usage), came to mean 'father,' and *'amm* received the more specific meaning of 'paternal uncle.' This is a common meaning in Arab. (cf. *bint 'amm* for 'wife,' lit. daughter of 'paternal uncle'), also in Min. and Sabæan. From this *'amm* came to mean any relative in the ascending line on the father's side, just as 'father' was used to denote a remoter ancestor; then it was used for 'relative' in general. It is used in this sense in one of the Tell el-Amarna letters (Winckler, 45^{32}). Jensen also cites an instance in Babylonian (*LCBl*, 1902, col. 695 f.). In Gn 17^{14}, Lv $7^{20f.\ 25.\ 27}$ 23^{29}, Nu 9^{13} 15^{30}, Ex 31^{14}, Lv 19^{16} 21^{1-4} *'amm* cannot mean 'people,' but only 'kinsman.' *Lo-'ammi*, the name of Hosea's child, must mean primarily 'Not my kin,' inasmuch as it was given with reference to the mother's adultery. The Carthaginian proper name עמא (*CIS* 384) and Nabatæan עמי, Ὀμμέλα (Euting, *Sin. Inschr.* 90^{27} 358^6 355), may mean 'kinsman' or 'uncle,' but cannot mean 'people' (cf. Aram.-Talm. אבא as a personal name). The final stage in the development of meaning was reached when *'amm* came to denote 'race' or 'people'—a common usage both in Hebrew and Arabic.

The question now arises, Which of these meanings is found in the numerous proper names compounded with *'amm*? These names are widely scattered through the Semitic races, and must have been one of the earliest types of name formation; it is natural, therefore, to conjecture that in them *'amm* has its primitive meaning of 'father-uncle,' and is used in some cases at least as a title of the Deity. Whether this is the fact can be determined only by an inductive study of the names in question.

1. The first class of 'Ammi-names consists of those in which 'Ammi is *followed by a noun*, as in *'Ammi-hud*. In most of these the translation 'people' for 'Ammi gives a very unlikely name for an individual, *e.g.* *'Ammi-el*, 'people of God,' or 'people is God'; *'Amme-ba'ali*, 'people of Baal,' or 'people is Baal'; and so with the other names given below. It is generally admitted, accordingly, that in all names of this class *'Ammi* has the sense of 'kinsman' or 'uncle.' This view is confirmed by the fact that compounds with *Abi*, 'father,' and *Aḥi*, 'brother,' run parallel to names with *'Ammi*, *e.g.* *Abi-el*, *'Ammi-el*; *Abi-hud*, *Aḥi-hud*, *'Ammi-hud*. The next question is, whether the epithet 'uncle' or 'kinsman' is understood of a human being or of a divinity. The answer to this question depends upon the grammatical relation in which *'Ammi* stands to the following noun. There is high authority for the view that it is a construct with the old genitive ending which frequently survives in the construct state, *i.e.* *'Ammi-hud* means 'kinsman of glory,' which, like *Abi-hud*, 'father of glory,' means 'glorious one.' This theory is open to many serious objections: (1) This construction is a pure Arabism, and there is no evidence that it existed in the other dialects. (2) It is very unlikely that any man should have been named *Abi-El* in the sense of 'father of God,' *Abi-Yah* in the sense of 'father of Yah,' *Abi-Ba'al* in the sense of 'father of Baal,' or *Abi-Melek* in the sense of 'father of Melek'; and it is just as unlikely that *'Ammi-El*, *'Ammi-Ba'al*, *'Ammi-Sin*, *'Ammi-Shaddai* mean respectively 'uncle (older kinsman) of God, Baal, Sin, Shaddai.' (3) These names are paralleled by names in which the same elements occur in reverse order, *e.g.* *Eli-'am* (2 S 11^3 = 1 Ch 3^5 *'Ammiel*), *Ba'al-'am*, *Aa-'am* (*Yah-'am?*), *Nabu-imme*, *Shulmanu-imme*, *Shamash-imme*. There is no reason to suppose that *Eli-'am* differs in meaning from *'Ammi-El* or *Ba'al-'am* from *'Ammi-Ba'al*. If the elements in these names are regarded as standing in the construct relation, they will mean respectively 'God of uncle,' 'Lord of uncle.' These have no relation to their inverted counterparts, and are most unlikely personal names. If, on the other hand, the nouns are regarded as standing in the relation of subject and predicate, the compounds are synonymous whatever be the order of the elements: *'Ammi-El* means 'uncle is God,' and *Eli-'am* means 'God is uncle.' (4) Conclusive evidence that *'Ammi*, *Abi*, *Aḥi*, *Dod* ('uncle'), *Ḥal* ('maternal uncle'), *Ḥam* ('father-in-law') are not constructs before the following nouns, is found in the fact that they are used in forming the names of *women*. *Abi-gal*, *Abi-noam*, *Ḥamu-ṭal* cannot mean 'father of joy,' 'father of pleasantness,' 'father-in-law of dew,' but must mean 'father is joy,' 'father is pleasantness,' 'father-in-law is dew' (cf. *Abi-ṭal*).

If *'Ammi* is not in the construct before the following noun but is the subject of a sentence, a further problem arises as to the meaning of the vowel *i* which appears not only in Hebrew but also in Canaanite names in the Tell el-Amarna letters and in Babylonian. Many regard it as the suffix of the first pers.; but against this view are the facts that no other pronominal suffixes are used in forming proper names, that the analogy of other names leads us to expect a general affirmation in regard to the Deity rather than the expression of a per-

sonal relation to Him, and that the *i* is omitted in parallel forms, *e.g. Eli-'am = 'Ammi-El, 'Ammi-Ba'al = Ba'al-'am, Ab-shalom = Abi-shalom, Ab-ram = Abi-ram.* Probably, therefore, *i* should be regarded as a modification of the original *û*, the nom. ending. The ending *û* still appears in *Ammuladin, Ammu-nira, Ammu-rabi*, and other names in Bab. and Assyr. records (cf. Heb. *Ḥamûṭal*). If this be so, *'Ammi-el* must be translated, not 'my uncle is God,' but 'uncle is God.'

From this conclusion it follows that *'Ammi* in all these names is not a designation of a human relative, but of the Deity. In such names as 'uncle is God,' 'uncle is glory,' 'uncle is Lord,' 'uncle' can only be a title of a divinity. This conclusion is confirmed by the facts that *Abi, Aḥi*, and other names of relationship, except *Ben* 'son' and *Bint, Bath* 'daughter,' invariably refer to a god; *'Amm* forms compounds also that are parallel to compounds with Yah, cf. *'Ammi-El* and *Jo-El, 'Ammihud* and *Hud-Yah.* The substitution of *Eli-'am* in 2 S 11^3 for *'Ammi-El* of 1 Ch 3^5 also shows consciousness that 'Ammi at the beginning of a compound is a Divine name. The change is analogous to the various substitutions for Baal in the Book of Samuel. Cf. also *Abi-ḥail* in the Heb. text of Est 2^{15} 9^{29} instead of *'Ammi-nadab* of the Gr. text.

The following names belong to this class:—*'Ammi-El*, 'uncle is God' (Nu 13^{12}, 2 S $9^{4.5}$ 17^{27}, 1 Ch 3^5 26^5) = *Imi-ilu* (Obelisk of Manishtusu, Scheil, *Textes Élam.-Sém.* p. 6 ff.); *Amme-Ba'ali*, 'uncle is Lord,' an Aramæan of the middle Euphrates region (Ashurnaṣirpal, ii. 12, 118 f.); *'Ammi-ḥud*, 'uncle is glory' (2 S 13^{37} *Q're*, a king of Geshur, Nu 1^{10} 2^{18} $7^{48.53}$ 10^{22} $34^{20.28}$, 1 Ch 9^4); *'Ammi-ḥur*, 'uncle is white'? (2 S 13^{37} *Kethib*); *'Ammi-ia* (עמיה ?), the name of a land in the Tell el-Amarna letters (Winckler, 119^{11} 120^{15} etc., cf. *Abi-Yah* and *Aa-am*); *Ami-li'ti*, 'uncle is might' (Rm. 77, rev. 10; Harper, *Letters*, No. 414); *'Ammu-nira*, 'uncle is light,' king of Beirut in the Amarna letters (Winckler, 96^{29} 128–130 = *Ḥamu-niri*, $71^{15.66.69}$ $91^{53.133}$); *'Am-'âd* (meaning?), a town of Asher (Jos 19^{26}); *Ama-Sin*, 'uncle is Sin' (Ob. of Manishtusu, A, v. 3) = *Imi-Sin* (*ib.* Scheil, *Textes Élam.-Sém.* p. 6 ff.); *'Ammi-Shaddai*, 'uncle is Shaddai' (Nu 1^{12} 2^{25} $7^{66.71}$ 10^{25}); *'Am-shai*, 'uncle is a gift' (1 Ch $6^{10\text{-}30}$ 11^{20}: read עמישי, cf. אביש).

2. A second class of 'Ammi-compounds consists of names in which 'Ammi is *followed by a word that may be either a verb in the perf. 3 sing. or a verbal noun*, e.g. *'Ammi-nadab.* In names of this class, as of the preceding, *'Ammi* cannot be translated 'people.' Such combinations as 'people has bestowed,' or 'people of bestowing,' 'people is generous,' 'people is friendly,' have no sense as names of individuals. *'Ammi* must here be translated 'uncle,' or 'kinsman,' and is clearly a title of the Divinity that has given the child. Nearly all the names with *'Ammi* of this class are paralleled by compounds with *Abi* and *Aḥi*, where also the name of relationship is a title of the deity; cf. *'Ammi-nadab, Abi-nadab, Aḥi-nadab*; *'Am-ram, Abi-ram, Aḥi-ram.* The parallelism between *'Ammi-zabad* and *Jeho-zabad*; *'Am-ram* and *Jehoram*; *'Ammi-nadab, Jeho-nadab, Chemosh-nadab*; also shows that *'Ammi* is treated as a Divine name. Mention has already been made of the fact that *Ḥammu*, the Bab. equivalent of *'Ammi*, is written with the determinative of 'god' in the name Ḥammurabi.

Those who take *'Ammi* as a construct in the preceding class of names take it also as a construct in this class, and translate *'Ammi-nadab* as 'uncle of generosity'; but all the objections urged against this view in the last class hold good here. *Jeho-nadab, Chemosh-nadab, Jehoram* can only be translated 'Jahweh is generous,' 'Chemosh is generous,' 'Jahweh is high'; and on this analogy the only natural translations for *'Ammi-nadab* and *'Am-ram* are 'uncle is generous,' 'uncle is high.'

Names of this formation are as follows:—*'Ammi-amara*, a Sabæan (Hommel, *AHT* 84); *'Am-mue'-en-shi* (עמיאנש), sheikh of Upper Tenu in the Egyptian tale of Sinuhe (*c.* B.C. 1970), apparently the same as the Sabæan name *'Ammi-aniṣa* (*CIS* 13; Halévy, 155 [= 156, 158], 176, 243) and *'Ammi-anas*, a god of the Khaulan (Wellhausen, *Reste* 2, 23); *'Ammi-ditana* (*satana*?), one of the kings of the I Dyn. of Babylon; *Ammi-zabad*, 'uncle has presented' (1 Ch 27[6]); *'Ammi-za'da*, 'uncle has terrified'; *Ammi-dhara'a*, 'uncle has sown'; *'Ammi-yada'a*, 'uncle knows'; *'Ammi-yapiya*, 'uncle is perfect' (all S. Arab names, Hommel, *AHT* 84); *'Ammi-yathi'a*, 'uncle has helped,' a Sabæan (Hommel, *AHT* 84) = *Am-yate'u*, an Assyrian (*WAI* iii. 46, No. 6 = Johns, *Deeds*, No. 229, rev. 5) = *Amme-'ta'*, an Arab (*WAI* iv. 47, No. 1[15]; Delitzsch, *Paradies*, p. 303; cf. *Abi-yate'* in Ashurbanipal, *Rassam*, vii. 97); *'Ammi-kariba*, 'uncle has blessed,' a Sabæan (*CIS* iv. 73); *'Ammu-ladin*, 'uncle is near,' a king of Kedar (Ashurbanipal, *Rassam*, viii. 15); *Ammi-nadab*, 'uncle has been generous' (Ex 6^{23}, Nu 17 23^{7} 12^{2}. 17 10^{14}, Ru 4^{19}, 1 Ch 2^{10} 6^{22}, Est 2^{15} 9^{29} [acc. to LXX]), also a king of Ammon mentioned by Ashurbanipal (*KB* ii. p. 240); *'Ammi-amuqa*, 'uncle is wise,' a Sabæan (cf. Heb. עמוק); *'Ammi-ṣaduqa*, 'uncle is righteous,' a Sabæan (Hal. 535), = *'Ammi-saduqa*, a king of the I Dyn. of Babylon; *'Ammu-rabi*, or *Ḥammu-rabi*, 'uncle is great,' a king of the I Dyn. of Babylon; *'Am-ram*, 'uncle is high' (Nu $3^{17\text{-}19}$ 26^{59}, Ex $16^{18\text{-}20}$, 1 Ch $6^{2.3.18}$, Ezr 10^{34}), also an Assyrian (Johns, *Deeds*, 59, rev. 2); *'Ammi-sami'a*, 'uncle has heard,' a Sabæan (Hommel, *AHT* 84); *'Ammi-shapaka*, 'uncle has bestowed,' a Sabæan (*CIS* 37).

3. A third class of 'Ammi-formations contains names in which 'Ammi is *preceded by a noun*; e.g. *Eli-'am.* Here also the translation 'people' for *'Ammi* gives no good sense, and the noun which precedes is not construct, but absolute. *Eli-'am* does not mean 'God of the people,' nor 'God is a people,' both of which would be impossible names for an individual, but it means 'God is uncle.' Once more the parallelism between *Eli-'am* and *Eli-Yah, Baal-'am* and *Baal-Yah*, shows that *'am* is a Divine name.

The following names belong to this formation:—*Eli'am* (2 S 11^3 23^{34}), also in a Phœn. inscription (*CIS* 147), and in the Bab. name *Ilu-Imme* (Johns, *Deeds*, 1625^{6}); *Ani-'am* (1 Ch 7^{19}; meaning?, perhaps = *Anu-'am*, 'Anu is uncle'); *Beli-am*, 'Beli is uncle' (Ob. of Manishtusu, C, xv. 3; Scheil, *Textes Élam.-Sém.*), = prob. Balaam; *Ben-'ammi*, 'son of uncle,' the progenitor of the Ammonites (Gn 19^{38}; cf. art. AMMONITES); *Bir-amma*, 'Bir is uncle,' an Assyrian (Johns, *Deeds*, 476, rev. 5; 855, rev. 8); *Zimri-ḫammu*, 'mountain-sheep is uncle,' a totemic Assyr. name (*Cun. Texts Brit. Mus.* iv. 1*a*, line 8); *Aa-amme* (perhaps = *Yah-am*, 'Jahweh is uncle,' an Assyr. name (Johns, *Deeds*, 2963); *Yithre-'am*, 'abundance is uncle' (2 S 3^5, 1 Ch 3^3) = *Atar-ḫamu*? (Johns, *Deeds*, 198, obv. 3; Bezold, *Catalogue*, v. 1982); *Nabu-ḫamme*, 'Nebo is uncle,' a Bab. name interchanging with *Nabu-amme* and *Nabu-imme* (Strassmaier, *Nabuchodonosor*, p. 18 f.); *Shulmanu-imme*, 'Shulman is uncle,' an Assyr. name (Johns, *Deeds*, 2843); *Shamash-imme*, 'Shamash is uncle' (Johns, *Deeds*, 2481); *Se-imme*, 'gift is uncle' (cf. עמשי), an Assyr. name (Johns, *Deeds*, Nos. 126, 282 f.).

4. A fourth formation, in which *a verb in the perf. 3 sing. precedes* 'Ammi, is represented, so far as the present writer knows, only by רחבעם, Rehoboam (1 K 11^{43} etc.), and (= Φιλόπατρις) as a cognomen of the Nabatæan king Ḥâriṭat (Euting, *Nab. Inschr.* 25, etc.). This is perhaps a late formation, and in it *'am* may have the late sense of 'people'; but the meaning '(Divine) uncle' is also possible, and is favoured by the parallel Rehab-Yahu. The name will then mean 'uncle is large.'

5. A fifth formation is found when 'Ammi *is preceded by a verb in the imperf. 3 sing.* Here belong the Heb. personal names, יקמעם, ישבעם, ירבעם, and five town names. These are commonly believed to be a late formation peculiar to the Heb., and *'am* in them is supposed to mean 'people'; but *Yashdi-ḫammu*, ''Ammi is lofty,' occurs in an Assyr. text (*Cun. Texts Brit. Mus.* iv. 2, line 21); and יקמעם is parallel to יקמיה, and ישבעם to ישביה; so that, even in this class, the primitive meaning of 'uncle' may still survive.

From the foregoing investigation it appears that *'Amm* is one of the earliest and widest spread of the Semitic designations of deity. It appears in the Obelisk of Manishtusu, which Scheil dates B.C. 4500, and in the earliest period of all the other Semitic languages. It was originally a title like El, Baal, Adon, Melek, and most other Divine names; but in a number of places where its primitive meaning was forgotten it developed into a true personal name. Among the Hebrews it was treated, like Baal, Adon, and Melek, as a title of Jahweh. It is found most frequently in the early period, and

no new names of this sort were coined during the period covered by the OT. See AMMONITES.

LITERATURE.—Derenbourg, *REJ* ii. 123; De Jong, *Over de met ab, ach, enz. zamengestelde Hebreeuwsche Eigennamen*, 1880; G. B. Gray, *Studies in Hebrew Proper Names*, 1896, pp. 41–60, 75–86; Grünwald, *Eigennamen des AT*, 1895, p. 46 f.; Hommel, *Altisr. Überlieferung*, 1897, p. 83 ff., *Aufsätze und Abhandlungen*, 1892, p. 154, *ZDMG* xlix (1895); Jensen, *ZA* x. 342 f., *GGA*, 1900, p. 979, *LCBl*, 1902, col. 695 f.; Kerber, *Die religionsgesch. Bedeutung der heb. Eigennamen*, 1897, p. 5 ff.; Krenkel, 'Das Verwandtschaftswort בן,' *ZATW*, 1888, p. 280 ff.; Lenormant, *Lettres Assyriologiques*, 1872, 1 ser. ii. 84; Mordtmann, *ZDMG*, 1872, p. 427; Nestle, *Die isr. Eigennamen*, 1876; Neubauer in *Studia Biblica*, 1885, i. 225; Prätorius, *ZDMG*, 1872, p. 427, *Neue Beiträge zur Erklärung der him. Inschriften*, 1873, p. 25; Sayce, *RP*, 2 ser. iii. p. xi; W.R. Smith, *Kinship*[2], 1903, p. 71 f.; Wellhausen, *GGN*, 1893, p. 480 f.; *KAT*[3], 1902, p. 480 ff.

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AMMONITES.—During the period covered by the Old Testament literature the Ammonites occupied the eastern portion of the region now known as the Belḳā. Dt 2[37] describes their territory as 'the whole side of the torrent of Jabbōq, and the cities of the hill-country,' *i.e.* the region about the upper course of the modern Wādy Zerḳā (cf. Dt 3[16], Jos 12[2]). Jos 13[25] speaks of the towns of Ja'zēr and 'Ārō'ēr as marking the frontier between Ammon and Israel. Ja'zēr is also named in Nu 21[24] according to the Gr. text (BAFL). It is described by Eusebius and Jerome as lying 10 R.m. west of Philadelphia (Rabbah) and 15 R.m. from Heshbon. Its precise location and also that of 'Ārō'ēr have not yet been determined. The capital city of the country was Rabbāh, or Rabbath benê-'Ammôn, at the head-waters of the Jabbōq (cf. Dt 3[11], Jos 13[25], 2 S 11[1] 12[26-29] 17[27], 1 Ch 20[1], Jer 49[2f.], Ezk 21[25(20)] 25[5], Am 1[14]). It was rebuilt by Ptolemy Philadelphus (B.C. 285–247), and received from him its Greek name of Philadelphia. Its modern Arabic name of 'Ammān is a survival of the ancient name of the land. The other towns Minnîth and Âbêl-cheramîm are mentioned in Jg 11[33].

In regard to this people there are no native sources of information. Even inscriptions are wholly lacking. Our knowledge of their religion, accordingly, must be derived from the scanty notices of the OT and from the allusions in certain Assyrian inscriptions.

According to Gn 19[30-38], the ancestors of Moab and Ammon were sons of Lot by his two daughters. They were thus nearly related to Israel (cf. Dt 2[9. 19]). In the case of the Moabites this opinion is sustained by proper names and by the Mesha inscription, which is written in a dialect almost identical with Hebrew. In the case of the Ammonites it is sustained by the proper names Nāḥāsh (1 S 11[1]), Ḥānûn (2 S 10[1]), Shōbî (17[27]), Zelek (23[37]), Na'amāh (1 K 14[21]), Ba'sa and Ruḥub (Shalmaneser, *Monolith*, ii. 95), Sanipu (Tiglath Pileser, *Clay Tablet Ins.*, rev. 10), Puduilu (Sennacherib, *Prism*, ii. 52; Esarhaddon, *Broken Prism*, v. 18), Amminadbi (Ashurbanipal, 'Fragment,' in *Keilinschrift. Bibl.* ii. p. 240), Ba'ālis (Jer 40[14]), Tōbîāh (Neh 2[19]); also by the divine name Milcōm, and the city names Rabbāh, 'Ārō'ēr, Minnith, Âbêl-cheramîm, all of which are easily interpreted from the Hebrew.

The Ammonites were a part of the same wave of Semitic migration to which Israel belonged, and their settlement east of the Jordan did not long precede Israel's occupation of Canaan. According to Dt 2[20f.], they dispossessed a people known as the Zamzummîm, a branch of the Rephaim, which it has been proposed to identify with the Zuzim in Ham of Gn 14[5] (cf. Dt 2[11]). According to Jg 11[13-22], Jos 13[25], they occupied originally the whole of the region east of the Jordan, but were driven out of the western half of this by the Amorites (cf. Nu 21[25-31]). The Amorite kingdom of Sihon the Israelites conquered, but the land of the Ammonites they did not disturb (Nu 21[24], Dt 2[19. 37] 3[16], Jg 11[15]). Dt 23[4(3)f.] represents the Ammonites as participating with the Moabites in hiring Balaam to curse Israel, and, according to Nu 22[5], Balaam came from the land of the children of Ammon (read '*Ammôn* with Sam., Syr., Vulg., instead of '*ammô*, 'his people'). According to Jg 3[13], the Ammonites assisted Eglon, king of Moab, in his conquest, and, according to 10[7]–11[33], they disputed the possession of Gilead with the Israelites. A similar attack upon Gilead by Nahash, king of Ammon, was warded off by Saul, and was the occasion of his elevation to the throne, according to the older source of the Book of Samuel (1 S 11[1-11]). Nahash 'showed kindness' unto David, *i.e.* kept peace with him and paid his tribute, but his son Hanun, trusting to the help of the Aramæans of the adjacent regions of Beth-Rehob, Zobah, and Maacah, revolted, and had to be conquered by David (2 S 10[1]–11[1] 12[26-31], 1 Ch 19[1]–20[3]). The spoil of this campaign David dedicated to Jahweh (2 S 8[12]= 1 Ch 18[11]), and the Ammonites remained tributary during the rest of his reign and during the reign of his successor. Zelek the Ammonite appears in the list of David's bodyguard (2 S 23[37]). Solomon cultivated friendly relations by marrying a wife from this nation (1 K 11[1]), and this account is confirmed by the fact that the mother of Rehoboam was an Ammonitess (14[21. 31]). According to one recension of the LXX, she was the daughter of Hanun, son of Nahash. For her benefit the cult of Milcōm, the god of Ammon, was established on a hill near Jerusalem (1 K 11[5. 7. 33], 2 K 23[13]). After the death of Solomon, the Ammonites appear to have regained their independence, and to have remained free until they fell beneath the yoke of the Assyrians along with the other small nations of Western Asia. The victories of Jehoshaphat, Uzziah, and Jotham over them rest only upon the authority of the Chronicler (2 Ch 20. 26[8] 27[5]). In B.C. 854, Ba'sa (Baasha), son of Ruḥub (Reḥôb), with 1000 men, came to the help of the king of Damascus against Shalmaneser II., along with Ahab of Israel and ten other kings of Syria (Shalmaneser, *Monolith*, ii. 95). In the reign of Jeroboam II. (*c.* 760 B.C.), Amos denounces the Ammonites because of the atrocities that they have committed in Gilead (Am 1[13]). In B.C. 734, Tiglath Pileser III. records that he received the tribute of Sanipu of Bit-'Ammān (Bêth-'Ammôn), along with that of Ahaz of Judah (*Clay Tablet Ins.*, rev. 10). From Zeph 2[8f.], Jer 9[25(26)] 49[1-6], it appears that after the deportation of the Israelites east of the Jordan by Tiglath Pileser III. in 734 (2 K 15[29]), the Ammonites moved in and occupied their land. Sennacherib (*Prism*, ii. 52) records that he received the tribute of Puduilu (Padahel) of Bit-'Ammān at the time of his invasion of Syria in 701. This same Puduilu is mentioned by Esarhaddon (*Broken Prism*, v. 18) as one of the twenty-two kings of the 'land of the Hittites' who furnished building materials for one of his palaces. In his place in a similar list of twenty-two kings Ashurbanipal names Amminadbi (Amminadab) (*Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek*, ii. p. 240, l. 11). At the time of Nebuchadrezzar's first invasion of Syria the Ammonites assisted him (2 K 24[2]). Subsequently they joined a league against him (Jer 27[3], Ezk 21[20. 28]), but before they were attacked they managed to make peace, and participated in his assault upon Jerusalem (Ezk 25[1-7. 10]). In spite of this, many of the Jews took refuge among them at the time of the siege, and Ishmael was incited by Baalis, king of Ammon, to murder Gedaliah, the governor whom Nebuchadrezzar had appointed at the time of the fall of the city (Jer 40[11. 14] 41[10]). The name Kephar hā-'Ammônai in Jos 18[24] (P), as one of the villages of Benjamin, suggests that during the Exile the Ammonites, like the Edomites, made settlements west of the Jordan. If so, this will explain the denunciation of the exilic prophecy, Is 11[14]. As early as the time of Ashurbanipal, two main divisions of the Arabians, Kedar and Nebaioth, were menacing the old lands of Edom, Moab, and Ammon, and were prevented from overrunning them only by the activity of the Assyrian monarch. Ezk 25 anticipates that these 'children of the East' will bring these three nations to an end (cf. Ob 17); and, as a matter of fact, after the Exile we find, instead of Moab and Edom, Geshem the Arabian as the chief enemy of the Jews (Neh 2[19] 4[7] 6[1. 6]). Ammonites are still mentioned, but they seem to lead no independent national existence. Tobiah, the Ammonite who opposed Nehemiah (2[10. 19] 4[3. 7] 6[17] 13[4]), bore a name compounded with Jahweh, he and his son both had Jewish wives, he was connected by marriage with the high priest, and he appears regularly in company with Sanballat the Horonite and the Samaritans. Apparently he had nothing to do with the old land of Ammon, but was a resident of Kephar hā-'Ammônai (Jos 18[24]). No king of Ammon is named after the Exile, and it seems probable that this people perished as a nation, along with Moab and Edom, at the time of the Nabatæan Arabian migration. Survivors of these nations found refuge in Judah, and gave rise to the problem of mixed marriages, which caused Nehemiah and Ezra so much trouble (Ezr 9[1], Neh 13[1. 23]). Where Ammonites are mentioned in the later history, we have merely an application of an old geographical term to a new race. The Ammonites under Timotheus (1 Mac 5[6-8]), and the Ammonites of Ps 83[7] and Dn 11[41], are Nabatæans or Greeks living in the old land of Ammon.

We must now endeavour to construct from these meagre sources a picture of the religion of the ancient Ammonites. From 1 K 11[5. 33], 2 K 23[13], it appears that Milcōm was their chief national god, just as Chemosh was the god of Moab, Kozai of Edom, and Jahweh of Israel. In 2 S 12[30]=1 Ch 20[2] the LXX reads *Milcōm* instead of *malcām*, 'their king.' This is the reading of the Talmud (*'Ābōdā zārā*, 44*a*), of the old Jewish commentators, and of most modern authorities. In that case the passage reads, 'And he took the crown of Milcōm from off his head, its weight was a talent of gold, and on it there was a precious stone. It David placed upon his own head.' From this it appears that Milcōm was represented by an idol of human size which was adorned with the insignia of royalty like other ancient images. In Jer 49[1. 3], LXX, Vulg., Syr. also read *Milcōm* instead of MT *malcām*, and this reading is undoubtedly correct, so that the passage should be translated. 'Hath

Israel no sons? hath he no heir? why then doth Milcōm inherit Gad, and his people dwell in the cities thereof? . . . Milcōm shall go into captivity, his priests and his princes together.' This shows that Milcōm bore a relation to Ammon similar to that which Jahweh bore to Israel, and that he had a priesthood that was the counterpart of the Jahweh priesthood. In 2 S 12^{31}, Am 1^{15} 5^{26}, Zeph 1^{5}, some of the versions and certain commentators also read *Milcōm* instead of *malcēn* and *malcām*, but these emendations are less probable. Apart from these passages in the OT no mention of Milcōm is known.

The name Milcōm is with Baudissin (*Jahve et Moloch*, 30) and Lagarde (*Übersicht über die . . . Bildung der Nomina*, p. 190) to be regarded as *milk* 'king' (Phœn. *milk*, Heb. *mélek*) with the old nominative ending and mimmation. It means, therefore, simply 'the king.' Others regard it as compounded of *mélek* and *'am*, and as meaning 'king of the people' (so Kuenen, *Theol. Tijdschrift*, ii. 1868, 555–598), or 'Am is king' (so Eerdmans, *Melekdienst*, 112); but these explanations are unsatisfactory, because they do not account for the disappearance of the *y*. In etymology and meaning accordingly, Milcōm is identical with Molech, the god wroshipped by the Israelites, according to Lv 18^{21} 20^{2-5}, 2 K 23^{10}, Jer 32^{35}. The vowels of this word are generally believed to be those of *bōsheth* 'shame,' and to have been added by the Massoretes to express their abhorrence of the cult. The original pronunciation was Mélek. The name is always accompanied by the article (except in 1 K 11^{7}, where the text is corrupt), and means 'the king.' In Is 30^{33} 57^{9} it is probable that 'the king' refers to this god, and there are other passages in the OT where it is possible that the expression has the same meaning.

On the basis of the similarity of form and meaning of Milcōm and Molech it has been conjectured that the two gods are identical, and that Molech-worship was borrowed by Israel from the Ammonites. If so, we can learn something in regard to Milcōm from a study of Molech. In support of this theory it is claimed that the only passages in the OT which mention Molech-worship (2 K 23^{10}, Jer 32^{35}, Lv 18^{21} 20^{2-5}, Is 30^{33} 57^{9}) were written after the time of Manasseh, and have his abuses in mind. This seems to show that Molech-worship was an innovation introduced from Ammon. There are several difficulties in the way of this view. Even if we grant that Molech was a borrowed divinity, it is not clear why he should have been borrowed from the Ammonites. They had no such political importance in the time of Manasseh that their god should have been sought as a refuge against the Assyrians. If Molech was borrowed from them, why did he not retain his original name of Milcōm? Mélek as a divine name is found in all branches of the Semitic race. In Babylonia and Assyria it appears as Malik (Jastrow, *Rel. of Bab. and Assyr.* 176 f.); among the people of Sepharvaim as Adram-Mélek and Anam-Mélek (2 K 17^{31}); in Palmyra as Malak-Bel (Baudissin, *Studien*, ii. 193); in Phœnicia, as Melkart (=מלך־קרית); in Edom, in the proper name Malik-ramu (Sennacherib, *Prism*, ii. 54). If Molech-worship is really a borrowed cult in Israel, it may have been derived from any one of these sources quite as well as from the Ammonites.

It is not certain, however, that Molech-worship was an innovation introduced by Manasseh. Mélek is a title frequently applied to Jahweh Himself (*e.g.* Ps $5^{3(2)}$ 10^{16} $20^{10(9)}$ 24^{7} 29^{10} $44^{5(4)}$ $47^{3(2)}$ $48^{3(2)}$ $68^{25(24)}$ 74^{12} $84^{4(3)}$ 95^{3} 98^{6}, Is 6^{5} 33^{22}, Jer 8^{19} 10^{10} 46^{18}, Mic 4^{9}, Zeph 1^{5}, Zec 14^{17}, Mal 1^{14}, and proper names such as Malkishua, 1 S 14^{49}). A characteristic feature of the Mélek cult was child-sacrifice, and this is known to have been an element of the early Jahweh religion. The Book of the Covenant in Ex $22^{28(29)}$ enacts, 'The firstborn of thy sons shalt thou give unto me,' and contains no provision for redemption, such as we find in 13^{13} and 34^{20}. The story of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac in Gn 22 (E) shows that child-sacrifice was practised in the early religion of Jahweh, but that the conviction was growing in prophetic circles that Jahweh did not demand these offerings. In spite of prophetic opposition, however, they continued to be brought (cf. 1 K 16^{34}, and Winckler, *Gesch. Isr.* i. 163, n. 3; 2 K 16^{3}, 2 Ch 28^{3}). Jeremiah repeatedly insists that Jahweh does not require these sacrifices (Jer 7^{31} 19^{5} 32^{35}), and this indicates that in the popular conception they were part of His requirements. The Holiness Code (Lv 18^{21}) also suggests that Molech sacrifices were popularly regarded as Jahweh sacrifices. Ezekiel goes so far as to quote the law of Ex 13^{12}, 'Thou shalt sacrifice unto Jahweh everything that openeth the womb,' and to say that Jahweh gave this commandment in wrath to destroy the nation because it would not keep the good statutes that he had previously given it (Ezk $20^{24-26.\ 31}$). These facts make it clear that Molech-worship was no new thing in Israel, and that by the nation in general it was regarded as one form of Jahweh-worship. The absence of early prophetic polemic against child-sacrifice is, accordingly, to be explained by the fact that the prophets included it in their repudiation of all sacrifice. Jeremiah and Ezekiel, who hold the Deuteronomic standpoint in regard to sacrifice, are obliged to specify that Jahweh does not require child-sacrifice, although He requires animal-sacrifice. If Molech-worship is ancient in Israel, then it cannot have been borrowed from the Ammonites in the time of Manasseh.

Another theory which identifies Milcōm with Molech supposes that this cult was introduced into Israel by Solomon. This opinion makes its appearance as early as the Gr. versions, and has been the source of much textual corruption. It seems to be supported by 1 K $11^{7.\ 33}$, which speaks of 'Milcōm, the abomination of the Ammonites,' as worshipped by Solomon after his marriage with an Ammonite wife (cf. 2 K 23^{13}, 1 K $14^{21.\ 31}$); and by 1 K 11^{7}, which calls this god Molech. Granting the historicity of Solomon's worship of Milcōm, which is disputed by a number of critics, it appears from 1 K 11^{7}, 2 K 23^{13}, that the high place of Milcōm was on the right hand of the Mount of Destruction east of Jerusalem, *i.e.* somewhere on the ridge of the Mount of Olives; but the high place of Molech, according to all the OT references, was in the Valley of Hinnom (cf. 2 K 23^{10}, Jer 2^{23} 7^{31} 19^{6} 32^{35}, 2 Ch 28^{3} 33^{6}). From this it is clear that Milcōm and Molech were not identified by the ancient Israelites (cf. Baethgen, *Beiträge*, 15). The substitution of Molech for Milcōm in 1 K 11^{7} is evidently a textual error; the MT points without the article, and Lucian's recension of the LXX reads Milcōm.

A third theory is that there was a primitive Semitic god, Mélek, of which Milcōm and Molech are local variants. Against this view is the fact that Milcōm and Molech are not personal names, but titles, like Baal, 'owner'; Adon, 'master'; Marna, 'our lord.' There was no primitive Semitic god Baal, whose cult came down in the various branches of the Semitic race, but there was a multitude of Baalim who presided over various holy places and who were distinguished from one another as the Baal of this place or the Baal of that place. These Baalim were different in functions and might have different personal names. In like manner there were as many Mĕlākîm as there were nations, and there is no reason why the Mélek of Ammon, or the Mélek of Israel, or the Mélek of Tyre, or the Mélek of Palmyra should

be identified with one another, any more than why their human rulers should be identified because they all bore the name of 'king.'

Although there was no primitive god Mélek, it is probable, however, that all the various M^{e}lākîm of the Semitic races bore a family resemblance to one another, just as the Baalim bore a family resemblance, so that it is possible to draw inferences from the character of one Mélek to that of another. The Baalim were gods of nature. They manifested themselves in springs and streams and trees. They gave the fruits of the earth, and they were worshipped with offerings of firstfruits. The M^{e}lākîm, on the other hand, were tribal gods conceived after the analogy of human rulers. They gave the fruit of the womb; and, accordingly, they were worshipped with firstborn children and firstborn animals. Wherever we know anything of the cult of the M^{e}lākîm, child-sacrifice is its most conspicuous feature. When this rite was practised in Israel it was always in the name of the Mélek, even though this might be understood as a title of Jahweh. From Dt 12^{31} 18$^{9.\ 10}$, Lv 18$^{21.\ 24}$, Ezk 16^{20}, Ps 106^{38}, it appears that this sort of sacrifice was also offered by the Canaanites, and this testimony is confirmed by the excavations at Gezer, Megiddo, and Taanach, where the remains of sacrificed infants have been found in large numbers. Child-sacrifice was a conspicuous element in the cult of the Tyrian and Carthaginian Melḳart, and 2 K 17^{31} states that the people of Sepharvaim sacrificed their children to Adram-Mélek, and Anam-Mélek. These facts seem to show that sacrifice of infants was intimately connected with the conception of deity as Mélek, or ruler of the tribe; and we are probably warranted in thinking that wherever a god was called by this name this sort of sacrifice was celebrated in his honour. In the case of Milcōm, accordingly, infant-sacrifice is probable, although this is never mentioned in the OT; and this opinion is confirmed by the fact that the closely related Moabites sacrificed children in honour of their god Chemosh (2 K 3^{27}).

In regard to the manner in which children were sacrificed we have only the analogy of Molech-worship in Israel to guide us. The technical name for the rite was 'making over children to the King by fire' (Lv 18^{21} 20$^{2-4}$, Dt 18^{10}, 2 K 16^{3} 17^{17} 21^{6}, 2 Ch 33^{6}, Ezk 20^{31}). The same expression is used of 'making over' the firstborn to Jahweh in Ex 13^{12}. From Gn 22^{10}, Ezk 16^{20}, Is 57^{5}, *et al.*, it appears that children were slain like other sacrifices, and from Dt 12^{31} 18^{10}, 2 K 17^{31}, Jer 3^{24} 7^{31} 19$^{4-6}$ 32^{35}, that their bodies were afterwards burnt in a place known as *T^{e}phāth* (*Tōpheth*, with the vowels of *bōsheth*, 'shame'). Analogous rites are found among the Phœnicians and Carthaginians, and we may perhaps assume that they existed also among the Ammonites.

Besides Milcōm there is no clear evidence that the Ammonites worshipped any other god. Jg 10^{6} speaks of 'the gods of the children of Ammon,' but this is a late editorial passage. From Jg 11^{24} it has been inferred that Chemosh was a god of the Ammonites as well as of the Moabites, or else that Chemosh and Milcōm were identified; but it is now generally recognized that the section Jg 11$^{12-28}$ has nothing to do with Jephthah's dispute with the Ammonites. It is a fragment of a narrative of a dispute between Israel and the Moabites which has been combined with the Jephthah story by the compiler of the Book of Judges (cf. Moore, *Judges*, 283).

More can be said in favour of the view that the Ammonites worshipped a god called 'Am or 'Ammi. The name 'Ammôn (Assyr. Ammān) is apparently a diminutive or pet-name from 'Am, as Shimshôn (Samson) is from Shemesh. Ammon alone is never used as a tribal name, except in the late passages, Ps 83^{7} and 1 S 11^{11}, where the Gr. reads τοὺς υἱοὺς Ἀμμών. The regular expression is 'children of Ammon.' Even the ancestor of the race is not called Ammon, but Ben-'Ammî (Gn 19^{38}). 'Am means primarily 'father-uncle' in a polyandrous society, then 'paternal uncle,' then 'kinsman,' then 'people.' The narrator in Gn 19^{38} has chosen the meaning 'father-uncle,' and has derived from this the story of the incestuous origin of the Ammonites. Their ancestor, he thinks, was called Ben-'Ammî, 'son of my father-uncle,' because his father was also his mother's father. It is more likely, however, that 'Ammî was used here originally with reference to a god who was called the 'father-uncle,' or 'kinsman' of the tribe.

This use of 'Ammî as a divine name is wide-spread in the Semitic dialects. In Heb. we find it as the first element of the proper names 'Ammiel, 'Ammihud, 'Ammihur, 'Amminadab, 'Ammishadai, 'Ammizabad, 'Ammiad; and as the final element in the names Ani'am, Eli'am, Ithre'am, Jashobe'am, Jekame'am, Jeroboam, Rehoboam, Jible'am, Jokde'am, Jokme'am, Jokne'am, Jorke'am. In Babylonia it appears in names of kings of the first dynasty, 'Ammisatana, 'Ammisaduga, Ḥammurabi (or 'Ammurabi), and in South Arabia in 'Amḳarib and other proper names. One of the kings of Ammon mentioned by Ashurbanipal bore the name Amminadbi (Amminadab), 'my father-uncle is generous,' where 'Ammî is clearly the name of a deity. Bala'am is also a name compounded with 'Am, and one tradition in Nu 22^{5} (read '*Ammôn* instead of '*ammô*, 'his people'), makes Balaam come from the land of the children of Ammon (cf. Dt 23$^{4\ (3)}$ *f.*. Rehoboam also bears a name compounded with 'Am, and he was the son of an Ammonite mother (1 K 14$^{21.\ 31}$).

On the basis of some of these facts, Derenbourg, in *REJ* (1880) i. 123, proposed the theory that 'Am, or 'Ammi, was the name of the national god of the Ammonites. This theory is correct, if we regard 'Am as merely a title applied to Milcōm by the Ammonites, as it was applied to Jahweh by the Israelites; but it is not correct if we regard 'Am as a separate deity. There is no evidence that there was a primitive Semitic god 'Am, any more than that there was a primitive Semitic god Baal or Mélek. 'Paternal uncle' is a title like 'father,' 'brother,' 'king,' 'lord,' that might be applied to the most diverse gods (see 'Amm, 'Ammi).

The word Ilu, or El, which appears in the name of the Ammonite king Pudu-ilu (cf. Padah-El, 'God has redeemed,' Nu 34^{28}), is also generic, and may refer to Milcōm, as it does to Jahweh in the parallel Heb. form (cf. Pedaiah, 2 K 23^{36}). Baalis (בעלי֫ס), the name borne by the king of Ammon at the time of the fall of Jerusalem, is of doubtful etymology. Grätz regards it as abbreviated out of Ben-ʿālîṣ (בן־עלי֫ץ), 'son of exultation.' Baethgen (*Beiträge*, 16) regards it as equivalent to Baal-Isis, 'husband of Isis,' or 'Isis is Baal,' and compares Abd-is, 'servant of Isis' (*CIS* 308). Both interpretations are exceedingly doubtful, and all that can be gathered from this name is that Baal was in use as a generic name for deity among the Ammonites as among the other Semites. Tobiah the Ammonite and his son Jehohanan (Neh 2^{10} 6$^{17f.}$) have names compounded with Jahweh, and this has been made a basis for the conjecture that Jahweh was one of the gods of the Ammonites, as of the people of Hamath (cf. Joram, 2 S 8^{10}, and Yau-bi'di in the inscriptions of Sargon), and of the people of Ya'udi in Northern Syria (cf. Azri-yau in the inscriptions of Tiglath Pileser III.). The conclusion is, however, not valid, because, as previously pointed out, the Ammonites settled in the land of Israel during the Exile and adopted the cult of the god of the land. The other Ammonite names that have come down to us are not theophorous, and, therefore, yield no information in regard to the religion of this race. Stephen of Byzantium (cited by Baethgen, *Beiträge*, 16) states that the original name of the capital of Ammon was Ammana, then it was called Astarte, and finally Philadelphia. If this be true, it indicates the worship of the primi-

tive Semitic goddess Ashtart. From the mention of the gigantic sarcophagus of Og that was preserved at Rabbah (Dt 3^{11}), we may, perhaps, infer that ancestor-worship was practised among the Ammonites as among other branches of the Semitic race.

From the foregoing survey it appears that there is no convincing evidence of the worship of any other god than Milcōm among the Ammonites. It would be rash, however, to infer from this lack of evidence, which is due to the scantiness of our sources, that Milcōm occupied the same unique place in Ammon as Jahweh did in Israel; and to use this, as Renan did, as proof of a tendency to monotheism in that branch of the Semitic race to which Israel belonged. In all probability the Ammonites were polytheists, like their neighbours and near relatives the Moabites and Edomites, and it is merely an accident that we know the name of only the head god of their pantheon.

In regard to the rites of their religion we know practically nothing, except what we may infer from the analogy of the religions of kindred races. Jer 9^{26} shows that they practised the rite of circumcision, in common with the Egyptians, Israelites, Edomites, and Moabites. In other respects probably their customs did not differ widely from those of ancient Israel. From Gn 19^{36-38} Delitzsch (*Com. on Gen.*) infers that the Ammonites and Moabites were characterized by an extreme lewdness that aroused the moral repugnance of Israel; and he appeals to Nu 25 for proof of this in the case of the Moabites; but Gn 19^{36-38} is so evidently derived from a fanciful popular etymology of the names Moab and Ben-'Ammī that no historical conclusions can be based upon it.

LITERATURE.—Ewald, *Hist. of Isr.* (London, 1876), ii. pp. 295, 336, 393 ff., iii. (1878), p. 24; Stade, *GVI* (1881), i. pp. 113–126; Wellhausen, *Isr. u. jüd. Gesch.* (1895), p. 7 ff.; Winckler, *Gesch. Isr.* (1895), i. pp. 213–216; Kautzsch, art. 'Ammon' in Riehm's *HWB* (1884); Macpherson, art. 'Ammon' in Hastings' *DB* (1899); Buhl, art. 'Ammon' in *PRE*^{3}; Moore, art. 'Milcom' in *EBi*; and the literature under MOLECH, AMMI in this work.

LEWIS BAYLES PATON.

AMNESTY.—The word is used somewhat loosely by modern writers with reference to several episodes in Greek history. Strictly and properly, it is the word used by writers of the post-classical age to describe the resolution adopted by the Athenians after the expulsion of the so-called Thirty Tyrants, when, in the summer of B.C. 403, a reconciliation was effected, through the mediation of the Spartan king Pausanias, between the oligarchical party of the city and the democrats of the Piræus, upon the following basis:

'All persons who, having remained in the City during the oligarchical régime, were anxious to leave it, were to be free to settle at Eleusis, retaining their full civil rights, and possessing full and independent rights of self-government, with free enjoyment of their personal property. . . . There should be a universal amnesty concerning past events towards all persons (*τῶν δὲ παρεληλυθότων μηδενὶ πρὸς μηδένα μνησικακεῖν ἐξεῖναι*), except the Thirty, the Ten (who were their successors), the Eleven (who had carried out their decrees of execution), and the magistrates (ten in number) of the Piræus; and these should also be included if they should submit *to give an account of their official acts (ἐὰν διδῶσιν εὐθύνας)* in the usual way' (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 39 [Kenyon's tr.]; cf. Xen. *Hell.* ii. 4. 38, and reference in Aristoph. *Plut.* 1146: *μὴ μνησικακήσῃς, εἰ σὺ Φυλὴν κατέλαβες. Ἀλλὰ ξύνοικον πρὸς θεῶν δέξασθέ με*).

That the children of the Thirty were included under the amnesty is testified by Demosthenes *Or.* xl. 32: *νυνὶ δ' ὑμεῖς μὲν οὕτως ἐστὲ κοινοὶ καὶ φιλάνθρωποι, ὥστ' οὐδὲ τοὺς τῶν τριάκοντα υἱεῖς φυγαδεῦσαι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἠξιώσατε*—which was in striking contrast with the practice usual in Greek political strife.* This agreement of harmony was ratified by the oath of the whole people, and for some years at least it seems to have been incorporated with the oath of office taken by members of the Council and the Heliasts—the senators swearing not to admit any information (*ἔνδειξις*) or to allow any arrest (*ἀπαγωγή*) founded on any fact prior to the archonship of Eukleides, excepting only in the case of the persons expressly excluded from the amnesty (*πλὴν τῶν φυγόντων*); the dikasts swearing neither to remember past wrongs, nor to yield to any solicitation to do so, but to give their verdict in accordance with the revised code dating from the restoration of the democracy (Andoc. *de Myst.* 90: *οὐ μνησικακήσω, οὐδὲ ἄλλῳ πείσομαι, ψηφιοῦμαι δὲ κατὰ τοὺς κειμένους νόμους.* See Grote, *Hist. of Greece* [vol. xii. ed. 1884], viii. 100 n.).*

The amnesty, as above described, seems to have been renewed two years later with the secessionists at Eleusis (Arist. *l.c.*; Xen. *Hell.* ii. 4. 43: *καὶ ὀμόσαντες ὅρκους ἢ μὴν μὴ μνησικακήσειν ἔτι καὶ νῦν ὀμοῦ τε πολιτεύονται καὶ τοῖς ὅρκοις ἐμμένει ὁ δῆμος*). The energetic but high-handed action of Archinos was a powerful factor in maintaining the amnesty. When one of the returned exiles began to violate the agreement, Archinos haled him before the Council, and persuaded the Councillors to put the man to death without trial (Arist. *l.c.*: *ἄκριτον ἀποκτεῖναι*), telling them that they had now an opportunity of showing whether they wished to preserve the democracy and abide by their oath. Archinos also carried a measure giving every one accused in violation of the amnesty the right to raise a special plea in bar of action (*παραγραφή*. See Isocr. *Or.* xviii. 2: *ἂν τις δικάζηται παρὰ τοὺς ὅρκους, ἐξεῖναι τῷ φεύγοντι παραγράψασθαι . . . ἵν' οἱ τολμῶντες μνησικακεῖν μὴ μόνον ἐπιορκοῦντες ἐξελέγχοιντο κ.τ.λ.*).†

It must be noticed that the terms used of the above events by the classical writers are *αἱ διαλύσεις* or *αἱ διαλλαγαί*, *αἱ διαθῆκαι*, *οἱ ὅρκοι*—the 'reconciliation,' the 'covenant,' the 'oath'; while for the specific content of the oath the phrase *μὴ μνησικακεῖν*, 'not to remember past wrongs,' is ordinarily used (corresponding to the phrase *τὰς περὶ τῶν προτέρων αἰτίας ἐξήλειψαν* used in Arist. *Ath. Pol.* xl. 3). Compare the account given by the Latin compilers, *e.g.* Corn. Nep. *Thras.* iii. 2: 'legem tulit, ne quis ante actarum rerum accusaretur neve multaretur, eamque illi oblivionis appellarunt'; Justin, v. 10. 10: 'atque ita per multa membra civitas dissipata in unum tandem corpus redigitur, et ne qua dissensio ex ante actis nasceretur, omnes iure iurando obstringuntur, discordiarum oblivionem fore.' The Greek word *ἀμνηστία*, translating the Latin *oblivio*, is first used in Val. Max. iv. 1. 4: 'hæc oblivio, quam Athenienses *ἀμνηστίαν* vocant'; and by Plutarch (*Cic.* 42): *Κικέρων . . . ἔπεισε τὴν σύγκλητον Ἀθηναίους μιμησαμένην ἀμνηστίαν τῶν ἐπὶ Καίσαρι ψηφίσασθαι* (cf. Plut. *Præc. Pol.* 17: *τὸ ψήφισμα τὸ τῆς ἀμνηστίας ἐπὶ τοῖς τριάκοντα*: and Hist. Aug. *Aurel.* 39: 'amnestia etiam sub eo delictorum publicorum decreta est de exemplo Atheniensium'). It was probably the classical phrase *μὴ μνησικακεῖν* that was in Cicero's mind in the opening of his First Philippic (*Phil.* i. 1: 'in quo templo, quantum in me fuit, ieci fundamenta pacis, Atheniensiumque renovavi vetus exemplum: græcum etiam verbum usurpavi, quo tum in sedandis discordiis usa erat civitas illa, atque omnem memoriam discordiarum oblivione sempiterna delendam censui'—where, however, the Berne MS reads 'amnestiam' before 'usurpavi').

A similar example of an Act of oblivion, though no details are known, is furnished by the restored democracy of Samos in B.C. 411 (Thuc. viii. 73: *καὶ τριάκοντα μέν τινας ἀπέκτειναν τῶν τριακοσίων, τρεῖς δὲ τοὺς αἰτιωτάτους φυγῇ ἐζημίωσαν· τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις οὐ μνησικακοῦντες δημοκρατούμενοι τὸ λοιπὸν ξυνεπολίτευον*). An abortive attempt to re-establish harmony on the basis of amnesty was made at Megara in B.C. 424 (Thuc. iv. 74).

It is clear that the above Acts of oblivion differ from those examples to which the word 'amnesty' is also applied by modern writers—that is to say, those resolutions, of which several instances are

* Cf. Dio Cass. xliv. 26. 2: *στασιάσαντές ποτε . . . καὶ τυραννηθέντες, οὐ πρότερον ἀπηλλάγησαν τῶν κακῶν πρὶν συνθέσθαι καὶ διομολογήσασθαι τῶν τε συμβεβηκότων σφίσι . . . ἀπολήσεσθαι, καὶ μηδὲν τὸ παράπαν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν μήτε ἐγκαλέσειν ποτὲ μήτε μνησικακήσειν τινί.*

† Whether this belongs to the year B.C. 403 or to B.C. 401 is doubtful—probably to the latter year; so the present writer would arrange the events, rejecting Breitenbach's attempt (ed. of Xen. *Hell.* ed. 2, note on *Hell.* ii. 4. 43) to prove that the oath as given by Andocides (above quoted) belongs to the second and final act of reconciliation, and that hence arises its difference from the oath as given by Xen. *Hell.* ii. 4. 38.

* *e.g.* at Corcyra (Thuc. iii. 70 *f.*); at Argos (Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, ix. 418); see Thonissen, *Le droit pénal*, p. 153, and cf. Dio Cass. xliv. 26. 5.

known from Greek history, taken in times of great danger, with the object of stilling disputes and uniting all forces in defence, by which political exiles were recalled and civic rights conferred upon those who had been partially or wholly disfranchised as a penal measure. The Athenians adopted this measure shortly before the battle of Salamis (Andoc. *de Myst.* 107: *ἔγνωσαν τοὺς τε φεύγοντας καταδέξασθαι καὶ τοὺς ἀτίμους ἐπιτίμους ποιῆσαι.* Cf. Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 22: *κατεδέξαντο πάντας τοὺς ὠστρακισμένους . . . διὰ τὴν Ξέρξου στρατείαν*). Again, a similar resolution was passed at the time of the siege of Athens by Lysander, on the motion of Patrokleides (Andoc. *op. cit.* 73: *ἐπεὶ γὰρ αἱ νῆες διεφθάρησαν καὶ ἡ πολιορκία ἐγένετο, ἐβουλεύσασθε περὶ ὁμονοίας, καὶ ἔδοξεν ὑμῖν τοὺς ἀτίμους ἐπιτίμους ποιῆσαι*: see § 77 for the full text of the decree). A third example is furnished by the proposal of Hypereides after the defeat at Chæroneia, that exiles should be recalled and public debtors and other *ἄτιμοι* be restored to their civic status on condition of military service (Lycurg. *Leocr.* 41; Hyper. *frg.* 29; Demos. *Or.* xxvi. 12: *ὅτε γὰρ Ὑπερείδης ἔγραψε, τῶν περὶ Χαιρώνειαν ἀτυχημάτων τοῖς Ἕλλησι γενομένων . . . εἶναι τοὺς ἀτίμους ἐπιτίμους, ἵν' ὁμονοοῦντες ἅπαντες ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας προθύμως ἀγωνίζωνται*). To these examples may be added the measure of Solon (Plut. *Sol.* 19), which restored civil rights to all who before his archonship (B.C. 594) had been visited with disfranchisement, with the exception of certain categories of persons which need not here be specified. Such acts of grace were known with reference to individuals, *e.g.*, the recall of Alcibiades (Xen. *Hell.* i. 4. 11, his return in B.C. 408; the vote of recall actually passed in B.C. 411, Thuc. viii. 97) and of Demosthenes in B.C. 323 (Plut. *Dem.* 27), as well as of the historian Thucydides—to take only conspicuous examples in Athenian history.

Such acts of grace or pardon on the part of the sovereign people in reference to individuals or comparatively small groups or classes are clearly different in their nature from Acts of oblivion, where, in Greek history at any rate, the sovereign body itself has been sundered in twain upon a conflict of principle concerning the forms of government. Both, again, are to be clearly distinguished (and the confusion is not uncommon in the books of reference) from what the Greeks called *ἄδεια*, which corresponds to our Bill of Indemnity. Such *ἄδεια* or guarantee against penal consequences was always necessary to enable anyone to exercise any privilege that did not properly belong to his status, *i.e.* to enable slaves, resident aliens or disfranchised citizens to perform those higher functions which were part and parcel of the notion of civic status. It was also necessary before a proposal for the State to forego any of its rights against individuals, as, for example, a proposal for the removal of *atimia* or disfranchisement (Dem. *Or.* xxiv. 47: *ἄλλος οὗτος νόμος, οὐκ ἐὰν περὶ τῶν ἀτίμων οὐδὲ τῶν ὀφειλόντων λέγειν οὐδὲ χρηματίζειν περὶ ἀφέσεως τῶν ὀφλημάτων οὐδὲ τάξεως, ἂν μὴ τῆς ἀδείας δοθείσης, καὶ ταύτης μὴ ἐλάττων ἢ ἑξακισχιλίων ψηφισαμένων.* Cf. *CIA* i. 180–183, and i. 32). A vote of *ἄδεια* also guaranteed informers against punishment for crimes in which they might have been participators; but their evidence must be truthful. In general, *ἄδεια* was a preliminary surrender of specific rights of the State in favour of an individual for a particular purpose (see Goldstaub, *De ἀδείας notione et usu in iure publico Attico*, Breslau, 1888).

We must distinguish, then, the following three categories: (1) *ἄδεια*, indemnity for acts which involve or may involve penal consequences; in general, prospective; only when retrospective does it coincide in practical effect with amnesty. (2) Pardon, in cases in which the penal consequences are already in operation. In this sense the word 'amnesty' is incorrectly used, as above explained. The Greeks apparently possessed no single term to cover this sense. (3) *μὴ μνησικακεῖν* (= Lat. *oblivio* and late Gr. *ἀμνηστία*; Eng. 'amnesty' in its correct use), an Act of oblivion, or refusal to make investigation of matters of fact with a view to punishment.

LITERATURE.—Grasser, 'Amnestie des Jahres 403,' Munich, 1868, *Jahrb. f. Philologie*, xcix. 193 fol.; Lübbert, *De Amnestia anno CCCCIII a. Chr. ab Atheniensibus decreta*, Kiel, 1881; J. M. Stahl in *Rheinisches Museum*, 1890, p. 275 fol.

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AMPHIARAUS.—A seer and, along with Adrastus, the chief hero of the legend of the Seven against Thebes. He had early become the subject of heroic legend, and his character was portrayed in legend in Argos as well as round about Thebes. These local legends had been, too, at an early date united to the Theban cycle of legends by the two Homeric epics, 'The expedition of Amphiaraus' and the 'Thebaid.' But his cult is older than the legend.

Amphiaraus was worshipped in the Peloponnesus (Sparta, Pausanias, iii. 12. 5; Argos, Pausan. ii. 23. 2; Phlius, Pausan. ii. 13. 7; and the colony of Byzantium, *FHG* iv. 149. 16), and especially in Oropus near Thebes, where his sanctuary has been excavated (Pauly-Wissowa, i. 1893 ff.). He was worshipped as a god of the lower world, often at his own grave, where he gave oracles. That is the original form of the belief regarding him. This is the reason, too, why he is a seer in the heroic legend, and why he does not die but descends alive into the depths of the earth.

As seer, Amphiaraus was genealogically connected with the famous seer Melampus (Homer, *Od.* xv. 225 ff.), and later with Apollo (Hygin. *Fab.* 70, 128). Argos was regarded as his home. An all but forgotten legend represents him as an Argive king and enemy of Adrastus, whose brother Pronax he kills. Adrastus flees to Sicyon to his grandfather Polybus, but returns victorious and makes peace with Amphiaraus. The latter marries Eriphyle, the sister of Adrastus; and both parties are bound to accept her decision. When Polynices was seeking allies for the war against Thebes, Adrastus his father-in-law bribed Eriphyle, who compelled Amphiaraus, against his will, to march with them (Pindar, *Nem.* ix. with Scholium 30 and 35; Herodotus, v. 67; Hygin. *Fab.* 73). A later version of the legend, which probably originated from the epic Thebaid, related that Amphiaraos concealed himself in his house in order not to be compelled to take the field against Thebes, where he knew he must die, but was betrayed by his wife Eriphyle, who had been bribed by Polynices with the necklace of Harmony. Thus did Eriphyle become guilty of the death of Amphiaraus, who at his departure instructed his youthful son Amphilochus to wreak vengeance on Eriphyle for his death (Homer, *Od.* xv. 243 ff. with Scholium 246; Sophocles, *Elec.* 836 with Scholium; Apollodorus, *Bibliotheca*, iii. § 60 ff.; Hygin. *Fab.* 73). This leave-taking was represented on the Cypselus chest in Olympia (Pausan. v. 17. 4), and the picture on the Corinthian bowl (*κρατήρ*) corresponds with it (*Monumenti d. Instituto*, x. 4. 5).

In Nemea also, which lies on the road between Argos and Thebes, there were legends of Amphiaraus, traces of which have been preserved in the legends of the founding of the Nemean Games, especially in the 3rd *Hypothesis* in Pindar's Nemean Odes; Aelian, *Var. Hist.* iv. 5; Pausanias, iii. 18. 12, ii. 15. 2; Apollodorus, *Bibliotheca*, iii. 6. 4.

In the war against Thebes, Amphiaraus slays the powerful Theban hero Melanippus (Herodotus, v. 67; Pausanias, ix. 18. 1). But he cannot with-

stand Periclymenus, and flees from him; however, as the latter is about to stab him in the back, Zeus divides the earth with a lightning flash, and sinks Amphiaraus with his chariot alive into the depths. This tradition is a unity, and thus probably derived from the epic Thebaid (Pindar, *Nem.* ix. 24; Euripides, *Supp.* 925; Apollodorus, *Bibliotheca*, iii. § 77).

There are mirrored in these legends struggles of the time of the settlement of the Greek peoples in Argos as well as round about Thebes. The people who worshipped Amphiaraus had brought his cult with them from Argos over Phlius and Nemea towards the north, where its last remnants were preserved between Attica and Bœotia. These historical recollections in connexion with the cult, which remained ever living, have provided the material of the legend and determined its character.

Literatur.—Welcker, *Epischer Cyclus*, ii. 320 ff.; Bethe, *Thebanische Heldenlieder*, 42 ff., 76 ff.; Pauly-Wissowa, i. 1866 ff. E. Bethe.

AMPHICTYONY.—An amphictyony was a union of different cities or peoples, centred in a temple for the common performance of certain religious duties. The name is derived from ἀμφικτίονες (with a variant form in later times, ἀμφικτιόνες), which, with its equivalent περικτίονες, is used by early writers (Homeric Hymn, Pindar, Thucydides) in the sense of 'dwellers round.' The word ἀμφικτυονία is not expressly defined by any Greek writer; it is not frequent in the classical authors, although the substantive ἀμφικτίονες and the adjective ἀμφικτυονικός are often used. The ideas attached to these words were coloured by the history and constitution of the Delphian amphictyony, and we need not assume that all amphictyonic unions were similar in organization or function. Many local unions in early times which were formed on a religious basis, and would fall within the definition given above, are not expressly described as amphictyonies. This may be accidental, for some amphictyonic unions are mentioned only once in ancient literature, and there were primitive religious leagues, which did not survive in later times, that seem to have possessed the characteristics generally regarded as amphictyonic, and we know of no essential difference which should exclude them from the present survey.

The simplest form of union which can be traced in the earliest times is the union of people of kindred race within a continuous area round a common temple.

Such a federation is perhaps implied in the beginning of *Odyss.* iii., where the men of Pylos in their companies feast and offer sacrifice to Poseidon. So Strabo records (viii. 343) that the Tryphilians met at Samicum in the grove of the Samian Poseidon, had the sacred truce proclaimed, and united in sacrifice. So also the twelve Ionian cities of the Peloponnesus, before the Ionian migration, combined in a religious league centred in the temple of Poseidon at Helice (Strabo, viii. 384), and on this league was modelled the federation of the Ionian colonies in Asia. Strabo (ix. 412) refers to the 'amphictyonic' league of Onchestus, whose meeting-place was the grove of Poseidon in the territory of Haliartus, founded perhaps before the immigration of the Boeotians. The Boeotians, after their conquest, celebrated at the temple of Itonian Athene, in the plain of Coronea, the festival of the Pamboeotia (Strabo, ix. 411); and we may assume that their league had an amphictyonic character. It may have been the original basis of the political federation of later times.

Strabo (viii. 374) also records an 'amphictyony' of Calauria, an island off the coast of Troezen. This met, probably at a very early period, at the temple of Poseidon (which was always an asylum), and included the following cities: Hermione, Epidaurus, Aegina, Athens, Prasiae, Nauplia, and the Minyan Orchomenus. At a later time Argos and Sparta took the place of Nauplia and Prasiae. This league combined states which were not neighbours. Whether it had any objects other than religious we do not know; but it is possible, as is generally assumed, that it was a union of sea-states, designed to secure intercourse by sea.

The amphictyony of Pylae, which afterwards became so important from its connexion with Delphi, was originally a combination of different races (not cities), united in the worship of Demeter. Its history will be studied in detail below.

There are possible references to an amphictyony of Dorian states centred in Argos (Paus. iv. 5. 2; Plut. *Parall.* 3), presumably meeting at the temple of Apollo Pythaeus. The allusion in Pindar (*Nem.* vi. 44) to the festival of the 'amphictyons' in the grove of Poseidon is held by some to imply a Corinthian amphictyony, but the word may be used in a general sense. It has been suggested that we should assume a Euboean amphictyony meeting in the temple of Amarynthian Artemis, as there is evidence of the Euboean cities combining in a festival there (Strabo, x. 448; Livy, xxxv. 38).

Of these religious leagues centred on the mainland of Greece, those meeting at Samicum, Helice, Coronea, and Amarynthus are not expressly described as amphictyonies. Of the federations of the Greek colonies, in the Aegean or in Asia, we have warrant for calling only that of Delos an amphictyony. This league from a very early date united the Ionians of the islands in the worship of Apollo, and its history will be considered below. There are other leagues which have amphictyonic characteristics. The twelve Ionian colonies of Asia Minor (of which a list is given in Herod. i. 142) met at the Panionium, a precinct on the promontory of Mycale dedicated to the Heliconian Poseidon, and celebrated a festival called Panionia (Herod. i. 148; cf. Strabo, viii. 384; Diod. xv. 49). The league, which was probably founded on the model of the original league of the Ionian cities in the Peloponnesus, had also political objects, and the meetings at the Panionium were used for the discussion of questions of common policy and to promote joint action (Herod. i. 170, vi. 7). Ephesus was also a place of common festival for the Ionians (Thuc. iii. 104; cf. Dionys. Hal. iv. 25, who says the precinct of Artemis was the place of meeting, and Diod. xv. 49, who says the πανήγυρις was transferred from the Panionium to Ephesus). The grove of Poseidon at Tenos seems to have been the site of a πανήγυρις (Strabo, x. 487).

The three Dorian cities of Rhodes (Lindus, Ialysus, and Camirus), Cos, and Cnidus, with Halicarnassus (which was afterwards excluded from the union), celebrated a festival on the Triopian promontory at the temple of Apollo (Herod. i. 144). Dionysius (*l.c.*) says that these Dorians and the Ionians meeting at Ephesus took the great amphictyony as their model, and attributes to their leagues, besides religious functions, powers of jurisdiction and control of policy for which we have no evidence elsewhere.

The religious leagues in Greece and the colonies which come within the definition of an amphictyony, as given above, have been mentioned. It is possible that there were other similar federations in early times of which all trace is lost.

Before discussing the Delian and the Delphian amphictyonies, each of which had a special character, it will be best to consider the general functions of such religious leagues.

It is clear that the amphictyony was a primitive form of union, the origin of which in all probability preceded the coming of the Achaean invaders. The gods whose temples supplied the meeting-places are for the most part the gods of the earliest inhabitants. Poseidon appears at Samicum, Helice, Onchestus, Calauria, and the Isthmus (if we interpret Pindar's allusion as showing the existence of an amphictyony), and at Mycale and Tenos. At Pylae, Demeter was the presiding goddess. The primary purpose was the common worship, at set times, of the god; and the offering of a common sacrifice and the celebration of a common festival were essential elements. (Terms like *τὰ Παμβοιώτια, τὰ Πανιώνια, τὰ Ἐφέσια, τὰ Δήλια* might denote the festival generally, or the sacrifice; cf. Strabo, viii. 384, *θύουσι ἐκεῖ τὰ Πανιώνια*).

At the meeting (*πανήγυρις*) a sacred truce (*ἐκεχειρία*) was proclaimed. The cities or peoples participating sent sacred envoys (*θεωροί*, in some instances denoted by special titles, *Πυθαϊσταί, Δηλιασταί*), but many of the ordinary citizens flocked to the gatherings. Usually there were athletic and musical contests, and it is possible that the great games of Greece had their origin in amphictyonic meetings (see Gilbert, *Griech. Staatsaltertümer*, ii. p. 406).

The gathering often served other purposes: fairs were held, and some of them became important markets. Peaceful intercourse between the states was encouraged, and combination for political purposes was facilitated by these meetings, which were sometimes used for definite political ends. Thus the Ionians discussed their common interests, and resolved on united action at the Panionium; the Boeotian confederation may have been the outcome of the religious league at Coronea, and events caused the Delian and the Delphian amphictyonies to assume political importance. In spite, however, of the exaggerated statements of some ancient writers (Dionys. Hal. iv. 25), there is not sufficient evidence to justify us in assuming that the original purpose of the amphictyonic gatherings was other than religious. But the indirect results were of great moment both in religion and politics. The Greek tendency to disunion was in some measure corrected. Co-operation in the worship of a tribal god gave expression to the idea of kinship; intercourse at the sacrifices, festivals, and marts tended to break down the barriers between different states, and on occasion prepared the way for permanent peace and political union. The names Pamboeotia and Panionia, given to two of these gatherings, emphasize the idea of unity. When the amphictyony included cities which were not neighbours, or which did not recognize the bond of kinship, its function was even more important. The association of different peoples in the worship of a common god broke through the exclusiveness of local cults, and tended to found that religious unity which was regarded as one of the bases of Hellenic nationality (Herod. viii. 144). The Delphian amphictyony certainly contributed to the idea of Hellenism, and, in concert with the oracle, had great influence in establishing common religious observances among the Greeks. Its political importance was in some sense accidental; its religious functions it shared with the other amphictyonies, whose importance in the history of religion rests on their work in uniting different states in the common worship of the same gods.

The Delian amphictyony.—Delos, the sacred island, hallowed as the birthplace of Apollo, was from early times a religious centre for the Ionians of the Aegean. The legends spoke of a transfer of the island from Poseidon to Apollo (Strabo, viii. 373), and of Theseus instituting a festival (Paus. viii. 48. 3; cf. Plut. *Thes.* 21). It is thought that the connexion of Theseus with the festival was an invention in the time of the Athenian domination; but, at least from the time of Solon, Athens sent sacred envoys, *Δηλιασταί*, chosen from certain Eupatrid families (Athen. vi. 234). There is evidence for the existence of the *πανήγυρις* at a comparatively early date, in the Homeric Hymn to the Delian Apollo (i. 146–164; cf. Thuc. iii. 104, *ἦν δέ ποτε καὶ τὸ πάλαι μεγάλη ξύνοδος ἐς τὴν Δῆλον τῶν Ἰώνων τε καὶ περικτιόνων νησιωτῶν*, and Strabo, x. 485). To Delos came the 'Ionians in their trailing robes,' with their wives and their children. There they offered sacrifice, performed sacred dances and hymns, and engaged in contests. Doubtless a sacred truce was proclaimed, and a fair was held upon the seashore, where the visitors to the festival exchanged their goods. The union of the states celebrating the festival probably bore the name of an amphictyony. Although it is not expressly described as such, the existence in later times of officials called *Ἀμφικτύονες* is best explained on the theory that the title is a survival from earlier days (see below, and cf. Thuc. *l.c.* *περικτίονες*). As Mycale and Ephesus rose in importance as meeting-places for the Ionians of Asia Minor and of the islands near the coast, the festival at Delos waned. The islanders (presumably of the Cyclades) and the Athenians continued to send their bands of singers and their sacrifices, but in the troublous times of the 6th and 5th centuries the great festivals were abandoned (Thuc. *l.c.*).

Delos was too small in extent and population to possess any political strength. Hence it was liable to come under the patronage or the sway of dominant powers. Pisistratus had purified the island, and Polycrates had shown it favour (Thuc. *l.c.*). The Athenians, on the institution of their confederacy in 477, chose Delos as the meeting-place. Political reasons may have moved them, but it is probable that their choice was partly determined by the desire to represent their league as an amphictyony, centred in what had been a holy place of the Ionian race, of which Athens claimed to be the natural head. At Delos the meetings of the allies were held, and the federal funds were stored. With the growth of Athenian domination and the transfer of the treasury to Athens (in 454), Delos lost its importance in the confederacy, until, in 426–5, the Athenians purified the island, and established a great festival, to be held every four years. Whether the amphictyony had hitherto in form survived or not, we do not know, but the Athenians seem to have wished to represent it as still existing. Thus, although the temple and its funds were controlled by Athenian magistrates (the earliest direct evidence refers to the year 434–3, *CIA* i. 283), these bore the title *Ἀμφικτύονες* or *Ἀμφικτύονες Ἀθηναίων* (*BCH* viii. p 283). The probable explanation of this name is that the title had at some time been borne by the representatives of other states, and that although (with one or two exceptions in the 4th cent.) only the Athenians appointed such magistrates, the fiction of amphictyonic government was kept up. (Our knowledge is based on inscriptions; the only allusion to such officials in literature is in Athenaeus, iv. 173, *ὁ τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων νόμος*).

The amphictyony of Delos thus ceased to be a religious union of independent states, and became an instrument of Athenian supremacy, so that its history is bound up with the varying fortunes of Athens.

The festival (*Δήλια*) was celebrated in the spring of the third year of each Olympiad. (A lesser festival took place every year). It was regulated and presided over by the Athenians (Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 54. 7, refers to it as if it were an Athenian festival); the Athenians sent a *θεωρία* in the sacred ship, and at every celebration an offering

of a gold crown was made to Apollo (*ἀριστεῖον τοῦ θεοῦ*, *CIA* ii. 814); and from the number of crowns recorded in the inventories, the number of celebrations can be estimated. The festival was modelled on the great Pan-Hellenic festivals, and was doubtless open to all the states of the Aegean, possibly to all the Greeks. To the old athletic and musical contests the Athenians added horse races. (For the order of proceedings see Plut. *Nic.* 3). Banquets concluded the festival, at which the Delians served the tables, and hence bore the title of *Ἐλεοδύται* (Athen. iv. 173).

The first celebration was in 425, and was probably the occasion of the magnificent *θεωρία* of Nicias (Plut. *Nic.* 3; others attribute this to 417). The Delians seem to have resented the rule of the Athenians, and in 422 the Athenians expelled them from the island (Thuc. v. 1), intending, no doubt, to make it a mere appanage of Athens. But in 420, at the bidding of the Delphian oracle, they were restored.

The festival was celebrated every four years during the Peloponnesian war. An inscription of 410–409 (*BCH* viii. p. 283) shows Delian *νεωκόροι* sharing in the administration with the four *Ἀθηναίων Ἀμφικτύονες* (for whose title this is the earliest definite evidence). After the fall of Athens, Delos regained its independence (the fragment of an inscription, *IGA* 91, probably refers to this); the great *πεντετηρίς* was abandoned, but the annual festival was celebrated by the Delians, and to this the Athenians still sent their *θεωρία* (Xen. *Mem.* iv. 8. 2).

Soon after the battle of Cnidus, when the Athenians were striving to re-establish a federation of sea-states, they seem to have regained the control of the Delian temple (*CIA* iv. 2. 813*b*), and the festival was renewed probably in 388 (in the 4th cent. its date was changed to the second year of the Olympiad). The Athenian control was interrupted for a time (the banishment of Delians recorded in *CIA* ii. 814 may be connected with this epoch), and probably the festival was omitted in 380; but with the foundation of their second confederacy the Athenians were again masters of the Aegean. The inscription containing the accounts from 377 to 374 (known as the Sandwich marble, *CIA* ii. 814) throws much light on temple property and administration. From 377 to 375 the sacred property was administered by four *Ἀμφικτύονες Ἀθηναίων*: in 374 five Athenian commissioners were appointed and five *Ἀνδρίων Ἀμφικτύονες*. This recognition of the allies is consistent with the principles of the confederacy, but in only one other inscription do the Andrian commissioners appear (*BCH* viii. 367), and the Athenians, aided by Delian subordinate officials (*Βουλὴ Δηλίων καὶ ἱεροποιοί* mentioned in an inventory of 364–3, *BCH* x. 461), continued to administer the temple and the sacred property. The festival was regularly celebrated with the usual offering of a golden crown. The resentment of the Delians was manifested in the banishment (probably about 350) of an Athenian partisan (*CIA* ii. 115*b*); and, in 345–4 or 344–3, the Delians appealed to the arbitration of the Delphian amphictyony to regain control of the temple (see below, p. 398). The decision was favourable to the Athenians; even after the collapse of her power, Athens retained her control of Delos until at least 315. Before 308 Delos was independent, and the nominal amphictyony had come to an end. (For date, see von Schöffer in Pauly-Wissowa, iv. 2482).

The Delphian amphictyony.—The chief amphictyony is usually referred to by modern writers as 'the Delphian' or 'the Pythian,' because in historical times Delphi was its most important place of meeting. It met also at Anthela, near Thermopylae. The ancients regard it as *the* amphictyony; allusions to it are usually connected with the substantive *Ἀμφικτύονες* or the adjective *Ἀμφικτυονικός* (with *σύνοδος*, *σύστημα*, *συνέδριον*), and the collective substantive *Ἀμφικτυονία* is comparatively rare (Dem. vi. 19, xi. 4). The substantive *Ἀμφικτύονες* is used either of the amphictyonic peoples generally, or of their representatives at the amphictyonic meetings, or of the actual council of Hieromnemones.

Its early history is legendary (Strabo, ix. 420, *τὰ πάλαι μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖται*), and the legends are diversely interpreted. The foundation was ascribed to an eponymous hero, Amphictyon, usually described as the son of Deucalion and brother of Hellen (by Dionysius, iv. 25, as the son of Hellen), some 300 years before the Trojan war. He, being king at Thermopylae, united the neighbouring peoples in the festival of Pylaea. Other accounts explained the name *Ἀμφικτύονες* as meaning 'the neighbouring peoples,' and connected the institution with Delphi (for the authorities see Bürgel, *Die pyläisch-delphische Amphiktyonie*, p. 4 ff.). The rival claims of Thermopylae and Delphi, as the place of origin, were reconciled in the legend that Acrisius, summoned from Argos to help the Delphians, instituted a *συνέδριον* at Delphi on the model of that at Pylae, and organized the constitution of the amphictyony (Schol. to Eur. *Orest.* 1093; cf. Strabo, ix. 420). Little further is recorded until the first Sacred War (B.C. 595), when the amphictyonic peoples are said to have attacked Crisa for injury done to Delphi and transgression of the amphictyonic ordinances (Æschines, iii. 107–8; Strabo, ix. 419). After the destruction of Crisa, the Pythian games were instituted.

The truth underlying the legends may be somewhat as follows. At a remote period, probably before the great migrations within Greece, the peoples then settled near Thermopylae combined in the worship of Demeter, the festival possibly being connected with the harvest. That Pylae was the original meeting-place is probable on the following grounds. The cult of Demeter Amphictyonis was always maintained at Pylae; the meetings of the amphictyony, whether at Pylae or Delphi, bore the name *Πυλαία*, and *Πυλαγόροι* was the title of the official envoys; the peoples in after times belonging to the amphictyony were largely those grouped round Thermopylae. It is a matter of speculation which of these peoples originally belonged to the amphictyony. There were, no doubt, fresh accessions consequent on the migrations, and, by the end of the 7th cent., probably most of the peoples in eastern Greece between Thessaly and Laconia had been admitted. The Thessalians were presidents. At some period before the first Sacred War, Delphi had been taken under the protection of the amphictyony, and became a second place of meeting. (Legend placed this at a very early date, and the tradition of the Greeks undoubtedly set it before the Sacred War. Bürgel argues that the war was not conducted by the amphictyony, which, he thinks, was opened to new states after the war). The war with Crisa marks an epoch; henceforth the history of the league rests on surer information; it is more closely identified with Delphi, whose shrine and property came under the protection of the amphictyonic council, which also had the superintendence of the Pythian games.

(*a*) *Members.*—The amphictyony was a league of twelve peoples (*ἔθνη*, called *γένη* by Paus. x. 8. 2; Strabo, ix. 420, wrongly speaks of *πόλεις*). Whatever changes in the composition of the amphictyony took place, the number of the peoples was constant. The earliest list that has come down to

as is that of Aeschines (ii. 116), who professes to give twelve names, though only eleven appear in the text. These are the Thessalians, Boeotians, Dorians, Ionians, Perrhaebians, Magnetians, Locrians, Oetaeans, Phthians, Malians, and Phocians. It is generally believed that the Dolopes should be added to complete the list, and that Aeschines describes as Oetaeans the people who more usually appear as Aenianes (Herod. vii. 132, in a list of nine peoples who submitted to Xerxes, cites only amphictyonic peoples). From 346 to 345 the Macedonian king took the place of the Phocians, and the Delphians were admitted, room being made for them by uniting the Perrhaebians and the Dolopes as one people. (An inscription gives us a list of the peoples in 344–3. See E. Bourguet, *L'Administration financière du sanctuaire pythique au IV^e siècle avant Jésus-Christ*, p. 145 ff., and *BCH* xxi. p. 322). The subsequent changes after the Aetolians were admitted need not be followed here.

While there was at all periods a conservative adherence to the principle that races and not states should be members of the amphictyony, a measure ascribed to Acrisius, and certainly adopted at an early date, regulated the participation of separate states in the amphictyonic council. Each of the twelve peoples admitted to membership had two votes (Aesch. ii. 116), and in some cases these votes were divided between different branches of the same race (*e.g.* the Locrians and the Malians), or between states belonging to the same race; thus we find the Ionian votes shared by Athens and one of the Euboean states; the Dorian votes divided between the Dorians of the metropolis and the Dorians of the Peloponnesus, or at another time between the Lacedaemonians and some other state of the Peloponnesus (*BCH* xx. p. 197 ff.); and the Boeotian votes between the different cities of Boeotia (Thebes being usually represented). The exclusion of a particular state from the amphictyony might be effected without diminishing the representation of the race to which it belonged, as its vote could be transferred to another state. We have no information as to how the apportionment of votes to the individual states or sections of the people was effected. While the decision of amphictyonic business was thus entrusted to the representatives of the states qualified for the time to vote, other states not so represented, or even states which had no right to a vote, might take part in the amphictyonic meetings, and send sacred embassies.

(*b*) *Meetings and representatives.*—The meetings were held twice a year, in spring and autumn (πυλαία ἐαρινὴ καὶ μετοπωρινή, Strabo, ix. 420), and on each occasion at both Anthela and Delphi. Extraordinary meetings might be called (Aesch. iii. 124). Any members of the amphictyonic peoples might attend; sacred embassies (θεωρίαι) were probably sent by the amphictyonic peoples, and there were also Πυλαγόροι (in some writers Πυλαγόραι) and Ἱερομνήμονες, who represented the interests of the states or peoples qualified to vote. From the 3rd century Ἀγοραστοί seem to have taken the place of the Πυλαγόροι.

There is some uncertainty as to the respective duties of the Πυλαγόροι and the Ἱερομνήμονες at different dates. In the early years of the 5th cent. the Πυλαγόροι are represented as the executive and deliberative power (Herod. vii. 213; Plut. *Them.* 20. Strabo ix. 420 does not mention any other officials). Towards the end of the century we can trace Ἱερομνήμονες (Aristoph. *Nub.* 623). Inscriptions and literary evidence (the account of the meeting of the amphictyony in Aeschines, iii. 115 ff., is our chief authority) show that in the 4th cent. the Hieromnemones (who were twenty-four in number, two for each amphictyonic people) formed the council of the amphictyony. Pylagori were still appointed, but had not voting power, and were perhaps not limited in number. Thus, Athens sent three to Delphi in 339. The method of appointing these officials may have been left to the discretion of the different states. At Athens we find the Hieromnemones appointed by lot (Aristophanes, *l.c.*) and the Pylagori elected. Prominent statesmen were sometimes appointed (*e.g.* Demosthenes and Aeschines), perhaps to watch over the political interests of their state at the amphictyony. From the narrative of the meeting in 339 (Aeschines, *l.c.*) it would appear that the Hieromnemones formed the council (συνέδριον) of the amphictyony, and that the individual Hieromnemon might seek advice and support from the Pylagori of his state. Thus Aeschines, who was one of the Athenian Pylagori, was admitted to the council of the Hieromnemones when the other Pylagori had withdrawn, and after defending the cause of Athens, retired before the vote took place. In the council of Hieromnemones, all power, deliberative, judicial, and executive, was vested, and it was apparently sometimes described as τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀμφικτιόνων (*CIA* ii. 551, l. 41; cf. Aesch. ii. 139). The president is referred to as ὁ τὰς γνώμας ἐπιψηφίζων (Aesch. iii. 124). The decisions of the council were called δόγματα or τὰ δεδογμένα. It was open to the council to call an ἐκκλησία of all who were attending the meeting (οἱ συνθύοντες καὶ χρώμενοι τῷ θεῷ, Aesch. *l.c.*), presumably to announce the course of action proposed, or to ratify the decision of the council.

For the special boards of ναοποιοί and ταμίαι see below.

(*c*) *Competence of the amphictyony.* — It is difficult precisely to define the competence of the amphictyony. There is no general statement in ancient writers that can be relied upon (Dionys. Hal. iv. 25, vaguely exaggerates), and its powers, so far as they cannot be inferred from the original aims, must in the main be deduced from the historical instances of its activity. It should be noted that the influence and the importance of the amphictyony varied greatly at different periods. As most of its members were politically insignificant, states such as Athens and Sparta at the height of their power had little respect for its authority. On the other hand, when a strong state commanded a majority of votes and so became predominant in the council, it could use the amphictyony for its own ends, and find pretexts to justify an extension of amphictyonic action. It is possible here to give only broad results without detail.

We may assume that, probably from the first, the amphictyony had two main objects: the union of different peoples for common religious purposes, and the common observance of certain rules affecting the relations between those peoples. Two causes combined to increase the importance of these objects. As the amphictyony came to include representatives from most of the peoples of Greece, it tended to assume an Hellenic character, and when Delphi was taken under its protection and became its most important meeting-place, the universal recognition of the oracle and of the cult of Apollo increased the prestige and importance of the amphictyony. It is not always easy to distinguish the relative spheres of Delphi and of the amphictyony, but it must be remembered that the oracle, though under the protection of the amphictyony, was independent, and many institutions or observances which owed their origin to Delphi should not be credited to the amphictyony.

The members of the amphictyony united in common religious observances at both Anthela and Delphi. At Anthela they worshipped Demeter (with the title Ἀμφικτυονίς or Πυλαία) and the hero Amphictyon. We know that there were meetings in spring and autumn protected by the proclamation of a holy truce (ἐκεχειρία); sacrifice was offered, and probably a festival was celebrated with its usual accompaniment of contests and market. An important inscription (*CIA* ii. 545) gives us much information as to the relations of the amphictyony with Delphi. The inscription dates from B.C. 380, and the assertion of the amphictyonic rules and duties may mark a recent restoration of the power of the amphictyony, perhaps under the protection of Sparta, then at the height of her power (Bürgel, *op. cit.* p. 252; Bourguet, *op. cit.* pp. 158–9). At Delphi Leto, Artemis, and Athena Pronaia (or Pronoia) were associated with Apollo as Amphictyonic deities (Aesch. iii. 108, 111), to whom sacrifice was offered at the spring and autumn meetings.

In the procession preceding the sacrifice, among other beasts an ox of great price was led (this is the *βοῦς τοῦ ἥρωος* of *CIA* ii. 545, l. 32; cf. Xen. *Hell.* vi. 4. 29, *βοῦς ἡγεμών*. Some think this beast was a special offering at the great Pythia). The amphictyony superintended the meetings and festivals, including the great Pythia, which took place every four years, and the annual Pythia. To these festivals the amphictyonic states sent envoys (perhaps the *πυθαϊσταί* of Strabo, ix. 404; cf. *CIA* ii. 545. 45, where Böckh restored *πυθαιστάς*). The amphictyony was responsible for the care of the sacred rites, of the property consecrated to the gods, the temples and other buildings, and the sacred land. In the inscription referred to provision is made for a circuit of the sacred land (*πέροδος*, cf. Dem. xviii. 150, *περιελθεῖν*), and penalties are imposed on any one taking it into cultivation (cf. Aesch. iii. 109, 119). The Hieromnemones are to keep the buildings at Delphi in repair. The roads and bridges (presumably on the routes leading to Delphi) are to be kept up by the amphictyons (usually interpreted as the different peoples belonging to the amphictyony).

More important duties fell to the amphictyony when the great temple had to be rebuilt. In the 6th cent., after it had been destroyed by fire, the rebuilding was entrusted to the Alcmaeonidae, as contractors (Herod. ii. 180, v. 62). In 373 the temple was again burnt down, and under the amphictyonic law of 380 the Hieromnemones undertook its reconstruction. We have much detailed information on the procedure from inscriptions recently found at Delphi. (The results are summarized in E. Bourguet, *L'Administration financière du sanctuaire pythique au IV^e^ siècle avant Jésus-Christ*). The restoration of the temple undertaken in 369 was not completed for thirty years. The work was interrupted by the Sacred War, but the heavy fine imposed upon the Phocians supplied funds, which enabled the work to be carried through. In connexion with this work two new colleges of amphictyonic magistrates were instituted. From 369 we can trace the activity of the *ναοποιοί*. The members of the College belonged to amphictyonic peoples, but the total number, as well as the numbers from the different states, varied widely. Some of the states represented in the amphictyonic council appointed none, while Delphi had a *ναοποιός* before it secured a vote in the council. The *ναοποιοί* met twice a year at the ordinary meetings of the amphictyony; they collected funds for the expense of rebuilding, and made contracts in accordance with the specifications (*συγγραφαί*) drawn up for the different parts of the work. (For details of the contracts, methods of payment, etc., see Bourguet, *op. cit.* p. 95 ff.). After the completion of the temple, the *ναοποιοί* were charged with the maintenance of the fabric, and their activity can be traced for a century and a half.

In 339, at the autumn session, a college of twenty-four *ταμίαι* was instituted (see Bourguet, p. 110 ff.). It is thought that the institution may have been proposed in the interest of Philip, who was anxious to increase his influence in the amphictyony. The result was to make the work of the *ναοποιοί* subordinate, and to concentrate the control of expenditure in the hands of the new college. The composition of the college was identical with that of the council of the Hieromnemones; the same states were represented, and the lists of both were drawn up in the same order. The *ταμίαι*, from the sums assigned to them, met not only the expenses of rebuilding the temple (the money for which was paid over to the *ναοποιοί*), but the other expenses of the amphictyony, both at Delphi and Pylae (see Bourguet, p. 126 ff.). This board was, however, only a temporary institution, and when the last instalment of the Phocian fine had been paid and the temple at Delphi was finished, their work probably ceased. Before 310, and possibly as early as 326, they were no longer acting.

Inscriptions thus enable us to realize in detail the activity of the amphictyony in the case of the sacred property. The protection of the property of the god is one of the objects guaranteed by the amphictyonic oath recited by Aeschines (ii. 115). The other clauses of the oath remind us of another obligation of the amphictyony, the observance of certain common principles, the violation of which was a sin visited by amphictyonic vengeance. Aeschines mentions the oath not to raze any amphictyonic city to the ground, or to cut off running water in war or peace. The purpose of those prohibitions, which may go back to the origin of the amphictyony, is not to prevent war altogether, but to modify its harshness and to encourage peaceful intercourse. We do not know whether there were other general obligations of a similar character recognized by the amphictyony. Dionysius (iv. 25) refers to *κοιναὶ νόμοι* called amphictyonic, and other writers refer to the laws or deliberations of the amphictyony (Strabo, ix. 420; Schol. to Eur. *Orest.* 1093). If we could accept the vague statements of these late writers, we might assume a much wider competence of the amphictyony in regulating the relations of the Greek states to one another, and it is possible that there were *κοινὰ νόμιμα* or *νόμοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων* other than those mentioned by Aeschines, which were sanctioned by the amphictyony (see Bürgel, *op. cit.* p. 198, for certain regulations, possibly but not demonstrably amphictyonic). There are instances of charges being brought before the amphictyony which may have been based on the supposed violation of general rules, though we lack definite testimony. Among the historical incidents quoted in this connexion are the condemnation of the Dolopes of Scyros for piracy (Plut. *Cim.* 8); the price put upon the head of Ephialtes after the second Persian War (Herod. vii. 213); the condemnation of the Spartans, who were fined and excluded from the amphictyony for the seizure of the Cadmea (Diod. xvi. 23); and the charge threatened against Athens by the Amphissians in 339 (Aesch. iii. 116).

Charges brought before the amphictyony were tried by the council, which might fine the offenders or exclude them from the league, or in more serious cases proclaim a holy war against the offending state. As we do not know the scope of the amphictyonic laws, we cannot say whether the charges were always based on a supposed transgression of them. Probably some pretext was assumed to bring them within the jurisdiction, but the competence of the amphictyony might be extended by the admission of charges which did not properly come before its court. Thus an Athenian decree of 363 (*CIA* ii. 54) asserts that Astycrates has been condemned *παρὰ τοὺς νόμους τῶν Ἀμφικτιόνων*, and in 335 Alexander apparently demanded that the orators of Athens should be tried before the amphictyony (Dem. xviii. 322). Apart from this, disputes might be referred by consent to the arbitration of the amphictyony, and we probably have an instance of this in the submission by the Athenians and Delians of their controversy respecting the Delian temple in 345–4 or 344–3 (Dem. xviii. 134, xix. 65).

The amphictyony might pass votes referring to individuals, as in the honours accorded to the heroes of Thermopylae (Herod. vii. 228) and to Scyllias (Paus. x. 19. 1), and in the grants of *ἀτέλεια* and *ἀσυλία* to the guilds of Dionysiac artists (*CIA* ii. 551—at some date after 279).

We may conclude that the competence of the amphictyony was not rigidly restricted, at least in practice. It was open to a power possessing a dominant influence to extend its functions, and Alexander induced the council to confer upon him the command of the war against Persia (Diod. xvii. 4).

(*d*) *Importance of the amphictyony.* — The amphictyony in its constitution, its objects, and its possibilities involved important principles. It united many different peoples of Greece on the basis of a common Hellenism; and this union was realized by a system of representation by which equal votes were accorded to the several members. It fulfilled the purpose common to amphictyonies generally, of maintaining certain religious institutions and rites, while it enforced the recognition of rules regulating the relations of its members. In this respect it tended to establish in the Greek world a system of *quasi*-international law, with a court to enforce it, comparable in our own days to the purpose of the Concert of Europe. In its constitution it might seem to prepare the way for a federal system, if not for a Pan-Hellenic national union. This may explain why, on different occasions, the amphictyony might act as the representative of Greek feeling or policy, and why it was sometimes described as if it included the whole nation (cf. Soph. *Trach.* 638, Ἑλλάνων ἀγοραὶ Πυλάτιδες; Herod. vii. 214, οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων Πυλαγόροι; Aesch. iii. 161, 254, συνέδριον τῶν Ἑλλήνων).

But the disruptive forces which dominated the Greek political system counteracted these tendencies. The influence of the amphictyony (apart from the oracle) in the sphere of religion scarcely extended beyond its own meetings. The rules of humanity which it laid down were not enforced, and amphictyonic cities were razed to the ground without vengeance or protest. The amphictyony had little effect in correcting the separate autonomy of the great states. Composed as it was in great part of peoples of small political or military significance, it could not impose its will on powerful states, which overshadowed it or made it a mere instrument of policy. Thus in the greater part of the 5th cent., while Sparta and Athens divided the allegiance and controlled the fortunes of the other Greeks, the amphictyony receded into the background. In the 4th cent., from 380 at least, the amphictyony assumed a greater importance, mainly because it came under the influence and served the purposes of the most powerful states—at first Sparta, then Thebes, and later the Macedonian king. The amphictyony became the scene of intrigues, and the Sacred Wars, waged nominally in the cause of the amphictyony, were critical for Greek history. It is precisely at this period that Demosthenes describes the league as ἡ ἐν Δελφοῖς σκιά (v. 25). The subservience to the policy of the dominant state became still more marked when the Aetolians controlled the amphictyony.

Literature. — For amphictyonies in general, the proper sections in G. Busolt, *Griech. Staatsaltertümer*[2] (1892); G. Gilbert, *Griech. Staatsaltertümer*, ii. (1885); G. F. Schömann, *Griech. Altertümer*, ii. (4th ed. by J. H. Lipsius, 1902), should be consulted. See also F. Cauer, 'Amphiktyonien' in Pauly-Wissowa, i. (1905 ff.). For the Delian amphictyony see von Schöffer in Pauly-Wissowa, iv. 2459 ff.; for the Delphian amphictyony, H. Bürgel, *Die pyläisch-delphische Amphiktyonie*, Munich, 1877. The French excavations at Delos and Delphi have brought many fresh inscriptions to light. These have been published in the successive volumes of the *BCH*. The financial history of the Delphian amphictyony is summarized in E. Bourguet, *L'Administration financière du sanctuaire pythique au IV^e siècle avant Jésus-Christ* (Paris, 1905).

LEONARD WHIBLEY.

AMRITSAR.—Amritsar, in the Panjāb, is one of the religious centres of India and the chief city of the Sikhs. It lies in what is known as the Mānjha country, about 32 miles east of Lahore, and contained at the census of 1901 a population of 162,429, of whom 40 per cent. were Hindus, 48 per cent. Muhammadans, and 11 per cent. Sikhs. It is the chief commercial town of the Panjāb proper; but its commercial importance is based less on any advantages of position than on the fact that the city is built round the celebrated 'Tank of Nectar' or 'Tank of the Immortals,' *i.e.* the gods (Sanskrit, *Amṛtasaras*), in the centre of which is situated the Golden Temple, the central shrine of the Sikh religion. There are stories of the spot having been visited by the first Sikh Guru, Nānak (A.D. 1469–1538), and by the third Guru, Amardās (A.D. 1552–1574); but the actual purchase of the site and excavation of the tank are believed to have been undertaken by the fourth Guru, Rāmdās, in A.D. 1577, and the masonry work was begun by the fifth Guru, Arjan, in A.D. 1588. The remaining five Gurus seem to have paid little or no attention to the place, but after the death of the last Guru in A.D. 1708, and during the turbulent period which preceded the breaking up of the Mughal empire, the shrine began to obtain considerable popularity and to be recognized as the national centre of the Sikh confederacies. The Muhammadan Government took every precaution to prevent access to the shrine; but so great was the attachment of the Sikhs to it that the Sikh horsemen would frequently risk their lives by galloping through the Mughal lines for a sight of the sacred tank. In A.D. 1762, the Afghan leader, Ahmad Shāh, blew up the sacred shrine with gunpowder, and polluted the sanctuary with the blood of kine; but four years later, in A.D. 1766, the shrine was reconstructed on its present basis. The Sikh leaders then began to build round it a number of separate fortified quarters which formed the nucleus of the present city of Amritsar, and the city has since continued to flourish under Mahārājah Ranjit Singh (A.D. 1801–1839) and the British Government (since 1849).

There are five sacred tanks in the city, but the most celebrated is the 'Tank of Amritsar' proper, in which the Golden Temple lies. The form of the tank is nearly square, the sides at the top being 510 feet in length, and it is fed by water from the Bārī Doāb Canal. The Temple occupies a small island in the centre of the tank, 65½ feet square, which is connected with the west side by a fine causeway 227 feet long and 18 feet broad. The central shrine is known as the *Har-mandar* or 'Temple of God,' and consists of a single room, covering a square of 40½ feet, with four doors, one opening to each side. The lower part of the outer walls is adorned with marble inlay, resembling that of the Tāj Mahal at Agra, and the upper walls and roof are covered with plates of copper heavily gilt, from which the place has obtained among Europeans the name of the 'Golden Temple.' Among the Sikhs themselves the shrine and its precincts are known as the *Darbār Sāhib* or 'Sacred Audience'; and this title owes its origin to the fact that the *Granth*, or Sacred Book, is looked upon as a living Person, who daily in this shrine receives his subjects in solemn audience. The book is brought every morning with considerable pomp from the *Akālbūnga* (see p. 400[a]) across the causeway to the shrine, and returns at night with similar ceremony. It is installed in the shrine below a canopy, and a *granthī* sits behind it all day waving a *chauri*, or yak's tail, over it, as a servant does over the head of an Indian Prince. On the south sit a selection from the *pūjāris*, or hereditary incumbents of the Temple, and on the north sit the musicians (*rāgīs* and *rabābīs* — the latter, strange to say, being Muhammadans), who from time to time sing hymns from the Granth

to the accompaniment of divers native instruments. In front of the book is the cloth upon which the faithful deposit their offerings. Although the outer precincts have since 1898 been lit by electric light, the shrine itself is lit with clarified butter or candles only. The wearing of shoes within the precincts, and, of course, smoking of any kind, are strictly prohibited; and as the Granth is always installed upon the ground, it is considered irreverent for any one within the precincts to sit upon a chair or stool.

Round all four sides of the tank runs a paved walk 30 feet broad, known as the *Prakarama* (properly *Parikrama*), which is frequented by the worshippers who come to bathe, by pandits or ascetics of various kinds, and by vendors of religious and other trinkets. At the south-east corner of this walk, where the water issues from the tank, is the bathing-place assigned to the Mazhabis, or low-caste converts, whom the bulk of the Sikhs still decline to admit to their religion on equal terms. Round the outside of the walk rise a number of picturesque buildings, known as *būngas* or hospices, which were for the most part built by the Sikh chiefs in the latter part of the 18th cent. for the accommodation of themselves and their followers when visiting Amritsar; and among these the *būnga* of the Rāmgarhia Sirdārs is prominent by its two large towers, which dominate the city and neighbourhood of Amritsar.

Attached to the main shrine are three subsidiary institutions, which are of considerable importance in the eyes of the Sikhs. The first of these is the *Akālbūnga*, or 'Hospice of the Immortal,' which adjoins the shrine on the west side of the causeway, and is the traditional centre of the fanatical sect known as the Nihangs or Akālīs. The *Granth Sāhib* is kept here at night, and the building also contains a fine collection of the weapons of Guru Har Govind and other Sikh Gurus and chiefs. The courtyard in front of the *Akālbūnga* is a favourite place for the administration of the *pahal*, or religious baptism of the Sikh creed; the ceremony may, however, be performed anywhere in the presence of the Granth, and the number of persons baptized at the *Akālbūnga* does not exceed 1200 annually. The second of the well-known subsidiary institutions is the *Bābā Atal*, a shrine surmounted by a tower, which lies a few hundred yards to the south-east of the Har-mandar. This shrine was commenced in A.D. 1729 in memory of Bābā Atal, the young son of Guru Har Govind (A.D. 1606–1645), and is surrounded by the cenotaphs of many of the old Sikh nobility. The third institution subsidiary to the Golden Temple is the shrine of *Taran Tāran*, which lies 13 miles south of Amritsar, and which was founded by the fifth Guru, Arjan (A.D. 1581–1606). The Taran Tāran shrine, which also is built on an island in a large tank, is the scene of a considerable monthly fair, and the Amritsar temple, too, is the centre of two exceedingly large fairs, the Baisākhī and Diwālī, which are held in the spring and autumn respectively, and are attended by immense numbers of persons, both for religious and for commercial purposes, from the whole of northern India.

The actual building of the Golden Temple and its precincts is maintained from the proceeds of a *jāgīr*, or assignment of land revenue from certain neighbouring villages. The *granthīs* who read the sacred volume are three in number, and are supported by offerings made directly to them by worshippers at the shrine. The *pūjārīs*, or incumbents, are a very large body of men to whom the general offerings at the shrine are distributed, after deducting a fixed sum for the temple establishment,—that is to say, the musicians, office-bearers, menials, and so forth. The whole institution and its subsidiaries are supervised by a manager, who is generally a Sikh gentleman of position appointed by the Government. The funds of the temple, as well as a certain number of precious ornaments, are kept in a somewhat primitive manner in a treasury over the main gate.

The whole importance of Amritsar from a religious point of view lies in the Golden Temple, and there is little of religious importance in the town outside the precincts of the *Darbār Sāhib*. Mention may, however, be made of two recent institutions, namely the Sāragarhī memorial and the Khālsa College. The former is a memorial in the form of a Sikh shrine, which was erected in A.D. 1902 in the centre of the city by the British Government in memory of the gallant manner in which a small body of the 36th Sikh Regiment held the fort of Sāragarhī on the North-West Frontier against an Afghan enemy in the Tīrāh campaign of 1897. The latter is a denominational college which was started some twelve years ago for the encouragement of learning among the Sikhs. It lies some two miles out of the city, and is largely supported by the Sikh States of the Panjāb as well as by private donors.

LITERATURE.—Murray's *Handbook for India and Ceylon*, 4th ed., 1901, p. 196; Hunter's *Imperial Gazetteer for India*, s.v. Amritsar; Sirdār Sundar Singh Rāmgarhia, *Guide to the Golden Temple*.

E. D. MACLAGAN.

AMULETS.—See CHARMS.

AMUSEMENTS.—A. 1. In the category of 'amusements' it is usual to include all sorts of pleasant occupations, both mental and physical, by which the attention is disengaged from the serious pursuits of life. Strictly speaking, however, an amusement is a light form of enjoyment in which little exertion either of the body or of the mind is required. In this respect amusements differ from recreation, which is a word of a higher order, inasmuch as recreation implies some considerable expenditure of energy, either mental or physical or both, although in the nature of the case the exertion is agreeable and refreshing. Both amusement and recreation are designed to serve the same end, the recuperation of one's jaded mental and physical powers; but amusement secures that by turning the mind into channels where the time passes pleasantly without the need of special exertion, whereas recreation effects its purpose by an agreeable change of occupation, by calling into activity other faculties and muscles than those engaged in work. Amusement, in short, is a form of enjoyment in its nature akin to relaxation; recreation is pleasurable exercise in which the energies, set free from work, are allowed to play in other directions (see RECREATION).

2. The slight demands which amusements make on the mental and physical activities, and their character as a means of lightly beguiling the time and drawing off the attention from the more important concerns of life, no doubt explain why in a serious age the word was used in a depreciatory sense. At the close of the 17th cent. we find *amusement* defined as 'any idle employment to spin away time' (Phillips, quoted in *Oxf. Dict.*). It may readily be allowed that anything which has no further aim than to kill time and to render men oblivious of the higher ends of life deserves to be condemned; and the use of the word pastime as synonymous with amusement has been regarded as an unconscious and melancholy confession that amusements have no other object and serve no other end than to fill up the emptiness of a life which is devoid of nobler interests, and to make men forget themselves. This pessimistic view of

amusements finds unquestionably some justification in the actual state of things. It cannot be doubted that amusements are often greedily sought after by those who find in the true business of life, in noble aims and strivings, nothing to excite their interest and to afford them joy; and they are indulged in with the object of appeasing the natural craving for happiness which finds no satisfaction in higher pursuits. Where this is the case, the passion for amusement is a pathetic witness to the misery of a life which has missed its true joy. But when a depreciatory estimate of amusements is based on the view that life itself, in the duties and relationships to which men are called, is so rich in delights that any other form of enjoyment is unnecessary, the ground is less secure. It is a severe and exacting philosophy which affirms that, to all who are conscious of the satisfactions which attend the pursuit of high moral aims, life is an absorbing interest which takes the place of all amusements. 'Where men are rightly occupied, their amusement grows out of their work' (Ruskin, *Sesame and Lilies*, 100). This, it must be confessed, is somewhat too highly pitched for ordinary human nature. It is this view of amusements which has commonly been associated with Puritanism, not altogether with justice. To begin with, at least, it was no aversion to pleasant things, arising out of an austere philosophy of life, that called forth the Puritan protest against the amusements of the time. Amusements were condemned, not because they were considered too trifling for men who had the serious business of life on hand, but because they were either sinful in themselves or closely associated with sinful accessories. This was the case, for instance, in the matter of dramatic representations. 'In the days of Elizabeth, the Puritan Stubbes held that some plays were "very honest and commendable exercises," and "may be used in time and place convenient as conducible to example of life and reformation of manners"; but the gross corruption of the seventeenth century stage drove Prynne and the majority of the Puritan party to extremer views' (Traill, *Social England*, iv. 165). It was the unfortunate association of evil with so many forms of amusement that disposed the Puritans in their later days to look askance at mirth and enjoyments perfectly innocent; their abhorrence of tainted pleasures led them to regard with suspicion every form of gaiety in which 'the enjoying nature' of their neighbours found expression, and fostered the growth of an austere and sombre spirit, which regarded life as too serious a business to permit of indulgence in light and pleasant diversions.

3. The Puritanic 'gospel of earnestness' is too narrow and one-sided to do justice to human nature. Healthy-minded men refuse to be satisfied with any view of life which ignores the natural instinct for play, and regards participation in amusements as a weakness which will be outgrown when men have tasted the more solid joys which duty brings. It is, no doubt, true that, wherever duty engages the conscience for its faithful and honourable discharge, it becomes, if one cannot say the chief amusement, at least the chief interest in life. But that does not mean more than the recognition of the subsidiary place which amusements should occupy. It does not justify an ascetic attitude towards amusements. Human nature has an instinct for joys of a light and entertaining kind, and the proper method of dealing with that instinct is not disparagement and repression, but a wise control and a large-hearted recognition of the part its gratification may play in the culture of life. The Christian view of life has room for laughter and mirth, for pleasures which stand in no immediate relation to life's duties, but minister to our natural capacity for enjoyment. And the supreme justification of this generous attitude to amusements lies in this, that where they are wisely indulged in, they serve a high end, and cannot be banished without loss. They give a zest to life; they pleasantly engage the mind and give it relief from the strain of duty, and enable it to recover its elasticity and tone. However interesting work may be, however congenial the more serious pursuits in which men engage may prove, the necessity arises, if the freshness of interest is to be maintained, of laying the work aside and seeking other interests. Human nature requires something more than rest for its refreshment; it requires that we should seek diversion for the sheer joy of it—some diversion which shall pleasurably occupy the mind and relax the energies, and afford an opportunity for escaping from the deadening influences of routine. The appetite for enjoyment must be wisely gratified, if the vitality necessary for good work is not to be impaired. *Cito rumpes arcum si tensum habueris.*

4. The main ethical justification of amusements lies, accordingly, in their fitness to renew and refresh our powers for the duties of life. But they serve other ends which are ethically important. They have a *social* value—many of them at least. The fact that we are thrown into pleasant association with others constitutes one of the charms of amusement; and, apart from the refreshing influences of such intercourse, there is a further gain in the growth and consolidation of friendship, and in the forging of links which bind us more closely together. There may be indeed, and there are, experiences shared with others which have a far greater uniting power than fellowship in the social pleasures of life, but the latter has its honourable place, and the value of it is deserving of recognition. Moreover, amusements, like everything else which draws us into association with others, serve as an opportunity for the culture of social virtues—unselfishness, equanimity, courtesy, and the like; while, if we extend our definition of amusements to include the great national games, they afford a discipline for the growth of such qualities as patience, self-restraint, magnanimity, alertness, readiness to seize an opportunity. Then, further, the pursuit of amusements is a bulwark against the temptations of the leisure hour. Nothing exposes the heart to the inroads of evil like the want of some healthy interest; and an honest love of innocent pleasure, if it served no other end, would be valuable as a moral safeguard.

5. All this must be freely acknowledged. Amusements have an undeniable ethical worth when they are wisely engaged in. But they cease to be ethically valuable, and indulgence in them becomes a dissipation, when they are sought after without due regard to the serious interests of life. When they are allowed to engross the mind and to become the main business in which pleasure is found, when their pursuit prejudices the performance of duty and the cultivation of higher interests, when they encroach on time which should be devoted to more serious matters, or make one indisposed to engage in one's proper work, they become harmful and morally reprehensible. There is no amusement, however innocent in itself, that cannot be changed into a means of self-indulgence through the excessive or untimely pursuit of it. Its pursuit is untimely when there is work waiting to be done. The pleasures of amusement are stolen pleasures, if they are enjoyed at the cost of neglect of duty. 'Sport and merriment are at times allowable; but we must enjoy them, as we enjoy sleep and other kinds of repose, when we have performed our weighty and important affairs' (Cicero, *de Off.* i. 29, 103). But the abuse of amusements lies not

only in their untimeliness, but also in their excess. They are frequently allowed to bulk so largely in life that serious occupations become distasteful. If, after participation in amusements, we are unable to pass with ease to more important concerns, and, instead of feeling refreshed for duty, have an aversion to it, we may fairly conclude that we have transgressed the limits of legitimate enjoyment, and have fallen into self-indulgence. That these limits are frequently overpassed is not a matter for doubt. There is no question that at the present day the desire for amusement has in many instances become a passion which is seriously prejudicing the culture of the higher life. In the opinion of competent judges, there is a waning of intellectual interests, a decay of any genuine love for those pursuits which enlarge and enrich the mind, a growing unconcern for the graver matters of religion and social service, and in some degree at least this is to be attributed to the immoderate indulgence in lighter pleasures. The fault of our age is not in seeking amusement, but in not knowing where to draw the line. *Nec lusisse pudet, sed non incidere ludum* (Horace, *Epist.* I. xiv. 36).

6. The nemesis of excessive addiction to amusements is not only the destruction of the taste for serious pursuits, but the decay of any genuine pleasure in life. The rationale of amusements is their power to send us back to work re-vitalized and capable of finding joy in it. But when they usurp the throne of our desires, and so dominate our thoughts and interest that work is felt to be a wearisome and uninviting interlude, they kill joy in that region of life where joy is all-important, where alone joy can be solid and lasting. A predominant craving for amusement defeats its own end; it renders joyless the whole stretch of life which of necessity must be given to work, and it speedily exhausts the enjoyment that amusement itself can give. Excessive pleasure-seeking brings satiety. Amusements, when they become the chief object of pursuit, lose their power of amusing. There is a world of truth in the well-known saying, uttered in reference to the excitements of a London season: 'Life would be tolerably agreeable, if it were not for its amusements.' Excess of pleasure nauseates and takes the joy out of life.

7. In the choice of amusements, and in the determination of the extent of their indulgence, there are other than personal considerations to be taken into account. From the individual's point of view, it is important that he should learn to avoid every form of pleasure which is physically harmful or morally debasing, and to allow himself only that measure of enjoyment which is consistent with the proper discharge of his work, and with a due concern for higher personal interests, such as self-culture and religious worship. But the question of amusements must be considered also in the light of the obligations which we have towards others. To some extent, of course, a consideration of that kind is always involved. Our conduct is never, strictly speaking, merely self-regarding; faithfulness in work, for instance, with which our amusements should never be allowed to interfere, is not simply a personal matter—it affects all others whom our work is calculated to benefit. But as members of a family, or of a church, or of society in general, we have duties to others—duties of love, helpfulness, consideration, service; and these must be kept in mind in determining the extent and nature of our amusements. Indulgence in pleasures the most innocent is illegitimate when it leads to the neglect of our social obligations. A man has no right to seek amusement to the detriment of those offices of love and fellowship which he owes to those of his own family circle. Similarly, one may spend so much time or money on the gratification of one's desire for enjoyment as to render impossible the honourable discharge of one's duties to society. Those most closely identified with religious and philanthropic work are unanimous in the opinion that one of the chief difficulties in finding money for its adequate maintenance arises from the increasing expenditure on amusements. Further, there may be occasions when our obligations to others raise the question whether we should not deny ourselves the gratification of an amusement which to us is perfectly innocent, but which is a cause of offence to those with whom we are closely associated. The duty which we owe to 'weaker brethren' cannot be entirely ignored, although there must be limits set to it. One may feel constrained in certain circumstances to renounce a form of enjoyment which harms another or offends his conscience; but, in the interests of moral education, it should be recognized that one has also a duty of vindicating the freedom of conscience, and of showing that amusements which to some are obnoxious, and even injurious, may be indulged in with perfect loyalty to high ethical standards. But, in still another way, our obligations towards others are bound up with the question of amusements. In these days the provision of amusement is very largely in the hands of professional classes, and it has been maintained that the moral danger to which men and women belonging to these classes are exposed is so great, that the amusements provided by them should not be countenanced by those who have the welfare of their fellows at heart. This is perhaps the chief reason why many refuse to enter a theatre. It should be frankly acknowledged that if, as is frequently alleged, the theatrical career puts the souls of men and women in needless jeopardy, and exposes them to temptations such as no one should be called upon to face; if the conditions and atmosphere of an actor's calling are so lowering to the moral tone as to make a loose manner of life practically inevitable, the enjoyment furnished by dramatic representations is a form of amusement which a good man will refuse to countenance. Now, that there are moral risks of a peculiar kind attending the theatrical profession, it would be idle to deny; but the fact of risk does not necessarily condemn it, any more than the inevitable risks attending all kinds of worldly business condemn them. Nevertheless it is a consideration which cannot be left out of account in determining our attitude to the theatre; each individual is bound not only to think of the effects of a dramatic entertainment on himself, but also to consider, on the grounds of the fullest knowledge at his command, whether those who provide the entertainment are prejudicially affected in character.

8. In the last resort, the question of amusement is for each individual to decide. It is impossible to lay down hard-and-fast rules which will have universal validity. The science of ethics is one of the most individual of all the sciences. The determination of duty is a matter for the earnest and enlightened conscience of each person for himself. It is not to be denied that the method, which has been largely favoured in some quarters, of drawing up lists of allowable and proscribed amusements has a certain practical utility; the deliberate judgment of good men in reference to pleasures, whose worth for the ethical ends of life is a matter of debate, is not rashly to be set aside; nevertheless, in all such matters the individual conscience must be the final judge. The free life of the spirit must not be bound; only it should be remembered that, for a wise settlement of the question of amusements, the individual must have a clear apprehension of the moral obligations resting upon

him, and be guided by a spirit of devotion to a lofty ideal of life. 'He that is spiritual judgeth all things.' Let a man realize the true ethical ends of life, let him recognize that life is a gift to be honourably used for self-culture and service, and the question of amusements may be left to settle itself. He who walks according to 'the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus' will never find himself in serious difficulty. He will not ask himself in what amusements he may indulge, or to what extent he may indulge in them, without doing wrong; he will be so intent on seeking the true ends of life that only those amusements will be desired which are in harmony with these ends, and only that measure of indulgence will be allowed which helps towards their attainment. In the most natural way, amusements will take their fitting place as a means of refreshment. They will be the lighter breathings of an earnest spirit, which finds in them a new zest for duty and a preparation for more exacting pursuits. The ethical ideal which gives unity to life will govern them and lend them value; so that pleasures, which in those indifferent to high aims are simply the frivolous exercise of a low-toned spirit, are the sparkle on the surface of a deep and earnest nature, the instinctive playfulness of a heart that finds in relaxation a help for serious work.

B. 1. So far we have been concerned with the general principles which should control the choice and pursuit of amusements; we turn now to consider their character and place in our modern life. It was inevitable that the vast changes which have taken place in business and industrial life within the last two or three generations should affect in a large degree the habits of men in their hours of leisure. The decay of intellectual interests has been incidentally referred to as one of the regrettable results of the increasing desire for lighter forms of amusement, but it must be confessed that it is hard to see how that was altogether to be avoided. The growing strain which the conditions of modern life have imposed on those engaged in business, the exacting demands made on brain and physical endurance by the sharpness of competition as well as by the necessity for providing the comforts and æsthetic refinements of a higher standard of living, have made such inroads on the energies of men that their pleasures have inevitably taken the form of amusements which agreeably relax the tension of the mind. In former days, when the strain was less severe, it was possible in moments of leisure to devote oneself to interests which required some intellectual effort; but under the conditions of present-day life the tension in the case of very many is so great that, if the balance is to be redressed and the powers re-energized for the proper discharge of work, amusements must often be of a nature to quicken sensation and act as an agreeable opiate to serious thought. This may be regretted in the interests of wide and harmonious self-culture, but it is part of the price which must be paid for the overdriven activity of modern life. The same consideration is a fair answer to the criticism which decries the craving for spectacular amusement in the name of robuster methods of recreation. It is blindness to the facts of modern life that leads to the wholesale condemnation of pleasurable excitement which is not accompanied by the healthy glow of exercise. That some measure of recreation in its nobler sense is both desirable and necessary for health of body and mind may be freely allowed; but it cannot be questioned that for the vast proportion of the toilers in our cities what is needed is not so much a further expenditure of energy, as some form of diversion which will quicken the pulse of life by its appeal to the imagination through the senses; and the hard-driven poor ought to be able to secure this in ways that are free from moral danger. Nothing, indeed, is of greater importance for the true welfare of those who are exposed to the strain of city life than the establishment of centres where healthy amusement, freed from all contaminating associations, can be had at a small cost. The Churches are moving in this direction already, and the time should not be far distant when municipalities will realize that it is their highest interest to devote some attention to the amusements of the people.

2. It is not merely the strain which our modern civilization imposes that makes the question of amusements of such vital importance; it is much more the unnatural conditions which have been created by the highly specialized character of modern industry. For large sections of the population there is under present conditions nothing in the nature of their work itself to excite any deep and genuine interest. In earlier days, handicraftsmen found in the varied operations of their calling, and in the freedom in which their skill found scope, a zest which in our mechanical age is almost entirely lacking. It is by no means surprising that men have sought an escape from the colourless routine of uninspiring work along the path of least resistance, and have endeavoured to satisfy their craving for a wider and more joyous life by indulgence in vicious pleasures or in forms of excitement which sap instead of renewing the energies. In these circumstances the great problem is to make activity pleasurable again, to find some way by which interest may be re-awakened in the performance of work which in itself is largely devoid of interest. Unquestionably the noblest way of attaining this end is to endeavour to implant in men's minds a new sense of the deeper meanings of work, a feeling for its ethical significance to the individual himself, and for its significance as the contribution which he is able to make to society in return for the privileges which society confers upon him. But the same end may be served in another way. It has been remarked that 'the most powerful moralizing influences are not always those which are directly moral' (MacCunn, *Making of Character*, 58). Accordingly, interest in work, with the formation of good habits which that implies, may be secured by the provision of healthy amusement which will stir the imagination and satisfy the instinctive desire for a larger life. While the love of life is at present largely exploited by private individuals, with results that are frequently far from beneficial, the aim of the community ought to be to supply forms of entertainment which shall prove a stronger attraction than questionable and vicious pleasures, and shall so enlarge the horizon of men's better desires that they will feel a new inducement to enter into work with all the energies at their command. As an indirect means of attaining moral ends, amusements have a worth which is deserving of greater attention than they have received. Professor Patten (*The New Basis of Civilization*) closes a suggestive discussion of this question with these words: 'Amusement is stronger than vice, and can stifle the lust of it. It is a base of economic efficiency upon which depends the progress of multitudes. When men and women have withstood the allurements of vice and learned work habits, then the steps beyond are fairly well paved. The Church and home can moralize and induce character, the school can clarify purpose, and the settlement can socialize the material ready in the industrial world' (p. 143). See also GAMES.

LITERATURE.—Martensen, *Chr. Ethics* (*Gen.*), 1885, p. 415 ff., *ib.* (*Soc.*), 1882, ii. 77 ff., 254 ff.; Schleiermacher, *Die chr. Sitte*; Rothe, *Chr. Ethik*; Richard Baxter, *Christian Directory*;

Lecky, *Map of Life*, 1899; Patten, *The New Basis of Civilization*, 1907; Dale, *Week-Day Sermons*, 1867; Bushnell, *Serm. on Living Subjects*, 1872; Munger, *On the Threshold*, 1881; Horton, *'This Do,'* 1892; Lambert, *The Omnipotent Cross*, 1899; Brierley, *Ourselves and the Universe*, 1906; Dickie, *Life's Ideals*, 1907; Cameron Lees, *Life and Conduct*, 1892.

A. F. FINDLAY.

AMYRALDISM was the name given, more generally, to the theology of Moyse Amyraut (Moses Amyraldus, the Amiro of Baillie's *Letters*), and, more particularly, to his way of defining the doctrine of Predestination. In the latter sense it was called, not quite appropriately, *Hypothetical Universalism*. It was one of three attempts (the others being Arminianism and the Covenant Theology) made during the 17th cent. to break through the iron ring of Predestination within which the Reformed Scholastic of that century had enclosed the theology of the Reformed Church. To understand the theory it is necessary to know something of the workings of that Scholastic, and something too of the life and aims of Amyraut.

The second leads naturally to the first. Moyse Amyraut was born at Bourgeil in Touraine in 1596. His family belonged to the Reformed religion. The boy was destined to a lawyer's career. He had begun his studies, and had attained to the grade of licentiate, when the reading of Calvin's *Institutio* turned all his thoughts to theology. He entered the Theological College of Saumur, where the teaching of the celebrated Scoto-French theologian, John Cameron, made a profound impression on him—second only to that already produced by the study of the *Institutio*. After a short ministry at Aignan, in Paris, he became minister at Saumur (1626). He had rapidly acquired a high position in the Reformed Church of France, and was deputed by the National Synod, which met at Charenton in 1631, to carry their respectful congratulations to King Louis XIII. At Court he attracted the attention of Cardinal Richelieu, and retained his friendship. In 1633 he was appointed Professor of Theology in Saumur, having as colleagues, appointed at the same time, Josué de la Place and Louis Cappel. All three had been students under Cameron, and all had a fervid admiration for the theology of Calvin as that was exhibited in the *Institutio*. All three believed that the so-called Calvinism of the day differed widely from the teaching of the master, and they were not slow to let this be known in their lectures. The College soon acquired a great reputation. Students came to it from the Reformed Churches beyond France, especially from Switzerland. Then doubts began to arise about the orthodoxy of its teaching, both in France and in Switzerland. The individual churches of the latter country began to withdraw their students, and that 'after-birth' of Reformed creed-making, the *Formula Consensus Helvetica*, was framed for the purpose of denouncing the doctrine of the three professors of Saumur.

The critics of Amyraut were right if orthodoxy was to be tested by the Reformed Scholastic of the day. It was his aim to bring back the Calvinism of the *Institutio*, which differed widely from the Scholastic, and in nothing more than in the doctrine of Predestination. With Calvin, predestination is not set forth at the beginning of his theological system; it is never used as the fundamental thought under which everything else is to be classed. It is simply an explanation of the sovereignty of grace, which overrides man's sin and man's weakness. Still, in spite of the smaller place and special position which the word and idea of predestination held in the *Institutio*, there was a master-thought running through Calvin's theological thinking which might easily be displaced by the conception of predestination. The devout imagination has never made grander or loftier flight than in the thought of the *purpose of God* moving slowly down the ages, making for redemption and the establishment of the Kingdom of God. This is the master-thought in the *Institutio*. It was full of life and movement, and had for issue a living thing, the Kingdom of God. If this conception of the Kingdom of God be kept in view, it is impossible to crystallize or stereotype the living thought of purpose. The Kingdom comes into being in such a variety of ways, none of them able to be expressed in exact definition. Its conception can never be summed up in a few dry propositions. It is something which from its very nature stretches forward to and melts in the infinite. But if a keen and narrow intellect, coming to Calvin's theology, fastens on its nerve thought of *purpose*, and manipulates it according to the presuppositions and formulæ of the second-rate metaphysics within which his mind works, it is possible to transform the thought of purpose into a theory of predestination which will master the whole system of theological thinking.

This is what the Reformed Scholastics of the 17th cent. did with the experimental theology of the 16th century. They made it a second-rate metaphysic dominated by what they called the Divine decree. Moreover, they effected the transformation in the very same way that the mediæval Schoolmen had treated the experimental theology of Augustine. They began with a definition of God borrowed from the Aristotelian philosophy, and put this abstraction in the place which ought to be occupied by the Father, who has revealed Himself in Jesus Christ. The *Principium Essendi* was their starting-point. The abstraction which did service for God in the Aristotelian philosophy needed another abstraction to bring it into relation to the universe of men and things. The Aristotelian thought which mediated between the principle of existence and the variety of life and motion in the universe was the category of Substance. Substance, the first and unique category, collected everything into a unity of being, and so brought the *All* into relation with the *One*. A second abstraction was also needed by the Reformed Scholastic. This was found in the Divine decree. It was the highest category, embracing all existence, including everything knowable, everything which proceeds from the One Principle of Being. The essential existence of God (Trinity) is alone outside this decree; everything else lives, moves, and has its being within the circle of the Divine decree. It is the channel through which God delivers Himself in action outside His essential nature. It includes, it *is*, all existence, still immanent within the Godhead. Within it are all things arranged in *eternal* providence, and all men, and the election of some and the reprobation of others. When existence emerges, it comes forth on the lines laid down within the Deity in the Divine decree, which includes all creation, all actual providence, all Divine work of redemption.

It was this Scholastic that Amyraut and his colleagues protested against—this enclosing everything thinkable within the ring-fence of a Divine decree, which was simply the Aristotelian category of Substance under another name. They wished to get back to the experimental theology of the Reformation age as that was exhibited in its greatest master. They felt that the first thing to be done was to break through this ring-fence, within which the metaphysic of the time made all theological thought move. The attempt made before them, which went by the name of Arminianism, did not appeal to them. It had nothing to do with the experimental theology of Calvin, and was simply the revolt of a shallower metaphysic against a deeper. They accepted the decisions of the Synod of Dordrecht. But they wished to bring theology back to life, to connect it with the needs of men and women.

The special doctrine of Amyraut is known as *Hypothetical Universalism*, or the *Double Reference Theory of the Atonement*. It was suggested by, if not based on, Cameron's doctrine of Conversion. That doctrine, as Amyraut understood it, was: Conversion may be described as a special case of the ordinary action of the intelligence on the will. According to the psychology of the day, it was held that the will acts only in so far as it is influenced by the intellect—action follows enlightenment, and that only. Conversion is a special case of this action of intellect upon will—special, because in this case the Holy Spirit enlightens the intellect, and the intellect, charged with this spiritual enlightenment, acts upon the will. Conversion is thus an instance of the ordinary action of the intelligence on the will, and yet is, at the same time, an altogether extraordinary work of supernatural grace. The grace of God, which is supernatural when it acts upon the will in conversion, follows the ordinary psychological laws. This relation between the intellect and the will in conversion suggested to Amyraut a similar parallel between Providence and Election, and between Creation and Redemption. Providence may be looked on as belonging to the course of nature; but Election is a special instance of Provi

dence and at the same time the peculiar and gracious work of God. Creation belongs to the ordinary course of nature, and Redemption is a special instance of Creation, and is nevertheless a unique and gracious work of God. Just as the relation of the intellect to the will may be called the universal of conversion, so Election may be looked at as set in the environment of Providence, and Redemption in the environment of Creation.

Amyraut, whose devotion to Calvin was unbounded, insisted that these thoughts of his were the legitimate and historical development of ideas presented in the *Institutio*. He keeps to Calvin's great thought of the purpose of God unfolding itself down through the ages. This purpose of grace, when viewed out of all relation to time, is universally Creation, specially it is Redemption; viewed historically, it is Providence and Election; viewed individually, it is Intellect acting on Will and Conversion. He has thus three pairs of ideas —the one universal and natural, the other special and of grace; and that which is of grace is always set in the environment of the natural.

This mode of thought, however, embodied a practical ecclesiastical purpose. In those days Germany was being devastated by the Thirty Years' War—a struggle hideously prolonged, all men saw, in consequence of the mutual jealousies between Calvinists and Lutherans. Since the Synod of Dordrecht, the Lutherans had grown more embittered against the Calvinists. They believed that its doctrinal conclusions had been directed against them indirectly. Amyraut hoped to make it plain to the Lutherans that Calvinist theology could be stated in a form which might be more acceptable to them. He saw that the Lutherans took special objection to the Calvinist doctrine of a limited reference in the Atonement, and he hoped to overcome that difficulty.

Two modes of dealing with the Lutherans were possible to Reformed theologians. (1) They might have insisted that Lutheran theology was quite distinct from Arminianism, and that the condemnation of the Arminians at Dordrecht was not meant to, and did not, involve a condemnation of the Lutherans; that the particular point raised in the Arminian controversy had never been before the Lutheran Churches, and had never been settled by it; and that in any attempt to bring the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches closer to each other, this particular doctrine of a limited reference in the Atonement might be left an open question. This was the view of the great French Reformed theologians Claude and Jurieu. (2) They might, while adhering strictly to the Reformed doctrine as laid down at the Synod of Dordrecht, have endeavoured to shape that doctrine so as to make it approach the Lutheran type in statement at least. Amyraldus selected the latter method. He tried to show that there might be the general reference in the Atonement to all men, which the Lutherans insisted on retaining, while the Reformed thought of a limited reference was also correct. He worked out his scheme of conciliation by the use he made of the three pairs of ideas already mentioned. The purpose in Creation, he said, was Redemption; the purpose in Providence was Election; the purpose in the gift of intellectual endowment was Conversion. Applying this to the matter in hand, he declared that, if the whole design of God in Providence is to make all things work together for the good of them that are called, Providence itself is but a wider election—an election which may be described as universal.

His argument condensed was somewhat as follows: The essential nature of God is goodness; and by goodness Amyraut means love *plus* morality—love limited by the conditions which the universal moral law must impose upon it. This Divine goodness shines forth on man in Creation and in Providence, which is simply Creation become continuous. But sin has through man entered into creation, and has destroyed the true end and aim of man's life. In presence of sin God's goodness shines on, but it must, from its very nature as love *plus* morality, take a somewhat different form. It becomes righteousness, which is goodness in the presence of sin; and this righteousness demands the Atonement, Christ's work of satisfaction, through which men are saved from the consequences of their sin. The goodness of God remains unchanged; it is seen in the desire to *save*; but the presence of sin has made it appear under a special form. When this thought is applied to assort the theological ideas of the 17th cent. Calvinism, it is seen that the purpose of God in salvation is really *infra-lapsarian*, because it arises from goodness in the presence of sin, and therefore face to ace with the thought of the Fall. But it may also be regarded as *supra-lapsarian*, because it is simply a continuation of the original goodness of God. In this purpose of God there is no theoretical limitation save what is implied in the means which the goodness of God in presence of sin is morally compelled to take, *i.e.* the work of Christ. The purpose of God to save is simply the carrying out of the original and universal goodness of God. The work of Redemption is thus the carrying out of the original work of creation. The purpose to redeem is set in the environment of the original purpose to create. When looked at from the point of view of Creation, the *supra-lapsarian*, there is a universal reference in the work of Christ. But when we look at this purpose of God in presence of sin, and when we know that some men do die impenitent and therefore are not saved—when we take the *infra-lapsarian* purpose to save—we see that the theoretically universal reference is limited practically by the fact that some are not saved. The universal reference is theoretical or *hypothetical*; the limited reference to the elect is practical and *real*. Christ's work has real reference only to the some who are saved. This placing a hypothetical universal reference round the limited reference in the work of Christ is *the* distinctive feature in the theology of Amyraldus.

Amyraut, however, applied this general thought in a threefold way:—(1) He broke through the strict idea of salvation limited to the elect—to whom all reference of the work of Christ was limited in 17th cent. Reformed theology—by making the goodness of God, which has regard to *all* men universally, still active in His righteousness (which is His goodness in the presence of sin). He declared that this thought lay implicitly in the well-known phrase of the divines at Dordrecht: '*Christum mortuum esse sufficienter pro omnibus, sed efficaciter pro electis*'; and to make plain what he believed to be its meaning, he changed it to: '*Christum mortuum esse sufficienter sed non actualiter pro omnibus.*' This gave him a hypothetical universalism and a real limitation to those actually saved. (2) He broke down the barrier which 17th cent. divines had reared against the possibility of the salvation of the heathen, by their statement that those to whom the external call is not addressed cannot be held to be recipients of the benefits of the saving work of Christ. He taught, following Zwingli, that God in providence did bestow upon pious heathen what in their case did amount to an external call. This gave a real and not a hypothetical, universal, external call, and with it the offer of salvation to those who had not heard the Gospel message. (3) He widened the precisely fixed sphere of conversion by insisting that every illumination of the intellect was an analogue and prophecy of the spiritual enlightenment which produces conversion.

But while all these three conceptions were discussed in his many treatises on Predestination, the controversy which followed the publication of his views was really confined to the first line of thought. The question was asked, What changes this hypothetical universal reference into a real particular reference? Is it the action of God or of man? If the change arises from man's power to resist what God has purposed to do for all, then Amyraut was an Arminian, as the Dutch and the Swiss theologians asserted. Did the mystery of the change lie hidden in God? Then his theology did not differ substantially from that of the divines of Dordrecht, save perhaps in sentiment. The latter was the view taken by the French Reformed Church. Amyraut was summoned before the

National Synod of 1637 along with his friend Paul Testard, pastor at Blois. The accused were energetically defended, and allowed full liberty to explain their position. They were acquitted of all heresy. The accusation was renewed at the National Synods of 1644 and 1645, with the same result. The Swiss theologians were not satisfied. Their *Formula Consensus Ecclesiarum Helveticarum Reformatarum* (1676) witnessed their protest.

The doctrine of Amyraut has maintained a firm hold on many evangelical Calvinists since his day. It was professed by Baxter, Vines, and Calamy in the days of the Westminster Assembly. It was not, as we can learn from the minutes, meant to be excluded by the definitions in the Westminster Confession. It was taught by Professors Balmer and Brown within the Secession Church in Scotland. It is part of much modern evangelical theology.

LITERATURE.—*Traité de la Prédestination et de ses principes* (Saumur, 1634); *Echantillon de la doctrine de Calvin sur la Prédestination* (Saumur, 1637, consists of six sermons); *De la Justification* (Saumur, 1638); *De Providentia Dei in malo* (Saumur, 1638); *Defensio doctrinæ J. Calvini de absoluto reprobationis decreto* (Saumur, 1641); *Dissertationes theologicæ quatuor* (Saumur, 1645, in the Theses Salmurenses); *Exercitatio de gratia universali* (Saumur, 1646); *Declaratio fidei contra errores Arminianorum* (Saumur, 1646, also in French); *Disputatio de libero hominis arbitrio* (Saumur, 1647); Quick, *Synodicon* (London, 1692), pp. 352, 455, etc. Later books: J. J. Hottinger, *Succincta et solida ac genuina Formulæ Consensus . . . historia* (Zürich, 1723); Walch, *Religionsstreitigkeiten ausserhalb der luther. Kirche* (Jena, 1733), i. p. 454 ff.; Schweitzer, *Die Prot. Centraldogmen in ihrer Entwicklung der Reform. Kirche* (Zürich, 1856); Ebrard, *Reform. Kirchenzeitung* (1853); Edmund Saigey, *Amyraut, sa vie et ses écrits* (Paris, 1849); also Bayle's *Dict.*, art. 'Amyraut.'

THOMAS M. LINDSAY.

ANABAPTISM.—I. *HISTORY.*—The Anabaptists, or Katabaptists (*Wiedertäufer* or *Täufer*) rose in close connexion with the early Reformers at Zürich, Wittenberg, and possibly elsewhere. They spread swiftly over those parts of Europe affected by the Reformation, making a profound impression in the early years of that movement. All the leading Reformers (Luther, Zwingli, Bucer, Oecolampadius, Calvin, Knox, and many others) combated their views in one or more publications and disputations; their doctrines are condemned explicitly or by implication in all the leading creeds of the 16th and 17th cents. (Augsburg, Part I. Artt. ix. xvi.; Trent. Sess. v. 4, 'On Bapt.,' Can. xiii.; French, xxxv.; 2nd Helv. Conf., Artt. xx. xxx.; Belgic Conf., Art. xxxiv.; Scotch Conf., Art. xxiii.; Formula of Concord, Art. xii.; Thirty-nine Artt. xxvii. xxxvii. xxxix.; Westminster Conf. xxviii.); and Calvin's *Institutes* were originally written largely to prove to Francis I. that the Reformers were not all Anabaptists; they were put under the ban by the Diet of the Empire in 1529; and most other civil governments, including that of England, took action against them.

They were the radical party of the Reformation period, regarding Luther and Zwingli as half-reformers who had pulled down the old house without rebuilding in its place. Despairing of reforming the old Church, they sought to build anew on the foundation of Scripture literally interpreted, without the help of the State or any other existing institution; this religious ideal involved fundamental social and political changes (Beck, *Geschichtsbücher d. Wiedertäufer*, p. 12). They differed considerably among themselves in spirit, aim, and many more or less important points of doctrine, but strove together towards a great and far-reaching reform. They sought to reform the work of the Reformers.

The striking similarity between many of their doctrines and those of some earlier sects has led to an effort to show some historical connexion. Ritschl (*Gesch. d. Pietismus*) has sought to trace their doctrines to the spiritual Franciscans; Ludwig Keller and others have sought to show some connexion with the Waldenses, who a little earlier were widely scattered over central Europe. The similarity in doctrines, spirit, and organization is so marked as almost to compel belief in some sort of historical succession; and yet the effort to trace this connexion has not so far been successful. Moreover, several considerations militate against such a conclusion. (1) The Anabaptists themselves were not conscious of such connexion, regarding themselves as the spiritual children of a renewed study of the Bible. (2) All their leaders, so far as their lives are known, came out of the Catholic Church. (3) They had little or no communion with older sects after their rise. These considerations render it probable that they, like the sects of the Middle Ages, are the offspring of a renewed Bible study, and that the similarity is the result of independent Bible study under similar circumstances and controlling ideas.

The history of the party can perhaps be best followed by dividing them into German, Swiss-Moravian, and Dutch Anabaptists. These divisions overlap more or less, but they are largely distinct types.

1. **The German Anabaptists.**—It is commonly held that the German Anabaptists rose with Thomas Münzer and Nicholas Storch at Zwickau in eastern Saxony. Münzer, a well-educated man, deeply imbued with the mysticism of the later Middle Ages, a friend and follower of Luther, became pastor at Zwickau in 1520. Here he came under the influence of Nicholas Storch, a weaver, who had become deeply tinged with Bohemian views: chiliasm; the rejection of oaths, magistracy, warfare, and infant baptism; and the insistence on community of goods. Under this influence he at once began drastic reforms. With his approval Storch set up a new church on the Bohemian model, claiming new revelations and the special guidance of the Spirit. Their socialistic teachings and revolutionary proceedings soon forced them to leave. Storch, in company with a former Wittenberg student named Stübner, proceeded to Wittenberg in the hope of winning the support of the University for their views. Luther was then in hiding at the Wartburg; Carlstadt and Cellarius, two of the professors of the University, were speedily won over by the new prophets, and even Melanchthon was deeply moved. Various reforms were put into effect immediately. Luther, hearing of these radical proceedings, and believing they would bring the whole reform movement to ruin, hastened to Wittenberg in spite of the protest of his friends, and in eight powerful sermons succeeded in suppressing the movement at that place. Storch and eventually the two professors whom he had won to his views were driven away, Melanchthon was saved, and the radical reforms revoked. Henceforth Luther was one of the most powerful and uncompromising opponents of the Anabaptists. Storch now wandered from place to place, and finally disappeared about 1525.

In the meantime Münzer had visited Prague for several months, had then laboured as pastor and agitator at several places in Thuringia, and had made a visit to southern Germany and the border of Switzerland in the interest of his views. He was becoming more socialistic, more chiliastic, more bitter towards the ruling and upper classes. At last in 1525 the peasant uprising broke out. It had his enthusiastic support, and shortly after its overthrow at Frankenhausen he was arrested and executed. With this catastrophe the Anabaptist cause in Germany suffered a permanent defeat. Henceforth Anabaptism was associated in the minds of Germans with the wild socialism and chiliasm of Münzer and the horrors of the Peasant War. And yet neither Münzer nor Storch is known to have been re-baptized or to have practised believers' baptism. Both opposed infant baptism, but Münzer specially provides for it in a German service which he drew up for the church of Alstedt in 1523. It is impossible to determine the extent to which these men preached the necessity of believers' baptism, and thereby became the founders of the Anabaptism of Hesse and other regions of western Germany. They were chiefly interested

in socialistic-chiliastic ideas, and probably did not press the demand for re-baptism. If this be true, the Anabaptists of the Rhine region had another origin, to be traced later.

2. The Swiss-Moravian Anabaptists.—Bullinger says that the Swiss Anabaptists sucked their Anabaptism from Münzer (*Refor. Gesch.* i. p. 224 f.). But this is improbable. Münzer, as we have seen, did visit the border of Switzerland in 1524, and was in conference with some men who later adopted Anabaptism; but in a letter still preserved (Cornelius, *Gesch. d. Münst. Aufruhrs*, ii. Beil. 1), written September 5, 1524, they show marked independence, even chiding Münzer for some of his views. Moreover, the whole tone and spirit of the Swiss was different from that of Münzer. Chiliasm and violence had no place in their scheme, and socialistic tendencies were much less prominent. Besides, there was in southern Germany and Switzerland at this time wide-spread doubt of the Scripturalness of infant baptism, Bucer, Oecolampadius, and even Zwingli being in doubt ('Vom Tauf, vom Widertauf,' etc., *Opp.* ii. p. 245, *ib.* i. p. 239 f.; Egli, *Actensammlung*, 655, 692).

These Anabaptists rose from the circle of Zwingli's intimate friends and associates at Zürich. Zwingli had become pastor there on 1st Jan. 1519, and by his powerful evangelical preaching had by 1523 brought many of the population to a readiness to abolish Catholic worship and doctrines. But he was anxious to avoid division and strife, and delayed action, hoping to convince the whole mass of the people and then proceed to reform with the authority of the cantonal government. Under these circumstances there sprang up a radical party who favoured proceeding at once with reform 'without tarrying for any.' Moreover, their convictions on some points were in advance of Zwingli's. They urged him to remove or destroy the images, abolish the Mass, begin the celebration of the Supper in both kinds, and finally, to set up a church composed of saints (believers) only. His delay in adopting their earlier demands and his flat refusal to entertain the last led to a final break with the party in 1523 or 1524 (Bullinger, *Der Wiedertäufer Ursprung*, Bl. 9).

The more prominent members of the party at this time were Simon Stumpf pastor at Höngg, Froschauer the famous printer, Heine Aberli, Andreas Castelberg a cripple, Conrad Grebel a young man of aristocratic family, Felix Manz, Wilhelm Reublin pastor at Wytikon, Ludwig Hätzer an excellent Hebraist and later translator of the Prophets, and Georg Blaurock a converted monk who was the most powerful popular preacher among them. Grebel and Manz were the real leaders of the party at Zürich. Grebel was trained at Vienna and Paris, and possessed a fine Greek culture; Manz was an excellent Hebrew scholar, habitually using his Hebrew Bible in preaching. These men held private meetings for Bible study, and here their views were gradually developed and perfected (Egli, *op. cit.* No. 623). Early in 1524 they reached the conclusion that infant baptism was without warrant in Scripture, was an invention of the Pope, yea of Satan himself; it was therefore invalid, was no baptism, and hence the duty of beginning anew the baptism of believers was felt to rest upon them. This they proceeded to do in Dec. 1524 or Jan. 1525, when in a private house Grebel baptized Blaurock, who in turn took a dipper (*aimer*) and baptized several others in the name of the Trinity (Egli, 636, 646). This was followed by the celebration of the Supper in the same simple way.

The civil authorities now resorted to repressive measures. After a public disputation with the Anabaptists (17th Jan. 1525), it was decreed that all infants should be baptized within eight days, that all private religious meetings be abandoned, and that all foreign Anabaptists be banished. Soon afterwards several were arrested, warned, threatened, and released. Continuing their activity, they were again arrested, thrown into prison, and a second ineffective disputation was held on 20th March. On 5th April most of them escaped from prison, and leaving for a brief period the Canton of Zürich comparatively quiet, they spread their views far and wide in other cantons. Renewed activity in Zürich was met by increasing severity on the part of the authorities. In Jan. 1526 the fine to be imposed for re-baptizing was raised to five pounds, and in March eighteen persons were thrown into prison and ordered to be fed on bread and water till they 'die and rot.' Further, baptizing or aiding and abetting the same was to be punished by drowning. Soon afterwards the prisoners were released, on what terms is unknown. Manz and Blaurock were again arrested in the territory of Zürich early in 1527. Soon afterwards Manz was drowned, while Blaurock was beaten through the streets and sent into banishment with the death penalty hanging over him in case of return.

In August 1527, Zürich proposed the adoption of uniform measures for the suppression of the Anabaptists by the cantons affected, viz. Basel, Berne, Schaffhausen, Chur, Appenzell, and St. Gall. These cantons had probably all received these views from Zürich (but see Müller, *Gesch. d. Ber. Täufer*, p. 52 f.) in the early stages of the movement.

The Anabaptists appeared in Basel in the summer of 1525, and for nearly a year enjoyed comparative peace. In June 1526 they were banished five miles from the city, and a month later attendance on their secret meetings was forbidden. Notwithstanding fines, imprisonment, and public floggings, they multiplied rapidly in the country districts throughout the year 1527 They first appeared in the territory of Berne in 1525, but gave little trouble before 1527, when persecution in Basel and elsewhere drove them into this canton in great numbers. In St. Gall they are found early, and achieved a signal success. The founder and leader was Wolfgang Uolimann, who was converted and baptized (immersed naked) in the Rhine at Schaffhausen in Feb. 1525. Grebel himself preached in St. Gall for two weeks in March with great power and success. By Easter the Anabaptists numbered five hundred souls, and their influence was so great that the authorities felt compelled to deal gently with them. The foreign Anabaptists were banished, and the native ones were persuaded to cease baptizing until the matter could be decided by the Council. Zwingli was alarmed by the rapidity of their growth, and persuaded Vadian, who was the leading statesman of the canton and a brother-in-law of Grebel, to oppose them, dedicating his book *Vom Tauf*, etc., to Vadian at the end of May. Notwithstanding the earnest entreaties of Grebel (Cornelius, *Gesch. Münster. Aufruhrs*, ii. 250), Vadian turned against them. After a disputation early in June, the Council ordered the Anabaptists to cease baptizing altogether, and to cease teaching outside one of the churches which was opened to them. Severe measures were enforced against them, and by 1527 the strength of the movement was broken.

In similar ways Anabaptism had been planted in Chur, Appenzell, and Schaffhausen. In Schaffhausen it seemed for a time that Dr. Sebastian Hofmeister, the leading preacher of the canton, would be won for the Anabaptists (Egli, 674).

The efforts of Zürich to secure the adoption of uniform regulations against the Anabaptists in August 1527 were unsuccessful; but all the cantons agreed to proceed more strenuously towards their extermination. It now became very difficult for the leaders to find hiding-places in Switzerland, and the emigration to the Austrian lands and Moravia which had begun several months earlier was greatly accelerated. Still many lingered and worked in Switzerland, and still the measures for their suppression increased in severity. In the canton of Zürich six were executed between 1527 and 1532, and one in the Catholic canton of Zug (Nitsche, *Gesch. d. Wiedertaufer* (1885), p. 97). Twenty years later, Bullinger still complains bitterly of their great numbers, and the time of their complete disappearance from the canton is unknown.

After the Reformation was legally introduced into Basel in 1529, the government proceeded against the Anabaptists more vigorously. On 12th Jan. 1530, Hans Ludi was beheaded, and a year later two others were drowned (Burckhardt, p. 41). Others, both men and women, were exposed in the pillory, ducked, beaten, and banished, and it is probable that others were executed (Burckhardt, p. 43). This broke their power, but they lingered on amid perpetual persecution through the 16th and 17th centuries.

Berne proceeded against the Anabaptists more vigorously after 1527. In 1528, during the great disputation which led this canton to accept the Reformation, eight Anabaptists were arrested and thrown into prison. When Zwingli and others failed to convince them of their errors, they were banished under penalty of death if they returned. During the years 1528–1529 frequent cases were brought before the authorities;

disputations with Pfister Meyer in 1531 and at Zofingen in 1532 failed to retard their growth. Berne then proceeded to blood, and between the years 1528 and 1571 no fewer than forty were executed (Müller, p. 78 f.). But even this severity was not sufficient to root them out of this canton. During the succeeding centuries they were sent to the galleys, deported, banished, persecuted; but they have maintained their existence to the present time.

In St. Gall, persecution drove the Anabaptists, especially the women, to the most absurd and childish and even immoral practices (Kessler, *Sabbata*). One case in particular wrought disaster to the Anabaptist name and cause. On 7th Feb. 1526, a half-witted man named Schugger struck off his brother's head 'by the will of God.' Later Anabaptists denied all connexion with this incident, but they could not escape the consequences of the deed. Anabaptists lingered in this canton till the 17th century.

By 1532 all the leaders, such as Grebel, Manz, Blaurock, Denck, Hätzer, and Hübmaier, were dead, hundreds had been forced to recant, many had died in prison, and perhaps thousands had been driven from the country. The movement in Switzerland lay in ruins, destroyed by the civil power. The causes of this bitter persecution are not far to seek. The Anabaptists in this region, with few exceptions, were quiet, pious, law-abiding people, with some oddities due to their strictness (Kessler, *Sabbata*, i. 272). Even Bullinger admits that they had the appearance of unusual piety. But they made what seemed at that time impossible demands: a Church composed of believers only, rigid discipline for moral offences, complete freedom for the Church and the individual conscience. Failing to obtain their demands, they divided and weakened the Reformers, causing endless strife and difficulty. Their refusal to bear arms, to serve as civil officers or take the oath, made them dangerous to the State, while their attitude towards property, usury, and certain forms of taxes threatened the whole social order. Hence suppression and extermination were felt to be the only paths to safety.

The intimate relations of the south German cities with Switzerland made them peculiarly susceptible to all spiritual and religious movements in that country. Accordingly we find large Anabaptist circles in Strassburg, Worms, Nuremberg, and Augsburg quite early. In these circles such leaders as Ludwig Hätzer, Hans Denck, and Hans Hut were won for the Anabaptist cause. One of the most important conquests was in the small border town of Waldshut in Austrian territory. Here Dr. Balthasar Hübmaier, a gifted scholar and eloquent preacher, some time rector of the University of Ingolstadt and Cathedral preacher at Regensburg, was the leading pastor. He was early converted to Reformed views, and in 1524 succeeded in introducing them into the city. But he was unable to stop here. Gradually he found himself compelled to accept Anabaptist views; about Easter 1525 he and some sixty members of his church were re-baptized. This was followed soon afterwards by the baptism of several hundred others, and the Anabaptists seemed to be in a fair way to win the town. But for some months the Austrian authorities, who were strict Catholics, had been threatening to punish the town for its evangelical doings. Hitherto the support of Zürich had emboldened Waldshut to persevere. The Anabaptist defection caused the withdrawal of this support, and in December the storm broke over the devoted city. Hübmaier fled to Zürich, was arrested as an Anabaptist, imprisoned, and forced to recant as the price of liberty. Released on 11th April, 1526, he fled through Constance to Augsburg, and thence in June to Nikolsburg in Moravia, where his persecuted brethren were already gathering.

Driven from Switzerland, the Anabaptists fled eastward into the Austrian lands from 1526 onwards. Their doctrines found ready acceptance, and soon large bodies had been gathered at Rottenberg, Kitzbüchl, Brixen, Bozen, Linz, Steyer, and elsewhere. Here they came under Catholic governments which hunted them down, if possible, even more strenuously than the Swiss. King Ferdinand himself was very active in the work of extermination, and in a few years hundreds had suffered martyrdom. Protected by the character of the country and the sympathy of the common people, the Anabaptists continued to maintain an existence for more than a century, until the Catholic reaction swept all forms of evangelical life in these regions out of existence.

Persecution in the Austrian lands drove the Anabaptists onward into Moravia, Bohemia, and Poland. The religious history and the social and political condition of these lands made them an asylum for various sects, and here for a brief period the Anabaptists found rest and safety. At Nikolsburg, under the protection of the lords of Lichtenstein, they found 'a goodly land,' a new Jerusalem, from 1526 onwards. Thither they streamed in great numbers from Switzerland, the Austrian lands, Germany, and elsewhere; natives were converted to their views, and soon they numbered thousands. Among the first to arrive was Hübmaier. Learned, eloquent, free from fanaticism, without rancour in debate, a careful exegete, possessed of an excellent literary style, he was the chief ornament of the sect. Within little more than a year he published no fewer than fifteen tracts, in which he set forth with force and clearness the great principles that characterized his people. Had he lived, their history might have been different. But the Austrian authorities soon learned of the presence in their dominions of this fugitive from Waldshut, and demanded his apprehension as a traitor. After some delay, the lords of Lichtenstein delivered him up in July, 1527. He was imprisoned at Vienna, where he was burned at the stake on 10th March, 1528. Thus perished the most important of all the Anabaptist leaders.

The community in Nikolsburg could ill afford to lose a man of such wisdom and sanity. Already in 1526 Hans Hut, one of Münzer's followers who had escaped from Germany, appeared among the brethren as a powerful and impressive herald of Christ's speedy return, a determined opponent of magistracy and war. Others soon began to agitate in favour of community of goods. Hübmaier had opposed all these views, but Hut's enthusiasm had won many of the brethren before his expulsion by the Lichtensteins. They soon felt compelled to banish his followers, who were now perhaps a majority of the brethren. The moderates remained at Nikolsburg under the leadership of Spitalmaier as chief pastor, but they were never again the most influential party. The radicals settled at Austerlitz, and soon became a thriving community, with branches at Brünn and elsewhere. Chiefly through the missionary labours of Jacob Huter, a noble and zealous leader, their persecuted brethren in the Austrian lands were induced to immigrate in large numbers. They built great communal houses, became experts in agriculture and stock-raising, and in the manufacture of many important articles of commerce. Their value was recognized by their lords, who protected them as far as possible; but after the Münster horror in 1535 a terrible persecution broke over them. Their houses were broken up, and they were driven forth into other lands. As persecution subsided, they returned and took up their work again. After another period of persecution, which lasted with more or less severity from 1547 to 1554, they enjoyed great prosperity till 1592, when they probably numbered some 70,000 souls. They had suffered from frequent internal strifes, and were

now caught in the great Catholic reaction led by the Jesuits, and gradually declined. Greatly reduced by the Thirty Years' War, they were completely ruined by later invasions of Turks and others, as well as by persecution. Some of them fled to Hungary and Transylvania, where they disappear in the 18th century. Others fled to southern Russia, whence a remnant removed in 1874 to South Dakota, in the United States, where they still preserve their communal life.

The Anabaptists of two other regions, both with some relations to the Swiss-Moravian movement, must be mentioned in this connexion. About 1526, in connexion with the work of Schwenckfeldt, the Anabaptists appeared in Silesia. Soon they had flourishing congregations in several important cities, but persecution from 1528 onwards gradually exterminated them.

By the middle of the 16th cent. there was a strong Anabaptist body in N.E. Italy, chiefly anti-Trinitarian in Christology. The Inquisition then got on their track, and in a few years the movement was stifled. Many of them fled to Poland, where they built up a flourishing connexion. In 1605 they issued the Racovian Catechism, which provides for immersion as the mode of baptism. Though they were Socinians, they believed in the authority of Scripture and the lordship of Christ. They suffered the fortunes of the other evangelicals in this region during the Counter-Reformation.

3. The Anabaptists of the Rhine regions.—As far as their history can be traced, the Anabaptists of the lower Rhine-lands owe their origin and peculiarities chiefly to Melchior Hoffmann. This wonderful man was born in Hall, Swabia, and was a furrier by trade. He early accepted Luther's views, and by 1523 was a zealous evangelical preacher in North Germany. He was without education, but early acquired a remarkable knowledge of the text of Scripture, along with an intense interest in the prophetic and apocalyptic portions. He developed a burning enthusiasm as well as a powerful eloquence in propagating the Lutheran views. His zeal and power usually aroused intense opposition, and frequently occasioned riot and sometimes bloodshed. He moved rapidly from place to place, and always made a profound impression. In 1523 he was in Wolmar, in Livonia; banished from there, in 1524 he was in Dorpat; in 1526 he was in Sweden, at Stockholm; in 1527, at Lübeck; then at Kiel, where he made a profound impression on King Frederick I. of Denmark. Banished from there, he entered East Friesland, with Carlstadt, where he threw himself into the controversy between the followers of Luther and Zwingli over the Supper, supporting the latter party, and by his power and eloquence carrying the day for his views. In June 1529 he reached Strassburg. By this time he had devoloped most of the peculiarities of his system, including the allegorical method of interpreting Scripture, a glowing chiliasm which fixed the beginning of the reign of Christ on earth in the year 1533, the assertion that the human nature of Christ was not derived from Mary, and, therefore, not ordinary flesh, a denial of the oath, etc. During this visit he is supposed to have come in contact with Anabaptists, who were then numerous in Strassburg, and to have been baptized into their fellowship. Returning to East Friesland in May, 1530, he began a truly wonderful Anabaptist propaganda, which extended, with brief interruptions, to 1533, and covered much of the Low Countries. Most of the Lutheran and Zwinglian work was swept away, and it is probable that the majority of Evangelicals in the Netherlands from 1533 to 1566 were of the Hofmannite type. In 1531 he suspended baptisms for two years, intimating that the Lord would then come to assume the reins of government at Strassburg, and bring the era of righteousness and peace for all the oppressed. The effect was magical, the religious and social excitement intense. In order to be present when the Lord came, he quietly returned to Strassburg early in 1533. He was soon apprehended and thrown into prison, where he died ten years later. But the seed which Münzer and others had sown was destined to bear some horrible fruit.

The episcopal city of Münster, in Westphalia, had been ruled by a succession of exceedingly dissolute and oppressive bishops, who, however, succeeded in holding reform at bay for several years. But in 1529 Bernard Rothmann, a gifted young preacher near Münster, began to preach evangelical doctrines. He was suspended, but returned to his work in 1531, and soon made an alliance with Knipperdollinck and the social democracy of the city. The bishop was driven away in 1532, and the next year reform was introduced. Persecuted Evangelicals from surrounding regions found their way into Münster, and there was great rejoicing and naturally great excitement over this new triumph of the truth. Heinrich Roll, a fugitive from Cleve, became an advocate of believers' baptism in 1532, and the next year Rothmann reached the same conclusion, and began a crusade against infant baptism. He was followed by a number of the leading men of the city. The City Council undertook to force the preachers to administer infant baptism, but popular sentiment was so strong as to prevent the execution of their will. This was the tense and excited condition of the city towards the end of 1533; Anabaptists, Lutherans, Catholics, and social democrats were all struggling for supremacy, when a horde of still more excited Anabaptists poured into the city from the Netherlands, believing it to be the hour for setting up Christ's kingdom at Münster as the New Jerusalem.

Jan Matthys, a baker of Haarlem, a disciple of Hofmann, inspired with a fanatical hatred of the upper classes, now proclaimed himself the promised prophet Enoch, and ordered the resumption of baptism as a final preparation for the coming King. In a short time thousands were baptized. In January 1534 two of his missionaries entered Münster, where they baptized Rothmann and other leaders, and announced the setting up of the earthly kingdom, in which there should be no magistracy, no law, no marriage, and no private property. Soon John of Leyden, a gifted young man of twenty-five years, appeared and took over the leadership of the new theocracy. Catholics and Lutherans fled, and the city fell completely into the hands of these fanatical Anabaptists. Matthys now declared Münster to be the New Jerusalem, and invited all the oppressed Anabaptists thither. Thousands of deluded and persecuted people sought to reach this place of safety and happiness, only to be destroyed on the way or ruined at last in the city. The city was soon besieged by the forces of the bishop, assisted by neighbouring princes, while within its walls murder, polygamy, and crime ran riot. After more than a year of ever increasing shame, the terrible orgy ended in massacre and cruel torture in 1535.

The effect of this Münster kingdom was most disastrous to the Anabaptists. Everywhere persecuting measures were sharpened, and the name became a byword and a hissing throughout Europe. This episode was regarded as the legitimate outcome of Anabaptist principles.

Menno Simons gathered up the fragments of

the quiet Anabaptists and re-organized them in 1536, at the same time disclaiming all connexion with the Münster fanatics. From him they have been called Mennonites (wh. see), and in Holland and America they still constitute a respectable folk.

Before and after the Münster episode some Anabaptists found their way to the eastern sections of England, where they were severely persecuted. It is possible, indeed probable, that there is some connexion between them and the Independents, English Baptists, and Quakers, all of whom show some of the peculiarities of the Anabaptists.

II. *System.*—Anabaptism affords a case of arrested development with scarcely a parallel in Christian history. Arising spontaneously at different points, the movement seized Central Europe with a powerful grip, and bade fair to divide the population with other forms of Protestantism. But the machinery of ecclesiastical and civil government was soon set in motion to suppress it, and in ten years there remained only a persecuted, fanatical remnant of the once powerful movement. Without any great leader to crystallize its doctrines, and suffering persecution from the beginning, the party never attained unity and harmony. It is, therefore, often necessary to set forth the prevailing tendency, and at the same time to point out important variations from the general trend.

The immediate, direct accountability of each individual soul to God in all religious things was the fundamental principle of the Anabaptists. No institution, sacred or secular, no ordinance, no parent or priest, could mediate between the soul and God. Communication between the two was open; they must approach each other through Jesus Christ. This principle determined the character of their religious views; and its corollary, the absolute brotherhood of believers, determined their conception of all human relations, their attitude towards society and the State. Both these principles they regarded as revealed and illuminated by the Scriptures, which, when properly interpreted, were authoritative for all the relations and duties of life. For their proper interpretation, only piety and spiritual enlightenment were necessary; learning might be useful or harmful, according to the spirit of the interpreter. In order to set forth their tenets in more detail, it is best to group them under the three heads of Religious, Political, and Social.

1. Religious views.—(1) In general, the Anabaptists accepted the common Catholic and Protestant doctrine of God as set forth in the Apostles' and the Nicene Creeds. A few, like Denck and Hätzer, doubted, or denied, the essential Deity of Christ; and, on the other hand, Melchior Hofmann and his followers denied the humanity of Christ, maintaining that His was a sort of heavenly flesh, descended through Mary, but without essential relations to humanity.

(2) They opposed the Augustinian theology of the Reformers, insisting vehemently on the freedom of the will and complete moral responsibility. The theology of Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin appeared to them to be contrary to the Scriptures, dishonouring to God, and dangerous to morality. In these views they anticipated Arminius by almost a century.

(3) The Anabaptists maintained the right of the individual to interpret Scripture for himself; and some of them, at least, asserted the superior authority and sanctity of the NT over the OT as the fuller, clearer revelation of God, thus approximating to the modern view of a progressive revelation. Pfister Meier says: 'I obey that in the Old Testament which I find confirmed in the New.' The chief qualification for correct interpretation of the Scripture was the illumination of the Holy Spirit—a doctrine which was strongly emphasized. It was charged that they claimed to have revelations and visions which they regarded as more important than Scripture; but this charge was probably an exaggeration of their real belief in the fact and importance of spiritual illumination.

(4) The true Church was composed of believers only—'saints.' Despairing of bringing the State Church to this standard, they proceeded to set up a new Church on this model, thereby introducing schism into the Protestant ranks. The purity of the Church was to be secured by the baptism of believers only, and preserved by the exercise of strict discipline. (*a*) Infant baptism was regarded as without warrant in Scripture, contrary to the principle of voluntary action in religion, an invention of the devil, and the chief source of the corruption in the Church and of its subjection to the State. In its stead they practised believers' baptism, administering the rite to those who had been baptized in infancy, thus winning the name 'Anabaptists'—re-baptizers—from their opponents; but the name and its implication they earnestly repudiated, declaring that so-called baptism in infancy was no baptism, and claiming for themselves the name of 'brethren' or 'disciples.' Infant baptism, the repudiation of which was the most obvious characteristic of the sect, became the chief battle-ground of the parties. The *mode* of baptism was never a matter of discussion. Most of them practised affusion, the form then prevalent on the Continent; but some of the Swiss and Polish Anabaptists insisted on immersion as the only admissible form, thus anticipating the modern Baptist position. (*b*) The means of preserving the Church pure was the constant application of rigid discipline for moral offences. Unconverted and immoral members were severed from the body relentlessly, the party doubtless going to extremes in this respect. Discipline was exercised by the democratic action of the congregation rather than by the officers of the Church or by the civil power. On all these points they came into sharp collision with the State Church. They strove to reproduce in themselves the life of Christ, and in their Church the life of primitive Christianity, laying great emphasis on the imitation of Christ. While admitting that they had the appearance of unusual purity of life, their opponents declared them to be hypocrites and guilty of grave moral lapses. A few cases, due to fanaticism, especially among the followers of John of Leyden and others of what may be termed the 'fanatical' Anabaptist school, seem to be proven; but, beyond dispute, they in general lived quiet and harmless lives, in striking contrast to the society about them.

(5) The ordinances of Baptism and the Lord's Supper had no sacramental significance. Baptism was rather a declaration of faith and forgiveness than a sacrament of cleansing or regeneration. They were charged with laying an over-emphasis on baptism; but, as a matter of fact, its place in their scheme was not so important as in that of Luther. They insisted on believers' baptism, because they regarded it as Scriptural and necessary to the purity of the Church; Luther insisted on infant baptism, because he regarded it as necessary to the regeneration of the individual. They believed that infants dying in infancy are saved without the necessity of baptism. They agreed with Zwingli in regarding the Supper as a memorial ordinance, rejecting Catholic, Lutheran, and Calvinistic views.

(6) Not much is known of the officers and organization of the Anabaptists. Ordination seems to have been in abeyance in the earlier stages of the

movement, which was a great outburst of missionary activity among laymen. When charged with preaching in improper places and without proper authority, they claimed the authority of a Divine call which needed no ecclesiastical ordination or State authorization. Later abuses in their own ranks forced them to adopt ordination. Preachers were chosen by lot and ordained by the congregation as a recognition of the Divine call, which they still regarded as the necessary part of their qualification for preaching. They rejected with decision the principle of State support in every form, and claimed that preachers ought to be supported by the free-will offerings of the congregation when located, and by Christian hospitality when travelling. They reproached the ministers of the State Church with inactivity and want of care for the people, among whom they should go as shepherds among the sheep.

(7) On eschatology there were great differences of opinion. The majority, perhaps, held sane and Biblical views; but expectation of the early return of Christ bred the wildest fanaticism in others. From the belief of Hofmann that Christ was soon to set up His Kingdom on earth and destroy the wicked, it was but a step to an effort to set up the Kingdom by destroying the wicked, and we have the 'fanatical' Anabaptists and John of Leyden's horrible 'kingdom' at Münster as the outcome. Thomas Münzer also had believed in the use of the sword, and his powerful personality had given the whole movement in Germany a fanatical and dangerous chiliastic bent, which brought ruin on his cause.

(8) Anabaptist worship was necessarily very simple. Persecution and the lack of church buildings made it necessary to worship in small companies, in such a fashion as to attract as little attention as possible. In the earlier years worship probably consisted almost wholly of prayer and instruction; later, singing occupied a large place. Their own compositions were set to popular music and sung far and wide. These songs, often written in prison, reveal profound religious feeling and unwavering faith and hope (cf. Wolkan, *Lieder der Wiedertäufer; Aus Bundt*).

2. Political views.—(1) The Anabaptists regarded the State as a necessary evil, ordained of God indeed, and therefore to be obeyed where its obligations were not in conflict with conscience. The charge that they were opposed to magistracy altogether is without foundation in fact. They denied the supremacy of the State in the realm of conscience, and resisted its assumption of authority here, even to death; as to other things they inculcated obedience. The conscience was absolutely free under God. The State had no religious duties; it was needed only to protect the good and punish the wicked. This doctrine involved complete disestablishment; universal toleration; freedom of worship, organization, and teaching. These views came to full, clear, and vigorous expression in Hübmaier especially. Repudiated and execrated then, this contention has been adopted in modern times with more or less completeness by all civilized lands.

(2) Many of the Anabaptists maintained that no Christian could hold civil office, because such elevation was in conflict with the principle of Christian brotherhood and equality; besides, it often required the infliction of capital punishment, and to kill was under no circumstances permissible to a Christian. This tenet, regarded by their opponents as destructive of all government, was not so understood by themselves. They did not believe capital punishment was necessary to the suppression of crime, nor did they regard all who bore the Christian name as Christians. Their opponents said: 'If no Christian can act as magistrate, we must go to the heathen or Turks for governors.' 'No,' replied the Anabaptists, 'there are but few Christians even in Christian lands, and hosts of men are left for rulers.' The different meanings attached by the two parties to the word 'Christian' were the source of the misunderstanding. Their anticipation of the modern movement for the abolition of capital punishment is noteworthy. Hübmaier and others, however, maintained the right of a Christian to hold civil office.

(3) They opposed the oath under any and all circumstances, on purely Biblical grounds (Mt 5^{34}). This, again, was regarded by Zwingli and others as destructive of civil government, which was thought to rest upon the inviolability of the oath. No such importance and sacredness were attached to it by the Anabaptists, who taught that one's assertion should be as sacredly kept as the oath. Under the threat of execution they sometimes took the oath; but it was not regarded as binding, because taken under duress.

(4) The Anabaptists were relentless opponents of war as the great destroyer of human life, which they held to be inviolable. Under pressure they paid war taxes, assisted in building fortifications, and rendered other services of this kind; but they suffered imprisonment and death rather than bear arms. The Münster kingdom was a hideous caricature of the whole movement, and cannot be cited in opposition to this statement. Indeed, the Anabaptists' insistence upon peace was the main cause of the constant war made upon them. The military basis of society in the 16th cent. made such advocates of peace appear exceedingly dangerous to national existence; but this cause of bitter denunciation and persecution may yet become their crown of glory as the world swings into the era of universal peace.

3. Social and economic views.—(1) In imitation of the primitive Christian Church, the Anabaptists were strongly inclined to a voluntary and benevolent communism in the acquisition and administration of property (Ac $2^{44f.}$). This opinion, which appears in the earliest stages of the movement, was fully developed in Moravia, where many of them lived and worked in great communal settlements (Loserth, *Communismus*, etc.). Among the German and Dutch Anabaptists appeared a tendency towards enforced communism, as seen in Thomas Münzer and in the Münster kingdom. But a large part, perhaps a majority, of the Anabaptists, did not favour actual communism in any form; they strenuously maintained, however, that all property belonged primarily to the Lord, and must be freely used in ministering to the needy. They conceived themselves in the position of stewards, under solemn obligation to administer the Lord's money for the highest good of mankind.

(2) They opposed the lending of money at interest, refused to accept interest themselves, and paid it unwillingly to others. Money, they held, should be lent for the benefit of the borrower rather than the lender. Proper fraternal relations forbade the exploitation of the needs of a brother; besides, the practice was regarded as contrary to the explicit teaching of Scripture (Dt $23^{19f.}$, Ps 15^{5}).

(3) They refused to pay ecclesiastical taxes, believing that religion should be supported by the voluntary gifts of religious people.

Glancing backwards over their views, we see that the Anabaptists were several centuries in advance of their age. They were the modern men of their time. Some of their tenets, then universally anathematized and persecuted, have been adopted by all civilized lands, *e.g.* universal religious toleration; others have been widely incorporated in the newer lands (America and Australia).

and are making headway in the older societies, *e.g.* complete separation of Church and State; yet others are still objects of endeavour, only seen as far-off boons, as, for example, abolition of war; some, as communism, are not likely ever to be adopted widely. It is remarkable that these simple people should have drawn from a fresh study of the Bible so many great ideas that still float before the race as high and distant ideals.

LITERATURE.—Anabaptist writings and disputations, now very rare and widely scattered in the libraries of Europe, of which but few have been reprinted or translated; the pertinent writings of their opponents in 16th cent.; various court records, published and unpublished, and a few chronicles. The earlier writers on the Anabaptists, such as Fischer, Gast, Meschovius, Ottius, Sender, and others, are more or less partisan and unreliable. The large recent literature, of which only a few of the more important works can be mentioned, is more just. The first-hand treatments are in German for the most part, though there are several excellent works in English and a few in French.—H. Barge, *Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt*, Leipzig, 1905; J. von Beck, *Geschichtsbücher d. Wiedertäufer in Oesterreich-Ungarn von 1526 bis 1785*, Vienna, 1883; K. W. Bouterwek, *Zur Lit. u. Gesch. d. Wiedertäufer, besonders in den Rheinlanden*, Bonn, 1864; P. Burckhardt, *Die Basler Täufer*, Basel, 1898; H. S. Burrage, *Hist. of the Anabaptists in Switzerland*, Philadelphia, 1881; C. A. Cornelius, *Berichte d. Augenzeugen über das Münsterische Wiedertäuferreich*, 1853, *Gesch. d. Münsterischen Aufruhrs*, Leipzig, 1855; H. Detmer, *Bernhard Rothmann*, Münster, 1904; E. Egli, *Actensammlung z. Gesch. d. Züricher Reformation*, Zurich, 1879, also *Die St. Galler Täufer*, Zurich, 1887, and *Die Züricher Wiedertäufer zur Reformationszeit*, Zurich, 1878; M. Geisberg, *Die Münsterischen Wiedertäufer*, Strassburg, 1907; C. Gerbert, *Gesch. d. Strassburger Sectenbewegung z. Zeit d. Reformation, 1524–34*, Strassburg, 1889; K. Hase, *Das Reich d. Wiedertäufer*, Leipzig, 1860; R. Heath, *Anabaptism from its Rise at Zwickau to its Fall at Münster, 1521 to 1536*, London, 1895; L. Keller, *Ein Apostel d. Wiedertäufer* (Denck), Leipzig, 1882, and *Gesch. d. Wiedertäufer u. ihres Reichs zu Münster*, Münster, 1880; J. Loserth, *Der Anabaptismus in Tirol*, Vienna, 1892, also *Communismus d. Mährischen Wiedertäufer in 16 u. 17 Jahrhundert*, Vienna, 1894, *Die Stadt Waldshut u. d. vorderösterreichische Regierung in d. Jahren, 1523–6*, Vienna, 1891, *Doctor Balthasar Hübmaier u. d. Anfänge d. Wiedertaufe in Mähren*, Brünn, 1893, *Georg Blaurock u. d. Anfänge d. Anabaptismus in Graubündten u. Tirol*, Berlin, 1899; O. Merx, *Thomas Münzer u. H. Pfeiffer*, Göttingen, 1889; E. Müller, *Gesch. d. Bernischen Täufer*, Frauenfeld, 1895; A. H. Newman, *Hist. of Anti-Pedobaptism from the Rise of Pedobaptism to A.D. 1609*, Philadelphia, 1897; A. Nicoladoni, *Joh. Bünderlin v. Linz*, etc., Berlin, 1893; E. C. Pike, *The Story of the Anabaptists*, London; K. Rembert, *Die Wiedertäufer in Herzogthum-Jülich*, Münster, 1893; T. W. Röhrich, *Zur Gesch. d. Strassburgischen Wiedertäufer in d. Jahren 1527–43*; J. K. Seidemann, *Thomas Münzer*, Dresden, 1842; Vedder, *Balthasar Hübmaier, the Leader of the Anabaptists*, New York, 1905; R. Wolkan, *Die Lieder d. Wiedertäufer*, Berlin, 1903; F. O. zur Linden, *Melchior Hofmann*, etc., Haarlem, 1885. Besides the above, many valuable articles will be found in Cyclopædias and Journals of History and Theology, as well as brief treatments in all the Church Histories (fullest in Lindsay, *History of the Reformation*, ii. [1907] 430–469).

W. J. M'GLOTHLIN.

ANÆSTHESIA.—Dioscorides in treating of mandragora gives a description of its virtues as an anæsthetic, and prescriptions for its use. Of one preparation he says that it is given to produce anæsthesia (*βούλονται ἀναισθησίαν ποιῆσαι*) in patients to be cut or cauterized; and of another, that the patient can be put to sleep for three or four hours so as to be cut or cauterized, feeling nothing (*αἰσθησόμενον οὐδένος*). Before his day and since, various drugs have been used to produce insensibility to suffering. The most efficacious of them, besides mandragora, were opium, Indian hemp, hemlock, henbane, belladona. They were usually given internally in the form of infusions, tinctures, and extracts. More rarely they were smoked when incandescent, or inhaled in the form of hot vapours. When chemistry took the place of alchemy and produced more definitely volatile substances, it was found that among them were some possessed of sedative properties; and in 1795, Dr. Pearson advocated the use of sulphuric ether to relieve the cough in cases of asthma. When the various gases came to be differentiated and their properties investigated, Sir Humphry Davy found that nitrous oxide—'laughing-gas,' as it was called—had the power of alleviating pain; and in 1800 he said, 'As nitrous oxide in its extensive operation appears capable of destroying physical pain, it may probably be used in surgical operations in which no great effusion of blood takes place.' His suggestion was not taken up. Laughing-gas continued, however, to be administered from time to time in chemical class-rooms and at public entertainments. In 1844, Dr. Horace Wells, a dentist in Hartford, Connecticut, observed that individuals might be injured when under the influence of the gas without being conscious of any pain. He conceived the idea of testing its effects during the extraction of teeth, and got his assistant, Dr. Rigg, to extract one of his own molars after he had produced insensibility in himself by the inhalation of nitrous oxide. After having proved its efficacy in a series of cases, he went to Boston to give a demonstration of its value in the Massachusetts General Hospital. In the test case, by some mischance, the anæsthesia produced was imperfect, and he was dismissed with something of contempt. His health broke down, and he went to Europe to recruit.

On 16th October 1846, Dr. William Thomas Green Morton, who had been assistant to Wells, put to sleep with sulphuric ether, in the same Boston Hospital, a patient on whom Professor J. C. Warren operated for removal of a small tumour in the neck, and on the day following he put to sleep another patient operated on painlessly by Dr. Hayward. Morton had consulted Wells, after his return to Hartford, as to the preparation of nitrous oxide, and had been advised to get from Professor Jackson, Professor of Chemistry in Harvard University, the necessary directions. Professor Jackson suggested that instead of nitrous oxide he should make trial of sulphuric ether, and Dr. Morton had experimented on himself and some of his dental patients before he offered to demonstrate its effects in the public theatre. He called his preparation *lethēon*, and took out a patent for its use. He associated Dr. Jackson with himself in obtaining the patent, and admitted that Dr. Smilie, who had previously anæsthetized a patient by causing inhalation of sulphuric ether with opium dissolved in it, might continue the use of his preparation without infringement of the patent. It was Morton's demonstration on the 16th of October 1846 that truly marked the beginning of the era of anæsthesia, and gave the impulse to its adoption in all branches of the profession throughout the world. But for a time there was unseemly strife as to priority of the discovery, Jackson and Wells both disputing the claim of Morton to be the discoverer of the new mode of producing insensibility to pain. So that, although a monument in honour of the great event was set up in Boston, years passed ere it was finally decided to inscribe on it the solitary name of Dr. Morton, and Wendell Holmes is credited with having made the suggestion that E(I)THER might do.

Meanwhile news had come to Europe of the great discovery that the inhalation of ether vapour could be employed with safety so as surely to control the pain of surgical operations, and surgeons in Great Britain and the Continent began to make trial of it in all directions. On the 17th of January 1847, James Young Simpson, Professor of Midwifery in the University of Edinburgh, etherized a woman in labour. The benefit of etherization in surgery was established. But would it be safe to apply it in midwifery cases? Would the pain of labour be removed without interference with the labour effects? Could the patient be kept for the necessary time under the influence of the narcotic? What might be the after effects? What of the child? The test case was one in which Simpson had predetermined, because of pelvic deformity,

to extract the child by turning, and the result showed that labour could go on in its course although the sensations of pain usually attendant on it were for the time being altogether abrogated. When the virtue of the anæsthetic had been proved in other cases of both natural and instrumental labour, he claimed for women the right to be relieved of this sorest of all human suffering—their labour-pains. There had been misgivings in some minds as to the propriety of the administration of ether to surgical patients, and when it was proposed further to abolish the pains of labour, there arose a perfect storm of opposition to the practice. Simpson had to bear the stress of it because of his application of it in midwifery, and because some months later, searching for a substance that might be free from some of the drawbacks of ether, he discovered, on the 4th of November 1847, the anæsthetic virtue of chloroform, and introduced it as a substitute for the earlier anæsthetic. Oliver Wendell Holmes had suggested that the term 'anæsthesia' should be applied to the process; but Simpson's papers, like those of most of the other writers up till the end of 1847, spoke of 'Etherization in Surgery,' 'The Inhalation of Sulphuric Ether in Midwifery,' and such-like. It was only after the new narcotic began to be used that it became necessary to fall back on the Greek expression which would be applicable to the effect of any agent; and when at a later period Simpson traced the history of narcosis and narcotics, and found Theocritus speaking of Antigone having a painless labour because Lucina poured *νοδυτὰ* over her, he regretted that he had not adopted the terms 'nodynia' and 'nodynic' rather than 'anæsthesia' and 'anæsthetic.'

The occasional deaths resulting from the use of both ether and chloroform led to fresh experiments with nitrous oxide, which has been found especially safe and satisfactory in operations of short duration, as in tooth-pulling, so that it is now the anæsthetic most frequently employed in dentistry. Other volatile liquids have also been found to be possessed of anæsthetic properties, such as amylene, ethidene, bichloride of mythylene, etc. But none of them is free from danger, and none of them is so serviceable as chloroform in the ease and rapidity with which patients can be anæsthetized with relatively small quantities of the drug, and in the comfort which attends the subsequent awakening. There is still much discussion as to the relative values of ether and chloroform. For, whilst the former requires special apparatus in its administration and is apt to have troublesome *sequelæ*, the proportion of fatal cases is distinctly less than is met with in the use of chloroform. So that members of the profession who specialize as anæsthetists prefer its use in hospital practice and for patients undergoing the major operations of surgery, whilst chloroform remains the favourite anæsthetic in hot climates, in the lying-in room, and in the hands of military surgeons and busy general practitioners in their ordinary round of daily work. The writer has in the course of more than half a century seen some thousands of patients under the influence of anæsthetics—commonly of chloroform, and he has not seen a fatal case; but he knows that any day the record may be closed.

Some have sought to avoid the danger associated with all means of producing general anæsthesia by the superinduction of local anæsthesia. The skin has been rendered insensible by applications of ice, of ether spray, as suggested by Sir Benjamin Ward Richardson, or of ethyl chloride so as to freeze the surface. Alone, or conjoined with freezing processes, electricity, cocaine, eucaine, and other analgesics have been applied to the surface or injected hypodermically so as to produce a more lasting degree of local anæsthesia. Ovariotomy has been performed on a patient who lay still and made no complaint of suffering during the operation, when the seat of incision in the abdominal wall had been rendered insensible by freezing with ethyl chloride and hypodermic injections of cocaine. Such measures are, as a rule, however, only applicable for minor operations. A wider and more lasting form of localized anæsthesia was introduced by Dr. Corning of New York, in 1885, who found that injections of cocaine into the arachnoid space in the lumbar region of the spinal chord produced anæsthesia in the lower half of the body, of sufficient intensity and duration to allow of the carrying out without pain of amputations of the lower limbs and other grave operations in the lower half of the abdomen. Cocaine and its derivates and also stovaine with adrenalin have been used in this way with results in midwifery and in various surgical procedures that give hope of a great future for this method of superinduction of localized anæsthesia.

It should be added that from time to time insensibility to pain has been produced by means that were not medicinal, but purely mental. In the 18th cent., Mesmer produced, by what he supposed was an animal magnetism, a series of phenomena which were more carefully investigated in the middle of last century by Mr. J. Braid. Under the designation 'hypnotism,' Braid described a state of the system into which individuals could be brought by having their attention fixed on a given object for a length of time until there ensued an exhaustion of some elements in the nervous system and the subject became amenable to the control of the operator. The person thus hypnotized can be made insensible to suffering at the suggestion of the hypnotizer. Dr. Esdaile and other surgeons in the Indian medical service reported a series of cases where operations, both major and minor, were performed on patients in a condition of unconsciousness thus produced. But hypnotism has been found applicable mainly to cases where there is disturbance in the nervous system; and its use for the relief of the pain of surgical operations is restricted by the circumstances (1) that not every patient can be hypnotized, and (2) that the patient may have to be experimented on repeatedly before the hypnotizer gains sufficient control to command the necessary degree of anæsthesia. The practice has not sufficiently commended itself to the medical profession, even so far as to encourage more than a few members of it to try for themselves whether they were capable of exercising a hypnotic influence.

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A. R. SIMPSON.

ANĀGATA VAṀSA ('Record of the Future').—A Pāli poem of 142 stanzas on the future Buddha, Metteyya. It is stated in the *Gandha Vaṁsa* (*JPTS*, 1886, p. 61) that it was written by Kassapa; and in the *Sāsana Vaṁsa Dīpa* (v.[1204]) we are told that he was a poet who lived in the Chola country. We may probably conclude that he did not reside at Kāñchipura, the Chola capital, as in that case the name Kāñchipura, which would have suited the metre equally well, would probably have been put in the place of Chola-raṭṭha. The further statement (*Gandha Vaṁsa, l.c.*), that he also wrote the *Buddha Vaṁsa*, seems to be a mistake. And we know nothing either of his date or of the other books attributed to him. The poem has been edited for the Pāli Text Society by the late Professor Minayeff (*JPTS*, 1886, pp. 33–53), with extracts from the commentary, which is by Upatissa (see *Gandha Vaṁsa*, p. 72). Of the latter writer also nothing is at present known, unless he be identical with the author of the *Mahā Bodhi Vaṁsa* who wrote in Ceylon about A.D. 970.*

Our ignorance about the date of the *Anāgata Vaṁsa* is regrettable, as the question of the origin and growth of the belief held by the later Buddhists in this future Buddha, Metteyya, is important. As is well known, there are statements in the *Nikāyas* (*e.g. Dīgha*, II. 83, 144, 255) that future Buddhas would arise, but, with one exception, neither the *Nikāyas* nor any book in the *Piṭakas* mention Metteyya. His name occurs, it is true, in the concluding stanza of the *Buddha Vaṁsa*, but this is an addition by a later hand, and does not belong to the work itself. Neither is Metteyya mentioned in the *Netti Pakaraṇa*. The exception referred to is a passage in the 26th Dialogue of the *Dīgha* which records a prophecy, put into the Buddha's mouth, that Metteyya would have thousands of followers where the Buddha himself had only hundreds. This passage is quoted in the *Milinda* (p. 159); but the *Milinda* does not refer anywhere else to Metteyya. In the *Mahāvastu* (one of the earliest extant works in Buddhist Sanskrit) the legend is in full vogue. Metteyya is mentioned eleven times, two or three of the passages giving details about him. One of these agrees with the *Anāgata Vaṁsa* in its statement of the size of his city, Ketumatī (*Mahāv.* iii. 240=*Anāg. Vaṁ.* 8); but discrepancies exist between the others (*Mahāv.* iii. 246 and iii. 330 differ from *Anāg. Vaṁ.* 78 and 107). It is in this poem that we find the fullest and most complete account of the tradition, which evidently varied in different times and places.

This is really conclusive as to the comparatively late date of the poem. In earlier times it was enough to say that future Buddhas would arise; then a few details, one after another, were invented about the immediately succeeding Buddha. When in the south of India the advancing wave of ritualism and mythology threatened to overwhelm the ancient simplicity of the faith, a despairing hope looked for the time of the next Buddha, and decked out his story with lavish completeness.

Three points of importance are quite clear from the statements in this work. (1) There is little or nothing original in the tradition of which it is the main evidence. It is simply built up in strict imitation of the early forms of the Buddha legend, only names and numbers differing. But it is the old form, both of legend and of doctrine.

(2) There is sufficient justification for the comparison between Metteyya and the Western idea of a Messiah. The ideas are, of course, not at all the same; but there are several points of analogy. The time of Metteyya is described as a Golden Age in which kings, ministers, and people will vie one with another in maintaining the reign of righteousness and the victory of the truth. It should be added, however, that the teachings of the future Buddha also, like that of every other Buddha, will suffer corruption, and pass away in time.

(3) We can remove a misconception as to the meaning of the name. *Metteyya Buddha* does not mean 'the Buddha of Love.' *Metteyya* is simply his *gotra* name, that is, the name of the *gens* to which his ancestors belonged—something like our family name. It is probably, like *Gotama*, a patronymic, and means 'descendant of Mettayu.' Another Metteyya, in the *Sutta Nipāta*, asks the Buddha questions, and is doubtless a historical person. We can admit only that whoever first used this as the family name of the future Buddha may very likely have associated, and probably did associate, it in his mind with the other word *mettā*, which means 'love.' It would only be one of those plays upon words which are so constantly met with in early Indian literature. The personal name of the future Buddha is given in the poem, and elsewhere also, as *Ajita*, 'unconquered.'

The poem in one MS has the fuller title *Anāgata-Buddhassa Vaṇṇanā*, 'Record of the future Buddha' (*JPTS*, 1886, p. 37). There is another work, quite different from the one here described, though the title is the same. It gives an account, apparently, in prose and verse, of ten future Buddhas, of whom Metteyya is one (*ib.* p. 39). This work is still unedited.

LITERATURE.—H. C. Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, Cambridge, Mass., 1896, pp. 481–486, has translated a summary of one recension of this work.

T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

ANĀHITA (Gr. *Ἀναεῖτις*).—Anāhita is one of the chief deities in Mazdaism, and we get fairly accurate information about her character from a complete *Yašt* (v) and numerous other passages in the Avesta. Ardvī Surā Anāhita, that is, undoubtedly, 'the high, powerful, immaculate one,' is a goddess of fertilizing waters, and more particularly of a supernatural spring, located in the region of the stars, from which all the rivers of the world flow (Darmesteter). The fertility which the divine water caused in the earth was extended to the animal kingdom, and, according to the Avesta, Anāhita 'purifies the seed of males and the womb and the milk of females' (*Vendīdād*, vii. 16; *Yašt*, v. 5), and is invoked by marriageable girls, and by women at the time of childbirth (*Yašt*, v.). At the same time she is thought of as a goddess of war, who rides in a chariot drawn by four white horses (*Yašt*, v. 11, 13), which are wind, rain, cloud, and hail (*Yašt*, v. 120), and she bestows victory on the combatants, and gives them sturdy teams and brave companions. The Avestan hymn, after enumerating all the heroes of the past who sacrificed to Anāhita, including Zoroaster, whom she instructed in her worship, concludes with a very exact description of her appearance and her dress (*Yašt*, v. 126 ff.). 'She is a beautiful maiden, powerful and tall, her girdle fastened high, wrapped in a gold-embroidered cloak, wearing earrings, a necklace, and a crown of gold, and adorned with thirty otter skins.' These minute details are undoubtedly inspired by a sculptural type, and this passage of the Avesta has rightly been connected with the famous text of Berossus (Clem. Alex. *Protrept.* 5), which says that Artaxerxes Mnemon (B.C. 404–361) was the first to teach the Persians to worship anthropomorphic statues in the temples of Babylon, Susa (cf. Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* vi. 27, 135), and Ecbatana (cf. Plutarch, *Vit. Artax.* 27; Polybius, x. 27. 12), in Persia, Bactriana, Damascus, and Sardis. These statues were probably reproductions of a Babylonian original, and perhaps, as has been suggested, Anāhita might even be identical with the Semitic goddess Anat. This would account for the passage in Herodotus (i. 131), according to which 'the Persians learned from the Assyrians to sacrifice to the "heavenly" Aphrodite, whom they

* Geiger, *Mahāvaṁsa und Dīpavaṁsa*, Leipzig, 1905, p. 88.

call Mithra.' The ancient historian had probably written 'Mithra' by mistake for 'Anâhita.' As a matter of fact, the two divinities are united, and form, so to speak, a pair in the cuneiform inscriptions of the Achæmenians, in which they figure precisely from the reign of Artaxerxes Mnemon (Weissbach-Bang, *Die altpersischen Keilinschriften*, 1893, 44, 46).

The information of Berossus on the diffusion of the Anâhita cult throughout the Persian empire is confirmed by a mass of evidence. Outside of Iran, the goddess is found in Armenia (Gelzer, *Sit. Gesellsch. Wiss. Leipzig*, 1896, 111 ff.; see also art. ARMENIA [Zoroastrian]). She had temples at Artaxata, at Yashtishat in Tauranitis, and especially at Erēz in Akilisene, the whole region of which was consecrated to her (*Anaetica regio*, Pliny, v. 83). The Erēz sanctuary, which contained a golden statue of Anâhita, was famous for its wealth, and the daughters of the noble families of Armenia used to go there and prostitute themselves to strangers before their marriage (Strabo, xi. 532 C). This sacred custom, which is probably of Semitic origin, seems to be a modification of the ancient exogamy (cf. Cumont, *Religions orientales*, Paris, 1907, 287). Old traditions continued to hold ground at Erēz under the Romans; the sacred buffaloes of Anâhita wandered at liberty in Akilisene, and the victims for sacrifice had to be captured by hunting (*RA*, 1905, i. 25 ff.).

The Persian goddess was worshipped also in Pontus and in Cappadocia (Strabo, xi. 512 C, xii. 559 C, xv. 733 C), perhaps also at Castabala in Cilicia (Strabo, xii. 537 C). In these districts she became identified with the great autochthonous divinity Mâ, and her temples were attended by a number of sacred slaves (ἱερόδουλοι) of both sexes. At Zela in Pontus, a festival, the Sacæa, which was probably of Babylonian origin, was held annually.

It is especially in Lydia that Anâhita has left numerous traces of her presence. She was probably, as Berossus states (cf. above), brought into Sardis by Artaxerxes II., and there became amalgamated with Kybebe (Cybele), the Great Mother honoured throughout the country. The well-known figures of a winged goddess holding a lion in either hand, to which the designation 'Persian Artemis' has been given, really represent this syncretic divinity worshipped as 'mistress of the beasts' (πότνια θηρῶν) (Radet, *CAIBL*, 1906, p. 285). Descriptions of her noisy rites exist as early as in the works of the tragic poet Diogenes of Athens (Nauck, *Trag. Græc. Fragm.* 776). Her principal temples were at Hierocæsarea (Paus. v. 27. 5, vii. 6. 6; Tac. *Ann.* iii. 62: 'delubrum rege Cyro dicatum'; cf. *Bull. Corr. hellén.* xi. 95), and at Hypæpa (Paus. *l.c.*; cf. *RA*, 1885, ii. 114; Dittenberger, *Orientis Græci Inscriptiones Selectæ*, 1903–05, 470); but her name also appears in a large number of inscriptions in this vicinity (Reinach, *Chroniques d'Orient*, 157 ff., 215 ff.; Buresch, *Aus Lydien*, 1898, 28, 66 ff., 128; Roscher, *Lexikon der Mythologie*, *s.v.* 'Persike'; Wright, *Harvard Studies*, 1895, vi. 55 ff.). The conception formed of the goddess and the ceremonies by means of which she was worshipped seem to have remained faithful to the ancient Iranian traditions; she was always regarded as the goddess of sacred waters (Ἀναείτιν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱεροῦ ὕδατος, Buresch, *l.c.* p. 118), and her liturgy was repeated in a 'barbarian' language (Pausanias, v. 27. 5).

The Greeks identified Anâhita, on the one hand, on account of her warlike character, with Athene, and, on the other, as a goddess of fertility, with Aphrodite (Berossus, *l.c.*; Agathias, ii. 24; Photius, *Bibl.* 94). Already, in Iran, as noted above, under the influence of the Chaldæan star-worship, Anâhita had become the planet Venus. But the name usually applied to her in the West was 'Persian Artemis' or 'Persian Diana' (Ἄρτεμις Περσική or Περσία, 'Diana Persica') (Pausanias, vii. 6. 6; *Bull. Corr. hellén.* xi. 65; Diodorus, v. 77; Plutarch, *Lucull.* 24; Tacitus, *Ann.* iii. 62). As the bull was sacred to her, she was confounded especially with 'Artemis Tauropolos' in Lydia, as well as in Armenia and Cappadocia. It was probably from this composite cult of the Asiatic Tauropolos that the 'taurobolium' penetrated into the Roman world (Pauly-Wissowa, *s.v.* 'Anaïtis'; *RA*, 1905, i. 28 ff.). In the Latin countries, the Persian goddess, assimilated with the *Magna Mater* of Phrygia, certainly remained in close connexion with Mithra, whose mysteries spread to the West after the 1st cent. of our era (Cumont, *Textes et monuments figurés relatifs aux mystères de Mithra*, i. 333 ff. and *passim*).

LITERATURE.—Windischmann, 'Die persische Anâhita,' *Sitzungsb. Akad. München*, 1856; Spiegel, *Eranische Altertumskunde*, 1878, ii. 54 ff.; Darmesteter, *Zend-Avesta*, 1893, ii. 363 and *passim*; Roscher, *Lexikon der Mythol. s.vv.* 'Anaïtis' (Ed. Meyer) and 'Persike' (Höfer). FR. CUMONT.

ANALOGY.—The determination of the limits within which validity belongs to the argument from analogy is a problem of long standing. Though the discussion of the question properly falls within the sphere of logic rather than of theology, yet the latter science is intimately concerned with its decision. So long as arguments from analogy occur with such frequency and have so important a part to play alike in the defence and in the exposition of revelation, the theologian will not be easy unless his confidence in this logical process be firmly established. Moreover, even the warmest advocate of the argument from analogy will admit that as an instrument of thought it is specially liable to abuse, and that its employment involves at least risks of error which require to be explicitly recognized in order to be avoided. In this article the subject of treatment will be the use of analogy in theology; but in the interest of clearness of statement it will be necessary to begin with some brief reference to general principles.

1. **Analogy: its definition in logic.**—At the outset we are confronted with a considerable lack of agreement among logicians as to the correct definition of analogy. Some authorities, content to fall in with popular usage, identify the argument from analogy with the argument from resemblances. Such, for example, is the position adopted by J. S. Mill, who explains it to be the inference that when one object resembles another in a certain number of known points it will probably resemble it in some further unknown points also. Such a logical procedure is akin to induction, but is distinguishable therefrom by the circumstance that no causal or necessary connexion has yet been established between the known points of resemblance and the further points whose resemblance is only inferred. The conclusion is, therefore, not demonstrable but probable, and the amount of probability will vary in accordance with the number and the importance of the resemblances which have been observed, and will be correspondingly diminished by any ascertained points of dissimilarity between the two objects. In estimating the extent of the probability, account must be taken of the proportion borne by the number of ascertained resemblances to the supposed number of unknown properties (cf. Mill, *System of Logic*, III. xx.).

This conception of analogy is, however, repudiated by other logicians as altogether too lax and unscientific. Influenced by the meaning of the word in the original Greek, and by its primary use as a term of mathematics, they insist that analogy is a

resemblance not between things, but only between relations.

'Two things,' writes Dr. Whately, 'may be connected together by analogy, though they have in themselves no resemblance; for analogy is the resemblance of ratios or relations; thus, as a sweet taste gratifies the palate, so does a sweet sound gratify the ear, hence the word sweet is applied to both, though no flavour can resemble a sound in itself' (*Elements of Logic*[3], p. 168).

The last words of the sentence are noteworthy. They indicate that upon this view of analogy no legitimate inference can be drawn from the nature of the one pair of related terms to the nature of the other pair. The relation between palate and taste may be strictly similar to the relation between ear and sound, but we cannot therefore draw inferences as to the nature of the one from what we know of the other. This is an important contention with far-reaching consequences, and its influence upon theological argument will appear presently.

This definition of analogy has the merit of scientific exactness, and of being in strict accordance with the type exhibited by mathematics, but it is at the same time open to serious criticism. The restrictions which it imposes upon the function of analogy are such as would almost entirely invalidate the use of the argument in practical life. Men in their daily concerns do not confine their analogical arguments to the consideration of mere relations, but freely draw inferences as to the nature of things. Although this is a merely practical objection, it is not without support in the theory of analogy. It has been pointed out that *some* identity of nature is always postulated in every analogy. In mathematical analogy, for example, it is at least necessary that both pairs of terms should be magnitudes. And, again, in the analogy between sound and taste, though in a sense there is no resemblance between them, yet they are both sensations. The heterogeneity is not absolute. Exception, therefore, may fairly be taken to the extreme statement of Whately, that no inference is permissible from the nature of the one to the nature of the other. And the theologian will press the point; for in his hands the argument from analogy is usually of the more flexible and practical form, which cannot be confined within the narrow limits set by the type of mathematical analogy. It is concerned with realities rather than with abstract relations.

2. **Analogy in religious vocabulary.**—The entire vocabulary of religion is based upon the perception of analogies between the material and the spiritual worlds. Words which now bear an immaterial and spiritual significance were originally used to denote visible and tangible objects. If in many languages the word for breath or wind has come to be used for the soul, it is because at an early stage of their development men became conscious of an analogy between the lightness and invisibility of air and the supposed properties of the human spirit. To a later and more critical age the analogy may appear thin and crude; but it must be remembered that the initiation of a religious vocabulary dates from the childhood of the race. In the gradual evolution of religion, crudities have been refined away, until the original meaning of many words now used exclusively with a spiritual significance has been forgotten. But throughout the whole course of the development the necessity for finding analogical words as a vehicle for the expression of spiritual truth has never been outgrown. The innermost secret of religion is still put into speech by means of the analogy of human fatherhood. Thus witness is borne in all ages to the instinctive readiness with which men assume a parallelism between the things which are seen and the things which are not seen. To what extent that parallelism really exists and how far it affords us grounds of inference to the real nature of the spiritual world, is the problem which every philosophy of religion sets out to solve.

3. **Analogy as a means to the knowledge of the spiritual world.**—Not only the vocabulary but the content of natural religion are derived from the source of analogical reasoning. For natural religion begins with the assumption of a resemblance between God and the world, sufficient to justify the inference that the wonder and majesty of Creation will in some sort reflect the wonder and majesty of the Creator (cf. Wis 13[5] 'For by the greatness and beauty of the creatures proportionably [ἀναλόγως] the maker of them is seen'). Though this is the only Biblical passage in which the word 'analogy' appears in this connexion, yet the thought of the world as the visible expression of the attributes of the invisible God is of constant recurrence in Scripture. It is familiar to the Psalmist (Ps 19). It is stated explicitly by St. Paul: 'For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead' (Ro 1[20]). This assumption of a significant analogy between God and the world is not argumentatively justified in the Bible. Like the other principles of natural religion, it is taken as accepted truth. And the belief culminates in the doctrine of man's creation in the image of God. It is impossible to overestimate the formative influence of this conception of human nature as the true analogue of the Divine. As it was one of the controlling factors in the development of Jewish religion, so has it exercised an even more dominant influence upon Christian thought, supplying, as it does, the philosophic basis for the doctrine of the Incarnation. Throughout the whole history of Christian doctrine the question of the reality of the likeness of man to God, *i.e.* of the truth of the analogy between Divine and human nature, has been one of the pivots of controversy. Men have arranged themselves in opposite camps according as they have been more or less ready to accept this belief.

4. **Analogy in Patristic writings.**—The great theologians of the early centuries, following the precedent of Scripture, made free use of analogy for the double purpose of defence and exposition. It was to them a convenient means of exposing the hollowness of many commonly urged objections, and a ready method of illustrating the difficulties of abstract theology by means of familiar and concrete examples. Illustrations of so frequent a practice are scarcely necessary. But perhaps a single example from East and West may not be out of place.

The following quotation from Gregory of Nyssa indicates how clearly he recognized the character of the logical process which he was employing: Ὥσπερ δὲ τὸν Λόγον ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς ἀναλογικῶς (*v.l.* ἀναγωκικῶς) ἐπὶ τῆς ὑπερκειμένης ἐγνωμεν φύσεως, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τῇ περὶ τοῦ πνεύματος ἐννοίᾳ προσαχθησόμεθα, σκιάς τινας καὶ μιμήματα τῆς ἀφράστου δυνάμεως ἐν τῇ καθ' ἡμᾶς θεωροῦντες φύσει (*Serm. Cat.* ii.). In the short treatise, *De fide rerum quæ non videntur*, ascribed to St. Augustine, the objection to the requirement of religious faith is met by insistence on the analogy of the actual necessity of faith in ordinary human intercourse. And in his work, *De Trinitate*, the mysteries of the Triune Being of God are repeatedly illustrated by the analogous mysteries of human psychology.

5. **Analogy in Scholastic theology.**—But however legitimately and successfully this method of argument was employed by the Fathers, it was not by them subjected to reflective criticism. A real advance was therefore made when the Schoolmen entered upon a rigorous examination of the limits of the analogical method with particular reference to its use in theology. Among the reasons which led them to undertake the task was their desire to find a philosophic justification for the anthropomorphic language of Scripture. Such language obviously could not be taken liter-

ally, nor yet be summarily dismissed as merely metaphorical, and therefore implying no real likeness between God and His creatures. The Schoolmen's answer to the problem is to be found in their theory of analogy, which concerns itself not only with the explanation of the analogical use of language, but also with the far deeper and more important question of the reality and the extent of the analogy between the finite and the infinite, and the legitimacy of inference from one to the other.

With regard to language, it was pointed out that a distinction must be made between the univocal, the equivocal, and the analogical use of words. A word is univocally employed when in two or more propositions it conveys precisely the same meaning; equivocally when used in two entirely different senses. But where two things are connected by some relation, the same word may be applied to them both in a related, though not precisely identical, sense. This last is the analogical use. Thus—the instance is as old as Aristotle—the word 'healthy' is analogically applied to the body which is sound, and to the food which is the cause of soundness. Similarly, the term 'being' is analogically applied to God who exists absolutely, and to man whose existence is contingent and dependent.

Upon the basis of this distinction was established the justification of the use of human terms about the Deity. When, for example, we speak of the wisdom of man and the wisdom of God, the word 'wisdom' is not used univocally. For if so, we should be denying any difference in kind between human and Divine wisdom, and our statement would be obviously opposed to the Christian teaching about God. Nor yet is the use of the word equivocal. For then we should be asserting the essential unlikeness of human and Divine wisdom, and it would be impossible to argue from the nature of the one to the nature of the other. Such a position would be untenable, because if a similar objection were supposed to hold good in all parallel cases, every inference from the creature to the Creator would be vitiated by the fallacy of equivocation. A way of escape from these opposite difficulties is provided by the recognition of the analogical use of the word. It is implied that there is a relation or proportion existing between the wisdom of man and the wisdom of God. What is partial and incomplete in man is perfect in God. (Cf. Thom. Aq., *Summa*, I. xiii. 6).

This distinction between the univocal and the analogical use of words was a sufficient reply to the reproach of anthropomorphism, but it left untouched the deeper question of the extent of the analogy or resemblance between God and His creatures. Accordingly, in the effort to reach greater clearness of thought with reference to this fundamental problem of religion, the Schoolmen proceeded to introduce further distinctions into their conception of analogy. These may be sufficiently illustrated from the scheme of Suarez (*Disput. Metaphys.* xxviii. sec. iii.). He distinguished two kinds of analogy, viz. that of proportion and that of attribution. To the former of these not much interest attaches. It amounts to little more than a mere resemblance, seized upon by the mind as justification for the use of a metaphor. Though such an analogy of proportion may appeal to the imagination, and therefore be of use in the way of illustration, it does not go far enough to warrant any inference in argument. The analogy of attribution, on the other hand, is established by the existence of a resemblance in the nature of things, and is valid for purposes of inference. When this resemblance consists in the possession by two subjects of the same quality in different degrees, the analogy is styled intrinsic. This is the highest grade of analogy, *analogia attributionis intrinseca*, and of this kind is the analogy between God and His creatures as regards, for example, the property of existence. Existence is predicated of Him and them. Their existence, however, is not of the same degree as His. Yet is it so far the same as to allow of some inferences being drawn, from what we know of finite existence, as to the nature of infinite existence. These distinctions may possibly appear needlessly subtle and technical, but the consideration of them will at least serve the purpose of calling the attention of the student to the possibility of some confusions of thought that have been actually responsible for the failure of much analogical argument.

6. Analogy in post-Reformation theology.—When the questions of theology ceased to be confined to the schools, and became the subject of popular debate, it was natural that the problem of analogy should be handled in accordance with the new methods, and in a manner intelligible to a larger public. A general advance in intellectual enlightenment brought the question once more to the front. At a time when man's knowledge of the world was being rapidly extended in many directions, he was inevitably brought once more face to face with the issue, whether Nature was in any true sense the analogue of God. Hence at the beginning of the 18th cent. we find that the theory of analogy was occupying the attention of some of the foremost theological writers.

Among the books on the subject which specially deserve mention may be noticed a *Discourse on Predestination*, by Dr. King, Archbishop of Dublin (1709). By this writer a somewhat extreme form of religious agnosticism was advocated. Desiring to allay the bitterness of theological controversy, he laid stress on the principle that all our notions about the Deity are inevitably limited by our human and finite capacity. 'If we know anything about Him at all, it must be by analogy and comparison, by resembling Him to something we do know and are acquainted with' (Whately's reprint of King in Appendix to Bampton Lectures, 3rd ed. p. 480). Our notions of God are really as far from the truth as a map is different from actual land and sea. A chart, while it provides instruction sufficient for the purpose of the traveller, does not actually resemble the country conventionally represented. Similarly, Scripture teaching about God may give us information about Him adequate for the purposes of this present life, without revealing Him to us as He is. This depreciation of man's capacity for acquiring a true knowledge of God was intended in the interest of theological peace. It became, however, the occasion of controversy. Bp. Browne, of Cork, contributed several books to the discussion of the question. In an early work he maintained that—

'Our ideas of God and divine things . . . are a sort of composition we make up from our ideas of worldly objects, which at the utmost amount to no more than a type or figure by which something in another world is signified, of which we have no more notion than a blind man hath of light' (quoted in Introduction to *Procedure*, etc.).

Adhering to these principles in his *Procedure, Extent, and Limits of the Human Understanding* (1728), he accepted without demur King's somewhat extreme conclusions:

'That we have no direct or proper notions or conceptions of God in His attributes, or of any other things of another world; that they are all described and spoken of in the language of revelation, by way of analogy and accommodation to our capacities; that we want faculties to discern them' (*op. cit.* p. 11).

At the same time he criticized King for failing to distinguish between metaphor and analogy, and for thus suggesting the inference that our statements about God are merely metaphorical, and as

unreal as the ascription to Him of human passions or human limbs. To the exposition of this distinction he devotes a chapter (bk. i. ch. ix.), explaining that metaphor expresses only an imaginary resemblance or correspondence, whereas in analogy the correspondence or resemblance is real. The same theme is worked out at greater length in his later book, *Things Divine and Supernatural conceived by Analogy with Things Natural and Human* (1733). Our knowledge of the spiritual order is strictly relative to our capacities.

'God does not raise up our minds to any direct or immediate view of the things of another world, . . . but brings them down to the level of our understanding' (p. 32). 'What just and sufficient knowledge of God we have in this life is obtained by analogy or similitude with those perfections we find in ourselves' (p. 39).

The question naturally attracted the attention of Berkeley, who handled it with characteristic acuteness and precision in *Alciphron*, Dial. iv. ch. xxi. Familiar with the Scholastic definitions of analogy, he does not shrink from the conclusion that all our knowledge of God is strictly analogical. It is not, however, on that account to be reckoned as worthless. Human passions, indeed, are attributed to God by metaphorical analogy only, and involve no statement as to His nature. On the other hand,

'Knowledge, for example, in the proper formal meaning of the word, may be attributed to God proportionably, that is, preserving a proportion to the infinite nature of God. We may say, therefore, that as God is infinitely above man, so is the knowledge of God infinitely above the knowledge of man, and this is . . . *analogia proprie facta*. And after this same analogy we must understand all those attributes to belong to the Deity which in themselves simply and as such denote perfection' (ed. 1732, i. p. 257).

Berkeley, while recognizing the incompleteness of our spiritual knowledge, lays the emphasis on its trustworthiness rather than on its inadequacy.

'This doctrine of analogical perfection in God, or our knowing God by analogy, seems very much misunderstood and misapplied by those who would infer from thence that we cannot frame any direct or proper notion, though never so inadequate, of knowledge or wisdom as they are in the Deity, or understand any more of them than one born blind can of light or colour.'

Such was Berkeley's repudiation of the attempt to make religious truth unassailable by assuming it to be unintelligible.

It is remarkable that Butler, whose work is still the classical example of the application of the argument from analogy to theology, should have deliberately abstained from any prefatory justification or explanation of the theory of the instrument which he wielded with so much effect. Such, however, is the case. Declaring at the outset that he will not take it upon him to say how far the extent, compass, and force of analogical reasoning can be reduced to general heads and rules, he curtly brushes aside objections to this kind of argument with the remark that it is undeniably adopted by all in practical life. 'It is enough to the present purpose to observe that this kind of general way of arguing is evidently natural, just, and conclusive.' Others, as we have seen, were discussing these very points at the time when Butler was engaged in the composition of the *Analogy*. Perhaps he distrusted such speculations as essentially unpractical. Whatever the reason may have been, they are absent from his own work. He applies, he does not analyze, the argument from analogy. What gives his work its pre-eminent position in apologetic literature is not his selection of this particular kind of argument, but the steady patience, the scrupulous exactitude, and the transparent honesty with which he applied it to the controversies of his day. He offers a striking contrast alike to those writers who denounced analogical reasoning as worthless and those others who belauded it as the key to all difficulties. The claim that he makes on its behalf is modest in its scope. Positively it can never (so he tells us) afford more than a probable proof; negatively it can expose the latent insincerity of much unbelief, by showing that circumstances often considered to be conclusive objections to religion are strictly parallel with analogous circumstances in nature, the acknowledged handiwork of God. Analogy in Butler's hands provided no vindication of the character of God (*Works*, ed. W. E. Gladstone, i. 359), but it was fitted to open the eyes of men to their obligations, leaving them without intellectual excuse if they failed to consider with appropriate seriousness the arguments urged on behalf of religious belief.

The full effectiveness of Butler's argument will not be appreciated unless it be remembered that he says he is arguing upon the principles of others, not his own (*ib.* p. 367). Convinced that the proper proof of religion was to be found in the principles of liberty and general fitness, he nevertheless avoided reference to these principles, and limited himself to the consideration of religion as a matter of fact and practice. Upon this lower ground he met his adversaries, the Deist and the indifferentist. Against them he turned the weapon of analogy with complete logical success. Deistic objections against Christianity crumble away under his analysis. It is, of course, true that since his day the incidence of the critical attack upon religion has shifted its position. Hence many of his arguments need re-statement in accommodation to modern requirements. But, whatever alterations in detail may be thought necessary, time has not altered the general verdict in favour of the soundness and cogency of his argument.

7. **Analogy since Kant.**—Discussion of the nature and extent of man's analogical knowledge of God will always hold a principal place in apologetics, and for that reason will be sensitive to any change in the general philosophic attitude towards the ultimate questions of metaphysics. Hence it was that the whole statement and treatment of the problem were profoundly affected by the influence of the critical philosophy of Kant. That influence, however, was slow to exhibit itself in English theology, and until the 19th cent. was well advanced the discussion continued along the traditional lines. A controversy between Copleston and Grinfield in 1821 brought out once more the possibilities of disagreement over the place to be assigned to analogy. The two writers, representing respectively the lower and the higher estimate of the value of analogy, reproduce with curious exactness the points which had been made a century before by Archbp. King and Bp. Browne. Explicit acknowledgment was made of the debt due to these earlier writers; and Whately, Copleston's friend and disciple, reprinted with notes and high commendation King's famous *Discourse on Predestination*, in which the limitations of human reason had been so rigorously insisted upon. A different attitude towards the fundamental question at issue revealed itself in Mansel's Lectures on the *Limits of Religious Thought* (1858). The title of the book recalls that of Bp. Browne's *The Procedure, Extent, and Limits of the Human Understanding*. And the resemblance is more than superficial. In both writers there is the same tendency to dwell on the inadequacy of the human intelligence to probe the mysteries of the Divine Nature. But Mansel, under the influence of Kantian principles as to man's ignorance of things in themselves, attacks the problem from a different side, and goes far beyond the point reached by his predecessor. Whereas Bp. Browne had urged the relativity and consequent incompleteness of man's analogical knowledge of God, Mansel went so far as to say that, of God's real nature, we, under our finite conditions, are, and must remain, totally ignorant. It is an ignor-

ance so complete as to exclude the possibility of either affirmation or denial.

'We cannot say that our conception of the Divine Nature exactly resembles that Nature in its absolute existence; for we know not what that absolute existence is. But, for the same reason, we are equally unable to say that it does not resemble; for, if we know not the Absolute and Infinite at all, we cannot say how far it is or is not capable of likeness or unlikeness to the Relative and Finite' (3rd ed. p. 146).

This is not the place in which to take notice of those further considerations with regard to the distinction between regulative and speculative truth, by which Mansel sought to establish religious faith upon this basis of philosophic scepticism. It is enough to give attention to the line which he adopted with respect to analogy. Repudiating on metaphysical grounds the analogy between the Finite and the Infinite, and consequently rejecting the customary philosophic proofs of religion, he found a negative defence for belief in the analogous difficulties of religion and philosophy. In so doing he claimed to be following in the footsteps of Bp. Butler, and to be adding another chapter to his argument on the analogy between religion and the course of nature. His principle he declares to be, that there is no rational difficulty in Christian theology which has not its counterpart in philosophy; and, further, that the stumbling-blocks which the rationalist professes to find in the doctrines of revealed religion arise, not from defects peculiar to revelation, but from the laws and limits of human thought (*ib.* p. 170). His work certainly resembles that of Butler in being an eminent example of the way in which the argument from analogy can be used for defensive purposes. He showed conclusively enough that many of the objections urged against revelation are applicable with equal force against the commonly accepted principles of thought and action. If the creed of theism contains its antinomies, so also does the creed of philosophy. In both cases explanation is equally impossible.

But the emphasis which Mansel placed upon our ignorance of the Divine Nature as it is, and his insistence on the absence of any necessary analogy between the goodness of man and of God, were the occasion of vigorous protests at the time, and eventually proved partly responsible for results very different from those which he desired. The assertion of man's ignorance, made by him and by other religious thinkers in the interest of revelation, was one of the exciting causes of the agnosticism, explicitly opposed to religion, which gained currency in the latter half of the 19th century.

8. **Renewed confidence in Analogy.**—In recent years there has been a distinct revival of confidence in the reality and the significance of the analogy between the Creator and His creation, and in the possibility of passing from the knowledge of one to the knowledge of the other. Among the causes which have contributed to this result must be counted the advance of the idealistic philosophy, and the increased attention given to the study of human personality. Instead of attempting to evade the reproach of anthropomorphism by conceding to the agnostic the inscrutability of the Divine Nature, the modern apologist is not afraid to avow the anthropomorphic character of theology, while he insists that in this respect theology is in the same position as every other department of human thought. 'Personality is thus the gateway through which all knowledge must inevitably pass. . . . It follows that philosophy and science are, in the strict sense of the word, precisely as anthropomorphic as theology, since they are alike limited by the conditions of human personality, and controlled by the forms of thought which human personality provides' (Illingworth, *Personality Human and Divine*, p. 25). In the book from which these words are quoted, human personality is deliberately taken as the analogical symbol of the Divine Nature, on the ground that God possesses, in transcendent perfection, the attributes which are imperfectly possessed by man. Thus what might appear to be the damaging effect of the admission of an anthropomorphic element in theology is neutralized by the correspondent assertion of a theomorphic doctrine of human nature. The supposition of an absolute and insuperable heterogeneity between the Finite and the Infinite, which has always been the basis of philosophic scepticism, whether in alliance with or in opposition to orthodoxy, is denied. The reality and the inexhaustible significance of the analogy between God and man are explicitly re-asserted.

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ĀNANDA.—One of the principal early disciples of the Buddha. He was the Buddha's first cousin, and is described as being devoted to him with especial fervour in a simple, childlike way, and serving as his personal attendant (*upaṭṭhāka*). A panegyric on him is put into the mouth of the Buddha just before his (the Buddha's) death (*Mahā Parinibbāna Suttanta*, in *Dīgha*, ii. 144–146). But it is for his popularity among the people and in the Order, and for his pleasant way of speaking on the religion, not for intellectual gifts or power of insight. So, in the same book (*l.c.* 157), the stanza put into Anuruddha's mouth at the death of the Buddha is thoughtful; while that put into Ānanda's mouth is a simple outcry of human sorrow. Though all the other disciples had attained to *arhat*-ship long before this, Ananda remained still a 'learner' (*sekha*); and at the council said to have been held after the Buddha's death, Ānanda is described as the only one of the first hundred members selected to take part in it who was not an *arhat* (*Vinaya*, ii. 285). He became one before the council met (*ib.* 286), and took a prominent part in it; but that did not prevent the council from admonishing him for certain faults of inadvertence he had previously committed. Other passages of a similar tendency might be quoted (*e.g. Majjhima*, No. 32); but these are perhaps sufficient to show that the picture drawn of him is of a man lovable and earnest, but withal somewhat dense.

T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

ANARCHY, ANARCHISM.—Anarchy means, as writers like Kropotkin understand it, the perfectly unfettered self-government of the individual, and, as a result, the absence of any kind of external rule. It is the widest possible application of the doctrine of *laissez faire*. Government, it declares, is something that human nature should not be asked to submit to. If men were but left to themselves, they would form themselves into co-operative producing groups, which would live in perfect harmony with one another. Each individuality would have unlimited powers of expansion, and the rigid moulds would vanish into which at present human nature is forced with infinite hurt to itself.

Anarchy as a theory must therefore be separated from Anarchism as a historical movement. The

popular idea of Anarchy is that it is concerned only with bomb-throwing and Terrorism. But Anarchy as a theory of existence has been proclaimed by some of the gentlest and most cultured spirits in Europe; and although, in the case of a writer such as Bakunin, the thinker and the active revolutionary are merged, it will be convenient to consider first the theory and then the history of the movement.

i. THEORY. — On its economic side Anarchy is a branch of Socialism or Collectivism. It regards the day of private ownership and of capitalism as drawing to a close. It believes that the wage *nexus* between employer and employee is evil, and must sooner or later cease. Its view of the remuneration of labour varies between payment by labour time and the taking by each of what he wants from the common stock of production. When the workers are living in free associations, each will see that his own interest is the interest of the association, and the present tragic struggle for the increased share will cease.

The political basis of Anarchy is, negatively, that the possession of mere electoral and voting power is quite illusory as a means of social redemption for the many. Liberalism has been a failure. Even universal suffrage could lead but to the deeper enslavement of the worker. Representative government has had its full trial, and has failed; its defects are inherent in itself, and never can be cured. It is impossible for a Parliament to attend to all the numberless affairs of the community. More and more Parliament shows this inability in the congestion of business, and in the increasing extent to which local affairs are delegated to local authorities. It is this process of decentralization that is so full of hope to the philosophic Anarchist. He takes it to foreshadow the day when every little group will settle its own affairs, when there will be no rulers and no subjects, when each individual will have free play within his group, and each group free play in its relation to all other groups.

Anarchy has been extremely anxious to place itself on a scientific basis. In its modern form it has claimed Herbert Spencer as intellectual sponsor. It declares itself to be acting along the lines of evolution in that it is conforming to those two great tendencies which Spencer discerns in present-day conditions—the tendency to integrate labour for the production of all wealth in common, so that no individual shall be able to say what portion of the total result is due to his toil; and the tendency towards the fullest freedom of the individual for the prosecution of all aims beneficial both for himself and for society at large. Throughout organic nature the capacities for life in common are growing in proportion as the integration of organisms into compound aggregates becomes more and more complete. The struggle for existence, Kropotkin asserts, is not merely the struggle for the existence of the individual, but also the progressive adaptation of all individuals of the species to the best conditions for the survival of the species. The conditions must, therefore, be modified, so that man will be able to live the normal free life, instead of being forced by positive law to hold a place in a system of things which gives him neither freedom nor opportunity.

ii. HISTORY. — The view that authority is in itself a thing undesirable, and that man reaches the full measure of his stature only when he is allowed to develop his individuality absolutely unchecked, is by no means new. It appeared in several of the Mystic and Anabaptist sects of the later Middle Ages and post-Reformation period. In the 13th cent. there was a sect of the Beghards, calling themselves Brethren and Sisters of the Free Spirit, who professed pantheistic views. It claimed the utmost liberty on the ground that, as God inhabited each, the will of each was the will of God. In their preaching the Brethren advocated community of goods and community of women; they insisted on a personal equality, and rejected all forms of authority. In the period immediately preceding the French Revolution the idea was widely spread that the normal condition of life was that represented by 'Paul and Virginia,' a condition under which men were self-sufficing and independent, owning no other authority than that of their own wills. In 1795, William Godwin wrote his *Inquiry concerning Political Justice*, advocating community of goods, the self-government of mankind according to the laws of justice, the abolition of all forms of government, and the abolition of marriage.

The real founder of Anarchy as a living modern movement was Pierre Joseph Proudhon, a Frenchman of humble parentage, born in 1809. The attention Proudhon attracted was due, not only to his great ability, but to the fact that he lived in the stormy middle years of the 19th cent., when all constituted forms of government were on their trial, and to his acceptance of the dominant Hegelianism as the vehicle of his thought. His first work, *What is Property?* was published in 1840, and the answer he gave to his own question was that property was theft. The conclusion reached had evidently much in common with Marx's view that capital was crystallized labour, wealth of which the workman had been defrauded in the process of production. Labour, Proudhon held, is the source of value, and the value of labour should be measured by its duration. So far he followed the ordinary Socialist views of his time. It was when he asked himself the question how the poor man was to be raised from his poverty that he diverged from many of his contemporaries, and began that rift in the Communistic ranks that now has become the gulf between the policies of State Socialism and Anarchy. Proudhon, with Marx and Louis Blanc, wished to secure for labour the whole product of labour. Blanc hoped to attain this end by organizing labour under the authority of the State; Proudhon thought that the same result could be reached by the free initiative of the people unassisted in any way by the State. Governments, he declared, were the scourge of God, introduced in order to keep the world in discipline and order. It was not their function to produce movements, but to keep them back. Progress would be made not by revolution, but by evolution. As the people became more enlightened, they would gradually learn to dispense with government. The constitution would have to be revised continuously and unceasingly; so gradually, by the formation of independent and interacting groups, Anarchy would be introduced.

It was in the ranks of the 'International Association of Working Men' that the conflict between State Socialism which wished to make government co-terminous with human activity, and Anarchy which wished to eliminate government altogether, came to be fought out. Before this struggle commenced, the 'International' had had a long and somewhat confused history. In 1836 a number of Germans, exiled in Paris, formed a communistic society which they called the League of the Just. Becoming involved in trouble with the French Government, they removed to London in 1839. Amid the mixture of races in London, the Society, as a matter of course, came to be of an international character. The influence of Marx began to tell upon it. It accepted his view that economic conditions determined the social structure, and that every vital change in society must be brought about

by a change not so much in political conditions as in economic. This change could be wrought only along the lines of social development. In 1847 the Society began to call itself the Communist League, its aim being 'the founding of a new society without classes and without private property.' The manifesto that the League put forth did not a little to give vigour to the various revolutionary movements of 1848; but, in the reaction following upon that time of enthusiasm, the League died. During the London International Exhibition of 1862 views were exchanged between French workmen visiting the Exhibition and their English fellows; popular sympathy with the Polish insurrection of 1863 helped the movement; and so, in 1864, the 'International Association of Working Men' was formed, with Karl Marx as its ruling spirit. His influence led the Association to the acceptance of State Socialism. State ownership of the land, as well as of the means of transport and communication, was early agreed upon as an object for which the Association should strive, although a proposal to abolish the right of inheritance did not find a majority.

But the disintegration of the International was at hand. In 1869, Bakunin and a number of the Russian Anarchists had joined it, and at once they began to attack the centralizing views of Marx. Then the Franco-German war broke out, and national feeling could not be eliminated even from an International Association. The Commune in Paris raised hopes that were almost immediately dashed in very dreadful fashion. In 1871 it became evident that there were two definitely marked groups in the Association, and the line of cleavage, as Kropotkin has pointed out, was not only an economic, but a racial one. The Germans, who now had received Parliamentary government, wished to work along electoral lines. 'The conquest of power within the existing status' became the watchword of the party which took the name of the 'Social Democrats.' The Latin and Slav elements in the Association gathered themselves together, under the leadership of Bakunin, in advocating the abolition of all paternal government, and the free action of the people through separate groups. In 1872 the Anarchists were expelled from the Association, and henceforth uttered their views through the 'Jura Federation.' This expulsion of the Anarchists was almost the last action of the International. It moved the seat of its General Council to New York, held one other Congress in Geneva in 1873, and then died. The Jura Federation and the Anarchists had a stormier history, owing to the influence of their leader.

Michael Bakunin (1814–1876) was an aristocrat and an officer. Horrified by the repressive duties he had to perform in Poland, he left the army and became a revolutionary. From 1849 to 1855 he was almost constantly in prison. In 1855 he was exiled to Siberia, but escaped in 1861 to America, and thence made his way to London. It was at this time that Russia seemed to be on the verge of a crucial constitutional change. The Czar in 1857 had promised the emancipation of the serfs, but after he had announced his intention the reactionary party induced him to impose upon the serfs an enormous redemption price for the land, and to postpone the emancipation till 1863. But in 1863 there broke out the insurrection in Poland. It was repressed with the utmost cruelty; tens of thousands of Poles were exiled to Siberia. Up to this time Russian social reformers had wrought mainly by going among the artizans and peasantry, indoctrinating them with their liberal and revolutionary views. This propaganda was now rendered almost impossible. After the attempt on the Czar's life by Karakozoff in 1866, the reformers had to hide their heads. Thousands fled the country, and settled in Switzerland and elsewhere.

It was among those exiles that Bakunin developed his Anarchist views. His object was the destruction of the existing order of things in faith, morals, economics, and politics. He refused to consider the question of reconstruction; 'all talk about the future is criminal, for it hinders pure destruction, and stems the course of revolution.'

The programme of the International Social Democratic Alliance which he founded gives the most succinct statement of his views. 'The Alliance professes atheism; it aims at the abolition of religious services, the replacement of belief by knowledge, and Divine by human justice; the abolition of marriage as a political, religious, judicial, and civic arrangement. Before all, it aims at the definite and complete abolition of all classes, and the political, economic, and social equality of the individual of either sex; and to attain this end it demands, before all, the abolition of inheritance, in order that, for the future, usufruct may depend on what each produces, so that . . . the land, the instruments of production, as well as all other capital, shall only be used by the workers, *i.e.* by the agricultural and industrial communities.' All children were from birth to be brought up on a uniform system, with the same means of instruction, so that there might disappear 'all those artificial inequalities which are the historic products of a social organization which is as false as it is unjust.' It rejected 'all political action which does not aim directly and immediately at the triumph of the cause of labour over capital.' It repudiated 'so-called patriotism and the rivalry of nations,' and desired the universal association of all local associations by means of freedom.

Bakunin's ideas were developed by his disciple Netschajeff, the son of a Court official in St. Petersburg, and born there in 1846. Netschajeff was much more a Terrorist than an Anarchist. Anarchy is, at all events, a reasoned system of things. It believes that life will be not only possible, but desirable, under the conditions it seeks to establish. But Netschajeff had regard purely to a destructive movement. His views were expounded in the Revolutionary Catechism, which was at first supposed to be the work of Bakunin, but is now, with more likelihood, held to have been by Netschajeff himself. According to this Catechism, the revolutionary must let nothing stand between him and the work of destruction. 'If he continues to live in this world, it is only in order to annihilate it all the more surely. A revolutionary despises everything doctrinaire, and renounces the science and knowledge of this world in order to leave it to future generations; he knows but one science—that of destruction. For that, and that only, he studies mechanics, physics, chemistry, and even medicine. . . . The object remains always the same—the greatest and most effective way possible of destroying the existing order.' The Catechism makes no ambiguity as to its methods. Differential treatment is to be meted out to the different classes of society; the rich are to be spared, but their wealth is to be used for the purposes of revolution; the former owners of wealth are to become the slaves of the proletariat. But rulers are not to be dealt with thus considerately. 'In the first place, we must put out of the world those who stand most in the way of the revolutionary organization and its work.' There is to be no attempt to set things right upon their present basis. Every effort is to be made 'to heighten and increase the evils and sorrows which will at length wear out the patience of the people, and encourage an insurrection *en masse*.' Active Terrorism is part of Netschajeff's programme. 'All is not action that is so called; for example, the modest and too cautious organization of secret societies, without external announcement to outsiders, is in our eyes merely ridiculous and intolerable child's play. By external announcements we mean a series of actions that positively destroy something—a person, a cause, a condition that hinders the emancipation of the people. Without sparing our lives, we must break into the life of the people with a series of rash, even senseless

actions, and inspire them with a belief in their powers, awake them, unite them, and lead them on to the triumph of their cause.' This is the attitude that the plain man understands by Anarchism. It is claimed, of course, by the Anarchist thinkers that to allow this extravagant utterance of the Revolutionary Catechism to stand as representative of the whole movement is to do it an injustice, and to confound extreme applications of a general principle with the principle itself. 'To confuse Nihilism with Terrorism is,' says Kropotkin, 'as wrong as to confuse a philosophical movement, like Stoicism or Positivism, with a political movement, such as, for example, Republicanism.' But, in answer, it may be said that all Anarchists are not thinkers, and it is teaching of the Bakunist character that has had, as it was intended to have, the most startling results. The assassination of Alexander II., of the Empress of Austria, of King Humbert, of President M'Kinley, the bomb outrages in Chicago in 1887, in the French Chamber of Deputies in 1893, in a theatre in Barcelona in 1894, the attack on King Edward VII. at Brussels in 1900, the attempt, on their wedding day, upon the young King and Queen of Spain, are the things which 'break into the life of the people with a series of rash, even senseless actions,' and make the whole movement hateful to those who feel that any organized form of society, however it may violate the rights of individuals, is preferable to a state of things in which the most irresponsible make the greatest noise and have the greatest power to do mischief. It must be allowed, too, that this irresponsible Terrorism is the dominant form of Anarchism at the present time. In 1882 the Anarchists, in conference at Geneva, cut themselves adrift from all political parties. They declared the enmity of the Anarchists to the law. 'We declare ourselves allies of every man, group, or society which denies the law by a revolutionary act. We reject all legal methods. We spurn the suffrage called universal. . . . Every social product is the result of collective work, to which all are equally entitled. We are, therefore, Communists; we recognize that without the destruction of family, communal, provincial, and national boundaries the work will always have to be done over again.'

It is, at first sight, not a little difficult to find any relation between this extravagant propaganda which has had such appalling results and Prince Kropotkin, the man of high birth, of splendid ability, of gentle and noble and self-sacrificing life. Kropotkin has told his own story in the *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*, and whoever would seek to understand Anarchism should read this book, along with the account of the trial of the Anarchists at Lyons in 1883 (*Le Procès des Anarchistes*). Such a reading will explain how it is that the more recent developments of Anarchism go so far beyond the conceptions of Proudhon. If Russians who have suffered, as Bakunin and Stepniak and Kropotkin and tens of thousands of others have done, can find no solution of the social situation other than the utter destruction, by any means, of the present condition of affairs in Russia, it is not to be wondered at. The Russian Anarchists imagine that they reach their conclusions as a necessary inference from certain scientific propositions. In reality it is the Russian bureaucracy that has conditioned their thinking. Kropotkin was born at Moscow in 1842, a member of one of the most ancient and distinguished families in the Empire. He was brought up as a page at Court; but already, on his father's estates and in his father's house, he had seen enough of the life of the serf to make him an ardent advocate of the liberal views that were in the air before the actual date of emancipation. Instead of following out the career that was open to him, as a courtier and an officer of the Household Brigade, he chose service in Siberia, and spent four years there, being occupied most of the time in geographical and geological work. In Siberia he recognized the absolute impossibility of doing anything really useful for the masses of the Russian people by means of the existing administrative machinery, and became convinced that the only future for mankind lay in an entirely free Communism. On returning to St. Petersburg, full of ardour for his country's freedom, he found that the liberal movement of the earlier years of Alexander II. had died. Turguenieff's 'Smoke' is its epitaph. Kropotkin accordingly set to work to renew the Anarchist zeal, and strove, through companions whose earnestness and utter disregard of self almost disarm criticism, to spread among the working classes of the capital revolutionary opinions. His activity was discovered. For three years he was imprisoned in the fortress of SS. Peter and Paul, but finally escaped. For the next few years he moved between Switzerland, France, and England, and, becoming involved in the Anarchist rising in Lyons in 1883, was sentenced to five years penal servitude. Since his liberation at the end of three years he has lived mostly in England.

Kropotkin's main idea is that, as the present system of government and competition and private property cannot be mended without being ended, society must fly asunder into its primary elements and begin to re-aggregate itself. The right of private property he denies, on the ground that if we go back to the uncivilized condition of things we find no such right. Land has been made what it is by draining and cultivation in past generations. Production to-day is the result of innumerable inventions that have now become merged in the general producing machinery. We can produce now only as a consequence of what past generations have done. 'Who is, then, the individual who has the right to step forward and, laying his hands on the smallest part of this immense whole, to say, I have produced this; it belongs to me?' This argument, by which he thinks he has proved the illegitimacy of private property, occurs again and again in his writings. An ironmaster, he declares, deals with and uses the discoveries of those who have gone before, and the discoveries of to-day that he can buy up. 'British industry is the work of the British nation, —nay, of Europe and India taken together,—not of separate individuals.' But where government has once been destroyed and individuals have been left free to re-aggregate themselves, each man will take his place in the group he prefers; and those groups, retaining their own freedom, will at the same time act with mutual helpfulness and consideration, without any constraint from a government. The working agreements that have been arrived at by railways suggest themselves to him as the kind of thing that will be reached under Anarchism. The result is to be a great increase in production. At present 'the owners of capital are certainly endeavouring to limit the production in order to sell at higher prices.' Kropotkin seems to think that the economics of the diamond industry apply, in this regard, to agriculture and cotton-spinning, quite oblivious of the fact of the general economy of large production. If it be asked how labour is to be organized, or to be rewarded, Kropotkin is sufficiently vague. Under the system of free groups each man would naturally turn to the work he could do; but what assurance would there be that he would stand to any agreement he had made? The Anarchist answer is that there will be no necessity to hold him to

his agreement. As the agreement has been freely entered into, there will be no need of any authority to enforce it. The labourer will be remunerated by helping himself to that portion of the joint product which he requires. The problem of the idler is easily settled:—there are not likely to be idlers in such a society. Work is natural to man, and the feeling of brotherhood and mutual responsibility will result in greatly improved labour. 'We consider that an equitable organization of society can arise only when every wage system is abandoned and when everyone contributing for the common well-being, according to the full extent of his capacities, shall enjoy also from the common stock of society to the fullest possible extent of his needs.'

To the questions that present themselves to the objector, Kropotkin has the most indefinite of answers. It may be asked, for instance, how, under any such free associations, any large public works are to be undertaken. We have heard not infrequently of such undertakings resulting in losses to the contractor, and, finally, being carried through not by that mutual agreement which is apart from law, but by the insistence of the law that a contract entered into shall be fulfilled. When a group finds difficulty in building, let us say, another Forth Bridge, who is to insist that the work shall be finished so that gross waste shall not ensue? And will not that ideal unity between group and group be very soon broken when matters of this kind come to be discussed and settled?

Then, again, with regard to the remuneration of labour, it may be granted that the wages system is not an ideal method of assessing the value of each man's contribution. But what would be the result on production, distribution, and industrial peace when each man was taking from the general heap exactly what he wished? The alternative on the Anarchist view is that he should be paid according to the labour time spent on his work. But what would become of art, music, literature, under such a system? The labourer is not, as a rule, prepared to acknowledge that anything is work which is not manual work. Far from granting that the value of an hour's work of Lord Kelvin or Mr. Edison was the equal of his own, he would deny to it the very name of work. Under this system the family would disappear as a matter of course. The notion of a permanent alliance between man and woman, enforceable by law, would be impossible. The relationship between husband and wife would be absolutely free; and this, unless human nature were to be altogether changed, would mean that the woman was to be placed at the mercy of the man and have assurance neither of home nor of sustenance. Children would require to be in charge of the group, not of the parents, and equality would necessitate that they should all be brought up in common.

Kropotkin assures the critic that the dreaded evils are imaginary. The solidarity of the human race will prevent them. The condition of things that is to be established not by law but by the sheer dignity of man, after bloodshed and revolution have done their work, is the idyllic one of perfect peace, and the solidarity of the human race. The Romanoff and the serf will vie with each other in praying the other first to take his portion of the heap.

On its theoretical and economic side Anarchism is a dream. It postulates an unreal world in which all men will live at peace, and work without thought of self. Nor is there any ground for the hope that under a system where men would be working for their group and not for their own advantage, production would be increased. One method of apportionment of wages—payment according to labour time—might have some chance of success under State Socialism, but none under a system where each man was absolutely free. The loafer and the malingerer would have found their paradise. But, anxious as Kropotkin is to dispense with government, his own scheme would involve government with an iron hand. Paternal feeling, one of the primary instincts of mankind, would have to be dead if men did not try to do their best for their own children. The rights of parentage would not be surrendered by those who were most worthy of being parents unless under the strongest compulsion. Only the sensual and the reckless would be satisfied. The great postulate of the whole system is that national feeling shall become extinct. A society organized in productive and socialist groups would clearly be unable to defend itself against a foe armed and organized as the great powers of to-day are. It would be necessary, therefore, not only that the groups within any one race should live at unity among themselves, but that they should be devoid of jealousy for the groups in any other race.

The history of Anarchism as a movement is the history of innumerable 'associations' flying to pieces, of innumerable congresses effecting nothing. Among the Teutonic peoples the movement has made no headway, for order and system is the genius of these peoples. Among the Latin and Slav races it has had a hearing. That a Russian who has suffered under the bureaucracy should be an Anarchist is no surprise. He may naturally feel that the dissolution of society into its elements is the postulate of any reconstruction. But that Anarchism shall ever establish itself as an organization of society under which men and women shall be able to live is impossible. What is even remotely practical in it, the taking of the means of production out of private hands, has already been adopted as the fundamental element of their policy by the State Socialists. The broad difference between those two great branches of Communism is that, while in the one it is realized that government will require to have much more extensive functions than it has at present, so that it may regulate those relationships which now are settled by private contract, in the other it is expected that the solidarity of the human race will be such that the will of the individual shall become the will of the group apart from all interference by government. That the former view better fits the facts as we know them, hardly admits of dispute.

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ANAXAGORAS, son of Hegesibulus, was born about B.C. 500 at Clazomenæ on the southern shore of the Gulf of Smyrna. He brought philosophy and natural science from Ionia to Greece, and marks an era in the history of Greek thought, being the first known advocate of a distinct psychical principle, called the *Nous* (Mind). He taught also an original theory of the constitution of matter.

Anaxagoras belonged to a family of wealth and position, but neglected his inheritance to follow science. Tradition asserts that he was a pupil of Anaximenes. This is chronologically impossible,

as Anaximenes died before B.C. 520. He probably belonged to the school of Anaximenes, for scholarship in Ionia was not unorganized; the relation among groups of congenial thinkers foreshadowed the development in Greece of chartered schools of philosophy (θίασοι) (Diels, *Ueber die ältesten Philosophenschulen der Griechen*, Leipz. 1887; Wilamowitz-Möllendorf, *Antigonos von Karystos*, p. 263 ff.). Theophrastus states that Anaxagoras was 'an associate of the philosophy of Anaximenes' (Arist. *Phys. Op.* fr. 4; Diels, *Doxographi Græci*, p. 478). Anaxagoras migrated to Athens about B.C. 460, the first philosopher to take up his abode there. The intimate friend and teacher of Pericles (Plato, *Phædrus*, 270), he taught in Athens thirty years, numbering among his pupils Euripides, Thucydides, Archelaus, and Metrodorus of Lampsacus. His influence was far-reaching in introducing rationalism into Greece.

His chief work, entitled περὶ Φύσεως ('on Nature'), complete in several volumes, was published, probably in Athens, after B.C. 467, the year of the great fall of meteorites which he mentions. It was written in prose, and was the first Greek book, with the exception of geometrical writings, to be illustrated with diagrams. Considerable fragments survive, most of which are found in Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*.

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when Pericles' popularity began to wane, Anaxagoras was arraigned for impiety, accused of denying the godhead of the sun and moon, and of saying that the sun was burning stone, and the moon earth (Plato, *Apol.* 26 D). Pericles saved him, but he was exiled to Lampsacus, on the southern shore of the Hellespont, about B.C. 430. There he had many disciples, and died in B.C. 428. A stone was erected to his memory bearing on one side the word Νοῦς and on the other Ἀλήθεια (Arist. *Rhet.* Bk. II. cap. 23).

That matter is neither generated nor destroyed had been the doctrine of the Ionian physicists for a full century. Heraclitus brought the idea of becoming into prominence, but Anaxagoras believed absolute change impossible. 'The Hellenes,' he said, 'are wrong in using the expressions "coming into being" and "perishing"; for nothing comes into being or perishes, but there is mixture and separation of things that are.' To Anaxagoras the eternity of matter involved the eternity of all its qualities, therefore the problem that confronted him was the origin of force. The three great systems of Empedocles, the Atomists, and Anaxagoras, all accepted the unchanging character of particles of matter and the separation of matter and force; Anaxagoras' book shows acquaintance with both of the other systems. Anaxagoras posited the *Nous* to satisfy his strongly developed sense of causation, to account for order in the universe, and to solve a definite mechanical problem.

In the beginning was chaos, which contained original particles of all existing objects, for 'How could hair come from not-hair, and flesh from not-flesh?' (Diels, cf. *Hermes*, xiii. 4). Anaxagoras calls the particles 'seeds' or 'things' (σπέρματα or χρήματα, Fr. 4 [Schorn]); but they were called *homœomeriæ* by a later half-Aristotelian phraseology. All things were together and occupied all space. There was no empty space. The action of the *Nous* upon some point of chaos produced rotation of inconceivable rapidity, which, ever widening in extent, caused the union of homogeneous particles. The impulse of the *Nous* was initial. Revolution followed and separation by force and speed, 'and speed makes force' (Fr. 11 [Schorn]). The earth was formed in the centre of this movement. The sun, moon, and stars were separated by the violence of the motion, and the celestial globe increased in circumference as ever-increasing masses of matter were included in the rotation. Homogeneous seeds combine to form objects as we know them, but there is never absolute freedom from disparate seeds. Objects become so by the kind of matter prevailing in them. Earth, water, air, and fire are complex substances containing particles belonging to all objects. The sun is a mass of ignited stone as large as, or larger than, the Peloponnesus. The earth is flat or a flat cylinder, resting on the air. Anaxagoras discovered with tolerable accuracy the cause of the phases of the moon and of eclipses, and he explained at length various meteorological and elemental phenomena. His observation in early manhood of a huge meteoric stone which fell at Ægospotami may have helped him to form his cosmological theories (Pliny, *HN* ii. 58; Diog. Laert. I. iii. 10).

Anaxagoras believed in the qualitative trustworthiness of sense-perception, but the senses, being weak, cannot discern the truth (Sext. Emp. *Math.* vii. 90). Sensation is produced by opposites, and is connected with pain (Theoph. *de Sens.* 27, 29; Diels, *Dox.* p. 507). That which is hot is also somewhat cold. Our senses show us the proportions that prevail. 'Snow must be dark, because the water from which it comes is dark' (Sext. Emp. *Hyp.* i. 33). The superiority of man lies in his possession of a hand. Death is a simple necessity of nature.

The *Nous* is the rarest and purest of all things, in its essence homogeneous, a kind of reasoning force, or thought-stuff. Personality is attributed to it in one fragment only, which speaks of its knowledge of the past, present, and things to come (Fr. 6 [Schorn]). The *Nous* was a possible first cause of motion from a dualistic standpoint, a *deus ex machina* according to Aristotle, and merited the disappointment which Plato in the *Phædo* attributes to Socrates regarding it. Yet it forms an important link in the shifting of interest from nature to man; and, although metaphysically an incomplete conception, the *Nous* of Anaxagoras was pronounced immaterial by Plato, Aristotle, and Theophrastus.

Anaxagoras' teaching regarding the laws of nature and unity in the cosmic process formed a marked contrast to the mythical ideas of his age. His great contribution to knowledge was in the scientific method employed and in referring order in the universe to a rational principle. Anaxagoras left no distinctly ethical or religious teachings. He considered contemplation of nature the highest task of man.

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MARY MILLS PATRICK.

ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND CULT OF THE DEAD.

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ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND CULT OF THE DEAD.—The worship of the Manes, or ancestors, is, says Tylor (ii. 113), 'one of the great branches of the religion of mankind. Its principles are not difficult to understand, for they plainly keep up the social relations of the living world. The dead ancestor, now passed into a deity, simply goes on protecting his own family and receiving suit and service from them as of old; the dead chief still watches over his own tribe, still holds his authority by helping friends and harming enemies, still rewards the right and sharply punishes the wrong.' In this view of the case the departed ancestor is regarded as invariably kindly and well disposed towards his surviving relatives; and it may be said that this is the usual feeling of savage and barbaric man towards his kinsfolk who have passed into the other world. But there are, as will be seen, exceptions to this general rule; and the question of the attitude of the living towards the dead has formed the subject of controversy between two schools of anthropologists.

1. *The dead regarded as friendly.*—What may be called the totemistic school—that which regards totemism as the main source from which religion has been evolved—dwells specially upon the kindly relations between the deity and his worshippers. Thus, according to W. R. Smith (213–357), primitive sacrifice is an act of communion, the totem animal or beast sacred to the god being slain in order to renew or re-establish the bond of connexion between the clan and its supernatural ally. Hence he rejects the supposition that 'religion is born of fear.' 'However true,' he writes (p. 54), 'it is that savage man feels himself to be environed by innumerable dangers which he does not understand, and so personifies as invisible or mysterious enemies of more than human power, it is not true that the attempt to appease these powers is the foundation of religion. From the earliest times, religion, as distinct from magic or sorcery, addresses itself to kindred and friendly beings, who may indeed be angry with their people for a time, but are always placable except to the enemies of their worshippers or to renegade members of the community. It is not with a vague fear of unknown powers, but with a loving reverence for known gods who are knit to their worshippers by strong bonds of kinship, that religion in the only true sense of the word begins.'

This theory has been extended by Jevons (*Introd. Hist. Rel.* 54 ff.) to the cult of the dead. He contends that primitive man was 'ordinarily and naturally engaged in maintaining such [friendly] relations with the spirits of his deceased clansmen; that he was necessarily led to such relations by the operation of those natural affections which, owing to the prolonged, helpless infancy of the human being, were indispensable to the survival of the human race; and that the relations of the living clansman with the dead offered the type and pattern, in part, though only in part, of the relations to be established with other, more powerful, spirits.' In support of this position, he contends that the maintenance of the parental instincts and family affection was essential to the survival of primitive man in the struggle for existence; and he quotes instances of the grief felt by the survivors when a death occurs in the family; the provision of food and other necessaries for the use of the dead; the retention of the corpse in the dwelling-house for a considerable period after death, or its ultimate burial beside the hearth; the preservation of relics of the departed; the appeals of the mourners to the ghost, imploring it to return home; the adoption of cremation, which frees the soul from the body and thus enables it to revisit its friends; the custom of catching the departing soul; the periodical feasts which the dead are invited to attend; and so on (*op. cit.* 46 f.).

2. *The dead unfriendly to the living.*—On the other hand, the same writer (p. 53) admits that love was not 'the only feeling ever felt for the deceased. On the contrary, it is admitted that fear of the dead was and is equally wide-spread, and is equally "natural."' These two apparently opposite modes of thought in relation to the dead he explains by the supposition that primitive man draws a clear line of distinction between the ghost of the kinsman and that of the stranger; the one is kindly and protective, the other malignant, dangerous, and hence an object of fear. 'In fine,' he remarks (*op. cit.* 54), 'as we might reasonably expect, the man who was loved during his lifetime did not immediately cease to be loved even by savages, when he died, nor was he who was feared in life less feared when dead.' The many instances of the savage cult of the dead, when it is prompted by fear, he regards as due to 'mal-observation of the facts of savage life.'

But these cases are so numerous that it is impossible to account for them in this way. Thus it is universally admitted that the spirits of strangers and enemies are inimical, and the same feeling is extended to those who have perished by an untimely death, or in some unusual or tragical way. On this principle Frazer (*GB*[2] i. 331) explains the inconvenient restrictions imposed on the victors in their hour of triumph after a successful battle, in obedience to which the warrior is isolated for a period from his family, confined to a special hut, and compelled to undergo bodily and spiritual purification. For the same reason, on the return of the successful head-hunter in Timor, sacrifices are offered to propitiate the soul of the victim whose head has been taken, and it is generally believed that some misfortune would overtake the victor were such offerings omitted. For the same reason, the same feeling is very generally extended to the

ghosts of kindred in the case of children, youths, or maidens snatched away in the prime of their strength and beauty. These are naturally supposed to cherish feelings of jealousy or hatred towards the survivors, who are in the enjoyment of blessings from which they are excluded. The same is the case with the ghosts of women dying in childbirth, who are almost universally regarded as specially dangerous. Equally malignant are the spirits of the murdered man, of one slain by a wild beast, or dying from snake-bite. This feeling is naturally extended to the ghosts of wizards or sorcerers, who were renowned during life on account of the mysterious powers which they were supposed to possess. Thus the Patagonians lived in terror of the souls of their sorcerers, who were believed to become evil demons after death; and the Turanian tribes of N. Asia dread their shamans even more when dead than when alive (Falkner, *Descript. of Patagonia*, 116; Castrén, *Finsk mytologi*, 124; Bastian, *Mensch in der Geschichte*, ii. 406; Karsten, *Origin of Worship*, 110).

Such cases may be easily explained; but the fear of the dead is not confined to spirits of the classes already enumerated. 'Death and life,' writes Tylor (ii. 25), 'dwell but ill together, and from savagery onward there is recorded many a device by which the survivors have sought to rid themselves of household ghosts.' He instances the habit of abandoning the dwelling-house to the ghost, which appears in some cases to be independent of horror, or of abnegation of all things belonging to the dead; and the removal of the corpse by a special door, so that it may not be able to find its way back. In some cases, again, the return of the ghost is barred by physical means. In parts of Russia and East Prussia, after the corpse is removed, an axe or a lock is laid on the threshold, or a knife is hung over the door; and in Germany all the doors and windows are shut, to prevent the return of the ghost. With the same object the Araucanians strew ashes behind the coffin as it is being borne to the grave, so that the ghost may miss the road; and Frazer suggests that the very general practice of closing the eyes of the dead was based upon the same principle, the corpse being blindfolded that it might not see the road by which it was borne to its last home (*JAI* xv. 88 ff.). In India the Aheriyas, after cremating the corpse, fling pebbles in the direction of the pyre to scare the ghost; and in the Himalayas one of the mourners, on returning from the funeral, places a thorny bush on the road wherever it is crossed by another path, and the nearest relative puts a stone on it, and, pressing it down with his feet, prays the spirit of the dead man not to trouble him (Crooke, *Pop. Religion*, ii. 57).

Appeals are often made to the spirit, imploring it not to return and vex its friends. Among the Limbus of Bengal, the officiant at the funeral delivers a brief address to the departed spirit on the general doom of mankind and the inevitable succession of life and death, concluding with an exhortation that he is to go where his fathers have already gone, and not come back to trouble the living in dreams (Risley, *Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, ii. 19). Similar appeals are made by the Chinese, Dakotas, and the Karieng (Frazer, *JAI* xv. 65). The Yoruba sorcerer wishes a safe journey to the ghost: 'May the road be open to you; may nothing evil meet you on the way; may you find the road good when you go in peace.' The house of death is abandoned or burned, the deceased is called upon by name, and adjured to depart and not haunt the dwellings of the living (Ellis, *Yoruba-speaking Peoples*, 156, 160). Even in India, a land where the worship of ancestors widely prevails, the Santál believes that the ghostly crowd of spirits who flit disconsolately among the fields they once tilled, who stand on the banks of the mountain streams in which they fished, and glide in and out of the dwellings where they were born, grew up, and died, require to be pacified in many ways. He dreads, says Hunter, his Lares as much as his Penates (*Annals of Rural Bengal*, 1897, p. 183).

3. *Prevalence of Ancestor-worship.*—In the sectional articles which follow, the character and prevalence of ancestor-worship in various parts of the world will be considered. In Australia it seems to be in little more than an embryonic stage; and the same may be said of New Zealand and Tasmania. Throughout Polynesia and Melanesia the cult is well established. In the Malay Peninsula it appears in the primitive animistic form, influenced by Islām. In the Semitic sphere the evidence for its existence is inconclusive. In Africa it prevails widely among the Bantu tribes, and in W. Africa became the State cult of the kingdoms of Ashanti and Dahomey. The elaborate death cult of the Egyptians was probably largely influenced from the south and west of the continent. In various forms it appears throughout the American region. It is, however, in India and in China, whence it seems to have been carried to Japan, that it appears in the highest vigour.

4. *Worship defined.*—At the outset it is necessary to define with some approach to accuracy what we mean when we speak of the 'worship' of ancestors. There are few races in the world which do not practise what has been called a death cult in some form, that is to say, we notice everywhere in the methods of disposal of the dead, in the funeral rites, and in the solemnities performed either immediately after the removal of the corpse, or subsequently at periodical intervals, one of two predominant ideas. Some people seem to desire to put the dead man out of sight, and thus relieve the survivors from any danger which may result from the hostility of the spirit; in other cases we find the relatives animated by a desire to maintain affectionate or friendly relations with the departed dead, to placate or gratify them, to supply them with food and other necessaries needed to maintain them in the new state of life on which they have entered. The latter is probably the most primitive, and is certainly the most general attitude adopted by the survivors. But even if we admit that the survivors do thus endeavour to secure amicable relations with the spirits of their departed friends, and that on occasion they may, in return, solicit their aid and sympathy, we are as yet far from reaching what may be rightly called 'worship' of the dead. 'Religion,' in its narrowest sense, has been defined by Frazer (*GB*² i. 63) as 'a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and of human life.' For our present purpose it is on the words in this definition 'superior to man' that the question depends. Savage or barbaric man usually regards his departed relatives as needing his ministration and aid, rather than thinks that he is dependent upon them for protection and support. He pictures the soul when it leaves the body as a diminutive, feeble entity, which must be carefully protected from injury, and for which a suitable refuge must be provided where it can await the period when it is finally admitted into death-land. Even there, as we see in Homer's Nekuia, the common dead are conceived to pass a weak and passionless existence, a feeble imitation of that which they enjoyed on earth. It is only certain heroic souls who acquire a higher degree of strength and vitality, and even they can be roused to meet and converse with their friends on earth only when they lap the blood of the victim from the sacrificial trench. When this conception of the

helpless life of the departed prevails, it is obvious that the loving sympathy and ministrations of the living to the departed do not rise to the dignity of 'worship.'

The distinction, then, between the worship and the placation, or tendance, of the dead is one of great importance, which many of our travellers and observers have failed to appreciate. There are cases in which the dead are worshipped; but those of placation and ministration to the needs of the departed in the other world are much more numerous. In the accounts which follow of the prevalence of this form of worship in various parts of the world, the evidence upon which they are based must be accepted with this preliminary reservation. This distinction, again, if kept steadily in view, will enable us to account in some degree for the remarkable differences of opinion which prevail regarding this form of belief. Hence we must receive with some degree of caution the accounts of travellers who report that certain tribes are exclusively devoted to the worship of their ancestors, or that this form of belief does not exist among them. Two things are liable to cause misconception. In the first place, the veil which the savage hangs round his most cherished beliefs and ritual is so closely woven that casual visitors to a savage or semi-savage tribe, or even persons who have resided amongst them for some time, and have acquired some considerable knowledge of their language and character, find great difficulty in penetrating the mysteries of their religion. In the second place, the death cultus, which ordinarily takes place at the grave, is of necessity a formal and public act, and is likely to be observed and investigated by the casual inquirer, who may remain in complete ignorance of what is really the vital part of the tribal beliefs.

5. *Ancestor-worship the basis of human religion.*—The theory which suggests that the cult of ancestors is the basis of all human religion is usually associated with the name of H. Spencer. This writer begins his summary of the conclusions at which he has arrived, by dealing with what may be called the hero cult. 'Anything,' he writes, 'which transcends the ordinary, a savage thinks of as supernatural or divine; the remarkable man among the rest. This remarkable man may be simply the remotest ancestor remembered as the founder of the tribe; he may be a chief famed for strength or bravery; he may be a medicine-man of great repute; he may be an inventor of something new. And then, instead of being a member of the tribe, he may be a superior being bringing arts or knowledge; or he may be one of a superior race predominating by conquest. Being at first one or other of these, regarded with awe during his life, he is regarded with increased awe after his death; and the propitiation of his ghost, becoming greater than the propitiation of ghosts less feared, develops into an established worship' (*Principles of Sociology*, i. 411).

This view of the hero cult may be accepted with some reservation. In the first place, there are grounds for believing that fear is not the only, or even the primary, reason for the deification of the hero. The cult of the distinguished dead was often founded, not so much upon awe as upon the desire of the survivors to maintain friendly relations with the spirits of the departed (Jevons, *Introd.* 106). Secondly, in those parts of the world where the hero cult is developed to its highest form, the devotion paid to the hero is of a degree inferior to that of the regular gods, who are often nature spirits, and not necessarily ghosts of the dead. This distinction is clearly marked in Greece, where the cult of Heracles or Asklepios is of a lower grade than that of deities like Athene or Zeus. The ritual of hero-worship is also clearly different from that used in the worship of the gods. The same is the case in India, where heroes like Rāma or Krishna, who have been elevated to the rank of gods, are found sheltering themselves as *avatāras*, or incarnations, of a great nature deity like Vishnu.

But Spencer goes much further than to recognize a cult of the deified hero. Following the passage already quoted, he goes on to say: 'Using the phrase ancestor-worship in its broadest sense as comprehending all worship of the dead, be they of the same blood or not, we conclude that ancestor-worship is the root of every religion.' Even the most downright upholders of the Spencerian hypothesis are unable to accept it when thus extended. Thus Grant Allen (*Evolution of the Idea of God*, 36) observes: 'I do not wish to insist that every particular and individual god, national or naturalistic, must necessarily represent a particular ghost, the dead spirit of a single definite once-living person. It is enough to show, as Mr. Spencer has done, that the idea of the god, and the worship paid to the god, are directly derived from the idea of the ghost, and the offerings made to the ghost, without holding, as Mr. Spencer seems to hold, that every god is, and must be, in ultimate analysis the ghost of a particular human being.' And in another passage (*ib.* 42) he writes: 'Religion has one element within it still older, more fundamental than any mere belief in a god or gods—nay, even than the custom or practice of supplicating and appeasing ghosts or gods by gifts and observance. That element is the conception of the Life of the Dead. On the primitive belief in such life all religion ultimately bases itself. The belief is, in fact, the earliest thing to appear in religion, for there are savage tribes who have nothing worth calling gods, but have still a religion or cult of their dead relatives.' Elsewhere, in discussing the cult of Attis, he seems to suggest that the tree-spirit and the corn-spirit originate in the ghost of the deified ancestor (*Attis*, 33 and *passim*).

Needless to say, these views have not met with general acceptance. Thus Hartland (*Legend of Perseus*, i. 203) regards this Euhemerism of Spencer as 'a child (one among many) of his passion for explaining everything quite clearly, for stopping up all gaps and stubbing up all difficulties in his synthesis, rather than an all-sufficient account of the beginnings of religion.' Lang (*Myth, Ritual and Religion*, ed. 1899, i. 308 f.) attacks what he calls 'the current or popular anthropological theory of the evolution of gods,' on various grounds. He finds in this hypothesis a 'pure Euhemerism. Gods are but ghosts of dead men, raised to a higher and finally to the highest power.' Analogous to this, but not identical, is the theory of Tylor (ii. 334), which suggests that 'man first attains to the idea of spirit by reflexion on various physical, psychological, and psychical experiences, such as sleep, dreams, trances, shadows, hallucinations, breath and death, and he gradually extends the conception of soul or ghost till all nature is peopled with spirits. Of these spirits one is finally promoted to supremacy, where the conception of a supreme being occurs.' To this combined animistic and ghostly theory Lang replies (*ib.* i. 310) that all gods are not necessarily of animistic origin. 'Among certain of the lowest savages, although they believe in ghosts, the animistic conception, the spiritual idea, is not attached to the relatively supreme being of their faith. He is merely a powerful *being*, unborn, and not subject to death. The purely metaphysical question, "Was he a ghost?" does not seem always to have been asked. Consequently there is no logical reason why man's idea of a Maker should not be prior to man's idea that there are such things as souls, ghosts and spirits. Therefore the animistic theory is not necessary as material for the "god

idea." We cannot, of course, prove that the "god-idea" was historically prior to the "ghost-idea," for we know no savages who have a god and yet are ignorant of ghosts. But we can show that the idea of God may exist, in germ, without explicitly involving the idea of spirit. Thus gods *may* be prior in evolution to ghosts, and therefore the animistic theory of the origin of gods in ghosts need not necessarily be accepted.' Secondly, he urges that, in all known savage theological philosophy, the God, the Maker and Master, is regarded as a being who existed before death came into the world. Everywhere death is looked on as a comparatively late intruder, who entered this world not only after God was active, but after it had been populated by men and beasts. 'Thus the relatively supreme being, or beings, of religion are looked on as prior to Death, therefore, not as ghosts.' Thirdly, the Vui of Melanesia and the Atua of the Tongans are '*beings*, anthropomorphic, or (in myth and fable) very often bestial, "theriomorphic." It is manifest that a divine being envisaged thus need not have been evolved out of the theory of spirits or ghosts, and may even have been prior to the rise of the belief in ghosts.' Fourthly, as among the Andamanese, Fuegians, and Australians, 'these powerful, or omnipotent divine beings are looked on as guardians of morality, punishers of sin, rewarders of righteousness, both in this world and in a future life, in places where ghosts, though believed in, *are not worshipped, nor in receipt of sacrifice*, and where, great-grandfathers being forgotten, ancestral ghosts can scarcely swell into gods.' Such gods, not receiving sacrifice, 'lack the note of descent from hungry food-craving ghosts.' If to this it be replied that the Australians are degenerate and must once have had chiefs or kings whose surviving ghosts have become their gods, he answers that there is no evidence of Australian degeneration. They have, on the contrary, advanced 'when they supersede their beast or other totem by an eponymous human hero.' Lastly, the theory being thus found inadequate to explain the facts of the lowest 'savage' religions, it is equally inapplicable to the 'barbarian' stage of culture. Here we often find a highest deity who is seldom worshipped with sacrifice, who has become otiose, a mere name, finally a jest and a mockery; while 'ancestral ghosts, and gods framed on the same lines as ghosts, receive sacrifice of food and of human victims.' Besides this, the higher barbarian gods are localized, which is not the case with the high gods of low savages. This 'break or flaw in the strata of religion' he explains by 'the evolution through ghosts of "animistic" gods who retained the hunger and selfishness of these ancestral spirits whom the lowest savages are not known to worship.' Such gods, needing constant sacrifices, are easily bribed to overlook the moral delinquencies of their worshippers, or to forgive their sins. Thus animism 'is on its way to supplant or overlay a rude early form of theism,' and thus the current theory, which makes the highest god the latest in evolution from a ghost, breaks down. The tribal or national deity, as latest in evolution, ought to be the most powerful, whereas among barbarians he is 'usually the most disregarded.' This line of argument may be accepted without admitting the implication that monotheism is a primitive form of belief, and it is to this extent valid against the Spencerian hypothesis.

As for the gods of nature, it is difficult to understand how the belief in them could have arisen through an ancestor-cult. It is possibly true, as Ellis (*op. cit.* 282) observes, that they are sometimes blended with ghost-gods; 'the reverence paid to certain rivers, rocks, cliffs, etc., must have often dated from some fatal accident that occurred in connexion with them. It was this which first attracted attention, and primitive man would not be likely to discriminate between the ghost of the victim, which would haunt the spot where the latter lost his life, and the indwelling spirit of the natural feature.' But such cases could never have been common, and the reverence paid to any abnormal feature of natural scenery would generally be quite independent of any association with a ghost. Still more is this the case with gods of sky, sun, moon, wind, or rainbow. The animism which leads to the worship of phenomena like these cannot depend upon, and may be earlier than, the belief in the survival of the soul after death.

6. *Ancestors oracular.*—Ancestral spirits are believed to be able to give oracles to their descendants, who consult them in times of danger or trouble. At certain places deep chasms or openings in the earth were observed, through which the shades could rise from their subterranean home, and give responses to the living. The Greeks called such places oracles of the dead (*νεκυομαντεῖον, ψυχομαντεῖον, ψυχοπομπαῖον*). The most ancient oracle of this kind was that of Thesprotia, where Periander succeeded in conjuring up and questioning the ghost of his murdered wife, Melissa (Herod. v. 92; Paus. ix. 30. 3). There was another at Phigalia in Arcadia (Paus. iii. 17. 8, 9), and Italy possessed one at Lake Avernus (Diod. iv. 22; Strabo, v. 244). The regular mode of consulting such oracles was to offer up a sacrifice and then to sleep in the sacred place. The soul of the dead man then appeared to the sleeper in a dream, and gave his answer (Frazer, *Paus.* iii. 243). The same belief is found in many forms in other parts of the world. In Melanesia, 'after a burial they would take a bag and put Tahitian chestnut and scraped banana into it. Then a new bamboo some ten feet long was fixed to the bag, and tied with one end in the mouth of it, and the bag was laid upon the grave, the men engaged in the affair holding the bamboo in their hands. The names of the recently dead were then called, and the men holding the bamboo felt the bag become heavy with the entrance of the ghost, which then went up from the bag into the hollow of the bamboo. The bamboo and its contents being carried into the village, the names of the dead were called over to find out whose ghost it was. When wrong names were called, the free end of the bamboo moved from side to side, and the other was held tight. At the right name the end moved briskly round and round. Then questions were put to the enclosed ghost, Who stole such a thing? Who was guilty in such a case? The bamboo pointed of itself at the culprit if present, or made signs as before when names were called. This bamboo, they say, would run about with a man if he had it only lying on the palms of his hands; but it is remarked by my native informants, though it moved in men's hands it never moved when no one touched it' (Codrington, *Melanesians*, 211 f.). Among the Akikuyas of E. Africa, the medicine-man holds converse only with those recently dead, whose lives he had been unable to save. He goes out and visits the corpse when it has been thrown out into the jungle. He pours 'medicine' upon its hands, and calls on it to rise. When it rises, the wizard says: 'Revile your father, mother, and brothers.' It does so, and after the wizard has thrown more 'medicine' upon it, the conversation ceases. Persons so reviled get sick and die (*JAI* xxxiv. 262). In S. Africa the wizard in the same way gets into communication with the spirit world, and delivers oracles in the form of riddles and dark parables (*ib.* xx. 120). The Dayaks sometimes, like the Greeks, seek communion with the ancestral spirits by sleeping at their graves in the hope of getting some benefit from them (Roth, *Natives of Sarawak*,

i. 211). In Australia some specially gifted seers are able to see the disembodied spirit sitting on the spot where its body lies buried, and no longer able to retire into its accustomed habitation (*JAI* xvi. 54). In Lapland, according to Scheffer (Borlase, *Dolmens of Ireland*, ii. 477), the Lapps buried their dead in caves, sacrificed a reindeer in honour of the dead, and fasted for three days after the burial. When offering the sacrifice, they inquired the will of the Sitte or ancestral ghosts. They said: 'O ye Sitte, what will ye have?' Then they used to beat a drum on which a ring was laid, and if the ring fell on any creature pictured on its surface, they understood that this was what the spirit desired. They then took the animal thus selected, ran through its ear and tied round its horn a black woollen thread, and sacrificed it. Sometimes the wizard pretends to go in person to death-land to consult the ancestral spirits. Among the Dayaks he possesses a charm which ensures the aid of a kindly spirit when he goes to Sabayan, the under world, in search of the soul of a sick man (*JAI* xxxiii. 81). The Melanesians tell a similar story of a woman who went to Panoi to consult the dead, and the Australian wizard is able to bring back news from the dead, or he ascends the sky, visits Daramulun, and obtains magical power from him (*ib.* x. 283, xiii. 195). In W. Africa the Yoruba priest takes a young child, bathes his face in the 'water of purification,' and digs a hole in the earth within the sacred grove at midnight. When the child looks into the hole, he is able to see Dead-land, and can tell the priest what he sees. When his face is washed a second time, he forgets all that has happened (Ellis, *op. cit.* 141). Such powers, often gained under the influence of fasting, are claimed by shamans all over the world (Tylor, ii. 410 f.).

7. *Disease, etc., caused by ancestral spirits.*—When the attention of a tribe is fixed on the cultus of ancestors, it becomes a natural inference that disease or other misfortune is due to neglect of their worship. In Celebes, all sickness is ascribed to the ancestral spirits who have carried off the soul of the patient (Frazer, *GB*[2] i. 265). This reminds us of the Greek conception of the Keres and Harpies (Harrison, *Proleg.* 176 ff.). In the same way, wrathful ancestors are supposed to cause tempests; the thunder is their voice. In Peru, when parents who have lost a child hear thunder within three months of the death, they go and dance on the grave, howling in response to each clap, apparently believing that they hear the sighs and groans of their lost child in the rumble of the thunder (Frazer, *Lect. on Kingship*, 206 f.). In some cases the wrath of the spirit is attributed to causes which we can only regard as frivolous. In Natal we hear of a diviner announcing to his people that the spirits had caused disease because they did not approve of some persons living in the kraal of a relative, and wished them to have a house of their own (*JAI* i. 181). Sometimes, again, the spirit is provoked on account of a sin committed by his people. Among the Banyoros of Uganda, the death of a man by lightning is attributed to the anger of the Bachwezi, or ancestral spirits, on account of some sin committed by the dead man, or wrong-doing on the part of members of the clan. To appease them, a sacrifice is demanded (Johnston, *Uganda*, ii. 539 f.). In Florida, according to Codrington, 'it is a *tindalo*, that is, a ghost of power, that causes illness; it is a matter of conjecture which of the known *tindalos* it may be. Sometimes a person has reason to think, or fancies, that he has offended his dead father, uncle, or brother. In that case no special intercession is required; the patient himself or one of the family will sacrifice, and beg the *tindalo* to take the sickness away; it is a family affair.' But if the *tindalo* be that of a stranger, a doctor is called in to identify and propitiate it (Codrington, *Melanesians*, 194 f.). But generally the cause of offence to the spirit is that the relatives have neglected its wants. When a North American Indian fell into the fire, he believed that the spirits of his ancestors pushed him in because their worship was neglected (Schoolcraft, i. 39). Often, again, it is caused by jealousy of the spirits towards the living, or it arises because the ghosts are lonely in Dead-land and desire companionship. For this reason spirits which have recently departed this life are apt to carry off with them to the world of the dead the souls of their surviving relatives (Frazer, *GB*[2] ii. 345 f.). Miss Kingsley was assured that the danger of the ancestral ghost's injuring the members of the family, particularly children, 'comes not from malevolence, but from loneliness and the desire to have their company. . . . This desire for companionship is, of course, immensely greater in the spirit that is not definitely settled in the society of spiritdom, and it is therefore more dangerous to its own belongings, in fact, to all living society, while it is hanging about the other side of the grave, but this side Hades' (*W. African Studies*, 133). Ellis, from whom Miss Kingsley probably borrowed the fact, says that ancestors cause sickness because the ghost wants the services of his relatives in Dead-land, and so hastens their departure from this world (*Ewe-speaking Peoples*, 109). It is a common belief that the spirits of people who have died a violent death may return to earth if they can find a substitute, and hence they are offended with any one who prevents another soul from taking his place by rescuing a person from drowning (Black, *Folk Medicine*, 28 f.). In Ireland, according to Lady Wilde, 'it is believed that the spirit of the dead last buried has to watch in the churchyard until another corpse is laid there, or to perform menial offices in the spirit world, such as carrying wood and water, till the next spirit comes from earth. They are also sent on messages to earth, chiefly to announce the coming death of some relative, and at this they are glad, for their own time of peace and rest will come at last' (*Ancient Legends, etc., of Ireland*, 1887, 82 f.). So in China 'it is commonly believed that if the spirit of a murdered man can secure the violent death of some one else, he returns to earth as if nothing had happened, the spirit of his victim passing into the world below and suffering all the misery of a disembodied spirit in his stead' (Giles, *Strange Stories from a Chinese Studio*, 1880, ii. 365). Fortunately, however, the patient is not always left to the mercy of the spirits of his enraged relatives. In San Cristoval, it was believed that the friendly and unfriendly ghosts fight with spears over the sick man. The patient would suffer, die, or keep his health according to the issue of this unseen spectral battle (Codrington, *op. cit.* 196).

8. *Ancestors appearing in children.*—The belief that the child is nothing more or less than an ancestor re-born on earth is found almost throughout the world. The idea, of course, depends upon the resemblance of members of the same family in successive generations. It is the basis of the extraordinary theory held by the Arunta tribe in Central Australia regarding conception, and among the northern tribes of the same continent every new child is believed to be the incarnation or re-incarnation of spirit children left by remote ancestors (Spencer-Gillen[a], 51 f., 337; *FL* xv. 467). Among the Thlinkets of N. America, the spirit was 'believed to have the option of returning to this life, and generally entered the body of a female relative to form the soul of a coming infant. If the child resembled a deceased friend or rela-

tion, this embodiment was at once recognized, and the name of the dead person was given to it' (Bancroft, *Native Races*, iii. 517). In the same region the Nootkas accounted for the existence of a distant tribe speaking the same language as themselves by declaring them to be the re-incarnated spirits of their dead (*ib.* iii. 514). In W. Africa the Yorubas inquire of their family god which of the deceased ancestors has returned, in order to name the child after him, and its birth is greeted with the words 'Thou art come,' as if addressing some one who has returned; and their neighbours, the Ewe, believe that the only part of its body which a child receives from its mother is the lower jaw, the rest being derived from the ancestral spirit (Ellis, *op. cit.* 120, 131). The same procedure in naming children appears among the Khonds of India, where the priest drops grains of rice into a cup of water, naming with each grain a deceased ancestor. From the movement of the seed in the water and from observation of the child's person he decides which ancestor has reappeared in it, and the name is usually given accordingly. Hence we can explain why in the islands of Watabela, Aaru, and the Sula Archipelago barren women and their husbands visit certain sacred graves to pray for offspring—the spirits of the sainted dead being thus re-incarnated (Ploss, *Das Weib*, 1887, i. 436 ff.). The same belief appears in W. Europe in the habit of young girls in the Pyrenees going to a dolmen to pray for a lover, and young brides for a child; in the erotic superstitions connected with rude stone monuments in Spain, Brittany, and Ireland; and in the cycle of Irish legend connected with the bed of Dermot and Grania (Borlase, *Dolmens of Ireland*, 580, 689, 845 f.). This leads immediately to the theory of metempsychosis, which is generally accepted among primitive races. In India it is doubtful whether this belief appears in the Vedas, but it is admitted in the later Purānic literature, and at the present day in the Panjāb it is quite logically accepted to explain the fact that, as the soul is transmitted from generation to generation, so with the life are transferred all attributes and powers of the progenitor. Hence we have numerous instances here of the transmission of the hereditary powers of curing disease or causing evil which are believed to be found in certain clans and families. 'This principle of inherited supernatural powers or sanctity is much more deeply rooted than that of caste. It is natural and fitting that a man should follow his father's trade, but he may change his occupation. . . . When once sanctity has been acquired by a family, it is next to impossible to shake it off. Social status is much less permanent. The original conception of the metempsychosis appears then to have been that the life or soul, with all its attributes, was transmitted by natural descent. This idea was developed into the doctrine that the soul transmigrated from one body to another independently of such descent, but this doctrine did not regard transmigration as something fitful and uncertain; on the contrary, religion held that it was subject to one set of rules, and magic that it could be regulated, but in neither sense was transmigration a matter of chance' (Rose, *Census Report, Panjāb*, 1901, i. 161 ff.). But, as Hartland remarks (*op. cit.* i. 220), 'the subtlety of savage metaphysics is marvellous. An acute observer points out that among the Tshi-speaking peoples of the Gold Coast and the Ewe-speaking tribes of the Slave Coast, a distinction is drawn between the ghostly self that continues the man's existence after death in the spirit-world, and his *kra* or *ñoli*, which is capable of being born again in a new human body. In the eastern Ewe districts and in Dahomey the soul is, by either an inconsistency or a subtlety, believed to remain in the land of the dead and to animate some new child of the family at one and the same time; but it never animates an embryo in a strange family.'

9. *Ancestor-worship and Totemism.*—The question of the relation of ancestor-worship to totemism has recently been discussed by Tylor, Hartland, and Frazer. Tylor (*JAI* xxviii. 146 f.) quotes from Wilken (*Het Animisme bij de Volken van den Indischen Archipel*, 1884–85, pt. i. p. 74 f.) cases of crocodiles being regarded as kindly and protective beings, to kill which is considered murder, as they may be man's near relatives. Offerings are made to them, and people look forward to the great blessedness of becoming crocodiles when they die. In the same way Sumatrans worship tigers, and call them ancestors. Some of the non-Aryan tribes of the central Indian hills believe that the ancestor is sometimes re-born in a calf, which in consequence of this connexion is well fed and treated with particular respect (Crooke, *Popular Religion*, i. 179). On this Tylor thus comments: 'Wilken sees in this transmigration of souls the link which connects totemism with ancestor-worship, and on considering his suggestion, we may see how much weight is to be given to the remarks made independently by Dr. Codrington as to Melanesia (*op. cit.* 32 f.). He found that the people in Ulawa would not eat or plant bananas, because an influential man had prohibited the eating of the banana after his death because he would be in it; the elder natives would say, we cannot eat so-and-so, and after a few years they would have said, we cannot eat our ancestor. . . . As to such details we may, I think, accept the cautious remark of Dr. Codrington, that in the Solomon Islands there are indeed no totems, but what throws light on them elsewhere. The difficulty in understanding the relation of a clan of men to a species of animals or plants is met by the transmigration of souls, which bridges over the gap between the two, so that the men and the animals become united by kinship and mutual alliance; an ancestor having lineal descendants among men and sharks, or men and owls, is thus the founder of a totem-family, which mere increase may convert into a totem-clan, already provided with its animal name. By thus finding in the world-wide doctrine of soul-transference an actual cause producing the two collateral lines of man and beast which constitute the necessary framework of totemism, we seem to reach at last something analogous to its real cause.'

Following on this discussion, Hartland considers the whole question in connexion with the tribes of S. Africa. He notices that the only branches of the Bantu race among which no certain traces of totemism and but few of mother-right are found are the Amazulus and their kindred tribes, the most advanced of the whole Bantu race. The Bechuanas, on the contrary, exhibit substantial remnants of totemism, and with them traces of mother-right. Thus in the lowest social stage of these races totemism is still flourishing, and patriarchal and pastoral institutions are struggling with it. Totemism is here, in fact, developing into ancestor-worship (Frazer, *Man*, i. 136), and the question is—How has ancestor-worship developed and supplanted totemism? This question Hartland answers by suggesting that it is entirely dependent upon the growth of the patriarchal system. 'The more absolute becomes the power of the head of a nation, and under him of the subordinate chiefs and the heads of families, the more the original totemism superstitions tend to disappear until they are altogether lost and forgotten.'

The same process seems to be going on in other parts of the world. Thus, in Yam, one of the islands in Torres Straits, the animal kindred come

to be replaced by a definite effigy, the soul of which is kept in an external receptacle, and the effigy is further associated with a hero (Haddon, *Cambridge Exped.* v. 377f.; *Head-hunters*, 138). Haddon regards this materialization of a totem as unique; 'so important a development of totemism is practically to place it beyond the realm of pure totemism.' We find something of the same kind in a totem-post from British Columbia, where, as Tylor remarks, 'the figures go beyond mere representations of the totem animals, and depict a mythic incident in which the human ancestor is believed to have come into relation with the animal which was thence adopted as the totem of the clan' (*JAI* xxviii. 136). The development of totemism into ancestor-worship is also illustrated by the case of the Bhuiya tribe in Bengal. They show great reverence for the memory of Rikhmun or Rikhiāsan, whom they regard, some as a patron deity, others as a mythical ancestor, whose name distinguishes one of the divisions of the tribe. Risley believes it possible that in the earliest stage of belief Rikhmun was the bear-totem of a sept of the tribe, that later on he was transformed into an ancestral hero, and finally promoted to the rank of a tribal god (*Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, i. 112).

With our present limited knowledge of the origin and development of totemism, which may at any time be revolutionized by fresh information from the Australian or other primitive tribes, it would be premature here to do more than quote these examples of ancestor-worship developing out of totemism, with the more or less plausible explanations which have been suggested to account for it.

10. *Ancestor-worship and Idolatry.*—We have more satisfactory evidence of the development of ancestor-worship into idolatry, a term not in itself satisfactory, but preferable to that of 'fetishism,' which possesses no scientific value. The practice of erecting carved representations of deceased ancestors is one of the many sources from which the idol was probably evolved. Its analogue is to be found in the primitive stone pillar, in which the god was manifested when blood was sprinkled upon it (Jevons, *Introd.* 133). This custom of erecting memorial images is very common in Melanesia and the adjoining region. At Santa Cruz, 'when a man of distinction dies, his ghost becomes a *duka*. A stock of wood is set up in his house to represent him. This remains, and is from time to time renewed, until the man is forgotten, or the stock neglected by the transference of attention to some newer or more successful *duka*.' Offerings are made to it in times of danger at sea, at the planting of a garden, on recovery from sickness, when fruit is laid before it (Codrington, *op. cit.* 139). In the Solomon Islands, if a person of great consequence dies, 'a figure may be made of him after his death, for the ornamentation of a canoe-house, or of a stage put up at great feasts. These images are hardly idols, though food may sometimes be put before them, though to remove them would be thought to bring down punishment from the dead man upon those who should so insult him' (*ib. JAI* x. 302). In Ambrym, however, the large figures screened with bamboos, which would naturally be taken for idols, are set up in memory of persons of importance at a great feast perhaps a hundred days after death. 'That they do not represent ancestors is fairly certain; the very oldest can be but a few years old' (*JAI* x. 294). They generally represent figures of men, who would be loosely called ancestors by the powerful people of the village, and these would be treated with respect, food being placed before them. 'But these had no sacred character, further than that they were memorials of great men, whose ghosts, visiting their accustomed abodes, would be pleased at marks of memory and affection, and irritated by disrespect. There was no notion of the ghost of the dead man taking up his abode in the image, nor was the image supposed to have any supernatural efficacy in itself.'

In the New Hebrides, a model of the dead chief is made of bamboo; the head is smeared over with clay, shaped and painted so as to be often a fair likeness of the deceased, and placed on the bamboo model, the whole image being set up in the god's house or temple, with the weapons and personal effects of the dead man. Boyd, who describes these images (*JAI* xi. 76, 81), is doubtful whether they are objects of affectionate regard or of worship, and Somerville (*ib.* xxiii. 21, 392) does not ascribe any religious character to them. But it is obvious that an image set up as a memorial and propitiated with offerings of food may very easily develop into an idol. Haddon (*Head-hunters*, 91) describes similar models in wax on skulls of deceased relatives. They seem to be kept mainly for sentimental reasons, as the people are of an affectionate disposition, and like to have memorials of departed friends; but they are employed mainly as *zogos*, or potent instruments of divination by which a thief, stolen goods, or a person who by means of sorcery had made any one sick, should be detected. The model was taken in procession, and was believed to be able to guide him who bore it to the house of the offender. There is much difference of opinion regarding similar images from Easter Island, some denying that they are worshipped; others alleging that they represent chiefs and persons of note, and that they are given a place at feasts and ceremonies; others, again, suggesting that they are used for purposes of divination. In the case of a rude cultus like this it is possible that all three suggestions may represent the varying conditions of the devotion paid to them (*Man*, iv. 73f.). In New Guinea the explorers found two roughly carved wooden men, with bushy hair on their heads. When asked to sell them, the natives said: 'No. They belong to our ancestors, and we cannot part with them' (Chalmers-Gill, *Work and Adventure*, 229).

In India the use of such images seems to be largely based on the principle of providing a refuge for the ghost during the period which elapses between death and the completion of the funeral rites. Among the lowest castes in North India a reed is very generally fixed for this purpose near a tank, and water libations are poured upon it during the days of mourning. Woodthorpe (*JAI* xi. 65) describes the curious images erected by the Nāgas of the N.E. frontier over their graves. These are sometimes executed with much skill, the wrists and elbow-joints indicated, emerald beetle wings representing the eyes and a row of white seeds the teeth. 'They were clad in all the garments of the deceased, with their shields fixed on the left side, two imitation bamboo spears standing on the right.' The Khariyas, according to Dalton (*Descriptive Ethnology*, 160), make images of the same kind. In South India the Nāyars make an image of the dead man out of palmyra leaf, and to this rice and other things are offered (Fawcett, *Bull. Madras Museum*, iii. 248). Among the Kāfirs of the Hindu-kush the veneration paid to images of this kind seems to amount to actual worship. Sacrifices are made before them, and their descendants, when suffering from sickness, sprinkle blood upon their pedestals. A straw figure of a warrior is venerated at his funeral, and effigies of the honoured dead are erected over their graves (Robertson, *Kafirs of Hindu-kush*, 414, 635, 648).

The Ostiaks of Siberia make similar figures. Among them the effigy is 'worshipped with divine adoration for such a period of time as may be

determined by the Shaman or priest, not exceeding, however, three years, when the image is buried. Offerings of food are set before it at every meal; and if it represents a deceased husband, the widow embraces it from time to time, and lavishes upon it tokens of affectionate and passionate attachment. The image of a deceased Shaman is preserved from generation to generation; and 'by pretended oracular utterances and other artful impositions the priests manage to procure pious offerings as abundant as those laid on the altars of the acknowledged gods' (Featherman, *Ugro-Turanians*, 559, 575).

In America the same practice is well established. Of the Cemis or images raised by the aborigines of Hispaniola, Ferdinand Columbus states: 'They give the image a name, and I believe it is their father's or grandfather's, or both, for they have more than one, and some above ten, all in memory of their forefathers' (*JAI* xvi. 260). The grave-posts, roughly hewn into an image of the dead, appear among many tribes of the American Indians (Dorman, *Prim. Superstition*, 177 ff.). The Similkameen Indians of British Columbia place carved figures representing the dead on their graves. These are dressed in the clothes of the dead man, and when decayed are renewed (*JAI* xxi. 313). The Sioux set up a grave-post, recording the totem of the deceased warrior, with a record of his warlike expeditions and of the number of scalps taken by him, of which Schoolcraft gives illustrations (i. 356).

In Africa the Lindu, a forest tribe, have a distinct form of ancestor-worship, and are accustomed to remember the dead by placing roughly-carved dolls, supposed to represent the deceased person, in the abandoned hut in which he is buried (Johnston, *Uganda*, ii. 555). Miss Kingsley (*Travels*, 473) records a case where, on the death of a twin, an image of the child was carried about by the survivor as a habitation for the soul, so that it might not have to wander about, and being lonely call its companion to follow it.

When we come to races in a higher grade of culture, we find survivals of the same practice. The Roman noble exhibited in the wings which opened from his central hall the *imagines* or likenesses of his revered forefathers, which are believed to have been originally portrait-masks to cover the faces of the dead. These at funerals were fitted on to the faces of the actors who represented the dead man's ancestors, and when kept in the house were probably attached to busts (Smith, *Dict. Ant.*[3] ii. 992 ff.). The actors with these masks were seated on chairs of dignity at the funeral rites (Granger, *Worship of the Romans*, 65).

11. *Ancestor-worship in relation to the family.*—Ancestor-worship is primarily a family cult, based on the desire of the survivors to maintain friendly relations with the departed. But the family is a comparatively modern institution, and behind the modern family, organized on the principle of the maintenance of the *patria potestas* and succession in the male line, there is a long past, when possibly promiscuity and certainly polyandry or group-marriage, with the natural accompaniment of succession in the female line, must have prevailed. This is not the place to discuss the priority of father-right and mother-right. In Australia, at any rate, group-marriage is found to prevail where mother-right exists, and it is difficult to imagine how it could have arisen under conditions of father-right. Hence ancestor-worship cannot be regarded as a highly primitive belief. Jevons (*op. cit.* 194) is on less sure ground when he argues that it could not have arisen before the time when agriculture was started as the main industry of the human race. 'Originally,' he urges, 'the dead were supposed to suffer from hunger and thirst as the living do, and to require food—for which they were dependent on the living. Eventually the funeral feasts were interpreted on the analogy of those at which the gods feasted with their worshippers—and the dead were now no longer dependent on the living, but on a level with the gods. . . . It could not therefore have been until agricultural times that the funeral feast came to be interpreted on the analogy of the sacrificial feast.' It would, however, be unsafe to infer that the cult of ancestors is confined to tribes organized on the patriarchal system. Thus in South India the custom of tracing descent through the female seems to have widely prevailed, and the Nāyars, who still maintain this rule, are ancestor-worshippers. This they have not borrowed from the Hindus, but it has been derived by them from the primitive animism (Fawcett, *Bulletins Madras Museum*, iii. 157, 247, 253, 273). The same is the case with many of the lower castes in Northern India, among whom survivals of matriarchy can easily be traced, and with certain Melanesian races, who combine an ancestral cult with descent in the female line; as, for instance, the Pelew Islanders, the Ipalaoos of the Caroline Archipelago, the Chamorres of the Ladrones, and the Biaras of New Britain (Kubary, *Pelauer*, 39; Featherman, *Oc. Mel.* 356, 358, 396, 401, *Pap. Mel.* 52 ff.).

12. *Social Results of Ancestor-worship.*—It remains to consider briefly the effect of ancestor-worship on the social condition of the races which practise it. In the case of Japan, a writer in the *Times* (20th Nov. 1905) remarks: 'It is not difficult even for Europeans to understand how strong is the foundation, both for national and dynastic loyalty, which such a faith affords. It ensures that the whole Japanese people, from the highest to the lowest, shall ever bear in mind the existence and the strength of the innumerable ties which knit the present to the past. It is at once a safeguard against violent revolution and a guarantee of gradual progress. It is a conception which we cannot perhaps easily grasp in its fulness, but we can readily acknowledge its nobility and its simplicity, and we can feel how great and precious a factor it may be in moulding the hearts and minds of a nation.' To the same belief the sanctity of the household and, as a consequence, the inviolability of marriage, have been much indebted. The strong desire of every man to leave a son competent to perform the rites on which the happiness of his ancestors and of himself depended was one of the main foundations of that family life which is the basis of modern society, and, except in countries like India, where it conflicted with the prejudices of the priestly class, tended to raise the status of woman. On the other hand, in the ruder stages of society, the belief that the unappeased and angry soul of the father or kinsman hovered round the family hearth, and could be consoled by no propitiation save by the blood of the murderer slain by a member of the household, tended to foster the desire for revenge, to strengthen the feeling of hostility towards rival tribes, and to confirm the popular belief that 'stranger' and 'enemy' were synonymous terms.

LITERATURE.—The authorities have been freely quoted in the preceding pages. On the general subject see Spencer, *Principles of Sociology* (1877), pt. i. chs. xx. xxv.; Avebury, *Origin of Civilisation* (1870), 364 ff.; Tylor, *Primitive Culture*[3] (1891), ch. xiv.; de la Saussaye, *Manual of the Science of Religion*, 112 ff.; Jevons, *Introduction to the History of Religion* (1896), ch. xv.; Fustel de Coulanges, *La cité antique*; Howard, *History of Matrimonial Institutions* (1904); J. G. Frazer, *GB*[2] (1900), ii. 460, iii. 83; W. R. Smith, *Rel. of Sem.*[2] (1894), 213; Landtmann, *The Origin of Priesthood*, ch. ii.; Karsten, *The Origin of Worship, a Study in Primitive Religion* [the two last being academical dissertations addressed to the Alexander University of Finland]; Carpenter, 'The Gods Embodiments of the Race Memory' in *Hibbert Journal*, ii. 259 ff.

W. CROOKE.

ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND CULT OF THE DEAD (American).—1. Communion with spirits of the dead.—Perhaps the most marked feature of the religion of the American Indians is the vivid belief in life after death, possessed by nearly all of the many tribes from Alaska to Patagonia.* There can be little doubt that this belief was based upon the equally general belief in communication between mankind and the spirits of the dead.

Whatever may be the true explanation of that modicum of genuine phenomena, which some attribute to the action of spirits, and others to the sub-conscious self, the phenomena were recognized by the Indians long prior to the advent of modern spiritualism, and, at least in many cases, prior to the earliest historical contact with Europeans. The tribes regarded these phenomena as caused by the spirits of the dead. As a rule they were friendly spirits, those of tribal ancestors, relatives, or friends who returned to earth to warn, protect, instruct, or amuse the living. They were treated with reverence and respect, seldom with fear. They could be seen by those who trained their senses above the normal plane, in accordance with methods handed down from the ancestors, or sometimes, under unusual circumstances, by ordinary mortals.

The power of seeing them was believed to be acquired in various ways—by continued solitary meditation, by the use of certain narcotic herbs, by crystal-gazing. Those who acquired this power became mediums, and were respected as the 'Medicine Men' (a term possibly derived from the mysteries of the Meda Societies), magicians, or priests. By the aid of the spirits they were enabled to foretell the future, and to describe events occurring at a distance. Evidently, therefore, the spirits were believed to possess superhuman knowledge and power, and intercourse with them was sought to obtain this, not for purposes of worship. Amongst many tribes those who acquired this power are distinguished by various names, according to the scope of their attainments, but the principal distinction is between those who are controlled by the unseen forces and those who control them. Only the masters were enabled to compel the spirits to do their bidding. No instances are given of the abuse of these powers. Like the spirits themselves, those who were supposed to hold intercourse with them seem to have been regarded only in a favourable light. As to the effect of these practices upon the medium personally, nothing is heard. Besides these methods of obtaining intercourse with spirits, some men were believed to be born gifted with this power, to some others it could be quickly or instantly imparted by masters. In dreams and visions and under unusual circumstances, spirits were believed to appear, without mediumistic interposition, to ordinary mortals.† There is hardly a tribe to-day which does not possess at least one member who believes that he is able to describe distant events at the time of their occurrence, or to perform some other apparently supernatural feat. In the myths of several southern tribes, mortals journey to the land of the dead, and return therefrom to relate their experiences.‡

2. The soul and the double.—'The Iroquois and Algonkins believe that man has two souls—one of a vegetative character, which gives bodily life, and remains with the corpse after death until it is called to enter another body; another of more ethereal texture, which can depart from the body in sleep or trance and wander over the world, and at death goes directly to the land of spirits.'§

The Sioux recognize three souls—one goes to a hot place after death, one to a cold, while a third watches the body. The Dakotas claim four souls.† In most American Indian languages the word for 'soul' is allied to those for 'air,' 'wind,' 'breath,' the breath being thought to represent the animating principle derived from the Cosmic Spirit, or Soul, as amongst Hindus and Romans, though only the system of the Vedas analyzed this relationship.‡

The individual soul was regarded as part of this Cosmic Soul which formed the principal deity of the American Indians. The personified deities in Peru, and probably elsewhere as well, were recognized as special manifestations,§ although the adequate understanding of this concept was doubtless confined to the few, as in all places and times. The unconscious attempt of the missionaries to read monotheism into the concept of the Great Spirit, amongst the northern tribes, naturally prevented appreciation of its true nature, and led to vagueness in their statements.

A wide-spread belief assigned to each individual an attendant guardian spirit, or spiritual companion, independent of, but attached to, the physical self. It warned the self through intuitions of impending dangers, and the like. Such was the *tornak* of the Eskimos; the *oiaron* of the Iroquois, chosen after a period of solitary meditation in the woods, and symbolized by some object seen in a dream or vision; the *ochechag* of the Ojibwas; the *amei-malguen* of the Araucanians; the *huauque* or 'double' of the Peruvians, literally 'brother of a brother,' but also applied to twins and, significantly, to a friend. The Peruvians, moreover, gave this name to the false heads placed upon the mummies to which they expected that the departed spirits would return at some future time. It is probable that the word *huaca*, applied to all sacred objects, referred to the spiritual counterpart, from which, according to the Peruvians, all material objects were derived. Whether accidentally or otherwise, this word is repeated in the sacred Mexican city of *Teotihuacan*, and in the deities *Wakan* and *Wakonda* of North American tribes, as Brinton has shown.‖ It is possible that *Thunapa pachaca*, 'He who knows himself and all things,' one of the names applied to the Peruvian Cosmic Spirit, may apply to one who has mastered the relation of this double to the physical self. The Guiana tribes also assert that every human being consists of two parts—body, and soul or spirit.¶

3. Methods of communication.—The Micmacs, like the Natchez, Peruvians, and other tribes, kept the bodies of their dead in their homes or temples, believing that this would enable the spirits to warn them of the approach of enemies, and to advise with their priests about the affairs of the tribe. It was once usual for the young men of many tribes, at the approach of puberty, to go alone into the woods to meditate in solitude and without food, until they had visions of visiting spirits, and the like. In Peru a class of hermits dwelt alone upon the mountains, and were consulted as to many things, past, present, and future. The Eskimos also had their hermits, *kavigtok*,** and, according to the Micmacs, there are now several such hermits of their tribe dwelling on the mountains in the almost unexplored wilderness around Cape North, Cape Breton Island.

* Brinton, p. 253.
† *Ib.* 49, 52, 55.
‡ See Oviedo, lib. xlii. cap. 2, 3.
§ See Molina, p. 29.
‖ Bancroft, iii. 199, 514; José de Acosta, lib. v. cap. vi.; Rink, 39; Lafitau, i. 336, 370; Molina, *Hist. of Chili*, p. 257; Hagar, *Peruvian Astronomy*, 'Gemini' chapter.
¶ Im Thurn, p. 346.
** Rink, 46.

* Brinton mentions the Pend d'Oreilles of Idaho as the only exception, but others are now known.
† For details of such beliefs amongst Eskimos and Micmacs, see Rink, p. 58; Hagar in *Jour. of Am. Folk-Lore*, vol. ix. p. 170 ff.; Bancroft, iii. 147.
‡ Lafitau, i. 402.

4. Folk-lore of communication. — There is a general belief amongst the Indians that if you go into the woods on a calm day and listen, you will hear the light footsteps of the spirits, and sometimes the sound of an axe. Many of the spirits inhabit trees, from which they appear before the solitary traveller. The Brazilian tribes believe that they announce coming death. The Northern Lights represent to the Eskimos and other tribes the dance of the dead, and are thought to occur only when many have died. The origin legend of the Incas relates that Huanacauri having been walled up in a cave by his three brothers, his spirit accompanied them thence to Cuzco, flying through the air. In some parts of Peru the natives scattered flour or maize or quinua about the dwelling to see by the footsteps whether the spirits had been moving about.* The modern Mayas mark a path from the tomb to the hut with chalk, so that the returning spirit may find its pathway thither. The Peruvians seem to have believed that all their laws were revealed to their rulers by spirits who descended from the celestial world.†

5. Seances.—The Pottawatomies had recognized rules for communicating with the dead.‡ The spirits came with a 'sound like that of a distant strong wind sweeping through leafless trees, and intermingling with strange voices.' A Zuñi rain-priest said that a woman member of his fraternity having died in the sword-swallowing rite, 'her spirit troubled us so much with rapping that we placed live coals in the centre of the room and added piñon gum; the room was soon filled with smoke, which effectually rid us of the spirit.' Amongst practically every tribe with which the Spaniards came in contact, their writers describe certain men as talking with the devil, who appeared to them in divers shapes, and imparted supernatural information. Probably they referred to the demonstrations called by us 'seances.' In Cumana, they say, the *piaches*, or priests, informed them as to the exact day when relief ships would arrive from Spain, and as to the number of men, and the amount of supplies they would bring. The priest who made this prophecy

'went into a cave on a very dark night, took with him some bold youth, who stood while he sat. The priest called, cried out, repeated verses, shook rattles, sounded horns dismally, spoke some words of entreaty, and if the devil did not answer, sounded again, sang threats, and grew angry. When the devil came, which was known by the noise, the priest pounded hastily and loud, fell down, and showed that he was taken by the fiend by the faces and gestures that he made.§

According to Acosta, the Peruvians had conjurers who

'tell what hath passed in the fartherest parts before any news can come. As it has chanced since the Spaniards arrived there that in the distance of two or three hundred leagues, they have known the mutinies, battles, rebellions, and deaths, both of tyrants and those of the king's party, and of private men, the which have been known the same day they chanced or the day after, a thing impossible in the course of nature. To work this divination they shut themselves into a house and become drunk, until they lose their senses, A day after they answered to that which was demanded. They likewise show what has become of things stolen and lost.'‖

In the provinces of Quito the devil in frightful shape appeared to the priests, who were much respected by all the other Indians.

'Among these one gave replies, and heard what the devil had to say, who, in order to preserve his credit, appeared in a threatening form. Then he let them know future events, and no battle or other event has taken place amongst ourselves that the Indians throughout the kingdom have not prophesied beforehand. There can be no doubt but that by an illusion of the devil the figures of persons who were dead, perhaps fathers or relations, appeared to those Indians in the fields in the dresses they wore when living.'¶

Perhaps the most detailed account of a seance in America, recorded, it should be remembered, long before the advent of modern spiritualism, is given by Salcamayhua, an Aymara, of pure blood and noble lineage, who writes as follows:

'It happened one day that the Inca Ccapac Yupanqui wished to witness how the huacas conversed with their friends, so he entered the place selected, which was in a village of the Andes, called Capacuyo. When the young Inca entered among these idolaters, he asked why they closed the doors and windows, so as to leave them in the dark, and they all replied that in this way they could make the huaca come who was the enemy to God Almighty, and that there must be silence. When they had made an end of calling the Devil, he entered with a rush of wind that put them all into a cold sweat of horror. Then the young Inca ordered the doors and windows to be opened that he might know the shape of the thing for which they had waited with such veneration. But as soon as it was light, the Devil hid its face, and knew not how to answer. The dauntless Inca Ccapac Yupanqui said, "Tell me what you are called," and with much shame it replied what its name was. It fled out of the house raising shouts like thunder.'*

Seances are also described amongst the Caribs and other tribes.

A special and much venerated class of Peruvian priests, called *mallquit umu*, devoted themselves to communicating to the people information obtained from the spirits which had formerly inhabited the mummies placed in their keeping. They were also called *huaca rimachi*, 'those who make the sacred objects speak,' and *ayatapuc*, 'those who make the dead speak,' as they obliged the devil 'to enter into the corpses which they consult, or into the bodies of those whom they put to sleep by their sorceries.'† The famous temple of Rimac Mallqui, near Lima, seems to have been devoted to communion with the dead.

The suggestion of hypnotism is repeated in the snake-charming of the Zuñis, whose priests claim to be able to insert their own minds into the brains of the reptiles and to learn their ways.

6. Inducing visions. — To induce visions the Peruvians made use of the plant called *villca*.‡ Hernandez says that the Mexicans used an herb called *ololiuhqui*, or 'serpent-plant,' when they wished to consult with the spirits. By means of it they were enabled to behold a thousand visions, and the forms of hovering demons.§ The Micmacs similarly used their *medeskööi* or serpent-plant. Amongst the Mayas the *h'menes* or priests were enabled by gazing into the *zaztun*, a crystal of quartz, or other translucent material, to behold reflected therein the past, present, and future, to locate lost articles, to see what was happening to absent ones, to learn by whose witchery sickness and disaster had been caused. Scarcely a village in Yucatan was without one of these stones.‖ The Cherokee magicians by means of their *oolunsadi*, or crystals, obtained power to go to the spirit world and back. In them they beheld events anywhere at any time they wished. They also used them to call to their aid the invisible little people, who would accomplish almost anything for them, either good or evil. They would drive out the hostile spirits who caused illness or inflicted death; they would fly on errands over land and sea. One Cherokee, with every indication of good faith, informed the present writer that he possessed a crystal and could use it in all the ways stated. It must be fed by rubbing blood upon it, and if angry would cause injury to its owner. The Zuñi priests used crystals for like purposes. In Peru, though the use of crystals is not affirmed, a legend asserts that the Inca Yupanqui, while gazing into the clear depths of a spring, beheld a messenger from the celestial world, who told him many wonderful things.

7. Belief in life after death. — Whether the general belief in life after death amongst the American Indians was founded on their real or

* Arriaga, p. 39.
† S. Hagar, *Peruv. Astron.* 'Scorpio' chapter.
‡ *Forum*, July 1898, p. 624. § Herrera, vol. iii. pp. 310, 311.
‖ Acosta, vol. ii. pp. 367, 368.
¶ Ciesa de Leon, pt. i. p. 190.

* Salcamayhua, p. 85.
† Calancha, tome i. p. 411; Squier, p. 84, quoting Pinelo Cieza de Leon, pt. i. ch. 91.
‡ See Lorente, p. 284. § *Popol Vuh*, p. 184 note
‖ Brinton, *Essays of an Americanist*, p. 165.

supposed communion with the spirits of the dead, or *vice versa*, the intensity of this belief amongst the Cahrocs and in Peru is evidenced by the Druid-like custom of whispering in the ears of the dying messages to departed friends.* Algonquin women who desired to become mothers flocked to the couch of those about to die, in the hope that the vital principle, as it passed from the body, would enter them and fertilize their sterile wombs. The Aymara word *mallqui* meaning 'mummy' is also translated 'tree,' 'lord,' 'immortal,' 'a bush for transplanting,' 'a young bird about to leave its nest for life elsewhere.' The conventional expression amongst the Indians at the approach of death is 'My father calls me to rest with him.' Many tribes held the doctrine of re-incarnation. The Chinook says that when a man dies, his spirit passes to his son; the Thlinket, that the soul has the option of returning to life. In that case it generally enters the body of a female relative to form the soul of a coming infant. Some tribes of Southern California supposed that the dead returned to certain verdant isles in the sea while awaiting the birth of infants, whose souls they were to form. The Apaches taught the metempsychosis of souls into animals. The Nootkas, Pueblos, and Mayas also believed in re-incarnation.† The Dakota medicine-men profess to tell things which occurred in bodies previously inhabited for at least half a dozen generations. Many tribes preserved the bones of their dead, believing in the resurrection of the body.‡

8. Magic.—Feats of magic in which, however, the participation of spirits is not asserted, are reported amongst many tribes, the Mayas being especially proficient therein. See fully under art. MAGIC.

9. Mortuary customs.—The various tribes made use of very diverse methods of burial, including inhumation in natural or artificial cavities, in or on the ground, desiccation by tight wrapping, the remains being afterwards placed in or on the earth, deposition in urns, surface burial in hollow trees or caverns, cremation, aerial sepulture in lodges or elevated platforms, and aquatic burial beneath the water or in canoes which were afterwards turned adrift.§ Mummies, common in Peru, have also been found in many parts of North America, but it is still doubtful whether any artificial process of embalming was resorted to for preserving these bodies. A form of water burial, analogous to the Norse, was once practised by the Micmacs at the funeral of chiefs. It seems not to have been used by any other tribe on the Atlantic coast.

Food, clothing, tools, and cherished objects were generally buried with the body, and food and drink were afterwards left upon the grave, but this was the service of love seeking to provide for the material wants of the soul in the earth above. It was not worship. In Peru, as in India, even the wives and servants of the deceased, together with some of his domestic animals, were once buried with the deceased, but at the time of the conquest it had already become the general custom to substitute images of the required objects.

The Ojibwas believe that, when they partake of visible food at the grave, the spirit at the same time partakes of the spiritual element of that food.‖ The Mexicans had a similar belief.¶ So, often, as in Egypt, the pottery deposited on the grave was broken that its 'spirit' might escape to serve the deceased.** The Algonquins beat the walls near the corpse with a stick to frighten away the lingering ghost. But this was done only by the enemies of the deceased.*

10. Nature of life after death.—The land of souls amongst the American Indians was usually located in the sky, the sky-world being regarded as the world of origins, of which the earth is but an echo or counterpart. Life in the sky-world therefore was thought to differ little from life on earth. The soul continued to pursue the same objects that it had sought here. The Happy Hunting Ground was a literal ideal of the northern hunter tribes, but the concept rises amongst the Mayas to a place of eternal repose under the cool umbrageous shade of the sacred tree, *yaxche*.† Certain legends seem to localize the land of souls in or near the sun, and in the Pleiades,‡ but the sun merely represents the dwelling of the ruler of the sky-land.

Journey of souls.—The way thither is long and difficult. For four days and nights the soul toils onwards over a dark and dreary way, lighted only by the fires which are maintained on its grave during that period. First it journeys to the extremities of the earth, to the point where the Milky Way, the path or river of souls, touches the earth. At the entrance to the Galaxy, it passes a dog, or between two mountains which guard the way. Then, guided by the spirit of a dog or by a star, it leaves the earth and advances on this narrow path until it comes to a point where the path forks. Here the spirits of those who have been brave and courageous, and have led praiseworthy lives, reach the broad arm and quickly attain to the celestial goal, while those less commendable pass out upon the narrow arm and struggle on with bitter effort. Such is the real symbolic basis of the journey of souls. Though this symbolism is usually veiled, it is sometimes quite clearly stated, as by the Skidi Pawnees.§ Everywhere the soul must cross water, usually a torrential river, sometimes a series of streams, the ocean or a lake. Sometimes it does this on a narrow hair bridge, as in Peru and Colombia and amongst the Eskimos, sometimes on a slippery log, as amongst the Cherokees, Iroquois, and other northern tribes, on an enormous snake amongst Algonquins and Dakotas, on sea-lions on the Peruvian coast, on dogs in Mexico, in a stone canoe amongst the Ojibwas. The Mexicans, with marked inconsistency in view of their sanguinary rites, translated to heaven at once and without effort the souls of warriors and of women who died in childbirth. The Pawnees conceded to them a comparatively easy journey.

The Zuñis believe that

'the ghost hovers about the village four nights after death, and starts on its journey to Kothluwalawa (Abiding-place of the Council of the Gods) on the fifth morning. During the spirit's stay in the village, the door and hatchway of the house must be left ajar that it may pass in and out at will; should the door be closed the ghost would scratch upon it, and not be satisfied until it was opened. These shadow beings can be observed by seers and by others under certain conditions.'‖

Parents or sisters of a deceased person sleep at the side of the surviving spouse during the four nights that the spirit is supposed to remain in Zuñi. A grain of black corn or a bit of charcoal is put under the head of the women to ensure against dreaming of the lost one, whose ghost would appear should the sleeper awake.

11. Worship of ancestors and of the dead.—Strictly speaking, instances of true worship of ancestors or of the dead in America are rare. The dead are seldom confused or identified with the various deities, whose attributes, with

* Hill, vol. i. p. 260; Bancroft, iii. 200.
† Bancroft, iii. 53, 514, 517, 525, 527.
‡ S. R. Riggs in *AAOJ*, vol. v. p. 149.
§ Yarrow, pp. 92, 199. ‖ *Ib.* p. 191.
¶ Tylor, vol. ii. p. 85.
** Sayce in *Dawn of Civilization*, p. 195 note 1.

* Brinton, 255; Bancroft, iii. 199.
† Landa, pp. 200, 201.
‡ See Brinton, 261, 262; Bancroft, ii. 511; S. Hagar, *Peruv. Astron.* 'Taurus' chapter.
§ Dorsey, *op. cit.* ‖ *Bur. Am. Eth.*, 1904, 807.

few exceptions, clearly reveal their origin in the personification of natural phenomena. The American Indians as a race are typically nature-worshippers. The sun and moon, and other celestial bodies, the seasons, the six directions, the four supposed elements, all figure prominently and generally in their pantheon, but the cult of the dead, wide-spread though it be, is confined almost entirely to communication with the spirits of the departed. Fear is seldom an element of this cult. Its main motive seems to be merely the renewal of friendly relations with the spirits, who are regarded as leading in another world an individual life very similar to their earthly life, to which they are eventually destined to return. Superhuman knowledge of events distant in time or space is indeed attributed to the spirits, no greater perhaps than that conceded to certain living men, but these men themselves were thought to receive their knowledge from the spirits. It is a long step from such attributes to deification. Honours were paid to the dead individually, similar in degree to those due them when on earth; information was asked of them, seldom anything else. But there is slight evidence that the dead were regarded as superior beings.

The chief when living remained a chief when dead, as much below the deities then as before, except for greater knowledge. In Spanish writings of a period when apostles were asserted to have fought visibly against the heathen in Peru, spirits are said to have helped the Inca Yupanqui to overcome his enemies. If this be a Peruvian tradition, it is a rare example of a native legend which attributes to the spirits active intervention in the affairs of this world. Amongst the civilized tribes who offer elaborate petitions to their nature deities, very few are directed to the spirits. The legend of Manco Ccapac and Mama Oello of Peru, and the deities of the Popol Vuh, who, descending from the sky, after an active life on earth re-ascend to the sky and become stars, clearly reveal nature personification. Amongst a number of legends relating to caciques similarly translated and deified, none which present details can be otherwise classified.

The Paraguayans and the Powhatans of Virginia are said to have worshipped the skeletons of their forefathers,* but may merely have retained them to consult with the spirits which were believed in some sense to remain attached to the bodies. So the people of Comagre worshipped the bejewelled mummies of their ancestors.†

The Eskimo upper world is ruled by the souls of the dead, including those inhabiting the celestial bodies. These were once men, and occasionally returned to earth.‡ In Nayarit, the skeleton of a king received Divine honours, as did Pezelao, god of the dead in Oaxaca.§ But the worship of the deity who governs the dead is quite distinct from the worship of the spirits themselves. The Caribs held regular meetings to propitiate the spirits.‖ The Californian tribes believed that some of the dead became stars,¶ the Iroquois that the stars had all been mortals, or favoured animals, and birds. But the sun and moon existed before them.** In Peru, the malquis, or mummies, were petitioned to grant food, health, and life.†† According to Acosta, each ruling Inca after death was regarded as a god, and had his individual sacrifices, statues, etc.‡‡ Each month the coast people sacrificed children and anointed the tombs with their blood.§§

* Brinton, 274.
† Bancroft, iii. 500.
‡ Rink, p. 48.
§ Bancroft, iii. 457.
‖ *Ib.* 498.
¶ *Ib.* 523.
** Mrs. Erminie A. Smith.
†† Arriaga, p. 30.
‡‡ José de Acosta, lib. vi. cap. xii.
§§ F. de Xeres, *Reports*, p. 32.

The Chibchas and Guatemalan tribes buried a corpse in the foundation of each building that it might be protected by the spirit.* The Mexicans called their dead *teotl*, meaning 'divinity.'† Some asserted that their gods had been at first mere men, who had been deified either because of their rank, or some notable thing which they had done.‡ They set up in their temples statues of their victorious generals.§

12. Festival of the dead.—In many parts of America there was an annual or semi-annual festival in honour of the dead who, at this time, as in China, Japan, and many other countries, were believed to return to earth over the Milky Way to participate invisibly in the ceremonies. In Peru the Ayamarca, or Carrying of the Corpse, festival was celebrated annually for three days at the time of our Halloween, All Saints', and All Souls'. The supposed coincidence in time is but one of many similar analogies in the Peruvian ritual that are associated with ceremonials which have reached us from pre-historic times. During this festival the bodies of the deceased rulers of the Incas, with those of their principal wives or *ccoyas*, were clothed in new garments, and were brought forth from the temple in which they were deposited. Each mummy, followed by its special attendants, was then borne in ceremonial procession through the streets of the sacred city of Cuzco, after which food and drink were offered to it with all the honours due in life, in the belief that at this time the spirit did indeed return to the body, and reside therein during the time of the festival. The procession echoed on earth the passage of the sun through the zodiacal sign of the Mummy (Scorpio). At the same time fruits and flowers were placed upon all graves to refresh the returning spirits. The festival is also associated with the imparting of celestial wisdom.‖

The basis of this ritual, however, seems to have been rejoicing over the temporary renewal of intercourse with departed friends and relatives, and its object to welcome and please them with respect and courtesies. The element of worship of the dead as superior beings or the offering of prayers to them for aid is not prominent. The Mexicans held festivals in honour of the dead in August and November, when the souls hovered over and smelt of the food set out for them, sucking out its nutritive quality. The Mayas, Miztecs, Pueblos, and Eskimos performed similar rites in November, the Iroquois in spring and autumn.¶ The Hurons believed that the souls of the dead remained near to the bodies until the feast of the dead was celebrated. They then became free, and at once departed for the land of spirits.** The Chibchas and Peruvians repeated the curious Egyptian custom of introducing a mummy in the midst of a revel to suggest to the feasters the omnipresence of death.††

13. Demons.—The religion of the American Indians is not dualistic; good and evil alike are attributed to the Great Spirit. But the conflict, so far as it is recognized, depends rather upon physical and mental than upon moral qualities. No instance can be found in aboriginal America of a contest between a supreme good and a supreme

* Scherzer quoting Ximenez in note, p. 133; Padre Simon, p. 255.
† Motolinia, p. 31.
‡ Mendieta, p. 84; Camargo, iii. p. 154; see also Herrera, iii. p. 221.
§ Camargo, in *Nouv. Ann. des Voyages*, 4me ser., iii. p. 136.
‖ S. Hagar, *Peruv. Astron.* 'Scorpio' chapter.
¶ Bancroft, ii. 331, 335; Frazer in *Fortnightly Review*, Sept. 1906, p. 476 ff.; Morgan, i. 275; Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, ii p. 45.
** Yarrow, 191; Stevenson; Lafitau, ii. 43; Charlevoix, 277.
†† Salcamayhua, 85; Uricoechea, 19.

evil power for dominion over souls or even for the control of the world. Mischievous, angry, and hostile spirits are recognized, and two heroes, respectively propitious and adverse to mankind, are sometimes contrasted in traditions, probably of native origin, though modified by Christianity. But there was no Satan in America, and the hostile spirits play a subordinate part. The attempts of the early missionaries to create a Satan in the various native languages are amusing. Generally the word used means simply 'spirit,' but in the list is included the beneficent Araucanian god dwelling in the Pleiades, numerous deities called evil only because associated with the dead, and the Peruvian *Supay*, which is only the name of the under world, shared by Haitians, Quichés, Pueblos, and, apparently, by the South Pacific Islanders and the Dayaks of Borneo.* This under world, as well as the sky-world, was undoubtedly viewed as the home of the spirits; and those who dwell in the former seem to be regarded as inferior and to some extent hostile, but there is no such contrast as between heaven and hell. There was no conception of a place of punishment. Such ideas are of missionary origin.

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STANSBURY HAGAR.

ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND CULT OF THE DEAD (Babylonian).—

It is at the outset necessary to inquire how far the Babylonian beliefs and customs relating to the cult of the dead, and pointing to a form or forms of ancestor-worship, were in their origin Semitic. The answer depends on the attitude one takes towards the Sumero-Akkadian problem. The majority of Assyriologists, believing as they do in the existence of a distinctly pre-Semitic Sumero-Akkadian culture and language, naturally hold that the cult connected with the spirits of the departed, which was allowed to flourish by the side of the Babylonian State religion (or rather religions) was in its essence very largely, if not entirely, a popular survival of an ancient non-Semitic form of animism, and Sayce goes so far as to say that the ideas connected with this cult were 'never really assimilated by the Semitic settlers' (*Religions of Ancient Egypt and Babylonia*, 1902, p. 276). An entirely opposite opinion must, of course, be held by the smaller number of Assyriologists, who categorically deny the pre-Semitic civilization here referred to; and even a cautious writer like Jastrow maintains that there is no necessity 'to differentiate or to attempt to differentiate between Semitic and so-called non-Semitic elements' in Babylonian and Assyrian religion (*Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, 1898, p. 24).

The non-Semitic origin of the cult appears at first sight to be confirmed by the many words of an entirely different linguistic stock that meet us in the texts relating to it, as, *e.g.*, *Ekur* and *Kigallu* (names of the under world), and apparently also *utukku* and *ekimmu* (kinds of ghosts). But Semitic terms are by no means absent, as *e.g.* *Allatu* (name of the goddess of the under world), *Shu'ālu* * (one of the names of the under world), and, as it seems, also *Arālu* † (or *Arallu*), which is the most common designation of Hades.

It is, furthermore, safe to assume by analogy that, even on the theory of an early pre-Semitic civilization of Babylonia, the Semites may, on entering the country, have brought with them popular ideas regarding the dead which were not dissimilar from those they found among the natives, and that the adoption of Sumero-Akkadian terms (which, let it be remembered, are frequent in the Semitic state religions themselves) would in the process of adaptation follow as a matter of course. It must also be borne in mind that, historically speaking, we have so far to do almost entirely with Semites. We are therefore in the present state of our knowledge fully justified in—provisionally at any rate—treating the cult and the ideas connected with it as in the full sense of the word Semitic.

Besides the question of origin, many other uncertainties still obscure the problem; for there are so far not enough data for the formulation of a complete system of these ideas and customs. In the interpretation also of a number of facts one has often to rely on inference rather than actual proof. It may be assumed that fuller knowledge will be the result of further excavation and the complete decipherment of extant materials; but for the present it must suffice to systematize the information that has already been gained.

The extant data may be conveniently treated under the following three heads:—(1) deification, (2) sacrifices and offerings to the dead, (3) necromancy. Some cognate matters, which may help to elucidate the problem, can easily be mentioned in connexion with one or other of these three parts.

1. **Deification.**—The only instance so far known

* S. Hagar, *op. cit.* 'Scorpio' chapter.

* On *Shu'ālu* (Heb. *Shĕ'ōl*) see § 3 below.

† Jeremias (*Bab.-Assyr. Vorstellungen vom Leben nach dem Tode*, p. 123) considers it to be the same as *Ariel* in Is 29[1ff.], both words apparently signifying (1) the mountain of the gods, the Heb. Zion; (2) a place of desolation and woe. The term *Arālu* would thus seem to point to a mountainous country (therefore not Babylonia) as the origin of the ideas connected with the under world. The same result is obtained from the use of the term *Ekur*, which among its various meanings includes that of the mountain of the gods.

in Babylonian mythology of mortals passing to immortality and deification without having previously died and gone down to the under world, is that of Sit-napishtin, the Babylonian Noah,* and his wife (or, according to Berossus, as reported by Alexander Polyhistor, also his daughter and his pilot†). When the deluge was over, Bel, whose wrath had been appeased by a speech of Ea, bestowed divine life on the pair, and assigned to them a dwelling afar off 'at the mouth of the streams.' The case of the hero Gilgamesh and that of Etana, before whose names the determinative for 'god' is always placed, are different; for both of them had first to pass through death, the common fate. Gilgamesh, as the epic bearing the name shows, endeavoured in vain to secure exemption from the fate of mortals by his visit to his ancestor‡ Sit-napishtin; and with regard to Etana, it is only reasonable to assume that he was dashed to pieces when he fell from the heights of heaven with the eagle that bore him. In the case of Adapa, who, having broken the wings of Shûtu, the south-west wind, was summoned to heaven to answer the charge, deification and a place in the company of the gods of heaven would have been his share, if he had not refused to partake of the 'meat of life' and 'the water of life' which Anu had offered him. The ground for deification in the cases mentioned was no doubt the heroic character of the persons concerned; but the element of ancestor-worship was probably not absent, and it is in any case clear that such instances of deification cannot be dissociated from the cult connected with the departed.

Passing from legend (which may, however, be assumed to rest on some actual ancient events) to historic times, we find the names of Dungi and Gudea (probably before the middle of the 3rd millennium B.C.) written on tablets that belong to the centuries immediately following their reign, with the determinative that is placed before the names of gods. Festivals were celebrated in honour of these kings, sacrifices were offered to them, and their images were placed in temples. Again, Gimilsin (about 2500 B.C.), of the second dynasty of Ur, appears [like an Egyptian Pharaoh] to have been deified during his lifetime, and there was a temple at Lagash which was named after him' (Jastrow, *op. cit.* p. 561). In paying honour to deified kings and other great personages, the sons and other descendants would both naturally and in accordance with an established rule (see § 2) take the lead, and the people generally would share in the celebrations, so that we have here instances firstly of ancestor-worship in the strict sense of the word, and secondly in its wider, if looser, signification as homage paid to the departed kings and fathers of the people.

Some acts pointing to deification or semi-deification in later times will be mentioned in connexion with sacrifices and offerings to the dead, and it will there also be seen what form the cult of the dead took among the people in general; but it is necessary to inquire whether we are able to form a clear notion of what deification meant among the ancient Babylonians. Did the deified rulers and chiefs stay among the gloomy deities of the under world presided over by Nergal and his consort Allatu, or did they ascend to join the company of the supernal gods? A writer like Jastrow, who strongly emphasizes the impossibility of a disembodied human spirit escaping out of the Babylonian Hades, must adopt the former alternative, notwithstanding the various difficulties connected with this interpretation (as, *e.g.*, the instances of an *utukku* actually finding its way back to earth). The brightest view so far taken of the Babylonian doctrine bearing on this problem is that of A. Jeremias (*op. cit.* pp. 100–105, and elsewhere). With Sayce and others this writer takes the epithet 'raiser from the dead,'* given to Marduk and other deities, in its natural sense (as against the forced interpretation of Jastrow, who takes it in the sense of preventing death from overtaking the living), and attributes to the ancient Babylonians hopes of a much brighter existence than was to be had in the under world; and if this be so, there is nothing to prevent us from thinking that by their deification Gudea and others entered the luminous company of the gods of heaven instead of dwelling for ever in Hades, and that in consequence their descendants had bright and happy visions of the ancestors to whom they addressed worship. Confirmatory of this view is the fact that the 'water of life,' to which reference has already been made in the story of Adapa, is to be found even in Hades. If Ishtar could by the command of Ea be restored to the upper world by being sprinkled with this 'water of life' ('Descent of Ishtar,' reverse, l. 38 ff.), why not also departed mortals who were destined for deification? The truth, however, seems to be that we have here to deal with different streams of belief, some tending one way and some another. But in accepting this opinion it is not necessary at the same time to agree with Sayce, who assigns the gloomier doctrine of Hades to the Sumerians, and the supernal deification to the Semites, for it may well be that there were different streams of tradition among the Semites themselves. Development within the Semitic field is, of course, also an important factor to consider.

2. Sacrifices and offerings to the dead.—Mention has already been made of sacrifices offered to deified kings in early Babylonian history, and of festivals celebrated in their honour. The famous Stele of Vultures, which records the victories of Eannatuna, or Eannadu, an ancient king† of the city of Shirpurla, shows on one of the extant fragments the corpses of departed warriors laid in rows, whilst their surviving comrades are represented with baskets on their heads, which are generally understood to have contained funeral offerings‡ for the dead. The fallen enemies, on the other hand, are refused burial, their remains being the food of struggling vultures (on the terrible meaning of this treatment, see below). An ancient bronze tablet, which represents a funeral scene, apparently watched over from the top by Nergal, and showing below the goddess Allatu in her bark, exhibits the dead person lying on a bier, attended by priests in fish-like garments, with a stand for burning incense not far from the head of the bier.§ 'On

* In reality Sit-napishtin (pronounced by some Par-napishtin, Pir-napishtin, or Ut-napishtim, and named Xisuthros [= Atra-khâsis, or Khâsisatra] by Berossus) appears to be a combination of the Biblical Noah and Enoch, the latter having also escaped death (Gn 5[24]).

† Or, perhaps, the ship's architect; see Euseb. *Chron.*, ed. Schoene, i. p. 22.

‡ In the Gilgamesh Epic, ix., beginning of col. iii., the hero says:—'Sit-napishtin, my father . . . who entered the assembly of the gods,' etc.

* Cf. 1 S 2[6] ('He bringeth down to Sheol and bringeth up').

† Probably before B.C. 4000 (see L. W. King, *Bab. Religion*, p. 48).

‡ The interpretation of the scene is, however, uncertain. The baskets may have contained more earth for the mound raised over the corpses. Jastrow (*op. cit.* p. 599) states that the Stele shows animal sacrifices being offered to the dead, and Maspero (*Dawn of Civilization*, p. 607) says that 'the sovereign deigns to kill with his own hand one of the principal chiefs of the enemy' in honour of the dead. Fragments of the Stele were first made known by de Sarzec, *Découvertes en Chaldée*, plates 3 and 4. For other literature, see Maspero, *loc. cit.*

§ See Jastrow, *op. cit.* p. 579; Maspero, *op. cit.* p. 690 ff.; L. W. King, *op. cit.* p. 37 ff. The exact interpretation of this tablet is also a matter of dispute, but there is no doubt about the burning of incense. The fish-like garments of the attendants or priests have apparently reference to the god Ea in his character as lord of the deep. This and the other bronze plates of the same class are by some supposed to have served as votive tablets in the graves of the dead.

the monuments of later Babylonian and Assyrian kings we do not find any representation of burial ceremonies' (L. W. King, *op. cit.* p. 48), but from a broken inscription of one of the later Assyrian kings, whose name has not been preserved, 'we learn that the king placed vessels of gold and silver in the grave as dedicatory offerings' to his departed father (*ib.* p. 49). Ashurbanipal (king of Assyria, B.C. 668–626), in a still more devout fashion, appears at the tombs of his ancestors with rent garments, pouring out a libation in memory of the dead, and addressing a prayer to them (see, *e.g.*, Jastrow, *op. cit.* p. 605).

It is necessary, however, to distinguish carefully between sacrifices in the proper sense of the word and offerings of various kinds made to the dead by way of providing for their proper maintenance in the under world. The former point to a form of deification and actual worship (though probably in most cases of a secondary kind), whilst the latter, which, roughly speaking, belong to the decidedly popular element of the cult, are generally understood to have had the object of keeping the ghosts of the departed in a sufficiently comfortable condition in the under world, so as not to risk their returning to molest their living relatives and acquaintances. One is inclined to include affection for the departed among the underlying motives, and some of the details to be mentioned presently would seem to support this view; but it is true that the motive of fear was exceedingly strong. The departed human spirit was best known by the dreaded name *ekimmu*. The difference between it and *utukku* cannot be accurately stated. It seems, however, that *utukku* was a general name for demon, for we hear of the *utukku* 'of the field,' 'of the sea,' etc., whilst *ekimmu* was (or became) the proper name for a departed human spirit. Sayce (*op. cit.* p. 284) would limit the meaning of *ekimmu* to the 'spirit of an unburied corpse over whose unsanctified remains the funeral rites had never been performed'; but R. C. Thompson (*The Devils and Evil Spirits of Babylonia*, i. p. xxvii. ff.) has shown that the name was also applied to ghosts who, though properly buried, had no one to provide them with the necessary sustenance in the under world, so that they were forced to return to the earth in order to seek for themselves some sort of maintenance among their former associates. When opportunity offered, the ghost would even enter the body of a living man, tormenting him until it should be exorcized by a priest. In order to guard against these dangers to the living, it was necessary, first of all, to perform the funeral rites, by means of which the human spirit was enabled to reach its destination in the realms of Arālu; and it was, secondly, required of the relatives, and more particularly of the eldest son and direct descendants of the deceased, to make provision for their proper maintenance in a region where, apart from the sustenance provided for them by their friends on earth, 'dust is their nourishment, their food clay,' and where 'over gate and bolt dust is scattered' (opening part of the 'Descent of Ishtar'). Offerings of this kind would, however, naturally assume a propitiatory character of a more or less definite kind, and a sufficiently close affinity with sacrifices proper would be the result.

The provision thus made for the departed differed, of course, in accordance with their condition during their life on earth, and was, besides, dependent on the means possessed by their living relatives. The occupant of the smaller chambers of burial 'was content to have with him his linen, his ornaments, some bronze arrowheads, and metal or clay vessels,' whilst others were provided with 'furniture, which, though not as complete as that found in Egyptian sepulchres, must have ministered to all the needs of the spirit' (Maspero, *op. cit.* p. 686). Special requirements were also thought of. Thus, 'beside the body of a woman or young girl was arranged an abundance of spare ornaments, flowers, scent-bottles, combs, cosmetic pencils, and cakes of the black paste with which they were accustomed to paint the eyebrows and the edges of the eyelids' (Maspero, *ib.*). 'Toys, too, are found in the graves, and we may assume that these were placed in the tombs of children' (Jastrow, *op. cit.* p. 598). Food and drink were, of course, the main requirements, and these all-important offerings were made to the dead not only at the time of burial, but also afterwards by surviving relatives; and the entrances to tombs that have been found (Peters, *Nippur*, ii. 173, and elsewhere) may be explained as an arrangement made for renewing these and other offerings. The son performed the office of pouring out water in memory of his father. The water-jar is indeed 'never absent in the old Babylonian tombs, and by the side of the jar the bowl of clay or bronze is found, which probably served the same purpose as a drinking utensil for the dead' (Jastrow, *op. cit.* p. 599). Remains of food of various kinds are, however, more frequent in the early graves than in those of later times. Among the other objects placed at the disposal of the dead are the staves which the owners carried about in their lifetime, and the seal-cylinders which persons of position were in the habit of using. How far the customary wailing for the dead, not only immediately after their departure, but also subsequently, included terms of homage and adoration, cannot be stated with any certainty; but it appears that the Festival of Tammuz was selected as a kind of 'All Souls' Day,' and some degree of adoration of the dead may have been combined with the ceremonies connected with the homage paid to the annually reviving god.

The grim side of this cycle of ideas is seen in the treatment of the corpses of enemies. By dragging the dead bodies out of their graves, mutilating their remains, and other indignities, their shades were deprived of their comfort and their rest, and their living relatives became at the same time exposed to the terrible molestation of the prowling and suffering ghosts. This explains the violence done to the remains of fallen enemies, as represented on the Stele of Vultures already referred to. In later times, Ashurbanipal expressly states that by destroying the graves of Elamite kings and dragging their bodies to Assyria he had made sure that no food should be tendered to them, and no sacrifices offered in their honour (see *e.g.* Jastrow, *op. cit.* p. 602; L. W. King, *op. cit.* p. 44). Similar revenge upon his enemies was taken by Sennacherib.

3. Necromancy.—Necromancy, which is an essential part of the cult of the dead, and which must also have been connected with the presentation of offerings to the shades consulted, undoubtedly held a prominent place among the magic arts of the Babylonians. 'A series of mythological texts shows that scenes such as that between Saul and the witch of Endor were familiar to Babylonian fancy also. Among the lists of the various orders of priests we find the offices of "exorcist of the spirits of the dead," the priest "who raises the Spirit of the dead," and the *Sha'ilu*, the "inquirer of the dead"'* (A. Jeremias, *Bab. Conception of Heaven and Hell*, p. 28). The argument, however, that

* Jeremias himself, however, states that the literature so far known to us has no example of the 'inquiry of the dead.' The case of Eabani was different, for Gilgamesh conversed with him like one person with another (see further on). It is to be noted here that in Ezk 21[26] [Eng. 21] Nebuchadnezzar is represented as inquiring of the Teraphim, which some writers regard as images of ancestors. (See § 2 of the 'Hebrew' article).

has been urged by Jastrow (*op. cit.* p. 559) and others, that the name *Shu'ālu* (Heb. *She'ōl*) itself proves that inquiry of the dead was inseparable from the very notion of the under world thus designated, is by no means convincing; for the root *sha'al* (שׁאל) may be connected with *sha'al* (שׁעל), thus giving to *Shu'ālu* the meaning of 'hollowed out place' rather than that of 'place of inquiry' * (see *Oxf. Heb. Lex. s.v.*).

The classical, and so far solitary, clear instance of raising a dead person and conversing with him (analogous to the famous Biblical instance of Saul and Samuel) is that of the hero Gilgamesh and the shade of his friend Eabani, as related in the closing tablet of the Gilgamesh Epic. The help of Nergal himself had to be obtained in order to secure the desired effect. The god of Hades 'opened the hole of the earth, and let the *utukku* of Eabani come forth out of the earth like a wind' (Gilgamesh Epic, xii. col. 3, ll. 27–8). The conversation of the two friends turns on the condition of the departed in the regions of Hades.

As connected with this part of the subject omens may be mentioned. Mr. R. C. Thompson, in the work already referred to, writes as follows:—

'The belief in the *ekimmu* spirit had obtained such a hold over the Assyrians that they even went to the length of deducing omens from the appearance of such a ghost in a house. As a rule, it was held to be an evil omen, whether it was merely a silent apparition or whether it gibbered or uttered some words or awaited some response. . . . The threat that is held over the heads of all spectres of this class is that no rite shall be paid to them until they have departed' (vol. i. p. xxxv).

To sum up: the evidence, so far as it goes, shows clearly that even in historic times the cult of the dead and elements of ancestor-worship formed, more or less distinctly, part of Babylonian religious observances. As regards deification of deceased ancestors, sacrifices in the proper sense of the word, and festivals held in honour of the dead, the clear evidence, as was to be expected, relates to the ruling families only. It may, by analogy with the religious development of other races, be assumed that ancestor-worship and the cult of the dead were more prevalent in pre-historic times than later on. But whether this cult was in very ancient times the only or even the chief religious worship of the Babylonians—whether Sumerians or Semites, or a combination of both—is quite a different question. It surely is not improbable that it was but one among a variety of cults, and that the various *numina loci*, the heavenly bodies, the storm, the lightning, and other powers of nature played at least as great a part in the earliest Babylonian religion as the worship of the departed. There is at any rate nothing in the Babylonian cult to confirm the theory of Herbert Spencer, that ancestor-worship was the sole original worship of humanity, and that animism in its wider sense was developed out of it.

LITERATURE.—The principal literature used has been frequently quoted. The part relating to the subject in the German edition of Jastrow's *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria* had not come to hand when the article was written. The bibliography at the end of that edition will no doubt be the fullest. In the quotations from the 'Descent of Ishtar' and the 'Epic of Gilgamesh,' Jensen's edition (Schrader's *KB* vi.) has been followed.

G. MARGOLIOUTH.

ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND CULT OF THE DEAD (Celtic).

The meagre data preserved concerning the Celtic religions contain little evidence to show that the worship of ancestors prevailed in Gaul or the British Isles. The general existence of this cult throughout the Indo-Germanic peoples (see Schrader, *Reallexikon der indogermanischen Alterthumskunde*, Strassburg, 1901, pp. 21–33), however, renders it practically certain that the Celts, like the kindred stocks, worshipped their ancestors. The Druids are known to have taught not only immortality but also metempsychosis (Cæsar, *de Bello Gallico*, vi. 14; Lucan, *Pharsalia*, i. 454–458). Yet the only passages which in any way sanction the hypothesis of ancestor-worship are Cæsar, *de Bello Gallico*, vi. 19, and Pomponius Mela, *Chorographia*, iii. 19. The former author states that, 'in keeping with the cult of the Gauls, funerals are magnificent and sumptuous, and they cast upon the pyre all that they suppose pleasing to the living; even animals and, a short time ago, slaves and dependants who were evidently especially dear to the deceased were burned with them after the funeral rites had been duly performed.' Pomponius adds that, in consequence of the Gallic belief in immortality, 'they burn and bury with the dead things proper for the living,' and says that the human victims who were burned were either messengers (like the slaves killed to carry tidings to a deceased king in Dahomey) or faithful retainers who desired to continue life in the future world with their patrons. It is questionable, however, whether all this can be construed as ancestor-worship in the strict sense of the term.

LOUIS H. GRAY.

ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND CULT OF THE DEAD (Egyptian).

—*A.* Ancestor-worship.—Of a developed ancestor-worship, like that of the Far East, there is in Egyptian religion little trace. Their knowledge of their long history disposed the Egyptians to revere the memory of their ancestors (*ḥepu-āui*), and we often hear 'the time of the ancestors' referred to with respect: such-and-such a temple was rebuilt 'as it had been in the time of the ancestors'; so wonderful a thing had never happened 'since the time of the ancestors,' and so forth. The kings naturally regarded their predecessors in the royal line with respect, and are depicted making offerings to their names, as at Abydos, where Seti I. and his son, the Prince Rameses (afterwards Rameses II.), offer incense before the two long rows of cartouches, each of which contains the name of a king whom Seti considered worthy of special honour. Incense is being offered much as it might be offered before Japanese *ihai*. But Egyptian ancestor-worship went little farther than this. The ordinary person did not specially venerate the names of his ancestors. He often commemorated them, but never as gods, except in so far that every dead man was a god in that he 'became Osiris.' But as a proof of his loyalty to the reigning dynasty, he venerated the ancient royal names which his king delighted to honour: at Saḳḳâra we find a private person, Tunur, offering to a series of kings' names, which is almost identical with that reverenced by Seti I. at Abydos. Such lists were purely commemorative. Seti I. did not regard his ancestors as gods because they were his ancestors, but because, as kings of Egypt, they had been gods; every king during his life was the 'good god' as the successor and representative on earth of the sky-god Horus, the oldest ruler of Egypt. Tunur regarded the ancient kings as gods for the same reason. He would never have represented himself offering to the *ihai* of his own ancestors as gods, because they never had been gods, nor did he regard them as gods except in so far as each was an Osiris.

Osiris-worship was not ancestor-worship. It is not probable that the Egyptians regarded even Osiris, the great god of the dead, with whom every dead man was identified, as a sort of original ancestor of the race, in spite of the belief that he had once reigned over Egypt as king. This Euhemeristic view is probably late, and was certainly of local origin, probably at Busiris in the Delta (see below). The older Egyptians had feared the

* Jeremias, *Leben nach dem Tode*, p. 62 renders 'place of decision' (*Entscheidungsort*), but the synonym *Mala-akki* which he quotes may itself be a mere guess of Babylonian etymologists.

magical power of the dead man, and had regarded him as a deity; every dead man was Osiris. So they worshipped him as Osiris and in the form of the god of the dead; not under his own name or in his own shape. Thus no real cult of ancestors as gods under their own names and in their own shapes ever grew up in Egypt. To venerate one's ancestors as Osirises was a very different thing from venerating them as ancestors. Filial piety demanded the mention of mother and father, perhaps of grand-parents, on one's gravestone; the son could put up a *stele* in memory of his parents 'as making their names to live upon earth.' But so also could a brother make the name of his brother or sister to live. No worship is implied.

Religious duty demanded the proper observance of certain ceremonies at the tomb by the hand of the 'servant of the ghost' (*ḥen-ka*), but these were not intended as worship of the ghost; they were meant to ensure his happy transit through all the terrors of the under world and the final reunion of the parts of his body and soul in the celestial boat of the sun-god. The religious texts inscribed upon the walls of the tombs had a similar signification. They are all magical spells designed to keep the spirit of the dead man from harm and wandering; and to enable him, by means of formulæ asserting his divine dignity, to win his way past all opposition to his position as a god and the equal of the gods. But no prayers are addressed to him as a god; and if they were, they would only be addressed to him as the god Osiris, not as an ancestor-god protecting his family and tribe. Of this conception we find no trace in Egyptian religion, except the position assigned to Horus, who, like his father Osiris, had reigned in Egypt, and was the predecessor, if not the progenitor, of its kings. But here again, as in the case of Osiris, the kings venerated their ancestor Horus, not because he was their ancestor and the founder of the monarchy, but because he was himself one of the great gods, and was also implicitly divine because he had been a king.

Thus it would appear that the deification of every dead man, or rather his identification with one particular deity, allowed no room for ancestor-worship, in the true sense, in Egyptian religion. No doubt possible traces of it may be discerned here and there in local beliefs, but in the main scheme of the national religion it had no place.

B. Cult of the dead.—As has been shown above, the deification of every dead man as himself the god Osiris resulted in the absence of any regular form of ancestor-worship in Egypt. The dead man was venerated as Osiris, not as an ancestor. Originally, however, this 'Osirian' doctrine was not common to the whole of Egypt. It seems to have originated at Dedu or Busiris, 'Osiris' town,' the modern Abusîr near Samanûd, in the Delta. Here Osiris, far back in the primitive period, must have been simply the protector-god of the local necropolis, as the god Ptah-Seker, or Sokari, was the protector of the necropolis of Memphis, and Anubis, the jackal (confused at a very early period with Upuaut, 'Opener of the Ways,' the wolf war-god of Siût), was the protector of that of Abydos. Anubis of Abydos was also identified with a shadowy deity, Khentamentiu, 'the Chief of the Westerners,' the latter being the dead, who were usually buried on the west bank of the Nile. Whether there was any idea among the primitive Egyptians that the Libyans of the western oases, who sometimes came within their ken, were the spirits of their dead in the West, and that the ruler of the dead was their chief, we cannot tell, but it seems probable that it was so. Khentamentiu, however, is never pictured, so we cannot tell what he was supposed to be like; he had already become identified with the jackal Anubis before the dawn of history.

While, however, the protector of the necropolis of Abydos was regarded as a jackal, because the jackal had his abode among the tombs and prowled around them at night, so that the childlike mind of the primitive Egyptian, in fear of him as the ravager of the graveyards, easily came to venerate him, and to desire to placate him by worship as its protector, the Memphite and Busirite gods of the dead were conceived of as dead men; in the northern view the dead were ruled by the dead. The Busirite and Memphite deities, Osiris and Ptah, were closely related. Both were represented as human mummies, the first carrying the whip and flail, emblems of sovereignty, and the second the symbols of power, stability, and life. If the legend of the foundation of Memphis at the beginning of the First Dynasty has a historical basis, it may be that the resemblance of the form of Ptah to that of Osiris is due simply to the fact that the worship of Busiris had penetrated so far southward at that time that, when the necropolis of Memphis was constituted, its protective deity was given a shape differing but little from that of Osiris. However this may be, the Osiride Ptah seems very soon to have come to be regarded as the god of the living city of Memphis rather than that of its necropolis, though his mummy form shows that he was originally a god of the dead almost identical with the Busirite Osiris. Then he was conceived as exercising his function of protector of the necropolis in the form of a dead and mummied hawk, placed upon a coffin. Hence, perhaps, his name of Ptah-Sekri, 'the coffined Ptah.' The hawk was an ancient symbol of divinity, and a dead hawk naturally symbolized a dead god. Later on, the peculiar Kabiric form of Ptah, which may really be older at Memphis than either the mummied man or the mummied hawk, and may, indeed, be the original form of the city-god before the Osiride form prevailed, was revered as 'Ptah-Socharis-Osiris.' This triple name combined Ptah, 'the coffined one,' and the Busirite Osiris proper, in one deity of the Memphite necropolis (now known as that of Saḳḳâra, the village whose name is that of the ancient god). At Memphis this Socharis-form of Osiris was never replaced by the regular Busirite form, which prevailed elsewhere in Egypt. Doubtless this was because, at Memphis, Osiris was entirely identified with Ptah-Seker, while at Abydos he was introduced from the north and merely displaced Anubis, the latter preserving his name and individuality, and only ceding his title of *Khentamentiu* to his superseder.

Thus at Abydos and everywhere else in Egypt, except at Memphis, Osiris was figured in his original Busirite form, as wearing the royal crown in his capacity of king of the dead, just as the living Pharaoh was king of the living. Indeed, as has been noted above, an Euhemeristic view regarded him as a very ancient dead king, who now ruled the shades as he had once ruled the living, and his wife and sister, Isis and Nephthys, as having been his actual wife and sister in life, who bewailed him as he lay on his bier after his death at the hands of his wicked brother Set, the half-foreign deity of the wild desert. Gradually the worship of Osiris spread southwards over all Egypt, and at Siût and Abydos the guardian wolf and jackal diminished into his sons and servants, preserving their individuality, but ceding to him their local sovereignty. At Abydos the title of *Khentamentiu* did not finally pass from Anubis to Osiris till about the time of the Twelfth Dynasty. Thenceforward Abydos became the great centre of Osiris-worship, and

Busiris degenerated into comparative unimportance. The only real rival of Abydos as the headquarters of Osiris was the northern city of Mendes, in the Delta, only a few miles east of Busiris, where the god had at an early period become identified with the local animal-deity, a goat, who was called 'Soul of the Lord of Dedu,' *Bi-neb-ded*, afterwards pronounced Bindidi, Mindid, whence Mendes and the modern Mendîd or Amdîd. It is uncertain whether the goat of Mendes was originally a god of the dead or not; probably he was not. The 'Lord of Dedu,' whose 'soul' he was called, is, of course, Osiris, lord of Busiris. This title of *Neb-Dedet* was recognized throughout Egypt as one of the chief titles of Osiris, and on the stelæ at Abydos it is always accorded to him side by side with the old appellation of the Abydene Anubis, *Khentamentiu*.

With the worship of Osiris went the peculiar doctrines associated with his cult: the belief in resurrection, in the springing of life out of death, which made him a deity of renewed life as well as of death, and so identified him with the green corn-bearing Nile land as opposed to the waste deserts of his brother Set; and, most important of all, the peculiar doctrine of the identification of every dead man with the god, which became at a very early period the cardinal tenet of Egyptian belief with regard to the dead. This Busirite dogma was held even under the Old Kingdom by every Egyptian, and we may find his *credo* in this regard in the well-known '*suten-di-ḥetep*' formula of prayer for the welfare of the dead man, which appears on every sarcophagus, and on every stele or gravestone, and in which the god, whether Anubis 'on the Serpent-Mountain, Lord of Sepa,' or Osiris, 'Lord of Dedet, Khentamentiu, Lord of Abydos,' is besought to give a 'king's offering' (*ḥetep-suten*) of 'thousands of flesh, fowl, and everything good and pure on which *the god there* liveth, to the *ka* of the venerated N, the justified.' The venerated and justified dead man is the *god there*, the deified Osiris N in the tomb, though he may not definitely be called 'the Osiris N.'

Even when other deities were invoked to give the offering, as Amen-Rā or Hathor in the Theban necropolis over which they ruled, or Geb the god of the earth and the Circle of the Nine Gods, the dead man is still Osiris; he is not identified with Amen-Rā, Hathor, or Geb, although the fact that he is Osiris is not always mentioned. On the *ushabtis* (see DEATH AND THE DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD [Egyptian]) he is always called Osiris, and in later times we find the formula definitely phrased thus, 'May Osiris . . . give a king's offering . . . to the Osiris N.' Osiris is asked to give an offering such as a king would give to himself, for every dead man was himself. The dead man was venerated, therefore, not as the dead N, a god because he was a dead ancestor, but as being one with Osiris. In this sense he was worshipped, and only in this sense may the Egyptians be said to have possessed a cult of the dead. Their cult of the dead was the cult of Osiris, and it was to Osiris that the *ḥen-ka*, or 'servant of the ghost' (usually a near relative of the deceased), made the offerings at the tomb, 'seeking to do honour to those there' [a polite periphrasis for the dead]. These offerings consist, in the words of the very interesting inscription on the stele put up by King Aahmes to the memory of his grandmother, Queen Teta-shera, 'in the pouring of water, the offering upon the altar, and the painting of the stele at the beginning of each season, at the Festival of the New Moon, at the feast of the month, the feast of the goingforth of the Sem-priest, the Ceremonies of the Night, the Feasts of the Fifth Day of the Month, and of the Sixth, the *Ḥak*-festival, the *Uag*-festival, the feast of Thoth, the beginning of every season of heaven and of earth.'

Originally, of course, these honours (see DEATH AND THE DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD [Egyptian]) were paid primarily to the *ka*, or 'double,' of the deceased, which was supposed to reside in the tomb, and, had it not been for the universal adoption of the Osirian doctrine, they would undoubtedly have developed into a regular form of ancestor-worship, the *ka* of each person 'there' being worshipped as a god. We may perhaps even say that before the general adoption of the Osirian doctrine, the southern Egyptians did worship the *kas* of the dead, or even the *sahus* (see DEATH, etc.). We do not know how ancient the beliefs in the other spiritual parts of the dead man, the *ba*, or soul proper, and the *khu*, or intelligence, are. In any case, these other spiritual portions of the man never were specially venerated. They required no sustenance, therefore no offerings were made to them, such as were made to the *ka*. These offerings were made by the members of the family of the deceased persons, whose names were commemorated on stelæ, together with those of their living descendants 'who make their name to live upon earth' (*se'ankh renusen tep ta*). Several generations of the dead are often thus 'made to live' on the stelæ (see DEATH, ETC. [Egyptian]). The Egyptian 'cult of the dead' amounted to no more than this.

The worship of the supreme god of the dead, Osiris himself, as apart from the offerings made to the individual Osirises, the dead, was carried on in the usual manner. He had two great temples, at Abydos and Busiris, which disputed the possession of his most holy relic, supposed to be his actual body; and at Abydos he was supposed to be buried in a tomb which, by a misunderstanding of a hieroglyph, was identified with the tomb of the early monarch Tjer, the sign of his name being misread as *Khent*, 'chief,' and so identified with 'Khentamentiu.' He was worshipped also as the ram at Mendes, and as the bull Apis and in the Kabiric form at Memphis. The temple at Abydos was originally not his. In its lowest strata we find that his predecessor Anubis is the sole deity mentioned. Later on, as we have seen, Anubis and his 'brother' Upuaut, the wolf of Siût (the 'Makedôn' of Diodorus), accompany him as his 'sons' and attendants. The wolf was originally not a god of the dead or of Abydos at all, but was a war-god, of whom the wolf was a good symbol, as the 'opener of the ways' to the pack. But the kinship of the wolf to the jackal soon caused Upuaut to be regarded also as a fellow-protector of the tombs with Anubis at Abydos, and in later times he is exclusively a god of the dead, the double of Anubis. Isis and Nephthys, with the child Horus, naturally accompanied Osiris from the Delta, where they also had their origin. But they did not come much forward till a comparatively late period, when the triad Osiris, Isis, and Harpocrates took the place of the Theban triad Amen, Mut, and Khensu, which had become somewhat discredited everywhere except at Thebes after the end of the Theban domination. During that period Osiris had degenerated from the position of king of the dead to that of merely their judge; his kingly functions were usurped by Amen-Rā, the Theban 'king of the gods,' who during the night was supposed to sail in his solar bark through the under world, giving light to the spirits and accompanied by them in his course. But in the Saïte period Osiris not only returned to his position as king of the dead, but became king of the living also, for he took the place of Amen-Rā as supreme deity of Egypt, and the whole set

of myths connected with his name and those of Isis and Horus became the most important part of Egyptian religious belief. It was natural that this should be so then, when the centre of political gravity had shifted to the Delta, the original home of the Osirian religion. Later the Memphite sacred bull Apis, originally the animal of Ptah, but, on account of the confusion of the city-god with Socharis, also regarded as an incarnation of Osiris, came very much to the front, and the Ptolemaic Egyptians evolved a Græco-Egyptian deity, Sarapis (from *Asar-Hapi*, Osiris-Apis), out of the old Osiris, whose name now disappears. Finally, in the Roman period, Sarapis becomes identified with the old Nubian god of the dance and of music, Bes, and this godling, the most disreputable of the whole Egyptian pantheon, is venerated on the walls of ancient Abydos as the successor of Osiris, of Anubis, and of the primeval Khentamentiu.

LITERATURE.—Maspero, *Études de mythologie et d'archéologie égyptiennes*, ii. pp. 10, 359 and *passim*; Eduard Meyer, 'Die Entwickelung der Kulte von Abydos und die sogenannten Schakalsgötter' in *Ägyptische Zeitschrift*, xli. (1904), 97–107 [with regard to the origin and relations of the Osirian doctrine, and the history of Anubis and Upuaut]; Budge, *Hist. Eg.* i. p. 19 [on the identification of the 'Tomb of Osiris' at Abydos]; Petrie, *Abydos* ii. [on the temple of Osiris there]; Currelly and Gardiner in *Abydos* iii. [on the stele of Tetashera]; Hall in *PSBA*, Jan. 1908 [on the *Suten-di-hetep* formula, etc.]. Generally, on the cult of the dead, the works of Budge, Erman, and Wiedemann on Egyptian religion.

H. R. HALL.

ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND CULT OF THE DEAD (Fijian).—The Fijian divinities fall naturally into two divisions—the *Kalou-vu* ('Root gods') and the *Kalou-yalo* ('Spirit gods,' *i.e.* deified mortals). There is much truth in Waterhouse's suggestion that the Kalou-vu were of Polynesian origin, carried into Fiji by immigrants from the east and imposed upon the conquered Melanesian tribes in addition to their own pantheon of deified ancestors; and that Ndengei, who was undoubtedly a Melanesian ancestor, was adopted by the immigrants, as the Etruscan gods were by the Romans. The Fijian's belief in his own tribal divinity did not entail denial of the gods of other tribes. To the Hebrew prophets the cult of Baal-peor was not so much a false as an impious creed. In giving their allegiance to the chiefs who conquered them, it was natural that the Fijians should admit the supremacy of their conquerors' gods, who, by giving the victory to their adherents, had proved themselves to be the more powerful. Wainua, the great war-god of Rewa, is said to have drifted from Tonga; and his priest, when inspired, gave his answers in the Tongan language. The Rewans had given the chief place in their pantheon to the god of mere visitors.

First among the Kalou-vu was Ndengei, primarily a god of Rakiraki on the north coast of Viti Levu, but known throughout Fiji except in the eastern islands of the Lau group. This god, evolving from the ancestor and tutelary deity of a joint family into a symbol of Creation and Eternity in serpent form, is a counterpart of Jupiter, the god of a Latin tribe, inflated with Etruscan and Greek myth until he overshadowed the ancient world as Jupiter Optimus Maximus. Ndengei and the personages associated with him are proved by the earliest myths of their home on the Ra coast to have been mortals deified as the first immigrants and founders of the race. If the Polynesian gods were originally deified ancestors, their deification took place at a period so remote that their descendants cannot be identified.

Ancestor-worship is the key to the Melanesian system of government. The Fijian's conception of human authority was based upon his religion. Patriarchy, if not the oldest, is certainly the most natural shape into which the religious instinct of primitive man would crystallize. First there was the family—and the Pacific islands were probably peopled by single families—ruled absolutely by the father, with his store of traditions brought from the land from which he came. His sons, knowing no laws but those which he had taught them, planting their crops, building their huts and their canoes under his direction, bringing their disputes to him for judgment, came to trust him for guidance in every detail of their lives. Suddenly he left them. They could not believe that he, whose anger they had feared but yesterday, had vanished like the flame of yesterday's fire. His spirit had left his body; yet somewhere it must still be watching them. In life he had threatened them with punishment for disobedience, and, even now, when they did the things of which he disapproved, punishment was sure to follow—the crops failed; a hurricane unroofed the hut; floods swept away the canoe. If an enemy prevailed against them, it was because they had neglected him; when the yams ripened to abundant harvest, he was rewarding their piety. In this natural creed was the germ of government. Each son of the dead father founded his own family, but still owed allegiance to the earthly representative—the eldest son—in whom dwelt a portion of the father's godhead. Generations came and went; the tribe increased from tens to hundreds, but still the eldest son of the eldest, who carried in his veins the purest blood of the ancestor, was venerated almost like a god. The ancestor was now regarded as a Kalou-vu, and had his temple and his priests, who became a hereditary caste, with the strong motive of self-interest for keeping his memory green. Priest and chief tacitly agreed to give one another mutual support, the one by threatening divine punishment for disobedience, the other by insisting upon regular offerings to the temple.

That the cult of a common ancestor persisted for many generations is shown by the custom of *tauvu*, which means literally 'sprung from the same root,' *i.e.* of a common origin. It is applied to two or more tribes who may live in different islands, speak different dialects, and have nothing in common but their god. They do not necessarily intermarry; they may have held no intercourse for generations; each may have forgotten the names of its chiefs of five generations back, the site of its ancient home, and the traditions of its migrations; and yet it never forgets the tribe with which it is *tauvu*. Members of that tribe may run riot in its village, slaughter its pigs, and ravage its plantations, while it sits smiling by, for the spoilers are its brothers, worshippers of a common ancestor, and are therefore entitled in the fullest sense to the 'freedom of the city.' Sometimes the bond can be traced back to its origin, the marriage of the daughter of a high chief with the head of a distant clan. Her rank was so transcendent that she brought into her husband's family a measure of the godhead of her ancestors, and her descendants have thenceforth reverenced her forefathers in preference to those of her husband. Generally the bond is so remote that the common ancestor is known by the name of an animal or of a natural object, and the fact that his worshippers may not eat the animal suggests a trace of totemism of a bygone age. In such cases a young band from an overcrowded island may have crossed the water to seek wider planting lands.

Among the Viti Levu tribes of Melanesian origin there was a peculiar ancestral cult known as the *mbaki*, primarily devoted to a thanksgiving for the first-fruits and to initiation. The rites were held in rectangular stone enclosures, called *nanga* ('bed,' *i.e.* of the ancestors). These were built close to

the graves of dead chiefs, who were invoked to shower blessings on the tribe in ceremonies which degenerated into orgies of a sexual character. The rites were said to have been introduced by two old men who were found wandering on the sea-shore—strangers cast up by the sea, for they could not speak a word of Fijian. The initiated were sworn to secrecy, and the peculiarity of the rites was that initiated members of tribes with whom the owners of the *nanga* happened to be at war might attend the rites unharmed, and invoke the aid of spirits from whom they were not themselves descended.

The Fijians had a well-peopled mythology of the after life. The spirits of the dead had neither temples nor priests, for, as they left the living unmolested, the living were not called upon to make propitiatory sacrifices to them. They were kept alive by the professional story-tellers, who revived them after funerals, when men's thoughts were directed to the mystery of death. In a land where every stranger is an enemy, the idea of the naked shade, turned out friendless into eternity to find his own way to Bulotu, conjured up images of the perils that beset the lone wayfarer on earth, and the shade was made to run the gauntlet of fiends that were the incarnations of such perils. Though the story of the soul's last journey agreed in outline, the details were filled in by each tribe to suit its geographical position. There was generally water to cross, and a ghostly ferryman who treated his passengers with scant courtesy. There was Ghost-scatterer who stoned the shade, and Reed-spear who impaled him. Goddesses of frightful aspect peered at him and gnashed their teeth; Ravuravu, the god of murder, fell upon him; the Dismisser sifted out the real dead from the trance-smitten; fisher-fiends entangled cowards in their net; at every turn of the Long Road there was some malevolent being to put the shade to the ordeal; so that none but brave warriors who had died a violent death—the only sure passport to Bulotu—passed through unscathed. The shades of all Viti Levu and the contiguous islands and of a large part of Vanua Levu took the nearest road, either to the dwelling of Ndengei or to Naithombothombo, the 'jumping-off-place,' in Bua, and thence passed over the western ocean to Bulotu, the birthplace of the race. No belief was more natural for a primitive people than that the land of which their fathers had told them, where the air was warmer, the yams larger, and the soil more fruitful, was the goal of their spirits after death.

When a chief died, his body was washed and shrouded in bark-cloth. A whale's tooth was laid on his breast to throw at the ghostly pandanus tree. If he hit the mark, he sat down to wait for his wife, who he now knew would be strangled to his manes; but if he missed, he went forward weeping, for it proved that she had been unfaithful to him in life. His tomb became his shrine. A roof was built over it to protect him from the sun and the rain. Kava roots and cooked food were laid upon it, that his spirit might feed upon their spiritual essence. And with each presentation, prayers for his protection were repeated. Indolent or ignoble chiefs were soon forgotten, and in times of prosperity the grass began to grow rank even over the bones of a doughty and masterful chief, but at the first breath of adversity his tomb was carefully weeded, and the offerings became regular. Some member of the priestly family would then become possessed by his spirit, and would squeak oracles in a high falsetto. The process of evolution from the tomb to the temple would now be very short. The peculiarity of ancestor-worship in Fiji is that men worshipped not their own, but their chief's ancestors, to whom they themselves might have but a slender blood relationship.

BASIL THOMSON.

ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND CULT OF THE DEAD (Hebrew).—The latest portions of the Hebrew Canon are, roughly speaking, contemporary with the earlier Jewish apocryphal writings; but it will for the present purpose be convenient to include the evidence of all the canonical writings of the OT under the heading 'Hebrew,' and to reserve the data found in the OT apocrypha, the Talmud, and other later works for the 'Jewish' section of the subject here dealt with. Probable dates of later Scriptures quoted in the section will, however, usually be given.

The question of ancestor-worship among the ancient Hebrews has been much discussed in recent times, the most systematic treatise on the affirmative side so far being Friedrich Schwally's *Das Leben nach dem Tode* (Giessen, 1892), which in the main follows the views previously laid down by Stade and Oort (see the literature at the end). A decisively negative answer is given in *Der Ahnenkultus und die Urreligion Israels* by Carl Grüneisen (Halle, 1900), who, whilst utilizing the arguments advanced in J. Frey's *Tod, Seelenglaube und Seelenkult in alten Israel* (Leipzig, 1889), attempts to establish his thesis on a more scientific basis than had been done before. This divergency of views rests, of course, not so much on questions of fact as on diverse modes of interpreting the many references to the departed found in the OT. The Hebrew Scriptures have, thanks partly to the relation they bear to all phases of life, and partly, no doubt, also to the judgment emphatically pronounced by Jahwism on other cults, preserved for us a far larger number of details connected with mourning and cognate matters than have so far come to light in the inscriptions of Babylonia and Assyria. It is highly probable, however, that a common stock of ideas underlies both these branches of early Semitic beliefs and customs; for it is becoming more and more clear that pre-Mosaic Hebraism was thoroughly rooted—not by borrowing, but by original affinities—in the widely spread traditions of the general Semitic family.

This branch of the subject will be treated under the following heads: (1) Translation to heaven; (2) Teraphim; (3) Sacrifices and offerings to the dead; (4) Sanctity of graves; (5) Mourning customs; (6) Levirate law; (7) Laws of uncleanness; (8) Necromancy.

1. **Translation to heaven.**—Deification, if the term were here allowed at all,* could not possibly mean the same in the religion of Jahweh as in the polytheistic Babylonian religion; and yet it seems impossible to resist the conclusion that the translation of Enoch recorded in Gn 5^{24} originally belonged to the same class of beliefs as the transference of the Babylonian Sit-napishtin to the society of the gods. It has already been remarked (see § 1 of 'Babylonian,' art. above) that Sit-napishtin is in reality a combination of the Biblical Noah and Enoch; or, more probably, Noah and Enoch represent a splitting up of the one original personality of Sit-napishtin. However this may be, Enoch, like Sit-napishtin, was spared death and the descent into Sheol, which are the common fate of mortals; and the legitimate meaning of the phrase 'Elohim took him' is that he was transferred to a condition of close association with the Deity. Under the Jahwistic system of religion this would mean that he joined

* The use of the term might seem justified by the designation *elohim* applied to the ghost of Samuel in 1 S 28^{13}, but it is there used only by the witch of Endor. Whether *elohim* = 'the dead' in Is 8^{19} is very doubtful. The idea of deification or semi-deification is, however, implied in a passage like Ps 82^{6}, though *elohim* is there used of the living.

the company of angelic beings (cherubim, seraphim, etc.) which in prophetic imagery * (see Is 6; Ezk 1 and 10) surrounded the throne of Jahweh.

Another clear instance of the translation of a mortal to the company of heavenly beings, without having died and gone down to Sheol, is Elijah,† who passed from earth to heaven in a whirlwind (2 K 2^{11}); and a veiled example of transference to heaven immediately after death (*i.e.* without having previously gone down to Sheol) is, according to Rabbinic tradition (see *Deut. Rabba*, xi. 6), contained in Dt 34^{6}, where the burial of Moses is apparently stated (see Driver, *in loco*) to have been undertaken by Jahweh Himself. Viewed in the light afforded by the translation of Enoch and Elijah, it seems likely that the Midrashic statements of the high favour accorded to Moses‡ are based on a tradition of great antiquity.

Different from the above-named instances, because pointing to an anti-Jahwistic stratum of belief in deification or semi-deification, is Is 63^{16}, where the supremacy of Jahweh is emphasized by the admission made by the prophet on his own behalf or on that of the nation, that 'Abraham knoweth us not, and Israel doth not acknowledge us.' The clear inference is that Abraham and Israel (or Jacob) were, as the departed ancestors of the race, regarded, by at any rate a portion of the nation, as tutelary deities who interested themselves in the condition of the people, and on whom one could call for succour in times of distress (see, *e.g.*, Cheyne, *The Prophecies of Isaiah, in loco*, and *Last Words*; Ed. Meyer,§ *Die Israeliten und ihre Nachbarstämme*, 1906, p. 285). The ideas connected with the term 'Abraham's bosom' used in the parable of Dives and Lazarus (Lk $16^{22.23}$) may not unfairly be regarded as a development from the deification of Abraham implied in the Isaianic passage quoted (see R. Winterbotham, 'The Cultus of Father Abraham,' in *Expositor*, 1896, ii. pp. 177–186).

2. Teraphim.—It has been suggested (see, *e.g.*, Schwally, *op. cit.* p. 35 ff.; Charles, *Eschatology*, p. 21 ff.) that the Teraphim, of which pretty frequent mention is made in the OT, were originally images of ancestors. But there is, so far, nothing to prove the correctness of this proposition. The word itself is of uncertain origin. Schwally's suggestion that *Teraphim* comes from the same root as *Rephaim* ('shades') fails to recommend itself on philological or other grounds. Sayce‖ connects it with a Babylonian word *tarpu* ('ghost'). Perhaps equally admissible would be a connexion with the Ethiopic *terâf* (pl. *terâfât*), which among other meanings has that of *excellentia, præstantia*. The plural *Teraphim* in the sense of *excellentiæ* would then be analogous to that of *Elohim* in its original plural signification, but it would at the same time afford no clue¶ as to what kind of exalted beings it represented. From 1 S $19^{13.16}$ (where Michal employs Teraphim to personate David on a sick-bed) we learn that the word was in the plural form used to denote a single image (thus lending itself, like *Elohim*, to a *pluralis majestatis*). The same passage shows that it bore a human form, but this fact by no means demonstrates its identity with an ancestral figure.* In Jg 17^{5} 18^{17a}, at any rate, the Teraphim cannot denote a mere family deity, but the national God (Jahweh) Himself; for the image there spoken of belonged first to an Ephraimite and then to Danites, with a Levite as ministering priest in both cases (see the emphatic reference to a general cult in 18^{19}). Nor does the testimony borne by 1 S 19 to the fact of the Teraphim having formed part of the usual equipment of a well-to-do family ['observe *the* Teraphim,' Charles, *op. cit.* p. 22] necessarily imply a connexion with ancestor-worship; for it is quite as likely that the national God Himself was thus represented in houses of private families.† Still less decisive is the consultation of Teraphim as oracles (with the sanction of the prevalent religion, as, *e.g.*, Hos 3^{4}; or without it, as, *e.g.*, 2 K 23^{24}); for Jahweh Himself or any other deity could thus be consulted.

The *Elohim* before whom a Hebrew servant who wished to remain perpetually in his master's service was brought, in connexion with the ceremony of having his ear pierced with an awl at his master's door‡ (Ex 21^{6}), have also been regarded by a number of scholars as images of ancestors and identified with the Teraphim. The momentary fixing of the servant's ear to his employer's door looks, indeed, like 'admission to the family cult with all its obligations and privileges,'§ and it is from this consideration that the idea of ancestral gods (or an ancestral god), being here represented by *Elohim*, derives its strength. But certain the conclusion is not; for the tutelary deity of the family need not necessarily be an ancestor, and may, in fact (as has already been remarked), be the national God Himself. Nor is it certain that images of any kind are here meant; for the term *Elohim* may bear the meaning of 'judges' (cf. Ex $22^{7.8.27}$ (Eng. vv.$^{8.9.28}$), and see LXX, Dillmann and the Rabbinical Commentaries, *in loco*), and the piercing of the ear may have been a symbol of obedience (for illustrations, see Dillmann, *in loco*). If, however, the *Elohim* in Ex 21^{6} were images of ancestors, either the Mosaic legislator must have felt no antagonism between Jahwism and this form of the ancestral cult, or the images must at the time in question have come to be regarded as representatives of Jahweh Himself. On the former supposition the omission of the *Elohim* in the parallel Deuteronomic passage (Dt 15^{12-18}) would point to a later effort made to eliminate the ancestral idea from the ceremony. On the latter supposition the Deuteronomist would have aimed at discarding images generally (even of Jahweh Himself).‖

There remain two references in the OT to Teraphim in connexion with non-Israelites, namely, the stealing of Laban's Teraphim by Rachel recorded in Gn 31, and the consultation of Teraphim by Nebuchadnezzar mentioned in Ezk 21^{26} (Eng. v.^{21}). From the fact of the apparent common worship of the Teraphim by Hebrews, Aramæans, and Babylonians, the conclusion has been drawn that ancestor-worship must be meant (see Schwally, *op. cit.* pp. 36, 37); for it would, so it has been argued, be difficult to find another cult that possessed the international character implied. Another such basis could, however, be easily imagined (any of the great powers of nature would indeed satisfy this requirement), and it is furthermore possible that the Teraphim (especially if the general meaning, *excellentiæ*, be adopted; see above) represented different kinds of deities among different nations. In the case of Ezk 21^{26} there is also the possibility that the prophet merely expressed Nebuchadnezzar's manner of consulting oracles in terms of Hebrew speech, and that

* These prophetic ideas were probably grounded on much earlier modes of religious contemplation. Isaiah and Ezekiel need only have given a special Jahwistic finish to certain more or less known forms of Divine imagery. In the case of Ezekiel, the influence of his Babylonian surroundings is clearly discernible.

† Charles (*Eschatology*, p. 56) regards the translation of Enoch and Elijah as a step preparatory to the higher doctrine of the soul developed by Jahwism; but an analogous higher belief probably existed also among the Babylonians (see A. Jeremias referred to in § 1 of Babylonian art.). The tradition regarding Enoch is, moreover, in all probability far too early to fall in with Charles's theory. The truth seems to be that diverse theories and beliefs existed side by side among both the Babylonians and the ancient Hebrews.

‡ In the Midrash referred to, as also elsewhere, the spirit of Moses is said to have been separated from the body, not by the intervention of the angel of death, but by a kiss of Jahweh. Immediately after death he was placed under the throne of glory amidst cherubim, seraphim, and other angelic beings.

§ This inference from Is 63^{16} is, of course, independent of Ed. Meyer's general theory regarding the original divinity of some of the patriarchs.

‖ See *Oxf. Heb. Lex.*, *s.v.*

¶ It would be too venturesome to base a theory on the root-meaning of the Ethiopic verb *tarafa: reliquum esse vel fieri*, so as to make it refer to the continued existence of the departed.

* The argument that an ancestral image must here be excluded by the very fact of David's firm adherence to Jahweh (Charles, *loc. cit.*) is not sufficiently convincing, for a certain degree of veneration paid to departed forefathers may be quite compatible with monotheism or (as in David's case) with henotheism.

† For illustrations, see Grüneisen, *op. cit.* p. 181.

‡ This interpretation goes with the theory that the Elohim were household gods; if (see farther on) judges are meant, the door or doorpost would be that of the sanctuary or court where they sat.

§ So Charles, *loc. cit.*; it would, however, be more correct to omit the word *all* from the sentence. The perpetual servant still continued in the status of a dependent, and fell short of the privileges of a son of the house (except, perhaps, under special circumstances, when there was no son; see Gn 15^{2}).

‖ If judges were meant by *Elohim*, their omission by the Deuteronomist might have been due to the use of the word in that sense having become obsolete, although it might be urged that *shōphĕṭîm* would in that case have been employed instead.

Teraphim in the usual OT meaning of the word were not actually used by him.

It would seem, therefore, that so far we have no clear indication as to what deity or deities the Teraphim represented. All that can be said is that they may originally have been images of ancestors, and the fact of their having been (in many cases at least) household gods would be in consonance with the idea, though it cannot be adduced as a proof of its correctness.

3. Sacrifices and offerings to the dead.—As a clear reference* to the offering of food to the dead Dt 26[14] may be claimed; the tithe-giver there makes the following declaration: 'I have not eaten thereof in my mourning, neither have I put away thereof being unclean, *nor given thereof to the dead.*'† Oort, Stade, Schwally, and others see in this declaration a prohibition (and therefore an evidence of the custom) of sacrificial offerings to the dead, understanding the text to mean that the tithe sacred to Jahweh was not to be perverted to idolatrous practices connected with the worship of the dead; but the general bearing of the entire declaration suggests only the provision of sustenance. The evidence for sacrifices offered to the dead must therefore rest on other grounds (see farther on). The fact, however, that every single tithe-giver had to make the statement in question proves that the practice of feeding the dead, or a strong disposition towards it, was wide-spread among the people, and perhaps also in the higher grades of society.

This is one of the indications showing that the ancient Hebrews shared with their Babylonian kinsmen the belief in the continuance of the human personality after death, and in its need of sustenance in Sheol, the Hebrew equivalent of the Babylonian *Shu'ālu* or *Arālu*. But whilst in Babylonia and Assyria the early customs connected with the belief were allowed to flourish by the side of the State religions, Jahwism strove with all its might to suppress them. In a measure it succeeded; but popular ideas are not easily rooted out, and the practice continued for a considerable period of time in different parts of the country. The various and partly conflicting references to the dead met with in the OT are largely to be explained by this conflict of Jahwism with the ancient cult and the frequent recrudescence of heathen ideas in all their original force. That, however, Jahwism made substantial progress in the course of time, is shown by the fact that Jahweh, who was originally only a territorial God, gradually acquired authority even over Sheol, as is evidenced by His power of bringing up the dead from the under world mentioned in 1 S 2[6] (hardly later than *c.* 700 B.C. [Driver]), and by the belief in His presence there recorded in Ps 139[8] (close of Persian age [Cheyne]). There is here another point of contact with the (probably likewise later) Babylonian belief which regarded Marduk and other deities as 'raisers from the dead' (see § 1 of 'Babylonian' art.); but the chief interest of the fact lies in the slow but sure preparation for the higher Hebrew doctrine of monotheism and the later Jewish belief in the resurrection as taught in Dn 12 (probably Maccabæan) (see Charles, *op. cit.* p. 132 *passim*).

Of direct evidence for the presentation of sacrificial offerings to the dead there is not much. The reference to a family sacrifice in 1 S 20[29] is not conclusive; for although there is much to be said in favour of the idea that the blood-relationship with an ancestral god lay at the base of such a family offering,* it is conceivable that a deity other than ancestral was in the case mentioned the object of common worship (see what has been said in § 2 on the family deity). The treasures found in the sepulchre of King David (*Jos. Ant.* XIII. viii. 4, XVI. vii. 1; *BJ* I. ii. 5), and doubtless also in those of other kings, may originally have had the character of a sacrificial offering (Schwally, *op. cit.* p. 24); but it is also possible that they were merely intended to serve as an ample provision for the dead monarch's needs. The divers kinds of spices with which the grave of King Asa was filled (2 Ch 16[14]) might have been nothing but an extension of the use of spices in the preparation of the body for burial; but the 'very great burning' which was made for the same king would seem to point at least to the offering of incense† to the departed. The prevalence of the practice in the case of kings is attested by Jer 34[5]; and its spread among the people is in all probability proved by the term *mesārᵉphō* (מְשָׂרְפוֹ, 'he that makes a burning for him,' rather than 'he who burns him'; see *Oxf. Heb. Lex.*, *s.v.* שׂרף) in Am 6[10]. Ezk 43[7-9] offers very strong evidence of the idolatrous worship of departed kings (see § 7), and the offering of sacrificial gifts must have formed part of such worship.‡ The evidence from oracles (see § 8) points in the same direction, for an offering of some kind would naturally precede the consultation of the dead. On the probable offering of hair made to the dead, see § 5; and there is, besides, the tendency to connect a propitiatory purpose with the ordinary presentation of sustenance to the departed; and if the analogy from the Babylonian custom be taken into account, it becomes pretty certain that among the ancient (pre-Mosaic and anti-Jahwistic) Hebrews also sacrifices to the dead were, to say the least of it, not uncommon.

4. Sanctity of graves.—The question concerning the veneration of graves is closely connected with that of sacrifices to the dead; for if the latter question be answered in the affirmative, the graves of ancestors would have to be regarded as the places where the sacrificial offerings were made. Viewed in this light, there is much in favour of the opinion that the *maṣṣēbah* set up by Jacob on the grave of Rachel (Gn 35[20]) was intended to mark it as a spot devoted to her worship.§ The name *Allon-bacuth* ('oak of weeping') given to the tree under which Rebekah's nurse, Deborah, was buried (Gn 35[8]), proves nothing; and Cornill's conjecture (*ZATW* XI. pp. 15–21) that the erection of a *maṣṣēbah* and the libation of oil poured on it recorded in Gn 35[14] referred in the original form of the text to Deborah's grave, cannot, of course, be treated as an ascertained fact. Nor can the circumstance mentioned by Schwally (*op. cit.* p. 58), that graves, like the sanctuaries of Jahweh Himself, were put on heights, be cited in favour of intended sacrificial worship there; for the same writer records the well-known fact that tombs in Palestine were, apparently for other reasons, generally rock-hewn.

The stress laid on family graves (as more especially the cave of Machpelah, Gn 23[3ff.] etc.), with

* Schwally's attempt (*op. cit.* p. 22) to construe Jer 16[7] into an evidence to the offering of sustenance, and even of sacrificial gifts to the dead, is not convincing (see Grüneisen, *op. cit.* p. 130); but so far as sustenance is concerned, the evidence of Dt 26[14] is quite sufficient.

† Driver (*in loco*) does not decide between the claims of this rendering and that of '*for* the dead,' which might then be taken to refer to funeral repasts offered to the mourners by their friends. But the phrase would hardly be natural in that sense. Among the Rabbinic commentators, Abraham ibn Ezra suggested an idolatrous intention, introducing this explanation by 'and some say.'

* See W. R. Smith, *Rel. of Sem.*[2], Lect. ii., *passim*.

† Unless it was merely intended to render the passage to Hades pleasant.

‡ The eating of sacrifices to the dead mentioned in Ps 106[28] is brought in as a foreign custom (connected by parallelism with Baal-peor), but at the same time it shows a tendency among the Hebrews to adopt it.

§ Cf. the *maṣṣēbah* set up by Jacob at Bethel for the worship of Jahweh (Gn 28[18]). The worship paid to Rachel would no doubt be of a secondary kind.

which the phrase 'being gathered to one's fathers' has been connected, may legitimately be regarded as a desire 'to introduce the departed into the society of his ancestors' (Charles, *op. cit.* p. 12); but the passages relating to these sepulchres contain (in the form at any rate in which the texts have been handed down to us) no reference to sacrifices or offerings of any kind.

There is, however, apart from family graves, the strong testimony of Is 65[4] ('who remain among the graves, and lodge in the monuments'), which, as an evidence of necromancy practised at graves (see § 8), demands not only the supposition that offerings were there made in order to obtain a hearing from the dead, but also that from the general idolatrous point of view such graves (declared doubly unclean by Jahwism; see § 7) were regarded as sacred. At least as strong is the evidence from Ezk 43[7-9]. On both passages, see § 7.

5. Mourning customs.—Several of the mourning customs of ancient Israel are very obscure, and a careful scrutiny is required before anything like a decision can be arrived at on any single point. It will therefore be best to consider these customs separately.

(*a*) *The mourner put on sackcloth.*—The sackcloth, with which the application of ashes or earth is sometimes mentioned, was in very early times in all probability a loin-cloth only, the tearing and entire putting off of the usual garments having preceded the 'girding on' of it (see esp. Is 32[11]). Mic 1[8] ('I will go stripped and naked'), especially if taken in conjunction with the phrase, 'in nakedness and shame' of v.[11], points to a still earlier custom, when the mourner went quite naked; but the general practice of putting on sackcloth as a substitute for all other garments must have set in pretty early, and considerable modifications * both in the form of the sackcloth and in the direction of putting on other apparel may have been gradually, though not universally, made in later Biblical times.

The putting on of sackcloth has been claimed as a mark of submission to a superior (cf. 1 K 20[31. 32]), and the fact of Isaiah having apparently worn it as his usual garment † (Is 20[2]) has been taken to show that it was also considered a holy garment (see Schwally, *op. cit.* p. 12). The practice would on either explanation point to one form or another of ancestor-worship. Jer 48[37], where the putting on of sackcloth is mentioned together with cuttings in the hands, etc., places it in the category of usages which have been claimed to possess a ritual value (see farther on). But it is, on the other hand, psychologically very probable that the meaning lying at the base of the practice is that of self-humiliation,‡—a sentiment which would equally accompany the attitude of submission to a superior, and the marks of grief at losing a beloved relative or companion, and which might also suit the prophet attending on Jahweh. The primitive entire nakedness of the mourner, to which reference has been made, reminds one of the fact that on the Stele of Vultures (see § 2 of the 'Babylonian' art.) the dead are shown to have been buried naked.§ The mourner might therefore have desired not to appear at greater advantage than the mourned dead. Later on, sackcloth would be assumed by the mourner in deference to the altered public sense of decency, and the modifications referred to would gradually follow. If this view be correct, the close association of the sackcloth with ritual usages (Jer 48[37]) may belong to later times. On the suggestion that the practice of wearing sackcloth was adopted with the object of deceiving the dead as to the identity of the mourner, see farther on.

(*b*) *The mourner put off his sandals.*—The putting off of one's sandals in connexion with mourning is not so frequently mentioned as the girding on of sackcloth, but it was no doubt meant to accompany it regularly (see, *e.g.*, Ezk 24[17], 2 S 15[30]). Passages like Ex 3[5], Jos 5[15] show that no sandals were to be worn at sacred places. Hence the supposition that it was essentially a ritual practice. But here again the original meaning was probably self-humiliation, which would suit both the grief of mourners and the attendance at sacred places.

(*c*) *The mourner cut off his hair, or beard, or both.*—The cutting off of the hair in connexion with mourning is mentioned, *e.g.*, in Mic 1[16] ('make thee bald and poll thee for the children of thy delight'); the removal of the beard as a sign of mourning for the destruction of Jerusalem is recorded in Jer 41[5]; the two together are found in Is 15[2]. The characteristic feature in cutting off hair on these occasions consisted in making a baldness 'between the eyes' (Dt 14[1]), which must mean over the middle part of the forehead (see Driver, *in loco*), although in different parts of the country hair from other parts of the head was probably also cut away. The beard was apparently cut off entirely.*

Tylor, Oort, W. R. Smith, and others favour the idea that the hair so cut off was designed as an offering to the dead—a theory which is strongly supported by numerous analogies from the customs of the Arabs† and other races. The offering of hair in the ritual of Jahweh is clearly attested in the case of the Nazirite (Nu 6[18]), and the practice would seem less strange in the ritual of the dead, who, according to old ideas, stood in need of all the things that appertained to the living.

Another plausible explanation would be that the cutting off of the hair from head and chin was a kind of adjunct to the removal of one's clothes. Everything, it may have been held, was to be discarded that served as an ornament or protection to the body, not only the clothes, but also the hair. The idea of self-humiliation, which might have been involved in the act, is supported by the fact that the cutting off of the beard (see 2 S 10[4], and the parallel passage 1 Ch 19[4]) was regarded as an indignity. This idea would, however, not be incompatible with the simultaneous sacrifice of the hair. The dead might be benefited, and the living at the same time humiliated.

A third explanation that has been offered of this and, in fact, of all the mourning customs connected with apparel and bodily mutilation, is that these rites had the object of deceiving the dead as to the identity of the living, so as to escape any evil which recognition might bring with it.‡ This idea seems, however, un-Semitic, and it certainly does not fit in with other notions regarding the dead in early Hebrew times. Beings who could be called *yiddᵉ'ōnîm* (יִדְּעֹנִים; 'knowing ones' §), and to whom one resorted for oracles, could hardly be deceived by a change of garments or other disguise on the part of the living. They certainly could not be deceived by taking off one's sandals, which is also pressed into the service. The examples, moreover, from the customs of other races (including the Romans), quoted by the supporters of this theory, are for the most part capable of another explanation. The opposite

* This supposition is borne out by the somewhat conflicting data regarding the wearing of sackcloth. The verb *ḥagar* which is used with *saḳ* appears to show that a loin-cloth was originally meant (cf. *ḥāgōrah* in Gn 3[7]), and the word *mothnaïm* ('loins') is expressly employed where *ḥagar* is not used. In as late a work as the Ascension of Isaiah (1st cent. A.D.) the prophets spoken of in 2[10] are said to be naked, notwithstanding the sackcloth that was on them. On the other hand, the verbs *lavash* and *kasah* are also used with *saḳ*, and *ḥagar* is also employed with *ephod*, etc.; and a passage like 'to spread sackcloth and ashes under him' (Is 58[5]), clearly points to a different kind of cloth from that put round the loins. For a fuller discussion on this point, see on the one side Schwally (*op. cit.* p. 11 ff.), and on the other Grüneisen (*op. cit.* p. 79 ff.). Whether in any case the *saḳ* ever had the form of a cornsack with a slit at the top (see Kamphausen in Riehm's *HWB*, art. 'Sack'), is a different question.

† Cheyne (*Prophecies of Isaiah, in loco*) regards it as an 'outer garment,' and explains the word 'naked' in, *e.g.*, 1 S 19[24] to mean 'without the outer garment.' But one can hardly accept this as a natural explanation of the term.

‡ See J. Frey, *Tod, Seelenglaube*, etc. p. 42.

§ It is, of course, possible that the circumstance was there due to the exigencies of war.

* This is required by the verbs *galaḥ* and *gada'* used in the passages quoted. In 2 S 10[4] the verb *karath* is used, and *half* the beard is expressly mentioned (in 1 Ch 19[4] [parallel passage] the verb *galaḥ* is, however, used, and apparently the entire beard meant).

† See esp. W. R. Smith, pp. 323–326.

‡ For a full exposition of this view (adopted also by Kautzsch in Hastings' *DB*, Ext. Vol. 614[b]), see Grüneisen, *op. cit.* p. 95 ff. J. G. Frazer (*JAI* xv. p. 73 ff.), on whose remarks regarding Bohemian and other customs Grüneisen and others primarily based the theory, expresses himself, however, doubtful as to the meaning of the cutting off of the hair spoken of here (*ib.* p. 73).

§ The Biblical statements affirming the impotence and shadowy character of the dead are mainly due to the weakening influence exercised by Jahwism on the ancient cult; so in Job (probably time of Bab. captivity [Driver]) 14[21.22], the dead are affirmed to know of nothing but their own pains, and in Ec 9[10] (*c.* 200 B.C. [Nöldeke and others]) Sheol is stated to be devoid of work, device, knowledge, and wisdom. Allowance must, of course, also be made for different streams of thought in very early times

treatment of the hair by men and women in times of mourning (each adopting the unusual course, men, *e.g.*, covering their heads at funeral ceremonies, and women letting their hair fly loose about them) may surely be explained as a species of self-neglect expressive in each case of self-humiliation induced by grief, and a similar explanation would be applicable to several other customs.

The Jahwistic prohibition in Dt 14[1] of making a baldness between the eyes for the dead furnishes a strong presumption in favour of regarding the act as a ritual observance connected with the worship of the dead; and the ground of the prohibition ('ye are children of Jahweh,' and a 'holy people' to Him) strengthens the theory that it was directed against an opposing religious cult. The place described as lying between the eyes may have for this very reason been chosen for the *ṭôṭāphôth* * (Dt 11[18] etc.), by which every Israelite was to be marked as a devotee of Jahweh, unless it was independently chosen as the most conspicuous part of the head. The absence of a prohibition regarding the removal of hair from other parts of the head and from the beard in connexion with mourning is probably owing to the fact that, according to Lv 19[27], it was prohibited under all circumstances.†

(*d*) *The mourner made cuttings in his flesh.*—Cuttings in the flesh, accompanied by removal of the beard and tearing of garments, appear as a general custom in Jer 41[5], notwithstanding its distinct prohibition in Dt 14[1], thus showing that the Deuteronomic legislation could make its way only very gradually. Instead of the verb *hithgōdēd* used in the two passages mentioned, and the form *gᵉdūdōth* found in Jer 48[37], there is in Lv 19[28] the command not to make a *séreṭ* (also tr. 'cutting') for a dead person, or to print any marks (writing of *ka'aḳa'*) on the flesh, the latter being evidently a kind of tatu. If the theory of making oneself unrecognizable by these disfigurements be discarded, there remains only the idea of thereby 'making an enduring covenant with the dead' (W. R. Smith, *Rel. of Sem.*[2] p. 322 f.).‡

That cuttings in the flesh were parts of religious ritual is, moreover, proved by the action of the priests of Baal recorded in 1 K 18[28]. The fact that these incisions, as also the making of a baldness between the eyes, were prohibited by Jahwism, whilst the wearing of sackcloth, etc. was never interfered with, would seem to show that these groups of acts belonged to different categories, thus forming another reason for rejecting the theory that they had all the purpose of making the living unrecognizable to the dead.

(*e*) *The mourner covered his head or beard.*—The covering of the head (*e.g.* 2 S 15[30], Est 6[12]) and the beard (Mic 3[7], Ezk 24[17]) as a mark of mourning on account of death or other calamity might be explained, with Schwally and others, as a substitute for cutting off hair from head and beard. But the covering of the face in 2 S 19[5] [Eng. v.[4]] (the clearest instance of actual mourning) reminds one of the same act performed in the presence of Jahweh (Ex 3[6], 1 K 19[13]). As the covering of the face was there prompted by the fear of beholding the Deity (cf. Ex 33[18ff.]), it seems likely that the mourner was also afraid of seeing the ghost of the departed (which is, of course, different from deceiving the ghost by a disguise). It is possible, however, that the covering of the face was merely an extension of covering the hair, and the idea that the latter act was a substitute for removing the hair might therefore be maintained. As the hair of the head and beard was regarded as a personal ornament, the covering of it might, in any case, be expressive of self-neglect or self-humiliation occasioned by grief.

No evidence of ancestor-worship can be derived from the extant accounts of the two remaining * customs, namely, (*f*) the *lamentation over the dead*, with its accompaniment of weeping and striking different parts of the body with the hand; and (*g*) the *partaking of food and drink by the mourners* † in connexion with funeral ceremonies. The lamentations were natural or professional (see Jer 9[16] [Eng. v.[17]] expressions of grief, and need—so far as the texts in their present form go—neither have been ritually addressed in worship to the dead (Schwally, *op. cit.* p. 20 f.) nor intended to scare away the ghosts of the departed by much howling (Grüneisen, *op. cit.* p. 100). The lamentations of David over Saul and Jonathan and over Abner (2 S 1[17ff.] 3[33. 34]) certainly show no trace of either intention. With regard to funeral repasts, Schwally's attempt to construe Jer 16[7] into a decidedly ritual act has already been referred to (§ 3). The text, as it stands, speaks only of food and drink offered to the mourners by way of comfort. On the uncleanness connected with the 'bread of mourning' in Hos 9[4], see § 7.

6. Levirate law.‡—A close relationship has been claimed between ancestor-worship and the law of levirate, which, in the form given to it in Dt 25[5-10], enacts that when brothers 'dwell together,' and one of them dies without leaving male issue, the surviving brother (no doubt the eldest, if more than one) was to marry the widow, and that the first-born son of this union was to be considered the son of the departed brother, so 'that his name be not put out of Israel.' The supposition is that the original object of the institution was to provide the dead man with a son to carry on his cult (so, *e.g.*, Stade, Schwally, Charles)—an object which must be assumed to have been entirely forgotten in the time of the Deuteronomic legislator. In the case of Ruth (where the law is found to extend over the whole clan), the object is 'to raise up the name of the dead upon his inheritance' (Ru 4[5]). Absalom (2 S 18[18]) puts up for himself a pillar in his lifetime, because he had no son to keep his name in remembrance. In Gn 38 (where, under an older form of the law, all the children would have apparently belonged to the departed) the ground stated is merely that of raising up a posterity to the departed.§ But if the institution—as it is quite reasonable to suppose—had from the first, besides the desire of leaving a memorial of one's name, a close connexion with the law of inheritance, it is impossible to eliminate the idea of the cult of the departed altogether, as the son or sons thus provided for the dead man, as inheritors of his property, would, under pre-Mosaic religious notions, be expected to charge themselves with the sustenance (and probably also sacrificial offerings) due to the departed. This broader basis of the levirate law would seem to be required by the extant data and the considerations arising from them, and it also

* Usually translated 'frontlets'; see *Oxf. Heb. Lex.*, *s.v.* טוטפת. The modern *tephillîm* (known as phylacteries) consist of a part for the left arm, and another to be placed over the middle part of the forehead.

† For the probable ground of this general prohibition, see Dillmann, *in loco*.

‡ Driver explains that 'the Israelites, being Jehovah's children, are not to disfigure their persons in passionate or extravagant grief' (on Dt 14[1. 2]). But it is doubtful whether grief would have generally gone the length of these mutilations, and the ground assigned for the prohibition (see the text above) appears to indicate an opposing religious cult.

* An attempt has been made to connect the festival of Purim with the Persian *Farvardîgān*, which was a kind of All Souls' Day; but if so, the story of Esther must have been purposely altered beyond ordinary recognition. See, on the one side, Schwally, *op. cit.* p. 42 ff.; on the other, Grüneisen, *op. cit.* p. 188 ff. The other literature will be found in these works.

† The supposition that sympathizing friends and neighbours provided the mourners with this nourishment is strengthened by the fact of the same custom obtaining among the Jews at the present day.

‡ For the custom, under partly different rules, among other races, see esp. Westermarck, *Hist. of Human Marriage*, p. 510 f.

§ On J. F. M'Lennan's theory that the law originally rested on a polyandrous system of marriage, see Driver, *Deut.* p. 284.

does justice to the fairly complex state of society which already obtained in those early days. So far as the element of the cult of the dead is concerned, it is important to mention that the *Kaddish* (see § 3 in the 'Jewish' article), which, like acts of Jewish public worship in general, is to the present day confined to males, also seems to bear traces of a survival (in a much modified form) of the religious services rendered to the departed by his surviving sons.

7. Laws of uncleanness.—The laws of uncleanness relating to dead human bodies (see esp. Nu 19^{14-16}) can be satisfactorily explained by the almost universal fear of contamination* arising from the contact or close vicinity of decaying bodies that obtained in ancient times. The ancient Egyptians,† it is true, busied themselves much with corpses, but then they took every possible care to prevent decay setting in. In the Mosaic law the abhorrence of dissolution also affected not only animals that were forbidden as food, but also clean ones if not slain in proper ritual fashion (Lv 11). Leprosy, which was similarly loathed, is also ritually unclean (Lv 13), though here the fear of contagion must have been an important factor.

It is likely that this fear of contamination was in early times merged into the general notion of savage races, that everything connected with birth, disease, and death involved the action of superhuman agencies of a dangerous kind (see W. R. Smith, *Rel. Sem.*[2] 444 f.), analysis and differentiation of causes being a product of gradual mental development; but it would be rash to identify these agencies with ancestral spirits. On the contrary, the fact that dead human bodies are regarded as unclean among a number of races with a strongly developed system of ancestor-worship (see Grüneisen, *op. cit.* p. 114) proves that the two are independent of each other. Worship may be given to the departed spirits of ancestors, and contamination may at the same time attach to their dead bodies. The regulation of Nu 19^{15}, that an open vessel with no covering round it, which has stood in the tent of a dead person, is unclean, whilst covered vessels remain clean, can be suitably explained by the idea that the covering protects the vessel from contracting contamination, and need not point to the fear that the ghost might take up its abode in the open vessel.

The pollution connected with the bread of mourners (לֶחֶם אוֹנִים) referred to in Hos 9^4 is also explicable without a reference to a Jahwistic opposition to ancestor-worship. For the meal offered to mourners by way of comfort may be all that is meant; and if so, the uncleanness would only be that of ordinary contamination contracted by contact with dissolution.

An additional tabu, arising from opposition to the religion of Jahweh, would come in only in cases where a sufficiently recognizable element of ancestor-worship or some other heathen form of the cult of the dead showed itself; and as such practices were demonstrably not uncommon among the ancient Hebrews (see esp. § 3), the additional tabu would be of a correspondingly wide application. But the dead body itself would probably in such cases be affected only in so far as the spirit may have been supposed to linger about it, for, as has already been remarked, the cult of the dead was not necessarily connected with the notions entertained of the body.

In the case of priests (Lv $21^{1ff.}$) greater restrictions against contact with dead bodies are imposed, because the contamination would make them for a time unfit for Jahweh's service. The ground of the main ordinance there given cannot be opposition to ancestor-worship, for the persons whose obsequies priests may attend (father, mother, etc.) are just those to whom the heathen cult of the dead would chiefly apply (see Grüneisen, *op. cit.* p. 112). The order, however, not to remove the hair from head and beard, or make cuttings in the flesh, appears (unless v.[6] be regarded as unconnected with the rule regarding obsequies) to have the meaning that, although priests may take part in the funeral rites of very near relatives, they must abstain from anything connected with heathen mourning ceremonies, more particularly as in their case this additional tabu, like that of uncleanness *per se*, would naturally be of greater stringency than in the case of laymen.

The strongest instance of the combined tabu of ordinary contamination and heathen worship appears in Ezk 43^{7-9}, where tombs of kings erected quite close to the sanctuary of Jahweh are clearly stated to have been places of a rival worship (note their *zenûth*, a usual term of unfaithfulness to Jahweh, borrowed from the relationship of marriage), whereby the 'holy name' of God is defiled. A similar double tabu is presented by Is 65^4, where graves, which are unclean in themselves (Nu 19^{16}), are used for purposes of necromancy.

8. Necromancy.—Though the Teraphim cannot be demonstrated to have been originally images of ancestors (see § 2), there is ample independent evidence of the practice of necromancy among the ancient Hebrews. The spirits of the departed were called *yidde'ōnîm* ('knowing ones') by those addicted to the practice, and the *'ōbōth* (usually rendered 'familiar spirits') also represent a form of necromancy, the calling up of the spirit of Samuel on behalf of Saul (analogous to the calling up of Eabani by Gilgamesh) having been effected by a woman possessed of an *'ōb* (*ba'ălath-'ōb*, 1 S 28^7).* In Isaiah 8^{19} the people are distinctly charged with inquiring of the dead on behalf of the living; and Is 65^4 may safely be regarded as a strong evidence of necromancy practised at graves.†

The practice was decidedly anti-Jahwistic, and is everywhere forbidden (whereas the inquiry of Teraphim is not always prohibited, see § 2). As has already been remarked, necromancy, which is in itself an important part of the cult of the dead, is, at the same time, an indirect evidence to the offering of propitiatory gifts to the spirits consulted.

Summary.—In summing up all the extant evidence, the same result is, in the main, obtained as in the Babylonian section. The OT embodies indubitable traces not only of the popular cult of the dead, but also of a certain degree of actual worship paid to ancestors and departed kings and heroes. But the importance of these practices has been much exaggerated. There is no ground for thinking that ancestor-worship was the only or even the chief religion of pre-Mosaic Israel. On the contrary, various parts of the OT show clearly that Jahwism had to maintain at least as keen a struggle against the worship of the heavenly bodies and of various other powers of nature as against the cult of the dead. It is also true that in a certain modified form the exaltation of departed heroes, more especially of the spiritual type, was from the first quite compatible with the religion of Jahweh; and the final monotheistic development of Mosaism left still more room for the glorification of great human personalities in one form or another.

LITERATURE.—Works of F. Schwally, C. Grüneisen, R. H. Charles, and others have been more or less frequently quoted. A very full bibliography will be found in Grüneisen's book. Add A. Lods, *La Croyance à la vie future et le culte des morts dans l'antiq. Isr.* (1906). Of earlier works in favour of ancestor-worship, notice esp. Oort, 'De doodenvereering bij de Israëliten,' *ThT* xv. p. 350 ff.; Stade, *GVI* i. pp. 387-427. W. R. Smith, *Rel. Sem.*[2], and other publications contain much that bears on the problem. J. Frey (*Tod, Seelenglaube*, etc.) tries to prove that though there was a belief in the soul, no cult of the dead (in the sense of paying homage to them) existed among the ancient Hebrews. Kautzsch (Hastings' *DB*, Ext. Vol. pp. 614–615) agrees in the main with Grüneisen [animism, but no ancestor-worship]. Among com-

* See Dillmann (*Die Bücher Ex. u. Lev.* p. 479), who also brings in the idea that Jahweh was a God of life, not of death. On the far-spread fear of contamination connected with death, see, *e.g.*, A. P. Bender in *JQR* viii. 109, 110. The removal of a corpse to the 'tower of silence,' lest it should pollute the sacred earth, is one of the most necessary duties of Parsiism.

† In the New World the Peruvians offered a fairly close parallel to the Egyptians in this respect (see Prescott, *Conquest of Peru*, book i. beg. of ch. iii.).

* The fact of Saul bowing to the ground at the appearance of the spirit of Samuel (1 S 28^{14}) might be regarded as an evidence of worship paid to the dead, though perhaps it was still the prophet who was thus honoured.

† Cf. Cheyne, *The Prophecies of Isaiah, in loco*. At graves the spirits of the departed would be more naturally consulted than demons.

mentators (some of the leading modern commentaries have, as occasion required, been referred to), Solomon Yiṣḥāḳi, Abraham ibn Ezra, and David Ḳimḥi will on a number of points still be found helpful. G. MARGOLIOUTH.

ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND CULT OF THE DEAD (Indian).—**1.** In India the worship of ancestors lies at the root of all the funeral rites. As now explained by official Brāhmanism, the object of these is to provide the departed spirit with a kind of 'intermediate body interposed, as it were parenthetically, between the terrestrial gross body which has just been destroyed by fire, and the new terrestrial body which it is compelled ultimately to assume' (Monier-Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hinduism*[4], 277). This writer goes on to say that this intervenient body, composed of gross elements, though less gross than those of earth, 'becomes necessary, because the individualized spirit of man, after cremation of the terrestrial body, has nothing left to withhold it from re-absorption into the universal soul except its incombustible subtle body, which, as composed of the subtle elements, is not only proof against the fire of the funeral pile, but is incapable of any sensations in the temporary heaven or temporary hell, through one or other of which every separate human spirit is forced to pass before returning to earth and becoming re-invested with a terrestrial gross body.' Unless it be provided with this new body, the soul must, like the ghosts of the unburied Homeric dead (Homer, *Od.* xi. 54; *Il.* xxiii. 72), wander about as an impure *preta*, or ghost, on the earth or in the air, among demons and other evil spirits, into the state of which it will eventually pass unless it be protected by the performance of the Śrāddha provided by its relatives on earth. Further than this, the new body thus created for the spirit must be nourished and supported, and the spirit must be aided in its progress from lower to higher worlds and back to earth by the performance of the periodical Śrāddha rites. This duty of the relatives is among orthodox Hindus supposed to be finally discharged only when the rite is performed at some specially sacred place. Gayā in Bihār is the most appropriate place for these rites, while the Hindus of the west, for the obsequies of a mother, prefer Sidhpur in the Baroda State. Hence also arises the necessity of begetting a male heir, which is urgently felt by all Hindus, as is also the case in China. Using a folk-etymology, Manu (*Institutes*, ix. 138) derives the Skr. name of a son, *putra*, as if it were *puttra*, 'he that delivers his father from the hell called Put.'

2. *Feeding the dead.*—This orthodox conception of the Śrāddha—that it is intended to provide an 'intermediate' body for the departed soul—is a later development. The Śrāddha was really evolved from the custom of feeding the dead, a rite common among all savage and semi-savage races. 'Like the habit of dressing the dead in his best clothes, it probably originated in the selfish but not unkindly desire to induce the perturbed spirit to rest in the grave and not come plaguing the living for food and raiment' (Frazer, *JAI* xv. 74 f.). The custom is well established among many of the Indian tribes. Thus, among the Nāgas of Assam, the corpse is watched with great care, and when decomposition sets in, quantities of spirits are thrown over it. Whatever the deceased was in the habit of eating and drinking in his lifetime (such as rice, vegetables, and spirits) is placed once a month on the ground before the dead body. At the end of the period of mourning, a great feast, consisting of liquor, rice, and flesh of cows and buffaloes, is prepared, and the members of the clan in war dress partake of it. Among the Luhupa sept of the same tribe the cattle sacrificed are eaten, with the exception of one leg, which is buried under the head of the dead man to serve as food for him in the grave. Among the Angāmi sept, on the first day after a death, meat is distributed among the relatives and friends of the deceased. The next day they assemble at the house of the dead man, eat part of the meat, and each member of the sept of the deceased throws a piece of liver out of the house to the distance of some eight paces. On the third day portions of the cooked rice are tied up in leaves, and buried outside the house on the fourth day. On the fifth day the platter and cup of the dead man are hung up in the house and left there till thirty days have passed, when they are given to a friend of their former owner. The funeral rites end with the sacrifice of a cock, the flesh of which is eaten by all the members of the family (*JAI* xxvi. 196 f.).

Among a more civilized race, the Nāyars of Malabar, the Śeshakriyā, or rite of making offerings to the spirit of the dead, commences on the day after the cremation ceremony, and continues for seven days. All male members of the Taravād, or sept of the deceased, bathe, and the eldest mourner taking with him a strip of cloth which he has torn from the dead man's shroud (probably in order to maintain communion with the dead), and a piece of iron (to scare evil spirits), brings some half-boiled rice, curds, and other articles of food, and places them in the north-east corner of the courtyard, which is believed to be the abode of the spirit. A lamp, which is also probably intended to drive off demons, is lighted beside the food. A piece of palmyra leaf, about a foot long and a finger broad, is taken, and one end of it is knotted. The knotted end is placed in the ground, and the other left standing up. This represents the deceased, and to it the food is offered. 'The place where the piece of leaf is to be fixed has been cleaned carefully, and the leaf is placed in the centre of the prepared surface. The offerings made to it go direct to the spirit of the deceased, and the peace of the Taravād is secured' (Fawcett, *Bulletin Madras Museum*, iii. No. iii. 247 f.).

The custom of providing food for the dead is common among the lower castes in Northern India. In Bengal the funeral rites of the Gonds last for three days, after which the mourners purify themselves by bathing and shaving, and make offerings of bread and milk to the spirit of the departed. Among the Kāmis, the blacksmith caste of Nepāl, 'on the eleventh day a feast is prepared for the relatives of the deceased; but before they can partake of it a small portion of every dish must be put on a leaf-plate and taken out into the jungle for the spirit of the dead man, and carefully watched until a fly or other insect settles on it. The watcher then covers up the plate with a slab of stone, eats his own food, which he brings with him to the place, and returns to tell the relatives that the dead man's spirit has received the offering set for him. The feast can then begin.' The Bhakat Orāons preserve the bones of the dead, to be interred in the tribal cemetery. 'At this festival pigs and great quantities of rice are offered for the benefit of departed ancestors, who are also held in continual remembrance by fragments of rice or dāl [pulse] cast on the ground at every meal, and by a pinch of tobacco sprinkled whenever a man prepares his pipe' (Risley, *Tribes and Castes*, i. 293, 395, 92).

The Māl Pahāriās, who identify the Lares, or ancestors, with Gūmo Gosāin or Gūmo Deota, the gods of the wooden pillar which supports the main rafters of the house, perform the same rite in another way. 'Around this centre are grouped a number of balls of hardened clay, representing the ancestors of the family, to whom the first-fruits of the earth are offered, and the blood of goats or fowls

poured forth at the foot of the pillar that the souls may not hunger in the world of the dead' (Risley, ii. 71). The custom of offering first-fruits to the ancestral spirits is very common, and has been fully illustrated by Frazer (*GB*[2] ii. 460, 462 ff.). The Mechs, again, adopt another method to secure that the offering may reach the etherealized souls of the dead. When the corpse is buried, 'a small fire is kindled upon the grave, in which food and drink are burned for the benefit of the deceased' (Risley, ii. 89 f.). The Māls provide for the needs of the departed in another way, by lighting on the night of the worship of the goddess Kālī, in the month of October–November, dried jute stems in honour of their deceased ancestors, 'and some even say that this is done to show their spirits the road to heaven' (*ib.* ii. 50).

In other parts of Northern India rites of the same kind are performed. The degraded Ghasiyas of Mirzapur, at the annual mind-rite for the dead, lay out five leaf-platters containing the usual food of the family, with the prayer: 'O ancestors, take this and be kind to our children and cattle' (Crooke, *Tribes and Castes*, ii. 417). The Kols, whenever there is a tribal feast, offer a fowl to the spirits of the dead, and pour a little liquor on the ground, with the prayer: 'Do not injure us or our children' (*ib.* iii. 311). The Rājis, who are perhaps the most degraded people in this part of India, content themselves with shaving the heads, beards, and moustaches of the sons and younger brothers of the dead man, and throwing the hair on the grave as an offering to the spirit (*ib.* iv. 213). The ritual of the Nats, a tribe of wandering acrobats, is more remarkable. The mourners cook food on a river-bank, and spread a cloth on which the ghost is supposed to sit. The nearest relative, taking an earthen cup and a knife in his hand, plunges into the water. The cup he places on his head with the knife upon the mouth of it, and then dives until the cup becomes filled with water. This he deposits under the cloth on which the spirit is supposed to sit, and lays a cup of water at each corner of the cloth. Within the enclosure thus made food is laid for the refreshment of the spirit, who is invited to partake of the meal. When the spirit is supposed to have done eating, they say: 'Go and join those who have departed before you' (*ib.* iv. 63 f.). Even more elaborate than this is the rite performed by the Musahars, a tribe which has hardly risen above the condition of wanderers in the jungle. After the corpse is flung into a river (which is their usual mode of disposing of the dead), a tree near the spot is selected as a refuge for the spirit, and food and water are laid at its foot for nine days in succession. At the time of presenting these offerings, the chief mourner invokes the dead: 'Come, O dead one, from the palace of Indra! Come and eat the food of this world! Take it and return to thy palace.' These offerings are allowed to lie for some time on the place where they were deposited, and are then removed by the mourner, who cooks and eats the food, throwing a morsel on the fire for the use of the dead, and repeating the invocation already made at the tree. The offerings are changed daily during the period of mourning, and the rite ends with a clan feast of the dead (*ib.* iv. 31 f.).

In the United Provinces, among the various branches of the outcast Dom tribe, the idea of feeding or propitiating the spirits of the dead is combined with that of barring or preventing the return of the ghost, which is believed to afflict the survivors. Thus, among the Basors, some sacrifice a hog in the name of the dead man, with the object of providing the spirit with food; while others kill the animal, cut off its legs, and bury the trunk in the courtyard of the house of death, as a sort of sympathetic charm to prevent the spirit from rising out of its grave and afflicting the family (Crooke, *op. cit.* i. 226). Very similar is the custom of the Dhāngars, among whom, on the tenth day after death, the mourner sacrifices a pig in the name of the deceased, and, cutting off its feet and snout, buries them under a stone in the courtyard, with the invocation to the spirit: 'I have buried you here, never to come out; you must rest here in spite of the spells of an exorcist, or of any one else who may try to wake you' (*ib.* ii. 269).

3. *Vicarious feeding of the dead.*—From this crude belief in the possibility of feeding the spirits of the dead, the transition to the theory that this can be done vicariously is easy. Among some of the Indian castes survivals of the primitive matriarchy are found in the custom of providing for the feeding of the spirits by the bestowal of food on relatives in the female line. The Bhoksas of the sub-Himalayan Tarāī, every year in the month set apart for mourning, feed the descendants of their daughters in order to propitiate the ghosts of the dead; and, for the same reason, the Juāngs of Bengal and other menial tribes of Northern India employ the maternal uncle of the person making the offering as priest (Crooke, *op. cit.* ii. 58; Risley, *op. cit.* i. 353). The next stage appears when the Paṭāri, or tribal priest of the non-Aryan peoples of the Vindhyan and Kaimūr ranges in the centre of the peninsula, is invited, as a right attaching to his office, to share in the funeral feast. When we reach the higher castes of Hindus in the Plains, we find the custom of feeding Brāhmans prevalent. The belief is that food consumed by them passes on to the spirits. In fact, all through Northern India, large numbers of Brāhmans, generally drawn from the younger members of the families which provide *purohits*, or family priests, or from those branches of the caste which have settled down to an agricultural life and have no body of religious clients, exist only to be fed. These people flock in numbers to attend the death rites of wealthy people. At places like Gayā, whither the pious journey to perform the final death rites of their friends, a special class of Brāhmans has the monopoly of attending to be fed on such occasions.

4. *Annual rites for the dead.*—The establishment of an annual celebration, like the All Souls' Day of Christendom, when the dead are specially remembered and offerings of food are provided for them, appears among the most primitive tribes. Thus the Luhupa Nāgas of Assam, once every year in the month of December, hold a solemn festival in each village in honour of those members of the community who have died during the preceding year. The village priests conduct the rites, which culminate on the night of the new moon. On this occasion, they believe, the spirits of the dead appear at a distance from the village in the faint moonlight, wending their way slowly over the hills, and driving before them the victims slain for them or the cattle which they have stolen during their lives. Finally, the procession disappears over the distant hills, amidst the wailing of those who have lost relatives during the year (*JAI* xxvi. 194). The period consecrated by orthodox Hindu usage to the propitiation of the spirits of the dead is known as the *Kanāgat*, so called because it takes place in the sign of Kanyā, or Virgo, or *pitra-paksha*, 'ancestors' fortnight,' occurring in the moonless half of the month Kuār (August–September). This fortnight is specially devoted to the death cult, and the pious offer sacred balls (*piṇḍa*) in memory of their ancestors. During this time the pious fast; others abstain only from meat, or eat fish instead of it.

5. *Ancestor-worship among the non-Aryan tribes.*—The cult of the dead, so far as it extends to the provision of food for the spirits of the dead, is thus

not confined to the higher castes, but is widespread among the non-Aryan part of the population. Sometimes, as in the case of the wild Kurubārus of Mysore, this worship is one of fear, and is devoted to the propitiation of the Vīrika, or spirits of ancestors who have died unmarried, and are thus supposed to be malignant (Buchanan, *Journey*, i. 397). The Yerukalas, one of the forest tribes of the Nīlgirī Hills, sacrifice, in conjunction with other gods, to the Pitris, or Manes of their ancestors (Oppert, *Orig. Inhabit.* 204). In the Bombay Presidency many of the ruder Hindu tribes, such as the Dhor Kāthkaris and Vaitis of Thāna, the Kunbis of the Konkan, Atte Kunbis, and Halvakki Vakkals of Kānara, worship their ancestors, usually in the form of an unhusked coconut (*Gazetteer*, xiii. 165, 182, xv. 217, 249, 203). The Bhīls of Khāndesh combine the cult of their ancestors with that of the Mātās, or Divine Mothers, and the same is the case with the Central Indian branch of the tribe (*ib.* xii. 93; Malcolm, *Trans. Roy. As. Soc.* i. 72). Gonds in the Central Provinces worship the family dead on the third day after a death, and on every Saturday and feast day (Hislop, *Aboriginal Tribes*, 25; *Gazetteer*, 278). In Chota Nagpur the Kisāns and Bhuiyars adore their ancestors, 'but they have no notion that the latter are now spirits, or that there are spirits and ghosts, or a future state, or anything'; the Bhuiyas revere their ancestors under the name of Bīr or Vīra, 'hero,' a title which, as we have seen, is often applied to malignant spirits; the Kharrias put the ashes of their dead into an earthen pot and fling it into a river; afterwards they set up in the vicinity slabs of stone as a resting-place for them, and to these they make daily oblations; the only worship performed by the Korwas is to their dead relatives, but this statement of Dalton is more than doubtful (Dalton, *Descript. Ethnol.* 132 f., 139, 160, 229). Among the Khonds the cult is very highly developed. 'The beatified souls of men enjoy immediate communion with all the gods; they are in rank little inferior to minor gods, live with them, and much after their fashion. Every tribe invokes the souls of deceased ancestors in endless array at every ceremonial, after invoking the minor gods; and they especially remember those of men renowned for great or good actions, as for reclaiming waste lands, for extraordinary bravery, for wisdom in council, or for remarkable integrity of life. They believe that beatified souls, although wholly without power, may act as intercessors with some of the gods, as with Dinga Pennu, on the one point of inducing him to restore lost relations speedily to their homes' (Macpherson, *Memorials of Service*, 95).

Among that remarkable people the Kāfirs of the Hindu-kush, though the fact is denied by them, there are distinct traces of ancestor-worship. They have the custom of making straw effigies of the honoured dead, which are paraded at their funerals, and one year after his death an effigy is erected to the memory of every Kāfir of adult age. These images are of various kinds, carved out of wood with axes and knives on conventional models. 'The more ponderous kinds,' says Robertson, 'are roughly fashioned in the forest, and are then brought into the village to be finished. Some of the best images have a manikin seated on the left arm holding a pipe; others have similar little images perched on the chair-handle. Several of the large images have all manner of quaint designs and carving over their bodies. Some even look as if the carving were intended to imitate tatuing, such as the Burmese are so fond of. The people have a good deal of superstition about these effigies. Bad weather which occurred while a slave was carving some images for me to take to India, was ascribed to the fact that images were being taken from the country. . . . The images are often decorated with wisps of cloth bound round the head, and, where the juniper-cedar is easily obtainable, by sprigs of that tree fastened to the brows. The faces of the effigies are carved precisely like the idols, and similarly white round stones are used for the eyes, and vertical cuts for the mouth, or rather the teeth. The effigies are provided with matchlocks, or bows and arrows, axes and daggers, carefully but grotesquely carved, and commonly have a cart-wheel-shaped ornament in the middle of the back. The effigies of males are given turbans, while those of females have a peculiar headdress, which is possibly a rough imitation of a horned cap. Before these images of the eminent dead sacrifices are made, and their pedestals are sprinkled with blood by their descendants when they are suffering from sickness. Long stones are also erected to serve as a kind of cenotaph, and a goat is always killed when the pillar is erected. The Kāfirs also celebrate a festival, known as Marnma, in honour of the illustrious dead; and the last two days of the Duban feast are devoted to dancing, feasting, and singing ballads in honour of the departed heroes of the tribe' (Robertson, *Kafirs of the Hindu-kush*, 636 ff., 414 f.).

6. *The Śrāddha.*—The mind-rite of orthodox Hindus, known as the Śrāddha (Sanskrit *śrat*, 'faith,' 'trust,' 'belief'), is a more highly developed form of the primitive funeral feast and of the custom of feeding the dead. Even so late as the time of Manu (*Institutes*, iii. 267–271) the idea of providing food for the dead was recognized. 'The ancestors of men,' he writes, 'are satisfied a whole month with sesamum, rice, barley, black lentils or vetches, water, roots, and fruit, given with prescribed ceremonies: two months with fish, three months with venison, four with mutton, five with the flesh of such birds as the twice-born may eat, six months with the flesh of kids, seven with that of spotted deer, eight with that of the deer or antelope called Eṇa, nine with that of the Ruru deer; ten months are they satisfied with the flesh of wild boars and wild buffaloes, eleven with that of hares and of tortoises, a whole year with the milk of cows and food made of that milk; from the flesh of the long-eared white goat their satisfaction endures twelve years. The pot-herb *Ocimum sanctum*, the prawn, the flesh of a rhinoceros or of the iron-coloured kid, honey, and all such forest grains as are eaten by hermits, are formed for their satisfaction without end.' He further directs (iii. 205 ff.) that an offering to the gods should be made at the beginning and end of a Śrāddha. 'It must not begin and end with an offering to ancestors; for he who begins and ends with an oblation to the Pitris quickly perishes with his progeny.' The Brāhman is directed to smear with cow-dung a purified and sequestered piece of ground, with a declivity towards the south. 'The divine manes are always pleased with an oblation in empty glades, naturally clear, on the banks of rivers, and in solitary spots.' The officiant is then to seat the assembled Brāhmans, and he is to honour them, 'having first honoured the gods with fragrant garlands and sweet odours.' The feeding of Brāhmans at the mind-rite was thus customary. As another lawgiver directs, 'Whatever mouthfuls at a Havyakavya (or Śrāddha) are eaten by the Brāhmans are eaten by the ancestors' (Wilson, *Indian Caste*, i. 366). To drop the oblation into the hands of a Brāhman is, Manu lays down, equivalent to putting it into fire. 'If his father be alive, let him offer the Śrāddha to his ancestors in three higher degrees; or let him cause his own father to eat as a Brāhman at the obsequies. Should his father be dead, and his grandfather be

living, let him, in performing the obsequies of his father, celebrate also his paternal grandfather. Having poured water with holy Kuśa grass and sesamum into the hands of the Brāhmans, let him give them the upper part of the cakes, saying, "Śrāddha to the Manes." That fool who, having eaten of the Śrāddha, gives the residue of it to a man of the servile class, falls headlong down to the hell named Kālasūtra. The superfluous Piṇḍas, or holy balls, may be given to a Brāhman, to a cow, to a kid, or consigned to fire' (iii. 220 f., 223, 249, 261).

The form of the modern Śrāddha rite is most intricate, and includes a number of minute observances, the ritual of which is elaborately prescribed. In the form of the rite known as Ekoddishṭa, which is performed for the benefit of a single deceased individual, for ten days after the cremation lamps are kept lighted for the benefit of the Manes, to light the ghost during its progress to join the Pitris or sainted dead, either in a temple, or under a sacred fig-tree, or on the spot where the obsequial rites are to be performed. These, technically called *Kriya-karma*, should take place near running water; and the spot is hence known as the *ghāt*, the usual term applied to the steps used for bathing at a river or tank. One condition is that it must not lie to the west of the house of death. This place, when selected, is carefully smeared with clay and cow-dung, a fireplace is erected, and beside it an altar of white clay, also smeared with the dung of the cow. The officiant, with his top-knot tied up, first bathes, and then standing with his face to the south, the land of spirits, offers a lamp, sesamum, barley, water, and sprigs of the sacred Kuśa grass (*Poa cynosuroides*), with a dedication to the Manes. The object of this rite is to allay the extreme heat and thirst which the spirit must undergo during cremation. This ends the ceremonies of the first day, and during the next ten days, either once or twice daily, the rite of feeding the spirit is performed. For Brāhmans rice, the original sacred grain, and for Kshatriyas, and the illegitimate sons of Brāhmans, barley-flour, are prescribed. These grains are boiled in a jar of copper, the old sacred metal, mixed with honey, milk, and sesamum, and then made into a small ball (*piṇḍa*), which is offered to the spirit with the invocation that it may obtain liberation, and reach the abodes of the blessed after crossing the hell called Rāurava (Manu, *Institutes*, iv. 88). By this rite the creation of a new body for the disembodied soul begins. On the first day one ball is offered, on the second two, and so on until during the observances of the ten days fifty-five balls have been offered.

The motive of the offerings appears in the numerous invocations which are made at various times in the service. One runs thus: 'Thou hast been burnt in the fire of the pyre and hast become severed from thy brethren; bathe in this water and drink this milk, thou that dwellest in the ether without stay or support, troubled by storms and malignant spirits; bathe and drink here, and having done so be happy.' Another hymn is as follows: 'Let the lower, the upper, the middle fathers, the offerers of soma, arise! May those fathers who have attained the higher life protect us in the invocations! Let this reverence be paid to-day to the fathers who departed first, to those who departed last, who are situated in the terrestrial sphere, or who are now among the powerful races, the gods. Do us no injury, O Father, on account of any offence which we, after the manner of men, may commit against you. Fathers! bestow this wealth upon your sons, now grant them sustenance. Do thou, O resplendent God, along with the fathers who, whether they have undergone cremation or not, are gladdened by our oblation, bless us' (Muir, *Original Sanskrit Texts*, v. 297).

By these ten days' rites the spirit has been enabled to escape from the same number of different hells, and gradually a new body with all its members has been created. The order in which the members of this new body are formed is sometimes thus defined. On the first day the dead man gains his head; on the second his ears, eyes, and nose; on the third his hands, breast, and neck; on the fourth his middle parts; on the fifth his legs and feet; on the sixth his vital organs; on the seventh his bones, marrow, veins, and arteries; on the eighth his nails, hair, and teeth; on the ninth all remaining limbs and organs and his manly strength. The rites of the tenth day are usually specially devoted to the task of removing the sensations of hunger and thirst which the new body then begins to experience. The house and the vessels which it contains are purified so as to remove the last taint of the death pollution; the fireplace at the scene of the obsequies is broken, and a handful of water is offered to the ether to assuage the thirst of the spirit. After bathing at a spot higher up the stream than that where the obsequies were performed, the officiant and other relatives go homewards, first being sprinkled with the five products of the sacred cow (*pañcha-gāvya*), and taking care to lay a ball of uncooked meal on the road behind them, so as to attract the attention of the ghost and dissuade it from returning in their company.

On the eleventh day the chief rites consist in the gift of a cow (*kapila-dāna*) to the chief Brāhman, and the loosing of a scape-bullock (*vṛṣotsarga*) in the name of the deceased. This seems to be partly a survival of the ancient rite of animal sacrifice, and partly a means of removing the tabu of death (Frazer, *GB*[2] iii. 13 ff.). It is released with the dedications: 'To father, mother, and relatives on the father's and mother's side, to the family priest (*purohita*), wife's relatives, those who have died without rites, and who have not had the due obsequial ceremonies performed, may salvation come by the loosing of the bullock!' At the present day the animal is usually branded with the divine emblems of the discus and trident, and henceforth is allowed to wander free in the village lands. Food is again cooked, and offered to the Manes, with the invocation: 'You have finished your course, and have reached the abodes of bliss. Be present, though invisible, at this rite.' The general effect of the ceremony is that the spirit ceases to be a disembodied ghost, and becomes enrolled among the sainted dead. On the twelfth day food is again offered, and water poured at the root of a sacred fig-tree for the refreshment of the spirit.

The rite done for the benefit of one individual person (*Ekoddishṭa Śrāddha*) is quite distinct from the annual propitiation of the Manes of the family. On the last day of this feast all ancestors are named and propitiated, but sacred food balls (*piṇḍa*) are offered only for the three male ancestors on the father's side—the father, grandfather, and great-grandfather. The idea prevails that the ancestor, once united with the sainted dead, needs no further special propitiation. The non-Aryan tribes believe that, like themselves, the spirits of the dead are mortal. What becomes of them after a couple of generations no one cares to say. But when that period has elapsed, they are supposed to be finally disposed of, and, being no longer objects of fear to the survivors, their worship is neglected, and attention is paid only to the more recent dead, whose powers of mischief are recognized. The Gonds propitiate only for one year the souls of their departed friends, and this is done even if they have been persons of no note in their lifetime.

But with worthies of the tribe the case is different, and if one of them has founded a village or been its headman or priest, he is regarded as a god for many years, and a small shrine of earth is erected to his memory, at which sacrifices are annually offered (Hislop, *op. cit.* 16 f.).

No Śrāddha is performed for girls who die unmarried, and for boys only if they have undergone initiation and investiture with the sacred thread. Special rites are performed in the case of those whose ghosts are universally regarded as malignant. Such cases are those of a woman dying in childbirth or in a state of impurity. Her corpse is generally anointed with the five products of the cow, sprinkled with water, a little fire is placed on the chest, and it is then either cremated or flung into running water. In such cases it is a common rule that no rites are performed until the ninth day after death, when, if the family can afford the cost, the ceremonies of the last few days, as already described, are performed. To these are added a special rite of expiation, which is intended to free the household from pollution. Similar rites of a special kind are performed when a man is drowned, dies on an unlucky day, or in the case of one originally a Hindu who becomes an outcast, a Christian, or a Musalmān. In this rite, which is known as Nārāyaṇa-bali, 'oblation to the god Nārāyaṇa,' the Śrāddha of expiation is usually performed over an image of the deceased, made of barley or some other grain (*Bombay Gazetteer*, xx. 522 f.; Risley, *op. cit.* i. 266, ii. 191; Crooke, *op. cit.* i. 90, 210, ii. 465).

The Śrāddha is performed throughout India with more or less variety of practice by all orthodox Hindus. Among the castes of a lower grade the primitive custom of feeding the dead has been to some degree extended after the example of their Hindu neighbours. The main point of difference is the abbreviation of the rite, which does not extend over a period so long protracted as in the case of the orthodox, and the ceremonial is very often limited to the last few days of the mourning season.

7. *Hindu worship of the Pitris.*—The question remains—how far the Hindus can be said to 'worship' the Pitris. In the earliest Vedic period the worship paid to the Manes was distinct from that of natural phenomena. 'It is not denied that the Hindus made gods of departed men. They did this long after the Vedic period. But there is no proof that all the Vedic gods, as claims Spencer, were the worshipped souls of the dead. No *argumentum a fero* can show in a Vedic dawn-hymn anything other than a hymn to personified Dawn, or make it probable that this dawn was ever a mortal's name' (Hopkins, *Religions of India*, p. 10). The general theory seems to have been that ancestors are of a class different from that of the gods, and that though they are divine and possessed of many godlike powers, so that the Vedic poet thus invokes them, 'O Fathers, may the sky-people grant us life; may we follow the course of the living,' yet they are distinct from the gods, and never confounded with them (*ib.* 143, 145). Hence, in the Vedic ritual of the Śrāddha, when the officiant invites the gods and ancestors to the feast, he does so with two separate invocations (Colebrooke, *Essays*, 114). Speaking of the Vedic conception of Yama, the god of death, Barth thus writes: 'It is there, at the remotest extremities of the heavens, the abode of light and the eternal waters, that he reigns henceforward in peace and in union with Varuṇa. There, by the sound of his flute, under the branches of the mythic tree, he assembles around him the dead who have lived nobly. They reach him in a crowd, conveyed by Agni, guided by Pūshan, and grimly scanned as they pass by the two monstrous dogs who are the guardians of the road. Clothed in a glorious body, and made to drink of the celestial soma, which renders them immortal, they enjoy henceforward by his side an endless felicity, seated at the same tables with the gods, gods themselves, and adored here below under the name of Pitris, or fathers' (*Religions of India*, Eng. tr. 22 ff.). When we come to the Atharva Veda, we first encounter the specific doctrine of the elevation of the Pitris. The due performance of rites raises them, we are told, to a higher state; in fact, if offerings are not given, the spirits do not go to heaven. This view was still further extended in a later period. It is when we reach the Epic period that we find a progressive identification of the gods and the Pitris. 'The divinities and the Manes are satisfied with the oblation in fire. The hosts of gods are waters; so, too, are the Manes. . . . They are both of one being' (*Mahābhārata* i. 7. 7 ff.). The poet speaks also of the Manes worshipping the Creator, Prajāpati Brahmā, in his Paradise. It is in the Purāṇic period, when the Indian religious imagination ran riot, and produced that vague and complex system which is the basis of modern Hinduism, that we find them mixed up with Vedic gods and a host of other objects of devotion, like the bird Garuḍa and the world-snake Śesha. But throughout this progressive development the Pitris seem invariably to lack that criterion of worship which we have already fixed. They are never regarded as independent divine beings; on the contrary, stress is always laid upon the fact that they depend upon their friends on earth for continuous aid and maintenance, and that their advancement to a higher stage is impossible without the due performance of rites done by their pious descendants.

LITERATURE.—The authorities have been freely quoted in the course of this article. The best authority on the funeral rites of Hindus is still Colebrooke's essay in *Asiatic Researches* (1801), vii. 232 ff.; reprinted in *Essays on the Religion and Philosophy of the Hindus*, ed. 1858, 93 ff. A good account of the modern rites will be found in Atkinson, *Gazetteer of the Himalayan Districts* (1882–84), ii. 853 f., 917 ff.; Grierson, *Bihār Peasant Life* (1885), 391 ff. Full details are given in the caste articles in the *Bombay Gazetteer*, edited by Sir J. Campbell.

W. CROOKE.

ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND CULT OF THE DEAD (Iranian).

—The Zarathushtrian religion, as known from the Avesta, comprises an elaborate system of religious thoughts and moral habits founded on the idea of two universal powers, one heavenly and pure, the world of Ahura Mazda (Ormazd), and its contrast, the bad and impure world of the devils, the head of whom is Angra Mainyu (Ahriman). In this religion, according to its theoretical scheme, the ancestors, or the souls of the dead, play no part; but practically, in the popular customs and beliefs, the cult of the dead still survives. Parsism not only permits this popular worship, but even finds room for it in the official ritual, so that in the Yashts of the later Avesta we read a voluminous litany to angels or ghosts, in whom, no doubt, are to be recognized the souls of the dead, especially those of the ancestors. But it must be observed that these primitive ghosts are difficult to recognize in the shape that is given them in this Avestan composition, being often placed in the epical evolution as heroes or kings of old, as patrons or protectors of persons, families, or provinces, or as heavenly angels or genii, fashioned after the national and religious ideas of the Iranians.

These ghosts are in the Avesta called Fravashis (Pahlavi *Farvardīn*), and are invoked in the 13th, or *Fravardīn*-Yasht. The word Fravashi means in the Avestan language 'confession,' the Fravashi being a personification of the belief of the pious, his genius or his *alter ego*, who protects him and takes care of him during his lifetime, and who

will, in time, receive him in the other world. Under this theological fabric is no doubt concealed a more primitive idea of a being which in some way belongs to human nature as part of his soul or as the principle of his life, nourishing him and giving him growth. These original functions of the Fravashis may be traced in the Avesta itself, when it tells that Ormazd, through these angels, makes all plants and herbs spring out of the earth, gives offspring to the herds, shapes the child in the mother's womb, gives it all its limbs, lets it be born, and grants the mothers many children. Originally these beings may have conferred these boons themselves without the direction of any supreme god, thus fulfilling the functions that ordinarily belong to the province of the ancestors.

This character of ancestral patronage becomes yet more conspicuous when we read Yasht xiii. 84 ff. Here we see how the Fravashis, when drought menaces the land, hurry to the heavenly lake Vourukasha, and how they quarrel in order to procure water, 'each for his own family, his own village, his own tribe, his own country.'

That the Persians themselves looked upon the Fravashis as souls, we learn from Yasna xxvi. 7: 'We invoke the souls of the dead (*iristhānām urvano*), the Fravashis of the righteous, the Fravashis of all our kinsmen that have died in this house, the Fravashis of men and women, of both sexes we invoke' (similarly Yasna lxxi. 23). The little we know of the exterior of the Fravashis fits in with this definition. 'They come flying like a well-winged bird,' we read in Yasht xiii. 70. The souls, then, were imagined in the shape of birds; as the Egyptian *ba* and as the souls in the Assyrian hell are described; as the souls, according to Greek beliefs, left the bodies on the point of death under the guise of birds—the same idea as still confronts us in European folklore (cf. von Negelein, 'Seele als Vogel' in *Globus*, lxxix. 357–361, 381–384; Goldziher, *ib.* lxxxiii. 301–304).

The *cult* of the Fravashis has had its fixed place and its special time in Zoroastrianism; the time was the period Hamaspathmaêdaya, March 10th–20th, *i.e.* the five last days of the year plus the five intercalary days, which days the Indo-European peoples always were wont to consecrate to the souls of the dead. Further, the Fravashis are always invoked in the evening, viz. in the Aiwisrûthrima Aibigaya (cf. Yasna i. 6; Gâh. iv. 1–2), being the first part of the night from 6 to 12,—the usual time reserved for the cult of the dead by kindred nations. We derive our information about the customs of this cult from Yasht xiii. 49–52: 'We invoke the good, the mighty, the holy Fravashis of the righteous, who descend to the villages at the time of the Hamaspathmaêdaya and return thither every night for ten nights to ask for help. Will anybody praise us? Will anybody pay homage to us? Who will accept us amongst his own? Who will bless us? Who will receive us with a handful of meat and a garment, and with sacred reverence?' Everybody who fulfils his duty to these Fravashis—we are told in the same Yasht—shall have his house filled with good things during the coming year (Yasht xiii. 51 f.).

This custom survived far into the Middle Ages; the Arabian chronologist al-Bîrûnî testifies that the Persians during these days placed the meat in the rooms of the deceased, or on the roofs of the houses, believing that the dead conversed with the family; then they burnt juniper as incense in their honour (*i.e.* in reality to keep them away) (al-Bîrûnî, *Chronology*, transl. Sachau, London, 1879, p. 210 ff.).*

* Cf. also the metrical *Sad-dar*, dating probably from the end of the 15th cent., xiii., xxii., xli.; tr. Hyde, *Hist. relig. veterum Persarum*, Oxford, 1700, pp. 444, 447 f., 456. There is likewise a record of the celebration of the feast in 588 (Hoffmann, *Auszüge aus syrischen Akten persischer Martyrer*, Leipzig, 1880, p. 78 ff.); while in 565 Chosroës spent ten days at Nisibis to celebrate the Fravardagân: τὴν ἑορτὴν τὴν Φουρδίγαν προσαγορευομένην, ὅ ἐστιν ἀλληγορεῖσθαι νεκυία (Menander, ed. Niebuhr, Bonn, 1829, p. 374).

The Fravashis are not only invoked during the Hamaspathmaêdaya-period, but also commemorated on the 19th of every month; in the Persian calendar (see art. CALENDAR [Persian]) they have, further, their place as the protectors of the first month of the year (*Fravardîn*; cf. the Armenian loan-name of the twelfth month, *Hrotiç*; Hübschmann, *Armenische Grammatik*, 1895, i. 184 f.). Corresponding to this official position of the Fravashis, the Persian imagination elevated them into higher and higher spheres; and we often meet with them as the genii of the stars (*e.g.* Yasht xiii. 5–7; Maînôg-î Khrat xlix. 22 f.). Altogether they seem in later times to have taken up a place in the Persian cosmology similar to the δαίμονες in Greece.

Besides their place in the ritual, the Fravashis play a prominent part in the private cult of the Persians, especially in the funeral ceremony called *âfrîngân* ('homage'). It was a common meal to which the survivors invited both rich and poor; the priests attended the feast and performed several symbolical ceremonies. On that occasion cakes of meat and flour were offered to the spirit of the recently deceased. The origin of this feast seems to be a meal to the nourishment of the deceased. The same oblation is repeated at the festival in memory of the deceased, or the *Srôsh Darûn*, where cakes are offered to the angel of Death, *Srôsh*.

In *Armenia* the Persian ideas on the Fravashis and their cult have continued into modern times. They are commemorated on the Saturdays before the five great festivals of the year, and, upon the whole, every Saturday. They are imagined to dwell in the neighbourhood of the tombs and in the houses of their kinsmen, and the survivors burn incense and light candles in honour of them. At the tombs the Armenians celebrate a special commemoration of the dead, on which occasion they burn quantities of incense. The Manes dwell three days on earth; then they fly away to heaven, leaving behind their blessings to their descendants. Especially between fathers and sons there is a vivid communication at that time. The Armenians as well as the Persians imagine that souls are connected with the stars.

LITERATURE.—J. Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta*, Paris, 1892–1893, ii. 152 ff., 500 ff.; N. Söderblom, 'Les Fravashis,' *RHR*, 1899; Manuk Abeghian, *Der armenische Volksglaube*, Leipzig, 1899, 23 ff.

ED. LEHMANN.

ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND CULT OF THE DEAD (Japanese).

—In order to understand what the worship of ancestors and of the dead actually amounts to in Japan, we must distinguish clearly the true national religion, that is to say, the native primitive Shinto, as it existed during the first centuries of the Christian era, from the Shinto subsequently modified under the influence of Chinese ideas. This transformed Shinto indeed is of very little interest here, as it is only a shadow cast over Japan from the continent. Our task is to distinguish and emphasize the ideas that are really Japanese, original, and prior to this foreign influence; and to accomplish it we must examine only the most ancient documents, such as the *Kojiki* (*Records of Ancient Matters*, A.D. 712), the *Nihongi* (*Chronicles of Japan*, A.D. 720), the *Norito* (rituals which were not published until the beginning of the 10th cent., but were undoubtedly composed at a much earlier date), etc., being careful to eliminate, even in these documents, any traces of Chinese ideas which they may contain.

It is on account of the neglect of these necessary precautions that Japanese writers, especially the great native philologians of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th cent., have represented their national religion as being mainly an ancestor-cult, while in reality it is mainly a cult of nature. For instance, the famous theologian Hirata (1776–1843), while claiming to restore the primitive Shinto, calls into existence a fanciful religion, into which he introduces, in an artificial way, ancestor-worship as practised by the Chinese: the worshippers must pray to the whole succession of their family ancestors in order that these Manes may protect their descendants and see to their happiness (*Tamadasuki*, vol. x.). From Japan this erroneous conception spread into Europe, where the writers have, one after another, repeated the statement that Shinto was chiefly an ancestor-cult. Even the most conscientious scholars have not escaped the influence of this prevailing idea. Sir Ernest Satow maintained in Murray's *Handbook for Japan*[2] (Introd. pp. 62, 69) that 'in its very earliest beginnings Shinto appears to have been ancestor-worship.' This eminent Japanese scholar has now, however, given up that theory. But more recently, Prof. B. H. Chamberlain wrote (*Things Japanese*[3], 1898, p. 358): 'Shinto is the name given to the mythology and vague ancestor- and nature-worship which preceded the introduction of Buddhism into Japan.' Dr. W. E. Griffis (*Religions of Japan*, 1895, p. 88) emphasizes the idea, saying that 'from the Emperor to the humblest believer, the God-way is founded on ancestor-worship, and has had grafted upon its ritual system nature-worship.' Capt. Brinkley sums up the whole in the very concise statement: 'Ancestor-worship was the basis of Shinto.'

This theory is, in the present writer's opinion, the reverse of the historical evolution as it actually took place. It is evident that at a certain period ancestor-worship was seen to be the dominant cult of Shinto, and when people in our time visit the temples which are dedicated for ever to illustrious ancestors or to certain nature-gods confounded with Imperial ancestors, they are tempted to see in them a confirmation of the general theory of Herbert Spencer. But if we get rid of these modern impressions, and also lay aside the conventional opinions of native commentators, and if we confine our attention simply to the ancient writings, we find that the oldest and most interesting parts of the *Kojiki* and the *Nihongi*, those relating to the 'age of the gods,' are essentially devoted to nature myths; that, moreover, the most important *Norito* celebrate the glory of the gods of nature, and that it is not animism but naturism that in Japan, as in so many other countries, constitutes the real basis of the primitive religion. Does this, however, mean that, as Dr. W. G. Aston maintains at the present time, 'Shinto, the old native religion of Japan, had no cult of true ancestors' (*Man*, 1906, No. 23, cf. his *Shinto*, 1905, p. 44 and *passim*; K. Florenz, *Nihongi, Zeitalter der Götter*, Tokio, 1901, p. 253, and art. SHINTO)? The present writer thinks rather that the truth lies between these two extremes, and that, if ancestor-worship did not appear until after nature-worship, and if it was then developed chiefly under the influence of Chinese ideas, it nevertheless existed in germ in the original Shinto as in the majority of primitive religions.

We shall not discuss the question as to whether cannibalism existed in pre-historic Japan, and if so, whether it was followed by a ceremonial anthropophagy, which is then explained by the desire to offer to certain ancestral gods the food they would most appreciate (see N. Gordon Munro, 'Primitive Culture in Japan,' in *Trans. of the Asiat. Soc. of Japan*, Dec. 1906, vol. xxxiv. pt. 2, pp. 73 ff. and 133 ff.). As a matter of fact, from the time that primitive man invests all the gods, if not with his own form, at least with his feelings, this moral anthropomorphism must lead him to offer to the gods, whoever they may be, the things which appear most precious to himself, and the gods for whom these sacrifices are intended may be gods of nature quite as well as ancestral spirits. We shall therefore dismiss this questionable interpretation of customs which are themselves doubtful, and confine ourselves wholly to the written documents.

These documents show us, in the first place, that the primitive Japanese had a vague belief in the immortality of the soul, without having, however, any precise or absolute idea on the subject. The *Nihongi*, when relating the story of the hero Tamichi, who appeared one day as a serpent with glaring eyes to punish the violators of his tomb, ascribes to the men of that time the thought: 'Although dead, Tamichi at last had his revenge. How can it be said that the dead have no knowledge?' This passage alone is sufficient to prove that there were supporters of another opinion, who doubted the sentient immortality of the dead. In general, however, they believed that the dead survived this life. The common people descended through the opening of the grave to a dark lower region, *Yomi*, *i.e.* 'the Land of Darkness,' where there were neither rewards nor punishments, but where all, good and bad alike, continued to lead a vague existence, regretting the life and light of the upper region. This is the dark kingdom, which swarms with the fierce deities of disease and death, the 'hideous and polluted land' where Izanagi, horror-stricken, found his wife Izanami in a state of putrefaction. Other persons, such as Izanagi himself, do not share this general destiny: it is on a terrestrial island amidst the living that this god chooses his resting-place. Lastly, many divine heroes and illustrious persons were translated to the 'Plain of High Heaven' (*Takama no hara*). Just as the first parents had sent the most beautiful of their children, the Sun and the Moon, to that upper region to illumine it with their brilliance, so men raised the objects of their admiration up to the stars. Like the deified Roman Emperors, they were 'sideribus recepti.' The dead whose brilliant career terminated in this final assumption were not, however, the most virtuous; they were the most illustrious, and their apotheosis was only the natural continuation of their former power. Thus, the particular abode of the dead depended chiefly upon their earthly dignity. Their future life, with which no moral consideration had to do, rested upon an idea that was purely aristocratic. The ladder of the ranks of men had a top which was lost in the clouds and leaned against the floor of the gods. In a word, the spirits of men found a place very readily in the society of the gods of nature. The heroic glory of the one corresponded to the physical brilliance of the other. They took up their abode in the same places, and in virtue of the same inherent sovereignty.

This being so, it follows that the cult of the dead was of a somewhat vague character, and that ancestors were worshipped mainly in proportion to the social position they had held during life. One old mythical account, in which there is a description of the burial of the god Ame-waka-hiko ('heaven-young-prince') by a flock of birds, which perform the various duties of the funeral ceremony, shows us clearly that the Japanese must have practised very complicated rites on such occasions. The existence of funeral sacrifices also shows that they rendered to their ancestors a worship intended to ensure their welfare, providing them with the

objects, animals, and companions which they would require in the other life. The most important writing on this subject is one which relates how human sacrifices were suppressed — an event which the *Chronicles of Japan* place at a time corresponding to that of the birth of Christ, but which probably should be brought down to a more recent date, of the actual occurrence of which, however, there can be no doubt. One passage explains, first of all, why they thought of this suppression:

'28th year [of the reign of Suinin = 2 B.C.], 10th month, 5th day. Yamato-hiko no Mikoto, the Mikado's younger brother by the mother's side, died.

'11th month, 2nd day. Yamato-hiko was buried at Tsukizaka in Musa. Thereupon his personal attendants were assembled, and were all buried alive upright in the precinct of the tomb. For several days they died not, but wept and wailed day and night. At last they died and rotted. Dogs and crows gathered and ate them.

'The Emperor, hearing the sound of their weeping and wailing, was grieved at heart, and commanded his high officers, saying: "It is a very painful thing to force those whom one has loved in life to follow him in death. Though it be an ancient custom, why follow it if it is bad? From this time forward, take counsel so as to put a stop to the following of the dead."'

Another passage then tells how the reform was accomplished:

'32nd year [= 3 A.D.], 7th month, 6th day. The Empress Hibasu-hime no Mikoto died. Some time before the burial, the Emperor commanded his Ministers, saying: "We have already recognized that the following of the dead is not good. What should now be done in performing this burial?" Thereupon Nomi no Sukune came forward and said: "It is not good to bury living men upright at the tumulus of a prince. How can such a practice be handed down to posterity? I beg leave to propose an expedient which I will submit to your Majesty." So he sent messengers to summon up from the Land of Idzumo a hundred men of the clay-workers' Be [hereditary corporation]. He himself directed the men of the clay-workers' Be to take clay and form therewith shapes of men, horses, and various objects, which he presented to the Emperor, saying: "Henceforward let it be the law for future ages to substitute things of clay for living men, and to set them up at tumuli." Then the Emperor was greatly rejoiced, and commended Nomi no Sukune, saying: "Thy expedient hath greatly pleased Our heart." So the things of clay were first set up at the tomb of Hibasu-hime no Mikoto. And a name was given to these clay objects. They were called *haniwa*, or clay rings.

'Then a decree was issued, saying: "Henceforth these clay figures must be set up at tumuli: let not men be harmed." The Emperor bountifully rewarded Nomi no Sukune for this service, and also bestowed on him a kneading-place, and appointed him to the official charge of the clay-workers' Be. His original title was therefore changed, and he was called Hashi no Omi. This is how it came to pass that the Hashi no Muraji superintend the burials of the Emperors' (*Nihongi*, tr. by Aston, 1896, vol. i. p. 178 f.).

With regard to the other funeral offerings, we are sufficiently enlightened by the pottery, weapons, and ornaments brought to light by excavations in the ancient Japanese tombs. Aston interprets these customs as being 'partly a symbolical language addressed to the deceased, and partly . . . an appeal for sympathy by the mourners and a response by their friends.' The present writer thinks rather that we should see in them the proof of a belief in the continued sentient existence of the dead, and in the necessity for satisfying the needs which they still experience in the other world, i.e., in a word, the existence of a real cult of the dead. Even to-day the majority of the Japanese scarcely think of a future life, and the conception of the immortality of the soul seems almost foreign to them; and yet towards their ancestors they perform no less rigorously the minute rites of the ancestor-worship borrowed by them from China. It is probable that the primitive Japanese also, who, as the ancient writings testify, were even at the hour of death not in the least concerned about a future life, felt none the less the desire to do all that they thought might still be useful for their dead relatives. It is true that the ancient documents do not make any direct reference to this point; but the fact must not be lost sight of that these are annals in which scarcely any but famous persons are described, and in which we could hardly expect to find information regarding the obscure life of the common people. They mention the human sacrifices offered at the tomb of an Imperial prince more readily than the humble offering of rice and water which poor families might make. But, on the other hand, with regard to heroes and illustrious personages, we find very clear cases of deification and of worship rendered to the far-off ancestors, gods of nature or human beings, who were regarded as the household gods (*ujigami*) of the great families of the 8th century. (For further details on this last point see the present writer's book, *Le Shinntoïsme*, Paris, 1907, p. 276 f.).

This cult of ancestors, which we can assert with certainty in some illustrious cases, and logically infer also among the poor people who were unknown to the court historiographers, was speedily developed and systematized under the influence of continental ideas. Then Chinese ancestor-worship came to be established with all the ceremonies which it involves and all the consequences it entails, beginning with the very important practice of adoption, which was intended to ensure the continuance of family sacrifices. But this evolution, which is quite distinct from real Japanese religious ideas, is beyond our subject. See CHINA.

MICHEL REVON.

ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND CULT OF THE DEAD (Jewish).—As was to be expected, the final victory of monotheism made the conscious practice of forbidden or doubtful rites in connexion with the dead impossible to those who strictly followed the sober development of pure Mosaism in early post-Biblical times and the various periods of Rabbinism that followed. Ancient occultism retained, however, a hold on the minds of not a few in each generation; and the confluence of Eastern and Western mystical ideas which in mediæval times produced the theosophical systems of the Kabbalah, gave a further impetus to various essentially un-Mosaic notions about the dead, and even succeeded in partially invading the liturgical form of synagogue-worship.

The literary evidence, which is on some important points supported by practices prevalent at the present day, has here to be collected from (1) the Apocryphal and Pseudepigraphical writings attached to the OT; (2) the Talmudic and Midrashic literature; (3) the Liturgy; (4) the Kabbalah. Only the salient features need, however, be mentioned in each part.

1. Apocryphal and Pseudepigraphical literature.*—Taking the different parts of the subject, in so far as sufficiently important data exist, in the order followed in the 'Hebrew' article above, it must first be mentioned that the garden or Paradise assigned to Enoch and the other elect is, according to the *Book of Enoch* (32^2 65^2 106^3), imagined to be at the end of the earth towards the east. In it is the tree of wisdom (32^{3-6}), whose fruit the holy ones eat and attain high knowledge. In 47^2 'the holy ones who dwell in the heavens' are, however, spoken of. The well of righteousness mentioned in 48^1 is perhaps a reminiscence of the 'water of life' which is to be found in the Babylonian heaven and other mythical localities. Whether the pseudepigraphical work known as the *Assumption of Moses* originally contained in the lost portions at the end an account of the translation of Moses to heaven still remains doubtful, though a negative answer would seem to accord best with the facts of the case (see the introduction to that book in Kautzsch's edition). Josephus, however, clearly implies a belief in it (*Ant.* IV. viii. 48), and 11^3 in the *Ass. Mos.*

* The books contained in the *Variorum Apocrypha* (ed. C. J. Ball) are here quoted in the usual English form. For the other books, *Die Apokryphen und Pseudepigraphen des AT* (ed. Kautzsch, 1900) has been followed. The dates of the books range from about B.C. 200 (Sirach) to the earlier Christian period.

itself (ending, 'the whole world is thy grave') would seem to be in consonance with the idea. Concerning Baruch, the friend and disciple of Jeremiah, we are informed that he was to be preserved alive 'to the end of the times' (*Apoc. Bar.* 13^3 76^2), — a favour which appears to stand in some relation to the translation of the earlier saints.

In the ridicule of Babylonian idol-worship contained in the *Epistle of Jeremiah* is found the statement that they set gifts before the idols 'as unto dead men' (v.[27]); but the practice of offering gifts to the dead thus implied may be understood to have been as purely Babylonian as the idol-worship itself. A direct warning against the heathen worship of the dead is contained in *Jubilees* 22^{17} ('Their sacrifices they slay to the dead, and pray to the demons, and eat upon the graves'); and it is natural to suppose that the warning would not have been needed, if there had been no tendency to adopt these practices among the Jews. The supposed reference to offerings made to the dead in Sir 30^{18} has been disproved by the Cairo Hebrew text (if here correct); for instead of 'messes of meat set upon *a grave*,' the Hebrew has 'heave-offerings placed before *an idol*' (*gillūl*).* The treatment of the dead spoken of in Sir 7^{33} and To 4^{17} may possibly refer to offerings made to the departed, but it is not unlikely that funeral rites only are meant in the former passage and funeral feasts in the latter (see the notes to the *Variorum Apocrypha*). It would seem indeed that the progress of monotheism had by that time made habitual offerings to the dead impossible, and that the transformation of the practice into what has not inaptly been called 'the new sacrificial cult of the dead' ('Das neue Totenopfer' [Schwally, *Das Leben nach dem Tode*, p. 188]) had already set in. In 2 Mac. $12^{42.\ 43}$, Judas Maccabæus is reported to have ordered the Jews under his command to offer up prayers and to send a large sum of money as a gift to Jerusalem, in order to effect an atonement for the Jewish soldiers killed in battle, under whose coats objects consecrated to idols—no doubt intended to serve as a magical protection—had been found. It has been suggested that the prayers and offerings of money were in reality intended by Judas and his companions to clear the survivors rather than the dead from the pollution of idolatry; but as the author or compiler of 2 Mac. interpreted the act as having been performed on behalf of the dead (see vv.[43b. 44. 45]), the practice of trying to benefit the dead rather than paying homage to them must have been in vogue when the narrative assumed its present form (some time in the 1st cent. B.C.).

The references to *mourning customs* found here and there in the Old Test. Apocrypha and Pseudepigraphical writings in the main support the view that the objectionable practices mentioned in the 'Hebrew' article lay outside the range of topics contemplated by the authors. Even the picture of priests having 'their clothes rent, and their heads and beards shaven,' and roaring and crying before their gods 'as men do at the feast when one is dead' (*Ep. Jer.* vv.[31. 33]), is taken from Babylonian idol-worship, and does not necessarily point to exactly similar practices among the Jews. With regard to the number of days given up to mourning, it is remarkable that, whilst Jth 16^{24} and Sir 22^{12} show that the practice of keeping seven days was usually continued, the *Life of Adam and Eve* speaks of six days' mourning, the seventh being (like a Sabbath) reserved for rest and joy. Ben-Sira (apparently inconsistent with himself) furthermore recommends (38^{17}) a day or two, 'lest thou be evil spoken of.'* If, therefore, Schwally's suggestion (*op. cit.* p. 41), that the seven days' mourning corresponds to the number of days assigned to great religious festivals, were adopted, it would at the same time follow that in the times to which the apocryphal books belong this idea had lost its hold upon the popular mind.

Necromancy in its ordinary form also lies outside the range of topics dealt with by the writers of this literature. But the appearance of the high priest Onias and the prophet Jeremiah to Judas Maccabæus in a dream on the eve of his battle against Nicanor (2 Mac $15^{12ff.}$) represents a form of oneiromancy that is pretty closely related to necromancy (cf. the appearance of Alexander to his thrice married widow Glaphyra, recorded in Jos. *Ant.* XVII. xiii. 4; *BJ* II. vii. 4). Ben-Sira, representing, as he did, Hebraism pure and simple, declares, however, that 'divinations, and soothsayings, and dreams are vain' (Sir 34^5). The call addressed to the 'spirits and souls of the righteous' (Song of the three Children [64]) to join in the universal hymn of praise to the Creator has a poetic ring about it, but the whole Song might be brought into relation with animistic conceptions.

2. Talmudic and Midrashic literature.—It may at first sight seem strange that the number of persons who gained the distinction of being translated to heaven without having died and gone down to Sheol, is considerably increased in some of the later additions belonging to Talmudic, Midrashic, and allied literature. This advance is, however, in reality quite in keeping with the greater facility for the glorification of distinguished human personalities under the final monotheistic development of Mosaism referred to at the end of the 'Hebrew' article. In the minor Talmudical tractate *Derekh Ereṣ Zuṭṭa* (7th or 8th cent.), ch. i., seven (or, according to others, eight) others, besides Enoch and Elijah (including the Messiah; Eliezer, the servant of Abraham; Hiram, king of Tyre, etc.),† are accorded this honour. In *Yalḳuṭ Ezekiel*, § 367 (about 11th cent.), thirteen such translations are enumerated, the name of Methuselah being among those added to the preceding list. The *Alphabetum Siracidis* (ed. Steinschneider, Berlin, 1858) occupies a middle position between the two lists named, the number of translations being eleven (one of the number, however, being the posterity of the phœnix). Specially developed in Talmudic and Midrashic literature is what may fairly be called the cult of Elijah, who, according to Mal 4^5, was to be the herald of a new order of things, and whose expected appearance as the forerunner of the Messiah is referred to in the NT (*e.g.* Mt $17^{10ff.}$). Quite in keeping with this expectation is, for instance, the conversation of Elijah with R. Yōsē related in *Berākhōth*, 3*a*, where the grief caused to the Deity by Israel's captivity is so forcibly and characteristically described. On the Midrashic statements regarding the high favour accorded to Moses at his death, see § 1 in the 'Hebrew' article.

A very important concession to popular habits of thought is made in the minor Talmudical tractate *Semāḥōth* (prob. 7th or 8th cent.), ch. viii., where the custom of placing the dead person's pen (or reed) and ink as well as his key and writing-tablet by his side in the grave is countenanced, although the belief in the ability of the departed to use these things might be considered to be perpetuated thereby. The concession is indeed ex-

* In the OT, however, the plural only of this word is used. The Greek ἐπὶ (or ἐν) νεκρῷ appears to rest on a misreading (*gōlāl* for *gillūl*); so also the Syriac.

* The suggestion that mourning for distant relatives only is here meant does not seem to suit the context (see note in Kautzsch's edition).

† For the full enumeration of this and the following lists see A. P. Bender, 'Death, Burial, and Mourning,' etc., in *JQR* vi. (1894) 341 f.

pressly granted, notwithstanding its known approximation to 'Amorite' customs. In the *Shulḥān 'Arūkh* of Joseph Caro (*ob.* Safed, 1575), which is the accepted guide of strictly orthodox Judaism at the present day, the same practice is tolerated (see *Hilkhoth 'Abheluth*, § 350). Merely academic is, of course, the permission to make burnings for kings, but not for persons of inferior rank (*ib.* § 348; *Semāḥōth*, ch. viii.; cf. the 'Hebrew' article, § 3). One of the explanations suggested to account for the pouring away of all the water found in a house in which a death has taken place, is that an offering to the dead, or, at any rate, a provision of drink for them, was thereby intended (see A. P. Bender, *JQR* vii. [1895] p. 106 ff.). It is, however, more likely that the water was poured away because it was believed to have contracted contamination * (see § 7 in the 'Hebrew' article). A Karaite writer of the 10th cent. (Abu's-Sari b. Maṣliaḥ) declares that a number of Rabbinite Jews of his day were in the habit of burning candles and offering incense on the graves of the righteous.† A transformation of this custom similar to that noticed in 2 Mac. (see § 1) is found, *e.g.*, in *Midrash Tanḥūmah* on *Ha'ăzīnū* (the last weekly pericope but one in Deuteronomy), where the religious commemoration of the dead on the Sabbath is recommended in order to prevent their returning to Gehenna (cf. the remarks on *Ḳaddīsh* and *Hazkārath Neshāmōth* in the next §).

Not much that can be regarded as significant is here to be noted in connexion with *mourning customs*. The repast provided in modern times for mourners by their neighbours after a funeral is clearly understood to have the object of thus offering sympathy and consolation to the bereaved, who are, besides, naturally unable to make satisfactory provision for their own wants at such a time. The rending of the garments on the part of mourners is now generally but a slight ceremonial act, consisting in tearing the (left) lapel of the coat one is wearing. In Talmudical and subsequent times there was a custom of baring the shoulder and arm (see Bab. *Baba Qāma*, 17*a*, and cf. *Semāḥōth* ix.). A. Büchler (*ZATW*, 1901, pp. 81–92) regards this act as a sign of subjection of the living to the dead (see § 5 (*a*) in the 'Hebrew' article). If so, there would here be a survival of the cult of the dead in the old sense of the word.‡

Jastrow (*ZATW*, 1902, pp. 117–120) tries to controvert Büchler's opinion by showing that practices of this kind are a return to ancient habits of life, entire nakedness having, in fact, originally obtained in connexion with mourning (see § 5 (*a*) in the 'Hebrew' article), because a state of nudity was the primitive condition of man. In reality, however, the two explanations do not clash with each other, for the sense of self-humiliation and subjection to the departed spirit would be quite compatible with a reversion to an older and less dignified mode of existence.

All trace of ancestor-worship (supposing that there ever was any in it) has disappeared from the rather precarious working of the levirate law in modern times. Nor is there now any trace of a ritual tabu in the Rabbinical ideas bearing on the uncleanness of dead bodies, fear of contamination through contact with a decaying human organism being the explanation adopted. A certain kind of necromancy, on the other hand, reappears in, *e.g.*,

* Mr. Israel Abrahams, on the authority of Nissim Gerondi (*ob.* shortly after 1374), favours the view that the pouring away of water was a method of making known the occurrence of a death (*Jewish Life in the Middle Ages*, p. 334); but if so, what need was there of pouring away *all* the water in the house? The likelihood is that the practice, though primarily pointing to quite a different principle, naturally got to serve in a secondary way to indicate death by a kind of association of ideas.

† See Perles, *MGWJ*, 1861, p. 389.

‡ The report found in *Semāḥōth* ix., of R. 'Akiba striking his breast at the death of R. Eliezer until the blood gushed out, has apparently no ritual significance, the act having been merely an expression of great personal grief.

Bab. *Berākhōth*, 18*b* (parallel passage in *'Abōth de-Rabbi Nathan*, ch. iii.), where a certain pietist, having on some occasions taken up his lodging at the cemetery, is reported to have overheard the conversation of two spirits regarding the success or failure of crops sown at different times of the year.

3. The Liturgy.—The high veneration, almost amounting to a cult, paid to Moses and Elijah, also finds expression in some parts of the Jewish ritual. A cup of wine is at the present time in many places reserved for Elijah in the Passover-night Service,* which, though celebrated in commemoration of the release from Egypt, also emphasizes the hope of future redemption by the Messiah, whose forerunner was to be Elijah. The same prophet is also assumed to preside at the ceremony of circumcision, the chair in which the actual operator sits being designated the 'chair of Elijah'† in the German and other forms of the ritual. In the *Pirḳe de-Rabbi Eliezer* (latter half of the 8th cent.), end of ch. xxix., this idea is brought into connexion with Elijah's well-known zeal for Jahweh, the child being by the rite of circumcision initiated into Israel's covenant with Jahweh. Moses, his work and his death, are the subject of a number of hymns in the *Maḥzōr* (extended Service Book) for the Feast of Weeks (in connexion with the giving of the Law on Sinai) and the Passover. The liturgical elaboration of the life and work of Moses is specially prominent in the ritual of the Karaites (sect founded about the middle of the 8th century).

The most important portions of the synagogue services to be noted here are, however, the *Ḳaddīsh* and *Hazkārath Neshāmōth*.

(*a*) The *Ḳaddīsh*, which is of the nature of a doxology and embodies the Messianic hope, but contains no mention of the dead, was primarily instituted for recitation after completing the study of a section of the Talmud and at the end of a Talmudic discourse or lecture. But as the merit of the study of the Torah (by which the Talmud as the authoritative exposition of the Torah was mainly understood) was considered exceedingly potent, the idea must have arisen early that the living might thereby benefit even the departed; and it probably thus came about that the doxology concluding such study was assigned to mourners. In *Massekheth Sōpherīm* (prob. 6th or 7th cent.), xix. 12, its use in this connexion appears firmly established, though its recitation is assigned to the cantor. Later on its recital was ordered to follow every burial (see Moses b. Naḥmān [*ob.* 1268 or 1269], *Tōrath ha-Adam*, ed. Venice, 1595, fol. 50*a*); and the mourners' *Ḳaddish* in the full modern sense of the word is mentioned in the French ritual known as *Maḥzōr Vitry* (A.D. 1208). The *Ḳaddish* thus gradually became, though never exclusively so, an indirect prayer for the departed. Its original connexion with the study of the Torah was in this use of it (as indeed in several other of its uses) lost sight of, and the idea of benefiting the dead by the special act of worship on the part of the surviving son or sons became very prominent.‡

The practice thus connects itself in idea with the new or inverted cult of the dead which was

* This custom, of which no trace has so far been found in mediæval MSS and early printed liturgical books, is probably due to the influences of later Kabbalism, though—as stated in the text—it is capable of being reasonably based on an old tradition.

† It is possible that the 'chair of Moses' in the now demolished Jewish synagogue at Kai-feng-fu in China (see *JQR*, Oct. 1900, p. 29) was intended to serve the same purpose.

‡ Compare the development of the custom as stated in L. N. Dembitz, *Jewish Services in Synagogue and Home*, pp. 109–110; see also the art. 'Kaddish' in Hamburger's *RE* ii. A statement on the different forms of the *Ḳaddish* will also be found in these works.

already in vogue in Maccabæan times, or, at any rate, at the time to which the composition of 2 Mac. belongs (see § 1). Instead of seeking to obtain benefits through the agency of the dead, the living engage in actions calculated to improve the condition of the departed; and as the surviving son or sons are the most approved agents of this form of the cult, it is only natural for those who see in the law of levirate (see § 6 in the 'Hebrew' article) an original connexion with the ancient sacrificial cult of the dead, to bring this use of the *Ḳaddish* into relation with that law, and to refer the religious function obligatory on the descendants to the same motive in both sets of regulations. The objection that might be raised is that, if the *Ḳaddish* were really connected with the idea underlying the law of levirate and the ancient sacrificial ritual of the dead, one would have expected to find it in use in much earlier times than can be attested by the existing literary evidence, continuity in essence being one of the marks of gradual development. But it is, on the other hand, not against analogy to suppose that if —as is very likely to have been the case—the idea itself was never eradicated from the popular mind, it should, under certain favourable influences,* have been later on fully revived under the form of the *Ḳaddish Yāthōm* (orphan's *Ḳaddish*). Such a use of the doxology would be merely one more instance of the embodiment of old forms of thought in fresh and later shapes.

(*b*) The same may also be said of the most solemn office connected with the departed, *i.e.* the *Hazkārath Neshāmōth* ('remembrance of souls'), which forms part of the Ashkenāzi ritual for the eighth day of the Passover, the second day of Pentecost, the eighth day of the Feast of Tabernacles, and the Day of Atonement. In this office direct petitions for the well-being of departed parents and other relatives are offered,† thus more explicitly attesting the revival (though in a much modified form), since mediæval times, of an earlier idea that the living are capable of rendering substantial service to the departed. In the Spanish ritual the same idea, in the form of direct petitions, is embodied in the *Hashkabah* ('laying to rest') which forms part of the Burial Service, and is also —under certain special regulations—recited during the synagogue services.‡

Mention should also here be made of the 'Jahrzeit,' or annual commemoration of departed parents, at which the *Ḳaddish* forms the most important feature, a candle being also kept burning for twenty-four hours.§ But the Jewish Liturgy also embodies petitions in which the merit of the departed is, *vice versa*, pleaded on behalf of the living, thus coming nearer to the old idea of seeking support from the spirits of the dead rather than offering help to them. In the famous prayer *Abīnū Malkēnū* ('Our Father, our King'), the merit of the martyrs is claimed as a ground for obtaining favour from the Almighty. The frequently occurring idea of *Z'kūth 'Abōth*‖ ('merit of the fathers') may indeed not unreasonably be attached to the invocation, in the ancient 'prayer of eighteen' (1st to 2nd cent. A.D. at the latest), of the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. In conclusion, the practice of asking pardon of the dead in a ceremony at the grave (see *Shulḥān 'Arūkh*, i. § 606) may be mentioned. The mystical or spiritual union of the living with the dead and the possibility of interaction between the two states of being are clearly expressed in this interesting ritual.

4. The Kabbalah.—The cult of Elijah is very prominent in Kabbalistic literature. The founders (12th cent.) of the developed form of mysticism which is more particularly designated by the term 'Kabbalah' claimed to have received their instruction from the prophet in person. In the *Zōhar* (a work compiled in the latter part of the 13th cent., but attributed to the Tanna Rabbi Simeon b. Yoḥai (2nd cent.), which is the great text-book of the Kabbalah, Elijah also often appears as instructor under the title *Sabha* (*i.e.* 'the ancient one'). Moses, under the title *Ra'ya Meḥēmna* (*i.e.* 'faithful shepherd'), appears, in a section bearing the same title, in conference with Elijah and R. Simeon b. Yoḥai; Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and other worthies being also present at the deliberations, which are honoured by the appearance of the Deity Himself. Meṭaṭrōn, who very frequently figures in the Kabbalah, but whose exact nature and origin have not yet been satisfactorily explained, is in many places identified with Enoch.* R. Simeon b. Yoḥai himself, designated *Būṣina Ḳaddisha* ('sacred light'), is almost deified, and great veneration is also paid to leaders of later Kabbalistic schools, more particularly Isaac Luria (*ob.* 1572) and Baal-shem (*ob.* 1761).

Connected with the honours paid to departed worthies is the doctrine of metempsychosis, which, though in origin and essence entirely foreign to Mosaism,† and indeed to Semitic thought in general, succeeded about the 8th cent. in passing from Greek (and Indian) thought into the tenets of certain Jewish sectaries, through the medium of Muhammadan mysticism. Sa'adyah Gaon (*ob.* 942), who appears to be the first to make mention of it in orthodox Jewish literature, protests strongly against it.‡ But it nevertheless gained a firm footing in the Kabbalah, and attained an extraordinary development in the comparatively modern Kabbalistic system of Isaac Luria, the works on *gilgūlīm* ('transmigrations') composed by himself and his followers, containing long lists of identifications of ancient personages with men and women of later date.§ An addition to the doctrine of metempsychosis made by the Kabbalists is the principle of *ibbūr* ('impregnation'). If two souls (who may, of course, be spirits of the dead) do not separately feel equal to their several tasks, God unites them in one body, so that they may support and complete each other. This doctrine may have been suggested by the theory of incubation (see farther on), which is itself clearly connected with the belief in demoniacal possession, taking the term 'demon' in this instance to denote a spirit, without reference to its origin or moral qualities.

Pilgrimages to graves‖ are much encouraged by the later Kabbalists. The tomb of Simeon b.

* It may thus well be that, as some have thought, the *Ḳaddish* is in a way the Jewish counterpart of certain practices in the Roman Church; but the idea underlying it would at the same time go back to ancient truly Semitic habits of thought.

† For further details see, *e.g.*, L. N. Dembitz, *op. cit.* pp. 219–220.

‡ See Dr. Gaster's edition of the Spanish Services, vol. i. p. 200 ff.; L. N. Dembitz, *Jewish Encyclopedia*, vol. vi. p. 283 f.

§ The article 'Jahrzeit' in the *JE* (vol. vii.) will be found instructive, for both the modern and the ancient manner of observing it.

‖ The Samaritans often use the formula זכות משה ('by the merit of Moses').

* See especially the passage in *Massekheth 'Aṣīlūth* (ed. Jellinek, *Ginzē*, etc. p. 3), where Metatron is stated to have been originally human (flesh and blood). For various attempts to explain the name and office of Metatron see *Literaturblatt des Orients*, 1847, coll. 282–283; Oesterley and Box, *Religion and Worship of the Synagogue* (1907), pp. 107–178.

† See A. Schmiedl, *Studien über jüdische Religionsphilosophie* (Vienna, 1869), pp. 159–166. The phrase *μεταβαίνειν εἰς ἕτερον σῶμα*, used by Josephus in connexion with the belief of the Pharisees (*BJ* II. viii. 14), must refer to the resurrection (comp. the parallel passage in *Ant.* XVIII. i. 3).

‡ *Emūnōth we-Dē'ōth*, ch. vi.

§ Compare the belief implied (though not countenanced in its literary sense) in Mt 11^{14}, Lk 1^{17}.

‖ On pilgrimages generally the art. 'Pilgrimage' in the *JE* (vol. x.) should be consulted.

Yohai at Meron near Safed is thus devoutly resorted to on the 33rd of 'Omar (*i.e.* the 33rd day from the 2nd day of Passover), when a great popular festival, at which illuminations are an important feature, is held in honour of the saint. Pilgrimages to the grave of Isaac Luria at Safed are made each new moon, and the persistence in many places of the popular custom of praying at stated times (as, *e.g.*, on the 9th of Ab) at the graves of departed relatives is probably also partly due to the influence of Kabbalistic ideas.

The efforts of 16th cent. and later Kabbalists to obtain inspiration from the souls of the departed by clinging with outstretched bodies to their graves, and thus in a manner to become incubated with the spirits of the dead, remind one of the practice of necromancy at graves condemned in Is 65[4] (see § 8 in the 'Hebrew' art.); but as the Kabbalists evidently arrived at this method by a new and largely borrowed line of thought, and as, furthermore, their object was not necromancy, but what they regarded as spiritual illumination, the custom cannot be regarded as a revival of the ancient practice. A species of oneiromancy is the same Kabbalists' belief that information of high import can be obtained through dream-visions of the departed.

Summary.—The general result obtained from a study of the Jewish part of the subject is, owing to the diverse forms of development undergone by the thoughts and practices of the people in different periods and widely scattered countries, far from homogeneous. The Talmudic and Midrashic literature thus exhibits a larger amount of reminiscence of, or reversion to, ancient thought than the Apocryphal and Pseudepigraphical writings, though these latter stood nearer in point of time to earlier Hebraism; and the Liturgy, influenced partly by the Kabbalah, and partly—as is not unlikely—by Christian practices, shows some interesting instances of the revival of old ideas in a much modified form. The Kabbalah itself, as has been shown, has added the doctrine of metempsychosis to the original Jewish and Hebrew stock of ideas, and it has in connexion with it furthermore introduced the theory of dual psychic personality in one body, thereby affecting the spirits of the departed in a manner previously unheard of in Judaism.

LITERATURE.—Besides the passages of the original sources (Apocrypha, etc.) referred to in the article, the following books, essays, or articles may be consulted with advantage. For Apocryphal and Pseudepigraphical literature, ch. iii. in F. Schwally's *Leben nach dem Tode*, 1892. From the Rabbinic point of view, J. Perles, 'Die Leichenfeierlichkeiten im nachbiblischen Judenthum' in *MGWJ* x. [1861] pp. 345 ff., 376 ff.; A. P. Bender, 'Beliefs, Rites, and Customs of the Jews, connected with Death, Burial, and Mourning' in *JQR* vi. [1894–5] 317 ff., 664, vii. 101 ff., 259 ff. [also discusses modern points of view]; A. Büchler, 'Das Entblössen der Schulter und des Armes als Zeichen der Trauer' in *ZATW*, 1901, pp. 81–92. For points in the Liturgy, the articles 'Seelenfeier,' 'Kaddish,' etc., in Hamburger's *RE*; L. N. Dembitz, *Jewish Services in Synagogue and Home* [the same author wrote the art. 'Kaddish,' etc., in the *JE*]. For metempsychosis, etc., L. Ginzberg's instructive art. 'Cabala' in *JE* iii. [requires, however, to be supplemented from other sources]; also I. Broydé's 'Transmigration of Souls' in *JE* xii. 231–234. Some other works dealing with the subject will be found in the literature given at the beginning of C. Grüneisen's *Der Ahnenkultus und die Urreligion Israels*, 1900. G. MARGOLIOUTH.

ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND CULT OF THE DEAD (Polynesian and Tasmanian).—

In Polynesia, ancestor-worship was far less important than in Melanesia or Micronesia. Throughout this group, moreover, it was only the nobles who retained an existence after death, the souls of the common people perishing immediately after dissolution (Waitz-Gerland, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, Leipzig, 1872, vi. 302; Dillon, *Narrative of a Voyage in the South Sea*, London, 1829, ii. 10–11). The ghosts of the dead might appear to the living and might work them either weal or woe, but they were in the main maleficent, and were accordingly, for the most part, objects of dread (Waitz-Gerland, pp. 315–316, 330, 332). Between the general worship of ghosts and the cult of ancestors a distinction should be drawn, evanescent though the line of demarcation often becomes. Ellis (*Polynesian Researches*, 2nd ed., London, 1832–1836, i. 334–336) expressly postulates the existence of *oramatuas*, or 'ancestors,' who ranked next to the *atuas*, or gods, and were often the spirits of deceased fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, children, and other relatives, as well as of departed warriors who had been conspicuous for bravery. Although the *oramatuas* frequently helped in time of need, and opposed the malevolence of other ghosts or of hostile magic, they were, as a rule, cruel and irritable. It was thus necessary to place the corpse of the dead at a considerable height above the ground, this being apparently the origin of the *fata tupapau*, or altar for the dead (Moerenhout, *Voyages aux îles du Grand Océan*, Paris, 1837, i. 470–471). Food was brought daily to the dead for six weeks or two months, and if the deceased had been a man of eminence, a special priest, termed *haivatupapau*, visited the body for several weeks and offered it food. It was believed that the *oramatua* could smell the spiritual part of this offering, and, in case it returned, it would therefore be gratified and content, so that it would not desire to resume earthly life (Ellis, i. 404–405; Moerenhout, i. 547; Wilson, *Missionary Voyage to the Southern Pacific Ocean*, London, 1799, p. 345). At the burial of a chief a hole was often dug in which the hostility of the deceased against his family for their supposed malevolence, which had resulted in his death, was buried, thus obviating the possibility of his maleficent return to his surviving kinsmen (Moerenhout, i. 552). Connected in a sense with the cult of ancestors was the mourning for the dead, together with the self-mutilations practised by the survivors (Waitz-Gerland, vi. 401–404); and here, too, belong the human sacrifices of wives, slaves, and favourites at graves in New Zealand, Hawaii (Waitz-Gerland, vi. 404–405), and the Fiji Islands (Russel, *Polynesia*, Edinburgh, 1843, p. 72). The motive for both these latter features was either the gratification of the *oramatua* at the sight of the grief which his death had caused, or a provision for his needs in the future life.

The religion of the Tasmanians was at a much lower stage of development than that of the Polynesians; yet it is clear that they, too, believed in a life beyond the grave, and thought that the souls of the dead might return to bless or curse them. They accordingly carried a bone of the deceased as a charm; yet the 'shades' (*warawali*) of dead relatives and friends were regarded, on the whole, as more kindly than the gods. Of an actual cult of ancestors, however, little seems to be known (Ling Roth, *Aborigines of Tasmania*, 2nd ed., Halifax, 1899, pp. 54–55). LOUIS H. GRAY.

ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND CULT OF THE DEAD (Roman).—

The great extent of ancestor-worship among the Romans, and its equally great limitations, make it not only one of the most interesting problems in the field of Roman religion, but also a subject the understanding of which brings with it a grasp of the fundamental principles which governed the formation and the development of the religion of the Romans. As it is in the main a private worship (*sacra privata*) rather than a public one (*sacra publica*; for the distinction, cf. Wissowa, p. 334; Marquardt, p. 120 ff.), our sources for the Kingdom and the Republic are limited, and it is only in the

Empire, with its vast number of sepulchral inscriptions (*CIL* vi., *CIG* xiv., over 40,000 for Rome alone) that we have any extensive contemporary sources. For the earlier period, however, we have a sufficient number of literary sources to enable us to form a definite idea of the cult, inasmuch as the stereotyped character of all religious ceremonial justifies us in combining testimonies from various historical periods; and, though the underlying ideas did undoubtedly change somewhat from generation to generation, there was a certain conservative force at work too. It will be most convenient, therefore, to treat of the underlying ideas and the expressions of them in cult acts, first during the general period of the Republic, and then, secondly, to sketch the development of these ideas from the close of the Republic onwards during the course of the Empire.

I. From the Earliest Period to the Close of the Republic.

1. The first and most fundamental question which requires an answer is this, Are any of the Roman gods to be traced back to ancestor-worship as their origin? From Euhemerus (cf. Rohde, *Gr. Roman*, 220 ff.) down to Herbert Spencer (*Principles of Sociology*) it has been a favourite contention that many great deities were in origin nothing but deified ancestors. An examination of Roman religion in its earliest state shows that this was not the case in Rome. The religion of the earliest period reveals distinct traces of animism (cf. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, i. 377 ff., ii. 1–377)—that belief common to all primitive peoples, which posits for all things, animate and inanimate, living and dead, a 'double,' or psychic parallel, which has an effect on the thing itself and must therefore be propitiated. These doubles are potentialities rather than individualities. They are interesting not so much for what they are as for what they do. Now, Roman religion is peculiarly interesting in this respect, because in it we see a development of animism one step further. Certain of these powers have advanced sufficiently towards individuality to acquire a name, but they are none of them as yet individuals thought of in the fashion of man (on the importance of names cf. Frazer, *Golden Bough*[2], i. 403 ff.); hence there was not, could not be, a native Roman mythology. They were advancing towards it when Greek influence placed her myths at Rome's disposal, so that she never developed any of her own. On the other hand, a great number of the gods of the earliest period were still mere potentialities, thought of in groups rather than as individuals, *e.g.* the *Di Penates*, powers who guarded the storeroom, the *Di Agrestes*, powers who looked after the crops. It was into one of these groups that the dead went, into the *Di Manes*, the 'good gods' (*manus* = 'good'; cf. Roscher, ii. 2316). It will be readily seen, therefore, that, far from its being the case that the dead were ever made great individual gods, they received such divinity as they had by the same processes of thought which made all gods, great and small.

If further proof is needed, it may be found in the total absence of hero-worship in Roman religion, as it was before Greek influence came; and in the significant fact that, when under Greek influence two great characters of Græco-Roman mythology, Æneas and Romulus, were elevated to the rank of gods, theologians found nothing better to do than to identify them with two already existing old Roman deities, Numicius and Quirinus respectively (for Æneas = Numicius, cf. Rossbach in Pauly-Wissowa, i. 1015; Aust in Roscher, iii. 475. For Romulus = Quirinus, cf. Wissowa, p. 141). Every attempt to make even the *Di Manes* the source of other deities has been a failure. It has been tried repeatedly, but in vain, in the case of the *Lar Familiaris* or protecting spirit of the house (cf. Fustel de Coulanges, *La Cité antique*, p. 20; Nissen, *Templum*, p. 148; Rohde, *Psyche*[3], i. p. 254).

2. Having rid our discussion of any connexion between the deified dead and other individual deities of Rome, we must now try to make clear to ourselves what the concept of the Di Manes was, and how the Romans felt towards them. It has often been asserted that the Romans had from the beginning a persistent and continuous belief in the immortality of the soul. This statement is absolutely misleading. We have seen that the habit of thought of the early Romans posited a double for everything; the dead must therefore have a double as well as the living. This double, even though it was the double of the dead, was thought of as possessing a certain sort of life—it could at certain times return to earth and exercise an influence for ill upon the living. This potentiality, however, was simply one of a vast number of similar potentialities; there was nothing individual about it, except its relation to its own family represented by the living members. Subsequent centuries, saturated with Greek philosophy and filled with an idea of individuality which was totally lacking in the earlier days of Rome, identified this poor shadowy potentiality with the human soul, and read into the whole matter a belief in immortality.

In the presence of the mystery of death, a mystery which even the light of Christianity has not wished fully to remove, men's minds do not work logically, and there is no part of religious beliefs where contradictions are more abundant than in the beliefs concerning the dead. Roman religion, in spite of its generally logical character, is no exception to the rule. It will never be possible for us, even with all the sepulchral inscriptions in the world, to establish one formula which will cover all cases—for the simple reason that no such formula ever existed. We are, however, able to make a general statement which will represent fairly well the normal concept, apart from the very numerous and very contradictory deviations.

When a man died, he went over into the *Di Manes*,—the good gods,—entering their ranks and losing all individuality and all specific earthly relations, except that when the *Manes* returned to earth, they visited the living members of the family to which they had belonged on earth; and thus the family idea, so fundamental in the social structure of Rome, triumphed over the grave, and possessed an immortality which the individual failed to obtain. The inclusiveness of the term *Di Manes* is seen in the fact that the gods who ruled over the dead, as well as their subjects, the dead themselves as gods, were all included in the phrase, though it is equally significant of the mass-idea that the actual gods of the dead, though demonstrably present, never rose to great individual prominence until the Greek Pluto-Persephone came into Rome as *Dis-Proserpina*.

3. Upon this theory of the *Manes* the cult followed inevitably. If the dead were able to influence the affairs of the living, they must be propitiated, and inasmuch as their interference was primarily with the affairs of the family to which they had originally belonged, and still did belong, it was incumbent upon the living members of that family to see that they were propitiated. Thus the cult of the dead was in its origin an ancestor-worship, and may well have been originally a family matter exclusively. Further, it was incumbent upon each living member of the family not only to perform these sacrifices, but also to

provide those who would succeed to the sacrifices after his death, in other words, to propagate the family. As for the State itself, it was also a family; and thus in that macrocosm of family life which the early State religion shows,—with its Vesta and its Penates,—there might come also sacrifices for the dead, not only for the dead already provided for by their own families, but also for that ever-increasing number of 'ancestors' whose descendants, in spite of all precautions, had ceased, that homeless throng of spirits whose immediate claims on the world of the living had been removed, and who therefore all the more readily would turn their ill-will against the State at large, unless she gave them satisfaction. Thus it was that both the *sacra privata* and the *sacra publica* were in part a worship of the dead.

There are sufficient suggestions and recollections in the body of Roman law to warrant the assumption of this theory, which, as one readily recognizes, is a close parallel to the Hindu law; but there is also this distinction, that, whereas Hindu law is based directly upon a sacral foundation, Roman law, when we first meet it, is already in the dual stage of *jus divinum* and *jus humanum*, with their intricate interlocking, so that we have merely the shadow picture of what once was. But even the shadow picture is tolerably complete, and the *jus Manium* formed one of the regular topics of Roman law, especially in relation to heirs and inheritances. The cardinal principle was the continuity of family worship (*perpetua sacra sunto*). Thus Cicero (*de Legibus*, ii. 22) quotes an old law: 'Let private sacrifices continue forever,' 'Keep sacred the laws concerning the divine dead.' The heir was under obligations to continue the sacrifices, and this was a prior lien on any money which the inheritance might bring him. Similarly, cases of adoption were often motived by the desire of the adopter to obtain an heir to care for the sacrifices; and, though the process was a civil one, it was necessary, inasmuch as it involved the giving up of one set of sacrifices and the taking of another on the part of the adopted person, to discuss it in the oldest and most primitive of all the assemblies—the Comitia Curiata—and to obtain the consent of the Pontifex Maximus to the giving up of the one set of *sacra* (the so-called *detestatio sacrorum*, cf. Hunter, p. 766), a consent which was never given if the transfer left the one set of *sacra* destitute of an earthly representative (for a similar precaution in Hindu law, cf. Hunter, p. 205, note 2). We may also compare the old law ascribed to Romulus (Plut. *Rom.* 22), whereby whoever sells his wife is given over to the *Manes*, probably because this was a blow to the stability of the family, and hence to the continuity of sacrifices to the dead. The actuating motive underlying all the *jura Manium*, all the enactments concerning the dead, was neither a chivalrous pity nor primarily a regard for the comfort of the dead, but first and foremost a self-protective action on the part of the living. So fearful were men lest they might in some way have offended the gods of the other world, and lest the powers under the earth might hinder the gathering of the crops which had come out of the earth, that every year before the beginning of harvest a sow (*porca præcidanea*) was sacrificed to Tellus (and probably also to Ceres) 'by him who had not given the dead his due' (Paul. p. 223); later, by all men to Ceres and Tellus together, for fear they might have offended, so that eventually it began to be thought of merely as a sacrifice to Ceres for a good harvest (Wissowa, p. 160).

4. In its earlier stages the cult of the dead belonged to the religion of fear rather than the religion of love. The spirits of the dead were capable of doing injury; they must first be brought to rest in the lower world. There they were incapable of doing harm, and they could rise from there only on certain occasions, and on those occasions religion provided for their pacification. All the cult acts pertaining to the dead may be grouped, therefore, under these two ideas, the bringing of the spirits to rest, which must be done immediately after death, and the placating of the spirits on the regular annual occasions when they returned to earth again. Around this crude religion of fear the religion of love wound itself, breathing a new and better spirit into these old forms, and possibly instituting one or two festivals of its own. But we must deal first with the self-protective apotropaic side.

The ceremonies connected with death and burial do not as a whole concern us here, but merely those festivals which were strictly religious in character. These features seem, all of them, to go back to two ideas which are so intertwined that for us they are practically inseparable—possibly they always were. One is the offerings given to the dead as a newly formed member of the *Manes*, including a proper burial, as giving him a home, and the offerings of food, etc.; and the other is the ceremonies of purification which were necessary for the living, after their close contact with this lower world at the edge of the open grave (cf. the idea of the *Manes* coming for the dead, which occurs occasionally in inscriptions, *e.g. CIL* ii. 2255 [Corduba]: 'the Manes have taken Abullia'). There is a considerable degree of uncertainty attaching to the exact order and names for the various ceremonies connected with and following the funeral; writers of the Empire, who are practically our only authorities, seem to be confusing Greek and Roman ideas, and older with newer Roman customs, and possibly the details will never be fully straightened out. But in general the matter was as follows. The supreme duty towards the dead was burial. Doubtless an ethical motive of piety, a desire to give the dead a home for his own sake, often re-inforced this duty; but the fundamental motive was one of self-protection, on the principle that the ghost of the dead would continue to haunt the living until a place was provided for it (Tertullian, *de Anim.* 56: 'It was believed that the unburied did not descend to the world below before they had received their due,' *i.e.* burial). Curiously enough, in certain cases it seems to have been felt that the dead had forfeited the right of burial, *e.g.* in the case of suicides, of those lawfully put to death, and of those struck by lightning. Here it was an equally great duty to abstain from burial, and there seems to have been no fear of evil consequences from their shades. But in all other cases burial was an ethical imperative (Quintilian, *Decl.* v. 6: 'Because even upon unknown dead we heap earth, and no one ever is in too great a hurry to honour an unburied body by putting earth, be it ever so little, on it'). The question of burial *versus* cremation in the various epochs of Roman history does not concern us here, for in either case the grave was sacred; but burial seems always to have held at least a symbolic supremacy—owing to the *os resectum*, or the custom of burying at least a portion of the body, *e.g.* a finger, when the rest was cremated. The burial was the most important self-protective act; in comparison with it the other acts were of relatively minor importance; and most of these acts seem to have had more to do with the purification of the surviving members of the family than with the dead himself. One sacrifice of purification took place before the body was carried out for burial: the sacrifice to Ceres of a sow (*porca præsentanea*, not to be confused with the *porca præcidanea* above), 'for the sake of purifying the family' (Festus, p. 250; cf. Mar. Victor. p. 25). In all probability Tellus, Mother Earth, and not Ceres, was the original recipient of the sacrifice, which was transferred to Ceres under the influence of the Greek Demeter cult (cf. Wissowa, p. 161); and hence the sacrifice was probably originally a purification of the living by means of an additional propitiation for the dead. On the day of the funeral and at the grave itself a sacrificial banquet seems to have been offered to the dead (*silicernium*, cf. Marquardt, *Privatleben*, p. 378). It consisted probably of very much the same things as were offered at the regular annual celebration of the *Parentalia* (see below). The nine days immediately following the funeral were days of mourning and purification, the *sacrum novemdiale*, the same term that was decreed by the State for its extraordinary periods of devotion occasioned by some great calamity (on the number nine as a sacred number cf. Diels, *Sibyll. Blätter*, p. 41). On some of these days the *Feriæ Denicales* occurred, a celebration about which we know little, except that

the attendance of the members of the family was considered so necessary that the military authorities recognized it as a valid excuse for the absence of a recruit from the enlistment inspection, 'provided it had not been set on that day for the purpose of serving as an excuse' (Gell. xvi. 4. 3 ff.). The period of mourning ceased on the ninth day with a final banquet, with offerings to the dead, the *cena novemdialis*; and if funeral games were celebrated at all, as they often were, they occurred on this day (*ludi novemdiales*). The spirit of the dead was now safely housed in the lower world, whence he could not return, except on stated occasions; and the Roman could go about his daily business, mindful only of these stated occasions when they arrived.

5. As regards the lower world itself, the Romans seem originally to have interested themselves very little in it. Every bit of description is given us by writers under Greek influence, and the details are identical with those of the lower world of the Greeks. Now, it is not likely that a strong Roman tradition could thus have been totally destroyed; we should certainly find traces of it somewhere. Hence it is probable that the Roman lower world was not furnished with the fittings of imagination until Greek mythology provided the models. There is nothing strange about this, when we realize that the half-animistic character of the Roman pantheon precluded the growth of mythology for both the greater and the lesser gods. From the time of the Punic wars onwards the Romans pictured to themselves the lower world in just the same form as the Greeks had done (cf. Rohde, *Psyche*[3], vol. i.); and before that time, if they thought of it at all, and inevitably they must have done so to some slight extent, it was merely as a place of shadows and darkness. Their practical concern was the question of the eventual return of the spirits to trouble them; and hence their attention was concentrated not on the lower world in pleasant poetic fancies, but on the door between it and the upper world, the passage through which these divine dead came up. This entrance was the *mundus*, about which the Romans possessed original beliefs strong enough to remain even under the pressure of Greek thought. The *mundus* was the opening of the lower world; it was in the form of a trench into which sacrifices to the gods of the lower world, and to the dead as gods, could be thrown. In the centre of every town, at its foundation, such a trench was dug and sacrifices performed. The oldest *mundus* of Rome was that of the Palatine city (for its location cf. Richter, *Die älteste Wohnstätte des röm. Volkes*, Berlin, 1891, p. 7 ff.; Hülsen, *Röm. Mitt.* v. 76 ff., xi. 202 ff.). It was opened three days in the year: August 24, October 5, and November 8; probably the stone, and possibly some earth was removed (cf. Festus, p. 142; Macrobius, *Sat.* i. 16, 17 ff.). 'When,' as Varro says (cf. Macr. i. 1), 'the *mundus* is open, the door of the sad gods of the lower world is open, therefore it is not proper on those days for a battle to be fought, troops to be levied, the army to march forth, a ship to set sail, or a man to marry.' There were other sacred trenches of the same sort in Rome: one in the Forum, the Lacus Curtius, connected with the story of M. Curtius (recently discovered; cf. Hülsen, *Rom. Forum*, p. 139; and, in general, Gilbert, *Top.* i. 334 ff.), another the so-called 'grave of Tarpeia,' which was evidently opened on Feb. 13, when one of the Vestals made sacrifice there (cf. Mommsen, *CIL* i.[2] p. 309; Schwegler, *Röm. Gesch.* i. 486; and, in general, on Tarpeia as a forgotten goddess of the lower world, Wissowa, *Rel. der Röm.* 187, 188), and still another at the 'grave of Larenta' in the Velabrum, to which on Dec. 23 the Pontifices and the Flamen Quirinalis brought offerings (Varro, *Ling. Lat.* vi. 23 ff.; *Fast. Præn.* to Dec. 23; cf. Wissowa, p. 188 and note 1).

6. Apart from these special occasions for each particular *mundus*, there were two general occasions in the year when all the spirits of the dead were supposed to return to earth again, the nine days from Feb. 13–21, and the three days, May 9, 11, 13. The first was called the *Parentalia*, the second the *Lemuria*. These two occasions were so entirely different, and the *Parentalia* is on such an infinitely higher plane ethically than the *Lemuria*, that it is difficult to think of them as having the same origin; yet, when we compare All-souls' Day with Hallowe'en, we see the same divergence. The *Parentalia* kept pace with Rome's increase in culture, whereas all that was crudest in old folklore clung to the *Lemuria*.

Since the *Lemuria* represents a more primitive stage, it had better be discussed first. The most picturesque account is that given by Ovid (*Fasti*, v. 419 ff.), but we must be on our guard in using it, remembering that Greek ideas and a poetical imagination are present in everything that Ovid writes. The ceremony takes place at midnight. The father of the household, barefooted, passes through the house, throws black beans behind his back, and says nine times, 'These I give, and with these I redeem myself and my family.' Then he shakes cymbals and says again nine times, '*Manes exite paterni*,' 'Go forth, ye divine shades of my fathers.' The comparison of this ceremony with the 'driving out of the ghosts,' so common among primitive peoples of to-day, suggests itself immediately (cf. Frazer, *Golden Bough*[2], iii. 83 ff. Here, as everywhere else in this interesting and valuable book, the reader must exercise great care in examining the sources given, as they differ widely in scientific value; cf. also Rohde, *Psyche*[3], i. p. 239).

The *Parentalia* presents quite a different picture. As its name implies, it is the festival of the *parentes*, or the making of offerings to one's ancestors. It began at noon of Feb. 13 and continued for nine days. The first eight days belonged only to the sphere of private worship, but the ninth day (Feb. 21) was also a public celebration, the *Feralia* (Varro, *op. cit.* 13; Paul. p. 85; cf. Marquardt, iii. 310 ff.). During all these nine days marriages were forbidden, the temples were shut, and the magistrates laid aside their official dress. Every family decorated the graves of its ancestors and made offerings there. Most appropriately, on the day after the close of the celebration, Feb. 22, a family festival, the *Caristia*, or *Cara Cognatio*, was held, when family quarrels were adjusted, and the peace which the individual member of the family had just made with the dead was now extended to the living members among themselves (cf. Ovid, *Fasti*, ii. 617; Val. Max. ii. 1, 8; *Calend. Philocal.*; cf. *CIL* i.[2] p. 258).

The attempt has been made to distinguish between the *Lemuria* and the *Parentalia* by considering the former as the festival of the unburied, and therefore hostile, dead, and the latter as the festival of the buried, and therefore friendly, dead (cf. Warde Fowler, *Roman Festivals*, p. 108). The idea of fear is certainly more prominent in the former than in the latter; but the *Lemures* are just the same ancestors as the *Di Parentes*, and the very fact that their interference, either for good or for ill, is confined to stated seasons, proves that they were buried, *i.e.* admitted into the lower world and resident there ordinarily.

Of the other yearly festivals of the dead we know but little: we hear of a festival of the *Carnaria* on the first of June, the 'Bean Calends' (*Calendæ Fabariæ*, Varro in Non. p. 341; Macr. *Sat.* i. 12, 31; Ovid, *Fasti*, vi. 101 ff.), so called from the offering of beans to the dead; but roses were also offered (*CIL* iii. 3893).

7. In one respect the spirit-worship of the Romans was in distinct contrast to that of the Greeks and of most other ancient peoples. The dead had the

power of returning to earth again on stated occasions, but they could not be called up and consulted. 'Necromancy' was an altogether imported idea, and wherever we meet with references to it, foreign influence is present. The absence of this custom is no accident. The idea of prophecy was hardly present in any form in native Roman religion; their science of augury and of the *haruspices* was simply a means of ascertaining the approval or non-approval of the gods in regard to a certain action, merely of obtaining an answer to a categorical question. But if the dead might not be called up arbitrarily to give information, it was possible for certain individuals to be given over to them for punishment, as in the *consecratio*, or for certain individuals voluntarily to give themselves over to them, as in the *devotio*. *Consecratio* is the transfer of a person or thing out of the realm of the *jus humanum* into that of the *jus divinum*. Where a person is involved, it is, of course, a punishment. Persons or things might thus be given over to any deity or group of deities, and the *Di Manes* formed no exception; *e.g.* a man who sold his wife was *dis manibus sacer* (Plut. *Rom.* 22); also a child who struck his parent (Fest. p. 230); and the violator of a grave (*CIL* x. 4255). The characteristics of the *devotio*, on the other hand, are these. It is in the nature of a vow, made to the *Di Manes*, or Tellus and the *Di Manes*, whereby a man's life is given to the *Di Manes* in advance in order that other men's lives may be destroyed. We have semi-legendary accounts of three generals who offered their own lives that the enemy of the State might be destroyed: the first the case of Decius, the father, in the battle of Vesuvius, B.C. 340 (cf. esp. Livy, viii. 6. 8–16; 9. 1–11, and, in general, Münzer in Pauly-Wissowa, iv. 2280); the second that of Decius, the son, in the battle of Sentinum, B.C. 295; and the third that of Decius, the grandson, in the battle of Asculum, B.C. 279 (cf. Münzer, *ib.* iv. 2285; on the *devotio* proper cf. Panly-Wissowa, *ib.*, *s.v.*). The *devotio*, as a curse directed against private individuals, does not belong to this period, as it arose entirely under Greek influence, and does not seem to have been prevalent until the Empire.

II. From the Close of the Republic until the Establishment of Christianity.

1. In the earliest periods of Roman religion the *Di Manes* were quite as truly gods as any of the other gods of Rome, and quite as unlike the later god-concept as any other of the gods. They were all alike thought of animistically as mere potentialities; but the other gods were destined to develop and to obtain an individuality, whereas the *Di Manes* remained an unindividualized mass of spirits, into which the dead man went at death, losing, so far as the cult was concerned, all his individuality except merely his family relationship. To be sure, under Greek influence certain gods of the dead were adopted by the Romans, namely Dis and Proserpina, formed on the analogy of the gods of the upper world; but this had the effect of only emphasizing the more the undeveloped dense mass of the *Di Manes*. On the other hand, during these centuries of the Republic, another idea had been slowly developing—the idea of the Genius (or if a woman, the Juno), or divine double of the individual, accompanying him during all his lifetime. In the question as to what became of the *Genius* at the death of the individual, and in the answering of that question by ascribing to him a life after death, the idea of personal immortality had its rise in Rome. The statements of later writers are obscured, partly by purely philosophical ideas foreign to the real beliefs of the many, and partly by a desire to identify and generally systematize all forms of Roman belief; but we can dimly recognize the following development. Originally the *Genius* and the *Di Manes* had no connexion whatsoever, except the mere matter of sequence; so long as a man lived he had a *Genius*, an individuality, at first thought of as merely physical, later as psychological; but when he died, his individuality ceased, he was gathered to the majority (not the divine doubles of the individuals in it), the *Di Manes*. Now, in the course of time one of the effects of Greece on Rome was the development of individuality and of the idea of individuality. All these ideas centred in the *Genius*, and hence it was natural to think of the *Genius* as existing after death. It must, however, in that case stand in some relation to the *Manes*, it must be identical with at least a part of them, that part contributed by the individual at his death. It is not surprising then, that, beginning with the Augustan age (cf. Hübner, in Müller's *Handbuch*, i. p. 529, § 47), the idea of the individual makes itself felt in connexion with the *Manes*, and we have the form (which soon becomes the ordinary form), 'To the *Manes* of, or belonging to, such a man,' emphasized occasionally by the addition of the *Genius* (cf. *CIL* v. 246, etc.). Sometimes the *Manes* are left out entirely, and we have merely the *Genius* or the Juno of such a person (for the *Genius*, cf. *CIL* v. 246, ix. 5794; for the Juno, v. 160, x. 1009, 1023, 6597). This reinforcement by the *Genius* was the salvation of the *Manes*; it gave new life to the concept, and the *Di Manes* began to develop out of a mere mass of spirits into a host of individual protecting deities. The cult went on in its old forms, but a new spirit, a new idea, had been brought into it. It is along this line that the *Di Manes* had their effect on the two great religious developments of the Empire—the emperor-worship of the first two centuries, and Christianity in its later centuries.

2. *The worship of the dead and emperor-worship.*—The elevation of the Roman emperors into gods was caused by two entirely distinct sets of tendencies; the one coming from the Orient, a tendency which, in so far as it was not checked (as it always was by all the better emperors), made the emperors into gods during their lifetime as well as after death; the other a thoroughly Roman concept, the idea that during life not the man but only his *Genius* was divine, but that after death, when the *Genius* still lived as the individualized *Manes*, the offerings might be made to the individual as a god. The difference, therefore, between an emperor, who allowed himself to be worshipped merely within the limits authorized by Roman ideas, and an ordinary Roman citizen was this: during lifetime the *Genius* of each was an object of worship, but the emperor's *Genius* was always, in all cases, one of the regular gods of the State cult, whereas the *Genius* of the individual belonged purely to the private cult, usually confined to a man's household. After death, both the emperor and the private citizen were worshipped as gods, with a similar distinction, namely, that in the case of certain emperors the Senate, after examining their acts, decreed that they should be included among the regular gods of the State. The only real distinction, therefore, was the inclusion of the emperor's *Genius* among the gods of the State in every case, during life, and the inclusion of the emperor himself, *i.e.* his *Manes*, among the State gods in certain cases after death. There can be little doubt that emperor-worship had the effect of strengthening the worship of the dead in general.

3. *The worship of the dead and Christianity.*—Among the many difficult problems which the teachers of the Christian religion had to solve in

the Roman world, perhaps none was more difficult than that presented by the developed concept of the worship of the dead as protecting and helping deities. Polytheism, so far as the greater gods were concerned, had among the educated classes gone over into monotheism without the aid of Christianity, merely by the doctrine of a philosophical syncretism; but it was with inborn, almost instinctive beliefs, bred in the bone, such as the divinity of the dead, that the Church's real battle had to be fought. Her method was one of compromise; it was the authorization, nay the encouragement, of the worship of certain individuals, men and women who as martyrs had by one act set the seal upon their faith, or whose life had been holy to such a degree as to merit certain miraculous manifestations. The worship of these martyrs and saints was intended primarily to keep them as ensamples in the minds of the living. But this was not enough for a people who had worshipped the dead not so much because they had been good during their lives, as because these gods of the dead were useful to them, protecting and helping them in their hours of danger and need. The saints, too, must accomplish something for them. This also was granted by the Church, but merely in the sense that the saints acted as intermediaries, whose intercession with God would increase the probability of obtaining one's petition. Theology stopped there, but humanity went further. By that facile transfer of the means into the end, of the intermediary into the final, which is so characteristic of simple minds, aided too as they were in this case by a habit of thought which had made the dead into gods like other gods, these saintly intercessors soon became gods on their own account, and the legend of each became a cult-legend, indicating the circumstances in which each was especially powerful. Thus there arose, literally from the dead, a host of minor gods, a myriad of potentialities, like the old gods of the so-called *Indigitamenta*. Human frailty had, at least in the lower classes, triumphed over theology, and the real religious world of the Roman's latest descendants bore a startling resemblance to that of his peasant ancestors in the days of Romulus. See also art. ROMAN RELIGION.

LITERATURE.—Aust, *Religion der Römer*, 1899, pp. 179 ff., 225–232; De Marchi, *Il Culto Privato*, 1896, i. 180–208; W. Fowler, *Roman Festivals*, 1899, *passim*; Hunter, *Roman Law*, 745 f.; Marquardt, *Staatsverwaltung*, 310; Preller, *Röm. Mythologie*, 1858, ii. 61–119; Rohde, *Psyche*[3], i. 216–258; Steuding, art. 'Manes' in Roscher; Tylor, *Primitive Cultures*[3], 1891, *passim*; Wissowa, *Religion der Römer*, 1902, 187–193, and his artt. 'Lemuria' and 'Larvæ' in Roscher.

JESSE BENEDICT CARTER.

ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND CULT OF THE DEAD (Slavonic).—We have only very few references to the cult of the dead among the pagan Slavs. The German chronicler Thietmar, who had not much sympathy with the Slavs, says (in the first Book of his Chronicles, § 14), 'They believe that everything ends with death' ('Omnia cum morte temporali putant finiri'). The Russian chronicler known by the name of Nestor, in the chapter in which he relates the conversion of the Russian prince Vladimir, puts into his mouth the words, 'The Greek priests say that there is another world,' which would seem to imply that the pagan Russians did not believe in that other world. On the other hand, the Bohemian chronicler, Cosmas of Prague, declares that the Christian prince Bretislav II., by an edict in 1092, suppressed 'sepulturas quæ fiebant in silvis et campis, atque scenas (or cœnas) quas ex gentili ritu faciebant in biviis et in triviis quasi ob animarum pausationem, item et locos profanos quos super mortuos inanes cientes manes . . . exercebant.' This most probably refers to rites and festivals in honour of the dead. The phrase 'ob animarum pausationem' seems to have been influenced by the Christian idea of purgatory.

The idea of death is expressed in the Slav languages by the root *mer*, *mor*, which is common throughout the Indo-Germanic languages. The place to which people go after death is called by the name of *nav*, which is connected with a root meaning 'die' (Lettic *nāve*, 'dead'; Gothic *naus*, 'corpse'; Greek *νέκυς*, etc.). The Polish chronicler Dlugosz, speaking of the pagan Slavs, says that they called Pluto 'Nya,' and that they asked of him 'post mortem in meliores inferni sedes deduci.' Dlugosz, as well as Cosmas of Prague, admits that the Slavs believed in the immortality of the soul.

The ancient Russians held banquets, called *tryzna* or 'festivals,' in honour of the dead. The ancient Slavs had no places used expressly as burying-grounds. They practised both burial and cremation.

We have no definite texts on ancestor-worship, but folk-lore gives valuable hints regarding it. The Russian peasants believe in the existence of a *dědushka domovoi* ('grandfather of the house'), which evidently represents the soul of an ancestor. In White Russia, one of the most primitive parts of the Slav world, ancestor-worship is prevalent at the present day. In the 16th cent. the Polish poet Klonowicz, in a Latin poem entitled 'Roxolania,' described the offerings which were brought to the graves:

'. . . Mos est morientum poscere Manes.
Portari tepidos ad monumenta cibos.
Creduntur volucres vesci nidoribus umbræ
Ridiculaque fide carne putantur ali.'

The peasants of White Russia give the name of *dziady* ('ancestors') to the souls of dead relatives, even in the case of children who died in infancy. Feasts of an absolutely pagan kind are held in their honour. They are invited to eat, and a spoonful or a part of each dish is taken and put into a special vessel. This vessel is placed on the ledge of the window. The meal ends with an address to the ancestors, who are then advised to go back to the sky (see art. ARYAN RELIGION). It is these rites that the Polish poet Mickiewicz has described so well in his poem on the *Dziady* ('The Ancestors'). On the other hand, in Bohemia, vessels which must have contained food have been found in pagan (probably Slav) graves. These had evidently been placed there for the use of the dead in the life beyond the tomb. The kindred Letto-Lithuanians also had special deities of the dead—Kapu mâte and Wella mâte amongst the Letts, and Vielona amongst the Lithuanians. Sacrifices were offered not only to Vielona as goddess of the dead, but also to Zemyna, the Lithuanian earth-goddess (cf. Usener, *Götternamen*, Bonn, 1896, pp. 104–105, 107–108). It is furthermore noteworthy that the Lithuanians offered sacrifices to the dead on the anniversary of their decease, when, after a formal prayer to them, water and food were cast beneath the table of the feast in their honour, and lights were placed on it even at midday (Brückner, *Archiv für slavische Philologie*, ix. 33). See also art. ARYAN RELIGION.

LITERATURE.—Kotliarevsky, *The Funeral Rites of the Pagan Slavs* (in Russian), 2nd ed., St. Petersburg, 1891; L. Leger, *La Mythologie slave*, Paris, 1901.

L. LEGER.

ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND CULT OF THE DEAD (Teutonic).—There is abundant evidence for Manes-worship among all Teutonic peoples. As a rule, however, the authorities give no indication that participation in the rites was confined to descendants and relatives of the deceased, though it is not unlikely that the worship referred to in such passages as *Indic. Superstitionum*, Tit. 1 ('De sacrilegio ad sepulchra mortuorum'), was generally of this variety. In Scandi

navian lands also we hear of worship paid to kings and other distinguished men, apparently at or near their tombs, but here again the cult appears to have been shared by the dead man's subjects or dependants.

Perhaps the nearest approach to strict ancestor-worship is to be found in the records of the colonists of Iceland, who believed that all members of their families would pass after death into certain hills. They regarded these places with special reverence, and constructed sacrificial shrines there. Again, the element of ancestor-worship may be said to enter into the cult of certain gods, from whom most royal families, in England as well as in the North, claimed descent. Yet in the case of deities whose cult was wide-spread, such as that of Woden-Othin (by far the most frequent case), it would be unsafe to assume that this was the original element. On the other hand, deities whose worship was more or less local, like Thórgerðr Hölgabrúðr, may very well have been regarded originally as ancestral spirits. In this connexion account is to be taken also of the *hamingiur*, or guardian-spirits of families, who are represented as similar to valkyries or warrior maidens.

Lastly, mention must be made of the *erfi*—a word which in other Teutonic languages means inherited property, but in Scandinavian a wake or feast in honour of a dead person, especially the head of the house. Such feasts were often held on an immense scale, and many hundreds of persons invited. Large quantities of ale were then drunk in memory of the deceased—whence the banquet was also called *erfi-öl*, a name which survived until recently in the northern English word *arval*. Towards the close of the feast the heir was for the first time allowed to occupy the vacant high seat. At religious festivals also it was customary to drink to departed relatives as well as to the gods.

The Cult of the Dead among the Teutons will be fully described under art. ARYAN RELIGION.

LITERATURE.—Golther, *Handbuch der germanischen Mythologie*, Leipzig, 1895, p. 90 ff.; Mogk, in Paul, *Grundriss der germ. Philologie*², Strassburg, 1900, iii. 249 ff.; Meyer, *Germanische Mythologie*, Berlin, 1891, p. 69 ff.; Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Religion of the Teutons*, Boston, 1902, p. 289 ff.

H. M. CHADWICK.

ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND CULT OF THE DEAD (Ugro-Finnic).—Ancestor-worship and cult of the dead is, so far as we can judge, the oldest form of religion among the Ugro-Finnic peoples. It is almost the only form common to them all. Their places of sacrifice frequently stand in close proximity to their places of burial; their images are chiefly representations of the dead; their offerings are to be explained by the needs (food, clothes, etc.) of the dead; and their whole system of magic seems in the main to aim at a union with the spirits of the dead. See artt. FINNS, LAPPS, MORDVINIANS, OSTIAKS.

KAARLE KROHN.

ANDAMANS.—1. *The Country and the People.*—The Andamans form the Northern portion of a string of islands, seven hundred miles long (the Nicobars forming the Southern portion), stretching across the Eastern side of the Bay of Bengal, between Cape Negrais in Burma and Achin Head in Sumatra. Certain physiological facts, in combination with phenomena exhibited by the fauna and flora of the respective terminal countries, have long been held to point to the former existence of a continuous range of mountains, thought to be sub-aerial, between these two points. Assuming this opinion to be correct, the Andamans are, in their present condition, the summits of a submarine range, connected with the Arakan Yoma range of Burma, which has, at some time or other, become almost wholly submerged by a volcanic subsidence. This range need not have been more than the physically possible one of two hundred fathoms, to connect a long narrow peninsula jutting out from the Burma coast with the present Andaman group of islands.

These considerations are of importance for the present purpose, as, according to Portman (see Literature below), the tradition of the South Andaman, or Bojigngiji, group of tribes is that Maia Tomola, the ancestral chief of the nation from which they all sprang, dispersed them after a cataclysm, which caused a subsidence of parts of a great island, divided it up into the present Andaman Islands, and drowned large numbers of the old inhabitants, together with many large and fierce beasts that have since disappeared. He also notes, as tending to show the junction of the Andaman Islands with the mainland, that, besides the South Andaman tradition, the people of the Little Andaman have names for animals that do not now exist and which they cannot describe.

Lying as they do in the track of a great commerce, which has gone on for at least two thousand years, both from China and Japan westwards and from the Levant and India eastwards, the existence of the Andamans has been reported probably from the days of Ptolemy (McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*, 1885, p. 236) under a variety of names, representing some form of *Andaman*, meaning a 'monkey' people, and indicating the savage aboriginal antagonists of the more civilized early population of India. As early as the 9th cent. the inhabitants of the islands were quite untruly described by Arab travellers as cannibals (Reinaud, *Relation des voyages*, 1845, i. 8)—a mistake that seems to have arisen from three observations of the old mariners. The Andamanese attacked and murdered without provocation every stranger they could seize on his landing, as one of the tribes does still; they burnt his body (as they did in fact that of every enemy); and they had weird all-night dances round fires. Combine these three observations with the unprovoked murder of one of themselves and the fear aroused in ignorant mariners' minds by such occurrences in a far land, century after century, and a persistent charge of cannibalism is almost certain to be the result. This is a consideration of cardinal importance, as this false charge led to the Andamans being left severely alone until 1857 (except for a brief period between 1789 and 1796), when the British Government was forced to take steps to put a stop to murders of shipwrecked crews by occupying the islands. The result is that there exists in the Andamans an aboriginal people uncontaminated by outside influences, whose religious ideas are of native growth and exhibit the phenomena of a truly untutored philosophy.

The Andamanese are naked pigmy savages, as low in civilization as almost any known upon earth, though close observation of them discloses the immense distance in mental development between them and the highest of the brute beasts, one most notable fact being that they eat nothing raw, cooking all their food, however slightly, and making pots for the purpose, and this from time immemorial. Their various tribes belong to one race, speaking varieties of one fundamental isolated language. They are the relics of a bygone Negrito population now represented by themselves, the Semangs of the Malay Peninsula, and the Aetas of the Philippines (these last two being much mixed with the surrounding peoples), who in very ancient times occupied the south-eastern portion of the Asiatic Continent and its outlying islands before the irruptions of the oldest of peoples whose existence, or traces of it, can now be found there. In this view the Andamanese are of extreme interest, as preserving in their persons and customs, owing to an indefinite number of centuries of complete isolation, the last pure remnant of the oldest kind of man in existence.

2. *Character of the People.*—In childhood the Andamanese are possessed of a bright intelligence, which, however, soon reaches its climax; and the adult may be compared in this respect with the civilized child of ten or twelve. He has never had any sort of agriculture, nor, until the English taught him the use of dogs, did he ever domesticate any kind of animal or bird, nor did he teach himself to turn turtle or to use hook and line in fishing. He cannot count, and all his ideas are hazy, inaccurate, and ill-defined. He has never developed, unaided, any idea of drawing or making a tally or record for any purpose, but he readily understands a sketch or plan when shown him. He soon becomes mentally tired, and is apt to break down physically under mental training.

He retains throughout life the main characteristics of the child: of very short but strong memory; suspicious of, but hospitable to, strangers; ungrateful, imitative, and watchful of his companions and neighbours; vain and, under the spur of vanity, industrious and persevering; teachable up to a quickly reached limit; fond of undefined games and practical jokes; too happy and careless to be affected in temperament by his superstitions; too careless, indeed, to store water even for a voyage; plucky but not courageous; reckless only from ignorance or inappreciation of danger; selfish, but not without generosity, chivalry, or a sense of honour; petulant, hasty of temper, entirely irresponsible and childish in action in his wrath, and equally quick to forget; affectionate, lively in his movements, and exceedingly taking in his moments of good temper. At these times the Andamanese are gentle and pleasant to each other, considerate to the aged, the weakly or the helpless, and to captives; kind to their wives and proud of their children, whom they often over-pet; but when angered, cruel, jealous, treacherous, and vindictive, and always unstable. They are bright and merry companions, talkative, inquisitive, and restless, busy in their own pursuits, keen sportsmen, and naturally independent, absorbed in the chase for sheer love of it and other physical occupations, and not lustful, indecent, or obscenely abusive.

As the years advance they are apt to become intractable, masterful, and quarrelsome—a people to like but not to trust. Exceedingly conservative and bound up in ancestral custom, and not amenable to civilization, all the teaching of years bestowed on some of them has introduced no abstract ideas among the tribesmen, and changed no habit in practical matters affecting comfort, health, and mode of life. Irresponsibility is a characteristic, though instances of a keen sense of responsibility are not wanting. The intelligence of the women is good, though not, as a rule, equal to that of the men. In old age, however, they frequently exhibit a considerable mental capacity which is respected.

There is no idea of government, but to each tribe and to every sept of it belongs a recognized chief, who commands a limited respect and such obedience as the self-interest of the other individual men of the tribe or sept dictates. There is no social status that is not personally acquired on account of some admitted superiority, mental or physical. Property is communal, as is all the land; and the ideas as to individual possessions, even as to children, are but rudimentary, and are accompanied by an incipient tabu of the property belonging to a chief. Custom is the only law, and the only explanation of social actions or of the form and adornment of manufactured articles. In the religious ideas of such a people as this, religion is seen in its most primitive form.

3. *Religion.*—The religion is simple animism, and consists of fear of the evil spirits of the wood, the sea, disease, and ancestors, and of avoidance of acts traditionally displeasing to them, and this in spite of an abundance of mythological tales told in a confused, disjointed manner. There is neither ceremonial worship nor propitiation. There is an anthropomorphic deity, Puluga, the cause of all things, whom it is not, however, necessary to propitiate, though sins, *i.e.* acts displeasing to him, are avoided for fear of damage to the products of the jungle. Puluga now dwells in the sky, but used to live on the top of Saddle Peak, their highest mountain. The Andamanese have an idea that the 'soul' after death will go under the earth b an aerial bridge, but there is no heaven or hel , nor any idea of a bodily resurrection in a religious sense. There is much active faith in dreams, which sometimes control subsequent conduct, and in the utterances of 'wise men,' dreamers of prophetic dreams, gifted with second sight and power to communicate with spirits and to bring about good and bad fortune. These practise an embryonic magic and witchcraft to such personal profit, by means of good things tabued to themselves, as these people appreciate. There are no oaths, covenants, or ordeals, nor are there any forms of appeal to supernatural powers.

Puluga, who is fundamentally identifiable with some definiteness with the storm (*wuluga*), despite his confusion with ancestral chiefs, has so many attributes of the Deity that it is fair to translate the term by 'God.' He has, however, a wife and a family of one son and many daughters. He transmits his orders through his son to his daughters the Morowin, who are his messengers. He has no authority over the evil spirits, and contents himself with pointing out to them offenders against himself. The two great evil, *i.e.* harmful, spirits are Erem-chauga of the forest and Juruwin of the sea. Like Puluga, both have wives and families. The minor evil spirits are Nila, and a numerous class, the Chol, who are practically spirits of disease. The sun is the wife of the moon, and the stars are their children, dwelling near Puluga; but there is no trace of sun-worship, though the Andamanese twang their bows and 'chaff' the moon during an eclipse; and a solar eclipse frightens them, keeping them silent.

The Andamanese idea of a soul arises out of his reflexion in water, and not out of his shadow which follows him about. His reflexion is his spirit, which goes after death to another jungle world (*chaitan*) under the earth, which is flat and supported on an immense palm tree. There the spirit repeats the life here, visits the earth occasionally, and has a distinct tendency to transmigration into other beings and creatures. Every child conceived has had a prior existence, and the theory of metempsychosis appears in many other superstitions, notably in naming a second child after a previous dead one (because the spirit of the former babe has been transferred to the present one), and in the recognition of all natives of India and the Far East as *chauga*, or persons endowed with the spirits of their ancestors.

4. *Superstitions.*—The superstitions and mythology of the Andamanese are the direct outcome of their beliefs in relation to spirits. Thus fire frightens Erem-chauga, *lit.* 'Forest-ghost,' so it is *always* carried (the practical reason is that the Andamanese are the only people known who have never been able to 'make' fire). To avoid offending the sun and the moon, they keep silence at their rise. Puluga shows himself in the storm, and so they appease him by throwing explosive leaves on the fire, and deter him by burning beeswax, because he does not like the smell. Earthquakes are the sport of the ancestors. There are lucky

and unlucky actions, but not many, and a few omens and charms. Animals and birds are credited with human capacities. For instance, murdered persons have been found with heavy stones placed on them, and with stones placed along the pathway. Every Andamanese knows that this is a warning to the birds not to tell the English that the men have been murdered, but that the murderers have passed along the path in front. Primitive simplicity here comes to the surface, as the presence of the stones tells an Englishman who understands the signs exactly what has happened.

5. *Mythology.*—The great bulk of the Andamanese mythology turns on Puluga and his doings with Tomo, the first ancestor; to him and his wife Puluga brought fire and taught all the arts, and for them he created everything. This line of belief is still alive, and everything natural that is new is attributed to Puluga. Thus, when the Andamanese were introduced to the volcano on Barren Island, seeing the smoke from the top, they at once named it *Molatarchona*, 'Smoke Island,' and said the fire was Puluga's. The next most important element in their mythology is the story of the cataclysm which engulfed the islands, and was, of course, caused by Puluga. It separated the population and destroyed the fire, which was afterwards stolen by Luratut, the kingfisher, and restored to the people. The population previous to the cataclysm became the *chauga*, or 'ghostly ancestors.' Other stories relate in a fanciful way the origin of customs (*e.g.* tatuing and dancing), the arts, articles of food, harmful spirits, and so on. An important ethnological item in these stories is the constant presence of the ideas of metempsychosis, and of metamorphosis into animals, fish, birds, stones, and other objects in nature. Indeed, the fauna chiefly known to the Andamanese are ancestors changed supernaturally into animals.

6. *Customs.*—There are rudimentary initiatory ceremonies for both males and females connected with arrival at puberty and marriageability, and pointing to a limited tabu, but they are not accompanied by the communication of any secrets or by any religious ceremony. The women also practise a limited tabu as to food during menstruation and pregnancy. The idea of tabu does undoubtedly exist as to food, and every man has through life his own tabued article. This is, however, usually something observed to disagree with him in childhood or to be unpalatable. Tatuing is partly ceremonial, and the perpetual evening dancing also becomes ceremonial on occasion. Neither has any religious significance, and the songs accompanying the dances rarely relate to beliefs and superstitions. Among the games, mock burials and 'ghost' hunts are favourites. Religion does not enter into the naming customs, except possibly into the 'flower' names for girls, which are bestowed after some one of sixteen selected trees which happen to be in flower at the time they reach puberty.

The Andamanese are monogamous, and by preference, but not necessarily, exogamous as regards sept, and endogamous as regards tribe, or more strictly, group. Marriages are not religious, but are attended with distinct ceremonies. Betrothal accounted as marriage is recognized, and the marriage relations are somewhat complicated, and quite as strictly observed as among civilized communities. Deaths occasion loud lamentations from all connected with the deceased. Burial in the ground and exposure in trees, as an honour, are practised. A death causes an encampment to be ceremonially marked, and to be deserted for about three months, and burial spots are also marked and avoided. Mourning is observed by smearing the head with grey clay and refraining from dancing for the above period. After some months the bones of the deceased are washed, broken up, and made into ornaments. To these great importance is attached as mementoes of the deceased, and they are believed to stop pain and cure diseases by simple application to the diseased part. The skull is tied round the neck and worn down the back, usually, but not always, by the widow, widower, or nearest relative. Mourning closes with a ceremonial dance and the removal of the clay. The ceremonies connected with the disposal of the dead are conventional, reverential, and by no means without elaboration in detail.

LITERATURE.—E. H. Man, *Aboriginal Inhabitants of the Andaman Islands*, London, 1883; M. V. Portman, *History of our Relations with the Andamanese*, Calcutta (Government), 1898; R. C. Temple, *Census of India*, 1901, vol. iii. ('The Andaman and Nicobar Islands'), Calcutta (Government), 1903.

R. C. TEMPLE.

ANDEANS.—1. The pre-Inca people.—For the study of the Andean religions it is necessary to take account of a civilization which flourished long before the rise of the Incas; because the later power inherited some of the names, and with them the religious belief, of the more ancient people. Near the south shore of Lake Titicaca, now over 12,000 feet above the sea-level, there are very extensive ruins of a most remarkable character. They are of such great extent that there must have been a very large population in the vicinity; the stones are of such size, and any possible quarry so distant, that the people must have been possessed of very remarkable mechanical skill; and they are cut and carved with such accuracy and precision that the workers must have been skilful masons. The mouldings and symmetrical ornamentation show most accurate measurements, and no want of artistic taste. There were numerous statues, and much detailed carving. The monoliths are so enormous, one of them 36 feet by 7, another 26 feet by 16 by 6, that they are excelled in size only by the obelisks and statues of Egypt.* The ancient people who built them may well receive the name of the monolithic people, forming a monolithic empire.† Universal tradition points to the south as the direction whence they came. The building of Tiahuanacu, as the ruins are now called, necessitated a great population, mechanical skill—the result of long ages of civilization—and abundant supplies of food.‡ It appears certain that the region could not have been at its present elevation. At 12,500 feet no corn will ripen, and the country can sustain only a very sparse population. The monolithic builders cannot have worked at that elevation, or anything like it. The early Spanish writers give unanimous evidence that the ruins of Tiahuanacu were built long before the time of the Incas.§

2. Pre-Inca religion.—The only clue to the religion of the monolithic people is to be found in a famous doorway cut out of one enormous stone. 'The masonry is excellent throughout, and all the lines are as straight, the angles as square, and the surfaces as level as could be produced by any good workman of the present day.' ‖ The length of the

* *The Megalithic Age of Peru*, by Sir Clements Markham, American Congress, Stuttgart, 1904.

† The best recent accounts are by Richard Inwards, *The Temple of the Andes* (1889), and by Le Comte de Crequi Montfort, *Mission Scientifique Française, Travaux et Fouilles de Tiahuanaco*, 1903.

‡ See *Archæologia*, vol. lviii. (2nd series, p. 73), on the transport of monoliths for Stonehenge and in Egypt. All needful appliances existed in the Stone Age, but a large population or command of men was essential. The date of Stonehenge is now placed at 1800 B.C., or 3700 years ago.

§ Cieza de Leon, cap. cv. pp. 374–379; Garcilasso de la Vega, i. pp. 71, 75, 210, 212, ii. 307; Acosta, pp. 71, 416. These references are to the present writer's translations (Hakluyt Society). See also *Relaciones Geograficas de Indias*, ii. p. 56.

‖ Inwards, *The Temple of the Andes*, p. 31.

monolith is over 13 ft., and the opening of the doorway 4 ft. 6 in. by 2 ft. 9 in. Above the doorway there is much carving. There is a central figure with many symbols and accessories. There are rays round the head; in each hand there is a sort of sceptre ending with heads of birds, the marks on the dress are the same as those round a golden representation of the sun of the Incarial times, denoting the Inca months *Camay* and *Ccapac Raymi*. It is the work of a highly skilled mason, but not of a sculptor. On each side of the central figure there are three rows of kneeling figures, eight in each row. They all hold sceptres, and are crowned. Those on one side have the heads of men, and on the other those of birds. Underneath there is a beautifully designed ornament running along the length of the stone, consisting of rectangular patterns, ending with birds' heads, and three human heads similarly ornamented. This central figure may, the present writer thinks, be assumed to represent the deity worshipped by all the chiefs of the people and all the animal creation. But there must have been an interval of many centuries between the fall of the monolithic empire, caused by the region becoming uninhabitable for a large population, and the rise of that of the Incas. When the old empire fell to pieces, the Andean region must have been occupied by many tribes, and the old language naturally broken up into dialects. One, spoken in the basin of Lake Titicaca, received the name of *Aymara* from the Jesuit missionaries of Juli; another spoken in the region of the Incas was called Quichua by the first Spaniard who wrote its grammar; another dialect was spoken further north. Eventually, some five centuries before the arrival of the Spaniards, the Incas began to form another great empire, and their language prevailed over the others.

3. The Incas.—There had been a long interval of disintegration. Nevertheless, all memory of the monolithic empire had not been lost. There were myths telling how the great God first made Himself known at Lake Titicaca, how the sun first appeared there, and how the first man was created there.* But the main tradition was the revelation of the almighty God, named Viracocha, who is carved with his adoring worshippers on the monolithic doorway. His worship was maintained by chiefs and learned men, after the old empire had disappeared, and was inherited by the Incas. Some other names were handed down as attributes of the almighty God. The chief of these were *Con*, *Illa*, *Ticsi*, *Pachayachachi*, *Pachacamac*. The meaning of *Con* is unknown. *Illa* means light. *Ticsi* is said to be a founder. The anonymous Jesuit explains the word as *Principium rerum sine principio*. The derivation of *Viracocha* is lost to us. Two authorities† say that the first part of the word is a corruption of *pirua*, a depositary or abode. The primary meaning of *cocha* is a lake, but here it is said to mean an abyss, profundity, space—'Dweller in space.' *Pachayachachi* and *Pachacamac* are attributes of the deity. *Pacha* means time or place, also the universe, *yachachi* a teacher, *camac* to rule or govern—'The teacher and ruler of the universe.' The name Viracocha sufficed to convey to the minds of the Incas the idea of a Supreme Creator, yet they added other terms to it, intended to express some of the attributes of the deity.‡

4. Viracocha.—The Incas, with their *Amautas* (wise men) and *Quipucamayocs* (registrars), certainly worshipped the Supreme Being under the name of Viracocha, having received the tradition from remote ages, and they looked upon all other deities as his servants, ordained to do his will. An Inca Indian, named Pachacuti Yamqui Salcamayhua, who wrote early in the 17th cent., mentions another being as having been made known in the early times, whose fame was handed down by tradition. This was Tonapa, also called Tarapaca and Pachaccan. He is also mentioned by Sarmiento as a servant of Viracocha. The details about him are puerile. It is possible that Tonapa represents a solar myth. The name occurs with that of the creator in some of the Inca hymns.

The Incas certainly worshipped Viracocha, the supreme creator of all things, but they approached him as an unknown god, who to them was shrouded in mystery. They cried to him to be taught where he was, that they might know and understand him; and they recognized that the sun, the moon, and the seasons were ordained and ordered by him. They sought to know the will of the Deity, and prayed for comfort and support.

5. Some hymns of the Incas have been preserved by Salcamayhua, but in a very corrupt form, and it is difficult to make out their exact meaning in English;* but they are so important for a correct estimate of the Peruvian religion that it seems desirable to give English versions of two of the hymns.

I.

O Viracocha! Lord of the Universe,
Now art thou male,
Now art thou female,
Lord of heat! Lord of generation!†
Can divination be employed
To learn where thou art?
If away, where art thou?
Whether thou art above,
Whether thou art below,
Whether thou art around
Thy royal throne and sceptre,
O hear me!
From the heaven above,
From the sea below,
Where'er thou art,
O Creator of the world,
O Maker of man,
Lord of all lords,
To thee alone,
With eyes that fail,
With longing to know thee,
I come to thee
To know thee,
To understand thee.
Thou seest me,
Thou knowest me.
The Sun, the Moon,
The day, the night,
Spring and winter,
They all travel,
Not ordained in vain,
From appointed places
To their destinations;
They duly arrive
Whithersoever may be ordained.
Thou holdest them
Under thy sceptre,
Thou holdest them.
O hear me!
Let me be thy chosen;
Do not suffer
That I should tire,
That I should die.'

* The Titicaca myths are related by Garcilasso de la Vega, Cieza de Leon, Molina, Betanzos, Salcamayhua, and the anonymous Jesuit, and in the official history of Sarmiento. They are not mentioned by Balboa, Montesinos, Acosta, or Santillana.

† Montesinos and the anonymous Jesuit.

‡ The best essay on the word *Viracocha* is by Don Leonardo Villar (Lima, 1887).

* They were originally printed in the corrupt Quichua, exactly as in the manuscript, in the present writer's translation of Salcamayhua (Hakluyt Society, 1873). Ximenez de la Espada brought out a Spanish edition in 1879, printing the hymns in Quichua in the same way. Don Samuel A. Lafone Quevedo then took the Quichua in hand, and, with the able assistance of Padre Mossi, the author of one of the latest Quichua dictionaries, numerous emendations were made, and still more corrections in the separations of words. The text was thus made sufficiently intelligible to bear translation into Spanish (*Ensayo Mitologico. Los Himnos sagrados de los Reyes del Cuzcos*, from S. A. Lafone Quevedo, Talleres del Museo de La Plata, 1892).

† Are these lines, conceivably, intended to convey an idea analogous to the Hindu *Linga* and *Yoni*?

II.

'Come, then,
Grand as the heavens,
Lord over the earth,
Creator of all things,
Creator of man!
Ever I adore thee;
Fainting, with my eyes
Hid under the lashes,
Thee am I seeking,
To look upon thee,
Like as on a river,*
Like as on the springs,
Gasping with thirst,
Comfort me, O Lord!
Acclaim thy will,
Help me, O Lord!
I raise my voice
With all praise,
Thinking on thy will
And doing it.
We will rejoice,
We will be glad,
So be it for evermore.'

6. Huacas.—Subordinate to Viracocha, to whom a temple was dedicated in the great square of Cuzco, the worship of the Sun, Moon, Lightning, and of certain deities, called *Huacas*, was ordained. When the empire of the Incas rose to greatness, there was a complicated ritual, with special ceremonies, festivals, and sacrifices for each month. Our information is mainly derived from the first Spaniards who came to Peru and wrote narratives. They were soldiers, lawyers, in two instances natives, but chiefly priests who were full of pre-conceived ideas.† It is not always easy to separate their pre-conceptions and the results of their leading questions from the actual facts they were told. It is still more difficult to reach the exact nature of the beliefs of a people, when we have reports only of their ceremonies and of their outward worship.

The people were divided into *ayllus* or tribes, which had a close analogy to the Roman *gens*. Every *ayllu* had a common *huaca* or sacred object of worship, which was called *paccarina*. The chief *paccarina* of the Inca *ayllu* was the Sun. The Incas were children of the Sun. But there was another very sacred *huaca*, which is often mentioned in Inca history, and to which a legend was attached.‡

The origin of the Incas is connected with this *huaca*. Four brothers and four sisters are said to have issued from 'windows' at a place called *Paccari-tampu* (some leagues south of Cuzco), two words meaning 'the tavern of the dawn.' Their leader was Manco Capac, the first sovereign Inca. They had many followers, and they advanced northwards to occupy the valley of Cuzco. During the march one of the brothers was turned to stone at a place called Huanacauri. This is the legend. Next to the celestial bodies, this *huaca* of Huanacauri became the most sacred object of worship. It was three miles from Cuzco. Very elaborate sacrifices were offered to it, and it was at Huanacauri that the great festival was celebrated, when the Inca youths went through their ordeals previous to receiving knighthood. But the exact position of the Huanacauri *huaca* in the Inca religion is not clear. It was certainly a very important one in the traditions of the Inca *ayllu*.

7. Ancestor-worship.—The other *ayllus* had various beasts or birds, natural objects or mummies, as their *paccarinas*. It was the worship of ancestors by the side of the worship of celestial bodies. The *mallquis*, or bodies of the dead, were preserved, and treated with the greatest respect. In the mountains round Cuzco and in the Yucay valley they were kept in caves faced with masonry. In the basin of Lake Titicaca they were preserved in towers called *chulpas*. Those at Sillustani are circular, and carefully built with ashlar masonry. In Quito the dead were interred in mounds called *tola*.

The bodies of the Incas were preserved with extreme care, and it is stated, in the official report of Sarmiento, that the special *huaca* or idol of each Inca was kept with the mummy (Sarmiento, *Hist.*). There were servants for the mummies of the sovereigns, and estates for their maintenance. The names of seven of the so-called idols have been preserved; and they do not support the idea that they were idols in our sense of the word, but rather insignia or commemorative ornaments, perhaps in the nature of *penates*, used by each sovereign in his lifetime. It was a custom, not only as regards the Inca *mallquis* but among all classes of the people, to place with the dead, offerings of food and other things required by them when living. This custom has never been eradicated, and even now it is practised secretly in many parts of Peru. The belief which originated this custom, and which has caused its continuance even to the present day, must have been very deeply seated. It is exceedingly difficult to acquire a complete understanding of the ideas of another race of people which give rise to special customs. But the present writer was well acquainted with an old priest, Dr. Pablo P. Justiniani, a lineal descendant of the Incas,* whose intense sympathy for his people enabled him to comprehend their ideas, if any one ever did so. He told the present writer that they felt a certainty that their dead continued to exist apart from their bodies, and that they had needs, but spiritual, not corporeal needs. They were certain of this because many of them had seen their dead. Don Pablo attributed this conviction to appearances in dreams and visions. Of a future state of rewards and punishments they do not appear to have had any idea in the time of the Incas, only the conviction that their ancestors continued to exist after death. In this state they were souls without bodies, but still with needs and requirements, not corporeal, but spiritual. Thence arose the strange belief that all things had souls as well as their material parts, and that the spirits of the dead needed the souls or spiritual parts of food, chicha, coca, llamas, even clothing. By placing the corporeal parts of these things with the dead, it was believed that their souls or spiritual essences were conveyed, through prayer and certain ceremonies, to the souls of the dead. This belief was so deeply impressed on the Inca people that it survived all subsequent persecution. The practice existed

* The same idea as in the 42nd Psalm.

† The most important work on the religion of Peru was written about 1575 by a priest named Cristoval de Molina, who lived at Cuzco, and was a master of the Quichua language. The present writer's translation, from the original manuscript, was printed for the Hakluyt Society in 1872.

In August, 1906, Dr. Pietschmann, the librarian of the Göttingen University, published the official history of the Incas, by Sarmiento. It was written in 1572 from information received from over 80 members of the Inca family, to whom the history was read, and whose suggestions and corrections were adopted. The manuscript had been in the Göttingen library since 1780. This work will be found to be the most authentic and valuable history of the Incas in existence.

‡ According to Arriaga, the word *paccarina* means 'worshipped.' It comes from *paccari*, 'the dawn,' whence *paccarisca*, 'birth' or 'origin'; and *paccarina* would be the 'original ancestor.'

* Inca Huayna Capac.
Manco Inca.
Maria Tupac Usca = Pedro Ortiz de Orua.
Catalina Ortiz = Luis Justiniani.
Luis Justiniani.
Nicolo Justiniani.
Justo Pastor Justiniani.
Dr. Don Pablo Policarpo Justiniani.

secretly fifty years ago to some extent, as Don Pablo informed us. The present writer is told by Baron Erland Nordenskiöld, who returned from Peru in the year 1906, that the practice still exists. This appears to have been the position of the Inca worship of their ancestors, possibly accompanied by some idea of intercession. Like the sovereign Incas, each *ayllu* had a *paccarina* or so-called idol, represented by a hill or other natural object, occasionally by an image. This was apart from the household *conopa*, to be noticed presently.

8. Priesthood.—The complicated ceremonial worship of the Incas necessitated a great body of priests and ministers. The *Villac umu* (lit. 'the head giving counsel') was the chief of the Inca hierarchy. Next in rank were the *Villcas*. Then there were the sacrificing priests, or *Harpaycuna*, special priests and virgins of the Sun, the priests and servants of the *huacas*, the soothsayers and wizards, the *Huacap Rimachi*, or receiver of oracles, and a host of recorders and servants. For the support of this hierarchy large revenues were assigned.

9. Festivals.—The Peruvian ceremonial system was very closely connected with the course of the year, the sowing and planting seasons, the irrigation, the harvest, and consequently with the course of the sun. The year was a solar year, divided into twelve months and some intercalary days, and it was necessary to ascertain the times of the equinoxes and solstices. Pillars were erected to determine the time of the solstices, and the time of the equinoxes was observed by a stone column in the centre of a circular level platform called Inti-huatana. There was one in the square before the Temple of the Sun at Cuzco, another at Pisac, and others in different parts of Peru. Each month had its special festival.

The first month, 22 June to 22 July, was called *Intip Raymi*. Many llamas were sacrificed to the Sun, amid ceremonies of great magnificence. The next month was called *Chahuarquiz*, the season of ploughing the land. It was also called *Tarpuy-quilla* or the sowing month. Prayers were made for a good harvest. The people chanted a song called *Yahuayra*, and sacrifices were offered. Next came the month *Yapaquis*, the season of sowing the land, when the *Situa* festival was solemnized. The rains commenced, and it was a time of sickness. Four hundred warriors stood in the great square, a hundred facing each of the cardinal points. The priests shouted, 'Go forth, all evils,' and the four parties started in four directions, shouting, 'Go forth, all evils.' They ran until they came to rivers, where they bathed and washed their arms. The Inca and the people also bathed, and there were ceremonies for driving away sickness at the doors of all the houses.

Ccoya-raymi was the Moon festival, the expiatory feast being at night. It was a time for weaving fine cloth. *Uma-raymi* was the month in which one of the great *huaca* festivals was celebrated for the initiation of aspirants. It took place at Huanacauri. The youths, after going through certain exercises and penances, were admitted to knighthood. The month of *Ayamarca* was in November and December. Next followed *Ccapac-raymi*, one of the three principal festivals of the year. There was another ceremony of admitting youths to manhood at Huanacauri, which was conducted with great magnificence. *Camay* was the month of martial exercises, and also the *hatun-poccoy*, or great ripening. The next month was *Pacha-poccoy*, or the small ripening, when the festival of the *mosoc nina* was celebrated, and the new fire for the altar before the Sun was kindled. The *Ayrihua* came next, being the beginning of harvest. The offerings of maize were brought to the temples of the Creator and of the Sun, youths and maidens, in procession, singing a harvest song called *yaravi*. The harvesting month was *Aymuray* in May and June.

10. Human sacrifice.—The religious ceremonies included burnt-offerings in great profusion. The present writer formerly held that the weight of evidence was, on the whole, that there were no human sacrifices. He felt this to be remarkable, for the idea of propitiatory sacrifice is to offer the best and most loved, as in the cases of Isaac and Jephthah's daughter. He held that the Peruvian sacrifices were more in the nature of thanksgiving than of propitiatory offerings. But the authoritative evidence of Molina and Sarmiento has led him to modify this view. On extraordinary occasions, two children, a male and a female, were first strangled and then included in the burnt-offerings. Such occasions were the celebration of great victories, or the commencement of wars, and the *Huaca* festival at Huanacauri.

11. Sun-worship. — Nearly all the ceremonies were connected with agriculture and with the course of the sun, so that it was natural that the sun should be the chief object of adoration with the people. But some shrewd remarks on the subject are recorded of one or two of the Incas (by Garcilasso de la Vega, *Comm. Real.*). Seeing that the Sun had to accomplish its circle every year, they concluded that it must have a master. It was the same thought as that of Omar Khayyam:

> 'And that inverted Bowl they call the Sky,
> Whereunder crawling coop'd, we live and die,
> Lift not your hands to *It* for help—for It
> As impotently moves as you or I.'

So they turned to Viracocha, the Creator obeyed by the sun and all living things, as the chief object of their adoration.

12. Government. — The religious beliefs of the people away from Cuzco were connected with their mode of life and their environment. It seems desirable to give a short account of the rural life of the people, and of the administrative organization of Inca rule. It was, in fact, pure socialism —a system which can exist only under a despotism. Several very able Spanish lawyers, notably Polo de Ondegardo and Santillana, were employed, soon after the conquest, to investigate and report upon the Incarial system of government. Reliance may be placed upon the correctness of the details they collected. It appears that the whole of the peoples were divided into ten classes, according to their ages and ability to work.

1. *Mosoc aparic* (baby), 'newly begun,' just born.
2. *Saya huarma* (child), 'standing boy,' age 2 to 6.
3. *Macta puric* (child that can walk), age 6 to 8.
4. *Tianta requisic* (bread receiver), about 8.
5. *Pucllac huarma* (playing boy), 8 to 15.
6. *Cuca pellec* (coca picker), very light work, 15 to 20.
7. *Yma huayna* (as a youth), light work, 20 to 23.
8. *Puric* (able-bodied), tribute service, 23 to 50.
9. *Chaupi rucu* (elderly), light work, 50 to 60.
10. *Puñuc rucu* (dotage), no work, over 60.

The *Puric* was the unit of administration, the other classes being dependent on him. A *Pachaca* was 100 *Purics* under a *Pachaca-camayoc* or Centurion. 1000 *Purics* were under a *Huaranca-camayoc*, or officer over a thousand, and the *Hunu-camayoc* governed the whole *ayllu* or *gens* of 10,000 *Purics*. There were four Viceroys over the four provinces, who were called *Tucuyricoc* ('He who sees all'). There were also a reporter on vital statistics and an officer to investigate and report upon charges and accidents, one to each *ayllu*. The land belonged to the people in their *ayllus*. The produce was divided between the *Inca* (government), the *Huaca* (church), and the *Huaccha* (people). The flocks were divided between *Inca* (government) and *Huaccha* (the people). When the people worked for the Government, they were fed by the Incas, and not from their own share of the produce.

Thus the land belonged to the whole *ayllu*, and each able-bodied member, or *Puric*, had a right to his share of the harvest, provided that he had been present at the sowing. No one who had been absent at the sowing could receive a share of the harvest. The population was very great, and increased rapidly; but the evils of minute sub-division were avoided by the system of *Mitimaes*, or colonists.*

13. Various cults.—The worship of Viracocha, the Supreme Being, was restricted mainly to the Incas and learned men. The worship of the Sun was more extended, and was the religion of all who took part in the festivals of the Incas; but the religion of the mass of the people was different. Each *ayllu* had its *paccarina*, with its festival and worship. But each *Puric*, or head of a family, believed that all things in nature had an ideal or soul which ruled and guided them, and to which they might pray for help. Thus there was a soul or ideal of the maize and other harvests, of the llamas, and of all things that influenced their daily life. They made statues or other representations of these objects, and prayed and sacrificed to them for healthy flocks and abundant harvests. The statues were made of pottery or stone, sometimes of the precious metals, and were called *huaca* or *conopa*. In Huarochiri, and, no doubt, in other provinces, the people had mythological stories of great interest in the study of their folk-lore; and the discovery of the remaining reports on the extirpation of idolatry will throw further light on the religion of the Peruvian people.†

14. Oracles.—The valleys on the coast, from Nasca to the Rimac, were occupied by people of the same race and language as the Incas, and at Nasca there are marvellous irrigation works. Here the ocean and its inhabitants received the worship that was given to other powers of nature in the Sierra; and there were two or more famous oracles to which people resorted from great distances. One was at Rimac, whence the name of Lima, the modern capital of Peru. Another famous temple was on the coast, at a place called Pachacamac. Raised on an eminence, with an extensive city at its feet, the oracle itself appears to have been a fish *conopa*, which was supposed to give answers to the questions of pilgrims.

There was no temple to the Supreme Being at Pachacamac. The word is that of an attribute of the Almighty Creator. But in this case it was merely the name of the place. Many other places received names from deities or festivals. There was another *Pachacamac* near Tumipampa. *Vilca* (sacred), *Huaca* (church), and *Raymi* (festival) form parts of the names of several places in Peru. The great temple at Pachacamac on the coast was dedicated to two *conopas* of the coast people, a fish-deity and a fox-deity, which became famous oracles. Pilgrims came from great distances, and an extensive town rose up at the foot of the temple. It was falling to ruin when the Spaniards arrived.

15. An unknown civilized people conquered by the Incas.—There was another civilized people along the northern part of the coast of Peru, quite distinct from the Andean tribes, but finally conquered by the Incas. We have evidence of their civilization from the contents of the tombs examined by Reiss and Stübel at Ancon. We have further evidence in the great palace of the 'Gran Chimu' near Truxillo, and Balboa has preserved a tradition of their arrival by sea and landing at Lambayeque, which also throws a little light on their superstitions.‡ There is a grammar of their language, which is totally unlike any Andean dialect.* But there is no account of the religion of this strange civilized nation of the Peruvian coast, now practically extinct.

Quito was conquered by the last great and undisputed sovereign of the Inca dynasty; but though there is a work on the former Scyris rulers of Quito, the accounts in it are comparatively modern and of doubtful authority. We have no narratives giving details respecting the religious belief of the Quito people previous to the conquest by the Inca Huayna Ccapac. It is stated that they worshipped the Sun.†

16. The Chibchas.—Farther north there was a civilized people, the Chibchas, of whose religion there is some account. Their land is where the Andes divide into three cordilleras, with the three great rivers of Magdalena, Cauca, and Atrato flowing northwards between them into the Caribbean Sea. The Chibchas dwelt on the table-lands of Bogota and Tunja, with their river Funza flowing to the Magdalena, their eastern drainage being carried by the Meta to the Orinoco. This territory is about 150 miles in length, by 40 to 50 broad. It was ruled by two principal chiefs, the Zipa of Bogota and the Zaque of Tunja. The Zipa was striving for a paramount position before the arrival of the Spaniards, and had subjugated the chief of Guatavita. It is of this chief that the story is told that he held a great annual festival on the banks of the Lake of Guatavita, when he covered himself with grease, and then rolled in gold dust. Gilded and resplendent, he then entered a canoe, and was taken to the centre of the lake. Before all his people, he plunged into the water, and his bath was followed by feasting and dancing. This was the origin of the story of El Dorado.

The *religious beliefs* of the Chibchas are thus stated by the earliest writers. Light was originally enclosed in a receptacle called *chiminigagua*, and this receptacle appears to have been, in the conception of these people, the Supreme Creator. The Chibchas are said to have worshipped this almighty deity, but none the less they also worshipped the sun, the moon, the rainbow (called *cuchairra*), hills, lakes, rivers, trees, and many idols.‡ Human sacrifices appear to have been offered only to the Sun, as a deity to be feared and propitiated. The Chibchas had a tradition of a beneficent being named Bochica having appeared amongst them, and having taught them all they knew. He also was worshipped. He is said to have opened a channel for the river Funza, and to have formed the famous falls of Tequendama. The people had several curious myths, and they appear to have conducted their ceremonial worship with some magnificence. There was a procession in which the Zipa joined at the time of sowing, and another at harvest time. There is certainly a superficial resemblance between the religions of the Incas and that of the Chibchas.

There are two early authorities for Chibcha civilization. Padre Fray Pedro Simon wrote his *Noticias Historiales* in 1623, and the work was published at Cuenca in 1627. Dr. Don Lucas Fernandez Piedrahita, the Bishop of Santa Marta, wrote his *Historia General de las conquistas del nuevo reyno de Granada* in 1676. Simon is the best authority, being nearest to the time; but Piedrahita wrote well, and gives a brief but clear account of the Chibchas. He was descended from the Incas of Peru. There is a grammar of the Chibcha language by Fray Barnardo de Lugo, 1624. It is not now spoken. The best modern works on the subject are Humboldt in his *Vues des Cordillères*, Acosta in his *Compendio Historico* (Paris, 1848), and E. Uricochea in his *Memoria sobre las antiguedades neo-granadinas* (Berlin, 1850).

The Chibcha language prevailed among all the

* Polo de Ondegardo, 162; Santillana.

† *Extirpacion de la idolatria del Peru*, por el Padre Pedro Pablo Joseph de Arriaga (Lima, 1621). Arriaga says he destroyed 600 *huacas* and 3418 *conopas* in one province. *Narratives of the False Gods and Superstitions of the Indians of the Province of Huarochiri*, by Dr. Francisco de Avila, 1608 (see the present writer's tr. for the Hakluyt Society).

‡ *Miscellanea Austral*, por Miguel Cavello Balboa, written between 1576 and 1586. Translated into French, and published in the series of Ternaux-Compans, 1840.

* *Arts de la lengua Yunga de los valles del Obispado de Truxillo*, por Don Fernando de la Carrera (Lima, 1644).

† *Historia del Reino de Quito*, por Juan de Velasco; also in the Ternaux-Compans series, 1840.

‡ *Couychi* is the Quichua for a rainbow. There may have been intercourse between the Incas and Chibchas, but there is no evidence beyond the identity of a few words.

tribes of the highlands, and they had all made advances in civilization, although those of Bogota and Tunja were far in advance of the rest. The general movement of the Chibcha tribes had been from south to north, and this race appears to have advanced its settlements beyond Panama, as far as Chiriqui. There is no evidence that any people of Aztec or Maya affinities ever entered South America or had relations with South American peoples.

17. **Originality of the Andean religion.**—The Andean races moved from the south northwards. Their civilization was of spontaneous growth, without any foreign aid, and uninfluenced by communication with other races. Elaborate attempts have been made to establish identity between Quichua words and words of similar meaning in Aryan languages, but a careful study of the subject cannot fail to produce the conviction that they are fanciful, and based on an insufficient knowledge of the Quichua language. The South American race naturally reached its highest development in the Andean region, where agriculture and the textile and other arts were necessary for the support and well-being of the people, and where a temperate climate conduced to the development of various civilizing influences and to a reasoning contemplation of the powers of nature, guided by religious instincts. It was in this way, and not by any foreign influences, that the Andean religions were developed by the races inhabiting the cordilleras of the Andes. In their highest form the Andean religions recognized the existence of a Supreme Creator of the universe, and sought to know his will by prayer and praise. The celestial bodies, the thunder and the rainbow, were revered as bringing good to man, but only as inferior deities obeying the mandates of the Creator. In the worship of the *paccarinas* and of ancestors there is a clear indication of a belief in a future existence; and the power attributed to the souls of animals and crops, and of inanimate objects, among the mass of the people, is peculiar to the Andean races in the form in which it prevailed amongst them. In whatever comparative position the Andean religion may be placed among the religions of the world, it must stand by itself as the unaided conception of the Andean people, uninfluenced by any communication with other races.

LITERATURE.—The works which give detailed accounts of the Andean religions do not include all the earlier works on the civilization and history of the native races. The first account is contained in the second part of the *Chronicle* of Cieza de Leon, tr. by Sir Clements R. Markham for the Hakluyt Society. The Spanish text was afterwards printed and edited by Ximenes de la Espada at Madrid. Juan José de Betanzos wrote his *Summary Narration* in 1551. He knew the Quichua language, and married an Inca princess. His work has been printed and edited at Madrid in 1880, but has not been translated. The two *Relaciones* of the learned lawyer Polo de Ondegardo are still in manuscript. But one of his reports has been translated and edited for the Hakluyt Society by Sir Clements R. Markham, 1872. Fernando de Santillana was a Judge of the Lima Audience in 1550. His valuable *Relacion* remained in manuscript until it was edited and printed by Ximenes de la Espada in 1879. The most detailed and best work on the religion of the Incas was written in about 1575 by a priest at Cuzco named Cristoval de Molina. The manuscript has been translated and edited for the Hakluyt Society by Sir Clements R. Markham in 1872. Miguel Cavello Balboa is the authority for the civilized people of the coast of Peru. He wrote his *Miscellanea Austral* at Quito between 1576 and 1586. It has been translated into French, and forms a volume of the Ternaux-Compans series (1840). José de Acosta's *Historia de las Indias* appeared in 1588. It was translated in 1604, and the Eng. tr. was edited by Sir Clements R. Markham for the Hakluyt Society (2 vols.), 1872. The works of Fernando Montesinos, entitled *Anales* and *Memorias Nuevas del Peru*, have a peculiar interest from the long list of sovereigns he gives, to be found nowhere else. He came to Peru in 1629. His work remained in manuscript until it was translated by Ternaux-Compans in 1840. The Spanish text was edited by Ximenes de la Espada in 1882. The *Relacion de los Costumbres Antiguas de los Naturales del Peru*, by an anonymous Jesuit, is a most valuable work. It remained in manuscript until it was edited by Ximenes de la Espada in 1879. The works on the extirpation of idolatry, by **Francisco de Avila**, written in 1608 (MS.), and Pablo José de Arriaga (Lima, 1621), are very important. Avila's report has been translated by Sir Clements R. Markham from the manuscript, for the Hakluyt Society, 1872. There is also information in the history of the order of St. Augustine in Peru (1638–1653), by Antonio de la Calancha. The *Commentarios Reales* by the Inca Garcilasso de la Vega are well known (1st ed. Lisbon, 1609, last ed. Madrid, 1723). Their value is much increased by the extracts from the lost work of the Jesuit Blas Valera. The work of Garcilasso de la Vega has been translated and edited for the Hakluyt Society by Sir Clements R. Markham, 1869. Bernabé Cobo's *Historia del Nuevo Mundo* (4 vols., Seville, 1890) was written in 1653. Pachacuti Yamqui Salcamayhua, an Indian of the Collao, wrote (c. 1620) a work entitled *Relacion de Antiguedades deste Reyno de Peru*. The manuscript was translated and edited by Sir Clements R. Markham (1872). The Spanish text was afterwards edited by Ximenes de la Espada (1879). By far the most valuable history of the Incas was written by Pedro de Sarmiento. The manuscript has been in the library of the University of Göttingen since 1780. The text was first printed by the librarian, Dr. Pietschmann, in August, 1906, with a learned introduction and notes. The work has been translated by Sir Clements R. Markham. The best essay on the word *Viracocha* is by Don Leonardo Villar (Lima, 1887). There are two authorities on the religion of the Chibchas of Bogota. Fray Pedro Simon wrote his *Noticias Historiales* in 1627. The *Historia General de las conquistas del nuevo reyno de Granada*, by Bishop Lucas Fernandez Piedrahita, appeared in 1676. The work on the antiquities of New Granada by Uricochea (Berlin, 1850) may also be consulted. CLEMENTS R. MARKHAM.

ANGEL.—See SPIRITS.

ANGEL DANCERS.—A religious sect of Methodist origin, founded in Hackensack, New Jersey, about 1890, by Huntsman T. Mnason, with the aid of John M'Clintock ('John the Baptist'), Daniel Haines ('Silas the Pure'), Mary Stewart ('Thecla'), Jane Howell ('Phoebe'), Elias Berry, and Herman Storms, with his wife and their children, Mary and Richard (the latter a graduate of Rutgers College). At the age of fifty, Mnason, after a somewhat dissolute life, became converted at a Methodist revival meeting in New York City in 1888. On the night of his conversion he believed that he had a vision of Heaven and Hell, seeing both the Lord and the Devil. He chose the Lord and Heaven, and claimed direct Divine guidance in all his acts. After many privations, he wandered to Park Ridge, N.J. Here he claimed to have received the power of healing by the laying on of hands. His strange appearance, in which he sought to imitate the traditional portraits of Christ, and his wonderfully magnetic will power, aided by a musical voice, evident sincerity, and easy flow of speech, made a strong impression upon men and women alike. He next appeared in Hackensack, N.J., where he commenced the preaching of his new doctrine, which he and his followers still maintain.

Mnason and his followers have everything in common, and believe they shall be judged by their works, and not by their faith. They are careful to harm no living thing, and they adhere to a strict vegetarian diet. They do not believe in any form of marriage, whether civil or religious, and hold the most extreme ideas of free love. Their dress has no decoration of any kind. At the house of a farmer in Hackensack, named Herman Storms, Mnason gathered some followers, and gave the place the name of the 'Lord's Farm.' The house is open at any hour of the day or night, and any one is welcome, and may share food and clothing. This was carried to such an extreme that vagrants were entertained 'in the Lord's name,' thus constituting a menace to the neighbourhood.

Locally the sect is known as 'the Lord's Farm,' never as 'Angel Dancers.' When at the height of their influence, they used to hold outdoor meetings in neighbouring towns. It was during these meetings that the dancing occurred from which the name of 'Angel Dancers' was derived. The dance is a species of religious frenzy, brought on by the

belief that the Devil is in their midst. It finds a ready parallel in many forms of religious ecstasy. It commonly begins after grace has been said before a meal, and a sign that the Devil is being vanquished lies in the ability to jump over the table! When directly questioned as to his denominational standing, Mnason claims to be an 'Old Style Methodist,' being opposed to all forms, and declares his religion to be based on the Book of Acts.

In May 1893, Mnason and some of his followers were arrested and put in jail for malicious mischief and maintaining a disorderly house. They refused, however, to defend themselves, and when speaking of each other styled themselves martyrs. At their trial in October of the same year, Mnason was sentenced to one year's hard labour. After his release the Storms took him back, and the 'Angel Dancers' continued their practices, their demeanour during their imprisonment having won them sympathy. Most of their time is spent in raising farm produce, which Mnason personally takes to market. They are noted for their industry and for their scrupulously honest dealings. Mnason never allows an angry word to be spoken to man or beast; and during both winter and summer he does a great deal of charitable work, going miles to carry aid, 'in the Lord's name,' to all who ask for it. At present only about twelve followers are left at the farm, where they quietly attend to their own affairs.

F. D. VAN ARSDALE.

ANGER (Psychological and Ethical).—i. *PSYCHOLOGICAL.*—There are two ways, according to Aristotle (*de Anima*, i. 1), in which anger may be characterized. By the dialectician or speculative philosopher (διαλεκτικός), it may be defined as 'the desire of retaliation, or such like'; by the natural philosopher (φυσικός), as 'the boiling of blood about the heart, or of heat.' Neither of these two ways, taken by itself, does he regard as adequate; for the one has respect only to the 'form,' while the other takes account solely of the 'matter,' and the complete view requires that both form and matter be attended to. In other words, Aristotle is here exemplifying in a concrete instance the great psychological truth that the emotions are 'materialized notions' (λόγοι ἔνυλοι), that they have both an inward or psychical side and an outward or corporeal expression; and that each of these requires to be reckoned with, if the phenomenon is to be satisfactorily explained. We may even go a step farther, and maintain, with Darwin (*The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, p. 239), that 'most of our emotions are so closely connected with their expression, that they hardly exist if the body remains passive.' Certainly, the control of anger consists very much in conscious abstraction from the modes in which it physically embodies itself.

(1) *On the physical side*, anger, in the individual, manifests itself in marked disturbance of the bodily organism: *e.g.* the movements of hands and jaws become pronounced, respiration is quickened, the nostrils are dilated, the action of the heart is accelerated, the face changes colour, the eyes flash, the eyebrows are knit, the voice waxes loud, harsh, and discordant; and, in that species of anger which we know as rage, there is wild 'striking out,' vehement and uncontrolled, so that anger may not inaptly be designated (as by Horace, *Epist.* I. ii. 62) 'a brief madness' (*ira furor brevis est*).

These changes in the body are obvious to the spectator. But there are others that are invisible, which take place in the internal organs, giving rise to organic sensations which play a distinct part in the process, inasmuch as they react on the emotion, modifying, accentuating, or intensifying it, as the case may be. Hence, the organism has been likened by psychologists (*e.g.*, Bain, James, Stout) to a 'sounding-board,' on which the nervous excitement correlated with the emotion 'plays,' and which is in turn affected and modified by the organic 'resonance.' This organic factor is highly important; but we must not make too much of it, as has been done by Professor James, who, in his theory of emotion, reduces emotion to a kind of sensation begotten of organic disturbance.

'Our natural way of thinking about these coarser emotions [grief, fear, rage, love],' he says (*The Principles of Psychology*, II. 449), 'is that the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My theory, on the contrary, is that *the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion.* Common sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry, and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened, and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry, and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that the one mental state is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily manifestations must first be interposed between, and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be.'

'Angry because we strike!' That, surely, is to put the cart before the horse; for why do we strike at all? Is it not because the emotion of anger is already aroused, through perception of the kind of act that affects us, though there is no doubt that the organic sensations react upon the emotion and fan it—the 'resonance' has a real effect? If we are angry because we are insulted, it is because we first *feel* the insult; without this feeling, we should, in all likelihood, remain indifferent, and it is the function of delay and deliberation to calm the feeling and to produce indifference.

(2) Taken *on the psychical side*, anger is mental disturbance, displeasure, or discomposure, of a painful kind, arising from opposition, hurt, or harm received, operating like a reflex act, viz., by immediate active response, or reaction without deliberation, on recognition of the unacceptable or offending fact that arouses it. It has thus a necessary relation to the conative, as well as to the emotive, side of our being. What induces anger is something that has to be got rid of; and, in the angry state, our activity is strongly put forth, so that the riddance may be readily secured. Moreover, if the real cause of the offence cannot be reached at the moment, the ebullition vents itself on something else (thing or person) within reach—stool, chair, book; the pent-up energy must find discharge somehow—an 'explosion' is inevitable. 'Young children, when in a violent rage, roll on the ground on their backs or bellies, screaming, kicking, scratching, or biting everything within reach' (Darwin, *op. cit.*, p. 241). Thus anger may be said to be instinctive. It does not wait for reason (though it may be brought under the control of reason), and is, in itself, regardless of results. It is aroused in us by what opposes us, or thwarts us, by what we object to, by what offends and pains us (all such we *resent*); and it aims at repressing or suppressing the opposition, and at preventing its future operation. It is not, however, in itself *malignant* or *malevolent*, and, consequently, is not really a synonym for retaliation, as Aristotle's 'dialectician' would make it to be. Hence, such a definition as Locke's (*An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, ii. 20) must be rejected: 'Anger is uneasiness or discomposure of the mind, upon the receipt of an injury, with a present purpose of revenge.' The 'present purpose' is not of revenge, but simply of rebutting the offence or getting rid of it, and does not primarily intend to repay or injure the doer at all, although revenge may easily follow in the wake of it. Thus it is that we may very well be angry with a man without bearing him ill-will; and thus it is that anger is only of brief duration (thereby differing

from wrath, which is a settled disposition), although the choleric man is liable to repeated fits of it.

Like other 'passions,' anger lacks in moderation—transgresses limits, defies proportion. This indicates its danger as a motive power. When it acts like the wind, it exercises a useful function; when it becomes the whirlwind, it may do serious damage. On this account, its effects on the irate individual himself may be unsatisfactory; when the passion has ceased, depression frequently ensues, exhaustion thus taking its revenge.

Anger is a primary emotion of the human mind, and needs to be experienced in order to be known. It has a distinct quality of its own, different from that of every other emotion; and no one could, by mere description, make it intelligible to a man who had never himself been angry. Not only is it not derived from other emotions, it does not even presuppose experience of other emotions to give it being. Yet it enters itself into other emotions,—sometimes as their basis, sometimes as a subsidiary factor,—and so may be allied with 'affects' that are distinctly malevolent. It is an *egoistic* emotion, which may quite easily be transformed into one of *selfishness*; hence its ethical significance, to be considered presently.

The varieties of anger are irascibility and peevishness. Irascibility is the susceptibility to anger of a nervously excitable subject; and peevishness is undue sensibility to trifles, annoyance at them far beyond what their real value or significance warrants.

ii. *ETHICAL.*—Anger, as has just been said, is not in itself malevolent: it is simply a protection or defence against harm or hurt, and may be directed against things as well as against persons. It is a species of resentment, and operates instinctively, and, therefore, without due regard to consequences; hence the need of direction and restraint, and hence the ethical bearings of the emotion. As instinctive resentment, it is neither to be praised nor to be blamed, but is to be accepted as a part of the human constitution necessary to the welfare of the individual, and therefore ultimately to the good of the community. But inasmuch as the causes of anger are frequently human beings, and inasmuch as anger is apt to expend itself in excessive measure, and, in cases where the causes of it cannot be immediately reached, on objects that had no share in arousing it, it has to be brought under the control of reason. This is necessary, if anger is to be (as it ought to be) a help to justice. But, in thus rationalizing it, we are giving it a distinctively moral character, and are taking it in a wider signification than is accorded it by the psychologist. We are now estimating it in relation to its consequences, and assigning it a place in an ethical scheme of values. This means (to use Butler's famous analysis) that we are distinguishing between resentment that is sudden or instinctive and resentment that is deliberate, and appraising each in connexion with its social bearings.

Sudden or instinctive resentment, on the ethical side, is directed against injury, as discriminated from mere hurt or harm: it presupposes a conscious agent, intentionally doing an offending act for the purpose of injuring us. It consequently assumes the form of moral indignation, which is the spontaneous reaction of the conscience against what is wrong or evil, when the wrong or evil is designedly effected. It is the resentment of a healthy mind sensitive to injustice, and responding unreflectingly or immediately on the perception of the offence. Without this kind of anger, it is hardly conceivable how the moral nature could be effective at all.

When, on the other hand, we turn to deliberate resentment, we find that we are giving anger a different complexion, and are bringing it into relation with other phenomena of human nature that may or may not be conducive to men's highest interests. In so far as deliberate resentment means simply restraining the act that would naturally follow from the instinctive perception of the injury inflicted, till we have assured ourselves (in cases where some doubt may be possible) whether our resentment is just or not, and whether the consequences of our action may not be out of all proportion to the offence, it can only be right and commendable. But when, as is so frequently the case, deliberate resentment allies itself with our malevolent inclinations (with the savage or the fiend within us), then it becomes morally reprehensible, often in the highest degree. It is the nature of anger voluntarily nursed to magnify the offence that caused it: vanity and offended dignity come in to intensify and transform the emotion,—a grudge rankling in the bosom naturally exaggerates. Further, there can be little question that anger readily associates itself with that desire to injure others or to inflict pain on them that seems to be native to human beings, and so is easily changed into hatred, or retaliation, or revenge, or, keener still, vindictiveness. It is now exclusively aimed at persons, and is in its nature diametrically opposed to the sympathetic and humane sentiments, the tender emotions, that bind men together; it is the very antithesis of love, and, instead of attracting and cementing, alienates and repels. It is not only that the angry person, full of hate, is estranged from his fellow or resents his action; he also desires to inflict injury on him, to cause him pain, and gloats over and delights in his suffering. If he longs simply to pay him back or to requite him for the offence committed, his emotion is retaliation, proceeding on the principle of equivalents, the *lex talionis*—'an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth,'—oblivious altogether of the promptings of generosity and mercy. When he harbours ill-will and cherishes his wrath, refusing to be pacified, meditating unmeasured requital and waiting for the favourable opportunity, it is revenge. Revenge is in its very nature inequitable and relentless, bloodthirsty and cruel, satisfied with nothing less than 'the head of John the Baptist in a charger.' When revenge pursues its object spitefully with unremitting persistence, and finds zest in every petty infliction of evil on him, it is vindictiveness. The spitefulness gives it a very despicable character.

Various questions concerning anger suggest themselves:

(1) A point that the earlier British psychologists (Butler, Thomas Reid, Dugald Stewart, Thomas Brown, etc.) delighted to investigate regarding anger and the malevolent affections, was their *use* or *final cause*. Accepting human nature as a given hierarchy of principles and faculties, and intending their philosophy to have practical value, they asked what end these seemingly destructive and objectionable forces served in the economy of man's being. They had little difficulty in showing that, given man and given his present circumstances, these forces minister both to the protection or self-preservation of the individual and to the good of the community. Sudden anger clearly conduces to the defence of the irate person against hurt or harm; and when the cause of the harm is another living person, it serves as a warning to him to desist: it is the Scottish Thistle fully displayed, with the significant motto, '*Nemo me impune lacessit.*' Even more strikingly is this purpose served by retaliation and revenge, when the vengeful person has to deal with others of like vengeful disposition as his own. His anger, being fierce, is both punitive and deterrent.

(2) In more recent times, another question has come prominently forward, viz.: *Whether the malevolence of human nature* (which nobody denies as a fact) *is really native to it?* The negative was ably upheld in *Mind*, a few years ago, by Mr. F. H. Bradley, who tried to reduce malevolence to excitement, or love of power, or self-assertion, or such-like. This was strenuously opposed by Professor Bain, who insisted that, making all allowance for self-assertion and the love of power and similar strong emotions, there is a certain residuum that is unaccounted for, and this residuum is simply innate malevolence.

'Let us take, then, the examples where we are witnesses to suffering inflicted by others, and where we ourselves are noways concerned, or, at all events, very remotely. Why do multitudes delight in being spectators of punishments, including the gallows? In former days, when executions were public, when whippings, the pillory, and the stocks were open to everybody's gaze, what was the source of the fascination attending the spectacles? They were remotely connected with the security of the people generally, but they were most frequented by those that thought least of public security. . . . We can go a step farther. There are abundance of examples of delight in mischief of the most absolutely gratuitous kind, beginning in tender years, and continuing more or less until maturity. The love of teasing, of practical joking, of giving trouble and annoyance, without any cause whatever, is too manifest to be denied. . . . The demand for excitement of itself proves nothing. What we are to look at are the forms that it takes by preference, inasmuch as these are probably something more than mere excitement: they involve real and unambiguous pleasure. If the votaries of excitement are in the habit of seeking it by molesting, annoying, chaffing other people, the inference is that the excitement is a mere cover for a definite pleasure, the pleasure of malevolence. To sit on a road fence, and pass insulting and jeering remarks upon the innocent passers-by, is not to be slurred over as mere love of excitement: it arises from the deeper fountains of malignity. We may easily procure excitement in forms that hurt nobody; we may even find excitement, and pleasure too, in bestowing benefits; when we habitually seek it in the shape of inflicting pain, we must be credited with delighting in the pain. . . . The question ever recurs—Why is hatred such a source of consolatory feeling, if there be not a fountain of pleasure in connexion with the sufferings of others?' (Bain, *Dissertations on Leading Philosophical Topics*, pp. 84–104).

The strength of the argument seems to lie on the side of the affirmative; and, however unacceptable it may be, the fact must be recognized that man has an original tendency to inflict suffering on others, and derives real satisfaction and delight from contemplating the suffering that he inflicts.

(3) Our repugnance to this position may perhaps be mitigated, if we accept the explanation of the origin or source of the malevolent affections offered by the theory of Evolution. In his masterly work on *The Expression of the Emotions*, and elsewhere, Darwin has amassed materials to show that these affections originated, æons ago, in the predatory habits of the race, taken in connexion with those of the lower animals. They are the result of the necessity for combat and mutual warfare in the early struggle for existence. It was in these far back times that anger, retaliation, and revenge, with all the ways of giving outward expression to them, so significant of their animal origin, arose; and they are a heritage to us from the past. By this hypothesis, the wolf in man receives an explanation of a scientific kind, which, whether fully adequate or not, throws light on many points connected with malevolence that otherwise remain dark and puzzling. The philosophies of some countries (Oriental in particular) have tried to explain the phenomenon by the supposition of metempsychosis or transmigration of souls, especially the passage of the soul of a brute into the body of a man. The lower impulses and passions seem thereby to be accounted for, and man's baser nature to be so far justified. That is but the imaginative and non-scientific way of solving the problem; over against which has to be placed the scientific and reasoned mode of solution offered by Evolution.

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WILLIAM L. DAVIDSON.

ANGER (WRATH) OF GOD.—I. *THE DIVINE ANGER AS PRESENTED IN THE OT.*—God is revealed in the OT as a living Being, who has a merciful purpose toward the universe which He has made. During all the ages of human history, He is seeking to carry out this purpose to its consummation. In doing so, He is confronted by the ignorance and slowness of men, by their self-will and their hostility. These awaken in Him such feelings as would be stirred in the heart of a wise and good man, in view of the hindrances and oppositions with which he met in the course of some great and beneficent enterprise. The OT speaks freely of the grief, and jealousy, and anger of God. There are doubtless very grave difficulties in attributing these emotions, and, indeed, emotions of any kind, to One whose thoughts are not as the thoughts of men. But the writers of the OT, while guarding against an obvious abuse of this anthropomorphic method of conceiving the Divine nature (1 S 15^{29}), do not stop to discuss such problems. They are chiefly concerned to make vivid and real the thought of God, as a living Person in whose image human beings have been made. Human qualities, accordingly, are attributed to God, because human nature is homogeneous with the Divine nature. In man these attributes and affections are marked by finitude and imperfection. In God they exist in absolute perfection. This makes a great difference between what is found in man and what is attributed to God, as the OT writers are well aware. But there is an identity deeper than the difference; and therefore even the latest and most spiritual of the prophets and psalmists make fearless use of anthropomorphic language. Had they failed to do so, they would have endangered, in the minds of their readers, the personality and the moral nature of God. Anger, accordingly, is found in the Divine character, as it is always found in any strong human character.

1. **The nature of the Divine anger.**—The OT describes it in terms which are laden with terror. What created thing can stand before the flame of that great anger (Dt 32^{22}; cf. He 12^{29}, Ps 78^{21} 88^{16} $90^{7.\ 8.\ 11}$)? The Divine anger, described in these and many other passages, is not to be confounded with the causeless and capricious fury which men have been wont to attribute to the objects of their ignorant and slavish fear. It is always to be understood by reference to the central truth of Jahweh's self-revelation. He is the covenant God of His people. He seeks their salvation. If He is angry, it is when the conditions under which alone He can work out that salvation are infringed, and His purpose of mercy is imperilled. The relation in which He stands to Israel necessarily implies that His holiness, *i.e.* His Godhead, be not violated in any of its manifestations. A God who is not holy and inviolable cannot be a Saviour. To invade His sanctity is to defeat His purpose. The anger of God is aroused, therefore, by any act which stands between Him and the end which He has in view.

Incidents are recorded which seem to bring the anger of Jahweh down to the level of the inexplicable rage of an unethical heathen god (*e.g.* 1 S 6^{19}, 2 S 6^{6-8}). Regulations are made which seem to connect the Divine anger with matters that are wholly outward, and, therefore, not fit occasions of wrath in a perfectly moral being (*e.g.* Lv 10^{6}, Nu 1^{53} 18^{5}; cf. Ex 12^{13} 30^{12}). All such cases, however, are to be understood by reference to the Divine purpose. It is endangered when the pride and self-will of man invade the sphere of the Divine holiness. What is at stake is not a ceremonial regulation as such, but the holiness, *i.e.* the very Divinity, of God Himself. By such acts as those referred to, therefore, the anger of God is kindled, and upon the perpetrators of them it descends in crushing might.

2. Its objects.—The objects of the Divine anger, accordingly, are men who oppose themselves to the Divine will. Such are all who are hostile to Israel, the people of God's choice, the realm wherein He rules:—the nations who rage, and the peoples who imagine a vain thing (Ps 2^{1}), the enemies that reproach, and the foolish people who blaspheme His name (Ps 74^{18}). Not these alone, however, nor these chiefly, provoke Him to anger. When Israel breaks the laws of righteousness, upon which the commonwealth of God is founded, or does dishonour to Him who redeemed His people, His heart is hot within Him; and He punishes, not with cold, unemotional, judicial exactitude, but with an intensity of indignation which, to an awakened conscience, is the most awful element in the penalty (Ps 5^{5}, Hab 1^{13}, Lv 26^{14-45}, Dt 12^{31}, Is 61^{8}). The long education of Israel, culminating in the teaching of the prophets, has burned into the conscience of men that sin is a reality for God, and that towards it He is moved with a just and terrible anger (Ps 11^{5}). The depth of God's feeling with regard to sin can be fathomed only by estimating aright the relation in which He stands to His people. He is their Saviour, and the tenderest and most sacred relation in which two human beings can stand to one another is not too close to figure forth His relation to them. He is their husband and Lord; they are His spouse. Sin on their part is conjugal infidelity, the most awful outrage that can be committed against love. In such figures the prophets depict the grief and jealousy of God, and seek to measure the fierceness of His wrath (Ezk 23, Am 3^{2}, Dt 4^{24} 5^{9}, Zeph 1^{18}, Ps 78^{58}).

3. Its manifestation.—The Divine anger, therefore, is an affection awakened in the Divine nature by the presence of evil. It is manifested in judgments following upon wicked deeds. Its instruments are to be found in the forces of nature, which are under the control of God, and in men, whose selfish pride or ambition may be made subservient to the will of God, so that it may, unconsciously, be the rod of Jahweh's anger (Is $10^{5ff.}$). The prophets, however, clearly discern that God's operations, alike in mercy and in judgment, cannot be carried to completion in the state of the world as they know it. Not in any of these common days, which succeed one another with uncompleted significance, can the work of God be finished, but only in a Day, which completes the series, and at once reveals and fulfils the whole design of God. This Day of the Lord will be both the crown of salvation and the ultimate stroke of judgment. The unimaginable terrors of that Day haunt the visions of the prophets, confounding the self-righteousness of those who had expected it to bring them the gratification of their national and personal pride (Am 5^{18-20}, Zeph 1^{7-12}, Mal $3^{2.\ 3}$). Thus the wrath of God gains a predominantly eschatological sense, not, however, to the exclusion of the view that it is a present quality of the Divine nature, and is continuously manifest in His attitude toward sin.

4. The turning away of the Divine anger.—Being under the control of the ultimate Divine purpose, which is love, the wrath of God may be restrained, or even entirely turned away, and give place to the unhindered outpourings of loving-kindness. It is, indeed, plain that, if God gave free vent to His anger, the objects of it would immediately be destroyed (Ps 130^{3}). Such an action on His part, however, would defeat His own ends. During the historic period, throughout which God is pursuing His aim, His wrath cannot be fully executed (Ps $78^{38.\ 39}$). One consideration is paramount—the honour of His Name, *i.e.* the success of His design of mercy to Israel. God cannot submit to be taunted with failure (Ezk 20^{22}, Is 48^{9-11}). He is angry, and He punishes. But he waits to see if, by punishments restrained and controlled by mercy, sinners may learn, and turn to Him, and live. Beyond this period of discipline there lies an awful possibility of exhausted forbearance, and final and measureless doom. What, then, will avert this doom, and turn anger into acceptance and delight? The OT has no clear or full answer to give. The sacrifices, obviously, could not atone for sin, in its real spiritual significance; and their symbolism cannot have conveyed exact dogmatic teaching. The prophets, however, had grasped one great and fruitful thought: if a representative of the people be found who, standing in living relation to the nation, yet separating himself from the national trespass, shall deeply apprehend the sinfulness of the nation's sin, and the terror of the Divine judgment upon it, and shall make profound acknowledgment before God, in the name of the people, of their guilt and ill-desert, the Divine anger will be appeased, and God will return to His people in mercy (Gn 18^{22-33}, Ex 32^{9-14}, Nu 25^{10-13}). It is true that no perfectly competent representative can be found among the people themselves. Even a Moses or a Samuel would be insufficient for so great a work (Jer 15^{1}). Yet the principle of atonement through sin-bearing remained deep in the prophetic consciousness (Ezk 22^{30}, Jer 5^{1}, Is 65^{8}), and, in the great vision of Is 53, one is depicted capable of undertaking even this vocation of unspeakable suffering, and, through his faithful discharge of it, procuring deliverance for the transgressors.

II. *THE DIVINE ANGER AS PRESENTED IN THE NT.*—The OT and the NT are at one in their intense conviction that God is 'a Person, with ethical attributes,' a living Being, having moral powers and qualities, which are reflected and reproduced in man. They agree also in their presentation of the character of God. That full ethicizing of the idea of God which is seen in the prophets of the OT is assumed as fundamental truth by the teachers of the NT. Love and mercy, holiness and righteousness, are qualities which believing men, alike before and after the coming of Christ, discern in the character of God, and adore with reverence and joy.

So also the NT, like the OT, has no hesitation in attributing emotions to God. Peace, and pleasure, and gladness are all to be found in Him, and, through their effects in the hearts of believers, are part of the Christian's heritage of blessedness. The reality of these Divine emotions is so wrought into Christian experience, as expressed in the NT, that to question it or explain it away would deprive the experience itself of its life and joy.

1. It may be urged, however, that while it is true that the NT, like the OT, attributes emotions to God, it differs in not attributing to Him the emotion of anger. Is this true? Does anger disappear in NT teaching as an element in the character of God? It is well known that Ritschl and some theologians of his school maintain that the only NT use of the Divine anger is eschatological. Is this correct? (*a*) It is true that the NT usage is prevailingly eschatological. NT believers, like the prophets of the OT, had the Day of Wrath full in view. The Baptist made it the burden of his warning and appeal (Mt 3^{7}). However difficult the exegetical questions may be in connexion with certain portions of the tradition, it is certain that eschatology occupied a large place in the teaching of Jesus, and

that He used OT figures in describing the terrors of the judgment. In the Apocalypse of St. John that final outpouring of the wrath of God weighs upon the soul with an awful sense of doom (*e.g.* $6^{16f.}$ 14^{10}). The preaching of the Apostles is full of the terror of the Lord. To them and to their hearers the impending wrath was a terrible reality; and one element, not the greatest, yet very precious and wonderful, in the gospel, is that the Messiah saves from this unspeakable Judgment (1 Th 1^{10}, Ro 5^{9}). (*b*) It is not true, however, that the usage is exclusively eschatological. It is to be observed, moreover, that while feelings of terror are readily awakened by references to the ultimate Judgment and its dread accompaniments, a deeper awe is aroused by the contemplation of a Judgment that is present and continuous, and an anger that is awake and abiding even now. This more solemn view of the wrath of God is not awanting in the NT. The teaching of Jesus is very far from depicting a God who is undisturbed at the sight of human pride and self-will. Sin is a reality for God, and there is one sin, which itself is the ultimate product of sin, which hath never forgiveness. Some of the parables are heavy with the weight of the Divine indignation (*e.g.* Mt 25^{14-30}). More significant still than the words of Jesus were His own feelings and their outcome in act. He who said, 'He that hath seen me hath seen the Father' (Jn 14^{9}), was not stoically cold or sublimely unmoved in presence of evil. Once and again He was filled with a great anger (Mk 3^{5} 8^{33} 11^{15-17}, Mt $23^{13ff.}$). In allowing Himself this emotion and its utterance, Jesus certainly did not regard Himself as out of harmony with the feeling and attitude of God toward the evils that so moved Him. This teaching is echoed throughout the NT. Sin always attracts to itself the wrath of God (Ro 1^{18} 4^{15} 9^{22}, Eph 2^{3} 5^{6}). Sin, in its inmost significance, is equivalent to rejection of the Divine mercy incarnate in the Son of God. 'He,' therefore, 'that obeyeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him' (Jn 3^{36}). When we remember what 'life' means, in the vocabulary of the Old and New Testaments, viz. the favour and fellowship of God, we are compelled to put into this saying the profoundest sense of a weight of holy indignation now resting upon the soul which is not standing in the obedience of Christ. It is possible to deny the doctrine thus conveyed, and to rid our hearts of the fear it conveys; but it is not possible to deny that NT writers held this doctrine, and owned this overwhelming terror.

2. The wrath of God, then, rests on the soul that rejects Christ; but upon the soul that is 'in Christ' no such awful load remains. The NT writers are at one in attributing this great deliverance to the saving work of Christ, and specifically to His death, which they regard as a sacrifice for sin. When Christ was raised from the dead, 'the cloud of Divine wrath—the ὀργή so long suspended and threatening to break (Ro $3^{25.\ 26}$)—had passed away. This is the thought which lies at the bottom of Ro 6^{7-10}' (Sanday on Ro $4^{23ff.}$ in *ICC*). The penitent believer, looking to the cross of Christ, is certified, by the witness of the Spirit within him, that the anger of God, which once rested upon him, is now turned away from him. *Is it then the intention of the Biblical writers to convey the idea that Christ bore the wrath of God, that He endured the outpouring of the Divine anger?* Is it fitting for the redeemed to say:

> 'The Father lifted up His rod:
> O Christ, it fell on Thee'?

It is a remarkable fact that the NT never does, in words, connect the death of Christ with the Divine anger, even in passages where the line of argument might have seemed to culminate in such a thought. It seems as though the writers deliberately refrained from any language which might suggest that the Son became the subject of the Father's anger, or that His death was due to an ebullition of the Divine wrath, which, flashing forth in lightning stroke, smote the holy breast of Jesus. At the same time it is to be noted that experiences which are themselves expressions of the wrath of God are attributed to Christ, and our salvation is traced to them. In Gal 3^{13} Christ is described as having become 'a curse for us,' and in 2 Co 5^{21} as having been made 'sin' on our behalf. Whatever these mysterious expressions, 'become a curse,' 'made sin,' may mean, they cannot mean less than an actual experience, by the sinless One, of what sin involves; and that, without doubt, is the wrath of God. Yet the actual phrase is not used. It must be remembered, also, that Jesus, in dying, experienced an agony, whose source and bitterness we can never fully know; which, as it broke from Him in the cry of desertion, cannot have meant less than an unspeakable sense of the Divine judgment upon human sin (cf. Principal Garvie in *Studies in the Inner Life of Jesus*, London, 1908, p. 417 ff. Yet it does not appear, even in that cry of infinite pain, that He felt that God was angry with Him. Descriptions are given, implying that Jesus in death bore sin, through a profound realization of what it means, and of what the Divine attitude and feeling toward it, and the Divine judgment upon it, really are. In these very descriptions, however, phrases which might lead to inferences regarding the anger of God being endured by the Son of His love are carefully avoided. Christian faith is directed to One who was the Son of God, in whom the Father was well pleased, who hung upon the cross in fulfilment of the mission to which the Father summoned Him, and who must therefore have been, in that hour, the object of the Father's deep satisfaction and most tender love, who yet surrendered the comforts of the Father's fellowship, identified Himself with sinful men, and passed, Himself sinless, through the apprehension of God's sentence upon sin, acknowledging its justice, and approving, as in the holy life, so in the sacrificial death, the righteousness of God. The believer, when he commits himself to the crucified and risen Lord, receives from Him salvation, and enters upon the joy of those from whom the Divine anger is turned away, and who live in the Divine favour and fellowship. At the same time, being spiritually one with his Lord, he enters into the experiences in which Christ won his deliverance, realizes and acknowledges God's judgment upon sin, dies to sin as a power over him, and begins to live the new life of victory over sin; and in these experiences, which strangely reproduce both the passion and the glory of the Redeemer, the salvation, which he receives as a gift, is wrought out in a growing assimilation to Christ. He combines, in his own experience, what he has seen combined upon the Cross, the wrath of God against sin and the Divine mercy toward sinners. The terror of the Lord and the love of Christ are the two powers which operate within his soul, to make him flee from sin, and live unto Him who for his sake died and rose again. It may be possible to have a religious experience in which a sense of the wrath of God has no place; but it ought to be acknowledged that it would not be an experience which has the cross of Christ for its starting-point and the NT for its rule and guide.

III. *DOCTRINAL CONCLUSIONS.*—The Biblical usage warrants certain inferences, which require to have their place in any theology whose guiding principles are found in the Scriptures.

1. The reality of the Divine anger.—The passion of anger is implanted in man, and has for its end the prevention and remedy of injury and the miseries arising out of it. 'It is to be considered,' in the words of Bishop Butler in his famous Sermon on *Resentment* (§ 11), 'as a weapon, put into our hands by nature, against injury, injustice, and cruelty'; and 'it may be innocently employed and made use of.' We ascribe human qualities to God, not because we think of Him as a magnified man, but because we necessarily regard men as reflecting, under conditions of finitude and limitation, the qualities of the Divine nature. Human anger shares in the imperfection and sinfulness of man. The 'weapon put into our hands' we often use unwisely, forgetting, as we wield it, the claims of both righteousness and love. Divine anger is far removed from any such defect. It is an affection of One who is at once loving and righteous. It is completely under the control of

attributes which are themselves combined, without any opposition, in the harmony of the Divine character. But it is in God essentially what it is in man. In Him, also, it is a 'weapon' against injury; and its keen edge is turned against those who, in pride and self-will, seek to injure God. The classical theological statement of this position is to be found in Lactantius' *de Ira Dei*. The gods of Epicurus inhabit 'the lucid interspace of world and world,' where no 'sound of human sorrow mounts, to mar their sacred everlasting calm.' The God of Stoicism is another name for the Universal Reason embodied in the universe, and is lifted far above the throb of feeling. Against any such views of the apathy of the Divine nature, Lactantius sets the Christian conviction of the character of God as love, and announces the principle 'qui non odit, nec diligit.' 'If God is not angry with the impious and the unrighteous, it is clear that He does not love the pious and the righteous. Therefore the error of those is more consistent who take away at once both anger and kindness.' This line of argument has been often followed, *e.g.*, by Trench (*Synonyms*, p. 129): 'There is a wrath of God, who would not be good unless He hated evil, the two being inseparable, so that He must do both or neither.'

Objections to the reality of the Divine anger have arisen mainly from an intrusion of philosophical theory into the sphere of Christian thought; and for this, in the history of theology, Augustine is chiefly responsible. He is still very largely under the control of Neo-Platonism, and shares the dread, always entertained by mystical piety, of lowering the Divine nature, by connecting it with finite things, or of breaking in upon the ineffable bliss of God, by the impertinence of predicates taken from human experience. Thus in the *City of God* (bk. xv. ch. 25) he speaks of 'the anger of God, which does not inflame His mind, nor disturb His unchangeable tranquillity,' and identifies it with the sentence which God pronounces upon sin. 'The anger of God is not a disturbing emotion of His mind, but a judgment by which punishment is inflicted upon sin.' The language which in Scripture attributes anger to God, he regards as anthropopathic, and explains it as 'a condescension to man's finitude, insinuating itself into the minds of all classes of men, alarming the proud, arousing the careless, exercising the inquisitive, and satisfying the intelligent.' We may even trace something of the same hesitation in Dr. John Caird's estimate of the value and the defects of anthropomorphic language: '. . . when we are told of His wrath as being aroused or abated . . . the religious mind passes beyond the anthropomorphic figure to seize, in an indefinite but not unreal way, the hidden spiritual meaning. The representation conveys a general impression which is of the nature of knowledge, though, literally construed, it expresses what is untrue' (*Introd. to the Philosophy of Religion*, p. 174 f.). It is true that the religious mind refuses to take literally figurative descriptions, which seem to ascribe to God 'the ignorance and changefulness, even the desires and passions, of our finite sensuous nature.' But it is certain, also, that the religious mind, instructed by Scripture and by experience, will not permit a speculative construction to imperil the conception of the Divine personality. The difficulty of conceiving how God can be both the 'Absolute' and a living Person is, of course, very great. Probably we ought to direct our thoughts to a fresh study of the conception of the Absolute, particularly with the aim of freeing it from the immobility and sterility which an exclusive use of the category of Substance has imported into it. In any case, we must seek to do justice in our thinking to an absolute will of love, which determines the whole counsel and action of God; and, also, to His attitude toward that which conflicts with this will—an attitude which can be construed only as condemnation and wrath.

2. Sin and the Divine anger.—(1) The indignation of God against sin is real; and the passing away of wrath and the unhindered manifestation of love are real also. Theology, accordingly, in its effort to give reflective expression to the facts of Christian experience, cannot neglect the idea of the wrath of God, and the problems connected with it.

Ritschl, indeed, refuses to allow any theological value to the idea of the wrath of God. He speaks of it in his great work on *Justification and Reconciliation* as 'ein ebenso heimatloses wie gestaltloses Theologumenon' (vol. ii. p. 154). In vol. iii. p. 323 [Eng. tr.] he says: 'From the point of view of theology, no validity can be assigned to the idea of the wrath of God and His curse upon sinners as yet unreconciled; still less, from this theological standpoint, is any special mediation between the wrath and the love of God conceivable or necessary in order to explain the reconciliation of sinners with Him.' This view depends (*a*) on an interpretation of the Biblical usage, viz. that 'wrath' has a uniformly eschatological meaning, which is surely unsound; (*b*) on a conception of God as being absolutely and exclusively love, justice being excluded from the Divine essence, which imperils the ultimate distinctions of Good and Evil. 'When the Divine reason, clothed with omnipotence, has created morally free beings, the right of punitive justice cannot be refused to it without exposing the moral world to the danger of falling a prey to chaos' (Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, vol. iv. p. 65). Guilt is more than a guilty feeling; and 'the impression of a change from Divine wrath to Divine mercy' (Ritschl, vol. iii. p. 323) is more than subjective. It is the reflexion, within the subject of redeeming grace, of an actual difference of attitude and feeling on the part of the personal Source and Author of redemption. Such an experience is real, and must not be so explained by theology, in its effort to maintain 'the view-point of eternity,' as to be explained away.

(2) The wrath of God against sin stands in the closest relation to all His ethical attributes, particularly to His holiness and His love. *His holy character* is outraged by the presence of moral evil. If it were not so, He would not be a God to worship, as the impersonation and the guardian of righteousness. A trained conscience bows before this righteous wrath of God against evil, recognizing it as an element in ideal excellence. That nature alone whose insight is blurred and whose judgment is perverted, fails to be angry at the sight of moral evil. 'A sinner,' says Dr. A. B. Davidson, 'is an ill judge of sin' (*Com. on Hebrews*, p. 108, on 4^{15}). God, knowing sin to its root, hates it with a perfect hatred. *His love* is not less affronted than His holiness. The welfare of men, which is the aim of His love, is ruined by moral evil. The highest good of men depends on the conquest of sin in them, and their conformity to the holy character of God. His love for men, therefore, intensifies the heat of His indignation against that in them which opposes the realization of His loving purpose for them.

Some theologians have pressed this close connexion between love and anger to the point of identifying them.

So Martensen: 'This wrath is holy love itself,' feeling itself 'restrained, hindered, and stayed through unrighteousness'; Oosterzee: 'Not without reason has this wrath been termed "the extreme burning point of the flame of love"'; and many modern writers, *e.g.*, Scott Lidgett: 'The manifestation of the Fatherhood of God is shut out, and because shut out, is turned to wrath; for the wrath of God is simply the love of the Fatherhood denied its purpose by rebellion'; and Stevens: 'The wrath of God is the reaction of His holy love against sin. It is not the opposite of love; it is a part or aspect of love.'

It may be doubted, however, whether this identification serves the purpose of clear thinking. Love, while incompatible with revenge, is certainly not inconsistent with resentment (cf. Butler, Sermon ix. § 10). It is possible to love those who have injured us, while feeling a deep and just indignation at the moral turpitude of their conduct. But our anger is certainly not a part or aspect of our love. Even a parent's anger at the evil conduct of a beloved child is not to be identified with his love for his child; though it is closely related to his love, being intensified by his desire to secure for his son the very highest moral results, and being, at the same time, controlled and directed by love in its manifestations. Anger is connected primarily with the attitude which a righteous man necessarily takes toward evil. He condemns it, and does so with a passion which is pure in proportion to the soundness of his moral character. To make it simply the impulse of disappointed love is to lower its moral quality, and make it selfish and unethical. A righteous man feels resentment toward evil, and is impelled to make that resentment clearly known and profoundly felt by the wrong-doer. He is constrained to do this not by revenge, but by his sense of the duty he owes to the principle of right itself, and to him who has invaded it. And this duty is not less binding, if the wrong-doer be a beloved child. The father's love and anger are real and distinct.

Their relations to each other constitute a problem the solution of which will tax his utmost wisdom.

It is after this analogy that the Biblical usage presents the Divine anger; and by it theological thought must be guided. God is full of love to the sinner, while at the same time He burns with just and awful resentment against his sin. His love and His wrath are alike real, and each has its distinctive place in the character of God. Their relations constitute a problem whose solution cannot be adequately set forth in terms of thought; while yet Christian faith grasps the solution in the cross of Christ.

Even Martensen, who identifies love and wrath, dwells upon 'the tension or apparent variance' which sin has produced between the Divine love and the Divine righteousness, and defines the idea of the Atonement as 'the solution of a certain antithesis in the very life of God as revealed to man, or of the apparent opposition between God's love and God's righteousness' (*Christian Dogmatics*, p. 303).

3. The turning away of wrath.—Scripture never suggests that there is any antagonism between the Divine love and the Divine anger, and nowhere countenances the idea that God was so angry with sinners that He felt it necessary to pour out His fury on someone before He could begin to love anyone. Theologians, who have kept close to Scripture, even while maintaining on scriptural grounds an 'objective' theory of the Atonement, have not failed to protest against this outrageous perversion of the truth. Calvin, whose expressions may often be criticised for their gloom and terror, is absolutely explicit upon this point: 'Our being reconciled by the death of Christ must not be understood as if the Son reconciled us, in order that the Father, then hating, might begin to love us, but that we were reconciled to Him, already loving, though at enmity with us because of sin' (*Institutes*, bk. ii. ch. xvi. § 4). The Divine love, accordingly, is the original impulse and the continual inspiration of the whole redemptive activity of God. Yet the Divine love cannot expunge and obliterate the Divine anger by a mere overflow of sentiment. The Divine anger can be turned away only when those against whom it is directed enter, with profound insight and entire assent, into its grounds and reasons, and submit themselves, with unmurmuring surrender, to the experiences in which the awful displeasure of the Holy One is manifested and realized. To say this, however, is to make the problem insoluble, and to seal upon sinners the unspeakable terrors of the Divine judgment. Suppose, however, that, in the centre of the human race, there should appear One so related to men that He was able to take upon Himself a service which no sinner can render for his brother, and no sinner can discharge in his own interests. Suppose that He should enter, without one shade of disparity or inadequacy, into the mind of God regarding sin, and submit Himself freely to the whole experience in which that mind is expressed, feeling, as He did so, an extremity of spiritual anguish for which no sinful soul has any complete measurement. Would not His suffering be a sacrifice for sin which the Divine love could accept without any infringement of its holiness, while the cloud of the Divine wrath would roll away for ever? Suppose, further, that such an One were the gift of God's love to the race, as indeed He would need to be, seeing that the race could not produce Him, and were in Himself the very Word of God, the express image of His Person, as He would need to be if He were to reveal God's mind toward sinners. Would He not be the living personal meeting-point of the Divine love and the Divine anger? But this is the message of the NT. In the sufferings of Christ, the love of God reaches its consummation, and by them the wrath of God is stilled for evermore. To the question whether the Son endured the wrath of God, we must, following the usage of Scripture and the obvious truth of the situation, give a negative answer. 'We do not,' says Calvin, commenting on the cry of desertion wrung from the anguish of Christ's inmost soul, 'insinuate that God was ever hostile to Him or angry with Him. How could He be angry with the beloved Son, with whom His soul was well pleased? Or how could He have appeased the Father by His intercession for others if He were hostile to Himself? But this we say, that He bore the weight of the Divine anger, that, smitten and afflicted, He experienced all the signs of an angry and avenging God' (*Institutes*, bk. ii. ch. xvi. § 11). The last phrase in this sentence is ill chosen. But the deep truth remains, that the Redeemer knew, in that hour of lonely and unknown agony, the whole meaning of sin, and apprehended it as the object of God's just condemnation and infinite resentment. Thus He bore our sin, and thus He turned away from us the wrath which was our due. The discussion of theories of Atonement is not here in place; but it is certain that no theory will be adequate which fails to give due weight to the fact which is presented in the narrative of the Passion, and in the teaching of the NT—that Christ in dying had laid upon His soul the very judgments of God (cf. Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, iv. 114, 116).

The faith which apprehends Christ as Saviour means the transition from a condition which involves the hostility of God, while yet His love is devising means for the restoration of the sinner, to a state in which the Divine love may satisfy itself in accepting the penitent and crowning him with goodness. But it is to be noted that this spiritual act has for its object Christ in His experience of sin-bearing, and implies spiritual oneness with Christ in it. The penitent, as he first comes to Christ, will know but little of what was involved in that experience. But the most rudimentary faith implies that the sinner identifies himself with Christ, as Christ had identified Himself with him; that the Divine judgment upon sin which Christ bore and so vindicated for ever, the sinner accepts and ratifies, and thus, under the constraint of the love of Christ, dies to sin in its principle and power. Thus, though the sinner does not bear the anger of God in its outpouring upon sin, yet, taught by the suffering of Christ, he knows what that righteous indignation is from which he has been delivered, and enters with purged conscience upon the new life of fellowship and obedience.

4. The day of wrath.—The NT is occupied mainly with the proclamation of the gospel, and with opening to believers the wealth of opportunity and blessedness which is theirs in Christ. It has, accordingly, comparatively little material for a doctrine of the Last Things on its negative side. Yet the conclusion to which we are led admits of no doubt. If there remain, after the full period of probation is ended, those who persist in their opposition to God and their rejection of the Divine mercy, whose characters have attained a final fixity, the NT leaves no doubt as to what their condition must be. They have sinned an eternal sin (Mk 3^{29}). They must endure the utmost visitation of the wrath of God (1 Th 5^{9}, Ro $2^{5.8}$ 5^{9}). We are not called on to decide the question whether there shall be many such lost souls, or even whether any such shall be found at the time of the consummation. We are warned against attempted descriptions of what is, in its nature, unimaginable, the loss and the misery of such a state. But any serious consideration of human nature, and of the relations of God and

man, leads to the conclusion that such fixity of opposition to God must be included in the possibilities of the development of human character, and that, if this possibility is ever realized, it must involve none other than this overwhelming judgment.

LITERATURE.—Monographs: Lactantius, *de Ira Dei*; Ritschl, *de Ira Dei* (1859); Weber, *Vom Zorne Gottes* (1862). Discussions in the Biblical Theologies, specially Davidson, Oehler, Schultz, Stevens; and in the Systematic Theologies, *e.g.* Martensen, Dorner, Kaftan, W. Adams Brown. Discussions in works on Atonement and Redemption: Ritschl, *Justification and Reconciliation* (Eng. tr. 1900); Dale, *The Atonement*[7] (1878); Simon, *The Redemption of Man*[2] (1906); M'Leod Campbell, *The Nature of the Atonement*[4] (1873); Moberly, *Atonement and Personality* (1901); Stevens, *The Christian Doctrine of Salvation* (1905); articles in *PRE*, and in Hastings' *DB* and *DCG*.

T. B. KILPATRICK.

ANGLO-ISRAELISM.—The theory that the inhabitants of England are the descendants of the 'lost' (?) Ten Tribes of Israel is held somewhat widely, and is said to have two million adherents in Great Britain and the United States. The Anglo-Israelites are, at any rate, sufficiently numerous to support one publisher, who devotes his business entirely to publications dealing with the subject. There are also several periodicals published in furtherance of the views of the Anglo-Israelites.

The earliest suggestions of an Israelitish ancestry of the English are to be found in John Sadler's *Rights of the Kingdom* (1649). These take the form of a series of parallels between English law and customs and those of the Hebrews and Jews. The name 'Britain' itself is traced to a Phœnician source, *Berat Anak* ('The Field of Tin and Lead'). Many of the legends attached to the Coronation Stone have also a Jewish tinge, and are traced back to a landing of fugitive Israelites, under the lead of Jeremiah and Baruch, in Ireland.

The modern movement owes its foundation to Richard Brothers (1757–1824), a half-pay officer of eccentric habits in the English navy. According to his account he was a Divinely appointed prophet. He described himself as a 'nephew of the Almighty,' and claimed descent from David. Among his prophecies were those of the imminent restoration of Israel to the Holy Land, and the elevation of himself as prince of the Hebrews and ruler of the world. Brothers was confined as a lunatic, but succeeded in obtaining many admirers, among them Nathaniel Brassey Halket, M.P. for Lymington. The non-fulfilment of his prophecies sorely tried the faith of the believers, but through good and ill repute he retained the loyalty of John Finlayson, previously a Scotch lawyer with an extensive and lucrative practice. According to the *Dictionary of National Biography*, Brothers printed in all fifteen volumes, chiefly in support of his theory of the Israelitish descent of most of the inhabitants of England. The more important of the volumes are *Revealed Knowledge of the Prophecies and Times* (1794), and *A Correct Account of the Invasion and Conquest of this Island by the Saxons* (1822). Prominent among the literature that followed upon Brothers' announcements were Finlayson's writings. In 1840 the theory was adopted by John Wilson, who lectured and wrote widely on the subject. His *Our Israelitish Origin* is the first coherent exposition of the theory. Other advocates in the nineteenth century were W. Carpenter (*Israelites Found*), F. R. A. Glover (*England the Remnant of Judah*), and C. Piazzi Smyth, the Astronomer-Royal for Scotland, who deduced from certain measurements of the Great Pyramid that the English were descended from the Lost Tribes. In 1871, Edward Hine published his *Identification of the British Nation with Lost Israel*, of which a quarter of a million copies are said to have been sold. In the United States the leaders of the movement have been W. H. Poole and G. W. Greenwood. The theory has also been adopted to a slight extent on the Continent, where, for instance, the hostility of the English to Napoleon and Russia, and the sympathy aroused by the Dreyfus case are attributed to this cause.

The advocates of the theory identify Israel with the *Khumri* of the Assyrians, the *Cimmerioi* of the Greeks, the *Cimbri* of the Romans, and the *Cymri*. All these forms, it is said, are variations of the same name, and traces of it are to be found in 'Crimea,' 'Cumberland,' 'Cambria,' and 'Gumri' (a Russian fortress on the banks of the Araxes, the place of the Israelitish exile). The Ten Tribes of the Assyrian Captivity on leaving the land of their sojourn are supposed to have wandered towards the west, while those of the Babylonian Captivity passed eastwards towards Afghanistan and India. It is claimed that evidence of the journey towards the north-west is to be found in the tombs, alleged to be of Israelitish origin, that stretch from the Caucasus westwards round the Euxine. The further passage westwards can be traced, we are told, in the river nomenclature of Russia: the *Don*, *Danes*, *D(a)nieper*, *D(a)niester*, and *Danube*. The theory goes on to state that these migrants were driven by Alexander over the Danube and settled in Dacia. There they were attacked by the Romans, whom they ultimately repulsed. Many of them, however, were driven farther north, and founded republics, on the Israelitish pattern, in the north and west of Europe. The Goths, who were also of Israelitish descent (Goth = Getæ = Gad) were driven by the Huns into the dominions of Rome, in which and beyond which they spread. In consequence of these events, almost the whole of Europe, as well as her colonies in other continents, is held to be peopled by descendants of Israel. Among the local identifications are the tribes of Simeon and Levi among the Ionians, Asher in the Etruscans, Dan in the Danes, Judah in the Jutes, and Manasseh in the Celts. The Lacedæmonians are also stated to have been descendants of Judah.

The Khumri are divided into the Scuthæ or Scythians — whence *Scots* — and the Sacæ — afterwards *Saxons* (sons of Isaac). The former, it is said, composed the migration of B.C. 670, when the tribes of Reuben and Gad, and half that of Manasseh, started on their wanderings. The latter consisted of the remainder of the victims of the captivity of nineteen years later. One branch of the tribe of Dan, however, escaped on ships, and ultimately settled in Spain and Ireland, where they were known as the *Tuatha-dé-Danann*. They arrived in Ireland under the lead of the scribe Baruch and possibly also of Jeremiah. Accompanying them, we are told, was an Israelitish princess who subsequently married a local chieftain, the couple being crowned on the Bethel stone, rescued from the ruins of the Temple. This stone, the *Lia-Fail*, it is claimed, accompanied the Scots to Scotland, was invariably made use of at coronations, was removed by Edward I. from Scone to Westminster, and is identical with that now used at English coronations. There is in reality considerable doubt whether the Coronation Stone is identical with the *Lia-Fail*.

In support of the theory many alleged identifications in respect of customs, traditions, beliefs, etc., have been adduced. These, without exception, depend upon very inadequate support. Similarities as authentic have been discovered between the various languages of the British Isles and Hebrew. The theorists choose safer ground when they point to England's influence and success, and suggest as a cause God's covenant with Abraham, fulfilled in

the persons of his descendants, the English. It is also argued that the English must be the representatives of Israel, as otherwise the many Divine promises made to that race would be unfulfilled.

The theory relies to a very considerable extent on a very literal interpretation of certain passages in the Old Testament (Authorized Version). It is pointed out that Israel was to change his name (Hos 1^9), increase beyond number, dwell in islands (Is 24^{15}) to the north (Jer 3^{12}) and the west, and be a great nation (Mic 5^8). Israel would also extend beyond his new limits and found colonies (Is $49^{19.20}$ 54^3, Dt 28^1 and 32^{7-9}). One of the tribes, Manasseh, was to become an independent nation (Gn 48^{19}). From this tribe, we are told, the United States was derived. Reference is found to the lion and the unicorn in Nu $24^{8.9}$, and to the American eagle in Ezk 17^3. The promise that Israel shall possess the gates of her enemies (Gn 22^{17} 24^{60}) is fulfilled in the case of Britain by the possession of Gibraltar, Aden, Singapore, etc.

LITERATURE.—The literature on the subject is enormous. The many works of Brothers and Hine are hardly readable. The most coherent account is to be found in John Wilson's *Our Israelitish Origin*[3] (1845). Other works explaining the theory, in addition to those already mentioned, are H. W. J. Senior's *British Israelites* and *The Ten Tribes* (1885); T. R. Howlett's *Anglo-Israel and the Jewish Problem* (1892); J. M. Williams' *The Sakai, Our Ancestors* (1882); H. H. Pain's *Englishmen Israelites* (1896); Oxonian's *Israel's Wanderings* (1881); H. A. Smith's *The Ten Tribes* (1887); C. A. L. Totten's *Our Race* (1896); and H. W. Poole's *Anglo-Israel* (1889). Other books that should be consulted are: C. Piazzi Smyth's *Our Inheritance in the Great Pyramid* (1864); R. Gorell's *English derived from Hebrew*, and *Identity of the Religions called Druidical and Hebrew* (London, 1829); F. C. Danvers' *Israel Redivivus* (1905). Cf. also Jacobs in *JE* i. 600 f. A very large number of books and pamphlets on the subject is published by Banks, Racquet Court, Fleet Street, London, E.C.

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ANGRA MAINYU.—See AHRIMAN.

AṄGUTTARA NIKĀYA.—The fourth of the five *Nikāyas*, or collections, which constitute the *Sutta Piṭaka*, the Basket of the tradition as to doctrine, the second of the three *Piṭakas* in the canon of the early Buddhists. The standing calculation in Buddhist books on the subject is that it consists of 9557 *suttas* or short passages.* Modern computations would be different. This large number is arrived at by counting as three separate *suttas* such a statement as: 'Earnestness, industry, and intellectual effort are necessary to progress in good things,' and so on. Thus in the first chapter, section 14, occurs the sentence: 'The following is the chief, brethren, of the brethren my disciples, in seniority, to wit, *Aññā Koṇḍañña*.' The sentence is then repeated eighty times, giving the pre-eminence, in different ways, of eighty of the early followers of the Buddha, who were either brethren or sisters in the Order, or laymen or laywomen. In each case the necessary alterations in the main sentence are made. We should call it one *sutta*, giving a list of eighty persons pre-eminent, in one way or another, among the early disciples. According to the native method of repeating by rote, and therefore also of computation, it is eighty *suttas*. Making allowance for this, there are between two and three thousand *suttas*.† The work has been published in full by the Pāli Text Society, vols. i. and ii. edited by Morris, and vols. iii., iv., and v. by E. Hardy (London, 1885–1900).

The *suttas* vary in length from one line to three or four pages, the majority of them being very short; and in them all those points of Buddhist doctrine capable of being expressed in classes are set out in order. This practically includes most of the psychology and ethics of Buddhism, and the details of its system of self-training. For it is a distinguishing mark of the Dialogues themselves, which form the first two of the *Nikāyas*, to arrange the results arrived at in carefully systematized groups. We are familiar enough in the West with similar groups, summed up in such phrases as the Seven Deadly Sins, the Ten Commandments, the Thirty-nine Articles, the Twelve Apostles, the Four Cardinal Virtues, the Seven Sacraments, and a host of others. These numbered lists are, it is true, going out of fashion. The aid which they afford to memory is no longer required in an age in which books of reference abound. It was precisely as a help to memory that they were found so useful in the early Buddhist days, when the books were all learnt by heart and had never yet been written. And in the *Aṅguttara* we find set out in order first all the units, then all the pairs, then all the trios, and so on up to the eleven qualities necessary to reach Nirvāna, the eleven mental habits the culture of which leads to the best life, or the eleven conditions precedent to a knowledge of human passion.

The form, therefore, is conditioned by the necessities of the time. The matter also is influenced, to a large degree, by the same necessities. In a work that had to be learnt by heart it was not possible to have any reasoned argument, such as we should expect in a modern ethical treatise. The lists are curtly given, and sometimes curtly explained. But the explanations were mostly reserved for the oral comment of the teacher, and were handed down also by tradition. That traditional explanation has been preserved for us in the *Manoratha Pūraṇī* ('wish-fulfiller'), written down, in Pāli, by Buddhaghoṣa in the 5th cent. A.D. This has not yet been published.

The original book—for we must call it a book, though it is not a book in the modern sense of the word—was composed in North India by the early Buddhists shortly after the Buddha's death. How soon after we do not know. And the question of its age can be adequately discussed only in connexion with that of the age of the rest of the canonical works, which will be dealt with together in the art. LITERATURE (Buddhist).

LITERATURE.—An analysis of the contents of each *sutta*, in English, has been given by Edmund Hardy in vol. v. of his edition, pp. 371–416. A few *suttas* have been translated into English by H. C. Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, Cambridge, Mass. 1896; and into German by K. E. Neumann, *Buddhistische Anthologie*, Leyden, 1892.

T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

ANIMALS.

[NORTHCOTE W. THOMAS.]

Introduction.—It is a well-established fact that the complexity of the mental processes of animals is apt to be exaggerated even by professional psychologists, and this, though civilization, or perhaps rather education, has brought with it a sense of the great gulf that exists between man and the lower animals, not excluding those to which exceptional intelligence is, rightly or wrongly, attributed, such as the elephant and the anthropoid ape. In the lower stages of culture, whether they be found in races which are, as a whole, below the European level, or in the uncultured portion of civilized communities, the distinction between men and animals is not adequately, if at all, recognized, and more than one cause has contributed to this state of things. Just as we overestimate the complexity of the mental processes of animals, the savage, though for a different reason, attributes to the animal a vastly more complex set of thoughts and feelings, and a much greater range of knowledge and power, than it actually possesses. We are accustomed to show respect to the lifeless corpse of a human

* See *Aṅguttara*, v. 361; *Sumaṅgala Vilāsinī*, ed. Rhys Davids and Carpenter, London, 1886, p. 23; and *Gandha Vaṁsa*, p. 56.

† Professor Edmund Hardy (*Aṅguttara*, Part 5, vi.) makes the number 'about 2344.'

being; the savage, in his treatment of the game which has fallen a victim to the prowess of the hunter, shows evidence of a similar state of mind; he attributes to the soul of the slain beast an anxiety as to, and a knowledge of, the good or bad treatment of its mortal remains. When the animal is still alive, he regards it as open to argument; he will reproach the crocodile with having slain those who have done it no harm, and point out that the crocodiles, having been the aggressors, have only themselves to thank when man takes the offensive and exacts vengeance for his lost relatives and friends. He attributes to animals the power of speech, a power which in the case of the monkey is said to be put to no use, owing to the animal's fear that he might be made to work if he once began to talk. Both in fables and folk-tales, animals are represented as carrying on conversations and as being moved by the same motives as the human beings who narrate the stories (MacCulloch, *Childhood of Fiction*, pp. 38–41, 247–278); so much so, in fact, that in Africa the arguments in a judicial process not uncommonly turn on the question of what the crocodile said to the hen—in which form the negro embodies his precedents and leading cases. Even in Europe it is not hard to find traces of this primitive attitude of mind; there is a well-known custom of telling the bees when the master of the house dies; and few beliefs are more firmly rooted in the minds of country people than that neglect of this precaution will offend the insects, and deprive the new master or mistress of their labours. So, too, a knowledge of the moral character of those about them is attributed to the bees, with a corresponding influence on their activity. There is therefore no line of demarcation between man and beast, so that the North American Micmacs say: 'In the beginning of things, men were as animals and animals as men' (Leland, *Algonquin Legends*, p. 31). To the uncultured the difference is in the form, not in the nature, of things. The Indians of Guiana do not see any sharp line of distinction between man and other animals, between one kind of animal and another, or even between animals—man included—and inanimate objects. On the contrary, to the Indian all objects, animate and inanimate, seem exactly of the same nature, except that they differ in the accident of bodily form. Every object in the whole world is a being consisting of body and spirit, and differs from every other object in no respect save that of bodily form, and in the greater or less degree of brute cunning and brute power, consequent on the difference of bodily form and bodily habits (Im Thurn, *Among the Indians of Guiana*, p. 350).

But this doctrine of the essential similarity of all things, in spite of differences of form, does not embody the whole of the savage's creed. Perhaps still more essential is his belief in the impermanence of form. We find this exemplified even in Europe; few tales are more common than those of the transformation of an old witch into a cat or a hare. But magical powers are by no means essential to this change of form. To take only one example. There is a wide-spread belief that certain migratory birds, and especially the stork, assume human form in other lands; and no sense of incongruity is felt when the story is told of a traveller in foreign lands, being one day approached by an unknown man who displays great familiarity with his family affairs, inquires after the health of his children, and takes a general interest in what is going on in the distant Fatherland. The traveller's astonishment is allayed only when he learns that the stranger obtained his knowledge on the spot. His request for an explanation is met by the simple reply that the stranger is the stork who nests on the good man's roof. All the world over we find the same belief in the power of men, animals, plants, and even inanimate objects, to assume another form at will (cf. MacCulloch, pp. 149–187). It is therefore no wonder if the savage attitude towards nature is widely different from our own.

These transformations can take place during life. Of a slightly different nature, but almost equally important for the comprehension of the beliefs and customs of the uncultured, is the idea that death simply means the assumption of another form quite as material as the former. One of the great sources of the respect paid to animals is the belief that certain species are the embodiments of the souls of the dead, or even the very souls of the dead (for the view varies), and that these souls must receive respect, not only because they are ancestors or relatives, but also because their anger would mean the anger of the species of animals which their souls inhabit. Thus a kind of alliance springs up between certain human kins and certain species of animals, in which some writers have sought the germ of totemism. Less important, because more temporary, is the alliance sought at the initiation ceremony; here an individual provides himself with a tutelary genius, sometimes conceived as a spirit, sometimes as a living animal, on whose aid he relies in the battle of life.

Again, to the superior knowledge of animals, to their magical powers, or sometimes, and as a later development, to their position as messengers of a deity, are to be attributed the wide-spread augural beliefs and practices. To sum up, the savage has a very real sense of his kinship with animals; they are not merely his brothers, but his elder brothers; to them he looks for help and guidance. Not only so, but on them he depends for a great part of his subsistence—a fact which is far more vividly brought home to him than to the meat-eating human being of civilized societies, and in like manner he is far more liable than more cultured peoples to meet his death beneath the claws of a lion or a bear, or to succumb to the venom of the serpent. It is therefore small wonder that his attitude towards the animal creation is one of reverence rather than superiority.

1. *AGRICULTURE.*—The researches of Mannhardt have shown that the European peasant of to-day conceives that the life of the corn exists in the shape of an animal or human being apart from the corn itself. The animal corn-spirit is believed to take various forms,—pig, horse, dog, cat, goat, cow, etc.,—and is often conceived to lie in the last ears to be cut, the reaping of which is termed in some parts 'cutting the neck.' The corn-spirit is found not only in the harvest field, but also in the barn and the threshing-floor; the corn-spirit is killed in beating out the last grains from the ears. As a rite of sacralization of the eater, or of desacralization of the corn, the animal incarnation of the corn-spirit is eaten in a ritual meal at the harvest supper, at seedtime, or at other periods; the bones or parts of the flesh of this ritual food are used in magic to promote the fertility of the new crop. Sometimes the actual animal is not itself eaten; in its place we find the cake in animal form; but we cannot assume that this cake has taken the place of a former sacrifice of the animal, for it is made of the corn; the eating of the corn in the form of the animal is as effective a sacrament as the eating of the animal itself.

In Greece and other parts of the ancient world we find traces of the conception of the corn-spirit as an animal. Demeter was closely related to the pig, and was actually represented at Phigalia in the form of a horse, while her priests were called horses. In the case of Attis and other *prima facie*

corn-deities a similar connexion with animals can be traced. Among the American Indians the corn-spirit is occasionally conceived in animal form (bison, deer, goat; see below). In other parts of the world an anthropomorphic or simply animistic conception is the rule.

Various theories have been advanced to account for the animal form of the corn-spirit. Frazer (*Golden Bough*², ii. 289) suggests that the animals which are driven into the last corn in the process of reaping may have suggested the idea. Marillier (*RHR* xxxvii. 381) holds, with more probability, that the animal form of the soul and of spirits generally was so familiar a conception that it was sufficient to suggest that the life of the corn must be in the form of an animal. Preuss explains some cases of the connexion of animals with corn or other vegetables, as their tutelary deities, on the ground that they were originally held to influence the supply of heat (*Am. Anth.*, N.S. iv. 40; *19th Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn.* p. 308, etc.), from which, like other magical animals (*Globus*, lxxxvi. 116; *Arch. Anth.*, N.S. i. 142 f.), they become tutelary deities. Possibly, too, the belief in soul-animals (see p. 493ᵇ) may have had some influence; it is not uncommon to make offerings to ancestors in connexion with agriculture; these ancestors are sometimes conceived in the form of animals; it is therefore no long step to the concept of a corn-spirit in animal form. In Indo-China the ancestor is actually believed to guard the fields in the form of a toad at seedtime (*Miss. Cath.* 1894, p. 143). In Yucatan, spirits in the form of lynxes were believed to protect the cornfields (Brinton, *Essays*, p. 172). In central Java the wer-tiger is held to guard the plantations against wild pigs (*Tijdschr.* xli. 570).

Vegetation spirits generally are conceived in Europe to be in animal form; but in other parts of the world this idea is seldom found.

2. *ART (DECORATIVE).*—It is an almost universal custom to decorate weapons, pottery, clothing, etc., with designs, often so highly conventionalized as to be recognizable only on comparison with less stylicized forms. One of the main sources of decorative design is the animal world, and the object was, it may be assumed, magical in the first instance. In its later forms there is a combination of purposes, but this is usually where the animal has come to be associated with a god. In this case the use of the animal as an art *motif* is a form of worship; at the same time, if the animal is the emblem, for example, of rain, its use is equivalent to a prayer for rain. There are, however, innumerable instances of the use of animals in art, both in connexion with totemism and otherwise, for magical or non-theistic purposes. The totem posts of the Haidas have all sorts of decorative animal carvings, sometimes of genealogical significance; in New Guinea the totem is delineated on drums and pipes. The lizard (see below) is largely used in Africa and the Pacific, and the frigate bird in Melanesia. In Central Australia the sand is covered with delineations of animals; animals are figured at Australian and South African initiation ceremonies; and many Australian decorative designs are totemic, or at least animal *motifs*. Probably the skin markings (see 'Tatu' below) of the Australian and other peoples are largely conventionalized forms of similar motives. Where a religious significance has once attached to a design, the art *motif* may continue to be largely used merely for magical purposes and finally for luck. In Europe we are familiar with the use of animals in heraldry. See articles on ART.

3. *COLOUR.*—The colour of animals is highly important, both in magic (wh. see) and otherwise. In Europe the king of the snakes is said to be white. White horses (see below) were especially sacred. In Indo-China the cult of the white elephant is well known. In Japan white animals have a high importance (*Globus*, lxii. 272), and good fortune for the reigning house is inferred from their appearance. The daughter of a man who feeds 1000 white hares in his house will marry a prince. In Patagonia white cassowaries are sacrosanct; the Patagonians believe that the species would die out if they were to kill such white specimens; white horses and cows enjoy an equal respect (*ib.* lxi. 63). The white animal is often preferred as a victim. The Woguls offer a white horse in autumn; the officiants dance round it and stab it with their knives till it falls dead (*ib.* liv. 332). So, too, the Tcheremiss offer white animals (Erman, *Archiv*, i. 415). Among the Shans of Annam a white buffalo is sacrificed annually (*Miss. Cath.* 1896, 59), and the Battas also select white victims (Marsden, *Sumatra*, p. 385). In August or September the Situa festival was held in Peru; the priests received for sacrifice one of the holy white llamas, which were never shorn (*Ausland*, lxiv. 951). See also 'Bear,' etc., below.

For special purposes distinctive colours must be used. Thus the rain-cloud is black; in a sacrifice for rain, therefore, the victim must be in imitation of it. The Wambugwes of East Africa offer a black sheep and a black calf when they want rain; the Garos of Assam offer a black goat on the top of a very high mountain in time of drought; in Sumatra a black cat is thrown into a river and allowed to escape after swimming about for a time; the ancient Hindus set a black horse with its face to the west and rubbed it with a cloth till it neighed (*Golden Bough*², i. 101–2); and in the same way white animals must be sacrificed for sunshine (*ib.* p. 103). For an agricultural sacrifice at Rome red-haired puppies were chosen, in imitation of the colour of ripe corn (*ib.* ii. 311). In the same way in Egypt red-haired oxen were the chosen victims (*ib.* p. 142). The Iroquois sacrifice of the white dog (see below) may perhaps be set down as another example; for although white is not everywhere the emblem of purity, it is natural to connect with this idea the selection of a white dog for a piacular sacrifice.

4. *CREATOR.*—It is by no means self-evident to the savage mind that the functions of the Creator of the universe or of some part of it are necessarily united with those of its sustainer, or of a moral ruler of mankind, or even of a god. Hence, though we find cases in which the Creator is an object of worship, or at any rate respect (see 'Crow' below), we also find a share in creation assigned to animals which are not even specially sacred.

The Gros Ventre account of the origin of the world is that the world was once all water, inhabited only by a swan, which in some unaccountable way produced a crow, a wolf, and a water-hen. One day the crow proposed to the wolf to send down the water-hen to look for earth, for they would be so much happier if they had a little ground under their feet. The earth was brought, and while the wolf sang and performed on a rattle, the crow sprinkled the earth about on the waters and formed the globe as we have it to-day. Subsequently man was created, and the crow turned herself into an Indian (Couse, *Henry and Thompson, MS Jls.* p. 351). According to the Guaycurus of South America, they were called into existence after all the other nations by a decree of the caracara bird, but they show it no special respect (*Patriota*, 1814, p. 26). In some cases chance seems to have caused an animal to figure as Creator; in S. Australia the islands were said to have resulted from a blow of a great serpent's tail, but Noorele created other things (Eyre, *Expeditions*, ii. 356).

5. *CULT.*—Anthropological data are supplied in many cases by the chance remarks of a traveller, who, if he understands the true nature of the phenomena he is describing, does not always appreciate their importance, and consequently leaves us in the dark on points which are indispensable to the correct understanding of his information. This is especially the case when the information relates to the worship or supposed worship of animals; not only are the sources of such a cult extremely various, but it may be possible for actions which spring from purely utilitarian motives to wear the appearances which elsewhere characterize the ritual of an animal cult. We find, for example, that in ancient Egypt it was the practice to feed the sacred crocodiles, which were associated with the god Souchos (Sebek); in modern days we have a similar practice recorded in West Africa; but in the absence of information from those who give them food we can hardly inter-

pret the custom without fear of error. Prudence is a faculty commonly denied to the peoples in lower stages of culture; but it may well have happened that accident, if not reflexion, suggested to some one that a hungry crocodile is a far more dangerous neighbour than one which is in no need of food. We cannot, therefore, explain the modern custom, without more ado, as crocodile-worship; the possibility of the utilitarian explanation must also be kept in mind. Quite apart from this, there is a difficulty in the interpretation of the data which arises from the indefinite nature of many of the observances. Savage ritual is well-established, but the savage creed is often vague and fluctuating. At any rate, in the hands of European questioners, it is not uncommon for one native to assert one thing while another will maintain exactly the reverse; or one and the same man will put forward contradictory propositions either after an interval of time or even during a single interview. Where the ritual is unmistakably religious or magical, we can dispense with the commentary of the officiating priest or magician; but where there is room for doubt we can ill afford to do without this guidance, even though we know that the explanation given is not necessarily the original one.

The terms 'worship' and 'cult' are used, especially in dealing with animal superstitions, with extreme vagueness; and, moreover, the interpretation of the facts to which they are applied is in itself uncertain. At one end of the scale we find the real divine animal, commonly conceived as a 'god-body,' *i.e.* the temporary incarnation of a superior being, with a circle of worshippers. At the other end, separated from the real cult by imperceptible transitions, we find such practices as respect for the bones of slain animals, or the use of a respectful name for the living animal. The question is one with the general problem of the definition of religion; it cannot profitably be discussed in connexion with a single species of cult, and it is the less necessary to do so here, as we are concerned only with general principles and broad outlines.

Animal cults may be classified on two principles: (*a*) according to their outward form; (*b*) according to their genesis. The first kind of classification is important chiefly for the comprehension of the principles which underlie the evolution of animal worship into anthropomorphic cults; the second is primarily concerned with an earlier stage—that of the actual beginnings, it may be, of the religious sentiment or its manifestation.

(*a*) *Formal Classification.*—Animal cults may be broadly divided into two classes: (i.) the whole species without exception is sacred; (ii.) one or a fixed number of a species is sacred. In a certain number of cases the second class may be indistinguishable from the first; this is the case in the Bornean cult of the hawk; there were only thirty-three real omen birds among the Ibans of Borneo in olden days, but they were indistinguishable from their fellows.

Although it is by no means axiomatic that the cult of the species has in every case preceded the cult of the individual animal, it seems probable that we may regard this as the normal course of evolution. The transition may be effected in more than one way. (1) As in the case of the hawk (see below) among the Bornean peoples, *a simple progress from theriomorphic to anthropomorphic ideas* may suffice to explain the change. There is no reason to doubt that such a process may take place both without foreign influence and without any internal impulse due to the rise of sun-, moon-, or other cults of single deities, which would naturally tend to produce a species of syncretism in previously existing multiple cults. Among more than one Australian tribe, for example, the eagle-hawk seems to have been transformed into an anthropomorphic deity; but there is no reason to suspect either foreign influence or assimilation to other native cults, for the latter are admittedly non-existent. So, too, in Central Australia the Wollunqua totem animal is a mythical serpent; the totemic ceremonies are performed to keep him in a good humour, and not, as is the case with the other totems of the same tribe, to promote their increase; but when we reach acts intended to propitiate a single animal, mythical or otherwise, we are on the verge of worship, if indeed the boundary between totemism and animal cults proper has not long been overpassed. At the same time, not only may the rise of individual cults, such as those of the heavenly bodies, exert a deep influence on the multiple cults, but a specialization of function may, where multiple cults alone are present, aid to bring about the same result. The chief purpose for which the Bornean peoples require omens is to get directions for the conduct of their head-hunting expeditions; in other words, the conditions themselves made for the specialization of a war-god, either multiple or unified. Intertribal war tends to increase, if it does not call into existence, the power of the chief; from the human leadership on the war-path to the predominance of one individual among the omen birds is not a long step; and we actually find evidence that it was taken by the Ibans, while the Kayans have gone far in the same direction. Evidence of similar tendencies can readily be produced from many other areas; the Amerinds had, in the very early days of the Jesuit missions, already attained the conception of an 'Elder Brother' of each species, marvellously great and powerful (*Rel. des Jés.* 1634, p. 13). In California the Acagchemens worshipped the *panes* bird; each village sacrificed a different bird, and the sacrifice was annual; but the view which the worshippers took was that only one bird was sacrificed, each year the same, and the same in each village. In Samoa the process had not gone quite so far; the gods of the villages were incarnate in animals; each god was incarnate in all the animals of the species; consequently although respect was shown to the individual dead animal, the life of the god was in no way affected by its decease; he continued to survive in the remainder of the species (Turner, *Polynesia*, p. 242). Other examples will be found in Tylor (*Prim. Cult.*[2] ii. 243 ff.).

(2) The process of unification, as in the case of the Acagchemens, where mystical ideas have also played their part, may be hastened by *a custom of sacrificing the sacred animal annually.* The doctrines of reincarnation and identity of the sacrificial animal would undoubtedly be highly important for the history of this case of evolution, if it were not probable that they were later developments, if not actually due to the influence of European ideas. For an example of a stage in cult where the importance of sacrifice pure and simple is manifest we may turn to the Woguls. Once in each year they go in crowds into the woods and kill one of each species of animals, preferring the horse and the tiger as best; they flay off their skins, hang up the carcases on a tree, and in their way pray to them, falling prostrate on the earth; after which they eat the flesh together (Ides, *Three Years' Travels*, p. 7). In this example we are not, it is true, told what is done with the skins. But another traveller tells us (Strauss, *Reise*, pp. 93, 119) that the Crim Tatars and others hang the skin of the sacrificial animal on a pole and worship it. We find that the Egyptians clothed the image of Ammon in the

fleece of the ram which was sacrificed to him once a year. Intermediate stages are given by the Californian custom of preserving the *panes* skin and using it as the *tobet*, or cloak, of Chinigchinnich; and by the Floridian sacrifice of the goat (see below), whose skin was preserved for a year, until its place was taken by that of the next victim.

(3) In the folk-lore of modern Europe the corn-spirit is conceived to bear sometimes human, sometimes animal form; but in neither case has anything like unification made its way into the minds of the peasants who are the repositories of these primitive ideas. In Greece and Rome, on the other hand, we find the corn-spirit, as recorded in literature, no longer an undifferentiated, multiple divinity, who resides equally in every field and on every farm. A process of synthesis has unified the anonymous rustic animal and human gods, though in Greece we can still trace their features in survivals. How far this unification corresponded to anything in the nature of anthropomorphization and unification in the minds of the peasants whose gods they originally were, we do not know; but it may be suspected that the process did not go far. It may, of course, be true that the corn-spirit in modern Europe is but a degenerate descendant of Wodan, Ceridwen, Demeter, or whatever the name of the corn-deity was; but this explanation leaves us without a hint of how the former god came to be conceived as an animal. However this may be, it seems clear that the passage from multiplicity to unity may have come about by a process which implies a certain amount of philosophizing. Just as in Egypt there was a tendency to identify all the gods with Ra, so in Greece, in a minor degree, went on the process of identifying the local corn-gods with more central and systematized cults. The natural tendency was for the cult of a deity to spread beyond its original area and to swallow up less important or nameless objects of worship, and this went on in the case of animal no less than of other cults. At the same time, we must not overestimate the importance of the movement, which may have penetrated but slightly the lower strata of the population. It may be noted in passing that it is possible to have two distinct kinds of syncretism: (α) where one deity swallows up his fellows, all being of the same species, which probably occurred in the case of Demeter, complicated, however, by the fact that the horse as well as the pig was associated with her, thus leading to a double movement of synthesis—the unification of many local homogeneous corn-spirits, plus the unification of the different species of animals, the heterogeneous corn-spirits — from which we get Demeter as she is presented to us by classical authors; and (β) where there is no underlying unity of function. If the cult of Apollo Smintheus developed from an older cult of the mouse, we can indeed explain why the mouse-god should also be the sun-god, by saying that the mice devastate the fields under cover of darkness, and that the sun-god is the natural protector of the farmer against the plague of mice. But though we can explain syncretic movements on semi-rational lines in this case, it by no means follows that we have given the real explanation; and it would be far from easy to hit upon similarly obvious explanations of other syncretic processes.

(4) Side by side with the immolation of the victim, and sometimes supplementing the annual sacrifice as a cause of the sanctity of a special animal, may be placed *the custom of selecting an animal for special honour*. We find two types of this practice. The first, among pastoral peoples, consists in consecrating an animal which is thenceforth inviolate. Perhaps we may see in a custom of this sort the source of the Egyptian cult of the bull, which later came to be regarded as a 'god-body,' and was recognized by special marks. In the second type, the animal, so far from remaining inviolate, is sacrificed at the end of the year or after a certain period of time; but, unlike the cases referred to in a previous section, its sanctity terminates with its death, and its place is taken by another living animal. This form of worship may perhaps be due in the first instance to the commonly felt wish to apologize and do honour to the animal about to be slain, in order that its comrades, honoured in its person, may show no disinclination to fall victims to the hunter's dart.

(*b*) *Genetic Classification.* — In dealing with animal cults from *the genetic point of view*, it must not be forgotten that, while changes in ritual are at most but gradual, the explanations which are given of the acts are liable to change in a much greater degree. Foreign influences apart, development in creeds is often a slow process; but it may be taken as axiomatic, at any rate for the lower stages of culture, that belief changes far more rapidly than ritual. If, therefore, we find that at the present day a species of animals is held in reverence, it by no means follows that the explanation is the one which would have been given in pre-European days; yet even this more primitive interpretation may not throw any light on the real origin of the cult. The ætiological myth is particularly characteristic of savages, and the ætiological myth is not history but guesswork. To take a concrete example, the Barotse explain the fact that they have the baboon as their totem by a myth which involves the supposition, if it is to be regarded as real history, that they developed totemism after their passage from savagery to barbarism, marked by their acquisition of cultivated plants (*Folklore*, xv. 110). Not only is this highly improbable in itself, but the myth throws no light on the genesis of totemism in other parts of the world or among other South African kins, if indeed it be totemism with which we are confronted among the southern Bantus. Again, the southern Bantus as a whole explain their respect for the totem (?) animal, or *siboko*, by the story that the souls of their ancestors go to reside after death in the species which they respect. It does not follow that this is an original trait of their creed. True totemism seems to exist among other Bantu tribes, uncontaminated by any eschatological theories. It is by no means impossible that with the southern Bantus true totemism existed in the first instance; with the development of ancestor-worship, possibly a result of the change from female to male descent, there would be a tendency to bring other cults into relation with the predominant form of worship. The belief, but rarely found in other parts of the world, of transmigration into the totem animal may have taken the place of the belief in transmigration pure and simple, which is found in Australia without any connexion with totemism (*Man*, 1905, No. 28).

Again, the cults of pastoral tribes are commonly explained on the ground that they do honour to the species on which they depend for their subsistence. That may be so at the present day; but there is no proof that the cult of the animal in question does not date back to the days before it was domesticated or when it was only in process of domestication, which obviously must have been for reasons unconnected with its future usefulness. If, as is not impossible, the cult of the animal led to its domestication, the modern explanation is obviously late, and we can only guess at the causes which made the animal an object of worship in the first place.

Animal cults may be conveniently classified under ten specific heads, with another class for non-

descript forms of unknown origin or meaning: (1) pastoral cults; (2) hunting cults; (3) cults of dangerous or noxious animals; (4) cults of animals conceived as human souls or their embodiment; (5) totemistic cults; (6) cults of secret societies, individual cults of tutelary animals; (7) tree and vegetation cults; (8) cults of ominous animals; (9) cults, probably derivative, of animals associated with certain deities; (10) cults of animals used in magic. Broadly speaking, it may be said that in the cases of (1), (2), and perhaps (7), the motive is mainly the material benefits which the animal confers on its worshippers; (3) and to some extent (5) and (10) are connected with fear of the consequences of refusing respect; (6) and (8) are connected with the assistance derived from the animal; and (9) with the fear of the wrath of a god; while (4) seems to be compounded of fear of the wrath of ancestors and desire for their help.

(1) The characteristics of the *pastoral* type are that a domestic animal, (*a*) is spared as a species, or (*b*) receives special honour in the person of an individual animal. (*a*) As an example of the first sub-type may be taken the Hindu respect for cattle, and, as a modified form, the attitude of the South African Bantus towards their herds. The latter are losing their respect for cattle; but whereas in pre-European days the sacrifice of cattle was permitted to the Hindu, at the present day he is absolutely forbidden to kill an animal of the species, though the prohibition is certainly of late development. (*b*) As an example of the second sub-type may be taken the Toda cult of the buffalo (see below), the Madi cult of the sheep (see below), and perhaps the West Asiatic cult of the camel (unless we should regard the rite described by Nilus in *PL* lxxi. as astral in its nature), since they fairly represent the class of pastoral cults in which honour is done to the species by sacrificing one of its members with special ceremony. In another class of pastoral cult the honour is done to the species by selecting one animal as its representative and letting it go free. As an example of this type may be taken the Kalmuk custom of setting free a ram lamb. But it may be noted that even here it is the practice to sacrifice the sacred animal eventually. This is only, however, when it is growing old, and Frazer explains it, like many other customs of a similar kind, as due to a wish that the god or divine animal may not grow old and thus lose, with the decay of his powers, the strength needed for the fulfilment of his functions.

(2) In *hunting* cults, on the other hand, the species which receives honour is habitually killed, and, in order to atone for the loss of individual members, (*a*) the species is considered to be represented by a single individual, which is itself finally killed, but not until it has, like the bear (see below) among the Ainus, received divine honours, and (*b*) each individual of the species at its death by the hand of the hunter is propitiated and receives offerings, or whatever treatment is conceived to be proper to make its feelings predominantly those of satisfaction, in order that its surviving fellows may show no unwillingness to present themselves in their turn. As examples of this sub-type may be taken the buffalo, and the bear (see below) among some peoples (cf. *Golden Bough*[3], ii. 404 ff.), and, in fact, most animals on which hunting or fishing tribes largely depend. In some cases the propitiation does not go farther than forbidding misuse of the bones of the dead animals, such as giving them to dogs, breaking them, etc., which may be a purely practical measure based on savage ideas of reproduction, rather than cult properly so called.

(3) The cult of *dangerous* animals is generally characterized by tabus before, during, and after the hunt, and by ceremonies intended to propitiate the slain animal. They are mainly practised in Africa and South Asia; as examples may be taken the cult of the leopard, lion, and tiger (see below). The dangers to be avoided are twofold: in the first place, the soul of the slain beast may take vengeance on the hunter, who therefore submits to the same tabus as are imposed on him during a season of mourning, with the idea of either deceiving or keeping at a distance the malevolent ghost; in the second place, as in the previous sections, the remainder of the species has to be kept in good humour or prevented from learning of the death of their comrade. To this end, in Sumatra, a magician is employed when a crocodile is to be hunted, and elaborate explanations are frequently given that the animal is to be or has been killed because it attacked a human being and thus broke the truce normally subsisting between man and the species. In Japan, a man who kills a snake should crush its head, or more will come; this seems to be intended as a means of preventing it from calling its fellows to avenge its death. Again, after hunting the leopard, it is the custom for the hunter to imitate the voice or the habits of the leopard; if this is not intended to deceive the spirit of the slain animal, it may be intended as a propitiatory act to appease the remainder of the species. Vermin are propitiated in various ways, and many of the practices are applied to mice (see below). In the Baltic island of Oesel an offering is made to a weevil, and they think less damage will then be done to the corn. In the island of Nias in the Dutch East Indies the ant is very destructive; at harvest time it is propitiated by being called Sibaia—the name of a good spirit which is supposed to protect the crop from harm. With the position of this spirit may be compared that of Apollo Smintheus (see 'Mouse' below), Dionysus Bassareus (see 'Fox' below), Baalzebub, and other deities whose names are associated with vermin. It is open to question how far we are justified in assuming that any cult of vermin is implied which has subsequently developed into the cult of a god or been united with it by a process of syncretism. In Central India the Waralis worship a stone which they call the lord of tigers (see below; see also 'Horse'), but there is no reason to suppose that they believe the stone to have been a tiger or to contain the spirit of a tiger; nor is any cult of the living tiger recorded among them. It does not necessarily follow that Apollo Smintheus must have been a mouse, or that a mouse cult must have been amalgamated with an independent cult unconnected with mice.

(4) We come to an entirely different set of ideas, in the respect shown to animals because they are regarded as the *abode of the souls of the dead*, or sometimes as *the actual souls of the dead, and even of the living* (*Rev. de l'H. des Rel.* xxxvii. 385; *Golden Bough*[3], iii. 409 f., 430 ff.; van Gennep, *Tabou, pass.*; *Folklore*, xi. 235; von den Steinen, *Unter den Naturvölkern*, pp. 512, 353, etc.) Some of the Celebes tribes perform a periodical ceremony in honour of the crocodiles, on the ground that their departed relatives take that form; they take provisions and musical instruments in a boat and row up and down, playing on the instruments, till a crocodile appears; they offer food to it and hope thereby to recommend themselves to their kindred (Hawkesworth, iii. 759). More especially among the Bantu tribes of South Africa and the Malagasy is the belief found that the dead pass into certain animals, which among the Bechuanas differ for each clan. What is sometimes regarded as totemism, is at the present day a system of ancestor-worship (*Man*, 1901, No. 111). With the South African facts should be compared the Madagascar beliefs (v. Gennep, *Tabou, pass.*). In the Solomon

Islands it appears to be the custom for a dying man to inform his family into what species of animal he proposes to migrate (*JAI* xxviii. 147). The abode thus taken up in an animal is commonly regarded as permanent, the soul of the dead man passing into another of the same species, if his particular animal is killed (*Man*, 1904, No. 118), but occasionally the soul is believed to pass on after a time to its final abode (*Folklore*, xii. 342). The belief is occasionally found in Africa that a chief has put his soul for safe keeping into an animal, which is therefore respected (*Golden Bough*[3], iii. 407; *JAI* xx. 13; see below, 'Goat,' 'Cattle').

If we are entitled to assume that the *sibokoism* of the South African Bantus is totemism, or has replaced an earlier stage of pure totemism, the soul-animal occupies a specially important place in the history of savage religion. In any case, the worship or respect for the soul-animal has probably been the starting-point of other cults; thus the Zulu and Masai respect for the serpent may represent the beginnings of serpent-worship. The association of the dog with the Lar at Rome probably points to a time when the dog was regarded as a form of the soul; at the same time it should not be forgotten that the Lar was also a household god, and that the dog might with special appropriateness be associated with it; the dog was likewise associated with Hecate, also apparently a family goddess.

(5) One of the most widely distributed animal cults is that known as *totemism*; it is, however, rather negative, consisting in abstinence from injuring the totem animal, than positive, showing itself in acts of worship. There are, however, exceptions; the Wollunqua totem is a single mythical animal; the Warramunga ceremonies with regard to it are at the present day devoted entirely to placating it, an attitude which can hardly be distinguished from the propitiation of a god. Among certain Central Australian tribes the totem animal is required to be eaten on certain occasions, although this is to be regarded as an aberrant form of totemism (Lang, *JAI* xxxv. 315–336). In America, too, we hear of sacrifices to the totem (Loskiel, *History*, i. 40; Maclean, *Twenty-five Years*, p. 186), unless, indeed, totem is here used in the sense of individual totem, offerings to which are frequent (Frazer, *Totemism*, p. 54). Under this head may be noticed the cult of certain animals in Australia, which are associated with all the males or all the females of a given tribe. They are frequently termed 'sex totems,' but 'animal brothers' would be a more intelligible term. Their real meaning may be said to be unknown. How far totemism tends to evolve into other forms of cult is a disputed question, but it seems probable that the totem of the chief, where the office is hereditary, will come to be respected by the whole tribe (*Miss. Cath.* 1888, 262; cf. *Tour du Monde*, 1895, p. 100). The segregation of totem kins leads to certain districts holding certain animals sacred, and may open the way to higher cults.

(6) In the case of the totem kin, the association of a human being with a species of animals is hereditary, and no choice in the matter is permitted to him. Of a more voluntary nature are *secret societies*. Even here inheritance has much to do with the acquisition of membership in a society, especially in N.W. America. At the same time, initiation seems to play a considerable rôle in the case of the secret society; in the absence of initiation ceremonies a man remains outside the society, but this can hardly be the case with a totem kin, for women, too, belong to it, though their initiation ceremonies, if performed at all, do not seem, any more than those of the males, and probably much less, to bear any relation to the totem. The fundamental idea of many secret societies is the acquisition of a tutelary animal. In the same way the individual gains an animal genius by his initiation fast. Closely connected with these 'naguals,' as they may conveniently be termed, are the familiars of witches and the wer-wolves, or other animal forms of wer-men.

(7) More especially in Greek and Roman mythology we find a number of woodland deities, which are very clearly *spirits of the woods in animal or partly animal form*. Bearing in mind the possibility of syncretism, it may be recognized that even if Dionysus and other deities commonly associated with vegetation cults are sometimes conceived in animal form, this is no proof that they were so conceived *qua* vegetation spirits; but this objection applies in a much less degree to Pan, the Satyrs, and Silenuses, while in the case of the Fauns there is a general agreement that they are spirits of the woods (Mannhardt, *Ant. Wald- u. Feldkulte*, p. 113). We have a parallel to them in modern European folklore; Lêshi, the wood-spirit, is believed in Russia to appear partly in human shape, but with the horns, ears, and legs of a goat (Mannhardt, *Baumkultus*, p. 138).

The frequent conception of the corn-spirit as an animal, and particularly as a pig, makes it highly probable that Frazer is correct in arguing that Proserpine, Attis, and Adonis were originally conceived as pigs, or, at any rate, that their cult developed from that of a corn-spirit in pig form. In European folklore there is little that can be termed worship or cult in the attitude towards the animal under whose form the corn-spirit is believed to appear; few or no ceremonies are performed, save those whose object is to placate the spirit injured by the reaping of the crop and to ensure the proper growth of the new crops when they are sown in the spring. More definite acts of worship are recorded of the Pawnees on the Upper Missouri (see 'Bison' below), and of some of the tribes in Florida.

(8) *Omens* are drawn from the cries and actions of birds, mammals, etc., all the world over; but developments like the cult of the hawk (see below) in Sarawak are probably rare. If we may assume that the present-day conditions in the tribes referred to represent three stages in the evolution of a god, there is no doubt that from an omen-giving bird has been evolved a specialized anthropomorphic deity, especially associated with warlike operations.

(9) The question of *the association of certain animals with certain deities* is a very difficult one. On the one hand, it is certainly impossible to prove that all such animals were sacred before they became connected with the god; and equally impossible to show that the god has actually been crystallized out of one or more sacred animals. On the other hand, we cannot point to any clear case of respect for an animal paid to it wholly and solely because it is associated with a certain deity. If the jackal was respected in Egypt because it was associated with Anubis, it may be argued, on the one hand, that this association was due to the fact that the jackal was formerly regarded as a soul-animal; on the other hand, we may with apparently equal justice argue that the jackal was frequently seen about the tombs, and that this led to its being associated with the god of tombs. The question seems to be in most cases insoluble.

(10) It can hardly be said that there is any cult proper of animals used in *magic*. Among the southern Bantus, however, the crocodile (see below) is sacrosanct. The explanation of this is not far to seek: the crocodile is used for evil by magicians; to kill a crocodile, therefore, would be to incur the suspicion of being a magician and possibly the penalty of death. It is therefore easy to see how the association of an animal with evil magic can lead to its being respected (for the view that magical animals become gods, see Preuss's articles in *Globus*, vol. lxxxvii. *passim*).

(11) In a comparatively large number of cases we are unable to trace the origin of a cult of

animals. First and foremost the facts of serpent-worship—the most widely spread of animal cults—are far from having been explained. The serpent is, in many cases, associated with a cult of ancestors; this is readily comprehensible where the species is a harmless one; the very fact of its harmlessness would mark it out as different from its fellows; so, too, where the snake inhabits the house or its immediate neighbourhood, we have an adequate cause for its association with the worship of the dead; among the Zulus, for example, not every snake is an *idhlozi*, but only those which are found in the neighbourhood of the kraal. Some part of serpent-worship may be put down to their association with water; one of the commonest forms of water-monster is the serpent. The water-snake is specially honoured among the Xosa-Kafirs, in order that cases of drowning may not be frequent (Merensky, *Erinnerungen*, p. 38). But these facts are far from sufficient to explain the wide distribution of serpent-worship. On the other hand, its cult is much more than the cult of a dangerous animal, as is readily seen by comparing serpent-worship with the cult of the wolf or the crocodile, and it seems doubtful if the mysterious nature of the serpent, which is sometimes invoked as an explanation, is sufficiently important to account for the preference given to the reptile. Probably a multiple origin may be assigned to it.

The relations of animals and gods in Australian religion are by no means clear. Baiame seems in some eastern tribes to occupy the same position which the bell-bird holds in the mythology of the central tribes; his opponent, Mudgegong, is conceived under the form of an eagle-hawk, thus reproducing the familiar mythical conflict which in other parts of Australia is narrated of the eagle-hawk and the crow. Farther south the eagle-hawk, under the name of Mullion, again figures as an evil spirit. The name of the god of some Victorian tribes is Pundjel, and the same name is applied to the eagle-hawk; possibly, however, both receive it simply as a title of respect. However that may be, it seems clear that a certain amount of anthropomorphization has gone on in Australia. What is not clear is the position of the animals from which the anthropomorphic gods or evil spirits seem to have been evolved. Both eagle-hawk and crow are phratry names; but, while the crow (see below) is respected, possibly as a soul-animal, there are few traces of a similar respect for the eagle-hawk. Yet we cannot find that the crow has been anthropomorphized into a deity, and the deities and demons are connected with animals in areas where the phratry names, at least at the present day, have nothing to do with these animals. On the other hand, the eagle-hawk is a common form of the wizard (Spencer and Gillen, *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 533).

Howitt has maintained that Koin and other spirits which the European observers have regarded as demons are really gods. If this be so, if the god of the Australian is no more than a magnified medicine-man, we have a sufficient explanation of the position of the eagle-hawk. Even if Howitt's theory is not generally applicable, the fact that the medicine-man of one tribe may be erected into a god by them, and into a demon by their neighbours who suffer from his machinations, gives a not improbable explanation of the facts. It does not, of course, follow that any one medicine-man has been deified; just as the Ibans have deified a generalized hawk (see below), the Australians may have apotheosized a generalised eagle-hawk-medicine-man.

In view of the position of the eagle-hawk as head of one of the phratries, it is of some importance that on the north-west coast of America we find among the Thlinkets two deities, Yehl and Khanukh, whose names mean 'raven' and 'wolf'; at the same time they are divided into two phratries, which are also named after the raven and the wolf. It is true that Tylor has denied (*JAI* xxviii. 144) that Khanukh ever appears in wolf form; Yehl, on the other hand, assumes the bird form in many of his adventures. This does not, however, seem fatal to the view that the presiding animals of the phratries have somehow been developed into deities or demi-gods, for Yehl is little more than a culture hero; at the same time this theory leaves unexplained the spread of the two cults into the opposite phratry. For neither in America nor in Australia is there any trace of uni-phratriac deities, as there should be on the supposition that the presiding animal has become a god. It should not be forgotten that in some of the central tribes of Australia there are traces of species deities (*R.G.S.Aust.*, *S. Aust. Br.* ii. 80). It is true that animal form is not expressly attributed to them; on the other hand, emu feet are attributed to the chief god of the southern Aruntas (MS note). It may therefore be that the deification of the eagle-hawk is due neither to its importance in magic nor to its position as a phratry animal, though these facts may have had influence in bringing about its preferred position.

Even were it established that phratry animals have been promoted to godship, it by no means follows that this is equivalent to the erection of a totem into a god. That phratry animals have ever been totems is a pure hypothesis, and no consistent account has yet been given of the process by which they became more than totems.

Another animal god of unexplained origin, whose importance marks him out for notice, is the Great Hare of the Algonquins (Strachey, *Historie of Travaile*, p. 98; Lang, *Myth*[2], ii. 79; Brinton, *Myths*[3], p. 193), who, in his human form of Michabou or Manibosho, was the culture-hero of this important family of Amerinds. Brinton, emphasizing the connexion of the Great Hare with the East, has, on etymological grounds, explained it as the dawn. Meteorological explanations have ceased to be convincing; moreover, according to one form of the myth, the rabbit (which is Brinton's translation of the latter half of *Michabou=Manibosho*) was not in the east but in the north (Brinton, p. 196). To speak of the cult of the Great Hare as animal-worship is, according to Brinton, to make it senseless, meaningless brute-worship; but this is to view it from the point of view of Europe in A.D. 1900 rather than in the light of other primitive cults. It may safely be said that no attempt to explain away animal-cults on these lines can be successful in more than very small measure. Brinton's preference for a dawn myth cannot therefore carry the day against the natural meaning of the Algonquin legends. Moreover, no adequate account has ever been given of the process by which men came, on the score of a simple etymological misunderstanding, to turn a god in human shape into an animal.

Less important is the Bushman god Ikaggen or Cagn (see 'Mantis' below), who, according to the latest account, was believed to manifest himself in the form of the mantis (*ikaggen*), or the caterpillar (*ngo*). From this duplex form we may perhaps assume that he had made some progress in the direction of anthropomorphization. The problem of how one god comes to manifest himself in several animals is a complicated one, when it is a phenomenon of the religion of savage or barbarous peoples, among whom the syncretic processes, the working of which in Greece or Egypt is fairly obvious, cannot be assumed to have played a large part, if indeed they played any at all. We see the same phenomenon in Samoa, where one village-god was believed to be incarnate in two or three kinds of animals. In the latter case it is perhaps to local causes, such as the aggregation of villages under one chief, or the coming together of more than one clan in a single village, that we must look for the explanation. But such an explanation can hardly be applied to the god of the Bushmen, who are on the very lowest nomadic plane of culture. The question is complicated by problems of Bushman origin and history; for if they were once a more settled folk, who suffered dispersal and disorganization when the Bantu stream overflowed South Africa, it may well be due to their disintegration that the hypothesis of syncretism, as an explanation of the cult of Cagn, seems inappropriate. Perhaps material for the solution of the problem may be found in the still unpublished mass of

material relating to the Bushmen collected by Dr. Bleek and Miss Lloyd.

Prominent among animal gods is the Hindu monkey-deity, Hanuman, who figures largely in the Rāmāyana. It has been argued that his cult is not primitive, but has been borrowed from some wild tribe; and this conclusion is based on the fact that there are no traces of worship of the monkey in the Veda, save so far as Vrishākapi (Rigveda, x. 86) may be regarded as the object of such (cf. the conflicting views of Bergaigne, *Religion védique*, ii. 270–272; Oldenberg, *Religion des Veda*, 172–174; Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, ii. 22–42; and Hillebrandt, *Vedische Mythologie*, iii. 278). But this line of proof overlooks the fact that the Veda is concerned with official religion, and that Hanuman may have been worshipped unofficially without any record of the fact being available. At the same time it is by no means improbable that the cult is to some extent based on an aboriginal predecessor, for we can hardly suppose that the Aryan-speaking invaders brought it with them from regions where the monkey is less prominent, if not non-existent. Hanuman is distinctly a species god; but we cannot discover the origin of the cult. The resemblance of the monkey to man, which has been suggested as the origin, has not produced the same effect elsewhere, and seems inadequate to account for a cult, however satisfactory it may be as an explanation of a rich monkey mythology.

6. *DELUGE, EARTH-FINDING.*—In legends of a deluge, animals figure in two capacities. In the first place, they are simple messengers, like the raven in the Book of Genesis; the crow, hare, dog, pigeon, and other animals go out to see if the waters are abated or how large the new earth is, sometimes causing it to increase magically in size by making the circuit of it. In other cases the waters show no signs of abating, and the water birds or animals are made to dive, and bring up mud, sand, or earth; from this the new earth is formed and laid on the waters; it grows to the size of the present world. This form of the *terre pêchés* is especially common in America, where it also occurs as a cosmogonic myth. Among the Mordvins and in the Altai the incident figures in a Creation myth. Among the Yorubas a hen plays a somewhat similar part in producing the earth from beneath the waters. See DELUGE.

7. *DIVINATION.*—For the purpose of divination, the entrails, the liver, and frequently the shoulder-blade of dead animals are used. Animals also serve to give indications which are more properly classifiable under 'divination' than under 'omens.' Ashes were strewn on the floor in Peru, and from the character of the tracks found on them was inferred the kind of animal into which the soul of a dead person had passed. In Mexico snuff was spilt on the altar, and inferences were drawn from the footprints of eagles, etc. (Tschudi, *Reisen*, p. 337; Bancroft, iii. 438). In Australia the ground near a corpse is carefully smoothed; if a track is found on it, they infer from it the totem of the person who caused the death of the man. In other cases a watch is kept, and the movements of an insect or its flight decide the direction in which the malevolent magician resides. Another method of using animals in divination is to make dice or other instruments of their bones; knuckle bones are especially used for this purpose.

8. *DOMESTICATION.*—The problem of the history of the domestication of animals has seldom been attacked, and up to the present no satisfactory solution has been propounded; we are in complete uncertainty as to why or how man in the first instance came to tame animals, bring them up in captivity, and induce them to perpetuate their species. In the Pacific the frigate bird is often tamed. The Indians of South America frequently keep tame animals in their huts But in neither of these cases can we properly speak of domestication. In the New World the domestic animals known before the advent of Europeans were few; the dog is, of course, nearly universal, but with this exception domestic animals were found only in Mexico and Peru, and then only the turkey, llama, alpaca, and perhaps one or two more, of which the llama and alpaca alone were economically important. In the Old World the main centre of domestication seems to have been Asiatic; but little, however, is known as to the localities in which the domesticated species first came under the dominion of man.

Probably the dog (see below) attached itself to man, but in other cases a process of domestication seems to be a necessary assumption. Totemism by itself seems inadequate, even when we make allowance for the additional leverage of the segregation of totem kins. Probably some form of cult (see 'Cattle' below) was in many cases the determining factor.

9. *EARTH-CARRIER.*—The problem of the stability of the earth has been solved, more especially by the people of Southern Asia and the Asiatic Islands, thanks in some degree to Hindu and Muhammadan influence, by the hypothesis that some great animal supports the world; the myth is also found in other areas, but only sporadically.

Among the Iroquois the world-turtle who received Ataentsic on his back, before the world was brought into existence, is clearly a mythical animal of this description; the Winnebagoes too, according to Knortz, made the earth rest on four animals and four snakes, which were in the end unequal to their task; but since a bison has joined his forces with theirs, the safety of the earth is assured. In India we find various myths; one account gives the snake, another the elephant, as the world-bearing beast (Ward, *View*, i. 3; Pinkerton, vii. 369); another view is that eight elephants bear the world on their backs (Monier-Williams, *Indian Wisdom*[3], p. 430), and the Lushai (Soppitt, *Short Account*, p. 26) and Daphtas (Bastian, *Völker am Brahm.* p. 16) make the world rest on the same animal. Another Hindu myth makes both turtle and serpent (dragon) rest upon an elephant (*Calc. Rev.* xi. 407), while a later myth gives the boar as the supporter. In Ceylon the world-carrying giant rests on a serpent, which rests on a turtle; the turtle rests on a frog, and beneath the frog is air (*Miss. Herald*, xviii. 365). The Indian boar recurs in Celebes (*Journ. Ind. Arch.* ii. 837; *Med. Ned. Zend.* vii. 114). Another account gives the buffalo (*ib.* x. 285), which recurs in the Moluccas (De Clercq, in *Bijdr.* 1890, p. 132). In Arabia and Egypt are found the cow and bull (Andree, *Ethnog. Par.* p. 102; Lane, *1001 Nights*, i. 21), which are also said to rest on a rock, and that on a fish. Probably as a result of Muhammadan influence, the bull or ox is found in Bulgaria (Strausz, *Bulg.* p. 36); Sumatra (Hasselt, *Volksbes.* p. 71), where it rests on an egg, this on a fish, which is in the sea; and in Java (Coolsma, *Voorlez.* p. 78). The turtle in a Kalmuk myth seems to play the part of the world-carrier (Bastian, *Geog. Bilder*, p. 357); the snake in Nias (*Tijdschr. T. L. V.* xxvi. 113), Sumatra (*Allg. Misszts.* xii. 404, etc.), and Java (*Tijdschr. Ned. Ind.* 1893, i. 10); the fish in Sumatra (see above), among the Ainus (Batchelor, p. 278), and in Europe in the Middle Ages (Mone, *Anzeiger*, viii. 514). The frog recurs among the Mongol Lamas (Tylor, *Prim. Cult.* i. 365). Among the Slavs four whales are said to support the world (*Berl. Lesekabinett*, 1844, 210), and among the Temnes of West Africa a trace of Muslim influence may be seen in the undescribed animal who bears all on his back (*Ausland*, 1850, 189). In many cases the movements of the earth-carrier are alleged to be the cause of earthquakes (see below).

10. *EARTHQUAKES.*—Most of the peoples enumerated in the preceding section account for earthquakes by the movements of the animal supporting the earth. In addition we find the snake in the Moluccas (Bastian, *Indonesien*, i. 81), interchangeably with the ox, in Bali (*Globus*, lxv. 98), Roti (Müller, *Reisen*, ii. 345), Flores (Jacobsen, *Reise*, p. 51), Mindanao (*ZE* xvii. 47), and among the Dayaks of Borneo (Perelaer, *Ethn. Bes.* p. 8). In Flores a dragon myth is also found (*loc. cit.*). The earthquake fish of Japan is placed sometimes under the earth, sometimes in the sea (*Natur*, 1878, 551; Brauns, *Jap. Märchen*, p. 154; Chamberlain, *Things Jap.* p. 120). In Sumatra the crab is found as a variant to the snake, Naga-padoka, whose horns are perhaps due to Muslim influence

(v. Brenner, *Besuch*, p. 524). In Flores (Jacobsen, *loc. cit.*), and Persia (Ritter, *Asien*, vi. 563), the dragon is the cause. In Kamtchatka the earthquake is said to be due to the dog of Touila, whose name is Kozei; the snow collects on his coat and he shakes himself to get it off (Krachenninikow, *Descr.* i. 94). The movements of the other animals are put down to a bee or mosquito stinging them.

11. *ECLIPSES.*—Animals figure in some of the primitive explanations of eclipses. Among the Potawattomies they are caused by the combat of the dog with the old woman who makes the basket (*Ann. Prop. Foi*, xii. 490). The dog plays the part of a protector, as does probably the bird in a Mongol myth (*Ausland*, 1873, 534), and possibly in the Lules myth (Lozano, *Desc. Corog.* p. 91). More commonly it is said that the moon is swallowed or attacked by an animal. In Burma the Karens say that wild goats are devouring the moon, and they make a noise to drive them away, or that frogs are eating it (*Miss. Cath.* 1877, 455). In Eastern Asia the dragon myth is common; it is found in China (Grimm, *Deut. Myth.* ii. 589), Siam (Bastian, *Reise*, p. 243), Sumatra (Marsden, *Hist.* p. 194), and Tidore (De Clercq, *op. cit.* p. 73). This form of the myth is not far removed from that which makes a giant or undescribed monster attack the moon or sun.

The dragon myth is found sporadically in Asia Minor (Naumann, *Vom Goldenen Horn*, p. 75), in Carinthia (*Zts. d. Myth*, iv. 411), and among the southern Slavs (v. Wislocki, *Volksgl.* p. 54); among the latter a bird myth is also found (*ib.*). In Sumatra (*Globus*, lxv. 96), and Celebes (*Med. Ned. Zend.* xi. 248; *Zts. Ges. Erdk. Berlin*, xxxi. 370), it is the snake that produces an eclipse, among the Nagas the tiger (Bastian, *Völker am Brahm.* p. 30), among the Chiquitos the dog (Tylor, *Prim. Cult.* i. 328), who tears the flesh of the moon and reddens her light with the blood which flows. Among the Tupis the jaguar was the animal which was believed to attack the sun (*ib.* p. 329), and the Peruvians held it to be some monstrous beast (*ib.*). The jaguar recurs among the Manaos (Martius, *Beitr.* i. 585), and the Guaranis (Ruiz de Montoya, *Conquista*, p. 12 ff.). The Tagbanuas tell a myth of a huge crab (Worcester, *Philippine Isl.* p. 497). The old Norse (Grimm, i. 202; ii. 588, iii. 207) held that a wolf attacked the sun or moon; and the same idea is found in France (*ib.* ii. 404). In many cases the dogs are beaten or incited to attack the monster which is assailing the heavenly body.

12. *FABLES.*—Animals figure largely in the folk-tales, no less than in the myths or sagas of primitive peoples (see Bleek, *Reynard the Fox*; Dennett, *Folklore of the Fjort*; MacCulloch, *op. cit.* etc.). In these they think and act and move like human beings, so much so that a lawsuit on the Congo turns on such questions as what the hare said to the elephant, instead of on legal procedure. At a later stage the beast story is complicated with a moral (Æsop's *Fables*). Beast stories are found in most collections of *Märchen*; for India, see especially the Pañchatantra.

13. *FAMILIAR.*—All the world over the witch or wizard is associated with an animal, termed 'the familiar,' which is sometimes conceived as real, sometimes as a spirit which stands at the beck and call of the human being. Just as the injury to the *nagual*, or bush-soul, has fatal results for its possessor, so the familiar's life is bound up with that of the witch; if a witch-animal is wounded, the owner will be found to have suffered an injury at the corresponding part of the body. Sometimes magical powers are attributed to whole classes, such as the Boudas, *i.e.* blacksmiths and workers in clay of Abyssinia, who are believed to have the power of turning into leopards or hyænas, instead of simply having the animals or their spirits at their command.

In the Malay Peninsula the alliance between the *pawang* (priest) and the tiger is said to be the result of a compact entered into long ago between the species and mankind; the office is hereditary, and the son must perform certain ceremonies to prevent the familiar from being for ever lost to the tribe. In Siberia the *ye-keela* (witch-animal) is said to be sent out by a shaman to do battle with the ye-keela of a hostile shaman, and the fate of the man depends on the fate of his ye-keela, which refuses the fight if it thinks it cannot beat its adversary.

In curative magic the wizard carries figures of his familiar and imitates them; sometimes his familiar is said to appear before he meets with success.

14. *FASCINATION.*—The power of fascination actually possessed by the serpent has been attributed to many other animals, among them the lion (Aelian, *de Nat. An.* xii. vii.; cf. Maspero, *Études*, ii. 415), μάντις (*Schol. ad Theoc.* x. xviii.), basilisk (see below), toucan (Smith, *Brazil*, p. 559), and, naturally, above all the serpent (*Mélusine*, iv. 570, v. 18, 41). The power of fascination is attributed to the wer-wolf in the East Indies (*Tijdschr.* xli. 548 f.). Something similar is believed of the ordinary wolf in Norway (Liebrecht, *Zur Volkskunde*, p. 335). See EVIL EYE.

15. *FOOD TABUS.*—The use of animals as food is prohibited for many different reasons. The totem kin usually abstains from eating the totem, the *nagual* is sacrosanct to the man with whom it is associated, and certain animals, like the cow in India, or in fact cattle generally among pastoral tribes, are never or only very seldom eaten. But whereas the totem is absolutely tabu, cattle, on the other hand, supply the pastoral peoples with a large part of their subsistence. Another class of animals which is commonly tabu, at any rate for those who claim kinship with them, are soul-animals (see below).

Sometimes special persons, by virtue of their position or occupation, are forbidden the use of certain meats. In Fernando Po the king may not eat deer and porcupine, which are the ordinary food of the people. Egyptian kings were restricted to a diet of veal and goose. Certain tabus are also imposed on mourners; in Patagonia the widow may not eat horse flesh, guanaco, or cassowary. Certain foods are tabu to men but not to women; among the South African Bantus men may not eat fish, fowl, or pig. Other foods are forbidden to women but not to men; on the island of Nias, in the Dutch East Indies, the former may not eat monkey flesh. Especially in Australia there is an extensive system of food tabus in connexion with initiation; as one gets older, these are abrogated one by one; emu flesh is usually reserved for old men. Similarly girls may not eat various meats at puberty; among the Dénés their sole non-vegetable diet is dogfish. Sometimes marriage removes some of the tabus. On the Murrumbidgee, ducks are the food of married people only.

In many cases only certain parts of an animal are tabu to certain persons: a Déné girl may not eat moose nose or reindeer head; among the Ottawas blood is tabu to the unmarried; the heart, liver, etc., are tabu to a Dakota after initiation till he has killed an enemy. The female animal is frequently tabu; in sickness the female animal only might be eaten by some of the New England peoples.

During pregnancy and after the birth of a child many kinds of food are prohibited to one or both parents; in New South Wales the woman does not eat eel or kangaroo; in Martinique both parents abstain from turtle and manatee. The reason generally given is that the nature of the food influences the offspring. Thus a turtle is deaf, and eating a turtle would make the child deaf too; a manatee has small eyes, and the child would have small eyes too if the parents did not abstain from it. Just as animals are eaten to gain their qualities, so their use as food is prohibited in order to avoid incurring them; this is the explanation often given for abstinence from the flesh of deer, the hare, and other timid animals.

Especially in West Africa food tabus are im-

posed upon members of a certain family by a priest, and the tabu is sometimes thenceforth hereditary. Among the Andamanese some food is prohibited to every individual, generally some kind which, in the opinion of the mother, disagrees with the child; but if it is not selected in this way, each person is free to determine what food is to be tabu for himself.

Other food tabus are connected rather with seasons than with anything else. It is not uncommon in south-east Europe to find a prejudice against eating lamb before a certain day.

In connexion with food tabus may be mentioned the prohibition against cooking certain kinds of animals together. In Kamtchatka different kinds of meat may not be stewed in the same pot; the Saponas of the Eastern States of America would not cook venison and turkey together, on the ground that they would have ill success in hunting if they did. See TABU.

16. *FUTURE LIFE:* (1) CERBERUS.—It is a common belief that the soul has to traverse a river on its journey into the other world. Sometimes the bridge over which it passes is said to be an animal; the Ojibwas said that a great serpent served as a bridge, and that he threatened to devour those who were in a trance (Keating, *Expedition*, ii. 154). In New Caledonia a serpent serves as a bridge from Morou to Tum, and allows to pass only such as find grace in his eyes, in other words, those who are tatued in due form (*Ann. Prop. Foi*, xxiii. 369). In other cases an animal guards the passage; in North Borneo the belief is that a fiery dog watches at the gate of Paradise and takes possession of all virgins (Forster and Sprengel, *Beiträge*, ii. 239). The idea of a dog at the end of the soul-bridge is also found among the Iroquois (Le Beau, *Aventures*, i. 359). Sometimes the river contains fish which devour the souls which fall in (*Globus*, xlvii. 108, among the Dayaks). In other cases the function of the animal is to turn back the souls of those who are to live; the Assiniboines held that a person in a trance went as far as the river, but was driven back by a red bull (Coues, *Henry and Thompson, MS. Journ.* ii. 521). The Senels of California also made a bull obstruct the path of the soul; but it was the bad who fell victims to him (*Cont. Am. Ethn.* iii. 169). In the Dayak mythology figures a bird, who lives aside from the direct road of the soul; if the soul turns aside, however, the bird sends it back (Ling Roth, *Natives of Sarawak*, i. 210). In the Solomon Islands the function of the bird is quite different; the natives of San Cristoval say that the soul becomes a ghost (*'ataro*) when it leaves the body, but that it fails to recognize that it is dead; a kingfisher strikes it on the head after two or three days, whereupon it becomes a real spirit (Codrington, *Melanesians*, p. 257).

The soul pursues in the other world the same occupations as it followed in this life. Consequently it is commonly represented as chasing the animals on which the living man depended for his sustenance on earth. The belief is especially common among the American Indians, whose 'happy hunting grounds' are proverbial (Matthews, *Hidatsa*, p. 49; *Rev. Hist. Rel.* xxx., xlii. 9 f.).

Sagard, one of the early Jesuit missionaries in Canada, tells us: 'The Indians say that the souls of dogs and other animals follow the road of souls; . . . the souls of the dogs serve the souls of their masters in the other life; the souls of men go hunting with the souls of their tools and arms' (*Histoire du Canada*, pp. 497, 498).

To this idea of the functions of animals and the lot of the soul in the other world is due in great part the custom of burial sacrifice (for the horse see *Teutonia*, ii. 148–162). Sometimes the object of the sacrifice is only to bear witness to the importance of the deceased in this life and thus influence his future lot (Abinal and Vaissière, *Vingt ans à Madagascar*, p. 221).

17. *FUTURE LIFE:* (2) SOUL-ANIMALS.—Few beliefs are more common than that the souls of the dead pass into animals. In South Africa it is the prevailing belief, but it is found in Europe (*Folk-lore*, xi. 234), America (Tylor, ii. 6–8), and Asia (*ib.* p. 9 f.; *Mission Life*, N.S. i. 459; *T'oung Pao*, ii. 11, etc.). Especially in the form of the doctrine of transmigration, as a punishment for evil done in this life, the belief prevails not only in India (see, *e.g.*, Manu, ii. 201, xii. 55–69), but also in Oceania and New Guinea (*Golden Bough*[2], iii. 432–4) and Australia (*Man*, 1905, No. 28; for a collection of references, see *Rev. Hist. Rel.* xxxvii. 385; see also below, 'Bat,' 'Crocodile,' 'Lion,' 'Lizard,' 'Tiger,' etc.).

The causes which are supposed to lead to this re-incarnation are various. Among the Mokis it is the form of the totem animal that a man assumes at death (Frazer, *Tot.* p. 36). In South Africa the different clans believe that their members pass into the animals which they venerate (*Man*, 1901, No. 111). The Zulus believe that their dead pass into snakes, called *amadhlozi* (*Golden Bough*[3], iii. 411); according to another account, the chiefs inhabit one kind of snake, the common people another, while the old women are re-incarnated in lizards (Callaway, *Religious System*, p. 200). According to the Masai, the souls pass into different kinds of snakes, one of which receives the souls of each clan or family (Hollis, *Masai*, p. 307). In Madagascar the body is thrown into a sacred lake, and the eel that gets the first bite at the body is the abode of the soul (v. Gennep, *Tabou*, p. 291). In China the soul of the drowned man is held to make a rush for the nearest living being; consequently they take the first crab seen in the mud to be the receptacle of the soul (*Mission Life, loc. cit.*). The Barotse hold that they can choose into which animal they shall pass (Bertrand, *Au Pays*, p. 300). In the Solomon Islands a man tells his family which animal will be his re-incarnation (*Golden Bough*[2], ii. 433). In the Argentine Republic it is the animals which are seen about the grave that come in for respect as soul-animals (*Bol. Inst. Geog. Arg.* xv. 740). In Brazil a kind of hawk is believed to inoculate with the souls of the dead the animals on which it perches to extract maggots from their flesh (Spix and Martius, p. 1084). It is a common belief in Europe, that if a cat jumps over a corpse, it becomes a vampire; in other words, the soul of the deceased passes into the cat. The Macusis believe that souls which are unable to rest come back to earth and pass into the bodies of animals (Waterton, *Wanderings*, p. 177). In Paumotu it was also believed that the wicked found refuge in the bodies of birds, which the priests accounted holy (Arbousset, *Tahiti*, p. 289).

In many cases the lodgment of the soul in an animal is held to end the matter. If the animal is killed, the soul passes into another beast of the same species (*Man*, 1904, No. 118). In Madagascar, however, the death of the animal is held to set free the soul lodged in it (*Miss. Cath.* 1880, p. 551). The Chiriguanos, on the other hand, hold that the soul enjoys a few years of liberty and then passes into the body of a fox or a jaguar (*Globus*, xlviii. 37).

Some tribes can describe in more or less detail the process of transmigration. The Amandabele of South Africa believe that the souls of chiefs pass into lions, but that the process takes place underground; for which reason the corpse does not remain long unburied. The body is put into a large wooden trough and hidden away in a cavern; some time afterwards it is found to have become a

lion's whelp, which grows rapidly (Thomas, *Eleven Years*, p. 279). The Betsileos are more explicit. The *fanany* (soul-animal) is in the form of a lizard, which comes to the surface after burial; the family approach it and ask if it is really the relative they have lost; if it moves its head they make offerings to it. It then returns to the tomb and grows to a large size; it is the tutelary spirit of the family (v. Gennep, *Tabou*, p. 272). According to another account, the corpse is attached to the central pillar of the hut until decomposition sets in; whereupon a large worm develops, which becomes a boa at the end of several months (*ib.* p. 278).

In several of these accounts the soul seems to become an animal rather than to enter into an animal; this is notably the case with the Amandabele belief; the Betsileos seem to waver between two opinions, if we take account of all the data. In other cases the belief is more explicit. In the Solomon Islands the common people turn into white ants in Marapa, the island of the dead, and in this form serve as food for the spirits of the chiefs, the warriors, and the successful men, who, however, in the long run suffer the same fate as the common people (Codrington, *Melanesians*, p. 260). Sometimes the change is regarded as the result of evil-doing; the Chins believe that the bad go to dark caverns, in which are the entrails of all sorts of animals; they are hungry, and stretch out their hands to find food; but as soon as they touch the entrails they themselves are transformed into the shape of the animal whose entrails they have grasped (*Miss. Cath.* 1884, p. 468). On the other hand, among the Montagnais, of whom P. le Jeune writes, the transformation of the soul is the result of simple misfortune or carelessness; the souls go to the extremity of the earth, which is flat with a great precipice beyond, at the foot of which is water; they dance at the edge of the abyss and some fall over; these are forthwith turned into fish (*Rel. des Jés.* 1637, p. 53).

The soul-animal is usually respected, for which two reasons are assigned. The injuring of the animal is the injuring of a relative or of a friend, for it is believed that the animals into which the souls pass do not injure those with whom they were allied on earth as men. By eating the animal, men may even eat the soul of a relative, and perhaps inflict unmerited hardship on it in its non-human existence. On the other hand, the eating of the animal may be an insult rather than an injury; but it may provoke the wrath of the dead man or of his fellows, and thus recoil upon the living. As a rule, however, the objection to injuring a relative is the prevailing feeling; for we find that, though a man will not injure his own family animal, he will not hesitate to kill the family animal of another man (*Golden Bough*[3], ii. 433). In the same way a man does not injure his own totem, but will kill that of another.

18. *Future Life*: (3) Psychopomp.—The duty of conveying souls to the other world is sometimes assigned to animals. The Araucanians believe that Tempulcague, an old woman, appears in the form of a whale and carries off the soul of the dead man (Molina, *Historia*, p. 70). On the Orinoco huge snakes are said to carry off the souls in their belly to a land where they entertain themselves by dancing and other delights (Ruiz Blanco, *Conversion del Piritu*, p. 63). In Brazil the duty was assigned to the humming-bird (Alencar, *O Guarany*, ii. 321). Among the Saponas, the soul, after an old hag had condemned it, was delivered over to a huge turkey buzzard, which flew away with it to a dark and barren country where it was always winter (Byrd, *History of the Dividing Line*, p. 96 f.).

Sometimes the animal is not a mythical one. The object of some burial sacrifices is to provide the dead man with a conductor. In Mexico the dog (see below), according to one account, fulfilled this office. Among the Yorubas of West Africa the young men who attend a funeral kill a fowl and throw its feathers in the air as they walk, subsequently cooking and eating the flesh. This fowl they call Adie-Irana, 'the fowl which purchases the road'; its function is to precede the dead man on his road (*Miss. Cath.* 1884, p. 342).

19. *Idols.*—It is not difficult to trace the main lines of the development of idols, so far as animals are concerned. It is a common custom, when the sacred animal is sacrificed annually, to keep its skin for the ensuing twelve months, just as the various figures made of the new corn are suspended in the house till the next harvest. From the custom of keeping the skin there arises, by a natural transition, the practice of stuffing it in order to give it a more lifelike appearance. Then it is found more convenient to have a wooden or stone image, and the skin is drawn over it, as was the ram's skin over the image of Ammon; and the idol is a *fait accompli*. There is, however, a tendency to anthropomorphize animal gods. We find, therefore, that in Egypt, India, and even Siberia, idols compounded of man and animal appear; sometimes the head only is human, as in the case of the Sphinx; sometimes it is the head which is animal, as in the case of the crocodile-god Sebek. Sometimes the head and body are human, but some minor portion is animal; the Fauns had goats' feet, and Dagon a fish's tail. With the appearance of the mixed form the course of evolution is completed, so far as the animal is concerned. It ceases to be an idol, and henceforth becomes an attribute of the god; he carries it on his shoulders, leads it, or stands in relation with it in some other way. Finally, if it is sacrificed to him, it ends by being regarded as his enemy.

20. *Inspiration.*—One of the methods by which inspiration may be produced is by drinking the blood of the sacrificial victim; possibly the result is in part due to physiological causes. Near Bombay, in the ceremonies of the Komatis, an old man, nearly naked, carried a kid round a car used for hook-swinging, and tore open its throat with his teeth; when he had sucked the blood of the kid, he was regarded by the populace as a god (*Miss. Reg.* 1818, p. 157). In this case no mention is made of any signs of inspiration; but in some parts of Southern India, when a devil dancer drinks the blood of a sacrificial goat, he shows evident signs of being possessed. As if he had acquired new life, he begins to brandish his staff of bells and to dance with a quick but unsteady step. Suddenly the afflatus descends. His eyes glare, and he leaps in the air and gyrates. Having by these means produced an auto-hypnotic condition, he is in a position to give oracles; he retains the power of utterance and motion, but his ordinary consciousness is in abeyance (*Golden Bough*[3], i. 134). The Sabeans explained the inspiration thus produced as due to the obsession of the blood-drinker by demons, whose food they held blood to be. They expected to gain the gift of prophecy by entering into communion with the demons (*ib.* p. 135).

21. *Life Index.*—It is a wide-spread belief that any injury done to the familiar of a witch will be shown on the corresponding portion of her body; similarly the wer-wolf is *solidaire* with the wer-man; a disaster to the bush-soul (see 'Nagual' below) of the West African spells disaster for the man himself. But it is by no means necessary that the relationship between the man and the animal should be conditioned by magical rites; it may be acquired from circumstances connected with the birth of a child (Hartland, *Legend of P.* i. *pass.*), or may be selected by the person himself

(*Golden Bough*[2], iii. 412). In the latter case the story usually takes the form that the soul of the person with whose life that of the animal is bound up has been deposited for safety in the animal. A few instances have been recorded in Australia in which the life of one of a totem kin is believed to be bound up with the life of the totem animal (Frazer, *Tot.* p. 7).

22. *MAGIC.*—The term 'magic' is vaguely used to denominate a great number of different conceptions, but these need not be distinguished in a brief survey of the part played by animals in magic. (1) Many forms of sacrifice (see below) are magical. (2) As the *nagual* (see below) or familiar, the animal gives man greater force than he would otherwise possess. (3) Just as in dying the dead animal sets free the magical power within it, so in life it may repel evil influences or attract them to itself and neutralize them. (4) By eating animals men acquire their qualities; lion's flesh gives courage, hare's meat makes a man a coward. By partaking of long-lived animals a man may overpass the ordinary span of life; by consuming wise animals he will acquire the gift of prophecy. (5) The external qualities of animals are susceptible of transference in like manner; by rubbing bear's grease on the head a plentiful growth of the hair is assured, for the bear is a hairy animal. This is called *the doctrine of signatures*. (6) Just as the familiar represents the witch and any injury done to the animal reappears in the witch, so any animal may be selected to represent a given person; a girl who wishes to compel the presence of an absent lover may, in Wales, take a frog's heart and stick it full of pins. (7) Diseases in the human being may be got rid of by transferring them to an animal. (8) Certain animals, like the frog (see below), are connected with certain departments of nature; by injuring or otherwise constraining them, these animals can be forced to produce the natural phenomena desired by the magician; thus frogs are whipped to produce rain. (9) Magical, too, from some points of view is the torture applied to the favourite animal of a god (*Golden Bough*[2], i. 108), to compel the deity to supply man with what he demands. From being used in magic the animal may come to be sacrosanct, as the crocodile (see below) among the Bantus of South Africa. See also 'Nagual,' 'Familiar,' etc. Although some animals are in greater request, it is probable there are few that are not in demand for magical purposes of some sort (v. Jühling, *Die Tiere in der Volksmedizin*; *Mélusine*, viii. 14, 32 f.). Especially important in European magic are the first animals seen in the spring, and the feathers, etc., of birds and animals carried in annual processions (see 'Wren' below, and art. MAGIC).

23. *MARRIAGE.*—Animals figure largely in European marriage customs. The custom of the 'Hahnenschlag' (*Folklore*, xi. 25) is sometimes practised, but more often the cock, or other bird or animal, is eaten by the bride and bridegroom or by the guests in general. Sometimes the bird is a mere ornament to the bridal waggon; sometimes it is killed by being burned in a bonfire, or hunted, or simply thrown into the house of the newly married, or rocked in a cradle before them; in some cases it is merely a gift from the bridegroom to the bride or her parents; or a game such as 'fox and geese' is played at weddings; or the newly married hunt the living animal. Custom sometimes requires a younger sister who marries first to give a white goat to the elder. The animals which figure in wedding ceremonies are the cat, cock or hen, crane, duck, goat, goose, owl, ox, partridge, pig, pigeon, quail, sheep, swan, and wren. The object of the ceremonies seems to be in some cases simply to avert evil by the ordinary method in use at other times of the year; sometimes the more definite object of securing fertility seems to be held in view. The tail, which is sometimes given to the bride, may perhaps have a phallic significance. The mimetic dance at weddings (*Cong. des Trad. pop.* 1900, p. 100) is perhaps intended to secure fertility. Sometimes an animal mask or dress only is worn. The bride is sometimes called 'lamb,' 'partridge,' etc., but this seems to be merely allegorical.

24. '*MEDICINE*,' *AMULET*, *TALISMAN*.—When the American Indian kills his medicine animal, he usually takes some portion of it, such as its pelt, claw, or wing, as a talisman and puts it in his medicine bag. It is held in some tribes that the medicine, once lost, cannot be replaced; it may, therefore, be conjectured that the medicine is regarded as the seat of the tutelary spirit whose aid is secured at puberty (cf. *Golden Bough*[2], iii. 432). In this connexion may be quoted a remark (Wied, *Reise*, ii. 190) that many Indians believe they have an animal, bison, tortoise, etc., in their bodies. The central idea of African 'fetishism' is that a spirit which temporarily inhabits a stone, bone, or other object, becomes for the time being the servant of the possessor of that object. The magical apparatus is sometimes composed of a bag made of the skin of some rare animal which contains various talismans, such as dried monkeys' tails, claws, etc. The same idea may be traced in the East Indies. If a Batta has a tooth as a talisman, he will, on the approach of danger, swallow it; this may perhaps be to ensure a greater measure of protection for himself; but it is more probably to ensure the safety of the talisman, which thus equals in importance the medicine of the American Indian. The uses of animal amulets are innumerable. Just as the American Indian believes that his medicine makes him invulnerable, so in Central Africa the leopard skin girdle is held to be a complete protection. In France the milk of a black cow is thought to confer the gift of invisibility. In Scotland serpent soup will make one wise like the serpent, but the serpent can also be made to assist the possessor of its skeleton. Often the particular purpose to be served is no longer remembered, and the talisman is simply carried for luck. In the Isle of Man the feathers of the wren are distributed at each house where the bearers call (see 'Wren' below).

25. *MIMETIC DANCES*, *MASQUERADES*, *ETC.*—Many primitive peoples are in the habit of imitating the movements and cries of animals, and usually in so doing assume the animal mask or dress. In some cases the object seems to be simple amusement, but this kind of dramatic representation is usually magical or religious in its purpose. (1) The initiation dance is frequently mimetic, and may perhaps have at its root the idea of transforming the man into a member of the kin by imparting to him a share of the nature of the animal. (2) Other dances, also performed at initiation, have for their primary object the conferring of magical power over the animal in the chase. (3) This magical power is also sought by mimetic dances performed immediately before a hunting expedition. (4) Mimetic dances before hunting may also be sympathetic in their purpose; the animal in human form falls a victim to the hunter, and in the same way the real animal will fall beneath his darts. (5) Sometimes mimetic dances are performed after a hunt also; their object seems to be protective (see 'Leopard' below), like so many of the other ceremonies after killing animals. (6) It may, however, be intended sometimes as productive magic, for the purpose of increasing the numbers of the animal and perhaps bringing to life again those laid low by the hunter. (7) With the object of provid-

ing for the due increase of the species, some American Indian tribes mimic the buffalo, the men taking the part of the males, the women of the females. (8) In many of the Central Australian ceremonies the movements of the totem are imitated in the ceremonies intended to provide for its due increase. (9) Conversely, imitation of the movements of animals and birds forms a part of some European marriage ceremonies, and seems to be here, too, a rite intended to promote fertility. (10) Where animals are sacred to a god, mimicry of their movements is equivalent to prayer and adoration, just in the same way as graphic representations of them. (11) The object of these prayers is often to produce rain or wind or some other natural phenomenon associated with the animals (see 'Frog' below); possibly in its origin the mimetic dance was intended by its magical power to produce these effects without the intervention of a god. (12) The wearing of animal disguises and imitation of animal movements during the chase have probably the purely rational object of deceiving the animal.

26. *MYTHS OF ANCESTORS, CHILDREN, HELPFUL ANIMALS, SWAN-MAIDEN STORIES.*—Sometimes as a totemic ætiological myth (Frazer, *Tot.* p. 3 f.), but often as a myth of tribal origin (Hearne, *Northern Ocean*, p. 342; D'Orbigny, *Voyage*, iii. 209 ff.; Liebrecht, *Gerv. Tilb.* p. 115, *Zur Volksk.* p. 17 ff., etc.), the descent from an animal ancestor is found all over the world. In the same way stories are told of animal births, which sometimes are simply ætiological myths of the origin of totem kins (Frazer, p. 6), and sometimes narratives of facts believed to occur at the present day (see 'Crocodile,' and cf. *Mélusine*, iii. 212, etc.). In another type of myth, animals are said to bring the children (*Folklore*, xi. 235, see also 'Lizard' below; *JRAS, S.B.*, 7, 146; Alencar, *O Guarany*, ii. 321). Corresponding to the animal form of the soul of the dead, we have the belief that the soul of the new-born child is in the form of an insect (*Miss. Cath.* 1894, 140) or of a bird (Skeat and Blagden, ii. 4), which the expectant mother has to eat. The helpful animal figures in many *Märchen* (Hartland, *Legend of P., pass.*, see also v. Gennep, 214–292; MacCulloch, 225–253, etc.). Sometimes animals figure as guides in tribal migrations, etc. (Wackernagel, *Kl. Schriften*, iii. 203 ff.). Under this head we may perhaps class the animal nurse (Frazer, *Paus.* iii. 234, 250; Farnell, *Cults*, p. 443; *Rep. Ind. Eth. Com.* 1866–7, p. 52). Connected with the myth of the animal ancestor is the swan-maiden story (Frazer, *Paus.* iv. 106; Hartland, *Science of Folklore*, pp. 255–332, 337–352; *Romania*, xxi. 62; *Aust. Ass. Adv. Sci.* iv. 731. See also 'Seal').

27. *MYTHS (ÆTIOLOGICAL).*—A great part of the mythology of savages is simply their idea of the history of the Universe. They account for natural facts, beliefs, customs, and rites by telling what some god or hero once did, by endowing all nature with sensibility and volition, by positing the same conditions in the heavens as exist on the earth, and so on. In particular, they account for the existence and peculiarities of animals by telling stories of what happened in the early days of the world. Once men went on all-fours, and pigs walked like men; but something fell on the head of a pig, and since then they have gone on all-fours and men walk upright.

The Indians of Brazil tell how the daughter of the great serpent married a young man who had three faithful slaves. At that time there was no night upon the earth; the young wife said her father had it, and the slaves were sent for it. They received it in a nut sealed with resin, which they were on no account to open. *En route* they heard a buzzing in the nut; it was the hum of the insects at night. Curiosity overcame them; they opened the nut, and night spread over the earth. Then everything in the forest changed into animals and birds; everything in the river into fishes. A wicker basket became a jaguar; the fisherman in his canoe turned into a duck, the oars forming the feet. When the woman saw the morning star, she said, 'I am going to separate night and day.' Then she rolled a thread of cotton, and said, 'You shall be the pheasant'; she coloured it white and red. She rolled another thread and made the partridge. These two birds call, one at dawn, the other at dusk. For their disobedience the three servants were changed into monkeys (Magalhanes, *Contes indiennes*, p. 5).

The relations of animals to man, and especially their sacrosanctity, are explained by ætiological myths. In Madagascar the Vazimbas account for the respect paid to the kingfisher by the following story: 'The Vazimba sent the kingfisher to visit their relatives with a message of good-bye to the father and mother, and an injunction to send fowls and sheep; when it had fulfilled its errand it came back, and the Vazimba said that as a reward for its bravery and wisdom they would put a crown on its head and dress it in blue by day and by night. Moreover, young kingfishers should be cared for, and the penalty of death inflicted on any one who sought to kill them' (v. Gennep, *Tabou*, p. 265). More common is the explanation that the animal in some way helped an ancestor of the kin (v. Gennep, *pass.*; see also 'Owl' below). In N.W. America an adventure with the animal is a prominent motive in the myths. Descent from the totem-animal seems to be the prevailing form of the story in the remainder of North America (for ætiological myths in Africa see *Folklore*, xv. 110; Rançon, *Dans la Haute Gambie*, p. 445; Merensky, *Beiträge*, p. 133 n., etc.); see also 'Eclipse,' 'Earth-carrier,' 'Earthquakes,' etc., above).

28. *NAGUAL.*—In Africa, Australia, and America it is the custom to undergo some ceremony, usually at the age of puberty, for the purpose of procuring a tutelary deity, which is commonly an animal. This is called *tornaq* (Eskimo), *manitou* (Algonquin), *nagual* (C. America), *yunbeai* (Euahlayi of E. Australia), etc. Among the Eskimos the bear (see below) seems to be the usual animal. Among the Thlinkets a young man goes out and meets a river otter; he kills it, takes out its tongue and hangs it round his neck, and thenceforth understands the language of all animals (*JAI*, xxi. 31; Krause, *Die Tlinkit-Indianer*, p. 284). Among the Eastern Dénés each hunter selects some animal, invariably a carnivorous one (*Smiths. Rep.* 1866, p. 307). Elsewhere the initiant has to dream of his medicine animal, and sometimes kills it in order to procure some portion of its body as a talisman (Frazer, *Tot.* p. 54). In Africa it is the magician who provides the tutelary beast; in one case a blood-bond is said to be performed with the animal selected. In Australia also the medicine-man sometimes provides the *nagual*; sometimes it is acquired by a dream. The animal thus brought into relation with a man is usually sacrosanct for him; if he loses his talisman, he cannot get another medicine animal (parts of America); the death of the *nagual* entails the death of the man (Nkomis of W. Africa); in Australia the *yunbeai* is sacrosanct, though the totem is not.

Closely connected with the *nagual* is the 'bush-soul' of West Africa. Possibly only our limited knowledge disguises their identity. A man will not kill his 'bush-soul animal,' for that would entail his own death; he cannot see it, but learns what it is from a magician. A 'bush-soul' is often hereditary from father to son, and from mother to daughter; sometimes all take after one or the other parent. In Calabar many are believed to have the power of changing into their *ukpong*. Something of the same sort is known in Europe, for in Iceland each family had attached to it an *ættar-fylgja*; each individual too had his *fylgja*, which took the shape of a dog, raven, fly, etc. (*Folklore*, xi. 237; Meyer, *German. Myth.* p. 67).

The *nagual* seems to be closely related, on the

one hand, to the 'soul-animal' (see above); on the other, it stands very near to the 'familiar' (see above) of the witch, and the 'wer-wolf' (see below). It has been argued that kin totemism arises from the *nagual*, which becomes hereditary. Up to the present no trace of animistic ideas has been found in connexion with totemism, if we except some doubtful cases in Australia (*Man*, 1902, No. 85). Nor has it been explained how the totem, the descent of which is, in Australia, predominantly in the female line, has developed from a *nagual*, which is seldom, if ever, possessed by women or inherited from the maternal uncle.

Closer to the *nagual* than the kin totem is the sacred animal of secret societies (which see), the initiation ceremonies of which, it should be noted, bear a strong resemblance to those practised by totem tribes. The *nagual* is the lineal ancestor of the 'genius' of the Romans, no less than of the 'guides' of modern spiritualism.

29. *NAMES.*—Animal names are very commonly used, and not among primitive peoples only, for three per cent. of English surnames are said to be derived from animals (Jacobs, *Studies in Bibl. Arch.* p. 68; for Indo-Germanic theriophoric personal names see Fick, *Griechische Personennamen, passim*). (1) Tribes are named after animals; the name of the Aruntas in Central Australia is said to mean 'cockatoo'; the Wakelburas are the eel people. In America we have the Dog Rib Indians, who trace their descent from the dog. In India the Nagas are a serpent tribe. (2) Far more common is the practice of naming totem kins after animals; it is one of the tests of totemism. In Australia we have a long list of Arunta and other totems in the works of Spencer and Gillen (for other kins see Frazer, *Totemism*). (3) The two sections into which most Australian tribes are divided are, especially in the south, often named after animals, and in particular after the eagle, hawk, and crow. Similarly we have the raven and wolf phratry among the Thlinkets (see also Frazer, *op. cit.*). (4) The intermarrying classes in Australia are also known by animal names; on the Annan River they are called after the eagle, hawk, and bee; at Moreton Bay they are named from the kangaroo, emu, etc. (5) In America the age classes and the closely connected secret or dancing societies are named after animals; in West Africa there is the leopard society. (6) In Zululand, possibly as a relic of totemism, the regiments are named after animals; we find similar names in Welsh history. (7) Both in America and in Australia sections of tribes are named from their principal food (*Globus*, xxxi. 381; lxix. 59). (8) Local divisions of Australian tribes have animal names. These are not to be confused with local totem groups. (9) Priests and worshippers are named after animals (see art. PRIEST). (10) Totem kins in America, and rarely in Australia, name their members after some part of the totem animal. (11) In South Africa the chiefs of animal-named kins bear the name of the animal. (12) Especially in America personal names derived from animals, either for magical purposes or as indications of the characters of their bearers, are very common. In Central America a child is named after some animal, which is thenceforward his *nagual* (see 'Nagual' above; cf. *Jahrb. Geog. Ges. Bern*, xiii. 150). (13) As a mark of respect kings and nobles receive names of animals as titles of address. (14) Gods are named from animals associated with them (see 'Goat,' 'Fox,' 'Mouse'). (15) Divisions of the calendar are named after animals in East Asia, and children take their names from them. (16) The signs of the zodiac, the constellations, etc., are named after animals. (17) Animal names are sometimes applied in Europe to the bride and bridegroom. (18) The reaper of the last ears, as representative of the corn-spirit, conceived in animal form, is called the cow, etc. At Easter or Whitsuntide, St. Thomas's Day, etc., animal names are applied to the last person to get up, or to an individual selected in some other way; cf. 'gowk,' *poisson d'Avril*. (19) Various games are known by animal names, in particular 'Blind Man's Buff' (see 'Sacrifice' below). (20) Animal nicknames are common in Europe, and probably in other parts of the world (Lang, *Social Origins*, App.). (21) The last ears of corn, as embodiments of the animal corn-spirit, receive animal names.

30. *OATH, ORDEAL.*—Just as in more advanced societies it is the custom to call upon the gods to bear witness to the truth of an assertion or to ensure the fulfilment of a promise, so the savage calls upon his sacred animal (see 'Bear,' 'Dog'). In later times this is regarded as an appeal to the gods, but originally the animal itself was believed to punish the perjurer, either by persecuting him as a ghost-animal or by devouring him as a living animal. The procedure varies, sometimes the hand is laid upon the animal or on its skull, sometimes its blood is drunk, sometimes the foot is put upon its skin. The Bantus of South Africa take an oath by their *siboko*, the Hereros by the colour of their oxen. In the island of Eibo the oath is taken by the Christmas boar. Corresponding to the oath by animals is a class of ordeals, in which the person to be absolved exposes himself to dangerous beasts by swimming across a river full of crocodiles, or by similar means.

31. *OMENS.*—In many cases it is impossible to point out either the causes which determine the augural character of an animal or those which make the appearance of a given animal favourable or unfavourable. Broadly speaking, omen animals may be classified as—(1) Totem or tutelary animals whose appearance is equivalent to a promise or grant of help to the receiver of the omen; their appearance may, however, be interpreted unfavourably (Frazer, *Tot.* p. 23). (2) The messengers of evil spirits or animal forms of evil spirits, whose appearance is equivalent to the announcement that a magician is seeking to do an injury to some one (see 'Owl'). (3) The animal is divine and has foreknowledge; by the manner of its appearance it shows what the future will be (see 'Hawk'). (4) The animal is the messenger of a god, who sends it to instruct man (see 'Hawk'). (5) The animal is possessed of magical influence, which tends either to promote or to retard the enterprise to which the omen is taken to relate; consequently its appearance is favourable or the reverse.

Omen-giving animals are (1) always of evil augury; (2) always of good augury; (3) auspicious or the reverse, (*a*) according to the manner in which they behave, or (*b*) according to the number which appear, or (*c*) according to the actions of the augur, who may change a bad omen into a good one by magical or other means, *e.g.* by killing the animal, by turning round three times, by spitting, or by purificatory ceremonies.

32. *POSSESSION.*—A belief in possession by animals is not uncommon. In New Guinea it is held that the witch is possessed by spirits, which can be expelled in the form of snakes, etc., just like any other disease. In the East Indies wer-wolfism is regarded as a disease of the soul which is communicable by contagion, or perhaps as a kind of possession in which the soul may be regarded as poisoned by the evil principle in the form of animals or reptiles. In South Australia the natives believed that they were sometimes possessed by certain animals, and it is no uncommon belief in Africa and Samoa that an offence against a totem or other sacred animal will be followed by its

growth within the body of the offender, which is equivalent to a kind of possession. Among the Ainus madness is explained as possession by snakes, etc., and they hold that it is caused especially by killing some sacrosanct animal. Thus a man who kills a cat is liable to be possessed by a cat, and he can prevent this only by eating part of a cat; it is called cat punishment. There is also bear punishment, dog punishment, and punishment by all the other animals. In Japan the obsessing animal is regarded as the physical incarnation of the sins of the sufferer, and is said to leave him after a while. In particular, foxes are held to possess people who have damaged the fields, etc., of their owners; and certain families are said to own foxes which enter the bodies of offenders and cause them to blurt out their crimes. In other parts dogs are the animals used; they are held to go out in spirit form; the body may even die in the absence of the vivifying principle; if so, the spirit enters the body of the owner of the dog, who is then more powerful than ever as a magician. Belief in the possession of wizards being so widely found, it is probable that the statement of the Prince of Wied (*Reise*, ii. 190), that many American Indians believe they have an animal in their bodies, refers to possession by the medicine animal. There are, however, traces of a similar belief in Australia with regard to totems.

33. *POWER OVER ANIMALS, ETC.* — Magical powers over the totem are frequently claimed by the kin in Australia, and occasionally in other parts of the world. Mimetic dances (see above) are held to give the same control. The eating of the flesh of an animal is believed to give power to cure diseases, which are often known by the name of that animal. Wizards and others sometimes claim immunity from the bite of serpents, etc.; in some cases this is said to be the result of inoculation at initiation. See also 'Familiar,' 'Nagual.'

34. *SACRIFICE.*—An account of the origin, function, and theories, savage and civilized, of sacrifice will be found in the article on that subject. It will suffice here to enumerate the various explanations, real or assumed. (1) The commonest view is that the animal is a gift or tribute to a god, a mark of homage or of self-denial. (2) From the facts of totemism the theory has been developed (Robertson Smith) that the animal killed is really the god; the object of the sacrifice, and especially of the following ritual meal, is to re-establish or strengthen the tie between the god and his worshippers. (3) It is in fact found that a savage will kill and eat the animal god of his enemy (*Miss. Reg.* 1822, 254); this may be explained on the same principle—the bond established by the ritual meal prevents retaliation, for an alliance has been entered into, unwillingly but none the less effectively. (4) Starting from the conception of the slain god (2), it has been surmised (Frazer) that the killing of the sacred animal, no less than of the god, has for its object the preservation of the Divine life, conceived as something apart from the living animal, from the pains and penalties of old age, and from the weakness to which they would reduce the being on whose strength the preservation of the people, or the growth of the crops, or some other important fact, depends. (5) From (2) follows also the magical totem-sacrifice, found as a totem rite in full activity only in Central Australia, by which the multiplication of the animal is promoted and the species at the same time desacralized for men other than the totem kin. Desacralization seems to have been also one of the purposes of the sacrifice of the corn-spirit, although here the object may have been primarily sacralization of the participants. (6) One means of the expulsion of evils is the scapegoat (see 'Scapegoat'); the purificatory sacrifice attains the same object by killing the animal, perhaps by disseminating the *mana* of the sacred animal, and thus counteracting hurtful influences. (7) Corresponding to (6) we have the magical sacrifice intended to produce direct benefits; the animal representative of the corn-spirit is killed and its blood sprinkled, or its bones mixed with the seed as a means of increasing fertility. (8) The burial sacrifice is intended to provide the dead with means (*a*) of subsistence in the other world, (*b*) of guidance to the other world, (*c*) of proving his earthly status in the other world, etc., or to purify the living from the dangers of mourners. (9) The deificatory sacrifice provides (*a*) the individual with his *nagual* or individual tutelary spirit; (*b*) a building with a protecting spirit; (*c*) a frontier with a guardian spirit, etc. (10) We have, further, the inspirational sacrifice, where the priest drinks the blood of a victim in order to procure obsession by his god. (11) In the messenger sacrifice, an animal is killed that it may go as an envoy to the dead (see 'Bear,' 'Turtle,' etc.). The simple food sacrifice must of course be distinguished from this. (12) A common ætiological explanation among the ancients was that an animal was killed because it was the enemy of the god or had in some way injured him.

Various forms of sacrifice are found. The victim may be slaughtered, burnt, thrown over a precipice or from a height, immured or buried; to these modes may be added the setting free of the bird or animal (see 'Scapegoat'). The skin of the victim may be put on an idol, used for a sacred cloak, hung upon a tree, etc. The flesh is frequently eaten; or part may be eaten and part burnt or buried. Special care is frequently taken of the bones. The priest sometimes arrays himself in the skin or mask of the animal to be sacrificed; if the sacrifice is that of the animal-god, the priest thereby assimilates himself to his god, and by putting on the Divine character sanctifies himself for his task. In any case, the donning of the skin and mask may be regarded as a rite of sacralization, fitting the human being for contact with divine things. Not only so, but the priest is actually called by the name of an animal. The worshippers of Ephesian Artemis were 'king bees,' the priestesses of Demeter, Proserpine, and the Great Mother, and possibly those of Delphi, were 'bees'; those of Dodona were 'doves'; youths at the Ephesian festival of Poseidon were 'bulls'; the girls at the Brauronian festival were 'bears' (Frazer, *Paus.* iv. 223). In Laconia the priests of Demeter and Kore were πῶλοι (de Visser, *Götter*. p. 198).

In this connexion may be noticed some facts connected with the game of 'Blind Man's Buff.' All over Europe the game is known by the names of animals [*Folklore*, xi. 261; to the names there given add cuckoo (*Rev. des Trad. Pop.* iii. 345), hoopoe (Maspons y Labros, *Jocks*, p. 45), sheep (Rolland, *Rimes*, p. 154), wryneck (Fagot, *Folklore*, p. 84); the name 'blind fly' is also found in India]. The players in the Middle Ages wore masks, as may be seen in Strutt's *Sports and Pastimes*, and we may certainly infer that they wore the mask of the animal by whose name the game was known. The significance of these facts is seen when we discover that the procedure in the game of 'Blind Man's Buff' is precisely that of many popular customs, in which cocks, cats, etc., are killed (*Folklore*, xi. 251 ff.). It cannot, however, be assumed that the game is a mere imitation of rituals in which animals are sacrificed, for it was not by children only that it was played or performed in the Middle Ages. In this connexion it should not be overlooked that in Sierra Leone the leopard society don leopard skins when they seize a human victim for sacrifice (Kingsley, *Travels*, p. 587). In this case, however, the human victim may have taken the place of a leopard; the leopard hunters of the Gold Coast likewise dress like leopards and imitate their actions when they have killed one (see 'Leopard').

As to the priority of human or animal sacrifices, no general law can be laid down. On the one hand, we find in Central Australia the ritual eating of the totem, and this is certainly not derived from any antecedent human sacrifice. On the

other hand, we find, also in Australia, a ceremony of child sacrifice in connexion with the initiation of the magician, where the priority of animal sacrifice is in the highest degree improbable. In America the ritual killing of the medicine animal (see 'Nagual'), as the central feature of the initiation rite, cannot be regarded as anything but primitive. But the human sacrifices of Mexico seem to be secondary in their nature, due, possibly, to a scarcity of domestic animals. How far the agricultural sacrifice of a girl among the Pawnees can be regarded as primitive it is difficult to say; the idea of the animal corn-spirit was certainly known to them, and the influence of cannibalism may have determined a transition from animal to human sacrifice, if indeed it did not at the outset bring about a practice of human sacrifice. Where, as in Africa and the East Indies, the sacrifice is frequently of the character of an offering to a dead man, we have no reason to argue that one form preceded the other. At the same time we cannot affirm that these sacrifices were the original form in those regions. The question is in most cases insoluble.

35. *SCAPEGOAT.* — Diseases and evil influences are commonly conceived by savage and barbarous peoples as persons, often as spirits; and as a logical consequence they hold that it is possible by suitable means to expel or otherwise render innoxious all the ills with which they are from time to time afflicted. One method of doing so is to cause them to enter the body of an animal, or sometimes, where the personal form of the evil influences is less emphasized, to load them upon the animal, and drive it from the neighbourhood of human habitations. In India the scape-animal may be a pig (as for Sītalā, the smallpox goddess), a goat or buffalo (for cholera in Berar), or a cock (for cholera among the Pataris, and, in light epidemics, in Berar); and it is noteworthy that the buffalo, goat, or cock must be black (as the vehicle of Yama, the god of death). In many cases, moreover, the scape-animal becomes an actual sacrifice, as among the Hill Bhotiyas, where once a year, in honour of the village god, a dog is intoxicated with bhang and spirits, and then beaten and stoned to death, so that no disease or misfortune may visit the village during the year (Crooke, i. 141 f., 166 f., 169–174).

When the Piaroas of the Orinoco build a new hut, they believe that it is occupied by an evil spirit who must be dislodged before it is possible for them to take possession of their new abode. They capture some bird, by preference a toucan, alive, wrap it up in banana leaves, and place it across the threshold, so as to prevent the spirit from escaping. The men of the family dance, gesticulate, and menace the evil spirit, which at last endeavours to leave the hut; it cannot pass over the body of the toucan, and is compelled to enter it. The bird, terrified by the noise and confusion, struggles within its covering of banana leaves; its movements are observed by an old woman; at the proper moment she sets it free and herself flees at full speed into the forest. The bird makes use of its recovered liberty and carries away the evil spirit (*Tour du Monde*, 1888, ii. 348; for similar customs see *GB*[2] iii. 102 ff.).

Sometimes it is held sufficient to make images of animals instead of using living animals; in Old Calabar the expulsion of ghosts or devils is called *ndok*; rude images of crocodiles, leopards, etc., called *nabikom*, are placed in the street, and guns fired to frighten the spirits into the images, which are then thrown into the river (Goldie, *Calabar*, p. 49; Hutchinson, *Impressions*, p. 162). Sometimes the scapegoat is a divine animal; the people of Malabar share the Hindu reverence for the cow, but the priests are said to have transferred the sins of the people into one or more cows, which then carried them away to whatever place was appointed by the Brāhman (*Golden Bough*[2], iii. 111).

There is a European custom of hunting the wren and other animals, usually in the winter season, and especially about Christmas, at which time the expulsion of evils among peoples of lower culture usually takes place. The wren and other animals which figure in these customs are sometimes simply set free (Rolland, *op. cit.* ii. 297; *Volkskunde*, vi. 155, etc.). It is not improbable that one of the ideas at the bottom of the practice is the expulsion of evils (*FL* xvii. 258 f.). It should be observed that a frequent feature of these popular customs is a procession in which the wren or other animal is carried round the village or town. A similar practice prevailed in Dahomey (*Miss. Cath.* 1868, 107), where every three years the serpent god Danbe was carried round in a hammock, his bearers killing dogs, pigs, and fowls on their way; this ceremony they explained as intended to rid the community of its ills and diseases. In the hunting of the wren and similar customs the striking at the animal with sticks, etc., is a prominent feature; this appears to be the method by which the sins and evils of the community are put away. In Bombay the Mhars celebrate the Dusserah festival, at which a young buffalo is set free and pursued, each of his pursuers striking him with his hand or some weapon. The effect of this ceremony is held to be to make the animal the bearer of the sins of every person who touches him (*Globus*, xvii. 24).

36. *SKULL, GABLE-HEADS.*—Reaching back to classical times, and in the present day extending far beyond European limits, is the custom of hanging up the skulls of slain animals, or sometimes their jawbones. The head is often regarded as the seat of the soul, and in the East Indies this is the reason given for preserving the jawbone; probably the Eskimo custom of preserving the heads of seals has a similar idea at its base. More commonly the head is put up in a field or a vineyard as a talisman to keep off evil influences; in the same way, after a head-hunting expedition, the head of a buceros (see below) is put up as a defence. American farmers frequently fasten the skulls of horses or cattle to barns and other outhouses, although the object is now merely decorative. Arising out of this use of the skull, which had its counterpart in Europe, we find the practice of carving horses' and other heads on the gables (*Folklore*, xi. 322, etc.), but here again their magical significance seems to have been lost. In the Middle Ages the Wends put up a skull when there was a plague among the cattle, but in modern days the practice is rather to bury it; from the stories of the revival of the disease when the skull is dug up, it is clear that the idea now is that the plague is buried; the same idea is found in India. The skull is sometimes important in ritual (see 'Bison').

37. *TABU.*—Respect for totems or other sacrosanct animals may be shown positively or negatively. The system of prohibitions by which respect is shown negatively is commonly called *tabu*. It is very generally forbidden to kill the animal (**Frazer**, *Tot.* p. 9; *Folklore*, xi. 239–242; and below, *pass.*). It may not be eaten, even if killed by another person; or in some cases even touched, save sometimes for the taking of an oath. In South Africa it is held to be unlucky to see the *siboko* (tabued animal), and in many cases there is an objection to using the ordinary name of an animal. Sometimes it is forbidden to imitate the voice of an animal or bird; it is often accounted unlucky to keep it in or near the house. The eggs of birds may not be taken, and there is a strong objection to the use of the feathers of certain birds in making feather beds.

The penalties for violation of these tabus, which are, of course, seldom found exemplified completely in any one area or in the case of a single animal, are varied. It is a common belief in England that the harrying of a robin's nest is punished by an accident to the offender, usually the breaking of a bone. Of other birds it is said that he who kills them is killing father or mother. Sometimes an injury done to a sacrosanct animal is believed to be followed by ill-luck or sickness in the family or among the cattle. In the Congo area it is thought that the women of the kin will miscarry or give birth to animals of the totem species, or die of

some dreadful disease, if a totem animal is eaten. Leprosy, madness, death by lightning, and various diseases are among other penalties for disrespect to sacred animals. In Samoa the sacred animal was thought to take up its abode in the man who broke the tabu protecting it, and thus kill him; a 'man of the turtle' would not object to helping a friend to cut up a turtle, but would take the precaution of tying a bandage over his mouth, lest an embryo turtle should slip down his throat and cause his death.

No sharp distinction can be drawn between sacred and unclean animals. The mere fact that an animal is the subject of tabus is indecisive.

Name-tabu.—It by no means follows that all tabus are an indication of respect for the animal whose name is avoided. In the case of dangerous or destructive animals the use of their name may have the result of summoning them, just as the use of the name of a dead man calls him. Various words are forbidden among fishermen; but it may be that it is unlucky for seafaring folk to mention things connected with the land, just as the Eskimos think that land and sea animals must be kept apart in cooking. Or it may be that the naming of an animal or fish will warn it that it is being pursued. Or the words may be, for some reason, of ill omen. See TABU.

38. *TATU, PAINT, KELOIDS, DEFORMATIONS.*—In America and New Guinea totem kins frequently bear their totem tatued on their bodies (Frazer, *Tot.* p. 28). In South Africa (*ib.* p. 2) teeth are knocked out in order that a resemblance to oxen may be produced. In British Columbia the totem is painted upon the face (*Globus*, lxxiv. 194). In South America some of the tribes of Brazil tatu their faces so as to resemble birds (Spix and Martius, *Travels*, p. 1027), which they respect and mourn for when they die, and into which they believe that they pass at death (von den Steinen, *Naturvölkern*, p. 512). The Californian Indians burned their *naguals* into their flesh, just as the Indians of Canada tatued theirs (Frazer, p. 55). In Africa some of the tribal marks, probably in raised pattern, are intended to make the wearer resemble a lion or a panther (*Tour du Monde*, 1891, i. 63). Some Hindu tatu marks, which are, for the most part, restricted to women, are intended to represent animals, but they are selected merely according to the desire of the person to be tatued, and, though perhaps originally totemistic, are now regarded simply as ornamental (Crooke, ii. 30–33). The totem mark in America and the tribal mark in Africa are sometimes emblazoned on the property of the totem kin or of the tribe (Frazer, *op. cit.* p. 30; *Tour du Monde, loc. cit.*). In Australia the tribes of the Upper Darling are said to carve their totems on their shields (Frazer, p. 30). The wizard frequently has animals carved on his wand or painted on his dress.

39. *TONGUE.*—Hunters frequently cut out the tongues of slain animals, and the tongues are eaten as sacred food. In folk-tales the test of the tongues is a frequent means of deciding between two claimants. The tongue of the sacrificial victim is important, and in Bohemia fox's tongue is held to confer the gift of eloquence. In N.W. America the shamans wear otter and eagle tongues round their necks as a means of acquiring supernatural knowledge. In particular, an otter's tongue is held to confer a knowledge of the language of all inanimate objects, all birds, beasts, and living creatures (*Golden Bough*², ii. 421, 422; cf. Krause, *Die Tlinkit Indianer*, p. 284). The shamanistic rattles contain the tongue *motif* carved on them as a rule in this part of America, and similar figures have been found in the Pacific (*Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn.* 1881–1882, pp. 111–112). Tongue masks are recorded in New Zealand (Parkinson, *Journal*, pp. 98, 128; see also Frobenius, *Weltansch.* p. 199).

40. *TOTEMISM.*—Under ordinary circumstances, totemism is a relation between a group of human beings and a species of animals, characterized by three main features: (1) the assumption by the totem kin of the name of the animal; (2) the prohibition of the intermarriage of persons of the same totem name; (3) respect paid by every member of the totem kin to the totem animal. Each of these features is liable to deformation; we find totem kins which respect an animal other than their eponymous one; kin exogamy becomes local exogamy or disappears altogether; the totem animal is eaten ritually or otherwise. Other features of totemism are present only occasionally, and their absence in no way invalidates the totemic character of the relation. More especially in America the connexion between the kin and the animal is explained as one of descent, the animal sometimes having united itself to a human being, sometimes having transformed itself into the ancestors of the kin by a gradual process, and so on. But it must not be supposed that totemism exists or has existed wherever we find a myth of descent from an animal (see 'Myths of Ancestors' above). More especially in Australia the totem is held to aid his kinsmen by omens or in other ways. Conversely, in Central Australia, the kin perform magical rites to promote the increase of the totem species; traces of magical influence over the totem are found elsewhere; but it does not seem legitimate to assume that all cases of magical influence of this sort are totemic in origin. Sometimes the kin indicate their totem by tatuing or other marks, sometimes by deformations, or by the mode of wearing the hair, or by their dress.

In determining the totem of a child, kinship is usually reckoned through the mother. On the other hand, the usual course at marriage is for the female to remove to the husband's house or district. The result of this is that the kins in any area are (1) intermingled, and (2) continually changing. Where the parent from whom the child takes its totem continues to reside in his or her own district, the tendency is for the totem kins to become localized. The result of this is that certain animals are respected in certain districts; in this way perhaps originated the local cults of Egypt. Tribal respect for the totem of the chief, and ancestor-worship are also paths by which totemism may have been transformed.

Totemistic tabus do not differ markedly in form from those connected with other sacred animals; they may therefore be dealt with together in this article (see 'Tabu' above).

Sex totems.—A peculiar relation exists in Australia between the two sexes and two species of animals which might better be termed 'animal brothers and sisters.' It is found from South Australia as far as Brisbane, and the animals thus related to the men and women are lizards, owls, bats, emu-wrens, superb warblers, and goatsuckers. Although the life of a man or woman is believed to be bound up with the life of one of these animals, and although they are in consequence jealously protected by the sex to which they belong, as a preliminary to marriage it is the custom among the Kurnais for one of the 'animal relatives' to be killed by the opposite sex (*Golden Bough*², iii. 414–416).

41. *VEGETATION.*—In the ancient world a number of minor deities, especially connected with vegetation, were believed to possess animal or semi-animal form. Not only were the bull and goat closely associated with Dionysus, but Pan, the Satyrs, and the Fauns are especially associated with goats (see below). The only explanation hitherto sug-

gested of this connexion is that the goat naturally wanders in the forest and browses off the tender shoots of trees, so that the animal which so boldly appropriates the property of the tree-spirit can be none other than that spirit in bodily form. Frazer has explained the ceremonies performed at various periods in the spring as intended in part to promote the growth of vegetation by killing the old, and therefore weak, spirit of the previous year, replacing him by a more youthful and vigorous representative. Many of these ceremonies are performed during the Carnival or at Mid-Lent; among the animals which appear at that period are the bear (in effigy), the ox, the goat, the wolf, etc. But these ceremonies seem to have had another purpose too, — that of the expulsion of evils,—so that we cannot identify all the animals that so appear with the spirit of vegetation. In the same way various animals (the squirrel, fox, cat, etc.) are thrown into the bonfires at Easter or other periods of the year, — Frazer says as sun-charms. It is hardly legitimate to regard these as so many representatives of the spirit of vegetation. In China the spirits are bull-shaped (de Groot, *Rel. Syst.* iv. 279).

42. *WATER.* — In Greece, Poseidon and river gods generally seem to have been conceived under the form of bulls (*JHS* xiv. 126, 129). The festival of Poseidon was called *Tauria*, and his priests were termed 'bulls' (de Visser, *Götter*, pp. 41, 193). In the north of Europe, on the other hand, the horse seems to have been considered a more appropriate form for the god of water (see 'Horse'; cf. *Folklore*, v. 116). In South Africa and Australia the form attributed to water-monsters is that of the serpent (see below). In India and Eastern Asia the conception of a dragon replaces that of a serpent; we find traces of the same idea in Europe in the story of Perseus and its many variants. See also 'Dragon,' 'Serpent.'

43. *WER-WOLF.*—The belief in wer-wolves is connected, on the one hand, with the pathological condition known as lycanthropy, in which the sufferer believes himself turned into an animal; on the other, with the belief in *nagualism* (see above), familiars and tutelary spirits which serve the human beings who can secure their services. Corresponding to these two sources of the belief, there are two different forms of it. In the first place, the man is conceived to put off his own form and assume that of the animal—in Europe most commonly the wolf, as the last dangerous animal to be exterminated or to survive in the west and south. This transformation may be temporary or permanent, may be due to eating human flesh, to the sins of the transformee, or to some magical procedure such as the drawing on of a wolf's skin, or to contagion, such as eating food left by another wer-wolf. In the second place, it may be simply the spirit of the wer-man which undergoes the change, his body being left torpid at home; or, according to another form of the belief, the wer-animal is simply his servant, and the man himself goes on with his ordinary occupations while it is on the prowl; his life, however, depends on its security.

In Europe the wer-wolf is supposed to fall upon his victim like ordinary wolves. In the East Indies the procedure of the wer-animal is more complicated. He attacks solitary individuals, who forthwith become drowsy. Thereupon the wer-man assumes his own form, cuts up his victim, eats his liver, and puts the body together again. There are various signs by which a wer-wolf can be recognized, and ordeals are prescribed for discovering it. The wer-wolf is, as a rule, in the form of a living man; but sometimes the dead are believed to return in animal form (see 'Soul-animal' above) and practise the same arts as wer-wolves proper. A method of burial is prescribed in Celebes for preventing the revival of the dead wer-man. The wer-wolf as form of the dead is closely connected, if not identical, with the vampire in some of its forms. See also 'Nagual,' 'Totemism' above. See LYCANTHROPY.

44. *PARTICULAR ANIMALS.* — **Ant.** — We learn from Greek writers that ants were worshipped in Thessaly; the Myrmidons revered them and claimed descent from them (de Visser, *Götter*, p. 157; Lang, *Myth*, ii. 197). In Dahomey and Porto Novo, ants are regarded as the messengers of the serpent-god Danbe (*Miss. Cath.* 1884, 232). In Jabim, New Guinea, it is believed that a second death after the first is possible, in which case the soul becomes an ant (*Nachr. K. Wilhelmsland*, 1897, 92). We find in Cornwall the belief that ants are the souls of unbaptized children (*FLJ* v. 182). In France it is held that it brings ill-luck to destroy an ant's nest (Rolland, *Faune*, iv. 279). The ant is fed by Hindus and Jains on certain days, and is regarded as associated with the souls of the blessed dead (Crooke, ii. 256).

In South America and California one mode of initiation was to allow the boy or girl to be stung by ants (*Golden Bough*[2], iii. 215); it is said to make them brisk and impart strength. The Piojes submit to it in order to acquire skill with the blow-tube (*JAI* viii. 221). The Athapascan Dog-Ribs believed that the gift of prophecy was acquired by secretly putting an ant under the skin of the hand (Franklin, *Second Expedition*, p. 291). On the other hand, the Aruntas hold that a medicine man must not go near the nest of the bull-dog ant; for if he were bitten, he would lose his power for ever (Spencer and Gillen, *Nat. Tr.* p. 525). In Bulgaria and Switzerland, ants are regarded as of bad omen (Strausz, *Bulgaren*, p. 298; *Schw. Arch.* ii. 216). The Esthonians regard them as of good omen (*Gel. Ehst. Ges. Schriften*, No. 2, p. 28); and for the Huculs red ants are lucky, black unlucky (Kaindl, p. 105).

Not only the ant but also the ant-hill is the object of superstitious observances. The Juangs take an oath on an ant-hill, and the Kharrias use it as an altar (*Miss. Cath.* 1897, 369, 380). At Poona a dance round an ant-hill is part of a religious ceremony (*Bombay Gaz.* XVIII. i. 293). In West Africa, ants' nests are regarded by the Susus as the residence of demons (Winterbottom, *Sierra L.* i. 222). Elsewhere they are brought into connexion with the souls of dead chiefs (Bastian, *Bilder*, p. 181). In South Africa the bodies of children are buried in ant-hills that have been excavated by ant-eaters (*Account of Cape of Good Hope*, 143). In the Sudan it is believed that a hyæna-man assumes his animal form at an ant's nest (*Globus*, xlii. 157). For myths and folk-tales of the ant see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 44 ff.

Ass.—The Romans believed that the Jews worshipped the ass (Tac. *Ann.* v. iii. 4; Diodor. iv. 148; cf. Reinach, *Cultes*, i. 342; Krauss, in *JE* ii. 222–224). In Greece at the present day the *pagania* are believed to have asses' heads; the people believe them to be Jews who worshipped the ass (Pouqueville, *Voyage*, ii. 415; cf. Tsuntas, Ἐφ. Ἀρχ. 1887, p. 160, pl. x.). At Frickhausen in Württemberg the peasants are said to keep a wooden ass in a cellar as the tutelary deity of the village (Mannhardt, *Germ. Mythen*, p. 411). In explanation of the poverty of Silesian vineyards, it is said that the ancient Silesians ate the ass on which Silenus rode (Sinapius, *Olsnographia*, i. 342, 3). Typhon was represented with an ass's head, and the inhabitants of Coptos threw an ass down a precipice as his representative (Plut

de Is. et Os. 30). The Armenians sacrifice an ass at the grave of the ancestors of a person against whom they have a claim, in the belief that if their claim is not satisfied, the soul of such ancestors will pass into an ass (Haxthausen, *Transkaukasia*, ii. 21). In parts of Germany, children are said to come from the ass's pond (Mannhardt, *Germ. Mythen*, p. 411). At Erfurt it is the custom to sell earthenware images in the shape of donkeys at an annual fair (*ib.* p. 414). In Moldavia, Calabria, and Portugal, an ass's head is a means of averting evil or the influence of the evil eye from the fields or orchards (Rolland, *Faune*, iv. 191; Trede, *Heidenthum*, p. 210; *Mélusine*, viii. 14). Near Meiningen the last stroke of the reaper was said to kill the oats, barley, or lentil ass, just as in other parts other animals are regarded as incarnations of the corn-spirit (Haupt's *Zeitschr. f. D. Altertum*, iii. 360 ff.).

Prominent among mediæval festivals was the *fête des ânes* or *festa asinaria* (Chambers, *Medieval Stage*, i. 282, 306, 331 ff.; *Zts. des Alpenvereins*, xxviii. 135–154), and there are traces of the performers wearing ass masks (Chambers, *op. cit.* p. 332). It seems probable that in spite of its ecclesiastical associations it was simply a popular festival of the same nature as the 'white horse' (*Rev. Hist. Rel.* xxxviii. 334) and other customs, the existence of which far back in the Middle Ages is well attested by ecclesiastical fulminations. In the present case the association of the ass with Palm Sunday made it possible for the Church to throw a veneer of religion over the pagan rite. In Augsburg in the 16th century a wooden ass was drawn through the streets; palms were thrown down before it; a priest prostrated himself and was beaten by another priest; and the first palm to be caught up was used in magical ceremonies (*Germania*, xvii. 81). Many of these celebrations are kept up unofficially at the present day at various times in the spring — Mid-Lent, Palm Sunday, Easter, Whitsuntide (*Tradition*, vi. 197, 226; *Bavaria*, II. i. 163; Reinsberg-Düringsfeld, *Festl. Jahr, pass.*; *Zts. f. Volksk.* iii. 307, iv. 33). The ass also appears in connexion with St. Nicholas on Dec. 6th, and in Zug children on this day carry round a wooden ass's head (*Schw. Archiv*, i. 64). In Grisons the ass of St. Nicholas is said to carry off the children and throw them down a precipice (*ib.* ii. 167). On the Thursday before Christmas the *Posterlijagd* is held at Entlebuch; people from other villages arrive, and one of them represents Posterli, sometimes in the shape of an ass. The image is left in a corner of the village (Stalder, *Schweizer. Idiotikon*, i. 208). For myths of the ass, its supposed phallic meaning, and folk-tales relating to it, see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 359–399. The story of Midas is also discussed by Ciszewski, *Bajka o Midasowych uszach.*

Basilisk.—Accounts of the basilisk (βασιλίσκος), a king of the serpents, have come down from Pliny (XXIX. xix.) and Heliodorus (*Æthiopica*, iii. 8). It was believed to be a small serpent with a cock's head; its look was fatal. In mediæval and modern Europe the basilisk or cockatrice is supposed to be hatched from the egg of a seven-year-old cock or from the hundredth egg of a hen (*Mélusine*, v. 18–22). On the other hand, the first egg of a black hen is held in Bohemia to be the dangerous one; there is, however, another belief, according to which it produces the *šotek*, or demon of good luck (Grohmann, *Abergl.*, Nos. 77, 543, 544).

Bat.—Among the Cakchiquels the chief god, Chamalcan, took the form of a bat (Bancroft, iii. 484). A sacred bat figures in a Queensland myth; the first man and woman were told not to approach it, but the woman disobeyed and the bat flew away; after that death came into the world; the form of the myth, however, suggests Christian influence (Ballou, *Under the Southern Cross*, p. 141). Among the Bongos, bats are called by the same generic term as witches and spirits—*bitabok* (Schweinfurth, *Heart of Africa*, i. 144). In West Africa an island on the Ivory Coast is peopled with huge bats, which are regarded as the souls of the dead, and are sacrosanct for that reason (*Golden Bough*[2], ii. 431). The Bantus of Natal will not touch a bat (Fleming, *Southern Africa*, p. 265). In Tonga, bats are sacred, probably as the abode of the souls of the dead (Bässler, *Südseebilder*, p. 318). No native in Victoria will kill or eat them for this reason (Parker, *Aborigines*, p. 25), and the Adjahdurahs also respect them (*R. G. S. Aust., S. Aust. Br.* II. iii. 17). They are respected in Bosnia (*Wiss. Mitt.* iv. 471) and parts of Shropshire (Burne, *Shrop. Folkl.* p. 214), but in other places they are killed. In Kusaie, or Strong Island, bat flesh is tabu to men (Hernsheim, *Südsee*, p. 49). Among various Victorian tribes the bat is a 'sex totem,' better termed a 'man's brother' (Frazer, *Tot.* p. 52). In China the bat is the emblem of the four desirable things (*Miss. Cath.* 1899, 359). In Poland it is of good omen before sunset (*Tradition*, viii. 138). It is considered lucky in Sarajevo for one to come into the house (*Wiss. Mitt.* iv. 441). On the other hand, it is usually considered of bad omen (Wiedemann, *Ehsten*, p. 451; Strackerjan, p. 24, etc.), and in Salzburg it is believed to bring death into the house (MS note). In Sicily the bat is regarded as a form of the devil, and a verse is sung to it; when it is caught it is killed by fire or nailed up with outspread wings (de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 203). For the song, compare Ledieu, *Monogr. d'un Bourg picard*, p. 41. The custom of nailing up bats is common (Sébillot, *Trad. de la H. Bret*, p. 94; Trede, *Heidenthum*, ii. 249; Böcler-Kreutzwald, p. 143). A bat's heart is believed to bring luck at cards (Köhler, *Volksbrauch*, p. 417).

Bear.—Although the bear is an object of fear and respect to most of the uncultured races who are acquainted with it, there is but little to say of it so far as mythology is concerned. In a few cases we find a myth of descent from the bear; the Modocs of California believe that they are sprung from the union of a daughter of the Great Spirit, who was blown down Mount Shasta, with a grizzly bear; before this bears were like men, but the Great Spirit then made them quadrupeds. As a mark of respect they never mention the bear by name; if an Indian is killed by a bear, he is buried on the spot, and all who pass by the spot for years afterwards cast a stone upon the place (Miller, *Life among the Modocs*, p. 242). Some of the totem kins of the Amerinds trace their origin to bears (Dwight, *Travels*, iv. 184; Schoolcraft, *Ind. Tr.* iii. 268). In Europe, as well as in Syria and in Dardistan, stories are or have been told of girls who are abducted by bears and produce sometimes human, sometimes half-human, offspring (Rolland, *Faune pop.* i. 53; Twysden, *Hist. Angl. Scr.* x. 945; Leitner, *Languages and Races of Dardistan*, iii. 12; MacCulloch, 270 f.). The Crees tell a similar story, but here the offspring are bears which are later transformed into men (Petitot, *Traditions*, p. 460). The Malays tell of the bear a story of the Gelert type (*JRAS, S.B.*, No. 7, p. 23).

As a useful and at the same time dangerous animal, the bear receives in many parts of the world a tribute of respect during its lifetime, which is often manifested by a disinclination to pronounce its name (see below, 'Name tabu'). It is, however, but seldom that it receives actual worship before it has been laid low. In Japan there is a tradition of a white bear-god which lives in an inaccessible

mountain (*Mitt. d. Ges. N.V. Ostasiens*, xlix. p. 431). Among the Tatars the earth spirits take the form of bears among other animals, and on this account they are accorded increased respect (Castrén, *Vorlesungen*, p. 230), but there is nothing to show that they receive actual worship. One authority says that the Ostiaks worship the image of a bear (Ides, *Travels*, p. 29); and in India the bear is believed to scare away disease, so that ailing children are made to ride on the backs of tame animals of this species (Crooke, ii. 242).

Name-tabu.—Some animals are not called by their ordinary names for fear of summoning them, but in the case of the bear the use of special terms seems to arise from a fear of offending it and a desire to do it honour. In Sweden it is called 'grandfather,' by the Esthonians 'broadfoot'; analogous to this case, though with a difference of usage, is the Ottawa practice of terming the bear kin 'broad feet.' The Finns call the bear 'the apple of the wood,' 'beautiful honey paw,' etc. (*Golden Bough*[3], i. 455; see also *ARW* ii. 332; Kaindl, *Huzulen*, 103). The Yocuts never express enmity to the bear, lest he should hear and take vengeance (*FLJ* v. 73).

Far more marked is the respect paid to the dead bear. Indeed, more than one observer has asserted of some of the East Asiatic peoples that the bear is their chief divinity. There can, however, be no doubt that the Ainus and others kill the bear whenever they can, and that its flesh forms their staple food. The subject has been treated at length by Frazer (*Golden Bough*[3], ii. 375 ff.), whose account is here followed, and who explains the custom as an atonement offered to the species, through the medium of single individuals, for the loss it sustains in the slaughter of so many of its members for food.

In preparation for the Ainu festival, a young bear is caught about the end of winter and brought into the village; it is fed until its strength increases and it threatens to escape from its wooden cage; then, in the autumn, the festival is held. The giver of the feast invites all his friends; libations are offered to the bear and various deities; and the women dance round the cage, addressing the animal in terms of endearment. After the men have shot at it with blunt arrows, a number of men put an end to its life by kneeling on it and pressing its neck against a log, the women all the time uttering lamentations behind them. The carcass is set up before certain sacred wands and decorated in various ways. Libations are offered to it, and the women, laying aside all marks of sorrow, dance merrily before it. The animal is next skinned and cut up, and its blood is drunk, so far as is known, by men only. The liver and brain are eaten on the spot, and the remainder of the flesh is divided among those who have been present. The Gilyaks hold a similar festival; but the bear is shot with arrows in this case; at the end of the ceremonies the skull is placed on a tree (*GB*[3] ii. 380). There seems to be a practice of imputing the guilt of the slaughter of the bear to the toad, which has an evil reputation among the Gilyaks (*ib.* p. 383). Before being sacrificed the bear is led round the village, and ceremonies are performed in its honour (*ib.* p. 382).

According to a later account, which is important for our attitude towards the whole of the East Asiatic bear ceremonies, the Gilyaks celebrate a festival for any bear which they kill in hunting, as well as for those they rear; as soon as the ceremony is over, the soul of the animal, which has permitted itself to be killed, goes to the 'Lord of the Mountain,' Pal, accompanied by dogs killed in his honour, and by the souls of gifts of which it is the recipient.

The bear festival proper is instituted in honour of a recently deceased kinsman. It is prepared by the *gens* of the deceased, but forms a general feast of several *gentes*, which are a more important factor in its celebration than the *gens* which provides the festivity. When the time comes to kill the bear, the chief guests are the husbands of the women of the host's kin; they bring with them their sons-in-law, whose duty it is to kill the bear. The guests are called *narch*, and they are entertained by the 'lord of the bear.' Women are excluded from the ceremony of killing the bear, which is preceded by a trial of skill with the bow, in which the *narch* take part as well as the kin of the 'lord of the bear'; it is a point of honour for the latter to shoot badly. The *narch* then settle among themselves who is to give the fatal wound. When the guests have gone, the nearest kinsmen of the dead man proceed to cut up the bear, which is placed in a majestic pose after being killed, its head to the west. Its head is carried off by the women on a sacred sledge, on which are also tobacco, sugar, bow and arrows, etc., gifts to the dead beast, who takes their souls with him. The guests of honour alone partake of the flesh of the bear; their hosts get only bear soup. Before they depart, the *narch* leave several dogs tied near the head of the bear. These are directed to follow their master the bear, and are then killed on the same spot. The flesh of the dogs is consumed by all persons of the kin of the dead man. On the following day the head of the bear is taken to its last resting-place, and then its soul goes to the 'Lord of the Mountain' (*ARW* viii. 260–272).

If the precise meaning of these ceremonies is not apparent, it is at least clear that the cult of dead kinsmen is one of the elements at the present day; it may be noted that the 'kin gods' of the Gilyaks are human beings who have met with a violent death, but whether it is only in honour of such that the festival is held does not appear (*ib.* p. 259). A second element is possibly that of purification (*ib.* p. 273).

On the whole, we must regard the Gilyak ceremony as analogous to the Zuñi turtle-killing—a means of communication with the dead of the tribe.

The Ostiaks, on the other hand, appear to pay equal honour to every bear which they kill; they cut off its head, hang it on a tree, and, surrounding it, pay respect to it; then they run towards the body and lament over it, explaining that it is not they but the Russians who have killed it (Autermony, *Voyage*, ii. 92). As a mark of respect, Samoyeds allow no woman to eat of its flesh (Erman, *Reise*, i. 681). If the Ostiaks show respect to the bear, they also give evidence of very different feelings; its skin is stuffed with hay and spat upon to the accompaniment of songs of triumph (*ib.* 670), but they subsequently set up the figure in a corner of the court and treat it for a time as a tutelary deity (*ib.*). (For songs in honour of the bear see *Beiträge zur Kenntniss*, xxv. 79).

We find a similar custom among the Pottawatomies. The head of the bear is set up and painted with various colours, and all participants in the feast sing songs in its honour (Baumgarten, *Allg. Ges. Am.* ii. 542). Although no special ceremonies are observed by the Kamtchatkans, the killer of a bear is obliged to invite all his friends to partake of the flesh (Krachenninikow, ii. 107). Among the Lapps the bear hunt is the occasion of various ceremonies. When the animal is dead, they beat it with rods and then transport it on a sledge to a hut constructed on purpose; they then go to a hut where their wives await them; the latter chew bark to colour their saliva red, and spit in the faces of the men (probably as a purificatory ceremony).

Continence is observed for three days, and then the flesh is prepared and eaten by men and women separately; the women may not approach the place where the bear is cooked or partake of flesh from the rump (*Voyages et Av. des Emigrés français*, ii. 150). The Montagnais prohibit bear's flesh to women and children (Hind, *Explor.* i. 179); the Ojibwas will not allow dogs to touch a dead bear (*JAI* iii. 111). The Tacullies eat bear's flesh at the feast of the dead (Harmon, *Journ.* 289). The Mohawks offered bear's flesh to Agreskoui when they had met with ill-success in war (Megapolensis, *Beschrijving*, p. 48).

In East Asia an oath by a bear is not uncommon. In some cases the skin or a piece of flesh is brought (Schrenck, i. 408); or an offering of a skin is made (Ides, p. 19), and in case of perjury the animal comes to life; we may take this to mean that they believe the bear will devour the perjurer, for the Samoyeds make a man bite a bear's head, and hold that a bear will devour him if he swears falsely (Billings, i. 228; cf. Latham, *Russian Empire*, p. 124).

There is a European practice, possibly connected with agricultural rites, of dressing a man up as a bear, especially in the winter season, and going with him in procession (Mannhardt, *Ant. W. u. Feldculte*, 188 ff.; *Zts. Ver. Volks.* vi. 429). The custom is especially prevalent in the Lausitz, a Wendish area (MS notes). In Poland the 'bear' is thrown into the water (Kolberg, *Poznanskie*, i. 134, 136, 139, ii. 350).

The Central Eskimos believe that they can acquire a bear spirit as tutelary deity, or *tornaq*. The would-be *angakok* must travel to the edge of the great ice-floe and summon the bears. When they appear, he falls down at once; and if he falls upon his face, a bear steps forward and asks his will. The man recovers and goes back with the bear (*Ann. Rep. Bur. Eth.* 1884–1885, p. 591).

The bear is especially associated with Berne, the name of which means 'bear,' and the town has kept bears for centuries. The explanation given is that duke Berthold delivered them from a gigantic bear, but this is simply ætiological and probably late; for it is certain that the bear was associated with the town centuries before Berthold. In 1832 a statuette of a goddess, Artio, was discovered in the neighbourhood, which dated from Roman times. Now Artio is certainly connected with Irish *art*, Lat. *ursus*, Gr. ἄρκτος, and means the goddess of the bear or something of that sort. A bear was also discovered among the other statuettes, but was not until later brought into connexion with the goddess, before whom it was standing in the original form of the group (*Rev. Celt.* xxi. 280). See CELTIC RELIGION, § x. 8.

In Greek cult, bears were burnt in honour of Artemis Λαφρία at Patræ (Paus. VII. xviii. 8), and 'bear Artemis' was one of the names by which she was known. There is a good deal of evidence to connect Artemis with a cult of the bear (Farnell, *Cults*, ii. 435). Callisto, in an Arcadian myth, is changed into a bear, and she seems to be only another form of Artemis (Müller, *Proleg.* pp. 73–76), who is also called Καλλίστη. Moreover, at Brauron, Athens, and Munychia, Artemis Βραυρωνία was worshipped (cf. Lang, *Myth*, ii. 212–215) in ceremonies which were perhaps a survival of initiation customs. Young maidens danced in a saffron robe, and, like the priestesses, were called 'bears'; the dance was called ἀρκτεία, and the participants were of ages from five to ten; the celebrations were quinquennial, and no girl might marry before undergoing the rite. There is a trace of a bear sacrifice at Brauron (Farnell, ii. 437), but the animal usually offered was the goat or hind. For folk-tales of the bear see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 109–119. For myths see Bachofen, *Der Bär.*

Bee.—The Tchuwashes of East Russia have a bee-god, and celebrate a bee festival at which they drink beer sweetened with honey (*Globus*, lxiii. 323). The priests of Ephesian Artemis were called 'king bees'; the priestesses of Demeter, Proserpine, and the Great Mother were known as 'bees.' From the fact that the priests of the horse-goddess Demeter were called 'horses,' we may infer that the goddesses in question were bee-goddesses, or that their cult had included a local cult of the bee (Frazer, *Paus.* iv. 223). As a means of attacking or defending cities, bees figure in Quiché and European sagas (Liebrecht, *Zur Volksk.* p. 75). In North Guinea beehives are actually hung at the entrance to a village, but the intention is probably magical (Wilson, *Western Africa*, p. 158). For myths of bees proceeding from the bodies of animals, as in the story of Samson (Jg 14^8), see *Globus*, xxxix. 222. The soul is believed in parts of Europe to take the form of a bee (*ib.* li. 316; Jecklin, *Volksthümliches*, i. 59).

In European folklore the bee is everywhere sacrosanct (*Folklore*, xi. 239), but, as often happens, the first bee may be killed for use in magic (*ib.* p. 254). As ominous animals, bees vary in their signification; in some parts of Wales a swarm entering a house is a bad omen; elsewhere the reverse is the case (*Rev. Hist. Rel.* xxxviii. 308). If they leave their hive it is a death omen (Brand, *Pop. Ant.* ii. 175, 219; Rochholz, i. 148). A swarm on a house means fire (*Globus*, xxvii. 96; Rochholz, *loc. cit.*). The European peasant attributes special intelligence to bees; they suffer no uncleanliness of any sort near them; they should not be sold; the death of a member of the family must be announced to them, and mourning put on their hives (*Globus*, xxxix. 221 f.). At certain times in the year honey should be eaten (*ib.*). For myths and folk-tales of the bee see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 215–223. For the symbolism of bees see Pauly-Wissowa (1894), p. 446 ff.; for myths, p. 448 ff. See ARYANS.

Beetle.—The cult of the scarab was general in Egypt (Budge, *Gods*, ii. 379). At the present day it is feared by the Hottentots, of whom Kolbe says that they sacrifice sheep and oxen to a beetle (Walckenaer, *Hist. Gen.* xv. 372). The beetle is tabu in various parts of Europe (*Folklore*, xi. 239, 242). Killing it is believed to cause rain (Rolland, *Faune*, iii. 324; Napier, *Folklore*, p. 116; MS notes). In East Prussia it is held to be lucky to set a beetle on its feet when it has got 'cast' (MS note; cf. Afzelius, *Sagohäfder*, i. 13). In Schleswig-Holstein its name connects it with Thor (Schiller, *Thier . . . buch*, p. 11). It is sometimes kept in a cage for luck (Napier, *Folklore*, p. 116; Böhme, *Kinderspiel*, p. 424). In Scotland the stag beetle is killed because it is the devil's imp; the black beetle is killed whenever it is found, and a story is told to explain the custom (*Gent.'s Mag.* 1876, ii. 510; cf. Rolland, *Faune*, iii. 327). In Lautenthal, boys put a stag beetle in the ground and strike blindfold at its horns; the one who hits it is the winner and takes the beetle home (Kuhn, *Nordd. Sagen*, p. 377). In the Grafschaft Mark the horns are used for divination (Wöste, p. 56).

The ladybird is often tabu (Grohmann, *Abergl.* No. 1686; Strackerjan, *Abergl.* p. 45). It is said to bring the children (Mannhardt, *Germ. Mythen*, p. 272). It is regarded as of good omen.

The cockchafer is also tabu (*Folklore*, xi. 240). It is greeted in the spring (*Bavaria*, IV. ii. 357), carried in procession (*La Fontaine*, p. 62), and sold in the spring (*Germania*, vii. 435; *FLR* iii. 138; cf. Rolland, *Faune*, iii. 340). It is considered of good omen for one to settle on the hand (*Bavaria*, IV. ii. 402). Children often repeat verses to the ladybird (Ledieu, *Monographie*, p. 40; Rolland, *Faune*, iii. 351–358). In Picardy it is the custom

to kill the ladybird (Ledieu, *loc. cit.*). A beetle is carried for luck (Spiess, *Aberglauben*, p. 417), and used in magic (Heyl, *Volkssagen*, p. 787; Wuttke, *Der Aberglaube, passim*). In the mythology of the Sia the beetle was entrusted with a bag of stars; getting very tired, he peeped in, and they flew out and covered the heavens (*Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn.* 1889–1890, p. 35). For the folklore of the beetle see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 209 ff.

Bison.—One of the Omaha clans traced its descent from a bison, which is said to have been originally under the surface of the water; they believed that they returned to the buffaloes at death (Frazer, *Tot.* pp. 4, 36). Both Iowa and Omaha males dress their hair in imitation of the bison when it is their totem (*ib.* p. 27). A southern tribe, probably the Kwapas, propitiated the dead bison; they adorned its head with swan and bustard down dyed red, and put tobacco in its nostrils and in the cleft of its hoofs. When they had flayed it, they cut out its tongue and replaced it by a piece of tobacco. Two wooden forks were then stuck into the ground and a crosspiece laid upon them, on which were placed pieces of flesh as an offering (*Hist. Coll. Louisiana*, i. 181). Another account says that the Louisiana Indians bewailed the bison before they set out for the chase (Hennepin, *Desc.* p. 80). Possibly the Blackfoot practice of putting a bison skull on an altar is part of a similar propitiation (*Miss. Cath.* 1869, 359).

Many tribes performed mimetic dances in order to increase the supply of bison (Frazer, *Tot.* p. 41; Battey, *A Quaker*, p. 172). The Sioux believed that they could attract the bison by imitating the bark of the coyote (*Tour du Monde*, 1864, i. 54). The Pawnees used to 'dance the bison' for their neighbours; they dressed in war costume and covered their heads with a bison skin with the horns still attached (Perrin du Lac, *Voyage*, p. 334). It does not appear whether this had anything to do with the belief in the bison form of the corn-spirit, but the Creek dance was performed at the time of their Green Corn dance; men, women, and children took an active part in the ceremony, dressing themselves in the scalp of the bison with horns and tail attached; uttering sounds in imitation of the animal, they danced in a circle, their bodies in a half bent position, their weight being supported on two sticks which represented the forelegs of the animal (Stanley, *Portraits*, p. 10). The bison is associated with corn in various ways by the Pawnees (Dorsey, *Traditions of Skidi Pawnee*, pp. 85, 344). For their corn dance preparations are made by killing a bison; this is done by a woman; the pericardium is dried and filled with various kinds of corn. For the dance itself the floor must be as clean as possible; sacred bundles of corn and bison flesh are prepared, and a bison skull and two hoes of bison bone are placed before them; the women dance, holding their hoes, and every one searches for buffalo hairs; if they see any they say, 'Now we are going to be successful in our hunt and in our corn' (Grinnell, *Pawnee Hero Stories*, p. 372). They give the name of 'mother' to the dried skull of a bison cow painted red, which they place at the bottom of the hut on a sort of altar; they think that it has the power of attracting bison. At seed-time the corn is brought to the hut, and the old men bring out little idols and bird skins, and sing all day to obtain a good harvest. Offerings of first-fruits are also made (Du Lac, *Voyage*, p. 270). Probably the same ideas prevailed among other tribes; for we find that the Osages had a myth that corn was given them by four bison bulls (*Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn.* viii. 379; cf. Matthews, *Ethn. of Hidatsa Indians*, p. 12).

Buceros (rhinoceros-bird).—This bird is important in the East Indian area. In Borneo the gables of some of the houses have a buceros in wood; and with this may be connected the fact that when they have taken a head on a head-hunting expedition, a wooden buceros is set up with its beak pointing towards the foe; on the gable it is said to bring luck. In Celebes the priests put the head of a buceros on a magic staff, and it is also believed to attract purchasers to shops on which it is placed. Under the central post of the house it is believed to avert evil from the dwelling. The head-hunter sometimes wears a buceros head on his own, probably for the same reason that one is set up; in Borneo it has become general to wear feathers and carved bills, but the right to do so is restricted to those who have taken a head with their own hands. It figures in the death dance of the Battas; a mimetic dance in Borneo seems to have in the present day no other object than amusement. At a ceremony of peacemaking the Ibans suspend from a wooden buceros a great number of cigarettes, which are taken down and smoked ceremonially by all the men present (*REth* iv. 312 ff.; *JAI* xxxi. 180, 198; *Tijdschr. T.L.V.* xxviii. 517, xxxi. 349).

Buffalo.—Like many other pastoral peoples, the Todas show their domestic animal, the buffalo, a degree of respect which does not fall far short of adoration. As often happens, the flesh of the female is never eaten; once a year a bull calf is killed and eaten by the adult males of the village in the recesses of the wood. It is killed with a club made of a sacred wood; the fire is made of certain kinds of wood, produced by rubbing sticks together (Marshall, *Todas*, p. 129 f.; see also Rivers, *Todas*, p. 274 ff.). In other parts of India the animal serves as a scapegoat in case of cholera (*Golden Bough*², iii. 101). The Mhars of Bombay sacrifice a buffalo at the Dusserah festival; they lead it before the temple of Bhavānī, and the chief strikes it on the neck with a sword; thereupon it is hunted and struck with the hand or with a weapon; in this way it is laden with the sins of those who succeed in touching it. After being driven round the walls, its head is struck off at the gate; a single stroke must suffice if the sacrifice is to be efficacious. Then they fall upon the victim and tear it in pieces; a procession round the walls follows, in which the demons are prayed to receive the offering; pieces of flesh are thrown backwards over the wall for them (*Globus*, xvii. 24). A somewhat similar sacrifice is performed among certain hill-tribes at the festival in honour of Nanda, Krishna's foster-father, and was also celebrated formerly by the Bhumij. The buffalo is frequently sacrificed, moreover, in honour of Durga, the consort of Siva, and in art is the vehicle of Yama, the god of death, the female being regarded as the incarnation of Savitrī, the wife of Brahmā (Crooke, i. 112, ii. 236 f.). The Zulus hold that the souls of the dead pass into the Cape buffalo (Fritsch, *Eingeborene*, p. 139). The Ewe tribes hunter observes tabus when he kills a buffalo (*Mitt. d. Schutzgeb.* v. 156). Among the Ewe tribes, when a buffalo bull has been killed, it is cut up and sold before the hut of the hunter. With an old woman as president, he and older companions partake of a meal in a hut, and the entrails of the buffalo are wound round some of the guests. The successful hunter must remain in his hut for some days, and for nineteen days wear no clothes. He is led by an older man through the villages during this period, and is permitted to capture and take home chickens. He may eat the flesh of warm-blooded animals only, and may eat no pepper, though salt is permitted. This period of tabu is concluded by a general festival, at which a mimetic representation of a hunting scene is given. At the close the

hunter who killed the buffalo is carried home (*Zts. Geog. Ges. Thür.* ix. 19).

Butterfly, moth.—In a Pima myth, the Creator, Chiowotmahke, takes the form of a butterfly, and flies until he finds a place fit for man (Bancroft, iii. 78). Many of the Malagasy trace their descent from a sort of moth, and believe that it was a man who was changed into a moth at death. The Sihanakas believe that the soul has to suffer after death till the body is only a skeleton; if it cannot endure this it becomes a butterfly; the Antimerinas call the soul by the same name as the butterfly (v. Gennep, *Tabou*, p. 292). In Samoa the butterfly was one of the family gods (Frazer, *Tot.* p. 13). Butterflies are tabu in Europe (*Folklore*, xi. 239; Napier, *Folkl.* p. 115). In Bukowina they should not be taken in the hand (*Zts. Oest. Volksk.* ii. 352). In the Vosges, France (Sauvé, *Folklore*, p. 317; Noel du Fail, ed. Asseyrat, i. 112), they should be caught. In Oldenburg the first butterfly should be caught and allowed to fly through the coat sleeve (Strackerjan, *Abergl.* p. 105). In Suffolk, butterflies are 'tenderly entreated,' and white butterflies are fed in the west of Scotland (*Suffolk Folklore*, p. 9; Napier, *Folklore*, p. 115), while at Llanidloes (*Montgom. Coll.* x. 260) the coloured ones are killed; in Scotland it is unlucky to kill or to keep them. Moths are killed in Somerset and Dorset (Rolland, *Faune*, iii. 316), red butterflies in the North of England (*Denham Tr.* ii. 325), the small tortoiseshell in Pitsligo (*FLJ* vii. 43), the first butterfly in Devonshire (Hone, *Tablebook*, p. 339); while in Essex the directions are to catch the first white butterfly, bite off its head, and let it fly away (MS note). The Magyars say that it brings great luck to catch the first butterfly (Jones and Kropf, *Folktales*, xlix.). In Yglau it is put in the gun to make it impossible to miss (*Zts. Oest. Volksk.* iii. 273). Some of the customs point to a scapegoat ceremonial; in other cases there is a belief that butterflies and moths are the souls of the dead (*Arch. Rev.* iii. 226). In Scotland, Friesland, and Bosnia, moths are regarded as witches (Gregor, *Folklore*, p. 147; *Wiss. Mitt.* vii. 315; *Globus*, xxvi. 158). In Germany the butterfly is sometimes said to bring the children (Ploss, *Kind*, i. 12).

There is a curious diversity in the omens given by butterflies. In North Hants three butterflies are a bad omen (*NQ*, 8th ser. iv. 165). In Brunswick a white butterfly seen first means death, a yellow butterfly a birth, and a coloured one a marriage (Andree, *Braunschw. Volksk.* p. 289). Elsewhere a white butterfly means a rainy summer, a dark one thunderstorms, and a yellow one sunshine (*Am Urdsbrunnen*, iv. 16). The Ruthenians hold that a red butterfly in spring means health, and a white one sickness (*Globus*, lxxiii. 245); while for the Bulgarians the dark butterfly announces sickness (Strausz, *Bulgaren*, p. 286).

Cat.—The cat was generally respected in Egypt, and mummified at Thebes; but this is not enough to establish cat-worship proper. In many parts of Europe it is considered unlucky to kill a cat (*Folklore*, xi. 239), and the same belief is found in Africa; the Washambas respect the cat, and believe that if one is killed, some one in the family falls ill; a sheep is led four times round the sick person, and then slaughtered; its head is buried, a living cat is caught, and part of the sheep's heart, covered with honey and fat, is given it to eat; if it will not eat it, the illness is put down to another cause; finally, the cat has a dark neckband put on and is set free (*Mitt. von d. Schutzgebieten*, ix. 313, 325; *Zts. Geog. Ges. Thür.* xi. 108). It has been stated, but incorrectly, that in Egypt a cat is regarded as holy, and that if one is killed, vengeance will sooner or later fall on the person who committed the deed (*PEFSt*, 1901, 267). On the Gold Coast a cat which had been of good omen received offerings; it was also held that the souls of the dead passed into cats (Bosman, *Reise*, p. 444; Müller, *Fetu*, p. 97). At Aix, in Provence, on Corpus Christi the finest tom-cat in the country, wrapped like a child in swaddling clothes, was publicly exhibited in a magnificent shrine (Mills, *History of Crusades*, quoted in *Gent.'s Mag.*, 1832, i. 605).

The cat is one of the animals sacrificed in Europe at various times (*Folklore*, xi. 253; Lund, *Danmark og Norges Historie*, vii. 160, etc.), in some cases by being thrown from a tower (Coremans, *L'Année*, p. 53; *Mitt. des Ver. für Ges. der Deutschen in Boehmen*, x. 347, etc.). In other cases the cat is burnt (Rolland, *Faune*, iv. 114; *Golden Bough*[3], 324; Chesnel, *Dict. Hist.* etc.). The explanation of these customs seems to be that they are survivals of a custom of expelling evils; this interpretation is borne out by the fact that at Wambeck the custom took the form of throwing the cat out of the village on a day known as 'Kat-uit.' In Bohemia they kill it and bury it in the fields sometimes, in order that the evil spirit may not injure the crops (*Volkskunde*, vi. 155; Grohmann, *Aberglaube*, No. 367). Sometimes the cat is associated with marriage ceremonies. In the Eifel district the 'Katzenschlag' follows the marriage by a few weeks; in Creuse a cat is taken to the church and afterwards killed by striking people with it; it is then cooked and given to the newly married couple (Schmidt, *Sitten*, p. 47; Rolland, *Faune*, vi. 102). In Poland, if the man is a widower, a pane is broken in the window and a cat thrown in; the bride follows through the same opening (*Tradition*, v. 346). In Transylvania the farm hands bring a cat in a trough the morning after the wedding and rock it on the cradle before the bride (Haltrich, *Zur Volksk.* p. 290). Probably the idea of getting rid of evils is in part an explanation of these customs, in part a magical rite to promote fertility. In India, on the other hand, the cat, being regarded as an uncanny animal, is respected, and it is a serious offence to kill it (Crooke, ii. 241, 270 f.).

The corn-spirit is sometimes believed to appear in the form of a cat (*Golden Bough*[3], ii. 270). At the Carnival in Hildesheim a cat is fastened in a basket at the top of a fir tree; influence over the fruit harvest is attributed to it (Kehrein, *Volksp.* p. 142). In Sumatra and the East Indies a cat is used in rain charms (*Golden Bough*[3], i. 102; *Tijdschr.* vi. 83). There is a curious conflict of opinion as to the omen to be drawn from the sight of a cat. In Germany, Scotland, the Vosges, etc., a cat, especially a black one, is of bad omen (Gregor, *Folklore*, pp. 123, 125; *ZE* xv. 90; Sauvé, *Folklore*, p. 116). On the other hand, in Hildesheim and other parts of Germany the black cat is held to bring luck (*Niedersachsen*, vi. 61; *Zts. des V. f. Volksk.* x. 209; *Alemannia*, xx. 284; Schreiber, *Taschenbuch*, p. 329). In the United States it is an evil omen for a cat to cross one's path, but good luck to be followed by a black cat, while a strange cat, especially a black one, brings good fortune to the house which it chooses to make its home. For folk-tales of the cat see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 53–66, and for Jewish material Jacobs, in *JE* iii. 613 f.

Cattle.—Among the cults of domesticated animals the most important is that of cattle. The question of the origin of the cult is complicated by the problem of the origin of domestic animals; for if the pastoral peoples who in historical times have respected or worshipped their cattle obtained them from a single centre, where they were originally domesticated, possibly, in part at least, through practices connected with religion (Hahn, *Demeter*

und Baubo, pass.), we cannot base any argument on the attitude of the cattle-keeping tribes of the present day. If, on the other hand, no sanctity attached to cattle when they came to them, the respect—and even love—which these peoples feel for their herds is important as a factor in the evolution of the more definitely religious attitude.

Pastoral peoples, of whom in pre-European days there were many representatives in Africa, commonly live on milk or game (Alberti, *De Kaffers*, p. 37; Fleming, *S. Africa*, p. 280). The Damaras cannot comprehend how any one can live upon meat from such a source; when they have any special feast, the killing of the cattle is almost a sacrificial function, and falls to the lot of the chiefs. In the same way bulls in ancient Egypt were killed only as a piaculum (Herod. ii. 41); and cows, as among the Phœnicians (Porphyry, *de Abstin.* ii. 11), were never eaten on any pretence.

In these cases there is no positive cult, though the cow is recorded to have been sacred to Hathor-Isis. With the male animal it was different. Conspicuous among Egyptian animal cults was that of the bull, and the worship of Apis (Ḥāp) goes back to the earliest times. According to Herodotus (iii. 28), it was the 'calf of a cow incapable of conceiving another offspring; and the Egyptians say that lightning descends upon the cow from heaven'; on the latter point another story was that the god descended on the cow as a ray of moonlight (Wiedemann, *Religion*, p. 188; Plut. *de Is. et Os.* xliii., *Quæst. Sympt.* viii. 1). Various accounts are given of the marks by which it was recognized; Herodotus (*loc. cit.*) says 'it is black, and has a square spot of white on its forehead; on its back a figure of an eagle; in its tail double hair; and on its tongue a beetle.' Pliny, however (viii. 72), says that a white crescent on its right side was the mark, and adds that after a certain age it was drowned in the fountain of the priests. Oxen were sacrificed to Apis, and had to be pure white (Herod. ii. 38). When the old Apis died, a new one was sought; the owner of the herd in which it was found was honoured; the discoverer was rewarded, and the dam of the bull was brought with it and confined in a second sanctuary at Memphis (Wiedemann, *loc. cit.*; Strabo, xvii. 31). Once a year a cow was presented to Apis and then killed (Pliny, viii. 186); others were regarded as concubines and permitted to live (Amm. Marc. xxii. 14. 7; Solinus, *Polyh.* c. 32). Its food consisted of cakes made of flour and honey; a special well was provided for its use. Its birthday was celebrated once a year; when it appeared in public, a crowd of boys attended it. Women were forbidden to approach it save during its four months' education at Nicopolis, when they exposed themselves before it (Diodorus, i. 85).

Oracles were obtained (1) by the behaviour of the bull, (2) by dreams which came to sleepers in the temple, and (3) by the voices of children praying before the temple. Both the living and the dead Apis were connected with Osiris, and its soul formed with Osiris a dual god Asar-Ḥapi (Serapis). The dead bull was carefully mummified and buried in a rock tomb. The cult of Apis was national. Less wide-spread was the cult of Mnevis, also consecrated to Osiris (see Budge, ii. 351 ff.).

At the present day similar observances have been noted on the Upper Nile. The Nuba (=Shilluk and Bonjack) venerate a bull, according to Petherick (*Travels*, ii. 10), usually a piebald one; it leads the cattle; its aid is invoked to avert evil. At its death it is mourned with great ceremony; at its master's death it is killed, and its horns fixed on his grave. This latter feature suggests that it may have been regarded as the abode of its master's soul, or possibly of the soul of the previous head of the family. Another account says that it is venerated under the name of Madjok (the Great God), and worshipped with music and dancing (Hassan, *Vita*, i. 58). Among the Nuers the bull is likewise honoured; it is regarded as the tutelary deity of the family, and receives the name *Nyel-edit*, which is also applied to thunder and perhaps to their Supreme Being (Marno, *Reisen*, pp. 343, 347; *Mitt. Ver. Erdk.*, Leipzig, 1873, p. 6).

Among the Angonis the spirit of a dead chief was located in a bull, which was then set apart and considered sacred. Offerings were made through it to the indwelling spirit; if it died, another was put in its place. This cult ceased as soon as the next chief died (*Folklore*, xiv. 310).

The Sakalavas of Madagascar have a black bull in a sacred enclosure in the island of Nosybe, which is guarded by two hundred priests. When it dies, another takes its place. In January the queen visits the island and a bull is sacrificed, whose blood is held to drive away evil spirits from the neighbourhood of the sacred enclosure (v. Gennep, *Tabou*, p. 248). In some parts of Madagascar myths of descent from cattle are told (*ib.* p. 239). When the sick perform the *bilo* ceremony to remove the tabu under which they lie, a bull is sometimes selected, which is thenceforth sacred until its master's death (*ib.*). Cattle played a great part in the as yet unexplained ceremony of Fandroana at the New Year (*ib.* p. 240). Cattle were kept for their milk and as sacrificial animals only (*ib.* p. 241). The sacrifice was eaten, and custom prescribed the persons to whom particular parts of the animal should fall (*ib.* p. 243). A child born on an unlucky day was usually put to death, but its life might be saved if the ordeal by cattle so determined (*ib.* p. 245). Among the most honourable terms of address were 'bull' and 'cow' (*ib.* p. 247).

The origin of the Hindu respect for the cow is an unsolved problem. Unlike Egypt, it is clear that India developed a respect for the animal in historic times. Of actual worship there is little to record; but the *pañcha-gavya*, or five products of the cow, are important factors in exorcism and magic; as a means of annulling an unlucky horoscope, re-birth from a cow is simulated; the pious Hindu touches the tail of a cow at the moment of dissolution, and believes that it will carry him across the river of death; just as, in the last re-incarnation before the assumption of the human form, the cow receives the spirit and brings it across the river Vaitarani, which bounds the lower world. Cattle festivals are celebrated in Nepāl and Central India, but their object seems to be mainly magical. The nomadic Banjaras, however, devote a bullock to their god Balaji, and call upon it to cure them in sickness (Crooke, *Pop. Rel.* ii. 235–236). In Iranian mythology the moon is closely associated with the bull, and is regarded as containing the seed of the primeval bull (*Būndahishn*, iv. x.), whence one of the standing epithets of the moon in the Avesta is *gaoćiθra*, 'having the seed of the bull.' Here the underlying idea is evidently a fertility-concept (Gray, 'Maonha Gaocithra' in *Spiegel Memorial Volume*). In Zoroastrianism, moreover, as in Brāhmanism, the urine of the bull is one of the chief modes of religious purification (*Musŧon*, ix. 105–112). For the bull and cow in the Veda, see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* i. 1–41; in later India, p. 41; in Persia and North Asia, p. 90 ff.; for the Slavs, p. 171; Teutons and Celts, p. 221; Greeks and Romans, p. 261 ff. For other cases of respect for cattle, see Hahn, *Demeter*, p. 60. For the bull as form of water god, see 'Water' above; see also de Gubernatis, i. 265.

In Greek cult the bull was associated with

Artemis Ταυροπόλος and Ταυρική, which Farnell interprets as referring to the agricultural functions of the goddess; in the worship of Ταυροπόλος the bull and cow were rarely, the calf never, sacrificed; the goddess is represented with horns on her shoulders, which are usually supposed to refer to the moon; the horns certainly appear in the representations of Selene, but the bull figures in the cult or representations of many non-lunar divinities, such as Themis, Dionysus, Demeter, Hestia, Apollo, Poseidon, etc. (Farnell, *Cults*, ii. 451, 454, 456, 529). The bull was one of the chief sacrificial animals in the cult of Zeus (for βουφόνια see below); and a cow was, in one form of the myth, his nurse (*ib.* i. 37, 95). Hera is termed βοῶπις by Homer; but there is no monument showing her as cow-headed, and her eyes are often unlike those of the cow (*ib.* i. 20, 228); at Mycenæ, Schliemann found cow ἀναθήματα; but this is of no value as evidence (*ib.* i. 181). White oxen drew the priestess in the ἱερὸς γάμος (*ib.* i. 188). The bull was prominent among victims offered to Athene (*ib.* i. 290); an Athene Boarmia ('ox-yoker') was worshipped in Bœotia (*ib.* p. 291). In Crete two cults seem to have been mingled—that of a Semitic goddess whose animal was the goat and whose lover was the bull, and that of Zeus-Dionysus and Europa; the bull may originally have belonged to the latter, but it was certainly associated with Dionysus and to some extent with Zeus (*ib.* ii. 632, 645). The bull was important in the ritual of Astarte (*ib.* ii. 676). In the cult of the Syrian goddess worshippers sometimes cast their children from the Propylæa of her temple, 'calling them oxen' (*ib.* i. 92). For the bull in Celtic religion, see CELTIC RELIGION, § x. 8.

Bouphonia.—The sacrifice of an ox at the altar of Zeus Πολιεύς on the Acropolis requires to be noticed at length. The myth of origin is as follows: A certain Sopatrus, a stranger, was offering cereals, when one of his oxen devoured some of his corn; Sopatrus slew it; he was then seized with remorse and buried it; after which he fled to Crete; a dearth fell upon the land, and to remove the curse the sacrifice of the βουφόνια was instituted. The oracle directed that the murderer should be punished and the dead raised; all were to taste the flesh of the dead animal, and refrain not. The ritual was as follows: At the festival of the Diipoleia oxen were driven round the altar, and the one which tasted the cereals was the chosen victim. The axe with which the deed was done was sharpened with water brought by maidens and handed to the sacrificer; another cut the throat of the victim, and all partook of its flesh. The hide was stuffed with grass and sewn together, and the counterfeit ox was yoked to the plough. The participants in the sacrifice were charged with ox murder (βουφόνια), and each laid the blame on the other; finally, the axe was condemned and thrown into the sea (Farnell, *Cults*, i. 56–58). This sacrifice has been interpreted by Robertson Smith as totemistic, but no totem sacrifice of this kind is known elsewhere. On the other hand, Mannhardt and, following him, Frazer have regarded it as connected with agriculture; but, as Farnell points out, the sacrifice of the corn-spirit is not attended elsewhere with a sense of guilt. The admission of Sopatrus to citizenship as a result of his sacramental meal lends little or no support to the totemistic hypothesis, although there was an ox-clan (Boutadæ) at Athens.

In modern European folklore the corn-spirit is frequently understood to take the form of a bull or cow (*Golden Bough*[2], ii. 279 ff.). Perhaps we may look to this conception for an explanation of the custom of leading round, about Christmas, a man clad in a cowskin (*ib.* 447; Evans, *Tour in S. Wales*, p. 44; Panzer, *Beitrag*, ii. 117; *FLJ* iv. 118; *Schweiz. Archiv*, ii. 228, cf. 178; Rolland, *Faune*, vi. 91; *NQ*, 9th ser. vii. 247, etc.). The same explanation probably holds good of the Athenian sacrifice of the Bouphonia (see above), after which a mock trial took place, in which the instruments of sacrifice were condemned to be cast into the sea. Possibly we may apply the same explanation to the spring ox of the Chinese (*Zool. Garten*, 1900, p. 37). The emperor offers a hecatomb annually to heaven and earth; the animals must be black or red-brown (*ib.* p. 31).

In Egypt and India the bull or cow played the part of a scapegoat (*Golden Bough*[2], iii. 1). Among the Abchases a white ox, called Ogginn, was sacrificed annually, perhaps as a 'pastoral' sacrifice (see above).

The Ova-Hereros have some practices which have been interpreted as totemistic. They are divided into *eanda* and *oruzo*; membership of the *eanda* is inherited through the mother, and is inalienable; the *oruzo*, on the other hand, descends, like the chieftainship and priesthood, in the male line. The *omaanda* are named after the sun, the rock rabbit, rain, etc.; the *otuzo*, after the chameleon, etc.; they are distinguished (1) by the practice of keeping or not keeping cattle with certain marks, and (2) by practising certain abstinences with respect to cattle and other animals; the *orosembi oruzo*, for example, do not keep grey oxen or injure the chameleon. It seems clear that the *omaanda* comes nearer the totem-kin, though no totemistic practices are assigned to its members (*Zts. Vgl. Rechtsw.* xv.; *Mitt. Or. Sem.* pt. iii. v. 109; *Ausland*, 1882, p. 834). It has been recorded that certain plants are sacred to each 'caste,' but whether *eanda* or *oruzo* is meant is not clear (Andersson, *Lake Ngami*, 228). The Batokas break their upper teeth at puberty to make themselves like cattle; but here, too, there is no connexion with totemism (Livingstone, *Miss. Trav.* p. 532), for it is not confined to any special clan.

Among the Bechuanas a cow or bull that beats the ground with its tail is regarded as bewitched (Mackenzie, *Ten Years*, p. 392). In the Hebrides, oracles were given by a man wrapped in a fresh bull's hide and left all night at the bottom of a precipice near a cataract (Saussure, *New Voyages*, Lond. 1819, vol. viii. 92). The Kalmuks take an oath by the cow; the accused stands on the skin of a black cow, moistened with blood, and jumps over the threshold (*JAI* i. 415).

In opposition to the practice of the African pastoral peoples, of the Hindus, and probably of ancient Europe (Hahn, *Demeter*, pp. 60–61), the East Asiatic culture area abstains from the use of milk, regarding it as a pathological product (*ib.* p. 21). These peoples employ their cattle for draught purposes only, over a considerable area (*ib.* p. 60; *Zool. Garten*, 1900, p. 34), without using them as an article of food; they explain their abstinence on the ground that it is improper to eat an animal which labours to provide them with food. There is nothing to show that the Hindu and Chinese explanation of the sacrosanctity of cattle within their areas is incorrect; and possibly the African tabus are explicable on similar grounds. It seems clear, however, that the Chinese learned to know cattle as draught animals, possibly as sacred animals, and not as direct factors in the economic situation. *Prima facie* this leads us to suppose that cattle were domesticated for a long period before the use of milk was introduced, for otherwise the practice of abstinence in China is hard to explain. On the other hand, it seems probable that a certain sanctity attached to cattle at their introduction into the East Asiatic culture area; for there does not seem to be any difficulty in the

way of breeding cattle for food and at the same time making use of their labour in agricultural operations.

Hahn has argued (*Die Haustiere*, Leipzig, 1895; *Demeter und Baubo*, Lübeck, 1896) that we must look to a religious motive as the decisive factor in the domestication of cattle. If neither the milk nor the flesh was originally used, we are left to choose between the religious and utilitarian theories of domestication. It is by no means impossible that the idea of replacing hoe culture by plough culture may have occurred to a people destitute of domestic animals; and they may have proceeded to tame and utilize cattle for this purpose. But in this case we should expect to find that man as a draught animal preceded the ox as the motive power of the plough; there is, however, no evidence of this. It seems, however, far more probable that man already had cattle in partial subjection, and that possibly on religious grounds he proceeded to employ them in agriculture, than that he took but a single stride from hoe culture to ploughing with cattle. The use of milk in early times as an offering seems to point in the same direction; for there would be no special reason for attaching sanctity to the products of an animal domesticated for utilitarian purposes. As to the grounds which led to cattle becoming associated with religion in the first instance, Hahn has put forward a theory that it was the shape of their horns which brought them into connexion with the crescent moon. The cult of the moon has undoubtedly been wide-spread, and was indisputably important in the West Asiatic area, where appearances suggest that we may locate the domestication of cattle. There is, however, no evidence that the horns of the ox were in fact brought into connexion with the sickle of the moon at an early period. On the whole, it seems more probable that cattle, like the bison among the Pawnees, were associated with agriculture, possibly as a form of the corn-spirit, before they came under man's domination. The association of the moon with vegetation would naturally result in bringing cattle into close connexion with the moon-goddess. Just as the Pawnees use the bones of the bison as hoes, it would be a natural idea to impress cattle, on this theory, into the service of agriculture on magical grounds, even if they were not employed at an earlier period as draught animals for the car of the god or goddess, and thus inured to labour. If their employment as draught animals in the sacred car was the primitive usage, it seems probable that the processions would visit the fields, and herein we may see another factor which may have suggested the use of the draught animal for the plough.

See also 'Earth-carrier,' 'Earthquakes,' 'Vegetation,' 'Water,' in present article.

Coyote.—The coyote figures largely in American mythology, especially among the tribes of California. The Gallinomeros attributed to him the creation of the sun, with the aid of the hawk, from a ball of tules (Bancroft, iii. 85). The Neeshenams made him their ancestor, and told how he rescued them later from a terrible old man (*ib.* 546). In Shuswap and Kutenay myths he is the Creator (Brinton, *Myths*, p. 161). According to the Chinooks, he was the creator of the human race, but fashioned men clumsily, so that another powerful spirit had to open their mouths and teach them how to make canoes (Bancroft, *ib.* 95). The Cahroks attributed to him the rôle of Prometheus; fire was in the possession of some old hags, and the coyote outwitting them brought a brand away in his mouth (*ib.* p. 115). They also said that he stocked the river Klamath with salmon (*ib.* p. 136). Many tribes held that they were descended from coyotes; the Potoyantes, or Coyote Indians, related how the primeval coyotes gradually assumed the shape of man (*ib.* p. 87). Many tribes worshipped the coyote (Bancroft, iii. 137; Brinton, p. 161). The Nahuas erected a temple to him and buried him at death (*ib.*). Among the Acagchemens the coyote was one of the forms under which the god Chinnigchinich was worshipped (Bancroft, iii. 166). The coyote figures in the Deluge myth of the Papagoes; he warned Montezuma, and with him escaped the Flood (*ib.* p. 75). The Pomos made him the hero of one of the widely spread myths of a water-swallower; he drank up Clear Lake and lay down to sleep off the effects; a man pierced him; the water flowed out, and with it the grasshoppers on which he had made a meal; and they became the fish that are found in the lake (*ib.* p. 86). The Shastas told a legend of how there were once ten suns and ten moons, so that man was in danger of perishing by heat and by cold alternately; the coyote slew nine of each, and saved the human race (*ib.* 547) (for other coyote myths see Bancroft, iii. 545, 549; Müller, *Geschichte*, pp. 64, 108*b*, 134). According to some of the Navahos, bad men are turned into coyotes at their death (Bancroft, iii. 528).

Crab, lobster.—The lobster was generally considered sacred among the Greeks; if the people of Seriphus found a dead lobster, they buried it, mourning over it like one of themselves; a living one caught in their nets they put back into the sea (Frazer, *Tot.* p. 15). They held that it was dear to Perseus (Hartland, *Legend of P.* i. 9). In New Caledonia a crab goddess or demon is known, who has a sacred grove, on the trees of which are hung little packets of food for her. She is in the form of an enormous land crab, and causes elephantiasis; she is the enemy of married people; the little crabs are her messengers, and are feared as such (*Miss. Cath.* 1879, p. 28). In one district of Madagascar the lobster is tabu; it is never eaten or caught (v. Gennep, *Tabou*, p. 292).

Crocodile.—The Egyptian god Sebek was believed to take crocodile shape; sometimes he was represented as wholly animal, sometimes only with a crocodile head; offerings of cake, meat, and honey wine were made to the sacred animals, which were tame with the priests; oracles were drawn from their behaviour; they were embalmed at death (Wiedemann, *Religion*, p. 191). The alligator is said to be put into a tank in India sometimes and worshipped (Crooke, ii. 253). In West Africa, Bastian saw crocodiles fed in a pond, but it does not appear whether they were regarded as sacred (*Bilder*, p. 161). The crocodile is respected in many parts of Africa and Madagascar (*Int. Arch.* xvii. 124 ff.; v. Gennep, *Tabou*, p. 279 ff.), the Malay Peninsula (*JRAS, S.B.*, No. 7, p. 24), and New Georgia (*JAI* xxvi. 386). In New Guinea and the East Indies crocodiles are frequently respected as being the abodes of souls of ancestors (Hagen, *Unter den Papuas*, p. 225; Hawkesworth, *Voyages*, iii. 759); so, too, in West Africa (Hutchinson, *Impressions*, p. 163); any one who falls a victim to a crocodile is supposed to have incurred the vengeance of some one who has taken that form; those who kill crocodiles are supposed to take that form after death. Slightly different is the Malagasy view, which makes the crocodile the ally of the magician in his lifetime (v. Gennep, *Tabou*, p. 280). The Matabele hold that killing a crocodile is a serious crime, because its liver and entrails can be used as charms (Decle, *Three Years*, p. 153); so, too, the Bechuanas (Mackenzie, *Ten Years*, p. 390). On the other hand, some of the Bantu tribes —it is not clear whether the Bakuenas alone or not (probably not; cf. Chapman, *Travels*, i. 46)—seem to regard the crocodile in another light. A man over whom a crocodile splashes water is excluded

from the village, in other cases a man bitten by a crocodile (Merensky, *Beiträge*, p. 92; *ZE* i. 43); the dead crocodile is handed over to the doctors to make medicine of; if one is killed, the children cough, and a piacular sacrifice of a black sheep must be offered (Merensky, *loc. cit.*). In many places the crocodile is attacked only if it has already shown its hostility to man. The Antimerinas trace their descent from the crocodile, which, however, formerly waged war on them, after which a treaty was made. If this is violated, notice is given in the district, and complaint is made of the offence on the shores of the lake; the crocodile tribe is called upon to hand over the offender, and to make matters more certain a baited hook is thrown into the water. On the following day the capture is hauled up, condemned to death, and executed on the spot. Thereupon the persons present begin a lamentation; and the body is wrapped up in silk and buried with the ceremonies usual at the interment of a man. On its grave a tumulus is raised (v. Gennep, *Tabou*, p. 281 ff.). The same precautions are taken and the same respect is shown in Borneo and Sumatra (*Golden Bough*², ii. 390 ff.). In the Philippines, offerings were made even when the islanders had no intention of attacking the animals (Marsden, *Sumatra*, p. 303). In North Arakan the ceremony of *ya*, or 'tabu,' is strictly performed when any one belonging to a village has been killed by an alligator (*JAI* ii. 240). This is perhaps explained by the belief of the Philippine Tagalogs that any one so killed becomes a deity, and is carried up by the rainbow (Marsden, *Sumatra*, p. 301). Connected possibly with the belief that the crocodile is a magician or his servant, is the Basuto belief that a crocodile can seize the shadow of a passer-by and draw him into the water; it is believed to suck the blood of the men and animals thus captured, but not to injure them otherwise—a point which still further brings it into relation with the magician (Arbousset, p. 12). Among the Jabuns and in Celebes it is believed that women sometimes give birth to crocodiles or to twins one of which is a crocodile (Hagen, *Unter den Papuas*, p. 225; Hawkesworth, iii. 756). In Celebes, families which tell of such a birth constantly put food into the river for their relatives; more especially the human twin goes constantly at stated times to fulfil this duty, neglect of which is said to cause sickness or death. In South Africa the Bawendas draw the figure of a crocodile on the ground at the girls' initiation ceremony (*ZE* xxviii. 35) In the west of Ceram boys are admitted to the Kakian association at puberty; in some parts the boys are pushed through a crocodile's jaw of wood, and it is then said that the devil has swallowed them, and taken them to the other world to regenerate and transform them (*Golden Bough*², iii. 442). Amours between crocodiles (or caimans) and human beings are recorded in Senegambian, Malagasy, Basuto, and Dayak folklore (MacCulloch, 260, 267).

Crow, raven.—The most important area for the worship of the crow, or, if not worship, for the pre-eminence of the crow in the pantheon, is the north-west coast of America. Among the Thlinkets the chief deity, sometimes identified with the raven (but cf. *JAI* xxviii. 144), is Yehl. In the Creation myth he plays a part similar to that attributed to the thunder-bird in the Chippewayan myth, and produces dry land by the beating of his wings; probably Chethl, the name of the thunder-bird, and Yehl, the Creator, are variants of the same word, which is also written Jeshl (Bancroft, iii. 100 ff.). The neighbouring Haidas of Queen Charlotte Islands make the raven their ancestor (Frazer, *Tot.* p. 5; *Mission Life*, iii. 32; Macfie, *Vancouver*, i. p. 452; but see Boas, *Indianische Sagen*, p. 306 f., where the chief incident is a contest between Yehl and his uncle). The crow figures as Creator in the Eskimo and Chukchi mythology (Seemann, *Voyage of Herald*, ii. 30, 67, 72; *Zts. Geog. Ges. Thür.* vi. 120). It also figures in a Javanese myth of origin (*Med. Ned. Zend.* xxxii. 131). Among the Gros Ventres it played an important part in the creation of the world (Coues, *Henry and Thompson, MS Journals*, i. 351). The crow appears occasionally in Deluge myths (*Rel. des Jés.* 1633, p. 16; *Am. Rev.* viii. 397; *Ann. Prop. Foi*, xiv. 52, etc.), and the early date of the first notice seems to establish the native character of the myth; in several cases the crow is said to have been originally white, but to have suffered a change as a punishment (*Ann. P. F.*; *Am. Rev.*, *loc. cit.*, Boas, p. 273), or for some other reason (Leland, *Algonquin Legends*, p. 27); a similar myth is found in Europe (Wiedemann, *Ehsten*, p. 404; *Zts. deutsches Altertum*, N.S. x. 15). In the north-west of America the crow is a culture hero, who brings the light, after tricking the power in whose possession it is, or gives fire to mankind (Bancroft, *loc. cit.*). The same trait is found in Victoria (Parker, *Aborigines*, p. 24; but cf. Dawson, *Aust. Abor.* p. 54, where the crows are represented as keeping the fire to themselves). Among the Algonquins the crow was held to have given man Indian-corn and beans (Williams, 'Key into the Language of America' in *Mass. Hist. Soc.* iii. 219). A Spanish expedition in California in 1602 reported that the Indians of Santa Catalina Island venerated two great black crows; but it seems probable that they were in reality buzzards (Bancroft, iii. 134), which are known to have been respected and worshipped in California (*Golden Bough*², ii. 367). As a parallel fact may be quoted the keeping of ravens at Nimeguen at public expense (Hone, *Everyday Book*, i. 44). The Ainus also keep crows, and reverence them (Frazer, *Tot.* p. 14). For Indian crow myths, etc., see Crooke, i. 166, ii. 243–245.

The *name* of the crow is sometimes tabu (Holzmaier, *Osil.* p. 41; cf. Wiedemann, *Ehsten*, p. 492, for another form of respect). It is not killed in Victoria (Morgan, *Life of Buckley*, p. 58; Parker, *Abor.* p. 25), New England (Williams, in *Mass. Hist. Soc.* iii. 219), among the Gilyaks (v. Schrenck, *Reisen*, iii. 437), parts of Europe (*Folklore*, xi. 240; *New Voy.*, London, 1819, iv. 60), and North America (Pennant, *Arctic Zoology*, p. 246), the explanation given being that it contains the souls of the dead (Morgan, Parker; cf. Crooke, ii. 243). Connected possibly with the idea of the crow as a soul-animal, is the belief that it brings the children (*Germania*, xvii. 349; Ploss, *Kind*, p. 12; *Zts. d. Altertum*, N.S. x. 11; cf. Aelian, *de An. Nat.* iii. 9; Hesychius, *Lexicon*, *s.v.* *κουριζόμενος*, etc.). The crow is one of the birds which figure in the annual processions so commonly found in Europe (Schütze, *Holst. Idiot.* iii. 165; *J. des V. f. Meckl. Ges.* ii. 123). Either a living crow or the nest was carried round. Frazer's suggestion (*Golden Bough*², ii. 446 n.) that the crow song of the ancient Greeks (Athenæus, viii. pp. 359, 360) was used in connexion with a similar ceremony may be regarded as certain. In some cases the crow is killed (*Niedersachsen*, v. 126). The ceremony is probably connected with the idea of the expulsion of evils. Offerings are made to crows at funerals in India (*Home and For. Miss. Rec.* 1839, p. 303).

As a bird of omen, the crow, raven, or rook is inauspicious (Dorman, *Prim. Sup.* p. 224; Purchas, ii. 1758; Billings, i. 231; *Zts. des V. f. Volksk.* iii. 134; Wolf, *Beiträge*, i. 232; Henderson, *Folklore of N. C.* p. 20, etc.; the Talmudic tractate *Shabbath*, 67*b*). Occasionally it is the reverse (*Autob. of Kah-ge-ga-bowh*, p. 48), especially at a funeral (Crooke, ii. 243). The crow is specially associated

with sorcerers in Australia (*JAI* xx. 90), America (Schoolcraft, *Ind. Tr.* iv. 491; Adair, *Hist.* pp. 173, 194), and Europe (Clouston, *Folklore of Raven*, p. 20). The Twanas hold that when a person is very sick the spirit of some evil animal, sent by a wizard, has entered into him and is eating away his life (Eells, *Ten Years*, p. 43). Ancient diviners sought to imbue themselves with the spirit of prophecy by eating the hearts of crows (*Golden Bough*², ii. 355); and raven broth in Denmark is held to confer the powers of a wizard on the person who tastes it (Clouston, *loc. cit.*). The crow is largely used in magical recipes (*Folk-lore*, xi. 255). A stone found in its nest is believed to confer invisibility (*FLJ* vii. 56; Alpenburg, *Alpenmythen*, p. 385). Both in India and Greece the brains of crows were regarded as specifics against old age (Crooke, ii. 245; *Golden Bough*², ii. 355). For folk-tales of the crow see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 250–258, and Pauly-Wissowa, *s.v.* 'Aberglaube,' p. 76.

Cuckoo.—In various parts of Europe are performed ceremonies named after the cuckoo. At Pollern, near Thieux, was held, on August 21st, a cuckoo court; husbands whose wives deceived them had to appear, and at the end of the proceedings the last married man in the village was thrown into the water (Düringsfeld, *Cal. belge*, ii. 115). In other parts the ceremony was in the middle of April (Rolland, *Faune*, ii. 91). At Stembert a man called the cuckoo was placed on a waggon with the last married man of the village by his side; they were dragged through the village and the cuckoo was thrown into the water (Harou, *Contrib.* ix. ii.). With these customs we may perhaps connect a Harz custom of putting a cuckoo into the bride-chamber, probably as a fertility charm (Pröhle, *Harzbilder*, p. 87), and the cuckoo dance at North Friesland marriages (*Ausland*, lvii. 810). In S.E. Russia at Whitsuntide, a pole is put up with a cuckoo upon it; round this a dance is performed (*ib.* lix. 253). A cuckoo dance was also known in Lithuania, for which the third day after Easter was the proper season (Wurzbach, i. 216). Among the Rajputs of India the girls paint a cuckoo on a tree or board at the Dusserah festival, and lay flowers and rice on it; they then call till a cuckoo comes (*Bombay Gaz.* ix. i. 137). The scavenger caste also worship cuckoos (*ib.* p. 380). A cuckoo tabu is very common in European folklore (*Folklore*, xi. 240), and in Madagascar (v. Gennep, *Tabou*, p. 264). Like many other migrants, it should be greeted in the spring by leaping or running (*Traditions pop.* iii. 345). It is said to lay Easter eggs (*Schw. Arch.* i. 115), and 'coou-mallard' is one of the names given to 'Blind Man's Buff' (*Trad. pop., loc. cit.*). The cuckoo is a bird of bad omen (Böcler-Kreutzwald, *Ehsten*, p. 140; Russwurm, *Eibovolk*, sec. 358; *Mélusine*, i. 454). It is connected with rain (Panzer, *Beitrag*, ii. 172; de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 235). It is commonly believed that it is not a migrant, but turns into a hawk (cf. de Gubernatis, ii. 231). For cuckoo myths, beliefs, etc., see *ZM* iii. 209–298, and de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 226–235.

Deer.—Tame deer were kept in Guatemala, which were held sacred by the inhabitants on the ground that their greatest god had visited them in that form (Bancroft, iii. 132). The natives of Nicaragua had a god whose name was that of the deer, but the animal was not regarded as a god; they explained it by saying that this god had to be invoked by those who hunted the deer (*ib.*). Deer are tabu in Sarawak, and both there and in California they are held to be the abode of souls of deceased ancestors (*JAI* xxxi. 187, 193; Bancroft, iii. 131). In West Africa an antelope is sacrificed annually (Ellis, *Tshi-speaking Peoples*, p. 224). Especially in America, deer, moose, and elk were treated with great respect by hunters; their bones might not be given to the dogs, nor might their fat be dropped upon the fire, because the souls of the dead animals would know that they were not being properly treated and tell the others. In Honduras the Indians preserved the bones till their houses were quite encumbered, for they believed that otherwise they would not be able to take other deer. If a man were ill among the Chiquitos, the medicine-man would explain it by saying that he had thrown deer flesh away, and the soul of the deer had entered him and was killing him. The Tzentales and Kekchis offered copal to a dead deer before they ventured to skin it. Cherokee hunters ask pardon of the deer they kill, otherwise Little Deer, the chief of the deer tribe, who can never die or be wounded, would track the hunter by the blood drops and put the spirit of rheumatism into him. The Apache medicine-men resorted to certain caves, where they propitiated the animal gods whose progeny they intended to destroy. When the Thompson River Indians of British Columbia killed a deer, they thought the survivors were pleased if it was butchered cleanly and nicely; if a hunter had to leave some of the meat behind, he hung it on a tree, especially the head, so that it might not be contaminated by dogs and women. Venison was never brought in by the common door, because women used it; the head was never given to the oldest or the second son of a family, for that would make the deer wild (*Golden Bough*², ii. 406). The Eskimos of Hudson Bay believe that a white bear rules over the reindeer. They pray to him to send the deer, and assure him that they have been careful to treat the deer well (*ib.* p. 408). Deer and sea-animals may not come in contact with one another (*2nd Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn.* p. 595).

The deer is eaten by more than one tribe in connexion with the feast of new corn. Among the Delawares, venison and corn were provided, and divided into twelve parts, according to the number of the old men who took part in the ceremony; after they were eaten, the new corn was free to all; in the evening, venison was again eaten and the remainder burnt, for it might not remain till the sun rose, nor might a bone be broken. A deer burnt-offering was made with much ceremony once a year (Beatty, *Journal*, p. 84; cf. Rupp, *History of Berks*, p. 23, quoting a letter of W. Penn). The Housatunnuks also had a deer feast, but it is not brought into connexion with agriculture (Hopkins, *Hist. Memoirs*, p. 10). Probably the deer was regarded as a form of the corn-spirit; for in Florida it was the custom to take as large a deer hide as could be procured, leave the horns on it, and at the end of February fill it with all manner of herbs and sew it together. They then proceeded to an open space and hung the skin upon a tree, turning the head to the east. A prayer was then offered to the sun, asking that these same fruits might be given. The hide was left up till the following year (*JAI* xxxi. 155; cf. the account quoted on p. 156 from Prætorius). Probably a Papago rain dance performed beneath a deer's head stuck on a pole in the month of July may be similarly interpreted (*ib.*). A small deer figures largely in Malay and other folk-tales (Skeat, *Fables*).

Dog.—It can hardly be doubted that the dog is the oldest, as it is also the most widely spread of the domestic animals. It has been maintained (*Ausland*, 1881, p. 658) that man's association with the dog was due in the first place to its being used as food. Though there is no reason to suppose that the religious factor entered into the causes which brought about its domestication, the food

theory seems less probable than the view that the dog made himself the companion of man, rather than that he was brought into subjection by the acts of man (cf. Much, *Heimat der Indogermanen*, 182–185). The dog is used as an article of food by a large number of peoples of low grades of culture, and sometimes by higher grades, *e.g.* the Chinese. It was used by neolithic man in Europe for the pursuit of game, and is employed in a similar way all the world over at the present day. In some cases the breed has become in no way specialized thereby; but among the Batuas (*Int. Arch.* ix. 111), pigmies of the African forests, a great advance in this respect is found. Among the Ainus the dog is used for capturing fish (Howard, *Life*, p. 51). Mainly in Arctic and sub-Arctic regions it is used as a draught animal; occasionally as a beast of burden. It was used by the Cimbri in war; the same usage prevailed in Uganda and Usukuma. (For the uses to which the products of the dog are put, see *Int. Arch.* ix. 140 ff.).

'Dog' is found as a term of abuse among Semitic and most Muhammadan peoples; among the Romans the contempt thus expressed was less than in modern Europe.

A myth of dog ancestry is not uncommon; it is found in Alaska (Lisiansky, pp. 196–197), among the Dog-Ribs (Petitot, 311 ff.), the Ojibwas (Frazer, *Tot.* p. 4), in Madagascar (v. Gennep, p. 231), Indo-China (*As. Q. Rev.* 3rd ser. i. 140), Kirghiz (Petermann, 1864, p. 165), New Guinea (Chalmers, p. 151), among the Kalangs of Java (Raffles, i. 328), and even in Europe (Liebrecht, p. 19; see also in general MacCulloch, 263 f.). In the Pomotu islands the first race of men are held to have been made into dogs (*Miss. Cath.* 1874, 343).

Especially in N. America the dog (coyote) figures in Creation myths (Bancroft, *pass.*), and occasionally in Deluge myths (see 'Deluge'). The Pottawatomies believe that in the moon is an old woman making a basket; the earth will be destroyed when it is finished; but a great dog ruins her work at intervals and then results an eclipse (*Ann. Prop. Foi*, xi. 490). Among the Mongols, Mbocobis (*Int. Arch. l.c.* 147), Chiquitos (Tylor, i. 329), Chinese (*Ann. Prop. Foi*, xxii. 355), etc., a similar association of the dog with eclipses is found. In Kamtchatka, earthquakes are attributed to Touila's dog, Kozei (Krachenninikow, i. 94). Classical mythology tells us of Cerberus (*q.v.*), who guards the entrance of the Infernal Regions (see Bloomfield, *Cerberus, the Dog of Hades*). In N. Borneo a fiery dog is held to watch at the gate of Paradise, and to lay claim to all virgins (Forster, ii. 239); the Massachusetts also believe that a dog watches the gate (Wood, p. 104); so, too, the Eskimos (*ZE*, 1872, 238); and the Iroquois the bridge by which souls had to pass (*Rel. des Jés.* 1636, 104).

Yama was held to have two dogs, whom he sent out to bring in wandering souls (*Rig Veda* x. xiv. 10–12; *Atharva Veda*, viii. 1, 9); and these dogs, described as four-eyed (*i.e.* with two spots above the eyes), recur in the Avestan dogs that guard the Chinvat Bridge, which leads from this world to the future life (*Vendîdâd*, xiii. 9; *Sad Dar*, xxxi. 5; cf. Scherman, *Materialien zur Geschichte der indischen Visionsliteratur*, pp. 127–130, and the references there given).

The Aztecs sacrificed a red dog to carry the soul of the king across a deep stream (Bancroft, ii. 605), or announce his arrival (*ib.* iii. 538; cf. Ober, p. 320); in Louisiana they killed their sick and sent dogs on to make the announcement (Stoddart, p. 421).

The Tlaxcalans hold that a wer-man appears as a dog (*Dav. Ac.* viii. 122). In Béarn a great white wer-dog was believed to sit at cross roads (Wahlen, i. 330).

The Baschilange (*Mitt. Af. Ges.* iv. 255) and Tonkinese (*Z. allg. Erdk.* i. 108) believe that human souls take up their abode in dogs.

Actual dog-worship is uncommon. The Nosairis and others are said to worship a dog (W. R. Smith, p. 291). According to Raffles (i. 365), the Kalangs worship a red dog, and each family keeps one in the house; another authority says they have images of wood in the shape of dogs, which are worshipped, and burnt 1000 days after the death of the person (*Tijd.* xxiv. 427). In Nepāl, dogs are said to be worshipped at the festival called Khicha Puja (Wright, 39 ff.; for other Indian cases see Crooke, ii. 218 ff.). The Yorubas have a demi-god, Aroui, god of the forest, with a dog's head (*Miss. Cath.* 1884, 221). Among the Harranians dogs were sacred, and held to be the brothers of the mystæ (W. R. Smith, p. 291). In ancient Egypt, dogs were commonly respected and mummified, in particular at Cynopolis (Strabo, 812). In ancient Persia the dog was held in the highest esteem, and most rigorous penalties were exacted for killing it (*Vendîdâd*, xiii. xv. 19–51; *Dênkart*, viii. 23). It was employed, moreover, in the *sagdîd*, 'dog's gaze' of the Parsi funeral ceremony, in which a 'brown four-eyed' dog or a 'white dog with yellow ears,' was made to look at the corpse three times, and was also led three times back over the road traversed by the corpse (Geiger, *Ostiranische Kultur*, 264–265; Karaka, *History of the Parsis*, i. 197; Jackson, *Persia Past and Present*, 388 f., 391 f.). The Bahnars say the dog is under the protection of Bok Glaih, god of thunder (*Miss. Cath.* 1894, 133). Sometimes only the use of dog's flesh is prohibited. The dog is found as a totem in Alaska (Lisiansky, 196) and in West Africa (Ellis, *Tshi-sp.* p. 206); a dog-kin is found in Madagascar (v. Gennep, p. 234). In German New Guinea an offering of food is made to the spirit of a dog (*Nachr. K. W. land*, 1897, 88). Among the Ot Danums the bodies of dogs are buried near the houses, rice and salt are given them in the grave, and rice is strewn on the grave to induce the gods to send the souls to the dog-heaven (Schwaner, 78). The Woguls lay the bodies of specially useful dogs in a small hut (Ides, p. 7). In Egypt a family shaved clean when the dog died (Herod. ii. 66); and so, too, the owner among the Masai (*Ausl.* 1857, 442), The Gonds purify themselves when a dog dies (Hislop, *Papers*, p. 6). The Tunguses take an oath by the dog, drinking its blood (Ides, 45). The exposure of the dead to dogs may spring from a similar idea; it is found among the Magi, Bactrians, Hyrcanians, and others (Spiegel, iii. 703), in Tibet (*JRAS, S.B.* lix. 212), Java (*Verh. Bat. Gen.* xxxix. 40), and Kamtchatka (Krachenninikow, p. 189). Omens are frequently drawn from dogs (Crooke, ii. 222 ff.; *Ausland*, 1891, 874; *Z. Ver. Volksk.* iii. 134, etc.). The Kalangs strew ashes on the floor, and if a dog's footmarks are seen, judge that the ancestors are favourable to a marriage (*Tijd. T.L.V.* xxiv. 424).

Connected with the sanctity of the dog is its use in art; in Borneo it is a frequent tatu pattern (*JAI* xxxv. 113). As might be expected, the dog is frequently sacrificed. The best known case is that of the Iroquois, who kill a white dog in January as a scapegoat; it is then burnt, and the ashes sprinkled at the door of every house; but there is some doubt as to the antiquity of the practice (*Golden Bough*², iii. 72, 109). Other authorities vary the details (*Ontario Arch. Rep.* 1898, 91; Sanborn, *Legends*, p. 7; *Miss. Her.* xxv. 91, etc.). Other dog-sacrifices are found among the Sacs and Foxes (*Miss. Her.* xxxi. 86), the Ottawas (Perrot, *Mœurs*, 19), the Mayas at New Year (Bancroft, ii

703), and in the cacao plantations in May (*ib.* 692), in Honduras before war (*ib.* i. 723), etc. (see Bancroft, *passim*). The Fuegians offer dogs (*Voice from S. Apr.* xiii. 211). In Asia, dog-sacrifice is found in China (*Ann. Prop. Foi*, xxxvii. 217), Aracan (*Miss. Cath.* 1881, 69), Java (*Med. Ned. Zend.* xvi. 307), etc. In Luzon the firstborn of a bitch are drowned (*Globus*, xlviii. 186). In Africa a dog is sacrificed by the Baghirmis (Barth, iii. 571; see also *Int. Arch.* ix. 144, xvii. 135, for further references).

In Greece the dog was regarded as unclean, but was used for ceremonies of purification in Bœotia, probably as the animal of Hecate, to whom the Argives offered a dog. The Spartan ephebi offered a young hound to the war-god (Farnell, *Cults*, ii. 507 n.). The Romans connected dogs with the Lares (Fowler, *Rom. Fest.* 101). They were sacrificed on April 25 (*ib.* p. 90), and in the Lupercalia (*ib.* pp. 313–314).

The dog is frequently used in magic. In Dahomey a dead dog is hung up as a protection against sorcery (Robertson, *Notes on A.* 291; Ellis, *Ewe*, 93). In Greece its flesh was used as medicine (Paus. iii. 250); so, too, among the Chukchis (Sauer, *Reise*, 236). Among the Kimbundas its flesh is reserved for warriors (Magyar, *Reisen*, 309). The dog figures in more than one ceremony of uncertain import. In China a big dog is dressed like a man and carried round in a palanquin in times of drought (*Ann. Prop. Foi*, xxii. 355). The Orang Dongus whip a black dog round the kampong in the first new moon after the rice season (*Journ. Ind. Arch.* ii. 692). The resemblance of the custom to the dog-whipping of the Carnival, handed down as a popular custom here and there in England (Nicholson, *Folklore*, p. 22), suggests that it is meant as an expulsion of evils (cf. Waling Dykstra, p. 318). For Jewish beliefs concerning the dog see Kohler, *JE* iv. 631 f.

Dragon.—Although the dragon is usually associated with the peoples of East Asia, it is by no means unknown in Europe. Not only is the story of St. George and the dragon told (Hartland, *Legend of Perseus, pass.*), but we find in the Mabinogion the same legend of the fighting dragons as occurs in the Malay Peninsula (cf. Skeat, *Malay Magic*, p. 304). In European folklore the dragon is taken round in procession at many places (*Grande Encyclopédie, s.v.* 'Dragon'), and there are many local dragon legends. Part of Anglesey is said to have been ravaged by a dragon; at last a champion tackled it, but his victory brought him reproof, not reward, for he had done his deed on Sunday. In the Alps a dragon inhabits a tarn; if a stone is thrown in, rain will follow, however good the weather may be; for if it hits the dragon, its movements throw up so much spray that a mist appears from which the rain condenses (Jecklin, *Volkst.* i. 44). On Norse houses the dragon sometimes figures as a weather-vane or gable decoration. Germanic mythology abounds in stories of dragons, which inhabit air, water, and earth, bringing woe (and, more rarely, weal) on men and animals, spitting forth fire and venom, and guarding treasures (Meyer, *Germanische Mythologie*, 95–100). There is, moreover, an entire cycle of tales, exemplified in the story of Perseus and Andromeda, in which human sacrifices must be made to a dragon, who is finally slain by the hero (MacCulloch, 381–409).

The association of the dragon with water is by no means confined to the West; in China the waterspout is regarded as a dragon, which is never seen completely, for its head or its tail is always invisible. The dragon and the tiger are at enmity, and if a tiger's bones are thrown into a 'dragon's well,' rain will follow within three days, for the animals fight, and when the dragon moves, rain falls (Doolittle, *Social Life*, ii. 264, i. 275). The great dragon lives in the sky, and the emperor is the earthly dragon (Gould, *Mythical Monsters*, p. 215; see pp. 215–257, 377–404). In Japan the dragon is associated not only with water but also with a variety of other things. The dragon produces nine young at a birth, each with different qualities; hence dragons are carved on bells, musical instruments, drinking vessels, weapons, books, chairs, and tables, according to the particular tastes of the different kinds of dragon. One kind loves dangerous places; consequently it is put upon the gables of houses (*Natur*, 1878, p. 549). India, too, had its dragons; one used to lie in wait for boats or ships, hiding itself on a neighbouring mountain; a criminal obtained his life on condition of ridding the country of the pest; he had human figures made, and the bodies filled with hooks, etc.; the dragon devoured them, and perished (*Lettres édif.* xviii. 409; cf. Crooke, ii. 129–131). In the same way in the last century a dragon on the borders of Wales was said to have been induced to meet his fate by putting red flannel round a post on which sharp spikes were fixed. Tiamat is the cosmogonic dragon of Babylonia (see BAB.-ASSYR. RELIGION).

Eagle.—The eagle is frequently respected, but, except in Australia, the respect does not seem to have risen to an actual cult. In many parts of Australia the eagle-hawk is one of the names of the phratries into which many tribes are divided; in Victoria, Pundjel seems to be a deified eagle-hawk (Brough Smyth, i. 423); elsewhere it is the evil spirit, so-called, which is the eagle-hawk. Mullion is the name of the former, Malian of the latter, and their identity is established by the belief and practice of the Wellington district, where the eyrie of the eagle-hawk was formed on the ground, at initiation, in memory of his contests with an anthropomorphic god, Baiame (*Man*, 1905, 28). The Apaches think there are spirits of Divine origin in the eagle and other birds (Bancroft, iii. 132). The Ostiaks regard a tree as holy on which an eagle has nested (Latham, *Russian Empire*, p. 110). In the island of Tauri, off New Guinea, a certain kind of eagle is tabu, but there are no totemic ideas connected with it (*Zts. vgl. Rechtswiss.* xiv. 325); the osprey is *hope* ('sacred') in New Georgia (*JAI* xxvi. 386). The Osages would turn back from an expedition if an eagle were killed (Nuttall, *Travels*, p. 87). The Samoyeds account it a crime to kill an eagle, and if one is caught in a snare and drowned, they bury it in silence (Schrenck, *Reisen*, i. 168). The Bosnians regard it as unlucky to kill an eagle (*Wiss. Mitt.* iv. 442). Some of the aboriginal Peruvians asserted their descent from eagles (Frazer, *Tot.* p. 5). The Buriats hold that the good spirits sent an eagle as shaman, to counteract the evil deeds of the bad spirits; the first human shaman was the son of the eagle and a Buriat woman (*JAI* xxiv. 64). The Zuñis, Dakotas, and others keep eagles for the sake of their feathers. The Mokis fasten an eagle to the roof in spring, and kill it at the summer solstice in order to get its feathers for ritual purposes; the body is buried in a cemetery, and it is believed that the soul of the eagle goes to the other eagles and returns again as an eagle (*Globus*, lxxvi. 172). The Hopi hunter purifies himself before going after eagles, and makes an offering; one bird has a prayer-stick tied to its foot and is set free (*Am. Anth.*, new ser., iii. 701). The Blackfoot hunter practises many tabus when he is on the hunt for eagles (Grinnell, *Blackfoot Lodge Tales*, p 237). The Pimas connected the eagle with the Deluge; a bird warned one of their chief prophets, but the warning was disregarded, and only one man was saved (*Smiths. Rep.* 1871, p. 408). In Jabin, New Guinea, a blighting

influence on bananas is attributed to the eagle, and no one plants them when an osprey is in sight (*Zts. Geog. Ges. Thür.* xii. 95). Among the Ojibwas the sailing of an eagle to and fro was a good omen (*Autob. of Kahgegahbowh*, p. 48; for the eagle see also de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 195–197). The eagle is likewise important in Indo-Iranian mythology. In the Rigveda (especially iv. 27) the eagle brings the sacred *sōma* (which see) to mankind (cf. Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, 111 f. and the references there given); while in the Avesta an eagle dwells on the 'tree hight All-Healing' (*Yasht*, xii. 17) in the midst of Lake Vouru-kasha (the Caspian), aided by his fellow (*Dīnā-ī Maīnōg-ī Khraṭ*, lxii. 37–41). From the Avesta the eagle passes into Persian literature as the *sīmūrgh*, whence is developed the *roc* of the *Arabian Nights*. The feathers of the sīmūrgh, which dwells on Mount Kaf or Mount Albarz, form talismans for the heroes Tahmuraf and Zāl (Casartelli, in *Compte rendu du congrès scientifique international des Catholiques*, 1891, sec. vi. 79–87).

In classical mythology the eagle occupied an important place; it was the first of ominous birds, and Roman legions took up their winter quarters where there was an eagle's nest. The eagle is associated with Zeus and the lightning; its right wing was buried in fields and vineyards as a protection against hail. The eagle stone (*ἀετίτης*) and parts of the eagle's flesh were used in magic (Pauly-Wissowa, *s.v.* 'Adler'). It was believed that the eagle was never struck by lightning. Its appearance was auspicious (*ib. s.v.* 'Aberglaube'). The eagle is the constant attribute of Zeus in the older monuments (Farnell, *Cults*, i. 128), as also of Jupiter (Preller, *Röm. Myth.*[3] ii. 327).

Eel.—For many of the Malagasy the eel is a forbidden food, and various ætiological myths are told to explain the fact (v. Gennep, *Tabou*, p. 290). By the Imerinas it is regarded as a soul-animal; the Betsileos believe that the lower classes pass into eels; when the body is thrown into the sacred lake, the first eel that takes a bite becomes the domicile of the soul (*ib.*). The eel is also a soul-animal among the Igorrotes (Wilken, *Het Animisme*, p. 72) as well as in Ceram (*ib.*), and receives a daily portion of food. In the Paumotu Archipelago the eel seems to have been held sacred; when one was captured, prayers were offered at a shrine apparently devoted to a cult of female ancestors or relatives; there was an 'enmity between eels and women,' and the latter might not look on them (*Miss. Cath.* 1874, 366). In N. Siam, Muang Naung was covered with water because its inhabitants ate white eels and thus enraged Thegya, the ruler of the world (*Zts. Geog. Ges. Thür.* iv. 149). In N. Queensland a connexion between eels and a flood seems to exist (Lumholtz, *Among Cannibals*, p. 205); although the passage may also be interpreted to mean that those who eat eels have the gift of prophecy. This belief is found in Europe (Wolf, *Beiträge*, i. 232, No. 594). Sacred eels were also known to the Greeks (Pauly-Wissowa, *s.v.* 'Aal'); and the eel is a totem of the Mundari Kols of Bengal and of the Oraons (Crooke, ii. 255). Neither they nor the Nosairis eat eels (Dussaud, *Histoire et religion des Nosairis*, p. 93).

Elephant.—In Siam it is believed that a white elephant may contain the soul of a dead person, perhaps a Buddha; when one is taken, the capturer is rewarded, and the animal brought to the king to be kept ever afterwards, for it cannot be bought or sold. It is baptized and fêted, and when it dies it is mourned for like a human being (Young, *Kingdom of the Yellow Robe*, p. 390 ff.). In Cambodia a white elephant is held to bring luck to the kingdom, and its capture is attended with numerous ceremonies (Moura, *Cambodge*, i. 101). In some parts of Indo-China the reason given for the respect paid to it is that it has a soul, and may do injury after its death; the whole village therefore fêtes it (Mouhot, *Travels*, i. 252; see also Bock, *Temples and Elephants*, p. 19 ff.). The cult of the white elephant is found also at Enarea, south of Abyssinia; but in view of the frequent respect accorded to white animals it is unnecessary to see in this any proof of Indo-Chinese influence. They are regarded as the protectors of mankind, and any one who killed a white or light-coloured elephant would pay the penalty with his life (*Int. Arch.* xvii. 103). Among the Wambugwes the elephant is believed to be the abode of the souls of their ancestors (*ib.*). The elephant is regarded as a tutelary spirit in Sumatra (*Tijdschr. T.L.V.* xxvi. 456). The name is sometimes tabu (*Golden Bough*[3], i. 457).

The hunting of the elephant is attended with numerous ceremonial observances. The Wakamis of East Africa prepare for the chase by passing a night with their wives on a kind of ant-hill, of which they believe that the female elephant makes use to feed her young one. On the day of the hunt a dance is held, and they make certain marks on their forearms. The hunter buries the trunk and cuts off the end of the tail; the latter he rolls up in palm leaves and puts in his bag; until he next goes to the chase this bag must remain in his wife's care; she also has a right to purchase something with the proceeds of the sale of the ivory; if the hunter quarrelled with her, his next hunt would be unlucky (*Miss. Cath.* 1874, 44). The Amaxosas offer a sacrifice after killing an elephant (Shaw, *Story of my Mission*, p. 452); the hair on the end of the tail is hung at the entrance to the cattle-fold; the end of the ear and the trunk are cut off and buried, the tusks are taken out, and no use is made of the remainder (Kay, *Travels*, p. 138). According to another authority, excuses are made and the elephant is appealed to during the chase not to crush his pursuers (Lichtenstein, *Travels*, i. 254), and the tusks are sent to the king (*ib.* p. 270). The Hottentot hunter must sacrifice a sheep or some other small animal, and none but he may partake of its flesh; any one, on the other hand, may eat of the slain elephant (*Zts. Geog. Ges. Thür.* vi. 42). The Wanyamwezis seek to propitiate the dead elephant by burying his legs, and the Amaxosas inter with the end of the trunk a few of the articles which they buy with the proceeds of the ivory (*Golden Bough*[3], ii. 400). In India the elephant is the representative of Ganeśa, who is also figured with the head of this animal; and in later Hinduism the earth is supported by eight elephants. Some elephants can fly through the air, and all have in their frontal lobes magic jewels. Touching an elephant is a chastity-test, and the hairs of its tail serve as amulets (Crooke, ii. 238–241). According to one account, the world rests upon an elephant (Tylor, i. 365). In West Africa, elephants which destroy plantations are regarded as wizards, and feared (Wilson, *West Africa*, p. 164). On the Congo the end of an elephant's tail is used as a sceptre (*Int. Arch.* xvii. 103). According to the Talmud (*Bᵉrākhōth*, 57*b*), it is a bad omen to dream of an elephant. For elephant myths see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 91–94, cf. 77. See also 'Earth-carrier,' above.

Fish.—Although sacred fish are not uncommon, a fish-god seems to be a somewhat rare phenomenon. Dagon is often regarded as a fish-god (but see *EBi*, *s.v.* 'Dagon'), but it is certain that he had a human head and hands; possibly his body was scaly, or he had the tail of a fish; for that he was a fish-god seems certain from the fact that his worshippers wore fish skins (*JHS* xiv. 104, quot. Menant, *Glypt. Or.* ii. 63). A figure probably

intended for, at any rate regarded as, Artemis Eurynome was depicted with a fish's tail (de Visser, *Götter*, p. 187; cf. Farnell, *Cults*, ii. 522), and there were sacred fish in the temples of Apollo and Aphrodite at Myra and Hierapolis, which raises a presumption of a fish cult (de Visser, pp. 177–178; cf. p. 163). Atargatis is said to have had sacred fish in a pool at Askelon, which were fed daily and never eaten; according to another account, they were the food of the priests. From Xenophon (*Anab.* I. iv. 9) we learn that the fish of Chalus were regarded as gods; and Hyginus tells us that the Syrians looked on fish as holy, and abstained from eating them (*EBi, s.v.* 'Fish'; for fish tabus see W. R. Smith, p. 292 ff.). In modern days fish are sometimes sacred in India, where they also play a considerable part in folklore, often serving as life-indexes. They likewise form the favourite food of *bhūts* (ghosts). Varuṇa rides on a fish, and Vishnu had a fish-avatār (Crooke, i. 243, ii. 156, 253 f.). The 'Small People' of Cornwall hate the smell of fish (Hunt, *Popular Romances of the West*[3], 109). According to the Talmud, fish eaten in the month of Nisan are conducive to leprosy (*Pesaḥim*, 112*b*). Iranian mythology likewise has the *kara* fish which guards the white Hōm (*Yasht*, xiv. 29, xvi. 7; *Būndahishn*, xviii. 3–6, xxiv. 13), as well as the 'ox-fish,' 'which exists in all seas,' and whose cry makes 'all fish become pregnant, and all noxious water-creatures cast their young' (*Būndahishn*, xix. 7). Fish are kept in parts of Wales to give oracles. Most of the South African Bantus will neither eat nor touch fish, giving as their reason that fish are snakes (Fritsch, *Drei Jahre*, p. 338). Other fish tabus are found in various parts of Africa (*Internat. Archiv für Ethnographie*, xvii. 128). Among the Yezidis only the lowest classes are said to eat fish (Badger, *The Nestorians and their Ritual*, p. 117). In North Aracan fish may not be eaten at harvest time (*JAI* ii. 240), and pregnant women are forbidden them in Servia (*Globus*, xxxiii. 349), thus reversing the teaching of the Talmud, which especially recommends them to women in this condition (*Kethūbim*, 61*a*).

The economic importance of fish makes it natural that fishermen often propitiate them. In Peru sardines are said to have been worshipped in one region, skate in another, dogfish in another, and so on, according to the species that was most plentiful (*Golden Bough*[3], ii. 410). Many tribes do not burn the bones of fish, because if they did the fish could not rise from the dead (*ib.*). The Thlinkets pay special respect to the first salmon which they take, and many other tabus are observed (*ib.* p. 411 f.; for treatment of the first fish see also Sébillot, *Folklore des Pêcheurs*, pp. 131, 254, 256). In the Ægean, sacrifices are still made to the melanurus (Walpole, *Memoirs*, p. 286; cf. Pliny, XXXII. ii.). In other cases magical ceremonies are resorted to in order to secure a good catch. In the Queen Charlotte Islands the fish are strung on a rope with feathers as charms, and put on the top of a pole stuck in the bed of the river. One of the tribe is banished to the mountains during the fishing season, and may not have a fire or communicate with the tribe, or the fish will leave the river (*Mission Life*, v. 103). In Jabim, New Guinea, the fishermen may not be mentioned, no noise may be made in the village, and women and children must remain at a distance from the fishers (*Zts. Geog. Ges. Thür.* xii. 95). In New Caledonia for one kind of fish appeal is directed to ancestral spirits in the sacred wood; offerings are made there, and when the men go into the water, the women extinguish all fires but one; then they perform a dance, and silence follows. For the sardine a stone wrapped in dried twigs is taken to the cemetery and put at the foot of a post and two sorcerers perform ceremonies (*Miss. Cath.* 1880, 239). In some countries a fish is sacrificed for success in fishing (Sébillot, *op. cit.* p. 116; Krassoff, *Peuple Zyriane*, p. 101).

The Ottawas held that the souls of the dead passed into fish (*Rel. des Jés.* 1667, p. 12; cf. 'soul-animals,' p. 493). In Japan the earthquake is explained as the result of the movements of a great fish in the sea or under the land (*Natur*, 1878, p. 551). In the Middle Ages the same explanation was given in Europe (Mone, *Anzeiger*, viii. 614). Fish are found as totems in South Africa (Fritsch, *Eingeborenen*, p. 153), Alaska (Trimmer, *Yukon Terr.* p. 109), and among the American Indians (Frazer, *Tot.* p. 4, etc.). Myths of fish descent are also found (*ib.* p. 6). For fish myths see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 331–353; for the crab, *ib.* pp. 354–359.

Fly.—In Greek mythology both Zeus and Apollo had names connecting them with flies, but it is doubtful whether either of them can properly be termed a fly-god; for the appeal to the god was that he would keep flies from interfering with a sacrifice (Farnell, *Cults*, i. 45). It is equally uncertain whether Beelzebub, whose name is commonly translated 'Lord of Flies,' had any connexion with them. In Africa, however, there seems to be a real fly-god. Flies are kept in a temple (Beecham, *Ashantee*, p. 177). The Kalmuks regard the fly as a soul-animal and never kill it (*JAI* i. 401). In North Germany it is held to be unlucky to kill the last flies, and any one who keeps one alive through the winter will receive a sum of money (Bartsch, *Sagen*, ii. 186). In Greece the 'brazen fly' was one of the names of 'Blind Man's Buff' (Pollux, *Onomastikon*, ix. 123); it is known as the 'Blind Fly' in Italy (*Folklore*, xi. 261) and North India (*Panjāb NQ*, iv. 199). In the latter country it is a lucky omen for a fly to fall into the ink-well (Crooke, ii. 257). According to the Avesta (*Vendīdād*, vii. 2, viii. 71), the demon of death assumes the shape of a fly. For Jewish legends concerning flies, see Krauss, *JE* v. 421 f.

Fowl.—The cock is one of the most important sacrificial victims (for Africa see *Int. Arch.* xvii. 145–148), and has probably replaced larger and more valuable animals in many cases. In some of the Bantu tribes the men abstain from eating domestic fowls (*JAI* xix. 279). The Araucanians do not eat the domestic fowl, because they regard it as a transformed man (*Bol. Inst. Geog. Argent.* xv. 740). Fowls are also tabu in East Africa and Abyssinia (*Globus*, xxxiii. 78). A refusal to eat eggs is more widely found, but does not necessarily point to a tabu of the fowl; abstinence from milk in the same way does not imply a tabu of cattle.

The cock figures in spring ceremonies in Europe; in Schiermonnikoog a green branch is fastened at the top of the May-pole, and on it is hung a basket containing a live cock (*NQ*, 8th ser. x. 194). In the same way at Defynog boys put the figure of a cock at the top of a rod and carried it round on the eve of the first day of May (*Montgom. Coll.* xvii. 268). The cock is one of the forms in which the corn-spirit is supposed to appear (*Golden Bough*[3], ii. 266). The cock is sometimes used in the expulsion of evils (*ib.* ii. 103). Modern Jews sacrifice a white cock on the eve of the Day of Atonement (*ib.* p. 109; cf. p. 25). We may probably interpret in the same sense the numerous European customs in which a cock or hen is hunted or beaten (*Folk-lore*, xi. 250, 251; *RHR* xxxviii. 341); connected with these customs is the name of the 'blind hen' used in parts of Europe for 'Blind Man's Buff.' These customs frequently re-appear in wedding ceremonies, perhaps with the same meaning. The eating of a cock (*Tradition*, iv. 364; *Anthropologie*,

iii. 552; *Bavaria*, i. 390; *Russische Revue*, xii. 269, etc.) may be a fertility charm; and in like manner a cock and hen were carried before a bridal couple on their wedding day among the Jews of the Talmudic period (*Giṭṭin*, 57*a*; for other Jewish beliefs concerning fowls see *JE* iv. 139, vi. 344). Occasionally a dance is performed in which fowls are imitated (*Bavaria*, I. i. 394, II. i. 317; Pröhle, *Harzbilder*, p. 8, etc.). In many of the games with fowls the successful player is termed the 'king.'

Sometimes witches are believed to take the form of cocks, and, according to the Talmud, the demons had cock's feet (*Berākhōth*, 6*a*); in Holland a cock put in a vessel over the fire is burnt to ashes to overcome the devil (*Globus*, xxvii. 195). The cock scares demons and ghosts (cf. *Hamlet*, I. i. 149–155), and witches are obliged to return from their Sabbat when the cock crows (cf. art. SATANISM). It is universally held to be a bad omen for a hen to crow like a cock; the remedy is to kill it; sometimes it is also thrown over the house top. The crowing of a red cock is held in Germany to betoken that a fire will break out in the building on which it is perched; the same belief is found in China (Matignon, *Superstition*, p. 43). The cock is used in various magical ceremonies in China. When a boy is named at the beginning of his sixth year, two priests push a cock backwards and forwards through a wooden cylinder (*Zool. Garten*, 1900, 70). On the coffin of a Chinaman whose body is being brought home is a white cock in a basket. One of the three souls is buried with the corpse, but it has to be caught; it can find no rest till the grave is covered with earth; the cock is to show the soul its way back to the body (*ib.* 71). For folk-tales and myths of fowls see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 278–291.

Fox.—Dionysus had the surname of *Bassareus*, not, probably, because his worship coalesced with that of an earlier fox-deity, but because as lord of the vine he protects the vineyards against the little foxes (*ClR* x. 21). A fox-god was also known in America (Müller, *Urrelig.* p. 320). Among the Chiriguanos it seems to be a soul-animal (*Lettres édif.* viii. 335). In Europe it is one of the forms in which the corn-spirit appears (*Golden Bough*, ii. 283); it was also burnt in some of the annual fires. A fox tabu is found at Inishkea (*Proc. R. Irish Acad.* iii. 631).

At the Cerealia at Rome foxes were set on fire and hunted about the circus, but it seems probable that they were originally driven over the fields (Fowler, *Rom. Fest.* p. 77 f.); Liebrecht draws attention to the similarity between this custom and the incident in the Samson story (*Zur Volksk.* i. 261 ff.; Frazer, *Paus.* iv. 178). In Finnic mythology the aurora is known as the light of the fox (Grimm, *Reinhart Fuchs*, p. xxxi). In China and among the Eskimos the fox is a wer-animal who appears in the shape of a beautiful woman and seduces the youths (*Arch. Anth.* v. 135; Rink, *Eskimoiske Sagen*, Nos. 16, 18). The same belief exists in Japan, where some families are noted for their ownership of foxes (see 'Possession,' above), and others refuse to intermarry with them on the ground of their magical powers (Chamberlain, *Things Jap., s.v.* 'Fox'). The fox is the hero of a number of Japanese tales (*Globus*, xxi. 332). In Schleswig-Holstein a procession with a fox in a basket takes place in summer, and presents are collected (Schütze, *Idiotikon*, iii. 165). To the fox is sometimes attributed the production of Easter eggs (*Globus*, xxxiv. 59). The name of the fox is sometimes tabu (*Golden Bough*², i. 454). As an ominous animal the Lithuanians regard it as inauspicious (Tettau und Temme, *Volkssagen*, p. 280); but in Masuren and Siebenbürgen the opposite view is taken (Töppen, p. 77; Haltrich, viii. 4). For folk-tales and myths of the fox see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 121–142.

Frog, toad.—In more than one European country the frog and the toad are hardly, if at all, distinguished; they may therefore be treated together. That this confusion is found in the New World seems clear from the association of the toad with rain, exactly as the frog is, justifiably, associated with water in Europe. In Ceylon the frog was held to be the undermost of the supporters of the earth; on its back was a turtle, then a serpent, then a giant; and he upholds the world (*Miss. Her.* xviii. 385). In South America the Chibchas gave the frog a place among their divinities, and had an annual ceremony in connexion with the calendar, in which the frog figured (Bollaert, *Researches*, p. 49; Dorman, *Prim. Sup.* p. 256). Among the Araucanians of Chile the 'land toad' was called the lord of the waters (*ib.*). In the mythology of the Iroquois it is told how all the water was originally collected in the body of a huge frog, by piercing which Ioskeha formed rivers and lakes (*Rel. des Jés.* 1636, p. 102). A similar story is told by the Micmacs (Leland, *Algonquin Leg.* p. 114), and the Australian blacks have Deluge legends in which the Flood is caused by the bursting of a water-swallowing frog (Brough Smyth, i. 429, 477). Among the Wends the frog is believed to bring newborn children; with this may be compared the Sea Dayak belief that the goddess Salampandai takes the form of a frog; if a frog comes into a house, sacrifice is offered to it and it is released; Salampandai is held to make the children, and a frog is seen near a house when a child is born (*JRAS, S.B.* vii. 146; Schulenburg, *Wend. Volkstum*, i. 94).

In Bohemia, children are believed to hop about the meadows in the form of frogs (Ploss, *Kind*², i. 12); with this may be connected the Brandenburg belief that a woman who digs up a toad will soon bear a child (*Zts. Ver. Volksk.* i. 189). A Shan tribe, the Wa, believes itself to be descended from tadpoles (*Asiatic Q. Rev.*, 3rd ser. i. 140). The Bahnars of Indo-China respect the frog, holding that one of their ancestors took that form (*Miss. Cath.* 1893, 140, 143), and in this shape he is believed to guard their fields. The Karens of Burma explain eclipses by saying that a frog is devouring the moon (*ib.* 1877, 455).

We have seen that the frog is associated with water. Like the Araucanians, the Orinoco Indians held the frog to be the lord of the waters, and feared to kill it even when ordered to do so; they kept it under a pot and beat it in time of drought (*Golden Bough*², i. 103; Blanco, *Conversion del Piritu*, p. 63). The Newars of Nepāl worship the frog, which is associated with the demi-god Nagas in the control of rain. A sacrifice of rice, ghi, and other objects is made to it in October (*Golden Bough*², i. 104; cf. Latham, i. 83, who says August). Water is also poured over a frog in India, or a frog is hung with open mouth on a bamboo, to bring rain (Crooke, i. 73, ii. 256).

In Queensland, British Columbia, and Europe, frogs are also associated with the procuring of rain (*GB*², *loc. cit.*), and among the Bhils (*Bombay Gaz.* IX. i. 355), etc.; in the Malay Peninsula the swinging of a frog is said to have caused heavy rain and the destruction of a kampong (*JRAS, S.B.* iii. 88). The toad is sometimes regarded as a tutelary deity in Europe (de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 380). The Tacullies of British Columbia are said to have no gods, but say, 'The toad hears me' (Maclean, *Twenty-five Years*, p. 265). The Caribs are recorded to have had idols in the form of toads (Sprengel, *Auswahl*, i. 43). In some parts of Germany the toad is regarded as a household genius (*Zts. Ver. Volksk.* i. 189; MS notes). With

this compare the belief of the Roumanians that killing a frog or toad is an omen that the killer will murder his mother (*Zts. Oest. Volksk.* iii. 373). In accordance with this belief, the frog and toad are spared (*Folklore*, xi. 240, 241; *Brandenburgia*, viii. 418; Wiedemann, *Ehsten*, 454; Russwurm, § 356, etc.). On the other hand, they are regarded as witches (*FLJ* v. 198; Haltrich, *Zur Volksk.* vii. 4; Müllenhof, *Sagen*, i. 212; Holzmaier, *Osiliana*, p. 37). Accordingly they are often killed (*Zts. Ver. Volksk.* i. 182; Rolland, *Faune pop.* iii. 49 f.; cf. *Devonshire Assoc.* xxviii. 63). For magical purposes they were killed at certain times of the year (Wuttke, *Der Abergl.* p. 95; Rolland, *op. cit.* iii. 54). In Zoroastrianism frogs and toads are evil animals, and are to be killed (*Vendīdād*, xiv. 5); and in Armenia the frog causes warts (a belief found also in the United States) and makes the teeth fall out (Abeghian, *Armenischer Volksglaube*, 30 f.). To cure these warts, meat must be stolen, rubbed on the excrescences, and buried; as the meat decays, the wart will disappear.

In a Mexican festival one of the ceremonies consisted in a dance round the images of the Tlalocs placed in a pond alive with frogs and snakes, one of which each dancer had to eat during the dance. More definite was the belief of the Choctaws, who assigned to the king of the frogs and other aquatic animals the function of initiating the rain-makers (*Miss. Reg.* 1820, 408). We may put down to the same idea the belief of the Guaranis that if a frog enters a boat one of the occupants will die (Ruiz de Montoya, *Conquista*, § 12). The southern Slavs attribute a magical influence to the name of the frog, which may not be mentioned before a small child (Krauss, *Sitte*, 549). The precious jewel in the head of the toad is mentioned by Shakespeare (*As You Like It*, II. i. 13 f.); a similar belief is found in Germany (*Germania*, vii. 435). For myths and folk-tales of the frog and toad, see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 371–379, 379–384.

Goat.—In Greek mythology the goat was associated at Argos with the cult of Hera; youths threw spears at a she-goat, and he who struck her got her as a prize (Farnell, *Cults*, i. 189), exactly as in modern Europe many animals are shot at, struck at blindfold, or otherwise gamed for (*Folklore*, xi. 25). The custom was explained by a myth that Hera had once fled to the woods and the animal revealed her hiding-place. The goat was usually a prohibited animal in the cult of Athene, but was once a year sacrificed on the Acropolis (Farnell, *Cults*, i. 290); it has been suggested that the ægis (which see) was simply the skin of the victim. Αἰγοφάγος is found among the titles of Zeus, and there is a myth in which the animal figures as the work of Zeus; he is called αἰγίοχος, just as Dionysus is termed μελάναιγις ('wearer of the black goat-skin'); in spite of the connexion of αἴγις, etc., with the wind, the original epithet was probably connected with the goat (*ib.* p. 100). In the worship of Brauronian Artemis, a worshipper sacrificed a goat, 'calling it his own daughter' (*ib.* ii. 436)—possibly a trace of human sacrifice. In Sparta a goat was sacrificed to Artemis before charging the enemy; at Ægina torches attached to the horns of goats are said to have scared away invaders (cf. Liebrecht, *Zur Volksk.* p. 261), and in Attica 500 she-goats were a thank-offering for Marathon (Farnell, ii. 449 f.). Aphrodite is the 'rider on the goat' (*ib.* 684), probably because it was her sacred animal.

At Rome goats were sacrificed at the Lupercalia, and youths clad themselves in the skins of the victims. After feasting they ran round the base of the Palatine, striking with thongs of goatskin the women whom they encountered, or who offered themselves to their blows (Fowler, *Rom. Fest.* p. 311). The Flamen Dialis was forbidden to touch a goat, and it was excluded from the cult of Jupiter (*ib.* p. 313). For the goat see also Pauly-Wissowa, *s.v.* 'Aberglaube,' p. 2.

Dionysus was believed to assume the form of a goat (*Golden Bough*², ii. 165), probably as a divinity of vegetation. Many minor divinities like Pan, Silenus, the Satyrs, Fauns, etc., either are in goat form or have some part of their body taken from the goat, and they are all more or less woodland deities. In similar fashion, the devil is commonly believed, in Europe, to have one foot in the form of a goat's hoof; and throughout mediæval demonology the goat is associated with Satan and with witches; while at the Sabbat the Evil One frequently was believed to assume the form of a goat. In Northern Europe, the wood-spirits Lēshi are believed to have the horns, ears, and legs of goats, and the goat is a form in which the corn-spirit is supposed to appear (*Golden Bough*², ii. 271, 291). In the 17th cent. the Circassian Tatars offered a goat on St. Elias day, a date on which the lamb is also offered in some parts. After proving the victim to be worthy, they drew its skin over its ears and hung it upon a pole; the flesh was then cooked, and consumed by men and women together; the men then prayed to the skin, and the women left them to their brandy and devotions (Strauss, *Reise*, p. 116). In Africa the Bijagos are said to have the goat as their principal divinity; on the Massa River the goat is kept as a tutelary deity. It is sometimes regarded as the resting-place of the souls of the dead (*Int. Arch.* xvii. 104). The king of San Salvador was believed to have deposited his soul in a goat during his lifetime (*Golden Bough*², iii. 407; Bastian, *Fetisch*, p. 12), and possibly this belief explains the position of the 'goat of the law' which Soyaux saw near Old Calabar (*Aus West-Africa*, i. 106).

The name of the goat is tabu in the Sunda Islands (*Golden Bough*², i. 462). The animal itself is similarly hedged round in South Africa (Galton, *Travels*, p. 84), Madagascar (v. Gennep, *Tabou*, p. 238), and in West Africa (*Int. Arch.*, *loc. cit.*). The goat is tabu to some of the Bechuanas (Mackenzie, *Daydawn*, p. 65 n.) ['Bushmen' in the text should be corrected to 'Bechuanas'], who believe that to look upon it would render them impure, as well as cause them undefined uneasiness; it does not, however, appear to be a totem. If a goat climbs on the roof of a house, it is speared at once, because it would bewitch the owner if it were not put to death (Mackenzie, *Ten Years*, p. 392). The antipathy, therefore, depends on its association with wizards. The goat is an important sacrificial animal, especially in Africa (*Int. Arch.* xvii. 136). In Athens it was excluded from the Acropolis, but once a year it was driven in for a sacrifice (*Golden Bough*², ii. 314). Frazer conjectures that the goat was originally a representative of Athene.

From the Jewish custom of sending a goat into the wilderness laden with the sins of the people (see 'Scapegoat,' above, and art. AZAZEL), has been derived the name for the whole class of animated beings so employed in the expulsion of evils (*Golden Bough*², iii. 101 ff.). The goat itself is the animal employed by the Lolos (Vial, *Les Lolos*, p. 12) in West Africa (Burdo, *Niger*, p. 182) and in Uganda (Ashe, *Two Kings*, p. 320). In Tibet a human scapegoat is dressed in a goat's skin; he is kicked and cuffed, and sent away after the people have confessed their sins (*South Am. Miss. Mag.* xiv. 112).

The Karens of Burma attribute eclipses to the fact that wild goats are eating the luminary; they make a noise to drive them away (*Miss. Cath.* 1877, 455).

In Europe the goat appears in processions and

other functions at Christmas, the Carnival, etc. (Mannhardt, *Antike Wald- u. Feldkulte*, 184 ff., 197). In Bohemia it is thrown from the church in September (Mannhardt, *Myth. Forsch.* 163 n.), but this apparent association with the harvest may be late; for in Wendish parts the date was July 25th (Kosche, *Character*, iv. 481). In Transylvania a goat dance is performed at weddings, probably as a fertility charm (Mannhardt, *Myth. Forsch.* 198). For the same reason, perhaps, the goat is given to the parents of the bride in Bulgaria, where, as in the Upper Palatinate, it forms the recognized dish (*Anthrop.* ii. 587; Schönwerth, *Aus der Oberpfalz*, i. 98; cf. 342). Among the Matabele of South Africa the husband gives the bridesmaids a goat to eat (*JAI* xxiii. 84). In the Vosges the younger sister who marries first must give her elder sister a white goat (*Mélusine*, i. 454).

'The goat' is one of the names by which the 'blind man' in Blind Man's Buff is known (*Folklore*, xi. 261). For myths and folk-tales of the goat see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* i. 401–428.

Goose.—The goose was one of the animals which were tabu to the Britons (Cæsar, *de Bello Gall.* v. xii.). The Norsemen also refused to eat it (*Life of Bede*, ch. xxxvi.). At Great Crosby it is still regarded as tabu (*Arch. Rev.* iii. 233). But, on the other hand, it is not infrequently eaten with more or less ceremony. The Michaelmas goose is certainly a very old custom. The bird is hunted or killed in various parts of Europe (*Folklore*, xi. 253; for ceremonial eating see p. 259). In China two red geese are given to the newly married; the explanation offered is that they are faithful to each other, as human beings should be (*Zool. Garten*, 1900, p. 76). The goose is also a gift to the newly married at Moscow (*Anthrop.* iv. 324); it has perhaps in some cases taken the place of the swan (see below). The Mandans and Minnetarees made their goose medicine; the dance was to remind the wild geese, which then prepared to migrate, that they had had plenty of good food all the summer, and to entreat them to return in the spring (Boller, *Indians*, p. 145). There were sacred geese in the Capitol and in Greek temples (de Visser, *Götter*, p. 175). In mediæval times, the goose, like the goat (see above), was associated with witches who frequently used these birds as vehicles to carry them to the Sabbat. For myths and folk-tales of the goose, swan, and duck, see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 307–319.

Hare.—Although the hare is one of the most important animals in the belief and practice of the uncultured, it cannot be said that it is anywhere regarded as divine, unless it be among the Kalmuks, who call it Śākyamuni (the Buddha), and say that on earth the hare allowed himself to be eaten by a starving man, and was in reward raised to the moon, where they profess to see him (Crooke, ii. 50). The connexion of the hare with the moon is also found in Mexico (Sahagun, vii. 2) and South Africa, where the Hottentots tell the story of how death came into the world, and explain it by a mistake made by the hare in taking a message from the moon (Merensky, *Beiträge*, p. 86; Bleek, *Reynard the Fox*, pp. 69–74). In North America, all the Algonquin tribes had as their chief deity a Great Hare (see 'Cult' above) to whom they went at death; he lived in the east, or, according to some accounts, in the north. In his anthropomorphized form he was known as Manibosho, Nanabojou, Michabou or Messou (Brinton, *Myths*[3], p. 193). In one aspect he is a culture hero, who teaches to the Indians the medicine dance and the arts of life; in another aspect he is a buffoon, who tries his magic art on various animals and fails ludicrously. In a New England Flood legend the survivors took a hare with them to the mountain on which they found refuge, and learnt of the assuaging of the waters by its non-return (Josselyn, *Account*, p. 134).

The name of the hare is frequently tabu (Russwurm, *Eibovolk*, § 358; Holzmaier, *Osiliana*, p. 105; *FLJ* v. 190; *Brit. Ass. Ethnog. Survey Rep.* [Toronto Meeting], 353; Grimm, *Deut. Myth.* cxxiv; *GB*[2] i. 457). It is unlucky to kill the hare (*Folklore*, xi. 240) or eat its flesh (Lyde, *Asian Mystery*, p. 191; Dussaud, *Hist. des Nosairis*, p. 93; *Globus*, xxxiii. 349; *Ausland*, lxiv, 58, etc.). There is a wide-spread belief that hare-lip is caused if a pregnant woman puts her foot in a hare's form.

Like many other animals, the hare is hunted annually at many places (*Folklore*, iii. 442, xi. 250; *Mem. Soc. Ant. France*, iv. 109; *Mélusine*, i. 143; *Ons Volksleven*, viii. 42), and sometimes eaten ritually (*Folklore*, xi. 259). Sometimes the hare is offered to the parish priest (*Ann. Soc. Em. Flandre*, 5th ser. i. 436; *Folklore*, iii. 441 f.). The hare is more especially associated with Easter (*Folklore*, iii. 442), and is said on the Continent to lay Easter eggs (*Das Kloster*, vii. 928; *Schweiz. Arch. Volksk.* i. 115). It is one of the animals in whose form cakes are made at Christmas (Bartsch, *Sagen*, ii. 227; Kolbe, *Hessische Volkssitten*, p. 7; Curtze, *Volksüberl.* p. 441). Among the Slavs hare-catching is a similar game to Blind Man's Buff (Tetzner, p. 86). In Swabia it is said that children come from the hare's nest (Mannhardt, *Germ. Mythen*, p. 410). The hare is said to change its sex every year (Liebrecht, *Zur Volkskunde*, p. 362).

The hare is almost universally regarded as an unlucky animal; when a Kalmuk sees one, he utters a cry and strikes a blow in the air (*JAI* i. 401). The Hottentots kill it, though they do not eat it (*Zts. Geog. Ges. Thür.* vi. 42). Its appearance in a village is thought to betoken fire, both in England and Germany (MS notes; Grohmann, *Abergl.* 375; *Am Urquell*, iii. 107; *Zts. Vsr. f. Volksk.* x. 209). In Oesel it is sometimes of good omen (Holzmaier, p. 43). Probably the association of hares with witches is in part responsible for the hare's evil augury. In Gothland the so-called milk-hare is a bundle of rags and chips of wood; it is believed to cause cows to give bloody milk (*Globus*, xxiii. 47). On the other hand, hares' heads are found on the gables in the Tyrol, probably as a protection against witchcraft (Heyl, p. 156); a hare's foot is a counter charm against witchcraft (Hone, *Tablebook*, iii. 674). Among the American negroes, in like manner, a most lucky charm is the left hind foot of a rabbit caught jumping over a grave in the dark of the moon by a red-haired, cross-eyed negro. It is also to be noted that the rabbit is one of the chief figures in the folk-tales of the negroes of the southern United States, where he outwits 'Brer Wolf' and all other animals (Harris, *Uncle Remus, his Songs and his Sayings; Nights with Uncle Remus*, etc.). The hare is one of the forms believed to be assumed by the corn-spirit (*Golden Bough*[3], ii. 269). For myths and folk-tales of the hare see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 76–82.

Hawk.—According to the Gallinomeros of California, the hawk flew in the coyote's face in the primeval darkness; apologies ensued, and the pair together made the sun, put it in its place, and set it on fire (Bancroft, iii. 85). According to the Yocuts, the hawk, crow, and duck were alone in the world, which was covered with water; the two former created the mountains from the mud brought up by the latter (*ib.* p. 124).

The most important area for the cult of the hawk seems to be North Borneo (*JAI* xxxi. 173 ff.). The Kenyahs will neither kill nor eat it. They address it, as they do anything regarded in its spiritual

aspect, by prefixing 'Balli' to its name; they always observe its movements with keen interest, and formally consult it before leaving home for distant parts. The rites are very elaborate, and, if successful, secure that the hawks which gave the omens serve as tutelary deities during absence. After a war expedition, pieces of the flesh of slain enemies are set out as a thank-offering to Balli Flaki for his guidance and protection. The hawk's aid is sought before agricultural operations are entered upon, and a wooden image of a hawk with its wings extended is put up before a new house. During the formal consultation of the hawk, women may not be present; but they keep in their sleeping-places wooden images with a few hawk's feathers in them, which serve magical purposes during illness. In this tribe the hawk seems to be regarded as a messenger of the Supreme God, Balli Penyalong; but the thanks seem to be offered to the birds exclusively. The Kayans have gone some distance in anthropomorphizing the hawk, though they still retain the idea that it is the servant of the Supreme God; they appeal to it for help, but if they get no reply, they transfer their prayer to Laki Tenangan. The hawk-god, Laki Neho, is described as living in a house at the top of a tree; but the individual hawk is still of importance. Among the Sea Dayaks the hawk-god, Singalang Burong, has become completely anthropomorphized. He is the god of war, but they say that he never leaves his house; consequently, though they take other bird omens, they do not regard the hawk as his messenger. He is the god of omens, clearly developed from a divine hawk species, and, as such, is the ruler of the omen birds; a trace of his hawk nature is found in the belief that, though he put on the form of an Iban to attend a feast, he flew away in hawk form at the end of it, when he took off his coat. It is instructive to note that in the opinion of the Ibans there are only thirty-three of each kind of ominous bird, though all are respected because of the impossibility of distinguishing ominous from non-ominous individuals of the same species.

In Madagascar (v. Gennep, *Tabou*, p. 261) various species of hawk are ominous. Some Sakalava families regard one species as sacred and bury it. In Imerina prayers are addressed to it, and portions of the wing, leg, or body serve as charms. One tribe is called by the name of a species of hawk, and the hawk is its emblem. The omens given by hawks are good or bad, according to the species.

In America the Kailtas held that when a man died his soul was carried to spirit-land by a little bird; if he had been a wicked man, the burden of his sins enabled a hawk to overtake the bird and devour the soul (Bancroft, iii. 524).

In Europe the hawk is regarded as lucky; in Baden one kind is kept or allowed to nest on the house; its presence is thought to avert a flash of lightning; in Bohemia a kind of hawk is regarded as a luck-bringing bird (Mone, *Anzeiger*, vii. 430; Grohmann, *Aberglaube*, No. 459). Like the owl and the bat, it is sometimes nailed on the doors of stables (*Melusine*, viii. 21). For hawk myths see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 92–94.

Horse.—In Greek cult there was at Colonus a common altar to Poseidon Hippius and Athene Hippia (Farnell, *Cults*, i. 272). Artemis was also associated with the horse (*ib.* ii. 450); so, too, Aphrodite (*ib.* ii. 641), perhaps in her maritime character. Cronus is said to have taken the form of a horse, and the Illyrians sacrificed a horse to him (*ib.* i. 29). But in none of these cases does the connexion of the animal with the deity justify the supposition that we have to do with a horse-cult which has undergone development, except perhaps in the case of Poseidon. There are, however, other deities intimately associated with the horse, in a manner which makes it legitimate to suppose that they have undergone anthropomorphization or taken up earlier theozoic elements. In the cave of Phigalia, Demeter, according to popular tradition, was represented with the head and mane of a horse, probably as a legacy from an older theriomorphic non-specialized corn-spirit (*Golden Bough*², ii. 303). In Laconia her priests were called πῶλοι (de Visser, *Götter*, p. 198; cf. *JHS* xiv. 138). Not only Poseidon but also the river-gods were, as a rule, conceived as tauriform, but at Rhodes four horses were cast into the sea (Smith, *Rel. Sem.*² p. 293); though this was interpreted as a sacrifice to the sun, it may have been connected with the horse form so commonly attributed to water-gods in Gaul, Scotland, and North Europe generally (*Teutonia*, ii. 72; Black, *Orkney and Shetland Folklore*, p. 189 ff.). In Gaul we find a horse-goddess, Epona, whose name is derived from *epos*, 'horse'; there are also traces of a horse-god, Rudiobus (*Rev. Celt.* xxi. 294). Of less specialized forms of horse-worship traces are to be found in Persia, where white horses were regarded as holy (Herod. i. 189; Geiger, *Ostiran. Kult.* 350 f.), and Teutonic regions, where their use was restricted to kings, and they were kept in holy enclosures (Tacitus, *Germ.* 9, 10; Grimm, *Deut. Myth.*⁴ ii. 552; Weinhold, *Altn. Leben*, p. 47). Horses seem to have attained sanctity early in India (Crooke, ii. 204), and the cult is not unknown at the present day (*ib.* p. 208). Koda Pen, the horse-god of the Gonds, is a shapeless stone, like the tiger-god of the Waralis (Hislop, *Papers*, p. 51 n.). (For the horse in mythology see Negelein in *Teutonia*, ii.; de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* i. 290–296, 330–355. For superstitions see Pauly-Wissowa, *s.v.* 'Aberglaube,' p. 76).

The horse or mare is one of the forms of the corn-spirit in Europe (*Golden Bough*², ii. 281), and the sacrifice of the October horse at Rome is usually connected with this idea (but cf. Fowler, *Rom. Fest.* pp. 248–249; see also Gruppe, *Griechische Culte*, p. 839 n.). A horse race was held, and the right-hand horse of the victorious team was offered to Mars. Its head was cut off and adorned with a string of loaves, for which the inhabitants of two districts contended; its blood was caught and used to fumigate the flocks in the spring (Fowler, *Rom. Fest.* p. 241 f.; *Golden Bough*², ii. 315 f.; cf. iii. 122). The head was fixed to the palace or the Mamilian tower. The custom of fixing horses' heads to buildings is still common, though it does not follow that we can explain the old custom on the same lines; the modern explanation is usually that the skulls are intended to keep away evil influences (Trede, *Heidenthum*, iii. 210). A similar custom exists in Germany and other parts of Europe of carving animals', commonly horses', heads at the end of the gables (Petersen, *Die Pferdeköpfe*; *Folklore*, xi. 322, 437). The horse is very commonly sacrificed in the Old World (*Teutonia*, ii. 90–148), especially in burial rites (*ib.* pp. 148–162). It is also offered in South America (*S. Amer. Miss. Mag.* xxviii. 38).

Processions in which a horse figures take place, commonly at Christmas, in Germany, France, and England (*Teutonia*, *loc. cit.*; Nore, *Coutumes*, pp. 70, 72, 76, 203, 205; *RHR* xxxviii. 334). The interpretation of these customs is uncertain; the German ceremonies are often brought into connexion with Wodan in popular belief; a connexion with the corn-spirit has also been suggested; possibly they may be associated with a mid-winter festival of the expulsion of evils, of which other traces can be found (Panzer, *Beitrag*, ii. 115 f.).

At Whitsuntide it was the custom to hold a horse race (Mannhardt, *Antike Wald- und Feldkulte*, *pass.*), to which we find a Roman parallel in the October race; they may probably be brought into connexion with the cult of vegetation.

The horse is important as an ominous animal (*Teutonia*, ii. 15), and in modern folklore omens are drawn in particular from the white horse. It is frequently regarded as being of ill omen (*RHR* xxxviii. 298; Grohmann, *Abergl.* Nos. 336–337) or a foretoken of death; but at the same time in Bohemia the white horse brings good fortune to the house where it is stabled (*ib.*); and in Northern India it is a lucky omen for a horse and his rider to enter a field of sugar-cane while it is being sown (Crooke, ii. 207). The horse, like the bull, is a fertility animal (*ib.*). If a boy is put on a horse immediately after his birth, Mecklenburgers think that he has the power of curing various maladies from which horses suffer (Ploss, *Kind*[2], i. 74). Some part of the magical importance of the horse-shoe is perhaps derived from the horse itself. In Wales and Ireland are found stories of the Midas type (*Folklore*, xi. 234).

Hyæna.—One of the chief centres of the hyæna-cult is the Wanika tribe of East Africa. One of the highest ranks of their secret society is that of the Fisi or hyænas, so called from the power of administering to suspected persons the oath by the hyæna, which, before the practice of burial was introduced, devoured the bodies of the dead. It is held that a false oath by the hyæna will cause the death of the perjurer. The Fisi also protect the fields from thieves by consecrating them to the hyæna, which they do by making certain marks near the boundaries (*Report on E. African Protectorate*, 1897, p. 10 ff.). The Wanikas look upon the hyæna as one of their ancestors, or as in some way connected with their origin and destiny. The death of one is an occasion of universal mourning, and a wake is held over it by the whole people, not by one clan only. It is a great crime to kill one, and even imitation of its voice entails payment of a fine (New, *Life Wanderings*, p. 188). Hyænas are tabu in Accra (*Int. Arch.* p. 101), and the Ewe tribes hold that they are inhabited by a god or spirit. The Masai expose their dead to be eaten by hyænas; and if a corpse has to wait more than a day for burial, it is a token of ill-luck, to be countered by the sacrifice of cattle (Baumann, *Massailand*, p. 163). South African Bantus likewise expose their dead to be eaten by hyænas (*Account of Cape of G. Hope*, p. 143), which they never kill. The hyæna is a common form of the wizard (*Int. Arch.*, *loc. cit.*), and there are various stories told of the *budas* in Abyssinia and others having transformed themselves in the sight of other people (Tylor, *Prim. Culture*[3], i. 310); gold rings are said to be found in the ears of dead hyænas similar to those worn by the *budas*, who are workers in clay and iron. Among the Matabele, wizards are said to go to fresh graves and dig up corpses, to which they give medicine and transform them into hyænas (Thomas, *Eleven Years*, p. 293), which they then employ as their messengers, or upon which sometimes they ride themselves. When the voice of the hyæna is heard, the hearer must remain perfectly still. If a hyæna is wounded at night and escapes to another kraal, the place is thought to be the residence of a wizard. The sight of a hyæna at night is unlucky; and if a man discovers a dead one, he runs away and remains perfectly silent about it. A wizard or diviner, when his training is over, has to put on the skin of a hyæna, as a sign that the Amadhlozi have endowed him with the necessary powers (*ib.*). In ancient Arabia it was believed that, if a hyæna trod on a man's shadow, it deprived him of the power of speech and motion; and that, if a dog, standing on a roof in the moonlight, cast a shadow on the ground and a hyæna trod on it, the dog would be dragged from the roof as if a rope had been made fast to it (*Golden Bough*[2], i. 287). In Talmudic belief (*Bābā ḳammā*, 16*a*), the male hyæna goes through the stages of a bat, *'arpad*, nettle, thistle, and demon, each lasting seven years.

Leopard.—The cult of the leopard is widely distributed in West Africa. In Dahomey it is especially sacred to the royal family; it is also an Ewe totem. A man who kills a leopard is liable to be put to death; but usually he pays a fine and performs propitiatory ceremonies. No leopard skin may be exposed to view, but stuffed leopards are objects of worship. Some of the king's wives in Dahomey were known as *kpo-si* ('leopard-wives'). A man wounded by a leopard was regarded as specially fortunate (Ellis, *Ewe-speaking Peoples*, p. 74; Labarthe, *Reise*, p. 153).

The Bakwiris regard the leopard as possessed by evil spirits (*Beitr. zur Kolonialpol.* iii. 194). On the Gold Coast it is regarded as the abode of the spirits of the dead (Müller, *Fetu*, p. 97), or of evil spirits (*Mitt. Geog. Ges. Thür.* ix. 18), which may endanger the life of the hunter or make him fire at a man in mistake for an animal. The hunter, when successful, announces his triumph to those who have killed a leopard previously; then a blade of grass is put in his mouth as a sign that he may not speak; his comrades tell the leopard why it was killed—because it had killed sheep; a drum gives the signal for an assembly; and the leopard is fastened to a post, its face to the sky, and carried round the town, its slayer behind it on the shoulders of another man; on their return the leopard is fastened to a tree, and the hunter is besmeared with coloured earth, so as to look like a leopard. Thereupon they imitate a leopard's movements and voice; for nine days after the death of the leopard they have the right to kill all the hens they can catch. In the afternoon the body is cut up, and portions are sent to the chief of the village and others; the hunter retains the teeth, head, and claws (*ib.*). In Agome the hunter observes the same ritual interdictions as at the death of his wife (*Mitt. d. Schutzgeb.* v. 156). Among the Fjorts the king has a right to the body of the leopard; people loot each other's towns when one is killed; and the killer has the right to appropriate any article outside a house when he is on his way to take a leopard to the king (Dennett, *Seven Years*, p. 180). In Loango a common negro who kills a leopard, which is regarded as a prince, is tried, and must excuse himself by saying the leopard was a stranger; a prince's cap is put on the leopard's head, and dances are held in its honour. In olden times the capture of a leopard was one of the few occasions on which the king could leave his *chibila* (Bastian, *Loango-Küste*, p. 243 ff.; *Int. Arch.* xvii. 98). When a leopard is killed in Okeyou, its body is treated with great respect and brought to the hunter's village. Representatives of neighbouring villages attend, and the gall-bladder is burnt *coram populo*; each person whips his hands down his arms to disavow guilt (Kingsley, *Travels*, p. 543). In Jebel Nuba a hunter, on killing his first leopard, may not wash himself for several weeks; the skin belongs to the chief; the hunter's tabu is broken when the last novice to kill a leopard has given him a slice of meat and received from him his shoes and the animal's skin (*Miss. Cath.* 1882, 461). In South Africa a man who has killed a leopard remains in his hut three days; he practises continence and is fed to satiety (Kolbe, *Pres. State*, i. 252).

The leopard society is common in West Africa. Members wear leopard skins when they seize their victims for sacrifice (Kingsley, *Travels*, p. 537).

Among the Yaos, leopards are among the animals whose figures are drawn on the ground at the initiation of girls (Macdonald, *Africana*, i. 131).

The leopard is one of the forms assumed by wizards in West Africa (Wilson, *West Africa*, p. 398), among the Madis and Latukas (Stuhlmann, *Mit Emin Pascha*, p. 801), and the Baris (*Int. Arch.* xvii. 99). The Nubas believe that the spirit of a panther passes into the *kudjur* ('priest') when he gives an oracle; he sits upon a stool covered with panther skin and imitates the panther's cry (von Hellwald, *Naturgesch.* ii. 235). In Calabar, on the other hand, the leopard is one of the animals whose images are placed in the streets at the Ndok, or purification festival, for evil spirits to pass into (Bastian, *Fetisch*, p. 21 ff.). In South Africa the heart of the leopard was sometimes eaten to gain courage, and portions of the animal were scattered over the warriors by magicians (*JAI* xix. 282). Among the Fans a leopard-skin girdle was held to render them invisible (Du Chaillu, *Voy. et Av.* p. 502). Zulu warriors ate leopard flesh to make them brave, and a Zulu would sometimes give his children a leopard's blood to drink, or its heart to eat, in order that they might become strong and courageous (*Golden Bough*², ii. 354). The gall of a leopard is regarded as poison, and in West Africa its whiskers are believed to have magical properties (Kingsley, *op. cit.* p. 543).

Lion. — In Egyptian mythology the tunnel through which the sun passed was supposed to have a lion at each end; statues of lions were placed at the doors of palaces and tombs to ward off evil spirits. There was a lion-god at Baalbek, and songs were sung when it devoured a calf. It was associated with Ra and Horus, and possibly the Sphinx with its human head and lion's body was intended as an abode for Ra (Budge, *Gods*, ii. 360; Damascius, *Vit. Isid.* p. 203). There was a lion-headed goddess Sekhmet, and the Arabs had a lion-god Yaghuth (*EBi* iii. 2804). In modern Africa we find a lion-idol among the Balondas. It is made of grass covered with clay, and resembles a crocodile more than anything else; it is placed in the forest, and, in cases of sickness, prayers are offered and drums beaten before it (Livingstone, *South Africa*, pp. 282, 304).

In comparison with its traditional position as king of the beasts, the lion occupies, however, an undistinguished place among the animals in savage belief and custom. It is regarded as the abode of the souls of the dead on the Congo and the Zambesi, as well as among the Wambugwes, Bechuanas, and Mashonas (Bastian, *Loango-Küste*, ii. 244; Livingstone, *Zambesi*, p. 159; Baumann, *Massailand*, p. 187; Brown, *On the S. A. Frontier*, p. 217; cf. Speke, *Journ.* pp. 221, 222). As a rule, it is the chief who is thus transformed; but among the Angonis there is a universal desire to be transformed into a lion after death (*ZE* xxxii. 199). The name-tabu is not by any means uncommon; the Arabs call the lion *Abū-l-'Abbās*; the negroes of Angola call it *ngana* ('sir'); both Bushmen and Bechuanas avoid using its proper name (*Golden Bough*², i. 456); the Hottentots avoid using its name on a hunting expedition, and call it *gei gab* ('great brother'). In South Africa the same ceremonies are gone through by the slayer of a lion as of a leopard or a monkey (see below). Another account says that the hunter is secluded for four days, purified, brought back, and feasted (Lichtenstein, *Travels*, i. 257). In East Africa the dead lion is brought before the king, who does homage to it, prostrating himself on the ground and rubbing his face on its muzzle (Becker, *Vie en Afrique*, ii. 298, 305). Among the Fulahs the killer of a lioness is made prisoner, and women come out to meet the party; the lioness is carried on a bier covered with white cloth. The hunter must be released by the chiefs of the village when he pleads, in reply to the charge that he has killed a sovereign, that it was an enemy (Gray and Dochard, *Travels*, p. 143). The lion is one of the animals whose shape is said to be assumed by wizards; this belief is found on the Luapula (*Petermanns Mitt.* 1874, 188) and on the Zambesi (Livingstone, *Zambesi*, p. 159), where a certain drink is said to have the power of transforming them; among the Tumbukas, men and women wander about smeared with white clay, and are held to have the power of assuming the shape of lions (Elmslie, *Among the Wild Ngoni*, p. 74); the Bushmen say that the lion can change itself into a man (Lloyd, *Short Account*, p. 20). In Greek cult a lioness was led in a procession at Syracuse in honour of Artemis (Farnell, *Cults*, ii. 432). The lion is used in magic to give courage (*Golden Bough*², ii. 354, 356; *JAI* xix. 282). It figures in Masai fables, where it is outwitted by the mongoose (Hollis, *Masai*, p. 198), and among the Bushmen (Lloyd, *loc. cit.*). In Hottentot stories it is outwitted by the jackal (Bleek, *Reynard*, p. 5); in another story the lion thinks itself wiser than its mother, and is killed by a man (*ib.* p. 67). In like manner, in an Indian story, first found in the *Pañchatantra* (i. 8; cf. Benfey, *Pantschatantra*, i. 179 ff.), and widely borrowed, appearing even in Tibet (O'Connor, *Folk-Tales from Tibet*, pp. 51–55), the lion is outwitted by the hare. For lion myths see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 153–159.

Lizard.—Of lizard myths unconnected with any cult or tabu there are but few, the best known and most widely distributed being the Bantu account of the origin of death; according to this, the chameleon was sent to man with a message that he was to live, the lizard some time after with a contrary message; the chameleon dawdled on its way, and as a result man is subject to death (Kidd, *Essential Kafir*, p. 76). In the Sandwich Islands lizards are believed to form part of the food of the soul which goes with the body after death (*Miss. Cath.* 1880, p. 626), while in Zoroastrianism the lizard forms part of the food of the damned (*Būndahishn*, xxviii. 48). In the Malay Peninsula the Orang Laut regard the small flying lizard as the emissary of the great flying lizard, which guards each man's life-stone; they cause the souls of the newborn to enter their bodies. They can change at will into crocodiles, and cause the death of any one whose life-stone is buried (*ZE* xxxviii. 187). With this may be compared a Polynesian myth about Moko (Gill, *Myths*, p. 229). The Maoris tell a story according to which the first of their race was drawn out of the water at the Creation by a lizard (Gerland, *Südsee*, p. 237). In South Australia the lizard is believed to have divided the sexes; it is a so-called sex-totem, the men destroying the female and the women the male lizards (Frazer, *Tot.* p. 52). Stories of lizard births are told in Indonesia and New Guinea (Wilken, *Het Animisme*, p. 73; *Ber. Utrecht Zendelingsver.* 1891, p. 20). In New Zealand, Yap, and the Banks Islands, the lizard is regarded as the residence of the souls of the dead (Shortland, p. 93; cf. *JAI* x. 288, 297, xix. 120; Hernsheim, *Südseeerinn.* p. 22; Codrington, *Melanesians*, p. 180; cf. 'Future Life,' above).

The main areas of lizard-cult are Polynesia (Wilken in *Bijdragen T.L.V.* 6th ser. vol. v. p. 468 ff.) and West Africa (*Int. Arch.* xvii. 112). The evidence in the latter case is, however, unsatisfactory; Dahomey is mentioned as one of the seats of the cult, but Ellis (*Ewe-speaking Peoples*) does not notice it. In Bonney, however, there appears to have been a practice of rescuing lizards which were in danger (Bastian, *Bilder*, p. 160); and Crowther

is said to have abolished the worship of the lizard-god (*Globus*, x. 285, xii. 256). An old writer describes a custom of bringing food to a lizard-god; it seems to have been the sacred animal of a secret society (Pruneau de Pommegorge in Cuhn's *Sammlungen*). On the other side of Africa the tribal god of the Shilluks is said to appear in the form of a lizard (Ratzel, ii. 43). In Polynesia respect for the lizard was wide-spread. In New Zealand, according to one account (but cf. Shortland, p. 93), it was regarded as an incarnation of Tangaloa, the heaven-god; a green lizard was more especially associated with him, perhaps from its habit of coming out and basking in the sun (Dieffenbach, *Travels*, ii. 116; Wilken, *loc. cit.*); so, too, in Samoa (*Globus*, lxxiv. 256 ff.). In the Hervey Islands, Tongaiti or Matarau (the night-heaven) was likewise identified with a spotted lizard, which comes out at night (Gill, *Myths*, p. 10). In Samoa not only family gods but general deities assumed lizard form, among them Le Sa, Pili, and Samaui (Turner, *Samoa*, pp. 44, 46, 72). An idol in lizard form, or rather a house-god, is reported from Easter Island (Geiseler, *Osterinsel*, p. 32; *Man*, 1904, No. 46). Moko, the king of the lizards, is recognized all over Polynesia (Gill, *Myths*, p. 229). In Micronesia lizard-worship was found in the shape of a cult of the dead. Lizards were kept in special enclosures, and their power over lightning and rain was held to pass into their keepers or priests, to whom offerings were made from all parts of the island (Hernsheim, *Südseeerin*. p. 22). In New Caledonia, a Melanesian area with Polynesian immigrants, the lizard was one of the animals respected and termed 'father,' probably as the abode of the soul of a dead man. Lizards were also worshipped or respected in Sumatra, Boeroe, the Mentawei Islands, Bali, etc., and seem to be identified in some cases with imported Hindu gods (Wilken, *loc. cit.*). In Madagascar the *fanany* is, according to the Betsileos, the re-incarnation of the soul of a dead man, and takes the form of a lizard; it is buried in a pot, and communication with the surface established with a bamboo; if, when it appears, it tastes the food offered, it becomes a tutelary deity of the family and the neighbourhood (v. Gennep, *Tabou*, p. 272). The lizard is commonly respected in Europe (*Folklore*, xi. 240). In Central Celebes it is killed to prevent ill-luck (*Bijd. T. L. V.* i. 88), probably as the familiar of a wizard; but this attitude is uncommon, although the Zoroastrians consider it an evil creature, the same belief surviving in Armenia (Abeghian, *Armenischer Volksglaube*, p. 31). We find the lizard in S.E. Australia as the familiar of a wizard (*JAI* xvi. 34); and the Maoris, though some lizards were respected, are recorded to have killed them as 'witch-animals' (*Aust. Ass. Adv. Sci. Reports*, vii. 774), or as the cause of sickness (Taylor, *Te Ika i Maui*, pp. 409, 44–5, etc.; cf. *JAI* xix. 120). As a messenger of the gods, or of the dead (Gill, *Myths*, p. 229; *Deutsche Geog. Bl.* x. 280), the lizard is ominous, also as the familiar of the wizard. The lizard is especially ominous in India (Pandian, *Indian Village Folk*, p. 130; *Asiatic Researches*, 1824, 421 ff.). The Musheras sacrifice a lizard (*Calcutta Rev.* lxxxviii. 286). The lizard is frequently employed in magic, sometimes as a love-charm (*Ausland*, liv. 912), or curative charm (Jones and Kropf, *Folktales*, xlix.), or for luck (Rolland, *Faune*, iii. 12). A lizard buried alive under a threshold is a protection against sorcerers (*Mélusine*, viii. 22; Müllenhof, *Sagen*, i. 212), but elsewhere it is regarded as maleficent in this position (Rochholz, *Deutscher Glaube*, ii. 167). In Madagascar the lizard is buried to cure fever (v. Gennep, *Tabou*, p. 271). In Tripoli the sight of a lizard is held to cause women to bear speckled children (*Globus*, xxxiv. 27). Connected doubtless with its magical qualities is the wide-spread use of the lizard as an art *motif* (*Publ. Kgl. Mus. Dresden*, vii. 14; *Bastian Festschrift*, p. 167). In classical antiquity the lizard was used in medicine (Pauly-Wissowa, *s.v.* 'Aberglaube'). For myths and folk-tales of the lizard see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 385–387.

Magpie.—It is held to be unlucky to kill the magpie (*Folklore*, xi. 241), but in Sweden it is the custom to rob its nest on May day and carry the eggs or young round the village (Lloyd, *Peasant Life*, p. 237). A magpie's nest betokens ill-luck (*Jahrbücher f. Schleswig-H.* viii. 92), but the omens drawn from it usually vary according to the number of birds (Napier, *Folklore*, p. 113; Gregor, *ib.* p. 137). In Norse belief the form of the magpie is assumed by witches (Meyer, *Germ. Myth.* p. 112). For magpie omens see Liebrecht, *Zur Volksk.* p. 327; *Jahrb. f. Roman. Lit.* N.S. i. 232; Socin, *Die neuaram. Dial.* p. 175; Wigstroem, *Sagor*, p. 114; Rolland, *Faune*, ii. 137, etc. The magpie is supposed to show the presence of foxes or wolves; and in Poitou it was the custom to fasten a bunch of heath and laurel to the top of a high tree in honour of the magpie (*Mem. Soc. Antiq.* viii. 451). For myths and folk-tales of the magpie see de Gubernatis, ii. 258–260.

Mantis.—A prominent figure in Bushman mythology is Ikaggen or Cagn (Bleek, *Brief Account*, p. 6; *Cape Monthly Mag.* 1874, July, pp. 1–13; Lloyd, *Short Account*, p. 5, etc.). Some doubt was thrown by Fritsch (*Eingeborenen*, p. 340) on the worship of the mantis by the Bushmen, and no very satisfactory evidence could be quoted with regard to them (*Int. Arch.* xvii. 131) until the publication of Mr. Stow's collection (*Native Races of South Africa*, pp. 531, 533), from which it seems abundantly clear that Cagn was sometimes conceived under the form of the mantis, sometimes under the form of the caterpillar, *ngo* (see 'Cult' above). It seems clear that the Hottentots regarded the insect as auspicious (Merensky, *Beiträge*, p. 86), and worshipped it on that account; the whites called it the 'Hottentots' god'; they abstain from injuring it (Schinz, *Deutsch S.W. Africa*, p. 101). Among the Tambukas, certain insects, among which is the mantis, are supposed to give residence to ancestral souls (Elmslie, *Wild Ngoni*, p. 71). In the Bismarck Archipelago there are two exogamous phratries, one of which is named after the mantis (*JAI* xxi. 28).

Monkey.—Even if it was not a common savage trait to believe in the descent of man from one of the lower animals, the resemblance between human beings and monkeys would be sufficiently strong to suggest such a tale. Consequently we find not only that man is regarded as an evolved monkey, but also that the monkey is explained as a degraded man (Tylor, *Prim. Cult.*[3] i. 376 f.; *Miss. Cath.* 1081, 97; Spix, iii. 1107). It is seriously believed in Africa and South America that monkeys can talk, but do not do so for fear of being made to work. Another group of stories tells how the great apes carry off women to the woods; while the belief in tailed men has been held by Europeans as well as savages (cf. MacCulloch, p. 277).

The chief home of the cult of monkeys is India, with its monkey-god, Hanuman. In orthodox villages the life of the monkey is safe from harm, and its magic influence is implored against the whirlwind, while it is also invoked to avert sterility. The bones of a monkey are held to pollute the ground (Crooke, i. 87–89). Mentioning a monkey brings starvation for the rest of the day, but it is regarded as lucky to keep one in the stable (*ib.* ii. 49). As at the famous monkey-temple at Benares, monkeys are said to be worshipped in

Togo, Africa, where the inhabitants of a village daily put meals for their benefit. The Kunamas and Bareas are also said to worship them (*Int. Arch.* xvii. 93). At Porto Novo, where twins are not killed, they are believed to have as tutelary spirits a kind which animate small monkeys; such children may not eat monkey meat (*Miss. Cath.* 1884, 249). Among the Hottentots the name of the monkey is tabu to the hunter (*Zts. Geog. Ges. Thür.* vi. 41). The Nkomis do not eat gorilla meat, and give three reasons: first, that their fathers did not; second, that the gorilla has no tail; and third, that it drinks the blood of the dead (*Miss. Cath.* 1894, 601). There is an ape tabu among the Battas (*Tijdschr. T. L. V.* xxi. 209). Among the Maxurunas a young mother may eat no ape meat (Spix, iii. 1188); and this tabu is extended to all women on the island of Nias (*Tijdschr.* xxvi. 282). In many cases the respect for the monkey is based on the belief that it is the abode of a human soul (*Int. Arch.* xvii. 93; *Home and For. Miss. Rec.* 1889, 302; v. Gennep, *Tabou*, p. 221); sometimes it is believed that a man who kills a monkey is turned into one after death (Hutchinson, *Impressions*, p. 163); the sacrosanct monkey is affirmed to be so only to certain families (Bastian, *Bilder*, pp. 145, 160). In Madagascar the babakoto is bought out of captivity, and in some parts the natives will not kill it or trap it (v. Gennep, *Tabou*, p. 214); the Betsimarakas bury dead monkeys, and call the babakoto their grandfather, holding it to be the abode of the souls of the dead (*ib.* p. 216). In some cases an ætiological myth is told to account for the respect shown by the Malagasy (*ib.* pp. 217–220). Among the Basutos the monkey is a totem (Casalis, *The Basutos*, p. 221; Arbousset and Daumas, p. 92; *Folklore*, xv. 112). Among the Hottentots the killer of a baboon has to sacrifice a sheep or goat and hang the lowest vertebra round his neck, or he will suffer from lumbago (*Zts. Geog. Ges. Thür.* vi. 42). The Tucunas of Brazil wear a monkey mask in some of their ceremonies (Spix and Martius, iii. 1188). In China a monkey is regarded as lucky in a stable—to keep away sickness (*Zool. Garten*, 1898, 23). In Java a magical ceremony which includes an offering to the king of the monkeys is performed to cure sterility (*Verh. Bat. Gen.* xxxix. 48). For myths, etc., of the monkey see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 97–119.

Mouse.—The mouse was especially associated with Apollo Smintheus; in his temple at Hamaxitus a mouse was portrayed near his statue, and mice were actually kept in the temple (de Visser, *Götter*, pp. 158, 178, 181). Various stories were told to account for this association of the animal with the god, none of which is necessarily true. We need not assume that there was originally a mouse-cult at Hamaxitus; the association of Apollo and the mouse may be late. If the god was appealed to, as god of day, to drive away the mice, which come in the night, his statue might well symbolize his conquest of them by putting the figure of a mouse beneath his feet; from his power over mice might arise the belief that he was the god of mice; thence the custom of keeping mice in the temple. It does not seem necessary to regard Apollo as an anthropomorphized mouse, any more than Dionysus as a transformed fox, because he was known as Bassareus. (For a discussion of the question, and of myths of mice gnawing bow-strings, etc., see *CR* vi. 413, etc.; Grohmann, *Apollo Smintheus*). The Dakotan explanation of the waning of the moon is that it is eaten by a multitude of mice (Riggs, *D. Grammar*, p. 165). The Chippewayans attribute a flood to the mouse having taken some of the bag in which the heat was stored, in order to mend his shoes, thus causing the snow to melt (Petitot, *Traditions*, p. 376). According to a Hucul myth, the mouse gnawed a hole in Noah's ark, and is unclean (Kaindl, p. 95). According to the Haidas, the mouse contains the soul of a dead man; in every one's stomach are numbers of mice, the souls of his deceased relatives (*JAI* xxi. 21). In Germanic belief, in like fashion, the soul assumes the form of a mouse, and in this form may come forth from a sleeper's mouth (Meyer, *German. Myth.* p. 64). In Celebes the *tanoana* soul is believed to turn into a mouse and eat the rice; the soul of a suicide is especially dangerous; if mice eat the rice, they take away its soul (*Med Ned. Zend.* xliii. 221, 243). The name of the mouse is tabu in parts of Europe (*Golden Bough*², i. 455). The Huculs hold that it is unlucky for a girl to kill a mouse (Kaindl, p. 73); and in India it is a sin to kill rats, which, if troublesome, must be induced to cease molestations by promise of sweetmeats (Campbell, *Spirit Base of Belief and Custom*, p. 267). In Bohemia a white mouse should not be killed; it should be taken out of the trap and fed, otherwise luck will desert the house and other mice increase in numbers (Grohmann, *Abergl.* No. 405). Sometimes spells are used to keep down the number of mice (*Golden Bough*², ii. 424); sometimes the same result is aimed at by catching a mouse and burning it (*Med. Ned. Zend.* xxvi. 240). Elsewhere one or two mice are caught and worshipped, while the others are burnt; or four pairs of mice are married and set adrift, in the idea that this will cause the other mice to go away (*Golden Bough*², ii. 425). In England, shrews must be thrust alive into a tree trunk, to prevent them from paralyzing the sheep or ravaging the lands (Hone, *Tablebook*, iv. 468). The belief that a shrew dies when it reaches a path is found among the Eskimos (*11th Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn.* p. 273), and in Greece (Pauly-Wissowa, *s.v.* 'Aberglaube,' p. 80). The 'blind mouse' is a common name for 'Blind Man's Buff.' A mouse mask is used in an Austrian ceremony (*Folklore*, xi. 261, 263). Mice are an omen of death; they leave the house at the death of the master (Rochholz, *D. Glaube*, ii. 173, i. 157). Near Flensburg a white mouse is a death omen; in Wendish districts it is a good omen (MS notes). (For a discussion of the Mouse Tower of Bingen and similar stories, see Liebrecht, *Zur Volkskunde*, p. 1 f.). Mice figure in the mythology of the Kamtchatkans, and are represented as playing many tricks on the stupid deity Kutka (Steller, *Kamtch.* p. 255). The mouse is an evil animal in Zoroastrianism, and the killing of one mouse is equal in merit to slaying four lions (*Sad Dar*, xlii. 9; cf. Plutarch, *de Invidio et Odio*). In Jewish folk-belief eating anything gnawed by a mouse causes loss of memory; whence cats, which eat mice, do not remember their masters (*Horāyoth*, 13*a*). For mouse myths and folk-tales see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 65–72.

Owl.—Although the owl is ominous in many parts of the world, it does not seem to figure largely in mythology. The Kalmuks have a saga as to the owl's having saved the life of Jingis Khan, resembling the story of Bruce's escape. From that time they are said to wear a plume of owl's feathers on their heads, and reverence the white owl. Whenever they celebrate any great festival, according to another account, they wear coloured owls' feathers. The Woguls are said to have had a wooden owl to which they fastened the legs of a natural one (Strahlenberg, *Hist. Geog. Desc.* p. 434). The owl was respected in Lithuania (*Globus*, lxiii. 66) and Mecklenburg (*Folklore*, xi. 241), and is not killed by the Macusis of British Guiana, as being the familiar of the evil spirit (Waterton, *Wanderings*, p. 223). Some of the S.E. Bantus will not even touch it, probably on account of its association with sorcerers (Fleming, *Southern Africa*, p. 265).

Among the Bechuanas it is regarded as a great calamity if an owl rests on a house, and the witch-doctor is sent for at once; he scrambles up to the place where it has perched, and purifies it with his charms (Mackenzie, *Ten Years*, p. 392). In the same way the appearance of an owl in the Capitol demanded that the place should be purified with water and sulphur (Hopf, *Orakeltiere*, p. 101). According to the Talmud, it is unlucky to dream of an owl (*JE* ix. 452); while in Germanic folk-lore witches and cruel stepmothers appear in the form of this bird (Meyer, *German. Myth.* p. 112). The owl is particularly important among the Ainus; its cry may not be imitated, because it can bewitch (Batchelor, p. 409); the eagle-owl is regarded as a mediator, and is worshipped on the chase; its head and beak are worn at feasts (*ib.* p. 413); these owls are kept in cages, like the bear, and killed (*ib.* p. 414); they are regarded as unlucky, and the barn-owl may not be eaten (*ib.* pp. 424, 428). Many American tribes associated the owl with the dead; the bridge over which the dead had to pass in the Ojibwa belief was known as the 'owl bridge' (Dorman, *Prim. Sup.* p. 262). In Australia, the owl is a so-called sex-totem (*Golden Bough*[3], iii. 415). The Chinese offer owl's flesh roasted in oil when they dig up the *phytolacca acinosa*, whose properties are believed to be those of the mandrake; the object of the offering is to appease the soul of the plant (*T'oung Pao*, vi. 342). The Buriats keep an owl, or hang up the skin of one, to protect children against evil spirits (*Globus*, lii. 252). It is one of the animals hunted in Europe (*Folklore*, xi. 250). Owls are frequently associated with magicians; the Zulus believe that they are sent by wizards (*JAI* xx. 115); among the Yorubas the owl is the messenger of sorcerers, who gather at the foot of a tree and send owls out to kill people; if one gets into a house, the inmates try to catch it and break its claws and wings, believing that this injures the sorcerer (*Miss. Cath.* 1884, 249). The Ojibwas believe that within three days after the burial of a man the evil spirit comes in the form of an owl, shooting out fire from his beak, and takes out the heart of the dead man; they endeavour to drive it away before it effects its purpose (*Manitoulin*, p. 49). Among the Pawnees, on the other hand, the owl is the chief of the night, when it gives both aid and protection (*22 RBEW* ii. 21, 40). The Greek priests carried a stuffed owl as the badge of their profession (Brinton, *Myths*, p. 128), and in Brazil the appearance of an owl is accounted a proof of its connexion with supernatural beings (Martius, *Zur Ethn.* p. 78). In the Malay peninsula the owl is one of the messengers of the pontianak (Begbie, *Malay Pen.* p. 464). In Madagascar the Antimerinas give the name *lolo* ('owl') to the souls of sorcerers (v. Gennep, *Tabou*, p. 262). Slightly different is the Californian belief that the great white owl is an evil spirit, on which account they wear its feathers as a cloak, to propitiate it (*Cont. Am. Eth.* iii. 143), or, more probably, as a countercharm, just as in Garenganze the use of a whistle made of the windpipe of the horned night-owl is held to avert the ill-luck it brings (Arnot, *Garenganze*, p. 238). On the same principle, possibly, the owl is frequently seen nailed to the barn or stable door.

The owl is sometimes used in magic. If its heart and right foot are laid on a sleeping person, it is said that he must confess all he has done. If an owl's liver is hung on a tree, all the birds collect under it (Wolf, *Beiträge*, i. 232). Sometimes, in spite of its character as a bird of ill omen, it is regarded as bringing good fortune. If it flies into a dovecot, it brings luck (Wolf, *loc. cit.*). Its cry frees from fever, and its feathers bring peaceful slumber (*Globus*, lii. 271). Its appearance near a house where a pregnant woman is forecasts an easy delivery, among the Wends (Haupt, *Volkslieder*, ii. 258); or the birth of a boy, or other good fortune, in Dalmatia (*Wiss. Mitt. aus Bosnien*, vi. 593). In Athens, as the bird of Athene, it was auspicious (Pauly-Wissowa, *s.v.* 'Aberglaube,' p. 70). In India owl's flesh is an aphrodisiac, and at the same time causes loss of memory. On the other hand, eating the eyeballs of an owl gives the power of seeing in the dark, while, if an owl is fed with meat all night by a naked man, the latter acquires magic powers. Nevertheless the owl is a bird of ill-omen in India (Crooke, i. 279, ii. 50). For the mythology of the owl see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 244–250.

Peacock.—Peacock-worship has often been attributed to the Yezidis. The latest account is that given by J. W. Crowfoot (*Man*, 1901, No. 122), who got his information from an Armenian. It appears that the Malik Tā'ūs ('King Peacock') is shaped like a bird; it has a hole in the middle of its back with a lid to it. It is brought by the head of the village, wrapped in linen, and filled with water. The priest kisses the image and sips water through the beak, the others following his example. Five bronze images are sent round continually, and every Yezidi must visit the figure three times a year. An equation, Tā'ūs = Tammuz, has been proposed, which explains the rites as a survival of Tammuz worship, the peacock coming in through a piece of folk etymology, though the Yezidis themselves hold that 'Malik Tā'ūs revealed himself in the form of a handsome youth with a peacock's tail when he appeared in a vision before Sheikh Aadi, the prophet of the faith' (Jackson, *Persia, Past and Present*, p. 12). Elsewhere in Asia Minor the peacock is regarded as the embodiment of evil (*Man, loc. cit.*; *JAI* xx. 270). According to a Javanese (Muhammadan) myth, the peacock was guardian at the gate of Paradise and ate the devil, thus conveying him within the gate (*Med. Ned. Zend.* xxxii. 237 ff.). On the other hand, in Kutch the peacock may neither be caught nor annoyed (*Zts. Geog. Ges. Thür.* xv. 59). In Europe, peacocks' feathers are considered unlucky; their cry is of bad omen. In Greek religion the bird was associated with Hera and was kept in her temple (de Visser, *Götter*, p. 175). In India the peacock is the totem of the Jats and Khandhs, and in the Panjāb snake-bites are healed by smoking a peacock's feather in a pipe. The feathers of the bird are also waved over the sick to scare disease-demons, and are tied on the ankles to cure wounds (Crooke, ii. 45, 150, 233, 250). For the mythology of the peacock see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 323–329.

Pig.—The pig is the most important sacrifice animal of Oceania, and is also a frequent victim in Africa (*Int. Arch.* xvii. 145). Its flesh is tabu to Muhammadans and Jews generally, to the males of S. African Bantus (*JAI* xix. 279), etc. It is a frequent form of the corn-spirit in Europe (*Golden Bough*[3], ii. 285; *RHR* xxxviii. 339). There are good grounds for supposing that the cult of Demeter was in part developed from that of a porciform corn-spirit (*GB*[3], p. 299). It is possible to explain features of the myths and cult of Attis and Adonis in a similar way (*ib.* p. 304), and Frazer has maintained the same of Osiris (*ib.* p. 310). Pigs were tabu in Egypt, and swine-herds might not enter a temple; but once a year pigs were sacrificed to Osiris (*ib.* p. 306). The Harranians abstained from pork (Dussaud, *Hist. des Nosairis*, p. 94), but ate it once a year (Chwolson, *Die Ssabier*, ii. 42). The Jews ate it secretly as a religious rite (Is 65^3 $66^{3.\ 17}$). Pigs were worshipped in Crete (de Visser, *Götter*, p. 161). (For Greek facts see *JHS* xiv. 152–154). There is some reason for connecting the Celtic Ceridwen with the pig; in modern Welsh folklore

the pig figures as a bugbear for children, and is believed to appear at Allhallows (*RHR, loc. cit.*). Both in Madagascar and Polynesia the pig is tabu (v. Gennep, p. 224; Turner, *Samoa, pass.*; Codrington, *Melanesians*, p. 249, etc.). In European folklore we find the pig hunted at certain times (*Folklore*, xi. 252), there is a story of a pig ancestor in Wales (*ib.* 234), and the grunting of pigs is imitated during an eclipse of the moon (Panzer, *Beitr.* ii. 313). The pig is regarded as lucky in the towns of Germany, but its original augury was inauspicious. In Oesel, on the other hand, it is regarded as of good omen (Holzmaier, *Osiliana*, p. 43). In Germanic mythology the pig is associated especially with storms, and, as a fertility animal, with the harvest-time (Meyer, *Germ. Myth.* pp. 102 f., 286 f.). In Celebes the pig supports the earth, and causes an earthquake when he rests against a tree (*Journ. Ind. Arch.* ii. 837). The pig is sacrificed in India to propitiate the cholera-goddess and other disease-demons, as well as to certain sainted dead, and to ghosts to prevent them from molesting the living (Crooke, i. 126, 137, 197, 200, ii. 58). In Zoroastrianism the form of the boar is one of those assumed by Verethraghna, the god of victory (*Yasht*, xiv. 15). For the cosmogonic boar see *ARW* v. 374 f.

Pigeon.—Various species of pigeon are tabu in Madagascar (v. Gennep, *Tabou*, p. 266), India (Crooke, ii. 246), and Europe (*Folklore*, xi. 341; *Ausland*, lvi. 1016, etc.). They are somtimes kept in houses for magical purposes (Lütolf, *Sagen*, p. 357), but are elsewhere considered unlucky (*Rev. des Trad. pop.* v. 601; *Wiss. Mitt. aus Bosnien*, vii. 349). In Albania a spring is said to be blessed annually by the descent of two doves (Hobhouse, *Journey*, p. 390). At Florence a pigeon of combustible materials is run along a line in the Cathedral at Easter (*Folklore*, xvi. 182; cf. Trede, *Heidenthum*, iii. 211; de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* p. 571; Düringsfeld, *Cal. Belge*, p. 351). In Swabia it is carried in procession (Panzer, *Beitrag*, ii. 90). In Hohenzollern-Hechingen a nest with a living pigeon in it is put on a post at Carnival; a mock contest takes place, and the bird is finally carried off amid the lamentations of the people that 'the summer bird' is stolen; the thief is caught and thrown into the water, and the bird is solemnly set at liberty (Mannhardt, *Myth. Forsch.* p. 134). Among the Brāhmans of Bombay two pigeons are brought to the bride and bridegroom on the second or third day after the wedding; they oil them and smooth their feathers (*Bombay Gaz.* ix. i. 62). Pigeons are also given or eaten in European marriage customs (Baumgarten, *Die komischen Mysterien*, p. 312; *Anthropologie*, ii. 423, n. 1; Schönwerth, *Aus der Oberpfalz*, i. 123; Vaugeois, *Hist. de l'Aigle*, p. 583, n. 110). The pigeon is of good omen in Königsberg (*Am Urquell*, i. 123), and Russia (Erman, *Archiv*, p. 628), but forebodes fire in Styria (*Zts. Oest. Volksk.* iii. 12), and very frequently a death (Kehrein, *Volksspr.* p. 269; Gregor, *Folklore*, p. 146, etc.). The souls of the blessed dead are sometimes held to take the form of doves (Meyer, *Germ. Myth.* p. 63; cf. the use of the dove in modern funeral-pieces).

In Greece the dove was associated with the cult of Aphrodite, and doves were kept in her temples (de Visser, p. 173). Similarly pigeons are attached to the shrines of Sakhi Sarwar in the Panjāb (Crooke, i. 209) and of Shakir Padshah in Khotan (Stein, *Sand-buried Ruins of Khotan*, pp. 179–180; for the mythology of the dove and pigeon see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 297–306). There is no proof that the priestesses of Zeus at Dodona were ever called 'doves' in the historical period; nor were dove-oracles known. Possibly Sophocles refers to some vague tradition when he speaks of the two doves through which the oak spoke to Heracles (Farnell, *Cults*, i. 38 n., 39 n.).

Quail.—The quail is one of the birds in Germany which it is unlucky to kill (Wuttke, *D. Abergl.*[3] p. 163; Strackerjan, *Abergl.* p. 45). In the Lausitz it is held to protect the house against lightning (*ib.*). It is also tabu in Madagascar (v. Gennep, *Tabou*, p. 267). In Hungary it is an accursed bird (Jones and Kropf, *Folktales*, p. lxi). It is one of the forms assigned to the corn-spirit in Silesia (Peter, *Volkstüml.* ii. 268), and is eaten by a newly married couple in Lithuania (*Russ. Rev.* xii. 268). In France the hearts of two quails are held to ensure the happiness of a married couple, if the husband carries that of the male, the wife that of the female (Rolland, *Faune*, ii. 343). Among the Greeks the quail was used in a game in which the players struck at it blindfold, exactly as the cock and other birds and mammals are used in Europe at the present day (Pollux, *Onomastikon*, ix. clviii.). The quail was sacrificed by the Phœnicians at its return in the spring, and they explained the festival as a commemoration of the resurrection of Heracles (*Athen.* ix. 47); possibly the first quail was killed—a practice to which there are many European analogues. In Greek mythology Artemis seems to have been vaguely associated with the quail (Farnell, *Cults*, ii. 433; she was called Ortygia, which is also a place name). For the quail in mythology see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 276–278.

Seal.—Among the Eskimos, women stop work when a seal is taken, until it is cut up; when a ground seal is killed, they stop work for three days (*5th Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn.* p. 595). The heads of seals and other marine animals are kept (*ib. 8th Rep.* p. 434). In Kamtchatka they do a piece of mimetic magic before they go seal fishing. A large stone is rolled into the court to represent the sea; small stones do duty for the waves, and little packets of herbs for the seals. A kind of boat of birch bark is made and drawn along the sand; the object of the ceremony is to invite the seals to let themselves be taken (Sébillot, *Folklore*, p. 125). In the west of Ireland and the islands north of Scotland there are certain people who believe themselves to be descended from seals, and who refuse to injure them (*Folklore*, xi. 232; *Orkney and Shetland Folklore*, pp. 170–189). The same belief is found in the Faroes (*Antiquarisk Tidschrift*, 1852, p. 191). A local legend records that they are the descendants of Pharaoh's army, which was lost in the Red Sea (Annandale, *Faroes*, p. 25). In the island of Rügen it is believed that the seal is descended from drowned human beings (*Folklore*, xi. 235). Among the Kwakiutls the chief group of dancers' societies is that of the seal (*Report of United States National Museum*, 1895, p. 419).

Serpent.—(For serpent-worship proper see separate article). The serpent is respected among many peoples who do not worship it in the sense of offering prayer or sacrifice to it; this is especially the case in South Africa and Madagascar. The Malagasy regard serpents as objects of pity rather than of veneration (v. Gennep, *Tabou*, p. 273), holding them to be the abode of dead men's souls. But the Antimerinas had a serpent idol, whose worshippers carried serpents (*ib.* p. 275); in the case of the Betsileos it is difficult to say whether we have to do with serpent-worship or not; they regard the *fanany* as the re-incarnation of a deceased ancestor, make it offerings of blood, and even tend it in an enclosure (*ib.* p. 277). If these attentions are offered it without *arrière pensée* and solely because it is one of the kin, we are hardly entitled to regard them as worship, which rather implies that an offering is not strictly disinterested.

Among the Zulus the souls of the dead are said to take up their abode in serpents, termed *idhlozi* (pl. *amadhlozi*). Various forms of the belief are recorded; according to one, the serpent form is assumed only by an ancestor who wishes to approach a kraal; another version, but slightly different, says that only the serpents which frequent the neighbourhood of a kraal are *amadhlozi*; a third authority says that the soul is not bound, as in some of the Malagasy beliefs, to the single soul-animal, but is incarnate in all the species, like the animal-gods of Samoa; a fourth account, probably unreliable, makes the *idhlozi* the soul-animal of the living (*Int. Arch.* xvii. 121; *Man*, 1904, No. 115; *Golden Bough*[3], iii. 409, etc.). As in Madagascar, different species of snakes are the abodes of different classes of men, one for chiefs, another for the common people, another for women (*Int. Arch., loc. cit.*). Among the Masai, on the other hand, the difference of species marks a difference in the family of the deceased (Hollis, *The Masai*, p. 307). In Europe, the form of the serpent, like that of the mouse (see above), may be assumed by the soul of a sleeper (Meyer, *Germ. Myth.* p. 63 f.). The serpent is respected over a large part of East Africa, sometimes as an ancestor of the tribe, sometimes as the soul-animal of deceased ancestors (*Int. Arch., loc. cit.*). Many of the tribes in New Caledonia never eat serpents, but no reason is given for this (Patouillet, *Trois Ans.* p. 113). In North America they were respected (Brinton, *Myths*, p. 129). In South America the Airicos believe themselves to be descended from serpents (Tirado, *Estudios*, p. 31; for other stories of descent see J. F. M'Lennan, *Studies*, 2nd series, p. 526). Serpents are respected over a large part of Europe, especially those which live in or near human dwellings—probably as a survival of ancestor-worship. In like manner, harmless snakes are tutelary household divinities in the Panjāb hills (Crooke, ii. 141 f.). The name of the serpent is also frequently tabu (Böcler-Kreutzwald, p. 120; Lloyd, *Peasant Life*, p. 230; *Tradition*, v. 149; *Asiatic Observer*, 1821, p. 421, etc.).

It is only rarely that ceremonies of purification are prescribed for the killer of a serpent; the Amaxosa custom prescribed that the killer of a boa had to lie in running water for weeks together; during this time no animal could be slaughtered; finally, the body of the snake was buried close to the cattle-fold (Kay, *Travels*, p. 341). On the other hand, certain precautions are to be taken in Japan; if the head of the snake is not crushed when it is killed, more will come to take its place (*Mitt. d. Ges. Natur- u. Volkerk. Ostas.* xv. 282). In Bombay it is believed that barrenness is the penalty for killing a snake (Crooke, i. 226), while in Germanic mythology such an act causes the child of the house to waste away (Meyer, *loc. cit.*).

The snake is commonly associated with water (see above), and said to reside in water-holes, rivers, etc. (Salvado, *Memoirs*, p. 260; Merensky, *Beiträge*, p. 126; Philip, *Researches*, ii. 117; *Church Miss. Rec.* xiv. 30; Strahlenberg, *Das N. u. O. Teil*, p. 420; Brinton, *Myths*, p. 130, etc.). Snakes are likewise guardians of treasure in folklore generally (Crooke, ii. 134–136). Mythical serpent-monsters are also found as earth-carriers (see 'Earth-Carrier'), or destroyers of the human race (*Mitt. d. Schutzgeb.* xiii. 45), or Creator (see 'Creator'); in Chile one is connected with the Deluge myth (Medina, *Aborigenes*, p. 28 ff.), and the Micmacs place two on the road followed by the souls of the dead (Rand, *Legends*, p. 233); the Hurons made a monster-serpent the source of all maladies (*Rel. des. Jés.* 1678, p. 75), and for the natives of Victoria the serpent Mindi is the cause of death (Parker, *Aborigines*, p. 25); for the Aruntas the Magellanic clouds are the teeth of a gigantic serpent, and silence is to be preserved when they are visible (*R.G.S.A.*, S. Aust. Br. ii. 36). In America, according to Brinton, the serpent is often associated with the lightning (*Myths*, p. 135). Mention should also be made, in this connexion, of the 'snake-dances' of the Hopis, which are probably expressions of clan totemism, not of ophiolatry (*19 RBEW* 963 ff.). In South America, serpents are held to be the chief food of the dead (Spix and Martius, ii. 695).

A good deal of mythical lore has gathered round the serpent in Europe. A king is their ruler (*Ausland*, lxiii. 1031; *Globus*, iv. 333, etc.), and wears a crown which is coveted for its magical properties; the king is often white, and the skeleton of the white snake makes its possessor the owner of a familiar spirit (*ib.* xxvi. 203). There is a stone in the snake's nest which draws poisons out of a man's body (Jecklin, *Volkstüml.* ii. 153; cf. Crooke, ii. 141 f.). In Hindu belief serpents have in their heads jewels of marvellous properties (Crooke, ii. 143 f.). He who eats the great white snake understands the language of birds (Russwurm, *Eibovolk*, § 357), or of the raven (*ib.* § 400). If a snake is hung up head downwards, it will rain (*FLJ* v. 91; Wuttke, *Volksabergl.*[3] § 153). St. Patrick banished all snakes from Ireland, and even Irish cattle have the gift of killing the snakes in the meadows where they are (*Northumb. Folklore*, F. L. S. p. 8). The snakes know a root by which they bring to life a snake that has been killed (Lepechin, *Reise*, ii. 105). The belief in the king of serpents is also found among the American Indians (Brinton, *Myths*, p. 137). Folklore likewise knows of many cases of the union of serpents with human beings (MacCulloch, 255–259, 264–267).

In the ancient world the serpent was associated with leechcraft (see DISEASE and SERPENT); the same idea is found in Madagascar (*Int. Arch.* xvii. 124), and also among the American Indians, perhaps because the snake is in America so often associated with the magician, who is also the leech (Brinton, *Myths*, pp. 132, 133). The snake is sometimes held to be unlucky (*Globus*, lxix. 72), but is more often welcomed as the 'Hausgeist.' A snake shot out of a gun is a charm against witchcraft (Liebrecht, *Zur. Volksk.* p. 332; Müllenhof, *Sagen*, p. 229); and a Huculian hunter carries a piece of snake to attract game (*Globus*, lxxvi. 274). In Sussex the first snake should be killed for luck (*FLR* i. 8). In Bulgaria and France the killing of a snake is a good work, probably because the snake is regarded as the incarnation of a witch (Strausz, *Die Bulgaren*, p. 34; Rolland, *Faune*, iii. 36). Snakes are burnt in the midsummer fire (*Athenæum*, 1869, July 24; Jones and Kropf, *Folktales*, p. lix). In North Africa the Aissaouas and other sects of fanatics eat serpents annually or at intervals during the year (Walpole, *Memoirs*, p. 396; Denon, *Travels*, i. 300; Pliny, *HN* VII. ii., VIII. XXV., XXV. x., XXVIII. iii.; Pausanias, IX. iv. etc.; cf. Bancroft, iii. 429).

The serpent is commonly of good omen; so among the South African Bantus (*Miss. Cath.* 1896, 371; Merensky, *Beiträge*, p. 126), in Arabia (Nolde, *Innerarabien*, p. 96), and in mediæval Europe (Panzer, *Beitrag*, ii. 259). In Albania it is unlucky before sunrise and after sunset (Rodd, *Customs*, p. 158). In Silesia it is held to be lucky, but its appearance is a warning that misfortune is near (Peter, *Volkstüml.* ii. 33). In Suffolk it is a death omen (*Suffolk Folklore*, F. L. S. p. 32). On the other hand, there is an elaborate table of omens drawn by the Zoroastrians from the appearance of a snake on each of the thirty days of the month (Al-Bīrūni, *Chronology of Ancient Nations*,

tr. Sachau, p. 218); so, too, in Norway, when it crawls across the road (Liebrecht, *Zur Volkskunde*, p. 326). In Zoroastrianism the serpent is a most evil creature, and to be killed (*Vendīdād*, xiv. 5; Herodotus, i. 140); it was formed by Ahriman (*Būndahishn*, iii. 15). A similar horror of the serpent exists in Armenia (Abeghian, *Armenischer Volkglaube*, p. 30). For the serpent, see, further, de Gubernatis, *Zool. Mythol.* pp. 389–419, Pauly-Wissowa, *s.v.* 'Aberglaube,' p. 77, and *JE* xi. 203.

Shark.—In New Calabar the shark is regarded as a god (*Globus*, x. 285). Sharks are sometimes regarded as enchanted men (Wilson, *Western Africa*, p. 161). The shark was formerly protected by a death penalty inflicted on the killer of one, but this was subsequently abolished by a religious revolution (Bastian, *Bilder*, p. 160). Shark-worship is said to have existed in Huahine (Montgomery, *Journal*, i. 245). In the Solomon Islands the shark is addressed as 'grandfather' (*Zts. Geog. Ges. Thür.* x. 34). Sharks were worshipped in the Sandwich Islands; and if a man who adored them happened to have a child still-born, he endeavoured to lodge its soul in the body of a shark. In order to do this he flung the body into the sea, performing various ceremonies at the same time. There were temples with shark-idols; the priests rubbed their bodies night and morning with salt and water to give them a scaly appearance (*Golden Bough*[2], ii. 432). In New Georgia the shark is *hope* ('sacred'), because it eats men. It may not be touched in Rubiana, but in the eastern part it may be killed but not eaten (*JAI* xxvi. 386). Sharks are very often the form in which dying people announce their intention of re-appearing; offerings are made to them. In Saa special coconut trees are reserved for them, but men who intend to become sharks may also use the trees. Other men will join them sometimes and ask for coconuts with the voice of a shark-ghost (*Golden Bough*[2], ii. 434–435).

Sheep.—In Greek cult the ram was connected with Zeus; at Eleusis and elsewhere its fleece was used in rites of purification (Farnell, *Cults*, i. 65; Smith, *Rel. Sem.*[2] 474). As a substitute for the eldest scion of the Athamantids, a ram was offered (Farnell, i. 94). A prayer for rain was offered to Zeus on Mount Pelion by youths clad in fresh ram-skins (*ib.* p. 95). Zeus Ammon is derived from Egypt (*ib.*). In the cult of Artemis the sheep was sometimes tabued (*ib.* ii. 431). In a sheep-offering to Aphrodite in Cyprus the worshippers wore the skin (W. R. Smith, p. 474). Aphrodite is represented as riding on the ram (Farnell, ii. 675).

Although the sheep is one of the most important sacrificial animals (*Int. Arch.* xvii. 139, for Africa), it is only in Egypt that we find a sheep-god proper. Amon was the god of Thebes; his worshippers held rams to be sacred, and would not sacrifice them. At the annual festival of the god a ram was, however, slain, and the image of the god was clothed in the skin; they mourned over the body and buried it in a sacred tomb. Amon is represented as a ram-headed god (*Golden Bough*[3], ii. 368 f.). Among the Nilotic tribes the Madis practise an annual sacrifice of a lamb, possibly as a means of expelling the evils which have accumulated. They are sad before the ceremony, and show great joy when it is over. They assemble by a stone circle, and the lamb is led four times round the people, who pluck off bits of its fleece as it passes and put them in their hair; the lamb is then killed on the stones and its blood sprinkled four times over the people. It is then applied to each person individually. As each rises to go away, he or she places a leaf on the circle of stones. The ceremony is observed on a small scale at other times, particularly when trouble comes upon a family; it is also practised on joyful occasions, such as the return of a son after a long absence (*Proc. R. S. Edin.* xii. 336). The piacular sacrifice of a ram is occasionally found in European folklore; near Maubeuge a ram is killed by one of the squires of the neighbourhood, and is believed to be laden with the sins of the people (Rolland, *Faune*, v. 206). But more commonly the sacrifice is performed without any specific reason being given for the ceremony. It is a common practice in Bohemia, Hungary, and other districts for a ram to be thrown from the church tower in the autumn in order to procure a good harvest in the following year (Mannhardt, *Myth. Forsch.* 139 n.). In Finland a lamb which has not been shorn since the spring is killed in the autumn; it must be slaughtered without using a knife, and no bones must be broken. When it is served up, water, which probably has taken the place of blood, is sprinkled over the threshold, and a portion of the meal offered to the house-spirits and the trees which will serve as May-poles in the following year (Böcler-Kreutzwald, *Der Ehsten Aberg. Geb.* p. 87). In East and Central Europe a lamb is commonly sacrificed at Easter or rather later, the day chosen being usually April 24th (*Globus*, xxvi. 158, xxx. 93, xl. 71, etc.; cf. *Golden Bough*[2], ii. 438). In West Europe there are traces of such a custom at Whitsuntide; in Hamburg, lambs, real and of wood, were on sale without the gate on the Friday before Whitsuntide; children received them as presents, and they were eventually consumed by the family (Schütze, *Schleswig-Holst. Idiotikon*, iii. 7); they were also brought as presents to the schoolmasters (*Jahrb. f. Schl.-Holst.* x. 29). In Virgen, a lamb is taken in procession on the Friday after Easter to a mountain-chapel and subsequently sold (*Zts. Ver. Volksk.* v. 205). The sheep also figures at the Carnival (Mannhardt, *Antike Wald- und Feldkulte*, p. 191 n.), the Kirmess or church festival (Pfannenschmid, *Germ. Erntefeste*, *pass.*), and at Christmas (*Tradition*, vi. 285; Mannhardt, *op. cit.* p. 196). In Wales, people dressed in sheep-skins went round on All Souls' Day (*Bygones*, May 6, 1891). In some cases the ram or sheep was hunted with or without a subsequent sacrifice (*Folklore*, xi. 251; Ducange, *s.v.* 'Agnus Dei'). Probably all these customs are in some degree connected with the idea of the expulsion of evils.

In Madagascar the sheep is one of the animals in which are incarnated the souls of ancestors; various families are forbidden to eat its flesh (v. Gennep, *Tabou*, p. 236). In India there is reason to believe that the sheep was once a sacred animal (Crooke, i. 163 f., ii. 226). A large number of Chinese have a prejudice against mutton; the sheep is, however, regarded as a lucky animal, and its skull is hung over the door to prevent theft (*Zool. Garten*, 1900, 6). In France a lamb is blessed in the church at Christmas in Nouvion, and allowed to die of old age (Rolland, *Faune*, v. 160). In the same way rich Kalmuks consecrate a white ram under the title of 'the ram of heaven'; probably the object is, as in France, to provide the flocks with a tutelary animal (*Golden Bough*[2], ii. 438).

The sheep is auspicious as an ominous animal. It is lucky to touch it (Desrousseaux, *Mœurs*, ii. 284). The skull of a sheep wards off evil (Wiedemann, *Ehsten*, p. 482; Russwurm, *Eibovolk*, ii. 281, 283, 402; *Mélusine*, viii. 33). The sheep figures in various European ceremonies connected with marriage; probably the rites are magical and performed as ceremonies of fertilization. In Poitou the newly married had to pursue a ram (*Mem. Soc. Ant. France*, i. 437); at Chatillon-sur-Seine the bride drove the animal thrice round a tub (*ib.* iv. 119). In Bulgaria and Russia the bride receives a lamb or sheep as 'Morgengabe' (*Anthropologie*, ii. 587; Holderness, *New Russia*,

p. 236). The Gallas take an oath by the sheep (Pinkerton, *Africa*, i. 8).

Spider.—In the Creation myth of the Sias there was only one being in the lower world, the spider Sussistinnako; he caused men, animals, etc., to come into existence, and divided them into clans (*10th Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn.* 1889–1890, p. 26 ff.) In like manner, among the Hopis the spider represents the 'medicine' power of the earth (*21 RBEW* p. 11). According to the Tetons, Ikto, the spider, was the first being in this world who attained maturity. He was the first to use human speech, and is more cunning than man. All the animals are his kindred, and he commands them. In their myths the spider is deceived by the rabbit (Dorsey, *Siouan Cults*, p. 472). The Tetons pray to grey spiders. When they are going on a journey, they kill a spider if they see one, and pray; it is unlucky to let it pass or to kill it in silence. They tell it that the Thunder-beings killed it (*11th Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn.* p. 479). In the mythology of the Akwapim, Anansi, the spider, is a sort of demiurge; he races the cat for the privilege of marrying the daughter of the god; hence the cat and the spider are enemies (*Petermanns Mitt.*, 1856, 466; Frobenius, *Weltanschauung*, p. 294). Many of these myths are now found in the West Indies (P. C. Smith, *Anansi Stories from Jamaica*). The Adjahdurrahs believe that the islands were made by the spider *R.G.S.A.*, S. Aust. Br. II. iii. 18). In another Australian myth the spider is a monster, and injures everything which the squirrel makes (*S. Amer. Miss. Mag.* xiv. 112). The Haidas also have a story of a spider who was the mortal enemy of man; he was overcome by T'skanahl, who threw him into the fire; he shrivelled up and became a mosquito (*Smiths. Report*, 1888, p. 326; cf. Ehrenreich, *Myth. u. Legend. d. südamer. Urvölker*, p. 33 f.). In a Kayowe myth, 'Old Spider' escapes the flood and is concerned with the early history of the human race (*Ausland*, 1890, 901). For the Flatheads the residence of their grandsires, the spiders, was in the clouds. Both in Australia (Howitt, *Native Races*, p. 388) and in America the spider's web is a means of getting up to the sky (*Trs. Ethn. Soc.* iv. 306). The Cherokees told how the spider brought fire on its web, but was captured before it reached the earth (Foster, *Sequoyah*, p. 241). It is held in several parts of Europe to be unlucky to kill the spider (*Folklore*, xi. 241; *Zts. f. Oest. Volksk.* ii. 252). In Tuscany it is the custom to kill a spider seen in the morning (Andree, *Ethn. Par.* p. 8). It is also killed in Poland (*Trad.* iv. 355). The Southern Slavs use it in magic; a girl takes a spider and shuts it up, calling on it to show her the destined lover, and promising to set it free if it does so, and if not, to kill it (Krauss, *Sitte*, p. 173).

There is a curious diversity in the omens given by spiders; in Ditmarschen a small black spider is a death omen (*Am Urquell*, i. 7). A spider in the evening is lucky, in the morning unlucky (*ib.* p. 64). In Stettin the reverse is the case (*Balt. Studien*, xxxiii. 169). In Jewish folklore the spider is hated (*JE* vi. 607). For other spider omens see John of Salisbury, i. 13; Wolf, *Beitr.* ii. 457; Meier, *Sagen*, p. 221; Birlinger, p. 119, etc. For the spider in folk-tales see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 161–164.

Stork.—The stork was sacrosanct in ancient Thessaly, and a killer of one was punished as though he were a murderer (de Visser, *Götter*, p. 157). It enjoys the same respect wherever it is found in Europe. It is also respected in Egypt (*Globus*, lxix. 257), and in Morocco (Clarke, *Travels*, III. i. 34 n.), where there is said to be a hospital for sick storks and a fund for burying dead ones. The stork is commonly said to bring the children. Its presence brings luck to the house; in particular, it is a safeguard against the danger of fire; its efficacy is discounted by the stork's supposed practice of removing its nest from a house that is shortly to be burned down. Occasionally the stork, however, is thought to bring bad luck (Wiedemann, *Ehsten*, p. 454), for, where one nests, one of the family or a head of cattle dies. So, too, in Bohemia, a stork settling on the roof, or twelve storks circling over a house, means fire (Grohmann, *Abergl.* Nos. 438, 439; cf. Meyer, *Germ. Myth.* p. 110). For other omens and beliefs see *Globus*, xxiv. 23.

The stork is one of the migrants which must be greeted when they appear in the spring; the house-stork must learn all that has happened in his absence. In other countries he is a man (*Zts. deutsche Phil.* i. 345). In spite of the sacrosanctity of the stork, it is used in magic (*ib.*; Grohmann, *Abergl.* No. 434), and its gall cures a scorpion's bite in Jewish folk-belief (*JE* xi. 559). For the stork in folk-tales see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 261–262.

Swallow.—There seems to have existed a custom in ancient Greece of carrying a swallow round from house to house, singing a song (Athenæus viii. pp. 359, 360). Swallow songs sung at the appearance of the bird in spring are very common (Kuhn and Schwartz, *Nordd. Sagen*, p. 452). We find the swallow carried round in modern Greece, a wooden bird on a cylinder, and a song is sung (Rodd, *Custom and Lore*, p. 136; cf. p. 271). In Macedonia the wooden swallow is encircled with leaves. Eggs are collected and riddles are asked the answer to which is 'swallow' (Bent, *Cyclades*, p. 434). The same practice prevails in Bulgaria and Little Russia, and the songs refer to the advent of spring (Miladinov, *Bulgarski narodni pesni*, p. 522).

The swallow is everywhere regarded as sacred; it is unlucky to kill it (Kaindl, *Huzulen*, p. 104; Strackerjan, *Abergl.* p. 45; *Globus*, xl. 325; *Brit. Ass. Ethnog. Surv. Scotl.* Nos. 379–383; Alvarez, *Folklore*, i. 224, etc.); it may not be touched (*Tradition*, v. 100), or caught (*Rev. des Trad. pop.* iv. 229; *Blätter für Landesk. N. Oest.* ii. 101; Grohmann, *Abergl.* No. 489), and its nest may not be taken (*ib.* No. 494 f.; *FLR* i. 8). In the West of Scotland, however, it is feared as having a drop of devil's blood in its veins (Napier, *Folklore*, p. 112). Its presence is regarded as lucky (*Zts. Ver. Volksk.* x. 209; Rochholz, *D. Glaube*, ii. 107). In spite of its sacred character, it is used in magic; in Bohemia the blood of the first swallow drives away freckles (Wuttke, *D. Abergl.*[3] p. 159). The first swallow is important in other respects; it has long been the custom to draw omens from it (Pliny, *HN* xxx. 25; Hoffmann's *Fundgrube f. Ges. d. Spr. u. Lit.* i. 325, and many modern instances; Bartsch, *Sagen*, ii. 172; *Germania*, xix. 319). As a rule it is of good omen, but in Thuringia it means a death in the family if a young swallow is thrown out of the nest (*Zts. Ver. Volks.* x. 209). A swallow in a room is a death omen (Erman, *Archiv*, p. 628). For other omens see Grohmann, *Abergl.* Nos. 496, 504, etc. Swallows are sold in Paris and elsewhere and set free by the purchasers (Rolland, *Faune*, ii. 321; *Rev. des Trad. Pop.* iv. 229). A similar custom exists in Japan, and is especially practised at funerals (MS note). For the swallow see also Pauly-Wissowa, *s.v.* 'Aberglaube,' p. 79.

Swan.—In the opinion of Jacob Grimm, the goose has supplanted the swan in mythology to some extent; but the opposite view seems nearer the truth. Perhaps the same applies to the duck. In European folklore the swan is most prominent in a class of *Märchen* to which it has given a name, —'swan-maiden stories' (see 'Myths' above),—but

in Picardy we find the duck taking the place of the swan (*Romania*, viii. 256). It may be noted that the subjects of transformation are not necessarily female (*ib.*; cf. Mannhardt, *Germ. Mythen*, pp. 378–379).

The swan is important in the religion of N. Asia (cf. Cochrane, *Ped. Journey*, ii. 163; Georgi, *Bemerkungen*, p. 282). Among the Tatars a man who catches a swan passes it on to his next neighbour and receives in return his best horse; its new possessor passes it on, and so on, until it is no longer presentable, when it is let loose (Castrén, *Vorlesungen*, p. 230). The oath by the swan was well known in the Middle Ages. In Moscow a swan is sometimes given to the newly married, who alone, in the opinion of the common people, have a right to eat it (*Rev. des Trad. Pop.* iv. 324). In Germanic folk-lore the swan is associated with the Norns, who sometimes assume its form (Meyer, *Germ. Myth.* p. 168). Its cry foretells a thaw, and it is pre-eminently a bird of prophecy, often of coming ill (*ib.* p. 112).

Thunderbird.—Widely spread over the American continent is the belief in a great bird as the cause of thunder, which also figures in the Creation myths of some tribes, notably the Chippewayans, as the being which brought the world from beneath the waste of waters (Mackenzie, *Voyage*, p. cxviii; cf. Dunn, *Oregon*, p. 102). The Hare-skin Indians describe it as a gigantic bird which dwells in winter in the land of the dead in the West-South-West, together with migratory birds and animals. When the warm weather comes, it returns with the ghosts in its train. When it shakes its tail-feathers, it makes the thunder, and the flash of its eyes is the lightning. It causes death; it is an evil deity (Petitot, *Traditions*, p. 283). The Iroquois believed that Onditachiæ controlled rain, wind, and thunder. The thunder they conceived as a man in the form of a turkey (?); the heaven was his palace, and he retired there in good weather; when it thundered he was collecting snakes and other 'oki' objects; he caused lightning by opening his wings (*Rel. des Jés.* 1636, p. 114; for other references see Bancroft, vol. iii. *passim*; Schoolcraft, *Indian Tribes*, etc.). In Vancouver Island the Ahts call the thunderbird Tootooch; his wings make the thunder, his forked tongue the lightning. Once there were four such birds, but Quawteaht, their great deity, drowned the rest in the sea (Sproat, *Scenes*, pp. 177, 213). The Dakotas say that the old bird begins the thunder, but the young birds keep it up and do the damage; the old bird is wise and good, and kills no one (Tylor, *Prim. Cult.*[3] i. 363). In Central America we find the bird Voc associated with Hurakan, the god of the tempest (Brasseur de Bourbourg, *Popol Vuh*, p. 71). In South America the idea is found among the Brazilians (Müller, *Am. Urrel.* pp. 222, 271; but see also Ehrenreich, *Myth. und Legend. d. südamer. Urvölker*, p. 15). The same conception is found in West Africa among the Ewe-speaking peoples. Khebioso or So, the god of lightning, is conceived as a flying god, who partakes of the nature of a bird; his name means 'bird that throws out fire.' He casts the lightning from the midst of the black cloud; the thunder is caused by the flapping of his wings. Various ideas of the same order are found among the Bantus. The Zulus think a brown bird is found at the spot where the lightning strikes; the Amapondos say that the bird causes the lightning by spitting out fire; according to the Bomvanas, the bird sets its own fat on fire and causes the lightning. The thunder is the flapping of its wings; the female bird causes loud, crackling thunder, the male distant, rumbling sounds. In Natal they hold that a white bird is the cause of the lightning (Kidd, *Essential Kafir*, p. 120 f.; cf. Moffat, *South Africa*, p. 338; Casalis, *Basutos*, p. 266; Callaway, *Religion of Amazulu*, p. 119). The conception of the thunderbird is also found in the Hervey Islands (Ellis, *Researches*, ii. 417; Williams, *Enterprises*, p. 93), and the Marshall Islands (*Mitt. d. Schutzgeb.* i. 66), and the Karens have a similar idea (Mason, *Burma*, p. 217).

Tiger.—A myth of descent from a tiger ancestor is found among the Bhils and Rajputs (Crooke, ii. 211). It is associated with Śiva and Durgā, but tiger-worship proper is confined to wilder tribes; in Nepāl the tiger festival is known as Bagh Jatra, and the worshippers dance disguised as tigers (*ib.* p. 212). The tiger is likewise worshipped by the Santals (*ib.* p. 213), while in Mirzapur, Bagheswar, the tiger-god, is located in a *bira* tree, and is said to take human form at night and call people by name; those who answer fall sick (*ib.* i. 256 f., ii. 78). The Waralis worship Waghia ('lord of tigers'), a shapeless stone smeared with red lead and ghī, which is held to protect them from tigers (*Home and For. Miss. Rec.* 1839, 390; cf. *Rec. of Free Ch.* vii. 252). In Hanoi a tiger-god is worshipped; a shrine contains an image of a tiger (*XI. Cong. Orient.* ii. 294); and a tiger-god is also found in Manchuria (*Miss. Cath.* 1895, 239). The tiger is represented in Sumatra as the abode of the souls of the dead (Marsden, p. 292; Junghuhn, *Battaländer*, p. 308), and a name-tabu is practised. A like custom is found in Sunda (*Tijdschr. T.L.V.* vi. 80) and parts of India, where the souls of those he devours sit on his head (Crooke, ii. 211). For other cases of name-tabu see Frazer, *Golden Bough*[2], i. 457.

The hunting of the tiger is naturally attended with much ceremony. The Sumatrans attack tigers only when a friend or relative has been wounded, or in self-defence. The Menangkabauers try to catch them alive in order to beg their forgiveness before killing them; they show them other marks of respect; no one will use a path that has been untrodden for more than a year; at night they will not walk one behind another or knock the sparks off a firebrand (*Golden Bough*[2], ii. 393 ff.). The people of Mandeling have a tiger clan which honours the tracks of a tiger, and claims to be spared by it; when a tiger has been shot, the women of the clan offer it betel (*ib.*). When the Battas have killed a tiger they bring its corpse to the village with great ceremony; people of the tiger clan make offerings to it; a priest then explains why it has been killed, and begs the spirit to convey his message to the soul of the tiger, so that it may not be angry and do harm; after this a dance is held, and most of the body is buried, only those parts being saved which are useful in medicine; in particular, the whiskers are burnt off at an early stage, so that they may not be used as poison (*Golden Bough*[2], ii. 394; *Tijdschr.* xxxiv. 172). Connected with the atonement for the death of a tiger is the Indian belief that a garden where a tiger has been killed loses its fertility (Crooke, ii. 212). Not only is it dangerous to kill a tiger, but being killed by one also has its perils; the 'tiger ghost' is worshipped (Crooke, p. 213). Among the Garrows a man who has been killed by a tiger is believed to appear in a dream and tell his relatives to change their names (*Mission Life*, N. S. x. 280). In North Aracan the ceremony of 'ya,' or tabu, is strictly enforced when any one has been killed by a tiger (*JAI* ii. 240). Connected with tiger-worship is the practice of taking an oath by it. The Juangs, Hos, and Santals are all sworn on a tiger skin (*Miss. Cath.* 1897, 369; Crooke, *loc. cit.*). Among the Gonds, two men, believed to be possessed by Bāgheswar, appear at marriage ceremonies and fall upon a kid with their teeth (Crooke, ii. 216).

Besides being the abode of the soul of a dead man, a tiger may be the temporary or permanent form of a living human being. In India a root is said to effect the transformation, and another root is the antidote (Crooke, ii. 216). In Central Java the power of transformation is hereditary, but the wer-tiger is held to be friendly, especially if his friends call his name; he guards the fields. For the variant of this belief which makes the tiger the soul of a dead, not a living man, see *Tijdschr.* xli. 568. The belief in the wer-tiger is also found in the Malay peninsula (Skeat, *Malay Magic*, p. 106) and China.

Closely connected with the wer-tiger is the familiar of the wizard in tiger form. A connecting link is found in the Thana belief that mediums are possessed by a tiger spirit (*Bombay Gaz.* XIII. i. 185). The Binuas of Johore believe that every pawang has a tiger subject to him, which is immortal (*Journ. Ind. Arch.* i. 276, 277). The Malays believe that the soul of the dead wizard enters the body of a tiger; the corpse is put in the forest and supplied with rice and water for seven days, during which the transmigration, which is the result of an ancient compact made by the pawang's ancestors, is effected. If the son of the pawang wishes to succeed his father, he must perform a ceremony to secure his soul (Newbold, ii. 387). The tiger is largely used in magic. In North India and Korea it is eaten in order to gain courage (*Golden Bough*[2], ii. 356). In India the fangs, claws, and whiskers are used in love charms and as prophylactics against possession, especially in the case of young children (Crooke, ii. 214 f.). The whiskers are regarded as poisonous in Sumatra (*Tijdschr. loc. cit.*) and in India (Crooke, *loc. cit.*). Tiger's flesh is burnt to keep blight from the crops (*ib.*). Some Dayaks keep a tiger's skull in the head-house; to move it is said to cause heavy rain, and to touch it is punished by death by lightning, while its complete removal would cause the death of all the Dayaks (*JRAS, S.B.* No. 5, p. 159).

Corresponding to lycanthropy in Europe, there is in India a pathological condition in which the sufferer believes that he is turned into a tiger (Sprengel, *Auswahl*, iii. 27). The Garrows say that the mania is connected with a certain drug, which is laid on the forehead. The wer-tiger begins by tearing the ear-rings out of his ears, and then wanders about, avoiding all human society. In about fourteen days the mania begins to subside. Although fits of this kind are not attributed to witches in India, the patients are said to be seen with 'their eyes glaring red, their hair dishevelled and bristled, while their heads are often turned round in a strange convulsive manner.' On the nights of such fits they are believed to go abroad and ride on tigers (Malcolm, *Memoir of Central India*, ii. 212). It seems, therefore, not improbable that the fit in question is of the same nature.

Tortoise, turtle.—Both in Asia (*Miss. Herald*, xviii. 385; cf. Bastian, *Bilder*, p. 356; Crooke, ii. 255) and in America the turtle is one of the mythical animals on which the world rests. In the Iroquois myth the world was at first covered with water, and when Aataentsic fell from heaven, the animals held a conference to decide how she was to be received, and the turtle caught her on his broad back; with the aid of mud or sand brought up by water-fowl the earth was formed (*21st Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn.* p. 180, etc.). The turtle is an important Iroquois totem, and the clan traces its descent from a turtle that threw off its shell (Frazer, *Tot.* p. 3). In like manner the tortoise is a totem of the Mundari Kols, and is also worshipped and sacrificed elsewhere in India (Crooke, *loc. cit.*). In Zoroastrianism, on the other hand, the tortoise was an evil creature, and consequently was to be killed (*Vendîdâd*, xiv. 5). A turtle tabu exists in Madagascar (v. Gennep, *Tabou*, p. 289), Java (*Tijdschr. T.L.V.* xxv. 573), and Pomotu (*Rovings in the Pacific*, p. 243); and the Kwapas were not allowed to lift a small water-tortoise by its tail, lest there should be a flood (*Journ. Am. Folklore*, viii. 130). The turtle was sacrificed in Pomotu (*Miss. Cath.* 1874, 378). The Zuñis have the turtle as one of their totems. Sometimes they send to fetch turtles with great ceremony, and apparently each family receives one; the day after it arrives the turtle is killed, its flesh and bones deposited in the little river, and its shell made into a dance rattle. The object of the ceremony is obscure; Frazer suggests that the dead are fetched in the form of turtles and sent back to spirit-land; it seems very probable that the turtle is killed in order that it may be a messenger; but it does not seem that the ceremony is performed only by the turtle clan; how far, therefore, the kinship terms applied to it are merely complimentary it is impossible to say (*Golden Bough*[3], ii. 371). Turtle-fishing is an occupation surrounded by many tabus; in Madagascar the fisher had to eat the turtle on the shore, and the shell had to be left there too; it might not be used. All the village took part in the turtle feast, and it was not allowable to eat other food with it. If these tabus are not observed, the turtles leave the shore (v. Gennep, *Tabou*, p. 287). In the islands of Torres Straits many magical ceremonies were performed to prepare a canoe for turtle-fishing. There were many tabus connected with the fishing, chiefly of a sexual character; turtle dances were also performed to ensure success in the fishing (*Camb. Univ. Exp. Reports*, vol. v. pp. 196, 207, 271, 330–336). For the myths and folk-tales of the tortoise see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 93–95, 360–370.

Whale.—The Tongans regard the whale as the abode of certain deities, and never kill it; when they chance to come near one, they offer it scented oil or kava (*Prim. Cult.*[2] ii. 232). Among the Haidas the fin-backed whale is tabu, on the ground that a dead man's soul sometimes enters it (*JAI* xxi. 20). As a rule, however, the whale, like other large mammals, is feared but not exactly worshipped. In Madagascar they have a certain veneration for it, and have a special ritual for the whale fishery; before the voyage begins, both husband and wife submit to a certain number of tabus, of which chastity is one: the man remains in his hut and fasts regularly; in his absence his wife does the same. After various magical ceremonies, the boat is covered with branches by the magicians, the fishers sing supplications to the old whales, which they do not pursue, to give them their young ones. After bringing the whale to land, the canoe backs away from the shore and then returns at full speed, the harpooners in the bow; they harpoon the animal again, and are then seized and carried to their huts, where, as a part of the ceremonies, their continence at once comes to an end; the whale is then cut up, and preparations for a feast are made; the carcase is decorated with necklaces, and one of the fishers makes a long prayer or address. Thereupon the whale is divided, and each hut receives a portion (v. Gennep, *Tabou*, p. 254 ff.).

In preparation for the whale fishing the Aleutians celebrate a festival; after killing a number of dogs, they carry a wooden image of a whale into a hut with loud shouts, and cover it up so that no light can get in; then they bring it out again and shout together, 'The whale has fled into the sea' (Krachenninikow, ii. 215). The Kaniagmiuts consider whalers to be in communication with evil spirits,

and fear them. They seem to have expiated the death of the whale as the Ainus do that of the bear. Whalers were initiated and lived in a special village; dead whalers were buried in caves, and were regarded as tutelary divinities; they were placed in positions resembling those which they took during the chase of the whale; offerings were made to them; it was believed that if a man put a piece of slate at the entrance to the cave the dead would prepare a spearhead (*Rev. d'Anth.* ii. 679–80). On the island of Ihack whalers were tabu during the fishing season; before it began, they searched for eagles' feathers, bears' hair, etc., as talismans; when the season was over, they hid their fishing implements in the mountain caves with the dead bodies; they stole the bodies of successful fishermen, some said as talismans, others in order to prepare poison from them (Lisiansky, *Voyage*, pp. 174, 209). In Vancouver Island whale-fishers are carefully selected; for months before the fishery they abstain from their usual food, practise continence, wash three times a day, redden their bodies, etc. Any accident during the fishery is put down to a violation of these tabus, and punishment is inflicted (Sproat, *Savage Life*, p. 227). The whole of the village shares in the proceeds of the fishing (*Rev. Sci.*, Nov. 4, 1899). A whale dance is performed at Cape Flattery (Swan, *Indians*, p. 70). In Nootka Sound a feast is held after the whale fishery, and the chief, before distributing the portions to the guests, performs a sort of pantomime, during which he imitates the blowing of a whale (de Saussure, *New Voyages*, ix.; Roquefeuil, p. 34). The great chiefs are buried in a special hut, which contains eight images of whales made of wood and placed in a line; after the bodies have been under ground some time, they dig them up, take off the heads, and place them on the backs of these images; the reason given is that it is done in memory of their skill in throwing the harpoon; but it has more probably a magical intention. When a whale is caught, the chief goes to the hut to offer some of its blubber to his ancestors and return thanks to the sun (?); after the festival mentioned above, the chief carves a wooden whale and puts it before the shed (*ib.* p. 102). The Eskimos of Greenland put on their best clothes for the whale fishery, because the whale cannot endure dirtiness; if they wore dirty clothes or some one took part in the chase who had touched a dead body, the whale would escape (Laharpe, xvi. 206; Egede, p. 18). The whale also in Norse folk-lore carries witches, and is himself a magician, being even associated with the dragon of Midgard (Meyer, *German. Myth.* p. 112 f.). Among the Yahgans the initiants are bound to abstain from certain parts of the whale (*South Am. Miss. Mag.* iii. 117). In South Africa the Yaos make images of whales on the ground, at the initiation of young men (Macdonald, *Africana*, i. 131). The Antimerinas believe that earthquakes are due to whales (v. Gennep, *Tabou*, p. 257). The belief suggests that they, like the Russians and others, hold that a whale supports the world. The Russians attribute a deluge to the death of one of the four whales (*Berl. Lesekabinett*, 1844, p. 210). On the Gold Coast the stranding of a whale is regarded as a presage of great misfortunes (Reclus, xii. 438).

A story resembling that of Jonah and the whale is a fairly wide-spread myth (Tylor, *Prim. Cult.*[3] i. 339). For the Dog-Rib Indians the swallowing of a man, and his escape through being drawn out by his sister's shoe-lace, form the introduction to a Deluge myth; the whale in his wrath raised great waves and inundated the earth (Petitot, *Traditions*, p. 319). The same incident of the swallowing is found among the Haidas and other tribes of the North-West Coast (*Am. Ant.* xi. 298, x. 370; Swan, *N.W. Coast*, p. 68). One of the incidents of Manibosho's career is the victory over a monster who has swallowed him (Schoolcraft, *Algic Researches*, i. 138). At Eromanga a story is told of a man who fell into the water and was swallowed by a whale, but escaped because his ear-rings pricked the inside of the monster (Murray, *Missions*, p. 180; Turner, *Nineteen Years*, p. 496). The same incident is found in the Paumotu archipelago (*Miss. Cath.* 1884, 343). The Bechuanas attribute the destruction of all save one woman to a monster who swallows them (Casalis, *Langue Sechuana*, p. 97). Among the Warangis of East Africa it is a snake which comes out of the sea (*Mitt. d. Schutzgeb.* xiii. 45).

Wolf.—Outside Europe, where the wer-wolf figures prominently in the popular belief of many countries, the wolf is, from a mythological point of view, comparatively unimportant. The Thlinkets have a god, Khanukh, whose name means 'wolf'; he is the head of the wolf phratry (Bancroft, iii. 101). It has, nevertheless, been denied that Khanukh the god has anything to do with the wolf (*JAI* xxviii. p. 144). These tribes are, however, stated to have a kind of image which they preserve with great care, as a safeguard from evil; one is in the form of a wolf's head (*Miss. Herald*, 1829, p. 368). This may, on the other hand, refer to the individual's tutelary deity; for it is a common practice to carry an image of the *manitou* (Frazer, *Tot.* p. 54).

In Europe the wolf was especially associated by the Greeks with Apollo, who was called Λύκιος (Frazer, *Paus.* i. xix. 3). Probably the wolf was originally worshipped or received offerings, as was the case among the Letts (*Golden Bough*[3], ii. 429); in process of time the cult was associated with that of Apollo, and it was supposed that he received his title from having exterminated wolves (*ib.*). Many stories connected Apollo with the wolf, some possibly due to a misunderstanding of his epithet λυκηγενής (*Iliad*, iv. 101, 119), probably meaning 'twilight-born' (Meyer, *Handb. der griech. Etymologie*, iv. 519), but interpreted by popular etymology as 'wolf-born.' In Delphi was a bronze image of a wolf; this was explained as commemorating the finding of a treasure with the aid of a wolf. Like Romulus and Remus, many children of Apollo by human mothers were said to have been suckled by wolves (Lang, *Myth*, ii. 220; Liebrecht, *Zur Volkskunde*, p. 18). The wolf was also associated with Zeus in connexion with Mount Lycæus, where a human sacrifice took place, succeeded by a cannibalistic feast, participation in which was believed to result in transformation into wolves; according to a later legend, one portion of the human flesh was served up among the other sacrificial dishes, and the eater was believed to become a wer-wolf (Lang, *Myth*, etc., ii. 263). At Rome the wolf was associated with Mars, and the Lupercalia is sometimes interpreted as a wolf-festival; if the Luperci were wolf-priests, it is probably due to the connexion of the wolf with Mars and the wolf cave (Fowler, *Rom. Fest.* pp. 310–321).

The Kamtchatkans celebrated a wolf festival and related an ætiological myth (Krachenninikow, p. 129). When the Koriaks have killed a wolf, they dress one of their number in its skin and dance round him, as they do round the bear, saying that it was a Russian who killed him (*Golden Bough*[2], ii. 397); the Tunguses kill a wolf with fear (Erman, *Archiv*, xxi. 25). When the Kwakiutl Indians of British Columbia kill a wolf, they lay it on a blanket and wail over the body; each person must eat four morsels of its heart. They bury it and give away the weapon with which it was killed. They believe that killing

a wolf causes scarcity of game (*Golden Bough*[3], ii. 396). In the same way in ancient Athens any one who killed a wolf had to bury it by subscription (*ib.*). Possibly the Cree custom of painting the faces of young wolves with vermilion or red ochre is a propitiatory ceremony (Hearne, *Northern Ocean*, p. 363), for there is a prohibition of killing wolves among them, which is not, however, universally observed (*ib.* p. 243). A neighbouring tribe, the Chippewayans, forbid women to touch a wolf skin (Dunn, *Oregon*, p. 106). It is very common to use another name for the wolf than the ordinary one (*Golden Bough*[2], i. 454; Rolland, *Faune*, i. 118; *FLJ* vii. 55, etc.). The Romans regarded the wolf as unclean, and purified the city with water and sulphur if a wolf got into the Capitol or the temple of Jupiter (de Gubernatis, p. 529).

The wolf is frequently found among the tutelary animals of the dancing or secret societies of North America. The Nootkas relate that wolves once took away a chief's son and tried to kill him; failing to do so, they became his friends, and ordered him on his return home to initiate the other young men into the society, the rites of which they taught him. In the ceremony a pack of wolves, *i.e.* men with wolf masks, appears and carries off the novice; next day they bring him back apparently dead, and the society has to revive him (*Golden Bough*[2], iii. 434 ff.). Similar associations are found among the Kwakiutls (*Report U.S. National Museum*, 1895, 477–479), and among the Dakotas, by whom parts of the animal are used in magic, though they may not kill it (except, probably, at initiation), or eat it, or even step over or on it (Frazer, *Tot.* p. 50; cf. Schurtz, *Altersklassen*, p. 164; and for these societies in general, pp. 150, 390 ff.). In connexion with these societies may be mentioned a curious confraternity that existed in Normandy till late in the last century. A prominent part in the midsummer ceremonies was taken by the Brotherhood of the Loup Vert and its chief; they ran round the fire hand in hand, and had to capture (while belaboured by) the man selected for the headship, to which was attached the title of Green Wolf, in the following year (*Golden Bough*[2], iii. 282).

The corn-spirit is believed to take the form of a wolf (*Golden Bough*[3], ii. 264 ff.), and the binder of the last sheaf is sometimes called 'the wolf.' The wolf also appears at Christmas in Poland (*ib.* 266), and at the Carnival in Nuremberg (Mannhardt, *Ant. Wald- und Feldkulte*, p. 323). In Norse mythology witches and giantesses ride on wolves yoked with serpents (Meyer, *Germ. Myth.* p. 142), while the demonic Fenrir-wolf is too well known to require more than passing mention here. In Zoroastrianism wolves rank as most evil animals (*Yasna*, ix. 18), and should be killed (*Vendîdâd*, xviii. 65). A wolf must be seen by a man before it spies him, or evil results will follow (*Yasna*, ix. 21)—a belief which has its parallels in classical lore and in modern Europe (Darmesteter, *Études Iraniennes*, ii. 244). In Armenia, in like manner, wolves are even more evil than serpents, and numerous charms are used against them (Abeghian, *Armen. Volksglaube*, 114–116).

As the last dangerous animal to survive in many parts of Europe, the wolf has given its name to the group of beliefs based on the idea of the temporary or permanent transformation of living men into wolves or other animals (see LYCANTHROPY). The people of the Caucasus say that women are transformed into wolves as a punishment for sin, and retain the form for seven years. A spirit appears to them at night bearing a wolf skin, which the woman has to put on; thereupon she acquires wolfish tendencies, and devours children. At times she puts off the wolf skin, and if any one can burn it the woman vanishes in smoke (Haxthausen, *Transkaukasia*, i. 323. For wer-wolves in general see Tylor, *Prim. Cult.*[2] i. 312; Hertz, *Der Werwolf*; Baring-Gould, *Book of Werwolves*). A very similar belief is found in Armenia (Abeghian, *op. cit.* 116–118). As an ominous animal the wolf is commonly auspicious. For myths and folk-tales of the wolf see de Gubernatis, *Zool. Myth.* ii. 142–149. For the wolf see also Pauly-Wissowa, *s.v.* 'Aberglaube,' p. 81.

Wren.—All over Europe the wren is called the 'king of the birds' (*Golden Bough*[3], ii. 442), and a German story tells how it gained the position in a contest with the eagle (de Gubernatis, ii. 208). In France and the British Isles it is accounted unlucky to kill a wren or harry its nest (*Golden Bough*[3], *loc. cit.*), but there was also a custom of hunting it annually (*Folklore*, xi. 250; *RHR* xxxviii. 320; *NQ*, 6th ser. x. 492, xi. 177, 297; Croker, *Researches in the S. of Ireland*, p. 233) at Christmas or somewhat later. In the Isle of Man the bird was killed on the night of Dec. 24, and fastened, with its wings extended, to a long pole. It was then carried round to every house, and finally taken in procession to the churchyard and buried. The feathers were distributed, and certain lines sung which seem to indicate that the wren was formerly boiled and eaten. In Ireland and Wales the bird was sometimes carried round alive. In France the bird was struck down, and the successful hunter received the title of 'King' (*Golden Bough*[2], ii. 445). In Limousin the 'roi de la Tirevessie' was named, whereupon he had to strip naked and throw himself into the water. He then took a wren upon his wrist and proceeded into the town, where he stripped the bird of its feathers and scattered them in the air; finally, the wren was handed over to the representative of a squire (*Tradition*, iv. 166). Thereupon a wooden wren was attached to a high post and shot at; if it was not hit, a fine had to be paid. In Berry the newly married took a wren on a perch to the squire; it was put on a waggon drawn by oxen (*ib.* p. 364; Rolland, *Faune*, ii. 297). At Entraigues the wren had to be set free (*ib.*). It is probable that these ceremonies are connected with a former annual expulsion of evils; in Kamtchatka a similar ceremony is performed in connexion with an annual festival (Krachenninikow, p. 147); a small bird is captured in the forest, roasted, and tasted, and the remainder thrown into the fire.

The wren is considered of good omen in Japan (Chamberlain, *Kojiki*, p. 241 n.), and among the Ainus (Batchelor, p. 439); in the Isle of Man fishermen take one to sea (Rolland, *Faune*, ii. 295), and it is used in the Tyrol folk-medicine (Heyl, p. 139). Among the Karens it is believed to be able to cause rain (*Miss. Cath.* 1888, 261). In Australia the emu wren is a 'sex totem' (*Golden Bough*[2], iii. 416); near Tanganyika it seems to be a totem (*Miss. Cath.* 1885, 381). Both in Europe (*Ann. Phil. Chrét.* 3rd ser. ii. 148) and in Victoria (Dawson, *Aust. Ab.* p. 52) the wren is said to have brought fire from heaven or elsewhere. The wrens of one brood are said to be re-united on Christmas night (*Ann. Phil. Chrét.* 1 f.). A song of the wren figures in the Pawnee Hako-ceremony (*22 RBEW* ii. 191 f.).

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ANIMISM. — *Definition and Scope.* — In the language of philosophy, Animism is the doctrine which places the source of mental and even physical life in an energy independent of or at least distinct from the body. From the point of view of the history of religions, the term is taken, in a wider sense, to denote the belief in the existence of spiritual beings, some attached to bodies of which they constitute the real personality (*souls*), others without necessary connexion with a determinate body (*spirits*). For convenience in treating the subject, it will be of advantage to study Animism separately under the following three forms:—(i.) Worship of the souls of men and animals, manifesting itself above all as worship of the dead (*Necrolatry*); (ii.) worship of spiritual beings who are not associated in a permanent way with certain bodies or objects (*Spiritism*); (iii.) worship of spiritual beings who direct the permanent or periodically recurring phenomena of nature (*Naturism*).

Animism in the sense just stated represents an attempt to explain in a rational way all the facts of the Universe. It is the religion and the philosophy of all non-civilized peoples. It predominates at the commencement of all the historical forms of worship. Finally, it still shows itself, in its complete development, among the survivals of folk-lore.

In all probability, from the moment when man began to inquire into the cause of phenomena, external or internal, he thought to find it in the only source of activity with which he was directly acquainted, namely, an act of will. Objects which moved, or which he believed capable of moving, gave him the impression either of bodies set in motion by hidden beings, or of bodies endowed, like himself, with will and personality. Our languages bear witness to a mental condition in which those who created them attributed life, personality, and sex to the forces of nature.*

The imaginary personalities that controlled the sun, the moon, the stars, the clouds, the waters, etc., were not thought of separately from their

* A similar conception is found at the present day among non-civilized peoples. 'The Ashivis or Zuñis,' writes Mr. Frank Cushing, 'suppose the sun, moon and stars, the sky, earth and sea, in all their phenomena and elements, and all inanimate objects as well as plants, animals and men, to belong to one great system of all-conscious and inter-related life, in which the degrees of relationship seem to be determined largely, if not wholly, by the degrees of resemblance' (*PBE*, Smithsonian Institution, vol. ii. [1883] p. 9). Again, Sir E. im Thurn relates that the natives of Guiana look upon men and animals, the heavenly bodies, atmospherical phenomena, and inanimate objects, all as beings of the same nature, alike composed of a soul and a body, and differing only in the extent of their powers (*JAI*, vol. xi. p. 377).

visible garb, any more than the personality of a man was conceived of apart from his body. But it cannot have been long before a new inference made its presence felt. The experience of dreams led men to the conclusion that their *ego* was different from their body, that it could separate itself from the latter—temporarily during sleep, finally at death—and yet continue to exist. Thus a native of Australia, being asked by a traveller whether he believed that his *yambo* could quit his body, replied: 'It must be so; for, when I sleep, I go to distant places, I see distant people, I even see and speak with those that are dead' (Howitt, 'On some Australian Beliefs' in *JAI*, vol. xiii. [1884] p. 189).

i. Necrolatry.—It will of course be understood that, in employing the terms 'soul,' 'spirit,' 'personality,' we do not mean to attribute to savages any notion of immaterial entities, such as is arrived at by making abstraction successively of all the properties of matter except force. The soul is to them simply a being of a more subtle essence, generally invisible but not always intangible, subject in a certain measure to all the limitations of human beings, but endowed at the same time with mysterious faculties.

Hitherto no people has been met with which does not believe in the existence and the survival of human souls, which does not admit the possibility of their intervention in the affairs of the living, and which does not seek to enter into relations with them by processes which are everywhere closely analogous—either by offering to them anything of which they were fond during their lifetime, or by applying to them the methods resorted to by sorcery in order to avert or to control superhuman powers. The assertions of some authors to a contrary effect are due to incomplete observation, hasty generalization, or misunderstanding of the sense of the terms employed.

The souls of living beings are generally believed to be the pale and vague image of the body itself.* It is the *double*, as it appears in dreams. Sometimes the soul is assimilated to the shadow cast by the body ('the shades' of poetical language), or to its reflexion in water. At other times we find it confounded with the breath (Lat. *anima*, Gr. ἄνεμος, Skr. *prâṇa*, Heb. *rûaḥ*= 'breath,' 'wind'), or with the beats of the heart and the pulse. Again it may have a special form attributed to it, borrowed from living beings or what are viewed as such: birds, serpents, insects, *ignes fatui*, meteors, wreaths of vapour, etc. There are peoples who imagine that man possesses a plurality of souls, each with its distinct rôle.

Souls, it is supposed, may feel the counter-stroke of wounds inflicted upon the body or of diseases which attack it. Again, the same body may become successively the seat of a number of souls, and, conversely, the same soul may inhabit in turn various bodies. Hence the magical processes, not uncommon among non-civilized peoples, whereby it is sought to replace the original soul by a superior one; and the custom, observed amongst the most diverse races, of putting to death, the moment he shows the first signs of mental or physical decrepitude, the personage—sorcerer, chief, or king—whom it concerns the tribe to preserve in the full possession of his faculties. In this way his soul is thought to pass yet unimpaired into the body of his successor.

What becomes of the *double* after death? In general it is supposed to continue to haunt the corpse as long as any part of it remains, or to frequent the vicinity of the tomb. At times the notion of survival is limited to the more or less vivid recollection retained of the deceased.

'Ask the negro,' writes Du Chaillu (*TES* i. 303), 'where is the spirit of his great-grandfather, he says he does not know; it is done. Ask him about the spirits of his father or brother who died yesterday, then he is full of fear and terror.'

At the end of a certain period, or as the result of certain rites, the soul, as is sometimes held, reincarnates itself; or, more frequently, it is believed to take its departure to another world—situated under ground, beyond the sea, on the summit of a mountain, above the vault of heaven, in the stars, etc. There it leads a vague, colourless, miserable existence (this is the peculiar quality of subterranean abodes, *Sheol* or *Hades*); or, it may be, an existence moulded more or less closely upon the earthly life, each shade retaining his rank and his circumstances.

But, even upon this hypothesis of another abode, the soul is still supposed to intervene in the affairs of the living, especially when the deceased wishes to do a good turn to his descendants or to take vengeance upon his enemies. Hence the importance assumed by Ancestor-worship, a practice which has played so large a part, as has been shown by Herbert Spencer, in the consolidation of families and tribes. This cult has its origin at once in the fear of ghosts, in filial affection, and in the desire to preserve for the family the benefits of paternal protection. Once it is admitted that death does not interrupt the relations between men, it is logical to suppose that a father after his decease will retain a prejudice in favour of his descendants, and will seek to add to their welfare and to protect them against dangers at home or abroad. The children, for their part, in order to preserve his favour, will have to continue to show him the consideration he demanded in his lifetime; they must also maintain the organization of the family and assure the permanence of the home, so that this cult may never be interrupted.

By the side of ancestors, and at times above them, a place comes to be taken by the *manes* of illustrious personages who have profoundly impressed the popular imagination—chiefs, sorcerers, conquerors, heroes, legislators, and reputed founders of the tribe or the city.

The worship of ancestors sometimes includes the belief that all the members of a tribe are descended from some individual who is held to have possessed the form of an animal or, more rarely, of a plant. This involves certain relations of consanguinity with all the representatives of this species. See Totemism.

The notion that the lot of souls in the future life is regulated by their conduct in the present life belongs to a more advanced stage in the evolution of religious ideas. Its appearance and development can be traced in the majority of historical religions. The first stage is to accept the principle that souls have awarded to them a better or worse existence according as they have or have not, during their sojourn on earth, deserved the favour of the superhuman powers. The last stage is reached when it is supposed that, upon the analogy of what happens in well ordered societies, the lot of the soul is made the subject of a formally conducted process of judgment, where good and evil actions are weighed. The favourite titles to future happiness are at first services rendered to the gods, pious actions, sacrifices; afterwards they are services rendered to the community which it is the aim of the gods to protect. Thus the theory of *retribution* finds room by the side of the theory of *continuation*, and probably succeeds to it. But

* The emperor Hadrian, when dying, gave a definition of his soul which well expresses this notion:

'Animula vagula, blandula,
Hospes comesque corporis.'

(Ælius Spartianus, 'Adrianus,' c. xv., in *Scriptores Historiæ Augustæ*).

even this method of regulating the destiny of souls after death does not exclude such an eventuality as their temporary return to earth and entrance into relations with the living.

ii. Spiritism.—Once a start has been made by attributing to all living beings, and even to a great many inanimate objects, a mental equipment which differs from a man's own merely in the degree of activity and power, it is a logical inference that souls may, in their turn, separate themselves temporarily from their bodies, and, if the latter be dissolved, may survive them. These souls assume, as a rule, the physiognomy of a *double*, or a form appropriate to their function, but always chosen so as to imply movement and life. Moreover, at this stage of intellectual development, man will cherish a belief in the existence, as independent agents, of a multitude of analogous souls proceeding from beings and objects which he has not known. These souls, from the very circumstance that they have lost their connexion with particular bodies, acquire a fitness for assuming all aspects and performing all offices.

Such is the origin of *spirits*, to whose agency are finally attributed all phenomena which men can neither explain by natural causes nor set down to the account of some superhuman being with functions exactly defined. The most benighted savages, even when they have no idea of the distinction between natural and supernatural, perceive quite clearly that certain events are due to causes whose connexion is self-evident. They did not need to wait till a Newton came to reveal the law of gravitation, in order to convince themselves that, if an apple detached from a tree falls to the ground, there is nothing in this phenomenon but what is natural and capable of being foreseen. But everything that strikes them as unusual and unexpected—and this category includes the great majority of phenomena—seems to them due to the action of invisible powers acting through mysterious processes. These powers bear, amongst all non-civilized peoples, a generic name which corresponds in their respective languages to our term 'spirits.'

The disembodied spirits may introduce themselves into any body whatsoever. When they invade the body of a man, they take the place of his personality, or at least introduce disorders; to them are attributed the phenomena of possession, inspiration, second sight, intoxication, disease. All non-civilized peoples without exception ascribe diseases either to the entrance of a spirit into the body, or to wounds inflicted by a spirit from outside, or to the removal of the soul by a malevolent spirit. When spirits penetrate into a material object, they make it the vehicle or the organ of their own personality, and thus transform it into a fetish. The fetish differs from the *amulet* (or the *talisman*) in that the latter owes its efficacy to a property transmitted from without, whereas the fetish itself always owes its virtue to the presence of a spirit lodged within.

When one begins to introduce something like order amongst the superhuman powers, spirits are grouped in classes according to the sphere which they inhabit or the function which they discharge. Thus we have spirits of the air, of the under world, of the waters, of fire, of plants, of flocks, etc. The physical form attributed to them is generally one borrowed from living animate beings, but enriched with fantastic features.

iii. Naturism. — The souls of natural objects endowed with the character of permanence or of periodicity (such as the sky, the earth, the heavenly bodies, the elements, vegetation, etc.) often tend to assume a special importance. They are, none the less, regarded as distinct from their visible garb, and likewise have a proper physical form assigned to them, which is ordinarily the human form or that of one of the higher animals. The genii so conceived of may temporarily leave their domain and even intervene in a number of affairs that have no connexion with their original function. They thus tend to encroach upon the sphere of the souls of ancestors and upon that of ordinary spirits. When we look at them from another side, we note that, while the majority of spirits are regarded as malevolent, and are dreaded and treated accordingly, the genii of Nature are sometimes ill-omened and at other times propitious, like the phenomena over which they preside; and hence they tend to awake in their worshippers a mingled sentiment of fear and of affection, corresponding to this double aspect of their nature. We frequently note a disposition to exaggerate their benevolent side, and, above all, their power by the use of flatteries, unconscious or deliberate, which in the end are brought forward as the expression of the truth. Certain genii tend thus to outstrip the other superhuman powers, and to become man's allies in his conflict with the hostile forces of Nature.

To the above differentiation in the conception of souls there corresponds a certain variety in the forms of cult. Propitiatory acts—sacrifice, prayer, homage—predominate in the relations with the higher rank of the Divine Powers; on the other hand, it is acts of conjuration—evocation, incantation, exorcism—that are employed by preference when spirits have to be dealt with. This explains why magic is the ordinary companion of Spiritism. Where the evolution of religion has developed neither veneration for the forces of Nature nor the worship of Ancestors, the cult consists almost exclusively—as we see in the case of the negroes, the Australians, the natives of Siberia and South America, etc.—of processes intended to avert or to subjugate the superhuman powers. Among these peoples the conception of the world as a domain abandoned to the caprices of arbitrary and malevolent wills makes of religion a reign of terror, weighing constantly upon the life of the savage, and barring all progress. On the other hand, where Animism develops into polytheism, it may be viewed as a first stage in that evolution which leads to making the Divine Power the supreme agent who seeks order in nature and the good of humanity.

[The subject will be more fully dealt with under SOUL and SPIRIT].

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GOBLET D'ALVIELLA.

ANNAM (Popular Religion).—A characteristic of the Annamese is the multiplicity and variety of their cults. Influenced more by tradition than by conviction, they are only indifferently versed in the three great religions of foreign origin that prevail in their country—Chinese Buddhism (*Phật giáo*), which is celebrated in the pagoda (*chùa*); Confucianism (*Nho giáo*), in the temples of the educated (*văn miếu, văn chi*); and Taoism (*Thờ' tinh, thờ' các ba*), in the palace (*phu dên*). These are official cults, practised especially by the upper classes and the learned.

So also the cult of the Sky and the Earth, which allows no other celebrant than the sovereign, and the cult of the ruling Emperor receive from the Annamese only subordinate veneration. We shall not describe these cults, which are all of Chinese importation, but refer the reader to art. CHINA.

The masses retain their preference for ancestor-worship (*thờ ông bà ông vai*), which the head of the family offers in a reserved part of the house (*nhà tổ*); for the Genii and Spirits of all kinds, which are invoked in the chapels (*miếu*); and for the numerous magical performances (*phép thuật*), which have come from China, from India, and from the other races of the Indo-Chinese Peninsula, or which are simply autochthonous. No one has yet succeeded in finally deciding what belongs to each of these various influences. They all co-operate in perpetuating the old animistic beliefs, which have remained very deep-rooted in Annam as elsewhere.

1. Animism.—To the inhabitant of Annam life is a universal phenomenon; it is the common possession not only of men and animals, but also of things—stones, plants, stars, and of the elements—earth, fire, water, wind, etc.

To all he gives a sex and a rank. The sun is male; the moon, his wife, is female; the stars send good fortune and bad from on high. Then some animals have been *anthropomorphized* or even deified, which implies fear and at the same time reverence for them; *e.g.* in Annam they always speak of 'Sir Tiger' (*Ông Cọp*). Hence that worship, which is so strange, of the whale, the dolphin, and the tiger.

The Annamese not only admits that life is common to all existing things, but conceives of that life not as isolated, but as collective; he sees it in groups, not in individuals. This difficulty in conceiving individualism is one which is not confined to the Annamese. It exists in almost all primitive races, and still continues among those of slow development, as in China, for example, where the idea of collective solidarity, the conception in groups, has legal consequences. When a crime is committed in China, not only is the guilty one punished, but his forefathers, his descendants, his parents, his friends, and even his neighbours. In the collection of taxes, the upper classes in the community are always responsible to the treasury for the general crowd.

In addition to these two ideas of universality and collectivity of life, the Annamese believes in the contiguity and permeability of beings who do not form distinct categories, but can pass from one genus or species to another under certain conditions of space and time. Hence theriomorphism and totemism.

The elephant was born from the star Giao Quang, the rabbit from the moon. A fox at the age of fifty years can change into an old woman; at a hundred years into a lovely maiden, very dangerous to her lovers; at a thousand years of age, if he happens to find in a cemetery a human skull which fits his head, he may become a spectre, or a being similar to the Hindu *preta*. Sows can go the length of changing into courtezans.

The fish after a thousand years becomes a dragon, the rat at the end of a hundred years a bat, and the bat after another hundred years a swallow. Any one who can catch it at the time of its metamorphosis and eat its flesh becomes immortal.

Tigers' hairs may give birth to worms. Even plants are capable of similar transformation: the chuối tree (a kind of banana), on reaching a thousand years of age, becomes a blue goat. The people maintain that a banyan tree (*Ficus indica*, Linnæus) which grew within the precincts of a temple near Hanoï, on being cut down, became transformed into a blue buffalo. The ngô-đồng (*Elæococca vernicifera*, Linnæus) has the power of changing itself at night into a ghost with a buffalo's head. These transformations, possible to plants and animals, are still more so to supernatural beings, and even to man. The fairies (*bà tiên, nang tiên*) often take the shape of butterflies, the genii those of men and monkeys. The mother of an Annamese king of the Trần dynasty (1226–1402) appeared in the form of a red serpent on the altar on which the first sacrifice to her *manes* was being offered. Some sorcerers have a still more extensive power: certain of them create swarms of bees from grains of rice, with which they fill their mouths and which they then blow out forcibly into the air; others ride on a simple sheet of paper, which they can at will transform into a donkey and then change back to its original state.

In this reciprocal and continuous intermingling of the life of all beings, pairing cannot be determined or limited by species. The legend of the founding of Cô-loa tells of the union of a maiden with a white cock. Dinh-bô-Lãnh, at one time a drover in the Ninh-bình mountains, who founded the national Annamese dynasty in the 10th cent., is said to have been the son of a woman and an otter. These totemic legends enable us to understand such names as the Fox clan, the Dragon clan, the clan of the Red Sparrow-hawks, assumed in semi-historical times by the tribes among which Annam was divided. The Annals state that, down to the 14th cent., the kings of Annam tatued their bodies with the representation of a dragon, in allusion to their legendary origin.

For a similar reason, but with a more practical object, the inhabitants of fishing villages used to tatu themselves with the figure of a crocodile in order to establish their relationship with the numerous crocodiles of their shores, and to be spared by them. Others in the same way used to adorn their bodies with a serpent, in order to avoid being bitten by those formidable reptiles.

Union was possible not only between men and animals, but also between human beings and supernatural beings, genii, or vampires, especially as vampires often assume the appearance of men, to be better able to deceive the women they wish to possess. O-loï, a famous personage at the court of the Hanoï kings, was, the legends affirm, the son of the genius of the Ma-la pagoda and the wife of Si-Doang, Annamese ambassador to the court of China.

The phenomenon of conception, in the popular beliefs of the Annamese, not only does not always presuppose the identity of species of the two parents, but can even be accomplished without sexual intercourse between them. Nearly all the heroes of the semi-historical period in Annam, as well as China, are the result of miraculous fertilization. The mother of the assassin of king Dinh-Tiên-Hoàng, who ascended the throne in 968, became pregnant after dreaming that she was swallowing the moon. Another king was born from a fresh egg that his mother had taken from a swallow's nest and eaten. The legends abound with analogous cases in which fertilization is due to spring-water, the touch of a handkerchief, the fall of a star, etc.

Another result of this absence of limits to beings and things is that everything that resembles a certain individual, in however small a degree, may at a given moment be regarded as the individual, and undergo the treatment that was to befall him. Here we come upon the spells often practised by the Annamese sorcerers. The effigy or the sign may replace the thing signified so effectually that they sacrifice to the genii of epidemics the effigy of the person whom they wish to see dead. By analogous reasoning, they burn at the graves paper representations or even merely a list of all the objects (clothing, furniture, jewels, houses, etc.) that the dead man is supposed to take away with him.

Similarly, any particular condition is transmissible by contact, without regard to the person's own will. That is why a person who wants to avoid all misfortune has to keep constantly in the shade. A pregnant woman must be careful not to accept betel-pellets from a woman who has already had a miscarriage, under penalty of abortion. She must not eat double bananas if she does not want to give birth to twins. A person carrying straw must avoid passing a field of rice in blossom; the rice would change to straw. They believe also in the contagion of death, and several parts of the funeral ceremony aim specially at guarding them from it.

Lost in the midst of the universal life which surrounds him, haunted by the terrible and manifold forms that that life can take to destroy him, the Annamese lives constantly on the defensive. If he tries by sacrifices and offerings to gain the favour of the good spirits, he seeks still more to appease the malignant ones, under whatever form they appear, and to foresee, and consequently to

avoid, all the misfortunes which may befall him. Hence the cults of the good and evil genii, of certain animals and of souls, the belief in magic and presentiments, and a whole series of prophylactic ceremonies before each important event in life, especially birth, marriage, and death.

2. Good Spirits.—In the first rank of good spirits is Dôc-Cu'ó'c, the one-footed Spirit, whose worship, the Annamese assert, was brought from Nam-quan in China to Tonkin by a Taoist priest. He flourished chiefly in Nghê-An, but he has worshippers throughout the whole of Tonkin. Dôc-Cu'ó'c assumes the form of a warrior of noble bearing, brandishing an axe in his only hand, which is always represented in profile. His body, cut in two lengthwise, rests on a single foot. A prayer taken from the ritual of the spirit praises his merits thus: 'The one-footed Spirit has only one eye and only one foot, but he is swift as lightning and sees all that happens in the world. He sees afar the evil spirits who bring plague, ruin, and misfortune. He calls to his aid the millions of celestial soldiers. He protects and avenges men. Tigers and demons dread him. He sends good or bad weather as he chooses, makes the sun to shine or the rain to fall, and cures all diseases.'

An inscription in memory of the erection of his temple in the hamlet of Ngo-ru'o'u (Tonkin) eulogizes him in these words: 'The one-footed Spirit is powerful; he protects the country. Every one fears, loves, and reveres him. Armed with a golden axe, he hovers on the clouds and scours the country, always present though invisible. By his favour the student is successful in his examinations, the farmer is assured of his crop, the buffaloes are strong and active, the farmyard is prosperous, gold and silver are amassed in the coffers, there are no longer any poor people in the village. All this is due to the influence of the one-footed Spirit, because he is pleased with our homage, and glad to see his temple erected in a propitious place.'

To obtain a favour from the one-footed Spirit they trace a formula on a white paper, and place the paper on his altar with a small sum of money (generally equal to about 1s. 6d.), where it must remain for one hundred days.

The ritual of the one-footed Spirit contains a series of formulas which, written in a certain way on paper or on shells, form precious charms for the most diverse cases: invisibility, toothache, barrenness, different diseases; they banish malicious powers, ensure the sex of a child during pregnancy, silence children who cry through the night, ward off nightmares and ghosts, prevent demons from entering the mouth of the celebrant when he is invoking the one-footed Spirit, and from replying instead of him.

Dôc Cu'ó'c can, moreover, transfer a part of his power to small figures of straw, wood, or paper made by his priests. These figures can then go to the places to which they are sent, in order to work as much harm as possible to men, animals, and objects chosen for their vengeance, who are not long in being struck down by death, disease, ruin, or destruction.

In the same way, in cases of demoniacal possession, the priest of the one-footed Spirit can, by his exorcism, constrain the demons to leave the possessed person and to take refuge in a rough wooden or straw doll, which is then burned.

Around the one-footed Spirit crowd legions of good spirits (*thân lành*), who preside over the events of life in general. The tutelary genii of the village (*thân kì*) and the patron guardians of the home and the family (*thân tù'*) are also worshipped. These spirits are infinite in number, as every action and even every object is, for the Annamese, placed in dependence upon a superior power, whose favour they must win, especially to thwart the continual temptations of the *ma*, or evil spirits.

It is for this reason that, during the first three days of a new year, when all Annam is rejoicing, each Annamese workman, after worshipping his ancestors, whose special festival it is, seeks to gain the favour of the spirit who presides over his special work. The peasant offers a sacrifice to the spirit of the buffaloes in the stable or in the fields. The offerings consist of cooked rice, a little salt, palm-sugar, incense, leaves of gilt paper, and as many large cakes as the farmer has cattle. The shape of these cakes varies according to the sex of the animal. The female buffaloes' cakes, which are square and flattened, contain other smaller cakes, intended for the young buffaloes which they are supposed to carry in the womb. The buffaloes have their horns decorated with gilt paper, and into each of their mouths is put a little of each offering, the remainder being left to the drovers. Then each buffalo is led out to trace three furrows.

Thus also the blacksmith sacrifices to his forge, or rather to the spirit of his forge, after having adorned his bellows with gilt paper. The limeburner sacrifices to his limekiln, the hunter to his nets and snares, the merchant to his hampers, and the master of the house does not forget the three hearthstones and the lime jug, which are also covered with gilt paper. The lime jug is filled to the brim so that it may have abundance, and that in return its spirit may see to the welfare of the family.

Invocation and sacrifice take place also when in a new house the head of the family installs the lime jug, whose contents will be used in the composition of the national masticatory of the natives of the Far East—betel-pellets. In it the guardian of the house (*chu nhà*) is incarnated. Its premature end would forebode the death of one of the members of the household, whom they wish to see crowned with hoary hairs, as the jar itself is with lime. When, in spite of all precautions, it breaks, a new one is bought, but great care is taken not to throw the other into the ashpit. Its spirit would dearly avenge such irreverence. They go and place it with great ceremony on the branches or trunks of certain trees near the pagodas, either to serve as an offering to the wandering souls who come to take shelter in these trees, or to be delivered there to a spirit which is powerful enough to prevent it from taking vengeance on the inmates of its former home.

When hunters catch an animal in their nets, they kill it and then pull off a part of its left ear, which they bury in the spot where the animal was caught, as an offering to the Spirit of the soil (*Thô Thân*). Then the prey is flayed and dismembered. Its heart, cut up into small pieces, is cooked on burning coals. These pieces are then laid on broad leaves on the ground; and the chief of the hunters, prostrating himself four times, informs Thô Thân that such and such a band of men from such and such a village has taken the liberty of depriving him of such and such an animal. The animal is then divided among all the hunters.

In fields of eatable or market-garden plants (cucumbers, water-melons, etc.), they often erect a miniature chapel of straw to the Lord of the earth (*Thô Chu*). In this way the field is placed under the protection of the spirit; and thieves are far more afraid to come near it, for it is Thô Chu, and not the owner, that they dread having anything to do with.

For the same purpose of protection, travellers, on leaving the river for the sea, make offerings of gilt paper at the mouth of the river, in order to secure the favour of the sea-spirits. Those who travel by land throw them at the turnings of the road to avoid accidents, especially the teeth of the tiger.

There are also female spirits (*chu' ví*), who inhabit forests, springs, thickets, and certain trees. At their head are the five great fairies:

(1) Thuy-Tinh-công-Chúa, 'Star of the Waters.'
(2) Quinh-Hoa-công-Chúa, 'Hortensia Flower.'
(3) Quê-Hoa, 'Camellia Flower.'
(4) Bach-Hoa, 'White Flower.'
(5) Hoàng-Hoa, 'Yellow Flower.'

Their goodwill is secured through the intermediaries *bà-dông*, or priestesses, who correspond to the sorcerer-priests of the evil spirits.

Then the people also render regular worship to the *Bà-Dû'c-Chúa*, or the Three Mothers, whose three images, dressed in red, are set up in a side chapel in nearly all Buddhist and Taoist temples. They represent, according to the Annamese, the Spirit of the Forests, the Spirit of the Waters, and the Spirit of the Air and Sky.

3. Evil Spirits.—Far more numerous and more dreaded are the maleficent powers, which, for the Annamese, inhabit all space. They include the whole of the *Ma* and the *Qui*, evil spirits or devils, hobgoblins, vampires, and ghosts, which are constantly adding to their number by recruiting from the millions of the wandering souls of the dead.

Physical and moral pain, epidemics, ruin, and accidents come from them. There is the Spirit of Cholera, of Small-pox, of Bad Luck, etc. It is for this reason that the Annamese seek by every means to appease them, and are far more deeply concerned about them than about the good spirits. For, whereas the good spirits harm human beings only when they are offended or slandered by them,

the evil spirits are incessantly trying to work mischief. They can be disarmed only by means of sacrifices, or rendered harmless by the protection of the good spirits.

In the first rank we must place the worship rendered to the spirits of the autochthones (*chu' ngu*), the original possessors of the soil, which wander about famished, because their descendants are no longer alive and cannot offer them sacrifices, and look with a jealous eye upon others possessing their goods. Not only are they granted a share of the oblations which are made at stated times by the bonzes, sorcerers, or private individuals, but every year each landowner, in one of the first three months, offers a sacrifice to them. And if unforeseen evils befall the farmers or their cattle, if they are the victims of misfortune, it is evident that the anger of the *chu' ngu* is affecting them. They must appease him by a sacrifice (generally an expensive one), in which they buy or hire his land from him, in order to live peaceably with him. With the help of a medium they enter into communication with the spirit and make him sign the contract of this mystical sale, the amount of which they pour out to him in imitation paper money. Henceforward the landowner has nothing to fear from the *chu' ngu*.

Of a more dangerous kind are the *Ma-lai*, 'wandering demons,' who have all the signs of life, and often assume the form of a pretty girl; but at night their head, followed only by the complete alimentary canal, becomes separated from the body and goes about feeding on excrement and taking part in a kind of infernal 'witches' midnight orgy.' The prosperity of a house which has been entered by a *Ma-lai* is very soon affected by it.

It is well also to guard against the *Ma-tro'i* or *ignes fatui*, which, thin and worn, wander through the fields quite naked, with dishevelled hair, walking a foot above the ground; and also against the *Con-tinh*, or spirits of young maidens who have died prematurely—spirits which are of the most malicious kind. They hide in trees, from which they are heard laughing with a weird laugh and calling. The passer-by who is so imprudent as to answer their call feels his soul fly from his body and becomes mad. One must also beware of the *Ma-gia*, or spirits of the drowned who have not received burial. They sit in trees at night, and try either to attract passers-by or to cause boats to sink. It is the *Ma-gia* that sends the fatal cramp to the swimmer, which paralyzes him and causes him to drown. The best means of appeasing this spirit is to call back the soul in order to construct a tomb for it (*chiêu hôn dâp nêm*).

This ceremony consists in re-making a body for the person who has disappeared, and in re-uniting the soul of the drowned person to this body by means of magical ceremonies, after which the funeral is celebrated. This artificial body, whose bones are made from mulberry branches, its entrails from five threads of different colours, its flesh and viscera from earth and wax, and its skin from flour pancakes, is dressed in the most beautiful clothes of the dead person, and put into a coffin. The ceremony of fixing the soul in this new body requires the aid of a sorcerer and of a medium who is provided with three sticks of incense and a coat that had belonged to the deceased. These two men go in a boat to the real or supposed place where the person was drowned, the medium stretching out the hand in which he holds the coat. If this hand begins to tremble, they conclude that the spirit of the dead man (*vià*) is re-instating itself in the coat. The medium then jumps into the water, and after a time comes up, saying that he has succeeded in getting possession of the spirit of the drowned man. They put the coat that was used in the ceremony into the coffin, which is then shut, and they proceed with the burial.

The *Ma-loan*, or spirits of soldiers who have died in the wars of the Empire, are recognizable by their hurried and unintelligible whisperings. The *Ma-giâu*, *Ma-dziua*, *Ma-dzem*, *Ma-riu*, or phantoms which mislead people in the night, form a ring and turn round about the traveller, or talk in front of him until, struck by illusion and exhausted with following the phantoms, he falls in some lonely spot to which he has been lured. A magical ceremony is necessary to bring back life or reason to the victims of these treacherous phantoms.

The *Ma trôt-trôt*, or souls of beheaded persons, are the cause of whirlwinds. The Annamese scare these demons away by calling out 'Chem! Chem!' ('I behead you').

The *Ma thân-vòng*, or souls of those who have hanged themselves, try to entice to another attempt at suicide those who have been saved when attempting to hang themselves. For these the charm is broken by cutting the string, not by undoing it. If this precaution has been omitted, the danger may still be obviated by a ceremony in which a *Ma thân-vòng* is represented with a rope in his hand. They burn this little figure, and then the rope of the hanged man is cut in pieces.

The *Con-hoa*, the souls of those who have perished in fires, glide under the roofs in the form of bluish smoke on the anniversary of the day of their death, or at fixed times, and cause spontaneous fires very difficult to extinguish.

The *Con-sâc*, or vexatious spirits, are especially fond of tormenting young children, in whom they cause frights, convulsions, head eruptions, etc. Twelve in number, they each rule an hour of the day. An offering of twelve red handkerchiefs, twelve mirrors, and twelve fans, while the mother and the child are under a bamboo frame, wards off their evil influence. Amulets, such as tigers' claws, vultures' vertebræ, or a tiger's skull, hung above the children's cradles, drive away the *Con-sâc*.

The *Môc-chân* dwell in trees, and continue to live in them even when their dwelling-place has been cut down and used as material for building houses. These demons, lying down on people when asleep, give them nightmare.

It is well to beware also of the *Ma-dun*, gigantic ghosts of buffaloes and elephants, and especially the *Cô-hôn*, or abandoned souls, who, having died a violent death, return to torment the living. They are appeased by offerings of leaves of imitation gold or silver, or counterfeit bank-notes. The wandering souls which have not had burial take shelter by 'millions and tens of millions' in the shade of shrubs and trees. At night they come in crowds to attack people passing on their way, and they send misfortune to those who forget them. So large is their number and so sad their lot, that small temples of wood or plaited bamboo are erected for them, or small stone altars, sometimes formed simply by a stone at the foot of a tree. The individual whose business is in danger tries to gain the favour of these miserable souls by oblations, which almost always consist of paper representations of bars of gold or silver,* paper shoes, and rice. The rice is scattered broadcast to the four cardinal points, while the offerer says: 'This is for the miserable souls who wander among the clouds, at the mercy of the winds, and whose bodies have rotted by the wayside or under the water. Let each single grain of rice produce one hundred. Let each hundred produce ten thousand, and let the wandering souls be satisfied.' The souls then hasten forward under the supervision of two spirits, one of which notifies them by ringing a bell, while the other, sword in hand, sees to the just division of the rice among the hungry souls.

4. Animal-worship.—From their ancient animal-cult the Annamese have retained some forms of worship, as well as a veneration born of fear, for a certain number of animals. The animal most dreaded is *Ông Cop*, a title of respect equivalent

* The bar (*nén*) is a parallelopipedal ingot used as money. The bar of gold (*nén vàng*) weighs 390·5 gr., and is worth 1336·80 francs. The bar of silver (*nén bạc*) weighs 382 gr., and is of variable value.

to 'Sir Tiger.' This awe-inspiring feline is worshipped in many places, and has special priests or sorcerers, the *thầy-dông*. Small stone temples are erected to him, provided with two altars, the one a little back and on the top of the other. On the lower one a huge lamp burns in honour of the spirit who is the real patron of the temple. At the foot of this altar, *Ông Cọp* is painted on a screen, seated, with bristling whiskers and sparkling eyes. Sometimes the temple has nothing on its altar except a stone tiger.

The *thầy-dông*, by means of a medium called *dông*, enter into communication with the spirits, and in their name exorcize, cure, give advice for the success of such and such a matter, etc.

This tiger, although so greatly respected, is nevertheless, in practical life, hunted with great keenness; and the Annamese, while eagerly pursuing it, from fear of being devoured by it, are careful to honour it and to speak of it with the most reverential fear. Among them fear or horror is often expressed by such exclamations as: '*Ma cọp*,' 'Tiger's ghost!' '*Cọp lại*,' 'The tiger is coming!' etc.

To excuse the unreasonableness of this conduct, they imagine two kinds of tigers: those which feed on human flesh, are always on the outlook for slaughter, and which men should kill mercilessly; and the real tigers, creatures which are endowed with supernatural powers, have a horror of human flesh, and live in solitude at the foot of the mountains.

Being devoured by a tiger implies predestination or heredity. Predestination would come from a misdeed committed in a former existence, and thus avenged by the tiger. Heredity would be explained in another way: the soul and spirit of a man devoured by the tiger become, as it were, the tiger's servants, and even slaves. They must accompany him everywhere and beat down his prey before him. They entice prey by imitating the cry of an abandoned child, thus causing men to lose their way in the mountains, and they always attach themselves preferably to members of their own family. Hence, when the father is devoured by the tiger, there is every likelihood that the son will have the same fate. For this reason, when a person has perished by the teeth of the tiger, he is not buried in the family tomb, and his relatives cover themselves with talismans or prophylactic amulets.

The hairs of the tiger's whiskers may be used for making very dangerous poisons. So they are burned whenever the animal is caught. The tiger's claws ward off evil spirits. From his bones and teeth an efficacious cure for hiccough is derived.

They have a very great regard also for *Ông-Voi*, 'Sir Elephant,' who is considered as strong as he is modest, and for *Con trâm nư'ớc*, 'the water buffalo,' a fabulous animal which causes the waters to divide before it. The person who holds a hair of this buffalo in his hand can cross a river dry-shod.

The dolphin (*Cá nư'ợc*, *Cá voi*) is very much revered, especially by the maritime population. He is believed to save shipwrecked sailors by carrying them on his back. They also give him the title of *Ông*, 'Grandfather,' 'My Lord,' 'The Venerable.' They make use of a periphrasis to announce his death, or say that he is dead and has received the official name of 'Spirit with the jade scales.'

The dead body of a dolphin encountered at sea is a presage of good fortune. It is taken ashore and buried with ceremony. The captain of the vessel that discovers it becomes the 'son of the dolphin,' conducts the obsequies, and wears the prescribed mourning. The bones of the dolphin, exhumed after three months and ten days, are laid in a sanctuary, this being a guarantee of prosperity for the whole village. Every boat, too, during its voyages, is on the outlook for the death of a dolphin. A village which possesses several dolphins' tombs may give one of them to a less fortunate village. The transference takes place with solemn rites, after the consent of the dolphin has been obtained in a ceremony with sacrifices.

Ông Tí, 'Sir Rat,' is invoked both by farmers, that he may not devour the rice which is being sown, and by sailors, that he may not gnaw their boat of woven bamboo.

Ông Tằm, 'Sir Silk-Worm,' is treated with the greatest deference during its breeding, in order to counteract the great mortality of its species. To *Ông Chà*, 'Sir Stag,' the peasants offer sacrifices, and beg of him not to devastate the fields of rice which they have planted in a newly-cleared corner of a forest, since normally the stag has every right to regard this very place as his home.

Ông Chang, 'Sir Boar' or 'Sir Wild Buffalo,' is implored in the same way to spare the harvests.

Serpents are the object of a worship equal to the fear which they inspire. They and the tigers are the great animal powers dreaded by the Annamese.

To meet a serpent is a bad omen. If they succeed in killing the serpent, they must be careful not to cut off its head with a knife, since it would escape and pursue them. So also, when holding a serpent by the tail, they must not let it wriggle about in the air, for feet would immediately grow on it. Pythons' fat (*con trăm*) makes a very good depilatory.

Certain millepeds have in their mouths a bright stone, the possession of which renders a person invulnerable to serpent bites.

The leech is the symbol of immortality, because it is indestructible. When killed it lives again; when cut in pieces it multiplies; if it has been dried, it becomes re-animated whenever it is put into water; if it is burnt, from its moistened ashes is born a crowd of young leeches. There is only one way of getting rid of it, to put it into a box along with some honey; then it disappears. There is reason to beware of the leech; for, if put into a person's ear, it creeps into the brain, multiplies in it, and devours it.

Pigeons have the gift of reading the future and foreseeing misfortune. When they abandon a house, it is a very bad omen.

The little gecko, or ceiling lizard (*Hemidactylus maculatus*, Dum. and Bib.), is dreaded because of its bite, which causes fatal suffocation. To avoid the consequences, the person must snatch a cornelian button from the first one he meets, rasp it in water, and swallow the beverage thus obtained.

The skink (*Euprepes rufescens*, Shaw) also causes a serious wound that may be cured by drinking the blood which escapes from a black cat's tail, the end of which has been cut off. When cooked, the skink is an excellent remedy for asthma and quinsy (mumps) in pigs.*

A mad dog inflicts bites which are fatal, unless some one manages to pull the three dog hairs that grow soon after on the bitten man's head; then he may recover.

Certain vegetables, material objects, and even the elements, require reverential treatment, for they may be receptacles of a mysterious power.

When a junk or a house is built, the sorcerer is sent for before it is occupied, and he exorcizes the spirits which might still be dwelling in the pieces of wood and might bring misfortune.

Before putting a new junk into the water, the sailors sacrifice to *Ông Hà Bà*, 'Lord of the River.' If, during their voyage, they notice in the middle of the water a tree-trunk which might knock against and capsize their vessel, they immediately sacrifice to *Ông Gốc*, 'Sir Tree-trunk.' They treat *Ông Thoi*, 'Sir Wind,' with equal consideration. If Annamese children, during their play, want to reach the fruit on a tree, they throw their sticks up at it and call on 'Sir Wind' to help them.

Aerolites (*tằm sét*), or 'meteoric stones,' are the objects of great reverence. They are supposed to be intimately associated with the lightning. They fall at each lightning flash followed by a thunder-peal, sink into the ground, and after three months and ten days † come out of it again.

The possession of an aerolite is a guarantee of good luck Aerolites chase away the evil spirits, which are terrified at their fall, and which at each peal of thunder run to take shelter under the hat or umbrella of the people they meet. Accordingly, at every peal of thunder the Annamese take care to raise their hats or umbrellas a little to guard against their intrusion.

Aerolite powder mixed with water keeps children safe from evil spirits. In smallpox it ensures regular and favourable suppuration.

The skull of a male (more especially of a child or a youth) who has been struck by lightning, which afterwards has had formulas recited over it, becomes a useful charm, and even a very good medium.

5. **Priest-sorcery.**—Beliefs so numerous and so entangled produce very complicated cults. All the various kinds of spirits have different requirements, and in order to secure their favour it is necessary to be fully aware of what they desire and of the offerings which they prefer. The common people are quite at a loss among their numerous charms, magical songs, exorcisms, and sacrifices. Hence arises a body of special priest-sorcerers among the Annamese.

The most numerous class is that of the *thầy phù thủy*, 'the masters of amulets and purificatory

* Needless to say, the virulence of the hemidactyl is a fable, and the skink seldom bites.

† The length of time of nearly all magical occurrences among the Annamese.

waters,' who have no regular temples, and who, when they go home, take their altar and the cult-objects with them. Some of them are the celebrants in temples erected by individuals. They officiate there at certain anniversaries, or when a person is imploring the intervention of the spirit of these temples.

Another class, of a higher order, the *thầy-phập* or *thầy-đồng*, practise only in their homes. Having a very numerous clientèle, they are often able to build stone temples in which to officiate, and which are their own property. They are assisted by a *đầy*, or 'suppliant,' who acts as a medium between the invoked spirit and the petitioner; for hypnotism, real or feigned, plays the chief rôle in these ceremonies. All these sorcerers derive their power from certain good or evil spirits, to which they have dedicated themselves, and which, after being raised, remain in direct communication with them, possessing them and speaking through their voices. The sorcerers can not only command the spirits, but are also able to influence the normal order of occurrences in nature. They raise the dead, cast lots, practise spells, and send telepathic suggestions to persons whom they wish to employ against others. They can instantaneously change the nature of beings and substances, transform a savoury dish into filth, or change a dog into a cock; they can send diseases, defects, or pains to whomsoever they choose.

They can also employ their power to do good. It is they who cure illnesses, exorcize people possessed and houses haunted by demons, cause rain to fall or to cease, and find out treasures. They do not all have an equal amount of power, and when any one is annoyed by the spite of a sorcerer, the only thing to do is to set a more powerful sorcerer against him.

The sorcerers still manufacture love philtres and talismans, for ensuring success in love, from the bodies (which are difficult to get) of two serpents that have died while fighting with each other, and one of which has been half swallowed by the other. To achieve the same end the ordinary people make use of less complicated charms, which consist in scorching in a pan the whole or part of a garment belonging to the person by whom they wish to be loved.

Some sorcerers are regular spell doctors, who perform their spells by the use of tubercules (*ngâm-ngải*). They themselves are called *thầy-ngải*, and have great skill in killing, causing illness, and inspiring love or hatred. They secretly cultivate the tubercules in their garden or their house, or in some isolated place, and then go and choose the one that they need at the appointed hour. While uprooting it, they recite incantations over it, informing it of the cruel design to be accomplished and of the hour at which it is to take place. Then, either directly or by means of a third person, who in most cases knows nothing about the part which they are making him play, they endeavour to bring the least particle of *ngải* into contact with the enemy whom they wish to harm. The latter is immediately struck by disease, and may die unless he happens to get the better of it, or unless the hatred of the avenger does not go the length of death. Only another sorcerer can cure him.

A popular superstition claims that these *thầy-ngải* are not the only persons who threaten the safety of the people; that there are in existence some families of professional poisoners, who, on various pretexts, slip into their houses and poison their provisions, especially the water. These persons poison from filial piety, because one of their ancestors poisoned somebody. His descendants must imitate him at least once a year, to pacify his spirit. If they did not succeed, they would have to sacrifice one of their own kin. That is the reason why, when their odious practices have achieved the slightest success, they stop them and go away, having thus performed their duty. On account of this fear, the Annamese take great care that strangers do not get near the family provisions, especially the jars where they keep the water.

6. Fortune-telling.—The Annamese have also fortune-tellers (*thầy-bói*), who are nearly always blind, and rather poorly remunerated. They cast nativities by means of copper coins, whose position, heads or tails, determines the prediction.

In the temples the divining logs and rods may be interrogated. The logs are two pieces of lacquered wood, like cotyledons, which give an affirmative answer when both fall on the same side, and a negative if the other way.

The rods, about thirty in number, have figures in Chinese characters, which, on being referred to a horoscope, give the reply of destiny. Other oracle books are read by means of wooden dice.

The Annamese practise cheiromancy, physiognomy, and phrenology. Several fortune-tellers, instead of examining the hand of the querist, obtain their prognostications from a cock's or hen's foot. Others tell fortunes from the lines of the hand, the lines of the face, and the protuberances of the head all at once.

7. Superstitions.—Is it necessary to add that the Annamese believe in signs and omens? The following is a list of the most common superstitions:

They must begin the year with a lucky transaction if they want to make sure of ending it in luck. It is for this reason that during the first days of the year shopkeepers sell cheap in order to sell much, and thus guarantee a regular sale all the year.

On the other hand, they all shut their doors until midday on the first of the year, in order to avoid seeing or being visited by people bringing bad luck.

Meeting an old woman is a sign of failure.

Meeting a pregnant woman has the same significance. If they have come out on business, it is wise, after such an omen, to go back to the house.

A tradesman who enters a house where there is an infant less than a month old, is followed by misfortune for three months and ten days, unless he wards it off by burning a handful of salt immediately on his return home.

Every son whose father has died a violent death is threatened with the same fate if he does not appease the evil spirits.

If a person who has weak eyes enters a room where a husband and wife are lying, he becomes totally blind.

The wick of a lamp burning well means work and prosperity. If it gets blackened and sputters, beware of thieves.

Numerous gossamers announce a bad crop; in the eye, coming blindness.

A singing fire means discord in the house.

To walk on paper with writing on it is in itself a serious fault. If there are Cambodian, Shan, or Arabo-Malayan characters written on it, misfortune will certainly follow; and if it is a pregnant woman that commits the fault, she will miscarry.

A lamp that goes out, a broken cup, and girls or women looking into a gambling-house without playing, are omens of loss for the banker.

When young people of either sex who have not arrived at the age of puberty touch the unformed flowers or fruits of mango or banana trees, they cause them to fall.

When trees persist in yielding no fruit, it is necessary, in order to obtain it, to threaten, on the fifth day of the fifth month, to cut them down. Every year some cuts are made with a hatchet in the mango trees to persuade them to produce fruit.

A locust flying low, a cawing crow, and a croaking frog, are all signs of rain.

A buffalo coming into a house, a bird flying round about it, and a spider at the end of a thread, are presages of misfortune.

A fish leaping into a boat signifies a bad catch, unless it is immediately cut in two and thrown back quickly into the water.

Fishing for the porpoise, the messenger of the demons, rouses their anger.

The cry of the *khách* bird (*Crypsirhina varians*), heard in the East, foretells a visit; in the West, news.

The cries of the gecko, 'Tokkê! tokkê!' an odd number of times are of good omen; an even number, of bad omen.

The cry of the musk-rat foretells a visit that evening or the following day.

The prolonged whining of dogs signifies a calamity.

The crowing of a cock at midday gives rise to fear that the daughters of the house will become ill.

The cry of night-birds announces illness or death.

The grating or cracking of inanimate objects foretells their future. If it is a coffin that cracks, it means that it is going to be bought. If it is a safe, it means that it is to receive money.

Do not open a safe during the night for fear of attracting thieves. Do not open it on the last day of the year, or the first three days of the next year. It is a sign of expense.

When a sword appears in a dream, it is a sign that one will soon have to be used. When it strikes against the wall, it means that an execution is near.

Guns that shake denote the approach of the enemy. Guns are, besides, regarded as being endowed with a sort of life. The Annamese sometimes think them ill, and give them medicine.

8. Diseases.—It is quite natural that, in a country where diseases are supposed to result from the malevolence of a spirit or the vengeance of a sorcerer, the popular medicine should consist of empirical remedies and magical performances.

The doctor and the sorcerer attend the invalid in turn, and it is not the former that is most listened to. The people try to prevent misfortune and its visitations by amulets and sacrifices to the spirits. If these precautions fail, they have recourse to the doctor (and they do not pay him unless he succeeds in curing the patient); and in grave cases they nearly always call in the sorcerer instead.

The two most terrible diseases that the Annamese have to do with are *cholera* and *smallpox*. Quite special talismans are needed against the demon of cholera, those which serve in ordinary illnesses being insufficient. The frightful rapidity of the disease does not allow of lengthy therapeutics.

Smallpox, which is even more frequent, is perhaps dreaded still more. It is never spoken of except in periphrases, and its pustules receive the reverential designation of 'Ông.' Smallpox is attributed to evil spirits, and especially to the souls of persons who have already died of smallpox (*Con ma dâu*). The latter are responsible for all the serious cases. The mild cases are due to predestination. Whenever a sick person is attacked by smallpox, he is isolated, not from fear of contagion, but from fear of the evil spirits which have taken possession of the invalid. Nevertheless, especially if a child is the victim, the family never leave him alone, and they surround him with a net to prevent the approach of the *Con ma dâu*.

When the disease takes a serious turn, many of the physicians abandon their patients, not so much, perhaps, to avoid attempting an impossible task, as to be safe from the anger of the *Con ma dâu*. In fact, one of their proverbs says: 'If you cure smallpox, it will have its revenge; if you cure phthisis, it passes over to the curer.' It is believed that the children of doctors die from the smallpox from which their father has saved others.

During times of epidemic, if a family has already lost a child from smallpox, they are afraid that he will come and take away his surviving brothers and sisters, and they sacrifice at his grave to prevent him from leaving it. Amulets and witchcraft are the only cures for smallpox.

During the course of the illness they place under the bed of the smallpox patient a *cá trê*, a fish with a smooth green skin, of the *siluridæ* genus, which is believed to become impregnated with the venom of the smallpox until it stiffens with it.

In order that the erythematous stage may pass quickly into the pustular, and to favour the further formation of crusts, the patient eats shrimps and crabs. On the other hand, when desquamation has set in, he eats fish with scales in order to help the peeling-off process. Vermicelli is expressly prohibited, for it would change into a multitude of worms in the softened liver and lungs of the patient.

So also, if the smallpox patient wishes to prevent a relapse when convalescent, he must avoid walking barefooted on hens' dung.

Lastly, when smallpox (or any other epidemic) is raging, everybody sacrifices to the crowd of maleficent spirits known by the generic name of *quan-ôn*, the primary cause of all ills. For these sacrifices, at the beginning of the hot season, when the death-rate is highest, they manufacture or buy paper figures representing the people whom they wish to be saved, and burn them in the village square. The offerings intended to appease the evil spirits are placed in little paper boats, which they send off at the edge of the water.

9. Birth.—The Annamese, who are a very prolific race, are anxious to have numerous posterity. They try above all to avoid miscarriages, still-born children, and infant mortality. In their eyes still-born or prematurely born children are special spirits in short successive incarnations, denoted by the name of *Con lôn* ('entering life'). The mother of a *Con lôn* is considered contagious. No young woman would accept a betel-pellet from her. They even avoid speaking about her.

Successive miscarriages are believed to be re-incarnations of the same spirit. In order to get rid of this evil influence, when a woman who has had one or more miscarriages is about to be confined again, a young dog is killed and cut in three pieces, which are buried under the woman's bed; and with the blood of the dog amulets are traced, which are taken to the future mother.

The evil spirit which presides at these premature deaths is called *Mẹ con ranh*, 'the mother of abortions.' It is represented in the form of a woman in white, sitting in a tree, where she rocks her children.

To drive away this demon from the body of the pregnant woman, they exorcize it. For this purpose they make two small figures representing a mother with a child in her arms, and burn them, after the sorcerer has adjured the evil spirit with threats no longer to torment the family which is performing the exorcism.

When a woman is pregnant, there is a very simple way of determining beforehand the sex of the child. Some one calls the woman, and she turns to reply. If she turns to the left, a boy will be born; if to the right, a girl.

At the time of her confinement the woman is subjected to a special diet of dry salted food, and a fire (*ndm bếp*) is kept burning under the bed—a custom which is common to all the Indo-Chinese. They invoke the twelve goddesses of birth and other deities.

If the parturient woman is in danger, the father prostrates himself and entreats the child to be born. Immediately after the birth the young mother is trampled under foot by the matron who has been attending her, and then fumigations and washings take place.

The part of the umbilical cord that is close to the section is preserved. It is, according to the Annamese, a powerful febrifuge for the use of children. Then they fix the prohibition post (*cdm kham*) before the door. It is a bamboo cane, on the top of which is placed a lighted coal, the burning side turned towards the inside for a boy, towards the outside for a girl. It gets its name from the fact that it prohibits from entering the house women whose confinements have been difficult or followed by accidents, and who might bring bad fortune.

Thirty days after the birth, during which the mother has been isolated, all the things belonging to her are burnt.

Various ceremonies then take place, with offerings of fowls, bananas, rice, etc., to thank the goddesses of birth, and afterwards to give fluent speech to the child. They take special care not to pronounce any words of evil omen, as, *e.g.*, speaking of illnesses, among others of thrush, for fear of giving it to the child. They also avoid frying anything in the house. That would cause blisters on the mother and the newly-born child.

As it is not quite customary to enter the room where the mother and the child are lying, each member of the family, in order that the child may make his acquaintance and not cry on seeing him, dips a part of his coat in a little water, which is given to the child to drink.

Towards the end of the first month after the birth, they sacrifice to the birth-goddesses and give the child a name. As far as possible, this name must never have belonged to any member of the father's or the mother's family. The rice that is offered on this occasion is tinted in five colours: white, black, red, blue, and yellow. Each of the invited guests presents a gift to the child.

The child that sucks the milk of a pregnant woman soon dies (of mesenteric atrophy), because that milk is supposed not to have reached its maturity.

It is supposed that, on awakening in the morning, a person's bite is venomous, though it ceases to be poisonous when the vapours which cause the venom have passed away. In order to avoid such a bite, the Annamese mother does not suckle her infant until it cries.

When a child remains sickly and difficult to bring up, to baffle the evil spirits which are tormenting it, the parents pretend to sell it either to the spirit of the hearth, or to the sorcerer, or to the Buddhist bonze. It then receives another name and is re-sold to its parents, as if it were a strange child.

When the child is one year old, a fresh sacrifice to the birth-goddesses takes place. Then they

spread out playthings and tools before the child. From his choice they infer his future aptitudes.

When a child less than a year old sneezes, they call to him '*Com cá*' ('rice and fish!'). The same cry is raised when he faints, or when he starts nervously in his sleep.

When a child is subject to hiccough, they stick on his forehead the end of a betel-leaf bitten off by the teeth.

When a young child is taken away on a journey, they make a stroke or a cross on his forehead with a cinder from the hearth, so that the spirit of the hearth may protect him from the evil spirits during the journey.

When they cannot take a child under seven years of age away on a journey, they stick a little wax on his head in order that he may not regret his parents.

10. Marriage.—Marriage does not admit of so many magical rites. But when a marriage has been arranged and presents exchanged, the engaged couple consider themselves as married; and if one of them were to die, the other would wear mourning.

Misconduct of the girl before her marriage is strictly forbidden. In case of pregnancy, she is compelled to name her seducer. If he denies his guilt, he is retained until the birth of the child. An official proof by blood then takes place, which is called *thích man*. They link one of the infant's fingers with one of the suspected person's, make a slight incision in each, and catch the blood in a vessel. If the two kinds of blood form two separate clots, the accused is declared innocent; if they mix, he is guilty, and receives punishment.

11. Death.—Funerals are as complicated as they are long and expensive. That is why certain families are not able to celebrate them until five or six months after the death, and are obliged to inter their dead provisionally.

The funeral rites include the putting on of mourning garments and the beginning of the lamentations. At the head of the funeral procession which conducts the dead man to his last resting-place walks the bonze; next come men bearing white streamers, on which are inscribed the virtues and the name of the deceased; next, under the shade of a large umbrella, the hearse of the soul, a small winding-sheet which is supposed to contain the soul, sometimes replaced by the tablet of the deceased; then, in grand funerals, a puppet, dressed in beautiful clothes, representing the deceased; and last of all the hearse, followed by the family and friends. All along the road they throw gold and silver papers representing money, to attract the attention of the evil spirits and secure an uninterrupted passage. The coffin, after being lowered into the grave, is not covered with earth until the sorcerer has ascertained, by means of a compass, the best orientation for it. A lengthy and pompous sacrifice, which only the rich can afford, terminates the ceremony.

Fresh sacrifices take place after seven weeks, then after a hundred days, one year, two years, and twenty-seven months after the death. About three years after the death, the corpse is exhumed in order that its bones may be enclosed in the regular tomb, after which there is an anniversary sacrifice—a ceremony in which they burn a copy of the imperial diploma conferring a posthumous title, and a new ceremony, of Buddhist origin, called the great fast or deliverance of the souls, which will obtain for the deceased the remission of all his sins. The sacrifice concludes with offerings to the wandering and hungry souls.

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ANNIHILATION.—It has been a matter of dispute whether anything once brought into existence can ever be utterly annihilated; and further, that possibility being conceded, whether this fate is in store for the souls of the impenitent wicked. Of these questions the first is purely theoretic and academic, appealing only to the interest of the few; the second, like other eschatological problems, has been keenly and widely debated. It is a remarkable example of the divergence in point of view between East and West, that the destiny which in the one hemisphere has been propounded as the final reward of virtue should in the other be regarded as the extremest penalty of obstinate wickedness. Where the theory of annihilation has found favour with Christian believers, its acceptance has usually been due rather to a recoil from the thought of the eternal duration of future punishment, than to the influence of the positive philosophical and theological arguments which can be urged on its behalf. Distracted between an equal reluctance to accept the eternity of hell or to admit the universal salvation of all men, some thinkers have found a way out of their difficulty by questioning the truth of the exclusive alternative between eternal blessedness and eternal woe hereafter. Thus they have been led to examine a third possibility, viz. the complete extinction of the wicked. The discussion of the problem belongs to that region of thought where both philosophy and theology have a claim to be heard. Whether the nature of the soul is such that the cessation of its existence is conceivable, is a question which cannot be argued except upon a basis of philosophical principles; what may be the bearing of the teaching of the Bible and of the commonly received tradition of the Church upon the point can be determined only by exegesis and by study of the history of dogma.

1. The question stated.—Obviously, the controversy concerning annihilation, so understood, arises only among those who are at least agreed as to the fact of survival after death. It is legitimate, therefore, at the outset to dismiss from consideration those theories which represent death as being of necessity the end of individual being. We are not here concerned to rebut the opinions of the materialist, who holds life to be a function of matter, or of the pantheist, for whom death is the moment of the re-absorption of the individual life into the common fund of existence. Subsequent, however, to agreement as to survival after death comes a parting of the ways, according as men accept or reject the view that the life so prolonged is destined to continue for ever. That it must so continue is the opinion of believers in the natural immortality of the soul. Nor must those who hold this view be accused of making an extravagant claim on behalf of human nature, as though they maintained the soul's independent and absolute immortality. Admitting that the life of the soul, though prolonged to infinity, must always rest upon the sustaining power of God, they contend that this relation of dependence is outside the bounds of time, and everlasting. By the annihilationist, on the other hand, the opinion of the soul's natural immortality, even in this restricted and legitimate sense, is considered a dangerous error, the root out of

which has grown a false eschatology. In place of the conception of an immortal life belonging essentially and inalienably to the soul, he would substitute that of an existence naturally destined to extinction, except under certain specified conditions. Upon this denial of the soul's natural immortality he bases his theory, and, though professing a positive creed and ready to give an account of it, he justly claims that, logically, the *onus probandi* as to immortality lies rather with those who affirm than with himself who denies that doctrine.

2. The natural immortality of the soul called in question.—This is not the place in which to state at any length or with any completeness the argument for the immortality of the soul. It will be sufficient if we so far indicate the grounds of belief as to render intelligible the objections which have been urged on the other side. Undoubtedly, the strongest force working in favour of a general acceptance of the belief in natural immortality has been the dominant influence of Platonism in the earlier stages of the development of Christian doctrine. 'Our creeds,' it has been said, 'are the formulæ of victorious Platonism.'* And though that statement may stand in need of some qualification, yet it is true in the main of the belief in immortality. The conclusion of the *Phædo* has become the accepted tenet of the Church. Moreover, it is remarkable how comparatively insignificant are the additions which have been made to Plato's argument since it was first constructed by his genius. In the reasons commonly urged to-day for belief in immortality we may recognize the main features of his proof, if only due allowance be made for the translation of his thought from the modes of ancient Greece to those of the present age. His argument, it will be remembered, is threefold.

It begins with insistence on the fact that in nature there are no absolutely new beginnings, but an alternation from one state to its opposite, as from motion to rest and from rest to motion. Since, in the history of the soul, life and death are thus related to one another as alternations, the latter, he argued, cannot possibly be a state of non-existence. Secondly, the soul's capacity for the recognition of truth is compared with memory, and is brought forward as proof of her pre-existence before union with the body. Hence may be inferred her continued existence after the dissolution of that union by death. Thirdly, the kinship of the soul with the ideas of which she is cognizant, and her identification with the idea of life, render self-contradictory, and therefore inconceivable, the thought of her annihilation.

The three lines of Plato's argument supply us with a classification under which the modern pleas for immortality may be arranged. Parallel with the first division of his proof is the modern appeal to the principle of the conservation of energy. As in the physical world energy is neither created nor destroyed, but transformed, so it is inferred that psychical energy likewise must be subject to transformation rather than to annihilation. Secondly, all idealist philosophers have found their most powerful argument for the immortality of the soul in the fact that she apprehends truth by means of powers which transcend the limits of time and space. The *a priori* forms of thought are taken as proofs of the immortal nature of the soul. Thirdly, Plato's insistence on the relation of the soul to the eternal and unchanging ideas is parallel to the appeal of religion to the kinship of the soul with the eternal and unchanging Divine Being. Lastly, the practical and ethical value of the belief in immortality and in the prospect of future rewards and punishments has been keenly appreciated alike in ancient and modern times.

Is it possible along these lines to establish a certain conclusion in favour of the soul's natural immortality? In that case, the theory of annihilation would be barred at the outset. But the required certainty is not forthcoming. However firmly convinced the student may be in his own mind of the fact of human immortality, he must nevertheless admit that, technically, the philosophic proof of the doctrine is far from reaching the standard of demonstration. The history of human thought enforces the admission. Even among the immediate inheritors of the Platonic tradition there were many to whom the opinion of the master on this point carried no conviction. Still less was the tenet of individual immortality acceptable to Peripatetics, Stoics, or Epicureans. And as in ancient times the world remained unconvinced, so to-day the philosophic arguments for individual immortality, however combined and expanded, are by no means universally admitted.

If we take the arguments in the order given above, we shall find that each in turn has been subjected to damaging criticism. Energy (it is retorted) cannot indeed be destroyed, but it may be dissipated. What reason, therefore, have we for thinking that the force which underlies the individual life will be exempt from the general law of dissipation? If the premises of the idealist philosophy be conceded, there is, doubtless, a legitimate inference to the existence of an immortal element in the human spirit, but that conclusion does not decide the question of the destiny of the individual. Even the admission of the kinship of the soul with the Divine Being is consistent with the denial of individual immortality. The ethical instinct which demands that the injustices and inequalities of the present life shall be rectified in the future—certainly by far the most powerful influence in inducing the belief in immortality—might be satisfied by the conception of a survival not necessarily endless. 'In truth,' writes Lord Macaulay, 'all the philosophers, ancient and modern, who have attempted without the aid of revelation to prove the immortality of man—from Plato down to Franklin—appear to us to have failed deplorably.'* Whately is of a like opinion. 'That the natural immortality of man's soul is discoverable by reason may be denied on the ground that it has not been discovered yet.'† Were it necessary, it would be easy to multiply quotations to the same effect.

That there is a living principle in man which cannot be affected by bodily death is a proposition from which few but declared materialists would dissent. That this living principle will manifest itself in a prolongation of the individual life is a conclusion for which there is a large measure of philosophic probability, though no demonstrative proof. That the life so prolonged will continue for ever is a tenable hypothesis, but it cannot be presented as an inference from universally admitted premises. Hence, in the absence of any proof of the conviction of natural immortality, theories of annihilation must obviously be given a fair hearing. They cannot be dismissed *in limine* on the plea that they are in contradiction to one of the accepted truths of natural religion.

3. Arguments for annihilation.—The hypothesis of annihilation has in its favour the following considerations.—(*a*) *Cosmological.* If the souls of the wicked are eventually to be annihilated, then the process of creation and redemption may be represented as destined to issue in unqualified success. When all that is evil shall have been finally removed, nothing will remain but light and love; whereas every theory of everlasting punishment involves the admission that a shadow of impenetrable darkness will hang for ever over a portion of the universe.

It was maintained by some mediæval theologians that the existence of this shadow would intensify by contrast the enjoyment of the light by the saved.‡ A more humane age recoils from the suggestion of such a reason for the everlasting duration of misery, and indeed takes precisely the opposite line, holding that the happiness of the saved could not be complete while other members of their race were suffering (cf. Rothe, *Dogmatik*, iii. § 48). Even though evil be regarded as powerless and fettered, stripped of all its capacity for assault and intrigue, yet its continued existence would seem to constitute a protest against the Divine government—a melancholy proof that the perversity of free will had in some measure frustrated the Divine intention. Advocates of the theory of annihilation maintain that the improbability of the everlasting continuance of evil in any shape gives the measure of the probability of the total destruction of the wicked.

(*b*) *Psychological.* A further argument in the same direction is derived from the nature of the

* Inge, *Personal Idealism and Mysticism*, 1907, p. 67.

* *Essays*, iii. 211 (pop. ed. 1870, p. 549).

† *On the Future Life*, p. 17; cf. E. White, *Life in Christ*, p. 84.

‡ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa*, iii. sup. xciv. 1.

soul and its relation to moral evil. All evil is self-contradictory, and therefore tends to be self-destructive. The wicked soul is not only at enmity with others, but divided against itself. And if the doctrine of natural immortality be abandoned, what is there to prevent the internal discord from accomplishing the work of disintegration, and ending in the final dissolution of the individual being? That evil is in its essence negative rather than positive, has been a widely accepted theory. It would seem to suggest the conclusion that the soul which identifies itself with this principle of non-being will become less and less alive, until it passes out of existence altogether. Sin, it has been said, may be regarded as a 'poison to which the vital forces of the soul must in the end give way by passing into sheer extinction' (cf. Gladstone, *Studies subsidiary to Butler*, 1896, p. 218).

(*c*) *Practical.* So strong is the tendency towards Pragmatism at the present day, that little objection is raised when the acceptance of a theory is justified by an appeal to its supposed beneficial effects upon practice. To judgments of value, as distinct from judgments of fact, is assigned a special validity of their own. In accordance with these principles, annihilationists have pointed to the influence of their doctrine upon the moral life of man. The prospect of annihilation for the wicked, and eternal life for the righteous, provides (they tell us) a legitimate appeal alike to the hopes and to the fears of mankind. Nothing can be a greater inducement to moral effort than the hope of acquiring an immortality otherwise unattainable; nothing a greater deterrent than the threatened doom of total extinction. If capital punishment upon earth arouses in the highest degree the fears of the criminal, the thought of an execution in which soul as well as body shall be involved in a common destruction is sufficient to appal the most indifferent and the most hardened.

4. Counter arguments.—Counter considerations to the above arguments are not wanting, and have been brought forward with effect by critics of the theory. (*a*) Whatever plausibility there may be in the argument that sinners must cease to exist in order that the final state of the universe may be altogether holy, is greatly lessened by reflexion on the obvious truth of our profound ignorance with regard to the whole problem of evil. Where the mystery is so impenetrable, it is well to remember that any inference must be hazardous in the extreme. And, after all, the ultimate and inexplicable riddle of the world lies in the present fact of evil rather than in the questions concerning its origin and its end. If we cannot reach even an inkling of the solution of the mystery of evil, present though it be before our eyes and lodged in our own hearts, we are in no position to indulge in rash speculations as to the mode of its introduction into the universe, and the likelihood of its final removal therefrom. Though confession of ignorance is never a very acceptable conclusion to any argument, yet along this line we can arrive at no other result.

(*b*) Nor, again, does the argument from the nature of the soul produce conviction. Advocates of the theory of annihilation are too apt to confuse absence of proof with proof to the contrary. Right as they may be in questioning the demonstrative cogency of the commonly received arguments for the immortality of the soul, they go beyond the mark in thereupon assuming its mortality. The positive arguments which can be produced to prove that the soul is subject to decay are at best conjectural. Ultimately they depend upon the assumption that the nature of the soul is complex, and therefore capable of disintegration. And that assumption is as much an unproved hypothesis as is the contrary theory of the soul's indiscerptibility.

(*c*) Lastly, the utilitarian arguments in favour of annihilation suffer from the weakness inherent in all considerations of that type. In spite of the stress which Pragmatists lay on the will to believe and on the credit due to judgments of value, it still remains true that the claims of the pure reason in speculation cannot be disregarded with impunity. A strong sense of the beneficial effects which will follow from a given belief may properly lead the inquirer to a diligent search for arguments pointing that way; it cannot dispense him from the obligation of finding them. Hence, though it be admitted that threatenings of hell-fire and never-ending torments belong to a stage of theological thought now outgrown, and have ceased to exercise a deterrent effect upon sinners; and though it be granted that a crude presentment of the theory of universal restoration may deaden the conscience and encourage a lamentable slackness of moral effort; and though it were true that an obvious way of avoiding these opposite dangers might be found in the adoption of the doctrine of annihilation, yet such a case would still be lacking in solid support. And, indeed, whatever be thought of the first two admissions, it cannot be denied that the last of the three is dubious in the extreme. Even where temporal interests only are concerned, it is one of the hardest problems of practical government to calculate correctly the deterrent effects of different punishments. *A fortiori* must it be a hopeless task to discover the comparative deterrent effects of the fear of eternal punishment and the fear of total extinction. If the theory of annihilation fails to commend itself on the grounds of reason, it can hardly hope to win general acceptance as a judgment of value.

5. Annihilation and Biblical eschatology.—In the literature of annihilation a great deal of space is devoted to the examination of passages of Scripture supposed to bear more or less directly upon the subject. In this article no attempt will be made to deal with particular passages and texts; it will be sufficient to point out why neither in the OT nor in the NT can we expect to find an explicit negative or affirmative answer to questions as to natural immortality. The gradual emergence of the hope of a future life among the Jews has formed the subject of prolonged and minute study, leading to some generally accepted results. Belief in a future life, beginning in Prophetic times as little more than a dim and uncertain hope, developed under the stress of national suffering and disaster until it succeeded in establishing itself as an integral part of the national creed. Long as the process was, yet throughout its whole course the issue of the soul's natural immortality seems never to have been raised.

Nor is this surprising, when the conditions under which the belief grew up are recognized. Belief in immortality did not supersede a definitely formulated view to the contrary, viz. a belief in the soul's mortality. In early times the Israelites had shared the common Semitic conceptions of the destiny of man after death. They had looked forward, not to annihilation, but to a shadowy existence in Sheol. It is maintained by Dr. Charles (*Critical History of the Future Life*, p. 47 ff.) that the gradual development of their monotheistic religion actually deepened the fear of death among them. The conclusion is less paradoxical than it appears at first sight. Believing the blessing of communion with God to be confined to this life, the more highly they came to rate that blessing, the more they dreaded its termination in death, the darker and drearier became the prospect of Sheol. In contrast with the state of the living, the abode of the dead was the land of forgetfulness, of darkness, and of emptiness. This gloomy view of death was still current among the Jews in the time of Christ, and we find it pressed to its logical conclusion in the Sadducean denial of the resurrection. Yet life in Sheol, however bare of all that makes life desirable, was better than nothingness.

Except in the latest books of the OT canon, where we may already trace the influence of Greek

thought at work, the possibility of complete annihilation is not contemplated in the OT. Hence, though it is true that in the OT there is no declaration of belief in the soul's natural immortality, yet it is equally true that there is no counter declaration of its possible extinction. The question whether the soul could or could not die entirely had not yet been asked. To attempt to find in the language of the writers of the OT a definite 'yes' or 'no' is to be guilty of an anachronism.

In the NT the situation is somewhat different. Contact with Greek thought and with the prevalent scepticism of the heathen world had by this time familiarized Jewish thinkers with the philosophic aspect of the problem. So far there is no reason why any NT writer should not deal with the question of the nature of the soul's life, and with the possibility of its death. In some Apocalyptic writings of earlier date than the Christian era, the annihilation of the enemies of Israel is foretold as one of the events of the last days (cf. Enoch xxxviii. 5, 6, Apoc. Bar. lxxii. 4–6; Charles, *op. cit.* pp. 240, 305). But in the NT the indications as to the ultimate fate of the wicked are of doubtful interpretation.

Nor is the reason far to seek. Apostles and Evangelists were concerned primarily not with the theory of human destinies, but with the practical task of propagating the faith. In their preaching, a doctrine of the last things undoubtedly occupied a prominent place; but the time for any discussion of the presuppositions of Christian eschatology had not yet arrived. It was enough for them to insist on the glorious certainty of eternal life through Jesus Christ, and on the inevitable penalty of the wrong-doer in the hereafter. The language of which they make use must not be treated as though it were deliberately chosen in view of possible differences of opinion as to the duration of the future life of the wicked.

When due allowance is made for the inexactitude of popular language, it will appear that the NT no less than the OT leaves the question of the soul's natural immortality altogether undetermined. On the one hand, the expression 'immortal soul' is notably absent, and, so far as it goes, this is evidence of the absence of the idea from the cycle of primitive Christian conceptions. On the other hand, the words 'death' and 'destruction,' freely employed in the NT to describe the fate of the wicked, cannot carry the weight of inference which the annihilationists desire to place upon them.

E. White's book, *Life in Christ*, affords an example of the attempt to discover evidence for an Apostolic doctrine of annihilation in the language of the NT. Of this work, J. Agar Beet, who himself raises an emphatic protest against the rigid enforcement of the traditional doctrine, sums up his criticism as follows: 'Thus fails, in my view, Mr. White's main argument. Throughout his interesting and able volume I find no proof of the ultimate extinction of the wicked except that contained in "the plain meaning" of two Greek words [ἀπόλλυμι, ἀπώλεια]. And that this is their plain meaning, *i.e.* the only one they fairly admit, is disproved by their use in classical Greek and in the Greek Bible' (*The Last Things*, p. 301). Neither for nor against annihilation is the language of Scripture explicit beyond the reach of controversy.

6. Annihilation and Patristic eschatology. — The eschatological thought of the Early Fathers was influenced alike by the ideas which Christianity inherited from Judaism, and by conceptions as to the life and nature of the soul generally current in the ancient world. The difficulty which they experienced in harmonizing conceptions gathered from different sources into one consistent view, reveals itself in the occasional ambiguity of their language on this matter. They do not speak with unequivocal clearness as to the natural immortality of the soul. Christianity stimulated and encouraged that keen sense of the value of individual existence which made the Greeks turn with abhorrence from the thought of extinction.

How vehement was their antipathy is indicated in a well-known passage in Plutarch. 'I might almost say,' he writes, 'that all men and women would readily submit themselves to the teeth of Cerberus and to the punishment of carrying water in a sieve, if only they might remain in existence and escape the doom of annihilation.'*

* *Non poss. suav. vivi sec. Epicur.* 1104.

Yet, notwithstanding the force of this feeling against extinction, the denial of its possibility contained in the Platonic doctrine of the soul's natural immortality did not find general acceptance. It was rejected, for example, by Justin Martyr (*Tryph.* v.), by Tatian (*ad Græcos*, xiii.), by Theophilus of Antioch (*ad Autolyc.* II. xxvii.), by Irenæus (*adv. Hær.* II. xxxiv.), and by the *Clement. Homil.* (III. vi.). At the same time it must be remembered that many of these denials may be most naturally interpreted as repudiations of the theory that the soul is independently and inherently immortal, and must not therefore be taken to be identical with an assertion of belief in the eventual extinction of wicked souls. This explanation, however, will not hold good in every case. In Arnobius, for example, there is no possibility of misunderstanding. He is unmistakably an annihilationist.

It is remarkable how closely Arnobius anticipates many of the modern arguments, insisting on the ethical value of his theory, and maintaining that the doctrine of an ineradicable immortality, no less than the supposed prospect of immediate extinction at the moment of death, renders men careless of the rewards and punishments of a future life; whereas no more powerful influence can be brought to bear upon the character than the offered alternative between life and death (*adv. Nation.* II. xxxii.). The extinction which he foretells is to be the inevitable result of the punishments which the wicked will justly incur hereafter: 'Hæc est hominis mors vera, cum animæ nescientes Deum per longissimi temporis cruciatum consumentur igni fero, in quem illas jacient quidam crudeliter sævi, et ante Christum incogniti et ab solo sciente detecti' (c. xiv.).

But Arnobius stands alone in his development of this theory. Platonic conceptions as to the nature of the soul and its essential immortality became predominant. To this result Augustine contributed the weight of his immense influence. He is, however, careful to warn his readers against attributing any independent immortality to the soul.

Commenting on the Biblical account of the creation of man, he writes: 'Cavendum est ne anima non a Deo facta natura sed ipsius Dei substantia tamquam unigenitus filius, quod est verbum eius, aut aliqua eius particula esse credatur, tamquam illa natura atque substantia qua Deus est quidquid est commutabilis esse potest' (*Epp.* ccv. 19).

7. Annihilation and Scholastic philosophy. — In later centuries, the Schoolmen discussed the abstract question whether it is conceivable that anything should pass absolutely out of existence. Thomas Aquinas answered in the negative. His argument, briefly recapitulated, is as follows:

In theory it is possible that God should annihilate His creatures, *i.e.* there would be no self-contradiction involved in His so doing. As He brought them into existence under no compulsion, but by the free act of His will, so might He by a similar free act reduce them again to nothingness. Not, indeed, that He, the source of life, could directly cause the death of anything; but inasmuch as the creature continues in existence only through the Divine conservation, the mere withdrawal of that support would be equivalent in effect to an act of annihilation. Having thus conceded the possibility of annihilation, he denies that it takes place in fact, on the following grounds: No natural process can end in annihilation; for in the case of material things the component parts will still continue in existence after the disintegration of the composite whole; and as to immaterial beings, 'in eis non est potentia ad non esse.' Further, the idea of a miraculous act of annihilation is rejected on the ground that the object of a miracle is to manifest the Divine grace; and the Divine goodness and power are revealed rather by the maintenance of things in life than by their annihilation (*Summa*, I. civ. 3, 4).

These metaphysical considerations, abstruse as they sound, bring out the real difficulty of introducing the conception of a Divine act of annihilation into a consistent and coherent view of the universe. At the same time there were other and more direct arguments by which the Schoolmen were led to a belief in the indestructibility of the soul. To them it appeared that the truth was sufficiently indicated, if not asserted, in Scripture. Inspired writers (so they contended) would not have asserted the survival of the soul after separation from the body so unconditionally, had that survival been due not to the nature of the soul, but to some miraculous interposition (cf. Suarez, *Anima*, I. x. 9). The balance of authority inclined strongly towards the doctrine of natural immor-

tality. At the 5th Lateran Council in 1513 A.D. Leo X. condemned in set terms the opinion of the mortality of the soul, and at the same time strictly commanded all and sundry philosophers, in their public lectures at the universities and elsewhere, to rebut and disprove that opinion.* It was not until the crisis of the Reformation had broken the fetters upon free speculation, that a theory of annihilation, not unlike that which had been expounded by Arnobius, was once again suggested and defended.

8. Annihilation in post-Reformation thought.—In this matter, as in so much else, Spinoza displays his originality and independence. His writings reveal a marked change of opinion in the course of his life. In the *Cogitat. Metaphys.* he had upheld the doctrine of the soul's immortality on the ground that the soul being a 'substantia' could not pass away. In the treatise, *de Deo*, etc., he takes up a different position, affirming that the destiny of the soul will be determined by her decision between alternative courses. She may unite herself either with the body of which she is the idea, or with God the source of her existence. In the first case she perishes at death, in the second her union with that which is unchangeable will confer upon her the privilege of immortality (*de Deo*, etc. II. xxiii., Suppl. 209, 211). 'It is obvious,' writes Dr. Martineau, 'that an immortality no longer involved in the soul as substance, but depending on the direction of its love, passes from the necessary and universal to the contingent and partial.'†

The influence of Hobbes was also making itself felt in the same direction. However little credit he deserves for sincerity, he is sufficiently explicit in his denial of the natural immortality of the soul:

'That the soul of man is in its own nature eternal and a living creature independent of the body, or that any mere man is immortal otherwise than by the resurrection in the last day, except Enoch and Elias, is a doctrine not apparent in Scripture' (*Works*, Lond. 1839, vol. iii. p. 443).

On the ground of a careful examination into the various Biblical passages bearing on the subject, he sums up in favour of a theory of the annihilation of the wicked:

'Though there be many places that affirm everlasting fire and torments into which men may be cast successively one after another as long as the world lasts, yet I find none that affirm there shall be an eternal life therein of any individual person, but to the contrary an everlasting death which is the second death. . . Whereby it is evident that there is to be a second death of every one that shall be condemned at the day of judgment, after which he shall die no more' (*ib.* p. 451).

Locke also conceived of the soul as being, under present conditions, subject to the law of death. In the short treatise, *On the Reasonableness of Christianity*, which exercised so profound an influence on the course of religious speculation in the next generation, he begins by insisting that the consequence of the Fall of man was to reduce him to a condition of mortality, the death-penalty involving the destruction of both body and soul. Through Christ alone is the doom reversed, and man becomes capable of immortality. Those who obey His precepts and imitate His example are delivered from death, and rewarded with the gift of life; and life and death are interpreted in their plain meaning of existence and non-existence. Thus Locke, in his attempt to recover the original simplicity of Christianity and to free it from the supposed accretions of theology, substitutes a doctrine of annihilation for the traditional doctrine of inherent immortality. Moreover, he seems to feel no doubt of his success in discovering evidence of the truth of the theory in the words of Scripture. His opinion gave occasion to some controversy on the point at the beginning of the 18th century.‡

But the question of the particular fate in store for the wicked was soon lost sight of in the interest of the wider discussion between Deists and orthodox as to the essence of Christianity. It was not until the middle of the 19th cent. that the topic came again into prominence. From that time forward the conception of annihilation has formed the underlying presupposition of all theories of conditional immortality, and guesses have been hazarded as to the nature of the process which will end in this result. While some writers have imagined a bare continuance of existence together with a loss of consciousness, others have adopted the more thorough hypothesis of entire extinction. Some, again, have assumed a future interposition of the Divine power in a sudden act of annihilation, others have preferred the idea of a gradual dilapidation of the soul. And the various theories about annihilation have been put forward with very various degrees of confidence. Cautious thinkers, like W. E. Gladstone and J. Agar Beet, have not ventured beyond the assertion that the Christian revelation certifies indeed the finality of the Judgment, but makes no pronouncement as to the duration of the pains of the lost. More eager advocates have believed that they can find positive proof of their theories in reason and Scripture (see art. CONDITIONAL IMMORTALITY).

9. Impossibility of comparison with Buddhist doctrine of Nirvāṇa.—Between the theory which we have been considering and the Buddhist doctrine of Nirvāṇa there is some superficial resemblance. Both involve the conception of annihilation; both assert survival after death together with the possibility of ultimate extinction, the total loss of individual existence. But the resemblance is more apparent than real, and affords little help in the elucidation of the problem. Things which are entirely heterogeneous not only cannot be compared, but cannot even be contrasted. And the difference between Christian and Buddhist religious conceptions amounts to heterogeneity. The two systems are committed to radically opposite interpretations of the universe, the one looking for the solution of all problems in the knowledge of God, the other ignoring His existence; the one regarding life as the great boon every increase of which is to be welcomed, the other as the great evil in deliverance from which the reward of virtue will be found. When views about God, the world, and the self are thus essentially divergent, no true relation of comparison can be established by the mere fact that in East and West alike some sort of annihilation of the individual is contemplated. Comparative Religion is a fascinating study, but it is well to remember that the religious conceptions of different nations are often incommensurable; and, even when similar terms are used, the underlying ideas may be very far from coincident. This is notably the case with the respective eschatologies of Christianity and Buddhism. See NIRVĀṆA.

10. Conclusions.—Metaphysical and ontological considerations must of necessity enter into any estimate of the theory of annihilation, although it is notorious that the present age is impatient and distrustful of abstract reasoning. Arguments based upon the supposed unity and simplicity of the soul carry less weight to-day than when the methods of philosophy were in more general use and favour. This is perhaps one of the reasons why the theory of annihilation has rapidly acquired a considerable popularity. Owing to the temper of the age, the philosophic difficulties have been insufficiently recognized. It is not easy to deny the contention that the doctrine of annihilation tends

* Labbe, *Concilia*, tom. xiv. col. 187.
† *Study of Spinoza*, p. 291.
‡ Cf. H. Dodwell, *Epistolary Discourse proving that the Soul is a Principle naturally Mortal*, 1706; reply by John Norris, *Philosophical Discourse*, etc., 1708.

in some measure to lower that high conception of the value and dignity of human personality which has been the direct outcome of traditional Christian teaching as to the nature of the soul. Man destined sooner or later to eventuate in a blank nothingness, such as is commonly supposed to await the animals, is widely different from a being Divinely endowed with the supreme gift of immortality. He stands on an altogether lower level. To make immortality dependent on response to the action of the Divine grace is to leave the position of man as man vaguely indefinite in the scheme of creation. So vast a gulf divides beings endowed with immortality from those for whom final extinction is the natural end, that the difficulty of conceiving a creature 'capable of both' may well seem insuperable. And yet there are doubtless many to whom a difficulty of this kind is less than that of admitting evil to be an ineradicable and eternal element in the universe. They see no escape from the conclusion that, if evil is irreformable, its annihilation is inevitable. If pressed for an answer as to the mode in which this result will be attained, it is doubtless open to any one to fall back on the conception of the Divine omnipotence, and to believe or hope that, by some Divine act analogous to creation but opposite in its effect, evil will be utterly abolished from the final state of the universe. By taking this line certain difficulties are avoided. The act of annihilation, so conceived, is an exceptional interposition discontinuous from the rest of the Divine action upon the created world, and therefore *ex hypothesi* not admitting of explanation. But the hypothesis of Divine interpositions becomes less and less acceptable as men realize, alike in the kingdoms of nature and of grace, the presence and action of the unchanging God. Hence, for the most part, preference has been given to that theory of gradual annihilation which has been under discussion. It is a solution of the problem which has commended itself to many; it may probably secure even wider acceptance in the future; but even its advocates will admit that the difficulties involved in it deserve to be more fully faced and met than has yet been done.

LITERATURE.—W. R. Alger, *Crit. Hist. of the Doctr. of a Future Life* (1885); Arnobius, *adv. Nation.* (Vienna ed. 1875); Augustine, *de Immortalitate Animæ*; J. Baldwin Brown, *Doctr. of Annihilation* (1875); J. A. Beet, *The Last Things* (new ed. 1905); E. M. Caillard, *Individual Immortality* (1903); R. H. Charles, *Crit. Hist. of the Doctr. of a Future Life* (1899); H. Dodwell, *Epistolary Discourses proving that the Soul is a Principle naturally Mortal* (1706); L. Elbé, *Future Life in the Light of ancient Wisdom and modern Science* (1907); W. E. Gladstone, *Studies subsidiary to Butler* (1896); A. Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*[2] (1897); T. Hobbes, *English Works* (1839); H. Keyserling, *Unsterblichkeit* (1907); J. M. E. M'Taggart, *Some Dogmas of Religion* (1906); D. Palmieri, *de Deo creante* (1878); E. Petavel, *The Problem of Immortality* (1892); E. Rohde, *Psyche*[4] (1907); R. Rothe, *Dogmatik* (1870); S. D. F. Salmond, *Christ. Doctr. of Immortality*[2] (1896); Suarez, *de Anima* (*Opera*, Lyons, 1621); Thomas Aquinas, *Summa*, I. div.; E. White, *Life in Christ*[3] (1878).

G. C. JOYCE.

ANOINTING.

Introduction (A. E. CRAWLEY), p. 549.
Buddhist.—See ABHIṢEKA.
Christian.—See UNCTION.
Ethnic.—See Introduction.
Hindu (A. E. CRAWLEY), p. 554.
Semitic (M. JASTROW), p. 555.

ANOINTING.—**1.** Unction,* anointing with oil, is a minor act of ritual, which possesses, however, considerable significance for the history of sacramental religion. Its forms correspond generally to the practical purposes for which, in early culture, animal and vegetable fats and oils were so largely employed, while in both principle and practice it has connexions with painting and dress, decoration and disguise, nutrition and medicine, lustration and the various uses of water and blood.

2. The application of unguents to the skin and the hair has obtained, as a daily cosmetic practice, in most, if not all, sections of the human race, from the Tasmanians to the ancient Greeks and Romans. The material varies, in both secular and sacred uses, from crude animal fat to elaborate and costly perfumed vegetable oils. Among the lower races, animal fats are employed, frequently in combination with ochre, occasionally with such substances as charcoal, soot, and ashes. Higher stages of culture prefer vegetable oils, with gums, balsams, vegetable pastes and powders, such as turmeric, sandal and mustard, sawdust and flour, or the sap and pollen of plants, some of which are occasionally used without oil. Perfumes were usually prepared in the form of ointments. Lastly, the term 'unguent' is in most languages made to include, by analogy, such substances as blood, saliva, honey, mud, pitch, and tar. (See art. BLOOD. For anointing with blood see H. C. Trumbull, *The Blood Covenant* [1887], *s.v.*)

3. Anointing usually follows washing or bathing, and completes the toilet of the skin. The action of oil is to produce a sensation of comfort and well-being. Some peoples regard it as conducive to suppleness of the muscles and joints. The Australian aborigines relieve the languor consequent on a long and tiresome journey by rubbing the limbs with grease (W. E. Roth, *Ethnological Studies among the North-West-Central Queensland Aborigines* [1897], 114, 162). Oil closes the pores of the skin, and partially represses perspiration; hence the use of unguents by the Greeks and Romans before exercise, and after the bath which followed. Similarly, the Hindu anoints himself before bathing. In extremes of heat and cold these properties have an increased value, and anointing is almost a necessary of life in very hot and very cold climates. Being a bad conductor, oil protects the skin against the sun, and also prevents the escape of body heat. It is a useful emollient for burnt or chapped skin, and a valuable food for the nerves.

4. The cosmetic use soon acquired æsthetic associations. The gloss produced by oil has itself an æsthetic value, which is heightened by the addition of coloured substances. Of the majority of early peoples it may be said that grease and ochre constitute their wardrobe. The use of unguents as the vehicles of perfumes became a luxury among the Persians, Hindus, Greeks, and Romans, while among early peoples generally it is a common practice on both ordinary and ceremonial occasions, the object being to render the person attractive. Thus the natives of West Africa grease the body, and powder it over with scented and coloured flour. On the Slave Coast, 'magical' unguents, supplied by the priests, are employed for such purposes as the borrowing of money and the obtaining of a woman's favour. Swahili women use fragrant unguents in order to render themselves attractive. Similarly, Homer describes how Hera, when desirous to obtain a favour from Zeus, cleansed her skin with ambrosia and anointed herself with fragrant oil. In the islands of Torres Straits, the boys, at the close of initiation, are rubbed with a pungent scented

* The etymological identifications, still to be met with in dictionaries, of Eng. *salve*, etc., and Lat. *salvus*, etc., and of Lat. *unguo*, etc. and Gr. ἄγος, etc. are unfounded. F. W. Culmann in his *Das Salben im Morgen- und Abendlande* (1876) has discussed the etymology of 'anointing' in Indo-European and Semitic languages.

substance, which has the property of exciting the female sex. The Ewe-speaking peoples of West Africa scent the bride with civet, and make her skin red with the bark of the *to*-tree (F. Ratzel, *The History of Mankind* [Eng. tr.], ii. 397, iii. 108; A. B. Ellis, *The Ewe-speaking Peoples*, 94, 156; Velten, *Sitten und Gebräuche der Suahili*, 212; Homer, *Il.* xiv. 170 ff.; A. C. Haddon in *JAI* xix. 412).

5. Anointing thus stands for physical refreshment, well-being, and personal attractiveness. It is, therefore, naturally regarded as being essential on festal occasions. The Australian native, we are told, is fond of rubbing himself with grease and ochre, especially at times when ceremonies are being performed. Among the ancient Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans, unguents, as representing the completion of festal attire, were offered to guests. In the Homeric age, bathing and anointing formed an indispensable part of welcome. The use of anointing as a mark of honour naturally ensues. Thus, when a Ceramese warrior has taken his first head, he is anointed with fragrant oil by the young women of his village (Spencer-Gillen[a], 38; Wilkinson, i. 425; W. R. Smith, 233; Homer, *Od.* iii. 466, viii. 454; J. G. F. Riedel, *De sluik- en kroesharige Rassen tusschen Selebes en Papua*, 118).

Parallel to the cosmetic use of fats and oils is their application to food-stuffs as a 'dressing'; to tools, utensils, weapons, furniture, and buildings, as a lubricant, preservative, or polish; and to perishable substances as a preservative (E. F. im Thurn, *The Indians of Guiana*, 314; K. Langloh Parker, *The Euahlayi Tribe* [1905], 123; Roth, *op. cit.* 102).

6. In the *magical-religious* sphere a further principle makes its appearance. In addition to their cosmetic, sanative, decorative, and other merits, unguents now develop a more potent, though not specifically distinct, virtue. The principle may be put thus: according to primitive psychology, organic matter and, to some extent, inorganic also, is instinct with a Divine force or vital essence. The chief centres of this are sacred persons, objects, and places; later, the gods and their temples, their representatives and apparatus. This essence, with its gifts of life or strength, and magical or supernatural power, is transmissible by various methods, primarily contact. Inasmuch as its most obvious and convenient source is the flesh and blood of men and animals, the most direct method of assimilation is provided by eating and drinking; but an equally certain method is external application—a method which, in the form of anointing, is peculiarly adapted to the case of fats and oils. Unction is thus based upon the same sacramental principle as the practice of eating the flesh and drinking the blood of sacred persons and animals. The Divine life is transmitted, and communion with the sacred source attained, by anointing the worshipper with the sacred essence. Fat is the most primitive unguent, and is regarded in early thought as a very important seat of life. Ideas of sacredness are perhaps implicit even in its ordinary use, inasmuch as it is animal-substance. (Ernest Crawley, *The Mystic Rose* [1902], *passim*, also *The Tree of Life, A Study of Religion* [1905], 110, 223; W. R. Smith, 383). Where the idea of the sacredness of animal life has been developed to an extreme, as amongst the Hindus, animal fat is tabued.

To take illustrations: the Arabs of East Africa anoint themselves with lions' fat, in order to acquire courage. The Andamanese pour melted pigs' fat over children to render them strong. The Namaquas wear amulets of fat. The Damaras collect the fat of certain animals, which they believe to possess great virtue. It is kept in special receptacles; 'a small portion dissolved in water is given to persons who return home safely after a lengthened absence. . . . The chief makes use of it as an unguent for his body.' The fat of the human body possesses a proportionately higher sanctity and potency. It is especially the fat of the *omentum* that is regarded as possessing this vital force (Becker, *La Vie en Afrique*, ii. 366; E. H. Man, *The Andaman Islands*, 66; C. J. Andersson, *Lake Ngami*, 330, 233; W. R. Smith, *op. cit.* 383). The Australian savage will kill a man merely to obtain his kidney-fat with which to anoint himself. It is believed that the virtues of the dead man are transfused into the person by anointing. It is a regular practice throughout Australia to use for this purpose the fat of slain enemies. These natives also employ it to make their weapons strong; sick persons are rubbed with it in order to obtain health and strength. In India a prevalent superstition relates to the supernatural virtues of *momiâi*, an unguent prepared from the fat of boys murdered for the purpose. Grease made from the fat of a corpse is a potent charm among the Aleuts (R. B. Smyth, *Aborigines of Victoria*, i. 102, ii. 289, 313; *JAI* xxiv. 178; C. Lumholtz, *Among Cannibals*, 272; J. Dawson, *The Australian Aborigines*, 68; W. Crooke, *The Popular Religion and Folk-lore of Northern India*, ii. 176; H. H. Bancroft, *Native Races of the Pacific States*, iii. 145). A piece of human kidney-fat, worn round the neck, was believed by the Tasmanians to render a man proof against magic influence. The virtues of human fat as a curative and magical ointment are well known throughout the world. By its use love may be charmed, warriors rendered invulnerable, and witches enabled to fly through the air. Transformation into animals, as related in folklore, is effected by magical ointments, originally the fat of the animals in question (J. Bonwick, *The Tasmanians*, 179; Apuleius, *Metam.* iii. 2. 1; Lucian, *Lucius*, 12).

7. There are two further considerations to be taken into account in treating of the origin of unction. Sacred fat, in the first place, may be regarded as too holy, and therefore too dangerous, to be eaten. External application is a safer method of assimilating its virtues. In the second place, neither fat nor oil is, properly, an article of food in and by itself (W. R. Smith, 232, 386), but rather a medium or vehicle. Even in its cosmetic uses, oil is frequently a vehicle only, and when used alone would be regarded as the medium of a hidden virtue. In its sacred applications, therefore, we may take it that the oil of anointing is the vehicle of a sacred or Divine life or vital-essence, which is either inherent in the material or induced thereinto. When the primitive conception of the virtues of human and animal fat decays, the Divine essence is, as it were, put in commission, and may be transmitted to any unguent by various methods of consecration. Apart from the sacredness which it carries, a holy unguent is distinguished from other vehicles chiefly by its original cosmetic, decorative, sanative, and other properties.

The sacramental principle is thus the controlling factor in the theory of anointing; but it is always possible to trace the connexion between the essence and the accidents of holy oil, between the magical force or supernatural grace and those material properties which, to quote a Catholic theologian, 'well represent the effects of this Sacrament; *oleum enim sanat, lenit, recreat, penetrat ac lucet*' (P. Dens, *Theologia Moralis et Dogmatica* [1832], vii. 3). Ceremonial unction in all religions satisfies the condition laid down by Catholic theology for the Catholic rite of unction; the *differentia* of the sacrament consists in the fact that 'the sign of the sacred thing, the visible form of invisible grace' (Augustine), should be 'such as to represent it and bring it about.'

The methods of transmitting the sacred essence to the unguent are material contact, magical and religious formulas, intention, blessing, and prayer. The results of unction develop from the decorative and sanative through the magical stage to a supernatural consecration, which imparts spiritual refreshment and strength—in Christian doctrine, grace and the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

8. In the very widely spread use of fats and oils for the treatment of the sick, physical, magical, and religious ideas shade off into one another imperceptibly. Some typical examples will illustrate the range and the working of these ideas. Thus the Australians use various fats to assist the healing of wounds and sores; but to cure a sick man it is necessary to 'sing' the grease with which his body is rubbed (K. Langloh Parker, *The Euahlayi*

Tribe, 38; Spencer-Gillen[a], 250, 464; Roth, *op. cit.* 157, 162). The *shamans* of Asiatic Russia charm the blubber, reindeer-fat, or bear's grease with which the body of a patient is anointed. So, more definitely, the Melanesian medicine-man imparts *mana*, magical or spiritual force, to the unguent. On the other hand, the most powerful unguent in the Chinese pharmacopœia owes its virtues to gold-leaf. Gold is considered to be the most perfect form of matter, and this unguent transmits life to the human body. The unguent employed by the priests of ancient Mexico, when sacrificing on the mountains or in caves, contained narcotics and poisons. It was supposed to remove the sense of fear, and certainly soothed pain. It was used in the treatment of the sick, and was known as 'the divine physic.' The holy oil of Ceram Laut may be manufactured only by a boy and a girl who are virgins. A priest superintends and repeats formulas over the oil. The Amboynese offer oil to the gods. What is left over is returned, and now possesses Divine virtues. It is used to anoint sick and sound alike, and is believed to confer all manner of blessings (V. M. Mikhailovskii in *JAI* xxiv. 98; R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, 198 f.; J. J. M. de Groot, *The Religious System of China*, iv. 331 f.; Acosta, *History of the Indies* [Hakluyt Society], ii. 365–367; J. G. F. Riedel, *De sluik- en kroesharige Rassen tusschen Selebes en Papua*, 179; F. Valentijn, *Oud en nieuw Oost-Indien*, iii. 10). To return to magical ideas, variations of method are seen in the practice of anointing the weapon which dealt the wound; in the East Indian custom, whereby fruits and stones are smeared with oil, and prayer is made that the bullets may rebound from the warriors as rain rebounds from what is covered with oil; and in the Australian superstitions connected with bone-pointing. Here it is possible for the user of the magical weapon to release his victim from the wasting sickness he has brought upon him, if he rubs the apparatus or his own body with grease, in some cases giving what is left of the unguent to the sick man. On the principle of sympathy, a mother will grease her own body daily while her son is recovering from circumcision (J. G. Frazer, *GB*[2] i. 57 ff.; C. M. Pleyte in *Tijdschrift van het Nederlandsch Aardrijkskundig Genootschap* (1893), 805; Langloh Parker, *op. cit.* 32; Spencer-Gillen[b], 466, also [a], 250).

9. The *anointing of the dead* is based on the principle that, as the Chinese say, the dead man 'may depart clean and in a neat attire from this world of cares.' Africa, North America, and the Fiji and Tonga Islands supply typical examples of the custom. The corpse is washed, oiled, and dressed in fine clothes (J. J. M. de Groot, *op. cit.* i. 6, 20; F. Ratzel, *The History of Mankind*, i. 328; Williams and Calvert, *Fiji and the Fijians*, i. 188; J. Adair, *History of the North American Indians*, 181). The ancient Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans thus prepared their dead for the last rites. The Egyptians also oiled the head of the mummy; the Romans poured perfumed oils over the ashes and the tomb. At the annual commemoration of those who fell at Platæa, the Archon washed the grave-stones with water and anointed them with oil. The Greeks placed in the tomb vessels (λήκυθοι) containing unguents for the use of the dead. The Kingsmill Islanders, like many other peoples, preserved the skulls of dead relatives. These were oiled and garlanded; food was offered to them as if they were alive (Wilkinson, iii. 363; Servius on Virgil, *Æn.* v. 219, ix. 483; Lucian, *de Luctu*, 11; Schömann, *Gr. Alterthümer*, ii. 595, 600; Wilkes, *U.S. Exploring Expedition*, 556). The pious affection shown in such customs is elsewhere very commonly developed into practices which aim at a closer union with the departed. Thus in Australia we find a prevalent custom among mourners of anointing themselves with oil made from the decomposing fat of the corpse. This practice has typical examples in the Dutch East Indies, Africa, and North America. The Creek Indians anoint themselves with oil mingled with the ashes of the dead. A curious custom obtains in the Aru Islands of the Dutch East Indies. As soon as a man is dead, his widow runs round to the houses of all his friends and smears the doors with oil (Spencer-Gillen[b], 530; Fison and Howitt, *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, 243; Riedel, *op. cit.* 308; *First Report BE*, 145, 155; Riedel, 288). The Catholic rite of Extreme Unction doubtless derives from the general principle of anointing the sick; but, apart from such customs, there would seem to be no definite case elsewhere of the practice of unction immediately before death.

10. It will be convenient at this point to draw out the connexion between *ceremonial anointing and the principles of tabu*. In the first place, grease, oil, and fat are convenient vehicles for the application of ashes, charcoal, and other marks of mourning, and of the red paint that denotes such persons as the shedder of blood and the menstruous woman. These states, being tabu, possess one form of sanctity; but it is a general rule that anointing proper, together with decent apparel, should be discarded during their continuance. Similarly, anointing, with other aids to well-being, is renounced by the ascetic. Differences of cosmetic custom produce exceptions to the rule; thus, among the ancient inhabitants of Central America it was the custom to smear the body with grease as a mark of fasting and penance. During the penitential season which preceded the New Year festival, every man was thus anointed daily; the festal use of paint was resumed as soon as the feast commenced (H. H. Bancroft, *op. cit.* ii. 690, 696). In the second place, we have to recognize the cleansing powers of unction. Anointing is positive, lustration negative; but this original distinction is not kept intact, for consecrated water not only cleanses, but imparts the Divine life of which it is the vehicle (W. R. Smith, 190); and consecrated oil, conversely, both imparts virtue and cleanses, by the action of the Divine life which it carries within it. Early peoples, it must be noted, employ fat and oil-refuse as a detergent. Anointing thus not only produces the sanctity of consecration, but also removes the sanctity of tabu. In the latter case, its result is re-admission to the normal life (which itself possesses a measure of sanctity [W. R. Smith, 426]), and to that extent it brings about a re-consecration of impaired sanctity. The following cases show how unction and lustration tend to assimilate. The *ghī* of the Hindus is held to purify by virtue of its sacred essence, while the sprinkling with sacred water which constitutes the *abhiṣeka*, or anointing of a king, possesses not only the name but the function of ordinary anointing. The Yoruba 'water of purification' is really an unguent, prepared from shea-butter and edible snails. The 'neutralizing rice-flour' of the Malays has both positive and negative virtues (A. B. Ellis, *The Yoruba-speaking Peoples*, 141; W. W. Skeat, *Malay Magic*, 77, 376, 385). Lastly, in the very widely spread ritual of blood, the material is either sprinkled like water, poured like oil, or smeared like ointment, while the results of the ceremony are both to cleanse and to confer a blessing.

11. The examples which follow illustrate the use of anointing to remove tabu, and comprise various principles of ceremonial unction. In the Ongtong-Java Islands all strangers are met by the priests immediately on landing. Sand and water are sprinkled about, and the visitors themselves are sprinkled with water, anointed with oil, and girt with pandanus-leaves. Galla warriors on returning home are 'washed' by the women with

fat and butter, and their faces are painted red and white (R. Parkinson in *Internat. Archiv für Ethnographie*, x. 112; P. Paulitschke, *Ethnographie Nordost-Afrikas*, 258). Before starting on a journey the Wanjamwesi smears his face with a sort of porridge, and the ceremony is repeated on his return. The Australian who has smitten his enemy with sickness by the use of 'the bone' may release him from the curse by rinsing the magical weapon in water or by rubbing it with fat. Similarly, as noticed above, the operator may produce this result by greasing his own body. The customs connected with war and slaughter supply remarkable cases of this form of unction. In Ceram Laut, when war is decided upon, the chief anoints the feet of the aggrieved person with oil. It is a kind of consecration. The man then raises the warcry and rouses the people. The *Illapurinja*, 'female avenger,' among the Central Australians, is rubbed with grease and decorated. On her return, her husband removes the decorations and rubs her afresh with grease. The Fijians observed an elaborate ritual for the son of a chief after slaying his first man. He was anointed from head to foot with red turmeric and oil. For three days he lived in seclusion with several other youths, anointed and dressed like himself. They were forbidden to lie down, or sleep, or change their clothes, or enter a house where there was a woman (F. Stuhlmann, *Mit Emin Pascha ins Herz von Afrika*, 89; Roth, *op. cit.* 157; Riedel, *op. cit.* 158; Spencer-Gillen[a], 466–468; Williams and Calvert, *op. cit.* i. 56). In the cases cited above many principles of early thought may be discerned. It is sufficient to note that war is a holy state, and that it must be inaugurated and concluded with ceremonial observance.

12. The removal of tabu coincides with the renewal of normal life and normal sanctity, and anointing is employed here no less regularly than for the inauguration of a highly sacred state. Thus mourners are anointed, as in Africa and North America, when their period of sorrow is ended. Throughout Africa it is the custom to anoint the mother with fat and oil shortly after child-birth. The practice is common throughout the world, after sickness generally, with women after the monthly period, and with children after the ceremonial observances at puberty. The practice in the last instance often takes a peculiar form. In Australia, for instance, and the Andamans, a boy is made free of a forbidden food by the process of having fat rubbed over his face and body (J. Shooter, *The Kaffirs of Natal*, Lond. [1857], 241; *1 RBEW*, 146; Maclean, *Compendium of Kaffir Laws and Customs*, 94, 99; D. Macdonald, *Africana*, i. 129; Dennett, *Folklore of the Fjort*, 137; Spencer-Gillen[a], 386; E. H. Man in *JAI* xii. 134; Howitt, *ib.* xiii. 455, xiv. 316).

13. Passing now to cases of *consecration* proper, we find anointing used to inaugurate periodic sacredness, as in rites corresponding to baptism and confirmation, in marriage and in worship. The customs last noted tend to merge into these. (*a*) It is a custom of wide extension that the new-born child should be rubbed with oil (Roth, *op. cit.* 183; Ratzel, ii. 286; Williams and Calvert, i. 175; Caron's 'Japan' in Pinkerton's *Voyages and Travels*, vii. 635; Ellis, *Yoruba-speaking Peoples*, 141). This practice soon becomes ceremonial, and suggests baptismal analogies. The Ovaherero ceremony of naming the child combines so many principles that it may stand for a typical summary. The rite takes place in the house of the sacred fire, and is performed by the chief man of the village. He first takes a mouthful of water, and spurts this over the bodies of mother and child. Then he addresses the ancestors thus: 'To you a child is born in your village; may the village never come to an end.' He then ladles some fat out of a vessel, spits upon it, and rubs it over his hands. He next rubs more fat in his hands, spurting water upon it. Then he anoints the woman. In doing this he crosses his arms, so as to touch with his right hand her right side, and with his left hand her left side. The process is repeated with the child. Finally he gives it a name, while touching its forehead with his own (E. Dannert in *South African Folklore Journal*, ii. 67).

(*b*) The anointing of boys and girls as a preliminary to the ceremonies observed at puberty is of wide extension; it is most prominent in Australia and Africa. In Central Australia the candidate is rubbed with grease at various times during the protracted ceremonial. At the circumcision festival of the Masai the boys were allowed to gorge themselves with beef. They rubbed the fat over their bodies, much as a Dayak rubs himself with the blood of a pig, or as a carnivorous animal rolls in the flesh of his prey (Spencer-Gillen[b], 93, 135, also [a], 242; *JAI* xxiv. 418; C. J. Andersson, *Lake Ngami*, 465).

(*c*) In the ceremonial of marriage we find typical examples of anointing. The Central Australian, for a few days after receiving his wife, rubs her daily with grease and ochre. A few days before marriage the Angola bride is anointed with oil from head to foot, and until she is handed over to her husband is treated like a queen. The custom is frequent in Africa, and occurs in Fiji. The Malays anoint both bride and bridegroom. In what amounts to a ceremony of re-marriage, performed after the birth of the first child, the Basuto pair are anointed by a medicine-man with a mixture of roots and fat. In Australia we find the custom of anointing pregnant women (Spencer-Gillen[b], 135, 606; G. Tams, *The Portuguese Possessions in South-West Africa* [Eng. tr.], i. 175; Williams and Calvert, i. 169; Skeat, 385; *ZE* [1877] 78).

(*d*) As a preliminary to worship, anointing is frequently incumbent on the people, more frequently on the priest. In ancient Greece, those who consulted the oracle of Trophonius were washed and anointed with oil. When a native of the Slave Coast worships the guardian spirit who resides in his head, he rubs his head with oil; the priests anoint themselves before entering the house of the god. The priests of Mexico and Central America were anointed from head to foot with a sacred unguent, which was also applied to the images of the gods. Returning to Greece, we learn that in the feast of Dionysus the men who carried the sacred bull to the temple were anointed with oil. Similarly, the Luperci at Rome were anointed and garlanded. An interesting side-light on the theory of anointing reaches us from Fiji and the Dutch East Indies. At shamanistic ceremonies the person into whom the god is to enter is anointed with fragrant oil, by way of rendering him attractive to the deity (Pausanias, viii. 19. 2, ix. 39. 7; Ellis, *Yoruba-speaking Peoples*, 126, also *Ewe-speaking Peoples*, 76; Acosta, *History of the Indies*, ii. 364; Bancroft, *Native Races*, ii. 323, iii. 341; Lactantius, *Inst.* i. 21. 45; G. A. Wilken, *Het Shamanisme bij de Volken van den Indischen Archipel*, 479 f.; Williams and Calvert, *op. cit.* i. 224).

14. For the special *consecration of priests*, anointing is a not uncommon piece of ritual, obtaining in various parts of the world. The Slave Coast of Africa provides a typical case. The candidate's body is smeared with a decoction of herbs. Then the priests who officiate anoint his head with 'a mystical unguent,' and ask the god to accept him. If he is accepted, the deity is supposed to enter into him. A new cloth is put upon the ordained novice, and a new name conferred. Among the Buriats a *shaman* is consecrated by being anointed with the blood of a kid. In North America, among the Chikasaws, the candidate fasted for some time, and was consecrated by a bath and unction with bear's grease. The Toltecs and Totonacs of Central America consecrated their pontiffs with an unguent made of india-rubber oil and children's blood. For the anointing of their spiritual king, the Aztecs employed the unguent used at the enthronement of their temporal monarch. The priests of ancient Egypt were consecrated with holy oil poured upon the head (Ellis, *The Ewe-speaking Peoples*, 143 f., *JAI* xxiv. 89; Adair, 122; Bancroft, ii. 214, iii. 433, ii. 201; Wilkinson, iii. 360).

15. The *anointing of kings*, with which Semitic

and Christian custom has familiarized the world, is a spectacular rite of rare occurrence outside the sphere of Hebrew tradition. It is found, however, in a more or less perfect form among the ancient Egyptians, the Aztecs, and the Hindus ancient and modern. The Pharaoh was anointed after investiture with the sacred robes. The monuments give representations of the ceremony, and in the Tell el-Amarna letters the king of Cyprus sends to the king of Egypt 'a flask of good oil to pour on your head, now that you have ascended the throne of your kingdom.' The Aztec ceremony of royal unction preceded coronation. The king-elect went in procession to the temple of Huitzilopochtli. After paying homage to the god, he was anointed throughout his whole body by the high priest, and sprinkled with holy water. He was then clothed in ceremonial robes, and about his neck was hung a gourd containing powerful remedies against sorcery, disease, and treason. The unguent used was the black oil with which the priests anointed their own bodies and the images of the gods. Its name is variously given, *ulli*, or *ole*, and its chief constituent was india-rubber juice. The Quichés and Cakchiquels bathed the king at his coronation, and anointed his body with perfumes. Candidates for the order of Tecuhtli, the Garter of the Aztecs, were anointed with the same sacerdotal unguent (Wilkinson, iii. 360; W. M. Flinders Petrie, *Syria and Egypt from the Tell el-Amarna Letters*, 45; H. Winckler, *The Tell el-Amarna Letters* [Eng. tr.], 87; Bancroft, ii. 144 f., 641, 196, iii. 385).

The anointing of kings and priests combines several principles, and is not to be explained on one separate line of development. It is, in the first place, a part of the festal dress essential on such occasions (W. R. Smith, 233, 453). Secondly, we have the various ideas connected with consecration,—the transmission of sanctity, power, and new life (*ib.* 383 f.), on the one hand; and, on the other, the 'hedging' of a dedicated person with sacredness, for his protection and the performance of his office.

16. The *anointing of sacrifice and offering, the altar and the temple, and the sacred apparatus* generally, supplies many details of ritual which fall into line with the main principles of religious unction, while giving prominence to such as are more closely connected with worship. The human sacrifices of the ancient Albanians of the Caucasus, of the Aztecs, and of the people of Timor, were anointed before being slain. The last case has to do with coronation. The princes of Kupang in Timor kept sacred crocodiles, and believed themselves to be descended from this animal. On the day of coronation, a young girl was richly dressed, decorated with flowers, and anointed with fragrant oil, to be offered as a sacrifice to the sacred monsters. In the remarkable human sacrifice of the Khonds, the *Meriah* was anointed with oil, *ghi*, and turmeric, and adorned with flowers. He received 'a species of reverence which it is not easy to distinguish from adoration.' Every one who could touched the oil on the victim's body and rubbed it on his own head. The oil was regarded as possessing the same virtue as his flesh and blood conferred on the fields (Strabo, ii. 4. 7; Bancroft, iii. 333; Veth, *Het eiland Timor*, 21; S. C. Macpherson, *Memorials of Service in India*, 118; J. Campbell, *Wild Tribes of Khondistan*, 54 f., 112).

The custom of 'dressing' offerings with oil was regular in the worship of the ancient Greeks. When the natives of West Africa sacrifice an animal, they sprinkle it with palm-oil by way of attracting the spirits. At the festival of the New Fruits among the Creek Indians, the priest took some of each sort and smeared them with oil before offering them to the spirit of fire. The people of Gilgit drench with wine, oil, and blood the branch of the sacred cedar used in their agricultural ceremonies. Similarly the Malays, in their ceremony of bringing home the Soul of the Rice, and the Javanese, in the Marriage of the Rice Bride, anoint the rice with oil (Schömann, ii. 236; Pausanias, viii. 42; A. B. Ellis, *The Yoruba-speaking Peoples*, 155; Adair, 96; Biddulph, *Tribes of the Hindu Kush*, 106; Skeat, *op. cit.* 235; Veth, *Java*, i. 524).

The natives of Celebes on great occasions anoint the flag and other emblems of state. The Santals anoint their cattle when celebrating the harvest-home. The Shans of Indo-China and the natives of Celebes purify with water and anoint with oil the plough used in their ceremonial ploughing of the rice-fields (G. K. Niemann in *Bijdragen voor de Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch Indië*, xxxviii. 2. 270; W. Crooke, *op. cit.* ii. 308; E. Aymonier in *RHR* xxiv. 272; B. F. Matthes, *Bijdragen tot de Ethnologie van Zuid-Selebes*, 93).

When we pass to cases more definitely representative of worship, we find a development of two ideas: first, that the sacred life immanent in the sacred symbol or image needs periodical renewing; and, secondly, that the spirit connected therewith requires conciliation; anointing the sacred object renews its vigour and also brings the worshipper into union with the deity. When the Wawamba of Central Africa or the Australian of Queensland anoints his sacred stone with fat when asking it for rain, we may infer that the sacred object is supposed to be revived and rendered gracious by the cosmetic virtues of unction. Similarly the Central Australians rub their *churinga* with fat and ochre whenever they examine them. The *churinga* is supposed to have human feelings, and the process of anointing is said to 'soften it' (F. Stuhlmann, *op. cit.* 654; Roth, *op. cit.* 158; Spencer-Gillen[b], 255, 265, 270, also[a], 161). Here the use of grease for utensils combines with cosmetic anointing. In many cases it is natural to find these ideas merging in the notion of feeding the divine object; but it would be incorrect to derive the anointing of sacred stones from the practice of feeding the god. The custom of smearing blood upon sacred symbols and images is of wide extension, but it is not a survival from any practice of pouring the blood into the mouth of an image. The practical primitive mind does not confuse anointing with nutrition, though well aware that the two are allied. As illustrating the extension of the custom, a few examples are here brought forward. The Greeks and Romans washed, anointed, and garlanded their sacred stones. The *ὀμφαλός* of Delphi was periodically anointed and wrapped in wool (Schömann, ii. 236; Lucian, *Alex.* 30; Apuleius, *Flor.* i. 1; Minucius Felix, *Octav.* iii.; Pausanias, x. 24, and J. G. Frazer, *Commentary on Pausanias*, v. 354 f.). The Malagasy anoint sacred stones with fat or oil or the blood of victims. The Wakamba neat-herd anoints a rock with oil and offers fruits, in order to get his cattle through a difficult pass (J. Sibree, *History of Madagascar*, 305; *ZE* x. 384). This combination of nutrition and unction is found among the Kei islanders; every family here possesses a sacred black stone, and to obtain success in war or trade a man anoints this with oil and offers fruits to it. In Celebes, sacred images, apparatus, and buildings are smeared with oil by worshippers. The ancient Egyptians anointed the statues of the gods, applying the unguent with the little finger of the left hand. The Arval Brothers anointed the image of their goddess, *Dea Dia*, on festival days. At the ceremony of mourning for the dead god, the stone image of Attis was anointed. This was probably the unction of the dead. When the image was brought out from the tomb on the day of Resurrec-

tion, the priest anointed the throats of the worshippers. The religion of ancient Greece provides a curious instance of the meeting of the practical and the religious spheres. The old temple-statues of the gods, made of wood, were rubbed with oil to preserve them from decay, while to preserve the magnificent creations of gold and ivory, such as the image of Zeus at Olympia, oil was run in pipes throughout the statue (Riedel, *op. cit.* 223; Matthes, *op. cit.* 94; Wilkinson, *op. cit.* iii. 361; *CIL* vi. 9797; Firmicus, *de Errore*, 23; Pausanias, v. 11, and Frazer's *Com. ad loc.*).

17. The principle of communion with the deity by means of anointing the sacred symbol or the worshipper himself is more apparent in the elementary stages of worship. The Assiniboins, we are told, venerate the bear, and try to keep on good terms with him. They pray to him when they wish to be successful in a bear-hunt, and so to secure a good supply of bear's flesh to eat and of the bear's grease with which they are always anointed. The natives of Central Australia, at the *Intichiuma* ceremony for maintaining the supply of kangaroos, eat a little of the flesh of this animal and anoint their bodies with the fat. In order to obtain success in hunting euros, they rub themselves with stones supposed to be parts of that animal. Similarly, before eating snakes they rub their arms with snake fat. At a higher stage of development we find the West African negro anointing that part of his own body where his guardian spirit resides (de Smet, *Western Missions and Missionaries*, 139; Spencer-Gillen[a], 206, also[b], 182, 255; Ellis, *Yoruba-speaking Peoples*, 126 f.).

18. The oil of anointing, as we have seen, transmits the sacredness latent within it in either of two directions—to the worshipper or to the god. If we look at the controlling source of its virtue, the potentially sacred substance of the human body, and compare the earliest forms of consecration, we see that the theory of anointing leads us back to pre-theistic and even pre-fetishistic times. The elementary stages of dedication illustrate the less common direction of anointing, in which the worshipper or the priest confers sanctity instead of receiving it. The dedication, more or less informal, of sacred buildings and apparatus by anointing obtained in Egypt, Greece, and Italy; it is remarkably prominent in India, ancient and modern, but does not appear to have been general elsewhere. It is, of course, connected with the use of oil for tools, utensils, and furniture, but also has associations with fetishistic methods of making gods (Crawley, *The Tree of Life, A Study of Religion* [1905], 232). The ritual of renewing the sacred vigour of a sacred symbol has already been referred to; here we note the original induction. Thus every man on the Gold Coast makes for himself a *suhman*, or tutelary deity. When he has made it, he anoints it with butter. Among the Bataks the *guru* inducts a spirit into the fetish with various ceremonies, chief among which is the application of a vegetable-unguent (Ellis, *Tshi-speaking Peoples*, 100 f.; Hagen in *Tijds. v. Taal- Land- en Volkenk. van Ned. Indië*, xxviii. 525; Matthes, *op. cit.* 94). But the Central Australian, rubbing a newly made *churinga* with fat, is an unconscious exponent of the embryonic stage of consecration by unction.

19. In its latest developments anointing passes into a theological metaphor of *quasi*-doctrinal import. *Spiritual unction* carries with it from the sacramental to the ethical-religious plane the various gifts of consecration, leaving in its course such traces of mysticism as 'the White Ointment from the Tree of Life,' found in the baptismal formula of the Ophites, and Justin's adaptation of Plato's fancy, to the effect that the Creator impressed the Soul of the Universe upon it as an unction in the form of a χ (Justin, *Apol.* i. 60; Plato, *Timæus*, 36).

In conclusion, the history of anointing in its connexion with religion shows that of all sacramental media the sacred unguent is the most spiritual, and that from beginning to end holy unction is the least material of all purely physical modes of assimilating the Divine. Its characteristic is soul.

LITERATURE.—Esp. W. R. Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*[2] (1894). Other references—*Encyc. Brit.*[9]; J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*[2] (1900), ii. 364 f.; A. E. Crawley, *The Mystic Rose* (1902), 105 ff.; F. W. Culmann, *Das Salben im Morgen- und Abendlande* (1876).

A. E. CRAWLEY.

ANOINTING (Hindu).—Unguents have been in regular use from the earliest times for every form of cosmetic, luxurious, medicinal, and ceremonial unction. Cosmetic and medicinal oils and pastes are found in greater number and variety in India than in any other country, though animal fats are there, of course, prohibited. Scented and coloured preparations are frequent; for ceremonial purposes, sandal-paste or oil, oil and turmeric, and ghī are chiefly used. Sandal-oil is popular on account of its fragrance; ghī and turmeric are extensively employed in medicine and cookery; turmeric and mustard-oil possess invigorating properties. Oil is applied to the head and body before and frequently after the bath. The practice is said to invigorate the system, and it is noted in the ancient literature that diseases do not approach the man who takes physical exercise and anoints his limbs with oil. Infants are well rubbed with mustard-oil, and are then exposed to the sun; it is asserted, on scientific authority, that the practice is a preventive of consumption. The hair is always well pomaded, coconut-oil being chiefly used. Sandal- or rose-water is offered to guests; and this custom (*mālaya-chandana*) is the ancient *arghya*. During mourning and sickness anointing is discontinued, also on fast-days, on visits to sacred places, by Brāhmans in the stage of life as student or ascetic, and by women during menstruation. At the conclusion of her period a woman is rubbed with saffron-oil; and anointing, more or less ceremonial, marks recovery from sickness and the end of mourning.*

Magical unguents, to which potency was given by *mantras*, were and still are used to inspire love, and to prevent or cure evil and disease. A still prevalent superstition is that of *momiāi*, the essential element of which is an unguent prepared from the fat of a boy murdered for the purpose. This is believed to heal wounds and to render the body invulnerable. The *amṛta* oil made men strong and women lovely; it ensured offspring, averted misfortune, promoted prosperity, and guaranteed long life. Its manufacture was preceded by purificatory rites. The Brāhman, when about to anoint himself, should think of the *Chirañjīvins* ('the long-lived'), seven half-divine persons.

At the hair-parting ceremony (*sīmantonnayana*), performed during pregnancy, the woman is bathed and fragrant oil is poured on her head. Immediately after birth the child is rubbed with warm mustard-oil. The tonsure (*chāula*) takes place at the age of three; the child is anointed with oil

* U. C. Dutt, *Materia Medica of the Hindus*, pp. 18 ff., 225; J. E. Padfield, *The Hindu at Home*, Madras, 1896, p. 90; A. F. R. Hoernle, *The Bower MS., passim*; W. Ward, *History, Literature, and Mythology of the Hindoos*, i. 92, 275, iii. 345; Bhagvat Sinh Jee, *Aryan Medical Science*, pp. 45, 62; Lāl Behāri Day, *Govinda Sāmanta*, 1874, p. 57; J. A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*[2], tr. by H. K. Beauchamp, Oxford, 1899, pp. 183, 713; *Laws of Manu*, tr. by G. Bühler, *SBE* cxxv. Oxford, 1886, p. 62; Monier Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hinduism*[4], London, 1891, pp. 153, 307; Rājendralāla Mitra, *Indo-Aryans*, Calcutta, 1881, i. 434, 439, ii. 17 ff.; S. C. Bose, *The Hindoos as they are*, 1881, pp. 17, 23.

and washed. Girls, on arriving at puberty, are decorated and anointed with oil, or oil and turmeric (*haridrā*). Brāhman boys, on investiture with the thread, are similarly anointed with oil and *haridrā*.* The ceremony of *gātra-haridrā* is performed during the preliminary marriage-rites and on the wedding-day. Bride and bridegroom are anointed with oil and turmeric. The 'sandalwood stone,' which they have to touch with their feet, is rubbed with oil. The bride's brother smears the hands of the bride with ghī, and sprinkles parched rice upon them. At a Yānādi wedding the mothers of the contracting parties anoint them with oil, turmeric, and sandal-paste. They then bathe and put on new clothes. Among the Kannādiyans the village barber sprinkles ghī over the heads of the bridal pair, who afterwards take an oil bath. For the *sindūrdān*, sandal-paste, blood, or vermilion are chiefly used. Oil or paste is a common medium for sacred marks.

After death, the body is washed and anointed with sandal-paste, oil, and turmeric, or ghī. In some cases the chief mourner touches each aperture of the body with his lips, repeats a *mantra*, and pours ghī on each. The forehead of a dying man is, if possible, smeared with the sacred mud of the Ganges. At the burial of the urn the chief mourner anoints himself with ghī.

At the ordination of a Buddhist priest, his hair is touched with oil before being cut.† The important ceremony of *abhiṣeka* (wh. see), the royal baptism or consecration, is in principle a form of unction; the holy water, with its numerous ingredients, consecrates rather by infusion of divine force than by lustration. This rite was celebrated towards the close of the protracted ceremonies of the *rājasūya*. The proper time for its celebration was the new moon after the full moon of Phālguna, *i.e.* about the end of March. Eighteen ingredients were necessary, the chief being the water of the sacred river Sarasvatī. The others included ghī, milk, cow-dung, honey, sugar, sandal-water, perfumes, earths, turmeric, and rice-meal. The *adhvaryu* mixed them from eighteen pitchers in a bucket of *udumbara* wood, repeating a *mantra* at every stage, *e.g.*, 'O honeyed water, whom the Devas collected, thou mighty one, thou begotten of kings, thou enlivener; with thee Mitra and Varuṇa were consecrated, and Indra was freed from his enemies; I take thee.' 'O water, thou art naturally a giver of kingdoms, grant a kingdom to my Yajamāna' (naming the king). 'O honeyed and divine ones, mix with each other for the strength and vigour of our Yajamāna.' The king, after a preliminary sprinkling, put on a bathing-dress, the inner garment of which was steeped in ghī, and took his seat on a stool covered with a tiger-skin, facing the east, and, as the pouring commenced, raised his arms. On his head was a rose-head of gold, through which the sacred liquid was to spread in a shower. The contents of the one bucket were transferred to four; these the *adhvaryu*, the Brāhman priest, a *kṣatriya*, and a *vaiśya* poured in turn over the head of the king from their respective positions. *Mantras* were recited, such as—

'O Yajamāna, I bathe thee with the glory of the moon; may you be king of kings among kings. . . . O ye well worshipped Devas, may you free him from all his enemies, and enable him to discharge the highest duties of the Kṣatriya. . . .'

At the close the Brāhman said, 'Know ye that he has this day become your king; of us Brāhmaṇas Soma is the king.'* Noteworthy details are the prayers to 'the divine Quickeners,' the belief that the gods consecrated the king, and that through the rite he was filled with divine force. The essence of water is vigour; this and the vitalizing essence of all the ingredients of the sacred liquid enter into him. One *mantra* states that he is sprinkled with priestly dignity.† The hair of the king was not to be cut until a year had elapsed. Three forms of *abhiṣeka* are mentioned—*abhiṣeka* for kings, *pūrṇābhiṣeka* for superior kings, and *mahābhiṣeka* for emperors. According to the Vārāha Purāṇa, a man may perform the ceremony on himself in a simplified form: 'He who pours sesamum-seed and water on his head from a right-handed *śaṅkha* destroys all the sins of his life.'

A modified form of *abhiṣeka* is still employed at the coronation of Rājahs. In Assam, for instance, the water for the ceremony is taken from nine holy places, and is mingled with the juices of plants. A similar account is given of coronation in Mysore. In Rājputāna the ceremony is unction rather than baptism. A mixture of sandal-paste and attar of roses is the unguent employed, and a little of this is placed on the forehead with the middle finger of the right hand. The royal jewels are then tied on.‡

As in Vedic times, the Brāhman washes and anoints himself with oil or ghī before performing religious duties. The institutor of a ceremony also anoints himself. On the first day of the festival *Saṅkrānti* it is the custom for every one to take a bath, in which rubbing the body with oil forms a conspicuous feature. In the *nirūdha-paśubandha* rite the tree from which the sacrificial post was to be cut was anointed, and the victim, after being rubbed with oil and turmeric and washed, was anointed with ghī just before the sacrifice. In the *Yagña* sacrifice the ram is rubbed with oil, bathed, covered with *akṣatas*, and garlanded.§ At the *Durgā-pūjā* festival a plantain tree is bathed and anointed with several kinds of scented oils.

The consecration of buildings by means of unction is a well-developed feature of Hindu ritual. There is a ceremony analogous to the laying of foundation-stones, in which a piece of wood (*śaṅku*) is decorated and anointed, being thereby animated with the spirit of the god Vāstupurusha, who becomes the tutelary deity of the house. Again, when the principal entrance is put up, the woodwork is anointed with sandal-oil and worshipped. The same ceremony is performed over the ridge-plate and the well, and for the house generally, when first entered.

The images of the gods in the temples are bathed, anointed, and dressed by the priests daily. Unguents for this purpose (*vilepana*) are one of the 'essential offerings' presented by worshippers. Sacred stones are also anointed and decorated; and the worshippers of Śiva anoint the *liṅga*.

The principle of consecration is well brought out in the Hindu ritual of anointing, while the allied principles of decoration and purification are fully recognized.‖

A. E. CRAWLEY.

ANOINTING (Semitic).—If we find traces of anointing among the Arabs in pre-Islāmic days,

* H. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, 1894, pp. 499, 513; *The Sacred Books of the East*, vol. xxx. *Hindu Mysteries*, Calcutta Review Lectures, 1889, p. 86; Monier Williams, *Religious Thought and Life in India*, 1883, p. 357; Ward, i. 74; S. C. Bose, *The Hindoos as they are*, p. 86; in general, Hillebrandt, *Vedische Opfer und Zauber*, 1897, pp. 43, 49, 62, 67.

† Lāl Behārī Day, p. 126 f.; Dubois, pp. 50 f., 122, 227, 336, 492; S. Mateer, *Native Life in Travancore*, p. 58; Bose, pp. 50 f., 250; *Madras Government Museum Bulletin*, iv. 3, 152, 156, 204; Ward, i. 168 f., 176, iii. 354; Monier Williams, pp. 298, 363; Rājendralāla Mitra, ii. 144.

* Rājendralāla Mitra, ii. 3, 37 ff., 46 ff.

† H. Oldenberg, pp. 428, 472; *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, tr. by J. Eggeling in *SBE*, vol. xli. p. 68 ff.; A. Weber, *Über die Königsweihe, den Rājasūya*, Berlin, 1893, pp. 4, 33 f., 42–45, 110–117.

‡ Rājendralāla Mitra, ii. 46 ff., i. 286; B. Hamilton, in W. Martin, *Eastern India*, 1838, iii. 611; L. Bowring, *Eastern Experiences*, p. 393; E. G. Balfour, *Encyclopædia of India*, s.v. 'Anointing.'

§ H. Oldenberg, p. 398; R. Mitra, i. 369 f.; Dubois, p. 518.

‖ Bose, p. 101 f.; M. Williams, pp. 197, 221, 420, 443; B. Hodgson, *Nepal and Tibet*, p. 140; *JRAS*, 1843, p. 20; *Asiatic Researches*, vii. 394; Dubois, p. 589; *Mahānirvāṇa Tantra*, v. 91.

we must perforce assume that, though still clinging by force of habit and tradition to rites and practices that fall within the category of primitive religious customs, resting upon distinctly primitive beliefs, they had advanced beyond these beliefs sufficiently to cause the rise among them of the longing to come into direct touch—not merely through the mediation of a special body of men—with the higher powers. A custom of this kind is vouched for in the pre-Islāmic period in connexion with the visit to the old sanctuary at Mecca, known as the Ka'ba, when the worshippers, in order to acquire and take, as it were, into their own person some of the sanctity associated with the deities of the place, rubbed their hands over the images of the gods (Wellhausen, *Reste Arab. Heid.*[2] p. 105) or pressed themselves against the edifice itself. Although no unguent which we commonly associate with anointing appears to have been employed, it is significant that the verb used to express this pressing (*taḳarrub*) comes from the stem that in both Heb. and Assyr. embodies the idea of 'offering,' while the rubbing (*tamassuḥ*) is from a stem that in Hebrew becomes the generic term for anointing, and in the form *mᵉšîʾaḥ* (Messiah) becomes one of the most significant terms in the religious nomenclature of both Judaism and Christianity.

Unless the kissing of the gods or of sacred objects, as, *e.g.*, the 'black stone' at the Ka'ba, be included, the ancient Semites do not appear to have gone further than to symbolize in these rites of pressing and rubbing the desire to reach out to the sanctity associated with images or objects. The use of wine and oil belongs to a still later stage of religious custom, and, when they are met with in ancient Arabia, are probably due to external influences. On the other hand, the antiquity of the blood-rite as a ceremony, used in covenanting, being vouched for (Trumbull, *Blood Covenant*, ch. i.), some of the uses to which blood is put in the sacrificial ritual of the ancient Semites may properly be classed under the category of anointing. To be sure, the custom of pouring or rubbing the blood of a sacrificial animal over a sacred stone on which the slaughtering is done, is not looked upon as a species of anointing, for the purpose of the act is to symbolize that the deity, represented by the stone, or supposed to reside in it, has accepted the animal by receiving the blood as the vital element (Wellhausen, *l.c.* p. 113). However, in the ancient Semitic method of covenanting by dipping the hands in blood (Trumbull, *l.c.* ch. i.) a union of the contracting parties is symbolized, and if the deity is introduced into the act by rubbing the blood also over his symbol—whatever it may be—it is with the view of making the deity a party to the covenant, and in so far the thought of a direct union with the deity—a blood relationship—is present. Yet even here a direct transfer of sanctity from the deity to his worshippers does not appear to take place, as would be involved in anointing, viewed as a religious rite. It is significant, as Wellhausen (*l.c.* p. 99) points out, that the 'black stone' of the Ka'ba is not smeared with blood. This may be taken as a proof that communion with the deity had its decided limitations among the ancient Semites, so that the sprinkling of blood over the door-posts and lintels, or the threshold of a dwelling, and such other practices as are instanced by Curtiss and Doughty as survivals of primitive religion among the inhabitants of Syria and Arabia, in which the blood is rubbed or sprinkled on animals or fields or newly erected or newly occupied dwellings as a protection against demons (*jinn*), or, in more positive terms, 'for a blessing' (Curtiss, *Primitive Semitic Religion To-Day*, ch. xv.; Doughty, *Arabia Deserta*, i. pp. 136 and 499, ii. p. 100, etc.), are not to be interpreted as anything more than the placing of the objects in question under the control of the gods invoked through the sacrificial animal. The use of blood in the Hebrew ritual, such as the sprinkling over the worshippers (Ex 24), or over the altar and the sanctuary (Lv 4), for which Robertson Smith (*Rel. of Sem.*[2] p. 344) may be consulted, embodies the same general idea.

Considerations of this nature lead us to the conclusion that the prominent rôle played by anointing among the Hebrews, with the application of unguents to sacred objects or to persons invested with sanctity, as priests and kings, is an expression of considerably advanced religious beliefs, in which the symbolical transfer of qualities associated with the Divine essence enters as a prominent factor. That this use of unguents in religious rites represents the transfer to the sphere of religion of originally secular rites, marking the adornment of one's person, may be granted; but this view, so brilliantly set forth by Robertson Smith (*l.c.* p. 232 ff.), must not blind us to the fact that in the transfer something more than the mere desire to show honour to sacred objects or persons was intended. The act was meant actually to symbolize the sanctity bound up with such objects and persons, and was to be understood as the investiture with such sanctity. The use of oil and wine as unguents—both symbols of luxury accompanying a more advanced culture—seems at all times to have been bound up with anointing among the Hebrews as among the other nations of antiquity, and is practised to this day in the Roman and Greek Churches for the consecration of sacred edifices. We have in this way instances of the anointing of altars, as, *e.g.*, the stone at Bethel (Gn 28^{18} 35^{14}); and, incidentally, it may be noted that the reference to oil, which a wanderer like Jacob could hardly have carried with him, indicates the projection of a late custom into the remote past. A similar projection is to be seen in the statement that the furniture of the Tabernacle and the Tabernacle itself were anointed with oil (Ex 30^{26} 40^{10}). Similarly, the high priest was anointed with oil, sprinkled and poured on his head (Lv 8^{12}), while in the case of the ordinary priests, the oil was only sprinkled on them (Lv 8^{30}). The anointing of kings represented the formal investiture with an office that was always regarded as a sacred one among the Hebrews. We have explicit references to such anointing in the case of Saul (1 S 10^{1}), David (1 S 16^{13}, 2 S 2^{4} 5^{3}), Solomon (1 K 1^{34}), Joash (2 K 11^{12}), Jehoahaz (2 K 23^{30}), and we may therefore assume that the rite was a general one from the beginnings of kingship among the Hebrews. That the act indicated, besides the purely formal investiture, the actual transfer of Divine powers to the person anointed, may be concluded from the explicit statement in connexion with the anointing ceremony, that 'the spirit of Jahweh' rested with the anointed one; so in the case of David (1 S 16^{13}). Correspondingly, the Divine Spirit leaves Saul (v.^{14}) as an indication that he is no longer in touch with the Divine Essence, *i.e.* is deposed from his sacred office.

In the further spiritualization of the fundamental idea underlying the rite of anointing, namely, the transfer of sacred or Divine qualities to an object or individual, the prophets are naturally viewed as the 'anointed' ones (Ps 105^{15}), even though the ceremony itself was not performed, except possibly in the single instance of Elisha, and even in this case the order given to Elijah to perform it (1 K 19^{16}) may be intended only as a metaphor to indicate the transfer of the Divine Spirit to Elisha. The metaphorical application is clear in the case of Cyrus, who is called the

'anointed' of the Lord, to indicate that he acts in accordance with the Divine quality with which he is imbued. The same interpretation is to be put upon the appellation 'anointed' employed in a late Psalm (105[15]). From this it was a natural step to designate Israel as the chosen people of Jahweh, as His 'anointed' one (Ps 84[9] 89[38. 51], Hab 3[13] etc.), in which case 'anointed' has become a synonym for holy, *i.e.* endowed with the holy Essence. The final stage is reached in the doctrine of the Messiah as the 'anointed' one to bring salvation to His people and to mankind in general. In Christianity, Jesus becomes the 'Messiah' *par excellence* (Gr. Χριστός), while Jewish theology in rejecting Jesus as the Redeemer of mankind was gradually led to abandon the doctrine of a personal Messiah, and to accept in its stead the outlook towards a Messianic age. The association of anointing with the Divine Spirit passed over into the Christian Church, which, to emphasize the descent of the Holy Spirit on all believers (2 Co 1[21], 1 Jn 2[20. 27]), instituted the practice of anointing with oil in conjunction with the rites of baptism and confirmation.

As yet no traces of anointing as a religious rite have been found in Babylonia and Assyria, though this does not preclude the possibility of our yet coming across the rite in cuneiform documents, especially for those periods when kingship and Divinity were in close union, as appears to have been the case in the days of Sargon, and during the reign of the Ur dynasty (*c.* 3000 to *c.* 2400 B.C.). In later times we have the pronounced tendency towards the secularization of the office of royalty, with a concomitant centralization of Divine prerogatives in the priesthood; and it would appear that among the Phœnicians likewise the position of the king, under the influence of the late Bab.-Assyr. conception, became a distinctively secular one, connecting itself with that of a lay-judge rather than with that of a priest-king. As for anointing as a secular rite among the Semites, there is every reason to believe that its origin is bound up with the use of unguents as medicinal remedies. In the medical prescriptions preserved on the cuneiform tablets of Aśurbanipal's library, copied from originals that probably date from as early as 2000 B.C., oils of various kinds to be applied to the skin are mentioned. The frequent mention of unguents as remedial agents, both in the OT and NT (Is 1[6], Ezk 16[9], Lk 10[34], Mk 6[13], and especially Ja 5[14]), points in the same direction, and forms the basis of the Roman Catholic sacrament of Extreme Unction, and the Greek and (previous to 1552) Anglican anointing of the sick. The cleansing qualities of unguents appear also to have been recognized at an early period in Babylonia, as well as their power in the prevention of diseases of the skin, so common in hot and moist climates. The use of unguents thus became at once a part of the toilet and an adornment of the person, like dress and ornaments. With the increase of luxury, expensive and highly scented oils were used, and, as a natural corollary to this stage of the custom, anointing became a symbol of prosperity (Ps 92[10]), while the general tendency in mourning rites to return to the customs of an earlier age led to the view that anointing was not appropriate during the prescribed period of lament for the dead, so that it was discontinued at such times. In the Semitic Orient popular customs are apt to become hardened into ceremonial obligations, and thus the anointing of a guest takes its place as a ceremony of greeting and hospitality, and also as a means of bestowing honour. The account of Mary's anointing Jesus with precious *nard* is an illustration of the observance of the ceremony down to a late period. Anointing oneself before paying ceremonial visits falls under the same category (Ru 3[3]).

LITERATURE.—Besides the references in this art. see the *Hebrew Archæologies* of Benzinger and Nowack, and the literature in Hastings' *DB*, *s.v.* 'Anointing.' See also *Jacob at Bethel* by A. Smythe Palmer (1899), pt. iii., 'The Anointing,' with some references to literature given there.

MORRIS JASTROW, JR.

ANSELM OF CANTERBURY.—

1. **Life.**—Anselm was born of noble parents at Aosta (not Gressan) in 1033. After a sheltered youth spent in study, on the death of his mother he crossed the Alps, and after three years of wandering settled in 1059 at the abbey of Bec in Normandy, newly founded (1039) by the saintly Herlwin. There Lanfranc was then at the zenith of his fame as a teacher. In 1060, on the death of his father, Anselm took the cowl, and when Lanfranc removed to Caen (1063), Anselm was elected his successor as prior. The fame of Bec as a school grew greater still. Anselm's genius as a teacher was remarkable; his gentle methods mark an epoch in pedagogics (see esp. Eadmer, *Vita*, i. cc. 10, 11, 22). On the death of Herlwin (Aug. 1078) the reluctant Anselm was appointed abbot. One result of this election was of far-reaching consequences. Bec had been endowed with vast estates in England, and Anselm's journeys in their interest brought him into touch with both the Conqueror and William II., and endeared him to the whole nation. On the death of Lanfranc (May 28, 1089) all men looked to Anselm as his successor. But Rufus, whose settled principle was the spoliation of the Church by keeping sees vacant and claiming their revenues, refused to appoint a new archbishop. In 1093 the king fell ill at Gloucester, and in one of his spasms of remorse sent for Anselm, and after some delay appointed him archbishop (March 6, 1093). To procure Anselm's acceptance violence was almost necessary, but once nominated, the 'furious bull,' already repentant of his penitence, discovered that the 'weak old sheep' (Ead. *Hist. Nov.* [*HN*] 36) was more than his match. Anselm insisted on the restitution to Canterbury of all its estates, and on the recognition of Urban II. (already recognized in Normandy) as the true pope. To this last William II., who had taken advantage of an anti-pope (Clement III.) to seize Peter's pence for himself, was driven to verbal consent by Anselm's threat of retiring to Bec. At last Anselm was enthroned (25th Sept. 1093), doing homage for his temporalities, a matter of interest in view of later disputes.

The question of the recognition of Urban was, however, not really settled, and in 1095, William, angered by Anselm's insistence on his own reformation, as well as by his omission to give bribes, once more refused to acknowledge Urban. 'No man,' he said, 'may acknowledge a pope in England without my leave. To challenge my power in this is to deprive me of my crown' (Ead. *HN* 53). All that Anselm could obtain was the reference of this to a Great Council held at Rockingham (Feb. 25, Eadmer, *Vita*, ii. 16; or March 11, Eadmer, *HN* 53). There, in spite of the defection of the bishops, who were all, with the exception of Gundulph of Rochester, 'king's men,' Anselm virtually won, chiefly through the support given him by the barons (1905).

On the outbreak of other disputes, and the impossibility of obtaining any reformation, Anselm appealed to Rome—a procedure as yet unheard of in England (Oct. 1097). His journey thither was, however, useless, and after two years he left, 'having obtained nought of judgment or of advice' (*HN* 114). Urban, in fact, had troubles enough of his own, and his prelates (Ead. *HN* iii.; cf. Will. Malm. *Gest. Pont.* 34) seem to have been won over by William's gold. But the two years were not lost, for during the summer heat Anselm finished at Schiavi (modern Liberi), in the Alban mountains, his *Cur Deus Homo*. At Urban's request he also attended the Council of Bari (Oct. 1098), and vindicated before the Greeks the Latin doctrine of the Procession of the Holy Spirit. From Rome Anselm, refused admission to England, retired to Lyons, but on the death of Rufus (Aug. 2, 1100) was summoned back to England by Henry I. To his influence, in fact, Henry owed his crown in his struggle with his brother Robert. A new dispute on the subject of lay investitures soon broke out. In England this was undoubtedly an innovation on Anselm's part on the 'customs.' In reality it was a part of the great conflict on the matter on the Continent, first started by Hildebrand, which after a struggle of 56 years, in which 60 battles were fought, was settled at last by the compromise of Worms (Sept. 23, 1122). After many attempts on the part of Henry to win over pope Paschal II., Anselm journeyed once more to Rome to defend his own views. He was forbidden by Henry to return to England (Christmas, 1103). For eighteen months he lived in banishment at Lyons, but on his preparing to excommunicate Henry, the king, influenced by his English queen, Eadgyth or Maud (whose marriage was due to Anselm), gave way, and on August 1, 1107, a compromise was agreed to, virtually a victory for Anselm (*HN* 186).

Before the peace was made, Anselm had returned to England (Aug. 1106), and was received with enthusiasm by king and people. But he had come home to die. For six months he gradually faded away, kept alive by his desire to write a treatise on the origin of the soul. On Wednesday, April 21, 1109, he fell asleep. His canonization, a suit for which was begun by Becket in 1163 (*Hist. Becket*, R.S., v. 35), was deferred, through the troubles over Becket's murder, until 1494 (Wilkins, *Conc.* iii. 641). By one of the ironies of history, it was then the work of the profligate pope Alexander VI. But Anselm had al-

ready been enrolled by a greater than Alexander among the immortals (Dante, *Par.* xii., last lines). His feast day is April 21 (*Acta Sanct.*, *s.v.*).

2. **Character and place in history.**—In character Anselm was a true saint, whose mingled sanctity and sagacity, gentleness and firmness, tenderness and austerity, acted as a charm on all who came under his influence, from the rudest brigands (Ead. *HN* 89), the Conqueror (*Vita*, i. 31), and Duke Roger's Apulian Saracens included (*Vita*, ii. 33), to the most obstinate novice (*Vita*, i. 10) or the pious saint. He possessed that personal magnetism invariably associated in the Middle Ages with miraculous gifts (Eadmer, *Descript. Miraculorum* (R.S.), 425 ff.). His unfeigned humility in all circumstances was the natural result of that mystical detachment which gives abiding interest to his writings.

Anselm's place in the ecclesiastical history of England cannot be exaggerated. Hitherto England had been but loosely connected with Rome, and as a Church had possessed her own customs and a considerable degree of independence. This independence the Conqueror was prepared to continue, as we see from his famous letter of 1076, in reply to Hildebrand (Freeman, *Norman Conquest*, iv. 433). The Conqueror insisted on the complete subordination of Church to State; the modern *congé d'élire* was with him the invariable rule. The powers of convocation were limited by his pleasure; papal letters could not be received unless they had first obtained his sanction (cf. Eadmer, *HN* i. 9). That William I.'s successors could not maintain his position was due to the stand taken by Anselm. This Italian of Aosta, by the force of his piety, character, and learning, succeeded in imposing upon the English Church the ideals of Hildebrand, and bringing the Church in England into close relation with the Church abroad. In many aspects the Reformation was but the rude undoing of his work and a return by the Tudors to the policy maintained by the Conqueror.

3. **Writings and place as a thinker and theologian.**—Anselm's writings may be classified as follows:—

(i.) **Four books of *EPISTLES*.**—These letters (over 400 in all) are proof of a wide correspondence, and of the singular regard in which Anselm was held as a director of souls by all sorts and classes. While of value for the details of his life, and for their revelation of his character, there is scarcely a reference in them to the stirring events of the day—another sign of his philosophic detachment of soul.

(ii.) ***DEVOTIONAL AND HORTATORY.***—Of these the most important are his *Orationes* (Migne, *PL* clviii. 855 ff.) and *Meditationes* (*ib.* 710 ff.). This last has singular charm; Anselm's mystic communings with his own soul breathing throughout a passionate love for Christ (cf. *Med.* xii. and xiii., both worth reading).

(iii.) ***POETICAL.***—That he wrote certain hymns for canonical hours may be reasonably accepted. Much also may be said for assigning to him the *Mariale*, a poem in honour of the Virgin sometimes attributed to St. Bernard, and commonly known as the *Prayer of St. Casimir* of Poland (Rigg, *Anselm*, 97–103; first published in full by Ragey, Lond. 1888). But neither in the *Carmen de Contemptu Mundi* (Migne, *PL* clviii. 687 ff.), with its amazing indifference to quantities, nor in several rude poems on the Virgin attributed to him (*ib.* 1055 ff.), is there any evidence of his authorship save some late and vague traditions. That he had the Italian's passion for the Virgin is, however, clear from his *Orationes* (cf. Rigg, 46–60; Migne, *PL* clviii. 942 ff.).

(iv.) ***THEOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL.***—Of these the most important are—

(*a*) *Monologion de Divinitatis Essentia.*—In this work, written about 1070, when still prior at Bec (*Epp.* iv. 103), he gives the famous so-called *a priori* proof of the existence of God which has thence found its way into most theological treatises. It is really an application of the Platonic Ideas to the demonstration of Christian doctrine by a logical ascent from the particular to the universal. In the world of experience we are confronted by transitory imperfect phenomena which inevitably lead the mind upward toward an eternal necessary perfect Being. Our recognition of goodness, for instance, in phenomena, drives us to believe in a supreme nature that is good *per se*, and which must be the final *causa causans*, the supreme objective reality in whom our 'ideas' inhere. Thus the existence of God is implicit in ordinary experience.

The criticism of this argument, which rests on certain Realistic presuppositions, would take us too far into philosophical discussions. But we may point out here a criticism that applies to all Anselm's works—his extreme anxiety to satisfy reason ('credo ut intelligam,' *Proslog.* c. 1 fin.; cf. *Cur Deus*, i. 25, last answer of Boso). Anselm in this is akin, though with a difference, to Abelard rather than Bernard (see ABELARD, p. 14, for further discussion of this). He attempts to establish on rational grounds not merely the Trinity, but also the Incarnation; but all knowledge, he holds, must rest on faith.

(*b*) *The Proslogion*, so called because it is in the form of an address to God, is an extension of the *a priori* argument to an attempt to prove the existence of God by a single deductive argument, instead of, as in the *Monologion*, by a long inductive chain. The fool's very denial of God, he argues, involves the idea of God, and of this idea existence is a necessary part. In other words, thought leads by an inherent necessity to the postulate of the Absolute, an argument substantially the same as that employed 600 years later by Descartes. To this reasoning Count Gaunilo († *c.* 1083), a monk of Marmoutier, replied in his *Liber pro Insipiente* or *Apology for a Fool* (printed in Migne, clviii. 242–8) that the idea of the fabled Isles of the Blest does not posit their existence (c. 6). Anselm replied briefly in his *Liber Apologeticus* that there is all the difference between the idea of the *Summum Cogitabile*, or eternal necessary idea, and any particular empirical idea of things which had a beginning, and will have an end (c. 9); contingent existence as such contradicts the idea of the *Summum Cogitabile*, which cannot be conceived save as existing.

The after history of those ontological arguments of Anselm belongs to the history of philosophy. They were too Platonic to be accepted by the Aristotelian schoolmen, with the exception of Duns Scotus (I. *Sent.* D. ii. 2 ii.), but have found their way in various forms into the systems of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Hegel. Their most effective critic is Kant (*Pure Reason*, i. (2) ii. (2) iii. (4)). Anselm's obligations to Augustine are also most clear (*e.g. de Trin.* viii. c. 3).

(*c*) *de Fide Trinitatis*, an answer to Roscellin's denial of universals as 'empty words,' was composed in 1098 at Schiavi. Roscellin's denial led him practically to the choice between Sabellianism and Tritheism; for the Trinity is itself a universal in respect of its comprehension therein of a threefold personality. Anselm meets Roscellin's monism by pointing out that it is a fallacy to suppose the universal and the individual to be repugnant *inter se*. Those who care for ingenious similitudes to the doctrine of the Trinity will find, in words that remind us of the Athanasian Creed, a parallel between a 'fountain, river, and lake,' each of which may be called the Nile (c. 8).

(*d*) To one great doctrine of the modern Roman Church Anselm gave a powerful impulse in his *de Conceptu Virginali*. In this work (c. 18), as well as in the *Cur Deus* (ii. 16), he argued for the congruity of the entire sanctification of the Virgin before she conceived of the Holy Ghost. Between this and the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception there is but a step, which he himself may have taken in his last thought (see the tractate of

his nephew on the matter, Migne, *PL* clix. 302 ff.). According to Mansi (xxv. 829), Anselm inaugurated in England the Feast of the Immaculate Conception (cf. Ragey, ii. 243–7). In this treatise (cc. 25–28) Anselm defends most rigorously the damnation of all unbaptized children—a logical deduction from his views on original sin.

(*e*) *de Veritate*, a short work which reminds the student of Malebranche. Truth is the accurate perception of the archetypal ideas in the mind of God.

(*f*) *de Libero Arbitrio.* — Mere freedom is not the power of choosing between alternatives, but of persevering in righteousness for its own sake (c. 13)—a doctrine afterwards more fully developed in Kant's *Metaphysic of Ethics*. It is of importance to notice that Anselm points out that original sin need not involve total depravity. Man is still left in possession of an impaired but real 'natural' freedom (c. 3) and the power of will to govern motives (cc. 5, 6).

(*g*) *Cur Deus Homo* (begun in 1094, finished in 1098).—In this most important of his works, which marks an epoch in the development of doctrines of the Atonement, Anselm destroyed once for all (i. 7) the old conception of a ransom paid to the devil. [This theory, propounded by Origen (in *Matt.* xvi. 8, ed. Lommatzsch, iv. 27) was developed by Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, and Augustine (*de Lib. Arbit.* iii. 10), and dominated the Church from Gregory the Great to Anselm.] In place of this he substitutes a conflict between the goodness and justice of God, familiar in all forensic ideas of the Atonement, and which reminds the student of Roman doctrines of *lèse majesté*. The defects of this theory (which may be described in brief as the interpretation of the relationship between God and man in terms of the Roman law familiar to Anselm — of Teutonic law Anselm would know nothing—), in addition to its tendency to destroy, as in much current theology, the essential ethical unity of the Godhead, lie in the essential opposition between God and the external world which it posits, leading to the idea of arbitrariness on the part of God, and the absence on the part of the individual of his own personality as an essential factor. This last, we may remark, is a common defect of scholastic Realism. The immanence of God can find no place, and the Pauline mystical conception of union with the Risen Christ (*Rom.* vi. esp. v. 5) is left out of consideration. This is the more remarkable, inasmuch as the Pauline idea would have appealed strongly to Anselm's cast of thought, if he could have freed himself from juridical bondage. But instead we have the superabundant payment by Christ, the substituted sinless God-man, of a debt due from man to the justice of God (i. 12, 23), which debt man, by reason of his original sin, cannot discharge. The keynote of the treatise is thus the paradox 'man *must*, man *cannot*' (ii. 6: 'quam satisfactionem nec potest facere nisi Deus, nec debet nisi homo; necesse est ut eam faciat Deus Homo'). Anselm's theory of the Incarnation in this treatise is far from satisfactory. In his anxiety to avoid conceptions now known as kenotic, he limits the sufferings of Christ to His human nature (i. 8: 'Divinam naturam asserimus impassibilem'). The digression on the restoration from among men of the number of the angels who have fallen (cc. 16–19) is characteristically mediæval.

(*h*) *de Processione Spiritus Sancti.*—This great work, the outlines of which were given at Bari and completed shortly before his death, moves in the main on lines traced out by St. Augustine's *de Trinitate*. The unity of God is absolute save so far as limited by His threefold Personality. The procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son ('Filioque') is more consonant with this absolute unity than the Greek doctrine, which rends the co-inhesion in the unity of the Godhead of the Three Persons (see esp. c. 29).

LITERATURE. — (1) *LIFE OF ANSELM*: We are primarily dependent on his *Letters* (in Migne, *PL*, see below) and his secretary Eadmer's *Historia Novorum* and *de Vita Anselmi*, two most conscientious records (best ed. by Martin Rule in Roll's Series, 1884, to which all references have been given; also in Migne, *PL*). Of other sources, William of Malmesbury, *de Gest. Pontif.* (R.S.), and Ordericus Vitalis, *Hist. Eccles.* (ed. Le Prevost, Paris, 1838–55), are of most value. Of modern lives, the best by far is that of J. M. Rigg, *Anselm of Canterbury* (1896), especially valuable for the philosophy; Martin Rule's *St. Anselm* (2 vols. 1883) is a good storehouse of facts, far from judicial in tone. Freeman has dealt at length with Anselm in his *Norman Conquest*, and more fully in his *William Rufus*. For the general reader, who is indifferent to Anselm's position as a theologian, Dean Church, *St. Anselm* (1st ed. 1878, often reprinted), may be commended. Of foreign works the best perhaps is Ch. de Remusat, *St. Anselme* (2nd ed. 1868). Ragey's *Eadmer* (1892) and *S. Anselme* (1877, and abridged ed. 1891) are also of service. The Life of Anselm by Dean Hook, *Archbishops* (1860–76), is a valueless Erastian caricature. Dean Stephens' account, *English Church*, vol. 2 (1901), is judicious and sympathetic.

(2) *EDITIONS.*—The first complete edition was that of Gerberon (Paris, 1721), still often quoted. The earliest dated printed ed. would appear to be at Nuremberg, 1491. All editions, save for Eadmer (see above), are now superseded by that of Migne (1853), *PL* clviii. and clix., including Eadmer and many spurious works. There are many reprints of the *Cur Deus Homo*.

(3) *REVIEWS* of the philosophy of Anselm are many. The student should consult Ueberweg, etc. Attention may also be drawn to Cremer's contention that Anselm owed much to Teutonic law conceptions as distinct from Roman. See Cremer, *SK*, 1880, 759. On the other side Loofs, *Dogmengeschichte*, 278 n.; Harnack, *History of Dogma*, iii. 342, n. 2.

H. B. WORKMAN.

ANTEDILUVIANS.—The term 'antediluvian' (Lat. *ante diluvium*) was formerly applied to men or races who lived before the Flood, the latter being regarded as a Deluge universal in extent, and destroying all men excepting Noah and his family. But the term also came to be used by some ethnologists to describe certain races which were believed to have survived the Deluge, the latter being supposed by them to be concerned only with a single race of men, those descended from Adam. This pre-Adamite theory, as it was called, found many advocates during last century. Thus George Catlin referred the American Indian tribes to an antediluvian genus or family called *Anthropus Americanus* (*O-kee-pa*, London, 1866; for a later exponent of this view, see Alex. Winchell's *Pre-Adamites*, Boston, 1880). Now that the belief in a universal Deluge has been generally given up, the name 'antediluvian' has come to have a literary, or it may be a mythological, rather than an ethnological significance. The purpose, then, of this article will be to inquire into, and to some extent compare, the beliefs of various nations concerning those who lived before the great Deluge, especially where that event has come to be part of a definite traditional belief.

1. The Bible antediluvians.—(*a*) *The traditions of J* (and secondary elements [J^{e}]).—Man is moulded out of the dust of the ground, and becomes a living being by the inspiration of the breath of Jahweh (Gn 2^{7}); woman is made out of a rib taken from the first man while he slept ($2^{21.\ 22}$). He lives at first on the fruit of the garden (2^{16}), in the simple innocence of childhood (2^{25}). He learns sexual knowledge as a consequence of disobedience, and his sense of shame sets him to provide a form of dress (3^{7}) much like what is still used by the pigmy women of the African Ituri Forest. On his expulsion from Eden this is exchanged for clothes of skin, implying the slaughter of animals (v.^{21}). Their use for sacrifice from this point is implied in the story of Cain and Abel (Gn 4 J^{e}), though the staple food is still vegetables and cereals, which can be obtained only through hard labour—in evident contrast to the fruit of the garden produced by Divine agency (3^{17-19}). A more important result of the Fall is

that man becomes mortal (3^{19}; cf. Ro 5^{12}, 1 Co 15^{21}). On the other hand, 3^{22-24} (J^e) seems to imply that man was naturally mortal, and that immortality could be acquired; but this passage does not accord with $3^{3.17}$, which speaks only of one forbidden tree, and is probably a separate tradition incorporated with J (see *Oxf. Hex., ad loc.*).

The primitive industries are tillage (3^{19}), and also pasturage ($4^{2.3}$ J^e). According to J, pasturage and the nomad life were first introduced by Jabal, the son of Lamech (v.^{20}). The same generation witnessed the invention of musical instruments, and the art of smelting brass and iron (vv.$^{21.22}$). The art of building, on the other hand, is primitive, the first to build a city being Cain (v.^{17}).

The attitude of the antediluvians towards religion and morality is more difficult to determine, and here again differences between J and J^e, and even between different sections of J^e, show themselves. The statement that in the time of Enoch men began to call on the name of Jahweh (4^{26} J^e) is hardly consistent with the story of Cain and Abel (J^e). 4^{1b} is too ambiguous to help us much. The story of the origin of the Nephilim from the unnatural union of the 'sons of God' and the daughters of men ($6^{1.2.4}$), in its present connexion with $6^{3.5-8}$, appears to be a reason for the depravity and violence which were the cause of the Deluge. But it is at least possible that this story was originally quite independent of the Deluge story, and that the latter belongs to a later cycle of traditions (J^e), inconsistent, as it obviously is, with $4^{20.21}$ (see *Oxf. Hex.* and art. DELUGE). If so, the term 'antediluvian' is not strictly applicable so far as J, as distinguished from J^e, is concerned.

The names of the antediluvians according to J (+J^e) are Adam, Seth, Enosh ($4^{25.26}$ J^e), Cain, (Abel), Enoch, Irad, Mehujael, Methushael, Lamech (Adah and Zillah), Jabal, Jubal, and Tubal-Cain (4^{16b-24} J). Of these Abel dies childless; Adah and Zillah are the wives of Lamech; Jabal, Jubal, and Tubal-Cain are Lamech's three sons. The rest appear in two genealogical lines, (1) Adam—Enosh, (2) Cain (the elder son of Adam)—Lamech, who is the seventh in the line.

(*b*) *The antediluvians of P.*—The first were made out of nothing by a direct fiat of God, in God's image and after His likeness, male and female simultaneously (Gn $1^{26.27}$ 5^{2}); were appointed the lords of creation ($1^{28.29}$); and were vegetarians till after the Deluge (1^{29} 9^{3}). The names of the antediluvians are given in one line only (Gn 5). Their relation with those of J can best be seen by the following table:



A comparison of these lists makes it evident that P has combined the two lists of J (+J^e), merely transposing the names of Mahalalel and Enoch. The changes in the form of the names are no more than we find in other parallel lists, and were probably due originally to copyists' errors. P has ignored the tradition that Cain was a son of Adam. Of these antediluvians, Seth is described as begotten in Adam's likeness and his image, implying that the Divine nature of Adam is reproduced in his offspring (5^{3}, cf. 5^{1}). Of Enoch it is said that he 'walked with God: and was not; for God took him' (5^{24}), meaning probably that he was translated (for the first phrase cf. 6^{9}, where it is used of Noah). From this it has been inferred that there is a hint of the translation of Noah comparable to that of Sîtnapišti in the Sumerian Deluge story (see DELUGE).

There is no trace given of the progress of civilization, or any suggestion of a physical difference before and after the Deluge, except that the age of man, which, but for Enoch, had been on an average about 900 years, began to decline rapidly.

2. The Babylonian antediluvians [see Fragm. of Berossus in Eus. (Migne, 1857) *Chron.* Bk. I. ch. i. (2); Driver's *Gen. in loc.*]. Berossus agrees with P in giving (1) 10 antediluvians, and (2) these in one line. (3) Some writers, especially Hommel and Sayce, have found a further agreement in the meaning of some of the names *occupying the same place* in the two records. Thus, in their opinion, Amelon = Bab. *amîlu* = 'man' = Enosh (אנוש), and Ammenon = Bab. *ummânu* = 'artificer' = Kenan (קינן) 'smith.' A more probable identification is that of Evedoracus or Edoranchus with Enoch. Evedoracus is believed to be another form of Enmeduranki, a legendary king of Sippar, a town sacred to the sun-god. This god called Evedoracus to intercourse with himself, taught him secrets of earth and heaven, and instructed him in divination, and thus he became the mythical ancestor of diviners. This identification is confirmed by the 365 years of Enoch's life, which, though having no parallel in Berossus, appear to have some connexion with the 365 days of the solar year. (4) A further point of contact lies in the fact that the sum of the reigns of the Babylonian antediluvians amounts to 432,000 years. If a *soss* (a period of 5 years) be substituted for a week in the Bible record, the period before the Deluge in the latter, 1656 years, will agree with the Babylonian (see Oppert, art. 'Chronology' in *JE*; Driver, *Genesis*, pp. 78–81).

On the other hand, it is difficult to reconcile this probable connexion of Berossus and P with the obvious derivation of the latter from J (+J^e). The difficulty may be got over on the supposition that P indeed took his list of names from J (+J^e), and altered the position of Enoch to agree with that in the list of Bab. antediluvians; that the agreement of the number 10, if it existed in the Babylonian traditions of P's time, was a fortunate coincidence; and, further, that P derived his date of the world's history from a Babylonian tradition, dividing the time among the antediluvians according to a method of his own. It must be admitted that apart from Enoch the identifications of names are ingenious rather than convincing. It must also be borne in mind that Berossus may very probably have himself departed from ancient Babylonian tradition by substituting a *soss* for a week, and possibly even the number 10 for an earlier 7. The translation of the 7th antediluvian, Enoch, Gn 5^{24} (like that of Sîtnapišti, the Sumerian Deluge hero), suggests the possibility that according to ancient tradition there were only 7 antediluvians, the last being Enoch = Lamech = Noah = Sîtnapišti.

3. Antediluvians in the mythological systems of other races.—It is not necessary to say much concerning these. It may suffice to remark that, whereas among Semitic peoples the antediluvians are, if indeed somewhat super-normal, at least human beings, among many other races they are described as more or less abnormal, and not infrequently as monsters, and that the purpose of the Deluge was to do away with them. Thus the antediluvians of a Tibetan legend were ape-like creatures (Andree, *Die Flutsagen*, § 6). In a Fiji legend two races were destroyed by the Deluge, one consisting of women only, the other of men

with dogs' tails (Andree, § 37). The Quiché Indians of Guatemala have a curious story connected with the origin of the tribe. Men were first made of clay, but they had neither speech nor intelligence, and were destroyed by a flood of water. Then the gods made another race, the men of wood and the women of resin. These could speak, but only in a senseless fashion, and were destroyed by a storm of burning resin and an earthquake, except a few who became wild asses. The third time men were made of white and yellow maize, and were so perfect that the gods themselves were afraid of them. They therefore took away some of their higher qualities, and they became normal men (Andree, § 73). See, further, DELUGE.

LITERATURE.—See the literature at DELUGE and AGES OF THE WORLD; also the Commentaries on the early chapters of Genesis, esp. S. R. Driver, *The Book of Genesis* (London, 1904), Introd. p. xxxi ff.; A. Dillmann, *Genesis* (Eng. tr., Edin. 1897); F. Delitzsch, *New Com. on Genesis* (Eng. tr., Edin. 1888–9); M. M. Kalisch, *Genesis* (new ed., London, 1879); C. J. Ball, 'The Book of Genesis' in *SBOT* (London, 1896); G. W. Wade, *The Book of Genesis* (London, 1896); T. K. Cheyne, *Traditions and Beliefs of Ancient Israel* (London, 1907); H. G. Mitchell, *The World before Abraham* (London, 1901); A. R. Gordon, *The Early Traditions of Genesis* (Edin. 1908); A. H. Sayce, 'The Antediluvian Patriarchs' in *ExpT*, vol. x. (1899) p. 352 f.

F. H. WOODS.

ANTHROPOLOGY.

[R. MUNRO].

Definition and scope.—Anthropology ('the science of man,' from ἄνθρωπος, 'man,' and λόγος, 'discourse'), in the modern acceptation of the term, treats more particularly of man's origin and place in the animal kingdom; his development as an individual (Ontogeny) and as a race (Phylogeny); the physical and mental changes he has undergone during his career on the globe; his new departure in the organic world as an implement-using animal; and finally, the development of articulate speech and the principles of religion, ethics, altruism, and sociology, which, at the present time, constitute the great landmarks of human civilization. The claims of Anthropology to be recognized as a separate science were for some time successfully opposed on the ground that the phenomena bearing on the history of mankind were already fully dealt with under the sciences of Biology, Anatomy, Physiology, Psychology, Theology, Ethics, Philology, Ethnology, etc. But the startling discoveries made in the collateral sciences of Geology, Palæontology, and pre-historic Archæology, about the beginning of the second half of last century, which culminated shortly after the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species* (1859) in the general acceptance by scientific men of the theory of organic evolution, conclusively proved that there were ample materials in this new field of research which were by no means covered by any of these sciences. While, therefore, Anthropology may be justly regarded as comprising all the elements of a comprehensive monograph on mankind—all that they are, or have been, or have done, since their generic founder came into existence—, practically it is restricted to an investigation of the earlier stages of humanity, leaving the details of its later phases to be worked out by these other sciences, on the principle of the division of labour. But, even after this limitation of the scope of Anthropology, its remaining materials, which are rapidly increasing in number and variety, present a greater attraction to the philosophic mind than those of any other department of speculative knowledge, because they are so impregnated with human interest that it is felt as if they were data intimately affecting one's own origin and pedigree.

In order to present a brief but reasoned summary of the conclusions to be derived from a study of so fascinating a science, it becomes almost necessary to arrange its scattered materials along certain well-defined lines of investigation, which may be thus categorically stated: (1) Man's physical characteristics; (2) his fossil remains; (3) his handicraft products; (4) his mental superiority over other animals; (5) his social evolution; (6) and lastly, some concluding remarks.

I. MAN'S PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS.—So long as the *Hominidæ* were believed to occupy a higher platform in the organic world than other animals, in virtue of specially created endowments, no one apparently thought of looking for evidence of their origin and history in the obscure vistas of pre-historic times. The long-cherished traditions and myths which had gathered around the problem left little room for any other hypothesis than that man's appearance on the field of life, as a fully equipped human being, was the last and crowning achievement of a long series of creative fiats which brought the present world-drama into existence. But to eliminate man altogether from the processes of organic evolution is not only an unwarranted assumption, but is unsupported by any evidence that can be characterized as scientific. No fair-minded person who is conversant with the close anatomical and physiological resemblances between the structural details of man and those of the anthropoid apes—every bone, muscle, nerve, and blood-vessel being virtually the same—and the striking analogy between the complex mechanism of their organs of sense, can seriously deny their community of descent, at least from the purely physical aspect of the subject.

But even the acceptance of the so-called orthodox view, viz. that a male and female were originally specially created, from whom all the present varieties of mankind have descended, would by no means get rid of the evolution theory. For, since Huxley's time, it has generally been admitted that the gulf between civilized and savage man is wider than that between the savage and the highest ape. If, therefore, the ancestors of the white-, black-, and red-skinned people of to-day were originally one undivided stock, why should it be regarded as improbable that that primitive stock itself was a branch of an older stem which included also the ancestors of the anthropoid apes of to-day? The causes of variation which evolved the typical Negrito and Caucasian from one common ancestor were quite adequate to evolve that ancestor from the anthropoid stock in the Tertiary period.

The striking analogy between the bodily structure of man and that of the nearest of the anthropoid apes becomes still more apparent when we consider the phenomena of the fœtal life of animals. Not only does the human embryo start from an ovule similar to, and indistinguishable from, that of many other animals, but its subsequent changes follow on precisely the same lines. All the homologous organs in full grown animals, as the wing of a bird, the flipper of a seal, and the hand of man, are developed from the same fundamental parts of the embryo.

'It is,' says Professor Huxley (*Collected Essays*, vol. vii. p. 92), 'only quite in the later stages of development that the young human being presents marked differences from the young ape, while the latter departs as much from the dog in its development as the man does.

'Startling as the last assertion may appear to be, it is demonstrably true, and it alone appears to me sufficient to place beyond all doubt the structural unity of man with the rest of the animal world, and more particularly and closely with the apes.'

The illustrious von Baer, who first directed special attention to the importance of embryology, formulated a law to the effect that structural differentiation in fœtal development was from a general to a special type. Haeckel, looking at the same phenomena from a different standpoint, came to the conclusion that the development of the

individual is a recapitulation of the historic evolution of the race. If this astounding generalization be true, the study of embryology should supply the anthropologist with a method of reaching the goal of his inquiry, by making the progressive stages of man's development the subject of experimental illustrations within the precincts of the laboratory. But, until greater progress is made in this special branch of morphological research, we have few data to guide us in forming precise conclusions on the subject. Meantime, it may be remarked that, if embryology is as conservative of energy as other organic processes, it would be expected that, in course of passing through a series of progressive increments, some of the minor links would ultimately drop out altogether. Nature is full of short cuts. As a parallel instance in ordinary life may be cited the instinct which leads the common honey-bee to fix always on a hexagonal cell instead of the simpler globular form used by the humble bee. Here we have an act of practical intelligence which must have been originally acquired through the ordinary processes of natural selection, but which is now directly transmitted through heredity—thus altogether skipping over its intermediate evolutionary stages.

The theory of man's descent from the lower animals is also greatly strengthened by a number of vestigial, or so-called rudimentary, organs described by anatomists as being normally present, or occasionally to be met with, in the human body. Such organs as canine teeth, the coccyx, inter- and supra-condyloid foramina of the humerus, the *cæcum* and *appendix vermiformis*, fibrous traces of various muscles, etc., are apparently useless in the human economy, while their homologues in other animals have well-defined functions assigned to them. But, indeed, the homological structure of the entire human body is utterly inexplicable on any other hypothesis.

'Thus we can understand,' writes Mr. Darwin, 'how it has come to pass that man and all other vertebrate animals have been constructed on the same general model, why they pass through the same early stages of development, and why they retain certain rudiments in common. Consequently, we ought frankly to admit their community of descent; to take any other view is to admit that our own structure, and that of all the animals around us, is a mere snare to entrap our judgment. This conclusion is greatly strengthened, if we look to the members of the whole animal series and consider the evidence derived from their affinities or classification, their geographical distribution and geological succession' (*Descent of Man*, p. 25).

But if the races of mankind are so closely related both in structure and mode of development to the anthropoid apes, what, it may be asked, are the essential characters which differentiate them from the latter? Flower and Lydekker, in *Mammals Living and Extinct* (p. 740), thus answer the question:

'The distinctions between the *Hominidæ* and *Simiidæ* are chiefly relative, being greater size of brain and of brain-case as compared with the facial portion of the skull, smaller development of the canine teeth of the males, complete adaptation of the structure of the vertebral column to the vertical position, greater length of the lower as compared with the upper extremities, and greater length of the *hallux*, or great toe, with almost complete absence of the power of bringing it in opposition to the other four toes. The last feature, together with the small size of the canine teeth, is perhaps the most marked and easily defined distinction that can be drawn between the two groups.'

Of the above distinctions it will be seen, from various passages in this article, that we have assigned the chief place to the erect attitude, because its attainment was the means of setting free the fore-limbs for the development of their higher functions as tool-making organs, which constitute the true starting-point of humanity. Throughout the animal kingdom there are many morphological changes which strike one as remarkable instances of the adaptation of special means to special ends, such, for example, as the evolution of the fore-limbs into fins and wings so as to make them suitable for locomotion in the different media of water and air. But nature's operations will be searched in vain for a series of phenomena comparable to those which ushered man on the field of life as a skilled craftsman. The preliminary step in this great event was the attainment of the erect attitude which to this day distinguishes him from all other vertebrates. This divergence from the pithecoid group of animals took place sometime in the Tertiary period, and was finally completed by the adjustment of certain muscles and bones so as to balance the upper part of the body on the spinal column, and facilitate bipedal locomotion, which henceforth became man's normal mode of progression.

The organic changes involved in the transformation from the semi-erect attitude of monkeys to that of men cannot be regarded as a very arduous piece of work; so that the assumption of bipedal locomotion, and the differentiation of the hands and feet, would have been effected in a comparatively short period. It was, however, very different with mental evolution, as the formation of brain substance in response to the progressive stimuli of the manipulative organs is a much more elaborate process—a process which has no limits, and indeed is still in operation. Hence, the time requisite to complete the former, or transition, period in the evolution of man is by no means comparable, in point of duration, to the long ages which have elapsed since he became a tool-maker. The evolutionary stages of organic life often run in grooves, and may be long or short in proportion to the facility afforded by the exciting causes in the environment and the benefits conferred by the change. Moreover, it is probable that the attainment of the erect attitude, together with its attendant morphological changes, was completed within a comparatively small area on the globe, so that the chances of finding the fossil remains of a typical specimen of the human representative of this early period are extremely small. On the other hand, the probability of discovering erect beings, with crania in all grades of development, from a slightly changed simian type up to that of civilized man, is enormously greater, not only because of the great length of time since they came into existence, but also because of their increased numbers and wide distribution on the globe. Whatever may have been the precise circumstances which induced the first anthropoid animals to resort to bipedal locomotion, the perpetuation of the habit soon became hereditary; and it has continued ever since to be one of the most distinguishing characteristics of man.

It will be observed that the angle which the axis of the spine of a vertebrate animal makes with the axes of its supporting limbs varies from 90° to zero. In man alone this angle reaches the vanishing point, because the vertebral axis has actually come to coincide with the vertical direction of the two lower limbs, which in his case exclusively support the body. The erect attitude is thus not only peculiar to men, but the ultimate goal of all improvements in the advance of vertebrate life, since the bilateral parts of the body are nicely balanced on the spinal column and the two posterior limbs. It is, therefore, the most conspicuous physiological line of demarcation that exists between man and the lower animals. Moreover, it was indirectly the means of profoundly affecting the subsequent career of mankind on the globe; for the exclusive appropriation of the fore-limbs to manipulative purposes virtually inaugurated a new phase of existence, in which intelligence and mechanical skill became henceforth the dominating factors. The co-operation of these two factors was the starting-point of the long series of inventions and ingenious methods by

which mankind have gradually worked out the elements of modern civilization and acquired dominion over all other animals.

Linnæus, in his *Systema Naturæ*, described the genus *Homo* as comprising four primary varieties, viz. Negro, Mongolian, Caucasian, and American, all of which were connected by numerous intermediate forms. To these Blumenbach added the Malay, as a fifth variety. On the other hand, Cuvier reduced them to three, viz. Caucasian, Mongolian, and Ethiopian,—a classification adhered to by M. Verneau in his *Races Humaines*. The description of these various races of mankind, their relation to each other and distribution on the globe, form the special domain of Ethnology and Ethnography (wh. see). For precise details of the anatomical changes consequent on the attainment of the erect attitude, readers are also referred to special works on the subject (see *Memoirs of John Goodsir*, 1868, vol. i. pp. 207–280).

With regard to Cuvier's division of the *Primates* into *quadrumana* and *bimana*, it may be observed that he is only partially accurate; for, although anatomically the four limbs of the former are truly prehensile organs, yet the upper two are decidedly more differentiated as hands than the lower. Even in the apes the distinction between hands and feet had already begun. In man the structural difference between the upper and lower limbs has greatly widened in two opposite directions, the former becoming exclusively adapted for prehensile and manipulative purposes, and the latter as exclusively adapted for locomotion.

II. SOME REMAINS OF FOSSIL MAN.—With the completion of the bodily changes involved in the attainment of the erect attitude, the evolution of the present human form, with the exception of some remarkable modifications in the cranium, facial bones, and probably the larynx, was practically completed. As soon as bipedal locomotion became habitual and firmly secured on anatomical bases, there was no apparent reason why the osseous characters of the lower limbs should be sensibly affected by any subsequent increase in the quantity or quality of brain-matter. For example, the femurs, which had henceforth to support the entire weight of the body, would not be in the least degree affected by the nature of the component ingredients of that load. It would, however, be very different with the brain-case and its attachments. For, by the substitution of manufactured weapons in lieu of nature's means of self-defence, the subsequent well-being of these novel bipeds became absolutely dependent on their skill in converting the laws and forces of their environment into useful mechanical appliances. As soon as they recognized that the reasoning faculties were the true source of such inventions, no doubt a premium would be put on useful discoveries. In this way strong motives for the production of more perfect weapons, tools, and other appliances were constantly coming within the scope of their daily avocations, the result of which would be a progressive increase in intelligence and a corresponding increase in brain substance. Now, according to the well-established doctrine of the localization of brain function, the additional brain molecules and cells thus acquired had their seat of growth for the most part somewhere in the cerebral hemispheres, which lie well within the anterior portion of the brain-case. The mere mechanical effect of this increment to the physical organ of thought would be to increase the weight of the anterior half of the head, and so to upset its finely equipoised position on the top of the spinal column. But, as any interference with the free and easy rotatory movements of the head would manifestly be disadvantageous to the individual in the struggle of life, it became necessary to counteract the influence of this disturbing element by the action of some other concurrent morphological process, which would not be prejudicial to the general well-being of the human economy. This object was partly attained by a retrocession, or contraction, of the facial bones, especially the jaw-bones, towards the central axis of the spinal column, and partly by a backward shifting of the cerebrum over the cerebellum. As the gradual filling up of the cranial cavity progressed *pari passu* with those cranial alterations, we have, in the facial angle of Camper, a rough mechanical means of estimating the progress of mental development during the period of man's existence as a human being, *i.e.* since he attained the erect attitude.

One of the results of this retrocession of the facial bones was the gradual contraction of the alveolar borders of the jaws, thereby diminishing the space allotted to the teeth,—a fact which plausibly accounts for some of the peculiarities differentiating the older fossil jaws from modern specimens. Thus, in the dentition of the former, the last, or third, molar is the largest, whereas in the latter it is the smallest. Not only so, but among some European races of to-day the last four molar (wisdom) teeth make their appearance at a later date in the individual's life than in early prehistoric times (a fact which has also been noted in a few Neolithic specimens), so that the so-called wisdom teeth seem to be on the highway to become vestigial organs. It is interesting to note that this shortening of the dental portion of the human jaw attracted the attention of Darwin, who, however, attributed it to 'civilized men habitually feeding on soft, cooked food, and thus using their jaws less.'

Another peculiarity of civilized races is the greater prominence of the chin, a feature which may also be due to the contraction of the alveolar ridges, and the more upright setting of the incisor teeth in their sockets. But whatever the precise cause may have been, there can be no doubt that the gradual formation of the chin has had a striking parallelism with the progressive stages in man's intellectual development ever since he started on his human career.

The evidence on which these views are founded consists of a few fossil skulls and other portions of human skeletons (necessarily fragmentary owing to the ordinary processes of decay). A short description will now be given of one or two of the more interesting specimens.

(1) *Java skull.*—Perhaps the oldest and most controverted of such remains are a *calvaria*, two molar teeth, and a left femur, found in 1891–1892 by Dr. Eugène Dubois in Upper Pliocene strata in the island of Java. After comparing these bones with the corresponding parts of other human skeletons, both fossil and modern, and of some anthropoid apes, Dr. Dubois published, in 1894, a very complete memoir on the subject, with descriptive details and photogravures of each bone. In this memoir (*Pithecanthropus erectus: eine menschenähnliche Uebergangsform aus Java*, Batavia, 1894) he assigns these remains to an animal having an erect attitude like man, and a brain-case with mixed characters, partly simian and partly human, to which he gave the name *Pithecanthropus erectus*. Unfortunately these bones, though found in the same horizontal strata, were not close together,—the skull-cap being 15 mètres from the femur—and consequently there is room for the objection that they did not belong to the same individual. Expert opinion was greatly divided as to the conclusions to be derived from these relics. Most of the anatomists who critically examined the femur pronounced it human—the late Prof. Virchow being almost alone in maintaining that it might have belonged to one of the anthropoid apes. As to the two molar teeth, there was so much difference of opinion among specialists—some regarding them as

simian and others as human—that it is quite unnecessary to advance any further proof of their intermediate character. But the 'bone of contention,' *par excellence*, was the *calvaria*, with regard to which some twenty experts of various nationalities ranged themselves into three groups, according as they held it to be human, simian, or a transition form (see Munro, *Prehistoric Problems*, pp. 165–168).

The following is a brief description of its prominent characters:—External surface generally smooth and without any marked ridges; sutures almost entirely obliterated; frontal bone slightly keel-shaped in the line of the frontal suture; *glabella*, supra-orbital ridges, and occipital protuberance strikingly prominent; cranial vault depressed, and on section (antero-posterior) showing an arch intermediate between that of the anthropoid apes and that of an average European man. Its general dimensions may be thus abbreviated:

Antero-posterior diameter (max.)	185	mm.
Transverse diameter	130	,,
,, ,, (behind the orbit)	90	,,
Height in the parietal region (max.)	62	,,
Cephalic index	70	,,
Estimated cranial capacity	1000	c.c.

The specially interesting features of the Java *calvaria* are its estimated small cranial capacity, the great prominence of the supra-orbital ridges and the occipital protuberance, and its remarkably low and retreating forehead. In the absence of the facial bones, we can only surmise that, to be in keeping with the above simian characters, the individual who owned this skull presented a highly prognathic appearance, something approaching to that of *Hylobates*, to which Dr. Dubois compares it. But whatever views may be held as to the anthropological value of this *calvaria*, the femur found in the same stratum conclusively proves that there had then been in existence a being of the genus *Homo* which had assumed the erect attitude as its normal mode of progression, *i.e.* at a time prior to the advent of that great landmark in the physical history of the northern hemisphere known as the Glacial period.

(2) *Neanderthal skull.*—In 1857, Prof. Schaaffhausen and Dr. Fuhlrott published an account of a skeleton found, the year before, in the cave of Feldhofen, situated at the entrance to a small ravine called Neanderthal, on the right bank of the river Düssel. The cave has long been quarried away, but its dimensions are reported to have been about 16 feet in length, 11 feet in breadth, and 8 feet in height. On its uneven floor lay a mass of consolidated mud, about 5 feet in depth, without stalagmitic deposits, but sparingly mixed with rounded fragments of chert. On this deposit being removed, the human bones in question were discovered. No other animal remains, with the exception of a bear's tooth of which neither the position nor character was determined, were found in the cave.

The Neanderthal human remains, especially the skull, presented such remarkable peculiarities that, when they were first exhibited at a scientific meeting at Bonn, doubts were expressed by several naturalists as to whether they were really human. The limb-bones were characterized by great thickness, with unusual development of the elevations and depressions for the attachment of muscles, and the ribs had a singularly rounded shape and abrupt curvature—all characters indicating great muscular power. The left humerus was more slender than the right—a fact which suggested the idea that the two did not belong to the same individual; but this peculiarity was shown to have been the result of an injury during lifetime. The cranium, which was of great size and thickness, was characterized by a long elliptical shape, a low retreating forehead, excessive development of the frontal sinuses, and a great projection of the occipital region. The sutures were nearly obliterated, and the line of the frontal suture was marked by a slight ridge. Its dimensions were as follows:

Antero-posterior diameter (max.)	200	mm.	
Transverse ,,	144	,,	
Frontal ,, (min.)	106	,,	
Frontal ,, (max.)	122	,,	
Cephalic index	72	,,	
Estimated cranial capacity (Huxley)	1330	c.c	

With regard to this skull, Professor Huxley, writing in 1863, says:

'There can be no doubt that, as Professor Schaaffhausen and Mr. Busk have stated, this skull is the most brutal of all known human skulls, resembling those of the apes not only in the prodigious development of the superciliary prominences and the forward extension of the orbits, but still more in the depressed form of the brain-case, in the straightness of the squamosal suture, and in the complete retreat of the occiput forward and upward, from the superior occipital ridges' (Lyell's *Antiquity of Man*, p. 84).

Here also, as was the case with the Java *calvaria*, we have no means, owing to the absence of the facial bones, of judging of the degree of prognathism of this very pronounced pithecoid specimen of humanity.

(3) *Les Hommes de Spy.*—In 1886 two human skeletons were found deeply buried in undisturbed débris at the entrance to a grotto called Belcheaux-Roches, at Spy-sur-l'Orneau, in the province of Namur, Belgium. The interior of the grotto had been examined more than once, but in front of it there was a terrace, projecting 13 yards, which had not been previously excavated. It was in this terrace that MM. Lohest and de Puydt made excavations which unearthed these skeletons. The outer skeleton was found at a distance of 26 feet from the entrance to the cave, under a mass of rubbish 12½ feet in depth and composed of four distinct strata, none of which appeared to have been hitherto broken through. It lay on the right side, across the axis of the cave, with the hand resting on the lower jaw, and the head towards the east. The other was 8 feet nearer the present entrance to the cave, but its position was not determined with so much accuracy as the former. Associated with these skeletons were worked flints of the type known as *Moustérien*, and some animal remains representing the following fauna:

Rhinoceros tichorhinus (abundant).
Equus caballus (very abundant).
Cervus elephas (rare).
Cervus tarandus (very rare).
Bos primigenius (pretty abundant).
Elephas primigenius (abundant).
Ursus spelæus (rare).
Meles taxus (rare).
Hyæna spelæa (abundant).

Immediately over the skeletons was a hardened layer composed of chippings of ivory and flint, pieces of charcoal, and some angular stones of the surrounding limestone rock. Above this there was a reddish deposit containing remains of the same fauna, but the worked objects indicated a decided advance in civilization—awls and borers of flint, together with needles, beads, and ornaments of bone and ivory. Above this was a bed of yellowish clay, in which were still found bones of the mammoth and various flint implements; and lastly, a mass of clay and fallen rocks, without relics of any kind.

The osteological characters of one of the Spy crania correspond in a remarkable degree with those of the Neanderthal skull, as may be seen from the following measurements by Professor Fraipont (*Congrès international d'Anthropologie et d'Archéologie préhistoriques*, Paris, 1889, p. 333):

	Spy.	Neanderthal.
Antero-posterior diameter (max.)	200 mm.	200 mm.
Transverse	140 ,,	144 ,,

	Spy.	Neanderthal.
Frontal (min.)	104 mm.	106 mm.
,, (max.)	114 ,,	122 ,,
Horizontal circumference	580 ,,	(571?) 590 ,,
Cephalic index	70 ,,	72 ,,

As regards the great development of the superciliary prominences, the low retreating forehead, and the depressed and elongated form of the cranium, both these skulls present a more brutal appearance than any human skull known up to the time of the Java discovery.

According to M. Fraipont, the entire anatomical characters of the Spy skeleton are in harmony with the same lowness of type shown by the skull. The jaws are deep and powerful, the chin slopes away from the teeth downwards and backwards, while the teeth and alveolar border have a striking prognathic appearance. The last molar teeth are not smaller than those immediately in front of them. The long bones are materially different from those of the normal Belgians of the present day, being generally shorter and stouter.

It is, however, only just to note that the pithecoid characters of the other Spy skull appear to be less pronounced, the cranial vault being more lofty and the cephalic index at least 74.

It has already been surmised that the individuals to whom the Java and Neanderthal skulls belonged had prognathic profiles, on the ground that this feature harmonized with their other observed simian characters. It is, therefore, particularly interesting to note that the jaws of these Spy men are highly prognathic—a fact which greatly strengthens the inference as to the two former.

(4) *Naulette jaw.*—Among isolated cranial bones occasionally discovered, the lower jaw, being merely attached to the skull by muscular and ligamentary tissues, is most frequently met with. Perhaps the most instructive of these fossil jaws is the *Naulette mâchoire*, discovered in 1885, in the *Trou de la Naulette*, by M. E. Dupont, Director of the R. N. H. Museum at Brussels. The cave known under the above name is situated on the left bank of the river Lesse, near Dinant, and contained much débris and remains of the Quaternary fauna, among them being this jaw, at a depth of 4·50 mètres beneath its final or modern floor. Though in a fragmentary condition, it presents certain peculiarities which strongly differentiate it from the corresponding bone in modern civilized man. Its characteristics, according to M. Dupont (*L'Homme pendant les Âges de la Pierre*, p. 99), may be thus stated:

(*a*) Its small height, in proportion to the thickness of the body, gives it an exceptionally stumpy appearance.

(*b*) The chin, instead of projecting forwards, slopes backwards; and the 'genial tubercules' (*apophyse géni*) on its inner surface are wanting.

(*c*) The posterior molars are larger than the others, and present the appearance of having five roots, as shown by the size of the sockets, all the teeth being absent from the mandible when discovered.

Dr. Broca came to the conclusion that the Naulette jaw, in its anatomical characters, approached the simian type more than any previously known.

'Nous serons autorisés à conclure,' he writes, 'que cette mâchoire, dont l'antiquité prodigieuse remonte au temps du mammouth, est de tous les restes humains que l'on connaît jusqu'ici celui qui se rapproche le plus du type des singes' (*Congrès International*, etc., Paris, 1867, p. 401).

With respect to the retreating slope of the chin and the character of the teeth, he considered that the individual who owned the Naulette jaw held an intermediate place between man and the anthropoid apes; and in support of this view he exhibited a sketch of a number of human mandibles showing a regular upward gradation from the extremely sloping chin of a chimpanzee up to that of a modern Parisian (*ib.* p. 399). These facts go far to establish the generalization that, as men advanced in intelligence, the prognathism which they inherited from their simian-like ancestors became gradually smaller, until the face assumed the almost straight and classic profile of modern times. This view is further strengthened by evidence derived from a comparison between the skulls of modern civilized people and those of the lower races still inhabiting the globe. This method of inquiry has yielded some striking results as regards the degrees of gnathism and frontal development which they respectively exhibit. The extent of this difference is well illustrated by Professor Owen (*Comparative Anatomy*, vol. ii. pp. 558, 560), in a comparison which he makes between the cranium of a native Australian and that of a well-formed European, from which it will at once be seen that the former has a low retreating forehead and a highly prognathic profile. The characters of the European skull, which present a very marked contrast to the former, are thus described by the Professor:

'In more intellectual races the cranial cavity is relatively larger, especially loftier and wider. The fore-parts of the upper and lower jaws, concomitantly with earlier weaning, are less produced, and the contour descends more vertically from the longer and more prominent nasals. The ascending ramus of the mandible is loftier. The malar is less protuberant, and the mastoid more so.'

(5) That other crania supposed to be of great antiquity have been recorded whose anatomical features do not, apparently, harmonize with these views so well as do those of the Java, Neanderthal, and Spy specimens, need not cause any surprise, considering the difficulty which sometimes occurs in correctly estimating their antiquity. Thus, the famous *skull of the old man of Cromagnon*, long regarded as originally belonging to one of the hunter-artists of the late Palæolithic period, shows a decided approach in all its characters to the normal type of civilized man. Its cephalic index is 73·6 and its capacity 1590 c.c. The height of its original owner was 1·82 mètres. The lower jaw has a large ascending ramus, behind which, on both sides, the third molar is partly hidden. These two teeth are also smaller than the other molars, being in this respect more allied to the dentition of Neolithic and modern races. For these reasons, as well as for the fact that the Cromagnon skeletons were found on the surface of the Palæolithic débris of the rock shelter of Cromagnon, some anthropologists maintain that this old Cromagnon man belonged to the early Neolithic period. But between the latest phase of the life of the Palæolithic artists of middle Europe and the earlier Neolithic people there was probably no great interval of time. Although the Cromagnon human remains were lying over the true culture débris of the *Moustérien* period, the amount of superincumbent talus under which the skeletons lay shows that they could not have been much later than the transition period. Moreover, there are other human remains with regard to which no such doubts have been raised, such as *the skulls of Chancelade and Laugerie Basse*, both found in the Dordogne district, which show equally advanced cranial characters.

(6) The recent discovery of two skeletons in the *Grotte des Enfants* near Mentone, which Dr. Verneau describes as belonging to a race intermediate between the Neanderthaloid and Cromagnon races, marks an important addition to fossil craniology. They belonged to a young man and an aged female of small stature, and lay on a hearth-layer at a depth of 7·75 mètres. The cephalic index of the former is 69·72 and of the latter 68·58, and both have prominent negroid jaws. But the interesting feature of the discoveries in this cave was that, a little more than 2 ft.

nigher up in the débris, another skeleton of the Cromagnon type was found, measuring 6 ft. 3 in. in height and with a cephalic index of 76·26 (*L'Anthropologie*, vol. xiii. pp. 561–583). That these two distinct races should be thus brought nearly on the same chronological horizon by no means discredits Dr. Verneau's theory, as it is not improbable that, while a higher race was being developed, individuals of an older and lower race still survived in Europe. In corroboration of this we have the record of two skulls, of a distinctly negroid type, having been found among Neolithic remains in Brittany (*BSAP*, ser. v. vol. iv. p. 432). But, even accepting the Cromagnon race, whose skulls indicate a great stride in mental capacity over those of Spy and Neanderthal, as belonging to the latest phase of the Reindeer period in France, it does not appear to the present writer that they disclose a greater brain-case than would be expected of a people who displayed such artistic feeling and mechanical skill as the authors of the art gallery of the Reindeer period (see § III.).

(7) Some forty or fifty human skulls, more or less imperfect, and supposed to date back to Quaternary times, have been recorded up to this date from almost as many different localities throughout Europe, occasionally in alluvial deposits, but more frequently in the accumulated débris of caves and rock-shelters. Some years ago (*Crania Ethnica*, 1873–1879), MM. Hamy and de Quatrefages carefully examined all the fossil remains then known, and classified them under the names of the localities where the most typical specimens were found. Among dolichocephalic, or long-headed, they described two distinct races, one represented by a portion of a *calvaria* found at Canstadt and the other by the skull of the old man of Cromagnon. The brachycephalic, or broad-headed, were made to represent four races, under the generic designation of *Furfooz*, the name of a cave in the valley of the Lesse, thus:

1. The race of Canstadt,		Cephalic index,	72
2. The race of Cromagnon,		,,	73·76
3. The race of Furfooz,	1st, Furfooz,	,,	79·31
	2nd, ,,	,,	81·39
	3rd, Grenelle,	,,	83·53
	4th, La Truchère,	,,	84·32

It was subsequently ascertained that these Furfooz skulls were the osseous remains of Neolithic interments, which shows both the difficulty and the danger of making chronological classifications on imperfectly observed data.

As the outcome of this short review of fossil craniology, perhaps the most important outstanding feature is that the three skulls above described as typical examples are all dolichocephalic. The race of Cromagnon was, in all probability, separated from the Neanderthal and Spy troglodytes by an interval of time which can be only approximately measured by the duration of the larger part of the Glacial period. The appearance of brachycephalic races in Central Europe only at the beginning of the Neolithic period is an ethnological problem not yet satisfactorily explained. It has been abundantly proved, by the contents of dolmens and other sepulchral tombs, that two races, one dolichocephalic and the other brachycephalic, lived contemporary with each other in the South of France (*RAnth*, 1873; *Matériaux pour l'histoire primitive et naturelle de l'homme*, vol. xii. 1877, etc.). From the remains in the artificial caves of Petit-Morin, investigated and described by Baron de Baye (*Archéologie Préhistorique*), the two races seemed to have more or less coalesced. From the amalgamation of these varied races the highly mixed populations of modern Europe can be readily accounted for; but whether the brachycephalic were developed from the dolichocephalic people at an earlier period still remains a controverted problem. These passing glimpses of the early races of man in Europe support the hypothesis that two peoples widely separated had come into contact in Southern France, and perhaps elsewhere in Europe, at the close of the Reindeer period. Of these the dolichocephalic appear to have been long indigenous to the locality, and were probably the direct descendants of the Palæolithic men whose skeletons were found in the caves of Spy and Neanderthal.

III. MAN AS A TOOL-MAKER. — Man may be differentiated from all other animals by the fact that he is a skilled mechanic, and manufactures a great variety of objects which he largely utilizes instead of the organs of offence and defence with which nature originally endowed him. In lieu of the specially developed teeth, claws, horns, hoofs, etc., used more or less for these purposes by other animals, man has provided himself with a multiplicity of knives, axes, swords, spears, arrows, guns, etc., through the instrumentality of which his self-preservation is more efficiently maintained.

(1) Looking at the accumulated products of man's mechanical ingenuity, which have been gathered on the highways and byways of his primeval life, from an archæological standpoint, there can be no doubt that they are characterized by successive increments of improvement, both in technique and execution, from the rudest forms up to the most perfect appliances of modern times. That, during the transition period, broken pieces of wood and natural stones would be used as missiles, without being fashioned into any particular shape, may be assumed as a corollary to the theory that man passed from a state of existence in which tool-making was unknown; also that, in the course of time, such missiles would give place to stones so slightly worked as not to be readily distinguished from the accidental operations of nature. Objects which come under this category are named *eoliths* (ἠώς, 'dawn,' and λίθος, 'stone'). They are recorded as having been found among gravels on chalk plateaus in various parts of the South of England, notably on the Kent plateau. Mr. Read, who describes and figures some of these eoliths in his *Guide to the Antiquities of the Stone Age in the British Museum*, thus refers to them (p. 10):

'It is not the province of this Guide to enter into the arguments which have been brought forward against or in favour of the artificial character of Eoliths, but it may be said that, whether their claims can be substantiated or not, the existence of implements of a ruder kind than those of the drift is in itself not improbable. For no invention reaches perfection suddenly, and each stage of advance is attained by an infinitely slow progress from the simple to the more complex. The majority of the drift implements are clearly something more than the first efforts of an unpractised hand: they show, on the contrary, signs of a comparatively long development, and it may be fairly argued that their ruder prototypes must exist somewhere. It was only to be expected that they should have escaped notice for a longer time than the typical Palæoliths, if only because they must necessarily be more difficult to distinguish from naturally fractured flints.'

(2) The recognition, even among anthropological savants, that some peculiarly shaped flints, now known as palæoliths, were manufactured by man and used as implements, is scarcely half a century old. A fine pear-shaped flint of this type was found along with an elephant's tooth at Gray's Inn Lane, London, about the end of the 17th century, but, though described in the Sloane Catalogue and preserved in the British Museum, its true significance became known only when Sir W. Franks pointed out its identity with those found in the Valley of the Somme (*Ancient Stone Implements*, p. 521). Also, as early as 1797, Mr. John Frere, F.R.S., described to the Society of Antiquaries some flint 'weapons' found, associated with the bones of extinct animals, at a depth of 12 feet in

brick-earth at Hoxne, in Suffolk. He was so much struck with the situation that he gave a precise account of the circumstances, and he regarded the implements as belonging 'to a very remote period indeed, even beyond that of the present world' (*Archæologia*, vol. xiii. p. 204). Mr. Frere presented specimens of the Hoxne implements to the Museum of the Society; yet here they lay, unheeded and unsuggestive, till 1859, when Sir John Evans, on his return from Amiens and Abbeville, recognized them as similar to those in the collection of M. Boucher de Perthes.

(3) It was about the beginning of the second quarter of last century that Kent's Cavern, near Torquay, first became a subject of archæological interest, owing to the researches of the Rev. J. MacEnery, who asserted that he found in it flint implements, associated with bones and teeth of extinct animals, beneath a thick continuous sheet of stalagmite. But the legitimate inference from these facts, viz. that man was contemporary with these animals and lived before the deposition of the stalagmite, had little chance of being accepted when opposed by the teaching and authority of so famous a geologist as Dr. Buckland, author of *Reliquiæ Diluvianæ* and of the Bridgewater Treatise on Geology and Mineralogy.

The facts on which Mr. MacEnery based his conclusions were verified by fresh excavations made by Mr. Godwin-Austen, F.G.S., in 1840, and subsequently by a committee appointed by the Torquay Natural History Society in 1846. Papers embodying the results of these investigations were read at the Geological Society of London and at the meeting of the British Association in 1847. But, according to the late Mr. Pengelly, F.R.S., the reception given to these researches was not encouraging, and the inconvenient conclusions arrived at 'were given to an apathetic, unbelieving world.'

(4) Another discovery of a similar character was the Windmill-Hill Cavern at Brixham, explored in 1858, under the auspices of a committee appointed by the Royal and Geological Societies of London. The first paper on the result of this investigation was read by Mr. Pengelly in September 1858, at the meeting of the British Association, then held at Leeds, in which it was announced that 'eight flint tools had already been found in various parts of the cavern, all of them inosculating with bones of mammalia at depths varying from 9 to 42 inches in the cave-earth, on which lay a sheet of stalagmite from 3 to 8 inches thick, and having *within* it and *on* it relics of the lion, hyæna, bear, mammoth, rhinoceros, and reindeer.' This paper, to use the phraseology of Mr. Pengelly, produced a decided 'awakening,' besides indirect results of the highest importance.

(5) The discovery by M. Boucher de Perthes of rude flint implements, associated with bones of the mammoth and other extinct animals, in the ancient gravel beds of the valley of the Somme, at various levels considerably above the present highest flood-marks of the river, equally failed to attract scientific attention. An account of his researches, under the title *Antiquités Celtiques et Antédiluviennes*, was published in 1847, but for upwards of ten years it lay absolutely unheeded. Nor can there be any doubt that the ultimate recognition of the importance of his discoveries was one of the indirect results of the less sceptical tone prevalent in scientific circles in Britain in consequence of the exploration of the Brixham Cavern just referred to.

Excluding the eoliths as too controversial a subject to be discussed in this brief review, it would appear that certain flint implements found at various depths in the higher gravels of our present river systems are the oldest evidence of man's handicraft in Europe. These gravels had been left high and dry long before the rivers had excavated the winding valleys at the bottom of which they now flow. The Hoxne implement, above referred to, is a typical specimen of what French archæologists call the *coup de poing*, probably the earliest type of hand-implement known, which came to be widely imitated among the earlier races of mankind. Implements of the *coup de poing* type vary considerably both in form and in size, the degree of variability being, however, strictly compatible with their function as hand-tools. They have been discovered in widely separated localities in Europe, Asia, and Africa; and nearly all possess the peculiarity of being made by chipping a nodule so as to convert it into a suitable hand-tool—the flakes struck off being apparently of no use.

The original manufacturers of these Palæolithic tools are supposed to have entered Europe from Africa at a time when there was easy communication between the two continents by several land bridges across the basin of the Mediterranean. The climate being sub-tropical, these naked nomads appear to have inhabited the wooded banks of rivers, living on fruits and the smaller fauna, till the advent of the Glacial period forced them to take shelter in caves and to protect their bodies by skins of animals. It is difficult to realize how much the severe climate which then supervened contributed to the improvement of their physical and mental attributes. It roused their dormant energies to the pitch of being able to adapt their mode of life to the changing conditions of their environment—for the adage that necessity is the mother of invention was as applicable then as now. The natural food productions of a warm climate gradually disappeared, until finally there was little left but wild animals,—mammoth, reindeer, chamois, horse, bison, etc.—many of which came from arctic regions. To procure necessary food and clothing in these circumstances greatly taxed the skill and resources of the inhabitants. The difficulty was ultimately solved by the manufacture of special weapons of the chase, with which they successfully attacked the larger wild animals which then occupied the country. The *coup de poing*, which for a long time served all the purposes of primitive life, gradually gave place to spear- and lance-heads fixed on long handles, together with a great variety of minor weapons and tools, made of stone, bone, horn, and wood. When the Palæolithic people finally emerged from this singular contest with the forces of nature, they were physically and mentally better than ever equipped for the exigencies of life. A greater power of physical endurance, improved reasoning faculties, an assortment of tools adapted for all kinds of mechanical work, and some experience of the advantage of housing and clothing, may be mentioned among the trophies which they carried away from that long and uphill struggle.

Of the kind of life which these early people of Europe led we have remarkably precise evidence in the food-refuse, and the lost, broken, and worn-out implements, weapons, and ornaments which have been discovered by excavating the caves and rock-shelters they had from time to time inhabited. The result of these investigations has disclosed a steady progress in the manufacture of industrial implements, weapons of the chase, and personal ornaments. When it was ascertained that the larger flakes could be utilized as sharp cutting tools, attention began to be directed to the art of producing them for teleological purposes. After some experience, it was found that a skilled workman could produce a flake of any required size and

shape. By subjecting these flakes to secondary chipping, implements of great variety and efficiency were in the course of time abundantly produced. This was indeed an important step of advance in flint industry, evidence of which is to be found in the fact that henceforth flakes were the useful products, while the residuary core was rejected as waste. The worked flints found in the earlier inhabited caves of France and Belgium, such as Moustier and Spy, show that secondary flaking was already in progress—thus proving that their habitation was later than the formation of the river-drift gravels containing worked flints.

From a careful inspection of the handiwork of these troglodytes, it will be seen that it is characterized by a gradual development from simple to more complete forms. Implements, tools, and weapons were slowly but surely made more efficient, thus evincing on the part of their manufacturers a progressive knowledge of mechanical principles. Art and ornament, too, had taken deep root among these primitive hunters, and before the end of their civilization they evinced a remarkable artistic taste and power of execution. Hence G. de Mortillet classified their industrial remains in chronological sequence into *Moustérien*, *Solutréen*, and *Magdalénien*, — a nomenclature which he founded upon the names of the most typical stations then explored. The earliest of the Palæolithic stations was Le Moustier, situated on the right bank of the Vezère (Dordogne). During its habitation by man the climate was cold and damp, and among the contemporary fauna were the mammoth, woolly rhinoceros, cave-bear, and musk-ox. The special features of the industrial remains of this period were the scarcity of the *coup de poing*—which was so characteristic of the older river-drift deposits—and the splitting up of flints into smaller implements, such as scrapers, trimmed flakes, etc. The next typical station in ascending order was the open-air encampment of Solutré (Saône-et-Loire).

The stage of culture here disclosed was characterized by great perfection in the art of manufacturing flint implements, especially spear- and lance-heads in the form of a laurel leaf, and by the abundance of horses and reindeer used by the inhabitants as food. The climate was mild and dry, the great glaciers were on the wane, and the rhinoceros seems to have disappeared from the scene. The third and last of the typical stations was the well-known rock-shelter of La Madelaine, characterized by the abundance of objects made of bone and horn, the development of a remarkable artistic talent, the predominance of a northern climate and fauna, and the extinction of the mammoth towards the close of the period.

The civilization thus developed represents the outcome of a system of human economy founded on the application of natural laws to mechanical purposes, but little affected by the principles of religion or ethics. The mysteries of the supernatural had not then been formulated into the concrete ideas of gods and demons. The notions of good and evil, right and wrong, were still dominated by the cosmic law that might is right. Neither gloomy forebodings nor qualms of conscience had much influence on the conduct of these people. Their philosophical and sentimental speculations, if they had any, centred exclusively on the habits of the animals they hunted, and on the strategic means by which they could be waylaid and captured. During this time they made great progress in the manufacture of mechanical appliances, as shown by the number of flint implements —saws, borers, scrapers, etc.—with which they made needles, pins, ornaments, weapons, and other objects, including the so-called *bâtons de commandement*. Upon the whole, it would appear as if their minds were engrossed with the chase and its exciting scenes and incidents, for the relics of their domestic economy indicate little more than the art of roasting or broiling the flesh of the captured animals, and of converting their skins into garments. Possibly some round pebbles, abundantly found in the débris, may have been used as 'pot-boilers,' but a few stone mortars, which occasionally turned up, would seem to have been used only for mixing colouring matter to paint their bodies. Of agriculture, the rearing of domestic animals, the arts of spinning and weaving, and the manufacture of pottery, they appear to have been absolutely ignorant. But yet, in an environment of such primitive resources and limited culture associations, these wild hunters developed a genuine taste for art, and cultivated its principles so effectually that they have bequeathed to us an art gallery of over 400 pieces of sculpture and engraving, many of them being so true to their original models that they bear a favourable comparison with analogous works of the present day. They adorned their persons with perforated teeth, shells, coloured pebbles, and pendants of various kinds. They depicted the animals with which they were familiar, especially those they hunted for food, in all their various moods and attitudes, often with startling fidelity. Harpoons, spears, and daggers of horn and bone were skilfully engraved, and sometimes their dagger handles were sculptured into the conventional form of one or other of their favourite animals. In several instances they also adorned the walls of the caverns they frequented with incised outlines of the neighbouring fauna, and made actual colour-paintings of them in black and ochre, or in one of these colours.

The other characteristic feature in the lives of these people was that they lived exclusively on the produce of the chase, for without agricultural and pastoral avocations they could do little else than organize daily hunting and fishing expeditions. During the later stages of Palæolithic civilization their principal prey consisted of reindeer and horses, which then roamed in large herds throughout Western Europe, thus rendering themselves more liable to be ambushed, trapped, or speared by their wily enemies. The weapons used by these hunters were harpoons, generally made of reindeer-horn; spear- and lance-heads of flint; and short daggers of bone or horn. It is not likely that with these weapons they would take the initiative in attacking the hyæna, lion, or cave-bear, except in self-defence. That, however, these formidable creatures were occasionally captured by them, is suggested by the fact that their canine teeth were highly prized and used as personal ornaments, or as mementoes of their prowess in the chase.

When the physical conditions which called these human accomplishments into existence passed away, and the peculiar fauna of the Glacial period disappeared from the lowlands of Central Europe, —some by extinction, and others by emigration to more northern regions or to the elevated mountains in the neighbourhood—we find the inhabitants of these old hunting grounds in possession of new and altogether different kinds of food. Finding the produce of the chase becoming so scarce and precarious that it was no longer possible to live a roaming life, now gathering fruits and seeds, now hunting wild animals, they fell somehow into the way of cultivating special plants and cereals, and rearing certain animals in a state of domestication. Whether this new departure was a direct sequence of the highly developed intelligence of the Palæolithic people of Europe, or was derived from new immigrants into the country, is a

lebatable question. At any rate, it was eminently successful, and may be regarded as the starting-point of Neolithic civilization. In the course of time these Neolithic people cultivated a variety of fruits, wheat, barley, and other cereals; they reared oxen, pigs, sheep, goats, horses, and dogs; they became skilled in the ceramic art, and in the manufacture of cloth by spinning and weaving wool and fibrous textures; the flint industry continued much the same as in the later stages of the Palæolithic period, but in addition to chipping they now ground stone implements so as to give them a sharp cutting edge; in hunting the forest fauna of the period they used, besides spears, lances, and daggers, the bow and arrow; they built houses, for both the living and the dead—thus showing that religion had become an active and governing power among them. But of the artistic taste and skill of their predecessors they had scarcely a vestige, and what they did by way of ornament consisted mainly of a few scratches, arranged in some simple geometrical pattern. The fundamental principles of the two civilizations are really so divergent that the Neolithic can hardly be regarded as a direct development from that of the Palæolithic period in Europe, although there are several instances on record in which their characteristic remains were chronologically superimposed, without any apparent break in continuity, as at Campigny, Reilhac, Mas-d'Azil, etc. The probability is that, while the reindeer-hunters were still in existence, people beyond this area, possibly of the same stock, were passing through the evolutionary stages which connected the two civilizations.

IV. MAN'S MENTAL ENDOWMENTS.—The great superiority of man's mental manifestations over those of all other animals is too patent to be called in question by any serious worker in the field of anthropology. Indeed, according to some eminent psychologists, the gap between them cannot be bridged over by the doctrine of organic evolution. On the other hand, evolutionists in general believe that it is explicable on the ordinary principles of physiology and psychology. If, then, it is to be held that man, like other animals, is a product of the ordinary organic forces of the Cosmos, it may well be asked why, and by what means, he has so far out-distanced all other beings in the struggle of life. The attempt to minimize this remarkable disparity between man and brute has not met with much support from any class of investigators. Anti-Darwinians have no object in discussing this question, their argument being that no speculation founded on materialism can account for it. Accordingly, various hypotheses have been formulated by way of explaining this psychological enigma, which now fall to be noticed.

That there is a physical stratum, common to man and some of the higher mammalia, which brings them both within the domain of organic evolution, has already been advocated in these pages (§ I.), and may be accepted as beyond controversy. This being so, we have to investigate the two following propositions: (1) What are the mental faculties common to both?; and (2) What psychological phenomena are peculiar to man? On these problems Mr. G. J. Romanes writes thus:

'If we have regard to Emotions as these occur in the brute, we cannot fail to be struck by the broad fact that the area of psychology which they cover is so nearly co-extensive with that which is covered by the emotional faculties of man. In my previous works I have given what I consider unquestionable evidence of all the following emotions, which I here name in the order of their appearance through the psychological scale—fear, surprise, affection, pugnacity, curiosity, jealousy, anger, play, sympathy, emulation, pride, resentment, emotion of the beautiful, grief, hate, cruelty, benevolence, revenge, rage, shame, regret, deceitfulness, emotion of the ludicrous.

'Now, this list exhausts all the human emotions, with the exception of those which refer to religion, moral sense, and perception of the sublime. Therefore I think we are fully entitled to conclude that, so far as emotions are concerned, it cannot be said that the facts of animal psychology raise any difficulties against the theory of descent. On the contrary, the emotional life of animals is so strikingly similar to the emotional life of men—and especially of young children—that I think the similarity ought fairly to be taken as direct evidence of a gentle continuity between them' (*Mental Evolution in Man*, p. 7).

Similarly, Mr. Romanes deals with Instinct, Volition, and Intellect, and strongly argues that there is only a difference of degree between their respective manifestations in man and other animals. So far these views have been more or less accepted by leading psychologists; but at this stage a serious divergence of opinion crops up among them, some holding that the principles of evolution are inadequate to account for the origin and working of the higher faculties of man. But these dissentients are seldom in agreement as to the precise nature of their objections. The eminent French anthropologist, Professor de Quatrefages, regarded man's entire organization, physical and mental, with the exception of the faculties of conscience and religion, as the work of evolution. Others extend the range of their objections so as to include the intellectual faculties. Mr. St. George Mivart, while denying that the principles of evolution are applicable to man, makes the following admissions as to the resemblance between the mental actions of men and animals:

'I have no wish to ignore the marvellous powers of animals, or the resemblance of their actions to those of men. No one can reasonably deny that many of them have feelings, emotions, and sense-perceptions similar to our own; that they exercise voluntary motion, and perform actions grouped in complex ways for definite ends; that they to a certain extent learn by experience, and combine perceptions and reminiscences so as to draw practical inferences, directly apprehending objects standing in different relations one to another, so that, in a sense, they may be said to apprehend relations. They will show hesitation, ending apparently, after a conflict of desires, with what looks like choice or volition: and such animals as the dog will not only exhibit the most marvellous fidelity and affection, but will also manifest evident signs of shame, which may seem the outcome of incipient moral perceptions. It is no great wonder, then, that so many persons little given to patient and careful introspection, should fail to perceive any radical distinction between a nature thus gifted and the intellectual nature of man' (Presidential Address at Biological Section, British Association, 1879).

Professor Huxley thus expresses his views on this phase of the subject:

'I have endeavoured to show that no absolute structural line of demarcation, wider than that between the animals which immediately succeed us in the scale, can be drawn between the animal world and ourselves; and I may add the expression of my belief that the attempt to draw a psychical distinction is equally futile, and that even the highest faculties of feeling and of intellect begin to germinate in lower forms of life. At the same time, no one is more strongly convinced than I am of the vastness of the gulf between civilized man and the brutes; or is more certain that whether *from* them or not, he is assuredly not *of* them. No one is less disposed to think lightly of the present dignity, or despairingly of the future hopes, of the only consciously intelligent denizen of this world' (*Man's Place in Nature*, p. 109).

On the other hand, Mr. Alfred Wallace, F.R.S., who holds such a distinguished position in this special field of research, has promulgated a most remarkable theory. This careful investigator, an original discoverer of the laws of natural selection, and a powerful advocate of their adequacy to bring about the evolution of the entire organic world, even including man up to a certain stage, believes that the cosmic forces are insufficient to account for the development of man in his civilized capacity.

'Natural selection,' he writes, 'could only have endowed savage man with a brain a few degrees superior to that of an ape, whereas he actually possesses one very little inferior to that of a philosopher' (*Natural Selection and Tropical Nature*, p. 202).

The present writer has elsewhere made the following comments on Mr. Wallace's position with regard to the application of the doctrine of evolution to man:

'This deficiency in the organic forces of nature he essays to

supply by calling in the guiding influence of a "superior intelligence." In defending this hypothesis from hostile criticism, he explains that by "superior intelligence" he means some intelligence higher than the "modern cultivated mind," something intermediate between it and Deity. But as this is a pure supposition, unsupported by any evidence, and merely a matter of personal belief, it is unnecessary to discuss it further. I would just, *en passant*, ask Mr. Wallace why he dispenses with this "superior intelligence" in the early stages of man's evolution, and finds its assistance only requisite to give, as it were, the final touches to humanity?' (*Prehistoric Problems*, p. 103).

That mind in its higher psychical manifestations has often been looked upon as a spiritual essence, which can exist independently of its only known physical basis, need not be a matter of astonishment, when it is considered how ignorant we are of the machinery of thought—how the pleasing abstractions of the poet, the fascinating creations of the novelist, and the profound speculations of the man of genius come forth as from a hidden cavern, without exciting any suspicion of having behind them not only a physical equivalent of brain matter, but also a laboratory in which thoughts are evolved. It is this marvellous power of volitional reflexion in summoning ideas from the materials stored up in the various localized portions into which the brain is divided, and utilizing them for other and nobler purposes than mere animality, that gives a *prima facie* plausibility to this theory. From this point of view abstract reasoning, imagination, conception, idealization, moral sense, altruism, etc., may be regarded as by-products of mental operations which are due to the ordinary reasoning faculties, and which have their chief stimuli in the external environment.

Leaving, however, the field of speculation aside, and reverting to the opinions of the four eminent authorities quoted above, it is manifest that they all recognize the magnitude of the psychological gulf which separates humanity from the rest of the animal world. Nor does Professor Huxley himself give any clear ideas as to how it is to be bridged over—certainly it has never been shown that this is possible on the Darwinian principle of the 'survival of the fittest.'

Such were some of the leading opinions on this particular phase of the evolution theory, as applied to man, when the present writer ventured to refer to the subject in his Presidential address to the Anthropological Section of the British Association in 1893. In that address (*Prehistoric Problems*, ch. ii.) he advocated the hypothesis that one of the main factors in the production of the higher brain-development of man was the conversion of the upper limbs into true hands. From the first moment that the being recognized the advantage of using a club or a stone in attacking his prey, or defending himself from his enemies, the direct incentives to a higher brain-development came into existence. He would soon learn by experience that a particular form of club or stone was more suitable for his purposes; and if the desiderated object were not to be found among the natural materials around him, he would in the course of time proceed to manufacture it. Certain kinds of stone would be readily recognized as better adapted for cutting purposes than others, and he would soon learn to select his materials accordingly. If these were to be found only in a special locality, he would visit that special locality whenever the prized material was needed. Nor is it an unwarrantable stretch of imagination to suppose that circumstances would lead him to lay up a store for future use. The power to make and wield a weapon was a new departure in the career of man, and every repetition of such acts became an effective object-lesson, and an ever-accumulating training force for further progress. The occupation of these primitive tool-makers, once fairly in operation, afforded frequent opportunity of comparing the merits and demerits of their respective mechanical products—thus supplying a fruitful medium for the development of abstract reasoning. In this way the function of the hand and the function of the brain became intimately correlated, the conjoint result of their long-continued action being a larger brain, greater intelligence, and a more highly specialized manipulative organ than were ever before seen among the products of the organic world.

That there is an amount of *cortex cerebri* in the human subject, corresponding to his greater mental powers, cannot be seriously controverted, as the size of the human brain, relatively to the rest of the body, is enormously greater than in any other animal. According to Sir William Turner, the cranial capacity of an average European is about 1500 c.c., while that of the gorilla, which is a larger animal, does not exceed 590 c.c. (*Journ. Anat. and Physiology*, vol. xxix. p. 436). That the largest portion of this increase in the substance of the human brain is to be correlated with the higher mental powers of man, as cause and effect, seems therefore to be indisputable; nor, in our opinion, can there be any doubt that its chief stimulus, at least in the earlier stages of human development, was the function of the hand. That subsequently there were other powerful factors working in the same direction is not denied, as will be seen from the following remarks on articulate speech.

Next to the invention of mechanical appliances, the use of articulate speech was, undoubtedly, the most potent factor in the mental evolution of man, especially when conjoined with its later offshoot, the art of writing. By articulate speech is meant the faculty of uniformly associating certain words or sounds with definite ideas, so that these ideas can be understood by those previously instructed in the process. Of course, the members of a family or tribe would be conversant with it from birth. Spoken language is virtually an extension, or rather a concentration, of the power which many of the more intelligent animals possess, in common with the *Hominidæ*, of giving expression to emotions and simple sensations by various ejaculatory sounds, grimaces, and gestures. The acquisition of full human speech was, unquestionably, the result of slow growth; for there is no known race, however low and savage, but 'has an articulate language, carried on by a whole system of sounds and meanings, which serves the speaker as a sort of catalogue of the contents of the world he lives in, taking in every subject he thinks about, and enabling him to say what he thinks about it' (Tylor, *Anthropology*, p. 132).

Of the importance of articulate speech in the intellectual and social development of man it is unnecessary to produce detailed evidence, as its elaboration must have proceeded *pari passu* with the higher development of the brain almost since man entered on his human career. 'A complete train of thought,' writes Mr. Darwin, 'can no more be carried on without the aid of words, whether spoken or silent, than a long calculation without the use of figures or symbols.'

As to the stage in the evolution of man to which articulate speech is to be assigned, there is little agreement among anthropologists. Darwin regarded it as having an early origin in the stem line of humanity, while Romanes made it subsequent to the art of manufacturing flint implements.

'For my part,' says Professor D. J. Cunningham, in his Presidential address to the Anthropological Section of the British Association, Glasgow, 1901, 'I would say that the first word uttered expressive of an external object marked a new era in the history of our early progenitors. At this point the simian or brute-like stage in their developmental career came to an

end, and the human dynasty, endowed with all its intellectual possibilities, began.'

Professor Haeckel, in describing the evolutionary stage of *Pithecanthropus erectus*, thus writes:

'The brain is considerably enlarged. Presumably it is still devoid of so-called articulate speech; this is indicated by the fact that children have to learn the language of their parents, and by the circumstance that comparative philology declares it impossible to reduce the chief human languages to anything like one common origin' (*Last Link*, Lond. 1898, p. 72).

One of the latest contributions on the subject is from the pen of Professor D. J. Cunningham (*Huxley Lecture*, 1902), who thus expresses himself:

'I have already hinted that by the study of the early conditions of the cerebral cortex in man, information may be attained regarding the evolution of function. . . . We have seen that the bulging of the arm-area in the human cerebrum occurs very early—somewhere about the middle or end of the sixth month. The portion of cortex devoted to speech assumes shape much later. Indeed, it does not appear until shortly before birth, and is not fully developed until the end of the first year of infancy. This might be considered to give some basis of support to Dr. Munro's plea that man attained the erect attitude, and that the arm was set free for the development of its higher functions, before articulate speech was elaborated.'

There are two well-attested general observations which appear to throw some light on this obscure point, viz.—(1) that none of the apes of the present day have even the rudiments of articulate speech; and (2) that language (as quoted above from Mr. Tylor) is well developed among all the *Hominidæ*. The present writer's interpretation of these facts is that the origin of articulate speech was subsequent to the separation of the genus *Homo* from the *simian* stem, but prior to the development of the races of mankind—a view which places it subsequent to the attainment of the erect posture and the development of the human hand.

V. MAN'S SOCIAL EVOLUTION.—It has now been amply shown that, from whatever standpoint we contemplate the great drama of human life, it stands forth as a unique development in the organic world. Starting, possibly as early as the Miocene period, with a progenitor whose physical and mental attainments were on a par with those of existing anthropoid apes, his successors, the *Hominidæ* of to-day, have gradually forged their way into what is virtually a new world — the world of ethics and moral responsibility. Almost from the very beginning they acquired manipulative methods, with latent capabilities which (as we can now realize) were tantamount to a new force in the organic world, viz. the art of manufacturing tools and using them for the advancement of their own welfare. Unlike the more helpless creatures around them, who were largely at the mercy of a fickle environment, these implement-using animals soon learned to accommodate themselves to all its vicissitudes. With a knowledge of the use of fire, the skill to manufacture garments, and, ultimately, the art to construct houses, they braved the rigours of frost and snow with comparative impunity. As they became more and more conversant with the laws and forces of nature and their own power over them, they laid a usurping hand on the reins of Cosmic evolution itself, by the cultivation of selected plants and animals, and the destruction of others which were found unsuitable for their own purposes.

The far-reaching consequence of securing food supplies by means of agriculture and the domestication of animals, led to more social and sedentary habits. The appearance of large communities concurrent with the development of various trades and professions was but a matter of time, the outcome of which is now a vast system of international commerce. Already the greater portion of the earth capable of being cultivated is converted into gardens and fields, whose choice productions are readily conveyed to all the chief towns of the civilized nations of the globe. Flesh diet is everywhere abundant, but it is no longer necessary to hunt the animals in their primeval haunts. Skin-coats, dug-out canoes, and the *coup de poing* are now lineally represented by woven fabrics, Atlantic liners, and Long Toms.

Concurrently with their ever-increasing inroads into the secret arcana of nature, these skilled artizans became religionists as well as legislators, and founded social institutions and laws for the guidance of a rapidly increasing population. In the course of their long sojourn on earth they had no doubt many difficulties to overcome before they succeeded in establishing the great landmarks of civilization as they now present themselves to us, not only in works of art, architecture, engineering, electricity, etc., but in constructive philology, religion, ethics, altruism, and the sense of honour, all of which may be said to be still in process of development, though their sources reach far back into pre-historic times.

Some of the lower animals have accompanied man so far on the road to reasoning intelligence as to be able to associate certain natural results with their natural causes, as crows do when they keep at a safe distance from a man with a gun. But none has ever reached the stage of being able to adjust the circumstances so as to produce the desired effect. Man not only sows the seed, but waters the field should the fickle environment refuse the seasonal showers. No other animal in a state of nature has attempted to do anything comparable to this simple act of practical ratiocination.

It is probable that religion came first to the front as a modifying influence to the stern decree of the survival of the fittest. Some grounds for this suggestion may be seen in the readiness with which the early races of mankind identified the obscure forces of nature with supernatural spirits who were believed to have control over human destinies, and were, therefore, worshipped as gods or demons; and in the prevalence among savages of magic and fetishism. But such polytheistic notions, as well as the pretended art of magicians to control the so-called supernatural agencies, are rapidly giving way to the precise methods of scientific research. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that for many ages religion has proved a weighty influence in mitigating the harsh effects of the Cosmic law that might is right, which is implied in the doctrine of the survival of the fittest. As already stated (§ III.), there is little evidence in support of the belief, advocated by some, that religion was practised by the Palæolithic people of Europe, at least to the extent of making a display of idolatry, so that the development of this governing force in the institutions of men is comparatively late. In Neolithic times its predominating influence throughout Europe is attested by a whole series of memorials of the dead—ossuaries, chambered graves, cairns, cists, urns, etc. That the Neolithic people believed in a life beyond the grave somewhat similar to the present may be inferred from the character of the grave-goods,—vessels with food and drink, implements, weapons, favourite wives and animals, often being buried along with the body.

Next to religion in point of importance, if not also in chronological sequence, comes the moral faculty, or conscience, which regulates judicial and ethical actions. Its position in psychology may be aptly compared to that of instinct in the organic world,—the point of analogy being that their sudden actions appear to be the outcome of an impulse rather than a deliberate act of ratiocination. The most rational explanation of this peculiarity, in both conscience and instinct, is that the suc-

cessive increments of reasoning on which their respective injunctions were originally founded have more or less lapsed in the course of time.

But perhaps the most important formula which has hitherto emanated from the laboratory of ethics is altruism (which see), which may be described as a product of conscience and the acquired sense of equity. Its object is the relief of suffering humanity, and for this purpose it has received the support of the civilized world. Many regard the motives of all such good deeds as having been instilled into the Cosmic mind by a revelation from heaven; but this is an unnecessary assumption; for in the accumulated deliberations of wise men during long ages we have an adequate pabulum for its birth and maturation. But whether heaven-born or earth-born, altruism has become a *sine qua non* in human civilization. So long as the laws of our wisest Solons are liable to error, and the environment contains a residuum of unexplained forces, there will be a certain proportion of failures among yearly births, whose fate can be mitigated only by altruism. Under this category come the deaf, the blind, the lame, the poor, the friendless, and, in short, all who are ushered into the world without the means of successfully entering on the struggle of life. Our original interference with Cosmic methods by living in large communities under the most imperfect sanitary arrangements, has greatly increased the number of such wastrels. Hence their immediate relief, so far as that is possible, is a moral obligation on all who derive benefit from the social government under which they have inherited or acquired wealth, position, and influence, possibly without any effort on their part. On this phase of the subject there is a conflict between Cosmic methods and those of the ethical code of humanity. The influence of the one is directed to the survival of the fittest; that of the other to 'the fitting of as many as possible to survive.' The former has left man with the garb and qualities of a savage; the latter has endowed him with mental culture, the refinement of civilization, and moral responsibility for his actions towards his fellow-creatures.

VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS.—The *Hominidæ* of the present day not only possess more highly developed brains than those of their early ancestors, but also derive great advantages in their life struggle from the accumulated experiences of their predecessors in the form of all sorts of mechanical inventions, organized institutions for scientific research, altruistic laws, and other ethical enactments acquired as results of their progressive culture. Thus they at once start on a higher rung in the ladder of human life. It is by these means that they have come to hold such a predominating position in the organic world; and it is through the general diffusion of such attainments that further progress can be expected. Among the more urgent reforms by way of rectifying past mistakes and safe-guarding the future interests of the race, may be mentioned the eradication of obsolete doctrines and pernicious superstitions, the enforcement of just and equitable laws, the prevention of crime, the popularization of scientific methods, and especially strict attention to sanitary improvements. There is, however, a limit to human powers over the laws of environment, for occasionally the most learned communities find themselves helpless amidst the operations of nature. But yet it is in this direction alone that prospects of future betterment lie.

From various data advanced in the previous sections, it will be seen that there are two distinct lines on which investigations into the past history of mankind may be profitably conducted. The first relates to man as a biological entity, and comprises, in addition to his ontogenetic and phylogenetic development, a few fragments of skeletons of his predecessors which by some fortuitous circumstances have to this day resisted the disintegrating forces of nature. This department is generally known as *Physical Anthropology*. The evidential materials to be gathered along the second line of research consist of the remains of man's handicraft works, which, being simply preserved impressions of his skill in the different stages of culture through which he has passed, may be characterized as *Cultural Anthropology*. The successive modifications which these respective materials have undergone during a long series of ages, though different in kind, are found to bear a decided ratio to the progress of human intelligence. Thus, taking the human skull at the starting-point of humanity as comparable to that of one of the higher apes, we know, as a matter of fact, that during the onward march of time it has undergone some striking changes, both in form and capacity, before reaching the normal type of modern civilized races — changes which can be classified in chronological sequence. Similarly, the products of man's hands show a steady improvement in type, technique, and efficiency—commensurate with his progressive knowledge of the laws of nature and his ability in applying them to mechanical and utilitarian purposes. Indeed, the trail of humanity along its entire course is strewn with the discarded weapons and tools which, from time to time, had to give way to others of greater efficiency. Between these two departments, though separated by a strong line of demarcation, there is a striking affinity which, in the words of Mr. W. H. Holmes (*Report of United States National Museum*, 1901, p. 256), is thus stated: 'If the physical phenomena of man include all that connects him with the brute, his culture phenomena include all that distinguishes him from the brute.'

These remarks will give some idea of the interesting and profound problems embraced by the science of Anthropology. Not since the material world became an object of human study and reflexion has there been accomplished such a complete and far-reaching revolution in current philosophical opinion. From the standpoint of evolution, the entire organic world, not excluding man, reveals a unity, a harmony, and a grandeur never before disclosed under any system of speculative philosophy.

What may be the outcome and destiny of humanity on the lines of modern civilization lies within the deepest shadow of futurity. One thing alone appears certain—that since human government on the anthropo-cosmic principles of ethics and altruism became a matter of real concern among the civilized nations of the world, there is no turning back from its behests, no alternative but to strengthen the ethical fabric by every means that human ingenuity can suggest. Above all, a national *esprit de corps*, with the motto 'Honour bright,' must be fostered among the members of each community; for if the steersman once relaxes his hold on the wheel, he and his freight may again be swept into the vortex of Cosmic evolution.

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ANTHROPOMORPHISM. — Generally, and perhaps always in the past, man has believed that there are powers other and greater than he. He has felt it not only desirable, but possible, to enter into communication with them; that is to say, he has taken it as a fact that they can understand him when he addresses himself to them; that he can more or less understand them; that he can win their sympathy and assistance, if he sets about doing so in the right way. Further, he has believed at some times that these powers possess the shape of man; at other times, that their shape is that of beasts or of plants; at others, that they are visible in and as the sun, moon, or stars, or audible in the storm, the earthquake, or the rustling of leaves. That deities have been supposed in all stages of human development, from that of the Fuegians to that of the ancient Greeks, to possess human form is a truth which needs neither demonstration nor illustration. Indeed, Xenophanes (frag. 17, ed. Bergk) even went to the length, whether in jest or earnest, of supposing that cattle, lions, and horses, were they able, would make the gods in their own likeness. It is also obvious that deities originally theriomorphic tended to become anthropomorphic: the Egyptian gods which have gained human bodies and limbs, but retained their animal heads, are an obvious instance of this tendency. And the human form given by Greek sculptors to Helios suffices to show that nature powers, if not originally conceived in human form, tend eventually to take it.

1. **Physical anthropomorphism.** — The belief, then, that deities have bodies and limbs like those of men is a belief which has had a beginning and an end. Religion has survived its disappearance; and though it is impossible to prove that before its appearance religion was, it is in the same way impossible to prove that religion then was not. We may therefore reasonably be influenced by the fact that though theriomorphic deities become anthropomorphic, as in Egypt, the reverse process never takes place; anthropomorphism is in some cases preceded by theriomorphism, but theriomorphism is never generated out of anthropomorphism. We may then, perhaps, assume that there was a pre-anthropomorphic stage in the history of religion. But if we make that assumption, we can do so only by limiting the term 'anthropomorphism' to the sense in which it means that deities have bodies and limbs like those of men, and by excluding from the content of the term the sense in which it implies that deities have thoughts, emotions, and wills like those of men, though transcending them. Further, it may be said that to limit the meaning of the term to the first of the two senses which may be put upon it is to break, or rather to ignore, the continuity which is characteristic of—indeed, essential to—evolution in all its forms, whether evolution of religion or of anything else; whereas, by including in the meaning of the term the second sense as well as the first, we are enabled to grasp the principle which underlies and runs through the whole evolution of the idea of God.

2. **Psychical anthropomorphism.** — From this point of view, then, man has always ascribed, and does now ascribe, to Deity thought, emotion, and will. He may originally have worshipped animals, or even stocks and stones, as the fetish-worshipper does; but if he did so, it was because he ascribed to those objects thought, emotion, and will; and the characteristics so ascribed were none the less human because they were ascribed to the deity in a transcendent degree. In the second stage of this evolution, not only did aniconic objects of worship become iconic, not only did pictures and statues of the gods in human form supplement, and more or less drive out, the stocks and stones which were the object of the older cult, but the very conception of the god, as it existed in the mind of the worshipper, became more and more definitely human—and did not in the process become more divine, as the example of Ares and Aphrodite in Homer will show. The third stage in the process of evolution is reached when religion comes to denounce the idea that the deity has a body or limbs like a man or an animal; but though religion in this stage becomes iconoclastic, and ceases to be anthropomorphic in the narrower of the two senses of the word, it continues to believe, in this stage as in the previous stages, in a personal deity. In this stage of evolution the same impulse that leads religious minds to deny that the deity can be conceived, or ought to be portrayed, as possessing bodily form, also leads to the conclusion that some human virtues cannot be ascribed to a deity: thus it would be degrading, if it were not unmeaning, to ascribe to deity the temperance or the courage which Ares ought to have possessed—the reason being that those qualities, and others of the same kind, imply defects which have to be overcome in the persons of whom they are predicated; and such defects are *ex hypothesi* excluded from the concept of a perfect being. This line of argument may, however, be continued, apparently in the same direction, until it brings us to a fourth stage in the evolution of the idea of God. It was, indeed, so continued in one of the arguments considered in Cicero's *de Natura Deorum* (iii. 15), where it is argued that knowledge of good and evil cannot be ascribed to a good God, 'for he who can do no evil requires no such knowledge'; and in the same way reason cannot be ascribed to Him—'shall we assign reason which makes dark things plain? But to a god nothing can be dark.' In modern times the same feeling finds expression in the doctrine that the cause of all things is the Unknowable, to which we are not warranted in ascribing thought, emotion, or will. If we seek so to ascribe them, we land ourselves in self-contradiction. In the interests of clear thinking, therefore, we must abstain from so ascribing them. Power, indeed, must be assigned to this Unknowable cause—but not personality. The anthropomorphism which has characterized religion from the beginning charac-

terizes it to the end. In the progress of human thought, anthropomorphism tends gradually to be sloughed off; at first, indeed, the tendency is to provide the gods more and more definitely and precisely with human limbs and bodies; but that tendency is eventually defeated by its own realization—when fully realized, it becomes intolerable, as it was to Plato, and then is doomed. Next, the tendency is for religion to insist on investing the deity with the mental and moral qualities of man; and that tendency too—on this theory—eventually reveals its own inner and essential self-contradictions. When this, like the previous form of anthropomorphism, comes to be felt untenable and intolerable, religion, in any ordinary sense of the word, becomes impossible.

3. Origin of anthropomorphism.—Looked at from the point of view of evolution, the fate of the belief in anthropomorphism was determined from the beginning. If it is seen in the end to be logically incoherent and impossible, it is so because it has carried within itself the seed of its own destruction from the very beginning. We have only, it is argued, to consider its origin in order to see its want of validity. The tendency to personify objects is exhibited by children—and even by animals—at play. Such personification, indeed, in the case of both children and dogs, may be involuntary and a source of terror; and the terror may be removed when the object personified is shown not to be a living thing. The same tendency is shown by the African negro, who, starting out on some business, happens to have his attention arrested by some object, say a bright pebble, and, immediately associating it with the business he is engaged on, picks it up as a fetish, regarding it as a personality which has the power, if properly treated, of understanding what he wants and of giving him assistance. The same tendency to personify objects and to associate them with the fortunes of the man who discovers their personality, will account for the fact that an object thus personified by the father of a family or the most influential member of a clan comes to receive the worship of the whole family or clan, and thus becomes not a personal fetish but a family god or a tribal god; and may possibly survive and eventually become a national god. But the African negro may find out that he gets no assistance from the object he picked up; and then, though he may cast it away as not being really a fetish, still he usually keeps it, even though he pays it no worship, because it may perhaps after all turn out to be an operative fetish. In the same way, amongst the African negroes and elsewhere, we find traces of gods who, though the names and the memory of them linger on, receive no worship, because they are no longer believed to do good or evil. The belief in such gods, and in such fetishes, evidently has a lessening degree of validity; or perhaps it never was really valid at all—its want of validity has merely grown more and more patent. That is to say, the origin, as well as the history, of the belief shows that it has no validity; the tendency to personify objects—whether objects of sense or objects of thought—which is found in animals and children as well as in savages, is the origin of anthropomorphism, which is puerile therefore in character as well as in origin. The evolution of the idea of God, on this argument, is simply the process by which a childish error is developed slowly to its fullest extent, and now that its inherent inconsistencies and self-contradictions are coming to be fully recognized, is being cast off. It is a case in which the psychological 'projection of the self' into the world is made the basis of an attempt to explain all things, and is ultimately found to afford no explanation which is satisfactory, morally or intellectually, of the not-self.

4. The method of science.—From this point of view, the not-self, the world around us, must be accepted on its own terms, so to speak, and must be studied objectively; we must not make the mistake of assuming it to be a subject, or the expression of a subject's reason or will. We must not assume its ways to be our ways or to be explicable by them or by analogy with them. We must take them as they are and study them as they are given, without presuppositions and without assumptions. In a word, we must take as our method that of science, the objective method. So we shall escape from the error of foisting on the facts an anthropomorphic explanation which they will not tolerate.

Now, the object of science is to understand the world; and it may fairly be said that any attempt to explain the world assumes the course of the world to be explicable. It is assumed not only that the course of things is or may be to some extent intelligible to the human reason, but also that it is fundamentally rational; every problem that presents itself to science is attacked by science with the firm conviction that there is a solution. Such a problem is a challenge to science; and the challenge is never declined on the ground that the problem is insoluble. The challenge is ever presenting itself; the problems submitted are continually being solved. The course of the world is continually being exhibited by science as more and more intelligible; and science is perpetually being confirmed in its fundamental assumption of the rationality of things. The world becomes daily more and more intelligible, on the assumption that the reason of things and the reason in things is intelligible to the human reason.

5. Objective rationality.—Are we then to say that science also is anthropomorphic, or are we to deny it? In the one case we shall say that science, like religion, starts from the human reason, and persists in measuring everything by it and interpreting everything in conformity with it. In that case, if we hold that anthropomorphism eventually breaks down in the hands of religion, and proves in the long run to be but a puerile 'projection of the self' into the external world, then the anthropomorphism of science, its assumption or presumption to read reason—human reason—into things, may, like the anthropomorphism of religion, pass muster for a while, but eventually must be found untenable and intolerable. Indeed, it may be said, science as well as religion has already come to that pass. It is vain to deny 'the possibility that being may be rational only in a very narrow sphere, and that it might some day turn towards us another side, about which we could build no structure of connected and practical thought' (Höffding, *The Problems of Philosophy*, p. 114). Not only does the reason in things cover only a very narrow sphere, but its hold on that sphere is wanting in security. 'With the same right with which we reason from the possibility of rational knowledge to a unifying force in Being, we might, apparently, reason to an irrational power in Being, to a cosmological principle that prevented the elements of Being from standing in a rationally determinable relation to one another' (*ib.* p. 135). If Being is fundamentally irrational, science's explanation of things is purely anthropomorphic. If, on the other hand, the reason which science professes to discover in things is really found there, and not put there, by science, then the reason so found is not human reason; nor does the fact that it is intelligible to man avail to prove that it is human. It is intelligible because it is reason, not because it is human. Science, therefore, in postu-

lating that the world is intelligible to man is not guilty of anthropomorphism; it does not assume that the reason which it strives to understand is human, and it does not make the reason which it finds. But even so—granted, that is, that to some extent, so far as it has gone, science finds in things a reason which it does not put there—the possibility remains that Being may any day turn to us another side, displaying no reason, but irrationality. The possibility indeed remains, but science scouts it or systematically ignores it; or, perhaps we may rather say, faith in science forbids us to acknowledge it. No unsolved problem in science is admitted to be insoluble. In other words, if the rationality of things, so far as it has been discovered by science, is a fact and not an assumption, still it is an assumption so far as it has not yet been discovered. It is not, of course, discredited by the fact that it is an assumption, for we must begin with an assumption—by assuming either that things are or that they are not, or that they partly are and partly are not, rational. And the assumption that things will continue to reveal a reason which, though it is not man's, is intelligible to man, is at any rate harmonious with the discoveries which science has thus far made, even though it be an assumption and an act of faith.

But, granting that we make the assumption and show the faith which science demands, we have only got thus far, viz. that the power which displays itself in things is rational in the sense that it is logical. More, indeed, we could not expect to get than this, for science aims at nothing more: its position is that things are logically comprehensible; its coherence is a logical coherence which it finds in things and does not put into them. Even then, if we take it that reason and logic are possible only to a mind, and that a mind must be self-conscious, the utmost that we can get out of science, or hold to be implied by science, is that there is a self-conscious mind whose power acts logically: and even if we grant that there is nothing anthropomorphic in this,—on the ground that the reason and logic in things are found in them and not imputed to them by science—still the mind or power thus revealed as superhuman is revealed as merely logical. It is distinctly not revealed as moral, or as recking aught of man. Its laws extend to, just as its rain descends on, the unjust and the just alike; and science affords not the slightest ground for holding that the ultimate working of the laws which it discovers favours the just rather than the unjust.

If, then, man can discover and does discover in things a logic and a reason which he does not put there, if the logic and reason so found are objective, and are not created by him, are not images of his own making,—are not, in a word, pieces of anthropomorphism,—can we go further and discover in man's experience anything else which is similarly given to him and not created by him? The fact that a thing is comprehensible by man is no proof that it is the work of man's reason; if a reason, partially intelligible to man's reason, is found in things by science,—which looks only for logic and reason,—can man and does man, when he looks for more, find more than mere reason? Does science exhaust objectivity, or does the realm of objectivity include other things than reason? Is man's experience of the universe that it discloses reason alone to him? Man's experience has been that he has found something more in it than a reason partially intelligible to him; he has found in it the workings of a power which awakes in him a sense of gratitude, of duty, of awe, and of fear.

But the experience in which these workings of this power are thus disclosed or felt is distinguishable, if not distinct, from the experience, or from the aspect of experience, of which science is the interpretation or the expression. Whether we term the aspect of experience with which science has to do sense-experience or experience of the physical or the external world, it is, however defined, at any rate marked off from the rest of man's experience, as being but a part and not the whole of human experience. Or, if we go so far as to say there is nothing in human experience which may not be investigated scientifically, we still indicate by the adverb 'scientifically' that the point of view of science is only one point of view, and that the aspect of reality which science confronts is not the only aspect which human experience presents to man. One and the same set of facts, for instance, may be viewed psychologically by science, may be pronounced valid or not valid from the point of view of logic, may be estimated right or wrong from the standpoint of morality, holy or sinful in the eyes of religion. The scientific aspect is not the only aspect of our experience. The scientific is not the whole account of that experience.

6. Ethical qualities.—If, then, the reason which science finds in things is not the creation of science, is not made after the image of human reason, and is not put into things by science, but is found in them and is found to be partially intelligible to man, then the same experience, which when studied by science reveals a reason which is not man's, may, when regarded in its entirety, or even when regarded from other points of view than that of science, reveal yet other aspects of that reason in things which is studied by science. If that power when studied by science is seen more and more clearly, the more it is studied, to be rational and self-consistent, it may, when regarded from other points of view, disclose other aspects than that of logical rationality. It may disclose ethical qualities. It may disclose qualities, in the apprehension of which by the heart, and not merely by the intellect, religion consists. Whether it does, as a matter of objective fact, disclose such qualities is not the question now before us for discussion. The point is that, in thus interrogating experience, we are no more guilty of anthropomorphism than is science when it interrogates experience. The question, in the case both of religion and of science, is what experience discloses when interrogated. Science discovers in things the operations of a reason which is not human reason; religion discovers in the experience of man the operations of a power whose ways are not the ways of man. Above all, religion discovers the operations of a personal power. The personality of that power is only partially disclosed in those of its operations with which science concerns itself; and it is disclosed only partially, because science is concerned with only a partial aspect of its operations. Even when we attempt to view its operations from a more comprehensive point of view than science pretends to offer, the conception we then form of it is, doubtless, shaped to some extent by our human limitations, and may be, nay, has been, generally distorted by those limitations. Of course, every apprehension must, to whatever extent, be so shaped, but it does not follow from this that nothing is apprehended. A thing to be misapprehended, even, must be apprehended; and, to be apprehended, it must be there. Will it, then, be said: Granting heartily that it must be there, still it can be apprehended only by being anthropomorphized? The statement, then, is, first, that the power is not personal or spiritual; and next, that, owing to the infirmity of the human mind, it can only appear, or be conceived, as personal. In other words, the religious experience of God as a person is alleged to be not experience, but an interpretation of experience—a false interpretation, and an interpretation which, from the nature

of the case, must be false. What, then, are the grounds on which we can say, *a priori*, that this interpretation, if it is an interpretation, must be false? They can only be that we know something which proves that it is false; that we know, to start with, that the power is not personal. But that is precisely what we do not know; that is precisely the point which is at issue. The allegation, on the one side, is that in religious experience God is known as personal. If, on the other side, that is denied, then the dispute is as to the nature of religious experience, and the dispute can be settled only by reference to that experience; it cannot be settled by assuming the point at issue, by begging the question. The question, then, becomes whether the personality of God is a fact of experience, or an inference—possibly a false inference—from experience. Now, those who have not had a given experience—for instance, a blind man who has not had experience of colour—are, obviously, on unsafe ground if they allege that other people have not had that experience, *e.g.*, of colour, but have had some other experience, *e.g.*, such as touch, which the blind man also enjoys, and from it have drawn the inference that they see. No blind man is, of course, so foolish as to argue in this way. He accepts the fact that sighted persons are blessed with an experience which he has not; he may be unable to form any idea of what the sensation of colour is, but he does not make his incapacity a reason for disbelief, or for arguing that sight is not an experience, but an inference—a false inference—from experience.

7. Testimony of experience.—We are, then, thrown back upon the necessity of interrogating experience, of asking what is found there. A person who is not accustomed to a microscope will not see what is undoubtedly to be seen through it; and we cannot accept the fact that he sees nothing as proof that nothing is to be seen. So, too, in the interrogation of religious experience we must accept what is found there, and not deny that it is objectively there because some of us fail to see it. The position that religion rests on the existence of God as a fact given in experience, and not reached by a process of inference, which may or may not be correct, is a position which this article assumes and has not to prove; here we have to consider simply in what sense, if any, religion is anthropomorphic. Now it is undeniable that the existence and the personality of God may be, and in many or most of the stages of religious development have been, anthropomorphized: He has been pictured in human form, as indeed also in animal form; and, even when this misrepresentation has been cast aside, He has been depicted as having passions which are specifically human. But though this is perfectly true, it is equally true, and philosophically more important, that this process of anthropomorphism has also been combated by the highest religious minds as incompatible with the personality of God as revealed in the religious consciousness; and its incompatibility, when thus pointed out, has been recognized by others as true to the facts of that religious consciousness. Thus, as a mere matter of historic fact, it appears that anthropomorphism has been, and is recognized to be, a limit and a hindrance to the comprehension and realization of the personality of God as revealed in the religious consciousness. That being so, the attempt to exhibit anthropomorphism as 'a producing condition of this Personality' is manifestly at variance with the facts; it is not a producing condition, but a distortion of the personality of God. That the distortion should be greatest in the least mature minds and the lowest forms of religion is a point which it is easy to recognize, and the recognition of which is compatible with—indeed assumes—the recognition that there is something there to start with which can be distorted, that is to say, anthropomorphized. That misinterpretation precedes recognition of the facts as they really are is illustrated by the history of science quite as fully as by the history of religion. But that the facts were not there, at the beginning, to be recognized is a position which neither science nor religion can take up. If it be said that science, starting from things as they appeared to the mind of primitive man, has eventually come back to pronounce them very different from what they then appeared, it is also true that some of the things are discovered to have been really facts by the science which eventually discerns their right relations. So, too, the growth of religion would have been impossible if there had not been at least one fact—the personality of God—which it not merely started from, but to which it constantly returns, and in which, properly understood, it finds its constant touchstone of truth. From this point of view, the proper understanding of the personality of God is a test of religious truth; and that personality is not properly understood so long as it is interpreted on the analogy of human personality—so long, that is, as it is interpreted anthropomorphically. So long as it is thus interpreted, or rather misinterpreted, the limitations of the finite are necessarily, and self-contradictorily, imposed on the Infinite. Escape from the self-contradiction is possible only so far as we reverse the process, and recognize, with Lotze, that 'perfect Personality is in God only; to all finite minds there is allotted but a pale copy thereof.' When that is recognized, anthropomorphism is seen for what it is—a misinterpretation of what is given in consciousness, leading necessarily, if slowly, to the assertion that God is not revealed in consciousness for what He is, but is given either for what He is not—the Unknowable—or is not given at all.

It may perhaps be said that human knowledge, to be human, must be contained in human minds, and, being so contained, it must be shaped by that which contains it; in fine, that in admitting it to be human we are asserting it to be anthropomorphic; in denying it to be anthropomorphic we are denying that it can be known to man. Thus, whatever knowledge is poured into human minds must be shaped by the mould into which it is poured, and so must be anthropomorphic. But this argument seems to assume both that the mould is shaped before anything is poured into it, and that the shape is purely human. It fails to consider the possibility that the vessel is plastic, and may be shaped in part by that which is put into it; and that consequently, even if the vessel is human, it may take a form more or less divine, if that which informs it be divine. It tacitly assumes that man makes God in his own image; or, at any rate, that man cannot possibly, under any circumstance of inspiration or aspiration, mould himself on the image of God: all he can do is to make God in his own image. But the assumption that man can shape the facts with which he comes in contact, but cannot in the least be shaped by them, is one which will scarcely bear examination. The facts cannot, of course, shape him if they are unsubstantial. But if they are unsubstantial, neither can he shape them. Scepticism at once emerges from this line of argument; it starts by crying of the facts, 'They are naught! they are naught!' And as long as it continues to do so, it is condemned to immobility.

But if we use the metaphor of the vessel,—whether it be a vessel of clay or of skin, whether it shapes or is shaped—we should remember that it is a metaphor; and if we cannot speak without metaphors, we may at least vary them. We speak

of rising above ourselves, and a fact, fortunately, is expressed thereby; in morality and in religion we may rise above ourselves, even as, from the metaphysical point of view, we may 'transcend self.' These facts, or rather the metaphorical expression of them, may serve to remind us that we do not merely receive facts and shape them into our own likeness, but that we go forth into a world of reality and there encounter things which we have not made, which are not in our likeness, but on which we may model ourselves.

8. Testimony of feeling.—We have considered the question of anthropomorphism thus far, rather from the point of view of knowledge than of feeling. But no answer will afford permanent satisfaction which appeals to knowledge only and not to feeling. Practically, the question is one of feeling rather than of knowledge; it is: Are we to doubt the goodness and love of God, and to suppose that it is by the fallacy of anthropomorphism that we ascribe them to Him? To that question the only answer is that we do not doubt God's love; we know it. But the 'knowledge' is not purely or primarily or essentially intellectual; and if it be said that then His love is not a matter of knowledge but of feeling, the simple and sufficient reply is: How else is love to be known? If it were a matter of knowledge, it might be a matter of inference; and the inference would be subject to examination, and therefore to doubt. It might be represented as an inference from the love of man for God, and so as anthropomorphic, as a human quality ascribed to Him. But an essential quality of it—without which it would not be what it is—is that it is experienced as His, and not as something which remains as it is, whether ascribed to Him or not. As a fact of experience, it must be accepted on the evidence of those who experience it, that our love is a response to His, and that it is His which calls forth ours. It is so felt. Beyond that, or behind it, it does not seem possible to go. Feelings, after all, are facts.

9. Testimony of action.—Feeling and knowledge issue in action. Omniscient love must, from the religious point of view, be the source from which all God's actions flow. From the religious point of view, therefore, nothing can be ascribed to Him save that which issues from such a source. Human actions, on the other hand, have other springs; and anthropomorphism is exhibited when actions are ascribed to God, or to the gods, which cannot without self-contradiction be imputed to a love that is omniscient. Human actions proceeding from human passions are essentially characteristic of anthropomorphism — more essentially indeed than are human parts. The gods of Greece were as anthropomorphic in their passions and actions as in their forms; and only in their forms were they typical of human beings at their best. The cowardice of Ares, the incontinence of Aphrodite, the lusts of Zeus, were doubtless a bequest to Greek civilization from barbarous or savage times; and they were a *damnosa hereditas*. If the bequest was not rejected but tolerated, with more or less acquiescence, by most of those who were born to it, the reason doubtless was that the philosophy summed up in the sentence, 'Man is the measure of all things'—*πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος*—was characteristically Greek: even the gods were made in man's image, and they did not do credit to it. Xenophanes spoke bitterly when he said that the gods of men were anthropomorphic, just as the gods of animals, if animals believed in gods, would be theriomorphic. He failed to note, apparently, that anthropomorphic gods do not always even stay anthropomorphic, but revert to theriomorphism and to bestial conduct. Where a plurality of gods is believed in, the gods are necessarily conceived as objects, as items in the world of objects, and therefore as limited and circumscribed in their action and reaction. The action of any one of them is liable to be frustrated by the action of the rest; and behind and over-topping them all there tends to rise the vague figure of destiny or fate, to which all are subject; omnipotence cannot remain in the hands of any anthropomorphic god. If anthropomorphism were a fallacy which infected religion alone, the position of those who see in religion nothing but that fallacy would be stronger than it is. On reflexion, however, it is manifest that science, as well as religion, has had that fallacy to contend with; in the animistic period of man's history, the tendency is to account for the action and behaviour of all—even inanimate—things by the assumption that their action is anthropomorphic, and to influence their behaviour by proceedings based on that assumption. Only when that assumption is discredited or ignored does it become possible to study the interaction of things scientifically—*rerum cognoscere causas*—to discover in them a reason not modelled on man's, though intelligible to it, provided that we reject the fallacy of anthropomorphizing their action. Religion, also, as well as science, has to throw off the fallacious tendency to anthropomorphize God's action. Polytheism is rendered by its very structure incapable of rejecting the fallacy. Monotheism escapes from it only by degrees; not only is vengeance the Lord's, but the worshipper may pray Him of His goodness to 'slay mine enemies.' The tendency to assume that God's ways are as our ways is the essence of anthropomorphism. To yield to the tendency and to follow it out to its logical extreme is to make God after man's own image. Science, by studying its facts objectively, succeeds in escaping from anthropomorphism. Religion succeeds in making the same escape only where it similarly renounces the *a priori* method of interpreting God's action, and further renounces the desire to utilize it as a means to making man's will be done. Religion rises for the first time clear of anthropomorphism when the prayer goes up from the heart, 'Thy will be done.' Then, and not till then, does the will of God become a fact presented to the religious consciousness, a fact which for the religious mind possesses as much objectivity as for the scientific mind do the facts studied by science, and for the non-religious mind is as meaningless as for the non-mathematical mind a mathematical formula is. The difference may be illustrated by contrasting the petition, 'Slay mine enemies,' with the command to love our enemies: the former is properly addressed to an anthropomorphic god; the latter could only proceed from a very God, and be accepted as of objective validity only by a religious mind. The fact that religion is not anthropomorphic is shown by the way in which the Christian revelation set as ideals before mankind lines of action (such as humility, love of enemies) which were paradoxical and foolish in the eyes of the world, though wise to those who had eyes to see. And the motives suggested were to do God's will, to be like unto Him, to be pure even as He. Should it be objected that validity is accorded even by non-religious minds to the precept of loving our enemies, we may use another illustration: the command to give your coat also to him who takes your cloke is one which cannot be justified on the principles of any non-religious system of ethics, and is one which is not accepted as valid by common sense: it is one which no anthropomorphic deity could self-consistently enunciate. The words in which the command is couched are, of course, intelligible to all; the value of the command is for the non-religious mind naught; only for him to whom it is revealed as God's will, as the course of action

which will be followed by him so far as God's will operates through him, does it become an objective fact possessing the same objectivity for him that the facts of science have for the scientific mind. It is not that the same thing is presented to the religious and the non-religious mind and produces different effects in the two cases: it is that the will of God is accepted by the one and rejected by the other, and that for him who accepts it all things become new—God is no longer anthropomorphic. To allege that religion is necessarily belief in an anthropomorphic god is to close our eyes to the fact that the point on which the fate of practical religion turns is whether God's will shall be done or man's. In the one case God—if a God be believed in — is anthropomorphized; in the other, man is conformed to God. If he be so conformed, God's will acts in him and through him. So far as he is thus conformed, God's kingdom comes, His will is done. It is in his action, when it is directed to doing God's will, that man shows likest God.

10. In conclusion, the view that religion is anthropomorphic seems to be based on an assumption, viz. that reason and love, because they occur in man, are limited to man. If that assumption be conceded, then it necessarily follows that to find reason and love elsewhere is a piece of pure anthropomorphism; the reason and love thus projected on to the clouds are, *ex hypothesi*, merely phantasmagoric, whether they be the reason proclaimed by science or the love proclaimed by religion. The reason thus projected is human reason; the love, human love. We may have soared for a while into the clouds, but the string of anthropomorphism all the time was round our feet, and brings us back to the facts we started from,—there they are just as they were when we started. We never have got clear of human limitations, never have lost ourselves in the Divine Love. We may have lost sight of self; but we come down to earth, and recognize that it was the self who imagined that self was transcended or lost. We have simply seen ourselves, our form, our human form, projected on to the clouds. Yet, after all, it is merely an assumption —and not the only possible assumption—that reason and love, because they occur in man, are limited to man. It may equally well be that reason and love are not limited to man, but revealed to him. And the question then becomes one of fact, whether such revelation is experienced. As a question of fact and of feeling, it can be answered only by experience and with reference to the experience. Those who have not the experience must make some assumption with regard to it; those who have it need make none. Experience excludes hypothesis.

LITERATURE.—Plato, *Euthyphro*; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, x. viii. 7; Lotze, *Microcosmus*[4], 1894, bk. ix. ch. 4; A. Pringle-Pattison, *Man's Place in the Cosmos*[2], London, 1902, p. 287 ff. (cf. pp. 61 and 206), and *Hegelianism and Personality* (1887); Cousin, *History of Philosophy* (tr. Wight, 1852), i. 24; J. Martineau, *A Study of Religion*[2], Oxford, 1889, i. 313; H. L. Mansel, *Limits of Religious Thought*[5], 1867, Lect. i.; E. Caird, *Evolution of Religion*, Glasgow, 1893, i. 239; J. Fiske, *The Idea of God as affected by Modern Knowledge*, London, 1901, p. 111; C. N. Scott, *Foregleams of Christianity*, London, 1893, p. 48; J. R. Illingworth, *Personality Human and Divine*, London, 1894, p. 219; G. A. Coe, 'Necessity and Limitations of Anthropomorphism' in *New World*, viii. (1899) p. 447.

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ANTICHRIST.—1. The name ἀντίχριστος occurs for the first time in *Christian* literature (1 Jn 2^{22} 4^{3}, 2 Jn ^{7}). The ideas which are associated with this name, in particular the conception of a God-opposing tyrant and ruler of the last times, reach back with certainty to the most flourishing period of Jewish Apocalyptic literature. It is most likely that they have their deeper roots not in definite historical phenomena and experiences, but in a mythological and speculative idea, namely, the idea of the battle of God with the devil at the end of the world.

This conception seems to have arisen in the Persian eschatology (the battle of Ahura Mazda with Angra Mainyu; cf. Bousset, *Rel. d. Judentums*[2], 534 ff.), and to have penetrated from this source into the Jewish Apocalyptic literature. The opposition between God and the devil, who is introduced under the names Βελίαρ, σατανᾶς, διάβολος, πνεῦμα ἄφρων, is the chief of the leading ideas of the Jewish source of the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*, which undoubtedly arose in the Maccabæan period. Even here Beliar appears as the enemy of the last times. It is said of the Messiah (Levi 18^{12}): 'And Beliar will be bound by Him, and He will give His children power to trample on the evil spirits.' In the same way, the description of the last great battle in *Assump. Mos.* (10^{1}) begins as follows: 'And then will His (God's) rule over all creatures be manifest, then will the devil be brought to naught.' The same thought is also to be found in the Gospels (Mt 12^{26}, Lk 11^{20}, Jn 12^{31} 14^{30} 16^{11}; cf. Rev $12^{3f.}$ $13^{1ff.}$ 16^{13} $20^{1-3.\ 7-10}$; Bousset, *Rel. d. Judentums*[2], 288 ff., 352 ff.).

It is very likely that '*Antichrist' is originally nothing else than the incarnate devil*, and that the idea of the battle of God with a human opponent, in which all devilish wickedness would become incarnate, arose under the influence of definite historical conditions.

2. In fact it is very probable that the roots of the conception of Antichrist are even more widespread. We shall have to assume that the idea of the battle of God with the devil was closely interwoven with *related mythological fancies regarding the battle of God with a dragon-like monster.*

Traces of these ideas, which probably take their rise from the Babylonian battle of Marduk with Tiamat, are already to be found in all parts of the OT (cf. Gunkel, *Schöpfung und Chaos*, 1895). In this way the figure of the devil and the dragon-like monster of chaos are combined into one (cf. Rev 12). Thus we need not be surprised if the figure of the devil incarnate, the figure of Antichrist, here and there bears distinct traces of the features of that mythical monster, and manifests a ghostly superhuman character which cannot possibly be explained from the definite historical situations of the separate predictions. Thus even in Dn 8 the figure of Antiochus IV. is depicted with the superhuman features of the monster, where we read that the little horn raised itself against the host of heaven and cast down some of them to the ground. In the same way Pompey in the song of triumph over his death (Ps. Sol. 2) is described as the dragon of Chaos, whom God destroyed because he rose up against Him. It is also a significant fact that Antichrist in a series of later passages receives the name which in the older sources (*Test. Patr.*, etc.) was applied to the devil—Beliar (acc. to Ps 18^{5} in all probability originally a god of the under world); cf. 2 Co 6^{15} (?) *Ascens. Is.* $4^{2ff.}$, *Sibyll.* iii. 63 ff., ii. 167.

3. The *idea of Antichrist itself* can be traced back to the 2nd cent. B.C., and appears first of all in the Book of Daniel, which belongs to the Maccabæan age. The historical figure whose features have in the first place been attributed to Antichrist is the *Syrian king Antiochus IV. Epiphanes*, the persecutor of the Jews. In particular, the representations of Dn $7^{8.\ 19-25}$ 8^{9-12} 11^{21-45} have been of lasting influence. That Antichrist ('the king of the North,' 11^{40}) will appear as a mighty king with great armies, that he will destroy three kings (the 'three horns,' $7^{8.\ 20}$), that Edomites, Moabites, and Ammonites are to be spared by him (11^{41}), that Libyans and Cushites will follow in his train (11^{43}), that he will persecute the saints (7^{25}), that he will reign $3\frac{1}{2}$ years (7^{25} etc.), and that he will set up in the Temple the 'abomination of desolation' (βδέλυγμα τῆς ἐρημώσεως, 8^{13} 9^{27} 12^{11})—all this belongs, from this time onward, to the standing requirements of the Antichrist legend. The end predicted by 'Daniel' did not come, but his book received a place in the canon; and thus the faithful still expected the fulfilment of his predictions in the future, and handed them on from generation to generation. In this process the figure of 'Antichrist' came to be separated from the historical figure of Antiochus IV., and became the type of the God-opposing tyrant who was discovered now in this and now in that historical character.

To the author of the *Psalms of Solomon*, it is Pompey, the captor of Jerusalem, the blasphemer of the sanctuary of God, that is the Divine adversary, the 'dragon' of the last times; and his destruction is celebrated in triumphant strains by the writer as a great act of his God ($2^{26ff.}$). In the *Assumption of Moses* (ch. 8) a remarkable prophetic picture of the cruel tyrant is

outlined; and, if minutely examined, it seems to be a figure possessing the mixed features of Antiochus Epiphanes and Herod the Great.

In the Roman period the character of *the Emperor Caligula* (A.D. 37–41) influenced the history of the legend. The fearful time of anxiety, when Caligula, embittered by the revolt of the Jews at Jamnia, gave the order to the governor Petronius to erect his statue in the Temple, recalled afresh the prediction of Daniel. The prediction regarding the *βδέλυγμα τῆς ἐρημώσεως* seemed to receive its fulfilment. The ever-recurring expectation of later times, that Antichrist would take his place in the Temple of Jerusalem, dates in all probability from this period. The small Jewish Apocalypse, adopted to a large extent in Mk 13 and Mt 24 and interwoven with words of Christ, may date from this time. In the same way the attempt has been widely made to find in Rev 13 a source belonging to this time, chiefly for the reason that the name Γάϊος Καῖσαρ actually makes up the number 616; and several manuscripts of Rev 13[18] preserve this number (instead of 666). Then we shall see later how the expectation of Antichrist was carried over to the *person of Nero*. Finally, in 4 Ezr 5[6], too, we find in quite general terms attention called to the last hostile tyrant of the last times: 'regnabit, quem non sperant' (cf. the Syrian Apoc. Bar. 40).

4. Christianity took over from Judaism this whole cycle of ideas, and we meet numerous traces of these conceptions in the NT. In the eschatological chapters (Mk 13, Mt 24) we have in all likelihood, as has already been indicated, a small apocalypse of Antichrist, interwoven with words of Jesus, if we are entitled to interpret the *βδέλυγμα τῆς ἐρημώσεως* (Mt 24[15], Mk 13[14]), which stands in the holy place, in terms of 2 Thess 2[4]. In particular, the predictions of the Revelation of John borrow their fundamental tone from the fancies regarding Antichrist. The eleventh chapter, with its prediction of the beast rising from the abyss (a mythical idea), who, as a hostile tyrant, surrounded by great armies, appears in Jerusalem and kills the witnesses of God, is entirely on the lines of Jewish Apocalyptic prophecy. Finally, if the beast, who is called up by the devil (Rev 13[1ff.]), and who rises out of the sea, is regarded as indicating the Roman empire, or more particularly a Roman ruler, we have here, too, the character of the Antichrist, the God-opposing tyrant, preserved.

5. A *strongly marked transformation* of the whole idea, from a specifically Christian standpoint, is indicated by the discussion in 2 Th 2, which the present writer, in spite of renewed and energetic opposition on the part of Wrede (*TU*, new ser. Ix.[3]), prefers to ascribe to St. Paul himself. Certainly here, too, the figure which controls the Jewish Apocalyptic thought forms the fundamental conception, as is proved by the names (2[3f.]) *ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῆς ἀνομίας* (perhaps Beliar; cf. the OT בְּנֵי־בְלִיַּעַל), *ὁ ἀντικείμενος*, as well as by the play upon Dn 11[36], which is found here. But, on the other hand, the Antichrist is *no longer the God-opposing tyrant*, but *a seductive agency*, which works by signs and wonders, and seeks to obtain Divine worship. Antichrist here is a false Messiah, a prophet who, it is assumed, will call forth the faith of those Jews who have rejected the true Messiah (2[10–12]). At the same time the idea is raised still further into the realm of the superhuman (2[4], *ἀποδεικνύντα ἑαυτόν, ὅτι ἐστιν θεός*). Accordingly, this false Messiah is now for the first time in a real and proper sense regarded as the opponent of the true Messiah. By means of the latter his destruction shall be accomplished, and this is described in 2[8] in the words of Is 11[4] (*καὶ ἐν πνεύματι διὰ χειλέων ἀνελεῖ ἀσεβῆ. . . .* The Targum on the passage, too, interprets the 'lawless one' as Antichrist). A remarkably puzzling trait is the 'sitting' of the *ἄνθρωπος τῆς ἀνομίας* in the temple of God—probably, as we saw above, a reminiscence from the time of Caligula. But this trait also fits into the new comprehensive picture of the seductive personality. If, finally, the enigmatic reference to a power which still keeps the appearance of Antichrist in check (*τὸ κατέχον, ὁ κατέχων*) be correctly interpreted as referring to the Roman empire, then the separation of the idea of Antichrist from the political tendency, which up to this time adhered to it, comes more clearly to the front. Accordingly the significant change, which 2 Thess. has effected in the idea of Antichrist, consists in this, that here out of the God-opposing tyrant the seductive adversary of the last times has been developed, so that, while the original idea led to the proclamation of the Roman empire or of a Roman emperor as Antichrist (Revelation of John), here the figure of the *ἀντικείμενος* obtains a non-political, purely ideal signification. In this process of re-moulding, which has become of world-wide historical importance, the genius of St. Paul is in all probability manifested, or in any case the genius of youthful Christianity, freeing itself from Judaism and placing its foot in the world of the Roman empire.

This new conception seems to have found acceptance in wide-spread Christian circles. The author of the Fourth Gospel, too, appears to give expression to the thought that the Jews, because they have not believed on the true Christ, who was sent of God, will place their faith in the false Messiah, who will come forward in his own name (5[43]). From this point of view we are enabled to understand how, in the *Epistles of John*, Antichrist is connected with false teaching (1 Jn 2[18. 22] 4[3], 2 Jn [7]), and how in general the appearance of false teaching is thought of as one of the signs of the last time—as the crowning point of Satanic malice (1 Ti 4[1], 2 Ti 3[1], 2 P 3[3]).

The *Διδαχὴ τῶν ιβ΄ ἀποστόλων*, 16[4], in its description of Antichrist, manifestly borrows from 2 Th. (*καὶ τότε φανήσεται ὁ κοσμοπλάνος ὡς υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ποιεῖ σημεῖα καὶ τέρατα*). In the *Christian Sibyllines*, iii. 63 ff., probably of a late date (cf. Bousset, art. 'Sibyllen' in *PRE*[3]), in the conception of which the figure of Simon Magus has been influential, 'Beliar' is in the first place a wonder-worker endowed with Satanic powers. In fact, even the author of the *Revelation of John* has paid his tribute to the new conception! In the second beast, which comes from the land (ch. 13), he has introduced into his prediction the figure of the anti-Christian false prophet (16[13] 19[20]), who performs signs and wonders to seduce the world. Of course he could not give the latter any independent significance; so he made it the servant and assistant of the first beast, the anti-Christian Roman empire (Bousset, *Kom. zur Offenbar. Joh.*, *ad loc.*).

6. But this anti-Jewish conception, which corresponded better with the position of Christianity in the Roman State, was prevented from obtaining exclusive predominance in the Christian tradition. This was due to the acceptance in wide circles of a remarkable combination of the Antichrist legend with the popular expectation of the return of Nero, prevalent originally among the heathen classes. Not long after the death of Nero, the rumour arose that he was not dead, but was still alive, or that after his death he would re-appear (Sueton. *Nero*, 57; Tacitus, *Hist.* ii. 8). As Nero had stood in friendly relations to the Parthians in his lifetime (Sueton. 47, 57), the report was now circulated that he had fled to them, and would return with a Parthian army to take vengeance on Rome. Deceivers made use of the rumour to appear under the mask of Nero. Such an one came forward as early as the year A.D. 69, under Otho (Galba) (Tacitus, *Hist.* ii. 8–9; Dio Cassius, lxiv. 9; Zonaras, xi. 15), and a second appeared under Titus (Zonaras, xi. 12; probably also Sueton. 57). Even in 100 A.D. the belief that Nero was still alive was held by many (cf. Bousset, *Com.*[2] [5], 411 ff.; Charles, *Ascension of Isaiah*, lvii ff.). This popular heathen belief was now adopted first of all by the Jewish Apocalyptic writers. While the author of the 4th (*Jewish*) *Sibylline* (79 A.D.) takes it over simply without any special tendency (iv. 137–139), the author of the (Jewish?) original basis of Rev 17 (Bousset, 414–415) expects the return of Nero with the Parthians to take vengeance on Rome, because she had shed the blood of the saints (17[6], destruction of Jerusalem [?]; *καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αἵματος τῶν μαρτύρων Ἰησοῦ* is a later addition). In the 5th *Sibylline*, which

for the most part (with the exception of vv. 1–51) was written by a Jewish writer at the end of the 1st cent. (J. Geffcken, 'Komp. u. Entstehungszeit der Orac. Sibyll.,' *TU*, new ser. viii. 1, p. 22 ff.), the subject of the return of Nero is mentioned by the author no fewer than three times (137–154, 214–227, 361–385). Here the figure of Nero is already distorted into a ghostly demon; his return and the terrible war, which will then convulse the world, will be the beginning of the last end. The *Christian* as well as the Jewish Apocalyptic thought took possession of the Nero legend, and on this soil the figure of the returning Nero was quite identified with that of Antichrist. Then we have to take into account the additional circumstance that the longer the period from the death of Nero became, the less could a simple return of the *living* Nero be expected, and the more did the expectation of his return from the under world grow. In this way, too, his figure became more and more hellish and ghostly: the relation to the Parthians is lost sight of, and instead of an adversary of Rome he becomes an opponent of God and Christ.

In particular, this is the form taken by the legend of Nero in the mind of the *final redactor of the Book of Revelation*, who composed ch. 13 in comparative independence, and in ch. 17 (see above) worked over a more ancient document. Here Nero is the beast that rises out of the abyss (17⁸), which was, is not, and again shall be, in order that it may go into perdition (17¹¹); he is 'the head as it had been slain' (13³· ¹⁴), the cruel adversary of the Lamb; and so both are indicated by the same phrase ὡς ἐσφαγμένον(η); he is the tyrant who receives worship over the whole earth (13⁴· ⁸, etc.), and the terrible opponent of the Lamb in the last great decisive battle (17¹⁴ 19¹⁹ff.). Without doubt the 'number of the beast' (13¹⁸) refers to him (according to the great majority of manuscripts, 666 = נרון קסר; the other reading, however, leads to the Latin form: 616 = נרו קסר).

In the small apocalypse in the *Ascens. Is.* 3¹³ᵇ–4¹⁸, which dates from the second, or perhaps only from the third, decade of the 2nd cent. (Harnack, *Chronol. der altchristl. Lit.* i. 573), we clearly see the final combination of two figures originally quite foreign to each other, when we read that Beliar, the king of this world, will descend from the firmament in the form of a man, who is depicted as the matricidal tyrant Nero. The beginning of the 5th *Sibylline* (vv. 1–51), too, probably a Jewish composition inserted by the redactor in the time of Marcus Aurelius, identifies Nero with the figure of Antichrist (vv. 28–34; εἶτ' ἀνακάμψει ἰσάζων θεῷ αὐτόν). In the 8th *Sibylline* (viii. 68 ff., 140 ff., 151 ff.), which dates from the period immediately preceding the death of Marcus Aurelius, only faint reminiscences are to be found. But Victorinus of Pettau, who wrote his *Com. on the Revelation* in the age of Diocletian, still knows the relation of the writing to the legend of Nero (Bousset, 53 ff.). The apologist Commodian, who probably did not write his *Carmen apologeticum* till the beginning of the 4th cent. (A. Harnack, *Chronol.* ii. 433–442), is acquainted with two figures of Antichrist, one of which he still identifies with *Nero redivivus*.

7. But even in the 2nd cent. the legend of Nero lost its influence on the minds of men, and in the same degree the *anti-Jewish conception*, borrowed from 2 Thess. 2, which was free from historical and political limitations, gained the upper hand. On the ground of exegetical combinations, in particular, under the influence of a renewed use of the predictions of Daniel, and by the help of other traditions—here the combination with the idea of a world-conflagration, which also in all probability arose from the Persian apocalyptic, is specially to be mentioned—the conception was filled out in detail, and continued to exhibit in all its particulars a remarkable persistency.

Antichrist is to come from the tribe of Dan (cf. Rev 7⁵; also Bousset², p. 232). He shall appear in Jerusalem as a mighty ruler, subdue three rulers, assemble the armies of the world around him, perform signs and wonders, and demand Divine worship. Elijah and Enoch, who both appear as witnesses against him, shall be subdued and slain. The Jews shall believe on him, and he shall rebuild the Temple. He shall persecute those among the Jews who refuse him their faith. These, however, shall be saved by a miraculous interference of God (the angel). He will put his seal upon his faithful, so that only he who bears this seal shall be free to buy and sell (cf. Rev 13¹⁶ff.). Finally, the famine of the last times shall overtake him, from which he will not be able to save his followers; then at the last he shall be subdued and destroyed by Christ, and the general conflagration follows. These are the ever recurring features of this picture of the future, which continues to persist throughout the centuries (cf., for the proofs in detail, Bousset, *Antichrist*).

The same ideas are already to be found in broad outline in the eschatological portions of Irenæus (*adv. Hæreses*, v.), and in Hippolytus (*de Antichristo* and *Com. on Daniel*). In times of political excitement during the course of the following centuries, men always turned afresh to the prophecy regarding Antichrist. The external features of the prophecy change, and special historical prophecies come to the front, but in the background the prediction of Antichrist, connected with no definite time, remains pretty much unchanged. Thus we find in the beginning of the *Testamentum Domini*, lately edited by Rahmani, an apocalypse of the time of Decius, although it has undergone a later redaction (Harnack, *Chronol.* ii. 514 ff.). In this work the description of the external appearance of Antichrist is of interest (cf. also the Coptic and the Jewish *Apocalypse of Elijah*; see below). The time of Aurelian and Gallienus, with its embittered struggles between the Romans and the Persians as well as between the Roman emperors and pretenders, seems to have given new food to the Apocalyptic fancy. From this time, in all probability, dates the Jewish *Apocalypse of Elijah*, which is preserved to us in Hebrew, and in which, if Buttenwieser's conjectures (*Eine heb. Eliasapokalypse*, Leipzig, 1897) are correct, Odhænat of Palmyra appears as Antichrist. In the same period arose undoubtedly the prophecy of the 13th *Sibylline*, which ends in a glorification of Odhænat, but does not belong to the Antichrist predictions proper. It is also possible that the special Antichrist passages in the 3rd *Sibylline*, v. 63 ff., and at the end of the 2nd *Sibylline*, belong to these circumstances (Bousset, *PRE*³ xviii. 273 ff.). Finally, it seems as if the puzzling Coptic *Apocalypse of Elijah*, contained in two partially preserved revisions, which shows signs of repeated corrections, had been worked over perhaps for the last time in this age (Steindorff, *TU*, new ser. ii. 3; Bousset, *Ztschr. f. Kirchengesch.* xx. 2, pp. 103–112).

Lactantius, in the *Divin. Institut.* vii. 14 ff., presents the Antichrist legend in an original and interesting form, which shows a certain amount of contact, on the one hand, with the *Apocalypse of Elijah*, which has just been mentioned, and, on the other hand, with the *Carmen apologeticum* of Commodian (belonging to the first decades of the 4th cent.).

8. A new turn in the history of the legend is represented by the so-called *Tiburtine Sibylline*. By means of the investigations, which all point to the same conclusion, undertaken by Sackur (*Sibyll. Texte und Forschungen*, p. 114 ff.), by Kampers (*Die deutsche Kaiseridee*, p. 18 f.), and by Bousset (*Antichrist*), it has been settled that the Tiburtine Sibylline, which appears in various editions and revisions of the Middle Ages, goes back to an original document which was composed in the 4th century. Since Basset published a 'Wisdom of the Sibyl' (*Les Apocryphes éthiopiennes*, x.) from Ethiopic and Arabic sources, which in itself is closely connected with the Tiburtina, but is enlarged by predictions which go down to the date of the sons of Harun al-Rashid, it has become still more easy to re-construct the original of the old Tiburtina. This Sibylline, dating from the 4th cent., and celebrating the Emperor Constans as the last ruler, is of importance, because in it occurs for the first time the *prophecy regarding the last emperor*, who, before the advent of Antichrist, shall obtain dominion over the whole world, and at the end of his reign shall march to Jerusalem and lay down his crown on Golgotha. From this time onwards *the last ruler of the world before Antichrist* becomes a standing requisite of the legend. In the treatise on Antichrist preserved in Latin under the name of Ephraim (Isidore), which probably dates from the 4th cent., and which has been published by Caspari (*Briefe und Abhandlungen*, 1890, pp. 208 ff., 429 ff.), this change in the legend is also already indicated: 'Christianorum imperium traditur Deo et patri' (ch. 5).

There are, besides, quite a number of writings on Antichrist which have been handed down to us under Ephraim's name, as, *e.g.*, a λόγος εἰς τὴν παρουσίαν τοῦ κυρίου καὶ περὶ συντελείας τοῦ κόσμου καὶ εἰς τὴν παρουσίαν τοῦ Ἀντιχρίστου (Assemani, ii. 222–230, iii. 134–143; related treatises are to be found among

Ephraim's works in Bousset, *Antichrist*, 23 f.); further, a Syrian homily (Th. J. Lamy, iii. 187 ff.), which—it is true—in its present redaction predicts the rising of Islām. Closely related to the Greek Ephraim are the *περὶ τῆς συντελείας τοῦ κόσμου* of pseudo-Hippolytus and a pseudo-Johannine Apocalypse (Tischendorf, *Apocalypses apocryphæ*). The fifteenth Catechesis of Cyril of Jerusalem should also be mentioned here.

9. Antichrist Apocalypses flourished again in the age of Islām. In the very beginning of it we meet with the most curious and notable of these prophetic books, viz. the *pseudo-Methodius*, which is extant in no fewer than three Greek recensions, a Latin translation, and various Greek and Latin redactions (the original Greek text is found in Istrin [see below], the Latin text in Sackur, *op. cit.*). Here the emperor of the future, who shall miraculously wake out of sleep, overcome Islām, and obtain the dominion of the world, has already become the most striking figure in the picture of the future. Then a number of *Byzantine prophecies*, which accompany the reigns of the Byzantine emperors and their fates, are influenced by pseudo-Methodius.

One prophetic composition, written in verse and adorned with pictures, which is ascribed to Leo VI. the philosopher (Migne, *Patrol. Græca*, cvii. 1121 ff.), predicts, *e.g.*, the fall of the house of the Comneni, and celebrates the emperor of the future, who, waking miraculously from the sleep of death, shall rise out of his grave. The legend of the sleeping emperor of the future is everywhere closely interwoven with the tradition of Antichrist. We possess, further, a Greek prophecy associated with the name of Daniel (alongside of a probably more ancient Armenian Daniel-apocalypse, Bousset, *Antichrist*, 41 ff.), which, in the period of the Latin empire, predicts the restoration of the Greek rule (Bousset, *Ztschr. f. Kirchengesch.* xx. 289 f.).

In the regions of the East which were ruled over by Islām, the age of Islām and the Crusades was exceedingly productive of prophecies of Antichrist. To this period belong the Apocalypses which are contained in the so-called *Liber Clementis discipuli St. Petri* (*Petri apostoli apocalypsis per Clementem*) in the Arabic, Ethiopic, and probably also the Syriac tongue (Bousset, *Antichrist*, 45 ff.), the Coptic (14th) *Vision of Daniel* (in the appendix to Woide's edition of the Codex Alexandrinus, Oxford, 1799), also the above-mentioned Ethiopic-Arabic *Wisdom of the Sibyl*, and finally the later Syriac *Apocalypse of Ezra* (Bousset, *Antichrist*, 45 ff.). In the age of Islām we have also a revival of *Jewish* Apocalyptic literature, probably to a large extent caused by the Christian prophetic writings. One of the most interesting of the writings here to be indicated is the Jewish history of Daniel which is handed down in the Persian tongue (Merx, *Archiv zur Erforsch. des AT*, i.). Alongside of this work there is a series of other writings: the *Mysteries of Simeon-ben-Jochai*, the *Midrash Vajoscha*, the *Signs of the Messiah*, the *Book of Zerubbabel*, etc. (cf. Buttenwieser, *Neo-Apocalyptic Jewish Literature*, 1901).

10. This whole type of predictions came to *the West* in the book of pseudo-Methodius, which was early translated into Latin. The Tiburtina, too, with its numerous recensions, accompanying the history of the German emperors, plays a special rôle. Finally, great influence was exerted by the letter which the monk Adso (954) wrote to the queen Gerberga: *de Ortu et Tempore Antichristi* (cf. Sackur, *Sibyll. Texte und Forschungen*, ii.). Then the legend of Antichrist passed through its classical period in the West, in which it even made history. Since the beginning of the 2nd Christian millennium a strong increase in the eschatological direction can be observed. This was intensified by the excitement which was produced in the lands of the West by the Crusades. All these fantastic eschatological tendencies found their intellectual focus in the person and activity of the abbot Joachim of Floris (end of 12th cent.); in particular, the intellectual movements which he originated found ready acceptance in the Franciscan order, and especially among those Franciscans who were inclined to form an opposition. Thus the time came when people saw Antichrist, or the forerunner of Antichrist, in every ecclesiastical, political, national, or social opponent, and the catchword 'Antichrist' sounded on all sides: in the struggle between the Emperor and the Pope, the Guelfs and Ghibellines, opposing Franciscans and the Papacy, between heretics and the Church, reformative social movements and the ruling powers opposed to them (*Reformatio Sigismundi*, *Onus Ecclesiæ* of Berthold of Chiemsee); in sculpture and painting (*e.g.* cf. Signorelli's picture in the cathedral of Orvieto), in lyric, epic, and dramatic poetry (cf. esp. the *Ludus de Antichristo*, ed. W. Meyer), the motives were supplied by the prophecy of Antichrist. In particular, the belief that the *Pope of Rome* was Antichrist, or at least his forerunner (*antichristus minor, mysticus*), became of world-wide historical importance. This view was assiduously cultivated by the Franciscans of the opposition, who had remained true to the original ideal of poverty. From them the conviction passed over to the pre-Reformation sects; the Bohemians Milič of Kremsier (*Libellus de Antichristo*) and Matthias of Janow are connected with them in a way which can quite easily be traced. Wyclif and his follower Michael Purvey (the probable author of the work edited by Luther [1528], *Com. in Apocalypsin ante centum annos editus*), as well as Huss on the other side, are firmly convinced of the anti-Christian nature of the Papacy.

In a particularly instructive monograph, H. Preuss has shown how important a rôle the idea of Antichrist played in the age of Luther among the widest classes of the people—how the idea gradually dawned on Luther's mind, and became fixed, that the Pope of Rome was the incarnate Antichrist, and how this conviction led him to more keen and daring opposition to the Papacy, and filled his soul with all the passion and remorselessness of battle. Thus in the Articles of Schmalkald, which were composed by Luther himself, the proposition that the Pope is Antichrist has been raised to an article of faith (Part II. art. iv. 'de Papatu,' § 10 f.); while in the drawing up of the Augustana, political reasons prevented this conviction from being expressed.

In the centuries that followed the Reformation, the doctrine that the Pope was Antichrist gradually receded into the background. It was, of course, still resolutely held by Protestant scholars, particularly by commentators on the Apocalypse even in our own times. But it came to be more and more only learned pedantry, and the belief no longer possessed the power of forming history. With this last phase the interest in the legend entirely disappeared, and it is now to be found only among the lower classes of the Christian community, among sects, eccentric individuals, and fanatics.

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W. BOUSSET.

ANTINOMIANISM.—Antinomianism (*ἀντί* 'against,' and *νόμος* 'law'), as a distinct theological phenomenon, originated with Johannes Agricola (1492–1566), who was an early coadjutor of Luther in the Reformation. It is the counterpart of modern political anarchism, being directed towards the destruction of the Moral Law of the OT in the

interest of the new freedom of Christians and the testimony of the spirit. Antinomianism, as John Wesley defined it, is the doctrine that 'makes void the Law through faith.' Christians are free from the Law. The Law primarily referred to was the Law of Moses. Agricola denied that Christians owed subjection to any part of this law, even to the Decalogue.

In its widest sense the term is used to designate the doctrines of extreme fanatics who deny subjection to any law other than the subjective caprices of the empirical individual, though this individual is generally credited as the witness and interpreter of the Holy Spirit. It is uncertain just how far Agricola went towards this wider capriciousness of the individual. For we get from history the usual exaggerations of theological controversies, when we read the debates between Luther and Agricola on the subject. Agricola began, and intended to remain, true to the great Reformation principle of *justification* through faith alone, without works. It was the fear of *work*-righteousness that led him to argue against the Moral Law—at least that of the Decalogue. He wished to establish Luther's condemnation of the Roman Catholic doctrine of *good works*, or *work-righteousness*, on some distinctively gospel principle. After making a secret propaganda for some ten years, he maintained, in a public disputation at Wittenberg in 1537, that works are indifferent, and that a man is saved by faith alone without any regard to his moral character. He said: 'Art thou steeped in sin, an adulterer or a thief? If thou believest, thou art in salvation. All who follow Moses must go to the devil. To the gallows with Moses.'

It was then that Luther characterized the teaching as being *antinomian*, and identified it, in principle, with the anarchism of the Anabaptists. Agricola retracted and was reconciled with Luther, but the controversy was carried on by others. One of the followers of Agricola, a certain Ammsdorf, said that good works imperilled salvation. Agricola claimed that he was only expounding the teachings of Luther and Melanchthon. Indeed we find Luther (*Werke*, xx. 203) saying: 'We do not wish to see or hear Moses. For Moses was given to the Jews, not to us Gentiles and Christians. We have our Gospel and New Testament. They wish to make Jews of us through Moses, but they shall not.' And Melanchthon says (*Loci communes*, 1st ed. by Augusti, p. 127): 'It must be admitted that the Decalogue is abrogated.' But the controversy with Agricola was only the occasion for Luther to give the definite term 'antinomianism' to a view far older than the German Reformation. This view showed itself even in NT times. Luther himself characterized the Epistle of St. James as 'an epistle of straw,' because of its emphasis upon good works. Then we find the Apostles (Ro $3^{8.31}$ 6^{1}, Eph 5^{6}, 2 P $2^{18.19}$) warning Christians against perversions of their doctrines as an excuse for licentiousness, or antinomianism. The Gnostic sects, hyper-spiritual in doctrine, were sensualistic in their morals. They held that the spirit (πνεῦμα), as part of the eternal Divine energy, existed absolutely separate and apart from the soul (ψύχη) and the material body. Hence, all acts of the soul and body were things indifferent to the spirit. Hence, soul and body might wallow in licentiousness without detracting from the salvation of the spirit (πνεῦμα). Here we find with the Valentinian Gnostics the most frank and definite statement of Antinomianism in its widest and most immoral form.

A tract of Augustine (*contra adversarium legis et prophetarum*) seems to indicate the existence of Antinomianism in the 4th century. There are traces of it to be found during the Middle Ages. It comes out strongly among the Anabaptists of Germany and Holland. During the Commonwealth, it existed in England among the high Calvinists. These argued that, if a man was elected and predestined to salvation, no power in heaven or on earth could prevent it; and hence, no matter what the moral conduct of a man might be, his salvation was sure if he was one of the elect; the wicked actions of such a man were not sinful, and he had no occasion to confess his sins or to break them off by repentance. Saltmarsh, Cromwell's chaplain, was among these 'sectaries.' But they never became an independent sect. Antinomianism existed in the 18th cent. in England both in the Church of England and among the Dissenters. Again, it appeared in England among the followers of John Wesley, who made earnest protest against it. This gave occasion for John Fletcher to write a strong book, entitled *Checks to Antinomianism*.

It is not in place to carry the discussion of this term beyond its proper theological rôle. We may only add that the principle of the thing—opposition to law—is found in every sphere of the organized or institutional activities of humanity. All who advocate doctrines subversive of the Family, the State, or the Church, are antinomians. All moral sophists are antinomians. All who pervert the principle that 'the end justifies the means,' into a disregard for established moral laws, so that some personal or finite end be attained, are antinomians. And every individual who pleads special exemption from obedience to the common law of morality is an antinomian.

We may cite Epiphanes, the sensual son of the Gnostic Carpocrates, as one of the lowest types of antinomians. He died at the age of seventeen from the effects of debauchery, after having written a work on *Righteousness*, in which he advocated the generous principle—'Follow your own nature, against all established laws.'

Jacobi may be taken as the highest type of an antinomian in his fervent protest against moral rigorism: 'Nay, I am that atheist, that profane person, who, in despite of the will that wills nothing, will lie, like the dying Desdemona; prevaricate and deceive, like Pylades representing himself to be Orestes; will murder, like Timoleon; break law and oath, like Epaminondas and Johann de Witt; resolve on suicide, like Otho; commit sacrilege, like David; nay, pluck ears of corn on the Sabbath, only because I am hungry, and the law was made for man, and not man for the law.'

For a modern representative of moral antinomianism we may mention Nietzsche in his doctrine of 'Die Unwertung aller Werte'—the unvaluing of all values, the illegalizing of all laws.

J. MACBRIDE STERRETT.

ANTINOMIES. — Kant first introduced this term into philosophy, although the conception for which it stands had been used by the Eleatic Zeno, by Plato (*Phædo*, 102; *Rep.* 523; *Parmenides*, 135) and by Aristotle. With Kant an antinomy is the unavoidable contradiction into which reason falls when it seeks to satisfy its necessary demand for the unity of the world as a whole. This is the subject-matter of Rational Cosmology. We can never perceive or conceive the world as a whole. But we are compelled to *think* it. The conflict then is—the world as we *know* it under the categories of the understanding, and the idea under which we *think* it by the Reason. Reason goes beyond the limits of a possible experience, and is met with a flat contradiction the moment it attempts to construe the unconditioned totality in terms of the conditioned, or the world of possible experience. In this knowable world, every phenomenon is determined in relation to other phenomena *ad indefinitum*, not *ad infinitum*. Hence no determination can be complete and final. But the idea of reason demands this very completeness and finality. This is the conflict between the understanding (*Verstand*) which *knows* and Reason (*Vernunft*) which *thinks*. Reason says, 'If the conditioned is given, then the whole sum of conditions, and therefore the absolutely unconditioned, must be given likewise.' But, as Kant limits knowledge to the syntheses of the under-

standing, he turns to it to prove the idea of reason. But it is limited to the conditioned, and therefore can never reach to knowledge of the unconditioned. An unconditioned condition is absurd. And yet this is what reason demands.

The idea of reason is too large for the capacity of the knowing understanding, and the definite knowledge of the understanding is too small for the idea of the reason. Hence the hopeless back and forth swing between the *dicta* on laws of the two faculties.

Kant gives four antinomies or pairs of theses and antitheses.

The first is the *antinomy of quantity*. Two mutually exclusive propositions can be proved with equal force in regard to the quantity of the world:

I.

Thesis.	Antithesis.
The world had a beginning in time, and is limited also with regard to space.	The world had no beginning, and has no limits in space, but is infinite in respect to both time and space.

He then shows that the denial of either member of both the thesis and the antithesis involves an absurdity.

The second is the *antinomy of quality*, and relates to the divisibility of matter.

II.

Thesis.	Antithesis.
Every composite substance in the world consists of simple parts, and nothing exists anywhere but the simple or what is composed of it.	No composite thing in the world consists of simple parts, and there exists nowhere in the world anything simple.

Here the same *reductio ad absurdum* is applied to both the thesis and the antithesis. These first two antinomies are styled the *mathematical*, as considering the world quantitatively and qualitatively. The next two he styles *dynamical*, as considering the world, not as a total of dead things, but as consisting of things dynamically and organically related to each other.

The first of these is the *antinomy of relation*, dealing chiefly with the relation of causality.

III.

Thesis.	Antithesis.
Causality, according to the laws of nature, is not the only causality from which all the phenomena of the world can be deduced. In order to account for these phenomena, it is also necessary to admit another causality, that of freedom.	There is no freedom, but everything in the world takes place entirely according to the laws of nature.

Here, again, Kant's reasoning is to the absurdity of the opposite of both thesis and antithesis. For the *thesis* it is argued that without free causality there is no *vera causa*, but everything is merely an effect, and not even that, unless it presupposes a *vera causa* which can never be found in any member of the causal series. For the antithesis it is argued that if free causality be allowed, then it must itself be held to be uncaused, and thus contradict the law of causality—that everything must have a cause.

The next is the *antinomy of modality*, and relates to 'the unity in the existence of phenomena,' or the ultimate nature of the universe.

IV.

Thesis.	Antithesis.
There exists an absolutely necessary Being belonging to the world, either as a part or as the cause of it.	There nowhere exists an absolutely necessary Being, either within or without the world, as the cause of it.

Kant claims that no *dogmatic* solution of these antinomies can be given. His own *critical* solution follows from this theory of Knowledge. Knowledge is only of phenomena. We *must think* noumena. But we cannot *know* them as phenomena. It is the attempt to do this that gives rise to these antinomies. His critical solution is that these antinomies arise (necessarily too) only from a confusion between knowable phenomena and unknowable (but real) noumena. It is this that constantly leads one's reasoning on either side to involve a *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*. Besides these four antinomies of the *Pure Reason*, we find Kant stating one antinomy of the *Practical Reason*, that is, an *ethical* antinomy. It is that between perfect virtue and perfect happiness. *Du sollst also du kannst* is Kant's bed-rock of morality. Unconditional obedience to the categorical imperative is the *summum bonum*. But the *bonum consummatum* includes perfect happiness. What bridge can there be found between perfect virtue and perfect happiness? Here comes the antinomy. Virtue denies happiness as a motive. Virtue demands happiness as the *bonum consummatum*. But virtue cannot be connected with happiness as its cause or its effect.

Thesis.	Antithesis.
The endeavour after happiness produces a virtuous mind.	A virtuous mind necessarily produces happiness.

Here we find Kant saying that the *thesis* 'is absolutely false.' He really goes on to make a *thesis and an antithesis* out of the antithesis. His real antinomy, therefore, is this:

Thesis: Virtue is causal of happiness.

Antithesis: Virtue is not causal of happiness.

To take the antithesis first, it is easily shown that virtue is not causal in the world of experience. Fire burns and poison kills the virtuous as well as the vicious.

Then as to the *thesis*, it is false so far as virtue is considered as a cause in the sensible world. But it is true so far as I am a denizen of a supersensuous world. But even there it is true only because I must have an indefinitely prolonged life in which to approximate to a virtuous mind, and because, finally, there must be a God as the cause adequate to equalizing or proportioning happiness to virtue, that is, a cause adequate to effecting this union of virtue with happiness.

In Kant's Third Critique, *The Critique of Judgment*, we find two other antinomies — the *æsthetic* and the *teleological* antinomies.

First, the *antinomy of taste* (§ 56):

Thesis.	Antithesis.
The judgment of taste is not based on conceptions; for otherwise *de gustibus non disputandum*.	The judgment of taste is based on conceptions; for otherwise we could not argue about it, and there would be no norm of taste.

Second, the *teleological antinomy* (§ 70):

Thesis.	Antithesis.
All production of material things and their forms must be judged to be possible according to merely mechanical laws.	Some products of material nature cannot be judged to be possible according to merely mechanical laws.

Hegel (*Encyclopädie*, § 48) blames Kant for his small list of antinomies. He holds that antinomies 'appear in all objects of every kind, in all representations, conceptions, and ideas.' It is this view that is the vital element of the dialectic, forcing thought onward to ever higher and more concrete forms till it reaches the Absolute Idea in which all contradictions are forms of self-relation. 'The true and positive meaning of the antinomies is this: that every actual thing involves a co-existence of contrary elements. Consequently, to know, or in other words to *comprehend*, an object is equivalent to being conscious of it as a unified group of contrary determinations' (§ 48, Zusatz). Hegel's whole *Logic* is an exhibition of the antinomial dialectic of all finite thought, in its indwelling tendency to absolute and final thought, as 'the life and soul of scientific progress, the dynamic which alone gives an immanent connexion and necessity to the subject-matter of science' (§ 81). Of every thing and every conception we say *it is* and *it is not*, because *it is more* than what it is in its unmediated form. With mere

identity, A = A, there can be no progress. But nothing in the world is mere identity:

'Nothing in the world is single;
All things by a law divine
In one another's being mingle.'

The truth of any thing or thought is always a unity of identity and difference, of *thesis* and *antithesis*. Synthesis is the truth of both. But all finite syntheses develop antinomies on the way to the ultimate synthesis of thought and reality, where antinomies are no more.

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ANTIOCHENE THEOLOGY.

[J. H. SRAWLEY].

THE title 'Antiochene Fathers' is generally applied to a school of Church teachers, all connected with Antioch, whose activity covers the latter half of the 4th and the first half of the 5th century. Its most famous representatives were Diodorus, bishop of Tarsus († 394); John Chrysostom, bishop of Constantinople († 407); Theodore, bishop of Mopsuestia († 429); and Theodoret, bishop of Cyrrhus († 457). But the theology of these Fathers has its roots in an earlier period, and reproduces the traditions of a school of Christian learning at Antioch, the history and characteristics of which form a necessary introduction to a study of the later writers.

I. *THE SCHOOL OF ANTIOCH: HISTORY AND CHARACTERISTICS.*—The city of Antioch, founded by the Seleucid kings and made by them the capital of their dominions, was the metropolis of the East and the third city of the Roman Empire. It was a centre of Greek life and culture, and was noted for its pursuit of art and literature. The Church of Antioch had played an important part in the early spread of Christianity, and from early times had been the centre of important movements in the region of thought. It was the home of the early Gnostics, Menander and Saturnilus, while the writings of Theophilus, bishop of Antioch, in the latter years of Marcus Aurelius and under Commodus, attracted the notice of the West, and show that the attention of the Church had been directed to the statement and defence of Christian truth. The earliest reference to anything like an organized Christian school of instruction occurs in connexion with the condemnation of the heresy of Paul of Samosata in the year 269. At the council of bishops, which met at Antioch in that year and condemned Paul, the latter's teaching was exposed by Malchion, a presbyter, who was the head of a school of Greek learning at Antioch. From Eusebius' description (*HE* vii. 29) it has been argued that the Church of Antioch already possessed some institution resembling the Catechetical School of Alexandria, in which sacred learning was combined with secular studies, and the pursuit of rhetoric and dialectic found a place (*σοφιστοῦ τῶν ἐπ' Ἀντιοχείας ἑλληνικῶν παιδευτηρίων διατριβῆς προεστώς*). How far the teaching of Paul himself is representative of a distinct school of thought at Antioch it is difficult to say, but there are features in it which are reproduced by the later Antiochene theologians (*e.g.* his appeal to the historical Christ and his rejection of metaphysics. See below, II. 6).

It is, however, in the time of Lucian († 311–312), the presbyter and martyr, that the school of Antioch first comes clearly to light. He is said to have studied in the schools of Edessa and at Cæsarea. From the latter he probably acquired that interest in Biblical studies which was due to the influence of Origen, and for which the school of Lucian was also celebrated. In conjunction with Dorotheus, who combined knowledge of Hebrew with Greek learning (Euseb. *HE* vii. 32), he completed a revision of the LXX, and to him has also been attributed the early Syrian revision of the text of the NT (on these see Swete, *Introd. to OT in Greek*, p. 81 f.; Westcott and Hort, *Introd. to NT in Greek*, p. 138). There is also extant a fragment of his Commentary on the Book of Job (Routh, *Rel. Sacr.* iv. p. 7 f.). But equally important with the Biblical labours of Lucian was the influence exerted by him on the theology of the Eastern Church. In what way he was connected with Paul of Samosata is uncertain (see, however, Harnack, *PRE*[3] xi., art. 'Lucian der Märtyrer'); but the influence of Paul's teaching upon him is unmistakable, and between the years 270 and 299 he appears to have been outside the communion of the Church (Theodoret, *HE* i. 3). His teaching represented a compromise between the Adoptianism of Paul and the Logos Christology of Origen (see below, II. 6). At the same time he taught the idea of a created Logos, and in this respect he handed on to his disciples a tradition which found its most logical expression in Arianism. The school of Lucian was 'the nursery of the Arian doctrine' (Harnack). The Arian leaders, Arius and Eusebius of Nicomedia, were pupils of Lucian, and the title Συλλουκιανισταί was at once a recognition of their reverence for their master, and a common bond of union. Our sources of information as to the teaching of the more prominent Arians exhibit two characteristics which re-appear in the later history of the school of Antioch: (1) the use of the dialectical philosophy of Aristotle; (2) the grammatical and literal exegesis of Scripture. On the former of these see Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma* (Eng. tr. 1899), vol. iv. p. 6. The latter characteristic is illustrated in the commentaries of Eusebius of Emesa, a disciple of Lucian, and a moderate Arian in doctrine, who had studied in the schools of Edessa, Cæsarea, and Alexandria, as well as at Antioch, and who, according to Jerome, exercised an influence upon the exegesis of Diodorus (Jerome, *de Vir. Illustr.* c. 119).

Harnack has pointed out the close parallel which exists between the principles of the school of Lucian and those of the earlier Roman Adoptianists, whose chief representative was Theodotus. In both alike we find the same use of Aristotle, and the same literal and critical exegesis of the Bible. Both schools opposed the dominant mystical and allegorizing tendencies of their time by a full use of empirical and critical methods (Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, vol. iii. p. 23 f., vol. iv. p. 6).

But it was not the Arians alone who handed on the traditions of the school of Antioch. Eustathius, bishop of Antioch (exiled in 341), in his *de Engastrimytho* attacks the allegorical interpretation of Origen, and exhibits the true Antiochene exegesis. Flavian, the colleague and friend of Diodorus at Antioch (Theodoret, *HE* iv. 22), and Meletius, the patron of Chrysostom, constitute links between the earlier and the later school of Antioch.

The history of the later school of Antioch really begins with Diodorus (bishop of Tarsus, 378–394). A fellow-student of Basil at Athens, and later on the colleague of Flavian, he had upheld the Nicene cause at Antioch in the days of Meletius' exile. His friendship with Basil (Basil, *Ep.* 135) is important as marking the union between Cappadocian and Antiochene orthodoxy (Harnack, *PRE*[3] iv., art. 'Diodorus'). Only fragments of his voluminous writings are extant, but they appear to have included treatises on philosophy and theology, and commentaries on the Old and New Testaments. In his opposition to Apollinarism he was led to conceptions of the Person of Christ which in later times caused him to be regarded as a precursor of Nestorianism. In his exegesis of the Scriptures, the principles of which he expounded in a treatise entitled *Τίς διαφορὰ θεωρίας καὶ ἀλληγορίας*, he contested the Alexandrian method of interpretation, and, while affirming the need of insight into the inner spiritual

meaning of Scripture, he asserted the importance of grammatical and historical methods of exegesis. Lastly, Diodorus' importance consists in the fact that he was the inspirer and teacher of the two most famous representatives of the school of Antioch—Theodore and Chrysostom.

Theodore, bishop of Mopsuestia († 429), developed on bold and original lines the teaching of his master Diodorus. As an independent thinker and systematic theologian he was the greatest of the Antiochenes. His theology contains a fully thought out system, embracing the nature and destiny of man and the Person and work of Christ. He has points of contact with the Pelagians in his teaching on sin and the Fall, free-will and grace; and in his Christology he was the immediate precursor of Nestorius. No less important were his contributions to the study of Scripture. In his subjective criticism of the Canon of Scripture, his insistence on the primary meaning of OT prophecy, and his endeavour to bring out the full historical meaning of Scripture, he represents the climax of Antiochene teaching.

Three other representatives of the school of Antioch during the period of its greatest fame call for notice, though none of them carried out so fully as Theodore its essential principles.

Polychronius, bishop of Apamea († *c.* 430), and brother of Theodore, exhibits in his commentaries on the OT the traditions of Antiochene exegesis.

John Chrysostom, bishop of Constantinople († 407), was the disciple of Diodorus and Flavian, and shows the influence of his Antiochene training alike in his doctrinal teaching and in his exposition of Scripture, though in both respects he was in closer accord than Diodorus or Theodore with the Church tradition of his time. Chrysostom was, however, the popular teacher and preacher rather than the exact theologian, and his commentaries on Scripture, which are marked by profound insight into human nature, are the work of a homilist rather than a critical student.

Theodoret, bishop of Cyrrhus († 457), was a disciple of Theodore, and played an important part in the Christological controversies of his time, in which he exercised a mediating influence between the conflicting principles of Antiochene and Alexandrian theology. He exhibits, alike in his theological and Biblical works, the Antiochene tradition. But he modified in several respects the teaching of his master. As a commentator he exhibits learning, judgment, and terseness of expression, though he is inferior in originality to Theodore and Chrysostom.

On the later history and influence of the school of Antioch, see below, III.

II. *THE TEACHING OF THE SCHOOL OF ANTIOCH.*—1. Holy Scripture and Revelation.—With the Antiochenes the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments held a foremost place as the source of Christian doctrine. In their Canon of Scripture they followed the tradition of the Antiochene and Syrian Churches (which is also represented in the Peshitta or Vulgate Syriac Version), and did not include in the NT Canon the Apocalypse, 2 Peter, 2 and 3 John, or Jude. Theodore, on subjective grounds, also rejected the Epistle of St. James. In dealing with the OT books, Theodore recognized degrees of inspiration, and submitted them to a rigorous subjective criticism. The Book of Job he regarded as the production of a pagan Edomite and a work of dramatic fiction, which was lacking in higher inspiration. Similarly, he denied inspiration in the higher sense to Proverbs and Ecclesiastes. The Song of Songs was merely the marriage-song of Pharaoh's daughter, and lacked the authority both of the synagogue and of the Church. He assigned little value to Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, and Esther, partly owing to doubts as to their acceptance in the Jewish Canon, and partly because they seemed to lack the prophetic insight which marked the other historical books. (Loofs, however, thinks that the only books which Theodore rejected from the OT Canon were Esther and the Apocryphal books. See *PRE*[3] xix. p. 604). He also rejected the inscriptions of the Psalms, and assigned a late date to the composition of many of the Psalms, placing some in the period of Hezekiah, others in that of Zerubbabel, and others again in Maccabæan times. These views, however, were rejected by Chrysostom and Theodoret, who adhered to the general sentiment of the Church.

The Antiochenes held the LXX in the highest reverence, and appear to have used Lucian's recension of its text. But Theodore and Chrysostom were unacquainted with Hebrew, and none of the teachers of the later school took up Lucian's textual labours or interested themselves in such studies (see, however, Chase, *Chrysostom*, p. 82 f.).

In their treatment of the inspiration of the Scriptures, while recognizing a real influence of the Holy Spirit upon the writers, the Antiochenes maintained that the individual character of the authors was imprinted on the style of the books. They recognized, too, the principle of accommodation to the time and circumstances of those who were addressed (Chase, *op. cit.* p. 42). Revelation is progressive. The OT has a preparatory character, and is the unfolding of one Divine purpose, which reaches its culmination in the Incarnation and the Christian dispensation. In their exegesis of Scripture the Antiochenes exhibit a pronounced opposition to the allegorical interpretation of the Alexandrian school. Eustathius, Diodorus, and Theodore all wrote works against the allegorists (see also Theodore on Gal 4[24] and *prœm. in Ose.*). Against Origen they maintained that the historical books contain true history, and are to be interpreted historically. But the history contains spiritual lessons, which, however, are to be deduced from it, and not arbitrarily imposed upon it. The moral difficulties of the OT histories and of the imprecatory Psalms presented obstacles to them, which they do not always satisfactorily overcome. Chrysostom often minimizes them, or occasionally resorts to allegory (Chase, *op. cit.* p. 53 f.). The typical character of the OT narratives is fully recognized. The incidents, persons, and objects mentioned are types of realities found in the NT (Theodore, *prœm. in Jon.*). This harmony between type and antitype was foreseen and foreordained by the Divine purpose in order to assist men in recognizing the truth (Theodore *in Ose.* 1[1]; *prœm. in Am.*, Migne, lxvi. 125, 141). Hence the obscurity of the OT is due to the fact that it contains shadows and imperfect images of the truth, but is not the truth itself (Chrys. *Hom.* 61 *in Genes.*). The language of the OT is often hyperbolical and figurative, if referred to its original object, and finds its full content only in the higher realities of the gospel (Theodore, *in Joel* 2[28]). The principles of the interpretation of prophecy were set forth in the most thoroughgoing manner by Theodore. He starts from the historical standpoint of the school, and maintains that, with the exception of a few passages which are directly Messianic, it is only by way of accommodation that the language of the Psalms and Prophets can be applied to the Christian dispensation (*in Rom.* 3[12], *Eph.* 4[8]). He distinguishes three classes of prophecies—(1) Those which have a primary application to Christ, and no other historical reference. These were few in number:

e.g. Theodore recognized only four Psalms (2. 8. 45. 110) as directly Messianic. (2) Prophecies which have a primary reference to OT events, and refer only typically to the NT, *i.e.* such prophecies as are quoted in the NT. (3) Prophecies which have no Messianic reference, but refer only to the OT (*e.g.* Mic 4^{1-3}, Zec $11^{4ff.}$, Hag 2^{1-9}, Mal 1^{1-11} 3^{2-5}). See Kihn, *Theodor v. Mops.* p. 143 f.

Theodore has a profound realization of the significance of the idea of the Kingdom of God as set forth in the OT. The whole course of OT history was intended to prepare the way for the coming of Christ. Theodore's application of critical methods to the OT, though often arbitrary and vitiated by his ignorance of Hebrew, exhibits at times an acumen and insight which were far in advance of his age. In his subjective criticism of the OT books he found no successors, but through the later Antiochenes—Chrysostom and Theodoret, who followed in the main his methods, while modifying his conclusions—the science of exact and literal exegesis gained a foothold in the Church, and exercised a far-reaching influence both in the East and in the West. See below, III.

2. Doctrine of God and of the Trinity.—The Antiochenes exhibit little interest in metaphysical speculation upon the Being of God or the proofs of His existence. Photius, however (*Bibl. Cod.* 223, see esp. p. 209*b*; Migne, *PG* ciii. p. 833), gives an account of Diodorus' work *Against Fate*, in which the latter propounds the cosmological argument for the existence of God. The world, Diodorus maintains, is subject to change. But change itself is a condition which implies a beginning, and requires us to assume something constant behind it. Moreover, the variety of existing things and the wisdom displayed in the very process of change point to an underlying unity of origin, and suggest a Creator and a Providence. Both Chrysostom and Theodore wrote works upon the providence of God, in which they endeavoured to show that this providence extends to particulars.

Diodorus and Theodore were staunch supporters of the Nicene theology. Accepting its conclusions, Theodore set forth the doctrine of the Trinity by the help of careful exegesis of Scripture, rather than by speculative arguments. From the baptismal formula in Mt 28^{19} we may learn that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are three self-subsistent Persons, and equally belong to the Divine and eternal Being. In the OT the distinction of Persons was not yet revealed (*in Hag.* 2^{1-9}). But when the OT speaks of the Divine nature, its language may be applied not only to the Father, but to the Son also, by reason of their community of nature (*in Heb.* 1^{12}). The Holy Spirit is a Person (ὑπόστασις) of the Trinity, and has His subsistence (ὕπαρξις) from the 'being' of the Father (*in Matt.* 1^{18}). Chrysostom's treatment is similar to that of Theodore. Careful exposition of the language of Scripture takes the place of metaphysical speculation upon the Trinity. Theodoret expounds in his *Eranistes* (*Dial.* i. p. 33 f., Migne) Basil's distinction between the terms 'being' (οὐσία) and 'person' (ὑπόστασις), but, like Theodore and Chrysostom, he contributes little to the subject.

In one respect, however, Theodore and Theodoret occupy an important place in the history of the doctrine of the Trinity. Theodore's teaching upon the Holy Spirit exhibits a clear conception of the essential Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father. In his comment on Jn 15^{26} he affirms that the Holy Spirit's 'going forth' (ἐκπορεύεσθαι) was no mere external mission, but 'a natural procession' (φυσικὴ πρόοδος). But in the Creed put forth by him (Hahn, *Bibliothek der Symbole*[3], p. 302) he denies that the Holy Spirit received His subsistence through the Son (οὔτε διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν ὕπαρξιν εἰληφός). This position was attacked by Cyril of Alexandria in the ninth of his anathemas against Nestorius, and the Spirit was declared to be the 'very own' (ἴδιον) Spirit of Christ. Theodoret, in his reply to Cyril (*Reprehens. Anathemat.* 9), re-affirmed the contention of Theodore, and pronounced the opposite opinion to be blasphemy. Possibly the motive underlying the denial of the Procession through the Son may have been the fear of introducing the heresy of the Pneumatomachi (so Swete, *DCB*, art. 'Holy Ghost').

3. The Creation of Man.—The chief representative of Antiochene teaching, Theodore of Mopsuestia, exhibits a fully thought out conception of human nature in its constitution and development. In this respect he is superior to the Alexandrian theologians, and shows a deeper interest than they in questions affecting the origin and history of man. Theodore's treatment, as in the case of his exegesis of Scripture, is empirical, and rests upon the observed facts of human nature. (1) He starts from the conception of the universe as a living whole (ἓν σῶμα, *in Rom.* 8^{19}; so the Platonist Fathers, *e.g.* Gregory of Nyssa), which exhibits the combination of visible and invisible, or material and spiritual elements (see CAPPADOCIAN THEOLOGY, vii. (2)). Man was designed to be the bond (σύνδεσμος, συνάφεια, φιλίας ἐνέχυρον) between these two parts of creation (*ib.*; cf. the similar treatment of Gregory of Nyssa, *Or. Cat.* 6). Just as a king's statue is set up in a town which he has built and adorned, in order to remind the citizens of the builder, so man is set in creation as the image of God, in which all created beings may find their meeting-point, and be led to give God the glory which is His due (John Philop., *de Mundi Creat.* vi. 9, in Galland, *Bibl. vet. Patr.* xii. 581). Hence man was endowed with all the powers necessary to enable him to fulfil the destiny assigned to him. He possesses a body taken from the visible and material creation, while on his higher side he is akin to the spiritual creation (*in Rom.* 8^{19}; cf. Greg. Nyss. *op. cit.*). Creation was meant to serve man, and the angels appointed by God to superintend the processes of nature minister to his good (*ib.*). Through man creation has access to the Creator (Sachau, *Theodori Mops. fragm. Syr.* p. 18). In order to fulfil the purpose of his being, man was endowed with all necessary powers, including the gift of free-will. Theodore has a more profound conception of man's freedom than any of his contemporaries. Freedom is with him no mere indifference to good or evil. Nor is it, as with some other Eastern Fathers (*e.g.* Origen and the Cappadocians), the mere possibility of change or development. True freedom is rather the power of self-determination, which is exercised in harmony with the guidance of the Divine Spirit. It is 'the higher unity of liberty of choice and necessity' (Dorner). Especially important is Theodore's conception of love as the means by which man's freedom in relation to the influence of the Divine Spirit is realized (*de Incarn.*, Migne, lxvi. p. 977; see below, § 6). Hence freedom implies moral growth and development. It cannot be complete from the first. In this respect Theodore is superior to Pelagius and the Alexandrians. (See, further, below, § 6; and cf. Dorner, *Person of Christ*, II. i. 36, 38).

(2) From the first, God made man's nature liable to mortality. As a result of this mortality, man is subject to passions and liable to change. Theodore distinguishes between two stages (καταστάσεις) in the history of created beings, a present stage, in which the creature is subject to change and death, and a future stage, in which all will be brought to a condition of immutability and immortality (*in Genes.*, Migne, lxvi. 634). God exhibited the

beginning of this second stage in the Incarnation of His Son (*in Jon.*, Migne, lxvi. 317), but it was His purpose that man should first pass through the earlier stage, in which he is subject to conflict, temptation, and mortality. In thus creating man mortal, however, there was a beneficent purpose. (*a*) This mutable and mortal condition was intended to train man's will by exercising his power of choice between good and evil (*in Gal.* $2^{15.16}$). (*b*) In view of man's fall, which He foresaw, God attached the penalty of actual death (as distinguished from the liability to death) to disobedience, in order to deter men from sin. (*c*) Man's mortal condition rendered it possible for 'the body of sin' to be destroyed along with the dissolution of his body. Had man sinned, being immortal, his fall would have been irremediable (*in Genes.* 3^{17}; there is a somewhat similar treatment in Methodius and Gregory of Nyssa). Hence the purpose of the command to Adam, and later on of the Law, was to call forth the knowledge of good and evil, to provoke sin, and to show man his inability to attain perfect righteousness. It was only through the struggle and the conflict of this mutable life that man could learn his need of the Divine principle of life revealed in Christ, in order that he might attain his true end (*in Rom.* 7^{8}, *in Genes.* 3^{17}, *in Gal.* $2^{15.16}$).

4. The Fall.—Theodore taught that by man's disobedience the liability to mortality became an actual fact, for God had not said, when He threatened man with death as the penalty of disobedience, 'Ye shall be mortal,' but 'Ye shall die' (Marius Mercator, ed. Baluze, p. 340). Death came by sin, and the result of death was the separation of soul and body in man. Thus, too, the bond of the Universe, which had held together the visible and invisible parts of creation, was broken. Sin gained an entrance into the world, and in Adam's descendants the same experience was repeated. As each of them sinned in turn, he became subject, like Adam, to death (so Theodore interpreted Ro 5^{14}). A further result of the actual mortality which resulted from sin was that it increased the tendency to sin, by fixing man's thoughts upon the present order of things and by ministering to his passions (*in Rom.* $7^{14.17.18}$, *in Gal.* $2^{15.16}$).

5. Original Sin.—The summary which has been given above of Theodore's teaching shows that he allowed no place for the idea of inherited sin. Even the 'death which passed unto all men' is regarded as the result of man's own transgressions, not as the result of Adam's sin. In the fragments of Theodore's work, *Against the Defenders of Original Sin*, preserved by Marius Mercator (ed. Baluze, p. 340 f.), his attitude towards the standpoint of Jerome and Augustine is clearly shown. He affirms that Adam was created mortal, and he repudiates the idea that Noah, Abraham, David, Moses, and other righteous men should be subject to punishment for Adam's sin. Such a view he regards as inconsistent with the Apostle's words (Ro 2^{6}), that God will render to every man according to his deeds. Thus, too, in speaking of baptism, he distinguishes between the forgiveness of the sins of the individual, and the sinless state which will be fully revealed only at the general restitution of all things, and he maintains that in the case of infants the former cannot be taken into account.

Such teaching made Theodore a valuable ally to the Pelagian leaders, and in 418 Julian of Eclanum and his companions sought refuge with him after their banishment from the West. The points in which Theodore's teaching resembles that of Pelagius are: his insistence that man was created mortal, his emphasis on free-will, his denial of inherited sin, and his treatment of man's growth in knowledge and obedience through the discipline of the commandments and the law of God. On the other hand, his idea of redemption is different from that of Pelagius. For, according to Theodore's teaching, the original constitution of man as mortal and mutable rendered it impossible for him to attain the goal of his existence apart from the deliverance which came through Christ. Again, as we have seen, Theodore's conception of free-will is more profound than that of Pelagius, with whom freedom is simply the indifference of the will to good or evil (see above, § 3).

Chrysostom in his teaching on human nature exhibits the same practical bent and absence of speculative interest which appears in other directions in his writings. Scarcely any of Theodore's distinctive ideas occur in Chrysostom's treatment of man's history. His conception of the Divine image in man, which he regards as consisting in his dominion over creation recalls Diodorus and Theodore. He regards the Fall as resulting in a privation of gifts which were not a part of man's natural constitution. He does not teach a complete loss of the Divine image. He agrees with Theodore in insisting on free-will and denying original sin. But in both cases this was probably due to his practical bent of mind, and to his association with that side of Eastern thought which, while emphasizing free-will, had not yet embraced the ideas found in Origen and Gregory of Nyssa, which approximated to Western teaching on Original Sin. As a preacher, Chrysostom saw the danger of any form of teaching which seemed to lessen the sense of responsibility or encourage the indifference and sluggishness of men's wills. To deny free-will was to take the virtue out of goodness (1 *Cor. hom.* 2). It is the bad will which is the root of evil (1 *Cor. hom.* 17). He denies that mortality is the cause of sin (*ib.*). Chrysostom, in fact, realizes far less than Theodore the weakness of man and his inability to attain to righteousness. In other respects Chrysostom's teaching exhibits points of contact with the later Pelagians. In a passage appealed to by Julian of Eclanum, he refuses to connect infant baptism with infant sin, though Augustine (*c. Julian.* i. 6) explained the passage as referring to actual sin.

Theodoret also presents few points of contact with the characteristic teaching of Theodore. Like Diodorus and Chrysostom, he maintains that the Divine image consisted in the dominion over creation, and, like all the Antiochenes, he emphasizes man's free-will. Thus he interprets the 'vessels of wrath' in Ro 9^{22} of those who have become such by their own free choice, and, like other Fathers, he misinterprets Ro 8^{28} by understanding *κατὰ πρόθεσιν* to refer to man's own act of choice. The words of Ro 7^{15} indicate not a necessity, but the weakness of human nature. Man embraces sin or virtue not by a natural necessity, but of his own free-will (*in Ro* 9^{21}). Theodoret again shows his connexion with Antiochene teaching in his treatment of the consequences of Adam's sin. Like Theodore, he holds that Ro 5^{12} refers to the actual sins of Adam's descendants, which involved them in the same penalty of death as Adam. The 'old man' denotes not the nature, but the evil will (*in Rom.* 6^{6}). In other respects Theodoret is more in accord with general Church teaching.

The Antiochene conception of human nature, as exhibited in its most fully developed form in Theodore, tends to a purely teleological view of man's development. Its philosophical basis, like the rest of the Antiochene theology, is Aristotelian. Mortality, rather than sin, is the great enemy of man, and it involves him in weakness and subjection to the passions. The history of man is the story of the struggle of his will towards a perfection which can come only from a new creation, and from the introduction of a higher stage (*κατάστασις*) of existence, when this mortal and mutable condition will be transformed into one which is immortal and immutable. In this presentation the disorder introduced by sin occupies only a secondary place. The extent of the consequences of sin is minimized, and the religious view of sin tends to disappear. Redemption comes to have a different meaning from that which it has in the teaching of St. Paul, St. Athanasius, and St. Augustine (see below, § 7). In logical consistency, Theodore's conception of human nature surpasses that of other Greek Fathers. But it fails to take account of those elements in the religious consciousness of man to which St. Augustine gave full expression (cf. Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, vol. iii. p. 279 f.).

6. Christology.—The Christology of the Antiochenes, which was closely connected with their doctrine of human nature, constitutes their chief importance for the history of doctrine. Their

teaching has links of connexion with the teaching current in earlier periods at Antioch (cf. above, I.), and, as Harnack has observed (*Hist. of Dogma*, vol. iv. p. 166, n. 1), there is an essential unity in scientific method between Paul of Samosata, Lucian, Eusebius of Emesa, Eustathius, Diodorus, Theodore, Chrysostom, and Theodoret. The features common to this treatment are (1) the rejection of metaphysical speculation (cf. above, I.); (2) the attention paid to the historical portrait of Christ in the Gospels; (3) the ethical interest, which leads them to assert a true moral development in the humanity of Christ; (4) the Aristotelian basis of their conception of *οὐσία*, which was taken by them to denote a particular individual being (Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, iii. p. 46; Bethune-Baker, *Introd. to Early Hist. of Christian Doctr.* pp. 112, 235). This rendered it difficult for them to conceive of a complete nature which was not personal.

But, while there is a general resemblance in the method of treatment exhibited by all these writers, there are considerable divergences in their theological standpoint. Lucian of Antioch, starting from the teaching of Paul of Samosata, departed from him in affirming (with Origen) the personal and pre-existent character of the Logos, who was united with the man Jesus. The later Antiochene school, which began with Diodorus, was further marked off from Lucian by its acceptance of the full Nicene teaching upon the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father (in place of the subordinate created Logos of Lucian; cf. above, I.). In other respects, however, this later school, represented by Diodorus, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Chrysostom, and Theodoret, still retained the essential characteristics of the earlier Antiochenes. Diodorus and Theodore represent the more fully developed form of this teaching. Chrysostom is more practical and less scientific, though in his case, too, the underlying conceptions show the influence of his Antiochene training. Theodoret, in his criticism of Cyril's anathemas, exhibits the Antiochene standpoint, though later on he expressed himself more nearly in accord with the position of Cyril of Alexandria.

The Christological language of the Antiochenes was influenced partly by their desire to avoid the suggestion of a confusion of natures, and partly by traditional usage derived from the undeveloped theology of an earlier period. It has, however, been thought to show an 'Adoptianist' bias. Thus (1) they commonly speak of God as 'dwelling in Christ' (Eustath., Diod., Theod., Theodoret, Nestorius) rather than of God becoming man. (2) They apply to the humanity the terms *ναός, οἶκος, σκηνή*. These terms were, however, derived from Scripture (Jn 2^{19}, Pr 91, Jn 1^{14}), and are occasionally found in Athanasius. (3) They use language which seems to imply a personal human subject distinct from the Divine subject in Christ (*ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἄνθρωπος ἀναληφθείς, ὁ λαβών, ὁ ληφθείς, ὁ χρίσας, ὁ χριστός*; so Eustath., Diod., Theod., Nestorius, Theodoret). Such language, however, finds occasional parallels in Athanasius and the Cappadocians (see art. CAPPADOCIAN THEOLOGY, § vi. (4)). (4) Side by side with these phrases, however, they use impersonal expressions to denote the human nature (*τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ὄργανον*, forma servi, *σάρξ*, quod assumptum est, natura assumpta). (5) They approach more nearly to the language of Athanasius and Cyril when they speak of the Divine personal subject as 'assuming' (*λαμβάνειν*, assumere, *ἀναλαμβάνειν*, Eustath., Diod., Theod., Theodoret) man (or human nature), as 'bearing' (*φορεῖν*, Eustath., Nest.) man, or, lastly, as 'becoming' man (Eustath.). The expressions, 'homo deifer,' 'homo deum ferens,' quoted from Eustathius by Gelasius (Migne, *PG* xviii. 694), are probably due to a misreading of the original *θεόφορος* (for *θεοφόρος*). If *θεόφορος* were the original, the phrases would be parallel to the language quoted above (*ἄνθρωπον φορεῖν*). See Bethune-Baker, *Christian Doctrine*, p. 276 f.). On the state of Christological speculation before the rise of Apollinarism, see Athanasius, *Ep. ad Epictetum*.

Apart from the influences of their training, the Antiochenes were largely affected by the controversy with Apollinarism, which led them to affirm the reality and completeness of the human nature assumed by Christ, to emphasize especially His possession of free-will, and to guard against any idea of the confusion of the two natures or of a transformation of the human nature into the Divine nature.

Our chief sources of information about the Christology of Diodorus are the fragments of his work against Apollinaris (*πρὸς τοὺς συνουσιαστάς*), found in Marius Mercator (ed. Baluze) and in Leontius of Byzantium, *c. Nest. et Eutych.* (iii. 43). For Theodore we have the fragments of his works, *de Incarnatione* and *contra Apollinarium*, collected from various sources; the Acts of the Fifth General Council, the works of Facundus and Leontius, and the Syriac MSS translated into Latin by Sachau. See Migne, *PG* lxvi.; Swete, *Theodore of Mops. on the Epp. of St. Paul*, vol. ii., Appendix; Sachau, *Theodori Mops. fragmenta Syriaca*. Of special value is Theodore's confession of faith contained in the Acts of the Council of Ephesus, and in a Latin form in Marius Mercator (see Hahn, *Bibliothek der Symbole*[3], p. 302 f.).

The teaching of Diodorus and Theodore may be summarized as follows:—

(1) Against Apollinaris, Theodore asserted the completeness of the manhood of Christ and His possession of a reasonable soul as well as human flesh (see 'Creed' in Hahn, p. 302 f., and Sachau, p. 38). Especially important is his insistence on the freedom of the human will in Christ (on his conception of freedom, cf. above, § 3). As freedom cannot, according to his view, be ready-made, it involves a process of development in the humanity (cf. the *προκοπή*, or 'moral advance' of Paul of Samosata). Further, in accordance with Theodore's conception of two stages in the history of created intelligent beings (cf. above, § 3), it was necessary that Christ should assume humanity in its mutable state, subject to bodily weakness and the passions of the soul. Christ submitted to the assaults of the Tempter, and underwent the moral struggle between the higher and lower impulses (Migne, *PG*, lxvi. 720, 992, 995). By this struggle He mortified sin in the flesh and tamed its lusts (*ib.* 720). Theodore further admitted a real ignorance in Christ, and an advance in human knowledge (*ib.* 977, 981). Similarly, Diodorus asserts that the Godhead did not impart to the manhood of Christ all wisdom at the moment of birth, but bestowed it gradually (Marius Mercator, ed. Baluze, p. 349). Cf. CAPPADOCIAN THEOLOGY, vi. (2).

(2) But it is in their conception of the relations of the human and Divine natures that the teaching of Diodorus and Theodore exhibited a tendency which finds its extreme expression in Nestorianism. It is here, too, that the traditional 'Adoptianism' of Antiochene teaching appears. Both Diodorus and Theodore drew a sharp distinction between the human and Divine elements in Christ, and thus exposed themselves to the charge of teaching the existence of two persons in Christ. Thus Diodorus distinguished (Leontius, *c. Nest. et Eutych.* iii. 43) in Christ two sons: one by nature, God the Word; the other by grace, the man who was born of Mary. God the Word is not to be supposed the son of Mary. He may, however, be called *καταχρηστικῶς*, 'Son of David,' because of the shrine of God the Word which came from David, just as He who was of the seed of David may be called 'Son of God' by grace, not by nature. Similarly, Theodore denies that God was born of Mary (Migne, p. 997); though elsewhere he asserts that Mary may be called both *θεοτόκος* and *ἀνθρωποτόκος* ('God-bearing' and 'man-bearing'), the latter in a natural sense, the former because God was in Him who was born (Migne, p. 992; cf. Nestorius in Loofs' *Nestoriana*, pp. 167, 301). When it is said that 'the Word became flesh,' this must be understood of appearance only, for the Word was not changed into flesh (Migne, 981). The object of both writers in these statements is jealously to guard against any idea of a confusion of the two natures. But, apart from this negative aim, both Diodorus and Theodore exhibit a positive tendency to regard the human nature as possessed of an independent personality. This led them to conceive of the union of the two natures as a moral

union of grace (whereas Cyril started from the conception of One Divine Person, who has become incarnate, and maintained a hypostatic [*καθ' ὑπόστασιν*] union).

The nature of the union is discussed most fully by Theodore in the *de Incarnatione* (Migne, p. 972 f.). He distinguishes three possible modes of the Divine indwelling. The first is by 'essence' or 'being' (*οὐσία*). But in Scripture the Divine indwelling is spoken of as a special privilege of the saints (Lv 26^{12}, 2 Co 6^{16}). This excludes therefore an 'essential' indwelling, since the *οὐσία* (or 'being') of God is not circumscribed by place. A second mode of indwelling is by the operation or energy (*ἐνεργεία*) of God. But this is common to all created things. Accordingly the only remaining mode in which the Divine indwelling is possible is by the Divine approval or complacency (*εὐδοκία*), the moral union by which God dwells in those who are pleasing to Him. How then did the union of God with the man Christ differ from His union with the saints? The answer is that He dwelt in Christ as in a Son (Migne, p. 976). Christ received the whole grace of the Spirit, whereas in other men the participation in the Spirit was partial (*ib.* p. 980; cf. Diodorus *ap.* Marius Mercator, ed. Baluze, p. 351; Nestorius, Loofs, p. 206). This indwelling of Christ began with His formation in the womb of the Virgin, and was a result of the Divine foreknowledge of what Christ would be (Migne, pp. 974, 980, 994). At His baptism Christ further received the grace of adoption. As a result of His supernatural birth, His inseparable union with the Word, and His unction by the Holy Spirit, Christ exhibited a hatred of evil and an irrepressible love of good (see below (3)). He was preserved by His union with the Word from the inconstancy of mutable human nature, and passed from stage to stage of virtue with the greatest ease (*ib.* 977). He thus proved Himself worthy of the union, and became our example and way, until after the Resurrection and Ascension He exhibited the union with the Word in its final completeness (*ib.* 977).

(3) In its treatment of the unity of Christ's Person, the teaching of Diodorus and Theodore exhibits a lack of precision and logical completeness. As we have seen, they tended to view the two natures apart, and to conceive of their union as a moral union of grace. Moreover, their idea of a complete human nature involved the notion of a distinct human personality (cf. above). 'When we distinguish the natures,' says Theodore, 'we maintain that the nature of God the Word is perfect, perfect too the person (*πρόσωπον*)—for it is not possible to speak of a distinct existence (*ὑπόστασιν*) which is impersonal (*ἀπρόσωπον*)—perfect too the nature of the man, and the person (*πρόσωπον*) likewise. But when we look to the conjunction of the two, then we say that there is one person (*πρόσωπον*)' (Migne, p. 981). The nature of the unity thus attained is in one passage compared by Theodore to that of marriage. As the Lord said of the man and the woman, 'They are no longer twain, but one flesh' (Mt 19^6), so it may be said of the union that there are no longer two persons (*πρόσωπα*) but one, the natures, of course, being kept distinct (Migne, p. 981). Elsewhere he compares the unity to that of the rational soul and flesh in man (*adv. Apoll.* ap. Facund. ix. 4). Theodore employs the terms *ἕνωσις* ('union') and *συνάφεια* ('conjunction') to denote the union of the natures. In his interpretation of this union he uses phrases which imply that it consisted in the harmonious relation of the human and Divine wills in Christ (cf. the phrase *ἑνώσας αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ τῇ σχέσει τῆς γνώμης*; Migne, p. 989). Theodore, however, was conscious that the charge of teaching two sons might be brought against him, and he repudiated it. 'The Son,' he says, 'is rightly confessed to be one, since the distinction ought of necessity to remain, and the unity of person (*πρόσωπον*) ought to be guarded without interruption' (Migne, p. 985; see the 'Creed' in Hahn, *op. cit.* p. 303; cf. Nestorius, Loofs, p. 330 f.). Similarly Diodorus refutes the charge of teaching two sons by saying that he neither affirms that there are two sons of David, nor that there are two sons of God according to substance, but that the Word of God dwelt in Him who came from the seed of David (Marius Mercator, ed. Baluze, p. 350).

For a fuller discussion of the question, see Dorner, *Person of Christ*, II. i. 47 *f.* Theodore has points of contact with the mystical theology when he emphasizes love as the principle which brings the humanity of Christ into harmony with the Word. 'The thought and volition of the man Jesus were, in point of *contents*, the thought and volition of the Logos.' 'The *form* in which the mind of Jesus actually expressed itself was determined by the Logos; though, in consonance with his theory of freedom, he represented this determination as a mere influence of the Logos' (Dorner, *l.c.*).

(4) Both Diodorus and Theodore assert the unique character and privileges of the sonship acquired by the man Christ. They both apply the words spoken at the baptism, 'This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased,' to Christ and not to the Word (Marius Mercator, p. 350; Theodore, *in Mt* 3^{17}; *de Incarn.*, Migne, p. 980). The title Son is applied both to God the Word and to the nature assumed by Him, by reason of its union with Him (Theodore, *de Incarn.* ap. Facund. ix. 3; cf. Nestorius, Loofs, p. 336). As a result of the union with the Word and His adoption as Son, the man Christ shares in the worship which is offered to the Word. 'We worship,' says Diodorus, 'the purple for the sake of Him who is clothed in it, and the temple because of Him who dwells in it; the form of the servant because of the form of God; the lamb because of the high priest; Him who was assumed, because of Him who assumed Him; Him who was formed of the Virgin, because of the Maker of all. Confessing this, offer one worship' (Marius Mercator, ed. Baluze, p. 351; cf. Theodore, *in Col* $1^{13\text{-}16}$; *de Incarn.*, Migne, pp. 991 f., 996; Nestorius, Loofs, p. 262).

This teaching of Diodorus and Theodore, which apparently escaped censure during their lifetime, attained public notoriety through Nestorius, the patriarch of Constantinople. Nestorius merely popularized the teaching of his master, Theodore, without exhibiting the same fundamental depth of treatment. The real parent of Nestorianism as a system of Christology is Theodore. See, further, art. NESTORIANISM.

The Christology of three other representatives of the school of Antioch calls for notice here.

Eustathius of Antioch is an important link between the earlier and later stages of the school. His works exhibit some of the characteristic Antiochene features. He ascribes to Christ a true human development, and speaks of the human nature as the temple of the Deity. The Divine nature is dissociated from the experiences of the human nature. It was the latter alone which was anointed and glorified. He further implies that Christ acquired the Divine gifts and graces gradually. Hence Dorner (*Person of Christ*, I. ii. 250) says that with him, as with the later Antiochenes, 'the deity and humanity remain separate and distinct, and do not constitute a living unity.' Yet Eustathius affirms the closeness of the union between the humanity of Christ and the Logos (Migne, xviii. p. 689, *συνδιατιμένη κυρίως ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ Χριστοῦ τῷ Λόγῳ καὶ θεῷ*. 'He is God by nature, yet He has become man of a woman, even He who was formed in the womb of the Virgin' (Migne, lxxxiii. p. 90). See fragments collected in Galland, *Bibl. vet. Patr.* iv. 577 *f.*; Mai, *Script. vet. Nova Coll.* (1832) vii. 135, 203; Cavallera, *S. Eustathii in Lazarum Hom.*, App. I. *de fragmentis Eustathii* (1905).

Chrysostom approaches Christological questions from the practical rather than from the speculative side. Like all the Antiochenes, he emphasizes the completeness of the humanity of Christ. Christ shared our mortal nature, but without sin, and was subject to the physical needs, the human emotions, and the sufferings of our humanity. He exhibits the characteristic Antiochene spirit when he asserts that Christ did all that He did in a human manner, not only to teach the reality of His incarnation, but as a pattern or ideal of human virtue. But the idea of Theodore, that the human nature was gradually moulded by the

influence of the Word finds no place in his teaching. Chrysostom further shows signs of Antiochene influence in dealing with the union of the two natures. He repudiates the idea that the Incarnation involved any change of place in the Deity, or that the Logos descended into the flesh of Christ. He interprets the humiliation of Christ (Ph 2^8) as a humiliation of mind. Again, he distinguishes, after the manner of the Antiochenes, the experiences of the humanity from those of the Godhead, and, like Eustathius, he declares that it was the humanity, and not the Godhead, which was anointed and exalted. Lastly, he speaks of the humanity as the temple of the Word. On the other hand, he asserts the unity of the two natures, and explains the passages which suggest Christ's dependence on the Father as the language of accommodation (*συγκατάβασις*). But he nowhere clearly defines the character of the union of the two natures, and much of the language quoted above suggests a merely ethical union and a dynamical relationship rather than a full personal union. Chrysostom's Christology, in fact, exhibits an undeveloped character. He is content to put side by side the affirmation of the two natures and the assertion of their union. Though he shares to some extent the Antiochene point of view, the more fully developed conclusions of the school were, in his case, held in check by his own practical bent and the influence upon him of other forms of Church teaching. See, further, Förster, *Chrysostomus in seinem Verhältniss zur antiochenischen Schule*, p. 101 ff.

Theodoret occupies a mediating position in the Christological controversies of his time. On the appearance of Cyril's anathemas against Nestorius, he published a refutation in which he charged Cyril with Apollinarism. (The *Reprehensio Anathematismorum* is printed in Schulze's edition of Theodoret, v. p. 1 ff., and in Migne, lxxvi. p. 391 f.). In this work he exhibits the same tendency to accentuate the distinction of the two natures which characterizes Theodore and Diodorus, and the same inability to conceive of a complete nature which is not personal. He denies that God the Word was naturally (*φύσει*) conceived of the Virgin, and prefers to say that 'He fashioned for Himself a temple in the Virgin's womb, and was with (*σννῆν*) that which was formed and begotten.' Similarly, he maintains that the weaknesses of the humanity cannot be attributed to God the Word. Lastly, it was not the Christ (*i.e.* the Word) who suffered, but the man assumed by God. He maintains, however, that the 'form of the servant' may be confessed to be God on account of the 'form of God' united to it. The Formula of Concord (A.D. 433), by which the differences of Cyril and the Antiochenes were reconciled, is probably the work of Theodoret, and represents a *rapprochement* between the two points of view. In place of Cyril's phrase, 'one incarnate nature of God the Word' (*μία φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένη*), it speaks of the unconfused union of two natures (*δύο φύσεων ἕνωσις ἀσύγχυτος*). At the same time it admits the term *θεοτόκος*, while carefully explaining it (Hahn, *Bibl. der Symbole*^{3}, p. 215). In the *Eranistes* (*Dial.* ii., Migne, lxxxiii. p. 145 f.), written in A.D. 447, he states the idea of a *communicatio idiomatum* in a way which is quite in accord with the later theology of the Church. Though we may not attribute to one nature what belongs to the other, we may attribute to the One Person what is proper to either of the natures. Theodoret nowhere goes so far as Theodore in affirming that the union of the natures was a moral union (*κατ' εὐδοκίαν*). He maintains that in Christ there was one undivided Person (*ἓν πρόσωπον ἀδιαίρετον*), though he does not anywhere acknowledge one hypostasis (*ὑπόστασις*), or employ Cyril's phrase, *ἕνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν* ('hypostatic union'). Finally, at the Council of Chalcedon, Theodoret made an orthodox confession.

Theodoret maintained that Christ assumed mutable (*τρεπτή*) human nature, which was subject to human passions, though it was kept free from sin. He experienced the temptations arising from the natural appetites, but not the sinful motions to which they commonly give rise (*Repr. Anathem.* 10; *Pental.*, Migne, lxxxiv. 68; *Hæret. Fab.* 5, Migne, lxxxiii. 497). He further acknowledged a true human ignorance in Christ, and an advance in knowledge 'as the indwelling Godhead revealed it.' So, too, in the *Repr. Anathem.* (10), he maintains that Christ attained perfection by efforts of virtue, and learnt obedience by experience, 'though before His experience He was ignorant of it.' In these statements we see the true Antiochene spirit, though Theodoret is far removed from the more extreme conclusions of Theodore. For a fuller discussion of Theodoret's Christology, see Bertram, *Theodoreti Ep. Cyrensis Doctrina Christologica*; J. Mahé in *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, vii. (1906), art. 'Les anathématismes de Saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie et les évêques orientaux du patriarchat d'Antioche.'

The Christology of the Antiochenes was the outcome partly of their training, and partly of their opposition to Apollinarism. The historical study of Scripture, and the high conception entertained by them (esp. Theodore) of the dignity and destiny of human nature, led them to emphasize to the fullest extent the humanity of the Lord. Their ideas of free-will and the moral development of man impelled them to oppose any teaching which impaired the reality of our Lord's human experiences, or tended (like Apollinarism) towards a docetic view of His humanity. The Alexandrian school, on the other hand, started from the Divine aspect of Christ's Person. It was the truth that God Himself was revealed in Christ which from the days of Athanasius had been emphasized in Alexandrian teaching. Hence Cyril of Alexandria was led to lay stress upon the unity of the Word Incarnate. The humanity of Christ does not belong to Himself. It is not the humanity of an individual and independent man, but of God the Word. The human element was subordinated to the Divine. The Word has taken human nature into the unity of His Divine Person, which remains one and the same after as well as before the Incarnation. The Antiochenes had not clearly faced the problem as it presented itself to Cyril. They had affirmed the integrity of the two natures, and they had asserted their ineffable union. But the nature of this union and the exact relations of the two natures had not been considered by them. Hence arise the apparently inconsistent statements of Theodore that the humanity is personal (*πρόσωπον*), yet Christ is one Person (*πρόσωπον*).

Much of the misunderstanding between Cyril and the Antiochenes arose out of the undeveloped stage of doctrine at the time, and the absence of any clear definitions of the words *πρόσωπον* ('person'), *ὑπόστασις* ('hypostasis'), and *φύσις* ('nature'). Nor had the union of the natures been clearly defined. The terms 'mixture,' 'blending,' 'union,' 'connexion' (*μίξις, κρᾶσις, ἕνωσις, συνάφεια*) had been used indifferently by earlier writers to denote this union (see art. CAPPADOCIAN THEOLOGY, § vi. (3)). The Antiochenes, from traditional habit, attributed to each of the natures that which befitted it, when regarded as independent. Cyril, on the other hand, referred everything to the personal subject, who is the Word. When brought face to face, both schools of thought admitted the unity of Person, and both asserted the integrity and distinction of the two natures. The difference between them was exaggerated by misunderstanding and controversy. The unguarded language of Diodorus, Theodore, and Nestorius was, doubtless, largely responsible for this, but the Formula of Concord agreed upon by Cyril and the Antiochenes exhibits the fundamental agreement of the two Christologies. The Antiochenes accepted and explained the word *θεοτόκος*, the unity of the two natures was affirmed, and Cyril's misunderstood expressions, *φυσικὴ ἕνωσις, ἕνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν, μία φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένη* ('natural union,' 'personal union,' 'one incarnate nature of God the Word'), were dropped. See, further, Mahé in *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, referred to above; for Nestorius see Loofs, *Nestoriana* (1905), and Bethune-Baker, *JThSt* viii. p. 119 f.

While Cyril affirmed a truth of vital importance to Catholic theology,—the truth that He who assumed human nature was personally God, and took human nature into vital union with Himself,—we are justified in maintaining the importance of the stand made by the Antiochenes in defence of the reality and completeness of Christ's human experiences. It was a valuable protest against an almost docetic tendency which had already appeared in Apollinarism, which was latent in Alexandrian theology (even in Athanasius), and which re-appeared in Monophysitism. If the Church was finally enabled to overcome the latter, it was largely due to what it had learnt from the teaching of the Antiochenes.

7. The Work of Christ.—Theodore alone among the Antiochene Fathers developed a distinctive conception of the work of Christ. His views upon human nature and sin led him to find the central significance of Christ's work not so much in His Death as in His Resurrection. The purpose of the Incarnation was the perfection (*τελείωσις*) rather

than the restitution of humanity. Christ is the new creation, who exhibits God's plan in its final completeness. In Him there is set forth that image of God which man was meant to attain, but which he failed to attain. The work of Christ was not only to restore the broken order of the universe and exhibit man in his true place at the head of creation, but to inaugurate that new stage (*κατάστασις*; cf. above, § 3) in the life of man, in which he should be free from the mutability and mortality of his present state. As a result of His struggle and victory, accomplished by the exercise of His free-will and through the union with the Word, Christ overcame the mutability of human nature, which was crucified with Him and rose with Him (*in Rom.* 6^{6}). The deliverance which He has won for men is already potentially theirs, though it is only in the future that it fully takes effect.

The omissions in this presentation are significant. The conceptions of guilt and responsibility, and the idea of Christ's death as an atonement, are absent. Death is but a necessary stage, through which Christ passes to the Resurrection and inaugurates the higher and final stage of man's development. The necessity of the Incarnation is not based upon the Fall, but upon the general conception of the Divine purpose for man, which required that he should be delivered from his present state of mortality. There are points of contact in this teaching with the teaching of Irenæus, Athanasius, and the Cappadocians, especially in the emphasis laid upon death and mortality. But we miss in Theodore the strong interest in the redemptive side of Christ's work which characterizes Athanasius, and the deeper teaching upon death which he and other Fathers exhibit. Again, Theodore's emphasis on man's free-will led him to assert, as Dorner says (*Person of Christ*, II. i. 51), not so much 'the thorough reality of the incarnation of God,' as 'the reality of the freedom of the human aspect of Christ's Person.' The purpose of Christ's work was to exhibit the development of human nature in its completeness. And in this development the thought of the forgiveness of sins and the work of grace is subordinate to that of the need of moral effort. See, further, Dorner, *l.c.*; cf. above, § 5, and below, § 8.

Chrysostom and Theodoret are much nearer to the general tradition of the Church in their teaching upon Christ's work. The conception of Christ as the 'first-fruits' (*ἀπαρχή*) of human nature, which is consecrated in Him, was suggested to them, as to Theodore, by their exegesis of Scripture. But it was not peculiar to the Antiochenes. More characteristic of Antiochene teaching is Chrysostom's picture of Christ as the original pattern or ideal of human virtue, to exhibit which was the purpose of His human life and experiences (*in Joh. hom.* 48). In their conception of the Atonement, Chrysostom and Theodoret echo much of the current teaching of their time (*e.g.* the deception of Satan, Christ's contest with him and overthrow of his dominion over mankind), but they exhibit nothing characteristic of the Antiochene standpoint. The same is true of the idea found in Theodoret (*de Providentia, Or.* x., Migne, lxxxiii. pp. 753, 756), that Christ paid the debt and endured the chastisement and penalty due to us for our sins. Chrysostom, though he emphasizes the importance of the Resurrection, does not, like Theodore, make it the central point of Christ's work.

8. The work of Salvation.—(1) The task of reconciling man's free-will with God's predestination was attempted by both Theodore and Chrysostom. Both reject the idea of an absolute predestination in favour of a conditional predestination. God's purpose, says Theodore, is dependent on man's free-will (*in Rom.* 8^{28}; cf. Chrys. *in Joh. hom.* 46). Both, too, regard God's eternal election of men as determined by His foreknowledge of what they would be (Chrys. *in Matt. hom.* 79; Theodore, *in Rom.* $9^{16.\ 14}$; so, too, Theodoret, *in Rom.* 8^{30} 9^{11}). On their interpretation of Ro 9, see Chase, *Chrysostom*, p. 165 f.; Sanday-Headlam, *Romans*, p. 270.

(2) In dealing with man's appropriation of salvation, the Antiochenes, owing to their views upon human nature, fail to do justice to St. Paul's conception of justification by faith. Though Theodore denies that man can be justified by works, yet the initiative of the individual occupies so prominent a place in his conception that faith enters into it only as a secondary idea (*in Cor.* 11^{34}). Moreover, the faith of which he speaks is different in character from that of St. Paul, being directed rather to the future resurrection life, which man shares at present, through his incorporation in Christ, only in anticipation (*in Gal.* $2^{16.\ 20}$). Chrysostom's treatment is practical. In some passages he emphasizes the act of will by which man turns from evil and inclines to good, and in others he maintains the importance of faith, and attributes all to grace. But the two ideas are not clearly brought into relation with one another (see Förster, *Chrysostomus*, p. 152 f.).

(3) From what has been said above, it will appear that the Antiochene attitude towards the question of the relations of grace and free-will resembled that of the Semi-Pelagians (on the relations of Theodore and Julian of Eclanum, cf. above, § 5). In the teaching of both Theodore and Chrysostom the initiative lies with the individual will, though both affirm the necessity of grace (Chrys. *in Joh. hom.* 17, *in Rom. hom.* 16. 19; Theodore, *in Marc.* 4^{26-29}, *in 1 Cor.* 11^{34}, *in Heb.* $4^{1.\ 2}$).

9. The Sacraments.—There is no formal treatment of the Sacraments in the Antiochene Fathers. They accept the traditional Church teaching and practice, and assign a real value to the Sacraments in the furtherance of the spiritual life (Theodore, *in Cor.* 11^{34}, *in 1 Tim.* 3^{6}). In Baptism, according to Theodore, man receives the gift of union with Christ through the Spirit and the pledge of the immortality which he is destined to share hereafter with Christ (*in Eph.* $1^{22.\ 23}$).

In speaking of the Eucharist, Theodore and Chrysostom use the current language of their time. Thus Theodore, in commenting on Mt 26^{26}, speaks of the words of institution in terms which recall the language of Cyril of Jerusalem, and says that Christ teaches us that we are not to regard the nature of that which lies before us, but to consider that, by the thanksgiving pronounced over it, it is changed into flesh and blood. In his comment on 1 Co 10^{5}, however, he speaks of the change as spiritual. Chrysostom uses the emotional and rhetorical language of popular devotion, and goes much further in asserting a conversion of the elements (see Batiffol, *Études d'histoire et de théologie positive*, 2ième série, p. 268 f.). But the two most characteristic contributions to the doctrine of the Eucharist from the Antiochene standpoint are to be found in the writings of Nestorius and Theodoret. Both writers approach the subject in connexion with the Christological disputes. In reply to Cyril of Alexandria, who had affirmed that the flesh of Christ given in the Eucharist is 'life-giving' (*ζωοποιόν*) by virtue of its union with the Word, Nestorius maintains that this view tends to an Apollinarian confusion of the two natures. He appeals to the language of St. John (6^{56}) and St. Paul (1 Co $11^{23f.}$), and urges that it is the 'flesh,' and not the Godhead, which is spoken of as 'eaten.' Christ said, 'This is my body,' not 'This is my Godhead.' St. Paul speaks of that which is eaten as 'bread,' and, adds Nestorius, it is bread 'of which the body is the antitype.' The Eucharist is the 'memorial' of the death of the Lord, *i.e.* of the Son of Man (not the Word). See passages in Loofs, *Nestoriana*, pp. 227–30, 355–7, and in Cyril, *c. Nest.* iv. 3–6. These statements led Cyril to accuse Nestorius of denying the virtue of the Sacrament, and of confining it merely to the commemoration of the death of a man (*c. Nest.* iv. 5).

But probably the real difference between Cyril and Nestorius as to the nature and efficacy of the Sacrament was less than Cyril allows, and was due rather to the difference in their Christological statements. There is a fine recognition of the religious value of the Eucharist in Nestorius' sermon on Heb. 3[1] (Loofs, *Nestoriana*, p. 241 f.).

More important is the contribution of Theodoret. In the *Eranistes* (*Dial.* i. p. 56, Migne; *Dial.* ii. p. 165 f., *ib.*), where he is arguing with a Monophysite opponent, he introduces an analogy from the Eucharist to show that the two natures in Christ are not to be confused. From the current appellation of the elements as 'types' or 'symbols' of the body of Christ, the orthodox disputant maintains that Christ still possesses a real body. The Monophysite opponent rejoins by a counter-assertion that just as the elements after the invocation undergo a change, so the Lord's body after the union with the Divinity is changed into the Divine substance. This the orthodox speaker denies. 'Even after the consecration the mystic symbols are not deprived of their own nature; they remain in their former substance, figure, and form; they are visible and tangible as they were before. But they are regarded as what they have become, and believed so to be, and are worshipped as what they are believed to be.' And again he says (*Dial.* i. p. 56) that Christ 'honoured the visible symbols by the appellation of body and blood, not because He had changed their nature, but because He had added grace to their nature.' In this presentation (which resembles that of Pope Gelasius in the *de Duabus Naturis*) Theodoret exhibits a view of the Eucharist which has been called 'Dyophysite' (Batiffol), and which, while preserving the reality of the outward and inward parts of the Sacrament, guards against those theories of a conversion of the elements which, from the 4th cent. onwards, gained ground in the Eastern Church. The change, according to Theodoret, is in the region of grace (κατὰ χάριν), not in the natural sphere. See, further, art. EUCHARIST.

10. Eschatology.—The Antiochene conception of man's history and of the work of Christ culminates, as we have seen, in the hope of immortality. Hence the Antiochenes were profoundly interested in eschatology. From Eph 1[10] Theodore drew the conclusion that all men and all rational creatures will finally look to Christ and attain perfect harmony. The eschatological teaching of Diodorus and Theodore is one of the few points of agreement between them and Origen (see also CAPPADOCIAN THEOLOGY, § x. (3)). Both Diodorus and Theodore express, like Origen, the hope that, though the wicked will suffer just punishment for their sins, this punishment will not be everlasting. Diodorus protests against the idea that the punishment of the wicked will be unending, on the ground that it would render useless the immortality prepared for them. God rewards the good beyond their deserts. So, too, the extent of His mercy exceeds the debt of punishment which the wicked have to pay (Assemani, *Bibl. Orient.* III. i. p. 323 f.). Similarly, Theodore asks what would be the benefit of the resurrection to the wicked, if their punishment were unending (Marius Mercator, ed. Baluze, p. 346). When the wicked have been led through punishment to see the evil of sin and to fear God, they will at length enjoy His bounty. Such texts as Mt 5[26] and Lk 12[47. 48] inspire him with the hope that the full debt of punishment may be paid, and the wicked finally delivered (Assemani, *l.c.*).

III. *LATER HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF ANTIOCH.*—The condemnation of Nestorianism by the Church in A.D. 431 was fatal to the development of the school of Antioch and to the reputation of its great representatives. Marius Mercator about 431 maintained that Theodore was the real author of Pelagianism, and later on called attention to the Nestorian tendency of his teaching. The use made by the Nestorians of Theodore's writings further increased this animosity. Rabbulas, bishop of Edessa, and later on Cyril of Alexandria, condemned the teaching of the great Antiochene and of his predecessor Diodorus. In the 6th cent., amid the Monophysite controversy, the Emperor Justinian issued the edict of the Three Chapters (544), in which the writings of Theodore, the treatises of Theodoret against Cyril, and the letter of Ibas to Maris were condemned; and this condemnation was repeated by the Fifth General Council in 553, which by an irony of fate also condemned the works of Origen, the representative of the rival school of Alexandria. The same Council likewise condemned Theodore's methods of Biblical interpretation. But, while the proscription of Nestorianism was fatal to the school of Antioch and led to its decline, its teaching was carried on under Nestorian influence in the schools of Edessa and Nisibis. Ibas, the head of the school of Edessa († 457), translated the works of Diodorus and Theodore into Syriac, and when finally the school at Edessa was broken up in 489 through the proscription of Nestorianism by the Emperor Zeno, the refugees found a home in the school of Nisibis, which was founded by Barsumas. Here the Biblical studies to which the Antiochenes had given so great an impetus were renewed, Theodore's memory was held in the highest reverence, and he came to be regarded as 'the Interpreter' *par excellence* among East Syrian Christians. In these schools the study of Aristotle, also inherited from the school of Antioch, was carried on and transmitted by the East Syrian Church in later times to the Muhammadans, by whom it was brought back to Europe in the days of Muslim civilization. Lastly, these East Syrian Christians became a centre for a wide field of missionary activity in the far East, extending as far as India and China.

In the Greek Empire, though the fame of Diodorus and Theodore became obscured through the controversies which gathered around their memories, the exegesis of the Antiochenes continued to exercise a wide influence through the works of Chrysostom, whose orthodoxy was not exposed to the attacks which had been levelled against other members of the school. Isidore, Nilus, and Victor of Antioch took Chrysostom as their guide in the commentaries which they wrote, while a long line of Greek catenists and commentators from the 6th to the 11th cent. show the greatness of their debt to the Antiochene expositors. Even in the West their influence was not unrecognized. Jerome had points of contact with the school and was influenced by its exegesis (Kihn, *Die Bedeutung der antioch. Schule*, pp. 59, 194; Hergenröther, *Die antioch. Schule*, p. 66). Cassian, a disciple of John Chrysostom, carried on the teaching of his master in the Church of Southern Gaul. The controversies about the Three Chapters aroused interest in the writings of Theodore, and it is probably to this period that we owe the Latin translation of some at least of Theodore's commentaries on St. Paul, which, passing into currency under the name of St. Ambrose, secured a place in the works of the later Western compilers (Swete, *Theodore of Mops. on the Minor Epp. of St. Paul*, i. pp. xlv., lviii.). Two other famous works produced in the West show the influence of Theodore's teaching. The first is the *Instituta regularia* of Junilius Africanus (*c.* 550), an introduction to the study of the Scriptures, which, as the author tells us, was derived from Paul of Nisibis, and which reproduces all the

essential features of Theodore's principles of Biblical interpretation as well as of his doctrinal teaching. This work of Junilius, whom later ages transformed into a bishop, was widely popular in the West. The *de Institutione divinarum literarum* of Cassiodorus a few years later shows a similar connexion with the East Syrian schools, and exhibits the influence of methods and principles which had been derived from the Antiochenes (Kihn, *Theodor v. Mops. und Junilius Africanus*, pp. 210 f., 215 f.).

Nor was the West wholly uninfluenced by the doctrinal teaching of the Antiochenes. As has been already indicated (see II. 5), Theodore was brought into contact in his later years with several of the Pelagian leaders. Julian of Eclanum, one of the most prominent of these, was an admirer of Theodore's writings, while another, the deacon Anianus, has been claimed as the translator of some of Chrysostom's homilies, his object being to uphold, by appealing to Chrysostom, the cause of man's free-will (Swete, *op. cit.* vol. i. p. liii f.). The Christological teaching of Leporius, a monk in the monastery of Marseilles, who is spoken of by Cassian as a Pelagian, shows clear points of contact with that of Theodore. In North Africa, during the 6th cent., amid the controversy upon the Three Chapters, the works of Theodore found many defenders, and the language of Facundus of Hermiane has been thought to suggest that they had already been translated into Latin. Finally, the Spanish Adoptianists exhibit a close resemblance in their Christology to Theodore, and Neander has suggested that Felix of Urgel was indebted to the writings of Theodore, possibly through a Latin translation made in Africa (Swete, *op. cit.* vol. i. p. lv f.; Neander, *Ch. Hist.* v. 219; Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, v. 284 f.).

IV. *General summary.*—The permanent service of the Antiochene school lies in its effort to correct a one-sided view of the factors and methods of revelation. To the emotional, mystical religion, which tended to lose the human element in the Divine, whether in inspiration, or the Person of Christ, or the relations of grace and free-will, it opposed conceptions which endeavoured to do justice to the dignity and worth of human nature. While the Alexandrian theology started from the Divine side, and deduced all its conclusions from that as its source, the Antiochenes followed the inductive and rationalistic method, which consisted in a careful examination of the facts of human nature and experience. The philosophical basis of the one was Platonist, while that of the other was Aristotelian. In Christology the school of Antioch centred attention upon the historical Christ; in its doctrine of inspiration it affirmed the immediate and historical reference of Scripture; in anthropology it insisted upon the reality of human freedom. It regarded the purpose of the Incarnation as the accomplishment of man's destiny rather than as the deliverance of him from the consequences of sin. The struggle and conflict provoked by the commandment became a means of educating man to realize his freedom of choice and his weakness, and so of raising him out of the stage of subjection to the passions and mortality into the higher life of immortality and sinlessness which has been won for him by Christ. The two standpoints, the Alexandrian and the Antiochene, represent complementary aspects of Christian theology. If the Alexandrian and mystical standpoint has found fuller expression in the later thought and teaching of Christendom, the problems of modern thought, and the evolutionary view of the Universe, have once more called attention to the point of view which underlies the teaching of the Antiochenes.

Literature.—(1) *History of the School of Antioch* H. Kihn, *Die Bedeutung der antioch. Schule auf dem exeget. Gebiete* (1866); P. Hergenröther, *Die antioch. Schule und ihre Bedeutung auf exeget. Gebiete* (1860); Harnack, art. 'Antiochenische Schule' in *PRE*[3], vol. i. (1896), and *History of Dogma*. Eng. tr. vols. iii. and iv.

(2) *Biographical and literary*: on Paul of Samosata see Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, vol. iii., and art. in *PRE*[3]; on the disputation between Paul and Malchion see Bardenhewer, *Gesch. der altkirchl. Litteratur*, vol. ii. (1903); on Lucian of Antioch see Harnack, *Gesch. der altchristl. Lit.*, vol. i. (p. 526 f.), and art. in *PRE*[3], vol. xi. (1902); and on Lucian and Dorotheus see Bardenhewer, *op. cit.* On Eusebius of Emesa, Eustathius, Diodorus, Chrysostom, see artt. in *DCB* (Smith-Wace) and in *PRE*[3]. On Theodore see Loofs, art. in *PRE*[3], vol. xix. (1907); Swete, art. in *DCB*, and *Theodore of Mops. on the Minor Epp. of St. Paul*, vol. i. (1880); Kihn, *Theodor v. Mops. und Junilius Africanus als Exegeten* (1880); on Polychronius see Bardenhewer, *Polychronius Bruder Theodors v. Mops. und Bischof v. Apamea* (1879); on Theodoret see artt. in *DCB* and *PRE*[3], vol. xix. (1907); also N. Glubokowski, *Der selige Theodoret, Bischof von Cyrus, sein Leben und seine Schriftstellerische Thätigkeit* (in Russian), 2 vols. (Moscow, 1890).

(3) *The Exegesis of the Antiochenes*: Kihn, Hergenröther (*opp. citt.*); Kihn, *Theodor v. Mops.* (cited above); G. C. H. toe Water, *de Theodoro Antiocheno xii Prophet. min. interprete* (1837); Sieffert, *Theodor. Mops. V.T. sobrie interpretandi vindex* (1827); F. A. Specht, *Der exeget. Standpunkt des Theodor v. Mops. und Theodoret* (1871); Sanday, in *Expositor*, 1st series, vols. xi., xii. (1880); F. Baethgen, art. 'Der Psalmencommentar des Theodor v. Mops. in syrischer Bearbeitung' in *ZATW* v. (1885); Swete, art. 'Theodore' in *DCB*; F. H. Chase, *Chrysostom: A Study in the History of Biblical Interpretation* (1887).

(4) *The Theology of the Antiochenes*: (*a*) General: Neander, *Church History*, vol. iv.; Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, vols. iii. and iv.; Dorner, *Doctr. of Person of Christ*, II. i.; Bethune-Baker, *Introd. to Early History of Christian Doctrine* (1903). (*b*) Special treatises: on Paul of Samosata see A. Réville, 'La Christologie de Paul de Samosata' in *Études de critique et d'histoire*, 2ième série (Bibliothèque de l'école des hautes études, Sciences religieuses, vii., 1896); on Theodore see Swete, art. in *DCB*, and *Minor Epp. of St. Paul*, vol. i. Introd.; Kihn, *Theodor v. Mops.*; art. 'Theodore of Mops. and Modern Thought' in *CQR*, i. (1875); on Chrysostom see T. Förster, *Chrysostomus in seinem Verhältniss zur Antioch. Schule* (1869); on Theodoret see Bertram, *Theodoreti doctrina Christologica* (1883); J. Mahé, art. 'Les anathématismes de saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie et les évêques orientaux du patriarchat d'Antioche,' in *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, viii. (1906).

(5) *The later history of the School of Antioch*: see works of Kihn, Hergenröther, cited above; Chase, *Chrysostom* (cited above); Swete, art. 'Theodore' in *DCB*, and *Theodore of Mops. on Minor Epp. of St. Paul*, vol. i. Introd.; Harnack, art. 'Antiochenische Schule' in *PRE*[3] (cited above). On Junilius Africanus see Kihn, *Theodor v. Mops. und Junilius* (cited above).

J. H. Srawley.

ANTIPATHY.—Antipathy is a state of mind or feeling expressing some sort of dislike or hatred of an object or person. Its proper reference is to persons, and it is often a milder or more polite term for hostility. Its analogue is found in the repulsion existing between elements of matter under certain conditions, as sympathy has its analogue in attraction or affinity between them. Thus an æsthetic man may have an antipathy or aversion towards an unæsthetic or vulgar person; an unbeliever may have an antipathy towards a religious believer. Anything that excites our dislike creates antipathy. It is a state of mind quite consistent with morality, and may actually be essential to it in certain stages of development; but it does not imply anything either moral or immoral, though it may be a state of mind making certain moralities effective. Anger and hatred are closely associated with ethical implications, but antipathy has no such associations, but rather connotes the fact of mental or emotional antagonism without regard to ethical considerations.

James H. Hyslop.

ANTI-SEMITISM.—**1. Historical.**—The expression 'Anti-Semitism,' which was coined about thirty years ago, signifies not opposition to Semites in general, but a hostile or at least an unfriendly disposition on the part of Aryans towards Jews, both socially and commercially.

The expression 'Semitic languages' was used for the first time in the year 1781 (contemporaneously by the two Göttingen professors, August Ludwig

von Schlözer and Johann Gottfried Eichhorn) as a comprehensive designation for those related languages which were spoken by peoples brought into connexion with Shem, in the table of peoples in Gn 10. The Bonn professor, Christian Lassen, was the first to give expression to the view that these peoples, the 'Semites,' were in many respects distinct from the Aryans and other races (cf. *Indische Alterthumskunde*, vol. i. pp. 414–417, Bonn, 1847).

Lassen ascribes to the Indo-Germanic race a 'higher and a more complete mental endowment.'

'The point of view of the Semite is subjective and egoistic. His poetry is lyrical, and therefore subjective. In his religion he is self-seeking and exclusive. The characteristic features of the Semitic spirit, the passionate disposition, the obstinate will, the firm belief in their exclusive rights, in fact the whole egoistic trend of mind, must have in the highest degree fitted their possessors for great and daring deeds. A bold spirit of enterprise, an energetic and persevering courage, great skill, and a fine discernment how to take advantage of favourable circumstances and means of help among strangers, characterize first the Phœnicians, and later the Arabs. As soldiers, sailors, and enterprising traders, not only can they place themselves on a par with Indo-Germanic peoples, but they have to some extent excelled their contemporaries of this race and been their predecessors.'

Ernest Renan has expressed himself in similar terms in *Hist. gén. des lang. sémit.*[1], Paris, 1855, and in *Études d'hist. relig.*[1], 1857. The Anti-Semites extracted from Renan many catch-words and lines of attack, although Renan's intentions did not lie in this direction. What he had said about Semites in general, they applied specially to the Jews. The influence of Renan's judgment of the Semites comes clearly to the front, *e.g.*, in an article which received much notice in its time, published anonymously, but written by the well-known ethnologist Friedrich von Hellwald, 'Zur Charakteristik des jüdischen Volkes' in *Das Ausland*, 1872 (Stuttgart), Nos. 38 and 40. We shall quote a few sentences here.

'In the case of the Jews, we have to do with an entirely different ethnic group. . . . This people, scattered and settled in Aryan Europe, is purely Semitic. From an anthropological point of view, the Jew who lives in our midst stands quite as far apart from us as the Arab; and the emphatic contrast between the two, usually indicated by the opposites, Christian and Jew, is for the most part exactly the same as the existing opposition between Aryanism and Semitism. The European feels, so to speak, instinctively in the Jew who stands over against him the foreigner who has immigrated from Asia. . . . From the time of their entrance into Canaan the Jews can boast of an almost exclusive national type, which has persisted with remarkable purity to the present day. . . . A further specific feature of Judaism is its extraordinary geographical extent and its remarkable power of adaptation. . . . All over the world, in all climates, Jews live in content and prosperity, in spite of having in some places to suffer very hard civil and social pressure. . . . In the east of Europe the Jew is sharply distinguished from the other elements of the population; he is an object of hate, but still an almost indispensable constituent of social life. Quite as rough and ignorant as the non-Jewish peasant, but in character ignoble and mean, while possessed of that cunning which is a natural endowment of the Semitic race, the Jew has understood how to make himself in economic relations master of the Christian population, which stands far below him in keenness of intellect, and whose hate he repays by plundering them in every conceivable direction. The Jews, like most of the Semites, possessed from the very beginning a cunning exceedingly valuable for all purposes of trade, a cunning which naturally tended to develop still further [owing to the oppression to which they were subjected]. . . . We cannot do otherwise than designate the Jews the very canker from which the lands of Eastern Europe suffer. No means (provided they are not violent; for everything for which personal courage is demanded is opposed in general to the Semitic, and especially to the Jewish, character) are too wicked for them to use in order to secure a material advantage. . . . In the civilized world there would be nothing to distinguish the Jew from his Aryan neighbours, were it not that nature has inscribed with indelible characters his certificate of birth on his countenance. . . . The difference of race, thanks to the free development which was possible, has been still more clearly emphasized than before.'

F. v. Hellwald speaks of the frugality of the Jews, of their love to their parents and children, of their system of mutual assistance, and of their extraordinary fertility.

'The great influence which the Jews, especially amid the Teutonic nations, have acquired in political, literary, and economic conditions, comes, too, from their excessive zeal for learning. Dark spots in the Jewish racial character are a consciousness of their own merits, often ridiculously exaggerated, and a boundless egoism. . . . Self-sacrifice, devotion, and love of country are conceptions foreign to the Jewish mind. The Jew everywhere feels himself a cosmopolitan. . . . The entire tendency of Jewish effort can be summed up in one word, "exploitation." Thanks to this method, instinctively and systematically employed, the Jews have actually reached a stage which enables them to control the rest of the population. . . . They have succeeded in concentrating in their hands enormous wealth. . . . Recognizing the power of the printed page on the masses, they have especially exerted themselves to obtain control over the daily press. . . . In many places journalist and Jew are identical conceptions. Equipped with a superficial and imperfect knowledge, they come forward as teachers of the people, accessible to every influence which suggests possibilities of gain. They form a focus of corruption more devastating than can well be imagined.'

These extracts from F. v. Hellwald, although they contain many false along with some correct opinions, are given here because many 'Anti-Semites' of the present day express themselves in exactly similar terms. He was one of the first to bring to clear expression what many at that time felt only in a vague way, and consequently his writing made so deep an impression and exerted so great an influence.

The expression 'Anti-Semite,' as will be clear from what has been said, is, so far as the present writer is aware, scarcely three decades old. In the year 1880, W. Marr published, at Chemnitz, under the general title *Antisemitische Hefte*, three short essays, 'Der Judenkrieg,' 'Oeffnet die Augen, ihr deutschen Zeitungsleser,' and 'Goldene Ratten und rothe Mäuse.'

Anti-Semitism, however, is more than two thousand years old. Cf. Est 3^8 'And Haman said unto king Ahasuerus, There is a certain people scattered abroad and dispersed among the people in all the provinces of thy kingdom; and their laws are diverse from all people; neither keep they the king's laws: therefore it is not for the king's profit to suffer them.'

But, leaving this passage out of account, we may regard Egypt, and especially Alexandria, as the seat of Anti-Semitism.

Cf. Felix Stähelin, *Der Antisemitismus des Altertums in seiner Entstehung und Entwicklung*, Basel, 1905; E. Schürer, *GJV*[3] iii. pp. 102–107, 397–420 (1898); Th. Reinach, *Textes d'auteurs grecs et romains relatifs au Judaïsme*, Paris, 1895.

As early as the times of the first Ptolemys many Jews resided in Alexandria. Their number increased especially during the time of the persecution of the Jewish religion by Antiochus Epiphanes. This persecution resulted in the Jews becoming more exclusive than ever in relation to adherents of other religions. Hateful accusations and bitter taunts, both to a large extent resting on ignorance, formed the answer of the heathen. Unfortunately the work of Flavius Josephus, *Against Apion*, is almost the only source of information we have. The earliest 'Anti-Semitic' author was the Egyptian priest Manetho (B.C. 270–250). Apion the grammarian (a contemporary of Christ) is best known to us from the still extant work of Josephus just referred to. Among the Romans we may mention Tacitus (*Hist.* v. 2 ff.) and the poets Horace, Juvenal, and Martial. The mockery of these writers was directed against circumcision, against abstinence from swine's flesh, and against the celebration of the Sabbath. The chief accusations brought against the Jews (apart from the assertion that the Jewish race was of late origin and had done nothing for culture) were: firstly, ἀθεότης, *i.e.* that the Jews rejected all Divine worship but their own, and consequently every image; secondly, ἀμιξία, *i.e.* the social exclusiveness connected with the laws of food and the Levitical laws of purity, which was interpreted for the Jews as 'adversus omnes alios hostile odium' (Tacitus, *Hist.* v. 5).

After Christianity obtained the supremacy over

heathenism in the Roman Empire, the Emperors (at a later date the Churches) of the separate lands, and many rulers regarded it as their duty to oppose Jewish influence, in order that the heathen, who had been newly won to Christianity, should remain Christians, and that the number of adherents might be more easily increased (cf. *e.g.* Fried. Wiegand, *Agobard von Lyon und die Judenfrage*, Erlangen and Leipzig, 1901). At a later date the wealth of many of the Jews, acquired for the most part by money-lending, attracted the cupidity of Christians. This was the case, *e.g.*, at the first Crusade (1096), and at the expulsion of the Jews from France by Philip IV. the Fair (1306). Religious motives were operative in the Jewish persecutions in the beginning of the second Crusade (1146; Abbot Peter of Clugny in France, the monk Rudolph of Mainz in Germany), as well as in the exclusion of the Jews from Spain in 1492 and from Portugal in 1497. In England, as early as the 12th cent. the maxim 'ipsi Judæi et omnia quæ regis sunt' held as law (Hovedon, *Annales*, ed. Stubbs, ii. 231). The Jews were regarded as the milk cow of kings; and as enormous sums of money were repeatedly demanded from them, they were almost compelled to procure these by means of usury. In this way the Jews called down the hate of the people upon themselves. Stories, some true, many fabricated, of acts of vengeance on the part of the Jews (murder or crucifixion of Christian children at the time of the Easter festival) were fitted, and were actually used, to rouse this hatred to uncontrolled passion. It was in the 13th cent. that the 'blood accusation' first came to the front in its latest and most objectionable form, viz. that the Jews required Christian blood for ritual purposes (cf. H. Strack, *Das Blut*[3], pp. 126, 194). In the same century attacks on the Talmud became very violent (cf. H. Strack, *Einleit. in den Talmud*[3], p. 68). The charge that Jews poisoned wells occurs probably for the first time in the 12th cent., in Bohemia; often in the 14th cent., in Switzerland and France, but especially in Germany. In the whole history of the Jews we find all too frequent proofs of hostile disposition and outbreaks of hatred, oppression, persecution, expulsion, and tyranny.

The French Revolution forms an important epoch in the history of the Jews. On the 27th of September 1791, the National Assembly declared the repeal of all exclusive measures directed against the Jews; the constitution of the year iii. (1795) recognized the Jews as possessing equal rights. The following legislation, as well as the Restoration, brought the Jews some restrictions, but these were set aside by the Revolution of July 1830. The Jews of Alsace, however, obtained this emancipation later, by means of the exertions of Adolphe Crémieux.

The course of events in France was not without influence in Germany. From 1799 onwards a great number of publications, some in favour of the Jews, and some against them, made their appearance.

Cf. J. de le Roi, *Gesch. der evang. Judenmission*[2], Leipzig, 1899, i. pp. 109–118. Several works against the granting of equal rights to the Jews may be mentioned here: C. W. F. Grattenauer, *Wider die Juden*, Berlin, 1803; O. G. Tychsen, *Gutachten über die Erweiterung der staatsbürgerl. Rechte der Juden in Mecklenburg-Schwerin* 1812 (see A. Th. Hartmann, *Olof Gerhard Tychsen*, i., Bremen, 1818, pp. 227–259, cf. pp. 202–208); Fried. Rühs, *Über die Ansprüche der Juden an das deutsche Bürgerrecht*, Berlin, 1816, and *Das Recht des Christenthums und des deutschen Reiches vertheidigt gegen die Ansprüche der Juden und ihre Verfechter*, Berlin, 1816.

In the year 1830, H. E. G. Paulus, the well-known representative of rationalism, demanded that the Jews should give up their ritual law as the condition of obtaining equal political rights (*Jüdische Nationalabsonderung*); a similar view was maintained by Carl Streckfuss in his *Über das Verhältniss der Juden zu den christlichen Staaten*, Halle, 1833 (a second pamphlet with the same title appeared in Berlin, 1843). The Rostock Orientalist, Anton Theodor Hartmann, who was well read in the Jewish literature, demanded that the Jews should expressly renounce the principles of injustice to be found in the Talmud and the *Shulḥān 'Arūkh* (i.e. those principles which, in the view of Hartmann and many others, allowed injustice against non-Jews or were otherwise opposed to morality). He demanded, further, that they should restrain themselves from all disparaging statements with regard to Jesus and those who were not Jews.

His writings on this subject are the following: *Joh. Andr. Eisenmenger*, Parchim, 1834; 'Darf eine völlige Gleichstellung in staatsbürgerlichen Rechten sämmtlichen Juden schon jetzt bewilligt werden?' in the *Archiv für die neueste Gesetzgebung aller deutschen Staaten*, ed. Alex. Müller, vols. v., vi. 1834–35; *Grundsätze des orthodoxen Judenthums*, Rostock, 1835 [a reply to Salomon's first letter]. Hartmann's views were keenly and in many respects cleverly attacked in two pamphlets by the Jewish preacher of Hamburg, Gotthold Salomon: *Briefe an Herrn Anton Theodor Hartmann*, Altona, 1835, and *Anton Theodor Hartmann's neueste Schrift 'Grundsätze des orthodoxen Judenthums' in ihrem wahren Lichte dargestellt*, Altona, 1835.

The commencement of the reign of the Prussian king Frederick William IV., who cherished the ideal of a 'Christian State,' gave a fresh stimulus to writings on the Jewish question. Among those who opposed the granting of equal civil rights to the Jews we have the following writers: H. E. Marcard, *Über die Möglichkeit der Juden-Emancipation im christlich-germanischen Staat*, Minden, 1843; and the well-known radical theologian, Bruno Bauer (died 1882), *Die Judenfrage*, Brunswick, 1843.

By the law of 3rd July 1869, absolute religious equality was granted within the North German Confederation, and soon after the same law was extended to the whole of the German Empire.

Modern Anti-Semitism arose in Germany in the eighth decade of last century (cf. J. de le Roi, *Geschichte*, i. pp. 258–272; A. Leroy-Beaulieu, *Israël chez les nations*[2], Paris, 1893). An important external cause was the daring attack made by many newspapers, possessed or edited by Jews, and appearing for the most part in Berlin, on many Christian topics (faith, constitution, recent events, ecclesiastical parties, and prominent persons connected with these); cf., *e.g.*, Franz Delitzsch, *Christentum und jüdische Presse*, Erlangen, 1882. As reasons for the rise and speedy spread of the Anti-Semitic movement, we may further mention, *secondly*, the great influence which the Jews had obtained in public affairs—to a large extent, of course, owing to the carelessness of the Christians. *Thirdly*, in newspaper writings, in the theatre, in some branches of art (music, *e.g.*, cf. Rich. Wagner, *Das Judenthum in der Musik*, Leipzig, 1869), in trade, and in several branches of industry (*e.g.* manufacture of ready-made articles of dress), the influence of the Jews appeared to many unreasonably great. *Fourthly*, the proud and ostentatious demeanour of many *nouveaux riches* Jews, who had acquired sudden wealth by speculation on the Stock Exchange, excited hatred. The same effect was produced, *fifthly*, by the economic dependence on the Jews into which many districts and occupations had fallen: *e.g.* a portion of the peasant population of Hesse had become dependent on cattle- and grain-merchants, while dressmakers and needlewomen were in the power of Jewish merchants; *sixthly*, by the support given to the Social Democratic party by Jewish leaders and Jewish money; *seventhly*, by the union among Jews of the whole world, *e.g.* *Alliance Israëlite Universelle*; and *eighthly*, by the exaggerated sensibility to every criticism and exposure of weaknesses on the part of Jews. *Ninthly*, there was a wide-spread feeling that the Jews were foreigners

among the Germans: the stricter Jews not only rejected intermarriage with Christians, but they also kept themselves socially separate from them, *e.g.* on account of the laws of food. Many Jews, particularly the Zionists, openly avow Palestine as their real fatherland, although for the time being it is beyond their reach.

We cannot here inquire more exactly how far these reasons, taken individually, justify opposition to the Jews, seeing that the conditions are widely different in the many lands where the Jews are numerous. An unprejudiced mind, examining the matter carefully, will, in our opinion, be compelled to recognize on the one hand that there are reasons for opposition, and on the other hand that jealousy of the wealth amassed by some Jews has enormous influence with great numbers.

We may mention here the following works from among the important pamphlets designed to spread and deepen the Anti-Semitic movement: C. Wilmans, *Die goldene Internationale und die Nothwendigkeit einer socialen Reformpartei*, Berlin, 1876 [3rd ed. 1876]; W. Marr, *Der Sieg des Judenthums über das Germanenthum vom nichtconfessionellen Standpunkt aus betrachtet*, Bern, 1879 [11th ed. 1879], *Wählet keinen Juden! Der Weg zum Siege des Germanenthums über das Judenthum*, Berlin, 1880 [4th ed. 1880]; Adolf Stöcker, *Das moderne Judentum in Deutschland, besonders in Berlin*, Berlin, 1879 [5th ed. 1880]; *Christlich-Social. Reden und Aufsätze*, Bielefeld, 1885 [2nd ed. 1890]; Heinrich von Treitschke, *Ein Wort über unser Judenthum*, Berlin, 1880 [4th ed. 1881]. Further papers and pamphlets are mentioned by Joseph Jacobs: *The Jewish Question, 1875–1881, Biographical Handlist*, London, 1885; Joh. de le Roi, *Nathanael* (ed. by H. Strack), 1887, pp. 65–89, *Geschichte*, i. pp. 258–271; and Deutsch, art. 'Anti-Semitism' in *JE* i. 641.

A very great influence was exerted by two speeches delivered before the Christian Social Labour party by Adolf Stöcker in Berlin in Sept. 1879: 'What do we demand from modern Judaism?' and 'Defence against modern Judaism' (both are printed together in the above-mentioned pamphlet on modern Judaism). In them Stöcker demands three things: 'a little more modesty, a little more tolerance, and a little more equality.' Hein. von Treitschke is the author of the phrases, frequently used since then, 'trousers-peddling young Poles' (*hosenverkaufende polnische Jünglinge*), and 'the Jews are our misfortune,' as well as the sentences: 'We do not wish that on the thousands of years of Teutonic civilization there should follow an age of a mixed German-Jewish culture,' and: 'We Germans are a Christian people, and the Jewish question in Germany will not be settled till our fellow-citizens of the Jewish race are persuaded that we are and will remain a Christian people.' An equally decided attitude has been taken, as is well-known, by Catholics in Germany, Austria, France, and Italy (cf. Deutsch in *JE* i. 643).

The irritation increased, and the conditions were made worse owing to the enormous emigration of Jews from the lands of Eastern Europe to the West, especially, since 1881, from Russia and Roumania, at first to Germany and then to America and England. The preventives used on the part of the German Government were: *firstly*, restriction, and later almost entire refusal, of nationalization to Jews coming from the East; *secondly*, regulations by means of which a rapid passage of the migrating Jews through Germany was assured, *e.g.* the appointment of special localities for the temporary sojourn of emigrants at the great centres of commerce on the route (Ruhleben near Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen, etc.); *thirdly*, turning out by the police authorities of persons without means or occupation, especially where there was any suspicion that those in question belonged to the Nihilists or Anarchists. The first measure of prevention adopted in England was the Aliens Bill. In the United States every immigrant is now required to show a small sum of money, in order to prevent the immigration of persons entirely destitute of means of support.

Only a few years later than in Germany, the flame of Anti-Semitism was kindled in Austria and in Hungary, by Istóczi in the Hungarian Parliament, and by Georg von Schönerer in the Austrian Imperial Assembly in Vienna (1882). In France a loud and successful agitator was found in the person of Ed. Drumont, whose book, *La France juive* (1st ed., Paris, 1886), has seen more than 100 editions. Since 1892 he has edited the Anti-Semitic journal *La libre Parole*. The case of Albert Dreyfus was long used, from 1894 onwards, as a means of rousing the passion of the Anti-Semites, especially in France. The matter ended in the year 1906 with the rehabilitation of Dreyfus and with his reappointment as Major in the French army. At the Berlin Congress of 1878 a resolution was passed that in Roumania all citizens, without distinction of religious belief, should enjoy equal rights. The Roumanian Government, however, supported by the Anti-Semitic majority in Parliament, devised a means of rendering this provision worthless. The Constitution declared that no one should be prevented by his religion from possessing civil and political rights, but it was immediately declared that the Jews were foreigners, and not Roumanians—a breach of trust unworthy of a government and a people professing to be Christian. Besides, good school education and admission to public hospitals were made almost impossible for Jews, and the authorities have sought, by means of a series of new laws, regulations, and police restrictions, to make it unbearable for Jews to remain in Roumania.

For the Jews of the Russian Empire, the death of Alexander II. in 1881 was fraught with grave significance. Soon after the accession of Alexander III., fearful persecutions of the Jews (*pogrom*, pl. *pogromy*) were begun, and by the laws passed in May, 1882, the freedom of movement of the Jews in the 15 provinces of the territory for settlement, already small enough, was still further limited. The chief attacks on the Jews took place in the years 1903 (at Easter in Kishenev; see H. Strack's remarks in his periodical *Nathanael*, 1903, pp. 78–93, and 1904, pp. 62–64; L. Errera, *Les Massacres de Kishinev*, Brussels, 1903; I. Singer, *Russia at the Bar of the American People*, New York, 1904; C. Adler, *The Voice of America on Kishineff*, Philadelphia, 1904), 1905 (in October at Odessa and many other towns), and 1906 (at Bialystok and other places). In view of the events of the year 1905, the Seventh International Jewish Missionary Conference, held at Amsterdam, April 25th, 1906, carried unanimously the following motion, brought forward by the present writer and the Rev. Louis Meyer of Chicago (now of Cincinnati):

'The Seventh International Jewish Missionary Conference hereby records its deepest sympathy with the poor sufferers from the latest persecutions of the Jews in Russia. One hundred and fifty villages, towns, and cities of Russia where Jews dwelt have been devastated, many hundreds of Hebrews have been slaughtered, and many thousand Jewish families have been deprived of all their possessions, and even of the possibility of gaining a livelihood. Though there may have been faults upon the Jewish side, no human or Divine right permitted Russian officials of Government and Police to incite the lower classes against the Jewish people, which as such are innocent, that in the persecution of the Jews these lower classes should forget their own sufferings, caused by bureaucratic maladministration and by refusal of liberty of thought and religion. Such action we condemn, because it necessarily must close the hearts of the Jews to the gospel call still more than heretofore.'

Those chiefly responsible for the anti-Jewish attacks in Kishenev were the Minister of the Interior, von Plehwe, and the vice-governor, Ustrugow. The latter had refused to grant protection from plundering and murderous bands to defenceless Jews who implored his help, because he himself was an Anti-Semite, and because he was certain that his inactivity would not be cen-

sured by the Minister. The former used the Jews as a lightning-conductor, by means of which the dissatisfaction of the population with regard to the arbitrariness of the police and the organs of Government might be directed into another channel. He could do this all the more easily that the Jews were in any case largely regarded with unfriendly eyes by the lower classes of the people, who had grown up in ignorance and superstition. The statement is often made that the Jews, as proprietors of dram-shops, have contributed much to the impoverishment of the Russian peasants, and have thereby aroused hatred. It is true that in Jewish persecutions, and, in general, in every disturbance, the Jewish drink-shops are often the first to be plundered. That, however, is easily understood without ascribing any special guilt to the possessors of these shops.

Unfortunately, it is by no means improbable that the extension of Anti-Semitism will still continue. The repetition of such outbreaks as have taken place in Russia in recent years will, indeed, be more difficult if a Government binding itself, or bound to, a constitution actually comes into existence. It is, however, quite possible that at no distant date serious Jewish persecutions will arise in the United States, in Hungary, or in France. And in Prussia there has at least been no lack of sinister attempts to incite the population to acts of violence, since for years Count Pückler (of Klein-Tschirne, Silesia) has dared in public assemblies in Berlin and elsewhere to summon the masses to a 'fresh joyous war' against the 'cursed Jewish band.'

2. Arguments of the Anti-Semites, and attempts to refute them.—The means made use of by almost all Anti-Semitic agitators have very materially contributed to the fact that Anti-Semitism has not only extended to the widest circles, but has also been turned into a slanderous malignity and a wild passion for persecution (cf. M. C. Peters, *Justice to the Jew*, New York, 1899).

(*a*) The most dangerous of these means since the 13th cent. has been the 'blood accusation' mentioned above (p. 595[a]). The most influential propagator of this accusation was the canon August Rohling in Prague in the years 1883–1892 (see Strack, *Das Blut*[8], pp. 109–120). Only the most important instances of modern times can be mentioned here.

On April 1st, 1882, a maid-servant, Esther Solymosi, fourteen years of age, in Tisza-Eszlár, disappeared. The evidence of the Crown witness Moritz Scharf, who had asserted that he saw the murder of the girl through the keyhole, was shown by the judicial investigation to be impossible; the suspected Jews obtained a verdict of not guilty (see P. Nathan, *Der Prozess von Tisza-Eszlár*, Berlin, 1892; S. Mannheimer in *JE* xii. 148–150). The eight-year-old girl murdered in Korfu in the night between 12th and 13th April 1891 was not a Christian, Maria Desylla (there was no such person there at the time), but a Jewess, Rubina Sarda. The Jewish butcher Adolf Buschhoff, in Xanten, in the Rhine province, was accused of murdering, on June 29th, 1891, the 5½-year-old boy Johann Hegmann. The public prosecutor, however, stated: 'In my long experience of criminal cases I have never seen a clearer case, where so convincing and connected a proof was brought forward, that the accused did not commit the crime in question.' Every suspicion that the murder was committed with a view to obtaining the blood of the victim was removed by the *post-mortem* examination (cf. *Der Xantener Knabenmord vor dem Schwurgericht zu Cleve, 4–14 Juli 1892, Vollständiger stenographischer Bericht*, Berlin, 1893; Deutsch in *JE* xii. 574). The Jewish shoemaker Leopold Hilsner was pronounced guilty of murdering Agnes Hruza on March 29th, 1899, in Polna, Bohemia. However, Arthur Nussbaum (*Der Polnaer Ritualmordprozess: Eine kriminalpsychologische Untersuchung auf aktenmässiger Grundlage, mit einem Vorwort von Franz von Liszt*, Berlin, 1906) has convincingly proved: (1) that the throat wound in Agnes was no slaughter-cut, and that the amount of blood which could reasonably be expected in the circumstances was present; (2) that the reasons produced for the guilt of Hilsner were utterly worthless, that the statements of the accusing witnesses attained to definiteness only in the course of time; (3) that they were contradictory of each other or incredible in themselves; and (4) that there was no motive adduced why Hilsner should murder Agnes which had even a shade of probability. Very great interest was aroused by the murder of the 18½-year-old High School boy Ernst Winter in Konitz, West Prussia, in March 1900. The highest medical authorities in Prussia came unanimously to the conclusion that the cut on the neck of Winter's dismembered body was not made till after his death, nor was his death caused by loss of blood (cf. *Die Gutachten der Sachverständigen über den Konitzer Mord*, Berlin, 1903; Deutsch in *JE* viii. 552–555).

More detailed information on the history of the Blood-accusation is given by the present writer in *Das Blut im Glauben und Aberglauben der Menschheit, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der 'Volksmedizin' und des 'jüdischen Blutritus'*[8], Munich, 1900; see also the work of the Roman Catholic priest Fr. Frank, *Der Ritualmord vor den Gerichtshofen der Wahrheit und der Gerechtigkeit*, Regensburg, 1901; Chwolson, *Die Blutanklage und sonstige mittelalterliche Beschuldigungen der Juden (aus dem Russischen übersetzt)*, Frankfurt-a'-M., 1901; *JE* iii. 260–267.

(*b*) Another important means of attack used by the Anti-Semites is the agitation against the killing of animals according to the Jewish rites. If the Jews are refused the exercise of the form of slaughter appointed by their religious laws in any town, permanent residence in that place is made very difficult for them. If the prohibition is extended over a whole country, life there is made almost impossible for Jews. Accordingly, the Anti-Semites of Germany have entered Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, and since 1883 have addressed petition after petition to the authorities and to Parliament against Jewish slaughter of animals. On 18th May 1887, the German Imperial Parliament rejected a proposal petitioning for legislation against the practice throughout the Empire. In 1892, however, Jewish slaughter was declared illegal in the Kingdom of Saxony by the Home Minister, and in the same year the prohibition of this form of slaughter was declared in Switzerland to be an essential element of the constitution of the union. In recent times, Anti-Semitic town councils in Prussian towns have attempted to make the custom impossible by means of slaughter-house regulations; and a new and very energetic agitation has begun in the Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.

Cf. the works of the physician and Russian Jew, J. A. Dembo, *Das Schächten im Vergleich mit anderen Schlachtmethoden*, Leipzig, 1894; *Gutachten über das jüdischrituelle Schlachtverfahren*, Berlin, 1894; F. Weichmann, *Das Schächten (Das rituelle Schlachten bei den Juden), mit einem Vorwort von H. L. Strack*, Leipzig, 1899. In these writings conclusive proof is given that the Jewish method of slaughter does not constitute cruelty to animals.

Among other objects of attack on the part of the Anti-Semites we may mention here (cf. above, p. 595):—

(*c*) The Talmud. There is no truth whatever in the assertions that the Jews seek by every conceivable means to keep the Talmud secret, that they fear lest its contents may become known, and that they declare it a crime worthy of death for a Jew to reveal its contents. The writings on the Talmud (explanations, monographs, translations of whole treatises, etc.) by Jews themselves are very numerous in all European languages. As a practical proof that Christians are not dependent for a scientific judgment regarding the Talmud on what a Jew may think fit to communicate, it may be mentioned that the present writer in 1887 wrote an introduction to the Talmud without having asked or received the slightest detail of information from Jews or Jewish Christians. The Talmud contains no report or statement which the expert Christian scholar cannot discover.

(*d*) The *Shulḥān 'Arūkh* (Ezk 23[41] 'table prepared'), the ritual code of Joseph Karo († 1575 in Safed, Palestine), was printed for the first time in Venice in 1564–5. A fanatical and slanderous attack was made by the proselyte, 'Dr. Justus' (pseudonym = Aaron Brimann), in *Judenspiegel oder 100 neuenthüllte, heutzutage noch geltende, den Verkehr der Juden mit den Christen betreffende*

Gesetze der Juden, Paderborn, 1883. A learned and suggestive treatise, but coloured somewhat in favour of the Jews, was published by D. Hoffmann, *Der Schulchan-Aruch und die Rabbinen über das Verhältniss der Juden zu Andersgläubigen*, Berlin, 1884 [2nd ed. 1894]. For a thorough examination of both sides of the question we are indebted to G. Marx (=G. Dalman), *Jüdisches Fremdenrecht, antisemitische Polemik und jüdische Apologetik*, Leipzig, 1886.

(*e*) The alleged existence of Jewish secret writings and secret sects. As early as 1900 the present writer publicly and solemnly declared that there are no secret Jewish writings. Of course, to those who do not understand Latin, Cæsar's *Gallic War* is a secret writing, especially if they are not acquainted with any of the numerous translations in English, German, etc. Judaism has always been tolerant of the faith and practice of the individual, but it has always persecuted sects, recognizing quite correctly that sects would be very dangerous to the existence of Judaism itself. The most important sect in Judaism is that of the Karaites, which arose in the 8th cent. A.D., and of which small remnants, even at the present day, are to be found living in the Crimea, in Poland, and in Cairo, with a few in Jerusalem. Karaites and Talmudists have been always most bitterly opposed, and even at the present day hate each other. If the Talmudist Jews, either as a whole or in sections, had a 'blood-rite' or other ordinance, which Christians would regard as abominable or destructive of the common good, the Karaites would not have failed to point expressly to it; and it is just as little likely that the Talmudist Jews would have kept silent if it had been possible for them to accuse the Karaites of observing a 'blood-rite' or other repulsive laws.

(*f*) The formula *kol nidre*, 'all vows,' by means of which the Jews on the eve of the Great Day of Atonement in the synagogue declare all vows which they may make in the next year to be non-binding, does not refer to oaths which are made to others, but only to obligations which one lays upon oneself. It is not admissible to use this custom to cast doubt on the good faith of the Jews in taking oaths in general (cf. the present writer's art. 'Kol Nidre' in *PRE*[3] x. 649–653; M. Schloessinger in *JE* vii. 539–542).

(*g*) A very foolish but, in Western Germany and Bavaria, widely credited accusation is that the Jews, before selling meat to non-Jews, must defile it (Lat. *mingere*) in the most loathsome manner (see the present writer's *Sind die Juden Verbrecher von Religionswegen?* Leipzig, 1900).

(*h*) The assertion is often made that a comparatively large percentage of Jews are punished as criminals (see, *e.g.*, W. Giese, *Die Juden und die deutsche Kriminalstatistik*, Leipzig, 1893). On the other hand, the Berlin Committee for answering Anti-Semitic attacks has published *Die Kriminalität der Juden in Deutschland*, Berlin, 1896. For a criticism of both writings by F. Nonnemann cf. *Nathanael*, 1896, pp. 44–78 (cf. also H. Lux, *Die Juden als Verbrecher*, Munich, 1894; Deutsch in *JE* iv. 362 f.).

(*i*) A publication by the same Committee, *Die Juden als Soldaten*, Berlin, 1896, with copious statistical tables, has in a thoroughgoing manner sought to meet the assertion which is frequently made, that the Jews are cowards (cf. also S. Wolf, *The American Jew as Patriot, Soldier, and Citizen*, Washington, 1894; M. C. Peters, *The Jew as a Patriot*, New York, 1901).

3. Conclusion.—The Jews have undoubtedly suffered great and bitter wrongs. On the other hand, justice must recognize that Jewish apologists have frequently failed to observe due moderation. Evil motives have often without proof been ascribed to opponents, who have been covered with hateful calumny. They have been scoffed at in an exaggerated way on account of single mistakes, as if thereby all other accusations and reasons were demonstrated to be false. Jewish apologists have often sought to put a favourable construction on something done by a Jew simply because a Jew did it, although the act could not be seriously defended. The non-Jewish majority has more than once been irritated by stupid aspersions (cf., to name only a single instance, P. P. G[ünfeld]'s *Ben Sirah Militans, Abgebrochene Sätze für A-B-C-Kinder*, Stuttgart, 1880).

The most important literature from the Jewish side has been mentioned above at various points. A very useful collection of materials is supplied by Josef Bloch, *Acten und Gutachten in dem Prozesse Rohling contra Bloch*, Vienna, 1890; cf. also *Antisemiten-Spiegel: Die Antisemiten im Lichte des Christenthums, des Rechtes und der Wissenschaft*[2], Dantzig, 1900. The most largely circulated book on the side of the Anti-Semites is the *Antisemiten-Katechismus*, Leipzig, which, from 1887 to 1893, went through 25 editions, and is now published under the title: Theodor Fritsch, *Handbuch der Judenfrage: eine Zusammenstellung des wichtigsten Materials zur Beurteilung der jüdischen Volkes*, Hamburg, 1907.

In conclusion a word may be said on *the duty of Christians* with regard to Anti-Semitism. We have in the first place to maintain in all circumstances veracity and justice. We must thus not only refrain from slander and false accusations, but contradict these in cases where Jews have difficulty in defending themselves. The question, *e.g.*, as to the criminality of Jews can, with the help of statistics available to every inquirer, be discussed quite as well by the Jew as by the Christian. If, however, Jews were to write on the 'blood accusation' or the Talmud, even the most upright Jew might easily fall under the suspicion of concealing or colouring the facts in favour of his nation and his religion. On this account, Franz Delitzsch (born Feb. 23rd, 1813, died Mar. 4th, 1890), the present writer, and others have regarded it as their duty again and again to show that many attacks directed by the Anti-Semites against the Jewish religion, and thus against the Jews generally, are based on falsehood, and are in fact slanderous.

Franz Delitzsch, *Rohlings Talmudjude*, Leipzig, 1881, 7th ed. 1881; *Was Dr. Aug. Rohling beschworen hat und beschwören will*, Leipzig, 1883; *Schachmatt den Blutlügnern Rohling und Justus*, Erlangen, 1883; *Neueste Traumgesichte des antisemitischen Propheten*, Erlangen, 1883. Hermann L. Strack wrote first against the 'blood-accusation' on the occasion of the case of Tisza-Eszlár in Zöckler's *Evangelische Kirchen-Zeitung*, 12th August 1882, No. 32. The murder in Korfu occasioned the publication *Der Blutaberglaube bei Christen und Juden*, Munich, 1891, 4th ed. *Der Blutaberglaube in der Menschheit, Blutmorde und Blutritus*, 1892, 5th to 8th ed. *Das Blut im Glauben und Aberglauben der Menschheit*, 1900; *Einleitung in den Talmud*, Leipzig, 1887 [4th ed. 1908]. See also the papers mentioned above, 2 (*f*) and (*g*).

It is, secondly, our duty to show in word and deed neighbourly love to the Jews. We dare not allow our love to be confined to those who share our religious beliefs (cf. Gal 6[10]), but we must always remember the lesson taught in the parable of the Good Samaritan (Lk 10). Thirdly, we are bound to furnish proof that the Christian religion rightly claims to be the universal religion. For this end we have to show the influence which Christianity has exercised and still exercises (*a*) on humanity as a whole; (*b*) on the individual; and (*c*) specially on Judaism (preaching in the language of the country, the work of the so-called Home Mission, *e.g.* spiritual care for prisoners, etc.).

Great complaints are made about the relatively excessive and still increasing influence exerted by the Jews in public life, not only in trade, but also in the press, in municipal councils, etc. We cannot here inquire where and how far such complaints are justified. One thing is certain:

violence and exclusive legislation will not lead to the removal of such evil conditions, but will simply replace them by still greater evils. But every non-Jew who is convinced that the Jews in any place exert too great an influence on their non-Jewish surroundings, must with double faithfulness perform his duties as a subject of his State (*e.g.* as Briton or as German) and as citizen (*e.g.* in London or in Berlin), and stimulate other non-Jews to a like faithful fulfilment of their duty. Here also the maxim holds: if we are dissatisfied with our environment, we must first ask what *our* fault is. Let us become better ourselves, and the state of affairs will improve. HERMANN L. STRACK.

ANURĀDHAPURA.—Anurādhapura was the capital of Ceylon for nearly 1500 years. It was founded, according to the tradition handed down in the earliest sources,* by a chieftain named Anurādha (so called after the constellation Anurādhā) in the 6th cent. B.C. on the bank of the Kadamba River. Nearly a century afterwards king Paṇḍukābhaya removed the capital, which had been at Upatissa, to Anurādhapura; and there it remained down to the reign of Aggabodhi IV. in the 8th cent. A.D. It was again the capital in the 11th cent., and was then finally deserted.

The name Anurādha as the name of a man fell out of use; and we find in a work of the 10th cent. (*Mahābodhivaṁsa*, p. 112) the name of the place explained as 'the city of the happy people' from *Anurādha*, 'satisfaction.' The Sinhalese peasantry of the present day habitually pronounce the name Anurāja-pura, and explain it as 'the city of the ninety kings,' *anu* meaning 'ninety,' and *rāja* meaning 'king.' The ancient interpretation of the name—Anurādha's city—is the only correct one. The second is little more than a play upon words, and the third is a *Volksetymologie* founded on a mistake. English writers on Ceylon often spell the name Anarajapoora, or Anoorajapura.

The exact site of Anurādha's original settlement has not been re-discovered. Paṇḍukābhaya constructed the beautiful artificial lake, the Victoria Lake, Jaya Vāpi, more usually called, after the king's own name (*Abhaya*, '*sans peur*'), the Abhaya Vāpi. It still exists, but in a half-ruined state, about two miles in circuit. Its southern shore is rather less than a mile north of the Bodhi Tree. It was on the shores of this lake that the king laid out his city, with its four suburbs, its cemetery, its special villages for huntsmen and scavengers, its temples to various pagan deities then worshipped, and residences for Jotiya (the engineer) and the other officials. There were also abodes for devotees of various sects—Jains, Ājīvikas, and others. North of all lay another artificial lake, the Gāmini Lake, also still existing, and now called the Vilān Lake. Apart from the two lakes, nothing has been discovered of the remains of what must have been even then, to judge from the description in the 10th chapter of the Great Chronicle, a considerable city.

But the foundations of the fame and beauty of the place were laid by king Tissa (so called after the constellation Tissā), who flourished in the middle of the 3rd cent. B.C., and was therefore contemporary with the Buddhist emperor of India, Aśoka the Great. The friendship of these two monarchs, who never met, had momentous consequences. Tissa, with his nobles and people, embraced the Buddhist faith; and, no doubt in imitation of Aśoka, erected many beautiful buildings in support of his new religion. Those at Anurādhapura numbered ten,† the most famous of them being the Thūpārāma, still, even in ruins, a beautiful and striking object. It is a solid dome, 70 feet high, rising from a decorated plinth in the centre of a square terrace, and surrounded by a number of beautiful granite pillars in two rows. It is not known what these pillars were intended to support. It would seem to appear from *Mahāvaṁsa*, ch. xxxvi. (p. 232, ed. Turnour), that they supported a canopy over the tope; but it is difficult to see how that can have been done. Perhaps each of them had, as its capital, some symbol of the faith. Such pillars, surmounted by symbols, put up by Aśoka in various parts of India, still survive. But in that case they are always solitary pillars. Bold flights of steps led up to the terrace from the park-like enclosure in which it stood; and the dome was supposed to contain relics of the Buddha. It was, in fact, a magnificent, highly decorated, and finely placed burial mound.

Another still existing building of this time is the Issara Muni Vihāra, a hermitage constructed by king Tissa on the side of a granite hill, for those of his nobles (*issara*) who entered the Buddhist Order. Naturally only the stonework has survived; but this includes caves cut in the solid rock, bas-reliefs on the face of the granite, two terraces (one half-way up, one on the top of the rock), a small but beautiful artificial tank, and a small *dāgaba*. It is a beautiful spot, and must have been a charming residence in the days of its glory.

Of the rest of the ten buildings no remains have been found; and it is very doubtful whether any of Tissa's enclosure round the Bodhi Tree has survived. The tree itself, now nearly 2200 years old, still survives. The soil has been heaped up round its base whenever it showed any signs of decay. Planted originally on a terrace raised but little above the level of the ground, it now springs up in three detached branches from the summit of a mound that has reached to the dimensions of a small hill. The tree planted by Tissa, a branch of the original Bodhi Tree at Gayā in India, was sent as a present by the Emperor Aśoka. The auspicious event was celebrated in two bas-reliefs on the eastern gateway of the Sānchi Tope,* probably put up by Aśoka himself.†

The capital was taken by the Tamils not long after Tissa's death, and was re-captured, about a century afterwards, by Dushṭa Gāmini Abhaya, the hero of the Great Chronicle. He occupies in Ceylon tradition very much the place occupied in English history and legend by king Arthur. We have information about the buildings he erected in his capital. Undoubtedly the most splendid was the so-called Bronze Palace. This was built on a square platform supported by a thousand granite pillars, which still remain *in situ*. Each side of the square was 150 feet long. On the platform were erected nine storeys, each square in form and less than the one beneath it, and the total height from the platform was 150 feet. The general effect was therefore pyramidal, the greatest possible contrast to the dome-shaped *dāgabas* in the vicinity, just as the bronze tiles which covered it contrasted with the dazzling white of the polished *chunam* which formed the covering of the domes. The building was almost certainly made of wood throughout, and its cost is given in the Chronicle‡ as 30 *koṭis*, equivalent in our money to about £300,000.

The other great work of this king was the Dāgaba of the Golden Sand; but this he did not live to complete. According to the Chronicle (ed. Turnour, p. 195), it cost one thousand *koṭis*, equivalent to a million sterling. It is still one of the monuments most revered by all Buddhists; and even in ruin it stood, in 1830, 189 feet above the platform on which it rests. Its Pāli name is

* *Dīpavaṁsa*, ix. 35; and *Mahāvaṁsa*, pp. 50, 56, 66.

† Enumerated in the *Mahāvaṁsa*, ch. xx. p. 123 (ed. Turnour).

* Reproduced in Rhys Davids's *Buddhist India*, pp. 301–303.

† For fuller details see BODHI, where the question of the evolution and meaning of the Wisdom-Tree conception will be more appropriately treated.

‡ *Mahāvaṁsa*, ch. xxvii.

usually simply *Mahā Thūpa*, 'Great Tope,' the name given above being a rendering of its distinctive title *Hemavali* in Pāli, *Ruwan Wæli Dāgaba* in Sinhalese. Five chapters in the Great Chronicle (ch. xxviii.–xxxii.) are devoted to a detailed account of the construction and dedication of this *stūpa*, and of the artistic embellishment of its central chamber, the relic chamber. This has never, it is believed, been disturbed; and as the exterior has, quite recently, been restored, there is now little chance of the historical secrets there buried being revealed.

For some generations after these great events the city enjoyed peace. But in B.C. 109 the Tamils, with their vastly superior numbers, again broke in, and took Anurādhapura. It was not till B.C. 89 that the Sinhalese were able to issue from their fastnesses in the mountains, and drive the Tamils out. Their victorious leader, Waṭṭa Gāmini, celebrated the recovery of the capital by the erection of a still greater tope than all the former ones—the Abhaya Giri Dāgaba. This immense dome-shaped pile was 405 feet high from ground to summit, and built, except the relic chamber, of solid brick. Its ruin is still one of the landmarks of all the country round. The Vihāra attached to this tope, and built on the site of the garden residences given by Paṇḍukābhaya to the Jains, obtained notoriety from a curious circumstance. The principal of the college, though appointed by, and a great favourite of, the king, incurred censure at an ecclesiastical court composed mainly of residents at the older Vihāra, the Great Minster, close to the Bodhi Tree. There ensued a long-continued rivalry between the two establishments, usually confined to personal questions, but occasionally branching off into matters of doctrine. For five centuries and more this rivalry had an important influence on the civil and religious history of the island.

With the completion of these buildings, the city assumed very much the appearance which it preserved throughout its long history. The Chronicle records how subsequent kings repaired, added to, and beautified the existing monuments. It tells us also how they and their nobles built palaces for themselves and residences for the clergy. These have all completely vanished. The only new building of importance that still survives is the Jetavan Ārāma, another huge dome-shaped pile, built about two miles due north of the Bodhi Tree at the beginning of the 4th cent. A.D.

It is at the beginning of the next century that we have the earliest mention of Anurādhapura from outside sources. Fa Hian, the Buddhist pilgrim from China, stayed there for the two years A.D. 411–412. He gives a glowing account of its beauty, the grandeur of the public buildings and private residences, the magnificence of the processions, the culture of the Bhikshus, and the piety of the king and people. The reason for Fa Hian's long stay in the city was his desire to study and to obtain copies, on palm leaf, of the books studied. For Anurādhapura was at that time the seat of a great university rivalling in the South the fame, in the North of India, of the University of Nālandā on the banks of the Ganges. Among the laity, law, medicine, astrology, irrigation, poetry, and literature were the main subjects. The Bhikshus handed down from teacher to pupil the words of the sacred books preserved in Pāli, to them a dead language, and the substance of the commentaries upon them, exegetical, historical, and philological, preserved in their own tongue. They had handbooks and classes for the study of the grammar and lexicography of Pāli; of the ethics, psychology, and philosophy of their sacred books; and of the problems in canon law arising out of the interpretation of the Rules of the Order. And they found time to take a considerable interest in folklore and popular and ballad literature, much of which has been preserved to us by their indefatigable and self-denying industry. All this involved not only method, but much intellectual effort. Students flocked to the great centre of learning, not only from all parts of the island, but from South India, and occasionally from the far North. Of the latter the most famous was the great commentator, Buddhaghoṣa (*q.v.*), who came from Gayā, in Behar, to get the information he could not obtain in the North.

'For there, in that beautiful land, the most fruitful of any in India or its confines in continuous and successful literary work and effort, there have never been wanting, from Asoka's time to our own, the requisite number of earnest and devoted teachers and students to keep alive, and to hand down to their successors and to us, that invaluable literature which has taught us so much of the history of religion, not only in Ceylon, but also in India itself.'*

The Chroniclers were not, therefore, very far wrong in emphasizing this side of the life of Anurādhapura. To it the city owed the most magnificent and the most abiding of its monuments, surpassed in historical value only by its intellectual achievements.

When Buddhaghoṣa was in Ceylon, the water supply of the city was being re-organized. The artificial lakes in the vicinity, which added so much to its beauty, were found insufficient; and king Dhātu Sena, in A.D. 450, constructed, 50 miles away, the great reservoir called the Black Lake (*Kāla Vāpi*). The giant arms of its embankment still stretch for 14 miles through the forest. It was 50 miles in circumference; and the canals for irrigation on the route, and for conducting the water to the capital, are still in fair preservation. A breach in the bank has lately been restored at great expense. This reservoir was, no doubt, at the time of its construction, the most stupendous irrigation scheme in the world.

This was the last great work undertaken at Anurādhapura. There ensued a series of dynastic intrigues and civil wars of a character similar to the Wars of the Roses in England. Each party fell into the habit of appealing for help to the Tamils on the mainland, whither the defeated were wont to flee for refuge. The northern part of the island, in which Anurādhapura lay, became more and more overrun with Tamil freebooters and free lances, more and more difficult to defend. Finally, in A.D. 750, it was abandoned as the seat of government, which was established at Pulastipura, under the shelter of the Southern hills. Anurādhapura fell into the hands now of one party, now of another. For a brief interval in the 11th cent. it claimed, under a Sinhalese pretender, supported by Tamil forces, to be again the capital. But the pretender was driven out, and the city reverted to the Pulastipura government. Finally, at what date is not exactly known, but probably about A.D. 1300, the whole district, stretching across the island, from 50 miles north to 50 miles south of Anurādhupura, became a kind of no man's land, and relapsed rapidly into jungle. Neither the Tamil kings of Jaffna in the north, nor the Sinhalese kings in the south, were able to exercise any real sovereignty over it. The once beautiful and populous city dwindled away to a few huts round the Bodhi Tree, now left in the charge of two or three solitary monks. The earliest notice of the ruins received in Europe was in Knox's *Historical Relation of the Island of Ceylon* (1681), iv. 10. Held a captive for twenty years in the mountains, Knox escaped in 1679 through the jungle round Anurādhapura, and his naïve words vividly portray the utter desolation of the place.

* *Buddhist India*, pp. 303, 304.

'Here is a world of hewn stone pillars, standing upright, and other hewn stones, which I suppose formerly were buildings. In three or four places are ruins of bridges built of stone, some remains of them yet standing on stone pillars. In many places are points built out into the water, like wharfs, which I suppose have been built for kings to sit upon for pleasure.'

The English Government has now made good roads, and a railway has been opened through to Jaffna. Several officials are resident at the station, and a settlement is growing up. For some distance round this settlement the undergrowth has been cut away, and there is now grass growing under spreading trees. The ruins are being cleared, and some of them preserved from further injury; and some excavation has been carried out.

LITERATURE.—*Mahāvaṁsa*, ed. George Turnour, Colombo, 1837; *Dipavaṁsa*, ed. Hermann Oldenberg, London, 1879; Sir J. E. Tennant, *Ceylon*[3], London, 1859; W. Knighton, *History of Ceylon*, Colombo, 1845; *Mahā-bodhivaṁsa*, ed. S. A. Strong, Pāli Text Society, 1891; *Fa Hian*, translated by J. Legge, Oxford, 1886; T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, London, 1903; *Ceylon Archæological Reports*, Colombo, 1868–1907; H. W. Cave, *Ruined Cities of Ceylon*, new ed., London, 1900; Don M. de Zilva Wickramasinghe, *Epigraphia Zeylanica*, pts. i.–iii., London, 1904–1907; Robert Knox, *Historical Relation of the Island of Ceylon* (1681), 2nd ed., London, 1817.

T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

APACHES.—The Apaches are the southernmost group of the Athapascan stock of American Indians, who originally covered the territory from the Arctic Coast to New Mexico, and from the Pacific to Hudson Bay, their kinship being plainly traceable through their language. However, the name 'Apache' is a misnomer, apparently from the Zuñi *ápachu*, 'enemy,' and not found in their vocabulary, as they are known among themselves, not as 'Apaches,' but as 'Inde' (N'de, Dĭnĕ, Tinde), or 'People.' Mentioned by Juan de Oñate as early as 1598 (*Doc. inéditos de Indias*, xvi. 114) in the 'Snowy Mountains' of New Mexico, they were not found as far west as Arizona, their present home, until the middle of the 16th cent., when they were a large and warlike tribe, whose numbers were increased by captives from their more peaceful neighbours, and whose customs, habits, and beliefs they assimilated to a certain extent.

Prior to their reservation life, the Apaches were a nomadic people, practising agriculture only to a limited extent, living mainly by foraging and by the hunt. They were and are now divided into tribal groups, designated by the locality to which they belong (see the list in Hodge, *Handbook of American Indians*, i. 66), but have always lacked the organization for which so many of the other tribes are noted, and to-day they are found living in bands and villages along the cañons and waterways, or in the rich valleys, tilling small farms and caring for their stock during the summer, and in the winter moving their camps to the heavily timbered sections, both for protection and more accessible fuel. Naturally their homes are of the most temporary character—usually willow poles thrust into the ground, fastened together at the top, oval in form, and of sufficient height to allow a person to stand erect, with an opening at the centre through which the smoke passes from the fire-place directly underneath. The sides are interwoven and thatched with bear grass, over which canvas is sometimes drawn, with a single opening for a door. Among the San Carlos Apaches these *khúvas* are excavated between one and two feet. The Jicarilla Apaches live in brush *wikiups* or in tents, the latter habitation being preferred also by the Lipan and many Mescarillo Apaches. There seems to be no ceremony or symbolism attached to the house, though Hrdlička observed one San Carlos family pray on entering a new *khúva*, while another house had two eagle-feathers tied as fetishes to one of the poles. The Apaches use smoke signals, columns of smoke being passed from camp to camp. One smoke column denotes attention; two, establishment of a camp, quiet, safety; and three, alarm; a greater number urging a correspondingly greater need of haste (Mallery, *1 RBEW* p. 538 f.). The Apaches have always been known as the cultivators of grain, particularly corn, from which *tis win*, their favourite drink, is made. Their additional foodstuffs consist of seeds, berries, nuts, melons, and small game, while fish and every species of fish-eating birds are tabued.

In appearance there is no uniform Apache type, this being due to their nomadic habits, and to their assimilation with neighbouring peoples. As a rule, they are sinewy and strongly built, with good lung power, and well-developed lower limbs. In early times the men's dress consisted of a breech cloth and moccasins, with long uppers extending to the knee, and often to the thigh, with rawhide soles, turned upward at the toe and decorated with painted designs. In winter a *poncho*, or buckskin shirt, made of two skins with an opening for the head, and fastened with thongs beneath the arm, was worn. A band round the head kept the hair back from the face; the hair was generally worn long or trimmed square on a level with the chin. The women wore a buckskin over one shoulder, which was fastened beneath the opposite arm, a short skirt of buckskin, coming just below the knee, with fringes of the same, and pendants of metal or shell. Girls and unmarried women wore their hair drawn back on the nape of the neck, and rolled in a club shape; while attached to the roll was a hair ornament made of leather in the shape of the figure eight, studded with brass-headed tacks; they also wore wristlets of brass and copper, and ear-rings and necklets of shell or seeds. Only of late years have they tatued, but now it is quite common to see various geometric designs on their foreheads and chins, and sometimes on the cheeks. On reaching puberty, girls have their eyebrows and eyelashes pulled out.

Polygamy is practised by the Apaches, a man generally marrying his wife's sisters as they mature, since they believe less friction will exist in the family. A widow cannot marry within a year of her husband's death, but his brother can take her to wife any time within the period of mourning; if he does not, however, she is free to marry any one she pleases. Marriage is generally arranged by the parents or near relatives, and is generally by purchase. If a man has more than one wife, they usually live in separate camps, the children belonging to the mother. The morality of the girls is always good before marriage. When a man marries, he avoids meeting or speaking to his mother-in-law. If they should meet by accident, the first to see the other hides or looks in the opposite direction. A girl is of marriageable age when she reaches the age of puberty, her parents making the announcement by a feast and dance, at which she is forbidden to be present, and which lasts through the night; afterwards she is open to proposal.

Women do all the household work, the planting and tending of the crops, and the carrying of the burdens. To-day their principal income is derived from the sale of hay, grain, and wood to the agency, military posts, ranches, and towns adjacent to the reservations. At home the Apache is fond of talking and entertaining his friends. Both men and women are inveterate gamblers.

Among Apache games are tossing arrows or darts at an arrow or dart already on the ground, so that they cross: the hoop and pole game (the principal gambling game), in which the pole is hurled through the rolling hoop; 'hide the button' (Jicarilla); 'cat's cradle' (White Mountain); foot races; and dice, the women's game (Culin, *24 RBEW* pp. 335, 449–457, 345, 762, 803 f., 86–91). The hoop and pole game, in which, amongst the White Mountain Apaches, the red pole is female and the yellow is male, has an esoteric religious meaning, which is jealously guarded by the *dĕĕ-yin* ('medicine-men'). It is said to have been taught first by one of the minor deities called Ghons; but the Jicarilla cosmogony describes it 'as having been made by Yolkaiistsun, the White-bead woman, for her two sons, children by her of the Sun and the Moon. She told them not to roll the wheel toward the north. They played for three days, when the Sun's son rolled the wheel toward the east, south, and west. His brother then persuaded him to roll it toward the north. An adventure with an owl followed, and the two boys were set to perform a succession of dangerous feats, which accomplished, they went to live in the western ocean' (Culin, *op. cit.* p. 449).

The principal Apache handicraft is basket-weaving, of which there are several forms, the conical shape for carrying burdens, over and bowl shape, also the *toose*, or water-bottle. All the baskets are built on coils, and sewn with willow and other splints

woven in geometric or figured designs of black, and made from the pod of a species of Martynia.

A close study and intimate knowledge of the various Apache tribes reveal no religious organization, but there are many forms of worship, not as the white man recognizes worship, but in the form of sacrifice, prayers, fasts, and physical penance to appease the wrath of the evil spirits. Perhaps the nearest approach to one of the classified forms of worship of the Apaches is the elemental, or nature-worship, though there are traces of animism as well as of animal-worship in their reverence for the bear, jack rabbit, snake, etc., to which they offer the sacrifice of *hoddentin* (see below). The number four is sacred, as among the American Indians generally; and so is eight, though to a minor degree. As far back as the 16th and 17th cents., the Jesuits and Franciscans formed missions, and worked with their accustomed zeal, but with little success. After years of toil and sacrifice, the field was wholly abandoned, and, apart from the various signs of the cross and sacred cords that might be traced to the rosary, no influence seems to have remained of these early teachings. And as these symbols were so common among the aborigines, it is doubtful whether even these are relics of former Christian influence. The belief in spirits both good and bad, and in the necessity of sacrifice, is prominent in their worship, as will be seen by their offering of *hoddentin* to appease every known spirit on every occasion.

To be properly understood, however, the beliefs and superstitions of the Apaches must be studied through their medicine-men and women, who wield a marvellous influence in fastening on them their belief in the occult, an influence little understood or appreciated by the civil authorities. Through this lack of understanding, the Apache Indians have been much maligned, and a great deal of the trouble with Government representatives in the past has arisen through not taking into consideration their superstitions and methods of reasoning. Great freedom exists as to the selection of the *shaman* or medicine-man. Any man, woman, or child who seems to be endowed with spiritual or occult powers and able to interpret omens, is free to follow his own inclinations and invent his own symbols. It is customary, however, for them to place themselves as assistants to some medicine-man who has gained power and influence, paying him liberally for his tuition, a year or more being the usual length of time given to study.

The Apache believes that all ills of the body are caused by evil spirits, which must be expelled or subdued. When any one is sick, he sends for his favourite medicine-man. If the patient is wealthy, the medicine-man will have the assistance of several others, often bringing his family along with him, and camping near the patient. The family and friends of the sick supply the medicine-man and his family with food and help. Before the medicine-man's arrival, the sick one's family generally prepares as many cans of *tis win* as they can afford; and when he arrives, a corner of the camp is reserved for his use, the best blankets are given for him to rest on, and the choicest food is placed before him. When he has finished his repast, large oyers of *tis win* are placed before him, and he drinks and calls from among his friends those whom he wishes to drink with him.

While the feast is going on, the medicine-man begins to bargain his service; and if everything is satisfactory, he proceeds to arrange a programme for his patient's care. If there is but one person sick in the camp, the exercises consist of singing, chanting, and drumming; but if there are more sick, or an epidemic is raging in the settlement, dancing takes place, prayers are recited, the women and children joining in the weird and monotonous cadence. *Hoddentin* is sprinkled round the couch of the sick, and applied to his forehead, tongue, and, in the form of a cross, to his breast, the medicine-men placing this same powder on their own tongues to give strength and divination. The singing and dancing are often continued until the leaders are completely exhausted. All the while they mumble a sort of gibberish that they claim to be understood only by themselves, and to possess the magic that is a part of their individual power. The Apache materia medica consists mainly of a few roots, leaves, and vegetable matter, always with the application of *hoddentin*. *Hoddentin* is the pollen of the *tule*, a species of cat-tail rush, and is gathered without any special ceremony. A small bag of it is carried by every man, woman, and child, even the infant in its cradle having a small bag attached to it. No undertaking, compact, or agreement is entered into without the sacrifice of some of this powder; a small portion of it is blown into the air at dawn and darkness; it is blown toward the sun to appease its heat and bring rain for the crops. Every phase of the life of the Apaches is surrounded by superstition and subject to necromancy, over which the medicine-men have control. Like the fraternity of physicians of more scientific learning, they specialize, one being consulted for rain, another to recover stolen property, another for sickness, etc.

In addition to this sacrificial powder, there are many other sacred emblems that are much relied on by the Apaches. The *izze-kloth*, or sacred cord, which is worn by leaders as well as by medicine-men, the bull-roarer, the medicine-hat, and the medicine-shirt are all firmly believed to possess certain special properties. The bull-roarer is an oblong piece of wood, about 1½ in. wide and 7 or 8 in. long, made with a round head through which a cord is passed, while on the main body are irregular furrows. It is usually of pine or fir, and if obtained from the mountain heights, and previously struck by lightning, it possesses special qualities in controlling the elements. This bull-roarer the medicine-men twirl rapidly. It then gives the sound of a sudden rush of wind, and exerts a compelling influence on the bringing of rain to the crops. The *izze-kloth*, used by leaders and laity alike, is the most sacred emblem the Apache possesses, so much so that it must be hidden from sight and protected from profane touch, both the *izze-kloth* and the medicine-hat losing their efficacy when in any way handled by an unbeliever.

The Apaches worship and sacrifice to the sun, moon, and other planets, as well as to the lightning, wind, etc.; and hold various dances, such as spirit-, ghost-, sun-, and snake-dances, though the snake-dances are not so common or so regular as among the Hopis and other neighbouring tribes.

Regarding the success of the medicine-men, it is well with them in cases of sickness if they do not lose too many patients; but when unsuccessful, they generally claim that there is some other influence at work overcomeing or counteracting their own. The present writer has seen several incidents where the medicine-man managed to shift the responsibility to another, knowing that the relatives of the deceased were dissatisfied with his work. While the body was still warm, the medicine-man drew from his medicine-bag a flake of flint, with which he made an incision in the side of the deceased where he had suffered most, put his lips to the incision and began to moan, and in a short time turned around and spat on the ground a mouthful of blood, and with it a small stone, which he claimed had been fired into the deceased by an old woman living forty miles away. That night a party went to the old woman's camp and killed her

as a witch. The individual interpretation given to each one's beliefs and imaginations precludes any set form of worship; but in a general way they all centre round those symbolic influences and superstitions that debar progress and hold them effectually to the faith of their fathers.

The characteristic Apache burial is in natural rock shelters in cliffs and crevices, either on the rocky sides of mountains or in the earth and talus at the base of the hills. Nooks in small unfrequented cañons are also utilized. After the removal of the earth and talus, the body is laid on the resulting platform and covered with a frame of poles and brush, over which rocks are heaped, the mound being from 4 to 10 ft. broad, 6 to 15 ft. long, and 2½ to 4 ft. high. No coffin is used, but the corpse is clothed and well wrapped up. A shovel (and sometimes an axe, or, in the case of a woman, a carrying basket), is frequently left on the grave, of which no subsequent care is taken. Among the White Mountain Apaches tree-burial occurs.

LITERATURE.—Hodge, *Handbook of American Indians north of Mexico* (*Bull.* 30 *BE*), Washington, 1907, i. 63–67 (with excellent summary of the history of the tribe), 335, 369, 394, 453, 492, 496, 512, 604 f., 642, 711, 768 f., 825, 863 f.; Drake, *Indian Tribes of the United States*, Philadelphia, 1884, i. 416–424; Bourke, 'Medicine-Men of the Apache,' in *9 RBEW* pp. 451–603; Russell, 'Myths of the Jicarilla Apache' in *Journal of American Folklore*, 1898; Mooney, 'Jicarilla Genesis' in *American Anthropologist*, old series, xi. (1898); Hodge, 'The Early Navajo and Apache,' *ib.* viii. (1895); Hrdlička, 'Notes on the San Carlos Apache,' *ib.*, new series, viii. (1905); Cremony, *Life among the Apaches*[2], San Francisco, 1877; Buschmann, 'Das Apache als eine athapaskische Sprache erwiesen' in *ABAW*, 1860–1863; Pilling, *Bibliography of the Athapascan Languages*, Washington, 1892.

ANTONIO APACHE.

APADĀNA.—The name of one of the books in the Pāli Canon. It contains 550 biographies of male members and 40 biographies of female members of the Buddhist Order in the time of the Buddha. The book is therefore a Buddhist *Vitæ Sanctorum*. It has not yet been edited, but copious extracts from the 40 biographies are given in Eduard Müller's edition of the commentary on the Therī Gāthā (*PTS*, 1893). One of those extracts (p. 135) mentions the Kathā Vatthu, and apparently refers to the book so named, which was composed by Tissa about the middle of the 3rd century B.C. If this be so, the Apadāna must be one of the very latest books in the Canon. Other considerations point to a similar conclusion. Thus the number of Buddhas previous to the historical Buddha is given in the Dīgha Nikāya as six; in later books, such as the Buddha Vaṁsa, it has increased to 24. But the Apadāna (see Ed. Müller's article, 'Les Apadānas du Sud' in *The Proceedings of the Oriental Congress at Geneva*, 1894, p. 167) mentions eleven more, bringing the number up to thirty-five. It is very probable that the different legends contained in this collection are of different dates; but the above facts tend to show that they were brought together as we now have them after the date of the composition of most of the other books in the Canon.

There exists a commentary on the Apadāna called the Visuddha-jana-vilāsinī. In two passages of the Gandha Vaṁsa (*JPTS*, 1886), pp. 59, 69, the authorship of this commentary is ascribed to Buddhaghoṣa.

According to the Sumaṅgala Vilāsinī, p. 15 (cf. p. 23), the repeaters of the Dīgha maintained that the Apadāna had been included in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, while the repeaters of the Majjhima said it was included in the Suttanta Piṭaka. This doubt as to its position in the Canon is another reason for placing the work at a comparatively late date.

The word Apadāna means 'pure action,' 'heroic action'; and each of the Apadānas gives us first the life of its hero or heroine in one or more previous births, with especial reference to the good actions that were the cause of his or her distinguished position among the early Buddhists. There then follows the account of his or her life now. An Apadāna therefore, like a Jātaka, has both a 'story of the past' and a 'story of the present'; but it differs from a Jātaka in that the latter refers always to the past life of a Buddha, whereas an Apadāna deals usually, not always, with that of an Arhat (*q.v.*).

When the Buddhists, in the first century of our era, began to write in Sanskrit, these stories lost none of their popularity. The name was Sanskritized into Avadāna; and several collections of Avadānas are extant in Sanskrit, or in Tibetan or Chinese translations. Of these the best known are the Avadāna-Śataka, or 'The Century of Avadānas,' edited (in part only as yet) by J. S. Speyer, and translated by Léon Feer; and the Divyāvadāna, edited by Cowell and Neil, not yet translated. As a general rule, these later books do not reproduce the stories in the older Apadāna. They write new ones, more in accordance, in spirit and implication, with the later doctrines then prevalent. Most of these Avadānas are on the lives of Arhats. But the main subject of the longest of all the Avadāna books, the Mahā-vastu-avadāna, is a series of the previous lives of the Buddha, though it also includes a few of the old Apadānas in new versions.

LITERATURE.—H. Oldenberg, *Catalogue of Pāli MSS in the India Office Library* (*JPTS*, 1882, p. 61); V. Fausböll, *The Mandalay MSS in the India Office Library* (*JPTS*, 1896, p. 27); Ed. Müller-Hess, *Les Apadānas du Sud* (Extrait des Actes du X^e^ Congrès des Orientalistes, Leyden, 1895); *Sumaṅgala Vilāsinī*, ed. Rhys Davids and Carpenter (*PTS*, 1886), vol. i. pp. 15, 23; *Avadāna-śataka, a Century of edifying Tales*, ed. J. S. Speyer (St. Petersburg, parts 1–3, 1902–4), translated by Léon Feer in the *Annales du Musée Guimet*, Paris, 1891; *Divyāvadāna*, ed. Cowell and Neil (Cambridge University Press, 1886); *Mahāvastu*, ed. E. Senart (3 vols., Paris, 1882–1897).

T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

APATHY.—The Greek doctrine of apathy (ἀπάθεια) is usually regarded as a leading characteristic of the Stoic School, but it undoubtedly belongs to an earlier date. This is the view of the anonymous commentator on Aristotle's Ethics (*Comment. in Aristot. gr.* xx. p. 128, 5 : ἱστέον δὲ ὅτι καὶ πρὸ τῶν στωικῶν ἦν ἡ δόξα αὕτη). There are certainly marked tendencies towards it in the Cynic School, with its complete renunciation of all pleasure and its glorification of work. If it is the case that Aristotle's *Nic. Eth.* ii. 2, 1104^b^, 24 (διὸ καὶ ὁρίζονται τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ ἡρεμίας) alludes to the Cynics, the latter must already have made use of the expression ἀπάθεια. In any case, it had influenced Stilpo the Megarian, who found happiness in the *animus impatiens* (Seneca, *Epist.* I. ix.), and seems to have used the word ἀοχλησία (Alex. *de Anim.* 150, 34, Bruns). Zeno, the founder of the Stoa, however, was influenced by the Megarian as well as by the Cynic philosophy.

On the other hand, Democritus described εὐθυμίη, the human happiness consisting in μετριότητι τέρψιος καὶ βίου ξυμμετρίῃ (*Frag.* 191, Diels), in the same way as apathy is described later. For apathy he is said to have used the term ἀταραξία, which appears again among later Sceptics. His doctrine, through the medium of Anaxarchus of Abdera (Diog. Laert. ix. 60), surnamed εὐδαιμονικός and celebrated especially on account of his ἀπάθεια, had an influence on Pyrrho, the founder of Scepticism, who taught ἀπάθεια probably even under this name (Cic. *Acad.* ii. 130; Plut. *de Prof. in Virt.* ii. p. 82 f.). His disciple Timon praises his constant cheerfulness (γαλήνη, *Frag.* 63, Diels) and his freedom from πάθη (*Frag.* 9); other passages mention his ἀδιαφορία and ἀταραξία (Diog. Laert. ix. 66, 68), which result from the withholding of judgment (ἐποχή) on all the events incident to human life: he who ventures no opinion about the worth of a thing may regard it as either good or evil, and so his tranquillity of mind cannot

be disturbed thereby. It is true that Epicurus did not advocate the extermination of the emotions (*πάθη*), yet he occasionally depicts the imperturbable tranquillity of mind of the wise man in such colours that he approaches the Stoic standpoint.

Cf. the statement from the third epistle (*Epicurea*, ed. Usener, p. 62): τούτου γὰρ χάριν πάντα πράττομεν, ὅπως μήτε ἀλγῶμεν μήτε ταρβῶμεν. ὅταν δὲ ἅπαξ τοῦτο περὶ ἡμᾶς γένηται, λύεται πᾶς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς χειμών; also *Frag.* 457: ἔρωτι φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινῆς πᾶσα παραχωδὴ καὶ ἐπίπονος ἐπιθυμία ἐκλύεται; and the well-known statement (Cic. *Tusc.* ii. 17): 'In Phalaridis taure si erit, dicet, "Quam suave est, quam hoc non curo."'

Such ideas are in accordance with the general feeling of the Hellenistic period, which was quite willing to recognize the happiness of the individual in a kind of *quietism*.

Entire freedom from the emotions was now demanded of the Stoic sage (*Frag.* 207, Arnim) by Zeno, who, however, made to the healthy human intellect the concession that even the sage, although unaware of the emotions themselves, is nevertheless conscious of a shadow of them (*Frag.* 215). This doctrine was more clearly expounded by his pupil Dionysius in his separate treatise *περὶ ἀταραξίας* (Diog. Laert. vii. 166), but more especially by Chrysippus (*e.g.* in *περὶ δικαιοσύνης* and *περὶ ὁρμῆς*), whose fragments on this subject are collected in Arnim, *Stoic. vet. Fragm.* iii. 443–455. The emotions belong to the irrational and immoderate (*πλεοναζουσαι*) class of impulses (*ὁρμαί*), which bring unrest into the mind of man. They arise from false judgments on the worth of things, or rather from the thoughtless assent (*συγκατάθεσις*) to such judgments (Dyroff, *Ethik der alten Stoa*, p. 152 ff.; Epict. iii. 19. 3: *οὐδὲν ἄλλο ταραχῆς ἢ ἀκαταστασίας αἴτιόν ἐστιν ἢ τὸ δόγμα*). The philosopher, as the physician of the soul, has to combat the passions, the chief of which are: desire, fear, pleasure, and grief,—pity is also included in them,—by demonstrating the falseness of the judgment and cultivating the virtues of moderation and courage. As virtue is perfected reason (*λόγος*), the irrational impulses are incompatible with it, and thus in the soul of the wise man there is left no trace of passion (*Frag.* 447); the *ὁρμαί* are completely blended with the *λόγος*; the wise man is *ἀταθής*, and therein consists his happiness (Diog. Laert. vii. 117; Cic. *Tusc.* iv. 37).

It was inevitable that against this extreme doctrine lively opposition should arise. Plato had already deliberately opposed apathy (cf. *Philebus*, pp. 21 D, 60 E, 63 E: *ἀλλ' ἆρ γε ἡδονὰς ἀληθεῖς καὶ καθαρὰς εἴπες, σχεδὸν οἰκείας ἡμῖν νόμιζε, καὶ πρὸς ταύταις τὰς μεθ' ὑγιείας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν*), and his disciples had, therefore, taken up their position almost on the standpoint of Aristotle and the Peripatetics, who strove after *μεσότητες ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι* (*Nicom. Eth.* ii. 1108^{a}, 30; the later writers call it *μετριοπάθεια*), and could not approve of apathy. No more could Epicurus, whose *ἡδονή* was actually regarded by the Stoics as one of the chief passions (Stobæus, ii. 90. 16). Carneades summed up this contradiction in his successful attack upon the Stoic exaggerations. He started from the fact that man is not only soul, but also body; that, consequently, certain bodily impulses are inevitable, among which pleasure assumes the first place; since it cannot be an evil, apathy is impossible (Gell. xii. 5, 7). This opposition resulted in the yielding of the Middle Stoa (Schmekel, *Philos. d. mittl. Stoa*, p. 364); Panætius after the fashion of the Peripatetics perceives virtue in the avoidance of extremes, and allows the *ὁρμαί* as legitimate in themselves. For him bodily pleasure is something natural, and therefore not to be exterminated; grief, on the other hand, is contrary to human nature, and therefore human nature is justified in avoiding it. Posidonius laid stress on the contrast between body and soul, and held that only the soul, so far as it remains pure, can be *ἀταθής*, but not the body; he admitted, besides, a *παθητικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς* (Plut. *de Virt. Mor.* 3, p. 441*d*; Galen. *de Hipp. et Plat. plac.* p. 408 M). He thus abandoned the old Stoic attitude on principle, although in some single statements he approached very near it (*e.g.* Cic. *Tusc.* ii. 61). The later philosophers are strongly influenced by this more moderate attitude. Epictetus is the only one who returns to the old rigorism; his wise man must again be *ἀταθής* and *ἀπάραχος, θίχα ὀρέξεως καὶ ἐκκλίσεως*, and he fought expressly against *μετριοπάθεια* (iv. 1, 175; cf. Bonhöffer, *Ethik des Epiktet*, p. 46). Seneca also opposes it in one of his writings (*Epist.* 85), but otherwise he assumes Posidonius' point of view. This view occasionally persists in the later philosophy, and Neo-Platonism, with its withdrawal from this world and its mortification of the flesh, is decidedly in its favour. Thus Philo resolutely demands apathy (Zeller, v. 4, p. 449), and so also with Porphyry it appears as the highest stage of virtue, while metriopathy receives a lower place (*op. cit.* p. 717).

LITERATURE.—Dyroff, *Ethik der alten Stoa* (1897), p. 152; Schmekel, *Philos. d. mittl. Stoa* (1892), p. 364; Zeller, *Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics* (Eng. tr. 1870), pp. 248–254 and 290–292; Bonhöffer, *Ethik des Stoikers Epiktet* (1894), p. 46; Sidgwick, *History of Ethics*^{3} (1892), p. 73; Ueberweg, *Hist. of Philosophy* (Eng. tr. 1871), i. 198; Davidson, *The Stoic Creed* (1907), pp. 149, 189.

W. KROLL.

APHRODISIA ('Αφροδίσια).—The general name of festivals in honour of Aphrodite. The cult of Aphrodite may be regarded as having been universal in one form or another in the Mediterranean lands. In all the great centres of Hellenic life it occupied an important place, prevailing from Naucratis in Egypt to Phanagoria in the Black Sea, and from the Troad to Italy and Sicily (see the long list, with the evidence, in Pauly-Wissowa, art. 'Aphrodite'). The Ægean islands were among its most famous centres, notably Cythera, Crete, and Cyprus. There is, however, no real ground for regarding the cult, in its later specialized form as the cult of a goddess of physical beauty,* as having been aboriginal in Greek lands. Probably Aphrodite was originally an Oriental nature-divinity, and she retained many Oriental traits in her local cult as a specialized divinity in Greece.† The more refined cult of the goddess as the patroness of married life is probably a genuinely Hellenic development, for this aspect of her is either altogether lacking or at least is not prominent in its Eastern forms. Contrary to a very general but erroneous conception, originating in Plato's well-known distinction between Ourania Aphrodite who personifies the intellectual love of the soul, and Aphrodite Pandemos who personifies the sensual love of the body (Plat. *Sympos.* 180 D), it is precisely this title of *Οὐρανία*, 'Heavenly,' that is the clearest sign of her Eastern origin; the Platonic distinction was not recognized in the State religion, and the moral and spiritual meaning of the title is of late growth (Farnell, *op. cit.* 629 ff., 659 ff.). In the same way, that aspect of Aphrodite under which she was worshipped at Athens and elsewhere as Pandemos, 'Guardian of the body politic,' was not an independent Hellenic development, but a survival and development of an Oriental conception (Farnell, p. 663).

With regard to the nature of the cult, ethically considered, it is to be observed that much of the modern conception is based upon a radically false notion, and the unguarded application to Hellenic practice of ill-understood Oriental phenomena.

* As a 'departmental goddess, having for her sphere one human passion' (J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, p. 309) she is depicted in the Homeric Hymn.

† For an examination of this question of origin, consult Farnell's *Cults of the Greek States*, Oxford, 1896, ii. 619 ff.

Until the decline of Greek civilization, the cult of Aphrodite, so far as we know it from our literary or monumental sources, was indistinguishable in point of purity and austerity from that of Zeus or Athene, and was in this respect, in fact, on a higher plane than that of Artemis. Rules of chastity, for example, were in some cases imposed upon her priestesses (Paus. ii. 10. 4). It was at Corinth alone in Greece, and there in connexion with the worship of the 'Heavenly' Aphrodite, that impure practices were found established as part and parcel of the ritual of worship. The fact is that a careful distinction must be drawn between Greek religion and ritual, which is upon the whole pure, and the mythological stories, which are often the reverse, and are, moreover, conveyed to us largely through the impure medium of degenerate poetry. Degeneracy did indeed exhibit itself in the cultus, as in other domains of Greek life and practice—a symptom of the loosening of the moral bonds in the Hellenistic period,—and later in the erection of altars and temples, and the establishment of festivals under the name of Aphrodite to the mistresses of the successors of Alexander and others (Athenæus, 253, 595).

Probably the festival of Paphos was the most celebrated of those held in honour of the goddess; and there also in all probability many features that had no parallel in Greece, save perhaps at Corinth, were to be seen. Great crowds assembled at the temple from all parts (Strabo, 683: *καὶ πανηγυρίζουσι διὰ τῆς ὁδοῦ ταύτης κατ' ἔτος ἐπὶ τὴν Παλαίπαφον ἄνδρες ὁμοῦ γυναιξὶν συνιόντες καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων*). The title *Ἀγήτωρ* borne by the high priest at Paphos would probably indicate his conduct of the vast procession. Sacrifices of blood were not offered, though victims seem to have been slain for purposes of divination; or there may have been two altars, one for incense, the other for sacrifice (cf. Tac. *Hist.* ii. 3: 'Hostiæ, ut quisque vovit, sed mares deliguntur: certissima fides hædorum fibris. Sanguinem aræ obfundere vetitum: precibus et igne puro altaria adolentur'). A ritual bath and mimic dance probably formed part of certain mysteries which were celebrated (Harrison, *op. cit.* pp. 283, 312; cf. Farnell, *op. cit.* p. 651: 'in Cyprus, in some religious ceremony, some scenic representation of the Adonia perhaps, the image of the dead goddess was exposed, and then after due performance of certain rites she was supposed to be restored to life'). Those who desired to be initiated *ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ μοιχικῇ* received on entering the temple a *phallus* and a lump of salt, and gave a piece of money to the temple treasury.*

Most Oriental in character of all the Greek cities was Corinth. Euripides celebrates Acrocorinthos as the holy hill of Aphrodite (*Frg.* in Strabo, 379: *ἥκω περίκλυστον προλιποῦσ' Ἀκροκόρινθον, ἱερὸν ὄχθον, πόλιν Ἀφροδίτας*; cf. Alciphr. iii. 60). The most un-Hellenic of the elements of the Aphrodite cult was the practice of religious prostitution (Strabo, 378), alluded to by Pindar when he celebrates the 'hospitable young women, the ministrants of Persuasion in rich Corinth, whose thoughts often flit towards Ourania Aphrodite' (Pind. *Frg.* 87, ed. Boeckh). At Corinth, apparently alone in Greece, these *hetæræ* took part in the State ritual; for whenever public prayers were addressed to Aphrodite on matters of moment, as large a number as possible of the *hetæræ* were taken to aid in the ceremony; and individuals privately often vowed to consecrate a certain number of these women to the goddess (such would be in general bought slaves of Greek or foreign origin). We hear of them as putting up public petitions on behalf of the Greek cause in the Persian Wars (Athen. 573 C). Naturally, therefore, the *hetæræ* took a conspicuous part in the festivals of Aphrodite, one day being given up to them, and another to the respectable women. Doubtless much of Eastern licence was seen on these festival days at Corinth; the city was notoriously dangerous in this respect to visitors (cf. Strabo, 378: *οὐ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐς Κόρινθόν ἐσθ' ὁ πλοῦς*).

At Argos the chief festival of Aphrodite was called Hysteria (*ὑστήρια*), because swine were sacrificed to her—probably an indication of the cult of Aphrodite in conjunction with Adonis, for ordinarily the Greeks, as we learn from Aristophanes (*Ach.* 793), did not sacrifice swine to Aphrodite. Probably, wherever the pig was sacrificed to Aphrodite, it was a mystery, the pig representing Adonis himself (see Frazer's note in Paus. ii. 10. 5; Farnell, *op. cit.* p. 756). Connected with the same form of the cultus was the strange hermaphroditic festival of the goddess at Argos, which bore the special name of the Feast of Wantonness (*ὑβριστικά*), at which women dressed as men, and men as women, the men even wearing veils (Plut. *de Virt. Mul.* 245 E). The festival was popularly explained as commemorative of the brave defence of Argos by the poetess Telesilla in 510 B.C.; but such interchange of garments as a religious rite is not uncommon elsewhere (cf. Macrob. *Sat.* iii. 8; and references in Farnell, p. 755), so that probably the story of Telesilla is merely ætiological (see Frazer on Paus. ii. 20. 8; Nilsson, *Griechische Feste*, p. 371).

In Ægina the festival of Aphrodite seems to have been combined with one to Poseidon (Plut. *Quæst. Gr.* 44), the details suggesting that the cult was one of Aphrodite as a divinity of death (about which see Farnell, *op. cit.* p. 652). In Thessaly, women alone appear to have taken part in the festival; it was at one such celebration that the courtezan Lais was murdered (schol. in Aristoph. *Plut.* 179: *αἱ Θετταλαὶ γυναῖκες ἐφόνευσαν αὐτὴν ξυλίναις χελώναις τυπτοῦσαι ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης, πανηγύρεως οὔσης, ἐν ᾗ ἄνδρες οὐ παρεγίνοντο*). In Zacynthos, athletic contests, especially racing, were part of the festival (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* i. 50). Some details connected with the festival of Aphrodite as Pandemos are furnished by an inscription found at Athens, in which the Senate recommends to the Assembly that the police officials (*ἀστυνόμοι*) on the occasion of the public procession (*πομπή*) in honour of the goddess, prepare for the cleansing of the temple a dove, cleanse and whitewash the altars, wash the images, etc. (Dittenberger, *Sylloge*[3], 556=*BCH*, 1889, p. 162; Nilsson, p. 374).

Finally should be noticed a usage of the word *Ἀφροδίσια* in a more general sense of 'festival gathering,' without religious significance. It is so found in Xen. *Hell.* v. 4. 4: *ὡς Ἀφροδίσια ἄγουσιν ἐν' ἐξόδῳτῆς ἀρχῆς* (of the Polemarchs of Thebes. Cf. Plut. *Cim. and Luc. comp.* 1: *ἤδη λοιπὸν Ἀφροδίσια τῶν πολέμων καὶ στρατηγιῶν ἄγοντα παίζειν*; Athen. 4, p. 128 B, *Ἀντιγόνου τοῦ βασιλέως δεῖπνον Ἀφροδίσια ἐπιτελοῦντος*. Such celebrations might naturally be annual; cf. Alciph. *Ep.* 2. 1, *τὰ Ἀφροδίσια τοῦ ταῦτα κατ' ἔτος*).

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* Clem. Alex. *Protr.* 14: *ἐν ταῖς τελεταῖς ταύτης τῆς πελαγίας ἡδονῆς τεκμήριον τῆς γονῆς ἁλὼν χόνδρος καὶ φαλλὸς τοῖς μυουμένοις τὴν τέχνην τὴν μοιχικὴν ἐπιδίδοται· νόμισμα δὲ εἰσφέρουσιν αὐτῇ οἱ μυούμενοι, ὦ ἑταῖραι ἐρασταί*; Arnob. *adv. Gent.* 5. 169; Justin, xviii. 5. 4: 'mos erat Cypriis virgines ante nuptias statutis diebus dotalem pecuniam quæsituras in quæstum ad litus maris mittere, pro reliqua pudicitia libamenta Veneri soluturas.' For this sacred prostitution, an Oriental practice, see Herod. i. 199, speaking of the cult of the Babylonian Mylitta (=Ištar, Astarte), cf. Strabo, 532; Ramsay, *Cities and Bishopries of Phrygia*, Oxford, 1895, i. 94; J. G. Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, Lond. 1906, p. 21. For similar institution in connexion with the Cappadocian goddess Ma, cf. Strabo, 535. See also Nilsson, *Griech. Feste*, p. 365 ff.

APHRODITE.—See preceding art. and GREEK RELIGION.

APOCALYPTIC LITERATURE, APOCRYPHA.—See BIBLE.

APOLLINARISM.—Apollinaris, the younger, of Laodicea († *c.* 390), was the founder of a heresy which forms the connecting link between Arianism in the 4th and Nestorianism and Monophysitism in the 5th century.

1. **Life of Apollinaris.**—Of the events of his life not very much is known. His father, who was also named Apollinaris, was a grammarian from Alexandria who came to Berytus (*Beirut*) and then went on to Laodicea (*Ladikiye*) in Syria. Here he married and had a son, Apollinaris the younger, the future heretic (Socrates, *HE* ii. 46). Socrates says that the father was 'joined in the closest bond of friendship' with a Sophist named Epiphanius, and that Theodotus, the Bishop of Laodicea, forbade him this acquaintance, as being dangerous to his faith. Eventually Theodotus, or perhaps his successor George, excommunicated Apollinaris, together with his son, either because they would not give up their intimacy with Epiphanius, or because they kept the faith of Nicæa and Athanasius, whereas the bishop was a semi-Arian (*ib.*).

Apollinaris the father, who had been ordained presbyter at Laodicea, tried to supply his fellow-Christians with a substitute for the Greek classics which Julian had forbidden them to teach. He appears to have arranged nearly the whole Bible in the form of poems of various metres. 'He expounded the books of Moses in heroic verse, and edited the other historical books of the Old Testament, partly as elegiac poems, partly as tragedies with different metres' (Socr. iii. 16). The son, having learnt this art from his father, wrote out the Gospels as Platonic dialogues (*ib.*). But there is some confusion between the father and son about these paraphrases of the Bible. Sozomen attributes them all to the son (Sozomen, *HE* v. 18).

Apollinaris the younger must have been born not very long after the year 300. Epiphanius speaks of him in 376 as a 'venerable old man' (*Hær.* lxx. ii. 2), and if he was excommunicated together with his father by Theodotus, he must have been more than a child before that bishop died (335). Socrates says that he was ordained Reader (ἀναγνώστης) and became a teacher of rhetoric (*HE* ii. 46). All his contemporaries speak of his great learning. After his separation from the Orthodox Fathers, they still write of him with much more respect than they usually give to heretics, and even with a certain affection. He was 'learned in science' (Socr. iii. 16); 'skilled in all knowledge and learning, a man of manifold erudition and accomplishments' (Soz. v. 18). Epiphanius says that he himself, as well as St. Athanasius and 'all Catholics,' loved the 'illustrious and venerable old man, Apollinaris of Laodicea,' and that when they first heard of his heresy they could not believe that so great a man had fallen into such an error (*Hær.* lxx. ii. 2).

In this first period, before he had proclaimed his heresy, while he was still known only as a scholar, a poet, and a zealous defender of the faith of Nicæa, he came into friendly relations with a number of Fathers. In 346, when St. Athanasius was on his way back to Alexandria after one of his numerous exiles, he passed through Laodicea in Syria, and there became 'a companion and particular friend' of Apollinaris (Soz. *HE* vi. 25). St. Jerome had learnt from Apollinaris as from so many other teachers, and he says that he had never embraced his heretical doctrines (*Ep.* lxxxiv. 3). To Epiphanius he is 'always most dear' (*Hær.* lxx. ii. 2). St. Basil says that he had once corresponded freely with him (*Ep.* cxxxi.); years afterwards, when he had broken off all relations with the heretic, he still writes with regard of the man 'whom we had expected always to find our ally in the defence of truth' (*Ep.* cclxv.), and he still doubts whether all the harm that is told of his old friend can be true (*Ep.* ccxxiii. 5). Apollinaris at first distinguished himself as a defender of the Nicene creed against Arians and semi-Arians. It was possibly for this cause that he had been excommunicated by his bishop. And then, according to Sozomen, he, having asked in vain to be received back into communion, 'being conquered by his grief, began to disturb the Church with his new doctrine' (*HE* vi. 25). It seems true that he first conceived his theory as a defence of Homoousianism.

We hear of him next as bishop, apparently of Laodicea. It is true that neither St. Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, Epiphanius, Socrates, nor Sozomen mentions him as a bishop, and that Leontius of Byzantium speaks of him only as 'Apollinaris the presbyter' (*de Sectis*, Act. iv., *PG* lxxxvi. 1217). And Photius doubted whether he had been bishop (in *ep. Philost.* viii. 15). On the other hand, St. Athanasius speaks of certain monks who had been sent to Alexandria by 'Apollinaris the bishop' (*Tom. ad Antioch.* ix.), Philostorgius relates the fact as having been 'told by some people' (*HE* viii. 14), Theodoret says that he generally lived at Laodicea (*HE* v. 4), and St. Jerome, who had known him well, calls him 'Bishop of Laodicea in Syria' (*de Vir. Ill.* 104). But Pelagius had succeeded George as bishop of the same city about the year 363 (Lequien, *Or. Christ.* ii. 794), so it seems that Apollinaris had been set up as Homoousian bishop in opposition to the semi-Arian line. It must have been about 360 that he began to be commonly known as the teacher of a new doctrine. The Synod of Alexandria in 362 seems to know and reject his ideas. It 'confessed that the Saviour did not assume an inanimate or insensible body. . . . Not only the body but also the soul receives salvation from the Word' (Athan. *Tom. ad Ant.* 7). But it does not mention his name. By the year 370 all the Orthodox Fathers speak of him as a heretic. St. Basil says, 'We have no communion with Apollinaris' (*Ep.* cxxxi. 2, etc.). He denounces him to 'the Westerns' (*Ep.* cclxiii. 4), and rejoices later that they have condemned him (*Ep.* cclxv. 2). This condemnation is that of the Roman Synod in 374 (Mansi, iii. 479). Apollinaris is not mentioned in any of its ten canons, but they are plainly drawn up as condemnations of his theory. The Synod of Antioch, held in 378 under Meletius, anathematizes those who 'say that the Word of God dwelled in human flesh in the place of a reasonable and intelligent soul' (Mansi, iii. 486). The first canon of the Synod of Constantinople in 381 condemns a number of heretics, of whom the last are the 'Apollinarists'; its seventh canon ordains that the Apollinarists shall be received back into communion if they retract their heresy and present a written declaration (λίβελλος) of the true faith (Mansi, iii. 558–563).

As soon as he had formulated his particular doctrine and had begun to be opposed by other bishops, Apollinaris gathered his following into a definitely organized sect. At Antioch he set up a certain Vitalis as anti-bishop, 'a man distinguished by his honourable life and educated in the teaching of the Apostles, but corrupted by this poison' (Theodoret, *HE* v. 4). Sozomen says that this Vitalis had joined Apollinaris because of a quarrel with Flavian of Antioch (*HE* vi. 25). And there were other Apollinarist bishops throughout Syria. St. Basil writes ironically of this heretical hierarchy: 'a great mystery of godliness, bishops bearing empty titles without either clergy or people' (*Ep.* cclxv. 2).

Meanwhile St. Athanasius (or the other author of the two books against Apollinaris that bear his name) and St. Gregory of Nyssa had written their treatises against the heresy (see below). Apollinaris died, leaving behind him an organized Apollinarist Church, about the year 390 (Jerome, *de Vir. Ill.* 104).

2. **The Apollinarist heresy.**—Apollinaris began as a zealous defender of Homoousianism against the Arians. Sooner or later the question was bound to arise: How could the Logos be joined to a human nature? It was around this question that the later Nestorian and Monophysite disputes turned. Apollinaris' solution, in which his heresy consisted, was an attempt to save the unity of Christ's Person at the expense of His human nature. In this way he was a sort of forerunner of Eutyches. He is certain that God Himself became man in Christ. He is also certain that the whole Divine nature cannot be joined to the whole nature of a man. He maintains this by the same arguments as were afterwards used by the Monophysites. Two perfect natures always remain two separate persons; 'two perfect beings cannot become one.' This axiom, quoted by Athanasius as one of his 'sophisms' (*contra Apoll.* i. 2), was the starting-point of his system. He illustrates it by various examples. We may not adore a man, we must adore God. So it would follow that Christ must be both adored and not adored. Moreover, a perfect man is necessarily sinful, 'where there is a perfect man, there is sin' (*ib.*); but Christ could not become sinful. And He would be neither really God nor really man, but a man-god (ἀνθρωπόθεος), a monstrous and impossible hybrid of two incompatible species, like the Minotaur, the centaurs, dragons, and other mythological absurdities (Greg. Nyss. *Antir.* 49). He goes on to argue that he would certainly not be a man, for all men consist essentially of three parts, body, soul, and spirit, whereas He would have four parts, adding to these His Divinity. In short, 'a person, being one, cannot be combined of two' (*ib.*). He finds the solution of the difficulty in the application of a general principle of philosophy. The Neo-Platonic school taught that human nature is the composition of these three elements—a *body*, a *soul* that actuates and *informs* the body (to use the later mediæval term), thus making us living beings, and the *mind*, or *spirit*, that makes us reasonable beings, which spirit is the special characteristic of man.

Apollinaris thinks that the doctrine of the three elements of man, body, soul, and spirit (σῶμα, ψυχή, πνεῦμα or νοῦς), is confirmed by Scripture. He quotes the text: 'Bless the Lord, O ye spirits and souls of the just' (Dn 3^{86} [=Three ^{64}]; cf. Greg. Nyss. *Antir.* 46). We are told to serve God in spirit and to adore Him in spirit and truth (Ro 1^{9}; *Antir.* 49); St. Paul prays that the Thessalonians may be sanctified in spirit, soul, and body (1 Th 5^{23}); and he distinguishes the carnal (ψυχικός) from the spiritual (πνευματικός) man (1 Co $2^{12.\ 14}$, cf. 3^{1} $15^{42\text{ ff.}}$;

Antir. 49). Of these three elements the body and the soul make up the 'natural' (*φυσικός*) being (the machine, Plato would have said), which is ruled and guided by the mind.

But the guiding principle in man is changeable, fallible, sinful. It cannot be so in Christ. Therefore in Christ the Divinity, the Logos, takes the place of a human mind. He is a natural man (*i.e.* body and soul) guided and ruled by the Logos. He too, like us, consists of three parts only, and He is therefore really a man and not an impossible being of four parts. Only one part, the most important, is not human but Divine. That is at any rate the eventual and fully developed form of Apollinarism. It has been suggested (Lietzmann), and some answers of his opponents seem to suppose, that its author did not at first trouble about a subtle distinction between soul and spirit, but simply said that the Logos instead of a human soul was joined to Christ's body. However, the stress of controversy soon made him adopt the Neo-Platonic theory as the basis of his theology, and he and his school then made so much of it that all through the Middle Ages the psychology of the three elements was associated with one name only, that of Apollinaris. He thinks that he has found texts to prove his explanation of the hypostatic union by the absence of a human soul, or, later, of a spirit in Christ. St. Paul, for instance, says that the first Adam was made a living soul, the second a life-giving (therefore Divine, not human) spirit; the first was carnal (*ψυχικός*), the second spiritual (*πνευματικός*, 1 Co 15^{45-49}; *Antir.* 11–12). The Incarnation is described as the assumption by the Logos, not of a whole man but of a physical body only. It is the 'mystery that appeared in the flesh' (1 Ti 3^{16}; *Antir.* 2), the Word was made, not man, but flesh (Jn 1^{14}; *Antir.* 16, etc.), Christ assumed the *form* of a servant (*i.e.* the body), and was found in the (outward) *habit* of a man (Ph $2^{7\,t.}$; *Antir.* 20, 21).

So in this way the Logos and the man Jesus are really one being. Christ was not two separate persons, but Divinity and manhood joined inseparably in one person. And we adore this person without making distinctions, because in Him even the human nature is actuated, and so made Divine, by the Logos that guides it.

The contemporary orthodox Fathers who reject this theory are not much concerned about the truth or falsehood of the statement that human nature consists of three elements. That question was raised again much later by the mediæval schoolmen when 'Apollinarist' became a favourite name of abuse given by Thomists to the Scotists who denied that the reasonable soul is the form (*forma substantialis*) of the body. But the first opponents of Apollinarism are offended chiefly by the assertion that Christ lacked an element of complete human nature. They quote against it the texts in which He is said to be like us in everything except only sin (He 4^{15}), to be really and completely man (Jn 8^{40}; *Antir.* 45), and to have not only a soul but also a spirit (Lk 23^{46}; *Antir.* 17, Jn 11^{33}; Athan. *contra Apoll.* i. 15, Jn 19^{30}, ii. 16). They also undertake to refute Apollinaris' arguments. If the quotation 1 Co 15^{45} proved anything in this question, it would follow that Adam had no spirit at all (*Antir.* 12), and that the word 'flesh' in Jn 1^{14}, as elsewhere, stands for the whole human nature (*Antir.* 27); and they insist on the conclusion which Apollinaris himself would not admit, namely, that if the Logos had become one of the elements of Christ's human nature, the Logos too would have suffered and died (*Antir.* 30, etc.).

3. The Apollinarist sect.—In spite of the opposition of a long list of Fathers (Athanasius, Basil, the two Gregorys, and many others), Apollinarism outlived its author for many years. He had set up a hierarchy all over Syria, and his sect existed and carried on his teaching till it seems to have been gradually absorbed by the far more important Monophysite movement. Vitalis was Apollinarist Bishop of Antioch. We hear of one Timothy of Beirut, who wrote a history of the Church, and who 'had no other object in so great a work but to commend Apollinaris, inasmuch as from him and to him an endless number of letters were written and written back' (Leontius Byz. *c. Nestor. et Eutych.* iii. 40, *PG* lxxxvi., who proceeds to point out that a man's greatness is not to be measured by the size of his correspondence). A certain Valentinus wrote a defence of Apollinarism, called 'Against those who accuse us of saying that the body is of the same substance as God' (*adv. Fraudes Apollinaristarum*, among the works of Leontius Byz. *PG* LXXXVI. ii. 1947–1976; some passages from both Timothy and Valentinus are quoted in this treatise). It seems that the unknown interpolator of St. Ignatius' letters (a Syrian in the beginning of the 5th cent.) was an Apollinarist. He twice (*Philipp.* v. 2 and *Philad.* vi. 6) expressly denies that Christ had a human mind.

Although the movement gradually disappears as its place is taken by Syrian Monophysitism, one still occasionally hears of Apollinarism in the ever-growing list of heresies; and as late as 691 the *Quinisextum* Synod in its first canon does not forget to condemn 'Apollinaris, leader of wickedness, who impiously declared that the Lord did not assume a body endowed with both soul and mind' (Mansi, *Collectio*, 1759–1798, xi. 936).

4. Writings of Apollinaris.—There is the most complete agreement among his contemporaries that Apollinaris was a learned as well as a very prolific writer. St. Jerome says that he had written 'countless volumes about Holy Scripture,' and that his thirty books against Porphyrius were greatly esteemed (*de Vir. Ill.* 104). Philostorgius tells us that his arguments against Porphyrius were superior to those of Eusebius (*HE* viii. 14). St. Basil says that 'as he had great facility in writing on any subject, he filled the world with his books' (*Ep.* cclxiii. 4). Sozomen gives a long list of his poems, and mentions a work 'Concerning Truth' (*Περὶ ἀληθείας*), an apology against Julian and the Greek philosophers, in which 'he shewed their errors concerning God without using texts from Scripture' (*HE* v. 18). We hear also of a refutation of Eunomius (*de Vir. Ill.* 120; Philost. *HE* viii. 12) and of a book against Marcellus of Ancyra (*de Vir. Ill.* 86). Epiphanius, too, writes with great appreciation of his learning and talents (*Hær.* III. ii. 24).

Of all these works scarcely anything is left. Of the poetic versions of the Bible written either by him or by his father, one volume remains, the *Paraphrase of the Psalms* (*PG* xxxiii. 1313–1538; it includes the 151st Psalm). It cannot be described as a success. A version of the OT in hexameters, into which the author has crowded every possible reminiscence, allusion, and idiom from the pagan classics, must obviously lose all the feeling and quality of the Bible without becoming more than a very feeble imitation of the real classics. So it is not wonderful that after Julian's death, as soon as Christians were allowed to return to the real thing, Apollinaris' substitutes were soon forgotten. Socrates says that in his time these Biblical poems had 'disappeared as completely as if they had never been written' (*HE* iii. 16).

There is, however, a constant tradition that after the death of Apollinaris his followers published their master's works under the names of

orthodox Fathers. Leontius of Byzantium (or whoever the real author of the treatise 'Against the Frauds of the Apollinarists' was) begins his work by saying: 'Some of the followers of Apollinaris, or Eutyches, or Dioscor, in order to confirm their heresy, have ascribed (ἐπέγραψεν) certain works of Apollinaris to Gregory Thaumaturgus, or Athanasius, or Julius, in order to deceive the simple'; and the whole of this little work is a compilation of texts which the author thinks to be cases in point. Its full title is, 'Against those who offer us certain works of Apollinaris, having falsely inscribed them with the names of holy Fathers.'

So one of the chief problems concerning Apollinaris has always been the discovery of any of his writings which may be hidden under other names. In the case of some such works the matter may be said to be now definitely settled. Leontius (*l.c.*) had already declared that the little treatise called *The Partial Faith* (ἡ κατὰ μέρος πίστις) among the works of Gregory Thaumaturgus (the text is published by Dräseke and Lietzmann; see below) was written by Apollinaris; this is now admitted by every one. Other works also commonly acknowledged to be by him are: pseudo-Athanasius, *Of the Incarnation of the Word of God* (Περὶ τῆς σαρκώσεως τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου, Dräseke, pp. 341–343); pseudo-Julius of Rome's *Letters to Dionysius of Alexandria* (*ib.* 348–351), and, very probably at least, the tract, *Of the union in Christ of the body to the Divinity* (Περὶ τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ ἑνότητος τοῦ σώματος πρὸς τὴν θεότητα, *ib.* 343–347), also under the name of Julius. Lastly, there are fragments of Apollinaris' writings in various Greek Catenæ (cf. Krumbacher, *Byzant. Litteratur*, Munich, 1897, pp. 206, 211) and in the quotations from him made by his adversaries (Athanasius, Gregory Naz. and Gregory Nyss.). Dräseke (*Apoll. v. Laod.*) proposes to attribute to him a large number of other writings, all pseudo-Justin, including the *Cohortatio ad gentes*, which he thinks to be Apollinaris' book 'Concerning Truth'; the third and fourth books of St. Basil *against Eunomius* (which would then be his work against Eunomius mentioned by Jerome and Philostorgius); the first three dialogues of Theodoret of Cyrrhus *on the Trinity*; some sermons of Gregory Thaumaturgus; pseudo-Athanasius' *Dialogues on the Holy Trinity*; as well as almost any more or less contemporary anonymous works, including even the poem *Christ Suffering* (Χριστὸς πάσχων, cf. *JPTh*, 1884, pp. 657–704), which is really a mystery play of the 11th or 12th cent. (Krumbacher, *Byzant. Litt.* pp. 746–749). These identifications are now generally considered to have been premature and mistaken (Bardenhewer, *Patrologie*, 1894, pp. 224–225; Krüger in *PRE*[3], art. 'Apoll. v. Laod.'; Harnack, *Lehrb. der Dogmengesch.*, 1895, pp. 309–321). Lietzmann (*Apoll. Laod.*) suggests a more reasonable list.

LITERATURE.—The first sources for a knowledge of Apollinaris' life and ideas are, after the fragments of his own works, those of his earliest opponents. These are: Athanasius (but there is some doubt about the authorship), *Two books concerning the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ against Apollinaris* (Περὶ σαρκώσεως τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ κατὰ Ἀπολλιναρίου, *PG* xxvi. 1091–1165); Gregory of Nyssa, *A Denier of the things said by Apollinaris* (Ἀντιῤῥητικὸς πρὸς τὰ τοῦ Ἀπολλιναρίου, *PG* xlv. 1123–1269) and his *Letter to Theophilus of Alexandria* (*ib.* 1269–1277). Theodore of Mopsuestia wrote a work against Apollinaris, of which fragments remain (*PG* lx. 993–1004). All these contain quotations from his own works. Gregory of Nazianzus speaks of him and of his heresy in several letters (ci. and cii., *to Cledonius*, *PG* xxxvii. 176–201, and ccii., *to Nectarius of Constantinople*, *ib.* 329–333). St. Basil's letters (*PG* xxxii.) also contain many references, and Leontius of Byzantium in the beginning of the 7th cent. (or another writer of that time; the authorship is doubtful) wrote the treatise, *Against the Frauds of the Apollinarists* (*PG* lxxxvi. 1947–1976).

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ADRIAN FORTESCUE.

APOLLO.—See next art. and GREEK RELIGION.

APOLLONIA (Ἀπολλώνια). — In the case of Aphrodite it was only by rare exception that her festivals bore a special name (see art. APHRODISIA), but festivals in honour of Apollo were, as a rule, known by special appellations. 'Apollonia,' as the actual title of such festivals, seems, in fact, to be confined to the following instances:—(1) At Delos, where the inscriptions speak of τὰ Δήλια καὶ Ἀπολλώνια, and often Ἀπολλώνια alone.* This was probably a double name for a complex festival, the famous Delian festival spoken of by Thucydides, iii. 104 (see Farnell, *Cults*, iv. 290). (2) At Myndus (Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum græcarum*[3], 677). (3) At Miletus (*ib.* 627). (4) At Epidaurus (*ib.* 690). (5) At Hierapolis in Asia Minor (Gr. Inscr. in Brit. Mus. 615; see Nilsson, *Griechische Feste*, p. 179 n.). The use of the word Ἀπολλώνια by Dio Cass. of the festival of Apollo in Rome does not fall to be considered here.†

Apart from the above examples, festivals in honour of Apollo bore special names, all of which seem to have had originally no connexion with him, but to have reference to primitive, and perhaps to some extent pre-Hellenic, usages which only later were brought into relation with Apollo, who came into Hellas with the Hellenic tribes from the North (cf. J. E. Harrison, *Proleg. to Gr. Religion*, p. 30; Farnell, *op. cit.* 99 ff.). The cult and ritual of Apollo is throughout a blend of primitive and advanced ideas and practice; 'being certainly the brightest creation of polytheism, he is also the most complex; so many aspects of the people's life and progress being reflected in his cult . . . and in reviewing his cults one is surveying the career of a people in its transition from the lower barbarism into the highest social and intellectual life' (Farnell, *op. cit.* 98). It is not intended here to go into the details of the various festivals of Apollo, but to point out the features of significance.

Festivals in honour of Apollo belonged to the spring, summer, or autumn season; none is known to have fallen actually in the winter season. Certain days of the month were sacred to him—the first, seventh, fourteenth, and twentieth; especially sacred was the seventh, which was regarded as his birthday, and on that date most of his great festivals began.‡ The Epiphany, or the day of Apollo's coming, was celebrated by certain States, usually in the spring, or early summer, *e.g.* in the *Daphnephoria*, a spring-festival in Bœotia (Paus. ix. 10. 4, with Frazer's note) celebrated every eighth year, or, as the Greeks expressed it,

* *BCH*, 1879, p. 379: Ἀοιδάμειαν καινηφορήσασαν Δήλια καὶ Ἀπολλώνια Ἀπόλλωνι Ἀρτέμιδι Λητοῖ (date, 2nd cent. B.C.); *ib.* 1883, pp. 105–121, lists of οἱ χορηγοῦντες εἰς Ἀπολλώνια from 286 to 171 B.C. Dittenb. *Syll.*[2] 209: ἀναγορεύσαι τὸν ἱεροκήρυκα ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ τοῖς Ἀπολλωνίοις—to which formula the Inscr. *BCH*, 1878, p. 382, adds the words: ὅταν οἱ χοροὶ τῶν παίδων ἀγωνίζωνται.

† Dio Cass. xlvii. 18: καὶ συνέβαινε γὰρ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ καὶ τὰ Ἀπολλώνεια γίγνεσθαι; *ib.* xlviii. 33: ἐν τῇ τῶν Ἀπολλωνείων ἑστοδρομίᾳ.

‡ Aesch. *Sept.* 800: τὰς δ' ἑβδόμας ὁ σεμνὸς Ἑβδομαγέτης | Ἀναξ Ἀπόλλων εἴλετ'. Hesiod, *Op.* 770: πρῶτον ἴσην τετράς τε καὶ ἑβδόμη, ἱερὸν ἦμαρ, | τῇ γὰρ Ἀπόλλωνα χρυσάορα γείνατο Λητώ. Cf. Herod. vi. 57 (at Sparta). At Delphi, the 7th of Bysios, his birthday. At Delos and Athens, the 7th of Thargelion. At Mykonos, a sacrifice on the 7th of Hekatombaion. Attic Pyanopsia on the 7th of Pyanepsion. Seven a sacred number in connexion with a festival of Apollo at Sicyon (Paus. ii. 7. 7). 'No satisfactory explanation, astronomical or other, has been suggested for these facts' (Farnell, *op. cit.* 259).

every ninth year. At Delphi there was a feast on his birthday on the 7th of Busios, the first spring-month, and this seems to have been identical with the *Theophania* (Herod. i. 51; Plut. *Quæst. Græc.* 9, p. 292 F; *BCH*, 1895, p. 11).

The more purely agrarian festivals may be distinguished from those in which the artistic character is more prominent. The former are festivals of first-fruits, or harvest-festivals, presenting many analogies to the peasant festivals of other lands. Examples of this type are the *Karneia* of Laconia, falling on the 7th of the month Karneios = Attic Metageitnion (Aug.), and the *Hyakinthia* celebrated in May–June at Sparta (Paus. iii. 19. 3; Wide, *Lakonische Kulte* [Leipzig, 1893], 289 ff.; Xen. *Hell.* iv. 5. 11).* Above all, the *Thargelia* of Athens, falling in the latter end of May, is a harvest-festival, for at that date in Greece the first cereals and fruits are ripe.† The *Thargelia* is a combination of a primitive harvest-festival with a rite of purification (the curious ceremony of the Pharmakos) which may have belonged originally to the Earth-goddesses and was afterwards appropriated to Apollo. The Attic *Pyanopsia* or *Pyanepsia*, the only recorded Apolline festival that fell in late autumn, was also an agrarian festival —a thanksgiving service for the later cereals and fruits (Farnell, *op. cit.* 286).

The festivals held at Delos belong to a higher order, being closely connected with art and poetry, although here also the agrarian or primitive element enters (Paus. i. 31. 2). So also the great Pythian festival held at Delphi on the 7th of the month Bukatios, the second summer month of the Delphian calendar (*CIA* ii. 545), may have been originally a harvest-festival; but if so, in historical times it is entirely identified with the higher aspects of Greek culture, and, moreover, the athletic side of that culture did not predominate at the Pythia, as it did at the Olympian festival, over the artistic and intellectual.

'The earliest competitions were musical and poetical, tragic recitations being subsequently added. . . . Prizes were awarded not only to the poets and musicians, but even to painters; and, in fact, the Pythia may be regarded as the prototype of the art-exhibitions of modern Europe, for in this festival alone we hear of the famous artists exhibiting their works and competing. The great Delphic celebration then was pre-eminently the consecration of the highest life of Hellas to Apollo; a detailed account of it would form a special chapter in the history of Greek music' (Farnell, *op. cit.* 292).

Other festivals of Apollo held at Delphi, though less brilliant, are of great importance to the student of Apolline ritual. The festival of the god's Epiphany in early spring has already been mentioned. To this should be added the *Theoxenia*, in which the newly-arrived god extended his hospitality to the other deities, especially to Dionysos, as appears from one of the lately discovered Delphic hymns, in which Dionysos is invoked 'in these holy hours of spring,' and entreated to show this hymn to the brother-god in the yearly *Theoxenia*.‡ This festivity, therefore, included poetic competitions; it included also a sort of vegetable show, for a prize was given to him who exhibited the finest leek (Athen. 372 A: *ὃς ἂν κομίσῃ γηθυλλίδα μεγίστην τῷ Λητοῖ, λαμβάνειν μοῖραν ἀπὸ τῆς τραπέζης*). Finally, we must notice the festival called the *Stepteria*, a feast of purification which is described by Plutarch (293 C, 418 A, 1136 B; cf. Ælian, *Var. Hist.* iii. 1), as in part a holy drama enacting the death of Python and the subsequent flight of Apollo to Tempe, where he is purified, and whence he returns in triumph with the sacred laurel. The following is the outline of the ritual ('no recorded religious service is so characteristically Hellenic, and perhaps none so fascinating,' Farnell, *op. cit.* 293):—On a certain day in spring, a noble Delphian boy went with a band of boys of the best family, under the escort of sacred women with torches, in complete silence to a cabin built near the Pythian temple in the form of a royal palace, in which the Python was supposed to be lurking. They set fire to the cabin, overturned the table, and fled without looking backwards through the temple-doors. Then the boy feigned to go into exile; afterwards they all went together to Tempe, where they were purified at an altar, and, having plucked the sacred laurel and crowned themselves with its leaves, returned home along the sacred Pythian way, and in a village near Larissa, called Deipnias, the boy-leader partook of a solemn meal of a sacramental nature. They then returned in triumph to Delphi, to the music of flutes, and the sacred laurel they brought served to fashion the crowns for the Pythian victors (see Farnell, *op. cit.* 293 ff.). This festival is closely connected with the cathartic or purificatory function of Apollo, a function which nowhere received fuller public recognition than at Athens, especially in connexion with homicide. Such cathartic ceremonies were, however, probably a late development of Apolline ritual.

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* For details of these festivals, consult Farnell, *op. cit.* 259 ff., or the handbooks of Antiquities. In the *Hyakinthia* we have a combination of an older and a more recent religious rite (Farn. *op. cit.* 127).

† For the *Thargelia* see Farnell, *op. cit.* 267 ('the most complex and the most important for the study of Greek religion'). Treated at length by Miss Harrison, *Proleg. to Gr. Rel.* 77; the Pharmakos element, on p. 96 ff. (See art. SCAPEGOAT).

‡ Plut. 557 F. Pæan to Dionysos discovered at Delphi, *BCH*, 1895, p. 406, ll. 110–112: *δεῦξαι δ' ἐγ ξανίοις ἐτείοις θεῶν ἱερῷ γένει συναίμῳ τόνδ' ὕμνον.* Cf. Paus. vii. 27. 4.

APOLLONIUS OF TYANA in Cappadocia is in several respects a notable figure in the history of religion. Apart from the fact that he was a religious reformer of no little fame, he gave rise, as early as the time of Eusebius of Cæsarea, to a controversy which has continued almost down to the present day. The details of his life are to be found in a work by Philostratus the elder (3rd cent.), which was written at the request of Julia Domna († 217), 'the patroness of every art, and the friend of every man of genius' (Gibbon). Septimius Severus was a passionate student of magic and divination, and had chosen Julia Domna as his second wife on account of her 'royal nativity.'* Philostratus' patroness, who was also a collector of books, had been made acquainted with some memoirs by Apollonius' disciple, Damis the Assyrian.† These were not well written, and Philostratus was requested to copy them, improve the style, and in fact to compile as complete a biography as possible. He tells us himself that several 'Lives' of Apollonius were in existence, and that to some of them—those of Maximus of Ægæ and Mæragenes—he had access. He also used letters of Apollonius.‡ Moreover, he himself travelled into most parts of the known world, and everywhere heard the 'inspired sayings' of Apollonius. The biography, however, which Philostratus composed is of a romantic-character.§ It is clear that the story of Apollonius, though much of it may be regarded as more or less true, has been greatly embellished. Many of the embellishments are of

* Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Bury's ed. vol. i. p. 126.

† Philostr. i. 3. 'Damis the Assyrian' has been regarded as purely a literary device; so F. C. Baur and Ed. Zeller. But although his character seems to have been intentionally drawn in such a way as to illustrate the moral and intellectual superiority of his master, there is no reason to doubt his existence. Boswell, with whom he has been compared, has made his own character appear somewhat unnatural. Apollonius and Damis have also been compared with Don Quixote and Sancho Panza. See A. Réville, p. 52; G. R. S. Mead, p. 112.

‡ The so-called 'Letters of Apollonius' which have come down to us are generally regarded as spurious. See Hercher, in *Epistolographi Græci*, Paris, 1873.

§ It has been described as a 'Tendenzroman' or 'Märchenbuch.' F. Ueberweg (*Hist. of Philos.*, London, 1876, vol. i. p. 233) speaks of it as a 'philosophico-religious romance.' Julius Jessen thinks the work was composed with the help of a Greek romance. See also Rohde, pp. 438–442.

such a nature as to suggest that they were made to suit the taste of Julia Domna, which was, of course, well known to Philostratus. Besides this, the compiler of the biography, in the manner of ancient writers, has added in the text many notes or glosses of his own without distinguishing them from the information derived from his original sources. Like Thucydides, too, he has composed a number of speeches and put them in the mouth of his hero; and it has been noted by F. C. Baur and others that the Babylon of Apollonius is identical with that of Herodotus.*

Apollonius, whose parents seem to have been wealthy, was born about B.C. 4. The country people said he was a son of Zeus,† but he called himself‡ the son of Apollonius. At an early age he displayed a wonderful memory and great power of application. He was also very beautiful. When he was 14, his father took him to Tarsus to study rhetoric with Euthydemus. But the boy thought the people of Tarsus frivolous, and soon afterwards retired to Ægæ, where he conversed with the disciples of the great philosophers in the temple of Asklepios. At 16 he became an enthusiastic disciple of Pythagoras, and determined to follow his strictest teaching (i. 7). He gave up eating meat, regarding only productions of the earth as pure, refused to touch wine, went barefoot, let his hair grow long, and wore only linen.§ At this period he spent much of his time in the temple of Asklepios, and was allowed to see the cures which were wrought there (i. 8). We are told that through him the temple became a Lyceum and Academy. When of age, he returned to Tyana. Here, his father having died, he gave his brother, who was a spendthrift, half his own inheritance, and set to work to reform him. He then distributed the rest of his inheritance among those of his relatives who needed money,‖ and for his own part determined never to marry (i. 13). As a disciple of Pythagoras, he then observed the five years' silence, spending the time partly in Pamphylia and partly in Cilicia, and making himself understood by signs or, when necessary, by writing. These years were devoted to study and observation (i. 14 f.). Afterwards he went to Antioch, where he visited various temples and suggested reforms in religious practices (i. 16).

Apollonius now decided to go to the East, particularly to India. When he reached Nineveh, he met Damis, who thenceforward became his devoted disciple and companion. Damis told him that he knew the languages of the countries in which they proposed to travel, but Apollonius replied that he knew all tongues, because he could read men's thoughts (i. 18).¶ In Babylon he seems to have met the Magi. He also met, and was entertained by, the king, Bardanes, but refused to take part with him in a sacrifice involving the shedding of blood, or to go to the chase with him, regarding the sport as cruel to animals (i. 25–38). After visiting the surrounding cities (i. 39), they made for the Indian frontier, and seem to have entered India by the Khyber Pass (ii. 6). A guide having conducted them to Taxila (Attock, ii. 20), Apollonius was entertained by king Phraotes, who afterwards gave him a letter to Iarchas, the eldest of the wise men (ii. 40). Crossing the tributaries of the Indus (ii. 43) to the valley of the Ganges (iii. 5), they at length reached the goal of their journey, the castle or monastery of the wise men (iii. 10). Apollonius was conducted alone by a messenger to the castle (iii. 10). Here he was allowed to ask any questions he pleased.** A messenger was then sent to invite Damis to attend as well (iii. 34). Apollonius, during his stay, besides learning many secrets from these Brāhmans or Buddhists,†† was allowed to witness certain cures. Iarchas touched a cripple and healed him; he also restored sight to a blind man, and the use of his hand to a paralytic (iii. 39).* They made the homeward journey partly by ship, going from the Indus to the mouth of the Euphrates (iii. 52–58). Then, by way of Babylon, Nineveh, Antioch, Seleucia, and Cyprus, they came to Ionia (iii. 58). Visiting Ephesus, Apollonius warned the inhabitants of an approaching plague. They disregarded his warning, and he retired to Smyrna (iv. 1–5). When the plague came, ambassadors were sent to him to implore his help. He returned to Ephesus and calmed the inhabitants.† They next visited Pergamus, where Apollonius cured diseases (iv. 11), Troy, Lesbos (iv. 13), and eventually sailed for Athens.‡ We next find them in Corinth (iv. 25).§ When at length they came to Rome, all Apollonius' companions but eight fled. In Rome the reformer was very outspoken. Moreover, a distemper broke out to which Nero became a victim. The people prayed for his recovery, and Apollonius is reported to have said that 'the gods were to be forgiven if they took pleasure in the company of buffoons and jesters' (iv. 44). Tigellinus had him arrested on a charge of high treason. But he was impressed by his conversation, and, taking him for a god, released him. While Apollonius was at Rome, a girl of consular family, who had 'seemingly died,' was carried out to burial. Apollonius touched her, and 'wakened her from that death with which she seemed to be overcome' (iv. 45).‖ He left the city when Nero published an edict excluding philosophers from Rome (iv. 47). He now went to Spain, landing at Gades (Cadiz). After staying here a short time (iv. 47), he went to Africa, and thence by sea to Sicily, where he visited the principal cities and temples (v. 11–14). Returning to Greece (v. 18), he sailed from Piræus for Chios (v. 21), and then went by way of Rhodes to Alexandria, where the people looked upon him as a god (v. 24).¶ Going up the Nile as far as Ethiopia, he visited certain gymnosophists or ascetics (vi. 1–27). He next returned to Alexandria (vi. 28), and Titus, having been declared emperor, requested him to confer with and advise him at Tarsus (vi. 29–34). After this he seems to have returned to Egypt. We then find him crossing from Egypt to Greece, taking ship at Corinth, and sailing by way of Sicily to Puteoli. Thence he journeyed to Rome, foreknowing that the Emperor Domitian had decided to have him arrested (vii. 10–16). The Prætorian prefect Ælian interviewed him privately, and warned him of the charges that would be made against him (vii. 13), one of which was that he had allowed the people to call him a god. He was put in prison (vii. 22), and later the Emperor ordered his hair to be cut off (vii. 34).** Before he went to make his defence before the Emperor, Apollonius sent Damis to Puteoli: there, after he had made the defence, he was to come to him and another friend Demetrius (vii. 41). The Emperor, after hearing Apollonius' replies to his questions, acquitted him, but bade him remain to converse with him privately.†† Later he returned to Greece (vii. 15), where

* Again, several gaps have been detected in his story (the first after Bk. i. ch. 15; another of about twenty years from A.D. 72).

† We are also told that before his birth, Proteus, the Egyptian god, announced to his mother that the child she would bear would be an incarnation of himself. It is said that he was born in a meadow, and that a chorus of swans sang in unison to celebrate the event (i. 4 f.).

‡ We are told later (viii. 24) that in Greece Apollonius' disciples called themselves Apollonians.

§ He refused, that is to say, to wear clothes made from living creatures.

‖ So Philostratus tells us here. Whenever Apollonius visited a temple, he was no doubt treated as a guest. But he must have required money for his travels, and there are indications elsewhere in Philostratus' story that Apollonius must have kept back part of his inheritance; so Tredwell, p. 49.

¶ This is clearly what Apollonius means. When we are told (i. 20) that he knew the language of animals, the idea is the same. We are told elsewhere that he sometimes made use of an interpreter. See Max Wundt, p. 320 f.; G. R. S. Mead, p. 112.

** In reply to the question, what the wise men thought of themselves, Iarchas said 'gods,' and explained, 'because we are good men' (iii. 18).

†† When Apollonius said that they were 'on the earth, and yet not on it,' it is clear that the words are to be interpreted spiritually (so Max Wundt, p. 313; G. R. S. Mead, p. 86). But, on the strength of this, Damis explains that they were able to float at a height of two cubits above the ground; and A. P. Sinnett thinks they were able to 'elevate' themselves in a modern spiritualistic sense. For parallels of such levitation see Rohde, p. 180, n. 1; Gray, in *AJTh.* vii. 309.

* In a letter of farewell to Iarchas, Apollonius says: 'I will continue to enjoy your conversation as if still with you, if I have not drunk of the cup of Tantalus in vain.' A. P. Sinnett (p. 18) thinks of telepathy; G. R. S. Mead (p. 88) says it is evident that the 'cup of Tantalus' is identical with the 'wisdom' which has been imparted to Apollonius, and is once more to be brought back by him to the memory of the Greeks.

† Philostr. iv. 10. We are told that Apollonius transported himself thither at once, and that he told the people to stone an old man with a bad squint who was begging. When they had done this, they found in place of the old beggar a large dog.

‡ Here, we are told, Apollonius cast a demon out of a young man, and as it went forth it overthrew a statue (iv. 20).

§ Here, we are told, Apollonius exorcized a demon, an *empusa* or a *lamia*, who in the form of a fair maiden had captivated one of his pupils, Menippus. Cf. Keats, 'Lamia'; and Burton, *Anatomy of Melancholy*.

‖ Philostratus evidently thinks that she was not dead. Apollonius seems to have awakened her out of a catalepsy or hypnotic sleep. On this see Joseph Lapponi, *Hypnotism and Spiritism*, London, 1907. J. M. Robertson (*Christianity and Mythology*, London, 1900) derives the story of the awakening of the daughter of Jairus in Mt 9$^{18ff.}$ from this episode in Philostratus. But, in spite of the resemblance, there is no reason to see any direct connexion between the two events (so Erwin Rohde, p. 368, n. 5). F. C. Baur and Albert Réville think that the story in Philostratus was modelled on that of the raising of the young man at Nain or of the daughter of Jairus. If, however, the story was borrowed, the model, as Julius Jessen suggests (p. 18 f.), is no doubt to be found in Asclepiades (Pliny, *HN* xxvi. 3, 8).

¶ Here he met Vespasian (v. 27), and is said to have hinted to him that the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus had been burned down at Rome. That is to say, he saw the fire as a clairvoyant. Swedenborg is said, when in Gottenburg, to have seen clairvoyantly a fire in Stockholm by which his own home was threatened (see Joseph Lapponi, *Hypnotism and Spiritism*, p. 142 f.). Psychologically, Swedenborg's vision is more intelligible.

** F. C. Baur fancifully compares the sufferings of Apollonius with the Passion of Jesus, and the conduct of his rival Euphrates with that of Judas Iscariot.

†† We are told that he did not stay, but shortly afterwards disappeared suddenly. This was before noon; in the afternoon he appeared to Damis and Demetrius at Puteoli (viii. 10). Pythagoras also is said to have had the power of suddenly disappearing (see Iamblichus, *Vit. Pyth.* ch. 217; Max Wundt, p. 321). It has been claimed that the same kind of phenomenon has been noted in modern times (as recently as in 1901). See

he stayed two years (viii. 24). Here he insisted on visiting the cave of Trophonius* at Lebadea in Bœotia, forcing his way in (viii. 19). Having returned to Ephesus, while he was in the middle of a discourse there, he saw and announced the death of Domitian.† He disappeared altogether at the end of the reign of Nerva, having purposely sent Damis away to Rome (viii. 28).‡ At what age he died is uncertain. It has been put at 80, 90, or 100.

There is no valid reason for questioning the historical existence of Apollonius. His character on the whole is quite intelligible; his teaching is clear and consistent. He was a Neo-Pythagorean religious reformer, a vegetarian, an ascetic, and a student of medicine; and in his creed, a worshipper of Helios, a universalist and humanitarian.§ We need not doubt that he was able to cure certain diseases; and it is possible that, consciously or unconsciously, he made use of telepathy;‖ but whether he travelled quite as much as Philostratus represents him to have done is open to question. Nor is there any reason to doubt that he was an author. The works attributed to him, besides Letters, are *Initiations and Sacrifices*, a *Testament*, *Oracles*, a *Life of Pythagoras*, a *Hymn to Memory*, and *Divination by the Stars*.

The pupil of a disciple of Apollonius is satirized by Lucian; and Apollonius himself is ranked by Apuleius with Moses and Zoroaster. Dio Cassius, who was also patronized by Julia Domna, tells us in his *History* (lxxvii. 18) that Caracalla (211–216) erected a chapel or monument to his memory; and Lampridius (*Life of Alexander Severus*, xxix.) says that Alexander Severus included Apollonius, with Christ, Abraham, and Orpheus, amongst his household gods. We learn from Vopiscus (*Life of Aurelian*, xxiv.) that, when Aurelian (270–275) was besieging Tyana, Apollonius appeared to him, whereupon the Emperor vowed him a temple. Porphyry and Iamblichus mention him as one of their authorities for the 'Life' of Pythagoras. A more famous reference to him is that of Hierocles (*Discursus Philalethes*, *c.* 305), proconsul of Bithynia under Diocletian; in criticizing the claims of the Christians, he cited the wonders of Apollonius in order to show that 'miracles' were not the peculiar property of Christianity. Eusebius of Cæsarea replied to him in a treatise, *contra Hieroclem*. Lactantius also (*c.* 315) attacked Hierocles. Later, however, Jerome and Augustine speak highly of Apollonius' character at least, and Sidonius Apollinaris says that 'perchance no historian will find in ancient times a philosopher whose life is equal to that of Apollonius.' Ammianus Marcellinus and Eunapius also eulogize him.

Hierocles contrasted the miracles of Apollonius with those of Jesus. Later writers have contended that Apollonius was invented as a pagan rival of Christ.¶ This is the view of F. C. Baur and Albert Réville, who find a number of more or less fanciful parallels between the story of the Gospels* and that of Philostratus; only they think that the latter was written not, as earlier critics supposed, in a hostile sense, but in the spirit of the religious syncretism of the age. More recent critics, however, have rightly maintained that there is no trace of any direct connexion between the two stories. In Philostratus the whole narrative bears a Greek stamp;† and his model for the life of Apollonius, if he had one, was Pythagoras.‡ As Julius Jessen further points out (p. 12), if Philostratus' work had had a polemical purpose, certain important miracles of healing would have been ascribed to Apollonius rather than to the Indians. Nor is it remarkable that two religious reformers should have lived about the same time and have had somewhat similar experiences (cf. Ed. Baltzer, p. 388). It should be mentioned, in conclusion, that the newest view about Apollonius is that he was a kind of spiritualist.§ It is held by A. P. Sinnett, and to some extent by G. R. S. Mead. Mr. Sinnett, writing in 1898, says that 'until the occult revival of the last twenty years, no modern students of philosophy were in possession of any clue by which it would have been possible for them to have understood Apollonius' (p. 4; cf. G. R. S. Mead, p. 116).

LITERATURE.—(i.) Text: A. Westermann, Paris, 1848; C. L. Kayser, Leipzig, 1870. (ii.) Translations: Edward Berwick, *The Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, London, 1809; A. Chassang, *Le Merveilleux dans l'Antiquité*, Paris, 1862; Ed. Baltzer, *Apollonius von Tyana*, Rudolstadt i/Th., 1883. (iii.) Other works: F. C. Baur, *Apollonius von Tyana und Christus*, Tübingen, 1832 [reprinted by Eduard Zeller, *Drei Abhandlungen zur Gesch. d. alten Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1876]; J. H. Newman, 'Apollonius Tyanæus' in Smedley's *Encyc. Metropol.*, London, 1845, x. pp. 619–644; Ed. Müller, *War Apollonius von Tyana ein Weiser oder ein Betrüger oder ein Schwärmer und Fanatiker?* Breslau, 1861; Albert Réville, *Apollonius of Tyana, the Pagan Christ of the Third Century*, [Eng. tr.], London, 1866; C. L. Nielsen, *Apollonios fra Tyana*, Copenhagen, 1879; C. H. Pettersch, *Apollonius von Tyana der Heidenapostel*, Reichenberg, 1879; Julius Jessen, *Apollonius von Tyana und sein Biograph Philostratos*, Hamburg, 1885; Jean Réville, *La Religion à Rome sous les Sévères*, Paris, 1886; D. M. Tredwell, *A Sketch of the Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, New York, 1886; G. Wotherspoon, *Apollonius of Tyana, Sage, Prophet, and Magician*, London, 1890 [a Lecture]; Eduard Zeller, *Philos. der Griechen*[5], Leipzig, 1892; A. P. Sinnett, 'Apollonius of Tyana' in *Transactions of the London Lodge of the Theosophical Society*, No. 32, 1898; Erwin Rohde, *Der Griech. Roman*[2], Leipzig, 1900; G. R. S. Mead, *Apollonius of Tyana: The Philosopher-Reformer of the First Century A.D.*, London, 1901; J. M. Robertson, *Pagan Christs*, London, 1903; Thomas Whittaker, *Apollonius of Tyana*, London, 1906; Max Wundt, 'Apollonius von Tyana: Prophetie und Mythenbildung' in the *ZWT*, 1906, p. 309 ff.; cf. Froude's *Short Studies*, vol. iv.

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APOLOGETICS.—

A. *Historical Introduction.*
B. *Apologetics of To-day.*
I. Outline of a progressive Apology.
II. Methods of Apology and modern needs.
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2. *The problems of nature.*
(*a*) *Miracles.*
(*b*) *Evolution.*
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Joseph Lapponi, *Hypnotism and Spiritism*, p. 131 f. A. P. Sinnett thinks it not impossible for Apollonius to have made himself invisible. He would then have been able 'immediately afterwards to levitate himself and pass out, over the heads of the people assembled, from such a building as a Roman court, open to the air, no doubt, in many directions' (p. 26, cf. p. 18). The truth is, no doubt, that this is one of the touches introduced to suit the taste of Julia Domna.

* F. C. Baur compares this with the descent of Christ to Hell.

† The story is also told by Dio Cassius (lxvii. 18). Joseph Lapponi (*Hypnotism and Spiritism*, p. 138) refers to this as one of the early instances of clairvoyance or telepathy.

‡ We are told that subsequently he appeared in a vision to a young man, and convinced him of the truth of immortality.

§ He protested against gladiatorial shows, and against every form of cruelty to animals. The slaves of his companions he regarded as part of his philosophic community (iv. 34). Cf. Jean Réville, p. 212 f.

‖ There seems to be sufficient evidence for cures of a like nature in modern times (see Albert B. Olston, *Mind Power*, London, 1906, p. 103).

¶ In the 15th cent. Apollonius was denounced as a detestable magician. In 1680, Charles Blount published, with a polemical purpose, a translation of part of Philostratus' work, with notes which have been attributed to Lord Herbert of Cherbury. Voltaire and others made a similar use of Apollonius.

* Baur and Réville (p. 64) also contend that Apollonius 'combines in his own person many of the characteristics of the Apostles.'

† So Pettersch, p. 22; Max Wundt, p. 321. Baur's most important point is that the Greek and Roman literatures of the time are not familiar with the idea of the casting out of demons as found in the story of Apollonius. But, as J. M. Robertson says (p. 285), this is 'to make the arbitrary assumption that the superstitions of Syria could enter the West only by Judaic or Christian channels.'

‡ So Julius Jessen, p. 80 f.; and J. M. Robertson, p. 285.

§ Baltzer, writing in 1883, wondered that modern spiritualists had not claimed him.

(ii.) The psychical realm.
1. *Historical arguments.*
(a) *The Jews and OT prophecy.*
(b) *The historical Christ.*
(c) *The Resurrection of Christ.*
(d) *The history of Christianity and of the Church.*
2. *Psychological arguments.*
(a) *The changed life of the disciples, and the conversion of St. Paul.*
(b) *The witness of Christian customs and institutions.*
(c) *The success of Christianity.*
(d) *The abiding unity of faith.*
(e) *The argument from the psychological nature of religion.*
Excursus:—The general superiority of Christianity to other religions.
3. *Metaphysical arguments.*
(a) *The argument from intelligence, will, and conscience.*
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(d) *The Cosmological or Ætiological argument.*
Excursus:—The anthropological attack.
(iii.) The moral realm.
1. *Arguments for theistic belief from the moral realm of thought.*
(a) *The universal idea of God and cultivation of religion.*
(b) *The moral sense in man, the conscience and the sense of sin.*
(c) *The moral course of the world's history.*
2. *Arguments for Christianity from the moral realm of fact.*
(a) *The Christian Scriptures.*
(b) *The morality of Christianity.*
(c) *The Person of Christ, the moral ideal.*
(iv.) The spiritual realm.
(a) *The testimony of the spiritual faculty.*
(b) *The testimony to Christianity of the spiritual yearnings of men.*
(c) *The testimony of holy lives.*
(d) *The personal experience of the Christian.*

A. *Historical Introduction.*—We define the term 'Apologetics' as the Christian defence against attack by non-Christians. Facing outwards as it does, it therefore need not include reference to the doctrine and theology which lie behind it. We may further limit this wide subject, in order to reduce it to the compass of an article, by omitting its history altogether. As different ages have had to face different attacks, this would be altogether impossible, were it not that the results of centuries of assault and defence have in our own age been collected in an academic form, so as to be the basis of a scientific system of *Apologetics*, as a regular branch of Christian literature and activity.

The need and use of Christian apologetics have existed from the beginning. All early Christian literature is in a sense an *apologia*, as is shown even in the NT from the first words of the first sermon onwards (Ac 2^{14-15}). With regard to the recognized 'Apologists' of the succeeding age, we shall note only two features. On the one hand, they found themselves called on to defend not so much the beliefs of Christianity as the behaviour of Christians; and, on the other hand, they developed the offensive as well as the defensive method of answer. Among the chief names are those of Justin Martyr, Aristides, Melito of Sardis, Minucius Felix, Tatian, and Tertullian.

From the 3rd cent. attacks became less personal and more doctrinal, and in the hands of such enemies as Celsus, the more hostile Neo-Platonists, and Julian, the Scriptures had become an object of ridicule. The later apologists are therefore of a somewhat different stamp, and we can only refer to such varied writers as Origen (*against Celsus*), Arnobius, Lactantius, Cyril of Alexandria (*against Julian*), Macarius Magnes, and Augustine (*de Civitate Dei*). Gradually the need for such works ceased, and, as we pass to the later centuries, we find that apologists deal no longer with the faith generally, but with special problems in connexion with it. It is the philosophic aspect that the Middle Ages give us, and the works of chief importance are the *Monologion* and *Proslogion* of Anselm, the *Dialogus inter Philosophum Judæum et Christianum* of Abelard, and the *Summa Theologiæ contra Gentiles* of Thomas Aquinas. The work of Anselm is of the most abiding interest, for it was he who first formulated the famous *a priori* proof of the being of God known as the Ontological argument. A new era began with the rise of Deism in the 18th cent., when the effort was made to set up a 'religion of nature' in place of Christianity. In England the chief answer came from Bishop Butler, who saw that the deistical admissions as to the existence and supremacy of God, the sins of men, and the reality of judgment, were valuable premises on which to base an argument for the acceptance of the whole of the faith. Starting with natural religion, he showed in his *Analogy*, by an argument which will always remain a famous Christian apologetic, that revealed religion follows from it, as neither more difficult nor more incredible.

The next attack, as represented by David Hume, was upon the credibility of miracles, and Paley's *Evidences of Christianity*, in answer, remains a classic in the history of English apologetics. The 19th cent. saw a more determined assault on the supernatural, and the growth of Positivism, Agnosticism, and Scepticism has been such that it must still be reckoned with in discussing the apologetics of the present day, and count has still to be taken of Huxley and Herbert Spencer, as well as of Haeckel, in setting forth, as we now proceed to do, the present state of the problem.

See J. Donaldson, 'The Apologists' (vols. ii. and iii. of *Hist. of Chr. Lit.*), 1864; J. Patrick, *The Apology of Origen in reply to Celsus*, 1892, pp. 121–262; J. M. Rigg, *St. Anselm of Canterbury*, 1896; J. Cairns, *Unbelief in the 18th Century*, 1880; W. A. Spooner, *Bishop Butler*, 1901.

B. *Apologetics of To-day.*—Instead of giving the outline of any one present-day apologetic work, an attempt is made below to state in general terms the chief arguments that are being used to-day to defend the Christian faith. Naturally they will be given by way of statement and not by way of argument, and will be placed in an order which is meant to be scientific, rather than such as will make the most forcible appeal to readers.

For the subject generally, see A. B. Bruce, *Apologetics: or, Christianity defensively stated*, 1892; C. A. Row, *Christian Evidences in relation to Modern Thought* (Bampton Lectures, 1877); W. L. Robbins, *A Christian Apologetic*, 1902; Lonsdale Ragg, *Evidences of Christianity* (Oxford Ch. Text Bks., 1905); F. Ballard, *Miracles of Unbelief*, pop. ed. 1904; *Christian Apologetics*, ed. W. W. Seton, 1903; G. P. Fisher, *Manual of Christian Evidences*, 1892; W. H. Turton, *The Truth of Christianity*, 1900; A. J. Harrison, *Problems of Christianity and Scepticism*, 1891; J. R. Illingworth, *Reason and Revelation: an Essay in Christian Apology*, 1906.

First, it will be well to indicate the limitations in his arguments which the wise apologist is ready to concede. He does not claim that they afford irrefragable proof of his beliefs. To assert that Christianity can be conclusively demonstrated by merely intellectual proof is to stultify the nature of a true revelation. If an essential of true religion be the exercise of *faith*, and if God has revealed Himself by appealing to a faculty in men which is *not* their reason, it will be impossible to make a man a Christian by mere argument. The final appeal is to the heart; the appeal to the mind must content itself with proving without a shadow of doubt that Christianity is rational, credible, and probable. This is specially true of the arguments for the being of God. None of them amounts to positive proof, and yet it must not be forgotten that there are many of them, and that their cumulative force adds enormously to their weight.

I. Outline of a progressive Apology.—We now proceed to give an outline of the successive stages by which the argument leads up from simple Theism to the Christian creed.

(*a*) Natural Religion.—God exists, and may be known apart from revelation. This is proved

by — (1) *The argument from General Consent.* That which is merely subjective when applied to the spiritual experience of the individual, and is therefore viewed with suspicion by opponents, becomes objective when it shows a 'consensus gentium' to belief in a God. (2) *The Cosmological or Ætiological argument*, which suggests the universe as an effect which must have a cause. (3) *The Teleological or Design argument*, which suggests that the order of nature implies a First Cause who is intelligent and free. (4) *The Ontological argument*, which points to God as the highest imaginable object of thought, and the ground of thought itself. (5) *The Moral argument*, which takes man's conscience as implying a lawgiver who inspires him without being identified with him. (6) *The Historical argument*, which points to the sense of purpose and design running through human history.

(*b*) REVEALED RELIGION.—(1) Natural religion leads us to expect something further, and suggests a Deity who would be sure to make Himself known. (2) This further step necessarily involves the supernatural. The objections to a supernatural revelation must be faced, viz. (*a*) such inadequate theistic theories as Pantheism, Deism, and Modern Theism; (*β*) such anti-theistic theories as Atheism, Agnosticism, and Materialism. Miracle must be discussed in its relation to natural law and to the purpose of revelation. (3) The Christian revelation must be shown to be intrinsically superior to other religions—Polytheism, Buddhism, and Muhammadanism—and to be the successor and higher fulfilment of Judaism. (4) The argument is led to that around which all centres—the Person of Christ. The Christ of the Gospels and Epistles is shown to be historic, the Resurrection makes all other miracles possible, and Christ remains the moral miracle of the world. (5) This is naturally followed by the history and influence of Christianity, as educating and regenerating the world, and showing a superhuman power of recuperation and continued existence. (6) This leads to the dispensation of the Holy Spirit and the work of the Church. Christian institutions, such as the ministry, the Sacraments, and the Christian year, are seen to be witnesses both to Christ and Christianity.

II. Methods of Apology and modern needs.—The bitter attack upon miracles in the 19th cent. has caused recent apologists to seek some line of proof that should be independent of this confident assault. It is on the *moral* aspects of Christianity that the chief stress is now laid. And the subject is no longer divided according to the old divisions of Natural and Revealed Religion. In the attempt to use every line of defence, it is preferable to marshal the evidences in accordance with the successive spheres in which they lie.

(1) Lowest stands the *physical* realm, but it is the arguments of science with which it is filled. The development of physical science during last century, as shown in new theories of which we connect the beginnings with the name of Darwin, and the attacks of Huxley and of Herbert Spencer, and yet more recently of Haeckel, make this an important part of modern Apologetics. The question of miracles lies only partly within it, for the Christian still adopts the attitude of Paley towards Hume, and refuses to admit that any Christian miracle is a merely physical occurrence. But the arguments in favour of a theistic religion, which, in the face of modern Materialism and Agnosticism, must still form the basis of a defence of Christianity, are many of them physical and physiological in form. Besides actual arguments found in the physical sphere, there are many problems connected with nature which need discussion. These are best placed under the same head, and include not only such questions as that of suffering, and the theory of Evolution in the forms which the last fifty years have made familiar, but that latest battleground of faith and unbelief which is represented by the word 'Monism.' At the present moment it seems likely that the honest and well-equipped apologist will have to re-consider each of his theistic positions in the light of the monistic tendency of the latest results of science, and indeed this has already been done in recent works to which reference will be made. But it will be impossible in this article to do more than show that, if a naturalistic Monism is invoked on one side, an even stronger weapon may be found in spiritual Monism on the other. The main features of this latter and its bearing on the faith can only be mentioned, and its authorities referred to.

(2) The next sphere of evidences is the *psychical*, when we have passed from nature generally to human nature, from physics and matter to metaphysics and mind. Properly speaking, the realm of psychology belongs only to the present, but it need not exclude those other spheres of mental activity which we speak of in the past and the future. The consideration of the past must necessarily embrace a large part of Apologetics, for Christianity is essentially a historical religion, and takes its stand upon the facts of long ago. Under this head we prefer to place the Christian defence of miracles, focussing attention on the supreme miracle of the Resurrection, which is supreme not only in the sense that, if its difficulty is overcome, the other miracles follow naturally, but also in the sense that with its truth as a fact of history Christianity stands or falls. And every century the lengthening history of the faith affords a further means of building argument upon the past. In the sphere of more direct psychology which concerns the individual mind, we are led to such questions as the conversion of Paul, and the position of the writers of the NT.

Some would postulate a separate sphere as the *metaphysical*—the sphere in which mental phenomena are in a special sense marshalled by reason. Others are content to give a metaphysical tinge to the stages which reach higher than the physical realm.

(3) The next sphere is the *moral*, raised as far above the mental as the mental is above the physical. Under this head come such theistic arguments as the universal idea of God, the conscience of man, the individual consciousness, and the sense of sin. But the supreme moral argument centres in the Person of Christ. He Himself and His earthly life and moral teaching are now made the chief argument for the truth of the religion that He founded. He is at the same time the moral miracle which cannot be explained by 'natural' causes, and the answer to the moral instincts of humanity, the key to unlock not only the unique monotheistic morality of Judaism, but such problems as those of sin and suffering, and of the purpose and the goal of human existence. Our generation is coming to realize more than those gone by that 'Christianity is Christ.' And the result, for the apologist, has been stated thus (W. L. Robbins, *A Christian Apologetic*, 1902, p. 25 f.): 'The fundamental ground of Apologetics must be shifted from miracles to the moral character of Jesus Christ, and verifiable facts of present religious experience. . . . This would seem to be the most wide-reaching modification required in modern Apologetics—a shifting of the accent from the past to the present, from the miraculous to the moral.'

(4) Highest and last is the *spiritual* realm. Here we reach without doubt the final argument, and

yet it is of but little use in Apologetics. For a spiritual religion must be spiritually understood, and it is only to the spiritual that it can make its final appeal.

It may therefore be said that the moral argument from the Person of Christ forms the chief line of defence, and the separation of these higher realms of evidence from the physical is in itself a reply to those opponents who try to confine the entire issue to the latter.

III. Arguments arranged according to the sphere in which they lie.—(i.) THE PHYSICAL REALM.—1. *The evidence of nature.*—(*a*) *The argument from matter, life, and mind.*—We begin with the mystery of 'Being,' and a study of the objects of sense reveals that *matter* is the basis of them. But material substances are of different kinds, and some of them are marked off from the rest as self-acting, or *living*. These are compound substances, capable of reduction to the same elementary substances as the rest, but possessed of the faculties of feeding, growing, and reproducing. But the *life* which they possess is far more than the sum-total of the material substances of which they are composed; it is a mystery, with no explanation of its origin. And there is a further mystery, for connected with some of these living material beings is *mind*, which is not demonstrably derivable from life, any more than life is from matter; for thought, which is the expression of mind, appears to be far more than simply a movement of matter. But there is an attribute of all being, known as *force*, which is an important factor throughout. As mental force, and as vital force, it must necessarily be conceived of as inherent in mind and life. But as physical force, in the lowest of the three stages, it has to be regarded, as Newton insisted, as exterior to matter, and acting upon it. Thus far, physical science can speak plainly. But what answer is to be given when the question is pushed a stage further back? How did these things come to be thus? How did matter originate? How is the gulf to be bridged that separates life from matter and mind from life? And whence comes the force that acts upon them all?

Materialism and Agnosticism have their answer; but are they as reasonable as is the following Christian explanation? Force is derived from an eternal force. Matter has not always existed, but was created at the fiat of His will. This implies a personal Creator, a First Cause who is both single, as shown by the unity of nature, and supernatural, because all the laws and forces of nature do not contain Him, but show His work. This by no means denies the Atomic Theory, but explains how the 'favourable circumstances' for the new formations of atoms came about; and the theory of Evolution is seen to be the method of His working, while there is no need of lame attempts to bridge the chasm between matter, life, and thought. Such an answer is no mere *a priori* argument to make certain preconceived ideas about religion fit in with science; rather is it the most reasonable induction from the facts of the physical realm. It lays no blame on science for getting no further back than matter and force; for it holds a true agnosticism which denies that it is the province of science to go further. Merely weighed by probabilities, it can claim to be the most rational and the least difficult explanation of the problem of being.

See Aubrey Moore, *Science and the Faith*, 1889; G. Sexton, *Baseless Fabric of Scientific Scepticism*, 1879; W. F. Wilkinson, *Modern Materialism* (Pres. Day Tracts); A. B. Bruce, *Apologetics*, 1892, ch. iv.; F. R. Tennant, *The Being of God in the Light of Physical Science* (Camb. Theol. Essays), 1905; J. Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*[2], 1903; P. N. Waggett, *Religion and Science*, 1904; J. Fiske, *Through Nature to God*, 1899; H. Wace, *Christianity and Agnosticism*, 1896; W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, 1899; J. R. Illingworth, *Divine Immanence*, 1898; H. M. Gwatkin, *The Knowledge of God*, 1907; J. Watson, *The Philosophical Basis of Religion*, 1907.

(*b*) *The argument from design in nature.*—This evidence, so keen a weapon in the days of Paley's *Natural Theology*, is said by opponents to have become blunted by the theories of modern science. Romanes claimed that the place of supernatural design has been taken by natural selection, basing his claim upon the fact that all species of plants and animals were slowly evolved, and not separately and suddenly created. But creation by God need not be sudden, and we welcome all the processes of evolution as so many examples of His method of working. Perhaps it is sufficient to insist that evolution is a process, not a cause. It serves only to push the evidence of design further back, and therefore to increase our admiration for the Designer. And it is to be noted that if the evidence of nature suggests the *existence* of a personal Creator, the evidence of design does more, for it suggests His *foreknowledge*.

To imagine that such exquisite mechanism as that of the human eye, or such wonderfully suitable material in all its properties as a man's bones, was due to the inanimate and fortuitous working of matter and force, makes a far greater demand than any Christian miracle.

The popular objection to the evidence of design lies in pointing to 'nature red in tooth and claw.' This opens the question of the problem of pain, which, as far as it relates to man, requires separate treatment. With regard to the sufferings of the animal world, some exaggeration of them seems to be made in these days, by attributing to lower creatures our own standard of sensibility. This is a department in which the apologist must be careful not to ignore the discoveries of modern Biology. See BIOLOGY, SUFFERING.

See F. Ballard, *The Miracles of Unbelief*, pop. ed. (1904), p. 65, etc.; G. P. Fisher, *The Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief* (rev. ed. 1903), pp. 42–67; J. T. Tigert, *Theism, a Survey of the Paths that lead to God*, 1900. See also, for the kindred argument from the sublime and the beautiful in nature, R. St. J. Tyrwhitt, *Natural Theology of Natural Beauty*, 1832; J. B. Mozley, *University Sermons*, Sermon on 'Nature,' 1876; G. Rawlinson, *The religious Teachings of the Sublime and Beautiful in Nature* (Pres. Day Tracts).

2. *The problems of nature.*—(*a*) *Miracles.*—The apologist refuses to limit the discussion of miracles to the physical realm, claiming their explanation through the historical and the moral aspect of them. But it is on the material side that the attack has come. The modern instinct revolts from miracles, and echoes Hume's assertion that no amount of testimony can render them credible. In our defence of them we must be careful where to begin. To one who does not believe in a God they are indeed incredible. He exalts certain so-called 'natural laws' into the supreme place, and rules out all that does not seem to agree with them. But if it be assumed that the world had a Creator (according to the foregoing arguments from nature, and those suggested by other lines of thought), miracles at once become possible. For a miracle may be defined as 'an act of God which visibly deviates from the ordinary working of His power, designed, while capable of serving other uses, to authenticate a Divine message.' If we begin with this assumption, we may still argue, as Paley did, that miracles have the same degree of probability as God's revelation of Himself to men.

Therefore, if we begin with the objection 'Miracles are impossible,' we must take the objector a stage further back, and discuss with him the belief in a God. But miracles are not always discredited by such reference to the main issue. The following are some of the objections levelled against them:—

(*a*) Miracles are inconsistent with the order of

nature. This argument not only ignores the working of a God who still has control over His creation, but also gives a rigid uniformity to certain so-called 'natural laws,' which after all are based only on the imperfect induction and limited experience of the human mind. If modern science has arrived at these laws by induction from a study of the universe, and not by the arbitrary assumption that these laws *are* uniform, all evidence must be taken into account. And as miracles lay claim to evidence, science must needs take them into consideration, or it will be stultifying its own methods. Such evidence, however, lifts the question out of the physical realm.

(β) It is further objected that the admission of miracles implies a lax or unscientific conception of the course of nature. And it is, indeed, true that Christians sometimes speak as if *only* miracles were the signs of God's working, and as if they interfered with the course of nature by subverting its laws. But we must insist that in speaking of miracles as 'supernatural,' we do not refer them to any other agency than that of so-called 'natural' events. We claim only that, if both historical and moral reasons demand it, it is both credible and reasonable that God should occasionally do what is outside man's ordinary experience of the working of created things. If man himself can interrupt the ordinary course of nature, he must certainly expect that God will do the same.

(γ) Perhaps the favourite attack on miracles to-day is the rationalizing of Biblical miracles one by one. It is claimed that such miracles may after all be brought into harmony with nature, for they are really to be referred to 'natural' causes. To have exalted them into more is the result of mistake or fraud. We reply that the only answer is in the weighing of the evidence. We are taken at once out of the physical realm into that of psychology and history.

(δ) Attempts are continually made to discredit all miracles by pointing to those that Christians themselves do not accept. But we may confine the issue to those Biblical miracles which have their climax in the Resurrection. We are not called on to explain the work of Pharaoh's magicians, the many marvels of the Middle Ages, or the achievements of occultism to-day. It is enough to prove that certain miracles actually happened, as an attestation of a Divine revelation.

See Mozley, *Miracles* (Bampton Lectures for 1865); Lord Grimthorpe, *Review of Hume and Huxley on Miracles*, 1883; A. T. Lyttleton, *The Place of Miracles in Religion*, 1899; A. B. Bruce, *The Miraculous Element in the Gospels*, 1886.

(*b*) ***Evolution.***—The modern theory of Evolution touches the faith at many points. The sceptic uses it to discredit the design argument (see above), and to show that there is no room for the existence or working of a God; to explain the life of the one Perfect Man as due simply to natural causes in the evolutionary progress of the race; and to point to the origin and development of Christianity as an evolution from natural causes and previous sources. The apologist refuses to hand over Evolution to be a mere weapon in the enemy's hand. He claims that it is also his own. He sees in it the visible processes (or rather, the theories about them which the human mind has tried to express) whereby God works. The evolution of Christ and Christianity he refuses to discuss merely in the physical realm, but applies the historical method to both, and finds that they can be shown to be evolved from natural causes only by arguments which ignore the first principles of Evolution itself. But the Christian apologist is not content merely to apply the theory of Evolution in the same sphere as his opponent. He claims that the principle may be extended more widely to embrace the moral world in the present as well as the physical world in the past, to strengthen the conviction and hope of the Christian with regard to the future. The following words will illustrate such a position (J. M. Wilson, *Evolution and the Holy Scriptures* [1903], p. 18): 'Evolution is showing us in very plain ways some of those truths that we have grasped only in words, the Unity of Nature, the Divine Plan, the Omnipotence and Omnipresence of God. . . . It is, moreover, a marvellous help to faith and patient work to believe that as there has been an evolution in nature in the past, so there is such a process in man and in the moral world now going on.'

See J. Iverach, *Evolution and Christianity*, 1894; E. Griffith-Jones, *The Ascent through Christ*, 1899; J. Cairns, *Is the Evolution of Christianity from mere natural Causes credible?* (Pres. Day Tracts); J. M. Wilson, *Problems of Religion and Science*, 1900; F. B. Jevons, *Evolution*, 1900, and *Religion in Evolution*, 1906; J. Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*[2], 1903; H. Calderwood, *Evolution and Man's Place in Nature*[3], 1896; J. M. Baldwin, *Development and Evolution*, 1902; G. H. Howison, *The Limits of Evolution*[2], 1905.

(*c*) ***Monism, true and false.***—The tendency of modern science has been to discover a closer unity in all things than had been imagined. Upon this the opponents of Christianity have not been slow to seize. They have never been able satisfactorily to bridge the gulf between matter and spirit. Now they have the word of science that such dualism has been discredited by recent research, and that all phenomena, whether material or spiritual, must be explained as essentially one, and that therefore the only rational theory of the universe is some form of *Monism*. The wise apologist does not meet this with a denial. He is ready to listen to science as long as science retains its proper sphere; and if monistic belief seems the most rational, he does not reject it because it has been said to controvert Theism, but first examines the matter, and then re-considers his theistic position in the light of his conclusion. Therefore, the first question to be asked is what is meant by Monism, and the second is what is its bearing on Christian belief.

(α) Monism is a word which is growing in popularity, but it certainly does not always mean the same thing. There is a naturalistic, or scientific, and there is a spiritual Monism. The case is like that of Evolution: one aspect of the theory is said to overthrow Christianity, but another side is claimed as supporting it. There is no doubt that the Monism which makes itself most heard is that of the naturalistic kind, such as is identified with the name of Haeckel. It does, indeed, claim not to be materialistic, and recognizes Spirit as well as Matter; but it refuses to allow a dualistic distinction between God and the world, and regards Force and Matter as only two sides of one reality or Substance, which does everything and is everything. There is an invariable 'Law of Substance' whereby this Substance is in a process of evolution which causes eternal motion throughout the Universe. Such evolution is succeeded in turn by dissolution, and thus new worlds are continually being born and re-born. There is no place left for God, freedom, or immortality. The one single Substance operates of necessity and without ceasing, through all things, so that everything is determined by what has gone before; and when each individual has served his turn, he gives way to another, and disappears. But there are modifications of such Monism which are not necessarily anti-theistic. Some allow that there is an underlying Source of all things, of which Force and Matter represent 'only two different sides or phenomenal aspects,' and even the name of God may be admitted if 'stripped of its theological and anthropomorphic associations, and not opposed to or set above the principle of the unity of nature.'

But there is quite a different kind of Monism which the Christian may fearlessly accept and assert, and that is *Spiritual* Monism. The term has been explained (W. L. Walker, *Christian Theism and a Spiritual Monism*, 1906, p. 202) as 'adopted in order to set forth both *agreement* with Science in acceptance of its facts, and *difference* from the interpretation which some in the name of Science give to these facts. It acknowledges the two-sidedness that is everywhere manifested, and sees everything and every being in the world to be the result of the working or unfolding, or development in its conditioned form, of a single Power manifested as both material and spiritual. But, instead of giving the predominance to the material side, or equal value merely to the two sides, or leaving them both unexplained, it regards the spiritual side as that which is logically first and deepest—that which the material side only expresses and serves—that which manifests its supremacy in our own consciousness.' And the claim that this form of Monism makes is this: 'So far as we are able at all to understand ourselves, and to look out upon the immeasurable vastness beyond, no monistic scheme can be tolerated which does not both do us justice and transcend us. And certainly a monism which treats the world of phenomena as real, whilst regarding as illusory, or as ultimately mechanical, the world of noumena, sufficiently discredits itself. Spiritualistic monism is not guilty of the latter, nor can it be denied that it fairly fulfils the former' (F. Ballard, *Theomonism True*, 1906, p. 378).

Before passing to our other question, we note the impossibility of trying to confine the issue to the merely physical realm.

(β) The bearing of Monism upon Christian belief can only be briefly indicated, and may perhaps be best expressed in the outline of the argument as given in the last-named work (pp. 380–400). (i.) There is no contradiction, or even collision, between Spiritual Monism and Theism. (ii.) It causes no weakening of preceding reasons for Theism. (iii.) It leads up to Divine Personality. (iv.) It refuses, with Theism, to treat man as an automaton. (v.) It demands, however, the purification and enlargement of theistic phraseology. (vi.) A twofold development is involved, namely, a fuller recognition of Divine Immanence, and a blending of this with Divine Transcendence. It is in such directions as this that the greatest change is coming over Apologetics at the present moment.

See W. L. Walker, *Christian Theism and a Spiritual Monism*, 1906; F. Ballard, *Haeckel's Monism False*, 1905, and *Theomonism True*, 1906; J. Morris, *A New Natural Theology*[2], 1905; F. R. Tennant, *Cambridge Theological Essays*, 1905; J. F. Tristram, *Haeckel and his Riddles*, 1907.

(*d*) *Suffering.*—This is a problem which has perplexed mankind in every age. It has to be faced in relation to every system, and it has often been used in the attempt to discredit Christianity. The unmerited sufferings of men are adduced as showing that there is not a God who looks after the world as a Father, and the sufferings of the rest of creation are said to point to a 'nature red in tooth and claw' such as no beneficent Creator would allow. We have to admit that the problem still remains for us a perplexing one, but at the same time we claim that Christianity is the only system under which it may be viewed in a satisfactory and hopeful light. Taking physical pain as the simplest form of suffering, we may see in it a useful and beneficent purpose, as forming a 'danger signal,' without which far more harm would follow. And then we may apply this to suffering of a more complex kind. In arguing with any but the mere hedonist, we may assume that the purpose of life is something other than enjoyment. If it be 'the growing development of our faculties through the discipline of life,' then it is easy to see how it is helped by suffering. And we may recognize in it a twofold use, partly for the education of the individual, and partly for the well-being of the race even at the cost of the suffering of the individual.

But what is the bearing of Christianity on the problem? (α) The belief in a re-adjustment hereafter explains the inequalities of suffering in the present world. (β) The Fatherhood of God teaches that He is in sympathy with the sufferings of His creation, and the realization of such a sympathy has already proved 'the secret of endurance in the sufferings of the world.' (γ) The Cross of Christ, as not merely an isolated act of vicarious suffering, but the manifestation of the abiding union of the Divine in suffering, proves that the Divine sympathy is real. The deeds of Christ are inseparably linked with His words, His example with His precept, and the sufferer sees the problem wrapt in a new glory in the light of such echoes as 'Not my will but thine be done,' and 'He that loseth his life shall find it.' (δ) Not only does Christianity throw light on the problem in the case of the Founder, but the Christian is bidden to take up his cross and follow Christ; the facing of it in His Master's spirit and strength is a necessary and a joyful part of his creed. The belief in his own redemption through suffering makes him ready to 'fill up that which is behind of the afflictions of Christ,' and voluntarily seek suffering in the service of his brethren, as well as patiently accept that involuntary suffering which he realizes will be for his eternal good, and make him more like the Master who was 'made perfect through suffering.' No other religion explains and glorifies suffering thus, and therefore we claim that it attracts men to the Christian faith, instead of repelling them and discrediting it in their eyes.

See Masterman, 'The Problem of Suffering' in *Topics of the Times* (S.P.C.K.), 1906; Illingworth in *Lux Mundi*, 1889; J. Martineau, *A Study of Religion*[2], ii., 1889; and art. SUFFERING.

(ii.) THE PSYCHICAL REALM.—1. *Historical arguments.*—(*a*) *The Jews and OT prophecy.*—While Christianity is not bound to answer the objections that are levelled against Judaism, it accepts Judaism as its parent. And the Jews and their sacred literature form a strong apologetic argument for our faith. Their *external history* is in itself a marvel from first to last, while their spiritual *theology* and *worship* amid the debased beliefs of the ancient world, as embodied in their ideas of God and man and in the Messianic hope, and above all their *prophetic instinct*, which has its only explanation in the facts of the founding of Christianity, offer an argument the value of which is coming to be once more appreciated in our own day.

See E. A. Edghill, *The Evidential Value of Prophecy*, 1906; W. Sanday, *Bampton Lectures*, 1903, ch. viii.; H. A. Redpath, *Christ the Fulfilment of Prophecy*, 1907.

(*b*) *The historical Christ.*—The Person of Christ makes a higher appeal than that of mere history. But, viewed from the historical side, we claim (α) that the birth, work, death, and resurrection of Christ are among the best attested facts of human history. (β) That their historicity would never have been called in question were it not for the miraculous element inseparably bound up with them. (γ) That we have already shown that the only scientific treatment of miracles is to regard them as capable of verification, and to weigh the evidence for them accordingly. (δ) That when all the evidence for the miraculous element in Christianity, both psychical and moral, has been sifted, the whole history of its founding remains as true as any other fact of ancient history.

But the sifting of historical evidence implied under the last head involves a study of topics which will be dealt with under their own titles

must, therefore, be content to mention them, and to refer to books where they are discussed.

(1) The authenticity of the four Gospels; the claim that either they record facts, or else nothing whatever can be said about Jesus of Nazareth; the arbitrary and unscientific nature of the attempt to offer any other history than that of the Gospels; the mutual relation of the Synoptic Gospels; the strengthening of the evidence through their various lines of testimony; the witness of the Fourth Gospel in relation to them.

See B. Weiss, *Introd. to the NT* (tr. Davidson, 1887-8); Gore, *The Incarnation* (Bampton Lectures, 1891); Westcott, *St. John's Gospel* (Introd.), 1892; Burkitt, *The Gospel History and its Transmission*, 1906; Sanday, *The Life of Christ in recent Research*, 1907; J. Orr, *The Incarnation and recent Criticism*, 1907.

(2) The historical accuracy of Acts; the impossibility that it is a sequel to anything but the history of the Gospels; its witness to the historical Person of Christ.

See Ramsay, *St. Paul the Traveller* (1895); Harnack, *Luke the Physician* (tr. Wilkinson, 1907), etc.

(3) The Epistles; the earliest witness to the life of Christ; the value of their incidental allusions; the basis afforded by the four uncontroverted Epistles of St. Paul.

See R. J. Knowling, *The Witness of the Epistles*, 1892, *Literary Criticism and the NT*, 1907; Howson, *Evidential Conclusions from the Four greater Epistles of St. Paul* (Pres. Day Tracts).

(4) The arguments for a historical Christ deducible from Jewish and heathen literature; Josephus, and the Talmudic account of Jeschu; Suetonius, Pliny, Tacitus, and, indirectly, the *True Account* of Celsus.

See E. Crawley, *The Tree of Life*, 1905, ch. v.; Paley, *Evidences of Christianity*, 1794.

(*c*) *The Resurrection of Christ.*—This, of course, is included in the proof of His historical Person on the lines indicated above. But from the beginning it formed the central evidence of Christianity, and, at the same time, as the supreme miracle of revelation, it has been the centre of attack. It must, therefore, receive separate treatment, owing to its profound importance; for it is the very centre of the Christian position. With it there stand or fall both the claim of Christ to be Divine and the Christian's hope in his own resurrection. At the same time, as the supreme miracle of the Christian revelation, it will bear the weight of all the other Gospel miracles. To have proved it to be historic is to have routed the attack on miracles, while isolated assaults on minor wonders must be brought to face this main issue. The evidence for the Resurrection has been summed up under the following heads:—

(α) The evidence of St. Paul. Not only is the risen Christ the mainspring of his changed life, but he asserts that he, as well as certain others whom he specifies, has seen Him with his own eyes. This is the earliest written testimony we have.

(β) The evidence of the other Apostles and NT writers. Not only is this found all through their writings, but it forms the text and centre of the sermons recorded in Acts.

(γ) The indirect evidence contained in the records, which establishes the fact that the appearances were under varied circumstances, to those in different frames of mind, in the same country and generation as they are said to have happened, and the cause of a changed life to believers and of bitter opposition from their enemies. The sudden change from sorrow to joy in the first disciples is incapable of any other explanation.*

(δ) The evidence of the empty grave. Had Christ's enemies possessed the corpse, they would have produced it; had His followers possessed it, Christianity would have been consciously founded on a gigantic fraud. This view is now held by no one.

(ε) The evidence of Christ's life before the Crucifixion. The records show that He fully expected this sequel, though His disciples were quite unable to grasp it or to realize it when it had actually happened.

(ζ) The evidence of the Church. Not only has the Resurrection been the central belief of the Church from those days until these, but such institutions as Sunday and the Eucharist, and the joy that is contained in them, cannot be explained by any other means.

Such evidence is far stronger than that which supports most of the accepted history of the ancient world. Such objections as the absence of eye-witnesses and the inconsistency of the accounts would never have been raised, but for the stupendous issue depending on the historic truth of the Resurrection.

Opponents are powerless to deny that the evidence was sufficient from the earliest days to enable every Christian absolutely to accept the fact, and make it the centre of his belief and conduct. All that they can do is to try to account for this belief in such a way as to deny the actual fact.

Bruce reduces such non-Christian hypotheses to five.

1. *The thief theory.*—The disciples stole Christ's body, as perhaps He had told them to, in order to make men believe in a resurrection. Such a theory as this of Reimarus is now universally discredited.

2. *The swoon theory.*—Christ did not really die, but revived, escaped, and pretended to have risen. This view of Paulus and Schleiermacher has been refuted even by Strauss as inconsistent with the character of such a moral reformer, while its practical difficulties are insuperable.

3. *The vision theory.*—Renan and Strauss assert that the belief arose from the hallucination of several disciples, the first to suggest it being Mary Magdalene, an excitable woman who had once been possessed. But this directly contradicts every word of the only existing records, which show that excited expectancy was entirely absent. Nor is it possible to think, if the Resurrection was only subjective, that these visions suddenly gave place after six weeks to the calm strength of the early Church.

4. *The theory of objective visions, or telegram hypothesis.*—This is Keim's attempted compromise. The appearances were not purely subjective, but the objective cause was not a risen body of Christ, but His glorified Spirit comforting them by 'sending telegrams from heaven.' But such a theory, without avoiding the supernatural, does not free the disciples from hallucination, for they certainly thought their Master was there in the flesh, and not in heaven.*

5. *The mythical theory.*—There were no appearances at all, but the strong way the disciples spoke of the continued life of their crucified Master was misunderstood by the Apostolic Church. Hence arose the myth of the Resurrection, which was later embodied in the legendary accounts contained in the Gospels. Thus Weizsäcker and Martineau would say that all is accounted for as an evolution from the conviction that flashed upon the disciples in their sorrow that 'Heroes die not,' and after all their Master was not dead. The craving for something more objective led to the invention of legendary Christophanies. We can only answer here, that there is no time for the growth of a myth that would change the human Jesus into the Divine Christ of our Gospels, that it even demands that such a change of belief should have taken place before Pentecost, and that such an explanation of the experience of the first disciples cannot be made to fit with the only records we have of their words and conduct. We thus turn back to the Christian theory as the only rational and historical explanation of the facts. Any further discussion of the nature of the glorified body belongs to the province of theology. It is enough to have assurance that the supreme miracle on which Christianity is based is a historic fact.

See Bruce, *Baur*, pp. 382-398; W. Milligan, *The Resurrection of our Lord*, 1881; H. Latham, *The Risen Master*, 1901; Sparrow Simpson, *Our Lord's Resurrection*, 1905, and art. 'Resurrection' in *DCG*.

(*d*) *The history of Christianity and of the Church.*—Here, again, is involved, in the first place, a study of Acts and the Epistles. Their early date must be proved. Christianity is not the creation of St. Paul. The early Church did not develop as Baur suggested, but as indicated by the early Fathers. The primitive existence of Church order witnesses to the same effect.

* However, the theory must not be entirely discounted which accepts the evidence of α, β, and γ above, while it rejects that of δ. See K. Lake, *The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection*, 1907.

* See below, under Psychological arguments, (α) concerning their changed life.

See L. Pullan, *The Books of the NT*, 1901; Gore, *The Church and the Ministry*, 1900; Neander, *History of the Planting and Training of the Christian Church* (tr. Ryland, 1851); A. B. Bruce, *Ferdinand Christian Baur* (Pres. Day Tracts); Salmon, *Introd. to the NT*, 1885.

2. *Psychological arguments.*—We must explain that this term is used for convenience to denote that class of argument which is not strictly historical, but which deals either with the feelings of individuals, or with the inferences which may be drawn from Christian practices, or the relation of Christianity to other systems. The following are given as examples of such arguments:—

(*a*) *The changed life of the disciples, and the conversion of St. Paul.*—Up to the death of Christ the disciples had shown themselves timid in their behaviour and earthly in their expectations. They suddenly became full of boldness and joy and a new spiritual force which nothing could resist. The psychological difficulty of such a change is enormous. It is overcome only by the explanation that their Master rose again, spiritualized their ideas, and gave them an abiding gift of the Holy Spirit. And even if these unlettered Galilæans had been deceived, it is impossible that they could have in their turn deceived a cultured and expert Jewish Rabbi. The conversion and apostleship of St. Paul alone, duly considered, was of itself a demonstration sufficient to prove Christianity to be a Divine revelation.

See G. Lyttleton, *Conversion and Apostleship of St. Paul*, 1869; R. J. Knowling, *Testimony of St. Paul to Christ*, 1905.

(*b*) *The witness of Christian customs and institutions.*—Allusion has already been made to these in their special relation to the Resurrection. But there are other evidential uses to which may be put such recognized parts of Christianity as the Ministry, the Sacraments, and the Christian Year. They satisfy the cravings of human nature, its needs, tendencies, and aspirations, in a way that no other religion does. The *ministry* is founded on the theory that man is social, and needs organization, continuity, and authority in the guidance of life. The *sacramental system* takes into account the composite nature of man, using and welding into one both the material and the spiritual elements, and at the same time conveying in a definite form that communication of Divine grace which we should naturally expect to be the climax of any revelation which God makes of Himself to the individual. The *Christian Year* links us with the first centuries. Easter and the Lord's Day were already observed in NT times, the observance of Friday as the day of the Crucifixion is of early origin; and so the list might be continued. Not only do these things witness to the historicity of the facts which they commemorate, but, viewed from the sphere which is psychical rather than historical, they bring the whole question of Apologetics out of the past into the present, and enable us to postulate the real life of those roots of Christianity which are hidden in the past, when we examine carefully those living and growing branches which are visible in the present.

See Lonsdale Ragg, *Evidences of Christianity*, 1905, 102–121.

(*c*) *The success of Christianity.*—Apart from the moral aspect of the question, an estimate of facts and their relation to mere human possibilities of explanation, suggests an evidence of the Divine origin of Christianity, and of the work of the Holy Spirit in the history of the Church. At the same time it has to be remembered that other religions may make a counter-claim, so that the claim of Christianity must be shown to be unique. The following are the chief points in the argument:—

(*α*) The early, wide, and, within certain limits, irresistible diffusion of Christianity. It required an enormous power to kill polytheism for ever, and to leave not a shrine of a heathen god behind; but this was what Christianity did.

(*β*) Its power of revival and restoration after every declension and decay. This may be traced throughout history, through the Middle Ages, the Reformation, and more modern revivals, and Christianity may be shown to possess elements which Muhammadanism cannot claim.

(*γ*) The resistance which it has been able to offer to successive assaults. From the days of the earliest martyrs persecution has been powerless to crush it. All the forces of the ancient world were arrayed against it, but the only result was the decay and fall of Rome itself. And it has faced all objections of later days, and can point to a confusion among its opponents which makes one school of anti-Christian thought contradict another.

(*δ*) It is specially armed with means and motives for self-propagation. Its work of proselytizing, founded on the pure motives of the missionary spirit, is on a different plane from Buddhism and Muhammadanism. The rule of faith expressed in its creeds, the universal application of its sacred writings, the organization of the Church, her ministry, her sacraments, her worship, and her government, are fitted in a unique way for passing on the faith whole and unimpaired from age to age and from land to land.

(*ε*) Its success is in harmony with its own predictions and anticipations. It is here that the argument from prophecy has its fullest force. For it begins with the earliest literature, in the promise that the seed of the woman should bruise the serpent's head, and continues through centuries. And when it reaches the NT, it shows such unlikely features as the anticipation of the corruptions of Christianity, from the parable of the Tares at the beginning to the expectation of Antichrist at the end.

Various natural causes have been adduced to account for such a success, but one by one they may be proved insufficient, and we fall back on the conclusion that the origin and growth of the faith must be attributed to a Divine agency.

See J. Cairns, *The Success of Christianity and modern Explanations of it* (Pres. Day Tr.).

(*d*) *The abiding unity of faith.*—In the face of the divisions of Christendom, and the misunderstandings which separate branches of the Catholic Church, it may seem bold to found an argument on the unity of Christendom in its belief. But when a broader view is taken, and Christianity is compared with other religions, a strong argument for the Divine origin and preservation of the Faith is found to lie in its continued acceptance. The Creeds themselves, handed on intact from age to age, present a remarkable phenomenon. Their silence on non-essentials combines with their insistence on fundamentals to prevent their ever being out of date. No other religion can point to so broad a unity. The unity of Muhammadanism or Buddhism is either local or at least Oriental, and can make no such appeal to the whole world. And the fundamentals upon which Christian belief has been based, *quod semper, ubique, et ab omnibus*, are just those truths which are not shared by any people outside Christendom. Such are the spirituality and Fatherhood of God, the moral condition of man and the blackness of his sin, the possibilities of universal salvation by redemption through One Person, in whom a human and a Divine nature are combined, the Personality and Divinity of the Holy Spirit, and His work in and among men, with the visible Body of Christ as His sphere of working, the approach through the sacraments, the authority of the Scriptures and of the Church, the necessity of faith, and the importance of an eschatology such that the thought of the future

resurrection of the body influences men in the present.

And this unity of faith is also manifested in a unity of aspiration. The biographies of different Christians in all ages reveal a kinship in spiritual life and belief, and the same is shown by a study of hymnology throughout the centuries.

It is a profound marvel that the Churches in different localities in the first days did not soon begin to show some cleavage of faith and the practices that result from it. It is a still greater marvel that in recent generations the multiplication of sects, the revolt against authority, and the rise of free speculation within the Church, have not made more impression on the fundamental unity of the Faith. The least difficult explanation of such phenomena lies in the Divine origin and preservation of Christianity.

See J. Stoughton, *Unity of Faith* (Pres. Day Tracts).

(*c*) *The argument from the psychological nature of religion.*—This is the result of a study of religion which is of comparatively recent growth. Kant began the investigation of religion not merely by reflexion on what was positive and objective, but by taking it as an internal and mental fact. Consciousness proves the existence of religion as a subjective or mental state; but consciousness itself must be analyzed, in order to analyze religion. In this way a threefold division of mental phenomena has been established—into cognitions, emotions, and volitions. Religion must be a state of intellect, sensibility, or will, or some combination of two or all of these factors. Hegel identified religion and thought. Yet no mere intellectual act constitutes religion, though the exercise of reason is an essential part of religion. If religion has no rational foundation, it has no real foundation. Others resolve religion into feeling or sentiment. But every feeling requires an explanation, which can be found only in an exercise of *intellect*. Hume traces religion to fear, Feuerbach to desire, Schleiermacher to a feeling of dependence, to which Mansel adds the conviction of moral obligation. Strauss combines all these. Kant identifies religion with morality. But it is *not* simply these things, though it includes them. Rather is the religious process at once rational, emotional, and volitional, and is to be connected with all three—knowing, feeling, and doing—in its threefold aspect of knowledge, affection, and self-surrender. If one general notion can be made to embrace the universal instinct of men as regards a definition of religion, it is this, that it belongs to the whole man, in accordance with the psychology sketched above. The question remains, which religion answers best to this description? It is only theistic religions that can claim to do it; polytheism, pantheism, deism, and rationalism are ruled out. 'Of the three great theistic religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Muhammadanism, the last is far inferior to the other two, and the first is a transition to and preparation for the second' (Flint, *Theism*[3], p. 44). Christianity is left, as alone giving a perfect representation of God.

EXCURSUS:—The general superiority of Christianity to other religions.—

(1) *Polytheism.*—Polytheistic beliefs are the characteristic of the whole ancient world, with the single exception of the Jews. Such beliefs continually broke down with the advance of culture, and it is perhaps sufficient to say of them that they have abundantly been proved to be ethically degrading, as not linked with morality, and philosophically unsatisfying, as offering no final revelation. Some of the religions of India are pantheistic as much as polytheistic, and admit of the fatal objection that they ignore the transcendence of the Deity. See artt. POLYTHEISM, PANTHEISM.

(2) *Buddhism.*—This deserves a word of separate treatment, as its moral code is profoundly attractive, and it counts almost as many adherents as Christianity. But really it is not so much a religion as a philosophy, an inherently atheistic system which does not offer a real Deity for worship, and suggests no hope for a future life. The very fact that its followers have instinctively demanded an object for worship, has caused it to become corrupted and obscured by the introduction of pure polytheism.

See C. F. Aiken, *The Dhamma of Gotama the Buddha and the Gospel of Jesus the Christ*, 1900.

(3) *Muhammadanism.*—Here it is its success which forms the chief recommendation of the religion; but this has been largely discounted by the forcible means of propagation which have been required. Its pure monotheism brings it into relation with Judaism and Christianity, but its God is as distant as He is sublime, and 'its theological outcome is simply awe and submission, not loving intercourse.' The lowness of its moral standard prevents it from having a civilizing influence, and the moral state of society under it may be judged by the painfully degraded position of woman. The fact that it is founded, not on a life but on a book, checks its power of expansion and adaptation, and has reduced it to a code which is the enemy of all real progress.

(4) *Judaism.*—This is the one pure religion of the ancient world, and might be a formidable rival of Christianity if the latter were obliged to treat it as false. But, on the contrary, it claims for itself all that is best and purest and most permanent in Judaism. Historically, the one religion grew out of the other; theologically, the germ of Christian doctrine is to be found in the OT doctrines of God and man, its progressive revelation, and its Messianic hope. There is no desire to belittle the one pure religion of the ancient world, but there is much in it that is incomplete. Christianity simply claims to fulfil it, to answer its problems, and to carry it forward to finality. The question of the position of the OT is here involved.

See R. L. Ottley, *Aspects of the OT*, 1897; J. Orr, *The Problem of the OT*, 1906.

It must be noted that the general superiority of Christianity to these religions includes the fact that it sums up all that is best in them. We do not stigmatize them as utterly false, but we recognize them as a feeling after that truth of which Christianity claims to be the final expression (see *Excursus* at the end of the 'Psychical Realm,' p. 620[b]).

For the whole subject, see Flint, *Theism*, Lect. ii. (Baird Lectures, 1876); A. B. Bruce, *Apologetics*[3], 1904, chs. iii.-vii.; Jevons, *Introd. to Hist. of Religion*, 1896; Lefroy, *Mahomedanism: its Strength and Weakness*; Liddon, *Essays and Addresses*, 1892, pp. 1–60; Elliot Howard, *Non-Christian Religious Systems*, 1906; Westcott, *The Gospel of Life*, 1892, esp. ch. v.; Marcus Dods, *Mohammed, Buddha, and Christ*, 1877; *Pan-Anglican Papers*, i. 1908; *JE*, *passim*; G. Matheson, *The Distinctive Messages of the Old Religions*, 1892.

3. *Metaphysical arguments.*—(*a*) *The argument from intelligence, will, and conscience, commonly called the Ontological argument.*—In nature, because we are thinkers ourselves, we realize that what is before us is the result of thought. We grasp by our intelligence that intelligence is exhibited in all work in which there are parts which bear an ordered relation to each other, and in which the whole is something more than the mere sum of the individual parts. Therefore we infer that what the mind detects, mind has produced, and that a creative intelligence underlies order. In *morality*, the sense of a moral law, and the demand for ethical perfection, in the voluntary fulfilment of such non-natural requirements as the dictates of duty, imply a standard, a superhuman will, a Holy One, such as has been revealed to the world in Christ. In the realm of *conscience*, there

lies in the human mind an instinct which expresses itself in the conviction of a survival after death and of future retribution and reward. In the face of all ills and miseries, man desires to continue to exist, and anticipates a re-adjusting of the balance which will not terminate until the full demands of that moral law, of which conscience is the representative and ambassador, have been met in full. The intelligence, the will, and the conscience thus combine in a threefold suggestion of an Intelligence which creates, of a Lawgiver who imposes a superhuman will, and a Judge who re-adjusts the balance. But in view of the unity of nature, and the unity with it of our human nature, that which lies behind all nature, and which the various parts of our human nature suggest, will in itself be *One*. We therefore arrive at a Personal God, as He has been revealed in Christ.

See J. A. Fleming, *The Evidence of Things not Seen*, 1904.

(*b*) *The argument from consciousness.*—We cannot stay to discuss that part of Herbert Spencer's philosophy which deals with the consciousness (see J. Iverach, *The Philosophy of Mr. Herbert Spencer examined* [Rel. Tract Soc.]). But human consciousness or personality affords an argument which is indeed kindred to the foregoing, but has been put in a form of which the following is an outline.

1. 'Through direct consciousness of himself man discovers that he is possessed of a Permanent Personality, endowed with will, intelligence, moral and spiritual affections. 2. Through consciousness further developed by reflexion on himself and the universe, he attains the conviction that over all is a Supreme Personality, endowed with omnipotent Will, infinite Intelligence, perfect Righteousness, and Love. It is contended that these results of consciousness rest on the same basis, and stand or fall together. If the primary consciousness of a human self is denied, all the rest vanish with it. On the other hand, if it is accepted, it carries all the rest in its train. Thus it is from the knowledge of himself that man rises to the knowledge of God. Theism is the fruit of belief in man's real humanity; agnosticism, of a virtual denial of his humanity.'

See Brownlow Maitland, *Theism or Agnosticism*, 1878.

(*c*) *The argument from the idea of God.*—Whence does the idea of God come to us? It is not originated by any of the arguments we use, whether ontological, cosmological, or teleological. They help to verify it, but they postulate it as already existent in the mind. It cannot be traced to man's conscience, heart, or reason, though these faculties may verify and develop it. There is no place where the idea of God has not existed. Therefore God exists. Kant overthrew the original ontological argument by asserting that any cognition of things is impossible where there is no empirical matter to work upon. But we refuse to allow that God cannot be empirically known. Agnosticism really asserts not only that man cannot know God, but that God cannot make Himself known. And to say this is to deny His existence. But a flat denial of God's existence is possible only for the man who has passed through every sphere in his search for Him. In short, in order to be able to assert authoritatively that no God exists, a man must be omniscient and omnipresent, i.e. he must himself be God, and himself give the lie to himself.

(*d*) *The Cosmological or Ætiological argument.*—We have the idea of causality inherent in us. We attribute everything to some cause, but even though we feel ourselves on a higher level of causality than ordinary nature, we do not feel self-caused. Our notions fall back to a First Cause, which is the final cause of all, and itself uncaused. The study of the universe suggests that this cause must be, not mechanical, but full of order and intelligence, and the study of our own personality leads us further to think of this *Causa causans* as a personal God.

See, for the metaphysical and philosophic aspect, Caldecott, *The Being of God in the Light of Philosophy* (Camb. Theol. Essays, 1905); J. R. Illingworth, *Personality Human and Divine*, 1894, and *Reason and Revelation*, 1906; and, for the influence of modern knowledge on the main theistic arguments, Ballard, *Theomonism True*, 1906, pp. 62–346.

Excursus:—The anthropological attack.—The analogies between Christian beliefs and practices and those of some of the other great religions of the world, have long formed the basis of an attack upon the faith. In recent years the study of more primitive religions, and of anthropology generally, has suggested further analogies, and given rise to a fresh attack. The attempt is being made to explain away Christian history and ideas as merely the survivals of what has now been found to exist in primitive cults all over the world. Various modes of defence have already been employed, but the apologist must not ignore the parallels afforded by recent discoveries. The facts collected in such books as Frazer's *Golden Bough* or Crawley's *Mystic Rose* or Robertson's *Pagan Christs* must rather be claimed and used for the Christian argument. As illustrations of the hostile use of them we may mention the theory that Christ is to be connected with Eastern Sun-worship, the twelve Apostles being the signs of the zodiac, and that the Sacrament of Communion is merely an adaptation of the wide-spread primitive belief, with its degrading accompaniments, that to partake of a life means to inherit its virtues. And strange elaborations have followed, such as Frazer's theory of the Crucifixion, which suggests that the Jews had transferred to the feast of Purim the customs of a strange kind of Saturnalia, wherein a mock king was first pampered and then killed, and that Christ only met 'the fate that annually befell the malefactor who played Haman' (see J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*[2], iii. 190 ff.).

The Christian answer to which we would briefly point is that all religion is one, and that its 'primary function is to affirm and consecrate *life* (Ernest Crawley, *The Tree of Life*, 1905, p. 270). If Christianity is God's final answer to human needs, we shall expect to see those needs manifesting themselves elsewhere. 'We can see a deeper meaning in the parallelism which forms so remarkable a bond between Christianity and the lower religions. These analogies from savage culture show that religion, everywhere and always, is a direct outcome of elemental human nature, and that this elemental human nature remains practically unchanged. This it must continue to be so long as we are built up of flesh and blood. For instance, if a savage eats the flesh of a strong man or divine person, and a modern Christian partakes sacramentally of Christ's body and blood under the forms of bread and wine, there is evidently a human need behind both acts which prompts them and is satisfied by them, and is responsible for their similarity. . . . Christianity is no survival from primitive religion, but a higher development from the same permanent sources' (E. Crawley, *The Tree of Life*, 1905, p. 261 f. See also J. R. Illingworth, *Divine Immanence*, 1898, ch. iv.).

(iii.) The moral realm.—It has been said that the moral element in our nature is as much higher than the mental as the mental is above the physical. The weight of moral arguments is therefore greater, and perhaps for this reason this sphere has been chosen by recent apologists for their main line of defence. It has already been mentioned that Christ Himself in His moral aspect is the supreme apologetic of to-day; but there are other lines of moral argument which are placed first, owing to their priority in the sequence of thought.

1. *Arguments for theistic belief from the moral realm of thought.*—(*a*) *The universal idea of God and cultivation of religion.*—This argument is sometimes called 'the evidence of general consent.' Cicero witnessed long ago: 'There was never any nation so barbarous, or any people in the world so savage, as to be without some notion of

gods.' The belief in some form, and the expression of it in worship, are found in every system, ancient and modern. To ascribe this instinct to accident is to raise a moral difficulty which cannot easily be surmounted.

(*b*) *The moral sense in man, the conscience and the sense of sin.*—Kant, while rejecting other arguments, placed the whole weight of proof on this one. There is in our nature a sense of moral responsibility, a feeling of what we *ought* to do, regardless of our present wishes and immediate advantage. This sense, commonly called conscience, cannot come either from our own liking or the will of the community, against the opinion of which it sometimes acts. The only explanation of its working is in the existence of a perfect moral Being, independent of ourselves, a perfect Lawgiver and Judge, to whom conscience feels itself responsible. It is here that we are brought closest to the vast problem of evil and of sin. A discussion of it belongs to theology rather than to apologetics. But we may quote the saying of Leibniz, that 'metaphysical evil consists in imperfection, physical in suffering, moral in sin.' As we trace the upward development of the race, we find that just where the sense of individual personality comes to the front, a conflict begins to be realized between the claims of others and those of self. Man is unique as placed in a position from which he may either rise higher or fall lower. He has a consciousness of something higher; if he wilfully chooses that which is lower, it is *sin*. But since his moral nature does realize the choice, struggling upward to the higher, in spite of the certainty that he will never fully reach it, and filled with humiliation when he has failed in the struggle and acquiesced in the sin, we are pointed to a perfect moral Being who is averse to sin, and to whom the moral sense in man knows itself to be responsible.

See Liddon, *Some Elements of Religion*, 1872, pp. 66–71; Inge, 'Sin and Modern Thought' (in *Topics of the Times*, 1906, pp. 142–167); Coe, *The Religion of a Mature Mind*, 1902, p. 361.

(*c*) *The moral course of the world's history.*—The tangled skein of human history is found, when unravelled, to exhibit a continual progress towards a more and more perfect exhibition of righteousness and goodness. There is a purpose running through history, indicating a moral governance. This may be studied in the development of the various sides of human institutions, as the life of nations, social life, crime, law, and religion. But such a moral government of the world, and such an education of the human race, imply a moral Governor and Educator; for it is impossible that such tendencies should be unconscious and impersonal.

See Fisher, *Grounds of Belief*[2], 1902, p. 69; Flint, *Theism*, 1902, pp. 227–261; Liddon, *Some Elements of Religion*, 1872, pp. 142–148.

2. *Arguments for Christianity from the moral realm of fact.*—(*a*) *The Christian Scriptures.*—As the study of nature suggests an intelligence behind, and a study of history suggests a moral Governor, so the study of the Bible suggests a power higher than that of the men who contributed to this great literature which contains so many varied elements. Stress must be laid on (1) its organic unity, manifested in an OT and a NT fitting into each other exactly in spite of the changes of time and thought, in the wonderful symmetry that is presented by the two, and in the advancing morality which may be traced in their pages; (2) its authority, the moral force and power of conviction that its writers possess in an absolutely unique degree, its tone of certainty and genuine ring as the authoritative message of God; and (3) its exact correspondence with the deepest instincts of human nature, so that conscience welcomes its words as the highest expression of morality and religion.

See J. A. Fleming, *The Evidence of Things not Seen*, 1908, p. 40 ff.; J. Orr, *The Bible under Trial*, 1907.

(*b*) *The morality of Christianity.*—The success of Christianity has already been dealt with. But nothing has been said about the inward and radical transformation which it has effected. Its elevation, from the first days until these, of those who embrace it, is a moral miracle absolutely without parallel. The early apologists were already able to point to the effects of Christianity, as seen in a complete moral change in Christians. The argument has been increasing in force ever since. For the inevitable introduction of half-hearted members into a growing community, which soon extended as widely as civilization itself, is more than compensated by the contrast between the civilization which has been leavened by Christianity, and any other civilization in the history of the world. It is true that Christian morality is founded on the morality of Christ, and can be explained as a perpetual endeavour to fulfil His precepts and imitate His example. But this only takes the argument one stage further back, as we shall see shortly. And the very fact that the sustained endeavour has been made gives an additional proof that the morality of Christ was not a human and natural product. Two points in Christian morality must be insisted on. (1) It presents an ideal which no one except its Founder has ever fulfilled or expected to fulfil. And yet men have gone on trying. They have none of the satisfaction which belongs to those who fulfil a lower standard, such as that of Muhammadanism. And their reason for trying is not personal advantage, for the ideal has to be sought through self-sacrifice; in Christianity it is the losing of one's own soul that is to save it. (2) And not only is Christian morality different from what the natural man would wish for himself, but it is different from anything that he would invent. Its code is of the most unexpected kind, and has no real parallel or preparation elsewhere, in whatever setting we view it. And perhaps least of all was it likely to arise at such a place and time as Palestine in the 1st cent. of our era. If we reject the explanation of it which lies in the person of the Founder Himself, the alternative conclusions are difficult indeed of acceptance.

See F. Ballard, *Miracles of Unbelief*, esp. pop. ed. 1904, p. 242.

(*c*) *The Person of Christ the moral ideal.*—The morality of Christ's teaching is universally accepted as the highest the world has ever seen. The point need not be laboured here. But it is not merely a matter of His teaching; it is His example that stands highest. And in this too there is agreement among all. Even a writer like Lecky can say (*History of European Morals*[8], vol. ii. p. 9): 'The simple record of three short years of active life has done more to regenerate and to soften mankind than all the disquisitions of philosophers, and all the exhortations of moralists. This has indeed been the well-spring of whatever is best and purest in the Christian life.'

It is upon the moral ideal presented by the Person of Christ that modern apologetic takes its stand. It boldly asks, 'Whence hath this man these things?' and demands a rational answer.

(*a*) Is it replied that this is simply derived from our records, and need have no place in the history of actual fact? But this is no answer; for we ask, Whence then came the Gospel portrait of Christ? Whatever view be taken of the composition of the Gospels, it involves in *some one* an exquisite conception of the ideal which has no parallel in the world. It is impossible to believe that various men, whether few or many, whether actual disciples or only compilers working up traditions in later years, succeeded in forming a unity, a harmonious picture, such as is found in

the Gospel portrait. The only explanation of their work lies in there having been an original to be painted.

(β) May we, then, retain the moral part of the portrait, and take it out of its miraculous surroundings? It will be found that the two are so interwoven that separation is impossible. Take away the supernatural, and nothing but a shadow is left. For the miracles are not interspersed amid the various indications of the character; they are the outward manifestation of it. They are not wrought, except on rare occasions, with an evidential purpose, but simply as the natural acts of so exalted a character.

(γ) And what of the Divine claim of Christ? Is it possible to regard it either as interwoven in the tale by His mistaken followers, or as an individual mistake owing to a wrong estimate of His own Person? Both alternatives seem incredible, in view of the fact that this claim is the only key to His life, His words, and His work. Take such a public declaration as 'I am the light of the world; he that followeth me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life' (Jn 8^{12}). If anything in the record is true, surely that solemn utterance, in the presence of His enemies and before the multitudes who had thronged to the feast, is not a figment of after years. And if He made the claim Himself, more presumptuous than could have come, not only from a Galilæan carpenter, but from the holiest of men, what must we say if it were not true? That He was either an impostor or a deluded enthusiast. No one nowadays dare assert the former, and to do so would only make it a greater miracle how the highest moral ideals of humanity have for eighteen centuries been linked with such a man. And if the latter alternative be chosen, it is absolutely impossible to reconcile the self-sacrificing devotion and utter humility of His whole life and work with a distorted moral obliquity and infatuated self-assertion which could make so preposterous a claim. The familiar dilemma, 'Aut Deus aut homo non bonus,' has not yet been avoided by those who would hold such views. If the moral ideal which His Person presents forbids the latter, the former is the only rational explanation which remains.

(δ) But is not Evolution to be allowed to enter and explain? Is it not simply that in Christ the upward movement reached its climax, and in Him we see the moral sense of the human race reaching its perfection? But it is the reverse of true that such a character can be explained by its antecedents and environment. The arguments of Paley are still true of 'the originality of Christ's character.' He assumed a part which was in many ways the direct opposite of the Messiah of popular expectation. And the one catholic Man, whose teaching is adapted to all nations and all ages, sprang from the narrowest and most bigoted nation of antiquity. And those who deny His Divinity change the virgin birth into an illegitimate one. They rob themselves of the argument that He was only evolved as the purer son of a pure virgin. They assert in effect that 'the most marked and mighty impulse of the past towards all that is purest, worthiest, loftiest, in the evolution of human nature, emanated spontaneously from the untutored, peasant-bred son of an adulteress' (Ballard, *Miracles of Unbelief*, p. 275). Such things are a denial of the first principles of evolution, and constitute a moral miracle far more difficult to accept than that a pure virgin 'was found with child of the Holy Ghost.' This line of defence is thus seen to lead to a direct attack on the enemy's position.

See Liddon, *The Divinity of our Lord*, 1867; Gore, *The Incarnation of the Son of God*, 1891; Ballard, *Miracles of Unbelief*, pop. ed. 1904, ch. viii.; Row, *Manual of Christian Evidences*, 1886, pp. 27-122; Robbins, *A Christian Apologetic*, 1907.

(iv.) THE SPIRITUAL REALM.—We here reach the highest form of Christian evidences, and the most convincing, for the proofs are brought within the range of personal experience. But, at the same time, they are useless in arguing with an opponent. We can do no more than point out to him that it is wholly rational that spiritual things should be spiritually discerned, and that in a spiritual religion like Christianity the final proof must be a spiritual one, while the cumulative arguments that lead up to it do not in themselves amount to absolute proof, but are as high as an outsider is capable of rising. It is true that God leaves not Himself without witness in the physical sphere, and that there is abundant testimony in the mental and ethical realms; but man approaches Him most closely in that which is least material, and therefore the spiritual faculty of faith is not to be mocked as contrary to reason, but accepted as transcending it. We must therefore take into account—

(*a*) *The testimony of the spiritual faculty.*—The spiritual faculty mentioned above may be simply spoken of as 'faith,' and we claim that it is distinct from the other organs of knowledge, so that it must be added to the senses and reason in order to complete our cognitive being. Often the testimony of the senses is contradicted by reason, and in the case of such a word as 'finite' it is positive and real to reason, though wholly imperceptible to the senses. And in the same way faith may sometimes contradict the conclusions which have been arrived at by the reason. To reason the word 'Infinite' is purely negative, but to faith it is entirely real and positive. So we claim that faith is that faculty or organ of knowledge whereby we apprehend the Infinite. Other religions may contain the knowledge of the presence of the Infinite, but Christianity is unique in not only telling men that their duty is to know God, but in giving them the successive steps whereby they may do so. Though he has arrived at his conclusion neither by the senses nor by the reason, the Christian has arrived at a real and legitimate form of human knowledge when he can say, 'I know whom I have believed.'

See Miller, 'The Idea of God,' in *Topics of the Times* (S.P.C.K., 1906).

(*b*) *The testimony to Christianity of the spiritual yearnings of men.*—Perhaps the two plainest of these yearnings are shown in the instinct to worship, and the hope of immortality, both of which are practically universal. The former opens the whole question of prayer, and the latter the wide subject of eschatology. Neither can be discussed here, but the argument must lead on to the fact that both are satisfied in a unique degree by the practice and belief of Christianity.

See F. Ballard, *Miracles of Unbelief*, pp. 280-310.

(*c*) *The testimony of holy lives.*—It has always been realized, from the days of the early Apologists, that one of the most telling of evidences lies in the spiritual life of Christians. Few men are argued into a belief in Christianity. They may verify their acceptance of it by its appeal to reason and the senses, but the real motive power consists in a touching of their heart. And this is done not by the words, but by the life of Christians. Apologetics may be exalted into a science, but the work of turning men is but little due to the professed apologist. Every Christ-like life is in itself a powerful apology, and often succeeds where all else fails.

(*d*) *The personal experience of the Christian.*—This can be the only final proof. The Christian can test all he has been told, in the sphere of his own spirit, and its relation to God as revealed in Christ. And this experience has been multiplying

in the lives of millions for nearly 2000 years. If we are charged with undue bias, it can be answered that 'initial unbelief is a prepossession as much as faith.' Thus do we pass upwards out of the region of Apologetics. We must be content to add the various arguments together, and claim that their sum-total raises so great a probability in favour of the Christian religion that there are far greater difficulties about any other explanation of the facts of the case. And the nature of our faith is such that the rest must be done in the region of the Spirit, wherein alone the probability can pass upward into certainty. T. W. CRAFER.

APOSTASY (Jewish and Christian).—The deliberate abandonment of one religion for another, *e.g.* Judaism for Christianity or *vice versa*, made voluntarily or under compulsion. The word is usually employed in a bad sense, and consequently from the standpoint of the religion deserted. Heretics, *i.e.* those who embrace one form of a religion in place of another, are not here reckoned as apostates. In Christian jurisprudence, apostasy is regarded as a far more serious offence than even heresy.

The word ἀπόστασις is used in classical Greek of a revolt or defection from an alliance. ἀποστασία is a later form, found in the LXX, Plutarch, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. In the LXX these words, with their kindred forms, ἀποστατέω, ἀποστάτης, fem. ἀποστάτις, are used in the sense of rebellion against Jahweh (Jos 22[22]) or an earthly monarch. Thus the 'rebellious children' of Is 30[1] are called τέκνα ἀπόστατα; the idolatry of Ahaz is his ἀποστασία (2 Ch 29[19]); and in 1 K 21[13] 'men of Belial' is rendered ἄνδρες τῆς ἀποστασίας. In 1 Mac. the word ἀποστασία is used in its modern sense (2[15] ἦλθον οἱ καταναγκάζοντες τὴν ἀποστασίαν). In the NT, St. Paul is accused of teaching 'an apostasy from Moses' (Ac 21[21]), and he speaks in 2 Th 2[3] of the great ἀποστασία at the end of all things, before the revelation of the 'Man of Sin' (see below). Augustine calls the 'Fall of Man' the *apostasia primi hominis* (*c. Jul.* lib. iii.), and he uses this term because the absolute freedom of our first parents, unhampered by original sin, to choose between obeying and disobeying God, made there a voluntary defection (see Shedd, ii. 148 ff.). St. Thomas Aquinas (Qu. 12, Art. 1) says of disobedience: 'apostasia videtur omnis peccati principium.'

1. Although we have many examples of national apostasy in the OT, instances of individual desertion of the religion of Israel are rare; but in the Deuteronomic law the provisions against those who try to persuade the people to 'serve other gods' are naturally severe (Dt 13[6-11]). In Ezekiel we have examples of secret worship of heathen deities practised in the very temple of Jahweh (Ezk 8[5ff.]). On the whole, however, it may be said that, with the exception of the great apostasy in the days of Ahab and Elijah, the infidelity of Israel towards Jahweh was, as a rule, shown in attempts either to combine this worship with that of the local divinities, or to serve Him with rites similar to those practised in the worship of the gods of Canaan.

We first meet with distinct acts of apostasy from Judaism during the fierce persecution under Antiochus Epiphanes, when Jews either voluntarily or under compulsion renounced the worship of God for that of the deities of Greece. The degree of apostasy varied between a total abandonment of all pretence of Judaism, and the adoption of certain Greek customs like the practice of athletics and the wearing of the *petasos*, or broad-brimmed Greek hat, which the more rigid Jews regarded as an act of disloyalty to Jahweh.

Antiochus Epiphanes (B.C. 175–164) did not cause the tendencies of the Jews to Hellenize which manifested themselves early in his reign. The inhabitants of Jerusalem, especially the priests, had already conformed to the Greek dress and frequented the *palæstra* (2 Mac 4[13-16]). Jason the high priest even sent presents for the sacrifices to Hercules at Tyre, though his messengers refused to employ the money for such an object, and handed it over to the royal navy (2 Mac 4[18. 19]). When the persecution began in B.C. 168, and the Jews were compelled to sacrifice and to eat swine's flesh, many of them apostatized (1 Mac 1[43]); and it was the slaying of one of these by Mattathias, the father of the famous Maccabees, that gave the signal for the revolt (1 Mac 2[24]). The Hellenizing Jews held the citadel of Acra in Jerusalem with the Syrians (1 Mac 1[34]), and were not dispossessed till B.C. 142.

Apostasy of a different kind is mentioned in the Book of Wisdom. The Alexandrian Jews adopted in some cases the philosophy of Greece, especially Epicureanism (Wis 2[1-11]). In the Talmud the term *Epiqûrôsin* is applied to apostates (see below).

2. Examples of apostasy among Christians are to be found in the NT; but in many cases the falling away of the converts was not strictly apostasy, but a relapse into Judaic Christianity or even heresy. Still Jesus Christ foretold that in the days of trial many would fall away; and in the Epistle to the Hebrews (if we may still believe this Epistle to be addressed to Jewish Christians) there are indications that many Jews who had embraced Christianity were forsaking the Church for the synagogue, when the choice between the one and the other became imperative. We have only hints of newly converted Christians becoming idolaters.

Mt 24[10] (σκανδαλισθήσονται πολλοὶ . . . καὶ μισήσουσιν ἀλλήλους) is possibly a prediction of the bitterness of the apostates towards their former friends; also (v.[12]) the ἀνομία will cause the love of the many to wax cold. The 'antichrists' spoken of in 1 Jn 2[18f.] may be classed as apostates, but see Westcott, *ad loc.* The important passage in He 6[4ff.], which speaks of the impossibility of renewing unto repentance those who fall away (παραπεσόντας) after enlightenment, and crucify (ἀνασταυροῦντας) to themselves the Son of God, seems to allude to apostates to Judaism. The warnings against apostasy in this Epistle are frequent (cf. esp. ch. 10). Though in the Epistle to the Galatians the abandonment of the Apostle's teaching was not a complete surrender of Christianity, yet he himself evidently regards it as a practical apostasy (Gal 5[4]). Indications that apostasy was not unknown may be found in the letters to the Churches in the Apocalypse and in the Pastoral Epistles.

In conformity with our Lord's warnings, the early Christians looked for a great falling away before His Second Coming. In 2 Th 2[3] St. Paul tells his converts not to be perturbed because they know that there can be no *Parousia* ἐὰν μὴ ἔλθῃ ἡ ἀποστασία πρῶτον. Whatever the exact nature of the apostasy in the present connexion is, it must be at least a religious apostasy, and one, moreover, as the use of the definite article proves, regarding which the Apostle's readers were already fully informed. From the Biblical use of the word ἀποστασία it would appear that there is an allusion to a falling away from God; but it has been maintained that the coming revolt of the Jews against the Imperial power of Rome was in the mind of St. Paul.

See art. 'Man of Sin' in Hastings' *DB*; Lightfoot, *Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul*. G. Milligan, *Thessalonians* (1908), Note J, p. 169 ff., gives a catena of the explanations of this passage.

In the primitive Church there were many cases of Christians forsaking the communion of the Church and relapsing into idolatry. Some of those accused of Christianity before Pliny admitted that they had left the Church for many years, and had no hesitation in complying with the proconsul's requests: 'Hi quoque omnes et imaginem tuam deorumque simulacra venerati sunt et Christo male dixerunt' (Pliny, *Ep.* x. 96). Ammonius Saccas, the founder of the Neo-Platonic school, is said to have been a Christian originally, and to have apostatized (Euseb. *HE* vi. 19); and there is a tradition that Aquila, the translator of the Heb. Scriptures, was an apostate to Judaism. Apostasy to heathenism was considered the gravest crime of which a Christian could be guilty, and even if it was due to fear of torture or imprisonment, no pardon or hope of reconciliation could be extended to the guilty person. It was not till the time of St. Cyprian (A.D. 252) that the idea of restoring an apostate to communion was even so much as entertained, and then only owing to the immense popular reverence for those who confessed the faith during the persecution of Decius.

Wilful apostasy was, of course, an inexpiable offence, and ranked with murder and adultery; but it appears that up to the time of Cyprian even involuntary apostasy excluded a person for ever from the visible Church. Hermas has been taught that there is no forgiveness for sin after baptism; and it is only by special revelation that he learns from the Angel of Repentance that one post-baptismal penitence is accepted (Hermas, *Mand.* iv. 3). Tertullian, in his earliest work, *ad Martyras* (ch. 1), says that those who could not find peace with the Church sought it from confessors awaiting martyrdom;

but it does not appear from the context that this means that they could restore an apostate to communion. In his treatise *de Pudicitia*, written in his Montanist days, the same writer, whilst denouncing Zephyrinus (?), Bishop of Rome, for allowing penitence to those guilty of carnal sins, enforces his argument by showing that these offences are in the same category as idolatry and murder—unpardonable in a Christian. It seems fairly certain that the re-admission of the *lapsi* was a novelty in the days of Cyprian. 'Evidently,' says Abp. Benson, 'the question which to some was presenting itself was not when, or upon what terms, the lapsed should be re-admitted, but whether it was possible for the Church to remit such guilt' (*Cyprian*, 1897, p. 108).

The law of the early Church in regard to apostasy was very severe. The offence consisted not merely in deliberate desertion of the Church, but in any compliance with paganism, *i.e.* a man was not permitted to continue a member of the Church who was engaged in any trade ministering to idolatry, superstition, or licentiousness; nor was he allowed to conform to custom by offering sacrifice in an official capacity.

When the days of persecution ceased, the severity of the canons was considerably modified, and apostates were re-admitted to communion after due penitence. The strictness of primitive Christianity is seen in the enactments of the Council of Elvira (Illiberis) in Spain, held during the persecution of Diocletian (A.D. 303). Apostasy to Judaism was much feared, especially in Spain and Gaul, and Christians were forbidden to attend Jewish banquets or to have any intimate dealing with Israelites. After the conversion of Constantine, apostasy became a civil offence punishable by law. Apostates to Judaism were liable to confiscation of property, and lost the right of making wills. Repentance was of no avail as regards the civil penalties incurred by apostasy, which included dismissal from all posts of dignity. 'Perditis, hoc est sacrum Baptismus profanantibus, nullo remedio pœnitentiæ (quæ solet aliis criminibus prodesse) succurritur' (Codex Theod. xvi. 7. 4–5).

In the time of Cyprian (A.D. 252) no hope whatever was extended to apostates. Even if they are slain for the name, they cannot be admitted to the peace of the Church (Cyp. *Ep.* lv.). This is confirmed by the legislation of the Council of Elvira, which refuses deathbed communion to adults who have deliberately sacrificed (*can.* 1), to Christians holding hereditary priesthoods who have performed the duties (ii.), and to informers who have caused the death of a Christian (lxxiii.). At the Council of Ancyra, held a year after, the edict of Milan allows the worst class of apostates to be received back to the Church after a due penitence extending 'over ten years (*can.* 9); and the Œcumenical Council of Nicæa (A.D. 325) allows such to be admitted to communion after twelve years in the ranks of the penitents (*can.* 11). In 397 the Council of Carthage actually forbids apostates to be excluded for ever from the Church: 'Apostaticis conversis vel reversis ad Dominum gratia vel reconciliatio non negetur.'

See Bingham, *Antiq.* xvi.; Smith, *DCA*, art. 'Apostasy'; Dale, *Synod of Elvira*; Hefele, *Conciliengeschichte*, vol. i.

The name 'Apostate' has been specially applied to the Emperor Julian, whose defection from Christianity threatened to undo the work of the conversion of Constantine. There is no absolute proof that Julian was ever baptized, though, as he held the office of a *reader* in his youth, it is, to say the least, highly probable. The Christianity he professed, moreover, must have been of an Arian type. The religion which he embraced after his 'apostasy' was a description of Neo-Platonism, which endeavoured to give a spiritual interpretation to the myths of antiquity. He depressed the Church by every means in his power short of actual persecution; but nothing caused so much consternation or gave such serious offence as his edict forbidding Christians to teach the classics in the schools and universities of the Empire (*Ep.* 42).

The main events of his life are as follows: Born in A.D. 331, the son of Julius Constantius, brother of the great Constantine, he was saved in the massacre of the Imperial family in 337, and educated by his cousin Constantius. In 351 he began to show a disposition towards heathenism, but fear of Constantius compelled him to dissemble. He was Cæsar in Gaul from A.D. 355 to 360, when the army of the province declared him Augustus. He was sole emperor from the death of Constantius, Nov. 3, 361. He was killed in a battle with the Persians, whose territory he had invaded on June 26, 363, and a Christian was immediately elected imperator by the army in the person of Jovian. An interesting study of the character of Julian is to be found in Ibsen's *Emperor and Galilæan*.

3. In the Talmud much is naturally said about apostates from Judaism. Four different kinds are mentioned: *Minim*, *Meshummadin*, *Masōrōth*, and *Epiqūrōsin*. The *Meshummadin* are those who wilfully transgress part of the ceremonial law; the *Masōrōth* are delators or political betrayers; the *Epiqūrōsin* freethinkers.

The *Minim* demand more special attention. It is an open question whether they were Jewish Christians or a Gnostic sect in Judaism. At any rate they were heretics desiring to keep their place in the community of Israel, who had to be detected and cast out. Thus the famous R. Eliezer was arrested on a charge of *Minuth*, but acquitted. In his sorrow for having been suspected he was consoled by the great R. Aqiba. The *Minim* are also spoken of in the Talmud as a separate sect, but at the same time they regarded themselves as being so little different from Jews that they could ask for, and obtain, a Jewish Rabbi of unimpeachable orthodoxy to be their teacher. A Gentile is never called a *Min*. The most famous of the *Minim* was Elisha ben-Abuyah, known also as Aḥer, 'the changed one.'

See R. T. Herford, *Christianity in Talmud and Midrash*, 1903, who devotes the greater part of his valuable work to the discussions between the Rabbis and the *Minim*. Friedländer in his *Der vorchristliche jüdische Gnosticismus* maintains that the *Minim* were Gnostics of the Ophite sect. The passage mentioned as enumerating the different classes of apostates destined for Gehinnom is *Sanh.* xiii. 45: 'The *Minim* and the apostates and the betrayers and *Epiqūrōsin*, and those who have lied concerning the Torah, and those who depart from the ways of the congregation, and those who have lied concerning the Resurrection of the dead, and every one who has sinned and caused the multitude to sin,' etc.; see also Deutsch in *JE* i. 665 f.; Kohler and Gotthell, *ib.* ii. 12–18; Broydé, *ib.* viii. 594 f.

4. In the Middle Ages apostasy and heresy were punished with the utmost severity, but it is scarcely possible to conceive of the open abandonment of Christianity where the jurisdiction of the Church was all-powerful. We have, however, a curious example of a deacon in England embracing Judaism in order to marry a Jewess, and being burned at Oxford on 17th April 1222, of course after degradation from his clerical office. This is one of the few cases of the execution of a heretic in England before A.D. 1401; and it seems that the Sheriff of Oxfordshire was blamed for his undue severity in so speedily executing this criminous clerk. In Spain also, under Alfonso X. (the Wise), A.D. 1250, conversion of a Christian to Judaism was made a capital crime; the influence of the Jewish race in that country being especially feared from the earliest times.

For the execution of the deacon see Maitland, *Canon Law in the Church of England*, ch. vi., 'The Deacon and the Jewess.'

The destruction of the Order of the Knights Templar by Philip the Fair and his accomplice Pope Clement V. may be mentioned as an example of the charge of apostasy being used by the Inquisition for a political purpose. The Order, which in 1119 consisted of nine knights devoted to the pious task of keeping the roads to Jerusalem clear of robbers, in the 13th cent. became one of the wealthiest monastic bodies in Christendom, and a military force of the most formidable description. With the fall of Acre in A.D. 1291 the Templars had ceased their activity in the Holy Land, and in 1307 Philip the Fair conceived the idea of embroiling them with the Church, in order to procure the abolition of the Order and the confiscation of their immense wealth. The profound secrecy which enveloped the meetings and even the religious services of the Order gave their enemies the requisite handle to bring charges of the foulest immorality and apostasy against them. The

Templars were accused of making every candidate for admission to their body apostatize by thrice renouncing Christ and spitting upon the crucifix. Torture was freely employed to extort confessions, but upon the whole the evidence obtained was of the most absurd and contradictory character, and the majority of those examined persisted in the innocency of the Order; and though the processes went on simultaneously throughout Europe and the Levant, no seriously incriminating evidence seems to have been obtained except in France. The cruelties which accompanied the suppression culminated in the burning of the Grand Master Du Molay and his companion on the Ile des Juifs on the Seine, 19th March 1314.

Lea, *History of the Inquisition*, vol. iii. pp. 239–334; Milman, *Latin Christianity*, bk. xii. ch. 1. Hallam, *Middle Ages*, vol. i. p. 137, is inclined to credit the charges against the Templars on account of the publication of Count Hammer Purgstall's essay, *Mines de l'Orient exploitées* (1818), charging the Templars with apostasy to a sort of Ophite Gnosticism. The subject is discussed by Castle in the *Transactions of the Quatuor Coronati Lodge*, vol. xix. pt. 3.

The Spanish Inquisition originated for the purpose of suppressing not heresy, but apostasy. The *maranos*, or Jewish converts, were suspected of practising their ancestral religion in secret, though outwardly conforming to Catholicism. It was to root out this crypto-Judaism that the tremendous machinery of the Holy Office in Spain was devised, and the sufferers under Torquemada were those who had relapsed to Judaism.

5. There have been many examples of Christians among the Turks and Moors abandoning their faith in order to enjoy the privileges reserved for Muhammadans; and the renegado often enjoyed high official positions in Turkey. Naturally such persons abandoned their nationality with their religion. Apostasy from Christianity to Judaism is extremely rare, as the Jews themselves do not encourage the reception of proselytes. One notable example of such apostasy is that of the fanatical and unfortunate Lord George Gordon, who was the cause of the famous No Popery riots in 1780. In 1788, after he had been found guilty of a libel on Marie Antoinette, he fled to Amsterdam, whence he was expelled, and on his return to England he made a public profession of Judaism. He was imprisoned in Newgate in the following year, and died in 1793, conforming in all respects to the ceremonies of his new religion.

In recent times there have been cases of Europeans and Americans of Christian parentage embracing Muhammadanism and Buddhism, and conforming to the practices of these religions. In France it has been asserted that *Diabolisme* is practised as a religion, of course involving a distinct apostasy; but the evidence of such persons as Leo Taxil, who declared that a church existed in France for the worship of Satan, seems to have been discredited by his subsequent disavowals, and Satanism (*q. v.*) seems to be little more than the revival of some of the follies of the Black Art of the Middle Ages.

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APOSTASY (Muhammadan).—'He that adopts any other religion shall be put to death.' Such, according to the sacred Muslim tradition, was the command of the Prophet; and on this basis all Muslim jurists are unanimous in deciding that apostasy from Islām (Arab. *irtidād*) must be punished by death. The Ẓāhirites, who, as is well known, adhere as far as possible to the outward meaning (Arab. *ẓāhir*) of the sacred texts, are even of opinion that the apostate (Arab. *murtadd*) must be put to death immediately, that is to say, without initiating any inquiry as to whether he might possibly be converted to Islām again, because the words of the Prophet present no indication of any delay. This was also the view held by Mu'ādh ibn Jabal, Muhammad's governor of Yaman. According to a well-known tradition, this official came to Abū Mūsā, whom he found engaged in questioning a prisoner. On hearing that this man had apostatized from Islām, Mu'ādh refused to take a seat until the apostate had been put to death, saying: 'Such was the decision of Allāh and his Apostle.'

But, according to the opinion of the majority of jurists, it is desirable (according to others, even a duty) before proceeding to carry out the punishment by death, to make an effort to bring the apostate to repentance (Arab. *tawba*). If such a one declares that he turns again to Islām, then the inquisitors are to be satisfied with the response and let him go away in peace. If, on the contrary, he refuses to return to Islām, they are bound, according to many, to allow him a delay of three days (according to others, even longer) as a period for reflexion. He is still retained in prison and may within this interval go back upon his error. In support of this practice, reference is made to the example of the Khalīf 'Omar. When he learned that a man of the troops of Abū Mūsā during the siege of Tustar, in the year 17, had been put to death on account of apostasy from Islām, he was extremely indignant at the deed. 'Why,' he inquired, 'did you not keep him in prison for three days and deal with him in order to bring him to repentance?' And all the companions of the Prophet who were present showed by their silence that they agreed with him.

The Ḥanafites are inclined to think that the punishment of death on account of apostasy is applicable only to men. According to them, women are only to be kept in prison until they repent, because the Prophet has forbidden the putting to death of unbelieving women. According to others, this prohibition has reference only to the killing of the wives of unbelievers in the Holy War. A similar difference of opinion exists with regard to the punishment of apostates while yet in their minority. These, according to some lawyers, may be put to death immediately, according to others only after attaining their majority.

The punishment by death is to be carried into execution only by the sword. From the sacred sources of tradition, it is known that the Khalīf 'Alī caused the adherents of Abd Allāh ibn Sabā to be burnt to death because they proclaimed heretical doctrines and held that 'Alī himself was God. 'Alī regarded this conduct as tantamount to apostasy from Islām. But when Ibn 'Abbās learned the occurrence, he said: 'I should indeed have put them to death, but certainly not burned them, for the Prophet has forbidden that any one shall be punished by fire, because this mode of punishment belongs exclusively to Allāh.' On this account, the opinion prevails that the infliction of death by the stake is prohibited in Islām. But other modes of torturing to death are also expressly repudiated by Muhammadan jurists.

Various other legal consequences of apostasy from Islām are mentioned in detail in the Muslim law-books. For example, the marriage of the apostate is thereby legally annulled. So also he loses the reward of all good works which he may previously have performed, and must make everlasting atonement for his sin in hell. His corpse is not to be interred among the graves of other Muslims, etc.

Apostasy does not necessarily consist only in an express declaration that one is no longer a Muslim, but may also at times be deduced from various other circumstances. If, for example, a Muslim declares to be lawful what the canonical law forbids to him, or, on the contrary, unlawful what the law permits to him, then such conduct is a clear

token of unbelief. In like manner this is so, if, at any time, a Muslim worships the sun or the stars or idols, or declares the Prophet to be a liar, or makes the existence of Allāh a matter of doubt.

According to the view of the Shāfi'ites, it is not only apostasy from Islām that is to be punished with death, but also apostasy from other religions, whenever this is not accompanied by conversion to Islām. A Jew who becomes a Christian will thus have to be put to death, according to the Shāfi'ites, because the Prophet has commanded in general that every one shall be put to death 'who adopts any other religion.'

LITERATURE.—A. N. Matthews, *Mishcât-ul-Masâbîh* (Calcutta, 1810), ii. 177 ff., and other collections of traditions; Ch. Hamilton, *The Hedaya or Guide* (London, 1791), ii. 225–246; E. Sachau, *Muhamm. Recht nach schafiitischer Lehre* (Berlin, 1897), pp. 843–846; Dimishki, *Rahmat al-ummah fi'Khtilâfi'l-a'immah* (Bulaq, 1300), p. 133, and other Muslim lawbooks; J. Krcsmárik, 'Beiträge zur Beleuchtung des Islamitischen Strafrechts mit Rücksicht auf Theorie und Praxis in der Türkei' in *ZDMG* lviii. 92 *ff.*; C. Snouck Hurgronje in *De Indische Gids* (1884), i. 794. TH. W. JUYNBOLL.

APOSTLES' CREED.—See Creeds.

APOSTOLIC AGE.—1. Chronological limits.

—The phrase is commonly used for the period in the history of the Church extending from the death of Christ to the end of the 1st cent., when, according to ancient tradition, John, the last of the twelve Apostles, passed away.

If the term 'apostle' were taken in the broader sense in which it was commonly used in the earliest days, the Apostolic age might be regarded as extending well on into the 2nd cent., when there were still many travelling missionaries bearing the name 'apostles' (see *Didachè*, 11). But the term soon came to be applied exclusively to the Twelve and Paul, and has been used in this sense ever since. It is true that no sharp line of demarcation can be drawn between the late 1st and early 2nd centuries; and even assuming that John lived to the time of Trajan, which is by no means certain, his death had no special significance for the history of the Church. As a consequence, some historians have made the Apostolic age end with the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70, or with the death of Paul. But to give such an emphasis to the former event is to overestimate its significance for the history of the Christian Church; and to make Paul's death the close of the Apostolic age is to imply that he was the only Apostle, when as a matter of fact there were others before he came upon the scene, and after he had passed away; for Peter himself, to say nothing of John, very likely outlived him by half a dozen years (see McGiffert, *Apostolic Age*, p. 592). If the designation is to be retained at all, it is better, then, to use it in the traditional sense for the period from *c.* 30 to *c.* 100 A.D.

2. Sources.—Our sources for a knowledge of the Apostolic age are meagre, and yet on the whole more satisfactory than for the generation immediately succeeding. Most important of all are the Epistles of Paul, which are very rich in historical material. The Book of Acts is also indispensable, based as it is in considerable part upon older sources, and containing a great deal of information not to be found elsewhere. But, like any other historical work written by one not himself an eye-witness of the events recorded, it has to be used with caution.

Into the question of the authorship and sources of the Book of Acts it is impossible to enter here (see the special studies by Sorof, *Die Entstehung der Apostelgeschichte*, 1890; Feine, *Eine vorkanonische Ueberlieferung des Lukas in Evang. und Apostelgesch.* 1891; Spitta, *Die Apostelgesch. ihre Quellen und deren gesch. Werth*, 1891; Clemen, *Die Chron. der Paul. Briefe*, 1893, p. 97 ff., and in *Th. Stud. und Krit.* 1895; J. Weiss in *Th. Stud. und Krit.* 1893, 1895; Jüngst, *Die Quellen der Apostelgesch.* 1895; Hilgenfeld in *Zeitsch. für Wiss. Theol.* 1895, 1896; and the summary in Moffatt, *The Historical New Testament*, 1901, p. 655 ff.). In a recent work entitled *Lukas der Arzt* (1906), Harnack maintains, in opposition to the prevalent critical opinion, that Luke, 'the beloved physician,' mentioned by Paul in Col 4^{14} (2 Ti 4^{11}, Philem ^{24}), was the author of the book, including the famous 'We' passages (16^{10-17} 20^{5-15} 21^{1-18} 27^{1}–28^{16}). Harnack has made out a strong, though, in the present writer's opinion, not a conclusive case for the traditional view; but even if his contention were accepted, it would not particularly affect the historical value of the Book of Acts, for those who deny the identity of the author of the 'We' passages with the author of the book as a whole recognize the general trustworthiness of the 'We' passages; and, as Harnack himself admits, the author was probably an eye-witness only as far as they extend, and was dependent upon others for his information in other parts of his book, where his acquaintance with Paul by no means guarantees his historic accuracy (see Schürer's review of Harnack's book in *Theol. Lit. Zeitung*, 1906, p. 406 ff., and Harnack's reply, p. 466 ff.). In any case, whoever the author may have been, his book must be controlled, and at many points corrected, by the Epistles of Paul.

In addition, we have the Gospels, which reflect in part the conditions of the age when they were written, the Epistle to the Hebrews, First Peter, the Pastorals, the Apocalypse, Clement's Epistle to the Corinthians, the three Johannine Epistles, and James and Jude. Other writings, such as the Didache, Barnabas, and the Epistles of Ignatius, throw light back upon the late first century; fragments of Papias and Hegesippus give us some information; and passing references occur in certain non-Christian writers, *e.g.* Tacitus and Suetonius.

3. Outline of the history.—The age falls into three periods: pre-Pauline, Pauline, and post-Pauline.

(*a*) *Pre-Pauline period.*—Of this period we have an idealized picture in the early chapters of the Book of Acts; but those chapters contain also some trustworthy information drawn from older documents, and perhaps in part from current tradition; and the Epistles of Paul, though chiefly reflecting later conditions, throw some light back upon earlier days. We are thus enabled to control the account in Acts, and to trace the course of events, at least in a general way.

The centre of interest during the period was Jerusalem. Here the disciples who had been scattered at the time of Jesus' death gathered again, when convinced of His resurrection and glorification, to carry on the work which they believed He had entrusted to them, and to prepare their countrymen for the establishment of the Kingdom which was to take place upon His return. They continued to live as Jews, and apparently had no thought of breaking with the traditions or customs of their people. Christianity meant simply the belief that Jesus was the promised Messiah, who was soon to return to inaugurate the Messianic Kingdom. The benefits of this Kingdom they believed, as devoutly as any of their contemporaries, were to be enjoyed by Jews alone, native or proselyte. That the Jewish law was to be abrogated, and Christianity to become a new and independent religion, apparently occurred to none of them. They were devout Jews, and their Christian faith did not in any way interfere with the practice of the religion of their fathers. But they were distinguished from their neighbours by their belief that Jesus was the Messiah and would soon return to do Messiah's work; and this conviction dominated their lives. They were Messianic believers in a sense true of none of their fellow-countrymen, and were thus bound very closely together. At the same time, they did not at first form an organized sect, and they had apparently no synagogue of their own. Their Christian life found expression rather in familiar domestic intercourse, and did not interfere with or become a substitute for their accustomed religious life in temple and synagogue. In the strict sense, we cannot speak of a Christian Church at this time in Jerusalem. The Christians all belonged to the one Jewish Church, and knew no other.

The early disciples felt themselves to be citizens of the future Messianic Kingdom, and their interest centred there rather than in the present. As a consequence, they were not in any sense social reformers. The community of goods, of which we have an account in Ac $2^{44f.}$ $4^{32ff.}$, represented no new social ideal, but was simply an expression of the feeling of brotherhood which prevailed within the little Messianic circle, and of an indifference to the goods of the present world entirely natural in men who expected its speedy displacement by a new and more glorious order of things. There was nothing

in Christianity as understood by them to necessitate a break with existing Judaism. In their zeal for the new faith, and in their efforts to win others to it, they created disturbances, and so came into conflict with the authorities (Ac 4 and 5). Such conflicts were of little significance; but the attack upon Stephen, and the persecution which followed, were a different matter, being due to the fear that the new faith threatened the stability of Jewish institutions,—a fear which the Christians themselves did not at all share (see McGiffert, p. 84 ff.). The trouble which arose at this time seems to have been only temporary. But it was impossible for non-Christian Judaism to regard the growing Christian sect with friendly eyes. The Christians, in fact, had to endure the steadily increasing hatred of their countrymen; and their flight from Jerusalem shortly before the siege of 70 A.D., and their refusal to take part in the Bar Cochba rebellion in 132 ff., only served to make the break complete and permanent. Though hated and repudiated by their countrymen, they still clung to their ancestral law and custom, and lived for the most part in isolation from the rest of the Christian Church, being known commonly as Ebionites or Nazarenes. Finally, after some centuries, Jewish Christianity entirely disappeared. The future was not with it, but with another form of Christianity altogether, of which the Apostle Paul was the greatest champion.

(*b*) *Pauline period.*—For this period our sources are Paul's own Epistles and the Book of Acts. The account in the latter is fuller and more trustworthy than for the earlier period. The author's information, however, was not always accurate and adequate even here, and his account has to be used with caution, and corrected or supplemented at many points by the Epistles, which are a primary source of the first rank.*

The second period is distinguished from the first by a change of leaders, of scene, and of principles. In place of personal disciples of Jesus, a new figure came to the front who had never known Him; in place of Palestine, the Roman empire at large was now the scene of activity; and instead of a mere form of Judaism, Christianity became a new and independent religion.

The conversion of Paul has always been recognized as an epochal event in the history of the Church. To him it was chiefly due that Christianity became a factor of importance in the life of the great Roman empire, and ultimately a world-wide religion. It is true that even before his Christian activity began, the new faith had been carried beyond Palestine and had made converts among the Gentiles,—he was not the first and not the only Apostle to the heathen,—but it was he who gave permanence and stability to the work, and thus became the real founder of the world-Church. Under his leadership Jewish propagandism became Christian propagandism, and the influence of Judaism in the world at large was made to promote the spread of a faith which became its worst foe. No wonder that Paul the Christian was hated by so many of his countrymen both within and without the Christian circle. It was he who made Jewish propagandism ineffective, by substituting for it a propagandism which conserved all its attractive features with none of its limitations. Paul was himself a strict Jew, zealous for the traditions of the fathers; but he was also a citizen of the Roman empire, born and bred in the midst of a Greek civilization to which Judaism meant little or nothing. It was inevitable that he should be interested in the spread of Judaism in the world at large, and that, when he became a Christian, the relation of the new faith to the life of the Roman empire should occupy his thought. But it was out of his religious experience before and after his conversion that there was born the principle which revolutionized Christianity and made it an independent religion. His conversion to Christianity was not the mere result of the conviction that Jesus was the Messiah, making of him simply another Messianic believer. It was the fruit rather of a moral struggle of peculiar intensity, out of which he emerged victorious only because he discovered in Christ a liberator from the bondage of law, and the creator of a new life of moral liberty. His moral struggle was not the effect of his conversion, but an antecedent of it, and his Christianity was simply the answer to his moral need. In it, therefore, there was a universality quite foreign to the Christianity of the early Jewish disciples. To them it had meaning only as a Jewish thing; it was the realization of their national Messianic hope. But to Paul it was the solution of a universal moral problem and the answer to a universal moral need. Wherever there was the desire for righteousness and the consciousness of failure in its pursuit, Christianity had place, and so it was just as much for Gentiles as for Jews. Messianic hopes and ideals had little to do with it; it was simply a new moral principle needed by all; for all, Paul believed, were under the bondage of sin. Thinking thus, it was impossible for him to limit Christian propagandism in the way the earlier disciples did. To them Christianity was exclusively Jewish; and if, under the pressure of events, they were constrained to admit that a Gentile might conceivably become a Christian without first becoming a Jew (witness, for instance, the case of Cornelius), they believed that this was provisional only, and would lead ultimately to the full acceptance of Judaism. If Christianity, then, reached the Gentiles at all through them, it could do so only under narrow limitations and burdensome restrictions. But the gospel of Paul, proclaiming, as it did, freedom from sin through the possession of a new moral power—the spirit of Christ—could be preached on equal terms and with equal effectiveness to men of all races. Paul's attitude towards the Jewish law was but an incident of his general position; but inasmuch as that Law constituted the chief distinction between Jews and Gentiles, and in its observance strict Jews saw the sum and substance of all righteousness, his attitude toward it was of immense significance. The Jewish law, he believed, like all law, was given by God in consequence of sin. Where the spirit of holiness has control no law is needed, any more than God Himself needs law to keep Him holy. Law is for the purpose of controlling a person and preventing him from living out his natural character, and therefore is needed only where the character is bad. When a man is freed from the dominion of sin by the possession of the spirit of Christ, he is freed also from the dominion of law; his character is holy and needs no law. Filled with the spirit of Christ, he cannot do otherwise than live in that spirit, which is the spirit of love, of purity, and of peace. Paul himself might continue to observe the precepts of the fathers, and on occasion he might even urge his converts to do the same; but on his own principles he could not insist on such observance, and the moment it was insisted on by others as essential, he must resist them and stand for his fundamental principle of Christian liberty. This might not have affected practical conduct in the least had Christianity been confined to the Jews, whose holiness expressed itself naturally in the observance of the Law, and

* The contention of van Manen and others of the Dutch school, that the Book of Acts is more trustworthy than the Epistles, is not sound, and has commended itself to few scholars.

to whom its ceremonial precepts were as sacred as its moral. But when Gentiles became Christians, it was another matter. To them much of the Jewish law seemed unnecessary and quite without relation to holy living. The result was a serious crisis, much more serious than had been precipitated by the case of Cornelius. The matter was considered at the conference in Jerusalem described in Ac 15 and Gal 2, and a compromise was reached which provided for the recognition of two forms of Christianity, a Jewish and a Gentile. The latter was free from the obligation to observe the Jewish law, the former was still bound by it. The compromise might have answered as a practical expedient had the two forms remained entirely isolated, but it was not long feasible in communities where there were both Jewish and Gentile Christians. Unless there was to be schism within the Christian brotherhood itself, all must live as Jews, or all the Jews must modify, at least in part, the strictness of Jewish practice which prevented familiar intercourse with the Gentiles. Where Paul's principles prevailed, only the latter course could be adopted. The former would have meant the subjection of his Gentile converts to the bondage of a law from which on his own principles they were completely free, while the latter meant only a liberty for Jewish Christians which on the same principles was equally theirs. Ultimately, as the Gentile wing of the Church grew, the principle of liberty thus asserted resulted in complete emancipation from Jewish ceremonial—an emancipation resisted by many stricter spirits in the Church, whom Paul calls Judaizers, but promoted by his powerful influence, and also by the wide-spread existence in the Roman world of a liberalized Judaism already largely indifferent to ceremonial and interested only in the more spiritual and ethical features of the ancient faith (cf. Schürer, *GJV*[3] iii.). Into the heritage of the older Jewish propagandism the new Pauline Christianity entered, offering the world all that and more than Judaism had offered it, in a form stripped of all its offensive features, and claiming to be not merely a modified Gentile phase of the Jewish faith, but a religion as truly Gentile as Jewish. It is no wonder that it speedily became a formidable rival of Judaism, and ultimately completely outstripped the latter in the race.

It is not necessary to trace here the Christian activity of Paul, which covered a period of nearly 25 years, from the beginning of his work in Antioch until his execution in Rome. He was the greatest Christian missionary of the period, and the only one about whose activity we have any extended knowledge. The fact that some of his Epistles have been preserved to us, and that the second half of the Book of Acts is devoted exclusively to his work, enables us to follow his career with considerable accuracy. But our meagre knowledge about others is no reason to suppose that there were no others doing similar work in different parts of the world, and even in those parts where he himself was active. Considerable districts of western Asia Minor, Cyprus, Macedonia, and Achaia seem to have owed their Christianity chiefly or in the first instance to him, but Rome was evangelized independently. At his death Christianity had already entered every province bordering upon the Mediterranean from Syria to Italy, with the exception of Thrace, and had penetrated into the interior of Asia Minor as far as Galatia.

His death at the close of his two years' imprisonment in Rome was due not so much to the fact that he was a Christian, as to his implication in successive disturbances in the East, leading the authorities to regard him as a dangerous character. It was this that caused his imprisonment in Cæsarea, and his execution followed his conviction before the Emperor upon the same charge (see McGiffert, p. 419 ff.). His conviction and execution therefore did not mean an attack upon Christianity by the Imperial government, and, so far as we can learn, did not in any way affect the status of Christianity in the Empire. With the death of Paul passed away the greatest of the Apostles, and the one who did most for the spread of Christianity in the Roman world. To him the Christian Church of history is chiefly due.

(*c*) *Post-Pauline period.*—For this our information is less abundant than for the previous period. The Book of Acts does not carry us beyond the Roman imprisonment of Paul, though, like the Gospels, it reflects in some degree the ideas of the age when it was produced. The Epistle to the Hebrews, First Peter, the Johannine Epistles, the Apocalypse, First Clement, and probably the Pastorals and the Epistles of James and Jude, also belong to this time, and throw some light on conditions in Rome, Asia Minor, and Corinth. We get glimpses of persecution here and there, and discover traces of the development of organization, of the diminishing spontaneity of religious life, and of the stereotyping of moral principle and practice. But the picture is vague and the details very few. No great figure dominates the history, as was the case while Paul was on the scene. It is a period of rapid growth and consolidation, and yet the actors in the history and the course of events are almost unknown to us. The persecution of Nero, to which Peter probably fell a victim, was caused apparently by the accident that the Christians were brought to his notice as convenient scapegoats upon whom to throw the blame for the conflagration of Rome (Tac. *Ann.* xv. 44). While confined to the capital, this persecution brought the Christians into unpleasant notoriety, and gave them the reputation of being dangerous characters, hostile to the public weal. Under the morose and suspicious Domitian both Christians and Jews suffered, because of the Emperor's doubts as to their loyalty. The First Epistle of Peter and the Apocalypse testify to conditions during this reign; and the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the Book of Acts with its apologetic interest, are best read in the light of these conditions. The Christians were evidently coming increasingly into conflict with the authorities, at any rate in certain quarters; and the letter of Pliny to Trajan, dating from 112, shows that already before he became governor of Bithynia the mere profession of Christianity had come to be generally regarded as a crime, though there is no evidence that any law had been passed upon the subject.

The most notable phenomenon of the period is the Johannine literature, and the existence of a Johannine school in Ephesus to which it testifies. That John the son of Zebedee was not its author is regarded by us as certain. We think it even doubtful whether he was ever in Ephesus (see Harnack's *Chronologie der altchristlichen Litteratur*, p. 673 ff.), but the presence there of an important personality of the name of John is beyond question, and the school which gathered about him bears a very pronounced type of its own, Pauline in its basal principles but highly developed in an original way. The Epistle to the Hebrews, with its large infusion of Philonism, is also an interesting and instructive document, illustrating, in our ignorance of its author, the paucity of our information touching the leading characters of the day. So far as our evidence goes, Christianity during this period spread no further than it had before the death of Paul, except toward the east and north in Asia Minor, where it reached Cappadocia, Pontus, and Bithynia (1 P 1[1]). The Apocalypse gives us the names of some churches in Asia Minor (Smyrna, Pergamum, Sardis, Philadelphia, and Thyatira) not mentioned in Paul's letters or the Book of Acts, and the Epistle to Titus shows that Christianity had already reached Crete. For Alexandria we have no direct evidence, but Christianity must have gone there early, in all probability long before the end of the 1st century. In general the scene of the history in this, as in the Pauline period, was the lands lying along the eastern and northern shores of the Mediterranean from Palestine to Italy. The close of the Apostolic age saw Christianity firmly established at least in Asia Minor, Greece, and Italy, and already well started on the conquest of the Roman world. The Christians

were an object of suspicion to the State, and were widely disliked by the populace, because of their lack of patriotism, their clannishness and exclusiveness, their hostility to prevailing religious beliefs and practices, their fanatical disregard of common worldly interests, and their puritanic denunciation of popular amusements and pastimes. They came chiefly from the lower grades of society, particularly the class of slaves and freedmen (another ground of offence against them in the opinion of many); but there were some among them of wealth and social standing (cf. Ph 4^{22}, Ja 2^2 4^{13}; Eusebius, *HE* iii. 18). The movement was not ostensibly a social one, and yet it had social consequences because of its recognition of the moral and religious possibilities of the lowest, and its emphasis upon Christian brotherhood and equality. The Christians were still expecting the speedy return of Christ, involving the downfall of the great Roman empire and the end of the present age; and they had a profound belief in the elect character of the Church and its ultimate enjoyment of the blessings promised to believing Israel. They therefore found their life largely in the future. Their religious services had taken on a more or less stereotyped character, and their local societies or churches were already somewhat definitely organized. They were conscious of belonging to one great Church of Christ, and the feeling of unity between the most widely separated communities found constant expression. Their hopes and ideals were everywhere much the same, and they were in possession of many of the beliefs and principles which still control Christendom. The Church at large was not yet an organized institution, but Christianity was already well started upon its historic career.

4. **Development of theology.**—The first disciples were not theologians, and did not concern themselves particularly with theological questions; but their conviction that Jesus was the Messiah led to a considerable modification of traditional beliefs, and became the starting-point in the development of a specifically Christian theology. Believing Jesus to be the Messiah, they were thrown into consternation by His untimely death, coming as it seemed while Messiah's work was still undone and the Kingdom not yet inaugurated. Their belief in His Messiahship could not have survived had it not been for the conviction that He was alive again, which speedily took possession of them. That conviction meant the rehabilitation of their old hopes. Jesus had risen in order to do Messiah's work, and if He did not at once 'restore the kingdom to Israel' (Ac 1^6),—if He were absent for a time,—it was only that Israel might be prepared by repentance and righteousness for the enjoyment of the blessings of the Kingdom which He would speedily return to establish. The supreme duty of His followers, then, was to proclaim His coming, and to prepare their countrymen for it. But their proclamation must seem absurd to those who did not believe Him to be the Messiah; and so the imperative need of the hour must be to convince their fellows of His Messiahship.

Proof was found in His wonderful works, and particularly in His resurrection (Ac $2^{22ff.}$ 3^{15} etc.), the disciples' testimony to the latter fact being confirmed by an appeal to OT prophecy ($2^{25ff.}$). To the seemingly fatal objection that He had, after all, done nothing that the Messiah was expected to do, and that His life and death were entirely unworthy of the Messianic dignity, it was replied that He would return to do Messiah's work when Israel was prepared, and that the Scripture foretold a twofold Messianic coming—the one in humility, involving suffering and death, and the other in glory, for the setting up of the Kingdom ($3^{18ff.}$). Here lay the nerve of the first disciples' preaching. In this novel assumption of a Second Coming is to be found the distinctive feature of primitive Christian theology. Their apologetic did not consist in showing that Jesus had already done Messiah's work; it did not involve any great modification or spiritualization of traditional ideas as to the character of that work and as to the nature of the Messianic Kingdom. It aimed only at proving that Jesus was really the Messiah, and that He might therefore be trusted yet to do all that had been expected. In their emphasis upon the second coming they lost the full significance of the first, and failed to understand Jesus' complete transformation of traditional values. Why, contrary to common expectation, should there be a twofold coming? Why had Jesus, being the Messiah, lived a life of humility and died upon the cross? That they found the situation foretold in the Scriptures seems to have satisfied them, though they very likely believed, as was not unnatural, and as Paul's words in 1 Co 15^4 perhaps suggest, that the first coming had its place in the promotion of repentance and righteousness, and so in the preparation of the people for the Kingdom, which could not appear until they had repented (Ac $3^{19ff.}$). But this was a subordinate matter.

The question of Jesus' origin, nature, and relation to God, which later became so important, was not raised among these early disciples. The common traditional idea of the Messiah as a man called and supernaturally endowed by God seems to have been accepted without question (Ac $2^{22.\ 36}$ 3^{13} etc.). Nothing in Jesus' words or deeds or in the events of His life led them to modify the existing view. The one controlling belief was in the future coming, and the one imperative duty was preparation for the enjoyment of the blessings of the Kingdom then to be established.

With the conversion of Paul a new period opened in the history of Christian theology. The central truth to him was not the second coming of Christ, but the transformation of man's nature here and now by the indwelling of the Divine. His theology was rooted in his religious experience. Out of that experience, interpreted in the light of contemporary Greek thought, was born a theory of redemption entirely unlike anything known to the early disciples. The theory involved the transformation of man's evil fleshly nature by the power of the Divine Spirit, Christ, with whom he is mystically united through faith. Thus united to Christ, a man dies with Him unto the flesh and rises with Him unto a new life in the Spirit, a life of holiness and freedom. Salvation is thus a present, not merely a future, reality; and the true spiritual resurrection of the Christian takes place now and here. The future resurrection will mean only the substitution for the present fleshly body, in which the Christian is compelled to dwell while on earth, of a new spiritual body fitted to the spiritual life which has already begun. Paul's theory involved also the Deity of Christ, through mystical union with whom a man's nature is transformed. It was in his doctrine of redemption that the historic belief in the Deity of Christ found its basis.

Into the details of Paul's thought we cannot enter further here. His system is found in all its essential features in the earliest of his extant writings—the Epistle to the Galatians—as well as in the latest (see McGiffert, ch. iii., also pp. 221 ff. and 378 ff.).

The peculiar type of thought of which Paul is the earliest representative appears also in a fragmentary way in the First Epistle of Peter; and the Fourth Gospel and First Epistle of John are dominated by it (so also the Epistles of Ignatius of the early 2nd century). Though Jesus is represented as speaking so extensively in the Fourth Gospel, it is the thought of the author rather than of Jesus Himself that appears both in Gospel and Epistle. In both we find the conception of the need of the transformation of man's nature by the indwelling of the Divine, and the belief in the Deity of Christ, through union with whom the transformation is effected. In spite of many divergencies between John and Paul, the general type of thought is the same, and the agreements far outweigh the differences.

In the other writings of the NT and in Clement's Epistle to the Corinthians an altogether different type of theology appears, more nearly akin to that of the early Jewish disciples. The influence of

Paul is hardly seen except in the common belief that the Jewish law has been abrogated, and that Christianity is open on equal terms to men of every race. To all these writers the gospel is the promise of salvation for those who keep the law of God. Salvation is a future thing, involving, in the thought of some, who retained the conception of the early Jewish disciples, a share in an earthly kingdom to be set up by Christ at His return and to endure for a season (Rev $20^{4ff.}$), and in the thought of all, the enjoyment of a blessed immortality in heaven. The principal condition of salvation is the keeping of God's commandments as revealed by Jesus Christ. This must be preceded by repentance, and repentance by faith,—which means, primarily, the conviction that God will reward those who keep, and punish those who break, His law,—without which faith no one will repent and obey God's commandments. The work of Jesus Christ was to bring to men a knowledge of God's law and its sanctions, and by Him they would be judged. He was thus at once Mediator of salvation and Judge of the world, and the titles 'Saviour' and 'Lord' were both commonly applied to Him. The exalted position which He occupied led Christians to think of Him as standing in a relation of peculiar intimacy with God, and in course of time to speculate about the origin and nature of that relationship. By some it was thought that His supernatural endowment began at the time of His baptism, when He was called by God and equipped for His work by the gift of the Spirit (cf. the accounts of the baptism in the Gospels, esp. the text given in Justin Martyr's *Dialogue with Trypho*, 103, and also the testimony of Justin, *ib.* 48, and Eusebius, *HE* v. 28. 3). By others He was given a supernatural origin, being represented as the child of the Holy Spirit (as in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke); while still others pushed His origin even further back, and thought of Him as a pre-existent Being who had come down from heaven (thus, *e.g.*, the Pastoral Epistles, Hebrews, Apocalypse, and Clement). Where this general type of thought prevailed, an adequate motive for assuming the Deity of Christ, such as actuated Paul and those who felt the influence of his theory of redemption, was lacking. Endowment with the Spirit at baptism, supernatural birth, pre-existence —none of them involved Deity in the strict sense. It was not due to these Christians, but to Paul and his school, that the doctrine of the Deity of Christ finally became a part of historic Christian theology.

The two types of thought that have been described developed for the most part independently of one another for some generations; but even in writings representing controllingly one or the other type, traces of the opposite tendency sometimes appear, and towards the close of the 2nd cent. the two were combined by Irenæus, bishop of Lyons, who made both man's obedience to the Divine law and the transformation of his nature through the infusion of Divine grace necessary to salvation, and so laid the foundations of historic Catholic theology. In the combination much of Paul's thought was lost; but the essential feature of it—that human nature is evil and must be transformed by union with the Divine—was permanently conserved, and became the basis of the sacramental system, which we find, as a matter of fact, already foreshadowed in 1 Co 10 and in Jn 3 and 6.

5. Ethical ideals. — To the primitive Jewish disciples, Christianity was primarily not an ethical but a Messianic movement. It is true that they believed, with John the Baptist and with Jesus, that righteousness was a condition of sharing in the blessings of the coming Kingdom (cf. Ac 2^{38}). It was because of the unrighteousness of the people that Jesus had not established it during His earthly life, and not until there was general repentance would He return (Ac $3^{19ff.}$). But they interpreted righteousness in the ordinary Jewish way as the keeping of the revealed Law of God in all its parts, and introduced little change in current ethical ideals. They saw in Christianity the promise of the speedy realization of the Messianic Kingdom and their own participation in its blessings, but apparently they did not feel the need of new ethical ideals and new moral power, and they did not think of looking to Christianity for them.

To Paul, as has already been seen, Christianity was an altogether different thing. He had experienced a serious moral crisis, and had passed through a severe moral struggle such as the earlier disciples had not known, and he found in Christianity, above all else, the satisfaction of his moral needs. Christianity, as he conceived it, was a religion offering to him and to every man a new moral power sufficient to transform him from an evil to a good being, from a sinner to a saint. His theory of redemption did not find general acceptance,—in fact it was commonly quite misunderstood,—but his conviction that Christianity has to do fundamentally with release from sin and with the promotion of holiness speedily became wide-spread. From him, too, came the sharp contrast between 'flesh' and 'spirit' which has dominated Christian thought ever since. Those who came after him were not, as a rule, so thoroughgoing as he at this point, but the idea of the Christian life as a moral conflict—the warring of two opposing principles, a fleshly and a spiritual—was common at an early date. Holiness thus came to be regarded as the principal mark of the Christian life, and sins of the flesh were esteemed the worst of all sins. Primitive Christian literature is full of exhortations to purity, and of denunciations of unchastity and lust. The lenient view taken of sexual immorality by the contemporary heathen world, and the close connexion between it and some of the religious cults of the day, doubtless had much to do with the frequent references to the subject in early Christian documents; but behind it all, even though seldom coming to expression, lay the Pauline contrast between flesh and spirit, and the conviction that impurity of the flesh drives away the Holy Spirit and makes His continued presence with the individual and with the Church impossible (cf., in addition to the many passages in Paul's own Epistles, He 10^{29}, Jude ^{19}, and esp. the 2nd cent. writings—Hermas, *Mand.* v. and x., and 2 Clement 14). Paul himself was not an ascetic in any strict sense; he even opposed asceticism in matters of food and drink, when it appeared in Rome and Colossæ (Ro 14 and Col 2); but hints of an ascetic tendency appear in his Epistles (Ro 8^{13}, 1 Co 5^5 9^{27}), particularly in connexion with the relation of the sexes (cf. 1 Co 7). In fact, the subsequent development of Catholic asceticism was already foreshadowed, though the process was still in its incipiency, in the Apostolic age (see the protest against it in 1 Ti $4^{1ff.}$). See ASCETICISM (Chr.).

Another controlling contrast in primitive Christian ethics, due in part to the same cause, in part to the prevailing expectation of the speedy return of Christ, was that between this world and the next—promoting a spirit of unworldliness, or otherworldliness, which has remained a permanent feature of the Christian view of life. The disciples early came to regard themselves as a people called out of the midst of a corrupt generation and set apart as God's own; and to live as citizens of another world, to fix one's affections upon higher than earthly things, to be separate from this world and superior to its interests and concerns—this was

regarded as the truly Christian attitude (cf., *e.g.*, 2 Co 6^{17}, Gal 6^{14}, Ph 3^{20}, Col 3^{3}, Ja 4^{4}, 1 Jn 2^{15}; and also the striking passage in the 2nd cent. *Epistle to Diognetus*, 5 ff.). Not harmony with one's environment, as in classic Greek ethics, but revolt against it, and the carrying on of a life entirely detached from it—this was the Christian ideal already in the Apostolic age. And this spirit worked together with the controlling emphasis upon fleshly purity to promote asceticism, and ultimately, though not yet in the Apostolic age, its natural fruit—monasticism (cf. the prophetic remark of Paul in 1 Co 5^{10}).

The sharp contrast between the two worlds, and the recognition of the present world as evil, did not result in a desire to change existing conditions; no social revolution was contemplated. The division of society into rich and poor, master and slave, was treated as normal. The effort was made to introduce Christian principles into all the relations of life, but the desire to escape from the class to which one happened to belong was not encouraged (cf. 1 Co $7^{20ff.}$). There is frequent emphasis in the writings of the age upon one's common duties as father, husband, wife, child, servant (Eph 5, Col 3, 1 P 2, 1 Ti 6, Tit 2), and even occasionally as citizen (Ro 13^{1-7}, 1 P $2^{13.17}$, Tit 3^{1}, 1 Clement 60. 61). However evil the present world may be, the Christian is to walk in such a way as to give no just ground of offence to outsiders, is to show proper respect to all men, and to live honourably, quietly, peaceably, and blamelessly with every one (Ro $12^{17ff.}$ 13^{7}, Ph 2^{15}, 1 P 2^{17} etc.).

The ideal of social service and the desire to promote the spirit of brotherhood in the world at large had little place among the early Christians. Rather to gather out of the world a company of holy men, heirs of the promised Kingdom—this was their great aim (cf. the Eucharistic prayers in the early 2nd cent. *Didache*, 9. 10). It is true that love is frequently insisted upon in the writings of the Apostolic age, but it commonly takes the form of love for the Christian brethren, which is to be manifested in charity, hospitality, sympathy, concord, forbearance, tender-heartedness, forgiveness, humility, etc. And even when it is not so limited, it usually appears as only one of a number of virtues (cf. 1 Ti 2^{15}, 4^{12}, 6^{11}, 2 Ti 2^{22}, 3^{10}, Ja 1^{27}, 2^{8}). The place of supremacy given to it by Christ and after Him by Paul is accorded to it by no other writers of the age. (The striking passage in 1 Clement 49 ff. is hardly sufficient to justify us in making an exception of the author). But the influence of Jesus is seen nevertheless in the general emphasis—common to most of our sources—upon the virtues of gentleness, peaceableness, forbearance, and humility. Nothing is said of the duty of insisting upon one's rights and demanding proper recognition from others. Self-abnegation in one's relations with one's fellows, rather than self-assertion, is the recognized ideal.

But the contrast with the prevailing ethical sentiment of the Roman world was not confined to a difference in ideals. The Christians recognized the moral law, which it was their duty to obey, as given directly by revelation from God, the revelation involving also an announcement of the future sanctions attending obedience and disobedience. There was thus a definiteness and compulsion about Christian ethics not commonly found elsewhere. Emphasis upon the hope of reward and the fear of punishment, as grounds of moral conduct, is very common in our sources (*e.g.* 1 Co 6^{9} 9^{25} 15^{32}, 2 Co 9^{6}, Gal 5^{21} 6^{8}, Col 1^{5}, 1 P 3^{9}, He 2^{2} 10^{32}, 1 Ti 6^{19}). But higher motives are also frequently urged: to walk worthily of one's calling as God's elect, to please and glorify God, to be like Christ, to be true to one's opportunities and responsibilities, to help, not harm, one's brethren, to promote the good name of Christianity in the world at large (cf. 1 Co 6^{20}, Ph 2^{15}, Col 3^{3}, 1 Th 2^{12} 4^{1}, 1 P 1^{15} $2^{9.12}$ 4^{1}, 1 Clement 30). It meant much also that the early Christians believed that Christianity was for all men, low as well as high, and that they recognized the moral possibilities even of the meanest. Christianity, indeed, supplied a new and mighty moral enthusiasm for the masses of the people, and that in spite of the fact that already the ominous distinction between two grades of morality, one for the common man and the other for the spiritual *élite*, was beginning to appear (cf. 1 Co 7 and *Didache*, 6).

So far as moral performance was concerned, it evidently left much to be desired. Of this the repeated exhortations and warnings in the Christian literature of the period are sufficient evidence, and we have direct record of some striking examples of immorality (*e.g.* Ac 5, 1 Co 5. 11, Jude $4^{ff.}$). It is worthy of notice, too, that the Christians bore a bad moral reputation among their pagan neighbours, due largely, no doubt, to prejudice, but also in part well founded (cf. 1 Th 4^{11}, 2 Th 3^{11}, 1 P 2^{12}). But in spite of all this, it is clear that Christianity was a controllingly moral movement, and that it involved a real moral improvement on the part of many of its adherents. The very insistence upon the matter in our sources shows that there was a strenuous ethical ideal, and that the Christians themselves recognized its binding character; and we have abundant testimony to the effects of Christianity upon the lives of its converts (see not only the writings of the Christians themselves, but also the tacit witness of Pliny's letter to Trajan). In general, it may be said that the common notion of the Christians was that the aim of Christianity is to make men purer and better here, in order to a blessed immortality hereafter.

6. Development of organization.—In primitive Jewish Christianity no organization was needed in the beginning, for the disciples regarded themselves simply as heralds of the coming Kingdom. It might perhaps have been expected that they would form in Jerusalem a separate synagogue, but this they apparently did not do, and the failure to do it shows how little they regarded themselves as a distinct sect. Their desire was to convince their fellow-countrymen of Jesus' Messiahship, and so win Him disciples, rather than to form a religious cult or society of their own. Certain Christians, particularly James the brother of Jesus, and others who had stood in relations of intimacy with Him, such as the Twelve, naturally had large influence in the Jerusalem circle, but there is no sign that this involved any official position or appointment. Some sort of an organization, however, the disciples had at an early date. As a brotherhood they felt it their duty to care for the necessities of the needy among them, and so a committee was appointed for the distribution of aid (Ac 6). Beyond this we do not know that the early Jerusalem Christians went; but ultimately, after the final break with their unbelieving countrymen, the Jewish Churches were organized as independent institutions, though the exact form which the organization took is unknown to us.

In the non-Jewish world conditions were different. Here, too, the expectation of the speedy consummation made any careful organization seem unnecessary, and the conviction of the presence of the Spirit made human officials seem superfluous. But the founding of churches began at an early date; and in them, although for some time leadership devolved naturally upon men specially endowed

by the Spirit, such as apostles, prophets, and teachers, gradually the necessities of the case led to a more formal organization, substitutes being required for the inspired men who might not always be present. Two classes of officials—bishops and their assistants, the deacons—existed in some churches before the end of the Apostolic age; but the development of the threefold ministry—bishop, presbyter, and deacon—belongs to the 2nd century.

7. Religious services.—The early Jerusalem disciples were devout Jews, and continued to observe the religious practices and to attend the religious services of their people. Their common religious life as Christians expressed itself not so much in formal services as in informal gatherings from house to house, where their community of feeling as disciples of Jesus and heirs of the approaching Kingdom found natural and familiar expression. Concerning the subsequent development within the Jewish Christian Churches we have no information.

In the Gentile world all seems at first to have been equally informal; but the attitude of hostility towards the religious practices and principles of the heathen world, taken by Paul and other early missionaries, made it necessary for converts to Christianity to repudiate, as a rule, their old cults, and to find their religious life wholly within the Christian circle. Thus it was inevitable that a Christian cult should early develop, to meet the need of those who were cut off from the religious exercises to which they had been accustomed. Christian worship became ultimately very elaborate and ornate, and took on many of the features of the cults which it displaced, but in the Apostolic age we discover only the beginnings of the development. Our information on the subject is almost wholly confined to the Church of Corinth, and there all was very simple and informal. The Christians met frequently for religious worship and mutual edification, and also at other times to partake of a common meal. The former occasions are referred to by Paul in 1 Co 14. At these meetings the Christians engaged in various religious exercises,—prayer, praise, prophecy, teaching, speaking with tongues,—the whole service being controlled by the Pauline idea of the presence of the Holy Spirit, by whose influence the disciples were inspired to pray or prophesy or engage in other religious exercises. Perfect freedom of expression was granted to all, but it was assumed that only those who were prompted thereto by the Spirit would take active part in the services. The freedom was not for the individual as an individual, but as a mouthpiece of the Spirit. At the time when Paul wrote, this liberty had already resulted in serious disorder, and the meetings had degenerated into scenes of confusion and discord. In dealing with the difficulties, he laid down two principles of far-reaching importance. The first was that the services are solely for the edification of those present, and all the exercises must be conducted with that end in view. Only such gifts must be employed, and only under such conditions, as will promote the good of all. But how can one refuse to utter what the Spirit imparts, even though it be unintelligible or untimely? In reply to this question, Paul stated a second general principle of equal importance with the first: 'The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets,' that is, an inspired man has the right and duty to exercise judgment in the use of his spiritual gifts, and to employ them only in such a way as to promote edification. The utterance of these two principles foreshadows the passing of the original freedom. If an individual fails to exercise discretion in the use of his gifts, he must be controlled by his brethren, and thus the way is prepared for a regular order of service, and for the appointment of certain persons to take charge of the meetings, and to see that all is done decently and in order. There is no sign that Paul himself contemplated such a result, but the stereotyping process ensued in course of time. In Rome, before the end of the 1st cent., it was already well under way, and regularly appointed officials were in control of the services (cf. 1 Clement, 40 ff., 44); and before long the early freedom had given way almost everywhere to liturgical rules (cf. *Didache*, 9 f.; Justin, *Apol.* 67; Ignatius, *Magn.* 7, *Trall.* 7, *Smyrn.* 8).

In addition to the meetings already described, the Christians at Corinth were in the habit of gathering from time to time to share in a common meal. At this meal they not only partook of food and drink for the ordinary purpose of satisfying hunger and thirst, but it was their custom, as was apparently the case among the early Jerusalem disciples, to eat bread and drink wine in commemoration of Jesus. At the time when Paul wrote, the meals had degenerated into scenes of discord and debauchery. Under these circumstances he informed the Corinthians that the commemoration of Christ's death was the chief purpose of the meal, and not eating and drinking for their own sake; and he commanded them to satisfy their hunger at home, that they might be able to commemorate Christ in the right spirit, and make the meal wholly a religious service (1 Co $11^{22.\ 34}$). The immediate effect of Paul's attitude in this matter we do not know. The common meals continued in some quarters for generations, but ultimately they were everywhere given up, and the religious ceremony known as the Eucharist or Lord's Supper alone remained. In subsequent centuries it became the central feature of the Christian cult. A very elaborate ceremonial grew up in connexion with it, and it was regarded as the most sacred and mysterious of all religious rites (see artt. AGAPE and EUCHARIST).

In the *Didache*, 9, it is commanded that none except baptized persons be allowed to partake of the Lord's Supper. This is the earliest explicit statement of a general rule which, it may fairly be supposed, was commonly operative from the beginning; for the sacred meals of the early Christians can hardly have been shared by any not belonging to the Christian circle, and admission to it was commonly, if not invariably, marked by the ceremony of baptism (see art. BAPTISM).

8. Significance of the Apostolic age.—The Apostolic age is the period of Christian origins, and as such has a significance attaching to no other in the history of the Church. It was during this period that the Church as an organization came into existence, and the foundations were laid upon which all subsequent ages built. Most of the tendencies that appear in Christian history are to be found at least in germ in the Church of the 1st century.

It is through the Apostolic age also that we get our knowledge of Jesus Christ. To it we owe not simply the written accounts of His life, but also the impression of His personality which constitutes an integral part of our picture of Him. It is true that the very change of emphasis from Christ's message about God to His personality as Messiah involved a changed interpretation of His controlling purposes, which has coloured Christian thought ever since. Nevertheless, it is through the Apostolic age that we approach Him, and from it that we get the information which enables us to understand Him in some respects better than His own disciples did. His person dominated the age, and the memory of His presence was a vivid and compelling reality. The days in which men who knew

Him face to face were still alive and influential must always stand apart from other days in the regard of His followers.

On other accounts, too, the Apostolic age will always have peculiar religious value. As the period of beginnings, there is an incomparable freshness about it. Its vivid sense of the approaching consummation gives it an inspirational quality not found elsewhere; and in it were produced the classic documents of Christianity from which all Christians since have drawn religious sustenance. This fact alone is enough to mark it off from all other ages in the history of the Church.

But another significance has been ascribed by Christian tradition to the Apostolic age. During the 2nd cent. there grew up a conception of Apostolic authority which has prevailed ever since, and has given the 1st cent. a worth and dignity to which the fact that it is the period of Christian origins and nearest in time to Jesus Christ would not of itself entitle it. In the effort to repudiate the errors of the Marcionites and Gnostics, which were spreading rapidly in the 2nd cent., certain leaders of the Church began to insist upon the teaching of the Apostles, that is, the Twelve and Paul, as the sole standard and norm of Christian faith, on the ground that they had been chosen by Christ to be the founders of His Church, and had been endowed with the Spirit in such measure as to render them infallible witnesses to the will and truth of God. In the effort to define the teaching of the Apostles, and to show that they gave no support to the vagaries of Marcion and the Gnostics, it was claimed that they had left certain writings together constituting an authoritative Scripture canon, and had framed a creed containing the fundamental tenets of the Christian faith. Whoever would be a member of the true Church, and so an heir of salvation, must unfeignedly accept all that was taught both by canon and by creed. A sharp line of demarcation was thus drawn between the age of the Apostles and all subsequent generations. In the Apostolic age was found the standard for all time to come. The Apostles themselves came to be regarded as figures supernaturally endowed for the unique work of establishing the Church, and raised above the ordinary frailties and limitations of humanity. Their official character was so emphasized that all sense of their individuality was lost. The differences between them were forgotten, in the conviction that as men divinely inspired they must all have been completely one. Apart from Paul, history knows practically nothing of their several careers, of the regions where they laboured, and the work they did; and not until the 3rd cent., long after all authentic sources of information had disappeared, did tradition begin to busy itself with them as individuals—a striking illustration of the indifference to historic reality to which the 2nd cent. theory of Apostolicity gave rise. As a result of that theory, all that the Apostles were supposed to have taught, whether by precept or example, acquired infallible authority; and nothing in doctrine, in polity, in ritual, or in practice could be regarded as Christian unless directly or indirectly of Apostolic origin. Development on all these lines was made possible by the belief that the Apostles had also instituted a perpetual Apostolic office for the government and guidance of the Church, the incumbents of which were endowed with the power to interpret infallibly the will and truth of God. Bible and creed were thus supplemented by the living voice of the Catholic episcopate, and the Church was enabled to conform to new conditions and to meet new needs as they arose, without ostensibly breaking away from its Apostolic foundations or giving up its theory of Apostolic authority. The Protestant reformers of the 16th cent. rejected the Catholic doctrine of an infallible episcopate, but the Catholic belief in Apostolic authority was retained, and the Bible was regarded as the complete and final expression of Apostolic teaching on all conceivable subjects. Revelation and inspiration were supposed to have ceased with the age of the Apostles, and the development that had taken place under the ægis of episcopal authority was repudiated. The effort was made to return to the conditions of the Apostolic age, and to bring the Church into complete conformity to its principles and practices in all respects, nothing being regarded as truly Christian unless it enjoyed the authority of Apostolic precept or example. Cf. next article.

This belief still prevails widely in connexion with doctrine, but in the matter of ritual and polity it has been generally abandoned. Moreover, the whole conception of Apostolic authority has been given up by many in modern times, and it has come to be widely held that the age of the Apostles was essentially like any other in the history of the Church, that it was confronted with its own problems and difficulties, and that the men who met and solved them were of like passions and limitations with Christians of all ages.

This change of attitude has been of immense historical and religious value. A reality attaches to the Apostolic age and to the figures of the early leaders of the Church which they never possessed before. For the first time an understanding of the period and a genuinely historical treatment of it have become possible, and from the religious experiences of the Apostles and their companions, now more clearly understood and appreciated, modern Christians are gaining new inspiration and instruction.

LITERATURE.—Of older books on the Apostolic age should be mentioned: Neander, *Geschichte der Pflanzung und Leitung der christlichen Kirche durch die Apostel*, 1832 (Eng. tr. 1842); Baur, *Paulus der Apostel Jesu Christi*, 1845 (Eng. tr. 1873 ff.) [an epoch-making work setting forth the conception of early Christian history which was adopted by the Tübingen school in general], followed in 1853 by *Das Christenthum und die christliche Kirche der drei ersten Jahrhunderte* (Eng. tr. 1878 ff.); Ritschl, *Entstehung der altkatholischen Kirche*, 1850 (2nd ed. 1857, entirely worked over) [in its second edition another epoch-making book, which did more than any other to break the dominance of the Tübingen interpretation of early Church history]; Renan, *Histoire des Origines du Christianisme*, 7 vols., 1863 ff.; of more recent works, Weizsäcker, *Das apostol. Zeitalter der christl. Kirche*, 1886 (3rd ed. 1902; Eng. tr. 1895) [the most influential of modern histories of the Apostolic age]; Pfleiderer, *Das Urchristenthum*, 1887 (2nd ed. 1902), also *Die Entstehung des Christenthums*, 1905 (Eng. tr. 1905); McGiffert, *Hist. of Christianity in the Apostolic Age*, 1897 (rev. ed. 1899); Bartlet, *The Apostolic Age*, 1899; Wernle, *Die Anfänge unserer Religion*, 1901 (2nd ed. 1904; Eng. tr. 1903 ff.); Dobschütz, *Die urchristl. Gemeinden*, 1902 (Eng. tr. 1904), and his brief sketch, *Das apostolische Zeitalter*, 1906 (in the *Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher*); Knopf, *Das nachapostol. Zeitalter*, 1905; Ropes, *The Apostolic Age in the Light of Modern Criticism*, 1906. The various standard lives of Paul, works on NT literature and theology, Church histories, and histories of doctrine, which deal more or less fully with our subject, it is not necessary to specify.

A. C. McGIFFERT.

APOSTOLIC SUCCESSION.—1. The principle of ministry in the NT.—That from the Apostles' time there has existed in the Christian Church a ministry exercising official functions by regular devolution of authority is a fact which few historians would have disputed, if no claim had been made on its behalf to be a necessary part of the institution of Christ. But as this claim is put forward on behalf of Churches retaining the canonical orders, and also by Presbyterians, Apostolic succession becomes a significant fact, and therefore a doctrine. Consequently it demands a closer and more vigorous scrutiny than would otherwise attend an investigation into the origin of the Christian Ministry. The theory is that Christ, having established a society primarily

visible and historical, gave to that society a recognizable unity and cohesion, not only by instituting in Baptism a sacrament of initiation, and in the Eucharist a sacrament of corporate life, but also by perpetuating its collective witness in a continuous and authoritative ministry.

This principle has often, and not unnaturally, been expressed in crude and unhistorical forms. It has, for example, been common to confuse the question of a true principle of ministry with that of the manner in which this principle has been realized in history. This has led to discussions on the Divine right of bishops as an exclusive form of Church government; and caused stress to be laid on an all but mechanical system of devolving episcopal authority which the facts of early Church history, so far as known, do not justify, and which is too formal to be consistent with an organically developing society. Hooker was right when, in opposing the Presbyterian theory, he contented himself with affirming that episcopacy 'best agreed with the sacred Scripture' (*Eccl. Pol.* iii. 16, but cf. vii. 11).

Or, again, the sacerdotalism of the third cent. has been unwarrantably intruded into the first, and the whole matter treated as though it were a question whether Christ had set up a priestly caste, to which the mysteries of religion were entrusted, and without which spiritual life was not only hindered but impossible. These methods of thought have led to narrow and technical inquiries into the sacramental character of holy orders, the form and matter of the rite by which they were conferred, and the precise conception of the various powers which from time to time it has been intended to convey. Such, for example, is the papal Bull *Apostolicæ Curæ*, condemning Anglican orders on the ground that the Ordinal of Edward VI. departed from the intention of its mediæval predecessors in denying sacrificial power to presbyters.

But the crudest form of the argument, in spite of Macaulay's ridicule (Essay on *Gladstone on Church and State*), witnesses to certain facts of the Church's development which may not be ignored. The Nicene canons, A.D. 325 (No. 4), make careful arrangements, on the basis of universal custom, for the due perpetuation of the ministry in all parts of the Church. In the 3rd cent. Cyprian can speak of the united episcopate as retaining the authority entrusted by Christ Himself to the Twelve (see below). The end of the 2nd cent. witnessed a universal episcopate, the descent of which from Apostles was not questioned, but used in argument by writers like Irenæus (*adv. Hær.* iii. 2, 3, iv. 40, 42, 53, v. 20) and Tertullian (*de Præscript.* 32, *adv. Marc.* iv. 5, *Apol.* 47; cf. Hegesippus, in Euseb. iv. 22). In the early days of the 2nd cent. Ignatius wrote that, apart from the threefold ministry, 'there is not even the name of church' (*Trall.* 3). It is not, therefore, scientific to dismiss the doctrine of Apostolic succession because the statement of it has been inadequate or extravagant. This is true of most, if not all, Christian doctrines.

The object of the present article is to show what reasons there are, in view of the facts and principles of the NT, for believing that the great institution of the Christian ministry belongs to the substance of Christianity. Whatever variations may have attended its transmission (as, *e.g.*, in the case of the supposed right of the Alexandrian presbyters until the time of Bishop Heraclas, A.D. 233, to consecrate their own chief pastor [Jerome, Ep. 146 *ad Evangelum*; see Bigg, *BL* p. 40; Gore, *Ch. and Min.*, Note B; J. Wordsworth, *Ministry of Grace*, pp. 135, 136]), the Ministry preserved an unbroken continuity in all churches till the 16th century. The theory built upon this fact does not stand or fall with a sacerdotal conception of orders, but arises out of the facts of the Gospel narrative. 'We find the Church,' says Archbishop Temple, 'from the very beginning flowing out of the ministry' (*Sermon at Consecration of Truro Cathedral*). Whatever may be the function of the Church, whether it be the teacher of truth or the dispenser of sacraments, the inquiry is not vitally affected. Where, as in the Western Church of the Middle Ages, great stress is laid upon the due celebration of the Eucharist, Apostolic succession will appear mainly as a sacerdotal theory. Where, on the other hand, as in the age of the Gnostics, resistance to doctrinal error is the foremost consideration, the ministry will appear rather as the Divinely appointed guardian of the Apostolic witness to evangelical truth. The two questions that are fundamentally important are: (*a*) Is the Church of Christ as the object of salvation prior to the individual Christian? (*b*) Does the Church as established by Christ present any of the features of a historical institution? It is only as these questions are answered that we can proceed to discover from history how the organic life of the society has been in fact developed.

Apostolic succession being accepted as a principle of the Church's life, we do not commit ourselves to any one theory of the reasons which led, in the evolution of the Christian society, to the establishment of the various orders of ministers. If the Seven of Ac 6 be, as is frequently supposed, the original deacons, then we know that, whatever functions may from time to time have been engrafted on the office in the course of history, the neglect of the Hellenistic widows was the occasion of their first election and ordination. Whether a similar need for the due administration of the common purse (Hatch, *BL* 2), or the requirement of a foreign correspondent to represent each community in its relations with the rest (Ramsay, *Church in the Roman Empire*, xv. 3, xvii.), or the demand for a vicar apostolic to guard the evangelical deposit from the attacks of heresy, be the cause of the establishment of bishops; or whether, as is more probable, a complexity of causes, some more influential in one region than in another, produced the universal episcopate, the Church still remains a differentiated and structural body, not a promiscuous gathering of persons professing Christian discipleship and organizing themselves for the promotion of common ends. On the other hand, unless it be held that the Apostles exercised an absolute authority in the primitive Church, and that the clergy, or any one order amongst them, succeeded to all the functions of the Apostolate—and neither view agrees with the facts of the NT—it is manifest that a ministry regularly ordered from Apostolic times may adapt itself to democratic institutions as readily as, for example, that of Congregationalism, which, as Dr. Dale has shown, is in theory no more dependent on the popular will than any other (*History of English Congregationalism*). The question at issue, therefore, really resolves itself into this—whether Christ is merely the source of a spirit which has found for itself a body, or whether the body also has Christ for its direct author.

A. *In the Gospels.*—The Gospel of Mark registers the stages by which the Christian community, with its characteristic message of forgiveness and endowment of the Holy Spirit, was established through the public work of Jesus Christ (F. C. Burkitt, *St. Mark's Account of the Birth of the Church*, pp. 3–5, cf. his *Gospel History and its Transmission*, ch. 3). It is important to observe, as revealed in this Gospel, the principles which appear as impressed upon it from the first. The headline of Mark's narrative is, '*The beginning of the gospel* of Jesus Christ, the Son of God' (1^1). That the gospel is virtually identical with the Kingdom, of which it is the proclamation, is apparent from vv.[14, 15] in which Jesus is described as taking up the work of the Baptist and announcing as His message the approach of the Kingdom (cf. Mt 4^{23}, Lk 4^{16-21}). The identification of the forerunner with the voice, which, according to the evangelical prophet (Is 40^3), was to herald the return of God's people to the sacred city (Mk 1^3), and the recognition of Jesus in His baptism as uniting the attributes of the expected Messiah with those of the Servant who is to be Jahweh's agent in the process of restoration (1^{11}; cf. Ps 2^7, Is 42^1), mark out the 'coming of Jesus' from Nazareth to Jordan and the descent of the Spirit (vv.[9, 10]) as the first stage in the development of the Kingdom.

The second stage is its proclamation by Jesus Himself on His return from the wilderness to Galilee (vv.[14, 15]). This is immediately followed by the call of Simon, Andrew, James, and John (vv.[16–19]), whose designation to a future Apostolate seems to be indicated in the words, 'I will make you to become fishers of men' (v.[17]). To these is subsequently added Levi or Matthew (2^{14}). The method of the earlier ministry, as a scheme of selection from the multitude of those prepared to follow Him, is clearly seen in the avoidance of popularity and the frequent retirement by which it is marked ($1^{35-38, 44, 45}$ 3^7).

Then follows the first great crisis out of which the incipient community issues with the impress of a definite form, never to be lost through all subsequent developments. Christ retires with His adherents to the Sea of Galilee (3^7). He ascends 'the mountain' (v.[13]). He calls 'whom he himself would' (v.[13]), thus constituting the outer ring

of His 'disciples,' who become a society resting upon the Lord's choice, no longer a promiscuous following united only by the uncertain bond of a common, though variable, devotion to one Master. Within this circle Jesus constitutes twelve (v.[14]); Luke adds 'whom also he named apostles' (6[13]). But the importance of this appointment is clearly seen by what in a narrative so concise as that of Mark cannot be without significance. He includes the list (3[16-19]) repeated by each of the other Synoptists (Mt 10[2-4], Lk 6[14-16]), and also in Acts (1[13]). The words 'He made twelve' (*ἐποίησε δώδεκα*) are noticeable. Christ created an office, the purpose of which was to extend His own mission by proclaiming the Kingdom and exercising authority in casting out the rival kingdom of Beelzebub (Mk 3[22-27] 6[7-13]). To this end those who now in a narrower sense become 'the disciples' are first to be 'with him' (3[14], cf. Lk 22[28]), so that from this point the narrative acquires a different character, being a record, on the one hand, of growing opposition on the part of the Jews to a movement now definitely embodied in an organized society, and, on the other, of the training of the Twelve for thrones in the Kingdom which Christ has appointed to them (Lk 22[29. 30]). The call to the Twelve is renewed, and further defined, by the preliminary mission on which they are sent throughout the villages of Galilee. Their commission corresponds to the stage which Christ's work has already reached. They preach repentance, cast out demons, and heal the sick. The exact words of the Evangelist (Mk 6[7]) are worthy of attention: 'He began to send them forth' (*ἀποστέλλειν*). Just as the whole narrative is the beginning of that Gospel the history of which is still in process of development, so here we have *the beginning of the Apostolate*, ultimately to become universal in its scope.

Two further preparatory stages are, however, necessary, before the Church can be built upon the Apostles (Mt 16[18]; cf. Eph 2[20], Rev 21[14])—the confession of Jesus' Messiahship, and the disclosure of suffering and death as the channel through which the gospel of the Kingdom was to become the witness to a crucified and risen Saviour.

The critical conversation at Cæsarea Philippi is narrated with greater detail by Mt. (16[13-20]; cf. Mk 8[27-29], Lk 9[18-20]). Mt. connects with the Apostolic confession the grant of the keys, and reveals the occasion as a further stage in the building of the Church, against which the gates of Hades are not to prevail. The authority to bind and loose here committed to St. Peter was, according to Cyprian (*de Unitate*, 4), extended to the Twelve on the occasion recorded in Mt 18[15-20]. It is, however, difficult to suppose that the *Ecclesia* in v.[17] does not primarily refer to the local Jewish synagogue (see Hort, *Christian Ecclesia*, p. 9), especially in view of the words 'Gentile and publican'; and it is quite in accord with Mt.'s manner to string together utterances not originally related. When, therefore, *ἐκκλησία* came to be interpreted of the Christian society, it would be quite natural to add, not only the promise of vv.[18. 20], but the charter of authority given in v.[18], which is at least evidence that it was not regarded as applying to St. Peter only. And it is probable that the authority in question was extended to the Twelve, and that v.[18], even if not originally spoken in that connexion, accurately expresses the fact. The Fourth Gospel, in recording one of the appearances of the risen Lord, represents Him as imparting the Holy Spirit by breathing on the disciples, and renewing the authority, not now in the old Hebraic form, but in language connecting the Apostolic ministry with the atoning work: 'Whosesoever sins ye forgive,' etc. (Jn 20[19-23]). The suggestion that Jesus here addressed not the Eleven, but a promiscuous gathering of disciples (see Westcott, *Gospel acc. to St. John* 20[23] n.) seems to be negatived by the whole course of the Johannine narrative. It is true that John notes the absence of Thomas (v.[24]). But he is specially mentioned as 'one of the Twelve,' and it is difficult to suppose that an Evangelist who gives at great length the last discourses addressed to the Eleven only does not intend to convey the same impression to the end. Nor can the renewed commission to St. Peter recorded in 21[15-17] be regarded, in the light of the Denial, otherwise than as a specific restoration to a position that might else have seemed to be forfeited.

We find, then, in the Gospels a Christian society already in existence, within which the Apostles are an inner circle of more immediate disciples, recapitulating and intensifying the characteristics of the general body. This becomes apparent from the moment of the choice recorded in Mk 3[14], and is emphasized in the conversation at Cæsarea Philippi. Hort favours the view that the words 'whom also he named apostles' (RVm, cf. Lk 6[13]) belong to the genuine text (*Christian Ecclesia*, p. 22). But it is clear that during the Lord's own ministry discipleship is the prominent feature. They are called 'the Twelve' (Mk 14[20]), 'the twelve disciples' (Mt 20[17]), and simply 'the disciples' (Mt 26[26]). But the name 'apostles' is also given to them, and the second reason for their selection as recorded by Mark, viz. 'that he might send them forth' (*ἀποστέλλῃ*, 3[14]), points to the ultimate purpose of their closer companionship. There is nothing to indicate a more permanent commission than that of ch. 6, in relation to which alone the term *ἀπόστολος* is subsequently used (6[30], but see above). Luke, however, clearly employs the word in the light of its subsequent use in Acts (Lk 6[13] 17[5] 22[14] 24[10]). Matthew uses it only in connexion with the Galilæan mission (10[2]), but it is in giving the list of names—a fact in itself significant of the wider purpose lying behind the immediate commission.

When we reach the last Passover, the importance of the narrative attains its height. From the confession at Cæsarea, the training of the Twelve takes a course clearly differentiating it from that of all others. The acknowledgment of Messiahship is not to be the complete witness of the disciples. It prepares the way for a fuller disclosure. From that time '*he began to teach them*' (Mk 8[31] *ἤρξατο*, cf. 1[1] 6[7]) concerning his suffering. The Transfiguration anticipated a more spiritual glory than that of the Jewish Messiah, to be attained through the *ἔξοδος* about to be fulfilled at Jerusalem (Lk 9[31]). The experience of the Last Journey had its appropriate sequel in that of the Upper Room. Mark says that 'when it was evening, he cometh with the twelve' (14[17]); Mt., that 'he was sitting at meat with the twelve disciples' (26[20]); Lk. significantly styles them 'apostles' (22[14]); while St. John introduces his more intimate narrative by calling this select company 'his own,' whom Jesus 'loved unto the end' (13[1]). Bearing in mind the general purpose of Mk. (see above), we shall naturally regard his account of the Supper from the point of view of the establishment of the Christian community. It must be remembered that the Eucharist was everywhere celebrated in the Christian congregations as the characteristic act of Church fellowship. Regarding the events of the Upper Room, Mark confines himself, with the single exception of the indication of Judas as traitor, to the shortest possible account of the institution of this rite, as the act by which the Christian community is formally incorporated (14[22-26]). The representative character of the Twelve is indicated by the dependence in which

the Church is thus made to stand upon them. The Eucharist became theirs in virtue of the conditions under which it was first celebrated; and only through them, and as they transmitted it, does it pass to the community. This is in accordance with the relations brought out by John. Those who are hereafter to believe are to do so 'through their word' (17[20]). The High-Priestly Prayer reaches out through the disciples, who are to bear the primary witness, to those who are mediately chosen by Christ out of the world.

The post-Resurrection narratives do but confirm the impression of the special separation of the Twelve which culminates in the seclusion of the Upper Room. The narrative of Mark is cut short; but the command given to the women, themselves Jesus' disciples, to 'tell his disciples and Peter' (16[7]) of the empty tomb, shows the Eleven as a distinct body. Mt. gives the commission to make disciples and to baptize as entrusted to the 'eleven disciples' (28[16]). Lk. shows other disciples gathered at Jerusalem when the risen Christ appeared to them (24[33]). But the Eleven are distinguished from them (*ib.*), the rest being expressly spoken of as they 'that were with them.' Even if, therefore, the appearance recorded in Jn 20[19-23] refer to the same occasion, the words 'Receive ye the Holy Spirit,' etc., must also certainly have a special bearing on the Apostolic office.

B. *IN THE ACTS.*—With the Acts we reach a further and a final stage in the foundation of the Christian society. The gospel of the Kingdom now becomes the organized *witness to the Resurrection.* The ministry of reconciliation finds its full expression in the proclamation of forgiveness through the Cross. This we find specially committed to the Apostolate (1[2. 8. 22. 25] 10[41])—a term which gains a correspondingly determinate meaning. The list of the Eleven is again given in connexion with this developed function (1[13]), and the choice of Matthias is based upon the necessity of completing the number of the official witnesses (vv.[21. 22]). The phenomena of the early chapters are precisely what a study of the Gospels would suggest. The Church enters upon its career as an organized body, the Apostles being differentiated from the brethren. From the first the brotherhood continues in 'the apostles' teaching,' and in 'the fellowship' thus established (2[42]). That this relation did not involve submission to an Apostolic despotism appears in the choice of Matthias and of the Seven. In the former case, two were 'put forward' (1[23]), apparently by the whole assembly, the final decision being reserved for the unseen though present Master (v.[24]). In the latter, the brethren were expressly charged by the Apostles to 'look out' from among themselves seven men (6[3]), who, after prayer, were set apart with the laying-on of Apostolic hands (v.[6]). All the elements of ordination are here. At the outset of ministerial appointment it would seem as though the Apostles disclaimed any lordship over God's heritage. They do not even exercise a veto. The responsibility of supplying the need of ministrations, as the circumstances of the Christian community disclose themselves, belongs to the society itself. The Apostolic imposition of hands is, like the sacraments, a form of covenanted prayer (Calvin, *Instit.* iv. 19, § 31: 'I admit it to be a sacrament in true and legitimate ordination'). Those set apart represent, not the Apostles, but Christ. The Seven have been traditionally regarded as the first deacons. If this be so, it is obvious that what subsequently became the third order of the ministry was not explicitly appointed by Christ. The general impression conveyed by Acts is that of a society extending and organizing itself as opportunity offered or circumstances suggested. But the laying-on of hands in this instance represents a principle conspicuous throughout the book, viz. the requirement of mission from Christ Himself, of which Apostolic recognition was the pledge. But there is no evidence even that 'the ministry of the word,' which, in directing the appointment of the Seven, the Apostles expressly reserved (v.[4]), demanded absolute submission. No doubt, the actual gospel itself was inviolate and unchangeable. But not even an Apostle, according to St. Paul, was to be believed if he deviated from that standard (Gal 1[8]). As primary witnesses to the Resurrection the Apostles have no successors. The gospel is an Apostolic report of incommunicable experience, once for all delivered to the whole body of the saints (Jude [3]). The formation of the NT canon was based upon the test of Apostolicity, and consequently the appeal to Scripture has become the permanent form in which, as regards matters of faith, the Church of every age sits at the Apostles' feet. But, even apart from the gospel, the Acts suggests that a recognition of Apostolic authority was not inconsistent with the freedom of prophecy (19[6] 21[9. 10]) and with the participation of the community as a whole in spiritual decisions (15[22]). What is constant is the maintenance of a Christian society, rendered coherent by dependence on a stewardship of the word mediated through the Apostles from Christ Himself (Lk 12[41. 42]). Philip, for example, though he evangelizes Samaria, cannot complete his work without the intervention of the Apostles at Jerusalem (Ac 8[14]). As local Churches are founded, presbyters are 'appointed' for them (14[23]; *χειροτονήσαντες*, being used of Paul and Barnabas, cannot here bear the meaning of 'elect,' which it has already lost in Hellenistic Greek [see Hatch, art. 'Ordination' in *DCA*]; it equals *καταστήσαντες* [cf. Tit 1[5], Clem. Rom. xliv. 2, *Didache* 15]; but it is equally far from connoting a particular mode of appointment).

With two exceptions, the existence of an extended Apostolate beyond the circle of the Twelve is scarcely apparent. Prophets are mentioned five times (Ac 11[27] 13[1] 15[32] 19[6] 21[9. 10]), the gift in one case (19[6]) attesting the presence of the Spirit in the baptized after the imposition of hands. The suggestion in each case is that the prophets have as yet no structural relation to the *ecclesia*, but are persons of either sex, directly endowed with a gift of declaring the Spirit's mind, and thus indicating courses of action, as when Barnabas and Saul are to be sent forth by the Church at Antioch. Teachers are coupled with prophets in Ac 13[1], as though representing a similar gift, and Barnabas is placed in this combined class. When in Ac 21[8] Philip is called 'the evangelist,' it seems likely that this function was not conferred upon him as one of the Seven, but discharged, like the office of prophet, in virtue of a special gift or *χάρισμα*. It is, however, clear that men exercising what has been called a charismatic ministry in relation to the whole *ecclesia* held a recognized place in the Apostolic Church (1 Co 12[5. 6], Eph 2[20] 4[11], cf. Ro 16[7]). But these do not constitute any infringement of the Apostolic authority. Whether Barnabas was an Apostle in the full sense of the word is doubtful, because the name is applied to him only in relation to his missionary labours (Ac 14[14]). That by imposition of hands in the Church at Antioch he was entrusted with a mission rather than ordained to an office is the probable interpretation of Ac 13[1-13] (see Hort, *Christian Ecclesia*, pp. 63, 64), though he was apparently associated with Paul in the appointment of presbyters (14[23]). But the same cannot be said of James 'the Lord's brother' and St. Paul himself. The former, who is ranked among the pillar Apostles in Gal 2[9] (cf. 1 Co 15[7]), and who extends the right hand of fellowship to St. Paul, is almost certainly not one of the Twelve (see Lightfoot, *Galatians*, 1[19] n.; also dissertation on 'The Brethren of the Lord'). Yet he is evidently the chief authority in Jerusalem (Ac 15[13], Gal 2[12]). The plan of Acts, which, after describing the beginnings of the Church in Palestine under the Twelve, passes into a narrative of its extension in the Empire under the preaching of St. Paul, witnesses to the permanent character of his commission as an Apostle. This is repeatedly claimed by St. Paul himself as depending on the direct choice of Christ (Ro 1[1], 1 Co 1[1] 9[1. 2] 15[8-10] etc.). He lays hands on the baptized, as did Peter and John (Ac 19[6]). The presbyterate in Churches of his foundation depends on his appointment (14[23], cf. 20[17. 28]).

The picture, therefore, with which Acts leaves us is that of a federation of Christian communities under the immediate guidance of presbyters, who themselves owe their appointment to Apostles—a body of direct witnesses of the Resurrection, dis-

charging a sort of general episcopate and including the Twelve, whose precise relation to the wider Apostolate is not clearly defined. Within these communities are exercised certain spiritual gifts, among the possessors of which the prophets seem to approach most nearly to a regular order, but are nevertheless not, like presbyters, Apostolic delegates. There is nothing to indicate any method by which the organic structure was to be maintained after the decease of the Apostles. The scope of the book carries us no further than what we now see to have been but a preliminary stage in the accomplishment of Christ's purpose and command—that the Apostles should be His witnesses to the uttermost parts of the earth. When the writer had brought St. Paul to Rome, the task, as his contemporaries would view it, was in a sense fulfilled. A delay of centuries in the return of Christ visibly to reign in the midst of His people was not contemplated. That is the true answer to the suggestion that the method of continuing a Christian ministry was among the things pertaining to the Kingdom, of which the risen Christ spoke to the disciples during the Forty Days. This could not well have been without a revelation as to the postponement of 'the restoration of the kingdom to Israel,' which it is clear the primitive community did not possess. The continuance of the Apostolic office itself beyond the lifetime of the original witnesses was, in the nature of the case, impossible. The terms of their appointment involved personal testimony to the facts of our Lord's life. The question, therefore, of ministerial succession could not arise until it became probable that the Apostles were not to tarry until Christ came.

C. *IN THE EPISTLES.*—The Epistles confirm, and in some points render more explicit, the testimony of the Acts. Here we are mainly concerned with the Pauline group, where the corporate aspect of Christianity is always prominent. But the Epistle to the Hebrews enjoins obedience to 'them that have the rule,' clearly implying accountability, not to the congregation, but to that 'great shepherd of the sheep' to whom reference is immediately made (He $13^{7.\ 17.\ 20.\ 24}$). And as the general tendency of the Epistle is to isolate the eternal priesthood of Christ in contrast with the transitory and therefore successive priesthood of the OT, it is well to remember not only that the body of Christian believers is here represented as a flock with many under-shepherds, but that the same idea is definitely presented under the figure of the house, in a passage distinctly anticipating a later and more developed view of the ministry (3^{1-6}). St. James apparently witnesses to a part of the Apostolic commission, viz. the healing of the sick, as vested in the presbyterate (5^{14}); and St. Peter develops the conception of the Christian congregation as a flock entrusted to the presbyters under the Chief Shepherd (1 P 5^{1-4}; cf. Mt 26^{31}, Lk 12^{32}, Jn 21^{15-17}, Jude ^{13}, Ps 80^{1} etc.). And it is noticeable that, calling himself a 'co-presbyter' (5^{1}), he regards the presbyterate as inherent in his own office, and yet again in that of Christ Himself as the 'Shepherd and Bishop' of souls (2^{25}). The Apocalypse, being mystical, has little to the purpose beyond the clear fact that the twelve Apostles of the Lamb are indicated as the foundation-stones of the heavenly city (21^{14}). The angels of the Seven Churches are almost certainly their mystical representatives, not their earthly presidents (see Swete, *Apocalypse*, p. 21 f.). But the conception of an ordered life and organic unity, inseparable from the idea of a city, is here, as elsewhere in the NT, prominent.

St. Paul in his earliest Epistles recognizes the two lines of authority, which subsequent ages have never succeeded altogether in adjusting, and which respectively represent the historical and the evangelical elements in the Church. On the one hand, there must be no quenching of the Spirit through contempt of the free ministry of prophecy (1 Th $5^{19.\ 20}$); on the other, Christians are to know and esteem those that are over them in the Lord ($vv.^{12.\ 13}$). The importance of the latter becomes clearer in 2 Thessalonians, which shows the forces of disintegration in the community, already operating through the disorders consequent upon the expectation of an immediate Parousia (3^{6-15}). That the function of government and discipline is in its origin an 'apostolic' gift, exercised by those entrusted with it in virtue of a Divine commission, is witnessed by St. Paul's treatment of the Corinthian offender (1 Co 5^{3-5}) and his vindication of his office (1 Co 15^{10}, 2 Co 4^{1} etc., Ro 11^{13} 15^{16}). The Pastoral Epistles show Timothy and Titus, in Ephesus and Crete, entrusted with a larger measure of government than the presbyters, as delegates of an absent Apostle (1 Ti 1^{3} $4^{11.\ 12}$ $5^{1.\ 17}$, Tit 1^{5} $3^{1.\ 10}$, 2 Ti 2^{2} 4^{5}), who, in the case of Timothy at any rate, appears to contemplate a continuance of authority beyond his own lifetime (2 Ti 4^{6}). Both have that supreme authority which arises out of the commission to ordain others to the presbyterate. In them we see provision made for the reproduction of the local pastorate. In them the principle of Apostolic delegation is transmuted into a principle of succession. There is nothing to show that the same method was adopted in the case of other Churches, or that, in making this provision, the writer was doing more than developing, in relation to the immediate needs of the Churches concerned, an authority capable of many applications. But none insists more strongly than St. Paul on the structural character of the Body of Christ (Ro $12^{4.\ 5}$, 1 Co 12^{12-14}, Eph $4^{4.\ 16}$), on the definite relation of ministry to this structure (Eph $4^{11.\ 12}$), on the primary character of the Apostolate (1 Co 12^{28}, Eph 4^{11}), or on the due subordination of spiritual gifts to the development of a society (1 Co 12^{4-29} 14^{12} etc.), a building of which Christ is the cornerstone (Eph 2^{20}). The foundation is twofold (*ib.*), the Apostles and prophets—the latter representing in principle the ministry of the word, the former, in so far as the office is disciplinary, that of sacraments. Both would seem to have been united in the ordination of Timothy (1 Ti 4^{14}), as though the historic, external call and the free activity of the Spirit were both apparent in the determinations of the primitive community. It was the separation, which inevitably arose in days of decaying fervour, between the outward links of continuity in the historic body and the manifestation of the Spirit, that raised the question of the seat of Apostolic authority in the Christian society.

Note on priesthood in the NT.—One other point remains to be discussed before leaving the NT. We have already seen that the problem of the ministry is capable of consideration, and ought to be considered, apart from any sacerdotal theory. In the hieratic sense of a caste which, by interposing between the worshippers and God, denies, while it appears to guarantee, the priestly character of the people for whom it acts, sacerdotalism is an idea foreign to the NT. On the other hand, the theory that every individual is in his own right a priest is equally inconsistent with the Christian idea. It is primarily the society that is a royal priesthood (1 P 2^{9}, Rev 1^{6} 5^{10}), having boldness of access to the throne of grace in Christ (He 10^{19}, Eph 2^{18}). It is the people of God, the holy nation (1 P $2^{9.\ 10}$), the commonwealth of the spiritual Israel (Eph 2^{12}), that answers to Israel after the flesh, differing from it only in those points wherein the priestliness of the latter was imperfect. It does not imply an absence of differentiation, which is essential to the life of the body. And the Epistle to the Hebrews, in designating Christ the great Shepherd of the sheep in His priestly character as 'brought again from the dead with the blood of the eternal covenant' (He 13^{20}), attaches a derived priesthood to the under-shepherds, who have just been spoken of as having rule in the Christian community, and watching for souls 'as they that shall give account' ($v.^{17}$). But while, in the light of the NT, priesthood is an aspect under which the Christian ministry may be legitimately regarded, it becomes from the 3rd cent. onwards its technical and essential character (see Lightfoot's dissertation on 'The Christian Ministry' in *Philippians*, pp. 255–264), with the consequent reversion to Jewish, if not pagan, ideas. 'The

ministry of reconciliation' (2 Co 5^{18}) never in the NT loses its ethical character. There is nothing to suggest that the performance of any particular rite is in principle restricted to an order, or that a ceremonial investiture must precede the exercise of functions precisely defined and limited. On the other hand, it is something more than a merely moral authority, dependent for its sanction upon results, with which the ministry of the NT is seen to be clothed. It is a principle of organic life.

2. The principle as preserved in the facts of Church history.—Passing from the NT to ecclesiastical history, we have to ask, not what were the opinions of ancient authors on the subject of the ministry, but how as a matter of fact the principles embodied in the Gospels, continued in the Acts, and attested by the Epistles, were retained in the succeeding life of the Church. How was what is seen to be a structural unity preserved from degenerating into a concourse of unrelated units? The Apostolic teaching is preserved in the canon of Scripture, in the formation of which Apostolicity was the invariable test. Where is the corresponding mark of Apostolicity in the structure of the Christian society?

A. *WRITINGS OF THE SUB-APOSTOLIC AGE.*—(1) *The Epistle of Clement* (*c.* 97 A.D.), in which, as in the *Didache*, there is no trace of diocesan episcopacy (the word ἐπίσκοπος being still, as in the NT, apparently synonymous with πρεσβύτερος), definitely asserts the Apostolic character of the ministry as succeeding to a pastoral authority.

The passage is xliv. 1–3: 'And our Apostles knew through our Lord Jesus Christ that there would be strife over the name of the bishop's office. For this cause, therefore, having received complete foreknowledge, they appointed the aforesaid persons, and afterwards *they provided a continuance*, that if these should fall asleep, *other approved men should succeed* to their ministration.' [The translation and readings are those of Lightfoot in *The Apostolic Fathers*]. A variant, which Gore adopts, and which makes the passage more distinctly 'episcopal' in complexion, will be found in that author's *Church and the Ministry* (ch. vi. 4). In either case, the writer seems to have believed that the ministry was propagated on a plan directly sanctioned by Christ. His words show that in the West, where the method of 'continuance' is less distinctly traceable than in the communities of Asia Minor, the principle of Apostolic order was unquestioned. The facts of the Church's life are stated in terms of succession. The Apostles 'appointed their firstfruits to be bishops and deacons' (xlii. 4). 'Christ is from God, and the Apostles are from Christ' (*ib.* 2). What is thus handed on is a ministry of the gospel and a priesthood of offering (xxxvi. 1, xl. 2–5, xlii. 1–4). The latter phrase, as also the comparison between the resistance of the Corinthians to their presbyters and the rebellion of Korah against the Levitical priests (xliii., xliv. 4), lends itself in a hierarchical atmosphere to a sacerdotal interpretation, but for Clement himself the point of the analogy is limited to the due observance of order in worship. The 'sceptre of God . . . came not in the pomp of arrogance or of pride' (xvi.). Clement sees the law of service in the adjustments of an organic universe (xx.), and Christ embodies the will and mind of the Creator (xxxvi.). As in St. Paul, nature is the true analogy of the Christian society. It is active in all its parts, laic as well as presbyterial (xxxvii. etc.). The consent of the whole Church is as much an expression of the Spirit as Apostolic appointment (xliv. 3). Not passive obedience, but observance of the limits which his 'ordinances' impose upon him, is the duty of every member (xl. 3–5). The relations of the several ranks are moral rather than technical.

The Epistle does not suggest a rigid system by which the performance of sacred rites is the exclusive function of a mediatorial class. But it is conspicuously plain that for Clement the Christian society is prior to the individual, and that the continuity of its vital relation to Christ depends on the persistence of facts of Church life not dependent on the choice of the several members.

(2) The testimony of *Ignatius* is not altogether easy to appreciate, because words and phrases are apt to be understood in the light of later developments. Unlike Clement, he nowhere explicitly states the principle of succession, but within the sphere of his experience a ministry of three orders is the type of Church government, and is apparently regarded as universal. The argument from silence, based upon the absence of references to ministerial orders in the epistle to the *Romans* similar to those which abound elsewhere, is of doubtful force in view of the statement in *Trall.* 3, that 'apart from these there is not even the name of a church.' Though there is little reason to doubt that monepiscopacy was established in the Churches of Asia by St. John, as Tertullian and others assert, and though the frequent association in Ignatius between obedience to the constituted ministry and observance of the Divine commands (*Magn.* 4, *Philad.* 1, *Smyr.* 8) suggests the inference that he regards this action of the Apostle as resting upon the explicit injunction of our Lord with respect to the permanent organization of His body, we are not justified in concluding, apart from direct evidence, that any such injunction was in fact given. Irenæus seems to say the same about the work of the four Evangelists; but his conviction of the mystical necessity of a fourfold Gospel (*adv. Hær.* 11) is parallel to the declaration of Ignatius, that Christ is the mind of the Father, even as the 'bishops that are settled in the farthest parts of the earth are in the mind of Jesus Christ' (*Eph.* 3),—a mystical inference from the facts of Church life which has no certain value for history. This vein of mysticism in Ignatius must never be forgotten in estimating the evidence of his letters. Nor in his most emphatic assertions of episcopal authority does Ignatius appeal only to the word of Apostles, or even of Christ Himself, but to the moral and spiritual results of schismatic action already apparent in the current experience of the Church.

The main idea of Ignatius is unity (ἑνότης, ἕνωσις—*Eph.* 4, *Magn.* 7. 13, *Philad.* 5). All things are from God and unto Him (*Eph.* 14, *Philad.* 9). This is realized primarily in the relation of the Father and the Son (*Eph.* 3. 5, *Magn.* 7, etc.). It is the purpose of Christ to unite men to God through Himself (*Eph.* 5. 9, etc.). This result Ignatius in his own case feels to be not yet fully attained. He only begins to be a disciple (*Eph.* 3). Martyrdom he believes to be necessary that this union may be consummated, and that he may 'attain unto God' (*Rom.* 2). This relation is thus no mere technical association through external bonds, but involves the moral elements of faith which is the body, and love which is the blood of Christ (*Trall.* 8). It is checked by spiritual experience. The Divine method by which the union with Christ is achieved is the Incarnation, expressed in the four facts of the Virgin-birth, Baptism, Passion, and Resurrection of Jesus (*Smyr.* 1)—those limitations of hard fact which alone give reality and assurance to Christ's work (*Magn.* 11: πραχθέντα ἀληθῶς καὶ βεβαίως ὑπὸ Ἰησοῦ Χ.), without which it is mere appearance (*Smyr.* 2: τὸ δοκεῖν). Without this acknowledgment there is no 'assurance' (*Magn.* 13) in Christian life. It is they who refuse to receive these cardinal facts that are a mere 'appearance' (*Trall.* 10: αὐτοὶ ὄντες τὸ δοκεῖν). Here is the second appeal to experience. The teaching which St. Paul combats in the Epistle to the Colossians, which appears in a yet more virulent form in the Pastorals, and which provoked the uncompromising hostility of the disciple who saw the blood and water flow from Jesus' side, had spread like a moral pestilence throughout Asia in the form of Docetism. As in the first age the retention of the pure gospel had been guaranteed by continuance in 'the apostles' doctrine and fellowship,' so now a faithful adherence to Apostolic commandments and submission to the bishop (*Eph.* 6, *Trall.* 2, *Philad.* 7, *Smyr.* 8), with the presbyters (*Eph.* 4 and *passim*) and deacons (*Magn.* 6, etc.) established everywhere in the communities as constituted by the Apostles themselves, give the only pledge of that union with Christ through the Incarnation by which the believer attains to God (e.g. *Trall.* 7).

We must observe: (*a*) That acceptance of the limitations imposed by loyalty to a duly constituted Christian society follows, in the thought of Ignatius, the principle of the Incarnation (*e.g. Eph.* 3). (*b*) Obedience to episcopal authority is represented as a moral obligation rather than as a technical condition of salvation. To follow one who makes a schism (*Philad.* 3), or to live without episcopal ministrations, is condemned. 'Do nothing without the bishop' is an injunction expressed in terms so general as to include more than the celebration of sacred rites, and thus indicates a spirit rather than a rule. (*c*) Baptism and the Eucharist are dependent for their 'validity' not upon the official character of the ministrants (a question not raised), but upon episcopal sanction (*Symr.* 8: οὐκ ἔξὸν ἐστιν χωρὶς τοῦ ἐπισκόπου κ.τ.λ.), the spiritual importance of which is apparent in the case of the latter—a sacrament of unity—, the neglect of the principle resulting in decline of faith and love. (*d*) 'Validity,' *i.e.* assured spiritual

efficiency, admits of degrees. Disregard of the ministry is the beginning of that spiritual declension which is perfected in the denial of the Son. 'Invalid' does not mean null and void. There is nothing to show that persons baptized 'apart from the bishop' would have been treated as unbaptized. βέβαιος as applied to sacraments must be interpreted in view of the wider use of the word and its cognates in these epistles (*Magn.* 4. 7. 13). The best translation will, perhaps, be 'regular' or 'standard.' (*c*) While we must refrain from fixing upon Ignatius a conception of the Church which reduces it to a nicely adjusted hierarchical machine, the principle of his thought warrants us in claiming him as an undeniable witness for the continuance into the sub-Apostolic age of a society duly subordinated, in the facts of its exterior order no less than of its spiritual life, to that presbytery which the Father's incarnate Representative gathered around Himself in the persons of the Apostles. Promiscuous powers of association, the alternative to structural continuity, are foreign to his whole conception. In that sense Ignatius is an unimpeachable witness to Apostolical succession in the early 2nd century.

(3) *Polycarp*, whom his friend and pupil Irenæus declares to have been appointed bishop of Smyrna by Apostles (*Iren.* iii. 4), writes to the Philippians, like Clement to the Corinthians, and Ignatius to Ephesians or Trallians, a letter addressed officially to the whole Church, not only in his own name, but in that of his presbyters. The evidence is equivocal as to the existence of a bishop at Philippi; for, though mention is made only of presbyters and deacons, the former are not called ἐπίσκοποι as in the Pauline Epistle to the same Church (*Polyc.* 5. 6. 11). But it does show that ministerial authority is a particular determination of that which attaches to the whole community acting constitutionally. It is the principle of obedience that Polycarp emphasizes—'Be ye all subject one to another' (10). God is the Father, Jesus Christ His Son the eternal High Priest (*pontifex*) (12). His coming and those commandments which are its issue, *i.e.* not moral precepts merely or chiefly, but the witness of the Cross, the Passion and Resurrection, which form the subject of the gospel, involve obedience on the part of Christians to the voices of the prophets who foretold, and the Apostles who proclaimed the gospel (6). The perversion of this truth, its accommodation to human lusts, by a Docetic teaching which denies bodily resurrection and eternal judgment, is still the fact of experience that constitutes the chief danger to faith (7). Though milder in form, Polycarp's teaching evidently tallies with that of Ignatius, whose letters comprise 'every kind of edification which pertaineth unto our Lord' (13). The Philippians are to submit themselves to the presbyters and deacons as to God and Christ (5).

(4) The importance of the *Didache* depends upon its character as a Hebrew-Christian document of a date not later than the early 2nd century. Internal evidence suggests that it represents a condition of affairs such as would exist among a community of Jewish disciples in Syria, whose members had been baptized on acceptance of the Pentecostal message that Jesus was the Messiah, had adopted the primary Christian practices of the breaking of bread and prayer, and were subject to the influence and teaching, if not of the Twelve directly, yet of original prophets and teachers like Philip, but were strangers to the developed theology of the Epistles (see J. Wordsworth, *Ministry of Grace*, pp. 16, 17). In observing the life of this community, we look not so much for settled principles as for indications of the way in which organization was taking shape in an inchoate and rudimentary stage. We notice: (*a*) That the community acts and may be addressed as a whole, resembling in this particular both the societies to which Clement and Ignatius write and the Churches of the NT. (*b*) Prophecy, which at a later date was emphasized in opposition not only to Gnosticism but to an official ministry, occupies a prominent place, not, however, as a promiscuous gift, but as realized in a more or less well defined order (*Did.* 10. 11. 13). Here again there is correspondence with the Acts and NT generally, where προφητεία is already tending to give rise to a class of προφῆται. In the *Didache* they possess a λειτουργία or right of service (15), which, while it evidently includes leadership in worship, is not precisely defined, does not apparently depend on ordination, and is moral rather than technical in type. As in the NT, so here ἀπόστολος is not confined to the Twelve, but seems to be applied to the προφῆται as a class (11: 'if [the apostle] ask money, he is a false prophet'), together with another name, διδάσκαλος (15). They are described by such vague phrases as οἱ τετιμημένοι (15), which devolves also upon the presbyters and deacons as admitted to a share in the same λειτουργία. Clement speaks of other ἐλλόγιμοι ἄνδρες: equally with Apostles appointing presbyters to λειτουργία (Clem. Rom. xliv.). Taking this passage along with the *Didache*, there is some ground for the suggestion that the prophets, in addition to the Twelve, St. Paul, and possibly other 'apostles,' were an original source of the succession, which would therefore be Apostolic rather as possessing the sanction of the Twelve than as flowing by direct delegation from them (see Gore, *Ch. and Min.* ch. 6). It is at any rate clear that this must have been the case with appointments made by St. Paul. Whether prophecy might re-appear from age to age as a constantly renewed and immediate source of authority, is a question not contemplated by the *Didache*, which, especially in view of the expected Parousia, is not concerned with a remoter future. But the community is to exercise its right of testing the prophet's claim by the standard of disinterested sincerity and conformity with a rule of faith (11. 12). If, however, he satisfies this test, he is to be admitted either temporarily or permanently to an authority described as that of a high priest (13)—the type, if not the source, of all other ministries. The community are to appoint for themselves bishops (*i.e.* presbyters) and deacons, who are to 'perform the service of the prophets and teachers' (15). Though χειροτονήσατε does not necessarily mean 'elect' (see above), yet the word clearly involves action similar to that required of the Church in the selection of the Seven (Ac 6[3])—a choice which was not an alternative to the imposition of hands. The presumption would rather be, as noted above, that the prophets, whose ministry they were to share, would repeat the action of the Apostles at Jerusalem.

B. *DISCIPLINARY CONTROVERSIES OF THE THIRD, FOURTH, AND FIFTH CENTURIES.*—The limitations of the principle of historic succession are defined in the course of the discussions concerning discipline (A.D. 200–450), which gather round the controversies involved in Montanism, Novatianism, and Donatism. The question in all these disputes was in reality not, What did the Apostles ordain, but What do the facts of the continuous history of the Church involve? The problem is parallel to that which centred round the Person of Christ, and issued in the dogmatic definitions of the 4th and 5th centuries. It may be admitted in either case that the matter is not merely one of terminology, but that a certain inadequacy of thought was often consistent with loyal acceptance of the facts, leading not unnaturally, under stress of new conditions, to positions

ultimately found to be departures from primitive Christianity.

(1) To describe *Montanism* as an innovation, in the sense of a conscious rejection of an authoritative system, is to misconceive the situation. Hitherto the inroads of Gnosticism had been met by insistence on submission to the principle of unity expressed in the organization of the Christian society. The appeal of Ignatius was developed by Irenæus (iii. 2, 3, 4, 40) and Tertullian (*de Præscript.* 30–32), who pointed to the episcopal succession as a guarantee for the preservation of Apostolic teaching. Nor were these alone in their contention. Hippolytus speaks of bishops as 'successors of the Apostles' and guardians of the word (*Hær.* procem. p. 3). Hegesippus, again, after speaking of the Corinthian Church as continuing 'in the right word' till the episcopate of Primus, says that he had made a list of the succession (διαδοχή) up to Anicetus (*ap.* Euseb. Iv. 22). Such evidence, together with that of the 'Church Orders,' which belong to the same period and in which we find careful regulations for ordination (*e.g.* the Roman Church Order, commonly called the *Canons of Hippolytus*), points to the importance attached to the structural unity of the Church by men who, inheriting the spirit of the Fourth Gospel and the Pastorals, regarded Christianity as a life manifested in facts (1 Jn 1[1]), not a system of knowledge. Montanism was not in intention a denial of this position. Writers like Tertullian fell back upon what seemed to them a more sure defence of orthodoxy in the spirit of prophecy. As with Novatian in the next age, who was careful to obtain a regular consecration to the episcopate, there was no separation from the external form of the Church. It was the Church itself that condemned them. Nor was the opposition to Montanism based on the illegitimacy of prophecy when unconnected with any outward delegation of authority, but simply on the nature and circumstances of the utterances themselves, which were pronounced on their merits to be not of God. In the continuance of prophecy there was nothing inconsistent with the authority of the ministry, and, though doubtless the claim of Montanus might in its issues become fatal not only to a canon of Scripture, but also to the historic fabric of the Christian society, it was only the authority to absolve sinners and repress prophecy that was actually assailed. The 'Church of the Spirit' was not a rival to the historic body, but rather the source of authority within it. And the immediate expectation of the Parousia, characteristic of the Montanists, absolved them from the necessity of thinking out the problem of continuity. There is no evidence of the creation of a fresh local ministry, as with the Irvingites, by the voice of the Spirit. There were Montanist bishops and presbyters, as subsequently there were Arian or Nestorian clergy. But though the question was brought to a final issue, the problem was essentially the same as had been involved in Gnosticism, and it was met by the Church in the same manner. Just as there is a 'form of doctrine,' an Apostolic gospel, a written word, so there is a historic structure, 'the witness and keeper of Holy Writ,' 'the pillar and ground of the truth.' This was involved in the claim to 'try the spirits' made on behalf of the Church acting through its organization.

(2) *Novatianism* produced a definite theory of the facts of organized Church life in Cyprian's *de Unitate*. To discuss the historical value of the distinctive claims of the episcopate put forth in that treatise does not fall within the scope of this article. It represents the facts as they were in the 3rd cent., and as in the mind of the writer they had been from Apostolic times. As a vindication of the Apostolic authority of the Church acting in a corporate capacity, it is in general agreement with Ignatius, Irenæus, and the opponents of Montanism. Its weakness lies in the impetus given to a ministerial sacerdotalism binding the activity of the Spirit to official channels (see Lightfoot, *Philippians*, p. 258). So far as Novatianism, following in the wake of Montanus, was resistance to growing officialism, it stood for the freedom of the gospel. The movement involved: (*a*) deference to the confessors, who, as manifesting the Spirit, were in deed what the prophets had been in word; (*b*) supersession of such bishops and other ministers as did not manifestly fulfil certain spiritual conditions. The Roman Cornelius was accounted no bishop, because, like Callistus, he was held to be deficient in a genuinely spiritual rigour. This was in effect to make the voice of the Spirit, not Apostolic succession, the decisive Church principle. Against it Cyprian elaborated his famous doctrine of the episcopate as the true centre of unity. The Apostolic authority, first entrusted to St. Peter, but immediately extended to the other eleven Apostles (*de Unit.* 4), was transmitted by succession from them to the bishops (5). Each bishop, representing the particular Church which he ruled, possessed an undivided authority, though in practice limited by a similar jurisdiction conferred upon his neighbours, the episcopate being regarded as exercised jointly and severally ('Episcopatus unus est cujus a singulis in solidum pars tenetur,' 5).

It is not easy to see precisely how Cyprian expected this principle to work out, and difficulties arose within his own lifetime in the controversy with Stephen of Rome concerning rebaptism. But there is no uncertainty whatever as to his theory. Christ founded a society, which from the first He entrusted to the college of Apostles, which reproduces itself from age to age in the universal college of bishops. Though, however, the days of exact constitutional limitations had not yet arrived, Cyprian does not appear to have contemplated an episcopal absolutism, for in practice he allows, and even insists upon, something in the nature of an organic exercise of authority on the part of the several dioceses, giving due recognition to presbyters, deacons, and even the laity, in synodical decisions (*Ep.* xvii. 1, xxxviii. 1, lxiv. 1, xix. 2). The right of the laity to withdraw from the communion of a sinful bishop is recognized (*Ep.* lxvii. 3). To the voice of the Plebes the bishop himself owed his position. But the tendency of this explicit theory and the character of an age which needed a disciplinary system were undoubtedly towards the identification of the Spirit's work with official acts assigned to the various grades of an accredited hierarchy. If Novatian applied a narrow human criterion to the work of the Spirit, by refusing to recognize His presence, when such manifestations as the members of a Church, itself imperfectly spiritualized, could discern, were found to be absent; so imperfectly did Cyprian understand the limits of the principle, by which he opposed the schism, that his hard-shell conception of the Church gave rise to a new Novatianism, in that bureaucratic idea of Christian society which led him to refuse recognition to the baptism of schismatics, which denies spiritual validity outside its own borders, and which finds its latest development in what Cyprian would have vehemently resisted—Ultramontanism and papal infallibility.

(3) The earliest form in which this exclusiveness organized itself was *Donatism*, appealing to the authority of Cyprian for the re-baptizing of all who had been 'sprinkled in the schism.' They differed, however, in one important respect, for whereas the latter inconsistently declined to break communion with bishops who, unlike himself, received Novatianists without a fresh baptism, the Donatists refused to recognize as Christians any who held the validity of what, as they viewed it, was a schismatical sacrament. It was claimed that, inasmuch as the Holy Spirit belonged to the Church, schismatics did not possess the gift, and therefore could not convey it. Against this narrow sacerdotalism Augustine, while not invalidating the principle of authority as expressed in the historic ministry, affirmed a conception of the Christian society wide as the universal purpose of Christ. The Church is catholic; no good thing can fall outside its unity. If there is no salvation outside

the Church, the Church for this purpose cannot be interpreted in a merely constitutional sense. The 'validity' of baptism depends, not on the authority of him who administers, but upon Christ's intention. How far-reaching this principle is does not at once appear.

That 'valid' here means, as with Ignatius, not 'genuine' but 'regular,' is clear from the fact that Augustine did not regard baptism as spiritually operative so long as the recipient adhered to Donatism. But while in Ignatius there is nothing to show whether baptism administered without episcopal sanction would have been treated as void, Augustine asserts that it may not be repeated. But the hindrance to grace is the absence of charity, which in experience is found to be in opposition to the spirit of unity and love, not the formal exclusion from covenanted channels of those who create division. What Augustine failed adequately to realize, probably owing to the historical fact that on the whole the 'fruits of the Spirit' were conspicuously lacking among the Donatists, was that responsibility for separation is usually divided, and that it is difficult to determine which of two contending parties is schismatic. It is this fact that makes apparent historical parallels seriously defective when applied to later controversies. What is of permanent value is the recognition that schism is a moral fault, not an ecclesiastical situation; that it is to be recognized in spiritual experience and healed by the appeal to conscience, not refuted by technical argument. A third point to observe is that apparently the validity of a sacrament is not dependent on the order of the minister who dispenses it. If it be argued that, as baptism, of which a layman may be the minister (see Bingham, *Hist. of Lay-baptism*; but cf. Waterland, *Letters on Lay-baptism*) is alone in question, the ordained ministry is not involved, the answer must be that the whole matter is argued on the basis of want of jurisdiction, which applies equally to the case of the Eucharist. For Cyprian had maintained his attitude towards re-baptizing on the ground of separation from the Catholic Church, which equally nullified schismatic ordinations. The time had not yet arrived for the distinction between character and jurisdiction in the matter of orders (see Bingham, *Ant.* xvii. 2. §§ 5, 6). A deposed cleric became a layman. Whether, therefore, a schismatic priest could create the Real Presence in virtue of a mystic power inherent in his ordination, would have been an unmeaning inquiry. The problem was simply whether a sacrament administered without authority was *ab initio* null and void. The reply was in the negative. In the ante-Nicene period the clerical order was simply the normal repository of authority. Clement of Rome indeed says that the layman is bound by the layman's ordinances (xl. 5), but this means no more than due subordination to 'them that had the rule' in the common discharge of the universal priesthood. Ignatius' 'Do nothing without the bishop' (*Philad.* 7. 2), applying as it does equally to Baptism and the Eucharist together with general Church discipline, does not exclude delegation by the bishop, in particular instances, of any priestly function to those who had no general authority in the matter, whatever may have been, and indeed were, the normal channels.

There are many indications that respect for the ministry as the seat of Apostolic authority did not at first involve the idea that the celebration of sacraments by laymen was essentially sacrilegious. The acknowledgment of lay baptism, for example, already mentioned, which, though not universal, is nevertheless general, rests upon no commission granted to laymen by council or canon, but simply upon practice; and there is no reason in the nature of things why, if occasion had arisen, a similar recognition should not have been extended to the other sacrament so ministered. It seems clear that, though in the NT presbyters tended to labour in the word and teaching (1 Ti 5^{17} etc.), and though in the succeeding age the function of the prophet tended to devolve upon the bishop, yet the primary function of the local ministry was ruling (1 P 5^{1-3}, 1 Ti 3^{5}, He 13^{17}), and other offices might be discharged by the gifted. Tertullian distinctly affirms that 'where there is no bench of clergy, you offer, baptize, and are priest alone for yourself' (*de Exh. Cast.* 7). It is usual to discount this statement on the ground that it appears in a Montanist treatise, and is contradicted, for example, by his own earlier opinion that 'offering' is a distinctive 'munus' of the clergy. In the *de Præscriptione* he charges the Gnostics with carelessness in the matter of ordination and of granting even to the laity sacerdotal functions ('nam et laicis sacerdotalia munera iniungunt,' 41). Not only in the later work does he seem totally unaware that his statement is controversial and contradictory of his former views, but there is really no opposition between them. That both the Eucharist and Baptism are rightly celebrated by the ordained ministry he expressly declares, even when he affirms that 'where three are, there is a church, although they be laics' (*ib.*). 'The difference,' he says, 'between the order and the people' rests on 'the authority of the Church' (*ib.*). And it was precisely that authority as Apostolic, and therefore derived from Christ, which he emphasized against the Gnostics. There can be no question that from the time of Clement and Ignatius, or rather from the days of the Apostles (Ac 2^{42}), it was perceived that unity of worship was as vital to the continuity of the Church as stability of doctrine, and that an Apostolic ministry was the guarantee of both. But it is also true, as the present condition of Eastern Christendom testifies, that the territorial conception of 'one bishop one area,' though it may have been the ideal (see *Nic. Can.* 8; Bingham, *Ant.* ii. 13), is a development that belongs rather to the West. The point, however, is that, although normally and naturally officers were duly appointed by 'Apostolic' authority to fulfil the various functions of both discipline and worship, the dominant conception of priesthood asserted by one early writer after another (as, *e.g.*, by Justin, *Dial. c. Tryph.* 116), and never lost even in the most narrowly hierarchical age, attached this character, inherited from the OT, to the whole community. Within the society the ministry, belonging as it did to its structure, was the permanent guarantee of its continuity as a vertebrate institution both in faith and in life. When this ministry is likened to the Aaronic priesthood, the shifting manner in which the analogy is applied by various writers shows that this aspect is not essential.

It is the merit of Augustine, in his handling of the Donatist controversy, to have pointed out the lines along which alone Apostolic succession can be given its true place in the Christian economy. Machinery cannot be exalted at the expense of spiritual experience. Had the Eucharist, like Baptism, been a sacrament incapable of repetition in the life of the individual, it cannot be doubted that the 'validity' of 'schismatic' Eucharists would have been decided in the same sense as that of Baptism. Both sacraments, as so administered, were equally regular or irregular according to the point of view. What may be called the 'channel theory' of sacraments, which regards Christian ordinances as vehicles of grace down which spiritual energy may be led, has operated disastrously, to produce a technical view of a succession equipped with the power of working the 'miracle of the altar.' It is not affirmed that this theory is purely mediæval, and that it was not present in germinant form in the first five centuries, and possibly even in the Apostolic Church. But it is the view of succession as preserving the fulness of Apostolic authority, and as the guarantee of a gospel which is 'not of men neither by man,' *i.e.* as realizing the principles upon which Christ established His society, that is alike primitive and permanent.

While any theory of the ministry, which involves a denial of the personal consciousness of the Spirit in the experience of individuals or the manifestations of His presence in the corporate life of any Christian communities in any age, is inconsistent with plain facts and the Christian conscience, it is yet, in the opinion of the present writer, probable that the present tendency towards reunion among Christians, with the instinct of social and corporate witness which it manifests, will inevitably, as it progresses towards yet wider amalgamations, reveal Apostolic succession as a subject of more than sentimental or antiquarian interest, and quicken inquiry into the conditions

which shall be necessary to make the fabric of universal Church life in the future structurally one with the Church of a continuous, though not undivided, past.

LITERATURE.—Aquinas, *Summa*, pt. ii. 2, 184, 6, 1; 185, 5, sc.; pt. iii. 67, 2, 1; 72, 11, c.; Calvin, *Institutes*, bk. iv. chs. 3 and 4; Hooker, *Ecclesiastical Polity*, bk. v. chs. 76–78, bk. vii. 1–14; Bilson, *The Perpetual Government of Christ's Church*, 1593, and *Jus Divinum Ministerii Evangelici*, pub. by the Provincial Assembly of London, 1654; Bingham, *Antiquities of the Christian Church*, 1708–22, bk. ii. chs. 1–3, 5, 6, 17, 20, bk. iv. 1–7; Latham, *Pastor Pastorum* (1890); A. W. Haddan, *Apostolical Succession in the Church of England* (1869); Lightfoot, Dissertation on 'The Christian Ministry' in *Com. on Philippians*[8] (1888); E. Hatch, *Organization of the Early Christian Churches* (1882); C. Gore, *Church and the Ministry* (1900); R. C. Moberly, *Ministerial Priesthood* (1907); E. W. Benson, *Cyprian* (1897); J. Wordsworth, *The Ministry of Grace* (1901), chs. 1, 2; G. W. Sprott and T. Leishman in *Scottish Church Society's Conferences*, 1st series (1894); J. Cooper, J. Ramsay Sibbald, G. W. Sprott, and T. Leishman in *The Pentecostal Gift* (1903). For a general criticism of 'institutional Christianity' the reader may be referred to A. M. Fairbairn's *Catholicism Roman and Anglican*[3] (1899).

J. G. SIMPSON.

APOTHEOSIS.—See DEIFICATION.

APPERCEPTION.

—The term 'apperception' was introduced into philosophy by Leibniz, being derived from the French *s'apercevoir*, 'to be aware of' or 'conscious of.' Its use is not wholly free from obscurity even in its inventor, while it has been applied by his successors in at least two widely different senses. With Leibniz it indicates: (1) a higher degree of perception—a perception which is distinct, vivid, relatively persistent, in contrast with perceptions which, lacking these qualities, affect the soul only in the mass, and which, as they do not emerge into individual consciousness, may be called *unconscious*.

'There is at any moment an infinite number of perceptions in us, but without apperception and reflexion, *i.e.* changes in the soul of which we are not conscious, because the impressions are either too slight, or too great in number, or too even (*unies*), so that they have nothing sufficiently distinguishing them from each other; but, joined to others, they do not fail to produce their effect and to make themselves felt at least confusedly in the mass' (*Nouveaux Essais*, Pref. [Langley's tr.] p. 47).

Leibniz's favourite example—the noise or roar of the sea as made up of the insensible noises of the separate wavelets—does not really hold; but a modern instance may be given from Helmholtz: the *over-tones* which give the peculiar quality or colour to the tones of different instruments cannot be separately noticed or 'apperceived' by the untrained ear, although in their mass they have a quite distinct and recognizable effect (Helmholtz, *Tonempfindungen*, p. 107 [Ellis' tr.[2] p. 62]). In Leibniz also apperception becomes: (2) the basis of a distinction in kind between beings or 'monads.' The lowest monads, which have *perception* alone, are merely passive mirrors of external events, while the highest monads or 'spirits' rise to *apperception*, 'which is consciousness, or the reflective knowledge of this inner state (perception), and which is not given to all souls nor to the same soul at all times' (*Principles of Nature and of Grace*, § 4 [Latta, p. 410]). In perception proper the soul is passive; in apperception it is active, self-conscious. 'There is not only an order of distinct perceptions which constitutes the *empire* of the soul, but also a mass of confused perceptions, or passions, which constitutes her *slavery*' (*Théodicée* [Janet's ed.], p. 143).

Although not incompatible, these two uses of the term in Leibniz are at least distinct. The second meaning, in which it suggests an internal sense, or reflexion, and self-activity, is that in which Wolff, and after him Kant, understood the term; but it was applied by the latter in a quite distinctive way (see KANT).

With Herbart, the theory of apperception enters on a new phase. It now means a process taking place between one presentation or idea and another idea or group of ideas (*Psychol. als Wissen.* ii. § i. ch. 5 [Hartenstein's ed. vol. vi. p. 190]). When a new sensation, perception, or memory enters the mind, it awakes or reproduces a number of older presentations or ideas referring to the same object. So far as these contain similar elements, it coalesces with them, and assimilates or is assimilated by them (*Verschmelzung*); so far as they contain opposite elements, there is mutual competition and conflict (*Hemmung*), each restricting the normal development of the other in the mind. The same process takes place also between those more complex series, masses, or systems, of ideas and thoughts, which result from combinations of all kinds at lower levels. The appropriation or absorption of an idea, from whatever source, by a more complex idea or system already present in the mind, is what Herbart calls 'apperception.' It is *external* or *internal*, according as the idea to be appropriated is a sense-perception or a representation of any kind; but this distinction, really inconsistent with Herbart's psychology, was afterwards rejected by Steinthal. The characteristics of the *apperceiving* mass are, (1) that it succeeds the *apperceived* idea in time, and (2) that it is stronger, more powerful, from some cause, and therefore compels the other to modify in accordance with it, while it itself continues to develop according to its nature (*ib.* p. 194; cf. *Lehrbuch zur Psych.* § 41). Thus it is relatively the active, the other relatively the passive element. An instance is the way in which our habitual modes of thought and action influence our apprehension of new ideas, our criticism of the conduct of others, etc. Not only *how* we see things, but *what* we shall actually see, is determined for each of us by our past experience and the use we have made of it. Psychologically, such experience is active only as a *present* system of ideas, according to Herbart. Apperception does not take place in the child or in the savage, because such systems are as yet unformed; it fails also under intoxication, fatigue, passion, etc., because the existing systems are disorganized. Education, intellectual and moral alike, is the gradual formation and strengthening of the due apperceptive masses. The slow and painful beginnings, the final rapid mastery and assimilation of a science, give further illustration. The modification is not wholly on one side, however; ideas 'act, as it were, chemically upon one another, decomposing one another and entering into new connexions.' Apperception is also the basis of *memory*; nothing can be recalled unless it has been built into a series or system of ideas, forming links by which the mind may reach it and drag it forth (*Psych. Untersuch.* iii. [Hartmann, vii. p. 591]). A further feature is the suppression, by the *apperceiving* mass, of whatever in perception or recollection conflicts with itself: in this, with the correlative raising up and isolating of the *apperceived* element, apperception is identical with attention (*Briefe*, p. 497). See ATTENTION.

In Volkmann also 'apperception' is defined as the coalescence of a new and isolated mass of ideas with an older mass which exceeds it in the number of its constituents, and in internal adjustment or systematization (*Lehrbuch der Psych.*[4] ii. 190). With both Lazarus and Steinthal the range of apperception is greatly extended; it becomes, indeed, coextensive with mental life. It is the *creative* process in mind; in it one content does not merely 'become aware of' another, but both are transformed, 'melted into a higher and richer third.' An idea becomes a centre of apperception through its *Macht*, or force, which does not imply either intensity or clear consciousness, but depends on the number of connexions which the idea has with other ideas, and on the closeness of the ties by which its constituents are bound together. Steinthal recognizes four chief forms of apperce-

tion, which are derived from those of Logical Judgment: Identifying, Subsuming, Harmonizing (with its negative, Disharmonizing), and Creative Apperception (*Kleine Schriften*, i. p. 60; *Einleitung in die Psychol.* p. 207).

With Wundt there is a return to the theory of Leibniz and Kant. A presentation or idea may be in consciousness simply, or also in the *focus* of consciousness, which, however, is not strictly a point, but rather a limited field. There are thus two *thresholds*,—the outer—that of consciousness or intensity; and the inner—that of apperception or clearness. The entrance of an idea into the focus of consciousness is its apperception, which may be either passive or active. Thus it is simply one side or aspect of the process of attention. Apperception is also identified by Wundt with will, and in this connexion acquires a strongly metaphysical colouring. This conception of apperception as a pure activity, which is yet directed or stimulated by presentations, has been criticized from different points of view by Volkmann, Hartmann, and the Associationist Psychologists, such as Ziehen, etc. In English Psychology the theory of apperception has been developed, mainly along Herbartian lines, by Dr. Stout. The following indicates his standpoint:—In all apperception 'a presentation acquires a certain significance for thought, by connecting itself with some mental preformation as this has been organized in the course of previous experience' (*Anal. Psy.* p. 110).

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J. LEWIS M'INTYRE.

APPETITE.—1. *Psychological.*—Appetite may be defined as a recurring sense or consciousness of want in the bodily organism, accompanied with a craving or desire for satisfaction, leading to efforts at fulfilment, under the impulse of uneasiness, which may become, under certain circumstances, more or less pronounced pain. It belongs to the animal side of our being, and is primordial to the human constitution. Most of the appetites—hunger, thirst, sleep, repose, rest—are connected with the conservation and welfare of the individual; sex has reference to the propagation and continuance of the species.

The characteristics of these natural physical wants (over and above uneasiness and efforts to remove it) are:—(1) They are not permanent, but intermittent: they disappear on being satisfied, but recur at stated times or periods. (2) If pressed beyond the natural limits of satisfaction, they breed satiety, and injury is done to the system. (3) They constitute our lower wants, in contradistinction to the higher or ideal wants of our nature, such as knowledge and friendship: we do not identify them with our inner self—they are *mine*, but they are not *me*.

The uneasiness in an appetite leads to action, mainly reflex and instinctive, not deliberately purposive, for the removal of it, and the gratification of the appetite brings pleasure. Hence, the original propensity to act under uneasiness may come to assume the form of desire for pleasure (as we see in the gourmand or the epicure), and what would be quite sufficient to remove the bare appetite (as in hunger) may be superseded by elaborate and refined modes of ministering to the desire, as shown in the art of cookery. It is thus that appetite may be specially effective on the will: it prompts to the acquisition and continuance of pleasure, not only to the getting rid of uneasiness or disquiet. These two things—*the pleasure that accompanies* (*say*) *eating, and the conscious and deliberate pursuit of the pleasure of eating*—are by no means identical. On the contrary, if desire of the pleasure become the predominant fact, the original normal and healthy craving in appetite may be supplanted by an abnormal craving, such as we see in gluttony; or an artificial craving, 'an acquired appetite,' may be produced, such as we see in the craving for tobacco or for alcohol. There is here, obviously, no appetite proper, but an induced desire, under the prompting of anticipated pleasure, which, in turn, is the product of individual pleasurable experience.

Hence, we must discriminate between appetite and desire for pleasure. Appetite simply craves for its object (the means for the attainment of the object being included in the conception of the object itself), and, given the object (food, for instance, for hunger), the appetite is satisfied—satisfied, no doubt, gradually, as the object is gradually realized, but fully in the realization of it. On the other hand, desire of pleasure is a consciously representative process, ideational in its nature, dependent on experience of pleasure (therefore, involving memory), and craving for that pleasure and, in the case of 'acquired appetites,' for the increase, as well as for the repetition, of it.

Appetite, like instinct, is native to the human being; but it differs from instinct in the following respects:—(1) It is an organic craving, whereas instinct acts under external stimulus. (2) In instinct, while there are an end to be effected and means to be used for the purpose, the individual is born with ability to employ the means without requiring to be taught how (as seen, for instance, in the sucking of the child)—in other words, the individual can unhesitatingly employ the means from the beginning, without, however, any consciousness of the end or deliberate purpose to achieve it. (3) In instinct there is also an untaught propensity, as well as an untaught ability, to act—'a propensity prior to experience, and independent of instruction.'

The pleasure that the satisfaction of an appetite gives is in general proportional to the craving. But there are cases where the strength of the craving is far greater than the pleasure of the gratification. Such a case we find in the glutton or the drunkard, whose passion, being persistent and whetted by successive gratifications, craves an indulgence which the object of it is incapable of adequately meeting. Here, excess has created a situation where pain has got the mastery—the craving does not disappear in its own fulfilment and periodically return, but persists and thrusts itself unseasonably upon attention: in other words, the object of desire when reached fails to appease completely, and the craving for satisfaction continues.

Although, therefore, in appetite proper, there is not involved the deliberate control of reason, nor is there any need for such, this control comes to be required when appetite would transgress its bounds. Such transgression is easy because of the pleasure associated with appetite, and because of the readiness with which abnormal conditions of the bodily system may be induced through excess. Hence, the appetites come to have a distinct and an important bearing on Ethics. Although in their normal action and in their rightful sphere they guide us in a way that calm reason could not—prompting us effectively, for instance, to eat for the support of life at the time and to the degree

that the body requires, and not leaving the 'when' and the 'how much' to be settled by rational calculation—their pleasure-giving or 'felicific' property has to be watched, lest it make voluptuaries or debauchees of us; and thus reason has its function in relation to them. This would seem to mark the distinction between man and the lower animals: in man, the appetites are rationalized; in the brutes, not so.

2. *Ethical.*—The appetites in themselves are neither selfish nor unselfish, neither virtuous nor vicious; they are simply a part of human nature, indispensable to the being and welfare of the whole. But inasmuch as they are intimately associated with pleasure, they may be abused, and thus become ethically significant. Not that there is anything selfish or morally wrong in accepting the pleasure that they bring—such pleasure is a sign of physical health (as pain is of disease) and is to be welcomed and cherished (as the other is to be avoided or got rid of); but it may be sought for and estimated beyond its value—it may be pursued immoderately or at wrong times or in a perverted manner, to the detriment of the system and to the exclusion of higher good. If it is characteristic of the appetites that they have a tendency to overstep just limit, it is characteristic of them also that they grow imperious in their demands. Eating may degenerate into gluttony, repose into sloth, love (appetitive) into lust; and when degeneracy sets in, each becomes as a daughter of the horse-leech, crying, 'Give, give!' Hence the appetites need to be regulated and controlled: they need to be placed under rational government. If left to themselves unbridled, they would ruin the higher nature. Hence asceticism is but the exaggeration of a deep spiritual truth; and self-mortification, or 'keeping under' the body, has a real justification in psychical fact. But this means that, in a rational being, the appetites become transformed: they cannot be in him what they are in a non-rational creature. A clear conception of their place and function inevitably changes their nature, and entails responsibility as to our use of them. As Spinoza puts it (*Ethics*, v. prop. 3), 'An affection which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it.' This is a very important truth, explaining to us many things in Ethics,—as, for example, how it is that the instinctive love of a mother for her offspring assumes quite a different aspect when we are dealing with human mothers from what it does when we are considering simply the lower animals. In both cases, there is instinct or natural affection; but, in the one case, it is rationalized (duly located in a system of thought or a scheme of values, and so lifted out of the sphere of mere instinct), in the other, not.

The situation as between the appetites and reason, or between the lower and the higher nature, or, still again (in Scripture language), between the flesh and the spirit, was put strikingly from the ethicist's point of view by Plato in the fable of the Charioteer and his Steeds. In *Phædrus*, the soul is aptly represented as a charioteer, riding in his car, drawn by two winged horses of different colour, nature, and temperament, requiring different management. On the one side, there is the black and vicious horse, 'ignoble and of ignoble breed,' ever refractory and plunging through unruly desire, 'the mate of insolence and pride,' and needing to be kept back by bit and bridle, yet 'hardly yielding to whip and spur.' On the other side, there is the white decorous horse, 'noble and of noble breed,' ever responsive 'to word and admonition,' on which bit and bridle sit lightly, and for which no whip is required. Here is a significant allegory. The charioteer is reason (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν); the white steed orderly and always harmonious with reason, represents 'the moral and spiritual element in man'; and the gross and sensual tendencies of human nature find their symbol in the dark and untractable steed. But the task of the charioteer is far from easy—not every one can successfully drive a team; the taming of the refractory steed costs him many an effort, and hard work and skill. Obedience is the result of a strong hand and a determined will, and of sore punishment repeated; only 'when this has happened several times and the villain has ceased from his wanton way, is he tamed and humbled, and follows the will of the charioteer.'

The right by which reason rules the appetites, or the rational basis of the distinction between higher and lower in our nature, is found here:—The appetites are non-ideal, and, consequently, individualistic. We cannot share them with any one else, neither is an appetite in itself susceptible of indefinite gratification. On the other hand, all the natural wants that we regard as higher—knowledge, friendship, virtue, religion—are distinguished by this, that (*a*) we share them with others, and yet we ourselves are none the poorer but all the richer—they are essentially altruistic and social; and (*b*) they do not cease with their immediate satisfaction—on the contrary, the desire increases with its gratification, as we see pre-eminently in knowledge, where the more we know the more we desire to know. They aim at an ideal; and it is the ideality with which they are bound up that produces their insatiableness: no limit is placed by nature to their culture, and no satiety cannot ensue; the capacity increases with what it feeds on.

It is needless to say, further, that both human happiness and human progress depend on the rational control of the lower nature; and this control is effective only when it becomes self-control, only when the individual acts as his own 'plagosus Orbilius,' gains the mastery over himself and exercises it spontaneously. How this self-control is acquired, through strengthening and directing the will, may be read in any good treatise on Psychology (*e.g.* Höffding's). Anyhow, if the individual's soul becomes, as Plato puts it, a well-ordered State—where there are gradation of functions, harmony, and order everywhere, mutual subservience of the parts to the interests of the whole and for the realization of its highest good—then the appetites and their pleasures count for much and have their own part to play in the economy of the human being: neither will they be ignored and starved (as Stoicism would fain effect), nor will they be made supreme and cultivated without stint (as some forms of Hedonism would appear to countenance).

But while there is thus a ground for the rationalizing of appetite, and for the subordination of the lower to the higher, in the nature of the different natural wants themselves, there is a further ground in the ethical dangers connected with the appetites. These are mainly as follows:—(1) In the first place, an appetite, strictly speaking, is neither selfish nor unselfish; but a depraved or unrestrained appetite is essentially selfish—thus turning a neutral thing into a positive evil. Vile appetites minister to the individual's cravings, but they may be made the means of corrupting others. (2) Depraved or unrestrained appetites lower the character, and stunt and check moral progress—they bring 'leanness' into the soul; for it is a law of the human mind that we cannot indulge intemperately without lessening our moral force, just as we cannot harbour base desires without thereby shutting out noble ones, or choose false-

hood without rejecting truth. Consequently, while they vitiate the taste, they enfeeble the will—*i.e.* they deprive us of the power of resisting temptation and of initiating reformation; which, otherwise expressed, means that they leave us the prey to impulse, and so the end thereof, in Scripture language, 'is death.' (3) Perverted appetites are a bondage: they drag us at their heels, and through them we lose our moral freedom—we are enslaved. The peculiarity is that, while we yield to them, we *protest*: the will is overborne, but we still retain our perception of the right and our appreciation of it,—'I see the better *and approve*, I pursue the worse' (Ovid, *Met.* vii. 21). In other words, our moral energy is felt not to be adequate to our moral insight; we are conscious of being coerced. This fact of the bondage of the appetites and passions is the theme of all great ethicists, from Plato downwards: it was kept before the mediæval world by the *Consolation of Philosophy* of Boëthius, and it is a heritage to modern philosophy from Spinoza, the fourth part of whose *Ethics* deals with this very subject of 'Human Bondage,' and the fifth part with 'Human Liberty.' It is also a leading theme of the Christian religion, and lies at the basis of the scheme of salvation. (4) Appetite unduly set on pleasure leaves a sting behind. 'But what shall I say of the pleasures of the body? This—that the lust thereof is indeed full of uneasiness (*anxietas*), but the sating, of repentance' (Boëthius, *Consol. Phil.* Lib. iii. prosa 7).

3. *Religious.*—The distinction thus drawn between the appetites and reason, the estimation put upon it, and the conception of the soul as a well-ordered, self-governed State, were taken over by Christianity; only, it is to be observed, Christianity has its own way of explaining the conflict between the lower and the higher in man, and it has its own means of ending the conflict. *That* is its peculiarity, marking it off from mere Ethics. On the one hand (using St. Paul as our guide—more especially, as he expresses himself in Ro 7 and Gal 5), the lower and concupiscent element in man is identified with 'the flesh' (σάρξ). This unruly principle—the black horse of Plato—rebels against the human reason and overpowers the human will ('mind' or νοῦς in Pauline phraseology), and causes the individual to exclaim in agony, 'O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me out of the body of this death?' The deliverance comes not from the man himself, not even from his active reason, although the natural function of active reason is to control; but from without—'I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord.' For man's impotence of will, according to Scripture, arises from a religious cause and needs a religious remedy: it arises from the fact that man is 'fallen,' is 'sold under sin,' has deliberately rebelled against God, and so has forfeited his rightful power of self-mastery; and the rectifying and conquering force must come to him from above—it must be a gift from heaven. This Divine gift, in accordance with the whole Christian doctrine of regeneration and re-creation, is 'the Spirit.' And so, in order to be delivered from the hard bondage of the lower self, which is the bondage of sin, man must be raised from the 'natural' or 'psychical' plane into the 'spiritual' realm—he must himself become a temple of the Holy Ghost, and through the indwelling Spirit he will conquer. 'But, I say, walk by the Spirit, and ye shall not fulfil the lust of the flesh. For the flesh lusteth against the Spirit and the Spirit against the flesh; for these are contrary the one to the other; that ye may not do the things that ye would. . . . And they that are of Christ Jesus have crucified the flesh with the passions and the lusts thereof' (Gal $5^{16.\ 17.\ 24}$). Thus the Christian faith incorporates Ethics, but transcends it. It is, consequently, effective on human life and practice in a way that Ethics, standing alone, cannot be.

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A PRIORI.—*A Priori* is one of those terms, by no means rare in philosophy, the meaning of which has in the course of centuries undergone divers changes. Originally an unobjectionable expression, denoting an ordinary mental act about which there can be no controversy, it has eventually become the index of one of the most stubborn problems which set the minds of men at variance. According to Prantl,* the earliest occurrence of the phrase is in the writings of Albert of Saxony (14th cent.), who draws a contrast between *demonstratio a priori*, the proof from what is before, *i.e.* from the cause, and *demonstratio a posteriori*, the proof which retrocedes from the effect. The usage can be traced to Aristotle, who in the *Second Analytics* states that that upon which proof is based must be prior to, and better known than, that which is to be proved, and continues thus: 'The earlier and better known has a twofold meaning. That which is prior by nature is not identical with what is prior for us; nor again is that which is in itself better known the same as what is better known to us. "The prior and better-known in relation to us" is the name I give to what lies nearer to our sense perception; what lies farther from that I call "the prior and better known in itself." The most remote of all is the universal; the nearest is the individual object.' The connexion of the term A Priori with Aristotle is thus quite evident. But while he differentiates the meaning of 'prior' according as the starting-point is the thing perceived or the process of perception, Albert of Saxony does not take this difference into account: with him *demonstratio a priori* signifies the proof from causes. It merely denotes a special mode of mental operation; in other words, *a priori* is a term of formal logic. The knowledge which proceeds from cause to effect, or knowledge a priori, rightly claims a higher degree of certainty than knowledge a posteriori, or from effect to cause, so long as the terms keep rigidly to the meanings assigned, and so long as the limits of formal logic are not transgressed. But the problem of knowledge goes beyond the scope of formal logic. The moment any shifting takes place in the meaning of A Priori and A Posteriori, and they show a tendency to coalesce respectively with knowledge based upon conceptions and knowledge based upon experience, and when, further, the province of logic is relinquished for that of psychology, it is no longer possible to maintain the higher certainty of a priori knowledge. For, with such change, perception appears as the earlier and more certain, while the general conception is the later, and thus A Priori and

* *Geschichte der Logik*, iv. 78.

A Posteriori have simply exchanged meanings. Hence Gassendi, in his polemic against the Aristotelians, impugns the dictum that the *demonstratio a priori* is more certain and conclusive than that *a posteriori*, and demands its warrant. Since on his view the *demonstratio a priori* becomes the proof from causes *and general conceptions*, and since the *demonstratio a posteriori* becomes the proof from effects and less general conceptions, he shows that he has abandoned the strictly logical usage of the terms. But in that case it is clear that there is but one answer to his question whether effects are not better known than causes; and the inevitable inference is that a priori knowledge depends upon a posteriori.* Gassendi's criticism shows that the term A Priori had become ambiguous; it was so far free to assume a new meaning.

Its new content was supplied by **Leibniz.** It is indeed true that Leibniz did not always use the term in one and the same sense. Thus, in connexion with the ontological proof of the existence of God, he argues that existence does not follow from conception, but that the possibility of the fact signified by the conception must first of all be established. This possibility, however, may be cognized either a priori or a posteriori: the former, if the various characteristics of the concept are mutually consistent; the latter, when the thing itself is an object of perception.† A similar usage appears in the passage where the criterion of a clear and distinct idea is said to be its capacity of yielding the knowledge of a number of truths by a priori proof.‡ Here A Priori is really concerned with the elucidation and explanation of conceptions, and with knowledge won from conceptions by correct reasoning. It is employed in a somewhat different sense in the passage where the knowledge which proceeds from God to created things and that which recedes from created things to God are respectively designated a priori and a posteriori.§ Still another usage is observable in the statement that in regard to the mysteries of the Christian faith, such as the Trinity and the Incarnation, a priori proofs on rational grounds are neither possible nor requisite, and that in this case the knowledge of the fact is sufficient, though the *why* remains unknown. A priori proof is here equivalent to the intuition of rational cause.‖ In discussing the relationship subsisting between the human and the animal soul, Leibniz comes to the conclusion that the faculty of simple empirical association is common to both. A dog being trained to perform a trick gets a tit-bit; a Dutchman travelling towards Asia will ask for his beer, perhaps even in a Turkish inn. The connexion between trick and tit-bit, between inn and beer, is in each case casual, not necessary; but the man differs from the animal in that he seeks for a *necessary* connexion. The mere data of experience are not sufficient for him, nor does he rely on experiments alone; he goes beyond them a priori, by means of first principles. A Priori thus acquires an implication of necessary relation.¶ According to Leibniz, then, knowledge a priori is found in the following contingencies:—(1) when the possibility of a fact is established by showing the self-consistency of its conception; (2) when from a clear and distinct idea further cognitions are deduced; (3) when thought proceeds from God to created things; (4) when the rational grounds of an actual truth are investigated; (5) when an essential relation is established. Thus A Priori has various shades of meaning; but it may be asserted that, as used by Leibniz, the expression tends generally to become identified with knowledge gained from pure reason. This is its meaning when he contrasts knowledge *par la pure raison ou a priori* with *philosophie expérimentale qui procède a posteriori*;* and when, in the *Nouveaux Essais*, the reason which is the basis not only of our judgment, but also of the truth itself, is made to rank as reason in the distinctive sense, or reason a priori.† A Priori is thus an attribute of that species of knowledge of which every constituent is furnished by reason alone.

Lambert also is of opinion that 'without qualification and in the strictest sense the term a priori can be applied only to that in regard to which we owe nothing whatever to experience.'‡ Wolff, on the other hand, reverts to the more general sense of the term, applying it to any kind of knowledge arrived at by reasoning, even when the conceptions employed in the premises are derived from experience.

The view of Kant demands a somewhat fuller treatment, since in this as in other respects he marks the consummation of the previous development, and the starting-point of the new. Besides, the problem indicated by the phrase *a priori*, according to him, stands at the very centre of thought, as it does with no philosopher before him. His entire system, indeed, may be regarded as an answer to the great question, How are synthetic judgments a priori possible? Alike in his theoretical and his practical philosophy, in his treatment of æsthetics and of religion, his aim was to discover and establish synthetic judgments a priori. He is at one with his predecessors in assuming the existence of a priori cognition, and in believing that it cannot be regarded as originating in experience. But he felt that justice had not been done to the problem involved.

If such a priori knowledge really exists, he argues, then it must be expressible in judgments which are a priori, and, indeed, synthetic. Merely analytical judgments, *i.e.* those which do no more than analyze and elucidate a given concept, while they render our knowledge explicit, do not augment it; only synthetic judgments, *i.e.* those which link a new predicate to the subject, furnish a genuine addition to knowledge. Hence the judgments a priori which are of any use at all are precisely those the predicate of which goes beyond the subject, adding something that was not contained therein. Such a synthetic judgment is exemplified in the dictum, 'Every event has a cause.' It is synthetic, since the concept 'event' does not involve the idea of a cause; the predicate, therefore, adds something new; it is a priori, since, while mere experience, or perception, certainly shows that events follow one another, it does not show that they are causally connected, still less that they are *always* so connected. Clearly we have a problem here. It is easy to understand how there should be synthetic judgments a posteriori, since perception itself supplies the predicate and its connexion with the subject. When I say, *e.g.*, that light-rays are refrangible, I am merely telling what I have learned by a simple experiment. But how can I say that every event has a cause, seeing that experience cannot be my warrant? How then are synthetic judgments a priori possible? Clearly because reason itself must contain a priori elements; and one great desideratum will be a complete inventory of these elements. But the mere fact of their existence does not warrant their embodiment in judgments having a real value for knowledge; hence their applicability must be vindicated, their relevancy made good. But even this demonstration does not complete our task. For there is an illegitimate as well as a legitimate use of them, and we must endeavour to fix the limits of their efficiency. It was Kant's conviction that all previous investigations of the problem had been inadequate in three ways: he felt the lack of (1) care in securing the full number of a priori elements; (2) proof of their applicability, and (3) precise definition of the limits of their efficiency. Only in the proper discharge of these three tasks do we obtain a truly exhaustive investigation, a Critique of Pure Reason.

1. If the a priori elements are discoverable at all, they must carry marks of recognition. And such marks they certainly have, for we actually find ourselves in possession of cognitions which are distinguished from all others by their universality and their necessity. Now these cannot originate in experience, for experience can tell us only that something is, not that it *always* is; can say only that it *is* this or that, never that it *must* be such. The marks of the A Priori are therefore true universality and strict necessity. But these do not forthwith provide us with rules for the discovery of the a priori elements

* *Exercitationes paradoxicæ adversus Aristoteleos*, lib. ii. exerc. 5.

† Leibniz, *Werke*, ed. Erdmann, p. 80.
‡ *Ib.* 272*b*.
§ *Ib.* 451*b*.
‖ *Ib.* 494*b*.
¶ *Ib.* 464*b f.*

* Leibniz, *Werke*, ed. Erdmann, 778*b*.
† *Ib.* 393*a*.
‡ *Neues Organon*, *Dianoiologie*, § 639.

of reason. Such rules, however, will be suggested by the following reflexions. In trying to discover what belongs to pure reason, we must isolate it by eliminating all alien material. Now, since the faculty of knowledge has two aspects, namely, the receptivity of perception and the activity of thought, these will necessarily meet us again in pure reason. But as the material element, that which is given in sensation, obviously lies outside the territory of pure reason, we may perhaps delimit this territory, if only we can disengage what sensation supplies. What then remains, when we make this elimination? Obviously, the universal *forms* of perception, namely, Space and Time. And what remains when we similarly separate all material elements from the products of active thought, i.e. our judgments? Clearly the pure *form* of the judgment itself. This pure form of the judgment, however, points to a function of the understanding, and the sum of such forms will give us the complete list of these functions, i.e. the categories. Now formal logic has already distinguished all the possible forms of the judgment, and has tabulated them under four heads, each having three momenta, and consequently the functions of the understanding, or categories, can be arranged in the same way. Thus the *quantity* of judgments as universal, particular, or singular, gives the categories of quantity: Unity, Plurality, Totality; the *quality* of judgments as affirmative, negative, or infinite, yields the categories of quality: Reality, Negation, Limitation; the *relation* of judgments as categorical, hypothetical, or disjunctive, provides the categories of relation: Substance and Accident, Cause and Effect, Community or Reciprocity; while, finally, the *modality* of judgments as problematic, assertoric, or apodictic, gives us the categories of modality: Possibility—Impossibility, Existence—Non-Existence, Necessity—Contingency. Thus the a priori elements are the pure forms of conception—Space and Time—and the twelve Categories. They are a priori, because they are truly universal and strictly necessary; and their number is complete, since they alone remain after our exhaustive process of elimination. Our first problem is therefore solved.

2. We turn next to the task of determining the function of these a priori elements, and the vindication of their applicability to the objects of knowledge. So far as space and time are concerned, the task is an easy one. They are forms of perception, since every object of perception is presented to us in one or both of them. Moreover, we have two sciences whose validity and truth are beyond question, viz., geometry and kinematics. Neither comes from experience, for geometry, not finding its figures to hand in nature, constructs them arbitrarily; and in the same way kinematics enunciates its propositions without the slightest reference to experience: both exhibit an unconditional necessity, which perception can never do. How then are these sciences possible? Clearly because, on the one hand, geometry rests upon the fact that there is an a priori perception of Space, while, on the other, kinematics rests upon the fact that there is an a priori perception of Time. The existence of these two sciences, then, vouches for the efficiency and validity of the a priori forms of perception. It is more difficult to demonstrate the function and competency of the categories, which are not forms of perception. What significance must we assign to them? Is it not enough that all objects of perception should manifest themselves in Space and Time, and are the categories not therefore superfluous? What can they add to spatial and temporal perception? But we must recollect that bare perception, i.e. perception conditioned by Space and Time, is not knowledge, and does not deserve the name of experience properly so called. Perception alone could yield nothing but a chaos of phenomena, without order among its parts, without rule in its changes, without coherence. True knowledge, true experience, is in fact impossible without the unity of consciousness, without an orderly synthesis; and it is at this point that the function of the categories reveals itself, and their validity is established. They exhibit the various ways in which the unity of consciousness effectuates the orderly synthesis of phenomena. Knowledge, genuine experience, becomes ours only when, by means of the categories of Quantity and Quality, we come to understand, arrange, and organize phenomena as extensive and intensive magnitudes; when in virtue of the categories of relation we are able to posit something permanent (Substance) amidst the flux of phenomena, to introduce a causal order into the stream of their succession, and to reduce their mere collocation to a vast system of perfectly interrelated parts; and when, finally, by the categories of modality, we are in a position to determine the gradations of things in respect to possibility, actuality, and necessity. Perception in itself can furnish nothing of this, as is best seen in regard to the categories of relation. It gives us only a constant flux, never anything permanent; only succession, never regular connexion; only collocation, never reciprocity; and accordingly it cannot give knowledge. But no less in the case of the other categories it may be shown that they superimpose something upon bare perception, and are a necessary condition of knowledge or experience in the strict sense of these terms. It is true, of course, that perception as such gives us extensive magnitudes, but it is only by means of the category of Quantity that we can formulate a universal law, thus bringing all phenomena under a common measure, without which they could not be grasped by thought. It is also true that perception yields intensive magnitudes, but again it is the category of Quality alone which sets forth the universal law that *every* phenomenon must have some degree of intensity; it alone renders possible an absolutely uniform and progressive scale of intensity, by which phenomena are actually compared and comprehended. Perception, finally, places everything upon a level; it yields no gradations. But where all things coalesce, knowledge is out of the question. Only the categories of modality afford the requisite gradation, enabling us to take into consideration questions regarding Possibility and Impossibility, Actuality and Non-Actuality, Necessity and Contingency. Thus, to sum up, it is by means of the categories alone that we can attain to knowledge, to experience in the proper sense; and contrariwise, the actual existence of knowledge and experience witnesses to the validity of the categories. Our second problem is thus solved.

3. The answer to the question involved in our third problem, viz., To what extent is the a priori element valid? is given in what has already been said. Our conclusion so far is that true experience is made possible by the A Priori. We must now say: Experience *alone*, nothing beyond it. It is mere illusion to suppose that by means of the categories we can attain to a knowledge entirely beyond experience. Rational Psychology which undertakes to prove the existence of the soul as immaterial and indestructible, is naught but a mass of illegitimate inferences. Rational Cosmology, which presumes to decide regarding the beginning or non-beginning of the world in time, and its limitation or infinity in space, the simplicity and indivisibility of atoms, or their infinite divisibility and the consequent impossibility of indivisible atoms, the universality of natural causation and the denial of freedom, or the assertion of it, the existence or non-existence of an absolutely necessary being—simply lands us in antinomies, of which both the thesis and the antithesis may be shown to be equally valid. Rational Theology, again, achieves its aim of proving the existence of God only by the manœuvre of making the conclusion contain more than the premises, as, for instance, in the ontological proof, according to which the *existence* of God follows from the *conception* of Him, existence in the premises being but a *conceptual* predicate, while in the conclusion it has become a *real* one.

Rational Psychology, Cosmology, and Theology are in point of fact concerned with *Ideas*, for which experience provides no corresponding reality. But however forcibly we must deny that the Ideas guarantee the existence of their correlative objects, still as Ideas they possess a real value. They are an expression of that striving after unity and totality which reason itself makes, and so point to a work which is at once necessary and ever incomplete. However incoherent and mutually independent the facts of perception may seem, reason demands unity and totality, and seeks to realize both by the endless process of linking together all the phenomena and preventing any of them from assuming an absolute independence. That is the true element in Rational Psychology. Again, reason endeavours to bring the aggregate of things which we call the universe into line with its own requirements of unity and totality. But since these requirements cannot be satisfied empirically, the process is one which can never stop. Carry the causal series as far as we may, we never reach an ultimate or unconditioned cause. Thus reason progresses ever from more to more; its object is not a universe rounded and complete, but one which it builds up with ceaseless travail. That is the truth of Rational Cosmology. Finally, Rational Theology seeks the unity and totality of all existence whatsoever—the first cause and the final purpose of the whole—and this search constitutes *its* element of truth. But all this is presented to reason not as a fact, but as a task—a labour forced upon it, yet never finished. In other words, the Ideas of Soul, World, God, are regulative, not constitutive principles, and indicate and direct the endeavour of reason after unity and totality. Our conclusion then is, that the sole purpose of the A Priori is to make experience possible; its function is an immanent, not a transcendental one.

So far, then, our result is this: the forms of perception and thought are a priori; their function is to make experience possible, and they do not avail beyond experience. But with a view to a complete explanation it remains to establish the two following theses: (1) the A Priori is not to be interpreted *psychologically*; and (2) the A Priori is not equivalent to innate.

(1) A psychological interpretation was given by Schopenhauer, who writes: 'The philosophy of Locke was a criticism of the functions of sense; Kant furnishes a criticism of the functions of brain.'* Helmholtz agrees with this, as does also F. A. Lange, who states that 'the psychological equipment which constrains us to condition objects by space and time, is certainly anterior to all experience.'† But so to understand Kant is to misunderstand him. Such an interpretation of the A Priori places it on a level with the other psychical functions. For we likewise see colours and hear tones in virtue of our psycho-physical constitution, and we should thus have to recognize an a priori element in these also. Kant, however, would altogether repudiate this. To understand anything psychologically is to apprehend it as the property or state of a subject, a soul, a psycho-physical organism. Psychology never goes beyond

* *World as Will and Idea*, i. i.
† *Hist. of Materialism*, ii. 26.

the psychological subject and its relations to the surrounding world, whether that world be looked at from the standpoint of Realism or of Idealism in the Berkeleyan sense. The true A Priori compasses both the psychological Ego and the world. A variation in our psychological organization would never involve more than the alteration of a part of our knowledge. If, for instance, the faculty of colour-perception were to become more sensitive or less so, were it even to disappear altogether, then, with the solitary exception of colour, everything would be as before; and, in fact, were the senses as a whole to suffer any drastic change, some being lost, some displaced by others, it would signify no more than the donning of a new garment; the intrinsic constitution of the mind would remain inviolate. But an alteration in the A Priori would be nothing less than a revolution. Take away space and time, and the world itself falls to pieces. We must accordingly guard against a psychological reading of the A Priori.

The difference between the A Priori and the psychological may be further illustrated as follows. The a priori space-perception of Kant and psychological space-perception are by no means identical. It may be the case that Kant ignored the distinction, but that is irrelevant meanwhile. It is a mistake to suppose that we refute Kant by showing that the faculty of space-perception is not congenital, but is acquired gradually, that our perception of a surface is prior to that of tri-dimensional space, and that we localize accurately only after having learned to do so. All that is true, but it does not conflict with the theory of Kant. The development of the psychological space-perception presupposes the a priori. Psychological space is limited, and we can in a manner discern its limits; a priori space knows no limit. Hence we may assert that what is a priori is not psychological, and *vice versa*. Once a psychological interpretation was put upon A Priori, it was quite proper to proceed to its analysis, as was done by the evolutionists. They maintained that what is now an A Priori for the individual was at first an A Posteriori for the race; that in the course of thousands or even millions of years mankind at length acquired what is now the congenital endowment of the individual person (so Spencer, Haeckel, etc.). Such a theory, however, though valid as against what we may call the psychological A Priori, cannot infringe the true A Priori.

(2) The proof of the second thesis, viz., that a priori is not equivalent to innate, is contained in what has just been said, and for its elucidation a few words will suffice. We may rightly apply the term 'innate' to anything which belongs to the natural endowment of the psychological subject, but precisely on that account it is not a priori. The innate is what is given, but, from Kant's point of view, the given and the A Priori are antithetical. What is given must needs be capable of being set forth as a quality or as something passive; but this is impossible in the case of the A Priori, which is from first to last an *activity* of the mind. We do not discover it as we discover an external object of perception; it forms the presupposition of all our thinking. We cannot seek for it as for other things, for in our very search that which we are looking for is already *in operation*. If, on the other hand, we wish to elicit the innate, the object of our search is not a factor in the process. Kant also insists that the A Priori must not be taken as applying to supposed inborn, ready-made ideas. He writes: 'Criticism admits the existence of no such ideas at all, but regards all ideas, whether belonging to perception or conception, as acquired. There is, however, also an *acquisitio originaria* (as writers on Natural Law were wont to say), and therefore also of something which did not previously exist, nor belonged to anything before the act.'* Hence, if criticism has to do with the A Priori, it has, for that very reason, nothing to do with the innate.

Having thus explained the A Priori in Kant's theoretical philosophy, we proceed to deal with his assumption of a similar element in the practical activity of reason or mind. In respect of morality and religion, no less than logical thought, reason possesses something all its own, and not derived from experience, which can be expressed in synthetic judgments a priori. This consists, in a word, of Ideas, by which the empirically real must needs be controlled. The demands of the moral law and of the Kingdom of God must be realized in the external world. It has, indeed, been recently questioned whether we can justifiably speak of a practical A Priori. Thus Stange, in his *Einleitung in die Ethik*, holds that there is hardly any resemblance between the A Priori of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and that of the *Critique of Practical Reason*, and points out the following contrasts: (1) The *Critique of Pure Reason* treats of an A Priori both of sense and understanding, viz. the pure perceptions, Space and Time, and the pure forms of judgment, viz. the Categories; the *Critique of Practical Reason* treats only of an A Priori of Reason. (2) According to the first *Critique*, the A Priori and the empirical must collaborate; according to the second *Critique*, the A Priori alone must determine the will. (3) In the former work, universality and necessity are given as the characteristics of the A Priori; in the latter, those tests are not applied, since they do not suffice to determine the A Priori. Thus the desire for happiness is also universal and subjectively necessary, but it is not a priori. These strictures are canvassed by Hägerström in his comprehensive exposition of *Kants Ethik*.†

Admitting, however, as we must, the differences between the two *Critiques*, we must likewise admit the propriety of applying the term A Priori in the practical sphere. There, too, we discover an endowment peculiar to the mind, and not derived from experience—a fact which is evinced by the Categorical Imperative, which reveals itself as a synthetic judgment a priori. This Imperative imposes unconditional commands upon the will, declaring that this or that ought to be done, and paying no regard whatever to human desire or pleasure, to natural disposition or circumstances—hence it is a priori; and further, since the obligation to obey an unconditional command cannot be deduced from the concept 'will' by simple analysis, the Categorical Imperative is a synthetic judgment. In the *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, Kant decomposes the Imperative into the following three principles: (1) Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature; (2) so act as to treat humanity, both in thine own person and in that of every other, always as an end, never as a means only; (3) act according to the idea that the will of every rational being is a universally legislative will. The constituent elements of these three principles we may denominate Ideas, by which human conduct must be ordered if it is to be morally good, and thus we discover the Ideas of a motive, an end, and a law, each of which is universally valid. They are not the resultants of experience, but are severally ideal creations of the practical reason, and as such are a priori. Just as we saw, however, in the case of the categories, that a material element was also necessary to the existence of actual knowledge, so must the practical A Priori be referred to empirical reality as the material for its elaboration. In other words, the practical A Priori, on Kant's view, is, equally with the theoretical, of a formal, not a substantial, character. But even as the theoretical A Priori is the necessary condition of experience in the true sense, so is the practical A Priori the pre-requisite of moral action, since it alone brings human conduct under the control of inviolable law. Without it, our active life were the sport of chance, incapable of a determinate aim, and morality were impossible.

Religion, too, has its synthetic judgments a priori; necessarily so, since neither God nor eternal life is an object of perception. But how are the synthetic judgments possible which assert the existence of God and the fact of immortality? We have found morality to be something actually existent; but we have likewise found it to be perfectly adequate to its own ends, needing to seek no sanction in the concept 'God.' We must bear in mind, however, that Reason cannot disregard the *results* of moral

* Hartenstein's ed., vi. 87. Cf. Caird, *Crit. Phil. of Kant*, i. 480.

† Pp. 346–349.

action; on the contrary, it is necessarily concerned, not merely with the individual practice of morality, but with the *genesis of a moral world*. The proposition, 'There ought to be a moral world,' is itself a synthetic judgment a priori—a priori, because a moral world is not an object of experience; and synthetic, because the proposition, not being involved in the conception of morality, is not discovered analytically, but reveals itself only when to the conception of morality there is added that of an end of moral action. How, then, is the moral world possible? Manifestly not in virtue of human action only, since we cannot conceive how the moral action of mankind should evoke a moral world from a world subject to entirely different laws. If our proposition, therefore, is not to be a mere futility, we must inevitably proceed to affirm the existence of an omnipotent Being who will secure the result aimed at in human morality. We can accordingly assert that there is a God—a proposition shown to be an a priori synthetic judgment, by the manner of its deduction. We must finally note that, as the realization of the moral ideal is an endless task, it postulates the endless existence of man. Thus we arrive at the a priori synthetic judgment that man is immortal. Religion also, then, has an A Priori, and is indeed based upon it. The religion that we actually find in the world is often but a sorry mixture, but in the process of development its a priori element is able to realize itself and to produce ever purer forms. For it does not subsist in severance from empirical reality, any more than does the A Priori of the theoretical or the practical sphere.

It was Kant's belief that every genuine form of human experience was a combination of a priori and a posteriori factors. The absence of either was a sure sign of sophistry; no knowledge was possible save by the corporate union of both. Without the A Priori, our perceptions were formless and lawless, and therefore fitful and evanescent; without the A Posteriori, we should have but the blind play of concepts. No less in the sphere of religion and morality must the empirical data be controlled and moulded by the A Priori. In the absence of the latter, we should have no morality, no religion, only the lawless flux of desires, only the figments and fabrications of superstition, while, if the empirical factor were absent, the a priori ideas, having no material to organize, would resemble the shades of the under world in the *Odyssey*, which must first have blood in their veins ere they can come to life.

It was Kant's design in these conclusions to arbitrate between Rationalism and Empiricism. He had striven to do justice to both the contending schools, and at the same time to confine each to its proper province. To rationalism in its fancied independence of the A Posteriori, as to empiricism in its repudiation of the A Priori, he rejoined that genuine knowledge resulted only from the interaction of the two elements. But the dispute was by no means at an end. Kant's solution was felt, after all, to be dualism, which it was necessary to transcend; Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel were sensible of the impossibility of regarding the A Priori and the A Posteriori as two distinct *sources* of knowledge, of which only one sprang from reason. They held that *everything* belongs to reason, since even the material element of knowledge has no other origin. So far, therefore, all is a priori. It was not, of course, the empirical consciousness of the individual, with its slow development and its gradually multiplying contents, to which they attributed this creative power; it was rather, to use meanwhile a non-committal phrase, a hyper-individual spiritual something, which at once produces and comprises all that is real. From the standpoint of the merely individual consciousness, everything is a posteriori. Thus, according to Fichte, 'the science of knowledge, quite irrespective of perception a priori, traces out that which, in accordance with the same, must be present in perception a posteriori. For that science, therefore, these terms apply, not to different objects, but to different aspects of one and the same object; very much as a clock is used a priori as pointing the hour, but a posteriori in our actual reading thereof.'* Schelling's view is set forth in his *System des transcendentalen Idealismus*. He regards not merely the a priori conceptions, but also the objective world, as beyond the empirical consciousness, adding only: 'As the Ego generates everything from itself, so everything—not merely this or that conception, or, as has been supposed, only the form of thought—all knowledge whatever, indeed, as one and indivisible, is a priori. But as we are not conscious of this generative process, there is nothing a priori for us: everything is a posteriori.'* Hegel, too, draws a distinction: a posteriori knowledge is the concern of the empirical sciences. Their function is important, but subordinate to that of philosophy, since they can only discover facts without being able to demonstrate the necessity thereof, whereas philosophy deduces all reality from one supreme principle, thus giving to the contents of the empirical sciences the form of the freedom of thought and the warrant of necessity.† Thus, while for Kant every real cognition is a product of both a priori and a posteriori elements, his successors recognize not only a *pure* a priori, but also a *pure* a posteriori knowledge. Either kind has its own truth, but only the a priori is perfect, and forms the special method of philosophy. We must, however, incidentally remark that these philosophers are not perfectly at one regarding the A Priori: according to Fichte, the vital element of mind is moral action; according to Schelling, it is artistic creation; according to Hegel, logical thought.

Vast as was the influence of these systems, and of the Hegelian in particular, yet their solution of the problem could not long prove satisfactory. Of necessity it came to be felt more and more that the attempt to resolve all existence into Pure Reason was one which, though made with signal courage and amazing ability, had in the event come to nought. The mind of man was obviously inadequate to such a task. True, as indicated above, it was no purely human faculty to which was assigned the work of generating and sustaining the universe; nevertheless, the human spirit was credited with the power of penetrating directly into the creative activity of the absolute spirit, and of beholding it at work. A reaction was inevitable. Philosophy was thrown aside, and the empirical sciences, notably exact physical science, made vigorous advance. With the question of an A Priori, science had no concern; it looked for direction to experience, to perception alone. But, as might be expected, it was not possible for any length of time to ignore the fact that experience itself involves a problem. Of necessity it came to be recognized that perception as such does not make experience; that the mind, far from being merely passive, is very largely active, and that this activity is the truly constituent element in experience. What then are the resources which the mind brings to its work? With this question we are again face to face with the problem of the A Priori. The influence of Kant entered upon a new lease of life, the turning-point being signalized by Liebmann's *Kant und die Epigonen* (1865), with its *cæterum censeo*, 'Back to Kant.' Once more knowledge came to be viewed as the joint product of the A Priori and the A Posteriori. From this point the theories regarding the nature of, and the shades of meaning therein assigned to, the A Priori became so numerous and varied that it is quite impossible even to distinguish them all by name.

The A Priori is frequently regarded as equivalent to consciousness in general, on the ground that all we know lies within consciousness, which must therefore form the logical prius to any particular constituent thereof. Just as objects in space are subject to the universal laws of space, so must the facts of consciousness accord with *its* universal laws. It is impossible to abstract from consciousness. Thus Ferrier points out that in everything the ego knows, it always recognizes

* *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. I. H. Fichte, ii. 355.

* *Sämtliche Werke*, iii. 527 ff.

† Cf. *Encyklopädie*, ed. 2 (1843), i. § 12 [Wallace, *Logic of Hegel*, 19 ff.].

something of its own. Green, again, sets forth the real universe as an all-embracing system of relations, the presupposition of which, however, is a unifying principle, a combining agency, such as we find in our individual consciousness. To these must be added Shadworth H. Hodgson, who, though he rejects a priori forms, holds that existence in the philosophical sense means that which exists in consciousness. By A Priori, again, has been understood the peculiar uniformity which belongs to the operations of thought. Thus Wundt: 'There exist within us only the universal functions of logical thought, *i.e.* those activities of relational comparison which are embodied in the primary laws of logic, and which in turn presuppose the facts of perception as the requisite material for them to work upon.'* Similarly, H. Cornelius regards thought as introducing necessity and uniformity into the flux of phenomena.† According to Renouvier, all ideas are subject to the categories, which are logically prior to them, and of which he enumerates nine, very different from those of Kant, namely, relation, number, position, succession, quality, becoming, causality, purpose, personality. Still another interpretation is given by Sigwart, who in his *Logic* maintains that our thinking is an endeavour to comprehend the world. The ideal of a world completely known looms before us in all we think, an ideal which possesses perfectly definite characteristics, namely, a vision of the world as complete in space and time, an exhaustive classification of all existence in a rounded system of conceptions, and, finally, intuition of the necessity of the given, in the form of an all-pervading causal nexus. Our whole mental life proceeds upon the feasibility of this ideal. Without the conviction that our thought is not aimless, all our striving after knowledge would be futile. Since, however, the possibility of attaining the ideal is manifestly not a datum of experience, the presupposition of it is a priori, not, indeed, as a self-evident truth, but as a postulate. We postulate, in the exercise of thought, the attainability of an ideal knowledge of the world, and therefore the characteristics of this ideal, as given above, namely, the vision of things as a complete whole, exhaustive classification, and intuition of necessity, are themselves postulates. These exhibit a certain affinity with ethical principles. Finding it impossible to surrender them, we brace ourselves, in spite of every failure, again and again to the task of realizing them, convinced that we are acting under the imperative of a moral idea. And in the sphere of practice, too, there hovers before our thought an ideal, which springs from the longing after perfect unity and harmony in our acts of will—the ideal of the highest good. Thus, on Sigwart's view, the essential A Priori, whether in the realm of reason or in that of practice, consists of postulates concerning the possibility of realizing lofty ideals. They can be realized, however, only by the effort of our conative faculty; we can reach the goal, even in the intellectual realm, only by exercise of will. It is significant that Sigwart thus makes out a connexion between the theoretical and the practical, and that in his opinion the A Priori has a meaning which transcends the former, being based ultimately, in fact, upon volition, *i.e.* the practical determination of the mind.‡ Sigwart also contends for an A Priori that may be taken as expressing the uniformity and activity peculiar to thought. The formation of number, in particular, rests upon an act of thought. Number cannot originate in sensible impressions, but only in the activity of thought, which in its combination of impressions, posits unity. No mere process of abstraction can possibly yield number. From a variety of red objects we can abstract the colour red as a property of all; but how, from a heterogeneous group of things, say, sun, moon, stars, trees, chimes, shall we isolate the idea of number as common to all? In virtue of our ability to delimit any particular portion of our experience, we can spontaneously posit such portion as a unity; we may, for instance, take a tree, or, if we please, its trunk, its root, a branch, a leaf, and think of each as *one*. By repeated acts of thus positing unity we obtain a numerical series, and at the same time the law of its formation. In this connexion Sigwart gives a full discussion of the views of J. S. Mill, who maintained that even in this field we owe everything to experience. Mill held that it is the evidence of the senses alone which convinces us that when, for instance, ten balls are variously distributed into two groups, as 1 and 9, 2 and 8, 3 and 7, etc., their sum is always 10. To this Sigwart rejoins that, if this be so, Mill must still accept the evidence of sense when an expert conjurer operates with three pebbles in such a way as apparently to produce two groups of 2 each, and to finish by showing that there are but 3 after all. Now, even if, in consequence of any miraculous change, two pairs of things were to produce 5 in all, we would indeed say that two *things* added to two *things* made five *things*, but we should still maintain that 2+2=4. Hence numeration is based upon acts of thought, and is therefore of an a priori character.§ Moreover, space and time are a priori, though in a more limited degree than Kant supposed; likewise the axiom that two different objects cannot occupy the same portion of space at the same time, an axiom which regulates the very idea of an object,‖ etc.

Consistent empiricists, such as Ozolbe and Mill, repudiate the A Priori altogether, as does also R. Avenarius with his empiriocriticism. On such a theory there is no difference in principle between psychical and physical, subject and object, consciousness and existence. According to Avenarius, *pure* experience is the starting-point, and again, as freed from every perversion and error, it is the goal. The individual discovers in pure experience both himself and the constituents of his environment. Every experience consists of two elements, the facts of the environment and the judgments of the mind, distinguished by Avenarius as R-values and E-values respectively. Both are equally present: there is no essential difference between them; they inhere in the *one* experience. An A Priori is therefore out of the question.*

In the question as to the recognition of an A Priori in *Consciousness*, the point at issue is really whether the mind is like an empty vessel, filled only from without, or whether it manipulates its own materials. When we state the question thus, we necessarily imply that we have to deal with something more than a problem in Epistemology. The matter cannot be settled in reference to knowledge alone; it also involves morality, art, religion, culture, and these perhaps in a more marked degree. The utterly misleading character of the empty-vessel metaphor appears from the fact that knowledge never simply comes to us, but is won only by effort. Such a passive acquisition as the metaphor would imply is a sheer impossibility. Even natural science, the experiential science *par excellence*, depends upon and advances by mental activity. Consciousness, therefore, is not anything quiescent, or merely receptive; it is something operative and constructive. We must further ask, however, whether the mind works simply as a machine, elaborating raw material into definite shape, and is thus of a merely formal character, or whether it does more. According to Kant, as to most of the present-day thinkers whose views have been touched upon in the foregoing survey, the mind's contribution is entirely restricted to the formal, the material quota being furnished in full by experience. Now it must certainly be admitted that natural science—to refer to it once more—is grounded in experience; it must begin with experience, and keep in constant touch with it. But it is none the less certain that natural science is continually begetting ideal entities, without which it could make no headway; such are, for instance, the conceptions of 'atom,' 'law' even 'matter' itself, not one of which is yielded by the senses. Thus the mind interweaves the data of sense with its own products. Nor is this discredited by the fact that such ideas as 'atom' and 'matter' are vigorously assailed at the present day, and may eventually be abandoned, since any conceivable surrogate thereof must come, not from bare experience, but from the mind itself, as is illustrated, for example, in Ostwald's *Vorlesungen über Naturphilosophie*, where the conception of matter gives place to that of energy. Everywhere, in short, does natural science set up a scaffolding of ideal construction, without which it would fall to pieces. Thus the mind exhibits even in this sphere a real productivity, which is certainly called into operation, but is in nowise created, by experience.

When we come to *Art*, the case is clearer still. To think of art as having no other function than to reproduce the external world as accurately as possible is totally to misconceive it. In its transition stages such extrinsic work may be of importance—*e.g.* in painting, the representation of light, atmosphere, and colour, and in the drama, the imitation of vernacular dialect and idiom; these things make for a more flexible technique. Nevertheless, they are but preparatory. Genuine art begins in the bodying forth of spiritual entities. It must express the best that men feel and think, that to which language in itself would be inadequate. The highest art, in fact, has often a prophetic cast; it is the herald of what ought to be; or, again, it wrestles with the deepest problems of life, being intimately connected with one's philosophy of things. In all this, however, it does not draw upon external reality, but manifests

* *System der Philosophie*, ed. 1, 218.
† *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 329 f.
‡ *Logik*, ed. 2, ii. § 62. § *Ib.* ii. § 66. ‖ *Ib.* ii. § 72.

* *Kritik der reinen Erfahrung*; *Der menschliche Weltbegriff*.

creative power, and is thus an additional witness to the fact that the mind has something all its own.

In *Morality*, again, everything depends upon the inner life. Morality cannot conceivably be a product of experience. For in this province the mind furnishes its own laws, and frames the ideas to which the outer world must conform, *e.g.* the idea of justice, of brotherly love. The man who sees in morality nothing more than the rules of conduct indispensable to human intercourse, is simply blind to its essential character. It is not designed to institute some commonplace relationship amongst men, being primarily directed towards the realization of truth and purity in the individual; indeed, it may even be the most uncompromising enemy of a given social state, and, should unveracity, luxury, or baseness have become dominant therein, it must threaten the fabric with destruction, whatsoever outward grandeur may perish in its fall. It was thus, for instance, that early Christianity sapped the foundations of a civilization which had become a sham.

Now, it forms no reasonable objection to this theory of a productive energy in mind to say that, since these Ideas are, like all else, facts of consciousness, as is maintained by the thinkers who would identify philosophy with psychology, they are therefore evolved from mere experience. If consciousness is to cover everything, then all its various 'facts' would be co-ordinate and of equal value, and any gradation amongst them out of the question. Arbitrary changes of consciousness, or even changes determined by mechanical causality, would simply follow upon one another, and no arrangement or grouping thereof would mean more than any other. Amid such conditions we could not even so much as ask for the truth. Now, in point of fact, all distinctively mental creations claim to have judicial authority; judgments purport to be more than collocations of psychical products; æsthetic and ethical Ideas involve more than feelings and desires. They claim, in short, to be authoritative, to be the standard of truth and law for what is given in experience. We must distinguish between the *quæstio facti* and the *quæstio juris*; it is one thing to ask what *is*, quite another to ask what *ought to be*. In dealing with the distinctively mental, we discover something beyond the fact of determination by natural law, namely, *regulative* law. The laws of logic, of æsthetics, and of morality, unlike the laws of nature, formulate that which ought to take place, not that which actually and invariably does take place. Thus we cannot deny the fact of the mind's peculiar heritage, as evinced by this unique claim to regulative authority. We must allow, nevertheless, that the objection indicated above, namely, that even these peculiar intellectual products must manifest themselves in consciousness, is something more than a truism; it expresses the fact that the real cannot be evolved by purely logical processes from abstract conceptions alone. Speculation at large is mere sophistry; typical examples of the method are Hegel in philosophy, and in theology Rothe, who, in speaking of thought, says: 'While engaged in speculation, it shuts its eyes for the time to all that is external, and looks only within, contemplating the dialectic movement amid which it has placed itself. Without a single side-glance, it pursues only the dialectic necessity with which each conception as it comes to birth in turn begets new conceptions in virtue of its inherent fertility.'* But it is manifest that this speculative method cannot evolve reality, even spiritual reality, from conception. It is therefore quite legitimate, in opposition to a mode of thought which arrogates to itself creative omnipotence, to emphasize the experiential character of our knowledge. But, on the other hand, empiricism is in error when it narrows down experience to experience of what is external; the mind has also an experience of itself. The real nature of mind can be manifested only in consciousness—and upon this fact depends the experiential character of our mental life; but what concerns us here is the mind's experience of its own peculiar endowment, which, as we have seen, claims to possess regulative authority, and thus carries us beyond the bare experience of empiricism.

* *Theologische Ethik*, ed. 2, i. 19.

This doctrine is not only in conflict with the purely speculative method, but is also at variance with the view of Kant. Kant believed that he could completely and finally determine that which belonged to mind or reason; but his conclusions were of a purely formal kind. The view advocated here involves not only a much greater amplitude in our mental life, but also a capacity for producing even *real* elements. What the mind really is cannot be determined once for all; an avenue must ever be left open for further developments. In other words, there is a historical element in consciousness, or at least in human consciousness. We are not for ever tied down to the same unvarying forms, into which all kinds of material must be pressed; the truth is, rather, that we possess creative Ideas which are ever proposing fresh problems to experience, and setting it new tasks. We must insist upon the fact of development and movement in our intellectual life, and decline to identify its essential principle with the invariability of its formal determinations. In giving birth to Ideas, the mind puts definite questions to the empirically real, and assimilates the answers thereof, thus winning for its Ideas a structure increasingly delicate, and an organization increasingly rich.

The answer given by empirical reality varies according to the kind of question put to it. It is obvious that, on the one hand, Aristotle's investigation of nature by means of the conception of entelechy, *i.e.* a form realizing its own Idea in matter, and, on the other, that of modern science, with its conception of a causal uniformity reducible to mathematical formulæ, must result in wholly diverse views of the world. Neither entelechy nor causality is as such a product of experience; both are concepts of the mind, both purport to be questions regarding the materials of sense, to which appropriate answers can be given by empirical reality, and thus to be capable of bringing the world under the domain of mind. That the Aristotelian conception has been supplanted by the modern does not imply that the former was an illusion pure and simple, or that it was inferior to the latter; as a matter of fact, each is a hypothesis; but the modern conception of causal uniformity has shown itself better adapted to certain purposes than the ancient entelechy. Even the belief that the world can be interpreted on mathematical and mechanico-causal principles was at first an Idea, regarding which it could not be ascertained beforehand whether experience would ratify or confute it. But the Idea has proved fruitful, and has accordingly become increasingly rich in content. From the first it signified more than the purely formal, involving indeed a conviction regarding the actual constitution of the world.

Similarly the manifold æsthetic and ethical Ideas, which are certainly more than mere forms, find their function in organizing the real. We need not go further into that matter here. Suffice it to say that the human mind has brought a great variety of Ideas to bear upon the real, and that it did not begin its task with the same inherent

equipment with which it pursues it. In fine, the mind also has a history.

Now the question arises whether these Ideas should be called a priori. If they are related to history, they must also be related to experience. Nothing save the tedious discipline of facts could have compelled man to form a fresh Idea. We may say with absolute certainty that the mind is not something ready-made, anterior to all experience; it is in reality built up by intercourse with the facts of experience and history. But for that very reason it is not the product of these. What they supply to the mind is but the stimulus to its own creative activity. Accordingly the fresh element generated by this spontaneous activity is an A Priori in reference to the whole province of empirical reality, which thus becomes the mind's *palæstra*, that which is to be organized by means of the Idea. Just as, according to Kant, the a priori forms of reason are the necessary condition of experience in the higher sense, so also are the Ideas generated by the mind. We must likewise note that these Ideas exist only in virtue of the mind's own activity, and that, were this to cease, they would forthwith pass away—another link of affinity with the A Priori of Kant. We must accordingly assign to them the efficiency which marks the A Priori. The fact that they undergo changes and transformations, or that they supplant one another, need not perplex any one who does not postulate the original perfection of the mind. We must grant, of course, that we can win a truth only by much effort, and that our approach to the ultimate and supreme end is asymptotic, never issuing in complete realization. Nevertheless in all our effort and travail we assume the reality of absolute truth; we must, in fact, make this assumption, else were all our striving fruitless, and even partial truth beyond our grasp. Just as the various parts of space lie within one and the same Space, so partial truths are constituents of the one absolute Truth. That this eternal, absolute truth is no *ignis fatuus* appears from the fact that there exists in us a mighty unrest, ever urging us beyond the position we have won. Whence this unrest? Certainly not from without. Were our mind sufficient to itself, no external force could move it onwards. There must exist, therefore, something *in* itself, which ever and anon provokes it to dissatisfaction with what it has achieved, and exposes the errors and imperfections thereof. Hence it is no arbitrary assumption that the human consciousness is interpenetrated by an Absolute Consciousness. The actual existence of this Absolute Mind would thus be the ultimate and supreme A Priori, and we recognize it as such even though we must refrain from analyzing it more particularly. We cannot once for all expiscate its constituent elements by logical operations or by introspection; but it gradually reveals itself in the process of our intellectual life.

To sum up: The A Priori has a threefold significance. It embraces (1) the formal laws of mind, of which logic furnishes the best example; (2) the Ideas generated by the mind; and (3) the contents of the absolute mind. This view, or one all but identical, is championed by the new Idealism, whose principal representative is Prof. R. Eucken, of Jena.

It remains to deal shortly with the significance of the A Priori for *Religion*. It was Kant's conviction that an A Priori is necessary to the very existence of religion; that genuine religion has its source in pure reason. All externals, according to him, such as rubrics and creeds, are incidental, and to look for the procreative forces of religion anywhere else than in pure reason leads to sheer error. Here we have a truth of paramount importance. For if religion is possible only in virtue of an original, inherent resource of the mind, it is clear that every effort to trace the origin of religion to something which is not religion is foredoomed to failure. Research into the most primitive cults never discovers the spot where religion issues from a non-religious soil; it can never get behind some primordial element of the mind. Still less convincing are the hypotheses —ingenious as they often are—which profess to *explain* the origin of religion. A vast prestige is enjoyed by the theory that it arises from the antinomy between our feeling of dependence upon the environment and our consciousness of freedom. Man sees himself conditioned at every point, and in thrall to non-spiritual forces, yet at the same time he is cognizant of his freedom and of his superior dignity in comparison with all that is merely natural; and so, in order to preserve his spiritual personality, he seeks to attach himself to the Absolute Spirit, the result being religion. But it is simply inconceivable how religion should originate in this way—to say nothing of the unproved assumption that such ideas as dependence upon environment and personal freedom prevailed among primitive mankind. Religion as we now have it may perhaps have some connexion with the antinomy in question; its natural growth may even be accelerated thereby; but it cannot possibly arise therefrom. We must carefully distinguish between what can and what cannot be done by historical and psychological research in this sphere. Historical investigation may disclose a continuous regress from highly developed religions to forms ever more simple, till at length the ostensibly lowest is reached; indeed, circumspect reasoning may warrant us in postulating an even more primitive stage, but what is thus elicited is still of the nature of religion. Again, by psychological study we may try to ascertain the particular modes of thought, feeling, and volition with which religion is specially connected—to determine, for instance, whether it is mainly concerned with the conservation and furtherance of the physical or of the moral life; but religion is presupposed in the very inquiry. Kant is therefore quite justified in recognizing an A Priori in religion. His characteristic error lay in the attempt to fix its limits once for all. Here also, however, we must insist upon the fact that fresh formations emerge in the process of development, as, for instance, in the prophets of Israel, or in Jesus. That religion has a link with history is beyond controversy; only in the fulness of time—to use the very language of religion—does the New Revelation come. Nevertheless the fact remains that what is essential, new, and great in such revelation is never an outcome of the actual historical situation, but always a creation of the spirit itself. No scrutiny of nature or history, however assiduous, can of itself bring us into touch with the God of holy love acknowledged by Christianity. We conclude, therefore, that there is an A Priori in religion also, and that its contents are of such a character as cannot be definitely ascertained, but are revealed in what they create.

Kant's results require modification in still another respect. He approached religion from the side of morality. He regarded the A Priori of the former, in contrast with that of the latter, as in some degree derivative. In point of fact, he was not resolute enough in regard to the independent position of religion, and it is Schleiermacher who makes good the deficiency. The latter vindicated the distinctive character of religion as something independent of thought or moral action. True, his own definition of religion as 'the feeling of absolute dependence' is most defective. It may be, and has often been, misunderstood, since 'feeling' has a psychological reference which tends to obscure its

a priori signification. Hence the protest of Hegel: 'It is matter of experience that the ingredients of feeling are of the most fortuitous character; they may be of the purest, or of the basest. If God lives in feeling, He is in no way superior to the worst, for on this soil the kingliest flower may shoot up beside the rankest weeds.'* Schleiermacher's real meaning, however, is not affected by this criticism. His 'feeling of absolute dependence' has nothing in common with the emotions aroused by sensuous phenomena, and distinguished as pleasant or painful. Within the limits of the purely empirical we can never have the feeling of *absolute*, but only of partial, dependence. Schleiermacher's definition has thus a metaphysical reference, and lies beyond the scope of ordinary psychology. But the misinterpretation is in part due to himself; he fails to give adequate and unambiguous expression to the non-experiential side of religion, *i.e.* its A Priori. He does justice, however, to its independence of thought and morality. We may now, in fact, take for granted that neither thought (as it was applied, *e.g.*, in the so-called proofs of God's existence) nor morality (as, *e.g.*, it was put into requisition by Kant) can of itself create religion or the elements thereof. Religion, with all that belongs to it, is something *sui generis*. It must, therefore, carry its own authority. Its independence implies its inherent certainty.

We have thus been brought to the question regarding the truth of religion, and at the same time have given an answer in part, viz., that a truly logical demonstration is yielded neither by history nor experience, neither by scientific thought nor morality. The truth of religion lies ultimately in itself alone. It is based neither upon experience, nor science, nor art, nor morality, nor culture; on the contrary, all these are ultimately based upon religion. All of them purport to be more than merely subjective activities, and this larger significance is valid only if the spiritual life of man is encompassed and sustained by a superhuman, cosmical spiritual Life. But no other proof of the presence of the Absolute Spirit in the human is so convincing and incisive as that afforded by religion. It is possible, indeed, that our religious certitude may be shattered; but when that happens, we only need to show, in order to restore it, that science, art, morality, and culture must likewise go by the board, and that accordingly the assured position of these indirectly endorses the truth of religion. Such an indirect proof cannot, of course, finally override every doubt; only a more intense experience of the religious facts themselves can do that. All this goes to show the importance of the A Priori for the truth of religion. In the A Priori the independent and self-evidencing character of religion finds its clearest manifestation; in it likewise is revealed the operation of a Power superior to the human. In the religious sphere, as everywhere else, the A Priori claims to have the authority of law. Not man's present condition, but the Imperative of the a priori Idea, is that which must prevail; and the emergence of such Ideas in human life is inexplicable save on the view that the spiritual life of man is interpenetrated by an Absolute Spirit. The ultimate and supreme A Priori subsists in God, and without His self-manifestation, without revelation, there could be no religion.

LITERATURE.—Special treatises on the subject are few; particular mention must be made of Eucken, *Gesch. und Kritik der Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart*, 1st ed. 1878, 2nd 1893, 3rd (under the title *Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart*) 1904 [the three editions differ thus: the 1st is mainly historical, the 3rd mainly analytical, the 2nd combines both aspects]. To these may be added: Eucken, *Gesch. der philos. Terminologie*, 1879; Eisler, *Wörterbuch der philos. Begriffe*, 1904; Scheler, *Die transzendentale und die psychologische Methode*, 1900; Prantl, *Gesch. der Logik*, 1855 ff.; Tröltsch, *Psychologie u. Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft*, 1905; Cassirer, *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie u. Wissenschaft der neuern Zeit*, 1906–7. The works of the philosophers themselves must be studied; above all, Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, to be read along with Vaihinger's *Kommentar zu Kants K. der r. V.* i. 1881, ii. 1892. The A Priori in Kant's ethics is dealt with by Stange, *Einleitung in die Ethik*, 1900; *contra* Stange's view, Hägerström, *Kants Ethik*, 1904; the A Priori in Kant's philosophy of religion, by Kalweit, *Kants Stellung zur Kirche*, 1904; cf. also Caird, *Crit. Phil. of Kant*, 1889, *passim*, see Index.

PAUL KALWEIT.

AQUINAS.—In the church of St. Catarina at Pisa, at the third altar on the left, is a picture by Francesco Traini, the most gifted pupil of Orcagna, representing St. Thomas of Aquino. The figure of the saint is of colossal size. Upon his knees are four books, representing the four parts of his *Summa contra Gentiles*. In his hands is a larger volume, the Sacred Scriptures, displaying Pr 8[7] 'Veritatem meditabitur guttur meum, et labia mea detestabuntur impium.' Above is Christ enthroned in a mandorla, surrounded by cherubim. From His mouth proceed rays of light, one to each of the six Biblical teachers, prostrate at His feet—to His left Moses, St. John, and St. Mark; to His right St. Paul, St. Matthew, and St. Luke. Three rays pass down to the head of St. Thomas, which also receives one ray from each of the Biblical teachers. To the right of the saint stands Aristotle, holding up his *Ethics*; to the left Plato, with the *Timæus*. From these proceed rays reaching the ears of the saint. From his own books proceed rays illuminating the faithful, grouped to right and left. In the middle lies Averroës, struck down by the light—the impious, whom the lips of the great teacher abhor. By his side lies his Great Commentary, transfixed by a ray proceeding from the books on St. Thomas' knees.

This picture faithfully represents the position of the greatest teacher of the mediæval Church, her greatest philosopher, who was also her greatest theologian, absorbing into himself all the sources of wisdom, human and Divine. In his teaching he brought Scholasticism to its highest development, harmonizing the Peripatetic philosophy with the doctrine of the Church.*

1. **Life.**—Aquinas was born in 1225 or 1227 (the date is uncertain), most probably at the castle of Rocca Secca, 5 km. from Aquino. His father was Count of Aquino, a rich fief in the kingdom of Naples. His mother, Theodora, was of the line of the old Norman kings of Sicily. His family was therefore connected with the Hohenstaufen, and so the great doctor of the Church was related to Frederick II., its scourge. At the age of 5 he was placed under the charge of his uncle, the Abbot of Monte Cassino, and he there received his first instruction. This he completed at the University of Naples, recently restored by Frederick II. (1224), and specially favoured by him in opposition to Bologna, which had incurred his wrath by joining the Lombard League. The mendicant orders were then at the zenith of their fame. Thomas was drawn towards them, and in the year 1243 joined the Dominicans without the knowledge of his family. His pious mother was at first not at all dissatisfied with the decision. She only wanted to be allowed to see her son. This the friars were not disposed to permit, fearing lest the claims of family ties might make them lose their promising convert. The mother made known her grief to her other sons, who held high rank in the Emperor's

* *Religionsphilosophie*, i. 73.

* Sandys, *Hist. of Classical Scholarship*[2], p. 582, gives a copy of this picture from Rosini, *Pittura Italiana*. (See also Renan, *Averroès*[2], p. 305; Gsell-Fels, *Mittel-Italien*, p. 561). For a similar picture in the Cappella degli Spagnuoli at Florence (Taddeo Gaddi?), *ib.* p. 385.

army, and besought them to get their brother back again. They succeeded in recovering him from the Dominicans, but no pressure could induce him to lay aside the habit of the order, and even two years' imprisonment in the castle of Rocca Secca could not break his purpose. He employed this time of solitude in studying the Bible and the Sentences. When his mother was convinced that it was impossible to change his will, she herself helped him to escape. He let himself down by a rope from the window, and rejoined the Dominicans. Towards the end of 1244 he accompanied Johannes Teutonicus, the head of the order, to Cologne, to study under Albertus Magnus. They travelled on foot, and reached their destination in 1245, after a journey of three months.

The many stories told of his youth, *e.g.* the well-known one of the *Bos mutus Siciliæ*, show that, as is the case with many great intellects, his development was slow, but before the age of 20 Albertus had discovered his powers, and made him his *alter ego*. On the 4th of June, 1245, at a general chapter of the order held at Cologne, it was decided to send them both to Paris. In 1248 they returned to Cologne. In 1252 Thomas was sent back to Paris to receive his degrees, and to establish an independent school there. This residence was interrupted by the contest of the mendicant orders with the university authorities headed by William of St. Amour. Thomas was sent to Rome to plead the cause of his order before Alexander IV. This he did with success. On his return to Paris he received in 1256 the degree of Magister which had been refused him before on account of his habit. The University bore him no ill-will, and shortly afterwards referred to the young doctor the much agitated question whether the accidents in the Eucharist really exist, or are only appearances.

In 1261 he was summoned to Italy by Urban IV., who tried in vain to persuade him to accept high ecclesiastical preferment. He taught at Ostia, Viterbo, Anagni, Perugia, Bologna, and Rome. In 1269 he returned to Paris, and taught there for three years.* He was then sent by the Order to Naples at the request of the king of Sicily, brother of St. Louis, to give the authority of his name to the school where he had himself received his first important instruction. In 1273 he was summoned by Gregory X. to the Council of Lyons, which was convoked to promote the Crusade and the re-union of the Greek and Latin Churches. Though in bad health, he started, accompanied by brother Reginald, his ever faithful assistant. At the Castle of Magenza—the possession of one of his nieces, the Countess of Ceccano—he fell into a long ecstasy, which much enfeebled him, and after which he felt his end to be near. As he wished to die in a house of his own order, he continued his journey, but was obliged to stop at the Cistercian Abbey of Fossa Nuova near Terracina. There he died, 7th March, 1274. At the time of his death, he was, at the request of his hosts, dictating for them an exposition of the Song of Solomon. He had got as far as 'Filiæ Jerusalem dicite dilecto meo, quia præ amore morior,' when his strength gave way. The report was current that he had been poisoned by Charles of Anjou.†

For nearly a century the Dominicans and Cistercians disputed the honour of possessing his remains. The quarrel was not yet settled when, 49 years after his death, he was canonized by John XXII. It was finally decided in 1368, by a bull of Urban V., that the body should be surrendered to the Dominicans of Toulouse, the mother church of the order. An arm was given to the Convent of St. Jacques at Paris, where St. Thomas and B. Albertus had taught. In 1286 he was raised by the Dominicans to the rank of *Doctor Ordinis*. In 1567 he was made by Pius V. the fifth 'Doctor of the Church,' and thus placed on an equality with St. Jerome, St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, and St. Gregory the Great.*

His works fill 17 folio volumes in the edition of Pius V. (Rome, 1570). Their exact chronological order is not yet completely decided, and the genuineness of some is disputed. He began his literary work at Cologne with the *de Ente et Essentia* (No. 30 of the *Opuscula* in the Roman edition). The most important are the *Summa contra Gentiles*, the materials for which he began to gather at Paris, during his first period of teaching there, at the request of Raymond de Pennaforte; the *Summa Theologica*, begun in 1265 in Italy and left incomplete at his death; the *Quæstiones disputatæ* (1261–1264); the *Quodlibeta*, of which the first five were composed at Paris, the last six at Rome; and the Aristotelian commentaries, begun at the instance of Urban IV.† Besides these, there are commentaries on books of Sacred Scripture, of which the best known is the *Catena Aurea*, properly called *Expositio continua*, and the commentary on the Sentences, which was the first extensive work composed by him.

This enormous literary output is all the more remarkable, when it is remembered that it was far from being the only occupation of these strenuous twenty years. During the whole time Aquinas was busily engaged in teaching. The attraction of his lectures was so great that it was difficult to find a hall large enough to contain the audience. At times he employed three or four secretaries at once, and dictated to them about different subjects without confusion. It is a mistake to speak of him as 'pure embodied intellect perfectly passionless.'‡ This is not the meaning of the primacy of the intellect over the will as taught by him. His hymns are proof enough of this—'the famous sequence, "Lauda Sion Salvatorem," "Pange lingua gloriosi corporis mysterium," "Verbum superne prodiens" (there is a hymn of St. Ambrose beginning with the same line), "Sacris solemniis juncta sint gaudia," and "Adoro te devote latens Deitas."' They were written for the festival of Corpus Christi, the observance of which was decreed by Urban IV. at his instance (1264). They are 'powerful in thought, feeling, and expression,' and probably exercised important influence on the general acceptance of the dogma of transubstantiation, the doctrine of which is set forth in them with a wonderful degree of scholastic precision.§ Every day he had a portion of a book of edification read aloud to him (*Rufini collationes Patrum*); and when asked why he withdrew this time from speculative thought, he answered that he considered the rousing of the spirit of devotion to be the due preparation for the sublimity of speculation. When the feeling of devotion was roused, the spirit rose all the more easily to the contemplation of the highest truth. He never began to study, to lecture, or to write, without first giving himself to prayer to obtain Divine illumination. When doubts intruded upon his investigations, he interrupted them to seek en-

* On the disputed point of the length of this stay at Paris see Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant*, etc., p. 99.

† See Dante, *Purg.* XX. 67 ff., and Scartazzini's note.

* For a complete account of the tributes of respect paid to St. Thomas by the Popes, from Alexander IV. onwards, see Kleutgen, *Die Theologie der Vorzeit vertheidigt*, iv. p. 100. To his list must now be added the Encyclical of Leo XIII., 'Æterni Patris,' 1879.

† On the Aristotelian question and the prohibition of Paris see de Rubeis, XXX. c. 7.

‡ Milman, *Latin Christianity*, IX. 132.

§ Lord Selborne, *EBr* xii. 684; cf. also on the hymns of St. Thomas, Julian, *Dict. of Hymnology*, pp. 22, 662–664. 878–880, 986, 1217–1219.

lightenment in prayer. The fact that the *Summa Theologica* was left incomplete was not due entirely to want of time. In the *Acta* we read: 'The witness—Bartholomew of Capua—declared that brother Reginald, seeing that the holy doctor did not continue the third part of the *Summa*, after the questions dealing with the sacrament of penance, asked him why he had stopped this great work, which he had begun for the glory of God, and which would enlighten the world. St. Thomas, filled with the thought of having soon to appear before the Supreme Judge, replied that he *could* not continue: that all he had written so far appeared to him to be nothing in comparison with the wonderful things that God had been pleased to reveal to him recently.' St. Thomas had a sane mysticism of his own, not the spurious kind that would banish reason from religion altogether, and drown itself in the wild fancies of the *Evangelium æternum*, but that which recognizes, with St. Augustine, that no real progress in the religious life can be made without corresponding progress in knowledge, and for which the supreme communion with God has no other content than that of the *Visio Dei*, i.e. essential knowledge.*

2. Sources.—(1) *The Sacred Scriptures.*—St. Thomas has, of course, a profound knowledge of Scripture according to all the four methods of interpretation (*Sum. Theol.* I. i. art. 10). He insists very strongly on the importance of not sacrificing the historical. For instance (*ib.* I. cii. 1), in discussing the question *Utrum Paradisus sit locus corporeus*, he says: 'Ea, quæ de Paradiso in Scriptura dicuntur, per modum narrationis historicæ proponuntur. In omnibus autem, quæ sic Scriptura tradit, est pro fundamento tenenda veritas, et de super spirituales expositiones fabricandæ.' It is to be noted that in his exposition of Isaiah 8 he has so faithfully presented the *sensus litteralis*, that Cornelius a Lapide and others declare it 'judaica expositio, Divi Thomæ ingenio prorsus indigna.' The three other senses are explained (*ib.* I. i. 10): 'Secundum ergo quod ea quæ sunt veteris legis significant ea quæ sunt novæ legis: est *sensus allegoricus*. Secundum vero quod ea quæ in Christo sunt facta vel in iis quæ Christum significant sunt signa eorum quæ nos agere debemus: est *sensus moralis*. Prout vero significant ea quæ sunt in æterna gloria: est *sensus analogicus*.'

The testimony of Erasmus to St. Thomas' merits as an interpreter of Scripture is amply justified: 'Nam meo quidem animo nullus est recentiorum theologorum, cui par sit diligentia, cui sanius ingenium, cui solidior eruditio: planeque dignus erat, cui linguarum quoque peritia, reliquaque bonarum litterarum supellex contingeret, qui iis quæ per eam tempestatem dabantur tam dextre sit usus' (Rom. I. 5, le Clerc, vol. vi. p. 554).

He had at hand some who were not unacquainted with Hebrew (*e.g.* he knows that תורה is feminine), but this does not prevent him from falling into pitfalls of translation, *e.g.* the use of *verbum* in Lk 1[37] (*Sum. Theol.* I. xxv. 3).†

(2) *The Fathers.*—De Rubeis has counted 56 Greek and 22 Latin Fathers as used by Aquinas. The greater part are taken at first hand. He informs us himself: 'Quasdam expositiones doctorum Græcorum in Latinum feci transferri' (Preface to *Catena aurea*). He makes special use of Dionysius. The charge of Monophysitism made against this author, which has recently been revived, has been amply examined and refuted by de Rubeis in his ninth Dissertation.

(3) *Secular authors.*—Dr. Sandys has noted that the *Summa Theologica* is an embodiment of the scientific spirit of the 13th cent., which stands in sharp contrast with the literary and classical spirit of the 12th.*

(*a*) Aristotle is, of course, the chief. How far his Aristotelianism is pure, and how far coloured by Neo-Platonism, is still *sub judice*. It must be remembered that this process of Platonizing Aristotle had begun by the time of Alexander of Aphrodisias. When Prantl† says that St. Thomas corrupted Aristotelianism and Platonism by the mysticism of the book *de Causis*, this statement needs a good deal of qualification. Aquinas was well aware that Proclus was the author of this book, and he gives the correct title to it, '*elementatio* [not *elevatio*] *theologica*.'‡ It is to be noted that in the crucial question of the νοῦς ποιητικός he is quite free from Neo-Platonic influences. Brentano says: 'He gives an explanation, which is most notably, in all the points above mentioned, in agreement with the fragment of Theophrastus which is preserved in the paraphrase of Themistius.' And again: 'If we ask which of the earlier interpreters has come nearest to the truth, it is undeniable that we must give this honour to St. Thomas. I do not know whether I ought not to say that he has grasped correctly the whole teaching of Aristotle.'§ This question of the νοῦς ποιητικός was the central point of the discussion with Averroism (see *Opusc.* 16, 'de Unitate intellectus'). The charge brought against St. Thomas and Scholasticism in general of following Aristotle blindly has been too often refuted to need any notice.

(*b*) Of Plato he knows only the *Timæus* in Chalcidius' version. He says expressly that the *Republic* was not accessible.

(*c*) Of the Latin philosophers he uses mainly Boethius, Cicero, Macrobius, and Seneca. He is familiar with the *Digest*. De Rubeis (xxx Dissertatio, c. iv.) notes that in the *Summa Theologica* there are quoted 46 Greek, Latin, and Arabic philosophers, besides orators and poets.

(*d*) *The Arabic and Jewish philosophers.*—The indebtedness of Aquinas to these sources has been the subject of much controversy. Some have gone so far as to say that had there been no Maimonides there would have been no Aquinas. This is an exaggeration, but Aquinas had certainly learnt much from the *Moreh Nebuchim*. Compare the arguments about the creation of the world in *Sum. Theol.* I. xlvi. 1 with *Mor. Neb.* ii. c. 15 [ed. Munk, vol. ii. p. 121]. His attitude to Ibn Gebirol is very hostile. 'In opposition to the Franciscans, who carefully preserved and circulated certain opinions of Avencebrol, St. Thomas, like his teacher Albert, rejects his opinions.'‖ He is the bitter enemy of the Andalusian school of Arabic philosophers, and is as well acquainted with Avempace, who is very often referred to in the *Summa contra Gentiles*, as with Averroës.

Of equal importance with his own contributions to the interpretation of Aristotle is the fact that Aquinas secured the making of new translations from the Greek, which displaced the earlier ones which were made from the Arabic. It was at his instance that William of Brabant—William de Moerbeka—is said to have produced in 1273—doubtless with the help of others—a literal translation of the Greek text of all the works of Aristotle.¶

In connexion with this work, the question has

* For a full account of the mysticism of St. Thomas, see Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* iii. 383. He notes that Denifle has shown that Meister Eckhart owed everything to St. Thomas.

† See de Wulf, *Hist. de la philos. médiévale*, p. 330, note 2, from Asín y Palacios.

* *History of Scholarship*[2], p. 583, after Abbot Gasquet. See also Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant*, p. 20.

† *Gesch. der Logik*, iii. 114.

‡ See Bardenhewer, *de Causis*, p. 256 ff.

§ Brentano, *Psychol. des Aristoteles*, pp. 24 and 226; see also, for the whole question, Schneid, *Aristoteles in der Scholastik*, p. 72 f. For his general attitude to Aristotle see Talamo, *L'Aristotelismo della Scolastica*, ch. 1; and Mandonnet, *l.c.*, p. 175.

‖ Wittmann, *Die Stellung des hl. Thomas von Aquin zu Avencebrol*, p. 76.

¶ See de Rubeis, xxiii. ch. 2, on the custom of sending Dominicans to Greece for study.

been raised as to St. Thomas' own knowledge of Greek. This question cannot be answered decisively until all his works have been critically edited. De Rubeis has shown that he was certainly not a complete stranger to the Greek language. 'In his commentary on the *Ethics*, the presentation of the right reading misspelt, and of a ludicrous etymology side by side with one that is very nearly right, seems to show that, while Aquinas had about him people who knew Greek, he had himself no substantial knowledge of it.'*

3. Main points of system.—The age of St. Thomas was also that of Frederick II. of Hohenstaufen and of St. Louis, and these names are representative of the conflicting tendencies of the period. The 12th cent. had witnessed a revival of learning, which was less important than that of the Renaissance, only in point of literary form. It had two sources—Arabian and Byzantine. The former has been fairly well investigated. There is a great deal about the latter that is still obscure. The result was seen at first in the rapid growth of speculative heresy, popular pantheism (David of Dinant), and the more serious, and therefore more dangerous, tendency of thought which afterwards crystallized into Averroism. Hence the prohibition of 1210, and the letter of Gregory IX. to the Parisian masters of theology, 1228.† The question at issue was whether the Church would be able to assimilate the new learning, or whether its doctrines would be gradually corroded away by it. That the former was the case is due to the work of Albertus as completed by St. Thomas. That work was therefore twofold—to harmonize the new scientific teaching with the doctrine of the Church, and to refute heresy.

The distinctive characteristics of the system of philosophy which Thomism displaced in the Western Church are well summed up by de Wulf as follows: 'Absence of any formal distinction between the domain of philosophy and that of theology, *i.e.* between the order of rational and of revealed truth; primacy of the notion of the good over that of the true, and in consequence primacy of the will over the intellect both in God and man; the necessity of an immediate illuminative action of God in accomplishing certain intellectual acts; actuality, in a low degree, but still some positive actuality in primitive matter independent of any substantial form; the presence in matter of *rationes seminales*;‡ even spiritual substances are composed of matter and form; plurality of forms in natural things; individuality of the soul independently of its union with the body, especially in man; the identity of the soul with its faculties' (*Gilles de Lessines*, p. 15). The philosophical element incorporated in this school was essentially Platonic.

For this Thomism substitutes Aristotelianism: not blindly, for 'locus ab auctoritate est infirmissimus' (*Sum. Theol.* I. i. 8, ad. 2), but critically, 'si audierit omnes quasi adversariorum dubitantium' (*Metaph.* iii., Lect. 1), though respectfully. The novelty of the teaching of St. Thomas is universally dwelt upon—novelty not only in method, but in matter. The main novelties were: strict distinction between Natural and Revealed Theology; unity of the substantial principle, as opposed to the plurality of forms; passive evolution of matter, as opposed to the theory of *rationes seminales*; the doctrine of subsistent forms, as opposed to the notion of spiritual substances being composed of matter and of form; the real distinction of the substance of the soul and its faculties, as opposed to the Augustinian doctrine of their identity; the primacy of the intellect over the will.* The new system was, of course, not received without a struggle, which continued long after the death of St. Thomas. The articles of 1277 were directed not merely against Averroism, but against Peripateticism in general.†

Notwithstanding the vast extent of St. Thomas' writings, a sufficient knowledge of his whole system may be obtained from the two *Summæ*. The *Opuscula* are useful for giving a more elaborate treatment of special subjects, but the whole is to be found in the two great works. There is little sign of gradual development in his writings, because he early reached his complete system. In the *Acta*, p. 670, we have the evidence of Ægidius of Rome (afterwards bishop of Bourges): 'In this marvellous and memorable doctor, it was a manifest token of the subtlety of his genius and the accuracy of his judgment, that as a master neither in teaching nor in writing did he change the new opinions and arguments which he upheld as a bachelor, with very few exceptions.'‡ The fact is that Albertus had laid the foundations, St. Thomas completed and elaborated in detail. But both the *Summæ* must be employed. The better known *Summa Theologica* handles many philosophical problems very briefly, which are dealt with at length in the other, which is in consequence often called 'Summa Philosophica.' In the short preface to the *Sum. Theol.* the author says that it is intended to be a compendium for beginners, and that he will deal with the questions 'breviter et dilucide.' These questions are dealt with in the Commentaries on Aristotle at even greater length; but it is a mistake to expect to find in these invariably St. Thomas' own opinions. Those of Albertus are modelled after Avicenna, and are therefore dissertations on the principal points dealt with by the Greek philosopher. St. Thomas proceeded 'quodam singulari et novo modo' (*Acta*, p. 661). This new method was that of Averroës, not following the text servilely, but expressing its meaning as faithfully as possible. They therefore are intended to give Aristotle's own meaning, which may or may not be that of the writer. They ought not, therefore, to be quoted as always giving St. Thomas' views; there may even be found in them some traces of the influence of the great commentator whose system it was the object of St. Thomas to overthrow.

SUMMA PHILOSOPHICA.—*Summa de veritate catholicæ fidei contra gentiles* is the title as given by Uccelli from the autograph MS, though the work is not addressed to Gentiles in the proper sense, but to Muhammadans, Jews, heretics, and unbelievers of all sorts, *i.e.* all outside the Church. Since the opponents either do not recognize the authority of sacred Scripture at all or only imperfectly, and do not recognize that of the Church, it is necessary in their case 'to have recourse to natural reason, although in things Divine this is insufficient.' The work is divided into four books. In the *First*, Aquinas deals with the existence and attributes of God. In the *Second*, he shows how all things proceed from God as regards their being and their distinctive characteristics. The development of this subject leads him to speak of the different kinds of substances, and especially of the *substantiæ intellectuales*, regarded in them-

* Sandys, *l.c.* p. 583 f.; de Rubeis, xxx. c. 3; Mandonnet, *l.c.* p. 55.

† This letter is given in Denzinger's *Enchiridion*, § 379.

‡ On *rationes seminales*—an idea derived from St. Augustine—see Kleutgen, *Philos. der Vorzeit*, i. 125.

* On this matter Mandonnet, *l.c.* p. 66; de Wulf, *La Philos. médiévale*[2], p. 369, and *Gilles de Lessines*, p. 15.

† One of the strongest opponents of Thomism was John Peckham, Abp. of Canterbury. See the two letters in the Rolls edition of his register (vol. iii. p. 864), to the Chancellor and University of Oxford, and (p. 870), to certain cardinals. See *Acta Sanct.*, March 7, p. 710.

‡ These exceptions are to be found mainly in his commentary on the sentences. For them see Mandonnet, *l.c.* pp. 63 and 259; de Wulf, *Philos. médiév.* p. 370; de Rubeis, xiii. cap. 5, xxvii. cap. 2.

selves, in their relations to body, and in their operations. He dwells specially, of course, upon the human soul, demonstrates its spiritual nature and its personality, and develops his theory of knowledge. The *Third* shows that all things are ordered towards one end, which is God, and that the supreme and final blessedness of man consists in the contemplation of God; that Providence embraces the whole universe, that it extends to intelligent creatures, without destroying their liberty, and prescribes to them laws, which are the norm of all their duties. The *Fourth* gives an exposition of revealed truth. This is above the powers of unassisted human intellect. All that can be done, therefore, is to show that these truths are beyond, not contrary to, human reason.

Summa Theologica.—This is divided into three parts. The *First* deals, in 119 *Quæstiones*, with God, and the procession of all things from God. The *Second* is divided into two sections, the first of which deals with Ethics in general, in 114 *Quæstiones*; the second with Ethics *in speciali*, in 189 *Quæstiones*. The *Third* deals with Christ and the sacraments, but breaks off in the middle of the sacrament of penance. In the short preface to this part the scheme is laid down to deal first with the Saviour Himself; then with the sacraments by which we attain salvation; thirdly, with immortal life, which we reach through Him by the Resurrection. To complete the work, therefore, the rest of the sacraments and the eschatology have been added from the commentary on the Sentences.* Each *Quæstio* is divided into a number of *Articuli*, and each article consists of three parts. (1) The difficulties are alleged, which seem to negative the *Quæstio*; (2) the authorities are quoted, sacred and secular; (3) then follows the philosophical discussion based on first principles, and the resolution of the difficulties. The whole is one of the most magnificent monuments of the human intellect, dwarfing all other bodies of theology into insignificance. Apart from its importance as the authoritative code of Latin Christianity, it is great as a work of art. At the Council of Trent it was placed on the desk, side by side with the sacred Scriptures, as normative of the discussions.

The Præambula Fidei.—The principal novelty in theology is the strict separation of natural from revealed. It had not so been laid down by any of the Fathers, or by any of the preceding Schoolmen; but it has remained in force, not only in Catholic but in Protestant countries.† The principles of the division are laid down as follows: It is the object of wisdom, taken absolutely, to discover the truth, and therefore, incidentally, to unmask falsehood. By truth is here meant, not any special truth, such as is the object of a special science, but the ultimate absolute truth, which is the foundation of all special truths (*Sum. c. Gent.* i. 1). The way of attaining to this truth is double. There are some things which are true about God, which transcend entirely the powers of human reason, such as the doctrine of the Trinity in unity, and all the distinctively Christian dogmas. There are others to which natural reason can attain, such as those of the existence and the unity of God. These things the philosophers have demonstrated exactly, under the guidance of the light of human reason (*ib.* i. 3).

When we speak of this double nature of truth, this must be understood relatively to ourselves, not as concerning the nature of truth absolutely. When we speak of a double truth in things divine, this is not to be understood in reference to God Himself, who is the one and simple truth, but in reference to our own knowledge, which has different ways of reaching this Divine truth (*ib.* i. 9).

(1) The first way is *ratio naturalis*. It is not the intention of St. Thomas in any way to vilipend reason, and so to drive it outside the sphere of religion altogether. It is *deficiens, i.e.* insufficient for ascertaining the truth completely, but not deceptive. It is 'the impression of the Divine light in us.' The light of natural reason by which we discern between good and evil, in that which appertains to the natural law, is nothing else than the impression of the Divine light in us (*Sum. Theol.* II.a. xci. 2). Human reason is perfected by God in two ways: first, by a natural perfection, according to the light of reason; secondly, by a supernatural perfection, by means of the theological virtues. Although this second perfection is greater than the first, the first perfection is possessed by man in a more perfect way; for the first is held by man, as it were, in full possession. The second is held only imperfectly, because such is our knowledge and love of God (*ib.* II.a. lxviii. 2).

(2) The second way is *faith*. The knowledge of God by faith comes to us by Divine revelation (*Sum. c. Gent.* iv. i.). Since the knowledge of God to which man can attain by reason is deficient, He has, out of His superabundant mercy, to make it more perfect, revealed to us certain things about Himself which transcend human knowledge. In this revelation a certain order is observed, such as is suited to man, so that he may proceed by degrees from the imperfect to the perfect. At first they are so revealed as not to be understood, but only to be believed, as it were, on hearsay, because the intellect of man, when in that state in which it is bound to things of sense, cannot raise itself at all to behold those things which exceed all the analogies of sense; but when it is freed from the bondage of sensible things, then it can rise to contemplate the things that are revealed (*ib.*). There is therefore in one sense a *triple* division of man's knowledge of Divine things, on account of this division of faith into two degrees (*ib.*).

This second means of reaching truth is needed: (*a*) On account of the imperfection of natural reason. The human intellect cannot succeed by its natural powers in grasping the substance of God, because the knowledge of our intellect according to the mode of this present life begins with the objects of sense. We see that there are various grades of intelligence. The simple rustic cannot understand what is intelligible to the philosopher, nor can the philosopher understand that which is intelligible to the angel (*ib.* i. 3). (*b*) Out of mercy it extends even to those things which natural reason could discover, because few could thus attain to them. The process of investigation takes a long time, and is not certain to be successful, because falsehood creeps in on account of the weakness of the intellect and the disturbing element of the fancy (*ib.* i. 4). Faith, therefore, supersedes but does not destroy reason. The lesser light is not darkened by the greater, but is rather increased, as the light of the air is by that of the sun; and in this way the light of science is not darkened, but rather grows brighter, in the soul of Christ by means of the light of Divine knowledge (*Sum. Theol.* III. ix. 1 ad 2). Still less is it contrary to it. Because it transcends reason, it is thought by some to be contrary to it; but this is impossible (*Sum. c. Gent.* i. 7). The relation, therefore, between philosophy and theology is clear.—(i.) Each has its proper province. In the teaching of philosophy, which considers the creatures in themselves, and leads us from them to the knowledge of God, it is the creatures who are considered first, and finally God. But in the teaching of Faith, which considers the

* On this supplementum see de Rubeis, xiii. cap. 6.

† In 1271 a decree was made at Paris that no teacher of the philosophical faculty should deal with any of the specifically theological questions. See Thurot, *De l'organisation de l'Enseignement dans l'Université de Paris*, p. 105.

creature only in its relation to God, it is God who is the first object of consideration and the creatures afterwards (*Sum. c. Gent.* ii. 4). (ii.) Natural reason must keep to its own department. Only those things can be known about God by natural reason which belong to the unity of His essence, but not those which belong to the division of the Persons. Therefore the attempt to prove the doctrine of the Trinity by human reason injures faith in two ways: (α) as concerns the dignity of faith itself, *i.e.* that it is concerned with things invisible, which, therefore, transcend human reason; (β) as regards the benefit of bringing others to the faith. For when a man brings reasons that are not cogent to demonstrate the faith, he only provokes the scorn of the unbelieving (*Sum. Theol.* I. xxxii. 1).* But natural reason can defend the Articles of the Faith, by showing that they are not repugnant to reason (*Sum. c. Gent.* iv. 1). (iii.) Those truths that can be discovered by natural reason, though they form part of revelation, are not *articuli fidei*, but only *præambula ad articulos* (*Sum. Theol.* I. ii. 2).†

Ethics.—To Ethics is devoted the third part of the *Sum. c. Gent.* and the second part (in two divisions) of the *Sum. Theol.* The numerous sources of St. Thomas' learning have led to much complexity in his ethical system. It is based on that of Aristotle, but the fourfold division of Plotinus is also introduced (II.a. lxi. 5 from Macrobius). In the development of the idea of virtue, and the division of virtues into moral and intellectual, he follows Aristotle. The intellectual take precedence, because the contemplative life, if the contemplation be theological, stands higher than the practical: 'Ultima et perfecta beatitudo non potest esse nisi in visione divinæ essentiæ' (II.a. iii. 8), and 'beatitudo est præmium virtuosarum operationum' (II.a. v. 7). The moral value of actions is determined by three elements: (1) *ex objecto*; (2) *ex circumstantia*; (3) *ex fine* (II.a. xviii.), and 'bonum virtutis moralis consistit in adæquatione ad mensuram rationis' (II.a. lxiv. 1). There are three intellectual virtues: (1) *sapientia* ('quæ considerat altissimas causas'); (2) *scientia* (*conclusionum*); (3) *intellectus* ('habitus primorum principiorum,' II.a. lvii.). The moral virtues differ according to their objects. Some regulate actions, some passions. The first are comprised under the general name of *justitia* ('omnis virtus quæ facit bonum debiti et recti in operationibus est justitia,' II.a. lx. 3). The other ten Aristotelian virtues are brought under the heads of (1) *prudentia* ('omnis virtus quæ facit bonum in consideratione rationis'); (2) *temperantia* ('quæ cohibet passiones et deprimit'); (3) *fortitudo* ('quæ facit firmitatem animi contra quascunque passiones,' II.a. lxi. 3). These are the *virtutes acquisitæ*, and are subordinate to the theological virtues ('virtutes infusæ'), viz. *Faith*, which completes our knowledge by the truths, which can only be known by revelation; *Hope*, which renders accessible the Divine end, which passes the forces of nature; and *Charity*, by which the will unites itself to that end, and so to speak transforms itself into it. *Fides* without *caritas* is *informis*.

The question of the will and its freedom is discussed at length (I. lxxxii. and lxxxiii.): 'voluntas media est inter rationem et concupiscibilem et potest ab utroque moveri' (II.b. clv. 3). It corresponds to the understanding, just as the natural appetite does to the senses (II.a. cix. 2). The question is discussed 'utrum homo possit velle et facere bonum absque gratia.' The answer given is carefully qualified.

It is a characteristic of Thomism that it maintains that good is *per se*, not *ex institutione* ('perseitas boni'). This is based upon Aquinas' view of the will, which in God as well as in man has knowledge for its presupposition and basis.

One of the most remarkable sections of the *Prima Secundæ* is the discussion on law (xc.–cviii.)—the first scientific discussion of the subject in post-classical times, and, says Jourdain, the best introduction to the study of law which has ever been written.* In the operation of the moral law on the mind, Aquinas distinguishes between the *synderesis* and *conscientia*, the former being the general moral consciousness—the latter applying this to particular cases (I. lxxix. 13 ad 3): 'Habitus autem ex quibus conscientia informatur etsi multi sunt, omnes tamen efficaciam habent ab uno primo principio, scilicet ab habitu primorum principiorum, qui dicitur synderesis.' Aquinas is decidedly anti-Socialistic (II.b. lxvi. 1), and, of course, no advocate of toleration (II.b. xi. 3).

The influence of Aquinas has been all-powerful over those who have come after him, not merely within the limits of Scientific Theology; *e.g.* in Dante's *Paradiso*, x. 8. 2, it is St. Thomas who speaks in heaven;† his writings had a mysterious influence over Savonarola;‡ and Baillet tells us that St. Thomas was the favourite author of Descartes, and the only theologian he ever wished to study.§ How much Hooker was his debtor any one may see who compares the first book of the *Ecclesiastical Polity* with St. Thomas' section upon 'law.'

Is Thomism a system still valid for our times, or are we to regard it as an overpassed standpoint? This is the question that lies at the root of the debates about the Encyclical *Pascendi*. One thing is clear, that Thomism is absolutely incompatible with the conception of Evolution—Transformism—that dominates modern thought. 'Nulla forma substantialis suscipit magis et minus' (*de Potentia*, III. ix. ad 9; de Wulf, *Gilles de Lessines*, p. 59). But is Transformism compatible with the theology of the Catholic Church?

LITERATURE.—An elaborate Bibliography of works bearing on St. Thomas is given in Ueberweg-Heinze's *Gesch. der Philos.*[3] ii. p. 272 ff. Since then have appeared (among many others): Wittmann, *Die Stellung des H. Thomas von Aquin zu Avencebrol*, 1900; Grünwald, *Gesch. der Gottesbeweise im Mittelalter*, 1907 [both in Baeumker's *Beiträge*]; Luquet, 'Aristote et l'Université de Paris pendant le xiii^e Siècle,' 1904 (*Bibliothèque de l'École des hautes études*); Eucken, *Thomas von Aquino und Kant, ein Kampf zweier Welten*, 1901; Picavet, *Hist. générale et comparée des Philosophies Médiévales*[2], 1907, where ch. ix. gives a useful survey of Neo-Thomism.

The authorities for the life are in the Bollandist *Acta Sanctorum*, March 7. The principal one is William de Tocco. Mandonnet (*l.c.* p. 81) considers him weak in chronology.

The fullest account of Thomism (philosophical) is Kleutgen, *Die Philos. der Vorzeit vertheidigt*[2], 1878; (theological) do., *Die Theol. der Vorzeit vertheidigt*[2], 1867, 6 vols. The system is well summed up from the Catholic side in Schwane, *Dogmengesch.* 1882, vol. iii.; and Willmann, *Gesch. des Idealismus*, 1896, ii. pp. 442–541; and from the Protestant in Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* iii. p. 424 ff. De Wulf, *Hist. de la Philos. médiévale*[2], is specially to be recommended; as also, for the conflict with Averroism, Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant*, etc., 1899.

H. Sidgwick gives a good summing up of the Ethics of St. Thomas in *EBr* viii. p. 594 (to which the present writer owes obligation). R. L. Poole, *Illust. of Hist. of Mediæval Thought*, 1884, p. 240, gives a good review of his political theories.

Of the edition of the complete works (Leo XIII.), 12 vols. have now appeared, the last completing the *Summa Theologica*. In the first are the invaluable dissertations of de Rubeis. There is a convenient edition of the *Sum. Theol.* published at Rome in 6 vols. 1894 (Editio aureo numismate donata a S. P. Leone XIII.). See also Uccelli, *Sum. c. Gent.* from the autograph MS, 1878;

* This point is elaborated in his *contra Græcos, Armenos et Saracenos*, cap. 2, No. 3 of *Opuscula* in Roman edition.

† Therefore, of course, philosophy is *ancilla Theologiæ* (*Sum. c. Gent.* ii. 4: 'Unde et theologia maxima sapientia dici debet, utpote semper altissimam causam considerans, et propter hoc ipsi, quasi principali, philosophia humana deservit.'

* Rashdall speaks of the result of the study of Civil Law at Bologna as the most brilliant achievement of the intellect of modern Europe (from Sandys, *l.c.* p. 583).

† See Ozanam, *Dante et la Philos. Cathol.*, p. 317 f.

‡ Villari, *Savonarola*, vol. i. p. 5: 'Le opere di San Tommaso lo attiravano con una forza quasi misteriosa'; p. 329: 'Aveva poi, sin da fanciullo, preso nel leggere e studire San Tommaso una strana passione.'

§ Baillet, *La vie de M. Descartes*, 1691, p. 286 (from Jourdain).

De Maria, *Opus. Philos. et Theol. et Quodlibeta*, Città di Castello, 3 vols., 1886.

The principal works on St. Thomas are:

Jourdain, *La Philos. de St. Thomas d'Aquin*, 2 vols., 1858; Werner, *Thomas von Aquino*, 3 vols., 1858 (new ed. 1889); Frohschammer, *Die Philos. d. T. v. Aquino kritisch gewürdigt*, 1889; Guttmann, *Das Verhältniss des Thomas von Aquino zum Judenthum*, etc., 1891.

For the translations of St. Thomas' works into other languages, see de Rubeis, xiii. c. 8; and Steinschneider, *Heb. Uebersetz. des Mittelalters*, pp. 483–489; also Jellinek, *Thomas von Aquino in der jüd. Literatur*, 1853.

For St. Thomas' psychology, cf. Siebeck, *Gesch. der Psychol.* vol. ii. pp. 448–472; Schütz, *Thomas Lexicon*², 1895.

(By this bibliography the writer desires to express a general sense of indebtedness, especially to Werner, Jourdain, and de Rubeis, in addition to what is expressed in direct reference].

J. M. HEALD.

ARABS (ANCIENT).

[TH. NÖLDEKE].

THE term 'ancient Arabs' is used in this article to denote the pre-Muhammadan population of the greater part of the Arabian Peninsula and of the neighbouring districts to the North, which were inhabited by Arabs (*i.e.* the Syrian Desert, etc.). But the ancient civilized population of Southern Arabia, the Sabæans or Ḥimyarites, is not included, since their religion demands a separate treatment. See SABÆANS.

The evidence which we possess does not enable us to form anything like a complete and vivid picture of the religion of the ancient Arabs. Wellhausen was therefore quite justified in entitling his treatise *Reste Arabischen Heidentums* ('Remains of Arabian Heathenism')*—a work which throws into the shade all previous books on the subject, and sets forth very many of the results embodied in the present article. As regards the older period, we are dependent mainly upon isolated statements of Greek writers, and upon Greek or Semitic inscriptions,† which mention various deities, either expressly or implicitly, as one of the elements in compound proper names of human beings, but supply us with scarcely any detailed information. These authorities relate exclusively to the Arabs of the northern regions. Somewhat fuller evidence, respecting the religion of the tribes who inhabited the Peninsula in the latest heathen period, is furnished by Arabic literature. Occasional references to the heathen religion are found in the ancient poets,‡ and some information may be gathered from the polemical allusions in the Qur'ān. Moreover, the ancient narratives which deal with the manners and customs of the heathen Arabs contain some passages bearing on the religion of those times. Much credit is due to a few of the early Muhammadan scholars, who laboriously collected, and handed down to posterity in a systematic form, whatever it was possible to ascertain about the heathen mythology and ritual. Among these scholars a specially prominent place must be assigned to Hishām b. Muhammad al-Kalbī, usually known as Ibn al-Kalbī († 819–820 A.D.), the author of the 'Book of Idols' (*Kitāb al-aṣnām*), the substance of which is known to us in the form of quotations, though the work itself is no longer extant.* Finally, we have to take into consideration the fact that Muhammad incorporated in his religion a number of heathen practices and beliefs, with little or no modification, and also that various relics of heathenism, which are alien to orthodox Islām, have been retained by the Arabs down to the present day. That the adoption of a new faith does not completely transform popular beliefs, and that the old conceptions, disguised under somewhat different names, frequently persist, with or without the sanction of the religious authorities, is a matter of common observation.†

But, scanty as the evidence is, it suffices to show that Muhammad's contemporaries and the generations immediately preceding them were, as a rule, little influenced by their religion. They followed the religious customs of their ancestors out of mere respect for tradition, the genuine Arab being essentially conservative; but no great significance was attached to such things. Nowhere do we find an instance of real devotion to a heathen deity. The hardships of nomadic life—and it must be remembered that the great majority of the Arabs were nomads—are, in general, unfavourable to the development of religious feeling, as we may perceive even at the present day. Moreover, the leading spirits, without being clearly conscious of the fact, had to some extent outgrown the old religion, which, taken as a whole, was of a very low type; and, in addition to this, Jewish and Christian influences had begun to make themselves felt. Such influences are particularly evident in the case of some of the most famous poets, Nābigha and A'shā, for example, who had much intercourse with Arabian Christians, chiefly at the courts of princes on the northern frontier, where a more or less superficial Christianity prevailed. Hence the vehement opposition which Muhammad encountered is to be explained as due, partly to the dislike of a personal ruler and of any firm government whatsoever, partly to the desire of retaining certain material advantages which were inseparably connected with the local sanctuaries; but to suppose that the Arabs fought against the Prophet *on behalf of their religion* would be a mistake. Among his opponents no trace of heathen fanaticism appears. A marked tendency to religious fervour, and even to fanaticism, is generally characteristic of the Semites; among the Arabs of the period these capabilities existed in a latent condition, and were manifested on a great scale as soon as they had imbibed the new religion. Similarly, at the present time, Bedawīn, who are lukewarm about religion, no sooner adopt a settled mode of life than they become transformed into bigoted Muhammadans.

Of the deities who were worshipped in Arabia a long list might be drawn up. They are known to us chiefly through so-called 'theophorous' proper names, that is, names which describe the bearer as 'servant,' 'gift,' 'favour,' etc., of this or that deity. But as to the nature of the gods, these names do not tell us much. How little should we know of the more important Greek deities, if our information about them were derived, to a great extent, from such names as Ζηνόδοτος, Ποσειδώνιος,

* 1st ed. Berlin, 1887; 2nd ed. 1897. See the review in the *ZDMG* xli. 707 ff., by the author of the present article.

† In the first few centuries after the Christian era the Nabatæans and the other Arabs of the North-West wrote their inscriptions in Aramaic, but their Arabian nationality is proved, beyond doubt, by the names which they bore and by other indications. The Palmyrene inscriptions likewise contain many Arabic names; a large proportion of the Palmyrenes were unquestionably of Arabian origin, though they had probably in all cases become assimilated to the Aramæans. We possess very many Greek inscriptions set up by Arabs or Aramæans, at that period or later still. The inscriptions in the district of Safa, to the south-east of Damascus, are in Arabic. Of these latter the author of the present article has not made an independent investigation, and he has accordingly followed the decipherments of Enno Littmann—see his 'Semitic Inscriptions' (New York, 1904), p. 102 ff., in Part iv. of the publication of an American Archæological Expedition to Syria in 1899 and 1900.

‡ Some references of this kind have been obscured by alterations of the text on the part of Muhammadans; in a few rare cases a verse has been transmitted to us both in its original and in its altered form. Fortunately this process of tampering with heathen passages was never carried out systematically. In dealing with the ancient poems, early Muhammadan philologists display an amount of historical and linguistic criticism which is worthy of great praise. This is shown, in particular, by the fact that they have handed down to us poems which contain virulent personal attacks upon the Prophet.

* See especially the *Geographical Dictionary* of Yāqūt († 1229 A.D.). The 'Book of Idols' was still extant in the time of the author of the *Ḥizānat al-adab* († 1682 A.D.), who quotes it independently.

† See, for example, Lucius, *Die Anfänge des Heiligenkults in der christlichen Kirche* (Tübingen, 1904), where the survival of ancient hero-worship, in the form of the veneration of martyrs, is elaborately proved.

Ἀπολλόδωρος, Ἀθηναγόρας, Θεοφάνης, etc. ! It would therefore be futile to reproduce all this 'rubbish-heap of divine names,' as Wellhausen calls it. For the present we must confine our attention to those gods who are prominent in some respect or other, particularly by reason of the diffusion of their cult over a wide area. But of Arabian *mythology* there is very little to relate. The luxuriant imagination which gave birth to the mythologies of the Indo-European race was denied to the Arabs, nor had they anything at all resembling the highly artificial and somewhat prosaic theology and cosmology of ancient Babylonia.

This is not, of course, the place to discuss the origin of the religious sentiment among the Arabs, for if we attempted any such thing it would be necessary to inquire into the origin of religion itself. To deal with these obscure questions is a task which we must leave to others. But it may be not inappropriate to observe that the saying *Primus in orbe deos fecit timor* is, with some qualification, to be accepted as true.* At all events we cannot fail to notice that, even in later times, the dread inspired by the more mysterious phenomena of nature leads man to personify the powers that produce them, and such powers he timidly endeavours to conciliate. The *fear* of God afterwards assumes a nobler character, but nevertheless retains traces of its origin.† The Arabic terms *ittaqā* 'to be pious,' *taqwā* or *tuqā* 'piety,' *taqī* 'pious,' properly denote the idea of 'being on one's guard against' something; thus they presuppose that man must take pains to protect himself against the injury which would be inflicted upon him by the higher powers, if he did not continually strive to pacify them.‡ In primitive ages the relation between man and the deity was not regarded from a moral standpoint. It is true that in historical times the original meaning of *ittaqā*, *taqwā*, etc., as religious terms, was no longer clearly present to the minds of the Arabs. But the weird beings who were supposed to haunt the desert and the darkness had not ceased to inspire terror, and are still dreaded by the Bedawīn of to-day (see below, p. 670).

I. INDIVIDUAL GODS AND GODDESSES.

1. *THE HEAVENLY BODIES AND OTHER POWERS OF NATURE.*—It has often been supposed that the religion of the Arabs, or even of the Semites in general, is entirely based upon the worship of the heavenly bodies. This theory, however, is scarcely in accordance with the facts. That the Arabs, at a comparatively late period, worshipped the sun and other heavenly bodies, is unquestionable, but they had various other deities also who cannot be explained as astral powers. The Sun (*Shams*, construed as feminine) was honoured by several Arabian tribes with a sanctuary and an idol. The name *'Abd Shams*, 'servant of the Sun,' is found in many parts of the country.§ In the North we meet with the name *Amrishams* (Ἀμρίσαμσος), 'man of the Sun.' According to Strabo, *Helios* was the chief god of Petra; but there he seems to have borne a different name (see below, p. 663).

For the worship of the rising Sun we have the evidence of the name *'Abd ash-Shāriq*, 'servant of the Rising One,' which, it is true, occurs only once. In the extreme South there was a god called *Dharīḥ* or *Dhirrīḥ*, which appears likewise to denote the rising Sun. In both of these cases the Sun is treated as masculine, contrary to the general usage. Once we meet with the name *'Abd Muḥarriq*; here *Muḥarriq*, 'the Burner,' may perhaps be another title of the Sun-god. The *Muḥarriq* who is mentioned as the ancestor of certain royal houses admits of a similar explanation.

The constellation of the Pleiades (*ath-Thuraiyā*), which was supposed to bestow rain, appears as a deity in the name *'Abd ath-Thuraiyā*; the name *'Abd Najm* probably refers also to the Pleiades, for the latter are often called simply *an-Najm*, 'the constellation.'

* For the contrary view see Robertson Smith, *Rel. Sem.*² p. 54 ff.

† The Greek *σέβεσθαι* likewise expresses primarily the notion of fright; see *Iliad*, iv. 242, xviii. 78, and esp. the Hymn to Demeter, 190, *αἰδώς τε σέβας τε ἰδὲ χλωρὸν δέος*.

‡ See a paper by the author of the present article in *ARW* I. (1898) p. 361 ff.; and cf. *ἡ πρὸς* (or *περὶ*) *τὸ θεῖον εὐλάβεια*, Plut. *Camillus*, 21, *Numa*, 22; also the *μετὰ εὐλαβείας καὶ δέους* of He 12²⁸.

§ This name is more widely diffused than would appear from the statements of Wellhausen, *Reste*², p. 10.

The evidence for the worship of Sirius (*ash-Shi'rā*) is not altogether above suspicion. Possibly the statements on the subject are mere inferences drawn from the Qur'ān, *Sūra* liii. 50, where God is called 'the Lord of Sirius'; this may have been interpreted as a condemnation of the belief that Sirius itself is a divine power.

Far more important, at least in historical times, was the cult of the planet Venus, revered as a great goddess under the name of al-'Uzzā, which may be rendered 'the Most Mighty.' The Syriac poet Isaac of Antioch, who lived in the first half of the 5th cent., bears witness to the worship of 'Uzzā by the Arabs of that period; in another passage he identifies 'Uzzā with the planet Venus. In the first half of the 6th cent., Mundhir, the Arab king of Ḥīra, sacrificed to 'Uzzā a large number of captive nuns, as we learn from a contemporary Syriac author. Procopius, also a contemporary, tells us that this same Mundhir slaughtered in honour of Aphrodite (*i.e.* 'Uzzā, the planet Venus) the captive son of his Christian rival, king Arethas (Ḥārith). The Arabian cult of the planet Venus is mentioned likewise by Ephraim Syrus (who died in A.D. 373), by Jerome, Theodoret, and later still by Evagrius. Nilus, about A.D. 410, gives us an account of a wild Arab tribe who offered sacrifices of a singularly barbarous kind to the morning star, doubtless under the name of 'Uzzā (see below). As early as the 2nd cent., or thereabouts, references to a priest of this goddess occur in two Sinaitic inscriptions, found not far from the district in which the scenes described by Nilus took place. Another Sinaitic inscription mentions the name *'Abd al-'Uzzā*, which at a later time, just before the rise of Islām, was extremely common among the Arabs.* The phrase 'by the two 'Uzzās,' used in swearing, presumably refers to Venus as the morning and as the evening star. In the same manner we may explain the two pillars or obelisks, called *al-Gharīyān*, 'the two objects smeared (with blood),' which appear in connexion with human sacrifices offered by a king of Ḥīra, the very place to which reference has been made above. 'Uzzā figures in the Qur'ān (*Sūra* liii. 19) as one of the three great goddesses of Mecca, who were supposed to be daughters of Allāh. That Muhammad himself offered sacrifices to her in his younger days is expressly stated by tradition. At Naḥla, near Mecca, this goddess had a sanctuary, which is said to have consisted only of three trees. Whether the Meccans and the other inhabitants of central Arabia at all realized the astral character of 'Uzzā is very doubtful. A deity is, in the eyes of its worshippers, an actual person, and does not necessarily represent anything else. We are not to suppose that the pious men who sacrificed to Apollo or Athene thought of inquiring what was the original significance of these deities as personifications of natural phenomena.

The expression 'by the Lord† of the blessed (*sa'īda*) 'Uzzā and by the god before whose house (*i.e.* the Ka'ba) Sarif‡ lies' is once used by a poet as a form of oath. Hence Wellhausen very plausibly argues that the term *as-Sa'īda* 'the Blessed,' which occurs elsewhere as the name of a deity at Medina and of a sanctuary on the lower Euphrates, whither the Arabs made pilgrimages, is nothing more than an epithet of 'Uzzā which had come to be regarded as a proper name.

Kuthrā, which probably means 'the Most Rich,' the name of an idol destroyed by order of Muhammad, is perhaps only another title of 'Uzzā. We also read of a man called *'Abd Kuthrā*, belonging to the tribe of Ṭai, in the very centre of Arabia. Here the absence of the definite article proves that the name Kuthrā is ancient.

Qozaḥ was possibly at one time a god of storms.

* Finally, 'Uzzā has been found to be a goddess of the Sabæans too.

† This is probably a Muhammadan correction for 'by the life.

‡ Sarif is a place about 5½ miles from Mecca.

This we may infer from the fact that the rainbow is called in Arabic 'the bow of Qozah,' and also from the use of Qozah as the name of a certain spot, within the sacred territory of Mecca, where pilgrims were accustomed to kindle a fire. This god had once been worshipped by the Edomites, as we learn from Josephus (*Ant.* xv. 253 [Niese], where the name is spelt Κοζέ); but among the later Arabs he had lost all significance, and his cult does not seem to have survived anywhere.*

The Sun-god who, according to Strabo (784), was held in especial honour by the Nabatæans, is very probably to be identified with Allāt, as Wellhausen has pointed out. We have already seen that the sun is properly feminine in Arabic and in most other Semitic languages; hence the name *Allāt*, which, so far as we can judge, means simply 'the Goddess,' is particularly suitable in this case. The same goddess appears in Herod. i. 131, iii. 8, as Ἀλιλάτ, the older form of Allāt (cf. *Al'ilāh*, the older form of Allāh). In both passages Herodotus identifies her with Οὐρανίη. But from this we can infer no more than that she was a great celestial goddess; to regard it as a definite interpretation would be illegitimate. Similarly we find that in later times her worshippers identified her with Athene.† In the second passage Herodotus goes so far as to assert that Ἀλιλάτ and Ὀροτάλτ are the sole deities of Arabia; the latter name, which he describes as the equivalent of Dionysus, unfortunately does not admit of any plausible explanation. Thus Alilat must have occupied a very prominent place in the religion of those Arabs to whom Herodotus alludes, namely, the inhabitants of the Sinaitic Peninsula and of the immediate neighbourhood. That Ἀλιλάτ is identical with Allāt, a goddess frequently mentioned, has long been an acknowledged fact. References to Allāt are found in several Nabatæan inscriptions; in one of them she is called 'the Mother of the gods.' Moreover, proper names compounded with Allāt appear both among the Nabatæans and the Palmyrenes. In the inscriptions of Safā her name is spelt 'LT and perhaps HLT, which apparently should be pronounced *Hallāt*. Among the later Arabs this goddess was no less venerated. In the Qur'ān (*Sūra* liii. 19) she is one of the three daughters of Allāh. She is also mentioned occasionally in poetry. Thus one poet says: 'I swore to him, in the presence of the throng, by the salt, by the fire, and by Allāt, who is the greatest of all.' Of the names compounded with Allāt, which were widely diffused, some at least must be of considerable antiquity, since the first of the two component parts is an obsolete word.‡ The cult of the goddess flourished, in particular, at the sanctuary of Tā'if, a town to the east of Mecca; the tribe of Thaqīf, who dwelt in that district, spoke of her as their 'mistress.' The tradition that she once was worshipped there has survived among the inhabitants down to the present day.

2. *ABSTRACT DEITIES.*—Some Arabian deities were originally personifications of abstract ideas, but they appear to have been conceived in a thoroughly concrete fashion. In particular, it is to be noticed that the Arabs, from a very early period, recognized the existence of certain powers on which human prosperity and adversity were supposed to depend. It is true that most of these beings are mere poetical, not real, personifications. Thus, for instance, Time in the abstract was popularly imagined to be the cause of all earthly happiness and especially of all earthly misery. Muhammad in the Qur'ān (*Sūra* xlv. 23) blames the unbelievers for saying, 'It is Time that destroys us.' The poets are continually alluding to the action of Time (*dahr*, *zamān*), for which they often substitute 'the days,' or 'the nights.' Time is represented as bringing misfortune, causing perpetual change, as biting, wearing down, shooting arrows that never miss the mark, hurling stones, and so forth.* In such cases we are often obliged to render 'time' by 'fate,' which is not quite correct, since time is here conceived as the determining factor, not as being itself determined by some other power, least of all by a conscious agent. But it must be admitted that the Arabs themselves do not always clearly distinguish the power of Time from that of Destiny pure and simple. Occasionally we come across such passages as the following: 'Time has brought woe upon him, for the days and the (allotted) measure (*qadar*) have caused him to perish.'† Or again: 'I submit not to the injustice of Time, and I behave as though unaware that the measure (allotted to me) hindered me from attaining aught.' Various other expressions are used by the poets in speaking of the 'portion' allotted to them, or of the goal that is set before them. The notion of a personified Μοῖρα is here vaguely present, but she has not yet become a living deity. The fatalism of the poets, as we might expect, is neither clearly formulated nor consistently carried out. Rigid dogmas on the subject of determinism and free-will were quite out of the question. Once we meet with the phrase 'till it be seen what the Apportioner shall apportion to thee' (*mā yamnī laka 'lmānī*), which apparently refers to a god; but this is an altogether exceptional case. The word here translated 'apportion' originally means 'to count,' hence 'to reckon' a thing to some one. From this root is derived *Manīya*, 'doom of death,' 'destruction,' a favourite expression with the poets; the plural *Manāyā* is used in the same sense. Manīya appears in poetry as driving man into the grave, piercing him with an arrow, handing to him the cup of death, lying in ambush for him, receiving him as a guest (when he is about to die), and so forth. Not unfrequently the possessive suffix is added, 'when my Manīya overtakes me,' 'his Manīya has come upon him,' and the like. We also find, but rarely, the synonymous forms *Manā* and *Manūn*, the latter derived from the cognate root MNN. These personifications, as we have seen, are merely poetical. But the same etymological group includes the ancient *Mĕnī* (Is 65^{11}), perhaps a Canaanite deity, and also the great goddess *Manāt*, who figures in the Qur'ān (*Sūra* liii. 20), by the side of 'Uzzā and Allāt, as one of the three 'daughters of Allāh' revered at Mecca. Since she had been raised long before to the dignity of a real goddess, we may assume that her worshippers were no longer conscious of her original character. Curiously enough, the two oldest documents which mention her, namely, a Nabatæan and a Latin inscription,‡ use the plural form *Manawāt* (spelt *Manavat* in Latin), just as the plural *Manāyā* is used for *Manīya*. Among the Arabs, Manāt had a sanctuary in the territory of the tribe Hudhail, not very far from Mecca. She was especially venerated by the inhabitants of Yathrib (afterwards called Medīna).

* The opinion of some native scholars that Qozah was 'a Satan' is merely a deduction drawn from the name of the rainbow.

† The son and co-regent of Zenobia, *Wahballāt* (Οὐαβάλλαθος, Vabalathus), *i.e.* 'Gift of Allāt,' also calls himself Ἀθηνόδωρος.

‡ Among these names we must reckon *Taim Allāt*. *Taim* is not, as has been commonly supposed, a synonym of *'abd*, 'servant'; perhaps it should be rendered 'distraught,' 'frenzied,' so that *Taim Allāt* would mean 'frenzied by (or for the sake of) Allāt.'

* Many examples are given by W. L. Schrameier in his work, *Ueber den Fatalismus der vorislamischen Araber*, Einleitung (Bonn, 1881). But the list is very far from being exhaustive.

† With this it agrees that the word *hīn*, 'moment of time,' 'brief period,' is formed the verb *hāna*, 'to be handed over to one's time,' 'to be doomed to death,' and also the substantive *hain*, 'death.'

‡ Referring to a soldier in Hungary who was of Palmyrene extraction (*CIL* iii. 7954).

Moreover, a number of proper names compounded with Manāt prove that her cult extended over a great part of Arabia.

There exists in Arabic a rare word for 'time,' namely, *'auḍ*.* A poet, who belonged to the tribe of Bakr b. Wā'il, in the North East of Arabia, says in describing his old age: 'The arrows of 'Auḍ have pierced my limbs and joints.' This does not differ at all from those poetical personifications which have been enumerated above; the same poem, it may be observed in passing, alludes to 'the changes wrought by time' (*ṣurūf ad-dahr*). But an isolated verse, not unfrequently quoted, contains the phrase, 'I swear by the blood (of the sacrifices) that flows round 'Auḍ'; here 'Auḍ, 'time,' 'fate,' appears as a real deity, with a regular cult, and Ibn al-Kalbī expressly states that 'Auḍ was an idol worshipped by the Banū Bakr b. Wā'il, the very tribe of which the aforesaid poet was a member.

Gad, equivalent in meaning to τύχη but construed as masculine, is the name of a deity who was venerated by various Semitic peoples (see Is 65[11]). That the Israelite tribe of Gad derived its name from this cult is not improbable. The form *Gaddā*, which occurs in Nabatæan inscriptions, might appear to have been borrowed, at a comparatively late period, from the neighbouring Aramæans. But since we meet with the proper name *'Abd al-Jadd* in a few cases (which, it is true, are confined to the coast of Yemen), and since the noun *jadd*, 'luck,' remained in current use among the Arabs, it is more natural to regard the Nabatæan *Gaddā* as an Aramaized form of the native Arabic word *al-Gadd* (*al-Jadd*).

To this category belongs **Sa'd**, 'fortune' (used in a good sense only). According to a certain verse and the statements of the commentator, Sa'd was the name given to a rock not far from Jidda, to which divine honours were paid. Moreover, we meet with the name *'Abd Sa'd* in quite a different part of Arabia, to the north-east. At an earlier period a man's name which seems to be compounded with Sa'd occurs in the inscriptions of Ṣafā.

Another deity who appears to have been designated by an abstract term is **Ruḍā**, 'good-will,' 'favour.' The commentary on a verse in which the name is mentioned informs us that Ruḍā was worshipped, in the shape of an idol, by the great tribe of Tamīm. The proper name *'Abd Ruḍā* is found among several Arabian tribes. To the nature of the deity in question the name supplies no clue. It might even be supposed that it was originally a euphemistic title given to some malignant power. The remarkable fact that in the above-mentioned verse *Ruḍā* is construed as feminine (whereas this grammatical form would be normally masculine), naturally suggests that at that period, about the time of Muhammad, people still realized that *Ruḍā* was merely an epithet applied to a goddess who properly bore some other name. But against this hypothesis it may be urged that the name is of considerable antiquity, as is proved by the Palmyrene inscriptions, where it occurs separately in the form 'RṢU, and in theophorous proper names as RṢU; the pronunciation is fixed approximately by the Latin transcription *Themarsa*.† The RDU of the Ṣafā inscriptions seems to denote the same deity.

Wadd, also pronounced *Wudd* or *Udd*, *i.e.* 'friendship,' 'affection,'‡ was, according to the Qur'ān (*Sūra* lxxi. 22), a god worshipped by the contemporaries of Noah. But it would be a mistake to conclude that his cult was obsolete in Muhammad's time, for we have sufficient evidence to the contrary. The poet Nābigha says once, 'Wadd greet thee!' There was a statue of this god at Dūma, a great oasis in the extreme north of Arabia. The name *'Abd Wadd* occurs in a number of wholly distinct tribes. But Wadd is another instance of a deity whose character remains altogether obscure. As we are told that his statue had a bow and arrows attached to it, we might be tempted to imagine that he was a kind of Eros, and this would imply a foreign origin. But though the root WDD means 'to love,' 'to feel affection' for an object, it is never used in a sexual sense.* Moreover, the statue in question bore not only a bow and arrows, but likewise a sword and a lance from which hung a flag; the god was also fully clad, and therefore does not look like a copy of the Greek Eros. Finally, it should be remembered that there were other Arabian idols which had weapons suspended to them.

The name **Manāf**, 'height,' 'high place,' is also a kind of abstract noun. That Manāf was worshipped as a god is proved by the testimony of a verse, and is confirmed by the occurrence of the name *'Abd Manāf*, which was especially common at Mecca and among the neighbouring tribe of Hudhail. Furthermore, J. H. Mordtmann has pointed out that the word Μάναφις, in an inscription from the Ḥaurān, is derived from the name of this god (=Μανάφιος); he also makes the very plausible suggestion that, in an inscription set up in Hungary by an Oriental soldier, the sentence *diis patriis* MN · PHO† *et Theandrio votum solvit* is to be understood as a reference to the same deity.‡

3. *DEITIES BEARING NAMES OF ANIMALS.*—The Arabian deities who bear animal names are few in number, and it is naturally impossible for us to ascertain their true significance. That they were originally totems is scarcely probable, for of totemism no clear traces are to be found among the Arabs, and the hypothesis that these names date from a very primitive age does not rest on sufficient evidence.§ In the case of the Lion-god, whose existence is proved only by the mention of a man named *'Abd al-Asad*, 'servant of the Lion,' belonging to the tribe of Quraish, such a supposition would be especially hazardous, since *asad* is a comparatively modern word for 'lion,' not the old word common to the various Semitic languages.‖

One of the gods worshipped by the contemporaries of Noah, according to the Qur'ān (*Sūra* lxxi. 23), was **Nasr**, 'the vulture.'¶ The Talmud (*'Abodah zara*, 11*b*) and the Syriac *Doctrine of Addai* (of the 4th cent.), p. 24, mention *Neshrā*, the Aramaic form of Nasr, as an Arabian god. These statements, taken by themselves, might be explained as referring to some cult practised among the Aramæans in the Roman province of

* It is used chiefly as an adverb, meaning 'at any time.'

† *CIL* viii. 2511, 2512. A similar form is given by Syriac authorities.

‡ That we should take the word as an adjective, meaning friendly,' is a less probable view.

* For the idea of sexual affection the Arabic language has plenty of other expressions.

† This is the reading now adopted, see *CIL* iii. 3668; *Ephem. Epigr.* ii. 390, No. 22. We may assume that the original spelling, or at least the spelling originally intended, was MANAPHO. Mordtmann had before him the incorrect form MANALPHO, which rendered the identification all the more difficult.

‡ *ZDMG* xxix. 106. The god Theandrios (with some variations of form) occurs repeatedly in inscriptions from the Ḥaurān. What Oriental name lurks under this Greek disguise we cannot say.

§ This point has been discussed by the author of the present article in the *ZDMG* xl. 156 ff., and in his *Beiträge zur semit. Sprachwissenschaft* (Strassburg, 1904), p. 74.

‖ Viz. *laith*.

¶ This is the meaning which the word always has in Arabic. In the North-Semitic languages the corresponding form (with *sh*) is applied to the eagle, but, in the case of large birds of prey, popular usage does not sharply discriminate between the various species. Even in the NT (Mt 24[28], Lk 17[37]) carrion vultures are called ἀετοί.

Arabia, since elsewhere we undoubtedly meet with an Aramæan god Neshrā, for instance, in the Syriac proper name *Neshryabh*, 'Neshr has given.' But it is to be noticed that the Sabæans likewise had a god called Nasr. Thus the worship of the Vulture-god was once widely diffused over the Semitic lands; in Arabia, however, it became nearly obsolete. Ibn al-Kalbī was unable to find any personal name compounded with Nasr; nevertheless it is not impossible that the *Νεσραῖος* mentioned in the ancient inscription of Memphis * was an Arab.

'Auf, in the fairly common name *'Abd 'Auf*, means 'the great bird (of prey).' This signification, it is true, does not actually occur in Arabic, but there are certain phrases in which a trace of it remains.† *'Auf* has, in particular, the sense of *augurium*, and it may be that the name of the god did not refer to the bird but to the omen drawn from it; in this case, 'Auf would be a synonym of *Sa'd* (see above).

4. *DEITIES NAMED AFTER PLACES.*—The god Dhu 'sh-Sharā, 'pertaining to ash-Sharā,' seems to have derived his name from a place. But there were several places called *ash-Sharā*, and the difficulty of determining with which of them the god was originally connected is increased by the fact that his cult goes back to very early times. The localities which bore this name appear to have been moist and rich in vegetation; such a spot, in the midst of a sterile country like Arabia, easily became a centre of worship. The inscriptions of the Nabatæans and of the neighbouring peoples not infrequently mention a deity whose name is spelt Δουσάρης in Greek; there is a corresponding Semitic form, and the theophorous names *'Abd Dhū Sharā*, *Taim Dhū Sharā* (Sinaitic), Δουσάριος also occur. Greek authors‡ supply us with some information respecting him. The most important of these statements is that at Petra, the Nabatæan capital, he was worshipped in the form of a four-cornered block of unhewn black stone, 4 feet in height and 2 in width. The blood of sacrificial victims was poured upon it, or in front of it; underneath it stood a golden pedestal, and the whole sanctuary blazed with gold and with votive offerings. According to Epiphanius, the festival of Dusares was celebrated at Petra and the neighbouring town of Elusa on the 25th of December, that is to say, about the time of the winter solstice. This we may accept as true; it indicates, no doubt, a connexion with Sun-worship.§ In the district which formed the centre of his cult, Dusares was identified with Dionysus; hence it is natural to regard him as the patron of luxuriant vegetation, which agrees with the fact that his home was at ash-Sharā. Nor does this view at all conflict with his character as a Sun-god. The interpretation which Greek authors obtain by changing Δουσάρης into Θευσάρης, and treating the latter form as equivalent to Θεὸς Ἄρης, has, of course, no value. Among the later Arabs *Dhu 'sh-Sharā* did not occupy a prominent position. He was represented by an idol in the territory inhabited by the tribe of Daus, not far from Mecca, and among them the proper name *'Abd dhi 'sh-Sharā* still survived.

Another god who appears to have been named after a place is Dhu 'l-Ḫalaṣa or *Dhu 'l-Ḫulaṣa*. He was greatly venerated at a place in the north of Yemen, apparently the district now called 'Asīr.

* This inscription dates from the 2nd cent. B.C.; see the *RA* for Feb. 1870, p. 109 ff., and *Cat. gén. des. Ant. Ég. du Musée de Caire* (Gr. inscr.), Oxford, 1905. It is a curious coincidence that among the names here enumerated we find the Greek Ἀετός.

† Thus the verb *'āfa*, which is derived from it, means 'to wheel in the air,' as birds of prey are wont to do.

‡ See the excellent paper by J. H. Mordtmann in the *ZDMG* xxix. 99 ff.

§ Cf. Wellhausen in *GGN*, 1905, p. 131.

Between his sanctuary and the sanctuary at Mecca there existed a certain amount of rivalry.

5. *DEITIES NAMED AFTER LIMBS OF THE BODY.*—From a grammatical point of view, the gods Dhu 'l-kaffain, 'He who has two hands,' and Dhu 'r-rijl, 'He who has a foot,' must be classed with the two foregoing ones. Perhaps these names may have been originally applied to sacred stones or fetishes, which by means of rude carving were made to bear a partial resemblance to the human form.

6. *ANCESTRAL AND TRIBAL DEITIES.*—Sometimes Arabian deities are designated by titles fashioned after the manner of 'the God of Abraham,' 'the God of Nahor' (Gn 31[53]). Thus among the Nabatæans we meet with 'the god of Rab'ēl,' 'the god of Qaṣīū,' and the phrase Θεῷ Μαλειχάθου occurs in an inscription which mentions also a man named Μαλείχαθος (Malīkat), not to quote other instances. Similarly, Muhalhil b. Rabī'a swears by 'the god of Rabī'a'; perhaps *Rabī'a* here refers not to the father of Muhalhil, but to the great group of tribes called Rabī'a, to which he belonged. This would be after the analogy of the formula 'by the god of the Quraish,' which occurs elsewhere.

Here we may mention a god who bore the curious title Shai' al-qaum (apparently 'the Companion of the people'), as we learn from a Palmyrene and a Nabatæan inscription. In the former he is called 'the kind god who rewards (or, who is grateful), and who drinks no wine,' *i.e.* to whom no libations of wine are offered. In the Ṣafā inscriptions he appears as Sh'HQM, which should probably be read *Shē' haqōm*.

7. *OTHER DEITIES OF THE TIME OF NOAH.*—The god Yaghūth, whose name evidently means 'Helper,' was, according to the Qur'ān (*Sūra* lxxi. 23), another of the deities worshipped in the time of Noah. Unless we are willing to adopt the very hazardous conjecture of Robertson Smith, who identifies Yaghūth with Yĕ'ūsh,* an ancestor of the Edomites mentioned more than once in Gn 36 and elsewhere in the OT, we find no trace of this god in early times, for his namesake Ἰεγοῦθος, a man who figures in the above-mentioned inscription of Memphis, cannot be cited as a proof. But at a later period we hear of a god Yaghūth, whose idol was an object of contention among the tribes of northern Yemen, and the name *'Abd Yaghūth* occurs in various parts of Arabia, even in the tribe of Taghlib on the north-eastern frontier.

The name of the god Ya'ūq, who is mentioned in the Qur'ān together with Yaghūth, probably means 'the Preserver'; his cult seems to have been confined to Yemen. Suwā', who is also included among the gods worshipped by Noah's contemporaries (*Sūra* lxxi. 20), was apparently of no great importance. He had a sanctuary at a place in the territory of the Hudhail, but none, so far as we know, elsewhere. The meaning of his name is altogether obscure. Neither Suwā' nor Ya'ūq seems to occur in theophorous proper names. It is hardly necessary to remark that the transferring of all these Arabian deities to the age of Noah was a fantastic anachronism due to Muhammad himself.

8. *HUBAL.*—Hubal was worshipped at Mecca: his idol stood in the Ka'ba, and he appears to have been, in reality, the god of that sanctuary. It is therefore particularly unfortunate that we have so little information respecting him. Wellhausen has plausibly suggested that Hubal is no other than *Allāh*, 'the god' of the Meccans. It would be unsafe to trust the descriptions of the idol in question which are given by writers of a later

* The correct pronunciation is, perhaps, *Yā'ūsh* or *Yā'ūs* (with *sin*); we may assume that originally the name was always spelt Y'Sh, without any vowel-letter after the '.

period; there is reason, however, to believe that the god had a human form. We may likewise accept as historical the statement that near him were kept divining-arrows, used for the purpose of ascertaining his will or forecasting future events. It is related that the idol was brought by 'Amr b. Luḥai from Ma'āb (Moab), a tradition which may contain some element of truth, for we have independent evidence indicating that this god was known in the North. He seems to be mentioned in a Nabatæan inscription at Ḥejr; and the tribe of Kalb, who dwelt in the Syrian Desert, used *Ḥubal* as the name of a person or clan; the same tribe, it may be noticed in passing, used in like manner the names of Isāf and Nā'ila, two other deities peculiar to Mecca. Moreover, 'Amr b. Luḥai is the representative of the Ḫuzā'a, a tribe who, according to tradition, occupied the sacred territory of Mecca before it passed into the hands of the Quraish. The assertion that 'Amr introduced the worship of idols into Mecca for the first time is, of course, utterly incredible. But the hypothesis that Ḥubal was a late importation from a foreign country is further supported by the fact that we hear nothing of him in other parts of Arabia, and that even at Mecca personal names compounded with *Ḥubal* were unknown. When the Meccans had gained a victory over the Prophet in the immediate neighbourhood of Medīna, their leader shouted, 'Hurrah for Ḥubal!' Thus they regarded him as the natural enemy of the God preached by Muhammad.

9. *'LORD' AND 'GOD.'*—Here we may notice certain deities whose titles in themselves seem to designate them as occupying a position of supreme importance in the eyes of their worshippers. Among these is al-Malik, 'the King,' a name which corresponds to the North-Semitic *Malek* (not to mention other forms)* as applied to a god; in Arabia, however, al-Malik is represented only by the rare personal name *'Abd al-Malik*.†

The divine title Ba'l or Ba'al, 'the Lord,' which was very common among the Northern Semites, survived among the Arabs of the Sinai Peninsula in the form *al-Ba'lū*, which occurs in their inscriptions together with the proper names *'Abd al-Ba'li*, *Aus al-Ba'li* 'gift of the Lord,' and *Garm al-Ba'li*, probably 'act of the Lord.' A trace of the worship of this god may be found in *Sharaf al-Ba'l*, the name of a place which lay somewhere on the route between Medīna and Syria. The Arabs of later times were not aware that any such deity had existed, but certain phrases in their language clearly prove that he had once been known. Thus the term 'soil of *Ba'l*,' or simply '*Ba'l*,' is applied to land which does not require rain or artificial irrigation, but has an underground water supply, and therefore yields fruit of the best quality.‡ In this case the god seems to be regarded as the lord of the cultivated land. That here the word *Ba'l* really refers to him is shown by the synonymous, or nearly synonymous, expression *'aththarī*, derived from *'Aththar*, a deity whose name had likewise sunk into oblivion among the Arabs of that period, whereas it appears in all the older Semitic languages with the usual variations of form (*'Ashtart*, *'Athtar*, and so forth). Again, the verb *ba'ila* and other derivatives of *Ba'l* mean 'to be bewildered,' properly 'to be seized by the god Ba'l.'

Among the Northern Arabs of early times, particularly in the region of Ṣafā, the word El, 'God,' was still very commonly used as a separate name of the Deity. It is true that it does not actually occur except in compound proper names of persons, Θεόδοτηλος, *Waḥb Ēl*, and many others. Some of these, such as *Waḥbīl*, 'gift of El,' *'Abdīl*, 'servant of El,' appear also among the Arabs of a later age, but at least in certain cases they must have been borrowed from the Sabæan language,* while in other cases they are restricted to the extreme north of Arabia. It may be added that the divine name *Iyāl*, which occurs once in an ancient verse, is possibly a plural of majesty formed from *Ēl*; *Uwāl* is a variation of the same name.

Allāh, in the Ṣafā inscriptions *Hallāh*, 'the god,' enters into the composition of numerous personal names among the Nabatæans and other Northern Arabs of an early period, *e.g. Zaid Allāhī*, 'increase of God' (that is, increase of the family through the son given by God), *'Abd Allāhī*, and so forth. In the Nabatæan inscriptions *Allāh* does not seem to occur separately as the name of a god, but in the inscriptions of Ṣafā the separate use is found. Among the heathen Arabs of later times *Allāh* is extremely common, both by itself and in theophorous names. Wellhausen cites a large number of passages in which pre-Islāmic Arabs mention Allāh as a great deity; and even if we strike out some passages (for instance, on the ground that the text has been altered by Muhammadan scribes), so many still remain over, and so many more which are quite above suspicion can without difficulty be found, that the fact is clearly established. Moreover, *Allāh* forms an integral part of various idiomatic phrases which were in constant use among the heathen Arabs. Of special importance is the testimony of the Qur'ān, which proves, beyond all doubt, that the heathen themselves regarded Allāh as the Supreme Being. Thus, men turn to Allāh when they are in distress (*Sūra* x. 23, xxix. 65, xxxi. 31). Solemn oaths are sworn in his name (vi. 109, xvi. 40, xxxv. 40). He is recognized by mankind as the Creator and the Giver of rain (xxix. 61 ff.). Their crime consists only in the fact that they worship other gods beside him; the three goddesses, Manāt, Allāt, and 'Uzzā are believed to be his daughters (xvi. 59 ff.).

In the Nabatæan inscriptions we repeatedly find the name of a deity accompanied by the title *Ālāhā*, 'the god.' Hence Wellhausen argues that the Arabs of a later age may also have applied the epithet *Allāh*, 'the god,' to a number of different deities, and that in this manner Allāh, from being a mere appendage to the name of a great god, may gradually have become the proper name of the Supreme God. In any case it is an extremely important fact that Muhammad did not find it necessary to introduce an altogether novel deity, but contented himself with ridding the heathen Allāh of his 'companions,' subjecting him to a kind of dogmatic purification, and defining him in a somewhat clearer manner. Had he not been accustomed from his youth to the idea of Allāh as the Supreme God, in particular of Mecca, it may well be doubted whether he would ever have come forward as the preacher of Monotheism.

II. THE NATURE OF THE GODS.

As to the manner in which the Arabs conceived of their gods, the theophorous proper names give us some information, though it does not go very far. We have, of course, to remember not only that the persons who coined these names naturally wished to be on the best possible terms with the deities in question, and to approach them in the most conciliatory fashion, but also that later generations, who made use of ancient names, did not pay much attention

* *Malīk*, the plural of majesty, formed from this noun, is used in Ethiopic as the ordinary word for 'God.'

† In the days of Islām, *al-Malik* became one of the epithets of Allāh, and hence the name *'Abd al-Malik* re-appears among Muhammadans.

‡ This applies primarily to the date-palm, which requires much moisture at its root but none above.

* Names commonly used in dynasties, or distinguished families, who originally came from districts where Sabæan or some other peculiar dialect of southern Arabic was spoken, naturally had a tendency to spread among the Arabs in general.

to the original meaning;* hence it may be concluded that, when Muhammad first proclaimed his mission, popular ideas as to the relation between gods and men had already begun to grow dim. It is also to be noticed that, in consequence of the abbreviations which names of persons are liable to undergo in daily life, compound proper names were often deprived of their divine element; thus *Aus Manāt*, 'gift of Manāt'; *Zaid Allāt*, 'increase (bestowed) by Allāt'; *'Abd Allāh*, 'servant of God,' became *Aus*, 'gift'; *Zaid*, 'increase'; *'Abd*, 'servant,' respectively. In theophorous proper names the deity sometimes appears as a lord, while the human individual is his servant, his handmaid, his obedient subject (*ṭau'*); sometimes, again, the deity is described as gracious, while the human individual is his gift, his reward, his act of favour, the aid which he supplies, his *protégé* who seeks refuge with him, etc. At other times the deity is represented as increasing the family, as sending a good omen and good fortune. The human individual is also said to be the 'man' of the deity, his 'companion,' and so forth. Some of these compounds are of doubtful meaning. With the exception of a very small number of uncertain cases found in inscriptions, there are absolutely no names which designate a human being as the kinsman or descendant of a deity, like those which we find among the Hebrews and other Semites.†

III. THE CULT.

1. *IDOLS, ALTARS, AND SACRIFICES.*—It has already been remarked that the scantiness of our knowledge respecting the Arabian gods is largely due to the fact that our information dates, for the most part, from the close of the heathen period, that is to say, from a time when the Arabs themselves had no very clear ideas on this subject. The traditional cult was duly practised; but mythology, not to mention religious dogma, could scarcely be said to exist. Even as to the fundamental question of the relation in which the Deity stood to the *sacred stones, idols, and other objects of worship*, no definite belief seems to have prevailed. If the heathen Arabs reflected about such matters at all, they probably imagined that the block of stone which served as a fetish (after the primeval Semitic fashion so clearly portrayed in the OT) was pervaded by a divine power, and, in its turn, exercised a divine influence. We have already had occasion to mention the black stone of Dusares at Petra; to this, it would appear, Clement of Alexandria alludes when he says that 'the Arabs worship stone' (*Protr.* iv. § 46). The veneration of the black stone in the wall of the Ka'ba has been adopted even by Islām; and, as Snouck Hurgronje has shown,‡ there exist in Mecca and the immediate neighbourhood various other sacred stones, which were originally fetishes, but have acquired a superficially Muhammadan character by being brought into connexion with certain holy persons. Stones of this kind served at the same time as *altars*; the blood of the victims was poured over them or smeared upon them,§ an act whereby the worshipper entered into communion with the god to whom the drink-offering of blood was presented. Upright blocks or slabs of stone (στῆλαι) formed an essential part of the cult; the Arabic equivalent of στήλη is *nuṣub* (pl. *anṣāb*), also *manṣib* (Heb. *maṣṣēbāh*). As early as the time of Herodotus, our oldest authority, the Arabs were accustomed to establish a blood-brotherhood by smearing sacred stones with their own blood, while they invoked the god and the goddess (iii. 8). Examples of a similar use of blood, in the solemn ratification of a treaty or in the swearing of an oath, occur at a much later period.* The blood is licked, or the hands are dipped in it; sometimes water or a perfumed liquid is employed as a substitute.†

A detailed account of a kind of sacrifice, performed about A.D. 410, is given by Nilus (Migne, lxxi. 612 ff.). The wild 'Saracens' of Arabia Petræa, he tells us, had no image of a god, but only an altar rudely built of stones,‡ on which they sacrificed, in great haste, a human being or a white camel to the morning-star (*i.e.* Venus, or 'Uzzā; see above, p. 660) before sunrise, evidently in order that the star might be visibly present during the whole ceremony. Thrice they marched round the sacred spot, chanting a hymn; then the chieftain, or an aged priest, struck the first blow at the victim, and drank some of the blood, whereupon the crowd, rushing forward, devoured the animal, raw and only half-flayed, together with the bones and entrails, before the sun appeared.§ One of the most peculiar features in this description is the drinking of the blood; in other cases, the Arabs, like the ancient Hebrews, allowed the blood of the victim to flow away, giving back the element of life to the deity, or else they applied it directly to the idol.

As is stated above, the Arabs of Petræa sacrificed not only animals, but also *human beings*; the son of Nilus was on the point of being slaughtered in honour of the morning-star, and escaped by a mere accident. Testimony of a somewhat earlier date is supplied by Porphyry, who tells us (*de Abstin.* ii. 56) that 'the people of Duma,‖ in Arabia,' annually sacrificed a boy and buried him under the altar, which served also as an idol (ξόανον); here we have another instance of the same object being used for both purposes. The vast human sacrifices offered, at a later period, by king Mundhir of Ḥīra to the planet Venus, the goddess to whom Nilus also refers, have already been mentioned.¶ But in Arabia proper we have no clear trace of human sacrifice.** Possibly among the Arabs of the extreme North, the continuance, or it may be the revival, of the ghastly ancient rite was due to the influence of the neighbouring peoples, whose religion had remained barbarous in spite of their advanced material civilization.

At the period to which our principal authorities relate, the Arabs sacrificed *camels, sheep, goats, and apparently less often kine.*†† We frequently

* These remarks, and many of those which follow, apply to other peoples also, both Semitic and non-Semitic.

† On all these questions see the art. 'Names' in *EBi*, p. 3271 ff. (by the author of the present article); and Littmann, *Oriental Inscriptions*, p. 121 ff.

‡ *Mekka*, i. (Hague, 1888) p. 21.

§ Very similar rites exist among other nations, *e.g.* in Bengal—see the *JRAS of Bengal* for 1903, Anthropol. Series, p. 82 ff. For blood ritual in Syria and Arabia, from heathen times to the present day, see Curtiss, *Prim. Sem. Rel. To-day* (London, 1902). Cf. also Musil, *Arabia Petræa*, iii. (Vienna, 1908); and Tauzzen, *Coutumes des Arabes au pays du Moab* (Paris, 1908).

* Count Landberg, *La Langue arabe et ses dialectes* (Leyden, 1905), p. 74, mentions a remarkable specimen of blood-ritual which is still practised in a certain district of South Arabia at the conclusion of a contract of service.

† The anointing of fetishes, as we find it in Gn 28^{18}, and as it appears elsewhere, both among the Northern Semites and other peoples, is likewise to be considered a secondary form of homage.

‡ Similarly, at an earlier period, the altar in the sacred palm-grove, probably near the southern extremity of the Sinaitic Peninsula, was ἐκ στερεοῦ λίθου, according to Agatharchides, cited by Diodorus, iii. 42.

§ In like manner the 'Aisāwa, a Muhammadan confraternity existing at the present day in the district of Tlemsen, Algeria, perform a religious rite in the course of which they devour a he-goat raw, with the skin and hair—see Doutté, *Les Aïssâoua à Tlemçen* (Châlons-sur-Marne, 1900), p. 13. This must be a piece of primitive African savagery; it was certainly not imported from Arabia. But there is reason to believe that similar things took place in the paroxysms of excitement which accompanied the Dionysiac cult. The *Bacchæ* of Euripides contains no very precise evidence on the subject.

‖ Probably not the oasis Dūmat al-Jandal, where Wadd was worshipped (see above, p. 662), but Dūma in the Ḥaurān, which was included in the province of Arabia.

¶ These sacrifices may be compared with the savage custom of 'devoting' vanquished enemies, which was in vogue among the ancient Hebrews (see, for instance, Nu 21^{3}, Dt 2^{34}, Jos 2^{10}, 1 S 15^{3}).

** The word *hadī*, 'conducted,' cannot be cited as an argument. When applied to a single individual, it denotes a prisoner, a person who is under the protection of another, or a bride who is brought to her husband. When applied to sacrificial victims, it is always a collective, the singular being then *hadīya*. Thus it would not be correct to say that a prisoner is called a 'victim.'

†† The most usual words for animals offered in sacrifice are *'itr* and *'atīra*; hence we may conclude that the Heb. *ha'tir*, 'to entreat,' *ne'tar*, 'to be moved by entreaty,' originally referred to sacrifice, accompanied by prayer, and to the effect which it produces on the deity.

read of the blood of the victims being applied to the sacred stone or pillar. The number of the animals slaughtered must sometimes have been very large, since the poets hyperbolically compare warriors slain in battle to a multitude of sacrificial victims. Offerings of other kinds are rarely mentioned. On one occasion we hear of a *milk-offering*, presented to the god Wadd (see above, p. 662), and another passage refers to an oblation consisting of barley and wheat over which milk was poured. Most of the Arabs being very poor, these less pretentious kinds of offering may perhaps in ordinary life have played a larger part than we should at first be inclined to suppose. But the words *nusuk*, *manāsik*, 'outpouring,' which are applied to religious ceremonies in general, and have become part of the terminology of Islām, certainly do not refer, in the first instance, to drink-offerings of this sort (as is the case with the Hebrew *nesekh*), but to the outpouring of blood. The flesh of the sacrifice was usually eaten by the worshippers, the god contenting himself with the blood. Sometimes, however, sacrifices were left to be devoured by vultures; hence a certain idol which stood in the neighbourhood of the Ka'ba was called *muṭ'im aṭ-ṭair*, 'the feeder of the birds (of prey).' In this case the god was probably imagined to be—through human instrumentality, it is true—an example of those virtues which the Arabs place above all others, namely, hospitality and munificence. But originally every sacrifice, properly so called, was regarded as food consumed by the god, or at least as a means of gratifying his sensations.* Thus the sacrificial meal brought the worshipper into close connexion with the Deity.

The Arabs, like the Hebrews, were in the habit of sacrificing *the firstlings of their flocks and herds*. But how far the custom extended it is impossible to say.† Soon after the birth of an infant, his head was shaven, and a sheep was sacrificed on his behalf; perhaps this was originally a ransom, offered as a substitute for the sacrifice of the child.

We may here mention a totally different kind of offering, namely, the practice of *setting an animal at liberty*, either in fulfilment of a vow or as an expression of gratitude to the deity for the increase of the flock; thenceforth the animal in question was not to be used for any purpose, except perhaps by needy travellers who might be allowed to milk it. Of these consecrated animals there were various sorts, each denoted by a distinct term. But as to the precise meaning of the terms, no trustworthy information was possessed by later scholars, since the Qur'ān had abolished these customs, together with the religion of which they formed a part. It is probable that the animals to which we have referred pastured in districts sacred to the deity, and generally were held inviolable.

The practice of *marching round the sanctuary* on the occasion of a sacrifice, as the Saracens described by Nilus were wont to do, prevailed in many parts of Arabia. Sometimes, at least in Mecca, this marching took place also when no sacrifice was being offered. It would seem that among the Arabs of later times *the solemn shout* (*tahlīl*) corresponded, in some measure, to the 'hymn' of the early Saracens. We may be sure that what the Qur'ān contemptuously calls 'whistling and clapping' (*Sūra* viii. 35) was not confined to the Meccan sanctuary.* The act of standing (*'ukūf*) in a devout posture before the sacred stone or image likewise formed an essential part of the ritual.

In addition to these traditional forms, there were other means of influencing the gods, namely, extemporized prayers, requests for special favours, benedictions, and, above all, imprecations. The effect of an imprecation was heightened by its being uttered in a sacred month and at a sacred spot, for instance, in the month of Dhu 'l-qa'da at 'Okāẓ.

We have already seen that the gods were represented not only by rude blocks of stone, but also by *statues* executed with more or less skill. The most usual word for a divine statue, whether of stone or wood, is *ṣanam*, derived from the Aramaic *ṣĕlēm*, and perhaps introduced into Arabia together with the object itself. The other word, *wathan*, is certainly indigenous, and seems primarily to mean nothing more than 'stone.'†

Examples of *tree-worship* are likewise to be found among the Arabs. The tree known as *Dhāt Anwāṭ*, 'that on which things are hung,' received divine honours; weapons and other objects were suspended from it. We also hear of a sacred palm-tree which was decked with apparel. At Nakla, as has been mentioned above (p. 660), the goddess 'Uzzā is said to have been worshipped in the form of three trees. We may assume that the deity was supposed to stand in the same relation to the tree as to the fetishes of stone. The garments, rags, and other things which were placed upon it are to be regarded as a substitute for sacrifice.‡

The *kindling of a fire* in honour of a god was quite exceptional among the Arabs. It took place in connexion with the great festival of the pilgrimage, at the spot called Qozaḥ; moreover, the term *as-Sa'īr*, which occurs in an ancient verse of poetry referring to some particular cult, may not improbably be explained as meaning 'fire,' 'blaze,' in accordance with the ordinary use of the word, rather than as the name of a god, although the latter interpretation might seem, at first sight, to suit the context.

2. *PLACES OF WORSHIP.*—Temples, properly so called, were certainly very rare, unless we include buildings in the Græco-Roman style erected by the Arabs of the extreme North. The primitive simplicity of the Ka'ba, which was held in such especial honour, proves that the sanctuaries of Arabia are by no means to be imagined as imposing edifices. The three temples which stood, according to Agatharchides (Diod. iii. 45), on a hill near the Arabian seacoast, may have been somewhat handsomer specimens of architecture, but it would seem that they were built by a foreign prince, probably a Sabæan. Yet in spite of their humble appearance, the houses of the gods were regarded with extreme veneration, as is shown by the proper names *'Abd ad-dār*, 'servant of the (holy) dwelling' (the ancestor of the family who were actually in charge of the temple at Mecca); *'Abd al-bait*, 'servant of the (holy) house'; and *'Abd al-Ka'ba*, 'servant of the Ka'ba.'§ The word *masjid*, 'mosque,' 'temple,' which has become part of the terminology of Islām, was originally derived from the

* Hence, wherever human sacrifices are offered—and this can be proved to have been the case among almost all peoples—we may assume that in the very earliest times cannibalism also existed. The idea that sacrifices are consumed by the gods appears, for instance, in Dt 32^{38}, but it is entirely rejected in Ps $50^{9\text{-}13}$.

† The remarkable, but well attested, statement that the Arabs considered it unlucky if the firstborn of a woman was a boy, may perhaps be explained as a survival from a time when they, like the Hebrews, offered to the deity their own firstborn, as well as the firstborn of animals. That the father should have been specially unwilling to sacrifice a boy is natural.

* Robertson Smith very justly remarks (*Rel. Sem.*[2] p. 340, note 2): 'The festal song of praise (הִלֵּל, *tahlīl*) properly goes with the dance round the altar (Ps $26^{6ff.}$), for in primitive times song and dance are inseparable.'

† As to the distinction in meaning between these two expressions the native authorities supply no trustworthy information.

‡ Sacred trees, to which rags are attached, exist in Arabia at the present day, and still more frequently in Syria. They are found in other countries also, but the rites connected with them present many difficulties of interpretation. On tree-worship in general see Frazer, *Golden Bough*[2], i. 166 ff.

§ Among the Syrians we find the name *'Ebedh Nakhlā*, 'servant of the temple.'

Aramaic, as is shown by the occurrence of *maṣgĕdhā*, 'place of worship,' in the Nabatæan inscriptions. The sanctuary in which an idol stood was usually not enclosed with walls, but marked off by means of boundary-stones, after the fashion described by Nilus.

3. *PRIESTS.*—That all the details of the cult could not be mastered without special training is sufficiently obvious. In connexion with several of the sanctuaries and idols we read of ministrants, who bore the title of *sādin* (pl. *sadana*); this term originally meant 'one who holds the curtain,' that is, one who admits to the shrine. But it is improbable that in the times with which we are mainly concerned there were men who had no other function than that of priest. At an earlier period, it is true, such persons existed. We learn from Agatharchides (Diod. iii. 42; Strabo, 776) that a man and a woman acted as priests, during their whole lifetime, in the sacred palm-grove, and wore the costume of primitive ages, consisting entirely of skins. In the Sinaitic inscriptions several individuals are expressly designated as 'priests,' which implies that they occupied posts of some dignity. This conclusion is supported by the fact that some of the persons in question appear from the inscriptions to have belonged to the same family.* Furthermore, Ibn al-Kalbī, in his account of the various gods, sometimes mentions the name of the priestly family by whom this or that god was served, and in the case of the Ka'ba we possess a considerable amount of detailed information as to the division of the several departments of the cult among a number of families closely related to one another. Wellhausen points out that in some cases the ministrants of a sanctuary belonged to a tribe other than that which owned the surrounding country. Usually this is to be explained by the supposition that the priestly family remained attached to the spot after their fellow-tribesmen had emigrated or been driven out. Occasionally it may have happened that a strange clan acquired control of a sanctuary by force or fraud; that this was the case at Mecca itself is not impossible.† In the inscriptions the word for 'priest' is *kāhin*, which seems to have been borrowed from the Aramaic; these persons, it is evident, were priests in the full sense of the term, as appears from the fact that one of them is called a '*kāhin* of 'Uzzā.'

IV. MECCA.

THE 'OMRA AND THE ḤAJJ.—The Ka'ba at Mecca was an unpretending edifice, erected, in the second half of the 6th cent. after Christ, on the site of an older sanctuary which had been destroyed by fire. The new building was constructed by a native of the Roman Empire, partly out of timber obtained from a stranded ship, wood suitable for architectural purposes being a rare article in most parts of Arabia. To the heathen Arabs the Ka'ba was an important centre of worship, and it afterwards acquired, through Muhammad and Islām, a world-wide fame, surpassing even that of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre or of St. Peter's at Rome. At what period a Ka'ba, that is, a durable building with rectangular walls,‡ was set up for the first time in that altogether sterile valley, we have absolutely no means of determining. It has been plausibly conjectured that the selection of the spot was due to the existence of the well called Zamzam, which has a tolerably abundant supply of water, and might naturally be regarded as a gift of the gods by the caravans which passed to and fro between Yemen and Syria, though the water of Zamzam, it must be admitted, is of an inferior quality, judged even by Arabian standards, and as compared with some other springs which are to be found no great way off. But, however this may be, the primitive structure in question, which was little more than a box containing, it is true, a repository for treasures, first appears in history as a sanctuary in the hands of the Quraish, surrounded by a stretch of sacred territory (*ḥaram*), and visited by strangers who performed a pilgrimage ('*omra*) to the place. The traditions which relate to the early history of Mecca are extremely untrustworthy, and many of them have been perverted in the interest of various parties; but there is no reason to doubt the statement that this territory, unattractive as it is in itself, had once, if not oftener, been overrun and seized by violence.* The ceremony of marching round the Ka'ba, and the accompanying rites, such as the procession between the two great stones, called Ṣafā and Marwā, which stood in the immediate vicinity, were rigidly fixed. The greater part of this ritual was incorporated into Islām by Muhammad, who from the first recognized the Ka'ba as the temple of Allāh (*Sūra* cvi. 3); only a few modifications were introduced, but there is reason to suspect that the changes made by the Prophet chiefly affected those very details which, if they were known to us, would have supplied the surest clue to the original meaning of the whole. In particular, he abolished all the idols† after the capture of his native city, whereas he retained a sample of the most primitive fetishism, the Black Stone, connecting it, as he connected the Ka'ba itself, with Abraham. According to one tradition, which has all the appearance of trustworthiness, the Prophet forbade his followers to march round the sacred spot naked; the practice in question must therefore have existed previously. The idea seems to have been that those who took part in the festival ought not to appear before the Deity in their ordinary garb; hence, if any one had not the means of borrowing a suit of clothes at Mecca, he was obliged to perform the ceremony in a state of nudity. The custom of worshipping at a shrine in garments lent by the priest occurs also elsewhere in Arabia. In one case, we are told, a Bedawī, who belonged to the neighbouring tribe of Hudhail, marched round the Ka'ba with his buttocks uncovered, apparently imagining that this was a

* A man named '*Amēū* calls himself 'a priest of '*Uzzā*' (Euting, 550), and a certain *Ḥarishū*, son of 'Amēū, is also a priest (Euting, 249). A second Ḥarishū is likewise so described (Euting, 348). In another inscription, which is unfortunately not quite clear, we find an allusion to a priestess; and the name 'Amēū appears again (Euting, 228). Although these names occur elsewhere, the fact that they are both contained in the only inscriptions which refer to priests plainly indicates some relationship between the persons in question.

† The native tradition itself supplies tolerably clear evidence that Quṣai, the ancestor of those families who had charge of the Ka'ba and the pilgrims, belonged to the tribe of 'Odhra, whose territory lay far to the north of Mecca.

‡ The word *Ka'ba* occurs thus, as an appellative, in the *Mufaḍḍaliyāt*, xxv. 72. 'The castle of Sindād with the Ka'bas'

(*Ibn Hishām*, 57. 3, and elsewhere), was doubtless a group of buildings, or at least a structure composed of separate parts. The theory that there was ever a sacred *tent* in the valley of Mecca is sufficiently refuted by the consideration that dwellers in tents, i.e. nomads, could never have found pasture there. Robertson Smith's statement that 'almost every holy place at the time of Muhammad was a little centre of settled agricultural life' (*Rel. Sem.*[2] p. 113), is wholly inapplicable to Mecca.

* Compare the account by Agatharchides (Diod. iii. 43; Strabo, 777) describing the subjugation of the tribe which was in possession of the sacred palm-grove by another tribe.

† It is expressly stated that traces of the paintings which had been effaced were still visible on the inner walls of the Ka'ba when the building was wrecked in the days of Ibn Zubair (A.D. 683). We have no reason to doubt this assertion, though it is naturally impossible for us to say what objects were there represented—a matter about which scarcely any information could be obtained at the period in question. But it seems by no means improbable that the tradition according to which the Ka'ba contained portraits of Jesus and the Virgin Mary is actually correct, for it might easily have occurred to the artist (whose name is said to have been Bāqūm, i.e. presumably Pachomios, showing that he was an Egyptian Christian) to paint such figures in a temple owned by ignorant and inoffensive heathens.

peculiarly effective means of appealing to the god. It is said that the Meccans and certain tribes known as *Ḥums*, who were nearly akin to them, used to wear sandals when they went through the ceremony—a rule which may be explained by the supposition that they regarded the place as their home; members of other tribes, on the contrary, always entered the sacred precincts barefoot.

Wellhausen has had the merit of discovering and carefully pointing out that the solemn procession from the hill called 'Arafāt to the valley of Minā, the real pilgrimage (*ḥajj*) κατ' ἐξοχήν, originally had nothing whatever to do with Mecca and the Ka'ba.* It is true that the route followed by the procession lay, for the most part, within the limits of the *ḥaram*, which was generally acknowledged to be the sacred territory of the Meccans; but the fact that the opening ceremonies, the halt on the hill of 'Arafāt† and the kindling of lights on the hill of Il̄āl, took place outside the *ḥaram*—for which reason the Meccans and the Ḥums as a whole had no share in them—is quite sufficient to prove that the festival was not really connected with the city. Moreover, it should be observed that even at the present day, in spite of the changes introduced by the Prophet, who endeavoured to assimilate the ritual as far as possible to the theory of Islām, the festival, properly so called, comes to an end when the sacrificial victims have been slaughtered at Minā; the subsequent visit to the Ka'ba is not an integral part of the *ḥajj*. Nevertheless, we cannot deny that by the time of Muhammad the pilgrimage had come to be closely associated with Mecca. The Quraish were sufficiently astute to appreciate the advantage which they derived from the sacrosanct character of their domain, and from the annual assemblage of pilgrims out of all parts of the country; these two circumstances together formed the basis of their trade, which rendered them intellectually far superior to other Arabs. The hospitality which they extended to the starving Bedawîn at the time of the festival was amply repaid by the security guaranteed to the Meccan caravans.

Ḥagg or *ḥajj* is a very ancient Semitic expression; whatever its original meaning may have been,‡ it corresponds for practical purposes to our word 'festival' (see, for instance, 1 S 30[16]). In Arabic the verbal form of this root is used also transitively, signifying 'to visit' a shrine. How familiar the idea of pilgrimage was to the ancient Arabs is shown by the fact that *Ḥaggāgū, al-Ḥajjāj*, 'he who is wont to go on pilgrimage,' appears not unfrequently as a proper name; furthermore, *maḥajja*, which originally meant a 'pilgrim-route,' is used for a 'route' in general, and *ḥijja*, 'annual festival,' has become a synonym for 'year.' That the festivals attended by pilgrims could take place only at fixed seasons is obvious; thus the pilgrimages were intimately connected with the remarkable institution known as the *sacred months*, that is to say, months during which *a universal peace* prevailed, no vengeance could be executed, and even the murderer enjoyed security. How such an institution can have established itself among uncivilized nomads remains a profound mystery;§ in any case it was generally accepted among the Arabs. Its existence is attested by Procopius (*Pers.* ii. 16), though, of course, we cannot be quite sure that the months to which he refers are precisely the same as those with which the concourse at Mecca was associated. The question is closely connected with the theory of the ancient Arabian calendar, about which some doubt still prevails. It appears tolerably certain, however, that Rajab, the sacred month which stood by itself, which was the favourite season for sacrifices, and seems to have been the proper time for the pilgrimage (*'omra*) to the Ka'ba, normally fell in the spring, whereas the three consecutive sacred months, in the second of which the great *ḥajj* took place, coincided with the autumn.* Similarly, we learn from Nonnosus, who lived during the first half of the 6th cent., that two annual festivals were celebrated in the sacred palm-grove, which is probably to be identified with the grove described by Agatharchides (see above, p. 666), but is nowhere mentioned in Arabic literature.† At the beginning of the *ḥajj*, a man who belonged to a certain family renowned for skill in such matters solemnly informed the assembly whether the ensuing year was to contain an intercalary month or not; in this manner the calendar was fixed annually. But the methods employed by the Arabs were of a crudely empirical kind, and hence, as we might have expected, their year gradually shifted to a considerable extent.‡ The pilgrims, who came to the festival from far and near, all wore a peculiar but very simple costume, known as the *iḥrām*, and abstained from shaving their heads until the ceremonies were over. It would seem that washing also was forbidden—a privation which most of the Arabs probably did not feel very keenly. Among certain tribes it was the rule that no one might enter a house by the door so long as he wore the garb of a pilgrim; in other words, during the time of the pilgrimage they dispensed with every sort of shelter; if, however, a man found it necessary to enter his house, he was allowed to creep in at the back (see *Sūra* ii. 185).§ The animals brought by the pilgrims had sandals, strips of plaited bark, and other objects attached to them, in order to show that they were intended for sacrifice. The festival began at 'Arafāt on the 9th day of the month of Dhu'l-ḥijja (*i.e.* the month of the feast); here the assembled pilgrims made merry with lighted torches and probably with other adjuncts which are not known to us. From the first day to the last—and this applies to the institution even in its Muhammadan form—the proceedings were conducted with much noise and, from a European point of view, without solemnity. On every side were heard cries of '*Labbaika!*', 'At thy service!'‖; but whether this invocation was addressed by every one to the same deity is uncertain. A little before sunset the whole of the vast throng, on foot or on camels, began to race towards Muzdalifa, a journey of some two hours; here they were joined by the

* On the whole of this subject see the excellent inaugural dissertation of Snouck Hurgronje, *Het Mekkaansche Feest* (Leyden, 1880), which errs only in being somewhat too sceptical on certain points; and also his great classical work, *Mekka* (Hague, 1888, 1889).

† We also meet with the sing. form '*Araṣa*; perhaps this refers properly to some particular summit, whereas the pl. '*Arafāt* may be used to include the whole ridge.

‡ The theory that it primarily refers to 'dancing' rests on no evidence.

§ It is less difficult to understand how sacred spots and districts came to be regarded as inviolable, for in early times it was natural to suppose that the god of the place would punish those who profaned it, and this reverence would acquire the force of a tradition. But how a widely dispersed and altogether lawless people, who had no conception of the heinousness of bloodshed in itself, can have been induced to suspend their feuds for the space of whole months, it seems quite impossible to imagine.

* In the Arabian calendar as given by Epiphanius (*Hær.* li. § 24), the month called *ḥaggat albait*, i.e. 'pilgrimage to the (holy) house,' likewise falls in the autumn. This name probably refers, not to the Meccan sanctuary, but to some other.

† According to Agatharchides, a great festival, at which hecatombs of camels were slaughtered, took place every fifth year—a very remarkable statement.

‡ If the adjustment of the lunar months to the solar year had been carried out at all rationally, Muhammad would hardly have conceived the unfortunate idea of imposing upon his followers a purely lunar year without any intercalation whatsoever.

§ Similar naïve attempts to deceive the Deity occur among other peoples.

‖ The grammatical derivation of this term is altogether obscure. Perhaps Professor Bevan is right in suggesting that it may be the Aramaic *labbaik*, 'towards thee (O God)!'

Quraish and their associates the Ḥums (see p. 668). At Qozaḥ, in the immediate neighbourhood, a fire was kindled. During the night spent at Muzdalifa every one remained awake, and as soon as the sun rose, the assembly started for the valley of Minā, about two hours farther on. On the way thither, at three different places, every individual threw some pebbles upon a heap of stones. At Minā the sacrificial animals were slaughtered; part of the flesh was consumed by the owners on the spot, and distributed among those who had nothing to offer, while part of it was cut into strips and dried in the sun for subsequent use. Thereupon the pilgrims shaved their heads, and the festival came to an end.

The practice of kindling lights on the hill of Ilāl, the fire at Qozaḥ, combined with the observation of the setting and rising sun as temporal limits, seem to indicate that the festival was held primarily in honour of the Sun-god. Just as the Saracens described by Nilus were careful to offer their sacrifice to the morning star before it vanished in the brightness of the dawn, so the pilgrims at 'Arafāt regulated their proceedings by the sun.* But whether the whole march from 'Arafāt to Minā was determined by a single plan, having a consistent mythological signification, whether, in other words, each individual rite is to be regarded as an integral part of a mythological drama and is capable of being so interpreted by us, appears extremely doubtful, notwithstanding the ingenious theory which Houtsma has propounded.† The custom of throwing stones is particularly hard to explain. We have to take into account the fact that ceremonies of the same kind were performed by the Arabs in at least two other places, and occur in every part of the world.‡

The great festival which we have described had gradually thrown all others into the shade. At several places not very far from Mecca, feasts, which originally had a religious character, were celebrated on fixed days in the course of the sacred months; but these assemblies became in process of time little more than fairs, where men came together for purposes of business or pleasure. This applies, in particular, to the fair held at 'Okāẓ. It must, of course, be understood that the great *ḥajj* itself was also utilized for commerce and other secular objects. The influence of these gatherings extended over a vast area. Thus at the fair of Dhu'l-majāz, a place some four miles from 'Arafāt, peace was concluded about the beginning of the 6th cent., through the intervention of Mundhir, king of Ḥīra, between the two kindred tribes of Bekr and Taghlib, who had long been deadly enemies, although the town of Ḥīra and the territory of the tribes in question lay far to the north-east of Dhu'l-majāz.

It is necessary to add that there were certain tribes, not very distant from Mecca, who did not recognize the sanctity of the festivals associated with that city, and even went so far as to plunder the pilgrims. The case of the brigand-poet Shanfarā, who boasts that he slew a pilgrim at Minā in the midst of the festive throng, thus violating at once the holiness of the place and of the occasion, belongs to a somewhat different category, since this was merely an example of individual impiety on the part of a man who in more than one respect showed a contempt for established usages.

V. VARIOUS PRACTICES AND BELIEFS.

1. *Circumcision.*—The practice of circumcision (*q.v.*) was universal among the Arabs.* Obscure as its origin is, it seems highly probable that the rite in the oldest times was connected with religion. In historical times the Arabs regarded circumcision as obligatory, not offering any reason for it except that it had always been their custom; hence, without any formal sanction, it was adopted into Islām.

2. *The sacrifice of infants.*—It is possible that the habit of burying female infants alive, which prevailed very widely, was likewise associated with some crude religious belief. The child may have been originally offered as a sacrifice to subterranean deities. In any case it is important to observe that the victim was slain without shedding of blood. But the real motive for the act was doubtless that which is assigned in the Qur'ān (*Sūra* vi. 152, xvii. 33), namely, poverty. It is well known that the same cause has led to infanticide in other countries.

3. *Demons.* — In addition to the gods who were publicly recognized, though sometimes half-forgotten, we meet with a great mass of shadowy beings, everywhere present yet nowhere distinctly perceived, the demons or, as the Arabs call them, the Jinn. The meaning of the name is probably 'covert' or 'darkness'; another form is *Jānn* (pl. *Jinnān*), to which the Ethiopic *Gānēn*, 'demon,' approximately corresponds.† The demons are always, in the main, objects of fear, crafty, mischievous, or even destructive beings. The notion that the Jinn were regarded by the heathen Arabs as partly benevolent seems to have arisen under the influence of Islām, which teaches that at least some of the Jinn are true believers, though it cannot be denied that, even in the pre-Islāmic age, certain friendly acts may occasionally have been ascribed to them: the Devil himself has moments of good temper, and strict consistency is not to be expected in a world of phantoms. The Jinn are usually invisible, but are capable of assuming various forms, especially those of snakes, lizards, scorpions, and other creeping things; hence the word *jānn* may be used to denote a snake. In this case also two separate ideas have been confounded; on the one hand, that of repulsive animal forms, particularly of the snake, which in every country has given rise to weird fancies; on the other hand, the invisible terrors of the desert.‡ It is related that the Meccan clan of Saḥm once suffered injuries at the hands of the Jinn, and accordingly marched out to a certain spot, where they proceeded to kill so many snakes, beetles, etc., that the Jinn were forced to sue for peace; here the creatures slain are evidently regarded as being themselves Jinn. It was natural to suppose that these demons haunted particular places, remarkable either for their loneliness or for their unhealthy climate. When Ḥarb, the grandfather of the Khalīf Mu'āwiya, together with another man, was engaged in clearing a marsh for purposes of culti-

* Muḥammad deliberately modified the connexion of the festival with the sun, for he ordered that the departure from 'Arafāt should take place soon after sunset, and the departure from Muzdalifa shortly before sunrise.

† 'Het Skopelisme en het steenwerpen te Mina,' p. 22 ff. (= *Verslagen en Mededeelingen der Kon. Akad. van Wetenschappen*, Letterkunde, 4th ser., vi. 206 ff.).

‡ See, especially, Frazer, *Golden Bough*², iii. pp. 8–13, where the rite is explained as an attempt to transfer an evil. Cf. also Doutté, *Les Tas de pierres sacrés en Maroc* (Algiers, 1903). The practice of pelting with stones the graves of unpopular persons probably has a different origin, although the belief of Muḥammadans, that the stones which they throw in the valley of Minā are directed against Satan, suggests this explanation.

* This might be inferred from the account of the circumcision of Ishmael in Genesis. The Jewish treatise *Mekhīltā*, composed in the 2nd cent., expressly states that all Arabs were circumcised.

† The word is possibly connected with other religious terms used in the Semitic languages, but on this point nothing can be affirmed with certainty.

‡ Jāḥiẓ, an author of the 9th cent., gives a very rational explanation of the belief in demons (see van Vloten's remarks in the *WZKM* vii. 241); the passage is cited by Mas'ūdī, (*Prairies d'or*, iii. 328 ff.). The articles by van Vloten, 'Dämonen, Geister und Zauber bei den alten Arabern,' in the above-mentioned periodical (vols. vii. and viii.), are peculiarly instructive.

vation, white serpents were seen to fly out of the burning weeds; and when both persons died forthwith, every one perceived that the Jinn had slain them. Perhaps we may hazard the rationalistic conjecture that their death was due to the poisonous air which they had been breathing. There are many other stories in which the Jinn kill or carry off human beings; their spiteful nature also leads them sometimes to prevent cattle from drinking. They utter a peculiar sound.* Their limbs are often very powerful; hence a strong man is said to resemble them. Occasionally they ride upon ostriches, as befits inhabitants of the pure desert. A brave warrior is described as alarming even 'the dogs of the Jinn,' so that they growl. These are merely samples of the fantastic notions connected with them; as we might have expected, there were equally fantastic devices for the purpose of warding off their influence.

Frequently a Jinnī (*i.e.* one of the Jinn) enters into a human being, rendering him possessed or mad.† But this belief, familiar as it was to the Arabs in historical times, seems to have been originally a foreign importation, or at least to have been greatly intensified through contact with foreigners. In the OT scarcely a trace of such a conception appears, whereas in the NT it is extremely common, phrases like *δαιμονιζόμενος*, *δαιμόνιον ἔχειν* occurring repeatedly. The idea was introduced into Palestine from Irān. The Persian word for 'madman' is *dēvāna*, literally 'demoniac' (from *dēv*, originally *daiva*, 'demon'), whence comes the Aramaic *daiwān*; on the other hand, the Aramaic *shēdhān* (from *shēdh*, which was used as the equivalent of the Persian *dēv*) passed into Persian in the form *shēdhā*. In pre-Islāmic times the Arabs borrowed from their northern neighbours not only many of the elements of civilization, but also much that was fanciful and superstitious; the latter class includes the belief in demoniacal possession. Even heathen Arabian poets speak of Palmyra as having been built for king Solomon by the Jinn;‡ in this case the foreign origin of the legend is quite obvious.

The Arabs almost invariably use a collective noun in referring to demons; an individual demon has no distinct character, and consequently bears no personal name. To regard *Shaiṭān* as a proper name is scarcely permissible. It seems tolerably certain that this word was known to the Arabs before the days of Muhammad, and it actually occurs as the name of human individuals; but its form agrees so closely with that of the Ethiopic *Shaiṭān*, which is derived from the Heb. *Śāṭān*,§ that we are forced to consider it a loan-word.‖ The occasional use of *shaiṭān* for 'serpent' is even less primitive than the use of *jānn* in the same sense.

Though the Jinn have no individuality, they fall into various classes, and certain of these are sometimes mentioned as particularly harmful. The most dangerous kind of all is the Ghūl (a feminine noun), of which the plural is *Ghūlān* or *Aghwāl*; this word comes from a root signifying 'to destroy,' perhaps originally 'to assault.' The Ghūl is supposed to lie in wait at some place where men are destined to perish; she also entices them thither, especially by night. 'The Ghūl has carried him off' is sometimes merely a poetical expression meaning 'he has perished.' She has the power of changing her shape, that is to say, of beguiling men in order to destroy them. But usually she is described as a hideous monster. A poet relates how the Ghūl, 'the daughter of the Jinn,' came one night to the fire which he had kindled, and how he cut off her head. It was a frightful object, like the head of a cat, but with a forked tongue; moreover, she had the legs of an infant prematurely born, limp and fleshless, and a hairy skin, resembling that of a dog or a rough and crumpled garment. In another poet we meet with the phrase 'arrows sharp as the canine teeth of Ghūls.'

The poets also mention a kind of female demon called Si'lāt, of which the plural is *Sa'ālī*; this term scarcely ever occurs except as a simile, for the purpose of describing swift horses or camels, formidable warriors, and frightful women. A certain Arabian clan was supposed to have sprung from a marriage between a man and a Si'lāt. Whether this ancestry was originally regarded as an honour or the reverse is doubtful; in any case no great importance can be attached to the story which was related on the subject.

In passages referring to the Jinn we occasionally meet with the expression *Ḥabal*, *Ḥābil*, or some other derivative of the root ḤBL, which primarily means 'to destroy,' and is applied, in particular, to the destruction of the reason, or, in other words, to madness. Usually the term is employed in an abstract sense and as a mere figure of speech, but sometimes the beings so designated are conceived as personal; thus, for instance, a poet says to his wife, 'Leave me in peace, even though I should give away my substance to the Jinn and the Ḥabal!'

The mysterious tribe called *Banū Uqaish* seem likewise to be a class of demons. In order to scare them away, it was the custom to rattle a number of dry skin-bottles one against another.*

The demons were never the objects of a cult, in the strict sense of the word; but on certain occasions, as, for example, at the building of a house, it was thought prudent to conciliate them with some offering, lest they should frustrate the work.† The curious proper name *'Abd al-Jinn*, 'servant of the Jinn,' may here be mentioned. Whether it was actually in use does not seem quite certain; in any case it cannot have been common.

The belief in this motley assemblage of inferior spirits was, on the whole, maintained by Islām; in fact, the Prophet went so far as to recognize the existence of the heathen gods, classing them among the demons (see *Sūra* xxxvii. 158). Hence these primitive superstitions not only held their ground in Muhammadan Arabia, but were further developed, spread over the rest of the Muhammadan world, and often combined with similar, in some cases much more elaborate, conceptions which prevailed among foreign peoples. Thus later narratives which refer to such subjects may, if examined with due caution, be used to illustrate the ideas of the ancient Arabs; but we must beware of accepting too readily the statements of those Muhammadan scholars who endeavoured to reduce demonology to a system.

4. *SOOTHSAYERS AND MAGICIANS.*—The notion that certain persons are under the immediate influence of the gods, and so possess the power of foretelling events or of performing other superhuman feats, prevailed generally in the ancient

* The word applied to it is *'azīf*, apparently a harsh, dull sound. It is also used to denote the clanging of a bowstring.

† 'To be possessed' is *junna*, and the participle *maǰnūn* means 'possessed.'

‡ The idea that Solomon was concerned in the building of Palmyra (*Tadmor*) is due to an ancient textual corruption in 2 Ch 8⁴, where *Tadhmōr* stands for *Tāmār* (see 1 K 9¹⁸). The demons were brought into the story because the edifices of the city seemed too marvellous to be the work of men.

§ From the Hebrew and the Aramaic several religious expressions passed into the Ethiopic language at an early period, through the influence of Jewish or Christian missionaries.

‖ This is by no means the only Arabic word which was borrowed from the Ethiopic.

* Some words which are often understood as referring to demons really have a different sense. Thus *zauba'a* is not a personal being, but simply 'whirlwind.' *'Ifrīt* in the Qur'ān (*Sūra* xxvii. 39) is an epithet of somewhat doubtful meaning, applied to a demon, but it is not the name of a particular class of demons. The belief current in later times, that the *'Ifrīts* or *'Afrits* are demons of a specially dangerous kind, is due to a misunderstanding of this passage.

† Here we have an instance of the so-called 'foundation sacrifice' which is practised in many parts of the world; see, in particular, *ZE*, vol. xxx.

world. It is certainly significant that the term *kāhin*, which, as we have seen (p. 667), retained among the Sinai-Arabs its original meaning of 'priest,' was used by the later Arabs in the sense of 'soothsayer.' In early times the Deity had been wont to make revelations to His priests; the divining arrows of Hubal and of other gods—things which, we may be sure, only the ministers of the sanctuary ventured to use—survived as relics of a more primitive age.* In the various stories which refer to soothsayers, we find no other traces of their connexion with the gods properly so called. We are sometimes told, it is true, that a soothsayer or a magician had a 'follower' (*tābi'*); in other words, a familiar spirit† who occasionally revealed secrets to him, but was not always at his disposal. This spirit seems also to have been called a *ra'ī*, 'one who is seen,' or perhaps we should translate 'seer,' assuming that the term was originally applied to the soothsayer himself, like the Heb. *rō'e*, the ancient word for 'prophet.' The Hebrew synonym *ḥōze* has an exact equivalent in the Arabic *ḥāzī*, 'seer,' 'presager,' 'diviner,' which is often used, as well as the verb corresponding to it.‡ In the same category we may include the *'arrāf*, 'sage,' who is acquainted with hidden things, to some extent the *ṭabīb*, 'physician,' literally 'skilful, well-informed,' who in many cases is an enchanter (*rāqī*), and even the man whose wisdom qualifies him to act as arbitrator (*ḥakam*). The word *shā'ir*, 'one who knows,' must in early times have denoted a man who uttered sayings inspired by some higher power; afterwards it gradually became the technical term for a 'poet.'§ In general, any one who possesses secret powers is called a *sāḥir*, 'magician.' Among the Arabs, as among other nations, it was particularly in this sphere that the mysterious depth of the feminine soul made itself felt; we read both of female soothsayers and female enchanters. A female familiar spirit (*ra'īya*) is likewise mentioned.

Arabic literature contains many stories about *kāhins* and many utterances which were attributed to them; but of all these only a very small proportion can be considered trustworthy, and a great deal is pure invention due to later writers. Nevertheless the passages in question enable us at least to form an idea of the style in which the soothsayers expressed themselves; the same style re-appears in the oldest chapters of the Qur'ān. The fact is that the conceptions which the soothsayers embodied were raised by Muḥammad to a far higher level. He felt in himself an inspiration which proceeded from the one true God. But if he had not had before him the example of the heathen *kāhins*, it is hard to believe that any such idea would have entered his mind; on the other hand, we cannot wonder that his prosaic fellow-citizens called him a soothsayer, a magician, and a 'possessed poet.' Nor is it impossible that his most formidable rival, Maslama‖ ibn Ḥabīb of the tribe of Ḥanīfa, was likewise sincerely convinced of his own divine inspiration.¶

5. *OMENS.*—The belief in signs as betokening future events was, of course, no less common among the Arabs than among other nations. Some birds were regarded as lucky, some as unlucky. The animals that crossed a man's path and the direction in which they moved alike conveyed a meaning. Many of these signs were such as every one could understand; others were intelligible only to persons specially trained. One peculiar art consisted in scaring birds and drawing omens from their flight; this operation was known as *zajr*. Various other superstitions of the same order might be enumerated, but such beliefs and practices do not properly belong to the domain of religion, and it is therefore sufficient to notice them in passing.

6. *THE SOUL.*—The Arabs, like all other Semites, identified the breath (*nafs*) with the principle of life, or the soul.* So completely did *nafs* convey, from the earliest times onward, the idea of human personality, that the word is used, with the addition of the possessive suffix, as an ordinary reflexive pronoun: *nafsī*, 'my soul,' means 'myself'; *nafsaka*, 'thyself'; *linafsihi*, 'for himself,' etc.† When the *nafs* permanently quits a man, death is the result; but the words of the Qur'ān (*Sūra* xxxix. 43), 'Allāh takes the souls to Himself when they die, and those who have not died (He takes) in their sleep,' presuppose the belief that during sleep also the soul is absent from the body.‡ It is true that the conception of the 'breath' as the principle of life does not harmonize very well with the theory that the life resides in the blood (see above, p. 665). But this latter view is much less popular among the Arabs than it was among the Israelites, and when the *nafs* of a man dying from wounds is said to 'flow away,' we need not assume, with the native Arabic commentators, that *nafs* here means simply 'the blood.' Even the Heb. *nephesh* (the equivalent of the Arabic *nafs*) is identified with the blood only in so far as the shedding of the blood causes death. It would appear that the life-giving soul (*nafs*) was supposed to have its seat in the heart; when the soul moves upwards, it is about to depart; in other words, death is imminent. The 'breath' escapes through its natural passage, the mouth or the nostrils.§ Thus, in passages referring to deadly peril, we read, 'when your soul had reached your throat,' 'before the soul rises above the ribs,' 'he just escaped with his soul in the corner of his mouth,' etc. In phrases of this kind *nafs* is sometimes omitted as being the implied subject of the sentence; for instance, in the words of the Qur'ān, 'when it (*i.e.* the soul, which is unexpressed) reaches the throat' (*Sūra* lvi. 82, lxxv. 26), meaning, 'when a man is at the last gasp.'‖ A view which at first sight seems to differ from the foregoing appears in a story told of a certain aged Arab who fell into the hands of a hostile clan. Seeing that they were determined to shed his blood, he presented a sword to them, saying, 'Cut off my head, for the soul (*nafs*) is in it,' which they accordingly proceeded to do.¶

* Cf. 1 S 307 etc.

† Hence any man noted for his intelligence is supposed to have a *tābi'*, who reveals all manner of things to him.

‡ The root was no longer employed by the Arabs in the simple sense of 'beholding'; even in Hebrew this usage is confined to the poetical or rhetorical style.

§ The connexion between poetical inspiration and the unseen world was not entirely forgotten even in later times, though the allusions which a poet makes to his 'demon' or 'Satan' are little more than jests. A very primitive stage in the development of this idea is represented by the story of Balaam in Nu 22–24; cf. Goldziher, *Abhandlungen zur arab. Philologie*, i. (Leyden, 1896) pp. 1–205.

‖ By the Muḥammadans he was contemptuously called *Musaïlima*, *i.e.* 'little Maslama.'

¶ This would partly account for the fact that his adherents were the only Arabs who displayed real courage and stubbornness in contending against Islām.

* The Ethiopic *nafest*, 'that which contains the *nafs* (breath, life)' means the living human body (cf. *animus*, *anima*, etc.). The Arabic *rūḥ* properly denotes the 'breath' only; its use in the sense of 'spirit' was unknown to the heathen, and when so employed it is to be regarded as one of the foreign religious terms which were introduced by Islām.

† The corresponding forms are similarly used in Hebrew and Aramaic.

‡ This conception prevails very widely. It is due to the belief that dreams are real experiences through which men pass while they are apparently lifeless. See Frazer, *Golden Bough*², i. 255 ff.

§ See Frazer, *op. cit.* i. 251.

‖ The common phrase *māta ḥatfa anfihi*, 'he died a natural death,' similarly refers, it would appear, to the cessation of the breath, since the 'nose' (*anf*) is here associated with the idea of 'dying' (*māta*); but the special meaning which *ḥatfa* has in this connexion remains obscure.

¶ See the Commentary on the *Naqā'iḍ* of Jarīr and al-Farazdaq.

These words, however, are probably to be taken as nothing more than a statement, based on ordinary experience, that the severing of the head puts an end to life, not as the expression of an idea opposed to the deeply-rooted popular belief which has been described above (see also footnote ‖, p. 671[b]).

In reading the Qur'ān we might be tempted to conclude that the heathen Arabs regarded the departure of the *nafs* as equivalent to annihilation; but in reality all that Muhammad's opponents denied was the novel, and to their minds absurd, doctrine of the resurrection and the other world.* Their notions as to the state of departed souls were, of course, vaguer, if anything, than the notions of Homer's fellow-countrymen as to the ψυχή. Nevertheless, the usual invocation addressed to the dead, 'Be not far away!' does not admit of any satisfactory interpretation, unless we presuppose the belief that the dead had a dwelling-place, and might be induced by entreaty to remain in the neighbourhood of his people.† It is true that the formula in question dates from a period when such things were more vividly conceived. Sometimes we meet with sober reflexions of the following kind: 'They will say, when they bury me, "Be not far away!" but what place can then be far away, if mine is not?'

Nothing seems to the Arabs more obvious than that blood must be expiated by blood.‡ Hence one who has been slain longs for vengeance, and thirsts for the blood of the murderer. These phrases must originally have been understood in quite a literal fashion,§ whence we may conclude with certainty that some sort of life was ascribed to the departed. On this subject strange fancies prevailed. The soul of the murdered man was represented as appearing in the form of an owl, and as continually crying out, 'Give me to drink!' until vengeance had been executed. It must be remembered that the scene of the murder was, in most cases, a lonely spot where the weird cry of the feathered anchorite would not be out of place. The term applied to the departed is *hāma*, properly 'skull,' the skull being the most characteristic part of the dead body;‖ the voice of the departed is called *ṣadā*, 'echo.' Hence 'skull' and 'echo' come to be used as designations of the ghostly bird, or owl, that cries for vengeance.* Moreover, the rites of burial, simple as they were, presuppose some kind of future existence. In order to show honour to the dead, it was the practice to tether a camel, which had previously been lamed, near the grave,† and to let it die of starvation. This usage can be explained only on the hypothesis that the soul of the camel was supposed to be ridden by the dead man. The custom of slaughtering sacrifices at a grave has maintained itself in various parts of Arabia down to the present day.‡ It is particularly interesting to note that about the year 1100 after Christ certain Arabs of Northern Yemen (apparently near the mountain-range of 'Asīr) showed their respect for a dead man, in accordance with their traditional practice, by breaking 1000 swords and 300 bows, and by laming 70 horses;§ this was undoubtedly a survival of an ancient heathen rite. That the objects destined for the service of the departed must be rendered useless to the living is an idea which might easily occur to the fancy of primitive man.‖ We likewise find traces of hair-offerings presented to the dead, but scarcely any traces of drink-offerings. Poets, it is true, often express the wish that the graves of those whom they love may be refreshed with abundant rain;¶ but whether this implies a belief that the dead themselves are capable of being refreshed is extremely doubtful; such passages may be mere figures of speech, referring to the verdure with which the grave is to be covered. In like manner, the greetings which poets sometimes address to the dead are purely rhetorical, and do not presuppose any notion of real intercourse with the departed.

The practice of refusing sepulture to an enemy, and of casting forth his corpse to be devoured by beasts and birds, prevailed no less among the Arabs than among the Homeric warriors or the peoples of Palestine (1 S 17[44], cf. Ezk 29[5]). There can be no doubt that this was originally regarded as a positive injury to the dead, as depriving them of rest in the grave, or the like. But in historical times such conceptions had begun to become obsolete;** the poet Shanfarā (see above, p. 669), who was outlawed by his tribe, disclaims all wish for burial, and invites the hyæna to rend his dead body on the battlefield.†† In general, however, the Arabs paid great attention to proper interment, and special care was taken to construct the grave so that it could not be violated by the hyænas. That all this may be done without any notion of bene-

Bodleian MS (Pococke, 390, fol. 53[b]): the passage in question has been communicated by Professor Bevan to the author of the present article.

* Primitive man must have been quite unable to grasp the idea of his personality being completely annihilated at death. Even to us such a thing is, strictly speaking, unimaginable.

† Poets modify the expression in various ways; thus, when one poet says, 'May Allāh not suffer thee to be far away!' we must beware of taking the words to imply a definite religious idea. Moreover, the poets use the same formula with reference to other things, *e.g.* 'May God not suffer youth to be far away!' One poet, whose hand had been cut off, actually says to it, 'Be not far away!' The primitive sense of the phrase is completely lost in the verse of the poetess Ḥansā, alluding to her departed brother, 'May the grave that contains his body not be far away!' The invocation 'Be not far away' is even at the present day addressed to the dead by certain Bedawīn.

‡ The substitution of a blood-wit (*diya*) for blood-revenge is a later modification. But in historical times the blood-wit had become very common; well-disposed persons eagerly furthered this device for maintaining peace, often at great sacrifice to themselves. Nevertheless it was not considered quite honourable to accept 'milk' (*i.e.* camels or other animals that could be milked) instead of 'blood.'

§ In reality, of course, the thirst for blood is felt by the surviving relatives. The daughter of the aged hero Duraid ibn Simma, who was miserably slain by a Muslim just after the battle of Ḥunain (A.D. 630), says in a poem, 'When we march against them, may He (*i.e.* Allāh) give us to drink of the blood of their noblest ones on the day of battle!' This is evidently metaphorical; but we can scarcely doubt that the phrase was coined at a time when men actually drank the blood of their slain enemies, partly in order to quench the burning thirst for vengeance, partly, it would seem, in order to absorb the strength of the vanquished. It must not be forgotten that, after the battle of Uḥud, Hind bint 'Otba, a woman of remarkable intelligence, bit the liver of her fallen enemy Ḥamza, who in a previous battle, at Badr, had with the aid of two companions killed her father, her son, and her uncle.

‖ Perhaps this use of *hāma* may be partly due to the notion that in the head, as the poet says, is the 'greater part' of the man,—an expression which refers, not to the brain, but to the external organs of sensation.

* As Professor Goldziher has observed, the saying ascribed to Muḥammad, that the souls of believers slain in fighting for the faith are deposited in the stomachs of green birds, which drink of the rivers of Paradise, eat of its fruits, and perch upon the lamps suspended in the shadow of God's throne, obviously stands in contrast to the gloomy beliefs of the heathen. The beatified martyrs do not thirst for blood, and the birds that contain them are clad in the colour of vegetation, which to the inhabitants of the desert is synonymous with life.

† The Arabs practised burial only; the burning of corpses was unknown to them. It should be observed that the root QBR, which properly expresses the idea of 'burying,' is common to all the Semitic languages, and that the synonymous root DFN is not confined to Arabic.

‡ See Goldziher, *Muḥamm. Studien*, i. (Halle, 1888) 239 ff.; Landberg, *Arabica*, iii. (Leyden, 1895) 103, and *Dialectes de l'Arabie mérid.* i. (*ib.* 1901) 434, by the same author.

§ *'Oumāra du Yemen*, ed. H. Derenbourg (Paris, 1897–1903), i. 18.

‖ Some similar cases have been pointed out to the writer of the present article by Professor Schwally, who is specially versed in these subjects.

¶ On the other hand, a curse sometimes takes the form of a prayer that no rain may fall upon the grave of the individual in question.

** The substitution of a crudely material Paradise and Hell for the vague or wholly negative beliefs of the heathen respecting a future existence, was doubtless one of the most important factors in the conversion of the Arabs to Muḥammad's teaching.

†† Nevertheless in an elegy composed upon his death the ancient formula occurs, 'May Shanfarā be not far away!'

fiting the departed is sufficiently obvious from the usages of modern Europe.*

The belief which exists among many primitive races, that the dead are malevolent, and seek to injure the living, is one of which no traces are to be found among the Arabs.

VI. MORALS.

It is almost superfluous to say that the Arabs had a generally recognized code of morals, which, we must admit, did not always reach a very high ethical standard. Some element of religion is contained in the maxim, which the poets repeat in various forms, that the misuse of strength leads to calamity;† there are likewise narratives which inculcate the same doctrine. Moreover, the poets sometimes bring the Deity into immediate connexion with the fulfilment of duties, for instance, as vindicating the sanctity of compacts. But in general it may be said that the maintenance of morality was due much more to respect for traditional usages and public opinion than to fear of Divine wrath.

LITERATURE.—**L. Krehl**, *Die Religion der vorislam. Araber*, Leipzig, 1863 [antiquated]. The great work on the subject is Wellhausen's *Reste arab. Heidentums* (=*Skizzen u. Vorarbeiten*, drittes Heft), Berlin, 1887 [2nd ed. 1897]. Much of value will be found in W. Robertson Smith's *Religion of the Semites*, Edinburgh, 1889 [2nd ed. 1894], and in the works of Ignatius Goldziher, esp. his *Abhandlungen zur arab. Philologie*, erster Theil, Leyden, 1896. See also the works cited in the body of this article. The present writer cannot recommend D. Nielsen's *Die altarab. Mondreligion*, Strassburg, 1904.

TH. NÖLDEKE.

ARAKH.—A tribe of cultivators and field-labourers in Northern India, of Dravidian origin, which at the Census of 1901 numbered 76,436, practically all of whom are found in the United Provinces. They claim to be Hindus, but their religion is really an advanced form of animism, and they are never initiated into any of the orthodox sects. Their tribal goddess is Devī, whom they propitiate by a sacrifice of goats, the service being done by a class of Brāhmans of low rank. They observe the usual Hindu feasts, and at that of the Karvā Chauth in October–November their women worship the moon by pouring water on the ground from an earthen pot with a spout (*karvā*). In Central India, as in the United Provinces, they are not assisted in their domestic worship by Brāhmans, and their worship is chiefly devoted to a snake god whom they call Kartal Deo.

LITERATURE.—**Crooke**, *Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, 1896, i. 83 f.; **Luard**, *Census Report, Central India*, 1901, i. 202.

W. CROOKE.

ARAMÆANS.—See SYRIANS.

ĀRAṆYAKAS.—The *Āraṇyaka* literature of the Hindus holds a position intermediate between the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads; in a formal and technical sense supplementary to the Brāhmaṇas, but sharing generally the themes and subject-matter of the Upaniṣads, which in their turn are appended to or form a part of the Āraṇyakas (see art. UPANIṢADS). These treatises are therefore *śruti*, revealed and inspired Scripture. The name indicates either that they were composed in the forest (*araṇye*) by the hermits who devoted themselves there to a life of seclusion and meditation, or that they were intended to be there read and studied. The latter is the Indian view.‡

Perhaps both are correct. Strictly speaking, also, each Brāhmaṇa had its own Āraṇyaka, just as each *śākhā*, or school of Vedic teaching, had its Brāhmaṇa; and the Āraṇyaka was completed and supplemented by a corresponding Upaniṣad.

This accepted classification of the Sanskrit sacred literature is not unconnected with the theory of the four *āśramas* (see art. ĀŚRAMA). The Brāhmaṇas were the text-books of the Brāhman householder, upon which he relied for the due performance of his obligations as *gṛhastha*. Later in life, during the third period, after his retirement into the forest as *vānaprastha*, he devoted himself to the study of the Āraṇyaka, as sanctioned and adopted in the *śākhā* to which he belonged.*

It has been shown that the Āraṇyaka literature in general is chronologically of more recent date than the *saṁhitās* of the Veda, which are known to it essentially in the form in which they have come down to us; and that it is later also than the Brāhmaṇas. On the other hand, the greater part at least is anterior to the period of the *sūtra* compositions, to the character and style of which the more recent portions of the Āraṇyakas approximate. Pāṇini† is said to be unacquainted with them; but in this instance the supposed ignorance may be only a matter of name.

The extant Āraṇyakas belong to the Rigveda and the Yajurveda. There are no known Āraṇyakas of the Sāmaveda or the Atharvaveda.

The *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* of the Rigveda is described as a distinct and separate treatise, not forming a part of the Ait. Brāhmaṇa. It consists of five divisions, or *āraṇyakas*, of which the last two are ascribed to the authors Āśvalāyana and Śaunaka, and are written in a later style, suggesting the peculiar features of the sūtra literature. Chapters 4–6 of the second Āraṇyaka form the Upaniṣad proper. The first āraṇyaka details the rules for the morning, mid-day, and evening offerings on the *mahāvrata*, or great vow day, the last day but one of the *gavām-ayana*, the 'procession of cows.' The first three chapters of the second āraṇyaka treat of the allegorical significance of the *uktham*, the spoken word;‡ while in the third part is discussed, quite after the upaniṣad manner, the meaning of the letters of the alphabet and their combinations.§

The *Kauṣītaki Āraṇyaka* also belongs to the Rigveda, but is attached to a different *śakhā*, or school, that of the Kauṣitakins. It contains fifteen *adhyāyas*, or chapters, some of which coincide with chapters of the Aitareya Āraṇyaka. Adhyāyas 3–6, according to the usual numbering, form the Upaniṣad; but their position is said to vary in the different manuscripts, as though the four chapters of the Upaniṣad had originally existed, and been in circulation apart from the Āraṇyaka.‖

Of the Yajurveda two Āraṇyakas are known, the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka* and the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, belonging respectively to the White and Black Yajurveda. The former is part of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, of which it forms the last six *adhyāyas* or five *prapāṭhakas* of the fourteenth or last book according to the Mādhyandina school; but in the *śakhā* of the Kāṇvas it is reckoned separately as the seventeenth book. Thus the Upaniṣad and the Āraṇyaka coincide; but the whole of the last book in the Mādhy. recension also is sometimes considered as the Āraṇyaka.¶ The *Taittirīya Ār.* consists of 10 books or *prapāṭhakas*, of which the first six are the Āraṇyaka proper. These books discuss the *mantras* for various ceremonies, the training and Vedic studies of a Brāhman, and the offerings to the Fathers. Books vii. to ix. are the Taitt. Up.; and book x. is supplementary, the so-called Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad. The style and contents seem to betray a comparatively late date.**

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*The outburst of popular indignation which proved fatal to the victorious commanders after the battle of Arginusæ shows that, near the end of the 5th cent. B.C., the bulk of the Athenians, notwithstanding the rationalistic doctrines of the Sophists, still adhered to the belief that funeral rites were of great importance to the dead. From the same standpoint we must regard the conduct of Antigone; it is not merely a *formal* expression of piety.

†For example, one poet says, 'Those who graze on the pasture of iniquity are smitten with pestilence.'

‡Sāyaṇa on the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka: 'The rule is that this āraṇyakam is for forest-study; it should be studied, therefore, in the forest,' etc. (Max Müller, *Ancient Sanskr. Lit.*[2] p. 313).

*Āruṇeya Upaniṣad, 2: the sannyāsin (*kuṭīcharas*) is to live without the mantras of the Veda, but to observe the three daily ablutions, to meditate on the ātman, and 'of all the Vedas to recite the Āraṇyaka and the Upaniṣad' (Deussen, *Sechzig Upan.* p. 693). Cf. Yājñavalkya, *Dharmaśāstra*, 8. 110: 'He who wishes to attain Yoga should know the Āraṇyaka'; *Mahābh.* 1.258: 'this body of the Mahābhārata is truth and immortality; it is . . . like the Āraṇyaka from the Vedas.' The last two quotations are in Max Müller, pp. 330 n. 2, 315 n. 1. See also E. W. Hopkins, *Great Epic of India*, New York, 1901, p. 9.

†About the latter half of the 4th cent. B.C. (B.C. 350 acc. to O. Böhtlingk). Others assign to him an earlier date. See C. M. Duff, *Chronology of India*, London, 1899, p. 7; Macdonell, *Sanskrit Literature*, p. 430 f.

‡'The beginning of the Ait. Ār. is in fact a commentary on the Rigveda' (Max Müller).

§P. Deussen, *Sechzig Upan. d. Veda*, p. 10 ff.; Max Müller, *l.c.*

‖Deussen, p. 21 f.; Max Müller, p. 337 f.; A. B. Keith in *JRAS*, 1908, p. 363 ff., who prefers the name Śāṅkhāyana.

¶Max Müller, p. 329 f.; *SBE*, vol. xliv., Introd. p. xlix f.

**Max Müller, p. 334 f.; Deussen, p. 213 f.

LITERATURE.—The Aitareya and Taittiriya Āraṇyakas have been edited in the *Bibliotheca Indica*, Calcutta, 1876 and 1872; the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, by O. Böhtlingk, Leipzig, 1889, and elsewhere; the first two *adhyāyas* of the Kauṣitaki Āraṇyaka have been published by W. Friedländer, Berlin, 1900, adh. iii.–vi. by E. B. Cowell, Calcutta, 1901, and the remainder is being edited by A. B. Keith (see *JRAS*, 1908, p. 363 ff.). See Max Müller, *Hist. of Anc. Sanskr. Lit.*[2], London, 1860, pp. 147, 153 f., 313–318, 334–341; A. Barth, *Religions of India*[2], London, 1889, p. 3 f.; P. Deussen, *Sechzig Upanishad's des Veda*, Leipzig, 1897, pp. 3 f., 10 ff., 21 f., 213 f., 373 ff.; **A. A. Macdonell**, *Sanskrit Literature*, London, 1890, pp. 34, 50, 204 f., 208 f., 211 ff.

A. S. GEDEN.

ARBITRARINESS is, according to the popular use of the term, that quality which is ascribed to an act of will (*arbitrium*), and whatsoever follows from it, not merely in so far as it is free, but in so far as the choice of the individual who wills is not influenced by consideration for others or respect for any law which is not self-imposed. Hence arbitrariness tends to imply capriciousness, irrationality, and an incalculable character generally. It must be in this wider sense that the word is employed by critics of the indeterminist theory of the Freedom of the Will (wh. see), when they say that that doctrine implies total arbitrariness of the will.

The theory of the arbitrariness of good, advanced by the Scotists, Occam and Descartes, is the doctrine that good is good because it proceeds from the undetermined will of God, who has chosen and commanded it; a moral act is not intrinsically good. Cf. Windelband, *Hist. of Philos.* (Eng. tr.) 332, 394.

G. R. T. ROSS.

ARBITRATION is an arrangement by which two persons, having a difference, agree to submit it to the decision of a third, and to abide by that decision when it has been given. Such an agreement precludes either party from instituting a suit in the ordinary Courts of law on the matter in question; and indeed those Courts are so favourable to arbitration that they will make the submission to arbitration a rule of Court, so that the decision of the third person, called the arbiter or arbitrator, may be enforced at law by either party against the other.

The reasons which induce persons who would otherwise become litigants to prefer a reference to arbitration to a suit at law are: (1) that it does not involve the personal hostility caused by legal proceedings; (2) that it is more economical in its cost; (3) that the arbitrator is at liberty to consider the whole circumstances of the matter in dispute, and to arrive at what in his opinion is an equitable solution of it; (4) that the arbitrator is a person selected by themselves upon the ground of his special fitness to deal with that matter.

It does not often happen, however, that the two parties at variance are able to agree upon a third who possesses equally the confidence of both. The ordinary form of arbitration is, therefore, the appointment by each party of a different arbitrator, and the appointment by the two arbitrators of a third person as oversman or umpire, by whom any difference between the two arbitrators shall be decided. In England the proceedings in arbitration are regulated by statute, and are, therefore, only a degree less formal than those of a suit at law. They begin with a submission to the arbitrators of the question in dispute; then there is the acceptance by the arbitrators of the burden of the reference, and the fixing by them of a time for hearing the parties. At that time each party may be heard in person or by solicitor or counsel; the evidence of witnesses and of documents may be tendered, and the arbitrators may administer an oath to each witness, or take his affirmation, which will render him liable to the penalties of perjury if his evidence be false in any material particular.

The decision of the arbitrator or umpire, when duly arrived at, is binding upon both parties, and the Courts will not enter upon any inquiry whether it is right or wrong. He draws it up in the form of an award, and, speaking generally, the Courts accept that award as conclusive. There are cases, however, where it may appear to the Court that the arbitrator has neglected the elementary principles of justice, as by refusing to hear evidence, or has not brought his mind to the consideration of the subject, or has not disposed of the question really at issue, or has in some other way failed in the due exercise of his functions; and the Court will in such case either refer the matter back to him, or hold that it is not ousted of its own inherent jurisdiction to determine that matter. For these reasons the parties in their choice of an arbitrator, and the arbitrators in their choice of an umpire, should be careful to select a person who, whether a practising lawyer or not, has a mind imbued with the principles of law, and has had some experience in their practical application, as well as an expert knowledge of the definite questions at issue.

In certain cases, in order to avoid the cost of litigation, a recourse to arbitration has been prescribed or authorized by statute. The Savings Banks Acts, the Friendly Societies Acts, the Building Societies Acts, and the Industrial and Provident Societies Acts contain provisions to this effect. In the case of the Savings Banks, including the Post Office Savings Banks, all disputes between a depositor or other claimant and the Bank are to be settled by the Registrar of Friendly Societies, and the jurisdiction of the Courts of law is ousted. As, however, the depositor has no choice in the matter, this is in effect only the creation of another Court having final jurisdiction, and using cheaper and more speedy methods than those of the ordinary Courts. In the other cases the statutes enable a society to provide by its rules that all disputes shall be referred to arbitration, and to define in those rules the manner in which the arbitrators shall be chosen. Where the rules contain such a provision, the jurisdiction of the Courts of law is equally ousted, and the member or other claimant has no other remedy than to avail himself of the arbitration thus provided.

In regard to the trade disputes between employer and employed, which frequently lead to much suffering and loss when pursued by the ordinary methods of trade warfare—strikes and lockouts—much may be done by means of arbitration and conciliation. Thus among the ironworkers of the country a permanent Board of Conciliation has been established, consisting of a given number of workmen and of representatives of the employers, who meet periodically to adjudicate on any questions of dispute that may have arisen in the course of the employment, and to prescribe any change in the current rate of wages that may be necessary. Their decisions are accepted by both parties, and the establishment of the Board has procured a long industrial peace in that particular trade. By the Conciliation Act of 1896 the parties to any trade dispute may apply to the Board of Trade to appoint a conciliator, and this method has been adopted with success in many important trade disputes. Lord Rosebery, Lord James of Hereford, Mr. Asquith, and other eminent statesmen have accepted the office of conciliator, and the results have been in general satisfactory—not only in saving the workmen and their families from much distress and the employers from heavy loss, but in re-establishing friendly and kindly relations between them. In like manner, arbitration has frequently been invoked in the United States in cases of conflict between capital and labour, as when, in the great miners' strike of 1902, President

Roosevelt appointed a Board of Arbitration which satisfactorily settled the disputes in question. Some States, as New Jersey, have regularly appointed State Boards of Arbitration.

Another still more important development of the principle of arbitration, rich in its promise for the peace of the world, has been its application to disputes between nations. Such disputes, even more than those between individuals, are apt to be coloured with local prejudice, *amour propre*, and all the elements that go to make up the sentiment of patriotism. Nothing is more difficult than for the people of one country, party to such a dispute, to appreciate the strength of the case of the other party. The nation's honour and prestige are thought to be at issue on the result of the dispute; and nothing is easier than to create an unreasoning popular clamour for war. To substitute for the appeal to arms—with all its consequences to both countries in bloodshed, suffering, waste, and demoralization—an appeal to argument and to calm reason is a triumph of civilization. The superstition of the ancients led them to think that the gods would defend the right, and even in Christian times we have seen two hostile armies each appealing to the god of battles for success upon that ground; but, in fact, the recourse to war is nothing but a resort to brute force.

An instance in point is afforded by the dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela. A question arose between those two States as to their rights in certain portions of the territory called British Guiana. In 1890 the Venezuelan Government proposed a reference to arbitration on this question, which Great Britain refused. Thereupon the Government of the United States of America interposed, upon the ground that any hostile action taken by Great Britain against Venezuela would be an infringement of the Monroe doctrine, and President Cleveland took upon himself to appoint a Commission to ascertain the rights of the matter. The British Government having refused to recognize this Commission, a wave of warlike enthusiasm swept over the United States, and if popular excitement had had its way, a war between those two great and kindred nations would have resulted, with all its horrible consequences, arising out of a matter of no real importance to either. Fortunately, better counsels prevailed, and Great Britain and Venezuela agreed to a reference to arbitration. The result of that arbitration was a concession to Venezuela of territory which Great Britain had more than once offered to that State, and the confirmation in other respects of the contentions of the British Government.

A still more famous instance is that known as the 'Alabama' arbitration. During the Civil War in the United States, resulting from the secession of the Southern or Confederate States, a vessel was built at Birkenhead, which was allowed to leave English waters, and was armed and commissioned by the Confederate Government. The United States ambassador had complained to the British Government of the breach of neutrality involved in the building and equipment of this vessel, and orders were given to stop it; but by an accident those orders were delayed till after the ship had actually sailed. In the course of the following two years this ship, named the 'Alabama,' destroyed much property belonging to citizens of the United States, and at the close of the war the Government of those States claimed the value of that property from the British Government as damages for which Great Britain was liable through its unintentional breach of neutrality. The British Government accepted the responsibility, and agreed to refer the settlement of the amount payable to arbitration. The amount awarded was 15½ million dollars.

E. W. BRABROOK.

ARCANI DISCIPLINA.—The name given by Dallæus to the custom in the Early Catholic Church of keeping the administration of Baptism and the Holy Supper, with related doctrines and rites, a secret from all except the baptized. Various reasons for this practice have been suggested by scholars. It was not due to any teaching of the NT, and the openness with which Justin Martyr describes the worship of the Church, and the fact that the followers of Marcion had not the practice, show that it was not usual before the third quarter of the 2nd century.

There is every reason to suppose that the celebration of the Holy Supper by the congregations in Apostolic times was virtually private. Danger of persecution led to concealment of the Christian assemblies and rites. The measures of the Roman government prevented the celebration of the Supper and the Agapæ at night, and compelled the observance of the former in connexion with the open preaching of the word in the daytime, and perhaps the gradual abandonment of the latter. The catechumens were then dismissed before the communicants entered upon the Holy Supper itself. The catechumenate afforded a period of probation. In the first part of it the candidates were instructed in the general principles of religion. It was just before their baptism that they were instructed in the mysteries of the faith. The Creed, and perhaps the doctrine of the Trinity which explained the formula of Baptism, were not imparted to them until just before their baptism; and the Lord's Prayer not until afterwards. The example of the heathen Mysteries was felt. Those who had been admitted to the Communion, having gone through the grades of the catechumenate, and having transacted successive renunciations and exorcisms, were spoken of as 'The Initiated.' Finally, it became usual to regard those rites from which all but the full members of the Church were excluded as 'Mysteries,' and to transfer to them the awe that belonged to ethnic Mysteries. As Th. Harnack says, 'The mystical became mysterious, and the liturgical became theurgic.' He traces the great change to the gradual concentration of all the authority of the Church in the episcopate, due to the necessity of opposing its authority to Gnostic sects and their teachings. The rites of the Church were thought to have no validity apart from the bishops; and those performed by them were invested with mysterious awfulness. To this conception of Divine worship, Roman Catholic writers have joined the notion of a secret tradition of doctrine from the Apostles, in addition to the teaching of the NT. To this tradition they ascribe, for instance, the doctrine of Transubstantiation, and also the reverence for images and for the saints.

This *Secret Discipline*, beginning about A.D. 175, was in vogue until the end of the 5th century. Its features may, perhaps, be best set forth by the following quotations from Fathers and teachers of the 3rd and 4th centuries.

Tert. (*Præscrip. Hær.* xli.): 'To begin with, it is doubtful who is a catechumen and who a believer; they have all access alike, they hear alike, they pray alike—even heathens, if any such happen to come among them. That which is holy they will cast to the dogs; and their pearls, although (to be sure) they are not real ones, they will fling to the swine. Simplicity they will have to consist in the overthrow of discipline, attention to which on our part they call pandering.'

Basil (*de Sp.* 27): 'Of the beliefs and practices whether generally accepted or publicly enjoined which are preserved in the Church, some we possess derived from written teaching; others we have received delivered to us "in a mystery" by the tradition of the Apostles; and both of these in relation to true religion have the same force.'

(In a note in the *Nicene Fathers*, vol. viii. p. 41, Photius is quoted: 'In this work Eulogius [Patriarch of Alexandria 579–607] says that of the doctrines (δεδαγμάτων) handed down in the church by the ministers of the word, some are δόγματα, and others κηρύγματα. The distinction is that δόγματα are announced with concealment and prudence, and are often designedly compassed with obscurity, in order that holy things may not be exposed to profane persons or pearls cast before swine. Κηρύγματα, on the other hand, are announced without any concealment').

'For we are not, as is well known, content with what the Apostle or the Gospel has recorded, but both in preface and conclusion we add other words as being of great importance to the validity of the ministry, and these we derive from unwritten teaching. Moreover, we bless the water of baptism and the oil of the chrism, and besides this the catechumen who is being baptized. On what written authority do we do this? Is not our authority silent and mystical tradition? . . . Does not this come from that unpublished and secret teaching which our fathers guarded in a silence out of the reach of curious meddling and inquisitive investigation? Well had they learnt the lesson that the awful dignity of the mysteries is best preserved by silence. What the uninitiated are not even allowed to look at was hardly likely to be publicly paraded about in written documents. . . . . Moses was wise enough to know that contempt attaches to the trite and to the obvious, while a keen interest is naturally associated with the unusual and the unfamiliar. In the same manner the Apostles and Fathers

who laid down laws for the Church from the beginning thus guarded the awful dignity of the mysteries in secrecy and silence, for what is bruited abroad at random among the common folk is no mystery at all. This is the reason for our traditions of unwritten precepts and practices, that the knowledge of our dogmas may not become neglected and contemned by the multitude through familiarity. "Dogma" and "Kerygma" are two distinct things: the former is observed in silence; the latter is proclaimed to all the world.'

Cyril Jer. (*Catech.* vi. 29): 'These Mysteries, which the Church now explains to thee who art passing out of the class of Catechumens, it is not the custom to explain to heathen. For to a heathen we do not explain the mysteries concerning Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, nor before Catechumens do we speak plainly of the Mysteries; but many things we often speak in a veiled way, that the believers who know may understand, and they who know not may get no hurt.'

Ambrose (*e. Myster.* i.): 'The season now warns us to speak of the Mysteries, and to set forth the purport of the sacraments, which if we had thought it well to teach before baptism to those who were not yet initiated, we should be considered rather to have betrayed than to have portrayed the Mysteries. And then, too, another reason is that the light itself of the Mysteries will shed itself with more effect upon those who are expecting they know not what, than if any discourse had come beforehand.'

Origen (*c. Cels.* i. 7): 'Crucifixion, Resurrection, Incarnation are well known. But that there should be certain doctrines, not made known to the multitude, which are (revealed) after the exoteric ones have been taught, is not a peculiarity of Christianity, but also of philosophic systems, in which some truths are exoteric and some esoteric.'

When, in consequence of the conversion of the Empire and the prevalence of Infant Baptism, the old catechumenate of adults fell away, the *Disciplina Arcani* ceased to be, although in the Greek Liturgy the distinction between a *Missa Catechumenorum* and a *Missa Fidelium* is still marked by the deacon's warning to all the catechumens to go out of the church.

LITERATURE.—Art. on 'Arkandisciplin' in *PRE*[2] (v. Zezschwitz) and *PRE*[3] (Bouwetsch); 'Disciplina Arcani' in the *Dict. Christ. Ant.*; also Th. Harnack, *Der christ. Gemeindegottesdienst im apostol. u. altkathol. Zeitalter* (1854), esp. pp. 3–60; Edwin Hatch, *The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church* (1888), pp. 283–309; John Dallæus, *De Scriptis quæ sub Dionysii Areopagitæ nomine circumferuntur* (1666); Meier, *De recondita veteris ecclesiæ theologia* (1670); Schelstrate, *Antiquitas illustrata circa concilia generalia et provincialia* (1678); Bingham, *Antiquities of the Christian Church*, x. xiv. xv. (1708–1722, Engl. 1875); Fromman, *De Disciplina Arcani* (1833); Richd. Rothe, *De Disciplinæ Arcani Origine* (1841); Th. Zahn, *Glaubensregel u. Taufbekenntnis in d. alten Kirche*; Anrich, *Das antike Mysterienwesen in seinem Einfluss auf das Christentum* (1894); Horn, *Outlines of Liturgics on the basis of Harnack* (1890).

EDWARD T. HORN.

ARCHÆOLOGY.—1. Archæology is a descriptive science, dealing with the interpretation of the remains of past phases of human civilization. Etymologically, the name denotes the study of *origins* generally (from Gr. ἀρχή, 'origin'; ἀρχαῖος, 'original'), and strictly it implies that the remains which it studies are interpreted as members of an originative or developmental series, irrespective of their nearness to the present time. Popularly, however, archæology is restricted to mean the 'study of antiquity,' and is understood to mean the interpretation, *either*, generally, of all the available evidence for past phases of civilization (in which sense it includes formal 'history' among its subdivisions); *or*, more particularly, of such evidence as is furnished by the material remains of human handiwork. In the latter and commoner sense, archæology stands alongside formal history, which is concerned with the interpretation of documents; and it is to be regarded essentially as the 'past tense' of technology, and of the æsthetic criticism of manufactured objects. Archæology, like palæontology and geology, which are the analogous 'past tenses' or 'historical' aspects of biology and geography, is a science of observation solely. Experiment is contemplated only in so far as it may be possible to test interpretation (*e.g.* of the evidence for an obsolete mode of manipulation) by re-constituting now the presumed conditions of the ancient process, so as to attain an analogous result.

It is only in its wider signification that archæology comes into contact with the study of religion or ethics. Ancient technology and ancient æsthetic, considered specially, occupy their own domain apart. But there are few, if any, religions which have not prompted the production of monuments, ornaments, utensils, and other ritual accessories; or affected the form and decoration of the instruments of daily life. And as these material expressions of religious ideas, once produced, are capable of preservation independently of their makers, they may be, and often are, the only evidence which has been preserved of the religion of an extinct people, whose beliefs and traditions have perished with it.

2. Archæological evidence may establish the occurrence of an act or a custom within assignable limits either of (*a*) space or of (*b*) time.

(*a*) To prove the distribution of an occurrence in *space*, the method of archæology is geographical. The instances which have been observed are tabulated in their geographical context, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary may be presumed provisionally to indicate a continuous distribution over the intervening areas. Such evidence to the contrary would be supplied *inter alia* by diversity of physical circumstance, exempting humanity locally from the need, or the inducement, to act in the manner presumed; or by evidence of the presence locally of other human observances inconsistent with the act or custom in question. The quality, as well as the quantity, of evidence requisite to give archæological proof varies almost indefinitely. But in general, quality is incomparably more cogent than quantity, and positive evidence than negative: a single really well-authenticated occurrence (*e.g.* of an object of human manufacture or of recognized style in a given area), not only supplies the contradictory instance to all negative generalities, but gives a positive though indefinite presumption that further instances exist. This characteristic, archæology shares with all branches of knowledge which are concerned with discontinuous series; the area actually open to inspection is at the same time so arbitrarily assigned, and so small a proportion of the whole, that the probable value of every positive instance is in any case somewhat greater, and of every negative instance somewhat less, than it would be in a region of which the larger part has been already explored. This theoretical consideration is in the main confirmed by a retrospect of the archæological work of the last century. As in geology, a very small number of well-selected data from small areas isolated from each other, and indicated by accidental circumstances, have permitted a hypothetical re-construction of the human culture of wide regions, which subsequent evidence, more copious, continuous, and cogent logically, has done little if anything to modify, or even to confirm.

Archæology, being concerned with evidence which has already been exposed for a while to the accidents of time, is confronted with discontinuous evidence in another sense also. Some classes of objects, no less characteristic and instructive than the rest, are composed of materials which decay readily, and leave little or no trace even when deposited in closed chambers. Consequently, archæology is concerned in most cases with evidence which has already undergone a process of quite arbitrary selection, and is compelled to qualify its conclusions accordingly. And even where the remains themselves are durable, the ravages of man or animals—the latter often far more elusive and perplexing than the former—have restricted the evidence again, objects of intrinsic value, or distasteful signifi-

cance (such as the monuments of a hated ruler or an alien creed) disappearing most readily, and causing the most serious breaks in the record.

(*b*) To prove the distribution of similar occurrences in *time*, or the sequence of dissimilar occurrences, archæology depends, again, like geology, on the comparison of simultaneities. Sequence of manufacture, among a series of relics of antiquity, may be determined either directly on the evidence of sequence of deposition (as in a stratified rubbish-heap, where the under layers must be older than those which overlie them); or indirectly, by comparison of style. The latter method, however, gives, strictly speaking, a series which is only morphological, not historical; it is evidence of change, not of development; and in many cases such a series is capable of being read in either direction, since no precise criterion exists to distinguish immaturity from decadence. When doubt arises from this cause as to which is the initial end of a series, recourse must be had in the long run to the evidence of stratification; but an *approximate* proof can frequently be constructed if it is possible to correlate a number of concurrent series.

For example, on a given site, a large number of tombs may be found, each containing examples of pottery, metal-work, stone-work, and other manufactures, of varying design. There is a probability that the tombs represent burials of a considerable number of successive generations. The pottery, weapons, and so forth, form morphological series, independent but approximately concurrent; *i.e.* phase *D* of the pottery is always found with phases *c d* or *e* of the metal-work; phase *Q* always with phases *p q* or *r*, never with *o* or *s*. In these circumstances, clear evidence as to the direction in which any one series is to be read biologically is conclusive for the remainder, and for the culture as a whole; and such evidence would be supplied if any one kind of object began to appear suddenly and copiously as a useful implement at *k*, for example, and was replaced in adjacent phases by substitutes of less appropriate forms or materials, or otherwise clearly imitative. If these after-types occur at *l*, *m*, and after, the historical order of the whole series is from *a* to *z*; if at *j* and before, the order is from *z* to *a*.

It is, of course, often the case that a purely morphological series is concurrent at one or more points with another series which belongs to a 'historic' civilization, that is, to one in which the relative antiquity of each phase can be represented by an 'absolute' or chronological date. In these circumstances alone is it possible to determine the actual rate of technological progress, and thereby of other elements of a civilization.

Such cases of contact between concurrent series representing the civilizations of different areas or régimes can only show valid contemporaneity when the proof is bilateral.

In locality A, for example, a group of objects of diverse styles are found together as the result of a single act of deposition, such as a burial, or the laying of a foundation-stone. In such a case, obviously, none of the objects which compose the group can be of a later date of manufacture than the date of its deposition in that group. On the other hand, any of them may have been of any imaginable age already, at the moment of deposition. External evidence (of custom, workmanship, and the like) alone can decide in each case whether the indigenous objects *aaa* included in the find-group fairly represent the phase of culture *a*, at which it has been ascertained that the group was deposited in the place where it was found. Now, if this find-group at A contains, not only indigenous objects *aaa* of relative date *a* in the series characteristic of this locality A, but also an object of exotic origin *b*, the circumstance (otherwise demonstrated) that the object *b* is of the relative date β in the series B does not prove that the phase *a*, to which the group as a whole belongs, is contemporary with phase β, but only that it is not of any *later* date; for the object *b* may have been of any age already at the moment of its deposit at A. If, however, even a single object of origin *a* and date *a* is found at B with objects of origin *b* and date β in the B-series, then by the same reasoning *a* is not of later date than the objects *bbb* with which it has been found. And if so, the proof is complete, that *a* and *b* are contemporary; for it was already known that an object *b* could not be of later date than *aaa*.

It is merely a matter of accurate observation to determine whether in any given case it is certain that the exotic object was really deposited simultaneously with the rest of the find-group, and not intruded into it at some later time.

3. The combination of evidence derived from *distributions* in space and *sequences* in time gives archæological proof of the *transmission* of new characters from one centre of civilization to another.

A character *x* which has already appeared at phase *γ* in series (or region) A does not appear in series B until phase *ε* (which has been shown otherwise to be contemporary with *ε* in series A); it is absent, moreover, from series C until phase *k*. Here alternative interpretations are offered. The character may have been introduced from A to B, or it may have arisen spontaneously also at B. At C, moreover, it may have arisen spontaneously, or have been introduced directly from A; or in addition, it may have been introduced directly from B and only indirectly from A, and so forth, the number of alternatives increasing directly with that of the series or regions in question. The conclusive proof of direct transmission is given only when, in addition to objects of *similar* style to the archetype at A, but of demonstrably local origin, B yields an object which demonstrably originated at A. Such proof is furnished most clearly by unpremeditated evidence supplied by the physical composition of the object; *e.g.* knives of an unusual style but made of bronze occur on an island B which yields copper and tin but not iron; there is no adequate proof that these are not due to indigenous invention. But if there occurs also at B a knife of the same style but made of iron, and iron knives of exactly this exotic style are also found in an accessible iron-yielding area A, the probability becomes very strong that the knife found at B is exotic, and the prototype of the bronze examples, which differ from it only in being of indigenous material. The proof, however, becomes conclusive only when it is shown that bronze, or this particular variety of bronze, was not in use at A. Otherwise there is still the possibility that the bronze knives at B may also be imports either from A or from some other region C which culturally is dependent on A. JOHN L. MYRES.

ARCHITECTURE.

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Buddhist.—See ARCHITECTURE (Chinese), p. 693, and TEMPLES (Buddhist).
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Slavonic (L. LEGER), p. 773.
Teutonic.—See ART (Teutonic).
Tibetan.—See TEMPLES (Tibetan).

ARCHITECTURE (Ægean).—Of the architecture in Greek lands before the true Hellenic architecture appeared upon the scene we know comparatively little, but even that little is great compared with our almost entire ignorance of the subject a generation ago. The account of the great discoveries of Schliemann at Tiryns, Mycenæ,* and Troy, restoring to us the Homeric world, of whose

* The author of this art. and artt. on Christian, Greek, and Roman Architecture always uses the Greek spelling of Greek names, but in the case of familiar words he has submitted to the spelling elsewhere adopted in the Encyclopedia.

very existence the greatest scholars were sceptical, reads like a fairy story. Since then a long series of excavations, carried out with greater and greater scientific precision throughout the whole Ægean area, has provided for us a mass of material which it will probably require the scholarship of many years to analyze and reduce to anything like systematic order. As yet no conclusions can be more than tentative.

This pre-Hellenic architecture can hardly be considered the parent of Greek architecture: its influence was on the whole smaller than might have been expected; indeed, the difference between them serves to emphasize the originality and independence of the Hellenic style that came after. It is convenient to term this architecture and the civilizations to which it belonged 'Ægean,' as it flourished not only in Greece itself but throughout all the coasts and islands of the Ægean Sea. But, at the same time, although there is a certain continuity of development with no decided break, such as exists between itself and the architecture of the Hellenes, it is nevertheless marked by changes and new departures that seem to imply influences from without, if not political and racial upheavals. These are at present exceedingly obscure and open to controversy, and it is difficult to do more than glance at the main trend of development.

(1) During the neolithic age in the Ægean, at some time which may be put approximately 6000 years before the Christian era, there was a primitive but flourishing civilization, implying a highly developed commerce, extending as far as Egypt, with some powers of navigation. Its centre apparently was in Crete, and is marked by the exploitation of the obsidian in the island of Melos, which, some considerable time afterwards, developed its own resources during the flourishing epoch of the town, now known to archæologists, from the name of the neighbouring village, as Phylakopi. In this very remote era the neolithic remains at Knossos contain obsidian, and Melos is the only known source of obsidian anywhere near the Eastern end of the Mediterranean. Obsidian beads are found in Egypt in remains to which a rough date of the seventh millennium may be assigned, and obsidian flakes occur there some 600 years or so later. By the time of the foundation of the first city at Phylakopi the trade was very considerable. The architectural achievement of this age must have been of an exceedingly simple nature, probably merely wattle and daub huts, as the marked clay strata testify wherever there have been settlements. Wooden or half-timber houses may conceivably have succeeded them, but they have left no remains, and we have nothing but an inference from a later mode of construction to point in this direction. Something, however, of the working of quarried stone is seen, at any rate towards the close of the neolithic period, in the cist graves found principally at Amorgos and at Pelos in Melos. It is therefore quite possible that a few of the more important buildings may have been of stone, but of these there is practically no evidence. At the very close of the neolithic period we seem to have stone-walled houses appearing at Purgos in Paros and also in S.W. Naxos, and these may represent an older tradition. It is also conceivable that sun-dried bricks may occasionally have been used, which, under certain conditions, can disappear, leaving practically no trace of their form.

(2) A definite style of stone building begins to appear about the commencement of the fourth millennium. The settlements are marked by their unwalled and unfortified nature, and, as far as the slight evidence goes, seem to have been laid out almost as scattered groups of buildings, yet in the main preserving a certain parallelism of plan, although they do not seem to be arranged along definite street lines. The building is rough rubble work of comparatively small stones built with clay and mud, and plastered over with the same; lime mortar is not yet used. So far there are no signs of any religious buildings as such, and indeed throughout the whole of the Ægean development there seems to have been hardly anything of the nature of religious architecture. This is one of the essential contrasts between these peoples and the Greeks, whose religious buildings were of such marvellous excellence and occupied so prominent a place in their style. The nature of the architecture, however, is of importance for the purposes of this article, as it is necessary to grasp both the resemblances and the differences between the architectural principles of the two styles, in order fully to understand the position of Greek religious architecture in the history of the art.

(3) A third architectural stage is reached roughly about B.C. 3000, when a closer system of town building, generally although not necessarily fortified, is adopted. It is marked by an elaborate system of street planning, with a distinct preference for rectangular rather than convergent systems. There is a very considerable advance in the art of building, with a regular drainage system beneath the streets. We find lime beginning to be used. There are great walls and fortifications, and the towns in the generality of cases are no longer open. The probable cause seems to have been pressure from the north, which rendered these fortifications necessary. They apparently first made their appearance upon the mainland, and worked their way southward, the cities of the maritime power of Crete remaining unwalled, probably on account of that very sea power. The great brick city of Troy, the second in the series, already shows this type completely developed, and its final destruction must have been at least as early as B.C. 2000. The second city at Phylakopi is of this type, and it was probably founded somewhere about B.C. 3000, reaching its prime about B.C. 2500.

Of the general character of building, it may be said that it passes from a comparatively rude to a highly developed style, and indeed might be divided into periods. But the variations of type are far greater in their local than in their chronological aspect, which latter is much more visible in the paintings and the minor arts of pottery. Architecturally, the second city of Troy is more akin to the great sixth city than either is to any period of Knossian architecture. The architecture seems to reach its zenith somewhat earlier than the other arts, and begins to show signs of decadence while they are still in some ways advancing.

It may seem strange to sum up a period, running into many hundreds of years, as though there were a single style throughout. But in the present state of our knowledge, particularly in the extreme uncertainty of the chronology, some such simplification is necessary if lengthy controversial matter is to be excluded. Very approximately it may be said that the architecture was at its finest at a time ranging round the 17th century B.C. But certain broad general characteristics may be noticed. The materials and construction used seem to have differed very considerably locally, such intractable material as basalt appearing at Phylakopi, and limestone, gypsum, brick, schist, etc., in other places; and varying from the roughest blocks, hardly shaped at all, to the finest jointed masonry, such as we see at Phaistos or in the walls of the great megaron at Knossos. Even early in the period there is good sound work with headers and

stretchers roughly shaped, as at Phylakopi. On the whole, work on the Greek mainland is rougher and less carefully finished, the so-called cyclopean masonry at Tiryns and elsewhere being typical. This would point to the civilizing influence proceeding from the south northward. Troy seems to be somewhat outside the main stream. Its architecture, particularly its fortifications, is very advanced, although in other particulars its civilization seems to be behind the rest of the Ægean.

There is a great tendency from the first to use rubble for interior walls and for less important structures. This is faced with plaster and frequently elaborately painted, as in the fresco of the Flower Gatherer at Knossos, or the absolutely delightful example of the Flying Fish at Phylakopi. Another method is to build one or two courses with great blocks of ashlar masonry and raise the rubble walls upon the top. In outside work some such foundation is almost



FIG. 1.

necessary. In the early second city of Troy, built mainly of sun-dried brick, there is a substructure of stone to protect the brick from the wet. Rubble tends to become more common in later work, and sometimes later rubble walls are found built upon older stone foundations. The system may be the origin of the orthostatai of later Greek architecture (*q.v.*). Sometimes there is also a projecting plinth, as in the case of the limestone blocks below the gypsum in the West Court at Knossos, or the reverse arrangement, with the gypsum blocks below, on the southern terrace (fig. 1). This is quite possibly the origin of another Greek feature, the stylobate [see ARCHITECTURE (Greek)]. Another method, which on account of its material was not likely to survive to our day, seems to have been something of the nature of a half timber construction, in which courses of short lengths of timber set transversely in plaster across the wall were used at intervals in the ashlar, or plastered rubble, as the case might be (fig. 2). There are grounds for supposing that we have the remains of such a course in the megaron at Knossos. In interiors the ends of these were masked by rosettes or medallions. In the last phase of Ægean architecture, the



FIG. 2.

Mycenæan, there seems to have been an interesting survival of this technique executed in stone over the doorway of the so-called Treasury of Atreus [see p. 683 and figs. 3 and 17].

On the whole it may be said that there is a distinct architectural decadence which in Crete becomes obviously marked about the 14th century B.C. But in the north it seems to be otherwise, and the masonry continues to improve until a later date, as, for instance, in the very fine beehive tombs at Mycenæ, which may be not much earlier than the 13th century. This may be accounted for by the fact that the artistic impulse spread from the south. Hence the north would be longer in developing; and, on the other hand, a northern subjugation of Crete, which seems to be probable, would have greatly arrested progress there.

The spanning of openings seems in most instances to have been with timber lintels, and in early work the stones are not even gathered over above. Stone lintels, however, were sometimes used. The jambs of doors were very commonly of stone, and in later work certainly an inward inclination was usual, which is very possibly the origin of the same feature in Greek doorways (fig. 3 below and fig. 8, ARCHITECTURE [Greek]). Windows, as contrasted with Greek architecture, seem to have been of frequent occurrence. They appear to have had timber lintels, jambs, and sills, and we may notice a remarkable anticipation of the modern window in the division into 'panes' of which we have clear evidence in tablets found at Knossos (fig. 3). The nature of the filling is unknown; it may



FIG. 3.

have been oiled cloth or parchment, and is indicated in red colour on the tablets.

Timber seems to have played a large part in the construction, especially in the columns, which were commonly of wood, although with bases of stone. The columns, and generally the bases, were circular in form, and it is noticeable that the columns tapered towards the lower end (figs. 4 and 12), the exact contrary of columns in Greek architecture. The taper, however, is generally exaggerated in drawings. The charred remains of actual columns



FIG. 4.

were found both at Knossos and at Phaistos. Stone examples of similar shape but of much later date

occur at Eleusis and Mycenæ. They were treated with different kinds of fluting as ornaments, sometimes vertical, sometimes diagonal (fig. 4), and this may even have suggested the Doric flute. The anta was used both in stone and in wood, and is possibly the prototype of that feature in Greek architecture. It is interesting to notice that when stone columns were used they were almost always square in section, especially in early work, as in the case of the Northern Portico at Knossos, the so-called 'pillar rooms' at Phylakopi, and at Knossos both in the palace and in houses outside. They are also of rectangular shape in the court at Phaistos, and by the N. entrance at Knossos, and even in the megaron itself, although there they are recessed. This is important in view of the discussion regarding the origin of the Greek column [see ARCHITECTURE (Greek)]. The inter-columniations were wide, and the architrave apparently was a wooden beam upon which the upper masonry rested.

In spite, however, of the use of wood, it does not seem to have been used for floors. The floor joists were of circular logs of wood, and above these was laid clay, and upon that a fine hard cement or a pavement. On the ground floor cement seems to have been the favourite material for exterior work, and is often laid over paving; but in interiors fine gypsum slabs are not uncommon. The ceilings, where there was no floor above, were in all probability of thick reeds covered with plaster. Remains of plaster have been found



FIG. 5.

at Phylakopi, clearly showing the shapes of the reeds embedded in the plaster (fig. 5).

The plans are in almost all cases characterized by numerous offsets, angles, and returns in the outer walls, which must have given a most delightful effect of light and shade to the complete elevation, and which are carried out with a lofty indifference to the extra work that they must have entailed (figs. 6, 8, and 9). Where



FIG. 6.

fortifications occur, an arrangement may also be noticed by which the entrance is guarded by a complicated and circuitous means of approach, as at Syros and Siphnos, and which attains its fullest development at Tiryns (fig. 8, E). This seems to have been due to northern mainland influence, and gradually to have spread southward. The buildings of greatest importance were the palaces of the kings, which show in almost all cases a remarkable complexity of plan; but there are certain marked variations. Both in the north and in the south there is a distinct parallelism in the arrangement, but the Cretan plan is more regular and conceived more definitely as an artistic whole. The equal balancing of the main masses about a central court is also a southern feature. In the north this is less obvious, and the court partakes more of the nature of a fore-court, and is surrounded by a colonnade. The greater regularity is doubtless mainly because in the islands the question of fortification was of

FIG. 7.

minor importance. In the north the buildings were castles as well as palaces.

But there is also a difference in the artistic *motif* that cannot thus be explained. The northern plan tends to rooms comparatively square in shape; the



FIG. 8.

Cretan type is long and narrow. The difference is most noticeable in the smaller chambers and magazines, which are very characteristic features of the style (figs. 7, 8, and 9), but it holds good throughout, and is true even of the great halls. Tiryns and Knossos, the finest examples and the best known, may be taken as typical (figs. 8 and 9). The fortress of Goulas or Gla in Bœotia, although northern in its main features, is to some extent an exception, and shows affinities with the southern type. Propylæa are common throughout, but here a northern type

can be distinguished which is almost the exact counterpart of the later Greek examples (fig. 10).



FIG. 9.

(The magazines are the narrow chambers on the left.)

But the most marked difference between north and south is in the megaron itself. The northern megaron is a broad rectangular chamber with an antechamber and a portico, and contains the hearth



FIG. 10.

in the centre. Above the hearth was probably an opening, and the sides of the opening were normally supported upon four columns which in all likelihood carried a sort of clerestory admitting light and allowing the smoke to escape. The typical Cretan megaron, on the other hand, has no central hearth, possibly on account of the warmer climate; but it has a feature peculiar to itself in the open chamber at the end of the hall, apparently open to the sky for the admission of light. This 'light-well' is found alike at Knossos, Phaistos, and Hagia Triada.

The southern type also contains columns which presumably supported the roof; but they are arranged in lines, as the square arrangement around the hearth is unnecessary. Moreover, whatever may have been the case in the north, there is no doubt that in Crete there were halls upon different storeys one above the other.

The northern type, although belonging to the ruder style, eventually supersedes the other, and we find it appearing in the south in the late third city at Phylakopi (compare the examples in fig. 11). In this northern type we see a plan closely resembling that of the classical Greek temple; and if it is really the origin of the temple form, it may be considered the most important of the Ægean influences upon later Hellenic architecture.

It is, of course, natural that we should know a great deal more about the plans than the elevations, but we have a certain amount of valuable



FIG. 11.—MEGARA, DRAWN TO COMMON SCALE, SHOWING N. AND S. TYPES.

evidence about the latter. In the south there is no doubt that there were several storeys, and in each storey the column played an important part. As in Spanish architecture, the main architectural features were in the interior, but the deep wells, with their tiers of columns and great staircases, must have produced a fine effect (fig. 12). There is some evidence that columns played a part in the external façade also. In



FIG. 12.—RESTORATION OF GENERAL EFFECT; HALL OF COLONNADES, KNOSSOS.

the north, upper storeys, above the megaron, were unlikely because of the hearth.

On the whole, it may be said that the northern influence is much more marked in the temple architecture of Greece than any influence we can trace to the southern types.

The columned storeys rising magnificently one above another are startling indeed, occurring at a date some 18 centuries before Christ, in a European civilization of which we had never previously heard; but the elaborate drainage system is almost equally surprising, finding its parallels only in the beautiful systems of the best work of the Middle Ages, and in those of modern times. Street drains were generally built of stone with large flat slabs above and below, but an open terra-cotta channel sometimes occurs. In small underground drains terra-cotta pipes with a collar were used (fig. 13), whereas in the great palace systems the main drains were well built passages large enough

to allow of a man entering them for cleaning purposes. Sanitary conveniences were supplied; and if there was not the extensive accommodation that was demanded in the Middle Ages, where in many instances every room has its own separate arrangements, at least there is no reason to suppose that it was less than satisfied the last generation, or than is commonly found on the Continent to-day. The same remarks apply to bath-rooms, which were plentiful, and often elaborately treated. Sometimes there was a sunk bath with steps, sometimes merely a move-

FIG. 13.

able bath with a channel all round the floor to carry off any splashings.

Such is a very brief description, enough to indicate the highly developed character of the style. When we turn to consider religious architecture, it is obvious that there was little or none, and the main importance from that point of view is the influence exerted upon succeeding styles. Yet there are just a few points that may be noted. We have in the 'pillar rooms' at Knossos and Phylakopi something of obvious religious significance. It does not seem to be necessary to suppose that the pillar was not purely structural in its function,—even a sacred sign upon the top does not preclude the possibility of its supporting other blocks. Many of the blocks of the palaces in Crete are marked with sacred signs, which may be paralleled by the numerous masons' marks upon our own mediæval buildings. But there does seem to have been a special sacredness attaching to the pillar form, and in the case of a 'pillar room' in a house at Knossos, a great number, some 200, of little inverted cups were discovered, beneath which were found the charred remains of small vegetable offerings (fig. 14). If we cannot



FIG. 14.

say that these rooms are examples of religious architecture, it can at least be said that some religious significance was attached to their architecture.

We have also a fresco, mentioned above, which in the light of the secular architectural discoveries of the palaces, admits of interpretation, and seems to represent a temple or shrine (fig. 16). Below we have the great gypsum blocks that we have seen in the palace, and above half timber work with its frescoes on the plaster. The pillars, presumably of wood, are of the usual inverted form of Ægean architecture, and their sacredness is thought to be indicated by the horned cult object set before them. An interesting frieze, resembling that of porphyry-like stone found at Knossos (fig. 15), or the alabaster example from Tiryns, occurs below the central opening. This seems to be

FIG. 15.

the progenitor of the triglyph frieze of the Doric order. The triglyphs in this instance, judging by the colour, were apparently of wood. There is also indication of the blue glass paste or enamel which occurs at Tiryns—a delightful form of architectural decoration—the *κύανος* of Homer, so long a stumbling-block to the critics. In this connexion may also be noticed some little gold ornaments found at Mycenæ, which are also generally supposed to represent a shrine (fig. 16). The lower part is again of ashlar masonry, the upper part is apparently of timber. There are three timber-framed doorways through which appear columns; but it is difficult to say whether they are meant to be within the building or form part of the façade. In front of them are the same sacred horns. The most interesting point is that the central part is higher than the sides, and it certainly does suggest a nave and aisle construction with clerestory lighting. On the other hand, it might equally well represent a lantern rising above the hearth, which would, of course, be visible from a point of view a little distance in front of the shrine, and could therefore quite legitimately be represented pictorially in the plane elevation.

FIG. 16.

Lastly, there remain to be considered the tombs, which were of a sacred and in some instances definitely religious character. The famous shaft graves of Mycenæ—deep shafts sunk vertically in the rock—represent for us a stage of burial that can hardly be considered architectural. So also with the larnax burials of Crete, where the corpse was first skeletonized in the earth and afterwards deposited in an earthenware sarcophagus or larnax and buried. But in the chambered tombs and the still more elaborate domed structures we have something very different.

They are found widely distributed over the Greek mainland, where the best specimens occur, but have been found at Phaistos, Palaikastro, Praisos, in Crete, and also in Melos.

The chambered form is that of a square chamber cut in the rock, with a gabled roof and approached by a dromos, or passage. It seems probable that it is merely a development of the shaft grave, and the dromos is simply a means of closer and more ready approach to the tomb itself for the worshippers of the shade of the deceased. This finally develops into the great domed chamber out of which in some cases the tomb itself opens, and which can hardly have served any other purpose than one connected with religious ceremonies in relation to the deceased. This development is borne out by the shaft-construction of the grave at Orchomenos, in some respects the finest example of these beehive tombs. It is, however, not in as perfect a condition as the so-called Treasury of Atreus at Mycenæ, which was a trifle larger than this example (fig. 17).



FIG. 17.

In both cases a large domed chamber, of beehive shape, about 47 feet in diameter, is cut out in the hill-side and lined with masonry of large blocks



FIG. 18.

built on the corbelled system (fig. 17). Opening out of the central chamber is a smaller side chamber, which in the case of the Orchomenos example was, like the shaft graves, clearly excavated by a shaft sunk from the top. The bottom was first lined with small stone masonry and then covered with marble slabs. This was roofed over with great slabs of green schist elaborately decorated with a typical Mycenæan pattern (fig. 18), and the marble walls were decorated in the same way. Above was another chamber to relieve the ceiling of weight, and above that again the shaft was filled up with débris.

The vault part is marked with numerous holes, some still containing bronze nails, and, as was also the case with the Mycenæan example, it was covered with bronze rosettes.

The fine doorway to the latter tomb can be restored with some degree of accuracy. A great door, narrower at the top than at the bottom, is flanked by two half columns, which taper downwards and are adorned with zigzag flutings. Above is an enormous lintel, the pressure upon which is relieved by a great triangular space originally filled with a light triangular slab. The architrave was ornamented with a pattern, clearly recalling the short log construction mentioned above, and below this was probably a series of lions' heads.

LITERATURE.—There is no work on Ægean Architecture as such, but some of the most useful sources of information are: T. J. Dörpfeld, *Troja und Ilion*, Athens, 1902; C. Schuchhardt, *Schliemann's Excavations*, tr. Eugénie Sellers, London, 1891; *Excavations at Phylakopi in Melos, conducted by the British School at Athens*, London, 1904; C. Tsountas and J. I. Manatt, *The Mycenæan Age*, London, 1897; see also *The Annual of the British School at Athens*, esp. vol. vi. f., London, and *Monumenti Antichi dei Lincei*, Rome.

J. B. STOUGHTON HOLBORN.

ARCHITECTURE (American).—Both in character and in material the dwellings and temples of the American Indians present the widest variety, ranging from the brush *wikiups* of the Pai Utes, and the snow *igloos* of the Eskimos, to the elaborate stone palaces of the Mayas of Yucatan. This diversity, however, must not be construed as racial in origin, since closely related neighbouring tribes frequently have dwellings of different types; nor is the cause any essential intellectual limitation. The divergency is climatic and economic in source. The snow-covered wastes of the extreme north, the forests of the Atlantic coast, the prairies which once abounded in herds of bison, the arid regions of the south-west, and the tropical luxuriance of Central America, each produced a distinct type of architecture. The dwellings of the American Indians admit of a triple classification: temporary, portable, and permanent, the first being exemplified by the Pai Ute *wikiup*, the second by the Dakota *tipi*, and the third by the stone *pueblo*.

1. The temporary dwelling is represented in its simplest form by the *wikiup* of Arizona. This is constructed by placing branches about 10 feet in length so as to form half or three-quarters of a circle. The tops are then brought together and smaller branches are thrown over them. The entire structure is, therefore, little more than a wind-break, and may be a development of the *kisi* of the Hopis, which is a rough shelter set up in the fields to protect those who watch the flocks. This general type of temporary dwelling is especially characteristic of the less developed tribes of the western desert, where the arid soil furnishes little building material beyond brush and mud. Closely akin to the *wikiup* is the Navaho *hogan*, a hut built either of branches covered with smaller boughs or of poles plastered with mud; and the same statement holds true of the Pimas and Mohaves. Such dwellings are frequently abandoned, since the materials of which they are composed are not portable, and the region affords no other kind. Religion also enters into the migrations of these tribes, since they do not occupy a dwelling which has been entered by death. Here too may be mentioned the grass houses still built by the Wichitas, but formerly characteristic of the Cadoans (except the Pawnees and Arikaras, who built, instead, the 'earth lodges' noted below).

2. A higher grade of American architecture is found, under more favourable economic circumstances, among the prairie tribes. Here the *wikiup* yields place to the *tipi*. The typical form of this structure is found among the Omahas, and is constructed by tying twenty or thirty long poles together at the top, and spreading out the bottom so as to form a circle. This frame is covered with skin or canvas, and an opening is left at the top for the escape of the smoke. Yet these tribes were by no means restricted to the *tipi*, since in the summer they sometimes built lodges covered with bark or earth, the former suggesting the Algonquin *wigwam*, and the latter what may be supposed to have been an earlier stage of *pueblo* construction. At all events, both represent a transition to the permanent dwelling. While the *wikiup* is naturally devoid of any ornamentation, the *tipi* often received somewhat elaborate adornment, this decoration being frequently totemistic, and sometimes the result of a vision or other omen. Here the form of the dwelling is conditioned by the material at hand, since trees are comparatively rare, while the herds of buffalo, which formerly ranged the plains, furnished an abundance of skins to form the covering of the poles. According to Dakota tradition, the tribes formerly dwelt in houses of bark in the present State of Minnesota, and were first forced by the invasions of the whites to adopt a nomadic life, and, in consequence, portable houses.

3. The *tipi* thus forms the transition from the temporary dwelling to the permanent. The latter form of house is characteristic of a settled people, and is, therefore, found among the most highly civilized American Indians. In its simplest form it may be exemplified by the *wigwam* of the Algonquins, which is constructed of a framework of poles, as are the *tipi* and the *wikiup*, but is covered with bark instead of brush, mud, or skins. This type is possible only in a wooded country, where the abundance of game and other necessities of life renders a certain degree of permanence possible. At the same time, the dwelling is capable of enlargement, and thus secures an advance in social life. The permanent type of dwelling was common throughout the continent at the time of its discovery, being found not only among the Algonquins and Iroquois, but in the Mississippi valley, Florida, the North-West Coast, and Arizona, and, in its highest form of development, among the Aztecs and Mayas. From the permanent house was evolved, moreover, the permanent village, in contrast to the temporary encampments found, for example, among the Pai Utes and the Dakotas. These villages were frequently defended by palisades, as among the Algonquian Lenni-Lenape, the Virginians, and the Caddoan stocks of the Mississippi valley. A remarkable feature of many of these permanent dwellings was their elevation on mounds of earth, which were frequently formed artificially. The original motive was, in the main, sanitary, dampness being thus avoided. This practice was also common among the natives of Florida, where these artificial elevations are described as being 'a kind of platform two or three pikes in height, the summit of which is large enough to give room for twelve, fifteen, or twenty houses, to lodge the cacique and his attendants. At the foot of this elevation they mark out a square place, according to the size of the village, around which the leading men have their houses. . . . To ascend the elevation they have a straight passage-way from bottom to top, fifteen or twenty feet wide. Here steps are made by massive beams, and others are planted firmly in the ground to serve as walls. On all other sides of the platform the sides are cut steep' (quoted from Garcilasso by Thomas, *Mound Explorations*, p. 647). The temples naturally stood at a still higher elevation than the houses of the people. Even dwellings of the permanent type here described, however, were liable to speedy decay if long abandoned for any reason, and the ruins of such houses no longer exist. Yet in them probably lies the secret of many of the mysterious mounds so common in the Ohio valley, which were formerly supposed to be the work of a race differing widely from the American Indians. Excavations of these structures have shown that their builders were simply American Indians, differing in no respect from their congeners elsewhere in the continent. The great majority of mounds are doubtless mortuary in origin, and thus do not properly come within the scope of architecture (cf. Yarrow, *Introduction to the Study of Mortuary Customs among the North American Indians*, Washington, 1880, pp. 17–29). Others, such as the Serpent Mound of the Ohio valley or the pyramid of Cholula in Mexico, were structures designed for purposes of religion, the latter, at least, serving as the base of a temple. Yet it is not impossible that the religious mounds (though not the mortuary) are ultimately identical in origin with those designed to support ordinary dwellings. The *hodenosotes*, or 'long houses,' of the Algonquian and Iroquoian stocks—mere developments of the *wigwam* noted above—find their analogues in the slab houses of the North-West Coast. Here the abundance of cedars, which may readily be split, renders it possible to construct houses of planks instead of poles and bark, these structures being more permanent than the eastern wigwams. In the dwellings of this type, moreover, as in the Iroquois 'long house,' separate rooms were partitioned off, thus marking a distinct step forward in civilization. Farther to the north, the Alaskan Aleuts construct their houses of ribs of the whale, driftwood, stone, turf, or any material which may be at hand in that barren region. The dwellings are not infrequently built entirely of turf cut in slabs. The most curious form of American Indian architecture, in some respects, is the Eskimo *igloo* (properly *iglugeak*, 'house-snow'). This is made by cutting compact blocks of snow, which are so laid on a circular base as gradually to slant towards the centre, thus forming the only case of a true arch among the North American aborigines. A house designed for occupancy throughout the winter is some 12 feet in height and 15 in diameter. It is heated with stone lamps filled with seal oil, while additional light is admitted by a window of ice or the intestine of a seal. Whenever his supply of material renders it possible, however, the Innuit constructs a still more durable dwelling of whale-ribs, driftwood, and the like, thus approximating to the Aleut house. In this same region, moreover, were semi-subterranean dwellings, especially among the Aleuts, Eskimos, coast Salishans, and kindred tribes. Their affinity with the subterranean houses of the Gilyaks, Kamtchatkans, Koryaks, Chukchees, and Yukaghirs of North-Eastern Asia is too striking and too close not to be due to borrowing on the part of the American Indians (Jochelson, in *XV^e^ Congrès international des Américanistes*, Quebec, 1907, ii. 115–128). Among the Pawnees, as among the Arikaras, Osages, Omahas, Poncas, and other tribes, are found 'earth lodges,' also semi-subterranean and somewhat analogous to the Navaho *hogans* mentioned above.

Of these dwellings Miss Fletcher writes as follows (in Hodge, *Handbook of American Indians*, i. 411): 'These tribes are said to have abandoned the grass house of their kindred at some distant period and, under the teaching of aquatic animals, to have learned to construct the earth lodge. According to their ceremonies and legends, not only the animals were concerned with its construction — the badger digging the holes, the beaver sawing the logs, the bears carrying them, and all obeying the directions of the whale—

out the stars also exercised authority. The earlier star cult of the people is recognized in the significance attached to the four central posts. Each stood for a star—the Morning and Evening stars, symbols of the male and female cosmic forces, and the North and South stars, the direction of chiefs and the abode of perpetual life. The posts were painted in the symbolic colours of these stars—red, white, black, yellow. During certain ceremonies corn of one of these colours was offered at the foot of the post of that colour. In the rituals of the Pawnee the earth lodge is made typical of man's abode on the earth; the floor is the plain, the wall the distant horizon, the dome the arching sky, the central opening the zenith, dwelling-place of Tirawa, the invisible power which gives life to all created beings.'

The room, found in the permanent dwellings of the Iroquois and on the North-West Coast, reaches a high stage of development among the 'cliff-dwellers' and the Pueblo tribes. In the deserts of the south-western United States the country is arid and treeless, although verdure at once springs up if irrigation be successfully practised. Cañons and cliffs abound, and the caves in the sides of these precipices, often modified artificially, are utilized as dwellings, especially since trees of any considerable size are extremely rare. A cliff-dwelling, moreover, is usually comparatively difficult of access and easy to defend, an important consideration when hostile Apaches stand ready to attack less warlike tribes. The houses in the cliffs are generally at a considerable elevation, and have the crevice on the face of the rock carefully walled up, both for shelter and for protection. An excellent example of this kind of dwelling is found in the Mesa Verde, where in a large crevice in the cliff is constructed a regular *pueblo* building, forming a marked contrast to the simple wall on the edge of the rock. The crevice is frequently modified to suit the requirements of its inhabitants, and the cliff-dwelling is divided into rooms. These apartments, which are of various shapes, average 7 feet in height and 10 by 17 feet in area. The only communication with the outer world is by a door, which is usually approached by steps cut in the face of the cliff. The floor was levelled off, and an effort was evidently made to avoid dampness by constructing low *adobe* ridges, across which poles covered with skins may have been laid. The chief districts of the cliff-dwellers were the Northern Rio Grande valley, the valley of the San Juan river, the San Francisco mountain region, and the valley of the Rio Verde.

4. Where cliffs were not available, and, perhaps, where a higher grade of civilization had been attained, the American Indians of the South-west constructed the so-called *pueblos*, the most remarkable type of communal dwelling on the American continent. The settlements of this type now in existence number about thirty, and are found chiefly in New Mexico and Arizona, although the area formerly extended from the Pecos to the middle Gila, and from central Colorado and Utah to Mexico. Many of the *pueblos* were constructed upon plateaux or mesas—an evident reminiscence of the cliff-dwellings—while all are obviously designed for defence, especially against the Navahos and Apaches. The *pueblo* consists of a number of square rooms of *adobe* or stone, which are constructed either side by side or one upon the other, the latter type being either pyramidal or in a series of steps, with the back of the entire structure dropping perpendicularly. The roof of each room is flat, and has a trap-door which forms the only entrance, the approach being a temporary ladder placed against the side of the building. As occasion requires, the *pueblo* is enlarged. The roof of one tier, which forms the floor of another, has as its basis a number of small logs, across which poles are laid at short intervals and covered with grass or twigs, serving to support the visible floor of *adobe* and earth.

The *pueblos* are also important as forming the transition to stone structures. The Pecos ruins in North-western New Mexico have walls of sandstone slabs; and round stone towers, frequently with two or three concentric walls, are not infrequent in the South-west. Some of these latter structures seem to have been like the modern Moki *kivas*, or places of general assembly for the men of the *pueblo*. The method of construction of the walls of the *pueblos* varies considerably. In the *pueblo* of Pewa they consist of stone slabs laid in mortar of *adobe* (mud mixed with straw), while the Rio Grande *pueblos* are built of *adobe* bricks. The famous Casa Grande, near Florence, Arizona, was built by the *cajon* method, in which *adobe* mud is rammed into large wicker frames and left to dry, after which the mould is removed and used for the next portion of the wall. This mode of building was modified in some of the buildings in the Salt River valley, by ramming earth between two rows of posts wattled with weeds and plastered on the outside with *adobe* mortar. These frames, unlike those on the *cajon* method, were permitted to remain. This system of construction is termed *pisé*, while a third system of plastering a single row of wattled posts on both sides with *adobe* mud so as to form a thin wall is called *jacal*. In Mexico the *pueblo* type of construction seems to have been common at the time of the Spanish conquest. Although these dwellings have long since disappeared, except in the remains of the Casas Grandes in Chihuahua, their modern representatives, as well as the accounts of the Spanish conquerors, show that the habitations of the common people differed little from those of their New Mexican congeners, except that they were usually but one storey in height, or at most two. They covered a large area in many instances, and may sometimes have been communal dwellings. In the valley of the Lake of Mexico many houses were built on piles over the water, finding an analogue on the one hand among the American Indians of the North-West Coast, and on the other among the South Americans of Lake Maracaibo. The *adobe* dwellings were frequently constructed on foundations of stone, while the temples, as already noted, were elevated on high platforms of earth or stone, the Toltec pyramid of the sun at Teotihuacan having measured 680 ft. at the base by 180 in height. The so-called pyramid is, in fact, one of the chief characteristics of Aztec, Toltec, and Maya architecture. It differs essentially from the Egyptian pyramid in its object, since it is designed simply and solely as a foundation for a building, while the African structure is a gigantic tomb. The Great Mound of Cholula is almost 1000 ft. square at the base, and reaches an altitude of 200 feet. The pyramid of Huitzilopochtli and Tlaloc in Mexico itself had five terraces, the lowest 360 ft. square and the highest 70, and was ascended by a flight of 113 steps, the processions to the chapels on the summit winding round each terrace before mounting to the next. Not only temples but palaces were constructed on platforms, so that the Maya palace of Palenque stands on an oblong mound 310 ft. in length by 260 in width, and 40 ft. in height.

5. North and Central American architecture reached its zenith among the Mayas of Yucatan, Honduras, and Guatemala. Over all this territory are scattered ruins of ancient cities, and many more, hidden in the tropical vegetation, doubtless still await discovery. The final history of the art and architecture of this region cannot, therefore, be written for many years, for it is by no means unlikely that even more extensive and important remains may yet be found than are thus far known. The sites hitherto best described are as follows: in Yucatan, Uxmal, Kabah, Zayi, and Labná in what may be termed the central group; Chichen-

Itza and Tuloom in the east; Izamal, Ticul, Mayapan, Mérida, and Aké in the north; Labphak in the south; in Honduras there are Tenampua, Calamulla, and, above all, Copan; and in Guatemala mention must be made of Quiriguá, Cinaca-Mecallo, Patinamit, Utatlan, and Tikal. Here, too, must be classed the ruins of Palenque, in the Mexican State of Chiapas, which are akin to those of Yucatan, but with western Honduras the line of architectural remains in Central America seems to be drawn.

Of the sites here noted—the list does not pretend to be complete—the most important for a knowledge of Central American architecture are Palenque, Uxmal, and Chichen-Itza. From these three centres a general idea may perhaps be gained of the main outlines of a Maya city, supplementary information being obtainable from a study of other sites. It becomes, therefore, advisable to give a brief summary of the principal structures still preserved at each of these three cities. At Palenque the chief ruins are those of the Palace and the Temples of the Three Tablets, the Cross, and the Sun. By far the most elaborate of these is the first-named, though there is, of course, no evidence that it was actually intended to be a palace. This structure is erected on a quadrangular pyramid some 40 ft. high, measuring about 260 by 310 ft. at the bottom, originally faced with stone (perhaps once painted or plastered) and ascended by broad central stairways on the east and north. The palace itself, which nearly covers the upper surface of the pyramid, measures about 180 by 228 ft. and has a height of 30 ft. In the outer wall were some 40 doorways, 8½ ft. high and 9 ft. wide, while above them runs a cornice pierced with small holes which may have held poles for the support of an awning. 'The main building is found to consist of two corridors, formed by three parallel walls and covered by one roof, which extend entirely round the circumference of the platform, and enclose a quadrangular court measuring about 150 by 200 ft. This court also contains five or six buildings, some of them connected with the main edifice, others separate, which divide the court into four smaller ones' (Bancroft, *Native Races*, iv. 308). The walls of the corridors vary between 2 and 3 ft. in thickness, and the corridors themselves have a width of 9 ft. and a height of 20 ft., the latter half of which is formed by corbel vaulting. In the main doorway through the central wall is found a trefoil arch, and niches of similar form occur frequently on either side of it. The pavement of the interior courts is 8 or 10 ft. below that of the corridors, and is approached by stairways. Of the buildings which divide this court into four parts, the most remarkable is a tower of solid masonry about 50 ft. high, in its present state, resting on a base about 30 ft. square, and with three storeys, each receding slightly and each having a door in the centre of each side. The pyramid itself contains 'apartments, or galleries, with walls of stone plastered, but without ornament, of the same form and construction as the corridors above. . . . The southernmost gallery receives a dim light by three holes or windows leading out to the surface of the pyramid; the other galleries are dark and damp. . . . These rooms are variously regarded as sleeping-rooms, dungeons, or sepulchres, according to the temperament of the observer' (Bancroft, *op. cit.* p. 320 f.). The restoration of the palace, given, for example, by Bancroft (p. 323), well illustrates the high architectural abilities of the Mayas. Mention should also be made, in this connexion, of a bridge in the vicinity of Palenque, built of hewn stone, with a convex conduit 9 ft. wide. The bridge itself is 56 ft. long, 42 ft. wide, and 11 ft. high.

At Uxmal the ruins are still more extensive than at Palenque, the principal remains being the Casa del Gobernador, Casa de Tortugas, Casa de Palomas, Casa de Monjas, and Casa del Adivino, as well as a number of pyramids. The most remarkable of these is the Casa de Monjas, or 'Nunnery.'

'This is perhaps the most wonderful edifice, or collection of edifices, in Yucatan, if not the finest specimen of aboriginal architecture and sculpture in America. The supporting mound . . . is in general terms 350 ft. square, and 19 ft. high, its sides very nearly facing the cardinal points. The southern, or front, slope of the mound, about 70 ft. wide, rises in three grades, or terraces, 3, 12, and 4 ft. high, and 20, 45, and 5 ft. wide, respectively, from the base. There are some traces of a wide central stairway leading up to the second terrace on this side, but none of the steps remain in place. On this platform stand four of the typical Yucatan edifices built round a courtyard, with unequal intervals between them at the corners. The southern building is 279 ft. long, 28 ft. wide, and 18 ft. high; the northern building, 264 ft. long, 28 ft. wide, and 25 ft. high; the eastern, 158 by 35 ft., and 22 ft. high; the western, 173 by 35 ft., and 20 ft. high. The northern building stands on a terrace of its own which rises about 20 ft. above the level of the main platform on which the others stand. The court formed by the four edifices measures 258 by 214 ft. It is 2½ ft. lower than the foundations of the eastern, western, and southern buildings, and traces of low steps may yet be seen running the whole length of the sides. Its area is paved with stone, much worn by long usage. . . . Each of the four buildings is divided longitudinally into two parallel ranges of apartments . . . with doorways opening on the interior court. The only exterior doorways are on the front of the southern building and on the ends of the northern; these, however, afford access only to the outer range of rooms, which do not communicate with the interior. In only one instance do more than two rooms communicate with each other, and that is in the centre of the eastern building, where are two communicating apartments, the largest in the "Nunnery," each 13 by 33 ft., with an ante-room at each end measuring 9 by 13 ft. . . . The rooms of the Casa de Monjas, 88 in number, . . . are plastered with a thin coat of hard white material like plaster of Paris. Those of the southern building average 24 ft. long, 10 ft. wide, and 17 ft. high. They all present the same general features of construction—angular-arched ceilings, wooden lintels, stone rings, or hinges, on the inside of the doorways, holes in the sloping ceilings for hammock-timbers, entire absence of any openings except the doors. . . . The platform on which the buildings stand forms a narrow promenade, only 5 or 6 ft. in width, round each, both on the exterior and on the court. The entrance to the court is by a gateway . . . in the centre of the southern building. It is 10 ft. 8 in. wide and about 14 ft. high, the top being formed by the usual triangular arch. . . . Opposite this gateway . . . a stairway 95 ft. wide leads up to the upper terrace which supports the northern building. On each side of this stairway, . . . on the slope of the terrace, is a ruin of the usual construction, in which six small apartments may be traced. . . . The sides and ends of each building are . . . plain and unplastered below the cornice, which extends round the whole circumference just above the doorways. Above this cornice the whole surface, over 24,000 sq. ft. for the four buildings, is covered with elegant and elaborate sculptured decorations. The four interior façades fronting on the court are pronounced by all beholders the *chefs-d'œuvre* of aboriginal decorative art in America, being more chaste and artistic, and at the same time less complicated and grotesque, than any other fronts in Yucatan. . . . The northern building, standing on a terrace 20 ft. above the platform which supports the other structures, and consequently overlooking them all, was very probably intended by the builders as the crowning feature of the Casa de Monjas. Its court façade was crowded with sculptured designs. . . . Apparently from no other motive than to obtain more space on which to exercise their talent for decorative art, and thus to render this front more striking, the builders extended the front wall at regular intervals above the upper cornice, forming 13 turrets 17 ft. high and 10 ft. wide, placed generally above the doorways' (Bancroft, *op. cit.* pp. 178–179, 187 f.)

The chief remains at Chichen-Itza are the Nunnery, Akab-Tzib (Maya, 'Writing in the Dark,' from the hieroglyphics upon its walls) originally level with the plain instead of on a mound, but with the ground surrounding it excavated, the Castle (or Pyramid), the Gymnasium (also called the Temple, and by the natives the Iglesia), the Chichanchob ('Red House,' also called the Prison), a series of 380 pillars from 3 to 6 ft. high recalling the 'Hall of Columns' (on a miniature scale) at Mitla, and the Caracol. The last is the most curious structure and is unique of its type. It is a circular, domed building, 22 ft. in diameter and some 24 ft. high, with two narrow corridors surrounding its apparently solid core. It rests on a

pyramid of two rectangular terraces, the lower 150 by 223 ft., and the upper 55 by 80 ft.

As already noted, many other ruins of Central America are of deep interest. Here mention may be made of the Casa de Justicia at Kabah; the Casa Grande at Zayi with its three storeys built around (instead of upon) a mound, the first storey being 120 by 265 ft., the second 60 by 220 ft., and the third (on the summit of the mound) 18 by 150 ft.; a room with an acute-angled roof at Nohcabab; the Castle at Tuloom; and the great fort of El Resguardo at Utatlan.

It is thus clear that among the Mayas, as among the Aztecs, and even the Cadoans, Floridians, and at least some of the 'Mound Builders,' the mound is almost universally the substructure, and though only the palaces and temples remain, the dwellings of the people having long since disappeared through the destructive climate, enough has survived to give some idea of the civilization adopted by the ruder Aztecs when they invaded Mexico. The walls of the Maya structures are of oblong dressed stones, usually laid without mortar, and richly carved. The walls were very thick, and the buildings were only one storey in height. The rooms were long and narrow, since the Mayas possessed little skill in roofing. Thus at Uxmal the main rooms of the 'Governor's Palace' are 60 ft. long and only 11 or 13 wide. The roof was frequently constructed by a sort of corbel arch, each course of masonry being gradually advanced towards the other until the opening could be covered with a single slab. On the roof was a roof comb—one of the most distinguishing features of Maya architecture. The comb on the 'Temple of the Cross' at Palenque was a latticed superstructure of stone and stucco in two storeys, one 7 ft. in height and the other 8, the main building being 40 ft. high. Closely similar was the architecture of the Zapotecs, of which the best remains are preserved at Mitla in the Mexican State of Oaxaca. Here, as among the Mayas, the rooms were long and narrow, one of them being 121 ft. long by 12 wide, while the architecture again resembles that of the Mayas in having no windows. The roof comb was lacking, however, and the structure of the roof was essentially different, the corbel arch being abandoned in favour of wooden beams covered with earth and slabs of stone. The most remarkable feature of Zapotec architecture is found in the 'Hall of Columns,' a part of the palace of Mitla. This hall contains six monoliths about 12 ft. in height and 9 in circumference, set at intervals of some 15 feet. These are the only monolith columns thus far discovered in American Indian architecture, although built up piers are found in *pueblos*, and wooden columns are frequent in the slab houses of the North-West Coast.

6. In South America the types of architecture are as varied as in North and Central America. The early Brazilian houses, according to Lafitau (*Mœurs des sauvages amériquains*, ed. Paris, 1727, iii. 8), were 'faites en forme de berceau. . . . Elles sont fort longues; cinq ou six cabanes composent un gros village. Il est vrai que dans chaque cabane il y a jusqu'à soixante et quatre-vingt personnes partagées en différents ménages.' In Guiana pile-dwellings are common, those of the Warraus being 7 or 8 ft. long, and built on piles 5 or 6 ft. high. Similar structures are found even on the savannahs. The walls are of leaf or bark plastered with mud, although thatches are also common. In the forests the Arawaks, Ackawais, and Caribs build open unwalled houses, whereas in the open savannahs the Macusis, Arecunas, and Wapianas construct dwellings with thick mud wattled walls, often 2 ft. in thickness. The Ackawai houses, moreover, are generally communal, frequently having eighteen hammocks in a structure 20 by 30 ft., while the Arawak dwellings often have partitions of palm-leaf or bark. The development of the Guiana house is shown by the temporary dwelling, or *benaboo*, a rough affair, triangular in base and covered with palm-leaves, the triangle being later replaced by a square, the usual form of the houses of this region (Im Thurn, *Among the Indians of Guiana*, London, 1883, pp. 202–210). The Chiriguanos of Bolivia had quadrangular thatched houses with frameworks of reeds or posts, arranged in circular villages, having an open space in the centre. Those of the Guatos of the Amazon are about 4 metres square and thatched on the sides with leaves (Schmidt, *Indianerstudien in Zentralbrasilien*, Berlin, 1905, pp. 177–178), while the Laguas of the Paraguayan Chaco construct dwellings of long, low, rough booths, either of papyrus reed or of sticks thatched with grass, although for stormy weather they place poles in a circle, and then bring them together to be covered with rushes, leaves, and similar material (Grubb, *Among the Indians of the Paraguayan Chaco*, London, 1904, pp. 72–73). On the Pampas tents were used, consisting of a framework of poles covered with horse-hide, and in Patagonia likewise tents of skin were used. The framework of these latter structures was frequently between 10 and 12 ft. in length, 10 in width, and 7 in height, and the interior was divided into a number of rooms, thus forming a sort of small communal dwelling. In Tierra del Fuego, on the other hand, with its far inferior civilization, wretched huts are built of sticks wattled with grass or rammed with mud, marking one of the lowest types of architecture to be found on the American continent.

7. Midway between North and South America stands the architecture of the Antilles. The majority of houses on these islands were round, pointed huts, with leaf roofs and wattled sides, often of perfumed reeds and elaborately adorned. The villages were small. There were, however, large houses, especially in Cuba, where some lodged between 100 and 200 men, and the residences of the caciques naturally received special adornment. The larger dwellings frequently had covered porches, and were divided into a number of rooms. While it is not impossible that in the most archaic period the inhabitants of Porto Rico, Haiti, Cuba, and other West India islands were, at least in part, troglodytic, by the time of the first discoveries they were largely village-dwellers, their groups of houses being palisaded as in Florida, Virginia, etc. The Haitian (and probably the Porto Rican) houses, called *buhios*, *caneyes*, and *eracras*, were of two types: circular, with upright sides supporting a sloping roof converging at the apex and thatched with leaves or stalks of cane, the door forming the only opening; and rectangular, constructed of similar material, but with windows and a small porch. No remains of stone or *adobe* houses are known on any of these islands; but since the accounts of the early discoverers and such analogues as may be traced in the modern cabins (which resemble the second rather than the first type) agree in general with the domiciles along the Orinoco and its tributaries, 'this resemblance is one of the many which can be advanced to indicate kinship of the people of South America with those of Porto Rico' (Fewkes, 'The Aborigines of Porto Rico and Neighbouring Islands,' in *25 RBEW* p. 46).

8. Architecture reached its zenith in South America among the Chibchas of Colombia and the Quichuas of Peru. The ordinary houses of the former people were built of straw and earth, and were frequently 100 ft. long and 20 wide; and even in Cuzco the common houses were of wood

and thatched with straw (Botero, *Relationi universali*, Venice, 1600, i. 234). Stone structures, however, were unknown, even in the case of the temples. This is the more remarkable since sculpture was known to the Chibchas, who were also acquainted with the column. The architecture of the Peruvians forms the South American counterpart to that of the Aztecs and the Mayas, although its spirit is entirely different. The Peruvian buildings which have survived are mostly of stone, and many of them, unlike those of Mexico and Central America, are true examples of cyclopean construction. A monolithic gateway at Tiahuanaco measures 13 ft. 5 in. in length, 7 ft. 2 in. in height above the ground, and 18 in. in thickness, with a door 4 ft. 6 in. high and 2 ft. 9 in. wide. At this same site are a large number of monoliths bounding a rectangle 445 ft. in length by 388 in width. These pillars vary from 14 ft. to 2½ ft. in height. Elaborate sun-circles, bounded by monoliths, also occur, as at Sillustani; and the latter site and its vicinity are also of importance for the *chulpas*, or funeral towers. These are plain towers, usually round, with corbelled cupolas, and ranging from 16 to 40 ft. in height, containing, within walls of extreme thickness, a very small funerary chamber (cf., further, art. DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD [Peruvian]).

The chief sites of ancient Peruvian (and Bolivian) remains are Pachacamac, Gran Chimu, Marca Huamachuco, Huanuco Viejo, Vilcas Huaman, Cuzco, Ollantaïtambo, Pisacc, Sillustani, Tiahuanaco, and the islands of Lake Titicaca. At Pachacamac are found the ruins of the Temple of the Sun and the House of the Virgins of the Sun, the former covering an area 600 by 450 ft., and the latter one of 350 by 200 ft. Over the four hills which form the site of the ancient city are scattered the remains of other large structures, including communal dwellings which recall the *pueblos* of New Mexico. But Pachacamac, like Ancon, is more noteworthy for its necropolis than for its architecture; nor are the coast sites of Peru, generally speaking, as important in their contributions to a knowledge of the ancient architecture of the country as the more inland remains. Nevertheless, mention should be made of the elaborate fortress at Paramonga. Here a hill about 825 ft. high, surrounded by an *adobe* wall, sustains a fortress of three terraces with a detached *quasi*-bastion of similar construction facing the sea. A similar, but far more extensive, wall is found at Marca Huamachuco; and the presence of such structures in Peru is the more noteworthy when it is remembered that in the corresponding culture-regions of Mexico and Central America the sole clear example is found in the Maya site of Tuloom. This wall at Marca Huamachuco is nearly 10 ft. high, and it encloses the still imposing ruins of two oblong rectangular buildings, originally of three storeys, surrounding central courts. The exact purpose of these buildings, known locally as the Church and the Castle, is uncertain; but close by are the undoubted remains of extensive llama-stables. On a third hill—the Cerro de la Monja—surrounded by a triple wall, is the Convent, an appellation which may not be without reason. The entire group of structures at Marca Huamachuco is dominated by the Cerro del Castillo, where the rulers evidently dwelt; and the entire community was, accordingly, thus divided, running from north to south: Cerro Amara (residences of the warriors and citizens), Cerro del Castillo, Cerro de la Falda (llama-stables), Cerro de la Monja (nunnery), and Cerro Viejo (purpose unknown).

Huanuco Viejo, which, according to the *conquistador* historian Xerez, covered an area three leagues in circumference, still has a perimeter of nearly a league, even when the dwellings of the people have disappeared, and only the palace, baths, temples, and wall surrounding the principal buildings remain. The building material is hard grey stone, and a noteworthy feature is the baths 'se composant de onze piscines murées en pierre et surmontées de parois d'un appareil admirable, pourvu de niches au fond desquelles sont fixés des bancs en pierre' (Wiener, *Pérou et Bolivie*, p. 211). Mention should likewise be made of the elaborate system of courts and of an avenue with four large pylonic gates. Vilcas Huaman is noteworthy chiefly for a truncated rectangular pyramid in three stages, ascended by a flight of steps, and surrounded by a wall with doors whose sloping sides resemble those of Huanuco Viejo. The structure is strikingly suggestive of the Aztec and Maya pyramids.

At Ollantaïtambo, some 12 leagues from Cuzco, are the remains of vast palaces, with their terraces, pylons, stairs, aqueducts, and cisterns, and distinct traces of the ancient city, as well as of the so-called Tribunal and Prisons; while about 2 miles away are enormous fortifications. Pisacc also has an interesting group of ruins, comprising a fort, a temple of the sun (*intihuanatana*), and traces of the ancient city. There is, in this series of elaborate fortifications throughout Peru, a marked divergency from the architectural remains elsewhere in America (unless an exception may be made in certain structures of the 'Mound-builders'). And it is also noteworthy that not only does the building material change from *adobe* to stone as one proceeds from the coast, but that the construction becomes, *pari passu*, more and more cyclopean.

Peruvian architecture reached its height of grandeur in the structures at Tiahuanaco and the islands of Lake Titicaca. At the former site are the remains of the Fortress, Temple, Palace, Hall of Justice, and Sanctuary. The Temple measures 388 by 455 ft., with a sunken court 280 by 190 ft.; while the Hall of Justice is a cyclopean platform 131 by 23 ft. with a group of seats at each end and in the centre, these groups being separated by monolithic doorways. Copper clamps were used to hold the stones together. (On the entire site cf. Strübel and Uhle, *Die Ruinenstätte von Tiahuanaco*, Breslau, 1882). On the islands of Titicaca and Coati are buildings dedicated respectively to the sun and the moon. The former island contains the Palace of the Incas (also called the Temple of the Sun), the Storehouse of the Sun, and the Bath of the Incas. The Palace, or Temple, 51 by 44 ft., is in two storeys, and originally had painted and stuccoed walls; while the Bath is 40 by 100 ft. and 5 ft. in depth. The island of Coati is especially famous for its Palace of the Virgins of the Sun, which, also in two storeys, is 183 by 80 ft. It contains numerous apartments, but, rather curiously, none of the structures on these two islands is cyclopean in type, nor is there any approach to such monuments as the monolithic gateways at Tiahuanaco, mentioned above.

Although less ornamental than the Maya structures, Peruvian architecture is of a higher type. The arch is occasionally found, especially at Pachacamac and Vilcas Huaman, and windows were not unknown in the interior, though they do not seem to have been constructed on the coast. The most important advance over the architecture of Mexico and Central America, however, was the roof, which obviated the necessity of the excessively narrow room which forms so marked a characteristic of the more northern style. The smaller structures seem to have been covered with a hip roof, at least in some cases, while in the larger buildings it has been suggested that the interior

was lined with wooden columns supporting a sort of verandah which did not cover the entire floor space. Although there is, naturally, no trace of columns in the present condition of the Peruvian ruins, this hypothesis is confirmed by the small footpaths which border the interior of the walls. Such a form of roof, moreover, would admit the necessary light to the dwellings, and the entire structure would thus present an analogue to the Roman *atrium*. Rooms were formed in the Peruvian houses by curtains. The doors varied remarkably in form, some of them being trapezoids, while others were truncated ovals, and still others resembled the reversed spade of the conventional playing card. A noteworthy feature of Peruvian architecture was the niche in the wall, usually either a rectangle or a trapezoid, sometimes perhaps serving for a closet and again for ornament. Stairs of considerable elaboration were frequent. Again, deviating from Maya and Aztec architecture, many of the larger structures, especially the palaces, contained many rooms, presenting ground-plans of much complexity, as in the palaces at Chimu. Structures of several storeys were erected, as in the case of the palace at Marca Huamachuco and the palace of the Inca on the island of Titicaca, the ground-plan of the second storey of the latter structure being entirely different from that of the first floor. Some buildings, notably the fortress of Paramonga, almost suggest the *pueblo* type of North America in their pyramidal construction, although neither motive nor type of building was at all analogous. A decided analogy of form also exists between the Aztec *teocallis* and the Peruvian *huacas*, although the latter were used, not as pyramids to support the temples, but as places of interment. Finally, it may be noted that the Incas—altogether the most civilized race of South America, and the rivals even of the Mayas of Yucatan—were able to construct bridges of stone and elaborate aqueducts, as well as admirable roads and cyclopean terraces.

LITERATURE.—Dellenbaugh, *North Americans of Yesterday* (New York, 1901); Thomas, *Introduction to the Study of North American Archæology* (Cincinnati, 1898); Hodge, *Handbook of American Indians* (Washington, 1907), i. 77–82, 515–519; Brasseur de Bourbourg, *Monuments anciens du Mexique* (Paris, 1866); Charnay, *Ancient Cities of the New World* (New York, 1887); Bancroft, *Native Races of the Pacific States*, iv. (San Francisco, 1883); Squier, *Peru* (*ib.* 1877); Wiener, *Pérou et Bolivie* (Paris, 1880); Waitz, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, iii. (2 parts, Leipzig, 1862–1864); T. M. Prudden, *The Great American Plateau* (New York, 1907); and many monographs in the reports of the American *BE*, the United States National Museum, the Field Columbian Museum, the Peabody Museum, and the American Museum of Natural History.

LOUIS H. GRAY.

ARCHITECTURE (Assyro-Babylonian).—In the absence of clear statements as to the history of the architectural forms found in the sacred buildings of the Babylonians and Assyrians, much doubt as to their origin naturally exists. The two principal forms are the temple on its earthen foundation, without any upper storeys, and the temple-tower, or *ziqqurat*, in stages. It is probable that the former preceded the latter in date.

As elsewhere, the temple in Babylonia has been regarded as originating from the tomb—a very natural development, in view of the probability that certain of the gods of the Babylonians were nothing more than venerated heroes of remote ages who had become deified. So far, however, no sepulchre which may be called an edifice in the true sense of the word has been found, either in Babylonia or Assyria.

Most of the temples probably originated from small beginnings, as is suggested by a document of about 2000 B.C. in the British Museum. In this Nûr-iḫi-šu founds a temple to Nûr-ili (or Lugala) and Sullat (probably Merodach and his spouse Zêr-panîtu^{m}), and dedicates it for the preservation of his life.* One priest only is named, so the building was probably a very simple structure—an oblong hall with a recess at one end for the statues or emblems of the deities to whom it was dedicated, and one or two rooms for sacred utensils and robes. In this case the motive for the foundation seems to have been to provide a temple for the gods of Babylon in a district where the sun-god was the patron deity, and it seems not improbable that other temples and shrines may have been founded in the same way.†

One of the most interesting temple-plans is that of the goddess Nin-maḫ, as excavated at Babylon by the Deutsche Orient-Gesellschaft (Delitzsch, *Im Lande des einstigen Paradieses*, p. 39). The ruin lies on the eastern side of the Ištar-gate, and, as is usual in the sacred buildings of Babylonia and Assyria, has its corners towards the cardinal points. It is of sun-dried brick, and its remains have even now traces of white decoration. The entrance on the N.W. led into a large vestibule communicating with a room on the left, and giving access to a court-yard with six other doorways serving the remaining chambers, eleven in number. Four of these had smaller rooms, probably the sanctuaries where were kept the statues or the shrines of the deities worshipped there (for the temple É-maḫ probably resembled others in Babylonia in associating certain companions with the principal divinity). The first hall was entered from the court-yard by a doorway nearly facing that giving access to the court-yard from the vestibule, and this, in its turn, led to the inner hall—the holy place. There seems to have been no rule for the position of the small rooms which probably contained the statues or shrines, some of them being at the S.W. end (when the halls to which they were appended ran N.E. and S.W.), and at the N.E. end (when the room ran N.W. to S.E.). The court-yard was not in the centre of the building, but set more towards the S.W. side, so that there was space on that side for only one row of two narrow rooms, whilst on the N.E. side there are two rows of rooms, narrower and longer, with sanctuaries for statues or shrines. Behind the 'holy place' are two narrow rooms only.

To all appearance the temples of Babylonia and Assyria were built upon the same general plan. From the outside the visitor gained access to a vestibule, which, in its turn, admitted him to the court-yard, or to a hall around which were the doorways leading to the remaining halls and chambers.

More ornate, to all appearance, than the temple of Nin-maḫ at Babylon was that built by Sargon of Assyria at Khorsabad. This edifice lay in the 'temple-court' of the palace, on the S.E. side of which were the 'priests' rooms,' the temple itself being on the S.W. side of the court, facing the state-apartments. A flight of stone steps gave access to a platform of crude brick (faced by a retaining wall of black basalt with a cornice of grey limestone). Two chambers were traced, floored with a mixture of stone and chalk. The fragments of black basalt bas-reliefs found here showed that the ornamentation was the same as that in the palace, but the subjects were religious.‡

A better example, however, is the Assyrian temple excavated by Sir H. Layard in the mound of Nimrûd (Calah). This lay at the S.E. angle of the great temple-tower, but was apparently unconnected with it. Here also we have an outer court, an entrance leading into a vestibule, a side-chamber (with two entrances), and a hall with a

* *JRAS*, Jan. 1899, p. 103 ff.

† A temple of these modest dimensions may have been simply an enlargement of the popular household sanctuary.

‡ Rawlinson's *Monarchies*, vol. i. pp. 369–371.

recess at the end. It differs from the Babylonian temple of Nin-mah, however, in having no interior court-yard. Its importance for Assyrian art, on the other hand, was considerable, many slabs of a religious nature having been found; and its pavement-slabs give the history of the reign of Aššur-naṣir-âpli (B.C. 885–860), its builder. Its main entrance was adorned with winged man-headed lions, and the entrance leading into the side-room had reliefs showing the deity expelling an evil spirit, represented as a winged dragon, from the place.* At the side of this doorway was the arch-headed monolith with the representation of the king (Aššur-naṣir-âpli) in his divine character, with an altar before it, implying that sacrifices of some kind were made to him.† The smaller temple apparently had no vestibule, and the visitor entered at once into the holy place, which had a recess for the statue or shrine at the left-hand end. Chambers supplying the place of the vestibule were constructed at each end. Altars for libations were placed in angles made to receive them on each side of the main entrance. These objects were hollow, and were decorated with gradines, similar to those of the walls already described.

On one of the sculptures found at Khorsabad is a small building which has been regarded as a fishing-pavilion,‡ because built on the banks of a stream, and also, by some, as a small temple. It is one storey high only, and is built, as usual, upon a platform. The roof is supported by two columns resembling the Doric of the Greeks. Above the columns the entablature broadens out into a deep cornice, which is surmounted by gradines like those above the walls of the temples and temple-towers, but rather smaller. No doorway is shown, so that the building looks like a mere shelter from the rain.§ That it is really a temple is also implied by the similar structure sculptured on a slab from the palace of Aššur-bani-âpli in the British Museum. It shows a temple on rising ground beside a terrace on arches (possibly the 'hanging gardens' of Babylon).‖ It is flanked by thickish columns, and has two slender ones in the centre, but no entrance is shown. The entablature above the columns has gradines, but its cornice is provided with a more elaborate moulding. On the left is an outbuilding surmounted by a shallow moulding and gradines, but otherwise, to all appearance, plain. The arch-headed stele in front was evidently detached from it. It has the figure of a Babylonian king in the usual conventional attitude, and an altar like those found by Layard at the smaller temple, at Nimrûd, already described.

Though there may be doubt as to the origin of the Babylonian temple—whether it was a development of the tomb or of the simple household shrine—the testimony in favour of the temple-towers of Babylonia being tombs is exceedingly strong, and is rendered still more so by the analogy of the pyramids of Egypt, which they resembled in their general appearance. Ctesias says (Diodorus, II. vii. 1) that the great sepulchral mound built by Semiramis at Nineveh on the Tigris was erected over the body of her husband Ninus; and Ovid (*Metam.* IV. 98) speaks of the 'tomb of Ninus,' under whose shadow the tragedy of Thisbe and Pyramus took place. On the other hand, this tomb-theory of the origin of the Babylonian temple-towers is quite unsupported by the older writings (Gn $11^{4ff.}$; Berossus, *ap.* Euseb. *Chronicon*, 13, *Præp. Evangel.* IX.; Jos. *Ant.* I. iv.; Syncellus, *Chron.* 44), which state that the tower at Babylon was for the purpose of reaching heaven. As far as the Babylonian records are known, this statement is likewise unconfirmed, though the use of the Bab. term (*ziqquratu*), applied to them to indicate the 'peak' of the mountain on which the Babylonian Noah sacrificed on coming out of the ark, would seem to support the idea that these erections were for the purpose of getting nearer to the deity when sacrificing, and likewise, probably, when offering prayers. It has also been suggested that the original inhabitants of the plain of Shinar, having come from a mountainous country, desired to break the monotony of their new home, and therefore built these mountain-like structures, which they turned to pious uses.

Apart from the descriptions given by explorers, perhaps the best account of a Babylonian temple-tower is that of Herodotus when describing the temple of Belus at Babylon (i. 181–183)—the building called by Nebuchadrezzar 'the Tower of Babylon.' Herodotus describes it as a massive tower 200 yards square at the base, within an enclosure 400 yards each way, and provided with gates of bronze. The stages, or 'towers,' as Herodotus calls them, amounted to eight in number, and, like the temple-tower found by the French explorers at Khorsabad, were provided with an inclined pathway on all four sides of each, enabling the visitor to reach the top. About the middle of the ascent (apparently the fourth stage) was a stopping-place, with seats to rest upon. On the topmost stage was a large cell, with a couch and a golden table, but no image, as the god himself was said to descend thither when he visited the woman chosen by him to pass the night there. The image of the god was in a cell below, with a table, probably for offerings, and an altar outside. Image, table, and altar are all said to have been of gold, and the last-named was for sucklings only. An altar for full-grown animals, and one for frankincense on the occasion of the god's festival, were also there. See ALTAR (Sem.), p. 353.

A detailed description of this famous temple is much needed, that given by Nebuchadrezzar being altogether inadequate. The late G. Smith was once fortunate enough to have in his hands a Babylonian tablet in which the building was described, and this is probably the most trustworthy account of it in existence.* Adopting his estimate of the metric system used, the 'grand court' of the temple measured 1156 ft. by 900 ft., and the next, 'the court of Ištar and Zagaga,' 1056 ft. by 450 ft., with six gates admitting to the temples.

The next division is described as a space or platform, apparently walled, called, in Sumero-Akkadian, *kigalla* or *zur*, and in Semitic Babylonian *kigallu* or *birûtu*—words apparently meaning an enclosed and levelled space. It was described as square, 2 *ku* each way (this is possibly the portion described by Herodotus as 'the temple' or sacred precinct, which measured 2 stadii—1213 ft. 6 in.—each way, and was furnished with bronze gates). In accordance with the usual Babylonian custom, the angles indicated the cardinal points, and each side had an entrance. Inside the enclosure, at the time the tablet was written, stood some kind of erection 200 ft. square, connected with the *ziqqurat*, or tower, and having round its

* Nimrûd Gallery, British Museum; Layard's *Monuments of Nineveh*, plate 5.

† Assyrian Transept, W., British Museum; Layard's *Nineveh and Babylon*, plate, p. 351.

‡ Botta, *Monuments de Ninive*, plate 114; Rawlinson, *Monarchies*, vol. i. p. 387.

§ An altar upon a hill to the right of this building suggests that it may have been merely for worship, the sacrifices being made on this 'high place' outside. Similar chapels or small temples are also found in Phœnician architecture (see p. 765).

‖ Assyrian Saloon, British Museum, No. 92; Rawlinson, *Monarchies*, vol. i. p. 388.

* *The Athenæum*, Feb. 12, 1876; repeated by Prof. Sayce in his *Hibbert Lectures*, 1887, p. 437 ff.

base the chapels or temples of the various gods, on all four sides, and facing the cardinal points.

On the E. side was a building 70 or 80 cubits long and 40 broad, containing sixteen shrines, the chief ones being dedicated to Nebo and Tašmêt, his consort. On the N. were temples to Êa or Aa and Nusku, and on the S. a single temple dedicated to Anu and Bel.

It was on the W. side, however, that the principal buildings were to be found—a 'double house' or temple with a court between two wings of differing dimensions. The building at the back was 125 cubits by 30. Mr. Smith was unable to make out with certainty the disposition of all the erections, but in the W. chambers stood the couch of the god, and the throne of gold mentioned by Herodotus, besides other furniture of great value.

The main building was the *ziqqurat*, or temple-tower, square, and with its corners towards the cardinal points. The lowest stage was also the largest, being 300 ft. square by 110 ft. high. It had the usual recessed or panelled ornamentation of Babylonian architecture. The second stage was 260 ft. square by 60 ft. high. An obscure term was applied to it, which G. Smith suggested might mean that it had sloping sides; probably they were hollowed out. This change in form would break the monotony of the structure.

The third stage commenced a regular series all equal in height, namely, 1 *gar* or 20 ft., but decreasing in size. The third was 200 ft. square, the fourth 170 ft., the fifth 140 ft., the sixth (the dimensions of which were omitted) apparently 110 ft. On this was the topmost stage, the seventh, which was the upper temple or sanctuary of the god Bel-Merodach. Its dimensions G. Smith makes to be 80 ft. long, 70 ft. broad, and 50 ft. high, the total height of the tower being 300 ft., exactly equal to the dimensions of the base. The raising of the base above the level of the ground would naturally make the height above the plain greater than this.

Weissbach's estimate of the measures does not differ greatly from that of G. Smith; he makes the base to have been about 100 metres, or 328 ft.*

The differing heights of the stages of the great 'Tower of Babylon' are in contrast with the regularity of Sargon of Assyria's well-proportioned structure at Khorsabad. At present this latter shows portions of four stages on a low platform; and those who visited it gained the summit by means of the gently sloping exterior passage leading to the topmost portion, which was about 140 ft. above the platform. Though in their restorations Perrot and Chipiez† do not place any chambers in the structure, it is not improbable that such existed, if not at some intermediate point, at any rate on the topmost platform.

Exceedingly noteworthy, however, are the excavations made by Layard in the ruins of the temple-tower at Nimrûd (Calah). Wishing to find out what authority there might be for supposing that Ctesias and Ovid were right in indicating that these towers were of the nature of tombs, he cut through the masonry in certain places, and was at last rewarded by finding a vault on the platform-level 100 ft. long, 12 ft. high, and 6 ft. broad. There is no doubt that this discovery justified him in regarding these temple-towers as being originally tombs, as stated, but that it is 'the tomb of Sardanapalus which, according to the Greek geographers, stood at the entrance of the city of Nineveh,' must be left doubtful, notwithstanding that Calah (Nimrûd) may have been regarded as part of Nineveh, at least in later times. Layard's statement that it had been entered at some unknown period by people who must have known exactly where to make the opening, is also in favour of his supposition: they had apparently entered for the purpose of rifling the tomb. The vaulted gallery found by Layard runs east and west. Details concerning the upper part of the monument are unfortunately wanting. Layard regarded it as having been a tower in five stages, which is probable enough, but the dimensions of all but the lowest are unknown. This last was built massively with a thick facing of stone, exactly 20 ft. high, and finished at the top with a line of gradines. The stones were carefully fitted together, without any mortar, though mud may have been used instead, as at the present time. As far as preserved, the upper part is of brick.*

As has been pointed out by Canon Rawlinson, the Babylonians and Assyrians made their temples insignificant in comparison with the dwellings of their kings, thus apparently not imitating the Egyptians. As the Babylonians and Assyrians, like all the Semitic nations, were exceedingly religious, this shortcoming was probably due to some extent to climatic conditions and the want of suitable building-stone; perhaps, too, more of the temple-revenues may have been appropriated by the priests. The want of stone was more especially felt in Babylonia; the Assyrians made use of it largely, though not to the same extent as brick. The possession of stone enabled the Assyrians to adorn their temples with many fine bas-reliefs.

As an accessory of a temple, and therefore belonging to religious architecture, may be mentioned the Ištar-gate at Babylon. This is situated near the ruins of the temple Ê-maḫ, and consists of massive walls—the sides of the gate—decorated with bulls and the fabulous creatures called *ṣir-ḫuššū*—strange and impossible serpent-dragons. These alternate vertically from top to bottom, and are exceedingly well preserved. The beauty of the workmanship and the excellence of the enamel were not surpassed even by the artizans of the Persian period. From the Ištar-gate a 'festival-street' led northward to 'the place of Fate,'† where the oracles were declared yearly in Nisan. This is an excellently-paved causeway, apparently decorated with tiles imitating valuable stones.

In the temple of the Sun at Abu-habbah (Sippar, identified, though doubtfully, with the Biblical Sepharvaim), bitumen seems to have been used for the pavement; and beneath this, in a corner of one of the rooms, was found an earthenware coffer containing the celebrated 'sun-god stone'‡ (see ART [Assyr.-Bab.]). Receptacles for sacred objects were probably made in all temples in Babylonia. It seems likely that there were but few erections of the kind which had not closed recesses, at each corner, for the reception of the cylinders recording the building, re-building, or repairing of the edifice.

Naturally there are a number of religious erections whose real use is at present difficult to discover or to prove. At Babylon, on the site which the German explorers regard as being that

* *Das Stadtbild von Babylon* (1904), p. 23. The site of this temple-tower is the rectangular depression now called *Sahan*, which is of the dimensions stated.

† *Hist. de l'Art dans l'Antiquité*, 'Chaldée,' pp. 404–405.

* Layard's *Nineveh and Babylon*, plan 2, and p. 123 ff. The stones 'were bevelled with a slanting bevel, and in the face of the wall were eight recesses or false windows, four on each side of a square projecting block between gradines' (Layard, p. 126). The northern side had a semicircular hollow projecting in the centre, flanked by three pilasters on the E. and five on the W. The western side had no projection, but the pilasters were eleven in number. The eastern and southern sides were perfectly plain.

† The inner walls of this building, Nebuchadrezzar states, had been overlaid with silver; but this he took away, substituting pure gold.

‡ See H. Rassam's 'Recent Discoveries of Ancient Babylonian Cities' in *TSBA*, vol. viii. pp. 175–176.

of 'the place of Fate,' several chambers were found, which may have formed part of that edifice. This seems to point to the probability that the oracles of the Babylonians and Assyrians were declared in special buildings, though such things may, from time to time, have been delivered in the temples, such as are described above. At present we know nothing of the lives of the declarers of oracles, or of the rites which accompanied their declarations of events, so that the nature of the building they needed receives no illustration from the ruins which have come down to us.

At Lagaš were discovered a number of cells whose uses seemed to be religious, though in what way was not clear. Some of them contained a bronze figure of a kneeling bull upon a shank or tang, others had a figure of what has been described as 'the god with the firestick.' They were accompanied by inscriptions on stone dedicating them to a deity. The figures are thought to have been for the protection of the buildings in which they were found. Here and there tanks and cisterns occurred, suggesting some connexion with libation-ceremonies. Two tombs were discovered, containing skeletons, a lamp of glazed ware, and vases with short handles. Notwithstanding the early objects found in the tombs, it is regarded as certain that they are of late date.

In the inscriptions referring to offerings, at least one reference to a *bît-ili* or *bethel*, 'house of god,' is found,* but in what these differed from other religious buildings is unknown. The large temples seem always to have been dedicated to some special deity, notwithstanding that several deities may have been worshipped within them. These *bethels*, however, had no special designation: any deity, it may be supposed, could be worshipped there. Perhaps, as they were regarded as the abode of the god without specifying his attributes, any worshipper could enter, and perform his religious duties there. That it was simply an emblem of divinity, or of the presence of the divinity, without any walls to shield it from the gaze of the careless passer-by, seems, from the inscriptions, to be unlikely. The places where oracles were declared must have contained chambers where the animals were killed when it was intended to examine their entrails or other parts.

The bricks used by the Babylonians and Assyrians vary in size from 11¼ in. square and 2¼ in. thick to 13 in. square by 3 in. thick and 16 in. square by 7 in. thick. Sometimes crude and burnt brick are used in alternate layers each several feet in thickness, but more commonly the unbaked brick was used for the internal parts of a building or for the core of a temple-tower, and the baked brick for the parts exposed to the weather. The layers of reed-matting which are found seem to have been used for buildings of unbaked brick. The use of this is exemplified by the ruins of the temple-tower at Warka (Erech), dedicated to Ištar, which is now called *Bowariah*, 'reed-mats.' The mass of the structure is of unbaked brick, the lower part buttressed with baked brick. That these buildings have resisted so long is remarkable, but they must always have been unsatisfactory. As a contrast to the temple of Ištar at Erech may be mentioned that of Nebo at Borsippa (the traditional Tower of Babel), where there are masses of brickwork of extraordinary hardness. This ruin still awaits complete excavation.

Besides brick in Babylonia, and brick and stone in Assyria, the building-materials mentioned in the inscriptions are cedar, terebinth (?), oak (?), palm-wood, cypress, pistachio-wood, etc. Nebuchadrezzar speaks of the cedar-beams from Lebanon which were used for the roofing of the temples of Babylon, which, he adds, were overlaid with shining gold. Besides this, silver, bronze, copper, rare stones, and ivory were used for their adornment. As before mentioned, baked and unbaked brick took the place, with the Babylonians, of the building-stone used by the Assyrians, bitumen being generally used for mortar, as stated in Gn 11[3].

Concerning the ornamentation, the inscriptions give but little information. The principal architectural decoration of the upper terminations of the walls were the gradines already referred to. The panellings of the walls, which were also a speciality of Assyro-Babylonian architecture, are an application of the gradine pattern to form recesses in the brick or stone walls in a vertical direction, and, when well carried out, had a sufficiently decorative effect.

Failing stone, certain of the buildings of Babylonia were decorated with reliefs of enamelled brick; and though this cannot be proved for the temples, it is extremely probable that some of them at least had ornaments of this nature, more especially as some of the fragments found seemed to have been parts of fabulous or mythological beings (see ART [Assyr.-Bab.]). In these there was an attempt at reproduction in natural colours, and there were inscriptions in white characters on a blue ground, the whole showing considerable knowledge and skill.

The Babylonians seem often to have employed, however, the same method of decoration as the Assyrians, namely, fresco, traces of which have been found. In the case of the temple Ê-mah at Babylon, the distemper, as far as preserved, is white, probably chosen as the groundwork for decorations in colours, similar to the more or less geometrical flower-forms of the painted tiles and other decorations of the temple called *Kidimuri* at Calah. The centres of the tiles, which were circular or lozenge-shaped, are generally provided with a knob pierced with a hole, probably for the purpose of hanging a lamp, though no remains of lamps are stated to have been found. Other Assyrian ornamentation consists of rosettes between two coloured borders, and red, blue, and black rosettes above a similar border supported by a kind of arcade-ornament—perhaps the original suggestion for the true arcades of architecture. The colours in Assyrian distemper-ornamentation were exceedingly bright.*

The principal portals of the temples of Assyria were guarded by colossal bulls and lions, with the usual sacred figures, which, in the case of the smaller temple at Nimrûd, were generally covered with inscriptions. The bas-reliefs always represent religious subjects. The exterior walls of this building seem to have been faced with enamelled bricks, some of which were found. Whether the temples at Babylon had their entrances flanked by colossal winged bulls or not is doubtful, but this seems probable, at least in some cases, as they are to all appearance referred to by Aššur-banî-âpli, king of Assyria, in his account of the destruction wrought by his grandfather Sennacherib at Babylon on the occasion of his final conquest of the city (see Aššur-banî-âpli's great cylinder, col. iv. line 70).

T. G. PINCHES.

ARCHITECTURE (Celtic).†—We have no definite information about the religious architecture of the Gauls. In the case of the Celts, ancient writers never describe places devoted to worship by the word *ναός* or *ædes*; they make use of vaguer

* See *The Babylonian and Oriental Record*, vol. ii. pp. 142–146. See also Hastings' *DB*, vol. ii. p. 201[b], where the *bethel* of cedar at Haran is referred to.

* See Layard's *Monuments of Nineveh*, 1st series, pl. 86, 87.

† This art. deals with pre-Christian Celtic Architecture; for Christian Celtic Architecture see ARCHITECTURE (Christian).

terms, such as *locus consecratus* (Cæsar, *de Bell. Gall.* vi. 13. 17), *ἱερόν* (Diod. v. 27. 4; Strabo, iv. 4. 5; Plut. *Cæsar*, 26; Dio Cass. lxii. 7; cf. xxvii. 90), *templum* (Livy, xxiii. 24. 11; Suet. *Cæsar*, 54), *τέμενος* (Strabo, xii. 5. 2; Diod. v. 27. 4), and *σηκός* (Strabo, iv. 1. 13).

The sacred places of the ancient Celts, therefore, resembled neither the sanctuary of the Greek temples nor the great buildings which constituted the temples of the Romans. There is no doubt that they were enclosures frequently situated in the woods. Lucan (iii. 399–425) describes a sacred wood near Marseilles where sacrifices were offered to the gods with barbaric ceremonies, and where there were altars on which cruel rites were performed; all the trees in the wood were purified with human blood; the miserable effigies of the gods were devoid of art—shapeless masses of tree-trunk. Pomponius Mela (iii. 2. 17) remarks that the large sacred woods of Gaul lent a pleasing appearance to the country. Cæsar mentions the sacred place in the territory of the Carnutes where year by year the Druids assembled to administer justice (*de Bell. Gall.* vi. 13), and states that in the sacred places of many races were to be seen pieces of spoil taken from enemies, and that a Gaul would never dare to keep a part of the booty in his house, or carry off anything from these stores (vi. 17). The Arverni had hung up in front of a temple (*πρὸς ἱερῷ*) the little sword that Cæsar had left with them during a battle. Plutarch (*Cæsar*, 26), who reports this fact, seems to have been influenced by the Greek and Roman custom, and we cannot conclude from this statement that a building was referred to. At Toulouse the sacred places included lakes, where great treasures were eventually accumulated under the water (Strabo, iv. 1. 13; Justin, xxxii. 3, 10).

There were temples among the Cisalpines; and it was to one of them that the Boii brought their booty and the head of the consul Postumius. There they made this head into a cup hooped with gold, and it was this sacred vessel that was used by the priests of the temple on their feast-days (Livy, xxiii. 24). Polybius mentions a temple (*ἱερόν*) of Athene among the Insubrians where the ensigns of war were kept (ii. 32). There is nothing to show that these temples were anything else than uncovered enclosures.

The Britons in the time of Queen Boadicea had sacred places, and they offered human sacrifices in the sacred wood (*ἄλσος*) of the goddess Adrastia (Dio Cass. lxii. 7). In B.C. 61, Suetonius Paulinus ordered the sacred woods of Mona, which were devoted to savage superstitions, to be cut down (Tac. *Ann.* xiv. 30).

The council of the Galatians of Asia Minor met to judge cases of murder in a place called *Δρυΐμητον*. The second part of this word means, in Celtic, 'sacred wood.' Probably it refers to a place consecrated to worship (Strabo, xii. 5. 1).

It must further be added that the Druids were regarded as the inhabitants of the forests. According to Pomponius Mela (iii. 2. 19) they taught, and according to Lucan (i. 493) they lived, in caves or secret glades. Pliny states that it was in oak-forests that they gathered mistletoe. The oldest etymology of the name 'Druids' made them 'the men of the oaks,' from the Gr. *δρῦς* (Pliny, xvi. 95, 249).

If we may calculate the shape of the sacred enclosures from the ruins of Gallo-Roman temples, they were almost perfectly square. But nothing more can be determined concerning the Gallic period from the numerous stone temples of which ruins have been found in Gaul, and which date from the Roman epoch. If there were small buildings sacred to the gods in Celtic countries in ancient times, these buildings, like the Gallic houses, were made of wood and wicker-work (Strabo, iv. 4. 3; Cæsar, v. 43; Vitruvius, ii. 1. 5). The Gauls did not use stone except for building the walls of their *oppida*, and even then it was unhewn stone, adjusted by means of wooden cross-pieces and iron bolts (Cæsar, vii. 23). They seem to have been ignorant of the art of hewing stones and joining them with mortar.

They probably found it as ridiculous to enclose the gods in any kind of house as to represent them in human form. Diodorus tells that Brennus laughed very much on seeing wooden and stone statues of anthropomorphic gods in a Greek temple (xxii. 9. 4). Lucan, when describing the sacred wood near Marseilles, and Cæsar, when speaking of the Gallic Mercury (vi. 17), use the word *simulacra* to denote the representations of the gods. Does this refer to more or less rough wooden statues similar to the *ξόανα* of primitive Greece, or to shapeless stone statues like some of the extant menhirs? It is possible that the Gallic races employed now the one method of representing their deities and now the other, according to the nature of the soil. The deities of the Gallo-Roman period—the Bull, the Woodman, the god with the mallet, the god with the wheel—undoubtedly arose from a new religious conception due to the influence of the Romans. No text gives evidence of the Druids having forbidden idolatry, and no text states clearly that there were real statues of gods among the Celts; therefore we cannot affirm that their sacred enclosures contained anything but very rudimentary symbols similar to those of savage tribes. The huge bronze statue of Zeus which the Galatians had at Tavium was probably of Greek origin, like the cult of the god whom it represented (Strabo, xii. 5. 2).

There do not seem to have been any buildings devoted to worship in pagan Ireland. Idols were apparently erected in the open air, as, *e.g.*, the large stone idol called 'Cromm Cruach,' which was surrounded by twelve smaller idols covered with brass and bronze ornaments. There were similar idols in various parts of Ireland, and some of them were believed to deliver oracles, *e.g.* the famous 'Lia Fail' at Tara. The idol Bel, in honour of which bonfires (through which cattle were made to pass) were kindled on the 1st of May, does not seem to have been enclosed in a temple any more than the other idols.

As regards the civil architecture of ancient Ireland, it is practically the same as that of races at the same stage of civilization. The houses were usually round in shape, built of wood and wicker-work, and covered with thatch. They were very small. The chief room served as kitchen, dining-room, drawing-room, and bed-room. Among the higher classes of society, small recesses were fitted in along the walls, each containing one or more beds. But the common people undoubtedly slept on beds arranged along the wall, as was the custom in Gaul and in Scotland during the same period. The fire was in the middle of the house, and the smoke escaped through an opening in the roof. The beds were placed in such a way that the sleepers had their feet towards the fire. Each bed contained often two and sometimes three persons. It was only in the houses of chiefs that arrangements were made to avoid too complete promiscuity, and that beds were surrounded with curtains.

LITERATURE.—Bulliot and Roidot, *La cité gauloise selon l'histoire et les traditions*, Autun, 1879; Jullian, *Histoire de la Gaule*, Paris, 1907, ii. 155–157; Dottin, *Manuel pour servir à l'étude de l'antiquité celtique*, Paris, 1906, pp. 120 f., 123, 250–254; Joyce, *A Social History of Ancient Ireland*, London 1903, ii. 20–103.

G. DOTTIN.

ARCHITECTURE (Chinese).—As the world is still in the dark with regard to the whole problem of China and the Chinese, so is it with

Chinese architecture. From an architectural point of view, this is a very novel and interesting subject. A style never dreamed of by Europeans is adopted quite freely, and a design which they call irrational and unnatural is executed with success. Little wonder, therefore, that we find few students of Chinese architecture, and those few touching on the subject but superficially.

The style of the architecture is a combination of the trabeated and arcuated systems, the materials consisting of wood, brick, and stone. The curved roof, with the skyward-projecting eaves, forms the principal feature of the building. This feature is especially noticeable in Southern China. Generally speaking, however, both the plan and the elevation are monotonous, and the complete structure is rigidly symmetrical. The mode of decoration is strikingly peculiar. The exterior is usually coloured bright red; and temples and palaces are sometimes decorated with ornamental sculptures and paintings. Gorgeous colours are applied to the interior, and the whole appearance of rooms and furniture is very picturesque. Red is the predominant colour, and then blue, green, and yellow (gold). Northern China is destitute of trees, as rain falls only once a year. Hence the building materials are principally brick and stone. Consequently a trabeated system of wood and an arcuated of stone have developed simultaneously. On the other hand, the abundance of trees in the South has given an impulse to a considerable development of wooden buildings, with deeply curved and boldly projecting eaves. As to the origin of the concave outline of the roof, there is diversity of opinion. The present writer considers it but a natural result of the necessity of making a gradual change in the slope of the roof as it approaches the eaves, and of the maintenance of harmony with their curves. The fact is that the bold curve of the eaves always follows the bold concave of the roofs. It is rather strange that the plan of Chinese architecture is always an arrangement of rectangular blocks; not a single example of roofing on irregular plans is known. This is due to the direct transmission of the ideas of primitive times, and is a good illustration of the stagnant mind of the people.

Chinese architecture may be called the architecture of colouring. Without colours it is a bare, rugged skeleton. Both without and within colours are profusely adopted. The fondness for red betrays the primitive mind. But this primitive colouring is in harmony and uniformity with the taste of the primitive plans and elevations. The simplicity and coarseness of the construction and the carelessness of workmanship are beyond expression, especially in the productions of recent date. The exaltation of art and the execution of details have been entirely ignored by modern architects.

Historically, Chinese architecture may be arranged as follows: (1) Chinese architecture proper (B.C. 2200–A.D. 68, *i.e.* from the earliest historical age to the introduction of Buddhism: Hsia, Shang, Chou, Ch'in, and the earlier Han Dynasties); (2) the rise of Buddhist architecture (A.D. 68–A.D. 618, *i.e.* from the introduction of Buddhism to the Six Dynasties: the later Han, both Chins, Sung, Ch'i, Lian, Chên, and Sui Dynasties, and also Wei, Ch'i, Chou of the North Dynasties); (3) Buddhist architecture in full splendour (A.D. 618–A.D. 1260, *i.e.* T'ang, Wutai, and Sung Dynasties); and (4) the introduction of Lāmaism (A.D. 1260-present day, *i.e.* Yuen, Ming, and Ch'ing Dynasties).

(1) The first was the period of palace building. Unfortunately, no ruins are in existence for our investigation. From a study of the time, however, we find that there existed during this period magnificent palaces and towers, great in design and majestic in style, such as A-Fang of the Ch'in emperor Shih-Whuan-Ti, and Chang-Lê, and Wei-Yang of the Han. The relics which show most clearly the structural aspect and treatment of details of that time are the reliefs of Wu-Lian-Tzu, though the monument itself belongs to the later Han Dynasty. From them we can trace long projected wooden eaves, balustraded towers, various kinds of caryatids, richly decorated roofs, etc.

(2) The second period may be divided into the later Han and the North and South Dynasties. During the North and South Dynasties the influence of Buddhist architecture began to be felt. The style of Buddhist architecture remained without much alteration, any change being confined to the inner arrangement and decorations. But for pagodas and those particular buildings required by the new religion, an entirely new system was imported from Central Asia. Scarcely any architectural relics of the Six Dynasties have been discovered, but the style is fairly well represented in the treatment of cave temples and reliefs. Specimens of the later Wei are found at Shih-fou-szu in Yün-gan, near Ta-T'ung, Shan-si; at Kung-hsien, Ho-nan; at Lung-men, near Lê-yang, etc.

(3) The third period may be divided into the earlier T'ang, the later T'ang, and Sung. In the earlier T'ang, Buddhist architecture and all other branches of art had reached the height of their grandeur, and from the later T'ang to Sung they began to decline continuously. During that time elaborate Taoistic temples were also built. The pagodas of Tz'u-wen-szu and of Chien-fou-szu, at Si-an, Shen-si, are specimens of the earlier T'ang. The two pillars and the two stone pagodas of Ling-yin-szu at Hang-chow, Che-kiang, are most probably remains of the Five Dynasties. Besides, dilapidated temples and pagodas belonging to the Five Dynasties and Sung are found in various parts of Southern China.

(4) The fourth period is divided as follows: (*a*) The Yuen. With the introduction of Lāmaism changes were brought about in art. A fine specimen of this time is the arch of Chü-yüng-kwan, near Pe-king. There are also the rock-cut sculptures at Feh-lei-fung, at the front of Ling-yin-szu, Hang-chow. (*b*) The Ming. Remains of this period are abundant everywhere. The old palaces at Nan-king and several of the Pe-king palaces are examples, and there is also an innumerable number of pagodas. (*c*) The Ch'ing. Somewhat noteworthy relics belonging to the reigns of the emperors Kung-hsi and Ch'ien-lung are in abundance, but the productions of later date are valueless.

Thus Chinese architecture developed rapidly with the introduction of Buddhism, and reached its golden age under the T'ang Dynasty. From the Sung it gradually degenerated down to the present day, when its ancient splendour has entirely vanished.

For convenience' sake, we may classify Chinese architecture according to the religions which have influenced the thoughts and arts of the people: Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Muhammadanism. Others, such as Zoroastrianism, Manichæism, Nestorianism, and Judaism, were of a temporary nature, and have left no architectural remains. Then we have a group of secular architecture: castles, palaces, dwelling-houses, etc., which will be treated below.

1. Confucian Architecture.—The religion which has spread all over China, and is held in reverence by all the people, is Confucianism. Temples, known as *Hsin-shih-miao* or *Wên-miao* (the latter different from *Wu-miao* [see § 3]), are dedicated everywhere in cities and towns. The most celebrated one is in Ch'ü-fou-hsien, Shantung, the birthplace of the sage. The temples of Pe-king and of Nan-king are well known, the former on account of the stone drums in the *Ta-ch'êng-mên*, and the latter on account of its immense size. But from an architectural point of view they show very little variety of plan and elevation.

The main edifice of the temple is the *Ta-ch'êng-tien*, built on a high platform, two-storeyed, and mostly hip-roofed. In the centre of the interior the tablet of Chi-sheng-k'ung-tzu ('the most sacred Confucius') is enshrined. To its left, the tablets of Tsung-sheng-ts'êng-tzu and Ya-sheng-mêng-tzu, and to the right, those of Fu-sheng-yuen-tzu and Shu-sheng-tzu-szu-tzu, are arranged. As a rule, there are also the tablets of the twelve disciples. In front of the *Ta-ch'êng-tien* is the *Ta-ch'êng-mên*, and in front of the *mên* is a pond, and still farther forward is a *pai-lou* (popularly known as the *Ling-hsing-mên*). On the sides of those buildings there are the East and the West corridors. Occasionally behind the *Ta-ch'êng-tien* there is a building which is sometimes called *Chung-sheng-tzu*. Within the

Ta-ch'êng-mên there are sometimes a bell-tower and a drum-tower facing each other. The general arrangement of these buildings resembles that of the Buddhist temple: e.g. *Ta-ch'êng-tien* stands for *Fou-tien*, *Ta-ch'êng-mên* for *T'ien-wang-tien*, etc. As a rule, the *Wên-miao* is combined with the institution of learning. One of the most famous institutions is Pai-lu-shu-yüan, at the foot of Wu-lao-fêng, a south-east peak of Lu-shan in Nan-kung-fu, Kiangsi. This was established by Chu-tzu. The largest among numerous buildings in the compound is *Hsien-hsien-shu-yüan*. Within the gate there is a court-yard, with fifteen cells on either side. Then comes the *Wên-hui-t'ang* ('meeting-hall'), and behind it another court, with five cells on either side. Last of all, the two-storeyed *chün-fêng-lou* is reached. The architectural system of educational buildings is more or less similar to the above. The *Kung-yüan* is an examination hall for the degree of *chü-jên*, and is noted for its extensive scale. One in Nan-king is said to be ample enough to accommodate over ten thousand students. In fact, learning in China means Confucian teaching; hence the relation of schools to the *Wên-miao* is similar to that of monasteries to the Buddhist temple.

2. **Buddhist Architecture.**—The most important factor in the development of Chinese architecture is Buddhism. History says that in the reign of Ming-ti of the later Han the new religion was first introduced into China (65 A.D.), and Pai-ma-szu was built at Lê-yang. Henceforward it spread and flourished continuously, until the meridian was reached under the Six Dynasties and the T'ang. The North Dynasty felt its influence more than the South, the earlier Si-an and Lê-yang and the later Lu-shan and Chien-yeh (now Nan-king) being the centres. The highest pagoda ever recorded was built in Yung-ning-szu by the Empress Dowager Hu of the North Wei. It is said to have been 900 ft. high, with a finial of 100 ft. But Buddhism suffered from the corruptions and disorders that were prevalent from the later T'ang to the Five Dynasties, and no temples of any importance were built. A temporary revival began under the earlier Sung, resulting in elaborate temple-building in Southern China during the South Sung Dynasty. T'ien-tai-shan, Lin-gan (now Hang-chow), Ching-ling (now Nan-king), and their neighbourhoods were the centres. Under the Yüan Dynasty, Lāmaism was made the State religion. The architectural style of Lāma temples does not differ from that of Buddhist, except in the occasional application of Tibetan styles to details, and the importation of new images and ritual articles. One new feature is the introduction of a pagoda which is a direct copy of a Tibetan model. Since the Ming Dynasty, Buddhism has been in a dormant state, greatly influenced by Lāmaism. In earlier days, Buddhism was divided into thirteen sects, but under the later T'ang only three prevailed: Vinaya sect, Dhyāna sect, and Sukhāvatī sect. Dhyāna was subdivided into five sects. At present this is the ruling sect, other shades of belief being indistinguishable. We may say that the architectural features are practically common to all sects. Among the temples now existing are Yung-wo-kun in Pe-king and several other temples on the Western hills outside of the city. Wu-tai-shan in Shan-si, T'ientai-shan, Pu-t'o-shan, T'ien-t'ung-shan, T'ien-omu-shan in Chê-kig, Lu-shanan in Kiang-si, Womei-shan in Szu-chwan, etc., are widely known, but they are almost in ruins and deserted, without a trace of their former splendour.

The commonest arrangement of Buddhist architecture is as follows:—In the main front there is the first gateway (*shan-mên*), wherein usually two guardian figures (*er-tien*) are kept. Then comes the *t'ien-wang-tien* ('temple'). In the centre of this temple an image of Maitreya with the features of Pu-tai is enshrined; behind Maitreya, and back to back, is a standing figure of Vedadeva. In the four corners are the *su-tien-wang* ('four heavenly kings'): in the North-east is Virûpâksha with a harp, in the South-east Dhrita-râshtra with a sword, in the North-west Vaisravana with an umbrella, and in the South-west Virûdhaka grasping a serpent. Behind the *t'ien-wang-tien* is the *ta-tien*, known by various names, such as *Ta hsiung-pao-tien* or *Fou-tien*. Here the Buddha and eighteen Arhats are enshrined.

Still further behind the *ta-tien* are sometimes the *fa-t'ang* ('preaching hall'), *tsang-ching-kê* ('library'), and *fan-chang* ('cloister for head priest'). To the right and left of the above buildings are corridors, divided into sections, used for various purposes. Generally there are the *ke-t'ang* ('reception hall'), *ch'ieh-lan-tien* ('shrine for the guardian god'), *tsu-shih-tien* ('shrine for the founder of the sect'), *shan-t'ang* ('meditation hall'), *ch'i-t'ang* ('eating hall'), *yün-shui-t'ang* ('cloister for mendicant priests'), etc. To the right and left of the *t'ien-wang-tien* a bell-tower and a drum-tower stand facing each other, sometimes with the addition of a pagoda.

The pagoda is the most interesting and tasteful of Buddhist buildings, there being numerous varieties of form. Its origin is the *stūpa* of India, obviously transported from Central Asia and India. The process of the modification of form is not yet plain, as even the pagodas of a very remote period seen on reliefs and carvings are many-storeyed, already losing the shape of the original *stūpa*. The pagoda of Tzu-en-szu, Si-an, is the oldest now in existence, and is said to be a copy of a model from Central Asia. It is seven-storeyed, and square in plan. Others are mostly seven- to thirteen-storeyed, octagonal, and built of brick. One in T'ien-ning-szu, Pe-king, is an example of the kind. In the Southern China and Yanze valleys seven-storeyed and hexagonal pagodas are also seen. The Lāma pagoda is merely a copy of a Tibetan model, the origin of which is an Indian *stūpa*. They are abundantly seen in Northern China, and a beautiful example is that of Pai-ta-szu of Pe-king.

3. **Taoist Architecture.**—There is no special style of architecture in Taoism, as it is practically borrowed from Buddhism. With a slight modification of the images and ritual articles, a Buddhist temple gives a good idea of the Taoist temple, such as is represented in Pai-yun-kuan at Pe-king. Behind the entrance *pai-lou* there is a *shan-mên*; and then comes a *ling-kuan-tien*, where at the centre and in the four corners the images of Lin-kuan are enshrined, corresponding to the *t'ien-wang-tien* of a Buddhist temple. Then there is the *yü-huang-tien*, where Yü-huan is worshipped; the *lao-lü-tien* for the seven sages of Taoism; the *ch'iu-tsu-tien*, and the *su-yü-tien* successively follow. In the last hall even the 'Eight Treasures' of Lāmaism are contained.

Temples for Chinese gods owe their origin to Taoism. The architectural style is Buddhist, with the following exceptions: at the front they have a stage for theatrical purposes, and before the stage there is an extensive court-yard; the architectural details are more minute, and the decorations more elaborate. The *Kuan-ti-miao*, or *Wu-miao*, is seen everywhere in China. Here Kuan-yü is worshipped, always attended by his two followers, Ch'ou-ts'ang and Kuan-ping. The *cheng-huang-miao* is a guardian temple of town and village. Numerous temples, such as *Wên-chang-miao* ('Temple of the Star-god'), *Ts'ai-shen-miao* ('Temple of the god of Wealth'), *Huo-shen-miao* ('Temple of the god of Fire'), *Fêng-shen-miao*

('Temple of the god of Wind'), *Shui-shen-kun* ('Temple of the god of Water'), *Niang-niang-miao* ('Temple of the god of Love'), and many others for 'profane' gods, and occasionally many-storeyed temples such as *Yün-huang-kê* and *K'uei-hsing-lou*, are abundant all over China.

4. Muhammadan Architecture.—Since the first mosque was built at Canton in the 7th cent. A.D., Muhammadanism has seen many ebbs and flows during the course of time, but it is flourishing far and wide. Ardent adherents are numerous, especially in the provinces of Kan-su and Shen-si. All the architectural relics of old days have been lost; according to investigations made by the writer, there is none older than the early part of the present dynasty. The temple is known by the one name *Ch'ing-chên-szu*, or popularly, *Li-pai-szu*. In style it resembles an ordinary Chinese temple; but the plan and the interior arrangement show the characteristic traits of the faith of foreign origin. The building consists of porch, hall, and sanctuary. The roofs are also divided into three distinct sections. The sanctuary is either square or hexagonal in plan, two- or three-storeyed, and pagoda-shaped, instead of domed like the mosques in other countries; the inner wall is niched, with a *miḥrâb*, and decorated with arabesque and Arabic characters. The hall is usually divided into front and back portions, with an arcade between. The *minbar* is placed at the right-hand corner of the back hall, where decorations of arabesque and Arabic characters are again executed here and there. Near the hall there is sometimes a fountain, and sometimes a hall for purification. Occasionally halls for the head priest, for receptions, etc., are arranged as in a Buddhist temple. Often even the interior of the hall is of a Chinese style, entirely losing all signs of Muhammadanism. Thus in a Chinese mosque there is neither dome nor minaret; it is but a slight modification of an ordinary Chinese temple.

5. Tombs.—The ancient Chinese tombs were simply low artificial mounds where coffins were kept. Later on, monuments were erected, accompanied by stone figures of men and animals. This custom was prevalent as early as the later Han Dynasty, and still exists at the present day. Massively designed mausoleums of the T'ang Dynasty may be seen in the neighbourhood of Si-an. Earth is raised in a mound, and human and animal figures of stone are erected on the site. Hsiao-ling in Nan-king and Shih-san-ling in the north of Pe-king are the mausoleums of the Ming Dynasty. They are of the same design: *pai-lou*, *ta-hung-mên*, *pei-lou*, stone-men, stone-animals, and then again gates and archways leading to the last mound. The mausoleums of Tai-tsu and Tai-tsung of the present dynasty are near Mukden. They are simply copies of the Ming mausoleum. In the tomb of an ordinary person there are no stone-figures. It is a little cone-shaped mound, often enclosed by earth heaped up in the shape of a horse-shoe. Sometimes the coffin is placed in a cave made on a hill-side and covered with stone slabs. Sometimes a stone chamber is built to contain the coffin. The tombs of priests are pagodas of either brick or stone, or pagoda-shaped monuments of some architectural design. There are, of course, many varieties.

6. Secular Architecture.—Castles, palaces, meeting-halls, dwelling-houses, and the like, are distinguished from ecclesiastical architecture. The castle is surrounded by high strong walls of brick. Battlements, with embrasures, are erected on the walls. The entrances consist of double gates (*yüeh-chêng*): beyond the first the path turns sharply and leads to another. The upper part of the gate is a two-storeyed tower, and beneath is a vaulted passage, which can be closed at will by huge doors strengthened by bands of iron. On a large building in the main street of the city there stand bell- and drum-towers for reporting the time, the upper part being the tower and the lower the passage. The present mode of palace architecture in general is the same as that of the past. The Pe-king palace is similar to the old Ming palace of Nan-king. It is called *Chiu-chung-tien-mên* ('Nine-fold system'). The front part, which is used for public audiences, is called *chao*, and the back, for private audiences, is *t'ing*. The architectural mode of the *tien* and the *mên* does not differ from that of the temples already described. Here the T'an, or platform for nature- and ancestor-worship, may be included, for which the T'ien-t'an at Pe-king is so famous.

A building called *hui-kuan* is an assembly-hall for colonial clans and commercial guilds. The club-system is wonderfully developed in China, and there are magnificent buildings for the purpose. In front they have a theatrical stage facing an extensive court-yard, which is surrounded by corridors.

Dwelling-houses in Northern China vary in some respects from those of the South. In general, the premises are enclosed by high walls. At the entrance is a gate with a cell, and then a court-yard. A second gate with corridors, a second court-yard, a third gate with corridors, a third court-yard, etc., are repeated in the same manner, the number of gates and yards indicating the wealth and rank of the occupant. The house itself is a simple repetition of rectangular blocks and corridors. The unsuitable materials, the heavy mode of construction, the defectiveness of lighting and ventilation, etc., detract from its architectural value; but, on the whole, with its fantastic features, it presents a picturesque appearance.

C. Ito.

ARCHITECTURE (Christian).—Although it is possible to discuss the different edifices erected by Christians in divers times and places, it is most important, at the outset, to dispel any of those misconceptions which would suppose that there ever was any Christian style as such. The Gothic architecture of the Middle Ages has often been spoken of as Christian architecture *par excellence*, and undoubtedly it is the most important of the styles in which Christians have erected their buildings, and being the style of our own country, it naturally demands the largest share of our attention. But Christianity, as such, never has created, and never could create, a style of architecture, any more than it could create a style of mathematics, or science, although it may make use of all of them. It has used buildings of the Latin, Byzantine, Moorish, Gothic, and Renaissance, and even the Greek styles, which differ from each other as much as one style of architecture can differ from another; and the differences are due to differences in the æsthetic expression of the people. These may be associated with other differences of character which may affect the forms of Christianity itself, but they are both the outcome of causes behind; the one is not the cause of the other. A certain type of man will produce a certain type of art and a certain type of Christianity, but the type of Christianity does not make the type of art, any more than the type of art makes the type of Christianity. Even schools of science or philosophy may be coloured in the same way. The failure to grasp this very simple fundamental principle has led to much absurd criticism and a complete misunderstanding of art and architecture. Doubtless the cause is to be sought in the fact that to be a Christian it is not necessary to be an artist, and many a good Christian, quite innocent of any knowledge of art, has endeavoured, in the light of what he did understand, to interpret things which he did not understand.

All this does not alter the fact that a church is a definitely Christian building erected for Christian purposes, and as such it will in many ways reveal this fact; but, at the same time, its principal architectural qualities are æsthetic rather than religious, and a building such as St. Paul's is architecturally more akin to Castle Howard than to Westminster Abbey, which, in its turn, claims a closer kinship with Westminster Hall or the town halls of Belgium. The architecture of the Middle Ages was as much an architecture of castle and hall as of cathedral and church, and is as closely related to the spirit of chivalry and romance as to Christianity. Mediæval Christianity, chivalry, romance, and architecture are alike the outcome of the mediæval man; one is not the cause of the other, even although there is a certain amount of interaction. To speak of Christian architecture, then, as a parallel term with Greek architecture, is entirely illogical. In this article, therefore, we can examine Christian buildings in various styles of architecture, although we cannot strictly speak of Christian architecture as such. It may also be possible to show how Christian building doubtless left some impress upon the several styles of which it made use.

1. **Latin Architecture.** — The earliest form of church with which we have any intimate acquaintance is the so-called Christian **basilica**, and its origin is exceedingly difficult to trace. One thing at least is clear; it is not directly derived from the Roman basilica, as was absurdly suggested in an uncritical and unhistorical age. The Christian church naturally developed from humble beginnings, where two or three might gather together; and such a lordly prototype is impossible. It used even to be suggested that the actual basilicas were the first Christian churches. But, as Christianity was some 300 years old before the conversion of Constantine, the Christians could not have had the remotest chance of using these buildings. Moreover, even after A.D. 312 (the date of Constantine's conversion), the basilicas were still required for their original purpose, and could not have been handed over to what, even at that time, was but a minority of the people. During all these three hundred years the Christians had required places of worship, and undoubtedly a more or less definite arrangement of their buildings by that time had become crystallized.

As an instance of the feebleness of the argument, not to say the gross perversion of the contexts, we may note the following—one of the main passages quoted in favour of this theory. In a laudatory piece of writing by Ausonius addressed to the Emperor Gratian thanking him for the consulship, we find the following passage: 'Quis, inquam, locus est, qui non beneficiis tuis agitet, inflammet? Nullus, inquam, Imperator Auguste, quin admirandum speciem tuæ venerationis incutiat: non palatium, quod tu, cum terribile acceperis, amabile præstitisti: non forum, et basilica olim negotiis plena, nunc votis, votisque pro tua salute susceptis.' The passage is given by Professor Baldwin Brown in his admirably suggestive work, *From Schola to Cathedral* (1886), and, as he points out, vows for an Emperor's welfare in palace, forum, basilica, or senate house (mentioned later), are scant evidence that any one of these places was turned into a church, and why the basilica should be singled out from the others with which it is coupled remains a mystery.

Leaving such puerilities, it remains perfectly true that the Christian basilica in the 4th cent. A.D. bore *some* resemblance to the Roman basilica, although it has never been proved that the Roman basilica was even roofed in; but one might as well argue from a modern fleet as to the appearance of the Spanish Armada, the interval of time being the same, and the development of Christianity as rapid as that of our fleets. What was the case in A.D. 350 is of little value as evidence for what was the case at the beginning of the Christian era, in architecture just as in anything else.

The earliest Christian services were held in the Jewish synagogues, and in private houses; and in comparatively early times we find the Christians legally occupying the position of the *sodalicia*, which correspond to our Friendly and Burial Societies. These Societies often possessed a *scuola*, or lodge-room, where they held their banquets in honour of the deceased.

These three forms of building may all have influenced the early form of the Christian church, although it should be noted that the *scuola*, with its apse, was probably itself derived from the large private hall, which often had an apsidal termination.



FIG. 1.

On the whole, the largest influence may be assigned to the private house (fig. 1). Certainly such houses were made over to the Christians for their use, and it may be even more than a coincidence that we find in the atrium of the early church the atrium of the Græco-Roman house, in the cloisters the peristyle of the house, and in the church itself the hall, *œcus*, or principal chamber, as at St. Ambrogio, Milan (fig. 2), or the Church of the Nativity at Bethlehem, where the atrium is reduced to a simple narthex.

The narthex, which gradually disappears from the Christian church, was the outer vestibule into which catechumens and penitents were permitted to enter, who were not admitted into the church



FIG. 2.

itself. It is probable that the atrium originally served a similar purpose, and the idea may be derived from the Court of the Gentiles in the Jewish Temple.

Some of the earliest actual places of meeting that still exist are the little chapels such as that in the catacomb of St. Agnese (fig. 3); but their value as evidence is slight, as the conditions were peculiar, and the form caused by throwing two or three cells together was the result of ne-

FIG. 3.

cessity rather than choice. The several cells may suggest divisions between the sexes or simply be-

tween clergy and laity, the clergy fairly obviously occupying the end cell and the bishop the seat at the end. The altar must have been somewhere in the body of the chapel, and as there is no trace of it, it was presumably in the form of a wooden table. But even this cannot be dated earlier than A.D. 250, and there is room for much change in a couple of hundred years.

What, then, are the characteristics of the early Christian basilica when first it emerges into the light of history? It is a three- or five-aisled hall, with the central aisle rising higher than the others and lit by a clerestory. At the end of the central aisle, generally the west end, is an apse containing the seats of the clergy. The entrance is at the opposite end, and beyond that is a narthex, and sometimes a complete atrium. The baptistery, commonly of circular or octagonal form, is usually in a separate building, on the other side of the atrium, or of the narthex, as at Parenzo. In the latter arrangement we may possibly see the origin of the German two-apsed church.



FIG. 4.

Occasionally, particularly in Rome, there is a space in front of the apse, and a great arch is thrown across the last pair of columns, known as the triumphal arch, as in Santa Maria in Trastevere (figs. 5, 7, and 10).

In this space is seen by some the origin of the later transept, but it does not occur in the Ravenna churches, and the later transept probably has a double origin; and this is, at any rate, not



FIG. 5.

the only factor. The building was apparently roofed with a simple open timber roof. The flat ceilings that occur in some Roman examples are late Renaissance, although they may possibly represent something older. They are rarely found elsewhere, but are supposed by some to have been a feature of the Roman public basilica (fig. 6). The walls were generally of brick, and comparatively thin, as there was only the wooden roof to support. Unlike the Roman basilica, it had no galleries, and consequently we find a very large wall space above the line of columns (fig. 7). This formed an excellent field for pictorial decoration, and at the same time distinguished it from the public basilica. Neither were the columns returned across the end opposite to the apse, at any rate in Italy, as was the case with the Roman building.

On the whole also, it seems probable that the apse was not a usual feature of the public basilica, and, when it did occur, it was practically in a separate part of the building. The columns in the Christian basilicas, particularly in the case of Rome, were stolen from earlier buildings, and it is very usual to



FIG. 6.—PAGAN BASILICA.

find that they do not match. This also accounts for the poor proportions of the earlier Christian buildings in Rome, as compared with those in Ravenna, where there was no such available spoil to hand, and the builders had to fall back upon their own resources. At first the horizontal entablature is more common, but it is gradually superseded by an arcade of arches, which gives an appearance of



FIG. 7.—CHRISTIAN BASILICA.

greater height to the building, although the necessarily wider intercolumniations detract somewhat from the effect of length. The principal entrance was perhaps more often at the east end, following the arrangement of the temples of Greece. But the question of orientation was of little moment, and churches faced in any direction. After the custom of having the entrance at the west, and the altar at the east, came into vogue, as in England to-day, it was hardly ever more than a Northern fashion. Moreover, the first fashion was exactly the reverse way, with the altar at the west. The first church that we know to have had an altar at the east end was built in A.D. 470 (St. Agatha, Ravenna). Of the early churches in Rome 40 out of 50 have not their altars at the east.

The altar or table in the 5th cent. was at the opposite end from the main entrance, but in the body of the church in front of the apse, so arranged

that the faithful sat round it, the clergy on one side and the laity on the other. Of course, this arrangement in most instances has been altered, but



FIG. 8.

the following churches in Italy show the old plan more or less undisturbed:—Torcello Cathedral, St. Apollinare in Classe, Ravenna, and Parenzo Cathedral (figs. 8, 11, and 4). (The bishop presided in a raised seat in the centre of the apse, very much as did the president at the table in the early *scuolæ*.) Outside Italy, in the East, where there has been less change and alteration, such churches are quite numerous, but the following instances will suffice:—Ezra, Pitzounda, Mochwi, Bedochwinta, Abu Sargah (fig. 14), Dair-as-Suriani. Bedochwinta has the seats at the back and down both sides, advancing even beyond the altar (fig. 9).



FIG. 9.

Churches with the altar in the body of the church, and the bishop's seat behind, but without the other seats, are familiar in Italy. There seems also to have been an arrangement, at any rate sometimes, for the lesser clergy and choir, whereby they occupied all the space immediately in front of the altar and were separated from the laity by a low screen. In the old church of St. Clemente in Rome, this screen, part of which is built from the actual pre-existing screen, may be taken to represent the original arrangement.

The floors of the churches were of ordinary marble mosaic, but this has often been altered in later times, and we see the so-called Cosmati work made with large pieces of coloured marble, surrounded by small mosaic, and this, again, by bands of white marble.

A good example of the basilican church is S. Paolo fuori le mura, Rome (fig. 10). This, although almost entirely a modern restoration after the fire of 1823, is still the best representative of a

FIG. 10.

great five-aisled basilica that has come down to us. It is 400 ft. long and 200 ft. wide, with a central aisle of 78 ft. The complete atrium of Old St. Peter's is here represented only by a narthex. The bema hardly projects beyond the aisle walls, and is peculiar in being double. It is in area among the largest churches in Christendom; but it is quite a simple thing to build these comparatively low buildings, with their light wooden roofs. There are 19 columns with pseudo-Corinthian capitals and a sort of Attic base. They are without flutings, and carry a series of simple, round arches. Above is a cornice, and where there would be the gallery in a Roman basilica, or the triforium in a Gothic church, is a series of medallions. The triumphal arch is carried upon a pair of columns on plinths. These columns have Ionic capitals, and the whole arch forms a very imposing feature, although not comparable with the great arches of the crossing in a Gothic cathedral. The general vista is fine, although, partly from excessive breadth, and still more from an inadequate marking of the bay divisions, which is so well managed in a Gothic cathedral, the length here is not felt. The church at present has a rich coffered ceiling, but it is doubtful whether this would have been the case with the original church of the 4th century.

FIG. 11.

In Ravenna perhaps the noblest example is St. Apollinare in Classe. It illustrates the characteristics of the place, which on the whole shows the indebtedness to Greek work even more than to Rome. As a result, the work forms a far more complete artistic unity. Everything is designed for the position that it occupies, and is not the spoil from other days. The church is a three-aisled basilica and has no transeptal space before the apse, this, as already stated, being what we should expect in Ravenna. In the dossere above

the capitals, as at S. Vitale (fig. 12), and the polygonal exterior to the apse, we see Byzantine features.



FIG. 12.

The capitals are carved for their place. Above the nave arcade is a series of medallions, as in S. Paolo fuori le mura. The apse is raised, with a small crypt below it, and it retains the seats round the altar on the side opposite the entrance. The brick exterior is bald to hideousness.



FIG. 13.

In the Eastern Empire one of the best examples of the Latin or basilican style is St. Demetrius at Salonica. It has certain features, more or less characteristic of the East, which should be noted. The columns are returned across the building at the entrance end, which in this case is the west, and so form a sort of inner narthex. Over the aisles are galleries for the women—another arrangement common in the East. The capitals are finely carved, as we have here the still living Greek influence. This, as already indicated, was felt in the West. It was long before the Italians could carve capitals or lay mosaics for themselves, and either they made use of the old work, as we have seen, or else the new work was executed by Greek workmen. Even in the 8th and 9th centuries, when the Italians began to copy the old work, theirs is very inferior and rude in comparison. In St. Demetrius there are fairly clearly defined projections which perhaps may be termed transeptal, but they are at the extreme end of the church, even projecting beyond the apse, and they are cut across by the main arcade of the church which makes them more or less invisible, and, in short, they are side chambers rather than a transept. Consequently there is no triumphal arch.



FIG. 14.

Other modified forms of the basilican church are found in Egypt and in Syria. In both cases there seems to be a tendency to keep the form of the apse only on the inside and to make the outside of the building square. The Coptic churches in Egypt are generally triapsidal with three altars, an apse occurring at the end of each of the side aisles—a form we shall meet again later (fig. 14). Syrian churches generally show a marked reminiscence of the style of Ancient Greece, and are finer in their work than those of the West. Not only were there many remains of ancient Greek work, but doubtless after the conquests of Alexander there was a certain admixture of actual Greek blood in the population. In many cases piers, and not columns, are used, and the church is divided into a few great square bays. The result is curiously



FIG. 15.

suggestive of some of the later Romanesque Gothic churches. Almost invariably there is a narthex, and above this, and outside the building, often a gallery with columns, forming a sort of loggia which makes a very pleasing feature (fig. 15). A point in Syrian construction might be noted which is possibly another reminiscence of Greek tradition. There is a distinct aversion to the arch construction, and often an arch is merely an arch in form, or is reduced by corbelling to the smallest possible limits (fig. 16). Note also another common form shown in the figure.

FIG. 16.

The Christian basilica, then, may be considered as a type of building, but hardly a style of architecture; and although we have seen that it was erected in various styles, they are all more or less a

continuation of the later Roman manner, affected nevertheless by different influences, as in Ravenna or Syria. It is perhaps convenient to group the whole together as the Latin style, and remember that other buildings than churches were built in it, but, as is natural from the lack of sacred association, they have very largely perished.

2. Byzantine Architecture.—In Italy, although Greeks to a great extent executed the work, they were trammelled by the traditions on an alien soil, and by the masters they served; but when the seat of the Empire passed to Byzantium they were able to build more freely on their own lines, in their own country, and among their own traditions. The result was marvellous, and we find the speedy growth of one of the greatest styles of the world, culminating under Justinian, which itself gave birth to descendent styles, and is still a living influence. There are two great ways of covering a square space so as to leave all the sides open —the intersecting vault and the dome. The first was used by the Romans, yet the full comprehension of its principles and possibilities was not grasped until the Gothic architects invented the true rib. The dome was used by the Byzantines, and although they cannot exactly be said to be the inventors, they perfected the system, and herein lies the great achievement of the style. The problem involved is the fitting of a hemisphere upon a square. Now, the circle may be made to touch either at the corners or at the centres of the sides. In the one case it is too big; in the other it is too small (fig. 17, I and II).



FIG. 17.

In the former case we may carry up the sides of the square, so to speak, cutting off the overhanging portion of the hemisphere, and the dome then rests upon the points of the square, and, provided abutment is brought to resist the outward thrust upon the arches formed by this process, the dome is stable (fig. 17, I and III).

Now, it is interesting to notice that these arches, formed by the intersection of the planes of the sides of the cube below the dome, are semicircular, and, further, the intersection of a sphere by a plane always gives a circle, and therefore it is always possible to raise such a dome upon semicircular arches; moreover, it is always possible to place one such dome up against another, and *it is not necessary for the two domes to be of the same size.* It is only necessary that the chords upon which the arches rest should be of the same length; the arches themselves will always be semicircles. It may also be put conversely that the intersection of two spheres is always in a *plane* circle, and therefore the intersection of two domes always allows of the building of a plane arch; and thereby the Byzantine architect escaped the greatest difficulty of the Gothic builders, who found that the intersections of their vaults were not in planes. This was perhaps the principal peculiarity or most individual characteristic of the Byzantine style, which, in certain of its aspects, can be described as a congeries of globular forms growing out of one another, as in the case of a mass of soap bubbles, which perfectly illustrates the system (fig. 18, St. Sophia).

But although such a dome, in its simple form as thus described, occurs in Byzantine architecture, it is open to certain objections. The apparent height is given only by the part above the arches, and the



FIG. 18.

resulting effect is comparatively low and flat. In order to remedy this, the dome is raised in one of two ways. The first is another instance of the intersecting spheres. A dome (as in fig. 17, II) with diameter equal to the diameter of the square, intersects, and rests upon, a dome (as in fig. 17, I) with diameter equal to the diagonal of the square. Of the lower, nothing is left, save the ring upon which the upper hemisphere rests, and the four triangular portions that remain after the four sides of the square have been raised in the manner indicated above. These triangular portions are termed pendentives (fig. 18).

This is the characteristic method of the first great period of Byzantine architecture. But the dome may be even further raised by the introduction of a cylindrical drum between the dome itself and the pendentives. This is, on the whole, the characteristic arrangement of the second period of Byzantine architecture, although it is not universal. The same pendentive method may be employed above an octagon as above a square, and it is not uncommon to find such an octagon set within a square, and the lower dome, resting on the octagon and forming the pendentives, itself intersected by little domes that form semi-domes in the corner of the square (fig. 18). Another method, and one frequently used in the case of a dome upon an octagon, is a system of corbelling, wherein squared stones are set horizontally, instead of radiating to the required curve of the dome. It is really the same system as the domed chambers of the Mycenæan civilization, but in this case the surface of the stones is not rounded off to the curved surface of the vault (fig. 18, Corbelled Pendentive).

The first great period of Byzantine architecture may be said to be from A.D. 500 to 600, but its principal achievements were all accomplished in the first 50 years. Its crowning glory is St. Sophia, completed in A.D. 537. Then follows a blank interval during the Persian and Saracenic wars, until we come to the second great period which lasted from the middle of the 9th cent. to the end of the 12th. In this period the great masterpiece is St. Mark's at Venice. After this follows a long period of decline, lasting till about the end of the 16th century.

(*a*) In the first period the plan generally approximates to a square, and there is almost invariably a narthex, and often an exo-narthex beyond that. The church is commonly entered by three doors, and a great dome covers the central area of the church, which contains the principal available open space. The dome rests upon piers, generally eight in number, between which are columns forming, in

the alternate intervals, semicircular niches which extend the central area toward the corners of the square (fig. 19). There is an apse behind the altar containing the seats of the clergy. The outside of the apse is polygonal. The central apse in which the altar stands is shut off from the church by an



FIG. 19.

iconostasis, and where there are two side apses there are generally two more of these screens. The side apses, except in the rarest instances, do not contain altars.

The whole style is much lighter and more skilful than that of the Romans, and the Byzantine builders made their domes generally of brick, using no concrete. Consequently the supporting piers were much less massive. Columns were used, as we have seen, not as an essential feature of construction, but rather as screens, and to break up the building. Thus, by this slight use of the principle of multiplicity, they produce an effect of scale that the open, undivided building would lack. The columns have bases with a few simple moldings,* and a capital, generally most elaborate in execution. Above the capital is the dosseret—one of the sign marks of Byzantine architecture. It is sometimes said that its use is to enable the column to support the very thick wall above it. It may be so, but the upper section of the dosseret is generally about the same area as that of the capital itself, and, in any case, there is no advantage in diminishing to the bottom of the dosseret, and then starting with a large top to the capital, so as to diminish again. The very function of a capital is to do this work, and there is no reason why, if necessary, its sides should not slope inwards more sharply. A capital that cannot do its work is a solecism. It seems, perhaps, more likely that the dosseret is a curious survival of the entablature (fig. 20). In any case it is not a pleasing feature. When it is so reduced as to make merely a sort of double abacus, there is not the same objection, as the diminution in the upper one, or dosseret, makes it a mere molding, emphasizing the horizontal nature of the abacus, as in some examples in St. Sophia (fig. 21). The shafts are commonly monoliths of coloured marble, generally with an entasis but no flutes, and the whole style depends for its effect upon colour rather than upon solid forms. The forms that are used depend for their value upon pattern, not upon mass, doubtless as the result of the same æsthetic preferences where surface rather than solidity is used as the medium of expression. Hence we find no great cornices, as in classic architecture, and no subdivided columns or ribs upon the vaults, as in Gothic architecture. The wall surfaces are flat and the decorations are flat. There are practically no moldings, and the arches have plain soffits. Plinths or basemolds to the wall, and string courses, are insignificant or altogether absent. The very corners, even, are rounded off to allow of mosaics being carried round them. Hence the carving is all surface carving,



FIGS. 20 AND 21.

and does not stand out from the background. The drill plays an important part, and there is but little modelling; the effects are those of patterns with a dark background formed by deep drilling, which is sometimes undercut, so that the pattern is detached from the stone behind. Even the capitals have the same character; projecting masses are rarely found. As wholes they are comparatively formless, although covered with the most intricate surface work. Doors are square-headed, although usually with an arch and tympanum above. Windows are generally simple semicircular-headed openings, but sometimes two or three lights, with semicircular heads, are placed together with shafts, or plain unmolded mullions, between.



FIG. 22.

Large semicircular windows are occasionally divided up by shafts, and even by a sort of transom bar, as at St. Sophia. The result is not beautiful. A more beautiful device is the thin slab of marble, often carved with the most exquisite patterns, which frequently fills the smaller windows. These patterns are cut deeply into the marble, which is sufficiently translucent to allow the light to come through. It is conceivable that this represents a Greek tradition.

The total result is a style easily grasped as far as its main architectural features are concerned. The variety which actually exists is perhaps surprising, considering that it is achieved within such comparatively narrow limits. Of course it cannot amount to the variety found in the Gothic style, which depends for its æsthetic expression largely upon complexity, whereas the Byzantine style, in its purely architectural character, is wholly simple. Complexity, with a touch of Eastern barbarism, makes its appearance only in the surface ornament.

The glory of Byzantine architecture of the first

* This is the correct mediæval spelling now generally adopted.

period—indeed of the whole style—is St. Sophia. This church was begun in A.D. 532 and completed in the extraordinarily short period of six years. This time can apply only to the architecture, and much of the interior decoration must have been added afterwards. In the centre is a great dome, a trifle over 100 feet in diameter, and nearly as large as the dome of St. Paul's, London. It rests on pendentives raised upon four immense piers. The great feature is the extension of this central space by two huge semi-domes of the same diameter as the principal dome, abutting against the arches of the pendentives. These semi-domes, together with the great masses of the piers in the direction of the length of the church, resist the thrust of the great dome in that direction. But the thrust in the direction across the church is met by enormous masses of masonry carried by arches over the aisles, and forming a bold, if somewhat extraordinary, feature upon the outside of the building. The





FIGS. 23 AND 24.—SECTION AND PLAN OF ST. SOPHIA.

result is the most spacious interior in the world. In order, however, to preserve the apparent as well as the actual size, there is a skilful arrangement of columns, in two storeys, in the great arches at the S.E. and N.W. sides, and in the semicircular niches that we have already seen as characteristic of the first period of Byzantine architecture. These columns give something of the principle of multiplicity, and provide a unity of measurement, without destroying the majestic simplicity of the whole.

The central area is surrounded by aisles covered with intersecting groined vaults, after the Roman manner, and at the lowest end is a fine narthex 205 ft. long. Over it is a gallery for the women, which is continued on either side over the aisles. A gallery for the women is the usual arrangement in Byzantine churches, and may be contrasted with the curious arrangement in the Basque provinces, where there are two or three galleries, one above the other, for the men and the boys. The lighting is effected by forty windows round the central dome and five in each of the semi-domes and the minor domes. Above the two tiers of columns on the sides are two tiers of windows (fig. 23). There are also large windows in the aisles. But in no case is the window arrangement satisfactory, and this is the weakest feature in the church.

St. Sophia was by far the most important church in Christendom built in this epoch, and it is interesting to notice that there is no attempt made to orientate it: the axis is one degree south of S.W.

The majesty and simplicity of the interior of St. Sophia, with the richness of its colouring, make it by far the finest interior of its kind in the world. It is difficult to compare things that are so utterly unlike as a Gothic cathedral and this building; each is wonderful in its own way; but certainly there is nothing in St. Sophia that warrants us in ranking it after any interior whatever. The exterior is different. One may work up a qualified admiration for it; but, in spite of a certain dignity of mass which it shares with all great engineering works, it is hardly architectural, and finds its compeers rather in the pyramids or in a modern railway station.

St. Vitale at Ravenna is generally classed as one of the great churches of the first Byzantine period; but, as Fergusson points out, it shows affinities with the so-called temple of Minerva Medica at Rome, quite as marked as any resemblances between it and SS. Sergius and Bacchus at Constantinople. There is, however, Greek influence in the Roman building, so there is something to be said for this view.

(*b*) The churches of the second period are smaller than those of the first, and have several characteristics of their own, although in the main they follow the earlier work. The lighting of the dome had always been a difficulty. Windows in a dome are, of course, not vertical, and the effect is always unpleasant. The difficulty can be met on the exterior by raising a vertical wall, which at the same time is helpful in resisting the thrust, acting as a pinnacle would in Gothic architecture. The outside of the dome is then generally treated with a double curve (fig. 25).



FIG. 25.

Viewed from the exterior, this naturally suggests the drum, which we find as the characteristic feature of the second period, even if it made its first appearance earlier. It is, however, not invariable. The effect of the drum is on the whole pleasing, forming an effective lantern in the interior, and giving altitude and architectural character to the exterior (fig. 26), which latter is so much needed at St. Sophia. The central dome is still the leading feature of the design, but subsidiary domes are frequently grouped round it. In St. Mark's, Venice, there are five domes. The dome is almost invariably, in this period, placed upon four supports only, instead of the eight common in the earlier period; and the semicircles (as in fig. 19) do not occur. The general proportions of the building show more variety than the practically square outline of the previous period. Sometimes we find an elongated rectangle or an approximation to the cruciform plan. The triple apse is almost universal in this period, with the

altar in the bema before the central apse. In other features the two great Byzantine periods are not markedly different.



FIG. 26.

Of this period the greatest church is undoubtedly St. Mark's at Venice, which, in spite of numerous later alterations, still preserves in its interior its principal Byzantine features. The Byzantine parts of the church of St. Mark's, as we now see it, are the result of extensive alterations, amounting nearly to a re-building, in the middle of the 11th cent., of an earlier basilican church of A.D. 976, itself containing parts of a still earlier building. The western narthex, the walls and arcade of the nave, and portions of the east end, are practically all that remains of the basilican church. The columns in the eastern part of the church were removed, and six great piers were introduced—two at the west end and four in the centre of the building. These are themselves pierced by arches of the same height as the nave arcade. Two transepts were added, the east end was lengthened, and the narthex was continued round the two sides of the building. Above the nave and the crossing were erected two large domes and three somewhat smaller domes over the bema and the transepts, which are made slightly smaller than the crossing by the width of the pilaster shafts that support the arches leading into the three arms. By this skilful device a perspective effect of greater size is obtained. Great arches, which are practically barrel vaults, cross from pier to pier, and upon these the domes rest. Above the nave arcade is a narrow gallery, some 3 ft. wide, which represents the women's galleries of the Eastern Byzantine churches. It is, however, valuable as providing a unit of measurement, and thus giving size to the church, rather than for any utilitarian purpose. The capitals are not very characteristically Byzantine, being of a sort of pseudo-Corinthian type. They probably belonged to the original basilican church, and are of very excellent workmanship. Above them is a double abacus, or abacus and reduced dosseret. The church is not nearly so well lit as St. Sophia, the principal light coming from sixteen windows in each dome, placed just above the springing.

The colour effect is the main feature of the building: the marble columns, and the famous floor with the wonderful Byzantine mosaics on their golden ground, and even the pictorial mosaics of a later age, all give a richness unsurpassed elsewhere. Hence we find the usual flat Byzantine treatment with few moldings of any kind, although St. Mark's, figs. 27 and 28, has an unusual amount of carving of a bolder type than one associates with Byzantine work, most of it, however, not belonging to the Byzantine design of the building. St. Mark's retains a magnificent example of an iconostasis with figures of the Virgin, St. Mark, and the



FIGS. 27 AND 28.—SECTION AND PLAN OF ST. MARK'S.

Twelve Apostles. This feature in the Byzantine churches corresponds to the rood loft of the Gothic buildings. In later times, particularly during the 13th and 14th centuries, a great deal of ornament has been added, especially to the exterior, which has been cased with a veneer of marble. The domes have been covered with tall cupolas, and to the same period belong the pinnacles and over-florid Gothic ornament.

3. Gothic Architecture. — During the development of Byzantine architecture—the direct outcome of the æsthetic character of the people of the regions where it occurs—we have another style developing in the West, a little later in reaching its maturity, but roughly the contemporary of the Byzantine. This style, to which the name 'Gothic' is not altogether inappropriately given, if we extend the term a little beyond its usual and somewhat arbitrary limits, was the style principally used by the Christians of the North. Those of the East made use chiefly of the Byzantine, and Italy of the Latin style—one, as we have seen, much more closely related to the Roman. Of course other styles have been used by Christians in different countries, as, for instance, in Norway or in Russia. Even in N.W. Europe, although it is convenient to group the styles of several countries under the one heading, there are in reality several styles; and the more one studies, say, the Gothic architecture of England and France, the more one realizes how little they have in common. It is true that to some extent the great wave of Romanticism marks the æsthetic character of the whole area, so that a church in England is, of course, more like a church in France

than a church in Russia, Constantinople, Italy, or Norway; but it is only a very inartistic or superficial observer that fails to see the enormous difference. The comparatively little that is known about the styles of the East offers an interesting parallel. We class Armenian architecture as Byzantine, but there is almost as much difference between the cathedral at Ani and St. Sophia as there is between St. Sophia and St. Paul's, London.

But, provided we remember that 'Gothic' is a name belonging to a group of styles rather than to one single style, it is really helpful to consider them together. The Gothic, then, may be defined as the architectural expression of those races which, beginning with Alaric the Goth (d. 410 A.D.), and Theodoric the Ostrogoth (d. 526 A.D.), overthrew and superseded the power and civilization of Rome. The beginnings of the Gothic tendency in architecture may perhaps even be taken as far back as Theodoric, but the culmination of the style is in the 13th century. The name 'Gothic' was originally given at the time of the classical revival as a term of contempt, practically meaning 'barbarous'; but although the actual Goths had nothing to do with what we term Gothic architecture, nevertheless they were the pioneers in that wave of North European civilization which finds its highest artistic expression in the architecture that passes under their name.

The character of the Northern races is essentially different from that of the South of Europe, and expresses itself, whether on its intellectual, artistic, moral, or religious side, in a manner of its own. There is also, undoubtedly, the character of an age as well as of a race, and this factor has also to be taken into consideration. As a result of race and age in this case, we have in the artistic world the romantic expression that we see at its height in such examples of art as Malory's *Morte d'Arthur*, the *Chanson de Roland*, the Cloth Hall at Ypres, Lincoln Cathedral, or Bodiam Castle. Chivalry on the social side, as Romanticism on the æsthetic, is the outcome of the same root characteristic; the one is not the result of the other; they are cognate characteristics proceeding from a fundamental trait at the back. It is important to notice this, as it is a safeguard against some of the common errors of those who, perhaps learned in their own departments, have no practical artistic knowledge. All artists are familiar with the attempts of laymen to explain perfectly natural artistic forms that arise inevitably from artistic causes by reasons based upon moral or religious grounds. It is perfectly true that there may be close parallels in the moral or religious world, but these artistic forms are not derived from them any more than they from the art forms, although both they and the artistic forms may proceed from something behind them both. The Gothic form of art seeks to express itself by the principle of multiplicity rather than by simplicity, and by suggestion rather than completion. [For a further examination of this question, see the article ART (Christian).]

The beginnings of Gothic architecture are to be found in what is perhaps best termed Romanesque Gothic—a style commonly known as Romanesque, and largely dependent upon Roman architecture. The term by which it is known is hardly a matter of much importance; the chief interest in the style is in the points wherein it showed its living force in developing from Roman architecture, and in pointing the way towards the later Gothic, rather than in its dependence upon the former. The style, moreover, is largely influenced by other elements that have nothing to do with Rome: the Celto-Saxon influences of our own country, for instance, or even the influence of Byzantium.

After the downfall of the Western Roman Empire, while Europe was in the melting-pot, architecture seems to have been somewhat stationary. It is, however, difficult to make certain, as later re-building has practically destroyed all evidence. Even if the conquerors were desirous of building, there was much less opportunity for it than in times of peace. About the beginning of the 9th cent. we find men's thoughts turning towards an architectural expression that rapidly blossomed into great things. In Burgundy and Provence, along the Rhine valley, in Lombardy, in Normandy, and in our own country, arose architectural schools, all of great interest, with their own individual characteristics, which endeavoured to express this artistic principle of romantic, suggestive, complex unity. In spite of its many parts, there is in the developed Gothic more homogeneity than in any other style save the Greek. The stone vault upon the stone walls, stone columns and arches, though doubtless to some extent a practical precaution against fire, is still more the expression of this æsthetic principle. The effect of organic growth, rather than of aggregation, marked by an extraordinary æsthetic appropriateness in every member to the function which it has to perform, all helps towards the final scheme. Above all, the suggestiveness of a certain intricacy of plan and elevation, of structural features and of ornament, marks out the æsthetic character of the Northern peoples and the age during which these buildings were erected.

It has been suggested that the Latin style had in itself a power of development that would have given us the future forms quite independently of the North; but, without entering into the argument, it is practically sufficient to point out that Central Italy itself never produced anything of the kind, even when the North had invented the style and carried the art to perfection. The different schools were not equally successful. Burgundy and Provence, with their barrel vaults, exercised comparatively little influence; and although the Rhine churches at first were in the van, they dropped behind and left it for England and Normandy, and the slightly later school of the Île de France, to perfect the art. The influence of the Île de France school ultimately became the greatest of all, although the Durham dates have now been settled beyond dispute, and prove that the Durham, or at any rate the English, school was first in the field, with perhaps the two greatest inventions of the Gothic architects—the shell vault on ribs and the flying buttress. But English architecture, uninfluenced, pursued its own line of development to the last, ignoring the French work alike at Canterbury and at Westminster.

In a short article such as this, a sketch of the development of our own school, and a brief comparison with that of the Île de France, will perhaps be the best way of illustrating the leading features of the age.

(*a*) *Celto-Saxon work.*—Putting aside for the present all architecture save that of church building,—although the influence of domestic and civil work upon churches is enormous and commonly overlooked—we find that we have in this country a Celto-Saxon type of church, resulting from the composition of divers elements, of which the more important are as follows:—

In the first place we have a purely Celtic element in the architecture, partly surviving through the Celtic or British population, partly resulting from the architecture introduced by the Celtic missionaries of St. Columba from the North. This spread over the whole country save the South-Eastern portion. St. Columba himself died in 597, but his missionaries continued to further his

work. In the year in which St. Columba died, St. Augustine came over to Canterbury, with the powers of a bishop, to convert the English, and he introduced a Latin element. But this influence was small, and affected the style but little.

Later we have an influence of Northern monasticism, which must be distinguished from the great Norman influence of the Conquest, but which also represents the Romanesque Gothic of Northern Europe. East Anglia was converted by a Lombard priest, Felix, afterwards bishop, and even until quite a late date we find a distinctly un-English influence at work in the great Benedictine foundations of East Anglia. Sussex was converted by Birinus, an Italian or Lombard monk, early in the 7th cent., and to some extent East Anglia, Kent, and Sussex remained the stronghold of Continental influence until the last. Monastic builders from Normandy were employed at Romsey Abbey in 967, and upon Bishop Ethelwold's cathedral, Winchester, during the reign of Edgar, who with Dunstan as his administrator largely reformed the monastic system.

The *first element* is by far the most important in the formation of the Celto-Saxon type of church. It is characterized by a narrow rectangular plan, commonly of two or more chambers, of which Trinity Church, Glendalough, Ireland; Egilsay, Orkney; St. Regulus, St. Andrews, Scotland; Escomb, Durham, and Bradford-on-Avon, Wilts, England, may be taken as typical. The different characteristics to be noted are—(1) the general length as compared with the breadth; (2) separate rectangular chambers; (3) large porches, or side chambers, as at Bradford, Repton, Deerhurst, etc.; (4) a western tower of defence, round or square, usually entered from within the church; this is a



FIG. 29.

common feature; occasionally, as at Brechin, it is separate from the church; (5) a type that occurs as at Studland, Dorset, Barton on Humber, or Basing, Hants, where the tower actually forms the body of the church (fig. 29).

All these features continue to play a prominent part in English architecture, and help to distinguish it from that of the Continent. In the first place, the extreme length of the English churches is one of their most important characteristics; they are the longest in the world. Secondly, the rectangular, instead of apsidal, endings to English churches are too familiar to need comment. Although the apse was introduced, it speedily disappeared, and never made way at all in the West of England. Thirdly, we may notice the English tendency to a series of more or less separate chambers—the separate closed-in choir, the nave being often, as at Canterbury or Windsor, completely shut off, and the separate extensions at the east end, as at St. Albans, Wells, Gloucester, Hereford, Winchester, and indeed most of our cathedrals. Fourthly, the large porches or side chambers have a double influence. As entrance porches they are exceedingly common, *e.g.* Worcester, Gloucester, Canterbury, etc., and in hundreds of small parish churches. It is said that our inclement Western weather is the original cause of the western entrances being rarely used or altogether absent in this country. We also see these side projections in the very marked English transepts, as compared with those of the Continent (see figs. 55 and 56). Frequently there is a second transept; many of our English cathedrals have three, while Lincoln has four, pairs of such projections. Fifthly, the single western tower, so familiar a feature in the English parish church, can be traced back to this source, and it hardly ever occurs in France. With regard to the last feature—when the tower forms the centre of the church—we reach by the addition of the characteristic side chamber a cruciform central towered type (*e.g.* Braemore, Hants, and the Priory, Dover Castle). There are doubtless other influences that give us this type, but it is probably the double influence that preserves it as the typical English great church, right through the Middle Ages.

The *second element* in the Celto-Saxon style is the Latin style introduced direct from Rome by St. Augustine, *i.e.* the basilican type of church; but the Augustine influence seems to have been local and of little moment. The original church at Canterbury was quasi-basilican with an eastern as well as a western apse, the altar presumably being in the western at so early a date. There are one or two basilican examples up and down the country, but they are very rare. It is, indeed, not at all certain whether the type as found at Wing in the vale of Aylesbury has anything to do with St. Augustine, and may not rather be a survival of the old Romano-British type of far earlier date, such as, presumably, we see in the plan at Silchester.

Latin influence, however, does make itself felt, but through an indirect channel, and the division into nave and aisle is introduced through *the third great element*—the Northern monastic church. The aisle, however, never becomes quite the popular feature in this country that it is on the Continent. Five aisles, so common abroad, practically do not occur in English cathedrals. It is also largely to this influence that we owe the great central towered cross-church plan. But even this would probably have disappeared along with other importations had it not practically coincided with a type of more native origin. To this composite influence we may be said to owe the unequalled pyramidal composition of Salisbury, or the dominance of the central tower in such magnificent tower groups as Durham, Lincoln (fig. 57), or Lichfield, quite unapproached by the Continental architects.

The details of the Celto-Saxon style are very largely of Celtic and Teuto-Scandinavian origin, although decadent Roman work is also a factor to be considered. There are certainly affinities with early German work, particularly noticeable in the method of wall building, which is solid, and not built with a rubble core after the Roman method found in France. A brief résumé of the principal details is as follows:—

(1) Long and short work, or massive corner quoins. (2) Absence of buttresses. (3) Pilaster strips, stone carpentry, or strap work—a feature whose origin is obscure, but a far-away derivation from the Roman pilaster is perhaps the most probable. (4) The arches are semicircular, and often cut out of a single stone, or else they are straight-sided—a peculiarity not found in other styles. (5) The windows are often divided by baluster shafts, which are set in the centre of the wall, with a long stone forming a sort of abacus that runs from front to back

through the whole thickness of the wall. (6) The windows are widely splayed, both internally *and externally*. (7) There is a great fondness for parallel lines as ornament, foreshadowing the later characteristic English parallel moldings of many bands, which contrast with the simpler flatter treatment of the Continent. (8) The interlacing bands and characteristic Celtic curves seem also to foreshadow the English ornamental work of the 13th century. There is a vast difference in the character of English and French ornament, which is generally overlooked. It is probably connected with a difference in origin.

FIG. 30.—CELTO-SAXON DETAILS.

Such are some of the principal points in connexion with the Celto-Saxon work—a style much more important than is commonly supposed, which tends to be ignored on account of the greatness of the next style of architecture that made its appearance in these islands, and was in its turn made use of for Christian purposes.

(*b*) *The Rise of English Gothic.*—The Norman Conquest produced in Britain a massive style of architecture, of towers, fortresses, and strongholds. The churches, which naturally are always built in the style of the country, partake of the same character, so that a change comes over the church building in these lands. Contrasted with the comparatively light buildings of Celto-Saxon work, we find heaviness almost the leading feature of the new work. But the English soon made their own influence felt, and for a time English church architecture undoubtedly led the way in Europe.

In the first place, the number of churches built is entirely without parallel. During the hundred years that followed, when the country had settled down after the disturbance of the Conquest, there were built between three and four hundred great cathedrals and monasteries, churches of first-class rank, besides numberless smaller buildings. In the last hundred years, with a population nearly twenty times as large, and enormously improved methods of transit and mechanical appliances, we have built only one great church, nearly completed a second, and laid the foundations of a third. Not only, however, was the number of churches remarkable, but the scale of the English churches very greatly exceeded all other churches in the world that were built about that time. In all the rest of Europe there were built only two churches of over 50,000 sq. ft. area. In England there were four churches that exceeded even 60,000 sq. ft.

AREAS OF GREAT MEDIÆVAL CHURCHES
built or in course of construction in A.D. 1100.

THE CONTINENT.		ENGLAND.	
Mayence	*c.* 36,000 sq. ft.	Gloucester	*c.* 38,000 sq. ft.
Worms	40,000 ,,	Norwich	*c.* 40,000 ,,
Tournai	44,000 ,,	The Confessor's, Westminster	40,000 ,,
St. Sernan, Toulouse	46,000 ,,	York	42,000 ,,
Spiers	53,000 ,,	Lanfranc's, Canterbury, with Conrad's Choir	46,000 ,,
		Durham	49,000 ,,
		St. Albans	over 60,000 ,,
		St. Swithin's, Winchester	66,000 ,,
		St. Paul's, London	66,000 ,,
		St. Edmund's, Bury	68,000 ,,

Cluny half a century later contained 54,000 sq. ft.

In many respects the very fact that England led the way was against her, because her great churches were already built when advancing art would have allowed her to build greater. Still more was she hampered in re-building and enlargement by the sizes already fixed. A new choir built on to an old nave cannot be made altogether out of scale with it.

That England led the way in number and size shows an activity, a resource, and an initiative that, even taken by themselves, would be strong presumptive evidence in favour of her being a leader in style; and this we shall afterwards see to be the case.

The Romanesque Gothic is marked by the cruciform plan, and the Norman form has the central lantern tower. The origin of both these features is far from clear. The transept is generally considered to be the development of the space in front of the altar in the Latin style. This, however, is not found at Ravenna, for instance, and is not common outside Rome, and the intermediate steps in any case can hardly be said to be traceable. The central lantern is still more doubtful in origin. Some have suggested a Byzantine origin for the whole North European Cross church as explaining both the cross and the central lantern; but although it may explain the cross better than the basilican church, and there is at least the lantern dome, while the basilica has no such thing, it is still a far cry from a Byzantine dome of the first period to a Norman lantern tower. The few dated examples are merely enough to make us beware of drawing hasty conclusions. There seems no particular reason for not supposing that the central tower was invented in the North, except that it is the fashion just now to believe that no one ever invented anything—which is true only within certain limits. The object of the lantern tower was twofold. In the first place, it threw light into the centre of the building, where the high altar was put; and, in the second place, it formed a unifying central feature, both within and without. The removal of the high altar from its proper position to the east end leaves the lantern tower to throw its light upon an empty space.

In any case, we find two distinct types of Cross church making their appearance in this country, both of which the national genius modified to suit its own æsthetic conceptions. First, we have the multapsidal type, and, secondly, the chevet type. The origin of the multapsidal type is possibly to be sought in the Byzantine or Egyptian types already noted, or it may be directly derived from the basilica, but it certainly becomes quite a common variety. The Normans in Normandy treated it in their own way, squaring the end two bays beyond the crossing, in a manner perhaps foreshadowed at St. Apollinare Nuovo at Ravenna, and then adding



FIG. 31.

the apse (fig. 31). The Anglo-Normans took this plan, and it at once began to assume the first English characteristic of greater length. We find a typical example at St. Albans, with its long parallel apsed chambers (fig. 31). This becomes one of the great types of Benedictine orthodoxy in the East of England.

But it is to the West and the North that we have to turn to find the truly English manner. Here we find Hereford with a square end as early as 1079–1095, and Llandaff and Romsey early in the next century. It has been said that the square end was introduced into this country by the Cistercians. This is impossible, as it was in use before the Cistercian order was founded. But it is interesting to observe that from this very Western district came Stephen Harding, one of the original founders, and head of the order, and abbot of Citeaux in 1109. It seems most probable that the Cistercians owe their square East ends to him. Hence, when we find the Cistercians at a later date building their square East ends in England, they are merely bringing back an English feature that naturally falls in with, and helps to strengthen, the native tradition.



FIG. 32.

So we find that in English hands the multapsidal type develops a squared form, such as we see in Kirkstall Abbey, Yorkshire.

The Reformed orders, Cistercians and Augustinians, mainly in the West and North, worked out the English manner, and although the great Benedictine abbeys of the East have had the fortune to survive, it is rather to the ruined abbeys of Yorkshire and the Welsh Border that we must turn if we wish to see the English style in the making. Hence, while the conservative Benedictine abbeys were still using the round arch and the apsidal termination, we find the pointed arch and the square end in the North and the West. The change of style is, as in France, partly due to an Episcopal influence that furthered advance and reform. In the latter country the bishops joined hands with the laity against the old Monastic orders, and we get the great laic cathedrals of France. In this country they joined hands with the Reformed orders, and to this is due the strongly marked Monastic character of English building. In early days the Cistercians eschewed ornament, central towers and triforiums, which gave a chasteness to the style in their hands that, to some extent, it would be true to say, marks the English work



FIG. 33.

until well into the 14th cent., even after such luxuries as towers and triforiums had become common again.

The other great type is the chevet type, which, as Fergusson points out, is very probably a development from the circular church by the addition of a nave, the circular part becoming the choir. The development is apparently French (fig. 33). In England the circular churches have had choirs built on to them, and the circular part becomes the nave. The chevet type, with or without its circumscribing chapels, is found at Bury St. Edmunds, Norwich, Edward the Confessor's, Westminster Abbey, etc., and is always lengthened in the English manner (fig. 34). This we also find still further Anglicized with a square ambulatory at the east end, as at Dore Abbey, Salisbury, or Glasgow.

Besides the lengthening from east to west, the English æsthetic character shows itself in the wide transepts and the still more characteristic transeptal west ends (fig. 55), which we find even in Rouen Cathedral, a church planned by an English architect. This we can contrast with the narrow twin-towered French Norman type, such as we see at St. Etienne, Caen.



FIG. 34.

The Anglo-Norman church of Bury St. Edmunds had a wide-spreading front of 260 feet. Ely was planned for a west front of 200 ft., although it is doubtful whether this front was ever completed. These two are about three times as wide as the nave.

WIDTH OF WEST FRONTS, NAVES, AND MAIN TRANSEPTS OF ENGLISH CHURCHES.

	West Fronts. Feet.	Naves. Feet.	Main Transepts. Feet.
Peterborough	170	82	190
Rouen (English design)	185	120	195
St. Albans	150 (?)	77	190
Ely	200	77	180
Bury St. Edmunds	260	80	240
Lincoln, 13th cent.	180	100	245
Wells ,, ,, (a small church)	150	80	150
Pre-Conquest Westminster	..	..	155
Reading	..	..	c. 190
Glastonbury	..	..	c. 190
Winchester	..	85	215
York, 13th century	..	140	245
Old St. Paul's, 13th cent. (probably nearly the original Anglo-Norman plan)	170	110	250
Compare these with			
Notre Dame	155	155	170
Rheims, 13th century	155	135	200
Amiens ,, ,,	150	160	220

The best way to obtain a general survey of each period is to work from the ground plan upwards. It has already been pointed out that Romanesque Gothic in England, perhaps best termed Anglo-Norman, is massive in its treatment, and this naturally shows on the ground plan. A single pier of Durham contains as much material as the whole set of piers of some of the later churches. The walls are always immensely thick, even when they support only a wooden roof, which on the

FIG. 35.—WALL DIAGRAM AND SECTION OF CHURCH.

whole is the commoner arrangement; but when they have to resist the thrust of a stone vault, this

is even more the case. Buttresses are as yet quite rudimentary, and the history of Gothic architecture might be described as a progression from a heavy wall with a wooden roof to a glass wall and a stone roof. The projection of the buttresses becomes greater and the wall thinner, and the progress might be diagrammatically represented as in fig. 35. So what practically happens is that the wall is turned round in sections upon itself, whereby, with the same or even less material, a greater resisting power is obtained (fig. 35).

Before passing upward to details, the general treatment of the elevation should be noted. The Anglo-Norman great church is a three-aisled building of three storeys (fig. 35). The nave-arcade is the principal series of arches in the church, and divides the central aisle, or nave, from the side aisles. In order to light the central aisle it is raised above the roof of the side aisles, whereby we obtain a clerestory, through which the light passes, and which is contrasted with the blind storey or triforium that occupies the space of the aisle roof. Sometimes the triforium is transparent, as it is termed; that is, it is treated as a gallery



FIG. 36.—JEDBURGH.

with windows over the side aisles. This treatment is more common in France than in England.

There is more variety in the bay treatment in this country than in France, arising in part from a different initial standpoint. The French architects were more interested in the logic of construction, and the tendency for their buildings is to become, as it were, skeleton constructions, and for the wall as such to disappear. The English, however, continued to regard the wall as a feature in itself, giving an æsthetic sense of horizontal continuity, as distinct from the vertical skeleton expression of French architecture. The wall, therefore, continues to some extent to be regarded as a field for decorative treatment on its own account. A single instance must suffice, and is seen in the interesting bay treatment, favoured mainly by the Augustinians, in which the triforium is treated as a hanging gallery, depending from the main arcade. Examples may be seen at Jedburgh, Romsey Abbey, Oxford Cathedral, Glastonbury, and Dunstable. It gives a sense of height greater than either the simple two-storey or the simple three-storey treatment.

Anglo-Norman piers are of two main types. In the first, which is more or less columnar, we probably see a far-off descendant of the columns of Greece. There are two distinct varieties, of which one, although generally built up in courses, and not in single drums, still, in general proportion of capital, and base, preserves the characteristics of a true column. The other is a huge mass of masonry with a few moldings round the top in lieu of a capital. This partakes more of the nature of a pier, and is peculiar to this country. Examples may be seen in Gloucester, Durham, Tewkesbury,



FIG. 37.—NORMAN PIERS.

etc. The second type is the pier proper, developed from a section of wall left between the arches.

Both these types develop in two ways which mutually influence each other; first, the struc-



FIG. 38.

tural, which is more particularly characteristic of France; secondly, the decorative, which is more

particularly characteristic of this country. In the first system additions are made to the pier, in order to support sub-arches and vaulting shafts; thus we get a composite type of pier where each part is assigned to the performance of some definite function. In the decorative system the pier also becomes composite, but in a different manner. The corners of the pier, for instance, may be chamfered off so as to form an octagon, or cut out as at St. Lawrence, Kent, and ornamental shafts inserted (fig. 38), thus giving a sense of lightness to the whole. Later we find these ornamental shafts arranged round the octagon formed by cutting off the corners. The octagon may become a circle. In the decorative system the change begins with the shaft, and the abacus remains square, and, in any case, the detached shafts have no direct connexion with the load above. When both load and support become very complex, the eye is sufficiently satisfied with the complex support for the complex load, without logically following out each subordinate part. The carpal and metacarpal bones in the beauty of the human anatomy may be taken as a parallel. The bases are generally set on a square plinth, often with an ornament to fill up the angles. The commonest form of molding is a hollow above a round (fig. 39).

There are three types of capital: (1) a pseudo-classic, a sort of debased Corinthian or Ionic, much commoner on the Continent than here; (2) a cushion-shaped capital which seems an original invention; and (3) the scalloped capital, a type derived from the cushion variety, which in its turn has important influences upon the next period. The abacus is always square, first with plain cham-



FIG. 39.

fer, then with hollow chamfer and small nick above. Passing upward, we may note that the arches are generally round, although the pointed arch is occasionally found. The earliest known example in this country is *c.* 1090 A.D., half a century before it becomes at all a general feature. The arcade arches are rarely of more than two orders (*i.e.* recesses or steps)—a main arch and a sub-arch (fig. 39). The moldings of the arch are very simple, a plain chamfer, a hollow chamfer, or an edge roll being all that is generally found. Door arches are often of many orders, being recessed sometimes as many as seven times. They are frequently much enriched.

The features of the triforium arcade are the same as those below, but it might be noted that decorative development often makes its appearance here before it is seen anywhere else.

The clerestory generally shows an ornamental arcade on the inner face of the wall, and plain round-headed windows on the outer face, commonly with a passage between the two in the thickness of the wall. The Anglo-Norman window is generally widely splayed within, and set near the outer face of the wall, in which respect it may be contrasted with the Celto-Saxon window. It is not treated with the elaboration of the door. Some later Anglo-Norman windows show rich decoration on the outside, but it is interesting to notice that, whereas the door becomes a less important member as Gothic architecture advances, the window gradually becomes the most important of all.

In the roof we reach the most complex and most interesting feature in Gothic architecture. It has even been said by some that Gothic architecture is nothing more than the art of building stone vaults. This, of course, is ridiculous; the early writers, such as Rickman, whose work still remains one of the most interesting on the subject, wrote of Gothic architecture with hardly any reference to the vault at all. There is certainly enough that is distinctive, and shows the whole spirit of the thing, without taking notice of the vault. Gothic architecture is not the mechanical treatment of any one feature, neither the vault nor the buttress, nor even the window, which probably, after all, is both more influential and more characteristic than any other single feature. It is not even a question of mechanics; Gothic architecture is architecture—a truism, one would have supposed; it is neither engineering nor building, as some writers would have us believe. Hence it depends fundamentally upon æsthetic principles, which, so to speak, set the mechanical problems for the mechanicians to solve, and the latter are essential, it is true, but only means to an end.

Of course any one is at liberty to define 'Gothic' as he pleases; but to deny the title to such a building as Eltham Palace or St. Peter Mancroft, Norwich, is so to circumscribe the sphere of inquiry as to make it of comparatively little importance. It is a primary and more fundamental question to find what is the root principle common alike to Crosby Hall, Exeter Cathedral, and Notre Dame, and differentiating these buildings from St. Sophia and St. Stephen's, Walbrook, than to find what differentiates them from each other—not that this latter inquiry has not great importance within the larger sphere.

A full discussion of the vault would be impossible within the limits of this article, but it may be thus briefly summed up. In early days it was more common to find an open-timber roof, but a desire to give organic unity to the whole conception, coupled doubtless with the advantages of greater security against fire, led to the gradual substitution of the roof of stone. This we find first in the aisles, and then over the wider spans, such as the great English Chapter Houses, some of them 40 ft. wide, or the high vaults over the naves of the great

FIG. 40.

churches. The vault was almost always covered by a wooden roof to protect it from the weather. This is to some extent a false construction, which is at variance with the ordinary methods of the Gothic architects. But there are a few examples of true stone roofs in this country,—the Treasury,

Merton College, Oxford; Willingham, Cambridge; Minchinhampton; Rosslyn; and Bothwell.

The simplest form of vault is the plain barrel or waggon vault, which gives a great continuous thrust throughout its length, and therefore requires a very thick continuous wall. The effect is gloomy, because the lighting problem is difficult of solution. Large windows are impossible in a wall bearing a continuous thrust, and sloping windows in the vault are both weak and ugly. If a window is put in the vault, it is a natural step to carry up the vertical surface of the wall below, as we saw in Byzantine architecture (fig. 25). This at once suggests the treatment of intersecting barrel vaults, which is eminently suitable for the vaulting of a square space, A, O, C, being the square of intersection of two half cylinders of hemispherical section, corresponding to A′, O′, C′ (fig. 41, I and II). This form of vault was used by the Romans, and the tradition never completely died out; and this vault, the ribless quadripartite vault, as well as the simple barrel vault, is used by the early Romanesque builders, as in the castle at Oxford.

The intersection of two cylinders is not a circle, as in the case of intersecting spheres (see p. 701), but an ellipse. This elliptical line of intersection is termed the groin of the vault. Directly the space to be vaulted is not square, difficulties arise, and as long as semicircular vaults are used they will not intersect at the crown at all, as the vaults are of different height (fig. 41, III). It is therefore



FIG. 41.

necessary to bring them to the same height, which may be done by stilting the narrower vault, that is, raising it on two vertical walls that serve the purpose of stilts. This may also be helped by using less than a semicircle for the larger vault. But, in any case, the groins will become twisted in plan, as may be seen in fig. 41, IV and V. In the narrow vault it is obvious that any point in that vault, up to the height of the stilt, must be vertically above the line CB. Any point, therefore, being on the line of intersection of both vaults, must be vertically above the line CB. The groin also must keep close above the side CB, until a height above A is reached. On the other hand, in the bigger vault, there is no vertical portion, and it curves gradually away from the side BF at the outset; the groin, therefore, will tend away from above BF, but keep close above CB. When the top of the stilt is reached, however, the narrow vault curves rapidly over to the other side, but the larger vault continues its gradual curve, so that the groin now crosses rapidly over to the other side, and then keeps similarly close above GF until it reaches G. In actual building the curve is generally coaxed a little, so as slightly to reduce the violent break in the line, as seen in the plan above, but in any case it is excessively ugly and weak, as the weight of the vault rests upon the groins. By making the vaults enormously thick and filling in the back with concrete, until the whole becomes one solid mass for some way up the vault, the weakness is counteracted, but it means an undue weight upon the walls and supports.

Now the great invention of the Gothic architects was the substitution of another principle. So far the vault has been regarded as the intersection of two continuous cylindrical tunnels, and the groin is merely the line of intersection. At any point along the vault we have, say at ML or HK (fig. 41, V) a section of a perfect cylinder; the line of the groin, however, we saw was not in a plane, but twisted. The invention is to build the groin regular (*i.e.* in a plane), and then accommodate the vaults to fit the groin, which is made in the form of a strong rib to support the whole. The vault is built by first erecting a series of arches of regular shape (*i.e.* in planes), not twisted, to form the ribs. The short ends may be stilted, the diagonals segmental, and the broad ends semicircular, so as all to be of equal height. The vault itself is then built, as a light shell, resting on these ribs. This shell is built in courses, as NP, PR (VI), which are practically straight, but very slightly arched to the ribs upon which they rest. The consequence is that, as now the shell must follow the curve of the groin ribs, it cannot itself be part of a regular cylinder; and as before the diagonals were twisted to suit the vault surface, now the vault surface is twisted to suit the diagonals. The result is a curved surface very much resembling that of a ploughshare.

The ribbed vault—and by ribbed vault is meant a ribbed shell vault upon the above principle, *i.e.* one which is structurally based upon the rib curvature—is perhaps the most distinctive invention made by the Gothic architects. Ribs may occasionally have been used in earlier days to strengthen the groins of vaults, based upon the curvature of the vault surface, but that is not the Gothic vault. There is no doubt that the earliest vaults of this type of which we have any knowledge are those of Durham Cathedral. Such were the high vaults of the choir begun in A.D. 1093. The earliest properly attested date in France is, at the very least, more than thirty years later.*

* The whole discussion of these dates, with regard to England and France, is given in J. Bilson's able little book, *Beginnings of Gothic Architecture* (1899). No other writer approaches Bilson in his thorough grip of his subject. A short résumé of the subject is given in the present writer's book now in the press (Fairbairns & Co.).

As to the cause of the compartments assuming the rectangular form instead of the square, it can hardly be questioned that the primary reason was æsthetic and non-mechanical, as the great English Chapter Houses, with spans of 40 ft., where there were no structural considerations, are so built. The immense improvement to the vista, and the beauty of the apparent length thereby gained, quite apart from any principle of unified complexity, are sufficient to account for it (fig. 42). The French



FIG. 42.

continued to use the square vault for a long time, taking two compartments of the aisle to one of the nave, even inventing the sexpartite vault (fig. 41, VIII) to get over the difficulty before finally following the English lead. The introduction of the pointed arch into the vault followed not long after. It offers an æsthetically more pleasing solution of the problem of vaulting over a rectangle, at the same time preserving the level crown, than does the stilted arch (fig. 41, VII). The pointed arch in every rib gives a far more satisfactory sense of æsthetic unity than the mixture of segmental and stilted arches, and it also reduces the ploughshare twist.

The pointed arch was used by no means solely in order to keep the level crown over the different spans, because in France the domical vaults, used when the ribbed system was introduced, continue even after the introduction of the pointed arch in the vault, and there is no attempt to make the crown level. Nevertheless, the fact that pointed arches of the same height can be erected over varying widths (fig. 41, IX) is one of their many advantages, as we may see in numbers of transept crossings, *e.g.* St. Bartholemew's, Smithfield.

An interesting variant of the sexpartite vault, which we might term quinquepartite, occurs in the aisle vaults of Lincoln, which is an ingenious and more justifiable use of the principle, as there are two windows on one side and only one opening on the other (fig. 42).

The origin of the pointed arch is another of those unsolved problems, but it occurs in the East long before it is found in Northern Europe. It is even found in Roman work—in the bridge of Severus in the Levant. It was certainly in common use in France earlier than here, although an example is found at Gloucester (*c.* 1090), of which Bilson gives an illustration. The pointed arch cannot be considered a specially Gothic feature, being found in various Eastern styles; and, moreover, many buildings where it does not occur are obviously completely Gothic in feeling.

In connexion with the ribbed vault appears the other great invention of the Gothic architects, namely, the flying or oblique buttress, where the buttress, instead of descending vertically to the ground, is carried obliquely upon an arch over an intervening space. This enables the abutment of the high vault to be carried across the aisles. The beginnings of this are seen in the demi-berceau or half-barrel vault of Gloucester (*c.* 1090), strengthened at intervals with buttresses or ribs. But the perfect system brings the abutment to bear, not continuously, but only so as to meet the resultant thrust of the vault ribs that support the vault. This we find in Durham choir (commenced A.D. 1093), where the buttress is carried over a semicircular arch. It occurs also at Chichester (commenced 1091), whereas the later development, namely, where the buttress is carried over a quadrant, was probably actually built at Norwich in 1096. It was certainly planned and half executed at that date, as that which remains after later alterations attests. The nave of Durham shows it complete (A.D. 1125).* The French examples are later, but the credit of perfecting the feature certainly belongs to them, if they did not even carry it too far.



FIG. 43.

Anglo-Norman ornament, at first sparing, gradually becomes rich if not over-ornate. The frequent use of arcades along the walls, particularly as a sort of 'dado,' and on towers, is the most prominent of these features, but minor forms are endless, of which perhaps the most common are given in fig. 44.



FIG. 44.—ARCADE AND MOLDINGS.

It has been usual among writers upon Gothic architecture to speak of a Transitional period; but as the special features that were supposed to distinguish it all appeared half a century earlier, this is only confusing. In any case, a division into periods is purely arbitrary. The whole story of Gothic architecture is one long transition, and the system of division into periods at all opens up the danger of considering the periods as though they were styles, which is to misunderstand everything.

(*c*) *The zenith of English Gothic.*—Anglo-Norman work developed into what are often termed the Early English and Decorated periods—the zenith of Gothic architecture. Here we see a further development of those principles we have already noticed. The tendency of the English plan is to become longer still. The old short choirs are pulled down, and great extensions take their place. In the elevation we may notice that the tendency is for the bay divisions to become wider in proportion to their height, and for the triforium to diminish.

* See references quoted above *re* the vault.

On the exterior the lofty spires of these two periods are the most distinguishing features.

The decorative sense develops and shows itself in every member. Three great types of pier make their appearance—the South-Western, the South-



FIG. 45.—PIER TYPES.

Eastern, and the Northern. The South-Western is formed by triplets of shafts attached to a central core and ranged regularly round it (Pershore, fig. 45). It is probably directly derived from the Anglo-Norman composite pier. But it makes little

FIG. 46.—THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 13TH CENT. CAPITAL.

headway beyond its own district, and gradually dies out. Not so the South-Eastern and Northern varieties. The South-Eastern type is formed by a central core with detached shafts round it, generally, although not invariably, of purbeck marble or some local variety (fig. 45). The central core is built up, and the shafts are monoliths, or in two or three long sections with annular bands. The Northern type, *e.g.* Roche and Sweetheart abbeys (fig. 45), is a composite pier of several shafts all united in one, without a central core, and seems to have originated from such forms as we see in Bishop-Auckland Castle, York crypt, Durham galilee, or Selby triforium. In these cases there are a number of separate shafts not grouped round a central mass. In the Northern type the composite pier is built up in horizontal courses, and the shafts composing it are therefore not continuous.

For a time the South-Eastern type carries everything before it and drives back the Northern, so that during the 13th cent. (Early English period) it practically becomes the type of the period, and is found, for instance, as far north as Durham. In the 14th cent. (Decorated period) the Northern re-asserts itself, and the South-Eastern type is driven back and disappears. The Northern type remains supreme, as long as Gothic architecture lasts, and is found all over the kingdom. A very beautiful example occurs at Grantham, with the fillets particularly common to this type. In the same church is an early example of the South-Eastern type (fig. 45).

The commonest base in the 13th cent. is characterized by the water-holding molding (fig. 47), developed from the so-called Attic base (fig. 2, ARCHITECTURE (Greek)). In the 14th cent. the hollow is filled by a round, the lowest member often overlapping the plinth. The English capitals are distinguished from those of the Continent by the characteristic abacus, which in English work is almost always round, and in the thirteenth century consists of a roll and fillet deeply undercut, and in the 14th of a scroll molding. The neck-molding is generally a plain astragal in the 13th cent. and a scroll molding in the 14th. Those capitals that have foliage are marked in the 13th cent., by a beautiful type, apparently derived from the scallop capital (see fig. 46), and very different from the French type derived from the classical capitals. The English variety, which we may term stiff stem foliage, is generally said to have the same origin as the French capitals, being derived from the classical volutes; but a careful examination of the capitals of the West Country and the North, where the national style has its origin, has led the present writer to the above conclusion. Doubtless the Continental variety was not without its influence; but not only does the other derivation explain the general form more satisfactorily, with its stiff stem and without the lower band of foliage found in French work, but it also explains another peculiarity of the English capital. The English foliage



FIG. 47.

FIG. 48.

tends to twirl round the capital instead of standing out from the centre as in Continental work.

In the 14th cent., although the forms are some-

times exceedingly beautiful, there is a distinct artistic decadence. An attempt to be true to nature results in being untrue to the stone material in which the artist is working—a much more serious fault. The forms are ill adapted to stone, and, moreover, instead of growing up from the neck, are twined round like a harvest festival decoration, and have no part in the organic unity of the whole.

The arches are pointed and with numerous moldings, of which those in fig. 49 are typical. The Early English moldings are marked by freehand drawing and numerous independent members, separated by deep hollows, *e.g.* Peterborough. Characteristic members are the roll and fillet and the pointed bowtell. Decorated moldings are set out by the compass instead of being drawn freehand. The fillets on the triple roll and fillet are set differently. The ogee curve makes its appearance, and a three-quarter hollow often marks off the orders of the arches (fig. 49). Up to the end of the 14th cent. the orders of the arch are generally clearly distinguished.



FIG. 49.

The development of the window is a long story, whose course can only be briefly indicated. The



FIG. 50.

normal early Anglo-Norman window is a square with a semicircle over it. This tends to become longer in its proportions, and the process continues after the introduction of the pointed arch, producing the so-called lancet window, until such extreme examples are reached as at Bottesford, which is 8 in. wide and 15 ft. 6 in. high. The natural result is to group windows together, one being insufficient for lighting purposes (fig. 50).

In the gable end the normal arrangement in the first half of the 13th cent. is three windows, the central one raised to fill the gable. At first the windows are quite distinct; then a common hood mold gradually draws them together, and finally includes them under one arch. The small spandrels are first pierced with various shapes and finally cut out altogether, and then cusped as at Cirencester or Peterborough Cathedral. But this pushes all the ornament up into the extreme head; and it is perhaps the two-light window in the aisle, which follows suit, that tends to the filling with tracery of the whole head of the window above the springing (see examples in fig. 50).

We thus pass from the lancet period to the first traceried period, which has been called the Geometrical period. This is a most misleading name, as it implies that the curves of the next period are not set out with a compass. Although at first glance they may not appear to be parts of circles, they invariably are. The real distinction is between curves of single and double curvature; or the first period may be described as composed of independent figures—circles, curvilinear triangles, and squares (not spherical, of course), quatrefoils, trefoils, etc., filling the head of the window. The terms Simple and Compound would be short and self-explanatory.

There are three main types of Simple or independent-figure tracery. In type I. (fig. 51) the circle or other figure rests on two sub-arches. The points of the sub-arches projecting below the central ornament are objectionable, and probably are the cause of type II. making its appearance, in which the outer curves of the sub-arches coincide with the curves of the window arch. It should be noted that type I. does not disappear but continues to be used, and this is the case all through the development of window tracery; a new form does not entirely oust an old one. The objection to type II. is that it tends to push the ornament too much into the head of the window. In all cases the sub-arches may also intersect or be separated from each other. Type III., which is really a three-light develop-



FIG. 51.—SIMPLE TRACERY.

ment, has no leading sub-arches, but the arches of the lights alone, and no leading central ornament.

The development into the Compound or flowing period is the result of attempts to improve type I. Divers devices had been tried to get rid of the objectionable points, the best being the disguising of them by a pointed trefoil. It occurred, however, to some unknown English genius that an exceedingly simple and obvious device—as is the case with most

great discoveries—was to omit the points, and continue the curve of the sub-arch into the curve of the circle. Thus is obtained a curve of double curvature or an ogee curve. The other side of the sub-arch is made to correspond, and we have a circle supported on ogee arches (fig. 52, A). The bottom and top of the circle then disappear, leaving us the completed type I. of the Compound period. This develops on lines similar to the independent-figure period with a second and third type (fig. 52).



FIG. 52.—COMPOUND TRACERY.

The vaulting continues to develop. First, in order to reduce the ploughshare curvature, resort is had to elliptical ribs, involving a most difficult and complex problem in the setting out and erection of every vault. This is superseded by pseudo-elliptical vaulting, where, instead of a true ellipse, an approximation to the ellipse is made by parts of circles, which join at points where the tangent is common to both circles, so as to avoid breaks in the curve (fig. 53). The line of the pier or shaft from which the vault springs is also tangential to the arch curve.



FIG. 53.

The ridge rib to mark the leading line of the roof, and also to provide a line of fitting for the vault shell, was apparently first used at Ripon. It has great æsthetic value, giving continuity to the whole and a line of emphasis to the vista. It is, in fact, the dominant æsthetic line of the building, corresponding to the keel of a boat. The French architects could not use it with any effect, on account of their broken ridge lines caused by the domical vault. Where they have used it the result is unpleasantly suggestive of the sea.

In order to reduce the space between the ribs, and to make the filling easier, subsidiary ribs are introduced, called *tiercerons* by the French architects. They were invented by the builders of Lincoln Cathedral and used first in a peculiar way (fig. 53). In the 14th cent. lierne or net ribs make their appearance, and give great complexity to the vaults (fig. 53).

The buttresses in the 13th and 14th centuries become more prominent, and the pinnacle, giving additional resisting power to the buttress, soon appears in the Early English period. Angle buttresses in the 14th cent. are commonly set diagonally, instead of in pairs at right angles (fig. 54).

FIG. 54.—BUTTRESSES.

It is difficult, and indeed inadvisable, to try to assign any particular date or period for the summit of Gothic architecture. In many points it continued to advance down to a very late date, more particularly in the development of towers and of the vault, but the decorative foliage certainly declines after the 13th century. For beauty of lighting nothing equals the so-called lantern churches of the 15th cent., but the window itself is perhaps at its best in the 14th. It is so with all arts; decadence does not come suddenly throughout the whole, but shows itself here and there, while the main trend is still forward. It would be much easier to assign a definite summit to French than to English architecture. In France there is a more or less definite single effort culminating in the 13th century. In England there are continuous new impulses: vault, wall, pier, foliage, window, and vault again; each in turn seems to play the leading part.

As said at the outset, the French and English styles are entirely different. A summing up at this point of a few of the differences between the plan of a great English and a great French church may show that it is surprising, not that they are now seen to be different, but that any one ever thought they were the same.

The English church is long and narrow with three aisles. The French is short and broad with five aisles.

The English West Front is broad. The French West Front is narrow, in Notre Dame narrower even than the nave.

The English transepts project enormously beyond the main lines, and often the English church has two or three of these



FIGS. 55 AND 56.—METROPOLITAN CHURCHES OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE.

projections. The French transepts hardly project at all, and one only is attempted.

The English church has a square East end. The French church has a semicircular chevet.

The English church has a long choir, generally more or less

shut off from the nave, being largely the result of monastic influence. It has no side chapels. The French church is broad and open throughout, with a short choir, largely the result of lay influence, and has numerous side chapels dear to the laity.

The four enormous central piers in the English church show the central tower that dominates the whole. The French church has great Western towers, but nothing, or merely a 'flèche,' at the crossing.

The English church is cut up by screens and divisions. The French church is open (figs. 55–58).

The interior of a French church is hard to surpass. It is exceedingly lofty, which gives it a most impressive character. The internal effect of the chevet is often exquisitely lovely, and the grace of the proportions as a whole, width of bays, and width to height, is in every way admirable.

The English church in its interior depends for its impressiveness upon length rather than height, except where modern folly, as at Norwich, has planted an enormous organ that entirely destroys the whole *raison d'être* of the building, completely (not partially) blocking the vista which would be, in its way, perhaps the finest in the world. Both English and French effects are delightful, but perhaps the French is the finer. Yet there is no reason why they should not be combined.

But with regard to the exteriors there is no comparison. The English here loses something by want of height. (Visit Chartres, Amiens, and then Lincoln within two days of each other, and the result will be startling.) But the dominant central tower, the wonderful skyline, together with the tower-groups, the grand projecting transepts and fronts, with their fine shadow effects, make the French examples look in comparison a shapeless mass. Where there is a narrow tall twin-towered front, there is an unpleasant effect of an overweighted end suggestive of a giraffe. The Franco-

FIGS. 57 AND 58.—LINCOLN AND AMIENS.

German church of Cologne is perhaps the worst example of this effect. The differences extend to every molding and every detail, and to the spirit in which everything is carried out: the French is more logical, the English more picturesque.

(*d*) *The Decline of English Gothic.*—The last period of English architecture is marked by rectangular forms and horizontal lines, and is generally called 'Perpendicular.' This word in most minds is so closely associated with vertical, that 'Rectangular' is a more satisfactory name.

Roofs become nearly horizontal, tops of doors and windows and all the arches follow the same tendency. There is often an actual straight horizontal line, strongly emphasized, above these features, particularly in the case of doors. Horizontal topped towers take the place of spires, horizontal transom bars appear in the windows, and horizontal topped panellings, instead of niches, occur all over the walls. Even the foliage and other ornaments become rectangular in form.

The Early English period was an age of Ecclesiastic reform, and the work of that period is marked by a certain ecclesiasticism in its planning and arrangements. The Traceried period of the 14th cent. is the age of the great nobles; the very ecclesiastics themselves aped the pride and pomp of worldly splendour; and the churches, with their private chantries and heraldic ornament and such things, partake to some extent of this character, as Mr. Prior points out (*History of Gothic Art in England*, 1900). The people, too, are beginning to assert themselves. The worship of Our Lady being particularly the cult of the people in England, we find the Lady chapels being built all over the country, in most instances actually at the east end, and approached from behind the high altar. The ecclesiastic privacy of the monastic choir perforce disappears. During the Wars of the Roses, the great barons gradually vanished, and the trading classes made their influence felt. This is the age of the guild chantries, and above all of the parish churches of the people. The large proportion of our parish churches belong to this date, and are built in the rectangular style. Hardly a single great monastic church or cathedral was built at this time, although, of course, there was a certain amount of re-building and enlargement. The chantries and other extensions affect the plans of the churches, and tend to obscure all transeptal projections.

The piers still belong to the Northern type, but incline to become meagre in their treatment both in section and in their capitals and bases (fig. 59). The S-shaped curve under the chamfered abacus is characteristic, as is also the curious cushion mold-



FIG. 59.

ing in the base and the bell shape above it. Capitals sometimes disappear altogether, and the moldings

run right round the arch without a stop. Foliage when found is rectangular in treatment (fig. 59).

The arches above show the same attenuation in the treatment of their moldings, and the distinction between the orders of the arch is often quite lost. The most characteristic feature is the cavetto, a deep hollow in the middle of the group (fig. 59). The arch, both in the main arcades and in the window, is often of the four-centred variety. Most arches are struck from two centres, but a four-centred arch, while rising without a break from the springing, allows the crown to be comparatively flat (DCEK, fig. 59). A drop arch, as it is called, gives the flat crown, but produces a broken effect where it springs from the shafts (B, fig. 59).

The triforium, owing to the horizontal tendency in the roofs, practically disappears and becomes a mere band of ornament.

The window gradually becomes a series of rectangular panels, partly as offering increased strength for the vast windows that become common, partly to further the easy arrangement in the glass of rows of saints standing in niches. The vertical lines at first appear timidly in the head of the window, then ascend from sill to crown, and finally even cut across the tracery sub-arches (fig. 59).

The vault still continues its development until we reach the wonderful fan tracery characteristic of this country. The multiplication of tiercerons seems to have suggested a polygonal form for the vault conoid, and from this to a circle is easy,



FIG. 60.

and we reach the concavo-convex conoid of the fan vault (fig. 60). The architects of the Gloucester cloisters have produced a delightful piece of work on this principle. But there is one objection, namely, that the flat central space makes an abrupt break with the lines of the ribs. It is probably this that led to the introduction of the four-centred arch, which allows the line of the ribs to pass imperceptibly into the central space (fig. 60, Windsor).

This is very satisfactory for a vault over a square, but the problems of satisfactorily vaulting a rectangular space begin again. The most complete solution is by the Oxford architects in the Divinity schools and the Cathedral, which are not true fan vaults (fig. 61); and the same principle, somewhat meretriciously carried out in a true fan vault, appears in Henry VII.'s Chapel, Westminster. The principle is practically that of dividing up the rectangular space to be vaulted into a new nave and aisles, as it were. The springings of the vaults are then supported upon great transverse arches thrown across the whole space. In this way a square compartment is obtained in the middle, which is easy to vault, and the small minor compartments can be treated by some other method. In the case of the Cathedral at Oxford they are very effectively treated as barrel vaults.



FIG. 61.

The influence of domestic architecture upon that of the church is a subject of great interest which has hardly yet received the study that it deserves. In early days many of the problems were first worked out in the Norman castles. Later, the domestic window with its transom bars and the beautiful open timber-roofs of the great halls had considerable effect upon church architecture. Of course, the plans and arrangements are different, but the spirit of the two is the same. Sometimes, as, for instance, in Belgium, the greatest achievements are in civil architecture; and although the bulk of these buildings in our own country have perished, such examples as the small Town Hall at Cirencester have a charm quite equal to that of the churches. But in any case, whether the building is for the Church, the State, the Borough, or the private individual, the artistic qualities triumph over the special difficulties involved in the particular instance, and the series of buildings—castles, cathedrals, halls, palaces, and churches—is as noble as that in any style.

Renaissance Architecture.

When, at the time of the Renaissance, men's minds began to turn back to the glories of the classical epoch, the result was naturally seen in architecture as in everything else. It was also natural that the beginning of the architectural change should be in Italy, as was the case in other departments of the movement, particularly in view of the large number of actually existing remains upon Italian soil. The development, however, was considerably stimulated by the discovery of the manuscript of Vitruvius Pollio, the architect of Augustus, who wrote the *de Architectura*. This famous treatise, in ten books, upon the architecture of the Augustan epoch, was translated into Italian in A.D. 1531. In spite of the impetus thus given to

the study, it would appear to have been by no means entirely beneficial in its results. Vitruvius seems to some extent to have been the Palladio of his day, viewing the art in a cut and dried and somewhat lifeless manner, which was not without its effect upon his followers of a later generation. It is true that Vitruvius' work was drawn chiefly from Greek sources, although these were probably very late; but it must always be remembered that, in the main, Renaissance architecture was founded not upon the Greek but upon the Roman style—a style itself a hybrid and full of solecisms. Many of the criticisms that are brought against Renaissance work apply equally to that of Rome, in such instances as the profuse use of meaningless decoration, and the unintelligent application of features imperfectly understood, *e.g.* the architrave that supports no ceiling, the incomplete drums, flutings, or drafted stones copied from unfinished Greek work, and chopped off sections of entablature, as in the church of St. Spirito, Florence.

It may be said that Bruneleschi, the Florentine, was the first great architect of the Renaissance. He produced a plan for the building of the dome of the Cathedral of Florence soon after A.D. 1407, which was eventually carried out. The spread of the style in Italy was extraordinarily rapid. The cause was very largely that the Gothic style had never firmly established itself in Italy: indeed, it may practically be said that it never penetrated to Central Italy at all. Even in Florence such an example as the famous campanile of Giotto has hardly anything of the real Gothic spirit, in spite of the applied Gothic features and ornament. It is not the living organism of Gothic structure and ornament, but a simple rectangular block with an elaborate veneer of surface adornment. The Italian mediæval churches were mainly 'Latin' in motive, and it was natural that the Italian mind should turn whole-heartedly toward a style which it had never in essence entirely abandoned.

From Italy the movement spread throughout Western Europe with varying degrees of rapidity, and was strenuously fought by the architectural traditions of the lands into which it made its way. The Renaissance style made no headway in the East, because the Greeks, who for centuries had been the most cultured people of Europe, were at this time overwhelmed by the Turks. In fact, the sack of Constantinople in A.D. 1453, although it was the final blow to Greek civilization in the East, scattered the Greeks over Europe, and very largely made the Renaissance what it was.

In the case of any revival or Renaissance style, it is always more difficult to make a division into periods than in the case of a style of true growth; because, in the first place, the individual factor is stronger, depending upon study and research, and also at any moment fortuitous circumstances may combine to make a particular building a more complete representation of the old style. But it may be said that Renaissance architecture was by no means wholly a 're-naissance'; it was in many respects a living style. And it may be noticed that it did pass through three more or less clearly marked stages, although these vary considerably both in manner and in date in different countries.

The first period is marked by a distinctly Gothic tendency, besides showing a comparatively limited knowledge of the nature of ancient work.

The second period, the period of maturity, shows a much greater knowledge of classical detail and arrangement, and is marked by a much more definitely classical spirit. The picturesque irregularity of Gothic planning and elevation gives way to a precise and calculated symmetry. The style reaches its zenith and exhibits itself in many of the world's noblest buildings, although the lover of Gothic architecture will always feel a certain coldness about them, and the lover of Greek architecture will be repelled still more by their lack of spontaneity, subtlety, and delicate restraint. In the work of the second Spanish period there is a certain restraint, it is true, but it is rather a formal coldness, and does not resemble the reserved but intense passion of Greek work. The nearest approach to the true Greek restraint is in the best work of Florence. It is to this second period that we have to look for the true work of the Renaissance. It is here that we learn what are really its characteristics. The first period is but one of transitional preparation, and the last of over-ripeness and decay.

The third period, sometimes known as the 'Rococo,' is marked by exaggeration, ostentation, and a still more mechanical application of rule, which proceeds side by side with a tendency towards slavish reproduction of ancient work. The latter tendency resulted in what is sometimes called the 'neo-Classic revival,' doubtless hastened as an antidote to the extravagances of the Rococo.

1. In the **first period**, then, the new style was fighting its way. Even in Italy, although the architects themselves were probably completely unconscious of the fact, the influence of Gothic work was quite marked, whereas in other countries the Gothic influence for a long time remained paramount, and the period of transition was enormously prolonged. In France, even in late Renaissance days, when Wren was building in England in a severely classical style, the high roofs and other features betray a Gothic origin.

In Florence, although the classical orders were used, they were very much subordinated, and in comparison with later work their use seems timid. Their actual scale was small, and this also was the case with the ornamental features which are characteristic of Gothic work. There was still a tendency towards that multiplicity of parts which characterizes Gothic feeling. Windows are generally round-headed, often with sub-arches in the typical Gothic manner, and occasionally they even contain a sort of tracery, especially in France and Britain (fig. 62). Even pointed arches are used, particularly in Venice, as in the Doge's palace.



FIG. 62.

In Florence great use is made of rustication—one of the typical affectations of the Renaissance, which seems to have had its origin in ancient Roman work, where unfinished Greek work was copied in which only the outer borders of the stones had been dressed. Ugly and meaningless as it frequently is, particularly in its aggressively finished forms, it is not so hideous or so foolish as the leaving of

occasional square blocks in a round column—a device that even the most extreme admirer of Renaissance work does not attempt to defend. This, however, does not appear until the style is more or less advanced. It becomes common in France during the reign of Charles IX. (A.D. 1560–1574). Rustication was never popular in Venice, where there had always been a certain true Gothic feeling, mingled with Byzantine, which was distinctly opposed to anything Roman. Indeed, it was doubtless partly a survival of this feeling that caused the Renaissance style to be reluctantly adopted in Venice only when the 16th cent. was well advanced. A rather charming device common in Venice at this period may at this point be noted, namely, the so-called shell ornament (fig. 62).

Another objectionable feature, apparently first used by Alberti in St. Maria Novella at Florence, in A.D. 1470, is the inverted console placed above the aisles. Presumably it may be regarded as the successor of the flying buttress of Gothic work, but it is utterly unfitted to perform any function structurally or æsthetically. A curve suited for a small decorative bracket becomes ridiculous when applied to a feature of the main composition over a score of feet in length (fig. 63).

FIG. 63.

On the whole, it may be said that, although many churches were built in Italy during the Renaissance, partly as a result of the counter-Reformation of the Jesuits, in the North the Gothic epoch had more than supplied all the churches that were required. Hence, religious buildings in the North, particularly during the first period, are comparatively rare, and it is only in such instances as the churches of London built after the Great Fire that there is anything very extensive in the way of ecclesiastical work. It was rather a palace-building epoch, such as is shown in the great *châteaux* on the Loire, of which the Château Chambord may be taken as typical. In the North, Renaissance architecture made its way very slowly, at first appearing only in minor accessories such as altars, tombs, pulpits, doorways, and occasional enlargements, as the apse of St. Pierre at Caen. When the main fabric itself is attempted, the result is a building entirely Gothic in planning, arrangement, and construction, and the surface ornament merely is of the classical type. Pilasters take the place of buttresses, and cornices the place of corbel tables, and so on, as, for example, in St. Eustache, Paris—an excellent specimen of the first period of Renaissance work in France. In Britain, although Inigo Jones and Wren introduced a pure classical style earlier than anything of the kind in France, this transitional feeling continued in certain districts very much longer, particularly in Oxford. As late as 1648–1652 the charming little church of Berwick-on-Tweed affords a most pleasing instance of the fusion of the two styles.

In the South of France much of the work was done by bands of travelling Italians, who have left a considerable impress upon the minor features of the period in that district. In the main it is true to say that French work of the time of Francis I. (1515–1547) is marked by a special elegance which is peculiar to itself. It is doubtless the outcome of the elegant French-Gothic acting upon the Renaissance style, and applies especially to domestic examples. In England the Early period, which may be said to cover the reigns from Henry VIII. to James I., may be divided into two. The earlier part, from the close of Henry VII.'s reign to the death of Edward VI., is marked by Italian influence, as in the case of Torrigiano's tomb made for Henry VII., and the later part is marked by Flemish and German influence; but throughout the whole period everything is tentative and experimental.

2. In the second period we have the matured Renaissance style, when buildings were classical not only in detail, but in spirit. This may be said to have been inaugurated in Italy when in A.D. 1506 Bramante commenced the church of St. Peter's in Rome, a date which was about contemporaneous with the very first beginnings of Renaissance influence in Britain.

In this second period the picturesqueness of Gothic planning almost entirely disappears. It is,



FIG. 64.

however, to be noticed that the great cross plan of the large churches, although carried out in a severely symmetrical manner, is the indelible impress of the Gothic hand upon the succeeding age. Even St. Peter's itself is so planned. Not only so, but, in the case of both St. Peter's, Rome, and of St. Paul's, London (figs. 64, 68)—the two greatest buildings of the style—the more severely symmetrical plan of the Greek cross, as designed by the architects, was altered to the long-naved Latin cross in deference to Gothic tradition. Both churches suffered by this arrangement, St. Peter's very seriously.

The orders in this period are no longer used in an unobtrusive manner, but become, except

perhaps in Florence, the main feature of the style, although, as in ancient Roman work, they are generally little more than mere ornament unrelated to the anatomy of the building. They are generally treated on Roman lines; but there was considerable latitude, the shafts occasionally being even fluted spirally, or wreathed with bands of foliage and fruit, or, worst of all, broken by square blocks. The Tuscan order becomes clearly defined in Renaissance work as a separate order. In Spain a new kind of capital appears, termed the 'bracket capital,' in which two or more brackets spring from the head of the column. It has the advantage of reducing the strain on the architrave.



FIG. 65.

In the best designed work one order is used for each storey; and in France this arrangement was practically universally observed. This was owing to the supreme influence in that country of Barozzi da Vignola, author of *The Five Orders of Architecture*, who had been brought back to France by Francis I. But in Venice Palladio introduced a system wherein one order ran through two or more storeys, minor orders being introduced in the storeys themselves. This unsatisfactory arrangement, which still further degraded the orders as mere applied ornament, unfortunately became popular in Britain, owing to the influence of Palladio, who was the inspirer of Inigo Jones.

One might even make a division of Renaissance architecture according as the orders or the windows formed the main element of the wall design. The latter is distinctly more Gothic in feeling, and is found more particularly at the beginning and end, before the Gothic art had quite disappeared, and after the Renaissance had spent its force. To some extent the division would be one of locality. In Florentine work the order is always less dominant than in either the school of Rome or that of Venice, and this distinction may also be noticed in those countries respectively influenced by these schools.

The column itself frequently bears the arch, particularly in early work, although the more usual arrangement is a massive pier with attached pilasters. Occasionally the unpleasant device is used of a section of entablature above the columns from which the arch is made to spring.

The moldings of the orders and other parts were the simple circular sections of Roman work. The great series of receding moldings on the arches of Gothic architecture were replaced by square soffits; and string courses and moldings generally become comparatively scarce. Effect is given by strongly marked entablatures dividing off the storeys of the building, and altogether horizontal features become very pronounced. In Italian and particularly Florentine work, a great cornice of very large proportions is often used on the top storey, suited in its size to the whole height of the building and not merely to the storey in which it occurs. This on the whole gives a pleasing effect with its marked shadow line.

The ornament is founded upon classical Roman work; but in the best Renaissance examples, especially in Florence, it is more refined. It should be noticed that Renaissance carving was almost invariably executed after the building was set up. In Gothic buildings every stone was completed before it was put into its place. The result is that the jointings often cut unpleasantly across Renaissance work, whereas Gothic jointing and the carving-design are thought out together. It is simply one aspect of the principle that the Gothic pile was always essentially a building; the Renaissance pile was rather a monument, treated somewhat after the manner of a picture.

The old Roman ribless vault was revived, at least in form, but a considerable geometrical improvement was made. In the plain barrel form it remained semicircular, but in the case of intersecting vaults over a rectangular space the curve of the vault was made elliptical, so that the diagonal groins might be projected as straight lines upon the plan (fig. 66). It should, however, be observed that in an enormous number of cases the vault was a mere plaster sham, and not part of the construction, as in Roman or Gothic work. All roofs in Italy were hidden within by ceilings, but in France and Germany the open timber-roof was made an important feature. The roof is of low pitch, and in the majority of instances so low that from most points of view the parapet forms the sky-line. In France, however, we find the high 'Mansard' roof; and in Germany the high roof with tiers of dormer windows is a very common feature. The fact is that Germany never wholly adopted the Renaissance style until long after every other country in Europe, and these high roofs are mediæval in character.



FIG. 66.

The glory of the style is the dome, which in its general treatment follows the Byzantine method. There is almost universally a drum, as in the second Byzantine period; but it is made an even more important feature, and very commonly is enriched by a colonnade. It was usual to build these domes with an outer and an inner shell of different curvature and a space between. The outer dome is frequently a mere timber-framed erection, resting upon the other, as in Sansovino's S. Giorgeo dei Greci at Venice, or the outer dome of the Église des Invalides, Paris, which consists of three domes (fig. 66). In this connexion may be noticed the very great use of carpentry all through Renaissance work, which has been compared by some writers to the modern use of iron. St. Paul's, London, has an outer and

an inner dome, with a brick cone between. St. Peter's, Rome, has two brick domes.

Renaissance spires were not of common occurrence save in England and Spain. They seem to have been invented first by Sir Christopher Wren, but the Spanish use is possibly independent.

In the second period round-headed windows were less frequent, and square-headed windows, often with small pediments over them, were the rule. The rustication, so common in Florence in the early period, was now generally confined to the quoins, as in the Pandolfini Palace designed by Raphael, and more or less freely copied in The Travellers' Club, London. At the same time there was a tendency for all wall space to disappear, and for the whole surface to be covered with an exuberance of applied architectural features. The detail and mouldings became more vigorous and elaborate, but lacked the earlier refinement.

The Roman method of building had been largely one of veneers. The inner part of the wall was of inferior material, but the outside was cased with fine stone or more often marble. The Romanesque Gothic had made use of a double wall with a rubble core, derived from Roman use; but this system was gradually abandoned, and in the best Gothic work the wall was built solid, or at least all the face stones were bonded into and formed an integral part of the wall. The Renaissance architects realized that this was a better system, and endeavoured to follow it out in their work. At the same time veneer was not infrequently used, and plaster facing was by no means uncommon. This was particularly so in the last period, when panels, cornices, and ornaments even upon the exterior were of plaster—a most unsatisfactory arrangement.

In Italy itself it may certainly be said that there were three distinct schools of the art:

(1) The *Florentine*, which depended largely on fenestration, and in which the orders played a secondary part. It was very severe, with a breadth and vigour of treatment exemplified in the due sense of the value of contrast as applied to plain wall surface and ornament, and again in the effective depths of shadow given by deep recesses and heavy cornices. It is marked by extreme delicacy in the ornamental carving.

(2) The *Venetian*, which was shallower and more pompous, with great ornaments introduced for ornament's sake, often coarse and over-insistent. There is less severity, and many curves give a weakness of effect. Orders of varying heights are used, and are often piled upon other orders somewhat indiscriminately.

(3) The *Roman*, which is midway between the two in severity. It is marked by great pilasters of the whole height of the building, so as to give the effect of one storey, and in consequence of this it has had a greater influence upon church architecture. The pilaster and not the column is used, as the inter-columniations upon so huge a scale would make the span of the architrave impossible.

3. In the third period there was a distinct decline, and a great deal of extravagance and affectation, such as broken entablatures, and pediments, and curved and irregular cornices. In Italy there is a peculiar lack of inspiration, and the work of Maderno and Bernini may be taken as typical. One of the most pleasing examples is that of St. Maria della Salute, by Longhena, in Venice (A.D. 1632). Its proportions and general mass are excellent, although the details leave something to be desired. Doubtless it owes a great deal to its situation. St. Genevieve (The Pantheon), Paris A.D. 1755), although greatly superior to most work of the time, belongs to this period. It was built from Soufflot's designs, and is interesting as having the smallest amount of area of supports of any Renaissance church, comparing even with Gothic work in this respect. Compare its plan (fig. 67) with that of St. Peter's or St. Paul's (fig. 68). It has not been successful, however, for it has been necessary to prop and support it several times.



FIGS. 67 AND 68.

The extravagances of the 'Rococo' in France are even surpassed by the work in Spain generally known as 'Churriguerresque,' after the architect Churriguerra, doubtless partly caused by a revulsion from the over-bald mechanical style of such men as Herrera in the previous period.

In considering the Renaissance style as a whole, certain broad characteristics should be noticed. In the first place, there was a very distinct tendency, particularly in the case of its Italian inventors, to view the whole composition as a matter of line and proportion rather than as a building. There is often very little relation between the uses of the building and its form. Architecture is an applied art, and therefore, unless it be well adapted to the function that it has to perform, it cannot be a success. But, further, it is not only upon these grounds that so much Renaissance work must be condemned. Even upon æsthetic grounds, in the erection of a monument as distinct from a building, it is necessary that the thing should form an organic whole; and a column which is the outcome of the æsthetic endeavour of many ages to express the beauty of support, is clearly out of place when it supports nothing. The concealment of construction and arrangement is a similar but different question. An enormously heavy lantern, rising above what is apparently a dome of light construction, may, it is true, be defended upon the grounds that it is obvious that there must be some further support within. The eye would, however, probably be æsthetically more satisfied if there were some indication of this support, as otherwise there is considerable though not absolutely certain danger of the artistic unity being marred. To treat the matter as a moral question is, of course, absurd, and simply shows entire ignorance of the nature of all æsthetic

philosophy. One might as well argue that a portrait was false because it was not flesh and blood but paint and canvas. But there is no doubt that Renaissance architects were in the habit of sailing very near the wind, and there is frequently a distinct want of harmony in their work. Some of the faults are directly traceable to Roman influence, and it is a pity that the greatest of the Renaissance architects were not better acquainted with Greek work, not merely in detail, but viewed as an artistic conception. As contrasted with Gothic work, Renaissance work—as is also the case with both Greek and Roman work—is more concerned with the building as a whole than with the parts. It is this that makes the exact repetition of similar parts a possibility. But when the Renaissance architect —as was not infrequently the case—allowed the quality of the detail to suffer, although he may find precedent in Roman work, he falls far behind that of Greece, whose detail was the most exquisite and subtle of any architecture in the world. Connected with the desire to form a pleasing whole, is the immense attention paid to proportion and also to symmetry, which was regarded as the best means of attaining this end. With regard to proportion, it is doubtful whether, with all their rules and formularies, the Renaissance architects were on the whole more successful than those of the Gothic era in this respect. A certain level was maintained; but if these laws were a check against falling below, they were also a check against rising above. For an interior vista the Renaissance architects never surpassed such an one as Amiens. The proportions of the bay designs of most of the great Gothic cathedrals are admirable. With reference to their exteriors more may be said; but as regards the proportionate disposition of its masses, it would be hard to find any Renaissance building to rival Durham; certainly not St. Peter's, Rome, whose façade and minor cupolas are entirely out of proportion with the rest. It is true it is a work of many architects, but so is Durham. St. Paul's, London, is perhaps the one rival; and St. Paul's, taking all things into consideration, is the finest of all Renaissance buildings. As for façades, the simple inevitableness of such an one as York Minster has deprived it of the praise it deserves. A façade such as that at Certosa will not stand comparison for a moment, neither will that of the Invalides at Paris nor the Pantheon, good as far as it goes, and certainly not Bernini's façade to St. Peter's. Again St. Paul's is the only possible rival.

A great deal of nonsense has been talked about Renaissance proportions. One of the most characteristic qualities of Renaissance work is its treatment of scale. The parts themselves are few in number, but of great size. The result is to give the impression of the building as a whole being very much smaller than it actually is. St. Peter's, Rome, is the largest church in the world, but in effect of size it is surpassed by many a Gothic cathedral not approaching it in area. It is probable that the contrary result was expected, but such is the fact. It is true that there is a certain calm and even dignity about the system, but this should rather be set against the loss of mystery and suggestiveness.

Renaissance architecture is largely the product of scholarship, and as such it challenges criticism in a way that is not the case with less 'studied' styles. It is therefore easy to form an erroneous notion of its value as a style in the architecture of the world, and to fail in giving it the place that it deserves.

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J. B. STOUGHTON HOLBORN.

ARCHITECTURE (EGYPTIAN).—We shall here deal only with the religious architecture; but as that is by far the greater part of what exists, the discussion will involve most of the known facts. The divisions of the subject are (1) Materials and conditions, (2) Plans, (3) Elevations, (4) Decoration, (5) Furniture, (6) Popular shrines.

1. **The materials.**—The materials necessarily condition the style and decoration of all architecture. In Egypt the commonest materials used by the peasantry are maize stalks, mud, mud brick, palm sticks, and palm logs. The simplest huts are made by lashing maize stalks (stems of the *durrah*, called *bûs*) together by means of palm-fibre; the flat screens thus formed are set upright at right angles, and lashed together down the corners. If the weather is cold and the wind strong, they are plastered over with mud. In this form the temporary dwellings in the fields are set up for two or three months of the pasture season. Where a column is required, a bundle of maize stalks is bound together, from 4 to 10 in. in diameter, and plastered with mud, thus forming an extremely stiff and unbreakable mass. Two such columns are even used to support the *shaduf*, or water-lift, which weighs two or three hundredweight, and is kept continually in swinging motion. In ancient times the papyrus stem was also commonly used, as well as the maize stalk. Mud brick was the principal building material in Egypt in all ages; even in the rainy climates of Syria and Babylonia it was universal, and in the general drought of Egypt it is an excellent material. The mud requires to be mixed with so much sand that the grains shall be almost in contact, and then rain has but a slow effect upon it. Another way of making it durable was to mix it with chopped straw, or even grass roots, which bind it together. The brick down to the VIth dynasty was generally pure mud; the sandy and gravelly bricks are of later age. Another form of brick is thin and wide like a tile, and ribbed on the face, in order to build it up by adhesion of mud on the faces, in forming arches. The palm-stick is used for fences, the tops being left with side leaves to form a barrier to men and animals. The logs of the palm tree are used for roofing-beams, but never for columns.

The nature of these materials has led to the general features of the architecture. The constant use of a portico or verandah in front of house, temple, or tomb, results from the common use of bundles of maize stalk. The palm capital results

from strengthening the column with a coat of the harder palm branches, whose thin tops were left loose around the capital. The sloping walls of the pylon result from tilting the courses of bricks inward, so as to prevent them from being easily dislodged. In order to save the corners of reed huts or brickwork from being broken away, bundles of stalks were lashed on down the edge; these were the origin of the torus molding marked by diagonal winding bands along the angles of the buildings. The fence, formed of palm-sticks with loose heads, lashed together near the top to a line of cross sticks, is the source of the cavetto molding with torus roll below it. The palm-log roof is copied in stone in tombs at Gizeh and Abydos. Thus the forms adopted for the stone architecture belong to the earlier materials, as in Greece.

2. The plans.—The plans of the temples vary considerably in different ages. The earlier temples are scarcely known except from the plans of the Osiris temples at Abydos, and the views of primitive shrines. The hieroglyph for a shrine in early times retained the appearance of a plain square hut, with a fence in front of it, and two tall poles at the sides of the entrance. Another form is a hut with a domed top, and a low enclosed court before it, having two tall poles at the entrance, and the standard of the deity placed in the middle of the court. The oldest plan of a temple at Abydos is a wall about 16 in. thick, enclosing a space at least 25 ft. wide and 42 ft. long; the entrance is a passage between walls 4 ft. apart and 35 ft. long, facing south. This is probably of the age before the first dynasty. Of the first dynasty is a much larger and more solid building, 42 ft. E.–W. and 21 ft. N.–S., with the entrance probably on the north; the wall is about 8 ft. thick. A great temenos wall was built round the site, and a block of store chambers placed at the side of the temple. The same form continued through the IInd and IIIrd dynasties. Khufu of the IVth dynasty changed the whole worship, and made a great hearth of burnt-offering, where clay models only were sacrificed. This hearth was about 12 ft. N.–S. by 8 ft. E.–W.; it was in a chamber about 15 ft. wide, probably entered from the north. Round this was subsequently added a stone wall reaching about 6 ft. farther out.

In the VIth dynasty, under Pepy I., a great re-construction took place at Abydos. The new temple had the principal door to the north, and a lesser one to the south. The building was of mud brick, with stone doorways; it was 49 ft. N.–S. and 23 ft. E.–W. in the middle hall, or with side chambers 58 ft. wide inside. The walls were 5 ft. thick. From the position of the doorways this seems to have been a processional temple, open front and back, for the processions to enter, deposit the sacred bark, and pass out by the other door. The surroundings were also altered. The old temenos wall had a stone gateway inserted, and outside of it, 40 ft. in advance, was built the outer temenos wall, with another stone gateway. A colonnade led from the outer to the inner gate. To this temple Mentuhotep added a colonnade on the eastern side.

Another entire re-modelling took place in the XIth dynasty under Sankh-ka-ra. A square of brickwork 47 ft. E.–W., 48 ft. N.–S., held the foundation of a stone temple, probably 44 ft. square. As this mainly overlies the Pepy temple, it was probably entered from the north, like that. The temple of Sankh-ka-ra was, however, not grand enough for Senusert I., who pulled it all down, and laid foundations over the pavement of his predecessor. This temple seems to have faced the East, as the outside length of it was 133 ft. E.–W., while only 75 ft. N.–S. The limits of it are shown by the corner deposits of the foundation. A great temenos was built around it, 192 ft. distant to the eastward, with a wall 23 ft. thick. To this temple Sebekhotep III. added a chapel and doorway on the south.

The XVIIIth dynasty saw all this re-built still larger. The temenos was 264 ft. long, E.–W.; in it lay the stone temple facing east, 215 ft. long, and 129 ft. wide; the temenos wall was nearly 30 ft. thick, with gateways of red granite. Lastly, in the XXVIth dynasty, there was an entirely new stone temple, facing east, 132 ft. square. It seems not improbable that this also was of the processional type, open back and front. We have detailed these successive temples as they are the only examples that have yet been observed and recorded, showing the growth and alterations throughout Egyptian history on one site. Many secondary details, and the outlying store-rooms, are not noticed here, nor buildings of the XIXth and XXth dynasties which were in adjacent positions, but are too much ruined to be traced. The total result is that there were seven entirely different plans on one site, beside alterations to these. The direction of facing was successively S., N., N. ?, N., N. ?, E., E., E.

Another early temple plan is that of Hierakonpolis. This was entirely of brick, but can hardly be earlier than the XIIth dynasty. Its shrines consisted of five chambers in a row, each 8 ft. wide and 20 ft. long. The whole block was 92 ft. wide over all. The shrines were each a closed cell with one door, and not of the processiona type.

Coming now to the temples which can still be examined in a more or less perfect state, the oldest is that of Medum, built by Seneferu of the IIIrd dynasty. This is merely an enclosed courtyard (nearly 20 ft. by 8) against the side of the pyramid, containing an altar between two tall stelæ. The approach to it is through two chambers placed with their length across the whole breadth of the building. Next is the granite temple of Khafra of the IVth dynasty, near the sphinx; the entrance to it is still buried, so that its nature is unknown. The first hall is 12 ft. by 60 ft. wide; the second hall is 22 ft. from back to front, divided by a row of six pillars, and 81 ft. wide; and from this branches another hall 33 ft. wide, divided by two rows of five pillars, and 55 ft. long. The whole is built of red granite. Neither of these was a temple in the usual sense, but a place for religious services for the benefit of the deceased king.

The oldest temple of which we have full plans is of Tahutmes III. at Medinet Habu. It is solely a processional resting-place for a sacred bark, open at both ends, with a colonnade round it for the procession to pass, and six store chambers behind. Of the same type were the subsequent temples of Amenhotep III. at Elephantine, of Ramessu III. at Karnak, of Alexander at Luqsor, of Philip Arrhidæus at Karnak, and of the Ptolemaic age at Kom Ombo and Dakkeh.

The other type of temple was not adapted for processions, nor, perhaps, for barks of gods, but had a small cell as the sanctuary, probably to contain a single large statue too heavy to be moved. Of this type there seem to be two of Amenhotep III., at Luqsor and at el-Kab; but all the others are Ptolemaic, as at Dendereh, Deir el-Medineh, Edfu, Philæ (Isis, Harendotes, Arhesnofer), and Kalabsheh. Probably also of this type were all the late temples with monolith shrines, which were mostly set up in the Delta (Saft el-Henneh, Nebeshah, Tmey el-Amdid, Sebennytos, Bubastis, Baqlieh) and less often in Upper Egypt, as at Abydos and Edfu.

The third type of temple was funerary, for ceremonies of offering to the deceased king, and neither for processions with a bark, nor for holding a statue in a naos. Such are those of Deir el-Bahri,

EGYPTIAN TEMPLE PLANS





SMALL SQUARE (ELEVENTH) AND OBLONG (TWELFTH DYNASTY) TEMPLES OF OSIRIS, ABYDOS

[All above, 1 : 400]



COMPLETE TEMPLE OF TWENTIETH DYNASTY, OF KHONSU, KARNAK

[1 :750]

Sety I. at Qurneh, Ramessu II., Merenptah, and Ramessu III.

For noting the various divisions of a temple it is best to take one built in a single reign, such as that of Khonsu at Karnak built by Ramessu III. The massive pylon leads to the peristyle court, with a single or a double row of columns around three sides. This is the expansion of the portico of the dwelling-house, with a court-yard in front of it. Behind this is the closed hypostyle hall, which originated in the hall of the house which had sometimes a single column in it. At the back of this is the actual sanctuary, with store chambers at each side, and sometimes also behind it. The sanctuary was either a long chamber, with wide doors front and back, and a wide passage around it for processions to pass bearing the bark of the god; or else it was a closed naos containing the statue of the god.

3. The elevations.—The elevations show almost always a slight slope inwards of the face of the wall, which is vertical inside, and thus becomes thinner toward the top. This form was inherited from building in brick. The doorways are, however, always vertical. The overhanging cornice with a roll below it was copied from the loose ends of the palm-sticks left free at the top, the roll being taken from the cross stick to which they were lashed. When elaborated, the cornice always has a palm leaf pattern on it. The columns are of various orders. The square pillar without any capital is seen in the temple of Khafra, and in the courts of the XVIIIth dynasty. Octagonal columns occur in the XIth and XIIth dynasties. The further truncation to sixteen sides belongs to the XIIth and XVIIIth dynasties. The palm column is apparently the bundle of maize stalks stiffened by a coat of palm-sticks round the outside, with the leafy ends of the palm-sticks left hanging free around the top, forming a capital. It always had a square abacus to carry the weight free of the projecting leaves. The lotus column represents a similar bundle decorated with lotus buds stuck into the hollows of the binding, and a sculptured capital imitating a half-opened lotus flower. The papyrus column is a bundle of papyrus stems, with a sculptured capital copied from the feathery head of the plant. The Hathor capital is usually on a polygonal column, or circular in late times, with a head of the goddess on one, or two, or all four sides. In Roman times various complex types with foreign elements were introduced.

The roof was either of wood, brick, or stone. The earlier little shrines were evidently roofed with the same stems which formed the sides. Brick roofing was certainly used largely for houses and tombs, and probably, therefore, for the smaller brick temples. Barrel roofs 6 ft. across were common in the VIth dynasty, and larger ones up to 15 ft. wide in later times. For stone buildings, roofs of stone were naturally used, either of limestone or sandstone like the walls. But so strong was the influence of brick arching that the roofs are often cut out in a curve beneath, while flat above, as at Abydos. The earlier stone roofs are very massive. The limestone slabs on the tombs of the IIIrd dynasty reach the size of $20 \times 8 \times 3\frac{1}{2}$ ft., weighing 33 tons. The granite beams in the great pyramid are at least 21 ft. long, 4 to 5 ft. wide, and about as deep. For greater security, the early roofs were often pointed, and on the cantilever principle; the centre of gravity of the block was over the wall, and it would not tend to fall even if the opposing block were absent. Such blocks sloped from 30° to 40°; and with their great depth, as much as 7 ft., their resistance as beams was enormous. In the pyramids there are generally three layers of such beams, one over the other. The roofing of temples was on a similar scale. Deep stone architraves rested on the columns, and large slabs stretched across the passage and chambers; those which roof the axial passage at Karnak are 28 ft. long.

4. The decoration.—The decoration was the life of an Egyptian temple. At first the walls are severely plain; at Medum there is not a single figure or hieroglyph, even on the funeral stelæ. At the granite temple of Khafra nothing is seen but perfectly smooth granite and alabaster, without even a molding. But in the Vth dynasty the Ra temple of Ra-enuser is as richly sculptured as the tombs of that age. The temple walls of the XIIth dynasty were very finely sculptured, and sometimes richly coloured (see *Koptos* and *Kahun*). In the XVIIIth dynasty the more complete temples enable us to follow the scheme of design. But it is in a quite perfect temple, such as that of Dendereh, that we can see the connexions of the scenes with the use of each part. On the outer screens between the columns is shown the king leaving his palace, followed by his *ka*, and preceded by an incense offerer. Then Horus and Thoth purify him, and the goddesses of south and north bless him. Mentu and Atmu—of Thebes and Heliopolis—bring him before Hathor, the goddess of Dendereh. On entering the hypostyle hall the king is shown sacrificing to the gods of Dendereh; and along the lowest line of the wall are the scenes of the founding of the temple by the king, hoeing the foundation, and presenting the bricks for the building. In the next chamber the king proceeds to worship the gods. And on reaching the sanctuary itself, the king is shown ascending the steps to the shrine, removing the band from the door, breaking the seals on the doors, opening the door, gazing on the goddess, praying to her, censing the sacred barks, and worshipping before the barks. Finally, he presents the image of truth to the goddess. Thus the decoration all has its purpose as an outline of the ceremonies proper to each part of the temple; it is a kind of ritual and rubrics in stone, like the scenes and figures of the early tombs, so that eternally the king should be considered to be performing the divine service in his spiritual person.

Apart from the ritual decoration, there were many details of customary ornament. The palm-leaf cornice we have already noticed. On the screens of stone between the columns, and on the tops of shrines, a cornice of uræi was often placed. Such was originally proper to the judgment-hall, the deadly uræus serpent being the emblem of the right of capital punishment. A favourite combination was the disc of the sun, the uræus in front of it, a vulture's wings at the sides, and ram's horns above it. This represents Ra, in three aspects, as Creator—the ram's horns belonging to Khnumu, the creative rain god; as Preserver—the vulture's wings spread out being the emblem of maternal care; and as Judge or Destroyer—the serpent being the sign of judicial right. Where the disc is shown over a king's head, it is often seen without the serpent, and with the wings drooping to embrace the king, as he is protected but not judged by Ra. Similarly on the roofs of tombs, especially the kings' tombs, there is a painting of vultures, with outspread wings across the passage, along the whole distance, showing the protection given to the soul.

A favourite structural decoration was a dado of papyrus plants along the lower part of walls. This seems to have been used in the Ist dynasty, to judge by the ribbed green tiles; it often appears in later times, and was usual in Ptolemaic and Roman temples. Similarly the ceilings are covered with a dark blue ground, spangled with

golden stars. The stars are always five-rayed; and the representation of stars with rays suggests that the ancient Egyptians were short-sighted like the modern, for stars appear only as points of light to long-sighted eyes.

Of minor decoration there is a very ancient form in the figure of a door surrounded by panelling, which became the emblem of the tomb entrance, and is often shown painted below the sacred hawk. The *ka* name of the king is always written above such a doorway. The very elaborate coloured patterns of the panelling on examples in the Old and Middle Kingdoms should be noticed. The small square panels are probably an imitation of a woodwork screen built up of small pieces. Such construction was requisite in so dry a climate, where wood warped and shrank so much, and only small pieces could be trusted to keep their form. The mediæval Arab woodwork met this difficulty in the same way. Another decorative use of wood was in the open-work carving of a pair of lotus leaves tied together, or a group of *dad* signs, which formed a fretwork over the ventilating holes in the screens. Similarly stiff bracing of woodwork was inserted to steady the framing of chairs and tables by fretwork groups of hieroglyphs, as the girdle tie of Isis, the *dad*, the *ankh*, and other signs. Such furniture work passed on into stone decoration of wall surfaces. Vegetable decoration had a great part in Egyptian life. Every festivity, every sociality, was a field for floral ornament with wreaths, garlands, and streamers of convolvulus; every water-jar had flowers over it and round it, and every group of offerings on an altar was heaped with flowers. Hence wreaths became a customary decoration on surface carvings and paintings. Also a favourite ceiling design was a vine trellis; and along the beams purple bunches of grapes hung down, made in glazed pottery.

5. The furniture.—The furniture of the temples is frequently represented. The central object of devotion was the sacred bark. This was a boat about 8 ft. in length (*Koptos*, xix.), fastened down to a framework of poles by rope ties (*Temple of Kings*, vi.). This framework was put upon the shoulders of the priests for carrying it in procession; as many as twelve to twenty priests are represented, each probably carrying a burden of half a hundredweight. To set down this bark a high stand was needed. This was sometimes of wood, a sort of square box with decorated panels (*Temple of Kings*, iii.–vi.), or a block of granite, like one in the British Museum with figures of six gods around it (see illustration in ART [Egyptian]). Upon the bark there stood a canopy or catafalque of slender wooden pillars and a springy top of board; and from this was suspended the square shrine of the god, hung by ropes, and kept from swaying by guide ties at the bottom. The detail of the structure is shown in a working drawing on papyrus. This shrine was elaborately carved and decorated, and was almost always half-swathed in a linen wrapper. Fore and aft of the shrine were statuettes of the king and of various gods, adoring the divinity. At each end of the bark was a figure-head, and a great engraved collar of metal hanging below it. Some shrines had a winged figure of Maat, the goddess of truth, at each end, embracing the shrine with her wings. Such seems to be the prototype of the winged cherubs on the Jewish ark. Of other furniture there were the standards of the gods upon long poles, which were carried in procession, as well as the stands for holding the libation jars and other vases used in the ceremonies; the framed wooden stands for water-jars hung round with garlands; and the tall trumpet-shaped stands of pottery or metal for holding jars. In the papyrus of Ramessu III. are named the tables of gold, silver, and bronze, the collars and ornaments for decorating the statues on the festivals, and a great balance plated with electrum. The buildings and chambers which now seem so bare and blank were radiant with plated tables and stands, glittering with precious vases of gold and silver, and bright with garlands of flowers.

6. The popular shrines.—These shrines were scattered all over the country by the waysides, doubtless like the modern Muhammadan *wely*. Such local worship is directly contrary to Islām, and must, therefore, have persisted from earlier times, like so many other customs. There still exist models of these shrines of Roman age, which were used for domestic worship in the house. They are shown as small chambers crowned with a pediment, supported by six columns—three on each side—which were connected by lattice screens; or as an arched roof carried on four columns, with a dwarf wall joining them; or as a small domed chamber with a doorway, exactly like a modern *wely*. The shrine in the house was a framed wooden cupboard surmounted by a pillared recess, covered with a cornice of uræi; inside this recess a lamp burned before the figure of the god.

W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE.

ARCHITECTURE (Greek).—The subject of Greek architecture is one that has been curiously neglected in this country, and the student finds himself beset by an insufficiency of data and an atmosphere of uncertainty immediately he enters upon the study. This accounts for the vagueness and incompleteness of what little has been written upon the question. It is therefore especially necessary in dealing with the subject of origins to be upon one's guard against certain popular fallacies, particularly when those origins are lost in the obscurity of a remote antiquity. A mere resemblance between two forms is absolutely no evidence that one is derived from the other, and nothing is more harmful to true knowledge than the shallow kind of art criticism that makes such an assumption without a very careful weighing of the evidence. Art is in its essence creative, and, in a great art, even when it does borrow, the important element is always not what it takes, but what it gives of itself. At the same time, the higher the art the more subtle it is, and consequently by the inartistic observer the primitive borrowed element is absurdly over-emphasized.

A familiar parallel is seen in the case of faces. The shallow observer is always noticing 'likenesses'; the artist notes differences. The stranger notices the 'likeness' among members of a family; those who really know the faces note the differences. Twins at first sight are often almost indistinguishable; later, as knowledge grows, we wonder that we ever noted any marked resemblance. (An excellent instance of this is seen on p. 715b.)

The architecture of Greece, the most refined, the most subtle, and in some respects the most artistic, that the world has seen, is pre-eminently the natural architectural expression of the gifted race that produced it. The Hellenic peoples were marked by extraordinary individuality and independence in a most unusual degree, and therefore, except where there is real evidence, it is not unreasonable to give them credit for invention, when the forms are such as might be developed from the simplest elements by any people of intelligence; and it is unnecessary to seek for far-fetched resemblances to bolster up improbable theories. At the same time, of course, due weight must be given to the conditions of previous and contemporary art, whose influences doubtless made themselves felt.

Of these influences three possible sources may be briefly noted—Egypt, Assyria, and the Ægean civilizations. In each case the most striking fact is the extreme difference in purpose, sentiment, treatment, and detail that distinguishes them from Greek architecture.

(1) The earlier periods of architecture in *Egypt*—of pyramids and tombs—hardly need be considered; partly because they belong to a time that had long since ceased to exercise any influence in Egypt itself, partly because they are entirely foreign in intention to anything built by the Greeks, who were never a race of tomb builders at all. Of the later Egyptian architecture, of the Theban period, it may be said that it was erected with more definitely religious intent than was that of Greece. The artists were, to some extent at least, under the thumb of a priestly caste, and although art itself is in essence free, the purposes of the buildings naturally influence to a certain degree the channels in which it moves. The effects after which the Egyptian artist strove were mainly internal rather than external. Throughout, the artistic motive is immensity and suggestion, as contrasted with the special grandeur of Greek art, which expresses itself in reserve, refinement, and grace. Like the Greek style, it is trabeated, but as this is the first and most obvious method that occurs to every builder, it certainly does not necessarily constitute an 'influence.' The stone construction is also a little too obvious an expedient to be interpreted as a sign of influence, and there remains the frequent use of columns as the only resemblance. But these are of so essentially different a character, and their gradual development in Greece is so easily explained, that there is no need to make reference to Egyptian practice at all.

(2) *Assyrian* architecture offers even less resemblance. It was of brick construction, a non-trabeated style, characterized by the arch or the vault. It was primarily secular, and neither tombs nor temples played any important part, but, as far as remains attest, the architectural spirit expressed itself in palaces. The ornamental detail in some ways resembles that of Egypt, and it is here that Greek work seems to have certain affinities, although probably not more than can be accounted for by a perfectly natural process of development or suggestion from pre-historic work in Greek lands.

It may, however, be noted that the influence of minor ornament is always more wide-spread than that of major forms, from the fact of its occurring upon more portable objects. But it is a *petitio principii* to assume that the influence passed from Assyria to the Ægean any more than *vice versa*. The probabilities are rather that there was a certain amount of interaction between the early Ægean, Assyria, and Egypt.

In the case of *Persian* architecture, which may at earliest be said to date from B.C. 558, although again entirely different in general intention from Greek architecture, there are certain minor features of detail which offer slight resemblances, particularly in the columns. But as the styles are contemporary—a fact invariably overlooked—it seems at least conceivable that we should assume a certain amount of interaction rather than definitely assert that the less original and less artistic race alone exerted influence. The great hall at Persepolis may be dated *c.* 485 B.C. Therefore, to suppose that it can have had any influence upon Greek Ionic architecture is absurd. The temple of Ephesus, for instance, whose perfect Ionic capitals can be seen in the British Museum, dates from the time of Crœsus, whose empire *ended* B.C. 546. The influence is almost certainly that of Greece upon Persia, and not the other way.

(3) In the third place, there are the great *Ægean civilizations*, of which little or nothing was known a generation ago, and of which our knowledge increases daily. Here on Greek soil most probably may be sought those influences which earlier writers have endeavoured to find in the afore-mentioned countries. Original as the Ægean work undoubtedly is, it is not to be understood that it was entirely untouched by the neighbouring art of Egypt. The most original art may adapt to its own purposes ingredients borrowed from its contemporaries, or even from the past, although this latter is a sign of a fully developed art—one, if it may so be phrased, that has become distinctly self-conscious. But the point to be noticed is that any Egyptian influence coming through such a channel to Greek art can, in any case, be only indirect.

Here again, in the case of Ægean architecture, the entire spirit of the styles, which are those of palaces and tombs, and not the work of temple-building peoples at all, allows at most of a limited range of influence. The wholly different art character of the two peoples, if we may group the Ægean peoples as one and the Greeks as another, is, however, a far more fundamental line of cleavage. The earlier art is more luxurious and less restrained. It is less structural in its character, depending more for its effect upon applied surface ornament. Further, the earlier art seems to have been less definitely intellectual, and expressed itself largely by an arbitrary symbolism, whereas the Greek, even when rudimentary, is marked by an attempt at a rational and self-explanatory embodiment of its content—a characteristic that grows more obvious as Greek art reaches its prime.

There may, however, be a real though limited amount of influence in the case of Ægean art, even though such influence be denied to Egypt and the East. A point of architectural significance may be found in a method of building which inclines to the use of stone for the lower part of the work and of lighter sun-dried brick or rubble above, faced either with stucco or a veneer of ornamental stone. This method is characteristic of certain Ægean work, and seems actually to have been used by the Hellenes in early work, as, for instance, in the temple of Hera at Olympia. This, therefore, does point to an early dependence; but it is soon thrown off. The *orthostatai*, or facing-blocks, at the foot of the wall in later Greek work may point to this origin (p. 679, fig. 1). It has been suggested that the very plan of the Greek temple itself is derived from the megaron in a chief's house, as at Tiryns (p. 680, fig. 8). The plan of the Hera temple shows a very great advance upon this, which must have taken a considerable time to effect, implying several earlier stages. The temple has been dated as early as B.C. 1100, in which case it becomes doubtful whether it should be considered as originally an early Greek temple, or a late Ægean building, adopted and gradually altered to the Doric style. The remains certainly show gradual and continual alterations, whatever may be the explanation of them.

There are, however, questions of great import in this connexion. The Greek races as a whole, and the greatest of them all in particular, namely the Athenians, were in all probability a mixed race, descended partly from an Ægean stock (probably non-Aryan) and an Aryan-speaking people coming from the North. Therefore, although we cannot point to distinct borrowings and definite features, directly inherited from the indigenous stock, which for convenience is here called 'Ægean,' nevertheless it was the spirit of the Ægean peoples, combined with that of the Northern incomer, that produced the true Hellenic architecture. It may even be hazarded as a suggestion that the ultimate decadence of Greek work was due to the gradual re-assertion of the indigenous stock over that of the incomer, and that the glories of what we might term the crossed fruit ultimately succumbed to the characteristics of the original wild crab. In that case the decadence is not a simple decadence, such as we may trace in the history of the art of coinage in Northern Europe, from the stater of Philip of Macedon to the BODVOC coins of Britain, but the re-assertion of an older, more ornate, and less restrained style. If, as seems most likely, we are to regard Byzantine Greek work as the true descendant of Greek art, this view receives a certain amount of additional confirmation. [An account of Ægean architecture will be found elsewhere (see p. 677 ff.)].

Of Hellenic architecture it may be remarked that it was a stone-built trabeated columnar style. It would be incorrect to say that its buildings were predominantly religious, although religious architecture played an important, perhaps the leading, part. It must always be remembered that a religious building is the most likely to survive, partly from the natural conservatism of religion and religious veneration, partly as belonging to a corporate body in contrast to all private property. We should always, therefore, expect, even in the case of an age where the building activity was evenly distributed, that remains of religious buildings would be the most numerous, of other public corporations next, and of domestic buildings last. The greater resources of a corporation, whether religious or otherwise, tend to a greater scale and possibility of survival; and, comparing religious and other public buildings, there is always the greater need for alteration and change in the case of the latter. Even the change from one religion to another, as in the case of St. Sophia, the Pantheon, or the Parthenon, is of itself only a partially destructive tendency, and indeed to this we owe the preservation of many buildings that would otherwise have been destroyed. An interesting case in point is the small temple of the Ilissus, which survived changes of religion for 2000 years; yet directly the ægis of religion was withdrawn the temple disappeared.

The same is true of Gothic architecture, and it is a mistake for the student to assume, as is frequently done, that the predominating character of an architecture is religious, or that it owes its features and style to religious influences, simply because such remains are the most numerous. The greatness of scale in so many religious buildings doubtless had its results in influencing other buildings, but this is only one factor among many. In the case of Athens itself the Stoa Basileios, the Stoa Eleutherios, the Stoa Poikile, the Bouleuterion, and the Prytaneum (see footnote, p. 677) must have ranked with the greatest religious buildings, and the greatest conception of all that has come down to us, judged from the purely architectural standpoint, is the Propylæa, which can hardly be classed as a religious building, actually having come into direct conflict with the religion of the day.

Greek architecture is generally considered as divided into three 'orders'—the Doric, the Ionic, and the Corinthian—which are variations in the arrangement or order of the essential constituents. These constituent parts, the stylobate, the column, and the entablature, are found in all three orders.

With regard to the temples, at any rate, it may be said that every building rested upon a platform or stylobate, generally of three steps. In this it may be distinguished from all other styles, where, although a base-mold or plinth may be found, nothing of this nature occurs. Upon this, as its name implies, stood the columns, and these in their turn supported the entablature or stone lintel which is the main characteristic of the style. This lintel, or trabeated, construction was used, not because the Greeks were unacquainted with the arch: apparently they deliberately rejected it upon æsthetic grounds. They knew of the arch in the East, and quite early made use of it occasionally for purely structural purposes, as in the case of a water-drain at Athens, a barrel-vault at Sicyon, the passage to the stadion at Olympia, an arch in Acarnania, and in the lower storey of a stoa at Alinda. It is not altogether improbable that the Tholos at Athens was covered by a small dome. The arches of the Ægean period are not, as a rule, built with radiating voussoirs, although an example occurs in Arcadia. The arch principle is really involved at Tiryns, perhaps unconsciously, but it is not truly the corbelled system. One may suggest that the reason is to be sought in the Greek type of mind, as it expresses itself both in religion and art, partly in its sense of reserve, the *μηδὲν ἄγαν* of the temple at Delphi, partly in its tendency to seek the highest in a completed and finished perfection that does not lead out beyond itself. Hence it is more readily satisfied in the rectangular self-contained composition of Greek architecture than in a style involving the distribution of thrusts and the æsthetic incompleteness of the line of the arch. This became one of the most expressive features of the essentially suggestive, rather than perfected or finished, mediæval style.



FIG. 1.

The further major divisions of the order may be tabulated as follows:—

- **Order**
  - Entablature
    - Cornice
      - Cymatium
      - Corona
      - Bed-mold
    - Frieze
    - Architrave
  - Column
    - Capital
      - Abacus
      - Ovolo
      - Neck
    - Shaft (including apophyges)
    - Base
      - Base moldings
      - (Plinth)
  - Stylobate or Crepis (the former is strictly applicable only to the top step).

1. The **Doric order** has generally been considered the oldest; but there is no adequate reason for supposing so, although it is not unlikely. The pre-Persic remains from the Acropolis of Athens and the temples at Ephesus and Samos, Neandria and Naucratis, show Ionic work of very remote date. Indeed, one might even suppose that they are cognate developments from a common beginning, rather than that the one is derived from the other or is a later invention. The Doric order is marked by somewhat massive proportions; for instance, the columns of the temple at Corinth are 4·47 diameters, and those of the Parthenon, 34 ft. high, are 6·025 diameters. The entablature is similarly heavy in proportion to the whole.

The Doric column consists of a shaft and capital only; there is no base. It is conceivable that there was originally a plain square base, and that a series of these have coalesced to form the top step of the stylobate. The early columns at Corinth (*c.* 650 B.C.) are monoliths, but in other cases the columns are built up in drums, fitted together with the most marvellous accuracy. The shafts are invariably fluted, with a sharp arris between the flutes (fig. 2). These flutes are generally 20 in number, but other numbers are not so rare as is commonly supposed. Thus:—

8	Flutes,	Trœzen.
8	„	Bolumnos.
12	„	Assos.
16	„	Sounion.
16	„	Ægina.
16	„	Shaft found at Olympia, probably Young Geloans' Porch.
16	„	A shaft of the Heræum.
18	„	Pronaos of Assos Temple.
20	„	Megarian's treasury at Olympia, but only 11 facets fluted: the remainder at the back are flat.
24	Flutes,	Temple of Poseidon at Pæstum.
25	„	Isolated column *in situ* at Assos.
28	„	Fallen fragment at Ephesus.
32	„	Two drums from Samos.
32	„	Epidaurian's house at Olympia (every alternate corner has a bead instead of a sharp arris).
44	Naxian's treasury at Delphi.	

FIG. 2.

The flutes are probably a perfectly natural development from the square pillar—a form not unknown in Ægean art—and, moreover, the anta in Greek work is square in section to the last. At first the corners would be cut, giving an octagon, as at Trœzen, then these would again be cut, giving sixteen sides. This would be done, doubtless partly for utilitarian reasons, so as to admit more light and give easy ingress and egress. But that the main reason was æsthetic is shown, in the first place, by the fact that the columns never became plain circles, and, in the second place, by the fluting or hollowing out of the sides of the polygon. These greatly accentuate the effect, and thereby give æsthetic emphasis to the verticality of the column, emphasizing the outline of the column, and making it tell, whether against a very dark or a very light background. The suggestion that it was derived from Egypt may be dismissed as fanciful, as the supposed prototypes at Beni Hassan belong to an age too remote to have had any influence. The primitive artist is not an eclectic archæologist. In the second place, the Beni Hassan columns are not fluted, but flat-sided. The flute, on the whole, points to a stone rather than a wooden origin, as it seems pretty clearly to be derived from a square, and not from the

round posts of a primitive wooden style. Other Egyptian polygonal types are even less likely.

The capital is composed of three parts. The abacus is a square flat block that takes the bearing of the architrave. Below this is the echinos or capital itself—a bold molded member eminently suggestive of powerful support. Below this are three fillets to emphasize the neck. This gently curves into the shaft by means of the apophyges, and at the top of the shaft, immediately below the apophyges, are three sinkings which prepare the eye, as it ascends, for the change from the vertical lines of the shaft to the horizontal lines of the capital.

The entablature is divided into three portions—the architrave or lintel proper, the frieze and the



FIG. 3.

cornice. The architrave is quite plain—a single solid block. In very large examples it may be necessary to use more than one block, but they are placed on their edges so as to present a single face to the front. The frieze is divided into spaces by upright blocks of stone (triglyphs) which support the real weight—a fact æsthetically emphasized by the upright channelling that gives them their name. These three glyphs, or channels, are arranged with two complete in the middle and one half on either side. The early form of the glyph seems to have been nearly round-headed (fig. 3).

The spaces between are filled with slabs which do not support anything. These are termed metopes. The metŏpē (*i.e.* the thing behind, or after, or at the back of the ope; cf. *μετάφρενον*) is the slab that goes behind the ope, hole or opening, in the frieze (fig. 3). This does perhaps imply that the interval was originally open. In a cella wall this would give light to the building (*ὀπή* in later writers means a window). In a peristyle it would become useless; and the introduction of the peristyle may have done away with the custom.

It does not throw much light on the beam-end theory, as the opening would be there in any case; but the method of fitting invariably used—which is to put the slab at the back of the hole—and the name—which does not mean 'between the triglyphs' but 'behind the opening'—if they point any way at all, suggest that the metope was always fitted as we find it, at the back of or behind the opening (fig. 3), which would not be possible if there were beam-ends. In rich examples the metopes are sculptured, particularly at the end of the building.

The cornice moldings need not be enumerated, but it might be observed that the uppermost member, the cymatium, is generally very similar to the ovolo molding of the echinos of the capital. This molding is carried up over the pediment at the ends of the building, and the corona or flat member beneath it is repeated, occurring once over the triglyph frieze, and once, with slight modifications, under the cymatium of the pediment.

The Doric order is the most severe and refined of the Greek orders, and this characteristic enables it the better to act as the frame of the glorious sculpture with which it was adorned. The tympanum, or triangular space in the pediment or gable, was generally filled with free sculpture, and some or all of the metopes were occupied by sculpture in very high relief. In rich examples, as, for instance, in the Parthenon, it would seem to have been permissible to introduce sculpture elsewhere.

In that example the famous Panathenaïc frieze runs round the upper part of the cella, within the outer range of columns.

It is generally said that sculpture is a speciality of the Doric order, and is not found in Ionic, but for absolutely no reason. The Erechtheum, the temple of Athene Nike Apteros, the temple of the Ilissus, the great temples of Artemis at Ephesus, the temple of Aphrodite at Aphrodisias, the Mausoleum, and the Ionic order in the interior of Phigalia, were all richly decorated with sculpture.

2. The **Ionic order** is marked by several important characteristics. In the first place, it is a lighter style; its columns are of more slender proportions and more widely spaced. At the same time it should be noted that, in proportion to the weight that they carry in the lighter entablature, they are no lighter than the Doric. It is less severe, and in any hands but those of the Greeks might have become over-ornate. The columns have bases which show very considerable variety in their moldings. The so-called Attic base is not a widespread form, occurring only in a single instance in the north porch of the Erechtheum and not elsewhere even in that building (fig. 2). The Corinthian example of the monument of Lysicrates is, however, but slightly different. The influence of this base upon the architecture of the world was extraordinary, but not more than its extreme simplicity and great beauty justify (p. 713, fig. 47, and context). The original form of Ionic base seems to have been a torus molding above a sort of plinth with several astragals. The scotia below the torus was first introduced, and then the second torus below.

The flutings are generally 24 in number, and much deeper than the Doric. They are separated by a fillet in place of the sharp arris, which gives a very different effect to the column (fig. 2). In early examples the flutings were more numerous—40 at Naucratis, 40 at Ephesus, 44 on a votive column at Delphi. The sharp arris is also found in these early instances. The capital is lighter and the most distinctive feature of the order. It may be described as resembling a scroll upon two rollers, which form the well-known Ionic volutes. There is a very small circular abacus which has ornamental carving. The head of the capital, the echinos, immediately below and between the volutes, is also carved, and sometimes, as in the Erechtheum, the neck also is richly decorated.

There seem to have been two early forms of the Ionic capital, that which may perhaps be termed Æolic and the Ionic form proper (Neandria and Heræum, fig. 4). It may also be noted that the egg and dart of the small echinos of the Ionic capital tend to diminish and become pushed up into the volute part of the capital. It is quite possible that this part is really the descendant of free overhanging leaves in an earlier form (fig. 4, Delphi). The architrave is not simple but divided into three facias, each slightly projecting over the one below (fig. 1). The frieze is a continuous band unbroken by triglyphs

and frequently sculptured. The cornice is more elaborate than the Doric, and the lowermost mem-



FIG. 4.

ber, as found in Asiatic examples, and afterwards borrowed in the Corinthian order, is very distinctive. This is the dentil band, which may be described as a series of small blocks set below the cornice, giving the appearance of a square serration. The uppermost member of the cornice is almost invariably the molding known as the cyma recta (fig. 9). On the whole it may be said that the Ionic style is less robust than the Doric, and depends more upon architectural ornament.



FIG. 5.

3. The **Corinthian order** is practically only the Ionic with a different capital. We are told by Vitruvius that Callimachus saw an acanthus plant at Bassæ near Phigalia, which had twined itself about a basket of sepulchral offerings, and that this suggested the idea of the Corinthian capital. A single capital of this type occurred at the S. end of the main chamber of the temple of Apollo at Phigalia, all the other capitals being of a peculiar Ionic type. This temple was built as a thank-offering for immunity during a great plague in either B.C. 430 or 420. It might even be hazarded as a suggestion that Callimachus was associated with the architect Ictinus in this case, just as Phidias was in the case of the Parthenon. The ultra-restlessness of the design of the frieze, and an almost over-elaborate treatment of the drapery, carried out though it may have been by Peloponnesian workmen, would point to the influence of an extreme Attic tendency, such as we would associate with Callimachus rather than with Phidias and his school. That Ictinus, the most famous Athenian architect, built the temple, and Phidias himself made the temple image, suggests some famous Athenian designing the sculptural decorations.

It is fairly clear that the Corinthian capital was an individual invention, as it suddenly appears complete, late in the history of Greek architecture. What more likely then than that in this single central capital, among a set of another kind, we have the original itself? This is strengthened by the fact that at Phigalia we also get the first departure from the true Ionic capital, showing obvious experimental tendencies in new directions on the part of the architect. Callimachus himself was famous as a worker in metal, and there is something suggestive of metal in the design, with its free overhanging leaves. That the inventor may have been familiar with the upward springing tendency of Egyptian capitals is conceivable, but to suggest an Egyptian origin is merely to go out of one's way to find things utterly unlike. The capitals of the Horologium, or so-called 'Temple of the Winds' (fig. 5), have the lotus leaf, but so have those at Persepolis. Vitruvius may very possibly be wrong, but to reject his evidence on the ground of his general unreliability is not of much assistance.

The capital is found in a considerable variety of forms, almost always including some small tendrils or spirals, totally unlike the Ionic volute, which is more of the nature of a thick scroll, or roll of cloth. Greek examples are not very common. Besides Phigalia, Pausanias informs us that it was used by Scopas in the interior of Tegea. The Choragic monument of Lysicrates is Corinthian, and the Horologium has Corinthian columns with acanthus leaves of Roman type. The temple of Olympic Zeus and the Corinthian Stoa, all in Athens, are other instances. A beautiful and somewhat peculiar example exists from the lesser Propylæa at Eleusis. The temple of Apollo Didymæus at Miletus shows fine examples, and there is an archaic Corinthian capital of uncertain date also found at Branchidæ near Miletus. But the loveliest of all Corinthian capitals are those of the Tholos at Epidaurus, obviously fairly early in date, and, with all their richness, marked by the chasteness and refinement of Greek work. The Corinthian order became the favourite of the Romans, and these subtle restrained delicacies were lost. It may be noted that in Greek work the acanthus leaf is worked with a crisp sharp edge, which becomes blunt and rounded in Roman hands (fig. 6).

This slight survey of the general characteristics of the orders prepares the way for the consideration of the commonly accepted theory of the wooden origin of Greek architecture. It is generally said that the Doric order is of unmistakably wooden origin, although it may be more doubtful in the case of Ionic. The grounds for suggesting this are the triglyphs, which are supposed to represent the beam ends, and the upward slope of the mutules, which represent the ends of the rafters. These features do not occur in the Ionic order.

In the first place, the general similarity in the main essentials of the two orders is far too marked for the principal source of origin and inspiration not to be the same. At the same time there are probably different contributory influences.

The stylobate can hardly be claimed as anything but a stone feature, even though the upper part were timber. In Doric architecture, as contrasted with Ionic, the columns have no base, and the base is one of the supposed signs of a wooden origin, either representing a metal shoe to prevent splitting—a feature hardly consonant with a primi-

tive style—or a flat stone laid on the ground to distribute the weight. However, it might be remarked that the distribution of weight is æsthetically demanded in any case by the slender Ionic column. The massive Doric column requires no base, and if it ever had one, it was early seen to be unnecessary. Its proportions are obviously those of stone, as are the narrow intercolumniations. The more slender Ionic with its considerably longer lintel has a closer resemblance to wooden proportions. It should further be noticed that the oldest Doric columns are the most massive, and most obviously the outcome of their stone material. The tendency of development from a wooden origin would naturally be in the reverse direction. Pausanias says that one of the columns of the Heræum at Olympia was of oak. It has been suggested that this was the last of the original wooden set, which were gradually replaced. There are, however, difficulties with regard to the entablature, which would not fit equally well upon a set of stone Doric columns of more or less normal proportions and upon wooden ones. Nevertheless it is conceivable, and the intercolumniations are certainly wider than usual.

The heavy Doric abacus projecting on all four sides is also obviously of stone; a wooden one would split off. To some extent the same might be said of the echinos, but its whole shape is essentially non-wooden.

In the Ionic capital, however, we find proportions that are not square and that would be eminently adapted to wood. The grain of the wood would run parallel with the line of the architrave. The spreading support is obtained, and at the same time the capital does not overhang at the front or the back, so there would be no danger of splitting off. Again, the spirals are a natural primitive incised ornament, equally applicable to stone and wood, although their final form is more suited to stone. Early incised and painted capitals have been found on the Acropolis of Athens. The Doric echinos, however, though subtle in its curvature, is a natural primitive stone form, claiming kinship with such a form as the rude primitive cushion capital of the Normans (fig. 37, p. 710).

It is just possible that the different fluting points the same way. A polygon when fluted can give only a sharp arris. It is a natural and simple expedient, in borrowing the idea of fluting from the stone Doric form and applying it to the circular form, to leave the plain fillet which we find in Ionic work. The surfaces of the fillets are on the circumference of a circle and are not flat. The circular form is the natural shape of the tree-trunk; the polygonal form is the natural development from the square block of quarried stone.

But it is in the Doric entablature that the wooden origin is supposed to be most conspicuous. The general proportions, which may be contrasted with the light entablature of the Ionic, are certainly true stone proportions as we find them. The massive architrave in a single block certainly does not suggest anything but the stone block which it is, whatever may be said for the three facias of Ionic work.

The triglyph frieze is generally said to represent the ends of the beams, and it is suggested that the guttæ represent the heads of the pins. What the regulæ are, from which the guttæ depend, is gracefully omitted from the theory. Now, in the first place, the actual position of the guttæ suggesting a vertical pin is quite impossible as at δ (fig. 6); but even if we try a diagonal position such as at γ (fig. 6), the pin would be absolutely useless, as it would draw, and this is really equally impossible. A pin might be placed at α or a huge pin directly underneath at β, but in neither place are the guttæ found. A true artist may have had the guttæ suggested to his mind by pin-heads, and then created a genuine stone feature, but that has nothing to



FIG. 6.

do with a wooden origin for architecture, any more than the acanthus leaf implies a haystack as an architectural prototype. The raindrops may equally well have suggested the idea and have spontaneously suggested rain-drops to children, who did not know the meaning of the word *gutta*.

But the most serious objection to the pin theory is that *guttæ* are not found in early work. They do not occur in the Bouleuterion at Olympia or the Selinuntine treasury, or in the newer, but still early, porch of the Geloans. They are not found at Assos or in the early Athenian fragments, or in the temple of Demeter at Pæstum.

With regard to the triglyphs, they are in the first place needlessly enormous for any ceiling joists. They might be the right scale for tie beams, but they are then placed at impossibly close intervals. The dentils of the Ionic order would in many examples, although most of them late, approximate more nearly to a reasonable scantling. But the most pertinent question to ask is how one could have beam ends all round the building at the same level—which is a hopeless impossibility. Now, in the case of the Lycian tombs at Xanthos (fig. 7), where we have actual copies of timber work in stone, we see, of course, where ends and sides of the building are visible, that the ends of the beams show only at the sides of the building. We also get a feature resembling purlin ends under the gable roof. It should be noticed that where we find timber construction reproduced in stone, as at



FIG. 7.

Xanthos, Beni Hassan (Egypt), or Naksh-i-Rustam (Persia), it is in no case a building, but simply a representation carved out of the solid, and is entirely non-structural. It is, in short, merely a pictorial representation. Every material demands

its own methods of construction, and this is perhaps particularly necessary in days of early development. Further, if they were beam ends, they would not occur at the corners, but a metope or a portion of the wall would finish the series. This again is, of course, the case in the Lycian tombs.

The difficulty of the metopes has already been noted. But what are the vertical channels themselves? They seem to serve the same purpose as the vertical flutes of the column. But to emphasize the verticality of a horizontal beam is somewhat of a solecism. The suggestion has been made that they are timber markings—which is not merely untrue but foolish, for they could not resemble timber markings, which radiate from a centre.

The very early treasury of the Geloans at Olympia is so early that it is not even Doric in character, but it is undoubtedly stone; and if its influence may be considered at all, it points in this direction. Although probably of the 7th or 6th cent., it may be set against the supposed original wooden Heræum. In several features, particularly its stylobate, its columns,* and its characteristic waterspouts, it anticipates Greek work of a later date. It might further be noted that the dentil band in Ionic work, which may possibly represent beam ends, is above the frieze, whereas the beams of the coffered ceilings in Doric work are above the frieze, making triglyphs as beam ends impossible.

The construction of the triglyph frieze, with rebated uprights and slabs behind, is found in the dado or frieze discovered at Knossos (fig. 15, p. 682). There it was obviously a stone construction from the outset, and was applied to the face of the wall. This is quite a conceivable origin for the triglyphs.

In early examples the triglyph and metope are frequently worked in one piece, as in several of the treasuries at Olympia. This is also found in many of the stones of Libon's temple of Zeus (also at Olympia), and was the case on the sides of the Athenian Hekatompedon. This of itself is enough to constitute a fatal objection to the whole theory.

The slope of the under side of the mutules would not coincide with the slope of rafters, and (like that of the under slope of the cornice itself) is sufficiently explained as a slope to throw off the rain and prevent its running under and down the face of the frieze. This device is common in stone architecture of all styles. It occurs even in string courses of Gothic moldings. The mutules above and the regulæ below the triglyphs are a delightful way of softening the effect of these members and also of providing for the eye an æsthetic support or introduction to the frieze and cornice respectively. They correspond to the corbel tables of Gothic architecture, which are more æsthetic than structural.



FIG. 8.

It should be noticed that Greek doors are narrower at the top than at the bottom (fig. 8). This is obviously to reduce the interspace for the stone lintel, and would be quite pointless in a wooden construction. Even as it is the lintels have often cracked. The exquisitely beautiful doorway of the Erechtheum had to be repaired in classical times.

Perhaps then it may be said that we have in Greek architecture the work of a stone-building people, modified in the East by a wooden type of work resulting in the Ionic style, and perhaps slightly affected in Greece itself by a mixed style of stone and wood. To some extent the two materials have always been used together: doors, ceilings, and roofs tend to be of wood in a stone building, and door-sills and hearths of stone in a wooden one. In any case it is the remarkable adaptability of every detail to the stone material in the perfected style, and the inevitableness of Greek architecture, that give it its charm.

Greek architectural ornament consisted in the first place of sculpture, either free, as in the case of the pedimental sculptures in the tympana, and the *akroteria* (figures placed on the summit of the pediment, and on little platforms at the lower extremities and standing out against the sky), or in reliefs, as in the case of the metopes and friezes. Sculpture also occurs upon the lowest drum of the column, as in both the archaic and later temples at Ephesus. Figures in the round are used as supports, as in the Telemones at Agrigentum or the Caryatids of the Erechtheum or at Delphi. In the second place, there are the exquisite moldings, which seem to be entirely original, and in any case the actual refinement in the forms used has no parallel in any other architecture in the world. The most important are the ovolo, *e.g.* in Doric capitals; the cyma recta, *e.g.* in the capital of the Doric anta; the cyma reversa, or ogee, used in string moldings; the torus, *e.g.* in the Ionic base; the scotia, a large hollow of double curvature, also found as a base molding; the fillet, a small projecting square-edged mold; and the astragal, a small projecting round molding; this when sunk is termed a bead (fig. 9).



FIG. 9.

A remarkable quality of Greek ornament is the adaptation of the surface decoration to the molding which it enriches. The outline of the ornament tends to be the same as the section of the molding; thus the egg ornament is found on the ovolo, the honeysuckle ornament on the cyma recta, the water leaf on the cyma reversa, and the guilloche on the torus (fig. 10).

In the third place, the Greek architects made use of colour, as for instance on the echinos molding of the Doric capital, and traces of it are not infrequent in many places. It is possible that more

* There is some doubt about the assignment to this building of a column found at Olympia.

was used than would be pleasing to a modern eye, particularly in cases where marble stucco was



FIG. 10.

applied to some inferior quality of stone such as poros. But we are not to imagine that the Greeks were not keenly alive to the beauty of their exquisite Parian, Pentelic, and other marbles, and the major portions of the surface of the buildings remained without colour. A very small amount of colour judiciously applied certainly enhances the effect of the marble, which looks almost staringly white without it, when new; and the comparison between buildings with and without colour may profitably be made in modern Athens to-day.

The workmanship of Greek architecture has never been approached, although some of their methods of construction are not above criticism, particularly in early work, as for instance in the blocks placed on edge on the face of the foot of the wall, forming a course much higher than the other courses (*orthostatai*) (fig. 1 in ARCHITECTURE [Ægean]). Very little bond is used in Greek work, but the size of the blocks makes these things a matter of small moment. Mortar was never used, yet so accurately are the stones fitted that in some instances they have actually grown together, and survived the accident of a fall without coming apart. Dowels are very frequently used, however, and their different shapes are useful for the determination of dates.

The methods employed can largely be gathered from internal evidence, particularly in the case of unfinished buildings. The building was apparently completed before the final dressing of the stone, which was done from the top downwards as the scaffolding was removed. The fine dressings on the faces of the stones, worked only for a short distance from the joint, and the short flutings of an inch or two at the top and bottom of columns, otherwise plain, are instances that may be cited of unfinished work, both of which have been ignorantly copied in Roman and modern times as though complete. Even in the finest work there is always a difference between the top joint of the column, which shows distinctly, and the others; as the flutings on the top block, which included the capital, were worked before it was placed in position. The rest of the fluting was worked when the joints had been made absolutely true by turning the blocks round and round after being placed in position. This seems to be the explanation both of their finer joints and of the wooden plugs and pins that have been found in the centre of the Parthenon drums (fig. 2, p. 679). The pin would be just strong enough to stand the turning of the drum but could not add any real strength to the building. The ankones, or projecting pieces found on unfinished drums and on other blocks, must have been used for this turning process. Doubtless they would also have been convenient for hoisting, but a quite unnecessary luxury, whereas the turning of a round drum would have been impossible without some such thing. The uppermost block could not be turned for fear of chipping the finished edge, hence the difference between that and the joints that were finished afterwards, which is always noticeable. The joints in the walls were probably made accurate by a similar process of pushing the blocks backwards and forwards, so as to grind the contiguous surfaces absolutely true, with the result that the finest knife blade could not be inserted anywhere between these mortarless joints. For this again the ankones would be useful. Every piece of carving, as for instance in the moldings of the Erechtheum, is executed with a minuteness of finish that one would naturally associate with ivory carving rather than with work in stone.

It is, however, the subtle curvatures in Greek architecture that are its most remarkable refinement, and the whole problem connected with them offers in itself a wide field for study. The following points may, however, be noted here. In the first place, it may be broadly stated that there are no straight lines in a Greek building of the finest class—a rather startling discovery to those who are accustomed to think of a Greek building as composed of nothing else.

Taking the principal lines of a building, the stylobate and the architrave, we find in each case a slight curve amounting to a rise of about $3\frac{1}{2}$ in. in the case of the long sides of the Parthenon, 228 ft. in length, and about 2 in. in the short sides, 101 ft. in breadth. These curves occur in the temple of Hephæstus and the Propylæa, but apparently not in the colonies or at Bassæ or Ægina. The next most important curve is the entasis of the columns, which is a convex departure from the straight amounting in the Parthenon to $\frac{2}{3}$ of an inch at a point about $\frac{2}{3}$ of the height from the ground, the columns being 34 ft. in height. The entasis of the Erechtheum shafts is even more subtle, $\frac{1}{170}$ of the length of the shaft and $\frac{1}{114}$ of the lower diameter, against $\frac{1}{56}$ and $\frac{1}{110}$ in the Parthenon. It should be noticed that these curves are not segments of circles but parabolic, or in some cases hyperbolic; but whether they were laid out mathematically or by eye seems to be uncertain. We may assume that the eye which would be sufficiently accurate to appreciate such a subtle distinction of curvature would probably be equal to the task of drawing the curve with a sufficient degree of precision. In the case of the



FIG. 11.—SUBTLE CURVES, ETC., OF PARTHENON EXAGGERATED.

echinos of the Parthenon, what appears at first glance to be a straight line rounded off at the end is found to be a subtle curve throughout, but the application of a 'straight-edge' to it reveals how minute this curvature is.

In addition to these refinements of curvature, others may be noticed. The columns that appear to the modern eye to be vertical really incline inwards towards the centre, so that the lines of the side columns in the Parthenon would meet at a point a mile and a quarter above the earth (fig. 11). The inclination of front to back is similar, and of

course all the intermediate columns incline proportionately. It is also preserved in the faces of the entablature and the pediment and the steps of the stylobate. But here a counter subtlety is introduced, and the faces of the higher moldings are slightly inclined the reverse way, so as to counteract undue foreshortening, occasioned by the other process and by their actual height above the ground.

It might also be observed that the angle columns are an inch or so wider than the others. The intercolumniations are slightly smaller, so as to bring the angle column under the triglyph. There is an exception in the temple of Demeter at Pæstum, where the last metope is made larger so as to attain the same result.

The extraordinary skill and refinement required may perhaps best be realized, as Professor E. Gardner suggests, by considering the case of the bottom corner drum. Here then what do we find? In the first place, the base of the drum has to be cut so as to allow for the curve of 3½ in. in 228 ft. But the mason has also to consider the curve, running at right angles to this, of 2 in. in 101 ft. This would be sufficiently puzzling if the axis of the column were vertical; but it is not. It has to be so inclined that it shall meet the axis of the corresponding column at the other end of the front, at a point 1⅓ miles above the earth, and a similar inclination has to be made in the other direction along the side. Added to this, the edge of the step from which he works is not vertical; and, further, he has to allow for the beginning of the entasis a curve of ⅜ in. in 34 ft. Those who are familiar with the extreme difficulty of cutting a voussoir for an arch in a curved wall—a comparatively simple process—will appreciate the work of the Greek mason. For not only did he conform to these requirements, but he executed it all with a nicety that would not admit of a sheet of paper being put into the joint. The voussoirs of the arches in such a building as the circular nave of the Temple Church, London, are well cut, but it is mere child's play in comparison.

It may well be asked for what purpose all these things were done, and in any case the answer seems to throw light upon the character of the Greek mind, confirming what might have been otherwise deduced.

It has generally been said that these are optical corrections, that the entasis of the column counteracts the tendency of two straight lines to appear hollow in the middle, that a straight architrave would appear to sag and a straight stylobate would appear to curve up at the ends, that the slope inwards is to correct a tendency of the columns to appear out of the vertical and overhang at the top.

It may be so.

But there are certain objections to the optical illusion theory.

In the first place, what does this theory mean? It means that the result of all the curves is to give lines that are optically straight and optically vertical as the case may be. If this is not the result, the optical illusion theory is ridiculous, as its only object is to avoid the appearance of curves and deviations from the vertical, which on this theory are *ex hypothesi* ugly. Now, it is quite true that in very early buildings, *e.g.* Corinth, there is no entasis. But when it first appears what do we find? An enormous swelling visible for miles, that no optical illusion could ever make look straight. The curve can be there for no conceivable object but that it should be seen. But, further, the parabolic curve with its maximum deviation at ⅓ from the base would not be correct for the correction of an optical illusion, whatever the amount of the curvature. In the case of the echinos there is no possible suggestion of such a theory, but we find a similar curve; and what is most important is that, in the early examples, it is coarse, just as in the case of the entasis, and ultimately becomes refined. These curves, then, were obviously delighted in for their own sake, and, as the eye became more trained, it naturally demanded that they should become more subtle. There remain, then, the curves of the entablature and the stylobate. Now, if the side of the building be viewed from some little distance, the optical illusion caused by these lines would be the same as that caused by the lines of the column; in other words, the architrave would drop in the middle and the stylobate rise, in which case the correction for the stylobate should be the reverse of what it is. To one standing upon the stylobate or very near it and above it, this correction might be valuable, but in that case the architrave would be wrong in its turn. It is very doubtful whether there is any optical illusion at all in the case of straight-sided columns. If there were con-



FIG. 12.—DIAGRAM SHOWING OPTICAL ILLUSION CAUSED BY ANGULAR LINES IN PROXIMITY TO PARALLEL LINES.

cave curves (or lines at an angle near them, as in the pediment and architrave) this might be the case. The line of the architrave is a legitimate instance because of the triangular pediment, but the line of the stylobate is not, and would appear to curve down at the ends even though there is no curve or angle below it (see diagram and test with ruler).

As to the inclination inwards of the columns, the upholders of this theory urge in the same breath that it is a correction of an illusion of the column not looking vertical, and that it gives a beautiful pyramidal appearance. If it does one, it cannot do the other.

That optical illusions were also considered, seems, however, certainly to be the case; the thickness of the angle columns and several other such subtleties appear to show it. Moreover, at Priene is an interesting diagram on the faces of the antæ of a temple, showing the correction of proportions as they appear to the eye in perspective.

Although, then, the optical illusion may have some influence, it seems more rational to fall back upon principles of æsthetic for the main reasons. It is clear in the case of the entasis and the echinos curve that it is pure delight in the curve. Doubtless this is associated with what we might term a mechanico-æsthetic reason. These curves are undoubtedly suggestive of strength and of organic growth, and may be paralleled by the exceedingly subtle curves in a human arm. The shape, indeed, would actually be stronger, although of course there is no practical need for it, as the margin of material to work done, allowed by the Greek, was very large, something like 3 to 2. In the case of the architrave and the stylobate there is the possibility of actual sagging in the centre upon soft ground, and therefore an appearance of greater strength is certainly given by the upward curve in the centre. In the case of the architrave the optical illusion would exaggerate the suggestion of weakness, and may have been taken into account. Earthquakes and weather, and the great powder explosion in the Parthenon, have made it more difficult to determine the original nature of the architrave curve than of the stylobate.

But all these things are an interesting illustration of one of the most elementary of art principles carried out with exceptional subtlety. A thing must not only be right, but must look right. In this case, therefore, it must not only be strong, but look strong. A plate-glass shop front, however excellently built, could never be æsthetically beautiful unless the eye were in some way satisfied as to the support of the walls above. In the echinos we have not only this principle exemplified, but also the still more fundamental principle of organic unity of design; and the vertical lines of the columns and horizontal lines of the architrave become one whole by the intervention of the

echinos. It is curious that the eye does not demand a base to the Doric column for the same reason. Indeed, some people have felt the want. But the side lines are diverging at the base, whereas they are converging at the top; the foot of the column, moreover, is so large as in some measure to dispense with such a necessity; it sits firmly without aid, so to speak. At the same time, it is a bold experiment, and is a feature that occupies æsthetically a somewhat peculiar position among great works of art.

It seems not unreasonable to suppose that the 5th cent. Greek saw all these things and delighted in them, just as his ancestors had delighted in their ruder curves, their less subtly proportioned columns, and their exaggerated projection of capital, all exemplifying the same principles, but carried out with less refinement. The result must have given to his keenly sensitive eye an organic artistic unity that has never been surpassed.

Whatever be the interpretation of these subtleties, one inference at least is certain, namely, the accuracy and refinement of the Greek eye, coupled with an æsthetic demand for a completeness and thoroughness in even the minutest particulars that go to make up perfection in a work of art. The immense importance that these must have had for the Greek, to make him expend such extreme care upon them, can be paralleled in modern times only outside the field of art, as in the making of a modern rifle barrel or an observatory telescope. Even optical illusions we are practically content to leave alone. But alongside this minuteness is a breadth and majesty equally astonishing. The composition as a whole is simple in the extreme, and the dignity of its proportions is unsurpassable.

In these things we find the key to the interpretation of Greek art, and there are certain distinct advantages in approaching that art through its architecture. Much can here be demonstrated by rule and line which only the highly-trained eye can see in the sculpture. The whole artistic feeling, too, which inspired every detail of Greek architecture and art, has its corresponding parallels in the Greek conception of religion and in Greek intellectual investigations. Naturally it is necessary to beware of the error of the superficial inquirer, who would make one the mere result of the other, rather than go deep enough to find their common basis. This does not mean that the one had no influence upon the others, but that each, as it were, remained master in its own house with its own fundamental principles. In the case, however, of the plan and general arrangement of the Greek temple the æsthetic and religious factors are somewhat closely connected. The general design of the building is naturally largely determined by religious requirements. It is hardly necessary to point out that the Greek temple was not a place of worship: the act of worship took place in the open air, generally in the temenos, or enclosure surrounding the temple; and here the altar was placed. The image within the temple was not the object of worship; the altar architecturally is therefore entirely unrelated to it. The temenos itself and the altar in it are supposed by some to represent the forecourt with its altar in the Mycenæan house. Small subordinate altars there seem to have been within the building; and doubtless there were always two tendencies at work—that which is essentially Greek, and culminates in the highest flights of Greek philosophy and art, and the grosser and more superstitious side which was shared with others. It is not always easy to disentangle these elements, but the essential Greek characteristic, that which distinguishes them, rather than that which they share with all mankind, is, of course, the main question. Doubtless it is easier to discern it in the time of its full growth, but the tendency is there from the outset; and it is this tendency that made the Greeks what they were, and that was their contribution to the world of humanity. Whatever may have been the origin of the temple image, which it would be out of place to discuss here, it may briefly be said that in the golden age of Athens it was certainly not a fetish or an idol, in the sense of a spirit or spiritual quality embodied in a material object. Nor can it even be regarded as a symbol; it is rather the rational self-explanatory expression of a concept, viewed, it is true, from the æsthetic side, in which we may say Greek art preceded Greek philosophy. It was not an idol, for it was not regarded as possessing any power *per se*. It was not a symbol, for it rationally explained itself without interpretation. Least of all was it a portrait or likeness; it represented no traditional appearance, and pretended to no inspired vision on the part of the artist. But it did express the outward beauty of certain inward qualities mentally conceived, and these qualities were the qualities of deity. It would perhaps seem a little strained to describe the temple image as the formulated creed of the Greek religion æsthetically expressed, yet it is hardly possible to look upon the later images of Phidias and Scopas in any other light. The natural superstition and conservatism of humanity among the masses were counteracting tendencies, but at the same time declining ones, and the essential Greek characteristic tends away from these. The *intellectual* expression in *art* of a *religious* and *ethical* position is an instance of the complete balance of the æsthetic, intellectual, and moral nature, tersely embodied in their motto, *γνῶθι σεαυτόν*, and its concomitant *μηδὲν ἄγαν*, implying a complete knowledge and development of all that makes man man, and yet excess in nothing. It is this that makes the Greeks unique among the peoples of the world.

The temple may be considered as the casket containing the image, and it is on this account that it is the outside, rather than the inside, which on the whole receives the first consideration. At the same time it is æsthetically the embodiment of the same general principles as are contained in the image itself. The idealism of Greek religion in its highest aspect had not to wait for Plato for its exposition, in the case of those who could understand. It is already æsthetically complete at the time of Phidias, and beginning to advance to what perhaps may best be termed a transcendentalism, culminating, as far as extant work can be taken as evidence, in Scopas. Probably it was closely approached by Praxiteles, whom we are apt to misjudge from the weakness of the copies of his work, read in conjunction with certain minor traits in the Hermes. It would be hard to say whether Greek philosophy ever reached the parallel to this second position; and even architecture shows only the beginnings of it in buildings such as the Propylæa and the Erechtheum; although in sculpture it is already making its appearance in the work on the Parthenon, particularly in the frieze.

It is therefore natural that the plan of the temple should be simple and remarkable for its perfection rather than its size—an appropriate casket for its treasure. This is all in marked contrast to the Egyptian temple, which is extensive and of many courts and chambers. The decoration of the Egyptian temple is almost entirely within, and it is dark, vast, and mysterious. The Greek temple is comparatively small, and the open-air worship in the temenos surrounding the temple is characteristic of the Greek nature, frank, free, and outspoken, fearless in inquiry, and anxious to bring the light to bear upon all things. The

priestly caste and the artificial mystery of the Egyptian were entirely alien to the Greek mind. There was no priestly caste, and hardly anything that could be called a priestly order; and we find this reflected in the popular character of their ceremonies and the open simplicity of their religious architecture. To say that the extraordinary progress of thought in the 5th and 4th centuries, the most rapid and far-reaching that the world has seen, was either the result of these things or their cause, would perhaps be an error, but the interrelation is unmistakable, and they are alike the product of the Greek mind. It should be said that one important religious building which survives, at least in plan, is to some extent an exception to the general rule—the Telesterion (so-called temple of Demeter) at Eleusis (fig. 14).

FIG. 13.

To the simple primitive rectangular cella a second rectangular chamber is apparently an early addition; but throughout Greek history there is hardly a departure from the general rectangular plan, although circular religious buildings do occur, such as the Thymele at Epidaurus.



FIG. 14.

The simplest form is a three-walled building with an open end divided by two columns 'distyle in antis' (fig. 13). The trabs or architrave, resting upon a column, required a support at the other end that would satisfy the eye as well as merely subserve its utilitarian end. It was not sufficient, therefore, that it should rest upon the wall, but a special feature was built for its support, a flat column of rectangular section attached to the wall, called an anta. Hence, wherever we have an architrave passing from a column to a wall, there is invariably an anta to receive it with its own capital and base. This capital and base mark the double character of the member, and are not the same as those of the column, but are in some respects more closely related to the flat wall (fig. 13). The anta with its clearly defined function degenerates into the Roman pilaster of later date. It has been suggested that the origin of the anta is an end-facing to a rubble wall. This does not explain the capital and base, or its frequent position not at the end of a wall. On the other hand, the anta is never found where it does not support an architrave.

The 'distyle in antis' arrangement may be at one or both ends, as at Rhamnus or Eleusis (figs. 13, 14). There is, however, no entrance to the temple at the back, the temple image being placed at that end of the temple with its back to the wall—an arrangement occasionally modified in the larger examples. The next development that may be noticed is a portico in front, 'prostyle'; or one in front and one behind, which is by far the more common arrangement, 'amphiprostyle,' as in the charming little temple of Athene Nike Apteros at Athens and the one by the Ilissus, both destroyed in comparatively modern times, although the former has been re-built. In the largest examples a range of columns is carried right round the building, 'peristyle'; and sometimes there is a double row of columns, 'dipteral,' as in the temple of Olympic Zeus in Athens. A single line of



FIG. 15.

columns at a considerable distance from the central building, or naos, is termed 'pseudo-dipteral,' as at Selinus (fig. 15). A temple is also sometimes described according to the number of columns at the ends—hexastyle, octostyle, and so on.

In the smaller temples the roof was apparently of a single span, leaving the floor space perfectly free. But in larger temples we find columns inside. They may be down the centre, as in the Doric temple at Pæstum (fig. 15), or the Ionic temple at Locri. The temple of Apollo at Thermum in Ætolia

shows the same arrangement. More commonly we find two ranges of columns, forming three aisles, as



FIG. 16.

in the temple of Poseidon at Pæstum or the Parthenon. These were apparently in two tiers, one above the other, as those remaining *in situ* attest (fig. 16). The roof, presumably, was of timber, and was covered with tiles, frequently of marble.

The columns down the centre seem obviously to support the ridge piece of the roof; but the arrangement must have been very unsatisfactory, blocking the central view of the building, and the temple image if placed in the middle line. The three-aisled arrangement would also lend support to the roof; but clearly that cannot have been the only function, for in the case of the two largest Doric temples known, that at Selinus and the temple of Olympic Zeus at Athens, a considerable part of the roof, which was the same breadth throughout, was apparently without these supports.

In the temple of Zeus at Olympia the lower tier supported a gallery, which was approached by stairs at the east end. There seem also to have been stairs in other instances, as in the great Ionic temple of Artemis at Ephesus, which may have served the same purpose (fig. 14). But they also occur where there were no interior columns, as in the great temple of Apollo Didymæus at Miletus, in which case they presumably only led to the space above the ceiling. That ceilings existed below the roof proper, we know from the record of the finding of a corpse between the ceiling and the roof at Olympia. The columns seem partly to have served a *quasi*-ritual purpose, for we find that a low screen often existed between them, as in the Parthenon or the Zeus-temple at Olympia. In the case of the Parthenon and the temple of Artemis at Ephesus the columns are returned at the west end (fig. 14). Only the priests would be allowed within the screens, and possibly only favoured persons would be admitted to walk round the gallery or aisles, and so obtain varying views of the statue.

It is also possible that the two-aisled arrangement may have had something to do with the lighting of the cella, which has always been a difficult problem. There are several possibilities. (1) It is suggested that all the light was admitted through the great temple doors, and when the great brilliancy of the light in Greece is considered, it does become just conceivable. But let any one who holds this theory seriously examine such plans as those of the great temple at Selinus, the temple of Artemis at Ephesus, or the temple of Olympic Zeus at Athens. A distance of 115 ft. through two doors and five sets of columns will bedim almost any light. After all, it is hard enough to see the part of the Parthenon frieze *in situ*; and this is outside. The interior frieze at Phigalia would be absolutely invisible.

(2) A second suggestion is that of artificial light, which doubtless would produce a certain richness of effect with a statue made of such materials as gold and ivory. Of course one cannot disprove such a theory, but it is a strange and unsatisfactory arrangement.

(3) It is suggested that the light was largely given by what filtered through the marble tiles. This almost precludes the possi-



FIG. 17.

bility of a ceiling, as, even if spaces were left in it, such a comparatively dim light would by this additional screen be still further reduced. In this connexion, however, it seems worth noticing that in Byzantine architecture, which may even represent a Greek tradition, thin slabs of marble, deeply carved, so as to become still more translucent, were actually used as windows.

(4) Some sort of opening in the roof is suggested, which may be of two kinds. There might be one or more comparatively small openings in the tiles, or one single great hypæthral opening. The former receives some support from tiles found by Professor Cockerell at Bassæ (fig. 17), and the latter from sarcophagi found in the form of little model temples (fig. 17). We are told that the temple at Miletus was open, and had shrubs growing inside — the temple image being in a small shrine within the temple. Strabo, however, mentions it as peculiar and not intentional, but due to the fact that it was found to be too big to roof. Vitruvius says that the temple of Olympic Zeus at Athens was hypæthral, but the temple was not completed until long after Vitruvius' death, so that this statement is valueless. We may therefore assume, first, that these temples were exceptional, and secondly, that they were merely unfinished buildings. A hypæthral opening would certainly sadly mar the line of the roof, and would admit rain and moisture that would have been very destructive. However, it is generally



FIG. 18.

forgotten that we have an actually existing instance in the Pantheon at Rome, and what was possible in the one place is

conceivable in the other. There seems, in some cases at least, to have been a *parapetasma*, or curtain, before the image, which may have been to protect it from the weather. It has to be admitted that this theory, although in some ways the least pleasing, has a certain amount of real evidence in its support.

(5) The fact that the covers of the coffers in the ceiling of the peristyle of the Theseum are movable, and marked with letters, has been used as evidence that light was obtained thus by reflexion from the pavement below, and then presumably reflected a second time from the roof. The amount of light thus obtained would be exceedingly small, and to reduce it under any circumstances by putting the covers on would seem to be quite unnecessary. The markings were probably simply for the convenience of the builders, just as a mediæval or modern mason marks a stone cut for a special position.

(6) The presence of the internal columns, as pointed out above, suggests the most ingenious and beautiful theory of all, if not the most probable. It is the theory of Fergusson, who suggested a kind of clerestory somewhat after the Egyptian manner. It is a tempting theory, but there is nothing to support it, save the bare fact that Fergusson anticipated so many of the so-called discoveries of other people, more particularly upon Gothic architecture, and has shown the keenest insight of the writers that have ever written upon the subject. It may be noted that the system is possible without interior columns, although the windows can be made much larger when they are present. The theory receives some measure of support from the fact that the columns certainly were not used solely to decrease the span, as shown above, nor were there generally galleries (fig. 18).

Unless new evidence be found the problem is likely to remain unsolved.

In size the Greek temples corresponded to our parish churches rather than to our cathedrals, making up, however, for the lack of size in the extreme refinement of workmanship. Moreover, the mass of material was considerable, and the actual size of blocks enormous, many of them weighing as much as 20 or 30 tons. The largest stone at Baalbec, very likely of Greek workmanship, weighs approximately 1100 tons. The cella almost invariably faced the east in the case of temples of the gods, although there were slight variations, probably in order that the image might catch the first rays of the morning sun on the day sacred to the god. This may even be trusted to give us the dates of their erection, calculated astronomically. In the case of heroes, the general rule seems to have been the reverse, and the temple to have faced west. In this matter of orientation the Greek usage may be contrasted with the Roman, which paid no attention to such things.

Within the temple, the temple statue held the place of honour, facing the entrance, and from the 5th cent. B.C., at any rate, this statue was of colossal dimensions. That of Zeus at Olympia, we are told, was so large that he would have been unable to stand upright had he risen from his throne. It would add to this effect if the temple were not too large; and what size it had was clearly not for the accommodation of worshippers, but simply what was necessary for the display of the statue. Indeed, one must clearly grasp that the temple and its image were a unity, and cannot be considered apart.

Within the temple there would be a minor altar to the deity, upon which offerings of cakes, or things of vegetable nature, would be made; and there seem also in some other cases to have been altars to other than the principal deity of the place, as, for instance, to the hero Butes in the Erechtheum. In addition to the altars, there would be numberless votive offerings dedicated to the deity by the State, as in the case of spoils of war, or by private individuals. These would have a tendency to accumulate, and yet, from their nature, it would doubtless have been sacrilege to throw them away. There would be small portable objects too, that would not be suitable for public display, particularly when of great value. Moreover, the deity, especially in the case of Athene Polias, represented the city herself, and the wealth of the city and the wealth of the goddess were, in a sense, one. These circumstances combined to make it necessary that, attached to the temple, there should be some place for the storing of treasure. Hence, in the larger temples we frequently find at the back of the cella (*naós*, or temple proper) another chamber prolonging the rectangular plan, and used for the above purposes. Indeed, the treasure chambers of the temples may in some senses be regarded as the State banks. The porticoes themselves were not infrequently closed in by railings between the columns.

In considering the plans of the larger Greek temples, we must not suppose that they were built upon any one pattern. Quite the contrary is the case, and it would be truer to say that there are almost as many different arrangements as temples. Perhaps the two most irregular plans are those of the Erechtheum (fig. 19) and the temple of Apollo at Bassæ. [The building at Eleusis is not a temple.] The irregularity of the first of these



FIG. 19.

is well known, occasioned partly by the irregularity of the site, partly by its having to house the image of more than one deity, and possibly in order that it might include certain sacred objects, such as the marks of Poseidon's trident and the salt spring.

The temple at Phigalia is interesting partly because of the curious arrangement of attached Ionic columns running round the interior of the building with the beautiful frieze above, which form a series of small recesses the whole way round, but even more as showing the importance attached to the correct orientation of the statue. It was more convenient to build the temple with its longer axis from north to south; the cella, therefore, had a door in the east side of the temple through which the statue looked eastward (fig. 20). The effect of lighting, to one entering the temple from the north during the morning light, must have been most impressive, and the æsthetic value of such an arrangement would doubtless influence the architect. It is possible that the actual cella occupied the site of a smaller sanctuary of normal orientation. The temple in some respects bears a curious resemblance to the Heræum at Olympia.



FIG. 20.

It is a hexastyle building, and its long proportions with 15 columns down the sides are those of an

early temple, the tendency being for the later temples to be wider. The Ionic half columns attached to the short side walls also recall the



FIG. 21.

earlier building. Richter figures an Ionic capital from the Heræum, presumably from the interior, which, in the proportions of its volutes and the arrangement of the continuation of the volute-bead, strikingly anticipates the later capitals at Bassæ.*

The plans of one or two religious buildings other than temples may be briefly noted in conclusion. The Telesterion, the great hall at Eleusis (fig. 21), is the nearest approach in Greek architecture to the modern church, a building designed for holding a congregation of people. Here, in a large square hall, with a roof supported by seven rows of six columns, were performed the sacred drama and final initiation of the *mustai*, after they had been worked up to a condition of religious excitement by fasting and wandering in the dark. The whole hall was surrounded by tiers of seats as in a theatre, and it seems probable that there was a gallery above these. The building was erected against a hillside, and there were six entrances, two on each of the free sides. The plan is traditional, and takes the place of a much earlier and smaller building of similar design, whose foundations can be traced. Below this are the foundations of a third, smaller still. This building was begun by Ictinus, *c.* 425 B.C., and was not completed until *c.* 315 B.C., when Philon built the porch. We know that the temple had windows and shutters above, for the admission or exclusion of light during the ceremonies. This could have been admirably arranged by a clerestory system such as Fergusson suggests (fig. 18). Fergusson, however, makes the ridge of the roof run from N.E. to S.W., so that Philon's portico would have no pediment, which, though quite possible, particularly as it was intended to carry the portico round as a sort of stoa, may not have been the case. But the roof might have been as in fig. 22.

* The present writer has not been able to see this capital, and does not know where Richter saw it (fig. 4).

In his restoration, all but the end column of the central row are omitted; but although this would



FIG. 22.

provide a wider open space and better lighting, and account for the curious disposition of the columns, six on the sides and seven on the end, nevertheless it is not necessary. If most of Philo's interior columns were Doric, as those of his portico undoubtedly were, there might have been a single



FIG. 23.

range of the more slender Ionic columns down the centre instead of the two-storey arrangement, a device used where columns of two heights were required. Those in the so-called Parthenon-chamber of the Parthenon were possibly Ionic columns of the height of the two tiers of Doric columns in the cella. Unfortunately, little exists but the ground plan, and there are practically no architectural remains from which to deduce the character of the building. The existing remains are mainly of Roman date, with Ionic columns.

In the island of Delos are the remains of the so-called 'sanctuary of the bulls,' the building containing the horned altar of Apollo, reckoned among the seven wonders of the world. In this building is said to have taken place the celebrated dance of the Delian maidens. It was extraordinarily long and very narrow, 219 ft. by 19 ft. (fig. 23). It was built upon a granite base with marble steps. The building was divided into three parts, a long central hall, with a sunken area, in which presumably the dances took place, and at the southern end a Doric portico, possibly tetrastyle, possibly 'distyle in antis.' At the north end of the long hall was the chamber containing the altar. It was entered between two composite piers, formed by a half Doric column on the one side, and an anta with two recumbent bulls as a capital on the other side. Above was a frieze with bulls' heads upon the triglyphs. It is these bulls that give the name to the building.

The Thymele (*i.e.* 'place of sacrifice'), the so-called Tholos, at Epidaurus (fig. 24) is one of the few round buildings, used for religious purposes, that have come down to us. Others were the Arsinoeion at Samothrace sacred to the Great Gods, the very small building, if so it may be called, whose circular foundations may be found in the Asklepieion at Athens, and the *quasi*-religious Philippeion at Olympia, which may be regarded as a sort of Heroon of Philip. It seems to have been one of the loveliest buildings of antiquity. The foundations are probably of older date, but the principal remains date from the end of the 4th cent. B.C., when it was built by the architect Polyclitus (possibly a grandson of the famous sculptor). It was 107 ft.

in diameter, and stood upon ring walls 4 in number. Upon the outermost and widest were two circles of



FIG. 24.

columns, the outer Doric circle containing 26, and the inner Corinthian, 14. The inner rings are divided by openings and connected by cross walls in a rather curious way. The Doric entablature had large richly sculptural rosettes upon the metopes. The ceiling of the ambulatory was executed with beautiful marble coffers. The capitals of the Corinthian order, as has already been noted, are in their way the acme of Greek art. The use of the building has been much discussed, but its name, and its correspondence to its miniature prototype or copy in the temenos of the same god at Athens, point on the whole to the building covering a sacrificial pit. That sacred serpents may have been kept in the spaces between the ring walls is also conceivable, without interfering with the first theory.

In its own way Greek architecture has never been surpassed, and probably never will be. It has said the last word upon such problems as nicety of construction and proportion, and has carried the delicacy of ornamental treatment to the furthest limits that are visible to the most highly trained human eye. The Greeks may be said to have set out to achieve perfection, and they have achieved it. Their style was original and practically entirely self-created. It is not until we reach the architecture of the Gothic architects that we again find an entirely original creation. The Gothic architects, however, did not aim at perfection, but at something different, and they, too, in their way were unsurpassed. In order fully to comprehend even the general spirit of Greek architecture, it would be necessary to have some knowledge of other than religious buildings, which alone come properly within the scope of this article. But in the main it is an extension of the same principles, showing, however, more variety and power of practical adaptation than is perhaps evident in the sacred buildings here considered.

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J. B. STOUGHTON HOLBORN.

ARCHITECTURE AND ART (Hindu).—The adherents of all the Indian sects and religions used for their several purposes the art of each age and country, which was applied, as occasion arose, to the special requirements of each form of worship. No fundamental distinction, from the point of view of the historian of art, can be drawn between the buildings of the various religions, and often it is impossible to determine merely by considerations of style whether a given building or sculpture is Buddhist, Jain, or Brāhmanical. As Le Bon observes, 'l'architecture est beaucoup plus fille de la race que des croyances.' But from the point of view of the student of comparative religion, it is legitimate and necessary to examine the modes in which the general canons of art were applied to the service of particular creeds; and it is possible, subject always to the understanding that the history of Indian art as such is in the main independent of variation in creed, to treat the Buddhist and Jain works separately, and to concentrate attention on the artistic forms especially, although not exclusively, affected by Brāhmanical Hindus.

Relic-worship not being an orthodox Hindu practice, the construction of *stūpas* with their attendant railings seems to have been confined to the Buddhists and Jains. This fact alone eliminates a multitude of important works from an account of Hindu art in the restricted sense. The *chaitya* hall, likewise, not being serviceable for Hindu ritual, all the known examples of this kind of building, whether rock-cut or structural, are Buddhist. Although it is true that Brāhmanical Hinduism in one shape or other is older than either Buddhism or Jainism, and that the worship of Śiva, Kṛṣṇa, and the other deities now favoured by the masses of the people, may be traced back to a distant antiquity, the material remains of ancient Hinduism are extremely rare, and nearly all the really old monuments are either Buddhist or Jain. Whatever may be the correct explanation of this, the fact is certain, and affords a further practical justification for the separate treatment, for certain purposes, of specifically Hindu works as distinguished from those of Buddhist or Jain origin.

Architecture is the dominant art of India, and almost all other modes of art have been developed as accessories to it. No Hindu ever spontaneously set to work to produce a statue or picture for its own sake, as a thing of beauty by itself, without reference to an architectural composition. The few detached images which exist were usually intended to be worshipped, and were designed primarily for religious not artistic purposes. It is hardly necessary to observe that Indian life in all its aspects—art included—is governed by religious motives, and the consequence necessarily follows that all notable works of art in India are associated with buildings dedicated to the service of religion. The examples of architectural skill applied to purely secular purposes are rare and comparatively unimportant, while the minor decorative arts as applied to articles of ordinary use or special luxury are largely dependent upon mythological motives. Practically, therefore, a discussion of Hindu architecture and art must deal almost exclusively with the architecture and decoration of temples appropriated to Brāhmanical worship. The decoration is nearly all the work of the sculptor, the few examples of Indian painting deserving the name of works of art being all, probably without exception, either Buddhist or Muhammadan.

For a discussion of Hindu architecture generally, the reader is referred to Fergusson's standard work. Here it will suffice to observe that the essential part of every temple is the shrine, containing the image or symbol of the deity. That shrine very often is not the principal element in

the composition, being overshadowed by the subsidiary parts added for the purpose of giving the desired impression of dignity and mass—not for congregational uses, which Hindu ritual excludes. The leading styles of Brāhmanical temple architecture are six in number, namely, four northern and two southern. The northern styles are (1) the 'Indo-Aryan' of Fergusson; (2) the Gupta; (3) the Kaśmīrī; and (4) the Nepālese. The southern styles are (5) the Dravidian, and (6) the 'Chālukyan' of Fergusson, better designated as that of the Deccan. We proceed to indicate briefly the geographical distribution, chronology, characteristics, and principal examples of each of these six styles. The reader who desires to pursue the subject will find a great mass of information recorded in the selected works named at the end of this article, and in the unnamed multitude of other books dealing with Indian archæology.

1. The 'Indo-Aryan' style is characterized by the bulging steeple with curvilinear outlines which surmounts the shrine or sanctuary containing the image, and frequently is repeated in other parts of the design. In Orissa an early temple sometimes consists of nothing more than the steepled shrine with a low-roofed porch, devoid, or almost devoid, of pillars; but larger examples have additional pillared chambers. The great temples at Khajurāho, in Bundelkhand, dating from the time of the Chandel dynasty, are built on a cruciform plan, with naves and transepts, which results in buildings of imposing dignity. The style in one variety or another is found all over northern India, between the Himālayan and the Vindhyan mountains. The most elegant examples may be assigned to the period between A.D. 950 and 1200, but some of the Orissan temples are supposed by Fergusson to date from A.D. 600. As a rule the material is stone, but a few brick temples in this style are known. The best preserved specimen built of brick is that at Konch in Bihār, to the north-west of Gayā, which is assigned to the 8th cent. A.D. (Cunningham, *Archæol. S. Rep.* vol. xvi. p. 58). Certain brick temples in the Cawnpore district, rather earlier in date, probably had steeples of the standard form, but are too much ruined to admit of certainty. The most ancient known Brāhmanical temple is one built of decorated moulded bricks, discovered by Dr. Führer in 1891–92 at Ahichhattrā in Rohilkhand, and assigned for good reason to the first century B.C. (*Archæol. S. for N.W.P. and Oudh*, Progress Report, 1891–92). Unfortunately no description of the building has been published. It is probable that the style was developed originally in brick, but it is not known how it originated. Nor is the genesis of the curvilinear steeple easy to explain. The most plausible suggestion is that the design was modelled on the form of a frame of bamboos fastened together at the top. In modern buildings the tendency is to diminish greatly or dispense with the curvature of the outline, and many temples of recent date have slender straight-line spires, closely resembling European church forms.

2. The Gupta style, with which Fergusson was not acquainted, is so named because it was favoured by architects in the 4th and 5th centuries A.D., when the imperial Gupta dynasty ruled northern India (see art. CHANDRAGUPTA, 2, 3). The recorded examples, about thirteen in number, including a good one at Sānchi, are found in the southern parts of the United Provinces and the neighbouring territories. Cunningham, who first distinguished the style, enumerates its seven characteristic features as follows:

(1) Flat roofs, without spires of any kind, as in the cave temples; (2) prolongation of the head of the doorway beyond the jambs, as in Egyptian temples; (3) statues of the rivers Ganges and Jumna guarding the entrance door; (4) pillars with massive square capitals, ornamented with two lions back to back, with a tree between them; (5) bosses on the capitals, and friezes of a very peculiar form, like Buddhist *stūpas*, or beehives, with projecting horns; (6) continuation of the architrave of the portico as a moulding all round the building; (7) deviation of plan from the cardinal points (Cunningham, *Archæol. S. Rep.* vol. ix. p. 42, and *ib.* vols. i. v. x. xi. xiv. xvi. xx. xxi.).

3. The Kaśmīrī style is restricted to the valley of Kaśmīr and the Salt Range country in the Panjāb, between the Indus and the Jhelum. Its peculiarities are distinctly marked, and include pyramidal roofs, fluted pillars closely resembling those of the Doric order, arches with trefoil-shaped openings, and dentils as ornaments. The temples are usually small, but in some cases are surrounded by cloistered enclosures of considerable magnitude. The notion that such enclosures were intended to contain water is erroneous. The oldest example to which a date can be assigned is the well-known temple of the Sun, under the name of Mārtānda, which was built by order of king Lalitāditya, about A.D. 750 (Stein, trans. of *Rājatarangiṇī*). All known specimens of the style may be dated between A.D. 600 or 700 and 1200. The obviously Greek character of the pillars has attracted much attention from European writers; but it is not easy to ascertain how *quasi*-Doric pillars became the fashion in Kaśmīr and the Salt Range, and nowhere else. Perhaps, as Le Bon conjectures, the style was introduced from Persia during the rule of the Arsacids.

4. The Nepālese style in its characteristic form is mainly Chinese, being merely a local modification of the Chinese style described as follows by Dr. Bushell (*Chinese Art*, vol. i. p. 49, London, 1904):

'The most general model of Chinese buildings is the *t'ing*. This consists essentially of a massive roof with recurved edges resting upon short columns. . . . The roof is the principal feature of the building, and gives to it, when finished, its qualities of grandeur or simplicity, of strength or grace. To vary its aspect the architect is induced occasionally to double, or even to triple it. . . . The great weight of the roof necessitates the multiple employment of the column, which is assigned a function of the first importance. The columns are made of wood. . . . The stability of the structure depends upon the wooden framework; the walls, which are filled in afterwards with blocks of stone or brickwork, are not intended to figure as supports.'

Most of the Nepālese temples are constructed on the same principles, but the curvature of the roof is much less marked than in China. The small valley of Nepāl proper, measuring about 20 miles by 15, in which the three towns Kāthmāṇḍū, Pātan, and Bhātgāon, are situated, probably contains more temples than any other equal area in the world. The total number is believed to exceed 2000, of which the great majority are in the towns above named. In modern Nepāl the practices of Brāhmanical Hinduism and Buddhism are so inextricably mingled that the symbols of both religions are found indifferently in the shrines. Le Bon has rightly laid stress upon the proposition that the existing state of things in Nepāl goes a long way towards explaining the process by which, in India, Buddhism gradually melted away into Hinduism. The oldest monuments in Nepāl are Buddhist *stūpas*, which may go back to the time of Aśoka (wh. see); but the Indo-Chinese structures described above are all comparatively modern, none probably being older than A.D. 1500. The Nepālese temples built entirely of stone vary much in form, and do not admit of summary classification as regards style. Examples of some of the most notable varieties are given in Le Bon's plates.

5. The Dravidian style is so named because it is that prevalent in the countries occupied by peoples speaking Dravidian languages. These countries correspond closely with peninsular India to the south of the Krishna (Kistna) river, and are nearly equivalent to the Madras Presidency. The Brāh-

manical temples in this style may be devoted to the worship of either Śiva or Viṣṇu. Whichever god is specially honoured, the style is the same. Mr. Fergusson defined its characteristics as follows (p. 325):

The temples consist almost invariably of the four following parts, arranged in various manners, as afterwards to be explained, but differing in themselves only according to the age in which they were executed:

1. The principal part, the actual temple itself, which is called the *vimâna*. It is always square in plan, and surmounted by a pyramidal roof of one or more storeys; it contains the cell in which the image of the god or his emblem is placed.

2. The porches, or *maṇḍapas* (*mantapa*), which always cover and precede the door leading to the cell.

3. Gate pyramids, *gopuras*, which are the principal features in the quadrangular enclosures which always surround the *vimânas*.

4. Pillared halls, or *choultries*, which are used for various purposes, and are the invariable accompaniment of these temples.

Besides these, a temple always contains tanks or wells for water, to be used either for sacred purposes or the convenience of the priests; dwellings for all the various grades of the priesthood attached to it; and numerous other buildings designed for state or convenience.

Except in the earliest rock-cut examples, the roofs and almost all parts are bounded by right lines. The bulging curvilinear steeple of the 'Indo-Aryan' style is unknown in the south. The celebrated Seven Pagodas at Māmallapuram (Mahābalipur) near Madras, executed under the orders of Pallava kings in the 6th and 7th cents. A.D., and certain other rock-hewn temples in the North Arcot and Trichinopoly districts, mark the earliest known stages in the development of the style, which then showed distinct traces of specially Buddhist forms. At Ellora, in the Nizam's dominions, we possess in the magnificent rock-cut Kailās a perfect Dravidian temple, as complete in all its parts as any later example of the style. This edifice is made to simulate a structural temple by the complete cutting away of the superfluous rock, both externally and internally, so that the temple stands out freely. It was excavated in the reign of Kṛṣṇa I. Rāṣṭrakūṭa, about 760 A.D.

The great structural temples of Southern India are much later in date. They are extremely numerous, and remarkable for their vast size. Fergusson was personally acquainted with 'upwards of thirty great Dravidian temples, or groups of temples, any one of which must have cost as much to build as an English cathedral, some a great deal more.' One of the most notable is the temple erected at Tanjore by the victorious Chola king, Rājarāja, between A.D. 985 and 1011, which has the great merit of having been 'commenced on a well-defined and stately plan, which was persevered in till its completion.' The numerous inscriptions on this temple have been edited by Dr. Hultzsch (*South Indian Inscr.* vol. ii.). Other huge similar structures, less laudable in plan but still magnificent, are to be seen at Śrīraṅgam, Chillambaram, Rāmeśvaram, Madura, and many other places. The adequate description of any one of these would fill a large volume. The central corridor of the *choultris* at Rāmeśvaram has an uninterrupted length of 700 feet, that is to say 100 feet longer than the nave of St. Peter's; and these figures may suffice to give some notion of the large scale on which the southern temples are designed. Fergusson expressed the opinion that the Dravidian temples 'certainly do form as extensive, and in some respects as remarkable, a group of buildings as is to be found in provinces of similar extent in any part of the world—Egypt, perhaps, alone excepted; but they equal even the Egyptian in extent' (*op. cit.* p. 379).

6. The so-called Chālukyan style, which may be designated more fittingly by a territorial name as that of the Deccan, is, as Le Bon correctly observes, a transitional one connecting the forms characteristic respectively of the North and South. If we exclude the purely local and isolated styles of Kaśmīr and Nepāl, the two extremes of Indian architecture are formed by the Indo-Aryan and the Dravidian styles. The Gupta and Chālukyan both possess an intermediate character, and are to some extent related to each other. The latter has two well-marked varieties, that of Mysore, described by Fergusson, and that of Bellary, described by Rea.

The Chālukya empire, which comprised at its greatest extent most of Mysore, parts of the Nizam's territories, and some districts now British, was founded about A.D. 550, and lasted under the first dynasty for about two centuries. The second dynasty was established in A.D. 973, and came to an end, as a power of importance, about A.D 1190. But early in the 12th cent. the Chālukya kings lost the Mysore country, which passed under the government of a Hoysala dynasty, and the splendid temples at Halebīd (Dorasamudra) and Bēlūr, which excited the enthusiastic admiration of Fergusson, who gave the inappropriate name Chālukyan to their style, really were built under the orders of the Hoysala kings. The Bēlūr temple was erected by king Viṣṇu when he was converted from Jainism to Hinduism in A.D. 1117, and the Halebīd temple belongs to the same reign, a few years later (*Epigr. Carnatica*, vol. v. p. 86).

The Mysore style, as described by Fergusson, is characterized by a richly carved base on which the whole temple stands, polygonal star-shaped in plan, with a stepped conical roof, not rising high enough to become a steeple, and a peculiar vase-like ornament crowning the summit. The Bellary variety, to which Rea has devoted a monograph, has a rectangular plan, and the buildings would be classed more properly as Dravidian than as a subdivision of the Deccan style. Rea, while using the name Chālukyan, admits that the temples discussed by him 'might best be described as an embodiment of Chālukyan details engrafted on a Dravidian building.' These works seem to belong wholly to the 12th century. The decorative sculpture is remarkable for its marvellous intricacy and artistic finish even in the minutest details, the ornament generally being completely undercut, and sometimes attached to the solid masonry by the most slender of stalks. The effect is described as being that of the incrustation of foliage placed upon the wall. The beautiful style of Western India, sometimes described as the Jain style, may be regarded as a variety of the Chālukyan.

Space will not permit of lengthy discussion of the manner in which the art of sculpture has been applied in countless temples to the service of Brāhmanical religion. The flat bas-reliefs, so much esteemed by the early Jains and Buddhists, have been rarely, if ever, used by the more orthodox sects, but the change of practice seems to have been due to modifications of taste rather than to religious motives. Regarded from the artistic point of view, no sound distinction can be drawn between the sculpture of the Brāhmanical Hindus and that of the rival religions. As a matter of fact, however, the early bas-reliefs are all Buddhist or Jain, while the later figure sculpture in high relief is predominantly Hindu. Each figure, individually, is rarely of much account as a work of art, but the mass of sculpture exhibited on a temple of the best age, when regarded, in the manner intended by the artist, as an essential part of the architectural design, produces on the mind an impression of extraordinary magnificence, and extorts from the most unwilling critic expressions of fervid admiration. The exuberance of fancy, and the patience in execution displayed by the Hindu sculptors, are almost incredible, and cannot be appreciated without study of either the original works or large-scale photographs.

Hindu mythology supplies the subjects for the decoration of a multitude of minor articles of art manufacture in metal, wood, ivory, and stone, made in many parts of the empire. Numerous examples exist which display rich fancy in design, and unsurpassed delicacy in execution. The

magnificent manuscript of the Razm Nāmah—a Persian abstract of the Mahābhārata—preserved in the Royal Library at Jaipur, exhibits the myths of Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, and other Hindu deities as represented in colour by artists of Akbar's time (A.D. 1588), trained in the Persian style. The illustrations cost four lakhs of rupees, or more than £40,000.

The existence of extant fragmentary and corrupt copies proves that a considerable body of Sanskrit treatises dealing with the rules of Indian architecture, both religious and civil, existed at one time. The dates of the composition of these treatises have not been ascertained, and the little that is known about their contents is to be found almost exclusively in the essay by Rām Rāz, who collected the remains of the architectural literature procurable in southern India, and published the results of his inquiry in 1834. The works examined by him are certainly ancient, because they lay down rules for the provision of sites for Jain and Buddhist temples, as well as for those of orthodox sects; but the materials for a more exact determination of their dates do not seem to exist. The following abstract of the contents of the treatise named *Māyāmata* will suffice to give a notion of the nature of these scriptures, known as the *Śilpaśāstras*.

The work 'opens with the mystical rites performed in honour of the *Vāstu*, or the spirit presiding over the ground on which buildings are erected, and proceeds to give rules for the examination of the soil, the preparation of it for buildings in general, the construction of a gnomon for the purpose of determining the cardinal points, the division of the ground-plan into several parts for religious as well as domestic purposes, and the performance of sacrifices previous to the commencement of the work; after which it describes the several sorts of villages, cities, and fortresses, *upapiṭhas* or pedestals, the *adhiṣṭhānas* or bases, the *pādas* or pillars, the *prastaras* or entablatures, the ornaments used in cavettos under the cupola, the seats raised for the reception of idols, the *śikharas* or the domes [*sic*, 'towers'] of temples, the ceremonies observed in laying the first and the last stone of an edifice, the several sorts of temples, the courts by which they are surrounded, the pyramidal gateways, the *mantapas* [*maṇḍapas*] or porticoes, the altars to be raised in the front of temples; and concludes with instructions for the carving of images,' etc. (Rām Rāz, p. 6). If an editor, skilled alike in Sanskrit and the technicalities of architecture, could be found, it is clear that an adequate edition of one of these treatises would throw much light upon the ideas of the Dravidian architects.

LITERATURE.—The only book dealing with Indian art generally is Maindron, *L'Art indien*, Paris, 1898, a small, popular work. For the architecture the standard authority is Fergusson, *Hist. of Indian and Eastern Architecture*, London, 1876, reprinted 1899; but a revised edition is needed and promised. Le Bon, *Les Monuments de l'Inde*, is valuable, with fine plates, and gives the best account of Nepālese architecture. Special monographs are, Rea, *Chālukyan Architecture*, Arch. Surv. of India, New Series, vol. xxi., Madras, 1896; and Fergusson and Meadows Taylor, *Architecture in Dharwar and Mysore*, London, 1866. Cunningham's *Archæological Survey Reports*, 24 volumes, and numerous other publications of the Survey by Burgess and various writers give copious unsystematic information on architecture and sculpture. For the minor arts generally the best authority is Birdwood, *The Industrial Arts of India*, London, 1880. The most magnificent publication on the subject is Hendley, *Memorials of the Jeypore Exhibition, 1883*, in four large quarto volumes. The *Journal of Indian Art and Industry*, 16 vols., may also be consulted with advantage. Rām Rāz, *Essay on the Architecture of the Hindus*, London, 1834, is the sole authority for the ancient Indian literary tradition of architectural laws, as practised in the south. Burgess explains the nature of the architectural *śāstras* of Gujrāt in ch. ii. of vol. ix., *Archæol. Survey of Western India*. An important work, E. B. Havell, *Indian Sculpture and Painting* (Murray), is announced as in the press. VINCENT A. SMITH.

ARCHITECTURE (Jewish).—Materials for a history of ancient Hebrew architecture are accumulating to an extent that must upset some conventional theories. The new Elephantine papyri reveal the existence in Egypt, at the end of the 5th cent. B.C., of a Jewish temple, with five portals of sculptured stone, copper-hinged doors, cedar-wood roofing, and gold and silver chalices. Flinders Petrie, again, has been able to identify the Onias Temple, which was also built in Egypt more than two centuries later. Here we have a tower-like structure, with massive walls of drafted stone, a substantial brick retaining wall, and Corinthian ornamentation. Half a century later Jewish architecture is represented by such buildings as the palace of Simon the Maccabee unearthed by R. A. S. Macalister at Gezer. The remains of Herodian buildings in Jerusalem, and the ruins of synagogues in Galilee, dating from the 1st cent. A.D., carry on the story. These stone synagogues seem to have had on the façade three doors,—one in the centre, large, the others at the sides, smaller. The Galilæan synagogues were built south and north, with entrance in the south. The interior (as at Tell Ḥum, Meiron, and Kefr Birim) was divided into three by two rows of pillars. The central space of the Tell Ḥum synagogue was surrounded by a gallery on three sides, and traces of similar galleries have been found elsewhere (Schürer[4], ii. p. 521). If these structures were meant for women, then the women's gallery, which became a distinctive feature of synagogues only after the Middle Ages, is traceable to an older date.

Though there was no legal prescription on the subject, the favourite shape for synagogues was the basilica, and square or oblong buildings are still the prevalent form everywhere. The Temple courts, where prayer-meetings were held, were rectangular, and the famous synagogue of Alexandria (destroyed in the time of Trajan) was a basilica. In modern times a number of octagonal synagogues have been built, but the basilica form remained constant despite the changes due to local style and taste. In Italy the Renaissance, in Spain the Moorish, influence, modified the decorations and columns; but there were certain essential requirements which kept the synagogue to one general plan. There was first the ark to contain the scrolls of the Law, secondly the Reading Desk or Almemar, thirdly the Entrance. The ark was by preference placed in the east, though this rule was frequently neglected. The Almemar (properly *al-minbar*, Arabic for 'pulpit') was mostly a rectangular structure occupying the centre of the building. It was used primarily for reading the Scriptures, but in Spanish synagogues it was also the place whence the prayers were read. In many parts, especially in the East, the prayers are still read from a depressed part of the floor near the ark, to comply with the text, 'Out of the depths have I cried unto thee' (Ps 130[1]). One of the greatest changes in synagogue architecture in modern times is due to the alteration in the position of the Almemar. This is now placed on the east side in many synagogues, forming with the ark one ornate structure containing the receptacle for the scrolls and the platform for precentor and preacher. Many of the older synagogues made no provision for a pulpit; for sermons were not regularly delivered in the synagogue until the 19th century. The place for the sermon was the school, or Beth Hammidrash. This modification of the position of the Almemar has also affected the seating arrangements. In former times (and also at present in the majority of cases) the benches for men ran lengthwise on two sides of the building, the centre being empty with the exception of the Almemar. Nowadays the seats tend rather to face the ark, so that the worshippers are always turned to the east, the posture required during certain parts of the service. In the older mediæval synagogues there were no galleries for women. Women had a separate prayer-room, which opened into the synagogue by a small window. When the synagogue proper became used by large numbers of women (as began to be habitual from the 14th cent.), the gallery became a prominent feature of synagogue structure. The gallery ran round three sides of the building, and

was protected by a lattice sufficiently thick to render the occupants of the gallery invisible from below. This grille has, however, been abandoned in modern times.

A somewhat unreasonable preference for a pseudo-Moorish style of decoration has prevented synagogue architects from adopting classical styles, which are really more suited to the purpose. This, however, is now changing, and there are some fine specimens of classical types in various parts of the world. The contrast between the exterior and the interior of the synagogue has often been noted. The Talmud preferred an elevated site for the synagogue, but it became impolitic for the Jews to draw upon themselves the attention of the world by making their places of worship too prominent. Hence there grew up a tendency towards mean exteriors with low elevations. Compensation was sought by deepening the floor. In the case of the old Karaite synagogue in Jerusalem the building is practically under ground. In Persia it was long forbidden for the synagogue to rise higher than any neighbouring mosque. It should, in passing, be remarked that in the East a good many synagogues resemble mosques, and the domes of Moorish buildings in Spain have found wide imitation among the synagogues of Europe and America. Though the exteriors of synagogues were often poor, this was compensated for by the beauty of the interiors. In many cases, indeed, sobriety and even severity of taste prevailed, and no ornament at all was admitted. But the general tendency was towards ornate decoration: the lion, flowers, fruits, interlaced triangles, and other geometrical patterns (on Arab models), elaborate gilding, and arabesques, fine ornamentation of lamps, and such utensils of worship as are described in the article on ART (Jewish)—in these directions much was possible. There were, by preference, twelve windows in the synagogue, but this number was not general. There were painted windows in the Cologne synagogue in the 12th cent., but it is only in recent times that such ornament has become at all common. Much more often the floor was richly covered with marble mosaics. A feature which added effect to the synagogue was the open space round it. This was sometimes laid out as a garden; but, even when merely a court-yard, it lent itself to the marriage and other processions in which the Jews were adept.

LITERATURE.—See under ART (Jewish).

I. ABRAHAMS.

ARCHITECTURE (Mithraic).—According to Porphyry (*de Antro Nymph.* 6), Zoroaster had consecrated to Mithra in the mountains of Persia 'a cave adorned with flowers and watered by springs,' and from that fact the adherents of the sect had derived and kept the custom of performing their initiatory rites in natural or artificial caverns. Modern investigation has confirmed the correctness of at least this latter statement. The worshippers of the Persian god, in order to carry on their worship, often took up their abode in rock-caves, and chose by preference for their sanctuaries places where a spring rose, or, at any rate, where water was in the neighbourhood. The origin of this custom is more doubtful. Does it go back, as Porphyry states, to ancient Zoroastrianism? We know that in the time of Herodotus the Persians offered their sacrifices on the tops of the mountains (Herod. i. 131). Caverns may have been the first places where they put their gods under shelter (cf. Strabo, xi. 7, 5, p. 510 C). On the other hand, caverns have served as temples in such different religions and among so many various races (Bötticher, *Tektonik der Hellenen*, ii.[2] 414 ff.; W. R. Smith, *Rel. Sem.*[2] p. 197 ff.) that it is difficult to ascertain what influences may have enforced the universally obeyed law that Mithra must be worshipped in subterranean *spelæa*.

Sometimes the followers of the sect chose their abode in a spacious cavern, whose mouth then marked the threshold of the sanctuary which was entirely contained within it. Sometimes, on the other hand, the narrower caverns served simply as a shrine to the temple which extended before their entrance. When a subterranean cavern was unobtainable, they sometimes chose a circular group of rocks which could be roofed in, or they hollowed out the side of a hill, so that at least two of the four sides of the building might be formed by the solid rock. Often they were even content to carve the image of the bull-slaying Mithra on a vertical rock, which served as a support for a structure of which it formed the back wall.

Thus we see the sanctuary gradually becoming separate from the mountain which at first enclosed it completely, and we can accordingly follow the successive stages of a development which little by little rendered the temple independent of the rock, from which it was originally inseparable.

A last step was taken when in the towns or the plains, far from any rock-cave or natural spring, there arose 'mithræums' without a natural support on any side. But they were always built in imitation of the caverns which they superseded, and continued to bear the technical name of *spelæum* (Justin Martyr, *Dial. cum Tryph.* 8; Porphyry, *de Antro Nymph.* 6; Tertull. *de Corona*, 15; for inscriptions, cf. Cumont, *Mon. Myst. Mithra*, ii. 536), although sometimes they received the more general name of *templum*. These two terms, like *specus*, *spelunca*, *antrum* (or *ædes*) and *sacrarium* (which on rare occasions are substituted for them), are used to denote one and the same kind of structure, as has been definitely shown by M. Wolff (*Das Mithrasheiligtum*).

We possess at present the exact plans of a score of these subterranean temples which have been drawn in Italy, in Pannonia, in Dacia, in Brittany, and especially in Germany. Their likeness to each other proves that an almost uniform type was everywhere adhered to. In these temples, the orientation of which is very variable and not settled by any liturgical rule, different portions may be distinguished. They are enumerated in an inscription of Apulum (*CIL* iii. 1096) which mentions 'cryptam cum porticibus et apparatorio et exedra.'

A portico (*porticus*, *CIL* iii. 1096, 3960) faced the street. It was doubtless composed of a colonnade surmounted by a pediment. Thence one entered into a large hall, the *pronaos*, situated on the level or above the level of the ground (*CIL* xiv. 61). Through the wall at the back a door led as a rule into a smaller hall, the *apparatorium* (*CIL* iii. 1096, 3960), that is to say, doubtless, the sacristy, where preparation was made for the celebration of the mysteries. From this sacristy, or, when it was absent, immediately under the portico, there was a flight of steps by which descent was made into the sanctuary proper, the *crypta*. This crypt imitated the appearance of the gloomy caves which it represented; occasionally even the walls were made to look like rock, and the crypt was always roofed with a vault, in which the worshippers saw an image of the sky. This was sometimes constructed in masonry, *e.g.* at St. Clement in Rome (Cumont, *op. cit.* ii. No. 19, fig. 30); sometimes the effect was produced by an arched and plastered ceiling. This ceiling was then attached to a gable roof covered with tiles, as is shown by the recent excavations at Carnuntum (*ib.* No. 228[bis]; cf. i. 60, n. 1). The crypt consisted first of all of a kind of platform which occupied the whole width of the hall; the remainder of the hall was divided into

three parts—in the middle a passage of an average width of 2½ metres, and on the two sides massive ledges of masonry stretching along the side-walls of the temple. The average height of these was about 80 centimetres, and the width about 1½ metres.

Modern archæologists have applied to the passage the name *cella*, and to the ledges that of *podia*, but these terms do not appear in the inscriptions, like the Latin names previously cited. Attempts have been made to compare this arrangement of the 'mithræums' with the division of churches into three aisles, but the likeness is purely superficial. The *podia*, whose upper surfaces are slanting and whose width is not great, were occupied by the worshippers, who knelt there, while the *cella* was reserved for the officiating priests. Here it was that the victims were sacrificed, and that the ceremonies of initiation took place. In a 'mithræum' of Ostia (*ib.* 84*d*), 7 semicircles marked in the pavement undoubtedly indicated the places where the priest paused to invoke the planets represented on the sides of the lateral ledges. In other parts certain receptacles appear to have held the water employed in purifications.

At the end of the sanctuary facing the entrance there always rose a great piece of sculpture, the venerated image of Mithra sacrificing the bull (cf. art. ART [Mithraic]), and before that were generally placed two altars, one of which seems to have been especially dedicated to the sun and the other to the moon. The extremity of the *spelæum* where the great bas-relief was placed had no absolute fixity in its arrangement. Sometimes it occupied an apse (*absidata*, *CIL* iii. 968; *exedra*, iii. 1096), making a projection in the exterior wall at the back; sometimes, on the other hand, two walls sloping inwards formed a niche where the sculpture was placed. Occasionally the bas-relief, revolving on itself in this niche or apse, could, during the services, present successively its two sculptured sides to the worshippers. There were also cases when the architect dispensed with these additions. The wall at the back was plain and the sculpture was made to fit into a recess in its thickness, or to rest upon a base. The part of the temple, generally raised above the rest, where this sacred image was displayed, formed a kind of inner shrine accessible apparently only to the priests, and sometimes screened off by wooden railings.

It is difficult to settle the origin of the arrangement in the 'mithræums' which we find in vogue under the Empire. We have no exact information regarding the sanctuaries of Mithra in the East, and we do not know if the plan adopted in Europe was already followed there. We are, however, in a position to state that the portico and the pediment were imitated from the Greek temples, which transmitted their Greek name, *pronaos*, to this fore-part of the building. We may surmise that the apse, which, moreover, is often wanting, is borrowed from the Roman basilicas, but the interior arrangement of the crypt remains as yet inexplicable. The division of this hall into three parts of unequal height does not offer, so far as the present writer knows, any likeness to any other kind of ancient architecture, and its resemblance to the early Christian basilicas is purely superficial. We must not conceive of these 'mithræums' as structures of vast proportions. Covered as they were by a single roof, they could not easily be enlarged. The most considerable of them are 20 metres in length by 6 to 8 in width, and not more than a hundred persons could find room on the stone ledges. Thus there are often several temples collected in the same place, even in very small towns (five at Ostia, four at Aquincum and Apulum, three at Heddernheim and Friedberg, etc.).

These small buildings were brilliantly ornamented. In the richest sanctuaries, marbles and mosaics covered the ground, the walls, and even the roof; in the poorest, stucco-work and plaster-coatings decorated with brilliant colours sufficed. When the lamps were lit, this gorgeous ornamentation was intended to harmonize with the various colours of the bas-reliefs and the statues in order to produce a more vivid effect.

Often, instead of building a temple for a body of worshippers, wealthy Romans used to place a cellar at their disposal. The traditional plan of the 'mithræums' had then to be modified in accordance with local peculiarities. The division of the crypt into three parts was always preserved, but the accessory constructions, the *pronaos* and the apse, disappeared. The *apparatorium* was removed to a contiguous hall, which was used as a sacristy. It is thus often difficult, in examining ruins, to ascertain where the owner's oratory ended and where his kitchen commenced.

LITERATURE.—Wolff, 'Ueber die architektonische Beschaffenheit der Mithrasheiligtümer' in *Das Mithrasheiligtum von Gross Krotzenburg*, Cassel, 1882, pp. 85, 101; Cumont, *Textes et monuments figurés relatifs aux mystères de Mithra*, Brussels, 1894–99, i. 54–67, of which we have given a résumé here. Nothing of importance has been found since the publication of this book. The principal discoveries are those of the 'mithræum' of Housesteads [Borcovicus] on the Roman Wall (Bosanquet, *Archæologia Æliana*, 1904, xxv. 258 ff.), and of Saalburg (near Frankfort), which has been re-constructed by the skill of the architect Jacobi, and can be visited.

FRANZ CUMONT.

ARCHITECTURE (Muhammadan).—*Introduction.*—Muhammadan architecture deserving of the name is that style of architecture which has sprung up alongside of the Islāmic civilization, and which borrows from the very characteristics of the social conditions in the midst of which it has been developed a distinctly peculiar and well-defined impress. As a matter of fact, it should be remarked that, although architecture is an art whose productions originate in the fulfilling of an actual need and the accomplishing of a useful purpose, and consequently are primarily utilitarian, yet, among all the arts, it is that one which expresses itself in the least realistic way, which demands for its comprehension the greatest power of abstract thought, and whose monuments are able to produce on the mind the most refined impressions. One might almost say that architecture, with music, is one of the most striking creations of the human mind, since, like music, it borrows its means of expression not from concrete things, as sculpture and painting do, but from successions of abstractions, of relations, of emotions and associations which affect the least material portions of our being. Architecture is an art whose origins lie far back in the past, and yet even at the earliest period the fundamental characteristics of architectural composition were clearly defined. This remarkable fact is due to the simplicity of the component parts, the regularity of the plans, the grandeur of the façades, and the mystery inseparable from sanctuaries dedicated to the Deity. As a matter of fact, it is in the construction of temples that the first architects worthy of the name produced their first works. The temple is thus the first building on which the newly-developed human spirit desired to impress a more lofty character than that required to satisfy the material needs of the utilitarian. Men aimed at giving to the building intended for the worship of Deity a character superior not only to that given to ordinary human dwellings, but to that of royal palaces.

When Islām came on the scene, the human race had already travelled far from its origins, and the religious idea had already found diverse expression in the monuments of Chaldæa, Assyria, Babylonia.

Egypt, Persia, India, Greece, Etruria, Rome, and Byzantium. Thus the first Muhammadan temples, the first mosques during the early centuries of the Hijra, assumed no other forms than those derived from imitation of monuments already existing where the new religion was established by right of conquest. The first architects and artificers of Islām, therefore, had no other means of expression than the procedure or tradition of the art of the Byzantines, Copts, Sasanians, or Indians. But these pre-existing elements were applied to new purposes: the new religion had neither mysteries, nor sacraments, nor priesthood properly so called. None of its temples was to enshrine the wonder-working image of a Deity, or of a saint, or the Divinity itself contained in consecrated elements. The mosque was only a place of prayer, of preaching, and, up to a certain point, of instruction. It was, properly speaking, a place of meeting in the general sense of that word (the *jāmi'*, *jama*, *gama*). The first mosque at Medīna, where the Prophet collected his earliest disciples, was an enclosure open to the sky, having one part sheltered by a flat roof supported by wooden pillars covered with plaster, and the Prophet ascended some steps in order to preach.

Here, then, we have in their simplest form the elements of the mosque—a court, porches to shelter the worshippers, the pulpit for the preacher to stand in, and the recess, or *miḥrāb*, the situation of which indicates the *qibla*, or the direction in which one ought to turn in order to have one's face directed towards the central shrine, the Ka'ba of Mecca.

This Ka'ba, the real sanctuary of Islām, and the only one which has a supernatural significance, is not a mosque. It is the 'House of God' built by Abraham, and there is set in the side of it a miraculous and Divine stone. It is the Egyptian 'naos,' or rather the Jewish 'ark,' where the invisible and indivisible God is present. But it is not the prototype of the mosque. The form specially typical of the mosque is the pillared hall, like the 'Amr mosque at Cairo, the mosque of Sidi Okba at Kairwan, the primitive al-Aqṣā mosque at Jerusalem, the mosque of Cordova, the great mosque of Samarra, etc. The origin of this form is easily explained when we remember that in order to recite their prayers the Musalmāns are arranged in ranks parallel to the wall at the end of the mosque where the *miḥrāb* is, which indicates the direction of Mecca. This is the original and specially Islāmic plan of a place for worship.

The Muhammadans, whose energetic advance had, so to speak, extended the limits of the ancient world, had continued their progress from the Pillars of Hercules to Java; and from the early centuries of the Hijra the empire of Islām united under one faith the most widely differing nations. The very diversity of the races conquered by Islām was destined to give rise to variety in Muhammadan architecture, for wherever the new religion was planted, it found itself face to face with fully formed civilizations possessing a well-defined architecture, and often very skilful workmen. The result was that the architecture of the early Muhammadan buildings was the native architecture, more or less strongly affected by new ideas, and without the representations of living creatures. We ought then to divide the study of Muhammadan architecture into as many sections as these distinct nationalities. But it is possible to bring them under more simple divisions. All Muhammadan buildings, or rather all the schools of Muhammadan architecture, may be arranged in five great subdivisions. (By this term 'school' is meant the division or distinction of styles in the same way that, with regard to painting, we use the expressions 'school of Bologna,' 'school of Florence,' 'school of Venice,' etc.) Under these headings, we may enter all hitherto existing monuments without consideration of the periods in which they occur. This method of subdivision seems sufficiently justified, firstly by geographical, secondly by historical considerations. These great subdivisions will then take the following titles:—(1) The Syro-Egyptian school (comprising monuments of Egypt, Syria, and Arabia). (2) The Moorish or Maghrib school (monuments of Algeria, Morocco, Tunis, Spain, and Sicily). (3) The Persian school (monuments of Persia, Mesopotamia, Armenia, Caucasus, Turkestan, Afghanistan, and Baluchistan). (4) The Turkish or Ottoman school (monuments of Constantinople, Anatolia, and Turkey in Europe). (5) The Indian school (monuments of Hindustan). We shall not here speak of the mosques of China, which have nothing of special interest for us, since they are built in the pure Chinese style, and are not distinguished by any characteristic from the architecture used in the public or religious buildings of China (see ARCHITECTURE [Chinese]).

General characteristics of Muhammadan architecture.—Muhammadan architecture, as stated above, is derived, generally speaking, from local architectures modified by Muhammadan ideas. What are these ideas, and in what did they differ from former ones? This is the principal question to settle; for architecture may be considered in a general way as the art of carrying out given ideas by methods which allow the materials at one's disposal to be employed to the best practical and æsthetic advantage.

These ideas in the department with which we are now more particularly engaged, that is to say, religious architecture, are, as we already said when treating of the mosque, entirely different from those governing Christian churches or ancient temples. Other Muhammadan buildings are also inspired by a religious purpose; these are the schools, the *madrasas*—colleges or academies—the *zāwiyas*, or places of meeting, and the shrines to which are attached religious endowments, such as schools, fountains, and alms-houses.

Another condition to be fulfilled was the exclusion of representations of living creatures from the ornamentation used. Although it may be proved that this restriction hardly applied except to religious buildings, and that the texts, as well as the monuments, show us that representations of living creatures were not systematically excluded from the ornamentation of private or public buildings, palaces, houses, etc., it is none the less true that, in general, the architectural decoration of Muhammadan buildings has conformed to this principle. Consequently all the subjects of decoration in Muhammadan art have been found in ornamentation borrowed from the vegetable kingdom and from geometry.

The first architects, whether Muhammadans or Christians, who raised the mosques of Islām drew from sources which differed according to their country. But these influences, whether Byzantine, Coptic, Sasanian, Indian, Africo- or Ibero-Latin, have been in a fashion mingled, and as it were interpenetrated, often because of circumstances quite peculiar to Islām. These will be indicated presently. Finally, nomadic art, if we may use such an expression, had a profound influence on the art of Islām. The art of nomads, which includes the ornamentation of tents, the decoration of saddlery, of carpets, of hangings—an art which may still be studied in the productions of the nomadic tribes from the extreme west of Morocco to the centre of Turkestan—which is based upon tradition, and sometimes reaches a high pitch of refinement, has not existed without exercising a remarkable and important influence on the internal

and external ornamentation of buildings. Of this we shall find numerous examples throughout the course of this article.

The Arab, a nomad in a special degree, developed, among all the nations where he planted his new religion, a taste for distant journeys, and the prescribed ritual of the Meccan pilgrimage has been the most striking token of this. Arabic literature, so rich in stories of travel, also witnesses to it. This pilgrimage, binding on every Musalmān, has brought into contact the most widely differing peoples; and it has been, so to speak, by a kind of reciprocal interfusion that the most heterogeneous civilizations have seen certain of their elements mix with foreign ones to form Muhammadan civilization.

From the point of view of the arts these reciprocal influences were not less remarkable. The artificers who made the pilgrimage to Mecca, having arrived in the Holy City, and being impelled thereto by an instinct of affinity, certainly did not fail to enter into relations with their fellow-tradesmen who were also there on pilgrimage. From this there undoubtedly arose an interchange of ideas and of skill; and all the more because, this journey being excessively laborious, the less wealthy of these workmen, either in going or in returning, were obliged to halt on their way in order to work at their trade to provide the means necessary for accomplishing the next stage of the journey. It is, on a much larger scale, a similar experience to that of the travelling journeymen of France in the Middle Ages.

Finally, the enormous extent of Islām from China to Morocco facilitated commercial interchange in a very remarkable way. Ships by sea and caravans by land brought the silks, perfumes, and precious things of the East to the West in a very short time. It is therefore quite natural that Chinese art should have in many cases influenced that of Turkestan and Persia, and that Indian art should have been able to exercise on the artistic products of Mesopotamia, Syria, Egypt, Persia, and even of Spain, an influence which certain passages of the historians explain to us, and of which we obtain a good idea from the observations to be made on many of the decorative details.

In bringing this preliminary survey to a close, we must dwell on one very remarkable aspect of Muhammadan art. It is a common, indeed hackneyed, remark, that Oriental *luxury* is the standing example of a degree of wealth and extravagance which has rarely been reached in other civilizations. This is, in fact, a special characteristic of Islām, and is explained partly by the peculiarity of the Muhammadan mind and partly by the events of history.

The chief characteristic of the Muhammadan mind, although not the absolute fatalism so often charged against it, is entire submission to the will of God. This submission accordingly implies the possibility of reverses of fortune which can in a short time destroy the greatest prosperity. The natural result of the mutability of fortune is to incite men to enjoy as rapidly and as intensely as possible the transitory possessions which fortune places at their disposal. The precariousness of absolute power and the enormous resources which despotism placed in the hands of the Khalīfs both had the same result. Despots, like common folk, were obliged to enjoy rapidly the means of luxury which they had within their reach. To this may be traced the extremely luxurious character of Muhammadan architecture, and also, unfortunately, the want of solidity in most of the private dwellings, palaces, mansions, or country-seats. The buildings dedicated to worship, or built upon plans inspired by religious ideas, were, as a rule, more durably constructed.

1. **The Syro-Egyptian school.**—This division is treated in a separate article—ARCHITECTURE (Muhammadan in Syria and Egypt)—and will not be discussed here.

2. **The Moorish or Maghrib school.**—The term 'Maghrib' indicates the whole of Northern Africa lying, of course, west of Egypt. Two elements have contributed to form the Muhammadan art of the Maghrib: on the one side the local traditions, Roman, Romano-Berber, and Byzantine in Africa, Roman, Romano-Iberian, and Visigothic in Spain; and, on the other, the introduction of Oriental architecture which appears to have been in the first place the Byzantine architecture of Syria, for certain Syrian forms seem to have been introduced directly into Africa. To be convinced of this, one has only to compare the Aghlabid gates of the great mosque of Tunis and the eastern façade of the great mosque of Sfax with the lateral façades of the great church of Qal'at Sim'ān (de Vogüé, *Architecture civile et religieuse dans la Syrie centrale et le Haouran du ier au viie siècle*). Another source of inspiration borrowed from the East, but this time from the Muhammadan East, is the plan of the mosques. The present writer has shown in his manual of Muhammadan architecture (*Manuel d'art musulmane*, Paris, 1907, i. [*History of Architecture*]) the likeness existing between the plan of the Zituna mosque at Tunis and that of the great mosque of Damascus, which itself is suggested by the plan of the great church of St. Simon at Qal'at Sim'ān (de Vogüé, *op. cit.* ii. pl. 139), two of the great aisles of which were joined at the ends by a transept running at right angles to them. This comparison has never been made so far as the present writer knows; it is, however, very remarkable. G. Marçais has mentioned in the *Revue Africaine* the numerous ideas borrowed, according to the Arab historians of Spain, from the Arab monuments of Syria by the architects of the Khalīfs of Cordova. This process of borrowing was quite natural because of the Syrian origin of the Umayyads of Spain. But the prototype of the great mosque of Cordova cannot be looked for at Damascus; its plan presents no resemblance to that of the great mosque of that city. We must find it at Jerusalem in the plan of the chief mosque al-Aqṣā. Guy le Strange, in his work, *Palestine under the Moslems* (London, 1890), has given a restored plan of it according to the description of Muqqadasī, which shows its arrangement in A.D. 985.* The ancient mosque of Jerusalem was 15 aisles in breadth and 21 in length; that of Cordova 11 aisles in breadth and 21 in length (at least originally); both have side-gates on the eastern façade. Idrīsī, quoted by le Strange (*op. cit.* p. 108), seems to have noticed this likeness, which le Strange has perfectly understood (p. 103). As to the decoration of the mosque at Cordova, it is borrowed partly from Byzantine art, and partly from Arab or Syrian or Mesopotamian ornamentation. This is certainly no longer doubtful, so that we can ascertain the origin of the serrated arches used systematically in the great mosque at Cordova, and recurring in the palace of Harūn al-Rashīd at Racca (Saladin, *op. cit.* p. 323, fig. 291), the al-Ashik palace at Samarra (*ib.* p. 325), of which General de Beylié † was the first to publish a very correct view (de Beylié, *Prome et Samarra*, Paris, 1907, pl. xiii.), and in the interior archivolts of the southern windows of the great mosque of Samarra (*ib.* p. 81). The horse-shoe arch is also of Oriental origin—Mesopotamian or Sasanian (exemplified in the secondary gate of the Palace of

* It was the mosque re-built by 'Abd al-Malik towards 691 of our era, and restored in 746 by al-Mansūr.

† Cf. also the work of Herzfeld published since that of General de Beylié.

Ctesiphon ; see Herzfeld, *Samarra*), for it is found in Persia at Firuzabad and at Ṭāq-i-Girra. This mosque-plan of which we have just been speaking is, to a certain extent (except in the proportion between the breadth and the length of the building), that of the mosques with aisles, like the 'Amr mosque at Cairo, and those of Samarra which de Beylié and Herzfeld have described, and that of Abū-Dilif which de Beylié was the first to portray, but these are later than the mosque of Cordova. They are mentioned here as giving the characteristics of the typical plan of the mosque, and comprising in themselves all that we know at present regarding the most ancient Muḥammadan monuments of Mesopotamia ; for the monuments of Samarra and of Abū-Dilif owe absolutely nothing to Syrian architectural traditions, which are based upon the use of dressed stone. These, on the other hand, are constructions of brick, and consequently connected with the pure Mesopotamian tradition, though strongly influenced by Sasanian art.

Thus, then, Spain appears to have been more directly influenced by Syria and Mesopotamia than was the case with Northern Africa. The great mosque of Kairwan in Tunis, for example, borrows an ancient or Byzantine character from all the ancient and Byzantine fragments which have been employed for its construction in columns, bases, and capitals. Arab historians, however, attribute to a Syrian architect the dome covered with green enamelled tiles which Ibrāhīm ibn al-Aghlab caused to be constructed above the porch of the celebrated mosque.

On the other hand, it is indisputable that the horse-shoe arch, the employment of which may be considered one of the characteristic principles of Moorish art, is borrowed from Sasanian architecture, for it is found in Persia in the Ṭāq-i-Girra, the palace of Sarvistan, and in Mesopotamia in the celebrated palace of Chosroës at Ctesiphon—in the gates on the ground floor. It appears to have been employed there in a systematic fashion, while in the Christian monuments of central Syria and in certain buildings of Armenia it appears to have been used only in an intermittent way. The most ancient examples of the use of this arch may be seen in Tunis in the inner window of the *maqṣūra* of the mosque of Sidi Okba at Kairwan, in the central motive of the interior façade of the Zituna mosque at Tunis, and in the eastern side façade of the great mosque at Sfax. This arch, which has been justly compared in shape to a horse-shoe, has been systematically used in the celebrated mosque of Cordova. It is found in the windows, the gates, and the interior arches, whether they are many-lobed or not.

Finally, local Christian art, whether African or Spanish, also had much influence on the architecture of the Maghrib. Byzantine art did not operate in the same way. Although some very important buildings were erected by the Byzantines in Carthage, it is not possible to assert, from what we at present know of them, the Byzantine character of the gates built or of the binding stones used at Tunis or at Sfax. At both Tunis and Sfax they are connected with the forms of Byzantine art belonging to central Syria. Such are the drums which support the domes of the Zituna mosque at Tunis, the Aghlabid gates of this mosque, and the gates of the eastern façade of the great mosque of Sfax. Moorish Spain, on the contrary, received, by means of artists summoned from Constantinople to Cordova, a genuine influx of decorative Byzantine art, recognizable in the first instance in certain parts of the sculpture of the *miḥrāb*, but above all in the admirable enamelled mosaics executed on the spot by the Byzantine artists who came for the purpose from Constantinople.

We may here recapitulate the chronology of these early monuments of the Maghrib :

Hijra.	Christian Era.	
50	670	Founding of the great mosque at Kairwan by Okba ibn Nāfi.
114	732	Founding of the Zituna mosque at Tunis by Ubaid Allāh ibn al-Habhab.
153	770	Founding of the great mosque of Cordova.

As early as the 8th cent. the new style in Spain assumed quite a distinct character ; for the great mosque of Cordova is obviously a building of a style absolutely and clearly defined. On the contrary, we do not find in Northern Africa, whether in Tunis, or Algeria, or Morocco, such a homogeneity of style in the first Arab buildings. The successive restorations of the mosque of Sidi Okba at Kairwan, the traces of which are still sufficiently visible on the building itself, the Aghlabid portions of the Zituna mosque at Tunis, of the great mosque of Beja, and of that of Sfax in Tunis, no longer give us the impression of a well-defined style. The reason for this must very probably be found in the fact that the commencement of the Umayyad Khalīfate of Cordova constituted a political and social régime on a sufficiently firm basis to give to the country such prosperity that the magnificence of the buildings far surpassed those of Africa, which was then a much poorer country. On the other hand, the continual relations of Cordova with Syria, and the arrival in Spain of a great number of followers of the Umayyads, made Arabized Andalusia at this time, so to speak, a second Arabized Syria. The proofs of this are abundant in the Arab historians and even in the buildings.

In the 11th cent. the influence of Middle Asia, that is to say, of Mesopotamia and perhaps even of Persia, was making itself felt in Africa in the style of the buildings of Qal'a of the Beni Hammād, and probably in those of Bougie, which are unfortunately thus far not known to us except from descriptions of Arab writers. It made itself felt also in Sicily, which had passed from the yoke of the Aghlabids under that of the Fāṭimids, and in which we recognize the Arab style only by the traces which Arab arts have left in the buildings of the 12th cent., erected there by the Norman kings.

At the end of the 11th cent., from the time when Yūsuf ibn Tāshfīn united Spain and the Maghrib under his authority, a modification seems to be introduced into the Arab architecture of Spain ; and it appears that this modification is due to Moroccan artists ; this cannot, however, be positively established by examples of an authentic date. The magnificence of Fez and of Marrakesh under the Almoravids completely explains how the architects who contributed to the adornment of these two towns were consequently able to exercise influence, either directly or by means of their pupils, on the tendencies of the school of Andalusia. This change of style is apparent at Toledo in the Puerta del Sol, and later under the Almohads in the great mosque of Tlemsen, and in certain portions of the mosque of Tinmel, which has recently been discovered and described by Doutté.

It was not till the 12th cent. of our era that the new style really spread in a wonderful manner, by this time freed from antique or Byzantine imitations, and clearly marked by qualities of taste, of sobriety, of elegance and restrained luxuriance, which render the monuments bequeathed to us true masterpieces.

A short enumeration will give the chronological sequence of these.

Hijra.	Christian Era.	
398	1007	Founding of the mosque of Qal'a of the Beni Hammād (Algeria, in the present province of Constantine).
450	1068	Founding of the mosque of Bougie by an-Nāṣir.
460	1069	The Almoravids found Marrakesh and beautify Fez.
478	1085	Conquest of Spain by Yūsuf ibn Tāshfin.
481	1088	Puerta del Sol at Toledo.
524	1131	Tlemsen restored by Abd-al-Mu'min.
530	1136	The cupola of the great mosque of Tlemsen built.
570	1174	Construction of the great mosque of Seville.

From 574 A.H. (A.D. 1178) to 590 A.H. (A.D. 1194) Ya'qūb al-Manṣūr covered Morocco and Andalusia with numerous buildings. In Morocco, Chella, Rabat, Marrakesh, Ceuta, Alcazar-Kabir, Manṣūra, mosques, fortifications, and buildings of every kind are ascribed to him. In Spain, and especially at Seville, he built mosques, *qasbas*, fortifications, quays, and aqueducts, and he completed the great mosque whose minaret is still standing almost entirely intact. The Kutubīya of Marrakesh, the tower of Ḥasan at Rabat, the minaret of Chella, and its fortified enclosure may be considered the most perfect types of this fine architecture. In A.H. 596 (A.D. 1199) the Alcazar of Seville was founded, but the 13th cent. was destined to inaugurate for the Moorish style a period of luxuriance and florid abundance quite different from the preceding one.

The tomb of Sidi bū Madina at Tlemsen gives an idea of this new development. In 1230 the Alhambra of Granada was commenced, in 1231 the mosque of the Qasba at Tunis was founded by Abū Zakarīya, a work of Andalusian architecture in which nothing any longer recalls the first Arab monuments of Tunis. For a large number of emigrants from Andalusia had a hand in it, not only because of the fall of the Almohads, but especially because, owing to the want of native artists, the Ḥafṣids, as Ibn Sa'īd tells us, imported their architects, their workers in enamel, and even their gardeners from Andalusia. Enamelled earthenware, in fact, had been used in the Maghrib from a considerably remote period; we cannot precisely fix the introduction of it previous to the buildings of Qal'a of the Beni Hammād which date from the commencement of the 11th cent. of our era, and in the ruins of which Paul Blanchet discovered a considerable quantity of fragments of enamelled facings, bricks, pieces of binding masonry and mosaic, etc. From that period this manufacture, which must have been introduced by Asiatic workmen, spread in the Maghrib. Their origin is Asiatic, since the only architectural enamelled earthenware work we know in the Maghrib, previous to this period, consists of the famous squares with metallic reflexions with which Ibrāhīm ibn al-Aghlab adorned the *minbar* of the mosque of Sidi Okba at Kairwan, and which he caused to be brought from Baghdad. By successive improvements this art rapidly attained to that delicacy of execution which we admire in the monuments of Tlemsen, Seville, Granada, and Morocco. Enamelled earthenware is at first used in mosaic, consisting of pieces cut out by hand and placed together, either in hollows cut in slabs of marble or of hard stone, as in the Qal'a buildings of the Beni Hammād, or on a coating of mortar as at Tlemsen and at Chella; in those cases its use is combined with that of enamelled brick. It is very probable that at first faience was used in this way in order to imitate the mosaics of marble which the Arab artists, following the example of the Romans and the Byzantines, had constructed in Syria, in Egypt, and in Sicily. They had even found in Africa some ancient specimens to copy, for the present writer once sketched a fragment of white marble inlaid with coloured marbles found at Lixus (Morocco) by H. de la Martinière. This fragment dates from the 5th cent. of our era, and evidently belongs to that series of works in marble mosaic which served as models to the Arab workmen. This work in faience mosaic, or rather in marquetry, was afterwards succeeded by square tiles, on which pieces of enamel in slight relief showed the usual ornamentation. Later they contented themselves with tracing in black lines on the white enamel a polygonal design with tracery worked in different colours. At a still later date the purely geometrical ornamentation was replaced by a floral decoration or one of some conventional pattern. In Persia and in Turkestan we shall be able to trace a similar development in ceramic decoration. There is no doubt that this art was of Asiatic origin. The similarity between the Spanish enamelled decorations and those in the famous frieze of archers in the *apadāna* of Susa is obvious. On the other hand, the likeness of the enamelling of the most ancient enamelled vases found at Racca (Mesopotamia) to the enamel-work of the Maghrib at once leads us to connect the latter with an Asiatic origin, since we may confidently assign the most ancient enamel-work of Racca to the period of the Abbāsids. But the intermediary link which would enable us to connect the enamel ornamentation of the Achæmenians with that of the Abbāsids is still wanting. We do not know what sort of fictile art was used in the architecture of the Arsacids and the Sasanians, although from a passage in the *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* by Philostratus we may conclude that, at the time when the latter wrote, enamelled earthenware still formed one of the most characteristic components of the architectural decoration of the monuments and palaces of Babylon.

This digression, though somewhat long, on the use and origin of enamel-work in Moorish architecture, is, however, indispensable in order to show by how slight a link Moorish art is connected with that of the Mesopotamian East. We have seen above that Racca and al-Ashik show us in their Abbāsid monuments the many-lobed arches to the use of which Moorish architecture owes one of its most elegant characteristics. The plan of the Moorish mosque was originally the plan with aisles, as in the 'Amr mosque at Cairo. This plan, which recurs in Tunis, in Algeria, and in Morocco, slightly modified by the broadening of the central nave and the aisle which runs along the *miḥrāb*-wall, undergoes a gradual alteration. Already in the Qal'a buildings of the Beni Hammād an enclosed chancel was outlined before the *miḥrāb*. This is only slightly indicated in the great mosque of Tlemsen (530 A.H. = A.D. 1136), but is clearly defined two centuries later in the mosque of Manṣūra at Tlemsen (737–744 A.H. = A.D. 1337–1344). It comprises the following: a fore-court, a minaret commanding the entrance, side porticoes in the court, a large hall with parallel aisles, and at the end the *maqṣūra*, or chancel, in front of the *miḥrāb*, marked by a cupola crowning a square hall. This is the same arrangement as exists in principle in the great mosque of Cordova, but at Tlemsen it is differently emphasized. This *maqṣūra*, instead of seeming to be a mere adjunct of the building as at Cordova, is at Tlemsen an integral portion of it, and forms, so to speak, the main feature, thus indicating in a formal way the real sanctuary of the mosque.

As this article is limited chiefly to the study of the religious monuments, we shall dwell on civil architecture only very briefly. The buildings,

however, which the Moors have left in Spain—the palaces of Tunis, of Algiers, of Morocco, of Fez, and of Mequinez, cannot be passed over.

The architecture of the houses of the Maghrib contains at the same time suggestions from Roman and Byzantine houses, and very probably also from houses of Mesopotamia and Persia. We do not know any very ancient Arab houses in the North of Africa, but the persistence with which the plan of these houses is reproduced, with very few variations, leads us to believe that the prototype has never lacked the features with which we are familiar: an interior court, the division of the house into the *selamlik*, or open portion, used for receptions, and the *harīm*, or private part, unentered by visitors, and reserved exclusively for women and domestic life. It is accordingly a variation of the Roman house. This is understood more easily when we remember that the early Arab conquerors of Northern Africa took up their abode at first in the Roman or Byzantine houses, which still existed in great numbers, just as the French took up their abode, at the commencement of their occupation of the country, in the Arab houses of Tunis and Algeria.

From the earliest period the palaces have been buildings of great magnificence, and the descriptions of the Arab historians give us full information regarding the luxurious style in which they were decorated and furnished. Of these we may mention, by way of example, the famous palace of Medinet-az-Zahra near Cordova, the palace of Mustanṣir in Tunis (described by Ibn Ḫaldūn, *History of the Berbers*), which possessed elevated pavilions, cupolas, kiosks, aqueducts, fountains, and large basins, forming, as it were, liquid mirrors. These were also to be found in the Sasanian palace of Qaṣr-i Shīrīn, and have remained from that time a traditional ornament in Persia. Mustanṣir's palace also contained pavilions with marble columns and wainscottings of marble and faience mosaics. The palace of the Sultan Hamadites of Bougie, and those of Fez, Morocco, and Mequinez, were not less magnificent. We can have, so to speak, an ocular demonstration of the splendour to which Moorish architecture had attained in the Alhambra of Granada, of which the greater part is still standing, although by an unaccountable whim Charles V. caused the south wing to be destroyed in order to build in its place a palace of lamentable mediocrity.

Part of the plan of the Alhambra is an extension of the plan of the Arab house. There are always numerous structures surrounding courts bordered by porticoes, with fountains or large uncovered basins. There is no need to enlarge, in addition, on the lavishness and taste with which a great wealth of constantly varied decoration has been expended on every portion of this delightful palace, which is the glory of Granada and of Arabized Spain (see ART [Muh.]).

After the final expulsion of the Arabs from Spain, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunis received the exiles, who carried thither their artistic traditions. These underwent profound changes in Algeria and Tunis; but in Morocco they were preserved, not entirely in their pristine purity, yet in a way so nearly complete as to give to the Moroccan buildings, down to the latest times, an artistic character very superior to that of the buildings of Algeria and Tunis.

Chronology of the Buildings of the Maghrīb.

Hijra.	Christian Era.	
50	670	Okba ibn Nāfi founds Kairwan and its great mosque.
84	703	Ḥasan ibn Nu'mān re-builds the great mosque of Kairwan, and builds the al-Ksar mosque at Tunis.
114	732	Ubaid Allāh ibn al-Habhab founds the Zituna mosque at Tunis.
153	770	Founding of the great mosque of Cordova.
222	837	Ziyadet Allāh restores the great mosque at Kairwan.
248	859	Founding of the Kairuīn mosque at Fez.
325	936	'Abd ar-Rahman III. founds the palace Medinet-az-Zahra near Cordova.
398	1007	Hammad ibn Bulukkiun ibn Zayri founds the Qal'a mosque of the Beni Hammād.
459	1068	An-Nāṣir founds the mosque of Bougie.
460	1069	The Almoravids found the mosques of Morocco (Marrakesh).
530	1136	Cupola of the great mosque at Tlemsen.
548	1153	'Abd al-Mu'min enlarges the Tinmel mosque at Morocco.
570	1174	The architect 'Abd Allāh ibn Amr commences to build the great mosque of Seville.
590	1194	Buildings of Ya'qūb al-Manṣūr at Rabat, Chella, Morocco, Seville.
596	1199	Tomb of Sidi bū Madīna at Tlemsen. Building of the Alcazar of Seville.
608	1211	Completion of the great mosque of Bougie.
629	1231	Mosque of Qasba at Tunis.
698	1299	Abū-Ya'qūb an-Nāṣir builds in three years the town of Manṣūra near Tlemsen.
718	1318	Mosque of Sidi Ibrāhīm at Tlemsen.
721	1321	Restoration of the Andalusian mosque at Fez.
754	1353	Mosque of Sidi al-Halwi at Tlemsen.
755	1354	Completion of the Alhambra of Granada, founded in 628 A.H. (A.D. 1230).
865	1460	Zāwīya of Sidi ibn Aruz at Tunis.
985	1577	Al-Manṣūr-az-Zahibi builds the famous palace al-Bedī' at Morocco, and a kiosk in the Kairuīn mosque at Fez.
1041	1631	Mosque Hamūda Pasha at Tunis.
1112	1700	Completion of the mosque of Sidi Mahres at Tunis.

3. **The Persian School (Persia, Mesopotamia, Turkestan, etc.).**—We have already spoken of the mosques of Mesopotamia, Samarra, and Abū-Dilif. In Persia the style is quite different. Yet the most ancient Persian mosques whose plans are known to us are built with aisles like the primitive mosques. The arrangement of these is still recognizable in the plan of the Juma mosque at Iṣfahān built in 142–153 A.H. under the Khalīfate of the Abbāsid al-Manṣūr; but in this plan there is a peculiar arrangement: in the court there is an isolated structure on a square plan. Dieulafoy describes a similar square pavilion in the centre of the old mosque of Shīraz built in A.D. 875 by Amr ibn Laith. This pavilion is evidently a reminiscence of the Ka'ba of Mecca, for it is known at Shiraz by the name of *Khuda Khan*, or 'House of God.' We should mention also the Juma mosque of Kazvin, re-built by Harūn al-Rashīd in A.D. 790 on the plan of the ancient mosque erected in the early years of the Hijra by Muhammad ibn al-Ḥajjāj.

At a period which it is as yet impossible to define, a remarkable development affects the arrangement of the Persian mosques: on the four sides of the court of the mosque there open enormous porches of great height and in the form of an immense arcade. These *īwāns*, as they are called, are certainly a reminiscence of the *īwān* of Chosroës, the Tāj-i-Kisrā of Ctesiphon, the magnificence of which had astonished the first Arab conquerors, and the recollection of which was always present in the minds of Oriental monarchs when they were erecting great buildings. Muhammadan historians, in fact, when they wish to emphasize the splendour of a building raised by one of their monarchs, always compare it to the *īwān* of Chosroës, to the buildings of Mada'in, etc. In the plan of all the Persian mosques this detail (the *īwāns*) always re-appears, and we find the same architectural feature in certain mosques of Turkestan and especially of Samarcand—mosques which also serve the purpose of *madrasas*, *i.e.* schools or academies, or rather universities. When we closely examine the plan of the Juma mosque of Iṣfahān, we easily see how Malik Shah, Shah Tamasp, and Shah Abbās, in their successive enlargements of the

building, changed its original appearance in order finally to give it that definite character which has been, so to speak, the type to which the Persian mosques have conformed, and which is so admirably condensed in the plan of the imperial mosque of Iṣfahān erected under Shah Abbas. This latter may be considered as the *chef d'œuvre* of religious architecture in Persia, where we find no other mosques with aisles, but only the four great *īwāns*, one of which serves as a porch of entry, and the other three as distinct places for prayer, each possessing its own *miḥrāb*.

We see, accordingly, that just as the Persians sharply divided themselves from the majority of the Muhammadans (who are Sunnites, forming a sort of heretical sect by themselves), since they are Shī'ites and therefore abandon the purely Muhammadan tradition,* they gave to their religious architecture quite a different character from that of the buildings to be seen in Syria, Egypt, and in the Maghrib. When the mosques are deprived of a central court, as was the case with the blue mosque of Tabris,† the praying place is always square-shaped, and is led up to by a large square hall surrounded by very broad galleries. Then we have nothing left to recall the primitive mosque, which is really derived from the shelter built along the wall of the *miḥrāb*, which allows the crowd of the faithful to line out along this wall and in files parallel to it, but with faces always turned in the same direction. The tendency in Persia would rather appear to be that of uniting the worshippers in a closed sanctuary in order to secure for them the isolation which favours collectedness of thought and prayer.

We see, therefore, that by a kind of natural development the changes through which the Persian mosque passed, while tending more and more towards a closed sanctuary, would produce successive forms approaching gradually those of certain Christian churches—those of Armenia, for instance.

The earliest Muhammadan architecture in Persia has also quite a special character. The leading elements in Persian architecture are, in fact, almost entirely borrowed from local traditions, that is to say, from the architecture of the ancient Persians and from that of the Sasanian period:

(1) The tapered column, accompanied by flat ceilings and terraces, which seems to be derived principally from Assyrian and Median art.

(2) The arch carried on drums or on columns standing in sets of four. (This arrangement was soon changed into a tetragonal pillar strengthened by four joined columns.) Since the arch and the pillar are constructed of rubble-stone or more frequently of bricks, we cannot doubt that the origin of this system of architecture must be sought in Chaldæa, whence it passed into Persia. As to the arch of dressed and cut stone and structures with binding masonry, they seem to be of Armenian origin, and to have passed from Armenia into the North-west provinces of Persia, where alone they are found.

The arch constructed of bricks was a matter of choice for the Persians; and this system seems to have been chosen because of the scarcity of timber in the greater part of the country. In this kind of structure they attained to a degree of artistic skill, ingenuity, and cleverness which has never been excelled anywhere. The use of unbaked and baked brick and of enamelled brick came to them both from Chaldæa and from Susiana. It is probably from the early Persian buildings adorned with enamelled bricks or faience mosaic that this process, so fertile in graceful applications, reached the West by way of Tunis and Algiers as far as Morocco and Spain, where the Moorish artists were able to elaborate it to a pitch of perfection as high as that reached in Persia by the Persians.

It was very probably from the use of bricks, whether by corbellings or by projecting stones, that stalactites came into use, which have always been one of the most interesting features of Persian and Syro-Egyptian brick architecture; but it is possible that stone and wood stalactites have not the same origin although very often similar in appearance. Finally, just as Roman architectural traditions have influenced the development of decoration in the Maghrib alongside of geometrical ornamentation, the origin of which is not yet clearly established, it seems that in Persian art the style of ornamentation has been influenced by Sasanian, Hindu, and, later, by Chinese traditions. Parallel with this also has proceeded a development of geometrical decoration which appears to be an element common to all the countries of Islām, and the origin of which, perhaps because of its Muhammadan character, should be sought in Arabia, not in the buildings of Yemen before Muhammad's time, but possibly in the ornamentation employed by the nomad Arabs in their embroideries, carpets, etc.

The origin of the lancet-arch, which was used in the ancient buildings of Egypt along with the catenary arch, and which has been found also in Assyria, appears thus to be settled, but its use seems to be reserved for the hidden parts of buildings, and those where solidity and economy in construction were both required. The palace of Chosroës at Ctesiphon in its visible portions has only semicircular arches, whether of horse-shoe shape or not, except its great arch, which is catenary; but the groovings disposed at the top of the tympanum of the arch, which were not seen because they were in the interior of the building and above the arches, had pointed groinings. This pointed arch was a feature as frequently employed by the Persians as the horse-shoe arch was by the Moors, but the Persians very soon recognized that the pointed arch formed by two skew arches involved a complication in construction easy to avoid by closing the curve by two straight lines; it is for this reason that their arches are of such an original and distinct character. We find in the West this predilection for closing brick arches by rectilineal portions in France, in the Roman architecture of Toulouse and its neighbourhood, and in England in numerous brick buildings, from which it passed into buildings of stone under the name of the Tudor arch.

The other religious buildings of the Persians are the *madrasas*, or religious schools, and the tombs. These *madrasas* assumed in Persia a still more important development than they did in Egypt or in the Maghrib. One of the most ancient which have been described is the *madrasa* of Mustanṣir, built at Baghdad in A.H. 630 (A.D. 1232), of which a summary plan is given by General de Beylié (*Prome et Samarra*, fig. 18). It consists of a suite of buildings arranged round a rectangular court, with a *īwān* in the centre of each of its four sides. These buildings, pierced by numerous arcades, contained the cells of the students. The likeness of the plan on which they

* The Sunnite mosque seems to be derived from the mosque of Medina, which originally consisted only of a wall with a *miḥrāb* approached by very rude porticoes. The Shī'ite mosque, on the other hand, seems to be derived from the mosque of Mecca. In the centre of the court (*haram*) is the *Khuda Khan*, or 'House of God,' an imitation of the Ka'ba, and places for prayer are arranged on the four sides of the court.

† This mosque was certainly erected by a Sunnite monarch, but the architect who constructed it has drawn his inspiration solely from the architectural traditions of Persia. Compare this plan with that of the mosque of Mir Buzurg Kawām-ad-din, built at Amul in A.D. 1879.

are built to that of the caravanserais with which Persia is covered will not escape any one, any more than its similarity to the plans of the great Persian mosques. If we could ascertain the most ancient types of these buildings, for example the Persian or Sasanian caravanserais, we should perhaps have the origin of that cruciform plan which the Persian architects have been able to turn to such excellent account.

One of the most remarkable *madrasas* which have been built in Persia is the Madrasa-i-Shah Sultan Husain at Iṣfahān (A.D. 1693). As a caravanserai was built close beside it at the same time, by merely examining the two plans in juxtaposition we understand what a striking likeness exists between them.

This arrangement has been reproduced in the great mosque-*madrasas* of Samarcand and Bokhara, and indeed in those of all the large towns of Turkestan, whence it is certain that the first architects of these buildings were Persians. In the case of some of them the proof is ready to hand. The *madrasa* Shir-Dar near Samarcand is the reduction to a comparatively small scale of the Persian *madrasa*; the mosque, *madrasa*, and tomb of Bibi Hanum at Samarcand is the expansion of it on a colossal scale (the plans are given by Schubert von Soldern, *Baudenkmale von Samarkand*, 1898).

The tombs and sepulchral monuments in the Persian school of architecture have also quite a special character. In the Maghrib they generally consist merely of a square structure surmounted by a cupola, which seems simply a detached portion of what ordinarily constitutes a mosque, for we have seen that generally the entrance is crowned by a cupola and the *miḥrāb* of the mosque by another; this is, at any rate, the arrangement which exists in the most ancient mosques of Tunis (Kairwan, Tunis, Gafsa, Beja, Sfax) and of Morocco (as in the Kairuīn mosque at Fez).

In Persia these buildings are of an entirely different character. They consist of square, polygonal, or cylindrical towers covered with conical or pyramidal roofs, or crowned by a bulb-shaped cupola, *e.g.* at Maragha, Nakshevan, Demavend. At Sultanīya, at Merv, in the tomb of the Sultan Sanjar, the plan is even more complicated, and sometimes, as in Persian Mesopotamia, these tombs of polygonal construction are crowned by cupolas composed of a series of stalactites superimposed on each other, and the outline they present is striking. Such are the tomb of Zubaida at Baghdad, and the tomb of Daniel at Susa.

Around these tombs of various styles are grouped different buildings, as, for example, at the tomb of the Sheikh Sufi at Ardabil; but the finest of all these sepulchral monuments is certainly the tomb of Timur or Gur Emir at Samarcand, built in 808 A.H. (A.D. 1405) by Muhammad, son of Mahmud of Iṣfahān. The whole effect of this impressive monument is very beautiful. The tomb, properly speaking, consists of a great square hall, the sides of which are grooved with large square niches, and which is crowned with a bulb-shaped cupola set on a drum decorated with enamelled bricks, the cupola being also adorned in the same way. The porch of the tomb opens on a square court surrounded with cells, at the four corners of which formerly rose four great cylindrical minarets of which only one now remains; two others flanked the entrance porch of the court. Other very striking tombs are still to be found near Samarcand adjoining the mosque of Shah-Zindah, and we can trace in them with a singular variety of detail the whole development through which the use of baked enamelled earthenware for the construction and decoration of these buildings had passed at this time. Besides the Persian artists engaged in the construction of the buildings of Samarcand, Chinese artists in pottery, summoned by Bibi Hanum (who was a Chinese princess), the wife of Timur, have exercised an indisputable influence both on the technique of enamelled earthenware-work and on the style of this decoration.

It is also certain that in these great specimens of enamelled decoration the Persian architects drew their inspiration from suggestions afforded by the decoration of tapestry, embroidery, cloths, and especially carpets. As the present writer has described in his manual of the history of Muhammadan architecture, the perfection of this enamelled decoration—a perfection attained at the commencement from an æsthetic point of view—can be explained only by the fact that they applied to decoration rules established by the long practice of manufacturers of carpets and painted cloths—rules which, by a process of continual selection, had eliminated imperfect elements from decorative compositions in order to preserve only such as were satisfactory.

Secular architecture in Persia has, perhaps more than religious, remained impregnated with the ancient traditions of the country. The Persian palaces have been compared above to the Sasanian palaces of Qaṣr-i Shīrīn; they might also be compared to the ancient Achæmenian palaces of Susa and of Persepolis. It is doubtless to this uninterrupted tradition that we should assign the use of terraces supported on long wooden columns, which are found in the palaces of Iṣfahān, of Shiraz, and of Teherān. The authentication of this tradition is all the more remarkable because wood is a comparatively rare and costly substance in nearly all the provinces of Persia.

In the royal palaces of Iṣfahān these columns were covered with little squares of looking-glass not only on the front of their shafts, but on their capitals; the stalactites of the ceilings and arches were also covered with them, and the flashing of these thousands of mirrors, the brilliance of the paintings, and the facings of faience, made these lofty halls, with glittering ceilings, marvels of taste and luxuriance, more remarkable even than we have seen in the Moorish palaces of Andalusia.

The Persian house, like all Muhammadan houses, is divided into an *anderun*, or part reserved for the women and the family, and a *birun*, or part reserved for the reception of guests. But its arrangement no longer presents any likeness to that of the ancient house. The building is no longer arranged round the front court. This court in Persia is replaced by a garden. If the house is a simple one, the *anderun* is on the first floor; if it belongs to a richer class, the *birun* opens on the garden and on the street, and at the bottom of the garden is the *anderun*. The Persians also built enormous bazaars, streets roofed in and lined with shops; and all their large towns still possess them, the finest certainly being those of Iṣfahān. These bazaars contain not only roofed streets and shops, but baths, or *ḥammāms*, mosques, schools, tombs, and city caravanserais, in which merchants with their wares put up. Other caravanserais are disposed at different stages along the roads; these are resting-places for travellers and caravans. Herodotus mentions that Cyrus had had them placed all along the roads of his empire. Here we have again in Persia a tradition dating from before the time of Islām.

The Sasanian kings had built a number of remarkable bridges. The Muhammadan sovereigns of Persia followed their example. Without counting the numerous bridges constructed in Persia since the Muhammadan conquest, we ought not to forget to mention the two very striking bridges of Iṣfahān, that of Allāh-Vardi-

Khan and that of Baba Rukn-ad-din, which are real masterpieces.

In a country as barren as Persia, the discovery, securing, and conveyance of water were naturally questions of vital importance. Subterranean aqueducts, or *qanāts*, made possible the search for water, often at great distances, for the purposes of supply and irrigation. These aqueducts supplied either large subterranean reservoirs (called *ābambār*) in the towns and villages, or vaulted cisterns, placed along the roads near the caravanserais. At other times the river-water was held back by dams to be conducted into irrigation canals. M. Dieulafoy has described two of them, the dam of Saveh and the Band-amir.

We shall not enter in this section, any more than in the preceding one, on the examination of military architecture. That of the Maghrib is known to us by a large number of drawn or photographed buildings; that of Persia, on the contrary, is as yet almost unknown to us.

The Persian school of architecture spread its influence as far as Baghdad and even Armenia, and exercised an indisputable effect on the Seljuk architecture of Asia Minor and on the Ottoman architecture derived from it. It has directly influenced the architecture of Turkestan, and we shall see that, as regards India, it is absolutely certain that the finest buildings of the Mughal period were immediately inspired by the finest architectural and decorative traditions of Muhammadan Persia.

But, since among Muhammadan arts architecture is absolutely supreme and all the other arts are based more or less on the principles which govern architectural construction, we ought not to be surprised at the immense importance of the influence of Persian decorative art on all the arts of other Muhammadan countries.

Chronology of the Buildings of Persia and of Turkestan.

Hijra.	Christian Era.	
137	755	Tombs at Rai.
142	760	Founding of the Juma Mosque at Iṣfahān.
174	790	Juma Mosque at Kazvīn.
261	875	Juma Mosque at Shiraz.
408	1017	Founding of the great mosque of Ardabil.
552	1157	Tomb of Sultan Sanjar at Merv.
583	1187	Mausoleum of Mumin-i-Hatum at Nakshevan.
630	1232	Mausoleums of the Saids at Amul.
659	1261	Tomb of the daughter of Hūlāgū at Maragha.
704	1304	Mosque of Uljaitu Shah-Khodabandah at Sultanīya.
722	1322	Mosque of Veramine.
781	1379	Mosque of Mir Buzurg Kawām-ad-din.
791	1389	Mosque of Bibi Hanum at Samarcand.
805	1403	Great or blue mosque at Tabris.
901	1496	Darwāza-i-Kieuchk at Iṣfahān.
942	1535	The town of Iṣfahān embellished with magnificent buildings.
1021	1612	Masjid-i-Shah at Iṣfahān.
1104	1693	Madrasa and caravanserai Madrasa-i-Shah Sultan Husain at Iṣfahān.
1206	1791	Buildings of Teherān.
1223	1808	Embellishment of Iṣfahān by Fath-Ali-Shah.

4. The Ottoman School (Turkey in Europe and Asia Minor).—The first real entrance of the Osmanli Turks on the stage of history is at the time when the last Seljuk ruler of Konia, Ala-ud-din III., conquered by the Mongols, yielded his empire to Othman, that is to say, in the 14th cent. of our era.

The Seljuk kingdom was therefore the germ of the future Ottoman empire. We also find that the buildings erected by the Seljuks of Rūm (*i.e.* the kingdom of Konia) are the first which exhibit the union of Persian and Syro-Egyptian influences still distinct and even widely differing in these buildings. These are the influences the fusion of which with the constructive traditions of Byzantine architecture produced the striking art of the Turkish buildings of Brūsa, Adrianople, and Constantinople. For this reason we should study them first. We find, in fact, in the buildings of Konia, Syrian features in the porches, the small columns joined together, the niches, the stalactites, and those long girths ornamented with eight-rayed half-stars which we see so frequently in buildings of the 13th cent. in Syria, and especially at Damascus. However (what we do not find in Syria, while the buildings of Konia and its neighbourhood show us numerous examples of it), there are various applications of enamelled earthenware and brick to the interior decoration of the buildings, and even to some interior elevations of them, such as that of the inner court of the Sircheli Madrasa at Konia. This, with its enamelled facings, seems to be a Persian building transplanted bodily to Konia, although the porch of its exterior façade is entirely of stone, and of a very decided Syrian style.

When the Turkoman tribes arrived in Asia Minor after a long sojourn and long wanderings in Persia, they imported thither the industries necessary to the life of nomad communities: saddlery and the manufacture of cloths, of carpets, and of embroideries. This art of the nomads has influenced in a very high degree not only the extremely original decoration of the mosque of Inje-Minareli at Konia, but still more the striking north gate of the great mosque of Divrigi, the complicated ornamentation of which is distributed over the whole façade in an arbitrary and unsymmetrical way (cf. Saladin, *Manuel*, fig. 335). Some of these mosques, like that of Ala-ud-din at Konia, or that of Echrif-Rūm-Jami at Beishehr, or, again, that of Houen at Kaisarīya, are arranged on plans with aisles like the ancient mosques of Egypt or of the Maghrib. Others are *madrasas* with their *īwāns* arranged crosswise, *e.g.* the Sircheli Madrasa at Konia, the Ibrāhīm Bey Madrasa at Akserai, the *madrasas* of Sivas and of Erzerum, etc. We find caravanserais also as in Persia, but with an entirely different plan. These caravanserais rather recall the plan of the Roman or Byzantine *castellum*, comprising, as they do, storehouses, dwelling-rooms, and stables. One of the most imposing of these buildings is the Sultan Khan, north-east of Konia, all the details of which have been carried out with remarkable skill. Its enclosure is strengthened by enormous buttresses, which reveal more decidedly than usual its defensive character, but a magnificent porch which adorns the entry prevents it from presenting too forbidding an appearance. This doorway is still quite Syrian in character; nevertheless we can already trace in it the chief tendencies which, modified and brought to perfection by the architects of the Green Mosque at Brūsa and of the Bayazidīya of Constantinople, evolved those splendid porches of the most ancient Turkish mosques. In the middle of the court a small square building serves as a mosque, representing the *Khuda Khane* of the Persian mosques. The interior decoration of this caravanserai is reduced to its most simple expression, as befits a building erected for public use. But these caravanserais no longer follow the Persian plan at all, while on the other hand the *madrasas* or mosque-*madrasas* still draw their inspiration from it. But at Erzerum, for example, the plan of the madrasa is doubled by a long nave, at the end of which is a tomb (Imaret Ulu Jāmi' or Chifte Minaret; cf. Texier, *Arménie, Perse, et Mésopotamie*), and assumes almost the appearance of a church-nave preceded by a hall surrounded with dwelling-rooms. In this case we must trace in it a Byzantine tradition.

As to the mausoleums, or tombs, they share as much in the Persian as in the Armenian tradition (cf. the tombs of Akhlat; see Lynch, *Travels in*

Armenia, ii. 181 f.). It is certain that Armenia also exercised a very strong influence on Seljuk architecture. The chief reasons for this will be found in the present writer's *Manuel*. We might, therefore, sum up the character of Seljuk art by describing it as a mixture of Persian, Syrian, and Armenian art. The fact is completely explained by the geographical position of Konia (Iconium). We may remark, moreover, that as we travel northwards the Seljuk buildings assume an uncouth and heavy style of decoration which seems to be strictly due to the predominance of Armenian influence; on the other hand, the more we approach the south, the more Syrian influence reveals itself by its refinement, distinction, and exactitude. The harmonious collocation of forms of stone architecture and of enamelled decoration did not at once reach complete perfection. It is easy to understand that brick architecture and stone architecture, which proceed from entirely different starting points, and consequently have quite distinct characters, could be harmonized only after many bungling attempts and trials. One of the most interesting of these is that made by the architects of the Ottoman sultans at Brūsa. The Yeshil Jāmi', or 'Green Mosque,' presents, in fact, a very homogeneous exterior harmony of marble architecture: a great porch opens on a façade pierced with windows and grooved with niches; the porch is still the Seljuk porch, but simplified, corrected, and admirably crowned by a kind of half-dome in stalactites; the latter is encircled by very fine arabesques, which are themselves set, as is the entire porch, in a majestic door-frame decorated with sculptures and inscriptions in magnificent characters. The interior is completely decorated with faience mosaics of the greatest beauty. The *miḥrāb*, entirely of enamel-ware, is very lofty, and the general impression made by it recalls a little that of a great Seljuk doorway; the walls are decorated with a ceramic panelling surmounted by a magnificent frieze, and the inner wall of the mosque opposite the *miḥrāb*, which is generally bare of decoration, here assumes a singular importance by reason of two great *līwāns* on the ground floor, and a fine alcove on the first floor, all entirely executed in very beautiful enamel-work. The plan of this mosque at Brūsa, although rendered totally different from those which we have already studied by a very skilful use of large cupolas, recalls, although in an imperfect manner, the cruciform plans of the *madrasas*, because of these two lateral *līwāns* which flank the chief cupola. This enamel decoration is still Persian in its workmanship and suggestion, and even the first secular buildings of Constantinople, such as the Chinli Kiosk, built at the Seraglio in 1466, in their plan and appearance are still altogether Persian.

At the time of the occupation of Constantinople by the Turks, however, the influence of the Byzantine buildings immediately made itself felt on the productions of the Sultans' architects who built for them their first mosques. Thus the mosque of Sultan Bayazid, commenced in 1497, reproduces on a small scale the plan of St. Sophia at Constantinople, *i.e.* its main characteristic is a great cupola resting on pendentives, supported in front and behind by two large demi-cupolas of equal radius. But this mosque is already distinguished from the mosques of Brūsa by a correction in the plan, and in the general arrangement of the outer and inner parts, a correction which shows an art already completely master of its methods. This art, now that it has been able to borrow from Byzantine art the chief element of structural arrangement, may be regarded as complete, for till the conquest of Byzantium the mosques did not possess that character of boldness, exactness, and definiteness which an architectural work must possess in order to rank among works of art. As long as the plan is undetermined, the work of architecture cannot be considered as complete.

The Turkish mosque consists, then, of a praying place properly so called—a large rectangular hall covered by an enormous cupola supported by two large demi-cupolas. The *miḥrāb* of marble or of enamel-work faces the entrance. Coloured panes set in plaster traceries light the mosque. The Turkish mosques are much the best lit of all, even when nearly all their glass panes are preserved, which is not often. In front of the mosque is a court surrounded by porticoes; in the centre a fountain, the φιάλη of the Byzantine churches, and commanding the four corners of the court, gigantic minarets like monolithic pillars crowned by a pointed roof. Such is the type of the Ottoman mosque from Bosna-Serai to Cairo.

From this time Ottoman art made giant strides, and the wonderful great mosques, the outlines of which still in our day adorn the capital of Turkey, are erected one after another. Such are the mosque of Muhammad II.; that of Sultan Selim; the Sulaimanīya, or mosque of Sulaimān the Magnificent, with its court surrounded with porticoes, its four minarets, its colossal dome supported by four enormous pillars, its great antique columns of porphyry and syenite seized from the Imperial palaces, its coloured panes and its enamel-work; the mosque of Shahzada; that of Sultan Ahmad, the largest of all; and the Jāmi' of Yeni Valideh, one of the finest.

Sulaimān's architect, the celebrated Sinan, is the builder of the finest mosques raised during the reign of the great legislator, but his masterpiece is perhaps not at Constantinople; it is possibly his last work, the Selimiya of Adrianople, which is the most perfect of all, with the extreme simplicity of its plan, the harmony of its proportions, and the perfection of its outline. Unfortunately the decadence of this fine art was rapid; contact with Western art was fatal to it. Already in the mosque Nur-i-Osmanīya (1748–55) we see the introduction of European elements into Ottoman architecture. That intermixture, which perhaps in skilful hands might have been able to bring about a happy modification of Turkish art, was left in the hands of second-rate French or Italian architects. These, by their unskilfulness, rapidly brought about the decay of that art which had produced such great masterpieces.

A few words remain to be said on other architectural works. The Ottomans built numerous schools, madrasas, and monasteries, or *takīyas*. These are generally occupied by dervishes of the Mevlevi order, who played such an important part at the commencement of the history of the Ottoman empire, and do so still in a quiet way, since it is their Grand Master who at the consecration of each Sultan girds the new sovereign with the Prophet's sabre in the old mosque of Ayyūb. Frequently the architecture of these buildings is affected by local traditions, and their case differs from that of the mosques which from the commencement of Sulaimān's reign were all erected on plans derived more or less directly from the types invented by Sinan.

The tombs of sovereigns and of great personages are influenced more or less, as regards their plan, by the use of the cupola. To give a list of them here would be tedious. We shall mention especially those which are near St. Sophia, those of the sultans Selim, Murad, and Muhammad IV., that of Sultan Ahmad, and, above all, those of Sulaimān and Roxalana, near the Sulaimanīya. Turkish tombs are often simplified to mere stelæ, but it

also happens that these stelæ, passing through stages of increasing richness of decoration, are evolved into monuments luxuriantly gilded and carved, which are sheltered under kiosks or cupola-crowned pavilions.

From their ancient nomad life the Turks have preserved a love of nature and of gardens; they regard the houses or palaces they erect only as transitory dwellings. Except the palaces of the sultans, it is rare to see in Turkey houses other than those of wood, or with wooden frameworks; such is, at any rate, generally the character of the Turkish house. Even when rich or luxurious, it is only a transient decoration; and this feeling seems to be essentially Muhammadan, for we find it in all the countries of Islām, where men build only for themselves, not for their children. At the zenith of their splendour the Ottomans were great constructors of buildings for public use—fountains, caravanserais, bridges, aqueducts, reservoirs, roads, *imārets*, or kitchens for the poor, and hospitals and shelters for the sick or for pilgrims. The sultans, their ministers, and persons of position vied in strenuous rivalry in erecting during their lifetime such buildings as might perpetuate their memory. The study of Ottoman art has been, so far, merely superficial; but it cannot fail to afford great interest from the parallel suggested between the magnificence and wide scope of the conceptions of the Ottoman architects and the splendour and energy which characterize the history of the Ottoman sultans. We might say that the characteristic of Persia is elegance, that of Syria and Egypt wealth, that of Moorish art abundance, and even redundance, and that of Turkey force — characteristics which are found both in the history and in the art of these nations.

This study of the Turkish buildings would be incomplete if unaccompanied by a chronology, which is accordingly appended (including the Seljuk buildings from which, without a doubt, Ottoman art is derived).

Hijra.	Christian Era.	
555	1160	Palaces of the Seljuks at Konia.
613	1216	Tash madrasa at Ak-shahir.
614	1217	Shifaiah madrasa at Sivas.
617	1220	Mosque of Ala-ud-din at Konia.
627	1229	Caravanserai of Sultan Khan.
640	1242	Sircheli madrasa at Konia.
700	1300	Mosque of Houen at Kaisariya.
758	1357	Ulu Jāmi' at Brūsa.
818	1415	Yeshil Jāmi' at Brūsa.
856–81	1452–76	Muhammad II. builds the mosque of Ayyūb, the palace of the Old Seraglio, the mosque named after him at Constantinople.
902	1497	Mosque of Sultan Bayazid at Constantinople.
919	1513	Built at Constantinople, during the reign of Sulaimān: the mosques of Shahzada, Selimīya, Mihrimah, Sulaimaniya, Rustam Pasha, etc.
		Built at Scutari: Inkelessi, Buyuk, Ayasma, Jahangir, etc.
978	1570	Selimīya at Adrianople.
1018	1609	Mosque Ahmadiya at Constantinople.
1044	1634	Kiosk of Baghdad at the Old Seraglio.
1060	1650	Founding of Yeni Valideh Jāmi' at Constantinople.
1072	1662	Kiosks, gardens, and fountains at the Seraglio of Adrianople.
1141	1728	Fountains of Bāb-i-Humayūn, Azab Kapū, Top Hane at Constantinople.
1161	1748	Mosque of Nur-i-Osmanīya at Constantinople.

5. **The Indian School.**—Islām, as it spread westward, had transformed everything in its passage. We have seen that in converting Persia it had not been able to effect a thorough conversion to the new doctrine, since the Muhammadans of Persia differ so strongly from those of Turkey, Arabia, and the Maghrib, that the former and the latter form, so to speak, two distinct sects, Shī'ites and Sunnites, each of which considers itself the only orthodox party. Similarly the Muhammadan art of Persia differs more fundamentally from the arts of other Muslim countries than the latter differ among themselves. We shall see that in India Islām had difficulty in taking artistic shape, and in creating devices and forms whose Islāmic character might differentiate them from those consecrated to other religions. We shall also see subsequently that in the far East, in China, Muhammadan art tends to disappear entirely under the effect of the strong originality of the Chinese character. In that country there is an 'influence of the mass,' as chemists would say. In India and in China the Muhammadan is only in a minority; he disappears in the crowd, and despite his stubbornness of principle he submits to circumstances without being able to defend himself against them or to escape them.

The first Muhammadan conquest of India dates from A.D. 712. The first Indo-Muhammadan kingdom was in the 10th cent. A.D., that of Ghazni, which united under one sway the Panjāb, Multān, Gujrāt, and Kaśmīr up to the Ganges. Delhi became the capital of the Afghan House of Ghor after the destruction of Ghazni (A.D. 1152). It was sacked in 1398 by Timur. Bābar (1494–1530), his great-grandson, founded a stable empire on the ruins of the ancient Muhammadan kingdoms of India. It was then that, under the dynasty of the Great Mughals, was set up one of the most remarkable régimes and civilizations of Muhammadan history. Up to the time of the Great Mughals the reaction of the native element against Islām had been so powerful that the art devoted to Muhammadan buildings had, in spite of all, preserved a marked local character. Bābar and his successors, by admirable general organization, unity of policy, and remarkable administrative ability, bestowed on their Empire a transient homogeneity, which forms its most striking characteristic, and which is reflected even in the buildings that they have left.

Accordingly, previous to the time of the Great Mughals, the Muhammadan buildings of India exhibit, in proportion as we approach the early times of the Hijra, features of increasing importance, borrowed from local traditions and from native art. From these the Muhammadans eliminated all representations of men and animals. Among them we find traditions of the Jain style of construction, the piling up of materials, corbellings, methods borrowed from timber-work, ceilings with simple or superimposed panels.

With the Great Mughals, on the contrary, we see the distinct impress of Persian influence which, commencing under Bābar, continued under Akbar, to become dominant under his successors.

Fergusson, the best historian of the Muhammadan architecture of India, proposes the following classification of the Muhammadan styles of that country:

(1) Style of the Ghaznavids.

(2) Pathan style (Northern India, 1193–1554).

(3) Style of Jaunpur (1394–1476).

(4) Style of Gujrāt (1396–1578), derived almost exclusively from the architecture of the Jain buildings.

(5) Style of the buildings of Malwa (from 1401 to the Mughal conquest), allied to that of Delhi.

(6) Style of Bengal (1203–1576).

(7) Style of Kalburga (1347–1525).

(8) Style of Bijapur (1489–1660), which exhibits an almost exclusively Persian character.

(9) Style of Golconda (1512–1572), in which decadence already appears.

(10) Mughal buildings, on which nearly all these different schools are based, especially those which have undergone the influence of Persian art. The chief monuments are at Fatḥpur, Agra, and Delhi.

(11) Buildings in Sindh, of a Persian character.

(12) Buildings of Oudh (1756–1847).
(13) Buildings of Mysore (1760–1799).

In all these different countries, as elsewhere, the Muhammadans have left mosques, *madrasas*, and tombs. It is naturally in these buildings that we ought to look for Muhammadan characteristics, and yet in the early Indian mosques like that of Ajmīr (A.D. 1200) and the Mosque of Kutab at Delhi, though the façade overlooking the large court is furnished with pointed window-bays, more or less recalling Western Muhammadan art, the interior of the building possesses an exclusively Hindu character. As Fergusson says with so much accuracy, it is a screen in the pointed style before a Jain temple. Historians agree in saying that these two mosques and many others were built of fragments which were taken from pagan temples. Cunningham discovered in the mosque of Kutab at Delhi an inscription stating that twenty-seven pagan temples were despoiled in order to provide materials for them. Thus, to quote Fergusson again (on the plan of the mosque of Ajmīr, *Indian and Eastern Architecture*, 1899, p. 129), 'If we refer to the plan of Vimala-Sah at Mount Ābū, and remove in our thought the principal cell and its porch in the centre of the court and the constructions in front of it from the side of the entrance, keeping only the portico which surrounds the court and that at the back with the cupolas, we have the type of the plan of the mosque, provided the back-wall be turned towards Mecca.' Later on the mosque becomes gradually free from Hindu forms, and under the Mughals all its features are Persian, a little softened, however, by the tendency of the Hindu genius to curve the lines. The public buildings, caravanserais, and bungalows, dams, bridges, and reservoirs also reveal the magnificence of the Muhammadan rulers of India. Historians have depicted for us the splendour of their State ceremonials, with a lavish expenditure of details which makes an indelible impression.

We have already spoken of the early mosques of India, that of Ajmīr and that of Delhi. We speak of the buildings of Ghazni only by way of making the record complete, for they have an almost exclusively Persian character. By the side of the mosque of Kutab at Delhi rises the tomb of the Sultan Altamsh (1235), the pointed arches of which are still dressed with horizontal joinings, while the overhanging stones at the corners are roofed with courses of corbelling. Consequently the local tradition still persists behind this pointed decoration. The doorway of Ala-ud-din at the same mosque already contains a much greater number of Western elements, and the arches are dressed with *voussoirs*. But the small columns of the principal porch and a thousand details exhibit the tenacious life of the local traditions.

After the reign of Ala-ud-din the style of building becomes more severe (tomb of Tughlaq at Delhi, and the tomb of Shīr-Shah at Sasseram in Shahabad). At Jaunpur the mosques are great vaulted halls, but the porticoes preserve a Jain appearance. The mosques of Gujrāt, while retaining the features of the local style, display a remarkable spaciousness of conception. In Bengal, brick architecture assumes a majestic type, which is extremely striking, as in the mosque of Khedim-ar-Rassul at Gur. The Adina mosque at Malda has an almost Western plan; it is the same at Kalburga, where vaulted construction almost entirely replaces that by corbellings. At Bijapur the Persian style dominates, but possibly the first sultan of Bijapur, who was a son of Sultan Murad II., contributed to this artistic revolution by summoning experienced architects from Turkey and Persia; such is the opinion of Fergusson—a correct one in the present writer's judgment. The masterpiece of the architects of Bijapur is the tomb of Mahmud, with its enormous cupola of 40 metres in interior diameter, and 55 metres in height under the crown.

The buildings of Sindh are also in the Persian style, but of brick, with bulbous domes. In the 16th cent. appear the buildings of the Great Mughals, and it is in them that we may say that Persia played in relation to the Muhammadan art of India, the same part which the Italy of the quattrocento and of the Renaissance played in relation to France and Spain. The buildings under the reign of Bābar (d. 1530) are few, but in a chaste and graceful style. Under Akbar architectural style assumes a remarkable force and magnificence, keeping all the while its great originality. Here Persian grace and elegance, destined to preponderate under Akbar's successors in the buildings of Agra and Delhi, mingle with the strength of the Pathan and Jain styles. This is noticeable in the wonderful buildings of the Fathpur-Sikrī palace, tomb, and mosque. This last, which possesses a triumphal gate in the grand style and of an almost exclusively Persian aspect, is situated in the background of a rectangular court, surrounded with porticoes. This mosque is of triple formation. In the centre is a praying-place under a cupola like that of the Juma mosque at Iṣfahān; on each side is a porticoed mosque, possessing a kind of closed *maqṣūra* as a *miḥrāb*. Do not these three sanctuaries placed side by side suggest a trinitarian idea, that of the old Hindu Trinity? The great mosque of Agra, also built by Akbar, already shows an increased tendency towards the Persian style; similarly the tomb of Akbar at Sikandra, with its Persian porches. If the tomb of Itmād-ud-daula at Agra, possibly a little Jainesque in appearance, has purely Persian details (arches, windows, ornaments), the Tāj Mahal, erected by Shāh-Jahān at Agra in memory of his wife, the Empress Mumtāz-i-Mahal, is itself purely Persian as a whole and in details (built between 1630 and 1647). Twenty thousand artizans worked on it for seventeen years. But what interests us more than the particulars of its cost in time and money, is to see in what a masterly fashion the architect of this imposing building has been able, while preserving Persian devices and details invented, arranged, and reduced to rules for the use of brick and enamelled earthenware, and while transferring these forms to marble architecture, to deduce from them effects so novel and so striking that the Tāj Mahal rightly passes for one of the most wonderful buildings in the world. On a large platform measuring 95 metres each way rises the Tāj, the pointed and slightly bulbous dome of which is about 210 ft. in exterior height. This cupola crowns the hall containing the tomb, supported by four accessory halls and four great pointed porches on the four sides. The whole building is of marble, inlaid with the rarest kinds of hard stones, black or coloured marbles, with parts gilded. In the interior the hall of the tomb, which holds only an imitation of the sarcophagus, is decorated even more luxuriantly than the exterior of the building.

The Tāj forms the centre of a plan in which gardens, terraces rising one above another, porches, pavilions, basin-shaped reservoirs, and marble aqueducts combine into a whole of wonderful beauty and harmony.

The decorations of the palace of the early Mughals were in a style befitting their power and splendour, and the remains of their palace at Delhi still exhibit portions admirable from an architectural point of view. Unfortunately, this wonderful efflorescence of art was only temporary;

the mausoleums of Golconda already seem heavy, badly put together, incoherent. After the power of the Mughals was shattered in consequence of the death of Aurangzīb, several kingdoms rose on its ruins, and this confusion was immediately reflected in the most thorough disorder of architectural tendencies. Decadence had set in beyond hope of cure.

It is not necessary to mention any Chinese mosques here. Nothing in their decorations presents any feature whatever which differs in character from the purely Chinese style. We shall conclude this account with a short chronological list of the buildings of India.

Hijra.	Christian Era.	
	10th cent.,	Buildings of Ghazni.
	11th cent.,	Mosque of Kutab at Delhi.
606	1209	Mausoleum of Alamuk at Delhi.
723	1323	Mausoleum of Tughlaq at Delhi.
748	1347	Mosque of Kalburga.
760	1358	Mosque of Khedim ar-Rassul at Gur.
829	1426	Great mosque of Ahmedabad.
929	1522	Tomb of Shīr-Shah at Shahabad.
952	1545	Bābar summons pupils of the celebrated Turkish architect Sinan to India.
962	1554	Tomb of Humayun at Delhi.
964	1556	Akbar makes Agra one of the most beautiful cities of India.
968	1560	Akbar founds Fathpur-Sīkri and its mosque.
1036	1626	Tomb of Mahmud at Bijapur.
1040	1630	As the result of a conference, the architect Isa Muhammad is commissioned to build the Tāj Mahal at Agra.
1138	1725	Buildings of Jaipur.

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H. SALADIN.

ARCHITECTURE (Muhammadan in Syria and Egypt).—1. Mosques.—The mosque dates from the beginnings of Islām. The simplicity of Muslim worship demanded a simple plan, which was settled as early as the first centuries of the Hijra. It consisted of a large square court (*ṣaḥn*), surrounded with porticoes (*riwāq*), which were covered with a flat roof (*saqf*) supported by arches (*ṭāq*), with stone (*ḥajar*) columns (*'āmūd*) or brick (*libn*) pillars (*rukn*). The elements of this plan seem to be borrowed, on the one hand, from the Persian palaces of the Achæmenian type, perhaps, but indirectly, from the Egyptian palaces, and, on the other hand, from the Christian churches of Egypt and Syria.

Like the church, the mosque is oriented, but in the direction of Mecca (*qibla*), towards which, in accordance with a rule in the Qur'ān (*Sur.* ii. 139), Muslims turn for prayer. The real orientation therefore depends on the latitude. In Syria it is to the S., in Cairo to the E. or rather E.S.E. In order to accommodate the crowd of worshippers, the portico on the *qibla* side is extended, and admits of a larger number of aisles than the other three. It is called *al-īwān al-qiblī*, 'the oriented hall,' in popular language *īwān qiblī* or simply *īwān*. This prayer-hall is often divided into two parts by a railing of carved wood, the *maqṣūra*. On the side facing the court it contains the platform (*dikka*) for the cleric (*muballigh*) who repeat the words of the *imām*. At the back of the prayer-hall opens the niche (*miḥrāb*), indicating the direction of Mecca (*qibla*), with the pulpit (*minbar*) at the side, from which the high priest (*imām*) and the preacher (*ḫaṭīb*) preside at prayer and divine service.

This arrangement presents clear analogies to that of primitive churches. The court surrounded by porticoes, the centre of which is occupied by the basin for ablutions (*mīḍā'*), recalls the *atrium*, which was also surrounded by porticoes, and adorned with a centre-basin for ablutions. The prayer-hall corresponds to the body of the church, the railing is a sort of rood-screen, and the *miḥrāb* a miniature apse. Lastly, the minaret (*manāra, ma'dhana*), perhaps derived from the steeple, and provided with galleries for the call to prayer (*'adhān*), became the visible outward sign of the mosque. Like the primitive steeple, it has no fixed position, and is built sometimes in a corner and sometimes against a face of the building. These analogies are easily explained. The conquering Muslims, finding a more advanced art among the conquered peoples, took possession of it, and began by transforming a large number of churches into mosques. We may mention two famous buildings of this kind: the great Mosque at Damascus and the al-Aqṣā Mosque at Jerusalem, which at the first glance betray their Christian origin.

The style and methods of construction were modified during the course of time, particularly as to choice of materials, gateways, façades, and minarets, profile outline of the interior arches and decoration; but the general plan of the mosque remained the same until the Ottoman conquest.

The classical and primitive name of the mosque was *masjid*, 'place of prayer.' The Qur'ān does not contain any other expression, and the ancient writers designate by that name every mosque, large or small. But towards the 4th cent. of the Hijra, on account of the progress of culture and of architecture, the mosque divided in a fashion into two. The *great Mosque*, in which the congregation of worshippers (*jamā'a*) attended the Friday service (*jum'a*), took the name of *masjid al-jamā'a*, or *m. li-l-jum'a*, or *m. jāmi'*. Very soon it was called simply *al-jāmi'*, 'the great Mosque.' Since that time the word *masjid* has been reserved for mosques of the second rank, the number of which is constantly diminishing. No great Mosques continue to be called *masjid* except those of Mecca, Medīna, and Jerusalem (al-Aqṣā). Tradition, following the Qur'ān, calls them by this name, and it has thus remained popular.

This evolution of terms traceable in literature is reflected in the inscriptions, which furnish definite, official, and dated evidence. The great Mosque of Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn, built in Cairo in 265 (879), still bears the name of *masjid* in its dedicatory inscription. But two centuries later the Mosque of the Nilometre, built in Cairo in 485 (1092), is called *jāmi'* in its three foundation inscriptions.

2. Madrasas.—When diffusing the Shī'ite heresy in Egypt and Syria, the Fāṭimid khalīfs did not modify the general mosque-plan; we meet with it again especially in those which they built in Cairo. But soon after their time the movement of religious ideas and the political situation created by the Mongol invasions and by the dismemberment of the khalīfate of Baghdad called forth in the Muslim East an orthodox or *Sunnite* reaction, directed specially against 'Alid or Shī'ite sects and dynasties. This religious (Ash'arite) and political (Sunnite) reaction caused a series of reforms in all domains

of civilization. One of the most important was the extension of the *madrasa*. Originating in Khorasan about the beginning of the 4th cent. A.H., the madrasa was at first simply a private school of religious sciences, *i.e.* of tradition, exegesis, and law, according to the Sunnite rites. But in the 5th cent. A.H. the Seljuk sultans of Baghdad, having become powerful vassals of the Abbāsid khalīfate, and the official protectors of Sunnism and Ash'arism, transformed the madrasa into a State institution, intended to produce a select body of officials for all branches of administration. From that time the madrasa became a powerful centre of religious and political propaganda, the school of official Sunnism, and almost a government institution. It was in this form that it was introduced into Syria in the 6th cent. A.H. by the Sunnite Atābeks, particularly Nūr-ad-dīn; then into Egypt by Saladin.

If the madrasa differs from the mosque in its character and purpose, its origin and history, it is also distinguished from it by its plan. When Saladin introduced it into Egypt, this plan was already settled: a small square court with open top (*ṣaḥn* or *qā'a*), enclosed by four high walls, with four halls (*īwāns*) in the form of a Greek cross, opening on to the court by a high arch (*'aqd*), and, in the outer corners of the building, offices for the attendants and the work of the establishment. This symmetrical plan with four branches was admirably suited for the *quadruple madrasa*, i.e. the school devoted to the four chief Sunnite sects (*Ḥanafite*, *Shāfi'ite*, *Mālikite*, and *Ḥanbalite*). Each sect was installed in one of the four *īwāns*, as is testified by the inscriptions in the large madrasa of the Sultan Ḥasan, built in Cairo in 764 (1363). This plan seems to have originated in Syria. It is found in a curious Syrian monument, of a far earlier date than the Syro-Egyptian madrasas, the *Qaṣr* of 'Ammān. Like the plan of the mosque, it combines elements of various origin: the *īwāns* are arched in the Persian style (Sasanian palaces), but their arrangement in a cross around a central court recalls the symmetrical plan with two axes of certain Byzantine and Syrian churches, which the Qaṣr resembles in many other architectural details.

Like the mosque, the madrasa became in time modified in its style and methods of construction. Thus, until the end of the 14th cent. A.D., its *īwāns* were covered with barrel-vaults (*qabu* or *'aqd*) of brick (*libn*), following the Persian and Byzantine methods (without centrings). The last large vaulted madrasa is that of the Sultan Barqūq, built in 788 (1386). Then the vaults were replaced by a flat wooden (*ḫashab*) roof (*saqf*) and ceilings whose rich polychrome decoration merely disguises a serious decadence in the art of building. The only vault that remained was that of the front arch of the four *īwāns* opening on the court, built with arch-stones. But, in spite of these modifications, the plan and general arrangement of the madrasa subsisted until the Ottoman conquest.

The Sunnite reaction gave rise to some institutions analogous to the madrasa, particularly the *dār al-ḥadīth*, the 'school of tradition' (Sunnite). But these establishments, not having the same political standing, remained in the background and created no type of architecture; or rather, being simply varieties of the madrasa, they adopted its general plan.

Under the Ayyūbids, who may have feared a troublesome return of the Shī'ite doctrines, the madrasa retained its character as a State institution with political tendencies. Its first result was to destroy the Fātimid school, the *dār al-'ilm*, a kind of academy with eclectic tendencies, where, along with Shī'ite doctrines, were taught the sciences inherited from Persia and ancient Greece. But Sunnism did not encounter the Shī'ite sects only. The Crusades had stirred up another opponent, the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem. Saladin and his successors, impeded by feudal administration and political decentralization, had weakened but not destroyed these foes, who finally fell before Baibars. On the ruins of Ayyūbid feudalism he founded the kingdom of the Mamlūks, a centralized State, defended by a regular army, and governed, from high to low, by a hierarchy of officials. With this powerful lever he overturned at once the Latin kingdom and the fortresses of the Assassins, the last bulwark of Shī'ite heresy in Syria. He afterwards established his prestige in the eyes of the Muslim masses by welcoming to Cairo the wreck of the khalīfate of Baghdad, which had been overturned by Hūlāgū (1258). In re-establishing, for his own benefit, the duality of the spiritual and temporal powers, he re-tied the thread broken by the Mongol invasion, and completed the work begun by the great Sunnites of the preceding century.

Then the struggle ended, and the militant spirit of Sunnism, inspired by the Holy War (*jihād*), became softened and turned towards pious works and contemplative study. The madrasa, having carried out its fighting rôle, had to lose for ever its original character and assume that of the mosque. All the large madrasas were then fitted up for the Friday service. The *īwān qiblī*, which was larger than the other three, served as prayer-hall and sheltered the pulpit and the *miḥrāb*. Last of all the minaret came to give to the madrasa the complete appearance of a mosque. But it had acquired such prestige that, instead of merging in the mosque, it threatened rather to supplant it. While the number of the great Mosques of classical plan continued to diminish, that of the madrasas of cruciform plan increased until the Ottoman conquest.

This evolution is reflected in linguistic usage also. The madrasas set apart for religious worship took the name of *madrasa lil-jum'a*; then they were called simply *jāmi'* like the great Mosques. Maqrīzī, who drew up his *Topography of Cairo* in the first quarter of the 15th cent. A.D., gives this name to the majority of the large madrasas of the Mamlūks. Finally, epigraphy officially established this use from the year 830 (1427). From that time the word *madrasa* fell into the background as the old word *masjid* had done. At the present day in Egypt it is applied exclusively to a civil and lay school; every great religious building is a *jāmi'*.

Thus the original mosque, the masjid, became subdivided into great Mosque (*jāmi'*) and small mosque (*masjid*). The madrasa, in its turn, subdivided into jāmi' and lay school. These two classes of jāmi' became blended in their purpose but not in their plans. They remained distinct until the Ottoman conquest, which caused the madrasa-plan to disappear. In Egypt and Syria the Ottomans continued to build jāmi's on the plan of the great Mosques, but modified under the influence of the Turkish school, whose mosques are built on the St. Sophia plan (the dome type).

3. Monasteries.—The Sunnite reaction, which brought the madrasa from Persia to Egypt, mingled during its course with tributaries of ancient origin, quite foreign to primitive Islām. One of the most important was *Ṣūfiism*, i.e. Eastern monasticism with mystic tendencies of Persian origin. The public building of Ṣūfiism is the Ṣūfī monastery, the *ḫānaqāh*, a Persian word which penetrated with the building first into Syria and then into Egypt, through Saladin, the founder of the first Egyptian ḫānaqāh. About that time it became

confused with the *ribāṭ*, an Arabic word denoting an ancient military settlement, which had also become, by a profound change of the original idea, a Sūfī monastery.

The ribāṭ and the ḫānaqāh flourished under the Ayyūbids and then under the Mamlūks, but without creating any real type of architecture. These monasteries sometimes assume the plan of the great Mosque (monastery of the Emir Shaiḫū in Cairo, 756 [1355]), and sometimes that of the madrasa (monastery of the Sultan Baibars II. in Cairo, 709 [1310]). Like these two types, they possessed all the visible appliances for worship: minaret, prayer-hall, pulpit, and *miḥrāb*. But their dependencies, fitted up for cenobitic life, and arranged in long lines of cells, give a peculiar appearance to their plan. Several curious traces of them still survive, especially in Cairo, where the monastery of the Sultan Ināl (858 [1454]) affords the most complete specimen.

At the Ottoman conquest the ribāṭ and the ḫānaqāh gave way to the *takiyya*, the monastery of Turkish dervishes, the plan of which also came under the influence of the Constantinople school (porticoes with domes). We may mention, lastly, the *zāwiya*, a word which means, in the Muslim West, a cell, a hermitage, and then a real monastery, but which in Egypt is applied only to a very small mosque, an oratory, or a chapel.

4. Fountains and Schools.—Connected with these three great types—the mosque, the madrasa, and the monastery—are two secondary types, the *sabīl* and the *kuttāb*. *Sabīl* means 'road'; *fī sabīl allāh*, 'in the way of Allāh,' 'for the sake of God,' is said of every pious work, of the Holy War as well as of almsgiving, and especially of foundations for the free use of the public. Now, in the East water is a treasure; according to a saying attributed to Muhammad, to give a drink of water is one of the most meritorious charities. Every free foundation is a sabīl, but the sabīl *par excellence* is the *public fountain*.

In Syro-Egyptian architecture, the sabīl is rarely isolated. It is placed at the corner of a mosque, a madrasa, or a monastery, on the ground-floor, and can be recognized by its two large square windows at right angles, closed with beautiful bronze railings and decorated with charming carvings. Above the sabīl is situated the *primary school* (*kuttāb* or *maktab*), which is rendered conspicuous at a distance by its elegant loggia, open on both sides, in rows of arches on small pillars. This graceful *motif* of the *sabīl-kuttāb* subsisted until the Ottoman invasion. At that time the sabīl became separated, first along with the kuttāb, and then quite alone. Its style has degenerated down to our time, when the fountain displays all the false taste of the modern Turkish school.

5. Mausoleums.—For the obscure dead a grave is sufficient. The illustrious dead, not content with a tomb, require a mausoleum. As far back as it is possible to go, the Syro-Egyptian mausoleum possessed its own peculiar architectural form: a cubical hall, square in plan, covered with a dome. Is this type a distant recollection of the ancient Egyptian *mastaba*? It seems to be more directly connected with a Christian type, the *kalybe* (καλύβη), some traces of which still survive in Syria. The problem of building the dome on a square plan, outlined in these old Syrian kalybes, receives in Muslim architecture the most varied solutions, which reflect the successive efforts and inventions of the Persians, Romans, and Byzantines. The transition between the square and the circle is built of bricks dressed or arranged in corbels, of beams covered with stucco, of hanging arches in semi-cupolas, or of beautiful stone pendants like stalactites. The materials, proportions, outline of the square, of the drum, and of the dome, the decoration—all, in a word, that constitutes the style—changed from age to age, but the general plan remained the same until the Ottoman conquest.

The classical name of the mausoleum is *turba*. But as the dome was its most conspicuous feature, the name of the latter (*qubba*) was extended to the whole building. In literature and the Syro-Egyptian inscriptions these two words are indifferently applied to the mausoleum as a whole, *i.e.* the architectural envelope of the tomb, which itself is called *qabr* or *madfan* or *marqad* or *ḍarīḥ*, the last an Arabic word of Aramaic origin.

The mausoleum is often built by itself, isolated in a cemetery. Sometimes there are several together in a single enclosure (*ḥōsh*), but not forming an organic whole. Frequently the mausoleum of a great person is placed in the corner of a religious building which he has founded. Like the great Italian *condottieri* of the Renaissance, the Sultans and Emirs, former slaves who had risen to fortune, and who were always uncertain of the future, took care to provide for their own tombs beforehand.

This association creates three chief combined types: the *mosque-mausoleum*, the *madrasa-mausoleum*, and the *monastery-mausoleum*. We may mention in Cairo: the mosque of the Sultan Shaiḫ (823 [1420]), the madrasa of the Sultan Qāyt-Bāy (879 [1474]), and the monastery of the Sultan Faraj (813 [1411]), popularly called the tomb of Barqūq.

We find also more complicated types, *e.g.* the *monastery-madrasa-mausoleum*. We may cite those of the Sultans Barqūq (788 [1386]) and Ināl (858 [1454]). All these combined types contain the sabīl-kuttāb *motif*, and unite one or several minarets to one or several domes. They do not have special names. The inscriptions of these huge buildings, agreeing with the literary texts, refer to them sometimes under one name and sometimes under another, according to the part of the whole that they wish to emphasize.

Like all the types of Syro-Egyptian architecture, the turba disappeared after the Ottoman conquest. The name continued in use, but it refers to tombs of any kind. Since the 16th cent. A.D., Egypt and Syria have not had any mausoleums worthy of their past.

6. Holy places and pilgrimages.—In spite of the express intention of its founder, Islām at an early date adopted the worship of saints, and the belief in miracles accomplished by their intervention. This cult was too deeply rooted in the Oriental religions for Muhammad to make it disappear. In Syria, especially, the old pagan cults connected with local gods, which had resisted Christianity, lay hidden under Islām, which had to tolerate while apparently assimilating them. The tenacity of these local traditions explains the manifold origin of Muslim saints. Some of them are pagan gods, transformed by an association of ideas, beliefs, or mere words into Muslim saints; others are the great personages in the Qur'ān, Muhammad, Jesus, and the Jewish prophets; others again are heroes of history, conquerors, or famous sovereigns; and others, ascetics, monks, or scholars, celebrated during their life and canonized by the common people with their irresistible inclination towards the supernatural. All these saints have their sanctuaries (*mashhad*). The belief in miracles wrought by their intervention makes these sanctuaries places of pilgrimage (*mazār*).

The mashhad has not created any special type of architecture. As it is almost invariably erected at the grave of the saint, it takes the plan of the

mausoleum. From the architectonic point of view it is simply a variety of the turba, perhaps the oldest. It is found in all sizes, from the small chapel with a little dome, whitened with lime (*marabut, shaiḫ, walī, nabī, maqām*), to the large classical mausoleum; all have the dome on the square plan. The only one of these buildings that departs from the traditional plan is the famous Dome of the Rock, the Qubbat aṣ-Ṣaḫra in Jerusalem, built by the Khalīf 'Abd al-Malik, in 72 (691), and many times restored since then. Its huge dome, on a circular plan, surrounded by a double octagonal enclosure, harbours, along with the famous rock, a whole cycle of Jewish and Christian legends. This circular-octagonal plan, which undoubtedly proceeded from that of the Christian building prior to the Qubba, is found again in a group of pre-Muslim Syrian churches (Bosra, Ezra, Qal'at Sim'ān, etc.). But apart from the Dome of the Rock and a few secondary buildings derived from it (Dome of the Chain in Jerusalem, mausoleum of the Sultan Qalāwūn in Cairo, etc.), it has not been adopted in Syro-Egyptian architecture.

Apart from the turba and the mashhad, the dome is used in only one instance in Syro-Egyptian architecture: a small dome, also called *qubba*, is erected in large mosques, at the back of the prayer-hall, in front of the *miḥrāb*. This ancient feature may probably again be a relic of the church, namely, the dome which certain basilicas erect at the crossing of the transept in front of the choir. This was the only place used for the dome in the great Mosques until the Ottoman conquest, which systematically introduced domes over the porticoes and the prayer-halls of the great Mosques, after the style of the Constantinople school.

MAX VAN BERCHEM.

ARCHITECTURE (Persian).—The account of the development of the architecture of Persia is almost synonymous with the land's own history. From the crude beginnings in early Median or pre-Median times, before the 7th cent. B.C., we may trace the evolution of the builder's art down to the Achæmenian period (B.C. 550–330), thence through the Seljuk and Parthian eras (B.C. 330–A.D. 224) and the following centuries of the Sasanian empire (A.D. 224–661). At the close of that period, in the 7th cent. A.D., Iran was completely changed by the Arab conquest and subsequent Muslim sway, from which epoch to the present time the history of Persian architecture forms a special branch of the study of the development of Muhammadan art.

1. **Early Iranian and Median period** (before B.C. 550).—Our knowledge of the architectural conditions during the early Iranian and Median periods is limited in extent, both because of the absence of historic remains surviving from that remote date, and because of the lack of definite descriptions in ancient texts that might serve to elucidate the subject. Nevertheless, from incidental allusions in the Avesta, from references in the Greek historians, and from chance statements in later writings from which deductions may be drawn, we are able to form some sort of a picture of the architectural status in ancient Media, or Western Iran, and in early Bactria, or Eastern Iran. Herodotus (i. 96–99) affirms that, down to the time of Deioces, the founder of the Median empire, the Medes used to live in villages, and that they were first gathered into cities by Deioces when he made Ecbatana his capital, and fortified it as his royal residence. From the conditions portrayed in the Avesta, so far as that work may be regarded as reflecting the age in question, and from the sight to-day of village after village of flat-roofed mud huts spread over much of the territory which once was ancient Media, we may infer that the primitive condition of architecture in that region of Iran was really represented by Herodotus' statement, and that the same was true of ancient Bactria. But this judgment must not be pressed too far; for, while the Avesta refers to habitations of so crude a sort that they might be removed or destroyed if a man died in them (*Vendīdād*, viii. 1–13), it also alludes to houses that were 'strong, well-built, lofty, handsome, shining and conspicuous, constructed with a special chamber, balcony, verandah, and enclosing wall, or erected with high columns, or with a thousand columns,' as we know from a number of passages from which the adjectives here given are drawn (cf. *Vend.* ii. 26; *Yasna*, lvii. 21; *Yasht*, v. 101). The columnar architecture referred to in the last two attributes anticipates by many years the pillared halls of the Persian kings at Persepolis.

The chief old Iranian terms for 'house,' apart from the Avesta *vaēsma*, 'abode' (*Yasht*, x. 86), and the old Persian *hadiš*, 'palace' (cf. the curious, though probably merely accidental, use of the linguistically cognate ἕδρανον to denote the palace of the Persian kings in Æschylus, *Persæ*, 4), are *nmāna* (Gāthic *demānā*) and *kata*, the latter, however, being the 'room' rather than the 'house' (the view that *kata* denotes 'underground house,' expressed, *e.g.*, by Geiger, is scarcely correct).

The houses, doubtless simple in construction, were built of wood (cf. *dāuru-upadarana*, *Vend.* viii. 1) or were sometimes mere felt-covered tents (cf. *nematō-aiwivarana*,' *ib.*), although the use of bricks and mortar, being mentioned in connexion with non-architectural construction (cf. *Vend.* vi. 51, viii. 8, 10), was doubtless common also in building houses. Besides the 'columns' (or 'pillars'), 'verandahs,' etc., already mentioned, the Iranian houses had both doors and windows (*Vend.* vii. 15, iii. 29, etc.), though how they were closed, we know no more than how the entire house was roofed. It may readily be supposed, nevertheless, that the roofs were of reeds or turf laid on beams, or even of simple sun-dried bricks, such as are still utilized in Iranian regions (cf. Geiger, *Ostiran. Kultur*, p. 219).

Turning from the Avesta to the description given by Herodotus (i. 98) of the fortified abode of Deioces at Ecbatana, we find a citadel that must have resembled an Assyrian or Babylonian *sikkurat*. Its massive walls rose tier above tier in seven circles, and were crowned by battlements of various colours, white, black, red, blue, and orange (probably coloured gypsum and glazed tiles), while the ramparts of the topmost fortifications, where the palace stood, were decorated respectively with silver and gold. This description is probably not overdrawn if we may judge from the account which Polybius (x. 27) gives of the magnificence and gorgeous decorations of the temple of Aena or Anaias at Ecbatana (the goddess Anāhita in the Avesta) in the 2nd cent. B.C.; and the fact that we have no remains of such splendour is due not alone to the vandalism of Alexander, Antigonus, Seleucus Nicator, and Antiochus the Great, as described by Polybius, but also to the circumstance that the Medes probably constructed their buildings largely of wood, sun-dried bricks, and clay, even though they were lavish in adornment.

As to the architectural style of their palaces, it is probable that the Medes, like the Persians after them, were largely influenced by Assyrian, Babylonian, and Chaldæan models. Regarding their religious architecture, we know practically nothing beyond the description by Polybius, just referred to; it is a fact, moreover, that Zoroastrianism does not appear to have been favourable to temple-building, for the Persians had no temples in the Greek sense, as Herodotus (i. 130) expressly states; yet it is equally certain that they must have had some sort of a sanctuary to protect the holiest of their sacred fires, and such shrines are presumed

by the Pahlavi writers of a later date to have existed in those early times (cf. *Pahlavi Bahman Yasht*, iii. 30, 37, 40; *Zāṭ-sparam*, vi. 22, xi. 8–10; *Būndahishn*, xii. 18, 34, xvii. 7, etc.), so that it is possible that the temple at Ecbatana, as described by Polybius, may have preserved some architectural features from ancient days. In the mortuary customs enjoined by their religion, moreover, the early Iranians, whether Medians or Bactrians, made use of temporary structures, called *dakhmas* (wh. see) in the Avesta (*Vend.* iii. 9, 13, vii. 54, vi. 44–51, etc.), on which to expose the dead, just as their modern representatives, the Parsis (wh. see) and Gabars (wh. see) still follow the custom in their 'Towers of Silence'; but what the shape of these receptacles may have been in ancient times is only a matter of inference.

2. Achæmenian period (B.C. 550–330).—With the victory of Cyrus of Persia over the Median king Astyages, the supremacy of N. Iran passed to S. Iran, and a new dominion, the sovereignty of the Achæmenians, or the combined rule of the Medes and Persians, came into being. The architectural remains, both religious and civil, which belong to this period are abundant, and they show the art of the builder in early Persia at its zenith. Terraced platforms of massive masonry and palaces of stone graced by halls with tall fluted columns, crowned by bull-headed capitals, were typical of the age.

Ecbatana, Pasargadæ, Persepolis, and Susa were the capitals of the Medo-Persian empire, and the chief seats, therefore, of architectural relics. The site of Ecbatana is now occupied by Hamadan; and there, or in its vicinity, are to be found portions of broken columns, and a few carved stones, remnants of walls that belonged to ruined structures, and may date back even to Median times. But as yet no systematic excavations have been carried on to determine their age, or tell whether extensive finds of a similar character may yet be made. If we leave Ecbatana out of account, the earliest remains of Achæmenian architecture are to be seen at Pasargadæ, the capital of Cyrus the Great, in the plain of the modern Murghab, between Iṣfahān and Shiraz. As we approach it from the north, we first pass the remains of a ruined platform on the crest of a range of low hills overlooking the plain. It was apparently designed to support an audience-hall of Cyrus, but was never completed. Spread over the surface of the plain itself traces of the royal city are to be seen. Nearest to the ridge is a single shattered wall of a massive stone building which must have been 40 ft. high by 10 ft. square, and which may have served as a shrine for the sacred fire, although some authorities (on less good grounds, it seems) believe that it was a princely tomb. A second group of ruins lies not far distant to the south, and comprises a high round column (not fluted), some angle-piers of an edifice that once surrounded a royal court, and a stone shaft consisting of three blocks, on the uppermost of which is inscribed in cuneiform characters, 'I Cyrus, the King, the Achæmenian.' A huge slab stands somewhat to the east of this group, and on its face is carved in low relief a winged representation of the Great King, above whose head was similarly inscribed the device of Cyrus just quoted, although the part of the stone containing it has been sawn off and lost within the last century. Still another collection of ruins lies somewhat to the south-east, and shows vestiges of pillars and stone door-sills grouped around a paved court that belonged to some edifice of Cyrus.

Most important of all the ruins is the tomb of Cyrus, which lies about a mile beyond in a south-westerly direction. It is known to be his mausoleum from descriptions in the classics. The structure resembles a small house, with a slightly pointed roof, and is made of a handsome white sandstone resembling marble. It stands high upon a sub-basement, built of the same material and consisting of a large foundation plinth, nearly 50 ft. long, 40 ft. wide, and 2 ft. high, surmounted by a series of six stone layers that form a pyramidal series of high steps approaching the mausoleum from every side. The mammoth blocks that make up the tomb itself were originally fastened together by iron clamps, but without the use of mortar; and so perfectly were they set that the structure still forms a compact whole, even though falling more and more into ruin. The sepulchre, measured from the outside, is about 20 ft. long, by 17 broad, and 18 high. A very low door in the western side serves as an entrance. The mortuary chamber measures 10½ ft. long, by 7½ ft. wide, and 8 ft. high (the exact measurements in metres may be found in Jackson, *Persia*, p. 288). It is needless to add that the chamber is now empty. In architectural style the tomb of Cyrus is thought to show Lycian influence, since somewhat similar burial edifices have been found in Asia Minor, the land first conquered by Cyrus after Media; but it may also be possible that the idea of such a vault for the dead may have owed something to the Avestan *kata*, 'house,' a temporary structure for the body before it was carried to the *dakhma*. Around the tomb, moreover, there once stood a decorative colonnade, as is clear from the fragments of columns still upright, and a few hundred yards beyond it are the vestiges of a platform on which was once erected a habitation for the Magian priests who were custodians of the tomb, as we know from Arrian (*Anabasis*, vi. 29. 7).

A single other vestige of Achæmenian architecture, religious in its character, is found at some distance to the N.W. in the same plain; it is in the form of the bases of two altars, used by the Magi in celebrating their sacrificial rites, as they did, in the open air.

Illustrations and descriptions of all the architectural monuments in the Murghab Plain are to be found in the works of Texier, Flandin and Coste, Ker Porter, Stolze and Andreas, Dieulafoy, Perrot and Chipiez, Curzon, and Jackson; and they convey a good idea of the architecture of Cyrus's capital.

Far grander than the ruined monuments of Pasargadæ are those of Persepolis, the capital of Darius, and Xerxes, and their successors. These tokens of a vanished empire are spread over a considerable area in the Plain of Murghab, some forty miles to the south of Cyrus's capital. The first vestiges of this important series are the traces of the lost city of Stakhra, indicated by some broken columns, remains of portals, and scattered fragments of building blocks at the site now called Stakhr or Istakhr. The southernmost point of this city is now marked by a small granite staging, some 40 ft. square and 7 ft. high, which the natives call *Takht-i Ṭā'ūs*, 'Peacock Throne,' or *Takht-i Rustam*, 'Throne of (the hero) Rustam.' A mile or so farther south rises the Platform of Persepolis itself, with its magnificent stairways and palace-crowned terraces, which the Persians call *Takht-i Jamshīd*, 'Throne of Jamshīd,' after the legendary king of that name, or *Chihil Minār*, 'Forty Pillars,' from the columns that remain standing. Although the site as a royal residence may date back to legendary times (cf. possibly *Būndahishn*, xxix. 14), we know from an inscription on the southern wall that it owed its origin as a stronghold to Darius I., apparently about B.C. 516–513, and it is generally believed that Greek designers were employed in its construction (see Justi, 'Gesch. Irans' in Geiger and Kuhn's *Grundriss*, ii. 448–449). Even when considered apart from the edifices that stood upon it, the platform is a remarkable piece of constructive

art. It measures over 1500 ft. from north to south, varying from 20 to 50 ft. in height, according to the elevation of the three main terraces, and it has an expanse running back eastward for nearly 1000 ft. until it merges into a low range of hills, called *Kuh-i Rahmat*, 'Mountain of Mercy,' the spurs of which have been partly cut away to furnish material for its construction. By the aid of inscriptions, and judging from the position of the different ruins, the columns that remain standing, and the arrangement of the bases of those that have fallen, as well as from the outlines of the walls, portals, stairway approaches, and sculptured pediments, we are able to identify each of the buildings that once occupied this site. Opposite the Grand Staircase of approach at the northern end, is the Porch of Xerxes; 50 yards to the south stand the relics of the Audience Hall of Xerxes; still farther southward, and near a mound, are the better preserved remains of the Palace of Darius; while a short distance southward again, across a ruined courtyard, are some traces of a Palace of Artaxerxes III. Ochus, identified by an inscription on the stylobate. Directly behind this is the Palace of Xerxes himself, with a minor edifice still farther back, while at some distance northward is the great Hall of a Hundred Columns, erected by Darius, with a portico near its south-western corner, showing in stone the king seated on his throne of state. The destruction of these gorgeous buildings is attributed to the drunken act of Alexander the Great, when he burnt the citadel after his victory over the last Darius; but though the hand of the conqueror destroyed the beauty of the edifices and left them a ruin for all time, it could not obliterate those traces that still in after ages bear witness to their ancient glory.

Some further remains of royal architecture are to be seen at Persepolis and in its vicinity; they are the rock-hewn tombs of the Achæmenian kings. Three of these sepulchres are cut in the hills, behind the great platform already described. They are believed to be the mortuary chambers of Artaxerxes II. Mnemon (B.C. 404–358), of Artaxerxes III. Ochus (B.C. 358–337), and of Darius III. Codomannus (B.C. 335–330), if we are justified in regarding the unfinished grave as that of the last of the Achæmenians. More imposing in their situation and older in point of time are the four tombs carved in the rocky front of the necropolis cliff of Naksh-i Rustam, on the other side of the plain, about 6 miles north-west of the platform. These sepulchres, which were the model for the three later ones, are each hewn in the shape of an immense Greek cross, and sunk deep in the face of the rock. They are elaborately carved in architectural style to represent a façade decorated with bull-capped pillars, two on either side of the doorway, and surmounted in each case by an entablature richly sculptured with a bas-relief of the king, his subjects, and Ormazd. An inscription shows that one of these tombs was the sepulchre of Darius the Great; the other vaults, it is believed, belonged to Xerxes, Artaxerxes I., and Darius II. A few yards distant from the tomb last named there is a square stone edifice which closely resembles the rectangular structure at Pasargadæ, already mentioned, but well preserved, and, like the latter, probably a fire-shrine rather than a tomb. Near the base of the necropolis hill, but hidden from the shrine by a spur of the cliff, are the remains of two altars, hewn out of the living rock and serving as fine examples of the stonecutter's work for religious purposes in Achæmenian times. To the same age may likewise belong some rude cuttings in the rocks on the crest of the cliff, apparently designed as repositories for exposing the bodies of the dead in accordance with the ancient Zoroastrian custom, but the date is not certain. To a later age, however, we must assign the seven sculptures cut in the rock beneath the tombs themselves, since their subjects prove them to be of Sasanian origin. The list of Achæmenian tombs is to be supplemented by several other sepulchres, somewhat resembling those of Naksh-i Rustam, but probably dating from an earlier period than they or the Persepolitan tombs, and without inscriptions or ornamentation, excepting one which has a crude bas-relief. These are found near the village of Sahnah, between Hamadan and Kermanshah, at Holvan in Western Persia, and Takhrikah in Azarbaijan, as well as elsewhere (see de Morgan, *Mission scientifique en Perse*, iv. 292–302, and Justi, *op. cit.* ii. 455, 456).

The fourth and last of the great Achæmenian capitals was Susa, whose remains were first made known by Loftus in 1852, and were excavated with very important results by Dieulafoy in 1884, 1885, 1886, followed by de Morgan in 1897, 1898, 1899. The site which they occupy was the winter residence of the Achæmenian kings and the old seat of government of Elam. The ruins extend over several *tells*, or hillocks, between the river Chaur, or Jaur, and the Kerkhah, in the vicinity of the modern Dizful and Shuster. Four principal groups of remains are distinguishable, according to the results of the explorations that have been mentioned: They are, first, the *tell*, called the Citadel; second, the Royal City, where stood the palaces of the successors of Darius; third, the traces of the city itself; and, fourth, the vestiges of the inhabited town along the river's edge. If we may judge from the elaborate finds made by Dieulafoy, the Citadel and the Royal City must have made an imposing spectacle in the days of their pristine glory (see the plates in Dieulafoy, *L'Acropole de Suse*); and the same investigator's researches have revealed, among other ruins, the remains of the *apadāna*, or throne-room, of Artaxerxes II. Mnemon, which was erected on a site earlier occupied by a palace of Darius I. which had been destroyed by fire. It was here that the archæological expedition, led by Dieulafoy and his wife, discovered the frieze of archers and a lion-frieze, together with the remains of an enamelled staircase and various other objects that enrich our knowledge of early Persian architecture and art. In point of style the Susian remains are quite like those of Persepolis, even as regards the character of the so-called 'Persepolitan column,' and, like the latter, they are thought to show traces of Greek influence combined with Assyro-Babylonian elements and other features already mentioned, although they are so thoroughly Persianized as to possess an individuality of their own.

The ruins of one other edifice in Persia may be referred to here as belonging possibly to the latter part of the Achæmenian period; it is the remains of the great temple of Anaitis (see ANĀHITA) at Kangavar, between Hamadan and Kermanshah. A portion of the N.W. wall of the stylobate on which the temple stood is still intact, and is crowned with the remains of a colonnade of pillars, while on the south-eastern side of the temple precinct there is a disordered mass of large granite blocks and columns, whose size conveys an idea of the vanished magnificence of the sanctuary which is now a mass of ruins. Owing to the presence of certain characteristics in the columns, which seem to show later Greek or Syro-Roman affinities, Dieulafoy and some others propose to assign this temple to the Parthian period; but, to the present writer, the evidence seems

stronger in favour of attributing its erection to Artaxerxes Mnemon or some other of the later Achæmenians. For the sake of completeness it should be added that Dieulafoy, on the contrary, assigns to the Achæmenian period some of the ruins at Firuzabad and Sarvistan in S.W. Persia; but other authorities, like Perrot and Chipiez, de Morgan, and Gayet, are better justified in assigning them to the Sasanian epoch.

3. Seljuk and Parthian periods (B.C. 330–A.D. 224).—The interregnum of seventy years occupied by the sway of Alexander's direct successors and the Seljuk rule exercised no appreciable effect on Persian architecture, unless it was to extend the sphere of possibility for Greek influence. The Parthians were Philhellenes, as is shown by their employing the Greek language and Greek devices on their coins; but they were not great architects, as is clear from the Parthian ruins—practically the only ones surviving—at Hatra and at Warka, although these are built with crude solidity, if not with beauty of design. The structure at Hatra, the modern *al-Ḥadhr*, in Mesopotamia, was either a palace or a temple, or possibly both combined in a single precinct, for which reason it is commonly spoken of as a palace-temple. The ruins show a brownish-grey limestone edifice, 366 ft. long, 210 ft. broad, and with thick walls proportionately high. The building consists of a series of seven large chambers arranged side by side, with several smaller rooms leading into them, and a large square hall—apparently a throne-room—added in the rear near the left-hand corner of the edifice. The front of the building was, for the most part, open, so that the light was good, and it was probably shaded by awnings. The walls of the greater apartments were strengthened by pilasters, and decorated by bas-relief sculptures and ornamental friezes, which added to the effect of the general architectural design. As to its date, the palace-temple at Hatra may be assigned with reasonable probability to the latter half of the Parthian period, or between the 1st and 3rd cent. of the Christian era, since the city was in a flourishing condition, and able to resist the siege of Trajan in A.D. 116, and of Severus in A.D. 198, but was a deserted ruin in the 4th century.

The second of the Parthian architectural remains is found at *Warka*, the ancient Erech, on the Euphrates, a city mentioned in Gn 10^{10}. This ruin consists of a sepulchral chamber built over a tomb in which was found a coffin of the Parthian period. The description which Loftus gives of this structure, with its bases of columns, capitals, cornices, friezes, and bits of painted plaster, shows that the Parthians in later times were not averse to decoration and artistic touches in their buildings, even if they had affected a rude simplicity in earlier times. This fact is further borne out by the account of the palace at Ctesiphon, as given in Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius* (ed. Olearius, i. 25). According to de Morgan (*Mission scientifique en Perse*, ii. 137 and plate lix.), there is a ruin of a Parthian palace or temple at Velazjord, near Kangavar, and mention has already been made of the view which would associate the ruined temple at Kangavar with the Parthian era. The scarcity of Parthian remains is probably to be accounted for, as in other cases, by the fact that brick was more largely used than stone in the construction of their buildings. As to originality in architectural art, it may be added that the Parthians are credited with the development of the arch- and tunnel-shaped roof, in contrast to the flat ceiling and square lintel of the Achæmenian period.

4. Sasanian period (A.D. 224–661).—The Sasanian monarchs, unlike their Parthian forerunners, were great builders, and distant architectural rivals of the Achæmenians. An enumeration of the places where monuments that date from their reign are found would take in a large part of Persia, as is clear from such a list as that given by Justi (*op. cit.* ii. 540–541). These remains show advances in constructive art over the Parthian period, more especially in the development of the dome, an outgrowth of the arched vault, and in the elaboration of the façade of such a palace as that at Ctesiphon, whose high recessed entrance, with galleried panels on either side, anticipates the sweeping curve of the grand portal and the panelled front which is typical of the mosque and madrasa architecture in Muhammadan times. The standard of royal magnificence under the Sasanians is shown in the ruins of Qaṣr-i Shīrīn, the castle built by Khusru II. Parvīz (A.D. 600), for his favourite, on the road between Baghdad and Kermanshah, and is evident in the sculptured grotto at Ṭāq-i Būstān, near the latter city. To about the same epoch belong the ruins at Mashito and at Ammān (the 'Rabbah of the children of Ammon' of Dt 3^{11}), as well as the palace called Aivan-i Khusru, not far from Susa. The religious architecture of the period is represented by the remains of numerous fire-temples, like the *ātash-Kadah*, near Iṣfahān, and that at Abarguh or at Jaur, in the district south of Shiraz; or, again, by a portion of the crumbling sanctuary of brick at Ṭāq-i Sulaimān, south-east of Lake Urumiah. The style of construction of a Sasanian caravanserai may be judged by the stone ruins, said to be the work of Khusru I., 'Anūshirvān the Just' (A.D. 531–579), at Aghuan, between Teherān and Meshed. Sasanian architectural engineering is illustrated by several bridges and dams, as at Dizful and Shuster, or the stone aqueducts, descriptions of which may be seen in the standard works mentioned at the end of this article.

5. Muhammadan period (from A.D. 661).—As already stated, the history of the Muhammadan period of Persian architecture forms a special branch of Muslim art, and the best examples of its development are found in the mosques, the religious edifices which supplanted the old fire-temples after Persia adopted Islām as its national faith, and which are characterized by towering domes (sometimes bulbous in shape), high façades with immense recessed arches, graceful minarets that give balance on either side, and ornamental exteriors decorated with glazed tiles and scroll-like arabesques. The architectural remains of the first period of the Khalifate, the Umayyads and Abbāsids (A.D. 661–847), have mostly been destroyed by the long series of wars that have devastated Persia from time to time; but the foundation of the mosque of Harūn al-Rashīd at Kazvin (A.D. 786) belongs to that epoch, and a mosque at Shiraz, built in the latter part of the 9th cent. by the Safarid Amr ibn Laith, is numbered among the older remains. To the early Ghaznavid age (10th cent. A.D.) may possibly belong the tower-like tombs at Rai and Hamadan, but it is more probable that they come from the later Seljuk era (roughly, 1030–1150) or from the Mongol age (1160–1260). The same is true of a crumbling mausoleum at Tus, near Meshed, as it is said to be the tomb of the poet Firdausi, who died in the year A.D. 1020; but although the poet's grave is actually near by, it is more likely that the structure is of Seljuk origin, since it closely resembles the mausoleum built by Sultan Sanjar at Merv about 1150. Good examples of the earlier Mongol period are to be seen in the tower-tombs of Jenghiz Khan's grandson Hūlāgū (d. 1265) and his queen at Maragha, the royal seat of the

Mongols in north-western Persia; while the mausoleum of Uljaitu Khodabandah (d. 1316) is of the later Mongol period. The best illustration of the architecture which flourished during the rule of the Tartars, after Timur's invasion, is the beautiful Masjid-i Kabud, or 'Blue Mosque,' erected in 1403 by Shah Jahan at Tabriz. Muhammadan architecture in Persia reached its height in the reign of Shah Abbās the Great (1585–1628), and is well illustrated by the Masjid-i Shah, or 'Royal Mosque,' erected in 1612 at Iṣfahān, and by the other imperial edifices of the same ruler. The architectural activity of Shah Abbās was not confined to his capital, however, or to palaces and places of worship, but was exercised in the construction of caravanserais, bridges, and other useful structures in many parts of Persia, so that his name is widely known throughout the land as the patron of the builder's art.

The cities which best show the different styles of Muhammadan architecture are those which had the honour at one time or another to be the royal capital, like Iṣfahān, Kazvin, Tabriz, Sultanīya, and Shiraz; but hardly of lesser fame are Kum, Kashan, Meshed, Būstān, and Ardabīl. Modern architectural tendencies are best observed in the present capital, Teherān, where it is possible to see even European elements combined with the most conservative features of the past. When viewed as a whole, it may be said that Persia's contribution to the history of architecture, if not distinctly original, is, nevertheless, considerable, and deserves the attention of the student of religious art as well as the architectural specialist.

LITERATURE.—For a general description consult Perrot-Chipiez, *Hist. de l'art dans l'antiquité*, v., Paris, 1890; Gayet, *L'Art persan*, Paris, 1895; Geiger, *Ostiran. Kultur im Alterthum*, Erlangen, 1882, pp. 216–222; Saladin, *Manuel d'art musulman*, i. ch. iv. ('École Persane'), Paris, 1907. For special discussions, illustrative drawings, and photographic reproductions, see Flandin-Coste, *Voyage en Perse*, 8 vols., Paris, 1843–54; Texier, *Description de l'Arménie, la Perse, et le Mésopotamie*, 2 vols., Paris, 1842–45; Dieulafoy, *L'Art antique de la Perse*, 5 vols., Paris, 1884–86, and *L'Acropole de Suse*, Paris, 1890–92; Mme. Jane Dieulafoy, *A Suse: journal de fouilles, 1884–86*, Paris, 1888; de Morgan, *Mission scientifique en Perse*, iv., Paris, 1896; Rawlinson, *The Five Great Monarchies of the Ancient Eastern World*, 4 vols., London, 1862–67, *The Sixth Great Oriental Monarchy*, London, 1873, *The Seventh Great Oriental Monarchy*, London, 1876, and *The Story of Parthia*, New York, 1893, pp. 372–385; Justi, 'Geschichte Irans' in Geiger and Kuhn's *Grundriss der iran. Philologie*, ii. 447–457, Strassburg, 1896–1904; Sarre, *Denkmäler persischer Baukunst*, Berlin, 1901.

A. V. WILLIAMS JACKSON.

ARCHITECTURE (Phœnician).—Worshippers of the powers of nature, it is not surprising that the Phœnicians, in the earlier stages of their national existence, should have discarded the work of the architect and builder, and taken to worshipping in the 'high places' so often referred to in the Old Testament. That these were natural eminences, and not artificial erections, like those of the Babylonians and Assyrians, is quite clear from the statements concerning them. They were within easy access from the cities, and thither the people resorted when assembling for worship. How common they were may be gathered from the fact that they were the customary places for worship among the Israelites until the 7th cent. B.C.* The oracle on Carmel, which, according to Tacitus and Suetonius,† Vespasian consulted, was possibly a sacred place of this kind. The god consulted had neither statue nor temple, but only an altar which was much reverced. This altar was probably of unhewn stones, like the one dedicated to Jahweh upon that same mount Carmel which Elijah re-built and consecrated anew on the day when he confounded the prophets of Baal.*

In all probability the Phœnicians would have continued worshipping in the same way, without temple and image, had it not been for foreign influence. The close relations, however, which the Phœnicians had with Egypt, brought them under the influence of that nationality, with its splendid temples and elaborate ritual, and the result was that they sought to imitate them, though they did so only to a certain extent, as far as our present knowledge goes.

The most perfect of the small imitations of Egyptian temples is that now called *al-Ma'bed*, 'the temple,' at Amrīt near Tartūs. This erection is built in a court, 52 yds. by 60, hewn in the rock and levelled, the S. wall being about 16 ft. high. If there ever was any wall on the N. or front side, as is probable, it has now disappeared, and is replaced by a hedge. Remains of columns near the corners of the court suggest that the walls were flanked by cloisters. The 'temple' is in reality a cella,† and stands on a square mass of rock more than 10 ft. high and about 18 square, being composed of three enormous blocks of stone covered with a monolithic roof. The blocks having been superimposed, the structure was apparently carved out in the form it now presents. The opening is towards the N.; and the plain cornice with which it is decorated is the usual Egyptian one, advancing in front over the anterior face of the rock. It is thought probable that the entablature was supported by columns of metal. The ceiling is vaulted. The flooring within is slightly sunken, and is flanked by narrow platforms or benches, graded and sloping upwards towards the back, possibly to render those taking part in the ceremonies more visible to the people outside.‡ Slots for a rod at the opening suggest that a curtain hid the interior from the passers-by when there was no public ceremony, and square sunken holes near the entrance seem to mark the positions of candelabra or, perhaps, sacred columns. Renan has suggested that the rock-hewn court may anciently have been covered with water from a spring near, when the wall on the N. was in existence; and the appearance of the surface confirms this. If that be the case, it resembled two other similar sanctuaries near *'Ain al-Ḥaiyāt*, 'the Serpent-Spring.' The more complete of these is a little monolithic chapel, now in ruins. It was rectangular in form, with a square opening in front, where it has an Egyptian cornice surmounted by uræus-serpents. It rested upon a rectangular block of stone about three metres thick by five wide, carried by a plinth of much smaller dimensions. On each side of the great rectangular stone are traces of a little stairway, which gave access to the platform formed by its upper surface.§ This shrine was about 5·50 metres high, and its slightly-vaulted ceiling was sculptured in relief with two great pairs of wings, one pair springing from the globe flanked by two uræi, and the other seemingly having as its centre an eagle's head.

Facing the chapel just described, and about 10 metres to the E., are the base and lower part of another chapel, nearly like it, but seemingly rather larger. There is hardly any doubt that they both formed part of the same architectural scheme, and it is possible that one was dedicated to a god and the other to a goddess, his spouse. They rise out of the water of a small lake or pond

* Hastings' *DB* ii. 881b.
† Tac. *Hist.* ii. 78; Suet. *Vespasian*, 5.

* 1 K 18^{30-39}. There was also a 'high place' at Gezer, without a temple, and marked off by monoliths or 'pillars' such as are often mentioned in the OT.
† Renan, *Mission de Phénicie*, pl. 10; Perrot-Ch'piez, *Phénicie*, fig. 40.
‡ Renan, *ib.* pl. 10; Perrot, *ib.* figs. 185, 187.
§ Renan, *ib.* pl. 9; Perrot, *ib.* fig. 188.

supplied by the spring, and it is possible that this was also the case in ancient times. Backed by verdure, it must have been a secluded and sufficiently picturesque spot, and the difficulty of access to the shrines would naturally prevent their desecration.*

It is improbable, however, that these remains show the common religious architecture of their time, and the fanes of Astarte at Sidon and Melqart at Tyre were undoubtedly much more important and imposing structures, though Herodotus' description of the latter (ii. 44) does not enable any idea of its form to be gathered; to all appearance he was most struck by its two pillars (στῆλαι), 'one of pure gold and the other of an emerald stone of such size as to shine by night.' Another important shrine was that of Eshmûn on the left bank of the Nahr Auli, about an hour N. of Sidon. This was a rectangular erection built apparently on the side of the slope, remains of the walls and masonry of the terraces being still in existence. The slope looks towards the N., and it is possible that the sanctuary to Eshmûn was a shrine like that at Amrît, which has the same orientation. Large numbers of votive statuettes were found on the site. The stones of the shrine, however, seem to have been long ago carried away by the inhabitants of the country to build their houses with, and some, with holes, are used in olive-pressing.†

Of greater importance, perhaps, are the indications available for the architecture of the temple at Gebal, made known by coins of the Roman period.‡ On the left is shown a chapel, the front surmounted by a pediment. The whole front was open, flanked by pilasters supporting the pediment. At the top of the steps giving access to the interior was a tripod table, perhaps for offerings, and a strange emblem surmounted the point of the roof, which seems to have been decorated on each side with three rows of sunken panels.

Naturally the architecture of this building suggests Greek influence, and to all appearance it is a simple reproduction of the Egyptian shrine, but it may be noted that Babylonian architecture had something analogous (see p. 682), and may have been the true origin of the structure. What would seem to be due to Greek influence is the pointed roof.

The real ancient part, however, was probably the structure on the right, which shows a colonnade to which access was gained by a flight of steps, and a large court-yard, with columns—a kind of arcade—behind. The representation of this building was evidently altogether too much for the die-sinker, whose ideas of perspective were on a level with those of the Assyrians. Above the cornice of the colonnade is an erection of open work, behind which one sees a conical object towering high in the open—the emblem of the god of the place, corresponding with the sacred stones in which the divinity was supposed to reside.§

And here we again have the 'high place,' not formed out of the solid rock by the laborious quarrying of all the mass which was not needed, but by an enclosure of hewn stone, ornamented with a colonnade all round. This was naturally much more elaborate than the simple clearings in the open, and also more æsthetic than the hill-enclosures marked off by simple rows of tall stones.

But it will be asked: Were these two forms—the 'high place' and the chapel or mountain-shrine—the only architectural creations of the Phœnicians for the purpose of worship? All that can be said is that they are the principal forms found. It seems not improbable, however, that they had others, and, as is well known, the temple of Solomon at Jerusalem was built by workmen and material supplied to that king by Hiram of Tyre. If not in that king's structure, there is at least in the temple as described by Ezekiel (40^{1}–43^{27} etc.), according to Chipiez's restorations,* a certain likeness to the Phœnician temples as shown on the coins of Cyprus, which seem to have been erections of imposing architectural appearance.

In Cyprus the most famous temples were those of Paphos, Amathus, Idalium, and Golgos, in which places were Phœnician settlements, as also, probably, at Citium (now Larnaca), Salamis, and other sites. From Cypriote coins,† an idea may be gained of the celebrated temple at Paphos, dedicated to Venus or Astarte. It consisted of a central erection—a kind of pylon—in the form of two narrow towers connected, in the upper part, by a chamber or chambers furnished with three windows. Below this was the entrance, in which the spectator could see the sacred figure adored there—a conical stone surmounted by a naïve indication of a head, and two rudimentary arms. Perrot suggests that the size of the opening has been purposely exaggerated by the engraver in order to exhibit the divine image, which was, in reality, not at the entrance, but at the far end of the sanctuary. On each side of the pylon were porticoes or colonnades, flat-roofed, hardly more than half the height of the central portion, surmounted by images of the doves sacred to the goddess. Under these arcades objects like candelabra are shown, the upper part arranged either for the purpose of giving light or for the burning of incense. Above the upper structure, and between the two towers, are shown a star and the crescent moon—emblems of the goddess. The space in front of the building seems to be represented paved, and enclosed by a semicircular railing, provided with a double gate. Within this enclosure is a dove, apparently seeking food. The details vary somewhat in the different coins,‡ and it is to be supposed that the engraver had no intention of giving more than a general idea of the building, so that numerous accessories have been omitted. According to Di Cesnola, the body of the edifice was rectangular, 67 metres by 50, surrounded by a court-yard 210 by 164, more or less. As it is based upon actual exploration, it is to be preferred to the plan given by Gerhard after the indications of travellers who visited the site in the early years of the 19th cent.;§ but how the latter could have obtained the exceedingly probable details of the interior which he gives is difficult to understand. According to his plan, there were two enclosures, the first provided with four entrances, and surrounded by a colonnade. A doorway admitted to the second enclosure, in which was the temple. There we see the semicircular railing, the paved forecourt, the sites of the towers, the central portion of the building, divided into a vestibule, a large hall, and a sanctuary wherein was the sacred image; likewise the lateral structures, each with four chambers, to which admission was gained only

* Renan, *Mission*, pl. 9; Perrot-Chipiez, *Phénicie*, fig. 189.

† Von Landau, *Vorläufige Nachrichten über die im Eshmuntempel bei Sidon gefundenen phönizischen Altertümer*, with plans, etc., by Makridy Bey from *RB*, 1902.

‡ Donaldson, *Architectura Numismatica*, No. 30; Perrot, *Phénicie*, fig. 19.

§ Upon these objects see p. 884.

* Perrot-Chipiez, vol. iv. pp. 263, 275, 289, and pl. v.

† Guigniant, *Religions de l'antiquité*, pl. liv., p. 206; Perrot-Chipiez, *Phénicie*, fig. 199.

‡ Cf. Perrot-Chipiez, *Phénicie*, fig. 58 (reproduced from Donaldson's *Architectura Numismatica*) with fig. 199.

§ Perrot-Chipiez, *ib.* fig. 200 (from Gerhard's *Akademische Abhandlungen*, pl. 41).

from the large central hall, and one (that at the end) which could be entered only from the sanctuary. The two plans are so different that one asks whether they could have been taken from the same remains. According to Tacitus,* the stone emblematic of the goddess was in the open air, indicating that the place where it stood had no roof; notwithstanding this, it is said never to have been wet with rain. This rather favours Di Cesnola's plan, which, however, does not agree with the picture on the coins. Probably further exploration is needed.

In the neighbourhood, but nearer to the sea, Di Cesnola† found two conical stones still in position, which, it is suggested, are all that remain of some sacred spot—perhaps the traditional landing-place of the goddess when she first visited the island. If this be correct, the site was the spot where the pilgrims to the sacred places on the island commenced their pious visits. Perrot suggests that this site is represented on another Cypriote coin,‡ in which two sharply-pointed cones are shown, one on each side of two columns, resembling the side posts of a doorway, standing on bases, and connected at a distance of about three-quarters of their height by joists, intended, to all appearance, to hold them in position. The whole seems to have been provided with some protective covering of the nature of an awning. Under this seeming doorway is a conical object on a plinth, surmounted by a flat top, on which stands a dove, the emblem of the goddess. In front is a semicircular enclosure with a single central gate. The whole shows a simple form of the temple at Paphos, without the lateral structures or aisles.

At Golgos the temple was a parallelogram,§ the roof supported by five rows of three columns each. There were two doors, one S., the other E. A large cone of grey stone found on the site implies that the building was dedicated to the goddess of Paphos. It resembles in form, but on a large scale, the terra-cotta cones found in such numbers at Telloh in S. Babylonia. Many figures of women holding or suckling their children, and cows suckling their calves, were discovered at many points on the site. Numerous pedestals, each of which anciently bore a statue, and some of them two, were found. Ceccaldi, who studied the objects disinterred there, has given a very vivid picture of the appearance of the temple when it was still standing. Its four walls were of sun-baked brick covered with white or coloured cement, and the pillars were of wood, with stone capitals, the two sides of the roof which they supported having only a very slight slope, forming a terrace, like the present Cypriote roofs. The roof was of wood covered with reeds and mats, upon which was spread a thick layer of earth beaten down hard. The exterior was therefore of a very simple appearance. The interior was lighted only by means of the large doorways, wherein one saw a motionless and silent crowd of stone-carved figures, their features and robes tinted with the colour of nature, surrounding the mystic cone as perpetual worshippers. Shrine-like stone lamps illuminated the grinning ex-votos hanging in recesses on the walls, which last were adorned with curious pictures. Strange sculptures adorned the circuit of the building, where the slanting rays of light were reflected on the white and polished tiling of the floors.

This is a vivid and probable picture, of which, however, some of the details require verification. Perrot suggests that this building was simply a treasury or museum belonging to the real temple.

A few underground buildings exist, the most noteworthy being the crypt at Curium,* in which were found many objects of value. Having descended the steps and passed along a short passage, one finds three successive bayed rooms, and at right angles with these, a fourth, with a further length of the passage. This interesting and well-built structure seems to have been used as a treasure-chamber, but whether it was originally intended for such is uncertain. That at Larnaca is known as the *Panaghia Phaneromini*. Enormous blocks, as well as small stones, have been used in this construction, which consists of a vestibule with a door leading to a small chamber, within which was found an old spring, probably some sacred source. The roof was formed of two large blocks of stone considerably arched on the under side. It has been thought to be a tomb; but in view of the existence of the spring, this is unlikely. It was probably a sacred well, much resorted to by the inhabitants and the people of the neighbouring port.

Far behind the perfection of the temples of Phœnicia and Cyprus are those of Malta and Gaulos (now Gozzo). Artistically and architecturally, a wide gap separates them from the structures of the Phœnicians, but the conical (sacred) stones found therein have caused them to be regarded as certainly Phœnician. Evans and others, however, are of opinion that these buildings are really Libyan. At Gozzo there are two temples,† side by side, and joined together by a wall, which forms a kind of rough façade. Passing through a narrow entrance, one reaches, in the case of the larger building, first a small and afterwards, continuing along the passage, a larger hall arranged at right angles thereto. The rear termination of the building is an apse in the form of a semicircle, and the whole suggests the arrangement of a church choir with deep bays. In consequence of its nearness, the smaller building has the first hall larger than the second, and the semicircular apse at the end is decidedly smaller; otherwise the arrangement is in both cases the same. In the various apses of which the building consists, the ground is made to mount by means of steps and sloping pavement. Barriers possibly railed off these raised bays, which then resembled the chapels in Catholic churches. It was in the right-hand bay, in the first hall, that the cone was found which gave the clue to the nature of these structures. Though symmetrically planned, the individual bays are not by any means regular in shape, and the stone supports for the furniture or sacred objects of the shrines seem to be placed without any attempt at orderly arrangement.

Still more irregular in shape and careless in arrangement is the temple of Hagiar Kim,‡ Malta, in which, moreover, the want of care and regularity extends also to the arrangement of the stones that form the walls, which are in some cases of enormous size.§ There are two entrances, giving access to two bays or apses on the E. and

* *Hist.* ii. 3.

† Di Cesnola, *Cyprus*, p. 214; Perrot-Chipiez, *Phénicie*, fig. 203.

‡ Gerhard, *Akademische Abhandlungen*, xliii. 17; Perrot-Chipiez, *ib.* fig. 202.

§ Di Cesnola, *Cyprus*, p. 139; Perrot-Chipiez, *Phénicie*, fig 204.

* Di Cesnola, *Cyprus*, p. 304, reproduced in Perrot-Chipiez, *Phénicie*, fig. 216.

† They are called the *Gigantiga*, the enormous stones used in their construction having led to the tradition that they were the work of giant builders. Plans and views, from La Marmora, *Nouvelles Annales de l'institut de correspondance archéologique, publiées par la section française*, i., Paris, 1832, pp. 1–32 and pl. i.–ii., are published in Perrot-Chipiez, *Phénicie*, figs. 221–224.

‡ Caruana, *Report on the Phœnician and Roman Antiquities in the group of the Islands of Malta*, Malta, 1882, reproduced in Perrot-Chipiez, *ib.* fig. 225.

§ *Ib.* figs. 219, 220.

four on the W., but the southernmost of each seems to have been separated from the rest, and partitions in the case of two others are shown on the plan. Stones decorated with spiral ornaments show that attempts at decoration were made; the ground upon which the spirals are carved is covered with a number of minute holes, emblematic, it is supposed, of the starry vault of heaven.* A striking altar,† with flutings, decorated with a representation of a growing tree, has the same ground-work, which covers also many of the great blocks of stone used in the building. Another altar, like a small table‡ with a thick central support—a type met with often in Syria—was found in one of the large bays.

Sculptures show that similar temples to those in Syria existed, in Punic times, in Sicily and Carthage. One of these was known under the name of *Erek Ḥayim*, 'Length of Lives,' and was dedicated to Astarte as goddess of longevity, whence the name of Eryx, given by the Greeks to the city where it was. It arose on the peak of a mountain, within that mighty wall which protected the summit. Judging from a stele found at Lilybæum (Marsala), a temple to Hammon existed there. The upper part of this monument§ shows a priest adoring before a candelabrum, or fire altar, behind which is the sacred cone with 'arms and head,' similar to the symbols found on the votive stelæ at Carthage. Inscriptions dedicated to *Ba'al Samaim*, 'the lord of the heavens,' *Astarte Erek Ḥayim*, 'Astarte length of lives,' *Eshmûn*, *Ba'al Ḥammôn*, and *Elat*, make it probable that Phœnician temples to these deities existed in Sardinia, where they were found. A shrine‖ in the Egyptian style, found at Sulcis (height 28 in.), has on the cornice a disc, and a row of uræi above. In another example from the same place,¶ carved with a goddess in Greek costume, we have a mixture of styles, Doric columns being introduced as supports of an entablature showing the Egyptian winged disc surmounted by a row of uræi.

Carthage and its dependencies have but little to offer in the way of religious architecture in the Phœnician style. At Ebba a lintel of a doorway** carved with two lotus-flowers, the sun with rays above them, and two crescent moons on each side, and at Jezza a capital of a column†† in modified Ionic, suggesting Cypriote influence, testify to buildings erected there. At Carthage itself the great temple of Eshmûn, demolished by the Romans, was re-built as the temple of Æsculapius; but nothing now exists of it, as the church of St. Louis and its dependencies at present cover the site.

The ornamentation of the Phœnician temples has been referred to from time to time in the preceding pages, but a few additional words thereon are necessary. The cornices are often plain, but when a row of uræi-serpents was added,‡‡ the effect was decidedly decorative. Exceedingly effective was the mixed style of the entablature of the temple at Gebal,§§ with its Græco-Roman decoration, including scrolls and flowers flanking a conventional Egyptian winged disc-emblem with uræi. The doorway at Um-al-Awamid,‖‖ being much more Egyptian in style, forms a striking piece for comparison. Egyptian influence is again manifest in the relief showing a sphinx, beautifully carved, found at Arad.¶¶

* Perrot-Chipiez, *Phénicie*, fig. 227.
† *Ib.* fig. 228. ‡ *Ib.* fig. 229, also 226.
§ *CIS*, pl. 29, reproduced in Perrot-Chipiez, *Phénicie*, fig. 232.
‖ Perrot-Chipiez, *Phénicie*, fig. 233.
¶ *Ib.* fig. 193. ** *Ib.* fig. 234. †† *Ib.* fig. 235.
‡‡ Renan, *Mission*, pl. 9; Perrot-Chipiez, *Phénicie*, fig. 61.
§§ Perrot-Chipiez, *ib.* fig. 48. ‖‖ *Ib.* fig. 68.
¶¶ *Ib.* fig. 73.

Apparently it was a favourite decoration with the Phœnicians, for it occurs also as the support of a throne in the decorative panel-relief showing a seated personage in the presence of the sacred fire (see below, p. 885 f.). Gradine ornaments,* such as are found in Assyro-Babylonian reliefs showing fortifications, occur on alabaster slabs from Gebal, now in the Louvre. They suggest the Assyro-Babylonian temple-tower, surmounting a decoration of flowers in squares over a band of laurel. This gradine-ornament is also applied to altars,† even of the Roman epoch. As in the case of the round tower-like monument of the tomb of Amrît,‡ however, the idea that it was really a battlement is lost by the material between the gradines being left; there are no openings. The great disadvantage to the modern student of their decoration, however, is that the remains are so scanty.

There is hardly any doubt that the architecture of the Phœnicians has had an influence on that of the nations around. Perrot and Chipiez cite the old mosques of Cairo, Amru, and Ṭûlûn, with their great rectangular courts surrounded on all four sides by rows of columns, the idol alone being absent. 'If one wish to have the type complete, one must go as far as Mecca, and enter into the Ka'ba, where even the triumph of the Qur'ân has not succeeded in ousting the primitive bethel, the black stone, which, set up in the sanctuary, has received the homage of the Arab tribes throughout many centuries' (*Phénicie*, p. 315 f.).

But perhaps these temples are not derived directly from Phœnician architecture. We have always to take into consideration the possibility of their having come down to the nations which produced them by some collateral line, and the likeness between them and the fanes of Phœnicia may be due to action and reaction. Whatever reservations may be made, however, the evidence of history and the monuments seems to show that the influence of Phœnicia preponderated.

T. G. Pinches.

ARCHITECTURE (Roman).—General characteristics.—If it be necessary in the case of Greece to point out that religious buildings were but a part of the architectural activity of the people, it is still more necessary in the case of Rome. Roman religious architecture plays a very small and comparatively unimportant rôle. Her baths, her palaces, her amphitheatres, and other public buildings were all upon a grander scale than her temples.

When Rome became mistress of the world, although she had at that time no architecture of her own, she made use of artists from all nations, and thus arose a composite style of the architectures of the world, in which Greece played by far the largest part. The origin of the Roman temples seems to have been partly Etruscan, partly Greek; but whatever part Etruscan architecture played in other branches of Roman architecture, the Roman temple in its final form was almost wholly Greek. The fact was that the great development of Roman architecture was almost entirely in the hands of Greek artists, and it is by no means easy to determine how much can really be considered Roman at all.

The true Greek style was trabeated, the arch, as has been shown, being only occasionally used. The style of the Romans, however, was a hybrid, partly arcuated and partly trabeated, and in their hands the fusion of the two elements never became complete. It is generally said that the arch in Roman architecture is the arch of the Etruscans: it is, however, doubtful whether it was not an introduction of the Greek artists of the East

* Perrot-Chipiez, *Phénicie*, fig. 77.
† *Ib.* fig. 78. ‡ *Ib.* fig. 95.

and Alexandria. In any case both the arch and the barrel vault date back to remote ages in the East, and the later Greek architects were more likely to be influenced by these traditions than by the comparatively obscure work of Etruria. At the same time, fine arches with large voussoirs were built by the Etruscans, as in the canal on the Marta at Graviscæ, supposed to date from the beginning of the 7th cent. B.C., or the Cloaca Maxima at Rome of the 6th. If, however, the Romans themselves had continued the tradition and built in a fine stone arched style, it at least seems probable that some remains, however scanty, would have come down to us. Indeed, we know that early Roman architecture was of brick, and brick vaulting with voussoirs occurs in Egypt as far back as B.C. 3500. Even the intersecting vault is found in a Greek example at Pergamos dating from the 2nd cent. B.C. The earliest surviving Roman building that had arches is the Tabularium, and it dates only from B.C. 78, long after the sack of Corinth, when Rome passed under the rule of Greece intellectually and artistically. Arches were in common everyday use in Greece, at any rate for structural purposes, as early as the time of Eumenes I. (B.C. 263–241), so there is no reason to suppose that Greek architects working for Rome were in any way necessarily indebted to the Etruscans for their conceptions. Even the triumphal arch—that ornamental form which we are wont to consider typically Roman—was built in Athens in B.C. 318. The earliest instance of such an arch in Rome is that of Scipio Africanus (B.C. 190), of which we have the record, but no remains. The most that can be said, then, is that it is not impossible that the Romans may have had a developed arcuated style derived from the Etruscans before they fell under the dominion of Greece; but there is no evidence of any kind, and, as far as existing remains are concerned, there are no new developments that precede Greek work. The attached column, for instance, sometimes spoken of as a Roman invention, occurs in the Arsinoeion in but slightly modified form, in the monument of Lysicrates in Athens, and at Phigalia, even if those of the Erechtheum were of Roman date.

With regard to their brick and concrete construction it is otherwise. The Romans were certainly great engineers. There is, however, not the same intellectual nicety about Roman work that there is in Greek work, and this was never acquired. When the Roman Empire was finally divided, the Greek or Byzantine portion at once began to develop a more scientific style in marked contrast with the ruder work of the West. Roman work was practical, rough and ready, often grandiose, but lacking in the finer artistic sense.

It is likely that we shall never be able to say what elements are Roman and what are Hellenistic, but it is possibly in the general planning that the Roman influence is strongest.

The Romans borrowed the Greek orders; or perhaps a more correct way of putting it is to say that the Greek architects working for Rome used their own orders, and by slow degrees trained a native school. The Doric order became very debased, and is found in a great variety of forms. The simpler of these forms are commonly grouped together as Tuscan, but they differ very much among themselves, and there is no historical evidence for any Tuscan origin. Vitruvius uses the term, but it is impossible to draw any clear dividing line between Tuscan and the debased Doric. The cause of the common error is that the Renaissance architects did make such a hard and fast division. The term as applied to Renaissance work has a definite meaning, but has no relation to anything in Rome. There was a Roman tendency to dispense with the fluting of Greek work both in Doric and Ionic, and occasionally in the Corinthian order, which greatly detracts from the strong refined vertical character of the shaft. Flutings were expensive to work, and were not showy enough to please Roman taste, which preferred monolithic shafts in hard brightly-coloured marbles in which flutings would have little effect. The column loses the sturdy proportions of Greek Doric, and tends to assimilate itself to the proportions of the other orders. In most of the existing examples of Roman Doric there is a base, but this is absent in early examples such as those at Pompeii, which are much more Greek in feeling. It has been suggested that the origin of the base is Etruscan, but its absence in early work is against this theory; and the part that Vitruvius would assign to Etruscan influence in architecture is not much more of a reality than the part assigned by Virgil to Æneas in Roman history. The contours gradually deteriorate, and the echinos of the Doric column speedily becomes a simple quarter round. In the almost unique early example of the Temple of Hercules at Cora the hyperbolic curve is found, and is obviously executed by Greeks. The architrave shrinks in importance, and the whole entablature is much shallower. There is a marked tendency for the intercolumniations to become wider. This is mainly the result of the fact that the order as such is not an essential part of the construction in Roman work. It does not govern the building, but is merely something applied afterwards, and has to suit its proportions to the available space. It is to this that we owe the introduction of the pedestal as a regular feature, which occurs only occasionally in Greek work. The architrave is set farther back than in Greek architecture, and the line of its face tends to fall within the base (fig. 1). The beautiful sculpture



FIG. 1.

which was the glory of Greek buildings, and particularly of the Doric order, is absent, and its place is often taken by trivial conventionalities, such as wreathed skulls. The origin of this feature is probably to be found in the actual skulls of

victims hung upon the altars. The Ionic order remains the same in its principal features, but the



FIG. 2.

capital is not infrequently found with the volutes set anglewise (fig. 2). They are, however, comparatively rare, although the text-books speak of them as almost universal. This arrangement in Greek work at Phigalia has already been noted, and its first known occurrence in Italy is at Pompeii, where the refined carving marks it as the work of Greek hands. The volute in Roman Ionic projects very much less than in Greek examples, and the proportions are not at all satisfactory. There is generally a dentil course beneath the cornice as in Asiatic Greek examples: this occurs even in Roman Doric in the Theatre of Marcellus. The Roman dentils, however, are set much closer together and are shallower than in Greek work, generally with a fillet underneath.

The tendency throughout is towards greater enrichment, clearly seen in the choice of the Corinthian as the favourite Roman order. In Greek hands, as at Epidaurus, or the choragic monument of Lysicrates, this order, in spite of its richness, is yet restrained and most delicate in its refinement. In Roman work this is lost, and mere carving takes the place of the sculpture which is still found in the choragic monument. The foliage, too, loses its crispness, and the acanthus mollis takes the place of the acanthus spinosus (fig. 6 in ARCHITECTURE [Greek]). In some instances, particularly in triumphal arches, the small angle volutes are greatly enlarged, and may have helped to popularize the angle treatment of Roman Ionic. The capital then partakes of the nature of both Ionic and Corinthian, and the egg and dart molding is introduced above the acanthus. Thus treated, the order is sometimes called the Composite order, a name unknown to Vitruvius, and not at all necessary: it is in no true sense a distinct order, although the architects of the Renaissance en-



FIG. 3.

deavoured to make it so. The origin of the arrangement is as usual Greek, and in the temple of Apollo at Naucratis, the Erechtheum itself, and a capital in the forum of Trajan, we see it in its undeveloped form.

The entablature in Roman Corinthian work is very ornate. The architrave is divided by several moldings more or less enriched. The frieze is often decorated with continuous scroll work founded on the acanthus leaf, which is beautiful in itself although giving a restless effect as the result of over-ornamentation. Below the corona a new feature is introduced in the modillions—ornamental brackets which give an æsthetic sense of support (fig. 3).

RELIGIOUS BUILDINGS.—Of course in most of the great secular work the arch plays an important part, and the orders are placed as ornaments in front of the real arched construction; but except in the case of the propylæa in the East before the sacred temenos, the arch practically plays no part in religious work. The vault, however, does occur (see below). The religious buildings of the Romans were of comparatively small importance, and the great *thermæ* are far more typical of Roman work than the temples. The temples, too, were used for many other besides religious purposes, just as was the case with the great mediæval cathedrals. The temple of Concord was not only an art museum of the spoils of the world, but was often used for meetings of the senate, as also was the temple of Mars Ultor. The public weights and measures office was in the temple of Castor. But the Roman temples, although in their main features simply modifications of the Greek, have certain distinctive marks of their own. It seems probable that the early Etruscan temples were often of three cellæ placed side by side, and, moreover, that it was the custom to erect them upon a lofty base, or podium.

The Etruscan architecture apparently was largely of wood, and terra-cotta ornaments played a very important part, noticeably in a peculiar fringe of ornamented terra-cotta tiles hanging from under the eaves and apparently also from the main beam of the portico. These features can be traced in Roman work—the lofty podium with a great flight of steps approaching the main portico, the wide intercolumniations, and the use of terra-cotta ornaments—and even the three-celled temple may have had its influence in the great breadth of the Roman temple, or in the case of a triple temple such as occurs at Sbeitla in N. Africa. [See ART AND ARCHITECTURE (Etruscan and Early Italic), p. 863].

The ruins of the temple of Mars Ultor and three columns of the temple of Castor and Pollux (completed A.D. 6) are probably the earliest extant remains. There may, however, have been earlier examples, as Greece can be said to have begun its dominion over Rome in B.C. 146. The temple of Jupiter Capitolinus was possibly largely Etruscan. Generally speaking, the earlier the date the purer the work and the more marked the Greek influence. It has been observed that the Greek temple was orientated; but this was not the case with Roman temples, and we find them facing in all directions, generally planned in relation to their architectural surroundings. We find them all round the Forum Romanum, for instance, each facing into the forum. As in the case of Greece, the altar was not in the temple but outside, and the exact *raison d'être* of the temple itself is by no means so clearly defined.

The typical Roman temple, then, is a rectangular building with a cella very much wider than was usual in Greece. In the temple of Concord the width was greater than the depth. This may possibly have been the result of the earlier three-celled temple or of the many uses to which the

Roman temple was not. The architectural effect was always concentrated upon the front, and the back of the temple was often absolutely plain. As part of the same tendency we may notice that the temples were generally only *pseudo*-peripteral, with attached columns round three sides of the cella and an abnormally large front portico. The temple of Fortuna Virilis is a good early example; there is a very fine later temple known as the Maison Carrée at Nîmes (fig. 4).





FIGS. 4 AND 5.

The Roman temples within were apparently rarely divided into nave and aisles, so that a greater floor space was obtained, but the span was sometimes reduced by internal columns close against the wall, after the manner of the Greek temple at Phigalia. Occasionally there was an apse, as in the temple of Mars Ultor; and in the temple of Venus and Rome there was an interesting arrangement of a double temple with two cellæ and apses back to back (fig. 5). The whole in this case was surrounded by a court and stoa.



FIG. 6.

The roof appears to have been normally of wood, but certainly in a few instances a concrete or stone vault was employed, as in the above-mentioned temple of Venus and Rome, the temple of Neptune, the temple of Ceres and Proserpine, and the temple at Nîmes known as the Nymphæum or the Baths of Diana, which has a stone barrel-vault supported on stone arches which rested upon attached columns (fig. 6).

In front of the temple was a great flight of steps generally flanked by two projecting portions of the podium, the steps not extending the entire width of the building. In the temple of Minerva at Assisi the steps are carried between the columns which are raised on pedestals. This was probably from want of space.

A favourite form of temple with the Romans was the circular building which had become popular in Greece during the 4th and 3rd centuries B.C. It has been suggested that the Roman circular temple had an independent Etruscan origin. Even if this be the case with regard to the mere fact of the plan being circular, it has certainly nothing whatever to do with the actual form, which is simply a copy of Greek work. The lofty podium is generally found in Roman examples; but this, too, occurs in Greek examples of much earlier date. The picturesquely situate temple of Vesta at Tivoli is a fine example, of which the cella itself may even date back to the close of the 1st cent. B.C., although the Corinthian peristyle is later (fig. 7).



FIG. 7.

By far the most remarkable of the circular temples, and indeed of all the Roman temples, is the celebrated Pantheon (fig. 8)—a great building 142 ft. 6 in. in diameter, 2 ft. in excess of the domed reading-room of the British Museum. The exterior is plain, not to say ugly; but originally the brick was faced with marble up to the first string course, and above this with stucco, which may possibly have somewhat improved the general appearance although not actually affecting the building architecturally. It is approached by a great portico built from the spoils of Agrippa's temple, which



FIG. 8.

was taken down for that purpose. This fact was discovered in 1892, and is some consolation to those

who have always maintained that the portico is hopelessly out of place, and ruins the severe dignity that the plain circular building might otherwise have possessed. The date of the main building also has conclusively been proved to be A.D. 120–124, from the stamps upon the bricks of which it is constructed. This is a most important fact, as the assignment of the building to Agrippa has led to many wrong inferences with regard to the history of dome construction.

The building occupies the site of what was once an open circular piazza, the pavement of which has been found some 7 or 8 ft. below the floor of the present building. The walls are 20 ft. in thickness, containing eight great recesses three of which are apses: the highest faces the entrance on the main axis, and the other two are at the extremities of the diameter, at right angles to the main axis. The entrance itself is a great rectangular recess covered by a barrel-vault, and between these four recesses are four others, all of rectangular form. Except in the case of the entrance and the main apse opposite to it, all the recesses have two columns *in antis* in front. The dome is divided in its lower part by vertical and horizontal ribs into five ranges of thirty-two coffers. Above this it is plain, and the whole building is lit by a huge circular hypæthral opening 30 ft. across. Altogether the interior effect ranks very high among the great buildings of the world.

Under Roman rule many great temples were built in many other countries than Italy, but, save in those countries that had no architectural styles of their own, it is misleading to call them Roman. Particularly in the East we find many buildings that are practically simply a development of Hellenistic architecture. The great temples of Syria, for instance, are not placed at the end of the fora as in Rome, but in a temenos of their own as in Greece, with propylæa leading into them. With one exception too (Baalbek) they are orientated in the Greek manner. Of this type is the great temenos of the temple of the Sun at Palmyra. In most instances, just as at Athens, the propylæa have a wider intercolumniation in the centre, but it was spanned by an arch, round which the entablature is carried. The propylæa of Damascus (fig. 9), which may be dated



FIG. 9.

c. 110 A.D., or not much later, are probably the first instance, and a similar dated example occurs in the temple of Atil (A.D. 151). Baalbek (A.D. 160) and probably Palmyra were the same. The invention—if so it may be termed—appears to be that of Apollodoros, a Greek of Damascus, and seems a natural development of the arches of later Greek tradition already noted. It afterwards appears in Diocletian's Palace at Spalato, on the north-east coast of the Adriatic (*c.* 305 A.D.). It marks an important step, because hitherto the arch had always been carried by portions of walls or piers. On the other hand, the columns had never before carried anything but a horizontal entablature; and the piers and arches behind, with the columns and entablature in front, always remained two distinct and irreconcilable elements. Indeed, it was left for the Byzantine and Gothic architects to work out truly homogeneous styles of column and arch.

Of these Syrian examples the finest is that at Baalbek, which is built upon a great platform forming an acropolis. The general setting out is probably not Roman, and some of the substructure is pre-Roman in date. It was approached by great propylæa of Roman times, the restoration of which is largely conjectural. An interesting feature is the hexagonal court, surrounded by a double peristyle upon which the propylæa opened. The hexagonal court leads in its turn to a great square court, at the end of which, somewhat in the Roman manner, is the larger of the two temples. Apparently it was never completed. The other temple to the south, the temple of Jupiter, is a very fine piece of work. In some ways the building was a compound of Greek and Roman feeling. It was peripteral with two ranges of columns in the front, but the portico was very deep, and the central intercolumniation was wider than the rest. The interior had attached columns after the manner of the temple at Phigalia, except that the entablature was broken and carried round and back between the columns. It probably had a flat roof, except at the far end, where there was a small vaulted recess, about half the total width, approached by a flight of steps. A curious feature is a two-storey division into shallow niches between the columns, which has a very unpleasing effect. The lower one is arched, with a horizontal cornice, and the upper has only the cornice, but is surmounted by a pediment. The carving is bold and good, and shows the influence of Greek tradition.

Construction.—The Roman method of construc-



FIG. 10.

tion was very different from that of Greece. Whereas the Greeks generally built in large stone blocks bonding right through the wall, the

Romans built mainly in brick and concrete, and the finer materials were used only for facing. In Rome itself even brick was never used throughout, although in the provinces brick walls or courses of stone and brick alternately are not uncommon. Whether brick or stone was used in the core of the wall or not, the outer face was invariably covered with stucco or some finer material. When brick or stone occurs, its use is not easy to determine, as it would neither add to the strength of the wall, nor admit of its being built without planking to keep the concrete in position while setting. Bricks were of flat triangular shape, and stones pyramidal. 'Opus incertum' was work where the stones were more or less irregular in shape, and 'opus reticulatum' where they were dressed to a true square, and set diagonal-wise in the wall (fig. 11). In either case occasional courses of large flat bricks, 1 ft. 11 in. long, bonding through the wall, were used. A similar method was adopted with arches to prevent the concrete from spreading and settling down before it had set (fig. 11). The marble or other facings were secured to the wall by iron or bronze cramps running into the body of the wall (fig. 11).



FIG. 11.

In vaults and domes, arches or ribs of brick were built upon light wooden centering, and cross bonding bricks dividing the whole into compartments were inserted at intervals. The concrete was then poured into these, and the whole set into one solid mass, exerting no outward thrust whatever. Stone vaults, instead of concrete, were occasionally built in later days, as in the Nymphæum at Nîmes, mentioned above.

Ornamentation.—The ornamental work of the Romans was not nearly so good as their construction, which was sound and workmanlike, and of great durability. One even regrets that they ever attempted ornament at all, as the bold and simple majesty of their great work is only spoilt by the applied ornament. After all there is very little Roman work, if any, more pleasing than the Pont du Gard at Nîmes; and it has no ornament at all. One of the most delightful of their more purely architectural works is the gateway at Trèves, which is practically devoid of ornament. The ornament used by the Romans was all derived from Greek sources, but there is a roughness and want of delicacy that shows an entire ignorance of the subtlety and refinement of Greek work. The profiles of the moldings are nearly always segments of circles, instead of the subtle parabolic and hyperbolic curves of Greek art. Moreover, the molding, as a rule, does not depend for its effect upon the subtle gradations of light and shade produced by its own contour, but upon the elaboration of the carving cut upon it. Somewhat similarly we find a preference among the Roman architects for the acanthus mollis with its rounded and less precise form, whereas the Greeks preferred the acanthus spinosus with its more crisp refined lines (fig. 6, ARCHITECTURE [Greek]). It is true that the acanthus spinosus badly drawn is less satisfactory even than the other, but this kind of thing is well known—the greater the height, the worse the fall. The carving, too, although vigorous in its way, is rougher and much more mechanical than that of Greece. Instead of the fine sculpture that adorned the temples of Greece, we frequently find endless repetitions of ox-skulls and hanging festoons of fruit and flowers between. There was a great tendency to use the ornament in such profusion that it stultified itself. Such an example, for instance, as the arch at Beneventum is so overloaded that there are practically no plain surfaces at all, and the whole effect is worried and unsatisfying.

Colour was used in their buildings by the Romans as by the Greeks, and the great fondness of the Romans for marbles of many colours gave their buildings an opulence in effect that was one of their most marked characteristics.

One of the most important adjuncts of Roman ornament was the mosaic, which, however difficult to work satisfactorily, is undoubtedly more in consonance with architectonic feeling than any mere surface pigment.

Adequately to appreciate Roman work, it would be necessary to study much more than the religious architecture. Rome's finest achievements were in the *thermæ*—the great baths, which were the centres of Roman life, where literature was read and discussed, and politics debated. In these magnificent buildings it was the interior that was the greatest achievement. It was in interior effects that the Roman architects made the real architectural advance, giving to them a magnificence hitherto undreamed of. Magnificence was the aim and end of Roman art; subtlety and refinement were beyond its comprehension. However, of existing remains, it is a religious building—the Pantheon—that gives us the clearest conception of what this interior magnificence was; and for us the Pantheon, with its fine interior and poor exterior, is the great typical example of Roman achievement, as the Parthenon, with its delicate subtleties and sculpture of unsurpassable loveliness, is of Greek.

LITERATURE.—**A. Choisy**, *L'Art de bâtir chez les Romains*, Paris, 1873; **W. J. Anderson** and **R. Phené Spiers**, *The Architecture of Greece and Rome*, London, 1902; **J. H. Middleton**, *The Remains of Ancient Rome*, London, 1892; **J. Gwilt's** translation of Vitruvius, 1826; **R. Lanciani**, *Ancient Rome in the Light of Recent Discoveries*, London, 1888; **F. M. Simpson**, *A History of Architectural Development*, vol. i., London, 1905; **R. Sturgis**, *A History of Architecture*, vol. i., London, 1907; **James Fergusson**, *Illustrated Handbook of Architecture*, vol. i., London, 1855.

J. B. STOUGHTON HOLBORN.

ARCHITECTURE (Shinto).—There are indications that the original Shinto place of worship was, like the Roman *templum*, not a building, but simply a plot of ground consecrated for the purpose. It was probably enclosed by a row of twigs of the sacred evergreen *sakaki* tree stuck in the ground. 'Spirit terraces' for Shinto worship are mentioned in the old records, and the common word for a Shinto shrine, viz. *yashiro*, means 'house-equivalent,' *i.e.* a make-believe house for the god—no doubt a plot of ground of this kind. Another word for a shrine is *miya*, which means 'august house,' and is applied alike to a palace and a shrine. Sir Ernest Satow says (*TASJ*, 1874):

'The architecture of the Shinto temples is derived from the primeval hut, with more or less modification in proportion to the influence of Buddhism in each particular case. Those of the purest style retain the thatched roof, others are covered with thick shingling, while others have tiled, and even coppered, roofs. The projecting ends of the rafters (called *chigi*) have been somewhat lengthened, and carved more or less elaborately.'

It appears from a passage in the *Nihongi* that the *chigi* were restricted to Imperial residences and to Shinto shrines. Another distinctive feature of the shrine is a row of cigar-shaped pieces of timber laid cross-wise on the roof-tree. The walls consist of planks: the pillars supporting the roof are round, and without bases. The shrine has a wooden floor, raised some feet above the ground. There is a sort of balcony all round, with a flight of steps up to the entrance. A certain amount of brass ornament and wood-carving is used in some shrines, but, generally speaking, they are characterized by great simplicity. The wood-carving and metal ornamentation of some of them are traceable to Buddhist influences, and were removed when the shrines were 'purified' after the restoration of the Imperial power in 1868. They are always of wood, without paint or lacquer, which, of course, limits their duration. The shrines of Ise are renewed every twenty years. Nor are they of great size. In the 8th cent. a 'greater shrine' had only fourteen feet frontage. At the present day the outer shrine of Ise—that in honour of the Goddess of Food—measures 34 feet by 19 feet. The great majority of Shinto shrines are very tiny edifices.

The more important Shinto shrines are surrounded by a cluster of subsidiary buildings, which serve various purposes. There is a small oratory, where the Mikado's envoy performs his devotions. No provision is made for the shelter of the ordinary worshipper. He remains outside in front of the shrine whilst he utters a brief invocation. The joint worship of a congregation of believers is a rare phenomenon in Shinto. Within the precinct there are usually a number of smaller shrines (*massha*) to other deities than the one worshipped in the main building. At Ise there were formerly more than a hundred of these. Sometimes there is an *emadō*, or picture-gallery, for the reception of *ex voto* offerings of this kind. A characteristic feature of Shinto architecture is the *torii*, or honorary gateway, which adorns the approaches to the shrine, sometimes in great numbers. These arches consist of two upright pillars leaning slightly towards one another. Near the top they are connected by a cross-beam or tie. Another beam rests on the upright columns, projecting a little on each side. It is often made to curve upwards slightly at each end. The *torii* is usually constructed of wood painted red, but may also be of stone, bronze, or even occasionally iron. The whole has a simple but graceful effect. Mr S. Tuke has shown that the *torii* is identical with the Indian *turan*, the Chinese *pailou*, and the Korean *hongsalmun*, which are similar in form and purpose. The name is probably Japanese. It means literally 'bird-rest,' *i.e.* hen-roost; and the gateways were so called from their resemblance to this familiar object.

LITERATURE.—B. H. Chamberlain, *Things Japanese*[3] (Lond. 1898); B. H. Chamberlain and W. B. Mason, *Handbook for Travellers in Japan*[7] (Lond. 1903). W. G. ASTON.

ARCHITECTURE AND ART (of the pagan Slavs).—The pagan Slavs seem to have had only the most rudimentary ideas on the subject of art. The few monuments which are ascribed to them are very crude, and it cannot yet be asserted with absolute certainty that they are the work of Slav artists. There is no connexion between these monuments and the more or less grotesque descriptions given in some of the Chronicles of the Middle Ages. These chronicles we owe to the Germans, Adam of Bremen of the 11th cent. (*Gesta Hammenburgensis ecclesiæ pontificum*), Helmold of the 12th cent. (*Chronicon Slavorum*), Thietmar, Bishop of Merseburg (976–1011), Saxo Grammaticus the Dane (12th cent.) in his *Gesta Danorum*, and the biographers of Bishop Otto of Bamberg (12th century).

The majority of the Slavs seem to have worshipped only idols and in the open air, and to have been quite unacquainted with temples. The existence of temples among the Slavs of the Russian Empire is very questionable. Hilarion, a monk of the 10th cent., writes: 'We are no longer building *kapishta*, but churches of Christ,' from which we may infer that the *kapishta* (from *kap*, 'idol') were pagan temples. But the oldest Russian chronicles speak only of idols, and the word *kapishta* may mean simply idols. Among the Baltic Slavs we find the existence of temples attested by German writings, in which the descriptions are not always very plausible. According to the statements of Helmold, the temple of Svantovit in the Island of Rügen was the great sanctuary of the Baltic Slavs. It was built in the town of Arkona. Saxo Grammaticus gives a glowing description of it. 'It was,' he says, 'a very beautiful wooden temple. The exterior or inclosing wall of the building was ornamented with thin roughly painted sculptures representing various objects. It was entered only by a single door. The temple was surrounded by a double wall. Inside the building stood a huge idol.' He adds that the temple was decorated with purple cloth and wild animals' horns.

According to one of Otto of Bamberg's biographers, the god Triglav had at Stettin four temples called *continæ* (from a Slav word meaning 'building'). The most important of these *continæ* was marvellously decorated and ornamented with sculptures representing men, birds, and animals, so cleverly reproduced that one could have believed them living, and so ingeniously coloured that neither rain nor snow could injure them.

At Gostkov, according to one of Otto of Bamberg's historians, there stood sumptuous temples adorned with colossal idols. In the town of Riedgost (perhaps Rhetra [?]) Thietmar describes a temple built of wood and resting on animals' horns (though the statement seems rather curious). The outside walls were covered with wonderful carved representations of gods and goddesses. In the interior stood gods made by hand, with their names engraved, arrayed in armour and helmets.

It is not our duty to discuss here the question as to the characters in which the gods' names might have been inscribed. This point, upon which much has been written, is probably purely imaginary. 'As many districts as there are in these parts' (*i.e.* among the Baltic Slavs or Slavs of the Elba), says Thietmar, 'so many temples are there, and the images of demons are worshipped by the infidels. It is to the temple that they come

when on the point of making war; to it they bring gifts after a successful expedition.'

Did the Slavs themselves build those temples, which were probably very small? Did they call in foreign architects? We do not know. The Arab geographer Mas'ūdī (10th cent.) had heard of their temples, but he gives an absolutely imaginary description of them, which cannot be believed, and he places the people whom he is describing in districts no less fanciful (*Les prairies d'or*, ch. lxvi.).

We have practically no specimen of the architecture of the pagan Slavs; and no ruined temple is in existence. We know the names of a number of idols worshipped in ancient Russia and among the Baltic Slavs—Svantovit, Perunŭ, Triglav. The present writer has reproduced in his *Mythologie slave* (1901) illustrations of some of the idols which have been discovered in Germany and in Galicia (Austria). They are believed to be of Slav origin; but we are not absolutely sure, as we have no trustworthy information. German and Ancient Russian writings alone bear witness to the existence of these idols. When Christianity reached the Slavs, they adopted the architectural style of the neighbouring races, from whom the gospel had come to them—the Roman style prevailing among the Western Slavs, and the Byzantine among the Slavs of Russia, Bulgaria, and Servia.

LOUIS LEGER.

ARDASHIR I. (Artashīr, Artakhshathr, Artaxerxes).—Ardashir I. (A.D. 226–241), the founder of the Sasanian dynasty, was the son of Pāpāk, 'king' of Khīr (Chīr), south-east of Persepolis. Having made himself master of Persia and some neighbouring kingdoms, Ardashir killed the Parthian 'king of kings,' Artaban, in 224, and seems to have conquered the capital, Ctesiphon, two years later.

From the beginning Ardashir identified his political aims with the restoration of the Mazdayasnian faith, which, notwithstanding the superficial sway of Hellenism, had never lost its hold on the people. He thus secured a mighty ally—the Zarathushtrian priesthood, the 'race of the Magians'—and continued and accomplished a work already begun by Parthian monarchs. In his zeal for the national religion, he seems to have kept to familiar traditions—his grandfather Sāsān having been attached to the temple of the goddess Anāhita in Istakhr (Persepolis)—as well as to his personal feelings. 'He was devoted to the Magian rites, and he himself celebrated the mysteries' (Agathias, *Hist.* ii. 36). The Avesta texts, destroyed and scattered in the time of Alexander and the following centuries, were collected by Ardashir, and completed by his high priest Tansar (according to a tradition reported in *Dīnkarṭ*, iii.), who thus gave 'a faithful image of the original light.' Another passage, in *Dīnkarṭ*, iv., which corroborates the king's having called Tansar to his capital in order to gather the scattered texts, adds the important fact that canonical authority was attributed only to the collection of Tansar, all doctrines that did not originate from him being considered as heretical. The collection was not completed until the reign of Ardashir's successor Shāhpūhr I. (241–272). A different tradition, reported in the introduction to the Persian translation of *Arṭā Virāf Nāmak*, makes Ardashir collect the Avestan texts and the Zend commentaries from the memories of the priests summoned to the capital (Haug and West, *Book of Arda Viraf*, Bombay, 1872, pp. xv–xviii). The custom of reciting a chapter, called *išnād* (*Yasna*), dates, according to Mas'ūdī, from Ardashir's time. Hence we may perhaps conclude with Darmesteter (*Zend-Av.* iii. p. xxxii) that Ardashir and his Hērbad of Hērbads regulated the liturgy. The two chief facts of the restoration, viz. the collection of texts, legends, traditions, laws, and doctrines, and the monopolizing of true worship and of true faith by the king, are expressed in the letter from Tansar to Gushnasp, king of Tabaristān (south of the Caspian), preserved, with additions and alterations, in a Persian translation of an Arabic version of the Pahlavi original (Darmesteter, *op. cit.* xxv–xxx).

The pretended letter of Tansar is discussed in a most thorough way by L. H. Mills ('Tansar's alleged Letter' in *Zoroaster, Philo and Israel*, 21–76), who, in pointing out the peculiar elements of this document, especially a certain ascetic tendency evidently contrasting with the Zarathushtrian law, considers it 'as being in its present form a subtle political fiction.' He goes much further than Darmesteter in eliminating spurious parts and in reducing the remainder, but he expressly recognizes a historical nucleus.

Ardashir has immortalized his political and religious restoration by his theory of the mutual aid of the two powers, the State and the Church, if Mas'ūdī (*Les prairies d'or*, text and tr. by C. Barbier de Meynard and Pavet de Courteille, ii. 162) has correctly rendered his testament to his son Shāhpūhr: 'Religion and kingship are two sisters that cannot exist the one without the other, because religion is the foundation of kingship, and kingship is the protectress of religion.'

LITERATURE.—For the Dīnkarṭ passages see Haug, *Zand-Pahlavi Glossary*, Bombay, 1867, pp. xxxi–xxxviii; West, *SBE* v. 199, xxxvii. 414, xlvii. 85, 127; Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta*, Paris, 1892–3, iii. pp. xxv–xxx; Geldner in *Grundriss der iran. Philologie*, ii. 83 f. In general, Justi in *Grundriss d. ir. Ph.* ii. 512 ff.; *Kār-nāmak-i Artakhshir Papakān*, ed. with transliteration, translations, etc., by Edalji Kerasāspji Antiā, Bombay, 1900; Browne, *Literary Hist. of Persia*, Lond. 1902–6, i. 136–150; Nöldeke, 'Gesch. des Artachšīr' in *Beizenberger's Beiträge*, iv. 1879, 22–69.

N. SÖDERBLOM.

ARHAT (lit. 'fit,' 'worthy').—In its Pāli form, *arahat*, it is met with in the earliest Buddhist texts, and is used there in two senses, according as it is applied to the Buddhist *arahats*, or to those belonging to other communities. In the latter sense, which is exceedingly rare (*Vinaya*, i. 30–32; *Saṁyutta*, ii. 220), it means a man who has attained to the ideal of that particular community, to what was regarded in it as the fit state for a religious man. This sense is not found in pre-Buddhistic literature; but the usage by the early Buddhists makes it almost certain that the term was employed, before Buddhism arose, among the religious communities then being formed in N.E. India. In the more usual, the Buddhist sense, the technical term *arahat* is applied to those who have reached the end of the Eightfold Path, and are enjoying the fruits of it, the *maggaphalaṭṭhā*. They had perfected themselves in each of the eight stages of the Path—right views, aspirations, speech, conduct, mode of livelihood, effort, mindfulness, and rapture (*Saṁyutta*, iv. 51; *Puggala*, 73). They had conquered the three so-called 'intoxications' (*āsavas*) of sensuality, re-births, and ignorance (*Dīgha*, i. 84). In a list of punning derivations in *Majjhima*, i. 280, the *arahat* is said to be one from whom evil dispositions are far (*ārakā*). The first five disciples attained *arahat*-ship on perceiving that there was no sign of a soul in any one of the five groups of bodily and mental qualities constituting a sentient being (*Vinaya*, i. 14). Rāhula, the Buddha's son, claims to be an *arahat* because he has overcome the 'intoxications,' and will incur no re-birth (*Thera Gāthā*, 296; cf. 336). Every *arahat* has the *sambodhi*, the higher insight, divided into seven parts—self-possession, investigation, energy, calm, joy, concentration, and magnanimity.* There is extant in the Canon a collection of hymns, 264 of which are by men, and 73 by women, who had become *arahats* in the time of the Buddha. Fifteen of these claim also to have

* The question of *sambodhi* has been discussed at length in the present writer's *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Oxford, 1899, pp. 190–192.

gained the three *vijjas*, or 'sorts of knowledge': the knowledge of their own and other people's previous births, and of other people's thoughts. Laymen could become *arahats*. A list of twenty who had done so in the time of the Buddha is given in *Aṅguttara*, iii. 451. Every Buddha was an *arahat*. The word occurs in the standing description applied to each of the seven Buddhas known in the earliest documents (*Dīgha*, ii. 2). The *Jātaka* commentator says that the Buddha made *arahat*-ship the climax of his discourse (*Jātaka*, i. 114, 275, 393, 401). That is so far the case that either *arahat*-ship, under one or other of its numerous epithets, or the details of the mental and moral qualities and experiences associated with it, forms the climax of the great majority of the Dialogues. Thus the first Dialogue in the *Dīgha* deals with the first stage in the Path. The second is started with the question, by a layman, as to what is the use of the religious life. After a lengthy enumeration of various advantages, each nearer than the previous one to *arahat*-ship, the discussion of the question ends with *arahat*-ship. The third is on social rank, and ends with the conclusion that *arahat*-ship is the best. In the fourth the climax is that the *arahat* is the true Brāhman. The fifth discusses the question of sacrifice, with the result that *arahat*-ship is the best sacrifice. The sixth is on the aim of the members of the Buddhist Order, and ends with *arahat*-ship; and so on through the remaining seven Dialogues in that volume. Ten out of thirteen chapters, if we may so call them, lead up to this subject, the other three being concerned with it only incidentally. The proportion in the rest of the *Dīgha* is less, in the *Majjhima* it is probably about the same.

The last discourse of the Buddha to his disciples is summarized in *Dīgha*, ii. 120, as follows:—

'Brethren, ye to whom the truths I have perceived have been made known by me, when you have made yourselves masters of them, practise them, think them over, spread them abroad in order that pure religion may last long for the good and happiness of the great multitudes. . . . Which are these truths? They are these: the four modes of mindfulness, the fourfold struggle against evil, the four footsteps to majesty, the five moral powers, the five organs of spiritual sense, the seven kinds of insight, the noble eightfold path. These are they.'

In *Vinaya*, ii. 240, these seven groups are called the jewels of the *Dhamma-vinaya*, the doctrine and discipline, in whose ocean the *arahats* dwell. The total of the numbers in the seven groups amounts to thirty-seven. These are identified in the commentaries with the *Sambodha-pakkhiyā dhammā*, the qualities which are the 'sides,' that is, constituent parts, of the insight of *arahat*-ship. These are mentioned already in the canonical books (*Aṅguttara*, iii. 70, 71, iv. 351; *Saṁyutta*, v. 227, 239). But it would seem from the discussions on the use of this term by E. Hardy in his Introduction to the *Netti* (p. xxx ff.), and by Mrs. Rhys Davids in her Introduction to the *Vibhaṅga* (p. xiv ff.), that the commentators' interpretation of its meaning is later, and that it originally referred simply to the *sambodhi*, the seven divisions of which, already given above, form only the seventh division of the thirty-seven qualities. The term is so used in the *Vibhaṅga*, p. 249.

It would follow from this that in the later Pāli writers the conception of *arahat* was extended to include all the thirty-seven of these characteristics. So also the *Milinda* distinctly adds to the conception of *arahat*-ship the possession of the four *Paṭisambhidās*.*

As the meaning of the term was extended, so the reverence for the *arahat* increased. In the old texts we are informed of a custom by which, when a *bhikkhu* thought he had attained, he could 'announce his knowledge,' as the phrase ran. The 112th Dialogue in the *Majjhima* gives the six questions which should then be put to the new aspirant. If he answered these correctly, his claim should be admitted. By the time of the commentators this was obsolete. They speak of no *arahats* in their own day; and we hear of none mentioned, in any source, as having lived later than the 3rd cent. of our era. The associations with the word became so high that only the heroes of old were esteemed capable of having attained to it.

The Sanskrit form *arhat* has had a precisely contrary history. First used some centuries after the rise of Buddhism by those Buddhists who then began to write in Sanskrit, its use was confined to those who tended more and more to put the conception of *bodhisattva* in place of that of *arahat*, as the ideal to be aimed at. In the literature of this period *arahat*-ship has ceased to be the climax; it is not even the subject of the discourses put into the mouth of the Buddha. Neither in the *Lalita Vistara* nor in the *Mahāvastu* can the present writer trace the word at all, except when used as an epithet of the Buddha, or of the early disciples. In the *Divyāvadāna* (a collection of stories of different dates, put together probably some time after the Christian era), whenever the legend refers to personages who lived in the Buddha's time (pp. 404, 464) the term *arhat* is used very much in the old sense. So also in the story of Vītāśoka, the brother of Aśoka, we find at pp. 423 f. and 428 f. the term used in a manner that shows it was familiar to those who recorded this particular legend, in the sense of one who had reached emancipation in this life. It is used incidentally, in the midst of the narrative; and throughout the volume attention is directed to the edifying legend rather than to the discussion of this or any other point in Buddhist ethics. The word had survived; the interest in the doctrine had waned.

In the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka* ('Lotus of the True Law'), *arhat* is used a score of times of a Buddha, and is, in fact, a standing epithet of each of the numerous Buddhas invented in that work. It is also used as an epithet of the early disciples, but with distinct depreciation. Thus at p. 43 of Kern's translation* *arhats* are called conceited if they do not accept the new doctrine. At p. 189 the stage of *arhat* is declared to be a lower stage. At p. 330 ff. the merit of one who hears a single word of the new doctrine is said to be greater than that of one who leads a vast number of men to become *arhats*. There is a similar argument beginning on p. 387. We find, then, in these works that *arhat*-ship is first passed over, or put on one side, and finally is openly attacked.

T. W. Rhys Davids.

ARIANISM.

1. Christianity recognizes Unity of God and Divinity of Christ.
2. Arius charges Bishop Alexander with Sabellianism. System of Arius.
3. Constantine intervenes. The Council of Nicæa.
4. State of parties after the Council.
5. From the death of Constantine to the Council of the Dedication.
6. State of affairs till A.D. 346.
7. The ten years' truce, A.D. 346–356.
8. Expulsion of Athanasius from Alexandria. The Creeds of Sirmium.
9. Reaction against *Anomœan* Arianism.
10. The Council of Alexandria, A.D. 362.
11. Arianism under Valens, and down to the Council of Constantinople, A.D. 381.
12. Character of Arianism.
13. The Arian controversy inevitable.
14. Controversies arising out of Arianism.
15. Arianism among the Teutons. Ulfilas.
16. Arianism supreme among the conquerors of the Western forms. Conversion of Clovis.
17. National strength of Teutonic Arianism.
18. The barbarian kingdoms abandon Arianism.
19. Spain returns to orthodoxy.

* ed. Trenckner, London, 1880, p. 104 [tr. by Rhys Davids in *SBE*, vol. xxxv. p. 157].

* *SBE*, vol. xxi., Oxford, 1884. The text has not yet been edited.

20. The Lombards and Arianism.
21. Revival of the Trinitarian controversy at the Reformation.
22. Re-appearance of Arianism in the 17th century.
23. Arianism in England in the 18th century.
24. Concluding remarks.

The promulgation of the heresy of Arius, which followed the close of the contest between the Christian Church and the Roman Government by only a few years, may justly be regarded as the culmination of all the various controversies in the early Church concerning the relation of the 'Persons' of the Holy Trinity to one another.

1. The Christian consciousness recognized from the first the supreme necessity of maintaining the absolute Unity of God. According to one of the earliest apologists, Aristides, the worship of the Christians was more purely monotheistic even than that of the Jews (*Apol.* xiv., xv.). But, whilst acknowledging Unity to be the essential of Divinity, Christians of every description perceived the momentous consequences of the Incarnation. Whether Judaic, Pauline, or Gnostic, all who professed to follow Christ saw in Him the one means by which God the Father had been made known to man. 'Thus the Lord's divinity was from the first as fixed an axiom of Christianity as the unity of God' (Gwatkin, *Studies of Arianism*[2], 1900, p. 5). The earliest controversies about our Lord bore on the question of the reality of His sufferings and His humanity; and it was not till the old Docetic heresies had become comparatively insignificant that the nature of the Divinity of the Son and His relation to the Father occupied an important place in Christian speculation.

By the close of the 2nd cent. the conditions under which a theological question could be debated were practically the same as those which have prevailed down to the dawn of modern criticism. It was no longer a question of rival Scriptures, the majority of the books of the NT being already acknowledged as authoritative; the orthodox tradition of the Church had practically prevailed over all opposition; the question as to the recognition of the OT by the Church had been decided. There were already definite methods of exposition, and collections of Scripture proofs for use in controversy with Jews and pagans had been formed from a very early date. None of the facts of the Gospel story was disputed; Christian philosophy identified Jesus Christ with the Divine Logos; faith acknowledged His pre-existence, His miracles, His Resurrection and His Ascension as unquestionable facts. No doubts were raised as to the authorship or authority of those passages in the OT and NT which were accepted as the basis of the Christology of the age. The utterances of the Prophets, the words of David and Solomon in Psalm and Proverb, the doctrine of St. Paul and St. John, were all admitted to be the source and basis of Christian doctrine. It is of great importance to bear in mind the fact that the premises from which orthodox and heretic alike drew their conclusions in the 3rd and 4th centuries were different from what would now be accepted; and it is not always by the arguments used in this controversy that we must form our judgment in regard to the decision finally reached.

The problem was, of course, the reconciliation of the two apparently conflicting beliefs in the Unity of the Godhead and in the real distinction of Personality in the Trinity. The controversy naturally turned first on the meaning of the characteristic Christian doctrine of the Divinity of Jesus Christ. In attempting to maintain the Unity of the Godhead, the Christian teacher ran the risk of sacrificing either the Personality or the Divinity of our Lord. On the one hand, Praxeas, Sabellius, and their followers represented the appearance of our Lord as hardly more than a temporary means whereby God had been dramatically manifested to the world, making the Trinity an economy by which the Divine is revealed in different aspects. But the Christian conscience could not thus allow a personality of the Divine Master without real permanence. 'It is clearly impossible, on any Christian theory of the world and of the Divine economy, that God should exist even for a moment only in a single mode, or that the Incarnation should be only a temporary and transient manifestation' (Bethune-Baker, *Christian Doctrine*, 1903, p. 106). Equally impossible was it for the Church to assent to a practical reversion to the old Ebionite doctrine that Jesus was simply an ordinary human being deified by reason of His eminent virtue. Theodotus, Paul of Samosata, and others who held this view were not unnaturally ranked among the heretics. But the question was too difficult to be settled by the rejection of these alternatives, and it was further complicated by misunderstandings as to the significance of the terms employed to expound the mystery of the Trinity, as the correspondence between Dionysius of Rome and his namesake Dionysius of Alexandria abundantly testifies (Feltoe, *Letters and other remains of Dionysius of Alexandria*, 1904). These interesting letters reveal two opposite tendencies—that of the West, which so emphasized the eternal unity as to obscure the distinction of the Persons in the Trinity, and the teaching of the Easterns, who, under the influence of Origen, insisted on the theory that subordination explained the existence of the threefold Personality. Dread of the Sabellian Christology was especially potent in influencing the course of theological speculation throughout the East.

At the beginning of the 4th cent. the most famous Christian scholar was Lucian, who, after the deposition of Paul of Samosata, founded a theological academy at Antioch. He seems to have been looked upon at least with suspicion by three successive bishops—Domnus, Timæus, and Cyril; but his exemplary conduct, ascetic practices, and, above all, the fact that he was one of the last martyrs in the Diocletian persecution, caused him to be regarded with particular reverence by his disciples, who felt especially bound to one another by the memory of their common master. The school of Lucian numbered among its adherents the bishops Eusebius of Nicomedia, Menophantus of Ephesus, Theognis of Nicæa, Maris of Chalcedon, Leontius of Antioch, and Athanasius of Anazarbus, the sophist Asterius, and the presbyter Arius (Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, vol. iv. p. 3, Eng. tr.).

It is a matter of considerable doubt whether Arianism is to be traced to Antioch or to Alexandria, and also how far it is due to the teaching of Origen. Newman is of opinion that Arianism is the outcome of the grammatical literalism of Antioch as opposed to the more spiritual method of interpreting Scripture current in Alexandria (*Arians*, ch. i. sec. i.). Professor Gwatkin, on the other hand, points out (*Studies of Arianism*[2], p. 19) that though Antioch was undoubtedly Arian in the later days of the controversy, when Alexandria, owing to the influence of Athanasius, had become orthodox, it was not so at the beginning. The language of Arianism was borrowed from Origen, and especially from Dionysius, who speaks of the Second Person as ποίημα τοῦ θεοῦ, ξένον κατ' οὐσίαν, and says οὐκ ἦν πρὶν γένηται—phrases which were adopted into the terminology of Arianism. Arius, moreover, had a very strong party in Alexandria when he promulgated his heresy. Harnack (*op. cit.* vol. iv. p. 3) considers that Lucian continued the work of Paul of Samosata at Antioch, and gives credit to the statement of Alexander (Theodoret, i. 4), which Gwatkin rejects, that Lucian remained a long time outside the Church of Antioch. Lucian is called 'the Arius before Arius.' The high honour, however, in which his memory was held, as the Synod of Antioch in A.D. 341 testified by accepting one of its confessions of faith as 'the creed of Lucian the martyr' (Sozomen, iii. 5), makes it difficult to believe that he was ever considered as a teacher of heresy. The question of Origen's responsibility for Arianism is an extremely vexed one, and is admirably discussed by Bishop Robertson (*Prolegomena to Athanasius*, p. xxv f.). As Athanasius showed in his *de Sententia Dionysii*, the language of two theologians may be almost identical, whilst the spirit in which they employ it is quite different.

2. The years A.D. 318 and 319 found the Church of Alexandria in great confusion, distracted by the obscure Meletian schism and by a controversy between the bishop Alexander and the presbyter Arius (Ἄρειος) of the district of Baucalis. Alexander, in a charge to his clergy, impressed upon them the unity in the Trinity of the Godhead. According to the historian Socrates (i. 5), Alexander in this discourse somewhat exceeded the limits of discretion (*φιλοτιμότερον . . . ἐθεολόγει*) in insisting on what is, after all, a single aspect of the truth in the mystery of the Trinity. Arius forthwith accused his bishop of teaching Sabellianism, and proceeded to formulate his own scheme of doctrine.

Alexander's doctrine is summed up in the following words in the letter of Arius to Eusebius of Nicomedia: '*Ἀεὶ θεός, ἀεὶ υἱός, ἅμα πατὴρ ἅμα υἱός, συνυπάρχει ὁ υἱὸς ἀγεννήτως τῷ θεῷ, ἀειγενὴς, ἀγεννητογενὴς, οὔτ' ἐπινοίᾳ οὔτ' ἀτόμῳ τινὶ προάγει ὁ θεὸς τοῦ υἱοῦ, ἀεὶ θεός, ἀεὶ υἱός, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ ὁ υἱός* (Arius' letter to Eusebius *ap.* Theodoret, *HE* i. 4). Arius, considering that this definition detracted from the unique majesty of the Father and introduced confusion, maintained the complete distinction between the Father and the Son, and the subordination of the latter. Harnack (*op. cit.* vol. iv. p. 15) enumerates eight points of the view advanced by Arius—

(1) The characteristic of the One and Only God is solitude and eternity. He can put nothing forth from His own essence. He was not always Father, but only after He begat (*i.e.* created) the Son.

(2) Wisdom and the Word (λόγος) dwell within this God, but they are powers, not persons.

(3) To create the universe, God brought into being an independent substance (*οὐσία* or *ὑπόστασις*) as the instrument by which all things were created. This Being is termed, in Scripture, Wisdom, Son, Image, Word, etc.

(4) As regards His substance, the Son is a separate being from the Father, different from Him in substance and nature. Like all rational creatures, the Son is endowed with free will, and consequently capable of change.

(5) The Son is not truly God, but is only the so-called Word and Wisdom. He has no absolute, but only a relative, knowledge of the Father.

(6) The Son is not, however, a creature like other creatures. He is the perfect creature (*κτίσμα τέλειον*), and has become God, so that we may term Him 'the only-begotten God,' etc.

(7) Christ took a real body, but it was a *σῶμα ἄψυχον*, the Logos taking the place of the soul. From the Gospel record we see that this Logos is not an absolutely perfect being, but is capable of suffering.

(8) Amongst other created beings the Holy Ghost is to be placed beside the Son as a second, independent substance. According to Arius, apparently, the Spirit is the creation of the Son.

Such, then, was Arianism—a theory of the mutual relations of the Persons in the Trinity based nominally on the words of Scripture, but arrived at really by the methods of the heathen philosophers. It led either to polytheism by allowing the existence of the Logos as a secondary God, or to Judaic Unitarianism by denying His proper Divinity.

The Arian system never really commended itself to the general conscience of Christians, and, as was usually the case in the early days of Christianity, the heresy found its support among the clergy, whilst the less instructed laity remained orthodox. Its tendencies were essentially pagan. As Harnack points out, Arianism was a new doctrine in the Church, and was really Hellenism tempered by the constant use of Holy Scripture (*op. cit.* iv. p. 41). From a very early time the conception of the God of the OT and the Heavenly Father of the NT had tended to give ground before the Hellenic idea of an abstract unknowable Deity. Clement of Alexandria had paved the way for Arianism by his doctrine of God: 'Stripping from concrete existence all physical attributes, taking away from it in the next place the three dimensions of space, we arrive at the conception of a point having position.' 'There is yet a further step,' says Bigg, 'for perfect simplicity has not yet been gained. Reject the idea of position, and we have reached the last attainable abstraction, the pure Monad.' This, as he observes, is essentially a heathen conception, and can be developed consistently only on heathen principles. Clement has gone astray from the first by his mode of approaching the subject. He has propounded as his question, not What is Spirit? or What is Good? but What is the simplest thing conceivable? This he assumes to be the cause of all that exists. Nothing that is part of the effect can belong to the cause. . . . The result is a chimera, a cause divided by an impassable gulf from all its effects (*Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, pp. 63–65). This is really the Arian conception of the Father, the unknown and unknowable Cause, of whom the Son is a creature as incapable of knowing or revealing Him as any other creature. Arius deliberately severs all possible connexion between the created and the uncreated, the human and the Divine. Christ is no mediator, no saviour. As Dr. Harnack forcibly remarks (*op. cit.* iv. p. 42), Arius and his friends are nowhere in their theology concerned with communion with God. Rightly, therefore, does Schultz (*Gottheit Christi*, p. 65) say that 'the Arian Christology is inwardly the most unstable, and dogmatically the most worthless, of all the Christologies to be met with in the history of dogma.' But if unsatisfactory in its conclusions, and leading to the ultimate subversion of Christianity, Arianism was most difficult to refute, owing to the confusion of thought prevalent at the time of its appearance.

In the controversy which ensued, Alexander seems to have acted with some moderation, and even to have allowed his hesitation to proceed to such extremes as to be made an excuse for a schism. Arius had no scruples in forming a party of his own. He enlisted the support of two bishops, Secundus of Ptolemais in the Pentapolis, and Theonas of Marmarica, and also that of several presbyters and virgins. To secure popular favour, he put his opinions into doggerel verse, adopting the metre of the licentious poet Sotades, in order that the sailors and dock-labourers of Alexandria might sing at their work of 'How the Father was not always Father,' etc. His *Thalia*, as this strange collection of songs was called, popularized his system among the formidable proletariat of the capital of Egypt. But Arius' strongest support was his 'fellow-Lucianist,' Eusebius of Nicomedia, the most influential prelate in the East. In A.D. 321, Alexander held a Council at Alexandria; Arius was excommunicated and left the city (see the *Depositio Arii*, included in the Benedictine Edition of *Athanasius*, and claimed as his by Newman. It is translated in the *Nicene and post Nicene Fathers*, 'Athanasius').

3. Two years later, Constantine defeated Licinius (A.D. 323) and became sole master of the Roman world. Affairs in Alexandria had become very serious, and indeed the whole Eastern Church was in the utmost confusion. The question as to the keeping of Easter distracted the Christians as a matter of practice as seriously as Arianism was doing as one of doctrine. Accordingly the Emperor sent his episcopal adviser Hosius, bishop of Cordova in Spain, to Alexandria with a very remarkable letter to Alexander and Arius, begging them to lay aside their logomachies and co-operate with him in restoring peace to the distracted world. But an Imperial letter, 'though marvellous and full of wisdom,' as Socrates describes it, could not allay so embittered a strife, and Constantine decided to submit all matters in dispute to a Council of the whole Church, to assemble in the year A.D. 325 at Nicæa, on Lake Ascanius, in the north of Asia Minor. The first act of the Council as regards Arius was with practical unanimity to pronounce his doctrine heretical. That the Son had been created out of things that were not (*ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*), that He was of another essence than the Father, that, even before time was, the Father was without the Logos, were on all sides regarded as blasphemous assertions. It was not till the question arose as to how the error should be refuted that there

was any serious difference of opinion. The Fathers had met to affirm the ancient faith of the Church against novelty; but when they wished to express what they meant in words, they found that none to which they had been hitherto accustomed were capable of escaping the evasions of such masters as the Arians in the art of making Scripture phrases assume a meaning contrary to the teaching of Scripture. In consequence of this, the Council, probably at the suggestion of Hosius, was induced to adopt the expression ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρός and the word ὁμοούσιος, neither of which is to be found in the Bible.

ὁμοουσιος (*ejusdem substantiæ*) was a word which presented no difficulty to the Latins who followed the teaching of Tertullian, *adv. Praxeam*, and Novatian, *de Trinitate*. Dionysius of Rome in his correspondence with his namesake of Alexandria had protested against any undue separation (*μεμερισμέναι ὑποστάσεις*) of the Father and the Son, thus virtually insisting on the ὁμοούσιον. Tertullian had also, in his *de Anima* (c. 32), carefully distinguished *substantia* (οὐσία) from *natura*. The Latins and the anti-Origenists at the Council desired to press the unity rather than the equality of the Son with the Father; and to them the word was eminently acceptable. But the majority of the Greek-speaking bishops had a strong objection to both expressions, ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας and ὁμοούσιος, on the following grounds: (1) They had no Scripture warranty. (2) The Council against Paul of Samosata (A.D. 269) had condemned the use of ὁμοούσιος. (3) The idea of an οὐσία common to the Trinity might countenance Sabellianism. (4) The words might either imply an οὐσία prior to the Father and the Son, or countenance materialism (οὐσία being conceived as an equivalent to εἶδος or ὕλη) (Bethune-Baker, *Christian Doctrine*, p. 171 n.).

On this rock the Council nearly split; and Eusebius of Cæsarea, the trusted adviser of the Emperor, and by far the most learned man of his age, was especially mistrustful. Ultimately, however, Eusebius and the Origenist party accepted a creed containing the expressions in dispute, and Arianism was explicitly condemned.

Eusebius first offered the Council the baptismal creed of his own Church, perhaps a little amplified. In this the Lord Jesus Christ was declared to be the λόγος and God from God (θεὸς ἐκ θεοῦ), and also firstborn of all creation (*πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως*, Col 1[15]) and only-begotten Son (*υἱὸς μονογενής*). Constantine himself, prompted no doubt by Hosius, suggested the ὁμοούσιον. The creed differs from our 'Nicene Creed' in its definition of the doctrine of the Son in several important points (see Hort, *Two Dissertations*, p. 61; Bethune-Baker, *Chr. Doct.* p. 168). After a bare profession of belief in the Holy Spirit, the creed concludes with anathemas of all the distinctive teachings of Arianism, (1) that there was a time when the Son was not, (2) that He was not before He was begotten, (3) that He came into being out of nothing, (4) that He is of a different essence (ὑπόστασις) or being (οὐσία) from the Father, or (5) that He is created or capable of change or alteration. It is generally agreed that at Nicæa οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, which afterwards were carefully distinguished, were practically synonymous.

4. Into the intrigues which culminated with the banishment of Athanasius, who became bishop of Alexandria on 8th June, 328, it is needless to enter, it being sufficient for us to inquire into the causes which prevented the Creed of Nicæa from being the immediate conclusion of the controversy. Few of the bishops, whilst abhorring the heresy of Arius, understood the exact merits of the question. They feared the error of Sabellius, and to this the *Homoousion* seemed to have committed them. Moreover, with the natural conservatism of men pledged to hold fast to the faith 'once delivered to the saints,' they distrusted words unsupported either by Scripture or by tradition. The Emperor himself, who to the end of his life believed himself faithful to the Creed of Nicæa, when he saw that its promulgation had failed to give peace to the Church, was less enthusiastic in its favour, and showed so much readiness to welcome back its opponents that he received Eusebius of Nicomedia not long after the Council, and, but for the sudden death of the heresiarch, Arius would, at his command, have been reconciled to the Church.

How new the phrases introduced into the Creed were as formulæ of belief is shown by Athanasius' defence of them in his *de Decretis* (sec. 25 ff.). He refers to similar language of Theognostus, Dionysius of Rome, and Dionysius of Alexandria. 'This anxious appeal to theological writers,' says Hort (*Two Dissertations*, p. 55), 'sets in strong relief the absence of authority derived from public creeds.' Eusebius's objections and his reasons for ultimately accepting the word ὁμοούσιος are set forth in his letter to his Church at Cæsarea. In this letter he discusses three expressions in the Creed, *ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρός, γεννηθέντα οὐ ποιηθέντα*, and ὁμοούσιος. He accepted the first on being assured that it meant that the Son was of the Father, but was not a part of Him. 'Begotten, not made,' passed, because 'made' was an appellative common to the other creatures which came to be through the Son, though the Son bore no likeness to them. As for ὁμοούσιος, Eusebius received it as implying 'that the Son bears no resemblance to the originated creatures, but that to His Father alone who begat Him He is in every way assimilated.' It is easy enough to see that Eusebius did not assent to the definitions of the Creed *ex animo*; and he is still more ready to explain away the anathemas. The letter is preserved in Athanasius, *de Decretis*, as an appendix, secs. 9, 10, being omitted by Socrates, *HE* i. 8.

5. On the death of Constantine (A.D. 337), his Eastern dominions passed to his son Constantius, who encouraged his bishops to draw up a creed to supersede that of Nicæa, to which all the Asiatic and Syrian Churches seemed opposed. The result of their labours is apparent in the five creeds of Antioch, which exhibit the tendencies of the different factions, whose only point of union seems to have been antagonism to Athanasius and the Nicene formula. These confessions of faith, together with the creeds drawn up at Sirmium and elsewhere, served only to show that there was no possible compromise between avowed Arianism and the *Homoousian* doctrine. The orthodox opponents of the language of the Creed of Nicæa, whom Professor Gwatkin terms 'the Conservatives'—men like Eusebius of Cæsarea, whom dread of Sabellianism and hatred of innovation drove into opposition to Athanasius—were being made use of by those who were at heart Arians to force an Arianizing creed upon the unwilling Church. The weak and unstable Constantius was always in the hands of those whom he believed capable of pacifying the Church by a new creed. He was in reality aiming at a comprehensive State-religion acceptable to all parties, and thought that a sort of modified Arianism would supply this want in the provinces over which he at this time bore rule. In A.D. 339, Athanasius was driven out of Alexandria, and in A.D. 341 the formal reaction against the Nicene doctrine began with the famous council assembled for the dedication of the Golden Church at Antioch.

Athanasius and Marcellus of Ancyra went to Rome to lay their cause before Julius, to whom the bishops assembled at Antioch wrote in A.D. 339. The Pope's answer is described by Professor Gwatkin (*Arianism*[2], p. 117) as 'one of the ablest documents of the entire controversy' (Athanasius, *Apol. contra Ar.* secs. 21–35; Socr. *HE* ii. 17; Soz. iii. 10).

In all probability, Dianius, bishop of Cæsarea in Cappadocia, presided at this synod, and there were also present Eusebius of Nicomedia, now bishop of Constantinople, who gave the name by which the opponents of Athanasius were at this time known, and Acacius, the successor of Eusebius Pamphilus in the see of Cæsarea.

The opponents of Athanasius were called *οἱ περὶ Εὐσέβιον*, or the *Eusebians*, as the words have been somewhat inexactly rendered. The term is used in two senses: (1) literally denoting the personal entourage of Eusebius, i.e. the court party, crypto-Arians all of them; (2) more generally the majority of the Asiatic bishops who were discontented with the Nicene Council. These latter ultimately became the Semi-Arian party.

Four creeds were put forward by this Council—all attempts to dispense with the objectionable word ὁμοούσιον. The most celebrated was the so-called second Creed of Antioch, to which the name of Lucian the martyr was attached. In this the Persons of the Trinity were said to be One by reason of the harmony existing between them—*τῇ μὲν ὑποστάσει τρία, τῇ δὲ συμφωνίᾳ ἕν*.

The honour in which the Council of Antioch was held in after days—St. Hilary of Poitiers speaks of it with great respect (*de Syn.* c. 32), and the canons were quoted by the popes themselves as authoritative (see Hefele, *Councils*, sec. 56)—is sufficient proof that the Church did not regard the bishops there as heretics. Yet they undoubtedly, by their endeavours to find some more acceptable substitute for the creed of Nicæa, played into the hands of the Arian party. The four creeds of Antioch were: (1) The first creed, which begins with a repudiation of

Arius: 'We have never become followers of Arius, for how shall we who are bishops follow a presbyter?' This creed was suspiciously like the confession which Arius himself had made before his restoration was ordered by Constantine. (2) The second creed, which became the watchword of the anti-Athanasian party. It declared the Son to be the unchangeable image (*ἀπαράλλακτον εἰκόνα*) of the Godhead, essence (*οὐσία*), counsel, power, and glory of the Father. It laid special stress on the reality of the Fatherhood and Sonship and on the office of the Holy Spirit—*τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐδὲ ἁπλῶς οὐδὲ ἀργῶς κειμένων ἀλλὰ σημαινόντων ἀκριβῶς τὴν οἰκείαν ἑκάστου τῶν ὀνομαζομένων ὑπόστασιν καὶ τάξιν καὶ δόξαν.* The anathemas were worded in such a way that an Arian could easily subscribe them. (3) A profession of faith by Theophronius of Tyana. At the conclusion the doctrines of Marcellus of Ancyra, as representing the Sabellianizing tendency of the Nicenes, as well as those of Sabellius and Paul of Samosata, are anathematized. (4) A decidedly Arian creed drawn up a few months later than the actual Council by certain bishops who met *δήθεν περὶ πίστεως*, as Athanasius bitterly remarks (*de Synodis*, sec. 25). These creeds are to be found in Athanasius' *de Syn.* secs. 22–25. See Hahn, *Bibliothek der Symbole*, pp. 153–156.

By A.D. 341 the parties at strife can be described almost in geographical terms. The Western Church, under the guidance of Rome, had ranged itself under the banner of Nicæa, whilst the Orientals rallied to the cry of 'No un-Scriptural terms in the Creed.' The leaders of the Arians, too prudent to show their hand openly, were content to allow the 'conservative' opponents of Athanasius to prepare the ground for them. As long as Athanasius was in exile, the Nicene theology had no foothold in the East. Circumstances, however, were preparing for a temporary triumph of the Athanasian party. After his death and the massacre of the collateral members of his family, Constantine's dominions were divided between his three sons—Constantine II. at Trèves, Constans in Italy, and Constantius in the East. The two former supported Athanasius.

6. When Constantine II. was killed in A.D. 340, his dominions seem to have passed under the sway of Constans, who was thus ruler over the greater part of the Roman world. As he supported Athanasius, Julius, and the party of the Nicene council, the *ὁμοούσιον* was upheld by the more powerful of the two remaining Emperors. The result of this state of affairs was that Constans, the patron of Athanasius, was able to insist in A.D. 343 on a joint meeting of the Eastern and Western bishops to re-try the case. The place selected was Sardica, the modern Sophia in Bulgaria, near the frontier of the dominions of Constans and Constantius; but when the bishops arrived, it was evident that no mutual understanding was possible. The Westerns insisted upon Athanasius and Marcellus of Ancyra taking their seats in the Council, and confirmed the Creed of Nicæa. The Orientals withdrew to Philippopolis, where they subscribed the Arianizing fourth creed of Antioch, and specially condemned Marcellus of Ancyra. Envoys were sent from Constans to his brother at Antioch, and a truly diabolical plot was hatched by Stephen the bishop to discredit them. The Eastern bishops had enough sense of rectitude to depose Stephen at a Council held at Antioch in A.D. 344, where a creed was drawn up called from its prolixity the Macrostich (*μακρόστιχος ἔκθεσις*), or fifth creed of Antioch. In it Marcellus and his disciple Photinus were expressly condemned. Constantius now seemed disgusted with the failure of the anti-Nicene party, and in the autumn of 346 Athanasius was allowed to return to Alexandria.

The Council of Sardica revealed the fundamental difference between the Western and Eastern Churches at this time. It is noticeable that up to this time the Eusebians had not directly attacked the Creed of Nicæa or even the doctrine of Athanasius (Harnack, *op. cit.* iv. 64), the accusations against the bishop being purely personal. The object of the Eusebians was to get the *Homoousion* set aside and to substitute a less controversial creed for that of Nicæa, and also to attack Athanasius through his friend Marcellus of Ancyra (Harnack, p. 67; see also Zahn's *Marcellus von Ancyra* and Eusebius of Cæsarea's two books against him). Hosius took the lead at Sardica, and, according to Athanasius (*ad Antiochenos*, 5), a fruitless attempt was made to supplement the Creed of Nicæa. A creed, however, was drawn up by Hosius and Protogenes of Sardica, which though it did not emanate from the Council (Hefele, § 63), expressed the theological teaching of the West. It is found in Theodoret, ii. 8, and a Latin translation has been discovered. It declares there is but one substance in the Trinity (*μίαν ὑπόστασιν* [Lat. *substantiam*], *ἣν αὐτοὶ οἱ αἱρετικοὶ οὐσίαν προσαγορεύουσιν*), and its doctrine of the Son is such that we can well understand how the Westerns refused to condemn Marcellus (Harnack, *op cit.* iv. 60). Athanasius, when he was asked his views on the orthodoxy of Marcellus by St. Epiphanius, would only smile, showing that he had an equally poor opinion of his friend as a theologian and of his inquirer as a man of sense (Epiph. 72. 11). The tendencies of the West inclined to Sabellianism, and those of the East to Arianism, and before orthodoxy could be satisfied each had to be checked. The infamous plot of Stephen of Antioch against the two Western delegates Vincentius of Capua and Euphrates of Cologne is related by Athanasius (*Hist. Arian.* c. 20).

7. During the next ten years (A.D. 346–356) the two parties were outwardly at peace, but yet busily arming for the conflict. At Alexandria, Athanasius, who had been welcomed back with surprising enthusiasm, maintained his influence undiminished, and set a seal upon the loyalty of his church to the Creed of Nicæa. The monastic movement was in all the vigour of its first enthusiasm, and the ascetics, recognizing the earnestness of the bishop, became his firmest supporters. At Antioch, Leontius, whose early indiscretion was similar to that of Origen (*Hist. Arian.* 28), though an Arian at heart, had managed to maintain the peace by his cautious policy. This wise old prelate, however, knew well that the tranquillity his discretion had secured was only temporary, and in allusion to his death he would pathetically touch his grey hairs and say: 'When this snow melts, there will be much mud.' At Rome, Photinus of Sirmium, whose indiscretion outran even that of Marcellus, had been sacrificed for his Sabellian teaching; but the death of the wise and politic pope Julius in A.D. 352 was a serious loss to the cause of orthodoxy. His successor Liberius lacked both his firmness and his wisdom. Political events were also precipitating the crisis. Athanasius' faithful friend, the Emperor Constans, was killed by the usurper Magnentius. From the end of A.D. 350, when he was at or near Sardica on Dec. 25, to the close of A.D. 359, Constantius spent his time in his Western dominions, being most frequently to be found at Sirmium or Milan (Gwatkin, *Studies of Arianism*[2], App. ii. 'Movements of the Eastern Emperors'). Sirmium, not Antioch, was destined henceforward to be the scene of creed-making.

8. Many of the original disputants in the controversy had already passed away, and a new generation had arisen. Parties were becoming more and more defined. As their system was developed, stern logic forced the Arians to become more Arian than their founder. Some of the old conservatives were drifting towards Arianism, whilst others shrank back in dismay at its encroachments. The general tendency favoured the obliteration of the old party landmarks and the rise of new factions. The place of Eusebius of Nicomedia as Imperial adviser had been taken by Valens, bishop of Mursa in Pannonia, the province bordering on Illyricum, to which Arius had been exiled after the Council of Nicæa. Valens, with his friend Ursacius, bishop of Singidunum, was a most uncompromising Arian, and his policy was not, like the old Eusebians, to fight Athanasius by means of conservative prejudice, but to force an Arian creed on the Church in place of that of Nicæa (Robertson, *Athanasius*, p. liv). Valens had won great influence over Constantius, who believed that the bishop had received from an angel the news of the victory of Mursa (A.D. 351), and from this time an organized campaign was conducted against Athanasius, which culminated in the *coup d'état* at Alexandria, when the bishop was expelled by military violence (A.D. 356). Valens' ablest assistants in the East were Acacius,

the successor of Eusebius Pamphilus in the see of Cæsarea, and Eudoxius, bishop of Antioch and Constantinople successively. In A.D. 357 there appeared from Sirmium the first really Arian creed, called by Hilary of Poitiers 'the blasphemy of Sirmium.' Other formulæ of belief were promulgated from the same place, notably the 'dated creed' in which the consuls of the year are mentioned, a fact of which Athanasius is not slow to take advantage in his *de Synodis*. The Arians, supported by the Emperor, did not hesitate to push their claims; and finally, at the great assemblies of Westerns at Ariminum and Orientals at Seleucia, an Arian creed was accepted as the official doctrine of the Empire. Thus in A.D. 359 it seemed as though the Nicene profession of faith was repealed and Arianism was triumphant.

The creeds of Sirmium are as follows. The 1st was drawn up against Photinus in A.D. 347. The 2nd (A.D. 351)—but commonly known as the 1st—is identical with the fourth creed of Antioch (ὅθεν περὶ πίστεως). The 3rd (A.D. 357), called the 'blasphemy,' (*a*) distinctly denies the true Divinity of the Son; (*b*) forbids the use of the terms οὐσία, ὁμοούσιον, ὁμοιούσιον as un-Scriptural, maintaining that it is impossible to declare the Nativity of the Son, because it is written *generationem eius quis enarrabit*; (*c*) in opposition to the teaching of the creed proposed but not accepted at Sardica (see above), makes the Divine nature of the Son as contrasted with that of the Father passible (see Bethune-Baker, *Introd.* p. 181 n.). This extreme teaching startled the bishops of Asia Minor, and under the presidency of Basil of Ancyra a synod was held at that place in A.D. 358. At this synod the extreme Arians, Eudoxius, Aëtius, and others, were excommunicated with anathemas condemning all who will not acknowledge the complete likeness (ὁμοιότης) of the Son to the Father, as well as the terms ὁμοούσιον and ταὐτοούσιον (Anathema xix. [Hahn, p. 201]). The result of the stand made by Basil and his friends was an attempt to compromise, *i.e.* to allow that the Son was *like* the Father. The 4th, or 'dated creed' (A.D. 359), composed by Mark, bishop of Arethusa, declared the Son to be ὅμοιον τῷ γεννήσαντι αὐτὸν πατρί with the addition 'according to the Scriptures,' which allowed the Arians to put their own sense on the words. It was this *Homœan* Arianism that was accepted under Imperial pressure at Ariminum Seleucia.

9. Already, however, a reaction had begun. In the first place, the Arianizers were divided among themselves. Logical and consistent Arians, like Aëtius and his disciple Eunomius of Cyzicus, were prepared to push the teaching of Arius to its ultimate conclusion. If the Son was not God in the same sense as the Father, He could not be like Him, for there can be nothing like God. Their argument, different as was the inference drawn from it, was the same as that used by Athanasius himself. 'Like is not predicated of essence, but of habits and qualities; for in the case of essences we speak not of likeness, but of identity' (*de Synodis*, 53). From their denial of the likeness of the Son to the Father this class of Arians were called *Anomœans*. But the majority of Arians were men of compromise and evasion, having no other idea than to insinuate their opinions under the guise of apparently innocuous phraseology. These, led by the dexterous Acacius of Cæsarea, allowed that the Son might be acknowledged to be *like* the Father, and were consequently called *Homœans*. Lastly, there was the party headed by Basil of Ancyra, the successors of those conservatives who had opposed Athanasius. These men, who constituted the strength of the episcopate of Asia Minor, were as hostile to Arianism as Athanasius himself, and were ready to accept the term *οὐσία* in their definition of the Godhead. Fearing that Sabellianism underlay the use of *ὁμοούσιον*, they rejected the Nicene test word, but were ready to admit that our Lord was like in substance (*ὁμοιούσιος*) to the Father. This formidable combination was known as the party of the Semi-Arians (*q.v.*). At heart most of them were orthodox, and this the two great champions of the Nicene faith, Athanasius and Hilary, bishop of Poitiers (who had been exiled by Constantius to Asia Minor), had the wisdom to perceive. After their triumph at Seleucia and Ariminum, the Arians and Homœans had the folly to attempt to crush these Semi-Arians at the Synod of Constantinople (A.D. 360), and thereby drove them in self-defence into the arms of the Nicenes. It needed only the rise of the great Cappadocian Fathers, Basil of Neo-Cæsarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory of Nazianzus, to complete the triumph of the Nicene Christology.

The Semi-Arians and the Cappadocian Fathers are subjects of separate treatment in this work; and it is unnecessary to do more here than allude to the important dispute as to the final settlement of the Arian controversy. The question at issue is whether the *Homoousion* was ultimately accepted in the sense of *Homoiousion*. This Dr. Harnack maintains to have been the case. His contention is very ably disputed by Mr. Bethune-Baker in *The Cambridge Texts and Studies* ('The meaning of Homoousios'). Attention should be paid to Professor Gwatkin's most instructive survey of the importance of Asia Minor to the Eastern Empire, which 'as long as that was unsubdued, remained upon the whole the strongest power on earth' (*Studies of Arianism*[2], p. 94). With true historic insight Gwatkin points out that in the Arian controversy Asia really played the part of the deciding factor. Disliking the *Homoousion* because it was an innovation, the steady conservatism of Asia accepted it when it was proved to be the only means of averting worse evils. 'Even the later Cappadocian orthodoxy,' he adds, 'rested on a conservative rather than a Nicene basis.' One of the chief representatives of Semi-Arianism is Cyril of Jerusalem (see Hort, *Two Dissertations*, p. 84).

10. The Arian party in A.D. 360 'was in a position too plainly artificial to be permanent' (Bright, *DCB* i. 197[a]), and the death of Constantius on 3rd Nov., 361, revealed its inherent weakness. Rome and the West at once returned to adherence to the Nicene faith, as though the Council of Ariminum had never assembled. Just before the Emperor's death, Meletius was, at the instigation of Acacius, elected bishop of Antioch, and his dramatic declaration of his faith at his installation showed the strength of popular feeling against Homœan Arianism. Constantius demanded that the new bishop should preach on the text *κύριος ἔκτισέ με*, 'The Lord created me,' *i.e.* wisdom; for so Pr 8[22] is translated by the LXX, and on this the Arians based their doctrine that the Son was a *κτίσμα*. To the delight of the people, always at this time more orthodox than the bishops, Meletius declared that the word *ἔκτισε* was a mistranslation of the Hebrew קנה, 'possessed,' and gave a decidedly Nicene interpretation to the text (the sermon is preserved by Epiph. *Hær.* 73. 29–33). 'This bold confession,' says Professor Gwatkin, 'proved to be the first effective blow at the Homœan supremacy' (*op. cit.* p. 187 f.). But perhaps the most crucial point was the return of Athanasius to Alexandria under Julian, when he held a small but very important Council at Alexandria, the great work of which was to clear up the misunderstanding due to the employment of such words as *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*. It was agreed that there might be a fundamental agreement between those who employed these terms in different senses, but that the language of the Nicene Council was the safest which could be made use of. This paved the way for a reconciliation between the conservatives, with their dread of Sabellianism, and the Athanasian and Western Christians, who clung to the importance of the Unity of the Divine essence. As Bethune-Baker says, 'By the 4th cent. it was becoming clear that the only solution of the problem was to be found in a distinction inside the divine unity . . . it was necessary to revise the idea of divine personality and to acknowledge not three individuals but three eternal aspects of the Divine' (*Chr. Doct.* p. 157 n.). This was done when the distinction in meaning between *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις* was agreed upon, and the ambiguity of the Latin and Greek terminology removed.

In the early days of the controversy the terms *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις* were used interchangeably. The confusion caused great misunderstanding, because, whilst one part of Christendom spoke of *τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις* in the Trinity, the other acknowledged only one. By distinguishing between *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*, and explaining the mystery of the Trinity as *μία οὐσία τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις*, the ambiguity was removed. This was the work

of the Cappadocian Fathers, but it really began with the Council of Alexandria. In Latin legal language *substantia* means property, and *persona* a being with legal rights, a 'party' in an action at law. Thus a *persona* might own several *substantiæ*, and a *substantia* might belong to more than one *persona*. Tertullian uses *substantia* in the sense of essence, or 'substance,' of which Father, Son, and Holy Ghost partake; but he seems to hesitate to use *persona* if he can avoid it. He takes the word from the Old Latin Bible *quotidie oblectabar in persona eius* (Pr 8^{30}), and *Spiritus personæ eius Christus dominus* (see Bethune-Baker, *op. cit.* pp. 139, 235, 'Meaning of Homoousios,' p. 21; Bigg, *op. cit.* pp. 163, 164; Harnack, *op. cit.* iv. 83; Gwatkin, p. 209 ff.). The Council of Alexandria forecasts the future development of doctrine by implicitly condemning Apollinarism (*q.v.*) and the denial of the Divinity of the Holy Ghost which subsequently became characteristic of Semi-Arianism.

11. But though Arianism may justly be described as collapsing with the death of Constantius, it remained, in its *Homœan* form, the official religion of the eastern half of the Roman Empire down to A.D. 378. On the death of Jovian (A.D. 364), Valentinian was chosen as emperor by the army on Feb. 26, and associated his brother Valens with him on the 29th of March, taking upon himself the government of the Western provinces, and assigning the Eastern to Valens. The stern but just Valentinian pursued a rigidly impartial policy in matters of religion, and though Milan, the governmental capital of Italy, remained under an Arian bishop, orthodoxy generally prevailed in Italy, Gaul, Spain, and Africa. Valens, on the other hand, supported the Homœans, thereby forcing the Semi-Arian party to open negotiations with Liberius, bishop of Rome, and his successor Damasus. The Homœan supremacy lasted down to the defeat and death of Valens at Adrianople (Aug. 9th, 378). Valentinian had died three years earlier, and his son Gratian had the magnanimity to appoint Theodosius, son of a distinguished official who had been put to death under Valentinian and Valens, as his colleague in the Eastern provinces. Theodosius, an orthodox Spaniard, cleared the Roman territory of victorious Goths, and, being afflicted with sickness in the year following his accession (A.D. 380), accepted baptism at the hands of Ascolius, bishop of Thessalonica. Theodosius took the faith of Rome and Alexandria as the norm of Christian belief in a law commanding all to follow the faith 'committed by the Apostle Peter to the Romans, and now professed by Damasus of Rome and Peter of Alexandria' (Cod. Theod. xvi. 1, 2). He allowed Gregory of Nazianzus to establish himself in Constantinople and to preach the doctrine upheld so strenuously by his friend Basil, bishop of Neo-Cæsarea (d. 379), in the evil days of Valens. The room in which Gregory delivered his discourses against the Arians became the Church of the Anastasia, the Resurrection of the Faith. In 381 the comparatively insignificant assembly, afterwards known as the Second General Council, met at Constantinople to confirm the faith of Nicæa. Further overtures were made to the Arians in the ensuing years; but in A.D. 383, Arianism was finally proscribed, and ceased to be legal for Roman citizens to profess.

Of the interval between the Councils of Alexandria (A.D. 362) and Constantinople (A.D. 381), though extremely important in the history of dogma, it is not necessary to treat at length in an account of Arianism, whose very triumph in the last days of Constantius made its ultimate downfall only a matter of time. In the present article it is only requisite to mention a few landmarks, referring the reader to the articles CAPPADOCIAN THEOLOGY and SEMI-ARIANISM. The Semi-Arians were at first favoured by Valens and allowed to assemble at Lampsacus, where they declared the Son to be ὅμοιος κατ' οὐσίαν to the Father, and cast out the Homœan Eudoxius and Acacius. Eudoxius, however, gained the Emperor's ear, and Valens expelled the Semi-Arians from their sees for refusing to communicate with the Homœans. One of their most distinguished leaders, Eleusius of Cyzicus, complied with the Imperial demands and acknowledged Eudoxius, but he repented bitterly of his action. Then came the negotiations with Rome, culminating in the Synod of Tyana (A.D. 367). The Semi-Arians were not really disposed to accept the Nicene faith in its entirety; and under the name of Macedonians many refused to acknowledge the proper Divinity of the Holy Spirit (Hefele, *Hist. of Councils*, § 88). The work of Basil and his friends, hampered as it was by the unfortunate schism at Antioch, was directed to a real reconciliation of those who were at heart orthodox to the Homoousian doctrine. For the question as to which creed was accepted by the Council of Constantinople in A.D. 381 see Gwatkin, *The Arian Controversy*; Burn, *Introduction to the Creeds*; and, above all, Hort, *Two Dissertations*.

12. Arianism may be defined as an attempt to determine the relations of the Persons of the Trinity on a basis of distinction and subordination. Despite all the efforts of Arius to popularize his opinions, they never found favour with the people. The movement was clerical rather than lay; the difficulties it sought to overcome were those of Origenist theologians perplexed by philosophical doubts and seeking an explanation where none was possible. Nor did Arianism pure and simple ever fail to arouse a strong feeling of indignation: the creed of Arius at Nicæa, the Sirmian 'blasphemy,' the opinions of Aëtius and Eunomius, all caused a storm. It was only by insinuating itself in the plausible guise of Scriptural phraseology that Arianism ever obtained a hearing. Nor could it be otherwise. An Arian Christ, a created Logos unable to reveal an unknown God, could never be the Christ acknowledged by Christians as the Incarnate Word, the sole Mediator between God and man, the supreme Sacrifice for the sin of the world. All who acknowledged this adhered at heart to the Nicene doctrine, however they might object to the language in which it was expressed. The great merit of Athanasius was his ability to recognize this truth; and he and Hilary were ready to make any concessions to those who shared the spirit, though they might not adopt the phraseology, of Nicæa. The test word *Homoousios* hardly appears in the works of Athanasius.

Arianism does not seem to have sprung from any strong ethical impulse. Its philosophy was pagan, and the object of its leaders was political rather than religious. 'Arius tried to interpret the Christian revelation in such a way as to render it acceptable to men whose whole conception of God and of life was heathen' (Bethune-Baker, *op. cit.* p. 156). His heresy was, in short, a symptom of the disease of the Church in the 4th cent. induced by the desire of ingratiating itself with the civil power. What the Roman government required when it invited the Christian Church to enter into alliance with it was that the Faith should cause as little disturbance as possible to the existing order of society. Arianism promised to provide this, in the form of a creed offering an easy and almost imperceptible transition from paganism to Christianity. By the edict of Milan, Christianity, the religion of the minority, had been virtually accepted by the Roman government, which thereby had committed itself to the policy of making it the religion of the majority. Arianism, by surrendering the chief characteristic of Christianity, the proper Divinity of Christ, made the new faith less hard to accept; and for this reason the Emperors, though from time to time encouraging the Nicene theology, were naturally disposed, especially in the Eastern provinces, towards Arianism. But, as the long controversy showed, the Arian doctrine led not merely to an accommodation to pagan theology, but also to an approach to pagan morality. For though some, especially of the extreme Arians, were faithful to their opinions, the majority of the party were dexterous politicians ready to serve the interests of the corrupt court of Constantius. Bishop Robertson sums up the character of many of the Arian intriguers when he says of Acacius of Cæsarea: 'The real opinions of a man with such a record are naturally not easy to determine, but we may be sure that he was in thorough sympathy

with the policy of Constantius, namely, the union of all parties in the Church on the basis of subserviency to the State' (*Athanasius*, p. liv). The men most opposed to the rapid secularization of the Church which characterized the 4th cent. were almost uniformly opposed to Arian teaching.

13. None the less, the Arian controversy was not wholly unreasonable; indeed, it was the inevitable outcome of the tendencies of the age. A Sabellian Christology would have been as fatal to Christianity as that of Arius, since it would have robbed the Incarnation of its reality, making it little more than a phase in the revelation of God, and depriving the Church of an ever-present Divine Master. Eusebius of Cæsarea was only reasonable when he demanded at Nicæa that the creed should not be perverted to encourage this error; and the views propounded by Marcellus of Ancyra and Photinus served to justify his action and that of the conservative and Origenist bishops of the East. It was not indeed till the Creed secured the adherence of Asiatic Origenists like the Cappadocians, Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory of Nazianzus, that it was really accepted. The episcopate of Basil, the eloquence of Gregory of Nazianzus, and the philosophy of Gregory of Nyssa were alike instrumental in inducing the bishops of Asia and Syria to accept the *Homoousion* as the one and only safeguard of the Divinity of the Son against the specious teaching of the Arians.

14. But though the Arian controversy virtually ended with the Council of Constantinople in A.D. 381, it was fruitful in new disputes destined to distract and divide Christendom. As early as the time of his banishment to Phrygia (A.D. 356), Hilary of Poitiers was able to foretell the approach of a heresy concerning the Divinity of the Holy Spirit (*de Trin.* lib. ii. and viii.; Swete, *Hist. of the Doct. of the Procession of the Holy Spirit*, p. 112). In 358 the rise of the Tropici caused St. Athanasius to enter, in the *Letters to Serapion*, upon the subject of the Divinity and Procession of the Spirit (Swete, *op. cit.* p. 91; see also pp. 47–49). The subject was also considered at the Council of Alexandria (A.D. 362); and about the same time Macedonius, the Semi-Arian bishop of Constantinople, deposed by the Homœan Synod in A.D. 360, was elaborating the theory (which was afterwards known by his name) that the Son was like, and the Holy Spirit unlike the Father. Though the controversies caused by this question never roused the world like those on the Divinity of the Son, the consequences were even more serious, the question of the Procession of the Holy Ghost being the pretext of the schism between Eastern and Western Christendom. Even more fruitful in divisions was the problem raised by Apollinaris of Laodicæa, one of the chief opponents of Arianism, concerning the relations of the Manhood to the Godhead of Christ. See APOLLINARISM.

The principle for which Athanasius contended so nobly, and which he asserted in early youth before the appearance of Arianism, was the union between God and man brought about by the Incarnation (*de Incarnatione*). But the zeal with which the Divinity of the Son was asserted tended, as Harnack truly says, to obscure the historical Jesus (*op. cit.* iv.); and theology occupied itself with the dogmatic aspect of the Divine rather than with the practical example of the human Christ.

15. It is a remarkable fact that one of the results of the great dogmatic controversies in the early Church was that the defeated party displayed conspicuous zeal in missionary effort; and, without sparing condemnation of the self-seeking and unscrupulous spirit of the political Arians, we have also to remember that some later Arians, like the heresiarch himself, were ready to condescend to instruct the simple. Possibly Arius believed that by re-stating the theology of the Church in terms suited to his age he was doing good service in rendering the faith acceptable to the heathen; and his followers found ready converts among the Teutonic invaders of the empire. The exile of Arius to Illyricum resulted not only in the appearance of those two champions of his heresy in the West, the bishops Ursacius and Valens, but also, if we are to judge from results, in the conversion of the neighbouring Goths, and through them of the Teutonic nations, to Christianity of an Arian type. For long years the dividing line between the Roman and the Teutonic invader of his territory was that of religion rather than that of race. It is our misfortune that we have little or no information concerning the labours of the unknown Arian apostles of the Goths, Vandals, Lombards, and Burgundians. The fact that Cyrila, the Vandal bishop or pope of Carthage, knew Latin very imperfectly (Victor Vitensis, lib. ii.), and the appearance of the famous Gothic version of the Scriptures, would seem to indicate that the barbarians were taught the doctrines of Christianity in their own languages, in which case their Arianism must have differed much from the refined subtlety which distinguished that of the schools of the Empire, and is perhaps expressed in the blunt refusal of the Burgundian Gundobald to worship three Gods (Avitus, *Ep.* xli.). But there seems little doubt that the transforming effects of the Christianity which the barbarians adopted were genuine. Both Salvian and Orosius praise the virtues of the Arian conquerors of Roman territory, and Augustine (*de Civitate Dei*, i.) relates how moderately the Visigothic Arians who captured Rome under Alaric treated the inhabitants of the city, and what respect they showed for the sanctity of the Christian Churches. The long reign, moreover, of the Arian Theodoric in Italy, and his impartial government, extort, as Milman remarks, 'the praise of the most zealous Catholic' (*Latin Christianity*, bk. iii. ch. iii.).

Ulfilas is mentioned by Socrates (ii. 41, iv. 33), Sozomen (vi. 37), Theodoret (iv. 33), Philostorgius (*HE* ii. 5), and Jordanes (ch. 51), but the most important document is the fragment of his pupil Auxentius, Arian bishop of Dorostorus (now Silistria), discovered by Waitz (*Ueber das Leben und die Lehre des Ulfilas*, 1840). Auxentius made remarks in the margin of a copy of the Acts of the Council of Aquileia (A.D. 381), at which the Catholics were led by St. Ambrose against the Western Arians under Palladius and Secundianus. In the course of his criticisms of the *Acta*, Auxentius makes mention of his master Ulfilas, who brought him up both physically and spiritually as his son in the faith. The facts of the life of Ulfilas seem to be that he was born of noble Gothic parentage, or, according to Philostorgius, he was the descendant of Cappadocians who had been carried captive. According to Socrates, he was a Christian from childhood, a pupil of Theophilus, the Gothic bishop present at Nicæa. He was ordained a reader, and about A.D. 340 he was sent on an embassy to Constantinople. In the following year he was made a bishop at the Council of the Dedication by Eusebius of Nicomedia. He laboured among his people in Dacia, but owing to a persecution he led the Christian Goths into Mœsia, at the foot of Mount Hæmus, where they were allowed by the Emperor Constantius to settle. These *Gothi minores* are described by Jordanes. Both Philostorgius and Auxentius compare Ulfilas to Moses; and if a more modern instance is permissible, we may recall the work of John Eliot, the Puritan of Jesus College, Cambridge, among the Algonquin Indians in the 17th century. Like Ulfilas, Eliot gave his converts the Bible in their vernacular. Ulfilas on his deathbed declared his belief, which is given by Auxentius, who comments in a decidedly Arian fashion on it. In this creed the Divinity of the Holy Spirit is expressly denied. Harnack (*op. cit.* vol. iv. p. 44, Eng. tr.) says it is the only Arian creed which is not polemical. It is found in Hahn, § 198. Theodoret says that Ulfilas was persuaded by Eudoxius that the controversy was unimportant; but from the statement of Auxentius he seems to have been a convinced Homœan Arian (see C. A. Scott, *Ulfilas*, 1885).

16. In the Western provinces of the Empire during the 5th and part of the 6th cent., Arianism was the religion of the conquerors, and orthodoxy that of the conquered. Nor did the Catholic faith triumph by force or worldly power so much as by persuasion, since at one time there was not a single orthodox ruler in the Empire or among the barbarians. It

was then that the belief of Rome, and the Churches in communion with her, won its most signal triumph in the conversion of Clovis and the Salian Franks (A.D. 496). The strength of the organization of the Church of the fallen Empire stands in remarkable contrast to the weakness of the less disciplined national churches of its Arian invaders. As Dr. Hodgkin remarks, 'The Arian bishops took their fill of court favour and influence while it lasted, but made no provision for the future. They stood apart from one another in stupid and ignorant isolation. Untouched apparently by the great Augustinian thought of the world-encompassing city of God, they tended more and more to form local tribal churches, one for the Visigoths, another for the Vandals, another for the Burgundians. And thus in the end the fable of the loosened faggot and the broken sticks proved true of all the Arian monarchies' (*Italy and Her Invaders*, vol. iii. p. 345; see also Gwatkin, *op. cit.* p. 272).

The events which followed the conversion of Clovis showed the immense political power of the Catholic-Nicene Church of the West. The important Visigothic kingdom of Toulouse, which lasted for nearly a hundred years, and reached the acme of its power under Euric (A.D. 466–484), fell before the Frankish arms at the decisive battle of Vouglé (A.D. 508). The war of Euric against Auvergne, in defence of which Ecdicius and the bishop Sidonius Apollinaris played so valiant a part, was one of Arian against Catholic; and the triumph of the former was followed by severe measures of repression, which have been termed a persecution. (For a discussion of these measures see C. A. Scott, *Ulfilas*, p. 185; and *DCB*, art. 'Euric,' by Mrs. Humphry Ward, who quotes the letter of Sidonius [*Ep.* vii. 6]). Mrs. Ward suggests that Gregory of Tours has misunderstood Sidonius' allusion to the natural death of bishops, to whose vacant sees Euric refused to permit a successor to be chosen, and imagined that they were slain by Euric. After the conversion of Clovis the Catholics had their revenge; that astute prince realized the value of their assistance, and made the expedition against Alaric, the son of Euric, a holy war. 'Valde moleste fero' were his pious words, 'quod *hi Ariani* partem teneant Galliarum, eamus cum Dei adjutorio, et, superatis eis, redigamus terram in ditionem nostram' (Greg. Tours, ii. 37). In the case of the Burgundian Gundobald, the Catholic spokesman Avitus, bishop of Vienne, held out, as an inducement to him to embrace orthodoxy, that he would be protected against Clovis (Avitus, *Ep.* v. 17, quoted by Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders*, vol. iii. p. 347). The fall of the Visigothic kingdom in Italy is an even stronger proof of the political strength of orthodoxy. The admirable rule of Theodoric, his fairness and toleration, were of no avail to save his dynasty; directly an orthodox Emperor was on the throne at Constantinople, the Church intrigued against him and his family. 'Totila,' says Professor Gwatkin, 'was a model of barbarian justice; yet even Totila could never venture to arm the provincials against the orthodox oppressor' (*op. cit.* p. 272).

Mr. C. A. Scott, in his useful monograph on Ulfilas, gives the secret of the broad distinction between the Arianism within and without the Empire. He explains the fact that the Christian Romans who adopted the opinions of Arius showed from the first a tendency to moral deterioration, whereas the barbarians improved in every respect under the influence of a creed which relegated the Son to a lower position than the Father, by reminding us that, whereas in the case of the Arianizing clergy in the days of Constantius, there was a fall from a higher to a lower conception of Christianity, the Teutons were making a distinct advance in substituting an Arian Christianity for heathenism (*Ulfilas*, ch. viii.).

In the same chapter (p. 172 ff.) Mr. Scott gives some useful hints about the few traces of Arian Church organization among the barbarians—a subject on which we are almost entirely in the dark.

17. It may be that the northern invaders found in Arianism an easy transition from polytheism to Christianity (Hodgkin, *op. cit.* p. 88); and their firm adherence to the doctrines which they had been taught, though they can have understood only imperfectly the subtle distinctions between *Homœan* and *Homoousian* Christianity, is very remarkable. But, despite Professor Gwatkin's assertion that the victory of Clovis over the Visigoths was an evidence of the inferiority of the Arian theology of the barbarians to the Nicene doctrine accepted by the Franks (*op. cit.* p. 273)—a view which the present writer himself formerly held (*Cambridge Theological Essays*, p. 500)—we are convinced that the Arianism of the Visigoths, Lombards, Vandals, etc., was no more than a phase in the ecclesiastical struggle between the Teutonic and the Roman conception of Christianity. The barbarians desired to have their own national Church, and when they found a form of Christianity which kept them separate from the despised provincial and independent of the clergy of the Empire, they held to it with the proud firmness of a conquering race. Their natural reverence for Roman civilization made them as a rule nobly tolerant of the religion it sanctioned; and when they are said to have been persecutors, the motive must have been mainly political. Euric's 'persecution' in Toulouse has been compared with the *Kulturkampf* in Germany, and it bears an even stronger resemblance to the more bitter struggle between Church and State in France, where the reason given for depressing the former is the determination not to submit to any external interference.

The inherent weakness of the barbarian occupants of the Roman territory was their incapacity for organization, whilst the strength of the Romans in both their civil and their ecclesiastical polity lay in a system tested by the experience of centuries. The Arian churches were as little able to maintain themselves as the short-lived Teutonic kingdoms, and their clergy had ultimately to surrender at discretion to the better disciplined church of the Roman provincials. The destruction of Arianism as a rival system is one of the most important factors in the genesis of modern European civilization; for, had the barbarian conquerors professed one form of Christianity and the weaker race another, no progress would have been possible. Oppressive as the unregulated feudalism of the dark ages was, it would have been intolerable if the conquerors had not had the claim of a common Christianity to encourage consideration for their vanquished subjects.

The chief authorities for the history of Arianism among the Teutons, besides those already cited, are St. Gregory of Tours (especially vi. 43, the story of the interview between Gregory and Opila, the Spanish ambassador to Chilperic. When examined as to his creed, Opila said, 'Credo patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum unius esse virtutis.' 'In that case,' answered Gregory, 'why will you not receive the communion with us'? 'Quia, inquit, gloriam non recte respondetis, nam iuxta Paulum apostolum nos dicimus Gloria deo patri per filium; vos autem dicitis, Gloria patri et filio et spiritui sancto,' etc.). See Sidonius Apollinaris, *Epistles*, bk. vii. The ninety-one letters of Avitus, bp. of Vienne, should be consulted; see also Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, ch. xxvii.; Revillout, *Arianisme chez les peuples germaniques*; Maimbourg, *Hist. of Arianism*, bk. x.; Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders*.

18. Every barbarian kingdom ultimately abandoned Arianism, or else, as in the case of the Ostrogoths in Italy and the Vandals in Africa, Arianism proved one of the causes of national ruin. The principal Arian nations were the Burgundians, the Visigoths, and the Lombards; and each in turn, after a severe struggle, abandoned the form of Christianity in which they had been instructed for the Niceno-Roman faith. As the chief reasons for their conversion were political, the reader is referred to the history of the period; all that is possible in this article is to give the main features of the struggle with the orthodox prelates, in which each of the three nations mentioned eventually succumbed. The Burgundians do not seem to have been originally Arians; indeed, if we are to believe Socrates, who wrote in the reign of Theodosius II. (*c.* A.D. 430), they were originally Catholics (*HE* vii. 30); see also *DCB*, artt. 'Gundicarius,' and 'Orosius.' It would seem that the Burgundians were never entirely Arian, though the majority of the nation at the time of Clovis were

of that persuasion. It is an open question whether Gundobald, the contemporary of Clovis, was Arian or orthodox (Greg. Tours, *Hist. Franc.* ii. 34, iii. prologue; Avitus, *Ep.*). His son, the unfortunate Sigismund, was certainly orthodox, whilst the next king Godomar (also a son of Gundobald) was an Arian. In A.D. 534 the Franks subdued Burgundy; but Arianism seems to have continued to drag out an obscure existence till the end of the century (Revillout, *op. cit.* p. 218).

19. After their defeat by Clovis, the Visigoths were gradually driven out of all Gaul except Septimania, the coast from the Pyrenees to the Rhone, being otherwise confined to the Spanish peninsula. In their dominions as elsewhere the Roman provincials remained orthodox, and in the seaport towns the influence of Constantinople was still considerable. Spain, however, was the great stronghold of Arianism, which made a long and obstinate struggle before it gave way to the orthodox belief of the Empire. In A.D. 569 the able Leovigild became king of the Visigoths; and, after a series of successful campaigns, reduced his people to almost complete submission to his authority. His son Hermenigild was married to Ingunthis, daughter of Sigibert and Brunichildis of Austrasia. The bride (she was only thirteen years of age) was expected to become an easy convert from Frankish orthodoxy to Visigothic Arianism. She proved, however, very firm in her faith, and absolutely refused to be re-baptized by the Arians, though her grandmother Goiswintha, the wife of Leovigild, treated her with great brutality. To prevent further trouble in his family, Leovigild made his son king, and gave him a separate establishment at Seville. There, it is said, by the influence of his uncle, the famous bishop Leander, and that of his wife, Hermenigild became a Catholic. The young prince soon rebelled against his father, and with the assistance of the Catholic provincials and the Byzantines his party became very formidable. To conciliate his subjects, Leovigild visited the churches, and professed that his belief was Catholic save for his denial of the Divinity of the Holy Spirit, for which he was able to find no Scriptural warrant. He also made a remarkable concession to the prejudices of his subjects, by allowing them to go from the *Roman* to the *Catholic Church*, for so the Arians denominated their body (*de Romana religione ad nostram catholicam fidem*), without any repetition of the baptismal rite, but merely by imposition of hands and saying the *Gloria* in the Arian form, 'Patri per Filium in Spiritu Sancto.' The rebellion of Hermenigild was suppressed, and Leovigild is said to have persecuted the orthodox faith with severity. The unfortunate Hermenigild was put to death, and received, on somewhat doubtful authority, the honours of canonization at the hands of Pope Urban VIII. (1623–1644). Leovigild died in A.D. 586, and was succeeded by his son Reccared. One of the first acts of Reccared was to declare himself in favour of the Catholics, and, according to Gregory of Tours (ix. 15), he arranged a disputation in A.D. 587 between the adherents of the two creeds, after which he embraced the Nicene faith; but this Synod is passed over in all collections of Councils save Mansi's (Hefele, *Councils*, sec. 286). Two years later, Reccared held the famous third Council of Toledo, at which 67 bishops and only 5 nobles were present. The leading bishops were St. Leander of Seville, uncle to the king, and Massona of Emerita. Twenty-three anathemas were pronounced against Arianism, the most interesting of which are *the third*, which declares the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father *and the Son*; *the seventh*, against those who maintain that the Son is ignorant of anything; *the ninth*, against declaring that the Son in His Godhead was ever visible; *the fourteenth*, prescribing the correct form of the *Gloria*; *the sixteenth*, condemning the 'abominable treatise which we composed' to seduce the provincials into the Arian heresy, *i.e.* at the Arian Synod at Toledo (581); and *the seventeenth*, against those who refuse to condemn the Synod of Ariminum (A.D. 359). 'The holy creed' (the Niceno-Constantinopolitan) was ordered to be recited before communion after the manner of the Greek Fathers; and, as is well known, the creed to which Reccared and his queen Badda, together with the bishops including eight Arians, subscribed, contained the fateful addition of the *Filioque*. Arianism, however, was not suppressed by Reccared without force, as many of the Gothic nobles held out for some years.

For fuller particulars concerning this Council see Gams, *Kirchengesch. von Spanien*, vol. ii. pt. i. secs. 6–16; also Dahn, *Urgeschichte der german. und roman. Völker*, p. 515. The native chronicler is Johannes Biclarensis (Migne, *Patrol. Lat.* vol. lxxii.). It is noteworthy that from Spain proceeded the one important Western heresy concerning the person of the Son—the Adoptian (see ADOPTIANISM), promulgated by Elipandus, metropolitan of Toledo, and condemned at the Council of Frankfort (A.D. 794).

20. The Lombard conquerors of Italy were Arians down to the close of the 6th cent., and, even in the days of St. Gregory the Great, Autharis, their king, forbade any of his Lombards to give their children Catholic baptism. But shortly before his death Autharis married the Bavarian princess Theodelinda, who had been brought up in the Catholic faith. So great an impression did her wisdom and beauty make on her people, that, when she became a widow, the dukes of the Lombards begged her to select her own husband and continue to reign over them. She chose Agilulf, and by her persuasions the new king was gradually reconciled to the Catholic faith. It was to Theodelinda that Gregory addressed that most interesting revelation of the credulity of his age, the *Dialogues*. Traces of Arianism remained among the Lombards down to the middle of the next century, and it is not at all certain by what means the whole nation was induced to abandon the heresy. The Roman pontiffs regarded them always with the greatest apprehension and abhorrence. For the correspondence between Gregory and Theodelinda see Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders* (1899), vols. v., vi., and Homes Dudden, *Gregory the Great* (1905).

The whole subject of the transition of the Teutons from Arianism to Catholicism is one of great obscurity, and deserves careful investigation. Of the Churches nothing seems to have survived, and, except Ulfilas' translation, there is no literature which has come down to us. The three important factors in the destruction of Arianism were the power of the Franks enlisted on the side of orthodoxy, the weight of influence which the subject Roman provincials were able to throw on the side they favoured in any struggle between rival barbarians, and the part taken by the wives of the kings and chieftains in bringing their people over to the religion of the Romans. Teutonic Arianism was at best a semi-barbarous Christianity; and it is interesting to observe that a form of Christianity, which began with the highly educated bishops of the East as a speculative creed, ended in the West as the national religion of ignorant barbarian warriors. But the struggle between Catholicism and Arianism in Western Europe was no less critical and far more protracted than in the eastern provinces.

21. During the Middle Ages there seems to have been little if any revival of Arian opinions properly so called, the tendency being perhaps in the direction of Sabellianism rather than otherwise, though the drift of Christian thought led men to speculate more on the nature of the Church, and eventually on the position of the Virgin Mary in the hierarchy of heaven, than on Christ (Dorner, *Doct. of the Person of Christ*, Div. II. vol. i. [Third Section]).

'Subordinationism, on the contrary,' says Dorner, 'durst no longer raise its head in the form of naked Arianism within the bosom of the Church; it was, however, permitted to conceal itself beneath a species of Tritheism, as in the case of Roscellin or to unite itself with Sabellianism, as in the case of the Abbot Joachim of Floris, whose view is suggestive of Tertullian's trinity

of the three ages of the world. But they touched Christology merely at a few points.'

It was not till more freedom in theological speculation became possible and theology was subjected to criticism in a rationalistic spirit that anything resembling Arianism made its appearance, and then in a shape different from the opinions of Arius and his adherents. After the Reformation the term 'Arian' was frequently misapplied to those who really held Unitarian views; and before discussing the later developments of those opinions which derogated from the supreme Godhead of the Son, it may be well to explain the difference between the position assumed by the Arians of the 4th cent. and their more modern followers. The Arian controversy proper concerned the Nature of the Divine Logos rather than the historic Christ of the Gospels. Arius and all his disciples acknowledged the pre-existence of our Lord, and concerned themselves but little with His Humanity. Indeed, Arius practically denied the manhood of our Lord, by teaching that His human body was animated by the Logos. But this Logos, though the creative principle by which all things were made, was, according to his teaching, not really of God, but a demi-god called into being to create the world, and, in the Incarnate Christ, to save mankind. No serious attempt was made to renew this heresy at the time of the Reformation.

Unitarianism started, on the other hand, with the denial of the pre-existence of Christ, who was declared to be no more than man, though miraculously born of the Virgin Mary and actually raised from the dead. The first Unitarians were Italians, and the majority took refuge in Poland, where the laxity of the laws and the independence of the nobility secured for them a toleration which would have been denied to their views in other countries. They were divided into two main parties: those who declared that worship ought to be paid to Christ, and those who held that to adore Him, a creature, was idolatry. The leader of the former party was Faustus Socinus (Sozzini), and those who followed him are often termed Arians to distinguish them from genuine Unitarians like Blandrata and Francis Davidi. These opinions, however, must be considered apart from Arianism proper, which is the subject of the present article.

See Toulmin's *Memoirs of Faustus Socinus*. In his introduction this author says that some of the Unitarians adopted Arian notions, and he distinguishes these from the followers of Socinus (see Liddon's *Bampton Lectures*, Lect. vii.). In mentioning Legate, the unfortunate heretic who was burned at Smithfield in the reign of James I., we observe that most Church historians style him 'an Arian.' According to Fuller (*Church History*, x. iv. 9), Legate held that Christ had no existence before His conception by the Virgin. Milton has been charged with Arianism on account of his representation of the sending of the Son by the Father to pronounce sentence on Adam and Eve (*Paradise Lost*, x. 55):

> 'But whom send I to judge them? whom but thee,
> Vicegerent Son? To thee I have transferr'd
> All judgement . . .'

But even if it is fair to judge a poet for words evidently dramatic, this subordinationism is not Arianism in its strict sense. Compare the expressions in the fragment, *In illud omnia*, attributed to Athanasius by Bp. Robertson, *Athanasius*, p. 87. In the tract *de Doctrina Christiana*, published by the Camden Society and in Bohn's *Prose Works of Milton*, the theological views of the poet are put forward. He opposes the teaching of the Calvinists on Free Will, and works out from the Bible a Christology of a Semi-Arian character. He does not appear to have been deeply read in the Fathers (*Dict. Nat. Biog.*, art. 'Milton'). For Sir Isaac Newton's views of Athanasius, which were decidedly hostile to the bishop and favourable to Constantius, see Sir David Brewster's *Life of Newton*, vol. ii. p. 342; Hallam's *Literature of Europe*, vol. iv. p. 36.

22. In the 17th cent. there was a tendency towards Arian opinions, due partly to the arguments advanced by the learned Jesuit Petavius in justification of the claim of the Roman Church to prescribe fresh articles of belief; for, though Sandius, a Unitarian, accuses Petavius of secretly holding Arian opinions, Bull was charitable and acute enough to see that the drift of his thesis, that the Anti-Nicene Fathers did not hold the doctrine of the Council, was completely different, and that he had the cause of the Papacy rather than that of Arius in his mind ('pontificiæ potius quam Arianæ causæ consultum voluisse,' *Def. Fidei Nic.* Prœm. § 8). Bull's famous treatise in defence of the faith of Nicæa appeared in 1684; and ten years later he wrote his *Judicium Ecclesiæ Catholicæ* in answer to views similar to those of Petavius advanced by the Remonstrant Episcopius, an amiable and learned man, whose object was not so much to attack the Trinitarian position as to maintain its comparative insignificance as an essential of Christianity ('frigidum nimis tantæ veritatis vindicem se ostendit,' *Introd.*; see also Nelson, *Life of Bull*, ch. lxvi.). The *Judicium*, as is well known, was highly commended by the great Bossuet, bishop of Meaux, and the clergy of the Gallican Church (*Life*, ch. lxvii.). The opponents of Bishop Bull were not, as a rule, Englishmen, anti-Trinitarian opinions in Britain having as yet no prominent advocates, but rather, as Bp. Van Mildert styles them in his *Life of Waterland* (p. 37), 'importers of foreign novelties.' Perhaps the best known English work advocating Arianism in the 17th cent. was the *Naked Gospel*, by Dr. Bury, rector of Exeter College (Oxford, 1690). In the same year, Dr. Sherlock, dean of St. Paul's, published his *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Holy and Ever-blessed Trinity*, in which, following some suggestions made by Cudworth, he maintained views which were denounced by South with his customary vehemence as countenancing Tritheism. Sherlock's opinions were condemned by the Vice-Chancellor and heads of houses at Oxford, who declared that it is 'false, impious, and heretical, contrary to the doctrine of the Catholic Church, and especially of the Church of England, to say "that there are three infinite, distinct minds and substances in the Trinity, or that the three Persons are three distinct infinite minds or spirits"' (Appendix to Dorner, by Patrick Fairbairn).

23. Professor Gwatkin in his *Gifford Lectures* ('Knowledge of God,' ch. xvii.) says incisively: 'Arianism is one of the most modern of the old heresies strangely English in its impatient common sense.' And it was in the England of the 18th cent. that the controversy revived.

'A variety of circumstances combined to give this turn to religious thought in England. The reaction from Puritanism, now that the tide of fortune had set in so powerfully against it and scope no longer existed for mental energy in that direction, was alone sufficient to account for it. . . . Partly springing, too, from the same reaction, and inspired by other influences, a philosophy came into vogue, heralded by Cudworth but properly founded by Locke, which in its bearings on morals and religion was peculiarly cold and rational. . . . Reason with this school of philosophical divines was placed in a sort of antagonism to faith; as the one element rose the other fell. . . . With those who still maintained a certain belief in Christianity, the prevailing spirit chiefly operated in disposing them to rob it of its more distinctive features, and, as regards the specific subject of our Lord's Person, led them either to reject altogether the doctrine of His divinity, or, with the Arians, to hold it but a quasi-divinity—something of an essentially subordinate nature to that of the Father' (Appendix to Dorner, *Person of Christ*, p. 350 ff.).

The two English divines properly deserving of the name of Arians were William Whiston, who succeeded Sir Isaac Newton in the chair of Mathematics at Cambridge, and his friend Dr. Samuel Clarke. Whiston was a man of high attainments, marred by many eccentricities. His study of Christian documents led him to place the *Apostolical Constitutions* on a par with the Gospels, and to choose Eusebius of Nicomedia as the exponent of the true tradition of Christian doctrine. He repudiated the name of Arian, but his outspoken utterances caused him to be deprived of his professorship. His more cautious friends, among them Benjamin Hoadly, rose to the highest and

most lucrative positions in the Church of England (Abbey and Overton, *The English Church in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. i. p. 490 ff.). Dr. Samuel Clarke, Rector of St. James's, Piccadilly, London, in 1712 published his *Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity*, in which no fewer than 1257 texts were cited and examined, with the result that the Father was declared to be alone Supreme, the Son Divine only so far as Divinity is communicable by the Supreme God, and the Holy Spirit inferior to the Father and the Son, not in order only, but also in dominion and authority. This avowed Arianism (for it was pointed out that of the fifty-five propositions advanced by Dr. Clarke there was only one to which an ancient Arian could not have subscribed) was the signal for an important controversy in England. The chief supporters of the new Arianism were Dr. Whitby and Mr. John Jackson, rector of Rossington and vicar of Doncaster. Clarke's work was condemned by Convocation in 1714; but the dispute was not thereby silenced, and in 1719, Dr. Waterland, archdeacon of St. Albans, published an answer to Jackson in his *Vindication of Christ's Divinity*. In the long war of pamphlets which followed, Waterland was conspicuous alike for basing his doctrine on Scripture alone and for the respect he showed for the Fathers. The Arian dispute in England marks, indeed, the close of the age when the Fathers were confidently appealed to in theological disputes. Nor was the Church of England alone disturbed by the question, since from the time of Emlyn's condemnation in Dublin (1702) and his expulsion from his church, the Nonconformists were disturbed by the presence of Arianism, which culminated in the Salters Hall Conference in 1718 between Presbyterians, Baptists, and Congregationalists. The Arianism of the early 18th cent. was succeeded by anti-Trinitarianism; and the subordinationist theories of the first decades gave way to more distinctly Unitarian doctrines, the discussion of which is scarcely within the scope of the present article.

For English Arianism see Nelson, *Life of Bull*, 1713; Van Mildert, *Life of Waterland*; Whiston, *Memoirs*, 1749–50; the Appendix to Dorner's *Person of Christ* (Eng. tr. 1865–68); Abbey and Overton, *English Church in the Eighteenth Century*, 1878, ch. viii.; Sykes, *Anti-Trinitarian Biography*; Dale, *History of Eng. Congregationalism*[2], 1907.

24. As a philosophy of religion, Arianism struck a blow not only at the root of the Creed, but at the whole principle of Scriptural revelation. 'Is,' asks Harnack at the beginning of his chapter on the subject (*op. cit.* vol. iv. Eng. tr.), 'the Divine, which appeared on the earth and has made its presence actively felt, identical with the supremely Divine that rules heaven and earth? Did the Divine which appeared on earth enter into a close and permanent union with human nature, so that it has actually transfigured it and raised it to the plane of the eternal?' The OT teaches that the One True God revealed Himself, in part at any rate, to Israel; and the NT supplements this by showing that humanity is made one in the Christ (ὁ Χριστός), and by this is brought into complete harmony with the God and Father of All. Arianism declared God to be unknowable, and the Son completely detached from Him. Humanity can therefore never be brought by Christ to the truly Divine, but only to a sort of pseudo-divinity created in the Son by the Father. Such an evacuation of the purpose of the Christian revelation has always been repudiated whenever the doctrine is presented in its crude form. But we must carefully distinguish between the logical results of such a system as Arius propounded and the opinions of those who have upheld it. Arius himself, in his dread of Sabellianism, may have advanced a theory of the Trinity without consideration of all that it involved. As a matter of fact, he was ready in later life to subscribe to a creed approximating to that of Nicæa. Of his opinions the famous Unitarian Dr. Priestley rightly says in his *Church History* (vol. ii. p. 139): 'Nay, the proper opinions of Arius, viz., that the Son was made out of nothing, and that there was a time when He did not exist, were really adopted by very few. So that what we call Arianism arose much later and spread much less rapidly than has been generally imagined.' The Arian Controversy resulted, however, in bringing forward two conclusions of which Christians had to choose one. If Jesus Christ existed from eternity, and is Head of a Kingdom which shall have no end, if He is indeed to be worshipped and received as God, then the Nicene doctrine is true, and He is of one substance with the Father. Otherwise, Christians have been mistaken from the first in their conception of Him, and He is not Divine, but a creature; not eternal, but belonging to time: either, as Arius suggested, a second God, using the term 'God' in its looser polytheistic sense, or, as the Unitarians maintain, a mere man eminent for goodness, but subject to human limitations, and unable to bring those who trust in Him to peace and communion with the Father. It is not without significance that Socinus expressly denied the doctrine of atonement through Christ.

F. J. FOAKES-JACKSON.

ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTELIANISM.—1. Life.—Aristoteles—son of Nicomachus, friend and physician of Amyntas, king of Macedonia—was born B.C. 384 at Stagira or Stagirus, a city of Chalcidice. In his eighteenth year (367) he came to Athens and joined the Academy, of which he continued to be a member, learning and teaching, during twenty years. Tradition relates that he taught rhetoric in opposition to Isocrates. That is to say, whereas at this time the school of the politico-rhetorical sophist Isocrates and the Academy, the school of Plato, were rival colleges, Isocrates was professor of rhetoric in the one, Aristotle in the other. In 347, when Plato died and his nephew Speusippus succeeded him as scholarch, Aristotle and Xenocrates, on the invitation of Hermias, lord of Atarneus and Assos, who was himself an Academic, betook themselves to his court. After a three years' residence there, Aristotle removed to Mitylene; and about this time, after the death of Hermias, he married Pythias, a near relative of his friend. In 343 Aristotle received and accepted a call to the Macedonian court to undertake the education of Alexander, then thirteen years old. This task occupied him during three years (343–340). A stay at Stagira followed; and it was not till Alexander had ascended the throne, and was about to start on his Asiatic expedition, that Aristotle finally left Macedonia. Meanwhile, in 339, Speusippus had died, and Xenocrates, after a contest with Heraclides Ponticus and Menedemus, had succeeded him as head of the Academy.

In 335 Aristotle returned to Athens and founded a school of his own in the gymnasium known as the Lyceum. There he spent twelve busy years, teaching in the morning a select class of advanced students, and in the afternoon a larger audience. From his habit of walking to and fro as he discoursed, the members of the school were called Peripatetics (Περιπατητικοί). Towards the end of this period of twelve years he lost the favour of Alexander, whose jealousy of Antipater and suspicion of Callisthenes prejudiced him against their friend and correspondent. Nevertheless, when Alexander died in 323, the anti-Macedonian party at Athens vented their spite against Aristotle in a charge of 'impiety.' The accusation based upon a

hymn to virtue, in which he was alleged to have represented Hermias as a god, was plainly frivolous; but Aristotle prudently left Athens and retired to his house near Chalcis in Eubœa. There he died in the summer of the following year (322). The story that he committed suicide by drinking hemlock or by drowning himself in the Euripus appears to have no foundation. Dr. Waldstein in 1891 opened a tomb near Eretria which he supposes to be that of the great philosopher.

2. Writings.—Cicero extols 'the golden stream of Aristotle's discourse'; Quintilian, its 'grace and fertility'; and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, its 'force, clearness, and grace.' These praises must needs refer to Aristotle's published writings, and, in particular, to his *Dialogues*, of which only fragments have come down to us. The philosophical writings, upon which his fame rests, are wholly deficient in literary quality. The style is curt, abrupt, jejune. The language is careless and conversational. The exposition is sometimes incomplete, sometimes redundant, sometimes inconsistent. There are reminders, recapitulations, revisions. Arguments are sometimes indicated without being worked out; inquiries which are promised are sometimes tacitly dropped. In a word, these writings, which have so profoundly impressed the thought of many centuries, would seem to be neither completed and published works nor text-books for use in the school, but informal records of oral teaching addressed to a few advanced pupils. In this way, and perhaps in this way only, are explicable the rough and ready terminology, the diagrams and examples, the references to the furniture and the decorations of the lecture-room and to members of the class, the occasional sentences which have no beginning, and, in one instance, the peroration addressed to an audience. But if these are records of oral teaching, some of them more completely finished than others, by whom were they prepared? Are they Aristotle's notes made with a view to his lectures? Are they notes of his teaching made by his hearers? Are they compilations made by an editor who had before him both Aristotle's notes for lectures and his hearers' notes of them? In the opinion of the present writer the treatises which have come down to us are in the main the notes of Aristotle himself. If they were the notes of pupils, and, *a fortiori*, if they were compilations, much of the roughness and the obscurity would have disappeared.

For example, in *Metaphysics*, A iii. 1069^b 35 and 1070^a 5 the words *μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι* would not have survived, and in A ix. 990^b 11–15 we should not find indications of three Platonic arguments and Aristotle's objections to them packed into four lines. It would seem that Aristotle's notes, made for his own use and supplemented and corrected by himself, but never revised for publication, were treasured in the school; so that we possess, not indeed always his last thoughts, but at any rate his thoughts; and the inconsistencies which trouble us prove only that his thinking was progressive.

The chief of the so-called 'acroamatic' treatises attributed to Aristotle may be classified under their mediæval titles as follows:—

i. Logic: the *Organon*, including *Categoriæ*, *de Interpretatione*, *Analytica Priora*, *Analytica Posteriora*, *Topica*, *de Sophisticis Elenchis*.
ii. Physics: *Physica* or *Physicæ Auscultationes*, *de Cœlo*, *de Generatione et Corruptione*, *Meteorologica*.
iii. Biology: *Historiæ Animalium*, *de Partibus Animalium*, *de Incessu Animalium*, *de Generatione Animalium*, *de Anima*, *Parva Naturalia*.
iv. Philosophy: *Metaphysica*.
v. Ethics and Politics: *Ethica Nicomachea*, *Ethica Eudemia*, *Magna Moralia*, *Politica*, *Œconomica*.
vi. Literature: *Rhetorica*, *Poetica*.

It is not possible to speak with any certainty about the chronology of these writings; for there can be no assurance that references from one to another are Aristotle's and not the additions of editors. But we know that the collection of treatises from which we gather Aristotle's ontology was early placed after the treatises on Natural History: for this, and no more, is implied in the title *τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά*, whence we derive our convenient misnomer 'metaphysics.'

Besides the 'published works' (*ἐκδεδομένοι λόγοι*), and the 'lectures' (*ἀκροαματικά*), there were also 'memoranda' (*ὑπομνήματα*). Under this last head may perhaps be placed certain summaries of the teaching of philosophers, the *προβλήματα*, and the *πολιτεῖαι*, *i.e.* notices of the constitutions of 158 political communities. The recently discovered *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία* appears to have contained (1) a brief constitutional history of Athens and (2) a citizen's handbook; but the want of proportion obvious in the former of these two sections suggests that it was a compilation, made by some member of the school, from extracts and documents which Aristotle had casually collected.

Strabo and Plutarch relate that Aristotle's library, including his own writings, became the possession of Theophrastus, and after his death passed into the hands of Neleus of Scepsis in the Troad; that his heirs, for fear of the lords of Pergamos, hid them in a cellar; that about B.C. 100 Apellikon bought them and brought them to Athens; and that in 86 they came into the hands of Sulla, and so became known to the grammarian Tyrannion, whose copies were the basis of an edition prepared about 70 by Andronicus of Rhodus, the eleventh scholarch. This curious story is probably true; but it must not be taken for granted either that the school had no philosophical library or that its library did not contain copies of Aristotle's principal writings.

3. Philosophical system.—We have seen that Aristotle entered the Academy and continued to be an active member of it during twenty years. In later life he still regarded himself as an Academic; for even when he is criticizing certain of Plato's tenets, he speaks of them as doctrines which *we* hold. Indeed, it would appear that, had he been at Athens in 339, he might have succeeded Speusippus as head of the School; for in the list of scholarchs, it is expressly noted that when Xenocrates was elected, 'Aristotle was in foreign parts.' But though an Academic, Aristotle cannot be regarded as a Platonist. The master and the pupil differed fundamentally in their attitude towards inquiry, Plato taking his departure from that which is eternal, Aristotle from that which is actual in time and space. Yet, in spite of this disagreement, they were at one in resting their schemes of scientific research upon the assumption that there are in Nature determinate kinds of species, which may be studied in their resemblances and their differences. After all, Aristotle had more sympathy with Plato than Speusippus, a biologist who assumed the existence of natural kinds without attempting a metaphysical explanation of them; and more appreciation of Plato than Xenocrates, a moralist, who, when he ventured into Platonic metaphysics, was soon out of his depth; and whereas Speusippus dropped the theory of Ideas, and Xenocrates blended it with Pythagorean fancies, Aristotle was, at any rate, careful to formulate his dissent. In a word, Plato propounded an idealist ontology and rested upon it a theory of natural kinds, which should be the basis for the study of cosmic existences; Aristotle, rejecting the idealist ontology, proceeded to restate the theory of natural kinds, resting it upon an ontology of his own. The criticism of his master's idealism is indeed Aristotle's starting-point, and for this reason it will be convenient, in the present account of Aristotle's system and encyclopædia, to give precedence to 'First Philosophy' (*πρώτη φιλοσοφία*) or 'Theology' (*θεολογική*).

(1) *First Philosophy.*—There are, thought Aristotle, four principal lines of inquiry, having for their ends the discovery of four causes (*αἰτίαι*) or principles (*ἀρχαί*). These causes or principles are the *material* cause (*ὕλη*), the *essential* cause (*οὐσία*, *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*), the *moving* cause (*ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως*), and the *final* cause (*τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα*, *τέλος*). Apart from

accidents or attributes which are not common to all the members of a natural kind, each of its members is, in thought though not in fact, resolvable into a specific soul or life, which is its form, and an appropriate body, which is its proximate matter. But again, the body is resolvable, in thought though not in fact, into organs and constituents. Further, these constituents are compounds of the four elements—fire, air, water, and earth. Finally, fire, air, water, and earth have for their ultimate matter a purely indeterminate potentiality which is the recipient of four primary qualities—hot and cold, wet and dry: fire is the combination of hot and dry; air, that of hot and wet; water, that of cold and wet; earth, that of cold and dry. The ultimate matter of the member of a natural kind is then a potentiality, in virtue of which that member exists in time and space: its form is the sum of its specific characteristics, in virtue of which it is what it is. What we can know of the member of a natural kind is its specific characteristics. Anything which is peculiar to an individual member or to individuals is not known but perceived.

Such is Aristotle's analysis of the particular member of the natural kind. It may serve as a statement of the aims which he has in view in his classificatory researches; but it leaves the adaptation of body to soul, the organization of body, and the differentiation of species wholly unexplained; and when he tells us vaguely that 'Nature' works always to an end and 'does nothing at random' (*οὐδὲν ἀτελὲς* [or *μάτην*] *ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις*), it is plain that 'Nature' is no more than a *deus ex machina*.

For the proximate moving cause, by which the particular member of a natural kind is brought into existence, Aristotle looks, not to any transcendental cause eternally operant, but to a previous member of the species which in its maturity transmits the specific characteristics to its offspring. This principle is expressed in the formula 'man generates man' (*ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ*). The final cause, the end sought, is the maintenance of the species. For though, under the influence of the sun as it approaches and recedes in its apparent progress through the signs, the life of the particular animal or vegetable waxes and wanes and ultimately ceases, Nature is 'careful of the type.'

It is necessary, however, to account not only for the existence of the animal and vegetable kinds, but also for that of the earth and the heavenly bodies, and for their motions, especially if, as the use made of the sun suggests, animal and vegetable life is to be dependent upon them. For this purpose Aristotle postulates (*a*) a prime unmoved movent (*πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον*), eternal, existent, essentially operant, exempt from matter, and (*b*) other unmoved movents (*κινούμενα ἀκίνητα*). The prime unmoved movent, with the other unmoved movents, attracts (*κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον*) the material universe, and so causes to rotate the spheres which are necessary to account for the motions of the earth and the heavenly bodies. Of such spheres Eudoxus had postulated 26, Callippus 33; Aristotle finds 55, or at any rate 47, necessary. The prime unmoved movent is mind (*νοῦς*), which, with itself for object, thinks continually (*ἐνεργεῖ ἔχων*), and is conscious of its thinking (*ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις*). The other unmoved movents, though Aristotle does not say it, must needs be the thoughts of the prime unmoved movent. For, at the end of Metaphysics Λ, criticizing Speusippus on the ground that his system makes the universe 'episodical,' Aristotle adds epigrammatically: 'Real existences refuse to submit to a bad constitution: as Homer says, a plurality of kings is bad; let us have one king.' Plainly Aristotle supposes himself to escape this condemnation: and so he does, if the other unmoved movents are the thoughts of the prime unmoved movent; for 'mind and its thoughts are one and the same' (1072^b 21, 1075^a 3).

Such is the substance of Aristotle's *First Philosophy*. But *First Philosophy* is also a 'Theology.' The mind, the prime unmoved movent, which, with its thoughts, the unmoved movents, originates and maintains the orderly motions of the earth and the heavenly bodies, is emphatically described as God; and, simple as his language is, Aristotle seems to be moved beyond his wont when he writes: 'It is wonderful that God should have always an excellence which we have sometimes: that he should have a greater excellence is still more wonderful. But so it is.' 'God is perfect: he has life, continuity of existence, eternity of existence; that is what God is.' 'He is one; and therefore the firmament which he sets in motion is one.' 'The belief in a Divinity which invests the whole of Nature goes back,' Aristotle adds, 'to remote antiquity; but, for the persuasion of the many and in the service of the law, an anthropomorphic mythology has been built upon it. Strip away the accretions, and then "first existences are gods" is a divine word.'

The lacunæ in the system here described are obvious. In particular, we desiderate an explanation of the part played by 'Nature'; and the omission is the more startling because we find Aristotle endeavouring to bring his scheme of unmoved movents into relation with the contemporary astronomy. His chief care was perhaps to show the possibility of resting the theory of natural kinds on a metaphysical system other than that of Plato. According to Plato, everything is directly or indirectly the thought of universal mind. Fire, air, earth, and water are its geometrical conceptions of space. The stars are modes of life implanted by it in fiery spheres. Animals and vegetables are modes of life, conceived by universal mind, but combined by the stars with bodies appropriately fashioned out of the elements. The particular member of an animal or vegetable species is a phenomenal copy or reflexion, in appropriately corporealized space, of the transcendental idea. Aristotle's immanent form received from the previous member of the species corresponds to Plato's phenomenal copy or reflexion of the Idea; Aristotle's Nature's design corresponds to Plato's Idea. The truth is that there is little difference between the two analyses when once it is understood that Plato emphasizes the transcendental idea at the expense of the immanent reflexion, and that Aristotle emphasizes the immanent form at the expense of Nature's design. But the fact always remains that, whereas Plato regarded matter also—that is to say, space—as the creature of universal mind, and so was a monist, Aristotle distinguished matter—that is to say, potentiality—from supreme mind, and was therefore a dualist.

In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle's answer to the question, What is the primarily existent (*τὸ πρώτως ὄν*)?, is to the following effect. It is not the receptive substratum called 'matter,' because, being purely potential, matter is not actually anything. It is not a mere universal (*καθόλου*), for the common characteristic or characteristics by which species are artificially combined in a genus, and particulars within a species are artificially combined in a group, *make* the genus or the group, and are not resemblances and differences discovered by comparison of species made by Nature. It is not the particular in which form and matter are combined, for with matter come in accidental attributes peculiar to individuals. It is the form and nothing but the form; that is to say, it is the sum of the charac-

teristics of the species to which the particular belongs. Such is the doctrine of *Metaphysics* Z. Nevertheless, in the *Categories*, primary existence is ascribed to the particular or composite of form and matter. The inconsistency is one of terminology and not of thought. For the specific form which is the primary existence of the *Metaphysics* exists only in the members of the species; and the primarily existent particular of the *Categories* is known only in so far as it represents the species to which it belongs. Aristotle coined many technical terms; but he allowed himself a large licence in the use of them, and he was not always careful to harmonize the terminology of one treatise with that of another. In this case, the terminological discrepancy is unfortunate; but, in the opinion of the present writer, it is a mistake to infer from it either confusion or vacillation.

(2) *Psychology*.—The conception of mind, exempt from matter, reappears in the *Psychology* (περὶ ψυχῆς). In this treatise Aristotle begins with a review of previous and existing opinion, from which it appears that some had regarded soul exclusively as the organ of motion, others exclusively as that of sensation and cognition. For himself, he proposes to include under this name all activity, which, whether manifested or not, is implicit in living body, and distinguishes living body from body which is lifeless. (Perhaps this is all that Aristotle meant in the first instance by defining soul as 'the first actuality of a natural organized body' [ἡ πρώτη ἐντελέχεια σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ]; but when he adds that, while soul is actuality of body, body is not actuality of soul, the definition becomes a declaration of soul's supremacy.) Having thus widened the scope of psychology, Aristotle proceeds to enumerate the faculties of soul. Nutrition (together with generation), sensation, appetition, locomotion, intellection, follow one another in this order; and the possession of a higher faculty implies that of all the faculties below it. The soul of plants is nutritive only. The soul of animals is not only nutritive, but also sensitive, appetitive, motive. The soul of man has all the faculties of animals, and is intellective also. In sensation the form of the sensible, without its matter, reaches the sense through an intervening medium; and the sense perceives the sensible in virtue of the change which the advent of the sensible brings about in it. Hence, when subject and object are in the like condition, there is no sensation; and when the sensible is in excess, the organ may be deranged or disabled. Touch is the primary sense. Besides the five special senses, Aristotle recognizes a common or central sense, which (*a*) is conscious of sensation, and (*b*) distinguishes and co-ordinates the impressions received by the special senses. Its organ is the heart. So far we have been dealing with faculties which man shares with the animals. Passing next to reason—the faculty which belongs distinctively to man—Aristotle distinguishes a passive reason (παθητικὸς νοῦς), which receives from the senses their impressions, and an active, constitutive reason (ποιητικὸς νοῦς), which provides forms of thought for the interpretation of the impressions received from the senses. Such is the function of the active reason in the individual; but it and it alone of the psychical faculties may exist apart from soul and from body. When it exists apart, 'independent of external objects, having no inessential attributes, essentially operant,' and 'only when it so exists,' it is immortal and eternal. Now the active reason, as thus conceived, is the prime unmoved movent, the God, of the *Metaphysics*. In so far as man possesses this reason, it comes to him from without. Plainly the passive reason is interposed in order to bring the recepta of sense into relation with the divine faculty.

(3) *Logic*.—Of all Aristotle's achievements the greatest was perhaps the invention of *logic*. The group of treatises known as the *Organon* includes a formal logic, a theory of scientific research, a treatise on disputation, and a classification of fallacies. The formal logic comprises an enumeration of categories or heads of predication; a study of the quality, quantity, and conversion of propositions; a detailed investigation of the syllogism and its figures; and a careful discrimination between *adduction* (ἀναγωγή), or generalization from known particulars in regard to those particulars, and *example* (παράδειγμα), or inference from known particulars in regard to unknown particulars, effected by ascent to an imperfectly certified *general* and subsequent descent from it. Within the limits of the *Organon*, Aristotle takes account at once of *dialectical debate*, by which the premises of demonstration are provisionally justified, of *demonstration*, by which the consequences of given premises are ascertained, and of *sophistry* or *eristic*, pursued irrespectively of truth with a view to argumentative success.

(4) *Science*.—While the formal logic still holds its ground, Aristotle's scientific writings were no more than stepping-stones. His physical speculations occupied the field for eighteen centuries; but they were never more than stop-gaps; and the time came when, by reason of his great name, they were positive hindrances to progress. His biological works are still praised for the observation, the insight, and the knowledge, of which they afford conclusive evidence.

(5) *Ethics and Politics*.—In the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics*, Aristotle raises and discusses anew the old question, What is man's chiefest good (τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν)?, regarding it in the one, as the end sought by the individual, and in the other, inasmuch as man is a social animal and cannot realize himself except as a citizen, as the end sought by the city-State (πόλις). Thus the two treatises are contributions to the architectonic science of Politics (πολιτική); but the one (ἠθικά) is concerned with the 'character' of the individual, the other (πολιτικά) with the 'constitution' of the State.

All are agreed that man's good or end is well-being (εὐδαιμονία), that is to say, well-living (εὖ ζῆν) or well-faring (εὖ πράττειν); and man's well-being—the term 'happiness' should be avoided—is the satisfactory performance of those functions which are distinctively human. In a word, 'man's chief good or end is a psychical activity characteristic of an excellence (ἀρετή), or, if there are more excellences than one, characteristic of the best and completest of them, such activity being continued during a complete period of existence.' Setting aside nutrition and growth which man shares with plants, and sensation which he shares with animals, we find that man's distinctive functions are reason, reasoning, and the rational control of appetition, under which head are included desires and passions. What, then, are the excellences of these functions? And which of the excellences is the best and the completest? There are two sorts of excellence—moral excellence, the excellence which the appetitive part of soul displays when it is duly obedient to the rational part, and intellectual excellence, the excellence of the rational part. Moral excellence (or virtue) is 'a deliberate habit which enables the individual, with the help of his reasoning faculty—subject to an appeal to the man of practical wisdom—to attain what is for him the mean between vicious extravagances.' The principal moral virtues are courage, temperance, liberality, munificence, magnanimity or self-respect, gentleness, justice. The intellectual excellences are practical wisdom or prudence (φρονησις), the excellence of that subdivision of the rational part of soul which controls

the appetitive part, and speculative wisdom (*σοφία*) the excellence of that purely intellectual part which is called reason (*νοῦς*). Practical wisdom and the moral virtues must be developed *pari passu*. Now, reason is obviously the best part of the soul, and therefore its excellence, speculative wisdom, is the best of excellences. This best of excellences has for its activity (*ἐνέργεια*) study (*θεωρία*). Consequently, the completest well-being of the individual is to be found in the life of the student (*θεωρητικὸς βίος*), who, however, must loyally do his duty as a member of the city and the family. This completest well-being brings with it the highest of pleasures. Next to the life of the student ranks the practical life of moral virtue. For the production of excellence, three things are requisite: first, natural aptitude; secondly, instruction, for its guidance; thirdly, habituation, to establish the habit. Inasmuch as well-being implies not merely the possession of a habit, but also its exercise, we require for the realization of well-being those external goods upon which the exercise of the habit depends. The doctrine that well-being implies the exercise of a habit and not merely the possession of it, and the corollary that external goods are indispensable conditions, distinguish Peripatetic from Academic ethics.

As in the *Ethics* Aristotle is concerned with the well-being of the individual, so in the *Politics* he is concerned with the well-being of the community. The city (*πόλις*) is a complex organism, developed out of the village (*κώμη*), which again has its origin in the patriarchal family (*οἰκία*). Right polities (*ὀρθαὶ πολιτεῖαι*) are those in which the sovereign (*κύριος*)—whether one, few, or many—rules for the benefit of the community; perversions (*παρεκβάσεις*) are those in which the sovereign—whether one, few, or many—uses power for personal advantage. The right polities are aristocracy, monarchy, polity proper; the perversions are democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny. The best of cities would be one in which absolute power was exercised for the benefit of all the citizens by one person, or more persons than one, superior to the rest in mind and in body. But we cannot hope to find rulers thus exceptionally qualified, and accordingly monarchy and aristocracy must be regarded as unattainable ideals. Thus of the three right polities one alone remains, namely, polity proper, in which all free men are admitted to a share in the administration and at the same time submit themselves to the 'passionless intelligence' of law. Of all polities this is, in Aristotle's estimation, the most stable; for inasmuch as all in turn rule and are ruled, the middle class has a preponderant influence. For the maintenance of polity proper, Aristotle would rely, as Athens did and as the United States do, upon supreme or constitutional laws (*νόμοι*), alterable only by special formalities, to which supreme or constitutional laws, upheld by courts of justice, all ordinary enactments (*ψηφίσματα*) must conform. Of the three perversions—democracy, oligarchy, tyranny—democracy, which has the smallest power for evil, is the least bad; tyranny, in which such power is greatest, is the worst. Tradition places at the end of the treatise a fragmentary scheme for a perfect State; but, unlike Plato, Aristotle had no hope of its realization. In the intervening books, on the strength of a careful study of known constitutions, Aristotle inquires what sorts of constitution are suitable to given sorts of people; how a constitution may be established and maintained in accordance with given assumptions or conditions; what is the best constitution for the generality of States; what circumstances tend to change, to overthrow, and to maintain the several constitutions. The reader of the *Politics* must not forget that, on the one part, the citizen population of a Greek State was very small, so that Aristotle knew nothing of representative government; and that, on the other part, the number of slaves was, in comparison with the number of free men, very great, so that what he calls a democracy was in some sort an aristocracy.

In these two treatises, the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics*, Aristotle is an acute and judicious student of human nature. They have a Shakespearean quality which makes them perennially interesting. But it must be clearly understood that they do not pretend to offer a theory of morality. Aristotle says nothing about the Good, about Duty, about the distinction between Right and Wrong; and very little about the faculty which discriminates them. Moreover, inasmuch as he concentrates his attention in the *Ethics* upon the well-being of the individual, and in the *Politics* upon the well-being of the State, the relations of man to man and of citizen to citizen are insufficiently handled. Indeed, they find a place, and that a subordinate place, only in so far as the particular virtues of justice and friendship are concerned with them. In a word, Aristotle works upon the lines of Plato's *Republic*.

In the *Eudemian Ethics*, which is now generally regarded as a summary prepared, *mutatis mutandis*, by Aristotle's disciple Eudemus, the line of argument is similar to that of the *Nicomacheans*. But (*a*) Eudemus chafes under the limitations of the inquiry, and would fain seek an explanation of moral differences; (*b*) regarding pleasure, not as the concomitant of an energy, but as identical with it, he sees in *εὐδαιμονία* the best of pleasures; and (*c*) abandoning the distinction drawn in the *Nicomacheans* between the activity of the student and the activity of the man of the world, he finds man's well-being in a life of culture (*καλοκαγαθία*) which combines both. It would appear that Aristotle himself, when he was writing the *Politics* (see IV. [VII.] iii. 1325^{b} 14), had learnt to regard statesmanship as a proper subject for scientific study. In the opinion of the present writer, Books v. vi. vii. of the *Nicomacheans*, which appear also as Books iv. v. vi. of the *Eudemians*, belong to the *Eudemians*, which they resemble both in their doctrine and in their style.

(6) *RHETORIC, ETC.*—In the *Rhetoric*—a treatise on oratory and style, apparently framed on lines marked out by Plato in the *Phædrus*—and in the fragmentary *Poetics*, Aristotle shows himself a literary critic of a high order. In particular, his appreciations of the tragedians have a permanent value. Perhaps no literary judgment has given rise to more controversy than the remark that tragedy, 'by raising pity and fear, purges the mind of those passions.' This theory of the 'homœopathic purgation' effected by tragedy (see Milton's Preface to *Samson Agonistes*) is Aristotle's answer to Plato, who in the *Republic* condemns tragedy as an incentive and stimulus to mischievous emotions.

The greatness of Aristotle was not fully understood until the Middle Ages, when the Church borrowed from him the framework of its theology, when the whole of civilized Europe saw in his encyclopædic writings the summary of the sciences, and when Dante hailed him as 'the master of those who know.' In the present article no more has been attempted than to describe in outline the philosophy upon which the schoolmen built, and to indicate the scope of Aristotle's labours. See, further, SCHOLASTICISM.

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Ethica Nicomachea (text), Oxf. 1890; Stewart *Ethica Nicomachea* (commentary), Oxf. 1892; Newman, *Politica*, 2 vols., Lond. 1887; Spengel, *Rhetorica*, 3 vols., Leipz. 1853–6; Cope, *Rhetorica*, 3 vols., Camb. 1877; Butcher, *Poetica*[2], Lond. 1898; Bywater, *Poetica*, Lond. 1898. For Aristotle's philosophy see Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, Eng. tr., Costelloe and Muirhead, 2 vols., Lond. 1897; Gomperz, *Griechische Denker* [Eng. tr., *Greek Thinkers*, Lond. 1901]; Ueberweg's *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie* (Eng. tr., Smith and Schaff), contains, together with a useful summary of Aristotle's system, a very valuable bibliography. The Clarendon Press is now bringing out a series of English translations of Aristotle's writings.

The writer of the present article has occasionally used in it sentences and phrases borrowed from a sketch of the history of Greek philosophy down to Aristotle, which he contributed to the Cambridge *Companion to Greek Studies*.

HENRY JACKSON.

ARK.—In an inquiry into the nature and use of sacred arks, our interest centres chiefly in that which is familiar to us from the OT, the so-called Ark of the Covenant.

This name, which occurs in the Deuteronomistic literature, is not, however, the earliest one, older designations being apparently 'Ark of Jahweh,' 'Ark of God,' and 'Ark of our God.'* But the word 'God' (*'ĕlōhīm*), when used in the genitive, may have two meanings; *i.e.* it may be either possessive or adjectival, in the latter case denoting connexion not so much with the one true God as with the class or order of supernatural beings, the supernatural world. Accordingly the expression 'ark of God' may mean either 'God's ark' or 'ark connected with the supernatural world,' *i.e.* 'sacred ark.' In order to decide which of these two renderings is the correct one, we must inquire what name the writer uses to denote the Deity. If, like the author of Gn 1, he habitually uses the word *'ĕlōhīm*, then the phrase *'ārôn hā-'ĕlōhīm* may mean 'God's ark.' If, however, he habitually uses the name *Jahweh*, the only possible translation of the phrase is 'the sacred ark'; for a Hebrew, unlike an English writer, does not attempt to vary his style by the use of synonyms. In the case of an ark associated with the worship of Jahweh, the mere mention of the name of Jahweh would be sufficient to show the sacred character of the ark, and the simple phrase *'ārôn Jahweh*, *i.e.* 'Jahweh's ark,' would naturally be used.

To this theory the objection may be made that in two passages (1 S 3[3] [and] 4[11]) *'ĕlōhīm* seems to be used as a *possessive* genitive, for an indefinite expression is not to be thought of in 4[11], and would scarcely be natural in 3[3]. But the interchange of *'ĕlōhīm* and *Jahweh* as synonymous names of the Deity is so un-Hebraic that it is scarcely possible to imagine that the text has in these instances come down to us as it left the hands of the original writer. It is noteworthy that the messenger who in 1 S 4[17] tells Eli the events previously recorded in 4[11], says *'ārôn hā-'ĕlōhīm*; it is therefore not impossible that 4[11] is a late addition by a writer to whom *'ĕlōhīm* and *Jahweh* were interchangeable synonyms. Ch. 3 has undergone considerable editorial modification, for neither the dimness of Eli's eyes nor the fact that the lamp had not yet gone out has anything to do with the theophany to Samuel. In any case we are certainly not justified in setting aside a well-marked rule on the strength of these two passages.

What purpose would such an Ark or chest serve? Strange to say, there is no explicit statement on the subject in any very early passage of the OT, the assertion that the Ark was the receptacle of the Tables of Stone being first found in Dt 10. On the one hand, the oldest documents of the Pentateuch, J and E, in describing the Tables of Stone, make no mention of any receptacle for them; and, on the other, the oldest passages outside the Pentateuch which mention the Ark give no hint that it was regarded as a receptacle for a sacred Law, but imply rather that it was regarded as containing the symbol of Jahweh Himself. Thus, to quote Cheyne, 'the Ark was not a symbol of the revealed Law, but the focus of Divine powers.' The formula given in Nu 10[35. 36], and similarly the account of the capture of Jericho, imply that the Ark was regarded as the visible symbol of Jahweh's presence. Still more striking is the narrative of the capture of the Ark by the Philistines. On hearing of its arrival in the camp of Israel, the Philistines exclaim (1 S 4[8]), 'Who shall deliver us out of the hand of these mighty gods?' and the natural interpretation of 1 S 6[3] implies the virtual identification of the ark with Jahweh (cf. 6[14]). Similarly, the language of 2 S 7[2], where David's dwelling in a house of cedar is contrasted with the dwelling of the Ark within curtains, appears more natural if the Ark was regarded as localizing the Deity* than if it merely contained the tables of His Law. It is noteworthy also that David's dances before the Ark is described as performed 'before Jahweh' (2 S 6[14]).

Professor Cheyne (*EBi* i. 302) considers it probable that in the earlier form of the story of the Tables of the Law, as originally given in JE, the shattered tables were not renewed but whether this be so or not, the uncertainty which prevailed as to the code inscribed on the tables (cf. Ex 34 with Dt 5 and Ex 20), coupled with the absence of any mention in JE that the tables were placed in the Ark, or in any other book that they were ever taken out of it, makes it extremely probable that the statement in Dt 10 is merely an inference drawn by the Deuteronomic writer, who supposed, reasonably enough, that, an empty box being meaningless, the sacredness of the Ark must have been due to the sacred character of its contents. In this connexion, since his religion forbade him to think of any idol, the objects which would naturally occur to his mind would be the sacred Stone Tables.

It has been suggested that the Tables of Stone were originally *bætyls*, possibly meteorites, or, according to Professor G. F. Moore (*EBi* col. 2155), more probably 'a stone from the "mount of God," by taking which with them the Israelites were assured of the presence and protection of Jahweh when they wandered away from His holy mountain.' But of such *portable* stones we have no other example in Israel. Moreover, the difference between *tables*—*i.e.* hewn stones—engraved with a code of laws and *fetish stones* is so great that it is difficult to suppose that the latter could be the only basis for the story of the former. A discussion of the original form of the 'Ten Words' would be out of place in the present article; but it is by no means improbable that in early times the Law of Israel was summed up in ten sayings, and that these sayings were inscribed on two tables. The *form* of the sayings varied from time to time, the Decalogue of Ex 34 being superseded by that of Dt 5, and again by that of Ex 20; but the traditional number, ten, was retained. Since even the Decalogue of Ex 34, with its prohibition of idols, cannot be the earliest code, it is at least possible that subsequently to the reforms of Hezekiah, when the tables containing the earliest code were broken up by the iconoclastic zeal of 'Moses,' two fresh tables were hewn like unto the first, whereon was engraved a Decalogue (viz. that which forms the basis of the Law in Ex 34), similar to that which was on the first tables, but amended in harmony with the growing hatred of images.

But since there is nothing in any early document to connect the Ark with the stone tables, and since, when the first passage which does so connect it (Dt 10) was written, the Ark itself had long disappeared, we may safely disregard this comparatively late tradition, and seek in the earlier writings of the OT some indication of the purpose of the Ark.

There is no mention of the Ark in the inventory of Temple furniture carried off by Nebuchadrezzar—an omission which cannot be due to lack of interest in the Ark, as is evident from Jer 3[16]; it seems, therefore, necessary to suppose that it had disappeared before the destruction of the Temple. But, such being the case, we cannot but inquire the cause of its disappearance. It may, indeed, have been carried off in one of the invasions of Jerusalem, such as that of Shishak (1 K 14[25f.]), or of Hazael (2 K 12[17f.]), or of Sennacherib. But, great as are the gaps in the historical records of the OT, it is difficult to account for such an omission. The omission of the account of the destruction of the Temple at Shiloh is not quite parallel; for the editor who incorporated in his book an account of the capture of the Ark may have deemed it unnecessary to describe what, in his eyes, must assuredly have been of less importance, viz. the destruction of the sanctuary which had contained the Ark. At any rate, considering the fairly consistent tradition concerning the Ark in the books of Samuel and Kings down to the time of its deposition in the Temple of Solomon, and the utter absence of any mention of it thereafter till the 7th cent. references in J and E, which seem to imply that the exact nature, at all events, of its contents had been forgotten, we may fairly argue that it had disappeared in the interval, for it is surely unnecessary to assume a 'pious fiction' on the part of the Deuteronomic writer.

The precise description of the Ark given in the Priestly Code is not a proof that any of the sons of Zadok who were carried captive to Babylon had actually seen it. At the same time, there is no difficulty in believing that tradition had preserved a general description of its form, which was eventually idealized in the same manner as the Tabernacle itself and its furniture.

Attention has already been drawn to the fact that the early references to the Ark imply that it contained some symbol of Jahweh, and it is now

* See Cheyne's art. 'Ark of the Covenant' in *EBi* i. 300.

* The phrase יֹשֵׁב הַכְּרוּבִים (*e.g.* 1 S 4[4]) suggests that the Ark was regarded as being in some way the abode or throne of God.

freely admitted that idol images of Jahweh were formerly common in Israel. It is natural, therefore, to regard the Ark as the portable shrine or receptacle of some such image, which upon this supposition must have been deposited by Solomon in the Temple of Jerusalem.* Have we any indication of the existence of such an image? The golden calves are not to be thought of, for there is no evidence that Jahweh was ever worshipped under this form among the Leah tribes; since it must be remembered that the original image at Dan, if it really was in the form of a calf—which is doubtful—was made not by Jonathan the Levite, but by Micah the Ephraimite.

But at Jerusalem there was an image of Jahweh to which sacrifice was offered, viz. the bronze seraph, or, to call it by the name by which it is generally known, the brazen serpent, which in the age of Hezekiah was believed to have been made by Moses (2 K 18[4]; cf. Nu 21[8. 9]), and may therefore be supposed to have been as old as the Ark. It is therefore a not unlikely inference that it was for this image that the Ark was made. It is noteworthy that these are the only two objects, traditionally connected with the worship of Israel in the wilderness, of the existence of which there is any evidence in the period of the Kings.† The traditions which assigned the making of the first golden calf and the brazen serpent to Aaron and Moses respectively are of the utmost importance; for the fact that the essential part of these traditions—viz. that images were made—survived even the iconoclastic commandments shows how deeply rooted must have been the traditions themselves. And if, as will be generally admitted nowadays, the narrative of Nu 21[8. 9] is the attempt of a later age to explain the origin of an object which seemed inconsistent with its iconoclastic law, and if the brazen serpent really was an image coming down from the time of Moses, or at least from the days of the Israelite conquest of Palestine, it is reasonable to suppose that the history of the brazen serpent was identical with the history of the Ark. But if the brazen serpent really existed in such an early period of Israelitish history (and both Nu 21[8. 9] and 2 K 18[4] agree in this respect), it must either have been carried off by the Philistines with the Ark or have been preserved by the priests who fled from Shiloh to Nob.‡ Of the latter alternative there is not the slightest hint; and it would have been strange if David had celebrated so joyfully the recovery of the Ark, and had disregarded an image which to subsequent ages, and presumably to David's own age, was an object of adoration.

If, as seems probable, we are right in concluding that the Ark and the brazen serpent shared the same vicissitudes, or, in other words, that the Ark *contained* the brazen serpent, we are at once able to explain both the existence of the latter in the days of Hezekiah, and the veneration shown to the former in the narratives of Joshua, Samuel, and Kings. And if the iconoclastic zeal of the reforming party in the days of Hezekiah destroyed the brazen serpent, the Ark, if this was the shrine of the serpent, would have shared the same fate.

Objection may perhaps be made to this theory, on the ground, first, that the narrative of Nu 21 implies an image which could not have been contained in the Ark; and, secondly, that it is the Ark itself which is always spoken of as sacred, no reference being made to its contents.

In answer to the first objection, it is sufficient to say that the conventional representation of the brazen serpent as twined about a pole is not necessitated by the language of Nu 21[8. 9], which merely states that, in order that the serpent might be visible, it was placed upon a standard (*nēs*, which is not necessarily a 'pole'; in Ex 17[15] it is used of an altar).

The second objection appears more serious; but when we remember the awe with which serpents in general, and the brazen serpent in particular, were regarded, it is by no means unlikely that men spoke of the Ark because they shrank from mentioning the sacred object within it.

But the question may still be asked, Why should a box have been necessary at all, since there existed a tent in which to keep the idol? In the case of a large image (and the writer of 1 S 19[13ff.] evidently thought of the *teraphim* as being the size of a man), a box would perhaps not have been necessary, though it might have been convenient for carrying the image about in time of war; moreover, the size of the Ark, of which the later tradition gives the dimensions as $2\frac{1}{2} \times 1\frac{1}{2} \times 1\frac{1}{2}$ cubits, would have been unsuitable to such an image. A comparatively small object, however, such as we must suppose the brazen serpent to have been, would certainly have needed some sort of case to preserve it when being carried about. But it is not improbable that the origin of the Ark may be due to another cause. The worship of a brazen serpent doubtless had its origin in the worship of a living serpent, for which some sort of receptacle would, of course, have been necessary. The conservatism of religious ritual would preserve this, even after the substitution of a metal serpent for a live one.

It is not necessary to suppose that a live serpent was reverenced in the time of Moses. The substitution of the metal image for so primitive a god may have taken place long before the age of Moses. There are, however, parallels which seem to point in this direction. Thus, on an amphora in the British Museum (*B. M. Cat.* E 418) there is a representation of the story of Erichthonios, which is reproduced by J. E. Harrison (*Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, 1903, p. 183): 'The sacred chest stands on rude piled stones that represent the rock of the Acropolis, the child rises up with outstretched hand, Athene looks on in dismay and anger, and the bad sisters hurry away. Erichthonios is here a human child with two great snakes for guardians, but what the sisters really found, what the maidens really carried, was a snake and symbols like a snake.' Additional evidence for the same practice of carrying snakes in sacred chests is to be found in the class of coins known as *cistophoroi*, of which a representation is given by J. E. Harrison (*Prolegomena*, p. 400).

For the existence of snake-worship in Palestine, there was, until recently, no evidence apart from the OT. But in 1903 Mr. R. A. Stewart Macalister, in the course of his excavations at the Canaanite 'High Place' of Gezer, came across a circular structure '13 feet 8 inches in diameter at the floor level . . . surrounded by a rude wall now standing to a maximum height of 6 feet.' Within this structure, among a number of broken pieces of pottery, there 'was found a small bronze model of a cobra, rudely but unmistakably portrayed' (see 'Report on the Excavation of Gezer,' *PEFSt*, July 1903, p. 222). Although the discovery at Gezer did not include anything of the nature of an ark, it is not impossible that it may throw light on the *raison d'être* of the *prototype* of the Ark. Mr. Macalister's discussion of the place of the discovery is so suggestive that it may be quoted *in extenso*. 'The structure in which the serpent was found completely puzzled me, but an ingenious suggestion was made by Mr. J. Stogdon, of Harrow, when on a visit to the excavations—namely, that it was possibly a pit for keeping live serpents. The building is as suitable for such a purpose as the pits in which bears and other animals are kept in a modern zoological garden. In such a case the fine broken pottery and the bronze model might be in the nature of votive offerings. We are reminded of the practice of keeping live snakes at certain Greek shrines, notably at the temple of Æsculapius at Epidaurus, where they were in some way instrumental in effecting the miracles of healing there wrought (see Rouse, *Greek Votive Offerings*, pp. 193–205; see also p. 209). It is not inconceivable that among the orgies or rites which were celebrated in the high places of Palestine some form of snake-charming was included, and that the snakes required for the purpose were kept in this enclosure—perhaps specially prepared poisonous serpents with the fangs extracted. The tricks of modern holy men with serpents, which, if I be not mistaken, were described by Mr. Baldensperger in the *Quarterly Statement* some years ago, may be a survival of such rites' (*PEFSt*, July 1903, p. 223).

It is possible, however, that objection may be made to the view here put forth, that the Ark contained the bronze serpent, on the ground that the method of carrying the Ark is at variance

* On the other hand, it is urged by Schwally (*Semit. Kriegsaltertümer*, p. 10) that it is not necessary to suppose that the Ark contained anything.

† The mention of the holy vessels and the tables of stone in 1 K 8[4. 9] is due to the Deuteronomic editor.

‡ The only other alternative is to regard the brazen serpent as a distinctively Judæan idol, which existed in Judah long before David gained possession of the Ark. It is, however, to be noted that the story of the making of the brazen serpent is plausibly assigned to the Ephraimite writer E (see Carpenter and Battersby, *Hexateuch*, vol. ii. p. 222), while the reference to the Ark in Nu 14[44] appears in its original form to belong to J.

with any such supposition. It is a safe inference from 1 S $6^{7ff.}$, 2 S $6^{3ff.}$ that the recognized method of carrying the Ark in early times was in a sacred cart (*i.e.* a cart that had been used for no other purpose) drawn by cows or bulls.* The use of horned cattle might possibly denote that the Ark was in some way connected with lunar worship; in any case, however, they probably imply that the god contained in the Ark was regarded as the god of fertility (see Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, pp. 46, 80).† At first sight it is difficult to suppose that a serpent could ever be regarded as a god of fertility, but whatever the origin of serpent-worship may be—and we need not assume that it has been everywhere identical—there can be little doubt that in some cases, at all events, it is celebrated with a view of ensuring fertility thereby. On this point the statement of the scholiast on the *Hetairæ* of Lucian, quoted by J. E. Harrison (*Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, pp. 121, 122), is very suggestive: *ἀναφέρονται δὲ κάνταῦθα ἄρρητα ἱερὰ ἐκ στέατος τοῦ σίτου κατεσκευασμένα, μιμήματα ὄφεων καὶ ἀνδρῶν σχημάτων.*

But whether the view here advocated that the Ark of Israel originally contained the brazen serpent be correct or not, it is at any rate certain that the Ark was the shrine or feretory of some object which symbolized Jahweh to His worshippers. On this point the evidence which we possess concerning similar arks among other peoples is conclusive (cf. Schwally, *Semit. Kriegsaltertümer*, p. 10). And as the sacred object was certainly not in every case a live serpent, we naturally inquire why it should be placed in a box, and not rather set on a pedestal or throne in a temple. The answer to this question is to be found in the conception of the god which prevails among primitive peoples, in whose minds the fetish or image is so identified with the spirit which is supposed to animate it that the two are indistinguishable. In times of need or danger man requires a god that is near, and not a god that is far off. It is by no means a primitive conception which we find in the dedicatory prayer put into the mouth of Solomon (1 K $8^{44ff.}$), that, if people go out to battle against their enemy, and they pray to their God towards the house which is built to His name, He will make their prayer and supplication heard to the heaven in which He really dwells.* Primitive warriors wanted to have their gods in their midst. Of what use was the Divine Father (see Nu 21^{29}) at home, when his sons were in danger in the field? It was but natural, therefore, that the gods should be carried out wherever their help was needed (2 S 5^{21}; cf. Polyb., VII. ix. 2; Schwally, *op. cit.* p. 9).

Man is slow to give up idolatry. In the course of the ages, indeed, he modifies his primitive conceptions of God; the inanimate fetish gives place to the bestial form, and this again to an anthropomorphic representation, tending more and more towards the spiritual. But the truly spiritual conception of God, enunciated alike by the prophet Jeremiah ($23^{23.\ 24}$) and by our Lord (Jn $4^{21f.\ 24}$), which is incompatible with local presence, seems ever to have been beyond the comprehension of the majority of mankind. Jeremiah's warning (3^{16}) has been disregarded even by those who have called themselves Christians. At any rate, in the minds of many ignorant folk, the place of the gods of heathenism has been taken by the Saints, and the shrines containing relics of these have been venerated as being virtually dwelling-places of divinity. Between the mediæval reliance on the protection afforded by holy relics and the primitive Israelite trust in the Ark, there is but little real difference. In theory the mediæval Christian denied that his shrine contained a god, but his practice too often gave the lie to his theory.

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* The idea that the Ark could legitimately be carried only by hand may have arisen from the fact that it was so carried into Zion (2 S $6^{13ff.}$). There is no mention on that occasion of any priest other than the king himself. The account of the carrying of the Ark in the Book of Joshua belongs to a later development of the religion of Israel.

† A moon god and a god of fertility are not, however, incompatible conceptions (see Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, p. 297 ff. and cf. Dt 33^{14}).

ARMENIA.

ARMENIA (Vannic).—The present article deals with Proto-Armenian religion as revealed in the Vannic or 'Khaldian' cuneiform inscriptions. The Indo-European Armenians, who are described by Herodotus (vii. 73) and Eudoxus (*ap.* Steph. Byz. *s.v.* 'Αρμενία) as immigrants from Phrygia, did not become masters of the Armenian highlands till the close of the 7th cent. B.C. Kretschmer (*Einleit. in die Gesch. der griech. Sprache*, pp. 209–11) brings them from Ormenion in Thessaly by way of Armenê, near Sinôpê (cf. Hirt, *Die Indogermanen*, 136; Prášek, *Gesch. der Meder und Perser*, i. 147). The name Armenia (Old Pers. *Armina*, New Sus. *Arminiya*) is first met with in the Bab. and Pers. cuneiform inscriptions of the Achæmenian age, and may be connected with the Vannic *armani*, 'written tablet.' The country had been previously known to its southern neighbours as *Urarṭu* (Heb. *Ararat*), which the Babylonian scribes explained as a compound of *Ura-Urṭu* or 'Highlands.' *Urṭu* is the name of the district near Lake Erivan in a Vannic inscription of Sarduris II. (Sayce, lxxxii. 6), though in the bilingual inscription of Topzawa *Urarṭu* is the Assyr. representative of the Vannic *Lulus*. The usual title assumed by the Vannic princes was 'king of Biainas' or 'Bianas,' the district in which their capital Ṭuspas (Tosp), the modern Van, was situated. Biainas is the Buana of Ptolemy (v. 13), now Van.

The Vannic inscriptions, which extend from about B.C. 840 to 640, are written in the cuneiform characters of Nineveh, but in a language which is neither Indo-European nor Semitic, and is believed by some scholars to be related to Georgian. It seems to have been spoken over the larger part of the later Armenia, and to have been connected with that of Mitanni in Northern Mesopotamia. Like the language, the religion of the Vannic population was peculiar, and is difficult to correlate with that of any other people.

At the head of the pantheon was Khaldis, whose children the Vannic kings and people regarded themselves as being in a special sense. Hence they called themselves 'the Khaldians,' a name also applied to the numerous local deities who were 'children of Khaldis.' But though Khaldis was the national god, he could be localized like the Semitic Baal, and we hear of a 'Khaldis of the north (?)' and a 'Khaldis of the south (?),' while a dedication is sometimes addressed to 'all the Khaldis-gods.' Along with two other divinities, Teisbas the Air-god (Assyr. Hadad-Ramman) and Ardinis the Sun-god, Khaldis was the member of a triad which occupied the supreme place in the

* The phrase לִשְׁמֹעַ הַשָּׁמַיִם אֶת־תְּפִלָּתָם וְגו׳ has long been a crux to grammarians. We venture to emend the passage by pointing לִשְׁמֹעַ (as *Pi'el*), and understand הַשָּׁמַיִם as the accusative of direction (*cf.* v. 30). The writer believes, like the prophet of Is 66^{1}, that 'heaven is God's throne,' but trusts that the prayers offered at the earthly sanctuary will be, as it were, made audible by the Lord at His heavenly throne. The quaintness of the expression is due to the writer's attempt to combine the phraseology of more primitive religion with his own spiritual faith.

Vannic divine hierarchy, and the conception of which may have been borrowed from Babylonia. Below the triad came the multitudinous deities of inferior rank, including even the 'Khaldis-gods,' or local forms of Khaldis. A long list of these, with the offerings to be made to them, is engraved on a rock called Meher Kapussi, two miles east of Van (Sayce, v.). Among them is Selardis the Moon-god, as well as the gods of various cities and countries incorporated into the Vannic kingdom by conquest or otherwise. Most of these deities were merely deified States, and consequently had no individual names of their own; it was only when they were within the limits of the district originally inhabited by the tribe whose supreme god was Khaldis that they properly became forms of the national god, and could be called 'Khaldians.' As the Vannic kingdom extended, however, and the idea of a common nationality grew stronger, the deified State, even if originally outside 'the land of Khaldis,' tended to pass into a Khaldis; thus the deity called at Meher Kapussi 'the god of the city of Ardinis' (the Muzazir of the Assyrians), became, a century later, in the time of Sargon, himself a 'Khaldis.' Only one goddess is mentioned in the inscriptions, and since her name, Saris, seems to have been borrowed from the Assyrian Ištar, it is possible that she was of foreign origin. The later (Armenian) legends which bring Semiramis into the plain of Van are possibly an echo of the fact.

How far Vannic religion, as it comes before us in the inscriptions, may have been influenced by Assyria or Babylonia it is impossible to say. Teisbas, however, who was afterwards united into a triad with Khaldis and the Sun-god, appears originally to have been the god of a tribe or nationality which was distinct from that of the Vannic 'Khaldians,' while among the neighbouring Hittites each city had its Sun-god, who was identified with the deified State. The conception of gods in the Assyro-Babylonian sense may have been due primarily to contact with the cultured lands of the south, like the titles 'lord of multitudes' and 'faithful shepherd of mankind' given to Khaldis. At all events, underneath the divine hierarchy of the official cult we find clear traces of an earlier phase of belief, in which the material fetish takes the place of the god. Sacrifices were made not only to Khaldis and his brother deities, but also to 'the gate of the land of Khaldis,' 'the gate of Teisbas in the city of Eridias,' 'the gate of the Sun-god in the city of Uisis'—all of which are carefully distinguished from 'the Khaldis-gods of the door' or 'the Khaldis-gods of the chapel'—as well as to 'the shields of the land of Khaldis,' and even to 'the foot-soldiers of the land of Khaldis' and 'the foot-soldiers of Teisbas' (Sayce, v. 13). These foot-soldiers were the temple-guards, armed priests, and attendants, who were called Seluians, Urbikans, etc. A prominent object of veneration was the vine, the sacred tree of the Vannic people, which was sometimes planted by the side of the temple of Khaldis (*ib.* v. 30, 31, lxxxvi. 10), sometimes in a sacred enclosure of its own. Sar-duris II., in one of his inscriptions (*ib.* li.), describes his endowment of one of these vines, which he had consecrated and named after himself on the north shore of the lake of Van. The vine was often planted in the middle of a garden which was attached to the temple. Spears and shields, specimens of which from Toprak Kaleh are now in the British Museum, were hung up on either side of the entrance to the temple, large basins of bronze or terra-cotta, on stands, being placed in front of the shrine for the purpose of ablution.

The endowments made to the temples usually took the form of provision for the sacrifices and offerings, which were numerous and plentiful. The great inscription of Meher Kapussi gives a long list of the sacrifices to be offered to each deity and sacred object recognized in the vicinity, on every day of the month. Thus 6 lambs were to be offered to the Vannic triad, 17 oxen and 34 sheep to Khaldis, 6 oxen and 12 sheep to Teisbas, 4 oxen and 8 sheep to the Sun-god, 1 ox and 2 sheep to the gate of the land of Khaldis, 2 oxen and 4 sheep to the foot-soldiers of the land of Khaldis. Libations of wine were also to be poured out, the wine being made, it would seem, from the fruit of the consecrated vines. Comparatively few, however, of the vast herds of oxen and sheep presented to the gods could actually have been offered in sacrifice; according to the inscription of Kelishin (Sayce, lvi.), when 'the gate of the land of Khaldis' was dedicated to Khaldis, 112 oxen, 9020 sucklings and lambs, and 12,490 sheep were presented to the god. Most of these must have been intended to serve as a source of income. Similarly the prisoners who were devoted to Khaldis would have been given as temple slaves. In the case of victory, the share of the god, we are told, was a sixtieth of the spoil (*ib.* xliii. 16). The temples, of which there were several varieties, probably possessed festival halls, since we hear of sacred feasts in honour of the gods.

LITERATURE.—Sayce, 'The Cuneiform Inscriptions of Van Deciphered and Translated,' in *JRAS*, 1882, 1888, 1893, 1894, 1901, 1906; C. F. Lehmann, *SBAW* xxix., 1900; Belck and Messerschmidt, *Anatole*, i., 1904. For the history of the kingdom of Ararat and the Khaldi see Prášek, *Gesch. der Meder und Perser* (Gotha, 1906), 54.

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ARMENIA (Zoroastrian).—The sources of our information for the earlier epoch of Armenia's religious history are the Urartic or Vannic inscriptions (see preceding art.). For the Indo-Germanic period down to Christian times the most important native sources are Agathangelos (5th cent., ed. Venice, 1862), Moses of Chorene's *History and Geography of Armenia* (5th cent., ed. Venice, 1865), Faustus of Byzantium (5th cent., ed. Venice, 1889), Eznik (5th cent., ed. Venice, 1826), Anania Shiragaci, (7th cent., ed. Patkanean, St. Petersburg, 1877), and (for names) the ancient Armenian version of the OT. We also gather short but valuable notices from Xenophon's *Anabasis*, Strabo's *Geography*, and the works of Dio Cassius, Pliny, and Tacitus. Considerable as the material is, it is but incidental to the main purpose of these ancient authors, and is, therefore, very fragmentary. We may, however, hope for important additions to our knowledge of Zoroastrianism in early Armenia from the critical study of Armenian folk-lore and popular superstitions, when enough shall have been collected for the purpose.

Originally there was nothing in common between the Iranian races and the ancient inhabitants of Armenia, who were probably connected with the Hittites in the West and the Caucasic races of the North (Jensen, *Hittiter und Armenier*, Strassburg, 1898; Messerschmidt, *Die Hittiter*[2], Leipzig, 1902, p. 10; Winckler, 'Westasien' in Helmolt's *Weltgeschichte*, Leipzig, 1901, iii. 125 ff.; Hommel, *Grundriss der Geog. und Gesch. des alten Orients*, Munich, 1904, pp. 37 ff.; Prášek, *Gesch. der Meder und Perser*, Gotha, 1906, i. 57, 65). But Armenia, owing to its geographical position, was destined to come into contact with Iranian politics and civilization when the Medes began their political career. Towards the end of the 7th cent. B.C. the Vannic, or Khaldian, kingdom (see preceding art.) fell before the invading hordes of Cimmerians and Scythians, and during this period of anarchy the Armenians seem also to have entered the country which was henceforth to bear their name (Hirt, *Die Indogermanen*, Strassburg, 1905–07, p. 138). Meanwhile the Medes had begun

their national career not long before 935 B.C. (Justi, 'Gesch. Irans' in Geiger-Kuhn's *Grundriss der iran. Philologie*, Strassburg, 1904, ii. 404–406), and the Median empire had been founded, probably in 678–677 B.C. (Prášek, *op. cit.* i. 108). From that time Iranian influence was strongly felt in the politics, language, and social organization of Armenia, and the Iranian religion, with its terminology, names of divinities, and many folk-beliefs, permeated Armenian paganism. How far the resultant religion may be treated as Zoroastrianism will become clear from a more detailed study of the material available, which may most conveniently be arranged under the main rubrics of Zoroastrian theology.

I. *CELESTIAL HOSTS.*—1. **Ahura Mazda.**—The chief deity of ancient Armenia was Aramazd, the Zoroastrian Ahura Mazda (see ORMAZD). In Agathangelos, the historian of the conversion of Armenia, King Tiridates calls him 'the maker of heaven and earth; father of all the gods, especially of Anahit, Mihr, and Nanē; giver of abundance and fatness' (Agathangelos, pp. 58, 61, 106, 590, 591, 593); while Moses of Chorene incidentally remarks: 'There is no such thing as Aramazd; but among those who would be Aramazd, there are four who bear the name, and one of them is Kund Aramazd' (*Hist. of Armenia*, i. 31). It is uncertain whether this refers to the Greek Zeus or to the Iranian Ahura Mazda. In the first case it might mean 'the bald (φαλακρός) Zeus'; in the second, *kund* might be translated 'brave,' 'strong' (Stepanē's modern Armenian translation of Moses of Chorene, p. 395). In fact, 'great' and 'brave,' or 'strong,' are frequent epithets of the Armenian Ahura Mazda (Agathangelos, pp. 52, 61, 106).* The name *Aramazd* reminds us of the *Auramazdā* of the Old Pers. inscriptions, rather than of the Avesta or Pahlavi forms *Ahura Mazda* or *Aūharmazd*, *Ohrmazd* (cf. Armen. *Ormizd*). There is another important passage in Agathangelos (p. 623) about Aramazd, which may be tentatively translated thus: 'In the season of the god of the New Year, (who is) the bringer of new fruits, of the festivities of the hospitable god.'

The later Greek translation reads: καὶ τὰ μνημόσυνα τῶν ἐνεχθέντων ἔταξεν εἰς τὴν μεγάλην πανήγυριν τῆς λεγομένης Διασωμπῆς, τῆς ματαίως εἰς τιμὴν τῶν παλαιῶν σεβασμάτων γενομένης ἀπὸ τῶν καιρῶν τῶν νέων εἰς τὰς ἀπαρχὰς τῶν καρπῶν, ξενοδόκτων θεῶν λεγομένης τῆς πανηγύρεως, ἣν ἐπιτελοῦσιν ἐν τῷ τόπῳ ἐκείνῳ εὐφραντικῶς ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων καιρῶν ἐν ἡμέρᾳ τῆς πληρώσεως τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ, 'And he ordered the commemoration of the (saints) brought in on the great feast of the so-called Diapompe, which was vainly held in honour of the ancient gods from the new seasons unto the first fruits, this being the festival called that of the hospitable gods [mistranslation of *dik'*, 'god'], which they joyfully celebrate in that place from olden times, on the last day of the year.'

This translation shows that the Gr. supposes a different, but none the less obscure, Armen. recension. The text must have become corrupt in early times, and yet St. Clair-Tisdall (*Conversion of Armenia to the Christian Faith*, London, 1896, p. 50) sees in it a new deity Amenabel, who had for a title Amanor ('New Year'). Others recognized Vanatur, 'hospitable,' as a separate deity, and explained it as 'deus hospitalis' (Gelzer, *Zur Armen. Götterlehre*,† pp. 133, 146) or 'Lord of Van' (Hommel, *op. cit.* p. 39). Moses of Chorene, however, in his allusion to this festival (ii. 66), treats *Amanor* simply as a common noun; nor does anything in the text of Agathangelos as it stands, either here or elsewhere, make it necessary to take either Amanor or Amenabel as the name of a deity. As for Vanatur, the only other time we find it mentioned (Armen. tr. of 2 Mac 6^2 LXX, Διὸς Ξενίου, Vulg. *Iovis hospitalis*), it is used as an adjective qualifying Aramazd. We can, therefore, fairly infer that it is simply the Greek Ζεὺς Ξένιος (see also Alishan, *Ancient Faith of the Armenians*, Venice, 1895, p. 256), whose functions were transferred to Aramazd under the Hellenizing influence of the Seljuks, or of Tigranes the Great and his successors. Very probably the festival of Amanor or Navasard, which is poetically described as a *fête champêtre* (Grigor Magistros), was celebrated in honour of Aramazd, who was the lord of the New Year, quite as the six days' celebration of the Zoroastrian New Year began on the day Aūharmazd of the month Fravartīn in honour of the creation of the world in six days by Ahura Mazda (Mar. 15; cf. al-Bīrūnī, *op. cit.* pp. 199–204). Navasard fell, according to the later calendar of pagan Armenia, in August, when the new fruits began to be gathered; and the Armenians still perpetuate the memory of this early autumn celebration by distributing and eating fruits on New Year's day.

The most prominent sanctuaries of Aramazd were in the ancient city of Ani in Daranali, the burial-place of the Armenian kings (Agathangelos, p. 590), as well as in the village of Bagavan in Bagravand (*ib.* p. 612), and on Mount Palat or Pashat ('The coming of the Rhipsimean Virgins' in Alishan's *Hayapatum*, Venice, 1901–02, p. 79).

It is not easy to determine what the Armenians understood by the fatherhood of Aramazd, as no goddess is mentioned as his consort, not even Spandaramet. It is through sheer ignorance that a late martyrology (quoted by Alishan, *Ancient Faith*, p. 260) calls Anahit the wife of Aramazd, she being rather his daughter (see below). The fatherhood of Ahura Mazda, however, is not altogether foreign even to the Avesta, which represents him as both the father and the husband of Spenta Armaiti (*Yasna* xlv. 4, xxxiv. 10; *Yasht* xvii. 16), as well as the husband of other female divinities (according to the Pahlavi commentary on *Vendīdād* xi. 5, of the Fravashis; cf. also *Yasna* xxxviii. 1; *Visparad* iii. 4), and the parent of Asha Vahishta (*Yasna* xlvii. 2), Sraosha, Rashnu, Mithra Ashi (*Yasht* xvii. 16), Atarsh (*Yasna* xxxvi. 3, etc.), Haoma (*Yasna* xi. 2), and, indeed, of all the Amesha Spentas (*Yasht* xvii. 2). On the whole, one may affirm that the Armenian Aramazd agrees quite well, in the little that we know about him, with the Avesta Ahura Mazda. In the Armenian of the 5th cent. *Ormizd*, the variant form of Aramazd, generally refers to the later form of the Zoroastrian Ahura Mazda; but the adjective *Ormzdakan*, 'Ormazdian,' may also have been used in reference to the Armenian Aramazd and the Greek Zeus.

2. Amesha Spentas.—Of these Zoroastrian archangels (see art. AMESHA SPENTAS), only Spenta Armaiti is unmistakably present in the Armenian pantheon. Her name appears in two forms, *Spandaramet* and *Sandaramet*, with a difference of meaning, the latter term denoting 'abyss,' 'Hades' (cf. Hübschmann, *Armen. Gram.*, Strassburg, 1897, i. 73–74); but *Spandaramet* never occurs in the abstract theological meaning that the Avesta attached to the Indo-Iranian spirit of the earth and the keeper of vineyards (cf. the Pahlavi *Shāyast-lā-Shāyast*, xv. 5; Gray, *ARW* vii. 364–371). It is owing to this latter function of Spenta Armaiti, however, that the Armenian Christian writers of the 5th cent. used her name to translate Διόνυσος in 2 Mac 6^7, although, by a strange inconsistency, they translated the same name by *Ormzdakan gad*, 'Ormazdian,' in 2 Mac 14^{33} and 3 Mac 2^{29}. *Spandaramet* in the form of *Sandaramet*, as already noted, came to be a synonym of Hades, and was very frequently referred to in theological books and in the Church

* Cf. such common Avesta epithets of Ahura Mazda as *mazišta* ('most great'), *sevišta* ('most mighty'); *e.g. Yasna* xvi. 1.

† *Berichte der. königl. sächs. gesellsch. der Wissensch. phil.-hist. Classe*, 1896, pp. 99–148.

hymnary. This sense is not altogether foreign to the Avesta itself, where, from being the genius of the earth, Spenta Armaiti gradually becomes the earth itself, with the dark, woeful under world. 'The darkness of Spenta Armaiti' (*Vendīdād* iii. 35) is a well-known expression of the Avesta, which has this in common with the Bab. cosmology, that the earth is also identical with the Hades which it contains, and that the powers of Hades have something to do with the fertility of the ground and with agriculture (Jeremias, *Hölle und Paradies bei den Babyloniern*, Leipzig, 1900, p. 19; for references to Spandaramet see Lagarde's *Purim*, Göttingen, 1887, p. 42).

Besides Spandaramet, we probably see the traces of the Amesha Spentas Haurvatāt and Ameretāt ('health' and 'immortality') in the Armenian *haurotmaurot*, the name of a flower (*hyacinthus racemosus Dodonei*), first mentioned by Agathangelos, p. 480 (cf. Abeghian, *Armen. Volksglaube*, pp. 62–63).

In the Qur'ān, ii. 96, Hārūt and Mārūt are mentioned as the names of two angels in Babel, who, according to Muslim tradition, having shown themselves impatient with human sinfulness, were sent down to earth by God to assume human flesh and to live in human circumstances. They could not, however, resist the temptations of lust, and were condemned to stay on earth, where they thereafter taught witchcraft. In the Arabic story of Bulūqyā, incorporated with the story of Ḥasīb Karīm-ad-Dīn in the *Arabian Nights* (tr. Payne, v. 72–73; cf. Horovitz in *ZDMG* lv. 523), Ḥillīt and Mīlīt, or, in Tha'labī's *Qiṣaṣ al-Anbiyā*, Jiblīt and Timlīt, are mentioned as the first inhabitants of hell. Burton and Eb. Nestle (*ZDMG* lv. 692) identify these with Hārūt and Mārūt, which have long been recognized as the Pahlavi Horvadaṭ (or Khūrdāṭ) and Amerōdaṭ (or Amūrdaṭ), or the Avesta Haurvatāt and Ameretāt. The Muhammadan legend in regard to these fallen angels has many parallels in Rabbinical literature, and the whole is, ultimately, a Rabbinical elaboration of the intermarriage of the sons of God and the daughters of men (Gn 6[4]; cf. Geiger, *Was hat Mohammed aus dem Judenthume aufgenommen?* Bonn, 1834, pp. 105–106; Hirsch in *JE* v. 333). How the Zoroastrian archangels were drawn into this Rabbinical legend of the Qur'ān, and by what curious accident, instead of the later Pahlavi forms, we have *Hārūt* and *Mārūt*, which find their parallel only in the Armenian name of a flower, is very problematical. Either *Hārūt* and *Mārūt* are Parthian, or even Syrian, corruptions of the archangels' names, and found their way both to Armenia and Arabia, or they are purely Armenian forms, and reached Muhammad from the north. At all events, Hārūt and Mārūt were not remembered in Armenia as angels. We know, on the other hand, that the two Zoroastrian archangels in question were protectors of the vegetable world (Darmesteter, *Haurvatāt et Ameretāt*, Paris, 1875, *passim*), and two flowers were respectively consecrated to them—the lily and the *camba* (*Bundahishn*, xxvii. 24; perhaps the *Michelia Champaca*, or Champak); so that Haurvatāt and Ameretāt may once have been known in Armenia as tutelary deities of plants.

According to Strabo (p. 512), Omanos (Vohu Manah) and Anadatus (Ameretāt), with Anaïtis (Anāhita) as a chief deity, formed a triad in Zela—a cult which has not yet entirely disappeared (Gelzer, *ZA*, 1875, 14 ff.). This peculiar cult, however, had probably spread northward from Cappadocia, where there was a purer type of Mazdaism than in Armenia (Cumont, *Les mystères de Mithra*[2], Brussels, 1902, ch. i.).

3. Yazatas.—The Zoroastrian *yazatas*, or angels, are better represented in the Armenian religion than the Amesha Spentas. We shall discuss them in the order adopted by Jackson in *Grundriss der iran. Philologie*, ii. 640–645.

(1) *Atar, or fire.*—We cannot tell whether fire-worship was a part of the ancient cult of the Urartian period, or was first introduced in Iranian times. Moses of Chorene (ii. 77) mentions a fire-altar in Bagavan, upon which Ardashir, after the conquest of Armenia,* commanded that the fire of Ormazd be kept unquenched. Anania Shiragaçi, in his discourse on the Cross, speaks of a *hurbak* in Armenia, which Hübschmann (*Armen. Gram.* i. 181) rightly interprets as a loan-word from the Pahlavi *frōbāg* (Avesta **hvarenō-baya*, '[fire of] divine glory'), a fire established, according to Iranian tradition, in Chorasmia, and later removed to Kabul (*Bundahishn*, xvii. 5–6). In the hagiography called the 'Coming of the Rhipsimean Virgins' (Alishan, *Hayapatum*, p. 79), wrongly ascribed to Moses of Chorene, we read that on the top of Mount Paλat (?) there was a house of Aramazd and Astλik (Venus), and on a lower peak, to the south-east, there was 'a house of fire, of insatiable fire, the god of incessant combustion.' At the foot of the mountain, moreover, there was a mighty spring. The place was called Buth. 'They burnt the Sister Fire and the Brother Spring.* In the caves of the rocks dwelt two dragons, devilish and black, to which young men and young virgins were sacrificed. And the devils, gladdened by this bloodshed, produced, by means of the altars of the fire and the spring (?), terrible sights, lights, and rolling thunder; and the deep valley was full of snakes and scorpions.' Elsewhere we read: 'Because they called the fire sister, and the spring brother, they did not throw the ashes away, but they wiped them with the tears of the brother' ('Story of the Picture of the Holy Virgin' in Moses of Chorene, *Works*, ed. Venice, 1865).

This form of fire-worship in a volcanic region has hardly anything in common with Zoroastrianism, though we have a true remnant of fire-worship, even in modern times, in the annual bonfire kindled everywhere by Armenians on the festival of Candlemas, or the Purification of the Blessed Virgin Mary (Feb. 13=2), when the fire is kindled from a candle on the altar. It is an occasion of rejoicing and good augury. The festival is called in popular language *Tērntaz*, and in the Church calendar the commemoration is called *Teaṙnedaṙaj*, 'Presentation of the Lord' (Abeghian, *op. cit.* p. 72).

It seems that the ashes of the sacred fire were also honoured, and the Christian writers love to remind their readers of the times when their ancestors were ash-worshippers (Agathangelos, p. 77; Anania Shiragaçi, *Praise of the Cross*, quoted by Alishan, *op. cit.* p. 45 ff.); while Thomas Artsruni applies this name to the Zoroastrians (*Hist.* i. 9–10). Nevertheless, vestiges of ancient fire-worship are still to be found among the Armenians of the interior (Abeghian, *op. cit.* pp. 66–74).

It is quite possible that two types of fire-worship existed among the Armenians—one, older and more primitive, in which fire was a feminine principle, and stood in close association with water, as a masculine principle; the other type similar to the Zoroastrian.

(2) *Water.*—Water was honoured in Armenia as a masculine principle. Many rivers and springs were sacred, and endowed with beneficent virtues. According to Tacitus (*Annals*, vi. 37), the Armenians offered horses as sacrifices to the Euphrates, and divined by its waves and foam. Sacred cities were built around the river Araxes and its tributaries. Even now there are many sacred springs with healing power, and the people always feel a certain veneration towards water in motion.

Transfiguration Sunday in the Armenian Church was amalgamated with an unmistakably pagan water-festival, during which the people amused themselves, as they still do, with throwing water at each other. A similar custom connected with New Year's Day is reported of the Persians (Alishan, *op. cit.* p. 305; al-Bīrūnī, *Chronology*, pp. 199, 203). The Armenian water-day, or feast of the Transfiguration, is called *vardavaṙ*, or 'rose-festival' (from *vard*, 'rose'). It falls in the last days of the year, according to the ancient Armenian calendar (Alishan, *op. cit.* pp. 283, 305).

* Shapur, not Ardashir, actually took possession of Armenia about A.D. 250.

* On water and fire as brother and sister see Abeghian, *op. cit.* p. 67. Lazar of Pharpe says (ed. Venice, p. 203): 'They took the (sacred) brazier and dashed it into the water, as into the bosom of its brother, according to the saying of the false teachers of the Persians.'

The great Zoroastrian water-*yazatas*, however, do not seem to be connected with water-worship in Armenia, even when they have a place in the Armenian pantheon. Of these *yazatas* we perhaps recognize Apām Napāt in the name of *Npat*, the Νιφάτης of Strabo, a sacred mountain of Bagravand, Npat being also the designation of the 26th day of the Armenian month, which was consecrated to the mountain.

(3) *Anahit.*—This goddess, doubtless an importation from Persia, was the most popular deity of Armenia. In Agathangelos she is called 'the great lady [queen] Anahit, the glory and life-giver of our nation' (p. 51) 'through whom the country of the Armenians exists and has life' (p. 61), and she is 'the mother of sobriety, the benefactress of all mankind, and a daughter of Aramazd' (p. 52). She is invoked, in an edict of Tiridates, to protect and watch over the country (p. 106). She was also called the golden mother (p. 607), and statues of massive gold were consecrated to her (pp. 591, 607), one of which (at Erēz ?) was captured by the soldiers of Antony (Pliny, *HN* xxx. 24). With this may be compared the description of Ardvī Sūra Anāhita in the Avesta (especially *Yasht* v. 64, 78, 101–102, 123, 126–129), 'who purifyeth the seed of all males; who purifyeth the wombs of all females for birth; who maketh all females bear with ease; who giveth all females meet (and) timely milk' (*Yasna* lxv. 2 = *Yasht* v. 2), besides multiplying herds and lands (*Yasht* v. 1.). Although the Iranian texts nowhere consider her the daughter of Ahura Mazda, she is 'his only water' (*Yasht* v. 5); and the epithet 'golden' of Agathangelos is paralleled by her Avesta attributes, 'laced with gold' (*Yasht* v. 64), 'wearing a golden kerchief' (*ib.* 123), 'with square golden earrings' (*ib.* 127), and 'with a golden diadem' (*ib.* 128; for further details, cf. Windischmann, *Die pers. Anâhita oder Anaïtis*, Munich, 1856). While the sacrifices offered to Anāhita as described in the Avesta (*e.g. Yasht* v. 15, 21) are quite conventional, the Armenians offered her green branches and white heifers (Agathangelos, p. 49). Lucullus (Plutarch, *Lives*) saw in Yashtishat (?) herds of these heifers, which were used only for sacrifices, at all other times 'wandering up and down undisturbed, with the mark of the goddess, a torch, branded on them.' Anahit was sought also in cases of great sickness (Moses of Chorene, ii. 60).

Three elements are to be distinguished in the Avesta Anāhita. She is a planet (Venus), a goddess of the fertilizing waters, and a female deity presiding over the birth and nursing of children, and the increase and maintenance of all things. The Armenian Anahit is pre-eminently a goddess, with no reference to a planet or water. The fact that in Erēz this goddess admitted of obscene forms of worship, such as are generally associated with the orgiastic nature-cults of Asia Minor, must be explained by the proximity of Akilisene to Asia Minor, as well as by the part which the Avesta Anāhita plays in human conception. Strabo says of this special cult (p. 532):

'Both the Medes and the Armenians honour all the sacred matters of the Persians; but above everything the Armenians honour Anahit, to whom they erect temples in other places, and specially in Akilisene [Ekeaeaç]. There they consecrate to her servants, male and female,* and this is not surprising; but the most illustrious men of the nation give to her their virgin daughters, who, according to custom, give themselves up to fornication for a long time near the goddess, after which they are given in marriage, and none thinks it unworthy to live with them.'

We have absolutely no proof, however, that this sacred prostitution was characteristic of the Armenian Anahit throughout the country, especially as native Christian writers do not mention it, although they might have used it to great advantage in their attacks upon the old religion.

Besides the great sanctuary in Akilisene, which was also called the Anahitian district (Dio Cassius, xxxvi. 38), Anahit had temples in Artashat (Artaxata) (Agathangelos, p. 584) and in Yashtishat (p. 606); while a mountain, now difficult to identify, was called the throne of Nahat (Faustus of Byzantium, v. 25), probably owing to the presence of a great sanctuary of the goddess there.

An image of Anahit is said to have existed in the district of the Anzavatzis near the 'Stone of the Blacksmiths,' where, as in Buth, there was a mixed worship of fire and water, along with magical practices (Alishan, *Hayapatum*, p. 50).

The great festival of Anahit was celebrated, according to Alishan (*Ancient Faith*, p. 269), on the 15th of Navasard with processions and rejoicings. The 19th day of every month was also consecrated to her (Tcherpet, 1820, quoted by Alishan, *Ancient Faith*, p. 143).

(4) *Sun and moon.*—Moses of Chorene makes repeated allusions to the worship of the sun and moon in Armenia. In oaths the name of the sun was almost invariably invoked (ii. 19), and there were also altars and images of the sun and moon (ii. 77). Of what type these images were, and how far they were influenced by Syrian sun-worship, we cannot tell. Agathangelos, in the alleged letter of Diocletian to Tiridates, unconsciously bears witness to the Armenian veneration for the sun, moon, and stars (p. 125). But the oldest witness is Xenophon, who notes that the Armenians sacrificed horses to the sun (*Anabasis*, iv. 5. 35; Weber in his *Dis kathol. Kirche in Armenien*, Freiburg, 1903, p. 28, understands this ἥλιος as Mithra). The eighth month of the Armenian year and, what is more significant, the first day of every month, were consecrated to the sun and bore its name, while the first day of the Persian month was assigned to Ahuramazda, the eleventh day being given to the sun in the Zoroastrian calendar. The twenty-fourth day of the Armenian month was consecrated to the moon, as was the twelfth in the Avesta system. The Armenians, like the Persians and most of the sun-worshipping peoples of the East, prayed towards the rising sun, a custom which the early Church unconsciously adopted, so that to this day the Armenian churches are built and the Armenian dead are buried toward the east, the west being the abode of the devil (see below). As to the moon, Anania Shiragaçi says in his *Demonstrations* (ed. Patkanean, p. 66): 'The first fathers called her the nurse of the plants,' an idea which has its parallel, and probably its source, in the short *Māh-yasht* of the Avesta, particularly in that vegetation grows best in the time of the waxing moon (*Yasht* vii. 4; al-Bīrūnī, *Chronology*, p. 219). Ohan Mantaguni (5th cent.) combats the general belief that the moon prospers or mars the plants (*Discourses*, Venice, 1860, pp. 198–199). The Armenians also shared the superstitions about the eclipse of the sun and moon current among the Persians, who held that these phenomena were caused by two dark bodies,* offspring of the primeval ox, revolving below the sun and moon, and occasionally passing between them and the earth (*Dāṭistān-ī-Dēnīg*, lxix. 2; *Shikand gūmānīg Vijār*, iv. 46). It was, moreover, a popular belief that a sorcerer could bring the sun or moon down from heaven by witchcraft (Eznik, *Refutation of Sects*, p. 217), though this does not find a parallel in the extant Zoroastrian writings.

No doubt the Persian worship of the sun and moon found a similar worship of long standing in Armenia, that of the Urarṭians (see preceding

* Cf. the male and female temple-prostitutes of the ancient Semites, adopted by the Cappadocians as well as by the Armenians.

* The modern Armenians still speak of an 'evil star' which causes the eclipses.

art.), and could do little more than influence it to a certain extent.

It has been suggested, with some plausibility, that the famous hymn to Vahagn, quoted by Moses of Chorene (i. 31), sounds like a sun-hymn:

'The heavens travailed; the earth travailed;
Also the purple sea travailed;
And in the sea
The red reed travailed.
From the stem of the reed there arose a smoke;
From the stem of the reed there arose a flame;
From the flame ran forth a young man.
He had fiery hair;
He had a beard of flame;
And his eyes were suns.'

Both sun- and moon-worship have left deep traces in the popular beliefs of the present Armenians (see Abeghian, *op. cit.* pp. 41–49; Tchéraz, 'Notes sur la mythologie Arménienne,' in *Transact. of 9th Internat. Congress of Orientalists*, London, 1893, ii. 823 ff.).

In the Armen. writers from the 11th to the 14th cent. we meet with a sect or tribe called 'the Sons of the Sun,' first mentioned by Grigor Magistros (11th cent.), who says, placing them between the Armenian Paulicians and Thondracians: 'Behold, some of the Persian Magi of the Mage Zoroaster and the sun-worshippers envenomed of them, called Sons of the Sun, many of whom live in Mesopotamia, call themselves Christians, but we knew how viciously and abominably they conduct themselves.' When, however, David, son of Alauk, says, a little later: 'The Paulicians or Euchites are the tribe of the Sons of the Sun,' he is evidently confusing three distinct things. From the letter of Nerses Shnorhali (12th cent.) about the 'Sons of the Sun' we learn that they wished to be received into the flock of Christ, so that, in his opinion, they were Armenians both in language and in nationality, who had remained unconverted in the times of Gregory the Illuminator, but now abjured their errors and their evil ways. Nerses gives special instruction about their reception into the Christian Church, about their moral life, and about giving up their magical practices, especially among women. 'Teach them to abstain,' he writes, 'from mixing impure things in the food and drink of the Christians for the purposes of their own diabolical love.' Nerses also mentions their worship of the sun and their reverence for the poplar. Later the Catholicos Mkhit'ar, in a letter to the pope, says: 'At that time (middle of the 14th cent.) there were Sons of the Sun in Manazkert'; and in the same century, Mkhit'ar Aparaneçi writes: 'There are some Armenians by birth and language who worship the sun, and are called Sons of the Sun. They have neither writing nor literature. Fathers teach children by tradition what they have learned from the Mage Zoroaster, the chief of the fire-temple. Whithersoever the sun goes, they worship him in that direction, and they reverence the poplar, the lily, the cotton plant, and the other plants which turn towards the sun. They make themselves like those flowers in faith and action, high and fragrant. They offer sacrifices for the dead, and they pay taxes to the Armenian priests. Their chief is called Hazrbed, and twice or oftener every year all of them, men and women, sons and daughters, gather in a very dark pit.' In another place we read:

'A woman feels no disgust towards
A Son of the Sun;
Nor towards a Turk or an Armenian;
Whomsoever she loves, he is her faith.'

In the 14th cent. Thomas Mejop'eçi tells us that Timurlang came to Mardin (Mesopotamia) and destroyed four villages of the Sons of the Sun—Shol, Shemeλaç, Safari, and Maraλ; 'but by the machinations of the devil they multiplied in Mardin and Amid.'

These quotations are drawn from Alishan's *Ancient Faith of the Armenians*, and from Grigor Vantzian's art. in *Handēs Amsoria*, 1896, p. 13 ff. Some of them are evidently of little value. Vantzian tries to prove that the Sons of the Sun were not Armenians, because (1) they had no literature, (2) they were not persecuted fanatically by the Christian Armenians. Moreover, he finds it difficult to identify them with the ancient Zoroastrians, because they had no magi or fire-worship. These conclusions disregard the best contemporaneous authorities on the subject. Even Grigor Magistros interposes them, in his allusion to them, between the Armenian Paulicians and the Thondracians. They spoke Armenian and called themselves Armenians. If they were not persecuted, this may well be due to the fact that the Christian Church has always shown more animosity against its own heresies than against heathenism, even within the boundaries of the national Church. There is, of course, no evidence of an organized Zoroastrianism or of a sacred fire among the 'Sons of the Sun'; but they might very well have been the remnants of a scattered community which had lost its magi and sacred fire. They may possibly have belonged originally to some district of Eastern Armenia, or they may have been descendants of Armenian converts during the strong Zoroastrian propaganda of the 5th cent. in Armenia. This, however, must still remain an open question, although it should be noted that they have lately been found to have some points of contact with the Yezidis (*q.v.*).

(5) *Tishtrya.* — Another important *yazata* of Zoroastrianism is Tishtrya (Sirius), the 'bright and glorious star' (*Yasna* i. 11, xxvii. 8, etc.), who assumes the form of a bull with golden horns (*Vendidād* xix. 37), and again, as a white horse with yellow ears and golden bridle, fights against the demon Apaosha (drought) and pours upon the earth the fertilizing rain and the seeds of all plants (*Yasht* viii. 18–33; *Bundahishn* vii. 4–13). He is the chief of all the stars (*Yasht* viii. 4; Plutarch, *de Iside et Osiride*, 47), or at least of the stars of the East (*Bundahishn* ii. 7); and the eighth *Yasht* is devoted to his praise. Besides Tishtrya there was also Tīr, the genius of the planet Mercury, to whom, according to the *Bundahishn* (v. 1), Tishtrya was opposed.

In Armenian mythology also we find a Tīr or Tiur, who has often been wrongly identified with Tishtrya, but who is, in reality, another divinity altogether. The Armen. Tiur (which Jensen, *Hittiter und Armenier*, pp. 186–187, endeavours to derive from Armen. *dpir*, 'writer,' 'scribe,' which would be a title of the Bab.-Assyr. Nabu, who was both the scribe of the gods and the planet Mercury [Orelli, *Allgem. Religionsgesch.*, Bonn, 1899, pp. 185–186]) is undoubtedly identical with Tīr, whose name is so often used in such theophorous compounds as Tiridates and Tiribazus (cf. Nöldeke, *SWAW, phil.-hist. Classe*, cxvi. 417–420; Justi, *Iranisches Namenbuch*, Marburg, 1895, p. 325 ff.), and who was widely known and honoured as an independent deity, being probably identified with the planet Mercury, although Tīr is not found in Armenian with this meaning.

Both in Cappadocia and in Armenia the fourth month was consecrated to this Tīr; and this was also true of the Parsi calendar, although, for theological reasons, the Parsis later made Tīr the equivalent of Tishtar (cf. *Bundahishn* xxv. 3, with *Āfrīngan* iii. 8).* The Armenian Tīr was famous as 'the interpreter of dreams,' as the tutelary deity of arts and learning, and as the scribe of Ormizd (Agathangelos, p. 584). Among the Armenians of modern times 'the writer' (very probably Tīr) has much to do with human fate and death. 'The writer take him!' is a common imprecation.† Tīr is, therefore, the Armenian Nabu, and there can be little doubt that the description given of him by Agathangelos whose Greek translator equates Tīr with Apollo (Lagarde, *Gesammelte Abhandlungen*, Leipzig, 1866, p. 294), agrees, in the main, with the general belief among other Oriental nations about Tīr.‡ In fact, the planet Mercury also is known among the Persian poets as 'the writer' (Stackelberg). The expression 'Scribe of Ormizd' applied to Tīr in Agathangelos has a Persian tinge, for the Armenians very seldom used the name Ormizd for their own Aramazd.

(6) *Mithra.* — Last, but by no means least, among the Zoroastrian *yazatas* is Mithra, the genius of the light of the heavens, and the god

* The Zoroastrian calendar also devotes the thirteenth day of each month to Tishtrya (Avesta) or Tīr (Pahlavi) (cf. *Sīrōza*, i. 13, ii. 13; *Yasna* xvi. 4, with *Bundahishn* xxvii. 24). That Tīr here refers primarily to the planet Mercury, and not to Tishtrya (Sirius), is confirmed by al-Bīrūnī's statement, in his account of the Tīragān, celebrated on the day Tīr of the month Tīr (*Chronology*, pp. 205–206): 'The name of this day is Tīr or Mercury, who is the star of the scribes.' The difficult problem of the replacing of Tīr by his opponent Tishtrya (cf. Spiegel, *Avesta Uebersetzt*, Leipzig, 1852–1863, iii. Introd. 21–22; Nöldeke, *loc. cit.*) is perhaps best explained by Justi, *op. cit* p. 325: 'Da die Planeten später als feindliche Wesen galten ward Tīr als Schutzgenius des 4. Monats und des 13. Monats tages durch den Tištrya (seinen Gegner) ersetzt; im Alterthum galt Tīr als guter Genius, wie die Eigennamen, deren ersten Theil sein Name bildet, beweisen.' The derivation of Tīr, 'Mercury,' is uncertain.—[Louis H. Gray].

† Cf. also Abeghian on the Groλs, or the 'writers,' as spirits of disease (*op. cit.* pp. 122–123). The words *Tīr* and *Tī* were also used as exclamations: '*Tīr*, forward!' Their relation to the deity's name, however, is not quite certain.

‡ In Egypt this god had his parallel in Thot, the moon-god of Chemun (de la Saussaye.† 207)

of truth and faithfulness, whose praises are especially celebrated in the tenth *yasht*. Derzana was the centre of Armenian Mithra-worship, and he also had a famous temple in the sacred village of Bagayarinj (Agathangelos, p. 515), although we have no proof whatever that Mithraism had obtained any foothold in Armenia proper. Mihr, the Armenian Mithra, was specially called the son of Aramazd (Agathangelos, p. 593; cf. *Yasht* xvii. 16); but, owing to the strong worship of the sun and Vahagn among the Armenians, he does not seem to have become as prominent in Armenia as in Persia, his place seeming, indeed, to be usurped by Vahagn (see below). Nevertheless, his name occurs frequently as a component part of many proper names of persons, such as *Mihran*, *Mihrdat* (Mithridates), and *Mehružan* (Hübschmann, *Armen. Grammatik*, i. 52–54), while the Armenian *mehean*, 'pagan temple, idol, altar,' has also been traced to the same source (cf. Hübschmann, *op. cit.* i. 194). The seventh month of the year and the eighth day of each month were his; and in the Zoroastrian calendar the seventh month and the sixteenth day were consecrated to him. We know nothing, however, of the functions or other duties of the Armenian Mithra.

(7) *Fravashis.*—Chief among the Zoroastrian *fravashis* (lower angels), is Verethraghna, the genius of victory, to whom the Avesta consecrates the fourteenth *yasht*. Like Mithra, he is of Indo-Iranian origin. In Pahlavi times his name was thinned down to *Bahrām*, often used by Persian kings, and in Armenian to *Vāhrām* and *Vŕam*. It is also very possible that Vŕt'anēs, the name of the second son of Gregory the Illuminator, reflects the Parthian form for *Verethraghna*. Since Lagarde, there has been a strong tendency to identify the Armenian Vahagn, probably the god of war and victory (Agathangelos, p. 106), with Verethraghna. According to Armenian phonetic laws, this is quite possible, although the termination *-agn* and the complete disappearance of both *r*'s constitute a difficulty. There was, moreover, a noble family called the *Vahevunis* (Elisæus, pp. 70, 127, 160, 173); while the list of the Armenian nobles in Mesrop's *Life of St. Nerses* gives *Vohevuni* (p. 33), but further below it adds the *Vahuni* (p. 34) as a different family. Moses of Chorene (i. 31, ii. 8, 12, 88) knows a priestly family of the name of *Vahnuni*, whom he makes descendants of Vahagn. Probably in all these cases Vahagn was the tutelary god, and the first syllable of his name was treated as independent.

Although in the ancient Armenian triad of Aramazd, Anahit, and Vahagn (Agathangelos, p. 106), Vahagn has the place of Mithra in the Old Persian triad (Art. Sus. a, 5; Ham. 6), he must be interpreted, despite the minor phonetic difficulties already mentioned, from the Avesta Verethraghna. Essentially a deity of victory, the latter fittingly declares: 'I will conquer the malignancies of all the malignant: the malignancies of demons and men, of wizards and witches, of oppressors, *kavis*, and *karaps*' (*Yasht*, xiv. 4), while the very form of his name recalls its Sanskrit equivalent *vŕtrahan*, the Vedic epithet of Indra as the slayer of the cloud-demon Vŕtra. The reflexion of his career in the Avesta is seen in the statement that 'Vāhrām the victorious is the stimulator of the warlike' (*Shāyast-lā-Shāyast*, xxii. 20), although the Iranian texts preserve no tradition of his conquests over dragons in the strict sense of the term. On the other hand, in Hellenic times Vahagn was compared with Herakles, and called the dragon-killer (Agathangelos, p. 606), while the Greek Agathangelos translates *Vahagn* as Ἡρακλῆς, and, reversing the process, the Armen. version of 2 Mac 4[19] renders Ἡρακλῆς by *Vahagn*. Ancient Armenians told, moreover, of Vahagn's stealing straw from Barsham (the Syrian god Ba'al-Shemīn, 'Lord of Heaven'), which he let drop on the way, thus forming the Milky Way (Anania Shiragaçi, p. 48; cf. Abeghian, *Armenischer Volksglaube*, pp. 49–50). The Vahagn-song, the parallelism of Vahagn with Herakles, and his relations to Mithra and Barsham, tend to create the presumption that he was also a sun-god. The most famous temple of Vahagn was in Yashtishat in Taraun* (Faustus of Byzantium, iii. 14; Agathangelos, pp. 606–607), where he was also known as the lover of Astłik, the Syrian Aphrodite (Agathangelos, p. 607; Moses of Chorene, p. 88).

II. *INFERNAL HOSTS.*—1. Ahriman.—Ahriman (Armen. *Arhmn*) is never referred to in connexion with ancient Armenian paganism; but the absence of his name may be easily understood when we remember that, while Christian writers had a reason for arguing against the ancient deities, Ahriman (*q.v.*) and his retinue naturally coincided with Christian demonology. Other Zoroastrian evil spirits were known among the Armenians, however; and Ahriman could hardly fail to be known as their chief. Alishan (*Ancient Faith*, p. 210) suggests, with some plausibility, that he was known under the name of Çar, 'the evil one,' a word which is frequently found in that sense in Armen. theological writings and old popular spells. Besides *Arhmn*, the forms *Haraman(i)* and *Kharaman(i)* were also current in Armenia, *Haraman* being apparently the older (Arsacid) and *Arhmn* the younger (Sasanian) form (Hübschmann, *op. cit.* i. 26–27); so that the pagan Armenians possibly used *Haraman* to denote the Ahriman of their religion. Haramani is used as an epithet of snakes by Abraham of Zenag, a 5th cent. writer.

2. Demons.—Of the six Zoroastrian archdemons there is no mention. The *Asmodæus* of the Book of Tobit (3[8] etc.) was transliterated by the Armenians as *Azmod*, which plainly shows that the name suggested nothing familiar to them.† The word *dev* (Avesta *dæva*), 'demon,' was current among the Armenians, although they had also native words like *ais*. The *devs* preferred stony places (Moses of Chorene, iii. 55) and ruins (Eznik, p. 98). They appeared as serpents (Faustus of Byzantium, v. 2) and in many other monstrous forms (Eznik, p. 98); some of them were corporeal, others incorporeal (*ib.* p. 97).

The *družes* were lying, perjuring, harmful spirits, probably believed to be feminine, like their Avesta counterparts, the *drujes*. What the Avesta says in regard to their third mode of self-propagation—by the semen emitted in the *pollutio nocturna* (*Vendīdād* xviii. 45–52)—seems to have been a current belief among the Armenians (Eznik, p. 178; Abeghian, *Armen. Volksglaube*, pp. 35–36). The *yātus*, 'sorcerers' of the Avesta, who were able even to slay men (*Vendīdād* vii. 3), are well known and much feared among the modern Armenians as *jatuks*. The *pairikās* (Armen. *parik*), destructive female demons (cf. *Yasna* xvi. 8; *Yasht* viii. 54, xiii. 104; *Vendīdād* i. 9, xi. 9), were also believed in, but Eznik (p. 97) classes them with such chimeras as the *yuškapariks* and *hambarus* (see below).

3. Monsters and chimeras.—Aždahak (Avesta *Aži Dahāka*) and Višap, especially the latter, occupied a large place in ancient Armen. superstition; and Moses of Chorene (i. 30) states that

* This temple was called the 'eighth sanctuary' (Agathangelos, p. 606), possibly because Vahagn-worship, and specially this temple, rose to importance long after the seven main sanctuaries (Agathangelos, p. 34) had established themselves.

† It should be noted that the divergences between the Jewish אשמדאי and the Avesta *aēšma*, '(demon of) wrath,' are so grave that the usual view that the two are identical is not free from suspicion (cf. Ginzberg in *JE* ii. 219).—[Louis H. Gray].

Aždahak is, in Armenian, the same as Višap. The latter word is, it should be noted, a loan-word from the Avesta *ārəš λεγόμενον višāpa*, 'whose saliva is poison,' used as an epithet of *uži*, 'serpent,' in *Nīrangastān* 48. The story of the war between Aždahak of Media and Tigranes I. (i. 24–30) probably contains traces of an old dragon-legend. In a later chapter Moses states that Aždahak was fettered and imprisoned in Mount Dembavend by Hruden, escaping only to be recaptured and guarded by his conqueror in a cave of the same mountain; just as, in Zoroastrian legend, Aži Dahāka, after a reign of 1000 years, was enchained by Thraētaona (Armenian, Hruden; Pahlavi, Frēṭūn) under Dimāvand, whence he is to arise at the Last Day and be slain by Sāma Keresaspa (*Bundahishn* xxix. 9; *Dāṭistān-ī Dēnīg* xxxvii. 97; *Dīnā-ī Maīnōg-ī Khraṭ* xxii. 38–39; *Dīnkarṭ* vii. 1, 26). Moses likewise records that Aždahak was kissed on the shoulders, and that from this kiss sprang serpents, which were fed on human flesh.* Though the extant Avesta does not note this, Aži Dahāka there being 'three-mouthed and three-pated' (*Yasna* ix. 8), the *Dāṭistān-ī Dēnīg* (*loc. cit.*) alludes to it in describing Dahāk, 'on whom most powerful demons and fiends in the shape of serpents are winged.' The legend is further elaborated by Firdausi in the *Shāh-Nāmah* (ed. Vullers-Landauer, 28, 99–30, 144; 35, 12–14), according to whom the kiss was bestowed by Iblīs. The legend of Aži Dahāka was also treated at length in the twentieth section of the lost *Sūṭkar Nask* of the Avesta (*Dīnkarṭ* ix. 21).

The *višaps* (Eznik, pp. 102–107) were corporeal beings which could appear both as men and as serpents, and could soar in the air by the help of oxen (?). They were fond of carrying the grain away from the threshing-floor, either by assuming the shape of mules and camels, or by real mules and camels of their own. In such cases, the Armenians called '*Kal ! kal !*' 'Stop ! stop' (Eznik, p. 103). They also sucked the milk from cows (Vahram Vartabed [13th cent.], quoted by Alishan, *Ancient Faith*, p. 172). The *višaps* went hunting on horseback; they had houses (Eznik, pp. 104, 107; cf. also *Yasht* xv. 19, and Darmesteter's note, *ad loc.*, on the palace of Aži Dahāka). They kept royal princes and heroes captive (Eznik, p. 104), among whom were Alexander the Great and Artavazd, king of Armenia (p. 105). They sometimes appeared enormous, and compelled men to worship them (p. 105). They entered into human beings; their breath was poisonous (p. 107). There was a whole colony of them at the foot of Masis (Moses of Chorene, i. 30), with whom Vahagn fought (*ib.* i. 31; Agathangelos, p. 607), and who later stole the child Artavazd and left a *dev* in his stead (Moses of Chorene, ii. 61; cf., further, on the *višap*, Abeghian, *op. cit.* pp. 78–83).

Closely connected with the *višaps* were the *nhangs* (Eznik, pp. 102–107)—a term borrowed from the Pers. *nihang* 'alligator, crocodile.' They lived chiefly in the rivers (Eznik, p. 106). According to Eznik, both *višaps* and *nhangs* appeared in deceptive forms, but the former were 'personal' (spirit-like), while the latter were not so (p. 102), so that he specifically declares: 'There is no personal *nhang*' (pp. 103, 107). Although they could assume different forms, they had no body (p. 102). Preferably they appeared as women (mermaids ?) in the water (p. 106); but at other times they became seals, and, catching the swimmer by the feet, dragged him to the bottom (*ib.*). An unpublished manuscript of the *Geography* ascribed to Moses of Chorene in like manner reports the general belief that there were *nhangs* in the Araçani, a tributary of the Euphrates, as well as in the Euphrates itself. They used their victims for their lust, and then sucked their blood and left them dead. The Armen. translators use the word *nhang* for 'hippopotamus' and 'crocodile.'

The *šahapets*, or 'protectors' (cf. Avesta **šōiθ rapaiti*, 'protector of the homestead,' Skr. *kṣetrapati*, 'lord of a field'), are mentioned in Agathangelos as the protecting genii of graves (p. 56). They appeared in the shape of men or serpents, like the *višaps* (Eznik, p. 106), and kept the vineyards and olive trees, according to the ancient Armen. tr. of St. John Chrysostom on Isaiah.

Another class of fabulous monsters which seem to have a Persian origin is that of the *hambarus*. According to von Stackelberg, *hambaruna* in Persian means 'genius of houses,' but we know little as to how the *hambarus* were imagined. In the Armen. tr. of the LXX Is 34^{13} the word is used to render *σειρήνων* (Vulg. *draconum*). They were female beings, had a body, and were probably thought to live on land. 'They were born and they died,' says Eznik (p. 97), who mentions them along with *yuškapariks* and *pariks*. The *yuškapariks*, or 'ass-*pariks*' (cf. Pers. *vušk*, 'ass'), used to render *ὀνοκένταυροι* in LXX Is 13^{22} $34^{11.\ 14}$, lived chiefly in ruined places (Eznik, pp. 97–98), while the *pariks*, to whom allusion has been made above, were seductive female demons, living not only in the water, but also in forests and meadows, as well as on the banks of streams. They are, primarily, water-deities, and correspond closely to the European mermaids, whom they also resemble in their frequent intrigues with mortal lovers. This erotic trait is an evident reminiscence in Armenia of the seductive *pairikās* of Zoroastrianism (see above; cf. also Abeghian, *op. cit.* pp. 103–104). Eznik (p. 99) likewise mentions the *covaçuls*, or 'sea-bulls,' which lived in lakes, propagating through kine, they themselves being born of cows. He also alludes to *pays*, which were born of men (pp. 98–99), and must doubtless be distinguished from the *pariks*. All these beings, as well as the *arłēz*, were held to be generally invisible, though occasionally they were seen of men (Eznik, p. 99). There are, moreover, other classes of demons in Armenian faith, such as the *yaveržaharsunks*, *k'ajk's* (husbands of the *pariks*), *mardagails* ('werwolves'), *als* (corresponding roughly to Lilith), the 'evil eye,' and disease-demons of various sorts (cf. Abeghian, *op. cit.* pp. 102–110, 116–127). Another clear survival of Armen. Zoroastrianism is the horror felt towards snakes, frogs, and ants (Abeghian, *op. cit.* pp. 30–31; cf. *Vendīdād* xiv. 5, and Darmesteter's note, *ad loc.*; Herodotus, i. 140), while the cat is an uncanny object, as in Parsi belief (Darmesteter, *loc. cit.*; *SBE* xviii. 419, where a demoniac father is attributed to it).*

III. *DEATH AND THE FUTURE LIFE.* — The abode of evil spirits and of the wicked dead was called *Džokhk'* (Pers. *Dūzakh*), and perhaps also *Sandaramet* (see above). We have absolutely no description of the Armen. Hades or Paradise; and the Avesta *garō-nmāna*, 'house of song, paradise,' appears in Armenian in the loan-word *gerezman*, 'grave.' After death, the soul lingered around the body until the corpse was buried, after which it remained in the vicinity of the grave or of its former dwelling for a year, though in later Armenian belief it passes to the future world within a day after burial (Abeghian, *op. cit.* p. 18). On its way, as in Iranian eschatology, the soul had to

* Faustus of Byzantium also (v. 22) tells a similar legend of King Pap.

* On the other hand, the Armenians lack the extreme veneration for the dog which is so characteristic of the Avesta (cf. *Vendīdād* xiii., xv. 5–6, 19–51; *Dīnkarṭ* viii. 23), so that *šun*, 'dog,' is also used in the sense of 'adulterer.'

cross a hair-bridge; if righteous, it reached the opposite shore in safety; if sinful, it dropped down into the stream of hell-fire. There was a middle place for those that were neither good nor bad (Abeghian, p. 20).*

We find absolutely no trace, however, of *dakhmas*, or 'towers of silence,' or of the custom of exposing bodies. On the contrary, there were great mausoleums for kings in the ancient city of Ani, and graveyards outside the cities. We also know that the Achæmenian kings did not obey the Avesta injunction concerning the exposure of dead bodies; while, according to Herodotus (i. 140), the Persians covered the corpse with wax and then buried it.

The Armenian burial-customs seem to have been more akin to the ancient Babylonian (Jeremias, *Hölle und Paradies bei den Babyloniern*, p. 10 ff.). The friends and relatives of the deceased came to the ceremony of wailing (Faustus of Byzantium, iv. 15); and at the funerals of the rich, professional mourners were employed (Moses of Chorene, ii. 60), led by the 'mother of the dirge,' who sang the story of the life and death of the deceased, while the nearest relatives tore their garments, plucked their hair and screamed (Faustus of Byzantium, *loc. cit.*). They cut their arms (?) and faces (*ib.* v. 31). During the funeral they had music, produced by horns, violins, and harps. Men and women danced facing each other, and clapped their hands (*ib.*). Johannes Garneçi (quoted by Alishan, *op. cit.* p. 413) says: 'Forbid wailing (over the dead) . . . cutting of the hair, and (other) evil things.' When the deceased was a king or a great personage, servants and slaves committed suicide over his grave (Moses of Chorene, ii. 60). Ancient gravestones are found in the shape of horses and lambs, perhaps symbolic of sacrifices for the dead. The modern custom of distributing bread and raisins and strong drink after the burial, moreover, is probably a survival of an ancient sacrificial meal (cf. Abeghian, *op. cit.* pp. 20–23). To this day it is quite customary to make two holes on the gravestones.

Death was a decree of fate (Eznik, p. 153), inevitable (p. 161), and foreordained (p. 162). In fact, the whole life of man was thought to be led by Fate (Ohan Mantaguni, quoted by Alishan, *op. cit.* p. 411). Later Armenians also spoke of Hogëar, the 'soul-taking' angel, who is frequently identified with Gabriel (Abeghian, *op. cit.* p. 17).

There is little to be said about the eschatology of the Armenians, although they certainly believed in resurrection and immortality.

There is an ancient Armenian legend about the end of the world. Artavazd, son of king Artashes, seeing that many people committed suicide over his father's grave, said, 'Thou didst depart, and tookest with thee the whole country. Shall I rule over ruins?' Thereupon his father cursed him, saying:

> 'When thou goest a-hunting
> up the venerable Masis,
> May the *K'ajk's* seize thee and
> take thee up the venerable Masis!
> There mayest thou remain and see no light!'

Artavazd is said to have perished, while on a hunting party, by falling with his horse from a high precipice. One Armenian legend says that he is chained in a cave of Masis, and two dogs, gnawing at his chains, try to set him free in order that he may bring the world to an end. The chains become very thin about the season of Navasard (New Year's festivities in August). Therefore, on those days the blacksmiths used to strike a few blows with their hammers on their anvils in order to strengthen Artavazd's chains and save the world, a custom which was continued even into Christian times (Moses of Chorene, ii. 61; Eznik, p. 105). This legend seems to have some affinity with that of Biurasp Aždahak, which Moses of Chorene gives at the end of the first book of his *History of Armenia* (see above).

* The belief that the soul remains on earth for a year seems to be Muhammadan (Wolff, *Muhammed. Eschatol.*, Leipzig, 1872, pp. 78–79; cf. Rühling, *Beiträge zur Eschatol. des Islam*, Leipzig, 1895, p. 43); while the Iranians held that it journeyed to the place of first judgment at dawn of the fourth day after death (*Yasht* xxii. 7, 25; *Dâtistân-i-Dênîg* xx. 2–3; *Dînâ-i Maînôg-i Khrad* ii. 114–115, 161; *Artâ-i Virâf* iv. 9–16). The bridge in Armenian belief is obviously the *činvat*-bridge of the Avesta—which is fully described in *Dâtistân-i-Dênîg*, xxi. 3–7, and which occurs not only in Iran but in India, mediæval Europe, and elsewhere (Scherman, *Materialien zur Gesch. der ind. Visionsliteratur*, Leipzig, 1892, pp. 102–110, 117–119; Becker, *Contribut. to Compar. Study of the Mediæval Visions of Heaven and Hell*, Baltimore, 1899, pp. 18, 44, 76, 83, 90, 97), as well as in Muhammadanism (Rühling, *op. cit.* pp. 62–63). The 'middle place,' moreover, finds its Iranian source in *Hamêstagân*, 'ever-stationary' (*Artâ-i-Virâf* vi.; *Shayast-lâ-Shâyast* vi. 2; *Dînâ-i Maînôg-i Khrat* vii. 18–19, xii. 14; *Dâtistân-i-Dênîg*, xxiv. 6, xxxiii. 2), where dwell the souls of those whose good and evil deeds exactly balance each other.

IV. *WORSHIP AND CEREMONIAL.*—There were probably temple-books which Christianity systematically destroyed. The temples were numerous, both in the country and in the cities; and there were also special temple-towns, such as Bagavan and Yashtishat, containing several important sanctuaries. Christian churches and monasteries succeeded both to the wealth and to the veneration belonging to the ancient sacred sites. Of ancient open-air worship we hear nothing, but there were sacred places on mountain tops, like the throne of Nahata (Faustus of Byzantium, v. 25). Besides the ordinary temples, the Armenians boasted, like other neighbouring and distant nations, seven main sanctuaries (Agathangelos, p. 34), which were often the scenes of great concourses of people gathered there for worship and religious festivities. Treasure-houses were connected with the great sanctuaries (*ib.* pp. 586, 591, 594; Moses of Chorene, ii. 48; Thoma Arṭsruni, i. 7), as they now are associated with the churches. Tiridates and Gregory plundered many of these on behalf of the poor and of the Church, during their campaign against the pagan sanctuaries of Armenia; and images and statues of deities were common, at least in later pagan times (Agathangelos, *locc. citt.*; Moses of Chorene, ii. 14).

Agathangelos (p. 34) describes the sacrifices of Chosroës after his return from victorious incursions.

'He commanded to seek the seven great altars of Armenia, and he honoured the sanctuaries of his ancestors, the Arsacids, with white bullocks, white rams, white horses and mules, with gold and silver ornaments and gold embroidered and fringed silken coverings, with golden wreaths, silver sacrificial basins, desirable vases set with precious stones, splendid garments, and beautiful ornaments. Also he gave a fifth of his booty and great presents to the priests.'*

In Bayazid (the ancient Bagravand) an old Armenian relief was found with an altar upon which a strange animal stands, and on each side a man clothed in a long tunic. One is beardless, and carries a heavy club. The other has a beard. Their head-gears, Phrygian in character, differ in details. Both of them raise their hands in the attitude of worship (Alishan, *op. cit.* p. 161).

The prevalent word for a pagan priest in Armenian, *k'urm*, is a loan word from the Syriac *kûmrâ*, 'priest,' although *mog*, 'magian,' may also have been used. The place of sacrifice was perhaps called *spandaran* (connected with Avesta *spenta*, 'holy'), a word which is now current only in the sense of 'slaughter-house.' This makes it possible that originally slaughtering had a sacrificial character. Christianity did away with all impure rites and human sacrifices which were of a local character, but animal sacrifices survived the fall of paganism (Conybeare in *AJTh* vii., 1903, p. 63).

In many of the sanctuaries, which, like the modern monasteries, were also places of religious hospitality, particularly in the country, sacrifices were distributed to strangers (Moses of Chorene, ii. 66). Besides animals, flower-wreaths and green twigs (the *barsom* of the Avesta?) were offered (Agathangelos, p. 49), and probably also fruit and money.

The priesthood must have been hereditary in a well-organized caste. There was a high priest, sometimes of royal blood (Moses of Chorene, ii. 53, 55), and the *Vahunis* are mentioned as a priestly family by Moses of Chorene (ii. 8), while another priestly family was perhaps that of the *Spandunis*. The priests were probably very numerous in temple-towns, and they certainly possessed great wealth and extensive lands and villages, which were later confiscated for the benefit of the Christian Church (Agathangelos, pp. 586 ff., 590, 594, 610). Of native Armenian magi as a caste

* Sacrifices were occasions of great rejoicing, and it would seem that not only the flesh of the animals, but also their blood, was consumed (Agathangelos, pp. 73–74; Faustus of Byzantium, iv. 4).

we have no record, although we read of magians (Moses of Chorene, ii. 48). The existence of priestesses in ancient Armenia is not absolutely certain, although we have the old compound *krmanuish* meaning 'priestess.'

A critical study of the Armenian Church calendar and ceremonies would probably reveal much that could be referred to the pre-Christian ritual. During Lent, for example, the morning service is opened with an abjuration of the devil and all his works—an elaborate formula, which is recited while the whole congregation turn their backs to the altar and look towards the west, with arms hanging rigidly at the sides. Although the abjuration is usual in the baptism of all ritualistic churches, this particular form may well have been derived from the ancient cult of the country. Evidently the Armenians considered the west as the abode of the devils, for Eznik says in his aphorisms (p. 313): 'Honey is sweet, but it harms a diseased body. Good counsel and rebuke are useful, but they do not benefit those who have set their faces westward.'*

The old Armenian calendar also bears traces of ancient Persian influence. *Trē* (Tīr), *Mehekan* (Mithra), *Ahekan* (Atarš), and *Hrotiç* (Pahlavi *Fravarţigān*) are common also to the Persian year (cf. art. CALENDAR [Persian]). The other months of the ancient Armenian calendar have names of Armenian and perhaps also two of Caucasic (Georgian) origin (Hagopian, 'Armenian Months,' in *Banssēr*, 1900; Gray, 'On certain Persian and Armenian Month-Names as influenced by the Avestan Calendar,' in *JAOS* xxviii.). The names of the days of the month, as given by Shah Tchrped (Alishan, *op. cit.* p. 143), have but few points of contact with the Zoroastrian (*Yasna* xvi. 3–6; *Sīrōza* i.–ii.; *Bundahishn* xxvii. 24; *Shāyast-lā-Shāyast* xxii.–xxiii.; al-Bīrūnī, *Chronology*, p. 53).

The Armenians shared with the Persians some of the characteristic superstitions and usages of the Avesta. One of them is the evil eye (*Vendīdād* xx. 3, 7, xxii. 2; *Bundahishn* xxviii. 33, 36). In Moses of Chorene, ii. 47, we read that king Ervand had so powerful an evil eye that he could break stones asunder by looking fixedly at them. The general belief is that people upon whom the evil eye is cast pine away without knowing the cause of their ailment, and nothing is safe from it. There are special prayers and ceremonies to break the spell of the evil eye (Alishan, *op. cit.* p. 385; Abeghian, *op. cit.* pp. 123–127). The modern Armenians have the same abhorrence for parings of nails and hair as the Avesta (cf. *Vendīdād*, xvii.); nor may fire and water be defiled (Abeghian, *op. cit.* pp. 57–58, 66). These superstitions of the later Armenians, like many other beliefs noted above, were probably imported in ancient times. Among the greatest requirements of the Avesta we find next-of-kin marriages (cf. Justi in *Grundriss der iran. Philologie*, ii. 434–437; Jackson, *ib.* 682, and the references there given). The only well-known instance of this in Armenia is the marriage of Tigranes III. with his sister Erato, a few years before the Christian era, although it seems to have been frequent among the nobles (Moses of Chorene, iii. 20; Faustus of Byzantium, iv. 4).

V. *CONCLUSIONS.*—Our study suggests the following reflexions:—(1) Great as is the mass of Zoroastrian material in Armenian paganism, it has also serious gaps. Was it ever complete? (2) We find the existing material in a quite uncertain shape. The substantial deviations from Zoroastrianism are considerable, as in the case of Anahit and in the worship of fire and water. The Zoroastrian angels are full-fledged deities in Armenian paganism; but primitive traits are not lacking, as in the case of Spenta Armaiti. (3) There is no trace of a highly developed system of theology, ritual and legalistic observance, as in Zoroastrianism. Abstract beings, the personifications of ideas, virtues, and vices, are quite absent. We find no theological systematization of the heavenly army, no developed dualism, no caste of magi, and no widely spread fire-altars. (4) There is no record of any Zoroastrian propaganda in Armenia, or of any religious fellowship between Persia and Armenia. When the Sasanians persecuted Christian Armenia, about A.D. 450, they said nothing about a return to the ancient faith, nor did the Armenians ever call their paganism Zoroastrian. (5) It is probable that Zoroastrianism gradually penetrated Armenia under the Achæmenian kings and under the Arsacids, but we have no exact knowledge as to when or how. (6) The study here presented must not be regarded as a complete picture of Armenian paganism. Both the pantheon and the world of minor spirits contained other non-Zoroastrian names and beliefs which have been omitted; but the old religion of Armenia was mainly Iranian, and may be described as Zoroastrianism of a corrupt type.

It is probable that the ancient Armenians themselves conceived their pantheon as containing the following deities: Aramazd, as chief god; Anahit, as chief and favourite goddess; Vahagn, as the national god of war and heroism; the sun and the moon; Mihr; and Tīr as the god of human destiny, whose relation to learning and eloquence has a Greek flavour. Deities of a lower magnitude of importance disappeared more easily from the popular memory. Along with these Persian deities, there were also an Elamitic goddess Nanê (the Babylonian Nanâ, cf. also the 'Persian' goddess Nanæa of 2 Mac 1[13]), the Syrian Astâik (Venus), and the Syrian Barsham (Ba'al-Shemin). These three must have migrated into Armenia during post-Alexandrian times, perhaps *Doppelgänger* of some of the native deities, though whether they formed a group, Barsham-Astâik-Nanê, corresponding to Aramazd-Anahit-Vahagn, as Jensen (*Hittiter und Armenier*, p. 181 ff.) suggests, is a less plausible hypothesis. At all events they soon asserted themselves as independent and separate deities, so that Astâik could become the paramour of Vahagn and have a temple in the sacred town of Yashtishat, where Anahit also had a sanctuary. After Alexander, and especially in Roman times, the Armenians came under strongly Hellenistic influences, and began to seek parallels between the Greek and their own deities. It would also seem that during this period the worship of the sun and the moon became somewhat neglected. Otherwise, we cannot understand why Agathangelos makes so little of them. The ancient Armenians were also very much given to divination and witchcraft (Moses of Chorene, i. 30, ii. 66; Ohan Mantaguni, *op. cit.* xxvi.; Alishan, *op. cit.* pp. 360–409).

LITERATURE.—Windischmann, 'Die persische Anâhita oder Anaitis' in *Abhandlungen der könig. bayr. Akad. der Wissensch.* I Cl. viii. pt. 1, Munich, 1856; Emin, 'Recherche sur le paganisme arménien' in *Revue de l'orient*, N.S. v. 18; Lagarde, *Armen. Studien*, Göttingen, 1877, and *Purim*, Göttingen, 1887; Johannissiany, *Armen. Bibliothek* iv., 'Märchen und Sagen,' Leipzig, 1887; Sarkissian, *Agathangelos and his many-centuried Mystery* (Arm.), Venice, 1892; Mkrttschian, *Die Paulikianer*, Leipzig, 1893; von Gutschmid, *Kleine Schriften*, iii., Leipzig, 1892; Tchéraz, 'Notes sur la mythol. armén.' in *Transact. of the 9th Internat. Congress of Orientalists*, ii., London, 1893; Nazarethian, 'Armenians and Armenian Mythology' in *Bazmavēp* (Arm.), 1893–94; Karakashian, *Crit. Hist. of Armenia* (Arm.), pt. i. ch. 8, Tiflis, 1895; Balassanian, *Hist. of Armenia*[3] (Arm.), Tiflis, 1895, p. 74 ff.; Cumont, *Textes et mon. figurés relat. aux mystères de Mithra*, Brussels, 1895–99, and *Die Mysterien des Mithra*, Leipzig, 1903; Gelzer, 'Zur armen. Götterlehre' in *Berichte der könig. sächs. Gesellsch. der Wissensch.*, phil.-hist. Classe, 1896, pp. 99–148; Alishan, *Ancient Faith of the Armenians* (Arm.), Venice, 1895; St. Clair-Tisdall, *Conversion of Armenia to the Christian Faith*, Oxford, 1897, p. 43 ff.; Hübschmann, *Armen. Gram.* i., Leipzig, 1897; Jensen, *Hittiter und Armenier*, Strassburg; 1898, p. 177 ff.; Abeghian, *Armen. Volksglaube*, Leipzig, 1899; Carrière, *Les huit sanctuaires de l'Arménie payenne*, Paris, 1899; Stackelberg, 'Iranian Influence on the Religious Beliefs of the Ancient Armenians' in *Report of Imperial Archæolog. Soc. of Moscow, Oriental Comm.* ii. pt. 2 (Russian), Moscow, 1901; Daghavarian, 'Ancient Religions of the Armenians' in *Banssēr* (Arm.), 1903; Weber, *Die kathol. Kirche in Armenien*, Freiburg, 1903, p. 25 ff.; Hommel, *Grundriss der Geog. und Gesch. des alten Orients*, i., Munich, 1904; Geiger-Kuhn, *Grundriss der iran. Philologie*, ii., Strassburg, 1904; Arakélian, 'La Relig. anc. des Arméniens' in *Verhandl. des zweiten internat. Kongresses für allgem. Religionsgesch.*, Basel, 1905, pp. 291–292; also numerous articles in *Handēs Amsōreay*, Vienna, 1887 ff., and in Pauly-Wissowa.

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ARMENIA (Christian).—I. *THE BEGINNINGS OF CHRISTIANITY.*—The national legends and traditions of Armenia are rich in information regarding the introduction of Christianity into the country.

* In the Avesta the north is the dwelling-place of evil spirits (*Vendīdād* vii. 2, xix. 1; *Arţā-ī-Vīrāf* xvii. 11).

In particular, it is said to have been preached by Apostles or disciples of Apostles, such as St. Bartholomew and St. Thaddæus. But it has been proved that these legends did not appear till late in the literature of Armenia, and that they were borrowed largely from the literature of Greece. Christianity certainly penetrated to Armenia, as elsewhere, by means of the living voice. The Apostles and their successors had early formed the habit of visiting the Churches founded by them; and the teaching of the gospel was continued and propagated in the Christian communities long before written documents came into use; but the names of these first preachers have not come down to us with any certainty. Yet, however meagre the information furnished by history may be, we are quite entitled to maintain that Christianity reached Armenia through Antioch, before the time of Gregory the Illuminator. The first Christian documents that the Armenians made use of were written in Syriac, and this language was used in the Armenian liturgy till the reform of Gregory the Illuminator. After Antioch we might mention Edessa and Nisibis as centres from which Christianity spread into the different provinces of the kingdom of Armenia.

LITERATURE.—The works, in Armenian and in translation, of Armenian writers: Koriun, Elisæus the Teacher (*Vartabed*), Eznik, Agathangelos, Lazarus of Pharpe, Sebeos, Zenobius of Klag, Faustus of Byzantium, Moses of Chorene. A. Lipsius, *Die apokr. Apostelgesch. und Apostellegenden* (Brunswick, 1883–1890); A. Carrière, *La Légende d'Abgar dans l'histoire d'Arménie de Moïse de Khoren* (Paris, 1895); H. Gelzer, 'Die Anfänge der armen. Kirche' in *Berichte der königl. Sächs. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften*, phil.-hist. Classe (1895); Petit,* fasc. vii. col. 1892–1893.

II. *EXTENSION OF CHRISTIANITY IN ARMENIA.* — St. Gregory the Illuminator. — Gregory the Illuminator belonged to the royal race of the Arsacids. When quite young he escaped the massacre of his family (A.D. 238), and took refuge in Roman territory. He studied at Cæsarea, and returned to Armenia when the kingdom was re-established under Tiridates II. (A.D. 261). After being persecuted for his faith, he attained to honour, and baptized the king and a large number of his subjects. He went again to Cæsarea, where he was consecrated bishop by Bishop Leontius, thus forming the link of spiritual connexion between the Cappadocian metropolis and the young Armenian Churches. When he was made bishop, Gregory fixed his residence at Yashtishat, and had a church and an episcopal palace built there. He substituted Armenian for Greek as the language of the liturgy, in order to have easier access to the masses of the people, and created twelve episcopal sees, at the head of which he placed, as titulars, converted pagan priests. He instituted ecclesiastical offices, making them hereditary in the sacerdotal families, and he created in his own family the supreme office of *Catholicos*. At first this title designated only the principal bishop of the country; later it came to mean an independent patriarch. The Gregorian and national Armenian Church, founded afterwards, lived its own autonomous life, while recognizing for some years a sort of supremacy in the mother Church of Cæsarea.

LITERATURE.—Mgr. Ormanian, *Le Vatican et les Arméniens* (Rome, 1873); von Gutschmid, *Kleine Schriften* (Leipzig, 1892); H. Gelzer, 'Die Anfänge der armen. Kirche' in *Berichte der königl. Sächs. Gesellsch. der Wissensch.*, phil.-hist. Classe (1895); Petit,* fasc. vii. col. 1893; S. Weber, *Die katholische Kirche in Armenien* (Freiburg, 1903); Malan, *Life and Times of St. Gregory* (Eng. tr. 1868).

III. *THE GREGORIAN ARMENIAN CHURCH.*— 1. Doctrine.—The creed of the Armenian Church is identical with the pseudo-Athanasian Creed which was introduced into Armenia by the Syrians, and in the 6th cent. took the place of the Nicene Creed. In the 14th cent. another creed was much in use in the Armenian Church. It was a compilation of formulas borrowed from various creeds, and was current until the middle of the 19th century. The religious heads of the Armenian Church several times formulated *professions of faith* intended to complete, explain, and fix the meaning of the Armenian Creed. We must mention the profession of faith addressed in 1166 by Nerses Shnorhali to Manuel Comnenus; that presented to pope Pius IV. by Abgar, the Ambassador of the Catholicos Michael of Etchmiadzin (1562–1563); that of the Catholicos Azarias of Sis (1585); that addressed in 1671 by David, the Armenian archbishop of Iṣfahān, to Louis XIV.; those addressed to the same king by Stephen and James, the Armenian archbishops at Constantinople (1671), and by Gaspar, the Armenian bishop of Cairo. On the other hand, the Roman Curia imposed on the Armenian Church two professions of faith: (1) the constitution of Eugenius IV., *Exultate Deo*; (2) the creed of Urban VIII., intended for all the Christians of the East.

LITERATURE.—Le chevalier Ricaut, *The Present State of the Greek and Armenian Churches, A.D. 1678* (London, 1679); E. Dulaurier, *Histoire, dogmes, traditions et liturgie de l'église armén. orientale*[2] (Paris, 1857); A. Balgy, *Historia doctrinæ catholicæ inter Armenos* (Vienna, 1878); Aršak Ter-Mikelian, *Die armen. Kirche* (Leipzig, 1892); J. Catergian, *De fidei symbolo, quo Armenii utuntur observationes* (Vienna, 1893); F. Kattenbusch, *Das apost. Symbol* (Leipzig, 1894); Hahn, *Bibliothek der Symbole und Glaubensregeln der alten Kirche*[3] (Breslau, 1897); Macler, Nos. 141, 145.

The following are the chief points of doctrine on which the creed of the Armenian Church differs from that of other Christian communities. As regards the Procession of the Holy Spirit, after much hesitation and even much indifference, the Gregorian Armenians profess that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, and reject the *Filioque*. The Armenians reject the decisions of the Chalcedon Council relative to the Incarnation; they call themselves Monophysites, admitting only one nature in Christ. The Gregorians, in reciting the *Trisagion*, retain the addition *qui crucifixus es pro nobis*, while some Catholic Armenians have rejected it. The Gregorians deny *purgatory*, but they pray for the dead like the Catholics, consecrating to this devotion the day after Epiphany, Easter, the Transfiguration, the Assumption, the Exaltation of the Cross, and the day of the holy Vardanians.

There is diversity of opinion among the Armenian doctors regarding the primacy of the Pope. The patriarchs, being equal in power, are *co-ordinate* the one with the other, and not *subordinate* to a superior patriarch. The Churches were founded by the Apostles and their disciples. These were sent by Jesus Christ, not by Peter; thus nothing enjoins the primacy of the Pope as a fundamental dogma of the Christian Church. The Armenians *baptize* by immersion, repeated at the name of each of the Divine Persons; hence a triple immersion. The anointing is with holy oil, and the person baptized receives the name of the saint whose festival is celebrated on the day of the baptism. Only the priest can baptize, and baptism may be administered even to a child already dead. *Confirmation* follows very soon after baptism. The anointing is done on the forehead, the eyes, the nostrils, the ears, the mouth, the shoulders, the breast, the hands, and the feet. Each anointing is accompanied by a special formula. The Armenians make use of unleavened bread and of wine unmixed with water as elements for the Eucharist. They make confession principally on the occasion of the great festivals, preferably at Epiphany or at Easter. They admit in theory the sacrament of *Extreme Unction*, but they never

* In this art. the foll. abbrevv. are used:—Petit = L. Petit, 'Arménie' in *Dict. de théol. catholique* (Paris, 1902); Macler = F. Macler, *Catalogue des manuscrits arméniens et géorgiens de la Bibliothèque Nationale* (Paris, 1908).

administer it. The Gregorians have a hierarchy of orders very carefully organized, including the office of precentor and reader; then the inferior orders of porter, reader, exorcist, and candle-lighter; and the superior orders of sub-deacon, deacon, and priest. The consecration of bishops is reserved for the Catholicos. Marriage is permitted to the inferior clergy, rigorous celibacy being enjoined only on the vartabeds and the bishops. Women are not excluded from the functions of the deacon. In Anatolia the Catholic Armenian priests are generally married; elsewhere they observe more freely the law of celibacy, which is not obligatory on them. When a priest has to say Mass, he passes the preceding night in the church. When a priest who is already married has to receive ordination, he spends forty days in the church; then there is a social repast, during which the wife of the priest sits on a stool, and keeps her mouth, her eyes, and her ears shut, as a sign of the reserve which she exercises with regard to the functions of her husband.

LITERATURE.—Galano, *Conciliatio Ecclesiæ Armenæ cum Romana* (Rome, 1690); de Moni, *Histoire critique de la créance et des coutumes des nations du Levant* (Frankfort, 1693); G. Avedichian, *Dissertazione sopra la processione dello Spirito Santo dal Padre e dal Figliuolo* (Venice, 1824), and *Sulle correzioni fatte ai libri ecclesiastici armeni nell' anno 1677* (Venice, 1868); J. B. Asgian, 'La chiesa armena e l'Eutichianismo' in *Bessarione*, vii.; E. Azarian, *Ecclesiæ armenæ traditio de romani pontificis primatu, jurisdictione et inerrabili magisterio* (Rome, 1870); A. Balgy, *Historia doctrinæ catholicæ inter Armenos unionisque eorum cum Ecclesia romana in concilio Florentino* (Vienna, 1878); J. Issaverdenz, *Rites et cérémonies de l'église arménienne* (Venice, 1876); Petit, fasc. vii. col. 1950–1958.

2. Councils.—Besides the councils common to Christianity, the Armenian Church has national councils, of which the following are the most important. Setting aside the traditional accounts relative to the first councils, the authenticity of which is more than doubtful, we must mention the Council of Yashtishat (*c.* 365 A.D.), held under Nerses the Great. Regulations were laid down regarding the laws of marriage, fasting, hospitals, and the schools where the young were taught Greek and Syriac. The laws for the monastic orders were there determined. Later, Sahak is said to have promulgated in A.D. 426, at a Council of Valarshapat, a certain number of rules intended to regulate the observance of festivals, funeral feasts, and the conduct of the clergy and priests. The canons of the Council of Shahapivan (A.D. 447) have for their special aim the refutation of the heresies which invaded Armenian Christianity and threatened to extinguish it. This was also the aim of the Council of Yashtishat (A.D. 449). At the Council of Valarshapat (A.D. 491) the Armenians made common cause with the Georgians and the Albanians in condemning the Council of Chalcedon; and this decision was maintained and affirmed still more definitely at the Council of Tvin (A.D. 525), where the two festivals of Christmas and Epiphany were fixed for the 6th of January. In A.D. 596 another Council of Tvin condemned the Chalcedon decrees. At the Council of Karin (*c.* 633 A.D.), Heraclius summoned the Greeks and Armenians, and had the union between these two nations proclaimed; the festivals of Christmas and Epiphany were fixed for different days, and the formula *qui crucifixus es pro nobis* was removed from the Trisagion. Another Council of Tvin (A.D. 645), condemned once more the Council of Chalcedon. John of Odzun, who is said to have summoned the Council of Manazkert about A.D. 719, gathered into a volume the canons of the Fathers and of the councils previous to the 8th century. About A.D. 770 the Synod of Partav fixed the books of the Old Testament which the Armenians regarded as authentic, and made rules relating to certain details of ecclesiastical discipline. At the Council of Shirakavan, held in A.D. 862, the Armenians accepted the decrees of the Chalcedon Council, anathematized the Councils of Manazkert, settled the articles of their faith in fifteen canons, and made peace with the Greeks. In the reign of Manuel Comnenus, several attempts were made to bring about a union between the Greeks and the Armenians. They resulted in the Council of Rom-Kla (A.D. 1179), at which Nerses of Lambron delivered a discourse on conciliation which is still famous. At the Council of Tarsus (A.D. 1196), Nerses of Lambron delivered another discourse with a view to the union. The Council of Sis (A.D. 1243) laid down rules regarding the election and nomination of priests, bishops, etc.; the Councils of A.D. 1307 and 1316 ratified the preceding ones, and furnish a complete profession of faith of the Armenian Church at this time. In A.D. 1439 the Armenians took part in the Council of Florence.

Along with these principal councils there were a number of special councils and synods, for the decrees of which we refer our readers to the works which deal specially with them.

LITERATURE.—Cl. Galano, *Conciliatio Ecclesiæ armenæ cum Romana* (Rome, 1690); H. Gelzer in *Berichte d. kgl. Sächs. Ges. d. Wiss.* (Leipzig, 1895); J. B. Asgian, 'La Chiesa armena e l'Arianismo' in *Bessarione*, vi.; J. Issaverdens, *Hist. of the Armenian Church* (Venice, 1875); F. C. Conybeare, 'The Armenian Canons of St. Sahak, Catholicos of Armenia' in *AJTh*, vol. ii. (1898), p. 828; Karapet Ter-Mkrttschian, *Die Paulikianer im byzantinischen Kaiserreiche* (Leipzig, 1893); Hefele, *Hist. of the Church Councils* (Eng. tr., Edin., 5 vols., 1896); E. Dulaurier, *Recherches sur la chronologie arménienne* (Paris, 1859), *Historiens arméniens des Croisades* (Paris, 1869), t. i.; *Domini Joannis Ozniensis opera*, ed. by J. B. Aucher (Venice, 1834); E. Azarian, *Ecclesiæ armenæ traditio de romani pontificis primatu* (Rome, 1870); Mgr. Ormanian, *Le Vatican et les Arméniens* (Rome, 1873); P. Hunanian, *Hist. of the Œcumenical Councils of the East* (in Armenian) (Vienna, 1847); Mgr. Abel Mikitariantz, *Hist. of the Councils of the Armenian Church* (in Armenian) (Valarshapat, 1874); the works, in Armenian and in translation, of Koriun, Agathangelos, Elisæus, Eznik, Sebeos, Moses of Chorene; Petit, fasc. vii. col. 1925–1933; J. Dashian, *Catalog der armen. Handschriften . . . zu Wien* (Vienna, 1895); Macler, *s.vv.* 'Conciles,' 'Canons,' and the names of places where the councils were held.

3. Festivals.—The Armenian Church celebrates five principal festivals: Christmas, Easter, Transfiguration, Assumption, and Exaltation of the Holy Cross. The day before these festivals is devoted to the Church, the day after to the commemoration of the dead.

The day before Christmas the poor boys of a village or town go from door to door, or from terrace to terrace, holding in their hands lanterns made from gourds, sing a Christmas carol, and receive fruit and cakes as a reward.

The festival of the Transfiguration (*Vardavar*) is called the Festival of Roses, after an old heathen festival which was celebrated on the same day. On the day preceding this festival, the commemoration of the Tabernacle of the Jews is held. On that day people sprinkle each other with water when they meet in the streets; and in certain provinces of Armenia pigeons are set free, either in recollection of the Deluge, or as a symbol of Astlik, the Armenian Venus.

On the day before the Assumption, the vision of Gregory the Illuminator is commemorated.

According to the canons of the Armenian Church, the priests are allowed to receive as offerings the skin and the right shoulder of the animals sacrificed in the churches on the days of the great festivals, in commemoration of the souls of the dead, or in honour of some great saint.

Other festivals play an important part in the religious life of Armenia. The day before *Candlemas* (Presentation in the Temple), fires are lit in the courts of the churches, and the people dance round them, jump over them, and so on.

The festival of *Vičak* (Fate) is one of the principal Armenian festivals, and one of those which seem to be relics of pagan times. It begins on the day before Ascension Thursday, and lasts till the

Sunday of Pentecost. The day before Ascension the young girls of the village meet together and choose several of their number to organize the festival. The members of this committee take a pitcher made of baked clay, fill it with water drawn from seven fountains or seven wells, and close the mouth of the pitcher with flowers gathered from seven fields; then each of the girls throws some object into it (bracelet, ring, button, bead from a rosary, etc.), wishing at the same time some good wish for her father, brother, or sweetheart. They have to shut their eyes while throwing the object into the pitcher and meditate deeply on their wish. On the Wednesday or Thursday night they hide the pitcher in the corner of a garden in the open air, to expose it to the influence of the stars, and they watch that it is not taken by the boys, who prowl about there all night, and try to discover it and carry it off. If the young men succeed in taking it, they give it back to the girls only in exchange for a large quantity of eggs and olive oil, which they have to offer. If, on the other hand, the young men do not succeed in getting possession of the pitcher, the girls sing songs in which they are made fun of (A. Tchobanian, *Chants populaires arméniens*, pp. 57–59; M. Abeghian, *Armenischer Volksglaube*, Leipzig, 1899, pp. 62–66.

Marriage, baptism, and burial are family festivals which are the occasion of special ceremonies and customs in Armenia.

(*a*) *Marriage.*—'Among the Armenians, children are betrothed from their earliest youth, sometimes when only three years old, sometimes as soon as born. When the mothers on both sides have agreed to marry their son and daughter, they propose the union to their husbands, who always sanction the choice of the wives. The mother of the boy then goes to the friends of the girl, with two old women and a priest, and presents to the infant maiden a ring from the future bridegroom. The boy is then brought, and the priest reads a portion of the Scripture, and blesses the parties. The parents of the girl make the priest a present, in accordance with their means, refreshments are partaken of by the company, and this constitutes the ceremonies of the betrothals. Should the betrothals take place during the infancy of the contracting parties, and even should twenty years elapse before the boy can claim his bride, he must every year, from the day he gives the ring, send his mistress at Easter a new dress,' etc. (Jones, *Finger-ring Lore, historical, legendary, anecdotal*, Lond. 1877, p. 312 f.).

It frequently happens that the bridegroom-elect does not see his betrothed during the engagement. On the marriage day a priest and a sub-deacon go to the house of the bride. The bridegroom arrives there with great pomp, and receives for that day the title of *king*, while the bride is called *queen*. The latter is then veiled, the priest says some prayers and blesses the young husband and wife, and then they set out for the church, where the nuptial blessing is pronounced and Mass is celebrated. The priest places on the head of each a crown, which they retain from three days to a week. The company sing wedding hymns on the way to and from the church. After a few days the priest goes and receives back the crowns, and then the young people's married life begins. Marriage cannot be celebrated during fasts or the dominical festivals, of which there are about 260 in the year.

(*b*) *Baptism.*—A short time after the birth of a child, the parents and the god-father carry him to church. They stop at the entrance, and the priest recites some prayers, after which they go into the church, making as many genuflexions as the number of days of the child's life, and the god-father makes confession. Then the infant's clothes are taken off, and he is immersed three times, his head turned towards the west, his feet towards the east, and his face towards the sky. After the baptismal water the priest anoints the child's head several times with holy oil, and clothes him in a linen robe. The child is then made to adore the Cross, and is taken home in state.

(*c*) *Burial.*—The day before that on which the body is to be carried to the church, the relatives, neighbours, and friends of the deceased meet in the house, each bringing a lamp with three or seven wicks, which they arrange, all lighted, round the coffin, and then they begin to sing in turn some funeral hymns. On All Souls' days (Christmas, Easter, Assumption, Transfiguration, Invention of the Cross) the families invite a popular poet to sing over the grave at the cemetery the praises of the person who has just died (A. Tchobanian, *op. cit.* p. 119). For some days after the funeral ceremony the priest goes to visit the relatives of the deceased; then on the Saturday of this week of mourning the relatives and friends meet and take part in a social repast, the remains of which are distributed among the poor.

LITERATURE.—E. Boré, *Arménie* (Paris, 1838); J. Issaverdenz, *Rites et cérémonies de l'église arménienne* (Venice, 1876); Petit, fasc. vii.; A. Tchobanian, *Chants populaires arméniens* (Paris, 1903), *Les Trouvères arméniens* (Paris, 1906), p. 130; F. C. Conybeare, *Rituale Armenorum* (Oxford, 1906).

4. Saints of the Armenian Church.—A glance at the Armenian Menology will suffice to show that the Armenian Church has adopted a large number of the saints of the Greek and Latin Churches. It has, besides, its national saints, for whom it has naturally great veneration. The principal of these are St. Rhipsime and St. Gaiana, who fled from Rome to avoid the carnal desires of the Emperor, and took refuge in Armenia, where their blood was shed for the cause of the gospel; the saintly translators, Moses of Chorene, David the Philosopher, Eznik of Kolb, Elisæus the Vartabed, St. Mesrop; and St. Sahak, St. Leo, St. Nerses Shnorhali, St. Nerses of Lambron, St. Gregory the Illuminator, and St. Nerses I. the Great. St. Vardan is the national saint and patriot *par excellence*. When Armenia was struggling in the 5th cent. against Persia and the introduction of Mazdaism, Vardan Mamikonian became the moving spirit in a general insurrection and in the struggle of Armenian Christianity against the Zoroastrian religion. He perished at the battle of Avarair; but the agitation for independence started by him continued for many years. St. Sarkis (Sargis or Sergius) is the saint invoked by prisoners, captives, those with difficulties to face, and especially by young girls in order to obtain a handsome sweetheart. If it snows at the festival of St. Jacob or St. James, it is said that the beard of the saint is falling on the earth. St. Karapet (John the Baptist) is regarded in Armenia as the most influential of the saints. His seat is at Mush, where his relics are found in the church named after him, which is one of the principal places of pilgrimage of the Armenians. Women are forbidden to enter the enclosure within which is the tomb of the saint, because it was women, Herodias and Salome, who caused John the Baptist to be beheaded. Young girls give a needle to friends going to kiss the tomb, begging them to rub it against the tombstone, so that they may be able with this sanctified needle to produce marvellous embroidery. Young women cannot go and kiss the tomb unless they make a vow never to marry. Those who have made this vow are allowed to sing with the choir during Mass (A. Tchobanian, *Chants populaires arméniens*, p. 149, n. 1). According to John Mamikonian, a very pious Armenian princess who was determined to enter the sanctuary was almost immediately smitten by Heaven as a pun-

ishment for her presumption (V. Langlois, *Collection des historiens anc. et mod. de l'Arménie*, i. 348, 362 f.). St. Karapet is the patron of the bards (*trouvères*), who go on pilgrimage to ask him to heighten their poetic imagination.

LITERATURE.—H. F. B. Lynch, *Armenia, Travels and Studies* (London, 1901); A. Tchobanian, *Les Trouvères arméniens* (Paris, 1906); 'Zenob de Klag' and 'Jean Mamikonian' in V. Langlois, *Collection des historiens anc. et. mod. de l'Arménie* (Paris, 1867), t. i.

5. Sects.—Armenian Christianity, in the course of the centuries, has had to struggle against the assaults of different sects and heresies in order to preserve its homogeneity. Gnosticism penetrated into Armenia in the 2nd cent.; Marcionism also crept into the Armenian Church and was refuted by Eznik (*Des Wardapet Eznik von Kolb, wider die Sekten*, tr. by Joh. Michael Schmid, Vienna, 1900, p. 172). About the same time are found traces of the Borboriani and the Messalians, of which sects the Paulicians seem to be a continuation through the Middle Ages. Mention is made also of the existence of Adoptianist churches as early as the 3rd century. The most important sect of the Middle Ages was that of the Paulicians, famous for their struggle against the worship of images. It has been established by Conybeare that they were Adoptianists. They believed that Jesus was born a man, and that He became Christ at the moment of His baptism; but they did not regard Him as equal to God the Father. The Paulicians practised adult baptism. The Thondracians, a sect founded about A.D. 820 by Smbat, rejected infant baptism, the worship of the saints, of the Virgin and of images, purgatory and the hierarchy. There still exist in the Caucasus some adherents of this sect. The Arevordians ('Sons of the Sun') are met with in the 12th cent.; their doctrine recalls the old ideas of Armenian paganism.

LITERATURE.—*Nersetis Clajensis opera omnia*, ed. J. Cappelletti (Venice, 1833); *Domini Joannis Ozniensis philosophi Armeniorum catholici opera*, ed. J. B. Aucher (Venice, 1834); Karapet Ter-Mkrttschian, *Die Paulikianer im byzantinischen Kaiserreiche und verwandte ketzerische Erscheinungen in Armenien* (Leipzig, 1893); 'Die Thondrakier in unsern Tagen' in *Zeitschr. für Kirchengeschichte* (1893); F. C. Conybeare, *The Key of Truth, a Manual of the Paulician Church of Armenia* (Oxford, 1898); Petit, fasc. vii. col. 1900; S. Weber, *Die katholische Kirche in Armenien* (Freiburg, 1903).

6. Superstitions and Peculiarities.—The Armenians, although Christians, have, like other Christian peoples, popular beliefs and superstitions which have passed down through the ages. The peasant women believe that there exist three *spirits of childbirth*—the spirits of the evenings of Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday. The first two are virgins and sisters, and the third is their young brother. If the wives have not spent the evenings of Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday with their husbands, these spirits aid them in childbirth. The Sunday spirit remains near the door of the birth-chamber and fulfils all his sisters' orders; he carries water and eggs, makes the fire, etc. The two sisters take the child, bathe it and prepare the omelet for the mother; and sometimes they present a gift to the newly-born child. But these spirits are also vindictive; and when a woman does not respect them, they avenge themselves by tormenting her, and sometimes by killing the baby (*Revue des traditions populaires*, x. [1895] 2). Each child has from its birth a guardian angel who protects him against evil spirits. This angel's duty is to cut the child's nails and amuse him with the golden apple which he holds in his hand. When the child is old enough, the guardian angel goes back to heaven. The child smiles to him and stretches out his little arms (*ib.* x. 4). The Armenian peasants believe also that *spirits of disease* exist. They are small in stature and wear triangular hats; and they hold in their hands a white, a red, and a black branch. If they strike any one with the white branch, he will fall ill, but will soon recover; if it is with the red, he will have to stay in bed for a long time; but if it is with the black, then it is all over with him, and nothing will cure him. The spirits have books in which are written the names of the men who must die or fall ill, and the appointed days; and the spirits act according to these books. The people believe also that there is a spirit called the 'Writer' (*Grol*), who writes men's names and the date of their death in a book called the 'book of the non-existent.'

The *devs* are tyrants possessing seven heads. They can throw the largest rocks a great distance. Their wrestling is like the shock of mountains, which causes lava to pour forth. The female *dev* is about the size of a hill; she throws back her left breast over her right shoulder, and her right breast over her left shoulder. The *devs* prefer to dwell in very thick forests or deep caverns. They are very rich in gold and silver, and possess horses of fire which enable them to cover great distances in the twinkling of an eye. *Devs* covet the company of young women of the human race, to whom they grant everything they ask. The young men are continually at war with the *devs* in order to get back the women, who show the men how to carry out ruses by which they may become the masters of the *devs*, who are ignorant, cowardly, boastful, and narrow-minded (*RTP* x. 193–196; Grikor Chalatianz, *Märchen und Sagen*, Leipzig, 1887, pp. xiv–xx). The witches are old women who have a tail which is not visible during infancy, but which develops with age. They can become invisible when they wish, enter anywhere, and cross the world in a few minutes. They mount on earthen jars, take in their hands a serpent which serves as a whip, and, flying to the seventh heaven, pass over all the universe. They act chiefly in love intrigues. Their ordinary business is to enchant the heart of a young man or woman, carry off a young girl in spite of her parents, and kill the irreconcilable rival or make him fall asleep (*RTP* x. 196). There are also good sorcerers, who are quite disposed, with the aid of supernatural powers, to render service to human beings (G. Chalatianz, *Märchen und Sagen*, p. xxxi ff.; F. Macler, *Contes arméniens*, Paris, 1905). The Armenians believe also in the existence of dragons, and possess numerous tales and legends which refer to these supernatural beings. The Armenians, especially those of Eastern Armenia, make great use of *rolls of prayers* containing magical or talismanic formulas, intended to protect them against the evil eye, slander, the anger of enemies, against sorcerers and enchanters, false love, and the bite of serpents, to conciliate lords, kings, generals, and the great, and to exorcize demons and other impure beings. These rolls of prayers are called *kiprianos*, or rather *girpaharan*, because they include prayers attributed to St. Cyprian. They are generally ornamented with vignettes, which belong to somewhat rudimentary art, but are very much used by the people (see 'Amulette' and 'Cyprianus-Buch' in P. Jacobus Dashian, *Catalog der armenischen Handschriften in der Mechitharistenbibliothek zu Wien*, Vienna, 1895; Macler, Nos. 97–102).

LITERATURE.—M. Abeghian, *Armenischer Volksglaube* (Leipzig, 1899); G. Chalatianz, *Märchen und Sagen* (Leipzig, 1887); H. von Wlislocki, *Märchen und Sagen der Bukowinaer und Siebenbürger Armenier* (Hamburg, 1892); A. G. Seklemian, *The Golden Maiden, and other Folk-Tales and Fairy Stories told in Armenia* (Cleveland, Ohio, 1898).

IV. ARMENIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OR ARMENIAN CATHOLICS.—There have been in almost all times Armenians who recognized more or less the supremacy of Rome. But it was recognized

only in a sporadic and casual way until the time of the Crusades, when the Armenians of the kingdom of Cilicia, or Lesser Armenia, were in constant contact with the Crusaders, and consequently with the Roman Curia. Later, in the 14th cent., Dominican missionaries founded influential communities of disciples in Armenia. These were the class of native missionaries known as 'Uniters' (*unitores*), and had as their first superior John of Kerni (or of Khrna). He had a translation made of the works of Bartholomew of Bologne, who was sent to Armenia by Pope John XXII. in 1318 (Macler, No. 149). Subsequently, especially in the 17th cent., other orders established missions among the Armenians, particularly among the Armenians of Persia: the Augustinians at Iṣfahān, the Jesuits at Iṣfahān, Julfa, Erivan, etc. The French Lazarists settled at Tauris and at Iṣfahān. Soon all the communities extended their ramifications into all the principal Armenian centres of the East—Iṣfahān, Ormuz, Shiraz, Banderabbas, Hamadan, Shamakia, Erzerum, Trebizond, etc.

Until the middle of the 18th cent., Catholic Armenians did not form an autonomous community; now they have a hierarchy of their own, a recognized religious autonomy, and a patriarch who resides at Constantinople. These results have sprung from the dissensions which occurred between 1737 and 1740 in connexion with the catholicate of Sis in Cilicia. The Catholicos of Sis was deposed, and he retired to Lebanon, where he founded the convent of Bzommar and a new religious order. This new state of things caused intestine quarrels between the Catholic and the Gregorian Armenians. We may note especially the quarrel of the Hassunists and the publication of the Bull *Reversurus*.

LITERATURE.—Galano, *Conciliatio Ecclesiæ armenæ cum romana* (Rome, 1690); E. Scrosoppi, *L'Empire ottoman au point de vue politique vers le milieu de la seconde moitié du xixe siècle* (Florence, 1875); A. Balgy, *Historia doctrinæ catholicæ inter Armenos* (Vienna, 1878); A. Boré, *L'Arménie* (Paris, 1838); L. Alishan, *Sisacan, contrée de l'Arménie* (Venice, 1893), an art. devoted to the 'United Brethren' in the cantons of Erinjak; de Damas, *Coup d'œil sur l'Arménie* (Paris, 1888); J. B. Piolet, *Les Missions catholiques au xixe siècle* (Paris, 1900); H. F. B. Lynch, *Armenia, Travels and Studies* (London, 1901); Petit, fasc. vii.; S. Weber, *Die katholische Kirche in Armenien* (Freiburg, 1903). For the disputes which have arisen over the subject of Avedik and Aghtamar see *Bibliographie analytique des ouvrages de M. Marie-Félicité Brosset* (St. Petersburg, 1887); Dashian, *Catal. der arm. Hndschr. in der Mechitharistenbibl. zu Wien* (Vienna, 1895); F. Macler, *Catal. des manuscrits arm. et géorg. de la Bibliothèque Nationale* (Paris, 1908).

V. *PROTESTANT ARMENIANS.*—The work of the Protestant missions among the Armenians dates from the beginning of the 19th century. It was specially prosperous from the day on which the Sublime Porte granted independence to the Protestant community. The Protestant missions in Armenia belong, on the one hand, to the Missionary Societies of England and America, and, on the other, to those of Basel. They have stations in the most important centres of Turkey in Asia, and some in Persia (Tauris, Teherān, Iṣfahān), and in Russia (Shusha, Tiflis). There are nearly 200 pupils in the Robert College at Constantinople; the college at Scutari is reserved for girls.

LITERATURE.—E. Scrosoppi, *L'Empire ottoman au point de vue politique vers le milieu de la seconde moitié du xixe siècle* (Florence, 1875), pp. 78–81; H. F. B. Lynch, *Armenia, Travels and Studies* (London, 1901); Petit, fasc. vii. col. 1920.

VI. *MUSALMĀN ARMENIANS.*—The attachment of the Armenians to Christianity is well known, and when they are abroad their religion stands to them in the place of nationality. In spite of this love of their religion, some Armenians, persecuted by the Musalmāns, have adopted Muhammadanism. Thus, two or three centuries ago, the Armenians of Hamshen, to the east of Trebizond, after some bloody massacres, accepted in thousands the law of Islām. They are therefore Turks, but they speak a dialect which betrays their Armenian origin. The Kurds, it is said, are ancient Armenians who have passed under the law of Islām.

About 1751, a certain Chalabi, who was very fanatical, associated himself with the Persian Musalmāns, and conceived the plan of massacring the Armenians if they would not be converted to Muhammadanism. He tortured them first, cutting off their ears so that they might not hear the singing in church, cutting out their tongues so that they might not speak their mother language, and putting out their eyes to strike fear into the other Christians. Chalabi inflicted these tortures on the poor, and granted honours and titles to the rich to impose silence on them. By this means thousands of Armenian families became Musalmāns, especially in the province of Oudi. In this province above all, the Muhammadans destroyed the churches and Christian sanctuaries, so that the Christians might the more quickly forget their original religion. In the province of Oudi many names recall their Armenian origin; at Gis is found a much venerated sanctuary of St. Elisæus. The Musalmāns as well as the Christians make pilgrimages to it, light candles, and address very fervent prayers to the saint; and in several villages in the neighbourhood of this sanctuary the Musalmān Armenians swear by St. Elisæus. They have preserved some old Christian customs. For example, when a mother is putting her child to sleep, she makes the sign of the cross over it, and murmurs the name of Jesus. When the paste is prepared, a young Armeno-Musalmān wife makes a cross on it with her fore-arm before putting it into the oven. The Armeno-Musalmān villagers of the province of Oudi are very bigoted and very suspicious; they distrust all foreigners, and never speak of matters of religion.

In Lasistan, also, several Armenian villages have become converted to Islām, from fear of tortures and massacres. There are found among them the same traces of Christianity as among their brothers of Oudi and elsewhere.

LITERATURE.—*Aghouanits erkir tev dratsikh* (Tiflis, 1893); *Loys*, Calendar for 1905 (Tiflis, 1904), pp. 191–196 (both in Armenian).

VII. *ARMENIAN COLONIES.*—There are Armenian colonies spread over all parts of the world; for example, in Europe: Poland, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Russia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Transylvania, Roumania, Lower Danube, Macedonia, Greece, Dalmatia, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, etc.; in Asia: Persia, Afghanistan, India, Japan, Palestine, China, etc.; in Africa: Egypt, Ethiopia; in America: United States; the English and Dutch Indies, Batavia, etc. These colonists generally lose their nationality, and adopt that of the country in which they are living; but they remain faithful to their religion, which is now the bond of the Armenian nation, since they no longer have a political autonomy.

LITERATURE.—L. Alishan, *Sisacan* (Venice, 1893).

FRÉDÉRIC MACLER.

ARMINIANISM.—1. Occasion of Arminianism.—Arminianism was a revolt against certain aspects of Calvinism, of far-reaching importance in the history of the Reformed Theology. It took place in the dawn of the 17th century. Against the Catholic absolutism of the external Church, Calvinism had set the absolutism of the eternal decrees. The situation was rigid with a new dogmatism. A recoil was inevitable. Many symptoms of dissent were manifest before Arminianism arose as a definite reaction. After Calvin's death, the more rigorous Calvinistic divines, including Beza, asserted that the Divine decree to salvation, being antecedent to the Fall, required for its

accomplishment the decree to sin. Sin was ordained not as an end, but as a means; it is here because there was something that God could not accomplish without it. What is first in the Divine intention is last in the Divine execution.* The primal purpose was the decree to save. But if man is to be saved, he must first be lost. Hence the Fall was decreed as a consequence of a decreed salvation. Those who held this position were Supralapsarians. It is doubtful whether Calvin himself held it. More moderate exponents of Calvinism connected the Fall with the permission of God, instead of with His foreordination. The Divine decree takes the existence of sin for granted, deals with man as fallen, and elects or rejects him for reasons profoundly indifferent to human judgment. This was the Infralapsarian position. An unequal rivalry between the exponents of these two schools was the immediate occasion of the rise of Arminianism. In Holland, which, in the 17th cent., owing largely to the immigration from France of Protestant theologians of distinction, had become, more than Switzerland, the centre of theological activity, the extreme views of the Supralapsarians found much favour. An acute and effective criticism was directed against them by James Arminius (Jacobus Arminius or Jakob Harmensen or Van Herman; also known as Veteraquinas, from *Veteres Aquæ* or Oudewater, the name of his birthplace). Arminius, who was born in 1560 and died in 1609, was a scholar of considerable reputation. He had studied at Leyden, resided at Geneva, and travelled in Italy; he was a learned and popular preacher at Amsterdam, with a pastoral career marked by fidelity and heroism; eventually he became, in 1603, professor of theology at Leyden. Even his enemies testified to his blameless and noble character. He was a consummate controversialist and a lucid expositor, with a remarkable gift of method. Trusted by the Supralapsarian leaders, he was requested in 1589 to answer Theodore Koornhert, of Amsterdam, who had attacked the high Calvinistic doctrine of Beza and the Genevan school, of which Arminius had been a distinguished disciple. Others had already replied to Koornhert, who were disposed to surrender Beza's extreme position in favour of one equivalent to Infralapsarianism. In preparing his reply, a process of doubt culminated in Arminius embracing the tenets he had undertaken to refute. He clearly perceived that the doctrine of the absolute decrees involved God as the author of sin; that it unworthily restrained His grace; and, leaving myriads without hope, condemned them for believing that for them there was no salvation either intended or provided in Christ. He saw, moreover, that it gave to those who believed themselves to be the elect a false security based upon no sufficient ethical principle. Arminius' conversion was succeeded by cogent criticism; and criticism by prolonged controversies, during which he was led by successive and careful stages to a luminous and impressive constructive exposition of those theological positions antagonistic to Calvinism which have since been associated with his name. Though it is probable that Arminius himself was less Arminian than his followers, yet the most distinguished of these, Episcopius (his successor at Leyden), Uyttenbogaert (his close friend), Limborch and Grotius, who most ably elaborated his positions—all men of great talents—only carried his conclusions to issues which the early death of Arminius probably prevented him from reaching. Arminianism spread amongst the clergy. Political differences and difficulties confused the purely doctrinal issue. Great statesmen, like Olden Barneveld, advocated Arminianism and Republicanism, as Calvinists preferred Supralapsarianism and Maurice, Prince of Orange. The martyrs for Arminianism probably suffered for political rather than for doctrinal heresy. From the beginning the Arminians were greatly outnumbered by their opponents. Their main strength lay in the genius and learning of their leaders. Dialectically they were victors; ecclesiastically and politically they were vanquished. With their defeat came many disabilities and some temporary persecution.

* *Cambr. Mod. Hist.* ii. 717.

2. **Doctrinal positions.**—The creed of the Arminians was set forth in the Five Articles of the Remonstrance addressed in 1610 to the States-General of Holland and West Friesland, from which fact its adherents received the name of Remonstrants. The articles were drawn up by Uyttenbogaert and signed by forty-six ministers. The Remonstrance is first negative, stating the five Calvinistic articles in order to reject them, and then positive, stating the five points of the Arminian position. Briefly summarized, the following are their positions. The first asserts conditional election, or election dependent on the foreknowledge by God of faith in the elect and of unbelief in those who are left in sin and under condemnation. The second asserts universal atonement in the sense that it is intended, although it is not actually efficient, for all. The third asserts the inability of man to exercise saving faith, or to accomplish anything really good without regeneration by the Holy Spirit. The fourth declares that the grace of God is indispensable in every step of the spiritual life, but that it is not irresistible. The fifth asserts that the grace of the Holy Spirit is sufficient for continual victory over temptation and sin; but the necessity of the final Perseverance of all believers is left doubtful. This last article was afterwards so modified by the followers of Arminius as to assert the possibility of falling from grace.

Gomarus, the university colleague of Arminius, but his chief antagonist in personal controversy, now engineered a counter-Remonstrance drawn up in less moderate terms. Negotiations for peace failed. An embittered controversy became involved with political intrigue. The famous Synod of Dort was assembled (1618–9) more to exercise ecclesiastical discipline than to reconcile the disputants. The Arminian theologians were excluded, and the Synod constituted itself accuser and judge. The Arminian articles were condemned, their preachers deposed, and recalcitrants banished. The Synod promulgated five heads of doctrine of its own, which present Calvinism in its unadulterated but not in its extreme form. Within the Arminian system processes of development set in, all moving in the direction of liberalism and comprehension. These will be noted in their place. Our present interest is with the leading principles of Arminianism. These are: (*a*) the universality of the benefit of the Atonement; (*b*) a restored freedom of the human will as an element in the Divine decrees and in opposition to the assertion of the absolute sovereignty of God. Apart from these and kindred questions involved in the problem of predestination, Arminianism has no definite theological distinctness. It attempts no fresh statement of the doctrines of God and man. These were accepted as they stood in the recognized creeds and confessions of Christendom; its general theological system was that of the orthodox Protestant Churches. But its specific contribution was of sufficient importance to rank it amongst the few really outstanding and permanent developments in theological thought. The three fundamental terms of theological definition and discussion—God, Man, and the essential re-

lations between them—are represented in the three great controversies of historical theology by the names of Athanasius, Augustine, and Arminius. Athanasius represents the movement which gave specific definition to the Church's doctrine of the Divine nature. Augustine stands as the great exponent of the inner moral significance of human nature and of the relation of the individual to the race. Arminius found his place as the interpreter of the ethical relations between God and man. His system recognized and expounded the developed doctrine of God and of man, which the Church had long accepted as established positions, but which her theologians had never satisfactorily related. Calvin had revived Augustinianism, and had pushed it to further logical issues. He made much of God, as Pelagius had made too much of man. Both gave isolation and distance to terms that could be completed only in mutual relations. Neither provided a scheme of reconcilation. The aim of Arminius was to express with dialectic vigour the only doctrinal position consistent with the necessary relations between God and man. This relation within the sphere of the provision and administration of redemption provided the points of controversy between his system and that of Calvin. The mission of Arminianism was to show how God could be what the Church taught He was, and man what the Church declared him to be, at one and the same time. The mode of re-adjustment of the disturbed and abnormal relations of man to God by justification was the central point of Protestant theology generally; the announcement and the ethical interpretation of the significance of the mutual relations between God and man in that adjustment was the contribution to theology offered by Arminianism. Its system is a *via media*; it strove to avoid sources of inevitable and historical error arising from the tendency to magnify either of the related terms by the virtual or formal suppression of the other. The exaltation of the Divine agency to the complete suppression of the human in that adjustment issued in simple Determinism; the exaltation of the human in complete suppression of the Divine in the same sphere led to the extreme positions of Pelagianism. Arminianism claimed to have stated, for the first time, with scientific care a balanced judgment on those relations of God and man in which their harmony and mutual recognition could be stated as a working principle, verifiable and verified by experience.*

To appreciate the *theological* value of Arminianism, it is important to review and interpret the points which differentiate it from Calvinism. To estimate its influence philosophically, it is needful to state and illustrate its two great principles—its ethical recognition of justice, and the emphasis it lays upon the human in the redemptive relations between God and man.

3. Criticism of Calvinism.—Arminianism regarded the Calvinistic position as open to attack on two sides—the side of God and the side of man. Its treatment of these was considered to be disproportioned and ethically unfair. The sphere in which God exercised His will was the soul of man. That will, therefore, concerned man and his acts. If such acts were performed solely because God had so determined, two consequences followed:—the acts would reveal the quality of the will, and man would not be consciously free; he would know himself as an instrument rather than as an agent. The criticism was urged therefore as much in the interest of man and of morality as of theology. In fact, Arminianism was at the bottom an attempt to formulate a protest against Calvinism from an ethical standpoint. It used much circumspection in the attempt. It carefully rejected, with Calvinism itself, the pagan leaven, which had lingered in the old Church, in the form of reliance placed upon human nature alone. But it renewed the sense of reality to human responsibility, and emphasized the moral conditions of reward and penalty. At the same time it sought to give psychological consistency, especially by its great doctrine of prevenient grace, to the common Protestant principle that man is entirely dependent, in all that concerns his salvation, upon the grace of the Spirit of God. The task undertaken by Arminianism was to re-state what was regarded as the primitive and Scriptural view, held by the Church before Augustine, concerning the relation between God and man in the work of salvation; and in this view the sole responsibility of man for his own damnation was evident. The criticism of Calvinism, therefore, found centres of attack in the following five points:—

(1) *Predestination.*—This the Calvinist held to be absolute and unconditioned. The decree to elect was without foresight of faith or of good works. In its operation the Divine will was unmotived from without, moved only from within, either by the grace or by the necessity of the Divine nature. The decree to reprobation was conditioned by no specific demerit of the reprobate. He was not distinguished in or by his personal sin. His reprobation was simply because of sinfulness of nature or habit, which, being common to all men, involved all men in equal guilt and penalty. No ethical difference was discernible between elect and reprobate. The Arminian criticism insisted on the ethical incompleteness of this view. The principle of the election of grace is maintained. The Divine will is absolutely supreme. But its supremacy is moral. God is not more bound to punish than to forgive. The Divine decree, whether elective or reprobatory, is conditional throughout. God elected to salvation or to reprobation only those whose faith or final disbelief He foresaw. The Divine foreknowledge logically precedes the Divine volitions; it is not an inference from them; it is intuitive, but not necessitative. What God knows, though its issue is absolutely certain, is not necessitated by that cognition.

(2) *Atonement.*—The Calvinist held the Atonement to be strictly limited. Its relation to the non-elect was incidental; its intention was for the elect alone. For them its efficacy was absolute. It so satisfied Divine justice on their behalf that they could not fail to be saved. For were any lost, the penalty of sin would be twice inflicted—once upon Christ and again on the sinner for whom He had died. This was a thing impossible to Divine justice. The Arminian held that the Atonement was universal. It was of infinite value, designed for all, accomplished for all. It made the salvation of no man actual, but rendered the salvation of all men possible, the result being in every case conditioned by faith. Christ died for all, but only believers receive the benefit.

The character of Arminian theology is illustrated in one of its most important writings, the treatise of Grotius on the *Satisfaction of Christ*, written in opposition to Socinianism. He develops the doctrine towards an issue not strictly in harmony with the position of Arminius, by stating what is known as the Governmental Theory. Both aimed at mediating between the rigorous Anselmic view of a satisfaction which is the substitution of a strict equivalent for the penalty due to sin and the Socinian rejection of all vicarious intervention. They agree that the atoning reparation satisfied not the rigorous exaction of Divine justice, but chiefly the just and compassionate will of God, emphasizing the love rather than the justice of God as honoured in the Atonement. The death of Christ is not the payment of a debt to a creditor, but a substitution counted sufficient by God the Father for a judicial penalty. Grotius emphasized the relation of God to man as a Ruler, and carried out the Arminian conception of 'the wrath of God' as His goodness regulated by wisdom. He regarded the motive of the Divine government as the desire and provision for the happi-

* *Amer. Meth. Qtly. Rev.* (1857) 346.

ness of the governed. In this rectoral relation the ruler has a right to remit a penalty, provided the end for which the penalty was appointed is otherwise attained. This end is the preservation of order and the prevention of future transgressions. The death of Christ as a 'penal example' secures this end, showing impressively what sin deserves and what the penalty would be were it actually inflicted on the transgressor. It is a manifestation of the Lawgiver's hatred of sin. It is not actual punishment, but rather the symbol of it. As it is not the literal penalty, God may freely determine what other conditions for bestowing pardon are suitable. In the light of the Calvinistic view of the absolute sovereignty, this rectoral theory was a surrender of the theory of satisfaction. But the Arminianism of Arminius laid much stress on the inflexibility of God's righteousness, which consists, according to Episcopius, in maintaining His truthfulness in attaching a penalty to His commandments. Episcopius himself, however, still held to a modified Anselmic position by regarding the sacrifice of Christ as a price; because God is willing so to regard it. Limborch is a closer representative of Arminianism. He asserted that Christ suffered as a Divinely appointed sacrifice, and reconciled God to man as if the sinner had suffered himself. Arminianism generally renounces the commutative theory of exact and mutual compensation, since some perish for whom Christ died.*

(3) *Depravity.*—The Calvinist held this to be total, involving bondage of the will and inability to any spiritual good. By the Fall the nature of man was poisoned at its inmost core, and original holiness and righteousness changed into absolute depravity. No distinction was made between imputed guilt and inherent depravity. Arminianism held that depravity was a bias, which left the will free and man responsible for his own destiny through the choice of faith or unbelief. The Adamic unity of the race was preserved, but its inherited tendencies to evil were met and neutralized by the free and universal grace communicated to the race in Christ—the second Adam. Absolute reprobation cannot therefore be based upon the doctrine of original sin. Arminianism denied that the sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity in the sense of their being guilty of, and chargeable with, the sin Adam had committed. A clear distinction is made between actual and original sin. The free gift of grace to the whole race in Christ is the foundation of the entire Arminian system. Its great contribution to the discussion of sin was the decisive assertion of the doctrine of prevenient grace, due to the universal diffusion of the influences of the Holy Spirit, and consequently the acceptance in every age of those who strove after natural uprightness. Grace, therefore, though not the solitary, is yet the primary cause of salvation. To this primary cause is due the co-operation of freewill; for upon its stimulus by grace prevenient depends the co-operation of the will with grace efficient.

Later Arminianism declined in some degree from this position. Less exalted views of the original state of man were current. To preserve intact the original freedom of the will, the conception of a primitive state of perfect holiness was discounted. A state of primitive innocence must have been allied with primitive ignorance. It was also doubted whether immortality originally belonged to the nature of man. With milder views of original sin greater stress was laid on the physical impurity of human nature; it was also denied that its corruption had in it the true characteristics of sin. The inclinations to evil inherited from Adam are not in themselves blameworthy; they are only different in degree from the same appetites in Adam. It is only consent to them that becomes real guilt. The 'innate liberty of the human will' was regarded as able to co-operate of itself with the Divine law. The Arminianism of Methodism reverted to the earlier position, holding that whatever power there is in the human will—in its ability or its choice—is the issue of redemption. No ability remains in man to return to God. The co-operation of grace is of grace. The Augustinian idea of 'common grace' is rejected in favour of the co-ordinating of the universality of grace with the universality of redemption. No man is found in a state of mere nature; nor, unless he has finally quenched the Spirit, is he wholly devoid of the grace of God. The virtues of unregenerate man are not *splendida vitia*, but works of the Spirit. Such virtues are a universal experience of the race. If Adam brought a universal condemnation and seed of death upon all infants, so Christ brings upon all a general justification and a universal seed of life.

(4) *Conversion.*—Both Calvinist and Arminian regard this as the work of the Holy Spirit. But Calvinism maintained the grace of God to be irresistible. The calling of God was both effectual and efficacious, and due to the immediate operation of the Spirit of God upon the soul. The Arminian asserted that the Divine action was mediate, through the truth, and thus moral and persuasive, as distinguished from physical and necessitating. Moreover, the grace which is effective to the processes of repentance and renewal may be finally resisted. The firm maintenance of universal redemption by Arminianism naturally affected its theory of justification at many points. Whilst holding, in common with the Reformed standards generally, that Christ's obedience is the only meritorious cause of justification, and faith its sole instrumental cause, and that good works have no kind of merit, Arminianism did not distinguish between the active and passive obedience of Christ. Gradually also it denied the direct imputation of Christ's righteousness. Faith came to be regarded as justifying, not as an instrument uniting the soul to Christ, but as an imperfect righteousness, which is mercifully accepted by God as if it were perfect. Whilst repudiating the view that works merit salvation, the Arminians asserted that the faith which justifies is regarded by God as a faith which includes obedience. This is the position both of Arminius himself and of his followers. It is allied with a tendency, distinctly marked, to define faith in terms of intellectual assent rather than as trust. It became a simple reception of the doctrines and laws of revealed religion. The influence of grace was by no means merely of a moral nature. It wrought in and accompanied the word of God. Its influence therefore, whilst supernatural in its character, was in its mode of operation analogous to the natural power of all truth. This tendency to invest faith with merit as a means of justification was suspected of approaching ultimately the Roman doctrine of merit by works on the one side, and of favouring the antinomian tendencies which had been condemned as inherent in Calvinism, on the other. A fair criticism of its attitude applied to it the term *Neonomianism*, because of its supposed introduction of a new law—the law of grace—according to which the legal righteousness for ever impossible to man finds a human substitute in an evangelical righteousness accepted of God, though imperfect, for Christ's sake. The title detected the perilous tendency, which the later history of Arminianism did not escape, of the notion that Christ has lowered the demands and standard of the moral law.

Methodist Arminianism met these tendencies in two ways:—(1) It declared that, though God requires faith, it is also His gift. He does in Christ pardon the imperfection of the good work wrought by faith, but He does not repute it as perfect so far as concerns our justification. This would be the imputation of righteousness to the believer himself. It is the faith of the ungodly which is reckoned for righteousness, even before it can produce its first act towards good works. (2) There was the definite insistence in Methodist theology upon the necessity as well as the possibility of entire sanctification. This teaching formulates and urges the demand that faith must be justified by works. It protests against the distinct imputation of the active obedience to man, whilst it clings to the imputation of Christ's righteousness generally. The Methodist teaching on entire sanctification was quite in harmony with the main contentions for which Arminianism stands, and ought to be regarded as a supplement to the views of the early Arminians, who wrote much on the question of Christian perfection. They left its principles and processes, however, largely indefinite. Compelled by their theological convictions, they maintained that such holiness as God reputes perfect may be attained in this life. If grace is free, it will be full. They distinguished between a first perfection of the beginning of Christianity, a second of the unimpeded progress of regeneration, and a third of established maturity of grace. Of the means, assurance, and limitations of the last stage they made no positive declaration. Perfection is proportionate and progressive. It is not sinlessness, but the 'expulsive power of a new affection,' excluding the habit of sin. Arminianism exhibits its doctrine more in opposition to the Roman works of supererogation or Calvinistic antinomianism than in its profound relation to sin and

* Pope, *Compp. Christ. Theol.* ii. 312.

love, and to evangelical perfection. Arminius writes: 'While I never asserted that a believer could perfectly keep the precepts of Christ in this life, I never denied it; but always left it as a matter to be decided' (*Works*, i. 608). The vital question of the abolition of sin was never, either by Arminius or his successors, decided upon. His protest against ultra-Calvinism was taken up by the German Pietists, and, in purer form, by the English Platonists, who prepared the way for the Methodist modification of doctrine on this subject, which was both mystical and ethical. Its chief contribution was the emphasis laid upon entire sanctification of the believer, as a provision of the covenant of grace, directly administered by the Holy Spirit, in response to faith—a faith working by love, and retained by constant union through faith with the living Christ (see METHODISM).

(5) *Final Perseverance.*—The Calvinist held the indefectibility of the saints. Men unconditionally elected, absolutely purchased by the death of Christ, and irresistibly called out of their depraved and lost estate by the direct operation of the Holy Spirit, could not possibly fall from grace. The Arminian criticism hesitated at first to meet this position by a direct negative. But such a position was speedily seen to be inevitable. And, as a result of its other doctrinal positions, the possibility of a true believer falling from grace was declared. This found warrant also and verification in examples and personal experiences that could not easily be mistaken. Moreover, as the Arminian method revealed a growing distrust of the authority of the Symbolical documents, it was easy to assert that the Calvinistic position professed not so much to be based upon direct Scripture support as to rest upon the necessary principles of the so-called Covenant of Redemption. The provisions of this imaginary covenant between the Father and the Son, before time began, in respect of the certain number to be redeemed and given to the Redeemer, as the reward of His atoning submission, had produced the idea of a fixed and unalterable division of mankind. To this canon every Scripture must be made to conform. It was easily shown that no Scripture evidence of such an unconditional covenant existed. It was less difficult still to urge against it the criticism that its ethical issues provided reasons against its provisions.

Theologically, Arminianism is a mediating system throughout. Its most characteristic feature is conditionalism. Absolutism is its persistent opposite; moderation, the mark of its method. The failure to appreciate this position accounts for the frequent and grave misunderstanding of Arminianism, and for the natural ease with which its delicately balanced judgment has declined, in the hands of some of its exponents, towards theological positions with which it had no true affinity. These have been chiefly Socinianism and Pelagianism—systems due to an over-emphasis upon the human. Much that in certain periods passed for Arminianism was really a modification of one or other of these systems, which a true Arminianism justly repudiates. In Holland, Arminianism, gliding by almost imperceptible degrees, ultimately reached a position with little to distinguish it from Socinianism. In England, where there was a presage of Arminian thought long before the time of Arminius and his system, its principles found an interesting development, and their profession an unusual environment. The influence was seen in the ambiguity or comprehensiveness of the Articles of the English Church. Latimer and Hooper, Andrewes and Hooker might with propriety have been called Arminians, if Arminianism as a system had been in vogue when they wrote. Arminian teaching by Baro, Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, gave rise to the Lambeth Articles also. But Arminianism became a political question, with the singular result that, through the influence of Laud and Juxon, it became allied with the side of the King, whilst it was the Calvinists, with the distinguished exception of John Goodwin, one of the ablest defenders of Arminianism, who stood by the Parliament. But the Arminianism of Laud was not the Dutch Arminianism. Arminius would have denounced its sacramentarianism as superstition With the issues of the Civil War, Arminianism suffered eclipse, but it returned with prelacy at the Restoration; and for more than half a century its influence was supreme in the Anglican Church. But the later divines of this school depreciated the doctrines of grace, dwelling more upon the example of Christ than upon His atoning work, and the Arminian principle persisted mainly as a negation of Calvinism. Cudworth, Jeremy Taylor, Tillotson, Chillingworth, Stillingfleet, Burnet, Pearson, Whitby, and others, down to Copleston and Whately, were Arminian theologians of eminence in the Church of England. The positive temper of Arminianism, however, suffered under their treatment of the system. Its fine balance between Calvinism and Pelagianism was lost. It was blended with tendencies to Latitudinarianism and Rationalism; and became a negative rather than a constructive or mediating system. It was from this setting, however, of Arminianism in its non-juror environment and atmosphere, that the restored Arminianism of Arminius, with its emphasis on the grace of God, emerged into strength in England in the Evangelical Revival of the 18th century. The Wesleys came of a sturdy Arminian stock of this type. And probably the ablest expositions in English of the Arminian system are to be found in the writings of John Wesley, John Fletcher, Richard Watson, and William Burt Pope, the Wesleyan theologians. Methodists throughout the world, with the exception of the Calvinistic Methodists in Wales, who represent the Calvinistic attitude of Whitefield, who withdrew from co-operation with the Wesleys on this ground, are convinced Arminians, who profess to adhere to the original Arminianism of Arminius and his followers of the earlier type before it approximated to the rationalistic temper of Socinians or Latitudinarians, or was merged in the prevailing tendencies of Restoration theology or American Unitarianism. The Wesleyan type of Arminianism, with its Evangelical note, is at present the most influential. It has spread widely throughout the British Empire and America, and is based upon the conviction that the Calvinistic positions are incompatible with Divine equity and human freedom, whilst its loyalty to the doctrines of grace is the best vindication of Arminianism from the common charge of Pelagianism and Socinianism. Lacking the doctrinal loyalty and the Evangelical vitality of the Arminianism of Methodism, Dutch Arminianism is a dwindling force. The inclination towards freedom of speculation, the rejection of all creeds and confessions, a preference of moral to doctrinal teaching, Arian views respecting the Trinity, the virtual rejection of the doctrines of Original Sin and imputed righteousness, and the depreciation of the spiritual value of the Sacraments, have resulted in the gradual reduction of Arminianism in Holland to a negligible theological quantity, and to the dimensions of an insignificant sect, numbering only some twenty congregations.

4. Underlying principles.—The supreme principle of Arminianism is conditionalism. It provides a philosophical *via media* between Naturalism and Fatalism. As an active criticism of Calvinism it is based upon two positions—the restless and dominant demand for equity in the Divine procedure, on the one hand, and such a reference to the constitution of man's

nature as will harmonize with the obvious facts of his history and experience, on the other. It sought to construct a system which should be dominantly ethical and human throughout. It contended, therefore, that moral principles and laws consistently condition the manward activities of the Divine will, and set human limits to the Divine action. The Calvinistic conception of justice was based altogether on the supremacy or rights of God; Arminianism so construed justice as to place over against these the rights of man. Sin, it declared, had not so transformed human nature that man had become a mere vessel of wrath or of mercy, a creature who was reprobate because of guilt he had inherited, or saved by a grace which operated without rational distinctions and without regard to foreseen faith or good works. In equity the worst criminal had his rights. A fair trial before a fair tribunal was one which sin did not invalidate. The consideration of these rights did not cease because the judge was God, and the accused, or even the condemned, was man. The Creator owed something to the creature He had fashioned, because of the manner of His fashioning; and these obligations did not cease because the first man had sinned. In a perfectly real sense sin had only increased the obligation of God to be just. If original sin was what Augustine had stated it to be, and what Calvinism had maintained it was, then it would be truer to the facts it involved to speak of it as a radical wrong from which man unjustly suffered. The race had not been consulted by the first man; in no true sense was he the representative of the individual members of the race; for they had no voice in his appointment, and no veto upon his acts. By every law of justice, therefore, they were to be regarded as objects of commiseration rather than persons to be blamed for what they had suffered, since they suffered as the consequence of the first man's sin, altogether apart from their own voluntary acts of kindred disobedience. And although Arminianism retained the federal principle, and held that the federal relationship had resulted in a weakened will for the individual, and had afflicted him with a bias towards evil, it urged that it was difficult to conceive anything more nearly approaching infinite injustice than allowing such a relation, of itself, to involve millions of men of every age and in every age in eternal death. If all had sinned, all had an equal right to be considered in the provision and administration of any redemptive processes that might be operative. The introduction into these relations of the Arminian principles resulted in a criticism that seemed irresistible; for the moment the idea of equity was admitted to a place in the consideration of the relations of man and God, the old absolute unconditionalism became untenable. If justice reigned, and its principles were common to God and man, it meant that God must be just to man, even though man was disobedient to God; and justice could not tolerate the condemnation of man for a sin which was committed without his personal knowledge or responsibility, any more than it could approve of a salvation which had no regard for the personal will or choice of its recipient.

Arminianism was always most successful when its argument proceeded upon principles supplied by the moral consciousness of man. This recognition of the value of the testimony and of the entire contents of human consciousness was the correlate in Arminianism to the idea of equity; its exposition of the idea of man provided the second of its two main principles. It regarded man as free and rational; sin had not destroyed either his reason or his freedom. By the one he had the ability to believe, by the other the ability to choose. Even if the racial connexion had weakened or perverted these faculties in the individual, the result was not incapacity to act, because the racial connexion with the second Head was intact and operative in the communication of the energy of prevenient grace. In justice, therefore, God must deal with man as possessed of such abilities. On their co-operation with the Divine activity the results in salvation or reprobation depended. Thus the free will of man was regarded as conditioning the absolute will of God. In the realm of nature His physical attributes ruled; His omnipotence was unconditioned. In the realm of mind and will His love and moral attributes governed, and their rule was conditioned. Man was not a part of physical nature merely, or a mechanism involved in the impersonal or unmotived motion of non-moral creatures. His destiny could not therefore be deduced by logical processes from the premise that God is the Sovereign Will, which can do as it chooses; for He has chosen to create man free and responsible; and His attitude and conduct towards man will consequently be conditioned by the nature He has made. If it has been His good pleasure to create man moral, it will not be His will to deal with him as if he were merely physical. If Creator and creature are alike moral in character, it follows that necessitating action on the one side, and necessitated action on the other, are both excluded. By His own voluntary act God has limited the range and exercise of His physical attributes, and so the terms which express His relations to man must be those of reason and freedom, not those of will and necessity. Arminianism offers no disparagement to grace in general, and deepens the emphasis on prevenient grace in particular. But whilst the peculiarity of Calvinism is found in holding fast to the absolute idea of God in opposition to all 'idolatry of the creature,' the centre of gravity of the Arminian system is found in the sphere of anthropology. Its doctrine of man probably differentiates it more definitely from Calvinism than its doctrine of God.*

5. **Theological and philosophical influences.**—The twofold emphasis of Arminianism on the ethical and human elements in its system declares the sphere and defines the source of the modifying influences it exerted on subsequent theological and philosophical thought. These influences were essentially mediating; and they were mostly indirect. They reached the sphere of philosophical speculation chiefly through theology. But the leading principles of Arminianism were potential in both spheres, in the succeeding periods of intellectual revival. It is well to keep in mind the fact that, in the history of European thought, the 16th cent. was great in theology rather than in philosophy, and that the 17th was great in philosophy rather than in theology. But without the religious thought of the earlier century, the later would have been without its problems, and therefore without its thinkers. The pre-eminence of the one in religion involved the pre-eminence of the other in philosophy. In this influence of theology upon philosophy, and, later still, upon more distinctly ethical thinking, Arminianism had a considerable share. Although questions directly upon ultimate philosophical principles were, on the whole, not in the spirit and thought of the age of Arminianism, yet Arminianism, as more generally true to the whole of the facts of existing problems, was distinctly more open to the access and authority of the modern spirit than Calvinism. By its underlying principles of equity and freedom it was more perfectly fitted than its rival system for a period of intellectual transition. It became the form of Re-

* Fairbairn, *Christ in Mod. Theol.* p. 170.

formation theology which most easily allied itself with the advance of knowledge and with the humanism of the new learning. The Cartesian philosophy, which was bringing about a gradual transformation of theological views, especially in the Netherlands, where already a liberal spirit was showing itself in general uneasiness under the yoke of the Symbolical documents, found especial favour with the Arminians. They had also within their ranks many eminent men, who were progressive thinkers and leaders of thought outside a distinctly theological circle, who exerted a beneficial reaction upon Protestant theology by their thorough scientific attainments and the mildness and toleration of their views. Arminianism stood generally for the strengthening of the scientific temper and for the principle of moderation, which represented dawning methods of far-reaching importance in the intellectual life of the modern nations. On the other hand, this attitude favoured the growing tendency towards Rationalism and Latitudinarianism into which Arminian theology frequently drifted. But that this drift represented any necessary effect of the Arminian movement is disproved by the fact that it was the Arminian system of thought which lay at the theological sources of the great Methodist revival in the United Kingdom and America during the 18th cent., whose leaders re-stated Arminianism in modern theology in its purest form, and vitalized it with the warmth of religious emotion and the joyous assurance of the Evangelical spirit. Arminianism in the glow of the spiritual enthusiasm of the early Methodist evangelists has been truly described as 'Arminianism on fire.'

The Arminians were the fathers of toleration. Amongst its earliest representatives are found stalwart advocates of religious freedom, who were willing to suffer for their views. Within the sphere of opinion Calvinism did not spontaneously incline to toleration; it was inflexibly dogmatic; its instincts and ideals were aristocratic rather than democratic in relation to ethical authority. It is curious to note, however, in spheres more purely political, that an interesting reversal of the natural order of the two systems occurs. As in England the Laudians were Arminian, and the Parliamentarians Calvinistic, so in France the Jansenists were Calvinistic, and the Jesuits Arminian. The natural tendencies of Arminianism to toleration may be instructively traced in the Latitudinarian teaching of the Cambridge Platonists, who were greatly influenced by the writings of Arminian scholars, particularly by those of Episcopius. They pleaded for liberty of conscience, and studied to assert and examine the principles of religion and morality in a philosophical method; they declaimed equally against superstition on the one hand and enthusiasm on the other. Moderation was the first law. They were conspicuous for their advocacy of freedom of inquiry, their toleration of diversities of opinion in non-essentials, their genial temper in controversy, their effort to bring about a reconciliation between theology and philosophy, their recognition of religion as less a doctrine or a ritual than an inward life, and their strong purpose to establish a rational theology, which should avail as a reply to the atheistic polemic. Arminianism, however, made common cause with all religious parties in resisting the dogmatism of the philosophy of common sense, which was declaring open war against the belief in the positive authority of Revelation. And the association of Arminianism with Deism and Naturalism, because of a supposed common fundamental ground in the appeal to reason, may be regarded as an unwarranted exaggeration of the Arminian emphasis on the human. Arminianism could be under no necessity to deny or depreciate the supernatural. By the time the age of speculative criticism and of the antagonism between faith and knowledge was reached, Arminianism as a distinctive doctrinal position had been established and its peculiar contribution made to Systematic Theology. Its influence on such later controversies is only indirect. That the influence was real cannot well be doubted, because of the emphasis on moderation and the more genuine welcome afforded to the products of modern speculation by Arminianism. Whether its influence, through its demand for the recognition of the authority of reason in the theological sphere, affected the philosophical thinking which resulted in the rationalism of Kant, or in its reaction in the subjective theories of Herder, or in the theology of Jacobi or Schleiermacher, it is difficult to say. Certainly Kant's doctrine of the Practical Reason, with its claim for the recognition of the ethical constitution of human nature, was developed in obvious harmony with the Arminian emphasis upon the authority of the moral consciousness as a factor in the interpretation of the relation of God to man. Schleiermacher's doctrine of absolute dependence had definite relation to Calvinism. Only in the place he gives to religious feeling is affinity with the Arminian principles likely to show itself.

With the distinct problems of modern speculative thought—'creation,' 'immanence,' 'mind and matter'—Arminianism, like the other Protestant theologies, had comparatively little concern. The theistic position of the creative act, with its implications, was generally accepted; there was no sufficient evidence, from the scientific study of nature, to suggest irreconcilable differences from the traditional view. In one point, however, Arminianism was peculiar. It laid special stress on creation being the work of the Father as distinct from the equal creative activity of the three Persons in the Trinity. The movement of Arminian thought was set in a framework of political, social, and economic changes which cannot be dissociated from its influences without missing their complete significance; but these are obviously beyond the scope of this article. One fact of importance ought, however, to be noticed. When the problems of 'natural rights' and the distinction between *jus naturale* and *jus gentium*, which had been raised by the philosophers and jurists of antiquity, passed, as a result of the Renaissance, from the region of academic speculation into that of practical politics, the transition was accomplished through an Arminian channel. Grotius was the first to start the question of the distinction between natural and conventional rights, and was thus the father of the modern exponents of the 'Philosophy of Law.' How profound was the influence of this transition upon the course and character of modern systems of Ethics will be obvious. It is here that we come into the presence of one of the less appreciated, but influential services rendered by the Arminian definition and advocacy of its fundamental principles—equity and human freedom. These principles represent the prevailing tendency of the leading ethical theories of the present. Without them the advance beyond the ethics of Scholasticism would have been impossible. Calvinism missed them, and, in doing so, missed the opportunity and the possibility of becoming the basis of an intellectual statement of ethical obligation satisfactory to the modern mind. Although the Calvinistic conception of the Church, as being based upon the individual rather than upon the institutional principle, was essentially different from that of Rome, the Calvinistic ethics is, nevertheless, based upon outward authority—

the authority of a truly organized Church and of the Scriptures truly interpreted by such a Church. This position was not accidental; it was of set purpose. Calvin deliberately subordinated ethics to dogmatics. From the Protestant point of view this was fundamentally reactionary; it was Scholastic in method and aim. The true ethics, and the only ethics consistent with the essential Protestant principle, must be based upon the inward compulsion of conscience, not upon any external authority. External authority could result only in casuistry. This was the Roman method and practice. The ethics of Thomas Aquinas and of Ignatius Loyola expounds a closed system given in the teachings of the Church; the ethics of Calvinism expounds a closed system given in the written Word. 'For true ethical development there is no more room in logical Calvinism than in logical Romanism.'* Ethically, Calvinism and Jesuitism have a common foundation in that they depend upon external standards and sanctions. On this account Calvinism has not, as a matter of history, contributed to the development of ethical theory in any degree commensurate with its magnitude as a religious force. It is beyond question that, as an inspiration to high ethical endeavour, Calvinism has produced types of sacrificial devotion to right conduct which have frequently touched a lofty heroism in the lives both of individuals and of communities in which its doctrinal system has been dominant. Yet it must be acknowledged that the influence of Calvinism, as a system, in the philosophical re-construction of modern ethics has been reactionary. The expansion, on the other hand, of the fundamental principles of Arminianism has wrought harmoniously with the processes of ethical development, which are based upon the manifold ideals and constraints of the moral consciousness of the individual. It was the plaint of the aggrieved moral nature, quite as much as the philosophic intellect, that was articulate in the Arminian protest. The deterministic depreciation of the rights of human nature to the value of a mechanical movement in the presence of the Divine will was the ethical weakness of Calvinism in which Arminianism found its advantage. This stress on the place and functions of human nature in the interpretation of, and co-operation with, the Divine mind was the distinction consistently maintained between the rival systems.

Arminianism was the medium by which the humanistic spirit of the Renaissance was translated into the theological and exegetical sphere. Its great men — Grotius, Episcopius, Limborch, Brandt, Le Clerc—are all men of literary faculty and humanistic temper. In Calvinism the spirit is more distinctly speculative and scholastic, and the intellect deductive and constructive. Its great men—Calvin, Zanchius, Gomarus, Twisse, Rutherford—are all men of speculative genius. It thus easily happened that the tendencies of Arminianism were often—and sometimes rightly—suspected of affinity with Pelagian and Socinian views. These affinities were strengthened by the mingling with the Arminians of Socinian scholars returning from exile; and in many cases Arminianism merged its identity in these phases of thought. It is well known that the exaggeration of Subordinationism by the Remonstrant divines, especially by those of the later age of Arminianism, glided by subtle degrees into the Socinian position. They denied the aseity of the Son, which Calvin had taught. His subordination to the Father, as the Spirit is subordinated both to the Son and the Father, was urged. It was held that, though the Divine nature belongs to the Son and the Spirit, the Father is first in dignity and power. Arminian leaders also favoured the Nestorian conception of the Person of Christ. The agency of the Logos was regarded as a 'special influx' or 'operation' of the Divine nature. It is an assistance of God, involving a communication of Divine powers so far as a creature can receive them. Much more recently the influential Unitarianism of America has succeeded the lingering Arminianism of the New England States, as a one-sided development of prevailing ethical principles respecting the responsibility of man and the enthusiasm for his prerogatives.

Arminianism arose historically in the great age of Protestant Symbolism, which succeeded the period of the earlier expositions of the Reformation theologians, who had based their authority more simply upon the appeal to spiritual experience and its warrant and confirmation in the Scriptures. It was the age of Protestant dogmatics, of which the characteristic was the substitution of creeds and the compulsion of confessions in place of the personal contact of the individual mind with the immediate sources of truth accessible in the writings of inspiration. Arminianism strove to emancipate exegesis from the thraldom of dogmatics. It resisted the tendency to erect everywhere a formulated creed into the position of a supreme arbiter of truth. The formal principle of authority was denied the first place. Ecclesiastical theology had tended to become dominant over Biblical. The Bible was looked upon as an authoritative text-book from which doctrines and proofs of doctrine were to be drawn with little or no discrimination as to the use to be made of the different sacred books. The Word of God and the Bible were identical. No critical distinctions were tolerated. Divines had not to reason their systems, but to unfold them from certain fixed and unquestioned postulates. In the Reformed Church predestination was accepted as the initial principle for the systematic exposition of the Christian religion. Dissent upon any point was treated as heresy. There was no antagonism in Arminianism to the formal principle of Protestantism—the immediate relation of the religious consciousness to Christ—or to the ultimate authority of Scripture. What Arminianism suspected and resisted was the prevailing tendency, which was far from the intention of the original authors of the Symbols, to assign to the Symbolical books of the Protestant Churches the same authority over faith which had been ascribed to tradition in the Roman Church. The Arminians sought to preserve a moderate and less dogmatic orthodoxy, and to introduce generally milder features into the prevailing hard cast of doctrinal systems. At the same time Arminianism, although apparently less intensely antagonistic than Calvinism to Rome, because of the emphasis it laid upon the value of the human in religion, was more truly Protestant in rejecting the Roman principle of the authority of tradition in its Protestant guise of authoritative Symbols. For similar reasons Arminianism was a protest against the mystical principle of interpretation which insisted upon the supremacy of the internal word as a sufficient exponent and infallible judge of the external. Constantly discounting dogma and mysticism alike, the Arminian divines appealed to the analogy of faith, to experience, to reason, to the aid of the Holy Spirit, as essential elements in the interpretation of Scripture. Authority was composite, and involved the whole contents of consciousness. A statement is not true because it is found in the Bible, but it is found in the Bible because it is true of itself. This position—that the Scriptures contain the truth, but are not of themselves the truth—gave considerable impulse to the

* *Hibbert Journ.*, Oct. 1907, p. 180.

speculative treatment of theology, and, through the writings of Grotius and Episcopius, issued in methods of theological discussion which gradually extended to the whole Evangelical Church.

The Arminian effort to meet 'the idolatry of Scripture' by the exaltation of the authority of the moral consciousness occasioned the charge against Arminians of laxity in views of inspiration. Their position was confused with the Socinian method of subordinating the authority of Scripture to that of reason, and of making its interpretation depend upon the so-called truths of reason. Here again, however, pure Arminianism is the mediating position. Whilst disagreeing with Luther's position that reason is blind in spiritual things, it resisted the Socinian extreme, as it resisted the rigid and narrow adherence to the letter of Scripture which marked later Protestant theologies. Some of the later Arminians added the canon that Scripture cannot contradict reason. The general position, however, was that reason must be followed in interpretation; that the foundation of religion, on its intellectual side, should be in personal thought and investigation; that neither antiquity nor universality was a proper or sufficient ground of belief; and that every passage of Scripture must be considered separately and in its historical setting and limits. This appeal of Arminianism from the Symbolic methods to the critical treatment of the text and substance of Scripture was a precursor of the methods of careful exegetical study now current, and of their issue in the restoration to authority of Biblical as distinguished from Systematic and Dogmatic Theology.

The reaction from the hardening processes of the Lutheran and Calvinistic divines upon the views, generous for their time, of Luther and Calvin, respecting the human and fallible element in Scripture, which were illustrated in the terms of the Helvetic Formularies and in the Buxtorfs' irrational contention for the inspiration of the Hebrew vowel-points, was inevitable. It was initiated by the Arminian writers, who reserved the direct action of the Holy Spirit for matters of faith, and left historical research and the memory of human writers to their fallible functions. Arminianism thus asserted positions in Biblical interpretation which have proved a basis and authority for the methods now known as the Higher Criticism. Sanctions were also provided for the science and practice of Textual Criticism through the access afforded by Arminian principles to an atmosphere of freer inquiry into the preservation and historical growth of the received texts of the OT and NT.

The Arminian principles of human freedom and personal responsibility, with the humanitarian spirit they tended to evoke, gave a new impulse to the awakening movement towards Foreign Missions, which succeeded the era of rationalistic influence in the Protestant Churches. If the Atonement was universal, and the salvation of the whole race possible, then the sense of responsibility for making known the conditions of salvation to the race was deepened, and a note of urgency was added to the claim for the expansion of Christianity. Moreover, the weak place in the great Protestant confessions had been the anthropological. One of the many effects of this deficiency was seen in the judgment of the Church in respect to the heathen races, which was obviously prejudicial to aggressive enterprise. Calvinistic thought had strengthened this judgment. The application of Arminian principles was amongst the earlier signs of the dawn of the new light upon the nature and history of the races of mankind, and upon their religious possibilities, which has since broken in the ethnic results of the kindred sciences of Anthropology and Comparative Religion. And the system, amongst the Protestant theologies, least discredited by the new light, is Arminianism.

Reference must be made finally to a great service Arminianism has rendered to theological thought generally. This is discovered in the subtle influence it has exerted in the gradual softening and humanizing of the harsher forms of theological definition. As a separate and separable system, either ecclesiastically or theologically, its reign was brief; as a genial and vitalizing influence, suffusing itself through all the discussions of the relation of God to man, its authority is ageless. It has wrought, often secretly and unacknowledged, towards the approximation of the position of modern theology respecting Predestination to that which was held by Catholic Christendom before the age and teaching of Augustine. Substantially the Churches of East and West were united, before his time, in holding the primitive and Scriptural view of the relations between God and man in the work of salvation, and of the sole responsibility of man for his own damnation, which it was the effort of Arminianism to restore. How far the disturbance of the thought of the Church on these relations, brought about by the revived and intensified Augustinianism of Calvin, has been redressed by the influence of Arminianism, is at present only partially discernible. It is, however, certain that it has greatly modified the specific views which were the objects of its original contention, as they are now held by Calvinistic theologians; it has also become a dominant factor in the current re-statement, to the present generation, of the doctrines of grace. The reduction of the area of Calvinistic influence, and its partial disintegration in communities where it had long been established, are facts that cannot fail to challenge attention. When Arminianism arose, very early in the 17th cent., the Calvinistic creed prevailed largely in Bohemia and Hungary; it was supreme in Switzerland, Holland, the Palatinate, and in the Protestant Churches of France, Scotland, and England, where, until the close of Elizabeth's reign, it was the prevalent theological influence; and shortly afterwards it grew to strength in the Puritan settlements of America. Over all these areas a steady disintegration of its force may be traced. Many factors have co-operated in this result. But of those which may be regarded as theological and ethical, the active principles upon which Arminianism insisted have been prime causes.

In France an early and interesting illustration of the modifying influence of Arminianism occurred in the theology of the school of Saumur, associated particularly with the name of Amyraut (see AMYRALDISM), and later with that of Pajon. Amyraut endeavoured to mitigate the harsh repugnance of the Calvinistic doctrine of election by his theory of hypothetic universal grace, which was substantially equivalent to a doctrine of universal atonement. God, in some proper sense, wills or desires that all men should repent and be saved. In case all should repent, no purpose of God would stand in the way of their salvation. But the indispensable means of repentance—regenerating grace, following election—is not bestowed upon them. In the order of nature the decree of election follows the decree providing the atonement. The main peculiarity of Pajon's attempt to blunt the edge of Calvinistic particularism was his conception of regenerating grace. The Spirit uses the truth of the Gospel as its instrument in effecting the antecedent intellectual change; but He also uses all the circumstances

and providential environment of the individual. To this aggregate of objective influence, which is not the same in different individuals, regeneration, where it takes place, is due. It is the act of God because the antecedent circumstances are the effect of God's ordering, and are adapted by Him to produce the result. Pajonism aroused wide-spread interest in the French Church.

In Germany the strength of Lutheran influence was already in sympathy with the Arminian movement. Its influence was also strong, though silent, in the bosom of the Reformed Church itself; and by the time of the Wolfian movement, the Reformed dogmatics were moving from the doctrine of the absolute decrees. Amongst the English-speaking peoples, in addition to the influences, already referred to, which strongly modified the theology of the great school of Anglican divines, the influence of Butler became a powerful ally of Arminianism. His doctrine of probation was not the Calvinistic doctrine of the probation of the race, but the Arminian insistence on the probation of the individual in his unshared and unshareable responsibility.

In the Methodist revival Arminianism became aggressive. Associated with the renewed vitalities of personal godliness, the Arminian theology, carried by singers and preachers, passed swiftly across the Atlantic, and accompanied the earliest settlers as they moved, from east to west, across the continent. In the newer British Colonies at the Antipodes a similar influence has wrought, until, at the present day, Arminianism, as understood and taught by Methodist preachers, dominates what is probably the largest Protestant Church in the world, reckoning some thirty millions of adherents. In America the matchless intellectual gifts of Jonathan Edwards were consecrated to the task of checking and devitalizing the forces of Arminian doctrine. But the ultimate results were disappointing to Calvinistic theologians. The New England theology, where it has not passed under Unitarian influences, has revealed a persistent modification of the Calvinistic position. The distinctively Calvinistic formularies of faith in Great Britain and America have undergone revision, mostly at those precise points which were the objective of the Arminian attack.

Modern theology in general has tended to forsake the harshness and absolutism of doctrinal statement, without surrendering the deeper significance of the ultimate supremacy of the Divine will. And this position was the original idea and ideal of Arminianism. There is a deep and almost universal dissatisfaction with the declaration and issues of a limited Atonement, which was a main element in the Arminian objection to Calvinism; and a strong conviction prevails that the salvation of the non-elect is an object of sincere desire to the mind of God. Yet it will be obvious that it is not the doctrine of Predestination *per se*, in which Calvinism has enclosed the realms of nature and providence in a network of teleology, that excites the strongest repugnance to the system against which Arminianism rose to protest.* For Determinism in philosophy and Selection in biological science are still acceptable and popular equivalents for Election in the realm of grace. Differentiation is a basal principle in each of these spheres; but differentiation involves inequality; and inequality involves preference; for it is admitted that the differences are original, so far as individuals are concerned. Biology posits differences in the single cell. Psychological ethics starts the career of individual character with differences *ab initio*. Popular inferences assume that the difference between Cain and Abel, or between Esau and Jacob, is an illustration of the same principle that differentiates the hawk from the dove or the hart from the swine. It is rather towards the Calvinistic eschatology that the antagonism is most keenly felt. The aspect of injustice and cruelty which this element in the Calvinistic system wore to the early Arminians, it wears to the modern mind. The humanity of God has become an element in the standard of judgment applied to the Divine activity. Fatherhood has dispossessed Sovereignty. Immanence has modified transcendence. When to such tendencies is added the momentum of the critical and exegetical methods which prevail in the modern interpretation of Scripture, to which Arminianism gave countenance and impetus at their origin, it may be possible to show some justification for the claim, made by the advocates of Arminian principles, that they possess the requisite possibilities of adaptation for the re-statement of the doctrines of grace demanded by the appeal to the conditions of modern thought. Moreover, the persistence and prevalence of Arminian principles presage a place of prominence for them among the contributory forces which appear to be making for an inter-confessional and international theology, based upon critical exegesis and upon a philosophy which includes the whole facts of human nature, whilst yielding reverent allegiance to the mystery and reality of the Divine Sovereignty.

* Fisher, *Hist. Christian Doctr.* p. 550.

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ARNAULD, ARNAULDISM. — See PORT ROYAL.

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,, in MSS (S. C. Cockerell), p. 859.
Egyptian (W. M. Flinders Petrie), p. 861.
Etruscan and Early Italic (G. Karo), p. 863.
Greek and Roman (E. A. Gardner), p. 866.
Hindu.—See Architecture and Art (Hindu).
Italian.—See Art (Etruscan and Early Italic), p. 863.
Japanese.—See Art (Shinto), p. 886.
Jewish (I. Abrahams), p. 871.
Mayan.—See Art (American), p. 827.
Mithraic (F. Cumont), p. 872.
Muhammadan (J. Strzygowski), p. 874.
Persian (A. V. Williams Jackson), p. 881.
Phœnician (T. G. Pinches), p. 884.
Roman.—See Art (Greek and Roman), p. 866.
Shinto (W. G. Aston), p. 886.
Slavonic.—See Architecture and Art (Slavonic), p. 773.
Teutonic (C. J. Gaskell), p. 886.
Tibetan.—See Tibet, Temples.

The religious art of savage and barbarian races constitutes a field of inquiry the limits of which are exceedingly difficult to trace with any accuracy. There seems to be no doubt that among some tribes religion dominates almost the whole of individual as well as of social life. The Pueblo Indians in Arizona and New Mexico may be quoted as an example of such thoroughly religious peoples. The better the customs of these Indians have become known, the more evident it has become that even the apparently most trivial actions are to them associated with religious feelings and ideas. From birth to death the Pueblo Indian is, passively or actively, partaking in an almost continuous act of religious worship. In the art production of such tribes the religious purposes are naturally apt to become almost exclusively predominant.

It is true that the Pueblo tribes appear to be quite exceptional in their inclination towards pious practices. But if the word 'religion' be taken in its widest sense, as including magical ideas and superstitious beliefs, there might easily be found many other tribes among whom religion exercises an all-predominating influence on art production. And the field of religious art becomes further widened if, as has been done by several authors, traditionalism is included under the head of religion. Among almost all uncivilized nations, everything that has been transmitted from ancestors to descendants is treated with a respect which closely resembles religious feeling. And in art, even if the products we meet with be of recent origin, the methods employed in production have almost everywhere been transmitted from earlier generations.

It is only natural, therefore, that several authors should have been led to consider all ethnic art as essentially religious. This opinion is represented by some of the most eminent German ethnologists. According to Dr. Gerland, the distinguished continuator of Waitz's *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, dances, pantomimes, and dramas, however meaningless they may now appear, have always originally been connected with religious ceremonies. The articles of dress and ornament with which primitive man decorates his body are, by ethnologists of this school, interpreted by preference as magic signs or religious symbols. And in works of art, such as rock paintings and engravings, the sacred and serious meaning has been taken for granted.

Against this line of thought, however, a reaction has set in among other German ethnologists. In his remarkable essay on petroglyphs (*Ethnographische Parallelen*) Andree has branded as a learned bias the general tendency to look for some sacred meaning in all ancient drawings, many of which may have had their origin simply in the impulse of the idle hand to scratch lines and figures on inviting surfaces. Other ethnologists have pointed out how easily the simplest dances and songs are to be explained as outbursts of an emotional pressure, which in itself has nothing to do with religious feeling. And it has been urged that the religious sanction, which traditionalism confers upon all ancient customs, does not in itself give us any information as to the real origin of these customs.

However sound in its principle, the reaction against the religious interpretation may, nevertheless, easily lead to a too radical scepticism. The case of the carved ornaments of the Hervey Islanders is most instructive in this respect. Notwithstanding the deriding strictures originally passed, in the name of common sense, on the symbolic interpretations of Stolpe and Read, an unbiassed examination can lead only to the conclusion, that in these apparently meaningless figures we really meet with a symbolic art which is full of religious significance (Stolpe in *Trans. of the Rochdale Lit. and Scientif. Soc.* 1891).

By such examples it is proved beyond question how impossible it is to uphold any *a priori* assertions as to the religious or non-religious character of primitive works of art. In order to estimate with exactness the influence exercised by religion on the earlier stages of æsthetic development, it would be necessary to examine in detail and from a philosophical point of view the artistic productions of all tribes of mankind. Such an examination has as yet been undertaken with regard to only a few tribes: the Hervey Islanders, the inhabitants of the Torres Strait regions, the Dayaks of Borneo, the Pueblo Indians, and some others. In an article for an Encyclopædia, there could in no case be any question of endeavouring to supplement these gaps in our knowledge. The only thing therefore that can safely be done is to interpret, at the risk of incompleteness, such works and manifestations alone as display their religious character on the surface. And it will be necessary, in order to keep the survey within reasonable limits, to exclude all works the origin of which is to be found in an exclusively magical purpose. Thus the various kinds of dramatic rain-making rituals, and the magically-medical cures, although generally executed by the religious profession, will not be treated of in this connexion (see Magic).

1. **Dramatic art.**—The simplest of all forms of religious art, from a theoretical point of view, are those dances and songs which are resorted to in order to bring about exaltation. The ceremonies of the Muhammadan dancing and howl-

ing dervishes and of many other well-known sects, might be quoted in proof of the fact that, among civilized as well as among barbarous peoples, a highly strung emotional state, even if produced by purely physical agency, is considered as a religious feeling. And it is significant that the only form of artistic manifestation that has been observed among the lowest of all savages—the wood Veddahs of Ceylon—consists of an exalted dance, which has justly been compared with the antics of the Siberian shamans and with the performances of the howling dervishes. As to the exact purpose of this ceremony, travellers do not all agree. Some take it to be intended as a kind of propitiation, addressed to the divinity of the arrow—an arrow being always stuck in the earth in the centre of the dancers. According to others, the dance might be explained as a kind of thanksgiving; others again see in it a rite, aiming at the expulsion of demons. But however much these interpretations may differ, the religious character of the ceremony has been taken for granted by almost all the different authorities. And their descriptions of the 'arrow dance' coincide at all important points (P. and F. Sarasin, *Naturwiss. Forsch. auf Ceylon*, iii.; Emerson Tennent, *Ceylon*; Hoffmeister, *Travels*; Deschamps, *Au Pays des Veddas*; Schmidt, *Ceylon*).

The participants in the dance are all men. At the outset, they advance slowly around the arrow without touching each other. Every dancer turns round on one foot, whilst performing some spasmodic movements with the free leg. The arms describe circles in the air, and the head is thrown backwards and forwards, to make the long, entangled hair stand out like a brush from the crown. The music is a simple melody, which is sung, or rather howled out, by the dancers. The time is marked by strokes of the hand on the nude belly. All this is begun in relative tranquillity. But gradually the time grows quicker, the movements become more violent, and the howling louder. Thus the dancers work themselves up to the utmost frenzy, and finally, one after another, fall to the ground in exhaustion. Some of them lie on their backs 'as stiff as a fallen tree,' whilst others, continuing the howling, tremble in convulsive vibrations.

This 'arrow-dance' is typical of a large class of dance-performances, examples of which are met with amongst most of the lower races, sometimes as mere amusements, but more often as religious rites. The means employed in order to bring about the exaltation and the convulsions may, indeed, be more complicated than those resorted to by the Veddahs. Thus, among some North American Indian tribes (cf. Schoolcraft, *Indian Tribes*, v.) the dancers prepare themselves for their performance by some days of fasting, and increase their state of exaltation during the dance by partaking of drugs or inhaling poisonous smoke. The clappings on the nude belly are, at higher stages of culture, replaced by the sound of some instruments capable of a greater suggestive power. But the spirit of the performance is none the less the same all over the world. Whether the dancers belong to the Ainus, to some of the aboriginal tribes of India (Aquis, Kurs, Santals), or to some South- or West-African race (Basutos, Tshi-speaking peoples on the Gold Coast), their chief endeavour is always to throw themselves, by violent movements and sounds, into a state of exaltation, which borders upon, or really passes over into, insensibility and unconsciousness; and it is the same endeavour which characterizes the celebrated shamanistic performances of the tribes of Northern Asia (cf. *e.g.* Radloff, *Sibirien*; Mikhailovski in *Journ. Anth. Inst.* xxiv. 62, 126).

In the shamanistic rites, however, we meet with one important feature that is not represented in the Veddah dance. In this example, the frantic scenes seem to be over at the moment unconsciousness is attained. In the higher developments of the arrow-dance type, however, it is from this moment that the real performance begins. And what follows, far more than the dance itself, is apt to give a religious character to the rite.

It is well known that on the lower stages of culture lunatics are generally considered as possessed by some divinity, and are consistently treated with a kind of religious respect. It is only natural that the same attitude should be upheld in those cases where the mental disorder is acute instead of chronic. And the shamanistic psychosis is the more liable to be interpreted in a supernatural way, since the shamans, in accordance with the traditionally-fixed programme of their performances, invariably astonish the bystanders by jugglery and feats of insensibility, such as eating fire, lacerating themselves with knives and needles, etc., made possible by their exalted and anæsthetic state (see SHAMANISM). The sudden change in the voice and behaviour of the convulsive dancer, together with the apparently supernatural power he exhibits, must necessarily lead the primitive spectators to the inference that a divine personality has taken hold of the shaman, while he himself is endeavouring by all means in his power to confirm the spectators in this belief. He delivers oracular utterances in a mystic voice, which is taken to be the voice of the god, or he keeps up long dialogues with the divinity, who is supposed to be visible to him, but is audible only to the bystanders. We have not in this connexion to decide whether these representations are wholly fraudulent, or whether they may have their origin in some visual and auditory hallucinations of the shamans. The important fact, from our point of view, is that in either case the orgiastic and, so to say, lyrical dance, which forms the beginning of the shaman performance, has passed over into something which, in its effect, if not in its intention, is to be considered as a work of dramatic art.

2. **Pictorial art.**—In these dramatic representations we meet with an expression of the belief—which may partially have been prompted by the facts of shamanistic possession—that the priests are, or may for a time become, inhabited by the divinity. If, as primitive peoples seem to believe all over the world, the priest really is a kind of 'god-box' (to use the picturesque expression of the Polynesians), then it is evident that the actions he is representing must impress his pious spectators as an eminently religious drama. But even if there had been no belief in a particular class of 'god-boxes,' dramatic representation would still have acquired a religious importance, on the ground of the belief in the magical effects which imitations of things and movements are supposed to exercise upon the things and movements that have been imitated. According to this belief, the god may be conjured to take up his abode in the body of the performer, who imitates what are believed to be his appearance, movements, and behaviour. And the artistic production, which has been called into existence by this principle of sympathetic magic, does not restrict itself to the department of dramatic art. It has attained a great importance within the domain of pictorial imitation.

The transition from dramatic to pictorial art is marked by those masks which, in many tribes, such as the Bellacoolas, the Melanesians, etc., are worn by the dancers in religious dances (cf. Boas, Dall, Woldt, on the Bellacoolas; Haddon and Cod-

rington on the Melanesians). The effect produced on the spectators by these painted faces is partially dependent upon the dramatic acting—the singing and the movements—of the performers. But the masks themselves are, no doubt, apt to awaken feelings of terror and awe. And among all primitive tribes they are regarded as sacred things, scarcely less holy than the religious paintings and statues venerated by more developed nations.

Among the most primitive tribes, however, one scarcely meets with any pictorial representations of the deity. This, probably, has less to do with the technical inability of the lowest savages than with the deficient anthropomorphism in their notions of the deity. Where a god is imagined as some vague and formless being, certain rude and shapeless fetishes may be considered as satisfactory representations or vehicles of the Divine power. But as soon as a god has taken the form of animal or man, pictorial art will be resorted to as a means of facilitating—by virtue of sympathetic magic—communications between man and the divinity.

The images and statues of primitive man must not, however, be interpreted as in any way similar to those pictorial representations of which barbarous—or sometimes even civilized—men avail themselves in order to bring about some effects of magic or illusion. It seems, on the contrary, as if similarity and lifelikeness had not even been aimed at in the idols and ancestral statues of the lowest savages. And what we know about the way in which these statues are made gives us reason to believe that their supposed efficacy rests only partially upon the principle of a magical connexion between similar things. A most instructive example has been quoted by Ellis in his description of West African fetishism. When the Negroes wish to transplant the wood deity from his original home to their towns and villages, they construct a wooden doll of branches taken from the tree in which he is supposed to live. The god is, no doubt, believed to feel a special temptation to take up his abode in the idol made in his own likeness; but it is evident that the material link established by the choice of the wood is thought of as being of no less, perhaps even of greater, importance than the resemblance (cf. Ellis, *Yoruba Peoples*, p. 278; *Tshi Peoples*, p. 81).

When the personality to be represented is not a nature-god but an ancestor, it is still easier to bring about a material connexion between him and the image. Thus the Melanesian religious masks often consist of a part of a human skull which has been painted in glaring colours. And among Melanesian, Malay, and West African tribes the skull of the dead is often inserted in the head of the statues which are made in their likeness (De Clercq in Schmeltz, *New Guinea*; Brenner, *Kannibalen Sumatras*). When the cannibals of Sumatra prepare their celebrated richly-sculptured magical staffs, they always enclose in the head of the uppermost figure of the staff the brain of a young boy, who has been killed for the purpose (Brenner, *l.c.*, cf. also the author's *Origins of Art*, p. 291). It is probable that whatever power such images are believed to possess is given to them chiefly by their material contents. The worship and respect shown to the statues are developed out of a worship of skulls, and the statues themselves have originally been considered, not as images of the body, but as receptacles for some part of the body itself. The more, however, the form of these receptacles has been elaborated, the more there must also arise a subjective illusion, which to the primitive spectators brings the image into connexion with the imitated reality. The crude character of savage statuary is no obstacle to such an illusion, as in primitive peoples the want of technical ability is counterbalanced by a naïve suggestibility. And as soon, on the other hand, as the image itself—as image—has acquired a magical or religious efficacy, there will also appear an endeavour to heighten the suggestive effect by increasing the lifelikeness and the resemblance of the statues. Thus superstitious and religious motives will tend gradually to increase the artistic value of the religious images. The religious statues of the Melanesians and the idols of the West African Negroes, for instance, undoubtedly owe something of their wild and fantastic lifelikeness to an attempt to awaken as intense an impression as possible of the divine powers which they are intended to represent. At somewhat higher stages of evolution, on the other hand, as, for instance, among the Pueblo Indians, religious motives tend to restrain the impressiveness of pictorial representation within some traditionally-fixed limits.

However crude and simple an idol may be, it will none the less, by virtue of its mere existence, bring about some important changes in man's attitude towards his god. By the idol a divinity, who has originally been considered as distant or vaguely localized, becomes concentrated in an approachable vehicle. The pious adorers thus acquire a fixed object for their worship. And the holiness of this object makes it necessary to shelter it from the environment. Thus, around the idol, there naturally arises a temple.

Among the lowest savage tribes these temples have no qualities entitling them to be enumerated among works of art. But at a somewhat higher stage of development, the house of the god is often decorated in a most gorgeous way. The ancestral houses—which are temples in the literal sense of the word—display, especially among some Malaysian and Melanesian tribes, a wealth of ornamental art (see TEMPLES). [See, further, 'Note on the Use of Painting in Primitive Religion,' following this article].

3. **Propitiation in art.**—In order completely to explain the motives which have led to these architectural constructions and decorations, it is not sufficient to appeal to those philosophical and superstitious ideas which have hitherto been mentioned. In the foregoing we have devoted our attention exclusively to man's endeavour to create, by dramatic or pictorial art, a representation of the god—a receptacle, so to say, of the divine spirit—by means of which he may enter into relations with the divinity. Alongside of this endeavour, however, there can always be observed another tendency, which has been of scarcely less importance for the history of art—the effort to flatter and propitiate the divinity. This effort has naturally become more and more marked the more the idea of God has become localized, fixed, and vivified through artistic representation. Thus the ornamental art which is lavished on the decoration of primitive temples may in most cases be interpreted as homage to the god who is believed to inhabit the temple or to visit it. But the tendency to flatter and propitiate is by no means dependent upon the degree of development reached by the idea of God. It manifests itself among tribes who conceive their divinity as a vague, unlocalized, and impersonal being, as well as among tribes who have adopted anthropomorphic or zoomorphic religions. Those of its manifestations, however, that are most important from a general point of view cannot possibly be treated of in this connexion. For there is nothing artistic in the various forms of *materiai* sacrifice—with the exception, perhaps, of the sacrificial vessels, which, in virtue of their religious purpose, may be elaborated and decorated with a

greater care than ordinary vessels. On the other hand, the *dramatic* and *poetic* forms of sacrifice—prayer and homage—afford us an ample store of examples which exactly fall within the scope of the present article.

A kind of sacrificial purpose may indeed be discovered even in those shamanistic dances which to the superficial observer appear to have their only motive in the desire to bring about a state of exaltation. As every effort is taken to be agreeable to the divinity, the dancers may in many cases nourish a hope of softening the hard heart of their god by their violent exertions. And this seems the more probable since the dances are often connected with self-tortures, *e.g.* scarifications, devouring of disgusting things, etc. But, on the other hand, these feats of endurance may as well be explained either as a means of imposing upon the spectators, or as immediate results—analagous to the self-woundings of hysterical and hystero-epileptic patients—of the pathological insensibility which has been brought about by the exaltation.

It is easier by far to interpret those less exalted dances, songs, and dramatic performances which tend only to provoke, or to express, a state of mild, pleasurable feeling. For the purposes of explanation it is advantageous to make a distinction between those artistic manifestations through which man aims intentionally at flattering or amusing the divine spectator, and those manifestations in which the expression of man's own feelings of thankfulness or happiness appears to be the chief motive. It is to be remembered that these two classes of religious art, which are to be differently analyzed and interpreted, may in reality often be blended together.

The most instructive examples of the first class are to be found among the melodramatic representations given at the tomb of the deceased. As the spirit of the dead man is considered to be a divinity, these performances are undeniably of a religious character. But as, on the other hand, the deceased are believed to preserve all the tastes and likings of the living, the means employed in order to amuse or flatter their spirits will closely resemble the various forms of secular art. As a matter of fact, there is no difference between, *e.g.*, the dances performed before a living king or chief, and the dances performed before the invisible spectator in the tomb. Yet the motives may in some cases give a peculiar character to the manifestations of funeral art. While the performances before a living spectator tend chiefly to produce in his mind an æsthetic pleasure, the funeral dramas and dances may often fulfil a magical purpose. In some cases the dances and songs aim at a stimulation of the spirit, which certainly needs an increase of force in order to surmount all the hardships and the weary wanderings of its transitional life. In other cases, funeral art is evidently intended to produce some terrifying effects upon the invisible enemies of the dead, who are believed to endeavour to possess themselves of his body. Sometimes one may even believe that the survivors try to frighten the spirit itself away from their homes by terrifying dances and pantomimes. Lastly, it is probably in the endeavour to exert a sympathetic influence upon the combats which the deceased has to undergo before he can attain his peace and rest, that survivors hold magic war-dramas (*e.g.* sham-fights and tugs of war) over his grave.

When—as has probably been the case in some tribes—the cult of some individual ancestor is transformed into a cult of a general divinity, and, in consequence thereof, the small spirit-house above the grave is replaced by a temple, some of the ancient funeral performances may still be kept up as religious observances. Although their original purpose is forgotten, their character will scarcely become changed. When magical ideas have died out, magical ceremonies will still survive as a means of religious homage. And when, at a later stage of development, the notion of a divine spectator has been forgotten, the same ceremonies may still be performed as mere amusements, for which the religious tradition offers a welcome justification. Thus it is more than difficult to decide in individual cases whether the artistic manifestations fulfil a religious, a magical, or a purely æsthetic purpose.

The same difficulty meets us when we have to do with purely lyrical dances and songs, through which the performers express their gratitude and devotion to the god. Psychologically there is an easy transition from the feeling of joy—when it is pure and complete—to the feeling of loving thankfulness. The fulness of the emotion seeks expression, and the expression seeks some one to whom it may address itself. Thus in happiness we experience a desire to imagine a god who may receive our gratitude. And among peoples who consider every happy occurrence as a benefit which has been especially accorded to them by the divinity, pleasure will easily cause some manifestations which embrace both emotions in one common expression. As the most typical and best known example of this kind of religious art, we may quote the song and dance of the Israelites after having passed the Red Sea (Ex 15). It is true that in this case the poetic and orchestic hymns were called forth by an exceptional and unique occurrence. But there are always some regular events of happy importance in the life of primitive man which will tend to make thanksgiving ceremonies a fixed institution. Thus the return of the spring will be saluted with dance and song among the nations that have been suffering from long and hard winters, *e.g.* the Eskimos, the Chukchis, etc. Among agricultural nations the occasion of a bountiful harvest will give rise to some joyful festivals, in which the participants amuse themselves at the same time as they pay homage to their divinity. Such festivals seem to be especially frequent among the North American Indians.

The dances performed at these ceremonies, as has already been mentioned, closely resemble the manifestations of pure and simple joy. But there are some gestures which, although originally connected immediately with the expression of this simple feeling, may gradually become peculiar to the honorific ritual. Thus hand-clappings (which, as is well known, accompany states of great joy both among savages and among children) have, among Polynesians as well as among the ancient Egyptians, acquired the sense of a pious and reverential gesture, by which the adorers manifest their love and thankfulness towards the god.

4. Ethical instruction in art.—The facts hitherto quoted have referred almost exclusively to an art which, while it addresses itself chiefly to the divine spectator, aims at bringing about an immediate relation between him and his adorers. This indeed appears to be the prominent purpose of religious practices among the most primitive tribes. But it must not be thought that savage and barbarous religions were entirely devoid of a didactic and moralizing side. Even the shamanistic dances may, as has already been pointed out, pass over into small pantomimes, by which the spectators are initiated into the transactions between the shaman and the god. And however much magical ideas may have to do with these dramatic and pictorial representations of the divinity, the theurgic purposes will soon combine themselves with the intention of explaining and illustrating the facts of religious history. In such dramatic representa-

tions as, for instance, the great Kachina dance of the Zuñi Indians, this didactic tendency seems to be especially prominent. In masquerades of the type represented by the Mumbo Jumbo dance in Central Africa and the 'Kinas' of the Fuegians, we meet with the moral, or pseudo-moral, motive of terrorizing women and children into subjection by showing them the awful aspects of the gods. Finally, in the dramas, songs, and dances at the initiation of boys and girls into maturity, magical, didactic, and moralizing purposes have all combined to create the most marvellous manifestations which are to be met with in the department of primitive art. It is true that the instruction conferred at these ceremonies refers chiefly to practical utility. But even among peoples at so low a degree of development as the Australian aborigines, religious and, one might say, philosophical doctrines are expounded to the young men. Thus in a kind of miracle play, to which some curious analogies have been found among the Fijians and the East Africans, the old men enact before the boys a representation of death and resurrection. Although less elaborate in dramatic detail and stage-management, the fragmentary dramas in which the American Indian shaman-novitiates are supposed to be killed and recalled to life present to us a scarcely less interesting illustration of the same great thought. There are indeed, especially in this last example, good reasons for assuming that the simulated death and resurrection are supposed to effect, in a magical way, some kind of spiritual regeneration in the novices on whose behalf the drama is performed. But while admitting this, we may nevertheless take it for granted that an endeavour to elucidate the doctrines of the priesthood may be combined with the magical rite in question. And similarly with regard to analogous ceremonies in other tribes, we feel justified in assuming the presence of a didactic purpose. The more the dogmatic system becomes fixed and elaborated, the greater need will there ensue of affording these doctrines a clear expression in the objective forms of art.

It is evident that poetry more than any other art is fitted to serve such a purpose. And, in fact, among several tribes at the stage of higher savagery and barbarism there have been found some more or less complete mythical poems. These songs, however, will be more properly treated of under the headings MYTHOLOGY, CHARMS, and HYMNS.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works mentioned above, the following books may be consulted with advantage:

On DECORATION and ORNAMENT in connexion with religion: Henry Balfour, *The Evolution of Decorative Art*, London, 1893; A. C. Haddon, *Evolution in Art, as illustrated by the Life Histories of Designs*, London, 1895; A. Hamilton, *The Art-Workmanship of the Maori Race*, Dunedin, 1896 *f.*; A. R. Hein, *Die bildenden Künste bei den Dayaks auf Borneo*, Vienna, 1890.

On MUSIC, DRAMA, and POETRY in connexion with religion: C. Letourneau, *L'évolution littéraire dans les diverses races humaines*, Paris, 1894; Posnett, *Comparative Literature*, London, 1886; R. Wallaschek, *Primitive Music*, London, 1893.

On the general ÆSTHETICS of primitive man: E. Grosse, *Die Anfänge der Kunst*, Freiburg i. B. 1894; Yrjö Hirn, *The Origins of Art*, London, 1900.

YRJÖ HIRN.

NOTE ON THE USE OF PAINTING IN PRIMITIVE RELIGION.—Besides the realistic and symbolic representation of his divinities or of his religious conceptions and aspirations by means of various art methods—images or statues, carvings, sacred dances, sacred hymns and chants—painting has occasionally been brought into the service of religion by primitive or savage man, as well as by his more civilized successor. The purpose of this note will be sufficiently fulfilled by reference to such painting in the Stone Age, among the rudest savages, and with a semi-barbaric people. In all alike the ends aimed at are precisely the same as those intended by the image or carving—the obtaining of power over or from the being represented, the vivid depicting of the worshipful object or person so that the worshipper, by means of the picture or symbol, may have his religious sense re-awakened, or may also be brought into contact and communion with the divinity. In the first example to be referred to—that of the Palæolithic cave-artists—the paintings are not those of divinities but of animals. Even if these had no totemistic significance, the pictures played a highly important part in the magico-religious ceremonies which, *ex hypothesi*, were performed before them.

Within recent years, French archæologists have discovered the existence of engravings and paintings of animals on the walls of caverns in Périgord and the Pyrenees. Similar paintings were, almost simultaneously, found in grottoes at Altamira in Spain. They are executed on rocks in the darkest part of the caves, far from the entrance. Artificial light must therefore have been employed in designing them, as is proved by the discovery of a stone lamp ornamented with an incised figure of a reindeer, and thus dating from the Reindeer age of the Palæolithic epoch—the age of simple engravings with which the great Glyptic period of Quaternary times terminated. Probably these wall engravings and paintings belong to this closing period also. The animals represented are mammoths, reindeer, bison, oxen, horses, goats, saigas, etc. Some of these are engraved; others, besides being engraved, have the outlines filled in with reddish-brown colour, or, in some cases, bluish-black, exactly as totemic grave-posts used by the American Indians have incised figures painted over with vermilion; in others the engraving lines are accentuated by a thin band of colour. Frequently a design is outlined in black, and the surface covered with red ochre. We are yet ignorant how the colour was applied; it may have been daubed on by means of some primitive brush, or blown from the mouth, as is the case with some Australian rock-paintings. The interest of these paintings, for us, consists in the theory regarding their purpose enunciated by a French *savant*, M. Salomon Reinach. He notes regarding these paintings as well as Quaternary art in general, that *motifs* borrowed from the animal world are the most numerous, and that the animals represented are those which form the food supply of a nation of hunters and fishers. They are *desirable* animals; others, not represented, *e.g.* the lion, tiger, jackal, etc., are undesirable, and this, he believes, is not the result of chance. Among modern savages it is not uncommon to find that the image of a creature or object is held to give its author a *prise* over the object or creature through a process of mimetic magic. Hence many savages object to be drawn or painted. In the same way pantomimic and dramatic exhibitions have for their purpose the actual result of what is thus imitated symbolically (rain-making, animal-dances). Among the Central Australians, in order to cause a multiplication of such a totem-animal as the witchetty-grub, the members of this totem clan assemble before a rocky wall on which are painted great representations of the grub, and there they sing in chorus, invoking the insect to multiply and be fruitful (Spencer-Gillen, *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, 170). Similar ceremonies, including the depicting, more or less symbolically, of the desired animal, are employed by other clans, *e.g.* the emu clan. The blood of some members of the clan is shed on the ground, and on the reddened surface is painted with coloured earth and charcoal an emu, along with yellow and black circles representing its eggs. Many other totemic designs, mainly of a symbolic

character, are painted on rocks, and are tabu to women and children.

M. Reinach notes the fact that the Quaternary paintings are executed on the walls of caves far from the entrance and at the end of corridors difficult of access, as if with a view to secrecy. Not only so, but the caves are in total darkness, and, as has been said, the paintings must have been executed and looked at by means of artificial light. Hence the impossibility of assuming that they were executed for mere pleasure. They must have had a religio-magical character, and their purpose was to secure, 'by magical practices, the multiplication of the game on which depended the existence of the clan or tribe. Ceremonies, in which adults alone took part, were performed with that end in the darkest part of the cavern, entrance to which was forbidden to the profane.' These paintings formed the object of the cult, addressed not to the individuals represented, but to the species, over which the worshippers had influence by reason of the individual being thus depicted. The animals, as a result of these ceremonies, would multiply and would frequent the neighbourhood. The various sculptures and engravings of the Reindeer age may have had such a purpose also, while the so-called *bâtons de commandement* doubtless played their part in magical and totemistic ceremonies, as M. Bernardin had already suggested in 1876 (*Revue Savoisienne*, Feb. 1876). Thus the art of the period was neither a luxury nor an amusement, but the expression of a rude yet intense religion, based upon magico-religious practices having for their object the attainment of the food supply. While we cannot admit that Palæolithic man's artistic powers were used only for magico-religious purposes—the beauty of some of his designs, and the care in reproducing exactly what he saw, suggesting the artist pure and simple—it could not fail that they should be frequently employed in such ways as M. Reinach has suggested. Everywhere else this has occurred, and art has been freely enlisted in the service of both religion and magic.

In the times of transition to the Neolithic age, though the brilliant art production of the earlier period is unknown, art was again used in the cult. This, already shown by the symbolic engravings and markings on rocks, megalithic monuments, etc., is further suggested by the painted pebbles found by M. Piette at Mas d'Azil. Some of the designs represent numbers, others are alphabetiform signs corresponding to the letters of the later Ægean and Cypriote syllabaries; others are pictographs, with or without a symbolic meaning. It is in these last that we may find the use of painting as an accessory to the cult. Among them are the cross by itself or within a circle, a circle with a central dot (solar symbols, some of which occur as engravings on the megalithic monuments of the Neolithic age), the serpent, tree, etc. All are painted with peroxide of iron upon white pebbles. Later, the carved symbols of the Neolithic period, *e.g.* the symbolic axes and female figures (divinities) on the walls of the grottoes of La Marne, etc., show traces of having been covered with colour, like the carved images of later ages.

For the cave paintings see *L'Anthropologie*, 1902; *Revue mensuelle de l'école d'anthrop.* 1902. M. Reinach's paper will be found in *L'Anth.* 1903, p. 257. See also his *Story of Art throughout the Ages*, ch. i. M. Piette's discoveries are described in *L'Anth.* vi. 385, xiv. 643 f. For the symbolic carvings of La Marne, see Cartailhac, *La France préhistorique*, 240 ff.; Baron de Baye, *L'Archéologie préhistorique*.

Some Australian instances of the use of painting for magico-religious purposes have already been referred to. Among the Northern tribes of Central Australia similar paintings are used in the totemic ceremonies. The men of the Thalaualla or Black Snake totem, when they perform the Intichiuma rites for the purpose of increasing the numbers of this snake species, paint partly symbolic and partly imitative designs on the ground with red ochre and other coloured earths and charcoal. These depict the mythic history of the ancestral snake, which is also dramatically represented (Spencer-Gillen, *Northern Tribes of C. A.* 302, 737). Similar ground paintings are used in the Wollunqua snake totem ceremonies. Each one represents, 'or rather was associated with, the various spots at which the animal stood up, performed ceremonies, and left spirit children behind him' (*op. cit.* p. 239). In this case the paintings are entirely symbolic, and consist of concentric circles and curved lines outlined in white dots on a ground of red or yellow ochre, painted on the surface of the earth previously prepared for the purpose. Spencer and Gillen describe at some length the sacred rock-drawings of the Central Australian tribes. These, which are usually executed in red ochre, are mainly conventional geometrical designs, all of which, however, have a definite meaning to the natives who use them. They are seen only by the men who have been initiated, and are painted on the rocks near the place where the sacred *churinga* of the clan are deposited. Among other Australian tribes, drawings and paintings on the ground or on trees are also found in connexion with the *bora*, or sacred initiatory ceremonies, and are shown only to the initiated. Sometimes gigantic figures of divine beings—Baiamai, Gunnanbuly, etc.—are outlined in the turf or formed out of a heap of earth; in other cases sacred figures are cut in the bark of trees. Similar figures are also painted with red ochre and pipe-clay on trees, or on sheets of bark, which are then hung up on or rested against the trees. The rock-paintings, which may or may not have a religious or mythic significance, are either stencilled by the object to be depicted being placed against the rock, which is moistened and upon which the colour is blown or applied with a kind of brush; or painted in outline, the inner space being sometimes filled in with the same colour, or shaded by strokes of some different colour.

With the symbolism of the painted pebbles of Mas d'Azil may be compared the designs painted or incised on Australian *churinga*. The *churinga* is a piece of wood or stone of long oval shape supposed to have been dropped by a spirit ancestor as he, for the purpose of re-incarnation, entered the body of a woman. The child thus born becomes the owner of the *churinga*, which is deposited, along with those of the other members of his totem clan, in a sacred place. The design has in each case a distinctive meaning, connected with the totem-beliefs of the people, and generally illustrating some incident of the mythic history of the totem ancestor. Among the designs are concentric curves and circles, parallel lines, etc. These exactly resemble designs painted on the pebbles, which also resemble the *churinga* in shape, as well as those incised on the megalithic monuments of the Neolithic age. It has been suggested that the Azilian pebbles may have been the *churinga* of a pre-historic totemistic people (A. B. Cook, *L'Anthropologie*, xiv. 655). In any case, the analogy of Australian sacred art shows that they had a religious value.

For Australian art see Spencer-Gillen, *Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 696 ff., and *Native Tribes*, p. 614 ff.; Stirling in *Report of Horn Scientific Expedition*, 'Anthropology,' pt. iv.; R. H. Mathews, *JAI* xxv. 146 ff., 299 ff.

Among the more cultured tribes of the North American continent—Zuñis, Tusayans, South Californians, and Navahos—a curious kind of painting is used as an adjunct to certain religious ceremonials whose purpose is usually the healing of disease, and which are characterized by great elaborateness

and length. As practised among the Navaho Indians, the ceremony continues for nine days, and is conducted by a theurgist and several assistants. Every part of the ritual has a special significance, and must be performed with the strictest attention to traditional detail, lest fatal consequences should ensue from the least infringement of it. Several men personate the gods and goddesses and take part in the ceremonies; each day's proceedings include pantomimic action, symbolism, offerings to the gods, singing of sacred chants, and prayers, and the whole ends with an elaborate dance. The whole ceremony is known as *yebitchai*, a word meaning 'giant's uncle,' and, as in several Australian mysteries, it is used to awe children, who, on the eighth day, are initiated into the ceremony, and discover that the men personating the gods are their fellow-tribesmen. The paintings are made with dry sand and pigments of various colours sprinkled on a ground of yellow sand with the thumb and forefinger of the operator. The colours used are yellow, red, white, black, and a blue prepared from a mixture of charcoal with white, red, and yellow sands. These colours, as well as the pictures themselves, are made according to instructions given by the gods, as the Navaho myth of 'The Floating Logs' relates. All the paintings represent gods and goddesses, usually about three feet in length, and depicted in a somewhat conventional manner. Face, arms, and legs are carefully done; the body is long and narrow; each divinity is usually depicted with various emblems; a god is denoted by a round head, a goddess by a rectangular head. Considering the method in which the colours are employed, the resulting picture is a marvellous piece of art work, full of minute details, while many of the colour lines in the dress and sash decorations of the divinities are like threads. The first sand-painting is made on the fifth day of the ceremony, and represents three divinities; in the painting of the sixth day, there are four pairs of divinities, male and female, each sitting on the limb of a cross, with their appropriate emblems; outside the painting are four gods, one on each side, and the whole is surrounded by the rainbow goddess. The seventh day's painting represents fourteen divinities in two rows, again surrounded by the rainbow goddess, 25 ft. in length. Twelve divinities are shown in the eighth day's painting; in their midst is a huge picture of a corn-stalk, the main subsistence of life; a square base and triangle represent clouds, and three white lines the roots of the corn. The rainbow goddess again surrounds this picture. A detailed account of this last picture will show its symbolic nature. The divinities are the Zenichi, who live in a rock, represented by a long black parallelogram. Those parts of their bodies and faces which are painted red, denote red corn; black signifies black clouds. Zigzag lines on the bodies mean lightning; certain black lines round the head, zigzagged with white, are cloud baskets holding red corn.

All these paintings are arranged on the floor of a medicine-lodge in which are assembled the invalid, the theurgist and his assistants, and certain privileged spectators. In each case the sick man is seated on the central figure of each painting, having previously sprinkled the design with sacred meal. Several ceremonies, chants, and prayers follow, during which one of the representatives of the gods touches the feet, heart, and head of each figure respectively with his right hand, each time touching the corresponding parts of the invalid's body. This appears to be the vital part of the ceremony, bringing the sick man into relation with the gods through their pictures and by their representative, thus transferring their power to him so that his disease may be overcome. This seems to be certain, as, before the pictures are obliterated at the end of the day's proceedings, the people crowd round to touch them, and then, having inhaled a breath over their hands, rub their bodies so that they may be cured of any malady, moral or physical, by the divine effluence. The sacred pictures thus exercise the *quasi*-sacramental power of the idol, fetish, or symbolic image, wherever found. Being like the gods, and made, as is believed, according to divine directions, they have all the power of the gods themselves. So the colours used in other American Indian ceremonies are believed to have been originally given by the divine *manitous* (see *BE*, Fourteenth Annual Report, p. 91).

James Stevenson, *Ceremonial of Hasjelti Dailjis and Mythical Sand Paintings of the Navajo Indians*, with illustrations of the paintings, in *BE*, Eighth Annual Report, 1891.

Reference may also be briefly made to: (1) Zuñi religious paintings on vessels, representing the Creation and other myths current among the people. The colours themselves are symbolic (see Cushing, *Study of Pueblo Pottery*, 1886; J. W. Fewkes, *Journ. of Amer. Ethnol. and Archæol.* ii. 1892).—(2) Painting or tatuing the body (*a*) for magical purposes, as among the Aracan hill tribes and Burmese (St. John, *JAI* ii. 235; Symes, *Embassy to Ava*, p. 312, and others); (*b*) with totem designs, *e.g.* the tribes of Malacca (Haddon, *Evol. in Art*, p. 252 *f.*); (*c*) on certain ceremonial occasions, as with the Australians (Spencer-Gillen, *op. cit.*); (*d*) for mourning.—(3) Painting the bodies or skeletons of the dead, usually with red, but occasionally (Andaman Islanders) with yellow—a custom which, beginning apparently in late Palæolithic times (grottoes of Baoussés-Rousses, Mentone), occurred frequently in the Neolithic period, and is found among various savages—Australians, American Indians, etc. (Cartailhac, *La France préhistorique*, 105, 292, 302; *L'Anthropologie*, vi. 4; *BE*, First Report, p. 107; Grosse, *Anfänge der Kunst*, p. 42).—(4) Painting totem-designs on weapons, furniture, houses, totem-posts, and grave-posts (Frazer, *Totemism*).—(5) The use of pictographs to illustrate chants used in religious mysteries and as mnemonic symbols among the American Indians (*BE*, Fourteenth Report, p. 107); see also TATUING, TOTEMISM.

These various examples show that, like every other branch of art, painting, realistic or symbolic, has been used by man to set forth his religious beliefs, to represent or symbolize his divinities, or, in accordance with his religio-magical theory of the universe, to gratify his wishes, to act as a protection, or to transfer the power of the person or object depicted to himself. 'Art for art's sake' was not unknown to primitive and savage man, but on the whole he made it subserve a useful purpose, *e.g.* in bringing it under the sway of religion. It is thus scarcely correct to say, as Grosse does (*Anfänge der Kunst*), that the art of primitive peoples is not connected with religion. Whatever be its origin, whether arising from some instinctive impulse to imitate the things man saw around him, or from some other cause, art soon lent itself to enhance and satisfy man's needs. At the same time, the purely æsthetic pleasure on the part of the artist in making an artistic object or design which was to be used for religious or other purposes must not be overlooked.

LITERATURE.—In addition to works cited throughout this article, see Andree, *Ethnologische Parallelen*, 1889; Hirn, *Origins of Art*, 1899.

J. A. MACCULLOCH.

ART (Primitive and Savage). — Before the acquisition of the art of writing by any people, the only method of recording facts or ideas, except by word of mouth, is by means of some kind of graphic representation. The carving or drawing may be intended to be realistic, though, even so, the realism may be imperfect; but one frequently finds that a suggestion of an object answers all the purpose of a representation of the whole object. Thus, an animal may be indicated by a limb, a zigzag may stand for the wings of an insect, bird, or bat; in other words, a convention may thoroughly satisfy the need of expression. When an object is decorated with conventional designs, these may be so remote in form from their original that they are usually described as 'geometric,' and

consequently they stand the chance of no further interest being taken in them; whereas, if information be obtained from the designers, it is nearly always found that they have a significance that cannot be discovered by inspection alone. Experience has proved that designs which have frequently been regarded as merely decorative have an import that could not otherwise have been predicated for them. Hence, the futility of an endeavour to elucidate the significance of designs without an adequate investigation in the field.

At the outset it must be acknowledged that all the designs of a 'primitive' people are not necessarily significant. The æsthetic sense which manifests itself in symmetry, balance, and decoration seems to have been present, to a greater or less degree, from the earliest times of which we have any record; and it is often quite marked among the less advanced peoples of the present day. It is useless to try to read a meaning into simple patterns unless we are sure of the key, as they may very well be nothing more than an expression of the artist's feeling for beauty as he experiences it, or as limited by his skill or by the materials at his disposal. For example, it appears useless to attempt to extract significance from the patterns engraved on bones by Palæolithic man, or from most of the designs of other pre-historic folk. The same applies to the decorative art of other peoples; indeed, the greater part of the decorative art of present-day civilization is meaningless; but it may for all that satisfy an artistic craving, or at all events it is an acknowledgment of an æsthetic need. The particular designs, however, may be suggested to the artist by what he sees around him, and he may apply them without relevancy, merely to please himself. It seems fairly certain that it is only among the culture-folk that inventive fancy has full play. The nature-folk may produce intricate or complicated designs, but these are nearly always found to be modifications or groupings of simple motives, and these latter are generally those which lie ready to hand. For example, mat-making and basketry are of universal occurrence where the materials exist for their manufacture; the plaits of the former and the weaves of the latter are limited in number, but the various sequences give rise to patterns. By means of differently coloured strips in the original foundation or applied thereto, or by pigments or other devices, these patterns can be emphasized, or new ones produced; but these are practically confined to straight and angled lines, chequers, and the like. These patterns are always before the native eye, and it is no wonder that they are transferred to clubs, wooden bowls, or pottery. The designs are incidental to the technique of plait-work, but are inappropriate to most of the other objects to which they are applied, although they satisfy the artistic craving. The same applies to lashings and various kinds of string- and thong-work; sometimes carved representations of string or braid may be expressions of an antecedent fastening together of separate parts, but more often they are merely decorative.

Artistic representation may be solely for the purpose of *depicting objects*, or for *recording events*, or for *giving information*, as in the case of much of the interesting graphic art of the Eskimos, or of the ruder attempts of certain Siberian tribes. Probably to this category belongs the pictorial art of the ancient cave-dwellers of Western Europe, who painted in caves or engraved on bone the animals that were daily before their eyes, as did the Bushmen of recent times; but the latter frequently depicted hunting scenes, and even fights with Zulus. The pictographs on the buffalo robes of the Dakotas, the most famous of the 'winter counts,' as they are termed, indicate the most salient incident of the previous year, and thus a pictorial history is painted which in this case extended for about seventy years (Mallery, *Fourth* and *Tenth Ann. Rep. Bureau Eth.*). The pictorial blazings or notice boards of the Alaskans gave definite information to friends and travellers (Mallery, *l.c.*).

Apart from the foregoing and the utilization of decorative art as an exhibition of wealth or for social distinction, we find that *magic* and religion have exercised a preponderating effect on the artistic impulse; nor is this surprising, considering the vast importance they play in the life, thought, and feeling of mankind. From the nature of the case that aspect of sympathetic magic known as 'homœopathic' lends itself to artistic treatment rather than does the 'contagious.' The representation of an object is as effectual as the object itself; and as there is virtue in words and power in a name, so there is efficacy in a pictograph, which, after all, is a graphic as opposed to an oral or written expression. According to von den Steinen (*Unter den Naturvölkern Zentral-Brasiliens*, 1894), certain designs on a Bakaïri paddle represent various kinds of fish, some of which are drawn within the meshes of a net; and the author believes that the object of this decoration is simply to bring fish close to the paddle so that they may be caught in the fisherman's net. Many other examples of simple magical pictography might be cited, but the most elaborate examples are those recorded by Vaughan-Stevens from the Semang and Sakai of the Malay Peninsula. These are hunting jungle-folk who undoubtedly come under the unsatisfactory designation of savages. The English reader will find the fullest account of their extraordinary designs in Skeat and Blagden's *Wild Tribes of the Malay Peninsula*. There has been a good deal of uncertainty concerning the *bona fides* of Vaughan-Stevens, but these authors are inclined to credit in the main the explanations given by him of the engravings on combs and bamboos which he undoubtedly collected from the natives. Some of the Sakai bamboo designs represent diseases, and the whole design on a bamboo is intended as a prophylactic against a specific disease. One bamboo design represents the swellings caused by the stings of scorpions and the pricks of centipedes; these creatures also are engraved together with an Argus pheasant. The significance of this bamboo is that, as the Argus pheasant feeds on centipedes and scorpions, its help is invoked against them by striking the bamboo against the ground. The decoration of one bamboo is a charm for rain; one is a pictographic formula to enable a man who wishes to build a house to find easily the necessary materials; one is supposed to protect the harvest and the plantations round the house from injurious animals; another helps women to catch fish, and also protects them from poisonous ones. The Semang women possess numerous combs, which are decorated with various designs, each of which is a prophylactic against a particular disease. When a woman goes into the jungle, she inserts at least eight of the combs horizontally in her hair, so that the disease-bearing wind-demon, who is the emissary of Kari, the thunder-god, on meeting the protecting pattern may fall to the ground; but should the woman not wear a comb with the appropriate pattern, the disease is deposited on her forehead, whence it spreads over the body. In a recent paper, Dr. Westermarck (*JAI* xxxiv. 211) has demonstrated the use of designs in averting the malign influences of the evil eye in Morocco. Silver amulets and numerous objects of everyday use are decorated with crosses, and

groups of five knobs or two intersecting squares; all these indicate the five fingers or finger-tips, which are employed in a gesture to throw back the harmful gaze of those who possess an evil eye. Similar designs and representations of eyes, often as triangles, decorate saddle-cloths, pottery, money-boxes, leather pouches, etc., and are embroidered upon or woven into the garments of the people, so that at all times and from all points they, their animals, and their personal effects may be protected from premeditated or casual harm.

Professor Maspero says of the decorative art of Ancient Egypt: 'The object of decoration was not merely to delight the eye. Applied to a piece of furniture, a coffin, a house, a temple, decoration possessed a certain magical property, of which the power or nature was determined by each word inscribed or spoken at the moment of consecration. Every object, therefore, was an amulet as well as an ornament' (quoted by Goodyear, *The Architectural Record*, iii.). The lotus is the parent, writes Hamlin (*Architect. Rec.* viii.), of a greater number and variety of ornament-forms than any other *motif* known. It was the most conspicuous and beautiful flower known to the Egyptians, and its intrinsic decorative value, as well as its importance in their mythological symbolism, gave it an extraordinary vogue as an ornament. Associated as it was with Horus and Osiris, with the idea of Nature's reproductive power, with the life-giving Nile, and with all the solar elements of Egyptian mythology, it was in constant and universal use as a symbol and amulet, both in its natural or concrete form, and in decorative representations of the flower. Whether or not its symbolic use as an amulet preceded or accompanied from the outset its decorative use as an ornament, it underwent the operation of that universal law by which ornament forms lose in time their original significance and receive new and diverse applications. Hamlin also states that symbolism alone does not sufficiently account for the fact that four-fifths, perhaps nine-tenths, of the ornamental patterns of Egyptian art are based upon the lotus; the real reason for the extraordinary vogue of this single *motif* is to be found in the decorative possibilities of the type itself. The lotus seems to have been symbolic of the sun. It was also largely employed in funeral rites, and also symbolized the resurrection; but this latter idea was associated in the Egyptian mind with reproductive power. As the intensely religious mind of the ancient Egyptians was permeated with the problems of death and elevated by the prospect of immortality, it is not surprising that the flower which symbolized the resurrection should be depicted in such profusion in their tombs and elsewhere. How the Grecian artists borrowed this motive and transfigured it, how it was still further modified by the Romans, and how it spread to the British Islands through Celtic and Scandinavian channels, has been described by Goodyear (*Architectural Record*, ii. iv., 'The Grammar of the Lotus'), Hamlin (*loc. cit.*), Coffey (*Journ. Roy. Soc. Ant. Ireland*, 1894–1895), and Haddon (*Evolution in Art*).

Whereas, for our present purpose, magic may be regarded as a direct action by means of which man endeavours to accomplish his desire, *religion* is the recognition of some outside power or entity who can give aid directly or indirectly, or with whom an emotional relationship has been established; though it is not always easy to distinguish between magic and religion. In a paper on the decorative art and symbolism of the Arapahos, who are typical Plains Indians of the W. Algonquin linguistic stock, Kroeber informs us (*Bull. Am. Mus. Nat. Hist.* xviii. pt. 1 [1902]) that the closeness of the connexion between the symbolism and the religious life of the Indians cannot well be overestimated by a white man. Apart from the decorative symbolism on ceremonial objects, the making of what have been called tribal ornaments is regularly accompanied by religious ceremonies. Some styles of patterns found on tent-ornaments and *parfleches* ('rawhide bags') are very old and sacred, because originating from mythic beings. A considerable number of objects are decorated according to dreams or visions. Finally, 'all symbolism, even when decorative and unconnected with any ceremony, tends to be to the Indian a matter of a serious and religious nature' (Kroeber, *loc. cit.* p. 150).

While totemism is largely a social factor, it has a religious aspect which is often not far removed from magic. When a people is in the totemic stage, the human members of the kin or clan are prone not only to carry about with them portions or emblems of their totem, but to mark their body by paint, scarification, or tatu with realistic or conventional representations of their totem. Not only so, but they may decorate their personal belongings with their totem (cf. Spencer and Gillen's *Native Tribes*, and *Northern Tribes*, and the *Reports of the Camb. Anth. Exped. to Torres Straits*, vols. iv. v. vi.). The Western Torres Straits Islanders frequently engrave on bamboo, tobacco pipes, drums, and other objects, representations of their respective totems; almost without exception the latter are animals. Not only the totem animals are pictured, but in a few instances others as well, of which there is no evidence that they ever were totemic. In this case it would seem that the habit of animal-drawing has been extended from totems to a few other forms. On the adjacent mainland of New Guinea we find plant totems associated with animal totems, and they too appear in the decorative art. At the mouth of the Fly River, plant totems greatly preponderate, and certain pipes and drums brought from some little distance up that river are decorated solely with plant motives. It is only when we come to the opposite extremity of British New Guinea—the Milne Bay district—and the neighbouring archipelagoes, that we again meet with animal forms, more especially birds, frequent in decoration, carved realistically and conventionally, and modified into a wealth of scrolls, curves, and circles; and once more we find totemism as a living cult (cf. Haddon, 'Dec. Art of Brit. New Guinea' in *Roy. Irish Acad.* 1894). Also in parts of Melanesia, where there is totemism, frequent representation of animals occurs (Stephan, *Südseekunst*, 1907). It would be safe to say that where totemism exists there is usually an expression of the cult in decorative art; but it would be very rash to assume totemism wherever we find representation of animals or plants.

Throughout the greater part of America the belief in guardian spirits has led to representations of the *manitou*, *wahubi*, *okki*, *sulia*, *nagual*, or by whatever name it may be termed. More especially is this the case along the North-West Coast, where blankets, boxes, hats, spoons, pipes, as well as the so-called 'totem posts,' are decorated or carved with representations of the guardian spirit of the owner or those of his ancestors. These highly esteemed and jealously guarded crests and emblems originated among the Salish, according to Hill-Tout (*Trans. Roy. Soc. Canada*, sect. ii. 1901), from two sources. The crest springs from pictographic or plastic realization of the *sulia* [or 'dream-totem']. The totemic (*sic*) emblems and insignia are symbolic records of some event or adventure more or less mythic in the life of the owner or of his ancestors from whom he inherited them. In neither case do they regard themselves

as descendants of their 'totems.' Speaking of the more northern of the North Pacific group of peoples, Boas says (*Rep. U.S. Nat. Mus.* 1895–1897) that each man acquires a guardian spirit, but he can acquire only such as belongs to his clan; thus a person may have the general crest of his clan, and besides use as his personal crest such guardian spirits as he has acquired. This partly accounts for the great multiplicity of combinations of crests on the carvings of these people.

Totemism frequently gives way also before an ancestor- or a hero-cult, and thus the human form makes its appearance in religious art. In the Papuan Gulf district the great bulk of decorated objects are ornamented with representations, sometimes highly conventionalized or degraded, of the human face (cf. *Dec. Art Brit. New Guinea*). In this district, at the initiation ceremonies, masks are worn to simulate the ancestral gods, and bull-roarers are whirled; these and other ceremonial objects, as well as the carved wooden belts that only warriors may wear, are decorated with faces or figures of the same apotheosized ancestors. It is highly significant that this is the only region of British New Guinea where 'gods' have been evolved (Holmes, *JAI* xxxii. 426 ff.); and at the same time it is the only district where the human form or face enters at all prominently into the decorative art of the natives, but here the human face is the dominant motive. It is worthy of note that, while animal forms are common in art in the extreme west and east of British New Guinea where totemism is rife, and the human face in the Gulf district where there are 'gods,' in the central district, where, so far as is known, there is no religion as defined above, the decorative art is devoid of animal or human representations, and is characterized by 'geometric' designs. While an ancestor-cult may develop into the worship of gods, the same result may be arrived at by other roads. In Torres Straits a hero-cult, presumably introduced from New Guinea, had invaded the original totemism, and we can trace the amalgamation of the old cult with the new, and its final disappearance and replacement by the higher religion. In the intermediate stage we have a strange confusion of the totem animal with the human hero. In the ritual this was symbolized by the wearing of masks of animal form, or of part animal and part human form. The same occurs also in the Papuan Gulf district, and occasionally these masks are represented pictorially. There does not appear to be any record of a totem animal actually becoming metamorphosed into human form. It may have occurred, but, judging from the Papuan evidence, it is more probable that a substitution took place owing to contact with an ancestor- or hero-cult, and during the transition the demi-god would partake of his double ancestry. In this way we can explain the beast-headed divinities of ancient Egypt. That a part of the religion of ancient Greece had its origin in totemism may be admitted. The ox, the mouse, wild beasts and birds, and similar associates of the Olympian hierarchy, whatever they were to the enlightened pagans who endeavoured to rationalize and even to spiritualize them, are to us milestones which mark the road traversed by Hellenic religion; the Egyptian had been petrified at an earlier phase. When gods had been evolved, it was very important for men to retain the remembrance of those family ties between them and mankind which were in danger of being snapped through the length to which they were drawn and the degree of attenuation which consequently ensued. The statements of tradition as to the descent of mortals from gods are reinforced by the representations of artists of the unlettered races, just as they are enshrined in the written cosmogonies of more cultured folk, the main difference being that anybody may understand the one if he knows the written characters, whereas the other is practically a pictograph, and requires the interpretation of the natives who have the traditional knowledge of the symbols. We are probably justified in assuming that very early in time the custom existed (still widely spread among backward peoples) of carving or painting the pedigree of the man from the god, of the human from the divine, as at a still earlier time the reverse process had taken place. Gill states that significance is 'invariably attached to ancient Polynesian carving' (*Jottings from the Pacific*, 223). Several investigators have studied the peculiar wood-carving of the Hervey Islanders (Haddon, *Evolution in Art*), and many of the designs can be shown to be modifications of the human figure. Stolpe says: 'Ancestor-worship is a characteristic feature of Polynesian religion. The souls of the departed become the guardian spirits of the survivors. Their worship demanded a visible form . . . it appears to me that the peculiarly hafted stone adzes of the Hervey Islands have a religious signification, that they are especially connected with ancestor-worship, and that they were probably the very symbols under which this worship was performed' (*Ymer*, 1890, 232, 234). Colley March first suggested that the carved shafts of the sacred paddles and adzes were pedigree-sticks, the patterns being 'the multitudinous human links between the divine ancestor and the chief of the living tribe' (*JAI* xxii. 324). This seems to be a probable explanation of these beautiful carvings, which thus illustrate the origin of man from his god, and his continued connexion with and dependence upon him. What more can religious art teach?

Symbolism is a universal method of religious expression, and most of the decoration in connexion with shrines and altars has this significance. Primitively this was entirely the case, as may be seen from the researches of Cushing, Fewkes, Voth, Stevenson, and others on the religion and ceremonies of the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico and Arizona (*2*, *15*, *21*, and *33 RBEW*; *Field Columb. Mus.*, Anth. Ser. iii.; *Journ. Am. Eth. and Arch.* i.–iv.; *Am. Anthropologist*, and *JAFL*, various vols.). The sand-paintings, decorated tablets, and other ornamented ceremonial objects appear to be not merely representations of the desires of the worshippers, or pictures of the gods and their attributes, but many may be regarded as actual pictorial prayers. The Huichol of Mexico also spends a great part of his life at ceremonies and feasts, many of which are for making rain. Very important in the religious life of the Huichols is the use of the *hikuli*, a small cactus known in the south-western United States as 'mescal buttons.' The plant is considered as the votive bowl of the god of fire, who is the principal god of the Huichols, and it has to be procured every year, or there will be no rain. Hence conventional representations of this stimulating, colour-vision-producing plant are placed on ceremonial objects or painted on the face. There are numerous other gods. Religious feeling pervades the thoughts of the Huichol so completely that every bit of decoration he puts on the most trivial of his everyday garments or utensils is a request for some benefit, a prayer for protection against evil, or an expression of adoration of some deity. As Lumholtz says (*Unknown Mexico*, 1903, ii. 204 ff.), the people always carry their prayers and devotional sentiments with them in visible form. Girdles and ribbons, inasmuch as they are considered as rain-serpents, are in themselves prayers for rain and for the results of rain, namely, good crops, health, and life; also the designs on these objects may imitate the markings on the backs of the real reptiles. Of

similar significance are patterns composed of representations of conventionalized or vestigial double water-gourds, or of the fire-steel which represents the great god, or of the toto flower which grows during the wet, corn-producing season, and therefore becomes a prayer as well as a symbol for corn. The eye is the symbol of the power of seeing and understanding unknown things, and 'god's eyes' are commonly combined with other designs in woven patterns, in order that the eye of the god may rest on the wearer (Lumholtz, *Memoirs Am. Mus. Nat. Hist.* iii.). Thus these people are literally clothed in prayers.

LITERATURE.—General subject: H. Balfour, *The Evolution of Decorative Art*, Lond. 1893; A. C. Haddon, *Evolution in Art*, Lond. 1895 (with numerous references); F. Boas, 'The Dec. Art of N. Am. Indians' in *Pop. Sci. Monthly*, Oct. 1903; *Bull. Am. Mus. Nat. Hist.* ix.; 'Prim. Art' in *Am. Mus. Journ.* iv.; Flinders Petrie, *Egyptian Decorative Art*, Lond. 1896. Few of these deal with the relation of religion to art.

A. C. HADDON.

ART (American). — The art of the American Indians, like their architecture, is of many varieties and many grades. The chief forms are weaving, basketry, pottery, carving and sculpture, painting, metallurgy and jewellery, and mosaics, which may be taken up in the order named.

1. Weaving. — The art of weaving is found among many North American Indian tribes, particularly in the south and west, although some, such as the Apaches, are unacquainted with it. The material for the loom is very divergent in character. The Menomonis, an Algonquian stock, form their thread from the inner bark of young basswood sprouts, while the southern and south-western tribes use cotton, and the Kwakiutls of the north-west coast employ wool, hair, and even birds' feathers. The fabrics produced by the looms of the Western American Indians are woven with extreme closeness, and the colours are very gaudy, although the blankets for ordinary use are dark blue and white, or black and white, or are even left the natural colour of the wool. The figures, both in the Navaho blankets and in the closely related Hopi work, are frequently elaborate, and the effect is pleasing. It is among these two tribes, indeed, that weaving is best developed in North America. The native colours of the Navahos, who are able to make blankets that are impervious to rain, are red, yellow, and black, but here, as in the Orient, chemical dyes have largely impaired the excellence of native workmanship. Most of the weaving is done by the squaws, who make up their designs, which are largely in angles and straight lines, as they go along, occasionally tracing model patterns in the sand. Considerable symbolism attaches to the designs. The square with four knit corners represents the four quarters of heaven and the four winds, thus corresponding to the use of the *swastika* in America; while the *tau*-cross is a symbol of protection and a prayer to the Great Spirit. A spiral is said to typify the purified soul and a double spiral the struggles of the soul. The colours, in like manner, have a religious significance; so that black is the symbol of water (also indicated by wavy lines), or the female principle, and red the sign of fire, the male element. The Chilkat blankets of the Alaskan coast, woven in elaborate and artistic figures, with a warp of cedar-bark twine and a woof of mountain-goat wool, are also important in this connexion. The designs on these blankets, as might be expected, are very like those on the totem-poles and other carvings of the north-west coast. The natives of the Antilles were also acquainted with weaving, and even made cotton puppets in which the bones of the dead were placed. Among the Aztecs weaving was highly developed, a conspicuous part of the adornment of the warriors being mantles of woven feathers, decorated with the art which was a national characteristic of this marvellous people. The most striking remains of ancient American Indian weaving, however, which even include lace and drawn work, are those preserved in the great Peruvian necropolis of Ancon, near Lima, where the elaboration of the designs and the richness of the colouring surpass all other examples of American textile art (see W. Reiss and A. Strübel, *The Necropolis of Ancon in Peru*, tr. by A. H. Keane, 3 vols., Berlin, 1880–1887).

The general course of development of weaving designs among the Peruvians is thus summarized by Wiener (*Pérou et Bolivie*, p. 636 *f.*): 'Les étoffes les plus simples ont pour ornements de simples lignes droites parallèles, d'autres des lignes croisées. . . . Cependant ces dessins se développent, le méandre remplace d'abord les lignes croisées, et puis petit à petit nous trouvons la reproduction de fruits, de poissons et d'animaux, pour nous élever finalement à la représentation de l'homme. Cependant les difficultés techniques empêchaient le libre développement de la ligne. La courbe est toujours remplacée par une ligne cent fois brisée et se mouvant suivant des angles droits. C'est ainsi que le crâne devient une pyramide à gradins, que l'œil devient un rhomboïde, le nez un triangle, la bouche un quadrilatère.' Yet, despite the restrictions necessarily imposed on the Peruvian artists, their figures of men, animals, and other objects have a distinct charm, and frequently suggest in many respects the products of the Orient.

Mention should also be made, in connexion with weaving, of the bead-work of the American Indians. The primitive basis of this form of art may well have been pebbles, seeds, nuts, claws, teeth, and similar objects of adornment, which continued to be employed side by side with the more artistic beads. 'Beads of marine or fresh-water shells were made by grinding off the apex, as in the case of dentalium, or the unchanged shells of bivalves were merely perforated near the hinge. Pearls were bored through the middle, and shells were cut into disks, cylinders, spheres, spindles, etc. In places the columellæ of large conchs were removed and pierced through the long diameter for stringing. Bone beads were usually cylinders produced by cutting sections of various lengths from the thigh or other parts of vertebrate skeletons' (Mason, in Hodge, *Handbook of American Indians*, i. 138). Ivory and amber beads were used by the Eskimos, while turquoise was carved into ornaments in the south-west, in Arizona, and in New Mexico. The principal uses of beads were personal adornment, the decoration of vessels and of articles of dress, as insignia of office, as records of intertribal treaties and other important events, and as money. In the last two uses the strings of beads are known as *wampum*. The value of beads naturally varied considerably. Pink shells were especially prized, while in New England dark purple wampum was made from the small round spot in the inside of the quahoy shell. The northern Pacific tribes affected dentalium shells. But here, as in blanket weaving, the invasion of the whites brought modifications, and glass beads and silver coins (the latter particularly among the Navahos) are now extensively worked up into ornaments. Woven beadwork is found among the Sioux, Winnebagoes, Apaches, and other tribes, the Sioux preferring geometric designs, while the Winnebagoes and others are noted for their designs of flowers and animals. Closely akin to beadwork is quillwork, especially among the Plains Indians (now done in its purity by few except the Eskimos, the tribes of the north-west coast, and the northern Athapascans), which, in its turn, is supplemented by featherwork, the latter carried, as already noted, to its highest perfection among the Aztecs.

2. Basketry.—Like weaving, basketry is largely the work of women among the American Indians. Its forms are classified by Mason ('Aboriginal American Basketry,' in *Report of the United States National Museum for 1902*, pp. 222–258) into

woven and coiled. The former is subdivided into checker-work, twilled, and wicker-work, wrapped, and twined, the latter further occurring as plain twined, twilled twined, crossed or divided warp with twined work, bird-cage weaving, and various forms of three-strand twining. Coiled basketry included the following: coiled work without foundation, simple interlocking coils with foundation, single-rod foundation, two-rod foundation, rod-and-splint foundation, three-rod foundation, splint foundation, grass-coil foundation, and Fuegian stitches (the buttonhole stitch). The forms of American baskets are equally various, ranging from flat trays, as among the Tulares of Central California or the Hopi food trays, which are little more than woven mats, to the elaborate water jugs of the same Hopis. The baskets are richly adorned with shells, beads, feathers, and the like, as well as coloured with dyes and painting, and interwoven with materials of different colours.

Basketry is used in America for the most varied purposes, as for transportation, cradles (especially on the Pacific coast), armour (as among the Massawomekes of Chesapeake Bay), clothing (particularly the basket hats of the Thlinkets, Haidas, and Hupas of the west coast), preparing and serving food, building (as among the Pomos of north-western California), furniture, trapping, general receptacles, and in burial. Baskets likewise play an important part in the ceremonial of the Hopis, as in the 'basket-dances,' the same tribe also including among its masks some made of basketry. The decoration on North American basketry is reduced by Mason (*op. cit.* p. 295) to the following *motifs*: lines in ornament, squares or rectangles, rhomboidal figures, triangles, polygonal elements, and complex patterns. Here the type of weaving adopted necessarily conditions the general style of decoration, the simplest being that obtained from checker-work, and perhaps the highest being such coiled basketry as that of the Salishans and Tulares. The decoration thus obtained may be heightened by the use of colours and by the addition of feather-work, bead-work, shell-work, and the like. But to convey an idea of the vast variety of design and colour of American Indian basketry without several hundred illustrations would be impossible, and reference can therefore only be made to the monograph of Mason already cited and to the bibliography given by him (*op. cit.* pp. 545–548), as well as to his *Indian Basketry* (2 vols., London, 1905).

Allusion has been made to the fact that basketry is employed in ritual, particularly in the Hopi women's festivals, celebrated in September and October respectively, of Lalakoñti and Owakülti (Fewkes, in *21 RBEW* pp. 22 f., 58). Symbolism in American Indian basketry is now confined to the western part of the continent; yet, even among those tribes and stocks which now show merely decorative designs in their basketry, symbolism still exists, 'for with Algonquian, Siouan, Kiowan, the substitutes for basketry, rawhide receptacles, as well as moccasins, cradles, and objects in three dimensions, are covered with idealism in painting and embroidery' (Mason, *op. cit.* p. 318). The chief modern symbolic basket-makers are the Hopis, the Thlinkets (cf. the similar designs on the Chilkat blankets), the Salishans, and the tribes of northern California and southern Oregon. It must be borne in mind, however, that the same design may represent totally different concepts among different tribes, and that the conventionalization is carried to such an extreme that only the makers themselves can truly interpret them, for 'to appreciate symbolism fully one must know the sign, hear the story, and then study the skies, the landscape, and the social environment. To attempt to discover an alphabet in this primitive art would be useless, for each tribe adapts old and new standard forms to its own concept myths' (Mason, p. 315). From the wealth of symbolic baskets allusion may be made to representations of the Corn Maiden (*Palahiko mana*) on Hopi basketry, and to the four birds of the cardinal points on trays of the same marvellous people, as well as to Navaho baskets with four crosses which give a double symbolism of the four cardinal points. Here the colours also are symbolic, and it is interesting to note, in this connexion, that the Pomos of north-western California have, according to J. W. Hudson (quoted from MS. by Mason, *op. cit.* p. 328), the following colour symbolism: red, bravery, pride (personified by the woodpecker); yellow, amatory success, gaiety, fidelity (lark); blue, demoniac cunning, perfidy (jay); green, astuteness, discretion, watchfulness (duck); black, conjugal love, beauty (quail); and white, riches, generosity (wampum). The *swastika* and labyrinth *motifs* are also found.

The relative perishability of basketry is obvious; and it is equally evident that its use was far more wide-spread in America than the extant remains would imply. It existed, for example, among the Pequots of Connecticut and the tribes of Virginia; fragments are found in the mounds of Ohio; and the means of re-constructing its designs in the Mississippi valley will be noted in the following section. Baskets were likewise known, according to the early explorers, among the Antilleans, some of them so interwoven with leaves as to be waterproof. Not only were baskets used in many religious ceremonies, but, like the Orinoco tribes, the Antilleans often preserved the skulls of the dead in baskets made specially for the purpose.

Throughout South America basketry is found. Thus, the Indians of Guiana make excellent baskets, which they adorn, as in North America, with geometrical figures. Along the Amazon the baskets receive their ornamentation primarily from the rectangles formed in weaving—another interesting proof of the influence of the older on the younger art. These designs, it should be noted, are extended to painting and drawing, and are apparent even in the drawings of men, fish, and birds made by the Indians of this region (Schmidt, *Indianerstudien in Zentralbrasilien*, Berlin, 1905, pp. 330–418), while some of the wooden masks of the Amazonian Indians have in their ornamentation obvious analogues with the more primitive woven masks. Of Peruvian basketry many specimens are known, particularly from the great necropolises, but they present scarcely any features not already known from North America.

3. **Pottery.**—The first utensil for holding water, grains, etc., at least in some cases, was the gourd, which was often slung in basketry for convenience, or reinforced with reeds or grasses, later still with earth or clay. It is not impossible that when these clay-covered gourds were left in the sun, the gourds were found to crack, while the clay became hardened. For a time pottery was accordingly made by covering gourds and basketry with clay, the former being destroyed by heat, and the latter retaining, in its hardened form, its original shape and the markings of its former mould. Still later, the mould was no longer used, since clay containing sand or particles of shell could easily be formed into the familiar shapes, and then be baked to the requisite firmness. It is significant, in this connexion, that the Navahos still term earthenware pots *kle-it-tsa*, or 'mud baskets,' thus recognizing the fact that American pottery is a direct development of basketry. In the further course of development, resinous gums were put on the

clay vessels while still hot, thus forming a glaze which enabled the otherwise porous receptacles to hold liquids. As pottery gradually evolved, moulds were dug in the ground, and clay ovens were constructed in the hill-sides. The coiled basketry, noted above, also finds its application in pottery, as among the Hopis, who both coil ropes of damp clay around a wicker nucleus and construct similar vessels by freehand modelling. It has already been stated that basketry was more wide-spread in America than the extant remains would indicate, and proof of this is afforded by many specimens of the pottery of the Mississippi valley, where casts taken of the clay vessels reveal the pattern of the basket shell on which they were constructed. There is, however, no decisive evidence that the potter's wheel was known in aboriginal America.

Pottery was primarily used for storing, cooking, and transporting food and water, later being used in religious ceremonial, and formed into various fancy figures, as masks, gaming implements, and even toys. Burial urns are also found in the Mississippi valley, and clay pipes are common, particularly among the Iroquois. In general, it may be said that the pottery of North America decreases steadily, in both quality and quantity, as one goes toward the north, until among the Eskimos it is represented only by lamps of the rudest description. The farther south one proceeds, on the other hand, the more abundant and excellent the pottery becomes, thus further exemplifying the fact that the peoples of Mexico, Yucatan, and Peru stood at the acme of all pre-Columbian American civilization. Pottery is a characteristic, moreover, of a sedentary people, and would thus find less use among the comparatively nomadic stocks and tribes of the northern parts of the American continent.

The shapes of the pottery of North America are numerous and, in many cases, artistic. Vases, dishes, and cups occur with especial frequency, either plain or with handles, the vases being both completely open and partially covered at the top. Bottles have also been found, as in Arkansas, and early writers on America relate that they saw earthenware drums in use, these being now represented in part by the earthenware rattles used in the ritual, as by the Pueblo tribes. At least one case of earthenware burial-caskets is known from Tennessee, and funeral jars with obvious death-masks are not uncommon in the Mississippi valley. The anthropological value of the latter form of pottery needs no comment. Frequent and most interesting forms of pottery are the figurines of fish, turtles, birds, and animals. It is noteworthy that these figurines are restricted to Pueblo Indians, who, indeed, represent the zenith of American pottery north of Mexico. It would be impossible within reasonable limits to give any detailed account of the forms of either construction or decoration of American pottery, whether in the northern or the southern continent. In the most primitive specimens of North American pottery there were merely the marks of the wicker mould. The early ornament of the coiled clay vessels was, as might be expected from their form and model of construction (see above), a direct imitation of the patterns of the basketwork vessels. With further progress the impress made by the fingers of the designer gradually came to have regular modifications, which resulted in producing artistic patterns of more or less regularity. The rope coils, at first pinched involuntarily, were later purposely thus modified into regular designs, a Pueblo pot, for example, having the pinch marks so obliterated as to leave rows of triangles attached to each other at the corners. Various tools were likewise employed, pointed ones for incising and gouges for scraping, as well as many varieties of stamps for impressing designs upon the clay before baking. Examples of fictile ware have been found, especially in Arkansas, engraved, after being burned first, with designs of true artistic merit.

The most common mode of decorating pottery, however, was to give the vessel a wash of fine clay, which was painted in various colours and designs, as well as polished, before the pottery was finally burnt. This was particularly the case among the Pueblo and Arkansas Indians. There is a wide range of colour, especially white, black, red, brown, yellow, and green. The designs are so numerous as scarcely to admit of classification; but as the material of baskets led most easily to the production of right-angled decoration, so in the pottery circles and curves form a prominent feature. At the same time, angular designs are not uncommon, doubtless derived from basket patterns; and both angular and curved decorations appear with great frequency on one and the same specimen. While many of the patterns are purely ornamental, and while representations of birds and animals seem, at least in many cases, to be simply decorative, other figures on Pueblo pottery possessed religious symbolism. The three 'lines of life' occur, for instance, on a food bowl from Chevlon, which site also shows raincloud symbols on another bowl. The raincloud symbol, indeed, is well-nigh as important on Pueblo pottery as in the ritual of the Hopis and kindred tribes. The chief raincloud symbols in the modern Hopi ritual are the rectangle (usually appearing as a stepped triad), the semicircle (also usually in triads), and the triangle. These and similar symbols occur frequently in ancient Pueblo pottery, as on a food bowl from Four-mile Ruin; and on another bowl from Homolobi the *swastika* (typifying the four cardinal points), on a red ground, is surrounded by a slate-coloured margin, each arm of the *swastika* pointing to straight red lines representing rain, and the intervening sub-quarters being occupied by three wavy red lines each. These few examples may serve to indicate the wealth of symbolism which may be traced on Pueblo pottery. Nor must it be forgotten that many designs which at first blush seem merely decorative are in reality fraught with deep religious symbolism. Here, in connexion with the pictures of birds and other living creatures, the investigator will do well to bear in mind the words of Fewkes: 'In all these representations of mythical animals the imagination had full sway. It was not the bird with which the artist was familiar through observation, but a monstrous creation of fancy, distorted by imaginations — real only in legends — that the potter painted on the vessels. Hence, we cannot hope to identify them, unless we are familiar with the mythology of the painters, much of which has perished. The comparatively large number of birds on the ancient pottery indicates a rich pantheon of bird gods, and it is instructive to note, in passing, that personations of birds play important parts in the modern ceremonies which have been introduced into Tusayan from the south' (*22 RBEW*, pt. 1, p. 146 f.).

Numerous specimens of pottery have also been found in Porto Rico, Santo Domingo, St. Kitts, Grenada, Trinidad, etc. This is, in general, coarse, unpainted, and rude. The most usual decorations are incised lines or relief figures, the former being preferably lines (especially parallels), triangles, spirals (rare), and circles. There are no traces of either painting or slip. The pottery of Porto Rico and Santo Domingo is distinctly characterized by an indentation of the extremity of each line in rectilinear decoration by 'a shallow pit that

was apparently made with the same instrument as the line itself; or it was sometimes slightly separated from the end of the line' (Fewkes, in *25 RBEW* p. 180). Pottery from St. Kitts, on the other hand, shows red ware with a fine superficial polish and incised lines filled with white pigment.

The art of painting pottery is also known among the South American Indians of the central Amazon and Guiana, the latter tribes adorning their pottery with juices extracted from the bark of various trees, thus making crude designs of animals or geometric figures in red, brown, black, and other colours.

North of the Isthmus of Panama pottery was carried to its highest development among the Aztecs, Zapotecs, Mayas, and kindred peoples. There not only vessels of various exquisite shapes and of a noteworthy degree of finish were made, but also elaborate funeral jars and water-pipes, and life-size figures of terra-cotta. Some of the Zapotec funeral urns are 20 inches in height, and are fashioned in the conventional forms of the sculpture of this region—a feat all the more difficult when the material used for the modelling is borne in mind. In South America the most elaborate fictile ware is found in Peru. Dishes and vases of all shapes, some of them of great intricacy of design and decoration, are found in large numbers. The forms of various fruits, animals, birds, reptiles, and fishes are represented with much fidelity, and clay vessels in human shape abound. The most important of the latter class are those which represent the head only; and while many are evidently conventional, others are plainly intended for portraits, and are thus valuable for a study of ancient Peruvian physiognomy. Groups were also represented; and fidelity to nature, which was the aim of the ancient potters of Peru, was increased by making some of their vessels a kind of mechanical toy, which could give a sound imitating the cry of the animal or bird represented, similar figurines also being found in Central, and even in North, America. A noteworthy form of Peruvian pottery was the water-jar, an article of prime importance in so arid a country. One of the chief forms is the twin bottle; and it has been suggested that one reason for the intricate shape of many Peruvian jars was the desire to prevent insects, etc., from finding their way into the interior. The pottery was often painted or engraved just as it was drying, after the clay itself had first been mixed with powdered ashes, carbon, or graphite, while in more common ware chopped straw was also employed. The decoration was, for the most part, purely conventional, although important exceptions are not lacking. The symbolism, which may well have existed, is not as yet worked out.

4. Carving and sculpture. — The carving and sculpture of the American Indians are still more limited than pottery in territory. This is but natural, in consideration of the fact that wood and stone are far less tractable substances than the clay of the potters. Excepting on the north-west coast, sculptured figures are rare, although a few rough heads have been found as far east as New Jersey. Among the so-called 'mound-builders' the tobacco-pipe attains a considerable degree of artistic development, and among the Eskimos rude carvings on ivory, copied in the scrimshaws of the whalers, frequently represent the forms of animals and other objects with remarkable fidelity. In the Mississippi valley carved shell gorgets have been discovered, which, in some cases, are curiously similar to Aztec work. Rude shell masks are also found, some as far east as Virginia. The most important specimens of North American Indian carving, however, are found among the tribes of the north-west coast, such as the Haidas, Thlinkets, and Kwakiutls, who are also skilful engravers on slate and metal. The totem-poles of these tribes are most elaborate, and are sometimes covered almost to their full height, which frequently reaches 50 feet, with representations of totemistic animals, birds, or fish. In addition to the totem-poles, the posts of the houses on the north-west coast are also elaborately carved, and both they and the totem-poles are gaudily painted in red, yellow, black, and other primary colours. Here, too, belong the wooden masks of the same tribes, which, like the totem-poles and the carved posts supporting the main rafter of the house, have religious significance, and suggest in design the basketry of the region and the Chilkat blankets. The Haida canoes are also elaborated, carved, and decorated with totemistic and other religious designs. The Pueblo Indians, so advanced in other respects, were singularly deficient in carving and sculpture, and there is a wide extent of territory from the Haidas to the Aztecs (except for a few stone whale-killer figurines among the Santa Barbara Indians of the southern California coast) before any real examples of these arts are found. It is only among the Aztecs, Toltecs, Zapotecs, and Mayas, moreover, that any carving or sculpture is found actually to be artistic. The elaboration of the Aztec calendar stone and of the sculptures of Palenque, Chiriqui, and Copan are unsurpassed in any part of the American continent, being far superior even to Peruvian art. Individualistic statues, likewise, occur in these regions, and the walls of temples are elaborately sculptured. The close connexion between sculpture and painting is exemplified in the resemblance of the carved figures to the pictures in Aztec and Maya manuscripts. Carving in wood was known in ancient Mexico, but naturally few examples of it have survived. Large stone figures are found from Mexico to Nicaragua, terminating, towards the south, in the idols of Zapatero and Pensacola and elsewhere, some of them 12 ft. high. They are, however, rude in structure, and far inferior to the polished productions of the Mayas. The archæological remains of Porto Rico and the neighbouring islands, which have become known from the researches of Jesse W. Fewkes in 1902–1904 (contained in his 'The Aborigines of Porto Rico and Neighboring Islands,' in *25 RBEW* pp. 3–220), give some striking contributions to American art from a region hitherto imperfectly explored. The remains are rude artistically, yet they serve to supplement our knowledge of the Orinoco tribes, with which he justly holds Antillean civilization to be connected. Here mention may first be made of stone pestles, chiefly from Santo Domingo, adorned with rude heads and figures of animals, birds, and men, the type being unlike any found in any other part of America. Besides objects more or less familiar elsewhere, such as beads, pendants, stone balls (perhaps used as roof-weights or fetishes), small stone heads and discs with human faces, stools (recalling the forms in South America), pillar stones (generally with rough and grotesque attempts to represent the human form), and rude wooden idols (some possibly imported by the Spaniards from Africa for the negro slaves), there are three classes of sculpture which are apparently peculiar to this region. These are three-pointed stones (either plain or with faces of birds, beasts, reptiles, or men, restricted thus far to Porto Rico and the eastern end of Santo Domingo), stone 'collars,' and 'elbow stones.' The first are regarded by Fewkes (*op. cit.* p. 131) 'as clan idols or images of tutelary totems,' fastened to some unknown object; and the third class may have been connected with the 'collars' (*op. cit.* pp. 172–174). There thus remain the 'collars,' which are either massive ovals or slender ovates, and either partially decorated or plain.

Their use is entirely problematical (cf. Fewkes, *op. cit.* pp. 167–172); but similar objects have been found in Totonac ruins in eastern Mexico. They are accordingly held by Fewkes (*25 RBEW* pp. 251–261) to be connected with the Aztec 'sacrificial yokes,' which he seems inclined to regard as fertility symbols (cf. the more conventional view advanced, perhaps incorrectly, by the present writer in art. ALTAR [American], above, p. 336). At all events, the problem of the real meaning of these 'collars,' which measure as high as 19 by 17 in., can as yet scarcely be said to be solved.

Turning to South America, one finds rough carvings on trees among the Indians of Central Brazil, while their chairs are made in the shape of birds, and they have vessels in the form of various birds, bats, fishes, and tortoises. On the Chaco, on the other hand, art consists only in scratching natural objects roughly on gourds and making rude topographical scenes (Grubb, *Among the Indians of the Paraguayan Chaco*, London, 1904, p. 98). Among the most remarkable sculptures, if such they may be called, of the South American Indians are those of the natives of Guiana. One of the most typical of these is on Temehri Rock in the Corentyn river, and measures 13 feet in length by 5 feet 7 inches in width. The carving represents a number of figures of men, monkeys, snakes, and the like, and also has simple combinations of two or three curved lines. The figures are in all cases extremely rude, and those of less importance are sometimes painted instead of carved. Some of these carvings are of comparatively recent date, for one at Ihla de Pedra in the Rio Negro represents a Spanish galley (cf. Im Thurn, *Among the Indians of Guiana*, London, 1883, pp. 391–410). The sculptures of the ancient Peruvians, although naturally superior to any others of the South American continent, were, as already noted, far inferior to the work of the Aztecs and their neighbours. Expert cyclopean architects though they were, they were but indifferent sculptors, and even the few specimens of wood carving which are still extant are but rough work. Like the Central Brazilian Indians, the Peruvians paid considerable attention to their chairs, and specimens have been preserved which are supported by figures of some artistic merit. Chairs of similar form are also found in Nicaragua and Porto Rico. A few admirable granite heads have been found, as at Pashash; and the fountain of Quonnacha is, at least at first sight, a remarkable work of art. Nevertheless, the rudeness of the head of a porphyry idol, now at Collo-Collo, and the shapelessness of the granite statues of Tiahuanaco, when contrasted with the Maya sculptures of Copan, bespeak most clearly the inferiority of the Peruvians in this form of art. The elaborate sculptures on the buildings, moreover, are far less frequent than among the Aztecs and their congeners.

5. **Painting.**—This art, at least in its crude forms, doubtless prevailed through most of the North American continent; but the best modern examples are to be found among the Indians of the West. The tribes of the north-west coast, where, as just noted, carving in wood is relatively highly developed, paint their totem-poles, canoes, chests, batons, and other objects in gaudy colours, while the Hopis and other Pueblo peoples are also acquainted with this art, as is shown by the masks, often of leather or basketry, and garments used in the personations of the gods in the great winter festivals. In like manner, much of the pottery discovered in the 'cliff-dwellings' is painted, frequently in conventional designs of pleasing effect and with the general systems of symbolism noted above (p. 829[b]). Among the Aztecs and related peoples the manuscripts still extant are painted with considerable skill, but with the high colouring characteristic of so much of early art. As if to atone for their somewhat curious deficiency in painting, however, the inhabitants of ancient Mexico were noteworthy for their skill in making pictures of trees and flowers, and even copies of European paintings, in mosaics of feathers, with a degree of excellence which aroused the admiration of the Spanish invaders (see above, § 1; and cf. Mason, in Hodge, *Handbook of American Indians*, i. 455 f., and the bibliography there given). The Peruvians also possessed the art of painting; but among them, as among the Aztecs, it was undeveloped as compared with their achievements in other departments of art. Their representations of the human form, however, as is clear from their vase-paintings, were far superior to those of the Aztecs, and the same statement holds true in general with regard to all ancient Peruvian painting. The problem of symbolism here, as elsewhere throughout America, must be solved together with the interpretation of the pottery, basketry, and kindred arts. Outside the empire of the Incas painting seems scarcely to occur in South America. It must be borne in mind, however, that painting is pre-eminently a sessile art, and one which requires a considerable degree of civilization before it can be acquired with any measure of real merit. It is less utilitarian even than carving and sculpture, and arises at a later period, while it is still more tardy in development as compared with weaving, basketry, and pottery, and for a like reason.

Certain special forms of painting among the American Indians call for notice in this connexion. Of these the first is 'dry-painting,' which is practised especially by the Navahos, Apaches, and the Pueblo tribes of Arizona and New Mexico, and in ruder form by the Cheyennes, Arapahos, and Siksikas. These paintings are used exclusively in religious ceremonies, as in the Hopi altars (see ALTAR [American], p. 336), and seem to be most highly developed among the Navahos. Here the paintings are sometimes 10 or 12 ft. in diameter, and are, of course, filled with symbolism representing deities, natural phenomena, and living beings of sacred import. The sand is laid to a depth of 2 or 3 in., and the colours are white, yellow, red (these made of powdered sandstone), blue (really grey, being a mixture of black and white sand), and black (pulverized charcoal). Working generally from the centre and according to the plan prescribed by the ritual (except in a few definite cases), the artist, in applying the pigments, 'picks up a small quantity between his first and second fingers and his opposed thumb and allows it to flow slowly as he moves his hand. . . . When he makes a mistake he does not brush away the coloured powder, but obliterates it by pouring sand on it, then draws the correct design on the new surface. . . . When it is finished, ceremonies are performed over it, and then with song and ceremony it is obliterated. When no semblance of it remains, the sand of which it was made is gathered in blankets and thrown away at a distance from the lodge. In the ceremonies of the Pueblo Indians a picture is allowed to remain several days' (Matthews, in Hodge, *Handbook of American Indians*, i. 403 f.). The Hopis, unlike the Navahos, begin their dry-paintings at the periphery, commencing with the north; and when the painting is effaced, pinches of the sand used in its composition are deposited in certain spots prescribed by the ritual.

A sort of heraldry was perpetuated by means of painting, particularly among the Plains Indians. This applied especially to the *tipis* and shields

and involved certain tabus, while the basis of the design was drawn from the visions obtained by the young braves (cf. COMMUNION WITH DEITY [American Indian]). As in many other lands, the painting of the face and body was and is common among the American Indians. This may be purely decorative in intent, or it may have symbolism relating to religion, war, or social status. Thus, the Mandans often painted their bodies reddish brown and drew red or black figures on their arms, while their faces were coloured vermilion or yellow. These designs, being merely ornamental, might be varied at pleasure; but the transition from the ornamental is shown by the practice of the same tribe of painting the entire face jet black after performing an exploit (Maximilian von Wied-Neuwied, *Travels in the Interior of North America*, London, 1843, pp. 340–386). Hearndon (*Exploration of the Valley of the Amazon*, Washington, 1853, i. 201) describes a Conibo dandy as 'painted with a broad stripe of red under each eye; three narrow stripes of blue were carried from one ear, across the upper lip to the other—the two lower stripes plain, and the upper one bordered with figures. The whole of the lower jaw and chin were painted with a blue chain-work of figures.' Ritualistic face-painting is exemplified among the White Earth Ojibwas of Minnesota, the first degree of their Ghost Society being indicated, according to Hoffmann (*American Anthropologist*, 1888, pp. 209–229), by a red stripe across the face from near the ears over the tip of the nose; the second by a similar stripe plus another across the eyes, temples, and root of the nose; the third by painting the upper half of the face green and the lower half red; and the fourth by painting the forehead and the left cheek green and impressing four vermilion spots on the brow and four on the cheek. The 'war paint' of the American Indians is, in general, either red or black, or a combination of both; and the same colours are frequently used for mourning (cf., in general, on American Indian face-painting, Mallery, in *10 RBEW* pp. 619–634).

Allusion should also be made to the pictographs which are scattered over North, Central, and South America. Since these are in great part mnemonic, chronological, or historical in purpose, or are intended to convey messages, notices, and the like, they will more properly be discussed under the head of WRITING (American Indian). Here, however, it may be noted that the artistic powers evinced in these pictographs (which are mainly petroglyphs) are decidedly primitive. Their interpretation, when they are not mere ornaments or idle *graffiti*, is often problematical, and requires, in many cases, a knowledge of traditions, local surroundings, and the like. An important class of pictographs is given in the representations of tribal designations (cf. the list in Mallery, *10 RBEW* pp. 377–388; and see in general on the subject his 'Pictographs of the North American Indians' in *4 RBEW* pp. 13–256, and 'Picture-Writing of the American Indians,' in *10 RBEW* pp. 25–822; supplemented for Porto Rico by Fewkes, in *25 RBEW* pp. 148–159). They likewise symbolize personal names (Mallery, in *10 RBEW* pp. 442–460), and religious symbolism is also prominent, being found not only in the Micmac pictographs from Kejimkoojik Lake, Nova Scotia, but also among the Ojibwas, Menomonis, Dakotas, and Haidas (Mallery, pp. 461–512). More than this, there are well defined pictographic signs for the *swastika*, the sky, the heavenly bodies, day and night, lightning, eclipses, and meteors, and representations of *tipis* and even *pueblos* are also found (Mallery, pp. 694–735). The older American pictographs are naturally on stone and uncoloured; but bone, skin, gourds, copper, wood, and textiles also bear like figures, frequently in colours.

6. **Metallurgy and jewellery.**—The Indians of North and Central America were acquainted with copper, silver, gold, iron, galena, lead, and tin, knowledge of the last two being restricted to the Aztecs, Toltecs, and Mayas. Nevertheless, the use of metal in personal adornment was comparatively rare in North America, shells, beads, and the like being used instead, although bracelets of copper were frequently worn and were highly valued, in view of the difficulty of mining the metal in pre-Columbian days. The metals were worked chiefly by cold-hammering and grinding, but there is no evidence of a knowledge of casting. Silver is now worked with considerable elaboration among the Navahos, and bells of copper have been found in Tennessee, while elaborate sheet copper *repoussé* figures occur in the Etowah mounds, Georgia, and the Hopewell mounds, Ohio; and the copper 'tokens' of the north-west coast are famous in many ceremonies. The Aztecs and other Mexican peoples were expert metallurgists, and their gold vessels and adornments were the marvel of their conquerors.* They imitated the forms of animals and birds, and manufactured personal jewellery, often enhanced in beauty by gems. They likewise possessed the art of making an amalgam of copper and tin, thus forming a bronze of considerable hardness, while specimens of copper plating are known from the mounds of Florida, Alabama, and Ohio. Gold ornaments are also known from Florida and the West Indies. The metallurgical remains of the Peruvians include silver bracelets and collars; gold, silver, copper, and bronze vases; and animals and birds, such as jaguars, deer, monkeys, and parrots, in copper, bronze, and silver, as well as human figures. Apart from this, however, South America falls behind the northern continent in the amount and excellence of metallurgical products and jewellery, as it does in nearly all other requisites and tokens of human progress in civilization.

7. **Mosaics and minor arts.**—The art of making mosaics was known especially in the Pueblo regions of Arizona and New Mexico and among the Aztecs. The modern products of the former region are much inferior to the ancient specimens, 'which consist of gorgets, ear pendants, and other objects. . . . Turquoise was the favourite material, but bits of shell and various bright-coloured stones were also employed. The foundation form was of shell, wood, bone, and jet and other stone, and the matrix of gum or asphaltum. Although the work is neatly executed, the forms are simple and the designs not elaborate' (Holmes, in Hodge, *Handbook of American Indians*, i. 947). Rude mosaics have been found in graves in southern California. One of the most interesting mosaic objects north of Mexico is a shell used as a pendant and found by Fewkes at Chaves Pass, Arizona, in 1896. This is a frog formed by imbedding turquoises in pitch on the shell of a *Petunculus giganteus*, with a small rectangle of red jasper set in the centre of the back (cf. Fewkes, in *22 RBEW*, pt. 1, p. 86 f.). Mosaics from Mexico have long been known, particularly a knife with a blade of semi-translucent chalcedony, the handle being a crouching man, clothed in an eagle's skin, his head issuing from the beak (cf. Bancroft, *Native Races*, iv. 557–559). Of these mosaics some twenty-three are thus far known; and for comparison with the Chaves Pass frog, allusion may be made to a

* The gold was an alloy of copper, varying from almost pure gold to almost pure copper. When the baser metal was used, it was frequently coated (plated?) with pure gold. The technical processes used were exceedingly skilful, but what they were is uncertain.

double jaguar now in the Berlin Museum für Völkerkunde. This is described by Lehmann (in *XV^e Congrès international des Américanistes*, Quebec, 1907, ii. 340–344) as follows:—The figure is carved of tough reddish brown wood, 32 cm. long and 10 cm. high at the head at each end, one of which is turned towards the spectator and the other averted. The belly, which has no mosaic work, is painted with black and bluish green. The bed for the mosaics is a dark brown resin 3 or 4 mm. deep, and the stones themselves are chiefly green or greenish-yellow turquoise and blue malachite, their shapes varying between polyhedrous, rectangular, and round, and all carefully polished. The neck and the extremities are almost covered with turquoises, and rosettes of the same material are evidently intended to represent the jaguar's spots. Rows of turquoise alternate with rows of obsidian on the body, and the ornamentation is enhanced by mother-of-pearl and bits of white, yellow, red, and violet mussel-shells. It would also seem that the eyes and nose were originally covered in part with gold-leaf (see in general on Mexican mosaics, *Globus*, 1906, pp. 318–322).

The account thus given of American Indian art, like that of the architecture of the same peoples, cannot pretend to be exhaustive. Besides the large categories here outlined, there were other arts, such as bark-work. This was used for cord, mats, receptacles of all kinds, dishes, canoes, and houses; for cradles and for burial; for clothing and for writing-tablets; and for religious dance regalia and masks (cf. Mason, in Hodge, *Handbook of American Indians*, i. 130–132, and the literature there cited). Among the more northern tribes and along the Pacific coast bone is almost as important as bark, being used not only for personal adornment and as household utensils, toys, and fetishes, but even for weapons and in the construction of dwellings, canoes, and the like. Bones were elaborately carved, and were also inlaid by the ancient Pueblo Indians, while even a copper-plated bone has been found in a Florida mound (cf. the summary of Holmes, in Hodge, i. 159 f.). Horn was likewise sometimes employed, as for dishes among the Salishan tribes.

LITERATURE.—Dellenbaugh, *North Americans of Yesterday* (New York, 1900); Thomas, *Introduction to the Study of North American Archæology* (Cincinnati, 1898); Hodge, *Handbook of American Indians*, i. (Washington, 1907); Bancroft, *Native Races of the Pacific States*, iv. (San Francisco, 1883); Kingsborough, *Antiquities of Mexico* (9 vols., London, 1830–1848); Maudsley, 'Archæology' in *Biologia Centrali-Americana* (London, 1899–1901); Wiener, *Pérou et Bolivie* (Paris, 1880); Baessler, *Ancient Peruvian Art* (Eng. tr. by Keane, 4 vols., Berlin, 1902–1903); von den Steinen, *Unter den Naturvölkern Zentral-Brasiliens* (Berlin, 1894); Waitz, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, iii. (2 parts, Leipzig, 1862–1864); and many monographs in the reports of the American *BE*, the United States National Museum, the Field Columbian Museum, the Peabody Museum, and the American Museum of Natural History. The present writer's thanks are also due Mr. F. D. Van Arsdale of Newark, N.J., for private information, especially concerning pottery.

LOUIS H. GRAY.

ART (Assyro-Babylonian).—The religion of the Babylonians and Assyrians, which, according to the received opinion, was animistic in its origin, may be regarded as going back to between 4000 and 5000 years B.C. This long period, added to the nature of their faith, has supplied us with an enormous amount of material illustrating their religious art, which the student can trace, in all its variant styles, through the ages of its existence, noting the changes in religious thought which it reflects, and the reaction of its influence on the people themselves.

Before B.C. 4500 (as far as is at present known) no monuments exist, so that there is practically no record of that animistic period in which the religion of the Babylonians had its origin. A wide gulf must therefore exist between the religious conceptions of the simple-minded savages of early Sumerian and Semitic times and those of the men of even the remotest civilization of Babylonia when works of art are found.

Babylonian religious art therefore comes before us only when it had attained a certain measure of perfection. It is true that a number of comparatively rude examples have come down to us, but such are a speciality of no particular age, and at all periods excellent examples, principally in stone, exist, among them being numerous engraved seals, mostly cylindrical. Many good bronzes, too, have been found, some of them being as early as the 3rd millennium B.C.

In all probability the art of Babylonia is best divided into periods, though the schools of the various States (Ur, Erech, Akkad, Babylon, Lagaš, etc.) could also be taken into account if we had sufficient material. With our present knowledge, however, it is often difficult to place the examples, and even the question of date is not without its difficulties, as the chronology does not admit of a clear line of demarcation in the matter. The divisions, therefore, can be only roughly determined, somewhat as follows:

1. Babylonia.
   (1) From the earliest period until the time of the Dynasty of Babylon (*c.* 2000 B.C.—Lagaš, Niffer).
   (2) Until the end of the dynasty of the Land of the Sea (*c.* 1700 B.C.—Babylon, Sippar, Erech).
   (3) The Kassite period (*c.* 1700 B.C.—*c.* 1100 B.C.).
   (4) From *c.* 1100 B.C. until the downfall of the Babylonian empire (B.C. 538).
2. Assyria.

The artistic period may be regarded as extending from the 9th cent. or earlier (we await the results of the German excavations at Aššur) until about B.C. 606.

Though, like the art of Egypt, that of Babylonia comes before us only when it had attained a certain amount of perfection, it is, in a way, more interesting than that of Egypt, in that it shows a much greater variety of styles; and the Assyrian school, when it comes into existence, has a distinct stamp of its own. We have also to distinguish, besides the perfect and artistic, the amateurish (which is sufficiently rare) and the rough and unfinished—generally cylinder-seals 'dashed off' by the hand of one accustomed to do such work, and probably to be regarded as cheap productions for the poorer classes, who naturally needed things similar to those required by the well-to-do, though they could not pay the price. At all times these classes of religious artistic productions had existed, and among the perfect and artistic are now and then to be found things of noteworthy beauty of workmanship, due, doubtless, to the presence of artist-workmen of wonderful talent.

1. **Babylonia.**—(1) Among the best of *the earliest examples* of Babylonian religious art are the very interesting cylinder-seals impressed upon tablets found at Tel-loh (Lagaš) in S. Babylonia. They show a man and a woman, nude, the former struggling with a stag, and the latter with a bull, whilst two lions, whose bodies cross each other symmetrically (a common device of Assyro-Babylonian engravers) attack the two animals at the same time. Various mystic emblems appear—a bat or bat-headed bird, an animal's fetlock and hoof in outline, and a young bull—whilst beneath the name of the owner are two bull-men whose bodies cross each other, as in the case of the lions. The wide-open mouth of the man, and the closed mouth and the large ear of the woman, suggest that we may have here primitive representations of the deities Nebo, 'the proclaimer,' and Tašmêtu, his spouse, 'the hearer'; but the crown with points which the woman wears is rather against this identification, on account of analogies elsewhere. Concerning the art here revealed, a few words may be said. The

animal-forms, especially the heads, are good, and the manes of the lions are well treated, but the human forms are less satisfactory, the body of the man being thick, and the arms in both cases abnormally thin. The head of the man regards the spectator, and, though too large, is more successful than that of the woman, which has the same defect, to which must be added the fronting eye in the profile face, fitting, as it were, into the somewhat pointed nose, which makes the figure grotesque. The close-shut mouth (the line of the lips is invisible in the impression) and the abnormally large ear, taken in conjunction with the wide-open mouth of the man, shows that the design has a deeper meaning than appears at first sight. This seal belonged to En-gal-gala, the superintendent of the women's house during the reigns of Lugalanda and Uru-ka-gina, about B.C. 4500.*

Scenes similar to this are common, though no woman is shown as one of those struggling with the animals. From the same site, Tel-loh, the de Sarzec expedition † obtained a very fine seal showing a bearded man struggling with a bull, and a bearded and crowned personage struggling with a lion. These animals cross each other like the lions in the other design, and the bull-men beneath the inscription of En-gal-gala's cylinder are replaced by two human-headed bulls, one of which is held by a nude bearded man, a bird, probably intended for an eagle, occupying the space between them. If the short inscription *Nin-in* or *Ni-in*, close to the crowned personage, refers to him, it probably represents the ancient deified king Ninus, who, with Semiramis, is said by Diodorus (ii. 8, 6) to have been represented on the walls of Babylon in enamelled brick, hunting the leopard and the lion.‡ The objects here described suggest that there was not only a legend referring to the goddess Nina, patron of Nina on the Euphrates and of Nineveh in Assyria, but also a male deity of similar name. Semitic influence, with its veneration for the male, is probably the cause of the substitution of the male deity for the hearing but silent female.

The occurrence of these early designs on cylinder-seals reminds us of an important fact in connexion with Babylonian art, namely, that in Babylonia there is neither building-stone nor even blocks in any number suitable for sculpture either in relief or in the round. It is therefore not impossible that the earliest works of art were primitive attempts at engraving, first as charms, and afterwards as charms and seals combined, on the cylindrical beads which were for many centuries the favourite form of seal in Babylonia and Assyria, and which afterwards travelled to the extreme west of Asia and Egypt.

Presenting a large surface in a small space, these cylinder-seals became suitable for all kinds of pictures, and we find engraved thereon the Babylonian idea of several of the legends with which we have become familiar from the tablets. Thus it happens that, in a scene showing a nude bearded figure struggling with a bull which is being also attacked by a lion, we see a representation of a boat and a personage within rowing,§ which is generally supposed to show the Babylonian Noah in the ark. Several copies exist also of that exceedingly interesting scene which shows Etanna riding in the air upon an eagle, whilst people on the earth below interrupt their daily work to gaze upon them.* Another noteworthy example is well known as a possible Babylonian picture of the Fall. It shows two personages seated one on each side of a palm-tree bearing fruit, and stretching forth their hands as if about to grasp it, whilst behind the figure apparently representing the woman a wavy serpent raises himself. The work is rough, but implies some technical skill.†

Noteworthy are the early engravers' attempts to cope with the scene representing the overthrow of the dragon Tiamat by Merodach. The best is one figured by Hayes Ward, in which the head of the Babylonian pantheon is seen striding or running along Tiamat's wavy body, and thrusting his weapon into her mouth as she turns her horned head towards him. Two of Merodach's helpers seem to follow behind. Another picture of the same, which is apparently of late date and Assyrian workmanship, shows the dragon with a long and straight, but apparently scaly, body, erecting herself at an angle where the feet spring forth. She does not turn her head towards him, and the god attacks her with thunderbolts, striding along on her body behind, followed by two of his helpers.‡ Other scenes, possibly from legends, occur, but have not as yet been identified. Thus a cylinder-seal in two divisions shows, on the right, a deity (the sun-god) dividing food, of which the owner of the seal, standing before him, seems to partake; and on the left another deity bending down a tall thin tree apparently to conceal a goddess and a (? child-) deity coming forth from its trunk (cf. the classical story of Adonis [Ovid, *Metam.* x.]). All the figures on this cylinder-seal (except that of the owner) wear the horned hat indicating divinity.§

The design in the right-hand division, which shows the owner of the cylinder before the god whom he worshipped, is probably, in its various forms, the commonest found, especially in the period preceding 2000 B.C. The deity is generally seated, and often holds a cup in his right hand. Before him is sometimes a vase, and the worshipper (the owner of the seal) is led into his presence by a divine personage.‖ A divine attendant sometimes brings up the rear.¶ The worshipper is generally bare-headed and clean-shaven, the latter peculiarity probably indicating his priestly office.** Variants of this oft-repeated design are found; one, which is regarded as exceedingly ancient, is a fragment of a bas-relief †† showing a seated deity holding a cup in his right hand, and wearing on his head a hat with two horns, one at the front and the other at the back, instead of one or more on each side, as in the later designs. The work is rough and primitive, the artist having apparently found his material not altogether satisfactory (it is a calcareous limestone, probably of sufficient hardness to make its working difficult).

* See the *Amherst Tablets*, vol. i. p. 2. The woman's crown appears in the reproduction published by M. N. de Likhatscheff, St. Petersburg, 1907.

† E. de Sarzec, *Découvertes en Chaldée*, pl. 30, 5*b*.

‡ Fragments of enamelled brick with portions of what appeared to be fabulous animals, and white inscriptions on a blue ground, were found at Babylon by Rassam. See also Delitzsch, *Im Lande des einstigen Paradieses*, pp. 34–38.

§ Smith, *Chaldean Genesis*.

* E. de Sarzec, *Découvertes en Chaldée*, pl. 30 *bis*, No. 13; *Cylinder-Seals in the Possession of Sir Henry Peck*, 1890 (plate, No. 18).

† Smith, *Chaldean Genesis*.

‡ L. W. King, *Babylonian Religion*, p. 102.

§ *Découvertes en Chaldée*, pl. 30 *bis*, 17*b*. It is not exactly known why the Babylonians and Assyrians represented their deities wearing horned hats. In the primitive design described above (p. 533), the demons or bull-men have horns placed directly upon their heads. Perhaps this is an artist's device to show who, among the figures in the picture, are gods and who are men, just as the star placed before the names of deities in the inscriptions is not an indication that all the deities are stars (though some of them were so regarded), but simply means that the gods belonged to the place where the stars are, namely, the heavens.

‖ Numerous representations of this kind will be found in the *Amherst Tablets*, vol. i. pp. 40, 63, 83, 141, 158, 196, etc.

¶ *Ib.* pp. 80, 170.

** A very fine but fragmentary relief, showing Gudea (*c.* 2500 B.C.) brought before his god by two introducers, is given in Meyer's *Sumerien und Semiten in Babylonien* (Königliche Preuss. Akad. der Wissenschaften, 1906), pl. vii

†† *Découvertes en Chaldée*, pl. 1, No. 1.

The deities at this period are represented wearing mantles which recall, in a measure, the Roman cloak wound round the body, and thrown over the left shoulder, leaving the right shoulder and arm bare. These garments seem sometimes to be represented as made of the skin of some animal, such as the goat (which seems to have been a sacred animal), sewn together in long strips giving the appearance of flounces. This costume distinguishes divine personages, or those who claimed divine kinship. A squat little figure in alabaster, standing with folded arms, and wearing a dress of this kind, the head bound round with a fillet crossing behind the long carefully-arranged hair,* may be a divinity, or the priest of a god.

It is noteworthy that though, in the archaic fragment above described† and on the cylinder-seals, the deities are represented in profile, in bas-reliefs of somewhat later date they are often shown front-face. Whether front- or side-face, however, the horns on their hats, which vary from two to eight in number, are shown as if the front of the head-dress were towards the spectator.‡ Goddesses are shown dressed similarly to the gods, in horned hat and robe of skin, but the right shoulder is covered as well as the left. One small fragment§ shows a goddess wearing a hat with a single horn on each side. Her hair descends in graceful curves upon her shoulders, necklaces adorn her neck, upon which is also a triple row of beaded work which disappears beneath the low-cut neck of her goat-skin robe, over which, from each shoulder, descends a beaded stole. She holds in her hands a vase from which flows a twofold stream of living water. Here we have something really good and artistic—almost æsthetic. The work is so dignified, the idea intended to be conveyed (that of a beneficent goddess bearing the water of life) so well expressed, that the spectator realizes that he has before him the work of a people who knew what they wished to express, and had skill to express it.

After that, the picture of a god,‖ apparently of the same period, is disappointing, though even this has its excellences. Its shortcomings are probably due mainly to the damage which the stone has received. A deity, front-face, bearded, and holding what seems to be a staff or symbol, is seated on a low-armed chair with a high and slightly bent back. He wears the usual robe of skin, and hair falling upon his shoulders. In spite of the damage to the stone, the dignity of the face is striking. Reliefs in terra-cotta, apparently produced from moulds, also occur. A very good example¶ shows a male figure nearly nude, wearing a horned hat, and plaited hair descending to each side of his longish beard, where it ends in two tightly-arranged curls.

The bronzes, though not numerous, are excellent of their kind. They represent *canephoroi* (priestly rulers as bearers of gifts to the temple), human figures and seated bulls, on a kind of tang for insertion in a socket, and the well-known kneeling figures in horned hats holding inscribed cones (regarded by some as the god with the fire-stick). They are of the nature of votive statuettes,** and were used as the bearers of stone inscriptions detailing the building of temples.

(2) *With the advent of Semitic influence* (c. 2100 B.C.) there is a change in the representation of certain of the deities. The horned hats and the skin robes are found, but, in the case of what may be regarded as the warrior-gods, short tunics and thick-brimmed hats appear, and the deity grasps in his right hand a short weapon, held close against the body. The beard also spreads over the breast. Sometimes the thick-brimmed hat is combined with the long flounced robe of skin. The cylinder-seals of this period are often very finely engraved, especially those of hæmatite. The bas-reliefs follow the style of the cylinder-seals, but seem to keep more to the old costumes. A very good specimen of the lapidary art of this period is the representation of Ḫammurabi before the sun-god Šamaš, at the top of that king's Code of Laws.* Ḫammurabi has flowing robes reaching to his feet, and a thick-brimmed hat. His right shoulder is bare, and his hand is raised as if addressing the deity. The sun-god, heavily bearded, wears a flounced robe without any indication whatever of a hairy surface. Upon his head is a pointed hat, with four horns curving upwards in front—eight in all. Wavy rays proceed from his shoulders. His seat has four superimposed recesses, such as are often found both in bas-reliefs and in designs on cylinder-seals. His right shoulder is bare, and in his hand he holds a staff and a ring, emblematic of his endless course and his authority as judge of the world. The work is good and well finished, but wanting in lightness and detail. The bronzes of this period seem to have maintained the excellence which those of the preceding period show. One, probably now in private hands, is a good reproduction, in the round, of one of those divine attendants so often shown in the cylinder-seals as a graceful female figure in a horned hat and wearing a robe of skin, holding up her hands with the palms facing each other. When the deity and the owner of the seal are absent, these attendants are sometimes shown in the same attitude of adoration before the divine name contained in the inscription.

(3) *In the Kassite period* we meet with another style for the cylinder-seals, the work being exceedingly plain and flat, and wanting detail. The designs are, moreover, confined to single figures, either sitting or standing, and accompanied by some emblem—a cross, one or more birds, etc.; and in one case even a fly, suggesting that the deity may have been the Babylonian Beelzebub. These designs probably form the transition to the later Babylonian style of art, in which the robes are likewise very plain; but the work, which seems to fall off somewhat during the Kassite period, later assumes remarkable accuracy and finish.

It is to the Kassite period mainly, however, that the boundary-stones which have come down to us belong. These objects (generally inscribed with grants of land) are sculptured with 'the signs of the gods' as a protection against the wrongful alteration of the boundary or changing the conditions of the deed, etc. Those found by the de Morgan expedition at Susa† are of special value, as they have sometimes short inscriptions which enable the signs upon them to be identified. The sun is represented by a disc having a flaming star within; the moon by a crescent; Venus by a star; Nusku ('the light of fire') by a lamp; Gula, goddess of healing, by a female figure in horned hat and robe of skin, etc. We see on them also the fish-goat, the scorpion, and the bull emblematic of Addu (Hadad). The signs vary on each stone, and the work is seldom really well finished, that of Nebuchadrezzar I. in the British Museum being in all probability the finest specimen.‡

(4) Comparatively early in *the latest period* (c. 900 B.C.) comes that magnificent specimen of Babylonian art, the sun-god stone, found beneath the

* *Découvertes*, pl. 1 *ter*, No. 3.
† *Ib.* pl. 1, No. 1.
‡ *Ib.* pl. 25, No. 5, is an interesting example of this.
§ *Ib.* pl. 8 *bis*.
‖ *Ib.* pl. 22, No. 5. ¶ *Ib.* pl. 30, No. 3.
** *Ib.* pl. 5 *bis*, 1*a*, 1*b*, 1*c*; and pl. 28.

* *Délégation en Perse, Mémoires*, vol. iv. pl. 3.
† *Ib.* vols. i. and vii.
‡ *Cuneiform Inscriptions of Western Asia*, vol. v. pl. 57; *British Museum Guide to the Bab. and Assyr. Antigs.* pl. xi.

pavement of the temple of the sun at Abu-habbah by Mr. H. Rassam. It shows a design derived from the early cylinder-seals. The sun-god sits in his shrine, wearing horned hat, robes of skin, and long beard. In his right hand he grasps his staff of justice and the circlet of his everlasting course. At the top of the shrine two little figures, personifying righteousness and justice, guide with cords the great disc of the sun erected on the table below. A divine personage leads Nabû-âbla-iddina, the king who had the stone sculptured, into the presence of the god, and a divine attendant in the usual attitude of veneration follows behind. The ground consists of wavy lines (the waters above the firmament) with stars below, pointing to the probability that the scene is laid in heaven. The figures are a little too broad, but the work is excellent, and may be regarded as maintaining all the traditions of Babylonian art.*

Figures of deities during this late period are rare, but there is evidence in the antiquities found that they did exist. On the cylinder-seals emblems similar to those found on the boundary-stones of the preceding period often take their place, such as the sun's disc and the moon's crescent mounted on a tall object set on square corniced and panelled plinths. A burly clean-shaven priest stands before the emblems in an attitude of adoration. The fish-goat and other deities copied from the boundary-stones also appear.

2. Assyria.—But it is Assyria, from about B.C. 885, that furnishes us with the greatest wealth of material for the study of Assyro-Babylonian religious art. In the sculptures of that date (time of Aššur-naṣir-âpli) the king is represented as the great high priest. Assyria being a country possessing stone, the sculptors were not dependent on such chance fragments as they could get, and magnificent bas-reliefs indicate what her artists were capable of. The examples from Nimrûd (Calah) show us the king, clothed in garments splendidly embroidered with representations of all kinds of mystic emblems and ceremonies,† himself engaged in ceremonial acts, surrounded by his eunuchs and drinking from the sacred cup, while winged genii offer him the divine pine-cone, or something of similar shape. In other sculptures we see him worshipping before the sacred tree, above which hovers the winged disc representing Aššur, the chief god of the Assyrians.‡ Familiar to all are the reliefs showing the adoration of the sacred tree,§ and the winged figures carrying offerings of flowers and young animals.‖ An admirable example of religious art is the sculpture from the entrance of the temple of Ninip, representing the expulsion of the dragon of evil from the building, which was repeated on the other side of the doorway.¶ As a testimony to the divine status of the king we have the image of Aššur-naṣir-âpli on an arch-headed monolith, and the sacrificial altar which stood before it at the entrance to the temple.** Though the figures are too thick-set, the work is excellently finished, and the details carefully indicated. This applies also to the winged bulls and lions of this reign, though they are wanting in vigour.†† The effect is somewhat marred by the long inscriptions which are carved across the sculptured work of this reign.

Based upon these or similar models are also the religious sculptures of Tiglath-pileser III., Sargon, Sennacherib, Esarhaddon, and Aššur-banî-âpli; but though they belong to the same school, the improvement in style can easily be traced, until we reach the delicate perfection of many of the sculptures of the last-named. Whilst the sculptures of Aššur-naṣir-âpli give us the Assyrian idea of the sea-god Ea (Syncel. *Chron.* 28; Euseb. *Chron.* 5, 8), who was clothed with a fish's skin,* Dagon, according to a sculpture of Sargon from Khorsabad, was shown as a deity with a horned hat, carefully-curled hair and beard, and a close garment reaching to his waist, where the scaly lower part, ending in a fish's tail, begins† (cf. 1 S 5[4] ['the stump of] Dagon,' AVm 'the fishy part'). Noteworthy, though clumsy, are the statues of Nebo standing in what is regarded as an attitude of meditation.‡ On a cylinder-seal, apparently of the time of Aššur-banî-âpli, and bearing a dedication to Nebo, is shown a divine figure holding two winged bulls by one foreleg, whilst they incline their heads gracefully towards him. If this be Nebo, and the design have a symbolical meaning, it may typify the power of the wise to overcome the strong.§ Turning to the bas-reliefs of Aššur-banî-âpli, we may note the scene where, to the sound of zithers, the lions which the king has killed in the chase are brought home, and before a sacred emblem and a table with viands he pours out an offering of wine over the beasts lying on the ground.‖ This is in the best Assyrian style; the figures of Aššur-banî-âpli ¶ and his brother of Babylon as basket-bearer at the restoration of the temple Ê-zida there, though good, fall somewhat short of the sacrificial scene.

Whether it is votaries or ministering spirits in the form of Ištar or of Mah (Merodach's spouse as she who presided over births) who are represented by Aššur-naṣir-âpli as making offerings before the sacred tree,** is uncertain—probably the latter. Ištar is apparently represented on a cylinder of the British Museum as a goddess in warlike guise, armed with bow and arrows, and standing upon a lion, which turns its head to lick her feet. A eunuch-priest stands before her, and the design is completed with the palm-tree and rearing goats whose bodies cross symmetrically. It is a gem of Assyrian religious art.††

The sculptors of that time likewise give us an idea of the spirits, evil and otherwise, in whom the Assyrians believed. Besides the four-winged genii, demons with snarling lion-heads, ass's ears, and eagle's claws, are shown. Sometimes they threaten each other with dagger and mace,‡‡ at other times they raise their weapon menacingly against a person unseen. But they are powerless in consequence of the protecting spirit in the form of a man in front, who with mystic sign casts an unseen spell. In some cases there is also a bearded and ringleted spear-bearer behind, similar to the nude figures on the Babylonia cylinder-seals of B.C. 2500, showing how long these things persisted.

No artistic remains from Assyria later than the reign of Aššur-banî-âpli are known.

There is hardly any doubt that the high level of Assyro-Babylonian art is due to the deep religious feeling of the two nations. Their sincerity is re-

* *Cuneiform Inscriptions of Western Asia*, vol. v. pl. 60; *TSBA*, vol. viii. plate between pp. 164–165.

† Layard's *Monuments of Nineveh*, 1st series, pl. 6, 8, 9, 43 ff.

‡ For various forms of this see G. Rawlinson's *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. ii. pp. 232–233.

§ Layard's *Monuments*, 1st series, pl. 7, 7*a*, 25 (king adoring).

‖ *Ib.* pl. 34, 35, 37, 38, 39.

¶ *Ib.*, 2nd series, pl. 5, and *Nineveh and Babylon*, plate, p. 351.

** See Layard's *Nineveh and Babylon*, plate, p. 351.

†† Layard's *Monuments*, 1st series, pl. 3, 4, 42 (with human arms).

* Rawlinson's *Monarchies*, vol. i. p. 167; *British Museum Guide*, pl. iv.

† Botta, *Monuments de Ninive*, pl. 32–34.

‡ *Bible Readers' Manual* (W. Collins Sons & Co.), pl. 6.

§ Perrot and Chipiez, *Histoire de l'art dans l'antiquite* 'Chaldee,' p. 673.

‖ Rawlinson's *Monarchies*, vol. ii. p. 134.

¶ *British Museum Guide to the Babylonian and Assyrian Antiquities*, pl. xiii.

** Layard's *Monuments*, 1st series, pl. 7.

†† *The OT in the Light of the Records of Assyria and Babylonia* (S.P.C.K.), pl. iii. No. 2.

‡‡ Rawlinson's *Monarchies*, vol. ii. p. 306.

flected in their work, which, if the nations producing it had continued to exist, might have attained a perfection which would have rivalled even the art of Greece and Rome. How far the influence of their art extended, it is difficult to say. Connexion with that of Phœnicia may be traced, the most striking instance being Esarhaddon's clay seal (referred to on p. 884).

LITERATURE.—Perrot and Chipiez, *Histoire de l'Art dans l'Antiquité*, '*Chaldée et Assyrie*,' Paris, 1884 (Eng. ed., Chapman and Hall, 1884). See also Layard, *Nineveh and Babylon*, 1853; G. Rawlinson, *Five Great Monarchies*, Lond., 1878, vols. i. and ii., and other works mentioned in the footnotes.

[A number of the pictures from Botta and Layard are given by Bonomi, *Nineveh and its Palaces* (Bohn's Illustrated Library), London].

T. G. PINCHES.

ART (Buddhist).—See artt. on BURMA, CENTRAL ASIA, CEYLON, CHINA, INDIA, JAPAN, JAVA, SIAM, TIBET, and art. TEMPLES (Buddhist).

ART (Celtic).—The article 'ART (Christian)' is designed to bring into view the various forms in which art in the modern era has been made the expression of religious feeling. Special attention is there given to that phase of Christian art in which there is little or nothing of the representative element, but on the other hand a lavish display of taste and skill and care, all consecrated to the production of a worthy offering of beauty for the service of religion. Celtic art represents this form of artistic expression perhaps more perfectly than the art of any other time or people, and this is one of the reasons why it here receives a special treatment. The spirit of monastic craftsmanship, in all its single-minded devotedness, is nowhere seen in such purity as in the ornamentation of Celtic manuscripts, or the exquisite ecclesiastical metal-work that had its home in the Ireland of the early Middle Ages.

Definition and scope.—By Celtic art is meant, of course, Celtic ecclesiastical art,* and this is related to Christian art in general just as Celtic Christianity is related to the whole religious system of the West. In each case we have to deal with a distinct province, the characteristic features of which are the outcome of special historical and geographical conditions. The Celtic religious area was practically un-Romanized, and it differs in this from all the other regions of Western Christendom. Part of the area lay entirely outside the Roman Empire, and other parts were only dubiously within it, while, on the other hand, after the area had received Christianity, it developed its church life and institutions in complete independence of the Roman ecclesiastical system. In like manner, the art of this same area differs from Christian art in general in that it is far less dependent on Roman tradition and models. Some of the forms of ornament which the Celtic Christians employed in the service of the Church were drawn, not from the familiar *répertoire* of classical motives developed and used by the Mediterranean peoples, but from a stock of forms of hoary antiquity that existed in Central and Northern Europe from a time before the beginning of distinctive classical culture in Greece and Italy. In connexion, therefore, with Celtic art, we are brought into contact with fresh and interesting artistic motives that we hardly meet with elsewhere in the wide domain of Christian art in general.

A word may be said on the local setting of Celtic church life, and of the art which was its outcome and its adornment. At the time of the introduction of Christianity the Celtic peoples in Eastern and Central Europe had yielded place to tribes of Teutonic descent, but they were still in possession in Gaul and in the British Isles, where they had developed, on Central European traditions, some elaborate and beautiful forms of decorative art. The conquest of Gaul and of Britain up to the Forth and Clyde Romanized to a considerable extent these Celtic lands. Christianity was probably introduced into Gaul, not from Rome or from Italy, but from Greek-speaking lands in the wake of Massiliote or Narbonnese commerce, and spread thence into the isles of Britain at a time and by agencies that cannot now be clearly determined. That the Gallic Church was the mother Church of those in Great Britain and Ireland is sufficiently established; and, so far as all these lands were included in the Empire, the Roman municipal and provincial system furnished the Church with a ready-made framework for its organization—an organization which we know existed in Britain on Gallic lines as early as the beginning of the 4th century. This Gallo-British Church, however, pushed its missionary activity into regions entirely outside or only nominally within the limits of the Empire, and here there were no effective Roman institutions to provide this framework. Church organization here, so far as it existed, was quite different from what it was in Romanized lands. It was not territorial or civic, but tribal and personal; that is to say, the bishop, the chief ecclesiastical functionary, was not bishop of a Roman *civitas*, i.e. a town with its surrounding district, but of a tribe, and was largely dependent on the personal support of the tribal chieftain. In other respects also the differences were equally marked.

Representatives of this missionary activity were Ninian, who looked to St. Martin of Tours as his exemplar, and soon after A.D. 400 evangelized the Southern Picts of Scotland; later on, Kentigern, who laboured in Strathclyde and Wales; and, most important of all, Patrick, who, a little later than Ninian and a century before Kentigern, stamped the impress of his personality so deeply on Ireland that he has remained ever since the patron saint of the island. We can gather from Patrick's own writings that Gaul, where he had received instruction and orders, bounded his ecclesiastical horizon, and he was clearly a missioner of the same type as the others just mentioned, who was working independently on the lines laid down by the social conditions of non-Romanized Celtic lands. Under the guidance of these single-minded evangelists, Celtic Christianity in these lands was free to evolve and maintain its own special ecclesiastical character, and this was especially the case in Ireland.

This exceptional character which attaches to the outward apparatus of Christianity in Ireland was further emphasized by the fact that after the island had received the new religion it was cut off from the rest of Christendom for a century and a half by the Saxon conquest of England, which interposed a barrier of paganism between the Christian West generally and this outlying province. Direct intercourse between Gaul or Spain and Ireland, which had existed from early times, was also checked owing to the political convulsions due to the Gothic and Frankish invasions. Hence it came about in certain ecclesiastical matters that, while changes were worked out in Western Christendom generally, Ireland, in this way isolated, preserved her more primitive forms, some of which had once been common to all provinces of the Church alike.

One of these forms, which had once been common but afterwards became conspicuous for its singularity, was the monastic settlement consisting in a number of separate cells and of small churches or oratories. This was everywhere in Christendom the earliest form of the monastery, because the hermit's cell answered to the primal impulse in the votary's mind of retirement from the world. The reputation for sanctity of the first recluse drew others about him, and so a community of considerable size might be formed, numbering possibly, as Bede tells us of the British monastery at Bangor near Chester on the Dee, as many as two thousand souls. The members of such a community, whether few or many, lived beside each other but not together. The arrangements for life in common, which English and Continental ruined monasteries have made so familiar to us—the cloistered court, the common refectory and sleeping-room—were all absent. These were Benedictine features, and did not come into use till the 6th or 7th cent., from which time onwards they were gradually introduced all over the Romanized West. Eastern Christendom, which Benedictinism hardly affected, and the Celtic regions outside the Empire, or on its north-western border, remained faithful to the older system.

Monastery the home of ecclesiastical art.—Celtic monasteries of the kind indicated existed not only in Ireland but in Scotland, in Wales, and in other parts; but it is in the first-named country that they have left the clearest monumental evidence of their character. Even as early as the time of Patrick—the first half of the 5th cent.—Irish men and women were devoting themselves with ardour to the religious life, and the sites of ancient settlements are almost innumerable. Those in the remoter and less accessible regions, such as the islands and rocky headlands of the indented western coast, are, as a rule, the best preserved, and we may take as an example the settlement on the most retired spot of all, the rock of Skellig Michael, an isolated peak about 10 miles out in the Atlantic, off the coast of Kerry. Here, at the height of some six hundred feet above the sea, we find on a terrace, sustained by a magnificent retaining wall of dry, *i.e.* uncemented, stone-work,

* For pre-Christian Celtic art see CELTIC RELIGION.

half a dozen or so of hermits' cells and two or three tiny oratories used for service and private prayer. The cells, and all other structures except one of the oratories, are constructed of the same dry stone-work, and according to methods that carry us back directly to pagan times. The terrace wall is of precisely the same construction as the vast ramparts that form the successive *enceintes* round the stone forts of unknown date and origin on the headlands and islands of Galway or Kerry. The cells are round or oval in plan, and are of a beehive form, the layers of flat stones of which they are composed gradually narrowing their circles till a dome-like finish terminates the whole, an opening being left at the summit for the egress of smoke. This method of construction also is pagan, and may be found in the central stone chambers of the great pre-historic burial tumuli at Newgrange, Dowth, and other places beside the Boyne. That the cells on Skellig Michael are Christian is proved by the fact that over one of the doorways white quartz stones have been set in the form of a cross. The smallest of the little oratories is one of the most interesting of early Christian structures. Its interior length is only about eight feet, and it has a door at one end and a window over the altar at the other end, which is turned towards the east. The construction is similar to that of the cells, but the plan is rectangular, and the walls are made to converge till they meet in a ridge at the top. The little oratory stands apart from the rest of the structures of the settlement, on a jutting corner of the terraced platform, and we may well fancy it a place where the worshipper might tarry awhile and meditate, in this almost inaccessible eyrie between sea and sky.

Such meditations availed much for Christendom at large, for these Irish hermit monks were at the same time the most indefatigable of missionaries. That passion for solitude which drew the Celtic Christians away from the world was only one of the tendencies in their emotional piety, and is balanced by quite the opposite passion for wandering and evangelistic enterprise. To carry on this work effectively they seem to have needed to submit themselves from time to time to certain spiritual influences, which should act on their inner nature and charge them as it were with an electric force that radiated with irresistible potency when they journeyed forth as missioners. It was in places of solitude and retirement, like Skellig Michael, that the fire was kindled and fanned till it burst into the proselytizing fervour of a Columba, an Aidan, a Columbanus. We are here at the source of a stream of Christian influence that flowed with beneficent effect over all the land of Britain and far across the Continent of Europe. Ireland gave Columba to Scotland, Scotland Aidan to Northumbria, and from Northumbrian Lindisfarne proceeded the effective conversion of the Angles, while some of the greater Continental centres of the religious life looked to Celtic missionary saints as their founders.

The foregoing details are germane to the purpose of this article, for we have to note that the arrangement and the life of the Celtic monastery had great influence on the forms and æsthetic character of Celtic ecclesiastical art. It is not pretended here that all the artistic activity of the early mediæval period was centred in the monastery. The monastic craftsman plays a predominant part in the artistic history of the time, but he had no monopoly. Among the northern peoples in the pagan period, the fabrication and adornment of weapons, implements, and objects of personal wear, gave employment to artistic workmen whose skill and taste are in their way unsurpassed, and there is no reason to believe that the introduction of Christianity broke this tradition. In Ireland the Tara brooch, in Scotland the Hunterston brooch, dating about the 8th cent., are pieces of secular art, and we need not credit them to the monks. On the other hand, as the mediæval period advanced, sacred art undoubtedly preponderated over secular, and sacred art was specially cultivated in the cloister. In time, as Mr. Romilly Allen has remarked (*Celtic Art in Pagan and Christian Times*, 1904, p. 171), 'The priest took the place of the warrior as the patron of the fine arts, and monopolized all the available time of the metal-worker and enameller in making beautiful vessels for the service of the Church.' In periods of political unrest, such as on the Continent followed the breaking up of the Roman provincial administration, the convent offered conditions more favourable to artistic activity than were to be found outside, while certain forms of art in great demand at the time, such as the writing and adornment of books, were practically in the hands of the religious. The Celtic monastery may accordingly be regarded as the home of almost all the artistic production of the time that had an ecclesiastical purpose, and it will lend force to this statement to quote the nearly contemporary record as to the making and putting forth of one striking monument of Celtic art, the so-called *Gospels of Lindisfarne* or *of St. Cuthbert*, a manuscript dating from the end of the 7th or beginning of the 8th cent., and now one of the treasures of the British Museum. In an Anglo-Saxon colophon of the 10th cent. appended to St. John's Gospel, we are told that 'Eadfrith, bishop over the church of Lindisfarne, wrote this book in honour of God and St. Cuthbert, and all the company of saints in the Island; and Ethelwald, bishop of Lindisfarne, made an outer case and adorned it, as he was well able, and Billfrith the anchorite, he wrought the metal-work of the ornaments on the outside thereof, and decked it with gold and with gems.' The fact that Billfrith is called the anchorite ('se oncra') shows that fine metal-work with the setting of gems was carried on by the solitary recluse in his cell. The extreme minuteness and elaboration of this is, in fact, just what we should expect in work executed under these conditions; and this applies with even greater force to the manuscripts, wherein ingenious planning of ornamental schemes and faultless execution of multitudinous convoluted detail must have made the lonely hours pass lightly away.

Celtic ecclesiastical art in general was of a kind that could be carried out single-handed and in small interiors. Work that needed the co-operation of many hands and large spaces was little in vogue. In the Benedictine monasteries of the Continent the dominant art was architecture, and vast buildings for the accommodation of communities were devised, planned, and sometimes actually achieved by the inmates in person. Romanesque architecture is in the main monastic, and the great abbey church is its crowning achievement. In Ireland and other Celtic areas early conventual buildings were, as has been seen, smaller and simpler; and though they may possess great constructive interest, little pains have been taken with their ornamentation. From the traditional dry-stone building, illustrated on Skellig Michael, there were evolved on the one hand certain striking features in the framing of openings, etc., and on the other some interesting forms of vault construction. The single-celled oratory was enlarged by the addition of a second cell, also rectangular, forming when smaller than the first a presbytery or chancel, and when larger a nave: and this type of church plan, differing from the type with apsidal termination which belonged to the Roman tradition, appears in England after its conversion by the Celtic evangelists, who may thus have contributed towards the establishment of our insular preference for square-ended churches. The most striking peculiarity of Celtic church architecture in early mediæval times is the detached round tower, abundant in Erin, though represented by only a few stray examples in other parts of these islands. These towers are always connected with religious establishments, and it is now acknow-

ledged that they were primarily designed as towers of refuge, though also employed as belfries. The dangers against which they furnished temporary security were the Viking inroads with which from the beginning of the 9th cent. onwards the country was scourged. It is stated by Miss Stokes in her *Early Christian Art in Ireland* (ii. 57), that, in the entries in the Irish annals,

'regarding the attacks of the Northmen from 789 to 845, it is recorded that the clergy fled for safety into the woods . . . but in the year 950, and for two centuries later, we read of the "cloicethech," house of a bell, as a special object of attack to the Northmen.' A record relating to Brittany (quoted *ib.* p. 56) speaks of the erection near a church in that Celtic region of a 'little round tower . . . wherein to deposit the silver-plate and treasure of the same church, and protect them against the sacrilegious hands of the barbarians, should they wish to pillage it.'

The construction of the extant round towers bears out this evidence of their origin and intention, for in almost every instance the doorway of access to them is at a substantial height above the ground, and was accessible only by means of a ladder, which could be drawn up when the temporary garrison was housed within it. The interiors had wooden floors at different stages reached by ladders, and in the uppermost was the place for the bell.

The features here described are specially but not exclusively Irish. In other Celtic regions which were practically outside the Empire, and to which the influence of the ecclesiastical Rome did not penetrate till a later date, we find specimens, or at any rate relics and traces of them. Scotland, especially in the north and west, is well supplied; for example, the 'Isle of the Saints,' *Eilean na Naoimh*, not far from Mull, has a group somewhat similar to that on Skellig Michael; but Wales and Cornwall have very little to show in the way of structures that are prior to the Norman Conquest. In Ireland such structures are at once more numerous, more clearly marked, and better preserved than they are elsewhere. The plainness of these early Irish structures has already been noticed, and is remarkable in a country where the arts of ornament were flourishing in the Pagan period, and were destined to develop for Christian service into forms so elaborate and beautiful. The rude stone building gave place to cut stone-work, and to the use of the arch and of lime mortar; but the same character of plainness prevailed till about the year 1100, when a rich and somewhat fantastic style of architectural embellishment came into vogue, with which was soon mingled the undoubtedly Norman element of the chevron, or zigzag. With the development of this so-called Irish Romanesque, Celtic architecture loses that special character it had derived from the primitive methods of dry-stone construction, and comes into line with the other local styles of Western Romanesque. The subject need not therefore be further pursued.

i. STONE-SLABS, CROSSES, etc.—If the earlier Celtic masons did not carve ornament on the stones of their religious buildings, they made up for this by considerable activity in sculpture of another kind. The reference is to the incised or carved stone-slabs and crosses, a monumental form of Celtic art represented by abundant examples in all the Celtic and also in the Teutonized parts of the British isles. No complete comparative survey has yet been made of the whole body of monuments, but there exist monographs on the various groups, the most complete and elaborate of which is the ponderous volume issued in 1903 by the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland under the title, *The Early Christian Monuments of Scotland*. The subject is a very large one, for the monuments in question in the Scottish area alone number about five hundred, and it can, of course, only be touched on here.

In the matter of distribution, we may distinguish the following provinces in which the monuments occur in groups large or small. (1) Southern, eastern, and midland England. The monuments here are sporadic, and some regions are bare of examples, though in other parts, such as Derbyshire, they are well represented. (2) North-eastern England and the same side of Scotland up to the Forth, the region forming the ancient kingdom of Northumbria. Here the monuments are very numerous and of great artistic merit. In point of art they show a combination of Celtic elements with those derived from classical sources, and exhibit inscriptions partly in Roman letters and partly in runic characters derived from Scandinavia. (3) Galloway or south-western Scotland, the scene of the ministrations of Ninian to the southern Picts, represented by some interesting early monuments of a Gallo-Roman type. (4) Cumberland and the Isle of Man, and in part Lancashire, where the art of the stones betrays a Scandinavian influence. (5) Eastern Scotland north of the Forth and south of the Moray Firth, known to historians as the ancient 'Kingdom of the (northern) Picts.' The stones here exhibit certain devices peculiar to this region that are for the most part unexplained, though probably Christian in significance, but in the main their art is of the Celtic type. (6) Central, northern, and western Scotland, where Celtic art prevails with a certain Scandinavian admixture. (7) Wales, a region specially well represented by monuments of this class, in which the art is Celtic, the epigraphy partly Roman, and partly in *ogham* characters, that is, in a native Celtic style of writing answering to the Teutonic runes. (8) Cornwall and Devon, the monuments of which on the whole resemble those of Wales. (9) Ireland. This region, with parts of northern and western Scotland, was, as we have seen, entirely un-Romanized; and here the art, with the language, and to some extent also the epigraphic character, of the inscriptions, is almost wholly Celtic.

Of these provinces all but the first and second are entirely, or, to a preponderating extent, Celtic, for the 'Pictish' element in (5), though very remarkable, does not affect the general character of the monuments. The ancient Northumbria, (2), was Teutonic in government and (with of course the admixture of older races) in population, though its art was preponderatingly Celtic. That this region was effectively Christianized by Celtic missionaries from Lindisfarne has already been noticed, and it is highly significant that one of the most important of all monuments in the recognized Celtic style of manuscript illumination was produced and ornamented there by Anglian hands at a time when the Celtic monks had already retired from the island. The existence of this datable monument, noticed in this article on p. 838[b] (the *Gospels of Lindisfarne* or *of St. Cuthbert*), shows that we might expect the same Celtic style in other monuments of the region; and this we accordingly find, mingled with other elements, in the early sculptured stones now under consideration. This may be fairly held to show great vitality in Celtic art, as well as an attractiveness for the Teutonic population. In view of it, it will not be surprising to find that the monuments scattered over the rest of England, (1), exhibit also a prevailing Celtic character, which reminds us that it was influenced in almost every part by Celtic missionary activity. We are therefore justified in regarding the whole body of these monuments as so far Celtic that they cannot be excluded from any general survey of Celtic art.

It is with the art of the stones, not their epigraphy, that we are here concerned; but the inscriptions cannot be entirely disregarded, for they often afford valuable evidence of the nature and provenance of the monuments. The questions that

have to be considered concern (1) the character, (2) the form, (3) the ornamentation of the stones.

1. Character.—The inscriptions show that the majority of them are sepulchral, and as such they represent a form of monument that has been in use since Neolithic times. At the single site of Clonmacnoise in Ireland, there are nearly two hundred of these tombstones, all inscribed, and many ornamented. This religious establishment beside the Shannon, a place of surpassing interest, was founded by St. Ciaran in the middle of the 6th cent., and an Irish poem thus celebrates 'the peaceful clear-streamed place':

> 'Ciaran's city is Cluain-mic-Nois,
> . . . .
> Nobles of the children of Conn
> Are under the flaggy, brown-sloped cemetery;
> A knot, or ogham, over each body,
> And a fair, just, ogham name.'

Of ogham inscriptions on these stones only one has been known in modern times, and the rest are in Roman minuscules. Among the names that can be read upon them is that of Suibine, son of Maelhumai, of the latter part of the 9th cent., celebrated as one of the most learned Churchmen of his time. Inscriptions, however, also show that many sculptured stones were not sepulchral but commemorative, or devised for other purposes. Thus at Kells in Co. Meath there is a cross with the inscription, 'The cross of Patrick and Columba,' which was erected centuries after the death of the saints whose names it celebrated. Most of the so-called 'High Crosses' of Ireland—elaborately sculptured stone monuments of the 10th cent.—were apparently of this commemorative character. In Northumbria we know, from Simeon of Durham (*Hist. Reg.* § 36), that two sepulchral crosses stood at Hexham at the extremities of the grave of Bishop Acca, who died in 740, but the Ruthwell Cross is shown by its inscription to have been a memorial of the sacrifice of Christ. We are told in the *Life of Kentigern*, by Joceline of Furness (late, but based on older materials), that the saint was accustomed to erect 'the triumphant standard of the cross' to commemorate any marked successes in conversion; and in Wessex we have evidence (*Acta Sanctorum*, Jul. 11, p. 502) that 'the sign of the Holy Cross' was set up to mark a place of Christian assembly before the building of a church. Again, some crosses were terminal, that is, they defined a boundary by a landmark which religion made inviolable. An Irish pillar stone at Killnasaggart, Co. Armagh, proclaims that the place which it marked was under the protection of St. Peter, while one of the interesting early stones at Whithorn in Galloway, Ninian's missionary centre, is inscribed 'The Place of St. Peter,' and was evidently a boundary mark.

2. Form.—In the matter of form, the earliest class of stone monuments are pillars unshaped by the tool, after the fashion of the pre-historic menhirs, and correspond to the rude stone building of the early Celtic Christians inherited from their pagan forefathers. These pillars have on them inscriptions in one or other of the languages and characters noted in the enumeration of the provinces, and sometimes incised crosses or sacred monograms. These last, though in themselves, from the æsthetic standpoint, negligible, become of importance as the origin of the form of the shaped free-standing crosses of later times. In Galloway there are upright pillar-stones with Latin inscriptions, and the Chi-Rho (☧) monogram in different forms which are early, but probably not so early as the time of Ninian himself. This monogram appears within a circle, in which we may see a reminiscence of the wreath that enclosed it on the original *labarum*, or standard of Constantine, described by Eusebius; and this wreath, or circle, becomes later the stone ring, which in the well-known 'Celtic' form of the monumental cross is seen connecting the arms. The Chi-Rho monogram changes into the form of a cross by the addition of a horizontal bar across the upright stem of the original Rho (P), and the arms of the cross, though originally enclosed within the circle, come afterwards to protrude beyond its circumference. This transformation can be seen in progress in a half-developed cross at Penmon Priory in Anglesey.

The untooled pillar-stone does not of course itself change directly into the free-standing cross, though the incised monogram it bears has influenced the development. The actual process was as follows: The pillar-stone corresponds, as we have seen, to the rude stone building. When this gives place to the construction with cut stone and cement, the former is similarly changed to a dressed monument, which may be recumbent, in the shape either of a flat slab, which is *par excellence* the Irish type as represented at Clonmacnoise, or of a 'coped' or 'hog-backed' stone, such as occurs chiefly in the north of England, and is more probably of Anglian or Scandinavian than of Celtic origin; or else may be upright, in the form of a smoothed slab like a modern tombstone. The flat recumbent Irish slabs are adorned with incised crosses, the upright slabs with crosses in relief. From these latter were developed the free-standing crosses by the following stages. When a cross head contained within a circle is carved in relief on a slab, the upper part of this may be rounded off to follow the curve of the circle, as on a stone from Papil by Shetland, in the Edinburgh Museum of Antiquities. Next, the part of the slab below the head of the cross is cut in a little to correspond with the form of the comparatively slender shaft, and we obtain the shape known as the 'wheel cross'—a shape confined to the Isle of Man, Wales, and Cornwall. The background may now shrink in still further towards the outline of the shaft, while, by a contrary process, the arms of the cross are allowed to protrude beyond the circle which has enclosed them, and the final step is taken when, as it has been said (Romilly Allen, *Celtic Art*, p. 186), 'the portions of the background of the cross between the quadrants of the ring and the arms are pierced right through the slab, thus giving us the "four hole" cross of Cornwall and the typical High Cross of Ireland,' in which the outline of the stone corresponds with the outline of the Cross.

3. Ornamentation.—The subject of the ornamentation of the slabs and crosses cannot be discussed without reference to Celtic decorative art in general. The forms in which this expresses itself, apart from the carving on the stones, are practically confined to fine *metal-work* and the *illumination of manuscripts*, for in extant specimens of the Celtic Christian period, productions in other materials, such as wood, ivory, or textiles, are so rare as to be in the meantime negligible. On stone, metal, and the parchment of books, Celtic artistic feeling externalized itself in elaborate and varied ornamental patterns, the design and technical execution of which have excited the wonder of all subsequent ages, from the time of Giraldus Cambrensis in the 12th cent. downwards. The same patterns and methods of application appear in all three forms of art, and some of the best authorities treat the stone carving as later in date than the similar work in the other materials. It is a curious fact that certain details of the Irish High Crosses have no meaning in stone-work, while there is a technical reason for them in work in

metal, and this would indicate the priority of the latter. Again, the similarity between richly decorated cross-slabs, of which Scotland is the home, and the emblazoned pages of ornament in Celtic manuscripts, cannot fail to strike the observer. Hence it is maintained that the styles of artistic treatment which are in question here were first evolved on the pages of books or in metal, and then transferred to stone; and Mr. Romilly Allen believes (*Celtic Art*, p. 171) that the book-work was prior alike to that on metal and on stone. At first sight this seems contrary to natural likelihood, for there is much elaborate and beautiful Celtic metal-work of pagan date and also a certain amount of decorative carving in stone, whereas manuscript writing and illumination came in as a totally new form of craftsmanship with the introduction of Christianity. Irish experts converted to the new faith could continue for Christian service their metal-work or stone-carving, while it would take them a long time to learn the new art of caligraphy and illumination. The first books used in Christian worship would be imported, and would only very gradually be supplanted by those of native production. Hence we should expect to find Christian metal-work and stone-carving earlier than the same art applied to books.

Here, however, we are met by rather a curious fact. Christianity at its first introduction did not seem to inspire the Celtic artist, but rather to repress his activity, so that, as Romilly Allen states, 'before about A.D. 650 there was no distinctively Christian art existing in this country' (*op. cit.* p. 165). He accounts for this on the theory that the introduction into the British Isles of Christianity itself was much later than is generally supposed, and suggests A.D. 450 as the date of this. The negative evidence of the dearth of really early Christian monuments in this country had so impressed him that he has called the significant and quite unquestioned notice of the presence of three bishops of Roman towns in Britain at the Council of Arles in A.D. 314 one of 'the vague and unsatisfactory statements of the mythical period' (*op. cit.* p. 164). Archæological evidence, however, must be weighed along with literary, and not allowed to supersede it. To take an instructive parallel, if we were left only to literary evidence for the condition of the earliest Christianity at Rome, we should probably believe that art was at that time tabued. Monumental evidence, however, as shown in the article 'ART (Christian),' is conclusive that the earliest Christian Church at Rome not only accepted art as part of its external dress, but soon began to use it for definitely Christian purposes. Conversely, if we were left to monumental evidence alone for Christianity in early Britain, we should believe that it hardly existed, for Romano-British Christian monuments are extremely rare, and those belonging to the 5th or 6th centuries are few and artistically simple and even rude; yet the Romano-British Church had progressed so far by the early part of the 5th cent. as to have established the flourishing Pelagian heresy, and after the Saxon conquest it is clear that the large and active Christian community in Wales was this Romano-British Church, and not a new foundation in the 5th cent. from Gaul. Why it was that the earliest Celtic Christianity did not at once employ the native artistic resources available is a question which cannot be entered on here; it is a fact, however, that the Celtic ecclesiastical art on stones and in metal and books, which flourished from the middle of the 7th cent. onwards, used motives that were not all originally Celtic, but are found also in 'Merovingian' work in Gaul and in that of the period of the Teutonic migrations in general, and hence it is reasonable to refer the great unfolding of Celtic artistic activity in this period to the impulse which came in from England and the Continent as soon as the conversion of the pagan Saxons opened the door once more to intercourse between Celtic lands and Western Christendom.

The following are the ornamental motives that occur in the decoration of the carved stones, the objects in metal, and the manuscripts: (1) the human figure, (2) leaf-ornament, (3) animals, (4) geometrical ornament, consisting in: (*a*) step- and key-patterns, (*b*) interlacing- or knot-work, and (*c*) spirals.

(1) Celtic art proper has no place for the *human figure*; and where this is treated in native fashion, as in some of the Irish manuscripts, it is reduced to a decorative pattern with no more resemblance to nature than have the figures on court-cards. Wherever the figure is reasonably well drawn or modelled, there influence from the side of classical tradition is at work. The best figures on monuments of at any rate partly Celtic character are those on the Ruthwell and Bewcastle Crosses, and they are accompanied here by vine-foliage enclosing animals which is of distinctly classical type. The High Crosses of Ireland, which date from the 10th cent., exhibit a remarkable display of figure-work which is all due to Continental inspiration, and need not here be described.

(2) *Leaf-ornament* is also foreign to the Celtic style proper. There is hardly a trace of it in the manuscripts, but it occurs very occasionally on the stones in the purely Celtic areas of Ireland, Wales, and northern Scotland. In the ancient Northumbria, on the other hand, it is abundant, and is clearly of classical origin, for the vine is almost always the motive employed. The vine scrolls on some so-called 'Anglian' crosses, such as that of Acca, now at Durham, and the one at Bewcastle, are as charming as any decorative foliage in existence.

(3) *Animals.*—Like the human figure, animals, such as the horse, the deer, the dog, occur, naturalistically treated in some abundance; and it is of course a well-established fact that the unsophisticated artist is always better at animals than at men. There are hunting and battle scenes on some of the crosses or their sculptured bases, and on a certain class of sculptured stones in Scotland animals are represented truthfully in a very telling and artistic fashion. There is nothing here, however, that is specially Celtic. On the other hand, the conventional treatment of animal forms for ornamental purposes is a very important element not only in Celtic, but in all northern decoration. There is no attempt in this to give the animal its specific character, or even to preserve elementary truth in anatomy and proportion. The creatures barely preserve so much zoological character as resides in the possession of a head and limbs, and their bodies are elongated and flattened till they are nothing but bands. All parts that can be extended, such as a limb, a tail, an ear, a tongue, a lip, are drawn out and twisted into elaborate convolutions, and are intertwined as if the artist wished only to produce the effect of complex knot-work. Though birds are sometimes introduced, the beast is generally intended to be a quadruped; but it is drawn out to such a length and tenuity as to justify the epithet 'lacertine,' or lizard-like, which is generally applied to it. There is no question which has been more discussed than that of the origin and history of this form of ornament among the Teutonic and Celtic peoples. The latest and most elaborate work on the subject, Bernhard Salin's *Altgermanische Thierornamentik* (Stockholm, 1904), favours the view that the animals in northern art are ultimately derived from classical models, but that the northern

peoples generally made the motive their own, and worked it out with extraordinary ingenuity and patience. A close comparison of the animal ornament in Irish manuscripts and metal-work and that on objects of Teutonic provenance indicates that Celtic zoömorphic forms are of Germanic origin. These forms are very rare in the Celtic decoration of the pagan period, and do not occur in Ireland, so that a foreign origin is in accordance with likelihood.

(4) In the *geometrical ornament*, in all its forms save the spirals, the same derivation seems now accepted.

(*a*) 'Step' patterns occur in the *cloisonné* settings of Teutonic jewels. Moreover, these patterns in the manuscripts, such as the *Book of Durrow*, are shown in white lines on a dark ground, and the background has been laboriously filled in so as to leave the lines the colour of the light vellum. There may be in this somewhat artificial process an attempt to imitate the damascening in lines of silver on iron, common on buckles and similar objects found in Germanic graves. 'Key' patterns, that is, patterns of a kind of which the Greek fret is typical, are very abundant both on the sculptured stones and in the manuscripts, but are not much used on metal. They are unknown in pagan Celtic work, and their prevalence in that of Christian date is probably due to Continental influence. The Celtic artist, however, showed his originality in that he turned these patterns obliquely, so that their lines are sloping instead of vertical or horizontal.

(*b*) The interlacing- or knot-work is so characteristic of Celtic decoration in Christian times, and is developed therein to such an incredible variety of forms, that it has been popularly regarded as a Celtic speciality. The work in question does not, however, occur in the decoration of the pagan period (or only in one or two doubtful examples), and in the Christian it is so far from being a Celtic speciality that it is the most widely diffused of all the forms of geometric ornament in the early Christian and early mediæval centuries. As Salin remarks,

'In the 7th and 8th centuries the general taste seems to have turned in this direction, for we find the work everywhere from Constantinople to Ireland, and find it, moreover, represented in the most diverse forms of art, in architecture, painting, the industrial arts. It even flourished in Asiatic and African lands wherever European culture had found admittance' (*op. cit.* p. 340).

The origin of the style is still a matter of controversy, and some derive it from basket-work, while others see in it the offspring of the plait or guilloche ornament, which is very common on the Roman mosaic pavements that were to be seen in all parts of the Empire. It is also a moot point whether the style of ornament, whatever its ultimate origin, was developed independently in different centres, or spread from one centre where its capabilities had at first been discerned. In any case the Christian Celtic peoples showed that they had a special affinity for the work, which they carried much further in artistic development than was the case elsewhere. It is especially abundant on the carved stones and in the manuscripts, as the motive is not so suitable for metal, especially when treated by the *repoussé* process.

(*c*) In the *spirals* we come to a form of ornament that is in a special sense Celtic, and is inherited by Christian Celtic art from that of the later pagan times. It is not classical save in ultimate derivation, nor is it Germanic in the broad sense, though it is very finely developed among the northernmost representatives of the Teutonic stock in Scandinavia. On the pagan metal-work of late Celtic times, in Britain, in Gaul, and in Ireland, it was treated with much artistic feeling for beauty of sweeping lines and for composition, and retains these same qualities when adopted for Christian use. Spiral ornament, however, as used in late pagan and early Christian Celtic art, is not quite a simple matter. On one side it is of immemorial antiquity. Spirals occur in Egyptian decorative art from about B.C. 2700 (if not much earlier), and were adopted from this source into the art of Mycenæan Greece, where we find them in Crete and at Orchomenus, Mycenæ, and other places in the second millennium B.C. At least as early as this they appear in southern Central Europe, as at Butmir in Bosnia, and thence the motive journeyed up the valley of the Danube and down those of the Oder and Elbe to Scandinavia, where we find it developed in the Bronze Age to the utmost possible perfection. From Scandinavia it is thought to have passed over North Britain to Ireland, where it appears carved on a great stone at the mouth of the pre-historic royal burial-place at Newgrange by the Boyne. In all these cases we have to deal with regular closely-coiled spirals, which look as if they were derived from the coiling of metal strips or wire, though there is evidence that they were first developed on stone. Now, in the later or Iron Age of Celtic art, spirals of a different and more elaborate kind become the predominant ornamental form, and produce what are sometimes called 'trumpet' patterns. These are formed by double lines which are coiled round each other and then diverge, so as to produce a shape like the mouth of a trumpet. These coils and expanded offsets are ingeniously connected together, so that they can be made in combination to fill with ornament any given space. It has been argued very forcibly by Dr. Arthur Evans that these late Celtic scrolls, which are sometimes called 'flamboyant,' are in fact derived, by a process of conventionalizing, from the 'honeysuckle' patterns or acanthus scrolls of Græco-Roman classical foliage. As used in Ireland and Scotland in early Christian times, the spirals are partly closely coiled and partly flamboyant, and we may regard them as representing a combination of these classical derivatives with the far older and more severe forms of the Bronze Age spirals, the origin of which can be traced to Mycenæan Greece and to Egypt. The use of this primeval motive for the purposes of Christian decoration is a fact of much interest, to which attention was called in a previous part of this article.

We are not concerned with archæological questions of origin so much as with those of the æsthetic use made of these various motives, and of the place of this artistic activity in the life of the Celtic Church as a whole. It has been well said by Dr. Joseph Anderson:

'From whatever source or sources the different elements of the composite style of decoration of the Celtic Christian period may have been derived, the style itself belongs specially to the period of the early Celtic Church in Scotland, Ireland, and Wales, with distinctively characteristic developments in each of these separate areas, and a modified extension into the area of the early Saxon Church, especially in Northumbria. In each of these areas it produced a remarkable development of monumental sculpture; and whether we regard the whole series of their manuscripts, metal-work, and monuments collectively as one great comprehensive manifestation of Celtic ornamentation of the early Christian period, or take them separately as national developments of a common style, it is equally true that, considering the work and the time, it presents a manifestation of artistic culture altogether unparalleled in Europe' (*The Early Christian Monuments of Scotland*, ci.).

The first point to notice about the artistic use of this decoration is the method of its distribution over the surfaces to be adorned. The ornament does not meander at will, but is confined to strictly defined spaces; and these spaces, which may be termed panels, are themselves arranged in a carefully thought-out scheme of composition. The finest examples of this are the pages devoted to ornament in the Irish manuscripts, and the large

cross-slabs which are best represented in Scotland.

ii. MANUSCRIPTS.—Of the Irish manuscripts now extant, the earliest is probably the *Book of Durrow*, and the most elaborate is the *Book of Kells*, both in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin; while the *Gospels of Corpus Christi College*, Cambridge, comes next in age to the former, and the *Gospels of Lindisfarne*, in the British Museum, is only second in beauty to the latter. This book, moreover, possesses the unique element of value that it is dated, and it supplies in this way a fixed point round which other examples not only in illumination but in metal-work and carving can be grouped. It was written within a few years of the date A.D. 700, and is earlier in style than the *Book of Kells* though not so early as the other two. Hence the *Book of Durrow* may be assigned to a date in the 7th, the *Book of Kells* to one in the 8th cent.; and it is satisfactory to know that Bernhard Salin endorses these dates as a result of his elaborate and detailed comparative study of the ornaments which occur in them. The decoration in these books is not more sumptuous and minute in its execution than it is clear and bold in its distribution. Leaving out of sight the figure-work, such as the representations of the Evangelists in front of their Gospels, in which classical models have been, however distantly, followed, and taking only the ornament, we find that the first word or two of each Gospel occupies a page, the initial letter spreading from top to bottom of it, and the rest of the letters of the first word filling up a good part of the folio. A border is designed to combine with the initial in framing the whole composition. If this page be a *recto*, the *verso* of the previous folio, which faces it as the book lies open, is treated as a sheet of pure ornament, the object being that the book shall present a sumptuous and beautiful appearance when placed open at the beginning of a Gospel on a reading-stand upon the altar. The scheme of design for such a page is generally based upon the form of a cross, which appears as the centre and support of a composition of variously-shaped panels filling the rest of the sheet. These panels, as has already been explained, are themselves filled in with patterns of the kinds above enumerated, while a border encloses the whole. As has been well shown by Mr. Johan Bruun, the general arrangement of these show-pages of initials or pure ornament provides spaces or panels varying in shape. Those which decorate or serve as complementary fillings for the big initial letters are often of curved outlines, while those connected with the cross opposite are commonly rectangular, or at any rate symmetrical in contour. In the decorative enrichment of these different fields, patterns of various kinds are selected.

'Spirals' (and we may add zoömorphic patterns) 'were chiefly used to fill in the irregular sections of the body of the letter and its curvilinear enclosed spaces, where, owing to a certain freedom in fixing the centres and making volutes of varying size, they were easily adapted and in keeping with the flowing outline of the margin. Interlacements were less easily adapted, but could be made to suit an irregular space, for instance, by forming a chain of knots of varying size and intricacy; whereas fret patterns were even more rarely used outside of the square or oblong panels, for which they were naturally suited. Thus the disposal of the various designs was ruled by taste, and effected the combination of contrasting elements in a graceful scheme' (*An Enquiry*, etc. p. 29).

We may connect this decision and self-control, in the matter of planning out and distributing enrichment, with the severity of the monastic discipline that prevailed in the Celtic monasteries, where this work had its home. The spirit of order and obedience to rule was as strong in the Celtic establishments as in those organized on the Benedictine plan, and the Irish regulars were not only among the most learned, but among the best-living in Christendom. And if we discern their mental rectitude and respect for law in these well considered and justly balanced schemes, in the actual execution of the ornament we are brought into contact with their intensity of devotion to the allotted task, and the infinite patience to which they were schooled by the seclusion and monotony of their daily existence. The little cells where once they sat at work are places as holy to the pilgrim of art as to the religious devotee, and we can realize there how this element of dainty loveliness in line and hue, this ingenious scheming, this minute accuracy in measurement, must have humanized and brightened spirits that might otherwise have become numbed in ascetic rigour, while an education of conscience must certainly have resulted from their scrupulous logic and exactness in pattern making. Prof. Westwood and other experts have examined Irish manuscripts with a glass 'for hours together, without ever detecting a false line or an irregular interlacement.' In the interlaced work, Mr. Romilly Allen reports that

'every cord laps under and over with unfailing regularity . . . and all the cords are joined up so as not to leave any loose ends. All the details of the spiral-work are executed with the minutest care, and there is never a broken line or pseudo-spiral. In the zoömorphic designs the beasts are all provided with the proper number of limbs and are complete in every respect down to the smallest detail' (*Celtic Art*, p. 256).

No mere description can give any idea of the variety, minuteness, and unfailing consistency of this decoration, which can now be judged of in accessible photographic reproductions, such as those in Stanford Robinson's *Celtic Illuminative Art*. As regards colour a word may be said, because it is noteworthy that the Irish scribe produced the effect of sumptuous splendour on his enriched folios without any use of gold, on which the Continental miniaturist so largely depended. This is at first sight surprising, for Ireland produced a good deal of gold; and this was not only used in her native metal-work, but, it is believed, exported to other lands such as Scandinavia. Trinity College, Dublin, possesses a magnificent and weighty gold fibula of native metal and workmanship, but the manuscripts in the library are destitute of gilding. The colours employed are not numerous, but yellow is largely used, and might have suggested to the scribe the substitution of gold. The reds, greens, blues, and purples are bright, clear, and harmoniously blended, but the best effect is gained by the free use of black, of which the scribe fully realized the artistic value. We may conclude on this subject with some words of Dr. Anderson, in which he speaks of the 'profusion of spiral, linear, and zoömorphic patterns arranged in symmetric and rhythmic designs shown up by contrasts of colour, and all carried to an extent of elaboration so bewildering, and yet so charming in the perfect balance and finish of its parts, that the more the result is studied, the deeper becomes the impression of its inimitable originality, grace, precision, and skill.'

iii. METAL-WORK.—The fine Celtic metal-work was, as we learn from some special cases, also a monastic craft in the hands of ecclesiastics. It was applied to the enhancement of the value of the manuscripts either at once in the form of covers, such as that adorned by Billfrith at Lindisfarne, or later on in that of the shrine or box, called in Ireland *cumdach*, made to contain and preserve the precious volume (p. 838[b]). These cumdachs are peculiar to Ireland. Shrines of a similar kind, also of a later date than the objects they were to protect, were made for the early hand-bells connected with the names of famous saints, which are in themselves objects of the highest interest, and may in some cases really have belonged to the saints with whom they are traditionally associated.

Their simplicity and even rudeness agree with an early date. The most primitive are four-sided, and made of plates of iron riveted at the corners. The later ones are of the same shape but of cast bronze, and these are sometimes ornamented. There are early bells of the kind in Scotland and Wales as well as Ireland, and Scotland has two bell-shrines, the rest being Irish. Celtic metal-work of early Christian date is perhaps most largely represented by the enriched penannular or annular brooches, of which the Tara brooch in Ireland and the Hunterston brooch in Scotland are the finest examples. As this article is concerned rather with things ecclesiastical, it may be sufficient to refer to four fine examples in this class, the Ardagh Chalice and the Cross of Cong in Ireland, and the Monymusk reliquary and crozier of St. Fillan in Scotland. They are all works of great interest either from the historical or the artistic side, and the first named is one of the most beautiful and elaborate examples of fine metal-work extant anywhere in the world.

The Monymusk reliquary is described by Anderson as 'a small wooden box' (it is about four inches long), 'hollowed out of the solid, and plated with plates of pale bronze and with plates of silver. . . . Its ornamentation is that peculiarly Celtic form of interlacing zoömorphic decoration, united with coloured designs of diverging spirals and trumpet scrolls, which are the principal varieties of the decorative art of the Celtic manuscripts and memorial stones of the early Christian time. It is jewelled and enamelled, and its engraved and chased designs are characterized by such excellence of execution that it must be early in date' (*Scotland in Early Christian Times*, p. 249). The special historical interest connected with the reliquary resides in the fact that there is some reason to believe it a relic of St. Columba, and a *vexillum*, or battle charm, which, like the Ark in ancient Israel, was borne out to battle with the Scottish host. It is preserved at Monymusk House, Aberdeenshire. The crozier of St. Fillan is an example of a specially Celtic form of ecclesiastical object. It is really a shrine of fine metal-work, made in the shape of, and enclosing, the head of the pastoral staff of wood traditionally belonging to an early saint. The form of the crozier is exclusively Celtic, and differs from the form that such objects take on the Continent, and in the case of that of St. Fillan authentic history shows that it was employed as a relic on which oaths of a peculiarly solemn kind could be taken, while it is surmised that it was borne as a *vexillum* into battle at Bannockburn. It is preserved in a damaged condition in the Museum of Antiquities at Edinburgh.

The Cross of Cong, at Dublin, is the one surviving example of a processional cross of the early Celtic Church. It measures 2 ft. 8 in. in height by 1 ft. 6⅜ in. across the arms, and is 1¾ in. thick. It is constructed of oak, and was supposed to contain at its centre, under a boss of rock crystal, a portion of the true cross. On the exterior it is all covered with metal plates of copper which are adorned with silver mouldings and plaques, with panels of fine gold work and gilded bronze, and with bosses of coloured enamel. The panels are ornamented with gold filigree work and zoömorphic patterns, and the effect of the whole is rich and artistically pleasing. It can be dated in the first half of the 12th cent., and is a striking proof of the long survival of fine artistic taste in characteristically Celtic work in Ireland. As a rule the later objects, such as the cumdachs and the bell-shrines, though the style of the enrichment remains the same, are comparatively coarse in execution, but the Cross of Cong has fine technical qualities.

Lastly, in the Ardagh Chalice we come back to the period of the most perfect design and workmanship, of about the 8th cent., and to a masterpiece of unique value. It is a large two-handled bowl on a low stem, and will hold as much as three pints of liquid. In its construction and ornament are employed no fewer than 354 distinct pieces, and the materials are gold, silver, bronze, lead, enamel, glass, amber, and mica; and the ornamental patterns include interlaced-work, step-patterns, key-patterns, spirals, zoömorphs, and scrolls, arranged in panels after the fashion represented in the manuscripts, and of the finest period of the style. What is chiefly remarkable about the chalice is not the elaboration or variety of its detail, but the almost classic nobility of its general design. As a rule, in all barbaric enrichment, whether Celtic or Teutonic in origin, the tendency is for the ornament to cover practically the whole surface of the object under treatment, while it is only very rarely that we find that contrast between plain and richly adorned passages on which so much of the effect of classical decoration depends. The chalice, like some other objects of the pagan period in the collection of the Royal Irish Academy, has an imposing largeness of style, due to the simple contours of the plain polished silver bowl, in contrast with the bands and medallions filled in with panels of delicate ornament and studded with bosses of variegated enamel. Not the least beautiful part is the flat plate on the under side of the base, which would be visible when the chalice was raised to the lips of a communicant.

Conclusion.—It has been seen that in the manuscripts all the kinds of ornament already enumerated are used freely in conjunction, while in the metal-work zoömorphs are conspicuous, and interlacing patterns are less used than the others. Turning now to the sculptured stones, we find interlacing patterns most prominent of all, so that they sometimes form the sole decoration of a monument. As the forms of the slabs or crosses differ in the various Celtic or Celticized districts, so do the kinds of ornament with which they are adorned. Decoration in tastefully distributed panels is everywhere the rule, and in Kells churchyard, Ireland, there is an unfinished cross, on which the panels are marked out and carefully squared, though there is no carving on them. The panels, however, are differently filled according to the localities. In Ireland, where the erect crosses are comparatively late, these show figure subjects greatly preponderating over ornament; and the same may be said of the free-standing Scottish crosses of the same type, though the subjects in Ireland are more generally Scriptural than in Scotland, where hunting scenes and the like are more common. In Wales and Cornwall, on the other hand, figure sculpture of all kinds is subordinate to ornament. In the matter of ornament, spirals of good design and zoömorphs are frequent in Ireland and Scotland, but are very rare in Wales and Cornwall, and, as far as spirals are concerned, in the Isle of Man. The Irish and Scottish stones have also as a speciality that kind of knot work where curved lines are most in evidence.

The varieties of interlacing patterns in Scotland and Wales are astonishing, and these have all been analyzed with extreme ingenuity and care by Romilly Allen in *The Early Christian Monuments of Scotland*, where the subject occupies 150 quarto pages. Since these slabs and crosses were, as we have seen, not so strictly ecclesiastical in character as the manuscripts and much of the metal-work, it is not necessary to postulate the monastic craftsman as in their case the sole executant. Yet the loving care and the single-minded devotion to a laborious task of which they give evidence are just the qualities which the monastic life developed in its votaries; and though the designer of some of the

elaborate cross-slabs of Scotland may have helped himself by appropriating compositions and motives from the manuscripts, yet he could never have carried out the work with such perfect execution had not his whole nature been brought into accord with the spirit that inspires it. Celtic art, as the expression on the æsthetic side of the fervour and intensity of a wonderful religious life, without which the Christian Church would have been greatly poorer, was a possession of the people at large, and is a democratic art practised alike by the unlettered mason and by the most learned scholars in Christendom.

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G. BALDWIN BROWN.

ART (Christian).—**Introduction.**—The limits of this article permit of the treatment of the subject only in one or two selected aspects. There can be no attempt to enumerate the various forms of Christian art, still less to trace out their history. For several of these, provision is made elsewhere in the Encyclopædia. The noblest and most important form of Christian art, architecture, furnishes the subject of a distinct article. Illuminated manuscripts are dealt with in next article. For an account of minor forms of Christian art, such as ivories, or ecclesiastical metal-work, information will be found in Dictionaries of Christian Antiquities, or in compendia like Dom Leclercq's recent *Manuel d'Archéologie Chrétienne*.

(*a*) *Scope.*—The scope of the present article must necessarily be a narrow one, and the main object of it is to take the most characteristic forms of Christian art as we meet with them in successive ages, and consider how far each of them expressed the religious ideal. In connexion with these historical phases we shall keep in view the two main questions: (1) that of the relation of art and the element of beauty generally to the religious life, and (2) that of the actual attitude of the Church at large, and of sections of it, towards art and beauty.

(*b*) *Definition.*—It is necessary to understand at the outset what is meant by 'Art.' To the majority of people a work of art means a picture or a piece of sculpture, and such works are generally regarded from the points of view of their resemblance to nature, and of the intrinsic character of the person or scene or object delineated. Art is, however, something far wider, and it is taken here to embrace the element of beauty wherever this appears in the works of man. The tasteful embellishment of buildings and of objects of utility is just as much art as the painting of a picture, and such decoration can be in the highest degree artistic even though the representation of nature plays little or no part in it. Where the representation of nature does form an important element in the effect of a piece, this may be a very beautiful and precious work of art, though the aspect of nature it presents is comparatively trivial, whereas a markedly inferior work of art, like some modern religious pictures of the 'Doré' type, may have for its theme a subject of the highest import. In this article the subject and the religious intention of a work are not reckoned as in themselves competent to give it its rank, and only those works are regarded as illustrating the subject of Christian art that express Christian ideas in an adequate and beautiful artistic form.

(*c*) *Misconceptions concerning Christian art.*—These considerations may help us to get rid at the outset of certain popular misconceptions, such as the notions that in early Christian days pagan art was deeply tainted with impurity; that the Christians were in consequence opposed to art, and that the earliest manifestations of Christian art assumed a symbolic or didactic character as a sort of apology or disguise. We must remember that there was an immense amount of art in the pagan world of a decorative kind that filled life with beauty, but did not obtrude upon notice any special representations of mythological personages. In cases where these personages were actually in evidence, there was, as a rule, nothing in the way they were displayed that would necessarily offend the eye. As a fact, the works of the Greek and Roman chisel and brush are so far from being tainted with impurity that it would be difficult to pick out from existing galleries of antique sculpture more than one or two works that are in any way suggestive or ignoble. Antique works compare quite favourably in this respect with those that figure yearly in European exhibitions of contemporary art. It is true we are told of some great painters of antiquity that they exercised their skill occasionally on licentious themes, but this is a fact also about certain prominent Italian painters of the Renaissance. As regards extant works of painting, apart from a few examples that were never meant for public view, we find nothing displayed on the plaster of Pompeiian walls that is not perfectly innocent. There is a class of Greek vase paintings that are marked by lubricity, but they were specially executed to suit the taste of the Athenian *jeunesse dorée*, and any one can see that thousands upon thousands of painted vases on view in the museums of Europe are as chaste as a child's picture book. A false impression arose when the Christian Fathers applied somewhat uncritically the OT category of 'idol' to the classical gods and goddesses, and were prompt to note the scandalous appearances these made in pagan literature. As the early Greek philosopher complained, the poets made the gods commit all the disgraceful acts repudiated among men, but the artists steadily refused to lend themselves to any such degradation of the religious ideal. In sculpture and painting the behaviour of these mythological beings is in almost every case exemplary. In their persons and conversation the artists exhibit nothing but what is ethically noble. Hence the spirit of pagan art, liberally interpreted, was not anti-Christian; and its forms might be adapted to Christian purposes without any marked incongruity.

Again, the existence of a vast number of works of art, often of an elaborate kind, dating from all the Christian centuries, is enough to show that there has been no general opposition to art in the

minds of Christians. There are, it is true, statements in the Fathers which have been interpreted as implying a condemnation of all forms of art. The statements are, however, primarily concerned with the making, embellishing, and setting forth of images connected with the pagan religion. This sort of work was naturally forbidden to the Christian, and Tertullian goes so far as to cavil at the making of the similitude of any natural object, on the plea that it might conceivably become an object of adoration. On the other hand, he points out (*de Idolatria*, ch. viii.) that the Christian artificer could properly exercise his craft on work which had no connexion with the pagan religion; and the 11th Canon of St. Hippolytus allows the craftsman to supply ordinary social demands for artistic work. Hence there is no reason to doubt that Christian houses were as pleasingly adorned, to the measure of the means and the taste of their owners, as pagan ones; but the art thus applied was of a light and decorative kind, not depending on formal pictures or statues, which probably would not make their appearance at all.

I. *EARLY TIMES.*—1. Before Constantine.—The earliest existing examples of Christian art are applied not to houses but to burial-places, wherein the classical fashion is followed of giving them the same sort of adornment as the abodes of the living. The earliest known of these are decorated in much the same fashion as contemporary Roman tombs, such as the well-known ones on the Via Latina. The style is bright and cheerful. Pure landscapes are not unknown. Wreaths of fruit and flowers play a considerable part, and there occur also figure motives of a classical kind, in the form of winged genii, often engaged in vintage operations, personifications of the seasons, Cupids and Psyches, and the like, wherein the innocent classical convention of the nude is not wholly repudiated. To these purely decorative shapes there were added from the first certain others of a religious significance. The simplest of these is the Orant, a female figure with arms raised in an attitude of adoration. In the case of more distinctive personages, as the Canon of the NT was at the time only in process of formation, the representations are drawn mostly from the OT. Jonah is the favourite, and is evidently accepted, in the spirit of Mt 12^{40}, as the type of Christ. Moses striking the rock, Noah, Daniel, the youths in the fiery furnace, and Susanna, also occur, and the choice seems determined by lists of typical worthies of the Old Dispensation such as those in the Epistle of Clement of Rome to the Corinthians, or in liturgical documents such as the *Commendatio Animæ quando Infirmus est in Extremis.*

The figure of Christ appears early, but in a disguised form as the Good Shepherd, or as Orpheus who exercised a controlling charm over all living creatures. Occasionally He is presented in His own person, and the artist for preference chooses those scenes in which He appears as worker of wonders. The 'Raising of Lazarus' is specially favoured. Save in one exceptional scene of the 'mocking,' the suffering Christ does not appear, and still less the Christ crucified. Such are the characteristic subjects in the 1st and 2nd centuries, while occasionally in the 2nd, and more often in the 3rd, we meet with representations of a more or less doctrinal kind, such as the faithful round the table of the Lord, on which is placed for food the mystic fish, the symbol of Christ. It is remarkable, however, that historical representations from the actual life of the Church, especially scenes of persecution and martyrdom, are wholly absent.

About all this work we have from the present point of view to note: (1) that it is in the main decorative, the artist being more concerned to cover bare spaces and to dispose symmetrically his representations than to inculcate by them any doctrinal lesson; and (2) that classical influence remains strong, even when we have passed from the earliest period of almost exact correspondence between pagan and Christian decorative schemes. As Dom Leclercq has recently shown, many of the OT and NT figures are modelled on pagan types, while the earliest and best plastic representations of Christ as the Good Shepherd not only reproduce the familiar classical motive, but show a grace and elasticity in form and pose not unworthy of a fairly good period of classical art. Moreover, when Christ appears in His own person, He is represented as youthful and beardless, with something of the attractive comeliness of an Apollo. It is impossible in face of these facts to believe that there was any general sympathy among the early Christians with the extreme view expressed by Tertullian when he objected to any representation of figures or natural objects; or that there was any reason why Christians should turn with repugnance from the classical art that was all about them.

The OT and NT scenes that begin to appear in the catacomb frescoes of the 3rd cent. are repeated on the carved sarcophagi of the 4th and 5th. On some of these we find the same idyllic scenes of genii vintaging, the vine being, of course, in this case the True Vine, and the same semi-classic decorative motives which we meet with in the earliest frescoes; but the OT and NT scenes form the staple subjects of sarcophagus art, and Jonah, Abraham, Moses, and Daniel are seen side by side with Christ raising Lazarus, healing the blind, or touching with a magic wand of power the waterpots of Cana. If the crowning scenes of His life are touched at all, there is no attempt to deal with the deeper Christian mysteries of suffering and sacrifice. The march to Calvary becomes a triumphal procession, with the Cross borne forward as a banner; the crowning with thorns is envisaged as a royal honour.

2. After Constantine.—The next epoch of Christian art, after the time of Constantine, introduces us into quite a different atmosphere. Christianity has become the religion of the State, and confronts the world as a regularly constituted power. The artist needs no longer to hint but can assert, and there is demanded from him a certain amplitude and majesty in his work.

(*a*) *Mosaic art.*—The characteristic form of artistic expression for this period is the monumental mosaic. The artist's operations are no longer confined to the narrow limits of a burial chamber or the side of a sarcophagus. He has to cover with decoration the vast interior wall surfaces of the great basilican churches and the stately though much smaller baptisteries. His style changes with his task. If the bright unpretending catacomb pictures seem to have a literary counterpart in the personal expression of the lyric song, the severe and imposing mosaics possess a certain epic grandeur. The subjects of the mosaics are not, as a rule, historical or directly doctrinal, and there is the same reticence in the avoidance of those Passion scenes in the life of Christ in which He is represented as suffering or in humiliation. The aim of the mosaic artist is to present in majestic and simple forms the heroes of Christianity. It is not the adventures of the saints that attract him so much as the dignity of their presence as they stand forth triumphant after suffering—lords in heaven and earth. It is the Presence of Christ, rather than His mortal deeds and sufferings, that he strives to bring before the spectator.

The early Christian mosaics from the 4th to the 6th cent. at Rome and Ravenna are as great in their illustration of the principles of design as in

their technical excellence and their artistic beauty. They adopt in the main the principle of the world-famous frieze of the Parthenon at Athens, and offer an ideal presentation of actual scenes of which the building they adorn was the theatre. One of the earliest and quite the finest of the mosaics, that in St. Pudentiana at Rome, is in respect of its main scheme canonical. In the apse of that church the stately form of Christ enthroned as teacher occupies the central position, while on a lower level and on both sides of Him sit the twelve Apostles. The arrangement transfers to the heavenly sphere the appearance of the apse of the church at service time, when the presiding official occupied the throne in the centre behind the altar, with the attendant priests on the stone bench round the curve of the apse on either side of him. Christ, behind whom in the mosaic rises a jewelled cross on a hill in the midst of a city, Jerusalem, is the invisible ideal president of the daily assembly; the spirit of the Apostles is ready to inspire the clergy. The work, which may date within the 4th cent., is notable for the classical feeling in the characterization of the Apostles, reminding us of the heads in some of Raphael's cartoons. Equally dignified, equally well chosen, is the scheme for the decoration of the Baptistery at Ravenna of about A.D. 450. Here in the centre of the dome is a noble picture of the ideal consecration to ministry, the Baptism of Our Lord, at whose feet the gaunt but imposing forms of the twelve Apostles are preparing to lay down their crowns. More extensive is the display in St. Apollinare Nuovo at Ravenna, where the worshipper on entering sees represented in mosaic, on the side walls of the nave above the arcades, on the one side a portion of Ravenna itself, and on the other the suburb Classis, the port of the Imperial city. From each there issues a procession of saints, male on the right, female on the left, who are represented advancing towards the altar end of the church, bearing crowns which they will lay at the feet of an enthroned Christ and an enthroned Mary with the Child, at the end of the nave. Here again is idealized the bodily movement of the actual worshippers from the door of the church to its altar, or from their city homes to the heavenly mansions prepared for them afar, as well as the spiritual movement of the heart from earthly to celestial preoccupations. Above these processions, between the clerestory windows, stand single figures of white-robed saints, which carry out better than any others that could be named the idea before noticed of the monumental presentation of heroic forms of epic simplicity and grandeur. Highest of all comes on each side a series of historical pictures in mosaic from the life of Christ —the first example of such representations that Christian art has to show. On the one side there are scenes from the miracles and discourses, very simply but effectively designed, and showing the protagonist of the youthful Apollo-like type met with in catacomb art and on the sarcophagi. On the other side is what would be called in later mediæval times a Passion series, but the actual scenes of the final tragedy are as a fact selected on early Christian principles, with a truly classical avoidance of anything painful, or of any situation in which the Lord would be shown as suffering humiliation.

Thus there is no scourging, no crowning with thorns, no crucifixion, no taking down from the cross or burial, and the scene in which Christ, a heroic figure, is making a sort of triumphal progress towards Calvary, is followed immediately by that of the Marys at the empty sepulchre. In the pictures of this second series Christ is represented as older and is bearded, and the marked difference in His personality in the two closely related sets of pictures is enough to show that there can have been no authentic tradition of His actual physiognomy.

(*b*) *Historical or symbolic representation.*—From this same period of the 5th and 6th centuries we can date the beginning of the most conspicuous but not always the most artistic form of Christian art —the historical or symbolic representation, of an edifying and often a didactic character. There is an often quoted saying based on Quintilian, which occurs in many early Christian writings, to the effect that pictures are the books of those who cannot read. To the ecclesiastical mind this gave a religious justification for the pictorial embellishment of the walls of public buildings, which had previously been a matter of tradition inherited from classical practice. In the middle of the 5th cent. we find St. Nilus laying down the principle that the inner walls of a church should be covered with scenes from the Old and New Testaments from the hand of a first-rate artist, in order that those who are unable to read may be reminded of the Christian virtues of those who have served aright the true God, and be inspired to emulate them. In the 6th cent. Gregory the Great recommended the use of paintings in churches in order that the illiterate might behold upon the walls what they were not able to read in books. On this idea was based a scheme of decoration which remained in use throughout the mediæval period. At the altar end of the church was displayed the figure of Christ glorified, as teacher or judge, and the faithful were to be inspired by the sight to strive for the joys of Paradise. Along the side walls were exposed historical pictures from OT or NT or from the lives of saints, in which instruction as well as edification was provided for the unlettered convert. The subjects would be chosen, and the figures, actions, and details as a rule settled not by the artist himself, but by the ecclesiastical authorities. Gregory of Tours gives us a charming picture of the wife of a bishop of Clermont in the 5th cent. sitting with her Bible in her lap in the church, and directing the operations of a company of painters who are frescoing the walls. The western or entrance wall was not at first included in the scheme, but from about the 10th cent. onwards it was utilized for a display complementary to that of the glories of Paradise over the altar. This was the Last Judgment, often with the connected scenes of the separation and after-disposition of the souls of the just and of the unjust. In the later mediæval period the Inferno was made especially prominent, with the avowed intention of affecting the souls of the worshippers by salutary terror as well as by hope. Of the subject of Christ in glory the finest examples by far are in the early Christian mosaics, but the historical scenes were not displayed in adequate artistic form till the development of the Italian schools of mural painting in the 15th century. The most impressive rendering of the scene of the Last Judgment is in the 14th cent. fresco of the subject in the Campo Santo at Pisa, which used to be ascribed erroneously to Orcagna. The treatment here is truly dramatic and moving, and is marked by a fine reticence. Later representations of the theme, such as the famous ones by Luca Signorelli at Orvieto, offend through their over-insistence on the terror of the scene, and especially on the physical torments inflicted by the demons on the lost spirits who fall into their clutches. The ecclesiastical authorities may have thought it well thus to daunt the sinner and to harry the feelings of the impressionable, but the artistic result is nothing less than deplorable. Both in these scenes, and in the representation which became very popular of Christ suspended in suffering on

the Cross, the painters of the 12th and 13th centuries, especially in Italy, offend against all laws of good taste and of beauty, and prostitute art to the service of a gloomy religiosity.

From these false ideals representative art in the West was saved by certain religious revivals, embodied in Italy in the person of St. Francis of Assisi, and in Germany in the mystics of the school of Cologne. In both cases pictorial art showed itself responsive to the religious impulse, and the artistic revivals connected with the names of Giotto of Florence and Meister Wilhelm of Cologne have a distinct basis in the changed religious thought of the times. Before discussing the effect of these revivals of the 13th and 14th cents. on Christian art and on the life of the Church, we must turn back more nearly to early Christian times.

II. *MIDDLE AGES.*—The mediæval period had no sooner opened than the controversy on images (A.D. 726–842) divided the East and the West.

1. Controversy between East and West.—The opposition to all graphic and plastic representations of sacred personages on walls, panels, or portable objects, with which some of the Byzantine emperors identified themselves, was partly, no doubt, inspired by Islāmite examples, and was carried to such fanatical lengths as to involve the destruction of numberless treasures of early Byzantine art. The controversy ended in a compromise, according to which representations in colour or relief of Christ, the Virgin, angels, and saints were once more permitted on walls and on portable objects, though religious sculpture of a monumental kind never afterwards flourished in the Byzantine empire. For these representations, schemes were drawn up, and these were crystallized into books of artistic recipes, which have governed the practice of Christian art in the lands of the Greek Church all through their later history. The best known of these handbooks is that brought by the French archæologist, Didron, from the cloisters of Mount Athos, and published by him in 1845. It is known as the *Hermeneia* or *Book of Mount Athos*, and gives an impression of that fixity, not to say lifelessness, which characterizes representative religious art in Eastern Christendom, in such striking contrast to the mobility and variety of the forms of Christian art in the West.

It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that the Byzantine iconoclasts were opposed to the use of art in connexion with religion. What they revolted against was the religious reverence paid to sacred effigies, which became in a sense idols. As Woltmann has remarked, 'images had been introduced into churches first for ornament, teaching, and edification; but image-worship soon crept in unawares. The reverence for the Divine and spiritual being was transferred to the image, which was honoured with incense and obeisance' (*Hist. of Painting*, p. 195). Now, this reverence or idolatry was only a further extension, to the limit of an abuse, of the didactic idea, which the Church as a whole began in the 5th and 6th centuries to attach to representative art. Some of the Byzantine emperors most inimical to image-worship, such as Constantine V. and Theophilus, embellished the churches with decorative art in sumptuous materials, and in the simple conventional forms of the earlier catacomb period. In the West, moreover, it must not be supposed that the use of subject pictures with a view to edification was the only fact of importance concerning Christian art in the early mediæval epoch. No doubt the Fathers and bishops, who patronized pictures as the books of the illiterate, thought they had accomplished a good work in moralizing art and in setting it to ecclesiastical service. They believed that they had avoided by these means the danger latent in art in respect to those who might be tempted by the lust of the eyes, and they were at the same time apparently unconscious of the danger on the other side of reverence for these sacred effigies passing into the idolatry of which the iconoclasts accused the Christians of the West. These Fathers and bishops, in the view they thus adopted about works of art, were not regarding the matter from an æsthetic, but rather from a doctrinal standpoint; but we are fortunate in possessing mediæval productions that do not depend for their artistic value on anything that they represent, and also expressions of mediæval opinion that are more satisfying to those æsthetically minded.

2. Theophilus on Art.—Among the most interesting documents that have come down to us from the Middle Ages is a certain technical treatise on artistic processes, written about the year A.D. 1100, by a German Benedictine monk whose name in religion was Theophilus. The author, a practical expert in fine metal-work and other artistic processes and materials, has prefixed to the three books into which his treatise, called *Schedula Diversarum Artium*, is divided, Introductions in which he discourses at large on the whole question of art and the cultivation of the beautiful as a part of the religious life. The view Theophilus advances is almost startling in its breadth and sanity, and gives the modern reader a very pleasing impression of monastic culture, which he will probably have been taught to believe was slavishly narrow and ascetic.

Theophilus bases his apologia for the practice of the arts on the part of those vowed to the religious life on a view of human nature that can be thus paraphrased:

Man was made in the image of God, that is, as Theophilus implies, in the similitude of the Divine Artist who fashioned the world, and he is bound to make his resemblance to the Divine as real and effective as he can. It is true that by the machinations of the evil one this Divine image in man was obscured at the Fall, but it was not so far effaced that man cannot through care and thought win back something of the ancient heritage of art and of learning. 'Wherefore,' he writes, 'the pious devotion of the faithful should not neglect the knowledge which the prudent foresight of our predecessors has handed down to us, but should embrace it as an inheritance from the Almighty.' As such it is not the private possession of any one individual, but is a trust from God, which the skilled person holds for the benefit of his fellows. For which reason, Theophilus declares, he is ready to offer to all who desire humbly to learn, as freely as he has himself freely received it, all the gift of the Divine grace—this gift being the knowledge of the technical processes of the arts which he then goes on to unfold. In another place he discourses in the same strain, and urges the artist to 'believe that the spirit of God has filled his heart, and will direct him by the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost.' He then explains that these seven gifts embrace the special qualities of skill and taste and industry which are requisite for the practice of the arts. The spirit of Wisdom teaches that God is the creator of all things, and without Him there is nothing—this is the primal lesson. Next, the spirit of Understanding gives to the mind the capacity for discerning the right order, measure, and distribution of parts which should be applied to the work in hand. The spirit of Counsel teaches us not to hide the talent which has been given us by God, but to display it openly, with all humility, in word and act before those who are desiring to learn. Through the spirit of Might the craftsman will throw off all the torpor of idleness, and will begin his work with vigour and carry it through with all his energy and power to the end. The spirit of Knowledge, which has been granted to him, has filled his mind with abundant stores, over which he presides, and which he must produce with all boldness before his fellows. By the spirit of Piety he will rightly judge upon what object, for whom, and when, and how much, and in what manner he shall spend his labour, and will guard against the insidious inroads of avarice and greed by a most scrupulous moderation in estimating the value of what has been done. Finally, as the great lesson of the whole, the spirit of the Fear of the Lord will remind him that he can do nothing of himself, that all he possesses or desires comes from God, and that he must ascribe to the bountifulness of the Divine mercy all that he knows, or is, or hopes to be.

3. Art in the monasteries.—The existence of artistic practice as an institution of the cloister may in itself surprise, for it seems to us moderns to belong to a side of life from which the ascetic recluse would turn rigidly away. We may, how

ever, repeat here what was intimated in connexion with the fact, to some almost equally surprising, that artistic practice existed among the earliest Christians. Art, regarded as an element of beauty attaching itself naturally to the works of men, and touching life at every point, the modern cannot readily understand, because with us this element of beauty is something artificial and extra, for which we have to make a special effort. This was not the case in old time, when it would have needed a special effort, not to *procure*, but to *exclude* this element. The earliest Christians decorated their tombs, the Christians after Constantine their churches, because not to do so would have been a forced act, for which, as we have already seen, there was no real reason. The artistic tradition, thus maintained from the first by the Church at large, was in Eastern Christendom never broken, and the Greek Church, while stereotyping the forms of its expression, has held it continuously in honour. In the West the Teutonic inroads broke up the fabric of antique culture; but though the classical tradition in art was thus in a measure severed, the barbarians were in their own way just as artistic as the Greeks or Romans, and the mediæval civilization of the West, partly classical and partly barbaric, derived its art from both these sources. Hence, when communities of monks and nuns were formed, alike in the Celtic and the once-Romanized parts of the West, the arts quietly made their appearance within the hallowed enclosures. A monastery, it must be remembered, was in theory self-supporting, and all sorts of operations in husbandry and in the mechanical crafts had perforce to be carried on by the inmates, whose bodily and mental health was greatly improved by the exercise. Of the Celtic monastery at Bangor, near Chester, Bede tells us that the two thousand inmates all lived by the labour of their hands. The rule of St. Benedict, in the 6th cent., provided that when artizans entered the Order they were to be allowed to continue working at their crafts, though they were not to take any personal pride in their productions. The quiet and order of a monastery must have been congenial to the artist, and Ordericus Vitalis tells us that, when the founder of a certain monastery in the 12th cent. invited all who joined it to continue the practice of the arts to which they were accustomed, 'there gathered about him freely craftsmen both in wood and iron, carvers and goldsmiths, painters and stonemasons, and others skilled in all manner of cunning work' (*HE* viii. 27).

The mere practice of the various crafts, artistic as well as utilitarian, in the mediæval convent is, however, one thing, and the religious enthusiasm with which Theophilus seems to regard artistic pursuits is quite another. It is this that constitutes for us the interest of the *Schedula*. The religion of the writer was evidently sincere and fervent, and it seems to him to find a natural, even a Divinely ordained, outcome in art. Though Ruskin and other eloquent modern writers have descanted on the praises of art from the moral and religious standpoint, there is a breadth and dignity about the thought of the 11th cent. monk that puts him above them all. There is, indeed, no more effective apology for the cultivation of art than this simple reminder that the love of what is beautiful is a part of human nature, or, if we take still higher ground, the more august assertion that the creation of what is beautiful is part of the law of the universe at large.

'Look around you,' we can hear Theophilus saying in effect to his hearers, 'and survey the fabric of creation. It is the work of an artist, of the Supreme Artist who has made all things beautiful in their season. He has gifted you too with a portion of His own nature and has formed you an artist, and you are bound in service to Him to exercise your creative power and make the most of your affinity with what is beautiful. In the name of religion take up the brush and tongs and mallet, and spare not cost or labour till the House of God that you build shall shine like the very fields of Paradise.'

These last words are used by Theophilus in a passage in which he foreshadows the concrete realization of the creative effort in the microcosm of an Abbey church, which is an image of the vast macrocosm of the universe. The church, he says, is to be so decorated on ceiling and walls as to present the appearance of the Heavenly Garden. It will seem to be blooming with all kinds of flowers, and green with leaves and grass, like the celestial fields where the blessed ones receive their crowns. The ceiling will be flowered like an embroidered robe, the wall resemble a garden, the windows send in a flood of variously coloured light. After the decoration of the fabric will come the provision of fittings and apparatus, including all the vessels for the service of the sanctuary, the construction and varied embellishment of which he describes in the technical chapters in the body of his treatise. There, in the workshop and among the appliances and tools which the monkish craftsman has to build and fashion for himself, we are invited to see the gold and silver and bronze, the coloured earths, the glass stained with metallic oxides, all taking shape in dainty and beautiful forms, till the mere matter, the raw material, has become spiritualized through its consecration, in a shape of beauty, to the service of the Most High. For with Theophilus the preoccupation always is with the technical manipulation of the material so as to compass an effect of beauty. From end to end of his treatise there is comparatively little about art as representative. The art he contemplates is decorative. It is not the kind of art that corresponds to the more prosaic vision of the Fathers and bishops, to whom the lessons to be drawn from the presentation of holy persons and scenes make up the chief value of art. He is, of course, aware that the beautiful forms he conjures into life under the hammer or by the glass-kiln represent something in nature, or have, at any rate, some symbolical import; but these considerations trouble him little, and, after describing some technical process, he often tells the worker to make with it 'what you will.'

The representative element in mediæval art must not, however, be ignored. Theophilus decks the walls and ceiling and windows of his church with the gaiety and colour of a garden, but he has in his mind the regular scheme of figure design for a church interior. On the walls will be displayed, he suggests, the Passion of the Lord, touching the heart of the worshipper, or the suffering of the saints will be movingly depicted. If the joys of heaven are displayed at one end of the building, and at the other the torments of the regions of the lost, the spectator will take hope from the thought of his good actions, and be terrified at the remembrance of his sins.

Though Theophilus troubles himself little about symbolism, there was no doubt a symbolical intent in many of the decorative forms employed in mediæval art. On this subject a word must be said, because it is one that is often misunderstood. There is no mystery about Christian symbolism, because it is almost entirely based upon Scripture. We are familiar in the OT and NT with figures in which animals and plants stand for personages and qualities, and know that there is little consistency in the use of these. Thus the lion is at times a type of Christ, as the 'lion of the tribe of Judah'; but at other times he may represent the evil one, who, 'as a roaring lion, walketh about, seeking whom he may devour.' In plastic or graphic art the lion may conceivably stand either for the ideal of good or the ideal of evil; but there is commonly, too, a third alternative, that the creature is purely ornamental, and may have been copied as a mere decorative motive from some indifferent source, such as an Oriental figured stuff. The whole subject of SYMBOLISM is dealt with in another article, and it is mentioned here only for the sake of warning the reader against imagining that it played any but a secondary part in mediæval design. The fact is that in every age the artist, as artist, has little care for these intellectual refinements, and it is because Theophilus is so true an artist that he troubles his reader but little with this subject. The artist's instinct is to make his work tell out at once with directness and force, and he does not desire to give the spectator the trouble of spelling out obscure allusions. The artist, however, as we have seen, often worked under the orders of theologians or of those who took a religious and literary interest, rather than a purely artistic interest, in the works produced. Such patrons might prescribe schemes of symbolism which the artist was quite willing to carry out.

The difference was that, while the theologian saw, in the shape, say, of a dragon, a reference to some allusion in the Apocalypse, the artist took a disinterested pleasure in the creature because its wings and tail were so effective for filling awkward spaces in the field of his design. Again, the persons here in view, in studying works of art already done, would find out all sorts of recondite suggestions in details which, in their origin, had probably a purely artistic purpose. In this way there came into existence in the 13th cent. the extensive work of Durandus, bishop of Mende, called *Rationale Divinorum Officiorum*, in which an elaborate symbolical interpretation was given of all the parts and fittings of the church and the apparatus of the altar. In this way, too, beast forms in art were credited with moral and religious meanings that were interpreted according to schemes of beast symbolism embodied in the so-called *bestiaria*. That beast forms in mediæval art were commonly symbolical is, however, rendered extremely unlikely by the fact that reforming churchmen of puritanical tendencies are found inveighing against such motives as barbarian and frivolous. The *locus classicus* occurs in the writings of St. Bernard, in the 12th cent., who protests against the foolish and wasteful display of these monsters on carved capitals and friezes, without any suggestion of their supposed religious significance. A later writer draws a distinction between pictures of the sufferings of Christ and the martyrs, which he praises as 'books of the laity,' and animal representations, for 'what have lions to do in a church, or dragons, or all the rest of these beasts?' (Schnaase, *Geschichte der bildenden Künste*, iv. 272).

These passages draw attention to the fact, which must not be passed over, that within the monastic system itself there was not perfect unanimity in regard to this lavish display of art in connexion with religion. There was a puritan vein in monasticism that led to protests against what was regarded as over-exuberance in the use of the element of beauty in the furnishing forth of sacred structures. The so-called reformed Benedictine Orders, beginning with the Cluniacs of the 10th cent., took, as a rule, this view, and a striking illustration of its working is to be found in the attitude of the Cistercians towards stained glass. The magnificent display of colour and imagery in the noble French storied windows of the 12th and 13th centuries, such as those at Chartres, they considered too sumptuous for the House of God, and substituted geometrical patterns in grey and yellow. Figure sculpture on the façades of their churches they also repudiated. It is, however, significant of the hold that art had obtained over the religious community in this advanced mediæval period, to note that there was no real opposition to art even among the severest of the reformed Orders, for Cistercian architecture, as the ruined abbeys of England sufficiently prove, though sparingly adorned, is of extreme beauty, and its ornamentation, with conventional foliage, of the utmost delicacy and grace.

4. Gothic Architecture.—We find, then, in the *Schedula* of Theophilus the conception of Christian art as a display of beautiful things carefully and cunningly wrought, that were offered as the homage of the mortal artificer to the great Artist of creation. This conception was actually realized, with a completeness and splendour of which a monk of the 11th cent. could have no idea, in the fabric and fittings of the French Gothic cathedral of the age of St. Louis. This is the most perfect embodiment of Christian art that the world has seen, because the representative element, though present and recognized as it was by Theophilus, was subordinate to direct artistic expression, first in the forms of the architecture, and next in the sumptuous display of detail and colour in the stone and wood carvings, the gilt and enamelled shrines, and, above all, in the 'storied windows richly dight' that are the glory of the Gothic fane. The subject of Christian architecture receives separate treatment, and it is necessary here only to emphasize the natural and obvious symbolism of the forms of Gothic architecture, which raises the soul in aspiration, while the sense of mystery, of the beyond, is instilled by its multitudinous elusive details, its perspectives, its magic of light and shade. Of the general artistic effect of these vast structures at the time of their glory, when the interiors, often now so cold and bare, were glancing with gold and colour, and were hung with gorgeous Eastern stuffs, we can form but an imperfect idea; but it is probable that nothing more artistically beautiful has ever been seen. The spirit of the work was still the spirit of the earlier religious decorative art of which we read in Theophilus; that is to say, it was impersonal work, unmarred by any touch of personal display so common in Italian art, simple and sincere in intent and in execution, and offered in an act of devotion for the service of the sanctuary. The representative element was at the same time present in the art, but it kept its place as on the whole subordinate to the general decorative effect. For that very reason we find in it a charm which more advanced representative work has often lost. It is the charm of *naïveté* and freshness due to the artist's unsophisticated delight in nature, and at the same time to the clearness of his mental vision, which gives him ease and assurance.

The decorative figure sculpture on the great French cathedrals, such as Chartres, Amiens, and Rheims, is really one of the most perfectly satisfactory forms of Christian art. It is a direct expression of the thought and feeling of the Gothic epoch, as they were embodied in the character and work of St. Louis, the typical man of his age. In St. Louis mediæval religion took on a new character, for his was no cloistered sainthood, of what may be termed a professional type, but the sainthood of a man versed in secular affairs though viewing them always from the standpoint of a childlike but cheerful piety. The forms of Christ and of Mary, of the Apostles and prophets, of saints and of angels, that cluster about the spreading portals, or take their stand in niches and on pinnacles on the upper stages of the buildings, are so fresh in their naturalness, so graceful and elastic in pose, so full of brightness and tenderness in expression, so pure and holy of aspect, that we feel that we never met with a company that seemed to realize better what is meant by 'the body of Christian fellowship.' On the intellectual side we trace in the figures and reliefs the working of ideas beyond the mental horizon of the carvers who actually achieved the work. At Amiens, for example, the subjects in the reliefs on the pedestals that support the noble figures of the Jewish prophets, on the western front, are drawn from the prophetic writings, and evince a knowledge of the Vulgate text that betokens the trained theologian; but if we take the sculpture as a whole, we cannot doubt that the minds of the carvers were just as alert as their hands, and that the qualities in the work which we most admire are due not to the ecclesiastical directors of the undertaking, but to the devotional feeling, the sense of beauty, and the freshly kindled love of nature, that in the France of that favoured epoch were so widely diffused throughout the community of artificers. It needs hardly to be said that the same qualities mark Gothic sculpture in other lands, and they are very apparent in the beautiful recum-

bent effigies in stone or bronze in which English craftsmen of the 14th cent. achieved so much success. The 'Queen Eleanor' of Westminster Abbey and the 'Edward II.' at Gloucester are among the best of these. English and German churches of the period are adorned with beautiful decorative sculpture, but the display is on a far smaller scale than is the case in central France.

We turned away from representative art in the West at a time when it was dominated by a somewhat gloomy view of religion, and exercised itself largely on subjects which, like the crucified Saviour, laid stress on physical suffering. This applies chiefly to Italy, where in the early part of the 13th cent., while French and English Gothic art had unfolded itself in forms so varied and beautiful, little was being produced but unattractive and coarsely executed pictures, on which the historians of Italian painting lavish all the terms of depreciation they can muster. The Gothic spirit is one of humanity and brightness, and it was the spread of this from central France to Italy that led to the revival of art in the Peninsula. This Gothic spirit became incorporated in St. Francis of Assisi. As Sabatier puts it:

'St. Francis is the friend of nature; he is the man who sees in all creation the work of the Divine goodness, the effluence of the eternal beauty . . . hence at the voice of the Umbrian reformer Italy began to recover herself; she found again her sound sense and her good humour: she put away those ideas of pessimism and of death as a healthy organism gets rid of the principles of disease. . . . Lifting himself as by the stroke of the wing to the religious life, Francis caused suddenly to shine forth before the eyes of his contemporaries a new ideal, in presence of which there disappeared all those strange and perverted sects, as the birds of night fly before the first rays of the sun' (*Life of St. Francis*, London, 1907, p. 45).

The beneficent influence of the genial creed of St. Francis on the revival of Italian painting is well understood, and in Giotto and Simone Martini, who at Florence and Siena respectively represent the coming in of the Gothic spirit of humanity and tenderness, we find this influence at work. It is worth noting also that a similar influence at a rather later date was exercised upon painting in Germany, and led to the beautiful art of the early school of Cologne. German representative art has often shown a tendency towards what is grotesque and terrible, and the popular early Dances of Death, or of the dead, are proof of this. In marked contrast to this tendency we find at Cologne in the last part of the 14th and beginning of the 15th cent. a school of painting marked by the most delicate idyllic grace and tenderness, and by a pure devotional feeling that few Italian pictures can match. The art is really inspired by the so-called German mystics or 'Gottesfreunde,' a body of men who without forming any sect or order felt themselves impelled to a religious life of more intense zeal than was shared by their fellows. Still remaining, like the early Franciscans in Italy, true sons of the Church, they sought to make religion consist in a more intimate personal relation between the soul and God. When this relation was established, the soul became entirely filled with an ecstatic love that was not only the love of God but also the love of one's neighbour, so that the perfectly holy man, it was said, might desire the Kingdom of heaven for his fellow-man even before himself. In this mood the mystics were visited by visions, but visions that presented only forms of beauty. The fantastic and the grim, which have exercised such fascination over the Northern imagination, seldom appeared before the eyes of Heinrich Suso or his fellow-seers, but their dreams were of lovely sights, of flowers, and even of celestial maidens to whom they were fain to offer adoration. Schnaase was perfectly right in connecting with this religious revival of the 'Gottesfreunde' the Cologne school of idyllic religious painting associated with the names of Meister Wilhelm, Hermann Wynrich, and Stephen Lochner, the painter of the famous 'Dombild.'

5. Development of Christian art from the 13th to the 16th century.—We thus see in Italy and in Germany alike that the artistic revivals of the late 13th and 14th cents. were preceded by and based upon certain religious movements that set in in the direction of humane and tender feeling. The influence was essentially the same as that which formed the inspiration of Gothic art in France in the century before; but whereas Gothic art is mainly decorative, we begin at the end of the 13th cent. to watch the development of painting and sculpture on their representative sides till they become capable of expressing the deeper emotions with dramatic force and verity. Up to this period the artist had never disposed of adequate means for the representation of nature. However pure in feeling, however devotional, had been the art of the catacombs, or of the monastery, or of the Gothic church, however noble the single forms, however lively in action the groups, in the mosaics or in the historical pictures from the lives of Christ or of the Saints, the delineation was always summary, the rendering of light and shade and perspective crude or faulty. From the time of Giotto onwards two centuries are occupied with the development of painting and sculpture on the technical side, till they become in a true sense mirrors of nature and clear expressions of artistic thought. This is the epoch of what would be called *par excellence* Christian art, and lies between the end of the 13th and the close of the 16th cent. in Italy, between the end of the 14th and the middle of the 16th in Germany and Flanders. From Giotto to Tintoretto in the one case, from the early Cologne masters to Quinten Massys of Antwerp in the other, painting and sculpture are Christian, in the sense that religious themes are preponderant, and that spiritual ideas are conveyed in a more or less distinct and convincing form. It would be a mistake, however, to use the term 'Christian' of this art in too absolute a sense, for the power which the artist gradually obtained over his materials he exercised on a realistic rendering of nature that resulted in a progressive secularizing of the spirit of the art, while the influence of the classical Renaissance of the 15th cent. acted potently in the same direction. All through the periods indicated, however, art that was in a strict sense Christian was being produced, though not by every artist, nor, with certain exceptions, by any artist at every time.

The lives and works of the leading representatives of art in the periods indicated are so familiarly known that it will be sufficient for the purpose of this article to indicate in a few sentences the most prominent instances in which these artists embodied distinctly Christian ideas in their productions.

(*a*) *Italian Schools.*—The artists of the school of Florence, with the exception of one or two of pronounced devotional feeling, such as Fra Angelico and Luca della Robbia, with others like Lorenzo di Credi and Fra Bartolommeo who were directly influenced by the revivalism of Savonarola, took their subjects as a rule from the human side, and are noted for characterization and for the dramatic presentation of scenes of interest rather than for pious preoccupations. These scenes are of a sacred character, but they are generally envisaged in their human aspects, as is notably the case with the greatest of the early Florentines, Giotto and Masaccio. Some of Giotto's scenes from the Passion of Christ at Padua, and Masaccio's magnificent designs in the Carmine at Florence, are in the truest sense spiritually elevating; but the effect is that of the sublime in art generally, and they are com-

parable with fine scenes in Shakespeare or Æschylus rather than with religious discourses. The same applies to some of the technically perfect achievements in religious art of the masters of the 16th cent., who bowed before Masaccio's genius in creation though they disposed of far more advanced technical science in execution than he could pretend to. The most notable of these works from this ethical standpoint are Leonardo da Vinci's 'Last Supper' at Milan, Michelangelo's frescoes on the roof of the Sistine Chapel at Rome, some of Raphael's less academic compositions, numerous religious pieces by Titian and by Giovanni Bellini, and the largest part of the work of Tintoretto. The single figures by these masters have the epic grandeur of those in the finest Christian mosaics, though we see them no longer in monumental repose, but alert and mobile and actuated by noble passion. The sacred scenes in which they figure are re-constructed on an intelligible scheme, though the deliberate intention of all the actions and details is often so much in evidence that we are chilled by a certain made-up look in the composition. The Venetians are more successful than the Florentines or Raphael in giving to these scenes a convincing air of reality, because they see them from the first as a whole instead of building them up piece by piece in conscious fashion. Perhaps the best of all these masterpieces for its direct religious impression is Titian's comparatively unpretending picture at Dresden known as the 'Tribute Money.' Christ, tempted with the insidious query about the lawfulness of paying tribute to Cæsar, has asked to see the penny, which is brought to Him by His interlocutor, and the painter has emphasized the contrast between the noble, and at the same time tender and sympathetic, lineaments of the Lord and the screwed-up cynical features of the weather-beaten Pharisee who peers cunningly into His countenance. The hand of Christ, one of the most beautiful in art, contrasts effectively with the gnarled paw that is holding out the penny at which He points. The realization of the Christ of the Gospels and the creation of the adequate and beautiful type represent one of the triumphs of pictorial art. The imaginative power shown in some of Tintoretto's vast sketches in oil, from religious themes, in the Scuola di San Rocco at Venice, has never been equalled, and Raphael's cartoons are in comparison cold and academic. The great 'Crucifixion' of the former artist at San Rocco, and the 'Christ before Pilate' opposite to it, are sublime creations.

The Italian painters of the first rank may be said to transcend the limits of an art that may technically be termed 'Christian,' and to present the sublime of human nature in such a way as insensibly to raise the mind of the spectator to Divine things. There were, however, many artists of the second order whose devout feelings found a more direct expression in works to which the adjective just used may with strictness be applied. The typical artist of this order was Fra Angelico, but the same spirit that animates his holy and beautiful paintings runs through the productions of the early Siennese and early Umbrian schools as a whole. Angelico's religious frescoes in the cells of the dormitory at San Marco, Florence, afford us the most perfect example of an art wholly devoted to the purpose of lifting the soul of the beholder on the wings of aspiration. Every figure, every composition, was a warning to leave the scenes of earth, and to join the celestial company around the Risen Christ, whose visionary form he constantly portrays. There is more power, more intensity, in his work than in that of the Sienese and early Umbrian painters, who in purity of soul and in simple piety are his counterparts. To match the religious design of Angelico, we must pass over a generation of artistic advance in technique, when we find in the fully accomplished painting of Francia and of Luini a devoutness equal to his own, joined with powers of execution to which he could lay no claim. The well-known 'Pietà' by Francia, in the London National Gallery, is a perfect piece of religious art, while the fragments of Luini's frescoes have filled the corridor of the Brera with some of the loveliest shapes of virgin and saint and angel that Christian art has to show.

(*b*) *German and Flemish Schools.*—Turning now from the religious art of Italy to the work of the early German and Flemish schools of the 15th cent., we find the fresh and innocent idyllic design of the early school of Cologne soon beset and overcome by the realism and the ugliness to which northern art has all along been ready to surrender itself. Out of this at the beginning of the 16th cent. Albrecht Dürer with difficulty fought his way, and created an art in which deep feeling and philosophical thought triumphed over the characteristic defects of Teutonic design. Many of Dürer's religious pieces, especially those representing the suffering Christ, are profoundly impressive, and were recognized by the Italians of his day as possessing qualities in design superior to those of their own productions. Dürer's finest works, however, such as the picture of the four Apostles at Munich, and the world-famed engravings 'Melancolia' and 'The Knight and Death,' are, like Michelangelo's 'Prophets' in the Sistine chapel, ethically great but not inspired by any sentiment that is distinctly Christian. It is worth notice that though Dürer remained all his life a mediævalist and a faithful son of the old Church, he held strong views about Papal abuses, and expressed the greatest admiration for Luther and some others of the Reforming party. We find proof of this in his writings as well as in some of his paintings. Once he addresses Erasmus as the 'Knight of Christ,' and bids him 'ride on by the side of the Lord Jesus.' There is a reference here, no doubt, to the figure in his own 'Knight and Death.' We find it hard to imagine Erasmus in mail and on a war-horse, and Luther's would have been a better name to invoke! The 'Four Apostles,' in the exaltation of Paul and John over Peter, betrays Lutheran prepossessions. In much of Dürer's work the German infatuation with the weird and terrible interferes with our æsthetic pleasure in its contemplation, but his woodcuts from the Apocalypse, where these qualities were in place, are charged with imaginative power. The pictures of the early Flemish religious painters, on the other hand, though in artistic rank they do not equal the masterpieces of Dürer, perpetuate in some degree the idyllic charm and tenderness of the early Cologne masters, while in the work of Rogier van der Weyden and some others there is distinct devotional intent. With regard to the founders of the school, the brothers van Eyck, we are in this difficulty: the known pictures of the younger, Jan, are on the whole realistic and secular, but there is a deeper note struck in the great altar-piece in which both brothers collaborated, the 'Adoration of the Lamb' at Ghent; and whether or not this is due to the profounder nature of the elder brother, Hubert, is one of the unsolved problems of modern painting. This school culminates and ends with the work of Quinten Massys of Antwerp, who died in 1530, and whose two fine triptychs, in the Museums of Brussels and Antwerp, exhibit the one a charming idyllic feeling, and the other, in the representation of the subject of the 'Pietà,' a dramatic power and pathos that make it a worthy last word of the early religious schools of painting north of the Alps.

Before passing on to the subject of Christian art under Protestantism, a few words may be said as to the later developments of religious painting on the older or pre-Reformation lines. We have seen that such painting in the Italy of the culminating period of the art tended to assume the form known as 'Academic,' in which sacred scenes and personages are represented in a somewhat 'made-up' fashion, and fail to impress us with any sense of reality and power. This form of religious art maintained itself through the 17th and 18th cents., especially, of course, in Catholic countries, but not in these alone. In Spain, though the greatest master of the age, Velazquez, rarely exercised his genius on religious themes, painting of an ecclesiastical kind was necessarily much in evidence, and Murillo (1618–1682) is a very prolific and, on the whole, sympathetic representative of this form of art, on a somewhat popular plane. In the Catholic Netherlands, Vandyke, who is more refined in his characterization than his master Rubens, painted some very good religious pictures of the conventional type, while his contemporary Eustache le Sueur in France (1617–1655) is one of the best of many artists of the second rank who exercised their talents on the familiar themes. Even in England religious pictures of the kind were painted, in the 17th cent. by Isaac Fuller, and in the 18th by Hogarth, who covered some very large canvases with religious compositions, the best of which is the 'Pool of Bethesda' on the staircase at St. Bartholomew's Hospital, London.

A somewhat remarkable development of art of a decorative kind was indirectly the result of the Reformation. This is the art of the so-called counter-Reformation largely engineered by the Jesuits. In the Jesuit churches, the most famous of which is the Gesù in Rome, built by Vignola in 1568, there was displayed decoration of the most sumptuous possible kind, embodying a protest against the Puritanism which had obtained a footing in the Church of the Reformation; and this same style in decoration spread to other church interiors of the 17th cent., with a result which visitors to Rome, Ravenna, and other places never cease to deplore.

Anton Springer has well characterized the style as one that 'robbed architecture of its fitting repose, and by the introduction of figures posed in startling attitudes, aroused or convulsed by agency unseen, of curves instead of straight lines, of pillar plied upon pillar, substituted a turbulent unrest. Not,' he says, 'that the style' (called generally 'Baroque') 'was without striking and artistic effect. An undoubted vigour in the disposition of detail, a feeling for vastness and pomp, together with an internal decoration which spared neither colour nor costly material to secure an effect of dazzling splendour: such are the distinguishing attributes of the Baroque style as in Rome it is to be seen on every hand.'

It is interesting to compare the spirit of ecclesiastical decorative art of this artificial kind with that of the sincere, unpretending, though in its way equally elaborate art offered by the mediæval monkish craftsman for the embellishment of his beloved fane. On a superficial view the motives may be held to be the same, but how immeasurable the difference! It is this substratum of ethical interest belonging to the history of the arts that gives this subject its importance to the student of the successive phases of human culture. It is noteworthy how much more is made of the evidence of art in historical and sociological studies on the Continent than among ourselves. The British mind is unfortunately prepossessed with the idea that the arts are merely separable accidents, detachable ornaments of human life, and not, as was really the case in the past, modes of intimate expression in which the ideas of an age or a community found embodiment.

III. *POST-REFORMATION PERIOD.*—It was inevitable that the Reformation should bring about a considerable change in the forms and the character of Christian art. Assuming the least possible alteration, let us see what would necessarily follow from the rejection of the Roman ecclesiastical system. We will suppose that the Protestant continued to recognize, as he recognizes to-day, the value of the element of beauty in human life, and the suitability of art as a form for the expression of religious ideas. The Saints would none the less all but disappear from view, and with them would go their altars and altar-pieces, as well as the picturesque and varied stories which had supplied artists for centuries past with unnumbered themes. In some respects the situation of the iconoclastic period would be repeated, and representations, such as that of the crucified Saviour, or the enthroned Madonna, which had attracted something like worship, would be banished at once from the churches. The cessation of any demand for the large scenic paintings of the Last Things may at first sight seem surprising, because in some of the reformed churches the doctrine of heaven or hell became of paramount importance. Wall paintings in churches, however, had become so closely associated with doctrines and rites now repudiated that they were generally abandoned, and with them went the pictures of the Inferno that might otherwise have proved dear to Calvinistic hearts. This limitation of the artist's range of possible subjects would, however, cause the subjects that remained to stand out in greater prominence. The person and life of Christ became of far greater relative importance under Protestantism, which refused to recognize the competing claims of Mary and the Saints. As the Bible was freely perused, the literary treasures of the Old Testament became more familiar possessions, and the prospective artist would in this way find ready for him in the bosom of the Reformed Churches a range of noble subjects of an absorbing religious interest. It must be noticed at the same time that, though sacred altar pieces and mural pictures went out of fashion, a new form of religious art grew up in the Germany of the Reformation period and spread to other lands, in the shape of the engraved plates which were abundant in the earliest printed Protestant Bibles and Testaments and in pious books of other kinds. Lucas Cranach illustrated Luther's Bible; and Holbein, who in this aspect of his art was a child of the Reformation, has left us classical examples in the 'Icones Historiarum Veteris Testamenti'—a series of Bible illustrations—and plates such as the 'Christ the True Light,' of 1527. This was a very cheap and popular form of art, and made up to some extent for the loss of the monumental works. In all these Protestant designs it would be natural, though not inevitable, for the subjects to be approached from the human side. So much had been made of the mystical element in religion in the older system, that the Reformers, though untouched by rationalism, might be disposed to keep the miraculous in the background.

It follows that under an enlightened Protestant régime there might be as much expenditure in architecture and on decoration as before, and the meeting-house of the Reformed congregation would have just as much right to 'shine like the fields of Paradise' as the monastic fane of four centuries earlier, while representative art possessed in the life of Christ upon earth, and in the doings of the Old Testament worthies, a range of subjects the value of which has just been indicated. The words of Luther are in this connexion very significant, when he said that he wished to see all arts, especially music, in the service of Him who had created and had granted them to men, and repeated the old arguments in favour of pictures

as more suitable for the instruction of simple folks than discourses. As a fact, however, the alteration brought about at the Reformation was far greater than we have just assumed. In Switzerland, for instance, in Luther's time pictures were condemned and banished as idolatrous; while in Great Britain, to take another example, the reaction of the Reformation period went so far that under the title 'monuments of superstition' artistic treasures of indescribable beauty and perfect innocence were ruthlessly destroyed. Between the first onslaught upon ecclesiastical property on the part of Henry VIII. and the edicts of Elizabeth that tried to put a stop to further vandalism, the loss to art was incalculable, and from this point of view those years of desolation and waste are among the darkest in our national annals. So richly equipped, however, were our English churches, and so well established had been the pre-Reformation tradition of beauty in the apparatus of worship, that, as in doctrine so here, a compromise was arrived at, and Christian art still recognized the Episcopal churches and cathedrals as its home, where, at any rate, it could dwell in peace till the Gothic revival of the early part of the 19th cent. fostered in it a new growth.

It was among the non-Episcopal sects in England, and especially in Scotland, that religious art fared worst. Like everything else in these churches, it was brought to the test of the letter of Scripture, and those parts of Scripture that were held at the time in special honour had little to say for it. A Biblical justification for art had always existed in the accounts of the Jewish temple and its ritual, and to these the lovers of art in mediæval days had appealed. Now, to the Presbyterian and the Independent, descriptions of temples and altars and priestly vestments and all the apparatus of ritual did not appeal, for all these things they could not away with, while of specially Christian or NT justification of art there was but small trace to be found in the Gospels. Their teaching, however broad it may be, ignores almost completely this side of life, which indeed would not naturally appeal to the Founder of Christianity in the temporal conditions under which His life was passed. His justification of the use made of the 'alabaster cruse of ointment of spikenard very costly' (Mk 14^3) is in this respect notable, as it can be worked into the service of artistic theory. Some of the recorded sayings of Christ encourage a feeling for the beauty of natural objects, but the only one in the Synoptic Gospels bearing definitely on art is of rather the opposite character. 'And as he went forth out of the temple, one of his disciples saith unto him, Master, behold, what manner of stones and what manner of buildings! And Jesus said unto him, Seest thou these great buildings? there shall not be left here one stone upon another, which shall not be thrown down' (Mk 13^1). The going forth from the Temple, if the tradition is a genuine one, was past the immense and splendid Hellenistic triple portico of Herod—the finest, Josephus says, in the world—and out under the vast substructures of the Temple area; so that the pride of the disciple in these glorious structures must have been not a little disconcerted at the response. It was thus possible at the Reformation to find Scriptural justification of a negative kind for a starved and narrow view of art and beauty, as well as for one comparatively broad and liberal, and it is interesting to note that the following out of the first view led to the extremes of rigid Puritanism, best to be studied in the Scotland of the 17th and 18th centuries; while on the second was based, as we shall see, in Holland, a phase of religious art that is one of the glories of Protestantism.

1. Narrow view of art.—Edicts for the destruction of works, which the early Reformers, like the Byzantine iconoclasts, stigmatized as 'idolatrous,' were not confined to Great Britain, but were necessary consequences everywhere of the revolt from Rome. How far they were in each land actually carried out in practice depended on many causes. The destruction has been comparatively thorough in Scotland, but it must be remembered that south of the Forth, at any rate, this pulling down and breaking was due quite as much to the constant English ravages as to Scottish iconoclasm. The views of the first Scottish Reformers may be gathered from the so-called *Buke of Discipline* of 1560, where under 'The Thrid Head, tuiching the Abolissing of Idolatrie,' we read as follows:

'As we require Christ Jesus to be trewlie preached, and his holie Sacramentis to be rychtlie ministerit; so can we not cease to requyre Idolatrie, with all monumentis and places of the same, as Abbayis, monkeries, freireis, nunreis, chapellis, chantreis, cathedrall kirkis, channounreis, colledges, uthers then presentlie are paroche Kirkis or Sculis, to be utterlie suppressed in all boundis and places of this Realme. . . . As also that Idolatrie may be removed from the presence of all personis of quhat estait or conditioun that ever thai be, within this Realme. . . .

'By Idolatrie we understand, the Messe, Invocatioun of Sanctis, Adoratioun of Ymagis, and the keping and retenying of the same: and finallie all honoring of God, not conteaned in his holie Word' (*The Works of John Knox*, ed. David Laing, Edinburgh, 1848, ii. 188).

In accordance with the principles thus laid down, we find that, on July 25, 1567, the Lords of the Council, after receiving the abdication of Queen Mary, affirmed certain articles of the Kirk, amongst which was their intention 'to rute out, distroy, and allutirlie subvert all monumentis of ydolatre, and namelie the odious and blasphemous mess' (*Register of the Privy Council of Scotland*, i. 536). That this intention was not at the time fully carried out we may judge from the 'Acts of the General Assembly' under date July 29, 1640, where at a meeting in Aberdeen there was passed an 'Act anent the demolishing of Idolatrous monuments' that is worded as follows:

'Forasmuch as the Assembly is informed that in divers places of this kingdome, and specially in the North parts of the same, many idolatrous monuments, erected and made for religious worship, are yet extant, such as crucifixes, images of Christ, Mary, and saints departed, ordaines the said monuments to be taken down, demolished, and destroyed, and that with all convenient diligence' (*Acts of the General Assembly*, Edinburgh, 1643, p. 44).

It is to be remembered that in Scotland it was not a question merely of the Reformation, but of a long continued and embittered contest against everything that savoured of Popery, and in the course of this a good deal that might well have been saved was suffered to perish. Thus, the Ruthwell Cross was thrown down and broken in 1642.

2. Broad view of art.—It was noticed above that on a broad and liberal Protestantism was based a phase of religious art that is among the glories of Reformed Christianity. The reference is to the Scriptural pictures produced in the Holland of the first half of the 17th cent., especially by Rembrandt and some of his scholars. Holland is the one country that developed a national art as an immediate sequel to its adoption of the principles of the Reformation. Protestant Germany might have done the same, but, owing to wars and the impoverishment of the country, art after the time of Dürer ceased almost to be cultivated, and Dürer's younger contemporary, Holbein, left his native country for England, which on her part, by her contented utilization of his services, showed her own indifference to the work she was paying him to do. In Holland, a country both wealthy and energetic, art was national and at the same time Protestant, and in the latter aspect it was incorporate in Rembrandt.

A very large number of the drawings, etchings, and pictures by this master are on religious themes,

drawn from both the Old and the New Testaments. Many of these, such as the 'Passion' series at Munich, are treated in a cold, almost academic fashion, though by no means on the conventional Italian lines; but, on the other hand, there exists a body of his work on these subjects that is as fresh, as warm, as dramatic in feeling as it is rich and masterly in execution. Rembrandt, whose work in this kind, it must be confessed, stands almost alone, has shown us here how it is possible to treat the person and the acts of Christ in a spirit as far removed from mysticism on the one side as from rationalism on the other, so that His Divine majesty is as convincingly apparent as His homely aspect, His friendliness, His intimate sympathy with human joys and sorrows. The writer may be allowed here to quote a sentence or two from a work of his own on the master.

'It is instructive to take the central figure of the Christian story, and to note the different situations, idyllic, epic, and dramatic, in which Rembrandt has portrayed the figure of Christ. We see with what warmth of human feeling he has invested those scenes in which the Saviour, an infant or a growing youth, makes holy by His presence the simple incidents of family life; how he rises to the height of epic dignity when Christ moves, a mature and heroic form through the acts of His earthly ministry; with how intimate a sympathy he withdraws the veil from the scars of agony, and displays the Man of Sorrows a sublime though pathetically human figure in the tragedy of His Passion; and finally, how he invests the Risen Form with a power and grace that have been made perfect through weakness and suffering, and completes the picture by embodying the eternal love that Christ revealed, in the father of the Prodigal' (*Rembrandt*, London, 1907, p. 279).

There is no need for any extended description of these masterpieces by Rembrandt, which we must remember are as fine in colour or light and shade and in technical execution as they are in the intellectual and ethical qualities of their design. A word may be said on one of the less known pieces, the 'Christ and Mary Magdalen' at Brunswick. We all know the 'Noli me Tangere' by Titian in the London National Gallery. It is a fine picture, but how unconvincing! There is no mystery, no appeal to the imagination. The figures, while sympathetically rendered, are posed for purposes of composition; the scene is full of daylight, and there is a village close by on the hill. In the 'Christ and Mary Magdalen' at Brunswick, in the mysterious garden where the Risen Lord meets with Mary amidst the gloom of rocks and trees, a touch of light on the clouds above heralds the coming morn, but the shadows of night cling about the form of Christ, whose body emits a faint ghostly radiance. His hand plucks away the robe to which the adoring Magdalen would cling; but the tender though reserved inclination of the head towards the woman, and the sympathetic gesture of the other hand, are loving-kindness embodied. We are there in the garden with the pair, and they both live before us. This, we feel, is how they looked and acted. In the Louvre picture of 'Christ at Emmaus,' where He is known in the breaking of bread, an equally imaginative treatment invests the figure with an unearthly charm, that drew from the great French critic Fromentin some of the most eloquent sentences he ever penned:

'Has any one ever yet imagined Him thus, as He sits facing us there and breaks the bread as He broke it on the night of the Last Supper, so pale and so thin, in His pilgrim's robe, with those darkened lips on which suffering has left its traces: with the large soft brown eyes whose full gaze He has directed towards . . . a living, breathing being, but yet one who has assuredly passed through the gates of death? The attitude of this divine visitant with that intense ardour in a face whose features are hardly to be discerned, and expression is all in the movement of the lips and in the eyes—these traits inspired from what source one knows not, and produced one cannot tell how, are all of value inestimable. No other art has produced the like; no one before Rembrandt, no one after him, has made us understand these things' (*Maîtres d'Autrefois*, Paris, 1890, p. 331).

The homely warmth of feeling in Rembrandt's 'Holy Families,' and in OT or Apocryphal pieces, such as those from the story of Tobit, of which he was especially fond, is just as satisfying in its way as the imaginative power just illustrated. There is also an intellectual side to his religious art, and we have the sense in looking at some of his pieces that he has thought out the subject and consciously arranged it, though this never results in that academic coldness which is the fault of so many accomplished Italian designs. The chief example is the famous etching called the '100 Florin Plate' or 'Christ Healing the Sick.' This is one of Rembrandt's greatest masterpieces, and is well known though not always rightly interpreted. Sick persons, it is true, figure in the plate, but Christ is not healing them. The truth is that there is a great deal more in the piece than the descriptive title suggests. It is really an illustration of Mt 19, and brings together a number of distinct persons and incidents, a unity being secured for the whole by the commanding dignity and beauty of the central figure. The words at the beginning of the chapter, 'and great multitudes followed him; and he healed them there,' are the motive for the introduction on the right of the etching of that wonderful throng of the maimed and feeble and sickly that Rembrandt has rendered with such pathos and intimacy. The next verse, 'and there came unto him Pharisees, tempting him,' accounts for the company of the well-to-do on the left, whose shrewd and cynical faces and expressions of inquiry suggest the insidious queries with which they have come prepared. Christ, however, in the centre is attending to neither group, but is holding out His hand in encouragement to a woman before Him who clasps a child in her arms, while Peter, by His side, is seeking to thrust her away. This is, of course, the 'Suffer the little children, and forbid them not,' of the middle of the chapter; while in the richly clad figure of a youth, who sits musing with his face partly hidden by his hand, we recognize the young man 'that had great possessions.' The justice of the characterization throughout the piece makes it a real commentary on the passages illustrated, and the actual situation is brought before us in the lifelike impressive groups.

It may cause surprise to find that Rembrandt's treatment of these sacred themes is so broad and genial, because the Holland of his day was strongly Calvinistic, and religion wore generally a garb of austerity. Now, we possess a contemporary notice, according to which Rembrandt was a member of the religious sect called Mennonites; and as the best of these Mennonites were on the whole Broad Churchmen of the Arminian persuasion, Rembrandt's upbringing may have given him liberal views on theology which will account for the comprehensive charity which breathes from all his scriptural pieces. His very last picture, a large and solemn canvas at St. Petersburg, represents the 'Return of the Prodigal Son,' and in this moving presentment of the tattered and weary wanderer as he buried his shame-stricken face in the bosom of the father whose compassion fails not, we read the artist's belief in an all-embracing Divine love. The effacement of the personality of the hapless truant has concentrated all the interest of the scene on the father, who presses him to his heart and gazes down on him with infinite pity and tenderness. He is not only the father of the parable, but the Eternal Love incorporate; and Rembrandt's art becomes in the best sense an embodiment of the higher Christian thought.

We may accordingly regard Rembrandt's design as more satisfying to the religious sense of the liberal Protestant than that of any other artist, and with this as our standard may pass on to a brief critical survey of religious art as it has been

revived in various experimental but interesting forms nearer our own time.

IV. *Modern Times.* — The last part of the 17th and the whole of the 18th cent. produced practically nothing in this style that was not a mere bloodless simulacrum of the academic art of the Florentine and Roman schools. An exception may be found at the close of the 18th cent. in the work of William Blake, who had genius enough in art and literature to have achieved true greatness, had that genius been trained and directed aright. Blake was exceptional, in his art a romanticist before his time, and belonging to the century of Coleridge rather than of Pope. Earlier in the same century, it is worth notice that even Hogarth in his religious pieces did not attempt the homely intimate style in which he might have succeeded, but adopted the conventional types of the Italianizing figure painters of the time. The revived religious art of the 19th cent. is the child of the romantic movement. This was a reaction against the predominant classicism of the latter half of the 18th cent., and took the form partly of a return to nature in which Rousseau and Robert Burns were pioneers, and partly in a revived interest in what was mediæval, which began in Germany and spread to Great Britain and to France. In Germany mediævalism was a natural product, for her traditions of past greatness were rooted in the Middle Ages, and even a classicist like Goethe paid homage to these romantic bygone glories. A curious result in the sphere of religious art of this return to the Middle Ages has made itself seen in our own time in the pictures from the life of Christ by Eduard von Gebhardt, in which the costumes and the *mise en scène* are taken from the Germany of the 15th century. What we know in our own country by the name of the 'Gothic Revival'—a movement that led to the restoration of mediæval features in innumerable English churches and to the establishment of something like a cultus of the romantic in art—was at the basis of the very interesting artistic experiment known as pre-Raphaelitism, while the earlier religious painting of the German so-styled 'Nazarenes' was founded rather on the national self-consciousness of the German people firmly braced by the struggle against Napoleon; mediævalism, at any rate, played no part in it, for the Nazarenes lived and worked in Rome. Both these artistic movements, the German and the English, were sincere and earnest, even to the extreme of fanaticism, but the æsthetic result was in neither case wholly satisfactory.

1. Nazarenes. — The name 'Nazarenes' was applied in good-humoured banter to a company of young German painters who in the early years of the 19th cent. settled in Rome in an abandoned monastery, where they sought to re-constitute the life and work of the painters of the earlier religious schools. They were romanticists of the type that surrenders itself to idealism but recognizes no attraction in nature and the things of the real world. Hence their art draws its motives not directly from nature, but at second hand from the works of the older masters. This secured a certain look of style in the compositions; but, on the other hand, the figures lacked individual character, and the colouring was pale, flat, and conventional. One good piece of work the Nazarenes accomplished early in their career, which has laid modern art under an obligation. In 1815 they re-introduced the technique of fresco painting, which had been abandoned since the death of Raphael Mengs in 1779, and with the aid of one of Menge's old journeymen executed successfully in the true process a series of paintings in a room of the Casa Bartholdi on the Pincian at Rome. These paintings are from the story of Joseph, and have been removed to the National Gallery at Berlin, where they are in a good state of preservation. Cornelius, Overbeck, Schadow, and Veit collaborated, and the works are among the best from an artistic point of view produced by the school. Modern German monumental wall-painting, which has flourished through the century, had here its origin.

Of the Nazarenes, Friedrich Overbeck (1789–1869) was the most characteristic figure. A devoted adherent of the Catholic Church, like most of his associates, he was intensely devotional, and his pictures breathe the same spirit of quiet and retiring devoutness that we have come to know in the early schools of Sienna and of Cologne. 'Art is to me,' he wrote once, 'a harp on which I would fain hear always sounding hymns to the praise of the Lord.' The comparative absence from his works of the qualities of colour, light and shade, and handling, which are essential to the beauty of a modern picture, makes it unnecessary from the point of view of this article to consider them further. Cornelius (1783–1867) was a far stronger artist than Overbeck, and covered vast wall spaces in Munich and elsewhere with compositions marked by learning and vigour, but lacking in warmth of feeling or æsthetic charm. His great fresco of the mediæval subject of the 'Last Judgment' in the Ludwigskirche at Munich, painted in 1840, may count as his masterpiece.

On the same plane of art as the Nazarenes are a once esteemed painter of religious themes, the Netherlander Ary Scheffer, and the accomplished Frenchman Hippolyte Flandrin, a pupil of Ingres, who executed beautifully drawn figure compositions on religious themes on the walls of Parisian churches, which are, however, tame in effect and wanting in charm of colour. Of all this set of artists no one had in him so many elements of true greatness as the Aberdeen painter, William Dyce. Had he been born in a time and in surroundings favourable to the development of monumental figure painting, he would have been a great artist, for there is in his design an originality and an intimacy of feeling, in his execution a firmness, that strike us at once as exceptional in this phase of art. Born in 1806, he met and was influenced by Overbeck in Italy, and Richard Muther in his *Modern Painting* reckons him 'with the Flandrin-Overbeck family,' though he notes that 'where the Nazarenes produce a pallid, corpse-like effect, a deep and luminous quality of colour delights one in Dyce's pictures. He is finished in grace, and with this grace he combines the pure and quiet simplicity of the Umbrian masters. . . . There is something touching in his madonnas. . . . A dreamy loveliness brings the heavenly figures nearer to us' (iii. 5). The 'St. John leading the Madonna to his Home,' in the Tate Gallery in London, is a good specimen of his art.

2. Pre-Raphaelites. — The religious art of the 19th cent. received a contribution of some value from the English pre-Raphaelites. Shortly before 1850 three or four young artists in London found themselves drawn together by something of the same feeling in art that had actuated the Nazarenes. They revolted against the academic conventions with which the name of Raphael was specially connected, and discerned salvation for art only in a return to the sincerity and simplicity of the 15th century. Unlike the Nazarenes, however, they had a strong feeling for nature, and it was from the first one of their principles that every part of a picture should be painted with the most scrupulous care directly from the living person or the natural object. The title 'Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood' and the mystic initials 'P.R.B.' which appeared after their signatures on their paintings, were the outward signs of a union which

ultimately included seven members, and the fact that two or three were writers explains the fact that the movement was from the first as much literary as purely artistic. The three original members, Dante Gabriel Rossetti, Holman Hunt, and John Everett Millais, are the only ones who need be mentioned here. Their intense earnestness, combined with their study of the early Italian masters, led them to religious themes, though these were not exclusively their objective. Indeed, they were before all things romanticists, and may be claimed by the Gothic Revival as its spiritual offspring. They were devoted to the poets, and some of the best things they accomplished in art are the illustrations to Tennyson's *Poems* published by Moxon in 1857. In Rossetti this tendency was particularly marked, and he ultimately confined himself as a painter to the romantic field, in the cultivation of which he was followed by Edward Burne Jones. This romantic and poetic vein kept their devotion to the facts of nature from falling into mere realism, so that in their pictures we discern a curiously matter-of-fact rendering of accessories, while the whole scene may be a fairyland of a poet's creation.

Of the distinctly religious pictures of the school, the best were some of the earliest. In 1849 and 1850 Rossetti exhibited the quaint but fascinating 'Girlhood of the Virgin Mary,' where the figures are portraits of the painter's nearest relatives, and the 'Ecce Ancilla Domini' which has now happily found a home in the national collection. For *naïveté* of feeling and poetic charm it is one of the loveliest pictures ever painted, and in its transparent sincerity it might have shamed into nothingness the commonplace conventional painting in vogue in the England of the time. The early Millais of 1850, 'The Child Christ in the Workshop of Joseph,' a far more ambitious piece, is perhaps, artistically speaking, the best religious production of the school; for Millais, as his after career showed, was far more highly endowed as a practician than any of his associates. Holman Hunt's universally known 'Light of the World' appeared in 1854, and this artist has maintained throughout his long and honourable artistic career the same religious earnestness, combined with the pre-Raphaelite faithfulness in details. 'In the whole history of art there are no religious pictures in which uncompromising naturalism has made so remarkable an alliance with a pietistic depth of ideas' (Muther, *Modern Painting*, iii. 12).

From the artistic point of view it should perhaps be pointed out that the plan of copying nature in a picture detail by detail does not really secure the truth aimed at, and with the pre-Raphaelites its adoption was due to intellectual rather than to purely artistic considerations. The experiment was of value in its time as a protest against the vague conventional rendering of nature with no true knowledge behind it, which was then the fashion in the English school, and to the non-artistic the principle will always seem attractive because of its ethical sound, but, as Horace says in the *Ars Poetica* (line 31):

'In vitium ducit culpæ fuga, si caret arte,'

and the way to represent nature truthfully in the artistic sense is not to copy bit by bit, but to render the general aspect of things in their true relations of tone and colour. This is the real difficulty of painting, and an impressionist study that secures absolute truth in these relations is at once far more difficult, and far better as art, than the most elaborate rendering of individual details with meticulous exactness. An English painter, possessed of a shrewd wit, tried the pre-Raphaelite method about 1850, but gave it up, saying, 'This cannot be right, it is too easy!' Hence it has come about that many a pre-Raphaelite painter who has carried out this principle of work has been, as Horace goes on to say:

'Infelix operis summa, quia ponere totum | Nesciet.'

Moreover, exact piece-by-piece rendering leads too often to a hardness in delineation that is destructive of pictorial effect, and when this is combined with crude and inharmonious colouring, the result from an æsthetic point of view may be disastrous. At the same time, though pre-Raphaelite pictures vary greatly in their artistic value, they are always to be respected for their earnestness and sincerity, and some of those on Biblical themes will ever remain prominent and justly-honoured representations of an interesting modern phase of Christian art.

3. **Modern experiments.** — One last phase of Christian art remains to be noticed, bringing us quite to our own day. The reference is to certain endeavours to secure convincing verisimilitude in the pictorial representation of Biblical scenes by the abandonment of all the time-worn conventions of academic design, and by the use of local types, costumes, accessories, and setting. This experiment has been tried in various forms, and always with sincerity and devout feeling. So far as these qualities are concerned, the works already noticed of the German von Gebhardt, whose 'Last Supper,' painted in 1870, is well known in this country through reproductions, are equal to the best; but his curious convention of a 15th cent. *mise en scène* gives them a position apart. One form which this work has taken is to place the events of the life of Christ in an Oriental setting, carefully elaborated from a study of the Palestine of to-day. The idea was first started earlier in the 19th cent., when the attention of artists was turned for the first time to Oriental subjects. Horace Vernet, on his Eastern tour in 1840, had noticed that the scenes of the Bible stories were laid in the East, and should be represented in Oriental settings. This was actually attempted by Holman Hunt, who painted religious pictures in Jerusalem and by the shore of the Dead Sea. Some German artists sought the same end by the adoption for the NT characters of the types of modern scions of the Hebrew race; but it has been reserved for a French and a Scottish painter of our own time to work the idea out with completeness. Both James Tissot, a French artist known first for his pictures of modern fashionable life, and William Hole, of the Royal Scottish Academy, conceived the idea of portraying the various incidents of the earthly ministry of Christ as they might happen in the Palestine of to-day. The lighting and colour of the landscapes, the forms of nature and of buildings, the attitudes of the figures and their costumes, the furniture, the accessories, are all drawn from actual life, as it can be studied to-day on the Mount of Olives, by the Sea of Tiberias, or at Bethany. The resulting pictures, made accessible by popular reproductions, are full of interest, and at every turn furnish some new suggestion that makes us realize and interpret better the familiar scenes. They are, however, in both cases comparatively small water colours and do not aim at greatness of effect. Indeed, the elaboration of the interesting detail often interferes with the general impression of a scene in its ethical or religious aspects. They are, nevertheless, valuable contributions to the religious art of our day.

An experiment in quite another direction has been made, also in our own day, by one or two German artists, of whom the most important is Fritz von Uhde. Von Uhde is probably the best painter of all those who have given themselves in this latest epoch to Scriptural themes, and his work has more of the quality we have learned to

admire in Rembrandt than that of any of the other moderns. There is no attempt here at archæological correctness, and the idea of an Oriental setting never crosses the artist's mind. On the contrary, he takes the actual scenes in town or village or country of the Germany of his own day, and imagines Christ introduced into them, and dealing with those He meets as He dealt with His fellow-countrymen in Palestine. In 'The Sermon on the Mount' Christ is seated on a modern wooden bench in the fields, and is discoursing to a group of German peasant women and children, on the outskirts of which hang the men who are going home from their work, with their tools over their shoulders. 'Suffer little children to come unto me,' at Leipzig, shows us the interior of a modern schoolroom in a small town, where the master stands in the background, while a group of children of all ages are gathered somewhat timidly near the chair on which a stranger, who has just entered, has taken his seat. This stranger is Christ, and we are made to see that He is gradually drawing the little ones to Himself by the magnetism of His personality. In other pieces we see Christ entering a peasant home, or sitting at meat with His friends, as at the Last Supper; or, again, with a frank acceptance of the mystical, the artist has given us the scenes of the Annunciation or the Nativity. The pictures are always serious, devout, and at the same time warm with human feeling, and often touched with idyllic charm. Their quality as works of art gives them an equally high place with that which they claim as achievements in religious design.

The name of Rembrandt was mentioned above in connexion with these homely renderings of sacred scenes. Rembrandt, like von Uhde, in the best of his pictures took the setting from his own surroundings, though he indulges not seldom in Oriental vestments and in Jewish types. These surroundings are, however, in the first place, very much generalized, so that they might almost do for any age and country; and, in the second place, they are as unfamiliar in the eyes of 20th cent. Britons as if they were genuine Oriental transcripts. Hence the setting of Rembrandt's pieces takes them to that distance from us which is necessary in order to let the imagination have free play. In the paintings of our own time, on the other hand, both the Oriental backgrounds and the modern ones are too real and too familiar, and the appearance against them of Christ and the Apostles seems forced and almost theatrical. If we recognize who the sacred personages are, they do not appear to live in these surroundings, but to have come in in a disguise, and we half expect their interlocutors to be finding them out. On the other hand, if we accept them as modern Orientals or modern Europeans, we cannot readily realize their unique character and greatness. They have been brought down too effectively from the ideal to the actual sphere.

Summary.—In the foregoing an attempt has been made to describe and to analyze, from the points of view indicated at the beginning of this article, the chief phases of religious art as they have manifested themselves through the Christian centuries. There have been two sides to the activity of Christian artists, each of which may here suitably receive a final word.

(1) On the one hand, their activity has been essentially *decorative*, and their spirit has been that of the monkish craftsman of the 11th, the Gothic mason and carver of the 13th centuries; all they could make or do they were zealous to offer on the altar of Christian service. Theirs was the gift of beauty to the Creator of all beauty—a grateful rendering back of the boon so lavishly bestowed, the gift of skill and care to the Lord of the inventive brain and cunning hand. How far, we may ask, can we in these modern days enter into the spirit of those mediæval craftsmen, and turn any artistic gifts we may possess to this high service? Unlike the men of old, we have in these days almost to justify the bare existence of the cult of beauty and of art, for these are not a natural and necessary part of our lives. We have seen how the practice of the arts in early Christian and monastic surroundings followed inevitably from the fact that life without this element of art was in those days impossible. With us it is something extra, and is as a consequence challenged to give an account of itself. That idea of an opposition between the life of art and the practical life of service to one's fellows, which underlies Tennyson's 'Palace of Art,' is not justified by the facts of the world. It is perfectly possible, as we can learn by looking around us, to combine the practical with the contemplative life, and to exercise the æsthetic faculties without any withdrawal from the sphere of the actual. It is true that there are those who do so withdraw themselves, but it does not follow that they are tempted away by the allurements of the imagination. It may very well be that they are morbid and self-absorbed, and if a field of activity did not offer itself in the æsthetic sphere, their life might decline to a much lower level. The pleasures of art are, at any rate, innocent, and if they do not necessarily ennoble the character, they at least refine the taste.

We saw that the mediæval artist-monk exalted the practice of the crafts that produce beautiful things as not only a function of human nature but a law of the universe at large. There is a narrow religiosity that is afraid of a human nature so amply endowed, and would confine its activity within much closer limits. In the churches of to-day, however, this timid creed is already an anachronism, and most of those which have Puritan traditions at their back accept to-day the broader view to which, at any rate, the student of the history of Christian art must feel himself forced. And if this energy of art is not only wholesome, but even in a sense enjoined, in what can it be more fittingly expended than in that service to which we have seen it devoted through the centuries? The time is now past when the square barn-like meeting-house, the bare walls, the homely fittings, could satisfy the cultured worshipper.

It is true, and must never be forgotten, that the outward show is as a mere nothing to the 'truth in the inward parts,' which is demanded as much from churches and congregations as from individuals; and if worship were less sincere in a beautiful and richly adorned fane than in a simple room, it is the art that would have to be sacrificed. It is true also that in parts of our own country a sacred tradition of unselfish piety, of heroic endurance, clings to these whitewashed walls that for generations past have looked down on the defenders of a creed for which they were ready at any moment to give up their possessions or their lives. The Church at large could ill spare the Puritan spirit, and must strive to retain what is best in this, while contesting some of its negations. The introduction of instrumental music into the act of worship, and of the element of art and beauty into its material apparatus and its home, is in principle conceded almost everywhere in Christendom, and there is every reason why the mediæval tradition should be revived, and these things not merely accepted as a fashion, but embraced with the godly joy and pride of the older days.

(2) On the other hand, the activity of Christian artists has been exercised not merely on the

creation of what is beautiful, but on representations of sacred scenes and personages, or symbolic shows that had a *didactic* purpose. This work, as we have seen, has taken several different forms. We may distinguish here: (*a*) the liturgical, doctrinal, or allusive composition, which began, as we saw, in the catacombs, and flourished greatly, in the form especially of the pictures of the Last Things, in the later mediæval period; (*b*) the devotional picture, represented centrally in the work of Fra Angelico, in which the specially Christian virtues of humility, devotedness, self-abandonment, are brought to view and their practice inculcated; (*c*) the historical representation from the life of Christ or of OT or NT worthies—a form of art that we have come across in many shapes, and in which at one time the mystical, at another the human, element is most apparent; and (*d*) the great work of art in which a supreme master like Michelangelo has created types that are profoundly ethical, though not in the distinctive sense Christian.

How is each of these forms of religious art related to the Christian thought of enlightened Protestantism?

(*a*) The first kind of picture has ceased for Protestants to have any didactic or specially religious significance, and is regarded rather from the intellectual point of view as an embodiment of poetic thought. The designs of William Blake are of this kind, and a good modern instance may be found in the allusive symbolical designs which, with charming decorative feeling, Mrs. Traquair has executed in the 'Song School' of St. Mary's Episcopal Cathedral and the Catholic Apostolic Church in Edinburgh, as well as in other buildings. Such works belong more to the domain of poetry and mysticism than to that of religion in the strict sense of the term. They answer to a special phase of artistic feeling both in the creator of them and in the spectator, and, in fact, they repel some sincere lovers of art just as strongly as they attract others. So long as there are artists and lovers of art, the temperament of some of these will turn them in the direction of works of the kind. This phase of religious art is illustrated also by some of the productions of G. F. Watts, an artist of genius who was meant to be a great painter, but was drawn aside from the direct course by the copiousness and insistence of his intellectual ideas.

(*b*) The time will never come when we shall cease to take delight in the purity and devoutness of the devotional pictures of the early schools of religious art in Germany and in Italy. In so far as they express the specially Christian temper of humility and dependence, and reveal to us innocence and love and the spirit of service embodied in the Virgin mother, in saint, and in angel, they will always have a message for those religiously susceptible. The harsh theological words 'Hagiology,' 'Mariolatry,' and the like need not disturb our contemplative enjoyment of these simple and sincere expressions of a faith which in the great essentials was the same as our own. The works are, at the same time, removed into the historical region by the fact that the whole religious *milieu* which conditioned them at their forthcoming is so different from ours. We regard them with interest and affection, but recognize them as not belonging to our own time or our own range of religious ideas.

(*c*) The historical treatment of the life of Christ or of the scenes of the OT is a matter that concerns us in these days and in Protestant surroundings far more nearly. It corresponds with the modern interest in the facts of the past, and with the (partly rationalistic) tendency to emphasize the human side of Christianity. Notice has been taken in what has gone before of the many attempts which have been made in art, throughout post-Reformation times, to bring home with convincing force to the spectator the personality, and the significance of the acts, of Christ. The difficulty has always been, on the one hand, to avoid what is mystical, with all the other conventions of the professed religious schools; and, on the other, to prevent such a modernizing of the *mise en scène* as may destroy the air of remoteness from the ordinary world and of ethical supremacy, which should belong to the person of the protagonist. Rembrandt, as we have seen, has succeeded here where many have failed; and when, the whole body of his work on religious themes is placed in accessible form before the public, as has been proposed, he will probably be recognized by all as the greatest religious artist of whom the history of painting bears record.

(*d*) The impression of the Sublime, when conveyed either by the appearances of nature or by those of art, is always in one sense a religious impression, for it implies a chastening, and, in the Aristotelian sense, a purifying, of the individual emotions by the recognition of what is transcendently great. This greatness is not hostile or terrifying, for the æsthetic impression of the Sublime is destroyed when the being is shaken or cowed through fear, but it represents, as it were, a challenge, to which we respond by bracing up the powers, and by measuring ourselves with it in the strength of free intelligence and in a certain confidence that does not preclude humility. So the human spirit, in the contemplation of the Divine, is not crushed, but raised and strengthened. Now, of all the functions that the arts of form can exercise for the higher service of man, none is greater than that of presenting human nature before us in aspects of such grandeur that we feel in a measure brought into contact with the Divine. The ordinary levels of human greatness are transcended by these exceptional creations of art, and our spirit is uplifted in response. The impression thus produced is religious, but it is quite apart from any particular creed. It takes us into a region where all creeds are merged in the one all-embracing conception of the Godhead, supreme in goodness as in power. It follows from this that all art which rises to this ethical level is religious art, whatever the creed of its creator; and from this point of view the masterworks of the Hellenic sculptor may claim a position by the side of the designs of a Michelangelo, or of any other creative artist of the Christian period. The impressiveness of a great work of art depends largely on the simplicity as well as the force of its message, and it is not by inculcating any special doctrines of religion but by raising the whole being into communion with the highest that art may best serve the spiritual needs of mankind.

LITERATURE.—For the whole subject up to the end of the mediæval period, the standard work is Schnaase, *Geschichte der bildenden Künste*², Düsseldorf, 1866, etc. See also Woltmann, *History of Painting*, Eng. tr., London, 1880, vol. i. Baum-Geyer, *Kirchengeschichte für das evangelische Haus*², Munich, 1902 (illustrated), gives a very good view of the bearing of the phenomena of art on the life of the Church at different periods. The following are more special works: for Early Christian Art, H. Leclercq, *Manuel d'archéologie chrétienne*, Paris, 1907; for monastic, Theophilus, *Schedula Diversarum Artium*, ed. Ilg, Vienna, 1874; for Gothic, Gonse, *L'Art gothique*, Paris, 1891; Mâle, *L'Art religieux du xiiie siècle en France*, Paris, 1902; for Italian, Venturi, *Storia dell' arte italiana*, Milan, 1901, etc.; for Flemish, Crowe and Cavalcaselle, *Early Flemish Painters*, London, 1872; for the engraved work of the Reformation period, Woltmann, *Holbein und seine Zeit*², Leipzig, 1874; for Rembrandt, Baldwin Brown, *Rembrandt: a Study of his Life and Work*, London, 1907; for modern developments generally, Muther, *History of Modern Painting*, Eng. tr., 2nd ed., 4 vols., London, 1907, with full bibliographies of the various artists and schools.

G. BALDWIN BROWN.

ART IN MANUSCRIPTS (Christian).*—There is no form of Christian pictorial art that has come down to us from the Middle Ages in such abundance, in such variety, and in such a genuine and unaltered condition, as the art of miniature-painting for the illustration and decoration of manuscripts. Isolated examples dating from the 4th cent. to the 8th may be found scattered through the great libraries of Europe, while others from the 9th cent. onwards exist in considerable numbers, not only in public libraries but in many private collections—and this in spite of the enormous destruction that has taken place through their being little cared for, or liturgically out of date, or the objects of fanatical hatred. There is no doubt that the manuscripts thus destroyed must be numbered by hundreds of thousands. At the same time, it must not be concluded that the majority of these, or even a large percentage, were as attractively written and illustrated as the precious volumes exposed in our museums. A glance at the contents of any considerable mediæval library, like those of Hereford Cathedral and some of the Colleges of Oxford and Cambridge, shows us how commonplace and dull and full of tiresome contractions was the everyday scholar's book, and that in nine cases out of ten the loss of them would not be a matter for artistic regret. The richly painted manuscripts on the whitest vellum were done either as furniture for lectern and altar, in keeping with the other splendours and adornments of a great church, or for the use of wealthy laymen and ecclesiastics, who sometimes read them as little as a modern student reads the *éditions de luxe* that he buys of poems that he has learned to love in a homely setting. St. Jerome, in his preface to Job, makes light of such possessions. 'Let those who care for them,' he says, 'own books that are old, or written with gold and silver on purple skins. All I need is a good text.' This sentence shows that the spirit of the fastidious book-lover was already abroad in the 4th century. It is perhaps a matter for congratulation that not every one had so austere a taste as St. Jerome.

The earliest examples of painted books that have survived in Europe are two Vergils of the 3rd or 4th cent. in the Vatican Library; but these do not come within the scope of the present article, which deals only with this branch of art in relation to Christianity. As might be expected, nearly all the earliest Christian manuscripts that exist are either Bibles or portions of Bibles, beginning with the Vienna Genesis of the 5th cent., which contains eighty-eight miniatures, and leading to the Ashburnham Pentateuch, written at Tours in the 7th cent. and adorned with nineteen large pictures. This is now in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris. Of the same century is the famous copy of the Gospels known as the *Book of Kells* at Trinity College, Dublin. This book, which is at once the earliest and the finest of the Celtic manuscripts, was written by a scribe or scribes of the utmost accomplishment, and ornamented with initials and other larger decorations of miraculously interwoven lines. The Irish decorators, however, while gifted with a sureness of hand that is almost beyond belief, were totally lacking in the higher qualities of imagination, and when confronted with a subject like the Crucifixion, showed as lamentable an inability as the veriest savage to draw and compose the human figure. Next after the Book of Kells the best-known example of this style is the *Lindisfarne Gospels* at the British Museum (fig. 1, p. 890), which, though not executed in Ireland, belongs to the same Celtic tradition and to approximately the same date. All subsequent examples, which do not owe a new development to external influences, show a falling off from this high standard. There was, in fact, in the system of the Celtic draughtsmen no human element or element of growth, and when once they had achieved the mathematically perfect, only decadence and repetition lay before them. Nevertheless, their consummate skill in ornamental design gives them a unique place in the history of book decoration, and was not without some effect on later schools in other countries, though always in subordination to the more emotional impulses derived from Rome and Constantinople.

Pictorially the Roman school, best exhibited in the paintings of the Catacombs, bequeathed but little that we can admire to the book-decorators of the Middle Ages, though as late as the 10th cent. books were illustrated with pictures, usually dead both in colour and expression, that differed scarcely at all from their classical prototypes. The Byzantine pictures in copies of the Greek Gospels and Lives of Saints written at Constantinople, full of Oriental blendings of gold and brilliant colour, and with a seriousness of intention quite absent from most of the classical figure-work, had a far wider and more vivifying influence on the art of the West. Under Roman and Byzantine influences, either separate or combined, a series of sumptuous books, usually copies of the Latin Gospels, and some of them written entirely in letters of gold, were produced on the Continent between the 8th and 12th centuries. By the latter century, Byzantine art, having reached an academical stage which allowed of no further evolution, was, as it were, frozen and crystallized into forms which in Russia survive unaltered to the present day.

Meanwhile, in England, and especially at Winchester, a notable school of book-decoration had arisen. The most famous example of this school is a *Benedictional* belonging to the Duke of Devonshire, which was written at Winchester for Bishop Æthelwold between the years 963 and 984. A similar *Benedictional*, written a few years later for Archbishop Robert of Jumièges, is now in the public library at Rouen. The British Museum is rich in productions of this school, beginning with *King Edgar's Charter of Hyde Abbey* (fig. 2, p. 890), written entirely in gold in 966 and enriched with a beautiful frontispiece, in which the figures are drawn with much animation and clad in the fluttering draperies characteristic of the English miniaturists of the 10th and 11th centuries.

During these centuries and for some time longer, it is not too much to say that English book-illustration was the finest in Europe. Until the end of the 13th cent. Italian pictorial art was much less inventive and energetic than that of England and France, while Germany was likewise under a weight of enervative Byzantine tradition, which seems to have prevented its producing more than a trifling number of books of notable merit between the 12th cent. and the time of the invention of printing. In the monasteries of Flanders, Hainault, and Artois, many stately books were written and illuminated, but in the reign of St. Louis the fame of the University of Paris attracted scholars and artists from all Christendom, who thenceforth made Paris the intellectual centre of Europe. In their train came a body of writers and illuminators, independent of the monasteries, who shook off the Byzantine fetters before Giotto and Cimabue were born, and produced work of an extraordinary and almost feminine refinement of execution, which is no less attractive than the manly vigour which is more especially English (fig. 3, p. 891). For a while the two countries ran an even race, but by the middle of the 14th cent. the French illuminators had gone far beyond their English rivals, and in the second half of the 15th

* Art in MSS (Jew.) see p. 872ᵇ.

cent. English patrons were so ill-served by their countrymen that they had to send to Bruges and Paris for their painted prayer-books and romances.

To the Italian scribes of the 15th cent. belongs the distinction of having discarded the Gothic or black letter, which by that time had reached a cramped and ugly stage, in favour of the more rounded and legible forms of the 11th and 12th cents., *littera antigua* as it was called when re-introduced, 'Roman letter' as we now call it (figs. 4, 5, pp. 891, 892). This revival was soon seen to be a reasonable one, and was adopted in all literary countries except Germany, which is only now coming into line with her Western neighbours. It was under the influence of the Renaissance that the finest illuminated books were produced in Italy. These were largely copies of the Latin classics; but many exquisite prayer-books were written, especially in Florence, Naples, Ferrara, and Venice, for members of the great families. Of Spanish illuminated books not many have survived, and these usually owe nearly everything to artistic influences from Naples or Bruges. In the latter city enormous quantities of dainty prayer-books were manufactured towards the end of the 15th century. The chief features of these books are the use of sprays of natural flowers and foliage in the borders, and the delicacy of the landscape backgrounds to the pictures. Dutch books are remarkable at once for great dexterity of execution and for a bluntness of conception which prevents their ever being in the first rank as works of art.

And now as to the types of manuscripts that were most frequently illustrated. With few and mostly fragmentary exceptions, all liturgical books earlier than the 13th cent. have perished, having been worn out, or cast aside on account of changes of fashion and of textual arrangement. It is certain that none of them were habitually so richly decorated as the early copies of the Gospels already referred to. These were always adorned with four frontispieces, usually representing the Evangelists in the act of writing, opposite the four opening pages of the Gospels, on which the text was written in large ornamental letters within an elaborate border. The principal liturgical books of a later date, of which there are many illuminated examples, are Pontificals, Missals, Breviaries, Graduals, and Antiphoners. The great choir-books, such as are shown in the Convent of St. Mark at Florence and in the Duomo of Siena, have survived in quantities in Italy and Spain, where they may still be seen in use. These often contain initials painted by artists of note, but they are for the most part not earlier than the 15th century. Choir-books of Northern origin, especially those of the fine period, are exceedingly rare. The best that exists is an Antiphoner in three volumes written in 1290 for the nuns of the Cistercian Abbey of Beaupré near Grammont (fig. 6, p. 892). This formerly belonged to John Ruskin, and is now (1908) in the collection of Mr. Yates Thompson.

The Vulgate Bibles that have survived from the 12th cent. are usually large folios in two or three volumes, with historiated initials at the beginning of each book, and decorative initials to the numerous prologues. One of the finest examples, a book of surpassing beauty, is in the library of Winchester Cathedral. In the 13th cent. the size of Bibles was reduced, and they were written in enormous numbers and with astonishing skill in France, England, and Italy (fig. 7, p. 893). The entire Bible, including the Apocrypha and perhaps a hundred and fifty painted initials, was often on so small a scale and on vellum of such astonishing thinness as to fit comfortably into the pouch or pocket of the Dominican and other itinerant preachers of the day. So great was the output at this time, that it seems almost to have sufficed until the invention of printing, as Bibles written in the 14th and 15th cents. are comparatively rare. Besides plain texts, portions of the Bible with extensive marginal commentaries were often finely written and illuminated for purposes of monastic study; and in England especially there were produced in the 13th cent. a number of splendidly illustrated copies of the Apocalypse, either in Latin or in French, and usually with an Exposition taken from the writings of Berengaudus. It is easy to see how the strange visions of St. John kindled the imaginations of the creative artists of this time, and with what zest they sought to interpret them (fig. 8, p. 893). In France, at the same period, a type of sumptuous picture-book was evolved, known as the *Bible moralisée*, in which the text is altogether subordinate to the almost countless illustrations. Two copies are in the Imperial Library at Vienna, while a third is divided between the Bodleian Library, the Bibliothèque Nationale, and the British Museum (fig. 9, p. 894).

From an early period the chief book of private devotion was the Psalter. In the 12th and 13th cents. every rich and devout layman seems to have possessed his own copy of the Psalms, to which were invariably added certain Canticles, the Athanasian Creed, the Litany, and a small number of Collects, sometimes followed by the Office of the Dead. It was on these books that the miniaturists, in what was certainly the culminating period of their art, lavished their utmost skill. To the more elaborate copies it was usual to prefix a series of illustrations of the Old Testament, from the creation of the world to the coronation of Solomon, and of the New Testament from the Annunciation to the Last Judgment, which series varied in length according to the wishes and purse of the individual who gave the commission; while the initials of certain Psalms—in early Psalters only Psalms 1, 51, and 101, marking the three divisions into fifty Psalms, and in later Psalters also Psalms 26, 38, 52, 68, 80, and 97, being (with Psalm 1) the first Psalms of the Office of Matins on the seven days of the week, and Psalm 109, being the first of Sunday Vespers—are invariably larger than the rest, and usually historiated with a more or less fixed sequence of subjects. Early in the 14th cent. Psalters of great size and magnificence were written in East Anglia. Among these must be named the Psalter of Robert of Ormesby, monk of Norwich (fig. 10, p. 895), now in the Bodleian Library, and two superb Psalters, both connected with Gorleston, near Yarmouth, one in the Public Library at Douai, and one in the library of Mr. Dyson Perrins.

As early as the 11th cent. certain private offices, the most important being the Hours of the Virgin, the Hours of the Trinity, and the Hours of the Passion, were added to a few Psalters. Later, these accretions came to be written separately, probably in the first instance for the use of women. Their portability and general convenience in this detached form led to their being adopted in place of the Psalter as the devotional book of the literate layfolk; and although there are but few separate Books of Hours of the 13th cent., and not many of the 14th cent., they were produced in enormous numbers in the 15th cent., and copiously illustrated with pictures which in the main illustrate the text (fig. 11, p. 894), but not seldom seem to have been calculated to withdraw the thoughts of the owner from the contemplation of heavenly things. The popularity of these painted prayer-books, of which the greatest number were written in Bruges, Paris, and Florence, was so great that they continued to be produced until long after the invention of printing.

SYDNEY C. COCKERELL.

ART (Egyptian).—The religious aspect of art in Egypt includes almost all that is known of it. The earliest sculptures are tombstones and tables of offerings for the benefit of a deceased person; the earliest statuary is of figures in which the soul of the deceased might reside, made as lifelike as possible, in order to give him satisfaction; the figures of servants with offerings, or of serfs to cultivate the ground, were for service in the next world; the whole of the tomb sculptures, paintings, and furniture—carved coffins, canopic jars, tablets, and all else—resulted from the religious theories of the future life. The buildings that remain to us are nearly all temples; the colossi which stand in them were habitations for the many *ka*-souls of the king; and even the battle scenes on the walls are all part of the display of religious fervour, and culminate in the triumphal processions of captives dedicated to the god, or led by the god as his appanage to be entrusted to the king's administration. The civil life of the lay Egyptian has almost vanished, the palaces and towns are nearly all below the plain of Nile mud; and it is only the sepulchral and religious remains that—being placed on the desert—have thus been preserved to us. Here we must notice only the main principles and examples of religious ceremonies. The page of examples given (p. 896) will illustrate the more important points.

1. Symbolism.—This begins with the rise of the art, as seen on the slate palettes. The various tribes engaged in the conquest of the country are designated by their emblems, the hawk, lion, scorpion, jackal, or pelican. The actions of the tribe are represented by the animal holding a pick and digging through the walls of a town, or by a human arm projecting from the standard on which the animal is, and clutching a cord or grasping a bound captive. The king is represented as a strong bull—as he is called in later times—trampling down his enemies; or the figure of a fish, used to write the name of a king, has two arms grasping a stick to smite his enemies; or the royal hawk has a hand which holds a cord put through the lip of the captive. In these instances it is seen how early symbolism was established as an elaborate means of historic expression. It is not surprising that in the subsequent times it should be commonly used. The kings are shown as being conducted by the gods, who also 'teach their hands to war and their fingers to fight,' standing behind the king and holding his arm in drawing the arrow; the gods place the crown on the king's head, and pour purifying water or blessings over him (see figure of Ramessu IV.); the goddess Hat-hor, as a woman or as a cow, is shown suckling the young king; and Setkhet-abui, the goddess of literature, writes the king's name on the leaves of the Persea tree. The limits between symbolism and dogma pass the critical stage altogether in the Tombs of the Kings, and a state is reached in the other world in which there is no distinction possible.

Special emblems of ideas became so common that they were used almost mechanically, like the cross in Europe. The sun and wings are noticed under ARCHITECTURE (Egyptian), 'Decoration.' And groups of hieroglyphs, such as the *ankh* for life, the *uas* for power, the *sad* for stability, the girdle tie of Isis, and other emblems, were carved as fretworks to stiffen furniture or form a trellis to windows.

2. Divine forms.—The compound theology of sacred animals and deities resulted in a variety of strange combinations. The animal element is always the head, placed upon a human body for a deity; a human head upon an animal body is used only for a sphinx, emblem of a king, and for the *ba*-bird, emblem of a soul. The combination of animal heads on human bodies is found in the second dynasty (Set, on seals of Perabsen) and the fourth dynasty (Thoth, on scene of Khufu); and it became very usual in later times. The combination is skilfully arranged, so that it scarcely seems monstrous; see the scene given (p. 896) of Horus and Thoth, where the short neck of the hawk fits directly on to the human shoulders, while the long neck of the ibis is backed by an immense wig, which after all has no possible support. Yet the effect is far better than could have been expected from such a difficult combination. The forms best known are the ram-headed Khnumu and Hershefi, lion-headed Sekhmet, cat-headed Bastet, jackal-headed Anubis, crocodile-headed Sebek, ibis-headed Thoth, and hawk-headed Horus and Mentu. Besides these, there were many compounded divinities in Ptolemaic and Roman times, formed of a deity and three or four animal parts; usually it is Ptah-Sokar who is thus elaborated. These combinations have none of the convincing dignity of the early animal-headed gods.

3. Dress.—The gods are usually clad in the oldest form of close-fitting waist-cloth; it is always older forms of dress that are thought appropriate for religious or artistic purposes, and in Babylonia the oldest figures of worshippers are entirely nude. The gods never wear the projecting peaked waistcloth common in the Old and Middle Kingdoms. Another primitive piece of costume was the animal's tail, hung at the back from the belt. This is shown as a bushy tail, like a fox's, on the archaic hunters, carved on a slate palette. It appears on all kings from the first dynasty onward (see the figure of Ramessu IV. [fig. 2, p. 896], and the kneeling Hatshepsut, where it is brought forward). And it gradually becomes almost universal for gods after the early ages. Here it can be seen on the figures of Horus and Thoth, in the long form, and thinner than usual.

The principal religious dress was the leopard skin, as on the priest in the scene of sacrifice (fig. 1, p. 896). It was worn from before the first dynasty (Narmer), and is seen not only on scenes, but also on statues in the eighteenth dynasty. It is shown on the priests when seated, or standing giving directions, or making offerings; it might be worn over a short kilt or over a long muslin dress.

4. Ceremonies.—The four chief ceremonies selected for illustration (p. 896) are Sacrifice, Offering, Laying on of Hands, and Purification.

(*a*) *Sacrifice*, as among the Semites, was the ceremonial killing of an animal for food; but there is no trace of the burning of the fat, or of the other form of whole burnt-sacrifice. In the early sculptured tombs the sons of the deceased are shown as trapping the birds, and sacrificing the ox, for the festival in their father's honour. It is rare to find representations of sacrifice later, such as this example of the nineteenth dynasty. Burnt-sacrifice was a foreign importation, and is only known in picture at Tell el-Amarna (eighteenth dynasty), and in description at the Rameseum (twentieth dynasty).

(*b*) *Offering* is the most usual religious subject. The offerings are heaped together on a mat, a slab on the ground, or a pillar-table; in this case a mat is represented, bound with thread at the middle and the two ends, a form which originates in the third dynasty or earlier. Upon the mat is a layer of round thin cakes, much like the modern flap bread, with two circles of seeds stuck in each. A layer of joints of meat (?) follows; then three wild ducks; above, a row of gazelle haunches, upon which are three plucked geese. The whole is covered with a bundle of lotus flowers and a bunch

of grapes. The queen is pouring out a drink-offering from a small spouted vase in the right hand. Such drink-offerings were of a great variety of wines and beers, as also milk, and water. In her left hand she holds an incense-burner. The Egyptian never burnt incense on an altar, but always in a metal censer held in the hand. It was a long metal rod, with a hand holding a cup for the burning incense at one end, and a hawk's head at the other end; in the middle of the length was a pan or box in which the pellets of incense were kept ready for burning. The heat requisite to light it was obtained by using a hot saucer of pottery placed in the cup, on which the resin fused. When the incense was burnt, the saucer was removed and thrown away, and thus no cleaning was required for the metal cup.

(*c*) *Laying on of hands* was represented as being done by the gods, in order to impart the *Sa*. This was a divine essence which the gods drank from the heavenly 'lake of the Sa,' and which the earthly images of the gods could impart to beings and to priests who knelt before them. The benefit was not ceaseless, but required renewal from time to time. The same form of laying on of hands was used, as in our illustration, for conferring the kingship; the inscription reads, 'giving of the kingship of both banks of the river, the complete office, to his daughter, Maat-ka-ra' (Hatshepsut).

(*d*) *Purification* was a very important idea to the Egyptian. A whole class of priests were devoted to the purification of places and things; and it was always represented by a stream poured out. Personal cleanliness was strictly observed by the priests; and the purifying of the king was performed symbolically by the gods, as shown on p. 896. Each god holds a vase from which he pours out a stream over the king. It is stated that Ramessu 'is purified with life and power.'

5. Furniture.—The main object in a temple was the sacred boat of the god, one of the best examples of which is shown on p. 896. The boat was a model intended to be carried on the shoulders of the priests; it rested, therefore, on two long poles, and when stationary was placed upon a square stand, so as to allow of the priests taking their station beneath the poles (see ARCHITECTURE [Egyptian], § 5, where the boat and shrine are described). This boat was probably made of wood, plated over with sheets of electrum or gold. The extent to which gold was used is hardly credible to us, who see only an excessively thin film used for gilding. Even in the 11th cent. the Countess of Sicily had the mast of her ship covered with pure gold; and the Egyptian often describes large objects as covered with gold, which was usually of considerable thickness. The reliefs were usually worked in hard stucco and then thickly gilded and burnished. The art of high burnishing upon a stucco base was kept up till Roman times. The sets of vases for the purification ceremonies and further libations of wine were kept on wooden stands, as shown below the boat. At the side of them is a stand with water jars, covered with lotus flowers, and with bunches of grapes placed below it. On another stand at the extreme left is a figure of the king kneeling, offering a large *ankh*, or sign of life; this is crowned with flowers, and has convolvulus and vine growing up beneath it. Another stand at the extreme right has a figure of the king offering a large bouquet of flowers. A main part of the religious art was spent on these statuettes of the king making a great variety of offerings. Unhappily all this wealth of figures has perished, and only a few fragments remain to give reality to the innumerable pictures of the temple riches shown upon the walls.

W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE.

ART AND ARCHITECTURE (Etruscan and Early Italic).—One can hardly speak of Italic art in connexion with the rude products of the Stone Age, even though some of the Neolithic weapons and implements in polished stone show a high degree of perfection in their way; the beginnings of a higher civilization appear more or less simultaneously in the whole country, varying in type according to the different races that inhabited the peninsula. The chief types are as follows:

1. *The 'terramare' of northern Italy.*—These are villages built upon platforms supported by wooden poles sunk into the muddy earth, a type of dwelling created for marshy districts, and frequent upon the shores of the lakes of Central Europe. From there the type spread not only down the marshy valley of the Po and its tributary rivers, but also farther south to the confines of the Emilia, and even, if we may judge by an isolated example, as far as Tarentum. What had originally been a method of building called for by the conditions of the soil was preserved and followed with religious care even in dry and mountainous regions. An invariable rule, evidently sanctioned by the religion of these 'terramaricoli,' in whom we may see the first Italic race on Italian soil, regulated the shape of these villages—a trapezoid space enclosed by a rampart of earth and by a moat, carefully orientated, accessible by a single bridge; the round huts inside were disposed in blocks, intersected by two main paths running at right angles to each other and to the ramparts, while, on the eastern side of the village, a rectangular space was reserved, evidently for the dwelling of the chief and the sanctuary or altar of the gods. The close resemblance of these arrangements to the shape and disposition of the Roman military camps is evident, and speaks for community of race; but the 'terramare' are many centuries older. The refuse accumulated under the huts contains rude pottery, numerous stone and bone implements, but only a few rare objects of bronze, which was evidently far from common at that time. The bronze fibulæ, found occasionally, allow us to assign to these primitive villages, roughly speaking, a date between 1500 and 1000 B.C. The cemeteries are simply reduced imitations of the living tribe's dwelling—miniature villages guarded by moat and rampart—rude earthen jars filled with the ashes of the dead taking the place of the huts. We find abundant traces of agriculture, a little commerce, and, if the 'terramare' of Taranto is really akin to the northern settlements, evidence of relations with the Ægean, in the shape of Mycenæan sherds and clay idols. No trace of writing has been discovered.

2. At about the same time, a more highly developed civilization was spreading through *Sicily and southern Italy*. We know these tribes, the Sikels, chiefly through their tombs, which are usually small chambers cut into the living rock. They often reproduce the shape of the living man's dwelling, either round or oval huts or square houses of wood or bricks and stone. Remains of some stone houses and even of a large building, evidently the seat of some powerful chief (at Pantalica west of Syracuse), have been discovered; and as the tombs were abundantly furnished with the necessaries of life—clay vases often delicately painted, weapons and implements of stone and bronze, and even some ornaments and jewellery of bronze, silver, gold, and ivory—we are able to re-construct, to a certain extent, this Sikelian civilization through several periods of its development. The presence of Mycenæan vases in some of the tombs fixes their date approximately. But the Sikels have no connexion with the contemporary, very much ruder, civilization of the 'terramare.' The

advent of the Greek colonists, after the decline of the Mycenæan sway, early in the first millennium B.C., almost stifled the local art of southern Italy and Sicily, which may be considered, after the 8th cent., simply as a province of Greek civilization.

3. An analogous development of local handiwork appears in *the rock-cut tombs of Sardinia*. Only here it is Phœnicia, not Greece, whose colonies modify the old order, at about the same period. But Sardinia always retains one distinctive feature of architecture, the 'nuraghe,' curious buildings of bee-hive shape, made of roughly hewn stones, sometimes well fortified and of considerable size, with internal rooms and winding passages in several storeys. The date of these buildings has never been sufficiently cleared up, nor is it decided whether they served as dwellings or tombs, or perhaps for both uses. It is, however, undoubted that the older 'nuraghe' must be placed rather early in the first millennium B.C.

4. In northern and central Italy the 'terramare' disappear towards the beginning of the first millennium B.C., and are replaced by *villages of rude huts without poles or ramparts*. We know the civilization of this period merely by its cemeteries, the first of which was excavated at Villanova near Bologna, and has given its name to this civilization. The ashes are buried in clay vases, as in the 'terramare'; but not only are these ossuaries, with their incised geometric ornaments, far more elaborate than the rude pots of the 'terramare'; they also contain, besides smaller vases, a number of weapons, implements, and ornaments far in advance of anything yet known in those parts of the country. Stone implements disappear; iron is used besides bronze—an immense step forward on the path of technical development; amber and ivory ornaments proclaim commercial relations with the north and east. Instead of the usual ossuaries, we often find the ashes of the dead buried in small clay imitations of the living men's huts, which appear to be considerably larger and better built than the primitive dwellings of the 'terramare.' But, in the older Villanova period, there is not yet any trace of writing, or of stone buildings, or of Greek vases. These appear among the natives a few generations later, with the advent of the first really developed civilization in Italy, the Etruscan.

5. The origin of *the Etruscans* is shrouded in mystery. Following the tradition almost universally accepted by ancient authors and corroborated by the archæological evidence, we assume them to have reached Italy by sea, about the 9th cent. B.C., subduing the native races of central Italy, especially the Umbrians, and founding a number of fortified towns, whose confederacy formed a powerful State. An entirely new era begins with them. The villages of rude huts are superseded by strongholds on the hills, protected by strong walls of polygonal or isodomic masonry, which are still standing on many Etruscan sites. These mighty walls of Cære, Cosa, Vetulonia, Volterra, Perugia, and other towns, belong to different periods, the oldest dating back as far as the 8th–7th cent. B.C. They have been constantly repaired in the course of the ages, and at a later date have occasionally, as at Volterra and Perugia, been provided with vaulted gates adorned with sculptured heads or the figures of tutelary divinities in relief. Within the walls, the houses were built mostly of wood, and have therefore perished. But the tombs give us a faithful representation of them. During the first century or two of Etruscan sway in central Italy, the ancient shape of the round hut still forms one prototype of the tombs. But, like the Mycenæan 'bee-hive' tombs, whose influence they seem to show, these Etruscan sepulchres are spacious cupolas of stone, provided, not for the ashes of a peasant, like the rude Villanova (Umbrian) ossuaries, but for families of wealthy warriors and merchants, whose corpses were buried in state, unburnt and surrounded by all they needed in the under world. The finest of these cupolas are found at Vetulonia, south of Pisa—one of the oldest and richest Etruscan cities—at Volterra, and one specially good specimen at Quinto Fiorentino. Other tombs of the same period, instead of the cupola, consist of rectangular vaulted chambers, either built of huge stones or cut out of the living rock, The most famous of the former is the Tomba Regulini Galassi near Cære, whose astonishing wealth of gold jewellery, precious vases and implements, is in the Vatican Museum. A fine example of the rock-hewn tomb was discovered near Veii; it is adorned with the oldest frescoes we know in Italy. These graves are doubly important. They are the earliest monuments that we can *prove* by their inscriptions to be undoubtedly Etruscan; by the Egyptian and Phœnician and Greek objects found in them, their date is fixed in the 8th–7th cent. B.C. The rectangular chambers give us an idea of the Etruscan house of wood or sun-baked brick, and a slightly younger type (7th–6th cent.) introduces us to roomy mansions. These latter tombs are always cut into the rock, and their central hall and side-chambers, with their beamed roofs and carved doorways, with couches and chairs hewn out of the rock, give a vivid conception of what an elegant Etruscan dwelling of the time looked like. Nay, in some cases, at Cære, for instance, we find two storeys above each other. The tombs built of stone blocks are simpler in design, consisting of one, rarely of two rooms, and occasionally, as at Orvieto, grouped in streets and blocks, just like real towns. The architectural forms and mouldings are of the simplest, and betray the imitation of wooden houses in stone. One detail—the doorways narrowing towards the top and surrounded by a rectangular moulding—seems to denote Egyptian influence.

These tombs are without sculptured decoration inside, except for occasional low reliefs upon the doors or the ceiling (chiefly at Corneto, the reliefs showing animals, fabulous creatures and hunters; and some funeral statues in a tomb at Vetulonia); but the mound or tumulus which covers the grave usually bears either a sculptured ornament or a stone stele with the image of the deceased in relief (standing upright in armour or reclining at a banquet), mostly accompanied by an inscription. Lions carved in stone often guard the entrance to the tomb. The walls of the sepulchral chambers are often gaily painted, and these frescoes demonstrate the development of Etruscan art, from the 6th to the 2nd cent. B.C. They and the sculptured sarcophagi also show the preponderant influence of Greek art over Etruscan; for the commercial relations between the two nations were continuous, and the Etruscans, who do not seem to have possessed a strong individual artistic genius, not only bought Greek vases and bronzes by the thousand, so that no tomb, however poor, is without its Greek objects, but also copied these imported works, more or less freely and successfully. Thus, the frescoes of the oldest painted tomb of Veii, mentioned above, show the meaningless medley of animals, fabulous creatures, and human beings which the Greek vase-painters of the 7th cent., especially in Corinth, had borrowed from the contemporary carpets and tapestries. The 6th cent. frescoes of Cære and Corneto show banqueting and hunting scenes, with an occasional marine monster and once a mythological scene, conceived in the style of Ionic art. The same art, debased by provincial Etruscan painters, appears

upon some terra-cotta slabs with paintings of sacrificial and funeral rites, which adorned the walls of a tomb at Cære. Occasionally, towards the end of the 6th cent., the banquets (they are the Elysian banquets of the happy dead) are replaced by frescoes showing funeral rites, dances, mourners, games, and fights, in which local Etruscan customs are rendered in a debased Greek style. These frescoes, especially those of a tomb at Chiusi, are full of interesting details—wrestlers and acrobats, dwarfs and tame animals. Early in the 5th cent. Attic models take the place of the Ionic or Corinthian ones; Attic vases of the red-figured style illustrate this new fashion in Etruscan painting. Banqueting and funeral scenes continue to be in vogue. In the 4th cent., still under Attic influence, the frescoes take more to religious subjects. A tomb of Corneto shows us the trembling soul in Hades, amid the terrific images of the famous sinners of Greek mythology, bearing their eternal torments. The kinder artist of a tomb of Orvieto lets the dead partake of a sumptuous banquet in the very palace of Hades, who presides with Persephone, before a sideboard laden with golden vessels. The gods and heroes are Greek, even to their names, which can easily be recognized in their Etruscan travesty; the style is wholly Greek, and it is only in certain ritual details, in the winged Fates (Lasa) who call the dead to Hades, in the curious monstrosity of Charun (=Charon), the infernal boatman, that the Etruscan artists have abandoned their slavish imitation of Hellenic imagery.

The same dependence is apparent in the sarcophagi which contain the corpses, where these are not simply stretched upon rock-hewn benches. In the 6th cent., some terra-cotta sarcophagi from Cære bear the figures of the dead man and his wife reclining together on their couch at dinner, according to Ionic custom, and in a style copying the Ionic. A century later, upon a stone sarcophagus from the Chiusi district (in the Florentine Museum), we see the same couple, Attic in style, the wife sitting at the feet of her reclining husband, as was the custom for a proper Attic lady. The old Umbrian custom of burning the dead, which had been in abeyance, though it never disappeared entirely, during the first five centuries of Etruscan sway, again became nearly universal with the end of the 4th cent.; the long sarcophagi for the outstretched corpse are replaced by short square urns sufficiently large for a handful of ashes. And while the figures reclining upon these urns are merely hideously deformed pieces of provincial work, the reliefs which adorn the front copy Attic paintings, of which little sketches must have been brought to Etruria in great numbers; this explains the contrast between the fine composition and the rough execution, so noticeable in the reliefs of these urns, and also the preference for Greek mythological scenes, some of them local Attic myths, which neither the Etruscan 'artist' nor his clients can have understood. The painted tombs grow very rare in this late period, but the shape and disposition of the chambers remain almost unchanged, as is proved by two excellent examples —the Tomb of the Volumnii near Perugia, with its fine architectural moldings and good stone urns, and the Tomba dei Rilievi at Cære, decorated with brightly painted reliefs of various implements and weapons. Both these tombs have Roman inscriptions combined with Etruscan ones, and belong to the last period of Etruscan art—the 2nd–1st cent. B.C. After this period, the Etruscan civilization was entirely flooded by the Roman.

The tombs have helped us to re-construct the Etruscan temple; the sites of several have been found, but as they were built of wood, it would have been impossible to divine their shape without the architectural analogies of the rock-hewn tombs, of which some, at Castel d'Asso and Norchia near Viterbo, show fine façades, with columns crowned by sculptured pediments. A couple of cinerary urns in the shape of small temples or chapels are equally important witnesses; but the most precious are the numerous terra-cotta figures and reliefs which decorated these wooden temples. The oldest, from Cære, Falerii, and Conca [the two latter places are in the lower valley of the Tiber outside Etruria proper; but Latium at this period was artistically under the sway of the higher Etruscan civilization], date back as far as the 6th century. They are antefixes (outer roof-tiles) decorated with reliefs, heads of nymphs and satyrs, of Herakles and the cow-horned Io, groups of dancing mænads and satyrs—all in the same Ionic style which we noted in the frescoes. And the same fashion is apparent in the terra-cotta slabs with friezes of warriors and chariots, of animals and hunters, of banquets, or merely of fine palmetto and lotus chains; these slabs protected the wooden rafters, the upper line of the wooden wall, against the rain. The decorative terra-cottas follow the development of the frescoes, in their style, from the 6th to the 3rd century. In the latter half of this period, pediment sculptures in terra-cotta are added to the antefixes and friezes. Some very fine 4th cent. figures of youths and maidens came from the Faliscan region (now in the Villa di Papa Giulio in Rome). The death of Amphiaraos and the flight of Adrastos before Thebes are given in a pediment from Telamone near Pisa, with very numerous small figures (3rd cent., now in Florence); and the pediments from Luni, also in Florence, appear to render the myth of the Niobids, in their large, admirably modelled figures. Altogether, these terra-cottas are the finest works of art that Etruria has produced, again following in the tracks of Greece. We cannot make sure of the appearance of the Etruscan temples in all their details; but we may safely say that they were mostly of modest size and simple decoration, consisting of a wooden house, oblong, with one or two rooms, and an open porch supported by wooden columns, the whole resembling the Greek 'templum in antis,' yet different in style. We may imagine the walls painted; and the terra-cottas, also brightly coloured, must have produced a rather gaudy effect. The description of the Etruscan temple by Vitruvius helps us also. But our materials for actually re-constructing these buildings in their original shape are too scanty as yet.

In the minor arts, as in painting, the influence of Greece was predominant. Among the very numerous bronze statuettes found in Etruscan tombs it is often difficult to distinguish between imported Greek originals and local imitations. The same doubt obtains concerning bronze statues like the Capitoline wolf. But it would be going too far to attribute only the inferior work to Etruscan artists; they seem to have been largely dependent upon Greece for inspiration, but their skill was nevertheless recognized in Athens itself, where Etruscan bronzes adorned the houses of the richest patrons of art (Pherekrates *ap.* Athenæus, xv. 700c; Kritias, *ib.* i. 28*b*). Etruscan bronzes were famous in Greece, and, we may say, justly famous, judging by a number of really fine works of a greater realism than is usual in Greece. Here again the Ionic style is paramount in the older work—the statuettes, vases, and implements of the 7th–6th centuries. The first merchants who traded with Etruria hailed from the Ionic colonies of Asia Minor, and their intimate connexion with the Phœnicians explains the presence of numerous Syrian and Phœnician objects—vases, ornaments,

and scarabs—in the oldest Etruscan tombs, since no direct connexion between Phœnicia and Etruria has been proved. In the later period, Attic influence again predominates, and is especially noticeable in the very numerous engraved mirrors and circular cists (toilet boxes) of bronze, some of them very beautiful, which are most nearly akin, in their style, to the reliefs of the later cinerary urns, though superior to these. Etruscan jewellery, at least in its older stages, is a great deal more independent. In fact, Greece offers nothing comparable, in technical skill and delicacy, to the wonderful gold ornaments, the gossamer filigree work, the microscopic granulations, of the bracelets, necklaces, ear-rings, and fibulæ of the oldest Etruscan tombs. The more recent ornaments show a stronger Hellenic influence, and a less perfect workmanship. Ceramic art is always more or less subservient to the more valuable metal vases. Thus, the shapes of Etruscan clay vessels reproduce bronze models, and as these models are more or less copied from Greek originals, the same imitation is apparent in the cheaper terra-cotta ware. But the technique of these vases is more independent; they are fashioned in black clay, called *bucchero*, adorned with incised or relief ornaments or figures; and though this technique is not infrequent in Greece, and again more especially in the Ionic colonies of Asia Minor, yet its predominance in Etruria is so great that only a slight Greek influence upon a strong local industry may here be granted. Painted vases are rare in Etruria, and are no more than poor copies of Ionic, Corinthian, or Attic originals; but *bucchero* may be claimed as mainly a native achievement.

Very little can be said of decorative work in ivory, or of engraved gems. Here again foreign, and chiefly Oriental, influence predominates, and the Etruscan artists have added little of their own. Even the types of their coins are merely derivatives from the superior Hellenic art.

Etruscan art and science were paramount during the earlier centuries of Roman history, throughout the whole of Latium, and even as far south as Campania. When the Greek colonies of Magna Græcia grew strong enough to hold their own, and the Etruscans were driven from Campania, towards the end of the 5th cent. B.C., their intellectual sway over Rome diminished steadily as the Greek influence increased. After the league of the Etruscan cities had been subjected to Rome, their peculiar civilization dwindled and disappeared rapidly, and it would be difficult to find a characteristically Etruscan work of art later than the 1st cent. B.C.

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G. KARO.

ART (Greek and Roman).—The history of Greek art, in relation to religion, passes through three phases which correspond more or less to its three periods of rise, perfection, and decadence. During the first period, art is subjected to religious influences, and frequently trammelled by religious conservatism; during the second, the two act in co-operation, art drawing its highest inspiration from religion, and itself contributing to the dignity of religious ideals, so that it was said of the Olympian Zeus of Phidias, 'cuius pulcritudo adiecisse aliquid etiam receptæ religioni videtur'; during the third, religion supplies numerous themes to the artist; but these often tend to be regarded, mainly or in part, as affording an opportunity for his skill in characterization or execution; and even when this is not the case, he often repeats the conventions of earlier artists rather than creates a new embodiment of a religious idea. It follows that the history of art in Greece is, throughout the course of its development, closely bound up with the history of religious thought—more so, perhaps, than in the case of any other nation, but the relations of the two vary considerably at different periods.

1. **Pre-Hellenic Art.**—Before dealing with Hellenic art, it is necessary to say something of the art which preceded it in Greek lands, and which is conveniently named Ægean, so as to include Crete and the Archipelago, as well as the mainland of Greece. Our knowledge of the Ægean religion (*q.v.*) is gained almost entirely from the remains of early art in these regions. The chief branches of this art consist of gem-cutting, the art of the gold- and silver-smith; painting on terra-cotta coffins and vases, and in fresco on the walls of houses and palaces; and sculpture, or rather modelling in terra-cotta and other materials, including life-sized coloured reliefs in *gesso duro*. Early Ægean art in all these branches shows a strong and characteristic native development, though it owes something also to foreign influences, notably to that of Egypt. It is marked by much naturalism in detail, especially in plant and animal forms, together with a curious conventionalism, especially in the treatment of the human figure, which has an unnaturally slim waist and elongated limbs. The article ÆGEAN RELIGION shows what subjects are treated in the art of the time. We find representations of shrines and altars, and of aniconic symbols of worship, such as the double axe and the horns of consecration, and an almost realistic rendering of landscape in the representations of sacred mountains and trees. Grotesque animal forms and monstrous combinations are a favourite subject, especially on gems. We also find figures which are probably to be regarded as representations of divinities, though the skill of the artist is not sufficient to indicate any difference between these and human figures, except by signs or attributes. Rudely-fashioned images of terra-cotta, which are almost certainly to be regarded as figures of deities, are found in Crete, and are also common at Mycenæ and elsewhere in Greece.

2. **The 'Dark Ages.' Art in Homer.**—Between this early Ægean art and the rise of the art which may properly be called Hellenic there is a long interval of time; nor is it possible, except in a limited degree, to trace any direct connexion between the two. The two chief qualities of the earlier work are beauty of decorative design and a close observation of nature, within certain limits. In both these respects its facile and even decadent

quality, in its later examples, offers the strongest contrast to the uncouth but promising beginnings of Hellenic art. Without discussing the complicated question of the racial changes that had taken place in the interval, we may admit that the innate artistic genius, of which we see the products in early Ægean art, may, after lying dormant for a time, have contributed its part to the later development, but in conjunction with new elements which entirely transformed its character. In this connexion it must be remembered that the rise and earlier stages of the development of early art in Crete and the Ægean islands go back to at least the third millennium before our era, and that the flourishing period of Cretan art ends with the destruction of the palace at Knossos about B.C. 1400, though at Mycenæ and elsewhere on the mainland of Greece a kindred art survived for two more centuries in vigorous condition, and considerably longer in a decadent stage. The rise of a strong and independent Hellenic art cannot be dated earlier than about the 7th cent. B.C. The five centuries or so which intervened are sometimes called the 'dark ages' of Greece—a time of invasions and migrations, when the old civilizations were overwhelmed, and the country relapsed for a time into comparative barbarism, so far as the external surroundings of life were concerned. It was during this time that the Homeric poems were composed; and in them there is no certain reference to any work of sculpture in the round, whether representing human personages or gods, with the exception of a doubtful passage in *Iliad*, vi. 92 and 303, where the Trojan matrons place a robe 'upon the knees of Athene.' Some authorities regard this as implying the existence of a seated statue; if the expression be not a purely metaphorical one, it is the only example of any such thing in the Homeric poems. Though temples are often mentioned, no images of the gods are referred to. Art in Homer is purely decorative, and is not distinctively Hellenic; many of the objects of finest workmanship are attributed to the Phœnicians. When scenes of an elaborate nature are described, as on the shield of Achilles, there are none of religious significance among them, though Ares and Athene are spoken of as appearing in a battle scene. Here, however, it is the gods themselves that are thought of, rather than artistic representations of them.

3. Beginnings of sculpture.—Many primitive images of the gods were attributed to the Heroic age; an example is the Palladium stolen by Odysseus and Diomed from Troy—a tale told in the 'Little Iliad,' of about the 7th cent. B.C. Some of these may have been survivals from pre-Hellenic times; others were probably wrongly assigned to so early a date. Some of them were attributed to Dædalus, an artist whose historical existence is doubtful, but whose reputed attainments summarize the sudden advance in the art of sculpture which seems to have taken place about B.C. 600. Shortly after this date we find several sculptors, or groups of sculptors, employed to make images of the gods, sometimes, apparently, as a new departure, sometimes to replace a primitive or aniconic object of worship. Such families of artists existed in Chios (Melas, Micciades, Archermus) as workers of marble, and in Samos (Rhœcus, Theodorus) as workers in bronze. In the Peloponnese, many statues of the gods were made by Dipœnus and Scyllis, Cretan 'Dædalids,' and by their pupils; the 'unshaped plank' which had served as the symbol of the goddess Hera at Samos was replaced by an image made by Smilis of Ægina; the Apollo of Delos was made by Tectæus and Angelion, said to be pupils of Dipœnus and Scyllis; and probably most of the other early images of the gods in human form were made in this period. From this time on we hear of numerous statues of the gods, made by almost all the chief sculptors; some of these were intended to replace more primitive images as objects of worship, others merely for dedication. In the former case the artist would in most cases be bound by religious conservatism not to depart too far from the accepted type. An example is the Black Demeter of Phigalia, whose primitive image, with a horse's head, had been destroyed; the sculptor Onatas of Ægina is said to have replaced it with remarkable fidelity, with the help of copies, and even of a vision. This is an extreme instance, but in many other cases the artists had to satisfy the religious scruples of priests and others, as well as the growing desire for a more artistic representation of the deity. In the case of dedicated statues he would naturally have a freer hand. Here the limitations would be imposed by his art. We have many statues of early Greek workmanship preserved, and these show that sculpture was confined to a small number of clearly marked types, which served for representations alike of deities and of human beings. The commonest of these types represented a fully draped seated figure, a nude standing male figure, or a draped standing female figure. All of these were used alike for figures of the dead set up over graves, for figures of worshippers dedicated in sacred places, and for images of the gods. The artist devoted his skill to perfecting these types, to getting more approach to a natural expression in the face, to improving the shape of limbs and hands and feet, to observing and recording correctly the position of bones and muscles in the body. He was too much taken up with these matters to give much attention to the representation of character or individuality, much less of a worthy ideal of the gods, though it was by his work that the tradition was being built up which enabled the masters of the 5th cent. to progress in this direction. Some other early types, however, offered an opportunity for a more direct and simple expression of divine energy. Sometimes swiftness was shown by wings, usually borrowed from decorative Oriental models, and by a position which looks like kneeling, but is meant to represent rapid running or flight; sometimes the god or goddess was shown striding forward rapidly, with an attribute of power—if Zeus, a thunderbolt; if Poseidon, a trident; if Athene, a spear—in the raised right hand. Such purely external expressions of divine activity seem often to have been derived from primitive images, which were incapable of expressing it in any subtler manner; and although some examples of this type were made, usually to carry on a religious tradition, even in the 5th cent., it gradually became obsolete as the artist acquired facility in expressing the character and power of the god under an intellectual and moral rather than a merely physical aspect. When this change had come about, the relations of art and religion were revolutionized. The sculptor no longer occupied himself with the technical problem of providing a statue suitable in age, sex, and attributes to the requirements prescribed by religion, but was himself able to contribute something to the ideal conception of the deity.

4. Decorative and minor arts.—So far we have considered only sculpture in the round, having as its province the making of independent statues. Minor works in bronze and terra-cotta, which were abundant on all Greek sites, naturally followed the development of sculpture, or to some extent, perhaps, even anticipated it; but what is said of sculpture applies to them also. It is otherwise with reliefs and other decorative works, whether in wood, stone, marble, terra-cotta, bronze, or other metals. So far as their religious signifi-

cance is concerned, this group of objects goes with painting, especially vase-painting; it deals with the same kind of subjects, and treats them in the same manner. This decorative art affords a link, such as is missing in the case of sculpture, with the earlier periods; for it continued to be practised to some extent during the dark ages between Mycenæan and Hellenic art; it transmitted some inherited types, and it borrowed many others from Oriental or other foreign sources. It is also of considerable importance for the study of religion and mythology, since the means at its disposal enables it not merely to represent figures of the gods and heroes, but to record or to illustrate stories about them, or scenes connected with their ritual. It is to be observed that descriptions of decorative reliefs in the Homeric poems—notably that of the shield of Achilles, which, even if later than the rest of the *Iliad*, is earlier in date than the rise of Hellenic art—do not refer to mythological scenes, but to incidents of daily life. On the other hand, the Hesiodic 'shield of Hercules' has a whole series of illustrations of mythical tales, such as the battle of Lapiths and Centaurs and the flight of Perseus from the Gorgons. In this respect it resembles actual works of decorative art that are recorded for us by ancient writers, such as the throne made by Bathycles of Magnesia for the Apollo at Amyclæ, or the chest of the Corinthian tyrant Cypselus, dedicated in the Heræum at Olympia. And the subjects recorded both on the imaginary and on the actual reliefs are just the same as we constantly find upon extant early works of decorative art—both reliefs in marble or stone or bronze or terra-cotta, and paintings upon vases. It appears, therefore, that, while the art referred to in the Homeric poems has nothing Hellenic about it except the poet's imagination, the references to works of art in Hesiodic poems and in later literature are closely in touch with the actual development of art in Greece.

The relation of art to popular belief and to literature, in its treatment of religious or rather of mythological subjects, is somewhat complicated. The decorative artist was extremely conservative and imitative in the use of his available répertoire of groups and figures. Free invention was hardly ever resorted to, except in cases where no already familiar type could be borrowed or adapted. For example, the judgment of Paris seems to offer a theme for imagination, and we find it so treated on later vases; but in early art it always takes the form of a procession, with the figures more or less differentiated; and this form is borrowed almost without modification from the procession of dancing women, headed by a musician, which is a common subject on the most primitive vases. Such mechanical repetitions may appear at first sight to preclude any strong influence of art on mythology; but in some ways their cumulative effect was greater than any that could have been due to originality of treatment, for it became almost impossible for people to figure these scenes or events to themselves in any other way than that conventionally accepted. And, moreover, the same conditions tended towards the assimilation and even identification of legends originally distinct, and so facilitated the systematization of Greek mythology. Again, the tendency of early Greek art to adopt rather than to invent led to many almost fortuitous identifications that have had great influence, not only on later art, but even on later belief. Thus the gorgon, the sirens, the sphinx, and other such monsters probably had no distinctive form in the eyes of those who first told tales about them; certainly no such form is indicated in the Homeric poems. But the early decorative artists borrowed from the East many monstrous forms of winged and human-headed beasts and birds which had probably no particular significance to those who first adopted them as decorative elements; and these forms came to be identified with the creatures of Greek myth so completely and so finally that we at the present day cannot think of Sphinx or Siren under any other form. The fact that both these fantastic figures appear as symbols of death upon tombs in Greece, in Lycia, and possibly elsewhere also, has further complicated the influence of the borrowed type, so that, in these cases and in others like them, it is now almost impossible to disentangle the contributions of art and of myth to the common conception.

5. Vase-painting.—The more technical side of the early development of decorative art in Greece concerns us here mainly as it affects the gradual acquisition of greater power of expression. In this matter sculpture in relief has much the same history as sculpture in the round, so far as the execution of individual figures is concerned. Vase-painting, on the other hand, has an independent development. It is impossible here even to sketch the development of early vase-painting in Greece; it is possible only to mention those classes of vases which are of most importance for the representation of mythological scenes. (1) The *geometrical* class, which succeeds the Mycenæan in Greece, frequently depicts scenes from actual life; this is particularly the case with the Dipylon vases of Athens, on which we see elaborate funeral processions, scenes of seafaring and combat, and classic dances; but few, if any, of these can be given any mythological significance. (2) The geometric period is succeeded by that of *Oriental* influence in various parts of the Greek world. On the coasts and islands of Asia Minor, especially in Ionia, Samos, and Rhodes, we find various classes of vases, which have certain characteristics in common, as well as clearly-marked local variations; and about the same time we find a similar development in some of the chief manufacturing centres in continental Greece, mainly at Corinth and Chalcis; and colonies such as Daphnæ and Naucratis in Egypt, and Cyrene in Libya, have each their characteristic ware. Athens also has its own pottery at this time, in succession to the Dipylon ware. The technical development varies considerably, but in all alike the tendency is towards an improvement both in the colour of the ground and of the pigment in which the figures are drawn. As a rule, in earlier examples the ground is of a buff or brownish colour, sometimes almost white, and the pigment is of a dark brown colour, varying from red to dull black. In late examples, and, above all, in Attic pottery, the ground tends to assume the beautiful reddish terra-cotta colour which is characteristic of Greek vases of the best period, and the pigment to take the form of lustrous black varnish. The monstrous forms, many of them winged, and the other beasts borrowed from Oriental fabrics, tend gradually to be replaced by scenes of some mythological meaning, or, if retained, to acquire a mythological significance; and the human figure, at first introduced as a decorative type like the rest, gradually asserts its supremacy in interest. The treatment of myths upon early vases becomes, so to speak, stereotyped along certain lines, the same figures or compositions being repeated again and again with slight variations to illustrate the same myth, or adapted to the rendering of another myth that lent itself to a similar treatment. In this way the vase-painter contributed in no small degree to the uniformity and systematization of mythology. (3) About the middle of the 6th cent. B.C. the Attic potters, assisted by the excellent clay of the Attic ceramicus, surpassed all rivals. This is the age of what is called *black-figured*

ware, the figures being drawn in black silhouette, and details added in incised lines, with touches of purple or white. We have many vases signed by potters of this period, as well as of the next, which begins in the latter part of the 6th cent., and continues until the date of the Persian wars and a little later. (4) This next period, which overlaps the preceding, is known as the *early red-figured* style, the same pigments being used, but the figures being reserved in the terra-cotta colour of the clay, and the background filled in with the black varnish. In this age we find greater imagination and freedom of drawing; but the old traditions are still closely adhered to, and the advance is in the details rather than in the general conception. We find at this time the most perfect decorative treatment, and the utmost precision of line drawing. As we approach the middle of the 5th cent., we find greater dignity and severity of treatment, probably owing to the influence of the great fresco painters, above all of Polygnotus, who came to Athens and decorated the 'Painted Stoa' and other buildings about this time.

In Athens the work of Polygnotus consisted partly of historical paintings, such as the battle of Marathon; at Delphi his most famous works were the 'Fall of Troy' and the 'Land of the Dead,' and by these he probably exercised great influence on his contemporaries and successors. He was specially noted for the ethical character of his subjects. His paintings have not been preserved, but from imitations of them on vases and from descriptions of ancient writers, we can infer that they consisted of simply-grouped figures, arranged without perspective, and probably conventional in colouring. But the grandeur and nobility of his conception probably contributed in no small degree to the ideals of Greek art in the 5th century.

6. Sculpture of the 5th century.—The development of sculpture was at this time very rapid. The great struggle between Greece and Persia led to a new consciousness of Hellenic unity and a new pride in the superiority of Greek over barbarian; and at the same time, the spoils of victory and the offerings to the gods in thanksgiving for the great deliverance afforded both opportunities and themes for the highest energies of the artists. The full effect of these influences was hardly felt at once, and they were combined, in their most splendid manifestations, with the glory of Athens, which, taking the lead at the time of the Persian wars, became under Cimon and Pericles the example and summary of all that was best in Greece. The immediate predecessors of Phidias, though they produced works which were admired by posterity, seem still to have been mainly occupied with the study of the type and the perfection of technique and mastery over material. A statue like the 'Discobolus' of Myron is characteristic of this age; and however great the skill of the artist in dealing with a difficult subject, it is to be noted that he does not go beyond the expression of physical life to that of character or emotion. Even a masterpiece such as the 'Charioteer of Delphi' shows the same restriction of aim. Pythagoras, to whom it is probably to be attributed, was noted also for the expression of pain in his limping Philoctetes; but here, as in the wounded warriors of Ægina, it was probably the physical rather than the mental or spiritual aspect of the subject that was rendered. To Calamis, with his nameless grace, we might perhaps look for something more; but we have no certain work of his left, and we are not justified in assuming that he went beyond his contemporaries.

It was reserved for Phidias to fill the forms that had already reached so high a degree of perfection, with an inner life and meaning. His colossal gold and ivory statues have not survived, but we have some copies of them, and probably of others of his statues, and the descriptions of ancient writers; and we can also see the reflexion of his influence in all contemporary and later work. From all this evidence we can infer that his statues of the gods did not merely represent the perfection of the human form in face and figure, but embodied all that was noblest in the Hellenic conception of the gods. He is even said to have gone beyond this, and to have added somewhat to the received religion in his statue of Zeus, which was so worthy of the subject represented that 'he who is heavy-laden in soul, who has experienced many misfortunes and sorrows in his life, and from whom sweet sleep has fled, even he, I think, if he stood before this image, would forget all the calamities and troubles that befall in human life' (Dio Chrys. *Or.* xii. 51, tr. Adam). The Zeus at Olympia was the father of gods and men, full of power and benignity, the common god of the Hellenes. The Athene Parthenos at Athens represented the more intellectual conception of the goddess of Athens, the embodiment of the artistic and literary genius of the people. Statues like these doubtless transcended the ordinary notions of the gods; but they were no mere allegories or personifications; they represented the religious ideals of the whole people, and contributed in no small degree to purify and ennoble these ideals. This new influence of art upon religion came just at the time when the accepted views about the gods and the tales that were told about them were being questioned, and Phidias and Pericles were in sympathy with the most enlightened views; it can hardly be doubted that both artist and statesman had it as their aim to represent the gods to the people as they should be worshipped. From the sculpture that decorated the temples of this period, above all from the sculpture of the Parthenon, we can learn the beauty and nobility of type and the unrivalled skill in execution that supplied the means whereby such an artist as Phidias could express his ideas.

In the latter part of the 5th cent. B.C. there were several other sculptors who followed more or less closely the tradition of Phidias, and made statues of the gods, which, like his work, had a great influence on current religious conceptions. Alcamenes, who, after the exile or death of Phidias, was the sculptor most employed upon official commissions in Athens, made famous statues of Hephæstus and Dionysus, of Hera and Athene; Agoracritus made the Nemesis at Rhamnus. Polyclitus, the head of the Argive school, followed the Argive tradition in his study of the athletic type, and his system of proportions or 'canon' was embodied in a statue, 'The Doryphorus' or spear-bearer, as well as in a theoretical treatise. He also made a great gold and ivory statue of Hera for the Argive Heræum, which embodied the Greek ideal of the goddess, and was placed, by some who had seen it, beside the Zeus and Athene of Phidias. Cresilas, a Cretan sculptor who probably came under the influence of both Phidias and Polyclitus, was famous for a statue of a wounded man, and also of a wounded Amazon; he also made the portrait of Pericles, of which copies survive, and which is a typical example of the early portraiture which treats its subject as the ideal statesman rather than as an individual. In all these works we can see the character of the art of the 5th cent., which expressed, as ancient critics tell us, *ἦθος* rather than *πάθος*, fixed type of character rather than varying passions and emotions.

7. The 4th century.—The art of the 4th cent. was less abstract and dignified, more human and individual. If Phidias did something to counteract the growing scepticism about the gods by presenting them in a form which could not be rejected as unworthy, the works of Praxiteles and Scopas

may in some cases have brought the character of the gods home to men by an intense and vivid realization of their personality; but in making them so human these sculptors may have made them less divine, and have opened the way for successors who regarded even statues of the gods as a mere theme for the exhibition of their artistic skill. Early in the 4th cent. we find a conspicuous example of a tendency of which traces may be seen earlier—that to personification. A group by Cephisodotus represented Peace nursing the infant Wealth; and later on allegorical figures such as this, which appealed to the popular imagination, usurped much of the worship that formerly belonged to the Olympian gods. But the statues of Scopas and Praxiteles were for the most part taken from accepted mythology, though the subjects selected were no less characteristic of the time than the manner in which they were treated. The most famous works of Praxiteles represented Aphrodite and Eros; and he set the goddess before mortals with her beauty entirely unveiled; her nudity is not natural and unconscious like that of male figures in Greek art, but a motive for it is supplied in her preparation for the bath. He was also famous for his representation of Dionysus and his attendant satyrs; and from extant copies we can estimate the skill with which he characterized these soulless, half-human creatures of the woods. In the Hermes with the infant Dionysus, of which the original is happily preserved, we can see the mythological conception of Hermes as the protector of youth made to live in a genial and individual embodiment. In other works, such as 'Apollo the lizard-slayer,' we have what was once a religious type treated as a piece of playful *genre*. The work of Scopas is throughout more earnest and impassioned. Extant works that can be associated with him represent heroes rather than gods, but in these we can see a passionate nature and intensity of expression; his treatment of creatures of the sea, with the restless yearning of their nature, is notable; and in his 'Mænad' the enthusiasm of divine inspiration was expressed with wonderful power. Of his treatment of more dignified subjects we can judge from such a work as the 'Demeter' of Cnidus, which, if not from his hand, is certainly to be associated with him; its expression shows maternal grief and the chastened melancholy in a passionate nature. The work of Scopas and his associates may also be seen in the Mausoleum.

Great as was the influence of Scopas and Praxiteles upon their successors, that of the third great sculptor of the 4th cent., **Lysippus**, was, if not greater, at least more direct. As the head of the school of Sicyon, he represented the Peloponnesian tradition of athletic sculpture; and he established a new canon of proportions, slimmer and less massive than that of Polyclitus. He made many statues of the gods, some of colossal size; and in his portrait of Alexander he is said to have satisfied the king by his representation of his ambitious and fiery temperament. Portraits of Alexander, and other extant works that may be associated with Lysippus, show that he was not, as has sometimes been supposed, an academic master, but full of fresh observation, while in expression he seems to have fallen under the influence of Scopas. Partly owing to his association with Alexander, his pupils are most conspicuous in the next generation, and are the founders of the schools that carried the traditions of Hellenic art to the East. We have records of many other sculptors of the 4th cent. who cannot all be enumerated; among them are Euphranor, who was also a painter and a writer on art, and was noted for his expression of the characters of gods and heroes; and Leochares, who made not only statues of the gods but also a set of portraits of the family of Philip and Alexander in gold and ivory for the Philippeum at Olympia—works which exemplify the tendency to represent men in a manner hitherto reserved for the gods.

The great painters of the 4th cent. are known to us only by literary records; and in this case we cannot, as in the earlier age of Polygnotus, expect any assistance from vases. From the descriptions we learn that the painters of this age often chose dramatic or sensational subjects, and their power of rendering individual character and passion was probably comparable with that of contemporary sculptors. The greatest of all Greek painters, Apelles was, like Lysippus, noted for his portrait of Alexander; and he was also fond of allegorical subjects, such as his group of Calumny, of which a detailed description is left us.

8. **Hellenistic art.**—In the Hellenistic age Greek art followed the conquests of Alexander to new centres in the East; it is no longer to Athens or Argos or Sicyon, but to Alexandria and Antioch and Pergamos that we look for its most characteristic products. The beginning of the Hellenistic age is dominated by the personality of Alexander. He had changed the relations of East and West, and Greek civilization was henceforth the prevalent influence in western Asia. His career, which might well seem more than human, induced the Greeks to accept the Oriental custom of the deification of kings; and his features came to be repeated even in the types of the gods. His head, too, was placed upon coins—an honour hitherto reserved for the gods alone. And his successors, with a less justifiable arrogance, claimed even higher privileges. Beside such present deities—to use the phrase of contemporary flattery—the ancient gods became mere abstractions. Images of them were still made, distinguished for their size—as the 'Colossus' of Rhodes—or for their artistic excellence. But the old types and conventions were mostly repeated either in mere repetition or in eclectic imitation. Certain schools, inspired by the dramatic power of Scopas, infused some new life into the old forms, notably the school of Pergamos. On the great altar in that city was a frieze with a representation of the gods and giants, in which all the learning of the mythologists and all the technical skill of the sculptors were devoted to a complete representation of the Greek Pantheon in action against their wild adversaries. But the extraordinary dramatic vigour of this work does not hide the fact that it is more or less an artificial creation, not a spontaneous embodiment of the people's belief. While philosophers turned to a more or less abstract and monotheistic conception of the deity, which was out of touch with art, the people often turned to a more direct and intelligible worship, such as that accorded to the 'Fortune' of Antioch, embodied in a graceful representation of the city, seated on a rock with a river-god at her feet, which was made by Eutychides, a pupil of Lysippus. The representation of children or of rustic subjects showed a reaction against the artificiality of city life, parallel to the literary development of the pastoral. Statues of the gods were still made, but were mostly mere repetitions of established types, though occasionally we find examples of great dignity and beauty, such as the Aphrodite of Melos or the colossal works made by Damophon in Messene and Arcadia. In the inadequacy of contemporary art, we find, as often in an age of decadence, a return to the character and even to the mannerisms of early art; in extreme cases this leads to an affected archaistic work which is easily distinguished from that of the early sculptors whom it imitates. At the same time, dramatic vigour and scientific study were still kept up in some schools; and in Rhodes, in the middle of the

1st cent. B.C., there were still sculptors capable of producing such a masterpiece as the 'Laocoon.'

9. Græco-Roman art.—Græco-Roman art—that is to say, the work produced for the Roman market by Greek artists—belongs for the most part to the more conventional and less powerful survivals of the art of Greece. There was an immense demand in Rome for the decoration of public buildings and of private houses, gardens, and libraries with the products of Greek art; and this was met partly by the spoliation of Greek shrines, partly by the production of new work resembling the old nearly enough to please the taste of the patron. Even the statue of 'Venus Genetrix,' set up by Julius Cæsar in his forum and made by Arcesilaus, the most famous sculptor of the day, was a mere repetition of a type which goes back to one of the masters of the 5th century. Under such conditions there was not much scope for originality or for a fruitful relation between religion and art.

10. Roman art.—Roman art had more originality, and made some technical advances even on its Greek models; but, from the religious point of view, these do not much concern us. They are best seen in portraiture, historical reliefs, and decorative work. The old Italian gods did not as a rule lend themselves readily to artistic treatment. There were, indeed, old terra-cotta images of the gods, made in Rome under Etruscan influence, which Cato and other conservatives regarded with veneration, and preferred to the imported products of Greek workmanship. These may have had a certain vigour of individuality and realism which affected later art in Rome, and more especially portraiture. But in the art of Rome, as known to us in Imperial times, there presentations of the gods follow for the most part the types and conventions borrowed from Greece. There were indeed certain figures, above all that of Rome herself, which were new creations; but these followed the lines of impersonation common in Hellenistic art. The art of the Augustan age, though characterized by an austere beauty, was academic and classical in character. Perhaps the finest extant figures of the gods in Roman art are those on the arch of Trajan at Beneventum, which are beautiful and dignified in type, yet so animated with an interest in the action portrayed as to seem full of life. In the deification of the Emperors we also find an incentive to ideal portraiture which did something to counteract the realistic tendencies of Roman art.

Two classes of monuments are of great importance to the general history of art, and even to the transmission of religious ideas. In historical reliefs on columns and arches—above all, in the Trajan and Antonine columns—we find a continuous method of narration which lent itself admirably to the records of chronicle or story; and this method was continued, for didactic purposes, into early Christian and mediæval art. In the sarcophagi also we find a great wealth and variety of resource in the renderings of mythology, often coupled with indifferent execution; and these likewise served as models, and handed on the classical traditions to later art. Types, such as that of Orpheus, also acquired a new significance in Christian art. The Greek traditions, in varying form, survived both in Rome and in Asia Minor, and through them were transmitted to the modern world. The relation and the spheres of influence of the Eastern and Western branches constitute one of the most difficult and disputed problems of modern archæology.

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ART (Jewish).—**1. The arts in which the ancient Hebrews excelled were poetry and music.** There are no remains, whether in literary sources or in the actual results of excavation, to warrant the belief that there was in any real sense a native Hebrew painting or sculpture. There are extensive stores of Jewish pottery, but the shapes and styles are derived from Phœnician and Egyptian types, and show some Babylonian influence. In glyptic art, again, the same imitativeness appears. Phœnician and Hebrew seals are much alike 'in shape, script, and ornamentation' (Benzinger). The Phœnicians, too, excelled in metal-working; and the Hebrews, while they do not seem to have early acquired the art of metal-casting, were skilful adepts in the process of overlaying wood with metal plates. This skill presupposes some aptitude for wood-carving, but sculpture as such was not one of the attainments of the Hebrews. It is remarkable how few inscribed stones of Hebrew provenance have thus far been discovered. Religion, which is usually the most powerful aid and stimulant of art, had the very opposite effect in Judaism. The prophetic attack on idolatry carried with it an objection to images, and the representation of any form of animal life was forbidden in the Decalogue. Thus, on the one hand artistic incapacity, and on the other pietistic asceticism, combined to prevent the growth of a Jewish plastic art. And when to these causes is added what Delitzsch terms a defective sense of colour (*Iris*, p. 43 ff.), we can understand that only a rude form of painting was possible. These subjects are treated by Flinders Petrie in Hastings' *DB* i. 157.

2. Art was held in high esteem in later Jewish opinion. In the Talmud (*Rosh Hashana*, 29*b*), art is a branch of wisdom (חכמה) as distinct from mere handicraft (מלאכה). But the old dislike of animal representations continued. The Jewish coins contain no heads of rulers; here, again, the cause was partly religious. And the same phenomenon of imitativeness recurs. If the Temple of Solomon shows Phœnician influence, that of Herod was inspired by Roman models. Most of the Talmudic terms for articles of art are foreign—Greek and Latin. Custom and law are not always identical in these matters. The law forbade only the carving of projecting images (*'Abōdā Zārā*, 43*b*), and Dr. Kohler (*JE* ii. 142) rightly asserts that 'portrait painting was never forbidden by the law.' But many Jews long continued to object to portrait painting. On the other hand, though as a rule the mediæval synagogues were destitute of mural paintings, there are instances of carved lions (as at Ascoli). The lion was a frequently used Jewish emblem. In recent times there has been an increase of ornateness in synagogue decoration, and stained glass windows are becoming common, though there is still a reluctance to admit animal or human forms.

3. But in some directions a specific Jewish art was developed. In mediæval times the Jews acquired great repute as silk-dyers, as embroiderers, and as masters of the gold- and silver-smith's art. The worship of the synagogue and the home required the use of many objects in which artistic taste could be displayed. The Ark, or receptacle of the scrolls of the Law, the mantles in which the scrolls were wrapped, the crowns and bells with which they were adorned, the lamps for Sabbath and *Ḥanukah*, the cups for the sanctification over the wine, the spice-boxes (mostly of a castellated shape) used at the *Habdala*, or separation service, at the close of the Sabbath, the Seder-dishes which were used in the home on the Passover Eve—these are among the most important of the articles which the Jews loved to ornament. Beautiful embroideries were also required as curtains for the Ark. Many fine specimens of all these were exhibited at the Anglo-Jewish Historical Exhibition in 1887, and the Catalogue of that Exhibition remains a valuable source of information on all these matters. An *édition de luxe* of the same Catalogue contains some splendid photographs by Mr. Frank Hars. Throughout the volumes of the *JE* will also be found many pictures of the objects briefly described here, as well as of another branch of art in which Jews excelled.

4. This branch is the illumination of manuscripts. Artistic writing was an art in which Jews were highly skilled, and in the illumination of initial letters and the painting of marginal ornament and grotesques, they acquired considerable proficiency. Though there is no specific Jewish art in manuscript illumination, there are original Jewish elements; as Mr. G. Margoliouth well puts it, the Jewish spirit makes itself perceptible to the eye. In classifying the Jewish illuminated MSS, Mr. Margoliouth takes first the Bible, with two kinds of illumination, (*a*) the Massorah in the form of designs, and (*b*) pictorial and marginal illuminations. Of course all these ornaments are confined to codices or Bibles in the form of books; in the form of the scroll (except in the case of the Roll of Esther) the Bible was never illuminated. The Synagogue does not permit the use, in public reading, of punctuated or ornamented scrolls. The illuminated Esther rolls were hardly meant for use in Divine worship. The most usual Hebrew book for illumination was the Passover Service, or *Haggadah*. This is often profusely supplied with miniatures, initials, and full-page pictures. Less common are illuminated Prayer-Books. But all Hebrew books might be illuminated. The Code of Maimonides exists in many beautiful specimens. A very common object for illumination was the *Kethubah*, or Marriage Contract.

It must be added that in recent times many Jewish artists have attained to fame.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works referred to in the course of the preceding article, see: the publications of the *Gesellschaft für Sammlung von Kunstdenkmäler des Judenthums* (Vienna, 1897 ff.); the *Mittheilungen der Gesellschaft zur Erforschung jüdischer Kunstdenkmäler* (Frankfort, 1900 ff.); *Die Haggadah von Sarajevo*, ed. Müller and Schlosser (Vienna, 1898); Günzburg and Stassof, *L'Ornement Hébreu* (Berlin, 1905); S. J. Solomon, 'Art and Judaism' in *JQR* xiii. 553; G. Margoliouth, 'Hebrew Illuminated MSS' in *JQR* xx. 113; and D. Kaufmann, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. i., 1908.

I. ABRAHAMS.

ART (Mithraic).—Oriental monuments of the worship of Mithra are as yet almost entirely wanting. The beautiful sculptures discovered at Sidon (De Ridder, *Collection De Clercq*, iv. 'Marbres,' 1906, No. 46 ff.) date from the 3rd cent. of our era, and cannot throw any light on the first productions of the devotees of the Persian god. We must, accordingly, confine ourselves to studying Mithraic art in the Latin-speaking provinces of the Roman Empire, where a very considerable number of its remains have been discovered. In time they range over about two and a half centuries. The most ancient monument, which is now in the British Museum, dates from A.D. 104 (Cumont, *Mon. myst. Mithra*, No. 65; cf. vol. ii. 546; *CIL* vi. 30728), and the last of them belong to the middle of the 4th century. They therefore constitute a group whose limits in space and time are small, and whose character can be accurately described.

It must be admitted that their artistic merit is much less than their archæological interest, and that their chief value is not æsthetic but religious. The late epoch in which these works were produced destroys all hope of finding in them the expression of real creative power or of tracing the stages of an original development. It would, however, be unfair, acting under the impulse of a narrow Atticism, to confound them all in a common depreciation. Some of the groups in high and low relief (for the mosaics and the paintings which have been preserved are so few and so mediocre that they may be disregarded) hold a very honourable rank in the multitude of sculptures which the age of the Emperors has bequeathed to us.

The bull-slaying Mithra.—The group most frequently reproduced is the image of the bull-slaying Mithra, which invariably stood at the background of the temples (see art. ARCHITECTURE [Mithraic]), and specimens of which are to be found in nearly all the museums. The sacrifice of the bull recalled to the initiated the history of the creation and the promise of a future resurrection. It can be proved (Cumont, *op. cit.* ii. 180 ff.) that these representations of Mithra, whose sacred type was fixed before the spread of the Persian mysteries into the Latin-speaking world, are replicas of an original created by a sculptor of the school of Pergamos, in imitation of the sacrificing goddess Victory which adorned the balustrade of the temple of Athene Nike on the Acropolis (Kekule, *Die Reliefs des Tempels der Athena Nike*, 1881, pl. vi.). The Asiatic adapter has merely clothed the Persian god in the half-conventional Phrygian costume which was associated with a number of Oriental personages (*e.g.* Paris, Attis, Pelops, etc.), and has given the face an expression of suffering which makes it resemble that of the celebrated 'dying Alexander.' 'The emotion that pervades the features of Mithras is rendered with almost Skopasian power' (Strong, *Rom. Sculp.* p. 311).

Certain sculptures discovered at Rome and at Ostia, dating from the beginning of the 2nd cent., still reflect the splendour of that powerful work of Hellenistic art. After an eager pursuit, the god, whose mantle flutters in the wind, has just reached the sinking bull. Placing one knee on its crupper and one foot on one of its hoofs, he leans on it to keep it down, and, grasping it by the nostrils with one hand, with the other he plunges a knife into its side. The vigour of this animated scene shows to advantage the agility and strength of the invincible hero. On the other hand, the suffering of the victim breathing its last gasps, with its limbs contracted in a dying paroxysm, and the strange mixture of exultation and remorse depicted in the countenance of its slayer, throw into relief the pathetic side of this sacred drama, and even to-day arouse in the spectator an emotion which must have been keenly felt by the worshippers.

This work of the Alexandrian period has, moreover, been affected by the Roman schools of art. In some of them is shown in a more or less felicitous manner the care for details which is characteristic of the works of the Antonine period, *e.g.* in a group from Ostia (Cumont, *op. cit.* p. 79, fig. 67) which dates from the reign of Commodus, and a bas-relief from the Villa Albani (*ib.* p. 38, fig. 45). The artist has taken delight in multiplying the folds of

the garments and in rendering more intricate the curls of the hair, merely to show his skill in overcoming the difficulties which he himself had created. A small piece of sculpture discovered at Aquileia (*ib.* p. 116, pl. iii.) is distinguished in this respect by a 'bewildering cleverness of technique.' The delicately carved figures are almost completely detached from their massive block base, to which they are connected only by very slender supports. It is a piece of bravura in which the sculptor displays his skill in producing in a brittle substance the same effects as the chaser obtains in metal. But these comparatively perfect works are rare even in Italy, and it must be acknowledged that the great majority of these remains are of discouraging mediocrity, which becomes more and more wide-spread towards the 4th century.

The Dadophori.—The group of the bull-slaying Mithra is almost always flanked by two torch-bearers, or *dadophori*, who were called *Cauti* and *Cautopati*. Dressed in the same Oriental garb as Mithra, one of them holds an uplifted, and the other an inverted, torch; they doubtless personify the sun at the equinoxes. The original of these two youths can be traced back, like that of the bull-slaying god, to an unknown sculptor of the Hellenistic age, who had drawn his inspiration from still more ancient models (Cumont, *op. cit.* i. 203 ff.); but this hieratic work, which did not afford scope for the expression of keen emotions, is of much less artistic worth. Yet, in the better specimens at any rate, one may notice the artistic advantage which the artist has been able to derive from the Phrygian dress, and the way in which he has been able to emphasize the different emotions of hope and sadness depicted on the faces of the two youths who are mutually contrasted. The most remarkable reproduction which we possess of this divine pair consists of two statues found near the Tiber, one of which has been taken to the British Museum, while the other is in the Vatican. They certainly date from the time of Hadrian (*ib.* 27 and pl. ii.).

The Mithraic Kronos.—The origin of the subjects just mentioned is to be found in ancient Greek art, but there is another Mithraic work which is certainly derived from an Oriental archetype. It is the lion-headed god, whose body is embraced by a serpent, and who personifies Eternity—the *Zrvân Akarana* of the Persians (see art. MITHRAISM), to whom the adherents of the sect used to give the Greek name Kronos, or the Latin Saturnus. The most celebrated specimen of this type is in the Vatican (Cumont, *op. cit.* 80, fig. 68). Like the majority of his compeers, this animal-headed monster is an exotic creation. His genealogy would carry us back to Assyrian sculpture (*ib.* i. 74 ff.). But the artists of the West, having to represent a deity entirely strange to the Greek pantheon, and being untrammelled by the traditions of any school, gave free course to their imagination. The various transformations which this figure has undergone at their hands were actuated, on the one hand, by religious considerations, which tended to complicate the symbolism of this deified abstraction and to multiply his attributes; and, on the other hand, by an æsthetic solicitude which tended to modify as much as possible the grotesqueness of this barbarous figure, and gradually to humanize it. Ultimately they did away with the lion's head, and contented themselves with representing the animal at the feet of the god, or with placing the head of the beast on his breast. This lion-headed god of Eternity is the most original creation of Mithraic art; and if it is entirely destitute of charm, the grotesqueness of its appearance and the suggestive accumulation of its attributes arouse curiosity and provoke reflexion.

We have, so far, confined our attention to the remains found in Rome and Italy, the artistic finish of which surpasses the average of the Mithraic ex-votos. But when we pass to the provinces of the Empire, we find there elaborate works of a very different kind. It is generally agreed that, during the Empire, a great number of the sculptures intended for the provincial cities were made at Rome, or by artists who had come from Rome (Friedländer, *Sittengeschichte*[8], iii. 280 f.) This is probably the case with certain of the sculptures we are considering; they come from distant studios, either those of the capital or even of Asia Minor or some other province. There is no doubt that certain tablets discovered in Germany were brought from quarries in Pannonia (Cumont, *op. cit.* i. 216). Nevertheless, the great majority of Mithraic remains were undoubtedly executed on the spot. This is obvious in the case of those which were sculptured on the surface of rocks, which had been smoothed for the purpose; but with regard to many, local workmanship is proved from the nature of the stone employed. Moreover, the style of these fragments clearly reveals their local origin. The discovery of so many Mithraic works has thus great importance for the study of provincial art under the Empire. The most remarkable of these works have been brought to light in the North of Gaul, or, more precisely, on the Rhine frontier. It seems that the whole of this group of monuments must be ascribed to that interesting school of sculpture which flourished in Belgium in the 2nd and 3rd cents. of our era, and whose productions are clearly distinguishable from those of Southern studios. Similarly, the less important bas-reliefs brought to light in the Danube provinces are certainly independent of Roman influence; they may be directly connected with certain Asia Minor models. The distinguishing feature of the most important works of these artists from the banks of the Rhine and the Danube is that the central group of the bull-slaying Mithra with his two companions is surrounded by a series of accessory scenes which represent the whole cosmogony of the mysteries and the mission of Mithra, from his birth out of a rock to his assumption up to heaven (*ib.* i. 153 ff.). Then there are added astronomical images or cosmic emblems (planets, signs of the zodiac, winds, etc.).

If we subject all these scenes and symbols to an analysis in detail, we can show that the majority of them are modifications or adaptations of old Greek subjects. Thus, Ahura Mazda destroying the monsters which have arisen against him is a Hellenic Zeus hurling his thunderbolt at the giants (*ib.* i. 157). The poverty of the new conceptions which Mithraic iconography introduces is in startling contrast to the importance of the religious movement that inspired them. At the period when the Persian mysteries overspread the West, the art of sculpture was too decayed to be revived. Whereas, during the Hellenistic period, sculptors were able to conceive novel forms for the Egyptian divinities (Isis, Serapis, etc.), happily harmonizing with their characters, the majority of the Mazdean gods, in spite of their strongly-marked nature, were obliged to assume, whether appropriate or not, the form and dress of the Olympian deities to which they were assimilated.

Art, accustomed to live by plagiarism, had become incapable of original invention. But if, without analyzing each scene and personage in detail, we contemplate the total effect of the work, we receive an impression of something entirely novel. The attempt to represent in stone, not only all the deities of the Mithraic pantheon, but the history of the world and of Mithra as creator and saviour, was a truly sublime idea. Even before this time, especially on the sarcophagi, we find a method employed which consists in representing

the successive moments of an action by pictures superimposed on one another or drawn on parallel surfaces; but we cannot mention any pagan monument which can be compared in this respect with the great Mithraic bas-reliefs, especially those of Neuenheim, Heddernheim, and, above all, Osterburken (*ib.* 245, 246, 251). To find a similar attempt we have to come down to the long series of subjects with which Christian artists in mosaic adorned the walls of churches.

If we wished to criticize the details of these sculptures, it would be easy to censure in them the disproportion of certain figures, the clumsiness of some movements, the stiffness of some attitudes, and, above all, the confused impression arising from the superabundance of personages and groups. This last fault of overloaded composition is one which the Mithraic monuments share with the contemporaneous sarcophagi. But in criticizing these remains, it must not be forgotten that painting came to the aid of sculpture. The strong contrast of colours emphasized the principal outlines, and threw accessory parts into prominence. Often certain details were indicated only by the brush; and gilding also was used to set off some subsidiary parts. Without such a brilliant combination of colours the piece of statuary would have been almost invisible in the deep shadow of the subterranean crypts. Such a device, moreover, was one of the traditions of Oriental art, and Lucian (*Jup. trag.* 8) had already contrasted the simple and graceful forms of the Greek deities with the startling gorgeousness of those imported from Asia.

In spite of the numerous suggestions which it has borrowed from the treasury of types created by Greek sculpture, Mithraic art, like the mysteries of which it is the expression, remains essentially Asiatic. The idea with which it is mainly concerned is not to produce an æsthetic impression; it aims principally at arousing religious emotion, not through the perception of beauty, but rather by recalling to the mind sacred legends and teachings. Faithful in this point to the traditions of the ancient East, it confines itself to relating and instructing. The medley of personages and groups with which some bas-reliefs are thronged, the host of attributes with which the figure of Eternity (see above) is overloaded, show us that a new ideal was born with the new religion. These ungraceful or tasteless symbols, the lavish use of which is attested by the monuments, did not charm by their elegance or their dignity; they fascinated the mind by the disturbing attraction of the Unknown, and aroused in the neophyte a reverential fear in face of a tremendous mystery. They were, as St. Jerome says (*Epist.* 107 ad Lætam), 'portentosa simulacra.'

Here, above all, is to be found the explanation why this art, extremely refined as it was, in spite of all its imperfections, has exercised a permanent influence. It was linked to Christian art by a natural affinity, and the symbolism which it had helped to make popular in the West did not perish with it. Even the allegorical figures of the cosmic cycle, which the devotees of the Persian god had reproduced in such abundance (for they regarded the whole of nature as divine), were adopted by Christianity, although really opposed to its spirit. Such were the images of the earth, the sky, and the ocean; the sun, the moon, the planets, and the signs of the zodiac; the winds, the seasons, and the elements; which occur so frequently on the sarcophagi, the mosaics, and the miniatures. Even the mediocre compositions which the artists had conceived to represent the incidents of the Mithra-legend were able to inspire Christian artists. Thus the figure of the sun raising Mithra out of the ocean served to express the ascension of Elijah in the chariot of fire; and, down to the Middle Ages, the figure of the bull-slaying Mithra was perpetuated in the representations of Samson rending the lion.

LITERATURE. — F. Cumont, *Textes et Monuments figurés relatifs aux mystères de Mithra*, Brussels, 1899, i. 213–220 and *passim*; E. Strong, *Roman Sculpture from Augustus to Constantine*, 1907, p. 309 ff.

F. CUMONT.

ART (Muhammadan). — **1. Introduction.** — Our researches into Muhammadan art are as yet entirely in their infancy. So far, the historical inscriptions are only being collected, and this undertaking, upon which M. van Berchem is still engaged, is a necessary condition of all historical study in this field. It is much to be desired that, by way of supplementing this, some one would group together the literary sources which bear upon graphic art in Islām. The bibliography at the end will show that, although we possess several comprehensive writings in this department, we have very few such treatises upon Muhammadan works of art as are serviceable for scientific investigation. The present position of our researches is conditioned by the fact that no Arabic scholar has made himself proficient in the department of graphic art, while the three or four historians of art who deal with Islām at all, have only the most meagre acquaintance with the language and culture of its adherents. In the circumstances it is not to be expected that the present article should do more than acquaint the reader with the outstanding facts of the subject in their relation to religion and ethics. The writer, indeed, feels more inclined to point out the *lacunæ* than able to fill them up. His purpose is not so much to supply adequate information upon the subject proposed, as to provide the reader with a general conspectus of Muslim art.

2. Pre-Muhammadan data.—The most important of these is the action which forms the inevitable adjunct of the Muslim's every prayer, viz., the turning towards Mecca. It does not fall to the historian of art to establish the origin of this custom of turning in a certain direction, or to decide whether it was not simply a transference of the practice of orientation by the sun, as was observed also by the Christians, to the new religious centre. So long as Muhammad had regard to Jews and Christians, it was towards Jerusalem that he turned; it was only at a later stage that he made Mecca the cynosure. We speak of Mecca therefore as pre-Muhammadan only in virtue of its having been a religious centre, and not because the Muslim turns his face towards it during prayer.

Mecca can hardly be said to have any further significance in regard to graphic art. As the Ka'ba lies in the centre of the temple-enclosure, and has not, like the mosque, a definite direction at one side, it naturally dropped aside as a pattern for the mosque. On the other hand, we may surmise that in this most important focus of pilgrimage in Arabia, some kind of monumental relic must have existed from the earliest times, even before Muhammad's day. We may imagine it to have been something analogous to the Qubbat aṣ-Ṣaḫra in Jerusalem, *i.e.* a centrally situated cupola-shaped building. At the present day the temple appears as a quadrangular open court, in the middle of which stands the 'Cube' with the Black Stone. Around this there has been laid out a circular area in the court, which may indicate the form of the earlier cupola-shaped structure. The Qubbat aṣ-Ṣaḫra is surrounded by a corresponding quadrangle.

3. Muhammad. — Had Muhammad not been forced to flee from his native city, it is probable that the mosque would have taken a form somewhat different from that which prevailed before the emergence of the *madrasa*, and apart from the influence of Christian architecture as applied to

churches. As Muhammad, however, established his place of prayer in Medīna, and was also buried there, this most unpretentious beginning gave the initiative to the architecture not only of places of worship, but also to some extent of tombs. Samhūdī, in his *History of the City of Medina* (ed. Wüstenfeld, in *Abhandl. d. Ges. d. Wissensch. zu Göttingen*, ix. [1860] 60), tells first of all how Muhammad obtained the site for his mosque, and proceeds as follows: 'Upon this the edifice of bricks was built, palms were used as columns, and a wooden roof was fixed above.' This mosque had three entrances—one at the back, which was built up when Muhammad began the practice of turning to Mecca instead of Jerusalem, the others being the Gate of Mercy and the prophet's private door. After the conquest of Khaibar the mosque was entirely re-built, being enlarged to twice its former size. Some idea of the interior is given by the position of the column beside which Muhammad prayed: 'It was the central column of the mosque, the third forward from the *minbar*, the third from Muhammad's tomb, the third from the south side, the third from the main road before (as Ibn Zabāla states) this was widened by the space of two pillars' (Wüstenfeld, 65). The columns fell into a state of decay during the Khalifate of Abu Bakr, and he had them replaced by fresh palm trunks. The most notable restoration—or re-construction—was that made by Walīd I., who was supplied by the Emperor of Greece with Greek and Coptic artizans, as well as with mussel shells and money. Walls and columns were built with hewn stones of equal size, and cemented with gypsum; decorations of shell-work and marble were introduced, while the roof was constructed of palm and coated with gold-colour. When Walīd inspected the completed work in 93 A.H., he exclaimed, 'What a contrast between our style of building (*i.e.* in Damascus) and yours!' to which the reply was, 'We build in the style of the mosques, you in that of the churches.' Beyond this single reference we have nothing from which to form an idea of the mosque of Muhammad as a whole, or of its imitations. We shall presently return to this.

Of the sacred accessories belonging to the interior of a mosque, such as the niche for prayer (*miḥrāb*), the platform (*dikka*), etc., the only one which we can trace to Muhammad himself is the *minbar*, or pulpit (Becker, in *Orientalische Studien Nöldeke gewidm.* 331 f.). In ancient Arabia the *minbar* was the judge's chair, but as Muhammad advanced from the position of judge to that of ruler, this originally very simple piece of furniture with its two steps became more and more of a throne. A fresco on the inner front wall of Quṣair 'Amra represents one of the first Khalīfs, or perhaps Muhammad himself, seated on a throne. As this, in view of the command against images, may well give rise to fruitful discussion, we give a reproduction of it (fig. 1, p. 897). Over the enthroned figure is a baldachin with a Kufic inscription, which is unfortunately so much abraded that only the closing words are now legible: 'May God grant him his reward, and have compassion upon him!' The personage thus pictured—with red beard, and the saint's *nimbus* about his head—must accordingly have been dead, and cannot have been, as one might naturally think, the Khalif then reigning. The figure beside the throne holds the lance—a recognized emblem in Islām to the present day; a woman with the *nimbus* is represented on the right, applauding. The design of the enthroned figure may be traced to the *Christus-Pantokrator*; in this case it will then be the Qur'ān, not the Gospels, upon which the left hand is placed. Beneath the great throne is seen the barge of the dead. At the time when this fresco was introduced, *i.e.* subsequent to 100 A.H., the *minbar* can scarcely have had the same appearance as that shown in the illustration. As a matter of fact, the pattern furnished by Muhammad for the mosque and the *minbar* alike was framed with a view to mere utility, and the artistic elaboration thereof belongs entirely to a later period; for Muhammad had even less interest than Jesus in the graphic arts. His attitude towards figure-painting was one of avowed hostility; thus he once remained standing before the house of 'A'isha until a curtain ornamented with figures was removed, and he threatened those who made images with the direst penalties in the world to come. It was therefore impossible that art in Islām should develop the same didactic tendency as it did in early Christianity, in which the representation of figures was expressly utilized as a means of instructing those who could not read.

4. The Umayyads.—It was under these rulers that foreign culture began to stream in upon Islām. Even the mosque did not escape the general transformation, and its original design of simple convenience was left behind. The incentive to the desire for something more was first given by contact with Christianity. At the conquest of Damascus, the principal church of the city, that of St. John, was divided. Apparently it had then the same form as now: a dome in the middle, contiguous basilicas to east and west, and a pillared court to the north fronting the whole. At first the Muslims laid claim only to one of the basilicas; it was Walīd I. (A.D. 705–715) who first transformed the entire edifice into a mosque. Of this 'church-design' of mosque, except in Damascus, only two examples are now known, viz., the great mosque of Diarbekr, dating from the 12th cent., and that of Ephesus, from the 14th. Its nucleus was a Christian *martyrium* built over a pagan sanctuary, around which in time several churches were grouped, as was the case with the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, the church at Nola, the church at the tomb of Menas, and the twin-churches at Ephesus.

The 'mosque-design' has no connexion with church architecture. It is certainly believed by some to be traceable to the plan of the forecourt attached to the Church of the Sepulchre in Jerusalem, of which the Muslims made a mosque for themselves; but in reality the *atrium*, or forecourt of the Christian church, still corresponds most nearly to the 'court-design' with the well in the centre. It is probably the case, however, that between the Christian *atrium* and the Muhammadan mosque there is an intermediate form—some primitive Asiatic type, such as a court with hall adjoining. The mosque exhibits this type in purer form than the church; the columnated halls, for instance, which enclose the court, grow more numerous in the direction of Mecca. Muhammad's mosque in Medīna was most probably of this form; as it stands to-day it is quite in accordance with this supposition, though, of course, it has been several times re-constructed.

The Umayyads, in building such mosques, had probably to avail themselves of columns taken from ancient or Christian ruins. Muhammad himself had used palm-trunks, and had thus left no established precedent. The oldest mosques, or at least those which survive in their rudimentary form, such as the ruins of Baalbek and Bosra, the 'Amr mosque in Old Cairo, and the great mosques of Kairwan and Cordova, are virtual column-museums, something like the façades of St. Mark's in Venice. Such embellishments have only a negative bearing upon the characteristic quality of Muslim art. As an example of an interior constructed of columns from ancient and Christian buildings, we give a view of the mosque at Kairwan (fig. 2, p. 898). Here we see a forest of columns in front; behind, to the right

of this, extends the entrance wall, beside which large chandeliers are suspended between the columns, the mid-passage running thence to the *qibla*. The arches run parallel to the line of this passage; in this instance they are rounded, though as a general rule they are pointed, and disproportionately high. The variously moulded capitals are linked together by anchors, while a wooden roof is placed over the whole. Such was the prevalent type of the Muslim place of worship in early times.

From the 1st cent. A.H. come other two buildings. One of these, situated in Jerusalem, has long been known; the other has been recently discovered by an Austrian research-party. The first, the Qubbat aṣ-Ṣaḫra upon the Temple hill, is not a mosque, but a memorial edifice. Above the rock with its caves rises a dome supported by four pillars, between every two of which stand three columns. Two circular passages with eight pillars, and two columns between each pair of these, lead over to the octagonal surrounding wall. Of the original fabric erected by 'Abd al-Malik in A.H. 72 (A.D. 691) very little remains; the columns still retain vestiges of the Cross upon the capitals, and must therefore have been taken from some Christian building, while the exceedingly valuable mosaics of the passage are of Persian origin.

On the other hand, the second monument referred to, a secular structure known as Quṣair 'Amra, and situated in the desert adjoining Moab, is pure Syrian in character. Attached to a small bath is a hall roofed with three parallel tunnel-vaults, and showing on the south two apsidal chambers, the niche between them having a straight front-wall directly opposite the entrance. The structure as a whole recalls the type of tunnel-vaulted churches indigenous to the interior of Asia Minor. The paintings are most instructive, as has already been shown in the case of the fresco of the enthroned figure illustrated in fig. 1 (p. 897). They exhibit Umayyad art in the full current of the Hellenistic style; the frescoes of the bath-chambers might well be counted as ancient. The pictures in the hall are of far-reaching significance, furnishing the best exemplification of the tendency which, while opposed to all worship of images, was again adopted by the image-breakers in Constantinople, and which, after the example of the Assyrian relief, became associated rather with the portrayal of landscape, and of hunting and fishing scenes, instances of these being found likewise in the early Christian art of Syria and its offshoots.

We must now call attention to the fact that in 'Amra, among scenes of hunting, fishing, and bathing, there have been introduced two pictures which, from the standpoint of religion and ethics, may well evoke much controversy in the future. Upon the front wall of the niche, opposite the entrance, appears the figure of the man seated on a throne. But it is the other picture which calls for explanation from the Muhammadan point of view; its subject is the princes overthrown by Islām, viz., the Emperor of Byzantium, Chosroës of Persia, the Negus of Abyssinia, and Roderick of Spain. How are these pictures to be brought into accordance with the interdict against graphic representation, and in what sense are we to interpret them? The picture of the Khalīf upon the throne undoubtedly gives the impression of its being a devotional piece, but that of the conquered princes can scarcely be explained in a similar way.

The Umayyads have also in recent times been spoken of as the builders of a number of large and beautiful castles in the desert, situated in the neighbourhood of 'Amra, but more towards the inhabited country. These have been made known chiefly by the large Meshīta façade which the Emperor of Germany received as a gift from the Sultan and placed in the Berlin Museum. In these castles the present writer discerns structures so unmistakably of a Persian character as to suggest conditions which would allow of a closer connexion with Hira or North Mesopotamia. Both Meshītā and Qaṣr-aṭ-Ṭūba are immense fortified royal seats, surrounded by groups of plots, and resembling those found in the Sasanian fabrics of Mesopotamia. Both are unfinished, and their respective porticoes bear the same kind of decorations, amongst which the Persian wing-palmette amid vine-tendrils characteristically recurs.

5. The Abbāsids.—The shifting of the centre of the Muslim world from Damascus to Baghdad had very important consequences for the development of graphic art, as the Syrian, *i.e.* the Hellenistic-Christian, factor now fell into the background, while the Oriental came to the front. In the latter, it is true, there is always a double strain: on the one hand the Assyro-Sasanian tradition, and on the other a drift in part still older, which may possibly have come in with the Parthians, and certainly found a channel in the immigration of sporadic parties, or even of whole tribes, of Turks from Central Asia to Persia and Baghdad. For the remote part of Western Asia this drift has all the significance of a barbarian invasion of a long established civilization, such as was experienced by Rome at the hands of the Germans. The Turks and the Germans were in fact the emissaries of an inchoate 'Hinterland' culture, which had been quite overshadowed by the hothouse growth of Egyptian, Babylonian, and Greek art, but which, when the representatives of the older refinement began to flag, came once more into the foreground. We must likewise bear in mind the gradually weakening influence of early Christian art, as also the growing potencies of the Chinese factor.

(*a*) *Persian elements.*—A wholly unique type of mosque is found in Mesopotamia. Here again, indeed, we have the arcaded court, with the open hall lying towards Mecca, but, in keeping with the nature of the country, the supports are formed not of columns but of brick pillars. In consequence of this, and because walls, pillars, and arches are now uniformly ornamented with stucco-work, the mosque assumes a most characteristic appearance, known to us until recently only from a mosque in Cairo erected in *c.* 870 A.D. by the Ṭūlūnids, who came from Baghdad to Egypt. It has lately been shown, however, that the mosque of Ibn Ṭūlūn was built upon the model of the mosque of Samarra, as had been stated by early Arabic writers. Moreover, in Abū-Dilif, 15 km. to the north of Samarra, there still stands a mosque which agrees with that of Ibn Ṭūlūn even in the number of its supports. Of this example of the unique character of Mesopotamian mosques we give an illustration from the survey of General de Beylié, which shows the entrance-wall opposite the *miḥrāb* (fig. 3, p. 898). Here we see pillars composed of brick, with hewn-out ornamental niches, and united by arches, the springers of which still remain. The side arches leave the view open towards the surrounding wall of the mosque, and through the central arch appears the spindle-like minaret.

Even this peculiar and fantastic minaret at Samarra has been copied in the mosque of Ibn Ṭūlūn at Cairo by the erection of a winding staircase on the outside. Elsewhere the stair is for the most part on the inside, and the minaret, which is used for calling to prayer, is outwardly smooth, whether rounded or quadrate. In the period of the Fāṭimids, buildings were constructed not only in the older style prevalent along the Mediterranean seaboard, *i.e.* with columns (*al-*

ashār), but also according to the Mesopotamian mode, *i.e.* with pillars (*al-hakam*). In both styles, however, the ornamentation was of the same kind. We shall return to this, but meanwhile we must speak of the accessories of worship.

There is first of all the *qibla*, or the direction towards Mecca, which is determined by a niche (*miḥrāb*) in the wall, very small in comparison with the great apse of Christian churches, and aligned with one or two columns. Of the origin of the *miḥrāb* we have no certain knowledge. It appears to have been originally made of wood. In Cairo three ancient wooden niches with beautiful ornamentation are still to be found. The typical form was already in use in the Khalīfate epoch of Baghdad; that period, at all events, exhibits the niche let into the wall, with bounding columns at the corners—a design which emerged in the East in Hellenistic times, and which had great vogue in the later period of ancient art, especially in Syria and Asia Minor. The graduated columnar porches of Western architecture likewise find their origin here.

The *minbar* has always been constructed of wood, essays in marble or other substance being of the rarest occurrence. By 132 A.H., when all the provincial mosques received their *minbars*, it can hardly have retained its primitive form, and was certainly of a different shape from that represented in the 'Amra fresco. Its model was not the throne, but rather the Christian *ambo*, an approximation to which had gradually been developed. Numerous steps led up to the platform, and parapet and steps were richly endowed with ornaments. The oldest surviving *minbar*, that of the great mosque at Kairwan, is of plane-tree, brought from Baghdad by Ibrāhīm ibn al-Aghlab in 242 A.H. (fig. 4, p. 899).

In order to convey a distinct impression of what the art of decoration as practised by the Abbāsids in Mesopotamia could achieve, we give an illustration of the façade of the al-Aqmar mosque in Cairo, as discovered in recent years and restored (fig. 5, p. 900). According to the inscriptions, it dates from A.D. 1125. Here we already see the arrangement which also prevailed among the Seljuks of Asia Minor—a central *risalit* which stands in front of the two wings, and derives its principal embellishment from a lofty gate. We do not as yet know the source of this design. It is all the more striking as we have before us only a false façade, which has no inner apartment corresponding to it, but which is simply a high wall standing before an open court. Of still greater interest is the ornamentation upon the wall-surface. This contains designs which in all probability were originally naturalized in the Orient as stucco-work, but which are here, in Egypt, transferred to the stone in common use. The portal-niche is connected with two smaller niches on a level with the ground-floor; all three display in their arches shell-like *tori* of luxuriant outline. Here too appears, fully developed, one of the main elements of Muslim decoration, viz. the *stalactite*. We find stalactites upon the side portals, taking the place of mussel-panelling, and also as a surface-decoration above the little niches beside the main porch, while they appear in their proper and original function on the corners of the building, where in two rows of niches one above the other they form a beak. The design of the niche with inserted columns is often applied to the upper wall; the little columns on the central *risalit* already show the bell-form which came with the Ṭūlūnids or the Fāṭimids from Persia to Egypt. Along the upper extremity of the façade, which is filled out with ornaments of rosettes and lozenges, runs an inscription-frieze.

The present writer regards these stalactites as a characteristic deposit of Muslim ethics in the field of graphic art. In them constructive restraint, *i.e.* the best and obligatory design, is surrendered in favour of a freakishness capable of endless variation, which becomes all the more interesting by reason of the limitations laid down by the spatial form. The stalactite, rightly regarded, is of purely constructional origin. It served originally, as a single niche, the same purpose for which the Byzantines used the so-called pendentive, *i.e.* the filling-out of the corner which remains open when a round cupola is placed upon a square substructure. For this, later Hellenistic architecture had a definite, mathematically accurate, solution in the sector of the vault of the circumscribed circle; in Persia, on the other hand, the custom was to place a niche in the angle. Instead of the single niche, however, we occasionally find three, combined as already noticed in the case of the al-Aqmar mosque, or, more frequently, in the inverse position, one below and two above. Next a further row, of three, came to be added, thus making a group of six; then a row of four, making ten, and so on. This embellishment of the cupola-wedge was transferred to portal-niches, then to surfaces, and in this way was obtained an ornamentation which always indicates a terminal line or a transition (cf. on this point the works of Bourgoin).

This delight in the spinning out of fortuitous conceits likewise brought to maturity the second style of ornament typical of Muslim art, viz., the *arabesque*. In this also the distinctive feature is that from a theme originally given—some natural object in the present case—certain elements are grouped by the imagination to imitate nature, and for this end new themes are introduced, with which, as with conventional numbers, endless combinations may be made. As the present writer has shown in the *Jahrb. d. preuss. Kunstsammlung*, XXV. (1904), p. 327 f., the arabesque takes its inception from the Hellenistic vine-branch. In the later period of ancient art this became the most popular pattern for striated or superficial decoration. The development towards the arabesque begins when the artist divests the vine-leaf of its natural form by superimposing other leaves, or a triad of globules, upon the diverging point of the ribs, or when, further, he makes the leaf tri-lobed instead of five-lobed. But the actual transformation consists in the application to the vine-leaf of the lobate form which may really be described as the artificial flower of West-Asiatic art, *i.e.* the palmette. The vine-tendril moulded after the palmette—this is arabesque. The development proceeds in virtue of the fact that the palmette can be split up either into halves or into single lobes; while each of these lobes again may be expanded, and give rise to new ramifications. The façade of A.D. 1125, in its details, furnishes illustrations of the initial stage of this whole development: here the branch shows more of the Persian than of the Arabian form. On the other hand, fig. 6 (p. 900), representing a wooden tablet in the K. Friedrich Museum in Berlin supposed to date from A.D. 1125, exhibits all the stages side by side—the five-lobed vine-leaf with and without the grape-cluster, the trifolium, all kinds of ramifying palmettes, and also the palmette itself with ornamental branching.

In this tablet the divided palmette in the centre is surrounded by a ten-angled star which obtrudes itself into the marginal bands both above and beneath. This brings us to the third class of specifically Muhammadan ornament, viz., *polygonal lace-work*. It is already to be seen on a closer scrutiny of the Cairo façade of A.D. 1125—appearing as striated decorations in the lozenges of the surface-niches, above to the left; but here they show rather the older double-stripe design which was common also in ancient and Christian art. The

distinctively Muslim variety, as we think, shows in its origin the influence of the Turkish-Mongolian nomadic races, who eventually brought the Khalifate to an end (A.D. 1258).

Before dealing further with this subject we may draw attention to the influence exerted upon the development of Muslim art by religion and ethics —an influence revealing itself in the fact that the ornamentation of sacred buildings embraces no representation of living objects. The wonted Mesopotamian type of decoration consists in overlaying the walls, pillars, and arches with stucco ornaments. We are cognizant of no instance whatever in which this architectural decoration contains the figure of man, animal, or bird. The mosque of Ibn Ṭūlūn in Cairo; the Church of Abbot Moses of Nisibis in the Syrian monastery of the Nitrian desert, which was stuccoed by Mesopotamian artists; Maqām 'Alī itself, on the Euphrates; Samarra—in none of these have we a trace of a living creature figured as an ornament. In this period, therefore, the commandment against the use of figures in sacred buildings would seem to have been stringently enforced. The ornaments are composed of half or whole palmettes, which are connected with one another by spiral designs, and thrown out by indentations so as to form independent configurations. To these again are added designs which are traceable in the main to the stucco-technique in its capacity to suggest the dark effects of depth. Symbolical figures, such as were favoured by Sasanian and Christian art—the crescent, the star, the wing, etc.—are entirely absent so far as religious art is concerned. If we would adequately appreciate the authority thus attaching to the precepts of religion in the sphere of graphic art, we must keep before us the delight which the Orient has always found in the mystical and symbolical use of animal forms, as is in fact exemplified by the extreme frequency with which such figures are employed in the secular art of Islām itself.

(*b*) *Turkish elements.*—One of the most singular notions still current, and one to be explained only on the ground that our vision has been deranged by our immemorial habit of seeing everything in the light of Græco-Roman institutions, is that the migratory races, whether Germans or Turks, were destitute of all art. This is to forget that the Goths brought with them into Italy a highly-developed culture, acquired upon the Greek coast of the Black Sea; and the like holds good of the peoples who forced their way from Central Asia into Persia, and who had thus passed through, or temporarily settled in, the long-civilized region beyond the Caspian Sea. Think of the discoveries in Hungary, telling of the time when the Magyars took possession of the country. This equestrian people came from the territories lying between the Altai and the Ural without coming into contact with Transoxiana; nevertheless their taste in decoration was well developed. How much more are we entitled to look for æsthetic proficiency amongst the peoples who had not only lived at close quarters with the Samanids or the Ghaznavids, but who, as, *e.g.*, the Seljuks, had made themselves masters of their lands before they conquered Persia and Asia Minor. In Egypt the new conditions were ushered in under Saladin, and continued during the period of the Turkoman and Circassian Mamlūks, until, in 1517, the Turks proper gained the upper hand.

It is worthy of remark that with the advent of the Turkish tribes are conjoined two types of building of which there are no surviving examples from Umayyad or early Abbāsid times: the large cupola-domed *mausoleum* and a new type of mosque-school, the *madrasa*. As regards the mausoleum, there is no doubt that it had already been roofed —by Constantine or even before his day—with cupolas. But a gigantic fabric of brick, such as the tomb of the Sultan Sanjar in Merv, dating from 552 A.H. (A.D. 1157), is, of course, hardly to be compared with the finely articulated edifices of Christian times. We must never forget, however, that the tombs of the Umayyads were violated by the fanaticism of the Abbāsids, or that the only tomb known to exist in the neighbourhood of Baghdad, that of Zubaida, the favourite wife of Harūn al-Rashīd, bears a curious niche-pyramid, which hardly permits of comparison with the later buildings. It is true that pyramids are found also upon the mausoleums erected in A.D. 1162 and 1186 by Seljuk Atabeks in Nakshevan, on the Perso-Armenian frontier, but these are supported by a dome-shaped vault, the walls of which are embellished with polygonal ornaments of mosaic work in stucco bricks. One of the far-famed sights of Cairo is the Necropolis, the so-called Tombs of the Khalīfs and Mamlūks (fig. 7, p. 901), which in their picturesque construction invite comparison with the massive forms of the pyramids on the opposite bank of the Nile. The mausoleums of Islām are so arranged as to permit of being dwelt in by the family of the deceased at certain seasons of the year. An even more magnificent effect, however, than that of the Necropolis of Cairo is made by the sepulchral mound of Shah Zindah, near Samarcand. The huge mausoleum of Timur (†A.D. 1405), which the terror-inspiring Mongol leader had built in his lifetime, and which is now known as the Gur Emir, lends signal distinction to the whole district. As a work of art, however, it is surpassed by the sepulchral mosque of Khudābandakhān in Sultanīya (A.D. 1304–1316), which, like the mausoleum at Merv, presents on the outside an imposing arcade style of architecture. It can hardly be a mere matter of chance that these three most important sepulchral edifices should be found in the Caspian or Trans-Caspian area.

The second architectural form which first came into general use subsequently to the incursion of the Turkish tribes, viz. the *madrasa*, likewise evolved a capacity of being applied to great monumental structures. An example of this type may be seen in the illustration (fig. 8, p. 901) of the mosque of Sultan Ḥasan in Cairo, erected in A.D. 1356–1359. It was the Ayyūbids who instituted such college houses in Egypt. The *madrasa* expresses the idea that, in order to correspond with the four sects of Islām, four separate wings are required, viz. *Madrasat al-Ḥanifīya*, *al-Shāfi'īya*, *al-Ḥanbalīya*, and *al-Mālikīya*. This plan of associating four schools in one building was carried out in a very ingenious way, namely, by planting them respectively in the four angles of a cross, which was formed by four tunnel-vaulted arms converging upon the open central court. Were the tunnels of this cross all of equal length, and were a cupola placed over the small court, we might fail to discriminate between this form of building, in its general plan at least, and the cruciform church with a dome. As, however, the central square is open to the sky, and the four aisles are often of very different lengths, such an identification is out of the question. We incline to believe that the plan of the *madrasa* is in its essentials of very remote origin. It is resorted to in the construction of a gateway for the citadel of 'Ammān in Moab, and was no doubt often used in Sasanian palaces. It is accordingly a Muslim construction only in so far as it has been transferred to the institution of the four sects, and elaborated in accordance with the requirements thereof (see ARCHITECTURE [Muh. in Syria and Egypt], p. 757).

This remarkable construction impresses the native of the West as being more decidedly Oriental than even the mosque. Picture these huge tunnels, vaulted mostly in the pointed style, and strengthened by the schools built into the corners like immense supports, and yet without anything to sustain; it is the spirit of the stalactite without architectonic motive, and of the vine-branch without the link with nature. Further, in Egypt at all events, there is something which must cause the utmost amazement, viz. the 'High Gate,' or portal-niche. The niche of the mosque of Sultan Ḥasan in Cairo, built in A.D. 1356–1359, *c.* 26 metres in height, has been cut out of a wall which rises 37·70 metres above the level of the street, and is not accommodated to the main feature of the edifice as a whole, *i.e.* it does not correspond with the *qibla*, but has a relation to the line of the street, being placed in a corner obliquely to the longitudinal wall, so that any one entering the vestibule can reach the central court only by way of various narrow passages. We might all the more expect to find an axial design in the main ornament, viz. that of the porch, as the immense dome of the builder of the mausoleum towers aloft exactly in the axis behind the *miḥrāb*. This ignoring of systematic design is peculiar to Egypt, and is not found, so far as the present writer knows, in other Muslim lands, while, especially in Asia Minor, the *madrasa* is always arranged symmetrically about the central axis.

Meanwhile we must say something regarding other innovations, which make their appearance subsequently to the ascendancy of the Central Asiatic element in the Muslim world. The astonishing growth in the popular use of polygonal ornamentation already touched upon may possibly be attributed to the preference for geometrical decoration which is characteristic of nomads. Even upon the *minbar* of Kairwan, constructed probably in Baghdad in 242 A.H. (fig 4, p. 899), the double-striped lace-work in straight or curved lines so largely predominates that we can scarcely reconcile its vogue with our wonted conceptions of Sasanian and early Muslim art, in which it is rather the palmette that prevails. But, by the time when the Oriental element re-emerged from the obscurity in which it had been embedded for centuries, Hellenistic art must already have returned, more decisively than ever, to the style of the geometrical lace-work. This reversion to the primitive, then, finds ample scope for development among the nomads from Central Asia, whose taste was still in thrall to the lace-work, as to the material generally, and to caprice.

Since, in the art ancillary to the cultus, *lace-work* takes the place of animal ornament, it demands some notice at this point. As an illustrative example, we reproduce a detail of the *minbar* (A.D. 1168–1169) of the al-Aqṣā Mosque in Jerusalem (fig. 9, p. 902). Here we have a piece of work in wood and ivory, by an artizan from Aleppo, so complicated in its construction as to be hardly intelligible to Europeans. We perceive arabesques of ivory in the middle of both the vertical mouldings. On either side are polygonal decorations, composed of purfled mouldings in wood and fillings of ivory. From the corners which form the foci of the main lines we may be able to infer the class of polygon upon which any particular play of lines is designed — whether it is the hexagon, the one mainly resorted to, or some other fundamental figure. The discovery of this, however, merely gives us the key; the endlessly varied ways in which the purfled fillets intertwine and intersect, leaving, in ordered repetition, free spaces, which in turn are filled up with relief arabesques or coloured inlaid work, can scarcely be resolved. All this is an expression of the same exultation in elaborating designs obtained mathematically or fortuitously as was to be seen in the case of the stalactite. The fly-leaves of the Qur'ān exhibit first-rate examples of such artifices. There, indeed, they are in their right place, as in them and in the caligraphic amplification of the writing a compensation had to be found for the absence of the human form.

(*c*) *Chinese elements.*—We are not accustomed to regard China as the source of a contribution to Muslim art. Chinese elements, nevertheless, may already have found admission in Syria, as they certainly did, more powerfully, in Persia, and finally, in all probability, through the influence of the on-coming Turks. From early notices of silk as a Chinese product, and of silk materials in Egypt and in mediæval Europe, it is easy to show that in the later ancient and the Christian period there was commercial intercourse between Syria and China. In Persia during the Abbāsid dynasty the influence of China begins to be felt even in architecture, and unmistakable evidences of this influence are seen in the Talisman Gate of Baghdad, completed in 618 A.H., as well as in two reliefs of winged figures dating from about the same time. These works become intelligible only in the light of facts which were afterwards made plain by the Oriental carpet. Thus both the examples just cited as bearing upon the field of architecture find their immediate explanation in the enormous carpet now in the possession of the Emperor of Austria and known as the 'Vienna Hunting Carpet.' The illustration of this (fig. 10, p. 902) shows, in the borders, winged genii, and, in the angles of the inner field, the Chinese dragon struggling with the phœnix. The manner in which the plant-designs and the Chinese cloud-design are wrought out leave us in no dubiety regarding their origin. Yet the carpet was manufactured in Persia, as is evinced, to say nothing of the workmanship, by the hunting scenes in the inner field, where Persians with turbans and heron-feathers are shown on horseback engaged in the chase. Chinese traits are visible also in the drawing of the figures.

This brings us to the most interesting fact of all in the development of Perso-Muslim art, viz. the resuscitation of figure-representation as a result of Chinese influence. Reference has already been made to the illumination of Qur'ān manuscripts, from which figures are entirely absent. This does not entitle us, of course, to assume their absence from other classes of literature. There exist, however, a few miniature manuscripts which are decorated in the style usual in Armenian and Coptic writings. But the great majority of Persian illuminated manuscripts, and precisely those which are most valuable in an artistic sense, display alike in landscape and in figure the identical type of representation which, judging from the earliest Japanese and Chinese works of art of the class that imitates nature, we recognize as belonging specifically to the Far East. Moreover, as recent researches make it credible that the cavalier and love poetry of the earlier mediæval period in Europe caught fresh stimulus from the Perso-Muslim world with which it came into touch on Spanish ground, it cannot but amaze us to encounter, in Persian manuscripts, illustrated with designs developed in China, the very spirit known to us directly in our own literary history. In one province of Muslim art, therefore, viz. the secular, a sphere is found for a creative impulse which works freely in the expression of all human feeling, thus forming a vivid contrast to the sacred art which was fettered to the interdict against 'graven images.'

The case is somewhat different in regard to the portrayal of animals and animal fights, hunting

and drinking scenes, planets, Alexander upon the dragon-chariot, and the like, as seen upon the so-called Mossul-bronzes, from the middle of the 12th cent. and onwards. It is possible that the technique seen in those vessels derived its inspiration from Central Asia, while Chinese designs likewise occur sporadically; but in the main the impulse towards the representation of figures must be traced to Persian Christians. On this hypothesis alone can we explain the adoption of the late Hellenistic picture-cycle, and, in particular, the introduction of scenes from the life of Christ, which were designed for the apartments of Muslim princes. Consequently, the figures portrayed must be interpreted, not in the ethical spirit of Hellenic-Christian symbolism, but as purely decorative. The primitive Oriental interpretation of the animal fight, as symbolical of the conflict between good and evil, is simply lost.

6. Later developments.—The great mass of the Muslim memorials of art emanates from the period after the Turkish tribes gained the absolute lordship of the civilized regions originally permeated by the Syro-Persian spirit. Art was now devoted more than ever to purposes of representation and embellishment. It is therefore very remarkable that what have come down to us from this relatively late epoch are mainly mosques and mausoleums, not palaces, the Alhambra being the only one of its class. It would appear that at this time places of worship alone were built 'for eternity,' *i.e.* of durable material. In the Seljuk kingdom of Iconium (Konia) in Asia Minor this material was principally stone. The mosques and *madrasas* of Konia and Sivas have magnificent façades of the same, or of an incomparably richer, style than the façade of the al-Aqmar mosque given in fig. 5 (p. 900). The *madrasa* approximates more to the type of the arcaded court. In Persia the predominant building material was brick. The result was that every variety of the art of facing was resorted to, the walls being veneered with stucco or many-coloured bricks, or covered with faience mosaics. The native soil of such things was not Mesopotamia or Iran alone, but, as in the case of so many other features of Muslim art, Transoxiana. There, in Samarcand and Bokhara, the most marvellous erections of the Mongols are found standing to this day.

An altogether peculiar position in Muslim art was taken by the Osmanlis, from the time that they obtained possession of Constantinople. It was the Church of St. Sophia that roused them to rivalry, so that in Stamboul we meet for the second time with mosques of Christian design, as Damascus furnished us with the earliest examples. The Osmanlis, in fact, bring to completion what had been aspired to by the great architects of Asia Minor in the inception of antique art at Constantinople, viz. the construction of edifices on a scale of amplitude hitherto unknown. We feel unable to decide whether it was intensity of religious emotion that gave the incentive to the stupendous domes in Stamboul, rising above enclosures that yield a total impression of such magnificence as is unparalleled in the Renaissance and Barocco structures of the West. We may assert without misgiving that the mosques associated with the Church of St. Sophia exhibit that ideal form which, since Bramante's time, has been sought in the all-round effect of stately interiors. Thus Islām at length achieved what lay originally far beyond its range: it gave the crowning touch to the development of the art of architecture which had evolved its designs from a Hellenistic foundation.

A second triumph was won for Islām by the too little known memorials of art in India. Here again Muslim art accommodated itself to the indigenous forms—a process rendered all the more easy as the ground-plan and elevation of the mosque, and even the fantastic play of ornamentation, had already been fully evolved in pre-Muhammadan India, though, naturally, in a style different from that of Western Asia. The magnificence of the plan of arrangement in the Indian mosque constructions is almost without parallel. It is also in India that we find palaces of vast configuration dating from Muhammadan times, and thus furnishing the necessary supplement to the secular art so slenderly represented in the Mediterranean region.

The Alhambra.—To Europeans the Alhambra represents the sum and substance of Muslim art, and, in point of fact, it is really such, so far as the province of secular art is concerned. There is one thing, however, which we must not forget—a fact of decisive import for the ethical value of the whole structure, viz. that the Alhambra must be regarded, not as an independent work of architecture, but as a component part of the natural environment, which is always taken into account in the secular art of Islām, and which, in the case before us, is a park encircling the whole rising ground about the main hill. We may gain an idea of the wide expanse sometimes given to such enclosures from the Conca d'oro beside Palermo, where the palace-grounds embrace the chateaux of Zisa, Cuba, Favara, and Monreale; note, however, that a different style was adopted by the Normans in the construction of their dwelling-place, that, namely, of the fortified stronghold. But in the citadel of Granada we meet with open courts, enclosed by lath-and-plaster work, which has been preserved as if by a miracle. The first court, called the Court of the Myrtles, still retains its garden-like character; while in the second, the Court of the Lions (fig. 11, p. 903), the fountain in the centre sends out babbling streams which flow into the halls.

Then the glittering wealth of ornaments, with their lustrous colours and their puzzling variety of form! The principal designs, the stalactite, the arabesque, and the polygon, make their appearance here once more, though employed with a more uniform ornateness than in the earlier style of art. The kind of workmanship, however, to which all this exuberance of beauty has been applied, explains why it is the Alhambra alone that has survived: the arches which are finished in such a splendid style of architecture have nothing at all to sustain; they consist simply of wood and plaster, like an ornamental sign-board. The structures which lie behind this embellishment are of a very simple kind, and characteristic of the race which produced them.

The inscriptions of the Alhambra reveal a surprisingly intimate relation between spectator and ornament. Just as the Turks had the faculty of giving individuality to each one of a long series of fountains, so the Moors must have had a fine sense of the language of ornamentation. The inscriptions pertaining to the various portions of the great fabric, as well as to the various ornaments, furnish suggestive introductions to these. Thus, for example, upon a niche at the entrance to the Hall of the Ambassadors appear the words which Schack has translated thus:

'Mich hat des Künstlers Hand gestickt, wie ein Gewand von Seide,
Und mir das Diadem besetzt mit blitzendem Geschmeide;
So wie der Thron der jungen Braut strahl ich in hellem Schimmer,
Doch bringe höh'res Glück als er, es weicht und wechselt nimmer.'

Such facts of observation prompt the inquiry whether the ethical significance of Muhammadan decorative art is not of a higher order than we commonly suppose. It is our hope that the scientific research which is only now being vigorously applied to the field of Muslim art in general,

may in course of time yield fuller information on the subject than we have been able to give here.

LITERATURE.—i. *COMPREHENSIVE WORKS*: *Manuel d'art musulman*, (i.) H. Saladin, *L'Architecture*; (ii.) G. Migeon, *Les Arts plastiques et industriels*, Paris (1907).

ii. *ARCHITECTURE*: Franz Pascha, *Die Baukunst des Islam* (Darmstadt, 1896); Saladin, *La mosquée de Sidi Okba à Kairouan* (Paris, 1899); Herz Bey, *La mosquée du Sultan Hassan* (Cairo, 1899); Sarre, *Persische Baukunst* (appearing); the Russian work upon Gur Emir in Samarcand; A. F. Calvert, *The Alhambra* (London, 1907); and the recognized older literature.

iii. *DECORATION AND ORNAMENT*: Strzygowski, 'Mschatta' in *Jahrb. d. preuss. Kunstsammlung* (1904): the various works of H. Wallis, Martin, Schmoranz, and others, which are found well arranged in Migeon's *Manuel*. Inostranzeff and Smirnov have published a collection of materials for a bibliography of Muslim archæology, St. Petersburg (1906).

J. STRZYGOWSKI.

ART (Persian).—Persian art has developed more on the utilitarian side in connexion with the manufacture of rugs, draperies, embroideries, pottery, brass-work, and decorative tiles, than along the more purely æsthetic lines of sculpture and painting. Sculpture, in fact, had no chance to develop further in Persia after the Muhammadan conquest, for the teachings of the Prophet, even as modified by the Shī'ite views, to which the Iranians adhere, are adverse to representing objects that have animate life, and the Qur'ān expressly forbids the making of graven images (cf., however, preceding art, esp. p. 875 f.). In respect to sculpture, therefore, the Arab invasion marks a sharp line of division between the old régime and the new; but in other respects the history of Persian art may be traced with a fair degree of continuity for nearly twenty-five centuries.

The chief eras in the national history of the country, which it is found convenient to follow in a study of its art, have already been characterized in the article ARCHITECTURE (Persian) as: Early Iranian and Median period (before B.C. 550), Achæmenian (B.C. 550–330), Seljuk and Parthian (B.C. 330–A.D. 224), Sasanian (A.D. 224–661), and Muhammadan (A.D. 661 to the present day). As sculpture practically died out with the Muslim conquest, it may be appropriate to treat its history first, and then take up metal-work, the fictile or ceramic arts, art in textile fabrics, decorative designs, and pictorial representation.

1. **Sculpture and carving.**—(*a*) We know nothing definite in regard to sculpture or the state of the plastic art during the *Early Iranian period*, that is to say, prior to the 7th cent. B.C. Even if we consider that the Avesta in a manner represents that era of antiquity, we nevertheless can find in it no specific allusions to sculpture, unless we are to accept the theory, which has been advanced by some scholars, that images of the divine beings Vohu Manah (the Zoroastrian archangel of Good Thought) and Ardvī Sūrā Anāhitā, or Anaïtis (goddess of the heavenly waters), may possibly be referred to in *Vendīdād*, xix. 20–25, descriptive of cleansing, and *Yasht*, v. 126–129, describing the appearance of the divinity. Such an interpretation of the text, however (especially in the former of the two passages), is more than doubtful, even if we concede that images of these divinities were known in Strabo's time (*Geog.* xv. 114). It is indeed possible that some of the bronze figurines and small terra-cotta images that are now and then found in primitive burial-places, or unearthed in such excavations as those by Dieulafoy and de Morgan at Susa (J. de Morgan, *Mémoires—Recherches archéologiques*, i., viii., Paris, 1900, 1905), may go back to a remote Iranian age, but no truly archaic sculpture of any size has yet been found.

(*b*) A similar uncertainty prevails with regard to kindred objects attributed to the *Median age*, and also with regard to the huge stone lion at Hamadan. This statue is executed in the round, like the bull at Babylon and the taurocephalic capitals at Babylon (Dieulafoy, *L'Art antique de la Perse*, Paris, 1884–85, vol. iii. p. 13). Its age is a matter of debate. A thousand years ago Mas'ūdī (d. 951 A.D.) ascribed its origin to Alexander the Great, while Yāqūt (*c.* 1220 A.D.) placed it much earlier; and a number of modern scholars are inclined to assign the statue to the Median period (Jackson, *Persia Past and Present*, New York, 1906, pp. 151–162).

(*c*) The oldest identified sculpture of the *Achæmenian period* is the bas-relief figure of Cyrus the Great at Murghab, the ancient Pasargadæ. This image (which Weissbach claims to be a representation of Cyrus the Younger) must certainly have been prior to B.C. 525, when Darius succeeded Cambyses, the son of Cyrus, and transferred the royal capital to Persepolis. The figure is carved in low relief upon a large monolith slab, and is conspicuous both by reason of the curious crown, with Egyptian affinities, that surmounts the monarch's head, and because of the four magnificent wings that rise and droop from the king's shoulders—a feature borrowed from Assyro-Babylonian art. The image of Darius sculptured above his own inscription at Bisitun, or Behistan, may be dated some time before B.C. 500, and the panel on which it is carved likewise represents figures of the king's two chief retainers, together with portraits of Gomates, or the pseudo-Smerdis, and the other eight pretenders to the throne. Above the head of Darius floats an image of the god Auramazda (Ormazd) presenting him with the circle of sovereignty, or the guardian spirit of the king, as the modern Parsis prefer to interpret the image. The god is represented as a bearded figure, wearing a cylindrical head-dress, with horns, surmounted by the disc of the sun, and as swinging in a huge circle from which proceed rays of light (King and Thompson, *The Sculptures and Inscriptions of Behistūn*, London, 1907, pp. xxii–xxiii). The whole device shows the influence of Babylonia and Assyria. Of similar character are the carvings around the tomb of Darius at Naksh-i-Rustam, and upon the palace walls at Persepolis and Susa. In several of these the king is represented in the attitude of adoring Auramazda, or with his throne supported by subject nations; but the most spirited of the bas-reliefs are those which portray Darius in combat with real or mythical monsters—a *motif* borrowed, in like manner, from Assyro-Babylonian art. The same is true of the statues of XERXES, Artaxerxes I., II., III., and Darius II., III. (so far as we can identify them); but the finest of all the specimens of the sculptor's art under the Achæmenians is the frieze of the stylobate of Xerxes' audience-hall at Persepolis, representing the vassal nations bearing tribute to the Great King. Of imposing grandeur, likewise, are the gigantic winged bulls with human faces, in Assyrian style, guarding the Portal of Xerxes through which his audience-hall was approached (see art. ARCHITECTURE [Persian]). The influence that was exercised in general upon Persian art by Assyria and Babylonia during the Achæmenian period may be seen at a glance by looking over the illustrations in the standard works on Persepolis and Susa mentioned at the end of this article.

(*d*) In the *interregnum*, or Seljuk period, that followed after Alexander's invasion (B.C. 330–250) and during the *Parthian period*, little progress was made in sculpture, save that the Greek impress supplanted the Assyro-Babylonian influence, as is evident from the Græcizing tendency seen in the bas-relief heads on the pilasters of the palace-temple at Hatra, and in certain characteristics of the carved bases of the columns at Kangavar, if that temple be ascribed to the Parthian age—a

matter that is doubtful. The principal piece of Parthian sculpture, however, belongs to the middle of the period, and is that chiselled on the panel of king Gotarzes (A.D. 46–51) at the base of the Behistan Rock. Its mutilated condition, due to the fact that at some time in the first half of the 19th cent. a tablet was incised into its very middle, renders it difficult to judge of the workmanship, but the style and execution appear to show distinct traces of Roman art.

(*e*) *Under the Sasanian dynasty* (A.D. 224–661), Persian sculpture received further inspiration from Roman art through the hands of Byzantine craftsmen, and gave no mean promise of higher development; but this was abruptly cut short by the iconoclastic Arabs when they swept over the land with their Muslim hosts. In style, Sasanian art is bold, though rather heavy, like that of its predecessors, and is marked by a superabundance of decorative *motifs*, especially in the form of crimped streamers floating from the shoulders of some of the figures, or hanging from chaplets held in the hand. The examples of Sasanian sculpture are comparatively numerous, and may best be seen in the series of seven massive bas-reliefs carved below the Achæmenian tombs at Naksh-i-Rustam, or again at Naksh-i-Rajab near Persepolis, at Shapur in the south of Persia, at Susa in the south-west, Ṭāq-i-Bustan in the west, and near the plain of Salmas in the north-west. The finest among them are the carvings in the grottos at Ṭāq-i-Bustan, near Kermanshah. They represent scenes from the life of Khusru Parviz, or Chosroës II. (A.D. 590–628), and are ascribed by popular tradition to the chisel of Farhād, the royal sculptor, whose love for Shīrīn, the king's beautiful favourite, brought ruin upon the gifted artist. At Ṭāq-i-Bustan and in two of the Persepolitan Sasanian sculptures, it is thought that the figure of the god Ormazd, or possibly of the female divinity Anaïtis, is represented.

(*f*) From the middle of the 7th cent., when the Sasanian power fell before Islām, Persia produced no more sculpture, although there was an attempt at a revival of it in the beginning of the 19th cent., when Fath Alī Shah (1798–1835) caused himself to be immortalized in stone at Rai (near Teherān) and elsewhere. His sculptures show certain survivals of the style of Sasanian times, but are combined with thoroughly modern traits. One of the two panels at Rai portrays the king in the act of spearing a lion, and is spirited in execution. Unfortunately, it was carved over the space occupied by an old Sasanian sculpture, which was destroyed to make room for it.

2. Seals, gems, and coins.—Closely connected with the glyptic art in its larger application is the more minute skill shown in the cutting of seals and gems or the sinking of dies for coins. The use of seals and cylinders from the earliest times is well known, and is sufficiently illustrated by the archaic finds made at Susa by de Morgan (*op. cit.* viii. 1–27); but if we are insufficiently supplied with evidence for the Early Iranian and Median eras, there are enough Achæmenian seals and carved gems to show the height to which artistic execution in small carvings was carried in ancient days. The art has never been lost, for we can trace its development all the way through the Parthian and Sasanian ages, and no Persian to-day is without his signature handsomely engraved on a seal for ordinary use. A similar form of skill was needed in the cutting of dies for coins, as illustrated in the Achæmenian period by the *darics* from the mint of Darius. The coins that were current under the Parthian rulers indicate to what an extent Greek influence affected Iranian art, and from that time onward the various changes may be traced by the issues from the mint of each successive ruler down to the present day, when the nickel *shāhī* (worth less than a halfpenny), inscribed on one side with the Lion and the Sun, as the national emblem of Persia, and on the other with a device in Perso-Arabic script giving its denomination, is as modern in appearance as if it had been made in a European mint.

3. Metal-work.—Owing to the mineral resources of the kingdom, the art of the metal-worker may be regarded as one of the oldest in Persia (cf. Geiger, *Ostiranische Kultur im Altertum*, Erlangen, 1882, pp. 146–148, 388–390). Specimens have been preserved in sufficient number to show the development of this phase of art from Achæmenian times, illustrated, for example, by the discoveries at Susa and the finds on the Oxus, down to the present day, when the brass-beaters of Iṣfahān and the coppersmiths of Kashan turn out some of the finest examples of artistic workmanship in the form of lamps, trays, dishes, bowls, pitchers, or damascened armour, that can be found anywhere. The various pieces of Achæmenian jewellery to be seen in the museums of Europe—the nail-studded Parthian helmet in the British Museum, two beautiful cups of the Sasanian king Chosroës II. in the Cabinet des Médailles in Paris, one of them embossed in silver, the other enamelled with gold—together with many beautiful examples of Iranian metal-work of various ages to be found in the Hermitage at St. Petersburg, may be cited as typical of the range and scope which Persia had in this branch of artistic production.

4. Fictile arts, porcelain, earthenware, and ceramics.—The artistic sense which Persia developed from the earliest times in fashioning and decorating earthenware objects, and in the making of beautiful tiles for practical and ornamental purposes, is worthy of high praise. In fact, it would be impossible to cite any rival for the wonderful frieze of archers, and the lion-frieze discovered by Dieulafoy at Susa, which show the height to which art in the making and colouring of tiles had been developed even in earlier Achæmenian times. If kindred specimens of Parthian and Sasanian tiles be missing, it is only because they have not been preserved; for the art was not lost, as is proved by the beautiful turquoise tiles on the domes of the mosques from the beginning of the Muhammadan era down to the present time. On the other hand, the remarkable skill which the Persians possessed in imparting to their tiles and plaques a metallic glint or lustrous sheen, known as the *reflet métallique*, has unfortunately been lost, since it died out some time during the 18th cent., and attempts to restore it have thus far met with the poorest success. For that reason good old tiles and plaques that display the metallic lustre are rare, even though broken fragments are still being dug up in the ruins of Rai, the city which seems most of all to have developed this peculiar product.

With reference to the early development of the ceramic art in pottery and earthenware, it may be said that some of the crude jars and bowls exhumed from the ash-hills at Urumiah (see Jackson, *Persia*, pp. 90–98), like those found by Henri de Morgan in archaic burying-grounds in Gilan and Talish (see J. de Morgan, *Mém.* viii. 251–342), may date from the Early Iranian or Median period, or even earlier. The potter's art, moreover, is mentioned in the Avesta (*Vend.* ii. 32, viii. 84), and fragments of jugs and earthenware vases, with coloured traceries as a decorative design, have been found in abundance as specimens of fictile art in the Achæmenian period. The same is true of the Parthian remains discovered at Warka; and noteworthy among these are the Parthian so-called 'slipper-coffins,' made

of a beautiful green glazed ware, and decorated with a somewhat stiff small human figure, repeated a number of times. The Sasanian fondness for elaborate decoration, as evidenced in the intricate designs and flower patterns on capitals of columns and in the ornamentations at Ṭāq-i-Bustan, was shown also in their ceramic work; for it is still possible to pick up among ruins like those of the Sasanian fire-temple, or *ātash-Kadah*, near Iṣfahān, pieces of jars and bricks with decorative markings that show an artistic sense; and the potter's art, well known to all through Omar Khayyam, is actively practised to-day.

During the earlier centuries after the Muhammadan occupation, Persia's art in faience (for, strictly speaking, there is no true Persian porcelain) is believed to have received considerable impetus through importations brought from China and through Chinese artizans settling in Iran. But, whatever may have been the extent of that influence — and the influence was not without reciprocity—Persian faience never lost its marked national characteristics in shape, colour, and design. In regard to glass, we know that the glass-worker's trade is referred to in the Avesta (*Vend.* viii. 85, *yāmō-pacika*), and specimens of glass, dating back to a comparatively early period, are extant. Glass vials, thought by some to have been lachrymatories, were found among the Parthian ruins at Warka, and the glass portions of the gold-enamelled cup of Chosroës II. show that the artistic uses of glass were well known under the Sasanians; while the employment of tiny facets of mirror glass in the interior decorations of sumptuous houses has long been a favourite means of ornamentation in Persia. Glass bottles, vases, jars, and urns, generally of a bluish colour, are found in almost every age down to the present, although the glass that is used in Persia to-day is almost wholly imported from Europe.

5. Textile fabrics: rugs, draperies, and embroideries. — The art by which Persia is best known in modern times is the manufacture of beautiful textile fabrics—rugs, carpets, draperies, and embroideries. We may presume that the art of rug-making was fully developed in Achæmenian times, since Themistocles, according to Plutarch (*Themist.* xxix. 3), when first presented before Xerxes or Artaxerxes, illustrated his meaning by a simile drawn from the intricate patterns of a Persian carpet; and there is little reason to doubt that rugs were used both on the floors and for ornamental hangings in the royal palaces at Persepolis and Susa. The employment, moreover, of archaic designs, handed down by tradition in the rug-maker's conservative art (for example, conventionalized forms of the tree of life), points back to the greatest antiquity. The carpet industry is to-day widely spread throughout Persia, and among the places that are thought to produce the best rugs, both in quality and style, are the districts of Kurdistan, Khorasan, and Kerman. Aniline dyes from Europe and Occidental patterns and designs are unfortunately finding their way in to corrupt the purity of this Oriental art, but a strong endeavour is being made to preserve its native integrity and ancient prestige—a prestige recognized in all the numerous works published in the West on the subject of Oriental rugs. Among Persia's textile arts is the weaving by hand of soft white and brown felts (Mod. Pers. *namad*) for mats, cloaks, and saddle-cloths. The art is as old as the time of the Avesta (cf. Av. *nemata-*, *Vend.* viii. 1, ix. 46), and it is still carried on in many parts of the country, more especially at Hamadan, Iṣfahān, and Yazd. Mention should also be made of richly embroidered Persian shawls, delicate fabrics with elaborate designs in needlework, heavily embossed brocades, ornamental draperies and hangings, and silks of various colours and fineness of texture. Among the oldest specimens of such fabrics are the examples of Sasanian textile work in the Archepiscopal Museum in Cologne, Germany, and in the temple of Horiugi, near Kioto, Japan (cf. Münsterberg, *Japanische Kunstgeschichte*, Brunswick, 1907, p. 118, pl. 14). The introduction and development of the textile arts as well as other arts of Persia were ascribed by Firdausi (A.D. 1000) to the legendary king Jamshīd, who lived in the golden age of Iran (see Firdausi, ed. Vullers and Landauer, Leyden, 1877, i. 23, 24 [tr. Mohl, Paris, 1876, i. 34–36; tr. Warner, London, 1906, i. 32–33]).

6. Painting, decorating, designing, and the art of penmanship. — Although painting cannot be called one of Persia's special arts, the wonderful effects in colour and decorative design that were obtained by the Achæmenian artists, as shown by the tile-work discovered in ancient Susa, prove conclusively how highly developed in early times were their æsthetic sense and their productive skill. Allusion has already been made several times to the artistic manner in which they still know how to employ colour and ornamental patterns even in connexion with objects of ordinary everyday use. How far the painter's art had advanced in Sasanian times among the Manichæans (for Mani was a painter as well as the founder of a great religious sect) has recently been illustrated by the remarkable finds made in Turkestan by the expedition sent out from Berlin by the German Emperor William II. As a rule, the Persians do their best work when painting portraits and flowers, while their landscape work and perspective composition are but mediocre. Their best pictures, in fact, are those on a small scale, like the miniature portraits on papier mâché writing-cases and lacquered boxes, or on the enamelled porcelain tops of tobacco pipes; or, again, in decorative designs of roses on book-covers, for the making of which they are especially noted.

One art, however, is carried to perfection in Persia; it is caligraphy, or the art of beautiful handwriting. Originally this accomplishment as an art may owe much to Muhammadanism, but nowhere else are to be found such beautiful specimens of chirography, whether minute or large, as in Persia; and no other people are so skilled in using their alphabet for decorative purposes, as may be seen from the graceful arabesques twined about the domes and minarets of the mosques, or interlaced into monograms of wonderful intricacy. To write a good hand is an essential part of culture among the Persians, and a number of well-known authors were masters of caligraphy. Not only so, but skilled scribes have devoted infinite time to copying in luxurious style the compositions of famous Persian poets, and their manuscripts are in themselves works of art.

7. Influence of Persian art.—The influence of Assyria and Babylon, of Greece and the Roman Empire, upon Persian art and architecture during the early and mediæval periods has already been referred to more than once. The fact has also been pointed out that Persia made these borrowings and importations thoroughly her own. In mediæval and later times Persia was influenced by (and influenced) China in ceramic art, and in the non-Muhammadan representation of living beings in paintings and the like (cf. above, p. 879). If the Arabs conquered Persia, they received more in art from her than they gave, and it is probable that the arts which the Moors developed in Spain and elsewhere were largely derived from the Persians. The Mongol invaders had little if anything artistic to offer Persia, but

she imparted to them in Central Asia much from her artistic taste, in the same manner as her art penetrated deep into Northern India. In the Europe of Chaucer's time Persian blue in textile fabrics was sufficiently well known to be referred to as 'pers,' and the West to-day acknowledges Persia's supremacy in the weaving of artistic rugs and carpets. In minor matters Persian art still exercises an influence on the Occident, but not without receiving some influence in return, and this gradual infusion of Western elements will doubtless tend to grow greater as time goes on.

LITERATURE.—See the bibliographical list given under ARCHITECTURE (Persian), and refer especially to Perrot-Chipiez, *Hist. de l'art dans l'antiquité*, tome v. 'Perse,' Paris, 1890; Gayet, *L'Art persan*, Paris, 1895; Murdoch Smith, *Persian Art* (Kensington Museum Handbook), Lond., 1880; Saladin, *Manuel d'art musulman*, Paris, 1907; Benjamin, *Persia and the Persians* (chap. xi. 'A Glance at the Arts of Persia'), London, 1887; Dalton, *The Treasure of the Oxus, with Antiquities of Ancient Persia and India*, London, 1905. A. V. WILLIAMS JACKSON.

ART (Phœnician).—To express the deity with the emblems of his majesty, as conceived by the worshippers, is the highest aim of religious art, and it was apparently this that animated the Babylonians, Assyrians, Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans, all of whom have produced specimens of their skill worthy of the highest admiration. The Phœnicians, on the other hand, worshipping Baalim and Baalat, did not possess any deities sufficiently distinctive in their nature to lend themselves to representation in sculpture and painting. El, Adon, and Melek were in the same case with Baal and Baalat—terms of much too general a nature. The Babylonian Tammuz, a sun-god, who became with the Greeks a simple hunter in Syria, and Ashtoreth, the Ištar of the Babylonians, spouse of Tammuz, and goddess of the moon and of the planet Venus, form exceptions, and had their influence, though they were not the chief divinities of the Phœnicians. When, therefore, they wished to represent the divinity, the emblem which they chose was in the form of a cone, of which numerous examples exist, not only in Phœnicia, but also in the countries which fell under its influence. The two Phœnicians of Malta, Abdosir and Osirsamar, did not attempt a beautiful statue of their great national god Melqart, but contented themselves with a cone-crowned plinth which the first stone-cutter they met with was able to make.*

Whether the Phœnicians felt that something better was expected, and even needed, than the commonplace, though mystic, emblem which they had adopted, is uncertain. Knowing, however, the art of Babylonia from old time, they turned to the Egyptians for their artistic education. And here it is worthy of note that they did not borrow from them, as they might have done, the gods with the heads of all kinds of beasts, in which the Egyptians delighted, but divine types taken from the human form. From every point of view this was an improvement, for they made their deities as frankly manlike as those of the Greeks.

The cone representative of the divinity is seen in the picture of the temple of Byblos (Gebal), towering high above the entrance of the great courtyard.† This cone, though found in Carthage more often than in Phœnicia itself, must have been at one time very common as a symbol in that country. Probably some would regard it as of phallic origin, but that seems to be doubtful. It is not impossible that it had some connexion with the small *cippi* with an ovoid top found at Sidon.‡ These also recall the objects with pyramidal or hemispherical tops* found at Tharros, one of which,† adorned with the sun and the crescent moon reversed above it, is flanked by two truncated cones with mouldings at the top. In connexion with these cones, it is noteworthy that Esarhaddon possessed a large clay seal,‡ formed like half an egg, upon the flat face of which is a cone surmounted by a bird, recalling the similar objects set up in the temples of Aphrodite at Cyprus.§ This, whilst showing a connexion between the cone and the hemisphere, at the same time suggests that they are of different origin.

Esarhaddon's half-egg seal, besides giving the cone with the dove on it, has, on one side of that emblem, the sun as an eight-rayed star, and, on the other, the moon and seven globular objects, emblematic of the seven planetary bodies, which, in all probability, corresponded with the seven deities whom the Assyro-Babylonians called the *Igigi*. As the sun and the moon are often represented on the votive inscriptions of Carthage,‖ it is probable that these emblems also occurred very frequently in the art of the Phœnicians in their own country. Other emblems, however, accompany them—the triangle emblematic of the cone, the top finished with arms (bent at the elbow and directed upwards), and a circle at the top of the cone representing a head; ¶ the raised right hand, palm outwards;** the candelabrum surmounted by a pyramid;†† the staff with a globe at the top surmounted by the broken ring emblematic of the crescent moon when a mere broken circlet of light;†† the plinth with the three truncated cones †† (apparently simplified forms of the two with cornices, flanking one with a pyramid on the top, already described). Such are the simple representations of the divine which the Phœnicians, apparently when uninfluenced by the nations around, produced. It is possibly an augmentation of the feeling of powerlessness in representing the deity which made their relatives and near neighbours, the Jews, go a step further, and seek to discard every image which might seem to recall idol-worship. Even a symbol derived from a living creature was a thing to be avoided.

As a type of a male divinity more or less Phœnician in character may be mentioned Baal Hammon, who, in a terra-cotta figure belonging to the Barre collection,‡‡ appears as a man in the flower of his age, with ram's horns on either side of his head, his hands resting on the heads of the rams which form the supports of the arms of his throne. A terra-cotta figure seated on a throne seems to show Tanit, his consort, the Astarte of Carthage, holding a dove in her left hand.§§ This is very roughly formed, and was apparently one of the little statuettes made in great numbers for exportation. A strange creation on the part of the Phœnicians was the pigmy-god—a little man with exceedingly short body and legs and a very large head, holding in his left hand a shield of curious shape.‖‖ These are said to be the dwarf-gods which became the pigmies of the Greeks.

* Perrot-Chipiez, *Phénicie*, p. 78 and fig. 28.
† Donaldson, *Architectura Numismatica*, No. 10, reproduced in Perrot-Chipiez, *Phénicie*, fig. 19.
‡ Perrot-Chipiez, *ib.* fig. 121.
* Perrot-Chipiez, *Phénicie*, figs. 172 and 173. † *Ib.* fig. 174.
‡ Now in the possession of Mr. W. Harding Smith.
§ Gerhard, *Akademische Abhandlungen*, reproduced in Perrot-Chipiez, *Phénicie*, fig. 202.
‖ *CIS*, Pars i. tom. ii. tab. ii. 456, 468, lv. 536, 545, etc.; Perrot-Chipiez, *ib.* fig. 20.
¶ *CIS*, Pars i. *passim*; Perrot-Chipiez, *ib.* figs. 14, 29, 192.
** *CIS*, Pars i. *passim*; Perrot-Chipiez, *ib.* figs. 14, 192. On Babylonian cylinder-seals of *c.* 2000 B.C. the hand has as many as seven fingers, including the thumb (Peek, *Tablets*, pp. 64, 66).
†† Perrot-Chipiez, *ib.* fig. 232 (from Lilybæum).
‡‡ *Ib.* fig. 25.
§§ *Ib.* fig. 20. Sometimes she is represented standing, wearing a pointed head-dress with thick plaits of hair descending to her shoulders, holding her robe with her right hand and the dove in her left (*ib.* fig. 142).
‖‖ *Ib.* fig. 22.

The inventive powers of the Phœnicians therefore tended towards the grotesque rather than the dignified and serious, and they were at their best as copyists. The upper part of the stele of Yehaw-melek, notwithstanding its weathered state, is a noteworthy specimen of their skill.* It shows Yehaw-melek, clothed in a Persian costume, standing before Baalat Gebal, the 'Lady of Gebal,' offering a dish probably containing the precious things which he presented to her. The 'Lady of Gebal,' however, is in Egyptian form and dress, seated and holding a lotus-staff. In her attributes she closely resembles the Egyptian Isis, and the style of the carving (relief within a sunken outline) shows Egyptian influence. At the top of the stele a mortice-hole indicates where the Egyptian disc with uræus-serpents was placed (probably carved in metal), and from this point curved wings sweep down on each side, like a canopy over the god and the king. A very fine specimen of Phœnician bronze-work reproduced by Perrot and Chipiez† seems to show the same goddess, the style differing somewhat from that of true Egyptian work. There is the disc, with the horns of the moon strangely shaped, surmounting her head, and the uræus rises upon her forehead. Perrot points out that, just as the type of the infant Ptah was appropriated by the Phœnicians to represent their Kabires and pigmies, so they borrowed Isis-Hathor to represent Astarte.

The pigmy-god already referred to‡ seems to be simply an exaggerated type of the Egyptian Bes, which the Phœnicians had also adopted.§ A very fine piece of glazed earthenware is that figured by Perrot and Chipiez in their monumental work (p. 408);‖ and if it really be Phœnician (it was found in Cyprus), it shows an imitative skill such as the cleverest forger might envy. Bes, with feathered head-dress, precisely as found in Egypt, is sitting astride upon a woman's shoulders. The latter, who holds him by the feet, stands upon a little lotus-pedestal, suggesting that the whole formed the top of a staff in the Egyptian style. In the opinion of Perrot, it is the woman's figure—naked, short, and broad—that stamps this work of art as being Phœnician rather than Egyptian.

But in all probability one of the finest efforts on the part of a Phœnician sculptor to produce the type of a divinity is preserved on the Stele of Amrit, in the de Clercq collection.¶ The owner called it the 'Phenico-Hittite Stele of Amrit,' on account of the group's likeness to certain rock-sculptures at Pterium, where a goddess is shown traversing the mountains whilst standing on the back of a lion. In this case it is a god wearing the crown of Upper Egypt with the ostrich feathers, and a close-fitting tunic in the Egyptian style, with a knotted girdle. In his left hand he holds by its hind legs a lion-cub, and in his right he raises a curved weapon like the so-called 'boomerang,' which the Assyrian hero of the sculptures of Khorsabad, who grasps in his arm a lion, likewise carries. His legs are thick and muscular, as in the Assyrian sculptures, and one foot is placed upon the head, and the other upon the curved tail, of the lion upon which he stands. The animal in question is represented walking over rocky ground, also indicated much in the Assyrian manner. Immediately above the deity's head is the crescent moon with the sun within; and forming an arch above his head, conforming to the shape of the stele, are the drooping plumes of the Egyptian winged disc. Except for the thickness of the legs and the shortness of the arms, the human form is well-proportioned, and the lion also is fairly good. It is therefore a good piece of work, and, whilst illustrating the art of the Phœnicians, is at the same time a symbol of their religion—a Phœnician idea on an Assyro-Babylonian foundation, and a Hittite design in an Egyptian dress.* There is nothing Greek in it—perhaps it was before contact with that nation, as the early style of the Phœnician inscription which it bears seems to imply. According to Philippe Berger, the deity mentioned in the dedication is probably Shôrbêl—a reading which Clermont Ganneau admits as possible, although he himself is rather inclined to read Shadrapha (Satrape).

There is naturally some doubt as to how far the Phœnicians, when they came into contact with the Greeks, imitated their art. That there are objects in the Greek style which are due to Phœnicians is undoubted, but they may have been merely ordered from Greek sculptors. This is well illustrated by the coin figured by Donaldson in *Architectura Numismatica* (No. 20),† where, in a Greek temple with a strangely un-Greek fan-shaped pediment, a winged Victory in purely Greek style, mounted on a pedestal, crowns with laurel a princely conqueror, equally Greek, holding a crozier. In fact, the whole coin may have been by a Greek engraver A votive stele representing a shrine,‡ which was found at Carthage, and is now in the museum at Turin, is regarded as being purely Greek work. The goddess is Persephone Cora, veiling herself as a bride, and holding in her left hand a basket of pomegranates. In the pediment above is the panther of Dionysus. Though dedicated by Melekiathon the Suffete, not only the art, but also the subject, is Greek. In Cyprus the story of Hercules was probably a favourite subject, as certain objects illustrating his tenth labour, the carrying away of the flocks of Geryon, show. In the bas-relief,§ Hercules is represented with considerable artistic skill, but the statues‖ are inferior, though some are not without merit.

The statuettes representing the worship of the power of reproduction are, as usual in the East, not in the best style of art. The mother goddess, as Perrot calls her, whether holding an infant or not,¶ is represented as thick and heavy; and the women pressing their breasts**—reproductions, perhaps, of votaries of Astarte—are far from being equal to some of the figures of a similar nature found in Babylonia. Certain figures thought to be Phœnician prototypes of the Venus de Medici are regarded as later than the Greek period, and therefore due to Greek influence. They show a female pressing one breast and hiding with the other hand the part which, in real Phœnician work, the artist intended to show openly. The best specimen†† is from Livadia, near Larnaca, and wears an Egyptian head-dress. In the purely Semitic figures, there is a direct and naïvely brutal allusion, as Perrot says, to the mysteries of fecundation and generation, but the thought which the Greek artist wished to awaken was quite different; it was Venus ashamed—the representative of woman.

Religious ceremonies are rare. One—that representing Yehaw-melek before the 'Lady of Gebal'—has already been referred to. Another—a mere fragment—seems to be simply a mural decoration.‡‡

* *CIS*, Pars I. tom. i. tab. i.; Perrot-Chipiez, *Phénicie*, fig. 23.
† Perrot-Chipiez, *ib.* fig. 26. ‡ *Ib.* fig. 22, described above.
§ *Ib.* fig. 21. ‖ Fig. 279.
¶ *Catalogue méthodique et raisonné, publié par M. de Clercq*, tom. ii. pl. xxxvi.; Perrot-Chipiez, *ib.* fig. 283.

* A similar design (a deity standing on the back of a lion) appears on a silver coin of Tarsus (de Luynes, *Numismatique des satrapies*, pl. vii. fig. 8; Perrot-Chipiez, *Phénicie*, fig. 285).
† Reproduced in Perrot-Chipiez, *ib.* fig. 67.
‡ *Gazette archéologique*, t. vii. pl. xvii.; *Phénicie*, fig. 326.
§ Perrot-Chipiez, *ib.* fig. 387.
‖ *Ib.* figs. 389–391. ¶ *Ib.* figs. 377 and 143.
** *Ib.* figs. 375, 379, 380. A better specimen, however, is that in the British Museum, from Tharros (Perrot-Chipiez, fig. 291).
†† *Ib.* fig. 382. ‡‡ *Ib.* fig. 81.

It was found in the neighbourhood of Tyre, not far from Adlun, and represents a personage, seated on a throne, holding in the left hand an object which cannot now be determined. Before him is a candelabrum or stand surmounted by a pan in which a flame is seen, whilst beside the throne or seat is a head with Egyptian head-dress, evidently part of a sphinx as supporter. The border-ornament recalls some of the designs of Assyria. This piece is extremely good, and shows what the true Phœnicians were capable of. Of an entirely different style is the statue of the Sacrificer, in the Metropolitan Museum, New York.* This shows a beardless man, with plump cheeks (perhaps a eunuch, as the Babylonian priests seem sometimes to have been), carrying a ram for sacrifice upon his shoulders, the feet, which come down in front, being held tightly and determinedly with both his hands. The style is that of the artists of Cyprus.

Greatly affected by the religion of the nations around, the Phœnicians absorbed from them ideas which they carried beyond the limits of their own domain. Strangely susceptible, they in like manner were strongly influenced by the religious art of their neighbours, which, when they migrated, they carried to other lands and modified. A series of different styles was the result, and the task of studying and understanding these is a long and difficult one. Nevertheless, it is a branch of archæology of considerable importance, though it must be admitted that the material from the various spheres of Phœnician influence is generally insufficient for a complete picture to be gained. The destruction of their temples and divine emblems and statues in Western Asia adds to the difficulty of the study; but the remains, such as they are, have a value quite their own, and reflect the religious feelings of a strong people who accomplished important work in their time. T. G. PINCHES.

ART (Shinto).—The genius of Shinto, like that of Islām, is adverse to the development of the arts of painting and sculpture. With few exceptions, no idols or paintings of the gods are to be seen in Shinto shrines. The deity is represented by a mirror, sword, stone, or other object, which is shut up in a box, and is never seen by the worshipper. In many cases the priest himself does not know what the box contains. In pre-historic times there was a practice of setting up a row of terra-cotta figures of men and animals round the tombs of Mikados, in substitution for an older custom of burying the servants of the deceased and other victims up to the neck, and leaving them to die and be devoured by dogs and crows. Several of these figures have been preserved in the Imperial Museum at Tokyo, and there is one in the Gowland Collection of the British Museum. They are of an extremely rude and primitive workmanship. This practice, however, does not appear to have given rise to a school of glyptic art, and in any case it is not directly associated with Shinto, which abhorred all connexion with death. In more modern times there is a custom of expressing gratitude to the Kami for answered prayer by making *ex voto* offerings to the shrine of pictures representing miraculous escapes from shipwreck, etc. Several of the more important shrines have galleries for the reception of such mementoes. They have no great importance in the history of Japanese art. Such galleries are called *emado*, or 'picture-horse hall,' one of the most common pictures being that of a horse—in substitution for the real living horse, which is a favourite Shinto offering. The 'seven gods of good fortune' are a common subject for the Japanese artist, but here we are dealing with quite a modern development. Nearly all of these deities, though called *Kami*, are of Buddhist origin, and in their portraiture foreign influence is easily traceable. At the present day Shinto myth is not infrequently resorted to for subjects by the Japanese artist, more especially by the book-illustrator; and wood engravings, of no great artistic value, representing the gods are sold to the pilgrims to Shinto shrines as mementoes.

LITERATURE.—W. Anderson, *Catalogue of Japanese and Chinese Pictures in the British Museum*, London, 1886; Henri Joly, *Legend in Japanese Art*, London, 1907.

W. G. ASTON.

ART AND ARCHITECTURE (Teutonic).—The antiquities from Northern Europe give evidence of a high artistic development from the Stone Age downwards, but few finds of earlier date than the Iron Age can with any certainty be connected with the religious life of their owners. Of the heathen period there are no architectural remains except the graves, and the structural forms of these do not appear to have had any definite relation to the religious beliefs of the different periods to which they belong. Sacred buildings of any kind came late into use among the Teutonic races, and the scanty knowledge we possess of their temples is derived entirely from literary sources, and refers only to the last few centuries of heathendom.

1. In the Stone Age the antiquities as a whole show a remarkably high development of art. The elaborate finish of the finest examples in both pottery and weapons may imply that they were not intended for ordinary purposes, but were reserved for religious ceremonies.

Many of the axes found are obviously not made for use. Some are too thin, others too small, others have shaft holes only large enough to admit a cord, and miniature axes of amber are also common. All these are doubtless votive offerings of some sort, in all probability dedicated to the god of thunder.

2. The Bronze Age in the North is also distinguished by the artistic skill of its productions, but foreign influences may now be recognized. At first the types resemble those found in the Ægean area, and the spirals and zigzag lines so common in Mycenæan art are a frequent form of ornamentation. The most notable relic of this period is the 'disc and horse of the sun' from Nordseeland, Denmark, usually dated about B.C. 1000.

It consists of a round bronze plate mounted on wheels and drawn by a horse also on wheels, and is, no doubt, intended to symbolize the sun's passage across the heavens. The face of the disc is overlaid with gold and ornamented with spirals, and the figure of the horse strongly recalls the animals of the Dipylon style of Greece.

At a later period of the Bronze Age there are evidences of Etruscan influences in the art, and many objects have been found that are clearly imported from Etruria. Among those of native workmanship are a number of beautiful gold vessels which seem too precious for private purposes, and were probably dedicated to religious uses. Such are the eleven gold vessels with long handles that were found at Rømminge, carefully placed inside a large bronze vase, and the two gold bowls with similar long handles, terminating in horses' heads, found with a couple of smaller gold bowls in Seeland. Other objects certainly connected with the worship of the gods are the little bronze cars on four wheels, apparently made to carry large sacrificial vessels, from Sweden, Denmark, and North Germany.

Religious symbols were frequently used in the ornamentation of the Bronze Age. The wheel cross, the symbol of the sun, occurs first in the Stone Age, and is found on many of the earlier objects of bronze. It is later replaced by the

* Perrot-Chipiez, *Phénicie*, fig. 402.

swastika,* and the *triskele* also appears, both of which symbols are common to all the Aryan races, and are universally agreed to have a religious signification. These same sacred signs are seen on the rock carvings from Behistan and elsewhere, which belong to this period. The purpose of these carvings is not clear; they consist of geometrical figures, ships, weapons, and other objects, animals and persons, and it seems probable that at least some of these represent the gods and their attributes.

3. In the first centuries after the introduction of iron the grave finds are scanty, and there is a scarcity of gold objects. This is partly due, no doubt, to the fact that the tribes of the North were at this time subjected to a strong Celtic influence, and it was the universal custom among the Celts to bury little else with the dead than their mere personal equipment. This Celtic influence introduced foreign elements into the style of the art, but was soon almost entirely supplanted by the spread of the classical culture due to the Roman conquests in Central Europe. Many of the finest antiquities from the graves and the bog deposits belonging to the first four centuries of the Christian era are unmistakably of Roman workmanship.

The most important of the native works of this earlier Iron Age appear to be connected with religion. Of these the earliest are the two four-wheeled chariots with long shafts, found in a bog at Deibjerg in Jutland. They are made of ash-wood, and the sides, shaft, and frame are richly adorned with bronze-work. The *swastika* is among the ornaments used. These cars are supposed to have been employed in religious ceremonies, and possibly to have been sacred carriages for images of the gods, such as are mentioned later in the sagas. Fragments of a similar one, however, which had evidently been burnt, were found inside a large bronze vessel in a grave at Fynen, so that, in this case at least, the car seems to have been given not to the gods, but to the dead man for his use in a future life. Cars have been found under similar circumstances in Celtic graves in France and the Rhine country, so that the peculiar disposal of the Fynen car may be due to imitation of a foreign custom.

Somewhat later in date, and showing a mixture of Celtic and Roman influences, is the beautiful silver bowl from Gundestrupp in Jutland. This was, no doubt, a sacred vessel, like the gold bowls of the Bronze Age already referred to; and we may compare in this connexion the statement of Strabo (p. 293), that the Cimbri sent their 'holiest bowl' to Augustus. Other bowls of similar shape to the Gundestrupp bowl have been found, but although it was in all probability made in the North, it is quite un-Northern in both style and subject. The subjects are drawn partly from classical art (there is, for example, an obvious imitation of Hercules and the Nemean lion), and partly from Celtic sources, as the representation of the Gallic god Cernunnos, with his stag-horns, ring, and serpent.

4. To the close of the Roman period, *i.e.* to the 4th cent. A.D., belong what are perhaps the finest of all the Northern antiquities—the two magnificent gold horns from Gallehus in Jutland. It is supposed that they were used as trumpets in religious services, and parallel instances can be quoted from many peoples of antiquity. Both the horns are of solid gold, and decorated with bands of carved figures; one has runes around the top, but these give only the maker's name. Both were incomplete when found. The significance of the figures upon them is not certain; various explanations have been given, and it seems probable that they have a mythological meaning, and refer to legends of the gods.

5. The later centuries of heathendom in the North may be divided into two periods: (*a*) a time very rich in gold ornaments of every kind, owing to the vast quantities of gold obtained from Byzantium; (*b*) the age of the Vikings, to which belongs the splendid profusion of silver ornaments to be seen in the museums of Copenhagen and Stockholm.

(*a*) In the first of these periods, *i.e.* from the 4th to the 8th cents. A.D., the only objects that appear to have any close connexion with religion are the gold bracteates. These were worn as pendants and necklaces, and were originally copies of Roman coins of the 4th cent., although the types soon became greatly altered, and the later bracteates appear to have a religious signification. The sacred symbols of the *swastika* and *triskele* appear on many of them, and when placed beside a human head may imply that a god is represented. The most common device is a head above a four-footed animal, and in some cases the latter seems to have a pointed beard and to be intended for a goat, an animal sacred to Thor. On others Odin is possibly to be identified, surrounded by snakes, or riding on his horse Sleipnir, with a sword in his right hand and a spear in his left, and fighting against the Midgaard serpent. Other bracteates have interlacing designs ending in animal forms—which shows that the beautiful animal ornamentation, which was elaborately developed later, already existed. This peculiar style of decoration, so characteristic of the later Northern art, seems not to have arisen from a desire to represent the animals sacred to the gods, but to be derived from creatures unfamiliar to the North, namely, the lions and griffins of classical art.

(*b*) When we reach the second, or Viking, period of the later Iron Age, we have evidence from literature, as well as from antiquities, of religion in art. Of the antiquities, the most important are the runic stones that were set up over the graves. On some of these are figures which appear to depict the gods; for example, a stone from Tjängvilde shows a figure riding on a horse with eight legs, probably intended for Odin on Sleipnir; and on the Sanda stone there are three figures in a special panel, which have been interpreted as the three chief gods, Thor, Odin, and Frey. On many of these stones Thor is invoked in the runes, and his hammer is carved to consecrate and protect the grave. Little silver pendants in the form of hammers have been found, and were doubtless worn as amulets, but these do not appear until the 10th cent., and were probably due to the influence of the cross-wearing Christians.

Under the head of amulets may be reckoned the figure of a boar, which was frequently placed on the crest of the helmet for protection in battle. This custom is referred to by Tacitus (*Germania*, 45), and there are several allusions to it in *Beowulf* (*e.g.* 303, 1113). It should presumably be connected with the golden boars of Frey and Freya mentioned in the sagas.

Two warriors wearing helmets surmounted by figures of boars are represented on one of four small iron plates from a cairn in Öland. That these plates were used to adorn helmets is evident from the similar bronze plates on the helmets from Vendel. The examples from Öland, as well as the majority of those from Vendel, are supposed to portray scenes of Scandinavian mythology. Thus

* The *swastika*, or cross with bent arms, in its simplest form appears thus , but is often elaborated into . Similarly the *triskele*, the three-armed figure, from , becomes .

one of the Vendel plates shows a cavalier armed with shield and spear, preceded and followed by a bird, and attacking a serpent; this is interpreted as Odin with his ravens Huginn and Muninn, and may be compared with the gold bracteate described above.

Regarding actual idols our only information is derived from literary sources. From the sagas we gather that the figures of gods set up in the temples were life-size, made of wood, and richly adorned with gold and silver. Thus in Olaf Tryggvason's saga, when Gunnar fought with the image of Frey and drove out the fiend inhabiting the idol, 'nothing remained but the mere stock of a tree,' and Gunnar, dressing himself in Frey's apparel, was accepted by the people as the god. Again, in the saga of Olaf the Saint a figure of Thor is described as 'a huge man's image gleaming with gold and silver . . . he bore the likeness of Thor, and had a hammer in his hand . . . he was hollow within, and had a great stand on which he stood when he came out.'

Other images are described as wearing bracelets, necklaces, and similar ornaments. The different gods seem usually to have been invested with their own peculiar attributes—Thor with his hammer or with sceptre as chief god, and Odin armed with sword and spear.

We also hear of smaller figures of the gods, such as the image of Frey which Ingimund carried in his pocket, and the ivory image of Thor which Halfred was accused of secretly carrying in his purse.

6. Turning to the heathen architecture, what knowledge we possess of the temples is gleaned from the literature of the North. Until the last few centuries of heathendom, the Teutonic races appear to have worshipped in the open air, Tacitus (*op. cit.* 9) saying: 'The Germans deem it inconsistent with the majesty of their gods to confine them within walls.' The temples that we hear of in the sagas apparently consisted of two parts: an oblong hall, the *langhús*, with an apse-shaped building, the *afhús*, at one end. It is possible that these two parts were originally separate, and that the round form of the *afhús* is due to its having taken the place of the sacred tree that was, in earlier times, the centre of worship. In this case the *langhús* would represent the dwelling of the chief (who officiated as priest) beside the tree. This *langhús* appears to have been copied directly from the simplest form of dwelling-house, and was used for the sacrificial feasts, but possessed no great sanctity. The *afhús* was the sanctuary proper, and contained the images of the gods, among whom Thor always occupied the chief place. Here also were the altar with the oath ring, the blood kettle, and the perpetual fire.

The temples were almost always constructed of wood, but the exterior as well as the interior was doubtless often ornamented. Adam of Bremen describes the chief temple of Sweden, that at Upsala, as a magnificent gilded structure. When Christianity finally drove out the old superstitions from the North, the temples were in most cases pulled down and destroyed; but the sanctity of the sites remained, and many Christian churches still mark the spots where the heathen gods were originally worshipped.

LITERATURE.—In addition to frequent references throughout the sagas, special mention may be made of S. Müller, *Nordische Altertumskunde*, 2 vols., Strassburg, 1897-98, and *Urgesch. Europas*, Strassburg, 1905; O. Montelius, *Die Kultur Schwedens in vorchristlicher Zeit*, Berlin, 1885; J. Worsaæ, *Primeval Antiquities of Denmark*, London, 1849; G. Vigfusson and F. Y. Powell, *Corpus Poeticum Boreale*, Oxford, 1883.

C. J. GASKELL.

ILLUSTRATIONS

FIG. 1. FROM THE LINDISFARNE GOSPELS.
ANGLO-IRISH. CIR. 700 A.D.



FIG. 2. FROM THE CHARTER OF KING EDGAR TO NEW MINSTER,
WINCHESTER. A.D. 966.

FIG. 3. FROM THE PSALTER OF ISABELLA OF FRANCE, SISTER OF ST. LOUIS. PARISIAN, CIR. 1260 70 A.D.



FIG. 4. FROM ODO OF ASTI'S COMMENTARY ON THE PSALMS. ITALIAN, CIR. 1125 A.D.



FIG. 5. FROM A 'PSALTER OF ST. JEROME' AND PRAYERS, WRITTEN AT NAPLES IN 1481 FOR POPE SIXTUS IV.

FIG. 6. FROM THE ANTIPHONER OF THE CISTERCIAN NUNS OF BEAUPRÉ, NEAR GRAMMONT. A.D. 1290.



FIG. 7. FROM A VULGATE BIBLE IN THE BRITISH MUSEUM (I.D.I.) WRITTEN IN ENGLAND IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 13TH CENTURY.



FIG. 8. FROM AN APOCALYPSE AT THE BODLEIAN LIBRARY, WRITTEN IN ENGLAND FOR EDWARD I. TOWARDS THE END OF THE 13TH CENTURY.



FIG. 9. FROM A *BIBLE MORALISÉE* AT THE BRITISH MUSEUM (HARLEY MS. 1527).
FRENCH, MIDDLE OF THE 13TH CENTURY.



FIG. 11. FROM THE BOOK OF HOURS OF ADMIRAL PRIGENT DE COËTIVY.
PARISIAN, CIR. 1440 A.D.

FIG. 10. FROM THE ORMESBY PSALTER AT THE BODLEIAN LIBRARY (MS. DOUCE 366).
EAST ANGLIAN, CIR. 1300 A.D.

FIG. 1. SACRIFICE.

FIG. 3. LAYING ON OF HANDS.

FIG. 2. OFFERING.

HORUS RAMESES IV. THOTH.

FIG. 4. PURIFICATION.



FIG. 5. SACRED BOAT OF A GOD UPON ITS STAND.

FIG. 1. FRESCO ON THE INNER FRONT WALL OF QUSAIR 'AMRA.

FIG. 2. KAIRWAN. INTERIOR OF THE MOSQUE.

FIG. 3. ABŪ-DILIF (MESOPOTAMIA). ARCHES AND MINARET OF AN OLD MOSQUE.

FIG. 4. KAIRWAN. MINBAR OF THE GREAT MOSQUE.

FIG. 5. CAIRO. FAÇADE OF THE AL-AQMAR MOSQUE.

FIG. 6. BERLIN: KAISER FRIEDRICH MUSEUM. WOODEN TABLET, 1125 A.D.

FIG. 7. CAIRO. TOMBS OF THE MAMLŪKS.

FIG. 8. CAIRO. MOSQUE OF SULTAN ḤASAN, 1356–1359 A.D.



FIG. 10. VIENNA. HUNTING CARPET IN THE POSSESSION OF THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA.

FIG. 9. JERUSALEM. AL-AQṢĀ MOSQUE. MINBAR. 1168-69 A.D.



FIG. 11. GRANADA. ALHAMBRA. COURT OF THE LIONS.

THE END OF VOL. I.

Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics

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VOLUME II

ARTHUR—BUNYAN

NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
1928

ENCYCLOPÆDIA

OF

RELIGION AND ETHICS

ARTHUR, ARTHURIAN CYCLE.—The Arthurian cycle is a body of legend that has grown up around the name of the British hero, Arthur. There appears to be no reason for doubting that Arthur was one of the leaders of the Britons against the English in the 6th cent. A.D., but nothing further concerning him can be stated with certainty. Among the Britons themselves legends appear to have readily attached themselves to his name, as they did to the names of other British heroes, while to the original Arthurian legend itself legends of other heroes became appended, so that in the Middle Ages the Arthurian cycle of romance had attained an extraordinary development. In France, especially, the cycle was the successor in popularity to that of Charlemagne, and, like other legends, either in France or in Britain, it was combined with certain legendary narratives of the Church to form the story of the finding of the Holy Grail, the Cup from which Christ drank at the Last Supper.

The name Arthur is Brythonic (the Celtic tongue of the Britons), a language which came later to be differentiated into Welsh, Breton, and Cornish. Though Brythonic in form, the name Arthur is probably borrowed from Latin, like many other Brythonic names, such as Urien (Urbigena), Owein (Eugenius), Geraint (Gerontius), Padarn (Paternus), Emrys (Ambrosius), Custennin (Constantinus), Rhufawn (Romanus), Anarawd (Honoratus), Rhystud (Restitutus).* The Latin original of Arthur is Artorius, a name found in Greek letters in Clement of Alexandria, and at Khamisa in an inscription dedicated to the goddess Noreia by G. Artorius Tertullus. Another form of it is probably Artŭrius, found in Juvenal (*Sat.* iii. 29). The later Latinized form Arturus or Arthurus and the Irish Artur are based on the British form, and of this the French form Artus and the Italian Artù are also corruptions. In Wales the name Arthur does not appear to have been common, but there is an example of it in the *Book of Llan Dâv* (Oxf. 1893, pp. 77 and 133) and also in one of the pedigrees, as that of Arthur, father of Noe or Nouy (also written Nougoy), a member of the royal line of Dyfed (Demetia). In the Osney Charter of 1129 the name Gaufridus Arturus (probably Geoffrey of Monmouth) occurs as that of one of the witnesses. The fact that the name Arthur is a genuine phonetic derivative of a real, though rare, Latin name is strong evidence of its authenticity, and the probability is that it was preserved, like other Welsh names of the Saxon period, in some genealogy or rudimentary chronicle, such as the nucleus of Nennius, which Prof. Zimmer (in his *Nennius Vindicatus*) thinks was composed at Dumbarton or Carlisle.

Attempts have been made from the evidence of Arthurian place names to determine the region of Britain with which Arthur was most closely associated; but, in spite of the researches of Mr. Stuart-Glennie (author of *Arthurian Localities*) and others, it cannot be said that these attempts have been successful, inasmuch as the later popularity of Arthur led to the naming of many places after him. The oldest indications make it probable that, like other prominent post-Roman Britons, he came from the zone of the North. Certain ruling families of Wales, such as those of Coel, Cunedda Wledig, and Cynfarch, maintained even into mediæval times the tradition (supported by Nennius) that they were settlers in Wales from the North, and styled themselves in their pedigrees 'The Men of the North' (for the northern associations of the Arthurian and kindred legends see the writer's articles in the *Celtic Review* for Oct. 1907 and Jan. 1908 on 'Wales and the Ancient Britons of the North'). The northern zones in question appear to be two: (1) that of Caer Alclud (Dumbarton), and (2) that of Dineiddin (Edinburgh). In an early stratum of Arthurian legend Arthur seems to be closely associated with Caw o Brydyn (Caw of Pictland), the father of Gildas and Aneirin (a Welsh poet), and of many of the saints of Anglesey. In the 12th cent. *Life of Gildas*, Arthur is represented as making war against Hueil, king of Scotland, one of the sons of this Caw. How early the name of Arthur came to be associated with the local legends of Wales it is hard to say, but it is significant that the name of one of Arthur's closest companions, from the very first appearance of the legend in the Welsh literature, is that of Cai (the Sir Kay of the Romances), whose name is found in that of Caer Gai, near Bala in North Wales, a place also known as Caer Gynyr, after the name of Cai's father Cynyr. An old Welsh poem which survives in the *Red Book of Hergest* mentions a *Ffynnon Vedwyr* ('the Spring of Bedivere'), but its locality is unknown. Through its entry into local legend in Wales and in other parts of the Brythonic world, the name of Arthur became attached to the characteristic stories of Celtic folklore, of which numerous examples are given by Professor Sir John Rhys in his *Celtic Folklore, Welsh and Manx* (1901), notably to those of the Other World, a type in which the folklore of Celtic countries abounds. It is not necessary to suppose that the names which that

* In this art. the spelling of Celtic names follows that now generally adopted by Celtic scholars, except in a few cases, where the actual spelling of the mediæval documents has been retained.

of Arthur may have supplanted in such stories bore any resemblance to it in sound or derivation.

In dealing with the Arthurian cycle, it will be convenient to give its place, first, in the tradition found in Cymric literature; secondly, in the Chronicles; and, thirdly, in the Romances.

1. Arthur in Cymric tradition.—The chief MSS in which fragments of this tradition are to be found are: (1) *The Black Book of Carmarthen* (verse, 12th cent.), (2) *The Book of Aneirin* (verse, 13th cent.), (3) *The Book of Taliessin* (verse, early 14th cent.), (4) *The White Book of Rhydderch* (prose, 14th cent.), and (5) *The Red Book of Hergest* (prose and verse, late 14th and 15th cents.). *The Triads of Arthur and his Men*, which are found in a Hengwrt MS of the 13th cent., are also important, as showing with what other legendary cycles that of Arthur was then, and probably earlier, associated in Wales. A considerable amount of the matter contained in the MSS, especially in the case of the oldest poetry, is older than the period of the MSS themselves. The Cymric tradition has many affinities with that of Geoffrey of Monmouth, but it has many features which are quite independent of Geoffrey, and which show that, while Geoffrey in some points borrowed from it, he either neglected or was ignorant of certain other important portions of it.

Of those above named, the MS which gives the clearest indication of containing pre-Norman matter is the *Book of Aneirin* (now in the Cardiff Free Library), since in one of its poems the scribe, in the course of copying a poem called *Gorchan Maelderw*, departed from his usual practice of changing the orthography into that of his own time, and copied that of his archetype practically unmodified, thus showing that this archetype was written in a style of spelling in many points identical with that of the pre-Norman glosses of Wales. In this clearly pre-Norman poem the name of Arthur occurs in the words 'bei ef arthur' ('even if he were Arthur'). The poem in question is practically identical in many of its lines with the *Gododin*, which forms the main portion of the MS, and thus suggests that the name of Arthur was held in high respect in the zone of poetry to which the *Gododin* belongs. This zone is essentially one composed in praise of the family of Cynfarch, to which Cynon ab Clydno Eiddin, the chief hero of the *Gododin*, belonged, and also Urien Rheged, whose son Owein is the original of Chrétien de Troyes's *Yvain*. With this family was associated the poet Llywarch Hen, and Elphin, the friend of Taliessin, and other heroes, whose names with brief records of their memory are given in the *Gododin* in connexion with the battle of Cattraeth (one of the famous battles of Welsh bardic tradition), in which they were said to have taken part. From all indications, the historical stock-in-trade of the Welsh bards seems to have contained short lists of famous battles, such as Cattraeth, Gwenystrad, Argoed Llwyfain, Badon, and Camlan. The two last were among the chief battles of the Arthurian tradition. In Welsh, as in other legend, the prominent heroes of one period tended to sink into the background of action in that of a later date, or else to survive as vaguely imposing figures, present, as it were, behind the scenes. Cynon ab Clydno Eiddin, Caw of Pictland, and Brychan Brycheiniog are names of this type in Welsh mediæval literature, while in the Cymric Arthurian tradition Arthur's warriors undoubtedly play a much more active part in the story than he does himself. This fact has often been wrongly interpreted as implying that the legend of Arthur himself was not in any way developed in Wales (a view which, in face of the significant allusions to Arthur in Welsh literature, is quite untenable), while the truth seems to be that it was so long established in Wales that to it were attached other legends, whose heroes came to loom more largely in action than Arthur, their sovereign chief. In the stock-in-trade of the bards and story-tellers of Wales, from whom the remnants of old Welsh poetry and narrative have come down, Arthur appears to have held distinctly a place of honour, and the various portions in which this stock-in-trade of legend reveals itself bear witness to the same tale. This stock-in-trade, though the stories composing it were heterogeneous in origin and in local association, yet preserved a certain unity from its professional character, and portions of it can easily be detected in various parts of old Welsh literature. In the *Triads*, in the account of Arthur's Court found in *Kulhwch and Olwen*, in the *Book of Aneirin*, in a group of Arthurian poems in the *Black Book of Carmarthen*, in the *Stanzas of the Graves*, in the poetry of the *Book of Taliessin*, in the Llywarch Hen poems of the *Black Book of Carmarthen* and the *Red Book of Hergest*, certain associated groups of names come to view which show clearly the body of legend to which they belong. It is significant that in all these legendary clusters the name of Arthur appears. It is true that he is not once mentioned in the *Four Branches of the Mabinogi*, in the *Dream of Maxen*, or in *Lludd and Llevelys*; but the reason is that, in the *Mabinogion* in their present re-cast form, a certain chronological arrangement is implied which would make any reference to Arthur anachronistic in a story that was meant to be pre-Saxon. In the *Book of Taliessin* and in the lists of Arthur's men in *Kulhwch and Olwen*—the least altered of the *Mabinogion* stories—no such regard for chronology is shown, and in the latter Arthur is said to have been related to the 'Men of Caer Dathyl' on his mother's side. It is significant that, even in Chrétien and the later romances, many of the names of those who are associated with Arthur are those of well-known heroes of the Cymric tradition. If this tradition was carried into Cornwall or Brittany, the extreme scantiness of the heroic literature of these provinces in mediæval times makes it exceedingly difficult to judge of the extent of the transference, and it may well be that it was only fractional in character, though Arthur himself may have attained a high degree of legendary popularity, as Alanus ab Insulis suggests when he says in the second half of the 12th cent. that in Brittany any one who should deny Arthur's return would arouse the deep hatred of his hearers.

In the *Stanzas of the Graves* (given in the *Black Book of Carmarthen*), a series of verses kindred to the elegies of Llywarch Hen, the various heroes of the Cymric cycle are commemorated, and among them in one stanza are named March (the King Mark of the Tristan legend), Gwythur (the rival of the fairy king Gwyn, son of Nudd), Gugaun of the Red Sword, and Arthur. Each of the first three heroes is said to have a grave, but the grave o Arthur is said to be 'anoeth bid' ('the object fo which the world searches'). The word 'anoeth' meant 'difficult,' as it still does in the Dimetian dialect of Welsh, and was used for the object of a difficult search, as in the Arthurian story of *Kulhwch and Olwen*. In the *Black Book of Carmarthen*, where these stanzas occur, there are other poems that contain direct or indirect allusions to Arthur. For example, in an elegy upon Geraint, son of Erbin (the Erec of Chrétien de Troyes), Arthur, for whom Geraint is said to have fought at the battle of Llongborth, is called 'the emperor, the ruler of the toil.' The significance of an allusion such as this, as indicating the place of Arthur in Welsh story, is clear. The site of Llongborth is unknown, but the men of Geraint are

said to have come from the region of Dyfneint (the Dumnonii). Poem xxxi. in the same MS is clearly Arthurian; but it is important to observe that it is one of a group in which the story of Arthur is associated with a cluster of names from the bardic tradition. Poem xxx., for example, though it does not name Arthur, yet mentions his horse Cavall, the Cabal of Nennius, the mark of whose hoof, according to that chronicler, was left on a mountain near Builth when Arthur was hunting the Porcus Troit (y Twrch Trwyth). In *Kulhwch and Olwen*, Cavall is erroneously given as the name of Arthur's dog. In the same poem, too, is mentioned Owein Reged, the Yvain of Chrétien. In the obviously Arthurian poem (No. xxxi.) there is a picture of Arthur and his men that is entirely distinct from those of Geoffrey and the Romances, and much more akin to that of the story of *Kulhwch and Olwen*. Arthur and his men arrive at a fortress (for what purpose is not stated, but it may have been for the rescue of one of their lost companions). Among his men are Cei Wyn (Kei the Blessed); Bedwyr (Bedivere); Mabon, son of Modron (an old deity, Maponos, son of Matrona); Mabon, son of Mellt (Lightning); Manawyddan, son of Llyr (Manannan mac Lir of Irish legend, a hero of the *Four Branches*); Llacheu, Arthur's son (who is unknown to Geoffrey); and others. Some of the topographical allusions, such as those to Traetheu Trywruid (probably the Solway Firth) and Mynydd Eiddin (the mountain of Edinburgh, possibly Arthur's Seat), are to the North. As in *Kulhwch and Olwen*, expeditions to the wild country of the North, *gwrthtir uffern* ('the wild land of Hades'), as it is called, appear to have been a favourite theme of the Welsh Cymric Arthurian tradition; and for the men of North Wales, North Britain appears to have been the natural way of getting into the Other World by land, while the men of South Wales may have had their corresponding entrance into it in Cornwall. The poem in question, too, like the story of *Kulhwch and Olwen* and portions of the lives of the Welsh saints, describes Arthur and his men as being in conflict with certain pests, both animal and human, and, among the latter, with certain militant hags or witches (Welsh, *gwiddonod*). Even in the Welsh story of Peredur (the Percival of the Romances) there is an account of a conflict with the Witches of Gloucester (*Gwidonot Caerloyw*). One of the monsters mentioned in poem xxxi. is the 'Paluc cat' (*Cath Paluc*), also mentioned in one of the *Triads*. Poem xxxiii., though not referring to any exploits of Arthur, mentions his son Llacheu, 'the marvellous in song,' in words put into the mouth of a speaker who refers to certain other of the stock characters of the Welsh bardic tradition, such as Gwyn, son of Nudd; Creurdilad, daughter of Lludd (the Cordelia of Geoffrey); Guendoleu, son of Keidaw (the Gwenddoleu of the Myrddin legend); Bran, son of Iwerydd (the latter possibly his mother's name); and Gwyddneu Garanhir (a prominent character in a legend of inundation). With this poem is closely linked poem xxxv., which mentions Taliessin, while it also alludes to two of the chief characters of Math ab Mathonwy (Lleu and Gwydion), whose names and legends were associated with the places Nant Lleu (now Nantlle), Din Lleu (now Dinlle), and Bryn Gwydion in Carnarvonshire, and Moel Gwydion near Trawsfynydd in Merionethshire.

From this stock of narrative certain historical names other than that of Arthur, such as that of Maelgwn Gwynedd (the Maglocunos of Gildas), were far from being excluded, and that of Maelgwn occurs in this poem. As suggestive of the association of the Arthurian legend with Monmouthshire as well as with the North Wales scenes in question, it may be mentioned that the *Liber Landavensis* (early 12th cent.) alludes to two streams whose names are identical with those of Arthur's sons (Llecheu or Llacheu and Amhir) in the forms Lechou and Amir.

How persistent was the Welsh Arthurian tradition which mentioned Llacheu may be seen from the fact that he is given as a son of Arthur even in the late Powys story of *The Dream of Rhonabwy*, found in the Red Book text of the *Mabinogion*.

Again, the evidence from the *Book of Taliessin* points in the same direction. In this curious book there are scraps of Welsh legend interspersed with ideas derived from the current cosmology of the Middle Ages. In one passage, *Annwfn* (the Celtic 'Other World') is definitely located beneath the earth. Other poems imply that it contains a cluster of island fortresses, accessible from the sea. With the latter conception the Cymric Arthurian tradition has been linked in one of these poems, and the place of fortresses in this tradition is worthy of notice. No effort was apparently made to reconcile this belief in *Annwfn* with Christian teaching. It was simply conceived as a kind of counterpart of this world; for example, in the story of Pwyll, prince of Dyfed, it is a land divided into kingdoms. The view of it, reflected in *Kulhwch and Olwen*, as being accessible by land through Scotland, appears to be associated with the idea, found in the Welsh poetry of the 12th and 13th cents., that the ghosts of the dead wandered in *Coed Celyddon* ('the Caledonian forest'); and this was pictured as the scene also of the wanderings, accompanied by ghosts, of Merlinus Silvestris.

In one of the poems of the *Book of Taliessin*, Arthur and his men are represented as making expeditions to the island fortresses of *Annwfn* in Arthur's ship *Prydwen*. These expeditions were for various purposes, such as the releasing of one of his men, Gweir, from prison, and the carrying away of the cauldron of the Head of Hades (*pen Annwfn*): the latter would not boil the food of a coward, and was heated by a fire kindled by the breath of nine maidens. As further evidence of the Arthurian legend in Monmouthshire in at least the 12th cent., it may be stated that one of the place names mentioned in one of the boundaries (*Lib. Land.*, Oxf. ed. p. 207) is *Mesur Pritgruenn* ('the Measure of Prydwen'). The poem has an obscure allusion which connects the story of Arthur with that of Pwyll and Pryderi, just as the *Black Book of Carmarthen* poem associated Arthur with Pryderi's friend Manawyddan. One of the island fortresses referred to in this poem, Caer Vandwy, is mentioned also in the *Black Book of Carmarthen*, while another bears the remarkable name Caer Wydyr ('the Fortress of Glass'). Of Arthur the first line of this poem says: 'Who has extended his rule beyond the bounds of the Universe?' That Arthur's name was proverbial within the zone of this poetry is shown by a passing allusion to 'the valour of Arthur' in poem xlviii. of the same MS.

This undoubted feature of the connexion of Arthur and his men with the Other World in the Welsh tradition suggests that the name of Arthur's wife, Gwenhwyfar ('the White Spectre'), is part of the same circle of ideas, and that the introduction of this conception made possible a number of congenial plots, such as the loss and rescue of one of Arthur's warriors, the loves of Arthur's warriors with ladies from *Annwfn*, the introduction into literature of the dwarfs with whom *Annwfn* was peopled, the machinery of magic and the supernatural, with which Celtic folklore especially associated the fairies, the possibility of being rendered invisible (another fairy privilege), and other commonplaces of Celtic legend, such as are found in Welsh and Irish story as well as in the living folklore not only of Celtic but of other imaginative countries.

As illustrating the place of the idea of imprisonment and release in the Welsh Arthurian tradition, it may be stated that one of the *Triads* contains a supplementary statement referring to a fabulous imprisonment of Arthur himself. The triad reads: 'The three noble prisoners of the Isle of Britain, Llyr of imperfect speech, who was with Euroswydd in prison, and the second, Mabon, son of Modron, and the third, Gweir, son of Gweiryoed, and one who was nobler than all three was for three nights in the prison of Oeth and Anoeth, and was for three nights in prison with Gwenn Benn Dragon, and was for three nights in the prison of magic (or fairyland) under the slab of Echymeint, and that noble prisoner was Arthur, and the same youth released him from those three prisons, and that youth was Goreu, son of Custennin (Constantine), his cousin.'

This story certainly appears to reflect a phase of Arthurian legend coloured by the characteristic ideas of Celtic folklore. These ideas show

themselves, too, in the Welsh Arthurian story of *Kulhwch and Olwen*, where Arthur and his warriors are represented as hunting the Twrch Trwyth (the Orc or Torc Tréith of Irish legend), a fabulous boar, to which there are obscure references in Old Welsh poetry and in Nennius. Though this story refers to Arthur's expedition to *Annwfn* and to other pieces of legend connected with that sphere, yet, like the *Four Branches of the Mabinogi*, it is characterized by the minute localization of its topography, an indication of the close relation of the Arthurian legend to certain Welsh districts. In *Kulhwch and Olwen* the narrative bears signs of having been connected originally with the North, but in its present form it is chiefly connected with Pembrokeshire, Carmarthenshire, Cardiganshire, and Breconshire. It is pre-eminently a story that has grown by accretion. The Court of Arthur, as is usual in the Welsh tradition, is located at Gelliwig in Cornwall (Cernyw). It is possible, however, that Cernyw is a later substitute for some Welsh locality. There is in the peninsula of Lleyn in Carnarvonshire a mansion called Gelliwig, but the writer has been unable to discover how old the name is.

It is, perhaps, not irrelevant to mention that in this peninsula there are certain names which provide links with the Welsh Arthurian legend, such as Bodarnabwy (for Bod Gwernabwy), Dynfra (for Rhedynfre), Coetan Arthur ('Arthur's Quoit'), a fine cromlech near Sarn Feillteyrn, and Ffynnon Wenhwyfar ('Guinevere's Well'). In the same district, too, is Castellmarch ('Mark's Castle'); nor is the zone of Nant Gwrtheyrn ('Vortigern's valley'), Dinas Emrys ('the fortress of Ambrosius'), and Abererch, where Rhydderch Hael was said to have been buried, far off.

Of the Welsh tradition there are certain indications, too, in the historical poets of Wales which suggest that it differed in some forms of it from Geoffrey's version. For example, in elegies and eulogies men are compared in compliment to Medrod (Modred). Meilir, for instance, says of Gruffydd ab Cynan, who died in 1137, that he 'thrusted in the fore-front of battle like Medrod'; and Gwalchmai, Meilir's son, in praising Madog ab Maredudd, prince of Powys, says that he had the strength of Arthur and the gentleness of Medrod. Gwynfardd Brycheiniog, too, calls the Lord Rhys of South Wales the twin-brother of Medrod, prophesied by Myrddin (Merlin). One triad (Foerster, *Myv. Arch.*[2] p. 393*a*), which shows, it is true, signs of later modification, states that there were in Arthur's Court three royal knights, Nasiens, king of Denmark; Medrod, son of Llew, son of Cynfarch; and Hywel, son of Emyr Llydaw. They were, the triad says, men of such gentle, kindly, and fair words, that any one would be sorry to refuse them any request. Where the feud between Arthur and Medrod is mentioned, it is represented sometimes in a different light from the account of Geoffrey; nor is the sympathy of the tradition always with Arthur. For example, a blow given by Arthur to Medrod is called 'an evil blow,' like that given by Matholwch to Branwen.

In a triad referring to the three costly campaigns of the Isle of Britain, Medrod is said to have gone to Gelliwig in Cornwall, to have left in the Court no food or drink unconsumed, and to have dragged Gwenhwyfar from her queenly throne. Arthur in revenge is said to have gone to the Court of Medrod, and to have similarly consumed all the food and drink, and, further, to have left neither man nor beast alive in the Hundred. The story of the battle of Camlan, too, appears to have been differently treated in different forms of the Welsh tradition. One form ascribes it to a blow given by Gwenhwyfar to Gwenhwyfach—a blow which is called in a triad one of the evil blows of the Isle of Britain. Another triad speaks of this as one of the vain battles of the Isle of Britain, and attributes it to the rivalry of Gwenhwyfar and Gwenhwyfach. According to the story of *Kulhwch and Olwen*, Gwenhwyfach was Gwenhwyfar's sister. In the story of *The Dream of Rhonabwy*, the battle of Camlan is said to have been caused by the mischief wrought by Idawc Cord Prydein in the negotiations between Arthur and his nephew Medrod. The fact that one of the triads says that there were three Gwenhwyfars suggests that there were in Wales not one but several Arthurian traditions. Though the Welsh 14th-cent. poet Dafydd ab Gwilym mentions Melwas (as in the *Life of Gildas*) apparently as the abductor of Gwenhwyfar, it cannot be stated with certainty that he was so known to the Welsh tradition. The name Melwas, however, was not unknown to S.E. Wales, as we see from references to persons of that name (written Melguas) in the *Liber Landavensis*.

Possibly, in one form of the Welsh tradition Arthur and Medrod fought on the same side at Camlan, for one of the triads says that one of the evil counsels of the Isle of Britain was Arthur's decision to divide his men three times with Medrod at Camlan. It is not impossible that this was the view of the writer of the *Annales Cambriæ* (under the year 537), who gives Camlan as the battle in which Arthur and Medrod fell together (*corruere*).

As illustrating further the Welsh tradition, it may be stated that Cynddelw Brydydd Mawr, a leading poet of the 12th cent., locates Arthur's Court at Celliwig, and that he has allusions to Gwalchmai, Dullus, son of Eurei, Cai and his father Cynyr, Myrddin, Elifer, Llacheu, the bards of Manddwy, Gwyndoleu, the family of Cynvarch, the Twrch Trwyd, and the battles of Baddon and Camlan. Another poet, Bleddyn Fardd, refers to Arthur as the slayer of a certain Erthyst, and to the valour of Gwalhaved as proverbial. All these allusions, though only of a passing character, suggest undoubted acquaintance with the legend, and the independence of the Welsh tradition from Geoffrey.

2. Arthur in the Chronicles.—Under this head reference may be made first to the lives of certain Welsh saints, and then to the *Chronicles* proper. The *Life of St. Gildas*, written in 1160, according to one of the most distinguished of Arthurian scholars, M. Ferdinand Lot, represents Arthur as being in conflict with Hueil, king of Scotland, the son of Caw of Pictland, and brother of Gildas. The association of Arthur with the family of Caw suggests a stratum of legend of an early type, not unrepresented in the story of *Kulhwch and Olwen*. The same *Life* also represents Melwas, a petty king of Somerset, as having carried Gwenhwyfar away from Arthur. In the *Life of St. Cadoc*, Arthur and his companions, Cai and Bedwir, are represented as haunting the borders of Breconshire and Monmouthshire.

In this connexion it may be mentioned that the highest point of the Breconshire beacons was called in the time of Giraldus Cambrensis (12th cent.), 'Arthur's Throne.' The association of Arthur in Nennius with Builth, in the same county, has already been mentioned, and there are similar associations in the story of *Kulhwch and Olwen*. Again, in the *Life of St. Carannog* (the saint of Llangrannog in Cardiganshire), there is a reference to Arthur as hunting a very powerful, huge, and terrible serpent, which had laid waste twelve parts of the land of Carrum—a description of Arthur's activities which is in thorough keeping with the Welsh tradition.

The *Life of St. Illtud* speaks of Arthur as the saint's cousin, to whom Illtud becomes a soldier, but the site of Arthur's Court is not mentioned. Further, in the *Life of St. Padarn* there is a curious story told of Arthur, who is called a *tyrannus*, in which, owing to his cupidity, he is cursed by the saint and swallowed in the earth up to his chin. This story is probably connected with the place name Llys Arthur ('Arthur's Court'), in the parish of Llanbadarnfawr in North Cardiganshire. In the *Chronicles* proper Arthur first comes to view by name in Nennius (a composite work completed before the 9th cent.), the nucleus of which was a *Chronicle of North Britain*, written probably at Dumbarton or Carlisle. Gildas, though he does not name Arthur, mentions a battle of Badon (fought, according to the *Annales Cambriæ*, in 516), which Nennius gives by name as one of the battles of Arthur. This battle is frequently mentioned by Welsh poets as Gweith Fadon ('the action of Badon'). In Nennius, Arthur is called *Dux bellorum* in the account of his battles, and *miles* elsewhere. The names are given of twelve of his battles, one of which was fought in 'the wood of Celidon' (Caledonia). Some of the other battles were also probably in the North. In the Chronicle called *Annales Cambriæ*, there is a reference under A.D. 516 to Arthur's leadership of the Britons at the battle of Badon by carrying the cross on his shoulders for three nights. In Nennius's account of

one of the battles, it is said that Arthur bore the image of the Virgin on his shoulders. Geoffrey of Monmouth says that Arthur fastened on his shoulders his shield Pridwen (in the Welsh tradition Pridwen was his ship), on which was the image of the Virgin Mary. Possibly the discrepancy between Geoffrey's account and the others is due to the resemblance between the old Welsh pre-Norman for 'shoulder' (*iscuid*) and 'shield' (*iscuit*). The Cambridge MS of the 13th cent. explains this passage of Nennius by saying that Arthur went to Jerusalem, and made a cross of the size of the true cross. These passages are interesting as demonstrating the Welsh tendency, shown in the case of Bran, son of Llyr, and Lles ap Coel, to make Arthur into a Christian hero—a tendency which reached its full development in the story of the Grail. Another Chronicle of the same type as the *Annales Cambriæ*, the *Chronicle of St. Michael's Mount*, composed by a Breton possibly in the 11th cent., says, under the year 421: 'St. Gildas was born. In these days was Artus (Arthur) king of the Britons, brave and witty' (*fortis et facetus*).

That there was a flourishing Arthurian legend in Brittany in the second half of the 12th cent. is suggested by the statement of Alanus ab Insulis already quoted, and that in the 12th cent. the Arthurian legend flourished in Britain also is attested by William of Malmesbury (born about 1095), who says of 'the warlike Arthur': 'This is Arthur of whom the idle tales of the Britons rave wildly even to-day—a man certainly worthy of celebration, not in the foolish dreams of deceitful fables, but in truthful histories; since for a long time he sustained the declining fortunes of his native land and incited the uncrushed courage of his people to war.' It is not improbable that there was at this time a flourishing Arthurian tradition in Glastonbury itself, in which place this historian was specially interested, and it is not out of place to mention that Glastonbury owned land in the beginning of the 12th cent. in the neighbourhood of Caerleon (see Adam de Domerham, *Charters of Glastonbury Abbey*). The popular view of Arthur may be reflected in Henry of Huntingdon's designation of him as 'leader of the soldiers and kings of Britain.' It was Geoffrey of Monmouth, however, who, in his *Historia Regum Britanniæ*, expanded and dignified the meagre annals of the Britons as given in Nennius by incorporating in them a number of stories (largely ætiological), together with matter based on the Welsh genealogies and on floating local legend, and by making the story of Arthur, as an Imperial figure, the culmination of these legends for the glory of Britain and his native county of Monmouth, wherein Caerleon, the seat in Geoffrey of Arthur's Court, was situated.

In this narrative Arthur is represented as the son of Uther-pendragon and Igerna (in Welsh *Eigr*). He becomes king at the age of fifteen, and his subsequent career is a succession of conquests, which culminate in an attempt to conquer Rome itself. In the very zenith of his power, and when within reach of the Imperial dignity, he is recalled to Britain owing to the usurpation of his throne by Modred (the Welsh *Medrod*), his nephew, and the latter's marriage to Ganhumara (Gwenhwyfar). In a great battle in Cornwall, Modred is killed, and Arthur is mortally wounded and carried to the Isle of Avallon (Glastonbury) to be healed. The note of tragedy in the story of Arthur is in keeping with other stories in Welsh literature, such as those of Pryderi, Bran, and Llew Llaw Gyffes in the *Four Branches of the Mabinogi*.

Geoffrey's form of the Arthurian legend (apart from his own pseudo-historical amplifications) was probably derived from the South Wales border and South-West Britain. It is needless to say that it is largely coloured by the ideas of the 12th cent., and traces of the spirit of chivalry and knight-errantry are already present. This book became exceedingly popular, and Henry of Huntingdon (some time after 1139) made an abridgment of it in his letter to Warinus. Benedict of Gloucester, too, gave a sketch of the Arthurian period in his *Life of St. Dubricius*. Afterwards came Thomas de Loches (about 1147) with a similar narrative in his *Gesta Comitum Andegavensium*. The chief successors of Geoffrey, however, were Geoffrey Gaimar (probably a little before 1150), whose *History of the Britons* unfortunately has been lost, Wace (in poetry), the author of the Anglo-Norman *Brut*, and Layamon, the author of a *Brut* in English verse. Wace's *Brut* is in the main a free paraphrase of Geoffrey's *History*, but in style it is often more romantic. His descriptions of love, for example, are not unlike those given by the Arthurian poet Chrétien de Troyes. Wace shows more of the spirit of chivalry than Geoffrey, and he appears to know many more stories about Arthur than he narrates. It is he who first introduced into literature the story of Arthur's Round Table, about which, he says, the Britons tell many a fable. Layamon came from Arley Regis in North Worcestershire, on the banks of the Severn, and may have been familiar with living Arthurian tradition. His narrative is based on that of Wace, which he treats even more freely than Wace treats that of Geoffrey. It may be noted that Layamon goes further than Geoffrey or Wace in naming the exact place of Arthur's final defeat, which he locates at Camelford in Cornwall, doubtless having in mind the Welsh *Camlan*. Of Latin metrical versions of Geoffrey, the chief were the *Gesta Regum Britanniæ* and the *Epitome Historiæ Britannicæ*. In spite of its popularity, Geoffrey's *History* was not allowed to escape criticism; it was violently denounced by William of Newburgh, and also by Giraldus Cambrensis, who accepts, however, important sections of the Arthurian story. A similar attitude was adopted in the middle of the 14th cent. by Ralph Higden. The longest account of the supposed discovery of Arthur's tomb at Glastonbury is given by Giraldus Cambrensis in his *de Principis instructione* (written about 1194). Of the later writers who followed Geoffrey, the most important is Holinshed (1577), from whose work the substance of Geoffrey became known to Shakespeare and other English poets.

3. **The Arthurian cycle in the Romances.**—The chief development of the Arthurian cycle combined with other cycles, both British and foreign, is found in the *Romances*, and the centre of this type of literary development was France. This development was undoubtedly stimulated largely by Geoffrey's *History* and the paraphrases of his successors, but the romances contain features of the Arthurian legend which are clearly independent of the *Chronicles*. In France, the chief poetic exponents of the Arthurian legend were Marie de France, Chrétien de Troyes, and Robert de Borron. In Chrétien de Troyes, especially, there are so many proper names—as Uriiens (Urien), Yvain (Ywein), Erec (Gereint), Keus (Kei), Bedivere (Bedwyr), Gauvain (Gwalchmai), Ider fil Nut (Edern, son of Nudd), Brons (Bran), Carados Briébraz (Caradog Freichfras), Ganievre (Gwenhwyfar), Tristans (Trystan), Melianz (Melwas), Maheloas (Maelwas), Bilis (Beli), Brangiens (Branwen), not to speak of others which are less obvious,—which are so clearly identical with well-known names of the Welsh tradition, that the existence of some relation to this tradition, whether direct or indirect, is obvious. Though the legend of Arthur himself flourished in Brittany, it is very doubtful whether the heterogeneous yet professedly connected mass of legends which the above names imply existed in Brittany, as it undoubtedly did in Wales. In spite of the opinion of Prof. Zimmer, it is perhaps simplest to accept the view that the Arthurian and other legends of the Welsh

tradition made their way into French literature through the contact of the Normans in the 11th cent. with the men of Breconshire, Glamorgan, and Monmouth. These districts were rapidly Normanized, and intermarriages of Normans and Welshwomen were frequent. This zone, too, was in close touch with Glastonbury and with other important monasteries, and monasteries such as this and Fécamp played no small part in the dissemination and development of the Arthurian and other legends. As for the lays of Marie de France, on the other hand, certain terms, such as 'Laustic' (=*l'eostik*, 'the nightingale'), as Prof. Zimmer points out, suggest Brittany as the source of their Arthurian matter. The degree of Chrétien's indebtedness not only for some of his proper names, but also for his materials, to Celtic sources has been a subject of great controversy, Prof. Foerster, the chief editor of his works, going so far as to deny that Chrétien derived any of his materials from such sources. But it is hardly conceivable that he should have borrowed from these sources only a bare list of personal names without a scrap of the legends connected with them. The task of discovering definite Celtic matter in his writings is, however, far from easy, owing to the elaborate transformation which such matter would have undergone when adapted to the courtly love-poetry of Chrétien and to his romantic conceptions generally. Still, it should be borne in mind that Welsh literature itself, as we see from the *Four Branches of the Mabinogi*, had already been developing on lines which reflected some of the conceptions of the feudal period, and which further showed skill in the delineation of female character, especially under conditions of unjust suffering.

The problem of Chrétien's origins has been further complicated by the existence in Welsh of three Arthurian romances corresponding to three by Chrétien, namely, *The Lady of the Fountain* (to *Yvain*), *Peredur* (to the *Conte del Graal*), and *Geraint and Enid* (to *Erec et Enide*). Count Hersart de Villemarqué thought that these were Chrétien's originals; but this is certainly not the case, as the traces of foreign influence on them show. At the same time, the Welsh tales, though in their present form based either on Chrétien himself (as Foerster thinks) or on his originals, have, in several points of topography and narrative, been shaped into conformity with a living Welsh Arthurian legend in a manner which adds considerably to their value and interest. The search for Celtic materials in Chrétien has been carried out with great diligence by Sir John Rhys, Mr. Alfred Nutt, M. Loth, Miss J. L. Weston, and a distinguished mediævalist, M. Ferdinand Lot. The task of reducing the narratives of Chrétien to their simplest elements, and comparing them with the narrative types of Welsh and Irish legend is one of great delicacy and difficulty, and some Celtic scholars, in their zeal for instituting such comparisons, have attempted to prove too much, without making sufficient allowance for the various literary influences to which Chrétien was accessible, or for his own imaginative power. The most fruitful line of investigation is the study of that Welsh group of legends from which Chrétien undoubtedly derived many of his proper names, and the classification of them into narrative types. Especially promising are the narratives that imply the wandering and return of Arthur's warriors, and in some cases their rescue from prison by him and his men. Narratives of the relations, pacific and hostile, between Arthur and his men and the fairy dwellers in *Annwfn* are a promising field of investigation, but Sun-myth theories of the Arthurian legend are now entirely abandoned.

Chrétien de Troyes was imitated in Germany by Hartmann von Aue, who wrote his *Erec* before 1197 and his *Iwein* before 1204; and also by Wolfram von Eschenbach, who composed his *Parzival* between 1205 and 1215. The latter mentions, in addition to Chrétien, a certain Kiot as his authority. The chief romantic accretions to the Arthurian cycle were the sagas of *Merlin*, the *Holy Grail*, *Tristan and Iseult*, and *Lancelot and Galahad*. The story of *Merlin* occurs in two forms, the ordinary *Merlin* and the *Suite de Merlin* (see MERLIN). The story of Tristan and Iseult is one of the most beautiful and tragic in the whole of literature, and, except perhaps as an element in the Welsh bardic tradition, was originally quite distinct from the Arthurian legend. The story of Lancelot is of uncertain origin, and that of Galahad, apart from the mere name (the Gwalchaved of the Welsh tradition), has no evident counterpart in Celtic legend. The story of Tristan was turned into German verse by Gottfried von Strassburg about 1210, who left it unfinished. But it was continued by Ulrich von Türheim (about 1236) and Heinrich von Freiberg (about 1270). In England the great collection of Arthurian romances was that of Sir Thomas Malory, printed by Caxton.

Within the limits of this article it is impossible to deal with all the problems which the various interrelations of these romances have raised, especially in the story of the Holy Grail. This story is essentially one where the legend of Arthur has been brought into connexion with the legends of the Church, notably such as were read from the Apocryphal Gospels at Easter. The stories of Helen, the mother of Constantine, and of Charlemagne had been similarly enlisted. One of the most distinguished authorities on the Grail legends, Mr. Alfred Nutt, conveniently divides them into two types, which he calls the 'Quest' and the 'Early History' versions respectively. These he enumerates as follows: Class I. (*a*) *Conte del Graal*, by Chrétien de Troyes; (*b*) *Conte del Graal*, by the continuators of Chrétien—Gautier, Manessier, and Gerbert; (*c*) the *Parzival* of Wolfram von Eschenbach; (*d*) *Peredur the son of Evrawc*, the Welsh version of Perceval; (*e*) *Sir Percyvelle*, an English metrical romance found in the Thornton MS, written shortly before the middle of the 15th century. Class II. (*a*) Robert de Borron, *Joseph of Arimathea*, and *Merlin*; (*b*) *The Grand St. Graal*; (*c*) *Quête del St. Graal*; (*d*) *The Didot Perceval*; (*e*) *Perceval le Gallois*, translated into English by Dr. Sebastian Evans under the title *The High History of the Holy Graal*. There is a Welsh mediæval translation of the story of the Holy Grail entitled *Y Seint Greal* which has been published with an English translation in the Hengwrt MSS. In modern times the Arthurian legend is most familiar through Tennyson's *Idylls of the King* and through Wagner's *Parsifal* and *Tristan*. Even into Dutch, Flemish, and Scandinavian literature portions of the Arthurian cycle penetrated.

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E. ANWYL.

ARVAL BROTHERS.—The study of the Arval Brothers is peculiarly valuable to the historian of religion, because it gives a unique insight into the details of the activity of a Roman priesthood. It also illustrates in a pre-eminent degree the accidental character of our knowledge of ancient Roman religion. Further, it emphasizes the activity of Augustus as a restorer of forms of ancient religion. And, lastly, it affords us additional proof of the supreme value of inscriptions.

In the matter of the appointment of priesthoods the Romans were extremely conservative. During the whole period of the Republic only two new priesthoods were formed—the *Duoviri* (later *Decemviri*, later *Quindecimviri, sacris faciundis*), in charge of the cults introduced by the Sibylline books; and the *Tresviri* (later *Septemviri*) *epulones*, merely assistants to the *pontifices* in arranging the banquets. On the contrary, many of the older priesthoods declined, and were, if not entirely forgotten, so neglected that they are very seldom mentioned in the literature. Thus during the Republic we hear of a certain priesthood, the *Sodales Titii*, only incidentally (Varro, *Lingua Latina*, v. 85); and even the Augustan reform and the Emperor's personal association with the priesthood (*Monumentum Ancyranum*, i. 46) result merely in our possessing eight or nine inscriptions in which individuals are referred to as *Sodales Titienses*.

Except that the etymology of the words *Fratres Arvales* is easier to understand than that of *Sodales Titii*, we should know scarcely more concerning them than concerning the *Sodales Titii*, were it not for the remarkable discovery of inscriptions. It will be well, however, to examine first what we know of the Fratres Arvales apart from these inscriptions.

1. **Literary sources.**—The one and only reference to the Fratres Arvales in the literature of the Republic is in Varro's *Lingua Latina* (v. 85), and reads as follows: 'They are called Fratres Arvales who make public sacrifices to the end that the fields (*arva*) may bear (*ferant*) crops. They are called Fratres Arvales from *ferre* and *arva*. Some people derive the name (*fratres*) from *fratria*; *fratria* is a Greek word designating a section of the people, as it is even now used at Naples.' In other words, Varro's interest is merely etymological, and his whole manner of treating the subject shows that the priesthood, though possibly still in existence, was practically unknown.

Borghesi, *Œuvres*, i. 376, thinks that the crown of corn-ears seen on the coins of D. Postumius Albinus Bruti *f.* and of L. Musidius Longus (Babelon, ii. 241 ff., and 385) relates to the Arval Brothers; but this is by no means certain (cf. Wissowa in Pauly-Wissowa, *s.v.* 'Arvales,' ii. 1463).

Had not Augustus included the priesthood of the Arvals among his religious reforms, this might well have been our only reference to them. As it is, however, apart from the inscriptions, of which we shall speak in a moment, and which are themselves due to Augustus's influence, we have such a revival of interest that a faint reflexion of it is seen even in the literature.

A famous jurist of Tiberius's reign, Massurius Sabinus, seems to have dealt with the problem of the origin and the number of the Arvals. We read in Gellius (vii. 7. 8): 'But Massurius Sabinus in the first book of his *Memorialia* tells us on the authority of certain historians, that Acca Larentia was Romulus's nurse. This woman, he says, lost one of her twelve sons by death. In his stead Romulus became a son to her, and called himself and her other sons the Arval Brothers. From this time the college of the Arval Brothers was twelve in number. The insignia of this priesthood were the crown of corn-ears and the white fillets.'

A similar story is told in Pliny, *HN* xviii. 6, and again in Fulgentius, *Sermones Antiqui*, p. 114 (ed. Helm). This absurd theory of Massurius Sabinus was in some unaccountable way taken as genuine legendary tradition by Em. Hoffmann, *Die Arvalbrüder*, Breslau, 1858 (original and more condensed form in the *Verhandlungen der Breslauer Philol. Versammlung*, 1857, 67 ff.). A similar idea governs E. Baehrens in his article in the *Jahrb. für Philologie*, cxxxi. (1885) 785 ff. Wissowa (in Pauly-Wissowa, ii. 1464) has pointed out that this legend of Romulus and the Arvals arose at the beginning of the Empire, when the Emperor, as a new Romulus, himself belonged to the priesthood.

One additional piece of information is given by Festus (ed. Müller, p. 5): '*Ambarvales hostiæ* are sacrificial animals (*hostiæ*) which were wont to be sacrificed on behalf of the fields by the twelve (*duodecim*, so Augustinus; *duobus*, MSS) brothers.' These are evidently the Arvals (cf. Macrobius, *Sat. Conv.* iii. 5. 7).

With such a scanty beginning it might well seem foolish to expect that the discoveries of modern times would put us in the position of knowing more about the Arvals than about any other Roman priesthood. Yet such is the case, and it is entirely owing to the discovery of inscriptions.

2. **Inscriptions.**—These discoveries began in 1570 (on the date cf. especially Aldus Manutius in *Cod. Vatican.* 5237, f. 158). In that year, while workmen were digging in a field five miles outside the Porta Portese on the Via Campana, near the Papal villa La Magliana, in the region which then as now was known as *Affoga l'asino* ('Drown the donkey'), more precisely, in a vineyard then called Vigna Galletti (later Vigna Ceccarelli, now Vigna Vignoli), the remains of a building were discovered. In the apse of this building were found nine (according to other authorities seven) statues of Emperors who had been members of the Arval priesthood. In each case the base with the inscription was preserved.

Flaminio Vacca (*Memorie*, ed. Nibby, *Roma Antica*, Iv., No. 98; ed. Schreiber, *Berichte Sächs. Gesell. d. Wiss.* 1881, p. 82, No. 99) says: 'A good two miles outside the above-mentioned gate (Porta Portese), in a place which is called "Drown the donkey," towards the Tiber, in a thicket, were found in the time of Gregory XIII. (1572–1576; 1570 seems correct) many consuls in marble, and each one had his pedestal with an inscription; and also columns of fair marble, thirty palms in length. The columns were sawn up and used for the Cappella Gregoriana at St. Peter's. The consuls were scattered throughout Rome They were, however, of only fairly good workmanship.' Baldassare Peruzzi's son, Silvestro or Sallustio, made a sketch giving the ground-plan of this building, and an attempted restoration. These are preserved in Florence (*Disegni di Architettura*, No. 664), and are reproduced by Huelsen, *Eph. Epigr.* viii. Tab. ii.

The statues have entirely disappeared, and all the inscriptions except one (*CIL* vi. 1012 : to Marcus Aurelius, preserved in the Vatican, Giardino della Pigna ; cf. Amelung, *Sculpturen des vatikanischen Museums*, Part i., Taf. 89), but six others have been preserved in copies (*CIL* vi. 968, 1021, 1053, 1093). The seven Emperors are : Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, Marcus Aurelius, Lucius Verus, Septimus Severus, Caracalla, and Gordian.

At the same time were found fragments of inscriptions containing the minutes of the meetings of the priesthood (first published by Fulvius Ursinus, *Notæ ad M. Catonem*, etc., Rome, 1587). Somewhat more than a century later, in 1699, a second great find of two large inscriptions was made on the same spot. Then came a constant series of finds, which have continued down to the present time. The most curious feature of these discoveries is their wide distribution. Fragments have been found on the Esquiline, on the Aventine, in excavating for the foundations of the choir of St. Peter's, at St. Paolo fuori le Mura, at St. Lorenzo, near the Lateran, and in the catacombs of Calixtus. The finds accumulated, so that in 1795 G. Marini was able to collect and publish 47 pieces (*Gli atti e monumenti dei Fratelli Arvali*, Rome, 1795). Further progress was made in 1858, when de Rossi proved the real site of the grove (*Annali dell' Instituto*, 1858, p. 54 ff.). The delay in ascertaining accurately the location of the grove was due to an error of Filippo della Torre (*Monumenta veteris Antii*, pp. 94, 384), who asserted that the stones found in 1699 had been discovered at the fourth milestone of the Via Ostiensis instead of Campana or Portuensis. In this he had been followed by Marini. This discovery was followed in 1866 by another important find in the grove itself. From 1867 until 1871 excavations were conducted by the German Archæological Institute.

The results of these exeavations were summed up in Henzen's book *Acta Fratrum Arvalium quæ supersunt* (Berlin, 1874), with an admirable commentary. Henzen had written previous to this a preliminary report, *Scavi nel bosco sacro dei Fratelli Arvali* (Rome, 1868). The first definitive publication occurred in *CIL* vi. (city of Rome) Part i., 1876, and again in Part iv., 1902. The originals have been collected as far as possible and arranged by D. Vaglieri, and are exhibited in the small rooms off the cloister of the Museo Nazionale della Terme in Rome.

The body of inscriptions thus obtained presents a record, naturally with many breaks, of the minutes of the Arval Brothers' meetings from the first year of Tiberius's reign down into the reign of Gordian (A.D. 241). As regards the original situation and disposition of these marble tablets, Lanciani (in Henzen's *Relazione*, p. 105 ff., Tab. iv. and v.) thought they were placed on the outside of a round temple, that of the Dea Dia. But this is impossible, since the *acta* themselves indicate that the tablets were inside the temple, for they were engraved *in situ*, which necessitated the introduction of iron (the graving tool) into the grove—an offence against the deity for which a special expiatory ceremony had to be performed. The full formula for this begins : 'On account of the iron which had been brought into the temple for the sake of engraving,' etc. Further, a careful examination of the fragments has shown that they were not attached to a curved surface, either inside or outside of a building. The conclusion from these investigations (cf. Huelsen, *Eph. Epigr.* viii. 316–350, and Bormann, *Arch. Epigr. Mitt.* xvii. 1894) is that the tablets were attached to the flat walls on the inside of a building.

3. History of the cult.—With the knowledge gained from these inscriptions, supplemented by that gained from the literature and from the general history of religion, let us attempt to sketch the history of the priesthood.

Though the legend of the foundation of the priesthood by Romulus is of late date, the priesthood itself belongs to the very earliest period. Proofs of this are found at several points. First, the prohibition of iron in the grove and in the temple indicates that the worship preceded the discovery and use of iron. We may compare with this the custom referred to in Macrobius (*Sat. Conv.* v. 19. 13) : 'The Etruscans used a bronze plough when they founded cities . . . among the Sabines the priests' hair was cut with a bronze shears' (cf. also Servius, *Aen.* i. 448 ; Ovid, *Fasti*, vi. 230 ; Lydus, *de Mensibus*, i. 31). Similarly no iron was used in the construction of the Pons Sublicius (Plin. *HN* xxxvi. 15. 100 ; Dion. Hal. iii. 45). Finally, we may compare the express permission to use iron in making repairs in the temple of Juppiter Liber at Furfo (*CIL* i. 603 = ix. 3513). A second proof of the age of the worship may be found in the adoration of the *ollæ*, very primitive earthenware vessels, preceding the discovery of the potter's wheel. Remains of these *ollæ* were discovered in the sacred grove (cf. de Rossi, *Giornale Arcadico*, lviii., 1868, p. 136, Tab. iv.). A third proof of age is the sacred song which they sang, the words of which have been preserved to us in the minutes of the year 218 (*CIL* vi. 28 = vi. 2104 = Buecheler, *Carmina Epigraphica*, No. 1 = Schneider, *Exempla*, No. 392, where other literature may be found). This chant was probably not understood by the people of the Augustan age.

The fact that the great festival of the Arvals, their celebration in May in honour of the Dea Dia, is missing in the list of old festivals in the so-called calendar of Numa is no proof against its very great age. It was a movable feast, and hence could not be engraved on a permanent stone calendar. We cannot tell the exact nature of the Arvals' worship in this early period. In Augustus's restoration certain of the older features were retained, but it is difficult to distinguish exactly what is old and what is new in his scheme. Hence it is better to leave the discussion of details until the Augustan age. In general, however, we can think of the Arvals during the Kingdom and the early centuries of the Republic as performing their sacrifices to Mars and the Dea Dia, one of those numerous agricultural ceremonials of which the ritual of early Rome was so full. As we have seen above, the history of the priesthood during the Republic is absolutely unknown to us, but we are probably justified in supposing that it continued down through the period of the Second Punic War. At the close of that war, in the religious reaction which set in during the last two centuries of the Republic, this priesthood very probably declined along with the rest.

Our first definite reference to the new life into which the Arvals entered with the coming of the Empire is found in the *Monumentum Ancyranum* (iv. 7), where Augustus, in recounting the priesthoods to which he belongs, mentions that of the Fratres Arvales. This record, written at the close of Augustus's life, is therefore contemporaneous with what has hitherto been supposed to be the earliest datable fragment of the Arval inscriptions, that from A.D. 14, the year which saw Augustus's reign end and that of Tiberius begin. On the other hand, together with the Arval inscriptions were found fragments of a list of consuls (*Fasti Consulares*, cf. *CIL* i.² 70 ff.). The fragments cover the years B.C. 2 to A.D. 37. It has been supposed, accordingly, that the restoration of the Arval priesthood must have been undertaken by Augustus in or before the year B.C. 2, and probably not earlier than B.C. 12, when on the death of Lepidus he became Pontifex Maximus. This office would unquestionably be the best strategic point for a revision of the priesthoods. But it has been shown (by Hula in *Arch. Epigr. Mitt.* xv., 1892, p. 23 ff. ; for counter-arguments, which, however,

are not convincing, cf. Mommsen, *Eph. Epigr.* viii. 303 ff.) that one fragment at least (*CIL* vi. 32338) dates from the year B.C. 20. Accordingly, Augustus's reforms must have occurred before he became Pontifex Maximus. We have, however, other indications of Augustus's interest in religious restoration at the very beginning of his reign, notably the *augurium salutis* of B.C. 29 (aptly compared by Wissowa in Pauly-Wissowa, ii. 1468; cf. Dio Cassius, li. 20 and Suet. *Octav.* 31), and the rebuilding of temples in B.C. 28 (proofs for this date especially Dio Cass. liii. 2, and Hor. *Carm.* iii. 6, collected by Mommsen, *Res Gestæ*[2], p. 86).

The college as re-organized seems to have contained twelve members. Probably this was also the ancient number. That it was the number as restored by Augustus is clear not only from the legendary account of its foundation given by Massurius Sabinus (which on this point agrees with the facts), but also from the negative testimony of the inscriptions themselves, where, when the names of those present at each ceremonial are given, the number twelve is never exceeded. The fact that on the only occasion when as high a number as twelve is reached (at a session in the year 57, *CIL* vi. 2039, 1 ff.) the name of the Emperor Nero is not mentioned, although he was certainly a member of the college, is no argument in favour of the number being greater than twelve, because the Emperor and the members of the Imperial household would be *supra numerum*.

The members were elected by co-optation, that is, the college filled its own vacancies. Originally this co-optation was entirely untrammelled, the Emperor possessing merely his own vote, which he, like any other member, might send in writing in case he was not able to be present in person. But by degrees the influence of the Emperor began to prevail, until, from the time of Caligula onwards, the election was usually reduced to a mere formality, which is best described in the words of the minutes of the year 120 (*CIL* vi. 2080, 22 ff.):

'Under the same consuls on the seventh day before the Ides of February, in the vestibule of the temple of Concordia, when prayers had been said by C. Vitorius Hosidius Geta, the magister, they filled the place of Q. Bittius Proculus, and in accordance with a letter of the Emperor Hadrian Augustus (here follow the Emperor's other titles) elected Publius Manlius Carbo and invited him to the sacrifices. And the letter was opened, which was sealed with a seal representing the Emperor, and in the letter was written "The Emperor Trajan Hadrian Augustus to the Arval Brothers, his colleagues, greeting. In the place of Q. Bittius Proculus, for my part I vote as our colleague the name of Publius Manlius Carbo." There were present, etc. . . .'

Partaking, as such priesthoods did, of the nature of an exclusive social club, the membership was naturally restricted to men of high rank and great wealth (though not, as Marini thought, entirely confined to patricians; cf. Mommsen, *Röm. Forsch.* i. 79).

The college possessed two officers, a *magister* and a *flamen*, who were elected annually out of the members of the college on the second day of the great May festival (see below). These officers served one full year, one Arval year, which began and ended at the Saturnalia (December 17). The year received its name from that of the magister, though, fortunately for us, always subordinate to the names of the regular consuls of the year which always precede it. In case either the magister or the flamen was prevented from attending a meeting, he appointed a substitute (*promagister* or *proflamen*), who, however, served only for that occasion, and as the personal substitute of the man in question. A regular vacancy was filled by a new election.

Connected with the college and present at the May festival were four boys, the sons of senators (in many cases the senators in question were the Arval Brothers themselves). These boys, whose father and mother must both be living (hence called *patrimi, matrimi*), took part as assistants in certain of the ceremonies.

They were regularly employed along with the *servi publici* to carry the libations to the altar on the first day of the great May festival. They were present also at the banquet in the afternoon of the first day, seated in chairs, while the Arval Brothers reclined on dining couches. At the supper in Rome in the evening they waited at table. They did not officiate at the sacrifices of expiation, where only the *servi publici* assisted the magister and the *calator*. The attempt has been made to separate them from the *camilli*, with whom we are elsewhere familiar (cf. Henzen, *Acta*, p. vii, and Wissowa in Pauly-Wissowa, ii. 1471); but this is probably wrong (cf. Wissowa, *Röm. Relig.* 426, Anm. 2). Their sitting with the Arvals at meat is probably a reminiscence of the old custom that young boys should accompany their elders to dinner (cf. Tac. *Ann.* xiii. 16; Suet. *Claud.* 32).

Apart from their own elective officers and these lads of noble families, the Arvals were assisted in their work by a number of slaves and freedmen. Some of these, the regular *servi publici*, were assigned to them by the Emperor. Besides these, each brother had his own servant (*calator*), whom he chose from among his own freedmen. Each *calator* had to pay an initiation fee into the treasury of the college (this is proved by the interesting case decided by the Brothers on May 29, A.D. 120; cf. *CIL* vi. 2080, l. 45 ff.). There is also one mention of a sacristan (*œdituus; CIL* vi. 2068, ii. 27), who was probably a private slave owned by the college as a whole.

A list of the Arval Brothers, so far as they are known, is found in Gatti's article 'Arvales' in de Ruggiero's *Dizionario Epigrafico*, i. 683 ff.

4. Activity of the Arvals.—We have seen above that it is not possible for us to ascertain whether, at the close of the Republic, the priesthood of the Arvals had entirely ceased or whether it was still in existence, though neglected and forgotten. In any case, however, Augustus's re-organization of it, like all his work, was an attempt to restore the old forms of Roman religion in their purity and simplicity, though it was at the same time inevitable that he should consciously or unconsciously adapt them to the new conditions inherent in the Empire. His successors were less interested in the old ritual, and more concerned with the adaptation of the priesthood to the purposes of the moment. All these new adaptations, including the beginnings made by Augustus, were attempts to connect the priesthood of the Arvals with what was becoming more and more the one universal religion of the Empire, namely, Emperor-worship. Thus the greater number of the ceremonies performed by the Arvals were in the interest of the Emperor and of the Imperial household.

The cult acts of the Arvals fall therefore into two categories: (1) those acts which go back to the old forms of the religion of the Kingdom and of the early Republic, and (2) those acts which are connected with the Emperor.

(1) Let us discuss, first, those acts which go back to the old cult. We have seen above, in our discussion of the early history of the cult, that it was originally one of the many agricultural worships characteristic of early Rome. We have left until now the discussion of details.

So much did the Emperor and his household monopolize the attention of the Arval Brothers, that during the early part of the Empire, when the minutes are in general more concise, we have relatively few references to any of the really ancient ceremonies. As the minutes become more diffuse, however, the descriptions of the older rites are more detailed, until eventually under Elagabalus we have a full account of at least the May festival. Thanks to the conservative tendency of ritual performance, we are justified in considering that what we know of the ceremonies as conducted in the year 218 corresponds almost exactly with the ceremony as restored by Augustus. In

describing these ceremonies, therefore, we are at liberty to use them as though they were contemporaneous inscriptions covering more than two centuries.

The ancient ceremonies of which we find traces in the acts of the Arvals may be roughly divided into two classes: (*a*) those which relate to the great festival in May, and (*b*) certain *piacula*, or propitiatory ceremonies, carried out under special circumstances.

(*a*) *The Festival in May.*—As has been said above, the May festival belonged to the category of movable feasts, the so-called *Feriæ Indictivæ*. The days on which it was to be celebrated had to be formally announced at the beginning of the year. This process was known as the *Indictio*. It must in the nature of things go back to the earliest days of the priesthood, and may well have been mentioned in all the minutes from the time of Augustus. The first *indictio* actually preserved is of the year A.D. 21 (*CIL* vi. 32340). As an illustration of the process may be quoted the *acta* of the year 105 (*CIL* vi. 2075, l. line 11):

'Under the same consuls on the seventh day before the Ides of January, in the vestibule of the temple of Concord, the Arval Brothers set the date for the festival of the Dea Dia. And Marcus Valerius Trebicius Decianus, the magister, having washed his hands, and having covered his face, standing in the open air and facing the east, together with his colleagues set the date for the festival of the Dea Dia, thus for this year: So may it be good, favourable, happy, and fortunate for the Emperor, Cæsar Nerva Trajan Augustus Germanicus Dacicus, and for his whole household, for the Roman people, for the Quirites, and for the Arval Brothers, the festival of the Dea Dia shall take place this year on the sixteenth day before the Kalends of June (May 17) at home, and on the fourteenth day before the Kalends of June (May 19) in the grove and at home, and on the thirteenth day before the Kalends of June (May 20) at home. There were present,' etc. (the list of names follows).

Though the festival was indicted every year, there arose by degrees a certain regularity in the dates chosen. For the earlier period before Vespasian more or less irregularity prevails, but from Vespasian onward, with the exception of the year 90, the dates chosen are the 17th, 19th, and 20th of May (in the years of the city which were even in number according to Varro's reckoning), and the 27th, 29th, and 30th of May (in the years of the city which were uneven in number according to Varro's reckoning).

The festival itself accordingly occupied three days, but extended over a period of four days, because the first and second day were separated by an interval of a day, the familiar *dies postriduanus*. Of these three days the second was the most important. On it, in the morning, the ceremonies were held in the grove, whereas on the entire first and third days the celebration was held in Rome.

Regarding the localities in which these ceremonies took place, the following seems to have been the state of affairs:—In Rome itself the Arvals had no official meeting-place of their own. In the minutes of the earlier years we find them meeting in the year 14 in the Regia, in 38 in the temple of Juppiter Stator, in 59 in the Pantheon, in 63 in the temple of Concord, and from 69 onwards regularly in the temple of Concord, though naturally, when ceremonies were held in honour of the various deified Emperors, they met in the temple of the particular Emperor. In the grove itself there seem to have been at least four structures. First, there was the temple of the Dea Dia, which was on or near the top of the hill. No traces of this temple are left, nor do any of the Renaissance sketches seem to represent it. Probably in this temple the marble tablets containing the *acta* were exposed. As we have seen above, the temple was not round. Second, at the foot of the hill was a building referred to as the Tetrastylum. As its name implies, it was rectangular, and it is therefore probably identical with the building discovered in 1570, of which we have the sketch by Silvio Peruzzi (see above, p. 7[b]). Third, also at the foot of the hill was a building referred to as the Cæsareum. Probably this is the round building, represented in a sketch by Ligorio (in the Turin codex), the remains of which are still to be seen on the spot (cf. Altmann, *Italische Rundbauten*, p. 63 ff.). Lastly, there was the circus, of which we have no traces.

The fullest account of the festival is found in the *acta* of the year 218 (Elagabalus, *CIL* vi. 2104). It reads as follows (filling out the *lacunæ*, a process which can be accomplished with a high degree of certainty on account of the various other descriptions in other years of the minutes):

'Under the same consuls on the sixth day before the Kalends of June (May 27), on the Palatine in the temple of the Divi, Alfenius Avitianus, the vice-magister, officiating, the Arval Brothers made sacrifice at dawn with incense and wine, and took into their hands the dried grain-stalks and the fresh grain-stalks, and also the bread crowned with laurel, and they anointed the Dea Dia with oil, and the Arval Brothers put on the toga prætexta and sat in chairs, and thereafter they laid aside the toga prætexta. There were present the following (a list of names follows). Thereupon after midday, having bathed, they sat in their chairs, and then, when they had washed their hands, they put on the white garments for supper and reclined on dining couches and banqueted. Then boys clad in the toga prætexta, the father and mother of each of whom were living, sons of senators, four in number, sat in the chairs and banqueted. And after the banquet (*i.e.* the first course) the Arval Brothers reclined on couches ornamented with fluted valences, and made sacrifice with incense and wine; and the sacrifice was carried to the altar by the boys in the prætexta, the sons of senators, and by the slaves of the State; and the priests received the perfumes and garlands, and they consecrated the perfumes and wrapped them in the napkins (to take home). Likewise the second course, the dessert, was served, and *sportulæ* were given both to the priests of the Emperor and to the other priests whose names are written above. Then, having distributed the roses, they gave the usual salutations of farewell.'

Thereupon follows immediately the account of the second day:—'Likewise on the fourth day before the Kalends of June (May 29), in the grove of the Dea Dia, Alfenius Avitianus, the vice-magister, sacrificed at the altar two young sows, an offering of expiation for the cutting of the grove and the work thus done, and then he sacrificed a heifer in honour of the Dea Dia, and going to the Tetrastylum he sat in his chair. Then returning to the altar, he offered the *exta* of the young sows, and then in the circus, in a silver brazier ornamented with a piece of turf, he offered the *exta* of the heifer, and then he returned to the Tetrastylum and entered in the book (that he had performed the sacrifice), and thereupon he took off his prætexta and returned to his tent. Moreover, in the afternoon the Arval Brothers put the prætexta on again, and assembled in the Tetrastylum and sat on the benches and entered in the official records that they had come together and performed the sacrifice, and they feasted upon the young sows which had been sacrificed for expiation, and afterwards consumed the blood. Then wearing the prætexta, with covered heads and crowned with ears of wheat, they went up into the grove, and Alfenius Avitianus, the vice-magister, officiating, they sacrificed a fattened lamb, and examined the victim to see the success of the sacrifice; and when the sacrifice had been completed, they all made offering of incense and wine. Then they went back into the temple, and at the table made sacrifice to the wine-jars, and in front of the temple on the turf the vice-magister and the flamen made sacrifice. Then going out again to the altar, they all made an offering of money. Thereupon the flamen and the vice-magister, carrying silver cups with bowls filled with wine, and also incense boxes, made sacrifice before the door with incense and wine, and the priests took their stand before the door, and two (of their number), together with the slaves of the State, went to fetch the grain, and they gave it with the right hand and received it with the left hand, and they passed it thus one to another, and finally gave it back to the slaves. Then they entered into the temple and prayed to the wine-jars, and when the doors had been opened they threw the jars down the hill. Then they sat on the marble benches, and bread crowned with laurel was distributed by the slaves. Then they all took *lumemulia* (?) with radishes, and anointed the statues of the goddesses, and all (except the priests) went out of doors and the temple was shut. Then the priests shut up in the temple, girding up their togas, took the song-books, and marking the time, danced the three step, singing thus: "Enos Lases iuvate, enos Lases iuvate, enos Lases iuvate! neve luerve Marmar sins incurrere in pleores, neve luerve Marmar sins incurrere in pleores, neve luerve Marmar sins incurrere in pleores! satur fu, fere Mars! limen sali, sta berber! satur fu, fere Mars! limen sali, sta berber! satur fu, fere Mars! limen sali, sta berber! semunis alternei advocapit conctos, semunis alternei advocapit conctos, semunis alternei advocapit conctos! enos Marmor iuvato, enos Marmor iuvato, enos Marmor iuvato! Triumpe, triumpe, triumpe, triumpe, triumpe!" And after the three step, at a given signal, the slaves entered and took the song-books. And they stood before the door of the temple of the Dea Dia, and with their servants carrying the wreaths intended for each of them, they laid hold of the altar; and the images of the goddesses were crowned, and they elected Publius Ælius Secundinus as magister to serve from the next Saturnalia (for one year to the Saturnalia following), and they named Marcus Flavius Alpinus a flamen . . . and then they wished the customary good wishes, and went down out of the grove; and, taking off their prætextas, they put on white dining garments and banqueted in the Tetrastylum. And the platters with the Campanian earthenware and the wine-jugs of each of the priests were carried into the Tetrastylum like a solemn circus procession. And after the banquet each of those present received the *sportula* (100 *denarii*) and the roses. Then Lucius Alfenius Avitianus, the vice-magister, put on a tunic with a broad border and the purple mantle, and upon his head a wreath of roses, and he took his place above the Carceres and

gave the signal to the four-horse chariots and to the two-horse chariots, and to the vaulters . . . and when the circus performance was finished, they returned to Rome into the house of the magister, and put on white dining garments, and, reclining upon couches with fluted valences, they made sacrifice with incense and wine; and there ministered unto them the sons of senators, the boys above mentioned, whose fathers and mothers were still alive. And when the sacrifice was finished, they received perfumes and wreaths, and again they consecrated perfumes and wrapped them in napkins, and each one received a *sportula* (100 *denarii*). Then they divided the second course, the dessert, and then they took the roses and wished the customary good wishes.'

Lastly comes the account of the third day:—'On the third day before the Kalends of June (May 30), in the house of the magister, the Arval Brothers assembled to complete the sacrifice to the Dea Dia. At the supper there were present (a list of names follows), and reclining upon couches with fluted valences they made sacrifice with wine and incense, and there ministered to them those same sons of senators above mentioned, those boys whose fathers and mothers were still alive; and these boys, aided by the servants and the slaves of the State, carried the sacrificial grain-stalks to the altar. Then, lighting the lamps, they took the Tuscan wine-jars and sent them home by their private servants. Then they divided the second course, the dessert, and received wreaths and perfumes and *sportulæ* (each 100 *denarii*). In this year they feasted for a hundred *denarii* each day on the sixth, the fourth, and the third day before the Kalends of June, and there feasted also the boys, the sons of senators, four in number, and they (too) received each day a *sportula*. And they wished the customary good wishes.'

In spite of the detailed character of our information, the question still remains open as to the real meaning of these ceremonies. The one thing which binds the three days together is the presence of the grain-stalks, which the Brothers handled at dawn on the first day, which were passed from hand to hand at the solemn sacrifice of the second day, and appear again and are solemnly carried to the altar on the third day. The presence of these grain-stalks, the very name itself (*Arval* = 'land-brother'), the crowns of ears of wheat, their religious year from Saturnalia ('seed-festival') to Saturnalia, and the time of the festival in May at the close of the long series of agricultural festivals—all proclaim the character of their worship as intimately connected with agriculture.

Riddles in abundance remain, however. One is the identity of the chief goddess, the Dea Dia. This is, of course, not a proper name, but is merely one of those adjectival descriptions so common in early times (cf. Bona Dea, Di Manes, Dea Tacita), which were employed because of the reverent fear of mentioning the real name (that this fear was especially felt regarding agricultural deities is clear from Pliny, *HN* xviii. 8, and Macrob. *Sat. Conv.* i. 16. 8). This goddess can scarcely be other than Tellus or the old Italic Ceres. Another difficulty is the relation of this May festival to the Ambarvalia. This has been the subject of a long discussion (full literature on both sides is given by Wissowa in Pauly–Wissowa, ii. 1478 ff.). The truth seems to be that the Arval festival, while not identical with the Ambarvalia as a whole, was closely connected with it. That this connexion was very clear in the minds of later Roman writers is evident from Festus, p. 5 (quoted above, p. 7[b]).

(*b*) *Expiatory ceremonies.*—Apart from this great annual festival in May, the only traces of ancient ritual which remain are those of certain expiatory ceremonies (*piacula*). Two of these ceremonies—that connected with bringing instruments of iron into the grove, and that connected with taking them out again—have already been referred to. Other ceremonies are connected with the trees in the grove. We have a series of minor expiatory acts on account of broken branches or trees destroyed by old age or snow-storms. There are also certain major expiatory acts on account of more serious portents—for example, the growing of a fig tree on the roof of the temple, or a tree in the grove being struck by lightning. An event of the latter character occurred in the year B.C. 224, and on that occasion temporary altars were erected and many victims were sacrificed to various deities: to Dea Dia, to Janus, to Juppiter, to Mars, to the Juno of the Dea Dia, to the Virgines Divæ, to the Famulæ Divæ, to the Lares, to the mother of the Lares, to Fons, to Flora, to Summanus, to Mother Vesta, to the Vesta of the gods and goddesses, to Adolenda and Coinquenda, to the Genius of the emperor, and to the XX Divi.

(2) The other and more frequently recurring function of the Arvals was their activity in connexion with the Imperial household. They made sacrifices on birthdays, anniversaries of consecrations, on the occasion of accession to the throne, and on the giving of the title of *pater patriæ* or of the office of *pontifex maximus*, etc. Extraordinary sacrifices were made also on special occasions in the life of the Emperor—for example, when conspiracy was overthrown, when great military victories were won, when an Emperor was saved from shipwreck, etc. Another feature of their work was the making of regular annual vows (*vota*) on behalf of the safety of the Emperor and of the members of the Imperial household.

We have seen that the inscriptions begin with Augustus and continue down into the reign of Gordian. During this time the priesthood was in the main prosperous. There is, however, a slight indication that even before the close of this period the tide of prosperity had turned. It lies in the fact that the latest datable inscription (that of the year 241) gives the *sportula* as twenty-five *denarii* instead of the one hundred *denarii* always mentioned previously. The financial support of the State was therefore being reduced. We may suppose that this reduction was at least continued, if not increased, during the subsequent reign of Philip, who showed decided tendencies towards Christianity (de Rossi, *Ann. d. Inst.* 1858, 72 ff.). Under Gratian (382, cf. *Cod. Theod.* xvi. 10. 20) the Arvals' wealth went into the public treasury, but the geographical location of the temple and the grove outside the city of Rome, and possibly also the connexion with a circus for public amusement, would tend to preserve it (*Cod. Theod.* xvi. 10. 3). In any case it was preserved as a matter of fact. The proofs for this are sufficient, though in the main negative. Before the time of Constantine the catacombs of St. Generosa were built in the immediate neighbourhood of the Arval grove, but no materials from the grove were used (cf. de Rossi, *Roma Sotterranea*, iii. 689 ff.). The same respect for the grove was shown when Pope Damasus (366–384) built the oratory of the Martyrs Simplicius Faustinus and Viatrix. The first desecration of the marble plates occurred in the building of a Christian cemetery in the 5th or 6th century (Henzen, *Acta*, p. xxv).

LITERATURE.—The best general discussion: G. Wissowa, *s.v.* 'Arvales' in Pauly-Wissowa, ii. (Stuttgart, 1896) 1463–1486. The inscriptions themselves are available in *CIL* vi. parts 1 and 4. With these inscriptions may profitably be read Henzen's splendid Commentary, *Acta Fratrum Arvalium quæ supersunt*, Berlin, 1874; and Huelsen's Commentary in *Ephemeris Epigraphica*, viii. G. Gatti's article 'Arvales' in de Ruggiero's *Dizionario Epigrafico*, i. 682–710, may also be compared.

JESSE BENEDICT CARTER.

ARYAN RELIGION.

[O. SCHRADER].

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INTRODUCTION.—*History.*—When A. Kuhn in the year 1845 published his famous treatise *Zur ältesten Gesch. der indogerm. Völker*, by which he gave the first impulse towards an Aryan* (Indo-Germanic) archæology, he held out at the close of it the prospect of further investigations:

'There is still abundance of material available for comparison, for there is *the whole province of religion*, which promises abundant results, and gives at the same time, from the intellectual side, the necessary complement of the picture we have sketched. If we have had occasion more than once in these pages to reach conclusions by means of the language of the Vedas, this will happen still more frequently when we are considering the myths and religion of these writings in relation to those of other races.'

A. Kuhn's scientific work during the remainder of his life was almost exclusively devoted to proving the truth of these words. Along with him we find Max Müller, with the same goal in view, and setting out from the same starting-point, the Rigveda, on which he was one of the best authorities.

These two scholars may be called the real founders of a comparative Aryan mythology, in which the notion of 'Aryan religion' had for a long time been taking shape. The common point of view which they hold lies in the conviction, already aroused by the brothers Grimm, that mythology as well as language is rooted deep in the heart of the people, and that it is not the creation of the higher ranks, such as the priestly or the poetic order—a theory which Fr. Creuzer had tried to prove at the beginning of the century in his *Symbolik*. Its explanation is to be sought exclusively in nature and its phenomena, especially in the idea of a struggle, such as the spectacle of a thunderstorm or the alternation of day and night presents to us. This naturalistic view of mythology is exhibited most clearly in the poems of the Rigveda—from which we can easily understand how the myths of the allied peoples were formed, and by means of which we are enabled to discover old Aryan myth-cycles. This A. Kuhn has attempted to do in his articles on 'Gandharven und Kentauren' (Kuhn's *Ztschr.* i.), 'Ἐρινύς, Saranyû' (*ib.*), 'Manus, Μίνως, Mannus' (*ib.* iv.), 'Ἑρμῆς, Saramâ, Sârameya, Wuotan' (*ZDA* vi.), and especially in his great work *Über die Herabkunft des Feuers und des Göttertranks* (Berlin, 1859). Max Müller—whose *Contributions to the Science of Comparative Mythology* (collected in 2 vols., 1897), *Lectures on the Science of Language* (1861–64), along with the 'Essays,' *Chips from a German Workshop* (1867–75), *Origin and Growth of Religion* (1878), *Biographies of Words* (1888), etc., are well known throughout the whole learned world—went even further than A. Kuhn in the naturalistic explanation of mythical names. As specially characteristic of the views of both scholars, the fact may be mentioned that they were not content with discovering old Aryan myths, but tried also to deduce their origin from the character of human speech, its capacity for poetic interpretation, its polyonymy and homonymy, etc. Such is, in a very condensed form, the conception of mythology and religion held by Kuhn and Müller, for the full characterization of which we should have to note also the meagre attention given in the works of both scholars to the important sphere of religious ceremonies or worship. This conception continued to be the prevailing one down to the eighties of last century, although from an early period currents were perceptible which, issuing from various departments of science, seemed to threaten the foundations of the Kuhn-Müller theory.

While this theory, in its re-construction of the Aryan religion, started mainly from the oldest literary remains of the Aryan races, first of all the Veda, and then the Avesta, Homer, and the Edda, on the other hand, the science which has become known under the title of 'Folklore,' and which has as its aim the collecting of the legends, fairy-tales, customs, and habits still prevalent among the people, directed attention to the forms of the so-called lower mythology, and sought to prove that the very oldest material is to be found in analogies, such as those of the Greek Dryads with the German moss- and wood-maidens, of the Cyclops and centaurs with the wild men, etc. It was held to be demonstrable that many exalted divine and heroic figures originated in these circles. The most successful representative of this view was W. Mannhardt, in his two chief works, *Der Baumkultus der Germanen und ihrer Nachbarstämme* (Berlin, 1875, 2nd ed. 1904) and *Antike Wald- und Feldkulte, aus nordeuropäischer Überlieferung erläutert* (Berlin, 1877, 2nd ed. 1905). Then, in addition to this, the study of ethnology, and in its train the *universal comparative history of religion*, pointed to a series of apparently primitive universal religious ideas among mankind, of which at least traces were found also among the Aryan races, and which did not seem to fit well into the system conceived by Kuhn and Müller. The *ancestor theory* especially, according to which all religions spring from the worship of the dead, was placed in the foreground from the anthropological side, and was applied to the Aryan races by J. Lippert in *Die Religionen der europäischen Kulturvölker, der Litauer, Slaven, Germanen, Griechen und Römer in ihrem geschichtlichen Ursprung* (Berlin, 1881); and in England, by H. Spencer, *Principles of Sociology* (1876–96), followed by Grant Allen, *Evolution of the Idea of God* (1897). Similarly Elard Hugo Meyer, in his *Indogermanische Mythen* (Berlin, 1883, 1887), distinguished three chief periods in the formation of myths: belief in souls, in spirits, and in gods, the first of which he designated pre-Aryan, the second Aryan, and the third post-Aryan.

Moreover, even the opinion that the poems of the Rigveda (from which, as we saw, the adherents of the Kuhn-Müller theory started, especially with regard to their interpretation of myths) introduce us directly to the domain of naïve nature-poetry began to waver, and there were many acute interpreters who claimed to discover, in the very

* The terms 'Aryan' and 'the Aryans' are used in this article for that group of languages and peoples which is generally called, among students of philology, 'Indo-Germanic.' The term 'Teutonic' is used as a general term, including all branches of the Germanic race; cf. art. TEUTONS.

oldest parts of the Veda, traces of decay and of priestly refinement. This objection to the Kuhn-Müller explanation of myths has been urged with special force by O. Gruppe in his book, *Die griech. Kulte und Mythen in ihren Beziehungen zu den orient. Religionen*, i. (Leipzig, 1887); and in England by A. Lang, *Custom and Myth* (1884), *Myth, Ritual, and Religion* (1899), and *Modern Mythology* (1897). Gruppe points out that a great many of the mythical figures of the Rigveda are explicable not by natural phenomena and occurrences, but by certain priestly manipulations of the cultus. He himself believes the Aryans of primitive times to have been completely devoid of religion, and ascribes the uniformity of their myths and worship, almost in the same way as Creuzer, to the enormous number of religious forms that they borrowed from Western Asia and Egypt and transferred to Greece, India, and Middle and North Europe.

Finally, at the end of the seventies, Comparative Philology, whose daughter the comparative mythology of the Aryan people might well be claimed to be, had also entered upon a new phase of its development, inasmuch as from that time onwards the demand for a *regular* system in the correspondence of sounds as the result of etymological comparisons of words and forms was more emphatically insisted on. Naturally, this claim was made also in the sphere of the identifications proposed by students of the history of religions; and it became evident that the great majority of these identifications, and among them many which had hitherto been regarded as the most reliable supports of mythico-historical hypotheses, were phonetically untenable: *e.g.* Skr. *gandharvá* = Gr. *κένταυροs* ('Gandharven und Kentauren'); Skr. *marútas*, 'the Maruts' = Lat. Mars; Skr. *Váruṇa* = Gr. *Οὐρανόs*; Skr. *Mánu* = Gr. *Μίνωs*; and many others (see A. A. Macdonell, 'Vedic Mythology' in Bühler's *Grundriss der Indo-Arischen Philologie und Alterthumskunde*, 1897).

Under these circumstances, it is not to be wondered at that doubt of the correctness of the Kuhn-Müller interpretation of mythology increased from year to year, and that finally people actually arrived at such a degree of scepticism as to affirm that it was impossible to ascertain with certainty anything whatever about the oldest religious ideas and customs of the Aryans (cf. *e.g.* E. Zupitza, in the *Ztschr. des Vereins für Volkskunde*, 1901, p. 343 ff.). It is only quite lately (cf. *e.g.* M. Winternitz, in a series of admirable articles on 'Was wissen wir von den Indogermanen?' in *Beilage zur Münchner AZ*, 1903, Oct. and Nov.) that people are beginning again to ask if it is necessary and just to pronounce the life-work of such distinguished investigators as A. Kuhn and Max Müller absolutely null and void, and are attempting to rescue at least some of their results. All this enables us to see how hard it is at the present moment to give a summary of our knowledge of the Aryan religion; and before we even begin this difficult undertaking it will be necessary, first of all, to touch on the most important points regarding the method which we are to follow in the subsequent discussion.

Method.—In a thoughtful address, entitled *Die Aufgabe der theologischen Fakultäten und die allgemeine Religionsgeschichte* (Berlin, 1901), A. Harnack says:

'In the first place, it needs but little consideration to recognize that the study of each single religion ought by no means to be separated from the study of the *history* of the people concerned. . . . To try to study the religion alone is a more childish undertaking than to examine only the roots or the blossom instead of the whole plant.'

On account of this indissoluble connexion between the history, or, more accurately, the *history of the culture*, of a race and its religion, which will often meet us in the following discussion, it goes without saying that the materials which furnish us with a knowledge of the culture of the primitive Aryans are in reality the same as those which make possible for us an acquaintance with their *religion*. As the present writer has recently treated the former in detail in the preface to his *Reallex. der indogerm. Altertumskunde* (Strassburg, 1901) and in the 3rd ed. of his work *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte* (I. Teil: 'Geschichte und Methode der linguistisch-historischen Forschung,' Jena, 1906), it only remains for him to characterize it shortly here in its special application to the history of religion.

The materials which are at our disposal for the investigation of pre-historic periods of culture are derived partly from *language*, partly from *things*. With regard to the former, we must first of all, with very strict regard to phonetic laws, compare the pre-historic equivalents discovered in the history of religion. For example, there exists beyond all doubt an equivalence of this kind in the group of words: Skr. *devá* = Lat. *deus*, Lith. *dẽwas*, Ir. *dia*, Old Norse *tívar*, 'God'; and Max Müller is certainly right when, at different times, he has reckoned the establishment of an etymology of this kind among the most important achievements in the mental history of mankind. In this search for the primitive vocabulary, we must, of course, exclude equivalents that are confined to particular languages of the Aryan group, which, we know, were united to each other more closely than to the other languages. This holds, *e.g.*, of a very considerable number of Indo-Iranian word-correspondences like Skr. *sóma* = Avesta *haoma* for the soma plant, which played so important a rôle in the cultus of both peoples; Skr. *mitrá* = Avesta *mithra* for the sun-god Mitra; Skr. *hótar* = Avesta *zaotar* for a certain class of priests, etc. We cannot utilize equivalents like these for determining the character of the Aryan religion; on the contrary, they simply demonstrate that the Indians completed the development of their religious history along with the Iranians, or perhaps only with the Eastern branch of them, the consideration of which falls outside the scope of this article (cf., on this point, Spiegel, *Die arische Periode*, Leipzig, 1887; and numerous sections in Oldenberg's book, *Die Religion des Veda*, Berlin, 1894). *Negative conclusions* from the vocabulary of primitive times, *i.e.* conclusions from the non-existence of an expression for a certain idea to the non-existence of that idea itself, are, on the whole, dangerous, as all negative deductions are. But it is otherwise when primitively related expressions are wanting for a *whole class of ideas*. When, *e.g.*, all attempts have failed to prove that real god-names existed in the earliest times, or when there is no etymological agreement to be found between two languages for the idea of the temple, these facts will require due consideration in deciding the question whether there really were god-names and temples in the primitive Aryan period.

But it would be a great mistake to suppose that the only way in which philology can be of service to the history of religion is by placing at its disposal the primitive etymological equivalents in the sphere of religion. Harnack (*op. cit.*) is right in saying that the history of religion is reflected in the history of language, and that only he who knows the latter is in a position to seek to decipher the former. In fact, the whole formation of religious ideas can be understood only with the help of philology. Whence came the god-names of the separate Aryan races, if, as we have just seen, they cannot be recognized in the vocabulary of the primitive language? What religious thought called them

into being in each separate case; and how did this, their fundamental idea, afterwards grow deeper and wider? But even if it must, unfortunately, be admitted that our knowledge in this department is still very limited, the fact that at present we know nothing certain about the etymological explanation of many, indeed of most, Aryan god-names (an Indian *Varuṇa* and *Mitra*, a Greek *Ares* and *Poseidon*, a Roman *Mars* and *Liber*, the Teutonic *Tanfana* and *Nerthus*, a Lithuanian *Occopirnus* and *Autrimpus*, etc.) does not justify the conclusion that this must remain so in the future. In this connexion, H. Usener's *Götternamen, Versuch einer Lehre von der religiösen Begriffsbildung* (Bonn, 1896), a book which to some extent forms the basis of the present article, shows a marked advance, although the present writer recognizes this advance more in the fundamental idea of the work than in its details, which are often linguistically assailable. Moreover, what we really lack most, in the sphere of Aryan archæology as in others, is a collection of linguistic material. Once we have before us, collected and sifted, the terminology of sacrifice and prayer, of priests and temples, of lots and consulting of oracles, of legal and moral ideas from all the Aryan languages, various stages of historical development emerge of their own accord, and each new etymological discovery implies a new discovery in the history of religion.

We have so far been treating of expressions which either belong to the common pre-historic vocabulary or are autochthonous in the separate languages. Now we have to refer to another important source for the understanding of religious history. This is the *foreign word*, or borrowing. Thus the Gr. Κάδμος taken from Heb. *qedem*, 'the East,' the Lat. *Apollo* and *Proserpina* from Gr. Ἀπέλλων and Περσεφόνη, and the Russ. *bogŭ*, 'God,' from Avesta *baγa*, show the directions from which new religious thoughts and suggestions came to the separate Aryan races.

Now, even although the aid which is given to religious history by philology is great and many-sided, yet it is a great mistake to believe, as was formerly done, that the religion of the primitive Aryans, like their culture generally, could be deduced simply from etymological comparisons. It is true that the above-mentioned equation, Skr. *devá* = Lat. *deus*, shows us clearly that there were divine beings even in primitive times; but we cannot expect from philology any information regarding the intrinsic value, or import and scope, of this term. In this, as in all other questions, therefore, the comparison of *things* and the investigation of *things* must accompany the comparison of *words*.

This brings us, in the first place, to *Pre-history* or *Pre-historic Archæology*, a science which, in general, is based in no small degree on certain religious conceptions and customs of prehistoric man. For we owe the majority of pre-historic relics, as is well known, to the ancient wide-spread practice of the worship of the dead; and the questions, how and where the dead were buried, what was placed beside them in the way of food and drink, what weapons and implements were laid in the grave or on the funeral pyre, and why the corpse was buried in this or that position, turned in this or that direction, are naturally connected most closely with problems of the history of religion. But discoveries of another kind—such as sacrifice-stones, idols, amulets, bronze kettles, bronze chariots, no doubt serving a religious purpose (one was found near Trundholm as recently as 1902; cf. S. Müller, *Urgeschichte Europas*, Strassburg, 1904, p. 116), and many others—possess great significance in religious history, even if at first they raise more problems than they enable us to solve.

But the chief task in this field of investigation must always be *the comparison of the religions historically attested in the various Aryan races*, and the attempt to select from the crowd of their heterogeneous phenomena what is common and original. And there can be no doubt concerning the path to be pursued, provided that the analogy emphasized above between the history of Aryan culture in general and the history of Aryan religion in particular is correct.

It is the great merit of V. Hehn to have shown, especially in his book *Kulturpflanzen und Haustiere in ihrem Übergang aus Asien nach Europa*[7] (ed. O. Schrader, Berlin, 1902), that the conditions of civilization in primitive Aryan times have persisted, often with great faithfulness, among the N. European races, particularly the Lithuanians and the Slavs, among whom they not infrequently show themselves at the present day. It is from the study of these races that the higher forms of life, as they are presented to us in Indian, Greek, and Roman antiquity, have for the first time been fully understood. There was really nothing further needed than the transference of this simple thought to the history of religion. In very much the same way, men like W. R. Smith (*Religion of the Semites*[2], 1894 [Germ. tr. Freiburg, 1899]) and S. I. Curtiss (*Primitive Semitic Religion To-day*, 1902 [Germ. ed. Leipzig, 1904]) have recently attempted to deduce the oldest Semitic religious conditions, not so much from Babylonian, Phœnician, and Hebrew antiquity as from their *modern* remains, especially among Arab tribes. Similarly our task is to look at the higher forms of religion of the Indians, Greeks, and Romans from the standpoint of the lower stages of N. European paganism, and to find the latter again in the former. Unfortunately, this methodical plan is more easily stated than carried out. The reason for this is that our knowledge of N. European religions is, in many ways, still shadowy and incomplete; for—and this more nearly concerns the *Teutons*—it cannot be doubted that the work of J. Grimm (*Deutsche Mythologie*[4], 1875–78), however worthy of admiration it is even yet, suffers from two defects which have not been removed even by later investigation. The first of these is that the religious-historical information with regard to the Continental Teutons is too much amalgamated with what we know about the *Northern* mythology, which requires special critical examination. The second defect is that the whole re-construction of the old Teutonic faith in the hands of Grimm and his followers is dominated by the same spirit of over-estimation of its contents as Tacitus exhibits in his *Germania*. Our knowledge of Slavonic paganism is still more uncertain. In G. Krek's *Einleit. in die slav. Literaturgeschichte*[2] (Graz, 1887), we find, indeed, a comparatively matter-of-fact presentation of ancient Slavonic religion (pp. 377–439); but the incisive criticism by A. Brückner (*Archiv für slav. Philol.* xiv. 161 ff.) has shown how careful an investigation we still need of the sources, which are far too full of the most incredible misunderstandings and faulty emendations (examples of these in *Archiv*, iv. 423 or xiv. 164), before we can obtain from them any grains of real gold. In particular, we know absolutely nothing about common Slavonic god-names, for even the agreement of *Zuarasici* (certified by Thietmar, vi. 7) with the Russ. *Svarog* does not prove any such thing with certainty (cf Jagić, *Archiv*, iv. 412 ff.). This is perhaps due to the simple reason that, as yet, there were no Slavonic god-names at all. If the historical information about Slavonic paganism is thus of a doubtful nature, we are compensated for it in some measure by the fact that on Slavonic soil many

heathen manners and customs, even under the gloss of Christianity, make themselves widely felt even at the present time. We possess excellent data about these; and we hope, especially with regard to the cult of the dead, to obtain new and valuable information by means of them.

It fortunately happens, too, that we are very well supplied with information about the primitive paganism of the Baltic brother-races of the Slavs, the Prussians, Lithuanians, and Letts. Among these peoples, originally at least equally far removed from the influences of both Roman and Byzantine culture, a particularly primitive religious system survived down to the 15th and 16th cents., and even longer; so that we see the remarkable spectacle of adherents of the Lutheran doctrine like Jan Malecki (Meletius, Menecius) about 1550, or Matthæus Prætorius (born about 1635) being able to report in detail regarding the paganism existing in their communities. F. Solmsen has enumerated and briefly explained these sources of the Prusso-Lithuanian religion, in Usener's *Götternamen* (p. 79 ff.) We shall return to some of them in the course of this article. In general, however, we may express the hope that the Lithuanian religion will render services to the history of Aryan religion similar to those rendered by the Arabs to Semitic study.

Idea of God.—If we undertake to examine and arrange, in accordance with the method described above, the stock of religious ideas and customs prevalent among the primitive Aryan races, what could be a better starting-point than that conception to the evolution of which all those efforts are in the last resort directed—the conception of 'God'? We shall make the three words Gr. *θεός*, Lat. *deus*, and the common Teutonic O.H.G. *got* the pivot of this preliminary investigation.

For a long time the Greek word was erroneously connected with the Lat. *deus*. Nowadays this theory may be regarded as finally abandoned. On the other hand, nearly all later etymologists agree* that the Gr. *θεός* is derived from **θFεσο-ς* (cf. *θέσ-φατος* 'spoken by God') and belongs to the following word-group: Lith. *dvesiù*, *dvėsti* 'to breathe,' *dvãsė* 'breath,' 'spirit,' *dùsas* 'vapour,' Old Slav. *duchŭ* 'breath,' 'spirit,' *duša* 'soul,' M.H.G. *getwâs* 'ghost,' Old Gall. *dusii* 'nightmare' (cf. Augustine, *de Civ. Dei*, xv. 23: 'Quosdam dæmones, quos *Dusios* Galli nuncupant, hanc assidue immunditiam et tentare et efficere plures talesque asseverant'; Isid. *Or.* 8, 11, 103: 'Sæpe improbi existunt etiam mulieribus, et earum peragunt concubitum, quos dæmones Galli *dusios* nuncupant, quia assidue hanc peragunt immunditiam'), Lat. *Fĕrâlia* (**dhvĕsâlia*) 'a festival in honour of the dead' (also probably *fĕriæ* from **dhvĕsiæ*, and *festus*). As the development of the meaning of the Gr. *θεός* we get therefore 'breath,' 'soul,' 'soul of the dead,' '*god*.'

A *second* series of words presents a quite analogous appearance. Jordanis (ch. 13) remarks of the Goths: 'Jam proceres suos, quorum quasi fortuna vincebant, non puros homines sed semideos, id est, *anses* vocaverunt.' Now the word *anses* which is here made use of, and which in the passage quoted denotes the souls of ancestors worshipped as gods, rose on the one hand to be the title of the highest old Norse gods, the Æsen (Old Nor. *ęsir*), and on the other hand exists still in Anglo-Saxon (*ęse*) in the sense of lower spiritual beings, the elves: *ęsa gescot* is like *ylfa gescot* = N.H.G. *Hexenschuss*, lit. *witches' shot*, *i.e.* lumbago. It is not improbable that there is, further, a connexion between the same word and Skr. *ásu* 'the breath of life in men and animals,' *anima* (cf., in phonetic connexion, Skr. *ási* = Lat. *ensis* 'sword'), and once more with Skr. *ásura*, Avesta *ahura* (Ahura-mazda) = 'god,' 'lord.'

The facts referred to find their explanation in a series of other related phenomena. As is the case among other races, the *soul* is thought of in the Aryan languages as breath, wind, vapour or smoke. A primitive Aryan expression for this survives in the equation Skr. *átmán* = O.H.G. *âtum* 'breath,' 'soul' (Ir. *athach* 'breath'), while the closely related equation of Skr. *mánas* = Gr. *μένος* (cf. also Lat. *Minerva* from **Menesova*) seems to mean not so much the physical substratum of the soul as its spiritual power (cf. Gr. *μέμονα*, 'I strive'). The heart of man appears to be regarded as the real seat of the soul, a fact which seems to follow, on the one hand, from the Gr. *κῆρες*, primitive spiritual beings (cf. below, pp. 27, 52), and their identity with *κῆρ* 'heart,' and, on the other hand, from the circumstance that the Indian *mánas* also has its abode in the heart, as a being the size of the thumb (cf. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, p. 526). The heart is also viewed as the starting-point of numerous spiritual functions and emotions: Lat. *vĕcors* 'mad,' *recordari* 'to remember,' Old Slav. *srŭditi sę* 'to be angry,' Bulg. *srŭčeliv* 'courageous' (Lat. *cor*, Old Slav. *srŭdĭce* 'heart'), etc. From the separate languages we may mention further, for the notion of the soul: Lat. *animus* 'soul,' *anima* 'breath': Gr. *ἄνεμος* 'wind' (Skr. *ániti* 'he breathes'); Gr. *ψυχή*: *ψύχω* 'breathe'; Gr. *θυμός* (*Il.* vii. 131 identical with *ψυχή*): Skr. *dhûmá*, Lat. *fúmus* 'smoke,' etc. This breath or smoke soul, then, is enclosed in the body of man, which, however, it leaves on the advent of death, also temporarily in the phenomena of sleep and dreams, in order to lead an independent existence. From the spiritual beings formed in this way there have now sprung a large host of spirits conceived as partly harmful and partly helpful, for which there exist in the Aryan languages a vast number of cognate expressions.

Some of these are: Skr. *drúh*, Avesta *druj* = Old Nor. *draugr*, Old Saxon *gidrog*, O.H.G. *gitroc* (cf. also A.S. *dreâg* 'larva mortui,' and perhaps Old Nor. *dvergr*, M.H.G. *twerc* 'dwarf') 'goblin,' 'ghost': Skr. *druh* 'to injure'; Skr. *rbhú*, Vedic expression for three clever elfish beings (Kuhn's *Ztschr.* iv. 102 ff.) = Old Nor. *álfr*, A.S. *ælf*, M.H.G. *alp*, 'fairy,' 'ghostly being,' 'demon,' 'nightmare' (cf. W. Grimm, *Kleinere Schriften*, i. 405 ff., and also Schrader, *Reallexicon*, art. 'Zwerge und Riesen'); common Teutonic M.H.G. *mar* m.f., Old Nor. *mara*, A.S. *mære*, *mare*, O.H.G. *mara* f. 'demon' (*mare* in 'nightmare') = Old Sl. *mora* 'witch,' 'demon,' 'goblin,' Ir. *mor-[r]ígain*, Gl. *lamia* 'goblin-queen'; Old Nor. *valr*, A.S. *wæl* 'the dead' (esp. on the battlefield) = Lith. *vėlės* 'ghostly forms of dead people, ghostly beings in general'; Goth. *hugs* 'νοῦς,' Old Nor. *hugr* 'soul' (*mannahugir* 'human souls which appear in many forms') perhaps = Lith. *kaũkas* 'dwarf-spirit,' 'hobgoblin,' etc.

To this class of beings, which will engage our attention, in the discussion of the conception of fate (below, p. 52[a]), belong originally the two series of words which were discussed above, namely, Gr. *θεός* and Goth. *anses*; but these words took on a higher meaning under the influence of the worship devoted to the souls of the dead, and ultimately became associated with those divine beings for whom the Lat. *deus* is the characteristic term.

The word *deus*, as we have shown above, corresponds to the Skr. *devá*, Ir. *dia*, Lith. *dievas*, Old Nor. *tívar*, and along with these goes back to an Aryan root **deivo-s*, which, in consequence of its close connexion with Aryan **dyĕu-s* = Skr. *dyáus* 'sky,' Gr. *Ζεύς*, Lat. *Juppiter*, must have had some such meaning as 'the heavenly.' Now, since the Aryan **dyĕus*, as the use not only of the Indian *dyáus*, but also of the Gr. *Ζεύς* and Lat. *Juppiter* proves, originally denoted merely the visible sky worshipped as a god, **deivos* derived in primitive times* from **dyĕus*, must have signified

* Bechtel forms an exception to this, in Bezzenberger's *Beiträge*, xxx. 267 ff. [*N.B.*—A star *before* a word (as in the next line) signifies that the form does not occur but is inferred.]

* A later formation from Skr. *dyáus*, *dívas* = Gr. *Ζεύς*, *Δι-F-ός* is Skr. *dívyas* = Gr. *δῖος* from **δι-F-jo-ς* 'heavenly.'

originally only the powers of nature visible in the sky, *e.g.* sun, moon, dawn, thunder, winds, etc. In them, therefore, we must see the 'heavenly ones.' The common Teutonic root Goth. *guþ*, Old Nor. *goð*, A.S. *god*, O.H.G. *got*, seems to the present writer to be largely characteristic of the oldest conception of the divine element thought of as active in these 'heavenly ones.' The most significant thing about it is that it leads back to a *neuter conception*, to an original **ghutóm* which (cf. on this point Osthoff in Bezzenberger's *Beiträge z. Kunde d. idg. Spr.* xxiv. 177), as is shown by the comparison with Skr. *hávate* 'he calls' (*hutá* 'called'), Avesta *zavaiti* 'he curses,' Lith. *záuėti* 'to charm,' most probably denoted originally 'the divine element called forth by a charm from the deified phenomenon.' We shall return to this later. But meanwhile the discussion of the Gr. *θεός* and the Lat. *deus* has led us to the necessity of dividing the material at our disposal into *two* parts, which we may distinguish as worship of the dead and worship of the 'heavenly ones.' In a *third* division we shall discuss what, indeed, in many ways comes into contact with the worship of the dead and the 'heavenly ones,' but yet is on the whole independent of it, viz. the prevailing ideas of Fate and the means of their investigation.

I. *THE WORSHIP OF THE DEAD.*—As far back as we can trace the Aryan races by means of tradition or excavations, they honoured their dead by a long series of customs which shed a surprising light on the ideas of man concerning a life after death. We shall get the best view of these by treating of (1) the different forms of disposal of the dead which we encounter among the Aryan races, especially burial and cremation; (2) the attentions paid to the dead at the time of the disposal of the corpse, especially the gifts to the dead; (3) the attentions paid to them after the funeral rites (ancestor-worship). Then we must speak (4) about the beliefs in fixed common abodes of the dead (realms of the dead)—beliefs which, in the course of time, made their appearance in several parts of the Aryan world.

1. **Burial and burning of the corpse.**—The fact that in all countries occupied by Aryans these two forms of disposing of the dead are found contending for the mastery, even in very primitive times, suggests to us the question, To which of the two are we to assign the greater antiquity? If we turn for an answer first to *Asia*, we find that cremation may be regarded as the regular means of disposing of the body among the *Indians* even in Vedic times, and is the only one mentioned in the ritual texts; but alongside of it there are also evidences of the burial of the unburned body. Thus in the *Rigveda* (x. xv. 14) the pious ancestors who dwell in the joy of Heaven are divided into 'those who have been burned by fire and those who have not been burned by fire'; and so too in the *Atharvaveda* (xviii. ii. 34) buried bodies and cremated ones are distinguished among the 'fathers,' whom Agni is to bring forward. A glance at the *Iranian* brother-race of the Indians shows us that in these latter quotations we have before us the traces of an earlier state of affairs. Among the kings of the Scythians, who ethnographically seem to represent a part of the primitive Iranian race, left behind or scattered westwards, and who remained in more primitive conditions of culture, Herodotus (iv. 71 f.), who describes their obsequies in great detail, presupposes burial as the only form; and the bodies of the ancient Persian kings also were entombed unburned, as their graves show. Herodotus (i. 140) states the same thing of the Persians in general, while he gives in addition an account of a protective envelopment of the body in wax (*κατακηρώσαντες δὴ ὧν τὸν νέκυν Πέρσαι γῇ κρύπτουσι*). When, on the other hand, cremation is proved by the Avesta as existing among non-Zoroastrian tribes, or when the followers of Zarathushtra, as well as the Persian Magi, previous to burying their dead, exposed them to be devoured by dogs, birds and beasts of prey, we must in both cases undoubtedly detect the introduction of foreign customs, the last-mentioned of which seems to have originated among the wild mountain tribes of the Oreitæ in Baluchistan (cf. Diodorus Siculus, xvii. 105: *τῶν γὰρ τελευτησάντων παρ' αὐτοῖς τὰ σώματα φέρουσιν οἱ συγγενεῖς γυμνοί, λόγχας ἔχοντες. εἰς δὲ τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας δρυμοὺς θέντες τὸ σῶμα, τὸν μὲν περικείμενον τῷ νεκρῷ κόσμον περιαιροῦνται, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τοῦ τετελευτηκότος καταλείπουσι βορὰν τοῖς θηρίοις*).

Similar conditions confront us among the *European* Aryans, especially among the *Greeks*. In the shaft-graves, and in the bee-hive and chamber tombs of the Mycenæan period, the dead were entombed unburned in a partly mummified state (cf. Tsountas-Manatt, *The Mycenæan Age*, chs. v. vi.). And even if, in the face of these discoveries, we must take account of the possibility of a non-Grecian population in Mycenæan Greece, the case is different with the great Athenian cemetery which has been open to view in the N.W. of the town since the year 1891 (cf. A. Brückner and E. Pernice, 'Ein attischer Friedhof' in *Mitteil. d. kais. deutschen archaeol. Instituts*, Athen. Abt. xviii.). Among the nineteen 'dipylon-graves' (graves of the geometric period) in this burying-place, only one contained an urn with burnt bones, 'and this state of affairs agrees with the assurances of Greek local antiquaries, who claim to have seen no *προιστορικὸς τάφος* with a burnt body.' So, when burying and burning are met with in the Greece of history alongside of each other, there can be no doubt that the former custom must be regarded as the more primitive, and that the Homeric world with its practice of body-burning represents an innovation contrary to the primitive Greek custom of burial which is preserved in the mother-country.

The *Roman* tradition corresponds to the conditions actually found among the Greeks. According to Pliny, burial preceded cremation in Rome also (cf. *Hist. Nat.* vii. 187):

'Ipsum cremare apud Romanos non fuit veteris instituti; terra condebantur . . . et tamen multæ familiæ priscos servavere ritus, sicut in Cornelia nemo ante Sullam dictatorem traditur crematus.'

An old royal enactment referring to the so-called 'Cæsarian operation' (cf. M. Voigt, 'Über die leges regiæ' in *ASG*, vii.: 'negat lex regia mulierem, quæ prægnans mortua sit, *humari*, antequam partus ei excidatur') appears to be acquainted with burial only, but the legislation of the Twelve Tables already sanctions both methods of disposal of the dead.

Cf. Tab. x. (ed. Schoell) 1: 'hominem mortuum in urbe *ne sepelito neve urito*'; 8, 9: 'neve aurum addito cui auro dentes iuncti escunt, aut im cum *illo sepeliet uretve*, se fraude esto.'

The excavations also indicate that burial was succeeded by cremation on ancient Latin soil. The lowest layer of the burying-ground laid bare near the Porta Esquilina contains rock-hewn burial chambers with unburned bodies; while in the second layer of soil in this cemetery, as well as in the necropolis of Alba Longa and among the most recent excavations of Professor Boni in the Forum Romanum, urns of ashes have been brought to light which point, no doubt, to a higher antiquity for cremation in Rome than might be expected from the historical tradition quoted. We have to rely solely on excavations with regard to the northern part of Italy. Here, in the famous burying-places belonging to the older Iron Age, of Bologna, Villanova, and Marzobotto, the graves of bodies buried and burned almost contemporaneously lie close together. The latter class are assigned by Mon-

telius (*La Civilisation primitive en Italie depuis l'introduction des métaux*, Stockholm, 1895) to the Umbrians, *i.e.* to the near relatives of the Latins, and the former to the non-Aryan Etruscans. But the observations of the present writer, on the spot and in the Museum of Bologna, failed to convince him of the possibility of carrying through this ethnographic division.

When we pass to the East and North of our territory, we find both methods of disposing of the dead mentioned by Herodotus (v. 8) among the *Thracians*: ταφαὶ δὲ τοῖσι εὐδαίμοσι αὐτῶν [the present reference is thus only to the rich] εἰσὶ αἵδε· τρεῖς μὲν ἡμέρας προτιθέασι τὸν νεκρόν, καὶ παντοῖα σφάξαντες ἱρήϊα εὐωχέονται, προκλαύσαντες πρῶτον· ἔπειτα δὲ θάπτουσι κατακαύσαντες ἢ ἄλλως γῇ κρύψαντες.* The same thing holds of the pagan *Prussians* and *Lithuanians*, regarding whom a treaty with the Teutonic Order in the year 1249 (cf. Dreger, *Cod. Pomeran. diplom.* No. 191) certifies the following: 'promiserunt quod ipsi et heredes eorum in mortuis *comburendis vel subterrandis* . . . vel etiam in aliis quibuscunque ritus gentilium de cetero non servabunt.' Elaborate descriptions of the disposal of the bodies of people of rank by cremation among the races mentioned are given us by different authorities, such as Peter of Dusburg or the canon Stryikowski; while others like the clerical Jan Malecki (Meletius, Menecius), who will often be referred to, in their accounts of the ancient Prussian funeral customs, start with burial as a self-evident institution. The older information among the Slavonic races is somewhat more uniform, and is in favour of cremation. It is certified by Boniface (Jaffé, *Monumenta Moguntina*, p. 172) as existing among the *Winedi*; by Thietmar of Merseburg (*Chron.* viii. 2) among the Poles, and by the Arabs Ibn Dūstah, Ibn Fosslan, Mas'ūdi, etc., among the Eastern and the Danube Slavs. Alongside of this, however, Ibn Dūstah tells of a custom according to which, if a man of noble rank died, a grave was made for him in the form of a large house, in which he was laid unburned. But, as the followers of this custom are expressly called Rhos (Russians), not Slavonians, it is natural to conjecture that, as we must understand by the Rhos the Norse conquerors of Russia, we have here to do with a Scandinavian custom; for we read of stately rooms in Norway belonging to the oldest Iron Age—rooms hewn in wood, in which some corpses lay on stuffed cushions, and some sat on chairs (cf. O. Montelius, *Die Kultur Schwedens*[2], p. 193). It may also be considered a foreign custom when, in the account given by Ibn Fosslan of the interment of a Russian merchant (see below, p. 30), the corpse was put in a ship and burned along with it, in exactly the same way as was customary in Northern Scandinavia. On the other hand, the simultaneous existence of different burial customs among the old Slavonic races—cremation among the Radimičes, Sěverjanes, and Kriviče, burial among the Poljanes and Drevljanes—may be inferred from the information of the old Russian *Chronicle* of Nestor, and Christianity at its introduction seems to have found both methods of disposing of the bodies followed to practically the same extent (cf. Kotljarevskij, 'On the Burial Customs of the Pagan Slavs,' in *Trans. of the Department for the Russian Lang. and Lit. of the St. Petersburg Acad.* [Russ.] xlix. p. 240 ff.).

The *Teutons* and *Celts* still remain to be considered. Among these the Roman authors are acquainted with cremation only.

Cf., for the Teutons, Tacitus, *Germ.* 27: 'funerum nulla ambitio: id solum observatur, ut corpora clarorum virorum certis lignis crementur, struem rogi nec vestibus nec odoribus cumulant: sua cuique arma, quorundam igni et equus adicitur, sepulcrum cæspes erigit.' As late as the year 785 (*MGH* iii. 49) Charlemagne decreed against the Saxons: 'si quis corpus defuncti hominis secundum ritum Paganorum flamma consumi fecerit, et ossa eius ad cinerem redegerit, capite punietur'; and again, 'iubemus ut corpora Christianorum Saxonum ad cimeteria ecclesiæ deferantur et non ad tumulos Paganorum.' The native testimonies to cremations on a large scale are too well known from the *Beowulf* and the songs of the Edda to require to be detailed here. With reference to the Gauls, Cæsar states (*de Bell. Gall.* vi. 19): 'funera sunt pro cultu Gallorum magnifica et sumptuosa; omniaque quæ vivis cordi fuisse arbitrantur, in ignem inferunt, etiam animalia, ac paulo supra hanc memoriam servi et clientes, quos ab iis dilectos esse constabat, iustis funeribus confectis una cremabantur.' The same thing appears from Pomponius Mela (iii. 2, 3) and from Diodorus Siculus (v. 28).

The question simply is, *At what time* did the Teutons and Celts begin to cremate their dead? The final answer to this can be given only by prehistoric archæology, for want of older written evidences. This shows that in the lands occupied by the Celts and Teutons during the Neolithic Age, the corpses were interred unburned in dolmens, upright graves, and stone chests, and that it was only after the use of bronze had become more firmly established in Europe that cremation gradually came in. It further encourages more and more the opinion (cf. Montelius, *AA* xvii. 151 ff.) that the change of custom went on in the countries mentioned, without any real change in the population, so that in this way we should have to conclude that, for both Celts and Teutons, burial and not cremation was the oldest method of disposing of the dead, although history gives evidence only of the latter. It is worthy of notice that in Sweden and Norway burial once more appears decisively during the younger Iron Age alongside of cremation, and we may doubt whether the former mode of disposing of the dead was at any time quite extinct.

No one who considers the facts and conditions here described (cf. for details J. Grimm, 'Über das Verbrennen der Leichen' in *Kleinere Schriften*, ii. 211, and Ridgeway, *The Early Age of Greece*, i. ch. vii. 'Inhumation, Cremation, and the Soul') will doubt that, so far as the Aryan races are concerned, there is a not inconsiderable probability for the priority of burial over cremation. This view is confirmed by a *consideration of the language*.

If it really happened, as J. Grimm (*op. cit.*) assumed, that cremation existed before burial, we should naturally expect this fact to be indicated somehow in the Aryan funeral terminology; that, *e.g.*, expressions for 'to dispose of the dead' should exhibit an original sense='to burn.' But this is not at all the case; and even the Gr. *θάπτω*, which means in historical usage 'to bury' and 'to burn,' can by no means, in spite of J. Grimm's contention, be connected with Skr. *tap*, Lat. *tepeo*, Gr. *τέφρα*, 'ashes,' but must very likely be connected with O.H.G. *tunc*, 'pit,' or with Armen. *damban* 'grave.' On the other hand, there is a wide-spread prehistoric designation of burial in the series: Old Pr. *kopts*, *enkopts*, 'to bury,' Lith. *kāpas*, 'cairn,' Lett. *kapu mâte*, 'grave-goddess,' Gr. *κάπετος*, 'grave,' 'pit,' Lat. *capulus*, 'coffin': Lith. *kapóti*, Old Slav. *kopati*, 'to hew,' and the same change of meaning recurs in the equally primitive equation: O.H.G. *grab*=Old Slav. *grobŭ*, 'grave,' 'coffin' (Goth. *graban*, 'to dig'). There is a pre-historic designation of the grave also in the probable equation, Lat. *orcus* (**urcus*), 'under world'=Goth. *aírahi* 'sepulchral cave' (cf. Bezzenberger, *Beiträge*, xxv. 166); while the Lat. *sepelio*, the oldest meaning of which was undoubtedly 'to bury,' as follows from the passages of the Twelve Tables quoted above, through its connexion with the Skr. *sapary*, 'to serve,' 'do homage,' 'honour,' plainly expresses the ancient *ritual significance* of this mode of disposal of the dead (cf. also W. Schulze, in Kuhn's *Zeitschr.* xli. 335).

* Cf. also Kretschmer, *Einleit. in die Gesch. der griech. Sprache*, p. 178.

We are thus justified in assuming that the Aryans, alike in the land of their origin and after their arrival in what afterwards became their home, interred their dead unburned in carefully prepared graves. The thought that prompted this kind of burial must have been simply the desire to protect the body of the deceased, whether with the pious intention of warding off enemies and wild animals from it, or because, believing that the soul of the dead hovers around the corpse and is bound to its existence, they thought to secure the interests of the deceased by procuring for him the longest possible existence, and at the same time to serve the interests of the survivors—for they were afraid of ghosts—by confining the spirits of the dead rigidly to the grave. Or it may be that all these reasons worked together.

This intention of guarding the body of the dead person is exhibited on the grandest scale in those colossal tombs, known as dolmens, vaults, cairns, etc., which are scattered over Europe in the North, West, and South, and which also recur in North Africa, Palestine, and India; but the questions to which these buildings give rise from the side of the history of culture and ethnography (cf. S. Müller, *Nord. Altertumskunde*, i. 68; Hoernes, *Urgesch. der bildenden Kunst*, p. 241; Zinck, *Det nordevrop. dysseterritor. stengrave og dyssernes udbredelse i Europa*; M. Much, *Heimat der Indogermanen*, Abschnitt v., 'Die grossen Steingräber') are as yet so far from being settled that we cannot enter upon them here. At bottom, however, the same endeavour to protect and preserve the human corpse is expressed in the later but still pagan invention of the coffin. It is unknown during the whole of the Stone Age, and in Greece also during the Mycenæan period of the Bronze Age. In Sparta, as late as the time of Lycurgus, the dead were, without any such covering, laid upon palm branches and leaves of the olive tree. Afterwards, as in the old Athenian cemetery (cf. above, p. 16), the bodies were enclosed in large vessels (πίθοι), and then the clay and wooden coffin and the stone sarcophagus gradually found their way into the South, borrowed perhaps from foreign countries. In the forest land of N. Europe there appeared for the first time, in the earlier Bronze Age, the so-called 'tree of the dead,' *i.e.* a hollowed-out trunk, especially of the oak, which was used for the protection of the body. Any one who desires to convince himself of the preserving power of this manner of interment has only to examine, in the Copenhagen National Museum, the tree-coffins with their contents taken from the Danish cairns. In Ancient Russia, and in dialects even at the present day, the coffin bears the very name *klada*, *koloda*, *i.e.* 'tree-trunk' (cf. N. Germ. *Dodenstock*). The Slavonians, even at the beginning of last century, felled a hollow tree for the purposes of burial, shaped it, and pushed the dead body inside. The sectaries of the province of Czernigovski are still said invariably to manufacture their coffins out of a complete tree-trunk. Moreover, corpses have been found in Russia which were enveloped only in bark (cf. Kotljarevskij, *op. cit.* p. 222 f.). This northern 'tree of the dead,' whose wide-spread use is a proof of the fact that the burial of the dead had never quite been given up, was afterwards superseded by the Christian coffin *constructed* from boards, which spread over Europe along with the diffusion of the new beliefs.

Eloquent witness is borne to this by numerous names of the coffin in the Teutonic languages—names which were borrowed from the Latin (O.H.G. *saruh*, *sarh*, from **sarcus*=*sarcophagus*, A.S. *cest*, *cist*, 'coffin,' *cistian*, 'to coffin,' Old Nor. *lîk-kista* from Lat. *cista*, M.H.G. *arke* from Lat. *arca*, O.H.G. *sarh-scrîni* from Lat. *scrinium*).

Thus all along, from the earliest to the most recent times, we see connected with the disposal of the dead by burial the endeavour to protect and preserve the corpse.

Now, in the most direct opposition to this series of ideas connected with the burial of the dead, is the custom of *cremation*, which, as we have seen, emerges in pre-historic times among all the Aryan races, and subsists, alongside of burial, down even to the introduction of Christianity. While those who bury a body aim at *protecting* it by durable grave-constructions or by coffining, we now find men resorting to fire as the most drastic means of *destroying* it. It is in reality a revolution which can be explained only by a complete change in the ideas about life after death, and which in recent years several famous scholars have made the subject of research. The first place here is due to Erwin Rohde and his book *Psyche*[2] (i. 27 ff.). According to his view, cremation is meant to effect the speedy and complete separation of the soul from the body, and this from an affectionate as well as a selfish motive. As long as the body lasts, the soul is bound to it; it enjoys no rest itself and allows none to the survivors, whom it terrifies by manifold appearances.

'Nothing can destroy the visible counterpart of the soul more quickly than fire; if a fire is kindled, and the most precious belongings of the dead man are consumed in it, no bond can detain the soul any longer in this world. Thus, by burning the body, they serve the interests of the dead, who no longer roam about restlessly, and still more those of the living, whom the souls banished to the depths of the earth can never meet again.

In essential agreement with Rohde, but independently of him, S. Müller, in his *Nord. Altertumskunde* (i. 363 ff.), is convinced that the true purpose of cremation is the release of the soul in order that it may find peace in the other life, while R. Much, in a comprehensive discussion of Müller's book (*Anzeiger für deutsches Altertum*, xlviii. 315 ff.), lays greater emphasis on the release of the survivors of the dead person from the fear of him than on the release of his soul.

'The thought of the dead person, if it was a case of burial, would involve the idea of the preserved but disfigured body, decomposed or already changed to a skeleton. . . . But if the dead person had been burned, what was left of him afforded no new food for the imagination. . . . The part which the dead under such circumstances played in the dreams, hallucinations, and imaginations of the survivors was undoubtedly a smaller and also a more friendly one; in other words, his soul entered more easily into the peace of a home of souls, or else followed its destined way at liberty within living and active nature.'

In confirmation of his view, Much appeals to the custom, which long persisted, of burning what were supposed to be vampires, witches, sorcerers, and the like, for no other reason than to prevent their return.

In opposition to the opinion (which, by the way, is generally prevalent) of these three scholars, that the 'dogma' of cremation spread into Europe and Asia by passing from race to race, W. Ridgeway, in his work mentioned above, *The Early Age of Greece*, defends the view that cremation was brought by the *conquering expeditions* of a N. European Celtic race to Italy and Greece as well as to Iran and India. He holds that, at the same time and in the same way as the custom of burning the body, the belief had spread that an entrance into a world of the blest was secured only by those who were burned by fire, but that cremation itself is rooted, in the last resort, in the conviction that it is only by fire that man can be freed from the pollution which death brings with it.

Setting aside this attempt of Ridgeway (which appears to have little foundation) to explain the spread of cremation among the Aryan races by migration of races instead of by 'waves of culture,' the present writer believes that in the discussions of all four scholars important points of view have been suggested for the under-

standing of the question with which we are here engaged, although naturally it will never be possible to get beyond more or less credible conjectures on the subject. There is no doubt that the thought which in stages of primitive culture is expressed most frequently and plainly, as we shall see in the section on 'Realms of the Dead' (p. 29), is that cremation opens for the dead person the entrance into a paradise beyond. But it cannot yet be decided whether cremation first originated from an Aryan race and spread 'wave-like' in different directions, or took rise outside the circle of Aryan linguistic and racial kinship—perhaps among the primitive Sumerian population of Babylon, where, in the year 1887, huge burying-grounds of burned bodies were brought to light in the two ruined sites of Surghul and El Hibba (cf. R. Koldewey, in *ZA* ii. 403 ff.).

2. Attentions paid to the dead at the time of the disposal of the corpse, especially the gifts to the dead.—Whether, in primitive times, the body of the dead was buried or burned, the disposal of it must have been accompanied even then by a long series of solemn customs, which can still be ascertained by a careful comparison of the burial-rites handed down from the separate Aryan races. Unfortunately, such a comparison has not as yet been undertaken, and cannot be attempted in an exhaustive way here. To show, however, how far-reaching the analogies in this connexion are, two at least of the chief Aryan races, namely, the *Greeks* and the *Lithuanian Slavs* will be compared.

For the former we shall start from the description of the Greek burial-customs in Rohde's *Psyche*[2] (denoted by R.), i. 218 ff.; for the latter we shall take special account of the above-mentioned (p. 17[a]) work of Kotljarevskij (=K.); cf. also Joannes Menecius (=M.), 'de Sacrificiis et Idolatria veterum Borussorum, Livonum, aliarumque vicinarum gentium' (*Scriptores Rerum Livonicarum*, ii. 389 ff.); and P. V. Šejn (=Š.1), 'Materials for a Knowledge of the Life and Language of the Russian Population of the North-West' (White Russia), i. 2, 2nd pt.: 'Burial and Memorial Customs, Wailings over the Corpse, and Lamentations for the Dead,' in *Trans. of the Department for the Russian Lang. and Lit. of the St. Petersburg Acad.* [Russ.] 51, No. 3, St. Petersburg, 1890, and the same author's work (=Š.2), *The Great Russian in his Songs, Usages, Customs, Superstitions, Tales, Legends*, etc. [Russ.], St. Petersburg, 1898, 1900, 2nd pt. p. 777 ff. Thereafter the important subject of gifts to the dead will be discussed with regard to all the Aryan races.

(*a*) ANCIENT GREEK AND LITU-SLAVIC BURIAL-CUSTOMS.—(*a*) *The lying in state of the corpse* (*πρόθεσις*).—'After the eyes and the mouth have been closed by the hand of the nearest relative, the corpse is washed and anointed by the women of the family, clothed in clean garments, and laid on the bed in the house for solemn lying in state' (R.).

'In funeribus hic servatur ritus a rusticanis. Defunctorum cadavera vestibus et calceis induuntur, et erecta locantur super sellam, cui assidentes illorum propinqui perpotant ac helluantur' (M. p. 391). 'On the appearance of the master of the house, the wife, and the persons intimately connected with the dead man, the lying in state takes place in the "corner" (*kutŭ*), which in this case does not mean the corner under the sacred images, but the bench opposite the entrance door.* Among other wishes connected with a "decent" death, as, *e.g.*, that in the hour of death all the relatives may be present, that the son may close the eyes, the daughter sing the song of woe, etc., the White Russian peasant wishes to lie on his own "bench" after his death; he has not died "decently" if he has lain in the "corner" in a stranger's house.' 'They clothe every corpse in a clean white garment, prepared in the house, and in new bast shoes, which are replaced by boots only in wealthy families.' 'It is the bounden duty of the dead man's nearest relatives to close his eyes, and in doing so they are required to avoid most strictly any possible injury to his body; and they make haste to wash the body, before it has grown cold.' 'They clothe the dead man in a complete summer dress, *i.e.* in a summer tunic and girdle over the under-garment, and they usually put a hat on his head' (Š.[1] pp. 512, 518).

A difference from the Greek custom is shown in the fact that among the Slavs the washing of the dead body, which, moreover, is regarded as a religious ceremony accompanied by prayers, is not usually performed by relatives, but by strangers; in the case of men it is done by men, in the case of women by women, or sometimes in the case of both by old women.

(*β*) *The lamentation for the dead* (*θρῆνος*).—'The lamentation for the dead took place over the corpse lying on its bier, and the purpose of the lying in state was to give opportunity for this' (R.). The spontaneous passionateness of this lamentation in the earliest times is attested not only in the description of Homer,* but also by the endeavours of the lawgivers, especially Solon (Plutarch, *Solon*, 21), which were directed towards putting a check upon it. Solon will have only the women nearest of kin (cf. below, 3 *e*) to take part in the lamentation; all violent outbursts of grief, scratching of the cheeks, and beating of the breast and the head are forbidden, as well as the singing of set forms (*θρηνεῖν πεποιημένα*). Homer (*Il.* xxiv. 707 ff.) gives a graphic account of what once prevailed: Priam carries the body of Hector to Troy. The whole town is assembled before the gates; with weeping and lamentations the people surround Priam's chariot; wife and mother tear their hair at the sight of their beloved dead one. Priam now exhorts them: 'Give me place for the mules to pass through; hereafter ye shall have your fill of wailing when I have brought him unto his home.' There the body of Hector is laid on a splendid couch, professional singers strike up a melancholy air, accompanied by the woeful cries of the women; then Andromache, Hecuba, and Helen step forward to the dead body to utter those mourning songs which are doubtless meant by the *θρηνεῖν πεποιημένα* of Solon's edict.

We meet with all these customs in everyday use in the Litu-Slavic world, sometimes even at the very threshold of the present day. From the laying of the dead body on the 'bench,' from the very moment of death, indeed, the lamentations of female relatives or neighbours continue through all the phases of the burial—often it is impossible to say whether more as a conventional necessity or as an expression of deep anguish. Moreover, they are repeated at the anniversary festivals of the dead, which will be spoken of below. The Arab Ibn Dūstah (K. p. 217) was acquainted with the fierceness of these outbursts of grief when he relates that the women lacerated† their hands and faces with knives when a member of the family died. And Šejn states of the White Russians of the present day (Š.[1] p. 535):

'The room of the peasant's house, in which the dead body lies, re-echoes with the weeping and mourning of relatives, neighbours, and acquaintances. In such a case the women naturally distinguish themselves by special ecstasies of feeling, their wailing and moaning and their despair at times reaching such a pitch that, on looking at them, one involuntarily begins to be apprehensive not only for the health, but even for the life of some of them.' Again, referring to the *Great Russians*, he says

* Cf. also Š.[1] p. 531: 'They lay the dead body on a long broad bench, or on a frame specially prepared for it in the middle of the room, with the head towards the sacred images (*krasny ugolŭ*)'; and Š.[1] p. 551: 'They lay the dead body in the middle of the room, with the feet towards the door.' So in Homer (*Il.* xix. 212) the dead person rests *ἀνὰ πρόθυρον τετραμμένος*.

* Cf. *e.g. Il.* xviii. 22 ff. (the son of Nestor announces the death of Patroclus to Achilles):

ὡς φάτο, τὸν (Achilles) δ' ἄχεος νεφέλη ἐκάλυψε μέλαινα.
ἀμφοτέρῃσι δὲ χερσὶν ἑλὼν κόνιν αἰθαλόεσσαν
χεύατο κὰκ κεφαλῆς, χαρίεν δ' ἤσχυνε πρόσωπον·
νεκταρέῳ δὲ χιτῶνι μέλαιν' ἀμφίζανε τέφρη.
αὐτὸς δ' ἐν κονίῃσι μέγας μεγαλωστὶ τανυσθείς
κεῖτο, φίλῃσι δὲ χερσὶ κόμην ἤσχυνε δαΐζων.
δμῳαὶ δ', ἃς Ἀχιλεὺς λήίσσατο Πάτροκλός τε,
θυμὸν ἀκηχεμέναι μεγάλ' ἴαχον, ἐκ δὲ θύραζε
ἔδραμον ἀμφ' Ἀχιλῆα δαΐφρονα, χερσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι
στήθεα πεπλήγοντο, λύθεν δ' ὑπὸ γυῖα ἑκάστης.

† Cf. *Il.* xix. 282 ff.:

Βρισηΐς δ' ἄρ' ἔπειτ', ἐκέλη χρυσέῃ Ἀφροδίτῃ,
ὡς ἴδε Πάτροκλον δεδαϊγμένον ὀξέϊ χαλκῷ,
ἀμφ' αὐτῷ χυμένη λίγ' ἐκώκυε, χερσὶ δ' ἀμυσσεν
στήθεά τ' ἠδ' ἁπαλὴν δειρὴν ἰδὲ καλὰ πρόσωπα.

(Š.[2] p. 779): 'When the women strike up their mourning songs at the graves, the weeping widow often swoons in consequence of her great grief, i.e. she falls on the grave of her husband, and lies there perfectly motionless. Then the women who are present shake her and bring her to her senses; and she falls down on the grave again, and continues her song of lamentation. Swoons like these occur several times in succession. Often they are only pretended, as it does honour to the bereaved one, and they praise her for "knowing how to weep."'

It is worthy of note that these Russian lamentations often assume an epic, and even a dramatic, character—*epic* in so far as occasionally a complete sketch of the life of the deceased is given in them (cf. Š.[1] p. 546), *dramatic* in so far as the mourners are in the habit of turning to the dead person with questions as if he were alive.

Cf. Menecius, *op. cit.* p. 391: 'Epota cerevisia (see above) fit lamentatio funebris, quæ in lingua Rutenica sic sonat: . . . id est, hei mihi quare mortuus es? Num tibi deerat esca aut potus? Hoc modo lamentantes enumerant ordine omnia externa illius bona, cuius mortem deplorant; nempe, uxorem, liberos, oves, boves, equos, anseres, gallinas, etc. Ad quæ singula respondentes occinunt hanc næniam: cur ergo mortuus es qui hæc habebas?' and Š.[1] p. 520: 'Those who visit the dead man take pains to express their genuine grief, and in doing so they recall different circumstances in their lives which have such and such a connexion with his life. The women express this in a mournful, tearful song, but the men in a long address, during which the speaker often turns to the dead man with questions, just as if he were still alive, and several times during the course of the speech he repeats that the dead man, although no longer alive, can nevertheless hear and understand quite well, only he is unable to express his thoughts and feelings.'

These speeches of the men are not really dirges, since only the women can take part in funeral dirges. Copious collections of these dirges, arranged according to the relationship of the mourner (widow, mother, sister, daughter, daughter-in-law, etc.), are to be found in both of Sejn's works. While on the whole marked by great monotony, these songs not infrequently exhibit in details genuine poetic feeling, and quite recall the mourning songs which the Trojan women poured forth over the body of Hector.

Thus a White Russian widow laments (Š.[1] p. 638): 'O, my brave partner, how am I to live now with my dear little children? Who will be their supporter and father? Whence can warm winds blow down upon them? No warm winds will blow upon them,' etc. Cf. Andromache's words at the bier of her husband (*Il.* xxiv. 725 ff.): 'Husband, thou art gone young from life, and leavest me a widow in thy halls. And the child is yet but a little one, the child of ill-fated parents, thee and me; nor methinks shall he grow up to manhood,' etc.

In Russia there are also paid female mourners, who often achieve great fame by their art (cf. Melnikow, *In the Forests*, ii. 307, Russ. ed.).

(γ) *The funeral procession* (ἐκφορά).—'The lying in state seems to have lasted, as a rule, only one day. Early on the morning of the third day after death, the body was carried out of the house along with the couch on which it had lain. . . . The solemn and magnificent forms which this part of the cult of the dead assumed, in the time of the ancient aristocracy, may be seen from the portrayal (if it corresponds at all to the reality) of a funeral procession on one of the very ancient "dipylon-vases." Here the body lies on an elevated bier in a carriage drawn by two horses; there are men with swords at the side, and a whole crowd of women following, wailing and beating their heads' (R.).

'Cum ad sepulturam effertur cadaver, plerique in equis funus prosequuntur, et currum obequitant, quo cadaver vehitur; eductisque gladiis verberant auras, vociferantes: . . . id est, aufugite vos dæmones' (M. p. 391). 'They always drive the dead body to the cemetery, and that on sledges even in summer; it is not customary to carry the dead body with the hands'* (Š.[2] p. 778). 'In old Russian the phrase "to sit on the sledge" means the same as "to approach the grave" (cf. Anučin, 'Sledge, Boat, and Horse as Requisites of Burial Ritual' (Russ.) in the *Moskauer Drevnosti*, xvi.). 'It is also worthy of notice that, as a rule, they yoke the dead man's favourite horse to his carriage.' 'In my parish they convey the dead to the cemetery in no other way than on a waggon drawn by a pair of oxen.' 'The burial takes place on the third day after the death of the invalid, and often on the second' (Š.[2] pp. 522, 541, 530).

The obsequies themselves naturally took a different form according as it was burial or cremation that was practised; both methods, as we have seen, can be proved to have existed in pre-Christian times, both on Litu-Slavic and on Greek soil. Winternitz, in his articles, 'Was wissen wir von den Indogermanen?' (*Beilage zur Münchner AZ*, 1903, No. 258, p. 293), thinks it is possible to recognize a primitive Aryan custom, connected with burial as well as cremation, in the frequently recurring practice of the mourners walking three times round the grave or the funeral pyre; but the present writer has not as yet been able to trace such a habit on strictly Slavonic soil. The most important part, however, of the obsequies proper was undoubtedly the *depositing of the funeral gifts* on the grave or on the funeral pyre of the deceased—a point which will be treated in greater detail below. We shall therefore pass on to the fourth and last chief act of the ancient Greek burial ceremonial on the one hand, and the Litu-Slavic on the other, viz. the funeral feast.

(δ) *The funeral feast* (περίδειπνον).—'Having returned from the disposal of the body, the members of the family undergo a religious purification, and then, crowned with wreaths, attend the funeral feast. This was also a part of the cult of souls. The soul of the dead man was believed to be present, as their host; it was dread of the invisible companion that gave rise to the custom of alluding to him only eulogistically during the feast. The funeral feast was a repast for the living relatives, given at the house of the dead person' (R.).

'All the rest of the company return (after the burial) to the peasant's house, with the priest at their head, in order to "celebrate the funeral feast" (*pravitĭ stolŭ*; cf. Homeric πάφον δαινύναι). By this is meant a commemoration meal for the dead person, which lasts from two to four hours.' 'After they have buried the corpse, the priest goes home, but often they invite him to the house of the dead person. All the others who attended the burial immediately betake themselves to the house of the deceased "to the feast of cakes" (*na klečki*). After they have washed their hands, they pray here first of all to God, sometimes inaudibly, sometimes, if there is a reader among them, aloud; then they sit down to table. The reader and those who dug the grave sit in the places of honour. The men sit at one table a little higher ("in the corner," *na kutě*), the women at another' (Š.[1] pp. 513, 554). 'But each one, before eating [at the funeral feast], must wash himself. This must have been a very ancient custom, and it has not been given up yet among the Nadravians; for, when the people come from the burial, a tub of water is placed before the door, as those who attended the funeral must wash* themselves, even although none of them touched either the earth or the corpse' (cf. Matthæus Prætorius, *Deliciæ Prussicæ oder Preussische Schaubühne*, ed. W. Pierson, Berlin, 1871, p. 99). 'To this day I cherish the greatest respect for this burial feast (*žalobny stolŭ*), at which rude speaking, slander, dispute, disagreement, strife, wanton jests, and everything else that usually accompanies gatherings of peasants, had no place. The large gathering spoke with restraint, not raising their voices, and the conversation, whether of individuals or of the whole company, confined itself to the deceased, his actions, and the most trivial details of his life. They recalled the talk and instructions of the dead man, especially those in which the goodness of his heart shone forth' (Š.[1] p. 514).

We shall learn more about the funeral feasts of the Greeks and the Litu-Slavs when we come to speak of their 'commemoration feasts for the dead' (3 *d*); the latter cannot always be sharply separated from the former.

(ε) THE GIFTS TO THE DEAD.—The remote antiquity of the Lithuanian, White Russian, and Great Russian ideas and usages connected with the disposal of the dead is shown not least in the custom, which even yet is in part wide-spread, of laying in the grave along with the dead person the favourite objects of his past life. The following is a selection from the great mass of testimonies:

'Post lamentationem dantur cadaveri munuscula, nempe mulieri fila cum acu: viro linteolum, idque eius collo implicatur. . . . Qui funus mortuis faciunt, nummos proiciunt in sepulcrum tanquam viatico mortuum prosequentes. Collocant quoque panem, et lagenam cerevisiæ plenam ad caput cadaveris in sepulcrum illati, ne anima vel sitiat vel esuriat' (M. *l.c.*). '[1]

* The custom is different on the other side of the Volga, among the Raskolnikans (cf. Melnikow, *In the Forests*, ii. 309, Russ. ed.).

* The Scythians also, as Herodotus (iv. 73 ff.) describes in detail, had to purify themselves after the burial, which they did by means of a vapour-bath from hemp-seed.

was assured that they put into the pockets of the linen shirt (*nasovü*), which is put on the dead man, pipe and tobacco-pouch, flint and steel if he smoked during his life, and a snuff-box if he snuffed. To the man's girdle above the shirt they hung a small bag containing smooth copper buttons, as well as a small knife in a leather sheath—articles with which the peasant never parts during his daily life. In the case of both men and women they placed in the front folds of the linen shirt a clean linen handkerchief (*nosovička*), so that the dead person might, if necessary, wipe his eyes, his nose, and his mouth.' 'I have heard it frequently asserted that on opening a burial-mound the grave-diggers sometimes used to find a bottle of spirits which had been previously laid in the dead man's coffin. The men, so far from despising such a find, consumed it on the spot with great pleasure.' 'They place a towel in the dead man's hand, and some coppers in his pocket, with which he buys a place for himself "in yonder world."' 'After the burial-service they lower the deceased into the grave, along with objects which were specially treasured by him and were specially dear to him during his lifetime. If, *e.g.*, he was by trade a shoemaker, they invariably placed beside him an unfinished bast shoe (*sü pičikomü i spicami*, implements of his trade?); if he was a carpenter, or some other tradesman, they gave him an axe, a chisel, a plane, a file, etc. Besides these things they put into every dead man's grave bread, salt, eggs for an omelet, nuts, beer and spirits in a bottle, and also a short pipe with tobacco and tinder-box, or a snuff-box with snuff' (S.[1] pp. 512, 517, 531, 534).

Similar customs may still be shown to exist among the Teutonic races of the present day, although they have to a large extent disappeared (cf. E. Mogk, 'Mythologie' in Paul's *Grundriss d. germ. Phil.*[2] iii. 252).

The result of these investigations is that even to-day, under the complete domination of Christianity, we find the remains of a custom which can be traced back, by means of excavations and traditions, to the epoch when people generally began to bestow care upon the disposal of the dead, viz. the Neolithic Age; and this custom consisted in giving to the dead man gifts of meat and drink, weapons, household furniture of all kinds, ornaments, domestic animals, and even servants and wives. In fact, in the time of the Vikings, they even deposited the dead man's ship along with him at the burial mound, as the well-known discoveries of Tune and Gokstad show. And among those Aryan races which, at the time of the oldest historical tradition, seem to be no longer acquainted with the custom of gifts to the dead, unmistakable traces point to its existence at an earlier date. For instance, gifts to the dead appear to be unknown to *Vedic* antiquity, but such facts as the following must be taken into account. According to a famous hymn of the Rigveda (x. 18), they give the dead warrior on the funeral-pyre his bow, and then take it out of his hands again; or they make the wife lie on the funeral-pyre beside her husband, and afterwards command her to 'rise once more to the world of the living.' This shows that here also it used to be the custom for weapons and wife to be burnt along with the dead man (cf. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, p. 575). The same holds good of the Homeric Greeks. With them also the ashes of the dead were interred generally without gifts to the dead; but the funeral ceremony which Achilles prepared for his friend Patroclus (*Il.* xxiii. 164 ff.), and the funeral-pyre on which he placed pitchers with honey and oil, and at which he slaughtered sheep, oxen, horses, dogs, and twelve noble Trojans, show that there reached even into the Homeric epoch the memory of a time when people honoured the dead with sacrifices and gifts.

The method in which these gifts were offered to the dead man varied. Where the rite of *burial* was prevalent, they were lowered with the corpse into the grave; where *cremation* was customary, they were either placed beside the ashes of the dead man or burned with him on the funeral-pyre—which seems to be the later custom. But it is difficult to carry through a sharp distinction as to the character of the gifts according as it was a case of burial or of cremation. It is true that S. Müller, in his *Nordische Altertumskunde*, has ventured to suggest, for the geographically limited district of this northern world, a complete history of the development of gifts to the dead in harmony with the development he assumes to have taken place in the ideas of the people of this region concerning a future life. Thus (according to S. Müller), at an earlier period of the Neolithic Age it was believed that the dead person really continued to live in the seclusion of the tomb, and so he was provided in great abundance with weapons and implements, with vessels containing meat and drink, with amber beads, etc. Then came the close of the Stone Age and the earliest Bronze Age, in which 'the earlier belief in the continuance of the life of the soul appears to have been given up without having anything to put in its place.' The consequence was that importance was no longer attached to the proper equipment of the dead, which 'was confined to a fixed collection of *weapons* and *ornaments*—one might say, to the things belonging to the daily outfit.' But what was the use of these then? And does it not seem a simpler assumption that in graves like these we have to do with those of warriors, who had no need of implements? Finally, we are told, cremation came in, which completely freed the soul from the body and carried it off to airy regions. From that time, according to S. Müller, the graves contain only 'petty wares, such as objects for the toilet, smaller pieces of furniture, or simple articles of dress.' But what would the soul, released from the body, want, *e.g.*, with a razor? Thus, however interesting it is to hear the opinions of an investigator of the standing of S. Müller, it is, nevertheless, very doubtful whether his views can be maintained even so far as the northern part, and especially the rest, of Europe is concerned. What meaning are we to put, *e.g.*, on the fact that, in the famous cemetery of Hallstatt, 525 graves of skeletons lie alongside of and among 455 graves of ashes, and that both kinds of graves exhibit essentially the same kinds of gifts deposited: weapons, utensils, ornaments, clay vessels, etc.? Or how are we to judge the fact that the Russian peasant of to-day who puts a handkerchief in the dead man's coffin (see above) gives as his reason the grossly material notion (which, according to S. Müller, really occurs only in the earliest Neolithic periods) that he does it in order that the dead man may be able to blow his nose?

The fundamental idea of all these gifts to the dead, from the most primitive times down to the present day, must always have been simply the wish to give the dead man something with him that might be useful or agreeable to him after death. In this connexion it must be emphatically observed that, *in depositing these things, the mourners were actuated not so much by definite conceptions of the future life, as by a custom inherited from their fathers.* This much we may say, that at different places and at different times the fundamental idea underwent a process of sublimation, in so far as the gifts to the dead, once seriously meant, showed a tendency to change into symbols of love and remembrance. We can recognize this very beautifully in the graves of the Athenian burying-ground already mentioned (cf. p. 16[b]), which was in use from pre-historic times down to the 4th cent. B.C. In the graves of the 'dipylon epoch,' which, as we have seen, contain skeletons almost exclusively, the abundant gifts (weapons, pottery of all kinds, pots with meat and drink, and bones from bull-offerings) deposited in the graves were doubtless meant seriously, and intended for the actual use of the dead man. It is quite different with the later graves—cremation as well as burial graves—between which no distinction can be made here in this

respect. The men generally get nothing more than a few worthless vessels. But beside the women are laid their ornaments, beside the children their toys (cf. Brückner-Pernice, *op. cit.* p. 189 f.).

We have said that we must regard as the fundamental idea of all gifts to the dead the wish of the surviving relatives to provide for the dead man in a future life, whatever they might imagine it to be. We cannot here enter fully into the much-disputed question as to whether this wish was called forth by fear of or love for the dead man. It may be that there was a time when fear of the soul of the dead, and the intention of keeping it securely in the grave by means of these gifts, were the only ideas in view. On the other hand, we must imagine the family ties so well knit, even in the times of the early Aryans, that they cannot be thought of as lacking a feeling of love (however rude the manner of expressing it), which was naturally extended also to the dead. So we can only say that a feeling of *timid* reverence for the dead, of fear mingled with love, was the foundation of the Aryan worship of the dead; and this notion is reflected in numerous testimonies (see below).

On the other hand, we must notice briefly another motive frequently supposed to underlie these gifts to the dead, viz. the assumption that men did not venture to deprive the dead of the property belonging to them in the eyes of God and of justice. It is all the more necessary to examine this view, because it best explains a number of facts which it is otherwise impossible or hard to understand. Thus, in the first place, the idea was widely current in Teutonic law of 'the portion of the dead,' *i.e.* 'a share which belongs by right to the dead for his own legacy,' and which H. Brunner (*Z. der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgesch.* xix. Germanistische Abt. p. 107 ff.) has shown 'originally consisted of the movables which were burned or buried with the dead man.' If, therefore, the oldest usage affecting the rights of souls was that the dead should receive his entire possessions, the further inference is drawn (cf. Rohde, *Psyche*[2], i. 30 f. footnote 3) that in later times the idea must naturally have arisen of commuting this right by means of a small symbolical gift. Thus is to be explained the coin, the *obolus*, which in classical antiquity was squeezed between the teeth of the dead man, and which we have also frequently met with among the Litu-Slavic races as a gift to the dead. In the former instance it appears as 'Charon's penny,' *i.e.* as payment for the ferryman of the dead, in the latter (cf. above, p. 21[a]) it is transformed into money to buy a place in the next world. Generally, at the transference of an inheritance, many customs appear which indicate the notion that goods and chattels, from the point of view of God and justice, must follow the owner to the grave. In White Russia (Š.[1] p. 522) when the coffin has been lifted to the waggon drawn by a horse, the relatives take leave of the dead man by kissing his forehead, but the new head of the house kisses the hoofs of the funeral horse, as well as those of the other horses, and sometimes those of all the cattle.

'The dead man,' writes Kotljarevskij (*op. cit.* p. 211), 'could take all his belongings with him into the grave; so among the inhabitants of Mazovia, the new head of the house, as soon as the old one dies, goes to the house, to the buildings connected with the house, to the trees, and to the domestic animals, and tells them of the death of their former master, and of the entrance into power of the new one, with the words: "Your former master is dead; I am now your new lord."' The same thing is stated by Carl Cappeller, *Kaip senëji Lëtuwininkai gyweno, Aufzeichnungen aus dem Kreise Stallupönen*, Heidelberg, 1904, p. 36: 'Thus it was a pagan custom,' the account concludes.

Similar customs are also reported from Germany. In Michelbach, near Marburg, when the head of the house dies, the new master goes to the cattle in the stable and to the bee-houses, and announces the 'Läd' and his taking over of the charge with the words: 'The master is dead; I am the master' (in letters of R. Heldmann). Hessler (*Hessische Landes- und Volkskunde*, ii. [Marburg, 1904] p. 152) tells of a similar undertaking of command on the part of the mistress.

Nevertheless, the present writer does not believe that the custom of gifts to the dead is made altogether clear by the series of ideas described above, however old they may be. In order to show this, he will in closing this section refer to one more point from which it will appear that on Aryan soil, even in pre-historic times, people had not only thought about providing the dead man with such things as had been, or might have been, his property during his life—his axe, his sword, his apparel, etc.—but made provision beyond this for his well-being in the world to come. For our purpose, we may start from the custom, already touched on above, of giving the dead man his wife, or, if he had several wives, one of them, as a companion in the grave or on the funeral-pyre.

According to the evidence in Europe collected by V. Hehn (*Kulturpflanzen und Haustiere*[7], p. 535) and H. Zimmer (*Altindisches Leben*, p. 329), the same thing is clearly demonstrable among Scythians, Thracians, Lithuanians, Slavs, and Teutons, and undoubtedly goes back to primitive Aryan times. For India, it cannot be proved from Vedic antiquity. Nevertheless, Indologists do not doubt that, when the burning of widows makes its appearance, from about the 5th cent. B.C., we have to do not with an innovation, but with the revival of a very old custom preserved locally even in Vedic times (cf. R. Garbe, *Beiträge zur indischen Kulturgeschichte*, Berlin, 1903, p. 141 ff., 'Witwenverbrennung'; Risley, *Report Census of India*, 1901).

All these testimonies are concerned with provision for the *married* dead. What happened in the case of the single man? The present writer has tried to answer this question in a little monograph on *Totenhochzeit* (Jena, 1904). In this he starts from the custom, attested in Attica, of placing on the grave of those who died unmarried a λουτροφόρος, *i.e.* a certain kind of water-pitcher, which at the same time played an important part in marriage-ceremonies, as the water intended for the bridal bath of the young couple was brought in it. It is only by comparing the Greek customs with those of other Aryan peoples that we can discover the meaning of this custom. We then find that the placing of the bridal λουτροφόρος on the grave of unmarried people represents the symbolical preservation of a custom which is still very wide-spread among the Slavonic races, in terms of which a ceremonial imitation-marriage was celebrated at the graves of unmarried men and maidens, during which a bride or a bridegroom was there and then assigned to the dead person.* The third and last stage of the custom under discussion is presented to us in the accounts of the Arabs regarding the oldest Slavonic and Russian conditions of life. According to them, not only, as has been mentioned, was the wife of the dead *married man* given to him as a companion in death, but the *single man* too was, after his death, married *in regular fashion* to a young girl, who also was therefore doomed to die (cf. Mas'ūdī, *Les Prairies d'or*, ed. Barbier de Meynard, Paris, 1861–1865, ii. p. 9, n. 7). One of these 'death-weddings' is described in detail by the Arab Ibn Fosslan (text and translation ed. by C. E. Frähn, St. Petersburg, 1823). But it follows from isolated traces that the custom of the wife dying along with her husband was prevalent also in Greece in pre-historic times (cf. Pausanias, ii. 21. 7), and in the story of the Trojan maiden Polyxene, sacrificed at the grave of Achilles, there exists also on classical soil a case of the barbarian custom of 'death-

* Remains of this custom are found also in Germany; for in Hesse the coffins of single men who have died must be accompanied by 'wreathed girls,' who must wear mourning for four weeks, etc. (cf. Hessler, *op. cit.*).

marriage.' If these statements (for a fuller account of which reference may be made to the booklet mentioned above) are right,* we are undoubtedly concerned with a case in which the funeral gifts cannot signify making the dead take with him property possessed before, but were clearly due to a concern on the part of the survivors for the fortunes of the deceased in the next world. This concern was based on the conviction, firmly rooted in primitive Aryan times, that marriage is an absolute necessity and bachelorhood a pitiable condition (cf. the present author's book, *Die Schwiegermutter und der Hagestolz*, Brunswick, 1904, p. 26 ff.).†

3. Attentions paid to the dead after the funeral rites (Ancestor-worship).—After the dead body had been consigned to the grave or the funeral-pyre, in the way described above, the person remained in connexion with his relatives by means of a rigidly appointed service of the dead. Survivals of this service are to be met with more or less distinctly among all Aryan races. They can, however, now be studied in detail and as a whole only in two branches of the Aryan linguistic group, widely separated from each other in time and place, the Indians and the Litu-Slavs. With regard to the latter we must refer to the works of Šejn and Kotljarevskij, already quoted (pp. 17[a], 19). So far as the Indians are concerned, their ancestors were worshipped by two kinds of religious ceremonies, the *Piṇḍapitṛyajña* and the *Śrâddha*. The first of these is a sacrifice in which balls of rice (*piṇḍa*) are offered only to 'the fathers' on the afternoon of the day on which the new moon sacrifice takes place. The *Śrâddha*, however, *i.e.* 'that which is offered from a sense of trust (*śraddhâ*, viz. in the Brâhmans),' is a celebration in which the ancestors are honoured with water, cakes, ointment, clothes, and again with water, —but in addition, in order to please one or more of the departed, the worshipper provides food for Brâhmans. For the former ceremony compare O. Donner, *Das Piṇḍapitṛyajña oder Manenopfer mit Klössen*, Berlin, 1870, and, for the latter, especially W. Caland, *Über Totenverehrung bei einigen der indogermanischen Völker*, Amsterdam, 1888, and *Altindischer Ahnencult*, Leyden, 1893 (cf. also the same author's 'Die altindischen Todten- und Bestattungsgebräuche' in *Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wettenschappen*, Amsterdam, 1896). Although the fundamental features of this old Indian ancestor-worship must be regarded as belonging to the Vedic period, still one cannot fail to recognize that its forms in most of the sources show that the ruling priesthood exerted a strong influence on them, and to a large extent transformed them. Fortunately, too, in India itself there is no lack of statements, as, *e.g.*, in the *Gṛhyasutra* of Gobhila, pointing to an essentially lower stage of ancestor-worship, features of which recur with surprising exactness in the Litu-Slavic ceremonial. We can almost say that the veil which Christianity has drawn across this ancient layer of religious worship is more transparent than the one which Brâhmanism has spread over it. In any case, it will be advisable in the re-construction of the old Aryan cult of the dead, to which we now pass, to take as our starting-point the Litu-Slavic and not the Indian conditions. Here we shall deal with (*a*) the designation and the manner of conceiving of the worshipped ancestors, (*b*) the times, (*c*) the places, (*d*) the ritual of the worship of the dead, (*e*) the general significance, for the history of culture, of the worship of the dead in early times.

(*a*) DESIGNATION AND MANNER OF CONCEIVING OF THE WORSHIPPED ANCESTORS (ADMISSION INTO THEIR NUMBER). — The White Russian peasants designate those to whom worship of the dead is offered as *dzjady* (Russ. *dědŭ*), 'grandfather,' while the Great Russians use the term *roditeli*, lit. 'parents.' Both expressions, but especially the Russian *roditeli*, *roditeli*, have now assumed such a general meaning that they can be applied to any deceased person, even to children of both sexes (cf. Š.[1] p. 594, footnote 1). The Gr. γονεῖς and the Lat. *parentes* (cf. *parentalia*, *parentatio*) correspond to the Great Russian expression, while the technical designation of the worshipped ancestors in Sanskrit, *pitáras*, literally means 'fathers.' A still further stage in the upward direction than the White Russian *dzjady* is represented by the Gr. τριτοπάτορες, 'great-grandfathers.' These are the ancestors to whom the inhabitants of Attica, at the celebration of a marriage, pray for the blessing of children (cf. E. Rohde, *Psyche*[2], i. 247). Thus we get the designations 'fathers' ('parents'), 'grandfathers' and 'great-grandfathers,' and it is not a matter of chance that in the Indian ritual the offering of cakes and water is dedicated to these three:

'To three (ancestors) is the water offered, to three is the *piṇḍa* given, the fourth (viz. the descendant) offers it (viz. *piṇḍa*) to the three; the fifth has nothing to do with it' (Manu, ix. 186). In the same way this 'threefold circle of fathers' is embraced by the Gr. γονεῖς and the Lat. *parentes*; cf. Isæus, viii. 32: γονεῖς εἰσὶ μήτηρ καὶ πατὴρ καὶ πάππος καὶ τήθη καὶ τούτων μήτηρ καὶ πατήρ· ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ ἀρχὴ τοῦ γένους εἰσίν; and Festus, p. 221: *parens vulgo pater et mater appellatur; sed iuris prudentes avos et proavos, avias et proavias parentum nomine appellari dicunt* (cf. A. Kaegi, *Die Neunzahl bei den Ostariern*, p. 6).

These ancestors are everywhere considered as real and powerful beings, watching especially over the welfare of the family, as may be seen from the designations applied to them, such as θεοὶ πατρῷοι, *Di parentes*, *Divi manes*, White Russ. *svjaty dzjady*, 'the sacred grandfathers,' etc., as well as from the wording of the prayers which are addressed to them. The following, *e.g.*, is a very characteristic report with regard to White Russia (Š.[1] p. 593):

'On every possible occasion the peasant expresses his worshipful remembrance of his "grandfathers." He does so in his daily prayer, in conversation in the family and in company, as well as on the different festive occasions. There are, too, weighty considerations which compel him to regard this as his duty. He is persuaded that all good fortune in the farm and in life was produced by the continuous exertions of his ancestors, and is sustained by means of their blessings and their prayers to the Supreme Being (the latter is a modern idea). It was they who laid out the present settlement and erected the buildings which until now have remained intact. There the grandfather dug a canal, there he broke up the land and made the fields arable. The grandson splits wood with the grandfather's axe, the granddaughter reaps with her grandmother's sickle. In the dowry of the daughter there are the "sarafan," the necklace, and even the wooden shoes of the grandmother; the spirited black horse is descended from the grandfather's mare. In a word, just as these individual objects speak of the ancestors, so the whole construction of life, which has changed little since their time, calls them daily and even hourly to remembrance.'

It is to them, therefore, that the peasant turns in all the necessities of daily life. Thus the following is a prayer used in India at the *Piṇḍapitṛyajña*:

'Honour, Pitaras, for your comfort, honour for your living sap, honour for your living power, honour for your gentleness, honour for your life, honour for your vigour, *Svâhâ* to you, honour to you, Pitaras, honour; this (viz. water) is yours, Pitaras, this is our and your life-bringing element; may we who are here be quickened.' Thereupon the husband gives

* Several objections to these views raised by Paul Stengel in the *Wochenschrift für klass. Phil.*, 1905, No. 18, and by F. Kauffmann in the *Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie*, 1907, vol. i., have been answered by the present writer in his *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*[3], i. (Jena, 1906), p. 220, note 1, and ii. (Jena, 1907), p. 385, note 3, p. 532.

† For examples of marriage of the living to the dead in modern India, see Nelson, *Manual of the Madura District*, ii. 40; Logan, *Manual of the Malabar District*, i. 128; Francis, *Report on Census of Madras*, 1901, i. 56. It was noticed also among the Tatars by Marco Polo (1st ed. i. 234, ed. Yule), who gives other examples; see also J. J. M. de Groot, *Religious System of China*, ii. 802 f.

the *pinḍa*, which lies in the middle, to his wife to eat, with the words: 'Give me a male child, ye Pitaras,' while the wife replies, 'Insert fruit in me, ye Pitaras, a lotus-wreathed boy, that he may be uninjured.'

In accordance with this signification of the help of the ancestors in producing children, we can understand why the Attic maiden, before her departure from her parents' home on the occasion of her marriage, was bound to offer a sacrifice to the souls of her ancestors (cf. E. Samter, *Familienfeste der Griechen und Römer*, Berlin, 1901, p. 96).

Frequently these spirits of ancestors are designated as the 'good' and 'helpful,' especially in the Lat. *mânes*: Old Lat. *mânus*, 'good.' This may, however, have been intended more in a euphemistic sense, in the same way as, *e.g.*, the avenging goddesses are called the 'Eumenides,' in order that they might be good and gracious; for, in general, the souls of ancestors are regarded as very stern and easily roused to anger.

The inhabitants of White Russia are filled with dread (Š.[1] p. 588) 'lest at the commemoration festival any mistake should be made. Then, to speak in the language of the peasants, the feast would be no feast. It would mean that they did not respect the memory of the person in whose honour the feast was instituted. As a punishment for disrespect to the dead there would follow at once family discord, death of cattle, failure of crops; in short, mountains and hills would fall upon the living.'

Woe betide those who do not really slaughter the cattle they have appointed for the commemoration feast, or who do not first taste the food which is served. In all these ways can the wrath of the worshipped ancestors be only too easily roused. The same ideas are to be found in India: 'Do us no harm, ye fathers, if in accordance with the way of mankind we have committed any fault against you' (*Rigveda*, X. xv. 6); and in the *Śrâddha*, too, the offerer, immediately after the offering of the cakes, pronounces the words: 'May the fathers not be hard' (see further in Caland, *Ahnencult*, p. 176 ff.). It was exactly the same thing that was meant in Greece by the saying, that the ἥρωες ('the spirits of the dead') were δυσόργητοι ('prone to anger') and χαλεποὶ τοῖς ἐμπελάζουσι (cf. E. Rohde, (*Psyche*[2], i. 246). In Italy, however, according to Festus (p. 237), they hung up to the Lares* at the *Compitalia* dolls resembling human beings, *ut vivis parcant, pilis et simulacris contenti*.

The dead man does not, immediately after his death and without more ado, join the number of these ancestors who are worshipped with such anxious dread; on the contrary, fixed ceremonies are necessary to elevate him to the rank of the ancestors who are worshipped as divine.

In White Russia (Š.[1] p. 534), after the mourners have returned from the burying-ground, 'one of the old women takes a piece of bread, turns towards the door, and, fixing a copper coin on it, speaks the following words, *with which she introduces the dead man into the general list of her departed relatives*: 'Grandfathers and grandmothers, fathers and mothers, uncles and aunts, take our dead father to yourselves, live there with him in friendship, do not quarrel, etc."' In addition to that, it is a wide-spread idea that for 40 days after his death the deceased has no rest in his grave, but 'visits his own house as well as those of strangers, and is able to inflict all kinds of damage on those among the living with whom he stood in hostile relations during his life; and, in fact, he can do this all the more easily as the latter are deprived of the power to take vengeance on their adversary, since he, owing to his immateriality, is invisible or comes forward in the form of different animals—which gives him ample scope to inflict all sorts of injury on his enemies' (Š.[1] p. 519). 'The peasants also believe that for six weeks the soul of the dead, every 24 hours and generally by night, flies into the peasant's hut and drinks water from a vessel, which is set out for the purpose and filled to overflowing' (Š.[1] p. 559).

A corresponding idea is prevalent in India, namely, that the soul of the deceased does not enter at once into the world of the Pitaras, but rather wanders to and fro as a 'spirit' or 'ghost' (Skr. *preta*, lit. 'the departed'). The spirits have also the inclination to return to the dwellings of the relatives, where in the same way 'food with a jug of water' must be given to them. In order to deliver the departed from this condition and to adopt them among the Pitaras, definite ceremonies were necessary, the most important of which was the *Sapiṇḍîkaraṇa* ('Sapiṇḍa-making'), which took place usually on the day after the first anniversary of the death, but often earlier (for particulars, see Caland, *Totenverehrung*, p. 22 ff., and Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, p. 554 f.). See ANCESTOR-WORSHIP (Indian).

We shall have to speak afterwards (3*c* and 4) of the places where the spirits of the ancestors in the earliest times were supposed to live, and of the later transformation of the views on this subject. We have still to mention here that these spirits of ancestors show a tendency in different territories, usually in connexion with the cult of the hearth-fire, which came more and more to the front (cf. below, II. 1), to develop into tutelary house deities, localized in the home.

The same is true of the Gr. ἀγαθὸς δαίμων (Rohde[2], i. 255), of the Lat. *di penates* ('those within,' cf. *penitus*, *penetrare*), and *lar familiaris*, of the Germ. 'kobold' (**kuba-walda*, 'the one who rules the house'; cf. Old Nor. *koi*, 'hut,' A.S. *cofa*, 'room,' M.H.G. *kobe*, 'shed, hovel' = Gr. γύπα, 'underground dwelling'; A.S. *cofgodu*, *cofgodas*, '*penates*, *lares*'), of Russ. *domovój* ('the one in the house'); and of many similar names.

In this connexion the worship of the *house-snake*, found among several of the Aryan peoples, can be explained. Nothing is more frequent in Greece than to imagine the soul of the deceased in the form of a snake (cf. Rohde, *Psyche*[2], i. *passim*, and artt. on SOUL and SPIRIT), which seemed especially suitable for this on account of its winding motions, partly on the surface of the earth and partly underneath it. Based upon this idea, a strongly marked domestic snake-worship has been developed among the Lithuanians, regarding which Menecius (see above) gives the most detailed account:

'Præterea Lituani et Samagitæ in domibus sub fornace, vel in angulo vaporarii, ubi mensa stat, serpentes fovent, quos numinis instar colentes, certo anni tempore precibus sacrificuli evocant ad mensam. Hi vero exeuntes, per mundum linteolum conscendunt, et supra mensam assident: ubi postquam singula fercula delibarunt, rursus discedunt, seque abdunt in cavernis. Serpentibus digressis, homines læti fercula illa prægustata comedunt ac sperant illo anno omnia prospere sibi eventura. Quodsi ad preces sacrificuli non exierant serpentes, aut fercula super mensam posita non delibaverint, tum credunt se anno illo subituros magnam calamitatem.' Cf. also Lasicius, *de Diis Samagitarum*, p. 51: 'Nutriunt etiam quasi deos penates nigri coloris, obesos et quadrupedes quosdam serpentes, Giuoitos (Lith. *gyvãtė*, "serpent") vocatos;' and Æneas Silvius in Usener-Solmsen, *Götternamen*, p. 91: 'Serpentes colebant; paterfamilias suum quisque in angulo domus serpentem habuit, cui cibum dedit et sacrificium fecit in fœno iacenti.'

At the same stage as the Lithuanian snake-worship stands among the ancient Romans (cf. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus*, p. 155), the worship of the house-snake, which is consecrated to the genius of the house, and which by its sudden appearance foretells the coming destiny of the house. This genius itself, lit. 'the generator' (*gigno*), can originally have been none other than the ancestral head of the family, who then came to be regarded as its tutelary spirit, under whose protection stands, as we might naturally expect from these family gods, especially the *lectus genialis*, the marriage-bed, the place of the generation of children. As the *paterfamilias* in Rome was considered the representative of the whole family and possessor of the family estate, it was natural that this genius should become spiritual

* *Lâses* (nom. sing. *lâs*, gen. *lâsis*) are undoubtedly, from the first, spirits of the dead, as is proved by the certain etymological connexion of the word with *larva* from *lâsua*, and with the festival of the dead, *Lârentalia*. The change from *â* to *ā* must be considered exactly the same as in *âcer*: *ācuo*, *ambâges*: *ăgo*, *fâma*: *fāteri*, *stâre*: *stātus*, etc. Wissowa, in Roscher's *Ausf. Lexicon der griech. und röm. Mythologie*, art. 'Lares' (cf. also *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, p. 148 ff., and *ARW* vii. 51), fails to recognize this connexion, and consequently comes to a false conception of the Lares as 'spirits of the fields.' The correct view is given by Samter, *Familienfeste*, p. 115; cf. also Walde, *Lat. etymol. Wörterbuch*, artt. 'Lar' and 'Larva.'

ized into the tutelary spirit of the master of the house.*

(*b*) THE TIMES OF THE WORSHIP OF THE DEAD.—Apart from the funeral feast already mentioned (p. 20[b]), which followed immediately after the disposal of the corpse, the feasts in commemoration of the dead in White Russia may be divided into two main classes, *special* and *general*:

'The former are celebrated in the circle of the family and near relatives, for each individual who has died in the course of the year, and they take place at stated intervals, though not on the same days or in the same months, but on the 3rd, 6th, 9th, 20th, and 40th days, reckoning from the day of the burial, during a period of six months, and periodically thereafter in the course of the year till the date of the death (*godovščina*, "anniversary"). These commemoration feasts take place without the co-operation or blessing of the Church. They are a relic of primitive, pre-Christian customs. The second class, or the general commemoration festivals, are held by all on the same days, which have been fixed from the remotest times by the Orthodox Church, and are never engaged in without her consecration. They are held from four to six times in the year, and for all relatives at one and the same time, no matter whether they have been dead for a longer or a shorter period. In the whole of Russia these commemoration festivals are held on Saturdays, and called in White Russia *dzjady* [the same name as that of the worshipped ancestors themselves], in Great Russia "parents' Saturdays" (*roditel'skija subboty*). But the *radunica* is for the most part celebrated on the Tuesday of the week following the first Sunday after Easter, and this feast is not everywhere called *dzjady*. . . . These commemoration feasts admit of being classified, according to the seasons of the year, into those of spring, summer, autumn, and winter' (8.[1] p. 582 f.).

These Christian institutions correspond to the old Lithuanian heathen conditions. Menecius has the special commemoration festivals in view when he writes: 'Cæterum cognati celebrant convivia die a funere tertio, sexto, nono et quadragessimo.' A general feast to the dead is described by Laskovskij in Lasicius, *de Diis Samagitarum*, p. 50:

'Iisdem feriis (the beginning of November, at the festival of the flax-god Waizgauthos) mortuos e tumulis ad balneum et epulas invitant: totidemque sedilia, mantilia, indusia, quot invitati fuerint, in tugurio eam ad rem præparato ponunt; mensam cibo, potu onerant. Dehinc in sua mapalia reversi triduum compotant; quo exacto, illa omnia in sepulchris, potu perfusis relinquunt; tandem etiam manibus valedicunt.'

Another general celebration of this kind is mentioned in Lasicius, p. 51: 'Skierstuvves festum est farciminum, ad quod deum Ezagulis ita vocant: Veni cum mortuis farcimina nobiscum manducaturus.' Cf. also p. 48: 'Vielona Deus animarum, cui tum oblatio offertur, cum mortui pascuntur; dari autem illi solent frixæ placentulæ, quatuor locis sibi oppositis paullulum discissæ. Eæ sikies Vielonia pemixlos ("wafers of which V. is very fond") nominantur.'

From the starting-point supplied by these data let us examine the times appointed for the worship of the dead among the other Aryan races. Among them all, *special* and *general* festivals in honour of the dead are frequently mentioned. With regard to the former, the Greeks in the south of Europe present us with exact parallels. In their case we meet with the *τρίτα καὶ ἔνατα* (the latter recurs also in the Roman *novendial*), *i.e.* meals which were offered to the dead at the grave on the third and ninth days after interment. In Athens we have likewise the *τριακάδες* (which was also at times repeated), a commemoration meal on the thirtieth day, a date which appears again among the Lithuanians, at least in so far as the widow must mourn for thirty days at the grave of her husband.

(Menecius: 'Uxor vero tam oriente quam occidente sole super extincti coniugis sepulcrum sedens vel lacens lamentatur diebus triginta').

Then both in Greece and Rome, in addition to the *parentalia* on the day of the death or the burial (White Russ. *godovščina*), an innovation appears in appointing the birthday of the deceased (*γενέσια*) as a regular commemoration festival in his honour.

Among the *general* festivals in honour of the dead, the most important, so far as Greece is concerned, is the close of the Anthesteria festival in the spring, while in Rome we have the nine *dies parentales* from the 13th to the 21st of February, the last of which is called Feralia, on the 23rd of December the great State festival of the Larentalia, and on the 9th, 11th, and 13th of May the Lemuria, all three named directly from the spirits of the dead (Feralia from **dhvĕsôlia*, cf. above, p. 15; Larentalia: *lâr laris*, cf. above, p. 24, footnote; and Lemuria: *lemures*, 'larvæ'). A later general festival in honour of the dead, though not a public State feast, was the *Rosalia*, festival of roses, which in Christian times acquired a significance far beyond the land of its origin, and among the great majority of Slavs has led to their designation of the Whitsuntide festival (*rusalija*, Lat. *pascha rosata*). See Warde Fowler, *Roman Festivals*, London, 1899.

With regard to the ancient Teutons we have not much reliable information. It seems that they held commemoration festivals for the dead on the 3rd, 7th, and 30th days, and on the anniversary of the death. It is also not improbable that at Yuletide a general feast for the dead took place (cf. R. Kögel, *Gesch. der deutschen Liter.*, i. 1, 55, and E. Mogk, in Paul's *Grundriss der germanischen Philologie*[2], iii. 391).

Lastly, regarding the Indian times for the worship of the dead, we are supplied with the same detailed information as we have about those of the Litu-Slavs. The time of the uncleanness of the relatives after a death lasts from three to ten days. During this period libations of water with grains of sesame must be offered to the departed either daily or on the 3rd, 5th, 7th, and 9th days. Then on the 11th day the first sacrifice (*śrâddha*, see above, p. 23[a]) is offered to the dead, and thereafter every month (thus every 30 days) on the day of the death and on the anniversary of the death itself sacrifices are offered to the ancestors (though the conditions are more complicated than they appear from this short summary). There were also in India real All Souls' feasts, among which the *Aṣṭaka*-festival may be specially mentioned (cf., for details, below, II. 4 *d*).

If we glance at the details before us, we see what a significant part *odd* numbers play in the fixing of these dates for the festivals in honour of the dead; and, in fact, it is frankly avowed in India that the odd numbers are sacred to the worshipped ancestors. The same thought, however, permeates the White Russian ritual, in consequence of which, *e.g.*, the number of foods offered at the commemoration festivals must invariably be odd (cf. Caland, *Totenverehrung*, p. 23, and Šejn[1], pp. 590, 611, etc.). Then among these odd numbers, the number *nine* comes very prominently to the front, which seems to represent the three days' period between death and interment (funeral feast) taken three times. Perhaps the 10 days' period of uncleanness or of mourning of the Indians may be conceived of as a nine decadally rounded off. The number 30, which also occurs frequently, would then be a triad of such decadally rounded nines (cf. A. Kaegi, 'Die Neunzahl bei den Ostariern' in the *Philologische Abhandlungen für H. Schweizer-Sidler*). It is, moreover, worthy of note that the farther back we go and the more primitive the state of culture, the greater is the number of these memorial feasts. A White Russian peasant can thus, according to the details given above, make the number of special and general festivals for the dead mount up to several dozens in the year.

*Cf. for a full account of snake-worship, F. S. Krauss, *Sreča, Glück und Schicksal im Volksglauben der Südslaven*, Vienna, 1886. It is especially interesting, in connexion with the Roman beliefs, that among the Wends in the Spreewald two snakes were worshipped in each house, one of which was called *gospodař*, 'lord of the house,' the other *góspoza*, 'lady of the house.' Each dies at the same time as the master of the house, or the mistress, as the case may be.

(*c*) THE PLACES OF THE WORSHIP OF THE DEAD.—The nearest and, so to speak, most natural place for the friends to serve up the dead man's feast for him, and to eat and drink together with him, is the neighbourhood of the grave where the body has been laid. This is still the custom in great parts of Russia.

'After the close of the banquet (in the house) they all repair to the burying-ground, taking with them vodka, "bliny," and barley. There each family prays at the graves of their relatives for the peace of their souls. Then they eat and drink, pouring out a little vodka on the grave and throwing some morsels from each dish on it' (Š.[1] p. 605). At the spring-*dzjady*, 'after the public worship of the church, they invite the priest, in whose company men and women betake themselves to the churchyard, partaking together of brandy and food on the way. After they have reached their destination they all seat themselves on the burial mound of those of the departed who during the year have completed the laborious days of their life's journey. Here they repeat fixed prayers for the blessed peace of their souls, as "Anëlŭ Panĭski" ("Angel of the Lord"), then they begin to weep and lament, and end with a small debauch in honour of the dead. . . . The first mouthfuls of each dish are in every case laid on the grave for the soul of the dead. After the glasses of brandy have gone round the circle several times, the mournful mood of the assembly gradually changes into a joyous one. While some of those present sob aloud, others laugh and joke. Some bow their heads over the grave of their beloved dead, and sing in a sustained tone melancholy laments. . . . In order to calm their sorrow, those taking part in the celebration have frequent recourse to their comforter—the brandy. Ultimately these memorial feasts end in the laments turning imperceptibly into songs of joy' (Š.[1] p. 616 f.).

The doings at the Greek τρίτα καὶ ἔνατα, which were likewise celebrated at the grave (see above, p. 25[a]), and at the Roman *solemnia mortis* (cf. Marquardt, *Römische Staatsverwaltung*, iii. 298 ff.), which were accompanied by feasts at the grave, as well as at those old German *obsitiones*, 'quæ in quibusdam locis ad sepulcra mortuorum fiunt,' against which Burchard of Worms, as late as A.D. 1000, protested, were no doubt *mutatis mutandis* identical with those just described. It is not improbable that the funeral banquet also (see above, p. 20[b]) took place originally not in the house of the deceased, but at the grave itself.

Thus Jordanis relates the following with regard to the funeral obsequies of Attila (ch. 49): 'Postquam talibus lamentis est defletus, *stravam* (probably a Slavic word, which signifies in Russian, Polish, and Bohemian "food," "meal," and in Old Bohemian also means "funeral banquet"; cf. Miklosich, *Etymol. Wörterbuch der slav. Sprachen*, Vienna, 1886, *s.v.* "Strava") *super tumulum eius*, quam appellant ipsi, ingenti commissatione concelebrant'; and the Greek expression περίδειπνον, 'funeral banquet,' could be most easily explained if the δεῖπνον took place, as among the White Russians, *round about the burial mound* of the deceased. The old Russian expression for the commemoration festival was *trizna*, which has not yet been etymologically explained.

Further, the *trench*, in which the meals are frequently offered to the dead, may be regarded as a symbolical indication of the grave. This is what we have in ancient India, according to the description of Gobhila: 'Then three trenches are dug out, one span long, four fingerbreadths wide, and the same depth. Thereupon *darbha* grass is scattered on them.' On this *darbha* grass, then, with many varied ceremonial actions, the cakes are laid down for the three ancestors, father, grandfather, and great-grandfather (cf. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, p. 549 f.). The same significance belonged in Rome to the *mundus*, a trench situated at the centre of the town, and opened on certain days for the purpose of receiving sacrifices for the dead. This trench played the same rôle in the worship of the *inferi* as the altar played in the cult of the *superi*. Such a *mundus* was probably also the 'grave' of the Larenta, in which at the Larentalia a sacrifice to the dead was offered (cf. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, p. 187 ff.; Samter, *Familienfeste*, p. 12 f.). Ulysses, too, as is well known, when in the lower world, offers his libations in a trench.

A third place at which the dead were often honoured with food, drink, and all kinds of festive celebrations was the *cross-road*. Among the Slavs, Cosmas of Prague bears witness that, about the year 1092, Prince Brětislav II. issued the following prohibition:

'Item sepulturas, quæ fiebant in silvis et in campis, atque cenas (or scenas? cf. Kotljarevskij, *op. cit.* p. 102 ff.), quas ex gentili ritu faciebant in *biviis* et in *triviis*, quasi ob animarum pausationem, item et iocos profanos, quos super mortuos suos manes cientes manes ac induti faciem larvis bachando exercebant.'

A feast similar to that here described was the Roman Compitalia, which was held once a year with debauchery and merry-making (*ludi*) in honour of the Lares at the cross-roads (more fully explained in Wissowa, *op. cit.* p. 148 f.); but in Greece also it was customary to throw down at the same places offerings to the souls and to Hecate, their mistress (cf. Samter, *op. cit.* p. 120). In India, in the same way, the belief is widely held, and of extreme antiquity, that cross-roads and dwelling-places of spirits are identical (cf. Oldenberg, *op. cit.* pp. 268[1], 562[2]; and Crooke, *Popular Religion and Folklore of N. India*, London, 1896, i. 77 f., 165, 290). The reason for this idea has been sought in the fact, which has been expressly attested at least in the case of India (cf. Oldenberg, p. 562[2]), that the crossing of great main roads was a favourite place for burying the dead. In this way the worship of the dead at the grave, at the trench, and at the cross-roads really amounts to the same thing. In opposition to this, however, we have the remembrance of the dead, with gifts of food and drink, in the *dwellings* of the surviving relatives, which will be dealt with in the next section.

(*d*) THE RITUAL OF THE WORSHIP OF THE DEAD.—It will here be advisable to pass over a considerable number of individual peculiarities, and to confine ourselves to the most important features.

(*a*) *The summoning and dismissing of the ancestors.*—It is a prevailing custom to call solemnly on the ancestors at the beginning of the commemoration feast, and to dismiss them as solemnly at its close. We are again informed most accurately with regard to White Russia:

'All seat themselves at the table, which is set with articles of food, among which beer and spirits are to be found, and the one who reads the prayer utters the following words:

"Ye sacred grandfathers, we call you,
Ye sacred grandfathers, come to us!
Here is all that God has given.
. . . . . .
Ye sacred grandfathers, we implore you,
Come, fly to us!"

At the end of the meal they rise from the table and disperse, after having taken leave of the heavenly inhabitants in the following way:

"Ye sacred grandfathers! ye have flown hither,
Ye have eaten and drunk,
Now fly away home again!
Tell us, do you wish anything more?
But better is it, that ye fly heavenwards.
Akyšŭ, akyšŭ!"

(a sound which they make to scare away hens and crows).' Cf. Š.[1] p. 596 ff.

The summoning as well as the dismissing of the ancestors is accompanied by extraordinary customs. For the purposes of the former they place a cooked pig's, sheep's, or fowl's head on the table.

'After the master of the house has got the guests seated at the commemoration table, he takes in the one hand a candle rolled up in a pancake, in the other a loaf of bread, and carries these three times round the animal's head which has been placed on the table, calling aloud by name not only all his dead relatives and acquaintances, but also all who have ever lived on the piece of ground belonging to him as master of the house, and invites them with the words, "Come to this banquet"' (Š.[1] p. 602 f.).

At the end of the feast the ancestors are scared away.

'The master or the mistress of the house removes the table away from the seats, and sprinkles the whole floor of the room to the door with water, saying at the same time, "If you have not eaten or drunk enough, go to the priest's court." With these words the souls of the dead are turned out' (Š.[1] p. 614).

A custom very like this is described by Menecius, who is also acquainted with the solemn invitation to the dead ('ad quæ convivia animam defuncti invitant precantes ante ianuam') among the pagan Lithuanians:

'Peracto prandio sacrificulus surgit de mensa, ac scopis domum purgat: animasque mortuorum cum pulvere eicit, tanquam pulices, atque his precatur verbis, ut e domo recedant; edistis ac bibistis animæ dilectæ, ite foras, ite foras.'

The same invitation and leave-taking of ancestors are attested with regard to the Indian *Piṇḍapitṛyajña*:

'After depositing the *piṇḍa*, he (the offerer) utters the words, "Ye Pitaras, may this be savoury to your taste, may each one enjoy his share." Afterwards he dismisses the Pitaras with the words: "Depart, ye lovely Pitaras, to your old mysterious ways, give us riches and good fortune, grant us abundant possession in men"' (cf. Caland, *Totenverehrung*, p. 5 f.).

In Italy and Greece, on the other hand, there are to be found survivals only of the final *expulsion* of the souls. In the latter there existed the saying, which is at once proved to have been very ancient by the use of the word *κῆρες* for *ψυχαί* (cf. above, p. 15): *Θύραζε, κῆρες, οὐκ ἔτ' Ἀνθεστήρια*—'Away, ye souls, the feast of the dead is over' (see J. E. Harrison, *Proleg. to the Study of Greek Religion*, Cambridge, 1903, pp. 35, 165, 632). In Italy, at the Lemuria, the spirits of the fathers were driven away with the words, 'Manes exite paterni' (cf. Rohde, *Psyche*[2], i. 239[1]).

(β) *The feeding of the summoned ancestors.*—Concerning the *forms* in which the 'grandfathers' were entertained by the White Russian peasants, we are also provided with full information from Šejn's materials:

'At the table, which is laid with Lenten food, all the guests sit down along with the family of the deceased. Before the meal the *kanunŭ* (from Gr. *κανών*, the real food of the dead) is given out, from which each of the guests takes four spoonfuls: one of these he pours out on the table beside him, the other three he sups, in accordance with the demand of custom to eat them all and leave nothing behind. The guests must leave over a part of each dish (of which there are not few) to appease the deceased, that he may not rob his relatives of their earthly goods' (Š.[1] p. 585).

'The supper begins with porridge, the first spoonful of which each member of the family lays on the table, directly on the table cloth, and these remain the whole night on the table, along with all the other eatables which have been left over from the supper. This is done, the peasants say, on account of the fact that the deceased comes during the night and devours all that is left there' (Š.[1] p. 592).

'The master of the house commences the feast. He takes a spoon with *kanunŭ* and a small piece of bread and pours it out on the table, and then he eats three spoonfuls from this dish. This is repeated in turn by all the members of the family who are present. Then the *kanunŭ* is removed from the table. From the other courses each guest takes as much as he pleases, provided that he first of all sets aside a small piece of each dish for the table—for "the grandfathers." From these little bits a considerable heap of all kinds of mishmash is, by the end of the supper, formed on the table' (Š.[1] p. 613).

'If at the time of the banquet any part of the food falls on the seat or on the floor, they dare not lift it up. "That," they say, "some one will eat"' (Š.[1] p. 611). Cf. also Menecius: 'Si quid forte decidat in terram de mensa, id non tollunt, sed desertis, ut ipsi loquuntur, animis, quæ nullos habent vel cognatos vel amicos vivos, a quibus excipiantur convivio, relinquunt manducandum.' 'After they have prayed at the grave, they all separate and go to their homes, where they seat themselves once more at the table, on which the wives place pancakes and mead. They throw morsels of the pancakes into the mead. Each member of the family (with the exception of the children) must invariably sup three spoonfuls of this dish. Some of this mixture they leave intentionally in a soup-bowl for the "grandfathers." After the pancakes they eat the other prepared courses. When they have supped and prayed to God, they lie down to sleep, placing the remains of the mixture on the window sills. The remains of the other foods they divide out into small dishes, which in the same way are placed here and there beside the window. Bread and spoons are left on the table the whole night. The doors in the peasant's room are not locked during this night, but are left a little ajar, so that the dead may come in' (Š.[1] p. 605).

From these statements three points are clear: (1) Food and drink are shaken out on the table for the 'grandfathers' during the meal itself; (2) That which falls under the table belongs to the dead who have no family or friends; (3) The remains of the food and drink are placed after the meal in vessels, which are set near the windows or on the tables to be partaken of by the 'grandfathers.'

All this can be proved in classical tradition, although only in fragments. Certainly the barbarian custom of preparing the meal for the dead on the table itself (as at the grave) has fallen into abeyance. Among the Greeks, points (1) and (2) are combined into one, in such a way that they believe that whatever falls under the table during the meal belongs to the dead in general.

Cf. Laert. Diog. viii. 34: *Ἀριστοφάνης τῶν ἡρώων φησὶν εἶναι τὰ πίπτοντα λέγων ἐν τοῖς Ἥρωσι μηδὲ γένεσθ' ἄστ' ἂν ἐντὸς τῆς τραπέζης καταπέσῃ*, and Athenæus x. 427 e: *τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι τῶν φίλων ἀπένεμον τὰ πίπτοντα τῆς τροφῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τραπεζῶν* (cf. also Samter, *Familienfeste der Griechen und Römer*, p. 109).

The third point finds its analogy again among the Greeks, in the fact that on the last day of the Anthesteria festival it was customary to place cooked fruits and seeds for the dead in pots—*χύτραι*, after which the day was named (cf. Rohde, *Psyche*[2], i. 238).

(γ) *The food of the dead.*—Like all the details of the ritual connected with the dead, the kinds of food and even the courses which must be placed before the dead are fixed in detail. With regard to the first of these, the cakes (cf. above, Lith. *sikies Vielonia pemixlos*, 'the wafers which Vielona likes'; and also White Russ. *klëcki*, the latter taken over from German through Polish) play an important part among the Lithuanians.

'The courses at the commemoration meal were as a rule as follows: *kutjá* (wheat or barley grains) prepared with ordinary or lenten butter, if honey could not be got, *klëcki*, "cakes" (in most cases made of barley with a piece of lard in the inside), pancakes, and porridge' (Š.[1] p. 514). 'All the others who attend the funeral at once betake themselves to the house of the deceased *na klëcki*, "to eat cakes"' (Š.[1] p. 554). 'At this meal *galuški* or *klëcki* must without fail be among the dishes. There are even proverbial expressions referring to them to be found among the population of this place, such as "he was *na klëckachŭ*" (he was at a funeral- or commemoration-feast); or if a person is dangerously ill and there is no hope of his recovery, they say: *nu klëckí jemu!* i.e., "he will very soon have to enjoy cakes"' (cf. Š.[1] p. 576).

It is hardly necessary to emphasize how closely this corresponds to the Indian *piṇḍa*, which is so characteristic of the Indian worship of the dead, that *sapiṇḍa*, 'cake companion,' has come to be the technical expression for the circle of relatives whose duty it is to offer to the three ancestors (father, grandfather, and great-grandfather).

The question, what dishes were in the earliest times served up to the dead, would require a special inquiry, which would also have a general interest for the history of culture by helping to determine the most primitive food of the living. In the meantime we can refer only to two undoubtedly very ancient foods of the dead, viz. *honey* and *beans*.

The former is the most important ingredient of the White Russian *kanunŭ* (see above): 'This is usually cooked with bruised grains of peeled barley or wheat, which are afterwards stirred in *sytá*, "honey-water"' (Š.[1] p. 555). Thus it happens that the *kanunŭ* (a Gr. foreign word, as we saw) is called by its vernacular name *sytá* (p. 613), and on comparing this with the Skr. *sutá*, 'soma-juice, soma-offering' (*lit.* 'pressed,' root *su*), we may venture to recognize in it a word derived from the primitive Aryan vocabulary, just as in the more frequent expression for honey and mead, Skr. *madhu*, Gr. *μέθυ*, O.H.G. *mëto*, O. Slav. *medŭ*, etc. The Indian food for the dead, which was offered at the *śrâddhas*, rice-soup and honey, corresponds exactly to the White Russian *kanunŭ*.

'Thus speak the Pitaras: "May the person be born in our family who will offer to us on the 13th day rice-soup mixed with honey and *ghí*!"' 'Tormented with hunger and making known their own sins, they demand rice-soup mixed with honey from their sons and grandsons' (cf. Caland, *Totenverehrung*, p. 44 f.).

But in the Greek and Roman cult of the dead also, honey is a favourite food devoted to the powers of the under world (cf., for details on this, Samter, *op. cit.* p. 84 ff., and Marquardt, *Staatsverwaltung*, iii. 299).

With regard to the *beans*, we may refer to an exhaustive article by L. von Schröder, 'Das Bohnenverbot bei Pythagoras und im Veda,' in *WZKM*, xv.

187 ff., in which convincing proof is brought forward that the above-mentioned pod, whose Aryan name appears in the Lat. *faba* = O. Slav. *bobŭ*, Alb. *baðę*, was used even in primitive Aryan times as an offering to the departed souls (see J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias*, iv. 240 f.).

It is also to be noticed that in the Polish-Russian province of Pintschov (cf. Kotljarevskij, *op. cit.* p. 255) the combination of these two foods of the dead, honey and beans, is attested: 'The foods at the commemoration feasts consist of beans and peas which are cooked in honey-water.'

(δ) *The frame of mind of the worshippers (joy and grief).*—According to Menecius, the funeral and commemoration meals were celebrated among the ancient Lithuanians in perfect silence: 'in his conviviis quibus mortuo parentant, tacite assident mensæ tanquam muti'; and also in India we are told: 'As long as the Brāhmans eat in silence, so long do the manes enjoy the meal' (cf. Winternitz, 'Was wissen wir von den Indogermanen?' in *Beilage zur Münchner AZ*, 1903, No. 259, p. 300). On the other hand, it is doubtful whether the Lat. *silicernium* denotes the 'meal taken in silence' or the 'meal of the silent ones' (*i.e.* the dead) (cf. Osthoff, *Etymologische Parerga*, Leipzig, 1901, 66 ff.).

In any case the meal, or at least the chief part of it, was passed in a restrained and anxious mood, as is most vividly described by Šejn ([1] p. 596 ff.) with regard to the White Russians:

'One can perceive that some anxiety fills the hearts of the whole assembly. The aged, who already stand, so to speak, with one foot in the grave, are at this time sadder and more thoughtful than the others. Not infrequently, when they have just raised the glass of spirits to their lips, they stop suddenly and do not drink, but listen to some unexpected noise, the moaning of the wind, or the rustling of a neighbouring tree which is casting off its last leaves. If the gate creaks, or the door moves, or the door-latch gets unfastened, or a half-broken pane in the window rattles—whatever the cause may be—if, attracted by the light, a belated moth or some similar insect should approach, all these things are regarded as undoubted signs of the visit of their dead grandfathers. Conversation comes to a standstill and consists only of single remarks, either concerning the certain presence of the dead and their share in the entertainment, or about their former life,' etc.

It is this frame of mind—this firm conviction that the deceased person is present at the meal—that led to the custom among the White Russians (cf. above, p. 20[b]), as well as in Greek and Roman antiquity, of remembering the dead at the meal only in a friendly way: *εἰώθεσαν οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐν τοῖς περιδείπνοις τὸν τετελευτηκότα ἐπαινεῖν καὶ εἰ φαῦλος ἦν* (cf. Rohde, *Psyche*[2], i. 232, footnote 1).

If thus the first and fundamental sentiment of the funeral and commemoration feasts is naturally a sad one, it is, nevertheless, quite as characteristic of these celebrations to show a tendency, before they are finished, to pass over to the opposite extreme—joy and mirth. The reason of this is, of course, to be sought, in the first place, in the fact that the mourners in an excessive degree turn for comfort to spirituous liquors, which very soon take effect, while, in the second place, the conviction is widely prevalent that too many tears and too passionate grief disturb the peace of the dead in the grave (cf. for details, Winternitz, *op. cit.*). In any case, it is a fact that, among all the Aryan peoples, the festivals in honour of the dead are wont to be brought to a close by games and dancing, trials of strength, masquerades, and music (cf. Winternitz, *op. cit.*). All these elements of rejoicing are contained in the following description from White Russia (Š.[1] p. 588):

'After the close of the entertainment, the mistress of the house produces a sieve with cabbage-heads and places it on the table. Every one has cabbage-stocks in his pockets. The person standing at the head of the table now takes a head of cabbage and pitches it at the master of the house, whereupon all begin to fight with cabbage-heads and cabbage-stocks. When these are exhausted they begin to throw at one another whatever comes to their hands. . . . It seldom happens that commemoration festivals pass without brawls. The ceremony of throwing or beating with cabbage-heads is accompanied by songs, masquerades, music, and dancing (after grief and anxiety come joy and consolation). That is how the White Russian commemoration festivals (*chavtury*) are celebrated.'

For the student of comparative culture, however, this rustic play with cabbage-heads is fundamentally the same as the *spectaculum admirandum* which took place at the funeral of Attila, or the games at the pyre of Patroclus.

(ε) *The feeding of beggars.*—In conclusion, we may mention the wide-spread custom, in the White Russian service of the dead, of showing kindness to *beggars* on this occasion.

'Without them no single funeral or commemoration festival takes place. They take the place of the priest on this occasion. Their songs, prayers, and religious poems are regarded as a sufficient equivalent, and one very advantageous to their pockets.' 'The beggars, knowing that at burials they are treated to food and drink, and receive bountiful gifts, stream together to them in crowds from all directions' (Š.[1] pp. 507, 527).

The reason for this is perhaps to be found in the fact that beggars, *i.e.* cripples, the blind, the lame, and especially the weak-minded and idiots, being exceptions to the normal course of nature, have in the thought of primitive man something supernatural, and thus 'sacred,' about them, on account of which they can be regarded as representatives of the summoned souls of the dead ancestors. It may also be owing to this idea that on Slavonic soil (cf. A. Brückner, 'Polnisch-lateinische Predigten des XV Jahrhunderts,' *Archiv für slav. Phil.* xiv. 183 ff.) the spirits of the dead are often thought of as *ubože* (O. Slav. *ubožije*), *i.e.* 'poor little men' ('dæmonibus sacrificia offerunt, quæ dicuntur *vbosthye*, remantes seu derelinquentes eis residuitates ciborum quinta feria post cenam'). We are therefore inclined to believe that in this feeding of beggars at the White Russian festivals a primitive custom is preserved which in India, as we have already seen, the clergy had turned to their own account, by actually making it a rule that the pious should feed and clothe whole bands of Brāhmans at the *śrāddhas*. The service which is rendered to the Brāhmans is really rendered to the ancestors.

(ε) THE GENERAL SIGNIFICANCE, FOR THE HISTORY OF CULTURE, OF THE WORSHIP OF THE DEAD IN PRIMITIVE TIMES.—It is not asserting too much to say that the entire social organization of primitive times rests in the last resort on *ancestor-worship*. Its practice falls, in the first place, on the sons, and then on the more distant relatives of the deceased. In this connexion we find, among some of the individual peoples, definite circles of relatives: among the Indians the *sapiṇḍa*, or 'cake-companions'; among the Greeks, the ἀγχιστεῖς, or 'nearest'; among the Romans, the *propinqui sobrino tenus*, 'the relatives as far as the *sobrinus*'; and it is not improbable that even in primitive times there existed a notion of such a close kinship, the members of which were, in the first instance, under an obligation to present the sacrifice of the dead to their common ancestors. In his *Reallex. der indogerm. Altertumskunde* (see art. 'Erbschaft') the present writer has sought to prove that these 'next of kin' in primitive times were covered by the conception of the Indian *sapiṇḍa*-relationship, and included those persons who had in common father, grandfather, and great-grandfather, or one of these ancestors, while in the case of the Gr. ἀγχιστεῖς and the Lat. *propinqui sobrino tenus* the purely *agnate* relatives mentioned above were, in the performance of the duties of mourning, early joined by *cognati* and even *affines*. But in any case they must have been originally the same persons to whom belonged, besides the offering of the sacrifice to the dead, the right of *inheritance* and the obligation of *blood revenge*. Thus worship of the dead and inheritance appear everywhere in

closest connexion with each other. In India, such expressions as 'to be one's heir' and 'to give the funeral feast to somebody' (Skr. *dâyâdâ*, 'sharer,' 'heir,' and *sapiṇḍa*, 'sharer in the sacrificial cake') are often synonymous. The same holds in Greece, where, as late as his own time, the orator Isæus (vi. 51) could say: 'Which of the two alternatives is law, that the son of this woman, or this son of the sister of Philoctemon, whom he has adopted, εἶναι κληρονόμον καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ μνήματα ἰέναι χρόμενον καὶ ἐναγιοῦντα?' In Rome the principle of the jus pontificum is accepted, *nulla hereditas sine sacris*, but among the old Teutons also the idea must have prevailed that worship of the dead and inheritance were identical conceptions.

Linguistic proofs of this are supplied by the Old Norse expressions: *erfa*, (1) 'to honour with a funeral feast,' (2) 'to inherit'; *erfð*, 'inheritance'; *erfða-öldr*, 'a funeral feast'; *erfi*, 'a wake,' 'funeral feast'; *erfingi*, *erfi-vörðr* (A.S. *erfe-weard*), 'an heir'; *erfi-öl*, 'a wake,' 'funeral feast.'

This alliance of worship and property was, at the same time, the real defensive and offensive alliance of primitive times, inasmuch as on it, in the first resort, the duty of *blood revenge* (cf. Schrader, *Reallex.*, art. 'Blutrache') for a murdered or wounded companion devolved; and since in those ancient times, in which as yet there was no State, but only families, clans, and tribes, it was simply this institution of *blood revenge* that afforded mankind that protection which in historical times the laws and institutions of the State guarantee, the extraordinary significance of ancestor-worship and the circle of relations based upon it again becomes, from this point of view, quite apparent.

But whether it was a question of offering the *sacrifice to the dead*, the entrance of the *heir* into possession, or the performance of the duties of *blood revenge*, it was always on the sons, in the first instance, that the man based his hope. This explains the ardent desire for sons which appears undisguised in the prayers to the gods, and especially to those ancestor-spirits who had charge of the welfare of the family (cf. O. Schrader, *Reallex.*, art. 'Kinderreichtum'). There was no special desire for daughters, who were unfitted to offer sacrifice to the dead, and were employed only in the lamentation services (see above, p. 19 f.). But sons who are to be fitted to perform these religious and social duties cannot even in primitive times be begotten of any woman indiscriminately; they must, on the contrary, be born of a wife who has been solemnly brought into the husband's house in compliance with the sacred customs (cf. *Reallex.*, art. 'Heirat'). It follows further from this, that in primitive times marriage was regarded as an unavoidable necessity, and bachelorhood as an almost unthinkable self-contradiction. So intense was this feeling, that, as we have already seen, the unmarried dead man was even after his death married to a wife for the life to come, with the observance of the full marriage ritual (cf. on this O. Schrader, *Die Schwiegermutter und der Hagestolz*, Brunswick, 1904, and *Totenhochzeit*, Jena, 1904).

4. The realms of the dead.—As the primitive Aryans lived together in families and clans (cf. *Reallex.*, artt. 'Familie' and 'Sippe'), we may assume that they buried their dead in families and clans. In Rome each *gens* had the use of a common *sepulcrum*, and also in Greece the individual groups of related οἶκοι were bound together by common places of interment (κοινὸν μνῆμα) (cf. Marquardt, *Privatleben der Römer*, 1879–82, p. 353; and Rohde, *Psyche*[2], i. 229, note 3). In the North, expressions like O. Nor. *œtthaugar*, 'hill of the tribe' (*œtt*, 'family,' 'tribe') and Russ. dial. *roditeliskoje mĕsto*, 'cemetery,' properly 'place of the ancestors' (on Russ. *roditeli*, 'ancestors,' see above, p. 23), point to the same custom, which is also confirmed by many facts of early historical research (cf. *Reallex.*, art. 'Friedhof,' and M. Much, *Mitteilungen der anthrop. Gesell. in Wien*, xxxvi. 90).

Public roads and paths were places at which these tribal graves were by preference wont to be laid out, perhaps because they were in this way most visible to the eye, or perhaps because in ancient times roads and paths were regarded at the same time as boundary lines between the separate districts, which were in this way both made obvious and protected by the sacred remains of the ancestors. The custom is especially well attested in Rome and Greece (cf. Marquardt, p. 351, and I. Müller, *Die griechischen Privataltertümer*[2], 1893, p. 221) as well as in India (cf. p. 26); but according to Nestor's *Chronicle* (ed. Miklosich, p. 7) the old Slavonic Radimičes, Vjatiči, and Sěverjanes laid the ashes of their dead in a small vessel and placed this *na stolpě* ('upon a pillar') beside the roads (cf. Kotljarevskij, *op. cit.* p. 123, who also refers to the fact that the Czech *hranice* has, in addition to the meaning 'boundary,' the significations of 'burial-mound' and 'funeral-pyre').

At these tribal cemeteries, situated at the sides of roads and paths, the souls of the dead were supposed in primitive times to dwell in the depth of the earth and in the neighbourhood of their graves. But as in the course of historical development (cf. *Reallex.*, artt. 'Stamm' and 'Staat') the families and clans of primitive times gradually increased to larger political unities, ruled over by kings, the idea became more and more natural of localizing the deceased in real realms of the dead, situated usually at a great distance, either in the heavens or on the earth, and governed by powerful rulers. Then, as the distinction between good and evil was more clearly recognized and, owing to the authority of influential priestly castes, obtained a religious significance (cf. on this below, II. 5), it became usual to distinguish in these newly created realms of the dead places of enjoyment for the 'good' and places of punishment for the 'wicked.'

Among the Aryans the following are the most important of these realms of the dead. The Indians, leaving the older primitive ideas (above, p. 23) out of account, thought of the kingdom of the blessed as in the heavens under the sovereignty of the first human pair, Yama and Yamî, whose names recur in an almost identical form in the Iranian Yima, proving this twin pair to be a common Indo-Iranian idea. It is a contested question whether, along with this heaven, there was also in Vedic times the conception of a 'hell' (cf. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, p. 530 ff.; Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, p. 169 f.). Among the Greeks, there stands as the central point of their belief in immortality the dark, because underground, world of Ἀιδης. Its entrance is reached by a long voyage over the ocean to the land of the Cimmerians, and the grove of Persephone (details in Rohde[2], i. 53 ff.). Deep down beneath it lies Τάρταρος (*Il.* viii. 13), a place of punishment for the wicked (*Od.* xi. 576). For a few elect Ἠλύσιον (*Od.* iv. 561 ff.) is appointed—a plain at the Western border of the world, where everlasting spring reigns. The only thing the Romans had to place over against these poetical pictures, which at a later date passed also into Italy, was their Orcus, which is lacking in every characteristic trait.

'The Romans did not possess a conception of the continuance of life and of retribution after death, or of the form of existence in the realm of the shades which was invested with any lively imagination' (Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, p. 192).

If we turn northwards, we find, in the first place, among the Γέται ἀθανατίζοντες, 'the *Getes* who regard themselves as immortal' (Herod. iv. 93),

a kingdom of the dead belonging to the god Ζάλμοξις or Γεβελέϊζις, to whom it was customary to send a messenger every five years, by throwing a man upwards and then receiving him on lances and so piercing him to death. We have already (above, p. 25[a]) made the acquaintance of the Lithuanian god of the dead *Vielona*, beside whom there existed a Lettic *Wella mâte*. In all the Teutonic languages there is, as an ancient designation of the realm of the dead, the common expression Goth. *halja*, Old Nor. *hel*, A.S. *hell*, O.H.G. *hella*, which only in the Old Norse (*Hel*) developed into a name for the goddess of the dead. The idea of *Valhöll* is also confined to the north. Among the common people it was in all probability only a name for a home of the dead, but by means of the poetry of the Scalds it became a paradise of warriors under the rule of Odin. In Anglo-Saxon we find for Paradise the unusual expression *neorxna-wong*. It remains for us to mention the expression *raj* (Lith. *rojus*, Lett. *raja*) common to all Slavonic languages, which even in pagan times must have denoted some paradise-like dwelling of the dead. But it is impossible to prove the existence of a pagan word, such as Old Slav. *piklŭ*, for the idea of 'hell.'

If we glance over these expressions for realms of the dead and their rulers, we see that they are formations of the separate languages, and etymologically tolerably clear. The Gr. Ἀιδης must be derived from an original *ἀ-Fιδᾱ, 'place of invisibility' (Lat. *videre*, Gr. *Fιδεῖν*), and then, by being made masculine (cf. νεανίας, 'young man': *νεανία, 'youth'), came to denote the ruler of the under world. The case is similar with the Goth. *halja*, etc. (=Lat. *celare*), 'place of concealment,' originally, in all probability, simply the grave (cf. A.S. *byrgan*, 'to bury,' *byrgels*, O.L.G. *burgisli*, 'tomb'); as also the Lat. *orcus* (cf. above, p. 17[b]) should most likely be compared with the Goth. *aúrahi*, 'sepulchral cave.' A.S. *neorxna-wong* has lately been interpreted by A. Leitzmann (*Beiträge z. Gesch. d. deutschen Sprache u. Lit.* xxxii. 1) as 'meadow of the powers of the under world' (**neorscna*, **nerþ-iska*, *Nerthus*, 'terra mater,' Gr. *νέρτεροι*, 'the powers of the under world'; otherwise F. Kluge, *Zeitschr. für deutsche Wortforschung*, viii. 144; Uhlenbeck, *Beiträge*, xxxii. 1). Perhaps we may also venture an explanation of the Getic god of the dead, Γεβελέϊζις. There was an Old Slavic root *gyb*, *gib*, 'ἀπόλλυμαι' (Old Russ., *e.g.*, *gybeli*; Russ. *gibeli*, 'destruction,' 'loss'). Thus the language would point to a meaning for Γεβελέϊζις such as δαίμων τῶν ἀπολλυμένων (Herodot. iv. 94: οὔτε ἀποθνήσκειν ἑωυτοὺς νομίζουσι, λέναι τε τὸν ἀπολλύμενον παρὰ Ζάλμοξιν δαίμονα. οἱ δὲ αὐτῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον νομίζουσι Γεβελέϊζιν). However, the group Lith. *Vielona* (**Vélônis*), Old Nor. *Valhǫll*, and Gr. Ἠλύσιον (**Fηλύσιον*) may possibly rest on a prehistoric connexion. The first part of both of the first two words is undoubtedly the Lith. *vėlės*, 'spirits of the dead,' Old Nor. *valr*, A.S. *wæl*, 'the dead on the battlefield,' O.H.G. *wal*, *wuol*, 'strages,' 'clades,' so that *Vielona* is the '*deus animarum*,' as is also explained in the Lithuanian tradition, while *Valhǫll* signifies 'the hall of the dead.' As regards the Gr. Ἠλύσιον (πεδίον), it is usually derived—even by E. Rohde (*Psyche*[2], i. 76, footnote 1)—from ἐλευσις, ἐλεύσομαι, etc., and interpreted as 'the land of the departed.' But in this etymology the fact is overlooked that the root ἐλευθ in Greek signifies 'to arrive' rather than 'to depart'; and as a 'land of those who have arrived' obviously gives no satisfactory explanation of Ἠλύσιον, the connexion of the Greek word with the Lith. *vėlės*, 'spirits of the dead,' suggested by A. N. Veselovskij (*Trans. of the Department for the Russ. Lang. and Lit. of the St. Petersburg Acad.* [Russ.], xlvi. p. 287 ff.), seems worthy of consideration. But, of course, we have before us in the case of *Vielona*, *Valhǫll*, and Ἠλύσιον, independent formations of the individual languages, so that all that follows from the series quoted is, in the end, no more than the existence of an Aryan root **vel-*, **vol-*, **vêl-* in the sense of 'souls of the departed.' Thus there is a total want of points of connexion to justify the assumption that even in the primitive Aryan times realms of the dead, like those mentioned above, were believed to exist. All the linguistic comparisons from which people were wont at an earlier date to draw conclusions as to the existence of such primitive ideas—as, *e.g.*, Gr. Κέρβερος=Skr. *śarvara*, *śabala* (a name of an Indian dog of the dead); Gr. Τάρταρος=Skr. *talâtala* (at a later date the name of a definite hell); Gr. Ἑρμείας (as leader of the dead)=Skr. *sârameya* (used of the dogs in the Indian world of the dead); Gr. Μίνως (as ruler of the dead)=Skr. *mánu*, and other similar comparisons—belong to the realm of beliefs that have long ago been given up by modern philology, as has been shown above (p. 13). Even the alleged agreements as to the matter in this sphere—as, *e.g.*, that a certain resemblance is to be found between the Gr. Κέρβερος and the two 'four-eyed and spotted dogs of Yama who guard the path'—do not turn out to be capable of convincing proof (cf. O. Gruppe, *Die griechischen Kulte und Mythen*, i. 113; E. Rohde, *Psyche*[2], i. 304, footnote 2; Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, p. 538).

Thus we believe that the idea of actual realms of the dead, situated at a great distance from the graves of the deceased, belongs to the individual development of the separate Aryan races, although this development may have taken place in prehistoric epochs. In the same way, it seems to us that it was also in the separate development of the individual peoples that the custom originated of burning the corpse and sending away the soul (which was thought of as 'smoke') to a distant land by means of the smoke of the funeral-pyre—a custom which, as we have shown above, stands in intimate connexion with this idea of a distant realm of the dead. If the first practice of cremation arose from still more primitive ideas—as, *e.g.*, from the wish to free the living from the pollution which was threatened by the dead, or to keep back, by means of fire, evil spirits from the body of the beloved dead—still it cannot be disputed that the conception of the flame as a female guide of the soul into a distant realm of the dead was one which, in the course of time, rose more and more clearly into prominence. This is most unmistakably the case in India, where, in an extremely realistic manner, the assurance is added, in the way of comfort, that at the cremation the male organ does not burn, and that there are many women-folk in the heavenly world (Oldenberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 544, 536). In Homer the only way to Hades is over the funeral-pyre, but the elect are 'translated' into Elysium, even when still alive. Among the Gauls (Diodorus Siculus, v. 28) it was usual at a cremation to lay letters on the funeral pyre, addressed to the departed relatives. These were supposed to be carried along with the soul of the cremated dead into the realm of the shades. But a Russian expresses himself most unreservedly as to the real purpose of cremation in the case of the funeral of a Russian merchant described by Ibn Fosslan (see above, pp. 17, 22):

'Ye Arabs are indeed a stupid people: ye take him who is the best beloved and most highly honoured of men and cast him into the earth, where the creeping beasts and worms feed on him. We, on the other hand, burn him in an instant, so that he goes directly, without delay, into Paradise.'

The oldest abode, therefore, in which the spirits of the ancestors dwell is the earth, the same earth

to whose bosom the farmer commits the seed; and accordingly we are not surprised if the gods of the earth who gradually emerge among the different peoples rule over the souls of the dead that are laid *in* the earth as well as over the seed which springs up *out of* the earth. This is true, in the first place, of the Mother Earth herself, of the Greek Γαῖα (Rohde, i. 208), and of the Latin *Tellus* (Wissowa, *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, vii. 47), while among the Lithuanians *Žemyna* (cf. Lett. *Semmes mâte*, Lith. *žẽmė* 'earth,' Thrac. Σεμέλη 'earth-goddess') is on the one hand a goddess of blessing for field and house, and on the other hand sacrifices are offered to her at the festival of the dead. In this connexion the attempt has been made by the writer of the present article (*Reallex.* p. 870) to interpret the Greek *Persephoneia* as the 'killing of the seed,'* and the Latin *Feronia* as the 'bringing of the seed.'

II. *WORSHIP OF THE SKY AND OTHER NATURAL PHENOMENA — 'THE HEAVENLY ONES.' — Introduction.*—If we have so far succeeded in presenting the fundamental features of the Aryan worship of the dead, sometimes even to very trifling details in its development, we have owed this above all else to the Litu-Slavic tradition, by means of which we were enabled fully to understand the conditions prevalent among other Aryan races, which were both incompletely attested and (as *e.g.* among the Indians) transformed by priestly refinements. It is natural, therefore, to ask whether it will not be possible in the same way to understand the fundamental character of the Aryan religion as a whole. For this task it will unfortunately be necessary, owing to the facts noticed above (p. 14), to leave almost entirely out of account in the meantime the history of the religion of the pagan Slavs, and to confine ourselves to a consideration of the conditions prevalent among the *Lithuanian Prussians*, regarding which, fortunately, we have much fuller information. We may begin the subject with some general descriptions, supplied by trustworthy authorities, of the pagan beliefs about God obtaining among these peoples. First of all we may mention Peter of Dusburg, the editor of the first *Prussian Chronicle* (1326).

'Prutheni noticiam dei non habuerunt. Quia simplices fuerunt, eum ratione comprehendere non potuerunt, et quia literas non habuerunt, immo in scripturis ipsum speculari non poterant. . . . Et quia sic deum non cognoverunt, ideo contigit, quod errando omnem creaturam pro deo coluerunt, scilicet solem, lunam et stellas, tonitrua, volatilia, quadrupedia etiam, usque ad bufonem. Habuerunt etiam lucos, campos et aquas sacras, sic quod secare aut agros colere vel piscari ausi non fuerant in eisdem' (*Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, i. 53).

We may compare with Peter of Dusburg's statement the following passage from the *Chron. ord. Theut.* of Blumenau (*Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, i. 53, note 1):

'Horum (the Prussians) ritus sicut a Christiana religione alienus, ita ab omni humanitate remotus fuit. Ipsi namque prisco gentilitatis errore imbuti omnem ornatum cæli atque terræ adorantes nonnullas silvas adeo sacras esse arbitrabantur ut nec ligna incidere nec vetustate quidem delectas arbores inibi abducere permittebant.'

Later but still more characteristic testimonies regarding the Litu-Prussian conditions are supplied by the report of a Jesuit missionary who at the beginning of the 17th cent. travelled all through Polish Livonia:

'Hi varios deos habent, alium cæli, alium terræ, quibus alii subsunt, ut dii piscium, agrorum, frumentorum, hortorum, pecorum, equorum, vaccarum ac singularium necessitatum proprios' (cf. Usener, *Götternamen*, p. 109). Cf. *Helmoldi Chronica Slavorum*, i. p. 163, ed. Pertz: 'Inter multiformia deorum numina, quibus arva silvas tristitias atque voluptates attribuunt, non diffitentur unum in cælis ceteris imperitantem.'

With these general characteristics of the Litu-Prussian religion the gods and god-names of the Lithuanians and Prussians themselves correspond well. We have information about these from men like Jan Menecius (Meletius, Malecki, see above, pp. 17, 19), Math. Stryikowski (*Kronika Polska, Litewska, Pruska, Moskowiewska, Tatarska*, Rgbg. bei Osterberg, 1582), Jakob Laskowski (in Lasicius,* *de Diis Samagitarum*, Basel, 1615), Matthæus Prætorius (*Deliciæ Prussicæ oder Preussische Schaubühne*, completed about 1698, edited, with verbatim extracts from the MS, by William Pierson, Berlin, 1871).

If we attempt to emphasize what is really characteristic in these Prusso-Lithuanian conceptions of the gods, it is evidently to be found in the fact that, for all phenomena of nature and life, for all undertakings and conditions of mankind, in fact even for every section or act of these which was at all prominent, individual gods (*Sondergötter*, 'special gods,' as H. Usener has aptly named them) were created, who, at least as a general rule, may be said to remain within the limits of the conception to which they owe their origin.

If, in order to demonstrate this by an example, we single out a particular province of culture, as, *e.g.*, cattle-breeding, which evidently occupied a prominent place in the life of the Litu-Prussians, we have, to begin with, a god who looks after cattle in general (*Sutvaras*), then a goddess who looks after their propagation (*Gotha*), a god who attends to the feeding (*Szerīczius*), another taking care of the pasture lands (*Ganýklos dẽvas*). In addition to these, there are 'special gods' concerned with the oxen (*Baubis*), the horses (*Ratainīcza*), the sheep (*Eratīnis*), the swine (*Krukis* and *Kremata*), the poultry (*Swieczpuńcscyunnis dẽvos*), the bees (*Bicziu birbullis, Austheia, Prokorimos*), the calves (*Karvaitis*), the young pigs (*Priparszas*), and there is even a divinity that reveals itself in one of the most horrible plagues of the farmer, the fly pest (*Musiũ birbiks*). We should meet with the same phenomenon if we examined closely the realms of nature or other spheres of civilization, agriculture, the home, family life, etc.

Long ago it was observed that this fundamental feature of the Litu-Prussian conception of the gods recurs on Aryan soil with amazing accuracy in the *Old Roman* religion. This comes before our notice most obviously in the list of gods which appears in the so-called *Indigitamenta*, *i.e.* priestly collections of forms of prayer to be used on the most varied occasions, which are known to us in the main from the attacks of the Church Fathers on the *Antiquitates rerum divinarum* of Varro, who drew his materials from these *Indigitamenta*. Now, although the fixing of these names of gods in definite classes (*di nuptiales, di agrestes*, etc.) † may have been already undertaken by the Pontifices, or for the first time by Varro, and although many of these names of deities may at first have been placed in that particular class owing to the interpretation of Varro, which was doubtless often wrong, still it is quite certain that in these *Indigitamenta*, and therefore in the Roman cult, there must have been a great number of individual gods, exactly resembling in their nature the Litu-Prussian deities:

'Sed et alii sunt præterea (*i.e.* besides the great gods of the cult, whose names also stand in the *Indigitamenta*) dei complures hominum vitam pro sua quisque portione adminiculantes, quos volentem cognoscere indigitamentorum libri satis edocebunt' (Censorinus).

* *Φερεφόνη*, etc.; *φῆρον· ἡ τῶν ἀρχαίων θεῶν τροφή*, Hes.; *φηρίς· ἡ τροφὴ θεῶν*, Arcadius, and *φόνος* (cf. also Hoops, *Waldbäume und Kulturpflanzen*, Strassburg, 1905, p. 360); *Fĕronia, Fārōnia, Fērōnia*, acc. to W. Mannhardt, *Wald- und Feldkulte*, Berlin, 1875–7, ii. 328: *far* (= *φῆρον*, **bhers-*), 'spelt'; for another view of *Feronia* cf. W. Schulze, *Eigennamen*, Berlin, 1904, p. 165.

* Cf. *Joh. Lasicii Poloni de Diis Samagitarum libellus*, ed. by W. Mannhardt, with additions by A. Bielenstein, Riga, 1868; 'Die Baltica des Libellus Lasicki: Untersuchungen zur litauischen Mythologie,' by Theodor R. von Grienberger in *Archiv für slavische Philologie*, xviii. 1 ff., and A. Brückner, 'Litauische Götternamen,' *ib.* xxii. 569 ff. The last-mentioned scholar raises doubts as to the trustworthiness of Laskowski, the main source of Lasicki. He holds, among other things, that the Lithuanian deities Gabie, Polengabia, and Matergabia mentioned by Laskowski to Lasicki are simply mutilations of the Christian saint Agatha, the patroness of fire (*Polengabia*, 'the Agatha of the hearth'; cf. Lith. *pelẽnė*, 'fire-place,' *Matergabia*, 'Mother Agatha'). All this may be quite right in itself, but we are not justified on that account in doubting the good faith of Laskowski. What must be regarded as primitive among the Lithuanians, as we shall see more fully below, is the attempt and the ability to form separate gods, but not all the separate names and forms of these gods themselves. Why should not a Christian saint in earlier times have strayed into their midst? However, in the following discussion names of gods mentioned *only* by Laskowski-Lasicius will be noted as such.

† Cf. Wissowa, 'Echte und falsche "Sondergötter" in der römischen Religion' in *Ges. Abh. zur römischen Religions- und Staatsgeschichte*, Munich, 1904, p. 304 ff.

The important thing, however, is that these great gods of the cult themselves, as we know them particularly from the fixed or movable festivals which were devoted to them, are essentially, even in the earliest historical times, or at least in the earliest period we can read with certainty, nothing else than 'special gods.' If we take, *e.g.*, the sphere of agriculture, which lay at the foundations of old Roman culture, sowing is represented by *Saturnus*, harvest by *Consus* and *Ops*, growth by *Ceres*, blossom by *Flora*, fruit by *Pomona*, failure of crops by *Robigus*—all of them deities who, according to the information supplied by the stone-calendar, had special feasts, or special priests and feasts, at their disposal (cf. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus*, p. 21). If we may judge from pictures in the circus, there were worshipped along with Consus, the god of harvest, the three goddesses *Seia*, *Segetia*, and *Tutilina*, who had power over the seeds beneath and above the ground (Wissowa, *op. cit.* p. 195).

In addition to these, there are the twelve gods who were invoked by the flamen at the *sacrum Cereale*: *Vervactor* (for the fallow ploughing), *Redarator* (for the second ploughing), *Imporcitor* (for the drawing of the furrow), *Insitor* (for the sowing), *Obarator* (for the grubbing), *Occator* (for the harrowing), *Sarritor* (for the hoeing), *Subruncinator* (for the weeding), *Messor* (for the mowing), *Convector* (for the gathering), *Conditor* (for the storing), and *Promitor* (for the delivery of the grain), while from the report of Varro could be added a god of manuring (*Sterculinus*), and several more (cf. especially Peter, 'Indigitamenta' in Roscher).

A remarkable fact regarding these old Roman names of gods is that sometimes there seem to appear in them chronologically different strata of one and the same idea. Thus *Insitor* (and at the same time *Sator*) is at the *sacrum Cereale* the 'sower'; *Conditor* is the 'storer.' The same meaning is in all probability in the names of the old gods of the cult *Saturnus* (Sæturnus) and *Consus*, which are probably connected etymologically with *serere* and *condere* (Wissowa, pp. 169, 166). In the same way, *Janus* (Wissowa, p. 96) originally was simply the god of the doors (*ianua*), just as in the Lithuanian religion there was a god of the well, *Szullinnis* (Lith. *szulinỹs*, 'the well'), or a god of the bath-broom, *Szlotrazys* (Lith. *szlùtražis*, 'broom-stump'). After higher ideas, such as the concept of the deity as a god of the beginning (entrance), were blended with the idea of Janus, a renewal of this idea took place. This renewal we find in the gods of the *Indigitamenta*: *Forulus*, 'god of the doors,' and *Cardea*, 'goddess of the hinges.'

If in the preceding account we have placed the Litu-Prussian and the old Roman gods on the same stage of development in the history of religion, we do not mean to say that the figures which belong to these two groups represent common pre-historic formations, even in cases where these figures exactly correspond to each other in their nature, as is the case, *e.g.*, with the Lith. *Gabjaujis*, 'god of the barns' = Lat. *Consus*; Lith. *Tartois kibirksztů*, 'god of fire' = Lat. *Stata mater* (Wissowa, p. 185); Lith. *Perdoytus*, 'god of merchants' = Lat. *Mercurius*; Lith. *Pizius* (Lasicius), 'god of sexual intercourse' = Lat. *Mutunus Tutunus* (Wissowa, p. 195), etc. What can be proved to be pre-historic is rather the mere capacity and the tendency to form into a divinity every conception in nature or in culture which was of significance for primitive man, and to maintain the gods who were thus created for a longer or shorter period in their original sphere.

The greater part of H. Usener's standard work (*Götternamen*) is devoted to proving that the same tendency was operative in the formation of the Greek gods, that here too the great personal gods were evolved from special gods resembling those of the Romans and Lithuanians. This book also shows (cf. p. 116 ff.) how, even under the rule of the Christian Church, the same primitive and deeply-rooted longing for separate gods lived on in the worship of the *saints*, who, just like the gods of the *Indigitamenta*, could be rightly designated as 'dei hominum vitam *pro sua quisque portione* adminiculantes.' But how do matters stand in this connexion with the religion of the ancient Teutons? 'It is impossible,' says F. Kauffmann in his *Deutsche Mythologie*[3] (Stuttgart, 1893), p. 40, Eng. tr. *Northern Mythology*, London, 1903, p. 31, 'to prove in the oldest Teutonic religion the existence of more than three male divinities; and a triad of gods is usually ascribed to the Teutons by the historiographers of later times. The names given are Mercury, Juppiter, and Mars, names which really denote the Teutonic gods Wodan, Donar, and Ziu. With them is associated a goddess originally the great all-mother Earth, the beloved of the gods, and as such called by the name of Freia.' Certainly, if this statement is correct, and it expresses the opinion current among the German mythologists, there would hardly be room for 'special gods' in the religion of the ancient Teutons. But how then is it to be explained that even Procopius found among the Herulians a πολὺς θεῶν ὄμιλος; and when Jordanis (ch. xi.) relates of the Goth Dicenus: 'elegit ex eis tunc nobilissimos prudentioresque viros, quos theologiam instruens *numina quædam et sacella venerari iussit*,' what else can be meant than that that ruler was the first to choose some few State-gods out of the crowd of existing deities? Or is it possible to regard the numerous gods, and especially goddesses, which the Roman inscriptions exhibit—a Thingsus, Requalivahanus, Halamardus, Magusanus, Saxanus, etc., or a Tanfana, Nerthus, Baduhenna, Nehalennia, Hludana, Garmangabis, Haiva, Vagdavercustis, Harimella, etc.—as all being different forms of the names and ideas of those chief gods or goddesses? When only the Roman gods Juppiter, Mars, Mercury, and Hercules appear as Roman equivalents of the Teutonic world of gods, is it not natural to suppose the reason of this to lie in the fact that the people who first brought news about the Teutonic gods to Rome were soldiers and merchants? The former of these classes—in addition to *Juppiter Optimus Maximus*, who was worshipped by all in common—honoured especially the god Mars, the latter Mercury and Hercules (as the guardian of measure and weight; cf. Wissowa, p. 227, 231), and accordingly these classes sought with special fondness their favourite guardian gods on the barbarian Olympus—and found them too. But none of these questions can be disposed of briefly, and accordingly we cannot settle them here. In any case, however, no substantial objection from the standpoint of Teutonic religion* can be raised against the view that the craving, which is strikingly prominent in the Litu-Prussian and ancient Roman religion, for an endless variety of 'special gods' representing all sides of the life of nature and culture is to be regarded as a primitive Aryan characteristic. What confronts us here, however, as the oldest of the old is in reality nothing else than the phenomenon which anthropologists have called 'animism,' *i.e.* 'the investing with life and the deifying of the inanimate.' The extraordinary world-wide importance of this mode of thought for religious life has long been recognized (cf. especially Tylor, *Primitive Culture*[3], London, 1891). In close connexion with this animism we see fu-

* The same is true of the old Indian religion. Here, from primitive Indo-Iranian times onwards, the ever-growing tendency to form gods was kept in check by influential priests and priestly classes, who everywhere exercised the strongest influence on the development of great personal gods (cf. below, § 5).

ther how, in the Aryan religions as well as everywhere else, traces of a pronounced 'fetishism' remain. It cannot be doubted that the Aryans, like other races, once worshipped and prayed to trees and stumps, stones and animals, not only as symbols of divinity, but as real embodiments of a divine *anima*. In the meantime it may be advisable to leave the proofs of this to be discussed in those sections which deal with the outward appearance and the oldest dwelling-place of the deity (below, 3 and 4 *c*).

In this way it may be said that in the Aryan world animism and fetishism form the first and the oldest stage in the evolution of the history of religion. They are also to be traced in historical times, and are still to be detected at the present day. But it is likewise certain that even in primitive Aryan times the beginnings of a higher form of religion made their appearance.

For although the countless numbers of 'special gods' presupposed as original are not at first to be regarded as differing qualitatively among themselves, still it is natural to suppose that, just as the individual objects and conceptions which excited religious emotions were of different significance for mankind, so also the significance of the deities arising out of them would from the beginning be different, or would soon become so. And, in fact, we see how at a time when the Aryan peoples were still together, or were for the most part very close to each other, a class of beings became separated from the motley crowd of divinities, and appeared distinct from the other 'special gods.' These were designated by the list of primitive Aryan words already known to us: Skr. *devá*, Lat. *deus*, Lith. *dìẽwas*, Ir. *día*, Old Nor. *tívar*, nom. pl. *i.e.* the 'heavenly ones.'

These 'heavenly ones' will accordingly have to occupy the chief place in the following discussion, which will consist of five sections: (1) evidences of the significance of the 'heavenly ones' in the old Aryan religion, (2) their names, (3) their forms of manifestation, and the interpretation of them in riddle and myth, (4) their worship, and (5) their relation to the morality of mankind.

1. **Evidences of the significance of the 'heavenly ones' in the old Aryan religion.**—It is emphasized in the most unmistakable fashion, by unbiased authorities, with regard to the most diverse sections of the old Aryan racial territory, that the worship of the *sky* and the powers of nature connected with it formed the real kernel of the primitive Aryan religions.

This we have already seen in the reports regarding the Prussian Lithuanians* quoted above (pro deo coluerunt, scilicet solem, lunam et stellas, tonitrua—omnem ornatum cæli atque terræ adorantes—varios deos habent, alium cæli, alium terræ, *quibus alii subsunt*).

This is still more clearly proved by Herodotus (i. 131) with regard to the Persians: ἀγάλματα μὲν καὶ νηοὺς καὶ βωμοὺς οὐκ ἐν νόμῳ ποιευμένους ἱδρύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ποιεῦσι μωρίην ἐπιφέρουσι, ὡς μὲν ἐμοὶ δοκέει, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνθρωποφυέας ἐνόμισαν τοὺς θεοὺς κατάπερ οἱ Ἕλληνες εἶναι. οἱ δὲ νομίζουσι Διὶ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ ὑψηλότατα τῶν οὐρέων ἀναβαίνοντες θυσίας ἔρδειν, τὸν κύκλον πάντα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ Δία καλέοντες· θύουσι δὲ ἡλίῳ τε καὶ σελήνῃ καὶ γῇ καὶ πυρὶ καὶ ὕδατι καὶ ἀνέμοισι· τούτοισι μὲν δὴ μούνοισι θύουσι ἀρχῆθεν, and the Scythians (iv. 59): θεοὺς μὲν μούνους τούσδε ἱλάσκονται, Ἱστίην μὲν μάλιστα, ἐπὶ δὲ Δία τε καὶ Γῆν νομίζοντες τὴν Γῆν τοῦ Διὸς εἶναι γυναῖκα. Cæsar reports regarding the Teutons: 'Germani multum ab hac (Gallorum) consuetudine differunt, nam neque druides habent, qui rebus divinis præsint, neque sacrificiis student, deorum numero eos solos ducunt, quos cernunt et quorum aperte opibus iuvantur: *Solem et Vulcanum et Lunam*, reliquos ne fama quidem acceperunt' (*de Bell. Gall.* vi. 21).

At the head of this worship stands the sky itself: Skr. *Dyáus*=Gr. *Zeús*, Lat. *Diespiter, Juppiter* (*Jú-piter*=*Zeû πάτερ*, an ancient vocative), Old Nor. *Týr*, O.H.G. *Ziu*.†. The fundamental meaning of the term 'sky' is most clearly preserved in the Vedic *Dyáus*, while the Gr. *Zeús* and Lat. *Juppiter* on the one hand, and the Old Norse *Týr* and O.H.G. *Ziu* on the other, have developed into gods, conceived of as purely personal, the classical words denoting the greatest god of the sky, and the Teutonic the greatest god of war. The root from which the whole class of words is derived is Skr. *div* 'to radiate,' so that Aryan **dyēus* (=Lat. *dies*, 'day') indicated in the first place the sky as the bearer of the light of day, and thus one of the first of the more elevated religious ideas of the Aryans was connected with the light of day.

The most violent natural phenomenon seen in the sky is the thunderstorm. From what has just been said regarding the fundamental signification of the Aryan **dyēus*, as well as from what has been indicated above regarding the fundamental feature of the Aryan religions—the formation of 'special gods'—it follows that the primitive condition of things has been preserved by those Aryan languages which have formed special deities for the phenomenon of the thunderstorm and its accompanying manifestation, the thundercrash, which agitates most powerfully the feelings of mankind. This is the case particularly over the whole of Northern Europe. Thus the universal Teutonic name of the thunder-god, O.H.G. *Donar*, O.L.G. *Thunar*, O. Nor. *Thórr*, is nothing else than the term for thunder (Skr. *stanáyati*, 'it thunders,' Lat. *tonat, tonitrus*, A.S. *þunian, þunor*, O.H.G. *donar*). The common Celtic expression for this natural power **torannos* (Irish *torann*, Welsh *tarann*, Cornish *taran*, 'thunder') is derived by metathesis from the same root. These Celtic forms led to the god (or goddess?) *Taranis* attested by Lucan (*Phars.* i. 445) and to forms which are found on inscriptions, such as Ταρανόου (Dat.), *Taranucus, Taranucnus*. Along with these we have a form exactly corresponding to the Teutonic *Donar*, viz. *Tanaros* (cf. R. Much, 'Der germanische Himmelsgott' in *Festschrift für Heinzel*, p. 227). The names of the Lithuanian god of thunder, *Perkúnas* (according to Menecius '*deus tonitruum ac tempestatum*'), and of the Slavonic *Perun*, who was especially worshipped in Kiev, are obviously related to each other, but the exact nature of this relationship has not yet been determined. Both of them are used in their own languages as appellative terms for 'thunderstorm,' 'thundercrash.' The first of these two names has been connected (cf. H. Hirt, *Indog. Forsch.* i. p. 479) with the Old Norse *Fjörgyn*, the name of the mother of Thor, and with *Parjánya*, the rain- and thunder-god of the Vedas. All these words have again been connected with the Lat. *quercus*, O.H.G. *forha* 'oak,' 'fir' (**perku*), so that the meaning 'he of the oak' would result for *Perkúnas* (cf. in Menecius: *Putscœtus*, 'deus qui sacros lucos tuetur,' Lith. *Puszaitis* [from *puszìs*, 'pine tree'], 'he of the pine tree'; cf. J. G. Frazer, *Early History of the Kingship*, 210). But the Skr. *Parjánya* must for phonetic reasons be excluded from this series (Skr. *j* is not=Lith. *k*), and after all it may be better (especially in consideration of the clear and evident changes of meaning which occur in the Celtic *Taranis* and the Teutonic *Donar*), in the case of *Perkúnas* and *Perun* to start from their appellative signification.† Just as in the North of Europe, so also in

* Cf., in addition, Erasmus Stella, 'de Borussiæ Antiquitatibus' ii., in Grynæus, *Novus Orbis*, Basel, 1537, p. 582: 'Solem et Lunam deos omnium primos crediderunt, tonitrua fulgetrasque ex consensu gentium adorabant, tempestates advertendas etiandasque precationibus dixerunt.'

* Bremer (*Indogerm. Forschungen*, iii. 301) has lately, on insufficient grounds, the present writer thinks, separated the Teutonic words from **dyēus*=Zeús and connected them with **deivos*=*deus*.

† E. Lidén (*Armenische Studien*, Göteborg, 1906, p. 85) has recently discussed all these words. With us he derives the Slav. *perunŭ* and Lith. *perkúnas* from the appellative significations 'thunder,' and places both words beside Old Slav. *perą, pirati* and Armen. *hark-anem*, aor. *hari* (cf. also Armen *ork*

the Vedas, *Dyáús*, the god of heaven, and *Indra*, the god of the thunderstorm (along with *Parjánya*) are carefully kept separate. In contrast to that, the Greek Zeus is god of the clear sky and thunder-god at the same time :

Ζεὺς δ' ἔλαχ' οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἐν αἰθέρι καὶ νεφέλῃσι (*Il.* xv. 192).

In fact, titles of the god referring to the latter quality, such as νεφεληγερέτα, τερπικέραυνος, στεροπηγερέτα, κελαινεφής, ἐρίγδουπος, ἐριβρεμέτης, ἀστεροπητής, ἀργικέραυνος, etc., exist in large numbers. On the other hand, the epithet of Zeus, the old neuter plural εὐρύοπα, 'wide-eye' (cf. above, τὸν κύκλον πάντα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ Δία καλέοντες), which is by far the most ancient of his titles, and takes us back to a long-forgotten epoch of the language, points to the god as the bearer of the light of day (cf. J. Schmidt, *Pluralbildungen der indoger. Neutra*, Weimar, 1889, p. 400). The same thing is to be found in the case of the Latin Juppiter as in the case of the Greek Zeus. In both instances, therefore, secondary developments and approximations are evidently present.

Further, the sun and the moon are unanimously mentioned, in the reports given above, as objects of worship among the tribes on the shores of the Baltic, the Persians, and the Teutons.

The Aryan names of these are :

The Sun : Skr. *súvar* (*sûrya* and *svàr*, Av. *hvar*), Gr. ἀβέλιος (Cret. Hes.), ἠέλιος, ἥλιος, Lat. *sol*, Goth. *sauil*, neut. (beside *sunnô*, fem.), Welsh *heul*, Old Pruss. *saule*, Lith. *saulė*.

The Dawn : Skr. *ushás* and *usrá*, Av. *ušah*, Gr. ἠώς, Æol. αὔως, Lat. *aurora*, Lith. *auszrà*.

The Moon : Skr. *más*, Av. *mah*, Gr. μήνη, Goth. *mêna*, Lith. *mėnů* (in addition O. Lat. *losna*, Lat. *lûna*, Armen. *lusin*; cf. Old Pruss. *lauxnos*, 'constellations').

All these and the related phenomena of the sky connected with light—*Saulėlė* 'the sun,' *Mėnů* or *Mėnesėlis* 'the moon,' *Auszrinė* 'the morning star,' *Wakarinė* (also called *Żevoruna*) 'the evening star,' the stars (Lith. *Żwaigždė*) as a whole, over which *Suaixtix* rules, *Auszrà* 'the dawn' (cf., in Lasicius, 'Ausca [for *Auszrà*] dea est radiorum solis [vel occumbentis vel] supra horizontem ascendentis'), etc.—play, as will be seen further on, an exceptionally important part in the Prusso-Lithuanian religion and mythology. But even in the case of the neighbouring Teutons evidences of the prevalence of the worship of the sun and moon are by no means confined to the report of Cæsar quoted above. Thus Tacitus (*Ann.* xiii. 55) mentions a Teuton of the name of Boiocalus, of whom he says : 'Solem deinde suspiciens et cetera sidera vocans, quasi coram interrogabat,' and even as late as the 7th cent. the saintly Eligius preaches among the Franks : 'Nullus dominos solem et lunam vocet neque per eos iuret.' A deified sun is mentioned in the O.N. *Sól* and in the second Merseburg magic formula : *Sinthgunt Sunna era suister*. The history of the Teutonic names of the days of the week points to the same fact. If the analogy of the days of *Ziu*, *Wodan*, *Donar*, and *Freia* (A.S. *tîwesdæg*, *wôdnesdæg*, *þunresdæg*, *frîgedæg*) in itself as well as O.H.G. *sunnûntag* and *mânatag* (=Lat. *dies Solis* and *dies Lunæ*, where Sol and Luna were regarded as highly sacred divinities, at least by the Romans, who brought these days of the week to Germany) makes probable the existence of Teutonic gods and goddesses, in the same way the hypothesis of the worship of a heathen goddess *Sunna* is strengthened by the general West Teutonic formation A.S. *sunnanæfen*=O.H.G. *sunnûn-âband*. For as this combination, whose original meaning (as in A.S.) was 'evening before Sunday,' must without doubt have been formed in pagan times, the conclusion may in all probability be drawn that there was a feast in honour of a heathen goddess *Sunna*, the eve of which was called *sunnûn-âband* (but cf. R. Much, in *Mitteilungen der anthrop. Gesellschaft in Wien*, xxxviii. p. 16). The name of *the dawn*, too, developed on Teutonic soil into an important goddess *Ôstara* (to be found in the O.H.G. *Ôstarûn*, *Ôstarmânod*), A.S. *Eostre* (*Eastormonaþ*, cf. Bede, *de Temporum ratione*, c. 13)=Skr. *usrâ*, Lith. *auszrà*, only with the difference that here the original goddess of the morning has become a goddess of Spring (but cf. A.S. *êarendel*, 'morning-star,' 'morning-dawn'). The reason of this change is to be found in the fact that in pre-historic times special worship was paid to the goddess of the dawn at the beginning of the year (the spring), as is made probable by the ritual of the Indian *Ushas* (cf. Hillebrandt, *Vedische Mythologie*, Bonn, 1891–1902, ii. 26 ff. and L. v. Schröder, 'Lihgo' in the *Mitteilungen der anthrop. Gesell. in Wien*, xxxii.). On Italian soil the Sabine *ausel*, 'sol' (Varro, *de Ling. Lat.* v. 68 acc. to emendation), must be mentioned as derived from the root **aus-* which has just been referred to, whose priests were called *Auselii* (*Aurelia familia* ; cf. also the form found on Etruscan mirrors, *Usil Sol et Eos*). With regard to the divinities *Sol* and *Luna* themselves, it is doubtful whether or not they belonged to the oldest components of the pantheon (cf. Wissowa, *op. cit.* p. 261). Tradition decides in favour of the former view, although there are no traces of their worship either in the calendar of feasts or in the priestly regulations. But the same is also the case with other Roman divinities, *e.g. Minerva*, whose name (**Menes-ova*) is derived from a root (Gr. *μένος*, **μενεσ-ος*) which is entirely extinct in the Italian languages, and therefore must be very old. *Mêna* in the *Indigitamenta* is the special goddess of menstruation. In Greece the related divinities are Ἥλιος and Ἠώς, Μήνη and Σελήνη, although they continue for the most part to play a rôle in the mythology subordinate to that of the chief gods. Finally, the Rigveda also knows a sun-god (*Súrya*) and a moon-god (*Mâs*), who, however, in the same way withdraw into the background before other gods who are probably not creations of the Indian soil, as *e.g. Mitra* (Avestan and Old Pers. *Miθra*, New Pers. *mihr*, 'the sun'), *Varuṇa*, and the *Âdityas*, or they have been repressed by these (cf. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, pp. 185 ff., 194). The position of the female personification of the sun *Súryâ* is more important, owing to her relation to the *Aśvins* and her marriage with *Soma*, the moon-god of a later date, which we shall discuss further on. The same is true of the *Ushas*, so often celebrated in song (cf. above). For a Μήν (moon-god ?) of Asia Minor, see Kretschmer, *Einleitung*, p. 197 ff.

Along with sun and moon, we find in Herodotus and Cæsar fire (Skr. *agni*=Lat. *ignis*, Lith. *ugnìs*, Old Slav. *ognĭ*) mentioned as an object of worship According to primitive ideas it is born in heaven (cf. A. Kuhn, *Herabkunft des Feuers*, Berlin, 1859), and is carried to earth in the lightning-flash, which is accordingly called 'fire' in the most ancient times (cf. Schrader, *Reallexicon*, art. 'Feuer'). On Prusso-Lithuanian soil it was the object of a sumptuous worship. Here Jerome of Prague found 'gentem quæ sacrum colebat ignem eumque perpetuum appellabat ; sacerdotes templi materiam ne deficeret ministrabant.' The people called it *Ugnìs szwentà*, 'holy fire,' or *szwentà ponyke*, 'holy mistress.' On leaving the house of her parents (Prætorius, p. 82), the young wife said, 'Thou holy fire, who will guard thee ?' There was also a goddess of the hearth, *Aspelenie*, 'the one behind the hearth' (Lith. *pelėnė*), etc. We thus find in

'thunder'), both of which mean 'to beat.' He also seeks to connect with this the Skr. *parjánya*. If this is correct, then, there would lie in the Skr. *parjánya*, Slav. *perunŭ*, Lith. *perkúnas*, a primitive Aryan word for thunder with the fundamental significance of 'the beating one.'

the North the same perennial fire, fed by priests, as recurs in the South in the cult of the Roman *Vesta*, Greek *ἑστία*, Arcadian *Ϝιστία*, 'hearth,' 'hearth-fire.' There is absolutely no reason for deriving this Roman cult of Vesta from Greece, as Kretschmer has lately attempted to do in his *Einleitung* (p. 162 ff.). On the contrary, everything we know of this cult and its usages, as, *e.g.*, its place in the oldest calendars of feasts, the existence of appointed priestesses, the re-kindling of the extinguished flame by means of the rubbing together of pieces of wood, the carrying of the fire in a brazen instead of an iron sieve, the beating to death of the unchaste Vestal, the circular form of the temple of Vesta, etc. (cf. Schrader, *Reallexicon*, art. 'Herd'; Frazer, *Early History of the Kingship*, 209 f.; and Wissowa, *op. cit.*, p. 141 ff.), points to the remotest antiquity. If we add to this the fact that, according to Herodotus (iv. 59), among the Scythians Ἰστίη (Scyth. Ταβιτί, *i.e.* 'the warming one,' or 'heat'; Avesta *tap*, Skr. *tápati*, *tápayati*, *taptá*; New Pers. *tâbad*, *tafsad*; Lat. *tepesco*) was a most sacred, in fact the most highly honoured, goddess, it is beyond doubt that the worship of the single hearth-fire, as well as of the common perennial fire, belongs to the most ancient religious ideas and cults of the Aryans. The most exalted, however, of all the divinities which spring from the element of fire is the Vedic *Agni* (Lith. *ugnis*), the wise and great priest of mankind. The Greek Ἥφαιστος (probably derived from the kindling of the flame, cf. *ἁφαί*, 'kindling'), and the Latin *Volcanus*, in pre-historic times apparently the god of the fearful and devastating might of fire (from **volkâ*, 'fire'=Skr. *ulkâ*, 'firebrand'; cf. Kretschmer, p. 133), are more narrowly confined to their original sphere than the Vedic *Agni*. The beginning of a formation of a Teutonic god of fire may probably be found in the figure of the Old Norse *Völundr*, whose name, however, has not yet been sufficiently explained.

As the last of the great powers of the sky and of nature we have to mention *wind* and *water*. The former appears as a god in the Litu-Prussian *Wējo-patis*,* 'lord of the wind' (also *Wejpons* and *Wejdievs*) from the Lith. *wējis*, *wéjas*, 'wind.' The last of these words corresponds to the Vedic *Vâyu*, 'wind,' and 'god of the wind,' and to the Greek Αἴολος (**Fη-ιο-λο-ς*). The name *Vâta*, which is found in the Vedas together with *Vâyu* and also means 'wind,' 'wind-god,' is generally compared with the Teutonic *Wôdan-Ôðinn*; but the etymological connexion in this view is not free from difficulty. The worship of *water*, too, in the form of springs and rivers, is reported from all Aryan lands (for the Persians, see Herodotus i. 138: *σέβονται ποταμοὺς μάλιστα*; for the Germans, Agathias 28, 4: *ἱλάσκονται καὶ ῥεῖθρα ποταμῶν . . . καὶ τούτοις ὥσπερ ὅσια δρῶντες*). The same is true of the Greeks (cf. Preller, *Griech. Myth.* iv.[4], 146 ff.), among whom the rivers were called *διοτρεφεῖς* and *διιπετεῖς*, 'fed from heaven' and 'heaven-born.' Gods having their name from the watery element are the Latin *Neptûnus* (Umbr. *nepitu* '*inundatio*,' according to Bücheler, *Lex. Italicum*, Bonn, 1881, xvii., Av. *napta*, 'moist,' Νάσατ, a Persian spring, Νάπαρις, a Scythian river); the Greek Νηρεύς: *ναρός*, 'flowing,' 'moist'; the Indian *Apsaras*: *ap*-'water' (*apâm nápât*, 'the water-child'), etc.

These powers of nature which we have now enumerated, *i.e.* the sky (**dyêus*), together with the phenomena appearing in it or coming from it, 'the heavenly ones' (**deivôs*), must accordingly be designated as the *real kernel of the old Aryan religions*. The way in which around this original kernel new layers of divine beings were ever added among the separate peoples will be indicated, at least in broad outline, at the close of the next section, although, strictly speaking, it does not belong to this discussion.

2. The oldest names of the 'heavenly ones.'—Aryan archæology, in the course of its historical development, has been gradually coming to the conclusion that, in the vocabulary of the original Aryan language, real names of gods cannot be proved. The only thing that can be proved, as follows clearly from the indications given above, is that there were appellative but perfectly transparent designations of the sky and the natural phenomena proceeding from it. The fact that they were worshipped in primeval times follows from their being all united in the word **deivos*, and from the numerous historical divinities which have grown out of them. The reason for this phenomenon lies in the simple fact that in primitive Aryan times there were as yet no real gods in the later sense of the term, viz., no personal gods whose names could have been inherited. In *dyâus*—Ζεύς—*Juppiter*—*Ziu*, in *agni*—*ignis*—*ugnis*—*ogni*, in *donar*—*torann*, etc., people worshipped in primitive times the mysterious power, the part of the infinite, the divine *anima*, which manifested itself to mankind in the phenomena of the sky, of fire, thunder, etc., but not as yet a god who was regarded as a person or who exerted influence outside of his own sphere. They were 'special gods' set, so to say, on a high pedestal of worship. That this was the oldest belief of the Aryans regarding their gods has already been clearly emphasized by the present writer in his book, *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*[2], p. 600 (1890). It is the merit of H. Usener, in his frequently mentioned book *Götternamen* (p. 277), to have recognized that such a worship of gods is *actually* borne witness to in extensive parts of Europe.

Thus Herodotus reports (ii. 52) of the Pelasgi, 'the ancients,' a name which, as the present writer believes, included all that was known or supposed to be known regarding the pre-historic inhabitants of Greece: *ἔθνον δὲ πάντα πρότερον οἱ Πελασγοὶ θεοῖσι ἐπευχόμενοι ὡς ἐγὼ ἐν Δωδώνῃ* (the oldest place of worship in Greece) *οἰδὰ ἀκούσας, ἐπωνυμίην δὲ οὐδ' οὔνομα ἐποιεῦντο οὐδενὶ αὐτῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἀκηκόεσάν κω.*

Thus they possessed gods and worshipped them, but as yet had given them no epithets and no names. The ancients, too, had obviously meant the same thing when they designated certain peoples as *ἄθεοι*, 'without gods.'

Theophrastus knew such a people in the Thracian Thôl of Mt. Athos, and in the same sense Strabo, iii. p. 164, reports: *ἔνιοι δὲ τοὺς Καλλαϊκοὺς ἀθέους φασί, τοὺς δὲ Κελτίβηρας καὶ τοὺς προσβόρρους τῶν ὁμόρων αὐτοῖς ἀνωνύμῳ τινὶ θεῷ* [*θύειν*] *ταῖς πανσελήνοις νύκτωρ πρὸ τῶν πυλῶν, πανοικίους τε χορεύειν καὶ πανυχίζειν.*

The gods of the Aryans were also 'nameless.' They sacrificed to the sky, the sun, the moon, the dawn, fire, wind, and water; but the names indicating these powers still coincided perfectly with the respective designations. A Greek who had listened to their worship would, under the impression of the lively figures in his Olympus, have called them also *ἄθεοι*.

The further development in the formation of gods among the Aryans was now mainly directed towards the *creation of personal gods* and *true proper names* for them. This process was called forth almost spontaneously in the course of the history of culture. History produces personalities, and, as happens on the earth, separate individuals come to the front as kings or nobles and grasp power and riches for themselves, in the same way an attempt was made to invest some of the gods with an individual and personal character. All the 'special

* The Lithuanian names of gods ending in *-patis* (cf. also *Dimstipatis*: *dimstis*, 'house,' 'court,' *Laukpatis* 'lord of the fields,' *Raugupatis*, 'lord of the leaven') are regarded by the author of the present article, in opposition to Usener-Solmsen, p. 115, as very old, seeing that the Lith. *pâts*, 'husband,' has preserved the old meaning 'lord,' 'master,' only in one case besides these names of gods, viz., in the old compound word *wíẽszpatis*, 'God,' lit. 'lord of the tribe.'

gods' had the capacity of annexing the sphere of activity of others. In the case of some deities the powers of various other gods were united. Then we have the additional fact that hundreds of new aspects and tasks of material culture, as of law and custom, require a new heavenly lord and protector, while the significance of the natural powers begins to pale, the more mankind gets raised above them.

In addition to this, there is no Aryan territory where *influences from without* have not made themselves felt. As far as India is concerned, Oldenberg (*Die Religion des Veda*, p. 194) is convinced that the great figures connected with light, which are sharply distinguished from the rest of the Vedic pantheon, *Mitra*, *Varuṇa*, and the *Âdityas* (according to him, sun, moon, and planets), had been borrowed, as early as the Indo-Iranian period, from the Semites or the Sumerians, or that they had received their astronomical character from them. Herodotus himself relates, in the passage referred to above, that the Pelasgi received the names of their originally nameless gods from the Egyptians, and that they afterwards handed on these names to the Hellenes. In any case there cannot be the slightest doubt that the personal characterization of the Greek deities followed the Oriental pattern to a large extent. The Persians, too, according to Herodotus (i. 131), had learned from the Assyrians and the Arabs to sacrifice to a personal deity, Οὐρανίη, along with their old nameless gods. Nor can we fail to recognize how the colourless forms of the old Roman gods were, during the course of Hellenic influence, clothed with Greek flesh and blood. The relation of the ancient Teutons to the Romans must be regarded in the same way. If we take the deities mentioned by Cæsar (obviously only as instances), sun, moon, and fire, and add to these the thunder (*Donar*), the sky (*Ziu*), and the wind (*Wodan* [?]), these being then regarded in their originally purely appellative meaning, we can find absolutely nothing in this list of old Teutonic gods which is in the least striking or unusual. Tacitus, 150 years later, mentions (*Germania*, ch. 9) as Teutonic gods Hercules, Mars, and Mercury; and these possess, at least according to his report, personal characteristics. But these 150 years were at the same time an epoch of intimate contact between Teutonic barbarism and Græco-Roman culture; and its definitely stamped divine figures, in the form which would be mediated to the north by traders and soldiers, must have tended to re-mould the conceptions of the special gods of the Teutonic nature-worship. If then, in addition to all this, we call up before our minds how the ever-increasing influence exerted by the priestly castes (cf. below, 4 *b*) and the beginnings of poetry and plastic art vied with each other in selecting individual deities from the ὅμιλος τῶν θεῶν, and in working up and embellishing the forms of their favourites, we shall have pretty well exhausted the conditions which brought about the gradual development of personal gods.

But however clear this development seems to be when we consider it in broad outline, it is nevertheless extremely difficult to fix beyond question the actual process of growth of the separate gods. For, at the point where the written records among the various Aryan tribes begin, these gods stand for the most part completed and finished before us, and in order to determine the point of departure in their development we are thus *almost exclusively dependent on the interpretation of their names*. It must, however, be said that the etymological explanation of the Aryan names of the gods unfortunately forms one of the most obscure chapters of comparative philology, and the only great step of progress that has been made here lies in the recognition of the fact that we know only a very little for certain. But even if we were successful in fixing the origin of a name of a god, and with it the first sphere of his activity, the 'cell of his nature,' still only more or less credible conjectures would be possible as to the lengthy and intricate pathway which led from this point to the personality of the god that we find in history. The phenomena of the sky, of which we have spoken above, are the most natural sources for personal gods. As soon as Ζεύς (**dyĕus*) began on Grecian soil to denote not only the brilliant sky of day, but also the cloud-girt sky of the thunderstorm, with reference to the divine *anima* which was thought of as in both, from that moment the point of commencement was given for the formation of a personal god, which now led in continuous development, through the assumption of ever new elements in the life of nature and of man, to the immortal figure of the father of gods and men which we find in Homer. But it is worthy of note that in the Epic the number of epithets describing the relations of the god to the order of the world and of mankind (*e.g.* μητίετα, ξένιος in the *Iliad*) is extremely small compared with the crowd of attributes referring to natural phenomena (cf. above, p. 34). Corresponding to this, *Agni* in India is originally nothing else than the divine *anima* of fire. But it enters into the realm of personal gods as soon as man requires it, not only to give light and warmth or to dispel evil spirits by its heat, but also, as is already done in the Rigveda, to supply the blessing of children and to promote domestic prosperity.

The Greek Zeus and the Indian Agni are thus real 'heavenly ones,' true *dii*. Then there are joined to these, from the most varied spheres of nature and culture, countless other special gods, who raise themselves in ways similar to these to the position and dignity of personal deities. We shall illustrate this by a few examples from the history of the Greek, Roman, and Teutonic religions.

From the first of these let us take the figures of *Apollo* and *Hermes*. Among the very numerous interpretations that have been proposed for these divine names there are two which, without forcing, satisfy all the demands of phonetics and the science of word-formation; both of them originate from Carl Robert, the editor of Preller's *Mythologie*. According to them, Ἀπόλλων, Ἀπέλλων (ἀπέλλα, 'fold') is 'he of the fold' (cf. *e.g.* κίβδων, 'miner': κίβδη, 'dross'; Ἀγάθων : ἀγαθός; Φίλων : φίλος, K. Brugmann, *Grundriss der vergl. Gram.* ii.[2] 1, Strassburg, 1906, 300); and Ἑρμείας, Ἑρμῆς (ἕρμα, ἕρμακες, 'stone,' 'stone-heaps'), is 'he of the stone-heap.'

Divine names which designate the god appellatively as standing in a characteristic relation to a definite conception are exceedingly numerous in all Aryan languages, as is seen. *e.g.*, in Lith. *Medeinis*, 'he of the wood' (Lith. *mẽdis*); *Puszaitis*, 'he of the pine tree' (Lith. *puszis*); *Eratinis*, 'he that belongs to the lambs' (Lith. *éras*); Lat. *Silvanus*, *Pomona*, *Mellona*, *Bubona*, *Minerva* from **Menesova* ('she who has to do with the **menos* = Gr. *μένος*'), Old Gall. *Braciaca* (*brace*), 'he of the malt'; Phryg. *Sabazios* = Dionysus (Illyr. *sabaia*, 'beer'), 'he of the beer' (cf. Schrader, *Reallexicon*, p. 89); and in numerous other instances. In the Teutonic languages the numerous formations in *-ana*—*Tanfana*, *Hludana*, *Saxanus*, *Magusanus*, etc.—may belong to this class. Ἀπέλλων is accordingly, in the first instance, a 'special god' of the cattle-pen,* then a god of cattle-rearing in general, in which character, as is well known, he already appears in Homer (*Il.* ii. 766, xxi. 448 ff.), and which is clearly referred to in the ancient epithets Λύκιος, 'he who frightens away the wolves from the folds,' Καρνεῖος : κάρνος, 'flock' (cf. Lith. *Eratinis*), and Νόμιος : νόμος, 'pasture' (cf. Lith. *Ganỹklos dẽwas* : *ganyklà*, 'pasture'), which had all, without doubt, originally designated independent gods. The figure of Hermes, however, takes us back to the primitive epoch of an ancient stone-worship (cf. below, 4 *c*). As late as the year 1583 the Jesuit Rostowski was able to report the following from Lithuania (cf. A. Brückner, *Archiv für slav. Phil.* ix. 33): 'Antiquæ colonis superstitiones . . . alibi Akmo (Lith. *aszmũ*, 'stone'), saxum grandius'; and further: 'Saxa pro diis culta (quæ illi lingua

* The Lithuanian god *Sutvaras* (cf. above, p. 31), 'the god of cattle,' would exactly correspond, if it is correct to connect his name with the Lith. *tvorà*, 'fence.'

patria Atmeschenes Viete, adiectorum scilicet loca [really adiciendi locus; Lett. *atmeschanas wieta*], in quæ ciborum analecta pro libamine coniectabant; quibus cæsorum animantium cruorem aspergebant quæque contingere ipsis fas esset victimariis), sex inquam eiusmodi aræ circum oppida, in primis Rositenum, Duneburgum, Russonum, eversæ coetusque sacrificantium dissipati.' Prætorius too relates (p. 21): 'There was, several years ago, a somewhat higher stone not far from Gumbinnen or Bisserkeim, in a pine grove, which was regarded as sacred, and on which the surrounding people offered money, clothes, and the like.' Similar phenomena occur in Greece. Even in the *Odyssey*, xvi. 471, we find the place name Ἑρμαιος λόφος:

τὸ γὰρ ἴδον ὀφθαλμοῖσιν.
ἤδη ὑπὲρ πόλιος ὅθι θ' Ἑρμαιος λόφος ἔστιν,

and the scholiast remarks on this passage: 'The heap of stones on the roadside is called *ἑρμαῖον*. Hermes first cleared the roads, and where he had cleared them he set a stone for a mark on the roadside. Ἑρμαιος λόφος, however, is the same as finger-post, for the Roman milestones were called Ἑρμαιοι λόφοι. Hence it is the custom of people to erect cairns of stones in honour of Hermes, because he is the guide and protector of travellers, and to throw ever more stones on these cairns, which they call Ἑρμαιοι λόφοι.' Cf. also *ἕρμακας λίθους σεσωρευμένους εἰς τιμὴν τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ* (Schol. *Nik. Ther.* 150). Eatables, too, such as dried figs, etc., were laid down on these cairns of Hermes (*ἕρμαιον*), professedly for the passing travellers, but in reality as a sacrifice to the god. In both racial territories we therefore find divinely worshipped stones or cairns, which were added to by the passers-by. The divine *anima*, which exercised sway in them, was called among the Greeks, 'he of the cairn of stones,' Ἑρμείας.

How these primitive gods, 'he of the cattle-pen' and 'he of the cairn of stones,' gradually grew into the powerful and many-sided personalities of the Greek Olympus will never, as has been mentioned above, be completely ascertained in detail. Before all else his early combination with Φοῖβος, 'the shining one,' a sun-deity, may have been of significance for Apollo. The sun-god Phœbus opened the ἀπέλλαι, 'the cattle-pens,' in the morning and drove the cattle to the pasture. Hermes was raised from insignificance by the circumstance that these cairns of stones were more and more transformed into 'direction posts,' and the god with artistically formed head and extended penis became the protector of the ever growing traffic, and the messenger of gods and men. In any case, at the end of their development both of them attained to the same elevation as Zeus, and were regarded as his sons.

On Roman soil let us recall once more the figure of *Janus*, which is remarkable in many ways. As *Terminus* was the 'god of the boundary stone,' *Fons* the 'god of the spring,' *Vesta* the 'goddess of the hearth,' and Lith. *Szullinnis* (*szulinỹs*) the 'god of the well,' in the same way the Latin *Janus* was originally nothing else than the 'god of the doors' (so also Kretschmer, *op. cit.* p. 161), however difficult it may be for the modern mind to conceive what religious emotion could be aroused by looking at doors and gates. Probably it was the thought of the two-sidedness of the door, the fact that it looked inwards and outwards at the same time (*Janus Geminus, Janus bifrons*), and that it both shut and opened (*Clusius, Patulcius* in the *Carmen Saliorum*), that gave occasion to the first conception of the god. But even in Rome of the earliest date the god had his own priest (*Rex sacrorum*) and his own festival (*Agonalia*), and higher thoughts, chiefly the idea that he was the beginning of everything—especially of the year (Januarius)—must have become connected with his worship and have made him into the *divom deus* or the *principium deorum* (cf. Wissowa, p. 91 ff.). In the same way as a material and originally highly prosaic conception was here elevated to the rank of the *dii*, we find in Rome a great fondness, corresponding to the abstract-thinking spirit of the Romans, for raising even abstract ideas into deities.

This is seen, *e.g.*, in *Ceres* (**Keros*, 'growth': *cresco* (cf. Osthoff, *Parerga*, i. 1), *Venus** (**venos* = Skr. *vánas* 'desire,' 'pleasantness'), *Sêia* ('sowing' = Lith. *sėjà*, 'seed-time'), *Robigus* ('failure of crops'), etc.

* In Oscan and Pælignian the goddess *Herentas* corresponds to her. The name is connected with Osc.-Umbr. *her-*, *herí-βούλεσθαι*, Goth. *gaírnjan*, 'to desire,' etc., and accordingly means 'desire.'

In the same way among the Teutons all sorts of 'special gods' were added from all sides to the ancient *tîvar* = *dii* (*Sol, Luna, Volcanus, Donar, Ziu, Wôdan*). As examples we may take the gods *Saxnôt* and *Requalivahanus*, which can be interpreted with comparative certainty. When bronze swords were introduced from the south-east into Europe, and thereby a new and formidable weapon was put into men's hands, they could not help seeing in this the activity of a god. As a matter of fact, evidences of such a *sword-cult* can be produced from extensive parts of Europe, from the Scythians, Alans, Quads, and other peoples (cf. J. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*[3], i. 185). This god who was present in the sword was called by the Saxons *Saxnôt*, *i.e.* 'sword-bearer,' 'companion of the sword,' and we can easily understand how he could, among a warlike people, acquire so great importance that in the baptismal vow he was placed on an equal footing with *Thunar* and *Wôdan* (Braune, *Althochdeutsches Lesebuch*[3], Halle, 1888, p. 159). We have seen above how a Celtic tribe, which had remained behind, worshipped a 'nameless god' by dancing in families before the gates on the nights of the full moon (above, p. 35[b]). May we not presuppose a similar custom among the neighbouring Teutons as well, and is it not likely that the god, when any one wished to indicate him in any way, was called 'he of the darkness' (Goth. *riqis* = Gr. *ἔρεβος*)—an interpretation of the *Requalivahanus* mentioned by the Romans, which the Germanists, by way of exception, unanimously accept? Besides, he was undoubtedly an important deity at the time when, according to a Roman inscription, Qu. Aprianus offered sacrifices and made vows to him on the banks of the Rhine.

3. The forms of manifestation of the 'heavenly ones,' and their interpretation in riddle and myth.—It is a characteristic quality of most primitive religions that in them the distinction between man and animal is entirely disregarded. 'The sense of an absolute psychical distinction between man and beast, so prevalent in the civilized world, is hardly to be found among the lower races. Men, to whom the cries of beasts and birds seem like human language, and their actions guided as it were by human thought, logically enough allow the existence of souls to beasts, birds, and reptiles, as to men. The lower psychology cannot but recognize in beasts the very characteristics which it attributes to the human soul, namely, the phenomena of life and death, will and judgment, and the phantom seen in vision or in dream' (Tylor, *Primitive Culture*[3], i. 469). There may also have been such an epoch in the Aryan religions, in which it seemed quite natural to think of the flame racing over the fields as a horse, or the thunder in the storm-cloud as a bellowing steer, and numerous direct and indirect evidences point to a time in which the gods were actually conceived of as animals, or at least as beings partaking partly of human partly of merely animal qualities. Even as late as the Vedas (cf. Oldenberg, *op. cit.* p. 68 ff.) the lower deities at least are by preference thought of as being in the form of animals. But the higher gods also are repeatedly characterized as the children of animals, *e.g.* the *Aśvins* as children of the mare. The different animals, too, which were sacred to the gods, such as the eagle of Indra, or the animals under whose figure and name the gods were honoured, the horse of Agni, the steer of Indra, etc., are unmistakable signs of these once prevalent ideas. The oldest condition of affairs in Greece is summarized by E. Meyer (*Geschichte des Altertums*, ii. 98) in the following way: 'The view is almost still more wide-spread that the gods reveal themselves in the form of animals.' All through Greece a wolf-god was worshipped, which

in the Peloponnesus has become Zeus, while the wolf is otherwise regarded as a manifestation of Apollo (but cf. above, p. 36). Artemis, in Attica and Arcadia, where she was honoured as the mother of the tribe, is regarded as a she-bear; in other cases she was thought of as a hind (cf. Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States*, ii. 435). In Argos, Hera βοῶπις was worshipped as a cow that was fertilized by Zeus in the form of a bull. In the countless rough figures of stone and clay, in human and animal form, which are found in all the layers of the Trojan and Ægean civilization, we may in all probability recognize the representations of the gods belonging to this epoch of Greece; not a few of them may have been house fetishes. In Italy, too, sacred animals (woodpecker, wolf, and ploughing ox) were assigned to different gods, particularly Mars. But the fact that the gods were here, too, conceived of as animals is very strongly supported by the tradition that there was carried in front of the divisions of the army, marching into the field, not only the eagle, as at a later date, but other figures of animals as well, wolves, minotaurs, horses, and boars (Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* x. 16: 'Romanis eam aquilam legionibus C. Marius in secundo consulatu suo proprie dicavit. Erat et antea prima cum quattuor aliis: *lupi, minotauri, equi aprique* singulos ordines anteibant'). It is the same custom to which Tacitus bears witness among the Teutons (*Germania*, ch. 7): 'Effigiesque et signa quædam detracta lucis in prœlium ferunt,' since it cannot be doubted that, among the *effigies*, the sacred animals of the gods, the snake and wolf of Wodan, the bear and he-goat of Donar, the ram of Ziu, and the boar (cf. A.S. *eoforcumbol*, 'sign of the boar') of Freyr are to be understood (cf. Tacitus, *Hist.* iv. 22: 'inde depromptæ silvis lucisque *ferarum imagines*'). Thus the oldest banners are seen to be animal fetishes, under whose visible protection the army marched into battle.

Along with the conception of the gods as animals, there is to be found, from the very beginning, the conception of them as existing in human form. In course of time this latter idea came more and more into prominence. It may seem that this is a contradiction of our earlier assertions, according to which the appearance of personal gods among the Aryan peoples is comparatively late. This is, however, not the case. We must not consider personification and the formation of personal gods as identical, no matter how much the latter presupposes the former. The characteristic mark of a *personal god* is that he is regarded as exercising influence outside of the sphere to which he owes his conceptual origin and his name. *Personification*, however, means, at first, simply the substitution of a human figure for the divine *anima* present in the phenomenon. This need for personification is all the greater the lower down we go in the stages of civilization. If the White Russian peasant be asked even to-day about his *Perunŭ*, whose fundamental appellative meaning is still quite clear to him (cf. above, p. 33), he says: 'He is a tall, broad-shouldered fellow, with black hair, black eyes, and a yellow beard. In his right hand he has a bow, in the left a quiver with arrows. He drives on the heavens in a chariot and discharges fiery arrows' (cf. Dahl, *Erklärendes Wörterbuch der lebenden grossrussischen Sprache*[2], St. Petersburg, 1880–82, iii. 104). Even quite impersonal conceptions of Greek and Roman civilization are, on their passing over into the Slavonic world, taken possession of by this primitive passion for personification. Thus the Lat. *calendæ* (καλάνδαι), 'New Year,' has led on Russian soil to a divine being, personifying the whole time between Christmas and Epiphany. In the neighbourhood of Moscow, even at the present day it is customary on Christmas eve to lead a maiden called *Koljada*, dressed in white, through the streets, and to sing, 'On Christmas eve was Koljada born, beyond the rapid river,' etc. In the same song, in close connexion with the worship of this Koljada, a pagan sacrifice of a kid is mentioned (cf. Glazunov, *Russian Folksongs* [Russ.], St. Petersburg, 1894, p. 1). We may also call to mind the supernatural *rusalki*, from Lat. *rosalia* (ῥοσάλια), 'festival of roses,' already mentioned above (p. 26).

Thus we may assume that there was, even in primitive times, an active tendency to conceive the divine in human form; and if Indra in the Rigveda and Thor in Northern mythology are described as giants with tawny or red beards, there is nothing against discovering there a primitive Aryan idea common to the Indians and the Teutons. This tendency, too, suggests an explanation of the fact that in certain branches of the Indo-Germanic language the attribute 'father' must have been, even in pre-historic times, added to the primitive Aryan **dyêus*, 'sky' (Skr. *Dyâus pitâ*, Gr. Ζεὺς πατήρ; cf. also in Hesych. Δειπάτυρος· θεὸς παρὰ Τυμφαίοις, Lat. *Juppiter*), as there were also a Scythian Ζεὺς Πατάϊος and a Bithynian Ζεὺς Πάπας, Παππῶος (Kretschmer, *op. cit.* p. 241 f.). It is doubtful, however, whether the word 'father' indicates a position of honour of **dyêus* compared to the other 'heavenly ones,' as seems more likely to the present writer, or expresses the relation of the god to the community worshipping him, as is the case in Italy, where *pater* (or *mater*) is applied to almost all the gods (or goddesses) of the oldest group.

A further consequence of this personification of the deity is to be found in the circumstance that the god was supplied with a wife, whose designation was most simply and originally obtained by forming the feminine of the male deity (Skr. *Agnâyî*: *Agni*; Gr. Διϝώνη: Ζεύς, Διός; Lat. *Juno*, **Jovino*: *Juppiter*, *Jovis*). The idea, too, that the heaven and the earth constitute a pair united in marriage is very old. In the Rigveda the 'mother,' *Pṛthivî* (=A.S. *folde*, 'earth'), appears along with the 'father,' *Dyâus*. The report of Herodotus regarding the Scythians (νομίζοντες τὴν Γῆν τοῦ Διὸς εἶναι γυναῖκα) has already been mentioned. Among the Thracians the lordly Διόνυσος (probably a Thracian word) is sprung from the marriage of the god of heaven with the earth-goddess Σεμέλη (cf. the Lithuanian *Zémyna*: Lith. *žẽmė*, Old Slav. *zemlja*, 'earth'). Deeply rooted in the mind of the Russian peasantry is the belief in the love of Jarilo, the god of light, to the *matì syra zemlja*, 'the cold Mother Earth,' just as we find in an Anglo-Saxon rural verse: '*Hal wes þu, folde, fira moder, beo þu growende on godes fæþme*,' 'Hail to thee, O Earth, Mother of men! Be thou fruitful in God's embrace.'* It is doubtful, however, if the ἱερὸς γάμος of Zeus with Ἥρη, who can scarcely be shown to be a goddess of the earth, is related to the same circle of ideas (cf. Kretschmer, *Einleitung*, p. 90 f.; on the other side, Frazer, *GB*[2] i. 228, and Farnell, *Cults of the Gr. States*, i. 180 ff.). Finally, we have to mention that the distinction of grammatical gender, which was already perfected in the primitive language, formed the basis on which, on the one hand, male (*e.g. Dyâus* and *Agni*) and, on the other hand, female deities (*e.g. Ushas, Eostra*) could be developed. In short, in many places there are to be found, even in primitive times, the first beginnings of the formation of those divine families whose real evolution belongs entirely to the province of the respective separate peoples.

The conception of the oldest gods now as animals now as men, which we have so far discussed, is

* We may look upon the rôle played by *Tellus* at Roman marriages as a reminiscence of the same ideas. Cf. Servius, iv. 166: 'Quidam sane etiam Tellurem præsesse nuptiis tradunt; nam et in auspiciis nuptiarum invocatur; cui etiam virgines, vel cum ire ad domum mariti cœperint, vel iam ibi positæ, diversis nominibus vel ritu sacrificant.'

however, in reality only the outcome of a general longing, immanent in mankind, to know and understand the world, a longing which in primitive stages of culture expresses itself in two other phenomena as well—in *riddle* and in *myth*. In discussing these we may commence, as we have done so frequently, with the Litu-Slavic conditions, where both ideas appear with special purity and originality. It is difficult to overestimate the significance of the riddle in the literature of the Slavonic peoples (cf. Krek, *Einleitung in die slavische Literatur gesch.*[2], p. 810 ff.; and, for the value of riddles in the interpretation of myths, Max Müller, *Contributions to the Science of Mythology*, 1897, i. 80 ff., and art. RIDDLE). They are in the real sense of the word *Welträtsel* ('riddles of the universe'), for their subject is, if not exclusively, at least in great measure, the universe, with its thousand-and-one phenomena, their meaning and illustration.

'Peas are scattered on a hundred paths; no one will gather them up—*ni cart, ni carica, ni krásnaja dévica*' (*the stars*). 'The black cow has gored all men to death; the white cow has brought them to life again' (*day and night*). 'Without hands, without feet, he creeps on the mountains' (*the wind*). 'In Spring he makes glad; in Summer, cool; in Autumn, satisfied; in Winter, warm' (*the tree*). 'There stands an oak. On the oak there are 12 nests; in each nest there are 4 blue-bonnets; each blue-bonnet has 14 eggs—7 white and 7 black' (*the year, the month, weeks, days and nights*).

It is the same fundamental trait as appears in these few Russian examples (cf. Sadovnikow, *The Riddles of the Russian People* [Russ.], Petersburg, 1875), viz. the tendency to explain the great cosmic processes, the course of the sun, the division of the year, etc., that comes most clearly to the front in the riddle-making of related peoples.

Thus in ancient India (cf. Haug, 'Vedische Rätselfragen und Rätselsprüche,' in *Sitzungsberichte der Münchner Ak. d. W.*, phil.-hist. Kl. 1875, p. 457 ff.) the priests even in Vedic times, on occasions of great sacrificial gatherings, proposed for each other and for the offerer riddles of the following kind. The Hotar asks, *e.g.*, 'Who travels alone?' 'Who will be born again?' 'What is the preventive against snow?' 'What is the great scattering?' and the Adhvaryu answers: 'The sun travels alone,' 'The moon will be born again,' 'Fire is the preventive against snow,' 'The earth is the great scattering.' Quite similar series of riddles occur on Teutonic soil (cf. Wilmanns' *ZDA* xx. 252) in the Edda and the poem of Traugemund ('What is whiter than snow? What is fleeter than the roe? What is higher than the mountain? What is darker than the night?'). In Greece one need only refer to the very ancient riddle of the fire that swallows up the father and mother, occurring in the *Marriage of Keyx*, ascribed to Hesiod. It makes quite a Vedic impression, seeing that it is a prevalent idea in the Rigveda that Agni, the son of the two pieces of wood by the rubbing of which he is produced, swallows up his father and mother at once after his birth.

The *myth* is devoted to the satisfaction of the same primitive longing as the riddle. It is quite incorrect (cf. above, p. 12) to suppose that it is the exclusive possession of higher social classes or the product of priestly acuteness, however much these may have influenced its forms as presented to us in history. In its origin it is undoubtedly nothing else than the naïve and popular expression of the wish to understand and comprehend the universe, as can with especial clearness be recognized on Aryan soil in the rich but simple and transparent mythical formations of the Lithuanian and Lettic peoples. These, in any case, prove that, even at the most primitive stage of religious ideas, a myth can be developed to explain processes of nature puzzling to the people. In the first place, this formation of myths is concerned with the phenomena of the sun, moon, and stars (cf. Mannhardt, 'Die lettischen Sonnenmythen' in *ZE* vii. 73, 209, 281, and Usener-Solmsen, *Götternamen*, p. 85 ff.).

Teljawelik is the smith that forged the sun. The people worship the sun and an iron hammer of special size. Once upon a time the sun was invisible for several months, because a very mighty king had closed him up in a strong tower. Then the figures of the Zodiac brought him help with the iron hammer. The tired and dusty sun is placed in a bath by the mother of Perkúnas, and then is dismissed on the following day washed and shining. Sun and moon are described in various *Dainas* as husband and wife, and, indeed, as unfaithful in that relation. The moon separates herself from the sun, falls in love with the morning star (*Auszrinė*), and is cut in two by the sword of Perkúnas. The stars are considered as daughters of the sun, and so on.

Such stories as these regarding the heavenly beings, their deeds, and their relations to one another, were without doubt related even in primitive Aryan times; and it is to-day, in spite of all opposing scepticism, the right and the task of comparative mythology to discover cycles of myths which go back to such pre-historic interpretations of nature, as has been done by A. Kuhn and Max Müller. Three of these cycles of myths seem to the present writer to have been fixed beyond question.* These refer (1) to the relation of sun, moon, morning and evening stars, (2) to the origin of the thunderstorm, and (3) to the source of fire. It must suffice at this point to characterize them in the briefest possible way.

(1) Sun and moon have concluded a marriage with each other, as is related in the Lithuanian and Lettic poems, and more fully in a celebrated hymn of the Rigveda (x. 85). The morning and evening stars stand to these two heavenly bodies in a relation described in different ways. In a Lithuanian poem, as we saw above, the moon separates itself from the sun in order to run after the morning star. In the Lettic poems the most usual conception is that the 'sons of the god' (*dēwa deli, dēwo sunelei*), among whom the two stars already mentioned are undoubtedly to be understood, are described as suitors for the favour of 'the daughter of the sun,' *i.e.* most likely the sun itself, just as in India the two *Aśvins*, 'the lords of the horses' (cf. Skr. *aśva*, 'horse'), are regarded as the lovers of *Sūryā* or *Sūryasya Duhitā*, 'the daughter of the sun.' A pre-ethnic connexion of the Indian *Aśvins* with the Lettic 'sons of the god' seems, therefore, beyond the range of doubt (the view of Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, p. 212), particularly when we remember that in the Lettic poems the morning and evening stars are also called the 'ponies' of the moon and the 'sons of the god' are thought of as riders on grey horses. Further, the equestrian Greek Διόσκουροι (Castor and Pollux), the brothers of Helena ('Ελένη : σέλη, * *sveltā*, 'heat of the sun') correspond to the Lettic *dēwa deli*, 'sons of the god.' Finally, the Lettic 'sons of the god' are very often described as servants and workmen of the sun and the moon. Seeing now that we know from Lasicius, *de Diis Samagitarum*, p. 47, about a Lithuanian god *Algis*, '*angelus summorum deorum*,' whose name (cf. Lith. *alga*, 'reward') literally means 'hired labourer,' and this Lith. *Algis* is etymologically the same as the name of the Teutonic deity *Alcis* who corresponded to Castor and Pollux (Tacitus, *Germania*, ch. 43: Apud Nahanarvalos antiquæ religionis lucus ostenditur; præsidet sacerdos muliebri ornatu, sed deos interpretatione Romana Castorem Pollucemque memorant; ea vis numini, nomen *Alcis* [**Alki*, dual ?]; nulla simulacra, nullum peregrinæ superstitionis vestigium; ut fratres tamen, ut iuvenes venerantur)—since this is so, it is impossible to deny that these forms also belong to the cycle of the Lettic 'sons of the god,' the Indian *Aśvins*, and the Greek Dioscuri.†

(2) The second cycle of primitive Aryan myths referred to above, dealing with the explanation of the thunder and the thunder-shower, is presented in two different settings. According to the one, a heavenly being slays the dragon concealed in the cloud, whose water now flows over the earth (fight of *Indra* with *Vṛtra*, of *Tištrya* with *Apaoša* in the Avesta, of Donar with the wolf Fenris, of Apollo with the Python); according to the other, a god delivers from a monster the cows of the clouds, who are imprisoned in a mountain gorge (*Indra* and *Viśvarūpa*, Herakles and Geryones, Hercules and Cacus).

(3) Lastly, the myths dealing with the origin of fire are connected with the custom, preserved among the Indians, Greeks, Romans, Slavs, and Teutons, and partially among the Lithuanians (cf. Usener, *op. cit.* p. 87), of obtaining fire for sacred purposes by taking a stick of hard wood (oak), boring it into a plank or board of softer wood (lime tree), and turning it round and round till fire is produced by the friction. In this way, which may be compared with animal generation, fire is also produced in the cloud, whence it is brought to earth by a bird or a daring human being (Prometheus). A similar origin is enjoyed by the earthly fire-drink, the honey-mead (Skr. *mādhu* = Gr. *μέθυ*, etc.) which, when drunk by mortals, bestows upon

* In this connexion the present writer agrees with Winternitz, 'Was wissen wir von den Indogermanen?' (*Beilage zur Münchner AZ*, 1903, No. 258, p. 292). Only in one point does Winternitz seem to make a mistake, viz. in deducing from these myths the existence of personal gods, a view which rests on the confusion emphasized above (p. 38[a]) between personified natural phenomena and natural phenomena that have become personal gods.

† A. Brückner (*Archiv für slavische Philologie*, xxiii.) is wrong in finding in the author's contention that Lith. *Algis* = Ger. *Alcis* (*Realexicon*, p. 673), a contradiction of his opinion, of which Brückner himself approves, that as yet there were no Aryan names for the gods; for these names represent, not an Aryan god-name, but an Aryan appellative ('hired labourer') preserved by chance in the myth.

them immortality (Skr. *amṛta*, 'immortality,' 'draught of immortality' = Gr. ἀμβροσία, lit. 'immortality') as it is possessed by the heavenly beings (A. Kuhn, *Die Herabkunft des Feuers und des Göttertranks*, Berlin, 1859). The thought that the universe is a well-ordered whole, resting on fixed laws, is a long way in advance of these explanations, and where this thought meets us in earlier epochs, as in the Indo-Iranian conception of Skr. *ṛtá* = Av. *aša*, it points to foreign non-Aryan influences (cf. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, pp. 49, 195).

4. The worship.—In the foregoing sections we have dealt with the ideas of the Aryans regarding their gods and with their beliefs. We now go on to the consideration of the services which they devoted to them, *i.e.* their worship. This point, which has often been neglected by investigators, is also of the greatest importance for the development of the gods, for naturally it must have been along with and by means of the form of worship assigned to them that the fluid and indefinite figures came to assume more fixed and individual forms. We shall in this discussion have to deal with four phenomena connected with worship which we find in historic times: (*a*) sacrifice and prayer, (*b*) the priests, (*c*) the temples, (*d*) the feasts. We shall have to ask whether and how far these institutions go back into the primitive history of the Aryan peoples.

(*a*) Sacrifice and Prayer.—There was among the Aryans, just as among all other peoples, a more ancient way of bringing the supernatural within reach of the natural than sacrifice and prayer, namely, *magic*. Its forms appear so closely connected, even in historic times, with those of the cult, that it is often difficult, if not impossible, to draw a sharp line of distinction between the two conceptions. We may say, however, that magic is present in all those cases in which man imagines that he is able, by word or by deed, to make a spirit *directly* and immediately serviceable to himself. On the other hand, we can speak of an act of worship only where, by a sacrifice or a prayer, the otherwise free will of a deity is supposed to be more indirectly influenced and made favourable to mortal man. It thus depends on the *way of influencing* the deity, not on the intention connected with it, which is in both cases the same. He who lights a fire early in the morning in order thereby to facilitate the rising of the sun, or he who banishes with a text a demon of sickness into a stone or a plant, performs a *magical* act. He, however, who appeals to the heavenly powers by means of sacrifices and prayers in order that they may cause the sun to shine or make him well, engages in an *act of worship*.

Magic may be practised either by *an action* or by *words*, as can be clearly gathered from its terminology. The following series of terms is characteristic of the former method: Skr. *kṛtyā* 'action,' 'bewitching,' 'magic,' 'witch,' Lith. *kerus* 'magic,' *kerėti* 'to bewitch some one by the eye, etc.,' Old Slav. *čarŭ* 'magic'; Skr. *kṛṇóti* from *kar* 'he makes,' from which also Skr. *kárman* 'the sacrifice' is derived. In both cases, *i.e.* in magic and in sacrifice, a 'doing' κατ' ἐξοχήν, a ceremonial action is intended.

In by far the greatest number of cases, however, 'to charm' is the same as to 'speak' or 'sing,' as is seen in the Greek ἐπῳδός 'magician,' 'charmer,' ἐπῳδή 'magic formula': ἐπᾴδω 'I sing to it'; O.H.G. *galstar* 'magic song,' *galâri*, *galstarâri*, 'magician': *galan*, *bigalan*; Old Slav. *bajati* 'fabulari,' 'incantare,' 'mederi,' Serv. *bajati* 'to charm,' Old Slav. *balija* 'magician': Gr. φημί, Lat. *fâri*; Lith. *vařdyti* 'to conjure,' 'charm'; *vaĩdas* 'name,' and in many other examples (cf. Osthoff, 'Allerhand Zauber etymologisch beleuchtet,' in Bezzenberger's *Beiträge zur Kunde der indogerm. Sprachen*, xxiv. 109; and Schrader, *Reallexicon*, art. 'Zauber und Aberglaube'). Here also we have to do with a 'speaking' κατ' ἐξοχήν, a ceremonial, rhythmical speaking, in which *a priori* a definite magic power is latent.

Such magic acts or words occur frequently on the soil of the separate Aryan peoples, along with and mixed up with actions of worship in the proper sense of the term. In India he who wishes to possess deadly weapons sacrifices iron nails (cf. Oldenberg, *op. cit.* p. 369); in Greece he who wishes to conjure up an actual thunderstorm produces by the rolling of a waggon a noise similar to thunder (cf. O. Gruppe, *Griech. Mythol.* i. p. 820). Burchard of Worms tells of a custom prevalent in Germany (cf. J. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythol.*[5] i. 560), according to which he who wishes rain causes a naked girl to be led to the river and there sprinkled with water. In Lithuania, if the people wish rainy weather, they turn towards the sun and sprinkle themselves with water at the time of the morning prayer (cf. Prætorius, p. 33), etc. We may call special attention to another rain-charm of this kind, which by comparison with the Indian and the Greek usage is seen to be primitive. In Greece the phrase Ζεὺς ὕει is used for 'it rains,' which, when traced back to an older stage of the language, can only mean 'The father (heaven) presses grapes' (Skr. *sunṓmi* 'I press,' *sóma* 'the pressed,' 'the soma drink'). It is also customary to charm the rain by an offering of honey, where the rain which drops on the trees and branches is likened to honey. Exactly corresponding to these ideas we find in India the belief that by letting the soma, which itself is called a son of the rain-god Parjanya, drip through the strainer, rain is enticed to fall. Thus the very fact that the man 'presses' the juice on the earth, incites or rather compels the god in heaven to 'press,' *i.e.* to cause the rain to fall (cf. Windisch, *Festgruss an Roth*, p. 140; Oldenberg, *op. cit.* p. 459; O. Gruppe, *op. cit.* p. 819). The *magic formula* plays a still more important part in the religious conceptions of the ancient Aryans, and at the lower stage everything is secured by its means, for which at a higher stage man turns to the gods with prayers and sacrifices. By its means wounds and sicknesses are healed, by its means women in labour are delivered of the fruit of their body (cf. *Reallexicon*, artt. 'Arzt' and 'Hebamme'), by its means the heavenly powers are enticed to partake of the food offered to them (see below, p. 41), by its means a man curses himself in case of perjury (see below, II. 5), by its means the darkness of the future is penetrated (cf. below, III. 1), and so on.

But it cannot be doubted that from the wilderness of these primeval beliefs, which from the standpoint of a higher conception are called 'superstition,' *superstitio* (survival[?]), but which were originally 'faith' itself, a higher form of divine worship was developed among the Aryans even in pre-historic times, in which real, if exceedingly primitive, sacrificial rites were employed.

The history of the language points at once to this, for the expressions for 'sacrifice,' 'to sacrifice,' 'sacrificial animal,' in the separate Aryan languages, extend for the greater part beyond the realm of magic, and belong to a higher class of words, whose fundamental meaning we are wont to express in our language by the term 'holy.'

Cf. Gr. ἅγος 'worship,' 'sacrifice' = Skr. *yájas* 'worship': Skr. *yaj*, Av. *yaz* 'to sacrifice,' 'to worship by sacrifice' (ἄζομαι 'to worship with religious fear'); Goth. *hunsl*, Old Nor., A.S. *hûsl* 'sacrifice' = Lith. *szventas*, Old Slav. *svętŭ*, Av. *spenta* 'holy'; Volsc. *esaristrom*, Umb. *esunu* 'sacrifice' = Gr. ἱερός 'holy'; Lat. *victima* 'sacrificial victim' = Goth. *weihs* 'holy,' *weiha* 'priest,' *weihan* 'to sanctify'; O.H.G. *zëbar*, A.S. *tîfr*, Old Nor. *tafn* 'sacrificial victim' = Lat. *dapes* 'sacrificial meal,' etc.

We have the additional fact that, among all the Aryan peoples, Slavs and Lithuanians as well as Greeks and Indians, the existence of real sacrificial rites can be proved. It will be our task in the following section to give an account of these.

Among the Indians, Greeks, and Romans of historical times, when sacrifices were offered to the immortals, fire had to be kindled on the altar in order that the gifts might by its means reach the gods. Thus 'to sacrifice' in Greek (*θύω*, *θυσία*,

etc.; Lat. *fāmus* 'smoke') implies 'to cause to go up in smoke.' Quite another picture is offered, however, by the other Aryan peoples. To begin with, Herodotus (i. 132) tells of a much more simple and primitive kind of sacrifice in the case of the Persians, who, as we saw above, preserved with great faithfulness the original ideas with regard to the gods:

θυσίη δὲ τοῖσι Πέρσῃσι περὶ τοὺς εἰρημένους θεοὺς (sun, moon, sky, earth, fire, wind, water) *ἥδε κατέστηκε. οὔτε βωμοὺς ποιεῦνται οὔτε πῦρ ἀνακαίουσι μέλλοντες θύειν. οὐ σπονδῇ χρέονται, οὐκὶ αὐλῷ, οὐ στέμμασι, οὐκὶ οὐλῇσι. τῶν δὲ ὡς ἑκάστῳ θύειν θέλει, ἐς χῶρον καθαρὸν ἀγαγὼν τὸ κτῆνος καλέει τὸν θεὸν ἱστεφανωμένος τὸν τιήρην μυρσίνῃ μάλιστα . . . ἐπεὰν δὲ διαμιστύλας κατὰ μέρεα τὸ ἱρήϊον ἑψήσῃ τὰ κρέα, ὑποπάσας ποίην ὡς ἁπαλωτάτην, μάλιστα δὲ τὸ τρίφυλλον, ἐπὶ ταύτης ἔθηκε ὧν πάντα τὰ κρέα. διαθέντος δὲ αὐτοῦ μάγος ἀνὴρ παρεστεὼς ἐπαείδει θεογονίην, οἵην δὴ ἐκεῖνοι λέγουσι εἶναι τὴν ἐπαοιδήν. ἄνευ γὰρ δὴ μάγου οὐ σφι νόμος ἐστὶ θυσίας ποιέεσθαι. ἐπισχὼν δὲ ὀλίγον χρόνον ἀποφέρεται ὁ θύσας τὰ κρέα καὶ χρᾶται ὅτι μιν ὁ λόγος αἱρέει.*

Thus this old Persian sacrificial custom did not know the use of fire in bearing the food to the gods. The flesh was laid on a specially prepared sacrificial litter, on which the gods were supposed to descend (Skr. *barhís*, Av. *baresman* 'sacrificial litter' = Old Pruss. *balsinis* 'cushion,' *pobalso* 'pillow,' Serv. *blazina* 'cushion,' Old Nor. *bolstr*, O. H. G. *bolstar* 'pillow'), and the god was allured, by means of an exorcism, to partake of the food. Herodotus (iv. 60) tells of a similar practice prevalent among the Scythians. The sacrificer threw the animal to the ground by means of a noose, and strangled it after calling on the god, *οὔτε πῦρ ἀνακαύσας οὔτε καταρξάμενος οὐδ' ἐπισπείσας.* The flesh of the strangled animal was boiled, just as was customary among the Persians. In this connexion the two Litu-Prussian sacrifices, which are described in Lasicius' book, *de Diis Samagitarum* (pp. 49 and 54), are of great interest. Both are harvest-offerings. At the first (related by A. Guagnini from the *Kronika Polska*, etc., of Math. Stryikowski, mentioned above), which took place at the end of October, the sacrificial animals were battered to death with cudgels by the priests and other worshippers, who all the time called on the god Zemiennik. Before the worshippers sat down to the feast, portions of each kind of food were thrown into every corner of the house with the words: '*Accipe o Zemiennik grato animo sacrificium atque lætus comede.*' The second (related by Menecius) was the sacrifice of a goat. The faithful were assembled in a barn. A he-goat was led in. The sacrificing priest, or 'wurschaite,' laid both hands on it, and called on all the gods in succession. Then, while a hymn was being sung, the goat was raised into the air and held there till the song was finished. Thereupon the priest slew the animal, sprinkled the blood, which had been caught in a dish, round about, and gave the flesh to the women to boil. Here, again, there is no trace of a burning of the victim. Finally, in the case of the Teutons also, regarding whose sacrificial customs we have, unfortunately, very scanty information, sacrificial fire seems to all appearance to have been unknown. The bodies of the victims or their heads (cf. Tacitus, *Ann.* i. 61) were in this case hung on sacred trees, a custom which, according to the report of the Arab Ibn Dūstah, prevailed among the heathen Russians of northern origin:

'The soothsayer takes the man or the animal, puts a noose round the neck, hangs the victim up on a tree, waits till it expires, and then says: "This is a sacrifice for the god"' (cf. Thomsen, *Der Ursprung des russischen Staates*, Gotha, 1879, p. 27).

The flesh of the victim is boiled here too, as is seen from the Goth. *saups*, 'sacrifice,' O.H.G. *siodan*, 'to boil.'

Moreover, as there is in the Veda no lack of evidence that 'in the sacrificial fire an innovation of an advanced sacrificial technique' was present (cf. Oldenberg, *Religion des Veda*, p. 343 ff.), we have good reasons for assuming that the thought that the gifts assigned to the god could be borne to him by means of the flame or the smoke was one which was as yet foreign to primitive Aryan times. In the earliest times the gifts were, on the contrary, spread out on the place of sacrifice itself, raised into the air or hung on trees, and the god *must come himself and partake of them on the spot.*

The worshipper refreshes his gods with the *food* and *drink* of which he himself partakes, in order thereby to make them strong and willing to carry out his ends. That this was the original sacrificial idea of the Aryan peoples follows most distinctly from the complete correspondence between ancient Aryan sacrifice and ancient Aryan food. The further back we penetrate into the past of the Aryan peoples, the more do we find that cattle-rearing predominated over agriculture, and that in consequence flesh foods and animal products outweighed vegetable foods (cf. Schrader, *Reallexicon*, artt. 'Ackerbau,' 'Viehzucht,' and 'Nahrung'). The same thing is true of the sacrifices. In the reports quoted above we find only animal sacrifices referred to. In the same way Tacitus (*Germania*, ch. ix.) mentions only *concessa animalia*. In reference to the Slavs, cf. Procopius, *de Bell. Got.* iii. 14: *θεὸν μὲν γὰρ ἕνα τὸν τῆς ἀστραπῆς δημιουργὸν* (*Perunŭ*) *ἁπάντων κύριον μόνον αὐτὸν νομίζουσι εἶναι, καὶ θύουσι αὐτῷ βόας τε καὶ ἱερεῖα ἅπαντα*, and also Helmold, *Chron. Slav.* i. 52: 'Conveniuntque viri et mulieres cum parvulis, *mactantque diis suis hostias de bobus et ovibus.*' Among the Lithuanians, as late as the beginning of the 16th cent., sacrifices of oxen and swine were offered. The very early acquaintance of the Aryan peoples with animal sacrifice is significantly witnessed to by the existence in their primitive vocabulary of exact designations of the outer and inner parts of the animal carcass, which could be obtained only in the course of sacrificial rites (cf. Schrader, *Reallexicon*, art. 'Körperteile').

In the earliest times it was customary to sacrifice and eat, or eat and sacrifice, the flesh of the ox, the sheep, the goat, and, in Europe, the pig, *i.e.* the most ancient domestic animals of the Aryans. The sacrifice of the horse seems to have occupied a special place. As the horse did not belong to the oldest stock of Aryan domestic animals (cf. Schrader, *Reallexicon*, art. 'Pferd'), perhaps other sacrificial ideas may have been influential in introducing this sacrifice, such as the wish to incorporate the qualities of the animal in the worshipper, or to render a special service to the god who was thought of in the form of a horse (cf. J. v. Negelein, *Das Pferd im arischen Altertum*, Königsberg, 1903). Fowl, game, and fish were excluded from the stated sacrifices, because they did not originally serve as food (cf. Schrader, *Reallexicon*, artt. 'Viehzucht,' 'Jagd,' and 'Fisch, Fischfang'). In the oldest times, too, the use of salt was avoided, again for the simple reason that for purely animal food it was unnecessary (cf. *Reallexicon*, art. 'Salz').

The sacrificial drink of primitive times was mead, the place of which was gradually taken in the north by beer, and in the south by wine. The customs connected with these drink-offerings in barbaric conditions, such as we must presuppose for primitive times, are again vividly portrayed by Menecius (Lasicius, c. 53) with regard to Lithuania:

'Die Georgii sacrificium faciunt *Pergrubrio*, qui florum, plantarum omniumque germinum deus creditur. Sacrificulus enim, quem Vurschaiten appellant, tenet dextra obbam cervisiæ plenam invocatoque demonii nomine decantat illius laudes. Tu, inquit, abigis hiemem, tu reducis amœnitatem veris, per te nemora et silvæ florent. Hac cantilena finita dentibus apprehendens obbam, ebibit cervisiam nulla adhibita manu ipsamque obbam ita mordicus epotam retro supra caput iacit. Quæ cum e terra sublata, iterum impleta est; omnes quotquot adsunt, ex ea bibunt ordine atque in laudem Pergrubrii hymnum canunt. Postea epulantur tota die et choreas ducunt.'

If, then, 'to sacrifice' means simply to refresh the gods with earthly food and drink, and if, as we have seen, these gifts were originally offered to the heavenly beings to be partaken of by the summoned recipients on the place of sacrifice without the use of fire, we cannot fail to see how closely this sacrificial rite resembles the entertaining of the dead described above, when food and drink were shaken or poured out into furrows or trenches (see above, p. 26). The explanation is thus by no means far-fetched that the feeding of the beings which were thought to be in the natural phenomena, the thunder, the storm, the fire, etc., is to be understood as a kind of deduction or transference from the cult of the dead, where the offering of food and drink is intelligible without any difficulty from the prevailing ideas regarding the further existence of the soul after death. In that case we should conceive of the course of development in the following way. There was a time when only the dead were supplied with food and drink, and when man sought to obtain influence over the powers of nature only by means of magic, as described above. But the more the thought of personification gained precedence over magic, the more did people begin to transfer the sacrificial customs usual in the service of the dead to the worship of the heavenly powers, and then the further change arose naturally from this state of affairs, viz. that the sacrificial gifts were spread *on* the ground instead of being buried *in* it.

Returning to the sacrifice itself, we reach one form of it which has not yet been considered—a form which with its gloomy aspect persists from primitive into historic times, viz. *human sacrifice* (cf., for the Greeks and Romans, E. V. Lasaulx, *Das Sühnopfer*, Würzburg, 1841; for the Celts, Teutons, Slavs, Lithuanians, J. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*[3], i. 38, V. Hehn, *Kulturpflanzen*[7], p. 531, Golther, *Germanische Mythologie*, p. 516, Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, iv. 214 ff.; for the Indians, A. Weber, *Indische Streifen*, i. 54–89, and Oldenberg, *op. cit.* p. 363). This human sacrifice is to be found in various forms. Thus in the north of Europe we have the *sacrifice of victory*, *i.e.* the previously promised slaughter of prisoners at the altars of the gods. In the south and among the Gauls we have the *sacrifice of expiation*, *i.e.* the giving up of a human life for other lives that are forfeited or in danger. We find everywhere the *building sacrifice*, *i.e.* the conviction that the durability of a new building could be purchased only by a human life (cf. Liebrecht, *Zur Volkskunde*, p. 284 ff. 'Die vergrabenen Menschen,' also *Germ.* xxxv. 211). It is difficult to discover the really fundamental idea in this sacrifice. To carry out the idea of the meat-offering, we might start with the supposition that cannibalism was once wide-spread among Aryan peoples, which undoubtedly is very fully attested for numerous non-Aryan peoples of Europe (cf. R. Andree, *Die Anthropophagie*, Leipzig, 1887, p. 2). In milder times a change in this sacrificial idea had taken place, in the sense that a human being was regarded as the best sacrifice that could be brought to the gods (cf. Procopius, *de Bell. Got.* ii. 15: *τῶν δὲ ἱερείων σφίσι τὸ κάλλιστον ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, ὅπερ ἂν Δωριάλωτον ποιήσαιντο πρῶτον*). Or we could think of a transference from the worship of the dead, in which, as we saw above (p. 21), it was usual to give men to the dead as servants and companions in death. From this, too (cf. below, II. 5), the *penal-sacrifice* (execution), which has not been mentioned above, may have taken its rise. Ideas connected with magic may also have been operative in the *building sacrifice*, as, *e.g.*, the wish to transfer human potencies into the building. Whatever the real explanation may have been, we must in any case regard human sacrifice as a primitive institution in the history of Aryan religion, and not a comparatively late innovation originating from the East, as is done by O. Gruppe (*Jahresbericht über die Fortschritte der klassischen Altertumsw.* lxxxv. 10).

We have already become acquainted with the incantation or magic formula which entices the gods to the feast, and seen it to be a necessary accompaniment of sacrifice. This is perhaps the oldest form of prayer. In any case the different terms for prayer point to a close connexion with sacrifice (cf. Gr. *εὔχομαι* = Lat. *voveo*; Gr. *λιτή*, *λίσσομαι* = Lat. *litare*; Lith. *maldà* 'prayer' = Goth. *blôtan* 'to sacrifice,' from **mlâd* [the last according to R. Much]). 'To pray' is to request a benefit while promising or offering a sacrifice: *do ut des*. The idea of *thanks* appears in the Aryan languages at a late date compared with the idea of petition (cf. *Reallexicon*, pp. 598, 605), and thank-offerings are almost entirely unknown both in the Vedic worship and in the Homeric poems. Those divinities, however, who were called up by means of those ancient incantations and prayers must at a very primitive stage of development have been designated simply as 'the called.' This we learned above (p. 16) to have been the real signification of the Teutonic 'God,' which then, as is easily enough understood, passed over into the masculine gender under the influence of expressions which were more personally conceived.

(*b*) THE PRIESTS.—If the practice of magic and the incantation preceded sacrifice and prayer, the magician must have been the forerunner of the priest. This development is clearly presented to us in the history of the language. The most important designation of the priest in the language of ancient India is *brahmán* (masc.), while *bráhman* (neut.) means 'devotion.' The opinion used to be generally held that the fundamental signification of this class of words was to be found in the sphere of religion (according to Böhtlingk-Roth, *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch*, v. 135, 'the devotion which appears as intensity and depth of feeling, and aspires towards the gods'), but in recent times it has become more and more recognized that *bráhman* originally means 'the incantation,' and *brahmán* in consequence 'he who knows incantations' (cf. M. Haug, 'Über die ursprüngliche Bedeutung des Wortes brahma,' in *Sitzungsb. d. kgl. bayer. Ak. d. W. zu München*, 1868, ii. p. 80 ff.; R. Pischel, *GGA*, 1894, p. 420; H Osthoff, in Bezzenberger's *Beiträge*, xxiv. 113 ff.). Now, in the view of the present writer and of the majority of investigators, the Lat. *flâmen*, whose formation (cf. *carmen*, *agmen*) points with certainty to an originally neuter idea (priesthood), corresponds exactly to the Skr. *bráhma*, so that for this word also there follows a similar evolution of meanings, 'incantation,' 'community of those who know incantations,' 'individuals acquainted with incantations' (= priests).*

It is accordingly not to be wondered at that from the Aryan root *vid—void*—'to know,' frequent designations of the magician and the priest are derived, since both are regarded as the 'knowers' (viz. of all kinds of magic) *κατ' ἐξοχήν*. Here must be mentioned, on the one hand, the O.H.G. *wizzago*, A.S. *witega* 'prophet,' O.N. *vitki* 'magician,' *vitka* 'witchery,' O.H.G. *wîzzôn* 'prophecy,' and Old Russian *vědunŭ* 'magician,' *vědĭ* 'witchcraft,' *vědĭma* 'witch,' *vědĭstvo* 'witchery'; but, on the other hand, there is also to be placed alongside of these the designation of the ancient Gallic priestly caste of druids, Ir. *drúi*,

* Even those scholars who do not believe in the etymological relationship of *bráhman* and *flâmen* (cf. *e.g.* Walde, *Lat. etymol. Wörterbuch*) admit the two facts which are of importance for the history of religion, viz. (1) that *bráhman* originally signified 'magic formula,' and (2) that *flâmen* was originally a neuter conception.

which, being derived from **dru-vids* (according to Thurneysen, in Holder, *Altkeltischer Sprachschatz*), means exactly 'the very knowing ones.' But the personalities which in this connexion are most important for the history of Aryan religion are those that are frequently mentioned in the Litu-Prussian sources, and designated with all kinds of variations of their name * as *waidewut*, *waidelotte*, *waideler*, *waidler* (Old Prus. *waist* 'to know,' *waidimai* 'we know,' *waidleimai* 'we perform pagan religious rites').

They were also named *žynỹs*: Lith. *žinóti* 'to know' (*žýnauti* 'to charm'), or the *monininks*: Lith. *moniu* 'I understand,' or the *maldininks*: Lith. *maldà*, 'prayer' (cf. especially Matth. Prætorius, *Deliciæ Prussicæ oder Preussische Schaubühne*, p. 41 ff.). These 'waidlers' may be described both as magicians and as priests. They were servants of the chief-priest, who was called in Old Prussian *kriwe*, of whom we shall speak further below. The separate gods seem each to have had special 'waidlers': *naruttes* (cf. Gr. Νηρεύς above, p. 35) was the name given to the waidler of the water-god; *szweronei* (Old Pruss. *swirins*, Lith. *žwieris* 'wild animal') were 'the waidlers who worshipped and protected the sacred animals in the woods, especially elks, owls,' etc.; and *medziorei* (Old Pruss. *median* 'forest,' Lith. *mẽdis* 'tree') were 'the servants of the sacred woods.' Every imaginable charm to divine the future (cf. below, III. 2) was in their hands. Now they are for the most part beggars and shepherds, although 'there are still well-to-do farmers who practise these arts of the waidler.' Prætorius (p. 48) mentions a fact regarding these waidlers which is especially important for the history of the priesthood:

'An old peasant of Strigkeim said to me that, many hundred years before, one of his race had been a chief-priest here in Prussia. He was called *Krywe Kriwulů*, and was believed to possess all the gifts which we find singly among the waidlers now called *Maldininks* (see above). *The gifts of the waidler are, they say, hereditary; if the gift ceases in one family, it becomes extinct.*'

This *hereditary transmission*, in certain families or clans, of the existing magic formulas, sacrifices, and prayers, which we have here attested, may be regarded by us *as a common feature of the gradually evolving priesthood among the Aryan peoples.*

Sacred clans like the *Vasiṣṭhas*, the *Viśvamitras*, the *Bharadvâjas*, and others are well known to us from the Rigveda as the forerunners of the later priestly castes, and there is no lack of traces that these priestly families, who, according to the tradition, represent essentially the same cult, had in earlier times possessed *special cults* and *special rites* (cf. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, p. 373). In Greece, too, we find numerous sacred clans with special cults, the Εὐμολπίδαι, the Ἐτεοβουτάδαι, the Ἡσυχίδαι, the Κηρυκίδαι, Κροντίδαι, Κυννίδαι, Παμμενίδαι, etc. The priesthood was a joint-possession in these families, and descended from the father to the son and grandson (cf. P. Stengel, *Die griechischen Kultusaltertümer*). By the institution of a sanctuary (which does not occur in Vedic India) such a priesthood becomes *local*, and in this way forms the *ἱερόν*, to which in Homer the existence of the *ἱερεύς* is united. Most nearly akin to the Homeric priest was the Norwegian 'godi' (Old Nor. *goði*, Goth. *gudja* 'priest'; cf. Goth. *Guþ*, 'God,' and see above, pp. 16, 42). They could break up the temple belonging to them and migrate elsewhere. Among them, too, the priestly office was inherited through several generations (cf. Golther, *Germanische Mythologie*, p. 615; and J. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*[3], i. 83). Finally, in *Rome* also there are indications of a condition in which not State colleges but particular families attended to the performance of special cults. This comes out most unambiguously in the case of the *fratres arvales* (see art. ARVAL BROTHERS), for at the time when this designation was coined *frater* can have indicated nothing else than the actual degree of relationship. The legend, too, explanatory of the name, reports that Acca Larentia, the wife of Faustulus, had twelve sons, along with whom she sacrificed once every year for the fruitfulness of the fields. We have, therefore, a real brotherhood (Gr. *φρήτρη*, Slav. *bratstvo*; cf. *Reallexicon*, art. 'Sippe') before us. Their peculiar hereditary magic poem was that song, luckily still extant, which was united to a dance, and by the combined invocation of the spirits of the dead (*Enos lases iuvate*) and a real god (*Enos Marmor iuvato*) bears the stamp of remote antiquity. The designation, too, of the Luperci, the priests of Faunus, as *Quinctiales* and *Fabiani* points to their tribal origin (cf. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, p. 340, note 3, p. 411). The Salii, or 'leapers,' were without doubt a sacred family of this kind. Their magical secret was the leaping procession which accompanied their obscure songs, for both dance and solemn procession (O.H.G. *piganc*—even in modern German we have the phrase 'ein Fest begehen') belong to the oldest form of divine worship among the Aryan peoples (cf. *Reallexicon*, art. 'Tanz').

On the ground of the facts which have been mentioned, we may assume that the 'learned in magic formulas,' whose existence in primitive times is attested by the equation, Skr. *brâhman* = Lat. *flâmen*, were primarily to be found in special families which were hereditarily distinguished by the gift of witchcraft. Further, seeing that it follows from the oldest sacrificial customs described above (p. 41) that at their celebration, in the majority of cases, persons designated as magicians, priests, or soothsayers assisted, we may consider it not unlikely that even in primitive times members of such sacred families were called upon by other families, and in particular by the head of the clan, to assist at sacrifices for the clan. In the case of sacrifices of the most ancient worship, we must sharply distinguish between the offerings dedicated to the souls of ancestors and those on behalf of the 'heavenly ones.' The former could, of course, be offered only by relatives (cf. above, p. 28 f.); in the case of the latter there was nothing against the assistance of a stranger who was particularly well acquainted with the incantations that would entice the gods. Here we have one of the deepest roots of the Aryan priesthood.

In the later history of the priesthood we shall call attention to only one more point, viz. the ever increasing closeness of the *union of law and religion* (cf. below, II. 5). This lent to the priestly dignity, here to a greater and there to a less extent, a new, and in part extraordinary, significance; and it may well be said that this is what really made the magician a priest. The more clearly the thought came to consciousness that the gods were the protectors of the moral and social principles attained in the long struggle of civilization, the greater must the influence of the authentic interpreters of the divine will have become.

In *India*, even before Vedic times, the hereditary dignity of the Brahmans had been developed from those families of primitive times that were expert in magic. From their midst there arose the domestic priest (*purohita*), who was indispensable to the king for preparing sacrifices, for 'the gods do not eat the food of a king who has no purohita' (*Aitareya Brâhmaṇa*, viii. 24). Under their supervision, too, the royal *administration of justice* was carried on, and in their conception of *dhârma*, 'the

* It may be conjectured that the form *waidewut*, **waidwut* = Gr. *εἰδώς* **Fιδ-Fυτ*, *Fιδ-Fότος*, 'the knowing one,' is the original one

fixed' (=Lat. *firmus*) law, custom, and religion lie together as yet undifferentiated. In *Rome*, in like manner, the *Pontifices*, 'the bridge-builders' (also without doubt originally a sacred family like the *fratres arvales*, perhaps endowed with a special magic charm for providing bridges and roads), were at the same time the guardians both of the *ius civile* and of the *ius sacrum* (*pontifex* according to Bezzenberger, in Kuhn's *Zeitschr.* xlii., from Umbr. *punti*, 'piatio, lustratio' from **kvento*=Av. *spenta*, Old Slav. *svętŭ*, Lith. *szwentas* 'sacred'). The former of these had, after a long process of evolution and not without leaving clear traces of its original condition (cf. Wissowa, *op. cit.* p. 324 ff.), separated itself from the latter. In *Gaul* also we find the administration of justice entirely in the hands of the Druids, who, however, in the time of Cæsar were not a real caste, or no longer a caste, but increased their numbers by securing and training novices:

'Fere de omnibus controversiis publicis privatisque constituunt, et si quod est admissum facinus, si cædes facta, si de hereditate, de finibus controversia est, idem decernunt, præmia pœnasque constituunt; si qui aut privatus aut populus eorum decreto non stetit, sacrificiis interdicunt. Hæc pœna apud eos est gravissima' (vi. 13).

In conscious contrast to these conditions, Cæsar (vi. 21) relates of the *Teutons*: 'Neque druides habent, qui rebus divinis præsint, neque sacrificiis student.' 'They have no Druids to preside over divine worship, nor do they lay any special stress on sacrifice' (cf. 'agriculturæ non student,' vi. 22, which cannot mean 'they do *not* engage in agriculture,' seeing that Cæsar himself attests that it was practised in a primitive form). The conclusion is that a distinctly marked priestly office which would attract the attention of a foreigner cannot at that time have been present among the Teutons. This, of course, does not exclude the existence of separate families expert in magic, as, according to our assumption above, was the case in primitive times. On the other hand, we find in the report of Tacitus a strong and influential priesthood already existing, particularly developed on the legal side (cf. also O.H.G. Old Sax. Fries. *êwart* and *êsago* 'priest,' lit. 'keeper or guardian of the law' and 'proclaimer of laws').

The priest is the man who calls for silence in the popular assembly (Tac. *Germ.*, ch. 11: 'silentium per sacerdotes, quibus tum et coercendi ius est, imperatur'); and while even Cæsar, vi. 23, reports: 'Cum bellum civitas aut illatum defendit aut infert, magistratus, qui ei bello præsint, ut vitæ necisque habeant potestatem deliguntur,' so that thus all power of punishment might be assigned to the *civil* authorities, we are told in Tacitus, ch. 7: 'Ceterum neque animadvertere neque vincire, ne verberare quidem *nisi sacerdotibus* permissum, non quasi in pœnam nec ducis iussu, sed velut deo imperante, quem adesse bellantibus credunt.' In addition, the priest carries the war standards out of the sacred groves (ch. 7), interprets the lot on public occasions, and accompanies, together with the king or prince, the sacred car in which horses are yoked (ch. 10). The priest of Nerthus (ch. 40) and the priest in the grove of Alcis among the Nahanarvali (ch. 43) seem to have presided at local sanctuaries.

The same extreme expansion of priestly power as is found in the west among the Druids of Gaul is to be met with again in the extreme east of Europe among the ancient Prussians.

Even Peter of Dusburg (*Script. rerum Pruss.* i. 53) was able to report: 'Fuit autem in medio nationis huius perversæ, scilicet in Nadrowia, locus quidam dictus Romow, trahens nomen suum a Roma (!), in quo habitabat quidam dictus *Criwe* [perhaps Lith. *keras* 'magic,' *kerėti* 'to charm'; a connexion with Lith. *krìwas* 'crooked,' from which we have *kriwūlė* 'the sign of the dignity of the Criwe,' seems semasiologically impossible], quem colebant pro papa, quia sicut dominus papa regit universalem ecclesiam fidelium, ita ad istius nutum seu mandatum non solum gentes prædictæ sed et Lethowini et aliæ nationes Lyvoniæ terræ regebantur. Tantæ fuit auctoritatis, quod non solum ipse vel aliquis de sanguine suo, verum etiam nuntius cum baculo suo vel alio signo noto transiens terminos infidelium prædictorum a regibus [by these are meant the small heads of clans who were to be found even in primitive Aryan times, cf. *Reallexicon*, art. 'König'] et nobilibus et communi populo in magna reverentia haberetur. *Fovebat etiam prout in lege veteri jugem ignem*' (cf. also the passage quoted above, p. 34, from Jerome of Prague, and the more detailed information given by Matth. Prætorius, *op. cit.* p. 38 ff.).

What we have here, then, is another of those families expert in magic (according to Prætorius, *op. cit.* p. 40, the blood relations of the Criwe were called *Krywaiten*), whose special service was devoted to a perennial fire, and whose chief on account of this cult—according to Jerome, magic oracles were practised by means of fire in the case of sickness—had attained to the position of influence described above.

(*c*) THE TEMPLES.—In primitive religions all over the world it is a recognized phenomenon that all objects which rise above the surface of the ground, in particular, *stones*, *stumps*, and *trees*, are regarded as possessing a divine *anima*, and are made the objects of a fetish worship (cf. E. B. Tylor, ii. 161 ff., 215 ff.). Among the Aryan peoples also this low stage of religious life can be proved. The most important testimonies for it will be brought together, without as yet asking the question whether the objects of worship of which they treat were really conceived of everywhere as real *incorporations* of the deity, or only as *representations* of it.

(*α*) *Stone-worship.*—With regard to ancient Greece in general, we have the following report of Pausanias, vii. 22. 4:

ἐστήκασι δὲ ἐγγύτατα τοῦ ἀγάλματος τετράγωνοι λίθοι τριάκοντα μάλιστα τὸν ἀριθμόν· τούτους σέβουσιν οἱ Φαρεῖς (Pharæ, a town of Achaia), ἑκάστῳ θεοῦ τινος ὄνομα ἐπιλέγοντες, τὰ δὲ ἔτι παλαιότερα καὶ τοῖσι πᾶσι Ἕλλησι τιμὰς θεῶν ἀντὶ ἀγαλμάτων ἄργοὶ λίθοι.

The same author mentions, in detail, unhewn stones in place of the figure of the god in the fane of Herakles at Hyettus, and in that of Eros at Thespiæ; but with regard to the cult of the Graces at Orchomenos, it is said (ix. 38. 1): τὰς μὲν δὴ πέτρας σέβουσί τε μάλιστα καὶ τῷ Ἐτεοκλεῖ αὐτὰς πεσεῖν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ φασίν. Thus the worship of rough stones was not confined to the oldest periods of Greek history, but continued through the whole time of paganism. For Socrates, in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, knows:

τοὺς μὲν οὐθ' ἱερὸν οὔτε βωμὸν οὔτε ἄλλο τῶν θείων οὐδὲν τιμᾶν, τοὺς δὲ καὶ λίθους καὶ ξύλα τὰ τυχόντα καὶ θηρία σέβεσθαι (i.e. they were atheists and fetish-worshippers). Cf., further, Overbeck, 'Das Kultusobjekt bei den Griechen in seinen ältesten Gestaltungen' in *Berichte d. kgl. sächs. Ges. d. Wissenschaften zu Leipzig*, phil.-hist. Kl., 1864, ii. p. 121 ff.; and also the account above, p. 37, of the oldest cult of Hermes.

On *Italian* soil, perhaps the cult of Juppiter Feretrius or Lapis may be mentioned in this connexion. He was worshipped, in a chapel founded for him by Romulus, under the symbol of a fire-stone (*silex*), although in this case other explanations are still possible. In *Germany*, Burchard of Worms demands: '*Lapides* quoque quos in ruinosis locis et silvestribus, dæmonum ludificationibus decepti, venerantur, ubi et vota vovent et deferunt, funditus effodiantur, atque in tali loco proiciantur, ubi nunquam a cultoribus suis venerari possint,' and among the *Lithuanians*, as we have already seen above, the Jesuit Rostowski found the worship of a massive stone Akmo (Lith. *akmů* 'stone') as late as the 18th century.

(*β*) *Worship of stumps.*—More frequently than unhewn stones, however, we find in ancient *Greece* shapeless piles, boards, lumps of wood, and posts (ξύλον οὐκ εἰργασμένον, ἄγαλμα ξύλινον ἄμορφον, πρέμνον αὐτοφυές, δόρυ, σανίς) mentioned as objects of worship. The testimonies for this also have been fully gathered by Overbeck* (*op. cit.*). The *Italian* history of religion offers as proof of the primitive worship of stumps the Lat. *delubrum*, 'sanctuary,' lit. *delubrum lignum*, 'a piece of wood freed from the bark' (*liber*, **luber*, Russ. *lubŭ*). Regarding it, Festus (ed. O. Müller, p. 73) reports: 'delubrum dicebant fustem delibratum, hoc est decorticatum,

* The author has been unable to examine the work of M. W. de Visser, *Die nicht menschengestalt. Götter der Griechen* (Leyden, 1903).

quem venerebantur pro deo' (cf. also Böttticher, *Baumkultus der Hellenen*, and Overbeck, p. 149. Wissowa [*op. cit.* p. 400], on the other hand, gives another etymology, which was also wide-spread in antiquity, viz. *delubrum*, from *deluere* 'to wash away'; hence, 'place of washing away'). Among the *Teutons* also the Old Saxon 'Irmensul' was simply an upright tree-stump, regarding which we have in *Transl. S. Alexandri* (Pertz, *Mon. Germ.* ii. 676) the following account: 'Frondosis arboribus fontibusque venerationem exhibebant: *truncumque quoque ligni non parvæ magnitudinis* in altum erectum sub divo colebant, patria eum lingua *Irminsul* appellantes, quod Latine dicitur universalis columna' (cf. also W. Mannhardt, *Wald- und Feldkulte*, i. 304). The Scandinavian-Russian 'Waragers' are described by the Arab Ibn Fosslan (ed. Frähn). He tells how the people offered their reverence and sacrifices before a huge upright block of wood, which in this case had something resembling a human face. In the *Slavonic* languages the most frequent expressions for idols or idol-temples go back almost entirely to fundamental meanings, such as 'stump,' 'post,' 'picture,' 'statue' (cf. Miklosich, 'Die christliche Terminologie der slav. Sprachen,' *Denkschrift der Wiener Ak. d. W.* xxiv. 36 ff.). Is it not also possible that the Russian expressions for 'magician' and 'to charm,' *koldúnŭ*, *koldovátĭ*, are connected with Russ. *kolóda*, 'tree-stump'?* With regard to *India*, it is natural to mention in this connexion the so-called 'sacrificial post' (*yúpa*) to which the sacrificial animal was bound, but which was also made an object of worship, seeing that it was addressed as 'Lord of the wood' (*vánaspati*), smeared with oil, and bound with plaited bands of grass (cf. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, p. 256). It is also worthy of note that the conception *post* or *stake* (cf. Skr. *sthūṇā*, Avesta *stūna* =Gr. *στήλη*, O.H.G. *stollo* from **st(h)el-nâ*, and Skr. *svāru*, 'sacrificial post'=A.S. *swēr*, 'stake') can be proved by means of two equivalents to be Aryan.

(γ) *Tree-worship.*—Of the exceedingly numerous evidences of tree-worship prevalent among the European branches of the Aryan race, only a few characteristic examples can be brought forward here. Further details will appear later in our investigation. In *Greece* we must, in the first place, mention the cult of Ζεὺς φηγωναῖος in the storm-moved Dodona, from whose sacred oak (ἐκ δρυὸς ὑψικόμοιο) the voice of the god rang forth proclaiming oracles, and who was served by a special priestly caste, the Σελλοί (=Lat. *Salii*), who slept on the ground with unwashed feet (*Il.* xvi. 234 ff.). In Mycenæan Greece also the worship of trees and stone-pillars was wide-spread (cf., regarding it, A. J. Evans, 'Mycenean Tree and Pillar Cult,' *JHS* xxi. 99 ff.), without making it necessary to think of influences from Oriental religions. The Phrygians, too, who migrated from Europe to Asia, worshipped a Βαγαῖος (probably =*φηγωναῖος*, cf. Kretschmer, p. 198). In Rome there stood on the Capitoline an oak sacred to the herdsmen.

Cf. Livy, 1. 10: 'Spolia ducis hostium cæsi suspensa . . . ferculo gerens (Romulus) in Capitolium ascendit, ibique ea cum ad *quercum pastoribus sacram* deposuisset, simul cum dono designavit Jovis fines . . . hæc templi est origo, quod primum omnium Romæ sacratum est.' In addition, Festus (ed. O. Müller, p. 87) states: 'Fagutal sacellum Jovis, in quo fuit fagus arbor, quæ Jovi sacra habebatur.'

We know also of numerous sacred groves in Greece as well as in Italy. In the latter country it was 'the deities of ancient origin,' such as *Robigus*, *Anna Perenna*, *Camenæ*, etc., that were worshipped in them (cf. Wissowa, *op. cit.* p. 401). The traces of tree-worship continue even more significantly in the richly wooded northern parts of the continent from the Amber coast to the Atlantic Ocean. With regard to the Lithuanians, we may refer to a few sentences of the report which a monk Jerome, who in the years 1409–1418 was active as a missionary in Lower Lithuania, sent to the papal secretary, Æneas Sylvius Piccolomini, and which is to be found in the work of the latter, entitled *Europa* (*S. Æneæ Sylvii Europa*), c. xxvi.:

'Postremo alios populos adiit (Jerome), qui silvas dæmonibus consecratas venerabantur et inter alias unam cultu digniorem putavere. . . . Ventum erat ad medium nemoris, ubi quercum vetustissimam et ante omnes arbores religione sacram et quam potissime sedem esse putabant percutere aliquamdiu nullus præsumpsit. . . . Erant in ea regione plures silvæ pari religione sacræ. Ad quas dum Hieronymus amputandas pergit, mulierum ingens numerus plorans atque eiulans Vitoldum (a Lithuanian duke) adit, sacrum lucum succissum queritur et domum dei ademptam in qua divinam opem petere consuessent; inde pluvias, inde soles obtinuisse; nescire iam quo in loco deum quærant, cui domicilium abstulerint. Esse aliquos minores lucos, in queis dii coli soleant, eos quoque delere Hieronymum velle.'

An altogether special worship was assigned to the sacred oak of Perkúnas, in whose rustling the worshipper believed himself to hear, as at Dodona, the voice of the god announcing the future (cf. below, III. 2). Other sacred trees were the birch (*biržùlis*), the hazel (*lazdona*), the cherry tree (*kirnis*), the maple (*klewēlis*), and the mountain ash (*szermukszsnis*). An especial reverence was assigned to trees that had grown together, *rumbuta*, *romove*, from which the centre of the Criwe mentioned above had its name. Undoubtedly the Teutons of the first Christian centuries stood at this stage of development, in spite of the idealistic interpretation which Tacitus (*Germania*, ch. 9) gives to their tree-cult:

'Ceterum nec cohibere parietibus deos, neque in ullam humani oris speciem adsimulare ex magnitudine cælestium arbitrantur: lucos ac nemora consecrant, deorumque nominibus adpellant secretum illud, quod sola reverentia vident.'

Of particular sacred trees, oaks before all others are mentioned, one of which Boniface felled near Geismar. The worship of a pear tree in Auxerre in heathen times is also well attested (J. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythol.*[3] i. 6 f.), although this report leads us to *Celtic* territory; for here, too, the tree-cult was fully developed. There was nothing more sacred to the Druid than the oak and the mistletoe that grew on it (Pliny, *HN* xvi. 249), and we hear of sacred groves in Gaul as well as in Britain (cf. on them H. Munro Chadwick, 'The Oak and the Thunder-god,' *JAI* xxx. 22 ff.).

In glancing over the evidences of Aryan stone-, stump- and tree-worship collected here, we could make no greater mistake than to suppose that the religious ideas which find expression in this worship are all to be placed at the same historical stage. It cannot be doubted that in many, in fact even in the majority of cases, the object of worship is merely the symbol under which a deity was worshipped that existed outside of the object, and was only occasionally present in it. But, on the other hand, it cannot be denied that the traces are clearly to be perceived of a time when people actually worshipped, as is the case among the rudest savages, the very stone, post, or tree, as a god, since they looked on it as the body of a divine *anima*. This becomes very evident in the remains of the Greek stone-cult and in the Lithuanian tree-worship. When Theophrastus (*Charact.* c. 17), in his day, tells us of people who, when passing stones smeared with oil at the crossways, did not fail to pour oil on them out of their oil-phials, to fall on their knees, and to present the most solemn salutations, this proceeding is to be judged in the same way as when 'in the Society Islands, rude logs or fragments of basalt

* At the present day this primitive stump-worship is perhaps to be seen on Teutonic and Slavonic soil in the remarkable 'Yule or Christmas log,' regarding which see R. Meringer, *Indogermanische Forschungen*, xvi. 151 ff., xviii. 277, xix. 444. Cf. here also on Lat. *delubrum*.

columns, clothed in native cloth and anointed with oil, received adoration and sacrifice as divinely powerful by virtue of the "Atua" or deity which had filled them' (Tylor, ii. 162).

In Lithuania the oak was, it is true, sacred to Perkúnas; but evidently, like the other sacred trees mentioned above, it enjoyed independent worship, as follows from the report of Rostowski: 'Arbores item evulsæ stirpitus, tum quercus, quibus mares tum tiliæ quibus feminæ pullastra pro frugibus et incolumitate rei domesticæ quasi diis faciebant' (Brückner, *Archiv für slav. Phil.* ix. 35), and other reports, according to which sick persons, observing remarkable customs, clamber up into the boughs of a sacred oak. 'Thereafter they bind each his offering on the branch of the tree, and seriously believe that they will be healed thereby. Often it happens that such a branch is quite full of garters, Lithuanian women's veils, girdles, knives, and such-like articles, which are tied to it from top to bottom. Several sacrifice money also, which they lay upon the ground before the tree' (cf. Usener-Solmsen, *Götternamen*, p. 87).

Accordingly, we may (like Frazer, *GB*[2]) conceive of the process of evolution of these ideas in the following way. There was among the Aryan peoples a distant period in which stones, stumps, and trees were worshipped as actual fetishes. When within the limits of this racial division—and certainly as early as primitive Aryan times (a point where the present writer differs from Frazer)—the cult of the 'heavenly ones' came more and more to the front, connexions began to be thought of between these 'heavenly ones' and the objects of worship just mentioned, especially with the sacred tree and its shoot, the stump or post, which were now regarded only as symbols and occasional dwelling-places of the 'heavenly ones.' Along with these ideas the old conceptions continued to operate further among the lower classes.

This connexion is most clearly exemplified in the relationship of the *thunder-god* to the *oak*. Zeus and the oak of Dodona, Juppiter Feretrius and the oak worshipped by the herdsmen on the Capitoline, Perkúnas and *Aužúlas* ('oak'), we have already noted; but we are also told of the Celts by Maximus Tyrius: Κελτοὶ σέβουσι Δία, ἄγαλμα δὲ Διὸς Κελτικὸν ὑψηλὴ δρῦς. Nothing can be more easily understood than this connexion, when we call to mind how the lightning flashes of the thunder-god come down with an especial fondness on the king of the forest; and it is difficult to conceive why H. Munro Chadwick, in his otherwise excellent essay, 'The Oak and the Thunder-god,' mentioned above, deduces such a far-fetched reason for this phenomenon as a supposed dwelling of primitive man below the oak. But the other gods are also preferably thought of as dwelling in trees and forests. In Greece we have, besides a Ζεὺς ἐνδενδρος, ἀ Διόνυσος ἐνδενδρος, an Ἐλένη δενδρῖτις, an Ἄρτεμις κεδρεάτις, etc. Among the Teutons were found, as well as a *silva Herculis* (= Donar) *sacra* (*Ann.* ii. 12), a *castum nemus* of Nerthus (*Germania*, c. 40), and a *lucus Baduhennæ* (*Ann.* iv. 73). Among the Lithuanians, as we have seen above, the rain- and sun-gods were worshipped in sacred groves.

In this assimilation of the cult of the 'heavenly ones' and a primitive stone-, stump- and tree-fetishism we have secured, once for all, the foundation for the explanation of the two most outstanding objects of heathen worship in historical times—the *temple* and the *image*. The tree or grove in which the deity is worshipped develops into the stone temple; the stone or wooden stump, which serves as a symbol of the deity, assumes human features and becomes the image of the god.

This process can be very well followed in the Greek word for 'temple,' Lesb. *ναῦος*, Dor. *νᾱός*, Ion. *νηός*, Att. *νεώς* (**ναϝο-*), which originally indicated not the *whole* temple, but only the inmost room, where the figure of the god stood (τὸ ἄδυτον, σηκός). This primitive Greek **nāvo-* is, in the conviction of the present writer, identical with the root found beside it, **nāvo-*, **nāu* (Skr. *nāva*, *nāvā́*, *nāú* = Gr. *ναῦς*), 'ship,' 'tree,' so that both words come together in the meaning 'tree-trunk' (cf. *e.g.* Skr. *ādru* 'wood' and 'boat,' Old Saxon *stamm*, 'tree-trunk' and 'ship,' and many other similar changes of meaning).

This probable combination is, the present writer thinks, raised to a certainty when we consider that in Greece, in the most ancient times, the figures of the gods were actually placed *in*, *below*, or *on* trees (*πρέμνῳ ἐνὶ πτελέης, φηγοῦ ὑπὸ πρέμνῳ, ἐν κέδρῳ μεγάλῃ*); and the name of Juppiter of Dodona in the primitive cult, *Ζεὺς Νάως* (*nāvio-s*), finds its natural interpretation if we conceive him as 'the one in the tree-trunk.'* The ἀργὸς λίθος and the ξόανον οὐκ εἰργασμένον gradually change into the *βρέτας* (= Skr. *mūrta* 'figure'?), the image or figure of the god. It is not far-fetched to find in the images of Hermes, in which only the face and the extended penis of the god are represented, a stage on this path of development.

The words of J. Grimm (*Deutsche Mythol.*[3] i. 59) are true of the Teutons. 'Temple is also at the same time wood. What we think of as a walled and built house, dissolves, the farther back we go, into the conception of a sacred place which has not been touched by human hand, but is hedged in and made peaceful by trees that have grown up of their own accord.' The conceptions *grove* and *temple* accordingly run to a large extent together in the Teutonic languages.

This is true of the series Goth. *alhs*, A.S. *ealh*, Old Saxon *alah* 'temple,' which corresponds to the Old Lith. *elkas* 'grove,' Lett. *elks* 'idol,' perhaps also to the Gr. ἄλσος (**alkjos*?) 'grove,' 'sacred grove,' which, however, is compared by others with Old Slav. *lěsŭ* 'forest.' The same also holds of O.H.G. *harug*, A.S. *hearh*, *hearg* (O.H.G. *harugâri* 'priest'), which are explained in glosses by *lucus*, *nemus*, and also by *sacellum*, *simulacrum*, *fanum*, as well as of the A.S. *bearu*, 'grove' (O.H.G. *parawâri* 'priest'), which belongs to the common Slavonic root *borŭ*, 'pine,' 'pine-forest' (cf. *Zutibure*, i.e. *sventi borŭ* 'sacred pine forest' in the lands of Merseburg according to Thietmar: *lucus Z. dictus ab accolis ut Deus ab omnibus honoratus*). To this class of expressions are added—for the later temples built of wood or stone, whose first traces are to be found probably in the *templum* of the *Tanfana*, which, according to Tacitus (*Ann.* i. 51), was level with the ground—new designations borrowed from the human dwelling-house, such as O.H.G. *hof*, *halla*, *sal*, *pētapûr*, *pētahûs*, *plôzhûs*, *plôstarhûs*, Goth. *gudhûs*, etc. Figures of the gods, too, which are designated as ξόανα, 'carved works,' but regarding whose more definite nature we unfortunately can discover nothing, are repeatedly mentioned from the 4th century (cf. Golther, *Germ. Myth.* p. 604).

At the same time in which we have among the Teutons *only* sacred trees and groves as places for the worship of the gods, the common Celtic name for 'sanctuary,' *nemeton* (δρυνέμετον, *Medionemeton*, *Tasnimeton*, *Vernemeton*: Skr. *námas* 'worship') without doubt indicates the stone temple built by human hands. Here too, however, the original meaning is seen from the Old Saxon *Indiculus superstitionum*, in which mention is made 'de sacris silvarum, quæ nimidas (= Gall. *nemeton*) vocant.' On the other hand, the neighbours of the Teutons on the North-East, the Prussians and the Lithuanians, may be regarded as having continued in their templeless condition up to the date of their conversion to Christianity. At the same time we hear incidentally of idols, which they carved for themselves. Thus a heathen fisher (cf. Prætorius, *op. cit.* p. 27) had made a wind-god (*Wējopatis*) out of bark, which had two faces on the head, one in front and one behind, both of them with gaping mouths. The same state of affairs is found among the *Eastern* Slavs, and Miklosich (*Die Christliche Terminologie*, p. 67) rightly remarks that there is no ground whatever for the assumption that the first preachers of Christianity found here buildings devoted to religious service (for Russian idols, cf. above, p. 45). The *Western* Slavs, on the other hand, were acquainted with

* The usual explanation of the Greek *νεώς*, 'temple,' derives this word from *ναίω*, 'I dwell,' and means the same as 'dwelling-place.' Against this view the chief objection is that designations of the temple according to the analogy of the human dwelling-place are all of a late date, and Gr. *νεώς* in the sense 'human dwelling-place' never occurs. Meringer (*Indogermanische Forschungen*, xviii. 277) now agrees with the explanation given by the present writer.

real temples, with statues of the gods, and with idols, *e.g.* the three-headed Triglav ('Three-heads'), as we learn from the descriptions of Thietmar of Merseburg (*Monum. Germ.* v. 812) and Otto of Bamberg (*M. G. Script.*, ed. Pertz, ii. 32). Here too, however, we see how deeply the ancient tree-worship was rooted in the affections of the people from the fact, related by Otto of Bamberg, that they calmly allowed four temples to be torn down, and even helped in the work, but raised objections when an attack was made on the large wide-spreading oak standing near, 'quam plebs simplex numinis alicuius inhabitatione sacram æstimans magna veneratione colebat.'

But the places of old Aryan worship are not yet exhausted in the foregoing discussion. While in the case of tree-worship it is to a certain extent supposed that the 'heavenly ones' descend from their airy abodes to the earth, an attempt was made by mankind in another direction to raise themselves to heaven. The *Persians*, we saw above (p. 33), climbed to the top of the highest mountain when they wished to offer a sacrifice to Heaven. The same was the case in Greece. Pausanias mentions the tops of mountains as the seats of famous cults in many localities. Especially sacred, however, was the territory of the Lycæan Zeus on the highest peak of Arcadia, where tree-cult and high-place-cult were combined. In *Italy*, too, the worship of the god of the sky was particularly connected with the high places; and with regard to most Roman hills the existence of ancient cults of Juppiter can be proved (Wissowa, p. 102). Of the Teutons, Agathias, 28. 4, reports: ἱλάσκονται καὶ . . . λόφους καὶ φάραγγας, καὶ τούτοις ὥσπερ ὅσια δρῶντες.

(*d*) THE FEASTS.—In the equation, Gr. ἑορτή, Ion. ὁρτή 'feast' = Skr. *vratá* 'decree,' 'divine service' (cf. *e.g.* *mahâvrata*, like M.H.G. *hôchzît*, lit. 'great feast'), there is to be found an originally related designation for the conception 'feast,' whose fundamental meaning was something like 'appointed time.' It is rather difficult to decide what these *certi dies* may have been among the Aryans, and without doubt a considerable time will have to pass before the comparative heortology of the Aryan peoples, the problems of which have hardly been taken in hand yet, will be in a position to give a decisive answer to this question. We saw above (I. 3 *b*) that the life of the Aryans even in primitive times was interwoven with a considerable number of special and general feasts for the dead; and in particular, in the wintry half of the year, the observance of a great festival of the dead, agreeing in many details, can be proved among almost all the Aryan peoples. Thus in India the third of the three annual festivals, which took place in the colder season of the year, was connected with a great sacrifice for the dead. Among the Lithuanians we discovered a general feast for the dead in the beginning of November. In Rome the *Larentalia* were held on the 23rd of December, the *Ferâlia* in February. Among the Teutons the dead seem to have been remembered with many varied customs at 'Yuletide' (cf. E. Mogk in Paul's *Grundriss*[2], iii. 391), a name which itself may be connected with the darkness of the realms of the dead, seeing that 'Yule' (A.S. *géol*, *geohhol*) probably goes back to a primitive Teutonic word **jeqa* or **jeqha* = Gr. **ζέφος* in *ζέφυρος*, *ζόφος*, 'west,' 'darkness,'—'under world.' Most remarkable in this connexion, too, is a wide-spread Slavonic name for the Christmas festival (Russ. *koročunŭ* 'Christ-evening,' Bulg. *kračun*, etc. 'Christmas'), which in White Russian signifies 'unexpected premature death in early years,' and 'an evil spirit that shortens life.' In regard to this development in meaning, Miklosich (*Etymol. Wörterbuch der slav. Sprachen*, p. 130) correctly remarks, 'perhaps *Kračun* was a feast of the dead.'*

The significance of these feasts of the dead, which in White Russia serve even to-day among the people as the basis for the reckoning of dates, is especially made manifest on Italian soil, as can be seen even in the language. Here it is impossible to separate the Lat. *fêriæ*, *fêsiæ* 'feast,' 'festival,' from the above-mentioned *fêrâlia* from **dhvês-âlia*, 'feast of the dead,' so that *fêsiæ* from **dhvêsiæ*, at first 'feast of the dead,' had come to mean 'feast' in general; and correspondingly *festus* from **dhvestus* and *fesnus* (in Umb. and Osc. *fesna*, *sc.* *domus*, 'temple') from **dhves-nus*, at first denoted 'applied to souls,' then 'sacred,' 'holy.'

But were there even in primitive times regular festivals in honour of the 'heavenly ones,' and is there a possibility of extracting a common primitive kernel from the endless mass of names and dates referring to the worship of the gods among the separate peoples? It has long been customary to find this in the festivals of the so-called four points of the year; and in particular the winter and the summer solstice were regarded as the most ancient feast dates of the Aryan peoples. We shall do well briefly to call to mind what we know regarding the oldest divisions of time among the Aryans, in order to make a judgment on these views possible. The *moon* was the oldest measurer of time for the Aryan peoples. According to its course natural months were distinguished. A division of the yearly course of the sun into these had not yet taken place, for which reason there were no names for the separate months in the vocabulary of the primitive Aryan language. Of course, some have sought to find a pre-historic attempt to equalize the moon-year with the sun-year in the apparent coincidence of our 'twelfth,' the time from Dec. 25 to Jan. 6, with the twelve sacred nights of the Brâhmaṇa-literature (354 days of the moon-year + 12 days = 366 of the civil sun-year) (cf. regarding it especially A. Weber, *Indische Streifen*, xvii. 224, and *SBAW*, phil.-hist. Kl. 1898, xxxvii. 2 ff.). The present writer, however, believes that it has been made very probable by A. Tille (*Yule and Christmas, their place in the Germanic Year*, London, 1899) that these twelfths, famed in legend among the Teutonic peoples, do not go back to the remotest heathendom, but are only a copy of the Christian Dodecameron, the sacred time between Christmas and Epiphany, the new and the old day for calling to mind the Divinity of Christ. Along with these purely unattached lunar months a distinction of seasons of the year was made in primitive times, originally only winter (Skr. *hêmantá* = Gr. χειμών, Lat. *hiems*, etc.) and summer (Avesta *ham* = O.H.G. *sumar*, etc.), then besides these, at an early date, a short transition period of spring (Skr. *vasantá* = Gr. ἔαρ, Lat. *ver*, etc.). Their combination was called a 'past' (**vetos* : Skr. *vatsara*, Gr. ἔτος, Lat. *vetus*, etc.); but in reckoning it was customary to calculate according to single periods of the year, especially according to winters. The Aryan year was thus a purely natural year (cf. *Reallexicon*, artt. 'Jahr,' 'Jahreszeiten,' and 'Zeitteilung'). All more exact methods of dividing the time, based on a knowledge of the course of the sun, were derived by the Indians as well as by the Aryan peoples of Europe from *Babylon*. Here, too, the distinction between the four points of the year must have arisen at a very early date, and in a long migratory progress have passed over to the Greeks (cf. Herodotus, ii. 109) and Romans, and from them to the north

* A Russian name for the whole period of Christmas is *kudesá*, lit. 'magic,' which shows with what sort of heathen ideas this time of the year was associated.

of Europe. The designations of the equinoxes in the Teutonic languages (O.H.G. *ëbennacht*, A.S. *efenniht*, Old Nor. *jafndœgri*) are undoubtedly only translations of the Lat. *æquinoctium* (Gr. *ἰσημερίαι*); and for the idea of the solstice separate expressions have been formed among the different Teutonic peoples (O.H.G. *sunwende*, *sungiht*, *sunstede*, *sommertag*, A.S. *sunnstede*, Old Nor. *sólhvarf*) which proclaim their dependence on the Lat. *solstitium* by the fact that they, like it, are used only for the *summer solstice*; but for the *winter solstice* (Lat. *brûma*, i.e. *brevissima*; perhaps its festival was *Angerona*, cf. Wissowa, *op. cit.* p. 194) *absolutely no old Teutonic expressions are to be found.* Finally, it is impossible to understand what significance the fixing of the longest or the shortest day could have had, presupposing that it was at all possible in primitive conditions of culture*; for Procopius (*de Bell. Got.* ii. 15) relates of the inhabitants of Thule that, after they had been 35 days without the light of the sun, they sent messengers to the highest peaks of the mountains to spy out if the sun would not soon return, and then, when they had announced its speedy return, they celebrated the greatest of their festivals. Such a narrative is easily enough understood of the most northerly stretches, but would be utterly unintelligible among men who had the sun always before their eyes (cf. A. Tille, *Yule and Christmas*, 'Solstices and Equinoxes').

But although these solstice festivals, as such, among the Aryan peoples, seem to be by no means very primitive, it cannot be said that the manifest agreement of the customs and usages relating to them rests entirely on later transference and migration. If we turn our attention to the rites connected with the summer solstice or St. John's day (St. Ivan's day among the Slavs), we see that a characteristic feature of them is the intimate connexion in which the two elements of *fire* and *water* occur. It is everywhere customary to kindle bonfires, to dance round them, or to leap over them, generally in pairs. Almost everywhere we find water in some form or other along with the fire. It may be that the festive company bathe either before or after the kindling of the fire, it may be that fire-wheels are cast into the stream and there extinguished, or it may be in some other way.† In this connexion it seems most easy to understand an old Indian solstice custom which took place at the *Mahâvrata* festival, *i.e.* (according to Hillebrandt, *Romanische Forschungen*, v. 299) at the festival of the summer solstice (at a later date Mahâvrata is the winter solstice). Accompanied by the beating of drums, women carrying jars filled with water march in procession three times round a fire from right to left and then again from left to right, singing a song, which closes with the refrain, 'That is mead.' After going round the fire for the last time, they pour the water into the fire and thus extinguish it.

This remarkable combination of the two elements so highly honoured by the Aryans, fire and water, is entirely inexplicable when we start from an original solstice festival. On the other hand, it can be very easily interpreted if, in the usage of the Mahâvrata festival, which, moreover, was held in honour not of a sun-god but of Indra, the giver of refreshing rain, we see with Hillebrandt (*op. cit.*) and Oldenberg (*Die Religion des Veda*, pp. 448, 507) an ancient *rain-charm*, *i.e.* a magical device for procuring rain (cf. above, p. 40). Then the conjecture is inevitable, that in the rites described as existing mainly among Indians, Slavs, and Teutons, we have to recognize the vestiges of an ancient Aryan festival dedicated to fire and water, and held in summer, in which, by means of extinguishing the fire on the earth, the worshipper sought to cause the heavens to send down streams of fertilizing moisture on the meadows and fields. We have the additional fact that among all the Aryan peoples inhabiting Middle Europe the time near the Feast of St. John constitutes a kind of dividing period in the rainfall, *i.e.* the rain that fell *before* St. John's Day was believed to be especially valuable, and was prayed for from heaven by priest and congregation, while, on the other hand, the rain that fell *after* St. John's Day was useless, and even brought harm. Regarding St. John's Day itself, different opinions prevail. The peasants of the Russian province of Archangel say, 'The rain on St. John's Day is better than a mountain of gold'; other peoples hold an exactly opposite view (cf., for details on the subject, Alexis Yermoloff, *Der landwirtschaftliche Volkskalender*, Leipzig, 1905, p. 296 ff.). Thus from this side also we seem to obtain confirmation of our conjecture that in the customs described above we have traces of a midsummer feast which was celebrated without special regard to the longest day. Among other things, it may have belonged to the solemn rites of such a festival to seek, for the last time in the summer, to obtain moisture for the meadows and fields by means of a rain-charm. This view, which we have adopted with regard to the original significance of fire and water, does not in any way militate against the idea expressed by Mannhardt (*Der Baumkultus*, pp. 497, 516, 521). He regards the midsummer fires as sun-charms, since fire is supposed to represent the light and heat of the summer sun, to which the growing vegetation must be exposed.

Remains of a second Aryan festival, *a spring-feast*, are perhaps to be found in the worship of the Teutonic *Ôstara* and the Indian *Ushas*, which had its special place in the ritual at the beginning of the year at the *Prâtaranuvâka* of the *Agniṣṭoma* sacrifice, which was observed with great solemnity in spring (cf. Hillebrandt, *Vedische Mythologie*, ii. 26 ff.). It seems that this festival is chiefly in view in the idea, proved to be Aryan by L. v. Schröder ('Lihgo, Refrain der lettischen Sonnwendlieder,' in the *Mitteil. d. anthrop. Gesell. in Wien*, xxxii.), that the sun at its rising, particularly on certain days, dances, jumps, shakes itself, and plays.

From such indications as these we must seek further information concerning the times of the old Aryan festivals. Since the moon, as we have already noticed, was the measurer of time in primitive times, the Aryan *certi dies* must have been connected with the chief phases of the moon, new moon and full moon. In fact, in India the sacrifices of the new and the full moon belong to the regular and most ancient offerings to the gods (cf. Oldenberg, *op. cit.* p. 441 ff., and A. Hillebrandt, *Das altindische Neu- und Vollmondsopfer*, Jena,

* Even in civilized Greece it seems to have been difficult. Cf. Eustath. on *Od.* xv. 402: *ἕτεροι δέ φασι σπήλαιον εἶναι ἐκεῖ, δι' οὗ τὰς τοῦ ἡλίου ὡς εἰκὸς ἐσημειοῦντο τροπάς, δι' ὃ καὶ ἡλίου διὰ τοῦτο σπήλαιον ἔλεγον, καὶ τοῦτο δηλοῦσθαι ἐν τῷ δθι τροπαὶ ἡλίου.* Cf. also Lebègue, *Recherches sur Délos*, Paris, 1876, p. 876: 'Le matin vers le moi d'avril un rayon de soleil glissant contre la montagne pénètre dans la caverne et la remplit un instant tout entière,' etc. (Communication of C. Weniger in Weimar).

† Cf. the following description from the south of Russia in Glazunov, *Russian Folksongs* (Russ.), St. Petersburg, 1894, p. 81: 'In particular, young men and women bathe themselves, then they put on wreaths of field-maple with fragrant herbs, gird themselves with artemisia, and gather before sunset on an elevated place, always overlooking a river. They set up two figures: one a human-like image, the other a piece of wood covered with female attire, ribbons, and garlands. The wood is generally maple. Then they kindle heaps of straw, walk in a circle round it, sing songs and, taking the figures in their hands, spring in pairs (every lad with his lass) through the fire. When they have all sprung through, then they throw the figures, of which the male is called *Kupalo* (*kupála* "St. John's day," cf. *kupatt* "to bathe"), the female *Marena* ("madder"), into the water. Afterwards they also throw their wreaths into the stream.'

1880). But in Greece also the feast-days were connected with definite phases of the moon, particularly the full moon (cf. A. Mommsen, *Heortologie*, p. 2); and among the Teutons the 'certi dies, cum aut inchoatur luna aut impletur' (Tac. *Germania*, ch. 11), on which the popular assemblies took place, and which were regarded as the 'agendis rebus auspicatissimum initium,' were certainly identical with the 'certi dies' (ch. 9) on which the people, *e.g.*, 'Mercurio humanis quoque hostiis litare fas habent.' In Rome all the Ides (*idus* = Ir. *ésce* 'luna') were regarded as feast-days.

Religious ceremonies must in primitive times have accompanied the ordinary family feasts as well. These come most directly to the front in the Aryan *marriage ceremonial*, in which again fire and water enjoy common worship. In India the bridegroom, after taking the bride by the hand, leads her three times round the fire on the hearth, on which a sacrifice of roasted corn is offered. Previously a new jug filled with water is placed on the floor, and it must remain on the right side of the bridal pair as they march round the fire. But liberal use is also made at other times of water, which is solemnly brought from the spring. The bride is bathed in it, or the young pair are sprinkled with it. In Rome, marriage is even designated a union 'aqua et igni.'

Romulus married the captured Sabine women, κατὰ τοὺς πατρίους ἐκάστης ἐθισμοὺς ἐπὶ κοινωνίᾳ πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος ἐγγυῶν τοὺς γάμους (Dion. ii. 30), and Varro (Serv. *ad Æn.* iv. 167) reports: '*Aqua et igni* mariti uxores accipiebant. Unde hodieque et faces prælucent et aqua petita de puro fonte per felicissimum puerum aliquem aut puellam interest nuptiis, de qua nubentibus solebant pedes lavari.'

Here, too, a solemn procession round the altar from left to right took place, at which a boy carried the marriage-torch and the marriage-water, drawn from a pure spring; then in the house of the bride's father a *far*-loaf (hence *confarreatio*) was sacrificed in the fire (on the Greek λουτροφόρος, cf. above, p. 22). The same customs which we find in the east and south of the Aryan world exist also in the north of Europe.

Thus Menecius reports of the Lithuanians: 'Cum nuptiæ celebrantur, sponsa *ter ducitur circa focum*, deinde ibidem in sella collocatur, super quam sedenti *pedes lavantur aqua* qua lectus nuptialis, tota supellex domestica et invitati ad nuptias hospites consperguntur.'

Also among the Slavs, just as on St. Ivan's day, baths and dancing through or over a fire belong to the fixed marriage rites, and finally, in ancient Germany the bride was led three times round the hearth in the house of the bridegroom after she had stepped over a vessel of water (cf. the proofs of this fact in *Reallexicon*, art. 'Heirat,' p. 356 ff.). Perhaps in this case the union of fire and water (heat and moisture) may be regarded as the symbol under which husband and wife were united to each other for the purpose of producing a numerous progeny.

For further details regarding the common religious customs connected with the naming of the child, the first cutting of his hair, the feast of puberty, etc., see Winternitz, 'Was wissen wir von den Indogermanen?' (*Beilage zur Münchner AZ*, 1903, No. 258, p. 293), and E. Samter, *Familienfeste der Griechen und Römer*, Berlin, 1901.

5. The relation of the 'heavenly ones' to the morality of mankind.—In all the higher stages of heathen religion we find the gods represented as the guardians of all written and unwritten law, and as the strict avengers of all human transgressions of the same. Here we shall seek to discuss the question how far back in the history of the Aryan peoples this conception goes. It is obvious that legal or moral ordinances could be thought of as under the protection of some higher being only after these ordinances had been evolved and come to consciousness in the human society itself. Accordingly, it will be necessary in entering upon this discussion to direct our attention to the law and custom of primitive Aryan times as they are shown to us by the science of Aryan antiquities. What we at the present day designate as 'punishment' and 'crime' resolve themselves, the further back we go into the past of the Aryan peoples, in a great number of cases into the conceptions of 'fine' and 'act liable to a fine.' The Lat. *pœna* is the judicial penalty prescribed as a corrective provision against the transgression of the law, but the Gr. ποινή, from which *pœna* is borrowed, is, as we shall see below, the old Aryan expression for 'fine.' In the same way the Lat. *condemnare* is used of every legal condemnation, but the root-word *damnum* originally signifies nothing else than 'that which is given (as a fine)' (**da-mno-m : dare*). The German word *Schuld*, which in all the Teutonic languages in which it occurs designates the guilt of the accused in a law-court as well as guilt before the gods, as is evident from its being derived from Goth. *skal*, *skulun*, *skula*, *skulds*, meant nothing else than *Du sollst*, sc. *bezahlen* ('Thou shalt pay'). The Lat. *flâgitium*, 'crime,' 'infamous deed,' which is derived from **flageto*, (cf. *flagito*, 'I demand') probably = Ir. *dligid* (**dligeto-*), 'duty,' 'law,' 'right,' Ir. *dligim*, 'I have a claim to something,' Welsh *dleu*, etc., 'to be guilty,' Bret. *dle*, Goth. *dulgs*, Old Slav. *dlŭgŭ*, 'guilt,' undoubtedly goes back in the same way to a fundamental meaning 'liability,' *i.e.* to a fine, and so on. The reason of this phenomenon lies in the fact that in primitive Aryan times a great number of actions which we regard as crimes at the present day, and which are punishable by the State—murder and manslaughter, theft and robbery, rape and adultery, etc.—were not punished in any way by the community, *i.e.* in primitive relations, *by the tribe and its chief* (Skr. *râj* = Lat. *rex*, Ir. *rí*), but the avenging of them was left to the self-help of the individual families which were united in the tribe. The exercise of this self-help took the form of *blood-revenge* (cf. above, p. 28), which even in the earliest times could be expiated by a fine of cattle. The Aryan expression for blood-revenge itself and its compensation by means of the money payment is contained in the equivalents: Avesta *kaênâ* = Gr. ποινή: Skr. *cʰi*, Gr. τίνομαι = 'to punish,' 'to avenge,' 'to submit to pay a fine.' When at a later date the power of the State to inflict punishment deprived the families of the self-help and the exacting of the fine, the latter idea was changed into the conception of the penalty imposed by the State, and the action which incurred payment of a fine became a crime against the laws of the State (cf. *Reallexicon*, artt. 'Blutrache,' 'Strafe,' and 'Verbrechen').

Now such actions as were to be followed by blood-revenge or to be expiated by a fine were not in primitive times regarded as transgressions of the decrees of any supernatural beings whatsoever. This is seen to be the case from the fact that, in the earliest historical times, *e.g.* in the ethics of the Homeric poets, those very crimes which according to our ideas are most heinous, murder and robbery, were neither regarded as defiling mankind nor condemned by the moral consciousness of the people. For what other explanation can be given of the fact that Theoclymenus (*Od.* xv. 256 ff.), who had slain a man in Argos and had taken flight, was received by Telemachus without any purification being regarded as necessary, as was usual at a later date; or that Ulysses himself (*Od.* xiii. 256 ff.) was not afraid of the abhorrence of his listener, when, although in an imaginary story, he represented himself as a man who treacherously lay in ambush and killed a fellow-countryman in Crete? Just as little did Telemachus (*Od.* iii. 70 ff.) take

offence when he was asked on his arrival if he was perhaps a robber who was roving over the sea and at hazard of his own life bringing woe on alien men (cf., further, in *Reallexicon*, artt. 'Mord' and 'Raub'). Thus, it seems that actions such as those mentioned above had nothing in them offensive to the conscience of the people if they were carried out openly or with violence. On the other hand, theft and adultery may have been regarded at an earlier date as morally reprehensible merely on account of their secrecy—a view which finds expression in the fact that, so far as we can see, the killing of the adulterer or the thief, caught in the act, did not as a rule call forth the blood-revenge of his family, *i.e.* to use the form of expression of a later date, remained unpunished (cf. *Reallexicon*, artt. 'Diebstahl' and 'Ehebruch').

Under the circumstances described above, it may seem remarkable that in the vocabulary of the original language there was nevertheless *one* expression for the notion of sin and crime, in which the idea of a shortcoming before gods and men seems to have been operative from the beginning: Skr. *á'gas* = Gr. ἄγος (*ánágas* = ἀναγής, *i.e.* 'without *á'gas*'—ἄγος). But we shall see that the circumstances connected with this expression are very peculiar. If we examine the oldest use of the Greek word (with regard to that of the Indian one, we can unfortunately deduce very little), we find that it is used by the tragedians (cf. *Reallexicon*, p. 905) with reference to *four* different actions, namely, high treason, regicide, parricide, and carelessness with regard to the duty of interment of a relative. An ἄγος, then, which is best translated by 'abomination,' was committed on the one hand by the man who was guilty of a hostile act against the tribe and against its chief, the king, and on the other hand by the man who violated the duties resting upon him in virtue of his family or tribal connexion. Here, too, there can be no doubt as to who the deities were that were insulted thereby. In Æschylus (*Septem contra Thebas*, 1017) we are told of Polynices: ἄγος δὲ καὶ θανὼν κεκτήσεται | θεῶν πατρῴων οὓς ἀτιμάσας ὅδε | στράτευμ' ἑπακτὸν ἐμβαλὼν ἥρει πόλιν, *i.e.* he who led the army against the city was in life an abomination to the θεοὶ πατρῷοι, and—as unburied—would be the same in death. But these θεοὶ πατρῷοι (cf. the discussion of the name in Caland, *Totenverehrung*, p. 69 f.) were—at least originally—*not* the 'heavenly ones' or the gods related to them, therefore not Zeus, Apollo, Athene, etc., but rather the *souls of the ancestors honoured as divine*, the heroes of the tribe or the family, to whom on the mainland of Greece even in later times a rich worship was assigned (cf. E. Rohde, *Psyche*[2], i. 167 ff.). We saw (above, p. 28) that the foundation pillars of the social organization in primitive Aryan times rested on *ancestor-worship*, and it is an almost obvious conclusion that the souls of the worshipped ancestors were thought of as watching with jealous exactness over the keeping of the old institutions in the family and in the tribe (cf. above, p. 23). All those actions which merited praise rather than blame, when committed against one who did not belong to the clan, were regarded when perpetrated against a member of the family as ἄγος, which challenged the vengeance of the spirits of the progenitors who presided over the family. The old Roman conditions speak very plainly in this connexion: 'In regis Romuli et Tatii legibus hæc est: "si parentem puer verberit, ast olle plorassit parens, puer divis parentum sacer estod" id est clamarit. adicitur: "si nurus [sc. verberit parentem], sacra divis parentum estod" in Servi Tulli' (acc. to Th. Mommsen in C. G. Bruns, *Fontes iuris Romani antiqui*[6], Freiburg, 1883, p. 8). Thus, then, if a son beats his father or a daughter-in-law her father-in-law, they are said to be doomed to the *divis parentum*, the θεοῖς πατρῴοις, the souls of the ancestors, *i.e.* to death. How much more must this have been the case with the *paricida*, the 'kin-murderer' (**pâro-* from **pâso-* = Gr. πηός), *i.e.* the man who had killed a member of the clan; and Brunnenmeister (*Das Tötungsverbrechen im altrömischen Recht* p. 171) has undoubtedly good ground for describing the *deo* (or better still the *divis parentum*) *necari* as the legal consequence of the *paricidium*. These conditions doubtless also gave rise to the Latin expression *supplicium*, 'capital punishment,' really, however, the 'appeasing' (*sub-placare*), sc. *divorum parentum*. As the spirits of the ancestors had power over the family, so in the same way would they also have controlled the tribe even in primitive times, and their wrath would have been aroused by everything which was directed against the tribe and its leader, the king. Punishment by death, then, by means of stoning, the only punishment of primitive times (cf. above, p. 42), which was decreed and immediately executed by the popular assembly, which represented the tribe, can best be conceived of as a *supplicium*, *i.e.* an act of expiation of the spirits who rule over the tribe (cf. *Reallexicon*, artt. 'Opfer,' 'Verbrechen,' 'Strafe,' and 'Volksversammlung').

It is therefore evident that the oldest combination of law, custom, and religion is to be found in the *worship of the dead*, who from the remotest antiquity were looked upon as the guardians of the order prevailing in the family and the tribe (Skr. *svadhá* 'propriety,' 'customary condition' = Gr. ἔθος, 'habit,' 'custom,' 'usage,' ἦθος, 'use and wont,' 'habitual stopping-place,' and (perhaps) Goth. *sidus*, O. H. G. *situ*, 'custom'). The 'heavenly ones' have originally nothing whatever to do with this conception; they are entirely beyond the realm of good or ill ('jenseits von Gut und Böse'). For if what is stated in detail above is correct, that the deities designated by the equivalents Skr. *devá*, Lat. *deus*, etc., were nothing else than 'special gods' of the sky and the natural phenomena connected with it, who exerted an influence only within the spheres to which they owed their conceptual origin, it is obvious that mankind could have recourse to them only in matters which lay within these special spheres. In this way a man may have sacrificed to the thunder that it might spare his own head and strike the head of the enemy, or he may have prayed to the fire to light up and to scare away the night-monsters and destroy the fields of the enemy, but nothing more. It is no accident that, even in the hymns of the Rigveda, the gods are much more frequently represented as strong, large, and powerful than as endowed with any moral qualities (cf. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, p. 284). But the more the 'heavenly ones' and the gods connected with them developed into distinctive and many-sided *personalities*, the more were they also invested with a moral life, seeing that, on the one hand, with the evolution of the family and the tribe into the city and the State, they took over the rôle of guardian from the souls of the ancestors, and, on the other hand, appeared as the bearers and protectors of *new* moral ideas, which were gradually coming to the front in human society. Thus the past belongs to the spirits of the ancestors, and the future to the 'heavenly ones.' It will be of advantage to seek to apprehend this important process of evolution in the history of *two* moral duties which received comparatively late recognition—the duty of truth and the duty of hospitality.

(1) *Truth.*—The Aryan name for this idea is contained in the two originally connected equivalents, Skr. *satyá* = Goth. *sunjis*, and Lat. *vērus* = O. H. G. *wâr*, Old Ir. *fír*, both roots signifying the 'actually existing' (*satyá* : *sán*, 'existing,' Lat. *verus* from **ves-ro-s*: Goth. *visan*, 'to be,' 'to exist'). The oath serves the purpose of strengthening this 'actually existing'; and

the farther back we go in point of time, the more important is the part played by the oath; just as, even at the present day, the uneducated more frequently than the educated regard it as necessary to strengthen their words by means of an oath. The existence of the oath in primitive Aryan times is placed beyond the reach of doubt by the series of words: Skr. *am*, Gr. ὄμνυμι, Ital. *omn* (cf. Aufrecht, *Rhein. Museum*, xl. 160, and Bücheler, *Lex Ital.* p. 18; cf. also the words, Old Slav. *rota* 'oath,' = Armen. *erdnum* 'swear,' and Irish *éth* = Goth. *aiþ*). The most ancient oath on Aryan soil (cf. *Reallexicon*, art. 'Eid') was simply a *curse*, which a man declared against himself in case of false swearing (thus Skr. *śapátha*, 'curse,' 'oath', Old Slav. *klęti sę*, lit. 'to curse oneself' = 'to swear,' Germ. *schwören*). In swearing, a man touched himself or some other object (thus Ir. *tong*, 'swear,' = Lat. *tango*, 'I touch,' and Old Slav. *prisęga*, 'oath,' lit. 'touching'), with the idea that the object touched would bring destruction or be exposed to destruction if he swore falsely. In contrast to this, the oaths of the Greeks and Romans manifest, even in the oldest historical times, a more elevated character; for among both these peoples, leaving out of account a few survivals of the oldest state of affairs, the gods, and in particular Zeus-Juppiter, were invoked both in order to be present as witnesses of the curse pronounced, and to carry it out in the case of perjury. Thus we are brought from the realm of magic to the sway of religion; the 'heavenly ones'—particularly Zeus, the god of the bright, all-seeing sky of day—have become the bearers and the guardians of the concept of truth.

(2) *Hospitality.*—The primitive Aryans, like all other primitive races, regarded the stranger as a man without rights, who could be killed or robbed with impunity. In apparently irreconcilable contradiction to this idea, which in its last ramifications was finally vanquished only by the new conception of life brought in by Christianity, there stands the custom of *hospitality*, which can be proved to have existed among all the Aryan peoples, even among Teutons, Slavs, and Lithuanians, as early as the beginning of historical tradition (cf. *Reallexicon*, art. 'Gastfreundschaft'); and the present writer, in opposition to his previous opinion, thinks it may be regarded as belonging to the primitive Aryans. How is it possible to regard a person as an outlaw, and yet at the same time give him a cordial reception at one's own fireside? In answer to this question, R. v. Ihering, in an essay, 'Die Gastfreundschaft im Altertum' (*Deutsche Rundschau*, 1888–87, vol. lii. April–June, 1887), and the present writer in his book, *Handelsgeschichte und Warenkunde*, i., Jena, 1886, p. 4 ff., have simultaneously, and independently of each other, pointed to the *exchange of gifts*, which is everywhere inseparably connected with the custom of hospitality, and expressed the view that in it is to be found the origin of hospitality, without which, in these primitive conditions, commercial intercourse would have been impossible. This opinion is everywhere confirmed by the facts of ethnology, which show that among many uncivilized peoples trade is nothing else than an exchange of gifts, and a hospitable reception is extended to the trader in spite of the bloodthirsty hatred of strangers. 'The Angami-Nagas, in the mountainous regions of Assam, are divided into numerous communities, who live in constant feud; they are zealous head-hunters. But, none the less, the Angami trader of any village whatsoever finds in every other at least *one* house where he receives food and shelter, and is in safety from sudden murderous desires' (Ratzel, *Völkerkunde*[2], i. 570 ff.). G. Klemm (*Kulturgeschichte*, iv. 310) also reports as follows of the South Sea Islanders: 'As we saw above, besides the salutation a special gift is also essential to the sign of hospitality. This gift is regarded, when it is received, as being, in a kind of way, a continuation and a confirmation of the salutation. It consists of fruits, mats, and such-like articles, and forms to some extent the foundation of intercourse on the basis of barter and trade.' Similar conditions may also be assumed for primitive Aryan times, in which the existence of a primitive trade by barter can be etymologically demonstrated (cf. *Reallexicon*, art. 'Handel'); and in the series of words, Lat. *hostis*, Goth. *gasts*, Old Slav. *gosti*, this twofold conception of enemy and guest lies clearly before us (cf. Winternitz, *op. cit.* p. 339). But, in order to become a 'guest,' the stranger must be formally received into a native family group. He thereby becomes himself a relative, as is expressed, *e.g.*, in the Lith. *svẽczias*, 'guest,' from **swetjas* = Gr. ἕτης from **svetá*, 'relative'; the father of the family, on the other hand, into which he enters, becomes the *hospes*, *i.e.* **hosti-pets* 'lord and protector of the stranger,' and thereby at the same time takes over the responsibility for the personal safety of the stranger. This relation is still clearly described in the Anglo-Saxon legislation (cf. Roeder, 'Die Familie bei d. Angelsachsen,' *Studien zur eng. Philol.* iv. 83, note 1); and that is what is meant when Mauricius, *Strateg.* xi. 5, reports of the Slavs: εἰσὶ δὲ τοῖς ἐπιξενουμένοις αὐτοῖς ἥπιοι, καὶ φιλοφρονούμενοι αὐτοὺς διασώζουσιν ἐκ τόπου εἰς τόπον, οὗ ἂν δέωνται, ὡς εἴγε δι' ἀμέλειαν τοῦ ὑποδεχομένου συμβῇ τὸν ξένον βλαβῆναι, πόλεμον κινεῖ κατ' αὐτὸν ὁ τούτου παραθέμενος, σέβας ἡγούμενος τὴν τοῦ ξένου ἐκδίκησιν, *i.e.* he feels himself bound to take blood-revenge, just as if he were a relative. Thus the 'guest,' by means of the protection of a family and the θεοὶ πατρῷοι which guard it, is rendered inviolable. Now, the more the intercourse between tribes is extended, and the more they all learn to look up to Zeus, the great father of gods and men, the more does he also take over the task of protecting the stranger who is already, in a certain sense, sacred, and so Ζεὺς ξένιος takes his rise. That this is a comparatively late process is expressed by this very epithet, which appears very seldom in the Homeric language, in comparison with the countless number of attributes referring to the physical or natural powers of the god (cf. above, p. 34).

Not only did the 'heavenly ones' become the guardians of moral ordinances which were present in human society from the earliest times or had arisen at a later date, but there were evolved from their cult moral ideas previously unknown. This side of the relation between the gods and morality can be illustrated from the history of the idea of chastity.

That there was anything of the nature of this idea in primitive Aryan times must, in view of ascertained facts, be regarded as well-nigh impossible. Unlimited sexual intercourse with concubines and slaves besides his wife was allowed to the husband. The wife was, it is true, bound to conjugal faithfulness on pain of death; but the circumstance that the husband, in case of his own sexual impotence, could hand her over to a 'helper in generation' or could place her at the disposal of an honoured guest, shows that less value was laid on her sexual chastity than on the unlimited possession of her, which could occasionally be surrendered. As far as the condition *before* marriage was concerned, it is to be feared that Herodotus with his description of the Thracians: τὰς δὲ παρθένους οὐ φυλάσσουσι, ἀλλ' ἔωσι οἵαι αὐταὶ βούλονται ἀνδράσι μίσγεσθαι (v. 6) comes nearer the true state of affairs in antiquity than Tacitus with his well-known glorification of ancient Teutonic chastity (cf. *Reallexicon*, artt. 'Ehebruch,' 'Keuschheit,' 'Zeugungshelfer,' 'Gastfreundschaft'). In addition, what a mass of indecent customs, or which at least seem to us indecent, are to be found in primitive times! In Rome a god *Mutunus Tutunus* (cf. above, p. 32) was worshipped, whose name was derived from the male and female sexual organs (*mutto* and *titus*). The newly married bride was placed on his *fascinum*. The amulet was called *muttonium* (from *mutto*). The Lithuanian youth sacrificed to a god *Pizius* (from Lith. *pisti*, 'coire') when they brought the bride to the bridegroom. Even the 'chaste' Teutons too, according to the report of Adam of Bremen, worshipped at their marriage festivals their god *Fricco* under the symbol of an immense *priapus*.

If, in contrast to this undisguised and brutally emphasized idea of sex, we examine the terminology of the conception 'chaste' in the separate Aryan languages, viz. Gr. ἁγνός (cf. ἅγιος 'holy,' ἄζομαι 'I fear'), Lat. *castus* (cf. *castum*, 'the sacred festive season of a deity, during which much restraint was enjoined,' *castimonia*, 'bodily purity which is demanded for religious ceremonies, the restraint from sensual enjoyments'), Goth. *swikns* (ἁγνός, ὅσιος, ἀθῷος), O. H. G. *chúski*, *scûski* (perhaps *sciuhen* 'to fear'), we find as a result that this conception in all probability has *its root in sacred soil*. In the worship of the 'heavenly ones,' the idea must first have occurred that it was fitting at definite periods, in order to draw near to the gods 'in purity,' to abstain from cohabitation* and other pleasures of the senses. An interesting pamphlet in this connexion is Eugen Fehrle, *Die kultische Keuschheit im Altertum*. i., Naumburg, 1908. It is, however, not unlikely that the whole teaching on religious purity, of which sexual purity forms only a single branch, is not native to Aryan soil (cf. *Reallexicon*, art. 'Reinheit und Unreinheit').

The connexion of the 'heavenly ones' with law and morality, thus briefly described, was, as we saw above, considerably promoted by the priests and priestly bodies that were always coming more clearly to the front among the individual peoples. For they believed that in representing all the rules of law and morality prevalent on earth as the outcome of heavenly ordinances, and themselves as the appointed interpreters of the same, they were most effectively serving the interests of the 'heavenly ones,' of mankind, and of themselves.

If in this way we are correct in our contention that in primitive Aryan times the bond of connexion between the 'heavenly ones' and the morality of mankind was very weak, we must not omit, at the close of our discussion of this topic, to call attention to the theory recently propounded by Leopold v. Schröder (cf. *Verhandlungen des II. internationalen Kongresses für allgemeine Religionsgeschichte in Basel*, 1905, p. 89). He holds that, like other primitive peoples, the primitive Aryans not only cherished animism and ancestor-worship, but already possessed the belief in one supreme benign being. This

* This does not exclude the possibility that certain rules of continence, as, *e.g.*, the demand occurring among the Indians and Teutons to preserve continence some time after marriage, had as their object the turning aside of magic influences, such as the entrance of evil spirits into the body of the woman at the consummation of the nuptials (cf. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, p. 271, and L. v. Schröder, *Die Hochzeitsbräuche der Esten*, etc., Berlin, 1888, p. 193).

being came in the course of pre-historic times to be combined with the primitive god of the sky, Dyaus, Ζεύς, etc. (cf. above, p. 33). We shall wait with interest to see what grounds L. v. Schröder is able to bring forward in support of this contention, which, to us at least, seems very daring.

III. *Fate.*—More even than by questions concerning the origin and relation of life and death, or by reflexion on the nature and descent of the heavenly gods, has the mind of man from remotest antiquity been exercised by the gloomy power which mysteriously surrounds him from the cradle to the grave, and which we call 'fate.' The souls of ancestors or the spirits that reveal themselves in the powers of nature can be reconciled and made serviceable to man. But inaccessible and incomprehensible seems to be that unknown power which appears ever to lavish its smiles on one and to bear an everlasting grudge against another, and which without distinction overwhelms with weal or woe 'now the curly-headed boy in the innocence of youth, now the grey-haired sinner in the guilt of old age.' Only rarely, and at certain late stages of its development, do we find in paganism the thought in which the Christian finds peace of soul—the thought, namely, that in reality God and fate are one and the same. Before that, however, mankind had proposed other solutions of the dark problem. What are these? Again the Christian, in his confidence in the unity of God and fate, and in the certainty that all that befalls him, as being sent from God, must be for his best here and hereafter, declines the attempt to probe the unsearchable will of God by human means. On the other hand, there runs through the whole of heathenism an irrepressible longing, appearing in a more intense degree the further back we go in point of time, to penetrate with inquisitive and premature vision into the dark land of the future, to tear the covering from the veiled picture. In what ways was this attempted?

Thus there are *two* questions which we have here to consider in reference to primitive Aryan times: 'What idea did they entertain of fate?' and 'How did they seek to divine the future?'

1. **The conception of fate.**—In this discussion we shall start from a famous passage in the *Iliad* (xxii. 208 ff.). Achilles has pursued Hector three times round the walls of Troy:

ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ τὸ τέταρτον ἐπὶ κρουνοὺς ἀφίκοντο,
καὶ τότε δὴ χρύσεια πατὴρ ἐτίταινε τάλαντα,
ἐν δ' ἐτίθει δύο κῆρε ταναηλεγέος θανάτοιο,
τὴν μὲν Ἀχιλλῆος, τὴν δ' Ἕκτορος ἱπποδάμοιο,
ἕλκε δὲ μέσσα λαβών· ῥέπε δ' Ἕκτορος αἴσιμον ἦμαρ.

The expressions that are of interest to us here are, first of all, the κῆρε, which are laid by Zeus on the balance of fate, and, secondly, the αἶσα involved in the αἴσιμον ἦμαρ. A synonym of αἶσα is μοῖρα, which is not mentioned here, but which is identical with it, representing the power that moves the balance of fate. As far as the word κήρ is concerned, we have seen its exact meaning at an earlier stage (cf. above, pp. 15, 27), where we were speaking of the driving away of the spirits designated as κῆρες on the occasion of the Anthesteria festival in Athens. κήρ is, accordingly, the soul, or better, *a* soul of man, for Tylor (i. 427 f.) has shown us that belief in the existence of several souls in the human body is widely prevalent. The soul designated by the term κήρ is specially regarded as the bearer of the fate of death to men, whether that death be peaceful or fraught with violence (cf. *Il.* ix. 411). Every man is invested at birth with such a κήρ, in consequence of which there are μυρίαι κῆρες (*Il.* xii. 326 f.). But every people as well, in so far as it is thought of as an individual, *e.g.* the Trojans or the Achæans (*Il.* viii. 69 ff.), possesses such a κήρ; and the word is finally used, and that, too, very frequently, as a personification of the goddess of death, Κήρ, the daughter of the night, whose brethren are Μόρος, Θάνατος, Ὕπνος, and the φῦλον Ὀνείρων, 'the people of dreams' (cf. Hesiod, *Theog.* 211 ff.). A series of ideas from the north of Europe comes more or less near to this Old Greek conception of κήρ. In the first place, the Old Norse figures of *fylgja* must be mentioned. Their identity with the human soul follows at once from the circumstance that the expression is interchangeable with the above-mentioned Old Norse *hugr*, 'soul' (cf. p. 15, and also W. Henzen, *Über die Träume in der altnordischen Sagalitteratur*, Leipzig, 1890, p. 36). They are called 'followers,' because the soul, like the ψυχή in Greece, follows the man as his second 'self,' his εἴδωλον. They often appear to the dreamer as animals (birds, horses, fishes, wolves, lions, white bears, boars, hares, oxen, goats); and if they appear, they announce certain ruin. As there was a κήρ of the Trojans and the Achæans, so among the old Norsemen there was a *kyn-* or *ættarfylgja*, i.e. a *fylgja* of the tribe; and, as was the case with the κῆρες (cf. *Il.* ix. 411), a man could have several *fylgja*. On the other hand, the latter word has a wider signification in so far as it designates the guardian spirit of the man generally. The latter is also the meaning of the Old Norse *hamingja*, 'the many-formed' (Old Nor. *hamr*, 'form'), in like manner a designation of the human soul taken from its capacity of transforming itself, for the *hamingja* appear frequently as animals or as women. Especially characteristic is their hereditary transmission in the family, passing over from father to son, and so on. They appear first as giant women, offspring of the Norns, who are the *hamingja* of the world (cf. Vigfusson, *Icelandic-Eng. Dictionary*, Oxf., 1874–76, p. 236). Finally, we may mention the characteristic features of the southern Slavonic *vjedogonya*, who are conceived of partly as spirits of the house and partly as guardian spirits dwelling in each man. Probably their name (Slovenian *vjetrogonja*) is connected with Old Slav. *větrŭ*, 'wind,' in which case the wind-like nature of the soul would be indicated (cf. F. S. Krauss, *Sreća, Glück und Schicksal im Volksglauben der Südslaven*, Vienna, 1886, p. 19 ff.).

We have thus made acquaintance with a series of souls of fate and souls of fortune, a knowledge of which will assist us in the following consideration of αἶσα and μοῖρα.

Both of these words signify not only etymologically (αἶσα from **aigia*: Lat. *æquus*; μοῖρα: μέρος, μείρομαι, εἵμαρται), but also in actual usage, nothing more in the first instance than 'share' without any reference to fate, and then the share assigned by fate to every individual man at his birth (ὅτε μιν τέκε μήτηρ) (*Il.* xx. 128; *Od.* vii. 198). Thus they correspond exactly to the Slavonic expressions, Russ. *častĭ*, 'part,' 'lot,' 'fate,' *sčastĭe*, 'fortune,' *nesčastĭe*, 'misfortune' (**čensti*: Gr. σχίζω, Lat. *scindo*, lit. 'the part split off,' 'the share'), and *dolja*, 'part,' 'portion,' *nedolja*, 'misfortune' (Old Slav. *dola*, *dělŭ*, 'part,' Goth. *dails*).

This 'share' is, according to the popular Slavonic idea, innate, and it is natural to make the mother responsible for it if one is dissatisfied with his 'share' (cf. A. N. Veselovskij, 'Fate in the popular thought of the Slavs,' in *Trans. of the Imperial Academy of Science in St. Petersburg* [Russ.], xlvi. 173 ff.). There is thus a slight distinction between μοῖρα (αἶσα) and *dolja* (*častĭ*), in that the former is received *at* birth, the latter *by* birth. The latter idea, however, is proved to be the more ancient from the circumstance that among many Aryan peoples, in connexion with the assignation of fate to the separate individuals, there are deities who

are designated as 'mothers' or 'child-bearers.' On Slavonic soil this is true of the Old Slav. *roždanicy* (*roditi, ražd̆ati* 'parere,' *rožd̆enije*, 'generatio,' *rožd̆enica*, 'nativitas,' 'obstetrix, 'matrix,' 'mater,' 'generatio'), deities to whom, just as to the Perun and the Rodŭ, *i.e.* the personifications of the clan, sacrificial offerings of bread, cheese, and honey were offered. At the present day among the Bulgarians of the Rhodope mountains the woman in child-bed is called *rožd̆enica*, but among the Slovenians and the Horvatians the women of fate are called *rodjenice* or *rojenice* (cf. Krauss, *op. cit.* p. 118 f.). Among the Greeks, the Εἰλείθυιαι, the goddesses of travail, are to be mentioned in this connexion. They occur in intimate alliance with the Μοῖραι (cf. Preller, *Griechische Mythologie*[4], i. 512). Among the Romans, we must note the *Parcæ*, whose name (*Par-ca: pario*, cf. similar formations in Brugmann, *Grundriss*[2], ii. 1, p. 476 f.) stamps them as 'child-bearers' (so also Wissowa, p. 213). Would it not be possible also to find in this way a better explanation of the puzzling Celto-Teutonic cult of the 'mothers' (*matronæ, matres, matræ*) than has as yet been suggested? Thus the mothers originally bring forth his fate to man, or, having become goddesses of fate or even fate itself (Old Slav. *roždenica*,* 'εἱμαρμένη,' cf. also *Archiv f. slav. Phil.* xiv. 137 ff.), they 'impart' it to him at birth, for which reason they are not infrequently called 'imparters.' Such designations are the Bulgarian *urisnicy* (from Gr. ὁρίζειν), the North Russian *udělinicy* (from *uděljati*, 'to impart'), which—an important fact for the subsequent consideration—have developed into spiteful spirits of nightmare, who torment women in labour, drag the children prematurely out of the womb, cause convulsions, etc. The Gr. Νεμέσεις (from νέμομαι 'impart') have also, in all probability, a similar origin, although at an early date they, along with the Erinyes, came to be known as avenging and punishing goddesses of fate. What these women of fate allotted to the newborn child in the decisive hour is designated not only as the 'share' (cf. above, p. 52), but also in three other ways: (1) as that which is 'spoken' by them (Lat. *fâtum*† [from *fâri*], Russ. etc. *rokŭ*: O. Slav. *reką*, 'I say'); (2) as that which is 'spun' by them (Old Nor. *urþr*, A. S. *wyrd*, O. H. G. *wurt*; cf. O. H. G. *wirt, wirtel*, 'spindle'); for next to bearing children it is fitting for the Aryan woman and the women of fate (cf. Gr. κλῶθες) to engage in spinning (cf. on this Veselovskij, *op. cit.* p. 210; otherwise R. Much, *Mitteilungen der anthrop. Gesellschaft in Wien*, xxxviii. p. 16); and (3) as that which is 'decreed' by them (Old Nor. *ørlǫg*, A. S. *orlæg*, O. H. G. *urlag*, Russ. *sudĭba*, 'judgment').

We have up to this point become acquainted with the women of fate as 'mothers' and as 'imparters.' This, however, does not by any means exhaust the enormously rich terminology belonging to them in the Aryan languages. In the Scandinavian North they are also called *nornir* and *díser*. The etymology of the former expression has not yet been explained. The latter, however (cf. Goth. *filu-deisei* 'cleverness'), is equivalent to 'wise women,' undoubtedly in the same sense as French *sage-femme*, since their help is called for by those in labour (cf. 'The Song of Sigrdrifa,' 9). Thus here, too, the women of fate stand in the most intimate relation to the birth of man. From the Slavonic region we may also mention the Bulgarian *narąčnici* and the Servian *sudnice, sujenice*, both so called from the *rokŭ* and *sudŭ* = *sudĭba* (see above) which they announce. From Lithuania the *laumė̃* (of unknown derivation) must also be mentioned. The most important phenomenon for us, however, is to be found in the fact that in many regions the conceptions of division, fate, fortune, etc., at first abstract, show a strong tendency to become transformed into beings regarded as persons. This is true in particular in Polish and Little Russian of the *dolja* mentioned above, in Servian of the *sreća* (cf. Krauss, *op. cit.*), a word which literally means 'coming-together,' 'meeting' (*sŭ* + √*rêt*). In Latin, from the *fâtum*, as we saw above, the 'word spoken' (by the Parcæ), we have evolved, particularly on Celtic soil, the demons of fate designated by the name *fati* and *fatæ*, the latter of which became Old French *feie*, M. H. G. *feie*, German *Fee* ('fairy'). The same process went on also with regard to the Greek αἶσα and μοῖρα 'portion of fate,' to the consideration of which we now return. It is well enough known how both have evolved into personal powers of fate, Aisa being thought of only in the singular, Moira being also used in the plural (cf. Preller, *Griech. Myth.*[4] i. 530). The Moiræ, as is well known, play a specially important part in the life of the common people of Greece even at the present day, and it is not unlikely that primitive features of ancient Greek life are here preserved (cf. B. Schmidt, *Das Volksleben der Neugriechen*, i. 210 ff.). Besides the form μοῖρα, there is also a masculine form μόρος, Μόρος 'fate,' especially 'misfortune,' to be mentioned. Now all these forms lead back to an Aryan **moro*— **moria* (perhaps on account of εἵμαρται, εἱμαρμένη there was a form in the primitive language equivalent to this, viz. **smoro*— **smoria*), which corresponds phonetically to the primitive Teutonic names of the demons of the nightmare, O. H. G. *mar, mara*, Old Nor. *mara*, A. S. *mære* (=**moria*, μοῖρα); the terms most nearly connected with these in the North of Europe we have already discovered (p. 15, above). Since then, on the one hand, we have just seen, in the Russian *udělinicy*, spirits of fate becoming spirits of the nightmare, and, on the other hand, Laistner (*Rätsel der Sphinx*, ii. 342 ff.) has shown in detail how many spirits of fate and fortune have their origin in demons of dreams and nightmares—which is easily understood from the close connexion between the spirits of the departed and those of fate on the one hand, and the phenomena of the departed soul and those of dreams (nightmares) on the other—we need not hesitate to assume in the Gr. μοῖρα (=A. S. *mære*) the existence of a group of primitive Aryan words bearing the meaning of the share allotted to man by fate, which was either innate or bestowed at birth. From this group beings were evolved who in Greece became spirits of fate, while in Teutonic countries they were rather spirits of oppression, although, even in the latter case, their connexion with fate could not be concealed.

The details given above prove that *the faith of the Aryan peoples was permeated by a deeply fatalistic trend of thought.* The fate of each individual is born with him, transmitted by his mother, or is bestowed upon him at the hour of birth by spirits who at first have nothing to do with the heavenly gods, but much with the realm of departed souls. It was only gradually that the more advanced idea came to the front which united fate to the immortal gods; and where this idea appears, it is still in conflict with the older conceptions. This is the case in Homer. Now Zeus is subject to Moira, and again he takes her place as

* The report of Procopius (*de Bell. Goth.* iii. 14), that the Slavs did not know the εἱμαρμένη, must, with Veselovskij (*op. cit.* p. 174), be understood to mean that *at that time* they had still no abstract *Fatum*, but knew only beings or deities of fate.

† According to Wissowa (p. 213), Lat. *fâtum* was only a 'translation and interpretation' of the Greek αἶσα, which, however, cannot be correct, seeing that *fâtum* means 'that which is spoken' and αἶσα 'share,' as we saw above. *Fâtum*, like *Parca*, must have been a living religious conception among the people.

he 'spins out' to men their fortune (*Od.* iv. 208). That this latter idea could only at a later date have been transferred to Zeus, follows at once from the metaphor of 'spinning' (above, p. 53). This figure is exceedingly far removed from the activity of the highest god of the heavens, and it finds a satisfactory explanation only in the primitive cycle of ideas regarding mothers and women of fate. Thus we may hold that the belief which finds expression in the oracular responses, in Herodotus, and—at least very often—in the tragedians, the belief, namely, in a supreme law of the universe, the Moira, which rules over gods and men and from which none can escape, represents the ancient condition of popular thought from which the Homeric world had begun to raise itself, just as it did in other religious matters, *e.g.* burning of corpses instead of burial, disappearance of gifts to the dead and of a real ancestor-worship, realms of the dead, Hades and Elysium, etc. (cf. above, I. 4). In this way it was possible for demons of fate to become immortal gods. An instance of this evolution is afforded by the Greek δαίμων. The word, probably connected with δαίομαι 'I divide,' signifies the 'divider,'* and as it is used by the oldest tragedians (*e.g.* Æschylus, *Persæ*, 620) to indicate the soul or the shade of some dead person, and by Hesiod (cf. Rohde, *Psyche*[2], i. 146) in the sense of glorified human souls, we see that δαίμων is originally one of the many spiritual beings that determine the fate of individual human beings *in bonam* and especially *in malam partem*. These ideas prevail also in Homer; but in addition δαίμων is a common name of the immortal gods, because, according to the belief which gradually came into favour, they were responsible for the decrees of fate. This fatalistic trait of the Aryan religions has in Europe been most faithfully preserved by the Slavs (cf. Krauss, *op. cit.* p. 89 ff. 'Gott und das Schicksal'). Nor is this merely a matter of accident. Of all the Aryans, the Slavs are the race that remained nearest the original home, and are thus the last to enter into history. Nothing, however, frees the soul so certainly from the dull depression of fatalistic ideas as the great deeds of historical life.

2. The divining of the future.—A primitive Aryan expression for this important idea is to be found in the series of terms: Lith. *saitas*, 'interpretation of signs,' *seitones*, 'interpreters of signs,' Old Nor. *seiðr*, 'a particular kind of magic for investigating the future,' Middle Welsh *hut*, New Welsh *hûd*, 'præstigiæ,' Old Corn. *hudol*, gloss. *magus* = Gr. οἶτος (Ionic for *οἶτος), 'fate' or 'misfortune.' A complete account of all the means used by the Aryan peoples to divine the future cannot be given here; still, we shall prove that among the Lithuanians and Prussians, from whom we have so often started in this discussion, the great majority of all kinds of divination practised among all the separate Aryan peoples is also to be found. The Baltic tribes, of whom Peter of Dusburg reported: 'Prutheni raro aliquod factum notabile inchoabant, nisi prius missa sorte secundum ritum ipsorum a diis suis, utrum bene vel male debeat eis succedere, sciscitentur' (*Script. rer. Pruss.* i. 54), come once more (cf. above, p. 31 f.) nearest to the Romans, of whom Cicero reports in almost identical terms: 'Nihil fere quondam maioris rei nisi auspicato ne privatim quidem gerebatur' (*de Div.* i. 28). For the most detailed account of this topic we are indebted to the repeatedly mentioned work of Matthæus Prætorius, *Deliciæ Prussicæ, oder Preussische Schaubühne* (ed. by W. Pierson, Berlin, 1871), in which the 'waidlers' (cf., p. 43, above) of the ancient Prussians, experienced in divination, are enumerated, and upon which we shall base the following discussion.

(*a*) *The flight and the cries of birds.*—'*Lekkutones* (cf. Lith. *lekiù* 'I fly') were the persons who observed the cries and the flight of birds and predicted future events from them, also called *Paukszt*ů*čiei* (cf. Lith. *paũkszt*ì*s*, 'bird'). Eagles, ravens, hawks were regarded by them as birds of strife; the kite as well as swallows, owls, and bees brought harm and fire. On the other hand, storks, herons, woodpeckers, nightingales, and pigeons were omens of good fortune' (Prætorius, p. 43). 'A *lekkutons*, or bird-diviner, when he is to prophesy, dresses in white, takes a sacred *krywule*, *i.e.* a crooked staff, in his hand, goes to a *pillukztis*, *i.e.* a mound of earth, prays with his face to the east, and waits till a bird comes' (Prætorius, p. 48). It is in accordance with this custom that in almost all the Aryan languages the words for 'bird' mean at the same time bird-omen and omen generally; cf. Skr. *śákuna* (*śákuna* 'the science of interpreting the flight of birds'), Gr. οἰωνός and ὄρνις, Lat. *auspicium* from **avi-spicium*, and probably also *augur* from **avi-gur* (the second part of the word is still obscure), O. H. G. *fogalôn* 'auspicari'; *fogal*, *fogalrarta* 'auspicium,' 'augurium' lit. 'bird's-cry' (Goth. *razda*, 'cry'), Old Slav. *kobl*, 'augurium'; Czech *koba*, 'raven' (for a more detailed list see *Reallexicon*, artt. 'Orakel' and 'Rechts und links'). We see how closely the Litu-Prussian *lekkutons*, even in details, corresponds to the Roman *augur*, who in the same way, armed with a crooked staff (*lituus*), mounted the citadel, and, generally with his face turned to the east, observed the sky. It is noteworthy that the dove, among the Prussians, was a bird of good omen, although it generally announced death and misfortune.

(*b*) *The appearance of the sky and natural phenomena.*—'*Szweigdžurûnis* (cf. Lith. *žvaigždė*, 'star') was a star-gazer' (Prætorius, p. 42). '*Orones* (cf. Lith. *óras*, 'air,' 'weather') observed the sky and predicted its changes' (Prætorius, p. 43). '*Wejones* (cf. Lith. *vėjas* 'wind') watch the winds, change the weather, and are still to be met with in Nadravia' (Prætorius, p. 44). '*Wanduolutti*, *item Udones* (cf. Lith. *vandů*, Skr. *udán*, 'water') are water-diviners, who divine from the foam, waves, etc. Of these there are different classes' (Prætorius. p. 45). It is enough to refer to the *de cœlo servare* of the Roman magistracy, the *cœlestia auguria*, as well as the report of Plutarch (*Cæsar*, c. 19) regarding the Teutonic sacred women: αἱ ποταμῶν δίναις προσβλέπουσαι καὶ ῥευμάτων ἐλιγμοῖς καὶ ψόφοις τεκμαιρόμεναι προεθέσπιζον.

(*c*) *Sacrifice, entrails, and blood.*—'*Widdurones* (cf. Lith. *widurìai*, 'entrails') were soothsayers who could predict the future from the entrails of the animal sacrificed to the gods. At the present time several of the inhabitants of Nadravia, on examining the spleen, liver, etc., of a pig, are able to say what kind of a winter it will be, what kind of a crop, whether the early or the late seed will thrive. *Kraujutten* (cf. Lith *kraũjas*, 'blood'), who could predict good or evil fortune from the blood of men and cattle, from the way it flowed, from its colour and changes, and who prophesied also from the menstrual blood of women, were the *medici* of the ancient Prussians. At the present date, in Nadravia we find *kraujutten* who let blood from the veins, suck it by means of a small horn, and tell from the taste whether the person will remain in good health or not. Before they suck, they murmur a few words indistinctly' (Prætorius, p. 43 f.).

In the south, the Greek ἱεροσκοπεία and the Roman *haruspices* correspond to these. It is generally believed that in these phenomena we have to deal with an oracular custom which was introduced at a comparatively late date from foreign sources (into Italy from Etruria), but it is not in accordance with this view that the Latin word *haruspex* with *hariolus*, *fariolus*, has been formed from a primitive root no longer extant in any Italian language (**haru-* 'entrails,' Old Nor. *gorn*, pl. *garnar* 'bowel,' 'bowels,' 'entrails,' Skr. *hirá'*, 'bowel'). It is also worthy of mention that in the Prussian reports the *liver* is emphasized as especially significant for oracular purposes, while in Greece it is regarded particularly as the seat of soothsaying (cf. K. F. Hermann, *Lehrbuch der gottesdienstlichen Altertümer der Griechen*[2], p. 242). In the same way among all Aryan tribes the blood of men and animals was regarded as a means of foretelling the future. Who does not remember the white-haired priestesses of the Cimri, who, according to Strabo (vii. p. 294), prophesied over a kettle of the blood of slaughtered prisoners of war? Cf. also Old Nor. *hlaut* 'sacrificial blood' = Goth. *hlauts* 'lot.'

(*d*) *Ominous meetings.*—'*Szweruttei* (cf. Lith. *žvėrìs*, 'game') prophesy from game. If a hare, wolf, ass, toad, lizard, or locust appears, it signifies misfortune' (Prætorius, p. 48). Cf. also the Galician-Volhynian chronicle of the Hipatios manuscript (A. Brückner, *Archiv für slav. Phil.* ix. 3): 'Still his conversion (*i.e.* of Mendowej) was not genuine; he was wont to sacrifice secretly to his gods, to *Nûnadėj*, *Teljawel*, *Diwerix*, and the hare-god *Mėjdėjn*; if when he rode out in the fields a hare rose, he would not enter into the thicket or dare to break off a twig, and he sacrificed to his gods, burned the corpses of the dead, and openly practised his paganism.' 'To meet a snake is still a good omen to the old Prussians and the Lithuanians' (Prætorius, p. 37). As far as the other Aryan peoples are concerned, it must suffice to call attention to the monograph of P. Schwarz, *Mensch und Tier im Aberglauben*, Celle, 1888. But we must specially bear in mind in Roman territory the information contained in Festus (ed. Müller, p. 244) on 'Pedestria': 'a vulpe, lupo, serpente,* equo, ceterisque animantibus quadrupedibus fiunt

* This explanation seems more likely than the one previously given by the author in his *Reallexicon*, p. 29 f.

* Also by Joh. Lasicius (*de Diis Samagitarum*, p. 51: 'nutriunt etiam quasi deos penates nigri coloris obesos et quadrupedes

(auspicia),' and p. 260 on 'Quinque': 'signa quæ augures observant ex quadrupedibus.'

(*e*) *The rustling of the oak.*—'Præexcellentes arbores, ut robora, quercus, deos inhabitare dixerunt, ex quibus sciscitantibus responsa reddi audiebantur, ob id nec huiuscemodi arbores cædebant, sed religiose ut numinum deos colebant' (Erasmus Stella, 'de Borussiæ Antiquitatibus,' li., in Grynæus, *Novus Orbis*, Basel, 1537, p. 581). Cf. *Od.* xiv. 327 *f.*:

τὸν δ' ἐς Δωδώνην φάτο βήμεναι, ὄφρα θεοῖο
ἐκ δρυὸς ὑψικόμοιο Διὸς βουλὴν ἐπακούσῃ,

and Æschylus, *Prom.* 830 ff.:

ἀμφὶ Δωδώνην, ἵνα
μαντεῖα θᾶκός τ' ἐστὶ Θεσπρωτοῦ Διός,
τέρας τ' ἄπιστον, αἱ προσήγοροι δρύες.

(*f*) *Fire and smoke.*—'Szwakones, those who observe the signs of a burning light and its smoke, from *szwake*, "a burning light," are called *Dumones*, from *dumai*, "smoke"' (Prætorius, p. 43). 'Illi (the fire-priests, cf. above, p. 44) noctu ad ignem accedebant, mane vero consulentibus responsa dantes umbram ægroti (the question is about predicting the future in the case of illness) apud ignem sacrum se vidisse aiebant, quæ cum se calefaceret, signa vel mortis vel vitæ ostentasset: victurum ægrotum facies ostensa igni, contra si dorsum ostentasset moriturum portendit' (Jerome of Prague). Cf. the Greek μαντικὴ ἐξ ἱερῶν or ἐμπύρων (K. F. Hermann, *op. cit.* p. 241). Thus, *e.g.*, Prometheus boasts in Æschylus, *Prom.* 498: καὶ φλογωπὰ σήματα ἐξωμμάτωσα, πρόσθεν ὄντ' ἐπάργεμα. But here we have to deal with prophetic utterances from the *sacrificial fire*, a custom which, as we saw above (p. 41) was unknown to the Prussians and Lithuanians.

(*g*) *Dreams.*—'*Sapnonei*, *i.e.* dreamers, from *sapnas* (*sāpnas*), "a dream": interpreters of dreams are to be found especially among the women' (Prætorius, p. 47). Cf. Gr. ὀνειροπόλος, 'interpreter of dreams' (see K. F. Hermann, *op. cit.* p. 330).

(*h*) *Prophetic utterances at marriages.*—'*Szwalgones* are bride-examiners, 'waidlers,' who attend at the betrothal and prophesy. They also arrange the *szwalgus* (Lith. *švalgà*, 'bride-inspection'), *i.e.* the betrothals. *Swalgauti* signifies literally 'to behold.' They interpret from all kinds of things, *e.g.* from the pouring, as either the bridegroom or the bride pours beer into the other's eyes. Such customs are still to be found' (Prætorius, p. 46). Cf. Servius, i. 346: 'secundum Romanos locutus est, qui nihil nisi captatis faciebant auguriis et præcipue nuptias'; iv. 45: 'nuptiæ enim captatis fiebant auguriis . . .'; iv. 168: '. . . ideoque auspices deliguntur ad nuptias.'

But, with all these the number of the Prussian 'waidlers' engaged in separate branches of divination is far from being exhausted. There was also a *Waszkonis* (*wāszkas*, 'wax'), *i.e.* a diviner who studied wax moulds; further, there were *Szwinautzei* (*szwinas* 'lead'), or lead-moulders; *Puttones* (*putà*, 'foam'), 'those who observed signs in the foam of the beer'; *Seitones* (see above, p. 54), who prophesied life or death from charms bound round the necks of men or animals; *Sietones* (*siẽtas*, 'sieve'), 'those who acquired information from the turning of a sieve'; *Stiklorei* (*stiklas*, 'glass'), *Zerkoluttei* (*zerkolas*, 'mirror'), and *Zolininkei* (*žolẽ*, 'plant'), who predicted the future from glass, mirrors, plants, etc. It would not be difficult to find parallels to these kinds of divination among the other Aryan peoples. On the other hand, there were several kinds of oracles attested among other peoples which have not yet been discovered in the Prusso-Lithuanian sources. Such are the *tree-oracle*, or oracle of the tree-lots (cf. *Reallexicon*, art. 'Los'), which is found among Scythians, Teutons, and Celts, and also in indistinct traces among the Greeks and Romans; the significance of monsters as foretelling misfortune (cf. *Reallexicon*, art. 'Orakel'); the *horse-oracle*, found among Iranians and Western Slavs (cf. V. Hehn, *Kulturpflanzen*, p. 44); and also the peculiarly Roman '*signa ex tripudiis*.' Still, the horse was also looked on as sacred among the Lithuanians (Peter of Dusburg: 'aliqui equos nigros, quidam albos vel alterius coloris propter deos suos non audebant aliqualiter equitare'); and also hens, which were regarded as inviolable, were attended to in the houses, and their chickens under certain circumstances were understood to foretell misfortune (Lasicius, p. 48: 'nato cuiusvis generis vel cocco vel debili pullo actutum sedes mutantur').

The facts respecting divination here set forth can be regarded only as characterizing, and can in no way be supposed to exhaust, the enormous number of customs of this class. And they will arouse deeper interest if we can only succeed in discovering the *motives* by which this proceeding, viz. divining the future, which seems so absurd to us, is to be explained. Ihering (*Vorgeschichte der Indoeuropäer*, Leipzig, 1894, p. 441 ff.) is, so far as the present writer is aware, the only one who, although confining himself to the practice of taking the auspices among the Romans, has dealt with this fundamental and central question in detail. He begins with the undoubtedly correct idea that the supposition that auspices of this kind revealed the will of the heavenly gods is secondary and transmitted, and that every attempt to connect divination with higher religious ideas is quite valueless. He himself, accordingly, seeks to deduce the origin of oracular divination from purely practical grounds. Thus, according to his opinion, the oracle from birds (*signa ex avibus*) takes its rise from the observation of the birds of passage which showed the Aryans in their migrations the passes of the mountains, the courses of the streams, and the islands in the ocean which invited them to rest. The inspection of the entrails (*signa ex extis*) is explained from an examination which was made of animals of an unknown region to see if their entrails were healthy, and consequently whether the fodder of the land was satisfactory, etc. Thus we should obtain the remarkable result that this divination becomes the more sensible the further back we go in primitive times. No one will hesitate to conclude that the solution proposed by Ihering cannot be the correct one, no matter how difficult it may be to show it to be impossible in detail. No one, however, who considers with unprejudiced mind the material presented will fail to observe that the whole conception of divination does not rest on a basis of rational consideration, but has its roots in the childlike, dream-encircled, and imaginative mental condition of primitive man. Τὸ γὰρ εἰωθὸς οὐ τέρας, says Theophrastus (*de Plantis*, v. 3); and in this short sentence we have the key, or at least one key, to the understanding of oracular divination. For primitive man only the smallest part of his inner and outer life is εἰωθός. Everywhere wonders and signs terrify him. The phantoms of his dreams, and especially those of the horrible nightmare*, which, in the rooms of primitive times, filled with noxious charcoal fumes, must have been very frequent (cf. Höfler, *Centralblatt für Anthropologie*, vi. 1), are realities to him. In the plants and animals, in the stones and stars, there live, as in men's own bodies, souls to which, as we saw above, fate is united. Can we be surprised, then, that in the world of dreams, in the rustling of the trees, and in the flight of birds, the shadows of the future were supposed to hover mysteriously round the life of man? This anxious, timid, and nervous condition of primitive mental life called to its aid the art of priestly diviners, who—deceived deceivers—were always devising new means of obtaining some mysterious message with regard to the future. Their profession, however, always rests in the end on one fundamental thought, namely, on making the probability or improbability of a future event dependent on the incidence of another occurrence which was independent of human volition, such as the approach of a four-footed animal or a bird, a flash of lightning, hearing the sound of animals or the human voice. All this had, originally, nothing to do with the heavenly gods, and it is only at the close of a long process of evolution that we find the Roman *auspices* announcing the will of Juppiter or Pythia, and prophesying in the name of Apollo.

Conclusion.—It has been our aim—and nothing else was possible—to present, in this discussion regarding the religion of the Aryans, not the opinions and the usages of a perfectly definite and distinct period of antiquity, but rather a *series of developments* in the history of religion taking place on the soil of primitive Aryan peoples. These developments depend on more or less deeply-rooted pre-historic connexions,

quosdam serpentes') snakes are considered as quadrupeds. This settles the doubt expressed by R. v. Ihering (*Vorgeschichte der Indoeuropäer*, p. 444 *f.*) with regard to the passage of Festus quoted above.

* Cf. L. Laistner, *Das Rätsel der Sphinx, Grundzüge einer Mythengeschichte*, Berlin, 1889, and H. Roscher, 'Ephialtes, eine pathologisch-mythologische Abhandlung über die Alpträume und Alpdämonen des klassischen Altertums,' *Abh. d. kgl. sächsischen Ges. d. W.*, phil.-hist. Kl. xx., 1900.

and lead to more or less distant epochs of primitive antiquity. Thus there have appeared different strata, lower and higher, overlapping each other in the historic development of the religion.

If at times we have assumed that these higher and lower strata of religion were to be found side by side at the same time and among the same people, such a supposition will not astonish any one who remembers that even among our own countrymen the purest religion and the darkest superstition are to be found existing side by side.

This series of developments has been obtained by a comparison of words and customs confined to the Aryan languages and peoples. Our intention has been to give the features of a comparative history of Aryan religions, not a comparative history of religions generally. At the same time, we by no means wish to underestimate the advantages of the latter discipline. On the contrary, we are indebted to it for a series of general stages in the evolution of the religious consciousness, which are also of great importance in the special history of Aryan religion. But at the same time it cannot be denied that a real history of religion can be written only on a historically coherent foundation, such as is offered by the Semitic and Aryan races, and only in the closest connexion with the history of language and culture, which can as yet be sufficiently examined only in the case of the two races mentioned. Even with this limitation, it must be confessed that comparative investigations such as ours, which are compelled to deal not only with the facts themselves but also with conclusions drawn from them, cannot possess the same degree of certainty as is to be found in the discussions of those who are content to supply a description of the historically attested religion of a single Aryan or Semitic people, the Indians or the Romans, the Hebrews or the Babylonians. It must, none the less, be emphasized that he who undertakes to give such a special description without reference to the comparative religion of related peoples deliberately closes his eyes to the light which, in judicious research, is cast by pre-historic upon historic times.

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O. SCHRADER.

ĀRYA SAMĀJ.—1. Founder.—Swāmī Dayānand Sarasvatī was born in the year 1824 in a village belonging to the Rājā of Morvī in Kāthiāwār, India. During his lifetime he refused to make known either his own name or his birthplace, lest his relatives should hinder him in his work or after his demise try to provide a successor as head of the sect. After his death, however, in 1883, it came out that his real name was *Mūl Śaṅkar*, son of Ambā Śaṅkar. His father was a well-to-do man, by occupation a banker, by descent a Brāhman, and in religion a stern and puritanical worshipper of Śiva. The life of Mūl Śaṅkar, *alias* Swāmī Dayānand Sarasvatī, falls into three nearly equal portions, namely, his life at home (1824–1845), his wanderings and studies (1845–1863), and his public ministry (1863–1883). For an account of the first two periods of the life of Swāmī Dayānand we are indebted to his *Autobiography*, which was dictated by him to the editor of the *Theosophist*, and published in English in that magazine.

There are three moments of religious interest in the home-life of the founder of the Ārya Samāj: first, his revolt from idolatry at the age of fourteen, on the night of his initiation into the mysteries of the Śaiva cult, when he saw mice running over the image of Śiva and defiling it; second, his resolve to abandon the world and seek salvation, the fruit of his profound grief on account of the death of his sister; and third, his flight from home at the age of twenty-one, in order to avoid the entanglement of marriage, into which his parents were determined he should enter. The history of the first twenty-one years of the life of the future Swāmī is thus summed up—(1) in the negative determination to eschew idolatry, (2) in the positive determination to seek salvation, and (3) in the further resolve to allow no such entanglement as marriage to interfere with his supreme purpose. There is no reason for questioning the essential truthfulness of the account of these early experiences. The sincerity of his revolt from idolatry, however it came about, is proved by the magnificent courage and vigour with which he afterwards attacked it in its chief centres, such as Hardwār and Benares. And the reality of his abandonment of the ties of home and kindred is proved by the fact that after his escape from his relatives he never again looked upon their faces.

After his flight from home he spent about eighteen years as a *Sannyāsī*, or religious mendicant, wandering from place to place and learning from a great variety of teachers. He first came under Vedāntic influences, and for a time was convinced of the identity of the individual soul and the Supreme Soul. He was initiated into the *Brahmāchārya* order and given a new name, *Śuddha Chaitanya*. Later, he was initiated into the fourth order of *Sannyāsīs*, and was given the name by which he always has been known, namely, Dayānand Sarasvatī. He retained little or nothing, however, that came to him from his Vedāntic teachers except this name, for he soon deserted the standpoint of the *Vedānta* for that of the *Yoga*. The crowning religious influence on the life of Dayānand Sarasvatī was exerted by the blind Vedic scholar, Swāmī Virajānand of Mathurā, an enemy of modern Sanskrit literature, who, as a condition of teaching him, demanded that he should throw away all his modern Sanskrit books. This condition being fulfilled, the blind Swāmī taught Dayānand the Vedas, and dismissed him with the words: 'I want thee to go forth into the world and spread enlightenment among mankind.' Thus ends the second period in the life of Swāmī Dayānand Sarasvatī (1845–1863).

His religious development may be briefly summed up. It was a movement from Paurāṇic Hinduism through philosophical Hinduism to Vedic Hinduism. He successively deserted Śaivism and Vedāntism, but clung to the end to the *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* as the philosophical point of view from which, in his opinion, the Vedas ought to be interpreted. The last twenty years of the life of Swāmī Dayānand Sarasvatī is the period of his public ministry (1863–1883). It is a history of preaching tours throughout the length and breadth of India, from Bombay and Poona on the South to Calcutta and Lahore on the North; of public discussions with pandits, maulvies, and missionaries; and of literary work. After his first preaching tour of four years, he went into retreat on the banks of the Ganges 'for further contemplation and perfection of character.' Happily, we have a picture, from the pen of a European, of Swāmī Dayānand as he appeared in 1868, during this time of partial retreat:

'In the afternoon I visited a fakeer down on the sand, by the water's edge, of whose learning and sanctity I had heard in the crowds of the bazaar. I found him sitting in a little straw booth; and a splendid looking fellow he was, with his herculean frame and massive limbs, fine oval cranium, and really benevolent face. He was sitting almost entirely naked, and entered at once into pleasant conversation. I found him to belong to a class of mendicants who profess to have entirely abandoned the world, and are living in complete contemplation of the Deity. The conversation revealed in him a fine mind, and well

versed in the ancient lore of the Hindus. He talked only Sanskrit, and our conversation was conducted through an interpreter' (T. J. Scott, *Missionary Life among the Villages of India*, p. 162).

After about two and a half years, Swāmī Dayānand emerged from his 'retreat' and plunged at once into public discussion and controversy. In the great centres of idolatry his usual theme was, 'Is there idolatry in the Vedas?' Against this practice he thundered with all the force of his strong will, impressive personality, and unusual eloquence, and, according to his biographers, uniformly carried the day.

It was at Bombay, on the 10th of April 1875, that Swāmī Dayānand founded the Ārya Samāj. He visited Delhi in 1877 at the time of the grand *Darbar*, where he met certain gentlemen from the Panjāb, who invited him to visit their province. This was the occasion of his first visit to the Panjāb, the scene of the future triumphs of his Society. From 1878 to 1881 there was the curious episode of a partnership between the Ārya Samāj and the Theosophical Society. Both parties were disappointed, for a split soon took place on the question of the personality of God. For the history of this strange union, see, as representing the Ārya point of view, the various biographies of Swāmī Dayānand; and for the point of view of the Theosophical Society, Col. Olcott's chapter on 'Swāmī Dayānand' in *Old Diary Leaves*.

Swāmī Dayānand came into contact with many different leaders of religious thought in India, *e.g.* Dabendra Nath Tagore and Keshab Chandra Sen of the Brahmo Samāj, Madame Blavatsky and Col. Olcott of the Theosophical Society, Bholānāth Sārābhāi of the Prārthnā Samāj, Sir Saiyid Ahmad of Reformed Islām, and Dr. T. J. Scott and Rev. J. Gray representing Christianity. There is evidence that Swāmī Dayānand made overtures to the leaders of both the Prārthnā Samāj (see Krishnarāo Bholānāth, *Life of Bholānāth Śārābhāi*, p. 7 f.) and the Brahmo Samāj, with a view to organic union, the amalgamated body to be called 'The Ārya Samāj.' But no union with any other organization was even temporarily effected except with the Theosophical Society.

In 1882–1883 the Swāmī visited Rājputāna, and while there became the friend and counsellor of princes. According to his biographers, he acted the part of a modern John the Baptist in rebuking the Mahārājā of Jodhpur for being under the influence of a courtesan. A few days later the Swāmī fell ill. Some think that a slow poison had been given him in his food. At any rate, the illness was fatal. He died at Ajmēr on the 30th of October, 1883, in the fifty-ninth year of his age.

Swāmī Dayānand was, from all accounts, a man of splendid physique, impressive personality, and great strength of will. T. J. Scott speaks of his 'magnificent presence' and 'imperious zeal,' and tells how 'he would crush an ordinary opponent with a sledge-hammer style.' The epithet *mahāmūrkh* ('great fool') was often on his lips when debating with the defenders of idolatry. Olcott speaks of him as 'tall, dignified in carriage, and gracious in manner,' and gives a general estimate of him in these words: 'The Swāmī was undoubtedly a great man, a learned Sanskrit Pandit, with immense pluck, force of will, and self-reliance—a leader of men' (*Old Diary Leaves*, p. 406).

2. **Doctrine.**—The official creed of the Ārya Samāj is in the form of a Decalogue, and it reads as follows:—

i. God is the primary cause of all true knowledge, and of everything known by its name.

ii. God is All-Truth, All-Knowledge, All-Beatitude, Incorporeal, Almighty, Just, Merciful, Unbegotten, Infinite, Unchangeable, without a beginning, Incomparable, the Support and the Lord of All, All-pervading, Omniscient, Imperishable, Immortal, Exempt from fear, Eternal, Holy, and the Cause of the Universe. *To Him alone worship is due.*

iii. The Vedas are the books of true knowledge, and it is the paramount duty of every Arya to read or hear them read, to teach and preach them to others.

iv. One should always be ready to accept truth and renounce untruth.

v. All actions ought to be done conformably to virtue, i.e. after a thorough consideration of right or wrong.

vi. The primary object of the Samāj is to do good to the world by improving the physical, spiritual, and social condition of mankind.

vii. All ought to be treated with love, justice, and due regard to their merits.

viii. Ignorance ought to be dispelled and knowledge diffused.

ix. No one ought to be contented with his own good alone, but every one ought to regard his prosperity as included in that of others.

x. In matters which affect the general social well-being of the whole society, one ought to discard all differences and not allow one's individuality to interfere, but in strictly personal matters every one may act with freedom (*Handbook of the Ārya Samāj*, 1906).

It will be noticed that of the 'Ten Principles' given above, the first three, which deal with the existence and nature of God and with the doctrine of Vedic Scripture, are theologically the most important. The last seven are ethical principles. The Creed of the Ārya Samāj, it will be observed, is a *short* Creed. It is published with considerable variations in the phraseology, there being no insistence upon the same form of words.

In the *Handbook of the Ārya Samāj* we are told that 'the theology of the Ārya Samāj may be summed up in one word, viz. *the Vedas*' (p. 21). Combining principles i. and iii. of the Creed, namely, 'God is the primary cause of all true knowledge,' and 'The Vedas are the books of true knowledge,' we have the doctrine of the *Divine Origin of the Vedas*, which will now be considered.

In approaching this doctrine, let us first notice the problem of the regeneration of India, religious, political, and scientific, as it presented itself to the mind of the founder of the Ārya Samāj. He found himself confronted by a variety of faiths both indigenous and foreign. Of religions of foreign origin there were Islām, introduced in the 10th cent., and Christianity, a comparatively recent importation from the West. The indigenous religion of India, namely, Hinduism, presented itself as a vast congeries of faiths, ranging all the way from the strict *advaita* doctrine of Śaṅkarāchārya to the crudest and grossest superstitions embodied in the Tantras, the whole being held together in a kind of external unity by the vast hierarchical organization of caste. Such was the religious environment of Swāmī Dayānand. There was also a political environment furnished by the vast and impressive administration of the British Government in India, and a scientific environment consisting of the spectacle on all sides of railways, canals, telegraph wires, steam-engines, etc. Thus, as Swāmī Dayānand wandered up and down over India, he studied not only the past but also the present, not only the thought of India as embodied in *Veda* and *Upaniṣad*, *Sūtra* and *Epic*, but also the thought of Europe as embodied especially in the inventions of modern science, everywhere manifest in India.

The problem which confronted him was how to reform Indian religion, how to effect a synthesis of the old and the new, of the East and the West, in such a way as to guarantee the intellectual and spiritual supremacy of the Indian people, do full justice to the attainments of other nations, and provide a universalistic programme of religion. The solution of this problem was found by Swāmī Dayānand in the doctrine of the Vedas as the revealed Word of God.

There are many points of contact between Dayānand Sarasvatī and Martin Luther. As Luther the German monk was a child of the European

Renaissance, so Dayānand the Gujrātī monk was a child of the Indian Renaissance. Both alike felt the tug of the 'Zeitgeist'. Both in their different ways became exponents of the new spirit. Luther attacked indulgences, while Dayānand attacked idolatry. Luther appealed from the Roman Church and the authority of tradition to the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. Swāmī Dayānand appealed from the Brāhmanical church and the authority of *smṛti* to the earliest and most sacred of Indian Scriptures. The watchword of Luther was 'Back to the Bible'; the watchword of Dayānand was 'Back to the Vedas.'

Swāmī Dayānand's theory of the Vedas may be outlined as follows:—The word *Veda* means 'knowledge.' It is God's knowledge, and therefore pure and perfect. This transcendent and heavenly knowledge embraces the fundamental principles of all the sciences. These principles God revealed in two ways: (1) in the form of the four Vedas, which were taught to four *Ṛṣis*, Agni, Vāyu, Sūraj, and Aṅgira, at the beginning of Creation over one hundred billion years ago; and (2) in the form of the world of nature, which was created according to the principles laid down in the Vedas, somewhat as the Tabernacle is said to have been built according to the pattern shown in the mount (Ex 25^{40}). Mark the doctrine of correspondence involved. The book of Vedic Scripture agrees with the book of nature, so that the latter confirms the truth of the former. As Swāmī Dayānand says: 'I regard the Vedas as self-evident truth, admitting of no doubt and depending on the authority of no other book, *being represented in nature, the Kingdom of God*' (*Handbook of the Ārya Samāj*, p. 35).

Note the ambiguity in the meaning assigned to the word *Veda*. It is (1) God's knowledge, the content of the Divine Omniscience, *which is one thing*; and (2) it is the collection of Aryan literature known as the 'Four Vedas,' which is *quite a different thing*. One may believe in the Veda in the first sense, without accepting it in the second sense. The Vedas, then, being regarded as 'the Scripture of true knowledge,' the perfect counterpart of God's knowledge so far as 'basic principles' are concerned, and the 'pattern' according to which Creation proceeded, it follows that the fundamental principle of Vedic exegesis will be the interpretation of the Vedas in such a way as to find in them the results of scientific investigation. As E. D. Maclagan remarks: 'The bases of the Aryan faith are the revelation of God in the Vedas and the revelation of God in nature, and the first practical element in this belief is the interpretation of the Vedas in conformity with the proved results of natural science' (*Census of India*, 1891, xix. 175). In other words, there is involved the assumption that the Vedas as 'the books of true knowledge' must contain 'the basic principles of all the sciences,' and accordingly that every scientific discovery and invention of modern times must be found expressed, germinally at least, in the Vedas. The science of the West, then, is but the realization of the scientific programme anticipated by the seers of the East, over one hundred billion years ago. To the ancient East belonged the faculty of *seeing*: to the modern West belongs the faculty of *doing*. The programme comes from the East; the realization, from the West. In this way Swāmī Dayānand sought to render to the East the things which belong to the East, and to the West the things which belong to the West. Thus the West, in realizing the principles laid down in the Vedas, is unconsciously following the Vedic religion.

The principle that all the sciences have their revealed source in the Vedas is enlarged by the further principle that all religions have their original and inspired source in the same early literature. The doctrine of the Vedas as a primitive revelation given once for all to mankind, and so 'the fountain-head of religion,' reminds one of the similar doctrine of 'primitive revelation' held by some Christians. Diversities in religion are explained as due to the influence of different environments, in the one theory, upon the primitive Biblical revelation, in the other theory, upon the primitive Vedic revelation.

The Ārya doctrine of Vedic Scripture may now be summed up: (1) The Vedas are a revelation from God, as is proved by their correspondence with nature. (2) They are the sole revelation from God, since no other books show this correspondence. (3) They are accordingly the fountain-head of the science and the religion of all mankind. Such is the doctrinal basis of the two great duties of the Ārya Samāj, namely, (*a*) to recall India to the forsaken Vedic paths, and (*b*) to preach the Vedic gospel throughout the whole world.

It is evident from all this that Pandit Dayānand Sarasvatī was a man of large views. He was a dreamer of splendid dreams. He had a vision of India purged of her superstitions, filled with the fruits of science, worshipping one God, fitted for self-rule, and honoured as the primeval source of the world's science and religion.

All will admit that the vision of a regenerated India as seen by the prophet and founder of the Ārya Samāj is a splendid and inspiring one. But what about the means to be employed for the realization of this vision? As above stated, it is a return to the Vedas, but, be it noted, to the Vedas as interpreted, not by the traditional scholarship of Indian orthodoxy or by the critical scholarship of the West, but by the scholarship of the Ārya Samāj alone. The Scripture basis of the Ārya Samāj then, while formally the Vedas, is in reality a certain interpretation of the Vedas, which is not recognized as legitimate by a single Sanskrit scholar, either Indian or European, outside of the Ārya Samāj. This interpretation must be characterized as highly subjective and fanciful, different meanings being applied to the same word according to the caprice of the interpreter. One can readily imagine what kind of interpretation is involved in the attempt to find in the Vedas the programme of modern scientific inventions. Thus Swāmī Dayānand's interpretation of the Vedas is marked by (1) great emphasis on the etymology and neglect of actual Vedic usage, and (2) assumption of irregularity in the Vedic moods, tenses, persons, and cases. For the proof of these statements it is sufficient to consult Swāmī Dayānand's *Commentary on the Rig Veda*. The pamphlets on Pandit Dayānand's interpretation of the Vedas, written by T. Williams of Rewāri (1893–1894), and a pamphlet entitled *The Dayānandī Interpretation of the word Deva in the Rig Veda* (1897) may also be consulted. In this connexion the opinion of Max Müller is worth quoting: '*By the most incredible interpretations* Swāmī Dayānand succeeded in persuading himself and others that everything worth knowing, even the most recent inventions of modern Science, were alluded to in the Vedas. Steam-engines, railways, and steamboats, all were shown to have been known, at least in their germs, to the poets of the Vedas; for Veda, he argued, means knowledge, and how could anything have been hid from that?' (Max Müller, *Biographical Essays*, ii. 170). In a word, the Vedic interpretation of Swāmī Dayānand is interpretation in the interests of a theory—the theory, namely, that the Vedas teach a pure and exalted monotheism, and contain 'the basic principles of all the sciences.' It is as if one should attempt to

find a pure monotheism and a complete programme of scientific inventions in Homer's *Iliad* or Virgil's *Æneid*. Every historical allusion in the Vedas is carefully explained away, on the ground that 'the Vedas, being divine revelation, expound the laws of existence in its various departments, which precludes the mention of persons and places' (*Ārya Patrikā*, Lahore, Oct. 19, 1901). Thus *a priorism* reigns supreme. Induction has no place. Enough has been said to show that the doctrines of the Ārya Samāj are based not on the Vedas themselves but upon an *uncritical* and *unscientific* interpretation thereof.

On the other hand, it is only fair to say that Swāmī Dayānand has shown a sound instinct in rejecting the manifold absurdities found in *smṛti*, or tradition, and in seeking a basis in the early literature for a purer and more rational faith. That in his ignorance of historical and critical methods he set up a method of interpreting the Vedas which must constantly remain the target of the critical spirit, may in charity be regarded as his misfortune rather than his fault. Nor is this all that can be said. For, as in the case of those who are determined to regard Srī Kṛṣṇa as an incarnation of deity, it is healthier and more ethical to allegorize his adventures with the *Gopis* than to take them literally, although by so doing a sin is committed against the critical conscience; even so we may say that for those who are bound to regard the Vedas as the Eternal Word of God, it is better that they should, by peculiar tricks of interpretation, read into the text a fairly consistent theism, than on the basis of a rigidly scientific interpretation find therein only a vague Henotheism or Pantheism. So much for the Ārya doctrine of the Vedas, which from its importance has been treated at length. The other doctrines of the Ārya Samāj may be dismissed with a word.

The *theology* of the Ārya Samāj is the religious philosophy of the *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*. The fundamental principle of the *Sāṅkhya* is the dualism of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, 'matter' and 'soul.' The *Yoga*, or theistic *Sāṅkhya*, takes one of the innumerable souls recognized by the non-theistic *Sāṅkhya* and makes it the Supreme Soul. The result is a kind of trinity consisting of God, soul (or souls), and matter, each category of being having independent self-existence. God is eternal; so also is each soul; so also is matter. Pandit Ralla Rām refers to this as 'the universal trinity recognized by science and religion alike,' and as 'the most important of the doctrines of the Ārya Samāj' (*Ārya Patrikā*, Dec. 14, 1901).

As regards the *soteriology* of the Ārya Samāj, the great means of salvation is the effort of the individual, and for this a sufficient sphere is allowed through the doctrine of Transmigration, or repeated births. Salvation is conceived as virtually an eternal process. There is no remission of sins. *Karma* is inexorable. As regards the freedom of the will, the Ārya Samāj holds that 'we are not free to will an act, if we were created by some one else. . . . In order to be free, we must be believed to be eternally acting as we thought best, or as our previous *karmas* determined the course for us, receiving, according to God's eternal laws, the fruits of our good or bad deeds, and shaping in accordance therewith, and with our own hands, as it were, our future destiny' (*Ārya Patrikā*, Dec. 14, 1901).

It is evident from all this that the God of the Ārya Samāj is conceived as a great Cosmic Executive, whose business it is to preside over the inexorable processes of transmigration and *karma*. He is, as it were, a constitutional monarch, whose power is limited and defined by the eternal existence of two other 'estates,' namely, *soul* and *matter*. Thus 'absolutism is denied even to God.'

In the Ārya system of theology there is an attempt to settle the age-long conflict between science and religion. The doctrine of correspondence between the book of Vedic Revelation and the book of Nature is used for this purpose. Miracle is rejected.

Ethically, there is one doctrine of the Ārya Samāj which is most objectionable. This is the doctrine of *Niyoga*, which may be described as a virtual recognition of the principle of free love, sanctified by a temporary arrangement. Thus, in the English translation of the *Satyārth Prakāś* (ch. iv. p. 150), we read: 'A man may also contract *Niyoga* with eleven women (one after the other), just as a woman may enter into the relation of *Niyoga* with eleven men (one after the other).' Swāmī Dayānand's doctrine of *Niyoga* has been correctly summarized as follows by Lālā Ruchi Rām in the *Niyoga Doctrine of the Ārya Samāj* (p. 34):

'The Ārya Samāj allows even married men and married women to enter into the *Niyoga* connexion with one another or with widows and widowers under the following distinctly specified circumstances:

(1) When the husband or wife is incapable of producing issue through disease, etc.

(2) When the husband has been absent from home longer than a given period of time, for the sake of religion, for the acquisition of knowledge, or for earning a livelihood.

(3) When he or she is troublesome or in the habit of saying unkind words.

(4) When the wife is sterile, that is, if she has not been able to produce issue within eight years after the marriage.

(5) When the children born of her do not live long.

(6) If she begets girls only.

(7) If the wife be pregnant or constantly sick, or if the husband be always in bad health, and the other party be in the prime of youth and unable to control his or her passions.'

The motives which underlie this concession are twofold: (1) the duty of perpetuating the male line of a family, and (2) the desirability of legitimizing an errant passion and so 'preventing adultery and illicit intimacies.' '*Niyoga* is solemnized publicly even as marriage is' (*Satyārth Prakāś*, p. 147), and thus differs from prostitution. It is evident from all this that Swāmī Dayānand, like Plato, held strange views as to the proper relations between the sexes. In this respect both alike seem to have been theorizers. The members of the Ārya Samāj have not been courageous in practising *Niyoga* in the manner prescribed. Says the editor of the *Ārya Patrikā* (Sept. 27, 1902): 'We have to confess with regret that even the Āryas have not been able to set a single example of *the higher kind of Niyoga*.'

Before leaving the doctrines of the Ārya Samāj, it is proper to sum up the things also which are commendable in the doctrines and practices of this Society. Briefly stated, they are: (1) *negatively*, the rejection of pantheism and of some of the doctrines included therein, such as illusion and absorption, the casting over of the Paurānic superstitions together with idolatry, and a more or less vigorous fight against certain hurtful social customs such as caste, child-marriage, and intemperance; and (2) *positively*, the promulgation of a fairly consistent theism, the doctrine of the eternal identity of the soul, belief in prayer and in the need of the social worship of God, and a certain enthusiasm for education and for social and political reform.

3. **The Society.**—The organization which Swāmī Dayānand founded for the purpose of realizing his doctrine, propagating his faith, and regenerating India and the world, is known as the Ārya Samāj. *Samāj* means 'society' or 'assembly,' and *Ārya* is an ancient Indian epithet meaning 'noble.' *Ārya Samāj*, then, means 'society of the noble.' The name 'Ārya' is a patriotic and religious name, freighted with memories of ancient India, and

applied to the members of the three 'twice-born' castes. As such it was fitted to awaken patriotic sentiments. It is a social and political more than a religious name. In this respect it differs from the names of the other theistic and reforming movements of modern India, as, *e.g.*, the *Brahmo Samāj*, or 'Society of *Brahma* (God),' and the *Prārthnā Samāj*, or 'Society of Prayer.'

Some account will now be given of the history, organization, government, worship, methods of work, statistics, and future prospects of the Ārya Samāj.

(1) *History.*—The chief event of the period reaching from the death of Swāmī Dayānand (1883) to the present time is the division of the Ārya Samāj into two sections. The ostensible grounds of this split are twofold: (*a*) differences of practice in regard to the use of flesh for food, and (*b*) differences in theory concerning the proper policy to be pursued in higher education. From the point of view of the first difference, the two sections are called respectively the 'meat-eating' party and the 'vegetarian' party; and from the point of view of the second, the 'College' party and the '*Mahātmā*,' or old-fashioned party. Both differences run back into a still more fundamental difference of opinion, namely, concerning the degree of authority to be ascribed to the teachings of Swāmī Dayānand. In this matter, the position of the College party, as the party of light and culture, is liberal, while the attitude of the *Mahātmā* party is conservative. The educational work of each section is carried on in harmony with its special theory. The 'Cultured' party has a College at Lahore, the *Dayānand Anglo-Vedic College*, which it administers on modern lines and with a considerable degree of efficiency. The *Mahātmā* party, on the other hand, has an institution at Hardwār known as the *Gurukula*, in which ancient ideals of education receive the emphasis.

(2) *Organization and government.*—The organization of the Ārya Samāj provides for the local Samāj or congregation, the provincial assembly, and a general assembly for all India. The conditions of membership in a local Samāj are (*a*) implicit faith in the Ārya 'Decalogue,' or Ten Principles; and (*b*) belief in the canons of Vedic interpretation laid down by Swāmī Dayānand. The minimum age for membership is eighteen. There is no special ceremony of initiation for members of the 'twice-born' castes, but outsiders, such as Christians and Muhammadans, must undergo a ceremony of purification. The members of a local Samāj are of two kinds, probationers, or non-voting, and approved, or voting, members. The period of probation is one year. Sympathizers are also mentioned as a separate class. The officers of a local Samāj consist of a President, Vice-President, Secretary, Treasurer, and Librarian, elected by the voting members. The officers, it will be observed, are those of an ordinary secular association. The provincial assembly is a representative body composed of delegates appointed by the local congregations. Each affiliated Samāj has the right to send one delegate for every twenty members. Thus the form of government of the Ārya Samāj is clearly representative.

(3) *Worship.*—The weekly religious service of the Ārya Samāj is held on Sunday morning, since the Government offices are closed on that day. It is a long service, lasting three or four hours. Directly in front of the speaker's platform in the place of worship is the Vedic Fire Altar, which occupies the same relative position as the Communion Table in many Christian churches. Religious worship begins with the burning of incense (the *homa*, 'sacrifice'), accompanied by the chanting of Vedic verses. This is followed by prayers, exposition of the writings of Swāmī Dayānand, hymns, sermon, and lecture, the whole ending with the recitation of the Creed. With the exception of the use of incense, the constituents of worship are those of an ordinary Protestant service. The service is Puritan in its simplicity. There is no official priesthood. Members who are qualified take their turn in conducting public worship. The prayers are mostly extempore, and the sermon is long. For a very graphic account of the devotional services of the Ārya Samāj, see J. C. Oman, *Cults, Customs, and Superstitions of India*, pp. 152–166.

(4) *Methods of work.*—In its methods of work the Ārya Samāj follows in general the methods current among the various Missionary Societies working in India. It uses preaching, education, tract distribution, newspapers, etc. There are two classes of preachers, honorary and paid. The honorary preachers are local, the paid are itinerant. The first class consists of men in regular employment as clerks, pleaders, teachers, physicians, and other business men, mostly English-educated, and many of them College-bred. The paid preachers, on the other hand, give all their time to the work of preaching, and are, as a rule, educated only in the vernacular. The 'Cultured' party, it is interesting to observe, emphasizes *education*, while the *Mahātmā* party emphasizes *preaching*. Each section of the Ārya Samāj maintains a number of high-schools and orphanages, and also several newspapers and reviews.

(5) *Statistics and future prospects.*—According to the *Imperial Gazetteer of India* (1907), i. 474, the Ārya Samāj in 1901 had 'over 92,000 professed adherents.' It 'showed an increase of 131 per cent. in the decade preceding the last census' (*ib.*). The Ārya Samāj probably has by this time a membership of considerably over 100,000. The largest number of members is found in the Panjāb and the United Provinces, nearly 98 per cent., according to the census of 1901. Thus the Ārya Samāj is essentially a North India religious movement. There are a few branches in Burma and in British East Africa, the fruit of work among Indians who have emigrated to those regions. Lahore is the religious centre and capital of the Ārya Samāj, although Ajmēr, as the scene of the death of Swāmī Dayānand and the seat of the Vedic press, is a close rival.

As regards the future of the Ārya Samāj, it is difficult to play the prophet. It is undoubtedly the most popular among the indigenous reforming movements in North India to-day. In the matter of female education, temperance, and other reforms, it is in the line of progress. It also ministers to the patriotic spirit through its claim that the Vedas are the original source of all the religion and science of the world. It contains many earnest and good men who sincerely desire the welfare of their country. By its emphasis on education and social reform it is playing no unimportant part in the regeneration of India. It keeps in close touch with orthodox Hinduism through the fact that comparatively few members of the Ārya Samāj have broken caste. Will it ultimately be reabsorbed into the abyss of Hinduism, as some think probable, or will it advance to a still more rational and enlightened position?

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II. *DOCTRINAL.*—*Rigvedabhāṣya* (*i.e.* the Rigveda translated into Hindi and explained); *Rigvedādibhāṣya Bhūmikā* (introduction in Hindi to the above-mentioned *Commentary on the Vedas*); *Satyārth Prakāś*, 'Light of Truth,' Eng. tr., Chiranjiva Bharadwāja, 1906. The three works just mentioned are all from the pen of Swāmī Dayānand Sarasvatī, and constitute the authoritative literature of the Ārya Samāj.

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ASAṄGA.—The sources of our knowledge about Asaṅga's life are the records left by Paramārtha (6th cent.), Yuan Chwang [Hiuen Tsiang] (7th cent.), I-Tsing (do.), and Tāranātha (16th cent.). From these we can gather the following data. He was born of the Kāuśika family in Puruṣapura in the north of India. He was the eldest of three brothers, of whom the youngest, known as Vasubandhu (*q.v.*), was intimately associated with him in religious and literary activities. The school in which Asaṅga was ordained as a monk was the Mahīśāsaka, a branch of the most ancient form of Buddhism; but he was afterwards (we do not know how or when) converted to a more idealistic phase of Buddhist philosophy, which is now known as Asaṅga's idealism. Still we see that his idealism is much influenced by his former faith.

According to Yuan Chwang, Ayodhyā (the modern Oudh) was the chief scene of his activity. Here it was that he taught publicly and wrote books, etc.; and here probably in Ayodhyā, on the bank of the Sarayū, he converted his brother Vasubandhu to the idealistic Mahāyāna, though, according to Paramārtha, this took place in Puruṣapura, their native town. In any case it is clear that both Asaṅga and his brother were closely connected with the court of Ayodhyā, and that they were contemporaries of King Bālāditya and his father Vikramāditya. If we identify this Vikramāditya with Chandragupta II. of the Gupta dynasty, his date can be fixed in the first half of the 5th cent. A.D.; if with Skandagupta, in the second half. This is confirmed from another source. Yuan Chwang tells us that his master Śīlabhadra was 107 years old when he saw him in 633 A.D. Śīlabhadra's master, Dharmapāla, was a great systematizer of Asaṅga's teaching, but he was not his immediate disciple. Thus we have sufficient grounds for fixing Asaṅga's date in the 5th cent. of our era.

Many writings (*śāstras*) ascribed to Asaṅga are enumerated by Yuan Chwang. They are all handed down to us in Chinese translations. Although not one of the originals has yet been discovered, and there can, therefore, be no question of any strict criticism, nevertheless the authenticity of their tradition is assured by the fact that most of them were brought to China by Yuan Chwang himself, who was the greatest apostle of Asaṅga's philosophy in the East. The most important are the following:—

(1) Yogāchārya-bhūmi (Nanjio, No. 1170). This contains descriptions of the practice of Yoga, and of the stages one successively attains through it. The work is ascribed to the revelation of Maitreya. (2) Mahāyāna-samparigraha (Nanjio, No. 1247), a condensed treatise on the whole system of Asaṅga's psychology. (3) Prakaraṇa-āryavāchā (Nanjio, Nos. 1177 and 1202), an exposition of the moral and practical aspects of the system.

We learn from these sources that Asaṅga's system, in contrast to the Mādhyamika of Nāgārjuna, is decidedly realistic. Though it bears the name of Vijñāti-mātratā, *i.e.* idealism, and though Buddhist enlightenment consists, according to Asaṅga, in release from attachment to the objective world, his philosophy postulates the reality of each man's personality and also of the external world. In this respect his system is very near to the Sāṅkhya.

Asaṅga terms mind the *ālaya*, *i.e.* abode or *nidus* where all things, both subjective and objective, are latent, and whence they are projected and manifested. This *nidus* produces from and by itself intelligence or will (*manas*, otherwise *kliṣṭa-manas*), reason (*buddhi*, or *manas*), and five senses (*vijñānāni*) in succession. It is, therefore, called the eighth (*aṣṭama*), just like the Sāṅkhyan *puruṣa*. Each of the sense-organs projects or manifests its own objects, both fine and gross, by virtue of the seed (*bīja*) stored up in the *ālaya*; and the world thus manifested or objectified reacts upon the eighth (the *ālaya*) through the seven subordinate mind-organs, by 'perfuming' them. The *nidus*, or source of the world, the *ālaya*, acts, in this way, as that which *takes on* the impressions received from the objective world, *i.e.* as the *ādhāna*. Illusion in human life thus consists in regarding the objectification of one's own mind as a world independent of that mind which is really its source. To get rid of this fundamental illusion, we must study the true nature of our mind and its objectifications. Right knowledge of its true nature, the *dharma-lakṣaṇa*, leads us to the full development of the 'seeds of enlightenment,' and, as a consequence, to the absorption of the whole world into one's own self. Following, therefore, on right knowledge, this absorption, first of thought and then of objective phenomena into the inner self, *i.e.* the *yoga-āchāra*, is the necessary step to the attainment of Buddhahood (see BODHISATTVA).

Asaṅga teaches seventeen grades (*bhūmi*) of this attainment, and also the three personalities or bodies (*trikāya*, see ADIBUDDHA, i. 97ᵇ, and *JRAS*, 1906, p. 943 ff.) of the Buddha (see TRIADS [Bud.]); but neither of these doctrines was originated by him. The characteristic feature of his system is the elaborate and scholastic systematization of a theory of mind and of the seeds contained in it. On this account the Buddhist sect founded upon his system is called the *Dharma-lakṣaṇa*, *i.e.* the wisdom which shows us the true nature of all phenomena. It is, therefore, a philosophy rather than a religion; and such religious traits as may be found in it are but loosely connected with the system.

In Asaṅga's Buddhism, faith in Gautama Buddha had declined, being gradually superseded by the worship of Maitreya, the future Buddha. This worship maintained its ground for a long time in India and the East, but it was at last overwhelmed by another feature of popular Buddhism, the worship of Amitāyus (*q.v.*), lord of the Sukhāvatī in the West. In this way Asaṅga's Buddhism lost its hold on India and China, and is now preserved simply as a branch of learning among the Japanese Buddhists.

LITERATURE.—*Life of Vasubandhu* (Nanjio, No. 1463); cf. Wassilieff, *Buddhismus, seine Dogmen, Gesch. und Liter.... aus Russischen übersetzt*, Leipzig, 1860, pp. 235–243; *Vie de Yuan Chwang*, pp. 83, 114, 118; J. Takakusu, *Record of the Buddhist Religion by I-Tsing*, Oxford, 1896, p. 186; Schiefner, *Tāranātha*, pp. 107–118; J. Takakusu, 'Paramārtha's Life of Vasubandhu' in *JRAS*, 1905, pp. 33–53; Nanjio, *Catalogue*, Appendix i. No. 5, also *Twelve Japanese Buddhist Sects*, Tōkyō, 1886; Fujishima, *Le Bouddhisme Japonais*, Paris, 1889, ch. iv.; H. Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, Strassburg, 1896, 128 f., and the references there given; L. A. Waddell, *The Buddhism of Tibet, or Lamaism*, London, 1895, p. 141 f.

M. ANESAKI.

ASCENSION.—See ASSUMPTION AND ASCENSION.

ASCETICISM.

Introduction (T. C. Hall), p. 63.
Buddhist (C. A. F. Rhys Davids), **p. 69.**
Celtic (E. Anwyl), p. 71.
Christian (O. Zöckler), p. 73.
Egyptian.—See Semitic.
Greek (W. Capelle), p. 80.
Hindu (A. S. Geden), p. 87.
Japanese (M. Revon), p. 96.
Jewish (A. E. Suffrin), p. 97.
Muhammadan (R. A. Nicholson), **p. 99.**
Persian (N. Söderblom), p. 105.
Roman (J. S. Reid), p. 106.
Semitic and Egyptian (G. A. Barton), **p. 110.**
Vedic.—See Vedic Religion.

I. Introductory Discussion and Definition.—'Asceticism' is derived from the Gr. word ἄσκησις = 'training.' The 'athlete' was one trained, and one might be an 'athlete' in virtue (πάσης ἀρετῆς ἀθλητής, Diod. *Excerp.* 551). So very early the ascetic became the spiritual athlete of Church History. Two quite different conceptions mingle in the history of asceticism. One of these preserves the original meaning of discipline of the body for some ultimate purpose, as when William James urges sacrifice to God and duty as a means of training the will (*Psychology*, vol. ii. p. 322, cf. also pp. 579–592). The other conception distrusts the body altogether. Asceticism has then as its function not the training but the destroying of the body or the negation of its importance.

1. **Pathological elements in asceticism.**—From the beginning we have to bear in mind that in the history of asceticism we are often dealing with phenomena distinctly *pathological*. The fact that this has only recently been fully recognized makes a critical investigation of all the phenomena exceedingly desirable. Whether we deal with the 'flagellantes' or with instances of *perversio vitæ sexualis*, we must recognize a distinctly psycho-pathological element in much of the self-torture and self-abnegation that goes by the name of asceticism. The close connexion between the excited emotions in the regions of love and religion has often been pointed out and variously explained (Neumann, *Lehrbuch der Psychiatrie*, p. 80; Krafft-Ebing, *Psychopathia Sexualis*, pp. 9–11); and in diseased conditions insane impulses to inflict pain and to suffer pain mark the mind controlled either by religious or by sexual emotions. It is not now difficult for the modern psychiatrist to recognize in the standard saints' stories of the Middle Ages many impulses familiar to him from his experience in the Insane Hospital, but which were, of course, at that time regarded only as evidence of piety and distinguished fellowship with God (Friedreich, *Gerichtliche Psychologie*, p. 389). Perversions of the natural impulses to protect the body from pain and destruction may range from slight and occasional contradictions to the madness of suicide. Thus no history of asceticism is complete that does not take into account the epidemics of hysteria in which all kinds of excesses against the body are committed. These outbreaks are common in Persia as well as in India, and marked the north of Italy from the 10th cent. until the 13th. At every step of a rational inquiry into asceticism in its most pronounced phases we must ask ourselves, How far are we dealing with distinctly morbid and neuropathic phenomena?

Literature.—Maudsley, *Pathology of the Mind*, London, 1879; Krafft-Ebing, *Psychopathia Sexualis*, Stuttgart, 1887, *Lehrbuch der Psychiatrie*, 1879; Friedreich, *Diagnostik der psyc. Krankheiten*[2], Würzburg, 1832, and *System der gerichtl. Psychologie*, Regensburg, 1842; Cramer, *Gerichtl. Psychiatrie*[4], 1908; H. Neumann, *Lehrbuch der Psychiatrie*, Erlangen, 1859.

2. **Survival forms in seeming asceticism.**—We must also deal with *survival forms* which are falsely classed as ascetic. Customs are classed as ascetic even by so critical an historian as Zöckler (*Askese und Mönchtum*[2], 1897) which may more correctly be connected with the survival of older moralities. Thus the Essenes saw the hope of Israel in desert life and in return to a semi-nomad communism. How far this was ascetic, however, it is impossible to say. To be ascetic this type of communism must be shown to be connected either (*a*) with a disciplinary process for the attainment of righteousness, or (*b*) with a complete negation of the body by its mortification. Even granting that the Essenes were ascetics (cf., however, art. 'Essenes' in Hastings' *DB*, in which this is not emphasized), all their peculiarities are not to be connected with their asceticism. Professional men in our age wear black coats, not from motives of asceticism, but as survivals of past fashions. The robes of the monks, the communism of various sects, the treating of vegetable diet as superior to meat diet, may all be connected with ascetic modes of life, but they may also be mere survivals of past customs, or a recrudescence of old ideals. In new social and economic situations past moralities see much to blame, and can find hope only in reverting to the outward simpler life of the past and its forms. Such reversion is, however, only in a secondary sense ascetic. It is, nevertheless, true that the ascetic finds a ready discipline in such reversions; and cave-dwellings, communism, vegetarianism, primitive dress, etc., all play their part in the history of asceticism, but must be always examined carefully when they occur, for they may appear, where no ascetic motive proper can be shown, simply as survivals.

Literature.—Ritschl, *Entstehung d. altkatholischen Kirche*, Bonn, 1857, pp. 179–203, for discussion of Essenes as ascetics; see also *Naturforscherversammlung*, viii. 184, Hamburg, 1893; Bousset, *Rel. des Judentums*[2], Berlin, 1906, pp. 484–496; Lucius, *Der Essenismus in seinem Verhältniss zum Judentum*, Strassburg, 1881; Schürer, *HJP* II. ii. 188 ff.; art. 'Essenes' in Hastings' *DB* by Conybeare, in *DCG* by C. A. Scott, in *EBi* by Jülicher, in *PRE*[3] by Uhlhorn; *JQR* vii. 558, viii. 155.

3. **Symbolic forms mistaken for asceticism.**—Some customs are not ascetic, but are *symbolic forms*. Primarily asceticism consists in the contradiction of natural desires under the mandate of some higher, or supposed higher, ideal set by the will before the life. Such contradiction involves pain and discomfort for the person, that the body may be disciplined into subjection or removed as a hindrance to the soul's development. Soon, however, such contradictions are symbolized, and the symbols become conventional, the original significance being sometimes lost. Thus the tonsure, shaving the head, peculiar clothing, taking the last place in the procession, etc., may become mere symbols of what was once the expression of an attempt at self-mortification. Here again the student must be careful to mark customs that have become binding through usage or enactment, and that may seem ascetic, as the wearing of phylacteries, or broadened borders to garments (Mt 23[5]), but which in truth may have an entirely different motive, this motive being either sanitary or æsthetic, or based on racial distinction, on misinterpreted phrases from religious authority, or the like. Sometimes a symbol with such past significance becomes a sign of self-mortification. The wearing of sandals had no ascetic significance as it arose in a hot country, but, transferred to the north of Europe, it became a familiar symbol of self-denial among the monastic orders.

4. **Disciplinary asceticism.**—Every system of morals enforces the discipline of the will, and all systems of developed casuistry suggest methods of such discipline (cf. Paulsen, *System d. Ethik*[5], vol. ii. pp. 10–29, ed. 1900; and the 'Spiritual Exercises' of the Roman Communion). In this definition might be included, therefore, all exercises undertaken as training of the moral life, and carried through not for the sake of the exercise but for the effect produced upon the person using it. Thus also spiritual exercises may have a mingled motive, on the one side the pleasure of actual participation, and on the other obedience to the impulse to overcome habitual sloth by doing what is at the moment unpleasant or even painful. So fundamental has regularity been to life's development (cf. Wundt's *Ethik*, ed. 1886, p. 120), that religion has ever insisted upon recurrent periods of religious exercise in festivals, Sundays, hours of sacrifice and prayer, etc. And the ethical value of enforced regularity has been so apparent that in all developed religious systems disciplinary asceticism has had a more or less pronounced place. In evangelical Protestantism, tithes, church-going, grace before meat, family devotions are felt to have this disciplinary value, apart from the spiritual mood of the moment, and sometimes in spite of felt unreality on the devotional side. The substitution of the rational and significant for the arbitrary and mysterious in religious acts has gone far in Protestantism, but perhaps at some loss to the disciplinary effectiveness of these acts. In the Roman Communion, the division of the year, the month, and even the day, is minutely undertaken; and, viewed as a means of ascetic discipline of the life, such divisions have untold influence. Asceticism in this sense has the commendation of all great Protestant writers (cf. Luther's Sermon 'Von den guten Werken,' 1520). Acts that have no value *per se* may become disciplinary measures of great usefulness as means to gain self-control, regularity of life, proper self-appreciation, etc. It may be necessary for the moral man to exercise himself spiritually, as a man of thought trains his thinking capacity and subjects it to severe tests, or as the physical athlete engages in increasingly severe bodily exercise for the development of his muscle. The NT writers, and especially St. Paul, abound in directions along this line (Ro 8^{1-14}, 1 Co 9^{24-27}, Ja 3^{1-12}). The temptation to attribute to such exercises a special merit *per se*, and to harden them into a legal bondage, is so great that it has made Protestantism fearful in developing the ascetic life, perhaps even along legitimate lines. In the study of asceticism, however, the student must carefully keep present to his mind this legitimate element amid the legalistic and dualistic distortions.

Literature.—Paulsen, *System d. Ethik*[5], Berlin, 1900, ii. 10-29; Wundt, *Ethik*, Stuttgart, 1886, p. 120; Black, *Culture and Restraint*, London, 1901, p. 187; Harnack, *What is Christianity?* Eng. tr. 1904, p. 81.

5. **Dualistic asceticism.**—The popular conceptions of asceticism have grown up in connexion with the experience of it linked with a distinct attitude towards life. In this thought the material body is inherently evil, and the spiritual element is alone good. (For the history of this, see the §§ 'Indian Asceticism' and 'Greek Asceticism,' p. 65). The object of ascetic exercise is not the *training* of the body, but its ultimate *extinction*, that the soul may be free (cf. Plato's *Timæus*, 69–71). This is a metaphysical dualism which separates soul and body, God and the world, material and spiritual, into sharply contrasted realities, and life is looked at more or less as the struggle for supremacy and the ultimate victory of spirit by the extinction of the material and lower elements. There are all degrees of this metaphysical dualism, from the sharp emphasis upon the negative work of destroying the body, that the soul may be free from its desires and itself cease (cf. Max Müller on 'Nirvāna' in *Chips from a German Workshop*, vol. i. pp. 276–287), to the positive emphasis upon union with God on the part of the soul by abstraction, contemplation, and faith, as in modern Pietism (cf. A. Ritschl's *Geschichte des Pietismus*, vol. i. pp. 1–60). In all shades of this thinking, asceticism plays its part. World-flight in various degrees becomes the standard of holiness. It may be only abstention from certain forms of amusement, or it may be the life of Trappist silence, but what determines the conduct is not loving expediency within the realms of a Christian freedom (Gal 5^{1}), using the world but not abusing it (cf. Augustine, *de vera Religione*, §§ 21 and 36), but world-flight, as from that which is inherently antagonistic to spiritual perfection (cf. A. Ritschl, *Die christliche Vollkommenheit*, 1902). This dualistic asceticism always results in establishing a double standard of holiness. The exigencies of social organization enable only a few actually to realize world-flight to any extent; for the average man some symbolic or sacramental substitute must be found. Hence the whole doctrine of merit grows up with dualistic asceticism, as thus enabling a chosen few to flee from the world and impart of their holiness to less fortunate or less gifted followers. In the history of asceticism, upon which we now enter, we shall find many elements mingling, and it is often impossible and always difficult exactly to determine with which special conception we have to do.

Literature.—Max Müller, *Chips from a German Workshop*, i. 276–287; Ritschl, *Gesch. der Pietismus*, 1886, i. 1–60, and *Die christliche Vollkommenheit*, 1902.

II. *History of Asceticism.*—1. **Ancient ascetic customs.**—Almost all primitive life is marked by certain trials of courage to which the boy reaching manhood must submit. The customs sometimes assume a time of preparation, and priestly or religious direction was only a natural development (cf. Tylor, ii. 362–442; Waitz, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, 1871). So also marriage has its rites, some of which have, no doubt, a sanitary origin, some are memories of past culture, while all of them may become in course of time ascetic, in the sense that they are regarded as a necessary training for the communal life. Thus circumcision became a religious rite, and in a sense may even be regarded as ascetic (cf. Wellhausen, *Prolegomena zur Gesch. Isr.* 1883, p. 360). But in a strict sense, as a discipline for the *spiritual* life, it cannot be classed as ascetic. And the classes of customs gathered by Zöcklér (*Askese und Mönchtum*[2], 1897, pp. 78–97) are almost without exception symbolic substitutes for outgrown customs, or they have social and legal significance apart from any true ascetic motive. Training for war and preparation for life's simpler duties produced customs which later on became the forms of ascetic practice; but in general it may be said that any developed asceticism belongs only to a high and elaborate economic stage. Asceticism proper belongs to an age of reflexion. Men in the process of mŏralization, looking out on life, revert to simple habits in the hope of restoring a morality that seems to them endangered. Thus the *forms* of asceticism have their history in customs that were in no sense ascetic. We have here to do with that variation of purpose of which Wundt rightly makes so much (*Ethik*, pp. 97–105, ed. 1886). A famine was viewed by primitive man as a direct infliction of the demons. To ward it off, self-inflicted periods of hunger, *i.e.* fasting, were the natural remedy. The punishment was thus anticipated and the demons were conciliated. There was no ascetic

motive until spiritual man sought in this form of religious custom a means for self-discipline. To the semi-nomad Amos the luxury of a commercial capital was immoral, and his only hope was a return to the nomad morality and semi-nomad customs and habits. The artificial music, ivory beds, etc. (Am 6^{4-6}), were hateful to him because connected with the luxury of a commercial development whose moral strains his people were standing but badly. The motive in his denunciation was, however, not ascetic, but patriotic and primitive. A tribe sees itself threatened with extinction, and to appease the wrath of gods or demons offers one of its members in human sacrifice (Iphigenia, Curtius, etc.). Later a *surrogatum* was found in animal sacrifice, or the devotion of that which was most precious to the worshipper (the Judæan-Prophetic story of Abraham, Gn 22^{1-19}). So at last the painful parting with possessions becomes by a process of reflexion a means of spiritual discipline in vows of poverty. At the same time the ascetic motive must be sought in the latest development. Hence the student must watch with care the uncritical collections of evidence for asceticism in primitive history. It is, to say the least, doubtful if, outside of the highest civilization, asceticism in the strict sense of either discipline or negation of the bodily desires can be shown anywhere (cf., however, Zöckler, *op. cit.*).

LITERATURE.—Waitz, *Anthrop. der Naturvölker*, 1871; Wellhausen, *Proleg. zur Gesch. Isr.* 1883, p. 360; Zöckler, *Askese und Mönchtum*[2], 1897, pp. 78–97; Wundt, *Ethik*, 1886, pp. 97–105.

2. Persian and Indian asceticism.—Geographical and racial factors in the development have exposed the populations of Persia, India, and Egypt to a long succession of oppressive tyrannies by physically superior, but often mentally and spiritually inferior, races (Mongol, Muhammadan, English). The Orient has hence become the breeding-ground for religions of despondency or even despair (cf. Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*[3], ii. 701–703). Although in the Avesta fasting and mortification are forbidden (Spiegel, *Avesta*, ii. lviii.; cf. especially *Vendîdâd*, iv. 47–49), and a great many of the alleged evidences for a primitive asceticism in Persia will not stand a critical investigation, yet Mani and the very prohibitions of asceticism are evidences that in Persia as well as in India and Egypt spiritual suffering gave rise to a pantheistic world-view, with despair and asceticism as characteristic features. The forms of this asceticism are those of world-flight, the hermit life, the mortification of the body by unnatural inhibitions of all its desires. The most imperative of these was the sexual impulse, and hence, as it was also linked with the continuance of a hated existence, the mortification of this impulse became primary. As Indian religion became fully self-conscious in Buddhism and Jainism, it deliberately opposed the ascetic to the legal, and the life of contemplation to rituals and sacrifice, and democracy to caste-aristocracy (cf. Max Müller, *Chips from a German Workship*, vol. i. art. 'Buddhism'). The asceticism of Brâhmanism aimed at absorption into God. It was a training for spiritual vision. The asceticism of Brâhmanism, as awakened to full self-consciousness in the Buddhist reformation, was a negation of all life, the denial of the will to live (cf. Max Müller, *op. cit.*, art. 'Nirvâṇa'). This is the logical outcome of dualistic asceticisms, the perfection of world-flight. Even the monastic system is a compromise; and although it sprang up in India in response to the imperative social instinct, the hermit and the faqîr are the real types (cf. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, London, 1878). The relatively mild asceticism of Buddhism seems due rather to the good sense of Gautama Buddha than to the logic of his teaching, and the result has been that ever increasing sects have pushed the logic of asceticism to its limits.

LITERATURE.—Besides works quoted, cf. Kuenen, *Hibbert Lectures*, 'National and Universal Religions,' London, 1882; Monier Williams, *Buddhism in its connection with Brahmanism and Hinduism*, London, 1889; Silbernagl, *Der Buddhismus nach seiner Entstehung, Fortbildung und Verbreitung*, Munich, 1891; H. Oldenberg, *Buddha*, Eng. tr. 1882, p. 61; T. E. Slater, *The Higher Hinduism in relation to Christianity*, 1903, p. 253. See also special artt. ('Hindu' and 'Persian') below.

3. Greek asceticism.—The æsthetic inhibitions prevented in Greece the disagreeable and morbid developments of asceticism found in India. Moreover, the evolution period was shorter. Yet the waning freedom of Greece and the high intelligence of her population began even in Plato's day to produce a despondent and ascetic as well as a pantheistic type of religious thought. It is immaterial whether this arose on the soil of Greece independently of the Orient (so Zeller, *Philosophie d. Griechen*[3], iii. pp. 70, 420 ff.; but cf. Röth, *Geschichte uns. abendländischen Philosophie*, 2 vols.), or was an introduction from without. It rapidly developed from the teachings of Plato (cf. *Philebus*, 41; *Phædo*, 66–67, 82–83; *Apology*, 40), whose dialogues contain all the germs of the future Neo-Platonic development (consult treatment by Zeller, Weber, and Ueberweg-Heinze in their Histories of Philosophy). The cosmological speculations had their real religious interest in the assertion of the increasing badness of the phenomenal world as it fell below the spiritual reality. Nor is it essential whether the final belief was in a permanent separation of the two elements or an ultimate extinction of the lower element; the groundwork of an ascetic development is the hopeless surrender of the phenomenal as the sphere only of evil. The character of Greek asceticism was again controlled by the philosophic interest. The elimination of the phenomenal was by contemplation rather than by mortification. The way of salvation was escape from the body by pure thought. Even for Aristotle the higher life is open only to the man of pure speculative activity. In Neo-Platonism the Oriental mysticism was united definitely with Greek metaphysics (cf. Ueberweg, i. § 64, pp. 312–359). The Hellenistic-Judaic and the Neo-Pythagorean schools found their final expression along ascetic and mystical lines in Plotinus and Porphyry. God and the world were definitely separated. God as pure being was abstracted from all phenomenal manifestation. Salvation was in the beatific vision. Asceticism was the way of freedom from the fleshly. Between God and man angels and spirits became mediators, and revelation was in philosophy and ecstasy. Thus the waning faith of a homeless Greek culture found refuge, just where India found it, in ascetic despondency and theosophic speculation.

LITERATURE.—Besides the philosophical handbooks of Ueberweg-Heinze, Windelband, Weber, and Zeller, cf. E. W. Möller, *Geschichte der Kosmologie in der griechischen Kirche bis auf Origenes*, Halle, 1860; Leopold Schmidt, *Die Ethik der alten Griechen*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1882; Röth, *Geschichte uns. abendländischen Philosophie*[2], Mannheim, 1862; J. Adam, *The Religious Teachers of Greece*, 1908, p. 375; Rohde, *Psyche*[2], Tübingen, 1898. See also separate art. ('Greek').

4. Asceticism and Judaism.—(*a*) *Canonical Judaism.*—All early religions resort to various forms of self-inflicted privation or suffering to appease the assumed wrath of gods or demons. Famine is anticipated by fasting (cf. above), and wounding the body becomes a *surrogatum* for the punishment the offended powers would otherwise inflict with more fatal results. The motive in these cases is, however, not strictly speaking ascetic. The spiritual life is not being trained, nor is the body being destroyed as a thing evil in itself. Distinguishing, as we must in the interests of clear thinking, asceticism proper from such survivals of ancient thought, Judaism is seen to be a distinctly

non-ascetic religion. The fasts and the days of humiliation ('afflict your souls'), as in Lv 23^{26-32}, are no more ascetic in the strict sense than a day of prayer in a Protestant community. Some of the directions about the relations of sex may seem at first sight ascetic (Ex 19^{15}, Lv 15^{16-18} etc.), but a close examination shows that the motive was not ascetic, but had to do with the conception of a physical uncleanness (perhaps sanitary in origin) before Jahweh. This magical conception of impurity led to washings, lustrations, certain sexual inhibitions, but we find no trace of asceticism proper in the gradual evolution of the Jewish ritual. The dualistic asceticism of the Orient seems to leave no trace upon the canonical books. The fundamental conception of God, indeed, excludes it. Nor does it obtrude itself even as a foreign element, as it does in Muhammadanism. In spite of national disaster, the eschatological hopes of the Jews (cf. Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums*[2], Berl. 1906, pp. 245–346) continually counterbalanced any beginnings of despair, such as we may notice in Job, Ecclesiastes, and Lamentations. For spiritual discipline the Jew turned to the study of the Torah (Ps 119), or submitted with great ease to the burden of a legal system. In all ages, however, the mystic world-view that lends itself to asceticism is sooner or later at war with any developed legalism, and likewise a developed legalism works inevitably against the mystic-ascetic type of religious thought. The evidences cited by Zöckler for an undeveloped asceticism (*Askese und Mönchtum*[2], pp. 113–120) will not bear critical examination. The Nazirite vows have no real marks of strict asceticism (cf. art. 'Nazirite' in Hastings' *DB*). They were vows of special consecration to Jahweh for a longer or shorter period, and represent survivals of primitive Semitic religious customs; but spiritual or ethical *training* was wholly lacking (cf. the story of Samson), and they had no marks of any desire to destroy the body. The abstinence from wine is a survival of nomad morality protesting against the agricultural stage (Hermann Schultz, *Alttest. Theologie*[5], 1896, § 111). The priestly regulation of the Nazirite vow has so destroyed its primitive character, that we must completely re-construct it in the light of the stories of Samson and Samuel and the allusions to the Rechabites (cf. art. 'Rechabites' in Hastings' *DB*). Jahweh as the storm-god of the desert had those who even in the midst of an agricultural economic stage were His earnest champions and the maintainers of more primitive types of conduct. Thus the forms were given in which asceticism might begin to develop, as perhaps in John the Baptist, although even here again we deal with other spiritual phenomena (cf. next col.); and only when the influence of the Orient and Greece can be historically traced in Judaism do we find undoubted evidences of the ascetic ideal. The story of Jephthah's daughter has no real bearing on the question (cf. Hastings' *DB*, art. 'Jephthah,' and the Comm. of Budde and Moore, *ICC*). The fasts, feasts, and ceremonial regulations of Jewish religion proceeded upon a supposition which excludes Oriental asceticism, for the nation is holy to Jahweh, and the body can and must be kept ceremonially holy. This is binding on all; but priests and Nazirites, who come into closest contact with Jahweh, must be especially holy, *i.e.* ritually clean. The religions of the Orient centre in the negation of the body; Judaism insists upon its physical and ceremonial cleanness. This gives an entirely different character to the thought of the relation of the physical to the spiritual. So that we may put even more strongly than Zöckler his closing words: 'Only the closing period of the pre-Christian Jewish history gives us real historical parallels and anticipations of monasticism,' and add that only in this period does ascetic practice proper have any place at all.

LITERATURE.—Out of a vast literature may be mentioned especially: H. Schultz, *Alttest. Theol.*[5] 1896 (Eng. tr. by Paterson, Edin. 1892); Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums*[2], Berlin, 1906; Schürer, *Gesch. des jüd. Volkes*[3], Leipz. 1898–1902; Weber, *Jüd. Theol.*[2] 1897; H. P. Smith, *OT History*, Edin. 1903. See also separate art. ('Jewish') below.

(*b*) *Hellenistic Judaism.*—The distinction between fasts that have as their object the training of the spiritual life and those intended to propitiate an offended God must be constantly borne in mind. The first type is ascetic, the second has no necessary ascetic motive underlying it. The national fasts of Judaism, connected also as they generally were with times of special rejoicing, were intended to ward off the displeasure of the worshipped God. The non-ethical quality of these very fasts led to their entire rejection by the ethical prophets (Hos 6^{6}, Am 5^{25}). As custom hardened into a formulated legalism, neither world-flight nor spiritual discipline can be recognized as a formative motive. The mingling, however, of Oriental and Greek elements with Judaism began early (cf. Schürer, *Gesch. des jüd. Volkes*[3], i. 187–190, ii. 21–67). The influence was probably wide-spread, but it reached its climax in the work of Philo at Alexandria. Here we find all the familiar marks of the Neo-Platonic teaching of a later day (Grätz, *Gesch. der Juden*, iii. [1856] 298, Eng. tr. ii. [1891] 211; Schultz, *Die jüd. Religionsphil. bis zur Zerstörung Jerusalems*, 1864; Lucius, *Der Essenismus in seinem Verhältniss zum Judentum*, Strassburg, 1881). God is not dragged down by the material; the highest life is that of contemplation; and abstraction from the body is the essential thing in religion. Holiness is also a negative thing. The dualism between God and nature is spanned by the Logos. The dualism between the flesh and the spirit is resolved in the contemplative life, where the spirit frees itself from the flesh and rises to the vision of God. The Essenes (cf. art. by Conybeare in Hastings' *DB*) are, as we have seen, doubtfully to be considered as an ascetic development. The communism is the simple agricultural communism that marked all Israelitish life in early times. The marriage customs are hidden in evidently inaccurate estimates of them, and the asceticism reported by Philo may well be imported from his preconceptions into their practice. It is difficult to believe that a sect that in so many ways suggests a recurrence to primitive type should become a medium for carrying a Greek culture (cf., however, Zöckler, *Askese und Mönchtum*[2], pp. 125–127). The reports of Philo and Josephus are always open to suspicion when they see in Jewish customs bonds between the Greek world-view and Judaism. The food and clothing of John the Baptist (Mt 3^{1-17}, Mk 1^{4-8}) no more have asceticism as their motive than the poke bonnets and grey colour of the Quaker costume; both were inspired by the desire to revert to a primitive simplicity. John the Baptist is the reversion to the semi-nomad prophetic type. He proclaims no asceticism, but faithfulness to everyday duty (Lk 3^{7-14}). Only when Plotinus and Porphyry and Iamblichus leave the assumptions of the OT, and by symbolic interpretation read Greek and Oriental thought into Judaism, do we get a system of contemplative asceticism well developed. This asceticism is not a Jewish product and has left little trace upon Jewish life, but it has profoundly influenced the Christian development.*

* Muhammadanism has borrowed from old Christian sources an asceticism which, however, often resembles far more the nomadic excesses of the wilderness than either spiritual discipline or world-flight. Indeed, this latter is wholly strange to the Qur'ān, although in Persia it may be noted (cf. sep. art. 'Muslim' below).

LITERATURE.—Schürer, *op. cit.*; Bousset, *Die Rel. des Judentums*[2], Berlin, 1906; H. P. Smith, *The Bible and Islam*, Lond. 1897.

5. **The Christian Church and Asceticism.**—(*a*) *The Early Church and Asceticism.*—Very early in its history the transformation of Christianity from a life to a philosophy of life began (cf. Wernle, *Anfänge unserer Rel.*[2], Tüb. 1904, 322–346). The marks of this change are already upon several of the NT books, notably the Ep. to the Heb., where the influence of Philo and Alexandrian Judaism is marked (cf. Siegfried, *Philo von Alex.*, Jena, 1875, p. 321 ff.; Pfleiderer, *Das Urchristentum*, Berl. 1887, p. 629 ff.; McGiffert, *Apost. Age*, Edin. 1897, pp. 477–482). Thus the Judaism with which the Christian Church found herself dealing was often not that of the OT, but a Hellenistic Judaism whose thought was based no longer on the ethical monotheism of 8th cent. prophecy, but on Greek dualism (cf. Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* [ed. 1883], vol. i. § 7, pp. 93–101). This distorted the whole conception of the relation of the body to the purpose of the Kingdom; but the distortion was not realized because the faith in a catastrophic introduction of a new age seemed in itself to minimize the importance of the existing world. Upon this distortion grew up the conception of world-flight, and asceticism of the purest Oriental character was linked with the life of the Church. The exact history of the rise of monastic asceticism is obscured by the controversy over the genuine character of the alleged work of Philo, *de Vita Contemplativa*. This document has been pronounced by P. E. Lucius (*Die Therapeuten*, Strassburg, 1879) and others to be a forgery, while it has been defended by Conybeare (*Philo: about the Contemplative Life*, Oxf. 1895) and P. Wendland (*Die Therapeuten und die philonische Schrift vom beschaulichen Leben*, Leipz. 1896). It is certainly impossible to use it with confidence as a source for studying the history of monasticism. The so-called Therapeutæ, described as a Jewish monastic order, probably never existed, but the invention reflects the ideals of the highest holiness of certain circles profoundly influenced by Hellenized Christianity. As might be expected, it was in the Oriental Churches that the most negative type of asceticism flourished. Egypt became the home of men and women fleeing from the world to find in ascetic solitude the holiness they longed for (cf. the interesting pen picture in Anatole France, *Thaïs*[3], 1891). The attitude of St. Paul to marriage had nothing fundamentally ascetic in the Oriental sense. Abstinence was a matter of expediency, for the stress was great and the time was short (1 Co 7^{1-40}), and marriage brought cares which hindered the Christian in his main business of proclaiming the coming of Christ. At the same time, the vileness and licence of the period made continency, even to the denial of marriage, a very distinguishing mark of superior enthusiasm. In opposition to Marcion, however, Tertullian protests (*adv. Marcion.* i. 20), and he was not the only one to do so, against the rising tide of ascetic denial of marriage, urging that Christian liberty must be preserved (Clem. Alex. *Strom.* li. 23, iii. 12; Euseb. *HE* iv. 29). Moreover, self-denial gave a stamp of sincerity to much religious life whose basis was really not Christian at all, as in Manichæism, and this religious life compelled the Christian communities to rival its earnestness by denials as dramatic; so that Tertullian, who himself distinctly repudiates asceticism in principle (*Apology*, 42), is nevertheless proud of the self-denials he is able to set over against the claims of the ascetic Marcionites (*op. cit.*). Thus, in Egypt and Africa world-flight and ascetic fasting and an un-Christian and un-Pauline celibacy came more and more to mark the ecclesiastical development. It culminated in the world-flight of Paul of Thebes, whose retreat to the desert was, however, only the logic of the transposition of Christian values effected by Cyprian and Origen. Manichæism and Gnosticism had really conquered, and, opposed with true instinct by the Church, had yet forced upon the Church the dualistic Oriental conception of life (cf. Hatch, *Organization of the Early Chr. Churches*, Lond. 1881, Lect. vi. pp. 152–164, for a slight modification of this view). And logic went to the fullest extent in the hermit seclusion and the absolute isolation of the individual, as in the case of Antony and Simeon Stylites. The grouping of the priests of the worship of Serapis is sometimes regarded (but see O. Zöckler's art. below, p. 75[a]) as the model for what now sprang up as a modification of this hermit isolation. The monastery was at first a mere group of hermits gathered about some conspicuous example, or banded together for mutual protection. To such groups Pachomius (285–345) gave a set of rules (F. E. König, 'Die Regel des heiligen Pachomius' in *SK*, 1878; Grützmacher, *Pachomius und das älteste Klosterleben*, Freib. i. B. 1896), and monastic asceticism was formally foisted upon the early Catholic Church. Then, as persecution began to lessen, and martyrdom became rarer and rarer, the enthusiasm that found vent in this last evidence of zeal and sincerity began to express itself in ascetic practices. The spiritual athlete proved his constancy by self-inflicted deprivations.

LITERATURE.—See ASCETICISM (Christian).

(*b*) *The Oriental and Greek Communions and Asceticism.*—In general it may be said that the negative, contemplative, mystic type of asceticism had its largest development in the Oriental Greek Church. From the time of Pachomius and Antony the contemplative withdrawal from life into the desert was indeed bound up with extraordinary limitations of diet, etc., but the life of contemplation was the end sought by these fastings. The bodily exercises remain in the late conception of Greek asceticism a means to the contemplative self-abstraction. This is seen clearly in the rules of Pachomius and their subsequent development (cf. Zöckler, *Askese und Mönchtum*[2], pp. 201–233). The influence of Origen and of the Neo-Platonic conceptions on the Oriental Church, as it ceased to be intellectually quick, was to emphasize dogma and details of ritual on the basis of an extreme literalism in the use of Scripture (cf. K. Müller, *Kirchengeschichte*, i. 209). The ritual development was excessive, and the monastery reflected the most primitive type, an aggregate of hermit cells. It was only when, in 988, the Russian organization and education called out the best that was in the monastic development that it exhibited any signs of life and growth. Cyril and Methodius, the two monks from Constantinople who gave Russia to the Greek Church, represented the spirit of missionary service (cf. J. M. Neale, *History of the Holy Eastern Church*, 1873). Yet asceticism in the true sense of the term was overlaid by formalism and ritual. The negative conception of holiness was even forgotten amidst the mass of superstitious externalism. The monastery as seen at Mount Athos or Mount Lebanon (cf. articles *ad hoc* in Brockhaus, *Konversationslexikon*) reflects the older type of com-

The prohibition of wine is not ascetic, but a return to primitive morality on national and economic grounds. Nor is the fasting of Muhammadanism in the strict sense ascetic any more than the regular hours of prayer can be so called. Pilgrimages, however (cf. art. 'Mecca' in *EBr*[9]), and various wild dances, do partake of the mystic negative view of holiness which sees in abstraction from the body the possibility of the Divine vision. But, on the whole, asceticism is as foreign to the real spirit of Muhammadanism as it is to the Jewish religious development.

munal life; but the asceticism, save in the absolute banishment of women from all participation in the life, is not extreme. Nor has asceticism proper experienced any new development in the Russian branch of the Greek Church. Sects have arisen with extreme and fanatical views based upon a bald literalism, as the sect of the *Skoptzy*, who interpret Mt 19^{12} literally, and of whom 176 were in the years 1839–71 sent to Siberia for obedience to this supposed command (cf. Loofs, *Symbolik*, i. 181 [1902]). Yet in such cases the pathological and the superstitious overshadow the ascetic motives; and, indeed, of genuine ascetic development in the various branches of the Orthodox Greek Church there is almost no trace since the 17th century.

LITERATURE.—J. M. Neale, *History of the Holy Eastern Church*, 5 vols., London, 1850–73; I. Silbernagl, *Verfassung und gegenwärtiger Bestand sämmtlicher Kirchen des Orients*, Landshut, 1865; W. Gass, *Symbolik der griech. Kirche*, Berlin, 1872; Stanley, *Hist. of the East. Church*, new ed., London, 1884.

(c) *The Roman Church and Asceticism.*—The primary interest of the Christian Church as an Imperial organization was neither in dogma nor in the negative conception of holiness fundamental in ascetic monasticism (cf. A. Harnack, *Das Mönchtum, seine Ideale und seine Geschichte*[5], 1901, p. 30 f.). Her interest was in the re-organization of the Empire in the service of an Imperial ecclesiasticism. At the same time, in the creeds and literature which the Western Church took over for her Imperial purpose, there were both dogmatic elements which she had to formulate and defend and ascetic ideals which she had to use and regulate. Under the leadership of Rome, asceticism became a handmaid of inestimable value. It was the great monk-pope Gregory VII. who forced on the whole of the clergy the ascetic celibate as an ideal (Synods of Erfurt and Passau, 1074), and in him were united the two contradictory ideals, the ruling of the world by an institution whose ideal was world-flight. The missionary activity of the monastery in Northern Europe had changed its character, and while bringing a mass of evils connected with the holding of property (cf. K. Müller, *Kirchengeschichte*, i. 353–358 [Freib. i. B. 1892]), it was at the same time the bearer of order and culture, and even of literature, to the relatively barbarous North. It had, however, of necessity drifted away from the ideals of Oriental asceticism. To the task of re-introducing those ideals the reform movements of the period from Otto I. (936–973) to Gregory VII. (1073–1085) were directed. The monastery of the Western Church was up to this period largely dependent on the great land-holders, and vows were not made for life. Only in the 7th century was the retirement from a cloister visited by penalty, and only under the vigorous reforms of Bernard of Cluny and the Abbot Hugo were the monasteries compelled to conform to the ascetic ideals of the past (cf. K. Müller, *op. cit.* i. 317 f., and 431–435). The new reformed monastic orders looked with suspicion on the agricultural and literary work which marked the less ascetic monastic institutions, and exalted more and more the life of contemplation and ascetic negation (cf. H. Reuter, *Gesch. der relig. Aufklär.* II. vi. 24–28, Berlin, 1877). From this period onwards extreme forms of ascetic life—scourging, wearing of chains and haircloth garments, no longer as survivals of primitive life, but planned to inflict pain and discomfort—as well as extreme seclusion, became the accepted means for the attainment of perfection; and the ideal of perfection was world-flight and the negation of desire. At the same time, the linking of these ideals with Churchly ambitions gave peculiar form to the ascetic conception. Everywhere the monastic reform set before itself the same ends:

'The revival of monastic institutions, the recovery of lost lands, and the acquirement of new possessions, the establishment of old ecclesiastical laws, the acquirement of a better class of novitiate, introduction of stricter discipline and cultivation of piety, as described in the older stories of monastery life, and especially in the writings of Gregory the Great (590–604), penance and self-inflicted pain of all kinds, contemplation in solitude, humility to the point of self-renunciation, constant employment of confession and the sacrament, homage of the saints and relics, pilgrimages, search for the miraculous, pessimistic judgment of the world, longings for death, and generally an abnormal raising of the emotional life, increased sensitiveness, and, above all, a high estimate of the "grace of tears"' (K. Müller, *Kirchengesch.* pp. 385–386).

Each new attempt at monastic reform of necessity but revived this negative idea of holiness, and hence it is no accident that the circumstances which originally produced the pessimistic world-flight religious type in the Orient should generally mark its revival in the Western Church. The times of revived asceticism are periods of national disorder and social disruption. Gentle and thoughtful souls found world-flight the only seeming refuge amidst the wrecks of all that makes life really attractive, and in the extreme symbolic self-renunciation of self-torture the only hope for the devoted lives of those who saw the evil. It is impossible for any religious development to be wholly without the note of service and self-sacrifice for others, yet this sinks more and more into the background the more self-consistent the pursuit of the ascetic ideal becomes. To save one's own soul by retirement from the dangers of life is the chief goal, and the selfishness of this goal is only partly hidden by the fact that service on behalf of others may become a means to this end. Even the asceticism that marked the great monastic revival under St. Francis of Assisi (1182–1226) made the great services rendered by the order often a source of real corruption (cf. *Life of St. Francis*, by Thomas de Celano, 1229, by Bonaventura, 1261, and recently by Hase, 1856, and Sabatier [Eng. tr.], 1894). The complete impossibility of making the negative monastic asceticism a universal demand upon all Christians, while still maintaining Imperial world ambitions, has always led in the Western Church to compromises with the 'lay' world. Hence each revival of the extreme emphasis has also led to 'lay-brotherhoods,' to modified vows for those who cannot altogether flee the world, and to an extension of ascetic symbolism. This ascetic symbolism plays, therefore, a larger and larger part in penance, fasts, prayers, vigils, etc., in which the element of pain and bodily deprivation is reduced to a minimum, and the ascetic element is represented by symbols, 'half-fasts,' fish and eggs instead of meat, beads told, and masses said by proxy, etc. Against these compromises protests were constantly being raised by those who seriously held the monastic ascetic type of Christian ideal (Bernard of Cluny); but more and more as the Imperial organizing force of a centralized Vatican made its way, these compromises received the sanction of the Church. From the time of the Reformation onwards the Roman Church has been on the defensive, and the militant character of her great organizing force, inherited from Rome, has driven the negative and ascetic conception of holiness into a secondary place. In the Jesuit development, asceticism has a distinctly different place from that occupied in the older orders. It is a training for service under the ecclesiastical Imperialism of Rome (cf. Döllinger and Reusch, *Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten in der römisch-katholischen Kirche* [1889], particularly the 'Einleitung'). The goal the Jesuit order set before itself was world-conquest rather than world-flight, and thus again is clearly seen the old struggle between two distinct ideals of holiness, while both are maintained within the great historic communion of the Roman Church. The

triumphs of the Jesuit policies since the great Jansenist controversy have therefore steadily relegated asceticism to a secondary and disciplinary place, and its recent history shows no new development within the Roman communion, while it still maintains its place as one of historic legitimacy.

LITERATURE.—Out of a vast literature may be specially mentioned: Zöckler, *Askese und Mönchtum*[2], Frankf. a. M. 1897; Lea, *Hist. of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages*, 3 vols., Lond. 1888; Jessopp, *Coming of the Friars*[3], Lond. 1905; Montalembert, *Monks of the West from St. Benedict to St. Bernard*, 7 vols., Edin. 1861–1879; Taylor, *Classical Heritage of the Middle Ages*, Lond. 1901; Harnack, *Das Mönchtum* [Eng. tr. *Monasticism*, Lond. 1881]; and the Standard Histories of the Church in the Middle Ages, *e.g.* those of Neander, K. Müller, etc.; also Gothein, *Ignatius von Loyola und die Gegenreformation*, Halle, 1895; Ranke, *Die römischen Päpste*, Leipz. 1878; Reuter, *Gesch. der religiösen Aufklärung*, Berlin, 1877.

(*d*) *Protestantism and Asceticism.*—In a true Protestantism there is no room for Oriental asceticism based upon world-flight (cf. Luther, *Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen*, 1520). The only place asceticism can properly have is as a training for the life of service, and it is only a matter of loving expediency whether the Protestant shall prepare himself for service by fasting, deprivation and negation of legitimate desires, or by the simple and faithful discharge of daily duty. In the Matthew tradition (Mt 6[16]) Jesus certainly anticipated fasting; but in actual fact His disciples did not emphasize it during His lifetime (Mt 9[14]), as is seen also in the Mark tradition (Mk 2[18], Lk 5[33ff.]); and St. Paul's doctrine of Christian freedom (Gal 5[1] and argument of whole letter), permitting, indeed, any act that may prove for spiritual edification, excludes any emphasis upon such practice as necessary. Hence the Reformers admit fasts. 'Fasten und leiblich sich bereiten ist eine feine gute Zucht,' says Luther in his Smaller Catechism, and he urged it as a pious and useful exercise; as did also Calvin, with, however, the old primitive motive appearing, for the Church was to fast 'to appease the wrath of God' (cf. Zöckler, *op. cit.* p. 565). All the ascetic practices have dropped away, or been actually condemned by both Lutheran and Reformed Churches (Augsburg Confess., Art. 27; 1 Helvet. Confess., Art. 28). In the form of world-flight Protestantism has overcome asceticism. Only in the forms of a legalism can we trace remains of the Catholic conception of a negative holiness (cf. A. Ritschl, *Gesch. d. Pietismus*, i. 36–80, Bonn, 1880), and even the legalism that forbids dancing, theatre-going, wine-drinking, and card-playing does so now on the basis of the expediency of the Christian life, or on the ground of inherent immorality in the practices, thus removing the discussion of them from the sphere of asceticism. It is therefore a source of confusion to confound these two separate motives. With Protestantism, therefore, Oriental asceticism may be said to have been theoretically overcome.

LITERATURE.—The best histories are those of Zöckler, *Askese und Mönchtum*[2], Frankf. a. M. 1897, a new edition of his *Kritische Geschichte der Askese*, 1863; and J. Mayer, *Die christliche Askese, ihr Wesen und ihre historische Entfaltung*, Freiburg i. B. 1894; see also article 'Askese' in *PRE*[3]. Interesting material may be found in Palladius, *Historia Lausiaca* (*PL*, vol. xxxiv.), and in Rufinus, *Historia Monachorum* (*PL*, vol. xxi.). There is curious material in Stadler and Heim, *Vollständiges Heiligen-Lexicon*, 1858. For the history of Monasticism consult the catalogue given in *Dictionnaire des Ordres Religieux*, 4 vols., Paris, 1860; and Montalembert, *Moines d'Occident*, 7 vols., 1860–1877 (in part translated). For accounts of Buddhism see Hardy, *Eastern Monachism*, 1850, *Manual of Budhism*[2], 1880, and *Legends and Theories of the Buddhists*, 1866. For the attitude of the Reformation see Luther, *An den christlichen Adel deutscher Nation*, 1520, and *de Libertate Christiana*; Melanchthon, *Loci Communes*, particularly 'de crucis afflictionibus,' 1521; Calvin, *Institutes*, iii. 6–10, iv. 12 ff.; also Luthardt, *Die Ethik Luthers in ihren Grundzügen*[2], 1875; P. Lobstein, *Die Ethik Calvins*, 1877. For the best expositions in the Ethical handbooks of the Protestant attitude, consult H. Schultz, *Grundriss der evangelischen Ethik*, 1891, p. 40 ff.; and Newman Smith, *Christian Ethics*, 1891. A very full bibliography is also given by Zöckler, *op. cit.* pp. 21–29.

See also art. AUSTERITIES.

T. C. HALL.

ASCETICISM (Buddhist). — Judged by its literature, India has revealed to us human intelligence at its widest, intensest range of reaction to sensuous and emotional stimuli. European writers have described the mild, passive, dreamy, quiescent Hindu. But they have ignored the fact that these qualities were the natural antithesis to, and rebound from, the preponderant disposition. That appears to have been of a nervous, eager, high-strung, emotional character, passionate and pleasure-seeking, keenly susceptible, exuberant in expression, impulsive and strenuous in effort to satisfy desire. The notes of the *vīṇā* (a kind of lute), the singing of the *Karavīka* bird from the Himālayas, are described as rendering languid and maddened those that heard it, no magic agency being imputed (*Saṁyutta*, iv. 197; *Sumaṅgala*, *ap. Dīgha*, xiv. 35). Where the heart's desire is cut off, the subject promptly lies down to die (*Majjhima*, ii. 57; Com. on *Therīgāthā*, p. 221). The ordinary man is described as indulging in extravagant expression and depression at a transition from happiness to grief (*SBE* xi. 102, 127; *Majjh.* i. 238, 239). Where sense and emotion sway so forcibly, we should expect to find a corresponding excess in attempts to cope with that exuberance. Nowhere, indeed, has asceticism been so highly elaborated as in India. Nowhere have sense impressions and sense gratification been suppressed more nearly to the utmost limits consistent with life. Nowhere has the art of pain been more studied. Every act and posture of common life was engrossed by the self-persecuting zeal of the ascetic. And the lay world that maintained him in the intervals of his weird warfare expected of him a rigid persistence in his efforts, in exchange for its alms, as much as the votaries expected it from each other, if the reputation for sincerity and sanctity of each was not to be lost (*Vinaya Texts*, iii. p. 66 ff., i. pp. 90, 93).

The English reader of translations from Pāli and Sanskrit will find the word 'ascetic' used to denote any person who from religious motives has 'renounced the world' (cf. *e.g. Dialogues of the Buddha*, i. 213, n. 2; *The Jātaka*, vi., Cambridge, 1907, Index, *s.v.* 'Ascetic'). This is due to the English poverty for such terms as *religieux* and its synonyms. It does *not*, however, follow that, beyond renouncing home, property, and marriage, the so-called 'ascetic' is to be understood as engaged in systematic penance or self-mortification.

Ascetic practices were spoken of collectively as *tapas* (Pāli *tapo*), *i.e.* 'burning,' 'glow.' Parallel with, but usually independent of, sacrificial rites, they constituted, no less than the latter, a systematic line of action pursued to gain a distinctive end. That end, when Buddhism arose, was chiefly the guarantee of re-birth under relatively happier conditions than the present life could afford.

For instance, in the parable of the log drifting down the Ganges, the Buddha, discussing the chances of its arriving in due course at the open sea, and enumerating the various obstacles, said that it might be seized by human or by non-human agencies. By this he illustrated the fate of a religious brother, drawn back again into the world, or captured by longings after some abode of the gods and conforming to some discipline (*brahmachariya*) with the notion: 'By this rule, or ritual, or askēsis (*tapena*), or discipline I shall become a god, or god-like being' (*Saṁy.* iv. 179 ff., but cf. also *Majjh.* ii. p. 36, l. 2).

Of the more usual object of *tapas*, according to the Vedas—the attainment of magical powers—but slight traces remain. The Buddha, for instance, tells, as an ancient legend, of the failure of certain *Ṛṣis* to blast by curses a seer who exclaimed that their *tapas* was proved futile and their discipline fruitless (*Majjhima*, ii. 155).

The way in which *tapas* was held to guarantee the end sought after was not, as in sacrificial rites, by the propitiation of a god or gods, but by satisfying, as a system of acts and abstinences, the law of *karma* conceived as impersonal, eternal, moral energy. Painful experience and the absence of pleasant experience were to work as a set-off, in the balance of fate, against the weight of pleasant

self-indulgences in the past, and of possible pleasant experience in the near future, respectively.

'There are, brethren,' the Buddha's discourse runs, 'certain recluses (Achelakas, Ājivikas, Niganṭhas, etc.) who thus preach and believe: Whatsoever an individual experiences, whether it be happy, or painful, or neutral feeling, all has been caused by previous actions. And thus, from the cancelling of old actions by *tapas*, and by abstaining from doing new actions, there is no influx into future life; by this non-influx *karma* is destroyed, and so ill is destroyed, and so feeling is destroyed, and so all pain will become worn away. This, brethren, is what the Niganṭhas (Jains) say. . . . Is it true, I asked them, that you believe and declare this? . . . They replied . . . Our leader, Nāṭaputta, is all-wise . . . out of the depths of his knowledge he tells us: Ye have done evil in the past. This ye do wear away by this hard and painful course of action. And the discipline that here and now, by thought, word, and deed, is wrought, is a minus quantity of bad *karma* in future life . . . thus all *karma* will eventually be worn away, and all pain. To this we assent' (*Majjhima*, ii. 214 ff.; cf. i. 238).

The recorded interviews between the Buddhists and the Brahmans yield no such efforts to master and forestall destiny. But one young Brahman names *tapas* as one of five conditions declared by the priestly class to be requisite for the achievement of 'merit' (*Majjhima*, ii. 199). And current verses commending *tapas* are here and there gathered into the Buddhist canonical anthologies (*Saṁyutta*, i. 38, 43, 172=*Sutta Nipāta*, verse 77; *Aṅguttara*, iii. 346).

Now Buddhism was frankly eudæmonistic in its ethics. It hastened to reduce the evil of the world to its ultimate term—*dukkha*, 'pain,' 'sorrow,' 'misery,' 'ill.' It spoke of *nirvāṇa* as absolute happiness. Its cardinal tenets were to be an organon for the extirpation of ill. Affectionate and moral conduct, 'noble' (Aryan) views, are commended as securing *phāsuvihāra*, that is, easeful, serene living (*Aṅguttara*, iii. 132). Consequently it could not well sanction any deliberate infliction of pain, or *dis*-ease, as such, on one's self or on others. One of those categories into which the canonical books delight to divide humanity classes men as self-tormentors, or self-burners (*attantapo*), tormentors of others, tormentors of both self and others, tormentors neither of self nor of others (*Majjhima*, i. 341, 411, ii. 159; *Aṅguttara*, ii. 205; *Puggala*, 55). Under the first head come the votaries of *tapas*; under the second, butchers, fowlers, hunters, fishermen, thieves, executioners, gaolers, and all doers of acts of cruelty; under the third, great functionaries who, when holding sacrificial ceremonies, perform rites involving some personal discomfort, and also have herds of animals slaughtered, and keep their slaves in fear of punishment. Under the fourth head come those who have left the world and the home for the career of a recluse. These are, or should be, filled with charity and compassion for all living beings; they own no property in animals or in personal service. They harm no one, molest no one, and have thrown off the cares and ties that torment the world. And, as it were in antithesis to the word 'burning,' they are said to have 'become cool' (*sītibhūto*).

The latter term, *sītibhūto*, would seem to imply renunciation of *tapas*, as well as of those professions and practices through which a man would become, as it were, a cause of burning or torment to others. He has, of course, still to cultivate, even if he be a *bhikkhu* frequenting forest seclusion (*Majjhima*, i. 469), the virtue of *hiri-ottappa*, conscientiousness and fear of blame. These will often entail, ere he graduates in saintliness, states of mind called 'burning-producing' (*tapanīyā dhammā*), to wit, 'I have left undone those things that I ought to have done, and I have done those things that I ought not to have done' (*Aṅguttara*, i. 49; *Dhamma-saṅgaṇi*, §§ 38, 1300, 1323). Nor was he to be 'cool' in pressing forward to complete emancipation and self-conquest; but, on the contrary, abundance of 'ardour' (*ātāpī*) was expected of him. Only the *arahat* is described as wholly *sītibhūto*, as one resting on a summit, or by clear waters beyond the jungle (see art. ARHAT).

Buddhism, again, claimed at its very inception, in the Buddha's first sermon, to be a Middle Path, opposed equally to the extremes of sensuous and worldly indulgence on the one hand, and of self-mortification on the other. Both are denounced as ignoble (un-Aryan) and unprofitable, the latter, also, as *dukkha* (*SBE* xi. 146, *Majjh.* iii. 230). Contrasted in another passage, in a jungle simile, as the thick-set path and the fired-out path, they are opposed to the middle course of the brother who (in the practice of the 'Four Inceptions of Mindfulness') 'ardently' surveys body, impressions, thoughts, and feelings, that he may subdue all grief arising from coveting the things of the world (*Aṅguttara*, i. 295).

The Buddha's twofold objection to the practice of asceticism is really one: *dukkha* is evil and must be removed. Excess is *dukkha*. *Tapas* is a form of excess, and multiplies *dukkha*. It does not even lead through suffering to any gain; it is unprofitable. This futility of *tapas*, and not any shrinking from pain, was the moral of his own strenuous essay in austerities. This he is said, in the canonical books, to have related to a rāja's son, who maintained that happiness was to be won only through suffering (*Majjhima*, ii. 93); also to a young Brahman, who questioned him on the originality of the system he put forward (*Majjhima*, ii. 212); and again to a young Jain, who doubted whether the Buddha's disciples studied bodily as well as mental control (*Majjhima*, i. 237). When almost worn out by his austerities, he came, he said, to the conclusion: 'Not by this bitter course of painful hardship shall I arrive at that separate and supreme vision of all-sufficing, noble (Aryan) knowledge, passing human ken. Might there not be another path to Enlightenment?' Whereupon he once more took reasonable care of the body, (whereby his fellow-ascetics, who had expected great results, lost faith in him), and chose, for the meditations that brought the light, a spot where the natural environment was of a kind to soothe and brace the spirit.

A little poem in the *Saṁyutta Nikāya* (i. 103) represents him, at this stage, as happy in the release from all self-mortification and from faith therein. Before his complete enlightenment he sat by the river Nerañjarā, at the foot of the Goatherd's Banyan tree, musing: 'Oh! but I am freed from all that difficult toil! Oh! but well freed am I from that useless course of difficult toil! Wholly steadfast and mindful now draw I near to *bodhi* (enlightenment).' Māra, the evil one, tried to shake his serenity: '*Tapas* and sacrifice hast thou abandoned, whereby the Brahman youths are purified? The impure may deem himself pure, when he hath missed the path of purity.' And Gautama replies: 'I who have discerned the uselessness of [my] *tapas* and of all *tapas* whatsoever—bearing along with it, as it does, all that is useless, even as punting-pole and steering-pole may bring along a water-snake—I, practising the path to *bodhi*—moral conduct, meditation and insight—have won the Purity supreme.'

The foregoing allusions define the attitude of Buddhism to asceticism when the term applies to a course of painful penance, privation, injury, toil, or tedium inflicted upon the person. But in the sense of the Greek *askēsis*, or way of life, in which some channels of activity are barred and others developed by special training, Buddhism was thoroughly ascetic. 'The Greek has his asceticism, but it is no mortification of the senses. It is just the power to refuse a lesser good for the sake of the greater. Such asceticism, an alert and constant effort after betterness, is a tonic, a strengthening of fibre, an added increment to life.' Dr. Jane Harrison's words (*Albany Review*, Jan. 1908) apply no less to the Buddhist. Of the lay-disciple a less high standard of training was expected. His whole duty may be said to be laid down in the *Sigālovāda Suttanta* of the *Dīgha*. But any deeply serious movement must always concentrate its energies and its care at first on a nucleus of whole-hearted devotees, who alone will tide it over initial difficulties, and propagate it. These can no more live like the rest of the world than an army when mobilized can afford to do. With the end it had in view, the Buddhist *askēsis* is in some respects in affinity with the Christian, in some, again, with the Greek. For the earnest student (*sekha*) the body was something to be analytically studied and kept in cleanliness and good health. Clothing for it, regular and frequent baths, massage, shelter, regular food, rest, and medicines were prescribed. But it remained, religiously considered, a foul thing (*pūtikāyo*); and the senses

were so many opportunities and channels of malefic impressions and impulses. Susceptibility to beauty of person required to be corrected by the contemplation or imagination of bodily transience, decay, and putrescence. The bodily culture of the Order amounted very much to what would now be called 'the simple life.' Needs (which would else provoke pain) were to be satisfied without arousing new and unnecessary wants. The recurring explanation of 'moderation in diet' is typical :—

'When any one takes food with reflexion and judgment, not for purposes of sport, excess, personal charm and attraction, but so as to suffice for the sustenance and preservation of the body, for allaying hunger and *for aiding the practice of the religious life*; and thinking, "While I shall subdue that which I have been feeling, and shall cause no new feeling to arise, and maintenance shall be mine, blamelessness also and comfort"—this content, temperance, judgment in diet, is what is called "moderation in diet"' (*Dhamma-saṅgaṇi*, 1348).

Compared with the ascetic excesses, as well as with the imaginative and speculative obsessions, of the age, the Buddhist standpoint was markedly hygienic. As the Buddha is recorded to have said (*Majjhima*, i. 509), to consider that health means merely that nothing ails the body is to lack all noble (Aryan) vision. On the other hand, a healthy and efficient condition of body was not only indispensable to a healthy and efficient condition of mind, but was an integral part of sound training (*Majjhima*, i. 239, 473 ff., 425; *Dhamma-saṅgaṇi*, §§ 40–51). There does not appear, in the canonical books, any glorification of the intellectual or spiritual at the expense of the corporeal. The constituents of individuality were ranked on a level, as being each and all impermanent, channels of suffering, and void of Ātman. But then this body-and-mind individuality, 'poor thing' though it might be, was potentially the vehicle of *nirvāṇa*, of *arahat*-ship. And hence the training of it was of the first importance—training by no means of a negative, paralyzing character. The pupil of a great Brahman ascetic school is asked by the Buddha whether, and how, Pārāsariya teaches the cultivation of the bodily faculties. The answer is, 'Yes; with the eye he sees no object, with the ear he hears no sound.' 'On that system,' is the rejoinder, 'the blind and the deaf have their senses best cultivated.' And 'the supreme faculty-culture (*indriya-bhāvanā*) of the noble (Aryan) discipline' is then described (*Majjhima*, iii. 298 ff.). The training, moreover, is often represented as gradual, just the 'bit placed in the colt's mouth' to begin with (*Majjhima*, iii. 2): 'Come thou, brother, keep the *sīla* and the precepts and acquire the range of moral conduct, . . . see that the gates of sense are well guarded, that no influx of impressions bear thee off thy feet, be moderate in diet, keep vigils, be mindful and heedful, cultivate self-collectedness in solitude, purging the heart of the five hindrances and practising the meditation raptures'—these are given as seven successive grades. But in proportion to the distance from graduation, that is, from 'emancipation,' was the training to be strict and unintermittent. Certain brethren, who asserted that a number of daily meals kept them in better health than the one midday meal of the Master, were gently reminded that they were too far from 'attaining' to emancipation to let themselves go (*Majjhima*, i. 473 ff.). To one who had attained, such questions sank into insignificance. 'You say,' the Buddha asks an appreciative friar, 'that my disciples hold me in reverence. Why do they?' 'For five qualities: your frugal diet, contentment with whatever raiment, food, and lodging you have, and your love of solitude.' 'That can hardly be,' is the answer, 'for while some of my disciples in one or other of these things practise austerities, I some days make a fuller meal, or wear lay robes, or accept invitations to dine, or dwell indoors, or among my fellows.' And he goes on to reveal the deeper basis of their trust in him (*Majjh.* ii. 5 ff.).

It was not to be expected that the Buddha's followers, even when they were advanced in training, would all appreciate the *quasi*-Pauline 'liberty' of his own high standpoint. In Dr. Neumann's words, 'ascetic simplicity is a characteristic of humanity and ineradicable' (*Lieder der Mönche und Nonnen* [Berlin, 1899], p. viii). The austerities alluded to in the Order became elaborated into a scheme of thirteen extra vows or burdens (*dhutaṅga*), more discussed, perhaps, than carried out (*SBE* xxxvi. 267–269). But they were at variance with the spirit of early Buddhism, which, in reducing life to a healthful simplicity for those who had set their faces toward the Highest, sought, in its own metaphor, to give them the liberty of the bird, which in flying 'bears with it but the power to fly' (*Digha*, i. 71).

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C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

ASCETICISM (Celtic).—**1.** It has been suggested (Fisher and Baring-Gould, *Lives of the British Saints*) that the monastic system of Ireland and Wales was a continuation of pre-Christian ascetic practices; but this statement is unsupported by evidence. Herodian (A.D. 197) mentions the hardiness and scantiness of clothing of the Britanni; but this had no ascetic significance. On the other hand, Strabo (vi. 196) states that the Celts were pleasure-loving (*ἡδονικοί*), and Diodorus (xxvi. 3) says of the Galatæ that they were fond of wine. At the same time, it has to be admitted that our information as to the Celts in antiquity is very meagre, and especially insufficient for the relatively barren Celtic lands where Christian cœnobitism and asceticism afterwards flourished.

2. The Christian asceticism of Celtic countries in the 5th and 6th cents. undoubtedly owes its origin to transmission from Egypt through Massilia (Marseilles), a port which under the Empire had a vigorous Egyptian trade. Massilia and Lérins (Lerina) in the South and Tours further North became active centres for the dissemination of the cœnobitic ideal in Gaul and beyond. In the Life of the Scottish St. Ninian it is said that the saint had met St. Martin of Tours, and held him in such respect that, when he heard of his death, he dedicated to him the church called *Candida Casa* at Whithorn, which he was then building. With the monastic system of Southern Gaul, John Cassian was closely associated, and it has been held by Professor H. Williams (in *Trans. Cymmr. Soc.* 1893–4) that the monastic system of Britain and Ireland was more akin to that of Southern than that of Northern Gaul. In the latter district monasticism made marked progress after the death of St. Martin of Tours (A.D. 400), and it may even have spread from this source to Britain, as is suggested by the story of St. Ninian; but the main impetus to the growth of the monastic movement in these islands undoubtedly came through the anti-Pelagian mission of Lupus and Germanus (429). At Lérins a church and cloister were built by Honoratus, and it was here that Lupus, bishop of Troyes, became a monk after giving up his see and his family life. There was probably some rivalry between the Northern and the Southern monastic systems of Gaul, for Sulpicius Severus (*Life of St. Martin*, cxvii.) says that the institutions of St. Martin were

in some respects on a higher plane than the Egyptian institutions of John Cassian, the founder of the monastery of Marseilles. That there were links between Lérins and Britain is suggested by the fact (attested by Sidonius Apollinaris) that Riocatus, whose name is undoubtedly Celtic, visited that monastery twice in A.D. 450. The probability is that both of the Gaulish movements made contributions to British and Irish monasticism.

3. Celtic asceticism, however, in spite of its relation to the general movement in Christendom, had certain well-marked features of its own, which were mainly conditioned by the tribal organization in which it took root (Willis-Bund, *Celtic Church in Wales*; Fisher and Baring-Gould, *op. cit.*). The heads of the cœnobitic communities of Celtic countries were members of ruling tribal families, and the headship of these communities and participation in their property and privileges continued (in some cases even to the 12th cent.) to be limited to those who, by means of their valid pedigrees, could show kinship with the founder. The formation of cœnobitic communities in Wales and Ireland was probably directed not only by religious but also by economic considerations, owing to the pressure of population and the insufficiency of cultivable soil. The monasteries were largely centres of co-operative industrial activity in agriculture and other arts, while the pursuit of learning and other amenities of civilized life were thus rendered possible. Lay interests probably had a larger place in the life of these communities than the later Lives of Celtic saints, written under Benedictine influences, might lead us to suppose, and it was natural enough accordingly that these communities, as such, should take no account of clerical orders (Willis-Bund, *op. cit.*).

Prof. Hugh Williams (*loc. cit.*) gives the following as the four stages of development of monasticism in Wales, and the development in Ireland was in the main parallel: (1) A *life of seclusion*, self-denial, prayer, and meditation (and it may be added, industry, to a large extent manual), in a common life of obedience to a superior, the abbot. There were similar institutions for women, and a Celtic monastery was sometimes double. The life of this stage appears to have been modelled on the teaching of Cassian in his *de Institutis Cœnobiorum* and *Conlationes Patrum*. (2) A stage when the monastery was pre-eminently a *school*, as exemplified in the case of the Welsh saint Illtud. When children were sent to a monastery of this kind, they were regarded as the foster-children of the Church, and a fee had to be paid not only for their fosterage but at their removal. (3) That of the *Eremites*, or *Anchorites*. In Egypt this stage came first, but in Celtic countries it grew out of cœnobitism. In 595, when Columbanus wrote to Gregory the Great, this movement was at its height in Ireland, and was also characteristic of Gaul and Britain. It was doubtless largely due to economic pressure upon the monasteries. The settlements of those who left the monasteries were often named after the saint who was head of the monastic community that they left. In all Celtic countries the hermits of this stage showed a marked predilection for islands, at first in lakes and streams, then in the sea. (4) The stage of *monastic pilgrims* or *missionaries*. These combined the work of itinerant preaching with that of tilling the soil in the districts where for the time being they settled. Among the fruits of these missions were the monasteries established by Welsh and Irish saints in Brittany, and notably the following important communities: (*a*) that of Iona, founded by St. Columba in 563; (*b*) those of Anegray, Luxeuil, and Fontaine in the Vosges, founded by St. Columbanus in the end of the 6th cent.; (*c*) that of Bobbio in Italy, founded by the same saint in the beginning of the 7th cent.; (*d*) that of St. Gall, founded by a disciple of St. Columbanus. Other Irish monasteries on the Continent were Lagny, Péronne, Fosse-la-Ville (near Liège), Lure, Beaulieu (in Argonne), Würzburg, and Säckingen. These and other Celtic monasteries were important centres of learning in the Dark Ages, and the Irish monks especially were distinguished for their skill in copying and illuminating MSS (cf. *ERE* i. 843, 860).

4. The regulation of life in the monastic communities gave rise to the formation of Penitentials and Rules. Some of the former, as, for instance, that of Gildas (see Hugh Williams, *Gildas*), show that drunkenness and worse vices had to be kept in check, and the Lives of the saints themselves sometimes give similar indications. The rule of Columbanus was in some respects severer even than that of St. Benedict (Warren, *Liturgy and Ritual of the Celtic Church*). So far as the celibacy of the clergy, however, was concerned, it is probable, as Warren points out, that a married priesthood was not unknown in certain places and at certain times. St. Patrick appears to have been the son of a deacon and grandson of a priest, and one Irish canon speaks of a cleric and his wife ('uxor ejus'). Gildas in his *Increpatio in sacerdotes* seems to imply a married priesthood. The efforts to promote clerical celibacy in Wales in the 10th cent. met with considerable opposition, which continued into the two following centuries. Gildas (*Epist.* xxii. 21) speaks with approval of the celibate life, and quotes Elijah, Elisha, and Jeremiah as examples of it ('Virgo Elias, Elisæus virgo, virgines multi filii prophetarum'); in *de Excid.* 80 he says, 'Hieremias quoque virgo prophetaque'; but this was probably in opposition to the current ecclesiastical practice of Wales in his time.

The lives of the Celtic saints sometimes describe their ascetic practices in terms not unlike those of Indian *yogis* or *faqîrs*, and it has been suggested that the principle underlying this self-torture was analogous to the Celtic legal remedy of 'fasting against a person,' a practice whereby the person 'fasting against' another, to whom he had preferred a request, could bring his blood upon the other person's head, if the fasting led to the faster's death through persistence in refusing the request (Fisher and Baring-Gould, *British Saints*, Introduction).

Some of the austerities recorded of Irish saints are as follows:—St. Finnchua is said to have spent seven years suspended by iron shackles under his armpits, 'so that he might get a place in heaven,' in lieu of one which he had given away. Both he and St. Ite are said to have caused their bodies to be eaten into by chafers or stag-beetles. St. Findian is said to have worn a girdle of iron that cut to the bone. Of St. Ciaran we are told that he mixed his bread with sand, and of him and St. Columba that they slept on the ground with a stone for a bolster. Of St. Mochua it is said that he lived as an *inclusus* in a prison of stone, and that he had only a little aperture left for letting food down to him. Of the Welsh saint Brynach we are told that he lessened his need for the luxury of clothing by dipping his body daily in the coldest water, and St. Cadoc is also said to have been wasted with fastings. Further, of the Irish saint Kevin it is said that he remained for seven years in a standing posture without sleep, with his arm held up in the same position, and that a blackbird laid and hatched her eggs in his palm. Some of these tales are obviously exaggerations, but doubtless the Celtic monks underwent not a few austerities both necessary and voluntary. An ascetic attitude towards women appears to be reflected in some ritual observances of the Celtic Church, as for instance in the rule (embodied in the *Penitential* of Cuminius) that women were to be veiled at the reception of the Eucharist. In the *Leabhar Breac*, too (f. 248, col. i.), there is mentioned an Irish church where women were prohibited from going near the altar or taking the chalice into their hands. The Irish *Liber Hymnorum*, in its praise of the celibate lives of St. Patrick and St. Brigit, shows that the ascetic ideal had an honoured place in Celtic monasticism; and St. Patrick says of himself in his *Confessio* that he prayed as many as a hundred prayers a day, and the same number at night. Neither snow, frost, nor rain could prevent him from going before daylight to his wonted place of prayer. In spite of its tribal and other features, it cannot be doubted that Celtic asceticism was essentially part of the same movement as that which showed itself in

Christendom generally, and was governed in the main by similar ideals.

5. One of the best known names connected with Celtic asceticism is that of the Culdees (Ir. *Céli Dé*, 'the companions of God'). This term was sometimes Latinized into *Colidei* ('God-worshippers'). It is probable, according to the view taken by Reeves and Zimmer, that this term, as used from the 9th to the 12th cent., did not denote the regular successors of the Irish monasticism of the 6th, 7th, or 8th cents., but the followers of a new movement, which dated from the 8th century. Zimmer suggests that it was probably due to the influence of monks who had returned to Ireland after living at Metz under the rule of Chrodegang (A.D. 749). It was not in Ireland, however, but in North Britain that the Culdee movement attained its most important development.

Many of the terms of Celtic monastic nomenclature were derived from Latin, but a few were of native origin. The following are the chief terms of Irish: *abb* ('the abbot'); *secnabb* (i.e. *secundus abbas*, 'the prior'); *fer légind* ('the lector'); *mac légind* ('the lector's pupil'); *coimétuide* ('the warden'); *manach* ('a monk'); *mac clérech* ('a young monk'); *banairchinnech* ('the prioress'); *caillech* ('a nun'); *mac-caillech* ('a young nun'); *berrad manaig* ('the tonsure,' in Celtic countries over the front of the head from ear to ear); *cathair, congbail* or *maimister* ('a monastery'); *anchara* ('an anchorite'); *anmchara* ('a soul-friend,' 'confessor'); *cilic* ('cilicium'); *clausul* ('clausula'); *crípta* (Lat. *crypta*); *disert* (Lat. *desertum*, 'an anchorite's cell'). In Welsh the following are some of the terms employed: *abad* ('an abbot'); *mynach* ('a monk'); *abades* ('an abbess'); *mynaches, lleian* ('a nun'); *mynachlog* ('monachi locus'); *mynachdy* ('a monastery'); *cufeint* ('a convent'); *didrufwr* (lit. 'a homeless man,' 'a hermit'); *ancr* ('an anchorite'); *meudwy* (lit. 'a servant of God,' 'a hermit'); *cufygl* ('cubiculum,' 'a hermit's cell'). The Breton and Cornish terms are practically identical with those of Welsh. The place name Dyserth in Flintshire is probably identical in meaning with the Irish *disert*. The derivative of *cella* was in Irish *cille*, in Welsh *cell*. *Cil* in Welsh place names means 'a retreat,' and *llan*, 'an enclosure,' a term applied to the precincts of a monastic settlement. Generally it is followed by the name of a saint, but sometimes by some other word, such as a river name: *e.g.* Llanelwy, Llandaf, Llangefni, Llanarth, Llanllyfni. The Welsh term *Plwyf*, Breton *Plou* (from Latin *plebes*), which now means 'a parish,' meant in mediæval Welsh 'a congregation.'

6. The general fusion of Celtic Christianity with that of Rome led to the assimilation of the monastic institutions also, and the foundation of new monasteries and nunneries by the leading orders of the Continent. In Wales some of the mediæval abbeys, such as Neath, Margam, Strata Florida, Strata Marcella, Aberconwy, and Valle Crucis, aided and patronized Welsh literature; but from the 14th cent. onwards Welsh poetry, largely under the influence of the love-poet Dafydd ab Gwilym, shows an anti-ascetic tendency. Unlike Ireland and Brittany, Wales has become thoroughly Protestant in spirit, and not only Protestant but Nonconformist. So far as the Nonconformity of Wales may be said to have an ascetic bias, it is in the direction of temperance and total abstinence from the consumption of alcohol; and this tendency has left its trace in legislation in the 'Welsh Sunday Closing Act.' The Calvinistic Methodist Church, especially, views the sale and use of alcohol by its officers and members with marked disfavour; and its regulations are strongly hostile to all forms of card-playing, dancing, and the drama, but the spirit of Welsh Nonconformity in general is practically identical in these matters with that of this denomination.

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E. ANWYL.

ASCETICISM (Christian).—

I. Introduction: Asceticism in its relation to Biblical revelation.
II. Attitude of the Early Christian Church to Asceticism.
III. Development of Asceticism in the Middle Ages.
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I. *INTRODUCTION: ASCETICISM IN ITS RELATION TO BIBLICAL REVELATION.*—The word 'asceticism' (Gr. ἄσκησις, from ἀσκεῖν = 'to exercise *or* practise'), when used in the sphere of religion and ethics, denotes self-preparation for a virtuous course of conduct, the zealous practice of acts of devotion and morality. This practice of virtue in the narrower and stricter sense, or what may be called moral gymnastic, may consist in exercises of an inward kind (prayer offered in the heart, examination of conscience, and the like), or in acts of self-discipline passing over into the outward life (self-mortification by fasting, voluntary poverty, sexual continence, etc.). Both forms of asceticism, that pertaining to the spiritual sphere and that of a physical and external character, were already known to classical antiquity, especially in the traditional teaching of its philosophers from Pythagoras and Socrates downwards (cf. ἄσκησις in Plato, for instance *Rep.* vii. 536; and in Aristotle, for instance *Eth. Nicom.* ix. 9; as well as the mention of πολλαὶ καὶ παντοδαπαὶ ἀσκήσεις ὀσιότητος in Isocrates, p. 226 C, etc.). A specially high value was set upon the ascetic habit of life in the schools of the Stoics (cf. especially Epictetus, Περὶ ἀσκήσεως, Diss. II. xiii. 6), the Cynics (cf. κυνικὴ ἄσκησις in Jos. *Ant.* VI. xiii. 6), and the later Platonists beginning with Plutarch (cf. the latter's *Moral.* p. 668 E). Owing to the great and widespread influence of these schools during the Roman Imperial period, 'philosophy' and 'asceticism' (τὸ ἀσκητικόν, Epictetus, Diss. II. xii. 6) were employed almost as synonymous terms. Abundant evidence of the essential identity of the connotation of the terms 'ascetic' and 'philosopher' is furnished especially by the writings of Philo Judæus, as well as by those of numerous Christian Fathers from the time of Justin Martyr and Clement of Alexandria onwards. When Philo hails the Jewish religion, and the Fathers hail Christianity, as the true philosophy, both have in view a certain ascetic element in their respective religions. The moral strictness and earnest demand for virtue found in both, when looked at from the view-point of asceticism, formed the connecting link which rendered possible such a combination of the Jewish or Christian ideal of life with the 'wisdom' of the Græco-Roman philosophers.

As a matter of fact, there does appear to be inherent in both the OT and the NT stages of revelation an element of asceticism. This consists in the urgent demand for an earnest combating of sin and a complete resignation to the holy will of God. In its ritual legislation the Old Testament also prescribes fasting—sometimes strictly obligatory and universal (especially on the Great Day of Atonement, Lv 16^{29} 23^{27}), at other times optional and limited by temporary or personal conditions (*e.g.* Jl 1^{14} 2^{12}, Jer 36^{6}, 1 S 7^{6}, 2 S $12^{16ff.}$, Ezr 8^{23});

in particular, it imposes upon the priestly order certain temporary forms of abstinence; and is acquainted with a form of vow in virtue of which certain persons abstain all their lives from the use of wine (Nu $6^{2ff.}$, Jg 13^4, 1 S $1^{10ff.}$, Jer 35). And the New Testament religion not only takes cognizance of these and similar ordinances of the Old Covenant, but even itself leaves scope for a corresponding ascetic course of conduct. While not prescribing fasting as a matter of obligation, the NT clearly assumes that this practice will occasionally be followed by members of the Christian community (Mt 6^{16} 9^{15}, Ac 13^2 14^{23}, 2 Co 11^{27} etc.); it exhibits a similar attitude in the matter of sexual continence (Mt 19^{12}, 1 Co 7^{25}), or of the renunciation of earthly possessions (Mt 19^{21}, Ac 2^{44} 4^{32} 5^4), or of temporary submission to a vow (Ac $21^{24ff.}$), and the like. In short, acts of ascetic discipline and training in virtue are contemplated in the NT as allowable, nay, even as necessary, according to time and circumstances, in the sphere of Christianity. In the interests of the kingdom of Christ, the Apostle Paul submits himself to fastings, watchings, cold, nakedness, etc. (2 Co 6^5 $11^{26f.}$); and 'bruises' and 'subdues' his body after the manner of athletes (1 Co 9^{27}). And he looks for similar action on the part of other seriously-minded followers of Christ (Gal 5^{24}, Ro 13^{14}, Col 3^5).

In view of the above and many other Biblical expressions, it cannot surely be maintained that ascetic practices are *excluded* by the religion of revelation. But, on the other hand, they cannot be regarded as a *primarily* important or *fundamentally* significant element of that religion. That they play only a secondary or accessory rôle in the sphere of revealed truth is plain even at the OT stage of religion, both from the relatively small number and the moderate strictness of the commands regarding fasting and other forms of abstinence, and from the sharp polemic of the Law and the Prophets against the excessive bodily and external mortification which prevailed widely in the religions of Israel's heathen neighbours (cf. the prohibitions of self-mutilation in Lv 19 and Dt 23, and Elijah's attitude towards the frantic wounding of themselves by the priests of Baal, 1 K $18^{28ff.}$). There is also proof of this in the absence of all trace of a partiality or a preference for the unmarried life in the social and ethical practice of life in Israel. To marry and to have children remain national fundamental virtues in Israel through all periods of its history; even as late as the Roman era, the Pharisees, who were preeminently the party of strict law, and who showed in many other points a disposition towards rigorous legalism in the matter of ascetic practice, maintained a decidedly unfavourable attitude towards celibacy. The opposite attitude of the Essenes cannot count for much, in view of the notoriously small number of this party and the extent to which they were probably influenced by foreign customs, particularly, it may be assumed, by the example of the Pythagoreans; and even in this sect there was a minority which (according to Jos. *BJ* II. viii. 13) did not renounce marriage.

That Christ and the primitive Christians deviated in any of the points here mentioned from the traditions that prevailed among the Covenant People of the OT is a theory that could be maintained only by a NT exegesis controlled by ascetic prejudices. Neither as regards the individual nor as regards society do the ethical teachings and prescriptions of the NT go further than *permit*. It is intended not as a rigorous statute, but as a command of love, when the Lord calls His disciples (Mt 10^{38} 16^{24}, Jn $13^{13ff.}$) to follow after Him in the way of the cross and of humility; and the Apostles adopted precisely the same free and mild attitude towards the problems of controlling the appetites and mortifying the flesh. In regard to these problems, St. Paul appears in some measure to have made stricter demands (cf. the above-cited passages in 1 and 2 Cor. as well as the Epistle to the Galatians, etc.) than even the stern legalist St. James; but an injustice is done him when the attempt is made to read into his Epistles anything like a commendation of monastic withdrawal from the world or of fanatical maintenance of virginity. He was and continues to be the preacher of true evangelical freedom, even in all those instances where he deals with questions of individual or of social asceticism (cf. 1 Co 6^{12} $9^{4ff.}$ 10^{23}, Gal 5^1, Ro $14^{2ff.}$); in the demands he makes for cross-bearing he nowhere goes beyond the standard set up by Jesus Himself. He who would 'walk by the Spirit' (cf. Gal $5^{16ff.}$) must, indeed, turn away from all works of the flesh; but there is no hint in this of an *ἀφειδία σώματος* or false angel-like spirituality (Col $2^{16ff.}$), no 'hating of one's own flesh' in the sense of Neo-Platonic or Oriental dualistic teachings (Eph $5^{28f.}$), no one-sided bodily exercise and mortification; for far higher than such *σωματικὴ γυμνασία* stands in his estimation the *γυμνάζειν ἑαυτὸν πρὸς εὐσέβειαν* (1 Ti $4^{7f.}$). Even in the solitary passage in which he uses the word *ἀσκεῖν* of religious and moral conduct (in his speech before Felix at Cæsarea, Ac 24^{16} *'ἀσκῶ ἀπρόσκοπον συνείδησιν ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, κ.τ.λ.*), the practice of virtue he has in view is that which he champions everywhere else, a practice marked by the characteristic freedom of the Gospel, and as far removed from Pharisaic narrow-mindedness and legal bondage as it is from unnatural self-torture after the fashion of Indian *faqîrs* or heathen Syrian priests of Asia Minor.

II. *THE ATTITUDE OF THE EARLY CHRISTIAN CHURCH TO ASCETICISM.*—In spite of the condition of things described above, which forbids us to regard asceticism as an element of the religious and moral life belonging exclusively to the essence of Christianity, or prescribed in its original body of doctrine as necessary to salvation, the ascetic principle early made way for itself in the development of the Christian Church. Nay, in the course of this development, asceticism soared to heights and produced phenomena in the life of the Church which for greatness and far-reaching influence or the whole cultured life of humanity fall in no way behind what the history of non-Christian religions has to show of an analogous kind. Christian asceticism is one of the phenomena produced by the union of pre-Christian factors of civilization with the spirit of Christianity, phenomena which —like Christian art, poetry, jurisprudence, etc.— have everywhere made contributions of inestimable value and of abiding significance for the furtherance and elevation of the mental life of mankind. And the source from which the Christian spirit derived this element of culture—so far as it did not lie in the religious and cultured life of the OT —can have been none other than that from which formative influences and impulses mainly flowed in the departments of art, poetry, politics, and law. The beginnings of asceticism in the Christian Church, especially as organized in the form of communities—monasticism—constitute another chapter in the history of that process which is usually spoken of as the 'Hellenizing of Christianity.' No other place can be assigned to them than within the sphere of this process, which embraces the history of the Church from the 2nd to the 5th century. For the stage upon which the phenomena of a fully developed and socially organized Christian asceticism first make their appearance is found in those lands which constituted the world of Græco-Roman civilization; and the religious and philosophical traditions of this same cultured

world form the point to which the asceticism of the Church, with its ideals and efforts, primarily and mainly attaches itself.

Per se another supposition might appear possible, namely, that a fruitful influence upon the ascetic and monastic tendencies of the ancient Eastern Church proceeded from a religious civilization which in the matter of asceticism was so richly developed as that of *India* (with ascetic systems like Jainism and Buddhism, which date back to a time considerably earlier than the Christian era). Or an attempt might be made to trace the earliest ascetic and monastic movements in Christianity to kindred phenomena in the religions of *Babylonia* (and Syrophœnicia) or of *Egypt*. But when the various pre-Christian religious civilizations are pitted against one another and their share in the result before us examined, none can dispute the palm with *Greece*. India is far too distant, and was always much too widely separated from the mental life of the peoples of Western Asia, to be seriously taken into account. Towards the religious usages of Babylonia and Syria, which might certainly be considered with a view to the solution of the problem, the people of God in OT times—and primitive Christianity in like manner—consistently assumed an attitude only of disapproval and sharp opposition (cf. the remark already made on 1 K 18^{26}). Again, the analogies with early Christian asceticism, which have been sought in the religious system of the Egyptians, prove, upon closer critical examination, to be merely apparent. This remark applies especially to those alleged ascetics or priestly monks of the temple of Serapis whom H. Weingarten (art. 'Mönchtum' in *PRE*^{2}, 1882; and previously in *Der Ursprung des Mönchtums im nachkonstantin. Zeitalter*, Gotha, 1877) sought to represent as the real models and teachers of the earliest Christian monks—a false theory which has been completely shattered by more recent investigation (see E. Preuschen's monograph, *Mönchtum und Serapiskult*, Darmstadt, 1899 [2nd ed. 1903], in which the existence of Serapis priests of a monkish type is disproved, and therewith the utter impossibility of Weingarten's hypothesis demonstrated). Thus we must abide by the view that the beginnings of early Christian asceticism and monasticism go back to essentially Greek influences, or, to put it more exactly, to the influence of the late Greek and Judæo-Hellenic schools of philosophy, to which we have already referred in this connexion. The religions of the Ancient East can at most be credited with only an indirect share (the result of the syncretism of the Alexandrian epoch) in the formative process we are considering. [Cf., on the one side, Edwin Hatch, *Influence of Gr. Ideas and Usages upon the Chr. Church* (Germ. tr., Preuschen, *Griechentum und Christentum*, Freib. i. B. 1892, p. 101 ff.), and A. Harnack, *Das Mönchtum, seine Ideale und seine Geschichte*^{4}, Giessen, 1895, esp. p. 18 ff.; and, on the other side, the literature (No. II.) cited at the end of the present article, dealing with the history of asceticism prior to and outside Christianity.]

Long before the rise of monastic organizations, by which asceticism was elevated to the rank of the ideal of life for the social ethics of Christianity, many forms of ascetic practice and endeavour had made their appearance within the sphere of individual ethics. Some of these had their model in Jewish customs. This was the case in particular with the habit of fasting twice a week and observing fixed daily hours of prayer. For both of these practices, the so-called 'station' fasts on Wednesday and Friday, and the habit of praying at least three times a day (the germ from which the later conventual institution of 'hours' developed), there is evidence in writings as early as the 2nd cent. (*Didache*, VIII. i. 3; Hermas, *Sim.* v. 1, 3; Aristides, *Apol.* 15; Tertull. *de Jejun.* i. 10, *de Orat.* i. 19; Clem. Alex., etc.). And at the root of both there is not only the Pharisaic Jewish model, but also an underlying allusion, dating probably even from Apostolic times, to the principal features of the Passion of our Lord. The phenomena of pre-monastic early Christian asceticism may be assumed to have found their models and motives mainly in pagan Hellenism. So with the custom (to be attributed to the influence of Montanism) of partial fasting for several weeks before Easter (the *Xerophagy*, or Fast of the Passion); the disposition (attributable to the same source) to increase the severity of Church discipline and to place additional obstacles in the way of contracting a second marriage (cf. especially Tertull. *de Pœnit.*, *de Pudic.*, *ad Uxor.*, *de Monogam.*, etc.); as well as the high or exaggerated value (to be explained partly from Montanist and partly from Gnostic influences) set upon voluntary virginity (*παρθενία*, *ἐγκράτεια*) as an ideal.

We see the *coryphæi* of all the leading schools of theology, Greeks and Latins, Alexandrians and non-Alexandrians (cf., in regard to these last, not only the already oft-cited Tertullian, but also especially Cyprian, *de Hab. Virg.* and *de Orat. Domin.*; Lactantius, *Inst. Div.* vi. 23; and Methodius, *Conviv.* vii. 3, viii. 1), participating in the endeavour to commend such ascetic practices. The ascetic element was most prominent, to be sure, in the theology of that school which, as the founder of an ecclesiastically orthodox gnosis in opposition to that of the heretical Gnostics, ventured to draw most boldly and most deeply from the treasury of the traditions of Greek philosophy—the *Alexandrian*, which far surpassed all other theological schools of the early Church in the matter of establishing and developing Christian asceticism. Even Clement, although he defends the right to hold earthly possessions (*Quis div. salv.*), and upholds the sanctity of the married condition (*Pæd.* ii. 10; *Strom.* ii. 23, iii. 12), gives expression to very rigorous views regarding the Christian attitude to fine clothes and various worldly pleasures and enjoyments (*Pæd.* ii. 1 ff., iii. 2 f., 7 f.), and even pleads at times in favour of an almost Stoically conceived ideal of apathy (*Strom.* iv. 22, cf. iii. 7 and vii. 12). Origen, even after he had learned to repent of the hyper-ascetic excesses of his youth, in particular his self-emasculation (Euseb. *HE* vi. 8), still remained an enthusiastic panegyrist of all forms of world-renunciation and mortifying of the flesh. He went still further in the matter of fasting and other forms of abstinence (see *Hom. in* Lv $^{10.\ 11}$, *Exhort. ad Martyr.* etc.), and especially in recommending virginity (on this last point, besides passages like *c. Cels.* i. 26, vii. 48, viii. 55, see especially his Com. on Ro 12^1, where he commends three kinds of 'living, holy, God-pleasing sacrifice,' namely a martyr death, voluntary celibacy, and abstinence from sexual intercourse on the part of married persons; similarly *Hom.* 23 *in Num.*).

It is not surprising that, when an advance took place from the practice of asceticism by individuals to its practice by bodies of people, the earliest signs of the movement took place where this Christian-Gnostic theology made its influence first and most powerfully felt. Egypt, the home of the Alexandrian theology, became also the mother-land of early Christian *monasticism*, or, to designate it more exactly and correctly, *cœnobitism* (for *μοναχός* or *μονάζων* is properly 'a hermit,' 'one living alone'; it is the living together in *κοινόβια* that stamps the ascetics as monks in the modern sense of the word). It was in those circles in Egypt in which theology and church stood in the closest connexion with Origen that the impulse towards more intimate

association, with a view to a common ascetic life, appears to have set in earliest. The adherents of the Origenist Hierakas, whom Epiphanius in No. 67 of his Catalogue of Heretics describes as a sect under the name Ἱερακῖται, may in many respects be regarded as one of the earliest societies of ascetics. But in their case, as previously in that of the Encratite party of Tatian, the element of theoretical traditional teaching or mystico-Gnostic speculation probably predominated to such an extent that the name 'school' or 'sect' fits them better than such designations as 'Mönchverein' or 'Klosterbrüderschaft' (cf. art. 'Hierakas' in *PRE*[3] viii. 38 f. by A. Harnack, who does not take sufficient account of the peculiarity which distinguishes them from the cœnobite societies of the following period). Like these Hierakites, who may have belonged entirely to the 3rd cent., the 'solitaries' (μοναχοί, also μονότροποι, μονήρεις), described by Eusebius in two passages of his Commentary on the Psalms (on Pss 67 and 83), were also still without the closer social organization. The latter may yet have been wanting also to those 'bond brothers' or 'sons of the bond' (Syr. *bənai qyāmā*), of whom mention is made by a Syrian contemporary of Eusebius, namely, Aphraates of Edessa, in Nos. 6 and 18 of his *Homilies*. To the category of ascetics who received their impulse from the Alexandrian theology we must assign also those representatives of the ascetic habit of life who belong to the first decades of the 4th cent., and whose dwelling-places should probably be sought in Palestine and Syria rather than in Egypt. What here again forbids our identifying them with monks proper or cœnobites is the lack of more definite information as to principles of organization or rules that may have belonged to them.

This characteristic of being bound together by a fixed principle or rule of life is not wanting, however, in those societies of Middle Egypt which from the early part of the 4th cent. began to make their appearance in the Eastern Church, and as the founders of which St. Antony and St. Pachomius have gained superlative fame. The former (born 251, died 356) lived for some decades (from about 270) as a hermit in the mountain wastes of northern Middle Egypt, on the right bank of the Nile, opposite Arsinoë and Heracleopolis. Then, shortly after the year 300, a number of bodies of associates in his ascetic mode of life, who had taken up their abode in the same region, were trained by him to work and to practise devotional exercises in common, and thus—though for a time without written rules—a kind of monastic life was established. The sites of two of the κοινόβια, or colonies of monks, established and directed by St. Anthony down to his death (*i.e.* for a full half century) can be fixed with tolerable certainty: Pispir, or the 'outer mount of Antonius,' lying close to the right bank of the Nile, and the 'inner mount of Antonius,' lying farther to the east, near the Red Sea. While this older patriarch of Egyptian monasticism still refrained from committing his rules to writing, his younger contemporary Pachomius (born *c.* 290, died 345 or 346) provided the hosts of ascetics who gathered round him in southern Middle Egypt, between Akhmîm [Panopolis] and Denderah, with a rule of life which regulated in detail their devotional exercises and their work. This body of rules was, no doubt, reduced to writing by himself or by some of his immediate associates. By the authors of the earliest accounts of his life and work it was regarded as a product of Divine inspiration, having, it was alleged, been given to him, written on a tablet of brass, by an angel while he sojourned in a cave. Its prescriptions regulate in the most minute detail not only the daily round of work and prayer, but also everything relating to the food, the clothes, the sleep, and the dwellings of the monks. They comprise much that is original and characteristic of the national Egyptian monastic usage, but also some things which the later tradition did not accept at all (so, especially, the division of the inmates of each establishment into 24 τάγματα classified according to age), or accepted only with considerable modifications (for instance, the prescription of 3 × 12 daily acts of prayer).

Partly independent of the models offered by the creations of these two great monastic fathers, and partly with more or less close attachment to them, there arose even during their lifetime various large and afterwards influential settlements of associated bands of ascetics. Thus we find (1) in Lower Egypt, the monasteries, or, to be more correct, the hermit-villages of the Nitrian mountain, founded somewhere about the year 320 by Amun or Ammonius, as well as those of the desert of Skete to the north of this hill country, founded about 330 by Macarius 'the Great' or 'the Egyptian' (died 390); (2) the South Palestinian hermitages and monasteries of St. Hilarion, a pupil of St. Anthony (*c.* 320–360); (3) the N. Syrian and Mesopotamian monasteries called into being about 325 in Nisibis and its environs by the Egyptian Awgîn (a monkish saint who received his training at Tabennisi, the principal monastery of Pachomius); (4) the monastic societies established about 330 still farther north, in Armenia, Pontus, and Cappadocia, by Eustathius of Sebaste. Only a little later are the phenomena which mark the laying of the foundation of a joint practice of asceticism in the West, especially the essentially monastic activity of St. Martin (*c.* 370–400) in Western Gaul. Regarding the majority of these fathers of the monastic system we have more or less detailed and in the main reliable historical information. In his *Historia Lausiaca* (written in the beginning of the 5th cent.), Palladius has collected sketches of the lives of some 70 notable ascetics and founders of monasteries. These sketches, while not devoid of certain features of embellishment, are never pure fictions, but rather embody reports by eye- and ear-witnesses of the persons and events in question. The same remark applies to the historical value of the still older *Historia Monachorum* by Rufinus, and to Athanasius's *Vita Antonii*. Here, again, this last-named biography of the most famous of all the Oriental fathers of monasticism has handed down to us information which, while it is enriched with not a few legendary additions, represents in the main the authentic testimony of contemporaries. [Against the attacks of modern hyper-critics (esp. the above-named Weingarten) on these and other sources for the history of asceticism and monasticism during the era of Constantine and the following period, see, in general, the discussions by C. Butler and the author of the present article in the works cited below (esp. Zöckler, *Askese und Mönchtum*, pp. 188 ff., 200 ff., 212 ff.)].

III. *DEVELOPMENT OF ASCETICISM IN THE MIDDLE AGES.* — The Church of the Middle Ages added scarcely anything that was essentially new to the forms of ascetic effort and action that had become usual in the Early Church period; but in the matter of establishing fixed rules and systematizing these forms it went far beyond what had been done by the Ancient Church. The development in question was accomplished in the course of the following four periods:

1. *The transition period from the Early Church to the Middle Ages proper* (*c.* 360–800).—During this period the labours of a number of *monastic legislators* in East and West gave permanent form

and binding force to the traditions of the era of Constantine with reference to the living together of ascetics in monastic establishments. Basil the Great of Cæsarea (died 379) drew up a set of rules, which proved of fundamental importance and attained to permanent influence, for the monastic system of the Eastern Roman Empire and partly also of Lower Italy and Sicily. Suppression of the hermit or anchorite form of monastic life (which was still frequently preferred by the earliest Oriental ascetics) by cœnobite arrangements, transfer of monastic settlements from remote deserts to the neighbourhood of cities, rejection of hyper-ascetic excesses (*e.g.* in such matters as fasting and the number of daily times of prayer, which were restricted to seven or eight), and generally an increasing mildness of disposition, directed to the discouraging of excessive ascetic enthusiasm—such are, upon the whole, the characteristic features of this organization which derived its origin and its name from Basil. In the Latin edition of the Rules of Basil, which Rufinus prepared to serve as a constitution for the lower Italian and Sicilian branches of this monastic family, provision is made even for the establishment of double religious houses, *i.e.* the erection close to one another of monasteries under an abbot and of nunneries under a 'mother.' The foundation of these double houses indicates a shrinking from the vehemence of the older sexual asceticism. A similar custom prevailed frequently in the West, even independently of the influence of Basil and Rufinus. Such houses were founded, for instance, in Spain by Fructuosus (died 670); in the British Isles we have examples in the Iro-Scottish religious houses founded by St. Patrick and St. Columba; and still later in the orders of Robert of Arbrissel (died 1117), Gilbert of Sempringham (died 1189), and Birgitta of Sweden (died 1373); cf. Zöckler, *l.c.* pp. 290, 379 ff., 419 ff., 541 f. More or less important developments continued to be undergone by Basil's monastic legislation in the Byzantine East till towards the middle of the 11th century. These concerned especially such matters as the placing of the religious houses under the bishop's superintendence, increased severity of discipline within convents, an organic union whereby anchorites (κελλιῶται, 'inmates of cells') lived with cœnobites within the same cloistral district, and the distinguishing of the monks' right of penitential discipline from the pastoral charge exercised by the secular clergy. Most effective for this development were the ecclesiastical prescriptions of Justinian's civil code; the canons of certain synods of the 7th and 8th cents., especially the Trullan Council, ii. 692; the influence of the patriarch Germanus of Constantinople (died 703), of the abbot Theodorus Studita (died 826), of Athanasius of Trapezus (*c.* 960 ff.) who founded the oldest principal religious house of the monastic republic on Mt. Athos, and of the Constantinopolitan monastic prefect, Simeon the younger (*c.* 1040; cf. Zöckler, *l.c.* p. 290 ff.; and, in regard to the last named, K. Holl, *Enthusiasmus und Bussgewalt beim griechischen Mönchtum*, Leipzig, 1898).

Turning to the monastic system and asceticism of the West, we discover the most influential legislator and most famous founder of orders in the person of Benedict the Great of Nursia (died 543), the founder of Monte Casino. A number of his predecessors in the West (in particular Joh. Cassianus [died 435] and Cæsarius of Arles [died 542], the former the composer of rules for monks, the latter the author of a system for nuns) had sought to adapt the ascetic traditions of the East as represented by Egypt and Syria to the needs of the inmates of Western religious houses. In relation to these attempts it is to be noted that the course followed by the *Regula Benedicti*, which became the fundamental code of the greatest of all the orders of monks, is partly to summarize and partly to condense and simplify previous results. The *Regula* in its present form is divided into 73 chapters, and though perhaps not free from some later additions, may be regarded, certainly up to ch. 66, as genuine. It exhibits no small degree of legislative wisdom in its enactments, which are marked on the one hand by strictness and on the other by humanity and mildness. It wears the aspect of strictness in its insistence upon the maintenance of the *votum stabilitatis*, and in its measures for ensuring a strict *clausura* in opposition to all undutifulness and disposition on the part of the monks to wander about without restraint; so also in its demand that there shall be no holding of private property by any inmate of a religious house; in short, in its enforcing of the three fundamental monastic duties: *castitas, obedientia, paupertas*. But, on the other hand, it evinces relative mildness in its dietary prescriptions (the eating of flesh food being prohibited, but a moderate quantity of wine allowed), its regulation of dress, its enjoining of silence (*taciturnitas*) at fixed times, and its directions as to devotions, eight daily 'hours' being indeed prescribed, but excessive length being avoided by reducing the number of Psalms to be sung in each 'hour' to three. The *Regula* of the patriarch of Monte Casino knows as yet nothing of the more violent methods of penance and discipline, such as self-flagellation, wearing the hair shirt, temporary *inclusio*, or confinement of monks in their cells, etc. It was reserved for later epochs in the Middle Ages to give birth increasingly to such aggravations of ascetic practice until an unnatural degree was reached.

2. *The period from the beginning of the 9th till towards the end of the 11th century* (from Charlemagne to Hildebrand).—This period is characterized, on the one hand, by the beginnings of that rigorous reaction, within the bosom of the Benedictine order of monks, against the frequent laxity or disuse of monastic discipline, such a reaction as is exhibited in the reforms of the younger Benedict (of Aniane, died 821) and the 'congregation' of Cluny (especially from the time of its second abbot, Odo [died 942]); and, on the other hand, by the constant effort of the Church, through the instrumentality of penance, to carry over ascetic principles and habits of life to the lay world. Amongst the literature serving this purpose (the *Libri Pœnitentiales*), one of the earliest and most prominent places should be assigned to the works of Columbanus of Luxeuil (died 615), who composed not only a book of penance for laymen, but a rule for religious houses (*regula cœnobialis*) which contained a severe penal code. In this class of literature we find prescribed not only a number of the ordinary forms of penance for sins that have been confessed (money fines, almsgiving, pilgrimages to distant shrines, intensified fastings, etc.), but with special frequency also the penalty of flagellation. In connexion with the rigorous movement emanating from Cluny, there were many monasteries in which, from the commencement of the 11th cent., this flagellation was practised in a specially severe form, and with all sorts of refinements added to intensify it. Thus arose the practice of self-flagellation, first introduced in certain religious houses of Central Italy (Clusium, Pomposia, perhaps also at Camaldoli near Arezzo, the original seat of the Camaldulensian 'congregation' founded by Romuald [died 1027]), and reduced to a fine art in Peter Damiani's establishment, Fonte Avellana, by Dominicus, surnamed

Loricatus (*c.* 1050), who added to the self-inflicted flagellation yet other methods of mortifying the flesh, notably the performance of numerous genuflexions (*metanœæ*) during the singing of Psalms in Divine worship, and so became a much admired hero of the self-torturing hyper-ascetic discipline (see the literature cited below).

A more harmless form of the joint practice of asceticism, likewise developed first in the religious houses that were influenced by the reforming movement of Cluny, and showing itself almost simultaneously in Central Italy and in South Germany, consisted in the institution of lay-brothers or 'outside brothers' (*fratres exteriores* or *conversi* or even *barbati*). These were a kind of half-monks, who, because they were subject to only part of Benedict's *Regula* and were not bound to wear the monastic habit, did much to diffuse the spirit of monastic piety even in lay circles, and at the same time to extend the political influence of the monastery. Starting from Gualbert's 'congregation' of Vallombrosa near Florence (*c.* 1038), and from Hirschau, the monastery of abbot William the Holy (died 1091), this institution of lay-brothers gradually established itself in other 'congregations' as well. It became the model for those brotherhoods of Penitents or Tertiaries which were afterwards (from the end of the 13th cent.) affiliated with the mendicant orders of St. Dominic and St. Francis, and from whose activity results of great significance followed.

3. *The period of the Crusades and of the last two centuries of the Middle Ages* (*c.* 1100–1517).—The characteristics of this period are an ever-growing effort on the part of the religious orders to extend their manner of cultivating piety to the Church as a whole, and an increasing tendency to multiply ascetic practices and forms. Even during the 12th cent. the monasticizing of the secular clergy by the imposition of celibacy—a movement which had the fashion set to it in Rome from the time of Gregory VII.—had been accomplished in almost all the countries of the West, both the great rival 'congregations' of the Benedictine order, that of Cluny and that of the Cistercians, lending their services to the Curia for this end. Still greater results were reached by the above-mentioned mendicant orders, which from the 13th cent. began to take up the work of both these bodies and in general of the older religious orders. Partly through the stringency with which they enforced the rule of poverty, partly through the institution of Tertiaries above referred to, and, in addition to all this, owing to their preaching in the language of the people, and to the self-sacrificing character of their pastoral activity, especially in times of severe national calamities, they gained for themselves a degree of popularity which threw all their predecessors into the shade. Many phenomena of asceticism as well as hyper-asceticism still prevailed side by side with the influences emanating from these regularly constituted chief representatives of monastic piety. Such, for instance, was the practice, much resorted to by both sexes, of *inclusio*, or allowing themselves to be shut up in narrow cells, caves, or huts, sometimes in remote districts, sometimes in the vicinity of much frequented churches or religious houses. So with pilgrimages to places of devotion and miracle-working shrines, the latter increasing in number towards the end of the Middle Ages. To the same category belong the processions of flagellants, which after the year 1349 repeatedly poured over great tracts of country, and whose practices about the beginning of the 15th cent. were brought to the highest degree of perfection under the guidance of the Spanish Dominican saint Vincentius Ferrer (1401–1417). Another phenomenon was the appearance in particular localities of groups of people who were seized with a sudden religious (or semi-religious) mania, *e.g.* the 'dancers' of the Lower Rhine and Holland (1374) and Strassburg (1418). Finally must be mentioned the numerous instances, amounting almost to a general epidemic of asceticism, in which, from the time of the 'stigmatization' miracle connected with St. Francis (1224), visible copies of the wounds of Christ were, it was alleged, miraculously produced on persons of both sexes, sometimes within the pale of the two rival orders of St. Francis and St. Dominic, sometimes outside it.

The above and kindred phenomena betray a religious degeneration, hand in hand with which went numerous symptoms of moral decay, particularly in the discipline of most of the religious orders, old and new alike. An attempt was made to counteract this degeneration by the mystical and inward tendency which marked some ascetic groups, esp. the 'Brothers of the Common Life' (*q.v.*), who spread from the Netherlands over North and Central Germany; but this effort to lead men to spiritual religious exercises and to a spiritual following of Christ failed to make any deep and lasting impression upon any large number of people.

IV. *ASCETICISM IN MODERN TIMES.*—The Reformation of the sixteenth century led to a return, on the part of all that portion of Western Christendom which adhered to it, to that limited measure of ascetic practice and aim which was the norm for primitive Christianity, with its freedom from the Law. In other words, an attitude of disapproval was adopted not only towards the hyper-asceticism of the Middle Ages, but also towards those intensifications of the ascetic-monastic principle which had made their appearance in the Early Church. On the other hand, in both the Churches of Catholic tradition, the Roman and the Greek, this critical attitude, derived from the Protestant doctrine of justification, towards the development of previous centuries was condemned as unbridled antinomianism. Hence the attempt was made to conserve not only the ascetic but partly also the hyper-ascetic acquisitions of the Church's past. Accordingly a wide severance between the principal Churches in the matter of their ascetic practice now set in.

1. *The Græco-Russian Church.*—This Church, which had been more or less untouched by the exaggerations of asceticism that had shown themselves during the mediæval development of the Western Church, continues to abide in all essentials by the forms and conditions with which the period of primitive Christianity had ended. Hence for it an enduring validity belongs to Canon 13 of the Second Trullan Council, which frees the priests and the lower clergy in general from the obligation to celibacy; as well as to the 12th Canon of the same Council, which strictly binds the higher grades of the hierarchy, from bishops upwards, to an unmarried life. Accordingly, the higher church offices can, as a rule, be held only by men chosen from the ranks of the monastic clergy—a principle far-reaching in its bearing upon the whole ecclesiastical and civil life, and serving to erect a great wall of partition against Western Catholicism.

2. *The Roman Catholic Church.*—Along with the celibacy of the clergy, this Church retains almost all the other intensifications of the ascetic principle which the mediæval development added to the Early Church traditions. Nay, in the interests of its contra-reforming aims it has in not a few points gone beyond the Middle Ages. New forms of ascetic discipline and self-torture could indeed

no longer be invented, but all that was possible was done in order to give more effective form and more refined manner to the creations of earlier days. This will be seen if, for instance, Loyola's *Exercitia spiritualia* be compared with their embryonic types in the monastic mysticism of the Brothers of the Common Life, or if the Jesuitical school comedies and the performance of oratorios in the order of Neri be compared with the crudities of the clerical plays of the closing pre-Reformation period. Of the unnatural extravagances of the later mediæval asceticism, some, such as flagellantism, *inclusio*, the wearing of the penitential shirt, etc., were, if not wholly suppressed, at least somewhat mitigated and more discreetly ordered. The tendency to multiply the forms of joint practice of asceticism was still maintained. And especially in the frequent formation of new religious brotherhoods and sisterhoods outside the orders proper the more recent Catholicism exhibits an inventive genius and a productive power which have been able to defy all counter-forces, including even the revolutionary storm at the transition from the 18th to the 19th cent., and which at the beginning of the present century continue to exhibit the same capacity as during the first decades of the counter-Reformation. The Society of Jesus forms the chief centre. Within its bosom is constantly produced that inexhaustible supply of ascetic vital energy which is diffused in all directions with triumphant effect. The uniqueness of this most important and original of all Catholic orders consists neither in unexampled severity of self-mortification nor in unusual zeal in performing deeds of loving self-sacrifice, nor yet in a superlative degree of scientific industry. In none of these points, least of all in the last-named, is the order of Loyola content to hold a secondary place; but it seeks its chief glory in an intensifying of the monastic virtue of obedience, whereby it far surpasses all that has been achieved in this matter by earlier ascetic societies. The secret of its greatness lies in the blindly obedient devotion on the part both of its individual members and of its superiors to the command of the Pope, and all with a view to extirpating Protestant heresy. To the vow of obedience it has imparted, especially by that sacrifice of intellect to which it trains its pupils, a military precision which secures for it an incomparable superiority over all the other militant orders of the Papal Church. And, owing to this essentially military character and organization, while it has not indeed reached its goal in the extirpation of Protestantism, it has gained other successes of the utmost importance. Instead of the Churches of Protestantism, it has completely conquered its own Church, and secured for itself within it a position of influence which, to all appearance, is destined to continue for decades if not for centuries.

3. *The Protestant Churches.*—These reject, as their reforming instruments and Confessions declare with practical unanimity (cf. *Conf. Aug.* artt. 26, 27; *XXXIX Artt.*, xxxii., xxxiv.; *Conf. Helvet.* ii. 18, 24, 29; *Scotch Conf.* i. 14, 15, and ii.), the Roman demand for the celibacy of the clergy, just as they oppose the claiming of special merit for ascetic displays of virtue. A certain number of wonted ascetic observances, especially in the matter of keeping weekly and yearly fasts, passed over into the practice of Lutherans, Anglicans, and some of the other Reformed Churches in the times immediately following the Reformation, but have survived in only a very limited measure down to the present day. A return to the principles and practices of strict asceticism in the matter both of fasting and of abstinence from worldly pleasures and enjoyments, evincing in general a tendency to withdrawal from the world, was aimed at and in some measure achieved by the Continental Pietism of the 17th and 18th cents., as well as in England and her colonies by Methodism and some of the Methodist and Baptist sects (especially the Tunkers [from *c.* 1724] and the Shakers [from 1774], both of which favoured the principles of celibacy and complete community of property). But even these attempts led for the most part to no permanent results. The Pietistic bodies in Germany, in so far as they survived the Spener-Francke and Zinzendorf times, introduced important modifications in their opposition to a more secular form of Christianity. A more enduring character belongs to the ascetic efforts of many branches of British and American Methodism. Particularly in the sphere of the crusade against alcohol not a little success has already been achieved, whose salutary influence extends to the life of other denominations as well, and from which still more may be looked for in the future. A similar remark applies to the work of the Salvation Army. Its 'Self-Denial Efforts,' *i.e.* abstinence from a number of the pleasures of life with a view to being able to give all the more for the benefit of others, may be classed with those forms of ascetic action whose survival and wider diffusion within the pale of Protestant Christianity are in general to be wished and prayed for. Similar in character and aim are the 'Weeks of Self-Denial' that have recently become common among the Presbyterians of North America, of which an account is given by R. E. Thompson, the historian of that denomination, in *American Church History* series, vi. 189.

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VI. *History of Asceticism in Modern Times*: On Greek and Roman Catholic asceticism see Kattenbusch and Heimbucher, *opp. citt.*; and cf., for the different modern orders, artt. Capuchins, Jesuits, Liguorians, etc. On asceticism in the Protestant Churches see H. Josephson, *Die evangel. Askese*, Leipzig, 1890; Jul. Kaftan, *Die Askese im Leben des evangel. Christentums*, Potsdam, 1904; cf. also the artt. Methodism and Pietism, and, in general, Zöckler, *op. cit.* pp. 558–631.

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ASCETICISM (Greek). — We find asceticism even in ancient Greek life, and there, in fact, its unseen beginnings go back to the 7th cent. B.C. Sundry anticipations of the practice are traceable in various religious cults, as, *e.g.*, the rigorous fasting enjoined by the Eleusinian Mysteries, the fast-day in the sacred calendar of the Attic *Thesmophoria*, the fasting preparatory to incubation in the chthonian cults, etc.* But none of these ever got beyond the embryonic stage, as they did not emanate from any systematic religious conception of the world. Ascetic movements of real significance make their first appearance among the ecstatic seers and purifiers of the 7th and 6th centuries B.C. Thus Abaris, whom Pindar (frag. 270 B) names as a contemporary of Crœsus, is said to have carried the golden arrow of Apollo over the whole earth without taking food.† In Strabo, vii. 301, he appears as the pattern *εὐκολίας καὶ λιτότητος καὶ δικαιοσύνης*—a description, of course, merely legendary and idealizing. The famous seer and purifier, Epimenides of Crete, is also extolled by ancient authorities for his rigorous fasting and his ascetic mode of life in general.‡ While it may be the case that these reports all proceed from the *Pseudepimenidea* of Onomacritus, we have nevertheless no reason to doubt the ascetic tendencies of the persons named, or of kindred spirits. This is, in fact, confirmed by the account given in Hippocrates, *de Morb. Sacr.* c. 1 (Littré, ii. 354 ff.), of the rules of abstinence prescribed by such purifiers.§ The purpose of these regulations and ceremonies was to purify men from the contaminating touch of demons. And, indeed, the practice of cathartics in general arose mainly from the dread of demonic powers, with their standing menace of pollution. Such ideas had not yet taken shape in the Homeric age.

These germinal notions, however, could not develop into a genuine asceticism until men had become conscious of an opposition between body and soul. No doubt the idea that the soul may pursue an independent existence apart from the body belongs to the remote past, the phenomena of dreams, the trance of 'possession,' as also the frequently abrupt transition from life to death, all having tended to suggest such a thought to primitive man. But the feeling of an *opposition*, the surmise that the soul is in its nature divine, while the body is merely its prison-house, makes its first appearance in Greece as a result of the experiences of men in a state of *ecstasy*, notably in connexion with the Dionysan cult. It was, in fact, the triumphal advance of the Dionysan religion which first gave currency to the conviction that the soul acquires hitherto unsuspected powers once it is free from the trammels of the body—a conviction presently appropriated by the adherents of Orphism. 'Of small account, as contrasted with the soul, ever striving after freedom, must appear the body, as that which obstructs, which fetters, and which must be cast off.' . . . 'It was all but inevitable that one who had become familiar with the idea of the antagonism between body and soul, especially if he moved in the circle of cathartic ideas and practices, should hit upon the thought that the soul itself must be "purified" from the body as a defiling encumbrance (Rohde, *Psyche*[2], ii. 101).'

This feeling of the rigid *opposition between soul and body*, as also of their vital and radical *difference in value*, forms the one main source of asceticism. The other is to be looked for in the nascent *consciousness of sin*, and the consequent *yearning for redemption*, in troubled souls.* Before the age of (let us say) Hesiod, such feelings had no place whatever in Greek life. They sprang from a pessimistic outlook upon earthly existence (cf. art. Pessimism), the proximate causes of which probably lay in the social and political conditions as well as in the revolutionary changes of the 7th and 6th centuries B.C. Asceticism was regarded as a means of liberating the soul from the bondage of the flesh and of the world of sense in general (that the body is the prison of the soul was one of the leading ideas of Orphism†): by the practice of asceticism, in fact, the soul, divine in origin, but meanwhile immured in the body by reason of its guilt, might free itself from every corporeal bond, as from the whole 'cycle of becoming,' and, venturing forth upon its flight to the Deity, at length become one therewith.‡ Here we come upon the conjunction of asceticism and mysticism.

1. Orphism.—Views of this character make their first appearance in the communities named after the Thracian bard Orpheus, which can be traced to about the middle of the 6th cent. B.C. The Orphic sect, which in the 6th cent. appears to have had its main centre in Athens,—witness the fact that Onomacritus flourished at the Court of the Pisistratidæ,—seems, towards the end of the same century, to have found a particularly congenial soil in lower Italy and Sicily.§ Fresh and surprising evidence of this has been furnished by the gold leaves found in tombs of the 4th and 3rd cents. B.C. at Petilia, near Thurii. An inscription of like import, moreover, dating from the 2nd cent. B.C., has been discovered at Eleutherna in Crete. While Orphism was never assimilated by the civic religion,‖ and while the various Orphic cults from the 4th cent. onwards degenerated more and more into esoteric mysteries and nonconforming communities, they nevertheless continued to exist till the close of the ancient era, and still exercised a profound influence upon Neo-Pythagoreanism and Neo-Platonism, as well as upon early Christian ideas regarding the other world and the experiences of the soul after death. The central feature of the Orphic faith was constituted by the fortunes of the god Dionysus-Zagreus, who as a child was torn in pieces and devoured by the Titans, Athene being able to recover his heart only; this she carried to Zeus, who, having swallowed it, presently, with Semele, begot the 'new Dionysus,' and destroyed the Titans with a thunderbolt. From their ashes afterwards arose the human race, and, accordingly, there are in man two constituent elements—a Dionysan and a Titanic. It is the Dionysan constituent that generates the human soul, and man must free himself as far as possible from the Titanic element in order to return once more to the deity whose essence he likewise shares.

The outstanding feature of early Orphic asceticism was the *prohibition of animal food* (cf. Euripides, *Hippolyt.* 952 = Diels, *Frag.*[1] 471, No. 8).

* Not only in the Demeter cult, but also in the worship of deities of foreign extraction: Cybele, or, later, Isis, or, finally, Mithras.

† Herodot. iv. 36; Plato, *Charmides*, 158 B; Lycurg. frag. 86; Iamblich. *Vit. Pythag.* 141.

‡ Diog. Laert. i. 114 = Diels, *Frag.*[2] ii. 490, l. 16 ff.; Plato, *Laws*, iii. 677 D (reference to Hesiod, *Op.* 40 f.); Plutarch, *Sept. Sap. Conviv.* 157 D = Diels, *Frag.*[2] 492, 27 n.; Theophrast. *Hist. Plant.* vii. 12. 1, *Char.* 16 = *Frag.*[2] 493, No. 6.

§ With Hippocrates' sketch cf. the Pythagorean regulations in Diog. Laert. viii. 33.

* *Orphica*, frag. 226.

† Cf. especially Plato, *Cratyl.* 400 C; *Phædo*, 62 B = *Orphica* frag. 221 (Abel).

‡ Cf. *e.g. Orphica*, frag. 226.

§ The earliest specific mention of the sect is in Herod. ii. 81.

‖ E. Maass is of a different opinion.

In Aristophanes, *Frogs*, 1032, Æschylus (who had probably been initiated into the Orphic mysteries) says :

'Ορφεὺς μὲν γὰρ τελετὰς θ' ἡμῖν κατέδειξε φόνων τ' ἀπέχεσθαι.

Cf. Euripides, frag. 475 N², v. 16 ff. :

Πάλλευκα δ' ἔχων εἵματα φεύγω
γένεσιν τε βροτῶν καὶ νεκροθήκης
οὐ χριμπτόμενος τήν τ' ἐμψύχων
βρῶσιν ἐδεστῶν πεφύλαγμαι.*

See also Plato, *Laws*, vi. 782 C : οὐδὲ βοὸς ἐτόλμων μὲν γεύεσθαι θύματά τε οὐκ ἦν τοῖς θεοῖς ζῷα, πέλανοι δὲ καὶ μέλιτι καρποὶ δεδευμένοι καὶ τοιαῦτα ἄλλα ἁγνὰ θύματα, σαρκῶν δ' ἀπείχοντο ὡς οὐχ ὅσιον ὂν ἐσθίειν οὐδὲ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν βωμοὺς αἵματι μιαίνειν, ἀλλὰ 'Ορφικοί τινες λεγόμενοι βίοι ἐγίγνοντο ἡμῶν τοῖς τότε, ἀψύχων μὲν ἐχόμενοι πάντων, ἐμψύχων δὲ τοὐναντίον πάντων ἀπεχόμενοι.† The prohibition not only applied to the eating of flesh, but covered all food-stuffs of animal origin, even eggs (frag. 42, Abel); and, amongst vegetables, beans : cf. Diels, *Frag.*² 214, 28 : φέρεται δὲ καὶ 'Ορφέως τάδε ἔπη, Δειλοί, πανδειλοί, κυάμων ἀπὸ χεῖρας ἔχεσθαι καὶ 'Ισόν τοι κυάμους τε φαγεῖν κεφαλάς τε τοκήων.

The reason of these prohibitions was that the things referred to were used by the χθόνιοι in their sacrifices to the dead and as food ;‡ in the case of eggs, a further consideration was perhaps the fact that these contained the germ of life (cf. frag. 42, Abel). The practice of *fasting* (*νηστεία*) seems also to have had a place in Orphic asceticism.§

'As a matter of fact, the things and conditions from which they really kept themselves unspotted were those which represented in the symbolism of religion, rather than involved in actual practice, a dependence upon the world of death and impermanence' (Rohde, *op. cit.* ii. 126).

The Orphic asceticism, however, like the 'Ορφικὸς *βίος* in general, probably had, even in its early stages, an ethical import as well. This is certainly not the opinion of Erwin Rohde, who, speaking of this asceticism, says : 'It does not enjoin the practice of the civic virtues, nor is discipline or transformation of character required by it ; the sum-total of its morality is to bend one's course towards the deity, and turn away, not from the moral lapses and aberrations of earthly life, but from earthly existence itself' (*op. cit.* ii. 125, cf. ii. 102). On the other hand, Gomperz writes : 'What distinguishes the Orphic branch of the Greek religion from the other Mysteries is the extraordinary emphasis it laid upon morality, an approximation to which is found only in the Apollinarian cult centralized at Delphi. This deepening of the moral consciousness may well be regarded as the true source of the most important and most characteristic element in the Orphic teachings about the soul' (*Griech. Denker*², i. 107, cf. 434).‖ It would certainly seem that the view of Gomperz, as compared with that of Rohde, is so far the right one, though the former has possibly somewhat exaggerated the moral factor.

2. Pythagoreanism.—Orphic ideas exercised a vast influence upon the succeeding period. In the first place, cognate views and practices are found among the early Pythagoreans. It is, of course, impossible to determine precisely how far such ideas are traceable to Pythagoras himself, as the oral traditions of the school are all we have to go upon till the time of Philolaus, *i.e.* the middle of the 5th cent. B.C. ;¶ but general considerations seem to favour the theory of their being so derived. With regard to Pythagoras, indeed, we are certain of only two of his cardinal tenets, viz. the immortality of the soul, and the transmigration of souls.** But when we bear in mind how intimately these two tenets are connected with asceticism among the adherents of Orphism, with whose Mysteries Pythagoras was undoubtedly acquainted, and when we find unmistakable traces of the ascetic mode of life even among the oldest Pythagoreans, we need hardly hesitate to infer that the founder of the school was himself an ascetic. Even Herodotus (ii. 81) speaks of the prohibition of burying the dead in woollen clothes as being not only an Orphic, but also a Pythagorean, ordinance ; while, again, the doctrine of the *ἀποχὴ ἐμψύχων* was attributed to Pythagoras by the geographer Eudoxus (*c.* 280 B.C.).* The contrary opinion expressed by Aristoxenus† is really meant to apply only to contemporary Pythagorean scholars with whom he was intimate.‡ The interdict against the use of beans seems likewise to belong to the early school.§ It cannot be doubted that the early Pythagoreans were distinguished by their *simple life*.‖ A peculiar feature in their asceticism, from the 4th cent. at least, seems to have been *silence*, originally resorted to, no doubt, as a means of avoiding sacrilegious or ill-omened language in their religious practices ; compare what is said by Isocrates (*Busiris*, 28) regarding the Pythagoreans of his own time.¶ It should also be noted that anticipations of *sexual* asceticism, or continence, are apparently found in connexion with the primitive school.**

Meagre as these notices are, they are sufficient to show us that purity (*ἁγνεία, ἁγιστεία*) in the ceremonial religious sense was the ideal of the 'Italic' philosophers no less than of the Orphic cults. Moreover, when we compare with them the teaching of Pythagoras regarding the immortality and the transmigration of the soul, and that of Philolaus regarding the human body as a house of detention wherein the soul expiates its guilt (frag. 14D), it would appear that early Pythagorean asceticism sprang from the same fundamental causes, and had the same objects in view, as that of Orphism, the influence of which upon the former is unmistakable. Pythagoreanism, further, had also an ethical tendency ; thus one of its characteristic virtues was *σωφροσύνη*, which was supposed to be promoted by asceticism, and which unquestionably had a place in the system before the days of Aristoxenus.††

3. Empedocles. — While we may thus deduce from a tradition, fragmentary at best and overgrown with later traditions, the fairly definite fact that among the ancient Pythagoreans asceticism was intimately associated with mystical theories about the soul, the same conjunction of ideas is brought out in strong relief in the case of the last great purifier of ancient Greece, viz. Empedocles of Acragas, who likewise belonged to the West. Further, the moral and religious views of Empedocles resemble those of the Pythagoreans in the circumstance of their having no organic connexion with his philosophical or scientific

* Diels, *op. cit.* 492, 27 n., where for frag. 472 read frag. 475.

† Cf. also Plut. *Sept. Sap. Conviv.* 159 C ; further, the late Orphic *Lithika*, 368 (proscription of animal food), 699 f. (proscription of animal sacrifice).

‡ The prohibition of burying the dead in woollen clothes is already noted by Herodotus, ii. 81 ; cf. Rohde, ii. 126, 1.

§ Diels, *Frag.*² p. 482, 4 ff. On this see Diels, *Orphischer Demeterhymnus*, 6 ff.

‖ Endorsed by Ernst Maass, *Orpheus*, 167 f.

¶ Diels, *Frag.*² i. 22.

** Herod. ii. 123 = Diels, *Frag.*² i. 22, No. 1 ; Xenophanes, frag. 7 D ; cf. Empedocles, frag. 129.

* Porphyr. *Vit. Pyth.* 7 = Diels, *Frag.*² i. 24, 39 ff. See also Strabo, xv. 716, from Onesicritus (*c.* 320 B.C.), frag. 10 M = Diels, *Frag.*² i. 24, 42 f. ; Diog. Laert. viii. 20 ; Callimachus, frag. 83A = Diels, *Frag.*² i. 270, 27 f. ; also Diog. Laert. viii. 33, from Alexander Polyhistor ; for the later period, passages from the Middle Comedy, in which the 'Pythagorists' are ridiculed ; Diels, *Frag.*² i. 291, 41 ff. ; 292, 1 ff., 47 f.

† Diog. Laert. viii. 20 ; Gellius, iv. 11. 1 = Diels, *Frag.*² 24, 47 ff.

‡ Rohde (ii. 164, 1 ; 162, 6) seems to have grasped the point better than Zeller, i. 317, notes 3, 4, 5 ; 318, 5.

§ Diels, *Frag.*² i. 279, 31 ff. = Aristotle, frag. 195 (Rose). Cf. also Diels², i. 214, 19 ff. Of course the explanations of Aristotle, as well as those given by Gellius, are quite inept. Cf. also Schroeder in *WZKM* xv. 187–212.

‖ Diels, *Frag.*² i. 268, No. 3 ; 284, 2 ff. ; 288, 23 ff. ; 289, 4 ff. ; from the Middle Comedy, Diels², i. 291, 31 ff. ; 292, 10 ff., 30 ff. ; 293, 9 ff.—caricatures, of course.

¶ Diels, *Frag.*² i. 23, 2 ; cf. 288, 4 f. ; 285, 8 ff. ; from the Middle Comedy, *op. cit.* 292, 27.

** Diels², i. 28, 36 ff. ; 29, 1 ff. ; cf. especially Ikkos (Diels, *Frag.*² i. 105, No. 2), further, the statement of Cleinias, *ib.* 267, No. 5 ; cf. also 289, 8 ff. ; 290, 20 ff. ; Diog. Laert viii. 33, *καθαρεύειν ἀπὸ λέχους*.

†† Cf. especially Diels, *Frag.*² 287, 33 ff. ; 288, 10 ff. ; 289, 46 ff

theories. In his poem called Καθαρμοί, abstinence from animal food, and, in fact, avoidance of blood-shedding in general, are very specially inculcated, and are based upon the theory of transmigration and that of the close affinity of man and animal—a concatenation of thought which we may perhaps suppose, though we cannot prove, to have obtained among the ancient Orphics and Pythagoreans.

So Hippolytus, *Refutationes*, viii. 29, 249 = Diels, *Frag.*[2] i. 206, 29 ff.: διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην οὖν τοῦ ὀλεθρίου Νείκους διακόσμησιν τοῦδε τοῦ μεμερισμένου κόσμον πάντων ἐμψύχων ὁ Ἐ. τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ μαθητὰς ἀπέχεσθαι παρακαλεῖ· εἶναι γάρ φησι τὰ σώματα τῶν ζώων τὰ ἐσθιόμενα ψυχῶν κεκολασμένων οἰκητήρια.*

Frag. 140 is also worthy of note, as enunciating the inviolability of the laurel (on this cf. Rohde, ii. 181, 2). In strict consistency, of course, Empedocles ought to have affirmed the inviolable nature of trees in general (as is justly observed by Plutarch, *Quæst. Conviv.* iii. 1, 2, 646 D, in reference to the passage cited), since souls migrate also into trees and plants.† On the other hand, the interdict against beans,‡ which Empedocles has in common with the Orphics and the Pythagoreans, probably sprang from the same motive in his case as in theirs.§

The deeper significance of these ascetic injunctions, to which Empedocles manifestly attaches enormous importance for the soul's welfare, and their close connexion with his mystical standpoint, are fully disclosed in the still extant fragments of his Καθαρμοί. For him, too, the divine nature of the soul is an indefeasible fact,‖ and he likewise accepts the doctrine of the soul's fall from its original divine condition into the corporeal state, in which it must expiate its guilt by a long pilgrimage through the bodies of men, animals, and plants.¶ Empedocles also shares the view that the human body is the disparate integument of the soul (frag. 126). He regards asceticism as one of the most effective means of delivering the soul from the world of sense. 'Who ever exerteth himself with toil, him can we release'; the soul at length returns to its divine habitat, and indeed the wise men who practise such holy living—the asceticism of Empedocles having a strong ethical tendency**—eventually become gods while yet upon the earth (frag. 146), so that the poet even speaks of himself as a god (frag. 112, 4 ff., and frag. 113).

It is certainly the case that Empedocles was strongly influenced by the teachings of Orphism, as has, in fact, been made out, with reference to certain particular points, by Otto Kern.†† While this is so, it would nevertheless be wrong, the present writer thinks, to deny the influence of the ancient Pythagorean Mysteries and asceticism.‡‡

* Cf. the passages given in Diels at frag. 135 (p. 213, 1 ff.), especially Cicero, *de Republ.* iii. 11, 19, and Iamblichus, *Vita Pyth.* 108, and frag. 135 D; further, cf. especially frag. 136 (Empedocles): οὐ παύσεσθε φόνοιο δυσήχεος; οὐκ ἐσορᾶτε | ἀλλήλους δάπτοντες ἀκηδείῃσι νόοιο; with this cf. Sextus, *adv. Math.* ix. 127 (from Posidonius) in Diels, *Frag.*[2] i. 213, 19 ff., also frag. 137 D, and passages there; Porphyr. *de Abstin.* ii. 21 = Diels, i. 210, 22 ff., also frag. 139; and Porphyr. ii. 31 = Diels, p. 214, 9 ff.

† Frag. 117. Cf. Zeller[5], i. 808 ff., 824, 837.

‡ Frag. 141. See the relevant passages in Diels, i. 214, 19 ff.; Diog. Laert. viii. 34 = Diels, 279, 31 ff.; Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, i. 254.

§ Special attention is due to the passage, Hippolytus, *Refutationes*, viii. 29, 249 = Diels, *Frag.* 206, 32 ff., where the injunction καὶ ἐγκρατεῖς εἶναι . . . τῆς πρὸς γυναῖκα ὁμιλίας, κ.τ.λ., is attributed to Empedocles.

‖ Diels, *Frag.* i. 159, 8 f.: καὶ θείας μὲν οἴεται τὰς ψυχάς, θείους δὲ καὶ τοὺς μετέχοντας αὐτῶν καθαροὺς καθαρῶς. Cf. *Frag.* i. 173, 1, and note by Rohde, ii. 185, 1.

¶ See especially the magnificent fragment, 115, and the passages cited in connexion therewith by Diels, who also refers to the famous passage in Plato, *Phædrus*, 248 C, as an imitation. Cf. also Diels, i. 219, 17 ff.; frag. 119, and relevant passages in Diels; frag. 121 (Rohde, ii. 178, 1).

** Frag. 112, 9 f.; 144, 145.

†† We do not agree with Kern, however, in regard to every point.

‡‡ Cf. Empedocles, frag. 129, and the passages given there.

To say nothing of the affinity between the views of Empedocles and those of the Pythagoreans,* it is impossible that one who lived at so short a distance from Magna Græcia could remain ignorant of Pythagorean doctrine, or that one of his cast of mind should not be deeply influenced thereby.

4. Plato.—This whole process of development, beginning with the ecstatic seers and purifiers of the 7th cent., may be said in one sense to reach its end, but in another to arrive at its culminating point, in the Platonic philosophy. In Plato, the founder of the idealistic view of the world, philosophical thought and theological thought merge and combine with one another in a wonderful way. The Divine origin of the soul, its pre-existence, its fall into corporeality, its judgment after death, its expiatory wanderings through the bodies of animals or men, according to its character, its final redemption from the cycle of re-births, and its return to God—all these various doctrines, in their main features at least, were borrowed by Plato directly from the 'theologians,' *i.e.*, in a special sense, the Orphics. The manner in which he amalgamates them with the results of his philosophical speculation is, however, all his own.

In the early stages of Plato's thought the two worlds of becoming and being stand in the relation of sheer opposition: here, the world of sense, with its unresting flux of ever-changing phenomena; there, the supersensuous world of eternally self-identical and absolutely unchangeable realities, of the 'Ideas,' of what alone truly exists. The human soul, however, occupies a peculiar position between the two; it is of Divine origin, and while not itself an Idea, it is 'most like' one, and partakes of the Idea of life. In its state of pre-existence in the supramundane sphere it has gazed upon the Ideas, but, having fallen into the state of corporeality, it has forgotten them; and only by its recollection thereof (*ἀνάμνησις*) can it possibly attain to true knowledge. Such leading principles must of necessity result in a pessimistic attitude to the world and its supposed goods,† that is, in a world-renouncing morality. Withdrawal from the life of the body, which only impedes and constrains the soul; the utmost detachment of the soul from its prison-house in the flesh (the philosophic 'dying' so impressively depicted by Socrates in *Phædo* [especially p. 64 ff.]); disengagement from the world of sense in general, with its phantasmagoria of delusive appearances—these things go to form the end which the friend of wisdom must keep in view.

In the *Theæt.* 176 A we read: διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε (from this world) ἐκεῖσε (to the gods) φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα. Similarly, philosophy becomes *κάθαρσις*; *Phædo*, 67 A: ἐν ᾧ ἂν ζῶμεν οὕτως ἐγγυτάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἐὰν ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, ὅτι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύωμεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἂν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς.‡ καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης, ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς, μετὰ τοιούτων τε ἐσόμεθα καὶ γνωσόμεθα δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινές· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἴσως τὸ ἀληθές· μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ᾖ κ.τ.λ.; § 67 C: κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἆρα οὐ τοῦτο ξυμβαίνει, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ χωρίζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐθίσαι αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγείρεσθαί τε καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι, καὶ οἰκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔπειτα μόνην καθ' αὑτήν, ἐκλυομένην ὥσπερ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος;‖

* Cf. also Cicero, *de Republ.* iii. 11, 19; Iamblichus, *Vita Pyth.* 108 = Diels, *Frag.* 213, 5 ff.; Sextus, *adv. Math.* ix. 127, quoted by Diels at frag. 136. The passages Diog. Laert. viii. 53, cf. 51 = Diels, 150, 22 f., cf. 154, 44 ff., refer to the grandfather of Empedocles, who bore the same name, and who, according to the latter passage (Athenæus, i. 5), had been a Pythagorean.

† Cf. *e.g. Gorg.* 519 A, *Repub.* vii. 515 D, *Laws*, vii. 803 B; and Rohde, ii. 291.

‡ Both the Orphic and the Platonic teaching make suicide a crime; the period of one's earthly existence is to be determined by the Deity alone.

§ Cf. 82 C ff., *Rep.* vii. 514 ff., *Phædo*, 62 B, 66 B, *Cratyl.* 400 B.

‖ Cf., further, 69 C, *Cratyl.* 403 E; Rohde, ii. 281, 4; 282, 1; 285, 2.

The philosopher also will therefore stand aloof from the enterprises and pursuits of his fellow-citizens, and, as one withdrawn from the community at large, will give himself entirely to the task of becoming holy.

On its positive side, however, this *katharsis* from all that is earthly implies a turning towards God. By renouncing the present world the soul becomes free to follow its true vocation—the knowledge of the ὄντως ὄν, the vision of the Ideas, and especially the Idea of the Good, the highest of them all. But the Ideas constitute the realm of divine realities. Thus the soul which, though of heavenly origin, had been cramped and defiled through its fall, becomes God-like by the possession of that highest *knowledge* which is identical with virtue.

Cf. *Theæt.* 176 B—in connexion with the passages given above: φυγὴ (from the corporeal) δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. 176 C: θεὸς οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἄδικος, ἀλλ' ὡς οἷόν τε δικαιότατος καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ ὁμοιότερον οὐδὲν ἢ ὃς ἂν ἡμῶν αὖ γένηται ὅτι δικαιότατος. 'To know God is to become divine' (Rohde). The philosopher, therefore, lives entirely in the ἐπιστήμη of the truly existent, this being rendered possible only by complete renunciation of the world.

Such is Plato's standpoint in the *Phædo*, as, indeed, also in the *Theætetus* and the *Gorgias*, a standpoint which, were it consistently applied, would put an end to all life and all progress upon the earth. As has been aptly observed by Eucken, however, 'in this relinquishment of the world we have the real Plato and the consistent Plato, but by no means the complete Plato.' In his later elucidation of the Ideal theory, Plato admits the possibility of mediation between the two worlds. Conceiving now of the Ideas as the final causes of phenomena, he sees the Divine realities looming through the world of sense, and he is thus able to regard the realization of the Ideas in practical life as the true task of mankind. Besides the all-pervading religious factor in Plato's thought, the æsthetic and the social factors are also active. Thus, to quote Eucken again:

'That ascetic tendency [in Plato] underwent considerable modification, and even some reaction, as has been the case with all its adherents who did not forget humanity at large in the individual. But that which upon Indian, and often also upon Christian, soil won at best a grudging recognition, found in Plato a native propensity in its favour; alike as a Greek and as the friend, nay, the discoverer of the Beautiful, he was bound with a thousand ties to the actual world.'

But nevertheless the opposition between the two spheres—between renunciation of the world and its transfiguration, between philosophical and theological thought—was never completely adjusted, and it shows itself unmistakably in Plato himself.

'In Plato's own nature the phlegmatic blood of the thinker co-existed with the lively heart-beat of the artist; there was a cleavage in the inner man; for, while his philosophy allured him into the realm of immaterial forms, yet the whole magic of Hellenic beauty was at work within him' (Windelband, *Gesch. der Philosophie*[3], p. 100).*

And, we may venture to add, he was thrilled with the desire to intervene in the moral, social, and political conditions of the world, with a view to succour, to ameliorate, to reform, as is well shown in the *Republic* and the *Laws*.

Plato was the discoverer of the supersensual world. The kingdom for which his lofty soul yearned was 'not of this world.' He purified the beliefs and ideas of the Orphic cult; he spiritualized and glorified them,† thereby becoming a religious reformer—probably the greatest, after Jesus Christ, our race has known.

5. Cynicism.—The asceticism thus far dealt with—*religious* asceticism, as it might be called—rests upon a twofold dualism; body and soul, Earth and the Beyond, being sharply and almost irreconcilably opposed to one another. But while among the earlier adherents of the older Academy, as, *e.g.*, Philippus of Opus, Heraclides Ponticus, probably Xenocrates too, and even in the youthful Aristotle (Rohde, ii. 297), a negative and ascetic attitude towards the world is still discernible (Polemon and Crantor being the first to secede therefrom), an entirely different congeries of ideas had given birth to a kind of asceticism which, in contrast to the religious, may be called the *rationalistic and ethical*, or more precisely the *volitional* asceticism. Its roots are to be found in the Socratic teaching. It is, of course, true that the ascetic aspect of the figure of Socrates portrayed by Xenophon in the *Memorabilia* and the *Symposium* belongs not to the historical but to the Antisthenic Socrates. (Xen. *Symp.* iv. 38 may serve as a striking illustration of this; on the whole question, cf. Joel's great work.) Further, the much-lauded temperance of Socrates, as has been appositely observed by Zeller (II. i.[4] 68), has nothing ascetic about it. His temperance, in fact, was not calculated abstinence from enjoyment, but only an expression of spiritual freedom; he would not be dependent upon enjoyment, nor would he sacrifice to it his self-command (Zeller, II. i. 57, 66, 68, 155 ff., 162 ff.).

But, as has been admirably said by Theodor Gomperz (*op. cit.* ii. 113) in reference to the views of life held by Socrates:

'In certain particulars he had certainly abandoned the view of life current amongst his people and his fellow-citizens; thus, in regard to one leading feature of that view, viz. its appreciation of external goods, including life itself, he ranks the health of the soul and inner peace of mind as incomparably higher than all.'

Here we have the germ of the ascetic strain in the *Cynic* ethics. Nevertheless, man's inner happiness, his εὐδαιμονία, was a matter upon which even Antisthenes, the founder of the school, laid the strongest emphasis, and in his view it could be won only by means of ἀρετή, 'moral excellence.' This moral excellence alone, therefore, as was argued by the uncompromising spirit of Antisthenes, is to count as a good; everything else in the world, as making no contribution to man's εὐδαιμονία, is simply indifferent, an ἀδιάφορον. The conviction of the utter worthlessness of earthly goods, moreover, brought the Cynics—even Antisthenes, and still more his pupil Diogenes, and subsequently Crates and others—quite consistently to the standpoint of *world-renunciation*.

Virtue, according to the Cynics, consists in right knowledge (φρόνησις) coupled with moral volition.* Their ethic, as formulated by Antisthenes, was above all a volitional ethic. Moral volition, however, as they held, was steeled by πόνος, by ἄσκησις. The latter word properly means the *exercise* or *practice* which was pre-eminently demanded by the Cynic conception of virtue,† since virtue, in the opinion of Antisthenes, was not simply theoretical knowledge regarding good and evil, but rather practical moral excellence, strength of character asserting itself against all περιστάσεις.‡ By virtue alone, he taught, does man attain to felicity. In what, then, does felicity consist? In that genuine freedom which is based upon independence of all external things—αὐτάρκεια—and in freedom from all desires and affections—ἀπάθεια. In order to

* See specially the *Symposium* and the *Philebus*.

† Cf. Windelband, *Platon*, 141: 'He implements the Orphic doctrine of the destiny of the soul, throughout its entire range, with the principle of moral responsibility and retribution.'

* Diog. Laert. vi. 11 (teaching of Antisthenes): Αὐτάρκη τὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, μηδενὸς προσδεομένην ὅτι μὴ Σωκρατικῆς ἰσχύος. Cf. also the Cynic ἐγκράτεια.

† The word certainly goes back to Antisthenes himself; cf. Xenophon, *Sympos.* viii. 27, *Memorab.* ii. 6. 20, where Socrates speaks of the ἀσκεῖν of ἀρετή. Cf. also *Memorab.* i. 2. 20 and 23, i. 2. 10, where Xenophon has even ἀσκεῖν φρόνησιν, as Isocrates, *Busir.* § 22, has φιλοσοφίας ἄσκησιν; both writers undoubtedly follow the example of Antisthenes. For the latter φρόνησις is inseparably connected with ἀρετή, and his whole philosophy is the practice of virtue based upon intelligence.

‡ On Heracles as an ascetic for the purpose of acquiring virtue, see Dio, *Orat.* lx., especially p. 310; on Diogenes' struggle against πόνοι, see Dio, viii. 12 ff., especially § 15; Marcus Aurelius, ii. 17.

render himself as independent of the external as possible, the Cynic endeavours to reduce his wants to a minimum; and in order to win his inner freedom (*ἀπάθεια*), he exercises himself in combating and overcoming the affections (so Diogenes, cf. Dio, ix. 12), more especially in fighting against *ἡδονή* (Diogenes, as in Dio, viii. 20 ff., ix. 12; cf. Lucian, *Vit. auct.* 8; Teles, frag. v. H).

This world-abjuring tendency in Cynic ethics found its chief expression in a negative attitude towards the family, the State, and the idea of nationality, and towards the great traditions of Greek history, even those of the Persian war; and in the position the Cynics assumed towards Greek religion, art, and science. This is to be explained in part by the fact that Antisthenes was but half Greek by blood, and that Diogenes sprang from the lower classes. Even in their boasted cosmopolitanism the Cynics were in earnest only with the negative constituent, viz. their detachment from State and nationality.

The real asceticism of the Cynics showed itself, above all, in their mode of life, which they reduced to the simplest conceivable form: thus their food consisted chiefly of lupines, dried figs, peeled barley and water; their clothing was practically limited to the *τρίβων*, their feet being *ἀνυπόδητοι*; while their place of abode, *i.e.* their lodging by night, was in the open air or among the pillars of the temple in summer, and in the bathing-houses in winter. By inuring the body to the extreme of rigour, they—more especially Diogenes—sought to strengthen their power of will (Diog. Laert. vi. 23, 34).

The significance attached to asceticism by Diogenes, who had already distinguished two kinds of *ἄσκησις*—one purely physical, the other both physical and psychical (Diog. Laert. vi. 70 f.)—is shown by his apothegm: *Οὐδέν γε τὸ παράπαν ἐν τῷ βίῳ χωρὶς ἀσκήσεως κατορθοῦσθαι, δυνατὴν δὲ ταύτην πᾶν ἐκνικῆσαι.* A significant, and characteristically Hellenic, feature of Cynic ethics, however, was its attitude towards the sexual impulse. To the Cynics this appeared to be no less natural than hunger itself, and therefore likewise to require satisfaction—though in the simplest and least expensive way. Thus Diogenes is in no way scandalized at either masturbation or illicit intercourse (marriage had, of course, no meaning for him); in fact, as the gratification of sexual desire was reckoned *κατὰ φύσιν* by the Cynics, many of them, such as Diogenes and Crates (with Hipparchia), had no scruples about indulging even in the presence of others, thus showing a gross lack of modesty, to say nothing of good taste. Nevertheless, those who indulged beyond the requirements of nature were looked upon as the slaves of pleasure (*ἡδονή*), and this they reckoned the worst of evils.*

Antisthenes did not himself lay so much stress on the external aspects of the Cynic mode of life; what he did was rather, it would seem, to make a virtue of necessity. Very much more did externals weigh with his gifted pupil Diogenes, as also with Crates, his wife Hipparchia, her brother Metrocles, and others.† The asceticism of the Neo-Cynics during the Roman Imperial period will be dealt with in connexion with the later Stoics.

Primitive Cynicism reprobated even innocent enjoyment. Further, from the time of Diogenes at least, the Cynics tended to make too much of the external aspect of their mode of life. But an asceticism which sprang from an ethical standpoint so grossly individualistic could be of no permanent value to human society. Still, in putting to the test of actual practice the dictum that man's true happiness does not depend upon his circumstances, the Cynics made a valuable contribution to human progress; while, from another side, their belief that moral volition is an essential constituent of virtue was pregnant with significance for the future.

6. Stoicism.—Of the leading principles of the early Cynic *ἄσκησις** only one was of exceptional importance, viz. the idea that virtue can be acquired only by unremitting practice. In this particular point, which involved an emphasizing of the volitional factor in virtue, the Cynics made an advance upon Socrates; it was, in fact, a thought destined to be fruitful for all time, and in the further development thereof special credit is due to the Stoics. We must not forget, indeed, that the Stoa was preceded by Aristotle, who in his *Ethics* had already distinguished two orders of virtues, viz. the ethical and the dianoetic (*e.g. Eth. Nicom.* ii. 1. 1103 A, 14 ff., i. 13. 1102 B, 33 ff.). Ethical virtue (*αὕτη ἐστι περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις* [*Eth. Nicom.* ii. 6. 1106 B]) *ἐξ ἔθους περιγίγνεται* (ii. 1. 1103 A, 17). Since the irrational impulse, with its resultant desire, is often stronger than the volition which springs from *φρόνησις*, it is only by means of exercise that the individual can acquire that *ἐγκράτεια* which enables him, even in opposition to the stronger desire, to do what he recognizes as right. Now, *ἐγκράτεια* is a sub-species of *σωφροσύνη*, which, again, is one of the 'ethical' virtues. But the idea of a psychological independence of the will—apart from the intellect—was foreign to Aristotle.

It must certainly be admitted that among the early Stoics, so closely related to the Cynics in many other things, the volitional moment in virtue does not stand out very prominently, though this may be due partly, of course, to the fragmentary character of our available sources. Unmistakable traces of the idea, nevertheless, are still extant, and yeoman service has been rendered by Adolf Dyroff in bringing these to light. The personal ideal of the Stoic doctrine of virtue—the wise man—has, of course, no further need of practice; but all the more is practice necessary for the neophytes, the *προκόπτοντες* (cf. Zeno, frag. 234 A). The founder of the school valued practical example more highly than arguments against pleasure (frag. 241); witness also his significant utterance *οὐδενὸς ἡμᾶς οὕτω πένεσθαι ὡς χρόνου. βραχὺς γὰρ ὄντω ὁ βίος, ἡ δὲ τέχνη μακρή, καὶ μᾶλλον ἡ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς νόσους ἰᾶσθαι δυναμένη* (frag. 323). His successor Cleanthes likewise places moral conduct higher than theory, and that he recognizes the element of volition in virtue is shown by frag. 563. It is accordingly easy to understand why Cleanthes, like Antisthenes before him, regarded the *πόνος* as *ἀγαθόν* (frag. 611), while frag. 129 (Gercke) furnishes special evidence of the fact that Chrysippus, 'the second founder of the Stoa,' appreciated the value of practice and habit in the attainment of virtue. The task of becoming virtuous, or—since only a few finally attain that end—that of coming as near to perfect virtue as possible, belongs

* Antisthenes, frag. xi. 1, Winkelmann, p. 29 (Clemens Alex. *Strom.* ii. 20, p. 485, Potter); Diog. Laert. vi. 3: *μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθείην.*

† Cf. *e.g.* Diog. Laert. vi. 23, 34, 48, 70 f. Concerning Crates, see Diog. Laert. vi. 87 (Diels, *Poetæ Philosoph. Gr.* 207). Further, Teles, frag., *πόνος αὐταρκείας* and *πόνος πενίας καὶ πλούτου*, 30, 10 ff., 31, 2 ff.; Crates, frag. 4, 7, 12, 18 (Diels). Main sources for ancient Cynicism: Diog. Laert. vi.; Xenophon, *Memorab.* and *Symposium*; Teles, ed. O. Hense, fr. v.–vii.; also Dio, especially *Orat.* 6, 8, 9, 10.

* No doubt, the doctrine of the absolute worthlessness of earthly goods was taken over by the Stoics, but it was subsequently modified by Zeno in his differentiation of three grades of *ἀδιάφορα*, viz., *προηγμένα*, *μέσα*, and *ἀποπροηγμένα*, whereby at least a certain relative value was assigned to sundry material goods. On the other hand, the *αὐτάρκεια* of the Cynics was spiritualized by the Stoics, who put no special value on the ascetic mode of life. Only in the case of certain adherents of the later Stoa, such as Musonius, and, in some degree, also Epictetus, did a change in this respect take place.

to the will, and cannot be performed without practice (cf. also frag. 214, 278 A). Chrysippus gave full recognition to the value of personal effort in the work of attaining perfection. True insight is shown also by Aristo of Chios in his remark that 'much practice and much fighting' is demanded by the struggle both against pleasure and against the affections (frag. 370 A). It is matter for regret that nothing now remains of the work of Herillus, who, like Dionysius Metathemenus, wrote *περὶ ἀσκήσεως* (Diog. Laert. vii. 166 f. [Diels, 410 f. A]), especially as he deemed *ἐπιστήμη* to be the supreme good. A further proof of the fact that the value of 'practice' in the sphere of virtue was ever more and more highly appraised by the Stoics, appears in their doctrine that many (apparent) evils are allotted to man for the purpose of calling his moral energies into exercise, and may therefore be utilized for his welfare in whatsoever degree he may choose. This idea was already mooted by Chrysippus, but it was especially in the later (though probably also in the middle) period of Stoicism that it became fruitful.

The early Stoics undoubtedly felt that the will has an important place in the acquirement of virtue, but they gave the thought neither clear articulation nor adequate recognition. An advance in this respect was made during the middle period. Thus Panætius, whose ethical teaching was unquestionably influenced by Aristotle, draws a distinction between a 'theoretical' and a 'practical' virtue, and holds that the latter, requiring, as it does, a correlative action, is attainable only by practice.* Discipline of the body is also necessary (Cicero, *de Offic.* i. 23, 79). The practical virtue, which concerns the individual, is *σωφροσύνη*, consisting in the unconstrained submission of the lower faculties to the reason. The most important of the four categories of *σωφροσύνη* is *ἐγκράτεια*, the virtue whose significance was first fully realized by Antisthenes, and afterwards very specially by Aristotle. Posidonius likewise distinguishes the two aspects of virtue. Inasmuch as practical virtue consists in the subordination of the irrational to the rational part of the soul, especially in the repression of the bodily impulses and passions, it is to be acquired, Posidonius believes, only by means of practice and habit, which must carry out the process of subjugating impulse begun by education. But this point of view, which at first sight is hardly distinguishable from that of Panætius, or even that of Aristotle, is in the case of Posidonius most intimately related to a mystical Platonic conception of the nature and destiny of the human soul: the soul is a part of the Divine *πνεῦμα*, and, coming down from the heavenly to the earthly sphere, enters the body which is its prison, and which seduces and defiles it with desires. To preserve this divinely begotten soul, this *δαίμων*, from earthly guilt and defilement, and by means of a virtuous life to effect its return to its celestial home, the Æther, where alone full knowledge can be its portion—such is the aim of all truly wise and great men. The influence of Plato is here quite unmistakable, though Posidonius was doubtless congenitally inclined to the idealistic point of view.

It was in later Stoicism, however, that the importance of practice in virtue, as in moral life and endeavour generally, first gained full and adequate recognition. Seneca, it is true, emphasizes this particular aspect in an incidental way at best, but this was due not so much to any lack of insight on his part, as to the defects and the weaknesses of his own character. He nevertheless makes many most apposite observations on the point in question.* Moreover, influenced as he was by the strong Platonizing bent of Posidonius, Seneca also manifests an ascetic mystical tendency which in the main takes the form of contempt for the body, the body being regarded as but a fetter upon the Divine soul, which amid her sombre, insecure, changeful, earthly existence longs for her Divine home, where every mystery of heaven and of nature shall be made plain.†

The idea of moral *ἄσκησις* assumes a new character in the hands of the two representatives of later Stoicism who deal seriously with moral problems and the improvement of their fellow-men, viz. Musonius and Epictetus. Of the dissertation *περὶ ἀσκήσεως* of Musonius a fairly large fragment has been preserved (frag. vi. H). He follows Panætius in drawing a distinction between theoretical and practical virtue. The practical, which he regards as the more important (p. 23, 14 ff. H), is to be attained only by practice of a twofold kind: one, as applied to body and mind together, the other, as applied to mind alone (p. 25, 4 ff.)—a distinction already made by the Cynic Diogenes. Exercise directed upon both body and mind produces *ἀνδρεία* and *σωφροσύνη*, whereas the purely mental exercise consists in those 'thought-actions' (*Denkhandlungen*, as Eucken calls them) which determine both our mental attitude and our conduct (cf. especially p. 25, 4 ff., Hense).

Frag. v., the thesis of which is *ὅτι ἰσχυρότερον ἔθος ἢ λόγος*, and frag. vii., *ὅτι πόνου καταφρονητέον*, are also significant passages; cf. also p. 7, 20 ff.; p. 10, 18; p. 11, 17; p. 29, 7 f. The ascetic views of Musonius in regard to sexual relations, as set forth in frag. xii., *περὶ ἀφροδισίων*, are likewise worthy of note; see, *e.g.*, p. 64, 1 ff.: *μόνα μὲν ἀφροδίσια νομίζειν δίκαια τὰ ἐν γάμῳ καὶ ἐπὶ γενέσει παίδων συντελούμενα, ὅτι καὶ νόμιμά ἐστιν· τὰ δέ γε ἡδονὴν θηρώμενα ψιλὴν ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα, κἂν ἐν γάμῳ ᾖ.* The student is recommended to read the whole fragment.

The moment of ethical *ἄσκησις*, however, reached its highest development in the Phrygian freedman Epictetus, in whose hands the idea of 'asceticism' became fully spiritualized, representing, in fact, *the unremitting endeavour of the individual soul towards its own moral perfection.* Of a multitude of relevant passages we note only the more important.‡

That which was openly taught and practised by Epictetus was put to the proof in private by Marcus Aurelius, the last Roman who sat upon the throne of the Cæsars.§ Amid the tumult of the world's capital, or by night in his lonely tent at Carnuntum, Aurelius laboured ceaselessly in the depths of his heart towards the purifying and perfecting of his soul. He is never able to satisfy himself, but never falters in his effort to come nearer and nearer to the ideal (pp. 127, 14 ff.; 131, 18 ff.), and throws himself bravely into the conflict between soul and sense (pp. 59, 13 ff.; 91, 9 ff.; 131, 12 ff.; 162, 4 ff.). But apart from other profound differences between Aurelius and Epictetus, though both were Stoics, they were fundamentally unlike in their spiritual outlook. Thus, while Epictetus, alike in thought and action, is wholly concerned with the present world—in the best sense, certainly—the mind of the Emperor tends rather to brood darkly upon the shortness of life and the transitoriness of earthly things (*e.g.* ii. 17, vii. 3). He despises the goods of this world (iv. 48), even fame, and often all but grows weary of life itself (p. 115, 9 ff.). His aphoristic utterances seem to be haunted by the pathos of life and the yearn-

* Cicero, *de Offic.* i. 18, 60; Schmekel, *Phil. d. mit. Stoa*, 116 ff.

* e.g. *Epp.* 16, 1 ff.; 18, 5 ff.; 75, 7 ff.; 82, 16; 90, 46; 94, 47; 95, 45 and 57. In *Ep.* 5, 4 he deprecates the extravagances of Cynic asceticism.

† *Quæst. Nat.* proleg. § 3 f.; *ad Marciam*, 23, 1 f.; 24, 5. 25; *Epp.* 65, 16 ff.; 102, 23 ff.

‡ e.g. *Dissert.* ii. 9, 13 f., ii. 18, iii. 3, iii. 12, iv. 1, 111; cf. also i. 2, 30–32. With regard to the attitude of Epictetus towards corporeal asceticism, see iii. 12, 16 f.

§ Cf. *e.g.* *εἰς ἑαυτόν*, ii. 1; also i. 9, p. 4, 5 ff., ed. Stich, i. 15 (p. 5, 21 ff.), i. 16 (p. 9, 6 ff.).

ing for death.* He certainly has no belief in a future life, but his eye turns away from earth and from human effort, and is directed toward the All and the Eternal.† Though he is an adherent of the monistic philosophy characteristic of the Stoa—a philosophy, however, not consistently maintained by Aurelius, any more than by Seneca and Epictetus—yet the fundamental qualities of his great soul have an admixture of the spirit of renunciation and mysticism. Leaving his anthropology out of account, we see this most unmistakably in his conception of the Deity.

7. Neo-Cynicism.—Of an entirely different nature from the view of life entertained by Aurelius, is that of the Neo-Cynics, for whose teachings there was a lively interest, and even a certain sympathy, among the later Stoics, such as Musonius, Seneca, and Epictetus. The representatives of this Neo-Cynic tendency revive the asceticism of Diogenes and Crates, and, while laying the main emphasis upon the actual practice of asceticism, they contribute nothing whatever in the way of fresh thought. For fuller information see art. NEO-CYNICISM.

8. Neo-Pythagoreanism and Neo-Platonism.—The tendency towards renunciation of the world, which forms the basal element in the temperament of Marcus Aurelius, was not due to the spirit of Stoicism, but was rather a product of the time, and, one may well suppose, of his own experiences and fortunes. It was, however, organically related to the philosophy of the Neo-Pythagoreans—that singular group which emerged in the earlier half of the first cent. B.C., perhaps in Alexandria. No doubt the greater part of the literature of this school is pseudepigraphic, and we know by name only a few of its adherents. Apart from P. Nigidius Figulus and Vatinius, contemporaries of Cicero, and Sotion the friend of the Sextians, the most important representatives known to us are Apollonius of Tyana and Moderatus of Gades (1st cent. A.D.), Nicomachus and Numenius (2nd cent. A.D.), and Philostratus (3rd cent. A.D.).

The moral and religious view of life promulgated by the Neo-Pythagoreans is in part traceable to the Mysteries of the ancient school, but in a still greater degree to Platonism, especially to that form of Platonism set forth by Posidonius in his commentary to the *Timæus*. The characteristic of the sect is absolute dualism: God and the world, soul and body. Spirit is the principle of good (the Deity being conceived as pure Spirit, and regarded as utterly transcendent), while the body, like matter in general, is the principle of evil. Between the two stands the Demiurge, or world-former, and the demons, whose kingdom lies in the sphere between the earth and the moon. The soul, which is formed of the Divine essence, is meanwhile confined within the body as in a prison, and her deliverance from the body and its impulses, in order that she may become worthy of communion with the Deity, is the most urgent task of mankind—a task which finds its positive side in a holy and devout life, since the Supreme can be worshipped in a truly spiritual manner only with purity of thought and piety of conduct (cf. the fragment of Apollonius in Eusebius, *Præp. Evang.* iv. 13). Mankind is exposed on all sides, however, to contamination by demons, and the means employed to cleanse from this defilement is asceticism. The most effective forms of asceticism are certain specific ablutions and expiatory ceremonies, abstinence from certain kinds of food, more particularly from flesh and wine (among the later Neo-Pythagoreans), sexual temperance, or even abstinence (as is said to have been counselled by Apollonius), silence on the part of neophytes, etc.

* Pp. 24, 19 ff.; 54, 6 ff.; 62, 5; 91, 19 ff.; 115, 4 ff.
† Pp. 21, 17 ff.; 66, 19 ff.; 155, 3 ff.

But as man is of himself unable to realize this end, and since between him and the supramundane Godhead there yawns a great gulf which requires to be bridged, the Deity reveals His will through the agency of specially gifted individuals, such as Pythagoras formerly, and now Apollonius, as also in the art of divination, in order that man may be helped in his dark endeavour to reach his heavenly home and the deification of his being.

Sources for our knowledge of Neo-Pythagoreanism are the account of Alexander Polyhistor in Diog. Laert. viii. 22 ff., the large fragments of pseudonymous literature written under the name of the old Pythagoreans (particulars in Zeller), the fragments of Numenius, Philostratus's *Vita Apollonii*, and the *Lives* of Pythagoras by Porphyry and Iamblichus.

In Neo-Pythagoreanism the mysteries of the older school are resuscitated in a spiritualized and morally nobler form. The real significance of the later development, however, lies in the fact that, in conjunction with Philo, it prepares the way for the last great system of ancient philosophy, viz. the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus. It was the aim of Plotinus to get beyond the dualism of Neo-Pythagoreanism on both metaphysical and ethical principles. In his nobly planned and profoundly excogitated system the whole world stands forth as an emanation from the Deity, who is supersensual, supramundane, and exalted above oppositions, even that between spirit and body. He is Pure Being, the Absolute, and from Him issues the world in a series of gradations, returning again to Him in a similar way. The principal stages of this emanation are three in number, viz., Spirit, Soul, and Matter. Just as light eventually fatigues the eye, and its radiance is changed to darkness, so does the final irradiation of the ineffable and inscrutable Essence, having traversed the intermediate stages of Spirit and Soul, become Matter (*Enneads*, iv. 3, 9), which, however, never attains the metaphysical independence that belongs to the Absolute. Matter is the μὴ ὄν, and, as the ἀπουσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, the πρῶτον κακόν. Man, too, is an effluence from the Absolute, and in the human soul are distinguished a supersensual or Divine, and a lower or sensual part. Just as pure spirit in its final expression becomes matter, so the human soul with equal necessity is metamorphosed into body. The supersensual part, which was pre-existent (iv. 3. 12, vi. 4. 14) and in union with God, has suffered disaster from having entered the body (iv. 3. 15 ff., v. 1. 1). From the union of soul and body springs all the irrationality and depravity of the soul. Our great task, therefore, is the 'extinction of everything that binds us to sensuous existence,' the complete withdrawal of the soul from the outer world to its own inner life. Hence, virtue is neither more nor less than the work of 'purifying' the supersensual soul from all its relations with the world of sense (especially i. 2. 3, i. 6. 6, v. 3. 9). It accords with all this that Plotinus should set no value upon taking part in earthly affairs, either of a scientific or a politico-ethical nature. This complete detachment of the soul from all ties with the external world, however, appears on the positive side as its surrender to the Supersensual, to the Deity, the yearning for whom becomes ever more intense as the bonds of sense are more and more transcended. So far as union with the Divine is concerned, the external mode of life is of no importance. What counts is, in the opinion of Plotinus, not action, but feeling; and accordingly he attributes no value to asceticism of the common sort, however it may have consorted with his own inclinations (Zeller, iii. 522 f.). Of greater importance is the thinking consideration of life, and, still more, pure intuition; but the full and blessed union is vouchsafed only to

the elect in the form of *ecstasy*, which is not to be won by force, but must be calmly waited for, if haply it may come over us. In the state of ecstasy, however, man not only forgets all his earthly limitations, but loses self-consciousness altogether, and all that remains is the blessed feeling of union with the Divine.

This withdrawal from the world of sense, however, is not without its positive complement. In the beauty of the external world and in all its varied phenomena, Plotinus, like Plato, discerns the shimmering of the eternal ideas. In man sensuous beauty awakes ἔρως, the love of the Good (cf. esp. i. 6) arouses the desire of the supersensual soul for its source. For the Absolute is likewise the absolutely Good.

This sketch lets us see that the ascetic tendency in the life of ancient Greece is of much more importance than is usually supposed. We are now in a position to distinguish two different kinds of asceticism: (1) the Orphic-Pythagorean-Platonic, or the religio-mystical; and (2) the Cynic-Stoic, or ethico-volitional. It is true, indeed, that the ascetic view of life, in the sense which we attach to the term, was always confined to narrow circles in the Greek world; nevertheless, as a consequence of its being embraced, deepened, and spiritualized by two of the greatest thinkers of Greece, Plato and Plotinus, its influence has been enormous. Of no less importance, however, than the asceticism of the religio-mystical type has been what we have called the ethico-volitional, which discovered, and to some extent developed, the significance of the will in morals. Both of these tendencies, which, moreover, were in some degree combined in Posidonius, exercised a profound influence upon early Christian thought.

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The present writer has in preparation [1908] a monograph, *Die Askese im griechischen Altertum*, which will also take account of the Sextians, the Essenes, Philo, and, in particular, early Christianity.

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ASCETICISM (Hindu).—In India ascetic practices have been very widely prevalent from the earliest times. The mortification of the body, and the self-inflicted penances associated therewith, have been habitually carried to lengths beyond anything familiar to other peoples. Tradition and legend have united to glorify the ascetic, whether human or Divine; religion, as elsewhere, has sanctioned and encouraged his devotion; and the highest rewards of place and power have been within his reach, if only his austerities have taken a form sufficiently protracted and severe. Eastern patience, self-abnegation, and resolution are seen in their strangest guise, in submission to extreme conditions of self-torture and distress. The profession of the ascetic has always been held in the highest esteem, and his claim to support at the public charge by gifts and alms universally allowed. If it is his merit to practise, it is the merit of others to give to him, that his simple wants may never lack supply. And thus on both sides asceticism ministered to spiritual profit, to the actual and personal gain of the ascetic himself, both present and prospective, and to the store of credit which by his generosity the householder trusted to accumulate for himself, so as to win a higher position and birth in the next existence. Part of the secret of the hold which the ascetic ideal has maintained on the Indian mind lies in the fact that, according to the teaching of their sacred books, benefit accrues also to the donor who forwards the holy man on his way with gifts of money or food, or ministers in any way to his personal needs.

The thought that essentially underlies the Indian conception of asceticism, and prompts the adoption of the ascetic life, is the desire to escape from the *saṁsāra*, the never-ending cycle or round of successive existences, in which all created beings are involved, and which brings in its train the suffering and misery to which all such beings are subject. Asceticism offers a means of escape from an otherwise hopeless procession, without beginning and without end. And there is therefore little marvel if to a people whose theory of life was essentially pessimistic present hardship and suffering voluntarily endured were welcome when they brought with them the promise of future deliverance.

1. **Meaning and history of the Indian term 'tapas.'**—The Hindu and Sanskrit term is *tapas*, from the root *tap*, 'to be hot,' 'to burn' (cf. Lat. *tep*-eo, *tep*-or, Gr. *τέφ-ρη*, 'ashes' [*Iliad*, xviii. 25, xxiii. 251], Old Germ. *damf*). *Tapas* signifies therefore in the first instance 'warmth,' or 'heat'; then the feelings or sensations, usually painful, experienced in consequence of heat; and thus pain or suffering in general, especially the pain which is voluntary and self-inflicted from a religious motive. The term therefore came to be applied in particular to religious penance, austerity, devotion, and to connote the merit which such devotion was supposed to assure. This was the paramount and ordinary significance of the word. But it was also used, by analogy, for the special duty or 'merit' of each of the four castes of Manu,* or again, in a limited and

* Manu, xi. 235 f.: 'All the bliss of gods and men is declared by the sages to whom the Veda was revealed to have *tapas* for its root, *tapas* for its centre, *tapas* for its end. Knowledge is the *tapas* of a Brāhmaṇa, protection the *tapas* of a Kṣatriya, his daily business the *tapas* of a Vaiśya, service the *tapas* of a Śūdra.'

technical sense, of the special season of the year (the month *Māgha*, Jan.-Feb.) to which the practice of religious austerities was more peculiarly appropriate. Other terms of less frequent occurrence were *tapasyam* and *tapasyā*.

The Greek writers, in their references to ancient India, make frequent mention of philosophers or ascetics, whose characteristic practices repeat themselves in every part of the country at the present day. Strabo, for example (bk. xv. ch. i.), quoting from Megasthenes, describes two sects of the philosophers whom he calls Brāhmans and Garmans,* who abstain from meat and from sexual indulgence, and live in groves without the city.† It is not always easy to determine whether he is referring to Hindu or to Buddhist mendicants; probably there was little difference at that period in the habits or dress of the monks and ascetics of either faith, and to a Greek eye they were indistinguishable. Elsewhere he writes of the Garmans (Sarmans) that the most honourable of them were known as Hylobioi,‡ who lived on wild fruits and leaves, clothed themselves in garments made of bark, and abstained from wine and sexual indulgence.§ Two of the Brāhman *σοφισταί* were seen in Taxila, of whom the elder was clean-shaven, while the other wore his hair long, and both were attended by disciples; they were provided with food without cost, and exhibited their powers of endurance by standing for a whole day on one leg, or lying on the ground exposed to the vicissitudes of the weather.‖ Others were seen standing immovable in one position during the day, naked and exposed to the almost intolerable heat of the sun. The elder of the two ascetics above referred to accompanied Alexander to Persis, and there abandoned his ascetic practices, giving as his reason that he had completed the forty years' term which he had prescribed for himself. Another, who followed in the train of the king, was named Kalanus. He perished by a voluntary death by fire at Passargadæ, at the age of seventy-three; with reference to this act Megasthenes is quoted to the effect that self-destruction was not a rule with the Indian philosophers, and that those who thus acted were regarded as rash and headstrong (*νεανικοί*, *ib.* xv. 68).

Other philosophers bore the name 'Pramnai' (Πράμναι, probably a corruption again of *śramaṇa*, *samana*), and were opposed to the Brāhmans. These the author distinguishes, some as living on the hills or plains, others as frequenting the cities. Others, again, were known as Γυμνῆται, and were therefore probably Jains, of the Digambara sect; they lived mostly under the open sky, and practised austerities for thirty-seven years.¶ Reference is made later to the Indian embassy to Augustus, and the Brāhman or perhaps Buddhist ascetic who accompanied it, and burned himself on the funeral pyre at Athens in the presence of the Emperor and the people. His name is said to have been inscribed on his tomb: 'Zarmanochegas, an Indian from Bargosa . . . lies here.'** Elsewhere the name appears as Zarmanus.††

2. 'Tapas' in Indian literature.—(1) *Rigveda.*—In the earliest Sanskrit literature, the Hymns of the *Rigveda*, neither the word *tapas* nor the conception and thought that underlies it is of frequent occurrence. It would not, however, be a legitimate inference from this fact that ascetic habits were unknown to the primitive Aryan communities. Nevertheless, the absence or rarity of reference does suggest that, together with much else which belonged to the lower side of the religious life, the practice of *tapas* also was, in great part at least, adopted from the aboriginal or other tribes among whom the new-comers settled. Theirs was the darker, gloomier view of religion and of life, to which austerity was congenial. To the bright, joyous spirit of the Aryans—the spirit that finds expression in the Hymns—the sad and despairing outlook which is the motive-power and inspiration of ascetic practice was repugnant. To them the gods were open-handed, and did not need to be forced or cajoled by human suffering; and life was not yet clouded by the pessimistic tendencies of a later age. It is noticeable that all the instances quoted from the *Rigveda* of the use of *tapas* in its technical sense are taken from the late tenth book, where the word is found both in the literal meaning of 'warmth,' 'glow' (*e.g.* x. 16. 4), and metaphorically of the glow of feeling, passion (*e.g.* x. 83. 2). *Tapas*, however, is also pain, suffering, voluntarily endured (*ib.* 109. 4, 154. 2, 167. 1). So also the root *tap*, which is met with in the earlier books with the significance of 'burn' (viii. 102. 16), or transitively to 'heat,' 'make hot' (iii. 53. 14, iv. 2. 6), to 'consume by fire,' 'destroy' (iii. 18. 2), assumes in the tenth book the connotation of remorse, the heat or pain which is within, self-originated in the heart (*tatāpa*, impers. x. 34. 11, cf. *ib.* 34. 10, 95. 17). Similarly, also in the same book, we find *tapasvat*, 'practising asceticism' (154. 4); *tapoja*, 'born through penance' (154. 5).*

The purpose and subject-matter of the *Sāmaveda* and *Yajurveda* almost preclude a reference to *tapas*; and the nature of the magical devices and charms, the incantations of the *Atharvaveda*, aims rather at inflicting harm upon another, or securing personal immunity, than at exhibiting endurance or attaining the desired end by actual self-inflicted tortures.†

Of the *Brāhmaṇa* literature the same is true as of the later mantra and ritual writings, that there was little occasion for reference to *tapas*. Such literature is concerned almost entirely with the order and interpretation of the sacrifice, with mythology, cosmology, and so forth. The practice of *tapas*, however, is recognized, and is enjoined, *e.g. Śatap. Brāhm.* x. 4. 4. 4: 'let him who knows this by all means practise austerities; for, indeed, when he who knows this practises austerities, . . . every part of him will share in the world of heaven.'‡ The world is conquered by *tapas* (iii. 4. 4. 27; cf. xiii. 7. 1. 1).§

(2) *Upaniṣads.*—In the *Upaniṣads*, on the contrary, the theory and the duty of *tapas* are completely assumed; and even where its efficacy is denied, or only partially and grudgingly conceded, the existence and wide-spread influence of ascetic ideals are taken for granted, though the writers claim that there is a better way by which to reach the supreme goal. In the oldest strata of the *Upaniṣad* literature the ascetic calling is an obligation to be undertaken at a special stage or period of life; and their greatest teacher, Yājñavalkya, proposes thus to abandon home and possessions, and, retiring to the forest, in the practice of austerities to sever actually and ideally every tie that binds to earthly existence. In complete harmony, however, with the spirit of these writings, *tapas* is depreciated in comparison with knowledge as an inferior, secondary way to the highest bliss, to *Brahman*.

* Βραχμᾶνες and Γαρμᾶνες, the latter name probably a textual error for Σαρμᾶνες, the Pāli and Buddhist *samana*, Skr. *śramaṇa*, *śrāmaṇera*, 'hearer,' 'disciple.'

† *διατρίβειν . . . ἐν ἄλσει πρὸ τῆς πόλεως, ὑπὸ περιβόλῳ συμμέτρῳ, λιτῶς ζῶντας ἐν στιβάσι καὶ δοραῖς, ἀπεχομένους ἐμψύχων καὶ ἀφροδισίων* (Strabo, xv. 59).

‡ *ὑλόβιοι*, 'dwellers in the forest,' *i.e.* Skr. *vānaprastha*.

§ *ζῶντας ἐν ταῖς ὕλαις ἀπὸ φύλλων καὶ καρπῶν ἀγρίων, ἐσθῆτας δὲ ἔχειν ἀπὸ φλοιῶν δενδρίων, ἀφροδισίων χωρὶς καὶ οἴνου* (*ib.* xv. 60).

‖ *τὸν μὲν πρεσβύτερον ἐξυρημένον, τὸν δὲ νεώτερον κομήτην, ἀμφοτέροις δὲ ἀκολουθεῖν μαθητάς· τὸν μὲν οὖν ἄλλον χρόνον κατ' ἀγορὰν διατρίβειν, τιμωμένους ἀντὶ συμβούλων, ἐξουσίαν ἔχοντας, ὁτὶ ἂν βούλωνται τῶν ὠνίων φέρεσθαι δωρεάν . . . τοῦ τε μέλιτος πολλοῦ προκειμένου καὶ τοῦ σησάμου μάζας ποιουμένους τρέφεσθαι δωρεάν . . . τὸν μὲν πρεσβύτερον, πεσόντα ὕπτιον, ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν ἡλίων καὶ τῶν ὄμβρων· ἤδη γὰρ ὕειν ἀρχομένου τοῦ ἔαρος. Τὸν δὲ ἑστάναι μονοσκελῆ, ξύλον ἑπτάπηχυ ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς χερσὶν, ὅσον τρίπηχυ· κάμνοντος δὲ τοῦ σκέλους, ἐπὶ θάτερον μεταφέρειν τὴν βάσιν, καὶ διατελεῖν οὕτως τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην· φανῆναι δὲ ἐγκρατέστερον μακρῷ τὸν νεώτερον* (*ib.* xv. 61).

¶ *τοὺς δὲ Γυμνήτας κατὰ τοὔνομα γυμνοὺς διαζῆν, ὑπαιθρίους τὸ πλέον, καρτερίαν ἀσκοῦντας, ἣν ἔφαμεν πρότερον μεχρὶ ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα* (*ib.* xv. 70).

** *Ζαρμανοχήγας Ἰνδὸς ἀπὸ Βαργοσῆς κατὰ τὰ πάτρια Ἰνδῶν ἔθη ἑαυτὸν ἀπαθανατίσας κεῖται.* Zarmanochegas is probably the Sanskrit *śramaṇāchārya*, a mendicant teacher, and Bargosa is Bharūch, or Broach, at the mouth of the Narbada river.

†† The passages from the ancient classical authors referring to the Indian ascetics, and especially to the examples quoted of self-immolation, are translated in J. W. M'Crindle, *Invasion of India by Alexander the Great*, 1896, pp. 386–392; and in the same writer's *Ancient India as described in Classical Literature*, 1901, pp. 65 ff., 73 ff., 113, 167 ff., 176, 181 ff., 212 f.

* In one Hymn, x. 83. 2, *tapas* is invoked, together with *manyu*, to protect the worshipper and overthrow his foes.

† A confirmation of the view that the conception of *tapas* was strange to the earliest Aryan thought, and was adopted from without and became familiar only at a later period, is perhaps afforded by *Rigveda*, vii. 59. 8: 'kill him with your hottest bolt,' *tapiṣṭhena hanmanā*, where *Atharvaveda*, vii. 77. 2, and *Taitt. Saṁh.* iv. 3. 13. 3, substitute for the last word *tapasā*, 'with your hottest penance,' an expression quite in harmony with the later thought of the overwhelming magical power of *tapas*.

‡ *SBE* xliii. 362. § *SBE* xxvi. 111.

The representation, however, as might be expected, is not always consistent. In addition to the view most usually adopted, which sees in *tapas* a real, though less commendable and direct, means to the attainment of a knowledge of *Brahman*, the two extremes are met with of those who declare the practice of austerities indispensable to such knowledge, and those who refuse to acknowledge in asceticism any virtue or efficacy whatsoever, and maintain that only in the way of knowledge and by no other means may the final end be reached. Elsewhere asceticism and the study of the *Veda* are placed side by side as the essential conditions of a true insight; and those who in the right spirit with faith practise asceticism in the forest ascend on the way of the gods.

Tapas also is indefinitely associated in the *Upaniṣads* with the third *āśrama* (*q.v.*), and the life of the anchorite in the forest (*vānaprastha*). On him the practice of asceticism is especially obligatory, but even he must add to it faith, or the mere outward observance and self-mortification will be in vain. Only gradually, and not quite clearly or definitely, within the *Upaniṣad* period was a distinction drawn between the third and a fourth higher stage, the essential note of which was not mere bodily self-mortification, but the voluntary and entire surrender of all worldly possessions, and the concentration of thought and affection on the Supreme. This last stage is identified with a real knowledge of *Brahman*. He who 'knows' has passed beyond the (three) *āśramas* (*atyāśramin*, *Śvet.* vi. 21), and *tapas* is no longer in the least degree necessary or profitable to him, for that which the ascetic painfully strives to win he has already attained. Thus the theory of the *āśramas*, and with it the doctrine of *tapas*, takes on in the *Upaniṣad* literature a distinctly ethical colouring. It is only, however, in the later treatises that the separation between the two last stages, the *vānaprastha* and the *sannyāsin*, is completely carried out, and the duties and obligations of each clearly defined.

(3) *Manu and the Law-Books.*—It is in the *Law-Book of Manu*, ch. vi., that the formal conditions and rules of the ascetic life are set forth; and these are in large part repeated, quoted, or amplified in the later *Dharmasūtras*. How far some of the more strict and exacting of these regulations ever became matters of literal observance, or how far they represented merely abstract or conventional ideals, must, of course, remain uncertain. But, in view of the capacity which Indian ascetics have always exhibited for almost heroic endurance of self-mortification, it would seem by no means impossible, or even improbable, that in some instances at least the utmost extremes of bodily torture were submitted to, and the rules of the books carried out in fullest detail. It will be noticed that Manu confines the rights and privileges of an ascetic life to the twice-born.

'A twice-born Snātaka, who has thus lived according to the law in the order of householders, may . . . go forth from the village into the forest and reside there, duly controlling his senses. Let him offer those five great sacrifices according to the rule, with various kinds of pure food fit for ascetics, or with herbs, roots, and fruit. Let him wear a skin or a tattered garment; let him bathe in the evening or in the morning; and let him always wear (his hair in) braids, the hair on his body, his beard, and his nails (being unclipped). . . . Let him be always industrious in privately reciting the Veda; let him be patient of hardships . . . ever liberal . . . and compassionate towards all living creatures.'*

Then follow directions with regard to the sacrifices the ascetic must offer, and the kind and quantity of food he may eat.

'In summer let him expose himself to the heat of five fires, during the rainy season live under the open sky, and in winter be dressed in wet clothes, gradually increasing his austerities. When he bathes at the three Savanas (sunrise, noon, and sunset) let him offer libations of water to the manes and the gods, and, practising harsher and harsher austerities, let him dry up his bodily frame . . . let him live without a fire, without a house, wholly silent, subsisting on roots and fruit . . . chaste, sleeping on the bare ground, dwelling at the roots of trees.'* 'Having thus passed the third part of life in the forest, he may live as an ascetic during the fourth part of his existence, after abandoning all attachment to worldly objects . . . after offering sacrifices and subduing his senses . . . an ascetic gains bliss after death.'† 'Departing from his house . . . let him wander about absolutely silent, and caring nothing for enjoyments that may be offered. Let him always wander alone without any companion, in order to attain (final liberation) . . . He shall neither possess a fire nor a dwelling, he may go to a village for his food, indifferent to everything, firm of purpose, meditating and concentrating his mind on *Brahman*. A potsherd (for an almsbowl), the roots of trees (for a dwelling), coarse worn-out garments, life in solitude and indifference towards everything, are the marks of one who has attained liberation. Let him not desire to die, let him not desire to live, let him wait for his time, as a servant for the payment of his wages . . . let him patiently bear hard words, let him not insult anybody, let him not become anybody's enemy for the sake of this body . . . entirely abstaining from sensual enjoyments, with himself for his only companion, he shall live in this world, desiring the bliss (of final emancipation)'.‡ 'Carrying an almsbowl, a staff, and a water-pot, let him continually wander about, controlling himself and not hurting any creature. . . . A gourd, a wooden bowl, an earthen dish or one made of split cane, Manu, the son of Svayambhu, has declared to be vessels (suitable) for an ascetic.'§

Rules are then given for begging and the manner of eating, subjects of meditation, etc. The ascetic is to beg only once in the day, and when he goes to any house for that purpose it must be after the ordinary meal of the household has been concluded (cf. *Baudh.* ii. 22; *Vas.* x. 7, 8).

'Three suppressions of the breath even, performed according to the rule, and accompanied with the (recitation of the) *Vyāhṛtis*‖ and of the syllable "Om," one must know to be the highest austerity for every Brāhmaṇa.'¶ 'When by the disposition (of his heart) he becomes indifferent to all objects, he obtains eternal happiness both in this world and after death. He who has in this manner gradually given up all attachments, and is freed from all the pairs (of opposites), reposes in *Brahman* alone . . . a twice-born man who becomes an ascetic . . . shakes off sin here below, and reaches the highest *Brahman*.'**

Elsewhere in the *sūtras* of Manu, in the other books, there are incidental references to the ascetics, which lay down further rules for their conduct and life.

Ascetics and students are to receive alms from the Brāhman householder after the performance of the Bali offering (iii. 94; cf. vi. 7; and *Baudh.* ii. 5. 11; *Vas.* xi. 5; *Āpast.* ii. 4. 10, 11).

The purification ordained . . . shall be 'double for students, treble for hermits, but quadruple for ascetics' (v. 137; cf. *Viṣṇu*. lx. 26; *Vas.* vi. 19).

The ascetic is not admissible as a witness in the law-courts (viii. 65; cf. *Baudh.* i. 19. 13; *Viṣṇu*, viii. 2).

For secret converse with female ascetics a small fine is payable (viii. 363; cf. *Viṣṇu*, xxxvi. 7, and the statement [*ib.* xcix. 14] that the deity himself resides 'in the frame of gods, ascetics, and officiating priests').

'An ascetic, a hermit in the forest, and Brāhmaṇas who are students of the Veda shall not be made to pay toll at a ferry' (viii. 407; cf. *Viṣṇu*, v. 132).

'Hermits (*tāpasāḥ*, *i.e.* those who practise *tapas*), ascetics (*yatis*, those whose passions are under control), Brāhmaṇas, the crowds of the Vaimānika deities, the lunar mansions, and the Daityas are the first (*i.e.* lowest) order of existence caused by Goodness' (*sattva*, xii. 48).

Additional details in the *Law-Books* are to the effect that a householder must turn back if he meets an ascetic (*Viṣṇu*, lxiii. 36). 'An apostate from religious mendicity shall become the king's slave' (*ib.* v. 152). Cf. *Gautama*, iii. (*SBE* ii.[2] 192–196); *Baudhāyana*, ii. 11. 14–26, 17. 16, 17, iii. 3; 'eight mouthfuls are the meal of an ascetic, sixteen that of a hermit in the woods, thirty-two that of a householder, and an unlimited (quantity) that of a student' (*Baudh.* ii. 13. 7; cf. *Vas.* vi. 20); 'let him (the hermit) not injure even gadflies or gnats, let him bear cold and perform austerities, let him con-

* Manu, vi. 1–8 (*SBE* xxv. 198 ff.).

* Manu, vi. 23–26; cf. *Viṣṇu*, xcv. 1–4. Chs. xcv.–xcvii. of the *Institutes of Viṣṇu* are devoted to the exposition of the method of life and the duties of the ascetic, and the subjects of his meditation; the whole is closely related to the corresponding passages of Manu.

† Manu, vi. 33, 34. ‡ *Ib.* 41–49. § *Ib.* 52–54.

‖ *i.e.* the three mystic syllables *bhūr*, *bhuvaḥ*, *svar* (cf. ii. 76, 78, 81); the virtue of their recitation, with suppressions of the breath is so great that it frees from the guilt of the murder of a Brāhmaṇa (xi. 249).

¶ Manu, vi. 70. ** *Ib.* 80–85.

stantly reside in the forest, be contented, and delight in (dresses made of) bark and skins (and in carrying) water (in his pot)' (*Baudh.* iii. 3. 19; *Vas.* ix. x. [*SBE* xiv. 45–49]). 'The qualities by which a (true) Brāhmaṇa may be recognized are the concentration of the mind, austerities, the subjugation of the senses, liberality, truthfulness, purity, sacred learning, compassion, worldly learning, intelligence, and faith' (*Vas.* vi. 23); 'he is worthy to receive gifts who . . . reduces himself by austerities' (vi. 30); 'to suppress the breath is the highest austerity' (x. 5; cf. *Āpastamba*, ii. 21. 7–21, 22, 23. 1, 2).

(4) *Bhagavad Gītā.*—The 'Song of the Blessed' represents, as is well known, a syncretism between the two views of an idealistic pantheism and the practical devotion demanded by a theistic creed, salvation by conviction and knowledge alone, or salvation through faith and works. It is a subject of dispute which of these views is the earlier in the poem, and forms the original kernel, and which has been superimposed upon the other.* In either case *tapas*, in the form of renunciation, self-devotion, is the highest form which 'action' can take; and in the thought and teaching of the writer the essence of ascetic practices is not painful mortification of the body, but the abnegation of selfish desires and the sacrifice of selfish inclination and love of ease in the cause of right and devotion to the Supreme God. Passages which enforce renunciation and the duty of earnest and purposeful action belong to the practical theistic strata of the poem. Attempts, however, to reconcile conflicting views, or at least to recognize what is good in both, are not wanting.

'There is a twofold path, that of the Sāṅkhyas by devotion in the shape of knowledge, and that of the Yogins by devotion in the shape of action. A man does not attain freedom from action merely by not engaging in action; nor does he attain perfection by mere renunciation' (*Bhag. Gītā*, iii. 3 f.).

The 'ascetic' is one 'who has no aversion and no desire. . . . Children, not wise men, talk of *sāṅkhya* and *yoga* as distinct. One who pursues either well obtains the fruit of both. . . . He who, casting off attachment, performs actions dedicating them to *Brahman*, is not tainted by sin' (*ib.* v. 3 ff.).

'Some by concentration see the self in the self by the self; others by the *Sāṅkhya-yoga*; and others still by the *Karma-yoga*; others yet, not knowing this, practise concentration after hearing from others. They too, being devoted to hearing (instruction), cross beyond death' (xiii. 24 f.).

'Renunciation is devotion (*yoga*); for no one becomes a devotee (*yogin*) who has not renounced (all) fancies. . . . The devotee whose self is contented with knowledge and experience, who is unmoved, who has restrained his senses, and to whom a sod, a stone, and gold are alike, is said to be devoted. . . . He should restrain his mind, and concentrate it on me, and sit down engaged in devotion, regarding me as his final goal. Thus, constantly devoting his self to abstraction, a devotee whose mind is restrained attains that tranquillity which culminates in final emancipation and assimilation with me. . . . When his mind well-restrained becomes steady upon the self alone, then he, being indifferent to all objects of desire, is said to be devoted. As a light standing in a windless (place) flickers not, that is declared to be the parallel for a devotee, whose mind is restrained, and who devotes himself to abstraction' (vi. 2 ff.).

The indestructible seat . . . 'is entered by ascetics from whom all desires have departed' (viii. 11).

'Whatever you do . . . whatever you eat, whatever sacrifice you make, whatever you give, whatever penance you perform, do that as offered to me' (ix. 27).

'This threefold penance (*i.e.* bodily, vocal, and mental) practised with perfect faith . . . is called good (*sāttvikam*). . . . Whatever oblation is offered, whatever is given, whatever penance is performed, and whatever is done without faith, that . . . is called *asat* (not good), and that is nought both after death and here' (xvii. 7, 28).

'One who is self-restrained, whose understanding is unattached everywhere, from whom affections have departed, obtains the supreme perfection of freedom from action by renunciation' (xviii. 49).

'Those who, restraining the group of the senses . . . meditate on the indescribable, indestructible, unperceived . . . they, intent on the good of all beings, necessarily attain to me. . . . He who is alike to friend and foe, as also in honour and dishonour, who is alike in cold and heat, pleasure and pain, who is free from attachments, to whom praise and blame are alike . . . who is homeless, and of a steady mind and full of devotion, that man is dear to me' (xii. 3 f., 18 f.).

Similar quotations might easily be multiplied. In the *Bhagavad Gītā* the philosophic theory of asceticism, as it presented itself to the Indian mind, appears in its loftiest and purest form. To the earnest-minded *sādhu* this book is his Bible; and the nobility of its thought, and the charity and breadth of its outlook, render it not undeserving of the name.*

(5) *Epic poetry.*—The Epic poems add little to the general conception of *tapas*, although they offer many examples of its practice, and contain narratives more or less marvellous of ascetics who proved in their own experience its virtue and power (see below, p. 91[a]). Rāma in his hermitage on the banks of the Godāvarī is the type of the peaceful, gentle hermit who has renounced the world, and lives retired from its strife and care, 'true to duty, true to virtue.' In the *Mahābhārata* descriptions of the hermit (*vānaprastha*) and of the ascetic (*sannyāsin*) are found, which agree almost verbally with those of Manu (*Mahābh.* xii. 191 f., 243 ff.; cf. above, p. 89). And in the same book, true and false *tapas* are distinguished from one another: 'Fasting though for a fortnight, which ordinary men count for *tapas*, is merely a castigation of the body, and is not regarded as *tapas* by the good; renunciation and humility, these are the noblest *tapas*; he who practises these virtues fasts unceasingly, and his virtue is never found wanting.' 'Study of the Veda and avoiding injury to any living being, men call bodily asceticism; the true spiritual asceticism is control of speech and thought.'†

In the *Purāṇas* and later literature the extravagances of ascetic practice are more prominent than its virtues. The underlying conceptions remain the same; renunciation of worldly possessions and the voluntary endurance of bodily pain are means to an end, viz. deliverance from the *saṁsāra* and the acquisition of supernatural powers. The essential principles, however, are overlaid with a mass of extravagant fancy and repellent detail; and the stories of the lives of the ascetics, and the descriptions of their self-inflicted tortures, present few features of attractiveness or interest.

3. Asceticism in modern practice.—The most general term for a Hindu ascetic is *sādhu*, a 'good' or 'pious' man, a saint, or sage, of which the feminine *sādhvī* denotes a woman who has taken ascetic vows. *Sannyāsin*, one who has 'cast off,' *i.e.* home and possessions, is also frequently used of any mendicant, though the title is more properly restricted to a particular sect (see below, p. 93 f.). *Faqīr* is a Muhammadan term, expressive of poverty of spirit, but is sometimes, though incorrectly, applied to a Hindu beggar or ascetic. India has always been the home of asceticism, and from the very earliest times this feature of Indian life has attracted attention. *Sādhus* have formed the shifting itinerant element in a population for the most part stationary and rooted to the soil. In spite also of their general aloofness, by their numbers and by the respect paid to them they have always exercised a considerable influence in the land, and, in the absence of more direct methods of conveying intelligence, have formed a fairly constant though uncertain means of communication between the different parts of the country. Present everywhere, although rarely making a prolonged

* See esp. R. Garbe, *Bhagavad-Gītā*, Leipzig, 1905, Einleitung; *SBE*, vol. viii.[2], Oxford, 1898, Introduction; and art. BHAGAVAD GĪTĀ.

* Cf. the interesting account which Dr. T. L. Penneli gives of the *sādhu* whom he overtook on the road from Ludhiāna, and who recounted to him his experiences and manner of life: 'When my heart is lonely I read in the *Bhagavad Gītā*, and get consolation, and I like that better than any other book because it makes my heart glad' (*Church Missionary Intelligencer*, 1905, p. 516).

† *Mahābh.* xii. 217, 221; cf. Deussen, *Allg. Gesch. der Philosophie*, i. 3. p. 89 ff.

stay in one place, they brought to the settled inhabitants the consciousness of an outside world, and wrought effectively, though probably unintentionally, against the narrowness of a merely local and parochial spirit. Whether the *sādhus* were more numerous in ancient times than at the present day it is difficult to determine. They occupy a larger place in the ancient than in the modern literature of India; and the same is true also in all probability of the thought of the people. They still form, however, an appreciable though small percentage of the population. At the census of 1901 the total number of beggars and religious mendicants was returned at 4,914,000, or nearly five millions, a decrease of about 6½ % during the decade preceding. The decrease, however, is attributed to the heavy mortality of the famine years, and not to any lessened attraction in the profession of sādhuism. Probably by far the greater number of these, if not all, were true ascetics, bound by vows to a life of self-renunciation and poverty.

More, also, perhaps than in any other country asceticism in India has been under the definite and strong sanction of religion. That sanction was given to the practice of *tapas* in the first instance by the example of the greatest saints and heroes of old, and of the gods themselves, who are represented as enduring self-inflicted tortures for thousands of years in order to attain supernatural or enhanced power. The *ṛṣis* of old, the demigods of legend and story, the dwellers in heaven as well as on earth, engaged in the practice of *tapas* to secure dominion for themselves, or to confound their foes. The Supreme Being himself endured age-long austerities in order to create. And Śiva, in the character of an austere naked *sannyāsin* practising austerities of almost unimaginable severity for thousands of years, is the type and patron of the ascetic, who by the grace of Śiva and by the virtue of *tapas* hopes to attain all his desires. There was no limit to the power of self-mortification; all things were possible to *tapas*. The classical example and the most convincing to Hindu thought was found in the story of the rivalry and hostile encounters of Vaśiṣṭha and Viśvāmitra. The latter, a Kṣatriya and a most powerful and wealthy king, was overthrown and put to confusion at every point by the might of the Brāhman's incantations and magical devices. Humbled and beyond measure enraged, Viśvāmitra had recourse to *tapas*, and by the most severe and protracted austerities compelled the gods to grant him the birth and rights of a Brāhman, thus placing him on a level with his Brāhman adversary. The story undoubtedly represents the rivalry of the two great orders or castes, the priestly and the warrior; but it also expresses the conception of the omnipotent strength of *tapas*, which could bridge the gulf, and lift the Kṣatriya, inferior though a king, to the level of the proud and domineering Brāhman.*

On the power of *tapas* see also Manu, xi. 239 ff.: 'Whatever is hard to be traversed, whatever is hard to be attained, whatever is hard to be reached, whatever is hard to be performed, all may be accomplished by austerities; for austerity (possesses a power) which it is difficult to surpass. Both those who have committed mortal sin and all other offenders are severally freed from their guilt by means of well-performed austerities. Insects, snakes, moths, bees, birds, and beings bereft of motion reach heaven by the power of austerities. Whatever sin men commit by thoughts, words, or deeds, that they speedily burn away by penance, if they keep penance as their only riches. The gods accept the offerings of that Brāhmaṇa alone who has purified himself by austerities, and grant to him all he desires. . . . The gods, discerning that the holy origin of this whole (world) is from austerity, have thus proclaimed the incomparable power of austerity' (*SBE* xxv. 478 f.); cf. iv. 148, where *tapas* is one of the means for remembering former births, and xii. 83, where *tapas* leads to the attainment of supreme bliss; cf. also *Rigveda*, x. 1. 86, where the long-haired ascetic with semi-divine powers is able to move on the path of the Apsarases and Gandharvas (A. A. Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, p. 134).

Hindu asceticism represented, further, a revolt from, or at least a protest against, the tyranny of caste. In its origin probably remote from Brāhmanism, and conveying the ordinary idea that bodily pain was profitable for the advancement and purification of the spirit, the ascetic life became, in association with Hinduism and under the prescriptive sanction of Hindu law itself, a refuge from the burden of caste rules and ostracisms. By the ascetic, caste, like every other institution of the mundane life, has been surpassed, and left behind. He is casteless not because he is below but because he is above caste. And this freedom from the bondage and artificial restrictions of a society elaborately fenced off and partitioned by innumerable barriers which the ordinary man might not transgress presented no inconsiderable attraction, and has been one of the secrets of the abiding popularity of the ascetic ideal and manner of life in India. The subdual of the bodily passions by mortification of the flesh, which in other countries was itself the end of asceticism, was in India only the means; the end was primarily and avowedly the attainment of magical powers, but also, perhaps in many instances only half consciously, escape from the burdens of a social life, the petty restraints and prohibitions of which had begun to be a weariness to the spirit. Over this tendency, with that wonderful compliance and dexterity of which it is so great a master, Brāhmanism threw its shield, and legalized what it could not prevent. In the doctrine of the four *āśramas* (*q.v.*) asceticism was made an integral part of the orthodox Hindu life, and it became the duty of every Hindu, as advanced age overtook him, homeless and a wanderer to chasten himself with austerities. Formally this was to be done for the sake of detaching himself from earthly ties, and of realizing union with *Brahman* (see art. YOGA). And a religious motive was thus supplied for that which in itself was a welcome release from responsibility, care, and the minute requirements of an elaborate social code.

In the first instance apparently, the right and privilege of asceticism, according to Hindu custom or law, belonged to Brāhmans alone; it was then extended to all the twice-born, and finally all restrictions were removed, and admission into the ranks of the ascetics was accorded to men of every position and degree.

Cf. Rāmāyaṇa, *Uttara Kāṇḍa*, 74. 9 ff., quoted in Muir, *Orig. Sanskr. Texts*[2], i. 119 f.: 'Formerly in the *kṛta* age Brāhmans alone practised *tapas*; none who was not a Brāhman did so in that enlightened age . . . then came the *tretā* age, . . . in which the Kṣatriyas were born, distinguished still by their former *tapas* . . . Those Brāhmans and Kṣatriyas who lived in the *tretā* practised *tapas*, and the rest of mankind obedience. . . . In the *dvāpara* age *tapas* entered into the Vaiśyas. Thus in the course of three ages it entered into three castes; and in the three ages righteousness (*dharma*) was established in three castes. But the Śūdra does not attain to righteousness through the (three) ages . . . such observance will belong to the future race of Śūdras in the *kali* age, but is unrighteous in the extreme if practised by that caste in the *dvāpara*.' Cf. Manu, i. 86: 'In the *kṛta* age the chief [virtue] is declared to be *tapas*.'

It is evident, however, with what reluctance the privileges and powers of the ascetic life were extended to Śūdras and low-caste men. At the present time there is no distinction or barrier; any one may become an ascetic, and the vows are not necessarily lifelong. Some sects, however, still restrict membership to Brāhmans, or at least to men of the three higher castes.

Moreover, the distinction between the last two *āśramas*, that of the *vānaprastha*, the anchorite in the forest, corresponding to the class of the ὑλόβιοι

* See J. Muir, *Original Sanskrit Texts*[2], i. 388 ff., who quotes the story in a twofold form from the *Mahābhārata* (*Ādiparvan*, 6638 ff.), and from the *Rāmāyaṇa* (*Bālakāṇḍa*, 51–65); cf. the narrative of Nahuṣa, who by *tapas* won for himself the rank of Indra (*Mahābh.*, *Ādip.* 3151; Muir, *op. cit.* p. 307 ff.)

of Megasthenes (see above, p. 88[a]), and that of the true *sannyāsin*, the homeless wanderer, was never very clearly drawn even in theory, and was in practice entirely disregarded. Ascetic habits at least were common to both; and the dweller in the forest-hermitage, no less than the man who had 'cast off' possessions and earthly ties in favour of a vagrant life through the cities and country, endeavoured by means of *tapas* to break the fetters which bound him to an earthly existence, and to secure final rest and bliss.

(1) *Clothing and habits.*—Numerous also as were, and are, the sects of ascetics, varying in the details of costume and habit, they all possess certain broad characteristic features in common, and to the eye of the comparative stranger present a similar and specific appearance by which their profession may be recognized. All *sādhus* carry a begging-bowl, which in its simplest form consists of a hollowed-out coconut or gourd, but is sometimes of brass, figured or otherwise ornamented, and furnished with a lid or handle; a water-pot also, and usually a staff. Theoretically, and as individuals, they are without worldly possessions, but the monasteries in which many of them take up their abode during the rainy season, and for longer or shorter intervals, are often richly endowed. Such monasteries, which are very numerous all over India, owe their existence to the liberality of pious founders, and have at different times been the recipients of gifts of money or land, whereby merit has accrued to the donors, and the religious houses have in many instances become endowed with great revenues. They are not, however, in most cases, places of permanent residence, but their inmates wander through the country as *sādhus*, or ascetics, living on the alms of the people. The robes of the ascetic are ordinarily salmon-coloured, but sometimes other colours are met with, according to the sect or order to which they belong; many also go practically naked. On their bodies they rub ashes—a practice which is supposed to have been originally intended to protect the skin against the insect plagues of India, or as a defence against the hosts of the demons.* The forehead is marked with the *tilaka*, the variously shaped sign or symbol, made with coloured earths, indicating their sect or the god to whose service they have consecrated themselves; and the hair hangs down from the head, long and matted, but in other cases is formed into a rough coil at the top, or is entirely shaved off, the head being left bald. They sleep on the ground, and once or twice in the day go round to collect food and alms, for which they must not ask, but contentedly receive what is given. According to the stated rule, they must not approach a house to beg until the regular meal-time is past; what remains over is the portion of the mendicant.

Other objects usually found in the possession of a *sādhu* are a rosary, the material of which and the number of the beads vary with the different sects. Śaivite rosaries are composed of the berries of the *rudrāksha* tree (*Eleocarpus ganitrus*), thirty-two or sixty-four in number; sometimes, however, such ascetics wear strings of human teeth (*dantamālā*) or the skin of a snake round their neck. Vaiṣnavite ascetics carry a rosary of a hundred and eight beads of *tulasī* wood, the holy basil (*Ocymum sanctum*), or occasionally, though it is said rarely, of the seeds of the sacred lotus. The purpose of the rosary is for use in the recitation of prayers, or to enable the devotee to repeat the name of his god a definite number of times without error.† In all probability the Christian use of the rosary was derived ultimately from India. Many *sādhus* will also be found with fire-tongs, the iron of which is supposed to be a protection against evil spirits, and, as they are inveterate smokers of bhang, with a pestle and mortar, and a pipe, which are brought into constant use. Many of them carry on their person small idols, or sacred objects, or talismans as the *liṅgam* or *śālagrāma*, relics also from the places of pilgrimage they have visited, and seals or certificates issued by the priests in charge. They are supposed to spend their lives in meditation, withdrawn from the thoughts and interests of the world. For a similar reason, because he is believed to be in *samādhi*, 'profound trance,' a state of intimate and untroubled communion with the Divine, the body of a *sannyāsin* is under ordinary circumstances buried, not burned; he is in reality not dead, and may revive at pleasure to a consciousness of external things.

(2) *Mortifications.*—The distresses and self-mortifications to which the Hindu ascetic submits himself would be almost incredible if they were not certified by the accounts of many eye-witnesses from the earliest times to the present day, and by the well-known capacity of the Eastern to endure with stoicism hardship and pain that would be intolerable or fatal to a European. Fully to enumerate and describe the various kinds of self-torture invented and practised by *sādhus* would be impracticable. Among the more usual and prominent which attract attention is the so-called 'arrow' or 'spike-bed' (*śaraśayyā, kaṇṭakaśayyā*), a flat board studded with iron nails or spikes, on which the ascetic sits or lies at full length, and which he is supposed never to leave night or day. The practice is in imitation of the sufferings of Bhīṣma, the leader of the Kurus and chief antagonist of Arjuna in the *Mahābhārata*. His body was pierced in the fight by Arjuna with so many arrows that, falling, it did not touch the ground, and Bhīṣma lay thus supported for forty-eight days and nights before his death, during which time he discoursed on high topics before the assembled armies.* A Brāhman ascetic at Benares is said to have used one of these couches, on which he lay naked, for thirty-five years.† Another common form of self-torture is to raise one or both arms above the head, and to hold them there until stiff and atrophied, when they cannot be drawn down again (*ūrdhvabāhu*). A man who has both arms thus extended is unable even to feed himself, and is dependent in everything on the help of others. As a further penance the hand is sometimes held closed till the nails grow through the palm. The *pañcha-tapāṁsi* penance consists in enduring the heat of four fires lighted around, with the sun overhead as a fifth; sometimes five artificial fires are employed. Difficult and distressing postures of various kinds are frequent modes of self-mortification, which are supposed to distract the thoughts from external objects (see art. YOGA), for example, standing on one foot for protracted periods (*eka-pāda*), measuring the length on the ground (*aṣṭāṅga*), and thus making slow and painful progress from one place of pilgrimage to another, or round a sacred shrine. Most *sādhus* undertake long and toilsome journeys to visit the holy places of their religion, as Badarīnāth in Garhwāl, or the sacred mountain Kailāsa;‡ and on the way, or at the temples themselves, suffer the greatest hardships from want and cold. Many perish by the way from these causes and from the attacks of wild beasts. Other *sādhus* undertake prolonged fastings, or place themselves under vows

[a] W. Crooke, *Popular Religion and Folk-Lore of Northern India*, i. 29 f.

† Monier Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hinduism*[4], p. 67 f.

The number of the beads is said to vary, or not to be very strictly observed; see J. C. Oman, *Mystics, Ascetics, and Saints of India*, 1903, p. 39 f. and note.

* *Mahābh.* bk. viii.

† Monier Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hinduism*[4], p. 560 ff.

‡ See E. S. Oakley, *Holy Himālaya*, Edin. and London, 1905.

of silence for years. Some display their powers by chewing live coals, or their endurance by thrusting knives or skewers into their flesh, treading on beds of glowing ashes, sitting immersed to the neck in water, allowing themselves to be buried alive, or hung with the head downwards (*ūrdhvamukhi*). Tricks of self-hypnotism of a most remarkable character have been without doubt known to and practised by Indian ascetics for centuries.*

(3) *Ascetic sects.*—Hindu *sādhus* are of various types and sects, between which to the unaccustomed eye there appears to be little difference. The greater number are Śaivites, but some belong to Vaiṣnavite forms of Hinduism. Śiva, the narrative of whose austerities is found chiefly in the *Śiva*, *Skanda*, and *Liṅga Purāṇas*, is the chief patron god of ascetics. In this character he is represented as *digambara*, 'sky-clad,' with hair unkempt and his body smeared with ashes, sometimes sitting under a snake canopy. While practising austerities his home was in the remote fastnesses of the Himālaya range, where accordingly some of the most sacred places of Śaivite pilgrimage are to be found. Most of the great teachers or reformers of Hinduism founded mendicant orders, and established monasteries, which are centres and homes of ascetic life. There are sects that trace their origin to Śaṅkarāchārya, Kabīr, Rāmānuja, Rāmānanda, etc. The number of them is great, and only a few of the more prominent and important can here find mention.†

There are seven chief sects of Śaivite ascetics as follows:—(1) *Daṇḍin*, (2) *Sannyāsin*, (3) *Brahmachārin*, (4) *Paramahaṁsa*, (5) *Liṅgait* or *Liṅgayat*, (6) *Aghorin*, (7) *Yogin*. The first four are mendicant orders founded by Śaṅkarāchārya, the great Brāhman teacher and expositor of the 7th or 8th cent. of our era. The *Liṅgaits*, or *Liṅgayats*, are properly Śāktas, who worship the *liṅgam*, or phallus, and whose founder is said to have been a Brāhman named Basava, or Basappa, of Kalyāna, and to have lived in the Deccan about the beginning of the 12th century. Their itinerant monks (*jaṅgamas*) are to be found all over India (see art. LIṄGAYAT).

The subdivisions of the *Daṇḍins* and *Sannyāsins* appear to be uncertain in their limits,‡ and perhaps some of the sub-orders coincide, and are practically the same. There are said, however, to be ten classes of *Daṇḍins*, whence they are known as *Daśnāmī* ('ten-named') *Daṇḍins*, which derive their titles from ten disciples of Śaṅkara. The general name has been given to them from the *daṇḍa*, or staff, which every *Daṇḍin* carries, and which they are said to worship; the various sub-orders have different kinds of staves. Membership of the sect is confined to Brāhmans, and they are especially numerous in Benares. They wear salmon-coloured clothes, and beg only from the houses of Brāhmans. Initiation into the order is accompanied by a kind of baptism, with fasting; the sacred thread is also taken off at this time and burned, and together with the communication of the sacred *mantram*, and the new name of the sub-order to which the candidate is to belong, there is enforced upon him the observance of chastity and poverty. *Daṇḍins* avoid the use of fire, and bury their dead or cast them into a sacred stream § (see art. DAṆḌIN). Seven classes of *Sannyāsins* are enumerated by Oman, together with three which are said to belong more properly to the *Daṇḍin* orders. The list is as follows:—Giri, Puri, Bhārti, Ban, Auran (Aranya), Parvat, Sagar; Tirath, Ashram, Sarasvatī. Membership of the sect is open to all, without distinction of caste; twice-born men lay aside the thread, and all join at meals. They usually wear a necklace of *rudrāksha* berries, and some, in place of the ordinary salmon-coloured robes, carry the skin of a tiger. In their food, which they accept from any Hindu, they avoid meat and do not drink spirits, but are great smokers of *ganja* (*guñjā*), or hemp. At initiation the *guru* communicates to the novice his new name and the *mantram* of his order, and he is then expected to serve the *guru* for a time, receiving instruction from him. He has to bathe daily, and to perform daily worship with contemplation of the image of Śiva; he must not sleep on a couch or during the day-time, or converse with women, and must always go on foot, etc. At death the body is buried in a sitting posture, facing east or north-east, and no *śrāddha* ceremonies are performed, since he is supposed to have quitted this life when he entered the order* (see art. SANNYĀSIN).

The remaining sects are of less importance. *Brahmachārin*, the name given in the old literature to a student of the Veda during his period of pupilage in the first *āśrama*, has been appropriated to a subordinate class of ascetics, who are said usually to act as servants to *Sannyāsins* or *Paramahaṁsas* (see art. ĀŚRAMA). The *Paramahaṁsas* are the highest order, and have an *Upaniṣad* of their own, the *Paramahaṁsopaniṣad*. They lay claim to greater sanctity, and profess to observe stricter rules of conduct than others. Before admission to the rank of *Paramahaṁsa*, a probation of some years, usually not less than twelve, must be undergone. In token of absolute renunciation of the world, some observe a strict vow of silence, profess to abstain entirely from food, or dispense with all clothing. Some are unquestionably men of sincere piety, and devote themselves to study and good works. The *Paramahaṁsa* believes that he has already attained to union with the Divine, or rather has learned to know himself as identical with *Brahman*—a creed not conducive to humility or modesty. The title is said to be derived from a mythical bird, which possesses the faculty of separating water from milk; hence in a metaphorical sense is able to distinguish falsehood from truth. The word *haṁsa* ordinarily signifies a goose; so that the title was perhaps originally given to members of the sect in derision.†

The *Aghorins* or *Aghorapanthins* are *sādhus* who have acquired a strange and repulsive appetite for the flesh of corpses, and are said to steal dead bodies from the graveyards, and drag them from the rivers for purposes of food. There are probably few, if any, of these ascetics now left in India, but in times past they were more numerous, and their habits have been noted from a very early date. The home of the chief of the sect is said to be at Siddhapur, in North Kanara (see art. AGHORĪ).

Yogin is a general term for an ascetic who is endeavouring by restraint and discipline of the body to secure the union of the soul with the Supreme (see art. YOGA). Such ascetics are usually mystics and self-hypnotists, who claim to be possessed of miraculous powers, and in some instances undoubtedly perform marvellous feats. As a sect they trace their origin to Gorakhnāth, a

* J. C. Oman, *op. cit.* chs. iii. iv. and vi.; Monier Williams, *Indian Wisdom*[3], p. 104 ff.

† The list and details that follow are derived in the main from J. C. Oman's important work; see also separate articles. There are, of course, in India many men who live ascetic lives, but who are not Hindus, such as the Muhammadan faqīrs in the north, and the wandering Jain monks (see artt. MUHAMMADANISM and JAINISM).

‡ See Oman, *op. cit.* p. 153.

§ Monier Williams, *op. cit.* p. 87

* See J. A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*[3], Eng. tr., Oxford, 1906, ch. xxxvi. p. 538 ff., and for an account of the initiation of a *sannyāsin*, *ib.* p. 523 ff.

† Monier Williams, *op. cit.* p. 87; Max Müller, *Ramakrishna*, London, 1905.

disciple of Mahendranāth, of whom little or nothing is known, even the period at which he lived being uncertain. *Yogins* worship Śiva, especially in the form of Bhairon or Bhairava (*q.v.*), the village god identified with Śiva, whose sacred animal is the dog; and they pay especial veneration to the nāths (*nātha*), or guardian spirits of the Himālayan peaks, and to the eighty-four *Siddhas*, or 'perfect' ones, whose practice of the *yoga* has reached perfection, some of whom are believed to be still living. They disregard caste, wear sacred rosaries of *rudrāksha* berries, and allow themselves the utmost freedom in the matter of food and drink. There are several sub-orders, as Kanphatas, Augars, distinguished by peculiarities of dress or ornamentation.*

The ascetic sects of the Vaiṣṇavites have perhaps hardly so much right to the name of ascetics. They are rather wandering monks, whose abstinence is displayed almost entirely in the matter of food and drink. Some of them practise the rules of *yoga*, and with few exceptions all refrain from partaking of flesh or spirits. Viṣṇu is worshipped by them under the form either of Rāma or of Kṛṣṇa, with whom they usually associate their wives Sītā or Rādhā. The list of the sects is as follows, omitting the adherents of Vallabhāchārya, whose principles are the reverse of ascetic:—

Name.	Reputed Founder.
Śrī Vaiṣṇava.	Rāmānuja.
Rāmānandin.	Rāmānanda.
Mādhava.	Mādhavāchārya.
Chaitanyite.	Chaitanya.
Kabīr Panthin.	Kabīr.†

The *Śrī Vaiṣṇavas*, so called because they unite the worship of Śrī or Lakṣmī, the wife of Viṣṇu, with that of Viṣṇu himself, retain the sacred thread, wear reddish-coloured robes, and carry strings of *tulasī* beads or of the seeds of the lotus. In addition to the *tilaka*, or sect-mark, on the forehead, they are often stamped or branded on the body with sacred marks emblematic of the god or his wife. They are found chiefly in the south of India, where the great monasteries of the sect are established.‡

The *Rāmānandins* are followers of Rāmānanda, the disciple of Rāmānuja. His work lay rather in the north of India, and the various types of ascetics who belong to this order are numerous in most of the northern districts of the peninsula. The chief subdivision is that of the *Bairāgins* (*q.v.*) or *Vairāgins*—a title which indicates one who is free from worldly passion or desire, and is often applied generally to any Vaiṣṇavite mendicant or devotee. The *Vairāgins* proper disregard caste distinctions, though they wear the thread, eschew meat and spirits, and worship Hanuman, the monkey-god, as well as Rāma and his brothers, and Sītā, and they go through an elaborate daily routine of bathing, etc., including the practice of *yoga*; frequently also they are branded upon the arm with the sacred symbols of Viṣṇu.§ Other sub-sects of Rāmānandins are Acharins, Khakins, Sannyāsins, the last-named being distinguishable from the Śaivite ascetics of the name by the use of the sacred thread. They wear robes of different colours, and the Khakins at least usually dispense altogether with clothing. All Rāmānandins are pledged to vows of celibacy (see art. Ramananda, Rāmānandin).

The *Mādhavas*, or *Mādhvas*, are almost entirely confined to the south of India. They live celibate lives, and admit all castes to the order. Their one garment is orange-coloured, and on breast and arms they bear the marks of Viṣṇu, and shave the head, in this last respect being distinguished from the true Vairāgins, who leave a small tuft of hair on the crown (see art. Madhvas).

The *Chaitanyites* are in some respects the most liberal in thought, and in mode of life most free and unrestrained of all Vaiṣnavite ascetics. They admit into the order men and women from all, even the lowest, castes, and with few exceptions do not profess or practise celibacy. The sect is most widely spread in Bengal, of which district the founder was a native. They wear white, or sometimes yellow garments, abstain from meat and spirits, and carry the usual *tulasī* rosary and necklace. There are several subdivisions, the moral reputation of some of which does not stand high (see artt. Bengal, Chaitanya).

The *Kabīr Panthins* can hardly be said to affect asceticism in any real sense of the term. They wear no distinctive dress, carry the usual necklace and beads, and on their foreheads the distinctive mark of Viṣnu. The wandering monks of the order are numerous in northern and central India, and bear a high character for simplicity and purity of life.*

The remaining orders of *sādhus* have originated among the Sikhs. The three most important are known as *Akālin*, *Nirmālin*, and *Udāsin*. There are others less numerous and distinctive. In general the dress of the Sikh *sādhu* is more complete than that of the ascetics of other, or at least of Śaivite orders; and he bears less prominent and obtrusive marks of his ascetic profession. The *Akālins*, or *Nihangs*, are the militant monks of the Sikh faith. They dress in blue garments, and travel over the country fully armed, on horseback or riding on camels, and their requests for alms are said to be preferred with a tone and manner that secures instant compliance (see art. Akālīs). The *Nirmālins* are for the most part quiet and inoffensive students of the sacred books, whose only outward marks of their *sādhu* profession are their reddish-yellow garments and long hair (see art. Nirmālin). The *Udāsins* dress in salmon-coloured robes, with a peculiar pointed cap, and a black cord round the neck; and, in addition to the water-pot, usually a gourd, carry a bag over the shoulder, and a small black mat or carpet, which they spread on the ground when they rest. Some Udāsins shave the head, while others allow the hair to grow; all avoid the use of meat or spirits, and do not smoke, and are pledged to poverty and continence† (see art. Udāsin).

There have also been at all times a few *sādhvīs*, or female ascetics, in India, who have emulated their more numerous male companions in their devotion and the rigour of their ascetic practices. The publicity, however, which the profession of sādhuism entails is an obstacle to its frequent adoption by Indian women, and any general observance by them of ascetic habits or vows would be opposed to the sentiments and prejudices of the Hindus themselves. *Sādhvīs* are usually widows, who have less to lose in the adoption of a roving life; and in most instances, though not always, are of low caste. It would seem also that generally, although again not without exceptions, the *sādhvī* is moved to enter upon this manner of life by the desire to cast in her lot with father or other male relative or friend; and solitude therefore rarely forms part of the voluntary penance which she undergoes. The case is recorded,

* Oman, *op. cit.* p. 184 ff. † *Ib.* p. 152.
‡ See G. A. Grierson in *JRAS*, 1903, p. 443 f., 1907, p. 817 ff., and art. Rāmānuja.
§ Oman, *op. cit.* p. 188 ff.

* See G. A. Westcott, *Kabīr and the Kabir Panth*, Cawnpore, 1907; G. A. Grierson, in *Bible in the World*, 1908 pp. 247 ff., 269 ff.; and art. Kabīr Panthi.
† See Oman, *op. cit.* ch. viii.

however, of a Hindu widow of good family, who lived as a solitary recluse in an underground cell near Benares for thirty-eight years, devoting herself to study and the practice of *yoga*, reverenced by all the people, and receiving visitors from the great distances to which her fame had spread.*

Asceticism, and the habits and practices associated with it, have been adopted in several instances in India by Christian missionaries, with the purpose and hope of thereby commending their teaching to the people among whom their lives were spent. It is doubtful how far the attempt has ever been really successful. With the spirit that counselled and animated such resolutions, moving men to self-renunciation and the abandonment of all for the sake of duty, and to promote the unselfish end which they had in view, all will feel sympathy. In the regard of every Hindu also the ascetic ideal is a noble one, and the man who endeavours to put it into practice is worthy of all honour. It would seem, however, that the utmost sacrifice which it is in the power of a European, either by constitution or circumstances, to make cannot approach the abnegation or extreme rigour of self-mortification of the ordinary Indian *sādhu*; and therefore to the Indian his mode of living will probably appear to be a pale imitation, not wholly sincere, and immeasurably below the true ideal. It will excite his wonder, but in no degree move him to respect, while the motive that prompts the adoption of such a life will be entirely beyond his comprehension. There have been native Indians also, Christian *sādhus*, who have wandered through the country in ascetic garb, and followed the ascetic rule of preaching and teaching by the way. Their action, so far as it is possible to ascertain, has greatly increased and widened their influence for good, and has appeared entirely commendable to their fellow-countrymen.†

4. Religious and ethical value of 'tapas.'—There is probably no country in which asceticism has been so widely and constantly practised, or in which its ideals have been held in such high regard, as India. The injunctions of their sacred books, and the examples of their sages, have kept before the mind of the people the thought that renunciation of the world, with rejection of its pleasures and pursuits, is the supreme good. And although the motive of the abnegation and bodily self-mortification of the Indian *sādhu* was undoubtedly in the ultimate analysis selfish‡—he abandoned the world that he might gain something better for himself—yet his life and action were an ever-present reminder to the people that the good of this world is not the good which is most worth having; and his example revived in them the longing, which the pressure of worldly cares and ambitions might well have deadened or crushed, for a higher experience of life than was suggested by the hard material facts of the present. The hand that pointed upwards and onwards might indeed be prompted by no generous or altruistic spirit. Nevertheless it did suggest and invite to upward striving. And there can hardly be any doubt that, in spite of its obvious drawbacks and limitations, sādhuism has been on the whole a good to India, and a force that has made for righteousness in the broadest use of the word.

That ideal commanded the assent and enthusiastic goodwill of the people at large. They were not blind to the defects and dangers of an ascetic life, the opportunities it afforded for imposture, the habits of idleness and the love of ease which it promoted. While, however, they jested at the *sādhu*, they respected his profession and wished themselves to be like him. It was his better qualities that they revered, and the ideal which he represented. His ignorances and littlenesses they tolerated or laughed at, while they allowed his claim to a holiness greater than any to which they, pre-occupied with mundane affairs, could aspire. That there were pretenders and impostors among the ever-moving crowd of ascetics, men to whom godliness was a way of gain, the keen instinct of the people always recognized. These, however, were not true *sādhus*, but were masquerading in a borrowed garb to which they had no right; and their presence hardly lessened the respect in which the profession was held, or weakened the influence which its better members wielded. It was and remained good that an ideal of purity, self-restraint, and indifference to pleasure and wealth should be constantly exhibited in concrete form before the eyes of the people.

On the other hand, the existence of so large a number of able-bodied men, living in idleness, cannot have been other, to our Western modes of thinking at least, than a burden to the commonwealth. No *sādhu* ever did any work. He passed his time in the most complete and absolute idleness, as far as the labour of the hands was concerned; and from a social or communistic point of view, his life was entirely unproductive. It must be remembered, however, that the burden was very widely distributed, from Cape Comorin to the utmost Himālayas; and that in any given case the demand made by the individual *sādhu* upon the people among whom he sojourned was very slight. The burden was probably little felt, much less than would have been the case in the more artificial and closer-knit States of the West. It is true, nevertheless, that, on the premisses of Western logic and argument, the loss of the remunerative labour of so great an army of potential workers cannot have been other than hurtful to the general prosperity of the land.

Sādhuism also, both by its principles and by its practice, struck a heavy blow at the spirit of caste. To the true *sādhu* all things were indifferent, and therefore the distinctions and jealousies of caste were nothing to him. Most of the orders acted up to this belief, although a few refused admission to membership to any but Brāhmans, and declined to receive food from men of a lower caste. Their influence, therefore, on the whole was democratic and levelling; they stood for brotherhood and equality as against caste assumption and pride. And mingling with the people as they did on their incessant journeyings, the conceptions and theories which they thus represented, though they never availed to break the Brāhman yoke, must have struck deep root, and given rise to many searchings of heart.

There is, however, at the present day a new spirit brooding over the land, inimical to sādhuism and the ideals which it represents and fosters. Western activities, and the conceptions of duty and aim which the West has introduced, and which are acting as a strong ferment in the life and society of India, must in the long run be fatal to the ascetic, to the world-renouncing spirit. English education, if there were nothing else, and the strenuous life which it inculcates, will render impossible the meditative existence of the *sādhu*—the man who in the world is not of it. The end is not yet; for perhaps a considerable time to come the professed ascetic in India will perform his pilgrimages by rail, will utilize the electric light and the other appliances and conveniences of

* Oman, *op. cit.* p. 244 ff.

† For a recent example of Indian Christian *sādhus*, see *Harvest Field*, 1906, p. 300 f.

‡ Cf. Deussen, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, p. 364 f.; the worth of *tapas* to the Indian was primarily its worth to himself; the external results, its worth for others, were of comparatively little account

civilization, and will remain what he is, unmoved and unchanged. Eventually, however, and inevitably the forces of the new era will be too strong for him. It is hardly possible that the *sādhu* should accommodate himself to an age that prizes merchandise and gold above all. He must vanish before the pressure of modern forces and strange ideas. But with him will go one of the most picturesque if not the most lovable figures that Indian history or life has to show. And it is permissible to doubt whether the new spirit and influence that is driving him from the world's stage will be on the whole more conducive to India's real welfare and happiness than his has been throughout the long centuries.

LITERATURE.—The more important works have been quoted in the course of the article. The most complete description in English of ascetics and their manner of life is to be found in J. C. Oman, *Mystics, Ascetics, and Saints of India*, Lond. 1903, and the same author's *Cults, Customs, and Superstitions of India*[2], Lond. 1908, pt. i. ch. 1, and pt. iii. ch. 4. E. S. Oakley, *Holy Himālaya*, Lond. 1905, describes the sacred places of pilgrimage in Kumāun and Garhwāl; and an interesting description of a visit to the *sādhus* of Rishi Kesh is given by T. L. Pennell in *Church Miss. Intelligencer*, 1905, p. 597 ff. Add F. Max Müller, *Rāmakrishṇa, His Life and Sayings*, new impression, Lond. 1905; Monier Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hinduism*[4], Lond. 1891, with a portrait and description of a high-caste Brāhman *sannyāsin*, formerly prime minister of Bhaunagar, and a C.S.I.; W. Crooke, *PR*, Lond. 1896; J. Jolly, 'Recht und Sitte' in *GIAP*, Strassburg, 1896, p. 150 f.; P. Deussen, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, Eng. tr., Edin. 1906, pp. 65 ff., 373 ff., *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, i. 3, Leipzig, 1908, and *Das Yogasystem*, p. 543 ff., cf. pp. 94 f., 98 f.; artt. ĀŚRAMA, YOGA.

A. S. GEDEN.

ASCETICISM (Japanese). — The asceticism found in Japan after the introduction of Buddhism is only a foreign importation with which we are not concerned here (see ASCETICISM [Buddhist]). What we must give our attention to is the only original form of Japanese asceticism, that is to say, the asceticism of primitive Shinto as it is met with in the most ancient documents.

A Chinese traveller, describing the Japanese of the early centuries of our era, mentions this interesting custom: 'They appoint a man whom they call an "abstainer." He is not allowed to comb his hair, to wash, to eat flesh, or to approach women. When they are fortunate, they make him presents; but if they are ill or meet with disaster, they set it down to the abstainer's failure to keep his vows, and unite to put him to death' (W. G. Aston, 'Early Japanese History,' in the *TASJ* vol. xvi. pt. 1, p. 55). All the features of this description—carelessness with regard to the cleanliness of the hair and the body, abstinence from certain foods, and continence—correspond exactly with what we know of the usual condition of the 'god-men' who are found among so many primitive peoples, and who, when illness or any other calamity occurs, are held to be responsible, and are deposed, punished, or killed (see J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], *passim*). Analogous conceptions are also known to exist in China, where the Emperor is held responsible for drought; and in Korea, where, in the event of a bad harvest, the ancient kings were deposed or put to death.

If we turn now to the most ancient Japanese book, the *Kojiki* (A.D. 712), we shall not find this primitive custom mentioned; but we may see there at least an idea of abstinence which appears to be the continuation of it. This idea is expressed by the word *imi*, the root of the verb *imu*, which, in its original meaning, signifies 'to shun.' In one passage the reference is to a sacred weaving-hall (*imi-hataya*), where the Sun-goddess presides at the making of the garments of the gods. Here *imi* has only the secondary sense of 'sacred,' which, however, is closely related to its original meaning. In another passage we have an account of the mythical origin of the *Imibe no obito*, that is to say, the chiefs of the *Imibe* (or *Imbe*), a hereditary corporation of abstaining priests, who claimed descent from the god Futo-dama ('Great Jewel' or, rather, 'Great Gift,' 'Great Offering'). Again, in a third passage, relative to the troubles which followed the death of the first legendary Emperor, Jimmu, we are told that one of his sons, renouncing his claim to the succession, became an 'abstainer' (see *Kojiki*, ed. with notes by Motoöri, 1789–1822, vols. 8, 15, 20; or the Eng. tr. by B. H. Chamberlain, sec. 15, 33, 53, pp. 62, 134, 186 of the re-issue of 1906).

The *Nihongi*, which appeared only eight years later, that is, in A.D. 720, contains passages corresponding to the first two passages of the *Kojiki*; but, under the influence of Chinese ideas, it substitutes for the 'abstainer' of the third passage a single priest 'of the gods of Heaven and Earth' (*Nihongi*, ed. Shukai, vols. 1 and 4, or the Eng. tr. by W. G. Aston, 1896, pp. 41, 42–47, 140).

We shall now examine the documents relating to worship, especially the old rituals in which the *Imibe* appear (*Engishiki*, A.D. 927, ed. Dehabon, vol. 8, *norito* 1, 8, 14), to see more clearly what their 'abstinence' consisted in. The special function of the *Imibe* was to prepare the offerings for the gods, 'avoiding' all impurity in doing so. This is what is given in exact terms in the last lines of the first ritual, relating to the *Toshigohi no matsuri*, or 'Festival for the Harvest,' celebrated at the time of sowing, and also at the end of the fourteenth ritual, recited at the *Ohonihe no matsuri*, or 'Festival of the Great Offering of Food,' which was a festival of first-fruits (*Nihi-name*, 'New-tasting'), more solemn, and celebrated only at the accession of the Emperors. On the other hand, in the eighth ritual, concerning the festival of the *Ohotono Hogahi*, or 'Luck-wishing of the Great Palace,' we are told that it was the *Imibe* who, with a sacred (*imi*) axe, set to work on the wood destined for the construction of this palace, and who, with a sacred (*imi*) mattock, dug out its foundations. On this occasion they also prepared the offerings, brought the Imperial insignia into the great hall, hung up the magic stones in various places (the audience-hall, the Emperor's bathroom and privy), and in conclusion pronounced the ritual. The recitation of the ritual (No. 9) for the *Mikado matsuri*, or 'Festival of the Sublime Gates,' was also entrusted to them. In short, the main idea underlying these various functions is that of material purity, which the *Imibe* had to ensure by avoiding with great care everything that might cause defilement.

Apart from the *Imibe*, abstinence was practised also by certain people and on certain occasions. As a general custom, to prepare himself for a religious festival, the officiating priest had to remain indoors (*i-gomori*), to avoid speaking and making a noise, to eat no food except that cooked on a pure fire (*imu-bi*), in short, to contrive to escape every possible cause of uncleanness. The duration of this abstinence varied, too, with the importance of the festivals: a month for festivals of the first class, three days for festivals of the second class, and one day for festivals of the third class. During the month preceding the *Ohonihe*, the most important festival of ancient Shinto, a lesser abstinence (*ara-imi*) was observed, and during the last three days a greater abstinence (*ma-imi*). The Emperor himself, having to take part personally in the ceremony, had to conform to this rule. When the Emperor Yuriaku desired to see the god of Mount Mimoro without having practised abstinence previous to presenting himself before him, he was confronted by the apparition of a dreadful serpent, which made him rush, terror-stricken, into the interior of his palace for

safety (*Nihongi*, which assigns the event to A.D. 463). Certain categories of priests had to observe special forms of abstinence. Some lower priests, the *Negi* (from *negafu*, 'to pray'), were called *imi-bi* in some old provinces, because of the particular care which they had to take to avoid all uncleanness with respect to fire. Similarly, the priestesses had to be virgins. This rule of continence was limited, however, to the time of their priesthood, and did not prevent their marrying afterwards. The *Saiwō*, a princess of the Imperial blood consecrated to the worship of the Sun-goddess, prepared herself for this office for a long time before. For three years, on the first day of each month, she had to repair to a sacred hall (*imi-dono*), where she worshipped towards the great temple of Ise. This was the 'three years' abstinence' (*mi-tose no mono-imi*). The *Kamu no Ko*, or 'god-children,' young daughters of the nobility attached to the principal temples to perform there the sacred dance (*kagura*), and to cook the food for the offerings, were called also *mono-imi*, that is to say, 'abstainers from things' ('impure' being understood). Lastly, from a passage of the *Hitachi Fudoki* we gather that a domestic *Nihinome* existed apart from the official festival, and that on this occasion abstinence was observed by all the family. But in every case abstinence was associated with the idea of ritual purity. The important thing was to avoid impurities (*tsumi*) of every kind, that is to say, everything that might be displeasing to the gods, *e.g.* uncleanness (to begin with personal cleanliness: no one could take part in a religious ceremony without first having washed and put on clean clothes), crimes condemned from the ritualistic point of view (*e.g.* incest), and lastly, calamities (such as the bite of serpents), because these were then regarded as a Divine punishment for some unknown offence. But, on the other hand, certain things forbidden to the ascetics of the primitive period, such as eating meat, were not considered to be contrary to this Shinto conception of abstinence.

The psychological evolution of Japanese asceticism can be clearly followed in this series of documents taken in their chronological order. In the first centuries of the Christian era we have the asceticism of primitive peoples, characterized chiefly by its strict abstinence and continence, and by carelessness with regard to personal cleanliness. In the 8th cent. we can scarcely discover any trace of an ascetic properly so called (cf. the passage from *Kojiki* which the *Nihongi* thought it necessary to correct). On the other hand, there is mentioned as a hereditary priesthood, already well established, this corporate body of the *Imibe* which we see afterwards in operation in the *Engishiki* in the 10th cent., and which represents the most typical case of the abstinence practised also by many other people in all circumstances connected with religious rites. But, under this new form which so quickly succeeded the preceding one, Japanese asceticism no longer demanded abstinence properly so called, or even continence, except as an immediate preparation for certain festivals or as a temporary condition for certain functions; and, above all, far from regarding filth as a virtue, it required absolute cleanliness. Thus the idea of religious purity had undergone a complete transformation; and, in conformity with this instinct for cleanness which already manifested itself as one of the distinctive features of the national character, physical cleanliness became itself the condition of moral and ritualistic purity.

MICHEL REVON.

ASCETICISM (Jewish).—1. Pre-exilic customs.—Jewish piety, consisting originally of faith and trust in a covenant God, found no room for asceticism as a self-imposed discipline of the soul. Indeed, the terms of the bi-lateral covenant between Jahweh and Israel rendered asceticism impossible. For, according to the solemn transaction on Sinai, Israel became Jahweh's own people in a special manner, pledged henceforth to acknowledge Jahweh as their only God, and to obey His will as revealed to them by Divinely-inspired legislators and prophets. Jahweh in return solemnly promised to remain Israel's God. Moderate prosperity was therefore regarded as His smile on His land and people. In the midst of opulence it was possible 'to walk with Jahweh.' No mortification of the flesh or renunciation of the world was necessary to arrive at the highest stage of Jahweh-pleasing holiness. And so we find that pre-exilic customs and laws were adverse to asceticism, *e.g.* mutilation of the body was forbidden (Lv 19^{28}, Dt 14^{1} 23^{1}), fasting was only an accompaniment of prayer and confession of sin, and was therefore an act of humiliation before God, and not a self-inflicted chastisement, and, except on the Day of Atonement, was left to the free will of the faithful (1 S 7^{6}, Ps 35^{13}, Dn 9^{3}, Ezr 8^{23}, Jer 36^{9}).

2. Post-exilic legalism.—The re-organization of the community after the Exile laid the foundation of that rigid, torpid legalism from which Judaism has not yet recovered. The leaders of the nation, in their efforts to re-establish the theocracy and to guard it against internal and external foes, had recourse to the rigour of the Mosaic Law. They had already learned in Babylon that by attachment to ancestral customs they could remain the people of Jahweh outside Palestine and without a sacrificial cult. On their return, the miserable condition of the nation and the scanty materials at their disposal for re-building the State rendered adherence to the Law their only weapon in the struggle for self-preservation. The theocracy was gradually being converted into a nomocracy. 'Let it be done according to the law' (Ezr 10^{3}) became henceforth the norm of Judaism. No longer the prophet with fresh messages from Jahweh, but the expounder of the Law became the spiritual guide. Fresh cases for which the Law had made no provision were decided by an artificial deduction from the written, or by an appeal to the traditions or unwritten Law. If the name 'Pharisee' as the designation of a party sprang up after the Maccabæan rising, the spirit of Pharisaism or Nomism came with the exiles from Babylon. 'The law was forgotten in Israel, and Ezra restored it' (*Sukka*, 20*a*). Even five centuries later, Hillel, the great doctor of the Law, was called 'disciple of Ezra' (*Tos. Soṭ.* 13). Thus the State became a Church, and religion equivalent to legalism, according to which a man's acceptance with God depended on a considerable balance of good works over his failings. 'Know also,' says *Pirqe Aboth* (iv. 29), 'that everything is according to reckoning.' 'Weigh thou therefore our wickedness now in the balance, and theirs also that dwell in the world, and so shall thy name no where be found but in Israel' (2 Es 3^{34}; cf. also *Siphrā* to Lv 26^{9}). Piety was equivalent to a life of righteousness, but such righteousness as God acknowledged and demanded in the Law.

3. Ḥasidism.—The early enthusiasts of Nomism and forerunners of the Pharisees were the Ḥasidim. They were neither a sect nor a political party, as might appear from 1 Mac 2^{42}, but only the pious in the land, of whom frequent mention is made in the Psalms (cf. *JE* vi. 250 f.). They were the successors of those coadjutors of Ezra who endeavoured to fulfil the Law in all its bearings. With that they combined austerity of life and a contempt for earthly possessions (cf. Enoch $108^{8f.}$). They were expected to be more self-denying than God-fearing

men (*Shab.* 120*a*). Theirs was the highest degree of piety (*Rosh hash.* 17). 'Zeal leads to innocence, innocence to purity, purity to Pharisaism, Pharisaism to holiness, holiness to humility, humility to sin-fearing, sin-fearing to Ḥasidism, Ḥasidism to the gift of the Holy Spirit,' etc. (*Soṭa* ix. 15). Their excess of piety was so great that their practice could not be quoted to prove a doubtful halakha (*Men.* 41*a*). Only those were admitted into their circle who were learned (*Pirqe Aboth* ii. 6), and whose youth had never been defiled by sin (*Suk.* 53*a*; see also *B. ḳāma*, 103*b*). Most praiseworthy was their cultivation of an even temperament, a forgiving spirit, generosity in money transactions, and almsgiving (*Pirqe Aboth* v. 10, 11, 14). Their devotions were preceded and succeeded by an hour's meditation, and accordingly they spent nine hours a day in spiritual exercises (*Bᵉrākh.* 32*b*). In order to sacrifice the more, they occasionally took the Nazirite vow (*Ned.* 10*a*). It was probably due to their excessive fasting that they mostly died of enteric diseases, from which they suffered ten or twenty days before their death (*Sᵉmāḥ.* iii. 9; *Gen. Rab.* 62).

Since, however, the object of the Ḥasidim was not mortification of the flesh but nomism, their asceticism did not exclude such indulgences as were permitted by the Law. Hence they never eschewed marriage, although even in the married state they imposed restrictions on themselves (*Nid.* 38*a*). Unlike the Essenes, they did not live in separate communities, and therefore it is incorrect to describe them as an *ecclesiola in ecclesia*. Ḥasidism merged not into Essenism but into Pharisaism and Rabbinism. Pharisees are mentioned first in the time of Jonathan (Jos. *Ant.* XIII. v. 9). Henceforth a Ḥasid was only an exaggerated Pharisee. Most of the Rabbis who were eminent for piety bore the title Ḥasid.

4. Pharisaism and Rabbinism.—Although the Pharisees were as rigorous in their opposition to Greek hedonism as were the Ḥasidim, in their life and teaching they modified the austere views of the latter, and showed less tendency to asceticism. Starting from the principle that right and wrong were defined by the Law, and that the choice of either was in one's own power (cf., besides Josephus, *Pirqe Aboth* iii. 19), they had no inducement to inquire further into the origin of evil, or to trace any connexion between cosmic and individual evil. God created the evil inclination (יצר הרע), and God created the Law as antidote (*Ḳid.* 30ᵇ). As long as the faithful were occupied with the study of the Law and with the performance of works of mercy, they had the power over their own evil inclination (*'Abōdā zārā*, 5*b*). Perfection could be aimed at by a punctilious attendance to the positive and negative precepts of the Law, without the suppression of the natural feelings. A legalist could therefore indulge in all those pleasures of life of which the Law took no cognizance, provided that indulgence did not interfere with Israel's separation (cf. also *Jeb.* 20*a*, 'Hallow thyself also in lawful matters'). The body was accordingly considered sacred, having been created in God's image (*Lev. R.* 34). Self-inflicted injuries were forbidden (*B. ḳam.* 91*b*).

No scribe might live in a town which did not possess, among other sanitary requisites, a bath, a barber, and a physician (*Sanh.* 17*b*). When health required, one might sell one's shoes for food; and he who stinted himself was threatened with retribution by Providence (*Shab.* 129*a*). To save life, even the life of a newborn infant, all laws except those relating to idolatry, incest, and murder might be suspended (*Joma*, 82*a*) and the Sabbath profaned (*Shab.* 128*b*; cf. also Mekh. *Ki This*, 1, 'The Sabbath is delivered unto you, not you unto the Sabbath'). A hungry invalid might be dieted on ceremonially unclean food. The wine-cup hallowed the Sabbath and great festivals, and was not missing from the social board. 'He who abstains from wine is a sinner' (*Ta'an.* 11*a*). Rab went so far as to say that in the great Judgment Day man would have to give an account for every lawful pleasure he refused (Jer. *Ḳid.* iv.). The same Rabbi on another occasion said, '*Beati possidentes* אם יש לו חיטב לך, for there are no pleasures in Sheol, and death knows no delay' (*Erub.* 54*a*).

Nevertheless, moderation and contentment were among the cardinal virtues of Judaism. 'A rich man is he who is contented with his lot' (*Ab.* iv. 1). 'Man must be taught not to be a glutton' (*B. mes.* vii. 5). From Dt 14²⁶ the Rabbis curiously deduce that one may not eat meat unless he has a special appetite for it (*Ḥul.* 84*a*). 'Abstain from evil, and from every appearance of evil' (*Ḥul.* 44*b*). Marriage was raised by the Rabbis to a positive precept, based on Gn I and Is 45¹⁸. There are a few isolated passages in pre-Talmudic writings which seem to attach greater sanctity to the virgin and celibate state than to wedded life (see 2 Es 16⁴⁴, Wis 3¹³, Sibyll. ii. 48, Test. Issachar 2). Enoch (83²) received his revelation before his marriage (cf. also To 8⁷, Jth 8⁴ 9⁴·⁹ 16²³, Lk 2³⁶, Mt 19¹²). But this was not in accordance with the teaching and practice of the Rabbis, to whom marriage was both a legal duty and a safeguard against sin (*Jeb.* 63*b*, *Kᵉth.* 61*b*). Nowhere in the Rabbinic literature is abstinence from marriage recommended as a help to piety.

Great merit was attached to fasting. The fact that an official calendar, the *Mᵉgillath ta'anith*, was published, which prohibits fasting on certain days, shows the prevalence of private fasting at the time of the Christian era. The bi-weekly fast, supposed to have been instituted by Ezra, which is mentioned in Lk 18¹² and in the *Didache*, is still observed in the East by extremely devout Jews. But the ethical value of public and private fasting consisted in its sacrificial nature and in its being the outward expression of penitence; it was not regarded as a stage on the path to perfection.

The destruction of Jerusalem by Titus led many Jews to adopt ascetic practices. Some abstained from meat and wine because of the cessation of sacrifices and libations. But Joshua b. Ḥananiah argued that for similar reasons they should abstain from bread, water, and fruits, for these also were elements offered on the altar (*Baba bathra*, 60*b*).

There are, indeed, instances of Rabbis who led ascetic lives. Thus R. Zadok is said to have fasted forty years to avert the destruction of the Temple, and he was so emaciated that, at the request of R. Jochanan, Vespasian allowed him to be treated by a physician (*Giṭ.* 56*b*, *Lam. R.* i. 5). His contemporary Ḥanina b. Dosa, the thaumaturgos, subsisted only on a kab of locust beans from week's end to week's end (*Bᵉrākh.* 18). Nor were R. Ze'era and Simeon b. Jochai, though abstinent, ascetics in the true sense of the word. Asceticism was not suited to the Jewish temper. Although trials and chastisements (יסורין) were regarded as Divinely ordered for expiatory reasons and with promises of compensation, they were not willingly sought after. Both R. Ḥiya bar Abba and R. Jochanan, when asked whether trials were welcome to them, are recorded to have replied, 'No, I will have neither them nor their reward' (*Bᵉrākh.* 5*b*). The principle of Rabbinism was, 'The disciples of Abraham our father enjoy this world, and are heirs of the world to come' (*Ab.* v. 22).

5. Alexandrianism.—While Palestinian Judaism was being developed into a forensic science, that of the Greek diaspora, notably in Alexandria, assumed the appearance of a philosophical system. There

were several agencies at work to produce this effect. The inability to fulfil every precept of the Mosaic Law on foreign soil must have been the first inducement to spiritualize the Law. The Stoa further supplied them with the allegoric method, and the Greek language with a metaphysical terminology. As early as pseudo-Aristeas the Jewish delegates to Ptolemy IV. are called philosophers (Kautzsch, *Apok.* ii. 21). According to the fragments of Aristobulus, the most prominent Greek philosophers and poets derived their knowledge from Moses, who was the inspiration and source of all philosophy. One of the fundamental principles of this religious philosophy was the pessimistic dichotomy of man which led to asceticism. 'The corruptible body,' says the Book of Wisdom, 'presseth down the soul, and the earthy tabernacle weigheth down the mind that museth upon many things' (9[15]). But it is Philo who is the prophet of Alexandrianism. According to him, man's highest aim is a mystic union with the Deity, attained through asceticism and flight from the world, the former as a means of liberating the spirit from the trammels of the flesh, the latter as a safeguard against a relapse into the sensual (*de Præm. et Pœn.* ii. 411). The patriarchs were accordingly ascetics and hermits. Enoch was removed from sinful surroundings (*de Abr.* iii. 352). Abraham's call was accompanied with the command to depart from temptations of the flesh (*de Mig. Abr.* i. 437). Jacob was the true ascetic who wrestled until he obtained a vision of God (*de Som.* i. 643). But the greatest ascetic was Moses, whom self-discipline and continence qualified for the gift of prophecy, and raised to the nearest approach to God (*Vita Mos.* ii. 145 ff.). Alexandrianism left no impression on Palestinian Judaism, though some of the Philonic *Midrash* found its way into the Rabbinic *Haggada*. The *ḥokhmath Jevanith*, or Greek philosophy, had no attraction for the Rabbis. The works of Philo would have perished if they had not been preserved by Christians. The first Jew who mentions Philo is A. dei Rossi (1573).

6. Essenism.—The asceticism of the Essenes, as seen in the short accounts of them by Josephus, Philo, and Pliny, is so strange that we doubt whether the Essenes and their practices have any claim to be called Jewish. Even the origin of the sect is obscure. Since no satisfactory derivation of the name exists, we hazard the suggestion that Ἐσσαῖοι is an ethnic term=*Esauites*, or Idumæans, or at least a clan of Idumæa.* This would coincide with Pliny's account of their chief settlement on the western shores of the Dead Sea, and would also account for Herod's partiality for them, and for the presence of an Essene in his court. Their rejection of animal sacrifice removes them considerably from Palestinian Judaism, in which the sacrificial cult is everything. Their other tenets are so non-Jewish that the conviction is inevitable that the sect was of exotic origin, though on Jewish borderland; that in its gradual development it received accretions from Pythagoreanism, and finally from Alexandrianism; that to replenish its ranks it carried on a propaganda in Palestine and Syria where the soil was ripe for anti-hedonic movements; and that those Jews who joined the order, and among them chiefly Ḥasidim and Pharisees, would adopt only those practices of the Essenes which were not inconsistent with the State religion. Thus Onias ha-M^{e}aggel, who is supposed to have been an Essene (*Ta'an.* 19 and *ib. Tos.* ii. 11), was a married man and offered sacrifices (*Ta'an.* 23). Josi b. Joezer the priest, another reputed Essene, was a wealthy man (*Baba bathra*, 133). The number of adherents, however, could not have been very considerable. The name 'Essene' is not mentioned in the NT. In the Talmud the allusions to them are scanty and doubtful, and under the appellations of *Vathikin* ('firm'), *Z^{e}nuim* ('modest'), *Ḥashaim* ('silent,' 'mysterious'), *Bannaim* ('builders'), and *Toblē Shaḥrith* ('morning bathers'). Perhaps the *Anshe Ma'aseh* ('men of work'), who are mentioned on a par with the Ḥasidim (*Sukka*, 51; *Soṭa* ix. 15), were Essene ascetics, *ma'aseh* being pure Hebrew for *'eseḳ* (=ἄσκησις), 'work,' 'occupation.'

* For other etymologies cf. Kohler, *JE* v. 234.

7. Modern Judaism. — The teaching of the Talmud is codified in the *Ṭurim* and *Shulḥān 'Arukh*, which is still binding on Judaism. We look in vain for traces of asceticism in that code.

The Jewish devotional literature of the Middle Ages shows indeed a tendency to asceticism. Foremost among these is Baḥya's *Ḥoboth ha-Lebaboth* ('Duties of the Heart'), which is a Hebrew translation from the original Arabic made by Ibn Tibbon (1161–1180), and is as popular among orthodox Jews as Thomas à Kempis' *Imitation* among Christians. So are the *Sha'are T^{e}shubah* ('Gates of Repentance') and *Sepher ha-Jirah* ('the Book of Fear'), by Jonah Geronoli († 1263). But this is due mainly to the influence of Græco-Arabic philosophy (see Brüll, *Jahrb.* v. and vi. 71–93). Maimonides' views are more in accordance with the Jewish spirit. In his *Mishne Torah, De'oth* iii. 1 and vi. 1, he points out that asceticism is not only unnecessary but even sinful. Judah Halevi, another prominent philosopher, in the *Kuzari* (iii. 1 and 4), states: 'The prevalent custom among us is not to separate oneself from the world, nor to despise life . . . but to love the world and length of life.'

On the asceticism of the Kabbalists and Kabbalistic Ḥasidim see KABBALISM, ḤASIDISM, also ESSENES, KARAITES, PHARISEES, and SECTS (Jewish).

LITERATURE.—M. Lazarus, *Ethics of Judaism* (Eng. tr., Philadelphia, 1900), §§ 246–256; *JE* ii. 165–169; Bousset, *Rel. d. Judent.*[2] 1906, pp. 470–539; Koeberle, *Sünde u. Gnade*, 1905, pp. 459–571; M. Friedländer, *Rel. Beweg.* 1905, pp. 237–264; Schürer, *GJV* (index).

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ASCETICISM (Muslim).—The very copious materials which are available in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish literature for the study of Muslim asceticism have hitherto received little attention from European scholars, and much remains to be done before it will be possible to give an adequate survey of the subject. This article can only attempt to sketch the main lines of development, and to illustrate the salient features of each.

1. Introduction: the teaching of Muhammad.
2. Early Muslim and Ṣūfī asceticism.
3. Development of Ṣūfī asceticism in the Middle Ages.
   (*a*) Monastic institutions.
   (*b*) Ascetic systems.
4. Philosophical asceticism.
5. Conclusion: the Dervish orders.

1. Introduction: the teaching of Muhammad.—The religious ideas of the pagan Arabs were vague and scanty. Engrossed in the toils and pleasures of the present life, they seldom thought of the future, and the notion of preparing themselves for a shadowy existence beyond the grave never entered their minds. It was Christianity, not ecclesiastical, but of an irregular and unorthodox type, that sowed the first seeds of asceticism in Arabia before the advent of Muhammad, and continued to exert a dominating influence upon its development in the Muslim empire during the early centuries. In pre-Islāmic times Christianity was diffused among the tribes of North Arabia, and many Arabs had at least a superficial knowledge of its rites and doctrines (Wellhausen, *Reste*[2], 230 ff.). Allusions in the ancient poetry show that the Bedawîn were impressed by the Christian monk (*rāhib*), whose lamp, burning in his lonely

cell, was a welcome sight to travellers in the darkness of the desert. These monks, together with occasional wandering hermits, offered to the heathen Arabs a model of ascetic life, and inspired certain individuals, known as *ḥanīfs*, to reject idolatry, profess monotheism, and even adopt ascetic practices, such as the wearing of sackcloth and the abstention from particular kinds of food. There can be little doubt that the *ḥanīfs* stimulated Muhammad, with whom most of them were contemporary; two, in fact, were connected with him by blood or marriage (cf. Sir Charles Lyall, 'The words "Ḥanīf" and "Muslim,"' in *JRAS*, 1903, p. 771 ff.). The influence of Christianity may serve to explain ascetic tendencies which appeared in the oldest form of Islām—*e.g.* Muhammad and his first converts used frequently to watch and pray through the night—but which were gradually mitigated (Wellhausen, *Reste*², 241). Asceticism is characteristic neither of Islām nor of its founder. The Prophet himself enjoyed all pleasures within his reach, and commanded his followers not to abstain from the good things which God allowed them (*Qur'ān*, v. 89). It is true that he imposed on them some restrictions and obligations of an ascetic nature—the fast during Ramaḍān, abstinence from intoxicating drinks, the five daily prayers, the pilgrimage to Mecca, etc.—but these only threw into stronger relief the social, active, and aggressive spirit of Islām as contrasted with monastic quietism and renunciation. Apart from general exhortations to recognize the vanity of earthly joys, and to put trust in good works rather than in the gifts of fortune, the Qur'ān contains few passages that can fairly be interpreted in a specifically ascetic sense. *Fasting* is enjoined as a penance for certain ritual and legal offences (*Qur.* ii. 192, 257, iv. 94, v. 91, lviii. 5); *penitence*, when accompanied by faith and pious works, turns evil into good (xxv. 70); *prayer* restrains a man from committing sin (xxix. 44); the doctrine of *self-purification*, especially by means of almsgiving (*zakāt*), is preached in Sūras of the Meccan period: 'He that purifies himself (*tazakkā*) hath attained felicity' (lxxxvii. 14; cf. Grimme, *Mohammed*, 1904, pt. ii. p. 113). The root ZHD ('to renounce'), from which is derived *zuhd*, the ordinary word for Muslim asceticism, occurs in the Qur'ān only once, and is applied reproachfully to those who sold Joseph for a low price (xii. 20); but an older term, *tabattul* ('detachment from the world'), is found (lxxiii. 8) among Divinely ordained acts of devotion. Another ancient epithet of ascetics is *sā'iḥūn*, fem. *sā'iḥāt* (literally, 'wanderers'); these are mentioned honourably (ix. 113, lxvi. 5). It need scarcely be said that Muhammadan writers on asceticism interpret the Qur'ān in the light of their own theories, and import a technical meaning into many words, *e.g. dhikr* and *tawakkul*, which the Prophet used in the obvious signification.

2. Early Muslim and Ṣūfī asceticism.—According to the Qur'ān (lvii. 27), monasticism (*rahbānīya*) was an innovation in Christianity itself, and Muhammad in a famous sentence declared that it was no part of Islām. Nevertheless, some instances of a tendency in this direction are recorded by early Muslim tradition (see Goldziher, 'De l'Ascétisme aux premiers temps de l'Islam,' in *RHR*, vol. xxxvii. p. 314 ff.), which invariably represents Muhammad as condemning such acts of penance and mortification, whereas at a later time, when asceticism was firmly established in Islām, and had to be reconciled with the Prophet's teaching, he is constantly cited as an authority for similar practices. Goldziher has collected several examples of persons contemporary with Muhammad, or nearly so, who did penance for their sins. Thus Bahlūl b. Dhu'aib retired into the mountains in the neighbourhood of Medīna, clad himself in haircloth, and tied his hands behind his back with iron chains, crying repeatedly: 'O my God and my Lord! see Bahlūl, bound and shackled, confessing his sins.' Abū Lubāba, in remorse for an act of treachery (Ibn Hishām, 686), fastened himself to a pillar in the mosque at Medīna, and remained in that position until he was assured that God had pardoned him. Other forms of penance were associated with the pilgrimage to Mecca. It was not unusual for pilgrims to go on foot and without shoes, or, while circumambulating the Ka'ba, to let themselves be led like a camel by means of a ring which was inserted in the nose (cf. Goldziher, in *Vienna Oriental Journal*, vol. xiii. p. 36, n. 3). We hear of pilgrims who had taken a vow of silence; this was denounced as a heathen custom by the khalīf Abū Bakr.

The first century of Islām was singularly favourable to the growth of asceticism. The long and bloody civil wars, the fierce fanaticism of the political sects, the rapidly increasing laxity of morals, the spectacle of a military despotism enforcing its will upon devout Muslims, and openly rejecting every principle of the ideal theocracy which they wished to restore—all these circumstances contributed to excite in men's minds a disgust of earthly affairs, and fix their thoughts on the world to come. Hence arose a powerful and wide-spread ascetic movement, originally orthodox in character, but gradually developing mystical tendencies, and passing almost imperceptibly into the oldest form of Ṣūfiism. During the Umayyad period (A.D. 661–750) this movement continued to bear a distinctly orthodox stamp, and derived its leaders, if not its chief strength, from the Pietists, including Qur'ān-reciters (*qurrā*), students of the *ḥadīth*, and learned divines. Its most prominent representative was the famous theologian Ḥasan of Baṣra (ob. 728 A.D.), who may be regarded as the founder of the Baṣrite school of ascetics and mystics (cf. *Qūt al-qulūb*, Cairo, 1310 A.H., i. 129 and 166). His sayings, and those of the early Muslims in general, leave no doubt that the mainsprings of their asceticism were (1) the intense terror produced by the vivid descriptions in the Qur'ān of the Day of Judgment and the tortures of Hell, and (2) a morbid consciousness of sin, which impelled them to spend their lives in penance and devotion. 'Only extreme fear,' said Sufyān ath-Thaurī (ob. 777–778 A.D.), 'enables any one to support the burden of devotion' (*Ḥilyat al-auliyā*, i. 74*a*). 'Suppose,' said Bishr b. Manṣūr to 'Aṭā as-Sulamī, 'that a blazing fire were kindled, and proclamation made that whoever entered it should be saved?' 'I should tremble,' 'Aṭā replied, 'lest my joy might cause me to expire before I reached it' (*ib.* i. 32*b*). Many stories are told of persons who died of fear on hearing a preacher describe the anguish that awaits the wicked after the Resurrection, or who wept so violently from terror and remorse that they swooned away. The slightest infraction of the religious law required a long and painful expiation. Kahmas b. al-Ḥasan is said to have wept for forty years because he once took a piece of clay from a neighbour's wall. There was a class of ascetics called 'the Weepers' (*al-Bakkā'ūn*), a term probably borrowed from Christian monasticism (Abu 'l-Maḥāsin, ed. Juynboll, i. 396, l. 5; cf. Thomas of Margâ, *The Book of the Governors*, ed. Budge, vol. i. p. cxlvii).

In this connexion the pervading influence of Christianity on the early period of Muslim asceticism should not be overlooked (see von Kremer, *Herrschende Ideen*, 52 ff., 57 ff.; Goldziher, *RHR*, vol. xxxvii. pp. 314–324, and 'Materialien zur Entwickelungsgesch. des Ṣūfismus,' in *Vienna*

Oriental Journal, vol. xiii. p. 35 ff.). Not only can the dress, vows of silence, and many other practices of Muslim ascetics be traced to this source, but in the oldest Ṣūfī biographies, besides numerous anecdotes of the Christian monk (*rāhib*), who from his cell or pillar gives instruction and advice to wandering Muslim devotees, we find unmistakable proof that the doctrines of the latter were, to a considerable extent, based on Jewish and Christian traditions. Quotations from the Pentateuch and the Gospels frequently occur among the sayings attributed to Muhammadan saints; and Biblical stories, related from the monastic point of view, were eagerly read, *e.g.* the popular collection entitled *al-Isrā'īliyāt*, which is said to have been compiled by Wahb b. Munabbih (ob. 728 A.D.), and the still extant *Qiṣaṣ al-anbiyā* ('Tales of the Prophets'), by Tha'labī (ob. 1036 A.D.). While, as has been stated, many of the early Muslim ascetics belonged to the learned class, lived in towns, and did not exclude themselves from social intercourse and public life, the movement had its roots among the common folk, of whom a great number embraced with enthusiasm the ideal of unworldliness that was held up to them, and strove to attain it by abandoning all human society, seeking shelter in caves and cemeteries, or roaming in solitary places, deserts, mountains, and on the shore. Of such wanderers Ibrāhīm b. Adham (ob. 776 A.D.) is a type, although, unlike most of them, he was of noble birth. A prince of Balkh, he clad himself in garments of wool, left his kingdom, and roamed through Syria, earning a scanty livelihood by gardening and other kinds of manual labour. On being asked why he shunned the sight of men, he replied: 'I have clasped my religion to my bosom, and am fleeing with it from town to town and from peak to peak. All who see me think that I am a camel-driver (read *jammālī* for *ḥummā'ī*) or a madman. This I do, that perchance I may save my religion from Satan, and bring my faith safely forth through the gate of death' (*Tadh. al-auliyā*, ed. Nicholson, i. 95. 15 ff.). Others, again, sought refuge from worldly temptations in the Ṣūfī monasteries which began to be founded before the close of the 2nd cent. A.H. Women took an active part in the movement, especially on its mystical side (see ṢŪFIISM). It had no organization, no system of doctrine, but is characterized, as Goldziher has observed (*Vienna Orient. Journ.* vol. xiii. p. 37), by the one-sided elaboration of certain Qur'ānic ideas and doctrines, with a corresponding neglect of other elements equally important in the eyes of orthodox Muhammadans. In the early period, asceticism can hardly be separated from Ṣūfiism; and even when the distinction became sharp (in the 3rd cent. of Islām), many who called themselves Ṣūfīs were really little more than ascetics with a vein of mysticism. It will be convenient, therefore, to regard the early Ṣūfīs as in some degree belonging to the movement under consideration, leaving the monastic institutions and organized asceticism of a later period to be treated in the following section. We shall now deal with some practices and theories which illustrate the general character of ancient Muslim asceticism.

(*a*) *Dress.*—Garments of coarse wool (*ṣūf*) were a mark of asceticism in pre-Islāmic times: in this respect the Arabs copied the Christian hermits (Nöldeke, in *ZDMG*, vol. xlviii. p. 47). Similar garments were often worn by Muslim ascetics; hence the name 'Ṣūfī,' which came into use before 200 A.H. A synonymous epithet of rarer occurrence is *Muṣūfī*, which is derived from the garments of hair-cloth called *mish*, plural *musūh* (cf. *Ḥilyat*, ii. 60[a]; *Nafaḥāt al-uns*, Calcutta, 1859, Nos. 89 و 90). Ascetics of both sexes are described as wearing a smock (*jubba* or *midra'a*) of wool; women sometimes added a head-covering and veil (*ḥimār*) of the same material. Sufyān ath-Thaurī (ob. 777–778 A.D.) condemned the wearing of wool as being an innovation (*bid'a*), others on the ground that it was borrowed from Christianity or savoured of ostentation (*Ḥilyat*, i. 90[a]; *'Iqd*, Cairo, 1293 A.H., iii. 348 f.; Sha'rānī, *Lawāqiḥ*, 1299 A.H., i. 45, penult.). Abū Sulaimān ad-Dārānī (ob. 830 A.D.) declared that a woollen garment might be worn for economy, or as a travelling dress, but not for religious purposes (*Ḥilyat*, ii. 171[b]). In another place (*ib.* ii. 167[a]) he allows the adept, whose heart is purged of all the passions, to wear an *'abā* (woollen mantle), 'which is one of the signs of asceticism,' but says that it is safer for him to wear 'two white garments' like ordinary people, so as not to excite remark. Garments of hair (*sha'r*) are often mentioned; they were sometimes worn under a rich dress, *e.g.* by Ja'far aṣ-Ṣādiq (*Lawāqiḥ*, i. 42. 20 ff.). Some pietists were recognized by their long cloaks (*burnus*, pl. *barānis*; cf. *'Iqd*, ii. 291. 7). 'Utba al-Ghulām (ob. *circa* 780 A.D.) wore two dust-coloured garments—one as a *ridā*, the other as an *izār*—so that he looked like a ploughman (*Ḥilyat*, i. 37[b]). Bishr al-Ḥāfī (ob. 841–842 A.D.), the well-known ascetic of Baghdād, went to market 'wearing a shabby fur (*farw*), a short boot (*ḫuff*), and a very fine *izār*' (*ib.* ii. 77[a]). All this shows that certain kinds of dress were peculiar to ascetics, but that ascetics were not invariably distinguished by a peculiar dress. Concerning the patched frocks (*muraqqa'āt*), which in course of time superseded the woollen garb of the Ṣūfīs, see art. ṢŪFIISM.

(*b*) *Food and fasting.*—Many ascetics attached great importance to eating only what was lawful (*ḥalāl*). Thus Ibrāhīm b. Adham said, 'Let your food be good (*ṭayyib*), and you need not pray by night or fast by day' (*Ḥilyat*, i. 199[a]); and he used to eat clay and earth when he could not get anything above suspicion. Sarī as-Saqaṭī (ob. 867 A.D.) was celebrated for the purity of his diet (*ib.* ii. 247[a]); he wished to eat no food that entailed either gratitude to man or chastisement from God, but confessed that he found this impossible (*ib.* ii. 244[a]). The legends of the Muslim saints furnish many instances of holy men who were miraculously guarded from eating 'dubious' viands, *e.g.* such as came from a wedding-feast or had passed through the hands of a government official. It is related of Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī (ob. 857 A.D.) that whenever he stretched out his hand to take any food of this sort, he was warned by the twitching of a vein in the tip of one of his fingers (Qushairī, Cairo, 1318 A.H., p. 64, l. 21). Ibrāhīm b. Adham recommended warm bread with olive oil as the best food for ascetics (*Ḥilyat*, i. 199[a]); others favoured bread and salt, gruel made of barley-meal, etc. Some abstained from meat altogether, but this does not seem to have been usual; it was, however, eaten sparingly. Vows of abstinence from particular kinds of food, *e.g.* carrots or dates, were often made, and were supposed to confer a higher spiritual rank (*Lawāqiḥ*, i. 61. 17 ff.). Besides the obligatory fast of Ramaḍān, voluntary fasts of varying length and severity form an indispensable feature of Muslim asceticism. Their purpose was to mortify the flesh and illuminate the spirit, to procure wisdom and prevent sin. 'He who masters his belly,' said 'Abd al-Wāḥid b. Zaid (ob. 793 A.D.), 'masters his religion and masters all the virtues' (*Ḥilyat*, i. 16[a]). Bāyazīd al-Biṣṭāmī said that he attained to knowledge of God by means of a hungry belly and a naked body (Qushairī, 16. 10). Sahl b. 'Abdallāh at-Tustarī (ob. 896 A.D.) was famous for his fasts.

He held that food should be eaten only to preserve life and reason, not to give strength, and that incapacity to perform one's devotions through weakness arising from want of food was better than the performance of them by one who had eaten his fill (*Iḥyā*, Cairo, 1289 A.H., iii. 87 f.). He used to break his fast once in fifteen days (Qushairī, 78. 31), and his name is included by Ghazālī in a list of those who had fasted forty consecutive days (*Iḥyā*, iii. 89). Later, Ṣūfīs surpassed his achievements in this line, for, according to Abū 'Uthmān al-Maghribī (ob. 983–984 A.D.), the man who is Divinely aided (*ṣamadānī*) does not eat once in eighty days (Qushairī, 79. 16).

(*c*) *Prayer.*—The five canonical prayers incumbent on every Muslim, arduous and exacting as they were, did not satisfy the zealots of the new religion. Authority for an extension of the practice was found in several passages of the Qur'ān where *dhikr* ('praise of God') is mentioned: the faithful are enjoined to praise God frequently (*Qur.* xxxiii. 14). Starting from this command, which does not refer to any special act of ritual, the early ascetics developed a regular service of litanies and devotional exercises: reading of the Qur'ān, repetition of the names of God, reiteration of certain invocations and formulas, such as *Allāh! Allāh!* and *Lā ilāha illā 'llāh!* This *dhikr* the Ṣūfīs regarded as one of the main pillars, nay, the very corner-stone, of practical religion; without constantly performing it no one could attain to God (Qushairī, 119. penult.). Here they may have imitated the Christian Euchites, as Goldziher conjectures (*Vienna Orient. Journ.* vol. xiii. p. 39) in his valuable paper on the early development of Ṣūfīism, to which the writer of the present article is deeply indebted. Even those who granted that ordinary prayer (*ṣalāt*) was the most excellent act of devotion recognized the superiority of *dhikr*, in so far as the latter was not confined to any stated times, and might be continued hour after hour without interruption (Qushairī, 120. 5 from foot). In some cases it was accompanied by acts of penance. Ḥāzim al-Ḥanafī used to knock his head against the wall of his chamber until it bled (*Ḥilyat*, ii. 251); and Shiblī (ob. 945–946 A.D.) during his novitiate was accustomed to pray in a dark cellar, and flagellate himself with a bundle of rods whenever he felt that his faculties were not concentrated (Qushairī, 120. 4 ff.). Meetings for the purpose of *dhikr* were held in the Umayyad period—Ḥasan of Baṣra is said to have presided over them—and seem to have been attended by persons inclined to quietism, who disliked the crude declamations of the *quṣṣāṣ*, or popular preachers (cf. *Qūt al-qulūb*, i. 149). The dangers lurking in a perpetual lip-service soon became apparent to the Ṣūfīs themselves; it was discouraged by the Baghdād school, which flourished in the 3rd cent. A.H., because it led to hypocrisy (Goldziher, *loc. cit.*, p. 40). Qushairī (119. last line) insists that *dhikr* with the tongue is subordinate to *dhikr* with the heart, and should be regarded as an instrument whereby the higher and truly effectual *dhikr* is acquired; nevertheless, the latter is incomplete without the former—the adept combines both. See also art. ṢŪFĪISM.

(*d*) *Renunciation and poverty.*—Qushairī, in his chapter on renunciation (*zuhd*), refers to the question whether *zuhd* consists in renouncing what is unlawful (*ḥarām*) or what is lawful (*ḥalāl*). The general opinion was that all Muslims were bound to renounce *ḥarām*, but that renunciation of *ḥalāl* was a merit; this view accords with many passages in the Qur'ān, *e.g.* 'Say, the goods of this world are little, and the next world is better for those who fear God' (*Qur.* iv. 79). At first, renunciation was understood almost exclusively in a material sense; the *zāhid* abstained from food, sleep, society, and all harmless pleasures. If a man possessed only one shirt, he might count on being admitted to paradise before his more deserving neighbour who had two (*Tadh. al-auliyā*, i. 47. last line and foll.). But since the ascetics naturally restricted *ḥalāl* to the narrowest possible limits, and condemned everything else as superfluous, it was but a short step to the view that 'nothing in the world is lawful, and therefore there is no true renunciation in renouncing the world' (Qushairī, 67. 11). The sayings of the early Ṣūfīs exhibit a strong bias towards a spiritual conception of *zuhd*. Not that they fasted less, kept fewer vigils, or relaxed their austerities, but they realized that such acts could have no value except as the expression of an inward feeling. Renunciation exists only in the heart (*Ḥilyat*, ii. 170[a]); it is the abandonment of all that diverts one from God (Qushairī, 67. 4), and especially the abandonment of 'self.' Self-abnegation, in its practical aspects, which alone concern us here, may be described as trust in God (*tawakkul*) or quietism (*riḍā*), and is closely connected with the doctrine of 'poverty' (*faqr*).

Most Muhammadan treatises on Ṣūfīism allude to the controversy which arose at an early period as to the superiority of poverty or riches (see, *e.g.*, *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*, Lahore ed. p. 15, l. 18 ff.; *Ḥayāt al-qulūb*, printed on the margins of *Qūt al-qulūb*, ii. 161. 15 ff.). It was debated whether the rich man who was blessed with wealth and who rendered thanks to God for it did not represent a higher ideal than the poor man who endured want uncomplainingly. Some argued that wealth (*ghanā*), being an attribute of God, should be preferred to poverty, which is an attribute of man, and cited the Prophet's saying: 'The upper hand is better than the lower,' *i.e.* 'to give is better than to receive.' The leading Ṣūfīs, however, with a few exceptions, declared in favour of poverty, quoting such traditions as these: 'O God, let me live poor, and die poor, and rise from the dead amongst the poor'; 'the poor of my people will enter Paradise five hundred years before the rich'; 'poverty is my pride' (*al-faqru faḫrī*). What poverty meant may be gathered from a saying of Sarī as-Saqaṭī (ob. 867 A.D.): 'Do not take any thing from any one, nor ask any thing of any one, nor have with you any thing that you can give to any one' (*Ḥilyat*, ii. 244[b]). This counsel of perfection was based on the theory of *tawakkul* ('trust in God'), which the early Ṣūfīs carried to extreme lengths (see Goldziher's investigation of the subject in the *Vienna Orient. Journ.* vol. xiii. pp. 41–56). They define *tawakkul* as renunciation of personal initiative and volition, leaving all to God, being entirely passive, like a corpse in the hands of the washer who prepares it for burial. Applying this doctrine to matters of practical life, the true *mutawakkil* could not make any effort, direct or indirect, to obtain the means of subsistence, or admit any thought of providing for the morrow. He could not beg, work for hire, or ply any trade or handicraft, but had to depend for his daily bread on what God, 'to whom belong the treasures of earth and heaven,' sent to him as a gift from Himself, or delivered to him by the hands of his fellow-creatures. He was then said to gain his livelihood *mina 'l-futūḥ*, *i.e.* through an 'opening' which God made for him. The ancient Ṣūfīs, who commonly adhered to these principles and hence are often called *al-mutawakkilūn*, seem to have been influenced by Christian teaching (Mt 6^{25-34}, Lk 12^{22-30}; see Goldziher, *loc. cit.* p. 45). In later times, when the theory had broken down, the same term was still used to denote a class of Ṣūfīs who wandered to and fro, living 'on trust' (*'alā 't-tawakkul*). It

was customary for such men to make the pilgrimage to Mecca 'without provision' (*bilā zād*), and in some cases they considered their vow of *tawakkul* to have been violated if they extracted a thorn from their feet or cried out for help on falling into a well. But, of course, the facts of nature were too strong for the doctrinaires. Living 'on trust,' if strictly interpreted, involved a serious risk of death by starvation. That some *mutawakkilūn* perished in this way is likely enough, and may possibly have evoked the assertion, which is ascribed to Sufyān ath-Thaurī (*Ḥilyat*, i. 81[a]), that those who refuse to beg, and die of hunger in consequence, go to Hell. Gradually the Ṣūfīs themselves came round to the opinion that *tawakkul* was not invalidated by seeking a livelihood (*takassub*). A similar conclusion was reached as regards the question whether a *mutawakkil* might take medicine or not; but there were always individuals who refused to compromise with their conscience. Goldziher (*loc. cit.* p. 53) mentions the existence in Persia, in the 4th cent. A.H., of a numerous sect who rejected medical aid. Their leader, Abu 'l-Ḫair b. Bābā, was a Christian physician, and, like modern Christian Scientists, he recommended his patients to trust in God. It is curious that a theory which forbade beggary, or allowed it only as a last resource, should actually have produced swarms of able-bodied mendicants who made their *tawakkul* an excuse for living on charity.

3. **Development of Ṣūfī asceticism in the Middle Ages.**—(*a*) *Monastic institutions.*—The Prophet's saying, 'There is no monasticism in Islām,' was not falsified, on any large scale at least, until several centuries had elapsed. Most of the early Ṣūfīs led secluded lives with a few friends and companions of the same way of thinking. Many of them were married, and some had the full legal complement of wives, like Ḥātim al-Aṣamm of Balkh, who died in A.D. 851 (*Ḥilyat*, i. 213[b]). Bishr al-Ḥāfī, although himself unmarried, is said to have acknowledged that Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, who had followed the *sunna* approving matrimony, was his superior in this respect (*Qūt al-qulūb*, ii. 241). Nevertheless, the advocates of celibacy—for they did not always practise what they preached—soon began to make themselves heard. Ḥasan of Baṣra said that, when God wills the welfare of a man in this world, He does not occupy him with wife and child (*Lawāqiḥ*, i. 38. 10). According to Ribāḥ b. 'Amr al-Qaisī, no one attains the rank of the elect (*ṣiddīqūn*) until he leaves his wife a widow and his children fatherless (*ib.* i. 61. 4). Abū Sulaimān ad-Dārānī spoke of marriage as a backsliding and a concession to worldliness; it might be the better state for those who could endure its cares, but only the single man (*waḥīd*) tasted the full sweetness of devotion, and was able to give his whole heart to God (*Qūt al-qulūb*, ii. 247). These views, conflicting with the ancient Muslim doctrine that a man's duties towards his family are quite as important as those which concern his faith, never gained universal acceptance. Celibacy is seldom demanded by Muhammadan religious orders as a condition of membership.

We have but little information as to the origin and growth of monasticism in the early period of Islām. The first monastery (*ḫānaqāh*) for Ṣūfīs is said to have been founded at Ramla in Palestine by a Christian dignitary (*Nafaḥāt*, 34), apparently before A.D. 800. Sitting in a *ḫānaqāh* was condemned, as equivalent to begging, by Abū Turāb an-Nakhshabī, who died in A.D. 859 (*Ḥilyat*, ii. 222[b]). The year 200 A.H. (=A.D. 815) is named in two fictitious traditions (*Qūt al-qulūb*, ii. 239) as the date after which celibacy would be permissible to all Muslims, and would be adopted by the best men amongst them; and this prophecy after the event seems to mark the beginning of Muslim monasticism with approximate correctness. It is probable, however, that the development of organized monastic institutions throughout the Muhammadan empire belongs to a much later period. In reading the older works on Ṣūfīism, *e.g.* the *Qūt al-qulūb*, the *Ḥilyat al-auliyā*, and the *Risāla* of Qushairī (all of which were written before A.D. 1050), one is struck by the rarity of any reference to monasteries; yet the celebrated Ṣūfīs of the 3rd and 4th cents. A.H. generally gathered round them a circle of disciples, who would naturally have dwelt in religious houses, if such had been available. Maqrīzī (*Ḫiṭaṭ*, ii. 414. 3) says that *ḫānaqāhs* were introduced into Islām during the 5th cent. A.H., which corresponds to the 11th cent. of the Christian era. We may accept this statement in the sense that Ṣūfī monasteries, the members of which lived together for ascetic purposes under the direction of an abbot, or *shaikh*, first became numerous and widely spread during the above-mentioned epoch. Maqrīzī's observation agrees with a passage in Qazwīnī (*Āthār al-bilād*, ed. Wüstenfeld, 241. 3 from foot), where Abū Sa'īd b. Abi 'l-Ḫair, who died in A.D. 1049 (not about A.D. 815, as was erroneously asserted by De Sacy in *Journal des Savants*, 1821, p. 725, and after him by Dozy and von Kremer), is described as the founder of Ṣūfī monasticism and rules of discipline. During the next two hundred years (A.D. 1050–1250) the system was further organized and extended by the various Dervish orders—'Adawīs, Qādirīs, Rifā'īs, Mevlevīs, etc.—which arose in rapid succession.

The well-known treatise on Ṣūfīism, entitled *'Awārif al-Ma'ārif*, by Shihāb ad-Dīn 'Umar as-Suhrawardī (ob. 1234 A.D.), supplies many interesting details concerning Muslim monastic life (see especially chapters 12–18 and 48–52). Speaking of the relation between the Shaikh and the disciple (*murīd*), Suhrawardī asserts that the latter becomes part of the Shaikh, just as in natural generation the son is part of the father. 'This,' he says, 'is a spiritual birth, according to the words of Jesus: "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God"' (Jn 3[3]). The disciple was usually invested by the Shaikh with a patched frock (*ḫirqa*) as a sign that he submitted absolutely to the Shaikh's authority; in this ceremony the hand of the Shaikh was considered to represent the hand of the Prophet. While the disciple remained in constant association with the Shaikh and under his care, he passed through the time of 'sucking' (*irtiḍā'*), and it behoved him not to depart without leave, but to wait until the Shaikh decided that the moment of 'weaning' (*fiṭām*) had arrived. 'The ascetics of old,' Suhrawardī continues, 'desired solitude on account of the dangers to which society exposed them, but Ṣūfīs who live in convents overcome these dangers by the strength of their devotion and the soundness of their spiritual state. They are as one body animated by the single aim of dwelling together in complete accord both outwardly and inwardly; this is a unique characteristic which distinguishes them from every other sect in Islām.' The convent (*ribāṭ*) comprised men of all ages, and consisted of private cells (*zāwiya*) as well as an assembly-room (*bait al-jamā'a*). The old men, Suhrawardī thinks, should be allowed to stay in their cells, where they can sleep and rest and do as they please; but, for disciplinary reasons, it is advisable that the young should sit in the assembly-room, holding their breath and keeping their senses under control; if, however, a novice is disturbed by talking and noise, he should be sent to the Shaikh's private apartment, that his attention may not be distracted, while the Shaikh himself maintains order in the assembly-room. Novices should be em-

ployed in 'service' (*ḫidma*) and sent to help their brethren who are engaged in devotion and contemplation, and who alone are excused from menial tasks. Service is a pious work, but the Ṣūfīs do not approve of asking any one who is not a Ṣūfī to serve them; for 'they are men, and things proceed from them, in the course of human nature, which are objectionable to a stranger ignorant of their aims.' Their refusal to associate with such a person is due to respect for his feelings, not because they deem themselves superior to any Muslim. The food of the monks was either provided by endowment or procured by begging. Only those were entitled to partake of it who were so occupied with God as not to be capable of earning their livelihood, or who were excused on the score of age, or who were authorized by the Shaikh to receive it in return for their labour. Unless the terms of the endowment necessitated a certain indulgence, it was a universal rule in Ṣūfī asceticism that no idler should eat the food of the convent. Suhrawardī recommends a forty days' seclusion (*arba'īnīya*) for prayer and fasting once a year. Solitude, he insists, has for its object a moral purification: it must not be sought on account of the visions and ecstasies which sometimes result from it. The disciple who goes into retirement (*ḫalwa*) should strip himself of the world and discard all that he possesses, and, after seeing that his clothes and his prayer-mat are clean, he should pray two *rak'as* and repent of his sins with weeping and humility. He ought not to leave his cell except for the public and Friday prayers (*ṣalāt al-jamā'a wa-ṣalāt al-jum'a*); on these occasions he should continue his *dhikr* and pay as little attention as possible to what he hears and sees, in order that he may not fall into temptation. During his retirement, he should perform ablutions regularly, and sleep only when overpowered by fatigue, and never cease from repeating his *dhikr* until he grows weary; then he must con it over in his heart, without any movement of his tongue (see *'Awārif*, chs. 26–28).

(*b*) ***Ascetic systems.***—European writers on Ṣūfīism are often inclined to identify it with pantheism and to lay undue stress on its transcendental flights, while they ignore its ascetic and ethical foundation. This is the 'path' (*ṭarīqa*) which every Ṣūfī must traverse before he can hope to reach the goal of his journey, and which is expounded at great length in the *Qūt al-qulūb* by Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī (ob. 996 A.D.) and other manuals written with a didactic purpose. In such works the different 'stations' (*maqāmāt*) of the 'path' are carefully mapped out, and the doctrines pertaining to each are explained and illustrated by means of Qur'ānic texts, traditions of the Prophet, and sayings or anecdotes of famous saints. All systems of Ṣūfī asceticism are based on the same materials; hence it is not surprising that one is very like another externally, however much they may diverge in spirit according to the author's individual point of view. It is not possible to describe any of them in detail here, but their broad outlines can be exhibited if we briefly examine the systematic treatment of the subject by Ghazālī (ob. 1111 A.D.) in his *Iḥyā*, which is a classical text-book of orthodox Ṣūfīism. Ghazālī does not address himself to Ṣūfīs alone; his aim is the revivification (*iḥyā*) of the Muhammadan religion, and he has no desire to make every Muslim a monk. Consequently, in the first half of the work he deals with the ordinary religious duties of purification, prayer, almsgiving, fasting, and pilgrimage; then with supererogatory acts of devotion, such as recitation of the Qur'ān, praise of God (*dhikr*), supplication (*du'ā*), and vigils; and discusses exhaustively the relation of religion to social life. Many of these topics, though bearing a wider application, belong to the preliminary stage—the 'law' (*sharī'a*), as it is technically named—of Ṣūfī asceticism, but in the third and fourth volumes of the *Iḥyā* Ghazālī unfolds the method adopted by the Ṣūfīs for attaining spiritual perfection. This method falls into two parts, which may be called *purgative* and *unitive*, inasmuch as the former purifies the heart by subduing the passions, while the latter leads to union with God by the acquisition of virtues and faculties. The principles of the *purgative* way are summarized as follows (*Iḥyā*, iii. 74. 15 ff.):—Before entering on his novitiate, the aspirant must renounce four things: wealth, reputation, mechanical conformity (*taqlīd*), and sin. He will then need a Shaikh to direct him. The Shaikh, to whom he must cling 'like a blind man on the bank of a river to his guide,' will provide him with four weapons against the assaults of Satan, viz. solitude, silence, fasting, and sleeplessness. Now begins what is generally a long inward struggle with the lusts and passions. When these have been vanquished, the novice should retire to his cell and perform only the obligatory acts of devotion, and continually repeat some *dhikr*, such as *Allāh! Allāh!* or *Subḥāna'llāh!* ('Glory to God!'), until the essential meaning of it has filled his heart. He must strive to banish every thought that is not of God, and to repel the evil suggestions with which Satan plies him. Whatever passes in his mind he should communicate to the Shaikh. Then, if the Shaikh knows that his pupil is intelligent and can be trusted rightly to apprehend the Divine reality (*ḥaqīqat*), he will bid him meditate assiduously, in order that illumination may enter his heart. Herein it behoves the Shaikh to exercise the greatest possible care, for this is a perilous matter, in which many novices, going beyond their depth, are utterly lost. The weak should be confined to what they are capable of understanding, *e.g.* simple faith and practical devotion. Those who occupy themselves with meditation have to beware of many pitfalls, such as vainglory, hypocrisy, delight in visions and miracles. After this *résumé* of the *purgative* way, Ghazālī treats in ample detail of the various passions and vices, from lust and gluttony to spiritual pride, their nature, symptoms, diagnosis, and the remedies which are most effectual in each case (*Iḥyā*, iii. 78–392). Finally, in the fourth volume of his work, he expounds the *unitive* way under the following heads: (1) repentance, (2) patience and thanksgiving, (3) fear and hope, (4) poverty and renunciation, (5) unification (*tauḥīd*) and trust in God, (6) love, desire, intimacy, and acquiescence, (7) intention, sincerity, and truth, (8) contemplation (*murāqaba*) and self-examination (*muḥāsaba*), (9) reflexion (*tafakkur*), (10) meditation on death and what comes after it. Similar scales of ascent occur in every system of Ṣūfī theosophy (see ṢŪFĪISM), and are possibly of Buddhistic origin (cf. Goldziher, in *JRAS*, 1904, p. 139 ff.). At any rate, Buddhism can be shown to have exerted a considerable influence on the practice and theory of mediæval Muslim asceticism; *e.g.* the use of rosaries and the custom of holding the breath were borrowed from Buddhist monks, whose example must also have powerfully affected the monastic ideals and institutions that reached a high degree of development in this period (cf. Goldziher, *loc. cit.* p. 125 ff.; von Kremer, *Culturgesch. Streifzüge*, p. 45 ff.).

4. Philosophical asceticism.—Suhrawardī (*'Awārif*, iii. 194 ff.) distinguishes the asceticism of the mystics, which illuminates the heart, from that practised by philosophers and materialists with the object of purifying the senses and thus facilitating the acquirement of the intellectual sciences: the latter, he says, leads to heresy. It assumes its

most interesting form in the so-called *zindīqs*, a name given by the Muslims to various kinds of heretics, particularly those who rejected positive religion and acknowledged only the moral law (for the derivation and meaning of *zindīq*, cf. E. G. Browne, *A Literary History of Persia*, 1902, i. 159 ff.; Nicholson, *A Literary History of the Arabs*, 1907, 372 ff.; and art. ATHEISM [Muh.]). Renunciation (*zuhd*) was characteristic of many on whom this epithet was bestowed. Some of them were undoubtedly influenced by Manichæan and Buddhistic ideas, but Muhammadan orthodoxy was apt to brand as 'free-thought' (*zandaqa*) any moral creed that was not built entirely on a dogmatic basis. Abu 'l-'Atāhiya (ob. 828 A.D.), though his poems are full of allusions to Paradise, Hell, and the Resurrection, was called a *zindīq* by his contemporaries, apparently because they suspected him of being a moralist in disguise; and they might have urged, with truth, that the prevailing tone of his poetry is ethical and reflective rather than religious. He sings the praises of asceticism, which he had adopted professionally in consequence, it is said, of a disappointment in love. 'The noblest of men,' he declares, 'is a king in the garb of a beggar,' *i.e.* an ascetic who is independent of the world and whose passions no longer enslave him; and again, 'those who are content with their lot are the truly free.' With much better reason the charge of heresy was brought against another celebrated Muslim poet, Abu 'l-'Alā al-Ma'arrī (see MA'ARRĪ). He too retired from a world where he had found only sorrow and failure. His asceticism, however, presents some peculiar features which it is possible, though hardly probable (cf. *JRAS*, 1902, p. 291), that he borrowed from the Indian Jains. He held that it was wrong to kill or injure any living creature, even a flea. His diet was strictly vegetarian; he abstained from fish and eggs as well as milk and honey. He wore a dress of undyed wool and wooden shoes, on the ground that no animal should be slaughtered to make leather of its skin. His celibacy was not monastic in character, but was the result of his belief that the best fate is non-existence, and that one ought to shrink from multiplying the misery of life. To pretend that such opinions and practices are typical of the moral philosophers of Islām would be unjust to Ma'arrī's eccentric and original genius. He resembled some of them in making asceticism an affair of the conscience and the understanding, an ingredient of the highest virtue instead of a stepping-stone to the Absolute. Others, like the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafā, or 'Brothers of Purity,' inculcate obedience to the Divine world-law and love of God, which 'gains in this life serenity of soul, freedom of heart, and peace with the whole world, and in the life to come ascension to Eternal Light.'

5. **Conclusion: the Dervish orders.**—As was said at the outset, this article is limited in scope, and deals only with the origin and main developments of Muslim asceticism. Nearly every Muhammadan sect could contribute something to a detailed history of the subject, and there are abundant Oriental sources for such a work, but in the present state of our knowledge a certain sketchiness is unavoidable. European writers have confined their researches almost exclusively to the modern Dervish orders, in which Ṣūfī asceticism and mysticism are carried as far as human nature can go. Some were founded before the Mongol Invasion (A.D. 1258), but since the 14th cent. they have branched out in all directions from Senegal in the west to China in the east. While basing their doctrine on the principles of mediæval Ṣūfiism, they have evolved a complex organization, extended the old practices, and introduced new ones. In some cases, too, their spirit and aims have been altered by the influence of environment and political circumstances. As regards the ascetic training which they impose on their members, naturally each order has its own rules, but they generally agree in the following points: (1) an elaborate ceremony of initiation, which is sometimes preceded by a long and arduous apprenticeship; (2) the wearing of a peculiar costume; (3) for neophytes, a severe discipline of solitude, prayer, fasting, and other austerities; (4) the immoderate use of *dhikr*, with the help of music, dancing, and diverse physical stimulants, to excite ecstasy; (5) belief in extraordinary spiritual powers vouchsafed to adepts and ecstatic persons, which they display by chewing live coals, charming snakes, predicting future events, etc.; (6) veneration, approaching to deification, of the Shaikh, or head of the order. If it is true that in most of their practices and beliefs the modern Dervishes had already been anticipated by the Ṣūfīs of the Middle Ages, from whom they are lineally descended, it is no less true that they have vulgarized Ṣūfiism by surrounding it with a network of mechanical routine, by exalting its thaumaturgy at the expense of its theosophy, and by associating its deepest mysteries with the performance of an orgiastic exercise. See article DERVISH.

LITERATURE.—Besides the references given in the article, students may consult, for early Muslim asceticism: von Kremer, *Gesch. der herrschenden Ideen des Islams*, 1868, p. 52 ff.; D. B. Macdonald, *Muslim Theology*, 1903, pp. 172–180; R. A. Nicholson, *A Literary History of the Arabs*, 1907, pp. 224–235; for Ṣūfī asceticism in the Middle Ages: Miguel Asin Palacios, *Algazel, dogmática, moral, ascética*, 1901; for philosophical asceticism: Goldziher, 'Sālih b. 'Abd al-Qaddūs und das Zindikthum während der Regierung des Chalifen al-Mahdī,' in *Transactions of the Ninth Congress of Orientalists*, 1893, vol. ii. p. 104 ff.; Dieterici, *Die Philosophie der Araber im X. Jahrhundert n. Chr.*, 1861–79; and for the asceticism of the Dervish orders: J. P. Brown, *The Dervishes or Oriental Spiritualism*, 1868; Depont and Coppolani, *Les Confréries religieuses musulmanes*, 1897.

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ASCETICISM (Persian).—An essential part of the meaning of the Zarathushtrian reform, viz. the care of cattle and pasture land, is given in 'The Complaint of the Soul of the Kine' in the *Ahunavaiti Gāthā*, *Yasna* xxix. This zeal for economics being inseparably connected with the new faith, the Prophet in his religion placed a distinct value on earthly goods and productive work, and introduced that strongly anti-ascetic tendency which separates the Avesta so widely from the higher Indian religion.

1. The Avesta moral code is not only negative ('Thou shalt not,' etc.), but also contains positive duties. In its origin it is the ethics of cattle-breeding. Zarathushtra himself was the first "meadow-keeping cattle rearer' (*vāstryō-fšuyąs*, *Yasht* xiii. 89), as well as the first priest and the first warrior. The *Gāthās* do not know any but pasture land. By the time of the later Avesta agriculture has appeared. *Vendīdād* iii. mentions the five places which are the happiest on this earth: (1) where one of the faithful is worshipping; (2) where one of the faithful erects a house with a priest therein, with cattle, a wife, children, and good herds, and where all these treasures of life are prospering; (3) where most corn and fruit trees are cultivated, and where water is led into a poorly watered soil (a later glosser has added, 'and where dryness is brought to a watery soil,' ditching being later than artificial irrigation); (4) where flocks and herds increase most; and (5) where flocks and herds yield most urine. The life-long fight against the demons means cultivating the ground, sheltering the plants from drought and frost, spreading cultivation over land strenuously conquered from the wild. Activity has always been one of the first principles of Zarathushtrianism.

Among the later writings of the Parsis, *Sad Dar* lxxxi. 10 inculcates: 'Every good work which thou art able to do to-day do not postpone for to-morrow, and accomplish with thine own hand the counsel of thine own soul'; and in *Ganje-shāyagān* (§ 126) one-third of the day (and night) is given to religious duties, one-third to the cultivation of the ground (the eight hours' working day!), and one-third to eating and sleeping.

2. The following objections are raised against ascetic principles:—

(1) Wife and children make a man superior to him who is not married (*Vend.* iv. 47). A young woman without children needs a husband, just as uncultivated ground needs cultivation. The good husband receives fruit from both (*Vend.* iii. 24–25).

Zarathushtra is of Divine origin—the heavenly glory (see art. AGES OF THE WORLD [Zoroastrian], vol. i. p. 205 f.) entered his grandmother (*Dīnkart* VII. ii. 2 ff., 14; VIII. xiv. 1). But nowhere is an attempt made to eliminate his father in the flesh. Such an idea would be opposed to the Mazdayasnian ideal of holiness. The psychological relation of the union of Zarathushtra's parents in *Dīnkart* VII. ii. 48–52 may be a criterion:

'Both have embraced the first time with desire for a son, and the demons shouted out unto them, in the villainous speech of sinfulness, thus: "Why shouldst thou act like this, vile Pōrūshāspō?," whereupon they started up like people who were ashamed.' The same experience was repeated a second and a third time. 'And they spoke with one another about it, and continued at this duty, and accomplished it, saying: "We will not so stop without accomplishing something, not even though both Rāk and Nōdar should arrive here together." Then that manchild, who was the righteous Zarathūsht, became complete . . . in the womb of his mother.'

The Mazdayasnian has to recite the *Ahuna-Vairya* (*q.v.*) and the *Ashem* when he goes in to his wife (*Dīnkart* IX. xix. 8).

(2) The man who owns a house is superior to him who does not (*Vend.* iv. 47).

(3) Fasting is a sin. Without eating no one has strength for a vigorous piety, for cultivating the ground, for begetting strong children (*Vend.* iii. 33). The man who nourishes and develops his body through the eating of meat takes in more of *vohūman* ('good thought') than he who does not (*Vend.* iv. 48). The man who teaches or practises fasting is an *ashemaogha*, a destroyer of piety and of the holy law, and deserves punishment (*Vend.* iv. 49).

A well-known passage of the Parsi treatise *Sad Dar* lxxxiii. forbids fasting: 'In our religion it is a sin to pass a day without eating. To us fasting means to fast from sin with the eye, with the tongue, with the ear, with the hand, with the foot.'

According to al-Bīrūnī, the person who fasted was considered by the Zarathushtrians as a sinner, and had to feed a certain number of men as an expiation (*Chronology*, tr. Sachau, p. 217).

(4) All practices of mortification are prohibited. The Pahlavi paraphrase of the *Varshtmānsar Nask* of the Sasanian Avesta attributes the self-tortures prescribed by Mani to the Evil One (*Dīnkart* IX. 39).

The ascetics whose doctrines are opposed in the Pahlavi writings can be identified, even if they are not expressly mentioned, as Mani in the Pahlavi *Varshtmānsar Nask* and Mazdak in the Pahlavi commentary to *Vend.* iv. 49 ('Mazdak, son of Bāmdāt'). The chief form of asceticism opposed besides Manichæism was Christianity. During the persecutions of the Sasanians, marriage was not infrequently offered as an alternative to death.

The ascetics referred to in the *Vendīdād* may have been Christians (Darmesteter) or Manichæans (Spiegel). But it seems equally probable that ascetic doctrines were well known and practised in Iran before them. The Babylonian religion had unmarried brides of gods. In India the great ascetic methods of salvation were ancient.

3. Penalties, imposed for offences against the Avesta law, often illustrate the anti-ascetic tendency, inasmuch as those punishments themselves do not consist in sufferings, but in positive useful work. The requirements of penance and agriculture are fulfilled at the same time. In some Avesta fragments of the manuscript *Tahmuras* and in some of the book of ritual ceremonies, *Nīrangistān*, the degree of penalty incurred partly by omissions or smaller inadvertencies in the ritual, and appointed to be three cuts with the lash (*sraoshō-karana*, 'the instrument of obedience'), is commuted into a day's work in the fields (Fragments of *Tahmuras*, xii. 11, 12; Fragments of *Nīrangistān*, 42, 43, 69, 83, 109; *AMG* xxiv. 55 f., 105 ff.). If the penance inflicted by *Vendīdād* xiv. upon the man who has killed an otter belongs to the ideals never realized, it is nevertheless very characteristic. He must, among other penalties, kill thousands of snakes, lizards, frogs, ants, worms, and flies. He must give to good men the instruments of a priest, of a warrior, and of a farmer. He must make ditches for irrigation, and make a gift to good men of cultivated ground, a byre, and a beautiful bedstead. He must give a young virgin as wife to a good man. He must make a gift of small cattle. He has to bring up twice seven puppies, and make twice seven bridges over ditches. He must cleanse twice nine dogs from vermin, and let twice nine Mazdayasnians get a good square meal of meat, bread, strong drink, and wine (cf. quotation from al-Bīrūnī under 2 (3) above, and *Vend.* xviii. 73-74, where the killing of snakes, frogs, and ants, and the building of bridges over water belong to the punishment for sexual intercourse at forbidden times). All animals considered as bad and noxious are called *khrafstra*, and it is a most meritorious work to kill them. This is very different from the view of Lao-tse, from Indian, and from mediæval Ṣūfī and Christian asceticism and mysticism.

LITERATURE.—Darmesteter *AMG* xxii. 61 ff.; E. Lehmann, *Zarathushtra* (1899–1902), ii.; Henry, *Le Parsisme* (1905); Rastamji Edulji Dastoor Peshotan Sanjana, *Zarathushtra and Zarathushtrianism in the Avesta* (1906); Söderblom, 'Du génie du Mazdéisme,' in *Mélanges Charles de Harlez* (1896).

NATHAN SÖDERBLOM.

ASCETICISM (Roman).—1. For the purposes of this article 'asceticism' may be taken roughly to mean self-discipline, prompted either by the authority of religion or by philosophic reflexion upon life, or by a combination of both these forces. The early Roman religion, so far as we can trace its features, was not to any appreciable extent swayed by the yearnings which in the Orient gave rise to asceticism at a time immemorially remote. The primitive Romans deemed that their shadowy and impalpable divinities were under compact with the community whose exclusive property they were. They asked of their worshippers no burdensome price for the favour which they accorded. The sacrifices required by them were trifling, though the ritual of circumstance and language connected with them was complicated, and needed to be carried out with the utmost precision. The idea of a taint or impurity, displeasing to the gods, and attaching to individuals, to masses of men, or to places, and to be cleansed away only by purificatory ceremony, is old enough in Roman religion. But the expiation was easy, and called for little in the nature of self-suppression. Some of the primitive servants of the gods, particularly the Flamen of Juppiter and the Vestal Virgins, were subjected to strong ceremonial restrictions in their lives. But these resembled the religious tabus prevalent among backward races, rather than any genuine

ascetic discipline. The Roman *feriæ*, or public religious celebrations, though requiring a cessation of labour and ordinary occupations, were, for the most part, joyous in character. Even the services to appease the dead and the powers of the nether world, or to avert the wrath of heaven as declared by prodigies, were not accompanied by practices of an ascetic character.

2. It is probable that the idea of self-sacrifice as an element in religion was first made conspicuous to the Romans by some of the forms of worship which were imported from without into the Roman State. The rare traces of human sacrifice at Rome in obedience to superstition or religion may safely be referred to a foreign origin. Such an elementary ascetic form as the *fast* was not regarded by Varro as belonging to the real Roman ritual, but as a feature of the *Græcus ritus*. The earliest mention of it is in a fragment of the *Bellum Punicum* of Nævius (quoted by Nonius Marcellus, p. 197 M: 'res divas edicit, prædicit castus'). The special name for a fast, *castus* (a noun), is of doubtful derivation. The adjective *castus* implied originally purity achieved not by self-discipline but by ceremonial observance of no very exacting nature.

3. Such discipline as the early Roman underwent was not self-imposed or required by religion, but was laid upon him by his country. There was no limit to the sacrifices which she might demand of him; but only in rare cases had these a religious significance. This was particularly true of the ceremony called *devotio*, by which a commander in the field, using a solemn formula, vowed himself to death, thereby binding the gods to bestow the victory on his army (Livy, viii. 6–10). But even in such circumstances, if the enemy failed to kill the willing victim, it was possible, in true Roman fashion, to cheat the gods by burying a human image and raising a mound over it.

4. We must look, therefore, for traces of asceticism to those cults which Rome and the West adopted from Greece and the East. The fast (*castus* or *jejunium*) enjoined upon a deity's worshippers first appears in connexion with Ceres. Although her name is Latin, all her ritual in historic times was Greek, and her station in the official religion was first assigned to her in the earliest days of the Republic by the custodians of the Sibylline books, who controlled the immigration of alien divinities. Her priestesses were Greeks brought from the towns of lower Italy (Cicero, *pro Balbo*, 55). As she became a chief patroness of the plebeians and the poor, her cult grew in popularity, and new services were grafted on the old. In B.C. 191 a fast in imitation of a Greek νηστεία was instituted in her honour, and was celebrated annually on Oct. 4. By a paradox not uncommon in the history of religion, Ceres, who bestowed the boon of bread, was honoured by abstinence from bread (Fest. p. 154; Arnob. v. 16). The fast may also have indicated a participation in the sorrow of the mother (Ceres-Demeter) for the loss of her child (Libera-Persephone). Also in August a vigil was maintained during nine nights by women worshippers, and was accompanied by a strict rule of chastity. This led to Ceres being regarded as a divinity who presided over divorce, though she was commonly reckoned as one of the patronesses of wedlock. An inscription found at Bologna, and of at least as early a date as 200 B.C., seems to point to a *castus* by which Juno Lucina and Juppiter were propitiated (Ritschl, *Prisc. Lat. Monumenta*, Suppl. 11, 12).

5. A few years before the time at which the *jejunium Cereris* was introduced, the Magna Mater, the Great Mother of the gods, who dwelt especially on Mount Ida, was officially welcomed at Rome. This was due to the superstition which was generated in the minds of the people by the disasters of the Second Punic War, when the Roman gods seemed insufficient to sustain the Roman power, and a yearning arose for aid from the gods of other lands. The formless stone, which in the temple of the Great Mother at Pessinus in Galatia was venerated as her type, was brought to Rome and enshrined on the Palatine. The ritual of the goddess was frenzied and orgiastic. For the first time self-mutilation was accepted by authority at Rome as pleasing to Heaven. The favourite of the Great Mother, commemorated in her ceremonies, was the mythical Attis, who gave his name to the weird poem of Catullus. At first the priests of the goddess were imported from her original home, as their name (*Galli*) indicated, and Romans were forbidden to take office under her. But as early as B.C. 77 a breach of the rule took place, and during the Imperial period the priests and priestesses were all Roman. The worship became more and more elaborated as time went on, and it grew in popularity till it spread far and wide in the West.

6. Closely connected with the Magna Mater was the great rite of the *Taurobolium*, with its minor form, the *Criobolium* (*qq.vv.*). Its history and nature are in several respects obscure, but its essence was that the adherent of the goddess should be penetrated with a sense of impurity, of which he is rid by being drenched with the blood of a slain bull or ram. A famous inscription (*CIL* vi. 510) relates how, after undergoing the *taurobolium* and *criobolium*, a worshipper 'was born again for eternal life' (*renatus in æternum*). This ritual sprang up in the 2nd cent. A.D., and its earliest traceable home was the Vatican mount, where St. Peter's now stands. The fame of this ceremonial is significant of that great change which passed over the Western world during and after the 1st cent. A.D., when the passage was made from general scepticism to general belief and superstition, and a curious sense of guilt in the face of heaven became prevalent, with a longing to find means for purging it away. Renunciation and the repression of desire were to some extent demanded by all the worships of the East which encountered this changed spirit and endeavoured to satisfy it. The satisfaction offered was, of course, to a large extent ceremonial and magical, and sometimes, to our ideas, flagrantly unethical. But the Eastern cults in their westward march dropped most of their baser features, and, on the whole, introduced new and better conceptions of Divine power. It was possible for speculating Romans to identify the Magna Mater and also Bellona,* whose respectability in Asia Minor was not beyond question, with the divinized idea of Virtue.

7. As is well known, the soldiers who served Rome, whether Romans or aliens, and passed from land to land, were greatly instrumental in carrying westward the Eastern cults. Some of these failed for a time to obtain authoritative recognition, and were merely tolerated by Government (with occasional suppression), because of their acceptability to the people at large. But by the 3rd cent. the Roman Emperors practically abandoned the attempt to hurl back the Oriental deities who were invading Italy and the capital of the empire. A cult which long remained unofficially popular was that of the Cappadocian divinity Má, a form of the Great Mother, whose acquaintance the Roman soldiers made when Sulla penetrated into the country of the goddess. We have in Strabo (p. 535) a reference to her temple at Comana, with 6000 servants attached, whose forms of veneration were often far

* A Cappadocian goddess who must not be confused with the Roman deity of the same name (cf. Cumont, *Les Religions orientales*, Paris, 1907, p. 66 f.).

from reputable. She was identified by the Romans with the old Italian goddess Bellona. The populace of the West became familiar with the spectacle of hierophants in procession with strange garb, who cut themselves with the double axe and sprinkled the mob with their blood, while they uttered frantic prophecies. The priests wandered about making collections, like the begging friars of the Middle Ages.

8. Egyptian divinities, especially Isis, early made their way into the Greek districts of Italy and into Etruria. The cult of Isis ultimately had extraordinary ramifications all over the Empire, but particularly in the West, and it exercised an especial fascination over women. Stringent bodily abstinence and a sort of penance were marked features of her worship, which took upon it manifold forms. Its elaborated ritual, its perpetual services carried on (as few were) day by day, its mystical character, its discipline preceding initiation in ascending grades, the duties which its ceremonies provided for the multitude, as well as for the priests, and the brotherhoods in which the worshippers were united and in some sort fenced off from the outer world—all these characteristics proved strongly attractive to the lower classes, so that Christians of the earlier centuries saw in Isis a formidable enemy of Christ. And she contributed, indeed, to Western culture elements which penetrated into the texture of the Church. Her worship was at first regarded with disfavour by the Government, but it advanced irrepressibly, as the literature of the Augustan age and later abundantly proves.

9. There was also an influx of deities from Syria. The *Dea Syria* had close affinities with the Magna Mater and Bellona, and the priests and worshippers of these three heavenly beings were often seen in company, particularly in the last age of Paganism, when a dim consciousness of one great God beyond and above the separate divinities became prevalent. Another immigrant from Syria was the Sun-god, who played a great part in the reign of Elagabulus and later. But more important than these was the mighty Persian deity Mithra, often identified with the Sun-god. The strongly developed discipline, the advancement of the worshipper in mystic fellowship from grade to grade, and the community of the sacred brotherhoods rendered this cult highly fascinating to the West. Even in barbaric regions never wholly Romanized, numerous altars dedicated to Mithra and other traces of his worship have been found (see article MITHRAISM).

10. These new forms of worship supplied to the Italic peoples elements which were wanting in the indigenous religions—the satisfaction which comes of self-sacrifice for heaven's sake, the sensation of mystical awe and an elevation of soul born of intercommunion with the deity, also oftentimes a hope of life in a world beyond the grave. In the hard primitive life of the early Italian farmer the lack of these elements was not felt, but the expanded life of later times welcomed their advent. Mysteries of a Greek type, with symbolic ceremonies partly reminiscent of religion, partly embodying ideas that originated in the philosophic schools, seem to have begun to spread to the Italic races as early as the days of the Punic Wars. To these mysteries ascetic practices were often attached. How ready the soil was to receive and develop the seeds of these new devotions was shown by the rapid spread of the movement called by the Roman Government the 'Bacchanalian conspiracy,' which was violently suppressed in B.C. 186. The Bacchic mysteries, taking root in the Greek districts of Italy, drew into connexion with them multitudes of Italic race and large numbers of Roman citizens. Many thousands were executed by authority of the senate, after inquiry which recalls the drumhead court-martial, in defiance of the laws which guaranteed fair trial to the Roman burgess. The criminal nature of the 'conspiracy' was assumed, but never proved. The secrecy of the worship, then a strange and unfamiliar feature, produced an atmosphere of panic, generating visions of crime such as arose in the Gentile world from the mysterious nature of the early Christian observances. In later centuries, 'mysteries,' connected with some mythical or semi-mythical founder such as Orpheus or Pythagoras, or with some definite divinity, were popular in the West, but the information which has come down to us concerning them is defective.

11. The prevalence of the rites and practices to which reference has been made must have greatly changed, in the course of centuries, the primitive Roman and Italian sense of the relation between the Divine powers and man. The claims of the gods upon man were felt to be more exacting than had been imagined in early days, requiring a toll of human suffering, sometimes physical, sometimes consisting in a sharp repression of many of the desires and ambitions of the average human being. The object of the discipline was in some way to cleanse the worshipper from a taint of impurity which he conceived to stand between himself and his divinity. The sense of sin often had a merely superstitious, ceremonial, or mechanical origin, but more and more of a moral and truly religious leaven mingled with it as time went on. Rome contained a large Oriental population, mostly descendants of slaves brought from the East; these contributed to the gradual transformation of ideas which proceeded through the centuries. Juvenal (*Sat.* iii. 62–65), it will be remembered, declared that the Syrian Orontes had long since debouched into the Tiber, and many other Eastern races besides the Syrian were abundantly represented at Rome. In the orientalizing of religious sentiment, the Jews played a certain part. The populace of the capital were as familiar with Jewish ideas as the rulers of the Empire were ostentatiously ignorant of them. The action of the Christian element on the pagan cults of the West, though important, is hard to measure, and has often been over-estimated.

12. But another potent influence mingled with that of religion, and promoted a change in the moral atmosphere—the influence of philosophy. The first conspicuous example of asceticism within the bounds of Italy is seen in the extension among the Greek towns of the brotherhood founded by Pythagoras. The Roman antiquarians of the late Republic believed that early Rome itself had been influenced by the great philosopher, whose personality had already been dissolved away by legend. Down to the latest Imperial times there never ceased to exist in Italy men who called themselves his followers. The name 'Pythagorean' came to stand for simplicity of life, and for quiet of mind secured by self-suppression, self-discipline, and abstinence. Doctrines and ideas connected with the mythical name of Pythagoras entered into many of the late forms of religion and philosophy in the West. Apollonius of Tyana (*q.v.*), who was at Rome in the time of the Flavians, was supposed to be the great exponent of Pythagoreanism on its moral and religious side. This figure, like that of Pythagoras, was soon encrusted by myth. The romantic biography written by Philostratus during the reign of Septimius Severus is charged with 'Pythagorean' ideas, and is deeply coloured by asceticism.

13. But the vogue of the Pythagorean school never extended very far. The force of Stoicism in the Western world was vastly greater and more

pervading. The educated class at Rome began to be affected by it in the middle of the 2nd cent. B.C.; and the influence continued and grew until the Imperial system was submerged. The Roman character, as formed in the hard school of early military service, and of that subjection to authority in which Rome had found the secret of conquest, responded more readily to the call of Stoicism than to any other creed framed in the philosophic schools of Hellas. When the days of luxury and corruption came, the ideal Roman heroes were such men as Cincinnatus, summoned from the plough to command the State; Curius Dentatus, receiving the envoys of the Samnites while he cooked his herbs over the fire; Decius and Regulus, self-devoted to death for their country's sake. In the Augustan age, the Stoic and the ideal Roman were felt to be closely akin. There is a Stoic breath in the pessimism of Livy and Vergil, and the hope of their times for a new Golden Age and a great moral reform was often tinged by Stoic influence. It was not unnatural that many of the national heroes of later creation should be Stoics: Rutilius, 'the Roman Socrates,' who suffered on a false charge of the very crimes which he had repressed, Cato of Utica, Paetus Thrasea, and Helvidius Priscus. Even the Stoics who had opposed his predecessors on the throne, were heroes and martyrs in the eyes of Marcus Aurelius.

14. Like all the other Greek philosophies of the later time, late Stoicism laid peculiar stress on conduct, and paid comparatively little heed to old theological and cosmological speculation. It carried to a higher pitch than other schemes the enthusiasm for morality, which it raised almost to the level of a religion. A school which proclaimed the worthlessness of all ambitions except the ambition to achieve pure virtue within the soul, which regarded 'Nature' as the teacher of all simplicity, which deemed that man most god-like who had the smallest wants and the most perfect control over his desires, which enjoined absolute submission to a Divine order, and aimed at complete harmony between the individual and the Divine will, could claim affinity with what the best Romans regarded as the true Roman spirit. The Stoic made higher moral claims than other teachers; he was therefore more severely judged by the outside world. It has been easy for the detractor in ancient and modern times to contrast the professions of many Roman Stoics with their practice, and so to exhibit their school as worthless. In equally easy fashion has the worthlessness of Christianity often been alleged. It is certain that for the Romans, and for Western society generally, during many generations Stoicism was a leaven which worked powerfully for good, transforming the noblest natures most, but more subtly affecting the tone of life over a wide area. Profoundly influencing Roman law, and creating an atmosphere which the early Church inhaled, the ideal pursued by the Roman Stoics has transmitted much to the culture of the modern world. In particular, the growth of asceticism within the early Church was made easier because society was permeated with Stoic ideas and ideas akin to them.

15. The Cynic School, which was well represented in the Imperial age, exaggerated all the ascetic elements in Stoicism. Some of the Stoics even pronounced Cynicism 'a short road to wisdom.' Cynicism was indeed Stoicism 'heated seven times more than it was wont to be heated.' Epictetus draws a striking picture of the true Cynic (*Diss.* iii. 22). He has thoroughly accepted the old Greek doctrine, which left its traces in many systems, that the body is the tomb of the spirit. The soul must turn to God for release, and liken itself to Him, so far as human strength will go, and must regard all material conditions as hampering and evil. But ascetic features were not wanting to many other sects besides the Cynics and the Stoics. They were conspicuous even in the much maligned Epicurean School. Although the motive power in human action was differently viewed by Stoics and Epicureans, yet the practical road to happiness laid down by both was much the same. The would-be happy man must learn to control, to limit, and to repress his desires, and to make himself independent of all that lies beyond his own power. Epicurus could rival Zeus in happiness on a diet of bread and water; and it was a maxim among Epicureans that the man of perfect wisdom would not cease to be happy if he were stretched upon the rack. Human misery was held to spring in large part from the mistaken value set on things external to the soul—the rest of it being due to superstition. Like other moral and all religious schemes, Epicureanism could be distorted and travestied, and could stray far away from the lines laid down for it by its founders and leaders. But true Epicureanism and true Stoicism were two trees which bore much the same moral fruit, however unlike they might be at the roots. Many of the most ascetic lessons in morality which are laid down by Seneca were drawn from the writings of the Epicurean brotherhood.

16. Platonism was early influenced by Stoicism, and the Neo-Platonic movement of the third and later centuries resumed and enforced the ascetic elements in the earlier systems. Philosophic sects and cliques other than those which have been named also existed; and nearly all showed some drift towards asceticism. But the most important movement of all was that great missionary movement which began early in the period of the Empire. Philosophers, often Cynics, but often also calling themselves by other names, left their studies and went forth into the streets of the great cities and preached to the people, urging them to change their lives and to follow after purity and abstinence, and to listen to the Divine call. The bearded preachers, wandering from city to city in coarse attire, have often reminded the modern student of the poor friars of the Middle Ages, who might have used without change many of the phrases uttered by their Stoic, Cynic, or Epicurean predecessors. Indeed, some of their utterances ring very like those of the 'revivalist' of modern days. Refined triflers like Lucian ridiculed and vilified these enthusiasts, but the common people heard them gladly, and thronged to drink in their lessons. Doubtless some impostors traded on this demand for instruction; but when every deduction has been made on account of the sounder ancient criticism, such as that by Epictetus, it would be unreasonable to doubt that these teachers did stir among the lower grades of society some yearnings after a better life. We cannot measure their influence with precision, but they must have contributed to swell the tide which bore Christianity on to its assured triumph. That the philosophic influences in the late Empire were far from worthless is seen by the example of Boethius, who, Christian as he was, found his chief consolation in philosophy.

LITERATURE.—Information bearing on this subject is to be sought in the great modern works bearing on Roman religion and on late ancient philosophy. Among them may be mentioned: Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer* (Munich, 1902); Réville, *La Religion romaine sous les Sévères* (Paris, 1886); G. Boissier, *La Fin du paganisme* (Paris, 1894); F. Cumont, *Textes et monuments figurés relatifs aux mystères de Mithra* (2 vols., Brussels, 1895–99), and *The Mysteries of Mithra* (Eng. tr. from 2nd Fr. ed., Chicago, 1903); Zeller, *History of Greek Philosophy* (2 vols., London, 1881); Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius* (London, 1904); and A. Gasquet, *Le Culte et les mystères de Mithra* (Paris, 1899).

J. S. REID

ASCETICISM (Semitic and Egyptian).—Asceticism, if it means the habitual renunciation of the things of the flesh as a self-discipline for the purpose of cultivating the things of the spirit, was unknown among the old heathen Semites and Egyptians. Asceticism is fundamentally based on a dualistic conception of the universe. It is justified only by the belief that matter is inherently corrupt—that it is the work, in whole or in part, of a being other than the Creator of the soul. Such a conception had no existence among either Semites or Egyptians. To the Semites in the earliest times the soul was simply the physical breath. It sometimes in later periods designated the inner nature of man, and thus was often used for the self, but it was always closely connected with the body, and was never conceived as of such a different order of existence that it could be benefited by the destruction of the body. That God who had made the body breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul (Gn 2^{7}), is the general Semitic conception. The soul was no holier than the body, for both were the work of the same deity. So dependent was the soul on the body, that after death the soul's existence was confined to the under world where the body had been placed—a dark and gloomy region, where it led a miserable and half-animate existence (see 'Ishtar's Descent,' *KB* vi. 80–91; Dhorme, *Choix de textes*, 326–341; or *Bab. and Assyr. Literature*, Aldine ed., 408–413; also Is $14^{9ff.}$ and Ezk 32^{18-32}). So closely was the soul associated with the body, that later, when Semites came to believe in a resurrection, they necessarily held to the resurrection of the physical body. Indeed, the early Semitic conception of the manifestation of divinity through the processes of procreation (see Barton, *Semitic Origins*, ch. iii.) shows that their conceptions were removed as far as possible from asceticism.

The Egyptian conception of the soul was different. They held it to be a concrete entity, impalpable during life, which had its residence in the body, but left it at the moment of death. Another entity was the *ka*—an impalpable something connected with every man. Whether it was his double, or his guardian spirit or genius, is not clear (see Steindorff, *Rel. of the Anc. Egyptians*, 121 f.). These were not, however, considered holier than the body, nor were their interests promoted by its destruction. On the contrary, the body had to be preserved for their use, and so preserved that each soul could recognize its own body; hence the great efforts made in Egypt to mummify the bodies of the dead.

It is clear, therefore, that among the peoples of whom we are speaking the fundamental thought-basis of asceticism did not exist. There are some phenomena, nevertheless, in the religions of these peoples which might to a superficial thinker seem to contradict this view. These must be briefly considered.

1. *Fasting* was practised by the Egyptians (Herod. ii. 40), by the Babylonians and Assyrians as is shown by their penitential hymns (cf. Zimmern, *Babylonische Busspsalmen*, 34; and *Bab. and Assyr. Lit.*, Aldine ed., pp. 434, 437), by the Hebrews (cf. 1 K $21^{9.\ 12}$, Lv $16^{29.\ 31}$ 23^{27-32} etc.), and by the Arabs, as is shown by the great fast of the month Ramaḍān, which has been taken over into Islām. A careful study of Semitic and Egyptian fasting makes it clear that it was not an ascetic practice. W. R. Smith (*Rel. of Sem.*[2] 434 ff.) held that in the beginning Semitic fasting was a preparation of the body for the reception of holy food—a view which Benzinger shares ('Fasting,' in *EBi*). This is evidently the conception of it which the Egyptians entertained, if Herodotus may be trusted, for he says the fasting was immediately followed by a sacrifice and a banquet. In the later development of Semitic thought among the Babylonians and Hebrews, fasting was undoubtedly regarded as a means of expressing penitence for sin, and of exciting the pity of the offended deity. This is the view which is expressed in the penitential psalms. It is based, however, on their conception of sin, and, as is shown below, that had nothing to do with asceticism.

2. Another practice which might be interpreted by some to indicate the presence of asceticism was the *abstinence from sexual intercourse* under certain conditions. Thus 'to lie with a woman having her sickness' was tabu (Lv 20^{18}). This was not, however, a manifestation of asceticism, but the tabu arose from the belief that menstruation was a manifestation of Divine power with which it was dangerous to come into contact. Herodotus tells us that among the Babylonians and Arabs all sexual intercourse was followed by purification (i. 198), which means simply that it was regarded as an especially Divine process (cf. W. R. Smith, 425 ff., 446 ff.). Sexual intercourse was also tabu among both Egyptians and Semites within the holy precincts of a sanctuary (cf. Herod. ii. 64, and W. R. Smith, 45 ff. and 481 ff.). This was the case even when sacred prostitutes were connected with the temples, for these were careful to take their partners outside the sacred precincts (cf. Herod. i. 199). It was also prohibited to warriors—war being to the ancients a holy function—and often to people under a vow. While the origin of these tabus is not altogether clear, they had nothing to do with asceticism. The tabu relating to holy places does not apparently belong to the earliest stratum of Semitic religious thought, for in the earliest period sexual licence appears to have formed a part of the religious feasts (cf. Barton, *Sem. Or.* 110). Probably at first sexual pleasures were tabued to those on pilgrimage for a reason similar to that which prescribed fasting, viz. that the body might be the better prepared for the holy function at the festival. The tabu may afterwards have been applied to the holy place as an extension of this, or may have existed from the first lest the exercise of such a holy function in a sacred spot would make it too dangerous for one afterwards to mingle with his fellows. The application of the tabu to warriors is an extension of the tabu attaching to the holy place. Sexual intercourse was also renounced by those under a vow, perhaps for the same reason that food was sometimes renounced, *i.e.* as a motive for the early performance of the vow (cf. Ac 23^{14}). In any case these tabus do not spring from ascetic principles.

3. The conception of *sin* which is found in the OT, the Babylonian penitential psalms, and in lesser degree in the Qur'ān (cf. Toy, *Judaism and Christianity*, 183 ff.; Morgenstern, *The Doctrine of Sin in the Babylonian Religion*, 1905; and Qur'ān, iv. 35), has no ascetic foundation. This consciousness of sin arose from the want of harmony between environment and life, or the disparity between prosperity and merit, and had nothing to do with ascetic conceptions.

There were two apparent exceptions in ancient Semitic life to the statements made above: the Essenes (*q.v.*) in Judæa, and the *rāhibs*, *sā'iḥs*, and *ḥanīfs*, who existed in Arabia at the beginning of Muhammad's career (see ASCETICISM [Muslim]). These were, however, not real exceptions, as in each case the impulse to ascetic practices came from non-Semitic sources.

The fullest contemporary description of the *Essenes* is in Josephus, *BJ* ii. 8. It appears that sunrise was a sacred time to them, though

Josephus does not, like Appian, imply that they worshipped the rising sun. The other ascetic traits connected with them were that they lived in brotherhoods, avoided trade, paid great attention to ceremonial purity, and some of them renounced marriage. Some regard this last as a natural heightening of Levitical purity, because priests had to be purified from sexual contact before performing priestly functions; others look upon it as a practice which could spring only from a dualistic conception of the universe, such as we find in Zoroastrianism. The reverence for the rising sun also points in the direction of Persian influence. Josephus makes it clear that the Essenes were confined to no locality, but were a brotherhood, about 4000 in number, scattered through the cities of Palestine. How the Persian influence reached them may be variously explained, but from the time of Cyrus the channels through which it might come were open.

Among the Arabs, the *rāhibs*, or monks, the *sā'iḥs*, or wanderers, and the *ḥanīfs*, who were regarded as a kind of monk, were probably imitations of Christian monks. We learn from the pre-Islāmic Arabian poetry in what high regard the Christian monks were held during that period. In the break-up of Arabian heathenism it was no wonder that men endeavoured to find satisfaction in the way of life which was followed by these monks and anchorites. Monasticism (*q.v.*) entered Christianity from non-Semitic sources, and in a mild form was transmitted by Christianity to Arabia. The same is true of Egypt, though monasticism in Egypt was Christian, and became much more intense than in Arabia. It was grafted on to Egyptian life, however, from a foreign source.

LITERATURE.—W. R. Smith, *Religion of the Semites*[2], 1894; Barton, *Sketch of Semitic Origins, Social and Religious*, 1902; Steindorff, *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, 1903; Erman, *Die ägyptische Religion*, 1905; Toy, *Judaism and Christianity*, 1891; Schürer, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes*[3], 1898–1901; Bousset, *Religion des Judentums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter*[2], 1906; Josephus, *BJ*, bk. ii. ch. 8; Zimmern, *Babylonische Busspsalmen*, 1885, *Babylonische Hymnen und Gebete*, 1905; Jastrow, *Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*, 1902 to date; Morgenstern, *The Doctrine of Sin in the Babylonian Religion*, 1905; Macdonald, *Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence, and Constitutional Theory*, 1903, which cites much Muhammadan literature. GEORGE A. BARTON.

AL-ASH'ARĪ.—Abū al-Ḥasan 'Alī ibn Ismā'īl al-Ash'arī was born at Baṣra in A.H. 260 (A.D. 873), of a noble and ancient Arab family; several of his ancestors held high offices in the State, and it was one of them, Abū Mūsā al-Ash'arī, Governor of Kūfa, who after the battle of Ṣiffīn represented the cause of 'Alī in the arbitration that resulted in the proclamation of Mu'āwiya as Khalīf (A.D. 658). Of his father little is known except that he was an orthodox Muslim, a student of the Traditions, and a friend of the Shāfi'ite legist Zakarīyā ibn Yaḥyā al-Sājī. Baṣra had long been a centre of active religious controversy, and had been the home of some of the most famous teachers of the Mu'tazilite school, such as Wāṣil ibn 'Aṭā, Abū al-Hudhayl, and others, and at this period—the end of the 3rd cent. of the Hijra—Abū 'Alī Muḥammad al-Jubbā'ī was famous there as the greatest living exponent of the Mu'tazilite doctrines. Al-Ash'arī seems soon to have broken away from the orthodox influences of his home and to have become a zealous Mu'tazilite as the pupil of al-Jubbā'ī. Until his 40th year, he attended al-Jubbā'ī's lectures and took an active part in the disputations of his school; having a ready wit and an engaging delivery, he was not infrequently called upon by his master to take his place, whenever al-Jubbā'ī was not prepared to lead the discussion. We have no certain information as to the mental processes through which al-Ash'arī passed before he abandoned the Mu'tazilite position, at the age of 40, and went over to the orthodox party. His biographer gives the following dramatic account of the manner in which he publicly announced his conversion: 'He shut himself up in his house for fifteen days and refused to see any one; then making his way to the great mosque of Baṣra, he went up into the pulpit and cried out, "O assembly, I have absented myself from among you so long only because I have been absorbed in meditation, for the opposing doctrines seemed to me to be equally balanced, and the true did not outweigh the false nor the false the true; so I prayed unto God for guidance, and He has led me into the true faith, such as I have written down in these books of mine. I strip myself of all my former beliefs, just as I strip myself of this my garment." So saying, he took off the robe he was wearing and cast it from him, and distributed his books among the people' (Mehren, p. 252). The conversion of so eminent a thinker and so ardent a controversialist created a great stir, and the ability with which he now began to champion the orthodox position attracted to him a large number of disciples, so that he soon became one of the most celebrated teachers of his age, and theological problems were sent to him for solution from all parts of the Muslim world. He held several controversies with his old teacher, al-Jubbā'ī, who survived the defection of his pupil only three years. We have an indication of the character of such disputations in a story which several authorities tell in slightly different forms; but in spite of its doubtful authenticity and uncertain date (*e.g.* whether it belongs to the period after or immediately before his breach with the Mu'tazilites), it is undoubtedly characteristic of the theological controversies of this period. The story, as told by Ibn Ḫallikān, (No. 618, ed. Wüstenfeld), is that al-Ash'arī proposed the case of three brothers, one of whom was a true believer, virtuous and pious; the second an infidel, a debauchee, and a reprobate; and the third an infant. They all died. What was the state of each one of them? Al-Jubbā'ī answered: 'The virtuous brother occupies a high place in heaven; the infidel is in the depths of hell; and the child is among those who have obtained safety.' 'Suppose,' asked al-Ash'arī, 'that the child should wish to ascend to the place occupied by his virtuous brother, would he be allowed to do so?' 'No,' replied al-Jubbā'ī, 'it would be said to him: "Thy brother attained to this place through his numerous works of obedience (to God), but thou hast no such works to show."' 'But suppose,' said al-Ash'arī, 'that this child said, "That is not my fault; Thou didst not let me live long enough, neither didst Thou give me the means of proving my obedience."' 'In that case,' replied al-Jubbā'ī, 'God would say, "I knew that, if I had allowed thee to live, thou wouldst have been disobedient and deserved the grievous punishment (of hell); I thus considered what was for thy advantage."' 'But suppose the infidel brother were then to say, "O God of the universe! since Thou knewest what his state would be, Thou must have known what mine would be; then why didst Thou consider what was for his advantage and not for mine?"' Then al-Jubbā'ī was put to silence (Spitta, p. 42). Indeed, al-Ash'arī seems to have become rather a thorn in the side of his old teacher, who at last declined further discussion with him; whereupon al-Ash'arī is said once to have concealed himself in a part of the lecture-hall where al-Jubbā'ī could not see him, and to have prompted a woman sitting near him with question after question to which al-Jubbā'ī was unable to give satisfactory answers, until at last he guessed the trick that was being played upon him. Of the rest of al-Ash'arī's life few details are recorded.

We know that he ended his days in Baghdad, but have no information as to why he left Baṣra, the scene of his earlier triumphs. He died in A.H. 324 (A.D. 935–6) in the arms of one of his pupils, with a curse on the Mu'tazilites upon his lips.

Al-Ash'arī was a voluminous writer, and a list of upwards of a hundred of his works has come down to us; some are theological, dealing with the exegesis of the Qur'ān or with the Traditions, others philosophical; but the greater part of them are of a controversial character—polemics against heretics and unbelievers of all kinds, and attacks upon individual thinkers, such as al-Jubbā'ī, al-Balḫī, and others of his contemporaries (Spitta, pp. 63–81). This list of his works also includes a number of pamphlets written by him in response to queries relating to difficult problems in theology and philosophy, and those authorities who give 200, or even 380, as the number of his writings must have reckoned up each one of these letters as a separate work. Out of this immense literary activity, only five treatises are known to have survived, and these exist in manuscript only.

The importance of al-Ash'arī in the history of Muhammadan theology lies mainly in the fact that he was one of the first to employ in the defence of orthodox doctrines the dialectic method, and those processes of reasoning and of proof of which the rationalists had made so effective a use. Orthodoxy thus learned to fight its opponents with their own weapons, instead of merely doggedly repeating texts and traditions in answer to all arguments and questions. Al-Ash'arī is in this respect typical of an intellectual need that was being felt by the orthodox party of his time for a rational statement and defence of their position; the same tendency manifested itself among his contemporaries in other parts of the Muhammadan world, such as al-Ṭaḥāwī in Egypt and al-Mātarīdī in Samarcand. Further, in stating his theological position, al-Ash'arī held a mean between the gross anthropomorphism of some of the traditionists and the philosophical speculations of the rationalists. Thus, while devoutly accepting the statements of the Qur'ān about the face, the hands, the eyes of God, and His sitting on His throne, as articles of faith, not to be interpreted as metaphorical expressions for the knowledge and power, etc., of God, he does not take them to imply a corporeal existence analogous to that of man, but explains them as being His qualities and free from all limitations of space. In his later writings, however, when apparently he had come under the influence of the Ḥanbalite school, he gave up all such attempts to explain these anthropomorphic expressions in the Qur'ān, and maintained that they must be accepted 'without asking how and without drawing any comparison,' *i.e.* with human qualities. Similarly, he took up a middle position between the fatalistic and the libertarian schools, which has been stated by Professor Macdonald as follows: 'Man cannot create anything; God is the only creator. Nor does man's power produce any effect on his actions at all. God creates in His creature power and choice. Then He creates in him his action corresponding to the power and choice thus created. So the action of the creature is created by God as to initiative and as to production; but it is *acquired* by the creature. By acquisition (*kasb*) is meant that it corresponds to the creature's power and choice, previously created in him, without his having had the slightest effect on the action. He was only the *locus* or subject of the action' (*Muslim Theology*, p. 192). As one of the most famous theologians of this school, Abū al-Ma'ālī Imām al-Ḥaramain (A.H. 419–478), puts it, al-Ash'arī holds that man has no power over the production of his actions, but has power over the acquisition of them, whereas the Mu'tazilites maintained that he has power over both, and the Fatalists that he has power over neither (Spitta, p. 141). In similar fashion, al-Ash'arī dealt with the great controversy on the nature of the Qur'ān, which had stirred the Muslim world to its depths, and had been made the subject-matter of decrees by successive Khalīfs—al-Ma'mūn (in A.H. 202 and 218) giving official sanction to the Mu'tazilite doctrine that the Qur'ān is created, and al-Mutawakkil (in A.H. 234) as authoritatively establishing as the orthodox doctrine the belief that it is uncreated. While allying himself with the orthodox party in maintaining that the Qur'ān is the eternal, uncreated Word of God, al-Ash'arī rejected their extravagances about the letters and the ink and the sounds employed in reciting it being equally uncreated and eternal. The above examples are sufficient to indicate how far al-Ash'arī was willing to allow dialectic reasoning to be applied to theological questions, thereby avoiding the gross literalism of the anthropomorphic exponents of the orthodox position, and attempting to explain where hitherto any such attempt had been branded as heretical. But such concessions to a rationalistic method were made by him mainly in dealing with matters connected with the doctrine of *tauḥīd* ('unity'), such as the Attributes of God and the Word of God. In other matters he frankly accepted the orthodox position unmodified, *e.g.* the intercession of the Prophet, his journey to heaven (*mi'rāj*), the miracles of the saints, the evil suggestions of Satan, the coming of Antichrist, etc.

Al-Ash'arī was the founder of a theological movement that gradually won for itself a preponderating influence among Muhammadan sects, gaining a foothold first in 'Irāq, and later spreading eastward into Persia and westward into Syria and Egypt; introduced into the Maghrib by Ibn Tūmart (*q.v.*) in the 6th cent. of the Hijra, it became in a modified form the official doctrine of the Muwaḥḥids. The sect produced a number of remarkable thinkers, who by their independent speculations further contributed to the development of the system; among them the most distinguished were Abū Bakr al-Bāqilānī (ob. 403 A.H.) (*q.v.*), Abū Ja'far al-Sumnānī (ob. 444 A.H.), Abū al-Ma'ālī Imām al-Ḥaramain (ob. 478 A.H.) and al-Ghazālī (ob. 505 A.H.) (*q.v.*), who systematized the tenets of the sect into a body of doctrine that is accepted throughout the greater part of the Muslim world to the present day.

LITERATURE.—Al-Shahrastānī, *Kitāb al-milal wa'l-niḥal*, ed. Cureton, i. 66–75 (tr. Haarbrücker, i. 98–113); Wilhelm Spitta, *Zur Geschichte Abu'l-Ḥasan al-Aš'arī's* (Leipzig, 1876); M. A. F. Mehren, *Exposé de la réforme de l'Islamisme . . . par Abou-'l-Hasan Ali el-Ash'ari* (Troisième Congrès International des Orientalistes, vol. ii., St. Petersburg and Leyden, 1879); Martin Schreiner, *Zur Geschichte des Aš'aritenthums* (Huitième Congrès International des Orientalistes, Deuxième Partie, Section i., Leyden, 1893). The creed of al-Ash'arī is given by D. B. Macdonald, *Development of Muslim Theology* (London, 1903), pp. 293–299.

T. W. ARNOLD.

ASHES.—The dust which remains after the burning of plants, animals, and human beings, has been used from the most remote times for various religious and semi-religious purposes. It is natural to think that, when once the use of fire was discovered, it would not be long before the ashes would be found to be valuable and be turned to some account.

1. In places where water is scarce, we know that sand has been used for *ablutions*. Where sand is scarce, ashes would provide an excellent substitute. And since, from the first, fire was regarded with awe and wonder, it is likely that the ashes were often thought to share its mysterious nature. At any rate, we know of the use of ashes in ablutions. Amongst the preparations which the Brāhmans made for any act of religion was an ablution called

'a bath sacred to fire,' the body being rubbed with ashes (Colebrooke, ii. 154).* Amongst the New Mexicans it was found that a newborn child was washed and then covered with ashes (Bancroft, i. 566). In this case, however, the ashes may have been used, not as part of the cleansing process, but for drying, or possibly for both purposes. People belonging to the Nahua nations were found by Bancroft to have a practice of rubbing an infant's joints, especially the knees, with ashes in order to strengthen them (Bancroft, ii. 277). This practice may have arisen from the other.

2. When ashes were used for ablutions, it would soon be noticed that the friction produced a healthy effect, or, as we should say, promoted the circulation.† In any case, it has been found that primitive folk also use ashes for *medical purposes*. Hot ashes would serve as a substitute for hot water. Thus the Nutkas apply them in order to cure headache, colic, or rheumatism; the Miwoks use a plaster of hot ashes for stomachic affections and cases of severe travail (Bancroft, i. 204, 396).‡ Vapour-baths are also produced by means of hot ashes. In parts of England the ashes of a consecrated box-tree, mixed with holy water, used to be thought an effective remedy for cold fever.§ Similar powers are attributed to the ashes of the Muhammadan sacred fire at Gorakhpur and to those of the Hindu Holi-fire; and in Ireland ashes from the bonfire on St. John's Day (June 24) are believed to aid the fertility of the fields (Crooke, ii. 197, 318). The Parsis of India dip their fingers in ashes, while the ancient Armenians venerated the ashes of the sacred fire, and scattered them in streams also considered holy. Among the modern Armenians, in like fashion, the ashes of the sacred fire kindled on Feb. 13 are held to protect men and cattle from sickness, and are carefully preserved or scattered on the four corners of the roofs, or in the stalls, the gardens, and the meadows (Abeghian, p. 73).

3. A more familiar use of ashes, however, is that associated with *mourning customs*. The Greeks showed their sorrow at bereavement by strewing themselves with ashes (Homer, *Il.* xviii. 22, *Odyss.* xxiv. 315; Plut. *de Superstit.* ch. 3; cf. Herod. ii. 85; Vergil, *Æn.* x. 844; Ovid, *Metam.* viii. 528), or by sitting in them (*Odyss.* vii. 153; cf. *Il.* xviii. 26); and the practice of sprinkling ashes over the head as a sign of affliction is wide-spread. But this simpler practice always seems to be an abridgment of the more elaborate ceremony. In course of time a mere sprinkling suffices instead of an actual sitting or lying in dust or ashes. It becomes a sign or simple expression of what was originally a stricter form of submission or humiliation, practised first before visible persons, and then before invisible beings as well. Herbert Spencer gives some interesting instances in support of this explanation of the custom. Thus, in the Congo regions of Africa, it was found that the person who would do homage to a *banza*, or village chief, prostrated himself, kissed the earth, and strewed dust over the forehead and arms. When the Dahoman made a salutation, he prostrated himself, and poured sand or earth upon his head. It was found that the Kakanda and Balonda people used the same ceremony; and we are told of the latter, that 'when they wish to be excessively polite they bring a quantity of ashes or pipeclay in a piece of skin, and, taking up handfuls, rub it on the chest and upper front part of each arm.' To what extent this ceremony underwent abridgment we see, when, instead of sprinkling dust on the head, people made salutations by pretending to do so (Spencer, ii. 124 f.). But originally the practice seems to have been one of humiliation. At the same time, even among primitive folk, other customs have been observed in which the ashes seem to be a mere badge of mourning. Thus it was found that some of the Californians mixed the ashes of a dead person with grease, and smeared their faces with the mixture. The dirt was allowed to remain until the action of the weather wore it off (Bancroft, i. 397). In the Arunta tribe of Central Australia, it was found that the widow of a deceased man smeared her hair, face, and breast with white pipeclay; hence she received the name *inpirta*, 'the whitened one.' Sometimes she smeared ashes from a fire over the pipeclay, and was then called *ura-inpirta*, *ura* meaning 'fire' (Spencer-Gillen, p. 500). Amongst the Athapascan Tacullies it was found that after a deceased man had been burned, the ashes were collected and put into sacks. Each wife then received one, and had to carry it on her person for two years, during which she was clothed in rags, kept in a kind of slavery, and not allowed to marry. At the end of this period of mourning, structures were erected, and the bags or boxes of ashes deposited in them (Bancroft, i. 126). Here again the bag of ashes seems to be a badge of mourning.

4. When bodies have been burned, instead of buried at once, the ashes have naturally been *regarded as sacred*. They are either buried afterwards, or left on the altar and the whole covered with earth, or thrown into a river to be carried out to sea, or carefully preserved in urns. In India, when cremation first took the place of ordinary burial, they were buried; at a later date they were thrown into a sacred river. Among the Nahua nations it was found that the ashes of the common people were placed in the yards of their houses, in the temple courts, in the mountains, or in the field. In time of war, even in the case of people who have not altogether adopted the practice of cremation in their native land, it has been the practice to burn the bodies of the slain, partly to prevent the enemy from mutilating them, partly that the warriors' ashes might be carried back to their native place. This explains the fact that in the Homeric poems only the burning of corpses is mentioned.* Sometimes the ashes are gathered with a good deal of ceremony. When the Brāhmans burn a corpse, the fire has to be so arranged that some of the bones may remain for the elaborate ceremony of gathering the ashes, which is performed by the nearest kinsman on the last day of mourning (Colebrooke, ii. 175 ff.). But it has not always been thought necessary to preserve all the ashes, or at least not all in the same place. Among the Nahua nations, it was found that, when a human victim was sacrificed, his heart, after being offered to the sun, was burned, and the ashes preserved with great care and veneration (Bancroft, ii. 307). Buddha gave directions that his body should be cremated, and a *dagoba* or *stūpa* ('reliquary monument') erected over the ashes. When the body had been burned, messengers came from the chiefs or kings of the tribes around and claimed the relics. To avoid dispute, these were divided amongst them, and placed in *stūpas* built for the purpose.† When

* Works are cited simply by their authors' names. The titles of the works will be found in the bibliography.

† In this particular instance, however, we possibly have a use of ashes which were supposed to possess special qualities.

‡ Some of the Californians took an internal dose of ashes for snake-bites. This, of course, is a different kind of treatment. We need hardly remind the reader that amongst primitive folk medicine is a part of religion. See MEDICINE-MEN.

§ It should be added here (cf. 5 below) that, according to Bede, the dust of Oswald, king of Northumbria, was preserved as a cure for sickness (see Brand, *Popular Antiquities of Great Britain*, ed. W. C. Hazlitt, i. 320).

* See H. Blümner, *Leben und Sitten der Griechen*, ii. 86 (Leipzig, 1887).

† See Hermann Oldenberg, *Buddha*, p. 428 (Berlin, 1897); and William Simpson, 'The Worship of Death,' in the *Transactions of the Lodge Quatuor Coronati*, No. 2076, p. 28.

Mr. William Simpson was in Jelalabad during the Afghan War, he excavated the remains of a Buddhist tope, called the Ahin Posh Tope, and was fortunate enough to come upon the relic-cell, where he found some brown dust which he supposed to be the ashes of the holy individual to whose sanctity the tope had been erected. Among the ashes was a golden relic-holder. The same writer tells us that amongst the Lāmas of Tibet also, when a holy man dies, a *stūpa* is made for his ashes. But he found another practice amongst them. The ashes are mixed with mud or clay, and small figures of Buddha are made of the mixture. These are then placed in the shrines where devotions are performed. But if the ashes of one person have sometimes been distributed, the ashes of two or more persons have sometimes been mingled. In this way Domitian and Julia, Achilles and Patroclus, were united in death. In other cases, family urns gathered up the ashes of kinsmen and friends.* It should be added that a king has been known to lie in state even when reduced to ashes. Thus it was found that among the Nahua nations they gathered the ashes and valuables of a Tarascan king, made them into a figure, dressed it in royal robes, and put a mask for its face, a golden shield on its back, and bows and arrows by its side (Bancroft, ii. 621).

5. Ashes have not only been regarded as sacred, but have sometimes been *thought to possess special virtues*. We hear of migrating tribes among the Nahua nations carrying the ashes of honoured chiefs with them to serve as talismanic relics (Bancroft, ii. 348), and of other savages inoculating themselves with ashes which represent and are supposed to impart moral and other virtues. Thus, as a protection against disease, a slight incision is made in a person's temple, and some powder made of the ashes of certain plants or animals rubbed into the wound, those plants or animals being chosen which denote certain special qualities (*e.g.* the claws of a lion might be used to impart bravery). In this way the fighting-men among some tribes of South-East Africa are inoculated with strength and courage in time of war (Frazer, ii. 361 f.).† Of a similar character is a practice found among the Tarianas and Tucanos and some other tribes. They disinter a corpse about a month after burial, reduce it by burning and pounding to a fine powder, mix this in large conchs of caxiri, and drink it, in the belief that by so doing they will imbibe the virtues of the dead man (Spencer-Gillen, p. 535 f.). The Cobeus were found to drink the ashes of the dead in the same way. It was a similar kind of belief in the virtues of human ashes that led the Romans to scatter in the city the bones of a general who had celebrated a triumph.‡ In Bavaria it has been customary to sprinkle ashes from the Easter fire on the land as a protection against hail-storms, and in Bombay caste is restored by swallowing ashes given by the *guru* (Crooke, i. 293). Ashes from the burning ground in India are used in 'black' magic (*ib.* p. 261).

6. A different use of ashes from any we have mentioned is found *in connexion with the belief in ghosts*. It has been a not uncommon practice to strew ashes on the ground in order to detect by the footprints the visits of ghosts or demons. The practice has been noticed amongst the Philippine islanders; and the Peruvians, instead of ashes, scattered flour of maize or quinua about the dwelling, to see 'by the footsteps whether the deceased has been moving about' (Spencer, i. 171). Amongst the funeral customs of the Hos of N.E. India, quite an elaborate rite has been observed, in which ashes are used to detect the return of a dead person's spirit; and similar customs exist in Mirzapur (Crooke, i. 176, ii. 72–74). Another practice has been noticed in Yucatan. A child is left alone at night in a place strewn with ashes, and the animal whose footprint is found on the spot in the morning is regarded as its guardian deity. With this may be compared the old superstition that the first bird or beast which appears after the birth of a child is its spiritual protector. In German folklore we hear of the little 'earthmen' leaving footprints in strewn ashes; and in England there was once a superstitious belief that, if on St. Mark's Eve ashes were sifted over the hearth, the footprints would be noticed of any one who was destined to die within the year (Tylor, ii. 197).

LITERATURE.—W. Mannhardt, *Wald- und Feldkulte*[2], 1904; E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*[4], 1903; J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*[2], 1900; Baldwin Spencer and F. J. Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, 1899; E. S. Hartland, *The Legend of Perseus*, 1894; H. Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology*, 1893; William Simpson, 'The Worship of Death' in *Transactions of the Lodge Quatuor Coronati*, No. 2076 (1888); A. Réville, *Hist. des Religions*, 1883–89; H. H. Bancroft, *The Native Races of the Pacific States*, 1875–76; Sir T. E. Colebrooke, *Miscellaneous Essays*, 1873; C. F. A. Wuttke, *Gesch. des Heidenthums*, 1852–53; W. Crooke, *Popular Religion and Folk-Lore of Northern India*, 1896; M. Abeghian, *Armenischer Volksglaube*, 1899; M. Jastrow, 'Dust, Earth, and Ashes as Symbols of Mourning among the Ancient Hebrews,' in *JAOS* xx. (1899) 133–150.

MAURICE A. CANNEY.

ASH-MOUNDS (in Persia).—The ash-mounds of Persia are a series of elevations in the Province of Azarbaijan in north-western Persia, composed largely of ashes mixed with earth, and called 'Hills of the Fire-worshippers' by the modern inhabitants, who assign their origin to the fire-cult of the ancient Zoroastrians. Scores of these hillocks are scattered over the great plain around Lake Urumiah and the city of that name, which is associated traditionally with events in Zoroaster's life in Azarbaijan. The mounds are usually constructed of clay mingled with immense deposits of ashes that are saturated with nitrous salts of organic composition; and in many instances these elevations surmount a small natural eminence. It is generally conceded that there is nothing of a volcanic nature in their composition; and although we may not agree in all respects with the natives, who unanimously ascribe the origin of the mounds to the accumulation of ashes from fire-temples, century after century, we may assume that at least some of the hillocks were surmounted, in ages past, by sanctuaries dedicated to the worship of fire.

Many of these hills have been excavated in recent years by the neighbouring peasants, who have discovered the value of the alkaline quality of the ashes for fertilizing purposes and for the manufacture of saltpetre. Their casual diggings have revealed in one or two instances remnants of ancient walls, and have brought to light ancient pieces of pottery, terra-cotta figurines, and other relics of antiquity, like the small bas-relief cylinder of alabaster found at Geog Tapah, near Urumiah, and now preserved in the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York city. The design of the cylinder is archaic Babylonian in style, and among the figures carved upon it are the sun-god Shamash and the demi-god Ea-bani, as described by Dr. W. H. Ward in *American Journal of Archæology*, vi. 286–301. The Mission museum at Urumiah contains similar relics. No systematic excavations, however, have been carried on to determine the possible

* See Sir Thomas Browne, 'Hydriotaphia,' ch. iii. (*Works*, ed. Sayle, Edin. 1907, vol. iii. p. 118).

† Modern psychology teaches that such a practice, however superstitious the original idea in it, might—and no doubt often did—have the desired effect. It would serve to remind the inoculated person of certain qualities, to concentrate the mind upon them, and so to produce them. This would be an instance of primitive folk having been led to adopt a custom for a reason of their own, which for another and a better reason has proved to be one of the factors in civilization.

‡ See F. Granger, *The Worship of the Romans*, 1895, p. 61 f.

value of the ash-hills as contributing to archæological knowledge or to a better understanding of the early religion of Irān. The study of the ash-mounds should furthermore be brought into connexion with the entire subject of kitchen-middens, cromlechs, and cairns.

LITERATURE.—For bibliographical references and a description and photographic illustrations of the Urumiah hillocks, see Jackson, *Persia Past and Present*, New York and London, 1906, pp. 90–97.

A. V. WILLIAMS JACKSON.

ASHTART (ASHTORETH), ASTARTE.—*'Ashtart* (עַשְׁתָּרֹת) was a goddess worshipped by the Canaanites, Hebrews, Phœnicians, and in Phœn. colonies. This vocalization of the name is attested not only by *'Athtar*, *'Attar*, etc. in the cognate languages, but by the earliest documentary evidence. In the Amarna Letters (Winckler, 142. 10, 237. 21) it appears as *Ash-tar-tu*. In a Bab. tablet (*PSBA*, Mar. 1889, p. 174 ff.) *Ash-tar-tu* is given as the Pal. equivalent of Ishtar, and in the treaty between Esarhaddon and Ba'al of Tyre *As-tar-tu* is named as one of the chief gods of Tyre (Bezold, *Catalogue*, 539). The Gr. transliteration is Ἀστάρτη, which appears even in the LXX along with Ἀσταρώθ. Augustine (*Quæst. in Jud.* 16) gives *Estart* or *Astart*. The pronunciation עַשְׁתֹּרֶת, *'Ashtōreth*, of MT is probably due to the substitution of the vowels of *bōsheth*, 'shameful thing,' as in 'Molech' for 'Melech' (Nöldeke, *GGA*, 1884, p. 1022).

1. **Origin.**—As to the origin of 'Ashtart, opinions differ. Hommel (*Zwei Jagdinschr.* 22), Delitzsch (*Assyr. Lesestücke*[4], *s.v.*), Driver (Hastings' *DB* i. 168), Zimmern (*KAT*[2] 420 f.), Jastrow (*Die Rel. Bab.* 81, 207 f.) hold that she is derived from the Babylonian goddess Ishtar. In favour of this view are the facts that Ishtar is mentioned in Bab. inscriptions long before the earliest mention of 'Ashtart, that Palestine was profoundly influenced by Bab. religion during the third millennium B.C., and that Ishtar is called *âshirat ilâni*, 'musterer of the gods,' which suggests a derivation of her name from Bab. *ashâru*, the same root from which *Ashshur* and *Asherah* may come (cf. Jensen, *KIB* vi. 409 f.).

There are, however, a number of difficulties in the way of this theory:—(1) This deity is found not merely in Babylonia and Assyria, but also in Canaan and among all the other Semites. In Syria she appears as *'Attar* or *'Atar* (see art. ATARGATIS); in Moab, as *'Ashtar* (see art. MOABITES); in South Arabia, as *'Athtar* (see art. SABÆANS); and in Abyssinia, as *'Astar* (Müller, *Epigr. Denkm. aus Abessinien*, 37 f.). In classical Arabic her name does not occur, though she herself is known under such epithets as *al-Lāt* and *al-'Uzza* (cf. Herod. iii. 8, where *al-Lāt* is identified with Urania = Astarte). It is hard to believe that the cult of Ishtar spread to all these races, since no other Bab. deity found such wide acceptance. It is more natural to suppose that 'Ashtar was a primitive Semitic goddess. (2) The phonetic changes that this name undergoes in passing from one dialect to another indicate that it is primitive Semitic. In Bab. א and ע are not distinguished. If Ishtar had been the original form, the appearance of the initial ע with the vowel *a* in all the cognates would have been impossible, and the second consonant would not have undergone the regular mutation Heb. שׁ = Arab. ش = Aram. ܫ. (3) The addition of the fem. ending *t* in 'Ashtar(t) is adverse to the theory of a direct borrowing of the Bab. Ishtar. (4) The absence of the fem. ending in 'Ashtar, Ishtar, favours the theory of a primitive Semitic rather than a Bab. origin of the name. Before the Semitic languages diverged from one another, the fem. ending was already developed, but a number of primitive words found in all the dialects, such as שֶׁמֶשׁ, רֶשֶׁל, are fem. without fem. ending. To this class Ishtar-'Attar appears to belong. If the Babylonians had coined this name after their separation from the parent stock, they would have appended the fem. ending. (5) The different genders of the name in the dialects witness to its primitive character. In South Arabia 'Athtar is masc., in Moab also apparently in the compound 'Ashtar-Chemosh. If these cults had been derived from Babylonia, where Ishtar was fem., the change of sex would have been impossible. If, on the other hand, 'Ashtar was a primitive Semitic name of some physical object, this might have been regarded as fem. by one tribe and masc. by another, just as in South Arabia *shams*, 'the sun,' was fem., while elsewhere it was usually masculine. (6) One of the most marked characteristics of the Babylonian Ishtar is her connexion with the planet Venus. There is no trace of this in other early Semitic religions, and this makes it improbable that she is the prototype of 'Ashtar, 'Athtar, etc. (7) The use of the plural *'ashtārōth* in the sense of 'offspring' (Dt 7^{13} $28^{4.\ 18.\ 51}$) cannot be explained from the goddess Ishtar, but points to a primitive Semitic root עשׁר. The Bab. association of Ishtar with אשׁר, accordingly, is to be regarded as merely one of the punning combinations of which there are so many instances in Bab. literature.

2. **Original sex and character.**—If 'Ashtar-'Athtar was a primitive Semitic name, the question then arises as to its original gender: Was it masculine, as in South Arabia and Abyssinia (*CIS* IV. i. 40. 4, 41. 2 f., 46. 5; Hommel, *Aufs. u. Abh.* 34; Mordtmann, *Him. Ins.* 862, 886[2]; Müller, *ZDMG* xxxvii. 4. 326; Barton, *Hebraica*, x. 52–59, 202–205), and apparently in Moab (*Mesha Ins.* 17; Barton, *Sem. Origins*, 141); or feminine, as in Babylonia, Assyria, Syria, Canaan, Israel, Phœnicia, and the Phœnician colonies? Zimmern (*KAT*[3] 420) holds that it was originally masc., on account of the absence of the fem. ending, but this proves nothing if the word belongs to the earliest period of Semitic language. Baudissin (*PRE*[3] 152) suggests that there were originally both a male and a female 'Ashtar, just as there were *ilu* and *ilat*, *Ba'al* and *Ba'alat*; but no other case exists where the fem. is expressed by the same word as the masculine. The most likely view is that 'Ashtar was originally feminine. This is the gender in all the Semitic languages except South Arabic and Moabite, and therefore is probably primitive. It corresponds also with early Semitic social organization. There is a large body of evidence to show that the Semites before their separation passed through a matriarchal stage of society (see W. R. Smith, *Kinship*, 131 ff.; Barton, *Sem. Origins*, 30 ff.). The tribe was a group of people inhabiting a particular oasis in the Arabian desert. It was made up of mothers and their brothers and children. The fathers were men of other tribes, dwelling in other oases, who contracted only temporary unions with the mothers. Descent was traced through the mother, and she was the head of the clan in peace and in war. In such a society the chief deity of the tribe must have been conceived as a counterpart of the human matriarch. Male divinities might exist and be known as אל, 'maternal uncle' (cf. חלכרב, חלאמר), but they would not be called 'father,' and would play so unimportant a part that they would survive only sporadically in later religion. This view is confirmed by the fact that all those traits which are oldest and most permanent in the character of 'Ashtart-Ishtar are those which for other reasons we must predicate of the ancient Semitic tribal mother.

(1) She is the goddess of *untrammelled sexual*

love. In the Ea-bani episode of the Gilgamesh Epic, one of the earliest monuments of Bab. literature (*KIB* vi. 166–171), she is represented as forming numerous unions which bring mischief to her suitors. In the Descent to Hades (*KIB* vi. 86 f.), sexual relations among men and animals cease the moment that she enters the under world. Prostitution as a religious rite in her service is widely attested: in Babylonia, by the Gilgamesh Epic (*KIB* vi. 122–129), Herodotus (i. 199), Strabo (xvi. 1. 20), Ep. Jer ^{43} (=Bar 6^{43}); in Syria, by Lucian (*Dea Syr.* 22, 43); in Arabia, by Theodoret (*Hist. Relig.*, ed. Sirmond, iii. 883; cf. Wellhausen, *Reste*^{2}, 44); in the Phœnician colonies at Carthage, Cyprus, and Sicily, by Augustine (*Civ. Dei*, ii. 4), Herodotus (i. 199), *CIS* I. i. 86, Clement of Alexandria (*Protreptikos*, 12 f.), Arnobius (*adv. Gent.* v. 19), Justin (xviii. 5), Strabo (vi. 2. 5). Among the Hebrews and Phœnicians, *qᵉdēshôth*, or 'temple harlots,' are often mentioned, but they are not expressly connected with the cult of 'Ashtart (yet cf. Herod. i. 105). If, however, they belonged to her in the colonies, they doubtless belonged to her also in the home country. *Ba'alat*, 'mistress,' the goddess of Gebal (Byblus) is only a title of 'Ashtart, and prostitution in her service is described by Lucian (*Dea Syr.* 6 ff.). The identification of 'Ashtart with Aphrodite by both the Greeks and the Phœnicians is also evidence of her sexual character. In this aspect she is clearly a counterpart of the ancient Semitic woman, who bestowed her love as she pleased upon men of other and often hostile tribes, who was courted at the risk of life (cf. *Mu'allaqāt of Labîd* 16–19, *of 'Antarah* 5–22, *of Ḥârith* 1–9), and who had frequent occasion to bewail the death of some Adonis.

(2) 'Ashtart-Ishtar is a goddess of *maternity and fertility.* With her is associated her son Tammuz (see art. TAMMUZ). Under the title *bêlit ilê*, 'mistress of the gods,' she is represented in Assyr.-Bab. art bearing on her left arm a child, which she suckles at her breast, while with her right hand she caresses or blesses it (Bezold, *ZA* ix. 121, line 5). She is called *bânat-ilâni*, 'creatrix of the gods' (Haupt, *Akkadische und sumerische Keilschrifttexte*, 116 f. obv. 6). She is often designated the 'mother' or 'creatrix' of men (cf. Zimmern, *KAT*^{3} 428 f.). In the Deluge Story (*KIB* vi. 238 f.) men are described as her offspring. In Babylon she was known as *Mu'allidtu* or *Mulittu* (מוּלִדְתּוֹ), 'she who causes to bear,' from which is derived the name *Mylitta* in Herodotus, i. 131, 199 (Jensen, *Kosmologie*, 294, 515). In a Sabæan inscription (*JA*, 8 sér. ii. 256 ff.) 'Athtar, who is commonly male, is called 'the mistress, mother-'Athtar,' and is described as the giver of children. In Arabia the goddess was comparable to the Virgin Mary with the child Jesus (Epiphanius, *Panarion*, li.). The existence of the same conception in the West is attested by the Carthaginian proper name אמעשתרת, 'Ashtart is a mother' (*CIS* 263), by the title 'mother' applied to the Paphian goddess, and by numerous myths of the sons of 'Ashtart (Aphrodite, Venus). In this aspect also she is the counterpart of the ancient Semitic woman, the fruitful mother of the children of the tribe.

(3) 'Ashtart-Ishtar is *a war-goddess.* She appears to Ashurbanipal robed in flames, with quivers on the right hand and on the left, a bow in her left hand, while with her right she draws a sword out of its sheath (*KIB* ii. 227, 251). In Babylonian art she is often depicted fully armed, standing on a leopard or a lion. In one hymn (Reisner, 108^{44}) she says of herself, 'Into battle I fly like a swallow.' In like manner the Canaanite 'Ashtart was regarded by the Egyptians as a war-goddess (*ZÄ* ix. [1871] 119), and was depicted standing on a lion (Müller, *Asien*, 313 f.). The armour of Saul was placed as a trophy in the temple of the Philistine 'Ashtart (1 S 31^{10}). Her statue at Cythera, a Phœnician colony, was in full armour (Pausan. iii. 23. 1), and there is little doubt that the armed Aphrodite and armed Venus of Gr.-Rom. art were perpetuations of Phœnician types. 'Attar at Hierapolis rode on a lion (Macrobius, *Sat.* i. 23. 18 f.). This warlike character of 'Ashtart stands in marked contrast to her maternal character, and is the basis of an antithesis often found in Gr. and Lat. poets. It finds a natural explanation in the analogy of the ancient Semitic matriarch, who was not only the mother of her tribe, but, like Deborah (Jg 5^{7-18}) and Samsi queen of Aribi (*KIB* ii. 54 f.), its leader in battle.

Other traits of 'Ashtart-Ishtar are local or late, so that they cannot have belonged to the primitive conception of this deity. In Babylonia she is identified with the planet Venus (also with Sirius and Virgo), but this does not appear elsewhere, except in late writers who have been influenced by Babylonian theology (*e.g.* Suidas and Zonaras, *Lex. s.v.*; Lydus, *de Mens.* iv. 44; Athenæus, ix. 392 D; *Myth. Vatic.* i. 17, ii. 37, iii. 8; Philo Bybl. in Müller, *Fragmenta Historicorum Græcorum*, iii. 569. 24). The identification of 'Ashtart with the moon by Lucian (*Dea Syr.* 4) and Herodian (v. 6. 4) is unconfirmed by ancient evidence, and is due to theological speculation. The horns with which goddesses are depicted in Phœnician art are not those of the crescent moon but of a cow, and are probably derived from the Egyptian Hathor, with whom 'Ashtart was early identified (Müller, *Asien*, 314). On 'Ashtaroth Qarnaim, ''Ashtart of the two horns,' see Moore, *JBL* xvi. 155 ff.

In the light of the foregoing facts, the original conception of 'Ashtar(t) as a divine counterpart of the human matriarch seems to be established. When society changed from a matriarchate to a patriarchate, either a male deity was exalted to the chief place, and 'Ashtar(t) became his consort, as in Canaan, or her sex was changed, as in South Arabia and Moab. This could be done the more readily since her name had originally no feminine ending.

3. **Etymology of name.**—The original character of 'Ashtar(t) must guide us in the effort to find an etymology and a meaning for her name. If it is primitive Semitic, it must be derived from the root *'ashar*, Heb. עָשַׁר, Arab. عثر, Aram. ʾḥṯ.

The *t* is infixed after the analogy of the Arab. VIII. stem *iqtatala* and Assyr. *kitshudu*, and is transposed with the sibilant after the analogy of Heb. *hishtaḥăwāh* and Assyr. *qashdu* for *qadshu*. In Heb. and Aram. עשׁר means 'to be rich,' which represents Arab. غثر rather than عثر, and therefore throws no light on the primitive meaning of عثر.

In Arab. the common meaning for *'athara* is 'stumble,' but *'athr* and *'athar*, or *'aththar*, are used of palm-trees or seed-produce which are watered naturally; and *'athûr* means 'a channel to irrigate a palm tree such as is termed *ba'l*' (Lane, *Lex. s.v.*). If these words are primitive and not loan-words, the root may mean 'to be watered.' The parallelism in Ps 65^{10} suggests the possibility of a similar meaning for עשׁר. If so, *'ashtar* in a reflexive sense may mean 'the self-watering,' *i.e.* 'the spring,' and in a passive sense 'the watered' or 'fertilized,' as in the Heb. *'ashtārôth*='offspring' or 'lambs.' All this, however, is very uncertain.

It does not seem unnatural that the primitive Semites should have regarded the numen of a spring as a divine matriarch, such as we have seen 'Ashtar(t) to be. To the spring, man and beast owed their lives in the arid desert. It formed the oasis about which as a centre the tribe rallied. It nourished the date palm, which furnished food, and which emphasized sex by its distinction of male and female trees, and its need of artificial cross-pollination. Everywhere throughout the Semitic world springs were holy (cf. Baudissin, *Studien*, ii. 148–184), and the same is true even in modern Arabia and Syria (Curtiss, *Ursem. Rel.*, 94–96, 113–115). In the Sabæan inscriptions 'Athtar is entitled 'Lord of the water-supply' (*CIS* iv. i. 41; *ZDMG* liv. 245), and is described as the giver of harvests (*CIS* iv. ii. 104, 105). *Al-'Uzzā*, 'the mighty,' a title of the fem. 'Athtar, was connected with the sacred spring Zemzem at Mecca (Wellhausen, *Reste*^{2},

34–45, 103). In a Bab. hymn (Haupt, *Akkadische und sumerische Keilschriftexte*, 116 f.) Ishtar is described as 'the one who causes verdure to spring forth, . . . creatrix of everything.' Of Atargatis, Plutarch says, 'She is the divinity who out of moisture produces the seeds of all things.' Her chief sanctuary Hierapolis bore the native name of *Mabbog* (Bambyce; *i.e.* מַבּוּעַ 'spring'), and had a lake full of sacred fishes. At Askalon also she had a lake and sacred fishes, and was represented as a mermaid with a fish's tail (see art. ATARGATIS). One of the chief sanctuaries of the Phœn. 'Ashtart was at Aphaka (= אֲפִיק, 'water-course'), at the point where the Adonis River bursts out of a cave in the side of Mt. Lebanon. Many nymphs of fountains and streams in Phœn. settlements may be only variant forms of 'Ashtart. On the whole, therefore, the etymology which connects 'Ashtart with a root meaning 'to be watered,' and interprets it as the numen of a spring, cannot be regarded as unreasonable (see W. R. Smith, *Semites*², 100; Wellhausen, *Reste*², 146; Lagarde, *Ges. Abh.* 14; Halévy, *REJ* ix. 182 f.; Hoffmann, *Phœn. Ins.* 21 f.; Baudissin, *Jahve et Moloch*, 23 f.; Schlottmann, *ZDMG* xxiv. 657 ff.; Nöldeke, *ZDMG* xl. 742; Barton, *Sem. Origins*, 102 f.; Haupt, *ZDMG* xxxiv. 758).

4. **Primitive worship.** — As to the manner in which 'Ashtar(t) was worshipped in primitive times, we can only conjecture that those rites which are most ancient and most prevalent among the Semites were originally consecrated to her. Some offerings were cast into the sacred spring, as in Arabia (Wellhausen, *Reste*², 76), and in modern Syria (Curtiss, *Ursem. Rel.* 114, 270); but in other cases, such as bloody sacrifices, this was impracticable, and another point of contact with the goddess was needed. This was found in the *maṣṣēbāh*, or 'standing stone,' which was erected as a *beth-el*, or 'abode of deity,' near the spring. On this victims might be slain and offerings might be poured without contaminating the sacred waters. This was the form of the goddess at Petra (Epiphanius, *Panarion*, li.). Down to the latest times the 'Ashtart-Aphrodite of Paphos was identified with such a stone (Tacitus, *Hist.* ii. 3; Serv. *Aen.* i. 720; Head, *Hist. Num.* 628). The *Ba'alat* of Gebal was similarly represented, to judge from a coin of this city (Pietschmann, *Phönizier*, 200). In Canaanite temples in general *maṣṣēbôth* rather than images seem to have embodied the mother-goddess. This is alluded to apparently in Jer 2²⁷ 'who say to the stone, Thou hast brought me forth' (see art. MASSEBAH). The sacred precinct around the *maṣṣēbāh* was enclosed with *'ăshērîm*, or 'totem posts,' which also received religious reverence and were early identified with 'Ashtar(t) (see art. POLES). Offerings were made of the fruits of the earth and of the increase of the flocks and herds. The first-born of animals were sacred. Circumcision was practised as a consecration of the reproductive powers, and the first-born child was sacrificed in order to secure increased fertility. In Gezer, where the cult of the mother-goddess is everywhere in evidence, the remains of hundreds of new-born infants have been discovered around the standing stones of the high place (for the existence of this custom among the Arabs, see Isaac of Antioch, ed. Bickell, 220). A spring feast was celebrated at the time when the lambs were born, and an autumnal festival at the time of the gathering of the date harvest. These occasions were marked by great sexual licence (see W. R. Smith, *Semites*², 469 ff.; Wellhausen, *Reste*², 94–101; Barton, *Sem. Origins*, 108–115; and art. SEMITES).

5. **History of cult.**—If 'Ashtart was a primitive Semitic deity, she must have been brought into Canaan by the first Semitic settlers. Her name first appears in the annals of Thothmes III. (B.C. 1478) in the name of the city *'A-s-ti-ra-tu* (Müller, *Asien*, 162, 313). In the Amarna Letters (*c.* B.C. 1400) this city is mentioned (*KIB* v., Let. 142. 10 237. 21). In the treaty of peace between Rameses II. and Khetasar (*c.* B.C. 1270) the 'Ashtart of the land of the Hittites is named (Breasted, *Egyp. Records*, iii. 172). Evidently the Canaanite mother-deity was so well known to the Egyptians that her name served as a general designation for foreign goddesses (Müller, *Asien*, 313 f.). In the mound of Gezer a large number of plaques have been discovered in pre-Israelite levels, representing a nude deity who is doubtless 'Ashtart. No other images, except of Egyptian origin, are found in these levels, and this indicates that 'Ashtart remained the principal, if not the exclusive, deity of the ancient Canaanites as of the primitive Semites (see art. CANAANITES).

In the OT 'Ashtart appears as a survival in the city-name *'Ashtārôth* (Dt 1⁴, Jos 9¹⁰ 12⁴ 13¹²· ³¹, 1 Ch 6⁵⁶(⁷¹)). In Jos 21²⁷ = 1 Ch 6⁵⁶(⁷¹) this is called Be'eshtera, i.e. *Beth-'Ashtart*, 'house of 'Ashtart.' The plural vocalization is not confirmed by the spelling in the Amarna Letters, and can hardly be due to the fact that several 'Ashtarts were worshipped at this shrine. It may perhaps be a plural of majesty like *'Elohim*. 'Ashtaroth-Qarnaim (Gn 14⁵, 1 Mac 5²⁶, 2 Mac 12²¹) is perhaps to be distinguished from 'Ashtaroth. In Jg 2¹³ 10⁶, 1 S 7³ᵗ· 12¹⁰—all from a late Elohistic or Deuteronomic hand—it is stated that the Israelites in the period of the Judges worshipped the Ba'alim and the 'Ashtaroth of the land of Canaan. Here *'Ashtaroth* means no more than 'goddesses,' as in the Bab.-Assyr. formula *ilâni u-ishtarâti*, 'gods and goddesses'—a usage that occurs as early as the time of Ḫammurabi (L. W. King, *Ḫammurabi*, ii. 34). Since 'Ashtart was known to the Canaanites, and also probably to the pre-Mosaic Hebrews, there is no reason to doubt that she was worshipped by Israel after the conquest of Canaan. According to 1 S 31¹⁰, the Philistines, who also were newcomers in Palestine, had adopted the cult of the Semitic mother-goddess (read the sing. with LXX *τὸ Ἀσταρτεῖον*). In 1 K 11⁵· ³³, 2 K 23¹³ 'Ashtart is called the 'goddess' (or 'loathsome object') of the Sidonians, and her worship is said to have been favoured by Solomon. In the latter passages *'Ashtart* is construed as a proper name without the article. The same is true in the Phœn. inscriptions. We do not read of the 'Ashtart of Tyre and the 'Ashtart of Sidon, as of the Ba'al of Tyre and the Ba'al of Sidon. In עשתרת ארך of *CIS* 135, ארך is probably an epithet and not the name of the city Eryx. In spite of this, different 'Ashtarts were worshipped in different cities, and the plural, as noted above, could have the general sense of 'goddesses.' The use as a proper name, accordingly, is due, as in the case of *'Amm*, *'Ammi* (*q.v.*) to loss of the primitive meaning.

The worship of 'Ashtart in Phœnicia and the Phœn. colonies is well attested by inscriptions and statements in classical writers: at Sidon, by *Tabnith Ins.* 1, 2, 6; *CIS* I. i. 3. 15, 16, 18; 4. 5; Lucian, *Dea Syr.* 4; Achil. Tat. i. 1; Lydus, *de Mens.* iv. 44; Malalas, *Chron.* ed. Dind. p. 31; at Tyre, by Sanchoniathon (Philo Bybl. in Müller, *Fragmenta Hist. Græc.* iii. 569, fr. 24), Menander (in Josephus, *Ant.* VIII. v. 3, *c. Ap.* i. 18); at Um el-'Awamîd near Tyre, by *CIS* 8; at Ma'ṣûb, by the *Ma'ṣûb Ins.* 4; in Cyprus, by *CIS* 11. 3; 86A. 4 (cf. 46, 72), *CIA* ii. 168; at Gul near Malta, by *CIS* 132. 3; at Eryx in Sicily, by *CIS* 135; 140. 1; at Carthage, by *CIS* 255. 4 f.; 263. 4, *C. R. Acad. Ins.* 7, Dec. 1894, Augustine, *Quæst. in Jud.* 16, *Heptat.* vii. 16 (Migne, iii. 797). It is probable that Ba'alat, 'mistress,' the goddess of Gebal and other Phœn. towns (*CIS* 1. 2 ff.; 177; Philo Byb. in Müller, *Fragmenta Hist. Græc.* iii. 569; Melito in Cureton, *Spic.* 44), is only a title of 'Ashtart. Her cult was the same as that of 'Ashtart, and she is identified with Astarte by Plutarch, *de Iside et Osiride*, 15 (cf. Cicero, *de Nat. Deor.* iii. 59). Tanith also and other Phœn. goddesses may be only local forms of 'Ashtart (see PHŒNICIANS). In Phœnicia, Cyprus, and most of the islands of the Ægean, statuettes have been found representing a nude female holding a dove. These are similar

in type to the plaques discovered at Gezer, and are generally believed to represent the Phœn. goddess (see Perrot and Chipiez, fig. 381 f.). On Phœn. coins she is represented standing on the prow of a galley with a mural crown on her head or in her hand.

Into Syria proper the cult of 'Ashtart seems never to have spread, on account of the strength of the native goddess Atargatis. Although 'Attar was originally the same as 'Ashtar, the two goddesses had diverged so far that they were never identified. Lucian (*Dea Syr.*) carefully distinguishes them. There was even a temple of Atargatis at Askalon alongside of that of Astarte, and Atargatis elsewhere invaded the territory of 'Ashtart. Accordingly, when Tertullian (*Apol.* 24), Artemidorus (*Oneirocrit.* i. 8), and Lydus (*de Mens.* iii. 35, iv. 44) call Astarte the goddess of Syria, this only shows a loose usage of the name Syria.

From the Phœnicians the cult of 'Ashtart spread to the Greeks and to the Romans. One inscription (*CIG* 6807) shows that her worship was carried, probably by Roman soldiers, as far as Corbridge in England. Hommel (*Neue Jahrb. f. Phil.* cxxv. [1882] 176; *Aufs. u. Abh.* 34) attempts to show that Aphrodite is etymologically the same as 'Ashtart; but this is doubtful. It is certain, however, that the Greeks identified 'Ashtart with Aphrodite (cf. the inscription from Delos in *Bulletin de Corresp. Hellénique*, vi. 1882, p. 473). Aphrodite often bears the title of *Urania* or *Cœlestis*, but this is also a title of 'Ashtart (Jer 7^{18} $44^{17f.\ 25}$; Sanchoniathon in Müller, *Fragmenta Hist. Græc.* iii. 569). Many of the seats of Aphrodite worship were originally old Phœn. sanctuaries. The temple of Urania Aphrodite at Askalon (Herod. i. 105) must be the same as the 'house of 'Ashtart' (1 S 31^{10}). The Aphrodite whose rites at Aphaka are described by Lucian (*Dea Syr.* 6) and Eusebius (*Vit. Const.* iii. 55), and whom Sozomen (*HE* ii. 5) calls *Urania*, can have been no other than the Ba'alat of Gebal whose identity with 'Ashtart has already been discussed. The shrines of Aphrodite in Cyprus also were certainly Phœn. foundations, and when Homer calls her Κύπρις and Κυθέρεια (*Il.* v. 330; *Od.* viii. 283, xviii. 193), he shows that she was derived by the Greeks from the Phœnicians. In like manner Venus Erycina of the Romans is identical with the old Phœn. 'Ashtart of Eryx, and Cicero says expressly (*de Nat. Deor.* iii. 59; cf. Lydus, *de Mens.* iv. 44) that there are four Venuses, one originating in Syria and Cyprus, who is called Astarte and is recorded to have wedded Adonis. Compare also what Lucretius says of 'Æneadum genetrix' in the opening lines of *de Rerum Natura*. It is clear, accordingly, that much information in regard to the cult of 'Ashtart may be gained from a careful sifting of the statements of classical authors concerning Aphrodite and Venus (see art. GREEK RELIGION). It is even possible that Rhea, Cybele, and other mother-goddesses of the ancient world may be ultimately derived from the Semitic 'Ashtart, or at least may be modified by her influence (see ATARGATIS, ISHTAR).

LITERATURE.—In addition to the discussions mentioned above, see E. Meyer, art. 'Astarte' in Roscher (1884); Cumont, art. 'Astarte' in Pauly-Wissowa (1896); Baudissin, 'Astarte und Aschera' (with full bibliography of earlier writers) in *PRE*^{3} (1896); Driver, 'Ashtoreth' in Hastings' *DB* (1898); Farnell, *CGS*, chs. xxi.-xxiii. (vol. ii. 1896); Moore, 'Ashtoreth' in *EBi* (1899); Barton, 'Ashtoreth and her Influence in the OT,' *JBL* x. 73 ff., 'The Semitic Ishtar Cult' in *Hebraica*, ix. (1893) 133–166, x. (1894) 1–74, *A Sketch of Semitic Origins* (1902); Haupt, 'The Name Istar,' in *JAOS* xxviii. (1907) 112–119; Lewy, *Sem. Fremdw. im Griech.* 148, 186 f. See also the literature under ATARGATIS, ISHTAR.

LEWIS BAYLES PATON.

ASIA (Ethnology, Religions, and Ethics).—**The distinctive title of *officina gentium*, formerly** awarded to Asia by common consent, was based mainly on her vast population, which greatly exceeded that of all the rest of the known world. Now it may be taken in a more literal sense, as indicating that this continent is really the *officina*, the true cradle of the human species. In art. ETHNOLOGY it is shown that man was specialized most probably in Malaysia during Pliocene times, that is, while that insular region still formed part of the Asiatic mainland.

From this centre of origin and dispersion the first migratory routes, still in the late Pliocene or early Pleistocene Age, may now be followed almost step by step through the Malay Peninsula, Indo-China, and India to the Tibetan plateau, which was not yet so sharply cut off from those lands as it afterwards was by the continuous upheaval of the Himalayan system. Recently a very old station on this route was revealed in the Pahang district, north of Johore (Malay Peninsula), where a rudely worked stone implement was found resting on limestone rock 45 feet below the surface, among some river gravel, above which was a bed of clay 43 feet thick, derived from the decomposition of the greenstone hills skirting the Tui river valley. These hills had been overlaid by the limestone deposit, and it was only when the limestone had been sufficiently denuded to allow the greenstone to emerge that the latter rock began to yield its clay. 'The amount of denudation since this emergence has been at least 300 feet' (*Straits Times*, 14th Feb. 1902). Farther north, Dr. Noetling discovered (1894) another palæolithic station in the Yenangyaung district, Upper Burma, where some chipped flints were found *in situ* in a Pliocene bed associated with *Hipparion antelopinum* and other long extinct fauna (*Natural Science*, April, 1897). In India, palæoliths are yielded, often in great abundance, by the Pleistocene beds and drift gravels of the Mirzāpur, Arcot, Orissa, Hyderābād, Narbadā, Gangetic, and other districts. Many of the objects are of the same type as those of the European Drift, and are certainly contemporaneous or even of earlier date (*JAI* xvii. 57 f.).

These primitive Indo-Malayan wanderers may thus easily have converged both from India and Indo-China on the Tibetan tableland, which, under conditions far more favourable than at present, would almost inevitably have become a new centre of specialization and dispersion for the human, as it has for so many other mammalian, species. Here was ample space, such as seems needed for the evolution of all new varieties; a different and cooler climate than that of the Torrid Zone, though, owing to its then lower altitude, more genial than at present; boundless plains intersected by ranges of moderate height, and diversified by a lacustrine and fluvial system far more extensive than that revealed by modern exploration. Here, therefore, the Indo-Malayan Pleistocene precursor must necessarily have become modified in the process of adaptation to his changed environment, and thus gradually have acquired the physical features characteristic of the Mongol division of mankind. Neither colour of the skin, texture of the hair, nor stature could present any difficulty, since in all these respects the Mongol type stands actually nearer than does the Negro to that of the generalized Quaternary ancestor (de Quatrefages). Taken as a whole, the Mongol archetype differs from the other divisions—black, white, red—mainly in the general yellowish complexion, the broad flat features, with prominent cheek-bones, small mesorrhine nose, mesognathous jaws, brachycephalous (short) head, somewhat sunken eyes, with a narrow almond-shaped aperture between the lids, a vertical fold of skin over the inner canthus, and the outer angle slightly raised; lastly, the highly

characteristic dark blue spot in the lower sacral region peculiar to all true-born Mongols, but disappearing in infancy, and said to be common also to the Simian young (Dr. Bälz, quoted by Dr. O. Nachod, *Gesch. von Japan*, 1906, p. 35). The oblique eye with its fold is also a distinct racial mark, whereas the black, lank, and rather coarse hair, round in transverse section, though constant is not exclusive, being common also to the American aborigines, and forming the most marked somatic link between the Mongol and American Indian divisions.

From the central Tibetan plateau this *Homo asiaticus fuscus*, as he has been named by Linné, radiated during the Stone Ages over the greater part of the continent, northwards to Mongolia, Siberia, and the Amur basin, eastwards to China and Indo-China, westwards to the Tarim basin, the Aralo-Caspian depression, and Mesopotamia, southwards to India as far as the Vindhyan uplands. Most of the Asiatic mainland was thus first occupied by peoples of proto-Mongol stock, who in their several new environments developed a number of sub-groups distinguished by more or less marked physical, mental, and linguistic characters. Such are the so-called *Hyperboreans*, comprising the now nearly extinct Yukaghirs, Chukchis, Koryaks, and Kamchadales of the Arctic region east of the Lena basin; the wide-spread *Mongolo-Turki* family, whose chief branches are the Mongols proper, the Tunguses with the Manchus, Koreans, Japanese, and Liu-Kiu Islanders, in the east, the Turks or Tatars, the Yakuts, Kirghizes, Samoyeds, and Ugro-Finns, in the north and west, ranging from the Lena basin to Lapland and Hungary, and loosely connected by their common agglutinating Ural-Altaic speech, of which Korean and Japanese appear to be aberrant members; the *Tibeto-Chinese* section, including the Tibetans, the Chinese, the Indo-Chinese, and several south Himalayan groups, all of more or less monosyllabic isolating speech; the extinct or absorbed *Akkado-Sumerians* of Babylonia, whose highly agglutinating pre-Semitic language is by many affiliated to the Ural-Altaic family (details in art. ETHNOLOGY, 'Conspectus).'

This first Mongol settlement of Asia left free the southern and south-western regions—a great part of India, Irania, Caucasia, Asia Minor, Syria, Canaan, and Arabia, *i.e.*, about one-fourth of the whole continent. During the early Stone Ages, most of the south-western section was occupied by various branches of the Caucasic division, ranging eastwards from North Africa, where that division appears to have been specialized (see art. AFRICA). Amongst the first arrivals were the *Semites*, who ramified from the common Hamito-Semitic stock, and occupied the Arabian Peninsula, of which they have always held exclusive possession, and whence they migrated later into Mesopotamia, Syria, and Asia Minor, becoming differentiated in their new homes as Himyarites, Arabs, Phœnicians, Canaanites (Israelites, Amorites, and others), Aramæans (Syro-Chaldæans), Assyrians, and perhaps Hittites. Other early streams of migration from Africa are now represented by the *Georgians*, *Circassians*, *Lesghians*, and others of the Caucasus, where they are distinguished by a surprising diversity of speech (whence the expression 'mountain of languages' of the mediæval Arab writers), and often by an almost ideally perfect physical type, owing to which 'Caucasic' was adopted by Blumenbach as a suitable conventional name of the white division, that is, of Linné's *Homo europæus albus*. Then came the Caucasians of Aryan speech, commonly called *Aryans* or *Indo-Europeans*, whose provenance and centres of dispersion are still moot questions, but whose various Asiatic branches are found at the dawn of history already settled in Asia Minor (Hellenes, Phrygians, Lydians, Armenians, and others), in Irania (Medes, Persians, Kurds, Afghans, Baluchi, and others), in the Hindu-Kush, Pamirs, and North India (Siah-Posh, Dards, Galchas, Vedic Aryans).

In India these Aryans were probably preceded by a now submerged *Negrito* element from Malaysia, by the *Kolarians* of the Vindhyan uplands, and by the *Dravidians* of the Deccan and Ceylon. There is no certain clue to the origin of the last two, who present mixed physical characters and speak two radically distinct agglutinating languages, Kolarian especially being of an extreme type. In its morphology it remotely resembles the Finno-Turki branch of the Ural-Altaic family, but, like Dravidian, in other respects differs profoundly from all other known forms of speech. But it is generally, and perhaps rightly, assumed that the Kolarians entered India from the north or north-east, and the Dravidians from the north-west, and that both may have been offshoots of the Mongol stock afterwards greatly modified in their new tropical homes.

This first occupation of Asia mainly by the Mongols, but also largely by the Caucasians, has undergone great changes and shiftings, brought about by the ceaseless migratory movements and racial struggles which, beginning in remote prehistoric times, were continued throughout the historic period, and are still in progress. Evidence is now available to show that the Mongol domain was encroached upon and traversed north and south by neolithic whites penetrating from Europe across Siberia and Mongolia to Manchuria, Korea, and Japan, and apparently from Africa through Syria, Caucasia, Irania, and north India to Indo-China and Malaysia. The strain of white blood is very marked amongst the Manchus and Koreans, while the Ainus, the true aborigines of Japan, are now definitely declared by Nachod to be neolithic Caucasians (*Gesch. von Japan*, 1906, I. i.). The route followed seems indicated by the station near Tomsk, West Siberia, where, in 1896, numerous worked flints and some human remains were found by Prof. Kashchenko in association with those of a mammoth. Farther east, A. P. Mositz explored (1895) five pre-historic stations in Transbaikalia, in one of which he found two highly dolichocephalic pre-Mongol skulls of the early European type (*L'Anthropologie*, 1896, p. 82). In Korea, where the evidence accumulates, H. S. Saunderson remarks on 'the frequency with which features almost European in refinement and Caucasian in cast are met with.' Here the numerous flint implements and dolmens, like those of Britain and North Africa, must be accredited to the San-San aborigines who occupied the peninsula long before its conquest by the Mongoloid Sien-pi from Manchuria.

The southern highway may similarly be traced from Africa through Syria, where Prof. Zumoffen describes seven stations of the early and later Stone Ages (*L'Anthropologie*, 1897, pp. 272, 426), and thence through Caucasia, India, and the Khāsi Hills to Indo-China, where the evidence again abounds. Here are numerous Caucasic groups intermingled or associated with the Mongol substratum, and conspicuous especially amongst the Kahyens of North Burma, the Cambodians of the Lower Mekhong, the Mosso, Lolo, Man-tse, and many other hillmen all along the Chinese borderlands from Assam to Annam. Mrs. Bishop (Miss Bird) describes the white Man-tse, visited by her in 1896, as 'quite Caucasian, both men and women being very handsome.' Prince Henri d'Orléans was reminded by the Kiu-tse (Khanungs, Lu-tsé) of some of his European acquaintances. Dr. Billet met some Nong people 'with light and even

red hair'; and M. R. Verneau tells us that the Mans and T'hai 'differ altogether from the Mongol group represented by the Chinese and Annamese. The Mans especially show striking affinities with the Aryan type' (*L'Anthropologie*, 1896, p. 602).

In the extreme west the racial movements resulted in Mesopotamia in the extinction of the Akkado-Sumerian Mongols by the Caucasic Semites over 4000 years ago. After the rise of Islām these and most other Semites became Arabized in speech and religion, while in Asia Minor nearly all the early Caucasic peoples were displaced by the Muhammadan Turki hordes from Central Asia. Anatolia has thus become by conquest a part of the Mongol domain, which has also encroached on a considerable section of North Irania, that is, the hilly district between Herāt and Kābul, now occupied by numerous Aimak and Hazara tribes, who are ethnically Mongolo-Turks, Muhammadans in religion, and now of Aryan (Persian) speech.

In Irania and the Aralo-Caspian steppe, that is, the *Irān*, or 'land of light,' and *Turān*, the 'land of night,' of the Persian poet-chroniclers, a perpetual struggle for the ascendancy has been maintained throughout the historic period between the nomad predatory hordes of the northern wastes and the cultured agricultural populations of the fertile southern lands. These southern Aryans were dominant under the old Persian empire of the Achæmenians, which extended from the Ægean to the Oxus and Indus, and fostered the growth of flourishing settled communities throughout Central Asia. Thus it was that Irān interpenetrated Turān, expanded its higher culture by the very enlargement of its own borders, and, when further stimulated by Hellenic influences, invaded the wilderness itself. In the Tarim basin, at that time a fertile well-watered region, there arose a great centre of Iranian and Græco-Bactrian civilization, the remains of which, after lying buried for some two thousand years under the advancing sands of the Takla-Makan Desert, have again been brought to light by the Sven Hedin expeditions of 1895 and 1900, and more fully explored by Dr. M. A. Stein, who in 1901 recovered great quantities of hidden treasures, now deposited in the British Museum (*Sand-buried Ruins of Khotan*, 1903).

Later, the Caucasian ascendancy in Central Asia disappeared before the repeated invasions of Huns, Finns, Turks, and other Mongol hordes, but has been again restored, at least politically, by the spread of the Russian power over the trans-Caspian region in recent times. To these incessant ethnical movements, dislocations, and interminglings are due those intermediate Mongolo-Caucasic populations, such as the Ugrians and other Finns, the Uzbegs, Turkomans, Hazaras, and other Turki groups, who in their physical characteristics present every shade of transition between the typical white and yellow races.

In many places the cultures and social and religious institutions are similarly intermingled, although in Asia the dominant religions are in great measure distributed according to race. Thus the Tunguses and most other Siberian aborigines are pronounced shamanists; the Hindus extreme polytheists; the Tibetans, Sinhalese, Indo-Chinese, Chinese, Japanese, and Mongols proper all nominal Buddhists; the Arabs, Kurds, Afghans, Turkomans, Uzbegs, Kirghizes, and Turks generally Sunnites ('orthodox' Muhammadans); the Persians, the Moors of Ceylon, and the Hazaras mostly Shī'ites ('separatist' Muhammadans). Thus is seen the curious spectacle of a nomad Turki group (Kirghizes) and a nomad Mongol group (Kalmuks) encamped side by side on the Lower Volga plains, both intruders from Asia, but the former strict Sunnites, the latter Buddhists like all their Eastern kindred. This distribution, however, is purely superficial, since below the outward forms, often merely official, as in Tibet, Siam, Annam, and China, the old primitive beliefs still everywhere survive in their full vigour. In Asia these beliefs represent all the earliest developments of the religious sentiment—pure animism, personification of the powers of nature, and ancestor-worship (art. ETHNOLOGY, § 9)—not merely in juxtaposition, but often in the closest possible association. Thus ancestor-worship, characteristic of Africa, and animal-cult, dominant in America, are both prevalent in China, jointly with the belief in good and bad aerial and water spirits, and an outward adherence to the three recognized national religions—the three 'State Churches,' as they have been called—*fo-kiao* (Buddhism), *tao-kiao* (Taoism), and *ju-kiao* (Confucianism).

> 'In every district are practised diverse forms of worship between which no clear dividing line can be drawn, and, as in Annam, the same persons may be at once followers of Confucius, Lao-tse, and Buddha. In fact, such is the position of the emperor, who belongs *ex officio* to all three of these State religions, and scrupulously takes part in their various observances. There is even some truth in the Chinese view that "all three make but one religion," the first appealing to man's moral nature, the second to the instinct of self-preservation, the third to the higher sphere of thought and contemplation. But behind, one might say above, it all, the old animism still prevails, manifested in a multitude of superstitious practices, whose purport is to appease the evil and secure the favour of the good spirits, the *Feng-shui*, or *Fung-shui*, air and water genii who have to be reckoned with in all the weightiest as well as the most trivial occurrences of daily life. These, with the ghosts of their ancestors, by whom the whole land is haunted, are the bane of the Chinaman's existence. Everything depends on maintaining a perfect balance between the two principles represented by the 'White Tiger' and the 'Azure Dragon,' who guard the approaches of every dwelling, and whose opposing influences have to be nicely adjusted by the well-paid professors of the magic arts' (Keane, *Man Past and Present*, p. 223).

The 'professors' here referred to correspond in China to the *shamans* who control the religious world in Siberia. Shamanism will be separately dealt with, and here it may suffice to say that it is not a particular system of belief, but rather a peculiar phase of thought, which is widely distributed, and appears to be a necessary stage in the progress of all religious development. Thus the shaman belongs to no special form of belief, but holds a position somewhat intermediate between the medicine-man and wizard of the lower, and the marabout and true priest of the higher, religious systems. Although in its more advanced state the office tends to become hereditary and thus to crystallize into a regular hierarchy, in Siberia any one may become a shaman who has sufficient will-power to enforce belief in his claim to supernatural virtues, and to exercise them as intercessor between the invisible and otherwise inaccessible deities and their votaries. Hence in Siberia beneath the general shaman-craft there are all kinds of animistic beliefs, practices, and superstitions, in which animal-cult, as in North America, plays a much larger part than ancestor- or nature-worship. Wer-wolf notions are wide-spread, and the *Tatars* of the Minusinsk district about the Abakan affluent of the Yenisei although baptized Christians, are still under the influence of the shamans, and credit the *Ainas*, that is, the invisible spirits of evil, with the power of assuming the form of dogs, foxes, birds, snakes, and other animals. These Ainas dwell in the underground regions, and are ruled by the *Irle-Khan*, who is also the familiar spirit and patron of the shamans.

So also the *Yakuts* of the Lena basin have a subordinate deity, the *Vekhsyt*, or 'Advocate,' who from time to time visits the abodes of mortals in the form of a white horse, an eagle, a cuckoo, or some other bird, and carries messages to and fro between them and the 'Merciful Chief,' creator of the world, who with his wife, 'Shining in Glory,'

is all-powerful. These are beneficent beings, but nearly all the rest appear to be devils, and amongst the Yakuts demonolatry is certainly carried to its extreme limits. The malevolent aerial spirits form twenty-seven tribes ruled by a kind of Satan, who with his wife has a numerous progeny, all hostile to man. *Sugai-toyon*, the Yakut *Juppiter Tonans*, is the instrument of his vengeance, while in the underground *Mung-tar*, abode of 'Everlasting Woe,' there dwell eight other hosts of demons under *Asharay-bioho*, the 'Mighty,' supreme in Hades. These hosts have all their female consorts, and are joined by the shamans after death. Another potent divinity is *Enakhsys*, the 'Cow-herdess,' who is much dreaded because of her power to harm their cattle, strike them with murrain, and destroy the calves; hence her wrath has to be turned aside by many costly offerings (Ovarovsky).

Despite their veneer of Russian Orthodoxy, the neighbouring *Samoyeds* still cling tenaciously to their old pagan beliefs. 'As long as things go well with him [the Samoyed], he is a Christian; but should his reindeer die, or other catastrophe happen, he immediately returns to his old god *Num* or *Chaddi*. . . . He conducts his heathen services by night and in secret, and carefully screens from sight any image of Chaddi' (F. G. Jackson, *The Great Frozen Land*, 1895, p. 84). Several instances are here mentioned of this compromise between the old and the new—a subject more fully dealt with in art. ABORIGINES. Thus on the Samoyed graves the wooden cross is supplemented by an inverted sledge, which is intended to convey the dead safely over the snows of the under world. They also hold in awe the rings of stones within which human sacrifices appear to have been formerly offered to propitiate Chaddi; and although these practices have ceased, 'it is only a few years ago that a Samoyed living on Novaia Zemlia sacrificed a young girl' (*ib.*). Many of these aborigines hold that death is the end of everything, that good and evil deeds receive their deserts in this life, and that immortality is reserved only for the *tatibé*, that is, the Samoyed magicians or shamans, who either remain quietly in their graves or else wander about at night seeking an opportunity to benefit their friends or harm their enemies. Despite this limited measure of immortality, in the graves are deposited all kinds of useful objects, such as clothing, cooking-pots, knives, horns filled with tobacco, guns, bows and arrows for the men, needles, thread, or sinews for sewing, and scraping-knives for the women, everything being damaged to prevent it from being stolen. The explanation of this seeming inconsistency is that the departed do not die at once, but survive for some time in the grave, where they will require the same objects that they needed in this life.

The above-mentioned Num is an aerial god who dwells in the sky, where he generates thunder and lightning, sends down rain and snow, and rules the winds and storms. The sky itself, also called Num (cf. *Diespiter*), is his visible embodiment, and to his essence also belong the moon and stars through which he manifests himself at night, the rainbow (*munbano*) which forms the hem of his mantle, and the sun in which he is chiefly personified, and which is greeted at its rising and setting with suitable invocations. Some even hold that the earth, the sea, and all visible nature form part of the same divine system, thus anticipating the monistic and pantheistic concepts of more advanced theosophies. Num knows and sees all that happens upon earth; if men are good and benevolent, he prospers all their doings, increases their reindeer herds (one of his epithets is *Jilibeam-baertie*, 'cattle-ward'), blesses their hunting expeditions, and endows them with many days. But if they lead wicked lives, they fall into poverty and misery, and die prematurely. There is even a sort of moral code containing the precepts by which all should be guided who wish to stand well with Num: 'Believe in Num. Believe in the spirit of evil, and that he can be appeased by sacrifices, that no misfortune befall thee, or thy family, or thy herds, that he may save thee from sickness and assist thee in thy labours. Believe in the spirits that they may do thee no evil. Do not jump over the sledge in which the gods are placed; honour thy parents; reverence thy elders; kill not, quarrel not, speak no evil, tend the herds, help the poor, and Num will reward thee. Speak not of what thou hast seen, that no one may know from thee what has happened.'

Yet beneath this outward display of lofty religious and ethical notions, most of the Samoyeds are still mainly nature-worshippers and animists. They show great respect especially for the bear, which with the wolf is held in the highest veneration in Siberia. Nevertheless the Samoyeds, like the Ainus and other Eastern peoples, will capture and kill it whenever they can. When it is dead, the claws of its forepaws are usually amputated, the object being, by a strange confusion of ideas, to protect themselves from harm when next they venture to attack one of the species.

Like the Samoyeds, the *Ostyaks* of the Yenisei region have a god of the sky, *Turm* or *Urt*, who sends thunder and storms, but is also credited with a high sense of honour and rectitude. He mingles amongst mortals, accompanying them wherever they go, and judging them according to their deserts, for no act, good or evil, can escape his notice. He is inaccessible even to the shamans; no appeals can bend his will; and he controls human destinies and the course of events according to the eternal laws of justice. No sacrifices can secure his favour, since he looks only to merit in the disposal of his gifts, without the least regard to prayers or offerings. Hence in times of distress and trouble it is useless to seek his aid. It is the lesser deities and the demons alone that can be swayed by the mediation of the shamans, and, as amongst the Ugrian Finns, they are generally represented by rude stone or wooden effigies, often of extremely fantastic form. Thus Ortik, the patron of the hunt, is figured as a legless horse stuffed with hair and skins, with two linen sleeves for arms, a linen skirt, and a face made of a hammered metal plate nailed to a block of wood. A log arrayed in beaver skins stands for Meig, a peculiarly malignant goblin, who plays mischievous pranks with people, leading them astray in the woods, and overwhelming them in snowstorms. In this strange pantheon a place is also found for both the wolf and the bear, and when one of these animals is bagged in the hunt it is regarded as a stroke of luck celebrated with much feasting and revelry.

'The skin is stuffed with hay, and the people collect from all quarters to jeer, mock, and spit upon the helpless enemy. They sing songs of triumph expressed in words of insult and defiance. After their spirit of merriment is exhausted, they set up on its hind legs in the corner of the hut the now harmless effigy of the ferocious beast, and bestow upon it, for a considerable time, the veneration of a tutelar god' (A. Featherman, *Races of Mankind*, 1891, iv. 564).

But it is in the extreme east, amongst the *Gilyaks* and *Ainus*, that this animal-cult has acquired its highest development. The *kohr* (bear), who represents the *Kur*, or Lord of the heavens, is one of the chief Gilyak divinities, although under certain circumstances he is occasionally captured and eaten. When taken in his lair while hibernating in winter, he is secured by a leathern noose and dragged along with shouts and cries intended to stupefy the still half-dozing victim. He is then kept in confinement, fed and fattened on fish, and at last slain on his feast-day, after a fight in which the villagers are required to attack him without arms. Similar strange practices prevail amongst the Ainus of Yezo, North Japan, as described by the late Mrs. Bishop:

'The peculiarity which distinguishes this rude mythology is the "worship" of the bear, the Yezo bear being one of the finest of his species. But it is impossible to understand the feelings by which it is prompted, for they worship it after their fashion, and set up its head in their villages, yet they trap it, kill it, eat it, and sell its skin. There is no doubt that this wild beast inspires more of the feeling which prompts worship than the inanimate forces of nature, and the Ainus may be distinguished as bear-worshippers, and their greatest religious festival, or Saturnalia, as the Festival of the Bear. Gentle and peaceable as they are, they have a great admiration for fierceness and courage; and the bear, which is the strongest, fiercest, and most courageous animal known to them, has probably in all

ages inspired them with veneration. Some of their rude chants are in praise of the bear, and their highest eulogy on a man is to compare him to a bear' (*Unbeaten Tracks in Japan*[4], 1885, ii. 73). For further details and a possible explanation of this strange cult, see the art. AINUS in vol. i. p. 249[a], and art. ANIMALS, *ib.* p. 502[b].

In Mongolia the never-dying superstitions associated with nature-worship, animism, demonolatry, and witchcraft still survive beneath the outward show of official lamaism. Indeed, the whole system of Buddhism is everywhere coloured and modified, as in most other Buddhist lands, by the old local beliefs. The magicians are still appealed to when the flocks are smitten by disease; when 'fine weather,' which there means rain, is needed; when sickness troubles the household; or when some healthy but unfriendly neighbour is to be stricken by a mortal illness or fatal accident. The very inmates of the huge lamaseries bear the name of 'Samaneans,' perhaps a corrupt form of the Tungus word *shaman*, as if the Buddhist monks were merely the spiritual successors of the old medicine-men. Every possible transition is thus observed between the former nature- and spirit-worship and the peculiar form of lamaism introduced from Tibet after the death of Jenghiz Khan.

In Tibet itself much the same relations prevail between the 'State Church' and the pre-Buddhist *Bonbo* or *Boa-ho* religion, which persists, especially in the central and eastern provinces, side by side with the national creed. From the colour of the robes usually worn by its priests, it is known as the sect of the 'Blacks,' in contradistinction to the orthodox 'Yellow' and dissenting 'Red' lamaists; and, as now constituted, its origin is attributed to Shen-rab (Gsen-rabs), who flourished about the 5th cent. before the new era, and is venerated as the equal of Buddha himself. His followers, who were powerful enough to drive Buddhism from Tibet in the 10th cent., worship eighteen chief deities, the most popular being the red and black demons, the snake devil, and especially the fiery tiger-god, father of all the subordinate members of this truly diabolical pantheon. The sacred symbol of the Bonbo sect is the ubiquitous *swastika* with the hooks of the cross reversed, 卐 instead of 卍, a change said to be due to the practice of turning the prayer-wheel from right to left as the Red lamas do, instead of from left to right as is the orthodox way. The common Buddhist formula of six syllables—*om-ma-ni-pad-me-hum*—is also replaced by one of seven syllables—*ma-tri-mon-tre-sa-la-dzun* (Sarat Chandra Das, in *JRASBe*, 1881–1882).

In the upland regions skirting the Brahmaputra, between Tibet and Upper Burma, there are a multitude of primitive Mongoloid peoples—Abors, Mishmis, Garos, Khāsis, Kocchis, Bodos, Kacharis, Lushais, Nagas, Kukis, Chins, Kahyens, Karens, and many others—who have been little or not at all affected either by Buddhist or Hindu influences, and whose religions or mythologies consequently present features often of exceptional interest. Thus the gods of the *Garos* are mostly vague mythical entities, dwelling in the hills or in the sky, but possessing no definite attributes or powers, and associated with many wonderful cosmical myths. Salgong, the chief deity, marries Apongma, a divine princess who descends on earth and gives birth to Kengra Barsa, father of fire and of all the heavenly bodies, and also to a daughter, Mining Mija, who marries the son of Donjogma, mother of mankind. From a granddaughter of Salgong spring the mothers of the Tibetan Bhotiyas, of the Garos, and of the Feringies (English), and so on. But beneath these fanciful legends, many of them obviously later inventions, there persists the old nature-worship, as seen in the personification of the sun, moon, and stars, of the hills, streams, and forests, with their indwelling genii, to whom are attributed divine powers as rulers of the universe, and controllers of human destinies and of all natural phenomena.

'According to the *Kuki* creation myth, the face of the earth was originally covered with one vast sheet of water inhabited by a huge worm. One day the Creator, passing over this worm, dropped a small piece of clay, saying, "Of this I mean to make a land and people it." "Nonsense," said the worm; "look here, I can swallow it." But the lump passing out of his body grew and grew until it became the world we now see. Then man sprang out of the ground by the will of the three gods, Lambra the Creator, without whose consent nothing can be done, Golarai, god of death, and the beneficent Dudukal, who operates through his wife Fapité' (C. A. Soppitt, *Kuki-Lushai Tribes*, 1887).

The *Tawyans*, a branch of the numerous Chin family, have a tradition that they were formerly very powerful, but were ruined by their insane efforts to capture the sun. With a sort of Jacob's ladder they mounted higher and higher, but, growing tired, began to quarrel among themselves, until one day, while half of them were clambering up the pole, the other half below cut it down just as they were about to seize the sun.

Although often described as devil-worshippers, the *Chins* appear to worship neither god nor devil. The northern groups believe there is no *Ens Supremum*; and although the southerners have a Kozin, or head god, they pay him no homage, and never look to him for any favours, except perhaps exemption from such troubles as he might be disposed to inflict on those who offend him in this world. There are also the countless *nats*, or spirits of the air, the streams, the jungle, the hills, and there are those that swarm in the house and in the fields. None of these can do any good, though all may do harm unless soothed by gifts. *Mithikwa*, the 'Village of the Dead,' is divided into two wards, the *Pwethikwa*, abode of the happy, and the *Sathikwa*, reserved for the wretches who die *unavenged*, and must there bide till their murder is wiped out in blood. Thus the vendetta receives divine sanction, strengthened by the belief that the slain becomes the slave of the slayer in Pwethikwa.

'Should the slayer himself be slain, then the first slain is the slave of the second slain, who in turn is the slave of the man who killed him. Whether a man has been honest or dishonest in this world is of no consequence in the next existence; but if he has killed many people in this world, he has many slaves to serve him in his future existence; if he has killed many wild animals, then he will start well supplied with food, for all that he kills on earth are his in the future existence. In the next existence hunting and drinking will certainly be practised, but whether fighting and raiding will be indulged in is unknown' (Carey and Tuck, *The Chin Hills*, 1896, i. 196).

Before the advent of the Vedic Aryans, the chthonic gods were probably supreme throughout India, and, despite the wide diffusion of Hinduism, they are still supreme amongst most of the Dravidian, Kolarian, and mixed Aryo-Dravidian aborigines. But these gods themselves are nearly all hostile to man, and consequently not easily distinguishable from devils. Hence it is that we have now official assurance that the Pahāriās and other low castes, and even some of the high castes, are for the most part demon-worshippers; and this is specially true of the aborigines of Southern India. In the Cochin *Census Report for 1901*, M. Sankara Menon writes:

'Nowhere perhaps has the belief in demons a stronger hold on the popular mind than in this part of India. The existence of numerous exorcists amongst the various sections of the Hindu population, from the highest Nambudri to the lowest Paraiyan, bears ample testimony to this fact. There is a separate caste, the *Panans*, amongst whom exorcisms, sorcery, and witchcraft are hereditary occupations. The Panan is quite as indispensable a factor in the social organism of the village as the barber and the washerman. There are again certain families who have special control over particular classes of demons.' The priests attached to many families have their special family deities 'by whose aid they profess to control the action of demons and spirits. It may sound strange, but it is none the less true, that there are exorcists amongst native Christians and Musalmāns

as well. One interesting fact is that high-class Hindus exercise their magical influence by propitiating only the more refined and sublime manifestations of the gods of the pantheon, whereas the low-caste Hindus do the same by propitiating Kālī in her more terrible and bloodthirsty aspects.' Some of the more evil-minded demons are 'supposed to be wandering about in mid-air, or haunting houses, trees, wells, or tanks, ever bent upon doing evil to those that come in their way. They are supposed to live upon the offerings made to them by their votaries, who are continually tormented for the purpose. Illness, accidents, and other misfortunes are often attributed to the evil influence of demons or spirits. At the sick-bed of a person, the astrologer, the exorcist, and the physician are all in attendance. The astrologer divines the causes, and prescribes propitiatory remedies. The exorcist then comes in, and goes through a more or less elaborate ceremony to drive out the demons or spirits. The physician steps in last to treat the patient, for the common belief is that so long as the patient is possessed, medicine can have no effect. The demons of smallpox and cholera, and myriads of others, have all to be coaxed into good humour to desist from doing evil. Ghosts or demons often appear in terrible form before they enter into human bodies, and with the sudden disappearance of the phantoms or apparitions a person believes himself to be possessed, and falls ill' (*ib.*).

In some places snake-worship ranks next to demonology even amongst the high castes. In Malabar nearly all the compounds have their serpent-groves, with effigies of the reptiles carved on blocks of stone; and here no orthodox Hindu will ever kill a snake, even if bitten, since an injury done to any of them would be sure to bring on leprosy, ophthalmia, or other ailments. Serpents are treated as members of the family, and served with milk, fruits, and all kinds of dainties. None but a Brāhman would dare to pluck even a flower or a twig from the trees growing in the snake-grove, where songs are chanted and religious rites observed in honour of these reptiles, which are, in fact, worshipped as gods or demons.

In the direction of the north the native superstitions seem to touch even a lower level, and among the *Kolarians* of the Vindhya uplands they were till recently associated with human sacrifices of a peculiarly barbarous character. In order to secure good harvests, the victim, often a child captured or bought from a neighbouring tribe, was put to a lingering death, by being slowly hacked to pieces with an axe, the supposition being that the greater the suffering the better pleased would be the god, and the heavier the crops of cereals. Of the *Mundas*, one of the largest Kolarian tribes, the chief social feature is their highly developed totemic system. The number of totems almost passes belief, and includes such remarkable objects as rice-weevils, cocoons, mice, leeches, mushrooms, ants, frogs, eels, worms, or even moonlight, red earth, umbrellas, ghī (clarified butter), or walking-sticks. These are all animated by indwelling spirits, so that we have here the lowest conceivable form of the animism that lies at the foundation of all natural religions.

Still more debased than the full-blood Kolarian and Dravidian aborigines are the *Aryo-Dravidian* half-breeds, who are interspersed over the northern provinces, and to their own crude religious dawnings often superadd the revolting ideas and practices of the later corrupt Hinduism. Here the blending of the higher and lower races, of the 'twice-born' Aryas ('Nobles'), and the scarcely human Nāgas, 'kindred of the dragon,' dates back to the earliest recorded times, and is typified in the mythical marriage of Arjuna, one of the high-born Pāndavas, with Ulūpi, daughter of the Nāga king Vāsuki. The union took place in the still sacred city of Hardwār on the upper Ganges, which is described as inhabited by 2000 crores (a crore = ten millions) of snake-people, whose wives were of peerless beauty; and here was also a lake which contained the waters of life, wherein all those snake-people were wont to bathe. During their later migrations the already mixed Aryas encountered the vile Dasyus, proto-Kolarians of the south Gangetic woodlands, for whom no terms of abuse are too strong, yet with multitudes of whom a fusion was eventually effected. Thus it was that 'from the union of the white, the yellow, and the black men arose the modern people of northern India' (W. Crooke). That the union was not merely ethnical, but also social and religious, is seen in the *baigā*, or devil-hunting priest of the jungle tribes, who in the Hindu system became a Brāhman *Ojha*, or exorcizer of evil spirits; and we know that in later times whole sections of the lower races were raised to priestly rank. But this tendency towards complete fusion of all the racial elements was arrested by the institution of caste, which, though at present occupational, had originally an ethnical basis (see art. CASTE).

A clear insight into these obscure relations is necessary to a right understanding of the strange intermingling of primitive and Hindu social and religious notions prevalent amongst these mixed northern groups. But even so, great difficulties remain, and Mr. W. Crooke, himself a most diligent and shrewd observer, finds it

'all but impossible to frame a working definition of a Hindu; Musalmāns of the lower class cling to many of the beliefs of the faith from which they were originally drawn; everywhere in the lower strata the forms of faith known as Brāhmanical or Animistic constantly overlap. . . . The natural cleavage line is between Brāhmanism and Animism, and it has been found possible on this basis to define the religious beliefs of eastern and southern India, but in northern India this distinction is unworkable. Most of the menial and hill tribes profess theoretically a belief in the Brāhmanical pantheon; at the same time even the higher classes are more or less influenced by the Animistic beliefs of the lower races' (*The N.W. Provs. of India*, 1897, ch. v.). And elsewhere: 'It is little use defining a man as a Vaishnava if we know that on occasion he will worship other gods as well—will reverence the cow or the pipal tree, Mother Ganges, or the goddess of smallpox' (p. 242).

As pointed out by Mr. E. A. Gait (*General Report of the Census of India*, 1901, p. 358), the animism here in question—a belief in and dread of impersonal powers to be coerced by magic—appears to have passed into the Hindu system from two different sources. Some of its elements 'are derived from the Vedic Aryans themselves, others from the Dravidian [and Kolarian] races who have been absorbed into Hinduism.' But 'it would be fruitless to attempt to distinguish the two streams of magical usage—the Vedic and the Animistic. They are of mixed parentage, like the people who observe them, partly Indo-Aryan and partly Dravidian.' It now becomes possible to understand the picture of chaotic religious notions—some utterly revolting and immoral, others betraying some glimmering of a moral sense, but the great majority degrading—by which these mixed populations are animated. Thus some of the widespread *Doms*, most probably the parent-stock of the European Gipsies (Dom = Rom, *r* and *d* interchangeable), hold that raiding and robbery have divine sanction. Before starting on a nocturnal expedition they sacrifice to Sansāri Māi, the chthonic goddess patroness of thieves, and pray in a low voice that a dark night may cloak their designs and the gang escape detection, just as the *furum dea*, Laverna, was silently invoked by the Roman *latro*:

> 'Labra movet metuens audiri, Pulchra Laverna,
> Da mihi fallere; da justo sanctoque videri;
> Noctem peccatis, et fraudibus objice nubem.'
> (Hor. *Epist.* I. xvi. 60–63).

Yet these Doms, scavengers in the towns, vagrants or wandering tinkers in the country, are not quite irreclaimable, and the recent efforts to civilize them have met with a measure of success in some districts. They have even a family priest, always the sister's son, which points to matriarchal times when kinship was reckoned through the female line.

The *Agariās* of Mirzapur, all smelters and forgers, call themselves Hindus, yet worship the tribal deity Lohāsur Devi, goddess of iron (*lohā* =

iron'), and also employ the *baigā* (see above) to worship the old local godlings. The black goat offered to Lohāsur Devi is worshipped before being sacrificed, and goats and fowls are also offered to the ghosts of the dead who appear to them in dreams. At the end of the difficult road to the heaven of Parameshvar (Vishnu) is a great gate guarded by terrible demons, who allow no woman to pass unless tatued. There are twenty-four forms of tatus, and the women who can show no mark of some god on their bodies are tormented by the gate-keepers, who brand them with a hot iron, roll them in thorns, and fling them down from the top of the gate. Tatuing has thus become a religious obligation, and although perhaps totemistic in origin, the forms—Ganeśa, Śiva, Krishna as flute-player, the moon, the peacock, and many others—are now merely charms to ward off evils and gain access to the abode of Vishnu. The whole religious world of the Agariās is an inextricably interwoven system of primitive and Hindu notions.

Similarly the *Agarwālas* of the Upper Ganges, although reckoned as Vaishnavas, call themselves, and are, *Nāga Upāsaki*, 'Snake-worshippers,' doing homage to *Āstika Muni*, who sprang from the sister of the great serpent Vāsuki. But there is also a deity Ohur, who saves women from widowhood, besides the tribal deity *Lakshmi* and several trees—pipal, kadam, sami, babul—which are held in special honour. Socially the Agarwālas are landowners, bankers, and money-lenders, but for them animal food, as well as onions, garlic, carrots, and turnips, is tabu, and a good illustration of the countless hair-splitting caste distinctions is the refusal of the women to eat the food prepared by their daughters-in-law.

One might almost suppose that the Hindu snake-cult had passed into Irania, so general is the respect in which these reptiles are held even by the Persian Shī'ites. No Persian will willingly kill a house-snake, partly because he thinks it harmless, but chiefly because he supposes it to be tenanted by the spirit of the late owner of the house. When one was shot by Dr. C. J. Wills, the whole household 'sulked and looked black for a week,' although the landlord, being an educated man, was glad, 'the clock-winding snake' having plagued him for years. Equally prevalent are the superstitions associated with omens, the evil eye, and astrology. Nothing serious is done in Persia without the taking of an omen, the casting of lots, or the consulting of an astrologer. A favourite place for taking omens is the tomb of the Shirazi poet and mystic, Hafiz, to whom are paid almost divine honours. Recourse is had to the *munajjim*, 'astrologer,' on all occasions; every village has its professional diviner, every town several, whose chief business it is to predict lucky hours or days, to read the future, and to discover stolen property, and in this they are often successful by laying pitfalls into which the thieves unwittingly stumble.

Apart from the fanatical Bābīs (*q.v.*), and the periodical outbursts of religious frenzy connected with the anniversary of the martyrs Husain and Hasan, the Persian Shī'ites are not particularly zealous Muhammadans. Many, indeed, of the educated classes prefer the writings of Hafiz and Sadi to the Qur'ān, are theists and even advanced freethinkers, while scepticism is wide-spread amongst the higher military and official classes. 'These say no prayers, keep no fasts, have no belief, and are utterly dead to everything but what they believe to be their own interests. Many openly boast their disbelief in anything, and this is done with impunity' (Wills, *The Land of the Lion and the Sun*, 1883, p. 339). One thing is clear. There is no danger that the monotheism which has supplanted the old Zoroastrian dualism in Persia will ever sink, like the Vedic system, to the low level of the primitive chthonic beliefs. It will rather be dissipated, like the Western creeds, in the atmosphere of philosophic unbelief.

On the other hand, these primitive beliefs are still rife in Arabia, the very cradle of Muhammadan monotheism. Muhammad enthroned Allāh, but failed to abolish the *jinns*, the *afrīts*, and *shaitans* that still haunt the sandy wastes, and swarm in every wady, cave, well, and hillside of the peninsula. But it has to be remembered that the Persians are Iranians, that is, one of the noblest branches of the Aryan family, while the Arabs are Semites whose primeval 'monotheism' is probably a delusion, and whose early beliefs were 'of the earth earthy,' originally associated with the Asherahs, the Astarte and Tammuz myths, the abominations of the Baals and Molechs, and all that is implied in the primitive phallus-worship.

For the higher religions, all of which took their rise in Asia, see special articles CHRISTIANITY, JUDAISM, MUHAMMADANISM, ZOROASTRIANISM, BRAHMANISM, BUDDHISM, SHINTOISM.

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A. H. KEANE.

AŚOKA.—Aśoka, emperor of India (B.C. 273-231), was the grandson of Chandragupta Maurya (*q.v.*), and son of Bindusāra, whom he succeeded on the throne in B.C. 273 or 272, although his formal coronation did not take place until B.C. 269, having perhaps been delayed by a disputed succession. According to tradition, Aśoka in his youth represented his father as viceroy at Taxila in the Panjāb, and also at Ujjain in Mālwā. Silly legends represent him as having attained power by the massacre of ninety-nine brothers, and as having been a monster of cruelty in the early years of his reign; but these are mere fables. In B.C. 261 he rounded off his vast inherited dominions by the annexation of the kingdom of Kalingā on the coast of the Bay of Bengal, corresponding with the 'Northern Circars' and part of Orissa. This was the only aggressive war of the reign. The suffering inflicted upon the conquered people made a profound impression on the conscience of Aśoka, who at about this time came under the influence of Buddhist teachers, to whom war was abhorrent. Four years later, the emperor solemnly recorded in inscriptions engraved upon the rocks his 'profound sorrow and regret' for the misery caused by his ambition, and declared that 'the loss of even the hundredth or thousandth part of the persons who were then slain, carried away captive, or done to death in Kalingā, would now be a matter of deep regret to His Majesty. Although a man should do him an injury, His Majesty holds that it must be patiently borne, so far as it can possibly be borne.'

Aśoka acted on the principle thus publicly professed and indelibly recorded, and henceforward was a man of peace, devoted to the inculcation and propagation of the Law of Piety (*dharma*), as conceived by him in accordance with the teaching of the Buddha. At a date not exactly known he

qualified himself for the highest rewards of a Buddhist saint, by accepting ordination as a monk, and donning the yellow robe of the Order, but did not then abdicate his royal power, although it is possible that in the last year of his life he withdrew from all worldly affairs. He passed away in B.C. 232 or 231 after a reign of fully forty years. The scene of his death may have been a monastery on the Golden Hill (Suvarṇagiri) at Rājāgrihā, the capital of the early kings of Magadha (S. Bihār).

The empire which Aśoka ruled comprised, in modern terminology, Afghanistan south of the Hindū Kush, Balūchistān, Sind, the valley of Kashmīr, Nepāl, the lower Himālaya, and the whole of India proper, except the southern extremity below the latitude of Madras. The central regions seem to have been governed directly from Pāṭaliputra, the modern Pātna, then on the north bank of the Sōn, the great city which continued for centuries to be the capital of India. The outlying provinces were controlled by at least four viceroys, who were often members of the Imperial family; and the orders of these high officers were executed by a regularly organized departmental service of officials. The capital was administered by a municipal commission divided into six boards, and similar arrangements probably existed in the other principal cities. A standing army of all arms —cavalry, infantry, chariots, and war elephants —was maintained in great force, and public order was well preserved.

When Aśoka became a devoted disciple of Buddha, the whole machinery of government was utilized by him for the teaching and dissemination of his Master's doctrine, and produced commensurate effects.

Gautama the Buddha, the founder of the Buddhist system as known to history, had confined his ministry to a region of moderate extent in the Gangetic valley, which may be roughly defined as lying between Gayā, Prayāg or Allāhābād, and the Himālayas. When he died in B.C. 487 or 486, his followers formed but one of many rival sects in that region, and the society of ordained monks organized by him had only limited and local influence. There is no reason to believe that the vogue of the Buddhist sect had increased very greatly during the two centuries and a quarter which intervened between its founder's death and the conversion of Aśoka. The latter event made the fortune of Buddhism, and transformed an obscure local sect in the basin of the Ganges into a dominant world-religion—perhaps the greatest of all, if measured by the number of its adherents.

Aśoka's progress in the faith was gradual. According to tradition, he was in early life an orthodox Hindu, of the Śaiva sect (see ŚAIVISM); and it is certain that he then approved of sacrifices, and sanctioned the slaughter of animals on a large scale for the purposes of food, sacrifice, and sport. Regard for the sanctity of animal life being the cardinal principle of Buddhist ethics, he began the reformation of his habits by reducing the butcher's bill for the Imperial table to the modest amount of two peacocks and one antelope daily. The institution of the royal hunt was abolished in B.C. 259, and two years later destruction of life for the service of the royal kitchens was absolutely forbidden. In B.C. 243 detailed regulations concerning the slaughter or mutilation of animals applicable to the whole empire were published, which prohibited unconditionally the killing of many large classes of living creatures, and imposed stringent restrictions on the entire population in respect of their dealings with animals.

In the next year the emperor placed on record a solemn review of all the measures which he had taken for the propagation of the *dharma*, or Law of Piety, and reminded his subjects how he had striven to lead them in the right way by his personal example, by exhortations, expressed in oral sermons as well as in inscriptions on rocks and pillars, by suitable official arrangements for the supervision of morals and the royal alms, by detailed pious regulations, and by benevolent provision for the cure and comfort of man and beast. But Aśoka, while utilizing to the full all this machinery for the moral regeneration of his people, recognized frankly that permanent improvement must be based on a change of heart, and could not be secured by merely administrative measures; because 'pious acts and the practice of piety depend on the growth among men of compassion, liberality, truth, purity, gentleness, and saintliness.' The growth of piety, he goes on to observe, 'has been effected by two-fold means, to wit, pious regulations and meditation. Of these two means pious regulations are of small account, whereas meditation is superior. Nevertheless, I have issued pious regulations forbidding the slaughter of such and such animals, and other regulations of the sort. But the superior effect of meditation is seen in the growth of piety among men, and the more complete abstention from injury to animate beings and from slaughter of living creatures.'

The substance of Aśoka's practical ethical teaching is tersely summed up in a short edict, perhaps one of the latest:

'Thus saith His Majesty: "Father and mother must be hearkened to; similarly, respect for living creatures must be firmly established; truth must be spoken. These are the virtues of the Law of Piety which must be practised. Similarly, the teacher must be reverenced by the pupil, and proper courtesy must be shown to relations." This is the ancient nature of piety —this leads to length of days, and according to this men must act.'

The three primary duties prescribed by the Aśokan code were (1) respect for the absolute, unconditional right of the meanest animal to retain the breath of life until the latest moment permitted by nature; (2) reverence to parents, elders, and preceptors—the superiors so honoured being required, in their turn, to treat their inferiors, including servants, slaves, and all living creatures, with kindness and consideration; and (3) truthfulness. Among secondary duties, a high place was given to that of showing toleration for, and sympathy with, the beliefs and practices of others, and all extravagance or violence of language was earnestly deprecated.

The ethical teaching outlined in the above propositions, which is in agreement with the doctrine of the *Dhammapada* and other scriptures of primitive Buddhism, was developed by Aśoka in a series of edicts, probably drafted by himself. The 'Fourteen Rock Edicts,' published in B.C. 256, were incised upon rocks at seven localities in the remoter provinces, namely: (1) Shāhbāzgarhī, in the Yūsufzai country, forty miles N.E. of Peshāwar; (2) Mānsāhra, in the Hazāra District, Panjāb; (3) Kālsī, in the lower Himālayas, fifteen miles west from Mussoorie; (4) Sopāra, in the Thānā District, near Bombay; (5) the Girnār hill, near Jūnāgaṛh, the ancient capital of Kāṭhiāwār; (6) near Dhauli, to the south of Bhuvanēsvar, in the Purī District, Orissa; and (7) at Jaugada, in the Ganjām District, Madras.

Some of these versions, which vary in script, in dialect, and to some extent in substance, are preserved practically complete, while others are mere fragments.

The second great series is that of the 'Seven Pillar Inscriptions,' six of which exist in six copies, engraved on monolithic sandstone pillars erected at various localities in the home provinces. The seventh and most important edict is found on one

pillar only. The remaining records, particulars of which will be found in the works cited at the end of this article, are the two 'Kalinga Edicts' in two recensions, three 'Cave Inscriptions,' two 'Tarāi Pillar Inscriptions,' four 'Minor Pillar Edicts,' two 'Minor Rock Edicts' in several recensions, and the 'Bhābra Edict.' The number of distinct documents known may be reckoned as thirty-five, forming a group of inscriptions which may be regarded with justice as among the most interesting and remarkable in the world.

A large body of tradition affirms that a Buddhist church council was held at the capital by the command and under the patronage of Aśoka, in order to settle the canon of scripture and reform abuses in monastic discipline. Although the traditional details of the constitution and proceedings of the council are clearly unhistorical, the fact of its assembly may be accepted without hesitation. If it had met before the thirty-second year of the reign, in which the emperor published the 'Seven Pillar Edicts,' recording his retrospect of the measures taken for the promotion of piety, the council assuredly would have been mentioned in those documents. But they are silent on the subject, and the fair inference is that the council was held at a date subsequent to their publication, that is to say, between B.C. 242 and 231.

The Imperial arrangements for diffusing the knowledge of Buddhist doctrine, and for enforcing the moral practices recommended by the teachers of the church, were designed on a grand scale, so as to cover not only the whole Indian empire, but also distant countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe. The officials of the Government in their various grades were required, in addition to their ordinary duties, to give instruction in morals to the lieges. From the year B.C. 256 the efforts of the official lay preachers were supplemented by the more systematic labours of special functionaries, designated as Censors of the Law of Piety (*dharma-mahāmātrāḥ*), who were enjoined to occupy themselves in promoting the establishment and progress of piety among the people of all sects, Buddhist or others, and were further charged with the delicate duty of superintending the female establishments of the members of the royal family. These officers were vested with special powers for the prevention of wrongful imprisonment or corporal punishment, and were directed to investigate cases in which peculiar circumstances caused the ordinary law to press hard upon individuals. The general superintendence of female morals was entrusted to another set of officers called the 'Censors of Women.' The regulations for guarding the sanctity of animal life presumably were enforced with strictness by the Censors; and if we may judge by what is known of the procedure adopted in later ages by pious Indian kings, the penalties of disobedience must have been extremely severe, extending even to the death of the offender.

The activity of the Censors was not confined to the provinces directly controlled by the Imperial officers, but embraced all the bordering tribes and nations in the Indian hills and forests, who lived under the rule of their own chiefs, subject to the suzerainty of the paramount power.

Aśoka's zeal carried his propaganda far beyond the limits of his empire, and induced him to organize a system of foreign missions, which permanently determined the direction of the religious history of a large portion of the world. A band of enthusiastic missionaries, headed by Mahendra (Mahiṁda), younger brother of the emperor (or, according to another account, his son), evangelized Ceylon with such success that the island has been essentially a Buddhist country ever since, and the religion of the Sinhalese monks to-day is practically the same as that of Aśoka. The Sinhalese chronicles aver that a mission was dispatched at the same time across the Bay of Bengal to Pegu, but strong reasons exist for believing that Buddhism was not introduced into the Burmese countries until several centuries later. The existing form of Buddhism in Burma, which undoubtedly was derived from Ceylon, and thus is indirectly a result of Aśoka's labours, dates only from the reformation effected by king Dhammachēti in the 15th cent., the history of which is related in the Kalyāṇī inscriptions (*Ind. Ant.* vol. xxii., 1893). The Siamese church also is a daughter of that founded in Ceylon by Mahendra.

From the time of Megasthenes, who was sent as ambassador by Seleukos Nikator to the court of Chandragupta Maurya in the year B.C. 303, regular intercourse, both commercial and diplomatic, had been maintained between the Indian empire and the Hellenistic kingdoms founded by the generals of Alexander. Aśoka made use of the channels of communication thus opened, in order to convey the treasures of Buddhist wisdom to the nations of the West. His missionaries traversed the wide realms of Antiochos Theos, king of Syria and Western Asia, and penetrated the dominions of Ptolemy Philadelphos, king of Egypt, those of his neighbour king Magas of Cyrene, and even those of the European monarchs Alexander of Epirus and Antigonos Gonatas of Macedonia.

Although missionary effort did not succeed in planting branches of the Buddhist church in the foreign countries named, except perhaps in some portions of the territory of Antiochos, its effects may be traced obscurely both in the history of the Gnostic and Manichæan sects of Christianity (Kennedy, 'Buddhist Gnosticism,' in *JRAS*, 1902, pp. 377–415) and in the reflex action on India which helped to develop the Mahāyāna form of Buddhism about the beginning of the Christian era. Ceylon, as already observed, was won permanently to Buddhism, which became the dominant religion in India and the bordering countries. Of course the other forms of Indian religion were not destroyed—they were merely overshadowed for a time, and in due course recovered their ancient vigour. In India, Buddhism is practically extinct at the present day, and is hardly traceable later than 1200 A.D. But for many centuries the impulse given by Aśoka's systematic missionary propaganda made Buddhist institutions a prominent feature of Indian life; and as late as the 7th cent. A.D., Buddhism, although then slowly decaying, was still a power in almost all parts of India. The extension of the Buddhist faith to Tibet, China, and Japan, through the agency of Indian missionaries at various dates, was an indirect consequence of the Aśokan propaganda.

Aśoka, while determined to enforce with all his authority Buddhist ethics as a practical system of morals, was avowedly tolerant of other creeds, and devoted a special edict to the subject of toleration:

'His Majesty does reverence to men of all sects, whether ascetics or householders, by gifts and various modes of reverence.

'His Majesty, however, cares not so much for gifts or external reverence as that there should be a growth of the essence of the matter in all sects. The growth of the essence of the matter assumes various forms, but the root of it is restraint of speech, to wit, a man must not do reverence to his own sect by disparaging that of another man without reason. Depreciation should be for specific reasons only, because the sects of other people deserve reverence for one reason or another. . . . Self-control, therefore, is meritorious, to wit, hearkening to the law of others, and hearkening willingly.

'For this is His Majesty's desire, that adherents of all sects should hear much teaching and hold sound doctrine.'

In another passage the royal preacher repeats his profession of reverence for all sects, and adds that 'nevertheless, personal adherence to one's own creed seems to me to be the chief thing.'

Extant dedicatory inscriptions prove that Aśoka gave practical effect to these liberal principles, by hewing cave-dwellings from the rock at enormous cost, and bestowing them on ascetics of a non-Buddhist sect; while, of course, hundreds of his benefactions must have passed unrecorded.

He realized the truth that his subjects could not be expected to take his preaching to heart unless he proved by acts of material beneficence that he was really, as he had claimed to be, the father of his people. Accordingly, he organized elaborate arrangements, both in his own dominions and in those of friendly powers, for the cure of man and beast, which doubtless involved the establishment and endowment of hospitals. We are expressly informed that healing herbs, medicinal for both human beings and animals, wherever they were lacking, were imported and distributed. In pursuance of the same policy, banyan-trees were planted to provide ample shade, groves of mango-trees were laid out to supply fruit, wells were dug at every mile on the highroads, and numerous rest-houses and watering-places were constructed, for the enjoyment of man and beast. But His Majesty is careful to explain his motive by the remark that 'such so-called enjoyment is a small matter. With various blessings have former kings blessed the world even as I have done, but in my case it has been done solely with the intent that men may conform to the Law of Piety.'

Aśoka's buildings were designed and constructed on a scale of such magnificence that they were regarded by the men of later ages as the work of demons obedient to his command. Although comparatively little of his architectural masterpieces has survived, the great *stūpas*, or brick cupolas, at Sānchi, and numerous monolithic pillars, inscribed and uninscribed, which are still standing, suffice to justify his fame as a builder. The monoliths, some of which are fifty feet high and weigh fifty tons, exhibit the stone-cutter's art in perfection, and have been polished and engraved with the utmost nicety.

It is clear that Aśoka was no merely fanatic devotee, but that he succeeded in combining the piety of a saint with the practical qualities of an able king. As a king he disputes with Akbar (*q.v.*) the right to the highest place of honour among the sovereigns of India; and, in the history of Buddhism, his importance is second only to that of the founder of the system.

Aśoka seems to have been followed on the throne by his grandson Daśaratha; but hardly anything is known about his successors, in whose feeble grasp the great empire founded by Chandragupta, and maintained for three generations, quickly crumbled to pieces. See BUDDHISM, CHANDRAGUPTA.

LITERATURE.—Edmund Hardy, *König Asoka* (Mainz, 1902); Vincent A. Smith, *Asoka, the Buddhist Emperor of India* (Oxford, 1901), containing complete translations of the inscriptions known up to 1901 (an inscription on a pillar at Sārnāth has been discovered since then; *Epigr. Ind.* viii. 166; *Comptes rendus Acad. des Inscr.*, 1907, p. 25; *JASB* iii., new ser., 1907), and *The Early History of India*[2] (Oxford, 1908). All the original authorities are cited fully in those works. *Buddhist India* (1903), by T. W. Rhys Davids, may also be consulted.

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ASPIRATION may be defined generally as ardent longing. The word is sometimes used to denote worldly ambition or desire, but its proper application, as the etymology may suggest, is to desire directed upon spiritual objects, and so it finds its distinctive exercise in the spheres of ethics and religion. In each of these spheres it is a power inciting to spiritual progress, an inward impulse by which men are urged to the development of their highest nature and true ends as spiritual beings.

1. In ethics, aspiration appears as a longing for the realization of ideals. Whatever theories may be held as to the origin of moral ideas and of the moral faculty, there is no ethical system worthy of the name that is not based on some moral ideal or conception of the highest good; and aspiration is the longing that impels to the pursuit of the ideal and of all the qualities that belong to it or tend to further it. Aspirations and ideals go together, and have a reactive influence upon each other. On the one hand, aspirations are kindled by ideals; on the other, ideals are shaped and fostered by aspiration. The moral feelings depend for their strength and purity upon the clearness and immediacy of the moral vision; while the moral vision owes much of its quick discernment to the cultivation of the moral feelings. Both vision and aspiration, again, are qualified by obedience. The gleaming vision must be pursued, the sighing of the human spirit after the attainment of its ideals must not be ignored or suppressed, else moral blindness and moral apathy will inevitably follow. But when men turn away from wrong and do what they know to be right, and keep hungering and thirsting after righteousness, moral progress is the assured result.

The particular function of aspiration in the moral sphere is to mediate between vision and obedience. It is a mighty motive power by which our spiritual knowledge is utilized for the purposes of our moral activity. Without the uplifting and impelling force of aspiration, ideals would never be transformed into realities; and so it is a necessity of the moral life that men should cherish their spiritual aspirations. The voice of duty is an imperative voice, but before its high behests can be carried out there must come some urging from the heart's desire. It is faith and hope, admiration and love—and these may all be summed up in aspiration—which enable us as moral beings to walk without fainting, to run without weariness, and even at times to mount up on eagles' wings. 'Let us learn to have noble desires,' said Schiller, 'and we shall have no need for sublime resolutions.' And what is moral aspiration but an impulse of noble desire which bears the soul irresistibly forward, as on the bosom of a swelling tide, towards the realization of the highest moral ends?

2. But it is in religion still more than in ethics that aspiration finds its especial home and sphere, for aspiration is the outgoing of the soul in search of complete spiritual satisfaction, and ethical ideals, even could they be perfectly realized, would not avail to satisfy it. 'Thou madest us for Thyself, and our heart is restless until it repose in Thee' (Augustine, *Conf.* i. 1). Nothing but personal communion with the Divine Spirit will meet the wants of the aspiring human spirit. It is to the experience of aspiration as a psychological fact that the origin of religion may be traced. In the visible world men saw around them on every side the tokens of change and decay, of transience and evanescence. But this sense of the perishableness and unreality of all earthly things brought to light their own possession of the idea of something or some one real and permanent; and instinctively their hearts went out in dumb longing to seek the Unknown God. And as self-consciousness grew clearer in the course of man's ascent, the contradiction between the inner life of feeling and desire, of hope and endeavour, and the hostile powers of nature by which he was encompassed and opposed, would fill his soul with a still deeper longing for communion with that higher Power akin to himself by whose help he might gain the victory over the world.

The aspirations of the religious soul naturally express themselves in forms of worship. And if at first the forms in which men embodied their religious desires were crude, material, grotesque, and even repulsive, they testified none the less to a sincere longing after God. The blood of the sacrifice was the blood of a covenant between man and his deity; the sacrificial smoke, as it rose into the air, was a symbol of the spirit's desire

to rise heavenward; the sacrificial meal was a sacrament of fellowship between the god and his people. Moreover, as men grew in the power of spiritual conception and apprehension, their aspirations became purer, and began to find expression in forms more spiritual and refined. And when the inspiring Spirit from above stoops down to raise and inform the aspiring spirit from below, there comes the utterance of the purest spiritual desire: 'As the hart panteth after the water brooks, so panteth my soul after thee, O God.'

There is a wide difference between the aspirations of morality and those of religion. Not only is the ethical ideal an abstraction, it is an elusive abstraction. As we pursue it, it recedes before us. The horizon moves onward as we advance, and the actual and the ideal never meet. Religious aspiration, on the other hand, being a longing of the human spirit for personal communion with the Divine Spirit, is able to enjoy an immediate fruition of its object. With the dawn of religion in the soul, the restless heart of man finds rest in God. Not that there is no room in the religious life for further progress and fuller aspiration; the room for progress is infinite, and the call to it is never hushed. But progress here 'is not *towards*, but *within* the sphere of the infinite. It is not the vain attempt, by endless finite additions or increments, to become possessed of infinite wealth, but it is the endeavour, by the constant exercise of spiritual activity, to appropriate that infinite inheritance of which we are already in possession' (J. Caird, *Phil. of Rel.* 284). Hence the life of Christian faith, in which the experience of communion with God is most fully realized, is a life of aspiration satisfied yet never sated, resting joyfully in its object and yet longing to apprehend it more fully.

LITERATURE.—Augustine, *Confessions*; Green, *Proleg. to Ethics*, 1883, bk. III. ch. ix.; Jevons, *Introd. to the Hist. of Religion*, 1896, ch. xxvi.; J. Caird, *Phil. of Religion*, 1880, ch. IX.

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ĀŚRAMA.—1. General survey.—*Āśrama*, from the root *śram*, 'to exert oneself,' means (1) a place where austerities are performed, a hermitage, and (2) the action of performing such austerities. It may be doubted which of the two meanings is the original. Without dwelling on this question, we limit ourselves to the second meaning, which in the development it has taken in India reveals a very striking feature of ancient Indian life. At the time when the Indians lived in the Panjāb there was no question either of a brāhmanical order of life or of castes and *āśramas*. The castes occur only in one hymn of later date (*Rigv.* 10. 90), and the word *āśrama* is not found at all in the *Rigveda*.

Very different from this oldest period of Indian antiquity is the time after the conquest of Hindustan by the Āryans. The danger of mixing with the indigenous tribes led to the establishment of a very sharp distinction between the victorious tribes of the Āryans and the remnants of the aborigines, who later on were included under the collective name of the *Śūdras*, and were excluded from all community of life, and especially of religion, with the Āryans. This principle of setting up boundary lines between the different classes of the population was carried out to a certain degree among the conquering Āryans themselves. The great mass of the Āryans were called *Vaiśyas*, 'colonists,' and devoted themselves to agriculture, handicraft, and trade. They were ruled and taxed by the *Kṣatriyas*, the kings, and those who with them had carried out the conquest of the country. But another class claimed and obtained a preponderance over both the Vaiśyas and the Kṣatriyas. These were the *Brāhmaṇas*, the descendants of the old Vedic *Ṛṣis*, who in their families kept as an inestimable treasure the ancient Vedic hymns, without which no religious ceremony could be performed, and no higher education was possible in an age wholly without secular literature. Indeed, the Brāhmaṇas succeeded in getting into their hands not only the religious cult, but also the education of the Āryan youth. It became a custom and more and more a law that every young Āryan, whether of the Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, or Vaiśya caste, should spend a series of years as a *brahmachārin* in the house of a *guru*, or brāhmanical teacher.

In the early period the father himself acted as *guru*, and instructed his son as well as he could in the sacred science in so far as it was in the possession of his family. Very often, however, the father was not able to satisfy the curiosity of his son. Not only metaphysical questions embarrassed him; the understanding of the old texts became more and more difficult, the ritual more complicated, the field of study ever broader. Thus it became necessary to apply to celebrated authorities in order to learn some special theory (*vidyā*). Wandering students (*charaka*) travelled far and wide (*Brih. up.* 3. 3. 1); renowned teachers itinerated from place to place (*Kauṣ. up.* 4. 1); and there were masters to whom disciples streamed 'like waters to the deep' (*Taitt. up.* 1. 4. 3).

Later it became customary for every *Āryan* to spend a series of years (at least twelve, according to Āpastamba, *Dharmasūtra*, 1. 1. 2, 16) in the house of a brāhmanical teacher. It was the latter's duty to prepare his brāhmanical pupils for their future vocation, and to teach those of the Kṣatriya and Vaiśya castes in order to inculcate in their minds the necessary directions for all their future life. We must assume (cf. Manu, 2. 241; Śaṅk. on *Brih. up.* p. 345, 13) that it became in course of time an exclusive privilege of the brāhmanical caste to give this instruction, and only thus can we understand the incomparable influence which the Brāhmaṇas gained and maintained over the Indian people.

It would seem that not only the outward apparel, but also the method of instruction, was different for the three castes; thus in *Ait. Ār.* 3. 2. 6, 9 the rule is laid down to communicate a certain theory *na apravaktre*, 'not to any one who will not himself become a teacher.' In return for this instruction the pupils had to work for the teacher in house and field; they attended to the sacred fires (*Chhānd. up.* 4. 10. 1), they looked after the cattle of the teacher (*Chhānd. up.* 4. 4. 5), collected for him in the village the usual gifts of charity, and bestowed a present upon him at the conclusion of their studies in his home. In the leisure time left from the duties to be performed for the *guru*, the Veda was studied; the teacher recited it verse by verse, and the pupils had to repeat it until the whole was learned by heart. It was perhaps not so much a time of learning as a time of vigorous training, as the word *āśrama* implies. The principal rule was strict obedience to the orders of the teacher (of which we read extravagant examples in *Mahābh.* i. 684 f.). It was a period devoted to practice in self-denial and mortification. But the brāhmanical system of life had the tendency to extend this *āśrama*, or self-mortification, over the whole life of the Brāhmaṇas, and as far as possible of all the Āryans. Not all, after having finished this course of study, founded families as *grihasthas*, 'householders'; some preferred to stay in the house of their teacher as *naiṣṭhikas* to the end of their life. Others again, as *vānaprasthas*, retired to the jungle and gave themselves up to privations and austerities. Some scorned even this form of a regular existence, and roamed about as beggars. These last were known as *sannyāsins*, 'throwing away everything,' or *parivrājakas*, 'vagabonds,' or simply *bhikṣus*, 'beggars.' It was only later that these various kinds of *āśramas*, 'religious mortifications,' were developed into a system embracing the whole life, the aim of which was to obtain methodi

cally and by gradual progress that which appears as an abrupt demand in *Matth.* 19. 21.

According to this later system, the life of every Brāhmaṇa (and not only of these, for the rules given in Manu, vi., seem to extend also to Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas) had to pass through four *āśramas*, or ascetic stages. Every Ārya had to be (1) a *brahmachārin* in the house of a teacher; (2) a *grihastha*, performing the duty of founding a family; (3) a *vānaprastha*, a hermit in the woods, devoting himself to gradually increasing austerities; and (4) towards the end of his life a *sannyāsin*, *bhikṣu*, *parivrājaka*, roving about without home or property, living merely on alms, free from all earthly ties, and awaiting his end, delivered even before it from all earthly attachments. How far the practice corresponded to this theory, given in Manu and other Law-books, we do not know; but we are free to confess that in our opinion the whole history of mankind has not much that equals the grandeur of this thought.

After this general survey let us proceed to consider the history of the *āśramas* in the Vedic and the post-Vedic age.

2. The Āśramas in the Veda.—In the older Upaniṣads the theory of the four *āśramas* is seen in course of formation. *Chhānd. up.* 8. 15 mentions only the Brahman-student and householder, and promises to these, in reward for study, the begetting of children, the practices of *yoga*, abstinence from doing injury, and sacrifice, a departure hence without return. *Chhānd. up.* 2. 23. 1 names the *tapas* (of the anchorite) side by side with these as a third 'branch of duty.' There is still no progressive series. Rather, according to this passage, the Brahman-students, in so far as they do not elect to remain permanently in the house of the teacher, appear to have devoted themselves partly to the householder's state, partly to the life in the forest. It is in harmony with this that in *Chhānd. up.* 5. 10 among the dying the anchorite in the forest and the sacrificer in the village appear side by side. *Chhānd. up.* 2. 23. 1 contrasts all three branches of duty with the position of the man who 'stands fast in Brahman.' So too, in *Brih. up.* 4. 4. 22, those who practise (1) the study of the Veda, (2) sacrifice and almsgiving, (3) penance and fasting, are contrasted with the man who has learned to know the *ātman*, and in consequence becomes a *muni* and *pravrājin* ('pilgrim'). Both have attained the knowledge of the *ātman*, and therefore the supreme goal. In the cognate passage *Brih. up.* 3. 5, on the contrary, the *brāhmaṇa* is still distinguished from the *muni* as a higher grade. In *Brih. up.* 3. 8. 10 also, the knowledge of the *ātman* as the highest aim is differentiated both from the sacrifices and benefactions (of the householder) and from the practices of *tapas* (of the anchorite).

All these passages assume only the three stages of Brahman-student, householder, and anchorite, and contrast with them the men who know the *ātman*. The last were originally 'exalted above the (three) *āśramas*' (*atyāśramin*, as it is said in *Śvet. up.* 6. 21, *Kaivalya up.* 24). This very position, however, of exaltation above the *āśramas* became in course of time a fourth and highest *āśrama*, which was naturally assigned to the end of life, so that studentship, and the positions of householder and anchorite (which stood side by side), preceded it as temporary grades in this successive order. Until the post-Vedic age, however, the separation between the third and fourth *āśramas*, between the *vānaprastha* practising *tapas* and the *sannyāsin* who has succeeded in attaining *nyāsa*, was not strictly carried out. An intimation of the fourfold number of the *āśramas* is perhaps already afforded by the words of *Muṇḍ. up.* 2. 1. 7: 'Mortification, truth, the life of a Brāhman, instruction.' Otherwise the oldest passage which names all four *āśramas* in the correct order would be *Jābāla up.* 4: 'When the period of Brahman-studentship is ended, a man becomes a householder; after he has been a householder, he becomes an anchorite; after he has been an anchorite, let him travel about on pilgrimage.'

(1) *The Brahmachārin.*—'Śvetaketu was the son of (Uddālaka) Āruṇi. To him said his father, "Śvetaketu, go forth to study the Brahman, for none of our family, my dear son, is wont to remain unlearned, and a (mere) hanger-on of the Brahman order"' (*Chhānd. up.* 6. 1. 1). From this remark it seems to follow that at that time entrance upon the life of a Brahman-student, while it was a commendable custom, was not yet universally enjoined upon Brāhmans. The entrance also of Satyakāma upon studentship appears to be his voluntary determination (*Chhānd. up.* 4. 4. 1). It was possible for a man to receive instruction from his father, as Śvetaketu (*Chhānd. up.* 5. 3. 1; *Brih. up.* 6. 2. 1; *Kauṣ. up.* 1. 1), or at the hands of other teachers, as the same Śvetaketu in *Chhānd. up.* 6. 1. 1 (contradictory to the passages just quoted). The request to be received must follow duly (*tīrthena*, cf. *vidhivat*, *Muṇḍ. up.* 1. 1. 3), *i.e.* according to *Brih. up.* 6. 2. 7, with the words *upaimi aham bhavantam*. The student takes the fuel in his hand as a token that he is willing to serve the teacher, and especially to maintain the sacred fires (*Kauṣ. up.* 4. 19; *Chhānd. up.* 4. 4. 5, 5. 13. 7, 8. 7. 2, 8. 10. 3, 8. 11. 2; *Muṇḍ. up.* 1. 2. 12; *Praśna up.* 1. 1). Before receiving him, the teacher makes inquiry into his birth and family (*Chhānd. up.* 4. 4. 4), but yet, as this example shows, in a very indulgent manner. Sometimes instruction is given even without formal reception (*Anupanīya*, *Chhānd. up.* 5. 11. 7). The duration of the period of instruction is twelve years (*Chhānd. up.* 4. 10. 1), or 'a series of years' (*Chhānd. up.* 4. 4. 5). Śvetaketu also begins to receive instruction at the age of twelve (*Chhānd. up.* 6. 1. 2), and continues his study for twelve years. During this time he has 'thoroughly studied all the Vedas' (*Chhānd. up.* 6. 1. 2), namely, the verses of the *Rigveda*, the formulas of the sacrifice, and the hymns of the *Sāmaveda* (*Chhānd. up.* 6. 7. 2), apparently therefore only the *saṁhitās*. In other instances there appears to have been at first no mention of study. In one example Upakosala has tended the sacred fires for twelve years, and yet the teacher can never make up his mind to impart to him 'the knowledge' (*Chhānd. up.* 4. 10. 1–2). Satyakāma is sent at first with the teacher's herds of cattle into a distant country, where he remains for a succession of years (*Chhānd. up.* 4. 4. 5). A further act of service on the part of the *brahmachārin* consists in his going to beg for the teacher (*Chhānd. up.* 4. 3. 5). On festival occasions also we find him in the train of the teacher and awaiting his commands (*Brih. up.* 3. 1. 2). Together with and after these acts of service, 'in the time remaining over from work for the teacher' (*guroḥ karma-atiśeṣeṇa*, *Chhānd. up.* 8. 15) the study of the Veda is prosecuted. The consequence was sometimes self-conceit rather than real enlightenment (*Chhānd. up.* 6. 1. 2). We further find the students wandering from place to place; they hastened, as stated above, from all sides to famous teachers 'like waters to the deep' (*Taitt. up.* 1. 4. 3); they roamed as far as the land of the Madras (on the Hyphasis) 'in order to learn the sacrifice' (*Brih. up.* 3. 7. 1, 3. 3. 1). As a rule, however, they lived as *antevāsins* in the house of the teacher, and not a few found this manner of life so congenial that they

'settled permanently in the teacher's house' (*Chhānd. up.* 2. 23. 1). The others were dismissed at the close of the period of studentship with advice (*Brih. up.* 6. 4) or admonitions. 'After he has studied the Veda with him, the teacher admonishes his pupil: "Speak the truth, do your duty, forsake not the study of the Veda; after you have presented the appropriate gifts to the teacher, take care that the thread of your race be not broken"' (*Taitt. up.* 1. 11). Further admonitions follow, not to neglect health and possessions, to honour father, mother, teacher, and guests, to be blameless in works and life, to honour superiors, to bestow alms in the appropriate manner, and in all doubtful cases to order one's conduct according to the judgment of approved authorities.

(2) *The Grihastha.*—'He who returns home from the family of the teacher, after the prescribed study of the Veda in the time remaining over from work for the teacher, and pursues the private study of the Veda in (his own) household in a pure neighbourhood (where Brāhmans are permitted to live), trains up pious (sons and pupils), subdues all his organs in the *ātman*, and, besides, injures no living thing except on sacred ground (at the sacrifice), he indeed, if he maintains this manner of life all his days, enters into the world of Brahman and does not return again' (*Chhānd. up.* 8. 15). According to this passage, the householder may remain in that state all his life long without doing injury to his soul. According to *Chhānd. up.* 5. 10, on the contrary, for those 'who in the village worship with the words "Sacrifice and pious works are our tribute,"' for those, in other words, who continue in the householder's state to the end of life, the transient reward in the moon and a return to a new earthly existence are appointed.

The most imperative duty of the householder is to establish a family and to beget a son to continue his father's works. To beget a son is considered a religious duty. In *Taitt. up.* 1. 9 it is enjoined side by side with studying and teaching the Veda. Frequently (*Chhānd. up.* 3. 17. 5, 5. 8–9; *Brih. up.* 6. 2. 13, 6. 4. 3) it is allegorically described as an act of sacrifice. In *Taitt. up.* 1. 11 the pupil, among other admonitions, is charged to take care 'that the thread of his race be not broken.' In *Mahān. up.* 63. 8 it is said: 'He who in his lifetime rightly continues to spin the thread of posterity, thereby pays the debt which he owes to the fathers; for it (begetting) is the payment of his debts.' His continued life in the world of men is assured by the son (*Brih. up.* 1. 5. 16), who stands in the place of the father in order to accomplish for him the religious works (*Ait.* 2. 4), 'and if anything whatever has been committed previously by him, his son will expiate it, therefore is his name "son" (*putra*, because he *pūraṇena trāyati pitaram*, Śaṅk.); for by the son he continues to exist in this world' (*Brih. up.* 1. 5. 17). Particular directions are given in *Brih. up.* 6. 4 how to proceed in order to beget a son or daughter of a certain quality. This chapter forms the conclusion of the Upaniṣad, and therefore probably the close of the religious instruction imparted to the student at the end of his student life. Several wives are permitted, as, in fact, Yājñavalkya himself had two (*Brih. up.* 2. 4, 4. 5). As further duties of the *grihastha* are named sacrifice, study of the Veda, and almsgiving (*Chhānd. up.* 2. 23. 1, 8. 5. 1–2; *Brih. up.* 4. 4. 22, 3. 8. 10).

(3) The *Vānaprastha* and (4) the *Sannyāsin.*—A distinction between these two periods of life was only gradually established. Originally the solitary life in the forest existed as a special branch of vocation (*dharmaskandha*) side by side with the position of householder (*Chhānd. up.* 2. 23. 1, 5. 10. 1–3). Later it may have become usual to retire into the solitude of the forest only on the approach of old age, after the obligations of the householder had been fulfilled. Yājñavalkya is an example, when he addresses his wife Maitreyī (*Brih. up.* 2. 4. 1 [4. 5. 1–2]): 'I will now abandon this state (of householder), and will therefore make a division between thee and Kātyāyanī.' In doing so, Yājñavalkya puts into practice what he teaches in *Brih. up.* 3. 5. 1: 'In truth, after that Brāhmans have gained the knowledge of this soul, they abstain from desire for children and desire for possessions and desire for the world, and wander about as beggars.' Here the third and fourth stages are not yet distinguished. The case is otherwise with the king Bṛihadratha, who (*Maitr. up.* 1. 2) surrenders his kingdom, retires to the forest, and gives himself up to the most painful mortifications, gazing fixedly at the sun, and standing with arms erect, and yet is obliged to confess: 'I am not acquainted with the *ātman.*' Here the anchorite, who devotes himself to ascetic practices with meditation (*Chānd up.* 2. 23. 1), has not yet attained the highest goal; he who without knowing the *ātman* 'practises austerities for many thousand years earns only a finite reward' (*Brih. up.* 3. 8. 10). Asceticism leads only to *pitṛyāna*, 'way of the fathers' (*Brih. up.* 6. 2. 16), and the case is different only with those who can say: 'Faith is our asceticism' (*Chānd. up.* 5. 10. 1). Penance and fasting are only the means by which Brāhmans 'seek to know' the *ātman* (*vividiṣanti*, *Brih. up.* 4. 4. 22). According to some, *tapas* is indispensable as a means to the knowledge of the *ātman* (*Maitr. up.* 4. 3, *na atapaskasya ātmajñāne 'dhigamaḥ*), according to others (*Jābāla up.* 4), it is superfluous; and this view is more in accordance with the whole system. For as long as the goal was a transcendental one, the hope might be cherished of approaching near to it by severing by means of asceticism the tie that binds to this life. If, however, emancipation is the discovery of one's self as the *ātman*, and therefore something that only needs to be recognized as already existing, not to be brought about as though it were future, the asceticism of the *vānaprastha* becomes as superfluous as the *grihastha's* sacrifice and study of the Veda (*Brih. up.* 3. 5, 4. 4. 21). He who knows the *ātman* is *atyāśramin*, 'exalted above the (three) *āśramas*' (*Śvet. up.* 6. 21). He has attained that which the ascetic only strives after, complete release from his individuality and from all that pertains to it, as family, possessions, and the world (*Brih. up.* 3. 5, 4. 4. 22). He is called *sannyāsin*, because he 'casts off everything from himself' (*sam-ni-as*), *parivrāj*, *parivrājaka*, because he 'wanders about' homeless; and *bhikṣu*, because without possessions he lives only as a 'beggar.'

(4) *The Sannyāsin* (*parivrājaka*, *bhikṣu*).—The *sannyāsa*, which is originally only the 'abandonment' of the entire brāhmanical mode of life in the three *āśramas*, assumed in course of time the position of a fourth and highest *āśrama*, which, as a rule, though not necessarily, would first be entered upon towards the close of life after passing through the stages of *brahmachārin*, *grihastha*, and *vānaprastha*. It thus, however, gained a further meaning. If it was originally a natural consequence of the knowledge of the *ātman*, it now became a final and most efficacious means by which it was hoped to attain that knowledge. The *sannyāsa*, accordingly, is represented as such a means to the knowledge of the *ātman* and to emancipation in a series of later *Upaniṣads*, of which the most important are *Brahma*, *Sannyāsa*, *Āruṇeya*, *Kaṇṭhaśruti*, *Paramahaṁsa*, *Jābāla*.

Āśrama. We find in them a full account, with numerous contradictions in details, of the preliminary conditions imposed upon the *sannyāsin*, of his departure from life, of his dress and equipment, of his food, place of abode, and occupations.*

3. The Āśramas in post-Vedic time.—Although the Upaniṣads teach that every man, Śūdra as well as Ārya, is an incarnation of the *ātman*, the knowledge of which, whether originating in an Ārya or a Śūdra, would lead to emancipation, yet the Brāhmans were too much under the influence of old traditions to put this doctrine into practice, and thus the Śūdras were, and remained, excluded from all religious community with the Āryas. So much the greater was their care for the spiritual welfare of the three superior castes, and the four *āśramas* became the *via salutis* through which every twice-born man (*dvija*) had to pass, *i.e.* every Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, and Vaiśya, in order to reach the highest goal. As in Vedic times, so also in the later period of Indian life, it was the rule that every twice-born man had to become first a *brahmachārin*. In this stage he lived in the house of a teacher, persisted in the fulfilment of his duties of temperance and chastity, and received, through the study of the Veda, the intellectual stamp for all his future life. He then, as *grihastha*, had to marry, to beget offspring, and to fulfil the six duties of teaching and learning, sacrificing in person and through the agency of others, giving alms and receiving presents; besides this there were five daily observances incumbent upon him: to satisfy the gods by sacrificing, the Ṛṣis by studying the Veda, the fathers by offering funeral oblations, men by almsgiving, and animals by feeding birds, antelopes, and other denizens of the forest. Afterwards he passed to the state of *vānaprastha* as it is described in Manu, 6. 2, and *Mahābh.* xii. 245. 4: 'When the householder sees his skin wrinkled and his hair white and the sons of his sons, then he has to retire to the forest,' in order to extinguish in himself, by austerities gradually augmented, all the remnants of worldly attachments. 'In summer let him expose himself to the heat of five fires, during the rainy season live under the open sky, and in winter be dressed in wet clothes, thus gradually increasing the rigour of his austerities' (Manu, 6. 23). Further, 'after having purified himself in the three social stages from all stain of sin, let him wander towards the highest goal with undaunted perseverance' (*Mahābh.* xii. 246. 3).

In this stage of *sannyāsin*, 'one who has abandoned everything,' he roamed about without home (*parivrājaka*), and lived merely on alms (*bhikṣu*). At a period of life when, according to our thought, aid from others is more than ever needed, the aged man was left to himself without any care or attendance; 'let him flee from society as from a serpent, from comfort as from a hell, and from women as from a corpse' (*Mahābh.* xii. 246. 13); 'let him not look forward to death, let him not look forward to life, let him await his time as the servant awaits a command' (*nideśam*, which is the better reading both in *Mahābh.* xii. 246. 15, and in Manu, vi. 45).

We subjoin a few more verses on the state of the *sannyāsin* from the sixth book of Manu. 'Let him put down his foot purified by his sight, let him drink water purified by (straining with) a cloth, let him utter speech purified by truth, let him keep his heart pure' (46). 'Let him patiently bear hard words, let him not insult anybody, and let him not become anybody's enemy for the sake of this (perishable) body' (47). 'Against an angry man let him not in return show anger, let him bless when he is cursed, let him not utter speech, devoid of truth, scattered at the seven gates (of the neighbours)' (48). 'Neither by (explaining) prodigies and omens, nor by skill in astrology and palmistry, nor by giving advice and by the exposition (of the Śāstras), let him ever seek to obtain alms' (50). 'Let him not (in order to beg) approach a house thronged with hermits, Brāhmaṇas, birds, dogs, or other mendicants' (51). 'His hair, nails, and beard being clipped, carrying an alms-bowl, a staff, and a water-pot, let him continually wander about, controlling himself and not hurting any creature' (52). 'Let him go to beg once (a day), let him not be eager to obtain a large quantity (of alms); for an ascetic who eagerly seeks alms, attaches himself also to sensual enjoyments' (55). 'When no smoke ascends from (the kitchen), when the pestle lies motionless, when the embers have been extinguished, when the people have finished their meal, when the remnants in the dishes have been removed, let the ascetic always go to beg' (56). 'Let him not be sorry when he obtains nothing, nor rejoice when he obtains (something), let him (accept) so much only as will sustain life, free from attachment to material things' (57). 'By eating little, and by standing and sitting in solitude, let him restrain his senses, if they are attracted by sensual objects' (59). 'By the restraint of his senses, by the destruction of love and hatred, and by the abstention from injuring the creatures, he becomes fit for immortality' (60). 'In order to preserve living creatures, let him always by day and by night, even with pain to his body, walk, carefully scanning the ground' (68). 'When by the disposition (of his heart) he becomes indifferent to all objects, he obtains eternal happiness both in this world and after death' (80).*

For further information about the four *āśramas* we must refer the reader to the detailed treatment of them in Manu, bks. ii.–vi., and to the parallel passages in the *Mahābhārata*, chiefly bk. xii. 243–246. Of special interest also is the short description, *Mahābh.* xii. 191–192, which, being in prose, may have been inserted from an old *Dharmasūtra*.†

If it is true that the highest aim of mankind is not to be found in this worldly existence, but in the realm beyond, however closed to our knowledge this may be, it is none the less true that the attempt, as we have it in the four *āśramas*, to transform the whole earthly existence into a preparatory school for eternity, merits recognition and admiration even from those who have reached the highest degree of civilization. The Indian system does not demand what is impossible; it does not tear men away roughly and abruptly from that attachment to the world which is innate in them. It offers the opportunity in the stage of *grihastha* to enjoy life, and by enjoying it to convince oneself of its futility. It then, in an advanced age, in the stage of *vānaprastha*, tends to a systematic mortification of sensuality, and it describes in the *sannyāsin* a man who, approaching the end of his days, has become free from all worldly fetters, and is best prepared for departure. What we say of so many precepts of the Gospels we may say also of the four *āśramas*: although they are by no means suitable for literal and blind imitation, yet they may serve in a certain sense as a pattern, since the way of thinking manifested in them may in other forms and modifications be precious for every age.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given throughout the article. See also ASCETICISM (Hindu), UPANIṢADS.

P. DEUSSEN.

ASSAM.—1. Religious history.—There is no part of India which is more interesting in some respects to the student of Hinduism than the Assam valley. As everyone knows, Hinduism professes to be a race religion, the religion of the inhabitants of Bhārat-varṣa, of the Hindu people. Yet, since the origin of the Hindu religion is Vedic, and the Vedas were the collected hymns of the so-called 'Aryan' immigrants, the two hundred millions of people now calling themselves Hindus must, in part at least, and probably in large part, be the descendants of races who were converted to, or more properly adopted into, Hinduism. Indeed, the later developments that have sprung from Vedic worship must have been due in great measure to the influence of aboriginal

* These will be found described in P. Deussen, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, ii. pp. 335–343; *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, pp. 374–382.

* *SBE* xxv. 207–213.
† See Deussen, *Allgemeine Gesch. d. Philosophie*, i. 3. pp. 90–95.

beliefs on the simple nature-worship of the Aryan invaders. That was essentially democratic in its nature, whereas the hierarchy of Brāhmanism and the intellectual aristocracy of priests, philosophers, and the highly cultivated warrior chiefs who played so important a part in the development of Hinduism, must have been due to conquest, at once physical and moral, of lower by higher races. Yet in most parts of India the transition and the struggle are so distant that all memory of them is lost. The Dravidian of the South and the Bengali of the East alike believe that they were always Hindu. The higher castes and classes, it is true, have dim traditions of a time when their ancestors, fairer and slighter in figure than the aborigines, migrated from North-Western India. But the lower castes have no such traditions, and no curiosity as to how their distant ancestors came to be accepted into the Hindu community. There are, of course, notable exceptions to this rule. On the whole, however, it is only the ethnologist who can conjecture from the physical aspect of the various races of India that they were once non-Hindus and spoke some non-Aryan language. But in the Assam valley, owing to geographical and historical causes, which will presently be stated as briefly as possible, the process by which aboriginal tribes are accepted into the Hindu fraternity is seen in actual operation at the present time, and, by analogy and in some cases by actual historical indications, the process can be traced back for some two thousand years. In the Assam valley we are on the border-land of the Hindu faith, and see the most tolerant and receptive of creeds in contact with the beliefs of Indo-Chinese races. It is singularly interesting to note how alien blood and alien civilizations are quietly assimilated by the slow, gentle, and irresistible force of Hindu ideas.

In the earliest times of which we have any knowledge, what we now call the Assam valley was the nucleus and centre of the great independent kingdom of *Kāmarūpa* (*q.v.*), a name which still survives as that of the modern District of Kāmrūp, whose capital, now Gauhāti (or Guāhāti), was then famous all over India as Prāgjyotishpur, the 'City of Eastern astrology.' This kingdom appears to have included, some 1500 years ago, not only the valley of the Brahmaputra river, but also the whole of Eastern Bengal down to the sea, and in addition (a thing even more difficult of belief for the modern traveller) the rugged and now almost inaccessible mountains of Bhutān. It was apparently in the Bhutanese hills that the kings of Kāmarūpa obtained their store of mineral wealth, and especially of copper. They were powerful monarchs, cultivated, warlike, and enterprising. Each dynasty, as it arose into power, attracted the attention of the Brāhmans, and, by one or other of the fictions common to early law and early religion in all countries, was adopted into Hinduism. It was, indeed, by common consent, at Prāgjyotishpur that there came into being the Tantrik form of Hinduism, that form which gives especial prominence to the female energy of the deity, his active nature being personified in his *śakti*, or 'wife.' Devī, as the *śakti* of Śiva, is the energy chiefly identified with the mystery of sex and magical powers, which are the leading topics of the *Tantras*, the scriptures (though, of course, not the sole scriptures) of this form of Hinduism. On the Nilāchal hill, a beautiful wooded eminence near the town of Gauhāti, still stands the temple of Kāmākṣā Devī, one of the forms of the *śakti* of Śiva. The legend that explains the ancient sanctity of Kāmarūpa and of Kāmagiri (the religious name of the Nilāchal hill) is as follows:

Satī, the first wife of the god Śiva, died of sorrow at the discourtesy shown to her husband by her father Dakṣa, who was incensed by the interruption of his famous sacrifice of burnt-offering. (It may be worth mentioning, as a picturesque circumstance, that when the woods on the southern slopes of the Bhutān and Ākā hills catch fire in the dry winter season, and can be seen glowing or blazing from great distances, the people to this day assert that the far-off glare against the sky is caused by the reviving ashes of Dakṣa's interrupted sacrifice.) Śiva, overcome by grief and remorse, wandered about the world, carrying, as a penance, his dead wife's body on his head. In order to arrest this penance and to prevent Śiva from obtaining excessive power, Viṣṇu pursued him, and, by successive blows of his discus, lopped the body piecemeal, so that it fell to earth in fifty-one pieces. Wherever any piece fell, the place became a *pīṭha-sthāna*, sacred and a fit resort for pilgrims. But the most sacred of all was the Kāmagiri hill, for this became identified with the generative powers of Satī, and, probably by some subsequent extension of the idea, with those of *Prithivī*, 'the Broad Earth,' regarded as the mother of living beings. But Śiva continued his penance, and Kāma-deva, the god of Love, was dispatched to beguile the mourner from his austerities. He succeeded. Śiva was so indignant that he burnt the Indian Cupid to ashes by a single glance from the eye in the midst of his forehead. But Love was not destined to die eternally, and the land where he recovered life to inveigle men from contemplation and austerity was the beautiful valley ever since known as Kāmarūpa, the 'Shape of Love.'

As the legend sufficiently indicates, the princes and upper classes of the kingdom of Kāmarūpa were Hindus, probably spoke some Indo-European dialect derived from Sanskrit, and were accepted as of Indian race. But the bulk of the people were not then, and many of them are not even now, Hindus. It is interesting, and not without more than ethnological interest, to indicate briefly what they were.

In the greater part of India, except in the extreme North-West, the people have a strong infusion of Dravidian blood. In the South they speak what are known as Dravidian languages, and the Southern races are of the dusky Negrito strain, and apparently akin to African peoples. In the North-East the Dravidian blood is mingled with other, and especially Indo-Chinese, infusions. In the Assam valley the Brāhmans (priests and astrologers) resemble their Bengali neighbours, and the Doms, a large fisherman caste, are plainly of Western origin. But the bulk of the people are evidently of partly Indo-Chinese blood, and their physical appearance is of the 'Mongolian' type, bearing, more or less, the characteristic aspect of the yellow races. They have themselves (with the exception of the Āhoms) no record, historical or traditional, of their advent into Assam. But the languages they speak are some clue to the successive invasions of Indo-Chinese folk from the north-east and the south-east of the valley. The oldest Indo-Chinese language spoken in Assam belongs to the Mon-Khmer sub-family, which has recently been named by Schmidt of Vienna the 'Austric' family of languages. Schmidt claims that it extends from Assam across Further India to Cambodia, and thence through Polynesia and Micronesia to Easter Island, on the coast of South America. It is worth noting, in passing, that Hindu dynasties seem once to have reigned over peoples of this race in the Far East as well as in Assam. E. A. Gait, in his *History of Assam*, quotes the case of an Indian king, Samuda, who was ruling in Upper Burma in A.D. 105, and also that of Hindus who led the Tchampas or Shans in their conquests of the mouths of the Mekong in A.D. 280. These Hindus, as Gait says, must have passed through Assam, as, probably, did the Hindus from Kām-bōd, in N.W. India, who founded and gave its name to the Cambodian kingdom in Indo-China. It is possible that Mon-Khmer peoples invaded and gave their language temporarily to much of North-Eastern India, as well as to parts of Burma. But the only Mon-Khmer tongue surviving in Assam is that of the Khāsis, now inhabiting and giving their name to the mountains between Kāmrūp and Sylhet. These interesting people remained independent until they came under British rule, and have not even now come under Hindu influences. They are a curious counterpart of the Basques in the Pyrenees. Elsewhere the Mon-Khmer element, whether in blood or speech, has become completely assimilated, and can no longer be distinguished.

The next wave of Indo-Chinese invasion is represented by the various peoples speaking the Tibeto-Burmese tongues. These have three main groups of dialects. The first of them is Nāgā, spoken in and to the east of the Nāgā hills. The second is Kuki-Chin, spoken in Manipur, Cāchār, the Lushai hills, and by the interesting race known as the Mikirs, who now inhabit an outlying bastion of the Khāsi hills jutting into the Assam plain. The people speaking these two groups of dialects have as yet hardly at all come into contact with Hinduism, and retain their own primitive animistic superstitions. The third and most important group is that now known (since Brian Hodgson's celebrated investigations into their language and ethnology) as 'Bodos.' They comprise the Meches of Northern Bengal; the Kacharis of Northern Assam; the Dimāsās, who live in the hills between Nowgong and Cāchār; the Gāros and Tipperas, inhabiting the mountains called after them; scattered plains-folk known as Lālungs and Rābhās; and (if they really

belong to the Bodo race) the Chutiyas of Lakhimpur and the great Māju1i island in the Brahmaputra. It is not to be supposed that the people who now speak Bodo languages were all of common origin. But the wide-spread survival of this group of tongues presupposes an invasion of sufficient force to impose them upon subject and assimilated races. Moreover, since the acquisition of the Bodo speech was not, as in the case of the incursion of Indo-European tongues, accompanied by the imposition of any caste restrictions, the assimilation of race was complete. It is impossible to find any ethnological difference between the various tribes now speaking the Bodo languages, except in so far as those who live in the plains among Hindus have acquired a tincture of Dravidian and, in a very slight degree, of 'Aryan' blood. The Koch race in Northern Bengal has become completely Hinduized, has adopted the Bengali language, and is practically a Hindu caste, to which modern converts from other Bodo races are still admitted. The Khyens, once a Bodo ruling race in Northern Bengal, are now wholly absorbed, and can no longer be identified. But the Meches and the Kacharis, though they live among Hindus, are still physically, linguistically, and in matters of belief, distinct races, as, to some extent, are the Chutiyas also. The Garos, Tipperas, and Dimāsās, being isolated highlanders, remain totally unaffected by Hindu influences, whether in language or religion. On the other hand, the race most properly described as Bodos (see art. Bodos) are rapidly losing their native speech, and are being adopted into Hinduism.

What the Hinduism of the great kingdom of Kāmarūpa was, it is impossible to say now with any certainty. But it was evidently the aristocratic religion of kings and nobles only, and from the fact that its centre was the hill shrine of Kāmākṣā Devī, it was no doubt of the Tantrik type identified with Western Assam and Eastern and Northern Bengal — a religion of propitiation of awful and uncomprehended natural forces by bloody sacrifices, often by the slaughter of human victims. Kāmarūpa, with its shrines, priests, kings, and heroes, figures largely in Sanskrit literature from the *Mahābhārata* downwards, and especially in certain *Purāṇas* which deal chiefly with the worship of Śiva and his *śakti*, such as the *Kālikā Purāṇa*. On the other hand, Kṛṣṇa makes a frequent appearance in the stories told in connexion with various places in the Assam valley. Many of these tales seem to imply ancient contests between the cult of Kṛṣṇa and that of Śiva.

For instance, in and round the little town of Tezpur, now the headquarters of the British District of Darrang, are the scattered remains of what seem to have been temples—stone pillars and slabs elaborately carved and ornamented. These are said to have been the palace of one Bāna Asura (the word Asura implies that the king was a non-Hindu by origin), who was the son of Bali Asura. Bāna had many sons and one lovely daughter named Ushā (perhaps after Ushas, the fair goddess of dawn). Ushā dreamt one night of a beautiful youth, and vowed that she would marry no other than the prince of her dream. Her attendant Chitra-lekhā (literally, the 'draughts-woman') had magic skill in drawing portraits, and she drew in turn the features of all the princes in India. Finally, trembling and with hesitation, she ventured to depict Aniruddha, the grandson of Kṛṣṇa himself, and this picture Ushā recognized as the vision that visited her sleep. Aniruddha was attracted by magic arts to Ushā's bower, and 'married her according to the Gandharva ceremony.' The young lovers were surprised by the princess's father, who, in high wrath, being a fervent follower of Śiva, cast the prince into prison, and confined him 'in serpent bonds.' Kṛṣṇa came to his grandson's rescue with a great fleet and army, and carried him and his bride away to distant Dwārika in Western India, but not until a great battle was fought, in which so much blood was shed that the town is called Sonitpur or Tezpur ('the city of blood') to this day, while the little river which runs near it is known as the Bharali, or 'river of fear.' The low range of hills which here skirts the Brahmaputra bank is said to be the extinct remains of a series of fiery volcanoes cast up by the god Śiva as a bulwark for his ally, the angry father Bāna.

There is one circumstance in connexion with this tale which has a certain ethnological interest. The ruins are visited in the dry season by the Daphlas, a wild tribe who live in the Northern hills. They declare that certain mysterious marks on the carved stones are 'Daphla writing,' and that the buildings were the work of their ancestors. It is possible that the Daphlas once lived in the plains of Assam, and were driven into forest fastnesses by some forgotten incursion of Indo-Chinese invaders. Their national costume, curiously enough, resembles the traditional dress of the god Śiva, and the lower caste Hindus believe them to be of the race of that god, who is described in the books as a Kirāti, 'dweller in the hills.' It was indeed somewhere in these north-eastern hills that the Epic hero Arjuna received lessons in archery and other arts of war from Śiva. In any case, the Daphlas have only to adopt Hindu rules of eating, marriage, etc., to be readily accepted into the Hindu fraternity. Again, it is said that Bhāluka, the grandson of Bāna, built a fort, ruins of which are still visible, not far from Bālipārā at the foot of the Ākā hills. The Ākās, whose chiefs now, on occasions of state, wear costumes evidently borrowed from Tibetan Buddhists, are said to claim descent from Bhāluka. It is possible that they too are descendants of a race that was driven into the hills, was once more or less Hinduized, and may yet be accepted into the Hindu fold.

But there are many such legends, all, or nearly all, relating to powerful Asura monarchs. One of the most famous of these was Naraka Asura, son of the Earth, who is said, in the *Mahābhārata* and *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, to have carried off the ear-rings of Aditi (the mother and daughter of Dakṣa, above described) to his impregnable castle of Prāgjyotishpur, where Kṛṣṇa, at the request of the gods, went and killed him and recovered the jewels. In the *Harivaṁśa* the same story is told in a slightly different form. Narak's son and successor was Bhagadatta, who is frequently mentioned in the *Mahābhārata*. In the *Sabhā Parvan* of the Epic, the tale is told of how Arjuna attacked Bhagadatta and compelled him to pay tribute. Subsequently, it is related that Bhagadatta went with a great army to the assistance of Duryodhan in the final struggle between the Kauravas and Pāndavas in Western India.

Those who are interested in the legendary period of Assamese history will find a full account of it in Gait's *History of Assam*. In the first half of the 7th cent. we at last get a glimpse of authentic history from the famous Chinese traveller Hiuen Tsiang, who visited Kumār Bhāskara Varmana, then king of Kāmarūpa. Assam was not then, or apparently at any time, a Buddhist country. The king and the upper classes were Tantrik Hindus, the humbler folk were not yet recognized as Hindus at all. This, in the end, was perhaps an advantage, as we shall see when we come to more modern developments of Assamese Hinduism. From the 7th to the 12th cent. our sole knowledge of the country is derived from inscriptions on copper plates, most of them discovered by Gait, which were records of grants of land made to Āyurvedic Brāhmans by Hindu monarchs. These documents contain lists of kings, and enable the historian to settle a few dates at rare intervals. When the Āhoms entered the Brahmaputra valley in 1282, the old kingdom of Kāmarūpa had been shorn of much of its pristine glory, and the history of Assam proper may be said to begin. The Āhoms were Shāns who descended into the valley over the Pātkai pass from Upper Burma. M. Terrien de Lacouperie, the eminent authority on this subject, says that the Shāns are the outcome of an intermingling of Mons, Negritos, and Chinese. They were a manly and hardy race, and (an unusual thing in the East) possessed the historic instinct very strongly. Their *bu-ran-jis* (the word is one of the very few Shān words in the Assamese language) are chronicles comparable for accuracy of detail and picturesqueness of narration with those of any country, and from this time on we have a systematic account of the rise, decay, and fall of the Āhom rule, which resulted finally in British supremacy in Assam. The name Assam itself is probably derived from the word Āhom. The religious history of the Āhoms (*q.v.*) closely resembles that of previous rulers of the country. They, like their predecessors, finally established themselves at Prāgjyotishpur (which gradually came to be called Gauhāti) after having founded Sibsāgar and other towns and palaces in Upper Assam. The kings and their Āhom subjects intermarried with their predecessors in the country

and became, as zealous Hindus, defenders of the famous shrine of the Tantrik goddess Kāmākṣā. But the bulk of the quiet, innocent, and cheerful Hindus of Assam are not Tantriks at all. They are, like the followers of Chaitanya in Bengal, Vaiṣṇavas, and hold a creed which is manifestly tinged by Buddhistic influences. Their faith is that of the *Bhāgavatas*, enthusiastic worshippers of a monotheistic personal god, who is regarded as the Father of his creatures, as accessible to prayer, as having been incarnate in human form, and as one who loves humanity. The soul is regarded as eternal, and extinction or absorption is not considered as possible or desirable. Rather is it the object of the Vaiṣṇava worshipper to obtain by *bhakti*, or 'devotion,' and prayer, fellowship with and ultimate approach to the presence of the divinity (see BHAKTI-MĀRGA).

2. **Śāktism.**—(*a*) *Historical aspect.*—This new religion, to which the majority of the converts to Hinduism from the humbler races and classes now belong, came into being at a time when the Assam valley was divided between the Koch kings of the West and the Āhom kings who were establishing their dominion in the East. One of the greatest of the Koch rulers was Nara Nārāyaṇa, who died in 1584 after a rule of nearly fifty years. In his time the Koch power reached its zenith, chiefly owing to the warlike ability and energy of his brother, the celebrated commander Silārāi. Nara Nārāyaṇa himself is described as a man of mild and studious disposition, who greatly encouraged the spread of the Hindu religion. Like all the rulers of Assam, he was himself a Śākta (a worshipper of the *śākti* of Śiva), and he re-built the temple of Kāmākṣā Devī, which had been destroyed by Musalmān invaders. He imported Brāhmans from Bengal to conduct the religious ceremonies at the temple, and, to this day, the *parvatia guṣain* ('mountain priest') who is the chief priest at Kāmākṣā, is a Bengali from the great seat of Bengal religion and culture at Nuddea. The temple contains two stone figures which are said to represent Nara Nārāyaṇa himself and his warrior brother Silārai (or Śukladhvaj). What Śāktism then was (and what it still is in principle) may be judged from the ceremonies conducted at the opening of the restored temple. Here we cannot do better than quote from Gait's *History*.

'At this time Śāktism was the predominant form of Hinduism in this part of India. Its adherents base their observances on the Tantras, a series of religious works in which the various ceremonies, prayers, and incantations are prescribed in a dialogue between Śiva and his wife Pārvatī. The fundamental idea is the worship of the female principle, the procreative power of nature as manifested by personified desire. It is a religion of bloody sacrifices from which even human beings were not exempt. In the *Kālikā Purāṇa* it is stated that a man without blemish is the most acceptable sacrifice that can be offered, and the manner in which the victim is to be dealt with is laid down in great detail. When the new temple of Kāmākṣā was opened, the occasion was celebrated by the immolation of no less than a hundred and forty men, whose heads were offered to the goddess on salvers made of copper. According to the *Haft Iqlīm*, there was in Kāmarūpa a class of persons called *Bhogis*, who were voluntary victims. From the time when they announced that the goddess had called them, they were treated as privileged persons; they were allowed to do whatever they liked, and every woman was at their command; but when the annual festival came round, they were killed. Magic also held an important place in the estimation of this sect, and in the *Ain-i-Akbari* the people were accused, among other practices, of divination by the examination of a child cut out of the body of "a pregnant woman who has gone her full term of months." The religious ceremonies of the sect were equally abominable, and they were often associated with licentious orgies too disgusting to be even hinted at' (p. 56).

It may be noticed as a historical fact, that the Śāktism of Kāmākṣā was the religion in turn of dynasty after dynasty of decadent monarchs, each promoted from a state of semi-savagery by adoption into Hinduism. It may be, on the one hand, that something of savage brutality and lust were imported into the cult by association with primitive beliefs. Certain it is that all the royal families, whether of the Brahmaputra valley or of the adjacent Surmā valley, seem to have been addicted to human sacrifice and to all the excesses and abuses that go with panic-stricken cruelty. It is a fact, too, that life in the soft, enervating, and malarious climate of Assam invariably produced physical and moral decay in the fine and manly Indo-Chinese races that invaded the country. When the British took possession of Assam, the Burmese were in occupation of the valley, and were belying their Buddhist creed by cruelties probably unequalled in savagery in any part of the world. Had they established themselves on the ruins of the Āhom monarchy, there can be little doubt that they, too, would have come under the influence of environment, and that their race would have become emasculated by commixture with the degenerate plains-people. Certainly the Tantrik religion of Kāmākṣā was one of inconceivable cruelty and degradation. Before going on to describe how in the 16th cent. a reformation of the utmost importance and interest altered the whole aspect and application of Hinduism in Assam, it may be well to state briefly what the present state of Śākti-worship in the Brahmaputra valley is known to be.

(*b*) *Śāktism at the present time.*—The modern manifestations of the cult of the generative and reproductive forces of Nature are undoubtedly less sensual, less devilishly cruel, than in mediæval times, and this for a variety of tolerably obvious reasons: (1) the reaction from Burmese oppression helped the natural tendency of the Assamese temperament towards placid acquiescence and tolerance; (2) the example of the reformed and infinitely milder and purer religion of the Bhakats had a similar influence; (3) British rule, again, has made open cruelty and obscenity impossible, and even the secret performance of illegal rites dangerous; (4) above all, perhaps, the spread of education, the improvement of communication, and the fact that Assam has now probably a larger foreign population in proportion to its total numbers than any other Indian province, have effected a real change in the tenets, perhaps, and certainly in the manners of Śāktas. Śāktism remains, and must remain while the Tantras are the scriptures of the sect, a religion of blind terror, of uncomprehended forces, of the terrible mystery of birth and death. The root-idea seems to be that Nature creates only to destroy; that she creates only *because* she destroys; that life is begotten only because it is foredoomed to early destruction. The Śāktist can indeed say of his Kāmākṣā, or of some other form of the generative powers of boon nature, that, like the Lucretian Venus,

'per te quoniam genus omne animantum
Concipitur, visitque exortum lumina solis.'

He can, indeed, take pleasure in the recurring marvel of love. But behind seems to lurk a morbid sense that life and death go hand in hand, or rather that one is the shadow of the other. Since the Venus of the Nilāchal hill is Mistress of Life, and Love, and Death, it is inferred that weak mortals, her children, can do her service by loving, by begetting, by slaying. This sentiment is very widely, if obscurely, present in the minds of Hindus of even the highest intelligence and culture. In *Bhānumati* (Calcutta, 1900), a novel by the poet Navin Chandra Sen, the most eminent of living Bengali men of letters, the sense of the mingled horror and rapture of Śākti-worship is expressed in a way that no mere description by a foreigner could convey. The novel contains, incidentally, a graphic account of the appalling cyclone and tidal wave which swept over the district of Chittagong in

October 1897. The whole description is a vivid reminder of the fact that this remote corner of Eastern Bengal was once part of the vanished kingdom of Kāmarūpa, and still preserves its ancient attitude towards the inscrutable mysteries of our common existence.

The tale opens with a singularly beautiful and poetic description of the smiling aspect of the Chittagong coast in late autumn, of the blue sea flecked with foam as the water of a lake is studded with swaying lilies, of the pale azure of the sky overhead, of the yellow sands shining in the happy brightness of morning sunshine, and behind them the rich gold of ripening crops, varied by the dense green foliage, in which the brown-roofed cottages of the peasants nestle. To the north soars the sacred peak of Chandra-sekhar, crowned with the gleam of the white temple of the goddess, and to the south lies the rocky island shrine of the local Venus at Māskhāl, an Indian Cyprus on a small scale. It is the eve of the annual festival at which, in old time, human sacrifices were offered to the goddess of Life and Death. The people are happy in the expectation of a plentiful harvest. They are preparing the simple presents with which they rejoice the hearts of their relatives and children; their minds are filled with gratitude for safety, and prosperity, and sufficient food. But the goddess is bent on warning her creatures that death is her function as well as life, and love, and happiness. On the fated night of the cyclone, when the rough and simple peasant folk are quietly sleeping, the great wind blows suddenly without visible warning, and, catching up the rising tide, pours it in a torrent of impartial destruction over the sleeping coast, involving all—happy homes, men, women, and children, ripening crops, prowling beasts of prey, and harmless domestic animals, even the birds of the air—in one common hecatomb. The goddess has exacted her own sacrifice, since men no longer offer victims at her altar. The chapter is significantly headed '*Raṇa-Kṣettra*,' the 'Field of Battle.'

And this, be it noticed, is not a description written by a fanatic priest. Navin Chandra Sen is an English scholar, and an administrator who rose high in the British service. He has been an ardent student of English literature, and, as his poetical works show, is deeply interested in the study of religion. But the warp and woof of the devotional texture of his mind is made up of the ancient conceptions which gave the Brāhmans of Prāgjyotishpur their supremacy through Eastern India, and the kingdom of Kāmarūpa its old reputation for magic, sorcery, and divination. It is still a land of spells and charms; and mystic formulas, rightly used, still have power to bless and curse, to draw on fellow-mortals the smile or frown of the inscrutable goddess in whose hands are the gifts of birth, love, and death alike.

The temple at Nilāchal is open to the visits of foreigners; but its rites are not, even now, very accurately known to the uninitiated. During the Amābasyā week the shrine is closed to all, because, by a quaint fancy, that is the period during which Mother Earth, obscurely identified with the goddess, is unclean. Conversely, the great river Brahmaputra, which flows under the shrine, is, for reasons mythological and other, ceremonially impure throughout the year, except on the annual bathing-festival of the Aśokāṣṭamī, when ablution in his waters becomes as cleansing as bathing in Mother Ganges herself.

In the *Report on the Census of Assam*, taken in 1891, Gait writes as follows:

'Their religious ceremonies [*i.e.* those of the Śāktas of Eastern Bengal and Assam] have frequently been the subject of adverse criticism. Robinson says* that some of the formulas used at the festival in honour of Kāmākṣā relate to things that can never become the subject of description, and that "the most abominable rites are practised and licentious scenes exhibited, which it is scarcely possible to suppose the human mind could be capable of devising." I am not aware on what authority he framed this extremely strong denunciation, but his statements are supported by other writers, and have not, so far as I know, been contradicted. It is well known that dancing girls are maintained at all the principal temples, and it seems certain that a great deal of licentiousness is permitted under the guise of religion.' Here Gait refers his readers to the account of Śāktism given by Monier Williams in his *Religious Life and Thought in India*.

The five essentials for worship are the five *Makāras*, or 'five *M's*,' namely, *Madya*, 'wine'; *Māṁsa*, 'flesh'; *Matsya*, 'fish'; *Mudrā*, 'parched grain and mystic gesticulation'; and *Maithuna*, 'the indulgence of sex.' B. C. Allen has a similar account of modern Śāktism in the *Assam Census Report* for 1901.

Before quitting the subject of Tantrik worship in Assam, it is only right to warn the reader that descriptions based on the excesses of possibly a few enthusiasts must not be accepted as a fair account of either the religious beliefs or the ethics of the great bulk of Assamese Śāktas. Like most Eastern Indians, and especially those who have an infusion of Indo-Chinese blood, they are a mild, contented, and smiling race, little given to excesses of any kind, good sons, husbands, and fathers, and, so far as the long experience of those Europeans who have lived among them shows, not more addicted to grossly superstitious practices than the bulk of humanity. Religion with them, as with most races, is left in its more esoteric forms to priests, experts, devotees, and enthusiasts. There are a few dancing girls at the Kāmākṣā temple, it is true, and it is to be feared that these are devoted to the perversely logical extremes of a creed of panic terror, and morbid exaggeration of the facts of sense. But there is no part of India where womanly virtue and modesty are more valued and more consistently practised than in Assam, which in this respect compares very favourably with neighbouring Bengal, where prostitution is rife. In truth, the Śākti-worship of Kāmākṣā can hardly be considered as belonging to Assam in any proper sense. It is the creed, so far as it is Assamese at all, of the upper classes, all of whom claim to be of foreign origin; and there can be no doubt that, except at the temple itself, it has been purified by contact with the true national religion of the country, the reformed Vaiṣṇavism, to which it is a pleasure and a relief to turn.

3. The Vaiṣṇavism of Assam.—(*a*) *The historical aspect of Assamese Viṣṇu-worship.*—When the Koch king Nara Nārāyaṇa (1528–1584) ruled in Western Assam, and the Āhom king Chuhumung, whose Hindu name was Swarga Nārāyaṇa (1497–1593), ruled over the eastern part of the Brahmaputra valley, the great social and religious reform initiated in Bengal by Chaitanya spread to Assam, and became the foundation of what is still the popular and prevalent form of Hinduism in the country.

In still earlier times, when the Āhoms entered the Brahmaputra valley, there were twelve subordinate rulers or chiefs, who were known as the Bāra Bhuiyā, and these claimed to be descendants of Samudra, the minister of an ancient and still famous ruler called Arimatta. Samudra, it is said, seized the throne on the expulsion of Arimatta's son Ratna Singh. Samudra was succeeded by his son Manohar, and Manohar's daughter Lakṣmī became the bride of the sun-god, to whom she bore two sons, Santanu and Sāmanta. Santanu became a follower of Viṣṇu, and Sāmanta a Śākta and worshipper of the rival deity Śiva—another reminder of the never-ending contest between the two great Hindu schools of divinity. The brothers separated, Santanu and his sons going to Rāmpur in Nowgong, while Sāmanta remained in Eastern Assam, at Lakṣmīpur, the village from which the British District of Lakhimpur takes its name. He and his descendants seem to have exercised a gradually diminishing political power, and for a long time maintained their independence against the Kachāri or Bodo king who then ruled in Central Assam, and the powerful Chutiya monarch whose capital was at Sadiyā, near the north-eastern frontier. Ultimately, however, they fell victims to the usual law of decay to which all Assamese dynasties have been subject, and were subdued by the rising Āhom power. As in so many other cases, this semi-royal family became reconciled to the common lot of Assamese humanity, and, save for some lingering pride of race and some intellectual aspirations, were merged in the landholding class. One of Santanu's descendants, named Rājdhar, settled at Bardowa in Central Assam, and his son Kusambar was the father of the great religious reformer Śankara Deva.

This is one of two versions given by Gait of the origin of the first of the reformers of Assam. The other story does not differ in material points from that which has been summarized above. It

* *Descriptive Account of Assam*, ii. 258.

too, describes Śankara Deva as the descendant of famous chiefs, but speaks of these as the wardens of the northern marches.

It is said of Śankara that he early recognized the crude and cruel features of the cult of the goddess of Life and Death, and was puzzled by the anomalies of the Śākta religion, obvious enough to modern minds, if they presented few difficulties to simple races surrounded not only by human foes, but by the frequently hostile and always terrible and incomprehensible forces of a land of fierce sunshine, and one much subject to earthquake and storm. Śankara's fate was cast in a happier and more peaceful time, when there was an equilibrium of forces between the two great powers of the Koch and the Ahom, and when men had leisure to think of the possibility that human beings might conceivably live at peace together, and that Nature herself might not be so hostile after all. He spent twelve years in Bengal, chiefly, it is supposed, at Nuddea, where he learnt the religious ideas of a greater than himself, the famous reformer Chaitanya. Like his master, he made the *Bhāgavad Gītā* his scripture, and Kṛṣṇa, the heroic incarnation of Viṣṇu, the god of his worship. He was one of the most eminent of the many teachers, both before and after Chaitanya, of the *Bhāgavata* religion, which in some of its forms so closely resembles the teachings of Christianity that it has been supposed by some that the doctrine of *bhakti*, or personal adoration of a divine Father, was borrowed from the Thomasine Christians of Southern India (see BHAKTI-MĀRGA). Śankara, at all events, abjured priests, idols, and castes, and taught that all men are alike the sons of Viṣṇu, possessed of immortal souls, and capable of being freed from sin and sorrow by addressing their prayers to their loving Father. He at first strove to propagate his ideas—and his earnest desire to find converts affords another parallel with Christianity — in the Ahom dominions. But the Ahom kings were under the domination of Śākta priests, who denounced the innovator as a heretic. Śankara was compelled to take refuge at Barpetā, in the kingdom of the mild and enlightened Koch king Nara Nārāyaṇa. It is said that the king had many interviews with the reformer, and even proposed to become his disciple. But Śankara, with characteristic modesty, refused the honour.

This story may merely record in a concise and picturesque form the fact that the Vaiṣṇavas of Assam never tried, as their Brāhman predecessors had done, to win over the ruling classes. Their 'kingdom,' if the expression may be used without irreverence, 'was not of this world,' and they were content to make converts among the humblest races and classes, those which orthodox Hinduism had, with some vague memory of the old 'Aryan' exclusiveness, regarded as Mlecchas and barbarian. It is said by modern followers of Śankara that he had studied the *Bhāgavad Gītā*, before he proceeded to Bengal, with Hari Deva and Dāmodar Deva, subsequently to be themselves founders of minor Vaiṣṇava sects. It is possible that there was at this period a widely spread wave of religious inquiry and a silent revolution against the physical and spiritual tyranny of Śākta priests. It is at least a curious coincidence that, when Luther and other reformers were rebelling against the abuses of Roman doctrine and discipline, a precisely similar movement should have produced Hari Vyāsa in Nepāl, Rāmānanda in Orissa, Chaitanya in Bengal, and Śankara in Assam.

Śankara is said to have lived to great old age, and to have died in the year 1569. He was succeeded by his favourite disciple Mādhava, a Kāyastha like himself. Among those who still follow the teaching of Śankara, Mādhava is regarded with even greater reverence than Śankara himself, and the sect is commonly known as the Mahāpuruṣiyas, the followers of the 'Great Man' or Teacher, *i.e.* Mādhava. But there were some who, on the death of their original teacher, were still under the influence of old-time ideas, and resented the founding of a hierarchy of Kāyasthas as religious guides. Several Brāhman disciples seceded and founded sects of their own. The most important of these Brāhman dissidents were Dāmodar Deva, Hari Deva, and Gopāl Deva, who founded numerous *chattras*, or centres of religious instruction. The most important and interesting of these are the institutions, not wholly unlike Buddhist monasteries, at Auniāti, Dakṣinpāt, Garamur, and Kurubāhi — all in the remarkable Mājuli island, perhaps the longest river-island in the world, which lies in the Brahmaputra, between the modern Districts of Sibsagar and Lakhimpur. There is little Śāktism now except in Kāmrūp Laur; and that of the Vaiṣṇavas in Lower Assam is mainly Mahāpuruṣiya, while Upper Siam, including Nowgong, east of the Kalang, is inhabited mainly by followers of the Bāmumya *guṣains*.

But even in Upper Assam the Brāhmans did not in early times exercise an unquestioned sway. There was one Aniruddha, a Kolitā or writer by caste, who quarrelled with Śankara Deva and founded the Moāmāriā sect, which played an important part in subsequent political events, and is known to all students of Assamese history as the origin of the famous Moāmāriā rebellion. It is said that the word 'Moāmāriā' is a nickname, contemptuously given by the Brāhmans to the low-caste followers of Aniruddha, who lived by a fresh-water lagoon which abounded in the coarse fish known as *moā*. His disciples were known as 'killers of moā-fish.' They became 'fishers of men' to considerable purpose in later times, and furnished a hard nut for the Ahom rulers of Assam to crack.

For a time the Mahāpuruṣiyas and Bāmuniyas between them practically ousted Śāktism from Assam. Its restoration was due to the royal pride of the famous Ahom king Sukhrungphā, better known by his Hindu name of Rudra Singh (1696–1714). He wished to adopt Hinduism, and was too proud to accept the *saran*, the oath and formula of orthodoxy, from a subject. He imported one Kṛṣnarām Bhattāchariya from Nuddea, and made him *parvatia guṣain*, the high priest of the mountain-temple of Kāmākṣā. Kṛṣnarām was a Śākta, and the Court and its dependants adopted his form of Hinduism. The new guṣain's priestly arrogance was aptly shown when Rudra Singh died and was succeeded by his son, Sunyeophā or Lakśmī Singh. Kṛṣnarām refused to recognize the young king, on the ground of illegitimacy. Lakśmi Singh accordingly imported another Śākta priest from Bengal, who was the founder of the family of the Na Guṣain, the 'New Priests,' as the Parvatia Guṣains are the heads of the Nāti Guṣains, who together with them form the nucleus of Śāktism in Assam. There are, however, a few representatives still of the old indigenous Śāktism of the Assam valley, who, from their habit of going about un-turbaned, are known by the title of *Mykali Muṛa*, the 'Bare-heads.' Gait believes that Śāktism has more vital force than Vaiṣnavism. 'Many Vaiṣnavas,' he says, 'are attracted by the more realistic worship of the Śāktas, and offer sacrifices at Kāmākṣā despite the remonstrances of their spiritual guides.' In truth, Vaiṣnavism, as practised by its humbler converts, is but a stage removed from the animistic creed of the aboriginal races of Assam. It involves chiefly the giving up of good roast pork and rice-beer—luxuries to which the castes that have Indo-Chinese blood in their veins are much addicted. Śāktism, on the other hand, puts little check on sensual gratification, since it is always possible for enthusiasts of either sex to regard themselves as incarnations of the male or female form of the deity, and so to please divinity by pleasing themselves.

(*b*) *Vaiṣnavism at the present time.*—It remains to say a word as to the Vaiṣnavas as they now are. Laymen are under the supervision of the *guṣains* of one *chattra* or another, to whom they have taken the vow of obedience. They are visited from time to time by *bhakats*, or disciples of the *chattra*, who exact the doles or fines by which the community is maintained. They are mostly simple and innocent enough folk, not much given to religious or ethical speculation. Their

rustic existence is so uneventful and unchequered that a very plain and uncomplex theory of moral and material existence suffices them. The Mahāpuruṣiyas now regard Śankara and Mādhava as *avatārs*, or incarnations of Viṣṇu, though neither of them claimed this promotion in his lifetime, and would, indeed, have regarded such an assumption of divine honours with horror. The way to salvation lies through the performance of good deeds and the devout pronouncing of the name of Hari. Worship is carried out by the performances of *sankirtan*, the enthusiastic singing of hymns accompanied by much beating of drums (*dhol*) and clashing of cymbals (*kartāl*). The ten incarnations, or *Daś Avatār*, of Viṣṇu are believed in. Caste prejudices, though theoretically opposed to the tenets of the sect, were not wholly destroyed by Mādhava himself, and are slowly but surely reasserting themselves, perhaps under the influence of the adjacent Śāktism. The Mahāpuruṣiyas do not, however, recognize caste so fully as the sects that have Brāhman leaders. The *Kaulia Bhakats*, the monks or recluses who live in the precincts of the *chattras*, are celibates, ascetics, and wholly ignore caste, as being of the nature of worldly distinctions. In each *chattra* there is an image of Viṣṇu, but this is said by the Kaulias to be a mere concession to the idolatrous weaknesses of the common people. They themselves do not pay any reverence to the idol, and are pure monotheists after the teaching of the *Bhāgavad Gītā*, with, no doubt, in the case of the better read among them, a leaning towards pantheism.

The Mahāpuruṣiyas eat the flesh of wild animals, such as deer, and also all feathered game. They do not eat domesticated animals or fowls. (It may be worth mentioning that the Assamese word for 'deer' is *pahu*, the local pronunciation of the Sanskrit *paśu*. The deer is, in fact, '*the* animal.') The Mahāpuruṣiyas do not kill with the knife or poleaxe, as most Indians do, but cudgel animals to death. Their principal scriptures are a *Kirtan* and *Daśam* attributed to Śankar Deva, and a *Nāmghoṣa* and *Ratnāvali* said to have been composed by Mādhava. The *Kirtan* and *Nāmghoṣa* are anthologies from different *purāṇas*. The *Daśam* and the *Ratnāvali* are extracts from the *Bhāgavad Gītā*. The Mahāpuruṣiyas refuse to eat with the Dāmodariyas, but, curiously enough, intermarriage with them is not unknown.

The Dāmodariyas worship the idol of Kṛṣṇa, and they regard their founder Damodar Deva as an incarnation of that god. Refusing the spiritual leadership of Śūdras, they refuse, necessarily, to recognize the claims to homage of Śankar and Mādhava. In other respects there is little difference between their tenets and habits and those of the Mahāpuruṣiyas. Though they are careful for Brāhmanical supremacy, they are, strange to say, less strict in diet than the Mahāpuruṣiyas, and eat the flesh of goats, pigeons, ducks, etc., following in that respect the example of their Brāhman teachers. Nor are they so particular as the Śūdra caste in matters of personal cleanliness.

The followers of Hari Deva regard their leader as an emanation of Kṛṣṇa, but do not on that account deny that Śankar was also an incarnation of Viṣṇu. Among them prevails the practice of the *bhakat-seva*, which permits their Brāhman leaders to accept indiscriminately all offerings made to them by their *jajmānas*, or disciples. Hari Deva was himself an enthusiastic admirer of Śankara and Mādhava, but in modern times the tendency is for the followers of this reformer to identify themselves with the Dāmodariyas.

Finally, a few words must be said as to the followers of Gopāl Deva. Gopāl was a disciple of Śankara, who quarrelled with his leader, and started a *chattra* of his own. But it is said that the misunderstanding did not wholly destroy their liking and respect for one another, and it is difficult at the present day to see much difference between the beliefs and practices of the followers of Gopāl Deva and the Mahāpuruṣiyas. The former hold an annual festival in honour of their founder, but in other respects are much the same as members of the rival sect.

4. Methods of conversion.—The most important method of conversion to Hinduism in Assam, but one always reserved for ruling princes and powerful tribes, and now obsolete, was that described by Gait as 'conversion by fiction.' As he says (*Census of Assam*, 1891, p. 83):

'The Brāhmans ingratiate themselves with the head of the tribe, discover that he is a Hindu of unexceptionable antecedents, whose ancestors have for some reason thought fit to conceal their identity, and present him with a brand new genealogy, in which his descent is traced back to some god in the Hindu pantheon or some potentate in Hindu mythology. Thus the Koch kings are said to be descended from Śiva, who, assuming the form of Haria Mandal, had intercourse with his wife, who was no other than an incarnation of Pārvatī. While a divine origin for the king was thus furnished, the rest of the tribe were not forgotten. It was explained to them that they were Kṣatriyas who fled eastwards to escape the wrath of Paraśurāma, and had remained there ever since, disguised as Meches and Koches. The Kachāri kings of Hiramba were similarly converted, and, after their ancestry had been satisfactorily traced back to Bhīma, the two chiefs, Kṛṣṇa and Govinda Chandra, were placed (about 1790 A.D.) in the body of a large copper image of a cow, and were thence produced to an admiring people as newly born Hindus. The whole of the Kachāris of that part of the country were also admitted to be of Kṣatriya origin, and were allowed to assume the sacred thread on declaring their adherence to the orthodox faith. The conversion of the Manipuris (or Meithei, the Kuki-Chin race inhabiting the Imphāl valley) happened in precisely the same way. Arjuna was alleged to have been the founder of the royal family, while the masses of the people, like the Kachāris, were admitted to be "concealed Kṣatriyas." To this day a Nāga or Kuki on conversion is at liberty to describe himself accordingly and to assume the sacred thread. For the Āhoms, Indra was selected as the mythical progenitor of the kings, but no special origin seems to have been assigned to the common people, so that an Āhom on conversion takes as low a place in the Hindu caste system, in his own estimation, as he does in that of orthodox Hindus.'

Here Gait adds an interesting note to the effect that Indra also enters into the traditions of the Mon-Annam races of Burma and the Far East. Indra alone of the Vedic gods, Forbes tells us, has been admitted into Buddhist mythology (*Languages of Further India*, p. 41). It is just possible that the Āhom kings brought the tradition of their heavenly descent with them from Burma, and did not obtain it from their priestly attendants.

The fictional system of conversion had its advantages. It admitted whole races at a time into Hinduism. But it involved important concessions, which the Brāhmans were not likely to make unless they could receive some equivalent in return. Converts who belong to tribes for which a high ancestry has already been invented, continue to claim admittance to their reputed caste—generally, of course, a high one. But nowadays conversion is sporadic and confined to humble folk, and such people are kept on a much lower footing than the kings, warriors, and invading races of old time. Sometimes they change their tribal name and enter a caste specially reserved for them. Sometimes they even become Hindu without changing the title of their race.

In the Assam valley the Koch caste is usually allotted to converts—a circumstance not without interest when it is considered that Koch was originally the name of a race whose members, in Northern and Eastern Bengal, changed their name to Rājbaṁsi, or 'royal-born,' when they adopted Hinduism. The true Bodos of the Kachāri Dwars usually enter this caste, while their highland

cousins, the Di-mā-fisā, as already related, have been raised to Kṣatriya rank. But even the name of Koch cannot be assumed all at once. A Kachāri, for instance, begins by placing himself under the protection of a *guṣain* and taking the oath of obedience, or *saran*. He is then called a Saraniya. At this stage he still eats pigs and fowls, and continues to drink beer and, less frequently, distilled spirits. Next he (or rather his descendants) becomes a Modāhi, which implies the renunciation of alcohol. By slow degrees the ancestral yearning for unholy food and drink diminishes or disappears, and, having become a ceremonially pure Hindu, the aforetime Kachāri is accepted as a Kāmtāli or Baṛ Koch. Even then, however, he is subject to relapses, especially in the matter of pork, as the presence of pigs in Koch villages sufficiently testifies.

In the eastern part of the Brahmaputra valley, where caste feeling is even now weaker than on the confines of Bengal, a change of name is unnecessary, and a Kachāri or Āhom retains his tribal appellation. In the Surmā valley the only Indo-Chinese tribes who are now converted are Manipuris and Kachāris; and these, as explained above, are entitled to be received as Kṣatriyas though the Kṣatriya caste no longer exists among the Bengalis. There are a few Tipperas (Bodo folk from the Tippera hills) who are received into Hinduism. These obtain the as yet unexplained caste name of Rārh.

It may be mentioned in passing that instances have been known in which members of hill tribes have undergone a stage of Christianity on their way to Hinduism.

For instance, there is a well-authenticated case of a young Kachāri in Darrang who was brought up in a mission school, was baptized, and obtained a somewhat lucrative post. To a man of his race it seemed natural that he should invest his savings in a polygamous union, and he was at some pains to convince his missionary that he could find nothing in the New Testament to prevent a layman from being the husband of two wives. It was, of course, impossible for his pastor to accept his view of the case, but he married a Koch girl *en secondes noces*, and himself in due course became a Hindu Koch.

At the present time the ferment of political agitation which is stirring in Bengal has spread, to some extent, to the educated classes in the Assam valley. The movement is largely a Hindu movement, and implies the fervent adoration of a Mātā, or mother, to whom the *Bande Mātāram* hymn is addressed. This hymn is usually interpreted as an invocation of the mother-land; and, in one sense, it undoubtedly has this meaning. But no one who will take the trouble to read the context in the well-known novel of *Ānanda Maṭh*, from which the hymn is taken, will have any difficulty in convincing himself that the invocation has also an esoteric sense, and implies the adoration of a female divinity, who is, more or less disguised, the Śākti of the old cult of the vanished kingdom of Prāgjyotishpur. The neo-Śāktists who, in Bengal and Assam at least, head the new 'national' movement towards autonomy and independence of British rule, boldly claim, on the strength of their education and intellectual ability, an equality with European races, and, of late, have exhibited a marked desire to be admitted to the amenities of European society. They themselves confess that the social and political progress of Japan has given the hint for this new ambition. It will be a matter of much interest to see whether followers of the more esoteric and, according to European ideas, less pure and elevating form of Hindu belief will be able so to transmute their social system and ideals as to obtain admittance into even the comparatively tolerant society of modern Europe. Of the intellectual ability of the Aryo-Dravidian upper classes of Bengal and Assam, the heirs of the ancient civilization of Kāmarūpa, there can be no doubt. That most of them are good citizens and excellent in their dealings with one another is equally undoubted. It may be that Śāktism at its worst was no worse than the society depicted, for instance, in the tales of Apuleius—a society which nevertheless still retained something of the administrative instincts of Republican Rome. It would be unwise to dogmatize or prophesy in a matter whose solution must depend on many incalculable events. It would be unfair to remind the political reformers of Assam that the shrine of Venus Kāmākṣā still draws its throngs of worshippers and furnishes revenue to priests who are much as were the priests of old time, when the humble civil station of Gauhāti was the proud and famous capital of Prāgjyotishpur, an early English account of which may be read in the travels of Ralph Fitch, who visited the country of Couch, or Quichen, as he calls it, when Nara Nārāyaṇa still ruled over the diminished remains of the old kingdom of Kāmarūpa.

See, further, separate artt. on ĀHOMS, BODOS, KHĀSIS, LUSHAIS, MANIPURIS, MIKIRS, NĀGAS. For an account of the Muhammadanism of Assam see ISLĀM (in Burma and Assam), and for the Buddhism see BUDDHISM (in Burma and Assam).

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J. D. ANDERSON.

ASSASSINS.—1. Names.—'Assassins' was a name given, mainly by European writers, to a community properly called Ta'limites ('Instructionists') or Ḥasanites ('followers of Ḥasan Ṣabāḥ'), forming a branch of the Bāṭinites ('followers of the Inner Meaning'), Ismā'ilians ('adherents of Ismā'īl b. Ja'far aṣ-Ṣādiq'), or Sab'ites ('Heptadists'), and sometimes confused with the Bābakites or Ḫuramites and Qarmatians (*q.v.*). For the origin of the name Assassin (spelt in base-Latin documents *assasini*, *assessini*, *assisini*, *assassi*, *hassasuti*, *heissessin*, etc.) many improbable conjectures were offered till it was finally identified by de Sacy (*Mém. de l'Institut*, iv. 44) with the Arabic *ḥasshāshīn* or *ḥashīshiyya*, 'drinkers of *ḥashīsh*' (an extract of hemp possessing intoxicating properties, with which there is reason to believe that the members of the sect were at times drugged). The story, however, to that effect which is told by Marco Polo (3rd ed., Yule, i. 139), though parallel with some Eastern narratives (see von Hammer, *Mines de l'Orient*, iv. 355), can only be regarded as a romance. The name *ḥasshāshīn* with its synonym has as yet been found in very few Arabic authors,* applied to the Syrian branch of the sect; and seems to have been a term of abuse, given to it by its enemies, who associated deceit with the habit of drinking this liquor (*ZDMG* xx. 591).

2. Tenets.—The tenets of the community are very imperfectly known, partly owing to the rarity of MSS emanating from it, and partly because their doctrines were essentially esoteric, and communicated in their entirety to very few persons. It is, however, certain that the system of the Ismā'ilians was a conflation of philosophic pantheism, emanating from India, with the formulæ of Islām; and the doctrine whereby this process was facilitated, and which won them the name Bāṭinites, was that every text of the Qur'ān had a hidden meaning, which was to be followed

* To de Sacy's references we may add Mufīd al-'ulūm (Cairo, 1310, p. 50), where *ḥashīsh* is said to be the food of the *Mulḥids* (the name by which the sect is known to its enemies).

to the exclusion of the literal sense. The name Sab'ites is ordinarily interpreted as implying that they recognized only seven *imāms*, whereas most of the Shī'ites recognized twelve; the seventh being that Ismā'īl b. Ja'far, who was supposed to have died before his father (who therefore left the imāmate to another son Mūsā), but in the opinion of the Ismā'ilians either did not die but remained concealed, to re-appear at some time as Mahdī ('divinely-guided' leader), or retained his title to the imāmate and handed it on to his son Muḥammad, a real or pretended descendant of whom afterwards founded the Fāṭimid dynasty in Egypt. More probably the name Sab'ite refers to their belief in seven incarnations of the deity, called *nāṭiqs*, 'utterers,' whom they enumerate as Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, Muḥammad, and Muḥammad b. Ismā'īl; for the last, as will be seen, the head of the community for the time being was apt to be substituted. Between every two of these *nāṭiqs* there came a series of seven *imāms*, or chiefs; and each imām was at the head of a heptad, of either followers or classes of followers, called respectively *ḥujja* ('argument'), *dhū maṣṣa* ('sucker,' *i.e.* imbiber of learning), *dā'ī akbar* ('greater missionary'), *dā'ī ma'dhūn* ('permitted missionary'), *mukallib* ('trainer') and *mu'min* ('believer'); the last class but one were not permitted to reveal the doctrines, but might shake the faith of ordinary Muslims. Similarly they had a system of seven operations required in the making of a convert, the first of which consisted in testing the capacity of a man for conversion, the second in winning confidence by flattering a man's particular taste (*e.g.* practising asceticism before an ascetic, debauchery before a loose liver), the third in suggesting doubts as to the truth of Islām; in the sixth a man had to abandon religious observances, and interpret 'washing' as obeying the imām, 'washing with sand' (permitted by the Islāmic code in the absence of water) as obeying the 'permitted missionary' when the imām was away, etc. Certain other examples of the 'inner meaning' assigned by them to Qur'ānic texts are given by Ch. Schefer (*Chrestomathie persane*, i. 178):

'When the Qur'ān says Jesus had no father, the meaning is that he received instruction from no trustworthy teacher: when it says that he raised the dead, it signifies that he brought knowledge to dead understandings.'

Rather more interesting is their gloss on the Qur'ānic passages in which Pharaoh and Haman are mentioned. These names they supposed to stand for the first two Khalīfs, Abū Bakr and 'Omar, who kept the first imām, 'Alī, out of his rights. With regard to the existence of God they maintained a sceptical attitude, so far at least as 'existence' might be regarded as an attribute; for their public symbol was at times 'we believe in the God of Muḥammad.' In their cosmogony the world of mind was said to have first come into existence; the world of soul followed, and then the rest of creation. A man's life is due to his being a receptacle of a partial soul which at death rejoins the universal soul.

3. History.—The tenets of this community seem to have attracted little attention till towards the end of the 5th cent. of Islām; for the work of Ibn Ḥazm on sects and creeds of the middle of that century contains but a casual allusion to them as one of many sects who vainly believed in a concealed imām. The importance of the branch known as Assassins began with Ḥasan b. 'Alī b. Ṣabāḥ the Ḥimyarite, ordinarily known as Ḥasan Ṣabāḥ, who in A.D. 1090 seized the fortress of Alamūt near Kazvīn; but it was greatly reduced when, in 1256, that fortress was taken by the Mongol Hūlāgū. On that occasion the conqueror gave his vizier 'Aṭā Malik Juwainī the right to inspect the library of the fortress before burning it, and the vizier thence extracted a brief history of the community, which he afterwards inserted in his chronicle called *Jahān-Kushāi*, tr. by Defrémery in *JA*, 1860.

This summary was afterwards embodied by the Persian chronicler Mirkhond (*ob.* 1498) in his *History*, together with some other matter bearing on the history of Ḥasan Ṣabāḥ and his successors (published with tr. by Jourdain in *Notices et Extraits*, ix. 143 ff.). An account in some respects more favourable to Ḥasan is given in the chronicle of Ḥamdallāh Mustaufī (*ob.* 1349 A.D.), translated by Defrémery in *JA*, 1848. Some of the matter given by Mirkhond is derived from a work by the celebrated Niẓām al-Mulk, vizier of the Seljūks, who was well acquainted with Ḥasan and finally perished by his machinations. The most elaborate account as yet discovered is that in the chronicle *Jāmi' at-tawārīḫ* (Brit. Mus. Or. 1684), which is told from the point of view of followers of the sect. The statements of this work, and others bearing on the same subject, have been submitted to searching criticism by E. G. Browne (*A Literary History of Persia*, ii. 190 ff.), who has disposed of certain familiar myths, which need not again be repeated. According to this, his father's home was Kūfah, but he had migrated to Qum, where Ḥasan was born; both originally belonged to the Shī'ite 'Sect of Twelve,' but the son was converted to the 'Sect of Seven' through the efforts of a missionary named Amīr Dārāb, and those of the famous poet and traveller Nāṣir-i-Khusrav. These missionaries, societies founded by whom had already honeycombed Persia, were agents of the so-called Fāṭimid Khalīfs of Egypt, at whose court ambition which had failed to find gratification at that of the Seljūks, now in control of Baghdad, naturally sought compensation. The myth to which reference has been made assigns Ḥasan a motive of this sort for joining the sect.

About the year 472 A.H. (A.D. 1079) Ḥasan went to the court of the Egyptian Khalīf Mustanṣir, and studied the doctrines of the community which he had joined. But he did not stay more than two years in Egypt, having espoused the cause of the Khalīf's eldest son Nizār, who had been appointed by his father to succeed him, but was later displaced in favour of another son. Ḥasan Ṣabāḥ maintained that the expressed resolve of an imām was unalterable. He obtained, however, some sort of certificate as Ismā'ilian missionary, and introductions to those persons who were already playing that part in Persia, whither he returned in 1081; and a writer on religions in 1085 at the court of Ghazni already mentions Ḥasan Ṣabāḥ as a successful preacher of Bāṭinism in Khurāsān and 'Irāq (Schefer, *op. cit.*, i. 161).

According to Ibn Athīr (ed. Tornberg, vol. x. p. 213), the Ismā'ilian revival with which Ḥasan proceeded to associate himself had about this time begun at Sāwa, where eighteen men met to perform worship in the style peculiar to the sect. There, too, their first assassination took place, the victim being a *mu'adhdhin* ('caller to prayer'), whom they had vainly endeavoured to convert to their doctrines, and had murdered when they feared he might betray them to the local authorities. The vizier Niẓām al-Mulk ordered a carpenter who was suspected of the murder to be executed with great brutality, and thereby exposed himself to the vengeance of the sect. Since Ḥasan Ṣabāḥ's conduct is said to have been dictated by dissatisfied ambition and the desire to be avenged on Niẓām al-Mulk, this may have been the occasion for his conversion; but the order of events is not quite certain. What is clear is that the sect was highly unpopular with the orthodox, though the skill of the missionaries caused it to spread in secret; and that the sectarians quickly felt the need for strongholds in which they could be safe from persecution. The first fortress seized was one near Qā'in between Iṣfahān and Nīshābūr (see C. E. Yates, *Khurasan and Seistan*, 1900, p. 62). That of Alamūt, which fell into the hands of Ḥasan, 'is 32 miles from Kazvīn; it is on a solitary rock, about 300 yards long from E. to W., very narrow, not 20 yards wide at the top; about 200 feet high everywhere save to the W., where it may be 100' (*JRGS* viii. 431; cf. iii. 15). Ḥasan

is said to have purchased it for 300 pieces of gold from an 'Alid who happened to be governor, and on whom Ḥasan imposed by professed asceticism and piety; and he probably obtained authority among the Ismā'īlians by professing to act as the deputy of the Egyptian Khalīf, whom they acknowledged as their chief. Ḥasan caused the land surrounding his fortress to be carefully cultivated, and this may have led to the legend which associated with it gardens of delight that could serve as a foretaste of the Islāmic Paradise.

Like other founders of dynasties in the East, Ḥasan was a preacher and controversialist. Works by him* or by his colleagues, embodying Bāṭinite doctrines, excited sufficient attention to evoke replies from the foremost theologian of the time, al-Ghazālī, who refuted their tenets in a work dedicated to the Khalīf Mustaẓhir (487–512 A.H.), whose reign coincided with Ḥasan's tenure of Alamūt. A second tract written by him in answer to the 'Instructionists,' called 'The Just Balance' (*al-Qusṭās al-Mustaqīm*), was published in Cairo, 1900. It is in the form of a dialogue between Ghazālī and a member of the sect. The latter maintains the doctrine of a hidden instructor, who can see all that is going on in the world, on the authority of his mother, 'and our master the lord of the fortress Alamūt,' as well as a comrade of Dāmghān Iṣfahānī, and the inhabitants of the fortresses. The treatise is occupied mainly with an account of the forms of the syllogism and the logical fallacies, and an attempt to show that there is no need for an infallible instructor. The book must have been written before 515 A.H., when its author died. The writings of Ḥasan were burned by one of his successors; but some of them were current in the time of Shahrastānī, who in his works on *Sects and Schools*, ed. Cureton, p. 150 (A.D. 1127 [521 A.H.]) gives excerpts from one of them, translated from Persian into Arabic. The purpose of this treatise appears to have been to decry the independent use of the reason, and prove that for knowledge of God (which with this sect was equivalent to salvation) recourse must be had to a divinely-authorized teacher, whence the sect are sometimes called *at-ta'līmiyya*, or 'Instructionists.' Undoubtedly his purpose was completely to enslave the mind of his disciples, who may even have been drugged for certain periods. Although assassination was from the commencement of Islām a common way of dealing with enemies, Ḥasan Ṣabāḥ appears to have systematized the process in a manner previously unknown. A doctrine which is ascribed to the Ismā'īlians by a late writer, but which may well have been taught also by Ḥasan Ṣabāḥ, was that the soul is imprisoned in the body for the purpose of executing in all points the orders of the *imām*. If the soul quits the body while fulfilling its duty of obedience, it is delivered and transported to the regions of the upper lights; whereas, if it disobeys, it falls into darkness (Quatremère, *Mines de l'Orient*, iv. 368).

One class of disciples, called *Fidā'īs*, were ready at all times to assassinate those whom the head of the order marked out for death; and in accordance with the doctrine described they would risk their own lives readily in making such attempts. Nevertheless these persons received a special training qualifying them for such missions; they were taught foreign languages and the ceremonies of foreign religions, and how to adopt and maintain a variety of disguises. Hence the assassins dispatched by the 'Old Man of the Mountain,' in order to win the confidence of their destined victims, would play a part for a series of months, or even years. The terrible certainty with which Ḥasan Ṣabāḥ could strike from his fortress soon enabled him to extend his possessions and make terms with various rulers. In the second year of his residence at Alamūt he struck down Niẓām al-Mulk, and, shortly after, the Sulṭān Malik Shāh. Emissaries of his made attempts on the lives of Malik Shāh's successor, Barqiyāruq, and the former's brother, Sinjār, installed by his nephew as governor of Khurāsān. During the war between Barqiyāruq and his brother Muḥammad, numerous fortresses were acquired by the chiefs of the sect, mainly in the region called Kuhistān. The knowledge of the existence of this society, and that many persons in high posts at the Seljūḳ courts were its secret adherents, caused terrible anxiety and disquietude. 'Whoever wished to ruin his adversary accused him of belonging to the Ismā'īlian sect; delations multiplied; suspicion hovered over every one' (D'Ohsson, *Histoire des Mongols*, iii. 159). The Sulṭān Barqiyāruq, son of Malik Shāh, was himself accused of favouring the Assassins, and was compelled to raid their country, without, however, achieving any important results.

Not long after the acquisition of Alamūt by Ḥasan Ṣabāḥ, the Assassins became strong in Syria also. Whether these Syrian Ismā'īlians at the first recognized the authority of the 'Old Man of the Mountain' is not certain; a detailed account of their history is given by Quatremère, to which something is added by Defrémery in *JA*, 1854, 1855. Ten years after the seizure of Alamūt, we hear of the Ismā'īlians establishing themselves at Aleppo; and for a time they enjoyed the almost unconcealed favour of the Seljūḳ prince of that place, Riḍwān, who is thought to have employed their services in getting rid of his enemy Janāḥ ad-Daula, prince of Emesa (A.D. 1100). The names of their leaders at Aleppo are given as al-Ḥakim al-Munajjim and after him Abū Ṭāhir al-Ṣā'igh (Abū Ya'lā Ḥamzah, p. 149). Through the machinations of the latter, in 1106 they obtained possession of Apamea, whence, however, they were ere long driven by the Franks. Riḍwān's successor, Alp Arslān, the Dumb, urged on by the Persian Seljūḳs, organized a massacre of the Ismā'īlians in 1113; yet their numbers and power kept increasing, and in 1126, through the efforts of their agent Bihrām and his influence with Ẓahīr ad-Dīn Atābek, they got possession of Bānias, whence, however, they were driven in 1129 owing to a massacre of their adherents in Damascus. In 1140 they acquired a highly important stronghold, Masyāt or Masyāf, and in the second half of the 12th cent. they were in possession of ten or eleven fortresses. Lists of the persons of eminence whom they killed have been made out by many writers. These were sometimes persecutors of the sect, but not infrequently the head of the community took pay from some foreign prince to strike down an enemy. In 1148 one of their number killed the Frankish count of Tripoli, in consequence of which the Templars invaded their territory and compelled them to pay tribute. On 29th April, 1192, an emissary of the 'Old Man of the Mountain' killed Conrad of Montferrat, signor of Tyre and titular king of Jerusalem; different accounts make the 'Old Man of the Mountain'—or rather Rāshid ad-Dīn, at this time independent head of the Syrian Assassins, resident in the fortress of Kahf—despatch the Assassins at the instigation of Saladin, and at that of our Richard I. The Assassins in this case were disguised as monks. The ability with which the Ismā'īlian chiefs could execute assassinations caused them to receive commissions for such acts from both Eastern and Western princes, including the Byzantine emperors. And many a crime of the sort was ascribed to them of which they were innocent.

* One of them is called by Muḥammad b. Malik Shāh 'the book filled with lies' (Abū Ya'lā Ḥamzah, ed. Amedroz, p. 153).

The throne founded by Ḥasan Ṣabāḥ was occupied by seven successors—Buzurg Umid (518–532 A.H.), his son Muḥammad (532–557), his son Ḥasan (557–561), his son Muḥammad (561–607), his son Ḥasan (607–618), his son 'Alā ad-Dīn (618–653), his son Rukn ad-Dīn (653–654), when Alamūt was taken by the Mongol leader Hūlāgū, and the fortresses of the Assassins in Persia were stormed one after another. This last date corresponds with A.D. 1256. In Syria the power of the Ismā'īlians continued somewhat longer, and as late as 1265 presents are said to have been sent them by various European monarchs; but the ruler of Egypt, which, after the fall of Baghdad, became the headquarters of Islām, gradually obtained possession of their fortresses, all of which were occupied by the Egyptian Sulṭān Baibars in 1273. Baibars, however, continued to favour the sect, and to make use of members of it when he required assassins; and a curious treaty is mentioned between his general Qalā'ūn and Margaret of Tyre, in which the Egyptian undertakes that no servants of his with the exception of Assassins shall molest her. At times they were able to regain possession of their fortresses, and in 1326 held as many as five. Many of the later Mamlūk Sulṭāns countenanced them, and occasionally employed their services against enemies; thus the long war between the Mamlūk Qā'itbai and the Turkomans was due to the employment by the Sulṭān's predecessor of an Assassin to remove a Turkoman prince.

Of the successors of Ḥasan Ṣabāḥ the third signalized himself by rejecting the claims of the contemporary Egyptian Khalīf to the imāmate on the ground that it had descended of right to Nizār, eldest son of Mustanṣir; and that he, Ḥasan, though supposed to be the son of the governor of Alamūt, was in reality the heir of this Nizār. In virtue of his divine right he formally absolved his subjects from many of the ordinances of Islām, including the Fast (*Ṣaum*), and made some changes in public worship. He is also charged with having given permission for various forms of immorality. The fifth successor, on the other hand, endeavoured to restore Muslim orthodoxy among his followers, and burned the books of the founder of the dynasty. He entered into friendly relations with the Sulṭāns of Baghdad, and was treated by them with distinction.

Of the members of the sect in Syria by far the most interesting is Rāshid ad-Dīn Sinān, of whose career a detailed account is given by S. Guyard in *JA*, 1877. About 555 A.H. (A.D. 1160) this person was sent by the ruler of Alamūt to take the place of Abū Muḥammad, governor of the fortress Kahf. He adopted the tactics with which Ḥasan Ṣabāḥ had previously succeeded, made himself interesting, and won respect in the neighbourhood of Kahf by religious exercises and philanthropic actions, and by an affectation of humility and asceticism. This secured him the notice of Abū Muḥammad, who received him into the fortress and treated him with honour, learning only on his deathbed that he had been sent to supplant himself. Rāshid appears to have shaken off allegiance to Alamūt, claiming to be not only *imām*, but an impersonation of the deity—a claim which won large acceptance among the Ismā'īlians, though his lameness constituted a difficulty to some minds. In the fragments relating to the doctrine of the sect published by Guyard in *Notices et Extraits*, vol. xxii., some treatises ascribed to him are to be found; in these the title *nāṭiq* (which is also given to Moses) is claimed for him. In anecdotes told about him (collected by one Abū Firās, *JA*, 1877), he figures as a magician, or rather conjuror. He claimed to be able to answer letters that he had not read, and, anticipating modern conjuring tricks, held conversation with a trunkless head.

At the beginning of the 19th cent., Ismā'īlian communities still existed both in Persia and Syria; J. B. Fraser (*Journey into Khorasan*, 1825), describes his meeting with Khalīl Allāh, the then head of the Ḥasanites (as he calls the sect) at Yezd. This chief was treated by the community with almost divine honours, and many of his adherents were visitors from India. The same personage is mentioned by J. B. Rousseau ('Mémoire sur les Ismaelis et les Nosairis,' *Annales des Voyages*, xlii., 1818), who, however, places the residence of the chief at Kehk in the district of Qum, S.S.W. of Teheran. Rousseau also gives details concerning a Syrian community of Ismā'īlians, with headquarters at Masyāf, twelve leagues west of Ḥamāth. They were distributed over eighteen villages, and their *shaikh*, or governor, was appointed by the governor of Ḥamāth. They were subdivided into two sects, Ḥadrāwīs and Suwaidānīs, of whom the former held seventeen villages and the latter one only; and they still possessed one of their ancient fortresses called Qadamūs. In 1809 they had sustained a treacherous attack by their neighbours the Nosairites, which, though afterwards avenged, left the community in a wretched condition.

Recent explorers of Persia and Syria seem either to ignore the existence of Ismā'īlian communities, or to speak of them as extinct (but see art. QARMATIANS). On the other hand, the Assassins are still represented in India by a community called Khōjās, who trace their origin to the mission of an Assassin named Ṣadr ad-Dīn, who some centuries ago made converts among the Hindu trading classes in Upper Sind. Col. Yule in his edition of *Marco Polo* (3rd ed., i. 146) states that the sect multiplied considerably in Sind, Kachch, and Gujarāt, whence they spread to Bombay and Zanzibar. Their numbers in Western India were then probably not less than 50,000–60,000. Sir W. Hunter (*Gazetteer of India*, 1885, iii. 52) adds that they are especially numerous in the Peninsula of Kāthiāwār. They have also established trading colonies along the East coast of Africa. The leader of the main body of the Khōjā community was then the Persian prince Aghā 'Alī Shāh, whose predecessor, the well-known Aghā Khān, was long a resident of Bombay after the troubles that drove him from Persia. About this person some further details are given by Yule in the passage quoted. Having raised a revolt in Kirmān, he fled from Persia to Sind in 1840. He had been installed as *imām* on the death of Khalīl Allāh (mentioned by Rousseau and Fraser) in a brawl at Yezd in 1818. In 1866 a schism in the Khōjā community, in which an attempt was made to exclude Aghā Khān from all rights over the sectarians and to transfer the property of the community to orthodox Muslims, led to a trial in the high court, which ended in favour of Aghā Khān. Further lawsuits have led to the appointment of a commission to inquire into the sect. According to Balfour (*Cyclopædia of India*, 1885), their sacred book is in ten chapters, of which the first nine treat of the incarnations of Viṣṇu, 'Alī being the subject of the tenth. This would imply that the conflation of Indian and Arabian ideas which characterized the sect from the first continues in its latest development.

LITERATURE.—Denis Lebey de Batilly, *Traité de l'origine des anciens Assassins porte-couteaux*, 1603; Falconet, 'Dissertations sur les Assassins, peuple d'Asie' (*MAIBL* xvii., 1751); de Sacy, 'Sur l'origine du nom des Assassins' (*Mém. de l'Institut*, iv., 1809); Quatremère, 'Mémoire sur les Assassins' (*Mines de l'Orient*, iv., 1814); Defrémery, 'Recherches sur les Assassins' (*JA*, 1854, 1855); S. Guyard, 'Un grand Maître des Assassins' (*ib.* 1877); E. G. Browne, *Literary History of Persia*, ii. (1906).

D. S. MARGOLIOUTH

ASSIMILATION (Psychological).—The term 'assimilation' in psychology represents a form of union or combination between presentations or presentational elements, but its precise application has been variously interpreted.

(1) In its general use it refers to a phase of the apperceptive process: a presentation is 'assimilated' when it is taken up into, and becomes an effective moment in, the total consciousness present at the time of its arrival. No new presentation is available either for memory or for knowledge or for practical application, until and unless it has been thus brought into connexion with other elements of consciousness, and with the general forms and tendencies of conscious movement which constitute for psychology the 'self.'

(2) Historically, the first usage of the term was the converse of the above: many of the Scholastics spoke of knowledge as taking place by the assimilation of the knower to the thing known, after the Greek principle (ἡ γνῶσις τοῦ ὁμοίου τῷ ὁμοίῳ): so Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Suarez, and others. A wide-reaching corollary of this principle was that (*a*) ideas are 'copies' or images of reality, and (*b*) memory-images are 'copies' or shadowy forms of sensations; to this reference is made below.

(3) In modern psychology, 'assimilation' is applied to a form of association (*q.v.*), namely, simultaneous partial association, the features of which are (*a*) that it takes place between elements or parts of presentations, not between individual or independent presentations, as in ordinary association by contiguity; (*b*) that the two (or more) elements which enter into the association are simultaneously given in consciousness, although one is usually a 'sensation' (*i.e.* peripherally excited), the other necessarily a 'representation' (*i.e.* centrally excited); (*c*) that they cannot be separated or distinguished by *direct* analysis, thus corresponding to the 'inseparable association' of English psychology. Instances are the union of colour and form in visual perceptions, of tone-quality and distance in the perceptions of sound, of tactual quality and 'hardness' or 'softness,' 'smoothness' or 'roughness,' in the perceptions of touch.

(4) More definitely, 'assimilation' is applied to the synthesis of similar elements or elements of similar quality, and is contrasted with 'complication,' a synthesis of presentations of diverse quality, etc. It may be either *intensive*, as in the musical *clang*, or the chord, where tones of different pitch combine to give a resultant which is more than their mere sum (it is a unity in which their individuality is absorbed); or *extensive*, as when a number of discrete touch-impressions or visual impressions combine to give a continuous presentation of surface or depth. This form of assimilation is sometimes made to replace the older conception of association by similarity, as when a perception (*e.g.* that of an orange) 'reproduces' an idea (*e.g.* that of the moon), which has some element in common with the perception in question. It has been argued (*a*) that this process is possible only by the assimilation of the given element to the former experiences of itself, which must therefore be somehow 'revived'; and (*b*) that the process is not one of association, since the new and the old experience have never formed parts of one and the same consciousness, as the doctrine of association requires; (*c*) that, so far from being an association of elements which through frequent repetition have become 'inseparable,' assimilation is a process prior to and presupposed in every association.

(5) On this view, of which Höffding and Ward are the chief exponents, an assimilative process is of the essence of perception. In its simplest form, perception is *recognition* (or direct cognition), *i.e.* the awareness of an impression, or group of impressions, as familiar, as already experienced, without any explicit idea or image of the previous presentation arising in the mind. The impression is not merely repeated, but has an added quality or colouring, by which it is distinguishable from a wholly new impression. This added character or mark Höffding calls the *Bekanntheitsqualität*, 'the quality of known-ness.' It has been explained by Külpe through (*a*) the facility and power with which the known excites other ideas, and (*b*) the peculiar mood or feeling which the known arouses, as contrasted with the unknown or unfamiliar. Both of these features, however, are common to other forms of repeated consciousness; they illustrate the *law of practice*, according to which all function, and especially nervous function, 'is made easier by repetition and practice.' A more important feature in Höffding's theory is that recognition or perception involves an assimilation between two elements, namely, the new or incoming impression (A), and the reproduction or revival of the earlier impressions (a_1, a_2, etc.), the whole being symbolized by $\binom{a}{A}$; *a* is not, however, an explicit or free idea, but an '*implicate* (*gebundene*) *representation*'—a tied idea. But according to Ward there is no revival of earlier impressions: 'We have to do not with the retentiveness of a waxen tablet but with the plasticity of a growing structure. The inchoate beginning, so far from being reproduced, is obliterated and superseded by the supervening detail; and even when the acquisition is complete, the perfect identity of the new with the old forbids us to talk of memory of ideas.'*

Thus (i.) assimilation is the process underlying all *acquired* perception, as distinct from mere sensory impressions on the one hand, and the organized sensations, or perceptions, which seem to form the stimulus of instinctive behaviour on the other. (ii.) It is a product of mental activity (through interest, attention, action by way of trial and error, etc.) in which past experience is correlated with the present situation. But (iii.) this influence is not mediated by distinct images or free ideas, which are a later product. (iv.) It marks a distinct step in mental growth, and is correlated with a special development of the central nervous system (the cerebral hemispheres). (v.) Individual development, phylogeny (the evolution of the nervous system in animals, and *pari passu* of the forms of animal behaviour) and mental pathology (cortical or sensory, psychic or 'soul,' and verbal blindness, etc.), support the view that sensation, perception and assimilation, free ideas, and association are both distinct in their psychical nature and origin, and have as their 'basis' distinct physical functions and structures.

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J. LEWIS M'INTYRE.

ASSIMILATION (Religious).—All development, that is growth, must proceed by means of assimilation. That is to say, religion, if it is to grow, must assimilate 'whatever is good and true in general culture' (Tiele, *Elements*, i. 242), or, if that is too wide a statement, then we may say it

* *Mind*, N.S. iii. 532.

must appropriate whatever conduces to its growth—'all that makes its creed clearer and deeper' (*ib.* 230); it must assimilate what it appropriates, and not merely 'imitate or adopt it' (*ib.* 237). What is thus appropriated will in the process be transformed to some extent, for it is 'assimilated' to religion or to the form of religion into which it is taken up. On the other hand, the form of religion which thus takes up from the environment something good and true, and assimilates it, will be affected by what it takes up; it will be brought into accord with the civilization from which it has appropriated the good or true idea; it will be different from what it was before; it will have developed or grown. But, in thus growing by means of assimilation, it must remain true to its type, it 'must form, maintain, and vindicate its *own* character' (*ib.* 242). It will also maintain and vindicate its own character by shedding dead leaves, throwing off waste tissue. And the matter thus thrown off is not matter which ought never to have been taken up, but matter which—useless and even dangerous as it now is, cumbering the ground on which it is found—was once, when first taken up, essential to the vitality and growth of religion. In now rejecting conceptions or formulæ which are dead, and being dead are injurious to continued growth and life, we are neither denying that they once were essential nor condemning the past generation with whom they originated. We are simply claiming the same right to grow which they enjoyed and exercised, the same right to grow in the same way as they—by shedding dead leaves and putting forth fresh ones.

Thus far we have illustrated the meaning of 'assimilation' by reference to ideas which religion appropriates from its cultural environment; and such ideas, though they may, at the time when they were taken up, have represented the highest scientific or philosophic knowledge of the day, may with the advance of knowledge cease to occupy that position; they may become dead leaves on the tree of knowledge, and if so, then religion, too, must shed them—or share decay with them. But a religion in the course of its history may—and if it is to grow, must—come into conflict with other religions and convert men from their old form of religion to the new. In such a case the converts cannot and do not empty their minds utterly of their old religious ideas. Some form of transaction or accommodation between the old and the new is inevitable; and no religion ever escapes from this consequence of contact. Some of the old ideas are taken up by the invading religion; but they are not simply adopted as they stand; they are assimilated. And, naturally and necessarily, they are assimilated to those elements in the new religion to which they are most akin; and they strengthen those elements. Thus, if the new religion recognizes the existence of evil spirits, whether as the cause of disease or of other ills, the gods of the old religion may appear as demons in the new. Or, if the new religion recognizes saints and angels, some of the old gods may persist by a corresponding metamorphosis. And in either case the metamorphosis immensely strengthens the element which it has reinforced. But though it strengthens the particular belief by this process of assimilation, it does not necessarily thereby make the religion which has absorbed it better as religion. On the contrary, the very belief which it strengthens may be one which religion, to live, must ultimately cast aside. 'Assimilation' is not necessarily and always beneficial to the organism. The healthiest organism may assimilate what is injurious to it.

On the other hand, what is assimilated from the old religion may be advantageous, in a greater or less degree, to the new. The habit of worshipping on stated occasions may exist in the old religion and be made usefully subservient to the purposes of the new. Yule and Easter testify by their names to the fact that they existed before Christianity, though they have been assimilated, and in the process of assimilation have been transformed, by the Church. What was thus taken up into Christianity and baptized into the name of Christ was not merely this or that outward form of worship: we have to recognize 'the selective assimilation and consequent consecration of many current customs and institutions and ideas' (Illingworth, *Doctrine of the Trinity*, p. 94). As an example of such ideas we may take the Logos doctrine. That idea was taken up—whether from Philo or from 'the general intellectual atmosphere of which he was a representative product' (*ib.* p. 88)—and baptized into Christianity by St. John. But it was not adopted just as it stood; 'the new faith fashioned a new thing' out of it (*ib.* p. 89), the new 'term was, so to speak, taken out of its old associations, to be employed thenceforward as a Christian symbol' (*ib.* p. 90).

At this point a divergence of opinion manifests itself as to what 'assimilation' means and implies. It may be maintained that assimilation never implies an addition to the original creed of Christianity—'never the imposition of a new article of faith' (Illingworth, p. 98), but simply the 'progressive formulation of doctrine' (*ib.*); the process is 'one of interpretation, and not of innovation'; it is 'the fuller explanation' of the meaning of the original teaching, 'an explanation of what was implicit, but never an addition to what was implicit in the teaching of Christ Himself' (*ib.* p. 101). This view may seem to imply that the formulation of doctrine is of necessity progressive; that the process is always one of interpretation, never of misinterpretation; that the result is always to bring out what was implicit in the teaching; and that those who hold this view have the means of knowing, and the power of declaring, infallibly, what was and what was not implicit in the teaching of Christ Himself. In the absence of such power, our confidence that the process in any given case is one of interpretation and not of innovation must vary with the particular circumstances of the case. Let us illustrate this by reference to the Logos doctrine. Every one will admit that out of the Philonian doctrine the new faith fashioned a new thing, viz. the Johannine doctrine. Was the new thing an innovation or was it not? It is evident that there was that in the new faith which was capable of being interpreted or explained by the terms and the conceptions of the Logos doctrine. But will it be maintained that, if the Philonian doctrine had been non-existent, the Logos doctrine would nevertheless have appeared, all the same, exactly as it actually does, in the Gospel according to St. John? No one can maintain that. Had the Johannine doctrine been non-existent, no one would or could maintain that it was implicit in the teaching of Christ Himself. And had the Philonian doctrine been unknown to St. John, the Logos doctrine would not have existed in the Fourth Gospel. But the Philonian doctrine did exist; it contained some truth; and that truth was recognized, appropriated, transformed—in a word, assimilated—by Christianity. To say, however, that Christian doctrine was not affected by what it assimilated, that it remained what it was, and that it is now exactly what it would have been had it never assimilated anything whatever from the spiritual and intellectual environment in which it developed, is a position which no one will undertake to maintain. Christian doctrine took over what was good and

true in the Philonian teaching; and it has grown consequently in a way in which it would not have grown otherwise. The Christian creed has grown clearer and deeper, because it had the power of appropriating and assimilating from its environment what there was good and true in that environment (*ib.* p. 144). But the power of assimilation, where it exists, is not always exercised; and, where exercised, is not always exercised wisely. We are not able to say either that Christianity left nothing good unassimilated or that everything it did assimilate was good. Neither, therefore, can we say that everything it did assimilate was implicit in the teaching of Christ Himself. We may believe—as members of the Church of Christ we must believe—that the growth and development of Christian doctrine, so far as it is the unfolding of what was implicit in Christ's teaching, is the work of the Holy Spirit, or of the Church following the guidance of the Holy Spirit. But it is simply not true that the Church has always, invariably, and in every respect, followed that guidance: 'our confidence that any given action is the result of that guidance . . . must vary with the particular circumstances of the case' (*ib.* p. 100). The fact that any given action is the action of the Church is a presumption, but no proof, that it was done under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. So far as the Church submitted to that guidance, 'it appropriated what was best and truest in the surrounding life and thought to its own purposes' (*ib.* p. 124). And that statement is as true of the present day as it is of the earliest days. But evil as well as good may be assimilated; has been, as a matter of history, assimilated; and, as a matter of fact, is being assimilated. The mere fact that a custom, institution, or idea has been assimilated constitutes no proof that it was implicit in Christ's teaching. The fact of assimilation is one to be 'constated' by scientific investigation. The value of the assimilation and of its consequences is a different question, and one which should be kept distinct.

If Christianity should come to be the dominant religion in Japan, it will inevitably, in becoming so, assimilate much from Buddhism; and it may be that the resulting form of Christianity will in some respects be higher than any hitherto taken by Christianity. That is a possibility which no one who believes in the infinite potentiality of Christianity will for one moment care to deny. But the higher form, in such case, will be a higher form of Christianity. The process will be one of assimilation; the result may be to reveal to the world that it is possible for men to make greater self-sacrifice, and to lead a more Christ-like life, than has hitherto been the case with any Christian people.

LITERATURE.—C. P. Tiele, *Elements of the Science of Religion*, Eng. tr., Lond. 1897; J. R. Illingworth, *Doctrine of the Trinity*, Lond. 1907; P. Gardner, *Growth of Christianity*, Lond. 1907; P. Wendland, *Die Hellenistisch-Römische Kultur*, Tübingen, 1907.

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ASSOCIATION.—Association, or, the more frequently used phrase, Association of Ideas, denotes a doctrine of both philosophical and psychological import. In philosophy it is the explanatory principle of that theory of knowledge which would derive all knowledge from items of sensation. Psychologically considered, association is primarily the doctrine which deals with the reproduction of past experience by a present object of consciousness. The so-called 'Laws of Association' express the conditions under which reproduction takes place. Three such laws have been formulated and are still discussed in current English text-books of Psychology. (*a*) *Law of Contiguity*: a present object will recall to mind any object with which it was contiguous in space or time, *e.g.* the sight of a visitor from one's native place revives memories of that place. (*b*) *Law of Similarity*: a present object will recall one similar to itself, *e.g.* the sight of one person revives the memory of another whom he in some respect resembles. (*c*) *Law of Contrast*: a present object recalls an object contrasting with itself, *e.g.* a childless hearth revives the memory of a neighbour's merry crew of boys and girls. It is this particular psychological doctrine which is the foundation both of association as a philosophical principle and of association as a comprehensive psychological theory.

It has been claimed by Sir W. Hamilton * that Aristotle was the first to formulate the Laws of Association. The passage upon which the claim is based is from *de Memoria et Reminiscentia*, a translation of the latter part of which Hamilton gives in full, together with his own emendations in, and commentary on, the text, in the note in question. After dealing with memory (*μνήμη*), or what modern Psychology would term retention, Aristotle contrasts with it recollection (*ἀνάμνησις*).

'The occurrence of an act of recollection is due to the natural tendency of one particular change to follow another. If the sequence is necessary, it is clear that, on the former change occurring, the second will be summoned into activity; when, however, the connexion is not necessary, but due to custom, the occurrence of the second process will take place only in most cases. It so happens that some people receive a greater bent from a single experience than others in whom the sequence has frequently taken place, and hence, in some instances, after seeing the things once we remember them better than others who have seen them frequently. Thus, when we recollect, one of our previous psychic changes is stimulated which leads to the stimulation of that one after which the experience to be recollected is wont to occur. Consequently we hunt for the next in the series, starting our train of thought from what is now present, or from something else, and from something similar or contrary or contiguous to it.' †

Plato had already noticed the same striking cases of relationship between recollected idea and present object of consciousness (*Phædo*, 73 D). At the sight of his lyre the lover will recollect the beloved. The picture of Simmias is apt to remind one of Simmias. 'Recollection may be derived from things either like or unlike.' ‡ There had, however, been no formulation of the principles involved or any attempt at a scientific theory of recollection as such. All knowledge was recollection.

The fact of association was recognized in the teaching of the Stoics and Epicureans, but no new contribution was made towards the theory either by them or later by the Schoolmen.

The first important formulation of a theory is that of Thomas Hobbes. In *Human Nature* (1650), Hobbes distinguishes between the casual and incoherent flow of ideas in dreams and the orderly flow—

'when the former thought introduceth the later. . . . The cause of the coherence or consequence of one conception to another is their first coherence or consequence at that time when they were produced by sense: as, for example, from St. Andrew the mind runneth to St. Peter, because their names are read together; from St. Peter to a stone, for the same cause, from stone to foundation, because we see them together; and for the same cause, from foundation to church, and from church to people, and from people to tumult: and, according to this example, the mind may run almost from anything to anything.' §

In addition to this form of the flow of ideas, which would be order in accordance with the Law of Contiguity, Hobbes notices another and different form which one might in general term 'appetitive,' on account of the cause assigned for it.

'The cause whereof is the appetite of them, who, having a conception of the end, have next unto it a conception of the next means to that end.' ‖

* *Works of Reid*, ed. Hamilton, note D**.

† *De Sensu* and *de Memoria*, ed. by R. T. Ross, Camb. Univ Press. This translation, from the point of view of scholarship seems preferable to that given by Sir W. Hamilton.

‡ Jowett's tr. of *Phædo*, 74 A.

§ *Human Nature*, ch. iv. §§ 1 and 2. ‖ *Ib.* ch. iv. § 2.

'To omit that kind of discursion by which we proceed from anything to anything, there are often other diverse sorts: as first in the senses there are certain coherences of conceptions which we may call ranging; examples whereof are: a man casteth his eye upon the ground, to look about for some small thing lost; the hounds casting about at a fault in hunting; and the ranging of spaniels: and herein we take a beginning arbitrary.

'Another sort of discursion is when the appetite giveth a man his beginning, . . . where honour to which a man hath appetite maketh him think upon the next means of obtaining it, and that again of the next, etc. And this the Latins call *sagacitas*, and we may call hunting or tracing. There is yet another kind of discursion beginning with the appetite to recovery of something lost, and proceeding from the present backward, from the thought of the place where we miss at, to the thought of the place whence we came last; and from the thought of that, to the thought of the place before, till we have in our mind some place wherein we had the thing we miss: and this is called Reminiscence.'*

The recognition of these appetitive associations might have led to new theories as to the origin of the association link, but Hobbes did not pursue the theme any further, and his successors do not appear to have noticed the group of associations which he here singles out.

For Hobbes the psychological doctrine of remembrance becomes also a philosophical one, the principle of his theory of knowledge, as it was thereafter the principle for the empirical school.

'All experience being . . . but remembrance, all knowledge is remembrance,'† for it is either sense knowledge and the remembrance of this, or is knowledge of the truth of propositions and how things are called, which latter again arises from experience—

'which is nothing else but the remembrance of what antecedents have been followed by what consequents.'‡ 'When a man hath so often observed like antecedents to be followed by like consequents that, whensoever he seeth the antecedent, he looketh again for the consequent, or when he seeth the consequent, maketh account that there hath been the like antecedent; then he calleth both the antecedent and the consequent signs one of another, as clouds are signs of rain to come, and rain, of clouds past. This taking of signs by experience is that wherein men do ordinarily think.'§

It is the power of arbitrarily devising signs and so increasing associations that differentiates man, the rational being, from the brute beasts. Without such signs the coherent flow of ideas would be at the mercy of chance—

'for one conception followeth not another according to our election and the need we have of them, but as it chanceth us to hear or see such things as shall bring them to our mind. The experience we have hereof is in such brute beasts, which, having the providence to hide the remains and superfluity of their meat, do nevertheless want the remembrance of the place where they hide it, and thereby make no benefit thereof in their hunger: but man, who in this point beginneth to rank himself somewhat above the nature of beasts, hath observed and remembered the cause of this defect, and to amend the same, hath imagined or devised to set up a visible or other sensible mark, the which when he seeth it again, may bring to his mind the thought he had when he set it up. . . . In the number of these marks, are those human voices which we call names or appellations of things sensible by the ear, by which we recall into our mind some conceptions of the things to which we gave those names or appellations.'‖

To John Locke belongs the authorship of the phrase 'Association of Ideas'; yet Locke does not even mention association in his psychological account of memory.¶ The phrase for him denotes the connexion of ideas 'that in themselves are not at all akin,' as opposed to those which 'have a natural correspondence and connexion one with another.' 'This strong combination of ideas, not allied by nature, the mind makes in itself either voluntarily or by chance, and hence it comes in different men to be very different according to their different inclinations, education, interests,' etc.** Association of Ideas is for Locke the explanation of error, prejudice, and intellectual habits, but it is not given any philosophical or general psychological significance.

* *Human Nature*, ch. iv. §§ 3, 4, 5; cf. *Leviathan*, pt. i. ch. iii.
† *Ib.* ch. vi. § 1.
‡ *Ib.* ch. iv. § 6.
§ *Ib.* ch. iv. §§ 9 and 10.
‖ *Ib.* ch. v. §§ 1 and 2.
¶ *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, bk. ii. ch. x.
** *Ib.* bk. ii. ch. 33.

In Hume's philosophy, on the other hand, Association of Ideas plays an all-important part. In the *Treatise on Human Nature* (1739–40), he brings forward association as the principle of connexion, *not* for ideas of memory, wherein the connexion is 'inseparable' and is 'the original form in which its objects were presented,' but for ideas of imagination. We are to regard it as 'a gentle force which commonly prevails.' 'The qualities from which it arises, and by which the mind is after this manner convey'd from one idea to another, are three, viz. Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause and Effect.'*

From the *Inquiry concerning Human Understanding*, we learn that Hume regarded himself as being the first to enumerate or class the principles of association. In this later treatise he recognizes them as principles of connexion for memory and imagination alike.

After Locke, Hume analyzes knowledge into simple and complex ideas; but with Hume association becomes what it never was with Locke, the mechanism by which complex ideas—relations, modes, and substances—arise from simple ones. Cause and effect is classed as if it were a special form of association, yet, when analyzed, it is shown to be merely a case of contiguous association. The 'necessity' which characterizes this relationship is due to the inferential attitude of mind, which again is but the effect of custom. 'After the constant conjunction of two objects, heat and flame, for instance, . . . we are determined by custom alone to expect the one from the appearance of the other.'†

Although in his theory of knowledge Hume shows an advance upon Hobbes, both in the application of the principle of association to explain our conceptions and in his systematization of the whole doctrine, yet his psychology of association is inferior to that of the earlier writer. Beyond the classification of the principles there is little attempt at a theory of association. 'Its effects are everywhere conspicuous; but as to its causes, they are mostly unknown, and must be resolved into original qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to explain.'‡ Custom is the cause of the necessary associations of contiguity, and with 'this propensity' we must rest content 'as the ultimate principle, which we can assign, of all our conclusions from experience.'§

It is in Hartley's *Observations on Man* (1749) that we first meet with association as a comprehensive psychological theory. Here for the first time there is a methodical array of the phenomena of mental life and a thoroughgoing attempt to show how the more complex mental phenomena are derived from the simpler by means of association, memory being but one particular case of this.

Here the passions and the phenomena of conduct are shown as products built up by the association of ideas (traces of sensation) with the simple sensations of pleasure and pain, and with automatic movements; just as similarly imagination and reasoning are but cases of the association of ideas with one another, and with words.

Hartley's psychological theory is closely bound up with his physiological one as to the nature of the processes which take place in the nervous system. The main outline of the general theory is best given by his own propositions, and from the psychological point of view some of these are important enough to warrant quotation *in extenso*.

'The white medullary substance of the brain is also the immediate instrument by which Ideas are presented to the mind; or, in other words, whatever changes are made in this sub-

* *Treatise on Human Nature*, pt. i. § iv., ed. Green
† *Concerning Human Understanding*, pt. i. § v.
‡ *Treatise on Human Nature*, pt. i. § iv.
§ *Concerning Human Understanding*, pt. i. § v

stance, corresponding changes are made in our ideas; and *vice versa*.

'External objects occasion, first in the nerves on which they are impressed, and then in the brain, vibrations of the small, and, as one may say, infinitesimal medullary particles.

'Sensations, by being often repeated, leave certain vestiges, types, or images of themselves, which may be called simple ideas of sensation.

'Sensory vibrations, by being often repeated, beget, in the medullary substance of the brain, a disposition to diminutive vibrations, which may also be called vibratiuncles and miniatures, corresponding to themselves respectively.

'Any sensations, A, B, C, etc., by being associated with one another a sufficient number of times, get such a power over the corresponding ideas, *a*, *b*, *c*, etc., that any one of the sensations, A, when impressed alone, shall be able to excite in the mind *b*, *c*, etc., the ideas of the rest.

'Any vibrations, A, B, C, etc., by being associated together a sufficient number of times, get such a power over *a*, *b*, *c*, etc., the corresponding miniature vibrations, that any of the vibrations, A, when impressed alone, shall be able to excite *b*, *c*, etc., the miniatures of the rest.

'Simple ideas will run into complex ones, by means of association.'*

Sensations are associated when their impressions are made at the same instant or in successive instants. Strength and frequency of impression are the determining conditions for the association. The whole theory is full of suggestions for the later psychology wherein association becomes the great explanatory principle. Even Herbart's mathematical treatment of the relations between ideas seems foreshadowed.

'The power of miniature vibrations to raise other miniatures may, perhaps, be made clearer to mathematicians, by hinting that the efficacy of any vibration to raise any other is not in the simple ratio of its vividness, but as some power less than unity; for thus *b* may raise *c*, a weaker vibration than *b*, *c* may raise *d*, etc., with more facility than if the efficacy was in the simple ratio of the vividness, and yet so that the series shall break off at last.'†

It was because of the physiological doctrines upon which the psychological theories were made to depend that Hartley's work did not meet with the attention it merited at the hands of his immediate successors. In France, Locke had had many disciples; the analysis of all the complex ideas of knowledge into simple ideas derived from sensation had been pushed to extremes far removed from Locke's 'plain, historical method.' One might therefore expect to find in France a parallel for, if not an acceptance of, Hartley's psychological analysis of the phenomena of consciousness. But there is nothing which at all compares with it. We do find in Condillac an effort to derive all the so-called faculties of the mind from sensation. This faculty is said to comprehend all the others; analysis of it will reveal attention, imagination, judgment, etc. But an instance of such analysis will show how far removed such an effort after derivation was from the scientific method pursued by Hartley.

'To decompose the faculty of feeling, we need only observe in succession all the circumstances that happen in it, when we acquire any knowledge whatever. . . . My looking at an object is an action by which my eye tends towards the object to which it is directed: for this reason, I give it the name of attention. . . . The attention we pay to an object is therefore, as to the mind, nothing but the sensation which that object causes in us. . . . As we bestow our attention on one object, so we may on two at once, then instead of one exclusive sensation we experience two. . . . Comparison is therefore nothing else but a double attention—it consists in two sensations. . . . It is impossible for us to compare two objects and to experience side by side, as it were, the two sensations which they produce in us exclusively, without presently perceiving that they resemble each other or differ from each other. Now to perceive resemblances or differences is to judge. Judgment, therefore, is nothing still but sensation.'‡

In a similar manner Condillac proceeds to derive 'desire,' 'will,' and 'the passions' from our sensations 'if we consider them as agreeable or disagreeable.'

In Scotland, Thomas Brown, although expressly disapproving of Hartley's theory of association with its physiological basis, gave an exposition of mental phenomena in which association, or, as Brown prefers to style it, suggestion, was used as the explanatory basis. In place of the varieties of powers or mental faculties given by Reid and others, Brown grouped all intellectual phenomena (other than those of sensation) under two generic capacities—simple and relative suggestion.

'Simple suggestion is the capacity by which conception after conception arises in the mind—precisely in the same manner, and in the same state, as each might have formed part of other trains, and in which the particular state of mind that arises by suggestion does not necessarily involve any consideration of the state of mind which preceded it.'*

The primary laws of simple suggestion are resemblance and contrast, while contiguity is treated as a secondary law. To simple suggestion belong conception, memory, imagination, habit.

Relative suggestion is 'the capacity for feeling resemblance, difference, proportion or relation in general, where two or more external objects or two or more feelings of the mind itself are conceived by us.'† To this capacity belong the so-called faculties of judgment, reasoning, and abstraction.

The true psychological descendant of Hartley is James Mill, in whose *Analysis of the Human Mind* (1829) we have association, freed from the effete mythology of vibratiuncles, used as the great explanatory principle of psychology. The phenomena of the human mind are analyzed into two classes—intellectual and active—and the psychology of these is a doctrine of elements and compounds. Sensations, including pleasurable and painful feelings, are the elements, the whole of the remaining furniture of mind being set forth as products, compounded out of these elements in accordance with the Laws of Association. Ideas are traces of sensation, and 'spring up or exist in the order in which the sensations existed of which they are copies.'‡ This order is synchronous and successive order in time, and synchronous order in space. Contiguity is thus the fundamental Law of Association, resemblance and contrast being treated as special cases. 'Not only do simple ideas, by strong association, run together, and form complex ideas, but a complex idea, when the ideas which compose it have become consolidated so that it always appears as one, is capable of entering into combinations with other ideas, both simple and complex.'§

Conception, imagination, classification, abstraction, memory, belief, inference, are shown by analysis to involve nothing but our sensations and their ideas compounded by association. Similarly for the phenomena of conduct. Will is analyzed as a chain of associations. In all cases where a certain action is desired, it is associated as cause with pleasure as effect; the idea of the 'outward' appearance of the action excites by association the idea of the inward feelings which are the immediate antecedents of the action, and then the action takes place. There is no place here for a doctrine of Free Will. 'Whatever power we may possess over the action of our muscles, must be derived from our power over our associations; and this power over our associations, when fully analyzed, means nothing more than the power of certain interesting ideas, originating in interesting sensations, and formed into strength by association.'‖ This strength, we are told, depends upon the vividness of the associated sensations and the frequency with which the association occurs.

As compounds formed in conformity with an exact law, mental phenomena admit of scientific treatment. Psychology need no longer stand without the pale of science; its method resembles that of the mechanical and physical sciences. The

* *Observations on Man*, Props. 2, 4, 8–12.
† *Ib.* on Prop. xi. p. 89.
‡ Condillac, *Logique* (1805), tr. by Neef (1809), ch. vii.
* *Lectures on Philosophy of Human Mind*, Lect. 33.
† *Ib.*
‡ *Analysis of Human Mind*, vol. i. ch. iii.
§ *Ib.* vol. i. ch. iii. ‖ *Ib.* vol. ii. ch. xxiv.

service which the principle of association thus rendered to psychology was clearly recognized later by John Stuart Mill.

'A science of human nature may be said to exist in proportion as the approximate truths which compose a practical knowledge of mankind can be exhibited as corollaries from the universal laws of human nature on which they rest.' *

Given the fundamental laws of mind, the Law of Retentiveness, and the Laws of Association—

'it is a fair subject of scientific inquiry how far these laws can be made to go in explaining the actual phenomena. It is obvious that complex laws of thought and feeling not only may but must be generated from these simple laws.' †

J. S. Mill emphasizes the distinction between complex ideas which can be treated as resultant sums of the simple ideas which form them, *i.e.* are what he would term 'homogeneous effects,' and complex ideas which are 'generated by' but do not 'consist of' the simple ideas, *i.e.* are heteropathic effects. In so far as we have the former, the complex phenomena are mechanical products, but in so far as we have the latter, they are products of a mental chemistry. Our inability to find the elements in the generated compound is no disproof that a complex idea is due to an association of simple elements. Such is the case with the associations treated by Hartley and James Mill as inseparable.

But although inability to resolve the product into the elements is no obstacle to its having been generated from such elements, Mill saw clearly the weakness of attempting to prove that a particular complex idea had been generated from such and such simple ideas merely on the ground that these ideas were always present whenever mind was in possession of the complex idea. It is necessary to show, further, that if the complex idea be lacking, it will arise when the simple ideas in question are associated. And it is in the direction of a closer investigation of the mental phenomena themselves, both simple and complex, that Mill would advance psychology. He hoped that the rapid progress being made in physiology would throw light on the influence of organic on mental phenomena. By advocating a more scientific study of the phenomena of consciousness as distinguished from scientific treatment of data obtained uncritically, Mill in reality was giving an impetus to a new psychology wherein association became untenable as a comprehensive explanatory principle.

In his theory of knowledge, Mill is a thoroughgoing empiricist. All knowledge, other than that given by the senses, is inductive inference, 'generalization from experience.' *A priori* or necessary truths there are none. The truths so called are inductions. The forcibility which characterizes mathematical axioms is due to the familiarity of the ideas involved. The very criterion emphasized by the champions of *a priori* truths—inconceivability of the opposite—does but testify to the law of inseparable association between ideas. 'If one exists, the other exists along with it, in spite of whatever effort we make to disjoin them' (J. S. Mill's ed. of *Analysis of Human Mind*, vol. i. ch. iii.).

Mill, however, never treats even inseparable association as a *ground* for the logical connexion of ideas. 'Assuredly an association, however close, between two ideas is not a sufficient ground of belief; it is not *evidence* that the corresponding facts are united in external nature.' ‡ Thus the relationship of cause and effect as a mere instinctive association could lay no claim to objective truth; it must be shown to be an inference, a generalization from experience.

Herein lies the difference between Mill's theory of knowledge and that of his predecessor Hume. The psychological statement of genesis, even if accurate, is no longer accepted as a logical criterion of the validity of relationships. Consequently Mill attempts to find an independent justification for our belief in the uniformity of nature, belief in the relationship of cause and effect in particular; and in this attempt his theory of knowledge breaks down. Psychologically he regards belief as being primordial. It makes the difference between memory and expectation on the one hand and imagination on the other. 'What, in short, is the difference to our minds between thinking of a reality and representing to ourselves an imaginary picture? I confess I can perceive no escape from the opinion that the distinction is ultimate and primordial.' * It is present when certain associations of ideas are entertained, absent in the case of others. It is present in every inductive inference, and its logical justification is 'experience'; the inferred connexion of ideas conforms to fact. Yet even in the simplest inference, since the judgment must embrace 'unobserved' as well as 'observed' cases (for otherwise it would be no inference), this guarantee, conformity to fact, already implies logically our belief in the uniformity of nature, in the uniformity of the unobserved with the observed; that is to say, the logical guarantee of the belief present in inference itself involves belief. Thus the attempt to establish as an induction the uniformity which every process of inference presupposes is foredoomed to failure; † and Mill ends by confessing that inference is not *from* uniformity, but *according to* it. What is important philosophically is not this failure to establish inductively the Law of Causation, but the recognition which this abortive effort involves, viz. the recognition of association as an inadequate doctrine in the theory of knowledge. This point might be further illustrated from Mill's own subsequent writings on Utilitarianism, where he uses association for the purpose of removing psychological difficulties in the way of his main logical thesis rather than for positively supporting it.

Alexander Bain in his *Senses and Intellect* (first published in 1855) shows adherence to the Laws of Association as the principles which should dominate the presentation of his psychology. Thus he writes in the preface to the first edition:

'In treating of the Intellect, the subdivision into faculties is abandoned. The exposition proceeds entirely on the Laws of Association, which are exemplified with minute detail and followed out into a variety of applications.'

Movements, sensations, appetites, and instincts are treated as the raw material, the data to be worked up into the various forms of intellect: memory, judgment, abstraction, reason, imagination. The fundamental properties of intelligence are consciousness of difference, consciousness of sameness, and retentiveness, of which last reproduction is a higher form. The general condition under which retentiveness is manifested is contiguity. This is the basis of memory, habit, and the acquired powers in general. Consciousness of sameness gives rise to the reproductive principle of similarity, which is dominant in invention, reason, and abstraction.

Bain then proceeds to trace out in detail the operation of these two principles upon our movements, sensations, and instincts, and the acquisitions and forms of knowledge to which they separately, and in conjunction, lead. In the *Emotions and Will* (the first edition of which appeared three years later than the *Senses and Intellect*), the same general plan of treatment prevails. Emotions and the will are secondary products. Emotions are derived from muscular feelings and sensations, while will is derived from spontaneous movement.

* *Logic*, bk. vi. ch. iii. § 2; cf. Preface to J. S. Mill's ed. of *Analysis of Human Mind*.
† *Ib.* bk. vi. ch. iv. § 3.
‡ J. S. Mill's ed. of *Analysis of Human Mind*, ch. xi. note.

* *Analysis of Human Mind*, ch. xi. note.
† Cf. *Logic*, bk iii. ch. xxi.

'The modes of derivation or composition of the emotions are various; but the leading circumstance is contiguous growth or the associating process. Association operates in uniting together a number of separate feelings into one aggregate or whole. . . . It also operates largely in the transfer of feelings from their original cause to some connected object.' *

But although in general method of exposition Bain follows the lines of the association school, treating the higher mental phenomena as products built up by the mechanism of association, yet the spirit of treatment is different; the new psychology has begun. This is the more evident if one compares the later with the earlier editions of Bain's works. The compounds are not conceived as mechanical or even as chemical products, but as growths; and psychology is no longer treated on the analogy of physics, but as having its place among the biological sciences, as the science of mental life. Mental development is brought under the influence of the new theory which was transforming the biological sciences—evolution. Mental phenomena are viewed generically not as mere contents, ideas, but as processes. The complex phenomena, instead of being compounded from simple, are higher processes developed out of the lower by means of association.

Among advances in detail is the recognition of movements and instincts as data for intellect. It is from the rudiments of all the forms of mental life that association builds up the higher intellectual processes, which again in their turn aid in building up the emotions and the will. And the new conception of psychology becomes especially evident in the attempt made to give a natural history of the emotions, to describe them, trace their origin, and classify them, and by the reference made where possible to physiological facts.

With regard to the laws and conditions of association, we may notice the following points. In the later editions, Bain places Contrast on the same plane as Similarity; it is the form of reproduction derived from consciousness of difference, just as similarity is derived from consciousness of sameness. Contiguity is the all-pervasive mode in which retentiveness shows itself, and, in so far, would appear to be directly derived from this fundamental property of mind; but Bain, nevertheless, treats of special 'conditions' of association by contiguity. These are: repetition, concentration of mind, and the specific aptitude of the individual. Concentration of mind is regarded as very important.

'Properly speaking, attention or concentration is the employment of will in the sphere of intellect. It is the stimulating adjunct that renders the intellectual processes effective for their purpose, and, being itself dependent upon the feelings, it illustrates the necessity for the united action of all the forces of the mind in the sphere of intellectual production.' †

Bain is here going behind the Law of Contiguity. A and B are associated not merely because they are successive or simultaneous, but because they are attended to. In his note to the chapter on 'Association of Ideas' in James Mill's *Analysis of the Human Mind* (ed. J. S. Mill), he again emphasizes the need for analyzing the conditions of association. James Mill named repetition and vividness; the latter Bain criticizes as failing to bring out the distinction between the influence of the feelings and the influence of the will, which his own condition, 'concentration of mind,' is designed to do.

Spencer's first edition of the *Principles of Psychology* appeared in the same year as Bain's *Senses and Intellect*. Here biological conceptions are the foundation of the whole structure. The phenomena of body and of mind are identical in being forms of life, and from the conception of the general characteristics of life, the special characteristics of mental life or intelligence can be inferred. Life is briefly defined as 'the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations.' * It is 'correspondence.' In the intelligence, then, it will likewise be adjustment of internal relations to external—correspondence.

'The relation between two states of consciousness corresponds with the relation between the two things producing them.' 'The strength of the tendency which the antecedent of any psychical change has to call up its consequent is proportionate to the persistence of the union between the external things they symbolize.' †

Such is the law of intelligence in the abstract and the basis for Spencer's theory of knowledge. Perfect knowledge will mean perfect correspondence between subjective and objective. This correspondence is the 'universal postulate' behind which thought cannot go. The ultimate test by which thought tries a subjective relation with respect to its objective validity is 'inconceivability of the opposite.'

'To assert the inconceivableness of its negation is at the same time to assert the psychological necessity we are under of thinking it, and to give our logical justification for holding it to be unquestionable.' ‡

Of such certainty are the 'necessary' truths and ultimate premises of our knowledge. Thus with Spencer, as with the earlier writers of the association school, the theory of knowledge is 'psychological.' This gains some additional plausibility because it is the task of psychology to trace out the processes by which the correspondence between subjective and objective relations is evolved, and in its task it must, through the doctrine of heredity, draw upon the experience of the race as well as on that of the individual. The various faculties—memory, imagination, reason—are different stages in the evolution of intelligence.

Mental life has two constituents—feelings and the relations between feelings. Our sensations are peripherally initiated feelings, ideas are secondary or faint sensations, while emotions are centrally initiated feelings.

'The requisite to the existence of a relation is the occurrence of a change, the passage from one apparently uniform state to another apparently uniform state implying the momentary shock produced by commencement of a new state.' §

Relations arise between feelings that are like or between feelings that are unlike, and again, between feelings that are simultaneous or successive. Such are the constituents. The law for their association is the Law of Similarity. Each primary or vivid feeling 'is joined to and identified with faint feelings (secondary), which have resulted from similar vivid feelings.' ‖

'Knowing a relation as well as knowing a feeling is the assimilation of it to its past kindred; and knowing it completely is the assimilation of it to past kindred exactly like it. But since within each great class the relations pass one into another insensibly, there is always, in consequence of the imperfection of our perceptions, a certain range within which the classing is doubtful—a certain cluster of relations nearly like the one perceived, which become nascent in consciousness in the act of assimilation. Along with the perceived position in space or time, the contiguous positions arise in consciousness.

Hence results the so-called law of association by contiguity. When we analyze it, contiguity resolves itself into likeness of relation in time or in space or in both. . . . Thus, the fundamental law of association of feelings is that each, at the moment of presentation, aggregates with its like in past experience. The act of recognition and the act of association are two aspects of the same act. And the implication is that, besides this law of association, there is no other; but all further phenomena of association are incidental.' ¶

This somewhat lengthy quotation will serve to make clear what association meant to Spencer. It is now a general name for the essential characteristic which Spencer finds in all processes of knowing—assimilation. Since consciousness is dependent upon change, there is also, in every process of knowing, 'differentiation'; consciousness is continuous differentiation and continuous assimilation. The finer the degree of differentiation and assimilation, the higher the process of knowing

* *Emotions and Will*[1], ch. iii.
† *Senses and Intellect*, 'The Intellect,' ch. i.
* *Principles of Psychology*, pt. iii. ch. i.
† *Ib.* pt. iv. ch. ii.
‡ *Ib.* pt. ii. ch. ii.
§ *Ib.* pt. vii. ch. xi.
‖ *Ib.* pt. ii. ch. ii.
¶ *Ib.* pt. ii. ch. viii.

This is the parallel of differentiation and integration in organic processes. In an organism increase in complexity of structure goes hand in hand with increase in function, and the establishment of closer connexion between part and part, with fuller organization of function.

'When we remember that the laws of structure and function must necessarily harmonize, and that the structure and function of the nervous system must conform to the laws of structure and function in general, we shall see that the parallelism here roughly indicated is such as might be expected. We shall see that the ultimate generalizations of psychology and physiology must be, as they here appear, different sides of the same primordial truth: both are expressions of the same fundamental process of life.'*

Viewed as a generic feature of knowing, association is not a mechanism for combining items of knowledge, but is the principle of growth whereby past progress is retained and further differentiation made possible. In the old doctrine the complex idea contained the elements out of which it was composed; here the higher process absorbs the lower, the new the old. So different is the doctrine, that one may be tempted to wonder why Spencer's psychology should be ranked with that of the association school. The reason is this: the conception of 'why' the higher is enabled to absorb the lower, the new the old, is taken unchanged from the theory of association.

Throughout the history of the school the advance in the theory of association as such is practically *nil*. There are efforts to distinguish some one form as more fundamental than the others, *e.g.* Mill selects Contiguity, Spencer Similarity, or to subsume them under some more comprehensive law, such as Hamilton's Law of Redintegration, but for all alike the theory of the process itself remains on the same level. Things are associated because they are alike, or because they are contiguous in space or time. A hint of an internal analysis of association is given, as we noticed, by Bain, and it is his study of the 'conditions' of association that marks the close of what is strictly to be called 'association psychology.'

Closer study of the 'how' and 'why' of mental development renders necessary broader conceptions than any which can be yielded by the three laws of association. Similarly, closer study of the memory processes brings a demand for a fuller statement of the conditions under which one fact of consciousness is able to suggest some fact of previous experience, and of the extent to which such a memory is 'a revival' (see MEMORY).

Although German psychologists stood outside the association school, it would be an omission not to refer to Herbart, in the general conception of whose psychology there is considerable likeness to that of Hartley and Mill. The first presentation of Herbart's psychological doctrine was the *Lehrbuch zur Psychologie* (1815). This was followed by the fuller and more reasoned exposition in *Psychologie als Wissenschaft neu gegründet auf Erfahrung, Metaphysik, und Mathematik* (1824–1825). Herbart rebelled against the dogmatism of 'faculty psychology.' He found Locke's treatment of mind as a storehouse of ideas at least truer to experience than the analysis of mind into faculties current in the school of Wolff. The faculties are set up as *genera* and treated as causes, when there has been, and can be, no study of the particulars from which alone such generic notions could be reached. Such psychology achieves nothing but hair-splitting distinctions between these faculties, and yet withal acknowledges an unknown unity in which these faculties are contained. The whole method of this psychology stands in need of reform. It is impossible to reach generic notions by study of particulars, *i.e.* it is impossible to use induction and analogy in psychology, because our knowledge of these particulars is unavoidably defective; consciousness is in perpetual change. The new method which Herbart introduces is elaboration (*Ergänzung*) or completion by means of constructive hypothesis. One is entitled to use such a method only if the existence of certain relationships can be demonstrated, viz. relationships wherein the positing of one member renders necessary the positing of the other.

The whole task of psychology will be to complete the known facts of inner experience, and to establish relationships by which these facts shall be connected, in accordance with general laws. Psychologists have failed to find conceptions appropriate for psychology, because they have not been mathematicians, and have thus not realized the special adaptability of mathematical notions to the ever-changing phenomena of consciousness. Further, it is, in Herbart's view, necessary for psychology to be based upon metaphysics. Psychology is brought face to face with the problem of the many in one, for behind all the varying mental conditions is the unity of mind. That is to say, psychology is brought face to face with the problem of 'substance.' And again, since consciousness is in perpetual change, psychology is brought face to face with the problem of change, transformation.

Herbart's psychology, therefore, is prefaced by speculative metaphysics. The first step is to arrive at a concept of the soul. This is defined as 'a simple substance, without parts, without any plurality whatever in its quality.' What this quality is we can never know. Like all other substances, the soul's activity consists in self-preservation. Each reality or substance conserves itself against other substances, and from these conservative activities arise relations, plurality. The efforts of the soul in opposition to other substances are its ideas. These ideas are not produced by any spontaneity of the soul, but arise only in its strife against other realities; they arise, then, from external conditions, and have their quality determined by these conditions. In so far as these ideas come into relation with one another they are forces, and in virtue of their opposition to one another have a quantitative character. Every idea is a tendency, and as such is never destroyed; it may be arrested, totally or partially, or pass from consciousness to subconsciousness, but it will ever strive to reinstate itself, and will do so should opposition be removed or reinforcement come through relations to some other idea. The subject-matter of psychology is not the soul, but these relations between ideas; hence the metaphysical speculations and the general consideration of mathematical relations are followed by a statics and mechanics of ideas.

It is in his reaction against 'faculty psychology,' and in his reduction of inner experience to simple events of a homogeneous character, from whose interplay arise all the diverse forms of consciousness — memory, imagination, feeling, will, etc.— that we see the resemblance between Herbart's conception of psychology and that of Hartley or James Mill. In the metaphysical bases of their thoughts and in their methods of exposition, the German and the English writers are poles apart.

In the more recent German psychology, and independently of Herbartianism, the influence of the association school can be seen, despite the fact that the errors of its doctrines are sometimes laid bare in a none too gracious manner. Wundt has treated psychology as a doctrine of elements and compounds; thus in his *Outlines of Psychology*, which represents his standpoint in general psychology better than the more specialized *Physiological Psychology* or the lectures on *Human*

* *Principles of Psychology*, pt. vi. ch. xxvii.

and Animal Psychology, we find the following division of topics: (1) psychical elements; (2) psychical compounds; (3) inter-connexion of compounds; (4) psychical developments; (5) principles and laws of psychical development. The elements, of course, are no longer the simple ideas of, say, Mill, since they are not simple items of knowledge, but abstractions, the ultimate factors into which the simplest experience can be analyzed by thought: elements of sensation, and elements of feeling. The compounds, too, do not correspond to complex ideas; they are the phases of experience which can be recognized as having a determinate character, *e.g.* an emotion, such as anger, or a simple perception; they are not, therefore, mere sums of the elements which enter into them. Moreover, such compounds are only components of experience; that is to say, in any given state of consciousness we have an inter-connexion of such compounds, *e.g.* the emotion in connexion with perception.

The connective processes, again, are not the old forms of association. Various processes are distinguished: for building up compounds, fusion and extensive union; for the inter-connexion of compounds, association (which, however, is not association of ideas, since no such phenomena as ideas in Mill's sense—copies of sensations—are recognized) and apperception. All save the last find their determining conditions in the nature of that which is connected; but the last, apperception, is a volitional process involving choice, the motives of which can be explained only from the whole previous development of the individual consciousness. As 'volitional' it is placed on a different level from the others.* This treatment of apperceptive connexion is peculiar to Wundt, and is connected with his ontological view that 'will' expresses the ultimate reality of the soul.

The same general ground-plan is followed by Külpe in his *Outlines of Psychology*. Psychology is defined as 'science of the facts of experience in their dependency upon experiencing individuals'† —a definition of the science which assigns a leading rôle to bodily processes, since 'individual' signifies corporeal individual. The connective processes, therefore, are viewed as dependent upon psychophysical conditions. The laws of reproduction are explained in relation to the conditions of centrally initiated sensations—the 'ideas' of English psychologists—and apperception is treated as being in principle capable of subsumption under the laws of reproduction.‡ For the essential conditions of the origin and maintenance of the feature which especially characterizes apperception, viz. attention, we are referred outside consciousness to the central nervous system.§

Widely different as the specific doctrines are from those held by the earlier English writers, yet, nevertheless, the scheme of classification adopted for the scientific exposition of psychological facts would seem to be derived from the writings of the association school.

As was stated above, current English psychology does not use association as an explanatory principle. Traces of the older method of exposition are, however, to be found in Prof. Sully's text-books, *Outlines of Psychology* and *The Human Mind*, although these embody the results of modern research and learning. The three aspects of mental life—intellection, the feelings, and conation or volition—are treated separately. Under each we have a serial order of phenomena; from elements of sensation, feeling, and conation, progressively higher products are built up by elaborative processes. These processes are: differentiation, assimilation, and association. The last is discussed in connexion with retentiveness and reproduction, and is conceived as the process 'which binds together presentative elements occurring together or in immediate succession,'* and as being a 'main factor in development, resulting in a progressive elaboration of what is relatively simple into more and more complex products.'† Attention is, however, treated as a determining condition for the elaborative processes, and this saves their operation from being purely mechanical.

The old method is entirely departed from in the psychology of Ward and Stout. Ward's conception of differentiation and integration, in the continuous advance of which processes mental development consists, shows an advance on that of Spencer.

'We shall find in the growth of a seed or an embryo far better illustrations of the unfolding of the contents of consciousness than in the building up of molecules: the process seems much more a segmentation of what is originally continuous than an aggregation of elements at first independent and distinct.'‡

Unity of consciousness is not something which psychological theory has to account for as a product or growth, but is that from which psychology takes its start.

'Working backward from this as we find it now, we are led alike by particular facts and general considerations to the conception of a *totum objectivum* or objective continuum which is gradually differentiated, thereby becoming what we call distinct presentations.'§

'The notion, which Kant has done much to encourage, that psychical life begins with a confused manifold of sensations not only without logical but without psychological unity, is one that becomes more inconceivable the more closely we consider it.'‖

Changes within the total field of consciousness, and persistence of the old alongside of the new (retentiveness), give the bases for differentiation, and subjective selection; that is to say, voluntary concentration of attention on 'this' or 'that' within the total field explains its further progress. The connexion of sensations with movements is the first phase of integration; the pleasure or pain which accompanies sensation causes change in the distribution of attention, and thus causes movement, the initiation of 'this,' the suppression of 'that.' First 'natural selection,' then 'subjective selection,' will bring about such syntheses, and thus 'presentations originally in no way connected tend to move in consciousness together.'¶ Association is a particular instance of this. Association by contiguity is as such inexplicable; for 'contiguity' Ward substitutes 'continuity.' A and X, which have no connexion one with another, occupy 'the focus of consciousness in immediate succession. This constitutes their integration.'** Through the movements of attention they are now parts of one whole, form what Ward terms a continuum, are continuous one with another. These movements of attention 'come in the end to depend mainly upon interest, but at first appear to be determined entirely by mere intensity.'†† The power of variously distributing attention is the one power which Ward desires to leave the subject of consciousness, and it is in virtue of this power that the subject plays the rôle of agent.

In Stout's psychology we have a similar view of the unity of consciousness and of the processes of differentiation and integration.

'The process of consciousness is a process of incessant change; the changes are partly due to the play of external impressions, and to other conditions extraneous to consciousness itself. But this is rarely, if ever, entirely so. The process is in part self-determining. The successive phases have by their very nature a tendency to pass into other phases.'‡‡

This tendency is conation, and it is conation which correlates and gives a special unity to 'other-

* Cf. § 17. † § 5, tr. by E. B. Titchener.
‡ Cf. ib. § 77. § Cf. ib. § 76.

* *Human Mind*, i. 135. † *Ib.* i. 169 f.
‡ 'Psychology' in *EBr*[9] xx. 45. § *Ib.* p. 45.
‖ *Ib.* p. 45. ¶ *Ib.* p. 52.
** *Ib.* p. 61. †† *Ib.* p. 61.
‡‡ *A Manual of Psychology*, bk. i. ch. i. § 4.

wise disparate and disconnected processes.' For such unity the 'general condition is that the successive phases of a conscious process shall constitute a movement towards an end-state or terminus.' * There must be continuity of interest, and for this, retentiveness is essential; later phases of a conative process owe their meaning to the earlier. So in general, it is the 'dispositions' or 'traces' left by previous experience which make development possible.

Continuity of interest lies at the bottom of all association and reproduction. In association by contiguity the re-occurrence of any one of the members of a 'conative unity' re-excites the whole disposition, because of the direct continuity of all the members of such disposition. There is direct continuity between the suggesting and the suggested idea. In what is called 'association by similarity,' the suggesting factor re-excites a disposition having a member similar to, or partially identical with, itself, and does so only through the medium of this similar or partially identical member; there is thus no direct connexion between the suggesting factor and the members of the re-excited disposition. The continuity of interest is indirect.

With both Ward and Stout, therefore, association takes its place as a process depending upon the fundamental laws of psychical development, as explanandum, not explanation.

LITERATURE.—General: Ferri, *La Psychologie de l'association*, Paris, 1883; Janet and Séailles, *Hist. de la Philosophie*, Paris, 1887; G. Croom Robertson, 'Association,' in *EBr*[9]. Special authors have been sufficiently indicated in the article.

BEATRICE EDGELL.

ASSUMPTION and ASCENSION.—*Meaning and scope.*—The idea underlying these theological conceptions is the idea of communication between the natural and the spiritual order, and of a passage from the former to the latter. As the idea of 'Revelation' presupposes the possibility of movement from heaven earthward, so the idea of 'Ascension' presupposes the possibility of movement from earth heavenward. In some form or other both these conceptions have a place in every religious system; and in primitive religions they are set forth in terms of the geocentric philosophy of antiquity. The earth is the centre of the universe. Heaven, the abode of the gods, is above us in the distant sky; and the advent of heavenly messengers is represented as a physical descent, a 'coming down,' while their departure is a physical ascent, a 'going up.' So too the movement of human beings to the spiritual region is a 'going up,' an uplifting; and the language of devotion bears perpetual witness to this primitive conception. *Sursum corda* is the form which an exhortation to fix our thoughts on the realities of the spiritual world naturally takes. We speak of noble ideals as 'high' or 'lofty,' and of material ambitions as 'low'; and the abode of the Eternal is described as 'a high and holy place.' It was inevitable, while the Ptolemaic system of cosmography was accepted, that its fundamental conceptions should affect the language in which spiritual facts were described.

It is clear, however, that belief in the possibility of communication between man and God, between the natural and the spiritual, between earth and heaven, is not bound up with this geocentric philosophy which no one now accepts, although we are quite content to continue to use the language of devotion which it originally suggested, just as we are content still to speak of the 'rising' and 'setting' of the sun. Such language misleads no one in the sphere of science, and there is no reason why it should be a perplexity in the sphere of religion. That there is a region of 'spirit,' which encompasses us; that, although invisible, it is not inaccessible; that it is the dwelling-place—for we can get no better phrase—of the Divine; that it is the ultimate reality of the universe: these convictions are a sufficient background for the idea of 'Revelation,' and also for the idea of 'Ascension,' that is, the passage from the natural to the spiritual order.

This idea has appeared in several different forms, which it is necessary to distinguish. A characteristic feature of mysticism is the belief that in supreme moments the soul is translated to heavenly places, and granted a vision of the spiritual world. Thus in the Neo-Platonic philosophy of Plotinus, knowledge of Divine things is conveyed to the human spirit in a condition of exaltation, described as ἔκστασις, by which man comes into contact with God (*Enneads*, vi. 9–11). The 'occult' philosophy of the East presupposes a similar means of approach to the highest truths. And the phenomena of clairvoyance and telepathy, as yet imperfectly understood, point to the possibility of free exercise of the cognitive powers, unrestrained by the limitations of the bodily senses. Here, however, there is no thought of a translation of the *body* to the unseen world; it is the *spirit* alone, temporarily divorced from the body, that is thus favoured. And, accordingly, we do not describe such an experience as an 'ascension' or an 'assumption,' these terms being reserved for the translation of the whole man, soul and body, to the region of spirit. In special cases, the vision of the spiritual order may be so clear that the man may be unable to determine, as he looks back upon it, whether he was 'in the body or out of the body.' Such was the case of St. Paul, who recalls (2 Co 12^{2-4}) how he had been 'caught up into Paradise, and heard unspeakable words which it is not lawful for a man to utter.' But it is only if the translation be of body as well as of soul that it comes within the scope of this article, which does not embrace an inquiry into 'visions,' or 'dreams,' or 'intuitions' of the Divine (see those articles).

I. *ASSUMPTIONS OF SAINTS.*—1. **Bodily translations to heaven, for purpose of revelations.**—The apocryphal and apocalyptic literature of Judaism and of Christianity furnishes (see BIBLE) some illustrations of bodily 'assumptions' into heaven, granted to individuals in order that they might be informed of spiritual truth. 'Assumptions' of this kind are temporary only; and, the vision ended, the man returns to earth. The language of Ezk 8^{3} was, perhaps, not intended to be literal, and (see 11^{24}) need not convey more than an involuntary rapture of the spirit; but the story of the transportation to Babylon of Habakkuk, who was lifted up 'by the hair of his head' (Bel ^{36}), implies a translation of his body. Granted a belief in the possibility of such earthly experiences (which underlies much Eastern folklore, as in the *Arabian Nights*), the step is easy to the belief in a translation of the body from earth to heaven.

(1) The most remarkable legend of this kind is that of *Enoch*, discussed below (**2, 1**). But there are other instances.

(2) *Abraham.*—In the *Testament of Abraham* (ed. M. R. James, 1892), Michael takes Abraham up in a cloud with angelic chariots, to show him the world of men from the standpoint of heaven. Abraham then is brought back to his house, where after an interval he dies.

(3) *Isaiah.*—In the *Ascension of Isaiah* (chs. 7, 8), Isaiah is raised to the seventh heaven, where he has a vision of the Beloved, after which experience he returns to earth (ch. 11).

(4) *Rabbinical seers.*—Rabbinical literature tells in like manner of four rabbis who entered Paradise and were granted revelations.

* *A Manual of Psychology*, bk. i. ch. ii. § 3.

(5) *Moses.*—The story of Moses in later literature has affinities with 'assumption' or 'ascension' legends of various forms. The two starting-points are the Biblical accounts of his discourse with God on the holy mountain, when the Law was revealed to him (Ex $24^{15ff.}$), and of his secret burial (Dt 34^{6}). The first of these led to the idea of an 'Apocalypse of Moses,' such as that edited from the Greek by Tischendorf; the second to the stories of his 'assumption' (cf. Jude ^{9}). Thus Josephus (*Ant.* IV. viii. 48) tells that, as Moses was discoursing with Eleazar and Joshua, a cloud suddenly enveloped him and he disappeared in a certain valley, although he wrote in Deuteronomy that he died, 'fearing lest because of his exceeding virtue men might venture to say that he had withdrawn to the Divine' (*πρὸς τὸ θεῖον αὐτὸν ἀναχωρῆσαι*). The phrase *πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀναχωρεῖν* is used by Josephus (*Ant.* I. iii. 4) of Enoch; and he evidently means to suggest that Moses' departure from the world was abnormal, although he will not say positively that, like Enoch, he escaped the passage of death. The legend of the 'Assumption of Moses,' as it is restored by Charles (*Assumption of Moses*, p. 106), described the living man carried up to heaven, while his corpse was hidden in the recesses of the mountains.

(6) *Muhammad.*—The journey of Muhammad to heaven affords a later instance. It has been interpreted, indeed, by some Muhammadan expositors as non-corporeal, and his experience has been described as that of a dream or a vision only. But the more popular version is that the prophet was transported by night from Mecca to Jerusalem, thence through the seven heavens to the presence of God, and then back to Mecca. Ch. xviii. of the Qur'ān claims to contain the revelation then vouchsafed to him.

2. **Bodily translations to heaven, in lieu of death.**—We have next to examine the legends which represent saints as being transported, without dying, to the world beyond the grave.*

In the Babylonian mythology, the apotheosis of Xisuthros, the hero of the Deluge, was of this character. In recognition of his piety, he was not subjected to death, but was assumed to heaven.† In Jewish literature, two figures stand out as having been granted this high privilege, Enoch and Elijah.

(1) *Enoch.*—The source of all the later traditions is Gn 5^{24} (Heb.): 'Enoch walked with God: and he was not; for God took him.' That he 'walked with God' or that he 'pleased God' (*εὐηρέστησε τῷ θεῷ*, LXX) does not necessarily signify more than that he spent his life in converse with the spiritual world, and that death was to him a withdrawal to God. But this simple statement, which might be made of every saint, was developed in two directions:—

(*a*) Gn 5^{24} suggested that Enoch was the recipient of supernatural revelations; and the *Book of Enoch* and the Slavonic *Secrets of Enoch* (see also the *Book of Jubilees*) were the outcome of this idea. In these books he is represented as having been 'assumed' to heaven that he might be instructed in heavenly things, which he subsequently described (*En.* lxx. 1, lxxxvii. 3; *Sl. En.* Introd.; *Jub.* iv. 21). According to the *Slavonic Enoch* (lxvii.), he lived on earth thirty days after this vision, and then 'the angels hasted and took Enoch and carried him into the highest heaven, where the Lord received him.'

(*b*) In the last quoted passage we have the idea of a translation to Paradise in lieu of dying, which is the most familiar form of the Enoch story. Thus the LXX of Gn 5^{24} has *οὐχ ηὑρίσκετο, διότι μετέθηκεν αὐτὸν ὁ θεός* (cf. *En.* lx. 8); and Sir 44^{16} says of him *μετετέθη* (cf. Sir 49^{14} *ἀνελήμφθη ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς*). Following this tradition, He 11^{5} has *Ἐνὼχ μετετέθη τοῦ μὴ ἰδεῖν θάνατον*; and the conception of Enoch's 'ascension' without dying is frequent in Christian literature. The same idea appears in Josephus (*Ant.* I. iii. 4), who says of Enoch, *ἀνεχώρησε πρὸς τὸ θεῖον, ὅθεν οὐδὲ τελευτὴν αὐτοῦ ἀναγεγράφασι.*

(2) *Elijah.*—The Elijah traditions, like those of Enoch, seem to have developed in two different directions. The *Apocalypse of Elijah* (ed. from the Coptic by Steindorff) is a Christianized form of a Jewish apocalypse, and bears witness to the belief that Elijah received supernatural revelations (it was long supposed to be the source of 1 Co 2^{9}). But the best known form of the tradition is that which starts from 2 K 2^{11} 'Behold, a chariot of fire, and horses of fire, which parted them both asunder; and Elijah went up by a whirlwind into heaven' (*ἀνελήμφθη Ἠλειοὺ ἐν συστρεισμῷ ὡς εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν*). It re-appears in Sir 48^{9} (*ἀναληφθεὶς ἐν λαίλαπι πυρός*) and in 1 Mac 2^{58} ('Elias for being zealous and fervent for the law was taken up into heaven'). It will be observed that the instrument of his assumption, according to the original story, was a tempest, not a chariot, of fire, as artists have loved to represent it; and that 1 Mac 2^{58} explicitly points to the piety of Elijah as the cause of his 'assumption' without passing through the gates of death.†

(3) *Other Biblical personages.*—In Rabbinical legends, other persons are held to have escaped death by a privilege similar to that of Enoch and Elijah: *e.g.* Eliezer, Abraham's steward, for his faithful service; Ebed-melech (Jer $38^{7ff.}$); Hiram; Jabez (1 Ch 4^{10}); Serah, Asher's daughter (Gn (46^{17}); and Pharaoh's daughter. So Ezra was 'taken up' after his vision (2 Es 8^{19}), and Baruch had a like privilege (Apoc. Bar., *passim*).

3. **Assumptions after death.**—With such 'assumptions' as have just been described, we must not confound the 'assumptions' in which *after death* the body was removed from earth and caught up to heaven.

(1) *Hercules.*—A classical example is the legend of Hercules. Being poisoned by the arts of Dejanira, he erected a pyre on the summit of Mount Œta in Thessaly, and lay down to die. Zeus, applauding his career, surrounded the pyre with smoke, and after the mortal parts of Hercules had been consumed, he was carried up to heaven in a chariot drawn by four horses. Neither his bones nor his ashes could be found, the underlying idea of the legend being that earth was not a worthy resting-place for the remains of one so godlike.†

(2) *Virgin Mary.*—A Christian legend of the same kind is that of the 'Assumption of Mary,' according to which first the soul, and after that the dead body, of the Virgin were assumed to heaven (see the *Transitus Mariæ*, ed. Tischendorf). 'It was becoming'—so Newman expresses the conviction of the Roman Church—'that she should be taken up into heaven and not lie in the grave until Christ's Second Coming, who had passed

* The story of Ganymede, who was caught up to heaven by Zeus that he might be the cupbearer of the gods, is not strictly parallel, for there is no suggestion that this was due to the piety of Ganymede. Cf. also the Rape of Proserpine, transported to the infernal regions by Pluto in his chariot.

† Cf. Abydenus *apud* Euseb. *Præp. Ev.* IX. 12, of Xisuthros, *θεοὶ μὲν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀφανίζουσιν*, and see Smith, *Chaldæan Genesis*^{2}, p. 88.

* According to early Christian belief, Enoch and Elijah were the 'two witnesses' of Rev 11^{3}, who were at last to be manifested in Jerusalem (11^{7}), and whose ascent into heaven (11^{12}) was to be followed by the Second Coming of Christ.

† The classical myth of the quest in Hades for his dead wife Eurydice by Orpheus, who afterwards returned to earth, is the prototype of many legends of visits to the under world, such as that in Virgil, *Æneid*, vi., or in Dante. But in these there is nothing strictly comparable with the idea of 'assumption' to heaven.

a life of sanctity and of miracle such as hers.'* And, accordingly, the Feast of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary has had a place in Church Calendars (Aug. 15) since the 7th century.

II. *ASCENSION OF CHRIST.*—The narrative of the Ascension of Christ (Ac 1^9) is not analogous to the Jewish legends of 'ascension' or 'assumption' in either of the forms which they have taken. Christ was not 'assumed' into the heavenly places in order to receive revelations of the spiritual order, as was reported of the seers of the Jewish apocalypses. Nor, again, was His Ascension an escape from the experience of death, as was believed by some to have been the privilege of Enoch and Elijah. It is represented consistently in the early Christian documents, canonical and extra-canonical, as a withdrawal into the spiritual world with the body which He had taken upon Himself and in which He had lived an earthly life, died, and risen victorious over death. After His Resurrection, His body is represented as spiritualized and as superior to earthly conditions, to a degree which is not asserted of it during the days of His ministry; but nevertheless, according to the Christian tradition, the body in which He ascended was the same body that had hung on the cross and had been buried in the sepulchre of Joseph. The 'assumption' of Moses was conceived of as consistent with the continuance of his corpse in a hidden grave (see above, p. 152[a]). But this is not parallel with the Ascension of Christ, which presupposed the empty tomb. Christ's Ascension was a 'resumption' of His pre-existent state, in His glorified humanity, rather than an 'assumption' to heaven, granted by the favour of the Most High. Its meaning will be considered more fully in a later section (§ 7); at this point, we note that, as described in the Christian tradition, it has no exact parallel in history or literature. This it is essential to keep in mind.

It is next to be observed that there was nothing in the Jewish beliefs about Messiah which would naturally suggest such a consummation of the visible ministry of the Christ. An Ascension, in lieu of death, might have been expected by those who accepted the current beliefs about Enoch and Elijah; but death, followed by a re-vivification and exaltation, was not within the purview of the first disciples. Looking back upon the Resurrection, they were able to find phrases in the OT which might be thought to point forward to it; and, in fact, that Christ rose again 'according to the scriptures' (1 Co 15^4) became a settled point of belief. But nothing of the kind was asserted consistently of the Ascension. Ps 110^1 was, indeed, quoted, according to Ac 2^{34}, by St. Peter, and Ps 68^{18} was quoted by St. Paul (Eph $4^{8.\ 9}$), as applicable to the exaltation of the Christ; but that He ascended *according to the Scriptures* was never an article of the Creed. The Ascension of the Messiah had not been part of the Jewish expectation. Nor, so far as can now be discovered, did the disciples understand the allusions which, in the Fourth Gospel, Christ is reported to have made beforehand to this consummation of His visible Ministry on earth (Jn 3^{13} 6^{62} 20^{17}), any more than they understood His predictions of His Resurrection (Mk 8^{31} 9^{10} 10^{34}; cf. the Synoptic parallels, and see art. RESURRECTION). That after His visible Ministry amongst them had come to an end there would be an interval of waiting and of discipline before the final appearance of the Christ in triumph, the Apostles seem vaguely to have realized, and it had many times been put before them (Mk 2^{20} with ‖‖, Lk 17^{22}, the parables of the Absent Master [Lk $12^{36ff.}$] and of the Pounds [Lk $19^{11ff.}$], Jn 13^{36} 14^{19} 16^7 etc.); but in their half-formulated expectations of a period of suspense followed by an Advent of Christ in victory and judgment, His Death, Resurrection, and Ascension had no place.

* *Discourses to Mixed Congregations*, No. xviii.

1. The Ascension in Christian literature.—In examining the belief of Christians as to the Ascension of Christ, it is important to distinguish between the *fact* of the Ascension and its *mode*, between the conviction of Christ's beneficent activities on behalf of mankind being continued after the withdrawal of His visible presence and the acceptance of the brief narrative which describes the manner of His departure. In every Christian age the former of these beliefs has been more conspicuous than the latter. In the language of theology, Christ's 'Session' at the right hand of the Father has always been more in the thoughts of those who call Him Master than His 'Ascension' to His Throne. For the belief that Christ is now in spiritual communication with His disciples, that He guards, forgives, and guides them, is essential to the Christian life. It is historically interesting, but it is not vital, to know how the beginning of this ministry was revealed to the early disciples by the Risen Master's final withdrawal from their sight. And, in fact, while the doctrine of the activities of the Ascended Christ has always been a principal part of Christian instruction, and a favourite topic of Christian contemplation, the Festival of the Ascension (see § 3 below) has throughout the Church's history been treated with comparative neglect.* It might have been anticipated *a priori* that this Feast would have rivalled Christmas, Easter, and Pentecost in its attraction for Christian believers; but it has never approached them in its popularity, not because there has been any doubt in the Church as to the event which it commemorates, but because it is the issues of that event, rather than the event itself, in which Christians have been mainly interested. A kindred phenomenon, which points the same way, is the poverty of the hymnology of the Ascension. The subject is one which might be expected to attract the imagination and inspire the poetry of the Church; but it has never done so to any considerable extent.†

In strict conformity with these tendencies of later Christian history, we find that, while the Pauline theology is full of the conception of an Exalted Christ in spiritual fellowship with those who are 'in Him,' references to the Ascension as an event are rare. It is always presupposed, as in the phrase 'The Lord himself shall descend from heaven' (1 Th 4^{16}), for *descent* implies a previous *ascent*. But this implication becomes explicit only in Eph 4^{10} 'He that descended (*sc.* into Hades) is the same also that ascended far above all the heavens,' where the reference to the *ἀνάβασις* of Christ is unmistakable. The only other allusion in the Pauline writings to the Ascension as an event is in the fragment of an early hymn quoted in 1 Ti 3^{16} (*ἀνελήμφθη ἐν δόξῃ*).

To these may be added, from the Epistles, He 4^{14}, (*ἀρχιερέα μέγαν διεληλυθότα τοὺς οὐρανούς*) and 1 P 3^{22} (*ὅς ἐστιν ἐν δεξιᾷ θεοῦ, πορευθεὶς εἰς οὐρανόν*), both of which carry a distinct reference to the act of Ascension. In like manner, the allusions in the Fourth Gospel are express: *οὐδεὶς ἀναβέβηκεν εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν εἰ μὴ ὁ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καταβάς, κ.τ.λ.* (Jn 3^{13}), *ἐὰν οὖν θεωρῆτε τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀναβαίνοντα ὅπου ἦν τὸ πρότερον*; (Jn 6^{62}), *οὔπω γὰρ ἀναβέβηκα πρὸς τὸν πατέρα μου . . . ἀναβαίνω πρὸς τὸν πατέρα μου, κ.τ.λ.* (Jn 20^{17}).‡ Whatever view be taken as

* This was noticed as early as the 4th century. *οἱ πολλοὶ ἀγνοοῦντες τὸ τούτης μέγεθος ἧττον αὐτὴν νομίζουσι* are words at the beginning of a Homily on the Ascension printed among the works of Epiphanius (*PG* xliii. 477).

† Cf. Trench, *Sacred Latin Poetry*[3], 1874, p. 172.

‡ It is possible that the words ascribed to Christ in Jn 12^{32}, *ἐὰν ὑψωθῶ ἐκ τῆς γῆς πάντας ἑλκύσω πρὸς ἐμαυτόν*, involve

to the accuracy of the reports of Christ's words in John, it is certain from these passages that, at the date of the composition of the Fourth Gospel, the Ascension of Christ as an event in time was a definitely conceived part of the Christian tradition. It did not come within the purpose of the writer to give any direct account of it, just as it did not come within his purpose to describe the institution of the Eucharist; but his allusions indicate that his readers had knowledge of both.

(1) *The Gospels.*—The end of the Second Gospel is lost, and what it contained can only be matter of conjecture, more or less probable. It is likely that the writer of Mt 28 had it before him, and that he followed the main lines of the Marcan narrative here, as in other places. If this be so, Mark in its original form did not explicitly describe the Ascension. Mark, followed by Matthew, represents the Galilæan tradition of the Resurrection-appearances, and the Ascension narrative belongs more naturally to the Jerusalem tradition, as the scene of the Ascension was Olivet. That Matthew does not describe it is to be explained precisely as his omission to describe the Appearance of the Risen Christ to the Eleven in the upper room is to be explained. He is following the Galilæan narrative of Mark, the climax of which probably was the appearance of Christ *in Galilee* (cf. Mt 28^{16}), in accordance with His promise (Mk 14^{28}) and with the angelic announcement (Mk 16^{7}). The climax, on the other hand, of the Jerusalem narrative would be the Ascension, the last of the post-Resurrection manifestations in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem, and accordingly we find it explicitly mentioned by the writer, who follows the Jerusalem tradition of the Resurrection throughout, *i.e.* by St. Luke (cf. 9^{51} *τὰς ἡμέρας τῆς ἀναλήμψεως αὐτοῦ*).

The statement, in the Third Gospel, of the events which followed the Resurrection is condensed to the point of obscurity, and the variants of the texts of the closing verses are puzzling. But when all this has been admitted, it does not seem (to the present writer at least) to be possible to regard it as silent on the subject of the Ascension, although this has been maintained by some critics. The passage is as follows: *ἐξήγαγε δὲ αὐτοὺς* [*ἔξω*] *ἕως εἰς* [*al. πρὸς*] *Βηθανίαν· καὶ ἐπάρας τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῦ εὐλόγησεν αὐτούς· καὶ ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ εὐλογεῖν αὐτὸν αὐτοὺς, διέστη ἀπ' αὐτῶν* [*καὶ ἀνεφέρετο εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν*]. *καὶ αὐτοὶ* [*προσκυνήσαντες αὐτὸν*] *ὑπέστρεψαν εἰς Ἰερουσαλὴμ μετὰ χαρᾶς μεγάλης· καὶ ἦσαν διὰ παντὸς ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ* [*αἰνοῦντες καὶ*] *εὐλογοῦντες τὸν θεόν* [*Ἀμήν*] (Lk $24^{50f.}$). The words in brackets are omitted in some (mainly Western) texts, and are marked as doubtful in WH. It is by no means certain that they did not form part of the original text; and if they did, *ἀνεφέρετο εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν* is an explicit description of the Ascension. But even if these words are left out of consideration, there remains the narrative of a solemn parting from the disciples in the act of benediction, subsequently to which they returned to Jerusalem with joy and continued in the Temple blessing God. Some special significance must have been attached to a departure of the Risen Master, so lately restored to them from death, which they would recall *with joy*, and for which they would fall to thanksgiving. Such a separation could hardly have been viewed as merely temporary; the language indicates that they regarded it as final, and the termination of the Gospel at this point shows that the evangelist conceived of it as the beginning of a new era for the followers of Christ. But a withdrawal of this nature into the spiritual region is the essence of the Ascension, to which, therefore, the conclusion of St. Luke's Gospel bears definite witness, even if it be supposed that *ἀνεφέρετο εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν* is a later gloss, explanatory, in the unscientific language of the age (see pp. 151, 156), of the manner of the disappearance of Christ into the spiritual world.

(2) *The Acts.*—In the later treatise by Luke, the Acts, this kind of descriptive language is used without hesitation when the story of the Ascension is being told: *βλεπόντων αὐτῶν ἐπήρθη, καὶ νεφέλη ὑπέλαβεν αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν αὐτῶν. καὶ ὡς ἀτενίζοντες ἦσαν εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν πορευομένου αὐτοῦ, κ.τ.λ.* (Ac $1^{9f.}$). According to Acts, that is, the departing Christ was received in a cloud, His disciples following His passage 'upward' with straining eyes. Angelic messengers then informed them that, as was the manner of His Departure, so would be that of His Return, *i.e.* in a cloud, from the upper regions of the sky. There is no doubt as to the definiteness with which the Ascension of Christ is here narrated. The testimony of Acts is express. It remains, however, a legitimate problem, although one of no small difficulty, to determine how far the language in which it is described is to be regarded as literal, and how far it may be understood either as symbolical or as the natural, unstudied language employed in an unscientific age to describe a fact quite abnormal and unique in the experience of the narrators.

The Christian Church for many generations regarded the story as literally precise, *i.e.* it was believed that Christ went 'up' in a cloud into the higher regions of the atmosphere. It may have been so, just as the true interpretation of the words ascribed to Christ of His Second Coming 'in the clouds of heaven with power and great glory' (Mt 24^{30}; cf. Mk 14^{62} = Mt 26^{64}) may be the literal interpretation, which was adopted by St. Paul ('we shall be caught up *in the clouds* to meet the Lord in the air,' 1 Th 4^{17}). But it must not be forgotten that phraseology similar to the eschatological language used by Christ—or, at any rate, ascribed to Him by the Evangelists—is to be found in the Jewish apocalypses, which reflect the popular beliefs of the age. If the last things were to be spoken of intelligibly at all, they must be spoken of in the language of symbol and imagery familiar to His hearers. And no one doubts the verbal connexion of Mk 14^{62} and parallel passages with Dn $7^{13ff.}$: 'There came with the clouds of heaven one like unto a son of man, and he came even to the ancient of days, and they brought him near before him. And there was given him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all the peoples . . . should serve him.' It is to be remembered, then, that the Ascension in Ac 1 is described as a 'going into heaven,' conceived of as a process similar to that 'coming from heaven' of which Jewish apocalyptic and Christ Himself had spoken. The cloud and the upward movement are, indeed, explicitly recorded as having been observed, and they present no special difficulty. But it is right to note that they are the natural and almost inevitable accessories of any Jewish narrative which sought to describe the solemn and unique departure of the Christ, or to enrich with detail the brief statement *διέστη ἀπ' αὐτῶν* (Lk 24^{51}).

(3) *Sub-Apostolic literature.*—The *Appendix to St. Mark*, a document of the earliest sub-Apostolic age, gives no information as to the post-Resurrection appearances of Christ which is not found in the Lucan and Johannine narratives. It may have been based upon these, but in any case, like them, it follows the Jerusalem tradition. It describes

another reference to the Ascension, despite the fact that the Evangelist confines them to the Elevation on the cross. In Jn 8^{28} the latter meaning must be the true interpretation of *ὑψόω*; but the context of Jn 3^{14}, *καθὼς Μωυσῆς ὕψωσε τὸν ὄφιν ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ, οὕτως ὑψωθῆναι δεῖ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*, seems to show that the *ὕψωσις* is the Ascension rather than the Crucifixion. The verb *ὑψόω* is used twice in Acts (2^{33} 5^{31}) of Christ's exaltation to heaven (cf. Ph 2^{9} *ὑπερύψωσε*). For a discussion of its meaning in John see Abbott, *Johannine Gram.*, 1906, 2642 *b*.

the Ascension in OT language: ὁ μὲν οὖν κύριος μετὰ τὸ λαλῆσαι αὐτοῖς ἀνελήμφθη εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν (the phrase used 2 K 2^{11} of the Assumption of Elijah) καὶ ἐκάθισεν ἐκ δεξιῶν τοῦ θεοῦ (cf. Ps 110^{1}).

Later writers, Barnabas (ἀνέστη ἐκ νεκρῶν καὶ φανερωθεὶς ἀνέβη εἰς οὐρανούς, c. 15), Aristides (εἰς οὐρανοὺς ἀνῆλθεν, § 15, ed. Robinson), Justin (ἀναβεβηκέναι εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν, *Dial.* 38), and Irenæus (τὴν ἔνσαρκον εἰς τοὺς οὐρανοὺς ἀνάληψιν, *Hær.* I. x. 1; cf. II. xxxii. 3, III. iv. 2), carry on explicit witness to the Christian tradition into the 2nd century. To these may be added the descriptions in the *Ascension of Isaiah*, *e.g.*: 'They will teach all the nations . . . of the Resurrection (ἀνάστασιν) of the Beloved, and those who believe in His Cross will be saved, and in His Ascension (ἀναβάσει) into the seventh heaven whence He came' (iii. 18, a passage which Charles treats as belonging to the earliest part of the treatise, and as probably of the 1st cent.); see also the description in xi. 22 ff. of the Ascension of the Beloved through the seven heavens (a passage which looks like an imaginative amplification of He 4^{14}).

2. **The Ascension and the Resurrection.**—Despite the definite language of passages such as those which have been cited, it has been suggested by some writers, *e.g.* by Harnack,* that in the earliest tradition the Resurrection and the Ascension were not clearly distinguished. But the considerations already adduced (p. 153ᵇ) sufficiently explain the omission on the part of some writers (*e.g.* Clement, Polycarp, and Ignatius [yet cf. *Magn.* 7]) to make explicit mention of the Ascension as an event in time. To the thought of the first Christians, the credentials of the Gospel were the appearances of Christ after His Resurrection; this historical fact was fundamental. But the *evidential* value of the Ascension was no greater than that of any other of the Epiphanies of the Risen Christ, and from this point of view it was not essential to make separate mention of it. So soon, however, as the Church began to formulate a Creed, the Ascension, as the event which terminated the visible ministry of Christ on earth and inaugurated His invisible ministry in heaven, was explicitly distinguished therein from the Resurrection, as it had already been distinguished in the Acts, in the Marcan Appendix, in Barnabas, and in the 2nd cent. writers. 'He ascended into heaven' is a separate article of the Creed in the earliest forms which we can trace.

Tradition, however, is not quite unanimous as to the interval between the first and last manifestations of the Risen Christ, between the 'Resurrection' and the 'Ascension.' Neither in the third Gospel nor in the Marcan Appendix is there any note of the time that elapsed; and as the story in both cases runs continuously, a hasty reader might conclude that these writers mean to place the Ascension on Easter Day. But it is evident that the Marcan Fragment is only a summary, and not a consecutive narrative. And, although not so evident in St. Luke's account, its summarized character is clear when ch. 24 is scrutinized closely. The Supper at Emmaus was in the evening (24^{29}); time must be found for the return to Jerusalem, seven miles away ($24^{13.\ 33}$); for the telling of the story to the Eleven (24^{35}); for the Meal in the upper room (24^{43}); for the Discourse there and the Commission (24^{44-49}); for the walk of 1½ miles to Olivet (24^{50}). No tradition represents the Ascension as taking place in the middle of the night; and yet this is what we must suppose St. Luke to state, if we take 24^{1-51} as describing the events of a single evening. The fact is that this narrative is not necessarily continuous, from 24^{43} to 24^{44} at any rate, and that therefore it does not contradict the statement of Ac 1^{3} (cf. Ac 13^{31}) that 'forty days' elapsed between the Resurrection and the Ascension.

3. **Ascension Day.**—'Forty' days is a round number; and although the Church since the 4th cent. has kept the Festival of the Ascension on the 40th day after Easter,* it is not certain that the author of Acts meant it to be taken quite literally. Barnabas speaks of the Resurrection and the Ascension as having both taken place on a Sunday† (διὸ καὶ ἄγομεν τὴν ἡμέραν τὴν ὀγδόην εἰς εὐφροσύνην, ἐν ᾗ καὶ ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἀνέστη ἐκ νεκρῶν καὶ φανερωθεὶς ἀνέβη εἰς οὐρανούς, c. 15); and it is possible that he preserves a true tradition about this.‡ It has been suggested by Dr. Swete (*op. cit.* p. 69) that Sunday the 43rd day after Easter would meet the statement of Barnabas, as well as the 'forty' days of Acts; and it may well be that this is the true interpretation of all the data.

4. **Origin of belief in the Ascension.**—The nature and details of the Church's tradition as to the Ascension of Christ have now been summarized. It is worthy of attention that, *a priori*, it would be difficult to account for the origin of such a belief were it not based on fact. Those who explain the belief in the post-Resurrection appearances of Christ as of *subjective* origin, and as due to the temper of strained expectancy which dominated the little company of the disciples of Jesus, may not unreasonably be asked to explain why these pious imaginings should suddenly have ceased. If the visions of the Risen Christ were evoked or created by the loving ardour of those who would fain realize the nearness of the presence of the Master whom they had lost from daily sight, why should they not have continued throughout the Apostolic Age? Granted a belief in the occasional appearances of Christ after His Resurrection, a belief in His subsequent Departure from sight and the complete withdrawal of His visible presence is a surprising phenomenon. Yet nothing is clearer in the records of the 1st and 2nd cents. than that the Church after Pentecost ceased to look for any manifestation of the Risen Lord other than His Second Coming in Judgment. Some event must have taken place which assured them that the period of the Resurrection visions was transitional, and that the consolations of the Church in the future were to be derived, not from such manifestations, but from the spiritual ministrations of a Master in heaven. There must have been, that is, some manifestation of the Risen Christ which they recognized with certainty as the last of the series, and which, therefore, in some respects was unlike those which preceded it. Such an experience was theirs, according to the Lucan narrative, in the vision of the Ascension; and those who do not admit that the narrative is based on a historical event are under the necessity of explaining how the disciples, whose only strength was in the conviction of the nearness of their Risen Master, should have been led to imagine that the gracious Epiphanies of His presence had suddenly come to an end.

5. **Manner of the Ascension.**—When it is sought more closely to determine the manner of the 'Ascension,' the data are found to be insufficient. For it is represented as an Ascension of the body, as well as of the spirit, of Christ; and yet of a body not subject to the ordinary physical conditions. Both in the Lucan (Lk $24^{31.\ 36-43}$) and in

* A careful and valuable examination of his argument will be found in Swete, *The Apostles' Creed*, p. 64 ff.

* Cf. *Const. Ap.* v. 19: ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης κυριακῆς ἀριθμήσαντες τεσσαράκοντα ἡμέρας, ἀπὸ κυριακῆς ἄχρι πέμπτης ἑορτάζετε τὴν ἑορτὴν τῆς ἀναλήψεως.

† Swete (*op. cit.* p. 69) points out that the *Syriac Doctrine of the Apostles* identifies the Ascension with Pentecost, which, although quite inconsistent with Acts, again places the Ascension on a Sunday.

‡ A Gnostic fancy (Iren. I. iii. 2 and xxx. 14), which is also found in the *Ascension of Isaiah* (ix. 16), represented the interval between the Resurrection and the Ascension as 18 months.

the Johannine (Jn $20^{19.26}$) Resurrection narratives, the Risen Christ is represented as in a body over which His spirit has complete control. It is the same body which hung on the cross, but it has been spiritualized. To describe it we have to use St. Paul's phrase, and say that it is now a 'spiritual body' (*σῶμα πνευματικόν* [1 Co 15^{44}]), a body which is the fit organ and instrument of the spirit. We can understand that such a body would not be subject to the laws of space and time, although it is impossible for us to figure in the imagination its movements. And therefore a physical theory of the Ascension is out of our reach. We are subject to spatial and temporal conditions, and although we fully recognize that they are not binding in the spiritual order, they impose limitations upon the pictures of our imagination.

6. Philosophical rationale of the Ascension.—It is, however, possible to conceive the *fact*, although not to imagine the *manner*, of the Ascension, when we remember that it represents the passage from the physical to the spiritual order. Heaven is not a place up in the sky; it is the spiritual world which encompasses us, and which is nearer than can be indicated by physical proximity. It is like a fourth dimension of space, invisible, unimaginable, and yet quite as real and quite as near as the length, breadth, and depth of our bodily environment. To move into this fourth dimension from the earthly life may be the most natural of all movements for the spirit, or for the 'spiritual body' which is its envelope, while the process may be, must be, inscrutable for the spirit confined by the 'natural body.'

Of such a process the counterpart would be a movement from the spiritual order into the physical plane. 'Their eyes were opened, and they knew him; and he vanished out of their sight' (Lk 24^{31}): that is the heavenward movement—the passage *to* the spiritual order. 'Jesus cometh, the doors being shut, and stood in the midst' (Jn 20^{26}): that is the earthward movement—the passage *from* the spiritual order. In neither case is the movement perceptible; the result alone, in the one case *appearance*, in the other *disappearance*, is noted by the bodily senses. Once the reality of the spiritual order is recognized, such phenomena will not be declared impossible. The capacity thus to rise superior to the earthly conditions of space, and in the power of the spirit to move unseen to and from the world of spirit, has been claimed by masters of the spiritual life in many lands; notably it has been claimed by Buddhist mahātmas. We do not stay here to examine the justice of such claims, upon which the last word has probably not yet been said by psychological science. Nor is this the place to enter upon speculation as to the power of spirit over matter, and of mind over body, the limits of which cannot as yet be regarded as defined. But it is desirable to note that the incidents in the Resurrection narratives which have been subjected to the severest criticism as abnormal and incredible present no other difficulty than this, that they presuppose a passage from the physical to the spiritual order. And, in this aspect, the only distinction between the Ascension and the previous withdrawals from sight of the Risen Christ is that the Ascension was the last of a series, and that it was purposely so effected as to give the impression that it would be the last.

7. Implications of the Ascension from the Christian point of view.—This, however, would be a quite inadequate conception of the Ascension from the Christian point of view, for no account has been taken in the preceding section of the unique Personality of the Ascending Christ. We proceed, therefore, briefly to exhibit the significance of the Ascension—or, more strictly, of the Heavenly Session which is its sequel, and which it initiated—in its relation to the fact of the Incarnation, with which it is associated in the Creeds. In what follows, the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation (see INCARNATION) is assumed, and an attempt is made to indicate the doctrinal implications of the Ascension, as they have been recognized by the Church looking back upon the Revelation of God in Christ.

(1) *Exaltation of Christ's Manhood.*—The Christian gospel is that God became man, (*a*) to free man from the bonds of sin, and (*b*) to restore him to the dignity of fellowship with the Divine. (*a*) The beginning of the movement of Divine Love is *Christ Incarnate*, i.e. *Christ in the Humiliation of His Deity*. 'The Word became flesh.' And the Divine sacrifice of the Cross marks the consummation of the Redemption of humanity. But (*b*) the Divine purpose is not fulfilled until man is restored to his true estate. 'The Incarnation could only identify the Redeemer with the essential elements of humanity. It could not spiritualize that bodily organization which is no less a part of the true being of man than his intellectual and moral gifts. . . . The Resurrection and Ascension needed to follow, that the quickening Spirit of Jesus, thus set free, might enter into our spirits, and make us sharers of its victory.'* Thus the end of the movement of the Divine Love is *Christ Ascended*, i.e. *Christ in the Exaltation of His Manhood*. The Ascension was *ἔνσαρκος*, as Irenæus has it (see 1. 3); it was not a mere *ἀνάλημψις*, or Assumption, of Christ's spirit; it was a true *ἀνάβασις*, an exaltation, of Christ as the Representative Man to the glory of the heavenly life. The doctrine of the Incarnation does not teach that Christ assumed human nature, body and spirit, only for the years of His visible ministry, and then abandoned it like a discarded cloak. In the light of the Ascension it means that He is still Man, and that as Man He is in communion with Deity. This is the significance of the Ascension when Christ resumed His heavenly condition, the same yet not the same, for He had become man, who thenceforth may dwel in Him, as He in man.

(2) *Completion of His ministry for mankind.*—The Ascension, therefore, marks the completion of the ministry of Christ in His relation to humanity; henceforth His Messianic offices of King, Prophet, and Priest are fulfilled in perfect measure and without the restraints to which He submitted Himself in the flesh. The service of man is always a service of *leadership*, of *counsel*, of *reconciliation*. These three functions exhaust the service which man can offer to his fellows; he may rule, he may teach, or he may by sacrifice of himself bring them nearer to each other and to God. And in the Ascended Christ as the Perfect Man these ideals are perfectly fulfilled.

(i.) *The Ascended Christ as King.*—It was under this image that the Hebrews most vividly conceived of the Messianic Deliverer who was to come. Their natural leader in war was their king, who not only directed the campaign from afar, but himself descended to the battle-field. So, too, under the conditions of Eastern autocracy, the king was the judge, who assigned reward and punishment by his own authority. And thus, when Christ spoke in parables of His future relation to mankind, the images most frequently used were the images of kingship and a kingdom: 'Henceforth ye shall see the Son of man sitting at the right hand of power' (Mt 26^{64}); and it is 'the King' who is to dispense blessing and cursing at the Last Assize (Mt 25^{34}). The Apocalypse represents Him as a Warrior going forth to smite the nations, 'King of kings and Lord of lords' (Rev 19^{16}), whose victory at last shall be complete: 'the

* Milligan, *The Ascension of our Lord*, p. 30.

kingdom of the world is become the kingdom of our Lord, and of His Christ' (Rev 11[15]). In this there is an inner moral necessity, according to St. Paul: 'He *must* reign till he hath put all his enemies under his feet' (1 Co 15[25]). The rule of the Ascended Christ, seated in majesty at the right hand of power, is the rule of an absolute monarch; and the Ascension marks the Enthronement of the King. The Hebrew conception of a Messianic Prince merges in the larger conception of an invisible Master in heaven, who directs the history of the world, and holds the keys of the future.

(ii.) *The Ascended Christ as Prophet.*—That 'the Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified' (Jn 7[39]), is a principle frequently laid down in the Fourth Gospel. The thought of Christ as 'the Servant of Jahweh,' the Prophet who was to be raised up, was prominent in the earliest Christology (Ac 3[13. 22. 26] 7[37]). That He came to reveal the Father's will was His own claim from the beginning (cf. esp. Mt 11[27] || Lk 10[22]). Nevertheless, this prophetical office, although fulfilled by the Incarnate Christ in such measure as no prophet or seer before Him had reached, was not to be fulfilled in its perfection until after the Ascension, when it was to be exercised through the ministry of the Spirit: 'It is expedient . . . that I go away: for if I go not away, the Paraclete will not come. . . . I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now. Howbeit when he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he shall guide you into all the truth' (Jn 16[7. 12. 13]). *Accipe Spiritum Sanctum* is the final gift of Christ, who became a 'quickening spirit' after His Resurrection. The gift of the Spirit is the supreme grace and glory of the Church, and through this ministry the prophetical office of Christ is perpetuated and perfected for all time.

(iii.) *The Ascended Christ as Priest.*—Of the conception of Messiah as Priest there is but little in the OT literature. The idea emerges, in Ps 110[4], of His Eternal Priesthood, although not after the order of Aaron, but 'after the order of Melchizedek'; but the thought was not developed until the Epistle to the Hebrews expanded it. The consummation of the official service of the Jewish high priests was reached when, on the Day of Atonement, the sin-offering on behalf of the people having been sacrificed outside, the blood of the victim was brought within the Holy Place and sprinkled before the Mercy-seat (Lv 16[15]). So, it is argued (He 9[11. 12]), the consummation of the offering of the great High Priest is His Ascension to the heavenly Mercy-seat, where the efficacy of His sacrifice of blood is perpetually pleaded. It is the function of a priest *to offer sacrifice*, and this is perfectly fulfilled in the voluntary sacrifice of the Victim-Priest, which is efficacious to the cleansing from *sin* and not merely from ceremonial defilement (He 10[12]), and which, further, is unique and needs not to be repeated (He 7[27] 9[25. 26]). But the higher, and more spiritual, function of a priest is *to intercede*, and this is perfectly fulfilled in the perpetual intercession (He 7[25]) of the Priest who has 'passed into the heavens' (He 4[14]), 'made higher than the heavens' (He 7[26]), 'who sat down on the right hand of the throne of the Majesty in the heavens' (He 8[1]), whose priesthood is 'unchangeable' (He 7[24]). It has been debated by theologians when the Priesthood of Christ began. Is He to be regarded as a Priest during any period of His visible ministry, or did He enter upon His Priesthood only in heaven?* The answer seemingly implied in Hebrews is that, while He was always Priest throughout His Ministry and Passion, and while the supreme sacrifice of His priestly ministration was the sacrifice of Himself on the Cross, yet the consummation of His priestly service is to be found in His perpetual intercession in heaven. Just as the Jewish priest did not reach the highest moment of his service until he had brought the blood of the victim within the Holy Place, so Christ did not fulfil His priesthood in perfect measure until He had ascended. The Ascension marks the complete fulfilment and consummation of His work as Priest no less than as King and as Prophet. For the Ascension no less than for the Passion, there was an inner moral necessity in the Divine counsels: οὐχὶ ταῦτα ἔδει παθεῖν τὸν Χριστὸν καὶ εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ; (Lk 24[26]).

8. Practical issues of the dogma.—While the Ascension has thus always been viewed in Christian theology as the 'Glorification' of Christ and the entrance upon His reward, the practical issue of belief in it has always been the same as that which is recorded of its first witnesses: 'They continued in the Temple, blessing God' (Lk 24[53]). The vision of the Ascension is a call to worship: Let us draw near unto the throne (He 4[16]). That Christ 'ascended' is not only the pledge that His Ministry for mankind is perfect and final; it also conveys the assurance that heaven is near, and that the earthly order is encompassed by the spiritual. The practical theology of the Ascension is the idealism of the Christian life.

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J. H. BERNARD.

ASSURANCE.—See CERTAINTY.

ASSYRIANS.—See BABYLONIANS AND ASSYRIANS.

ASTROLOGY AND ASTRONOMY.—See STARS, also SUN, MOON.

ASURS.—The Asurs of the present day are a non-Aryan tribe of the Kolarians in Chota-Nagpur, Bengal. A people of the same name is mentioned in the religious books of the Hindus. According to the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, they are the descendants of Prajāpati ('the Lord of the Creation'). How they became evil spirits or *A-sura* (='not-God') is not clear; the fact alone is stated that they fought against the Devatās 'for the possession of the earth,' and that they were overcome and finally succumbed. The historical grain of truth in this poetical story is apparent: the Aryans, in their invasion of what is now called India, were obstructed by that fierce and savage-like people whom they called *Asura*, or demons, and whom they expelled and partly annihilated.

Whether the Asurs living in Chota-Nagpur are the offspring of these opponents of the Aryans or are connected with the Asura builders of those ancient embankments still found in the Mirzāpur district, is, of course, an open question; yet there seems to be nothing to exclude such suppositions. This much is certain, that Chota-Nagpur was partly inhabited by Asurs before the Kolarian and Dravidian tribes entered it from the North-West, when they likewise had been expelled from their former seats by the stronger and more intelligent Aryans.

There are still traces of copper mines in Chota-

* For opposing views, see Milligan, *op. cit.* 77 ff., and Westcott, *Hebrews*, *passim*.

Nagpur, which seem to have been worked in ancient times, and tradition attributes these to the Asurs. The conclusion may readily be drawn that the Asurs, before leaving their former settlements, lived for some time as subjects of the conquering race (the Aryans), by whom they became to some extent civilized. At the present time their occupation consists in digging iron ore, melting iron, and making agricultural implements for their neighbours.

When the Kolarians were compelled by the Aryans to seek refuge in the hills and the dense forests of Chota-Nagpur, they met there the Asurs, and a severe fight ensued for the possession of the arable land, in which the Asurs were overcome, and again almost annihilated. The remnant fled to the plateaux of the Chota-Nagpur and Palāmau hills, where we find them to-day. A few of them have emigrated to adjacent districts.

The spirits of the slain Asurs must ever have haunted the superstitious and demon-fearing Kols, and they, perhaps with the help of some Hindu hermit versed in the Purānas, invented the so-called *Asur legend*. In this legend may perhaps be found some traces of the tradition of the tower of Babel, and the supposition is allowable that such a legend was current among the Kolarians when the story of the destruction of the Asurs and the dispersion of their remnant was added and mixed up with it in later times. The legend as told at present by the aborigines in Chota-Nagpur amounts to the following story :—

There were twelve brethren (septs) of Asurs with their wives and children. They melted iron, they ate iron, and made such a big fire in the melting furnace that Singbongā, the sun-god, was annoyed. He first sent two birds with a message of warning, but the Asurs maltreated the divine messengers, sullied their colour, and plucked feathers from the tail of one of them until only two were left; these birds were the raven and the black starling. Seeing that the Asurs were bent on doing even more mischief, Singbongā at last sent his son in the form of a *Kasrā Korā*, or leprous youth. He sought and found shelter with an old Munḍā chief and his wife. The Asurs got hold of him and threw him into the furnace; but he came out of the ordeal cleansed of his leprosy, and bearing in his hands large lumps of gold. This roused the covetousness of the Asurs, and bidding their wives to tread the bellows well, they jumped into the fire, and perished one and all, leaving their wives and children widows and orphans. These surrounded the son of Singbongā, and did not let him return to heaven until he had assured them that they might occupy the high mountains, the forests, the rivers and desert places, where people would worship them, offering fowls and goats, and rice and liquor, to feed and satisfy them. Whereupon the old ladies dispersed and became the malicious spirits of the mountains, the Sāl-forest, the barren fields and the springs, where they receive the offerings of the people, and are content as long as they are appeased.

The Asurs in Chota-Nagpur number 4894, besides 4616 Brijiā and Agariā. They claim to be connected with the Brijiā or Binjhiā tribe, an agricultural and land-holding class in Chota-Nagpur, who within their own households speak Uriya. A subdivision of the Asurs are the Agariās, beggars wandering about with tamed monkeys, whose feats they exhibit. Another subtribe, following the vocation of blacksmith, call themselves 'Loharā-Asurs.' Others are called Pahārias or Hill-Asurs. Though few in number, the Asurs are divided into several totemistic septs, such as *Bāsriār* (=sprung from the bamboo), *Makrār* (=spider), *Ind* (=eel), *Hōrō* (=tortoise), etc. The totems of these septs do not appear to be tabu, though marrying within one of these sections is eschewed as far as practicable.

Customs.—Child marriages are unknown among the Asurs. A price for the bride is given, varying from 3 to 5 rupees. Polygamy is permitted, as well as re-marriage of widows. No priestly functions are required for the marriage ceremonies, which are very simple. Rice-beer is indulged in by both sexes, but smoking only by the men. The Asurs have no dancing places like the Kols, as they lead almost a nomadic life, leaving their own settlement when the iron ore or the land is exhausted; the latter they till only in the most primitive way, without manuring or ploughing. They have scarcely any musical instruments, and seldom sing or dance. The women, however, are notorious for their lax morality, and are easily enticed away into the towns and large villages of Chota-Nagpur, where they earn a living as dancing girls. As to food the Asurs are not very particular, eating almost anything, the flesh of the carcass of a cow not excluded.

Language.—The language of the Asurs, which they call *Dukma*, is a dialect of the Kolarian family of languages, and was most probably adopted from their conquerors, the Munḍās, with such alterations in the pronunciation as suited their nature. For example, almost all Munḍāri words found in *Dukma* that commence with *h* change this consonant into *v*; and wherever a vowel follows *n* in Munḍāri, the Asur inserts the semi-vowel *y* between the two. There are no traces of an original tongue in the Asur *Dukma* as spoken at the present day, for almost every word in its vocabulary can be traced to Kolarian or Dravidian sources. From the Dravidian languages the Asurs subsequently added to their vocabulary. Through contact with Aryans, they have adopted also a number of words derived from Sanskrit. What has been said about their language is not opposed to the assumption that the Asurs are essentially a Kolarian tribe. They may have separated from the rest of the Kolarian ancestors at a remote period, developing a language of their own, until they were conquered by the Kolarian tribe of the Munḍās, whose dialect they adopted to a great extent. The features and bodily appearance of the Asurs are distinctly and decidedly Kolarian.

Religion.—This is somewhat different from the animism of their Kolarian relatives. The Asurs are not demon-worshippers, and have no priestly institution. Where they are found sacrificing to the evil spirits of the forest, the mountain, or the field, this is due to their being members of a village community, consisting of Kolarian or Dravidian inhabitants, who worship those deities. Wherever they live by themselves, they do not worship any of the petty gods or demons of those tribes. The Asurs believe in a great benevolent spirit, the Creator and Preserver of the world. He does not require to be worshipped in any way. When they identify him with the sun, or rather believe him to be resident in the sun, they most likely follow therein the notions of the Munḍāri tribe. It is true that they also believe in evil spirits, and have to propitiate them by making bloody sacrifices, consisting of fowls. These evil spirits, however, with the Asurs, are exclusively the departed spirits of their forefathers, who must be provided with food, and propitiated whenever they become hungry and irritable. All the diseases and troubles of this life are ascribed to their anger; they must be appeased, therefore, with sacrifices of fowls, presented by the head of the family at the house-altar, the fire-hearth. In new-born children the Asurs see the re-born spirits of ancestors. Witches and the evil eye are therefore unknown within the tribe, but people from without may bewitch an Asur baby, or a foreigner may cast an evil eye upon him, and for this reason anklets of iron are required to protect the little Asur child.

The Asur has no moral code, all his obligations being confined to the one important matter of keeping the spirits of his ancestors at ease, or, when disturbed, of quieting them in the manner described above. Every departed parent becomes a spirit—a good one if he died a natural death, an

evil one if he died suddenly or by accident. In the former case it is essential to provide him with food for the journey beyond, and in the latter to present a sacrifice at the funeral. The Asurs burn their dead, and at the funeral some rice must be put on the funeral pile, and for eight days after cremation portions of the regular meals must be placed outside the door of the house in the name of the departed. After the time mentioned he will settle down in quiet. At the close of the eight days the nearest relatives and friends come for the funeral meal, when they partake freely of home-brewed rice-beer. After this, good spirits of the ancestors need no further attention, and may be trusted to help and protect their people on earth. It is only the unfortunate evil spirit which so frequently becomes irritable and ill-disposed. He is to be feared, and in time of sickness and calamity to be reconciled by offerings of rice and liquor, and by sacrifices. See art. AGARIĀ.

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AŚVAGHOṢA.—Aśvaghoṣa is well known as the author of the Buddha-charita, a poetical description of Buddha's life.* To him is ascribed the Alaṅkāra, a collection of Buddhist stories with their respective moral teachings. The authenticity of these traditions is confirmed by the external evidence of I-Tsing's statement,† and the internal evidence does not contradict it.

We learn from the colophon to the Tibetan Buddha-charita,‡ and from a biography of Vasubandhu, that Aśvaghoṣa was a native of Sāketa. According to the latter authority, it was he who was summoned to Kābul by Kātyāyanīputra, the alleged composer of the 'Abhidharma in Eight Sections,' in order to help him in the compilation of the great commentary (Mahāvibhāṣā) on the text of that Abhidharma. As we learn from Yuan Chwang (Hiuen Tsiang), this compilation took place under the patronage of King Kaniṣka, who is now generally believed to have flourished in the 1st cent. A.D. That Aśvaghoṣa was contemporary with Kaniṣka is confirmed from another source,§ which describes Aśvaghoṣa's life in detail, and from which are derived the later legends concerning him.

We are told that Aśvaghoṣa was a learned but haughty man, who was at last converted to the Buddhist faith in the nonentity of the phenomenal world. The agent in his conversion was Pūrṇayaśas, a disciple of Pārśva,‖ who is said to have presided over the compilation of the above-mentioned great commentary. After his conversion Aśvaghoṣa worked eagerly for the propagation of Buddha's teaching in Kusumapura (the modern Patna), not only as a preacher, but also as a poet and musician. When that town was taken by the army of Chandana Kaniṣṭha, the king of the Yuehchis, Aśvaghoṣa was carried away to their country in the north as a portion of the tribute paid to the conqueror by the Magadhans.

Another biography of Aśvaghoṣa tells essentially the same story. The indebtedness of Aśvaghoṣa to Pārśva and Pūrṇayaśas is confirmed by the expression of homage at the beginning of the Alaṅkāra, while his connexion with King Kaniṣṭha is elsewhere asserted.*

Thus far the traditions about Aśvaghoṣa's life, which are the oldest sources of our knowledge about him, may be regarded as comparatively authentic. But when we take up many other writings which bear his name, we find ourselves in the dark as to the identity of the person.† And the matter is made no clearer by the Tibetan tradition, which applies many epithets to him. This tradition dates from the 16th cent., and itself seems to be the result of confusion.

According to it, Aśvaghoṣa was living under King Bindusāra, the son of Chandragupta, and was connected with Kanika, the king of Tili and Mālava in the west. Of six epithets given to him we mention: Mātṛcheta, Dhārmika-Subhūti, Śūra. Comparing these different traditions, we find little reason to see in this Aśvaghoṣa the author of the Buddha-charita, except the connexion of the name with King Kaniṣka or Kanika. The Tibetan author, it is true, states expressly that the Kanika mentioned there is not to be confused with Kaniṣka, yet there is reason enough to suspect his accuracy.

The following are the works attributed to a person or persons bearing the name of Aśvaghoṣa.

1. 'Hymn in one hundred and fifty stanzas.' This has been handed down to us in a Chinese and in a Tibetan version. The two agree fairly well with one another, and in both the author is known as Mātṛcheta. The colophon to the Tibetan version identifies this Mātṛcheta with Aśvaghoṣa. But I-Tsing, the translator of the hymn into Chinese, seems to regard him as different from the author of the Buddha-charita. On the other hand, there is in Tibetan an epistle sent from Mātṛcheta to King Kanika of the Kuśa race.‡ King Kaniṣṭha is mentioned in Aśvaghoṣa's Alaṅkāra as of the Kuśa race. But there Aśvaghoṣa speaks of the king as of one who lived in the past. It remains quite uncertain whether Mātṛcheta and Aśvaghoṣa, on the one hand, and Kanika, Kaniṣka, and Kaniṣṭha, on the other, are respectively to be identified or not.

2. The Vajra-sūchī,§ a refutation of the caste-system, bears the name of Aśvaghoṣa as its author; but the same text in the Chinese translation (Nanjio, No. 1303) is ascribed to Fā Hien, lit. 'law-fame.' This name is usually rendered as Dharmayaśas, but may be Dhārmika-Subhūti, lit. 'lawful-glory.'

3. Further, a work, in the Chinese translation, called 'The Distinctions of the Fruits of Works' (Nanjio, No. 1349), is ascribed to a Bodhisattva 'Great Valour,' which is surely Mahāśūra in Sanskrit. Another book, 'Transmigration in the Six Resorts,' agrees with the above in substance, and its authorship is ascribed to Aśvaghoṣa.

The two instances given above seem to be confirmatory of the Tibetan tradition, but they are not strong enough to establish the identity of these Aśvaghoṣas with the author of the Buddha-charita.

4. Another book ascribed to Aśvaghoṣa is 'A Nirgrantha's Inquiry into the principle of Non-ego.'‖ It expounds the contrast of phenomena and reality, just as in the sermon delivered by Pūrṇayaśas to Aśvaghoṣa which is preserved in the Records of the Patriarchs. Probably this Aśvaghoṣa is the same as the Aśvaghoṣa of those Records.

5. There is mention of the name Aśvaghoṣa in the memoirs of Yuan Chwang. This Aśvaghoṣa was a contemporary of Nāgārjunana, of Deva, of Kumāralabdha, and of the man who detected a Brāhman possessed by a demon. Though Yuan Chwang calls this Aśvaghoṣa a Bodhisattva, we have no ground for identifying him with any of the Aśvaghoṣas mentioned above.

6. Finally, we have Aśvaghoṣa the author of *The Awakening of Faith*.¶

This last work represents a well-reasoned exposition of the doctrines of the final metaphysical principle and of the phenomenal world as contrasted with it. Everything phenomenal is unreal, because it is made up of constituents and is governed by the law of causality. Now reality transcends every distinction and qualification. It is the ὄντως ὄν, and cannot but be named *tathatā*, *i.e.* 'the

* Nanjio, No. 1329, *Ratnapiṭaka*, tr. by Kiṅkārya. He gives the name as something like Kaniṭa (or, -ṭṭha); but a later translator, Sūryayaśas, gives Kaniṣṭha.

† T. Suzuki has made a very exhaustive collection of the materials respecting these works and legends in his introduction to Aśvaghoṣa's *Awakening of Faith*, Chicago, 1900. But he was too anxious to regard any Aśvaghoṣa as identical with the author of the book he translated.

‡ On the connexion of Mātṛcheta with King Kanika and the questions connected therewith, see F. W. Thomas, art. in *IA*, 1903, p. 245 f.

§ A. F. Weber, *Die Vajra-sūci des Aśvaghosha*, Berlin, 1860.

‖ Tr. by Sūryayaśas (11th cent.), but the work is not mentioned in Nanjio's *Catalogue*. See S. Beal, *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, 2 vols., Boston, 1885; *Life of Buddha*, by Aśvaghoṣa Bodhisattva, *SBE* xix., Oxford, 1883, p. xxx ff.; L. A. Waddell, *Lamaism*, 1895, p. 10 f.

¶ Nanjio, No. 1249 *f.*, translated by T. Suzuki; see above note †.

† *Record of the Buddhist Religion*, Oxf. 1896, pp. 158, 165 f.

‡ *IA*, 1903, p. 350.

§ *Records of the Patriarchs*, Nanjio, No. 1340, tr. by Kiṅkārya (Kiṅkāra of Suzuki and Kekaya of Takakusu) in 472; No. 1460 tr. by Kumārajiva about 405; see Wassilieff, p. 231.

‖ Possibly an epithet of Kātyāyanīputra.

* Tr. in *SBE*, vol. xlix.

Thatness.' The final aim of Buddhist enlightenment consists in the full realization of this absolute reality, which is the true and highest condition of Buddhahood. That is the eternal substance of the Truth revealed by Buddha, and is, therefore, the true doctrine and, at the same time, the true body or entity of Buddha, *i.e.* the *Dharma-kāya*. But the absolute, which is unique in its substance, does not remain without its manifestations. When it appears to us in its state of bliss, it is the Buddha in enjoyment (*sambhoga*). When it is manifested in this world in order to save us personally, it is the Buddha incarnate or in *kenosis* (*nirmāṇa*), as, for example, Śākyamuni. In order to attain the ideal of enlightenment, it is necessary for us to believe in any of these three aspects of Buddha's personality, and to be saved by his grace (*parigraha*, lit. 'grasping').

Thus we see in this work of Aśvaghoṣa a concise systematization of later Buddhist metaphysics in their consequences, and of Buddhist religious faith, expressed in the doctrines of the three personalities (bodies) of Buddha,* and of the relation between grace and faith.

Summing up these statements, we have not enough evidence either to affirm or to deny the identity of any of the Aśvaghoṣas enumerated under heads 1–6, except 4, with the author of the Buddha-charita. The same epithet may have been applied to many authors in different periods, because of their poetic talent or of their wisdom, which is said to have touched the heart even of a horse. The Tibetan tradition seems to have erroneously regarded these different persons as one with many names.

LITERATURE.—Nanjio, *Catalogue of the Chinese Buddhist Books*, 1883, No. 1460, 'Life of Aśvaghoṣa,' No. 1463; 'Life of Vasubandhu,' in *JRAS*, 1905, p. 33 ff., and Wassilieff, *Buddhismus*, 1860, p. 239.

M. ANESAKI.

AŚVAMEDHA.—The *aśvamedha*, 'horse-sacrifice,' is one of the most imposing sacrifices in Indian ritual. It ranks as one of the great or solemn sacrificial ceremonies (*mahākratu* or *yajñakratu*). As early as the Rigveda itself two hymns are found composed for this particular occasion (i. 162 and 163). The sacrifice is described in detail in the Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa (xiii. 1–5) and Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa (iii. 8–9), as well as in the special treatises on ritual known as the Śrautasūtras, of Kātyāyana (xx.), Āpastamba (xx.), Āśvalāyana (x. 6 f.), Śāṅkhāyana (xvi.), and others. In the Mahābhārata (xiv. 71. 14 ff.) the horse-sacrifice which King Yudhiṣṭhira celebrated after his victory over the Kurus, as a purification from all sins, is described with epic diffuseness. The *aśvamedha* was thus the royal sacrifice *par excellence*. The privilege of sacrificing the horse belonged only to a ruler whose sovereign power was undisputed. It was designed to secure for him continued success, the fulfilment of all his desires, increase of strength and extension of the empire. Consequently the sacrifice was made before an expedition for conquest (*digvijaya*), or after a campaign which had ended in victory. The Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa (viii. 21 f.) gives a list, adorned with antique verses, of the kings of olden times who, after ascending the throne, marched victoriously through the whole earth and then celebrated a horse-sacrifice. The *aśvamedha* thus became a great State function in the performance of which the people took part officially, and with which were associated customs of a secular and often very gross character, accompanied by oratorical displays. In the strictly regulated ritual these last were prescribed in detail; but in olden times, before the ritual had hardened into fixed rules, they were a matter of spontaneous improvization. These two features, its more secular character and its national colouring, distinguished the *aśvamedha* from most of the other sacrifices, which were exclusively priestly.

The sacrifice began in spring or summer, and, with the preparatory ceremonies, occupied more than a year. First, a suitable victim had to be carefully selected. The animal chosen must be of pure breed and valuable, distinguished by special marks. After it had been set apart for sacrifice by the symbolical act of tethering to the sacrificial post, and had been bathed, it was granted full freedom again. It was allowed to run loose for a whole year, and to sport freely in the company of a hundred old horses. A hundred royal princes, a hundred noblemen, a hundred sons of officials of higher, and a hundred of those of lower rank, all armed in accordance with their station, formed its escort and guarded it against danger or theft, without interfering with its freedom of movement. Conflicts or wars (cf. especially Mahābhārata, xiv.) often resulted from attempts to steal the horse during its wanderings. If it were lost, the ceremonial had to be partly repeated and another animal substituted.

While the horse thus roamed about at a distance, the people at home awaited the time of its return, and in the meantime took part in all kinds of festivities. Gifts were offered daily to the god Savitṛ; daily also at a festive gathering before the king and the court the *hotṛ* had to give a recital. Every eleven days this cycle of recitations was repeated. The recital concluded with an appropriate chapter from the Vedas, together with singing, lute-playing, and impromptu verses, composed by a noble bard in honour of the king, the giver of the sacrifice, in which he was compared with the pious rulers of olden times. The recital itself was enlivened by dramatic action. According to the class of persons who formed the subject-matter of the recitation, it was arranged that the audience and chorus to whom the reciter addressed himself should consist of old or young people, snake-charmers, robbers, usurers, fishermen, bird-catchers, or sages. When the year had expired and the horse had returned, the sacrifice began with consecration (*dīkṣā*) of the king.

The ceremony proper lasted three days, and was accompanied by numerous other animal-sacrifices, and by the pressing of the soma. On the second day, the sacrificial horse, decked with gold, was once more yoked with three other horses to a gilded car, driven round, and then bathed. On its return, it was anointed by the three chief wives of the king and decorated, while the *hotṛ* and the superintendent of the sacrifice (Brāhman) performed a *Brahmodya*, or theosophical enigma-play. The horse was then bound, together with a he-goat, to its sacrificial post, the other animals for sacrifice, to the number of several hundreds, being bound to similar posts; and, having been covered with cloth, it was suffocated. The chief wife of the king had to lie down by the corpse under a covering and submit to an obscene ceremony, while the sacrificial priests took part with the women and maidens in sportive questions and answers (*Vajasaneyi-Saṁhitā*, xxiii. 22 f.), not distinguished by delicacy. As soon as the chief wife had arisen, the horse was skilfully cut up. After another series of enigmatic questions in which all the chief priests and the sacrificer joined, the served portions of the horse were roasted on a spit and offered to Prajāpati. On the third day the whole festival closed with the bath of purification of the donor of the sacrifice and with gifts to the sacrificing priests. The honorarium (*dakṣiṇā*), which was measured with a very liberal hand, was derived from booty captured in the conquered land. Even

* See art. 'Triad' in *JRAS*, 1906, p. 943 ff.

wives of the king with their maids figure among the presents.

LITERATURE.—A. Hillebrandt, *Rituallitteratur* (Strassburg, 1897), p. 149; J. Eggeling, *SBE* xliv., Introd. p. xv f.

K. GELDNER.

ASYLUM.—Asylum (Lat. *asȳlum*, Gr. ἄσῡλον, 'refuge,' 'sanctuary,' neut. of adj. ἄσῡλος, 'inviolable,' from ἀ priv. and σύλη, σῦλον, 'right of seizure') means a place of shelter and protection from which a refugee is not allowed to be forcibly removed.

1. Among many peoples at different stages of civilization sacred places are asylums. Thus among the Aruntas of Central Australia there is in each local totem centre a spot called *erinatulunga*, in the immediate neighbourhood of which everything is sacred and must on no account be hurt. The plants growing there are never interfered with in any way; animals which come there are safe from the spear of the hunter; and a man who is being pursued by others cannot be touched as long as he remains at this spot.[1] At Maiva, in the South-Eastern part of New Guinea, 'should a man be pursued by an enemy and take refuge in the *dubu* [or temple], he is perfectly safe inside. Any one smiting another inside the *dubu* would have his arms and legs shrivelled up, and he could do nothing but wish to die.'[2] In Upolu, one of the Samoan Islands, a certain god, Vave, had his residence in an old tree, which served as an asylum for murderers and other great offenders; if that tree was reached by the criminal, he was safe, and the avenger could pursue no farther, but had to wait for investigation and trial.[3] In the island of Hawaii there were two *puhonuas*, or cities of refuge, which afforded an inviolable sanctuary even to the vilest criminal who entered their precincts, and during war offered safe retreat to all the non-combatants of the neighbouring districts who flocked into them, as well as to the vanquished. As soon as the fugitive had entered, he repaired to the presence of the idol and made a short ejaculatory address, expressive of his obligations to him in reaching the place with security. The priests and their adherents would immediately put to death any one who should have the temerity to follow or molest those who were once within the pale of the *pahu tabu*, and, as they put it, under the shade or protection of the spirit of Keave, the tutelary deity of the place. After a short period, probably not more than two or three days, the refugee was permitted to return unmolested to his home, the divine protection being supposed still to abide with him. In Tahiti the *morais*, or holy places, likewise gave shelter to criminals of every kind.[5]

2. In many North American tribes certain sacred places or whole villages served as asylums.[6] Thus the Arikaras of the Missouri had in the centre of their largest village a sacred lodge called the 'medicine-lodge,' where no blood was to be spilled, not even that of an enemy.[7] 'In almost every Indian nation,' says Adair, who wrote about the tribes of the South-Eastern States, 'there are several peaceable towns, which are called "old-beloved, ancient, holy, or white towns"; they seem to have been formerly "towns of refuge," for it is not in the memory of their oldest people that human blood was ever shed in them, although they often force persons from them, and put them to death elsewhere.'[1] Among the Acagchemen Indians, however, in the valley and neighbourhood of San Juan Capistrano in California, a criminal who had fled to a *vanquech*, or place of worship, was secure not only as long as he remained there, but also after he had left the sanctuary. It was not lawful even to mention his crime; all that the avenger could do to him was to point at him and deride him, saying, 'Lo, a coward, who has been forced to flee to Chinigchinich!' Yet this flight turned the punishment from the head of the criminal upon that of one of his relatives.[2]

3. On the coast of Malabar a certain temple situated to the south-east of Calicut affords protection to thieves and adulterous women belonging to the Brāhman caste; but this privilege is reckoned among the sixty-four *anatcharams*, or abuses, which were introduced by Brāhmanism.[3] Among the Kafirs of the Hindu-Kush there are several 'cities of refuge,' the largest being the village of Mergrom, which is almost entirely peopled by *chiles*, or descendants of persons who have slain some fellow-tribesman.[4] In the Caucasus holy groves offer refuge to criminals, as also to animals, which cannot be shot there.[5]

The Barotse of South Central Africa have a city of refuge, where anybody who has incurred the king's wrath or committed a crime is safe; the man in charge of it is expected to plead for him before the chief, and the refugee can then return to his house in peace.[6] In Congo Français, according to Miss Kingsley, there are several sanctuaries. 'The great one in the Calabar district is at Omon. Thither mothers of twins, widows, thieves, and slaves flee, and if they reach it are safe.'[7] In Ashanti a slave who flees to a temple and dashes himself against the fetish cannot easily be brought back to his master.[8] Among the Negroes of Accra, criminals used to 'seat themselves upon the fetish,' that is, place themselves under its protection; but murderers who sought refuge with the fetish were always liable to be delivered up to their pursuers.[9]

4. In Morocco the tombs of saints and mosques offer shelter to refugees, especially in those parts of the country where the Sultan's government has no power; even the descendants of the saint or his manager (*mḳaddam*) can only by persuasion and by promising to mediate between the suppliant and his pursuer induce the former to leave the place.[10] In other Muhammadan countries there are, or have been, similar places of refuge.[11] In Persia the great number of such asylums proved so injurious to public safety, that about the middle of the 19th cent. only three mosques were left which were recognized by the government as affording protection to criminals of every description.[12]

Among the Hebrews the right of asylum originally belonged to all altars (Ex 21[13f.]; cf. W. R.

[1] Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 133 ff.
[2] Chalmers and Gill, *Work and Adventures in New Guinea* (1885), p. 186.
[3] Turner, *Samoa* (1884), p. 64 f.
[4] Ellis, *Tour through Hawaii* (1827), p. 155 ff.; Jarves, *History of the Hawaiian Islands* (1872), p. 28 f.
[5] Turnbull, *Voyage round the World* (1813), p. 366; Wilson, *Missionary Voyage to the Southern Pacific Ocean* (1799), p. 351.
[6] Bourke, 'Medicine-Men of the Apache,' in *9 RBEW* (1892), p. 453; Kohl, *Kitschi-Gami* (1859), p. 271 (Chippewas).
[7] Bradbury, *Travels in the Interior of America* (1817), p. 165 f.

[1] Adair, *History of the American Indians* (1775), p. 159; see also pp. 158, 416.
[2] Bancroft, *Native Races of the Pacific States*, iii. (1883) p. 167; Boscana, in Robinson, *Life in California* (1846), p. 262 f.
[3] Graul, *Reise nach Ostindien*, iii. (1854) pp. 332, 335.
[4] Scott Robertson, *Káfirs of the Hindu-Kush* (1896), p. 441.
[5] Hahn, *Kaukasische Reisen* (1896), p. 122.
[6] Arnot, *Garenganze* (1889), p. 77.
[7] Kingsley, *Travels in West Africa* (1897), p. 466.
[8] Bowdich, *Mission to Ashantee* (1819), p. 265.
[9] Monrad, *Skildring af Guinea-Kysten* (1822), p. 89.
[10] Westermarck, '*L-'ár*, or the Transference of Conditional Curses in Morocco,' in *Anthrop. Essays presented to E. B. Tylor* (1907), p. 372 f.
[11] Goldziher, *Muhammedanische Studien*, i. (1889) p. 237 f.; Quatremère, 'Mémoire sur les asiles chez les Arabes,' in *Mémoires de l'Institut de France, Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, xv. pt. ii. (1842), p. 313 f.
[12] Polak, *Persien*, ii. (1865) p. 83 ff.; Brugsch, *Im Lande der Sonne* (1886), p. 246; Jackson, *Persia Past and Present* (1906), pp. 170, 267, 422.

Smith, *Rel. of Semites*[2], 1894, p. 148, n. 1); but on the abolition of the local altars it was limited to certain cities of refuge, three on either side of the Jordan (Dt $4^{41ff.}$ $19^{2ff.}$). Unintentional manslayers were sheltered in these cities; whereas, if a refugee was found guilty of murder, he had to be taken away from the asylum by the elders of his town and delivered to the next kinsman of the murdered person, to be put to death by him (Dt $19^{4ff.}$). According to the post-exilic law, the refugee could leave the place, after the high priest's death, without being exposed to the pursuit of the avenger of blood (Nu 35^{28}); but he was not permitted to purchase an earlier return to his possession with a money ransom (Nu 35^{32}). However, the restriction of the legal right of asylum to the case of involuntary homicide was undoubtedly a narrowing of the ancient custom. Many heathen sanctuaries of the Phœnicians and Syrians retained even in Roman times what seems to have been an unlimited right of asylum, and at certain Arabian shrines the god likewise gave shelter to all fugitives without distinction, and even stray or stolen cattle that reached the holy ground could not be reclaimed by their owners.[1]

5. In Greece many sanctuaries possessed the right of asylum down to the end of paganism, and any violation of this right was supposed to be severely punished by the deity.[2] According to an old tradition, Romulus established a sanctuary, dedicated to some unknown god or spirit, on the slope of the Capitoline Hill, proclaiming that all who resorted to it, whether bond or free, should be safe.[3] This tradition and also some other statements made by Latin writers[4] seem to indicate that from ancient times certain sacred places in Rome gave shelter to refugees; but it was only at a comparatively late period of Roman history that the right of sanctuary, under Greek influence, became a recognized institution of some importance.[5] This right was expressly conferred upon the temple which in the year 42 B.C. was built in honour of Cæsar;[6] and other imperial temples, as also the statues of emperors, laid claim to the same privilege.[7] When Christianity became the religion of the State, a similar claim was made by the Churches; but a legal right of asylum was first granted to them by Honorius in the West and Theodosius in the East.[8] Subsequently it was restricted by Justinian, who decreed that all manslayers, adulterers, and kidnappers of women who fled to a church should be taken out of it.[9]

6. The right of sanctuary existed among the pagan Slavs, or some of them,[10] and, as it seems, among the ancient Teutons.[11] After their conversion to Christianity the privilege of asylum within the church was recognized in most of their codes. In the Middle Ages and later, persons who fled to a church or to certain boundaries surrounding it were, for a time at least, safe from all prosecution, it being considered treason against God, an offence beyond compensation, to force even the most flagrant criminal from His altar. The ordinary of the sacred place, or his official, was the only one who could try to induce him to leave it; but if he failed, the utmost that could be done was to deny the refugee victuals, so that he might go forth voluntarily.[1] In the *Lex Baiuwariorum* (i. 7) it is asserted in the strongest terms that there is no crime which may not be pardoned from the fear of God and reverence for the saints. But the right of sanctuary was gradually subjected to various restrictions both by secular legislation and by the Church.[2] Innocent III. enjoined that refuge should not be given to a highway robber or to anybody who devastated cultivated fields at night,[3] and, according to Beaumanoir's *Coutumes du Beauvoisis* (xi. 15 ff.), dating from the 13th cent., it was also denied to persons guilty of sacrilege or arson. The Parliament of Scotland enacted that whoever sought the protection of the Church for homicide should be required to come out and undergo an assize, that it might be found whether it was committed of 'forethought felony' or in 'chaud-mellé'; and only in the latter case was he to be restored to the sanctuary, the sheriff being directed to give him security to that effect before requiring him to leave it.[4] In England a malefactor who took refuge in a consecrated church could not be removed from it; but it was the duty of the four neighbouring 'vills' to beset the holy place, prevent his escape, and send for a coroner, who then came and parleyed with the refugee. The latter had his choice between submitting to trial and abjuring the realm. If he chose to abjure the realm, he hurried, dressed in pilgrim's guise, to the port which was assigned to him, and left England, being bound by his oath never to return. His land was escheated, his chattels were forfeited, and if he came back his fate was that of an outlaw. But if the refugee would neither submit to trial nor abjure the realm, then the contention of the civil power was that, at all events after he had enjoyed the right of asylum for forty days, he was to be starved into submission; although the clergy resented this interference with the peace of Holy Church.[6] In the reign of Henry VIII. there were certain places which were allowed to be 'places of tuition and privilege'—in fact, cities of permanent refuge for persons who should, according to ancient usage, have abjured the realm, after having fled to a church. There was a governor in each of these privileged places, charged with the daily duty of mustering his men, who were not to exceed twenty in each town, and who had to wear a badge whenever they appeared out of doors. But when these regulations were made, the protection of sanctuary was taken away from persons guilty of murder, rape, burglary, highway robbery, or arson. The law of sanctuary was then left unchanged till the reign of James I., when, in theory, the privilege in question was altogether denied to criminals.[6]

[1] W. R. Smith, p. 148 f.

[2] Tac. *Ann.* iii. 60 ff.; Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States*, i. (1896) p. 73; Westcott, *Essays in the History of Religious Thought in the West* (1891), p. 115; Schmidt, *Die Ethik der alten Griechen*, ii. (1882) p. 285; Bulmerincq, *Das Asylrecht* (1853), p. 85 ff.; Fuld, 'Das Asylrecht im Alterthum und Mittelalter' in *ZVRW* vii. (1887) p. 118 ff.; Barth, *de Græcorum asylis* (1888).

[3] Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Antiquitates Romanæ*, ii. 15; Livy, i. 8. 5 f.; Plutarch, *Romulus*, ix. 5; Strabo, v. 3. 2, p. 230.

[4] Valerius Maximus, *Facta dictaque memorabilia*, viii. 9. 1; Dionys. Hal. *Antiq. Rom.* vi. 45; Cicero, *de Lege Agraria oratio secunda*, 14 (36); see also Hartung, *Die Religion der Römer*, ii. (1836) p. 58 f.

[5] See Tac. *Ann.* iii. 36; Plautus, *Rudens*, 723; Dio Cassius, *Historia Romana*, xlvii. 19; Bulmerincq, *op. cit.* p. 58 ff.; Mommsen, *Römisches Strafrecht* (1899), p. 458 f.

[6] Dio Cassius, xlvii. 19.

[7] Tac. *Ann.* iv. 67; Suetonius, *Tiberius*, 58; Mommsen, *op. cit.* p. 460.

[8] Mommsen, *op. cit.* p. 461 f.

[9] *Novellæ*, xvii. 7.

[10] Helmold, *Chronik der Slaven*, i. 83 (1852), p. 170.

[11] Wilda, *Das Strafrecht der Germanen* (1842), p. 248 f.; Stemann, *Den danske Retshistorie indtil Christian V.'s Lov* (1871), p. 578; Brunner, *Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte*, ii. (1892) p. 610; Fuld, *loc. cit.* p. 123 f.; Frauenstädt, *Blutrache und Todtschlagsühne im deutschen Mittelalter* (1881), p. 81.

[1] Milman, *History of Latin Christianity*, ii. (1867) p. 59; Bulmerincq, *op. cit.* p. 78 ff.; Fuld, *loc. cit.* p. 136 ff.; Bracton, *de Legibus et consuetudinibus Angliæ*, fol. 136*b*, vol. ii. (1879) p. 392 f.; Innes, *Scotland in the Middle Ages* (1860), p. 195 f.

[2] Brunner, *op. cit.* ii. 611 f.; Bulmerincq, *op. cit.* p. 91 ff.; Fuld, *loc. cit.* p. 140 f.

[3] Gregory IX., *Decretales*, iii. 49. 6.

[4] Innes, *op. cit.* p. 198.

[5] Pollock and Maitland, *History of English Law before the Time of Edward I.* ii. (1898) p. 590 f.; Réville, 'L'abjuratio regni,' in *Revue historique*, vol. i. (1892) p. 14 ff.

[6] Pike, *History of Crime in England*, ii. (1876) p. 253; Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, vol. iv. (1778) p. 333.

Yet, as a matter of fact, asylums continued to exist in England so late as the reign of George I., when that of St. Peter's at Westminster was abolished.[1] In the legislation of Sweden the last reference to the privilege of sanctuary is found in an enactment of 1528.[2] In France it was abolished by an *ordonnance* of 1539.[3] In Spain it existed even in the 19th century.[4] Not long ago the most important churches in Abyssinia,[5] the monastery of Affâf Woira in the same country,[6] and the quarter in Gondar where the head of the Abyssinian clergy has his residence,[7] were reported to be asylums for criminals. And the same was the case with the old Christian churches among the Suanetians of the Caucasus.[8]

Among the ancient Irish the right of sanctuary also existed. This was of two sorts: temporary within the precinct (*maigen*) of a person of rank, and permanent within the land of a hostel (*bruden*) or the glebe (*nemed, termann*) of a church. The *maigen* varied according to the status of the owner of the land, ranging from the radius of one spear-cast to the entire plain in which the palace of a provincial king, the king of Ireland, or the Archbishop of Armagh, stood. Within the *maigen* the fugitive, when duly certified of the character of the place and granted formal permission to enter, was safe, so long as he in no wise injured the *maigen* or its owner, for a time, but must sooner or later incur the penalty of his original misdeed. Within the *bruden*, on the other hand, a homicide was safe from the vengeance of his victim's friends until he could obtain a fair trial before a *brehon*, or judge. 'The right accorded to the maigen of a dwelling was for the protection of the owner against scenes of violence on his premises by outsiders—not primarily in the interest of the fugitive; and as it depended on the will—or caprice—of the owner, it was uncertain. It was indeed not an asylum at all in the proper sense of the word. But the sanctuary of a church or the asylum of a bruden was absolute and inviolable, depending on no conditions and on no man's will or caprice.'[9]

7. In many cases the tombs of dead or the houses of living persons serve as asylums. The Arab poet Ḥammâd found a safe refuge at the tomb of his enemy's father.[10] In the monarchical states of the Gallas, in Eastern Africa, homicides enjoy a legal right of asylum if they have succeeded in escaping to a hut near the burial-place of the king.[11] Among the Barotse[12] and Kafirs[13] the tombs of chiefs are places of refuge. Among the Ovambos in South-Western Africa the village of a great chief is abandoned at his death, except by the members of a certain family, who remain there to prevent it from falling into utter decay; and condemned criminals who contrive to escape to one of these deserted villages are safe, at least for a time.[14] Among various peoples the domicile of the chief or king is an asylum for criminals;[1] and in some places in West Africa the same is the case with the house of the high priest.[2] In Usambara, again, a murderer cannot be arrested at any of the four places where the great wizards of the country reside.[3] But even the house of an ordinary man may possess the right of asylum. Among the Bareas and Kunamas, in Eastern Africa, a murderer who finds time to flee into another person's dwelling cannot be seized, and it is considered a point of honour for the community to help him to escape abroad.[4] In the Pelew Islands 'no enemy may be killed in a house, especially not in the presence of the host.'[5] In Europe the privilege of asylum went hand in hand with the sanctity of the homestead;[6] and the reach of a man's peace was proportionate to his rank.[7]

8. The right of sanctuary has been ascribed to various causes. Obviously erroneous is the suggestion that places of refuge were established with a view to protecting unintentional offenders from punishment or revenge.[8] The restriction of the privilege of sanctuary to cases of accidental injuries is not at all general, and where it occurs it is undoubtedly an innovation due to moral or social considerations. Very frequently this privilege has been attributed to a desire to give time for the first heat of resentment to pass over before the injured party could seek redress.[9] But although such a desire may have helped to preserve the right of asylum where it has once come into existence, it could hardly account for the origin of this right. It should be remembered that the privilege of sanctuary not only affords temporary protection to the refugee, but in many cases altogether exempts him from punishment or retaliation, and that shelter is given even to animals which have fled to a sacred place. And if the theory referred to were correct, how could we explain the fact that the right of asylum is particularly attached to sanctuaries? It has been said that the right of sanctuary bears testimony to the power of certain places to transmit their virtues to those who entered them.[10] But it is doubtful whether we have any evidence that the fugitive is supposed to partake of the sanctity of the place which shelters him. In Morocco, persons who are permanently attached to mosques or the shrines of saints are generally regarded as more

[1] Jusserand, *English Wayfaring Life in the Middle Ages* (1892), p. 166.
[2] Nordström, *Bidrag till den svenska samhälle-författningens historia*, ii. (1840) p. 405.
[3] Du Boys, *Histoire du droit criminel des peuples modernes*, ii. (1858) p. 246.
[4] Du Boys, *Histoire du droit criminel de l'Espagne* (1870), p. 227 f.
[5] Hellwig, *Das Asylrecht der Naturvölker* (1903), p. 52.
[6] Harris, *Highlands of Æthiopia*, ii. (1844) p. 93.
[7] Rüppel, *Reise in Abyssinien*, ii. (1840) pp. 74, 81; von Heuglin, *Reise nach Abessinien* (1868), p. 213.
[8] von Haxthausen, *Transcaucasia* (1854), p. 160 n.
[9] Joyce, *Social Hist. of Ancient Ireland* (1903), i. 358 f., ii. 44 f., 173.
[10] Goldziher, *op. cit.* i. 236.
[11] Paulitschke, *Ethnographie Nordost-Afrikas, Die geistige Cultur der Danâkil*, etc. (1896), p. 157.
[12] Decle, *Three Years in Savage Africa* (1898), p. 75.
[13] Rehme, 'Das Recht der Amaxosa' in *ZVRW* x. 51.
[14] Schinz, *Deutsch-Südwest-Afrika* (1891), 312.

[1] Harmon, *Voyages and Travels in the Interior of North America* (1820), p. 297 (Tacullies); Lewin, *Hill Tracts of Chittagong* (1869), p. 100 (Kukis); Junghuhn, *Die Battaländer auf Sumatra*, ii. (1847) 329 (Macassars and Bugis of Celebes); Tromp, 'Uit de Salasila van Koetei,' in *Bijdragen tot de taal-land- en volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië*, xxxvii. (1888) p. 84 (natives of Koetei, a district of Borneo); Jung, quoted by Kohler, 'Recht der Marschallinsulaner,' in *Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss.* xiv. 447 (natives of Nauru in the Marshall Group); Turner, *Nineteen Years in Polynesia* (1861), p. 334 (Samoans); Rautanen, in Steinmetz, *Rechtsverhältnisse*, p. 342 (Ondongas); Schinz, *op. cit.* p. 312 (Ovambos); Rehme, 'Das Recht der Amaxosa,' in *Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss.* x. 50; Merker, quoted by Kohler, 'Banturecht in Ostafrika,' *ib.* xv. 55 (Wadshagga); Merker, *Die Masai* (1904), p. 206. Among the Barotse the residences of the queen and the prime minister are places of refuge (Decle, *op. cit.* p. 75).
[2] Müller, *Die africanische Landschafft Fetu* (1673), p. 75; Wilson, *Western Africa* (1856), p. 129 (Krumen of the Grain Coast).
[3] Krapf, *Reisen in Ost-Afrika*, ii. (1858) p. 132.
[4] Munzinger, *Ostafrikanische Studien* (1864), p. 503.
[5] Kubary, 'Die Palau-Inseln in der Südsee,' in *Jour. d. Museum Godeffroy*, iv. (1873) p. 25.
[6] Wilda, *op. cit.* pp. 242, 243, 538, 543; Nordström, *op. cit.* ii. 435; Fuld, *loc. cit.* p. 152; Frauenstädt, *op. cit.* p. 63 ff.
[7] Pollock, 'The King's Peace,' in *Law Quarterly Review*, i. 40 f.
[8] Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, § 117; Powell, 'Outlines of Sociology,' in *The Saturday Lectures delivered in the U.S. National Museum* (1882), p. 82.
[9] Meiners, *Geschichte der Menschheit* (1785), p. 189; Nordström, *op. cit.* ii. 401; Pardessus, *Loi salique* (1843), p. 656; Bulmerincq, *op. cit.* pp. 34, 47; Fuld, *loc. cit.* pp. 102, 118, 119, 294 ff.; Kohler, *Shakespeare vor dem Forum der Jurisprudenz* (1883), p. 186; Quatremère, *op. cit.* p. 314.
[10] Granger, *Worship of the Romans* (1895), p. 223 f.

or less holy; but, so far as the present writer knows, this is never the case with casual visitors or suppliants, hence it is hardly from fear of the refugee that his pursuer refrains from laying hands on him. Prof. Robertson Smith has stated part of the truth in saying that 'the assertion of a man's undoubted rights as against a fugitive at the sanctuary is regarded as an encroachment on its holiness.'[1] There is an almost instinctive fear of disturbing the peace, and particularly of shedding blood,[2] in a holy place; and if it is improper to commit any act of violence in the house of another man, it is naturally considered equally offensive, and at the same time much more dangerous, to do so in the homestead of a supernatural being. But this is only one aspect of the matter; another, equally important, still calls for an explanation. Why should the gods or saints themselves be so anxious to protect criminals who have sought refuge in their sanctuaries? Why do they not deliver them up to justice through their earthly representatives?

The answer lies in certain ideas which refer to human as well as divine protectors of refugees. The god or saint is in exactly the same position as a man to whose dwelling a person has fled for shelter. According to Moorish ideas, the owner of the house or tent must, in his own interest, assist the fugitive; for, by being in close contact with him and his family and his belongings, the refugee is thought to be able to transfer to them curses and evil wishes. He is in the *'âr* of his host, and *l-'âr* denotes a compulsory relation between two persons, the constraining character of which is due to the belief in the transference of a conditional curse.[3] Ideas of this sort seem commonly to underlie the duty of assisting a suppliant;[4] and especially when the protector is so mighty a personage as a king or chief or high priest, his domicile then readily comes to be regarded as an inviolable place of refuge. Sometimes a criminal can, in a similar way, be a danger to the king even from a distance, or by meeting him, and must in consequence be pardoned. In Madagascar an offender escaped punishment if he could obtain sight of the sovereign, whether before or after conviction; hence criminals at work on the high road were ordered to withdraw when the sovereign was known to be coming by.[5] In Usambara even a murderer is safe as soon as he has touched the person of the king.[6] Among the Marutse and neighbouring tribes, a person who is accused of any crime receives pardon if he lays a *cupa*—the fossilized base of a conical shell, which is the most highly valued of all their instruments—at the feet of his chief; and a miscreant likewise escapes punishment if he reaches and throws himself on the king's drums.[7] On the Slave Coast, 'criminals who are doomed to death are always gagged, because if a man should speak to the king he must be pardoned.'[8] In Ashanti, if an offender should succeed in swearing on the king's life, he must be pardoned, because such an oath is believed to involve danger to the king; hence knives are driven through the cheeks from opposite sides, over the tongue, to prevent him from speaking.[9] So also among the Romans, according to an old Jewish writer, a person condemned to death was gagged to prevent him from cursing the king.[1] Fear of the curses pronounced by a dissatisfied refugee likewise, in all probability, underlay certain other customs which were prevalent in ancient Rome. A servant or slave who came and fell down at the feet of Juppiter's high priest, taking hold of his knees, was for that day freed from the whip; and if a prisoner with irons and bolts on his feet succeeded in approaching the high priest in his house, he was let loose and his fetters were thrown on to the road, not through the door, but from the roof.[2] Moreover, if a criminal who had been sentenced to death accidentally met a Vestal virgin, on his way to the place of execution, his life was saved.[3] So sensitive to imprecations were both Juppiter's high priest and the priestesses of Vesta, that the Prætor was never allowed to compel them to take an oath.[4] Among several peoples even ordinary women are regarded, in a way, as asylums, probably from fear of the magic power attributed to their sex. In various parts of Morocco, especially among the Berbers and Jbâla, or northern mountaineers, a person who takes refuge with a woman by touching her is safe from his pursuer. Among the Arabs of the plains this custom is dying out, owing to their subjection to the Sultan's government;[5] but among certain Asiatic Bedawîn, the tribe of Shammar, 'a woman can protect any number of persons, or even tents.'[6] Among the Circassians, 'a stranger who intrusts himself to the patronage of a woman, or is able to touch with his mouth the breast of a wife, is spared and protected as a relation of the blood, though he were the enemy, nay even the murderer, of a similar relative.'[7] The inhabitants of Barèges in Bigorre have, down to recent times, preserved the old custom of pardoning a criminal who has sought refuge with a woman.[8]

Now, as a refugee may by his curse force a king or a priest or any other human being with whom he establishes some kind of contact, to protect him, so he may in a similar manner constrain a god or saint as soon as he has entered his sanctuary. According to the Moorish expression, he is then in the *'âr* of the saint, and the saint is bound to protect him, just as a host is bound to protect his guest. It is not only men that have to fear the curses of dissatisfied refugees. Æschylus puts the following words into the mouth of Apollo, when he declares his intention to assist his suppliant, Orestes: 'Terrible both among men and gods is the wrath of a refugee, when one abandons him with intent.'[9]

LITERATURE.—Bulmerincq, *Das Asylrecht*, Dorpat, 1853; R. Andree, 'Die Asyle,' in *Globus* xxxviii., Brunswick, 1880; Fuld, 'Das Asylrecht im Alterthum und Mittelalter,' in *ZVRW* vii., Stuttgart, 1887; Barth, *de Græcorum asylis*, Strassburg, 1888; J. G. Frazer, 'The Origin of Totemism,' in *The Fortnightly Review*, N.S., lxv., London, 1899; Hellwig, *Das Asylrecht der Naturvölker*, Berlin, 1903; Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, ii. (London, 1908) pp. 628–638.

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ATARGATIS.—Atargatis (Ἀτάργατις, Ἀταργάτη, Ἀτέργατις, Ἀταργάτειτις, Ἀττα[ρ]γάθη) is the Greek pronunciation of עתרעתה, a Syrian goddess often mentioned by classical writers. The Aram. name was shortened into תרעתה, the regular form in the Talmud, Syr. literature, and Armenian; and from this was derived Δερκετώ, Derceto, a

[1] *Rel. of Sem.*[2] p. 148.
[2] Westermarck, *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, i. (1906) p. 330.
[3] Westermarck, in *Anthrop. Essays presented to E. B. Tylor*, p. 361 ff.
[4] Westermarck, *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, i. 587 ff.
[5] Ellis, *History of Madagascar*, i. (1838) p. 376.
[6] Krapf, *op. cit.* ii. 132 n.*
[7] Gibbons, *Exploration in Central Africa* (1898), p. 129.
[8] Ellis, *Ewe-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast* (1890), p. 224.
[9] *Ib.* p. 224.

[1] Quoted by Levias, 'Cursing,' in *JE* iv. 390 (cf. in general, for Biblical and Talmudic material, Toy and Ginzberg, *ib.* ii. 256–259).
[2] Plutarch, *Questiones Romanæ*, 111; Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticæ*, x. 15. 8, 10.
[3] Plutarch, *Numa*, x. 5.
[4] Aulus Gellius, x. 15. 31.
[5] Westermarck, *Origin and Develop. of the Moral Ideas*, i. 668.
[6] Layard, *Discoveries in the Ruins of Nineveh and Babylon* (1853), p. 318.
[7] Pallas, *Travels through the Southern Provinces of the Russian Empire*, i. (1802) p. 404.
[8] Fischer, *Bergreisen*, i. (1804) p. 60.
[9] Æschylus, *Eumenides*, 232 ff.

common Gr. and Lat. form. The origin of this name was a matter of much speculation to earlier scholars. Selden (*de Dis Syris*, 178) explained it as a corruption of אַדִּירְדָּג, 'great fish,' and connected it with Dagon; Sickler (*Die Hieroglyphen*, 74 f.) and Gesenius (*Com. üb. Is.* ii. 342) interpreted it as אַדַּרְגֹּר, 'greatness of fortune'; Movers (*Phönizier*, i. 594) as Aram. תַּרְעָא, 'cleft,' like Heb. נֶקֶב, as a designation for 'female'; de Vogüé (*Syrie Centrale, Insc. Sem.* 7 f.), followed by Baudissin (*Jahve et Moloch*, 25), as עַתַרְעָה, 'fullness of favourable time.' All these etymologies were set aside by the discovery of inscriptions bearing the name עתרעתה, the original Aram. designation of the goddess (see below). Ewald (*Inschr. von Sidon*, 1856, p. 52) at once recognized that this was compounded out of עתר, 'Atar, and עתה, 'Ate, two well-known Syrian deities, and in this view he has been followed by Levy (*Phön. Stud.* ii. 39), Nöldeke (*ZDMG* xxiv. 1870, pp. 92, 109), Baudissin (*Studien*, i. 238; *PRE*[2] ii. 172), Baethgen (*Beiträge*, 69 ff.), and nearly all recent scholars. Lagarde (*Mitt.* i. 1884, 77 f.) doubts the correctness of this view, and Jensen (*Hittiter und Armenier*, 1898, 157 f.) suggests that Atargatis is derived from a hypothetical Hittite goddess Tarkhu. Neither of these scholars has succeeded, however, in disproving the commonly accepted etymology.

'Atar, the first element in the compound, is the Aramaic form of the name that appears in Canaan as 'Ashtar(t), (Astarte); in Assyr. and Bab. as Ishtar; in South Arabia as 'Athtar; in Abyssinia as 'Astar; in Moab as 'Ashtar. Heb. ש and Arab. ث regularly correspond with Aram. ת, so that Heb. עשתרת becomes Aram. עתתר. *'Athtar* was soon assimilated into *'Attar*, and this was written עתר, the usual form in the inscriptions. The phonetic relation of these various forms shows that 'Athtar ('Ashtart, Astarte) was a primitive Semitic deity who must have been worshipped by the Aramæans from the earliest times. The first appearance of the name is in the Annals of Ashurbanipal (Rassam, viii. 112, 124 = *KIB* ii. 221 f.; Cyl. B, vii. 92 = *KIB* ii. 215, n. 4), where the form *Atar-samain*, 'heavenly Atar,' indicates the Aramaic origin of the divinity. It appears also in Syrian proper names such as Atar-bi'di, Atar-gabri, Atar-'idri, Atar-sûri (Johns, *Ass. Doomsday Book*, 17; Hilprecht, *Bab. Exp.* ix. 51, 76). A gem bears the inscription עתרעוז, 'Atar is strong' (Levy, *Phön. Stud.* ii. 38; E. Meyer, *ZDMG* xxxi. 1877, 732, n. 1). From none of these early mentions does it appear whether 'Atar is masculine or feminine. In South Arabia, Abyssinia, and Moab it is masculine, in Assyria and Canaan it is feminine (cf. Barton, *Semitic Origins*, ch. iv.). Winckler (*Altorient. Forsch.* i. 528) has shown, however, that Ashurbanipal in two texts equates Atar-samain with the Assyrian Ishtar, which is always feminine (in spite of the absence of fem. ending). Strabo also (xvi. 785) says that Athara is the same as Atargatis, and Atargatis is always feminine. *Athara* seems clearly to be a variant form of *'Athtar*, *'Attar*, and Nöldeke (*ZDMG* xxiv. 109) explains it on the analogy of Arab. *'Athur* for *'Aththur*, *'Ashshur*, 'Assyria.' Justin (*Hist. Phil.* xxxvi. 2) speaks of Arates (Arathis = Athares) as the wife of Damascus, for whom he built a temple. In the light of this evidence there can be no doubt that the Aramæan Atar was a goddess (see ASHTART).

'Ate or *'Athe*, the second element in the compound name Atargatis, appears in the forms עתה, עתא, and עת in Palmyrene proper names, *e.g.* עתנתן, עתעקב, Ἀθηακαβος, זברעתה, זברעתא, Σαβδααθης or Σαβδεαθης, נורעתה, עברעתה, עתה as the name of a man, and עתי as the name of a woman (de Vogüé, *Insc. Sem.* No. 30, 5, 19, 63, 74, 107, 143, 54; Mordtmann, 'Neue Beiträge z. Kunde Palmyra's,' *SMA* 1875, 47; Sachau, *ZDMG* xxxv. 1881, p. 740 f.). It appears also in Phœn. inscriptions from Cyprus in the names נרעת and עתרשף (*CIS*, No. 93, 79; cf. Nöldeke, *ZDMG* xlii. 1888, p. 471; Halévy, *Mélanges de critique et d'histoire*, 1883, 146). In Gr. inscriptions and authors it assumes the forms Ἄθη, Ἄθης, Ἄθας, Ἔθαος. These forms and the masc. verbs in the Palmyrene proper names suggest that 'Ate is a male divinity, but there is so much looseness in Palmyrene in the agreement of the verb with the gender of its subject that this argument is not conclusive. Pseudo-Melito (in Otto's *Corp. Apol. Christ.* ix. 426, 505; Cureton, *Spicileg.* 44, 25 Syr.) describes ܥܬܝ, 'Ati, as worshipped at Hadyab (Adiabene), and uses the feminine in speaking of her, but this testimony also is far from decisive. As uncertain as the sex of 'Ate is his (or her) identity. De Vogüé and Baudissin think that the name is ܥܬ, Heb. עת, in the sense of 'favourable season,' and that it was used originally merely to distinguish the 'Atar of Heliopolis from other 'Atars, but subsequently was separated from her as the name of an independent deity. This is very unlikely. Combinations of two deities into one are common in the Semitic world, but the separatiou of one into two is an unknown phenomenon. Levy (*Phön. Stud.* iv. 7) and Six (*Numism. Chron.* 1878, 108) hold that *'Ate* comes from *'Ante*, *'Anath*, but the Gr. equivalent Ἄθη makes this view difficult. Baethgen (*Beitr.* 71 ff.) identifies 'Ate with Attes (a Lydian deity), which appears in the proper names Sadyattes, Myattes, Alyattes, and he appeals to Lucian's story (*de Dea Syr.* 15) of the founding of the temple at Hierapolis by Attes the Lydian in honour of Rhea who had castrated him. In that case the phonetic relation of *Athes* to *Attes* is the same as that of *Athara* to *Attar* (see above). Hommel (*PSBA*, 1897, p. 81) thinks also that the original seat of the worship of 'Ate was in eastern Asia Minor (see ATE, ATTIS).

When so much doubt exists as to the character of 'Ate, it is difficult to determine what is the relation of 'Atar to this deity in the compound 'Atar-'Ate, or how the character of the primitive Semitic 'Atar is modified by this relationship. Meyer (*ZDMG* xxxi. 730) and Hommel (*l.c.*) regard 'Atar as the wife of 'Ate, but Hadad is always represented as her consort. Halévy (*l.c.* 224) suggests that 'Atar is the daughter of 'Ate, and compares 'Ishtar the daughter of Sin.' Baudissin (*PRE*[2] ii. 173) thinks that, if 'Ate is a real name and not a mere title of 'Atar, he is probably the son of 'Atar (cf. Ishtar and Tammuz and the legends given below of Atargatis and her son). Baethgen (*Beitr.* 71 ff.) thinks that the relationship is 'Atar = 'Ate, *i.e.* Attes has lost his identity in 'Atar; and he appeals to Lucian's story (see above). The philological method cannot throw much light on this problem, and we are compelled to turn to the allusions in the inscriptions and in classical writers in order to ascertain the character of Atargatis.

The earliest references to the worship of this goddess are found in fragments of Ctesias († *c.* B.C. 400) scattered through the writings of later classical authors (cf. Ctes. *Relig.* ed. Bähr, 393–395; Müller, in Dindorf's *Herodotus*, 16 ff.). Strabo (xvi. 785) says that Ctesias calls Atargate *Derkětó*. Diodorus Siculus (ii. 4), in dependence upon Ctesias (cf. ii. 20), narrates that Aphrodite was angry with Derkětó, and caused her to fall in love with a beautiful youth among those who sacrificed in the temple in Askalon. By him she became the mother of Semiramis. Filled with shame, she caused the youth to disappear, and placed the child in a desert, where she was fed by doves. She then

cast herself into a lake near Askalon and was changed into a fish, with the exception of her face. This is the origin of the half-human half-fish image of Derkětó. The same story is repeated by Athenagoras (*Legat. pro Christ.* 26) and by an anonymous author (Bähr, *op. cit.* 393 f.; Müller, *op. cit.* 18), who also calls Derkětó 'the Syrian goddess.' Eratosthenes (*Cataster.* 38) cites Ctesias as his authority for the statement that Derkětó was saved by a fish at Bambyce (Hierapolis, the modern Membidj) in northern Syria. He also calls her the goddess of Syria. Hyginus (*Astron.* ii. 41) states, on the authority of Ctesias, that a fish rescued Isis (*i.e.* Derkětó) from the sea, and therefore the Syrians regard fishes as holy, abstain from eating them, and worship golden images of them. Xanthus the Lydian, a contemporary of Ctesias, cited by Mnaseas, according to Athenæus (viii. 37), states (if the citation be genuine) that Atargatis because of her pride was seized by the Lydian Mopsus and cast with her son Ichthus ('fish') into a lake near Askalon, where she was devoured by fishes. Hesychius (*s.v.* Ἀτταγάθη) says that she is called Ἀθάρη by Xanthus.

The earliest epigraphic evidence of the worship of Atargatis is found on a coin bearing on one side the inscription עבד הדד, 'Abd-Hadad, on the other עתרעתה, 'Ataʾatu (de Luynes, *Essai sur la numismat. des Satrap.*, 1846, p. 39, pl. v.; Blau, *ZDMG* vi. 1852, pp. 473 f.). De Luynes supposed that this belonged to the Persian period, but it is probably to be assigned rather to the early Greek period. It comes perhaps from Hierapolis, and is interesting as confirming the statements of later writers that Hadad and Atargatis were the two great divinities of Syria. Other coins of 'Abd-Hadad show the more usual spelling עתרעתה, 'Ataʾateh (see Waddington, *RN* vi. 1861, p. 9 ff.; Six, *Numismatic Chronicle*, 1878, p. 105).

According to 2 Mac 12[26], Judas Maccabæus in the year B.C. 164 went forth against Carnion and the temple of Atergatis (τὸ Ἀτεργάτιον) and slew 25,000 people. In 1 Mac 5[43] this is described as τὸ τέμενος ἐν Καρναΐμ. From this it appears that the cult of Atargatis flourished during the Greek period not only in Hierapolis and Askalon, but also in Bashan. An inscription of the same period from Kefr Hauwar, on the road between Damascus and Banias, bearing the word [Ἀ]ταργάτη indicates probably that there was a temple of Atargatis in this place (Waddington, No. 1890). Excavations in Delos have disclosed a number of votive inscriptions to Atargatis dating from a period shortly before the beginning of the Christian era. Here occur the forms Ἀταργάτη, Ἀτέργατις, Ἀταργάτειτις (*BCH* iii. 407), and Ἀτάργατις (*ib.* vi. 495 ff., vii. 477, viii. 132). These inscriptions combine Atargatis and Adados (Hadad) and identify Atargatis with Aphrodite. In one case she is called Ἀφροδίτη Ἀτάργατις, in another ἀγνὴ Ἀφροδίτη. Her priests are called 'Hierapolitans,' either because this was a colony that had come from Hierapolis, or because the cult was known to be derived from that city.

Ovid (†A.D. 17) tells how Dercetis was changed into a fish in Palestine (*Metam.* iv. 44–46). Germanicus (†A.D. 19) calls her 'the Syrian goddess,' Derceto, and Atargatis (*Scholia on Aratus*, ed. Breysig, pp. 65, 98 f., 125, 176), and adds the new information that she was changed into a fish at Bambyce (Hierapolis). Strabo (†A.D. 24) says, 'Atargate (according to some MSS, Artagate) the Syrians call Athara, but Ctesias calls her Derkětó.' Here Atargatis is identified with 'Athar (=Athtar, Ashtart, Astarte) in the same manner in which she is identified with Aphrodite in the Delos inscriptions (cf xvi. 748, 785). Cornutus (†A.D. 68) records (*de Nat. Deor.* 6) that fishes and doves were sacred to Atargatis, the goddess of the Syrians, and therefore were not eaten. Pliny (†A.D. 79), in *HN* v. 13 (14), 69, says of Joppa, 'There is worshipped the fabulous Ceto.' Whether this is to be understood of the sea-monster (κῆτος), whose skeleton, according to Strabo and Pliny, was shown at Joppa, or whether it is to be regarded as a truncated form of Der-ceto, is uncertain (cf. Baudissin, *Studien*, ii. 178). In v. 23 (19), 81, Pliny identifies Atargatis with Derceto, and says that she was worshipped at Hierapolis, or Bambyce, or Mabog. In xxxii. 2, (8) 17, he speaks of the pond of sacred fish at the temple of Hierapolis. Plutarch (*Crass.* 17) says of the goddess of Hierapolis that some call her Aphrodite, others Hera, while others regard her as the divinity who out of moisture produces the seeds of all things, and has shown men the way to all good things.

A Palmyrene bilingual of the year A.D. 140 (de Vogüé, *Inscr. Sem.* 3=Waddington, 2588) mentions עתרעתה, or [Ἀταρ]γάτει, as one of the 'good' or one of the 'national' gods. On the strength of this inscription a broken Palmyrene text (*CIG* iii. 4480) is doubtless to be restored [Ἀταργ]άτει. Another inscription of the 2nd cent. from Astypalæa, near Crete, reads, Ἀταργατειτι ἀνέθηκαν (see Rayet, 'Dédicace à la déesse Atergatis,' *BCH* iii. 1879, pp. 406 ff.; cf. *CIG* iv. 7046; *ZDMG* xxxix. 43).

The fullest of all the accounts of the cult of Atargatis at Hierapolis is found in the treatise of Lucian († *c.* A.D. 200), *de Dea Syria*. Lucian was himself a Syrian, and speaks as an eye-witness. He never calls the goddess Atargatis, and refuses to identify her with Derkětó of Askalon, because the image in that place had a fish's tail, while the one in Hierapolis had perfect human form (14). He prefers to call her Hera (1, 16), although he admits that there is much to be said in favour of the view that she is Rhea (15). Nevertheless, there is no doubt that his 'Syrian goddess' is really Atargatis. His title Συρία θεός is one that is constantly applied to this divinity by other writers. Hierapolis is known to have been a chief centre of her cult. The priests of Atargatis at Delos entitle themselves Hierapolitans. In the temple was a pond of sacred fish, such as Pliny describes in the temple of Atargatis at Hierapolis; and Lucian himself narrates that the people said that the temple was built by Semiramis in honour of her mother Derkětó, and that they abstained from eating fish and doves, in the same manner as the people of Askalon (14).

The temple of Hierapolis is described by Lucian as the largest and richest in Syria. To it pilgrims came from all parts of Western Asia (10). It stood on a hill in the midst of the city, and was surrounded with two walls, one of which was very ancient. To the north of the sanctuary lay a court 100 cubits square. In this stood a row of huge stone *phalli*, one of which a man ascended twice a year, and remained on the top seven days offering prayers for the people, who placed gifts at the bottom. In the court there was also an altar of bronze, and round about it were a multitude of statues of gods, heroes, and kings, among them 'Semiramis.' Here also bullocks, horses, eagles, bears, and lions fed together (28–29, 39–41). In the inner temple, to which only certain priests were admitted, stood three golden images. The first was that of Hera (Atargatis), which had attributes not only of Hera but also of Athene, Aphrodite, Selene, Rhea, Artemis, Nemesis, and the Fates. In one hand she carried a sceptre, in the other a distaff. On her head, which was surrounded with rays, she wore a tower-crown, and she was encircled with a girdle like that of Urania. She stood on lions, and had a drum like that of Rhea (32, cf. 15). The second image bore a general resemblance to Zeus, although it was called by a different name. It was, doubtless, Hadad, who was represented armed with a thunderbolt. Between these two stood a third image, the sex of which Lucian could not determine. It had no name, he says, but was called merely σημήιον, 'sign.' [Baethgen (*Beiträge*, 73) is doubtless correct in regarding this statement as due to a mistake on Lucian's part of אתה for עתה. The third divinity was really 'Ate, whose name appears as the second element in עתרעתה, Atargatis.] As to the origin of the temple, some said it was built by Deucalion, others by Attes (= Ate?), others by Semiramis, and others by Stratonice. Lucian preferred to believe that it was the work of Dionysus (12–29).

The priesthood of the temple was very numerous, and was divided into classes that exercised different functions. Conspicuous among these were the *Galli*, or eunuch-priests. On

festal occasions young men worked themselves into a frenzy through music and other religious exercises, and then castrated themselves. After this they wore women's dress, and travelled about the country carrying an image of the goddess, which they worshipped with wild orgies, flogging one another and cutting themselves with knives (50–53, cf. *Asin.* 35–44). Of this custom Lucian offers two explanations. One was that it was in honour of Attes (Atę̂), who was castrated by Rhea, and wandered through the world in female attire; the other was that it was in memory of Combabus, who mutilated himself in order to avoid compromising himself with Queen Stratonice. There were also female devotees in the temple (43), and licentious rites were practised as a part of religion (22).

One of the great annual ceremonies consisted in carrying the third image (Atę̂) to the sea-shore and bringing thence jars of sea water, which were poured into a hole in the temple precincts (13, 33, 48). Another ceremony in the spring consisted in piling up trees in the outer court of the temple, heaping upon them garments, treasures, and all sorts of animals, and then burning the whole in the presence of all the gods of Syria, who were brought by their devotees to witness the rite (49). Domestic animals, except the hog, were offered in sacrifice. These were presented in the temple, and were taken home to be slain, but sometimes they were killed by being cast down from the portico of the temple. Children also were occasionally offered in this way. Pilgrims always shaved their heads when coming to the sanctuary, and young men and women presented their hair in gold or silver boxes before marrying. Tatuing in honour of the goddess was a common practice (54–60).

Apuleius (*Metamorph.* viii. 170) speaks of the 'omnipotent and all-producing Syrian goddess.' Ælian (*Hist. Anim.* xii. 2) speaks of the reverence for fishes at Hierapolis or Bambyce. Athenæus (viii. 37) gives the goddess the name of Ἀτέργατις. Arcadius (*de Accent.* ed. Barker, 36. 18) calls her Ἀταργατῖς. The book *de Legibus*, ascribed to Bardesanes († A.D. 223) (in Cureton, *Spicileg. Syr.* 1855, 20, tr. 31), calls her *Tar'atha* (ܬܪܥܬܐ), and says that she is worshipped in Syria and Edessa (the Gr. translation speaks of Rhea as worshipped in Syria and Osroëne). He also mentions castration as practised in her worship. Tertullian (*ad. Nation.* ii. 8, cf. *Apol.* 24) calls Atargatis 'the goddess of the Syrians.' Macrobius (beginning of 5th cent.) says that among the Syrians the sun is called Hadad, the earth Adargatis. The latter is represented mounted upon a lion, with her head encircled by rays (*Sat.* i. 23, 18). Jacob of Sarug († A.D. 521), in the documents published by Martin (*ZDMG* xxix. 1875, 132), states that Tar'atha (ܬܪܥܬܐ) was worshipped at Harran. Simplicius (6th cent.) has the form Ἀταράτη (cf. Lagarde, *Ges. Abhl.* 1866, 238). The Talmud (*Abōdā zārā*, 11*b*; tr. Ewald, 1868, p. 85) calls her *Tar'atha* (תרעתא), and says that she is worshipped at ובד, *i.e.* Mabog (Bambyce, Hierapolis). In Armenian writers the goddess appears as *Tharatha*. Moses of Chorene (ii. 27) says that Abgar built Edessa and brought into it his idols, Nabok, Bel, Bathnichal, and Tharatha. For other Armenian authorities see Lagarde, 'Armenische Studien' in *AGG* xxii. 1877, p. 58, § 846; Mordtmann, *ZDMG* xxxix. 43.

From these accounts it appears that Atargatis is merely a local form of the primitive Semitic goddess Ishtar-Athtar. Strabo and Hesychius both affirm her identity with Athara, and the Delos inscriptions call her Aphrodite. Like Astarte, she was a goddess of life-giving water and of fertility. The main seats of her cult, Askalon, Karnaim, and Delos, were places long devoted to the worship of Astarte. Doves were sacred to her as to Astarte, and, according to Artemidorus (*Onirocrit.* i. 8), fish were not eaten by the worshippers of Astarte any more than by the worshippers of Atargatis. The emphasis upon sex in the cult at Hierapolis, as described by Lucian, also favours the original identity of Atargatis with Astarte. At the same time it is doubtless true that, in the mind of the common people, the Astarte of Hierapolis was distinguished from the Astartes of other cities as a separate deity, just as Ishtar of Arbela was distinguished by the Assyrians from Ishtar of Nineveh. At Askalon there was a temple of Astarte as well as one of Derkĕtó, and there is no evidence that the Atargatis of Karnaim was regarded as the same as the old Ashtoreth of Karnaim. See ASHTART, ISHTAR.

Hierapolis was, doubtless, the starting point of her cult, because her name is Aramaic. Mabog, the native name of Hierapolis, is apparently מבד, 'spring,' and is derived from a sacred spring in the precincts of the goddess. From Mabbog or Manbog comes the Gr. *Bambyce*. From this centre the cult spread in every direction. We find it at Palmyra, in the Ḥauran, at Karnaim, at Askalon, and in the Greek islands. Into every place where the worship of Astarte had gone that of Atargatis seems to have followed. During the Hellenistic period she became well known in all ports of the Mediterranean, and by Greek and Latin writers she was commonly called 'the Syrian goddess.'

LITERATURE.—In addition to the special treatises referred to above, see the art. and full bibliography by Baudissin in *PRE*³ ii. (1897) p. 171; also artt. 'Atargatis' and 'Dea Syria' in Roscher (1884) and in Pauly-Wissowa (1894); Puchstein, *ZA* ix. (1892), 420; W. R. Smith, *Religion of the Semites*² (1894), 172–175; White, art. 'Atargatis,' in Hastings' *DB* i. (1899), 194; Cheyne, art. 'Atargatis,' in *EBi* (1899); Barton, *Semitic Origins* (1902), 238–248.

LEWIS BAYLES PATON.

ATAVISM.—This word is used in three senses. (1) It is used to denote the hereditary re-appearance of a character not seen in the parents, or even in the immediate ancestry, but found in an ancestral race or in one related thereto. Thus, markedly projecting canine teeth in man have been regarded as re-expressions of a Simian character, and supplementary mammæ on the breast of a woman have been regarded (probably quite erroneously) as atavistic re-appearances of a characteristic of the Lemuroids. (2) It is used to denote the hereditary re-appearance of a character not seen in the parents, but known to have occurred in a definite ancestor belonging to the stock. Thus, a child may have the peculiar hazel eyes or a peculiar lock of hair characteristic of a great-grandparent, and not expressed in the intervening lineage. To such cases the term 'reversion' is often restricted—'the full re-appearance in an individual of a character which is recorded to have occurred in a *definite* ancestor of the same race' (K. Pearson, *Gram. of Science*², 1900, p. 489), while 'atavism' is restricted to 'a return of an individual to a character not typical of the race at all, but found in allied races supposed to be related to the evolutionary ancestry of the given race' (*ib.*). This would be a useful distinction between atavism and reversion, but unfortunately some scientific writers have used the two terms in the very opposite way, applying 'reversion' to (1) and 'atavism' to (2). The distinction which Pearson makes seems quite clear, but we doubt if it is now practicable. (3) It remains justifiable to use 'atavism' and 'reversion' as synonyms denoting the hereditary re-appearance of characters which were latent in the parents at least, but which were expressed in definite—not problematical—ancestors near or remote. It need hardly be said that an atavism is not necessarily a deterioration; it may be a throw-back to a higher degree of differentiation. That depends on the direction in which the species or stock is evolving in relation to its ancestors.

Examples.—A dovecot with carefully bred pigeons was left to itself for some years, after which it was found to contain numerous blue pigeons, resembling in many ways the wild rock-dove (*Columba livia*), believed to be the ancestor of all the domestic breeds of pigeon. In exact experiment this reversion to the rock-dove type has been repeatedly observed. Cultivated flowers and vegetables, such as pansies and cabbages, sometimes produce forms hardly distinguishable from their wild progenitors. The nectarine, which is derived from a peach, may produce what is practically a peach again; the white flowering-currant, which is derived from the common red form, may have branches with red flowers. In a hornless breed of

cattle, derived originally from a horned breed, a horned individual may suddenly re-appear. A dark bantam hen, crossed with an Indian Game Dorking cock, produced amongst others a cockerel almost identical with a jungle fowl (*Gallus bankiva*) —*i.e.* with the original wild stock (Cossar Ewart). Similarly, in his horse-zebra hybridizations, Professor Cossar Ewart obtained forms whose stripings were at least plausibly interpreted as reversions to an extremely old type of horse, such as is suggested by the striped ponies of Tibet.

There is no doubt that organisms often show peculiarities which their parents did not possess, but which their ancestors possessed. Summing up such cases *descriptively*, we may say that they seem to illustrate atavism, but the use of the term *as an interpretation* is not justified unless we can give some reason for believing that the resemblance to an ancestor is due to the rehabilitation of latent items in the inheritance. To do this we have to try to eliminate other interpretations, and that is often difficult. (*a*) What looks like an ancient feature may be due to an arrest of development through lack of appropriate nutrition. (*b*) Similar conditions of life, *e.g.* of food and climate, may induce an acquired or modificational resemblance between the organism and its great-grandparent, but this would not be an atavism. (*c*) Many organisms normally have certain 'vestigial organs,' and these are often variable. A quantitative variation in a normally present vestigial organ is not what is meant by an atavism. (*d*) It is conceivable that an independent individual variation may happen to coincide with one that occurred generations before, but this is different from the re-awakening of a latent item in the inheritance. (*e*) Filial regression, or an approximation towards the mean of the stock, is of everyday occurrence in blended inheritance, and must be kept quite distinct from reversion or atavism. (*f*) The list of alleged atavisms must also be reduced by the subtraction of what are called Mendelian phenomena. In certain cases, such as peas and mice, the crossing of two sharply contrasted pure-bred parents results in hybrid offspring which are all like one of the two parents as regards the contrasted characters; when these hybrid offspring are inbred, their progeny resemble in definite proportions the two grandparents.

The fact seems to be that many phenomena have been labelled atavisms which admit of other interpretations, and that genuine atavisms are rather rare. Let us repeat that an atavism is a harking back to a more or less remote ancestor, the harking back being due to the re-assertion or re-awakening of ancestral contributions which have lain for several generations latent or unexpressed.

It seems unnecessary to use the term 'atavism' for the common phenomenon of resemblance to a grandparent. There is every reason to believe that an individual inheritance is like a mosaic, built up of many contributions, through the two parents, from the grandparents, great-grandparents, and so on. It is a normal and frequent fact of inheritance that an offspring exhibits a peculiarity known to have occurred in one of the grandparents but not in either of the parents. There seems little utility in calling this very frequent 'skipping a generation' an atavism, though it is of the same general nature, and though it is obviously difficult to decide where to draw the line. For how long must a character have been absent or latent before its re-assertion or re-awakening is to be called an atavism? A drone-bee arises from an unfertilized egg; it has a mother and two grandparents, but no father. But it seems rather absurd to call its resemblance to its grandfather atavistic or reversionary. This is a *reductio ad absurdum*, for the drone-bee would resemble its father if it had one! The case may serve to show that it is undesirable to use the term 'atavism' unless the throw-back is to an ancestor more than two generations antecedent.

The exact study of atavistic phenomena must have regard to characters which can be definitely measured and registered, and only when this study has reached secure results will it be possible to discuss with precision what may be called psychical atavisms, re-awakenings, often more fitly termed recrudescences, of ancestral traits which have lain latent, it may be, for generations. The garden of a shepherd's cottage which was swallowed up in a deer forest, lost all trace of its previous cultivation, and became a weed-ground. After many years, under more humane conditions, it was re-delved, and there sprang up many different kinds of old-fashioned flowers whose seeds had lain dormant for several generations. So may ancient flowers and weeds now and again re-appear out of latency in that garden which we call our inheritance.

LITERATURE.—See artt. HEREDITY, REVERSION, and the important works noted under these articles. See, in particular, Charles Darwin, *The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication*, 2 vols., London, 1868; Yves Delage, *L'Hérédité et les Grands Problèmes de la Biologie Générale*[2], Paris, 1903; J. Cossar Ewart, *The Penycuik Experiments*, London, 1899, also 'Experimental Contributions to the Theory of Heredity, Reversion and Telegony,' *Trans. Highland and Agricultural Soc. of Scotland*, 1901; I. H. F. Kohlbrugge, *Der Atavismus*, Utrecht, 1897; Karl Pearson, 'On the Law of Reversion,' in *Proc. Roy. Soc.* London, lxvi. (1900) pp. 140–164, also *The Grammar of Science*[2], London, 1900, p. 486; J. Arthur Thomson, *Heredity*, London, 1908, see ch. v.

J. ARTHUR THOMSON.

'ATE.—A Semitic deity first mentioned in Assyrian proper names such as *Ata-idri*, *Ata-suri*, *Ate-iana* (cf. *KAT*[2] 435), then in Palmyrene inscriptions under the forms עתה, אתא, עת, Ἄθη, Ἄθης, Ἄθας, and in Gr. and Syr. writers. This divinity was associated with the old Semitic mother-goddess 'Attar - Ishtar - 'Ashtart in the compound name עתרעתה 'Attar-'Ate, Atar-gatis (see ATARGATIS). The characteristics and even the sex are uncertain. It is possible that the Lydian god Attis is only another form of the name, in which case his myths may be used to supplement the meagre information in regard to 'Ate (see ATTIS).

LEWIS BAYLES PATON.

ATHANASIAN CREED.—See CREEDS.

ATHANASIUS.—**1. Life.**—There is no trustworthy record of the early years of Athanasius, but his writings show that his education was Greek (Gwatkin, *Studies of Arianism*[2], Camb. 1900, pp. 67–70). He is acquainted with Greek literature (Homer, Demosthenes, and Plato) and with the later Greek philosophy. In knowledge of the Greek Bible he is second to none of the Fathers.

He first passes into the light of history at the Council of Nicæa in A.D. 325, at which the Arian party was opposed by 'Athanasius, a deacon of the church of the Alexandrians, who was highly esteemed by Alexander the bishop' (Socrates, i. 8). The rest of the life of Athanasius coincides in the main with the history of the Arian controversy, in which he was the protagonist on the Catholic side. In A.D. 328 he succeeded Alexander as bishop (Cureton, *Festal Letters*, p. xxxvii f.), though it was asserted that he was 'too young' at the time* (p. xliv). It was further asserted that his election was secret (*Apologia*, § 6).

* Gwatkin (*Ar.* 67 [71], note) and Robertson (*Selected Works of Athan.* p. xiv, note) say that the assertion that A. was 'under age' (*sic*) at his consecration must have had some semblance of truth, and they draw the conclusion that he was about 30 in A.D. 328; but the argument is precarious. There is not sufficient evidence to show that a canon was accepted at this time at Alexandria prescribing 30 as the age qualification for the episcopate. The *Didascalia*, both Syriac (Lagarde, p. 10) and Ethiopic (Platt, p. 16), lay down the general rule that a bishop must not be less than 50 years of age, and the Apostolic Constitutions (Funk, p. 31) uphold the same limit. Canon xi. of the Council of Neocæsarea (A.D. 314 or later) prescribes 30 as the age for a presbyter, but does not touch the case of a bishop.

The objection to Athanasius on the score of his youth is instructive. He was, indeed, representative of the new age which began with the conversion of the Emperor Constantine. Eusebius of Cæsarea, the older contemporary of Athanasius, stood for the bygone order. He had been a confessor during the terrible Palestinian persecution, and so he feared heathenism chiefly as a persecuting power, and was lulled into security when Constantine adopted Christianity. But a new and more subtle danger was arising. Crowds of heathen followed the Emperor with a facile profession of his religion on their lips, and a traditional attachment to heathenism in their hearts. When, therefore, Arius represented the Son of God as a (heathen) demi-god, his teaching secured ready listeners. To the young Athanasius, the man of the new age, fell the task of detecting the working of the heathen leaven, and of meeting it with Christian medicine.

Athanasius succeeded Alexander in a troubled heritage. Not only were the (new) Arians to be reckoned with, but also the (old) Meletians. In 306, during the Galerian persecution, Meletius, bishop of Lycopolis, separated from Peter of Alexandria on the ground that Peter's treatment of the lapsed was too mild (E. Schwartz, in *GGN*, 1905, p. 164 ff.). The schism continued throughout the episcopate of Alexander. The Council of Nicæa endeavoured to heal the breach, but the election of Athanasius seems to have widened it; indeed, Gwatkin (*Ar.* 66, note) thinks it probable that the Meletians elected a candidate of their own, one Theonas.

Athanasius' career as bishop falls into three periods: (*a*) 328–345, the double contest, personal with the Meletians, doctrinal with the Arians; (*b*) 346–356, the steady growth of his influence over Egypt, and the decline of Arian power in that country; (*c*) 357–373, the contest with those who denied the Divinity of the Spirit, and the reconciliation of the old Conservatives of the East to Nicene orthodoxy.

(*a*) *First period* (A.D. 328–345). — During the first period the battle waged by Athanasius against Arianism was confused with personal issues. The Meletians worked for his deposition, because he was a strong man and not their own candidate; the Arians aided them, because he was known as an opponent of Arianism. His enemies declared his rule to be oppressive, and accused him of violence, and even of murder. At the Council of Tyre in 335, in which several Arian sympathizers took part, Athanasius was deposed. He appealed to Constantine, but the Emperor compromised the dispute by sending him into honourable banishment to distant Trèves. He returned at the accession of Constantius for a troubled period of sixteen months, but was expelled in Lent, 339, by the prefect Philagrius, his enemies asserting that the sentence pronounced at Tyre was still binding. Gregory, a Cappadocian and (according to *Epist. Encycl.* 4, 6) an Arian, became bishop. Athanasius fled to Julius, bishop of Rome, and after some negotiations was re-tried in 343 by a Council held at Sardica (Sofia, in Bulgaria), and was acquitted of the charges on which he had been condemned at Tyre. The Eastern bishops, however, seceded from the Council, and refused to receive Athanasius. The doctrinal question lay behind the personal. The result of the Council showed that the West was Nicene, while the East outside Egypt was in the main (though not Arian) certainly anti-Nicene. In 345 Gregory died, and Constantius conciliated Alexandria by allowing Athanasius to return to his see.

All through his period of exile Athanasius showed himself a true pastor to Egypt and Alexandria. His 'Festal Letters' (announcing the date of Easter each year and warning his flock to prepare for it) are preserved for many eventful years. They show the pastoral side of the bishop and the depth of his religious feeling. On the occasion of his expulsion by Philagrius, he wrote his *Epistula Encyclica*, a narrative of the acts of outrage with which the intrusion of Gregory was accompanied. The four *Orationes c. Arianos* were probably composed about the same time (so Loofs, in *PRE*[3]).

(*b*) *Second period* (346–356).—In the autumn of 346, Athanasius returned to Alexandria. The great welcome he then received and the ten prosperous years which followed are sufficient proof that the bishop had won the hearts of his people. During this decade he may be said to have completed his work of bringing Egypt round to the doctrine of the ὁμοούσιον. Indeed, his position became so strong that it excited the envy and alarm of the suspicious Constantius. For a while the political condition of the West stayed the Emperor's hand, but when Constantius became master of the whole Empire in 353, he marked out Athanasius for overthrow. The well-known affection of the Alexandrians for their bishop protected him for a year or two, but he was driven from his seat in 356. Syrianus, 'dux Ægypti,' with 5000 men broke into the church of Theonas in which Athanasius and his people were keeping vigil, and Athanasius was forced to flee for his life. For years he flitted from hiding-place to hiding-place in different parts of Egypt, encouraging his flock by letters and by secret visits. George, an Arian of Cappadocia, took the see of Alexandria, and ruled without gaining affection or success.

(*c*) *Third period* (357–373).—The ejection of Athanasius, however, greatly encouraged the various anti-Nicene parties of the East. It was followed in 357 by the issue of a manifesto by a few bishops gathered at Sirmium (Mitrovicz in Slavonia on the Save), which condemned the Nicene ὁμοούσιον and the 'Semi-Arian' ὁμοιούσιον, and stated without disguise the Arian doctrine of the Person of the Son. But this act roused the conservatives of the East, and compelled them to approach the theological position of Athanasius. While still hesitating to accept the word ὁμοούσιον, they began to adopt the language and arguments of the Nicenes. At the Council of Seleucia in 359 the majority signed the Lucianic Creed, a conservative confession, and deposed Eudoxius of Antioch, George of Alexandria, and some other leading Arians. Athanasius in exile heard the news. In his *de Synodis* he approaches the conservatives with a friendly appeal to them not to stumble at the *word* ὁμοούσιον, since (he says) they accepted the *doctrine* which it represents. This act was the beginning of a policy of conciliation which bore good fruit a few years later.

For the moment it failed. A new party, the Homœan, gained the Emperor's ear and the predominant voice in the Church. The Homœans, by their confession that the Son is *like* (ὅμοιος) the Father, stood opposed to the extreme Arianism which denied this likeness, but otherwise they represented colourless doctrine and a policy of toleration for all, including the Nicenes. (The Homœan supremacy, with the brief interruption of the reign of the pagan Julian [A.D. 361–363] and of Jovian [A.D. 363–364], lasted until the accession of Theodosius in A.D. 379.)

In 362 Athanasius returned from hiding and held a Council at Alexandria. The work of conciliation was continued. Arian clergy who came over to the Nicene side were allowed to retain their rank on accepting the Nicene Creed and anathematizing those who spoke of the Holy Spirit as a creature (κτίσμα, *ad Antioch.* 3). To the doctrine of the

Holy Spirit Athanasius had already devoted an important work, the Epistles *ad Serapionem* (356–361, Loofs). The subject remained with him to the end of his life, but he was unwilling to see any addition made to the bare clause as it stood in the Nicene Creed—καὶ εἰς τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον (*ad Afros*, 10, 11).

Athanasius retained his position (with one short interval) under the Homœan emperor Valens. It was during this last period of his life (364–373) that he was able to see the promise of the coming decisive victory of the Nicene Creed. In Cappadocia, the province which had produced many of the Arian leaders, there now grew up under the leadership of Basil of Cæsarea a party devoted to Nicæa. Basil's early connexions had been with the conservatives, but Athanasius accepted his overtures, and gave the support of his name to Basil's schemes for reconciling the conservatives with the Nicenes. Acacius, the Homœan of Cæsarea in Palestine, and Meletius the conservative of Antioch, and others like them, became willing at last to accept the Nicene Creed. Egypt and the West were already Nicene, and the work of Basil, blessed by Athanasius, made Orthodoxy victorious. In 373, eight years before the Council of Constantinople registered the victory, Athanasius, Confessor and Reconciler, departed this life.

2. Theology. —*Introduction.* —(1) Athanasius, though an Alexandrian, was not a speculative theologian, but (as his Festal Letters show*) a great Christian pastor. Bishop of Alexandria in name, he was, in fact, the effective spiritual father of the numerous Christian congregations of Upper and Lower Egypt and of Libya. The ascetic spirit of Egypt, in which he shared, deepened his religious life without impairing his vigour as a Christian ruler. Arianism was to his pastoral mind not heterodoxy, but impiety and soul-destroying (ἀσέβεια, ἀνθρωποκτόνος). Redemption was the centre of his teaching.

(2) As far as Athanasius' theology was systematic, it was a systematizing of Scripture. His knowledge of the text was wide; he compares Scripture with Scripture, and appeals to the sense rather than to the words. As regards the contents of the Canon, there is no reason to believe that his opinions ever changed in any important particular, but his list of the Canonical books belongs to the last years of his life (Festal Letter 39, written for Easter, 367). In the NT his list coincides with our own; in the OT Esther is reckoned with the 'other' (ἕτερα) books, and is placed between Sirach and Judith.

(3) In forming an idea of Athanasius' teaching, we have to use his works, even those given by the Benedictines as genuine (*PG* xxv., xxvi.), with discrimination. The *Expositio Fidei*, *Oratio iv. c. Arianos*, *Vita Antonii*, and *Sermo Maior de Fide*, though probably genuine, are not free from difficulty. Some phrases may be non-Athanasian. *Historia Arianorum ad Monachos* was written, perhaps with the help of Athanasius, but not by his hand. The *de Incarnatione et c. Arianos* is probably of mixed authorship. The two *Libri cont. Apollinarium* are doubtful according to Loofs and Bardenhewer, non-Athanasian according to Stülcken and others. The genuineness of *de Virginitate* (*PG* xxviii. 251–282) has recently been defended by von der Goltz, but the phrase Πατὴρ καὶ Υἱὸς καὶ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα, τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις is in any case not likely to have come from Athanasius.

Discussions of the genuineness of Athanasius' works are found in Loofs' 'Athanasius,' in *PRE*[3]; in Stülcken's 'Athanasiana,' in *TU*, new ser. iv. 4; and in O. Bardenhewer's *Patrology*, p. 258 ff., Eng. tr., 1908; see also von der Goltz, 'de Virginitate,' in *TU*, new ser. xiv. 2a.

* See also the Letters *ad Dracontium* and *ad Amunem monachum* included among the 'ascetical works.'

1. *REDEMPTION.* —An account of Athanasius' theology begins naturally with his presentation of the doctrine of Redemption. Athanasius speaks of the death of a Divine Christ as 'the sum of our faith' (κεφάλαιον τῆς πίστεως, *Incarn.* 19; see, too, *Orat.* i. 34, where the same term is applied to the doctrine of the threefold name into which Christians are baptized).

'After showing the proofs of His Godhead from His works, He next offered up His sacrifice also on behalf of all, yielding His Temple (Jn 2[21]) to death in the stead of all, in order, firstly, to make men quit and free of their old trespass, and, further, to show Himself more powerful even than death, displaying His own body incorruptible, as firstfruits of the resurrection of all' (*Incarn.* 20).

In all references to Redemption, Athanasius gives an important place to the thought that Christ delivered mankind from physical extinction.

Adam and Eve were 'by nature corruptible, but destined by the grace which followed from partaking of the Word to have escaped their natural state, had they remained good' (*Incarn.* 5). They fell, however, and so corruption remained with them; the rational man made in God's image was disappearing (ἠφανίζετο, *Incarn.* 6) by a gradual course of deterioration. So the Word by whom man was made came into the world by the Incarnation in order to re-make man, that God's purpose in creation might not be disappointed. The mere coming of the Word in a human body availed in one aspect to save man. Human nature could not finally perish, seeing that the Word united Himself with it.

But a further work remained for the incarnate Word. Death, owing to God's sentence against Adam, had acquired a certain authority; this authority, however, was exhausted by the Passion of Christ (πληρωθείσης τῆς ἐξουσίας ἐν τῷ κυριακῷ σώματι, *Incarn.* 8). This annulling of Death was demonstrated by the Lord's resurrection with an incorruptible body, and those who believe in Christ know that they themselves have become incorruptible through the Resurrection (*Incarn.* 27).

In connexion with this annulling of the authority of death, the death of Christ is spoken of by Athanasius as a sacrifice or offering (θυσία, προσφορά, *Incarn.* 10); yet whether to God or to the Divine justice he does not say.

'By offering *unto death* (εἰς θάνατον) the body He Himself had taken, as an offering and sacrifice free from any stain, straightway He put away death from all His peers by the offering of an equivalent' (τοῦ ἀνταλλάγματος, *Incarn.* 9).

In another passage Athanasius uses the forensic analogy, yet without definitely saying that Christ's death was a satisfaction of Divine justice by a substitution. His statement follows Scripture closely:

'Formerly the world as guilty was under judgment from the Law, but now the Word has taken on Himself the condemnation (τὸ κρίμα), and, having suffered in the body for all, has bestowed salvation upon all' (*Orat.* i. 60).

But these statements are general; so far (says Robertson, p. lxx) as Athanasius works out the doctrine of redemption in detail, it is 'under physical categories without doing full justice to the ideas of guilt and reconciliation, of the reunion of *will* between man and God.'

On the other hand, Athanasius loves to dwell on the spiritual illumination of mankind wrought through the Incarnation, and the restoration thereby to man of the lost Divine likeness (*Incarn.* 14, 15).

If Athanasius does not attain to the Scriptural fullness of the doctrine of Redemption, yet his own teaching as to the Incarnation and the Passion is Scriptural in its grandeur. He seeks to express what he finds in the Scriptures, and often sums up the teaching of many passages in one terse phrase of his own. Regarding the purpose of the Incarnation, his summary is: 'He was made man, that we might be made Divine' (ἵνα θεοποιηθῶμεν, *Incarn.* 54; cf. *Orat.* i. 39). Any other attempt to summarize the work of the Incarnate Word is renounced by Athanasius.

'In a word,' he writes, 'the achievements of the Saviour resulting from His becoming man are of such a kind and number that, if one should wish to enumerate them, he may be compared to men who gaze at the expanse of the sea and wish to count its waves' (*Incarn.* 54).

ii. *THE DIVINITY OF THE SON.*—Athanasius is best known for his defence of the Godhead of the Son. His older contemporary Arius challenged the whole Christian world by the answer which he gave to the question, In what sense is Jesus the Son of God? Arius wished to maintain the doctrine of the Divine unity, and at the same time the doctrine of the personality or separate existence of the Son. Lest he should confess two Gods, he treated the title 'Son of God' as honorific only. According to Arius, the Son was not God, or eternal, or omniscient, or immutable, but a creature (κτίσμα), yet unique among the creatures. The Son as Son was later than the Father, therefore not eternal, therefore not God but a creature. This bald logic involved Arius in a great contradiction. Beginning by basing his argument on the title 'Son of God,' he ended by emptying the title of all meaning. The Son was not a Son, but only a favoured creature of God.

The doctrine of Arius is easy to state, for it was only a theory of something conceived of as finite; but this is not the case with that of Athanasius. It is true, indeed, that Athanasius accepted from the first the Nicene Creed and defended it to the last. Negatively, in agreement with its anathematisms, he contradicted the favourite Arian formulæ, ἦν ποτὲ ὅτε οὐκ ἦν—ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐγένετο—ἐξ ἑτέρας οὐσίας, etc. Positively, in loyalty to the terms of the Creed, he taught that the Son was born ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρός, and that He is ὁμοούσιος τῷ Πατρί. But these two last watchwords of orthodoxy were not the invention of Athanasius; nor were they, in their orthodox sense, of Eastern origin. Neither Athanasius nor any other Eastern received them without allowing his thought to play round them and put them to the test.

When we turn from the acknowledged fact of Athanasius' acceptance of the Nicene Creed to study his own works, we are met by two important facts: (1) Athanasius does not restrict himself to the Nicene watchwords, but (2) on the contrary he uses a great variety of language in order to assert the true Deity of the Son. His language is, in fact, a maze through which we might perhaps make our way more easily, if we could be sure of the dating or at least of the order of his works. But much remains uncertain. The two apologetic works (*c. Gentes; de Incarnatione*) are usually assigned to a date before the outbreak of the Arian controversy; but, as Loofs points out, the same kind of evidence might be urged in favour of a similar dating of some of the Festal Letters. The important *Orationes c. Arianos* are assigned by the Benedictines to *c.* 358 A.D., but Loofs gives good grounds for *c.* 338 A.D. The short *Expositio Fidei* contains no certain indication of date, though it is important to know at what period Athanasius made use of the rather surprising language found in it. If, however, we may accept in general the Benedictine dates in addition to Loofs' early date for the Orations, we may say that in his later works Athanasius seems to hesitate less to use and defend the special term ὁμοούσιον than in the early work. To this extent there seems to have been a development in Athanasius' teaching.

In his early works, however, far from confining himself to the watchword ὁμοούσιον and to the language of the Nicene Creed in general, Athanasius allows himself great freedom, and not seldom seems to avoid ὁμοούσιον. Thus in *Expositio Fidei* (§ 1) he writes: Τὸν αὐτοτελῆ . . . τὴν ἀληθινὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ Πατρὸς ἰσότιμον καὶ ἰσόδοξον ('Very Son . . . true image of the Father, equal in honour and glory'), while later in the section he uses even ὅμοιος τῷ Πατρί ('like to the Father'), the formula adopted by the Homœans in A.D. 359–360 (*de Syn.* 30) for evading the issue. In *Orat.* i. 40, in arguing with his opponents he uses for the moment ὅμοιος κατὰ πάντα, the formula of the fourth Council of Sirmium (*de Syn.* 8), and in iii. 11 he similarly employs ὅμοιος κατ' οὐσίαν, a variant of ὁμοιούσιος. These, no doubt, were intended to be only approximations to Athanasius' full meaning, but it is worthy of note that in i. 58, where he seems to aim at full and explicit statement, he gives not ὁμοούσιος but τῆς τοῦ Πατρὸς φύσίας ἴδιος καὶ ὁμοφυής. In *Orat.* iii. 1 he writes, in almost untranslatable phrase, πλήρωμα θεότητός ἐστιν ὁ Υἱός ('The Son is the completeness of Divinity,' *i.e.* is completely Divine).

Similarly Athanasius seems often to avoid the Nicene [γεννηθέντα] ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρός. In the Orations (cf. *de Decr.* 26; *de Syn.* 35) he gives ἴδιον γέννημα τῆς οὐσίας τ. Π. ('proper offspring of the essence of the Father'). For οὐσία, 'essence,' 'substance,' Athanasius sometimes prefers φύσις, 'nature.' Thus he writes τὸν Μονογενῆ τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸν ἀχώριστον τῇ φύσει (*Omnia tradita*, § 3), and ἡ φύσις μία καὶ ἀδιαίρετος (§ 5). It is clear that Athanasius recognized that the terms οὐσία and ὁμοούσιος raised real difficulties. Οὐσία, 'substantia,' suggested to many thoughts of that which is material, while ὁμοούσιος suggested some previously existing οὐσία in which both Father and Son shared as brethren (cf. *de Syn.* 51). Consequently Athanasius received these two terms only in the sense in which they were used by the Nicene Council, and only for the purpose which the Council had in view. He contended so long not for the un-Scriptural word ὁμοούσιος, but for the official condemnation of Arianism which it registered.

'The Bishops,' he writes, 'were compelled (ἠναγκάσθησαν) to gather once more from Scripture the general sense (τὴν διάνοιαν), and to write that the Son is of one substance (ὁμοούσιον) with the Father' (*de Decr.* 20; cf. *de Syn.* 36).

Athanasius' own doctrine is best described as a direct and complete repudiation of the teaching of Arius. He denies *seriatim* all Arius' propositions, holding that the Christ of Arius could not be the Saviour of the world. Athanasius maintained that the Son is Divine, because He is the true Son of God (ὡς ἐκ πηγῆς ζωὴ καὶ φωτὸς ἀπαύγασμα, *de Syn.* 42). But he shrank from attempting to tie this truth to set phrases.

'The more I desired to write,' he says, 'and endeavoured to force myself to understand the Divinity of the Word, so much the more did the knowledge thereof withdraw itself from me; and in proportion as I thought I apprehended it, in so much I perceived myself to fail of doing so. Moreover, also I was unable to express in writing even what I seemed myself to understand; and that which I wrote was unequal to the imperfect shadow of the truth which existed in my conception' (*Historia Arianorum: Epistola*, § 1).

Athanasius' argument for the Divinity of the Son may be stated under five heads. (1) He argues from the notion of a Trinity (τριάς) that it is folly to suppose that it is partly created and partly uncreate, in part eternal and in part not eternal (*Orat.* i. 18). (2) He identifies the Son with the Word (Λόγος, *Orat.* i. 28), and urges that the Son must be eternal, because the Father can never have been without His Word or Reason (ἄλογος, *Decr.* 15). (3) He appeals to the Divine works of the Son, namely, Creation (*Orat.* ii. 22) and Redemption (*Incarn.* 20). (4) By a copious use of Scripture, and particularly of the Fourth Gospel and the Epistle to the Hebrews, he shows how great is the difficulty of reconciling the Arian theory of the Person of Christ with the language of Scripture. (5) Similarly, he shows that the Christian consciousness demands a Divine Christ (Χριστιανοί γάρ ἐσμεν, ᾧ Ἀρειανοί, Χριστιανοί ἐσμεν ἡμεῖς, *Orat.* iii. 28).

Defensively Athanasius meets the Arians with a

careful exegesis of the chief passages of Scripture which they quoted in defence of their views. The passages are collected and discussed in *Orat.* i. 37–iii. 58. They may be classified under various heads. Some of them seem to speak of the Son as a creature, *e.g.* Pr 8^{22} (ἔκτισέν με, LXX), He $3^{1,2}$ (τῷ ποιήσαντι αὐτόν); others of His advancement from a lower state, *e.g.* Ph $2^{9,10}$, Ps 45^{7}; others of His entire dependence on the Father, *e.g.* Mt 11^{27}, Jn 5^{30}; others of His progress in knowledge or of His ignorance, *e.g.* Mk 13^{32}, Lk 2^{52}; others of His prayers, *e.g.* Mt 27^{46}. Others again seem to draw a line of separation between Him and the Father, *e.g.* Jn 17^{3}. On the whole, it must be said that Athanasius shows a great grasp of Scripture, and that his interpretations are sounder than those of his opponents. Most of the passages cited above he understands of the human nature of Christ, telling the Arians that their objections are really objections to the Incarnation itself. The passages which refer to advancement he explains less convincingly as referring to the exaltation of human nature through union with the Word by the Incarnation.

iii. *CHRIST'S HUMAN NATURE.*—THE UNION OF THE TWO NATURES IN CHRIST. — Though Athanasius' language is not that of the Chalcedonian definition or of the *Quicumque vult*, he maintains in fact the true manhood and the true Godhead together with the true union of the two Natures in Christ. The apparently Nestorian language of such a passage as *Expositio Fidei*, § 1 (τὸν ἡμέτερον ἀνείληφεν ἄνθρωπον Χ. Ἰ. . . . ἐν ᾧ ἀνθρώπῳ σταυρωθεὶς . . . ἀνέστη ἐκ νεκρῶν), has to be judged in connexion with other statements of a different form.

'He became man; he did not merely enter into a man' (*Orat.* iii. 30). 'It behoved the Lord in putting on man's flesh to put it on in its completeness with its own passions' (μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων παθῶν αὐτῆς ὅλην, *Orat.* iii. 32). 'They [truly] confessed that the Saviour had not a body without a soul, nor without sense or intelligence; . . . nor was the Salvation effected in (through) the Word Himself a salvation of body only, but of soul also' (*Antioch.* 7). 'If the works of the Word's Godhead had not taken place through the body, man had not been deified; and again, if the things proper to the flesh had not been predicated of the Word, man would not have been completely delivered from them' (*Orat.* iii. 33; cf. 32).

iv. *DIVINITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.* — The Fathers of Nicæa contented themselves in their Creed with the brief clause, 'and in the Holy Ghost'; they added nothing regarding His Person or work. For thirty years after the Council met, Athanasius kept himself within the limits thus laid down. Though he was engaged in contending for the full Divinity of the Son, though in this contest he often uses the Trinitarian baptismal formula and the word 'Trinity' (τριάς), he does not attempt to complete formally his doctrine of the Trinity by extending or adapting to the Spirit the Nicene definitions which asserted the Divinity of the Son. Perhaps he realized that, when the doctrine of the Godhead of the Son was accepted, the acceptance of the Godhead of the Spirit must follow as a consequence.

In the Epistles *ad Serapionem*, written some time after A.D. 356, Athanasius begins to speak fully of the Divinity of the Holy Spirit. He learned that certain of the Arians were teaching that the Holy Ghost was a creature, one of the ministering spirits, superior to the angels only *in degree* (βαθμῷ, *Ser.* i. 1). It appears also that there were others who disagreed with the Arians as to the Deity of the Son, but were content to regard the Holy Spirit as a creature. To these last Athanasius utters the challenge: 'Is God a Trinity or a Duality?' (τριάς ἐστιν ἢ δυάς, *Ser.* i. 29).

Athanasius unfolds his doctrine of the Holy Spirit in his Epistles to Serapion, much as he develops his teaching on the Son in the Orations. (1) He maintains that the Trinity must be a real (eternal) Trinity, in which no creature is included (*Ser.* i. 9, 17, 20, 28; iii. 7). (2) He asserts that the work ascribed to the Spirit implies His Godhead. Thus he asks: 'Who shall unite (συνάψει) you to God, if ye have not the Spirit of God Himself, but the spirit of the creature?' (τῆς κτίσεως, i. 29; cf. i. 6). He carefully discusses passages which appear to speak of the Spirit as a creature (κτίσμα), and rejects the Arian interpretation of them (i. 3, 4, 10), pointing out that πνεῦμα anarthrous does not mean the Holy Spirit (i. 4, 9, in reference to Am 4^{13} κτίζων πνεῦμα). He appeals to 2 Co 13^{14}, and expounds Eph 4^{6} of the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit (i. 28). If his opponents point to passages (*e.g.* 1 Ti 5^{21}) in which only two Persons of the Trinity are mentioned, he answers that the Trinity is indivisible (ἀδιαίρετος) and united within itself, so that, when one Person is mentioned, the other Persons are understood (i. 14). He accepts fully the doctrine of περιχώρησις, 'circumincessio,' based on Jn 14^{10} 'I in the Father and the Father in me.'

'Therefore also,' he writes, 'when the Father gives grace and peace, the Son also gives it, as Paul signifies in every Epistle, writing, Grace to you and peace from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ' (*Orat.* iii. 11).

Athanasius avoids applying directly to the Holy Spirit the contested word ὁμοούσιον, except in a very few places (*e.g. Ser.* i. 27).

He writes: 'It is sufficient to know that the Spirit is not a creature' (i. 17). He describes the Spirit as 'united to the deity of the Father' (ἡνωμένον τῇ θεότητι τοῦ Πατρός, i. 12), and as immutable and unchangeable (ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον, *Ser.* i. 26). Usually, however, he asserts the Deity of the Spirit *through His relation to the Son.*

'If the Son . . . because He is own offspring of the Father's essence is not a creature, but ὁμοούσιος τοῦ Πατρός, so neither would the Holy Spirit be a creature, because He is proper to the Son' (διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν Υἱὸν ἰδιότητα, iii. 1; cf. i. 33).

v. *PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.* — Athanasius can hardly be said to have a doctrine of Procession. He approaches it in *Ser.* i. 15, where he represents his opponents as saying: 'If the Spirit is not a creature (*i.e.* as we hold), but proceedeth from (ἐκ) the Father (*i.e.* as ye hold).' Cf. i. 33, 'Who deny that the Spirit (αὐτό) is from (ἐκ) the Father in the Son.' But if this seems to attribute to Athanasius the doctrine of Procession from the Father alone, Athanasius himself (*Ser.* iv. 4) describes the Spirit as ἴδιον τῆς τοῦ Λόγου οὐσίας, 'proper to the essence of the Word,' so that the two passages taken together supply evidence that Athanasius approximated to the Western doctrine of Procession from the Father and the Son. The same might be said of *de Incarn. et c. Arianos*, 9: 'David (a reference to Ps 36^{9}) knew that the Son, being with the Father (παρὰ τῷ Πατρὶ ὄντα), is the source (τὴν πηγήν) of the Holy Spirit,' but the genuineness of the passage is highly doubtful (Stülcken, p. 63 f.).

On this mysterious subject Athanasius does not forsake his custom of keeping as closely as possible to the language of Scripture. 'The Son is the Son of God,' he says, 'and the Holy Spirit is the Holy Spirit, and not the offspring (ἔκγονον) of the Father' (*Ser.* iv. 4). He doubtless prefers to speak of the Procession in Time: 'The Spirit who proceedeth from (παρά, Jn 15^{26}) the Father, and, being proper to the Son, is given by Him to the disciples and to all that believe on Him' (*Ser.* i. 2).

vi. *THE TRINITY.* — Athanasius is clear and express in his teaching that the Trinity is one in nature and cannot be divided (*Orat.* iii. 15; *Ser.* i. 2), but he is less precise in his doctrine regarding the nature of the (personal) distinctions within the Godhead. He writes with severe restraint, keeping himself as far as possible to the words of the

Baptismal formula (Mt 28^{19}) and the Pauline benediction (2 Co 13^{14}). Indeed, 'Person' is not one of Athanasius' theological terms; the phrase *εἰς θεὸς ἐν τρισὶν ὑποστάσεσι* (*de Incarn. et c. Arianos*, 10), 'one God in three Persons' (or 'Subsistences'), belongs to a passage of highly doubtful authenticity. In *de Syn.* 36 he reckons the phrase *τρεῖς εἶναι ὑποστάσεις* among the un-Scriptural phrases used by his opponents. It is true, indeed, that once (*Omnia tradita*, § 6) he uses the term much as Westerns use it:

'For the fact of those venerable living creatures (Is 6) offering their praises three times, saying, "Holy, Holy, Holy," proves that *the Three Subsistences* (*τὰς τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις*, if the text be sound) are perfect, just as in saying, "Lord," they declare the One Essence (*τὴν μίαν οὐσίαν*).'

In the *Expositio Fidei*, however, he points out the danger which lurks in the term:

'Neither can we imagine three subsistences (Persons) separated (*μεμερισμένας*) from each other, as results in the case of men from their bodily nature, lest we hold a plurality of gods like the heathen' (§ 2).

Accordingly Athanasius never makes *τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις* a test of orthodoxy, and in his later years he tells the Antiochenes (*Antioch.* 5, 6) that he received those who professed belief in *τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις* (meaning three 'Persons') on condition that they in their turn received those who confessed *μία ὑπόστασις* (meaning one 'Substance'). Indeed *ὑπόστασις*, a synonym of *οὐσία* in the Nicene anathematism, could never become fixed for Athanasius himself to the meaning 'Person,' though he might tolerate the innovation in others. Sometimes Athanasius writes simply *ἄλλος ὁ Πατήρ, ἄλλος ὁ Υἱός* (cf. *Orat.* iii. 4), and similarly, 'The Father is Father, and the Son Son' (*Orat.* iv. 2).

Conclusion.—Looking at the teaching of Athanasius as a whole, we see that it was shaped with a practical aim, and that it was expressed as little as possible in set theological terms. The profound mind of Athanasius realized that Christian truths strain to the breaking point the formulas in which men strive to express them. He invented no theological terms himself, and if in his later writings (from *de Decretis* onward) he strenuously defended the *ὁμοούσιον* of the Nicene Council, this defence was justified by an experience of many years that this word, and this word only, was a 'bulwark' (*ἐπιτείχισμα*) against Arian error (*de Syn.* 45).

LITERATURE.—i. *ANCIENT.*—The works of Athanasius printed in Migne, *PG* xxv.–xxviii. (with these works are associated a number of contemporary documents of great value). To these must be added the *Festal Letters* (almost wholly lost in Greek, but edited in Syriac with an Introduction by W. Cureton, Lond. 1848). Though several doubtful or spurious works are included in Migne, yet enough remains which is certainly genuine to yield a full account both of his life and of his teaching. Athanasius' writings ('Pamphleten,' as E. Schwartz calls them) illustrate in a living way both the vicissitudes of his own life and the varying fortunes of the Arian controversy. (The later writers, Rufinus, Socrates, Sozomen, and others tell us little in addition that is trustworthy, and, moreover, misrepresent much which is given in Athanasius' own writings.)

Information with regard to the MSS of the works of Athanasius is to be found in *JThSt* iii. 97–110, 245–258, two articles by F. Wallis, supplemented by notes by A. Robertson, and C. H. Turner; also in *JThSt* v. 108–114, notes by Kirsopp Lake; *JThSt* vii. 600–603, note by C. H. Turner, calling attention to G. Bertolotto's art. in the *Atti della Società Ligure di storia patria*, 1892, pp. 1–63. Bp. Wallis's work has been used and supplemented in the valuable account of MSS given by E. von der Goltz in his ed. of [Athanasii] *de Virginitate*, Leipzig, 1905 (=*TU*, new ser. xiv. 2a).

ii. *MODERN.*—Modern authorities have thrown much additional light on Arianism and on Athanasius. Full bibliographies are given in Gwatkin, *Arianism*, 1882 and 1900, and in Bardenhewer (see below). Gwatkin's book is itself almost a life of Athanasius. A. Robertson, *Selected Works of A. translated into English* (Oxford and N.Y. 1892), gives an important Introduction on the Life and Teaching of Athanasius. W. Bright, 'Athanasius,' in Smith-Wace's *DCB*, and Loofs, 'Athanasius,' in *PRE*^{3}, are both valuable. E. Schwartz, 'Zur Geschichte A.'s,' in *GGN*, 1904, 1905 (and 1908), throws light on some obscure points. O. Bardenhewer, *Patrology* (Eng. ed. by Shahan), Freiburg i. Breisg. 1908 (pp. 253–264), and A. Stülcken, 'Athanasiana,' *TU*, new ser. iv. 4 (on the genuineness of some disputed works), are both of value. Cf. J. F. Bethune-Baker, 'The Meaning of homoousios' (1901), in Cambridge *TS* vii. 1. Of general histories of doctrine it is sufficient to mention Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma* (Eng. tr. 1896–98), especially iii. 272 ff., 290 ff., iv. 1–163. Among general Historians of the Church, L. Duchesne, *Histoire ancienne de l'église*, ii. (1907), tells the story of Athanasius and the Arian struggle with much freshness.

W. EMERY BARNES.

ATHAPASCANS.—See DÉNÉS and NAVAHOS.

ATHEISM.

Anti-theistic Theories (C. B. UPTON), p. 173.
Buddhist (L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN), p. 183.
Chinese.—See p. 176^a and art. CHINA.
Egyptian (F. LL. GRIFFITH), p. 184.
Greek and Roman (A. C. PEARSON), p. 184.
Indian, Ancient (R. GARBE), p. 185.
Indian, Modern (G. A. GRIERSON), p. 186.
Jain (H. JACOBI), p. 186.
Jewish (S. DAICHES), p. 187.
Muhammadan (D. S. MARGOLIOUTH), p. 188.

ATHEISM AND ANTI-THEISTIC THEORIES.—*Introduction.*—Atheism is sometimes said to be equivalent to pancosmism, *i.e.* the doctrine that the universe consists of nothing but those physical and psychical existences which are perceptible by the senses or are cognizable by the imagination and finite understanding. Pancosmism, however, is a positive doctrine, while atheism, both by etymology and by usage, is essentially a negative conception, and exists only as an expression of dissent from positive theistic beliefs. Theism is the belief that all the entities in the cosmos, which are known to us through our senses, or are inferred by our imagination and reason, are dependent for their origination and for their continuance in existence upon the creative and causal action of an Infinite and Eternal Self-consciousness and Will; and in its higher stages it implies that this Self-existent Being progressively reveals His essence and His character in the ideas and ideals of His rational creatures, and thus stands in personal relationship with them. In its earlier stages theism conceives of God simply as the Cause and Ground of all finite and dependent existences; but as it develops, it realizes the idea of God as immanent and self-manifesting as well as creative and transcendent. Until it attains to this consciousness of felt personal communion with the immanent Cause and Ground of the universe, it is more appropriately described as deism.

As was said above, atheism presupposes the existence of theism. It can hardly be said to arise until the human mind has formed the conception of a Unitary Self-existing Cause on whom all things and persons depend, and to whom the sentiments of reverence and worship are directed. Anthropology shows that long before the idea of One Infinite Supreme Being is reached, uncivilized races, through the experience of dreams and supposed ghosts, as well as through the intuitive judgment that the energies in nature which resist human volitions are the manifestation of wills resembling their own, come to believe in the existence of superhuman beings who act for or against human welfare, and are thus the objects of worship or of fear. But along with this conception of a variety of finite superhuman personalities there dawns on the more advanced minds of savage peoples, through the intuitive idea of infinity, the felt Divine authority of conscience, and the gradual

intellectual perception of a pervading unity behind all the changing phenomena of nature, the conception of One Supreme Spiritual Reality who is the omnipresent Cause that originates and controls all the forces of nature, and in varying degrees manifests Himself within the human soul.

It is not till this theistic idea is to some extent present that real atheistic negation becomes possible. If a Hindu or a Greek came to disbelieve in one or all of the deities of his national pantheon, he would not necessarily be an atheist; for it often happened that this scepticism, which the vulgar called atheism, arose simply from a more or less clear apprehension of the One Supreme object of worship. Max Müller well says in his Gifford Lectures on *Natural Religion* (p. 228):

'We must remember that to doubt or deny the existence of Indra or of Juppiter is not Atheism, but should be distinguished by a separate name, namely, Adevism. The early Christians were called ἄθεοι, because they did not believe as the Greeks believed nor as the Jews believed. Spinoza was called an atheist, because his concept of God was wider than that of Jehovah; and the Reformers were called atheists, because they would not deify the mother of Christ or worship the Saints. This is not Atheism in the true sense of the word; and if an historical study of religion had taught us that one lesson only, that those who do not believe in our God are not therefore to be called Atheists, it would have done some real good, and extinguished the fires of many an *auto da fé*.'

Atheism, as we have seen, is not, like theism and pantheism, a positive belief the phases of which can be depicted in their relation to one unifying conception. It has no organic character. The history of it is little more than a collection of the instances in which doubt and negation in regard to some essential element in theism have arisen. And the occasion and cause of this atheistic frame of mind will generally be found in some new scientific or philosophical ideas, which have, for the time being at least, appeared to be incompatible with the current form of deistic or theistic belief.

The following lines of scientific and philosophical speculation have been especially influential in calling forth atheistic protests against theistic belief. First, *materialism*, or the theory that matter and physical forces constitute the ultimate reality of the universe, and that, through the aggregation of the elements of matter in various organic forms, life and the infinitely varied forms of consciousness have originated. Another line of speculation which has largely concurred with materialism in undermining religious belief is the doctrine of *sensationalism*, which originated early among Greek thinkers, and which the genius of our philosopher, John Locke, presented in so plausible a form that both in this country and in France it led to much atheistic negation. Locke himself was a devout theist; for though, according to his basal theory, all our ideas are derived from sensations or from reflexion on sensations, he still held that the human mind is compelled to postulate an adequate creative cause for all material and psychical existences. Had Locke, however, carried out his sensationalism to its logical results, it would have led him, as it led many sensationalists in France, to an atheistic conclusion. If all our ideas arose out of sensations, we could have no conception either of an infinite God, or of ultimate causation, or of that absolute moral imperative which has been to Kant and to several other thinkers the main foundation of theism. A third source of atheistic doubt, and one which has been strongly operative since Evolution became recognized as the method of nature, is *distrust of the argument from design*—an argument which, ever since the time of Anaxagoras, has been one of the chief supports of theism. This argument appears, however, to be recovering its former power even in the scientific world, for Huxley and other scientists have admitted that, when account is taken of the process of evolution as a whole,

'it is necessary to remember that there is a wider Teleology which is not touched by the doctrine of Evolution, but is actually based upon the fundamental proposition of Evolution' (Huxley, *Critiques and Addresses*, 1873, p. 305). See art. Design.

Among the intellectual causes which have led, not indeed to atheism but to extreme agnosticism, is the doctrine of *the relativity of knowledge*, which, when carried to such length as it has been by the Greek sceptic Carneades, and by recent thinkers such as Mansel and H. Spencer, precludes all insight into the essential nature and character of the ultimate cause and ground of the universe. This complete agnosticism has been ably criticized by Calderwood in *The Philosophy of the Infinite*, and by Martineau in several of his philosophical Essays and Reviews.

1. Criticism of atheistic materialism.—Of the alleged reasons for rejecting theism, materialism has been, and still is, the most influential. It is the basis of much of the earliest atheism, and also of the recent atheism which appears in the writings of H. G. Atkinson, Bradlaugh, Büchner, and Haeckel. For this reason it seems desirable, before presenting a brief sketch of the chief historical instances of atheism, to state what appear to be the most potent answers given by theists to the arguments for materialistic atheism.

Idealists, as their name implies, make short work with materialism; for their basal assumption is that matter and force have no existence apart from the sensations and ideas in self-conscious minds. Most theistic writers, however, hold that the experience of resistance to our volitional efforts justifies the conviction that entities exerting energy exist independently of perceiving minds. But while the theist maintains that these entities depend for their origination, their continuance in existence, and their special properties on the creative activity of an Infinite and Eternal Self-consciousness and Will, the atheist contends that matter is itself the ultimate and self-existent reality, that in virtue of its modes of motion and the properties which intrinsically belong to it, it can, when its elements are aggregated in certain ways, manifest life and, in the case of the highest organisms, all the forms of personal consciousness and volition.

Perhaps the most conclusive reply to the atheism which asserts that out of uncreated matter and energy all that we know of life and consciousness has been evolved, is based on an appeal to the recognized philosophical principle that no effect can contain more than is contained in the ground and cause from which the effect has proceeded. The American writer Dr. M. J. Savage thus expresses himself on this point:

'If you can prove to me that "dead" matter, the matter we find in a brick or a piece of marble, under some mysterious transformation comes to have the power to live, to think, to feel, to love, to hope, to sacrifice itself for another, to aspire, to look onward towards an immortal life—if you can prove to me that matter can do that, you have simply changed your definition of matter, and made it coincide with what I call spirit' (*Belief in God*, Lond. 1881, p. 40).

Haeckel would probably reply to this by saying that in his view the elements of the ultimate and self-existent 'Substance,' out of which the universe arises, have their psychical as well as their physical side or aspect, and that it is owing to the former aspect that organic compounds of matter become capable of feeling, thinking, and volition. Does he, then, mean that all the higher attributes of mind are already implicit in the ultimate eternal 'Substance,' out of which, by condensation or otherwise, that which we call matter, energy, and life proceeds? Is the perfection of all human ideals already present, though invisible to the scientific gaze, in 'the Infinite and Eternal Energy,' which is H. Spencer's mode of describing Haeckel's ultimate 'Substance'? If so, the self-existent 'Substance' is nothing less than the theist's Eternal

God; and the molecular corpuscles are simply variously limited modes which the will of God imposes upon a portion of His own eternal life, or, as Lotze and Martineau would say, are differentiations or individuations of His own essential being, to which He delegates some measure of individuality or selfhood. In each of them the Ground and Cause of all created things and persons is immanent and active, and through His creative presence there is no limit to the possibilities of the development of the creatures whom He calls into existence. If it were true, as Tyndall said, that 'in matter are the promise and potency of all terrestrial life,' that could be the case only in the sense that in the ground and cause of each molecule there are already involved all the energy, all the intellectual, moral, and spiritual powers and ideals, which are gradually evolved in the course of the development of the cosmos. The fallacy in Haeckel's 'Weltanschauung' is that, though he gives to the separate molecular corpuscles out of which the universe proceeds a mental side, a germ of consciousness, there is nothing in his account of these elements of matter and energy which at all explains how it comes about that all these innumerable corpuscles conspire together to produce the present harmonious and intelligible cosmos, or how sentient organisms should at length become cognizant of those authoritative ideals which prompt them to subordinate their own personal aims to the general good, and which enable them in a measure both to see and to act from the point of view of the immanent God. It is for want of this recognition of the constant creative presence of the source of ideals throughout the course of evolution that Haeckel's theory, no less than the theories of coarser materialists, must be condemned as unsatisfactory. It fails to show that the 'Substance,' which he represents as the cause and ground of all things, contains within itself the power to produce the effects which we experience in ourselves, and which we discern in the cosmos.

Some eminent physicists and philosophers, including Sir Oliver Lodge, Professor J. H. Poynting, and Professor James Ward, have recently assailed materialism on the ground that the mechanical and chemical movements which matter exhibits in its inorganic condition appear to be quite different from the action of matter in the case of living organisms.

'Matter,' says Sir Oliver Lodge, 'possesses energy, in the form of persistent motion, and it is propelled by force; but neither matter nor energy possesses a power of automatic guidance and control. Energy has no directing power (this has been elaborated by Croll and others—see, for instance, *Nature*, vol. xliii. p. 434—thirteen years ago, under the heading 'Force and Determination'). Inorganic matter is impelled solely by pressure from behind, it is not influenced by the future, nor does it follow a preconceived course nor seek a predetermined end. . . . The essence of mind is design and purpose. There are some who deny that there is any design or purpose in the universe at all; but how can that be maintained when humanity itself possesses these attributes? Is it not more reasonable to say that, just as we are conscious of the power of guidance in ourselves, so guidance and intelligent control may be an element running through the Universe, and may be incorporated even in material things?' (*Hibbert Journal*, Jan. 1905, p. 327).

The celebrated astronomer Laplace maintained that a Perfect Calculator,

'who for a given instant should be acquainted with all the forces by which nature is animated and with the several positions of the beings composing it, if, further, his intellect were vast enough to submit these data to analysis, would include in one and the same formula the movements of the largest bodies in the universe and those of the lightest atom. Nothing would be uncertain for him; the future as well as the past would be present to his eyes' (see Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, i. 41).

Professor Poynting pertinently asks whether this 'Perfect Calculator' would find all his predictions verified as his atoms (see ATOMISM) came in contact with living matter, and were themselves concerned with life.

'Suppose the man into whose brain the atoms entered were Laplace's friend and chief, Napoleon. If the calculator took into account every atom in Napoleon's frame, would he be able to calculate all the motions of Napoleon, all his actions on the similar surrounding groups of atoms which we call his generals? Could the calculator foretell the eclipse of Waterloo as surely as the astronomer foretells an eclipse of the sun? Is man, in fact, from the physical point of view a group of atoms, each of which behaves as it would with the same neighbours were it part of a non-living system?' (*HJ*, July 1903, p. 739).

After showing elaborately that there is contrast, rather than correspondence, between physical action and mental action, Professor Poynting concludes as follows, and his testimony to the real freedom of the will is specially interesting and important, as coming from a high authority in physical science:

'I hold that we are more certain of our power of choice and of responsibility than of any other fact, physical or psychical. . . . It appears to me equally certain that there is no correspondence yet made out between the power of choice and any physical action, and there does not seem any likelihood that a correspondence ever will be made out. . . . Holding this view, I am bound to repudiate the physical account of Nature when it claims to be a complete account. I am bound to deny that the Laplacean calculator can be successful when he takes man and the mind of man into his calculations' (*ib.* p. 748 *f.*).

While Sir Oliver Lodge holds that the mind or will thus controls the atomic movements of the brain, he yet maintains that this power of guiding energy does not involve any creation of energy whatsoever. 'Life,' he says, 'is not a form of energy, but guides energy.' On this secondary question he appears to differ from some contemporary thinkers, who agree with Sir John Herschel that in a volitional act the will does originate *some* force,

'though it may be no greater than is required to move a single material molecule through a space inconceivably minute.' 'It matters not,' continues Sir John, 'that we are ignorant of the mode in which this is performed. It suffices to bring the origination of dynamical power, to however small an extent, within the domain of acknowledged personality' (*Familiar Lectures on Scientific Subjects*, p. 468).

The difference between Sir Oliver Lodge and Sir John Herschel is of some importance in regard to the philosophy of religion; but it does not in any way affect the force of the argument against materialism. Both authorities agree that mind or will controls and guides the atoms of the brain, and that, therefore, will cannot possibly be a mere attribute or accompaniment of the cerebral structure.

In connexion with the criticism of materialistic atheism, reference has to be made to two lines of argument which have often been employed by theists in the past, but which are now falling, and probably justly, somewhat into disuse. One of these is the appeal to the inability of present science to prove the existence of any case of abiogenesis (*q.v.*), as if it afforded clear evidence of special Divine creation. But it is impossible to show that a natural passage from non-living to living matter has never taken place, or that it would not take place now if the fitting conditions for it could be reproduced. The argument from our ignorance is not conclusive; and probably most thinkers would agree with Sir Oliver Lodge that, 'though we do not know how to generate life without the action of antecedent life at present, that may be a discovery lying ready for us in the future' (art. 'Life,' in *Hibbert Journal*, Oct. 1905, p. 106). But if this discovery should one day be made, it would not at all destroy the force of the argument against materialism; for if under certain circumstances the elements of inorganic matter assume an organic form, and manifest psychical properties, that change can be accounted for only by assuming the presence in nature of a cause which guides the movements of the corpuscles, and is competent to confer on them, or to manifest in connexion with them, the germs of that self-conscious and self-directing principle of life which

no mechanical properties of matter could possibly generate. The creative power and directing influence of immanent intelligence and will are equally necessary to explain the emergence of organism and life out of the mechanism of the inorganic world, whether that emergence took place once only by a special creative act, or always takes place when the antecedent conditions are realized. As Professor Flint well says, 'Were spontaneous generation proved, materialism would remain as far from established as before' (*Anti-theistic Theories*, p. 164).

The other doubtful argument which has often been employed by theistic writers is that the universe must have come into existence at some point of past time. This again appears to be a question in regard to which dogmatism is out of place. Science assumes that matter and energy are indestructible; that the present arrangement of them results from a previous arrangement, and this in turn from one still earlier. Thus science affords no justification for the belief in a temporal origin of all things. When our present solar system is traced back to its earlier condition in a revolving fiery mist, it is not supposed that this discovery brings us at all nearer to the origin of the cosmos. Some theists have maintained, however, that an infinite regress of these secondary or scientific causes is inconceivable, and that we are compelled to assume that at some remote moment the great First Cause by a creative act started this series of entities and phenomena which science endeavours to understand. This alleged inconceivability is not admitted by some eminent theistic thinkers. Regarding the laws of nature as the method of God's creative action, they see no conclusive reason against the supposition that creation is perpetual, and that there never was a time when the universe did not exist as a visible garment and expression of God's eternal life. This appears to be the view of great scientists, such as St. George Mivart and Sir Oliver Lodge, and it is also the view of such theistic philosophers as Lotze and Martineau. It is at the heart of present physical and psychical reality, and not at some imagined beginning of things, that both science and philosophy most effectually find the immanent and living God. The universe, in all its particulars and throughout its entire history, depends for its existence upon the Eternal Cause, the methods of whose activity science gradually discovers, and whose essential character is progressively revealed in the authoritative ideals of truth, beauty, righteousness, and love, which constantly testify to their Divine and self-existent source at the centre of our dependent and created being (cf. Upton, *Bases of Rel. Belief* [Hibbert Lectures, 1894], p. 209 f.; and art. MATERIALISM).

2. Atheism in the East.—It is not till we reach the period of Greek civilization that we meet with atheistic arguments sufficiently explicit to call for detailed description and criticism. In the ancient civilization of China, materialistic atheism appears to have been rife; and in the 3rd cent. B.C. the eminent philosopher Mencius, the disciple of Confucius, speaks of it as a moral danger to the State. The Chinese appear to have been almost incapable of thinking of spirit as existing apart from matter. Dr. Legge, in his prolegomena to the edition of Mencius, translates an essay by a certain Yang Choo, which, as Dr. Flint says, is 'one of the oldest systems of ethical materialism and of materialistic ethics' (*op. cit.* p. 47). He advises men

'to care nothing for praise or blame, virtue or vice; to seek merely to make themselves as happy as they can while happiness is within their reach; to eat and drink, for to-morrow they die' (*ib.*).

Concerning recent materialistic and atheistic speculations in China, there does not appear to be at present much reliable information See CHINA.

In regard to materialism and atheism there is a great contrast between China and India. The introspective and philosophic character of the Hindus led them to dwell especially on that Absolute Spirit or Self which they felt to underlie, and to reveal itself in, all finite personalities. In comparison with this infinite and eternal Being, the visible world appears to them as an illusory appearance. Hence in Hindu speculation materialistic atheism plays but a small and inconspicuous part. In a conspectus of philosophical systems written by Mādhavāchārya in the 14th cent. A.D. (recently translated into English by Cowell and Gough, and published in Trübner's 'Oriental Series,' 2nd ed., Lond. 1894), there is mentioned as one of sixteen schools, including the Buddhists and Jains, a school called the Materialists, who denied the existence of the soul and God, and rejected the whole theory of *karma* and transmigration.

'These were known under various designations, and in the 14th century A.D. their ideas were fathered on a mythical ogre in the Mahābhārata, named Chārvāka. Denying transmigration, they rejected the entire claims of the Brāhmans. Matter was the only reality, and sense-perception the only form of knowledge. The pedigree of their text-book was traced back ironically (Macdonell) to Brihaspati, preceptor of the gods, and bitter verses survive, declaring, "There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in any other world"' (J. E. Carpenter, 'Oriental Philosophy and Religion,' in *DPAP* ii. 234). See also ATHEISM (Indian).

Atheism among the Buddhists as well as among the Greeks and Romans will be dealt with in separate articles following, and may therefore be passed over here.

3. Modern atheism.—Soon after the time of Christ scepticism declined, and its place was taken by that eclectic blending of Platonic, Aristotelian, and Oriental ideas which flourished in Alexandria and exercised at times considerable influence over Christian thought. The influence of the Church, and the reverence for Aristotle's writings, as well as the absence of any vigorous interest in science, explain the fact that until the close of the Middle Ages atheistic speculation was to a great extent in abeyance. It was not till the *Renaissance*, when new scientific discoveries were made, and freer principles of Biblical criticism began to be applied, that atheism again raised its head; and here, as in similar cases in India and Greece, the reputed atheism was in some cases genuine, but was more frequently a name applied to the theism or pantheism which was intellectually in advance of the theological thought of the time.

(*a*) *Atheism in England and France.*—It was not till the fifteenth century that materialistic interpretations of the universe began to show themselves in modern times. F. A. Lange, in his *History of Materialism* (vol. i. p. 225), mentions one isolated case in the 14th century—that of Nicolaus de Autricuria, who at Paris in 1348 was compelled to make recantation of several doctrines, and among others this doctrine, that *in the processes of nature there is nothing to be found but the motion of the combination and separation of atoms.*

'Here,' says Lange, 'is a formal Atomist in the very heart of the dominion of the Aristotelian theory of nature. But the same bold spirit ventured also upon a general declaration that we should put Aristotle, and Averroës with him, on one side, and apply ourselves directly to things in themselves. Thus Atomism and Empiricism go hand in hand together! In reality the authority of Aristotle had first to be broken before men could attain to direct intercourse with things themselves.'

The speculations which followed the incoming of the Copernican conception of the universe, such as those of Bruno and Vanini, were pantheistic rather than atheistic in their character. It was not till the first half of the 17th cent. that the ripe fruits of the great emancipation of thought began clearly to present themselves. On the

materialistic side these fruits appeared in the writings of Bacon, Gassendi, and Hobbes, and, on the spiritualistic side, in the works of Descartes. The materialism of the former writers cannot be called atheistic, for the atoms as they conceived them were not self-existent. There were probably a good many professors of materialistic atheism in this early part of the 17th century.

Père Mersenne, a contemporary and friend of Descartes, makes the startling statement that there were in his time as many as 50,000 atheists in the city of Paris alone. It seems likely, however, that the majority of these were called atheists simply because they declined to accept any longer the authority of Aristotle. Descartes himself had been accused of atheism on this ground.

About this time there was much scepticism and speculation which came very near to atheism, but escaped it by an adhesion that was, no doubt, in some cases insincere, but in other cases genuine enough, to the national Church. Whether the attachment of Thomas Hobbes to the English Church was sincere has been questioned. His philosophy was thoroughly materialistic. He held that even human sensation is nothing but the motion of corporeal particles; but he sheltered himself from the charge of atheism by saying that, in regard to his view of the universe, he confined himself exclusively to the phenomena which are knowable, and can be explained by the law of causality. Everything of which we can know nothing he resigns to theologians. The way in which, in his *Leviathan*, he utilizes religion for State purposes appears to render the genuineness of his theism very doubtful.

'He lays down the following definition, "Fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind or imagined from tales publicly allowed, *Religion*; not allowed, *Superstition*"' (Lange, *op. cit.*, vol. i. p. 283).

While both Thomas Hobbes and the other great English thinker of the 17th cent., John Locke, were attached to Christianity, and the latter no doubt most sincerely so, their writings had no little effect in preparing the way for future manifestations of positive atheism. Both the materialism which formed the basis of Hobbes' philosophy, and his selfish system of morals, were quite uncongenial to theistic belief. And Locke's doctrine of the origin of all ideas in sensation, though its atheistic tendency was, as we have seen, neutralized in his own case by his inconsistent belief in the necessity of an adequate causal ground for the universe, and by his recognition of the validity of the teleological argument, yet really undermined the rational basis of theism, and when consistently carried out, it, in conjunction with Hobbes' materialism, was largely instrumental in bringing about the positive atheism which flourished in France towards the middle of the 18th century. What kept Locke and, indeed, most thoughtful persons in England from atheism during the 17th and 18th cents. was the indestructible principle thus enunciated by Locke:

'Whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily contain in it, and actually have, at least all the perfections that can ever after exist; nor can it ever give to another any perfection that it hath not actually in itself, or at least in a higher degree; it necessarily follows that the first eternal being cannot be matter' (cf. Flint, *op. cit.* p. 142).

It should be added that, as Dr. Flint acutely remarks, the absence in England of much positive scepticism and professed atheism during these two centuries is partly to be accounted for by the strong tendency at that time, and also till far on in the 19th cent., to refer theological insight and philosophical knowledge to two quite distinct sources. In § 1 it has been argued that in the above principle lies the most conclusive refutation of materialism and atheism. But though Locke built his own theism mainly on this foundation, it is a principle which finds no justification in his own exposition of the origin of knowledge. It is a purely *a priori* conception and belief, such as are also the conceptions of moral authority and of infinity. Accordingly, when Locke's ideas were introduced into France in the 18th cent., his doctrine of the origin of all knowledge in sensation was consistently worked out, and led several thinkers to atheism. The belief in a separate and specially inspired source of theological truth had to a large extent passed away among French thinkers; and hence what was simply neutral materialism in London became often positive atheism in Paris. The physician La Mettrie, the author of *L'Homme Machine* (1748), was led, through observing in his own case the influence of the movements of the blood on the power of thought, to maintain that all thinking and willing have their origin in sensation. He admits that it is probable that a Supreme Being exists, but adds that, if so, it is a theoretical truth without any use in practice.

'For our peace of mind,' he says, 'it is indifferent to know whether there is a God or not, whether He created matter, or whether it is eternal.' But a little further on he appears to agree with a friend of his whom he represents as arguing that 'the world would never be happy unless it was atheistic' (Lange, *History of Materialism*, ii. 73).

Lagne, who gives an excellent account of La Mettrie's writings, remarks that

'La Mettrie's friend has only forgotten that even religion itself, quite apart from any revelation, must be reckoned among the natural impulses of man, and if this impulse leads to all unhappiness, it is not easy to see how all the other impulses, since they have the same natural origin, are to lead to happiness' (*ib.*).

In his treatises on *Volupté* and *L'Art de Jouir*, La Mettrie seeks to justify the pursuit of sensual enjoyment in a manner which Ueberweg justly describes as 'still more artificially exaggerated than frivolous.'

About twenty years after the publication of La Mettrie's *L'Homme Machine*, appeared the work which is regarded as the *chef-d'œuvre* of French materialism. Its title is *Système de la nature ou des lois du monde physique et du monde moral* (1770). On its title-page it professes to be written by a M. de Mirabaud, who was a deceased secretary of the French Academy, but the real author was known to be Baron d'Holbach. Holbach's system, says Ueberweg, 'combines all three elements of the empirical doctrine, which till then had been cultivated separately rather than together, viz. materialism (La Mettrie's), sensationalism (Condillac's), and determinism (which Diderot had at length admitted).' In this elaborate treatise the atheism is most pronounced, so that when a translation of it was published in London by the secularists in 1859, it bore on its cover the title *The Atheist's Text-Book*. It directly attacks the existence of God, and traces the origin of religion to fear and ignorance. Holbach substitutes for God matter and motion. The work is highly rhetorical, and in parts quite eloquent. Its ethics resembles that of Epicurus. Like Epicurus, Holbach points to the pleasure and happiness which friendship and sympathy can impart, and reaches a code of morals which superficially seems somewhat exalted. In his concluding chapter he says:

'Be just, because equity is the support of human society. Be good, because goodness connects all hearts in adamantine bonds! Be thankful, because gratitude feeds benevolence, nourishes generosity! . . . Forgive injuries, because revenge perpetuates hatred! Do good to him that injureth thee in order to show thyself more noble than he is; and in order to make a friend of him who was once thine enemy. Be temperate in thine enjoyment, and chaste in thy pleasures, because voluptuousness begets weariness, intemperance engenders disease' (p. 513).

It is characteristic of this ethical theory, as of all sensational ethics, that the intrinsic grandeur

and worth of all these virtues are undermined and destroyed by the egoistic motives to which they are referred.

Several other French writers of this epoch show anti-theistic leanings, even when they repudiate atheism, such as Diderot, in his later life, Helvetius, Lalande, Maréchal, etc. (see Flint's *Anti-theistic Theories*, pp. 469–474). The great astronomer Laplace is sometimes classed among atheists, because, when reminded by Napoleon that in his treatise on *Mécanique Céleste* he had said nothing about God, he replied, 'Sire, I had no need of that hypothesis.' But it is quite possible that in this reply he meant simply that he could account for the celestial movement by the forces of which alone science takes cognizance, and he may not have implied that these second causes do not demand for their existence a self-existent 'Cause of causes' (see § 1, above; and cf. Fiske, *Through Nature to God*, p. 141). It is related of David Hume that, when dining once with a party of eighteen at the house of Baron d'Holbach, he expressed a doubt as to whether it was possible to find any person who would avow himself dogmatically an atheist. On which his host replied, 'My dear sir, you are at this moment sitting at table with seventeen such persons.'

The greatest French writer, however, of this time, Voltaire, felt no respect for these sceptical or atheistic reasonings. That powerful and original thinker (like Locke in the previous century) saw that only by a spiritual First Cause could living and self-conscious beings be produced; and in the universe he saw such clear evidence of beneficent purpose that more than once in his writings he dwells eloquently on that old argument from design to which from the time of Anaxagoras and Socrates theists have confidently appealed, and which, as we shall afterwards see, the facts of evolution have by no means invalidated.

The materialistic atheism which flourished in France before and during the Revolution gradually decayed, owing partly to Kantian and Hegelian influence, and partly to that spiritual philosophy which was developed in France itself by Maine de Biran and Victor Cousin.

(*b*) *German anti-theistic theories.*—About a century after the advent of materialism and atheism in French thought, there arose in Germany, partly as a result of the extreme idealistic thinking, but to a still greater extent as a reaction against it, a succession of anti-theistic writers of whom the latest, Professor Ernst Haeckel, is still exercising great influence, both on the Continent and in Britain. The first of these in date, Ludwig Feuerbach, began his intellectual career as an idealist. Along with the still more celebrated writer David Strauss, he came forth from the extreme left wing of the Hegelian school. Both of these thinkers found the supreme object of interest not in the Hegelian Absolute Spirit, but in human nature; and hence Feuerbach was a humanist like Auguste Comte rather than a materialist.

'In his view,' says R. H. Hutton, 'God is but the magnified image of man reflected back upon space by the mirror of human self-consciousness. As pilgrims to the Brocken often observe, during an autumn sunrise, shadows of their own figures enormously dilated confronting them from a great distance, bowing as they bow, kneeling as they kneel, mocking them in all their gestures, and finally disappearing as the sun rises higher in the sky, so the German Atheist maintains that in the early dawn of human intelligence, man has been deluded by such a Brocken-shadow of himself, which has been childishly worshipped as an independent being and named God, but which must vanish soon' ('The Atheistic Explanation of Religion,' in *Essays Theological and Literary*, vol. i. p. 25. This article is an admirable exposition and criticism of Feuerbach's position).

The translation of Feuerbach's chief work, *The Essence of Christianity* (*Das Wesen des Christenthums*, 1841), by Miss Marian Evans (George Eliot) in 1854, which was reviewed in the before-mentioned article by R. H. Hutton, attracted much attention in this country. The feature in his thought which has led to his being classed among materialists is his doctrine that only the sensible is real.

'The body,' he says, 'is part of my being; nay, the body is its totality, is my Ego.'

Consistently with this view, he emphatically rejected all belief in personal immortality.

Far more decisively materialistic than Feuerbach was Carl Vogt, who in his *Physiological Letters* (1845–1847) developed the ideas of the French author Cabanis (1798), and argued that 'thought stands in the same relation to the brain as the bile to the liver, or the urine to the kidneys.' In 1852 appeared Jacob Moleschott's famous work, *The Circulation of Life* (*Der Kreislauf des Lebens*), which maintains that all vital phenomena can be explained as a perpetual circulation of matter from the inorganic to the organic world, and then back again from the organic to the inorganic. This doctrine has recently been acutely criticized by Sir Oliver Lodge, who contends that the phenomena of organization and life find their only satisfactory explanation in the assumption that a higher principle, life, guides and controls the elements of matter and energy (see his article on 'Mind and Matter' in *HJ*, Jan. 1905). 'Without phosphorus,' says Moleschott, 'there is no thought'; and he concludes that thought is a movement of the matter of the brain.

The book which in this materialistic and atheistic movement of the 19th cent. had much the same position and influence as Holbach's *System of Nature* had in the century preceding, was Professor Ludwig Büchner's *Force and Matter* (*Kraft und Stoff*, 1855). Büchner was the first of those German materialists who afterwards came under the influence of Darwin's book on *The Origin of Species* (1859). He professed that he found in Darwinism the chief support of materialism, and in the later editions of his book he declared that the doctrine of Natural Selection had wholly destroyed the force of the teleological argument. His general inference is that—

'not God, but evolution of matter, is the cause of the order of the world; that life is a combination of matter which in favourable circumstances is spontaneously generated; that there is no vital principle, because all forces, non-vital and vital, are movements; that movement and evolution proceed from life to consciousness; . . . that there is no God, no final cause, no immortality, no freedom, no substance of the soul' (Case, 'Metahpysics,' in *EBr*[10], vol. xxx. p. 647).

Sometimes Büchner speaks of mind as an effect of matter, and sometimes as a movement of matter, and he uses these expressions indifferently. He defines psychical activity as 'nothing but a radiation through the cells of the grey substance of the brain of a motion set up by external stimuli.' Büchner argues that his 'philosophic system, since it puts at its head not matter as such, but the unity and indivisibility of force and matter, cannot be described as materialism' (*Last Words on Materialism*, p. 273). But, as Professor Case points out, if a philosophy makes force an attribute of matter, as Büchner's does, it will recognize nothing but matter possessing force, and will therefore be at once materialism and monism, *i.e.* materialistic monism.

The most recent anti-theistic work of importance in Germany is Professor Haeckel's *Riddle of the Universe* (*Die Welträthsel*), of which there is an English translation by J. McCabe (see § 1, above). The peculiar feature of Haeckel's theory is that, like the ancient Hylozoists, he represents the original substance as having a psychical as well as a physical side. Because of this he contends that his philosophy is not materialism. As, however, in his doctrine mind is always spoken of as an attribute of body, and cannot be conceived to exist dissociated from matter, it would appear that his system, like

Büchner's, is fitly described as materialistic monism. Haeckel derives everything from an eternal primitive substance, which by condensation passes first into imponderable ether, and then by further condensation into the elements of ponderable matter. This eternal substance is God. His system bears some resemblance to that of Leibniz in so far as his monads possess the germs of perception and appetition. The souls of animals and men have no origin separate from that of their bodies. Sensation is the property of all matter. In plants and the lowest animals he considers sensation and will to be present, but only in a rudimentary and unconscious form. As to the point in evolution at which consciousness first clearly presents itself, he is not explicit.

'However certain,' he says, 'we are of the fact of this natural evolution of consciousness, we are, unfortunately, not yet in a position to enter more deeply into the question' (Haeckel, *Riddle of the Universe*, p. 191).

On this Case makes the weighty remark:

'Thus in presence of the problem which is the crux of materialism, the origin of consciousness, he first propounds a gratuitous hypothesis that everything has mind, and then gives up the origin of conscious mind after all. He is certain, however, that the law of substance somehow proves that conscious soul is a mere function of brain, that soul is a function of all substances, and that God is the force or energy, or soul or spirit, of Nature.' (See Professor Case's admirable article on 'Metaphysics' in *EBr*[10] for a fuller account and criticism of the systems of Büchner and Haeckel.)

As was before remarked, Haeckel's philosophy affords no explanation of how it comes about that the corpuscles from the primitive substance conspire not only to form organisms, but to produce an orderly and teleologically arranged cosmos. What is needed for this is not only the psychical character which he assigns to each corpuscle, but an intelligence and will dominating the whole and co-ordinating all its separate parts. He calls his philosophy the monistic or mechanical philosophy, as contrasted with the teleological.

'There is everywhere,' he says, 'a necessary causal connexion of phenomena, and therefore the whole knowable universe is a harmonious unity, a *monon*' (*Evolution of Man*, ii. 856).

But Haeckel's 'Law of Substance' gives no explanation of the cause of this 'harmonious unity,' nor does it at all account for the origin of the ideas which he makes the very bases of religion—the ideas, namely, of the good, the true, and the beautiful. In his system, spirit and matter are inseparable, and therefore spirit can neither create nor control matter. This circumstance alone shows that there is an impassable gulf between his world-theory and any world-theory that can be rightly termed theistic.

Along with German anti-theistic theories must be classed a doctrine which, so far from being materialistic, is intensely idealistic, namely, the doctrine of 'ethical idealism,' which is propounded by F. A. Lange in the third volume of his very able *History of Materialism*. Lange, under the influence of the agnostic side of the Kantian philosophy, came to the conclusion that there exist in the universe no reality or realities corresponding to our ideal conceptions. But these ideal conceptions, he contends, are in themselves of incalculable value to the soul, and it is in this sphere of the poetic imagination alone that we must look for the satisfaction of our religious sentiments and aspirations. The intelligible world is, in his view, a world of poetry. The greatest poems, he argues, have immortal worth, though the heroes celebrated in them may have had no historical existence. To this illustration pastor Heinrich Lang of Zürich very pertinently replied:

'Poems hold their own when they æsthetically satisfy: religion decays so soon as it is seen that the objects of faith are imaginary and not real.' An admirable criticism of the school of religious thought of which Lange is one of the leaders will be found in Martineau's Address on 'Ideal Substitutes for God' in his *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses* (vol. iv. p. 269 ff.).

4. **Positivism.**—Positivism, both as a philosophy and as a religion, appears to have about as much influence in England as it has in the land of its birth. In Mr. Frederic Harrison and Dr. J. H. Bridges it has had remarkably able exponents and advocates in this country; and its monthly organ, *The Positivist Review*, often reaches a high level of philosophical and sociological thought. As a philosophy, Positivism professes to be an exclusively non-metaphysical system. It teaches that the phenomenal world is the only knowable world, and it deprecates as wholly without value or interest all speculations concerning the nature of the ground or cause beneath or behind the phenomena of the sensible universe. While Herbert Spencer holds that our very conception of the relative character of all our scientific knowledge compels us to believe in the existence of an Absolute Reality behind the world of phenomena, and that it is this Unknowable Reality which forms the object of religion, the Positivists, on the other hand, maintain that what is wholly unknowable is wholly without interest to mankind, and therefore can never excite or satisfy religious ideas or emotions. According to Comte's celebrated law of the three stages of religious insight, mankind begins by assigning the causation of cosmical phenomena to the supernatural volition of personal deities, and finally to one Supreme Deity, when the stage of monotheism is reached. Reason, Comte held, gradually overthrows this theological belief, and in place of a personal cause sets up metaphysical abstractions such as centrifugal force, elective affinity, or vitality as the causal principles behind phenomena. Science, however, at length concludes that these abstractions rest upon no real experience; and the third and final stage is that of Positivism. The Positive stage of conviction, towards which all culture is approaching, means, he says, the recognition of the truth that all ontological causes (whether metaphysical or theological) are wholly beyond the scope of man's intellectual insight. It has been shown by many critics of Positivism that these three ways of considering the universe are not necessarily successive, but constantly occur together in the history of philosophical and religious thought.

There is one true and valuable feature in Comte's philosophy which raises it far above the level of the 18th century materialism of La Mettrie, d'Holbach, etc. They carried up the materialistic and mechanical principles, by which they explained the inorganic world, into the sphere of life and consciousness, and thus arrived at the description of man as a machine (*L'Homme Machine*). This, said Comte, is materialism, and against it he strongly protested. He would never allow that the mechanical theory was rationally applicable beyond the limits of the physical world, and held it to be self-condemned so soon as it was pushed into the provinces of biology and human character (Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, i. 503).

Comte's religious conception appears to be atheistic, in so far as it rejects the view that nature and humanity are the products of a self-existent and self-conscious Eternal Cause. In the place of God, in the theistic sense, he substitutes the *Grand Être*—Humanity—as the supreme object in the universe. Some critics hold that the real object of the Positivist's adoration is the ideal of human perfection, which he practically hypostatizes and adores. Positivists, however, will not admit this, for this would be, in their view, equivalent to the worship of an abstraction. In the *International Journal of Ethics* for July 1900 (p. 425), Dr. Coit, the founder of the 'ethical culture' societies in England, says:

'So far as I am aware, the Positivists have never declared that Humanity is God. But they have maintained that all the homage

and obedience which has been rendered to God should now be transferred to Humanity. They have worshipped Humanity, they have prayed to it, they have found consolation and strength in communion with it. Surely, then, it has become their God.'

In the next number of the *Positivist Review*, however, Mr. Frederic Harrison expresses strong dissent from this statement, and denies that Positivists have prayed to and worshipped Humanity.

The non-metaphysical character of the Positivists' religion provokes a comparison of it with Buddhism. There are, however, vital differences between the two. The religious sentiments of Positivists do not centre in a glorified personal being; nor has Positivism as a religion anything corresponding to the doctrines of *karma* and transmigration, which bring Buddhism into some affinity with theistic religion. Cf., further, art. POSITIVISM.

5. Anti-theistic theories in England in the nineteenth century.—It was not till the middle of the 19th cent. that anti-theistic writings had much influence in England. The *Essay on the Origin and Prospects of Man* (3 vols., 1831)—a posthumous work by Mr. Thomas Hope, the author of a brilliantly written novel, *Anastasius, or Memoirs of a Modern Greek*—is a confused medley of materialistic speculations respecting the origin of the inorganic and organic worlds from molecules, which are represented as proceeding by way of radiation or evolution from the substance of God, the inconceivable primary cause. On its appearance Thomas Carlyle characterized the book as 'a monstrous Anomaly, where all sciences are heaped and huddled together' (*Miscellaneous Essays*, iv. 31). Some illustrative passages are quoted from it in Flint's *Anti-theistic Theories* (pp. 476, 478).

A much more lucid materialistic treatise, and also more decidedly atheistic, appeared in 1851, in the form of *Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and Development*, from the pens of Mr. H. G. Atkinson and Miss Harriet Martineau. In this book Atkinson says:

'I am far from being an Atheist, as resting on second causes. As well might we, resting on the earth, deny that there is any depth beneath; or, living in time, deny eternity. I do not say, therefore, that there is no God; but that it is extravagant and irreverent to imagine that cause a Person; the fundamental cause is wholly beyond our conception' (p. 240).

As these writers, however, always speak of matter as if it were eternal, declare that 'the mind of man is the result of material development,' and assert that 'philosophy finds no God in nature, nor sees the want of any,' it is impossible to deny that their book is fundamentally atheistic. Like most atheistic treatises, it denies the freedom of the will and personal immortality, and declares that 'there is no more sin in a crooked disposition than in a crooked stick in the water, or in a hump-back or a squint.' At the time of its appearance the work was severely criticized by James Martineau in the *Prospective Review*, and there is another acute criticism of it in Professor J. S. Blackie's *Natural History of Atheism* (1877).

6. Secularism.—English Secularism appears to be almost entirely an indigenous growth. During the early portion of the 19th cent. there appeared several writings which, though by no means atheistic, yet prepared the way for the incoming of a non-religious and also of an anti-religious drift of thought. The phrenological writings of George Combe, though they were in his own case associated with theistic views, were calculated to encourage a materialistic view of mind. Thomas Paine and Richard Carlile were themselves Deists, but many of the admirers of their rationalism did not admit the validity of their deistic views. The philosophy of the philanthropic socialist, Robert Owen, exercised a strong anti-theistic influence. Owen held a doctrine somewhat resembling Haeckel's, in which God is conceived as permeating all the particles of the universe. At this time there was also an important circle of thinkers, of which Jeremy Bentham was the centre, and which was strongly antagonistic to positive religious beliefs. Professor Bain in his *Life of James Mill* says:

'That Mill's acquaintance with Bentham hastened his course towards infidelity it is impossible to doubt. Bentham never in so many words publicly avowed himself an atheist, but he was so in substance. His destructive criticisms of religious doctrine in *The Church of England Catechism Reviewed*, and still more his anonymous book on Natural Religion, left no residue that could be of any value. As a legislator he had to allow a place for Religion; but he made use of the Deity, as Napoleon wished to make use of the Pope, for sanctioning whatever he himself chose, in the name of Utility, to prescribe. John Austin followed on the same tack; but this course was too disingenuous to suit either of the Mills. It is quite certain, moreover, that the whole tone of conversation in Bentham's more select circle was atheistic' (cf. *Mind*, vol. ii. p. 527).

All these circumstances had probably some influence in bringing about that secularist movement in which George Jacob Holyoake and Charles Bradlaugh were the leading spirits. Bradlaugh in the *National Reformer*, and Holyoake in the *Reasoner*, appealed to a large number of readers, especially of the artizan class. The work thus begun has been continued down to the present time by a succession of lecturers and writers; but it has now to a large extent lost its positively atheistic character, and is merged in the larger movement of agnosticism, which the numerous cheap publications of the 'Rationalist Press Association' are doing much to advance. The name 'Secularist,' as distinguished from 'Atheist,' was originated by Holyoake in 1851. The latter word, to which Bradlaugh had no dislike, was objected to by Holyoake on the ground that it was often understood to mean 'one who is not only without God but also without morality.' The two leaders were of very dissimilar types of mind. Holyoake, like Robert Owen, of whom he had been a disciple, was of a constructive disposition; he would have liked to give to the word 'secularism' a meaning which would not have excluded theists. Bradlaugh, on the contrary, was naturally aggressive. He identified all theological ideas with superstition, and the work of undermining them he evidently found very congenial.

The chief logical ground on which they both rejected theism differed somewhat from that which was taken by earlier atheists of that century. These, as we have seen, asserted the existence of a First Cause, though they regarded its character as wholly unknowable. Holyoake and Bradlaugh, on the other hand, started with matter, maintaining that it needed no cause, being itself self-existent and eternal. Their contention was that the creation of matter by a self-existent Spirit is inconceivable. To this the theist replies that, though we have no experience of it, such creation would violate no necessary law of thought; and he further contends that the atheist's assertion that out of lifeless matter organization and life spontaneously arose is not only inconceivable, but actually violates the law of thought which compels us to believe that no cause for an effect can be admitted unless there is some element in it which can be conceived as capable of giving rise to the effect.

Another very prominent feature in both Bradlaugh's and Holyoake's attack on theism was their attempt to invalidate that argument from design in which so many thinkers, including Locke and Voltaire, have found a sure basis for theistic belief. Holyoake in his chief works, *Paley Refuted* and *The Trial of Theism*, dwells at great length on this question. Finding it impossible to explain the order and systematic organization of the cosmos on the materialistic hypothesis, he tries to overthrow the theist's explanation by contending that, if it were a real explanation, it would involve other necessary assumptions which experience shows to have no existence in fact. Admit,

he says, that there was a designer, then that designer must have been a person; and if a person, he could not have designed the universe unless he had possessed what all persons whom we know possess, namely, a cerebral organization, a brain; and, he concludes, there is no evidence of the existence of such a brain. This argument has also been employed by Professors W. K. Clifford and Du Bois-Reymond in the anti-theistic interest. It has been replied to by eminent thinkers, both scientific and philosophical. On the relations between mind and matter Sir Oliver Lodge says:

'Fundamentally they amount to this: that a complex piece of matter called the brain is the organ or instrument of mind and consciousness; that if it be stimulated mental activity results; that if it be injured or destroyed no manifestation of mental activity is possible. . . . Suppose we grant all this, what then? We have granted that brain is the means whereby mind is made manifest on this material plane, it is the instrument through which alone we know it, but we have not granted that mind is *limited* to its material manifestation; nor can we maintain that without matter the things we call mind, intelligence, consciousness, have no sort of existence. Mind may be incorporate or incarnate in matter, but it may also transcend it. Brain is truly the organ of mind and consciousness . . . but no one is at liberty to assert on the strength of that fact that the realities underlying our use of those terms have no existence apart from terrestrial brains' ('Mind and Matter,' *HJ*, Jan. 1905, p. 324 f.).

In § 1 reasons have been given for concluding that organization can be explained only by assuming that a higher principle guides the arrangement of the material particles. If this is the case, life is the cause of the structure of brain, while brain is posterior to life, and is the organ through which life and the material universe interact. Dr. James Martineau, in his article on 'Modern Materialism: its Attitude towards Theology,' very carefully discusses this question. He argues that, though a finite and created mind needs a cerebral organ for its communication with the physical world, it is highly probable that a self-existent and eternal Mind is not thus conditioned. 'Further,' he says,

'I would submit that in dealing with the problem of the Universal Mind this demand for organic centralization is strangely inappropriate. It is when mental power has to be localized, bounded, lent out to individual natures and assigned to a scene of definite relations, that a focus must be found for it and a molecular structure with determinate periphery be built for its lodgment. And were Du Bois-Reymond himself ever to alight on the portentous cerebrum which he imagines, I greatly doubt whether he would fulfil his promise and turn Theist at the sight; that he had found the Cause of causes would be the last inference it would occur to him to draw; rather would he look round for some monstrous *creature*, some cosmic megatherium, born to float and pasture on the fields of space' (*Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. iv. p. 254).

If the objector still insists that the Eternal Mind must have some material organ, both Sir Oliver Lodge and Dr. Martineau point out that

'it has been surmised that just as the corpuscles and atoms of matter, in their intricate movements and relations, combine to form the brain cell of a human being, so the cosmic bodies, the planets and suns and other groupings of the ether, may perhaps combine to form something corresponding as it were to the brain cell of some transcendent mind. The thing is a mere guess, it is not an impossibility, and it cannot be excluded from a philosophic system by any negative statement based on scientific fact' (Sir Oliver Lodge, *loc. cit.*, p. 325; cf. Martineau, *op. cit.*, p. 255).

In addition to these two arguments for atheism, Bradlaugh appeals to some metaphysical obstacles which, in his opinion, bar the way to a theistic conclusion. The chief of these is that we are necessitated by the laws of thought to conceive of Substance as 'that which does not require the conception of anything else antecedent to it'; and therefore Substance cannot have been created or originated. To this Dr. Flint well replies:

'If he [Mr. Bradlaugh] can conceive substance *per se*, and not merely through its qualities, effects, and relationships to his own faculties, he is logically bound to abandon sensationalism and all its consequences, and betake himself to absolute idealism or to mysticism' (*op. cit.*, p. 517).

In a similar strain Bradlaugh contends that, if God were infinite, it would be impossible to conceive of any addition to Him, and that, therefore, an infinite God and a created universe are incompatible ideas. Such arguments as these, even if they were valid (which all theists would deny), would have little or no weight with secularists in general; for such arguments assume the existence of an *a priori* source of knowledge, and this very few atheists would grant.

Besides Holyoake and Bradlaugh, there have been other secularist lecturers and writers, such as Charles Watts, G. W. Foote, Mrs. Besant (who has since become a leader among the theosophists), W. S. Ross, etc. An account of the books, pamphlets, and periodicals which have been issued by this school of anti-theistic thought will be found in Dr. Flint's *Anti-theistic Theories* (pp. 509–519). See also art. SECULARISM.

7. Recent Agnosticism. — In connexion with this subject, brief reference needs to be made in conclusion to some recent distinguished writers, whose speculations, though often by no means atheistic, have unquestionably weakened theistic belief in the case of many of their readers. The most eminent among them are the scientific writers, G. J. Romanes, W. K. Clifford, John Tyndall, T. H. Huxley, and the philosopher, H. Spencer. In 1878 there was published anonymously a decidedly atheistic work, entitled *A Candid Examination of Theism*, by Physicus. Many years later, Romanes acknowledged the authorship, and stated at the same time that he had then come to see that his most important objections to theism were invalid. In the above work he says that he had at one time been convinced by Baden Powell's work on *The Order of Nature*, that this order necessitates the hypothesis of an eternal creative intelligence and will, but that, on the appearance of Spencer's *First Principles* and Charles Darwin's work on *Natural Selection*, his views had undergone a total change, and that at the time of writing the *Candid Examination* he felt assured that the appearances of design in the universe could be explained without the assumption of a creating mind. About the year 1889, however, he wrote three articles on the 'Influence of Science upon Religion,' and these, together with some other notes on theism from his pen, were published, after his death, under the title *Thoughts on Religion*, by Dr. Charles Gore, now the Bishop of Birmingham. In these articles Romanes declares his recovered faith in the validity of the teleological argument.

'I think it is perfectly clear,' he concludes, 'that if the argument from teleology is to be saved at all, it can only be so by shifting from the narrow basis of special adaptation, to the broad area of Nature as a whole. And here I confess that to my mind the argument does acquire a weight which, if long and attentively considered, deserves to be regarded as enormous. For although this and that particular adjustment in Nature may be seen to be proximately due to physical causes . . . the more ultimate question arises, How is it that all physical causes conspire, by their united action, to the production of a general order of Nature? It is against all analogy to suppose that such an end as this can be accomplished by such means as those, in the way of mere chance or "the fortuitous concourse of atoms." We are led by the most fundamental dictates of our reason to conclude that there must be some cause for *this co-operation of causes*' (*Thoughts on Religion*, p. 67 f.).

He then proceeds to show that this adequate cause can be nothing short of a Divine Mind, though that Infinite Mind may be, and indeed must be, beyond the comprehension of man's finite intelligence. For the views of Dr. Romanes on the 'character' of God, and on Christianity, the *Thoughts on Religion* must be consulted. Bishop Gore mentions that his friend, shortly before his death, expressed his belief that it is by 'intuition' we become acquainted with God, and added that he was in cordial agreement on this subject with Knight's *Aspects of Theism*.

Professor W. K. Clifford held a world-theory somewhat similar to that of Haeckel. Everything, both physical and psychical, was, he maintained, composed of elements of 'mind-stuff,' and

when these elements are compounded in a nervous system, they manifest the phenomena of consciousness. As to the cause which so arranges these elements as to form out of them the actual orderly universe of matter and mind, his writings furnish no explanation. With Holyoake and Du Bois-Reymond, he regards the existence of a self-existent personal cause as highly improbable, owing to the want of evidence for the existence of a corresponding brain. What has been previously said in reply to Holyoake's secularistic atheism applies equally to Clifford's reasons for denying the existence of God. Clifford's view of religion was akin to Positivism.

'In such a moment of utter sincerity,' he says, 'when a man has bared his own soul before the immensities and the eternities, a presence in which his own poor personality is shrivelled into nothingness arises within him, and says, as plainly as words can say, "I am with thee, and I am greater than thou." Many names of Gods, of many shapes, have men given to this presence, seeking by names and pictures to know more clearly the guide and the helper of men.'

These words appear to point to a theistic conclusion, but Clifford disappoints this expectation; for his final judgment is that, 'after all, such a helper of men, outside of humanity, the truth will not allow us to see' (*Lectures and Essays*[3], 386).

Professor John Tyndall's Address before the British Association at Belfast in 1874 excited much attention, and called forth many criticisms from the theistic side. Among these perhaps the most important was a paper in the *Contemporary Review* on 'Modern Materialism: its Attitude towards Theology,' by Dr. James Martineau, between whom and Professor Tyndall there had often been mental encounters at the meetings of the Metaphysical Society. (This paper, together with another on 'Religion as affected by Modern Materialism,' is reprinted in vol. iv. of Martineau's *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*.)

Though in the 'Address' Tyndall says, 'I discern in matter the promise and potency of all terrestrial life,' he declined to be called a materialist. His view somewhat resembled Haeckel's, in that he maintained that sensation could not arise unless the elements of matter had a psychical as well as a physical side. He did not, however, regard sensation as a property of matter, but rather as a universal concomitant of matter. The passage from the physics of the brain to the facts of consciousness he admitted to be altogether inconceivable by the human mind. As to the cause of the atoms and of the processes of evolution, his position was not atheistic but agnostic. In an Address at Birmingham, a few months later than the one at Belfast, he says, in reply to the question whether there are not in nature manifestations of knowledge and skill higher than man's:

'My friends, the profession of that atheism with which I am sometimes so lightly charged would, in my case, be an impossible answer to this question.'

Like Lange, he confines religion to the sphere of idealism and emotion. In reference to Tyndall's statement that 'we must radically change our notions of "Matter" if we are to understand how it carries with it the promise and potency of all terrestrial life,' Martineau remarks (*op. cit.* iv. 175) that what Tyndall says simply amounts to this:

"'Charge the word [matter] with your *quæsita*, and I will promise to elicit them explicitly." It is easy travelling through the stages of such an hypothesis; you deposit at your bank a round sum ere you start; and, drawing on it piecemeal at every pause, complete your grand tour without a debt. Words, however, ere they can hold such richness of prerogative, will be found to have emerged from their physical meaning, and to be truly θεοφόρα ὀνόματα—terms that bear God in them, and thus dissolve the very theory which they represent. Such extremely clever Matter—matter that is up to everything, even to writing *Hamlet*, and finding out its own evolution, and substituting a molecular *plebiscite* for a divine monarchy of the world—may fairly be regarded as a little too modest in its disclaimer of the attributes of Mind.'

The views of Professor T. H. Huxley differ in one important respect from those of his great friend, Professor Tyndall. The former, through his study of Hume, was inclined to accept the principles of sensational idealism, whereas the latter sided with the agnostic realism of Herbert Spencer. Huxley, accordingly, seeks to rebut the charge of materialism, by declaring that he is utterly incapable of conceiving 'the existence of matter if there is no mind in which to picture that existence' (*Method and Results*, Lond. 1893, p. 245). But, while he thus makes the existence of matter dependent on mind, he at the same time holds the doctrine of 'human automatism,' *i.e.* that while states of consciousness depend upon the molecular movements of the cerebral substance, 'there is no proof that any state of consciousness is the cause of change in the motion of the matter of the organism' (*ib.* p. 244).

At a meeting of the Metaphysical Society, when Huxley had read a paper on the subject, 'Has the Frog a Soul?' one of the members present said: 'I was walking down Oxford Street this morning, intending to go straight to the Marble Arch; but, happening to glance at my boots, I saw that I needed a new pair, and I accordingly turned into Regent Street, where my boot-maker lives.' Then, addressing Huxley, he asked, 'Am I to understand that the coming into my mind of the idea about the boots had no causal connexion with the change in the direction of my walk?' 'Most certainly you are,' replied the professor.

It is clear, then, that though Huxley in words rejects materialism, and asserts that the body is only a group of mental symbols, he is virtually a decided materialist, for he represents mind as dependent for its existence on this group of mental symbols, and possessed of no power to act in any way upon the reality for which these symbols stand.

As Huxley maintained that nothing is knowable but phenomena, *i.e.* states of consciousness, he held that we can neither affirm nor deny the existence of God or of any metaphysical realities behind phenomena. To describe his attitude towards these metaphysical questions he coined the convenient word 'Agnostic.' The charge of atheism he emphatically repels, saying:

'The problem of the ultimate cause of existence . . . seems to me . . . hopelessly out of reach of my poor powers. Of all the senseless babble I have ever had occasion to read, the demonstrations of these philosophers who undertake to tell us all about the nature of God would be the worst, if they were not surpassed by the still greater absurdities of the philosophers who try to prove that there is no God' (*Method and Results*, p. 245ff.).

With regard to the relation of the Darwinian account of evolution to the argument from design, Huxley expresses himself as follows:

'No doubt, it is quite true that the doctrine of Evolution is the most formidable opponent of all the commoner and coarser forms of Teleology. . . . The teleological and the mechanical views of nature are not, however, of necessity mutually exclusive. On the contrary, the more purely a mechanist the speculator is, the more firmly does he assume a primordial molecular arrangement, of which all the phenomena of the universe are the consequences; and the more completely is he thereby at the mercy of the teleologist, who can always defy him to disprove that this primordial molecular arrangement was not intended to evolve the phenomena of the universe' (*Critiques and Addresses*, pp. 305–307).

It would seem that Huxley should here have asked himself the question whether this 'primordial arrangement,' from which a universe abounding in marks of adaptation has proceeded, does not by a necessity of human thought demand an adequate cause. Romanes, as we have seen, did put this question to himself, and the answer to it in which he finally found satisfaction was that it is only on the hypothesis of the creative action of an Eternal Mind that the facts of physical and mental evolution are at all satisfactorily accounted for. Huxley, however, never fairly faces the question of ultimate causation, but concludes his criticism of the teleological argument with the words:

'Why trouble oneself about matters which are out of reach, when the working of the mechanism itself, which is of infinite practical importance, affords scope for all our energies?' (*ib.* p. 307).

He forgot that the human mind has other aspirations and faculties besides those which lead

to scientific discovery; that it cannot content itself with the ascertainment of the order of phenomenal succession, but must perforce, for the satisfaction of its rational, its ethical, and its religious nature, ever seek after insight into the reality and the character of the *Causa causarum*.

Herbert Spencer's attitude towards theism was by no means so negative or neutral as was that of Tyndall and Huxley; and with good right he maintained that his philosophical system might be pantheistic, but could not justly be termed atheistic. His conception of the basal reality of the universe rested upon an assumed *a priori* principle.

In opposition to the doctrine of Mansel and Sir W. Hamilton, he maintains,

'Impossible though it is to give to this consciousness of the Absolute any qualitative or quantitative expression whatever, it is not the less certain that it remains with us as a positive and indestructible element of thought' (*First Principles*[6], p. 77; cf. *Nineteenth Century*, July 1884, pp. 5–7).

In his view it is the same ultimate reality which in the inorganic world manifests itself in the form of matter and motion, and in living beings in modes of consciousness. His philosophy, however, furnishes no explanation of how, from the modes of matter and motion which physical science discerns, organic structures can spontaneously arise. He states that the volumes in which he would have explained the passage from the inorganic to the organic had for want of time not been written. What these volumes would have contained we can only conjecture from other passages in Mr. Spencer's writings, where he maintains that, in his doctrine of an infinite and eternal energy out of which all phenomena, both psychical and physical, arise, he has reached a reality which satisfies the demands alike of science and of religion. In 1884, he declares that

'though the attributes of personality, as we know it, cannot be conceived by us as attributes of the Unknown Cause of things, yet duty requires us neither to affirm nor to deny personality, but to submit ourselves in all humility to the established limits of our intelligence, in the conviction that the choice is not between personality and something lower than personality, but between personality and something higher; and that the Ultimate Power is no more presentable in terms of human consciousness than human consciousness is representable in terms of a plant's functions' (*Nineteenth Century*, July 1884, p. 7).

Were it not for the last clause in this quotation, one might suppose that Spencer held a view akin to the theistic doctrine of Lotze, i.e. that personality under human limitations must needs be imperfect, and that it is only in God that perfect personality is realized. Lotze's doctrine is theistic, because it implies that, in conceiving of God after the fashion of the highest form of human personality, we have a real and positive, though imperfect, insight into the nature of God. The last clause of the above quotation, however, denies the possibility of any such insight, and thus entirely separates Spencer's doctrine from true theism. Further, Spencer's attempt to derive all moral ideals and all consciousness of moral authority from the experiences of pleasure and pain, makes it impossible for him to recognize in our ideals any insight into the *character* of God; and hence his Ultimate Reality cannot be regarded as an adequate object of religious faith and worship.

This article may conclude with the obvious remark, that at the present time atheism in the definite form which it has often assumed in the past has almost entirely disappeared, and an agnostic form of rationalism has taken its place. Benn's treatise on *The History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century*, and Robertson's *Short History of Freethought*, will give a tolerably clear idea of the forms of negation with which the defenders of theism will probably have to deal during the present century.

LITERATURE.—James Buchanan, *Faith in God and Modern Atheism*, 2 vols., Edin. 1855; Robert Flint, *Anti-theistic Theories*, Edin. 1879; artt. 'Greek Philosophy' and 'Oriental Philosophy and Religion,' in *DPhP*, 3 vols., New York and Lond. 1901–5; T. Case, art. 'Metaphysics,' *EBr*[10]; F. A. Lange, *History of Materialism*, 3 vols., Lond. 1877–81; J. Martineau, *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. iv. (Essays on 'Materialism,' in reply to Tyndall) Lond. 1891; Paul Janet, *Contemporary Materialism*, Lond. 1865; J. S. Blackie, *Natural History of Atheism*, Lond. 1877; J. Iverach, *Is God knowable?* Lond. 1887, and the same author's *Theism in the Light of Present Science and Philosophy*, Lond. 1900; R. M. Wenley, *Contemporary Theology and Theism*, Edin. 1897; Charles B. Upton, *The Bases of Religious Belief* (Hibbert Lecture), Lond. 1894; art. 'Atheism,' in Franck's *Dict. des Sciences Philosophiques*, Paris, 1875; Goblet d'Alviella, *The Contemporary Evolution of Religious Thought in England, America, and India*, Lond. 1885; Alfred Caldecott, *The Philosophy of Religion in England and America*, Lond. 1901; Ralph Cudworth, *The True Intellectual System of the Universe* [tr. by John Harrison], 3 vols., Lond. 1845; Rudolf Otto, *Naturalism and Religion*, Lond. 1907.

CHARLES B. UPTON.

ATHEISM (Buddhist). — 1. Buddhism, in so far as it is a philosophic system, is radically averse to the idea of a Supreme Being—of a God, in the Western sense of the word. It must be remembered that this atheism is not a characteristic peculiar to Buddhism alone. The 'Lord' (*Iśvara*) of the nominally theistic schools (*aiśvarikas*), when He is not conceived of as an Oriental despot, arbitrarily imputing sin or virtue and assigning hell or heaven to His creatures, is practically only an Organizer of the world, keeping account of the actions (*karma*) of creatures in order to ensure their due recompense, and, after each period of chaos, re-constructing the universe in order to set each creature in the place which befits it. All the Hindus believe, as a matter of fact, in endless transmigrations.

Another point worthy of remark is that, although the Buddhists maintain the uselessness of this 'Lord,' a mere delegate of the *karma* of creatures, they nevertheless personify the *karma*, or Law. 'Even if I hid my sin from every one, I should not hide it from the Law' (cf. *SBE* xxxv. 295). But, as a general rule, retribution for deeds is believed to operate automatically by reason of an energy called the 'indestructible' (the 'invisible' of the Brāhmanical treatises), and the system is therefore atheistic because it does away with the thought of a personal Being who would scrutinize the 'book of debts' of which their treatises sometimes speak. It must be acknowledged, however, that to believe in infallible and immutable justice is to recognize at least one of the thoughts which constitute the idea of God. The Buddhists know that good actions can mix with evil ones and counteract their unhappy consequences; they especially praise repentance, and by doing so raise themselves above the purely mechanical idea of *karma* (*q.v.*), which they view as an intelligent force.

It may be further remarked, that the contemplation of the Buddha plays in early Buddhism a rôle analogous to that which the *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* assigns to the contemplation of the 'Lord' (*Iśvara*).

2. It will be profitable to read the 2nd chapter of the *Brahmajālasutta* (Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Lond. 1899, p. 30), where the Buddha explains how the god Brahmā, being born at the commencement of the world-age in the midst of the heaven prepared for him by his *karma*, unconscious of his former existences, and witnessing the birth of the other gods whom he wished to have as companions, imagines that he is in truth 'the Supreme One, the Lord of all, the Creator, the Ancient of Days, the Father of all that are and are to be.' 'These other beings are of my creation. And why is that so? A while ago I thought, "Would that they might come!" And on my mental aspiration behold the beings came.'

The *Kevaddhasutta* (*ib.* p. 280) is also very instructive. It shows the reverence of the gods for the great Brahmā, and how Brahmā is inferior to the Buddha. A certain monk, in order to solve

a problem of cosmology, traverses the celestial regions, consulting the divinities. They refer him to Brahmā. 'He is more potent and more glorious than we. He will know it.' 'Where, then, is that great Brahmā now?' 'We know not where Brahmā is, nor why Brahmā is, nor whence. But when the signs of his coming appear, when the light ariseth and the glory shineth, then will He be manifest.' Soon after, Brahmā became manifest, and that monk drew near to him and asked, 'Where do the four great elements cease, leaving no trace behind?' Brahmā then took the monk by the arm and led him aside and said, 'These gods, my retinue, hold me to be such that there is nothing I cannot see, I have not realized. Therefore I gave no answer in their presence. But I do not know where the four elements cease. Therefore return to the Buddha, and accept the answer according as he shall make reply.'

3 In the later literature of Buddhism there are found formal proofs of the non-existence of a God who creates and organizes the world, for example in the *Bodhicharyāvatāra*, ch. ix. ver. 119 f.

'Theists say that God is too great for us to be able to comprehend Him; but then it follows that His qualities also surpass our range of thought, and that we can neither know Him nor attribute to Him the quality of a Creator. Theists further maintain that the nature of God is incomprehensible, and His work comprehensible. But (1) God has created neither souls nor elements which are eternal: He does not bring about the birth of knowledge in the mind [compare Malebranche], since knowledge is produced by its object; He does not allot pain and pleasure, which result from *karma*. Then (2) if God acts without desiring to act, it is because He is subject to another; if He acts because He desires to act, He is subject to desire; therefore He is not independent; and (3) if He is independent of others, why does He not accomplish at one and the same time the creation, preservation, and destruction of the universe? An eternal and immutable cause ought to produce all its effects at the same time. Thus everything is momentary.'

LITERATURE.—'Abhidharmakoça,' in Burnouf, Introduction, Paris, 1844, p. 572; *Buddhacharita* ix. 53 (*SBE* xlix. 100); Nāgārjuna, 'Friendly Epistle,' in *JPTS*, 1886, p. 16; 'Bodhicharyāvatāra,' ed. with commentary, in *Bibl. Buddhica*, Fr. tr., *Introduction à la pratique des futurs Bouddhas*, Paris, 1906; Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Lond. 1899, 'Brahmajālasutta,' and also 'Tevijjasutta': 'that no Brahman has ever seen Brahmā'; Oldenberg, *Buddha*[5], 1906, p. 380; Edm. Hardy, *Buddhismus*, Münster i. W. 1890, p. 130; St. Clair-Tisdall, *The Noble Eightfold Path*, Lond. 1903, p. 161 *f.* (ch. iv. 'Buddhism and Christianity').

LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

ATHEISM (Egyptian).—No trace has yet been found of any definite atheistic teaching in Egypt. The contradictory, wholly incompatible, doctrines current in Egypt regarding the future life must have caused every thinking man to wonder and doubt, and when such a man appeared to accept them all and act upon them, if his motive was not simply to conform with custom, or to satisfy the superstition of his women-folk, it must have been the hope that one of the alternatives might possibly be correct enough to help towards bliss. The Song of the Harper, engraved in banqueting scenes in the tombs of kings and priests, urges to present enjoyment because death comes to all, and no one has ever returned to tell what has become of the dead; the most learned scribes and philosophers pass away and become as though they had never been. 'Follow thy heart greatly; but give bread to him that hath no field—so shalt thou have a good name among all posterity.' Such is the teaching of the Song. This text dates from the Middle Kingdom, but was in vogue also later. Another, of late Ptolemaic age, when the Egyptian religion was indeed on the decline, is put into the mouth of a deceased lady. Inscribed upon her tombstone, it is addressed to her husband, the high priest of Ptah at Memphis, who was almost, if not quite, at the head of the Egyptian hierarchy. She counsels merrymaking and enjoyment in the years of life upon earth: the 'western' land of the dead is a land of wakeless sleep, of heavy darkness, of forgetfulness; and apparently implies that nothing could relieve the misery if the dead could feel it. It seems that these views belonged in some degree to the varied face of orthodoxy, which preached the Psychostasia, the reward in rich fields of Aalu and abundant food and happiness; or, again, the attainment by the dead of all Divine powers; or, again, the sad doctrine of a gloomy existence in the dark under world, relieved only by one hour of illumination each night while the sun passed between two of the clanging gates.

LITERATURE.—There is no literature on the subject. For translations of the Songs, see W. Max Müller, *Die Liebespoesie der alten Ägypter*, Leipzig, 1899, p. 29 ff.

F. LL. GRIFFITH.

ATHEISM (Greek and Roman).—As a dogmatic creed, consisting in the denial of every kind of supernatural power, atheism has not often been seriously maintained at any period of civilized thought, and Plato goes so far as to assert that, while other erroneous views about the gods might be permanent, no one, after embracing in his youth the doctrine of atheism, had ever continued in it up to old age (*Legg.* 10. 888 C). Thus, in dealing with the statements of Greek and Latin texts, it is necessary to distinguish those thinkers, such as Xenophanes (fr. 15, Diels, etc.), who rejected the gods of the popular religion, from those who repudiated the idea of God in its entirety. There are further difficulties arising from the fragmentary and often untrustworthy character of our authorities. A charge of atheism was a favourite controversial weapon, and how careful we should be in accepting isolated statements which impute it may be learnt from a consideration of the cases of Socrates (Plat. *Apol.* 26 C) and of the early Christians (Gibbon, *Roman Empire*, ii. 225). Moreover, the sceptic is always liable to be confounded with the atheist. Thus the attitude of Protagoras towards the problems of theology is sufficiently indicated by the sentence preserved by Diogenes Laertius (ix. 51), in which he declares himself unable to affirm of the gods either that they are or that they are not. Nevertheless, other authorities (Epiphanius, *adv. Hæres.* iii. 2. 9; Diels, *Doxogr.* p. 591, 1) testify to his absolute denial of the existence of God. These considerations will show the difficulty of appraising the statements which impute atheism to the physicist Hippo, a contemporary of Pericles (Plut. *Comm. Not.* 31, p. 1075 A, etc.), or to the more notorious Diagoras of Melos. The latter, familiar to us from the allusions of Aristophanes (*Nub.* 830; *Av.* 1072), is said to have turned to atheism because the gods failed to visit with punishment a flagrant wrong which had been committed against him (Sext. *Math.* ix. 53). We have more definite information about Theodorus of Cyrene, a follower of Aristippus, who lived in the latter years of the 4th cent. B.C. His atheism was absolutely uncompromising (Diog. Laert. ii. 97; Epiphan. *l.c.*; Diels, *Doxogr.* p. 591, 25), and formed a reasoned element in a philosophical system which was subversive of the foundations of customary morality.

Again, atheism is the logical result of the rationalizing system of Euhemerus; but the charge is made against him (Plut. *Is. et Osir.* 23, p. 360 A) on precisely the same grounds as against the Stoics (Plut. *Amat.* 13, p. 757 C), and cannot of itself be held to imply more than his opposition to received religion. The same is true of the earlier attempt of Prodicus, who held that Divine honours were in the first place bestowed upon such natural objects as the sun and moon and the fruits of the earth, and next in order upon the civilizing benefactors of the human race (Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, Eng. tr., Lond. 1901, i. 430). To the same period belongs Critias, the leader of the Thirty Tyrants, who is ranked with the atheists by Sextus

Math. ix. 54) on the strength of some remarkable verses, referred by other authorities, erroneously, as it would seem (Diels, *Doxogr.* proll. p. 59. 1), to the *Sisyphus* of Euripides. These lines are conceived in the spirit of a Callicles or a Thrasymachus, as we meet them in the *Gorgias* and the *Republic*. The argument is founded on the Sophistic distinction between nature and convention; and the belief in God, which is made subsequent to the rule of morality imposed by law, is attributed to the policy of a cunning legislator, who sought to check secret immorality by the fiction of an eternal, all-seeing, and all-wise power, and to procure obedience to its decrees by investing it with awe-inspiring attributes.

Though denounced as a fiction in the age of the Sophists, the universality of religious belief among the nations of the world was always one of the strongest weapons possessed by the advocates of theism (Plat. *Legg.* 10. 886 A; Sext. *Math.* ix. 60). The only exception which ancient tradition, as preserved by Theophrastus in his treatise on *Piety* (Bernays, *Theophr. üb. Frömmigkeit*, p. 56), records was furnished by a doubtful story concerning the Thoës or Acrothoitæ. They are said to have been a tribe living on the borders of Thrace, who, like Hesiod's Silver Race (*Op.* 133 f.), neglected entirely to sacrifice to the gods, and were swallowed up by an earthquake as a punishment for their atheism (Porphyr. *de Abst.* ii. 7, 8; Simplic. *ad Epict. Enchir.* 31. p. 95, 34, Dübn). Thus, whether viewed in connexion with popular opinion or with scientific thought, atheism appears to have been regarded by the ancients as a mark of coarseness, depravity, or eccentricity.

LITERATURE.—See the commentators on Parmenides and Heraclitus, and L. Campbell, *Religion in Greek Literature*, Lond. 1898, p. 295. For the charges against astronomers, Plato, *Legg.* 12, 967 A. See also Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato*[3], Oxford, 1892, Index; Zeller, *Stoics*, etc., Eng. tr. new ed. 1880, p. 465; G. Boissier, *La Religion romaine*[4], Paris, 1892; and other reff. throughout the article. A. C. PEARSON.

ATHEISM (Indian, ancient).—The beginnings of Indian atheism can be traced back into the Vedic period. In the Rigveda the national god Indra is derided in several passages (iv. 24. 10, x. 119); and we read (ii. 12. 5, viii. 100. 3) of people who absolutely denied his existence even in those early days. We have here the first traces of that naive atheism which is so far from indulging in any philosophical reflexion that it simply refuses to believe what it cannot visualize, and which, in a later period, was known as the disbelief of the Lokāyata system; that is to say, of crass materialism (see art. LOKĀYATA).

It is different with the atheism which had grown into a conviction as the result of serious philosophical speculation; this, in distinction from the other naive form, we may describe briefly as *philosophic* atheism.

When the old Vedic religion developed into pantheism, the figures of the old gods faded and became transient creatures. But, as such, they still lived in the philosophic systems of India, even in the atheistic Sāṅkhya system (see SĀṄKHYA), and in the religions of Buddha and Mahāvīra, which found support in this system, and, like it, recognize no *real* God. Here these shadow-like gods afford an illustration of a fact which can be noted throughout the history of religion—that religious ideas belonging to earlier periods project themselves into a later and differently-conceived view of the world—one with which in essence they have ceased to have anything to do, but to which, nevertheless, they adapt themselves. In the Sāṅkhya system, in Buddhism, and in the religion of the Jains, we find the belief in the existence of gods, demi-gods, and demons, as well as in heavens and hells. But the gods are only more highly organized and happier beings than men; like the latter, they are within the *saṁsāra*, 'circle of life,' and, unless they gain the saving knowledge which enables them to withdraw from worldly existence, they are obliged to change their bodies again. Nor have they escaped the power of death; consequently they are lower than the man who has reached the highest goal. In India, recognition of these faded gods of the people has been fully reconciled with the atheistic view of the world. In the Sāṅkhya system, belief in gods who have risen to evanescent godhead (*janyeśvara, kāryeśvara*) has nothing whatever to do with the question of God Eternal (*nityeśvara*), as regards whom the theists assume that He made the world by His will. The use of a special term (*Iśvara*, 'the powerful') in Indian philosophy obviously arose out of the endeavour to distinguish this God even verbally from the shadow-like gods of the people (*deva*).

The positive way in which the existence of God is denied is one of the characteristic features of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, which on that account is also continually denoted as *nirīśvara* ('godless'). Again and again in the Sāṅkhyasūtras it is stated that the existence of God cannot be proved (i. 92–94, v. 2–12, 46, 126, 127, vi. 64, 65, with the respective commentaries). Having regard to the aphoristic conciseness of this work, it is clear from this frequent repetition what importance was attached by the adherents of the Sāṅkhya system to this point—the actual absence of any strict proof of the existence of God. The denial of God in the Sāṅkhya philosophy is in essence the result of the following ideas: (1) the doctrine that there is inherent in unconscious matter the force which operates with physical necessity to develop itself for the purely receptive souls; and (2) the general Indian conception of the after-effects of the actions of living beings, which instigate that natural force and guide its activity into definite channels. Other reasons seem to have contributed, especially the realization that the problem of misfortune cannot be solved by any of the speculations of theism. This idea is made use of by Vāchaspatimiśra (12th cent. A.D.) in the *Sāṅkhya-tattva-kaumudī* to *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, 57, as one of the main supports of the atheistic explanation of the world. It will be useful here, we think, to give a translation of this passage, which is so important and so characteristic of Indian thought. It runs thus:

'Every conscious action is, without exception, determined either by an egoistic purpose or by kindness. Since these two motives are excluded in the case of the creation of the world, it becomes impossible to assume that the creation of the world was due to conscious action. For a God whose wishes are all fulfilled can have had no personal interest whatever in the creation of the world; the possibility of any egoistic purpose consequently disappears. But neither can God have undertaken the creation from kindness; since *before* the act of creation souls suffered no pain—senses, bodies, and objects not having come into existence yet—from what could the kindness of God wish to have souls released? If, on the other hand, we suppose that the kindness of God was shown later, when, after the act of creation, He saw His creatures full of pain, we can hardly escape the argument in a circle: creation was the result of kindness, and kindness the result of creation! Further, a God who is actuated by kindness would create only joyful creatures, but not creatures in different conditions. If to this some one objects that the difference results from the difference in that work for which individuals receive a reward from God, we reply that in that case the direction of the work on the part of that conscious, highest Being is entirely superfluous, for the effectiveness of the work performed by individuals (that is to say, the consequences of merit and guilt) fully explains itself without any supreme direction on the part of that God. . . . On the contrary, that operation of unintelligent matter which we assume has no egoistic purpose behind it, nor is kindness its motive; consequently it cannot be substantiated as against *our* theory that the stated grounds of refutation apply to it as well.

This argument of Vāchaspatimiśra was repeated almost entirely by Mādhavāchārya (14th cent.

A.D.) in the Sāṅkhya chapter of his *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha* (p. 228 of tr. by E. B. Cowell and A. E. Gough). These and similar reflexions had certainly already forced themselves upon Kapila, the originator of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, when he decided to take the bold step of publicly declaring for atheism. That no other doctrine in the Sāṅkhya system was so often and so fiercely attacked as this may be inferred even from the fact that Patañjali, the founder of the Yoga system (see art. YOGA), introduced the idea of a personal god in the hope that he would thus make the Sāṅkhya philosophy acceptable to his countrymen. The strict adherents of the Sāṅkhya doctrine, on the other hand, tried to derive from their own system new arguments by which to ward off the attacks made upon the denial of God. They placed first and foremost the sophistical alternative: Is God to be thought of as a free or as a fettered soul? Regarded as a *free* soul, that is to say, one not connected with a body or with any physical organ, God would be devoid of all qualities, and particularly of desire and will—the prerequisite of all creative activity; He would also be without any motive for directing the world. Regarded as a *fettered* soul, God would belong to the *saṁsāra*, and, like all other beings, would be deluded, and be hampered by human infirmities; in which case again He could not be creator and controller of the world, but only a nominal (*pāribhāṣika*) god who came into existence at the beginning of this world-period, and passes away with the end of it. If a theist raises against this argument the obvious objection that in that case God would belong neither to the free nor to the fettered souls, but must be assigned an exceptional place, he receives the answer, 'When a thing is defined as being unique in character, every basis upon which to argue is removed.'

This atheism of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, somewhat softened by the recognition of the gods of the people, was taken over, as we have already noted, into Buddhism and the religion of the Jains. But in all probability it also had an influence upon two schools of Brāhman philosophy—the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya (see the two articles). These two schools were originally atheistic, and did not go over to theism until after their amalgamation.

LITERATURE.—R. Garbe, *Die Sāṅkhya-Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1894; L. Suali, in *Muséon*, new ser. ix. 277–298; F. Max Müller, *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, London, 1899; P. Deussen, *Philosophie der Upanishads*, Leipzig, 1899 (Eng. tr., Edin. 1905, esp. pp. 238, 407). See also artt. SĀṄKHYA, YOGA.

R. GARBE.

ATHEISM (Indian, modern).—In modern India, philosophic atheism still survives in the religion of the Jains. (For Jain and Buddhist atheism see the special articles.) As regards the materialism professed by the ancient Lokāyatas, the modern predominance of a religious attitude founded on *bhakti*, or faith devoted to a personal Supreme Deity, has practically extinguished it. Sporadic attempts to revive it have been made by isolated teachers, with but small success. The best known of these was the composition of the *Sūnīsār*, or 'Essence of Emptiness,' by a religious mendicant named Bakhtāwar, the promulgator of the so-called *Śūṇyavādī* doctrine. He flourished in the early part of the 19th cent. under the patronage of Dayā Rām, a Jāṭ Rājā of Hāthras in the central Gangetic Doab. Bakhtāwar's teaching went a step beyond simple materialism, and was an attempt to popularize it. According to him, nothing—God, or man, or any material object—exists. All is emptiness (*śūnyatā*). The one thing that exists is the Ego, and all conceptions are but reflexions of this Ego. 'It is an error,' he says, 'to think that the reflexion of my face in a glass is not my face, but is that of another. Similarly, whatever you see elsewhere is but yourself, and father and mother are non-entities. You are the infant and the old man, you are the wise man and the fool, the male and the female. It is you who are drowned in the stream, and it is you who pass over safely. You are the killer and the slain, the slayer and the eater, the king and the subject. You seize yourself and let go, you sleep and you wake; you dance for yourself and you sing for yourself. You are the sensualist and the ascetic, the sick man and the strong. In short, whatever you see, that is you, as bubbles, surf, and billows are all but water' (Wilson, *Rel. Sects*, 361).

It was not to be expected that such a dreary creed would retain many adherents, and it is doubtful if the few who were first attracted by it have left any representatives at the present day.

The atheism of the Sāṅkhya school is still professed by those learned men who follow that system of philosophy, and these and the Jains are the only real atheists of modern India.

LITERATURE.—Wilson, *Religious Sects of the Hindus*, Lond. 1862, 359 ff.

GEORGE A. GRIERSON.

ATHEISM (Jain).—Jainism is atheistical, if by atheism we understand the belief that there is no eternal Supreme God, Creator and Lord of all things; for the Jains flatly deny such a Supreme God. Nor need it surprise us that atheism should be essential to a religious system; for even the most orthodox Brāhmanical theologians, the Mīmāṁsakas of Kumārilabhaṭṭa's school, deny the existence of a Supreme God, though, of course, on other grounds than those of the Jains (see *Ślokavārtika*, sec. 16, Calcutta, 1907).

The Jains admit the existence of innumerable gods of many kinds and various degrees of perfection. But none of these gods is eternal; however long their life, it must come to an end when the merit of the god in question is exhausted. The longest life of a celestial being is that in the highest heaven Sarvārthasiddhi, which lasts between 32 and 33 *sāgaropamas* ('oceans of years'). Gods are embodied souls, just like men or animals, differing from them in degree, not in kind; for their greater power and perfection appertain to their divine body and organization, which is the reward for their good deeds in a former life, and which they lose on the exhaustion of their merit, to be born again in some other state of life. But those souls who are not born again, or, in other words, are liberated, go up to the top of the universe and remain there for ever in the state of absolute perfection; they have no longer any connexion with the world, and cannot, therefore, have any influence upon it. Accordingly the functions of a Supreme God, as Lord and Ruler of the world, cannot be attributed to liberated souls; and as the not yet liberated souls, *i.e.* the souls in the state of bondage, are subject to re-birth, none of them can be regarded as an eternal God. Therefore the Jains cannot acknowledge a Supreme God in our sense of the word.

Following up their theoretical views on this point, the Jains have strenuously combated, and denounced the fallacies of, the arguments by which the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophers tried to prove the existence of an eternal and omniscient God as Creator and Ruler of all things, viz. the famous argument that all things, being products, presuppose a maker who has an intimate knowledge of their material cause. The refutation of this argument will be found in the *Syādvādamañjarī*, in the *Commentary on the Saddarśanasamuchchaya*, and many similar works. The Jains also controvert the views of the Vedāntins and of the followers of the Yoga philosophy regarding Brahman or Īśvara as the Supreme God and Cause

of the world. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas seem to have been their most formidable opponents in this controversy about the existence of God.

Though the Jains are undoubtedly atheistical, as we understand the term, still they would probably object to being styled atheists. While admitting that the world is without beginning or end, and therefore not produced by a god, or ruled by one, they recognize a highest deity (*paramadevatā*) as the object of veneration, viz. the Jina, *i.e.* the teacher of the sacred Law, who, being absolutely free from all passions and delusion, and being possessed of omniscience, has reached absolute perfection after having annihilated all his *karma* (*Śaddarśanasamuchchaya*, 45 f., Calcutta, 1907). It must be remarked, however, that there are innumerable Jinas who, having proclaimed the sacred Law, have reached perfection, and have passed out of this world of change and woe. Prayers are addressed to them by the faithful, just as if they did or would bestow happiness and bliss on the devout adorer; but, of course, a Jina cannot show favour to anybody, as he is utterly indifferent to all that belongs to the world, and is entirely free from all emotions. He therefore does not reward the adorers or satisfy their wishes, but in his stead the gods who watch and control true Discipline (*śāsanādhiṣṭhāyikā devatās*) hear their prayers; for the practice of the discipline taught by the Jinas is the best mode of worshipping them. In the case of spiritual gifts vouchsafed to the worshipper, the explanation given comes to this: the adoration of the Jina purifies and sanctifies the soul of the worshipper through his meditating on the perfections of the Jinas. In this sense the Jinas are regarded as the highest deity (*paramadevatā*); temples are erected for their worship, and a kind of divine service is instituted in them on the model of that practised in Hindu temples.

LITERATURE.—There is no literature beyond the texts quoted in the article.

H. JACOBI.

ATHEISM (Jewish).—Atheism as a system of thought has no place in Judaism, and there is no equivalent for the term in the Hebrew language or literature. The deliberate denial of the existence of a Being who is responsible for the activity of nature and for the course of history presupposes a systematic analysis and explanation of natural and historical phenomena as the necessary effects of existing uncreated causes. The ancient Hebrew had no disposition to analyze the natural phenomena in the way the Greek did, and to trace them back to physical laws and principles—the indispensable basis of all conscious atheistic doctrines. He was more disposed to err on the side of polytheism than on that of atheism.

1. **Atheism in ancient Israel.**—Nevertheless there are passages to be found in the OT from which we can conclude that disbelief in the existence of God (or gods) was extant among the people in pre-exilic times, and that this disbelief was regarded by the prophets and psalmists as the source of the wickedness of the masses. It is also likely that the polytheism and idolatry against which the prophets contended were not the result of genuine superstition, but of real indifference towards all the gods served, whose worship was merely a pretext for indulgence in all kinds of licence and crime, and whose recognition was prompted mostly by political and social considerations. But the reason for this unbelief was always supposed to be thoughtlessness, indifference, ignorance, sensuality. There was no system of thought leading to the denial of God which the prophets deemed it necessary to combat. They merely wished to awake the people and to induce them to shake off their indifference. Jeremiah very often speaks in this tenor. The most outspoken passage is Jer 5^{12} 'They have denied the Lord, and said, He is not.' Here the prophet has in view the more intelligent members of his race, 'the great men' who ought to 'know the way of the Lord' (5^5). While pleading absolute ignorance and folly for the degraded masses with whom it would be useless to argue (5^4), he addresses himself to the leaders who are avowed atheists. The fact that they swear by the name of Jahweh (5^2) does not contradict the assumption that the prophet accuses the people of practical atheism. As their oaths are false, the perjurers only misuse the name of Jahweh without believing in His existence. Jeremiah employs the cosmological proof for the existence of God (5^{20-25}), in order to convince the people of their folly. But the confident use of the proof makes it quite clear that he merely intends to dispel the thoughtlessness of the people, and not to refute any antagonistic theories concerning the natural phenomena he refers to (cf. also Is 32^6, Pr 30^{1-4}, Ps 12. 36. 58^{11} 74). Psalms 10 and 14 (53) contain passionate outbursts against the *nābhāl* ('impious,' 'fool') who denies the existence of God, and thus degenerates into a dangerous criminal. 'The impious says in his heart, There is no God' (Ps 14^1). 'The wicked in the haughtiness of his countenance saith, He will not require. All his thoughts are: There is no God' (Ps 10^4). The *nābhāl*, however, typifies the whole people. 'There is none that doeth good, no, not one.' It is not likely that Ps 14^1 refers to Edom or some other enemy of Israel (see Baethgen, *Psalmen*[2], p. 36, Delitzsch, and others; the reading of 'Gebal' by Cheyne seems quite unfounded). Here it is the reckless ignoring or denial of the omniscience of God or His very existence that is dwelt upon by the psalmist as the immediate cause of the moral decay of the Jewish people (which in the end must lead also to political ruin). Atheism and immorality are regarded as being inseparably connected with each other.

2. **Post-exilic times.**—In late post-exilic times we lose sight of any atheistic tendencies that may have existed among the Jews, for there were no more prophets to chronicle the sins of the people. Moreover, the contact with Babylonian culture had given rise to the mythical beliefs which from the days of Ezekiel became identified with Judaism, and which have found definite recognition in the Talmudic and Rabbinic literature. Again, the revival of the religious and national spirit under Ezra was destined to dispel that ignorance and thoughtlessness of which Jeremiah and the psalmists complained, and the second Temple could not very well accommodate arrogant and defiant unbelievers. The influence of Hellenism was no doubt responsible for the slackening of religious fervour and the loss of national self-consciousness during the period immediately preceding the time of the Maccabæans, but that influence never went so far as to cause the Jews to adopt the Greek Pantheon or to deny the existence of an invisible God. It was their unflinching faith in their only (invisible) God that later on prevented the Jews in Alexandria and elsewhere from joining their fellow-citizens in the worship of the local deities, and created the feelings of hatred which resulted in the curious charge of 'atheism' being made against the Jews—a charge which Josephus refuted with great vigour (Josephus, *c. Apionem*, ii. § 6).

3. **Philo against Atheism.**—Jewish thinkers, however, have never ignored atheism. Philo devotes two chapters in his *de Somniis* (§§ 43, 44) to a refutation of all atheistic doctrines from a Jewish standpoint. The wicked say that 'this Universe is the only thing which is perceptible to the outward senses, and visible, having never been created, and being destined never to be destroyed, but being

uncreated and imperishable, not requiring any superintendence or care, or regulation, or management.' This view must lead to universal disorder and anarchy, that means to the ruin of mankind (*ib.* § 44). All that uphold this view are sure to meet with severe but well-deserved punishment, as all wicked people always do (§ 45). The world cannot exist without a ruler, as a house cannot exist without a master, or a country without a leader (*ib.*).

4. Atheism in Talmudic and Rabbinic literature.—The final ruin of the Jewish nation and its great humiliation by the Romans in the 1st cent. after Christ made reckless ignoring or denying of the existence of God impossible. The deepening of the religious sense and the attachment to the great literary products of the past caused by the downfall led to the development of the Talmudic and Rabbinic literature, which henceforth dominated Judaism and put an end to atheistic beliefs and practices. There is no reference in the Talmud to theoretical atheism, and no attempt is made to prove the existence of God. The *Min* or the *Apikoros* (Epicurean) is not necessarily an atheist, but one who denies one of the principles of the Jewish faith. Immortality, Resurrection, Divine origin of the Law, and several other tenets are of equal importance with the belief in God as regards the application of the above designations. The term that approaches most closely the meaning of the word 'atheist' is *kofer be' ikkar* (*i.e.* 'one who denies the first principle'), which occurs for the first time in Bab. *Shabbath*, 16*b*, and is frequently used in modern Rabbinic literature.

Among the Jewish thinkers and religious philosophers of the Middle Ages, there was none who denied the existence of God or could in any way be described as an atheist (although pantheistic ideas are frequently to be found in their works). The problem of reconciling Aristotle with the Bible necessitated the discussion of the question of creation, of the attributes of God, and of the eternity of matter (maintained by the Muhammadan atheists and adopted by Crescas), but the existence of a free, personal God had never been questioned by any Jewish philosopher down to Spinoza.

5. Spinoza.—Spinoza himself can scarcely be described as an atheist. To an atheist nature is possible without God, and matter is responsible to itself—not to mind—for its existence and development. Mind is altogether denied, for the assumption of mind is incompatible with the materialistic conception of the Universe which leads to atheism. Spinoza denies the existence of anything beyond God. Mind and matter are attributes of the same substance, of *deus* (*sive natura*). Certainly there is no free, personal God in existence according to Spinoza, and in a religious sense this amounts to atheism. But man himself is part of God, and is thus in no need of worshipping any Deity. It is the 'intellectual love of God' that makes man perfect—an idea which, although vague and capable of various interpretations, is incompatible with consistent atheism. The influence of the Jewish religious philosophy on Spinoza was too great to allow him to become anything but a pantheist.

6. Modern Jewry.—The philosophical views and ideas of modern Jews are so closely connected with the standard of culture and the ideas of the nations among whom they live, that they do not admit of separate treatment. Every school of thought has its Jewish followers, and Büchner, Darwin, and Haeckel are just as popular among free-thinking Jews as they are among free-thinking Christians. But the charge often made against modern Jews, that the proportion of atheists among them is greater than among their Christian neighbours, is unfounded. There is scarcely a Jewish thinker to be found who has included atheism in his system, while the great masses of the Jewish people all over the globe still faithfully believe in the God of their fathers, and twice daily proclaim their faith in the words of Moses: 'Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is one.' In the last decade or two there has been a tendency growing among the Jewish proletariat of the East of Europe to combine doctrines of atheism and hatred of religion with their socialistic ideas. The well-educated leaders of the working classes succeeded in spreading those doctrines among the young Jewish workers, by providing them with the necessary literature in their own Yiddish language by translation from the European languages. But the rise of the Jewish national (Zionist) movement has in the last few years proved most effective in stopping the growth of those tendencies, and is now bringing the despairing, ill-treated, starving Jewish labourer back to the camp of Israel and to the God of his fathers. With the revival of the hope for better times, the belief in God's mercy and omnipotence has also been revived. A great truth is expressed in the saying of the Rabbins: 'Israel, and the Law, and the Holy One (blessed be He!) are one.' Israel cannot exist without a firm belief in his God, 'the one and only God, the Creator and Ruler of the Universe.'

LITERATURE.—D. Neumark, *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters*, Berlin, 1907; G. S. Spiegler, *Geschichte der Philosophie des Judentums*, Leipzig, 1890; T. K. Cheyne, *The Book of Psalms*, London, 1888 (pp. 33–35); art. 'Atheism' in *JE*, and in Hamburger.

SALIS DAICHES.

ATHEISM (Muhammadan).—The Muslim world has at no time been a favourable soil for the growth or continuation of agnosticism, and in Arabic literature unorthodox tenets of all sorts are apt to be described by the word *zandaqah*, which, though of uncertain origin (being derived by some from the Syriac, by others from the Persian), is probably the correct term for such systems as deny the existence of a personal God and the moral government of the world. Another name for the holders of such opinions is derived from the word *dahr*, 'time,' and signifies 'believers in the eternity of the world,' *i.e.* in its having no beginning. The earliest persons credited with these doctrines are certain of Muhammad's Meccan opponents, including the leader of the long-continued opposition against him, Abū Sufyān b. Umayyah, who are all supposed to have learned their 'atheism' from the Christians of the Ḥarrah [? Ḥīrah] (Tha'ālibī, *Laṭā'if al-ma'ārif*, p. 64). The charge against Abū Sufyān is not borne out by history, and of the others we know too little to estimate its probability; but the supposition that such opinions would originate from Christians, and especially monks, seems to have been due to the cultivation by Oriental Christians of certain forms of Greek philosophy; whence, in the legend that tells us how the Khalīf Ma'mūn (ob. A.D. 833) acquired his library of Greek books, the Greek king is advised to send his library to the Muslim ruler on the ground that 'these sciences' have never been engrafted on a religious system without ruining it.

In early Arabic writers the system of the *Zindīqs* seems to be inextricably confused with that of Manes, whose followers were fiercely persecuted by the early Abbāsids. The *locus classicus* on the subject for the early Abbāsid period is in the *Zoology* (iv. 141–144) of Jāḥiẓ (ob. A.D. 869), where, however, a *Zindīq* is confuted by the Khalīf Ma'mūn by means of a puzzle which could only trouble one who believed in dualism. The verses which the author cites show, nevertheless, that the

persons with whom he is dealing held the leading tenets of the atheists: 'You have given presents,' says Ḥammād 'Ajarrad in a lampoon on 'Umārah b. Ḥarbiyyah, 'to one who asserts that the heavens made themselves, and that the earth was not laid out by its Creator.' On this the author makes the curious remark that no one asserts that the universe with its organization came of itself, and that Ḥammād's ascription of this doctrine to the persons whom he lampoons might count as a proof that he held them innocent; and that, in fact, the satirist was himself a colleague of the objects of his lampoon. Jāḥiẓ then proceeds to enumerate the persons who constituted this society of sceptics, and his list contains some names that are familiar from the *Kitāb al-Aghānī*, while others are more obscure: Ḥammād 'Ajarrad, Ḥammād the Reciter, Ḥammād b. al-Zibriqān, Yūnus b. Hārūn, 'Alī b. al-Khalīl, Yazīd b. al-Faid, 'Ubādah, Jamīl b. Maḥfūẓ, Qāsim, Muṭī', Wālibah b. al-Ḥabbāb, Abān b. 'Abd al-Ḥamīd, 'Umārah b. Ḥarbiyyah. 'All these were in constant communication, and might be considered one person.' Of these, Yūnus addressed a pamphlet to the Byzantine emperor, showing up the vices of the Arabs and the defects of Islām. Abān figures in a satire by the well-known poet Abū Nuwās (ob. A.D. 810), partly as a follower of Manes, but partly as a rationalist:

'I sat one day with Abān (plague on him!), when the time for the first prayer came, and the call was duly uttered by a correct and clear-voiced speaker.

We all repeated the call to prayer to the end. Then said Abān: "How could you testify to that [*i.e.* the Muslim formula of faith] without ocular demonstration? So long as I live I shall never attest anything but what I see with my eyes." Then I said: "Glory to God"; he said: "Glory to Manes." I said: "Jesus was an Apostle"; he said: "Of Satan." I continued: "Moses was the interlocutor of the Gracious and Faithful One"; he said: "Then your God must have a tongue and an eye. And did He create Himself, or who created Him?" So I held my tongue before this obstinate blasphemer.'

The poet then gives a list of sceptics, containing several of the names that have already been mentioned. In the tales told about them in the *Kitāb al-Aghānī* they are not distinguished from dualists, and 'their book,' which was said to be in the hands of the daughter of Muṭī' b. Iyās when arrested for *zandaqah*, was probably the work ascribed to Manes. In Ṭabarī, iii. 588 (A.D. 786), an account is given of their system which is clearly more positive than negative, enjoining washings, to which Jāḥiẓ (*loc. cit.*) adds respect for animal life and vagrancy.

'Vagrancy means with them that they may not abide two nights in the same dwelling; the vagrants among them always wander in pairs, and adopt four rules—saintliness, purity, veracity, and poverty.'

The author then tells a story about two of these *Zindīqs*, who suffered themselves to be beaten almost to death on suspicion of stealing jewels which they had seen an ostrich swallow, rather than let any harm happen to the ostrich. From these 'atheists' *par excellence* other free-thinkers were careful to distinguish themselves: *e.g.* the poet Basshār b. Burd (ob. A.D. 783), who himself had a reputation for unorthodoxy, and in one of his verses prayed to the Prophet Muhammad to join with him in an attack upon the Deity. Abū Nuwās himself was severely punished for being a 'dualist,' because he ridiculed the angels (Ṭabarī, iii. 964).

Although this sect was persecuted almost to extermination in the 2nd cent. of Islām, this fact did not prevent the rise of other systems branded by the orthodox as 'atheistic.'

The most famous founder of a system of the sort in the latter part or this and the first half of the 3rd Islāmic cent. was Abu'l-Ḥusain Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā al-Rāwandī, reckoned by later historians as one of the three *Zindīqs* of Islām. A sect bearing the name Rāwandī is mentioned by Ṭabarī shortly after the accession of Manṣūr (A.H. 140 [A.D. 757-8]) They came from Rāwand in the country between Qāshān and Iṣfahān, and held the strange opinion that Manṣūr was himself the Deity. Aḥmad al-Rāwandī was somewhat later, as he died in A.H. 245 or 250, but as early as A.H. 189 he recited his works in Baghdad. His followers were also called *abnā'u al-dawlah*, 'sons of the Empire,' with reference to a book by him called 'The Empire,' in about 2000 leaves. He appears to have taught the eternity of matter, as a book was written in refutation of his opinion that 'a body could not be created out of nothing.'*

Besides sectarians, there were persons of importance notorious for holding liberal opinions at most periods of the Khalīfate. In the 2nd cent., atheistic verses, it is said, were composed by the Umayyad Khalīf Yazīd b. al-Walīd b. 'Abd al-Malik (ob. A.D. 744; *Aghānī* vi. 123), who also displayed great contempt for the ordinances of religion. In the 3rd cent. the poet Abū Tammām (ob. A.H. 231 [A.D. 846]) had this reputation, though his extant poems appear to show no trace of unorthodoxy. It was earned with apparently more justice by his successor as chief poet in the following century, Abu'l-Ṭayyib Aḥmad al-Mutanabbī (ob. A.H. 354 [A.D. 965]), whose brilliant odes are, in the opinion of Muslim critics, defaced by utterances which imply disrespect for prophets and revealed religion. His most offensive line in their opinion is one in which he tells his patron, an 'Alid, 'the greatest miracle of the man of Tihāmah (*i.e.* Muhammad) is that he is thy father'; in another he tells a patron that if his sword had hit the head of Lazarus on the battlefield, Jesus would not have been able to restore him to life; and that if the Red Sea had been like his hand, Moses could never have crossed it.

Somewhat later in the 4th cent. of Islām comes the second of the great *Zindīqs*, Abū Ḥayyān 'Alī al-Tauḥīdī (ob. A.H. *c.* 400 [A.D. 1009]), whose works are said to have been more dangerous than those of the others, because, while the others proclaimed their unbelief, he expressed his in innuendoes. Such of his works as are now accessible seem harmless and even pious. Still, in a story told by him in an apparently lost book, copied by Yāqūt in his *Dictionary of Learned Men* (ii. 45–51), he pours ridicule on a secretary of State who is advised by his friends to study Euclid, but finds heresy in the first two definitions, and so will proceed no further. And, indeed, the study of Greek philosophy, of which portions were translated or travestied in Arabic, and taught to aspirants after the medical profession, was generally thought to indicate atheism; and 'the naturalists and physicians,' with whom the astrologer is sometimes joined, are said to deny the resurrection of the body, and therewith the future life.

It is curious that the writer who brings this accusation is himself the third of the great *Zindīqs*, Abu' l-'Alā Aḥmad b. 'Abdallah of Ma'arrah (ob. 1057 A.D.), 'discovered' by Alfred von Kremer, who translated many of his verses. Three of his works in particular were supposed to be tainted with unbelief: the *Luzūmiyyāt*, 'Double Rhymes,' made familiar by von Kremer; the 'Divine Forgiveness,' epitomized by R. A. Nicholson in *JRAS*, 1902; and a volume of poems called 'I ask pardon, and do thou ask it,' of which the present writer has collected some fragments in his dissertation, 'Index operum Abu' l-'Alæ Ma'arrensis,' in the volume of studies in memory of Amari. The most considerable collection of heretical or atheistic

* One of his criticisms on the Qur'ān is quoted in the *Letters* of Hamadhānī (ob. A.H. 396 [A.D. 1005–6]), ed. Beyrūt, p. 18. He asked the grammarian Ibn 'Arābī whether 'to make one taste the garment of hunger' (*Qur.* xvi. 118) was really an Arabic phrase.

epigrams composed by or attributed to this author is to be found in Yāqūt's *Dictionary of Learned Men* (i. 189–194); and, indeed, they seem to go in the direction of agnosticism as far as it is possible to go. All known religions are branded as error. Mankind consists of two classes—the wise who have no religion, and the fools who are religious. The real meaning of the assertion that there is a Creator outside space and time is that he who asserts it has no intellect.

'Do not suppose the statements of the Prophets to be true; they are all fabrications. Men lived comfortably till they came and spoiled life. The "sacred books" are only such a set of idle tales as any age could have and indeed did actually produce. What inconsistency that God should forbid the taking of life, and Himself send two angels to take each man's! And as for the promise of a second life—the soul could well have dispensed with both existences.'

It is remarkable that the author should also have preached vegetarianism in an extreme form, as apparently was done by the earlier *Zindīqs*; still more, that he should have devoted much of his time to the composition of sermons and other works of an edifying character.

In orthodox circles the possession of philosophical books long continued to be an indication of heretical tendencies, and the burning of such books by authority was not uncommon. The employment of Avicenna and similar students of Greek systems in government offices was unpopular, and is condemned by historians. In the 6th cent. of Islām there was a considerable development of pantheistic Ṣūfiism, which produced a series of works which, under pretence of orthodoxy and devoutness, in reality substituted for the personal God and the future life of Islām notions that were irreconcilable with either and were supported by an interpretation of the Qur'ān so far-fetched as to be ludicrous and irreverent. The most famous of these are the poem of Ibn al-Fāriḍ (556–632 A.H. [A.D. 1161–1235]), called from its rhyme *Tā'iyyah*, and the treatise of Ibn 'Arābī (550–638 A.H. [A.D. 1155–1240]) called *Fuṣūs al-Ḥikam*, 'Gems of Maxims.' Both these works at different times brought their owners into danger, and were the cause of riots (see Ibn Iyās, *History of Egypt*, ii. 119 [875 A.H.] and 219 [888 A.H.], where the latter book is described as the work of a worse unbeliever than Jew, Christian, or Idolater). Of the comments on the Qur'ān which this work contains it is sufficient to cite that on the story of the Golden Calf; according to Ibn 'Arābī (or the Prophet, who revealed this work to him in a dream), Moses found fault with his brother for not approving of the worship of the Calf, since Aaron should have known that nothing but God could ever be worshipped, and therefore the Calf was (like everything else) God.

Refutation of the opinions of the 'atheists' was one of the purposes of the science called *kalām*, or metaphysical theology. They are divided by the theologian Ghazālī (ob. 505 A.H. [A.D. 1111]), in his treatise called *Al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl*, into three classes: the *duhrīs*, 'an ancient sect who denied the Creator, maintained the eternity of the world, and the eternity of generation,—these are the *zindīqs*'; the 'Naturalists,' who allow the existence of a Creator, but suppose the life and soul to be the result of the admixture of elements and humours in the body, and to cease at death; and the 'Deists,' viz. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and their followers.

A somewhat different division is given in the treatise on *Sects* by Ibn Ḥazm (ob. 456 A.H. [A.D. 1064]), where, after refutation of the Sophists, who make knowledge either non-existent or relative, the author deals with those who (1) say the world is eternal, without Creator or Governor; (2) say that the world is eternal, with a Creator and Governor; (3) say that, besides God, Time, Space, and the Soul are eternal. In addition to the other names that have been mentioned, this author gives the believers in these positions the name *mulḥid*, 'heretic,' and gives the name of one of the upholders of the first as 'Abdallah b. 'Abdallah b. Shunaif. It could not be expected that many names of the supporters of such unpopular opinions would be recorded.

LITERATURE.—There is no treatise, so far as we are aware, in any European language bearing on the subject. The original sources are given in the course of the article.

D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

ATHLETICS, ATHLETICISM. — Athleticism, notwithstanding the great and elaborate developments which have taken place in the last hundred years, is to be understood only as an expression of a very primitive instinct—the instinct to play. All the evolution of twentieth century sports and games—the elaboration of rules, the development of muscle and nerve—is a provision for the impulse, the same in lambkins and in babies, in savages and in civilized men and women, to stretch their limbs, to overcome elemental forces, to contend against self-imposed difficulties and against each other.

It is interesting, in an attempt to analyze athleticism or to review athletics, to note the various forms of amusement which have sprung from that instinct to gambol, and the various factors in modern sports which make them appeal to various people. It is impossible to treat the subject exhaustively; one could scarcely enumerate all the different kinds of sport, much less discuss them. There are, however, some points worthy of consideration as suggesting the different kinds of development in physique and in character, acquired by different forms of exercise. Walking, running, leaping, dancing, hill-climbing, and swimming are our simplest sports. In these a man pits himself against natural difficulties, for the most part fighting against the force of gravity, and develops muscle and nerve in comparatively gross combinations of movements. In other words, there is achieved by these primitive exercises the kind of development of muscle and nerve which all young animals achieve when they learn to disport themselves in air, on land, or in water. That is the elementary stage of athletics, very like what the savage attains to when he executes a war-dance. It represents the demand of the body to be allowed to grow to its full stature—and a little over. The surplus we call *play*. In these days the same kind of simple development is achieved by such exercises as are now in England associated with the name of Sandow. If one has not opportunity to climb hills or battle with waves, one may 'bring up' the muscles by daily contest with improvised forces of an elastic nature, when the strain and the stress are finely adjusted and each day's ambition is to increase both. At this level of athleticism there seem to be only two kinds of gain—the opportunity to get rid of surplus energy, and the function of the muscle substance and the skin in disposing of elements in the blood which clog the vital mechanism.

Another kind of effect is experienced when implements are introduced for outdoor sport. About the simplest of exercises at this level are stilt-walking and pole-vaulting, and here we begin to realize a development which can never be achieved by primitive exercises. The feeling one has in pole-vaulting, when, by his own effort, he raises himself on a pole over a nine-foot fence, is quite different from the effect in simple high leaping. So also is the effect of high stilt-walking. In both of these there is demanded also a skill in movement which, added to the pleasant sensation,

makes a nerve-muscle combination on a plane much higher than that of natural movements.

This brings us to the innumerable varieties of games in which a ball of some kind is used. Of these football is the most elementary, so far as the impedimenta of the game are concerned. There has always been a great difference of opinion as to whether the Rugby or the Association game is the better, but the discussion is idle, for the two games are not comparable. The feeling and the skill in a Rugby game when one plays with an oval ball and is allowed to use one's hands freely, are obviously quite different from those of an Association game, which is played with a round ball and in which the use of the hands is not allowed. The same sort of idle dispute is waged over the respective advantages of golf and cricket. The two games have little in common, except that, in both, one tries to strike a ball with an implement under conditions which usually make the stroke difficult, and in those who are skilful at such games the nerve-muscle development is of a very high order. The same, of course, is true of other games—lacrosse, hockey, tennis, racquets, lawn-tennis, croquet, and the rest. A most important change comes about when the athlete employs something to carry him—a boat to row in or to sail, a bicycle, motor, or horse. The game of polo is probably the most athletic of all games. It develops strength and endurance; it requires co-operation between man and beast which is always inspiriting; and to be able to strike a ball which may be moving with great rapidity, the striker himself riding at breakneck speed, while all the time one hand is engaged with the pony, betokens a development of eye and nerve and muscle of the highest order. One is naturally tempted to pass from polo to other forms of horseback exercise, but one may not dwell upon the glories of the chase.

1. The *hygienic* effect of athleticism is its first justification. The contribution to the health of the community derived from sports is incalculable. It consists chiefly in the development of the chest from full breathing of fresh air; in the increase in the circulation from the acceleration of the heart's action; in the quickening of appetite and the promotion of digestion; in the elimination of waste products achieved by muscular exercise, rapid breathing, and perspiration; and, perhaps most important of all, in the rest and change it affords to a tired and dull brain. When we hear any one ask what form of exercise would be best for him, our answer, especially in the case of adults, should almost invariably be—that which he most enjoys. Even exercises so mild as bowling and croquet promote nearly all the good results just enumerated if entered into with zest and keenly pursued. On the other hand, caution should be exercised lest excess of effort lead to injury. The most important ill effect, and one not sufficiently considered and often entirely overlooked, is a dilatation or strain of the heart. This sometimes occurs in young people who are pressed to do too much. Boys at school may suffer irreparable injury from being made to play a strenuous game of football, or take a long cross-country run, when they are not toned up to the effort. More frequently heart-strain occurs in adults who are of a sporting nature—men who, perhaps on the occasion of their school sports, come ill-conditioned from the desk and try a quarter-mile race; or who tramp for eight hours on 'the Twelfth' without preparation; or who are carried away in the Christmas vacation, after weeks of muscular idleness, and ride to the finish on their first day with hounds. The next most important injury is perhaps apoplexy—a rupture of a blood-vessel. We read frequently of some one having suffered a paralytic shock when engaged in sport, and that means that he has neglected his exercises and allowed his blood-vessels to become hard, then has subjected them to an unwonted stress. It is doubtful if bones become brittle from want of exercise, though some authorities maintain that they do. It is certain that, without exercise, muscles become flabby and cannot meet unwonted demands of a severe kind. In wrestling, for example, which has become very popular of late (and deservedly so, for it calls into play more functions than any other game not implemented by tools), one is apt to ask the bones and muscles to do too much, and strain and laceration of muscle are very likely to follow. The lesson to be gathered is that one should keep oneself as fit as possible, take as much moderate exercise as may be, but never attempt anything severe without due preparation.

2. The good and the ill effects of athletics *in moulding character* are not to be so plainly set forth. It is certain, however, that sports have been and are of enormous importance in their effect upon a nation's mind and morals; and probably nowhere so much as on British soil. The kind of trite saying which echoes 'the Duke's' remark about our battles being won on the playgrounds of our schools, describes only a fraction of the influence exerted by athletics on a people's character. It would be unwise to be an unconditional advocate of sport, but it is useful to try to see what the effects of it are.

It may be well to dispose first of the evil effects often attributed to athletics. And, at the outset, let us observe that athletics never can give to man or boy, woman or girl, what they did not have at least potentially before. Athletics are a form of education, and can only elicit and develop the qualities, physical and mental, good or ill, already gifted by nature. Thus, for example, we are told that athletics tend to make men brutal, but that is true only of those who are already cruel. In any case, well-conducted sport, as, for example, modern football with its penalties for rough play, tends all the other way. In the present writer's opinion, the charge is most fairly laid at the door of those who conduct big 'shoots' in which there is wanton destruction of birds which may almost be described as domesticated fowl; and there are other so-called sports sometimes conducted so as to transgress the law of sport that every creature should be given a fair chance. But these are the exceptions. A good Master of Hounds is as humane as he is expert, as just as he is ingenious, in the pursuit of stag, fox, or otter. To a big-game hunter the temptation to kill for killing's sake, when, as often happens, no other white man is at hand to see, may be considerable. But even then self-restraint and humanity are part of the etiquette of the sport. Sometimes it is alleged of single-handed games, like golf, that they are selfish; that, when a man is playing for his own hand, he is doing something not so good as when he is playing for his side, as in cricket. The argument is superficial, as both results and theory show. It is safe to assert that the average cricketer plays as selfishly as the average golfer. In both cases the play itself makes wholly for self-forgetfulness. The man who, at the moment of the stroke, thinks what is going to happen to him because of it will thereby spoil his game. Both games, and all games, weed out those whose attention is not wholly upon the thing to be done at the moment. It will be found that most of the 'selfishness' in games crops up in the talk of the pavilion or clubhouse, when the salutary stimulus of the game is withdrawn. Other evils spoken of, and especially gambling, are quite accidental, and are no more part of athletics than weather or geography.

On the other hand, the advantages which ath-

letics confer cannot be gainsaid. First come the qualities which go to make up what we confusedly call physical courage—pluck, endurance, and indomitable resolve. But these are transferred in essence to a higher plane, and a sound athletic training teaches the adult, if he has it in him, not to be afraid, not to give in, and not to think too meanly of himself. Probably the most important, because the most constant contribution—and a very desirable one—is that which well-ordered games make to those qualities which are related to a sense of justice. It is questionable if it be possible to convey to a youthful mind a living meaning of fair play by any method so well as by the give-and-take of the playground. There also is to be learned a most wholesome discipline. First and foremost comes the training of the colt, to use a cricket phrase, reined and whipped to abide by the rules of the game, taught the obedience which he must give to the captain of his team, the unselfishness which he must show in sacrificing himself for the good of his side; and such discipline is invaluable. And in games, more easily perhaps than by any other means, a lad learns to take a just measure of himself, neither too high nor too low, to know what he can and what he cannot do, wherein he excels his fellows and wherein he falls short. Finally, we may repeat, one of the greatest advantages of sport, though not immediately recognized as of value, is that it offers an opportunity for sheer forgetfulness of the oppressive things in life, when in the zest of a mild game or the excitement of a dangerous contest, the sportsman is 'beside himself' for a brief spell, wholly removed from the sense of laboriousness and hardship and care. That way sanity lies. See also art. GAMES.

LITERATURE.—W. Houghton, 'Field Sports of the Ancient Greeks and Romans,' in *Qu. Rev.*, July 1863; *Athletic Sports in England, America, and Australia*, Philad. 1890; M. Shearman, *Athletics and Football* (Badm. Lib.), Lond. 1887; H. H. Griffin, *Cycling and Athletics* (Bohn's Ath. Sports, v.), Lond. 1891; art. 'Athletic Sports' in *EBr*, 9th ed., iii. 12 (H. F. Wilkinson), 10th ed., xxv. 764 (M. Shearman, W. Camp); W. Lefroy, 'The Moral Aspect of Athletic Sports,' in *The Immortality of Memory*, Lond. 1898; F. Ballard, *Sports from the Christian Standpoint*[2], Lond. 1903; F. J. Foakes-Jackson, 'Athleticism at the Universities,' in *Oxf. and Camb. Rev.* No. 1, June 1907, p. 167. See also the artt. AMUSEMENT, GAMES, SPORTS.

G. R. WILSON.

ATIMIA.—An Athenian in full enjoyment of all civic rights was spoken of as *ἔπιτιμος* (*ἐπιτιμία* of the condition); the word *ἀτιμία* denotes, therefore, the various degrees of penal limitation of such rights (Lat. *capitis deminutio*).

How old such limitation of rights was in Athens is not known; it occurs as early as the legislation of Dracon (about B.C. 620), and by Solon's time (B.C. 594) apparently a large number of Athenians had incurred disfranchisement on various grounds. Solon restored their civic rights to such, with the exception of those who for treason or crimes of violence were in exile. From the wording of his law (Plut. *Sol.* 19) it would appear that we should distinguish two classes: (1) those who were living at Athens disfranchised, and (2) those who had gone into exile, which necessarily also involved loss of civic rights, and must in many cases have involved loss of property also; but it does not therefore follow that such perpetual exile should be regarded as forming part of the penalty of *ἀτιμία*, any more than that the confiscation of property, which in post-Solonian times is found sometimes conjoined with it, is so to be regarded. It is possible, indeed, that the Athenian law never attained a perfect clearness of conception in regard to this connexion.

The *locus classicus* upon this subject is a passage of Andocides (*de Myst.* 73 f.), in which he distinguishes the following three varieties of *ἀτιμία*: (1) deprivation of civic rights and confiscation of property, in which category he enumerates only public debtors; (2) loss of civic rights, without confiscation—inflicted upon thieves, those who received bribes, those guilty of breaches of military duty or thrice convicted of perjury, or children convicted of unfilial conduct; (3) a minor degree of disfranchisement (*κατὰ προστάξεις*), in which certain specific disabilities were inflicted for certain varieties of offence.

The distinction of three degrees of 'atimia,' made by Meier in his treatise *de Bonis Damnatorum* (Berl. 1819), which he entitles *infamia maxima, media*, and *minima*, upon the analogy of Roman law* and upon the basis of the above-cited passage of Andocides, does not seem to be substantiated by the evidence. For the passage of Andocides is clearly of the nature of a popular classification, which omits several well-established categories of offences, and is in general devoid of any logical principle of division. It would seem safer to adhere to the view enunciated by Caillemer, according to which 'atimia' *per se* was limited to the civic status of the subject; but we must also recognize that in practical effect it was a necessary concomitant of a sentence of exile (*ἀειφυγία*), and that, on the other hand, confiscation might in certain cases be conjoined with a sentence of *ἀτιμία*.

From this point of view 'atimia' must be distinguished simply as (1) total, and (2) partial.

1. Total 'atimia' meant the entire loss of civic personality (Lat. *caput*), so far as its active functions were concerned. The citizen who was pronounced totally *ἄτιμος* † was incapable of holding any civil or priestly office within the Athenian empire, or of acting as herald or ambassador; he might not appear in the Agora or attend meetings of the Senate or Assembly, or appear in any public sanctuary or public ceremonial; nor could he appear either as principal or witness in any court of law (see the enumeration of disabilities in Æschines, i. 21; Demos. *Meid.* 87: *οὔτε λαχεῖν ἀδικηθέντα*). Under the conditions of Athenian life the prohibition against taking part in the business of the public Assembly (*λέγειν καὶ γράφειν*) naturally covered most of the privileges here enumerated, and consequently this right is frequently spoken of as that which *par excellence* was forfeited by the *ἄτιμος* (Demos. *Steph.* i. 79: *τίνα τῆς πόλεως . . . καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῇ παρρησίας ἀπεστέρηκα*). In general, the condition of the *καθάπαξ ἄτιμος* was inferior to that of the alien (Demos. *Theocr.* 88: *μηδ' ἐλπίδα ἡμῖν εἶναι μηδεμίαν τοῦ μετασχεῖν τῆς καὶ τοῖς ξένοις διδομένης παρρησίας*), and is spoken of by Isocrates as worse than exile (Isocr. xvi. 47: *ἀτιμίας, ἣν ἐγὼ φυγῆς μείζω συμφορὰν νομίζω· πολὺ γὰρ ἀθλιώτερον παρὰ τοῖς αὐτοῦ πολίταις ἠτιμωμένον οἰκεῖν ἢ παρ' ἑτέροις μετοικεῖν*).

The *ἄτιμος*, in fact, was in the State, but was not of it.‡ Precisely how far his disabilities extended is not known; our authorities do not furnish an answer to all questions which suggest themselves. It has been pointed out, for example (see art. ADOPTION [Greek]), that *ἀτιμία* on either side would be a practical bar to adoption; but whether in law it was so is uncertain, and the suggestion might be hazarded that, in order to prevent the extinction of a family, testamentary adoption, at any rate, may not have been denied. Again, the case of one holding an hereditary priesthood presents a difficulty. And we may ask what legal protection was given to the life and property and personal dignity of one who was *ἄτιμος*, and under what forms. The consequences of *ἀτιμία* in detail are not treated by modern writers, who content themselves with the above-given generalizations as to its significance; but even these cannot be taken quite *au pied de la lettre*. It may be conjectured that redress of personal wrongs in the case of an *ἄτιμος* was secured, if at all, by means of a public prosecution (*γραφή*) undertaken by a friend of the aggrieved (see Demos. *Meid.* 47). The free use of depositions, which obtained in Attic legal procedure, would obviate the difficulty in regard to evidence (cf. Demos. *Meid.* 95). If so, we must say that in point of law a sentence involving total

* *Dig.* iv. 5. 11: 'Capitis deminutionis tria sunt genera, maxima, media, minima; tria enim sunt quæ habemus, libertatem, civitatem, familiam. Igitur cum omnia hæc amittimus [*e.g.* by death or slavery], maximam esse capitis deminutionem; cum vero amittimus civitatem, libertatem retinemus, mediam esse,' etc.

† Cf. Demos. *Meid.* 87: *ἀπέντων ἀπεστέρηται τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ καθάπαξ ἄτιμος γέγονεν.*

‡ Cf. Arist. *Ath. Pol.* viii. 5: *ἄτιμον εἶναι καὶ τῆς πόλεως μὴ μετέχειν.*

ἄτιμία was equivalent to civil death, but stopped short of outlawry.* Attic law protected even the murderer who had fled beyond jurisdiction (*CIA* i. 6[4] ; Demos. *Aristocrat.* p. 631).

The crimes for which total disfranchisement was the penalty were the following : †

(1) *Treason* (προδοσία).—The penalty was death, confiscation of property, and a declaration of ἀτιμία, which became the unavoidable inheritance of the heirs of the disfranchised, falling also upon any who subsequently adopted them. To the same penalties those were liable who conspired to subvert the democracy (δήμου κατάλυσις).

(2) *Theft* (κλοπή) in its more serious forms ; cf. Andoc. *l.c.*: ὁπόσοι κλοπῆς . . . ὤφλοιεν, τούτους ἔδει καὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τούτων ἀτίμους εἶναι.

(3) *Corruption* (δῶρον or δωροδοκία of the recipient ; δεκασμός of him who bribed) on the part of public functionaries (Demos. *Meid.* 113). For some forms at least of this offence the penalty was hereditary ἀτιμία and confiscation of goods.

(4) *Various offences in respect of military service by sea or land*—refusal to serve, desertion, cowardice in the field, etc. (Andoc. *l.c.*: ὁπόσοι λίποιεν τὴν τάξιν ἢ ἀστρατείας ἢ δειλίας ἢ ἀναυμαχίας ὤφλοιεν ἢ τὴν ἀσπίδα ἀποβάλοιεν). For all such offences disfranchisement was the penalty, and in some cases confiscation seems to have been conjoined.

(5) *Perjury* (ψευδομαρτυρία, with the particular variety ψευδοκλητεία, false assertion of service of writ). According to Andoc. *l.c.*, disfranchisement was incurred only after a third conviction, but other authorities seem to prove that a single conviction was sufficient (see Wyse on Isæus, v. 17 and art. PERJURY).

(6) *Unfilial conduct* (κάκωσις γονέων).—The law seems to have specified four varieties of the offence—actual ill-treatment, withholding food, expulsion from the house, and refusal of funeral ceremonial.

(7) *If a man gave in marriage to an Athenian citizen a foreign woman, falsely alleging her to be his daughter and a citizen of Athens*, he incurred loss of civic rights and confiscation of property.

(8) *Contempt of the sentence of a court or of the Council or Assembly.*—Disfranchisement fell upon a President of the Assembly (πρόεδρος) who put to the vote the illegal question of remitting a debt to the Treasury.

(9) *Unauthorized proclamations by the herald in the theatre.*

(10) 'Any one who *suffers injustice at the hands of the public Arbitrators* (διαιτηταί) may appeal to the whole Board of Arbitrators ; and if they find the magistrate guilty, the law enacts that he shall lose his civil rights' (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 53 : case in point, Demos. *Meid.* 87). A Heliastic court could confirm or reverse this verdict on appeal.

(11) *Offences against the dignity of a superior magistrate* (Demos. *Meid.* 32 ; Greenidge, *Rom. Publ. Life*, p. 190).

(12) Disfranchisement was the penalty for any *proposal to modify the old* (*Drakonian*) *law relating to homicide.*

(13) *Condonation of a wife's adultery*, if she were caught in the actual commission of the offence.

(14) A law attributed to Solon visited with loss of civil rights the man who *in time of party-strife* (στάσις) *did not take a side* (Plut. *Sol.* 20 ; cf. Cic. *ad Att.* x. 1. 2 : 'ego vero Solonis, popularis tui, ut puto etiam mei, legem neglegam, qui capite sanxit, si qui in seditione non alterius utrius partis fuisset.' See on this Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, iii. 144 ; Mahaffy, *Problems in Greek History*, p. 87 n. The intention was that he should side with the established government, for armed assault upon it was itself a capital offence). This law was apparently obsolete by the end of the 5th cent. B.C.

(15) A law of Solon, traditionally derived from Egypt, but probably in existence in Drakon's time, made ἀτιμία the penalty on *a third conviction for incorrigible idleness* (ἀργία).

(16) Disfranchisement was the penalty for those who, having been guilty of *unchastity for hire* (ἑταίρησις), took office or spoke in the Council or Assembly, or who had *wasted their substance in riotous living.*

(17) Every citizen who, having reached the age of 59, at which he was competent to serve as *Public Arbitrator* (διαιτητής), *failed to do so*, became ἄτιμος (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 53).

2. Partial atimia signified that a man lost certain of his rights, retaining in respect of the remnant an equality with his fellows. Partial 'atimia' in its various forms was the penalty in the following cases :

(1) Generally, one who initiated a public prosecution (γραφή) and thereafter dropped it, or who in the event did not obtain a fifth part of the votes of the jury, was fined 1000 drachmas and lost the right to bring a similar suit in the future (Harpocr. : ἐάν τις γραψάμενος μὴ μεταλάβῃ τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων, ὀφλισκάνει χιλίας καὶ πρόσεστιν ἀτιμία τις. Andoc. *l.c.*: ἑτέροις οὐκ ἦν γράψασθαι, τοῖς δὲ ἐνδεῖξαι, which would seem to include all forms of γραφαί ; others think that only the particular form in which the prosecutor failed was henceforth debarred to him. See Goodwin's Demos. *de Cor.* p. 331, n. 3).

(2) Any one who had been thrice convicted under a γραφὴ παρανόμων of submitting illegal or unconstitutional proposals was debarred in future from making any further proposals in the Senate or the Assembly.

(3) Certain disabilities attached to certain specified classes (these are cases of ἀτιμία κατὰ προστάξεις properly so called, although Andocides, *l.c.*, applies this term to all cases of what we have called 'partial atimia'). For example, those citizens who had remained in the city and constituted the military force of the Oligarchs in B.C. 411 were deprived of the right of sitting in the Senate or the Assembly. Andocides mentions other cases of deprivation of specific rights, but we know not on what grounds it was inflicted.*

3. Conditional atimia.—To these two degrees of disfranchisement, a third variety, which may be styled 'conditional atimia,' must be added. This form was not in consequence of a verdict of any court of law, but was in a way voluntarily assumed. The class concerned is that of all who were in any degree debtors to the Treasury. All such debtors as failed to meet their obligation by the date fixed by law became *ipso facto* ἄτιμοι in the full sense of the word until the debt was paid. The amount of the debt was immaterial. A list of such State-debtors was kept by the Praktores in the Acropolis. The ninth Prytany, or decimal part of the year, constituted the official limit of grace, on the expiry of which the Poletai sold the possessions of the debtor to double the amount owing ; in the meantime the debtor remained disfranchised, and if the proceeds of the sale were insufficient to pay the debt, he continued so until the balance was forthcoming. If the debtor died before the balance was paid, his heirs inherited his ἀτιμία until the claims of the State were finally satisfied. The moment the debt was discharged, full civil rights were *ipso facto* regained. In a general way, then, it rested with the man himself to retain or lose his citizen rights on this account. The institution of the Eranos, or Club, must have been of some importance in this regard.

If an ἄτιμος continued, nevertheless, to exercise any of the rights which he had lost, he was liable to the summary processes of arrest (ἀπαγωγή) or ἔνδειξις (information laid before a magistrate).† If transgression was proved, he might be punished, without further proceedings or appeal, with imprisonment or death. The above methods would be employed when there could be no dispute as to the existence of the disability, *i.e.* when the ἀτιμία was the consequence of conviction on some charge for which it was the penalty. It was possible, however, that a man might be notoriously or otherwise guilty of conduct (*e.g.* ill-treatment of parents, or unchastity—ἑταίρησις) which, if proved, involved disfranchisement, though he had never, owing to public apathy or his own influence, been charged before a court therewith. So long as he did not challenge public opinion by conspicuous exercise of his civil rights, he was safe ; but the attempt to speak in the Assembly or to hold office rendered him liable to the process called ἐπαγγελία δοκιμασίας, or challenge to stand judicial inquiry into character before a jury court. If the jury

* Outlawry was indeed known and applied by the Greeks, but is not indicated by the single expression ἄτιμος without the addition of further explanatory terms and phrases (see art. OUTLAWRY).

† In order to keep the article within bounds, a general reference to the classical work of Meier and Schömann, *Der attische Process* (new ed. by Lipsius, 2 vols., 1883–1887), for the justificatory texts must here suffice.

* Seeing that a woman had no political rights, perhaps we may class here the 'atimia' which by a law of Solon fell upon a woman taken in adultery : she was forbidden to adorn herself or to enter the temples (Æsch. *Timarch.* 183 : ἀτιμῶν τὴν τοιαύτην γυναῖκα καὶ τὸν βίον ἀβίωτον αὐτῇ παρασκευάζων).

† For a complete discussion of these processes, consult Meier-Schömann, *Der att. Proc.*[2] 270–294.

found a verdict of guilty, sentence of disfranchisement was formally pronounced. Whether from the moment of the challenge the right to ascend the Bema, etc., remained in abeyance until the issue of the trial is uncertain.

It is to be observed that a sentence of 'atimia,' once pronounced, was perpetual, and, moreover, was in certain cases an inheritance no more avoidable by a man's heirs than was his other estate (see art. INHERITANCE). Rehabilitation, at any rate, was so hedged round with conditions as to make it hopeless in the vast majority of cases. No citizen could propose a restoration of civic status to one disfranchised, without the protection of a preliminary Bill of Indemnity (ἄδεια), for the validity of which at least 6000 votes were requisite (Demos. *Timocr.* 46: ἄλλος οὗτος νόμος, οὐκ ἐῶν περὶ τῶν ἀτίμων οὐδὲ τῶν ὀφειλόντων λέγειν οὐδὲ χρηματίζειν περὶ ἀφέσεως τῶν ὀφλημάτων οὐδὲ τάξεως, ἂν μὴ τῆς ἀδείας δοθείσης, καὶ ταύτης μὴ ἔλαττον ἢ ἑξακισχιλίων ψηφισαμένων—by which we should probably understand 6000 votes in all, not 6000 affirmative votes). If the Bill of Indemnity were passed, the main proposal would be carried as a matter of course. But it is, in fact, easier to find examples of rehabilitation on a large scale than on a small, as, for example, the Act of Rehabilitation passed by Solon (Plut. *Sol.* 19). In times of national peril, above all, such wholesale enfranchisement was not infrequent (cf. Cic. *in Verr.* v. 6: 'perditæ civitates desperatis iam omnibus rebus hos solent exitus exitiales habere, ut damnati in integrum restituantur, vincti solvantur, exules reducantur, res iudicatæ rescindantur'). Examples from Athenian history are the decrees passed just before the battle of Salamis, and during the siege of Athens, and after the defeat at Chæroneia (see art. AMNESTY).

In the above account no notice has been taken of a species of ἀτιμία which, although a natural consequence of certain acts, was yet not part of their legal penalty. 'Atimia,' in this non-legal sense of the verdict of popular opinion, is alluded to by Demos. *Meid.* 72 (of the insult of a blow received in public), and by Aristotle (of the dishonour attaching to the suicide).* Similarly, and equally naturally, the sycophant, the disowned son, and the children of a man who had been executed, were all under this species of 'atimia' (cf. Demos. *Arist.* i. 30).

'Atimia' in this non-legal sense in Athens is akin to 'atimia' as it presents itself at Sparta, where there was not the same development of legal ideas and procedure; but all the more strong there was the force of public opinion, which perhaps to a greater degree than elsewhere in Greece was identical with law. At Sparta such 'atimia' fell upon all departure from the customs of the community (Xen. *Resp. Lac.* x. 7, iii. 3). An example is the case of Aristodemos who survived the battle of Thermopylæ (Herod. vii. 231: ἀπονοστήσας ἐς Λακεδαίμονα εἶχε ὄνειδός τε καὶ ἀτιμίην; cf. Xen. *op. cit.* ix. 4; Plut. *Ages.* 30). Those who surrendered at Sphacteria, however, were treated more leniently (Thuc. v. 34: ἤδη καί ἀρχάς τινας ἔχοντας ἀτίμους ἐποίησαν, ἀτιμίαν δὲ τοιάνδε ὥστε μήτε ἄρχειν μήτε πριαμένους τι ἢ πωλοῦντας κυρίους εἶναι—a penalty corresponding to 'partial atimia' at Athens). The number of those defeated at Leuctra made it impossible to carry out the law even to this extent. Spartans who remained unmarried were also subjected to a certain 'atimia,' being deprived of all claim of respect from their juniors, and excluded from certain festivals (Plut. *Lyc.* 15). Inability to provide the fixed contribution to the common mess excluded a Spartan *ipso facto* from the class of Peers (ὅμοιοι), which probably implied the loss of political rights, as distinguished from the civil rights, of citizenship (Arist. *Polit.* ii. 9; Xen. *Hell.* III. iii. 5). Apparently full rights were at once recoverable by conformity to the required conditions; even Aristodemos by his valiant conduct at Platæa recovered caste, though not, indeed, entirely (Herod. vii. 231 and ix. 71). It would hence appear that 'atimia' at Sparta was in general analogous to what we have called 'conditional atimia' at Athens.

The existence of 'atimia' as a penal measure is proved for other States of Greece (*e.g.* Chalcis and Eretria in Euboea, Chios, Lokris, Ephesos, etc.) by inscriptions ranging in date from the 5th to the 1st cent. B.C. In certain cases Athenian influence may have operated, as in Euboea (see Hicks, *Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions*², No. 40: ὁμόσαι δὲ Χαλκιδέων τοὺς ἠβῶντας ἅπαντας. ὃς δ' ἂμ μὴ ὀμόσῃ, ἄτιμον αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ τὰ χρήματα αὐτοῦ δημόσια); and perhaps also at Delphi, where, in the 2nd cent. B.C., at any rate, State-debtors were ἄτιμοι (Dittenberger, *Sylloge*², No. 306). But, in general, it is probable that the penalty of 'atimia' was practically a universal method among the Greek States, and followed immediately from the Greek conception of the relationship between the State and the individual (on this subject see Newman's *Politics of Aristotle*, vol. i. p. 30 f.).

LITERATURE.—Besides the works above specified, see also P. van Lelyfeld, *De infamia iure Attico*, Amst. 1835; H. M. E. Meier, *Historia iuris attici de bonis damnatorum*, Berl. 1819; Thonissen, *Le Droit pénal de la république athénienne*, Brussels, 1875. Paul Usteri, *Ächtung und Verbannung im griechischen Recht* (Berl. 1903), gives the most exhaustive treatment of the subject; following out the ideas of H. Swoboda (in *Arch-Epigr. Mitt. aus Österr.-Ung.* xvi. [1893] p. 49 f.), he draws a sharp distinction between ἄτιμος in the sense of 'outlawed' and ἄτιμος = 'disfranchised,' but without apparently attaining any very significant result.

W. J. WOODHOUSE.

ATĪSA (or **Dīpaṅkara**).—A learned Indian Buddhist friar, who effected the most profound reformation of Lāmaism. Entering Tibet in A.D. 1038, and finding the prevalent Buddhism in the hands of an immoral priesthood and extremely debased by demonolatry, he founded a new Order, on a purer Buddhist model, which he called 'Bound by the Orders' (*Kah-dam*). This afterwards became the 'Yellow-cap' sect or 'the Virtue Practisers' (*Ge-luk*), now the dominant State Church. In his reform Atīśa restored celibacy and purged the ritual of much of its grosser devil-worship. He wrote a great many doctrinal works, and translated into the Tibetan scriptures a large number of Indian Buddhist commentaries. The beneficial effects of his teaching also initiated other semi-reformed sects, the Saskya and Kargyu, which arose somewhat later. He died in A.D. 1052 at Ne-t'ang, near Lhāsa, where a large funereal mound, or *stūpa*, was erected over his grave and still exists.

LITERATURE.—C. F. Köppen, *Lamäische Hierarchie und Kirche* (Berlin, 1857–59), ii. 78, 117, 127, 235; L. A. Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet* (1895), pp. 35, 36, 54, 57, also *Lhasa* (1905), p. 320 f.

L. A. WADDELL.

ATĪTS or, incorrectly, **Atiths**; **AVADHŪTS**, sometimes **Abdhūts**, **Audhūts**, **Avdhūts** (Skr. *atīta*, 'passed away [from worldly care]'; *avadhūta*, 'shaken off').—These two names can conveniently be taken together. They are generally applied in India to any religious mendicants, as indicating that they have 'passed away' from or become liberated from worldly cares, or have 'shaken off' all caste and personal distinction. *Avadhūt* is applied to both Vaiṣṇavas and Śaivas (*qq.v.*); but, so far as the present writer is aware, *Atīt* is applied only to the latter. Mr. Risley,* however, states that Vaiṣṇava Atīts exist in Bihār. In this technical

* Ar. *Eth. Nic.* v. 11: καί τις ἀτιμία πρόσεστι τῷ ἑαυτὸν διαφθείραντι ὡς τὴν πόλιν ἀδικοῦντι. This should not be taken, as is usually done, of a penal consequence. For upon whom should it fall?

* *Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, *s.v.* 'Atit.'

sense, *avadhūta* often occurs in Sanskrit literature, but the technical use of *atīta* seems to be more modern, and to be confined to the vernaculars. *Atīt* is often confounded with the word *atith* (Skr. *atithi*), 'a guest,' which has more than once given rise to fanciful explanations. In addition to this customary general sense, both words are sometimes employed to indicate special classes of religious mendicants.

In this narrower sense *Atīt* is applied to six and a half of the Dasnāmī, or ten sections of Śaiva mendicants, who claim spiritual descent from the great reformer Śaṅkarāchārya (*q.v.*). Three and a half of these sections, who are called *Daṇḍīs* from their habit of carrying a *daṇḍa*, or staff, are considered to have retained Śaṅkarāchārya's doctrine in all its purity. The rest, viz. the Vanas, Araṇyas, Purīs, Giris, Pārvatas, Sāgaras, and half the Bhāratīs, are reputed to have fallen to some extent from orthodoxy, but are still looked upon as religious characters. These are the Atīts. Unlike the Daṇḍis, they carry no staff. They differ from the latter also in their use of clothing, money, and ornaments, their methods of preparing food, and their admission of members from any order of Hindus. Some of them lead an ascetic life, while others mix freely in the world, carry on trade, and acquire property. Most of them are celibate, but some of them marry, and are then known as *saṁyōgī* ('married') or *gharbārī* ('householder') Atīts. They are often collected in *maṭhs*, or monasteries, and some officiate as temple-priests. They wear ochre(*gērū*)-coloured garments, and carry a rosary of the *rudrākṣa* seeds sacred to Śiva. They do not eat flesh or drink spirits. They worship Śiva, usually under the name of Mahādeva or Bhairon, and also pay devotions to the monkey-god Hanumān or Mahāvīra. Their religious theories (when they have any) are based on the *advaita* Vedānta (*qq.v.*) of their founder Śaṅkarāchārya.

The Śaiva Avadhūts (when the word is employed in the narrower sense) are ascetics of a sterner mould. They wear as few clothes as possible, making up the deficiency with mud, and let their hair grow long and matted (technically called *jaṭa*). They practise silence, and live on alms. In the cold weather they may be seen cowering over a small fire. Their life is in every way an extremely hard one. Gorakhnāth (*q.v.*), the founder of the sect of *Kānphāṭā* Yogīs, is often referred to as a typical Avadhūt of this class.

As regards Vaiṣṇavas, the term *Avadhūt* has a special significance. When Rāmānanda made his great reformation amongst the followers of Rāmānuja, and abrogated the distinction of caste in religious orders, he gave this title to his followers, to signify that they had, so to speak, 'put off the old man.' They had 'shaken off' all personal distinction by adopting a religious life, and thus quitting the ties of nature and of society. For an account of the religious tenets and customs of these Avadhūts, see RĀMĀNANDIN and BHAKTI-MARGA.

LITERATURE.—These names can hardly be called the titles of distinctive religious sects, and hence little has been written about them. The above article has been compiled partly from the writer's private notes and partly from the following works: H. H. Wilson, *Essays on the Religion of the Hindūs* (ed. 1861), i. 204 ff. ('Atīt'), 55 ff. ('Vaiṣṇava Avadhūts'); H. H. Risley, *Tribes and Castes of Bengal* (1891), *s.v.* 'Atīt'; W. Crooke, *The Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh* (1896), *s.vv.* 'Atit,' 'Awadhūt.'

GEORGE A. GRIERSON.

ĀTMAN.—1. Etymology.—The origin of the word *ātman* is doubtful. It is usual to compare it with the Greek *ἀτμός*, *ἀϋτμήρ*, *ἀϋτμή*, and the Teutonic *ātum*, *āðom*, *æðm*, and it is then derived either from *an*, 'breath' (*Petersburger Wörterbuch*), or *at*, 'go' (Weber), or *av* (=*vā*), 'blow' (Curtius, Grassmann, etc.). The development of meaning would therefore be—(1) breath, (2) soul, (3) self. However, *ātman* in the sense of breath (of the wind) occurs only in four passages of the Rigveda, mostly in hymns of younger date; and, what is more important, we find more frequently in the Rigveda the abridged form *tman* (in the case-forms *tmanam*, *tmanā*, *tmane*, *tmani*, *tman*), in the sense partly of a reflexive pronoun, partly of an adverb. It might then be that *ātman*, and perhaps also the Greek *αὐτός*, originate from two pronominal stems, *a* (in *a-ham*) and *ta* ('this'), and the meaning would be 'this ego,' 'this my own self.' However this may be, the word *ātman* came very early to signify 'the self in contrast with that which is not self,' and this meaning developed in four directions: (1) the own person, the own body, opposed to the outside world; (2) the trunk of the body as opposed to the limbs; (3) the soul as opposed to the body; (4) the essence as opposed to what is not essence. Examples of these various meanings are frequent in the Vedic texts.

2. Philosophical meaning.—It is evident from this that the idea of *ātman*, 'self,' is *relative*, pointing to something which is not the *ātman*, and *negative*, in so far as the positive sense is not in it, but in that which is to be excluded. Such relative-negative concepts are frequent in philosophy, and have been used with great advantage to signify the inner principle of the universe, excluding from it the whole content of the phenomenal world. Of this kind is the *ἀρχή* of Anaximander in contrast to all things which have antecedents; the *ὄν* of Parmenides in contrast to the *γένεσις* and *ὄλεθρος* which rule in the world of sense; the *ὄντως ὄν* of Plato in contrast to the *γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον*; the *substantia* of Spinoza in contrast to the *modi*, of which the whole world, corporeal as well as intellectual, consists; and the *Ding an sich* of Kant in contrast to the whole phenomenal world, which contains the things only in so far as they exist *for us*, *i.e.* for our intellect in its innate forms, viz. time, space and causality. All these concepts, *ἀρχή*, *ὄν*, *ὄντως ὄν*, *substantia*, *Ding an sich*, are *negative*, for they state only what the principle is not, and not what it is. They are therefore empty of content, and herein lies their great value for the science of metaphysics, which has to do with a subject eternally unknowable. Of this kind is also the concept *ātman*, which requires us to direct our attention towards the Self of our own person, the Self of everything else, the Self of the whole world, and to discard all that, strictly speaking, does not belong to this Self. It is the most abstract, and therefore the best name which philosophy has found for its sole and eternal theme. All those other names, *ἀρχή*, *ὄν*, *ὄντως ὄν*, *substantia*, *Ding an sich*, still smack of the phenomenal world, from which they originate. *Ātman* alone touches the precise point at which the inner, obscure, never-appearing essence of things reveals itself. Nor is it by accident that Indian thinkers, above all others, arrived at this most abstract, and therefore best, expression for the eternal subject of all metaphysics; for the Indian genius is animated by a restless desire to penetrate to the depths, a longing to be rid of all that is external and non-essential, as we shall see later on in some famous examples from the Upaniṣads.

3. Brahman and Ātman.—There are two words, *brahman* and *ātman*, which are often used in the Upaniṣads to signify the inner essence of the individual as well as of the whole world, and which cannot be considered separate from each other. *Brahman* means originally, and wherever it occurs in the Rigveda, 'prayer'; and it is very strange (and recalls the similar case of the Biblical *λόγος*

how this word came to mean the essential principle of the world. In prayer the devotee felt himself elevated above his own individuality, above the phenomenal world, in union with the gods; in prayer he felt awaking within himself a power which was above all beings, above all worlds, and even above the gods. So it came about that to the question already raised in Rigveda, x. 81. 4, 'What was the wood, what was the tree, of which they have carved heaven and earth?' the following answer is given later on in a Brāhmaṇa (Taitt. Br. ii. 8, 9): '*Brahman* was the wood, *Brahman* was the tree, of which they have carved heaven and earth.' We cannot enter here into further details; let it suffice to say that we can follow in the Vedic literature step by step the path by which the word *brahman* from the original meaning 'prayer' came to signify the 'principle of the world.' It might be supposed that a similar development could be traced for the word *ātman*. And, indeed, there are some who believe that, side by side with the theological significance attached to the word *brahman*, there was a more philosophical tendency which circled round the word *ātman*, and that both views expanded more and more until they coalesced in the identification of *brahman* and *ātman* as it is found in the Upaniṣads. But this hypothesis is not confirmed by the facts. It is useless to attempt to gain in the hymns and Brāhmaṇas the necessary materials for a history of the word *ātman*, as we can for the word *brahman*. On the contrary, we see the word *ātman* emerging here and there, and quickly disappearing again, until the Indian thinkers, becoming aware of the advantage of this term, began to use it more and more frequently to express what they felt without being able to clothe it in words. In fact the word *brahman*, 'prayer,' originally expressed a subjective feeling; and it was only by intensifying this subjective, and at the same time metaphysical, character that they came to take hold of the word *ātman* as the most striking and happy expression for the inner essence of the individual, and for the inner essence of the whole world (see art. BRAHMAN). A few examples may serve to illustrate this process.

4. Examples from hymns and Brāhmaṇas.—Even as early as the Rigveda, in the profound and difficult hymn of Dīrghatamas (i. 164. 4), the poet asks: 'Who has seen how the firstborn, being the Bone-possessing (the shaped world), was born from the Boneless (the shapeless)? Where was the vital breath, the blood, the Self (*ātman*) of the world? Who went to ask him that knows it?' Here the poet, penetrating deeper and deeper, passes from the vital breath to the blood, from the blood to the *ātman*, or inmost Self. It may seem strange that the Indian philosophers ask earlier after the Self of the world than after the Self of the individual, but the mind is like the eye, which sees everything else before it sees itself.

Many other quotations of similar import will be found in the present writer's *Geschichte der Philosophie*, i. 1, especially p. 331 ff. It is said, for example, of Prajāpati (a mythical personification of the creative power) in the Taittarīya Āraṇyaka, i. 23: 'In building the worlds and the beings he entered with his own Self (*ātmanā*) into his own Self (*ātmānam*)'; in Atharvav. x. 8. 44: 'He who knows him does no longer fear death, him the wise, undecaying, ever-young *ātman*'; in Taitt. Br. iii. 12. 9. 7: 'He through whom the sun shines, enflamed by glowing fire—only the knower of the Veda when departing this life understands him, the great omnipresent *ātman*. He, living in the Brahmans as their greatness, is not augmented or diminished by works; the Self is his pathfinder; one who knows him is no more stained by evil deed'; in Taitt. Ār. iii. 11. 1: 'He who lives in us as our ruler, who is one, and yet appears in many forms, in whom the hundred lights of heaven are one, in whom the Vedas are one, the priests one—he is the intellectual Self (*mānasīna ātmā*) in man.'

These passages already approach the standpoint of the Upaniṣads, which is fully reached in the so-called 'Science of Śāṇḍilya' (Śatap. Br. x. 6. 3) and Chhānd. Up. iii. 14: 'Verily this world is *Brahman*. Let a man meditate upon it in silence as *Tajjalān* (origin, annihilation, and breath of the world). Mind is his stuff, life his body, light his shape, truth his thoughts, his Self the infinite. All-working is he, all-wishing, all-smelling, all-tasting, all-embracing, silent, unconcerned; He is my soul (*ātman*) in the inner heart, smaller than a rice-corn or a mustard-corn, or a millet-corn, or a rice-corn's kernel; He is my soul (*ātman*) in the inner heart, greater than the earth, greater than the atmosphere, greater than the heaven, greater than all these worlds. The all-working, all-wishing, all-smelling, all-tasting, all-embracing, silent, unconcerned, He is my ātman in the inner heart, He is the Brahman; to Him, when departing, I shall enter. Whoever obtains this, verily he does not doubt! Thus spake Śāṇḍilya, Śāṇḍilya.'

5. The Ātman in the Upaniṣads.—The words just quoted, 'He is my *ātman* in the inner heart, He is the *Brahman*,' contain the two words about which circle nearly all the thoughts of the Upaniṣads. Very often they are used without any distinction; but wherever, as in the quotation just given, a difference is observable, *Brahman* means the eternal principle as realized in the whole world, and *ātman* the same principle as realized in ourselves. Assuming this, the fundamental thought of all the Upaniṣads can be expressed by the simple equation:

Brahman = *ātman*,

meaning the identity of *Brahman* and *ātman*, or, as we should say, of God and the soul. It is thus expressed in the so-called 'great words': *tat tvam asi*, 'that art thou' (Chhānd. Up. vi. 8. 7), and *aham brahmā asmi*, 'I am Brahman' (Brih. Up. i. 4. 10). That means: *Brahman*, the power which creates all the worlds, supports them, and destroys them. This all-mighty, all-pervading, eternal power is identical with the *ātman*, with that which, rightly understanding, we have to consider as our soul, as our own unchanging, imperishable Self. The grandeur of this thought is manifest. We do not know what ways are reserved for philosophy in future ages, we do not know what discoveries may be made in times to come, but so much we know with certainty: if a solution of the riddle which this phenomenal world presents to us is possible in any way to mankind, the key to that riddle can be found only where Nature manifests herself not merely from the outside, but where she exceptionally reveals her secret to us, and allows an insight, however limited, into her abysmal depths, *i.e.* into our own inner Self, into our *ātman*. This way was trodden by the Indian philosophers in the Upaniṣads, and no future time will cease to learn from them. But what have we to consider as our Self, as our *ātman*? It was not without serious researches that the Indians came to a satisfactory answer to this question. *Ātman*, the Self, might be simply the body, it might be the vital principle, the individual soul (*jīva*) in us, it might be something higher than all this. It is wonderful to follow the Indian thinkers in their researches after the real essence of the *ātman*, as they lie open before us in the various Upaniṣads; here, however, we must limit ourselves to a few examples.

In the second *vallī* of the Taitt. Up. the philosopher takes man as he appears as a bodily existence. In so far he consists of food, he is *annarasamaya*, 'consisting of the essence of food'; but this body is only the sheath which envelops something else, the *prāṇamaya ātman*, 'the Self consisting of vital breath.' This, again, hides another being, the *manomaya ātman*, 'the Self consisting of will.' This, again, contains the *vijñānamaya ātman*, 'the Self consisting of consciousness'; and only by removing this, as an envelope, do we come to the inmost Self, the *ānandamaya ātman*, 'the Self consisting of bliss.' Having come to this, the text says: 'Verily this is the essence; for whoever obtains this essence is filled with bliss. For who could breathe, who could live, were not this bliss in the ether of his heart? For it is he who creates bliss. For whoever in that Invisible, Incorporeal, Unspeakable, Unfathomable finds peace, finds rest, he really has come to peace. But whoever assumes in it a distinction, a separation between himself and this *ātman*, there is fear for him; it is the fear of the man who thinks himself wise' (Taitt. Up. ii. 7).

As in this passage five different *ātmans*, one within the other, are distinguished, so another

text speaks of three *ātmans*—the corporeal, the individual, and the highest *ātman*. In Chhānd. Up. viii. 7, Prajāpati said: 'The Self (*ātman*) which is free from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose wishes are true, whose counsels are true, that is to be investigated, that is to be understood; he obtains all worlds and all wishes, whoever has found that Self.' These words of Prajāpati were heard by the gods and by the demons; and in order to learn the true Self the gods sent Indra, the demons Virochana, to Prajāpati. He consented to teach them, and began his instruction with the words: 'Look at yourself in a vessel of water, and tell me what of your Self you do not see there.' They answered: 'We see, O venerable master, this our entire Self even to the hairs, even to the nails.' And he said: 'Well, that is the Self, that is the Immortal, the Fearless, that is the Brahman.' They went away with satisfied heart, but Prajāpati said: 'There they go away, without having perceived, without having found the Self.' Virochana, the messenger of the demons, remained content with the answer; but Indra, without returning to the gods, came back and said: 'O venerable master, just as this Self is well adorned when the body is well adorned, well dressed when the body is well dressed, well cleaned when the body is well cleaned, even so that Self will be blind when the body is blind, lame when the body is lame, crippled when the body is crippled, and, in fact, will perish as soon as the body perishes; therefore, I see no consolation in this doctrine.' Prajāpati then led him to a higher conception of the Self, saying: 'He who moves about happy in dreams, he is the Self, this is the Immortal, the Fearless, this is Brahman.' Indra departed, but, before reaching the gods, came back and said: 'Venerable master, it is true that the Self is not blind when the body is blind, not lame when it is lame, it is true that it is not affected by the infirmities of the body; it is not killed when the body is murdered, is not lamed when it is lamed, but it is as if it were killed, as if it were vexed, as if it suffered pain, as if it wept, —in this I see no consolation.' Prajāpati gave a new instruction: 'When a man, being asleep, reposing, and at perfect rest, sees no dreams, this is the Self, this is the Immortal, the Fearless, this is Brahman.' Indra departed, and returned again: 'Venerable master, in that way he does not know himself, does not know "I am this," nor does he know anything that exists. He is gone to annihilation. I see no consolation in this.' And now Prajāpati, after having led his pupil from the bodily Self to the conscious individual Self in dreams, and from this to the unconscious individual Self in deep sleep, revealed the full truth about the Self: 'O mighty Indra,' said he, 'this body indeed is possessed by death. It is the abode of that immortal, incorporeal Self. Possessed is the incorporated Self by pleasure and pain; for, because it is incorporated, there is no escape from pleasure and pain. But the incorporeal Self is touched neither by pleasure nor by pain. Bodiless are winds, clouds, lightning, and thunder; and as these, being hidden in the heavenly ether, rise from it, and, approaching the highest light, appear in their own form, thus does that serene being, arising from this body, approaching the highest light (the knowledge of Self), appear in its own form. He then is the highest spirit. He obtains all worlds and all wishes who knows and understands this Self.'

6. **Conclusion.**—Even in the oldest texts of the Upaniṣads there is found a bold *idealism* which maintains the sole reality of the *Ātman*, and denies an existence beyond the *Ātman*. This standpoint, however, could not be maintained for any length of time, for the reality of the phenomenal world imposed itself upon the mind; and, therefore, the desire to satisfy both convictions, that of the sole existence of the *Ātman* and that of the reality of phenomena, led to a kind of *pantheism* (represented chiefly by the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad), whose thesis was the identity of the universe and the *Ātman*. But this identity, however often proclaimed, was and remained unintelligible. Substituting for it the more comprehensible concept of causality, the thinkers of the Upaniṣads came to what we would call *cosmogonism*, asserting that the *Ātman* was the cause, and the world its effect. The *Ātman* creates this world, and, having created it, He incorporates Himself in it as individual soul.

Taitt. Up. ii. 6: 'He desired: "I will be manifold, I will propagate myself." He performed austerities. Having performed austerities, he created this whole world, whatever exists. Having created it, he entered into it.'

Even thus the *Ātman* remained what it was before, the Self in us. This Self creates the world, and enters into it as the individual soul. As early as the Kāṭhaka Upaniṣad this theory developed into a kind of *theism*, distinguishing between the highest *Ātman* who creates the world, and the individual *ātman* who lives in it. It is very remarkable that this theism then passed into the atheism proclaimed in the Sāṅkhya system. The highest *Ātman*, being distinguished from the individual *ātman*, in which it had its real certification, was no longer sufficiently certified, and was rejected by the thoroughgoing realism of the Sāṅkhya philosophy. There remained only material nature called *prakṛti*, and a multitude of individual *ātmans* called *puruṣas*. The last step in this process of degeneration was the *apsychism* of the Buddhists and the Chārvākas, who in part doubted, in part denied, the *ātman* altogether.

Thus the lofty idealism of the Upaniṣads was altered, and at last destroyed, by the realistic tendencies of a later age.

LITERATURE.—Deussen, *Allgemeine Gesch. der Philosophie* (2 vols., Leipzig, 1894–99), I. i. 282–336, ii. 78–90, 359–362.

P. DEUSSEN.

ATOMIC THEORY.

Greek (W. KROLL), p. 197.
Indian (H. JACOBI), p. 199.
Muhammadan (T. J. DE BOER), p. 202.
Mediæval and Modern (J. H. POYNTING), p. 203.

ATOMIC THEORY (Greek).—The originator of what is called the atomic theory was **Leucippus**, of whom even the ancients knew so little that Epicurus could entirely deny his existence—a conjecture which was revived in modern times, but may now be regarded as finally abandoned. Leucippus' native country was Ionia (Miletus ?), and he lived between the times of Parmenides and Democritus. We are acquainted with his teaching only in the form which it took in the mind of his disciple, **Democritus**. The latter was born at Abdera; but the ancient writers knew nothing about the period in which he lived except what he himself had stated in a written work. He was a young man, evidently, when Anaxagoras had attained a rather advanced age, this would imply that he was in his prime in the years B.C. 430–420 The logical consistency of his thought, the wide range of his knowledge of natural science, and the excellence of his composition, made the success of

his numerous writings very considerable. His views were thoroughly discussed and opposed by Aristotle and Theophrastus.

Leucippus was led to his theory by the reaction against the Eleatic School, whose views had been placed on a scientific basis by Parmenides. It had denied all motion and change, and declared them to be an illusion of the senses; the truth being, they maintained, that reason leads us to perceive that what exists is unchangeable. This assumption so entirely contradicts all experience that a more plausible explanation of the processes of nature had to be found; account had to be taken of Heraclitus' correct observation that a continual change is taking place in the world. But it was no longer permissible to explain—as was formerly done—this change as due to transformations of a primordial substance, for neither could the conversion of fire into water and earth, and *vice versa*, as Heraclitus claimed, be grounded on experience, nor could the Eleatic principle be ignored that anything that is permanent must be present in the change. While the Pythagoreans found this permanent element in number, and therefore entirely abandoned the explanation of materialism, Leucippus and Democritus recognized it in atoms—those particles of matter so minute that they cannot be further divided, and are not perceptible to the senses—of varying size and form, but all consisting of the same substance, or matter, which cannot be more narrowly defined. Particular things come into existence when these atoms combine, and disappear when they separate; but the atoms themselves are eternal and indestructible. The combination and separation of the atoms are not possible unless there be motion, nor this again, as the Eleatic School had already noted, unless there be empty space; but whereas the Eleatics had denied motion and empty space, the atomists held both to be real, indeed to be the only reality (Democr. *Fragm.* 125, Diels: *νόμῳ χροίη, νόμῳ γλυκύ, νόμῳ πικρόν, ἐτεῇ δ' ἄτομα καὶ κενόν*). For these principles Democritus also found support in special observations; *e.g.*, a body can grow only by the nutriment penetrating the open pores.

The atoms differ in form, composition, and condition; with the form is connected the size, and on this depends the weight. But these characteristics of bodies are primary, all other sense-qualities being secondary; *e.g.*, warmth was supposed to appertain to round atoms, whiteness to rough atoms, blackness to smooth atoms, sourness to small angular atoms, and sweetness to larger round atoms (there is some apt criticism by Theophrastus, *de Sens.* 68, in Diels[2], p. 376). Since it depends upon chance which kind of those different atoms that form a body makes most impression upon the senses, these secondary qualities are at the same time subjective (*νόμῳ*, see above). The other elements assumed by physicists are, of course, for Democritus composite bodies; but he made fire an exception by supposing it to consist of only one kind of atom, globular in form. On this point he was no doubt influenced by Heraclitus.

There are great difficulties in the question whence, in the ultimate analysis, the motion arises which causes combination and separation of atoms. It was clear to Democritus that all change is motion in space, though, at the same time, Epicurus was perhaps the first to say so expressly. The old atomists did not answer this question; on the contrary, they assumed an eternal, primordial motion of the atoms, and gave up the idea of specifying its first cause. Whether they thought of the motion as a falling movement like that of gravity or as an irregular whirl is not quite clear. Zeller takes the former view, Brieger and Liepmann the latter. In any case, they had no strict idea of gravitation or of the necessity of falling; and this makes the dispute very difficult to decide. In this motion the particles impinge upon one another, seemingly in consequence of their unequal weight, receive blows, break off other particles, and so produce a whirling motion, a kind of primordial dance in which several atoms combine, provided that their form renders them capable of adhering to one another (the modern theory has actually been led to make similar assumptions). Every such whirl may develop into a world; and this led the atomists to the assumption—to which Plato objected (*Tim.* 55 C)—that there were innumerable worlds, several of which had passed out of existence again through colliding with greater ones. The space between these worlds Epicurus called *μετακόσμια* (in Cicero, *intermundia*). Round the whirling mass of atoms a crust was formed out of hook-shaped particles. This crust, in the course of a long process of rotation, became thinner and thinner (the *flammantia mœnia mundi* of Lucretius, i. 73). The heavier atoms gathered in the middle and formed the earth, the lighter atoms remaining at the circumference. The crust holds fast those bodies which, coming from without, conglomerate at the edge of the world, and are aflame with the velocity of their motion: these are the stars. Worlds may perish by becoming feeble or old, but also by collision with other worlds.

In psychology also Democritus carried his views to their logical consequences. The human soul consists, in like manner, of atoms, and of the most mobile of these—that is to say, of fire-atoms, which are so distributed throughout all bodies that between every two body-atoms there is one soul-atom, and which produce both motion and thought. The preference here given to fire is again due to the influence of Heraclitus. Even the sensations are explained atomically; for instance, sight is produced by fine particles, which retain the form of bodies (*εἴδωλα, δείκελα*), detaching themselves from the surface of bodies and pressing upon the eye. Similarly sound is a material thing. But perception gives only a dull cognition; thought alone makes it clear (*γνώμης δὲ δύο εἰσὶν ἰδέαι, ἡ μὲν γνησίη, ἡ δὲ σκοτίη· καὶ σκοτίης μὲν τάδε σύμπαντα, ὄψις, ἀκοή, ὀδμή, γεῦσις, ψαῦσις· ἡ δὲ γνησίη, ἀποκεκριμένη δὲ ταύτης. Fragm.* 11 Diels).

To the school of Democritus belonged Nausiphanes of Teos (Diels, *Fragm. d. Vorsokr.*[2] i. 462), who became the teacher of Epicurus (*c.* 325 B.C.) and introduced him to the atomic theory. But while it had been the aim of Democritus to explain the world-phenomena in a uniform way, Epicurus merely wished to give his own views on human happiness a satisfactory basis in natural science (*Sent. Sel.* xii. *οὐκ ἦν ἄνευ φυσιολογίας ἀκεραίους τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀπολαμβάνειν*); he regarded the whole of natural science as superfluous except in so far as it served this purpose, and declined to recognize as final any solution of a question if it failed to rid us of fear (*Sent. Sel.* xi.). Consequently he accepted Democritus' theories without introducing much change into them (Cic. *de Fin.* i. 21: 'Quæ sequitur, sunt tota Democriti. Atomi, inane, imagines, quæ *εἴδωλα* nominant'). A number of the changes which he did make have been abortive, and, when carried to their logical conclusions, are such as to shake the foundation of the system. For instance, even the ancient writers had noticed that Democritus did not avail himself of chance as an explanation of certain phenomena (Eudem. *ap.* Simplic. in *Phys.* 330, 14). Epicurus, on the other hand, made frequent use of this expedient.

Again, the only existing things, according to him, are atoms and empty space, and he finds the former characterized by hardness (*ἀντιτυπία*), and the latter by pliability (*εἶξις*). The atoms, on

account of their minuteness, are not perceptible, and yet they are not infinitely small in a mathematical sense, but simply, by reason of their hardness, not further divisible. They fall downwards by their weight, like rain, and with equal rapidity, empty space yielding to them; here then, in opposition to Democritus, a characteristic primordial motion is ascribed to them. Since, however, in this way no contact could ever take place between them, Epicurus found himself forced to make the assumption—fundamentally monstrous, and derided even by the ancients—that certain atoms deviated very slightly ('nec plus quam minimum,' Lucr. ii. 244) from the perpendicular direction, thus colliding with others and producing all those processes which, from Democritus' point of view also, led to the formation of worlds. He made use of this deviation of atoms as an explanation even of the freedom of the will (Brieger, *Abhandl. für Hertz*, Berlin, 1888). The idea that the motion of the atoms is permanent, and does not cease even in the interior of the bodies formed from them, also appears to be new. Even the soul Epicurus makes to consist of material atoms, though not now merely of fire-atoms, but of fire, air, *pneuma*, and an indefinable substance which was supposed to be the vehicle of feeling; thus he gave the soul a separate status in contradiction to the logic of materialism. Perception he explained in exactly the same way as his great predecessor, but he seems to have laid greater emphasis on the identity of perception and motion in the soul-particles, being here, as often, influenced by Aristotle. While Democritus had explained the sense-qualities as subjective, Epicurus ascribes reality to them, and denies that the senses can ever deceive. But since all kinds of atoms are intermingled, and one person perceives more of one kind and another more of another, the same things may affect different men differently (Fragm. 250, Us.). Epicurus' teaching about the mingling was more correct than that of Democritus. The latter had assumed that parts of the mingled matter lay side by side, but was met by Aristotle with the objection that in this way only a medley could arise, and not a real mingling. Consequently, Epicurus now made, not the particles of matter, but the particular atoms come to the side of one another, and thus approached very near to the views of modern chemistry.

The school of Epicurus held to the teaching of its founder with greater tenacity than any other, and consequently in ancient times atomism subsequently underwent no development. Thus Lucretius, although he is hardly indebted directly to Epicurus, but to later Epicureans, faithfully reproduces the views of the master. A little before him lived the physician Asclepiades of Bithynia, who grounded his theory of medicine on the basic ideas of the Epicurean doctrine of atoms (M. Wellmann, in Pauly-Wissowa, ii. 1632).

LITERATURE.—On Leucippus and Democritus: E. Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*[5], i., Leipzig, 1892, 837 ff.; H. Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*[2], Berlin, 1903, i. 342 ff.; C. Baeumker, *Das Problem der Materie*, Münster, 1890, p. 79 ff.; A. Brieger, *Die Urbewegung der Atome*, Halle, 1894; H. C. Liepmann, *Die Mechanik der Leukipp-Demokritischen Atome*, Leipzig, 1886 (cf. the notice by Lortzing in Bursian's *Jahresbericht*, cxvi. 135 ff.); E. Wellmann, in Pauly-Wissowa, v. 135. On Epicurus: *Epicurea*, ed. H. Usener, Leipzig, 1887; Zeller[3], iii. 1, p. 363 ff.; Baeumker, *op. cit.* 303 ff.; A. Goedeckemeyer, *Epikurs Verhältnis zu Demokrit*, Strassburg, 1897; H. v. Arnim, in Pauly-Wissowa, vi. 133. W. KROLL.

ATOMIC THEORY (Indian).—In the oldest philosophical speculations of the Brāhmans as preserved in the *Upaniṣads*, we find no trace of an atomic theory; and it is therefore controverted in the *Vedānta Sūtra*, which claims systematically to interpret the teachings of the *Upaniṣads*. Nor is it acknowledged in the Sāṅkhya and Yoga philosophies, which have the next claim to be considered orthodox, *i.e.* to be in keeping with the Vedas; for even the *Vedānta Sūtra* allows them the title of *Smṛtis*. But the atomic theory makes an integral part of the Vaiśeṣika, and it is acknowledged by the Nyāya, two Brāhmanical philosophies which have originated with, or at least been favoured by, secular scholars (*paṇḍits*), rather than by divines or religious men. Among the heterodox it has been adopted by the Jains, and, as is stated in the *Abhidharmakośa vyākhyā*,* also by the Ājīvikas. It seems to have been unknown to original Buddhism; for the well-known Pāli scholar, Professor Franke, states that no mention is made of it in the Pāli canonical books. It is different, however, with the Northern Buddhists; for the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas were adherents of the atomic theory, while the Mādhyamikas and Yogācāras opposed it, as they declared the external world not to be real.

The speculations of the sects and philosophical schools just mentioned may be arranged in three groups. The first is represented by the Jains; the second by the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya *Sūtras* and the *Bhāṣya* on the latter by Vātsyāyana, and, on the other hand, by the Northern Buddhists; while the last phase of the theory is that which appears first in the *Praśastapāda-Bhāṣya*, the oldest systematic exposition of the Vaiśeṣika system, and has since been generally adopted by the combined Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas.

I. We place the Jains first, because they seem to have worked out their system from the most primitive notions about matter. These may be taken to be the following. Matter is an eternal substance, undetermined with regard to quantity and quality, *i.e.* it may increase or diminish in volume without addition or loss of particles, and it may assume any forms and develop any kind of qualities. Material substances may coalesce into one substance, and one substance may divide into many.

Now, the Jains maintain that everything in this world, except souls and mere space, is produced from matter (*pudgala*), and that all matter consists of atoms (*paramāṇu*). Each atom occupies one point (*pradeśa*) of space. Matter, however, may be either in the gross state (*sthūla, bādara*), or in the subtle (*sūkṣma*). When it is in the subtle state, innumerable atoms of it occupy the space of one gross atom. The atoms are eternal as regards their substance; each atom has one kind of taste, smell, and colour, and two kinds of touch. These qualities, however, are not permanent and fixed for the several atoms, but they may be changed and developed in them. Two or more atoms which differ in their degree of smoothness and roughness, may combine to form aggregates (*skandha*). The figures formed by the arrangement of the atoms into groups are manifold, and are precisely described in the *Bhagavatī*; every thing is believed to be formed of groups of one kind only. The atom may develop a motion of its own, and this motion may become so swift that by means of it an atom may traverse in one moment the whole universe from one end to the other.

It is evident, from what has been said, that there are not different kinds of atoms corresponding to the four elements, earth, water, fire, and wind; but though it is not explicitly stated, still we may assume that the atoms, by developing the characteristic qualities of the elements, become differentiated and thus form the four elements. For the latter are presupposed by the belief in elementary souls:

* The passage is quoted, *s.v.* 'Aṇu,' in a Buddhist dictionary now [1908] being printed in Calcutta, for the proofs of which the present writer is indebted to the courtesy of Prof. de la Vallée Poussin.

earth-souls, water-souls, fire-souls, and wind-souls, *i.e.* souls in various phases of development, which are embodied in particles of earth, etc. The elements must accordingly be regarded as the bodies, or even corpses, of particular living beings; at any rate they are not without beginning and end.

We must mention the opinion of the Jains concerning *karma*, *i.e.* merit and demerit, in its bearing on the atomic theory. *Karma* according to them is of material nature (*paudgalika*). The soul by its commerce with the outer world becomes literally penetrated with material particles of a very subtle kind. These become *karma* and build up a special body, the *kārmaṇaśarira*, which never leaves the soul till its final emancipation. Thus the atoms of which the *karma*-matter is composed are believed to be invested with a peculiar faculty which brings about the effects of merit and demerit. The opponents of the Jains understood this theory to mean that *karma* is the property of atoms, and produces a motion in them so that they combine to form the body, and that the internal organ enters it.*

II. In our second group the conception of atoms has been combined with that of the four elements in the following way: There are four distinct kinds of atoms corresponding to the four elements, earth, water, fire, and wind; and the distinctive qualities of the latter are already found in the several atoms. Now, the belief that all material things are made up of four elements, singly or jointly, was current in India probably long before the philosophical systems of which we are speaking came into existence. We first meet it in the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad* (vi. 2 ff.). There it is said that the *Ens absolutum* created fire, fire created water, and water created earth (*anna*), and that these three elements combining produce all existing things. In other places, wind (*vāyu*) is regarded as an element, and at last space (*ākāśa*) was reckoned as the fifth element; for it seemed proper that there should be five elements corresponding to the five organs of sense.† This theory of the five elements has been adopted in the Sāṅkhya philosophy, and there it has been further developed by distinguishing two sets of elements, subtle (*tanmātra*) and gross (*mahābhūta*). The elements in Sāṅkhya are, however, not atomic or eternal, but are developed from primeval matter (*prakṛti*) by a process which need not be detailed here. Of these traditional five elements, the fifth, *ākāśa*, has a peculiar character of its own, as it is not considered to enter into combination with the other elements, but to be a simple, *i.e.* an infinite and continuous, substance; nor did the Buddhists even reckon it among their elements (*mahābhūta*). And the Vaiśeṣikas also, who distinguished space (*diś*) from *ākāśa*, the substratum of sound, count the latter among the simple and infinite substances (*vibhu*), together with space, time, and the souls. Accordingly, both Brāhmanical and Buddhistic atomists admitted only four atomic substances, viz. earth, water, fire, and wind. But in other details their opinions vary.

As we have as yet but defective and second-hand information about the atomic theories of the Buddhists, we shall first describe that of their opponents, the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas.

1. Vaiśeṣika being chiefly concerned with physics, and Nyāya with metaphysics and dialectics, the physical side of the atomic theory was more the province of the former, and the metaphysical of the latter system. Hence it may be supposed that the atomic theory is more intimately connected with the Vaiśeṣika system, and indeed Bādarāyaṇa regards it as their cardinal tenet.‡

The opinions of the Vaiśeṣikas on atoms and their qualities, as well as the arguments connected therewith, are epitomized in a few aphorisms of the 4th and 7th chapters of the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* by Kaṇāda. They reasoned in the following way: Things that exist and are not produced from a cause are eternal; they may be inferred from (the fact that all known things are) products. Besides, as we call everything we perceive non-eternal, this idea of non-eternity presupposes eternity (IV. i. 1–4). And finally the fact that we do not perceive the ultimate, *i.e.* uncaused, causes of things, constitutes our ignorance, and thus we are forced to assume that these ultimate causes are eternal.

But there is another interpretation of the last sūtra (IV. i. 5), which consists only of one word, 'ignorance'; *i.e.*, as we can imagine no other cause of the destruction of a thing than the disjunction or destruction of its causes, it follows that the last causes must be eternal.

For the interpretation of the sūtras here given the writer relies not so much on the modern commentaries (for there is no old one in existence), as on their refutation by Śaṅkara, which shows us what was the meaning attached to them more than a thousand years ago. It is to be understood that these eternal things, the causes of the non-eternal ones, are the *atoms*; but they are not visible. For the sūtra goes on to declare that a great thing may be visible, if it has many constituent parts and possesses colour (IV. i. 6). The next sūtra (not in our text, but as quoted in the *Nyāya Vārtika*, p. 233) states that the atom is invisible, because it is not composed of material parts. Now, a thing is great if it is composed of many constituent parts, or if the parts themselves are great, or if they are arranged in a peculiar way (VII. i. 9, not as in our text, but as quoted by Śaṅkara on *Ved. Sut.* II. ii. 11). The reverse of this holds good with the small *aṇu* (*i.e.* atom); that is to say, the atom is not composed of parts.

The discussion, carried on in the next sūtras (10–20), comes to this. The expressions 'great, small, long, short,' as used in common parlance, are relative terms, the same thing being called great with reference to one thing and small with reference to another. These expressions refer to great (or long) things only, since only such are visible, and therefore they are used in a secondary meaning. In their *primary* sense 'great' and 'small' are not relative terms, but denote distinct kinds or *genera* of dimension (just as red and blue are different kinds of colour). For otherwise we should speak of great or small greatness, *i.e.* we should attribute qualities (great or small) to a quality (greatness), which would be against the principle that qualities have no qualities. Greatness and smallness are non-eternal in non-eternal things; in eternal things they are eternal, *i.e.* absolute or infinite. The absolutely small is called globular (*parimaṇḍala*).

About the other properties of the atoms we have the following statements. The qualities of earthen and other things—colour, taste, smell, and touch—vanish on the destruction of the thing itself; accordingly they must be eternal in eternal things, *i.e.* in atoms. And so they are in the atoms of water, fire, and wind. In earth, however, as well as in atoms of earth, (some) qualities are *pākaja*, *i.e.* changeable by heat (VII. i. 1–6). Different atoms may come into conjunction (IV. ii. 4). In the beginning of creation the atoms are set in motion by *adṛṣṭa*, *i.e.* merit and demerit of creatures in the past period (V. ii. 18). The internal organ also is an atom (VII. i. 23).

This is all the information about atoms we can gather from the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*. But, short though it be, it is enough to show us the actual state of the atomic theory at the time of Kaṇāda and the arguments used by him in establishing that theory. Two things deserve to be noticed. Firstly, the word for 'atom' used in our text, and, it may be added, in the *Nyāya Sūtra* too, is *aṇu*; only in the sūtra quoted in the *Nyāya Vārtika* do we meet with *paramāṇu*, the usual form with all later authors; but this may be a mistake of the Vārtikakāra, who quoted from memory. Secondly, the argument for the existence of atoms, which is based on the impossibility of unlimited division of a thing, was not yet made use of by the author of the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*.

2. In the *Nyāya Sūtra* by Gautama, and especially in the *Bhāṣya*, or old commentary on it, by

* *Vātsyāyana*, p. 191, and Vācaspati's remark in the footnote, and *Nyāya Vārtika*, p. 448.

† This subject is treated at some length in Dr. Sukhthankar's dissertation, 'Teachings of Vedānta according to Rāmānuja,' in *Wiener Ztschr. f. d. Kunde d. Morgenl*, xxii.

‡ *Vedānta Sūtra*, II. ii. 11 ff., and Śaṅkara's remarks on II. ii. 1.

Vātsyāyana, who wrote in the 5th cent. A.D. or earlier, some aspects of the atomic theory are discussed, and objections raised to it by opponents are refuted. Gautama shared the opinions of the Vaiśeṣikas on the physical properties of the atoms described above. For, since he incidentally remarks (IV. i. 67) that the black colour (of earthen atoms) is not eternal (though existing from eternity), it follows that he considered the properties of water, fire, and wind to be eternal. The metaphysical questions, however, relating to atoms are fully discussed by Gautama, and further explained by Vātsyāyana. In the two places (II. i. 36 and IV. ii. 14 ff.) where they occur, they are brought in at the end of the discussion of the 'whole and its parts.' The Naiyāyikas maintain that the whole is something more than its parts; it is a different thing (*arthāntara*), not separated from its parts, but rather something in addition to them. We perceive the whole thing as such, *e.g.* a tree, though we see only the front parts, and not the middle and back ones; and thus we see a thing though we cannot see the atoms of which it consists. The question of atoms is then discussed in this way. A thing consisting of parts is called a whole, but each part must again be considered as a whole, and so the parts of a part, and so on *ad infinitum*. If we never could come to last parts, we could not conceive the idea of the whole, and so the whole would be dissolved into nothing. But the division reaches its limit in the atom, which cannot be divided any further, as we assume it to be absolutely small.

Another proof is the following. If the division into parts had no limit, the mote (*truṭi*) would not differ in size from the highest mountain, because both would have the same number of parts (IV. ii. 1 f.). The text then proceeds to refute objections raised against the notion of atoms as indivisible smallest things without parts. *Ākāśa* ('air'), as the Vaiśeṣikas assert, is a simple, all-pervading, and infinite substance: the question is put whether it penetrates the atoms or not. If it does, the atom must have parts; if not, *ākāśa* would not be all-pervading. The reply is that the atom has no exterior or interior, nor is it hollow inside, but it is a simple not a compound thing. It is further objected that, since the atom has a form, being globular, and since the form of a thing consists in the disposition of its parts, the atom must have parts. And again, when three atoms are in juxtaposition, that in the middle touches the one to the left with its right side, and that on the right with its left side; and when the atom is surrounded on all sides, we can distinguish six sides of the atom which must be considered its parts. And if the six sides were reduced to one (*i.e.* if the atom were a mere point), then the aggregate of the seven atoms would take up no more space than one atom, and consequently a jar could be reduced to the size of an atom, and hence become invisible. These arguments are met by the declaration that the division of the atom into parts is not real, but a mode of expression only.

The following are some opinions on atoms, which are mentioned in the *Nyāya Vārtika* (6th cent. A.D.), but the authors of which are not named. Some thought that the mote which is seen in a ray of the sun entering a window is an atom. Others believed that atoms do not occur singly (*asaṁhata*), but always in aggregates (p. 234). Some, apparently Buddhists, maintained that the atoms were not eternal, because they possess motion. The Naiyāyikas agree with the Vaiśeṣikas that the atoms are set into motion by *adṛṣṭa*, *i.e.* merit and demerit, but expressly state that God (*Īśvara*) directs the action of the atoms.*

3. The chief opponents of the Naiyāyikas, who held different views on atoms, were Buddhists of the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools, as was said at the beginning. The Vaibhāṣikas maintained that external things can be directly perceived, the Sautrāntikas that they can only be inferred. Śaṅkara, who comprises both under the name of Sarvāstivādin, describes their opinions on atoms in his commentary on *Ved. Sut.* II. ii. 18 thus: 'These Buddhists acknowledge the four elements, earth, water, fire, and wind, with their properties and products, including the organs of sense; the four elements are atomic; the earth atoms have the quality of harshness, the water-atoms that of viscidity, the fire-atoms that of heat, and the wind-atoms that of motion; in combination these atoms form earthly things,' etc.

More details we learn from the work of the Tibetan *ḥjam yaṅ ḥśad pa*, of which Wassilieff has given an abstract,* from the *Abhidharmakośa vyākhyā*, a work of the idealistic school Yogācāra (for a transcript of which the present writer is indebted to the courtesy of Prof. de la Vallée Poussin), and from Prajñākaramati's commentary on the *Bodhicharyāvatāra* (ix. 8 f., 95 f.).

The Vaibhāṣikas admitted that an atom had six sides, but they maintained that they made but one, or, what comes to the same, that the space within an atom could not be divided. Their opinion has been disputed by the Naiyāyikas in an old verse quoted in the *Nyāya Vārtika* (p. 521). They further asserted that atoms were amenable to sense-knowledge, though they were not visible apart, just as a dim-sighted man sees a mass of hair, though he cannot see a single hair. This view, too, was disputed by the Naiyāyikas, who maintained that the atom is transcendental (*atīndriya*), not perceptible to sense (*aindriyaka*).†

The Sautrāntikas seem to have regarded the aggregate of seven atoms as the smallest compound (*aṇu*).‡ Their opinion seems to have been that the (globular) atoms did not touch one another completely, but that there was an interval between them; but some held different views. All agreed that the atom is indivisible, though some admitted that it might be regarded as having parts, viz. eight sides. Both the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas declare that atoms are not hollow, and cannot penetrate one another.

Most points in the Buddhistical opinions which we have related are also discussed in the *Nyāya Sūtra*, *Bhāṣya*, and *Vārtika*; all the speculations on atoms we have dealt with in this our second group (the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* perhaps excepted) must, therefore, be regarded as having been current in the same period, *i.e.* in the beginning of our era down to the 6th cent. and later.

III. The latest improvement of the atomic theory consists in the assumption of *dvyaṇukas*, etc. It was first taught by *Praśastapāda* (p. 28), and is plainly referred to by Udyotakara;§ it was received as a tenet in all later works of what may be called the combined Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The fusion of these two schools began early, and seems to have been complete at the time when the *Nyāya Vārtika* was written; for in this work the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* is several times quoted simply as the *Sūtra* or *Śāstra*, and once (p. 222) its author is called *Paramarṣi*, a title accorded only to the highest authority. From that time *dvyaṇukas* are quite familiar in Sanskrit writers. It is assumed that two atoms (*paramāṇu*) form one binary (*dvyaṇuka*), and that three or more‖ *dvyaṇukas* form one *tryaṇuka*, which is 'great' and perceptible by the eye. From *tryaṇukas* are produced all things. Modern writers further assume *chaturaṇukas*, formed of four *tryaṇukas*, etc. The reasoning that led to this highly artificial theory is the following.¶ The rule that the quality of the product is derived from the corresponding quality of the cause does not apply to *dvyaṇukas* and *tryaṇukas*. For in that case the 'small' *dvyaṇukas* would produce a 'small' *tryaṇuka*, not a 'great' one as required. And if the smallness of the *dvyaṇukas* were produced from the like quality of the *paramāṇus*, it would be of a higher degree, just as two great things produce one greater

* *Nyāya Vārtika*, p. 461 ff.

* *Der Buddhismus*, pp. 298, 307 f., 337 of the Germ. tr.
† *Nyāya Sūtra*, II. i. 36, IV. ii. 14; cf. *Nyāya Vārtika*, p. 232.
‡ Cf. Hiuen Tsiang, *Si-yu-ki*, i. 60. In Paurāṇic measures *paramāṇus* = 1 *parasūkṣma* (Wilson, *Vishṇu Purāṇa*, i. 93 n.).
§ *Nyāya Vārtika*, p. 448. ‖ *Śridhara*, p. 32.
¶ Athalye's note to *Tarka Saṅgraha*, Bombay Sanskrit Series, p. 128.

thing; but the *paramāṇu* is that than which nothing smaller can be imagined. Therefore it is not the dimension of the cause, viz. of the parts, which produces the peculiar dimension of the *dvyaṇuka* and *tryaṇuka*, but another quality: *number*. The number of the *dvyaṇukas* in the *tryaṇuka* has the effect of producing, on the latter, greatness, a dimension which differs in kind from that of its parts. *Dvyaṇukas* have been assumed for the following reason. As great things are of two kinds, eternal (viz. the infinitely great ones, *e.g.* space) and non-eternal, so both kinds must be found in 'small' things. Eternal small things are, of course, the atoms. Non-eternal ones must therefore consist of atoms; they are the *dvyaṇukas*.* Now number is produced by the 'notion which refers to many unities' (*apekṣābuddhi*); and such a notion presupposes an intellect to form it; in our case it must be the intellect of one who perceives all the atoms and *dvyaṇukas*, and who therefore must be omniscient—that is, God. Without him in whose intellect the notion of duality in *dvyaṇukas* subsists, there would not be any *dvyaṇukas* or any *tryaṇukas*, and consequently there would not be anything whatever. This strange idea, found *in nuce* already in *Praśastapāda*, was brought forward by Udayana (12th cent.) as a proof of the existence of God.

Having passed in review all forms of the atomic theory which are known to us at present, we must now inquire into the origin of that theory. Two points appear to be of chief importance for our inquiry: firstly, that the name of atom is *aṇu*, 'small,' or *paramāṇu*, 'absolutely small'; and secondly, that 'small' was generally considered to differ, not in degree but in kind, from 'great.' In accordance with this notion which is shared by all, even by the opponents of the atomic theory, the small, or, as we had better call it, the infinitesimal, had to be assumed as existing, and needed no further proof. The idea of the infinitesimal in this sense seems to have already been current in the time of the *Upaniṣads*, where we frequently meet with the statement that *Brahman* is smaller than the small, and that the self (*ātman*) is small (*aṇu*). In order to arrive at the conception of the atom, the idea of the infinitesimal had not only to be applied to matter, but it had, at the same time, to be joined to the idea of its indestructibility. Reasoning from analogy apparently came in to help; as the absolutely great, *e.g.* space, is acknowledged by all to be eternal, so the absolutely small, the atom, must also be assumed to be eternal. At any rate, the notion of the infinitesimal led, by easy steps, to the conception of the atom. It was probably in this early stage of development that the Jains took up the idea of the atom and made use of it in their metaphysical speculations. But in India the inventors of a new theory have generally been forgotten, and the fame attached to it went to those who succeeded in defending the theory against all opponents and in thus putting it on a base of firm reasoning. This task seems to have been performed by the Vaiśeṣikas. For the atomic theory makes an integral part of their system, and in their *Sūtra* we find the outlines of the arguments used to establish it. Moreover, when the atomic theory is discussed in the *Vedānta Sūtra*, it is there ascribed to the Vaiśeṣikas, and at the same time treated as one of their cardinal tenets; we may therefore conclude that the author of the *Vedānta Sūtra* looked on the Vaiśeṣikas as the principal upholders, if not the authors, of the atomic theory.

When once firmly established, the atomic theory must have had much persuasive power with many philosophers; for it put in place of the primitive conception of matter as an eternal but quite undefined substance the more rational notions which offered an intelligible explanation of the perpetual change of things while still maintaining the eternity of matter. The Northern Buddhists adopted it, though they had to deny the eternity of atoms, according to the fundamental tenet of Buddhism that there are no eternal things. Even some adherents of Yoga admitted *paramāṇus*, defining them as the smallest particles in which the three *guṇas* are present.* The Mīmāṁsakas are said by Prajñākaramati to have acknowledged eternal atoms;† and the same holds good with the Ājīvikas, as stated above.

It must, however, be mentioned that Dr. W. Handt‡ has maintained the Buddhist origin of the atomic theory. 'Starting,' he says, 'from the fundamental view of original Buddhism, which looked on the *saṁsāra* as continual springing into existence and perishing, they regarded the whole material world as an aggregate of non-eternal atoms, just as the spiritual one was produced by the aggregate of the five *skandhas*.' But non-eternity seems to reverse the idea of the atom as it is generally understood. And if, as Handt asserts, the Buddhists, in order to explain the perpetual flow of existence, 'naturally hit on the assumption of non-eternal atoms which are divided into four classes according to the four elements,' still it would seem not to have sufficed them even for that purpose. For the Sautrāntikas have brought forward their famous theory of the momentariness of all things (*kṣaṇikavāda*). Every thing, according to this theory, exists but for a moment, and is in the next moment replaced by a facsimile of itself, very much as in a kinematoscopic view. The thing is nothing but a series (*santāna*) of such momentary existences (*kṣaṇa*). Here time is, as it were, resolved into atoms. This theory explains perfectly well the perpetual change of things, and apparently was invented for that purpose. Still, the Sautrāntikas retained the atomic theory alleged by Dr. Handt to have been invented by the Buddhists for the same purpose. We shall therefore not err in supposing that the Buddhists did not invent the atomic theory as a prop for their fundamental dogma, but advocated it because it belonged to the stock of physical and metaphysical ideas which passed current during the early centuries of the Christian era in Northern India.

LITERATURE.—Handt, *Die atomistische Grundlage der Vaiśeṣikaphilosophie*, Rostock, 1900. A full discussion of the Atomic Theories is lacking. The original works are:—I. *Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra*, by Umāsvāti, translated in *Zeitschrift d. deutsch. morgenl. Ges.* vol. lx. p. 512 ff. II. *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* and *Praśastapāda Bhāṣya*, *Nyāya Sūtra* with *Bhāṣya* and *Vārtika*, at the places quoted in the article.—III. See above. p. 201.

H. JACOBI.

ATOMIC THEORY (Muhammadan).—The genesis of atomic theories among Muslim thinkers is shrouded in obscurity. It is probable that such theories found their way into Islām through the medium of the Aristotelian physics and the Neo-Platonic commentaries dealing therewith. As far back, at all events, as we can follow the growth of atomism in this field, we find it imbued with the conceptions of Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic thought.

We can trace the presence of such atomistic doctrine as early as the 9th century. Al-Naẓẓām († A.D. 845) is mentioned as having been an opponent thereof, while al-Kindī († A.D. *c.* 870) wrote a treatise against its adherents.

The first recognizable form of the doctrine is that which it assumed in the hands of Abū Hāshim of Baṣra († *c.* 933 A.D.). His theory, which is practically

* *Praśastapāda*, p. 131, and *Śridhara*, p. 133.

* *Nyāya Vārtika*, p. 251 f., and *Yoga Sūtra*, i. 40.

† Com. on *Bodhicharyāvatāra*, ix. 127.

‡ *Die atomistische Grundlage der Vaiśeṣikaphilosophie*, Rostock, 1900.

that of the Basrensian Mu'tazilites of the 10th cent., is found in the *Kitābu 'l-masā'il* of Abū Rashīd Sa'īd b. Muḥammad b. Sa'īd al-Naisābūrī, whose lifetime falls between A.D. 932 and 1068. We give here a concise summary of his views.

The atom (*al-juz' allaḏhī lā yutajazzu'*), or, as it is commonly called, the substance (*al-jauhar*), possesses in itself (*jauhar fard*), as the attribute involved in its very essence, the capacity of filling space (*taḥayyuz*). The 'substances' are of cubical form, and they are all of the same sort. Hence the only real difference amongst them lies in the fact that each occupies a definite portion of space (*ḥayyiz*). Besides existence and spatiality, each has likewise a certain range (*jiha*), or spatial persistence, by means of which others are prevented from usurping its position. Finally, the substances have the property of assuming accidents, in virtue of which they are qualitatively determined.

These substances move in empty spaces, and interact by pressure and impact. The proof of this is sought not merely on deductive lines, but by way of simple experiments. According to the older form of atomism, as set forth by Democritus, Nothing is no less a fact than Something (*μὴ μᾶλλον τὸ δὲν ἢ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι*), and by 'nothing' in this case was meant simply empty space. As a result of the infusion of later theories, however, this idea is wholly discarded in Islām, and the states of being and not-being are distinguished as existing in the substance itself; or, in other words, even the non-existent, as something known, *i.e.* distinguished from something else, is possessed of substantiality.

The essence of the atom, or substance, is independent of its existence—a statement which probably means that such essence might form the content or object of the Divine thought or of human knowledge. The substances are not created by God: He simply brings them into existence, or lets them come forth. When they have attained the status of actual being, they have certain necessary modes of existence (*'akwān*), such as motion and rest, union and separation. Other accidents again are contingent, *i.e.* each several substance may assume an indefinite number and variety of accidents, so long as these are not mutually antagonistic.

The substances and the bodies they go to constitute are endowed with duration in time. Their annihilation—the cessation of their existence—is possible, but only in their totality, *i.e.* only if the whole world were to pass away at once.

Such, apart from insignificant differences of view, was the theory of the Basrensian thinkers. From these the scholars of Baghdad differed in many ways. The teaching of the latter school is known to us most fully in the form subsequently given to it—first of all, probably, by Abū Bakr al-Bāqilānī († *c.* 1012)—in the Ash'arite or orthodox *Kalām*. A most comprehensive account of this doctrine is given by Maimonides (1135–1204), and it is largely upon his description that the following outline is based.

The entire world, of which God is the absolutely free Creator, consists of indivisible substances or atoms, and their accidents. These substances, taken separately, are mere points; they have no magnitude or extension, and are thus imperceptible to sense. They have their *ḥayyiz*, or natural position, which, however, in contradistinction to *makān*, does not involve quantity or spatial magnitude. Only by aggregation do the infinitesimal substances become spatially extended bodies occupying the tri-dimensional *makān*. By union or separation of substances—which are all of the same kind—bodies are produced or dissolved. What is true of space holds good also of time. The latter is generated by the combination of points of time or moments (*'ānāt*). Motion also, like space and time, is discontinuous.

Every individual substance possesses at all times a large number of accidents. Some thinkers even hold that it possesses all possible positive accidents or their opposites. Negative states, or privations, in fact, are just as truly accidents as positive states: death as well as life, ignorance no less than knowledge, etc. Life, feeling, thought—in a word, the soul—are quite consistently classed amongst the accidents. Some writers regard the soul as belonging to all the atoms of the body, while others are of opinion that it is composed of finer atoms, or again, that the soul and the mind appertain to only one particular atom in the body.

No accident can subsist for more than an instant, and as the substance is inseparably united with its accidents, the measure of its persistence likewise shrinks to a moment of time. Now, since the entire aggregate of spatial points which constitutes the world can maintain itself only for a moment, it must follow that the world is created anew by God every instant. There is no such thing as causal connexion or natural law, nothing save the arbitrary act of an omnipotent Creator, to whom being and not-being are alike. God creates as many worlds one after another as He chooses, and when He ceases to create any more, what He then really creates is Nothing.

Here, then, is the religious purpose of this atomistic doctrine achieved. The theory is meant to be, not an explanation, but a subversion, of nature. All natural causes whatever are sacrificed to the arbitrary fiat of Allāh. Anything is possible; whatsoever is capable of being figured in thought or imagination may come to pass. Of everything that happens the opposite might quite as well happen, if Allāh but willed it so.

This atomistic teaching seems almost an anticipation of Occasionalism, especially as applied, not to the course of nature merely, but also to human action. The classical illustration is that of a man engaged in writing. It was maintained that Allāh creates within him, and, indeed, creates anew every instant, first the will, and then the capacity, to write; next, the movement of the hand, and, finally, the motion of the pen, concurrent therewith, etc. Every factor in the transaction is independent of every other, all the several stages of the process emanating from God alone. It is only in appearance that we have a coherent action; only in appearance is there a self-consistent and harmoniously-working world in space and time. That the world and human life appear to be pervaded by a causal nexus is due simply to the fact that meanwhile, and as a rule, Allāh does not choose to interrupt the continuity of events by a miracle. It is possible, however, that He might so intervene at any moment.

LITERATURE.—M. Schreiner, *Der Kalām in der jüdischen Literatur*, 1895 (xiii. 'Bericht über die Lehranstalt f. d. Wissensch. d. Judenthums in Berlin'), and *Studien über Jeschu'a ben Jehuda*, 1900 (xviii. 'Bericht,' etc.); *Kitābu 'l-masā'il fi'l-ḥilāf bejn al-Baṣriyyin wa'l-Baġdādiyyin—Al-kalām fi'l-jawāhir: Die atomistische Substanzenlehre aus dem Buch der Streitfragen zwischen Basrenseern und Bagdadensern*, ed. Biram (Leyden, 1902); *Maimonides' Dalālat al-ḥā'irīn: Le Guide des Égarés*, ed. Munk (1856), i. lxxiii. 375 ff.; *Aḥron ben Elia's Ez ḥayyim*, ed. Steinschneider and Delitzsch (Leipzig, 1841); Kurd Lasswitz, *Gesch. d. Atomistik vom Mittelalter bis Newton* (Hamburg and Leipzig, 1890), i. 134 ff.

T. J. DE BOER.

ATOMIC THEORY (Mediæval and Modern).—**1. History.**—If we seek for an explanation of the phenomena of expansion, contraction, solution, and precipitation, we are inevitably led to adopt the hypothesis that matter is, in its minute structure, formed of particles with interspaces. If matter is a continuum, these phenomena are ultimate facts,

not to be likened to, and not to be explained by, any other facts. We may conceive the possibility of expansion and contraction of a continuum, but we cannot explain it. If, however, we assume that matter consists of discrete particles, a crowd of particles is like a crowd of people. Expansion is a widening out, contraction is a drawing in, of the crowd. Solution is the thorough mixture of two crowds, precipitation is the expulsion or segregation of certain members of the crowd. Other phenomena, too, find an easy explanation. Thus, evaporation is the passing away of members of the crowd from its boundary. It is no necessary part of the hypothesis that the space between the particles is a vacuum. We know that there is air between the members of a crowd of people. So there may be some kind of material between the particles of matter, displaced when other particles squeeze their way in.

When we trace the history of the speculations about the constitution of matter from mediæval into modern times, we find that the atomic doctrine of Greek philosophers—the doctrine that the minute particles are indivisible—has fallen into disfavour (see ATOMIC THEORY [Greek]). The mediæval philosophers no doubt thought of matter as composed of minute parts, and they followed the ancient philosophers in regarding the parts as of four kinds, four elements—fire, air, earth, and water. Ordinary bodies were 'mixed bodies,' mixtures of these four, in different proportions in different bodies. But the elements were not always elements in the modern sense. It was sometimes thought that they could be transformed one into another. Roger Bacon, for instance, in the 13th cent. held that the four elements were made of *hyle* (ὕλη), that each could be converted into the nature of another, and everything into anything else. Wheat is a possible man, and man is possible wheat (*de Arte Chymiæ*).

These four elements were still dominant when modern science began; and long thereafter they hindered progress, not disappearing indeed till the 18th century. At the beginning of the modern period, matter was regarded as consisting of particles, but the particles were not atomic. Thus Francis Bacon in the *Novum Organum* (1620) in several passages mentions the 'atoms' of Leucippus and Democritus only to discard them, and in one passage he says:

'Nor by this are we brought to the (Epicurean) Atom, which presupposes a vacuum, and matter immutable (both of which are false), but to true Particles, as they are found to be' (*Nov. Org.* bk. ii. § 8, Kitchin's tr.).

Bacon made an important contribution to the theory of matter by his clear statement of the doctrine that heat is a mode of motion of the particles:

'Heat is motion, not expansive uniformly in the whole, but expansive through the lesser particles of the body; and at the same time restrained, repelled, and reflected; so that it obtains an alternative motion, ever hurrying, striving, struggling, and irritated by repercussion; whence the fury of fire and heat has its origin' (*ib.* bk. ii. § 20, iii.). 'Heat is motion, expansive, restrained, and struggling through the lesser parts of (a body)' (*ib.* iv.)

These passages clearly imply a crowd of separate particles knocking each other further apart when heated, that is, when thrown into more violent motion. Between the particles Bacon appears to have supposed that there was an intangible, weightless, continuous material which he called 'spirit.' Had he lived later, probably he would have called it 'ether.' He speaks of

'the action and motion of spirit enclosed in tangible bodies. For everything tangible that we know contains an invisible and intangible spirit, and covers and seems to clothe it. Hence that powerful triple source (of effects) and wondrous *process* of spirit in a tangible body. For spirit in a tangible thing, (1) if emitted, contracts and dries up bodies; (2) if retained, softens and melts them; (3) if neither entirely emitted nor entirely retained, models them, gives them limbs, assimilates, carries them out, organizes them,' etc. 'Spirit has no weight' (*op. cit.* bk. ii § 40).

It may be worthy of note that Bacon held that the totality of matter is constant.

The first attempt at a detailed theory of the constitution of matter was made by Descartes in his *Principia Philosophiæ* (1644). He held that whatever we can clearly perceive is true, clear perception being of that which is present and manifest to the mind giving attention to it (pt. i. xxx., xlv.). Applying this doctrine to the parts of matter, he is led to the rejection of indivisible atoms. For however small we suppose the parts, we are always able in thought to divide any one of them into two or more smaller parts, and may accordingly admit their divisibility. Again, he holds that a vacuum or space in which there is absolutely no body is repugnant to reason. Extension in space is extension in substance. All space, then, is filled with matter. Sensible bodies are composed of insensible particles (pt. iv. cci.). These insensible particles are of three elementary forms (pt. iii. lii.), though constituted out of the same kind of material. The first element consists of very minute bits, of irregular shape and capable of very rapid motion; chips off the particles forming the second element, and entirely filling the spaces between them. The particles of the second form have become spheres by attrition. They are very minute, and beyond the range of vision. The third form is larger and slower in motion. The sun and stars are composed of the first element, the sky of the second, and the earth and planets of the third. The second and third elements appear to have vortices of the first element round them, and these vortices account for the forces which the particles exert upon each other. They are like the vortices which Descartes supposed to exist round the sun and planets to account for orbital motion.

This theory of the three elemental forms of matter, fanciful in its beginning, becomes more fanciful as he builds it up. It does not appear to have served, except in the mind of Descartes, to co-ordinate facts or to stimulate investigation. But it is important historically, as the first suggestion that it might be possible to consider in detail the ultimate structure of matter and to explain phenomena by this structure. It is important, too, in that it is purely mechanical, that all phenomena are to be explained by configuration and motion of the ultimate particles. Descartes insisted that the sensations are excited by the *motion* of matter only.

'Our mind is of such a nature that the motions of body alone are sufficient to excite in it all sorts of thoughts, without its being necessary that these should in any way resemble the motions which give rise to them, and especially that these motions can excite in it those confused thoughts called sensations' (pt. iv. cxcvii., Veitch's tr.). We perceive nothing outside ourselves 'except light, colours, smells, tastes, sounds, and the tactile qualities; and these I have recently shown to be nothing more, at least so far as they are known to us, than certain dispositions of the objects, consisting in magnitude, figure, and motion' (pt. iv. cxcix.).

That is, there is not a separate light principle or substance, smell principle, sound principle. These are in our minds. All the different senses are excited by the size, shape, and motion of the small particles of which matter consists.

Like Bacon, Descartes held that heat is a mode of motion of the particles (pt. iv. xxix.).

The most influential writer on the structure of matter in the generation succeeding that of Descartes is Robert Boyle, who in the *Sceptical Chymist* (1661), *Origin of Forms and Qualities* (1666), and other works, laid the foundation of modern chemical theory. He was probably an atomist.

'We may consider,' he says, '(1) that there are in the world great store of Particles of matter, each of which is too small to be, whilst single, sensible; and, being entire, or undivided, must needs both have its determinate shape, and be very Solid. Insomuch that though it be *mentally*, and by Divine Omni-

potence divisible, yet by reason of its Smallness and Solidity, Nature doth scarce ever actually divide it; and these may in this sense be called *Minima* or *Prima Naturalia*. (2) That there are also multitudes of corpuscles, which are made up of the coalition of several of the former *Minima Naturalia*, and whose bulk is so small, and their Adhesion so close and strict, that each of these little Primitive Concretions or Clusters (if I may so call them) of Particles is singly below the discernment of Sense, and though not absolutely indivisible by Nature into the *Prima Naturalia* that composed it, or perhaps into other little fragments, yet, for the reasons freshly intimated, they very rarely happen to be actually dissolved or broken, but remain entire in great variety of sensible Bodies, and under various forms or disguises' (*Forms and Qualities*, p. 71).

Yet in the prefatory address to the reader in the same work, he says that he has forborne to use arguments that are grounded on or suppose indivisible corpuscles called atoms. Though not a Cartesian he followed Descartes, as indeed all the world has followed him, in ascribing the qualities of natural bodies to the 'Catholick and fertile Principle *Motion*, *Bulk*, *Shape*, and *Texture* of the minute parts of Matter' (*Forms and Qualities*, last page). He, too, regarded heat as a vehement agitation of the parts of the body tending all manner of ways ('Heat and Cold,' *Works*, Shaw's ed. i. 560). Fire, however, is the violent agitation of the particles of a subtle matter. But it is for his clear idea of the nature of chemical combination that we are chiefly indebted to Boyle. In the *Sceptical Chymist* he discards the old elements, air, earth, and water, and says that these three are to be regarded as made up of mixed bodies rather than mixed bodies as made up of them; and by mixed bodies he means ordinary bodies which had been regarded as mixtures of air, earth, and water, and had so come to be called mixed bodies. He dwells on the idea that an enormous number of compounds may be made by various arrangements of corpuscles, and that they differ from each other in nothing but the various textures resulting from the magnitude, shape, motion, and arrangement of the small parts.

'One and the same parcel of universal matter may by various alterations and contextures be brought to deserve the name sometimes of a sulphureous, and sometimes of a terrestrial or aqueous body' (Shaw's ed. iii. 282).

Boyle agreed, then, with Descartes in thinking of matter as one in kind, the differences being due solely to shape, size, and motion of the parts.

Newton does not appear to have concerned himself very much with speculations about the ultimate structure of matter. He was, above all, an experimental philosopher, determining laws by experiment and observation, using mathematics to deduce their consequences, and comparing these consequences with further experiment and observation, thereby verifying or correcting the laws. The framing of atomic hypotheses did not come into this programme. In the *Principia* he hardly uses the hypothetical structure of matter at all. There is a suggestion of it in the determination of the velocity of sound, but a mere suggestion. In the series of queries at the end of the *Optics* (2nd and 3rd editions) he gave himself free play, and among a number of speculations he declared himself an atomist. 'It seems probable to me that God in the beginning formed matter in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, movable Particles' (3rd ed. p. 375). In the history of the subject Newton is mentioned only as in all probability deflecting attention from it. His immediate successors were occupied so much in following out his methods that theories of matter were apparently little studied or considered by leaders in physical thought.

But the atomic doctrine was probably making way. One very notable contribution to the particle theory was made by **D. Bernouilli** in his *Hydrodynamica* (1738), § x.. He suggested that a gas consists of very minute corpuscles moving with very great velocities in all directions, and that the pressure of a gas against the walls of a containing vessel is due to the bombardment by these corpuscles. He showed that with this constitution the pressure would be inversely as the volume if the volume were changed, which is 'Boyle's Law'; and that if the temperature were raised by increase in the velocity of the corpuscles, the pressure would be proportioned to the square of the velocity. His reasoning is somewhat obscure and unconvincing, and, perhaps on that account, his theory remained almost unnoticed for more than a century, when it was re-discovered and was developed on better lines.

In 1758, **Boscovich** published his *Theoria Philosophiæ Naturalis*. In this work he begins with his celebrated hypothesis of the nature of an atom, and then seeks to show how physical phenomena, such as collision, cohesion, fluid pressure, viscosity, and elasticity may be accounted for if matter is composed of atoms such as he imagines. According to his hypothesis, an atom is a central point to which mass or inertia is assigned, a mass-point let us say, and towards this point force is acting so that another mass-point is urged towards it with an acceleration proportional to the mass of the first point, and varying with the distance in such a way that at a great distance the attraction is inversely as the square of the distance. But when the distance becomes very small the force undergoes one or more alternations of repulsion and attraction, finally ending with a repulsion which is infinitely great when the two points are infinitely near each other. Two central mass-points can therefore never actually coincide. Boscovich did not assign any formula for the force, probably considering that future experiment alone could determine the law, but it is easy to devise expressions which satisfy his general conditions.

For instance, if a mass-point is distant r from a mass-point m, and if its acceleration to m is expressed by $m(r-a)(r-2a)(r-3a)/r^3$, the force is attractive, and inversely as the square of the distance if r is very great, it increases as r diminishes to a certain point, and then diminishes to zero when $r=3a$. Between $r=3a$ and $r=2a$ it is a repulsion, again vanishing at $r=2a$. Between $r=2a$ and $r=a$ it is an attraction changing again to a repulsion when r is less than a, a repulsion becoming infinite when r is infinitely small. Whatever the velocity of approach, that velocity will be destroyed before the two points coincide, *i.e.* they never will coincide.

Perhaps we can form an idea of the way in which Boscovich's atoms would act, by imagining that two solid surfaces are brought together. At great distances apart there is merely the inverse square law of gravitative attraction. When, however, they come very near, there is mutual pressure, which we may represent by supposing that the surface atoms have come into each other's first sphere of repulsion, and outside pressure is required to overcome this repulsion. If the outside pressure is made very great, we may force the atoms through this sphere of repulsion into the second sphere of attraction, and we may have equilibrium at the point where the attraction again changes into repulsion. If we can reach this point, the surfaces will adhere even when the outside pressure is removed. Thus the hypothesis explains the adhesion of bodies pressed very closely together.

Boscovich's predecessors had, like Newton, imagined a little hard nucleus round the centre of the atom; Boscovich showed that the nucleus was unnecessary. Its place was efficiently taken by the repulsive force rapidly increasing as the centre was approached. The nucleus had no part to play, and might be discarded.

The hypothesis at once excited attention. It was adopted, for instance, by **Priestley** (*Vision*, 1772, and *Matter and Spirit*, 1777). In the next century it attracted **Faraday**, who definitely adopted it (see two letters to R. Phillips, *Researches in Electricity*, 1844–55, ii. 284, iii. 447). Faraday laid stress on the uselessness of the little hard nucleus of finite size

—an idea which had again gained ground in the form of the atomic hypothesis of Dalton. He urged that the powers of matter, the forces which it exerts, are all that we know about it. These powers or forces *are* the matter, and where they extend the matter also extends. Each atom, then, extends through all space. Faraday symbolized the forces by straight lines extending out on all sides from the atomic centres, and thought of light as tremors or minute jerks carried along these lines—an idea which has been revived and made precise by Sir J. J. Thomson.

In recent years, **Lord Kelvin** took up 'the inevitable theory of Boscovich,' and sought to show how the grouping of Boscovichian atoms could account for crystalline arrangement and for the phenomena of light.

For purposes of calculation, the Boscovichian atom is indeed inevitable, in some form or other, in any atomic theory in which the forces depend solely on the distance. Mathematically, there is no difficulty in thinking of one point, B, moving towards another point, A, with an acceleration expressed by $mf(r)$. We then define m as the mass of A. If A moves towards B with an acceleration $m^1f(r)$, we call m^1 the mass of B, and we say that the force is $mm^1f(r)$. But, physically, there is some difficulty in reducing all to force. We think of force as effort, symbolized by muscular effort; and if we have force alone, it is difficult to assign meaning to effort acting on effort. We must have a duality, at least in thought. If we think of force, we think also of that which the force moves, or perhaps more fundamentally that which resists the force, and we call this matter. If with Boscovich and Faraday we identify the moved with the mover, and say that the matter is but force, then we have a dual aspect of force. In one aspect it acts, in the other it suffers action. One is the symbol of will, the other of sensation. Whatever may be the ultimate fate of Boscovich's atom in physical theory, the conception of the unity of matter and force, and unity as force rather than as matter, is a permanent contribution to philosophical ideas.

We have now come to the time when chemistry began to influence atomic speculation. Up to the latter half of the 18th cent. it was a hindrance rather than a help. Of course, chemical knowledge was continually increasing, so far as concerned the extraction of the metals from ores and the preparation of definite substances. But progress in chemical theory was hopeless while the doctrine of the four elements, fire, air, earth, and water, held sway. About 1700 the phlogiston theory of **Stahl** came into vogue, and added to the confusion of thought. This theory held that the metals contained a something called 'phlogiston' which they gave off on combining with air, that oxygen was air deprived of phlogiston, that nitrogen was air containing phlogiston, and some chemists even supposed that hydrogen was phlogiston itself. There must have been some expression or symbolization of fact in a theory which was accepted by discoverers so great as Black, Cavendish, and Priestley. But it is difficult now, so entirely is our point of view changed, to see what facts it expressed. It is obvious only that any advantage in its adoption was far outweighed by the confusion of thought which attended it. Towards the end of the 18th cent. the fog in which chemical theory was enveloped began to lift. The atomic theory had been making way, though in a vague form, and in many minds Boyle's idea that chemical compounds consisted of definite groups of atoms had taken root. The word 'molecule,' originally used as equivalent to particle, was now adopted for atomic groups. The four elements, fire, air, earth, and water, were being gradually disestablished from their supreme position. A number of gases were discovered with definite properties, and obviously not mere modifications of air. Air itself was found to consist almost entirely of two gases which we now call nitrogen and oxygen, and so air ceased to be regarded as an element. Cavendish's discovery that water was a compound of hydrogen and oxygen removed it, too, from the list. Earth was resolved into at least several different earths, and the discovery by Lavoisier of the part played by oxygen in ordinary combustion killed phlogiston. Fire and flame, however, still remained as substances; for the idea that heat was a form of motion, or, as we should now say, of molecular energy, so often put forth in the 17th cent., had fallen into abeyance, and heat was regarded as a subtle substance. The way was being prepared for the atomic theory of Dalton, and there were several foreshadowings of it, the most notable by **William Higgins**, who in 1789 published *A Comparative View of the Phlogistic and Antiphlogistic Theories*, in which he says that 'we may justly conclude that water is composed of molecules formed by the union of a single ultimate particle of dephlogisticated air [oxygen] to an ultimate particle of light inflammable air [hydrogen], and that they are incapable of uniting to a third particle of either principle.' But it is doubtful whether he considered this as an example of a general principle, and he does not appear to have considered the 'ultimate particles' of an element as all alike.

In 1804 the modern doctrine of chemical combination was definitely formulated by **Dalton**, and communicated to his friends. In 1808 he first published it in his *New System of Chemical Philosophy*. According to Dalton, the particles or atoms—he uses the terms indifferently—in a simple body are all exactly alike, and in a finite space enormous in number.

'Chemical analysis and synthesis go no farther than to the separation of particles from one another and to their reunion. No new creation or destruction of matter is within the reach of chemical agency. We might as well attempt to introduce a new planet into the solar system, or to annihilate one already in existence, as to create or destroy a particle of hydrogen. All the changes we can produce consist in separating particles that are in a state of cohesion or combination, and joining those that were previously at a distance.' Compounds are definite groupings of definite atoms. Thus 1 atom of A + 1 atom of B may form 1 atom of C, binary; or 1 atom of A + 2 atoms of B may form 1 atom of D, ternary, and so on.

Here he uses 'atom' for C and D where we now use 'molecule'; and it is evident that he does not think of an atom as an indivisible particle, but as the smallest particle of a body which has the properties of the body. If this particle is divided, the substance is resolved into different substances. Dalton goes on to show that the relative weights of two elements entering into, say, a binary compound are proportional to the weights of the atoms themselves, and he gives the first table of atomic weights of the elements, taking the hydrogen atom, the lightest, as having weight 1.

Dalton's great advance appears to consist in the clearness of his conception of an element as consisting of particles all alike, and whether truly atomic or not, yet indivisible by ordinary chemical agency, and in his supposition that compounds consisted in general of small groups of these elementary particles or atoms. This gave an easily pictured hypothesis to account for the chemical fact, by this time established, that the elements combine in definite proportions, which are always integral multiples of the smallest proportions in which they enter into combination. From this time forward, chemists, freed from the burden of the four elements, sought for bodies which were not to be decomposed by ordinary chemical and physical agency. These they termed 'elements,' and they investigated the

proportions in which the elements entered into compounds.

Soon after the publication of Dalton's theory, Avogadro put forward the hypothesis that in gases at the same temperature and pressure equal volumes contain equal numbers of molecules—a hypothesis then supported by experiments on the combination of gases, and since shown to be in accord with the kinetic theory of gases.

We have seen that with Dalton the atom was not necessarily indivisible, but merely undivided, and in modern times probably no one has held the indivisibility. Indeed, quite early in the development of the atomic theory by chemists, the old idea was revived, that the atoms of the different elements were really made of one kind of material, differing only in the quantity or arrangement of that material. Prout held that all the atomic weights were exact multiples of the atomic weight of hydrogen, a supposition which seems to imply that other elements were really groups of hydrogen atoms not to be divided by known agency. Later, it was suggested that discrepancies with this theory might be accounted for by taking one half or one quarter of the hydrogen atom as the unit out of which other atoms were built. But subsequent research on atomic weights has not supported these suggestions. There were, however, other reasons for supposing some community of plan in atomic structure. If weights of different metals be taken, containing, on the atomic hypothesis, equal numbers of atoms, nearly equal quantities of heat are required in many cases to raise these weights through one degree of temperature. In electrolysis, equal quantities of electricity are required to turn equal numbers of atoms out of combination. If the atoms of different elements had, as their only common property, weight or gravitation, and in other qualities were entirely different, we should hardly expect these quantitative relations.

The chemical atomic theory, as set forth by Dalton, is a statical theory. For chemical purposes the atoms may, up to a certain point, be considered as little bodies somehow held together in compounds by forces which need not be specified; and their motion and the motion of the molecules need not be regarded.

By the middle of the 19th cent. the researches of Joule and others had led every one to reject the doctrine of heat as a substance, and had brought to the front the old idea that heat was the energy of motion and of separation of the atoms and molecules. The dynamic aspect of the atomic and molecular theory now began to be seriously studied. We have seen that D. Bernouilli made an early but fruitless attempt to show that gas pressure could be accounted for by molecular motion. Other attempts were made by Herapath in 1821, by Waterston in 1846 (published only in 1892, when Lord Rayleigh disinterred the paper from the archives of the Royal Society), and by Joule.

Joule, in 1848 (*Scientific Papers*, i. 290), was the first to publish a calculation of the velocity with which the molecules are flying about. But the general acceptance of the dynamical, or, as it is now termed, the kinetic, theory began with the work of Krönig, Clausius, and Maxwell about 1856, and from that time onwards the theory has been developed in a series of memoirs by various authors, especially by Clausius, Maxwell, and Boltzmann.

2. **Kinetic Theory.**—The kinetic theory has been studied chiefly with regard to gases. It supposes that a gas consists of an enormous number of molecules, all exactly alike in a given gas, but so small that their average distance apart is very great compared with the size of any one molecule. These molecules are flying about in all directions with very great velocities, continually colliding with each other and with the walls of any containing vessel. The collisions are of such a kind that on the whole the energy of motion remains the same so long as the temperature is constant. The molecules are so far apart that they do not act upon each other except just during the moment of collision. Between collisions, then, they move in straight lines, and the average length of path between two collisions is called the 'Mean Free Path.' The velocities of the molecules are not all equal, but are grouped about a mean value which remains constant, and when the gas is in a constant or steady condition the grouping about this mean value is constant. It can be shown from simple mechanical considerations that if $\bar{v}^2$ is the average of the squares of the velocities, if p is the pressure, and if ρ is the density, then $\bar{v}^2 = 3\ p/\rho$. If we suppose that $\bar{v}^2$ remains constant so long as the temperature is constant, when the density is changed by changing the pressure, p/ρ is constant. This gives 'Boyle's Law.' The mean velocity is not quite the same as $\bar{v}$ (the square root of the mean of the squares), but the difference is only small. For hydrogen at 0° C. $\bar{v}$ is about 1800 metres per second—over a mile per second. For oxygen and nitrogen it is about a quarter of a mile per second. It can be shown that in a mixture of gases it is necessary that the average kinetic energy of each kind of molecule be the same in order that the collisions shall not affect the general condition; hence it can be further shown that the number of molecules in equal volumes of two gases at the same temperature and pressure is equal. This is 'Avogadro's Law.' Experiment shows that the pressure of a gas in a closed vessel increases by equal amounts with equal rises of temperature, and is, in fact, proportional to the temperature reckoned from −273° C. as zero. Then $\bar{v}^2$ is also proportional to this temperature. Or the mean kinetic energy of the particles is proportional to the temperature reckoned from −273° C. On this scale of temperature the sun's surface is probably about twenty times as hot as the earth's surface, so that the molecules of hydrogen there have about twenty times as great a $\bar{v}^2$ as they have here. Their velocity is thus about $4\frac{1}{2}$ times as great, say, some 5 or 6 miles per second.

So far it is not necessary to enter into the structure of the molecules; but for further developments with regard to the specific heats of gases, structure has to be taken into account, and difficulties arise into which we need not enter.

The mean free path, or the average distance travelled in a straight line between two collisions, plays a very important part in the theory. It is evident that the rate of diffusion of one gas into another, or the diffusion of one part of the same gas into another part, will depend partly on the mean free path, partly on the velocity; and from certain phenomena depending on the rate of diffusion, most simply from the resistance to the travelling of one layer of gas over another, the mean free path can be calculated. For hydrogen at atmospheric pressure it is about 0·00002 cm., or, say, a little less than a hundred thousandth of an inch. For air it is almost half as much. This implies that the hydrogen molecule is effectively less than the air molecule, since it can thread its way farther through its neighbours without collision.

The greatest triumph of the kinetic theory consists in its determination of the size of the molecules and of the number in a given space. By the size of the molecules we are not to suppose some definite solid shape. Imagine two molecules approaching so closely that they just begin to deflect each other, *i. e.* just begin to collide. Draw equal

spheres round each, just touching. Then the radius of either sphere is termed the radius of molecular action, and the sphere round each molecule is taken to be the size of the molecule, even though the atomic centres may be far within the surface of the sphere. It is evident that the mean free path of a molecule depends partly on the number of molecules in a given space, and partly on their size, just as the distance a man can walk straight on in a street without touching another passenger will depend partly on the number of people, partly on their breadth from shoulder to shoulder. A relation can be found connecting the mean free path, the molecular size, and the number present in unit volume; and since we know the mean free path, this gives a relation between size and number. Another relation can be obtained from the supposition that when the gas is condensed to a liquid the contraction is due to all the molecular spheres coming into contact. We may illustrate this by thinking of a cloud of equal water drops in a vessel as representing the molecules. When the cloud sinks to the bottom of the vessel, the volume of water at the bottom will be equal to the volume of each drop multiplied by the number of drops. So the observed volume of liquid into which a given volume of gas condenses may be taken as equal to the volume of each molecule multiplied by the number of molecules. At least it may be taken as nearly equal. We cannot say how closely the molecules are packed in a liquid, and thus some uncertainty is introduced into the results obtained. Thus we have two relations between number and size, and from these two we can calculate approximately both number and size. The result obtained is that the number of molecules in a cubic centimetre of a gas at 0° C. and atmospheric pressure is about 6×10^{19}. The mass of a molecule of hydrogen, which we must suppose to consist of two atoms, is a little less than 10^{-24} of a gramme. The radius of molecular action, differing somewhat for different gases, lies between 10^{-7} and 10^{-8} of a centimetre. The number of molecules in a cubic centimetre of water is about 10^{23}, and the distance from centre to centre about 10^{-8} cm. (These results can be translated into inches if it is remembered that 1 inch = 2·5 cm.) The number of molecules of gas per cubic centimetre has been calculated in other ways, most notably from certain experiments on electric discharge, and the results obtained are in fair accordance with those given above. Unless, then, we reject the theory altogether, we may assume that we know with fair accuracy both the 'size' and the average distance apart of the molecules in a body.

The kinetic theory, when applied to account for the properties of solids and liquids, has made very little progress. In the gaseous condition the molecules, according to the theory, spend most of their time in moving in straight lines, and when the collisions do occur there is no need to consider the forces acting. It is enough to assume that, on the whole, collisions do not alter the general condition. Many properties can then be accounted for. But when we come to solids and liquids, the molecules are supposed to be so closely packed as to be always entangled with each other, and there is no mean free path. Hence we cannot go far without knowing the forces between the molecules; and even if we could specify the forces, the calculations of their effects in such complex systems would probably be exceedingly difficult. In the solid condition, we must suppose that the molecules do not move far from a mean position. Each is held by its neighbours, so that though it may be violently agitated it keeps slackly anchored, as it were, to one spot. In a liquid, the molecules are still entangled with each other, but they possess more energy, and are able to break away every now and then from their anchorage and get into new surroundings. A liquid may probably be regarded as a cross between a solid and a gas—solid-like if time be reckoned by millionths or billionths of a second, gas-like if it be reckoned by seconds.

3. **Atomic and molecular structure.**—Since the kinetic theory of matter arose, several attempts have been made to imagine atomic structures which should serve to give some account of phenomena. Rankine (Nichol's *Encyclopædia*, *s.v.* 'Heat,' p. 353) assumed that the atoms were little nuclei surrounded by atmospheres whirling round them in vortices—a revival of Descartes's idea. Though Rankine made use of the theory himself, it is obscure in detail, and has not been used by others.

The vortex atom of Lord Kelvin (*PRSE*, Feb. 1867) is a much more celebrated hypothesis. This atom is founded on Helmholtz's investigations on fluid motion. We are to suppose that space is full of a frictionless incompressible fluid of uniform density throughout. An atom is a vortex ring in this fluid, a ring-shaped portion of the fluid distinguished from the rest solely by its peculiar whirling motion. The whirling motion may be understood by running an india-rubber umbrella-ring along its stick. The friction makes it move round and round as it travels. The rings which an expert smoker makes are vortex rings. A spoon drawn sharply across a cup of tea makes half a vortex ring of which the two cut ends, as it were, appear as little whirlpools, the half ring being below the surface. We can make rings in real fluids, because they possess viscosity or friction. But in a frictionless fluid, the creation and equally the destruction of a ring would require forces to act which the fluid itself does not possess; so that a ring if in existence must have existed in all past time, and will persist in all future time, the same portion of fluid always existing in it. We thus have a suggestion for an indivisible and eternal atom. The difficulty of the mathematical investigation of the mutual actions of vortex rings is so great, that little progress has been made in the theory. But it possesses value in suggesting the possibility that all energy is of one kind, energy of motion either of the rings themselves or of the fluid outside the rings. In accounting for the eternity of the atom it perhaps goes too far. In recent years the theory has dropped into the background.

Another hypothesis, due to Larmor (*PRS* lxi. [1897] p. 275), supposes that space is filled with an elastic solid, or jelly, capable of vibrating and carrying waves. An atom is the centre of a strain or twist in the jelly. The strain is persistent, but it can move from point to point in the jelly, using new parts as it travels along. It is the form of strain which is the persistent atom. The atom may be likened to a kink on a rope which travels along the rope, new material continually passing into the kink to take the place of the material which passes out of it.

Larmor has developed this hypothesis in several memoirs, showing how electrical and optical phenomena are to be interpreted in terms of it.

The latest atomic hypothesis is one which assigns an electrical structure to the atom. Here we can only give a sketch of the subject. Fuller details will be found in *Electricity and Matter* and *The Corpuscular Theory of Matter*, by Sir J. J. Thomson, on whose researches the hypothesis is chiefly based, and in *Electrons*, by Sir Oliver Lodge.

The idea that the forces keeping the atoms together in the molecule are electrical in nature is

as old as **Davy.** It is rendered probable by the fact that electric charges put into a liquid will decompose it, and by the fact that one of the chief sources of electricity is the voltaic cell in which chemical combination occurs and charges are given out. We may suppose that, if a molecule contains two constituent atoms or groups of atoms, one of these is positively electrified and the other negatively electrified, and that it is the attraction between the two charges which binds the atoms together to form the molecules.

Faraday discovered that, when a liquid is decomposed by an electric current, a definite charge of electricity of each kind is required to disengage a definite amount of an element from a compound, and that, if we accept the atomic theory, the charge is proportional to the number of atoms disengaged. The hydrogen atom always requires the same charge. Other atoms require either the same charge as the hydrogen atom or twice the charge or a small multiple of it. There is no evidence for the existence of a smaller charge than that on the hydrogen atom, and apparently all other charges are exact multiples of it. Thus electricity appears to be, as it were, atomic. Any quantity of it consists of multiples of the hydrogen atom charge, which is an undivided unit. We have to suppose that, when we decompose a molecule, each constituent has a charge, one positive the other negative, and we have to put in equal neutralizing charges to render the products of decomposition neutral. This interpretation of Faraday's discovery may be regarded as the foundation of the theory of the electrical atom.

The superstructure began with a discovery made by **Crookes,** when investigating electric discharge in highly rarefied gases. If the discharge takes place between two metal plates in a space sufficiently rarefied, Crookes found that a stream of negatively electrified matter shoots straight out from the plate to which negative electricity is supplied. This stream of matter can be deflected by a magnet. Sir J. J. Thomson found that it can be deflected also by electric force. In a series of brilliant experiments on the deflections by known magnetic and electric forces, he made the immensely important discoveries that the mass carrying a given charge is the same whatever the gas used, and that it is $\frac{1}{1700}$ part of the mass of hydrogen which would carry the same charge. By further experiments he showed that each particle in the stream carried a charge equal to that of the hydrogen atom, so that the mass of each particle is $\frac{1}{1700}$ part of the mass of the hydrogen atom. These minute carriers of negative electricity he termed 'corpuscles.' They are usually now called 'electrons.' We must suppose that the electric forces during the discharge tear away the negatively electrified portions of the atoms at the negative plates, that these are alike for all atoms, and that their mass is but $\frac{1}{1700}$ part of the mass of the hydrogen atom. If the atom was neutral before the corpuscle was torn from it, an equal positive charge remains behind upon what is left.

In building up the electric atom we must bear in mind that all experiment shows that there are equal quantities of the two opposite charges. We do not know of such a thing as a charge of one kind alone. One kind of charge is always accompanied by the other kind of charge—either united to it as in a so-called neutral atom, or separated from it by a greater or less distance, yet connected to it by forces. We imagine, then, that an atom consists electrically of a charge of positive electricity and a greater or less number of electrons, and there are reasons for supposing that the number of electrons is proportional to the atomic weight. The oxygen atom will possess, for instance, 16 times as many electrons as the hydrogen atom. The positive charge is equal to the sum of all the negative charges on the electrons. This positive charge is supposed to be spherical, and to be distributed uniformly within the sphere. In some way it coheres and occupies a definite volume of the order of the atomic volume, say, 10^{-8} cm. radius. The spherical supposition is made for simplicity of treatment. The electrons are moving about inside the globe, and can move without resistance through the positive. With these suppositions, it can be shown that, if there were a single electron moving within the globe of positive, it would have a definite period of revolution round the centre of the globe, the same whatever its distance from the centre. With a number of electrons moving in orbits round the centre, each would affect the time of revolution of the others, but certain arrangements of orbits would persist. Other arrangements might be unstable, and then electrons might be thrown out of the atom. As the electrons circulate in their orbits, they radiate out energy in the form of waves, one wave for each revolution, and the hypothesis thus seeks to account for light and other radiation of like kind. If two such atoms approach each other, one may be so nearly unstable that it parts with one electron, giving it to the other, which may absorb it into its own system. One atom, then, gains a small balance of positive, while the other has acquired an equal small balance of negative, and, these opposite charges attracting each other, the atoms keep together and form a molecule.

The atom possesses an enormous store of energy in the motion of the negative electrons. It may become unstable through mutual action of these in their orbits, and some part may fly off to form a new atom. Thus the hypothesis seeks to account for the breaking down of the atoms which appears to occur in radium and other radio-active bodies.

We have seen that the mass of each electron is $\frac{1}{1700}$ part of that of the hydrogen atom. The hypothesis gives an account of this mass which we owe to J. J. Thomson. If a body with an electric charge upon it is moving, it acts like a short length of electric current, and it is surrounded by a field of magnetic force; that is, there is magnetic energy in the space around as well as electric energy. If the moving body is a sphere with the charge upon its surface, the quantity of magnetic energy is directly proportional to the square of its velocity, and is inversely as its radius. Now, the mass of a body may be measured by the energy required to get up in it a given velocity v, for that energy is $mv^2/2$. If the sphere has mass m and no charge, its energy when moving with v is $mv^2/2$. If it has a charge, then there is in addition the magnetic energy also proportional to v^2, say, $m^1v^2/2$, or the total will be $(m+m^1)\,v^2/2$. Suppose that when without charge the sphere has no mass, m will be 0. When it has a charge, there will still be mass m^1, or rather the sphere will behave just as if it had this mass. It is possible, then, that the mass of the electron is entirely due to its charge. Calculation shows that a massless sphere carrying a surface charge equal to that of the hydrogen atom, and about 10^{-13} cm. in radius, would behave as if it had mass $\frac{1}{1700}$ of the hydrogen atom.

If we could suppose that the hydrogen atom contains 1700 electrons, we could thus account for its whole mass. But it appears much more probable that that atom contains but one or a few electrons, so that if we are still to give an electrical account of mass, we must break up the positive globe into very small spheres enormous in number, and each containing a very small charge, far smaller than

that on the electron, these being scattered through the globe. But for this supposition there does not as yet appear to be any justification, *i.e.* it does not account for any observed phenomena.

Certain experiments do seem to show that the mass of the electrons is fully accounted for by the magnetic energy of their charges when in motion; but even if we accept this account it is very doubtful if we have 'explained' mass. Certainly all our measurements of energy involve the idea of mass, and it may perhaps be maintained that the magnetic energy in the space round the moving electron implies the existence of mass in that space to serve as a seat for the energy. If so, the electric theory of mass only takes the mass from the inside of the moving sphere and spreads it through the outside space. Again, we come to the Boscovich-Faraday conception, that an atom is wherever its force acts—not at the centre alone, but spread through all space.

Summary.—Present position of the atomic theory.—The belief that matter is granular in structure, that it consists of exceedingly minute discrete particles, is irresistible. The particle structure accounts for a vast host of observed facts, for which no other explanation has been suggested. We must accept it, unless we abandon all explanation by means of hypothesis, and are willing to content ourselves with mere description of phenomena—a frame of mind which is non-existent. When we pursue the particle structure into detail, we find an excellent explanation for the facts of chemistry in the hypothesis that, in a definite chemical compound, the particles are molecules, all alike, and that each molecule consists of a group of still smaller particles, which, without prejudice to their divisibility, we call atoms. The chemist finds that the compound can be resolved into bodies, each of which is incapable of further resolution by ordinary chemical agency, and which he terms 'elementary.' An element is supposed to consist of atoms all alike in each one kind. No explanation other than this has been devised for chemical phenomena, and it works so well that it has been universally accepted. So far, we cannot even conceive of any other hypothesis. The hypothesis that in a gas the molecules are, on the average, far apart and rushing about leads to a simple explanation of many gas properties, and has suggested properties hitherto unknown which investigation has shown to exist. Again, no alternative hypothesis has been offered; and if we accept this, we are bound to accept the determinations of number and size, determinations arrived at also from other starting-points.

So far, no special assumptions need be made as to atomic or molecular structure. But if we seek an explanation, on the atomic hypothesis, of certain electrical phenomena, we must imagine some definite structure for the atom. The electrical atom, in some such form as that described, is the only atom yet imagined which has any value for the purpose. It has served to explain many of the phenomena, and it has suggested researches which have led to new and important discoveries. It is easy to criticize it, to point out the large assumptions on which it is founded. There is, for instance, the coherent globe of positive electricity held together by unknown agency and allowing the negative electrons to move about freely in it. For this we require properties unlike the properties of any known electrical system. But the chief value of such a hypothesis lies, not in its objective truth, but in its success in accounting for, in co-ordinating, what we actually observe, and in predicting results which are afterwards verified. It is to be regarded as a 'working model' which gives the same results as the actual atom, though, it may be, by quite different machinery. From this point of view the electrical atom is a brilliant success.

We observe phenomena due to matter in large masses. Our senses tell us nothing of ultra-microscopic structure, and perhaps the sparkling of zinc sulphide when exposed to radium is the only phenomenon which can fairly be ascribed to single atoms, each sparkle being assigned to the impact of one atom. When we go behind observed phenomena and assume a minute structure to account for them—a structure far beyond the range of our senses in minuteness, and probably utterly beyond direct verification — it is possible to imagine many types of structure which will account for what we observe; just as when we stand in front of a clock which we cannot open, we can imagine many different trains of wheel-work which will account for the motion of the hands. We must, therefore, accept only provisionally any one type of atomic structure which may be offered. It is, on the highest valuation, only one possible solution of the problem. We must be prepared for alteration, for addition, for re-construction, as new phenomena are observed and need to be accounted for. We must be prepared even to abandon it altogether if some better 'working model' is devised. The hypotheses of science are continually changing. Old hypotheses break down and new ones take their place. But the classification of known phenomena which a hypothesis has suggested, and the new discoveries of phenomena to which it has led, remain as positive and permanent additions to natural knowledge when the hypothesis itself has vanished from thought.

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J. H. POYNTING.

ATONEMENT.—See EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT.

ATROPHY.—This term in its simplest meaning signifies lack of nourishment, but in its strictest use is applied to the diminution and enfeeblement of the limbs and organs, or parts of organs, of complex animals and vegetables as a result of disuse. The rapid decrease in weight of an animal as a result of starvation, or the wasting (emaciation) so commonly seen as a consequence of prolonged fever or malignant disease, does not even in the medical sense come under the heading 'atrophy'; this term is used to express such changes as the wasting of a muscle when its nerve supply is cut. Muscles are in reality the specialized end-organs of motor nerves, and without the necessary stimulus from the nerve-centres the muscle is useless. The atrophy of a muscle is brought about not only by dividing its dominant nerve, but also by destroying the nerve-centre in the spinal cord or brain from which its impulses to contract are derived. Examples of atrophied muscles from these causes may be found in every Poor Law infirmary in Great Britain. Similar results may be studied in other special sense-organs like the

eye; when the optic nerve is divided, or the visual centre in the brain destroyed, the retina, the delicate structure in the eyeball which is the recipient of light rays, quickly atrophies. It is likewise a matter of importance for the preservation of highly organized structures that they be kept in moderate use. It is common knowledge that living animals kept in dark places lose their acuteness of vision, and in fish, crustaceans, and burrowing forms of animal life the sense of vision is not only diminished but is actually lost, and the eyeballs diminish to inconspicuous dots.

The most interesting examples of atrophy and suppression of parts are those which come under the observation of naturalists and morphologists. These observers are especially interested in the effects produced by disuse of organs of animals and plants caused by changed habits of life, or by the increasing importance of other organs. This is illustrated by tadpoles. When the frog embryo emerges from the egg, it has a long tail and external gills; in the course of its metamorphosis limbs appear, and the tadpole assumes more and more the form of a frog; the gills and tail do not drop off, but are slowly absorbed and disappear, and the aquatic tadpole is changed to the amphibious frog. The disappearance and modification of the cartilaginous arches which supported its gills, and some correlated changes in the framework of the skull, are as remarkable, though not so obvious, as the atrophy of the tail. Similar atrophy of organs may be studied in many animal forms which in their early life enjoy a free existence, but later become fixed forms, such as ascidians. Many remarkable instances of the atrophy and disappearance of larval organs may be studied among invertebrates, especially sea-urchins and star-fishes. Whilst wondering at these remarkable things, we should not overlook the fact that many instances of this suppression of parts occur in the highest mammals, even in man. The fall of the milk-teeth is due to a process similar to that which causes the loss of the tail in tadpoles and ascidians. Puppies are born blind, owing to the existence of a vascular membrane occupying the space known as the pupil of the eye; this membrane atrophies, and the pups become sensible to light. In the human embryo this membrane is also present, but it disappears shortly before birth.

The bodies of all mammalia contain many remnants of organs which in the early stage of their development were of first-rate importance in their economy; but when the animals are born and become lung-breathers, the alteration in the manner of respiration leads to very great changes in a few of the larger blood-vessels, causing them to atrophy; but they remain throughout life detectable by the eye and scalpel of the anatomist. Even more remarkable are the great number of vestiges of parts which may be discovered in every special organ of the body; and the more specialized the organ has become, the greater the number of atrophied parts it contains. The brain abounds in such remnants, and contains rudiments of a third eye. The organ of hearing, and even the external ear, or auricle, contain many atrophied parts. This is true of the eyeball and its protecting lids. A child can verify for himself that a horse or a dog has three eyelids, merely by holding the paired eyelids apart; and if he examines the nasal side of his own orbit he will see the little pink cone representing the third eyelid (nictitating membrane) of the horse, dog, and owl, and with a magnifying glass may distinguish the delicate hairs upon it. The larynx, the heart, the liver, the intestines, and even the limbs abound in vestiges. In those remarkably modified mammals the whales, the hind limbs are represented by mere rudiments concealed in blubber.

Probably the result of atrophy in producing profound modification of outward form and structure and yet leaving traces of its steps in the form of atrophied organs is nowhere so convincing as, or more easily studied than, in those interesting flowers known as orchids. The present writer believes that it is hardly an exaggeration to urge that orchids hold the same relation in the floral world in regard to modification of form through atrophy and suppression of parts—the results of a changed environment—that whales hold for the same reasons among mammals.

Not the least important aspect of atrophy is its relation to sexual organs. It is well known that flowers represent the reproductive organs of phanerogamous plants, and that in many of them a single flower contains male and female parts. In some plants the sexes of the flowers are separate, some being male and others female. A careful investigation of the development of certain flowers which, when fully blown, are of single sex, shows that they possess the germs of organs belonging to both sexes, and that in the course of growth the organs of one sex develop and attain maturity, whilst those of the opposite sex remain rudimentary or completely atrophy. It happens, and not infrequently, that in a flower of a plant normally unisexual the male and female parts develop equally: such are called hermaphrodite. Exactly similar conditions have been detected throughout the animal kingdom, even to its summit—man. In the higher mammals, hermaphrodite forms are always sterile, and regarded as malformations. In addition to suppressed or atrophied parts resuming a former higher grade of development, they may even in their degenerate condition, like idlers in a community, be a source of much trouble. Very many curious and often dangerous conditions, known to surgeons as cysts and tumours, arise in the remnants of belated organs. Many occur in the neighbourhood of the mouth, tongue, and neck. Probably the two most persistently fatal are the vermiform appendix, and the remnant of the representative of the yolk-sac, known as Meckel's *diverticulum*, a fertile source of intestinal obstruction as well as a cause of malformation in that part of the alimentary canal known as the *ileum*.

When an organ, or part of an organ, which is usually suppressed, or represented by an atrophied rudiment in the adult, appears as a fairly formed part in an animal, it is regarded as a malformation. For example, men and women normally possess twelve pairs of ribs, but the vertebral segments in the neck, and some of those in the loin, possess minute undifferentiated ribs. In many vertebrates the corresponding cervical and lumbar vertebræ bear well-developed ribs, but, as they are always present, it is usual to speak of them as normal. Occasionally in man the rudimentary ribs in the neck and loin appear as well-developed elements in the skeleton. Thus a skeleton with thirteen pairs of ribs is described as being abnormal. The condition has a deeper meaning. The interpretation which the morphologist places on the matter is this: Man is descended from an ancestor who normally possessed more than twelve pairs of ribs; the cervical and lumbar ribs have undergone suppression, and are represented by rudiments or vestiges. When a vestige of this character reappears in a functional form, it is described as an example of atavism (*q.v.*) or reversion.

Atavistic phenomena are easily studied in plants. This has been a subject of great fascination since Goethe drew the attention of botanists to the fact that the various parts of a flower may be regardec as modified leaves. This does not mean that each

part of a flower is a metamorphosed leaf, but that we are able to trace every structural gradation, from leaves to bracts, from bracts to sepals; and not infrequently sepals will be replaced by or become converted into true leaves. The changes from sepals to petals, and from petals to stamens, are as gradual as from bracts to sepals; and the homology is often declared by the stamens becoming petals, and petals appearing as leaves. Even stamens occasionally revert in this way, and constitute abnormalities or monstrosities.

Atavistic conditions of this kind are met with in animals, especially in connexion with the appendages of crustaceans; and it is astounding to see a lobster with an antenna surmounting its eye-stalk and replacing the whole or part of its eye. Yet parallel malformations occur in sheep, dogs, and children, when the conjunctival covering of the eyeball reverts to skin and produces hair. Although men offer explanations of these curious phenomena, and call them reversions to ancestral types or adaptations to environment, or seek to solve them by the phrase 'natural selection,' it must be admitted that the cause still remains veiled in impenetrable mystery. It is also certain that, if we knew the cause of the shedding of the milk-teeth in children, we should be able to explain the origin of species, and the cause of the great division of plants and animals into males and females. See also DEGENERATION, DISEASE.

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J. BLAND-SUTTON.

ATTACHMENT.—Attachment may be considered in three relations: (1) attachment to the things of sense; (2) to objects of affection; (3) to the fruits of action.

1. *Attachment to the things of sense.*—This is the uncontrollable attraction that the physical and emotional environment has for the lower consciousness in man. Now it is obvious that attachment in this sense is perfectly natural, and is quite necessary for long stages of evolution during which the ego in man is gaining experience and learning the necessity for self-control, while the various faculties of the mind are developed through the activities induced by the struggle for life and goods. The characteristic of this form of attachment is that it centres in the personal self, and is essentially selfish, and so cannot be an abiding condition in the life of humanity. A time comes in the evolution of each individual soul when that attachment is weakened and a new centre formed; and it is religion that then begins to draw in opposition to that downward absorption in worldly affairs which claims so strongly the energies of man. There may indeed be long periods during which the attraction towards a spiritual life may seem almost inoperative, but sooner or later must come the conversion to a new course of life, when the old way will be forsaken and an upward path adopted.

2. *Objects of affection.*—Though attachment here, in the more primitive phases, is strongly permeated with selfishness, yet there is always and in all cases a centre of attraction formed outside the self, and this change, implying new motives, at once begins to humanize and improve the entire nature. From sex and family affections—extended gradually to comrades and friends—there eventually arises a wide love of mankind, losing all the elements of attachment as it grows in unselfishness and approaches union with the Divine.

3. *The fruits of action.*—Man seeks advantageous results; he sets his mind on success, and is proportionally elated or depressed as events turn out in accordance with his wishes or against them. He is attached to the outcome of his efforts, and is not content solely with doing his duty, or his best, and leaving the result to God. It is on this kind of attachment that the *Bhagavad Gītā* (ch. 5) has so much to say: 'The man who is devoted and not attached to the fruit of his actions obtains tranquillity; whilst he who through desire has attachment for the fruit of action is bound down thereby.' Man acts less and less selfishly as he rises towards perfection, and he remains undismayed and patient when the results appear adverse. When he has rid himself of all the lower attachments, he is no longer a slave to the lower desires, and has become ready to enter the abode of bliss, or the Kingdom of Heaven, for he has conquered self and obtained freedom.

LITERATURE.—Fowler and Wilson, *The Principles of Morals*, Oxford, 1894, p. 98; Davidson, *Christian Ethics*, London, 1899, p. 110 f.; Newbolt, *The Sacrament of the Altar*, London, 1908, pp. 175, 260; Copleston, *Buddhism, Primitive and Present*[2], London, 1908, p. 98. See also DETACHMENT, LOVE, FEELING.

G. A. GASKELL.

ATTENTION.—

'Strange to say, so patent a fact as the perpetual presence of selective attention has received hardly any notice from psychologists of the English empiricist school. The Germans have explicitly treated of it, either as a faculty or as a resultant; but in the pages of such writers as Locke, Hume, Hartley, the Mills, and Spencer, the word scarcely occurs, or if it does so, it is parenthetically and as if by inadvertence. The motive of this ignoring of the phenomenon is obvious enough. These writers are bent on showing how the higher faculties of the mind are pure products of "experience"; and experience is supposed to be of something simply given. Attention, implying a degree of reactive spontaneity, would seem to break through the circle of pure receptivity which constitutes "experience," and hence must not be spoken of under penalty of interfering with the smoothness of the tale' (James, *Principles of Psychology*, i. 402).

This is the opening paragraph of James's chapter on Attention, which introduced into English-speaking countries a new and better way of treating the subject. Other writers on Psychology have written luminously on the subject, and readers of the works of Ward, Baldwin, Stout and others, may now have an adequate conception of the function of attention in the evolution of mental life, and of its significance in mental work.

While the empiricists have, for the reason stated by Professor James, thrust attention into the background, and have neglected the whole function of mental activity in experience, other schools also have conspired towards the neglect of this form of mental action. Idealism in all its forms finds scarcely any place for it and its function. As the empiricist, in the interest of a view which regarded experience as given and determined by the pressure of the external order on the mind, insisted that all experience is implicit in sense impressions, so the idealist regarded experience as determined by the evolution of the Idea. Will is, for some of them, especially for Mr. Bradley, the self-realization of the Idea. But in the evolution of the Idea there is no room for selective attention; there is scarcely room for any activity of the subject at all. It is curious that both idealists and empiricists come to practically the same result. Empiricists ignore selective attention, because they wish to account for all the products of experience by laws of association which cluster things together independently of the activity of the subject; and idealists, in the interests of the ideal order, regard experience as dictated by the objective selection of pure thought.

In truth, the question of attention and its significance involves the whole question of the possibility of spontaneity in life, and of whether the movement of life is wholly determined from without, or whether the organic being has the power of selecting, out of various possibilities, what it can be and do. Is there such a thing as subjective selection, as Dr. Ward calls it, or organic selec-

tion, as Professor Baldwin calls it? Or is the life of an organism determined for it by factors in which it has no function? Is there subjective selection, or is all determined by what is called Natural Selection? The question is too large to be argued here, but it is named because the same fundamental issue is raised by writers on attention. It may be well, then, simply to state the issue as it appears from the view of Biology before we discuss it from the narrower view of Psychology and Ethics.

The question may be broadly stated thus: Is there an autonomy of life? Is the proper activity of the organism a real factor in biology? And are there new concepts required to describe the functions of life, in addition to those which are required for an adequate account of the phenomena of the inorganic world? A quarter of a century ago, it was strongly affirmed that a true and adequate scientific account of vital behaviour could be reached only when the behaviour of life could be expressed in terms of physics and chemistry. Vital phenomena were only transformed physical and chemical processes. They were altogether determined by the pressure of physical and chemical activities. Let one read the writings of Huxley, or the art. 'Zoology' in *EBr*[9], and it will be seen that the physical and chemical explanation held the field. It holds the field no longer. There are now many who do not fear to speak of the autonomy of life, and who do not hesitate to affirm that the chief factor in biological science is the proper activity of the organism. It is questioned now whether any organic feature can be explained, even in the most general way, by the action of physical forces.

'What at first seems to be the result of mechanical pressure may afterwards be found to be an active process of growth, and what at first seems to be a full effect of capillarity among homogeneous elements may afterwards be shown to depend on specialized metabolic conditions of the surfaces as its principal *cause*' (Driesch, *The Science and Philosophy of the Organism*, i. p. 93).

As Driesch further shows, these processes do not constitute life, 'they are used by life.' In this sentence the issue is stated with clearness and precision. Life uses for its own purpose the physical and chemical processes, and account must be taken of the activity of life, if we are to understand the problem of vital behaviour.

Life, then, uses the physical and chemical processes, and by its own activity disposes of them for its own purpose, and puts them to uses not forthcoming in the inorganic world. Alien matter is taken up, transformed, raised to a higher level, and used for the weal of the organism. Life selects out of the environment what is needed for itself. There is selective activity on the part of life; it takes what it needs and neglects what it does not need.

'Turn a miscellaneous lot of birds into a garden: a flycatcher will at once be intent on the gnats, a bullfinch on the pease, a thrush on the worms and snails. Scatter a mixture of seeds evenly over a diversified piece of country: heath and cistus will spring up in the dry, flags and rushes in the marshy, ground; violets and ferns in the shady hollows, gorse and broom on the hilltops. . . . By the principle of subjective selection special environments are singled out by different individuals from the general environment common to all, and so far there is not necessarily any competition. Two artists or two anglers may be in each other's way, but an artist and an angler will hardly incommode each other. A garden would still interest a flycatcher if there were neither pease nor cherries in it, provided the insects remained; whereas the bullfinch would at once forsake it. Natural selection, as distinct from subjective selection, comes into play only when two anglers contend for the same fish, two artists compete for the same prizes, when the early bird gets the worm that the later one must go without' (Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*[2], i. 295 f.).

For a complete explanation of biological phenomena, account must be taken, no doubt, of the two comprehensive factors summed up under the names of 'natural selection' and 'subjective selection.' This is not the place to deal with them in any comprehensive manner (see art. ACTIVITY and other related articles). Here it is sufficient to say that natural selection (comprehending under that name all external conditions, and all that Darwin sets forth under the comprehensive title of Natural Selection) is not sufficient to describe the behaviour of life, or to account for its manifold activities. Life itself counts for something in the final result. Growth, assimilation, and reproduction attest the activity of life. These show that life so far selects its environment, and that, if there are a thousand species in a square mile of ground, each selects its own environment, and each uses it in its own way, and for its own purposes.

The wider problem set to biology by the activity of the organism, and by subjective selection in relation to natural selection, is parallel to the problem set to the psychologist and the moralist by the relation of attention to the general conditions imposed on conscious individual life by the fact that there are logical laws, laws of association, psychological conditions of thought, action, and feeling, and other conditions which seem to determine the limits within which attention is to be exercised. As in biology we ask the question, Does natural selection account for vital experience without the postulate of the activity of the organism? so here we ask the question, Do the logical, psychological, and other laws and conditions of mental life account for mental behaviour without the postulate of the conscious activity of the individual subject?

As regards life in general, it is to be observed that its first work is concerned with those movements which are indispensable to vital functions and to its existence as a living body. As a primary condition of existence an organism must adapt itself to its surroundings, and a series of actions must proceed in order that such an end may be accomplished. These activities relate themselves to the general ends of self-preservation and the preservation of the species. A full account of the phenomena connected with this problem would lead us into the region of the relation of organ and function, the relation of appetite and desire to their objects, and also the relation of feeling generally towards physiological processes on the one hand and mental processes on the other. Without entering into these, we shall merely notice here that life can be described only as a series of actions having reference to an end. That end is the preservation of the individual or the preservation of the species. It is a question whether those activities which are said to be instinctive in the individual are really so; that is, whether they are the outcome of activities which at the outset were acts of choice, these being by repetition consolidated into habit; or whether they were automatic from the beginning. Some contend that actions at present instinctive were originally the outcome of choice, and that these actions, stimulated by a feeling of pleasure, which usually accompanies the exercise of vital functions, have been translated into habit, and have passed into the region of reflex action. Habit is 'lapsed intelligence,' *i.e.* voluntary action may become instinctive, or impulsive, and in the evolution of life may become habitual or reflex action.

But, if we take any organism as it stands, leaving undecided the question as to the forces which have operated to make it what it is, there is no doubt that every organism has to adjust itself to its environment. Whether it has been made by the slow processes of what is called natural selection, or whether it has had something to do with the making of itself, yet, as it is there in its circumstances and conditions, it has to strive,

to work, to adapt itself to varying conditions; and if it is to survive, it must select the most advantageous course of action. In the case of life generally this is comparatively simple. The individual organism adapts itself to its environment by a series of actions directed to the main ends of self-preservation or the preservation of the species.

'All acts of willing, whether external or internal, are divided into two great classes, the first comprising simple or impulsive acts; the second, complex acts, which imply freedom of choice. Simple or impulsive acts are determined by a single motive, whereas complex acts, though they may be determined by a single motive, imply a choice between several. An impulsive action, whether internal or external, is therefore quicker than an act of choice, which is preceded by a feeling of doubt and hesitation. The latter is also termed a free act, or an act of "free-will," because it expresses more clearly than any other the freedom, spontaneity, and independence of the individual with regard to external stimuli. Impulsive acts are also acts of volition, though in a lesser degree than acts of free-will, and possess the character of spontaneous consciousness, which distinguishes all manifestations of the will' (Villa, *Contemporary Psychology*, p. 213).

In an ordinary organism, up to the appearance of reflective consciousness, action is directed to its ends mainly by what Villa calls 'a single motive.' Driven by the impulse of hunger or of love, the action of the organism goes straight to its object. Whether this is the outcome of natural selection, or whether it is acquired by the organism itself as the result of a process of education, it is not necessary here to decide. For in either case the adaptation is there, and the action of the organism is the result of subjective need finding its satisfaction in an appropriate object. In any event, the action and its motive are simple, direct, and imperative.

In a life which is merely organic, the need of the organism may be regarded as in direct and simple relation to its external objects, and proceeds straight to the appropriation of them; in conscious life, or in the life which is on the way towards self-consciousness, other factors enter in, and the situation becomes more complex. Yet the more complex situation rises naturally out of the simpler. There is no abrupt break in the evolution of mental life, and we can scarcely say when what we call attention begins to be properly exercised. In every organism there is a centre, to which all movements are referred. The organism is aware of its own needs, and of the objects which are to satisfy those needs. With the growth of consciousness, the awareness becomes intensified, until, in the fully-developed self-conscious life, consciousness is aware of itself and of all its needs and aims. But consciousness in general is just this awareness, and this awareness involves that mental activity which we call attention. More fully described in the words of Dr. Ladd, attention is 'a purposeful volition, suffused with peculiar feelings of effort or strain, and accompanied by a changed condition of the field of discriminative consciousness, as respects intensity, content, and clearness' (*Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory*, p. 61). While the description just given seems to apply in its fullness only to a mental life completely developed, it is in a measure applicable to all conscious life. It will be observed that in the definition given above there is no attempt to limit attention to the exclusive operation of any particular activity of the mind. It is, on the contrary, the synthesis of all the activities of the mind, whether of feeling, willing, or thinking. Attention is thus elementary and universal; it belongs to every state of consciousness, and is present in every field of consciousness, or, as is said by Dr. Ward:

'As to the subjective relation of objects, the relation of presentation itself, we have merely to note that on the side of the subject it implies what, for want of a better word, may be called *attention*, extending the denotation of this term so as to include even what we ordinarily call inattention. Attention so used will thus cover part of what is meant by consciousness—so much of it, that is, as answers to being mentally active, active enough at least to "*receive* impressions." Attention on the side of the subject implies intensity on the side of the object: we might indeed almost call intensity the matter of a presentation, without which it is a nonentity' (*EBr*[10], art. 'Psychology,' p. 41[b]).

Awareness of the stream of consciousness, as it passes on, becomes attention in the stricter sense as elements in experience become more or less intense. It is impossible here to enumerate all the elements which enter into consciousness, nor is it necessary. For the reaction of the mind against its presentations, whatever these may be, gives us at once the elementary condition of attention. At the outset, before mind has come to the possession of itself, it is possible that attention is without purpose, that it is aroused by change in mental experience—by pleasure or pain, or by the overstimulation of sense or faculty—and that it is exercised in an unthinking, involuntary way. But such rudimentary forms of conscious activity are the foundations on which voluntary, deliberate, and sustained attention are built up. Some, indeed, limit the term 'attention' to its more developed form, and refuse to recognize the more rudimentary forms as worthy of the name. But without the rudimentary forms there would be no possibility of the development of mental life, and no possibility of the deliberate sustained attention which fashions for itself a scheme of living, and shapes means for realizing it. Mental activity in accepting the given, in being interested in it, finds that it can enhance the intensity of some elements, may hasten or retard the flow of the stream of consciousness, may also discriminate between desirable and undesirable elements, and thus the value of attention is recognized. For mental life cannot grow without proper mental activity, and the proper name of such activity is simply 'attention.'

Usually the conditions of attention are just the conditions of consciousness in general. We have seen from Dr. Ward that a large part of the stream of consciousness is properly included under the phenomena of attention. It so happens that many writers on this topic so describe the conditions of attention as to leave out of sight any proper activity on the part of the subject. It is possible so to describe the effects of attention as to leave out all reference to the selective activity of the individual. One may say, with Professor Pillsbury, that 'the essence of attention as a conscious process is an increase in the clearness of one idea or group of ideas at the expense of others' (*Attention*, p. 11). This is quite true, only it leaves out the essential element of how attention was directed so as to produce that result. In fact, in the able work cited so much stress is laid on processes and conditions of attention that attention itself scarcely ever appears. Thus there are many valuable descriptions of the motor concomitants of attention, of its conditions, of the effects of attention on consciousness, and so on, and yet the proper character of mental activity receives hardly any recognition. We may quote from the summaries, usefully appended to each chapter. The summaries of the chapter on 'The Conditions of Attention' are these:

'The conditions of any act of attention are to be found in the present environment (objective conditions) and in the past experience of the individual (subjective conditions). The main objective conditions are the intensity, extent, and duration of the stimulus. The subjective conditions are to be found in the idea in mind at the time, in the mood of the moment, the education, previous social environment, and heredity of the individual' (p. 52).

Professor James has said:

'My experience is what I agree to attend to. Only those items which I notice shape my mind; without selective interest experience is an utter chaos. Interest alone gives accent and emphasis, light and shade, background and foreground—intelligible perspective, in a word. It varies in every creature, but without it the consciousness of every creature would be a grey,

chaotic indiscriminativeness, impossible for us even to conceive' (*Psychology*, i. 402 f.).

But Professor Pillsbury in his summary of the chapter on 'Interest and Feeling of Activity as Conditions of Attention' speaks thus:

'Neither interest nor "mental activity" can be regarded as a condition of attention. Interest is either a general name for the subjective conditions of attention when ascribed to the object, or it is used to designate a mood which accompanies all attending. Mental activity is really bodily activity—a mass of sensations that comes from the contraction of muscles in different parts of the body. The contractions result from motor innervations which accompany attention' (p. 68).

According to Professor James, we attend to things because they are interesting. Professor Pillsbury is of opinion that 'things are interesting because we attend to them, or because we are likely to attend to them: we do not attend to them because they are interesting' (p. 55). The cart and the horse are somehow united, but we are left in doubt as to which comes first. To us it appears that in the solution of Professor Pillsbury the cart is before the horse. His book is the largest and most elaborate of any work we know on 'Attention.' It contains many things which are of the highest value. But it does not seem to cast much light on its main theme. Attention in its proper meaning seems to be conspicuous by its absence. We quote from the chapter called 'General Conclusions':

'Using attention as a type, it is possible to bring many of the other mental processes under that head and to make it serve as a basis for the classification of states of mind. We have seen, for example, that attention influences recalled impressions in practically the same way that it influences their original entrance. When a memory image is once given in consciousness, it will be retained very much as a perception received immediately from the external world. Furthermore, attention largely determines which of the many possible associates of any impression shall become actual. In this sense it selects the memories offered by association just as it selects the objects of sense that shall be permitted to enter. By attention in this sense we mean again from the side of the conditions the effect of the sum-total of previous conscious states, as united in the purpose of the moment, the general trend of the preceding thought, the character of the man, his profession, and further back the complete series of earlier experiences and inherited tendencies which make him what he is. His thought about any subject, no matter what the starting-point, is an expression of himself in the fullest meaning of the term' (p. 313 f.).

When Pillsbury in the passage quoted describes attention as 'the effect of the sum-total of previous conscious states,' etc., has he not left out the most essential element in attention? When he speaks of the complete series of earlier experiences and inherited tendencies which have made 'him what he is,' has he not neglected the most potent factor, namely, the share which the man has in the making of himself? Take members of the same family, descended from the same parents, subject to the same kind of earlier experiences, the same inherited tendencies, responsive to the same environment in family, school, and neighbourhood, and how on his principles does he account for the manifold differences between them? It seems to the present writer that Professor Pillsbury, in his earnest desire to lay stress on the general conditions, has forgotten the personal equation of each individual. He has imitated the procedure of the biologist, who lays the whole stress on natural selection, and neglects the part played by the subjective in the evolution of life. General laws can never account for particular effects. It is a useful study to seek to find out the general conditions which have helped to make a man what he is; but that has to be supplemented by a particular study of the man in his habit as he lives. It does not help us much to say that Shakespeare was an Englishman, and that Burns was a Scotsman; for we have still to learn what were the topics which interested these great men, and what was the interest which directed their attention to this or to that line of thought and action. It is possible that we may never be able to give a scientific explanation of the individual in this relation or in any other; for the individual, as such, is outside of general rules, and must be accepted in all his concreteness as a subject of study by himself.

It is pointed out by Höffding (*Outlines of Psychology*, pp. 108–112) that, in immediate sensations and in the flow of them, interest and the attention determined by the interest play an essential part. He points out (p. 120) that we are not given over in a purely passive way to the impressions of the external world. Excitations from without call forth movements which serve to retain or pursue them. An involuntary search and accommodation help to determine the character of the sensation.

'If a sensation takes complete possession and almost succeeds in driving all else out of consciousness, it then arrests our activity also. An exclusive sensation therefore presupposes attention, but is not one with it. Besides, how does a sensation become exclusive? Excitations can flow in upon us simultaneously from several sides. The eye, *e.g.*, receives simultaneous excitations from several points of light. Several senses, moreover, may be in operation together. If purely passive, sensuous perception would afford at every instant a chaos of diverse sensations. But from the multitude of these diverse sensations, in every instant, one is selected which becomes the centre. Reflexly and instinctively the attention moves from one excitation to another . . . The motive which decides the attention to leave one excitation and turn to another is to be looked for in a sense of fatigue or in a feeling of dullness, which makes it a necessity or a recreation to turn to a new excitation, especially to one which is a natural counterpart or supplement of a preceding excitation. In every such transition an elementary choice takes place' (p. 120 f.).

Referring to the whole discussion for further elucidation, we may now say that even in sensations and in the flow of them choice has a part, and attention may determine what sensations may occupy the centre of consciousness, what may be thrust into the background, and what may be thrust altogether outside the threshold of consciousness.

But such attention may be involuntary, or may have the character of reflex movement. Yet this elementary choice is the necessary condition of such new arrangement of sensations as will be transformed into those results of human effort which we recognize in the contents of science, art, philosophy, and in all other results of human effort. Out of elementary choice and out of almost unconscious attention come the magnificent results which we have already named. We may attend to things because we cannot do otherwise. But when we have an express volition to attend to this or to that, we call it voluntary attention. All other attention is called non-voluntary or spontaneous. The relations between spontaneous and voluntary attention are manifold. They may be antagonistic to one another, or they may act in such a way that the one passes into the other. Thus voluntary attention to an uninteresting object may invest it with such interest as to make attention to it a spontaneous matter. For example, when we are occupied with any matter, as when a great misfortune has befallen us, or when we pass in review a certain course of conduct in order to find the cause of failure, it may take possession of our minds to such a degree that no effort of will can make us cease from brooding over it. An article has to be written, or a book is in process of preparation; the work is carried on to the loss of sleep, and we are unable to tear ourselves away from it; the attention which began voluntarily has become an obsession.

On the other hand, experience shows that, by the constant and ever-renewed effort of attention, a subject which at the outset was dry and uninteresting may become full of interest as we master it, and learn its meaning and its issues. The power of concentrating our attention on the subject may become stronger, the intervals of con

centration may become more prolonged, until no effort is needed to attend to the subject. Voluntary attention has become spontaneous (see Stout, *Analytic Psychology*, vol. i. p. 241 f.).

It would be tedious and would not be profitable to enumerate the various kinds of involuntary attention. Reference may be made generally to systematic treatises on Psychology, in which the various kinds are described. Vital needs, the calls of love or hunger, pleasure and pain, every relation between the organic being and his environment, may give rise to that exaltation of consciousness which calls forth the reactive energy which we name 'attention.' It is possible, however, to classify all of these under two great divisions, and to speak of them under the general heads of 'external' and 'internal.' The external are the presentations with the accompanying emotions which precede action. These are usually simple and single in their procedure. The internal are those which, as already indicated, consist in a variation of the current of presentations and feelings. In these we have emphatically the presence of choice, of the selection of one motive out of many, with the increase of intensity and urgency resulting from the concentration of the mind on it.

In the description of these external and internal movements an attempt has been made to introduce greater precision into psychological phraseology. Instead of the phrases 'involuntary' and 'voluntary,' which many still use as adequate, some psychologists have introduced the terms 'perception' and 'apperception' (*q.v.*). By 'perception' they mean a content of which we are conscious. When we concentrate ourselves on a content of consciousness so that it stands out distinctly or as distinctly as possible, we say that it is 'apperceived.' In the art. APPERCEPTION will be found the history and meaning of this term; it is sufficient to say here that those psychologists who use attention in this sense define it as that peculiar state, characterized by certain special feelings, which accompanies apperception. Spatial illustrations are used to describe the state of apperception. Consciousness is figured as a circle, the centre of which represents the focus or point of apperception. The circumference of the circle represents the threshold of consciousness; and of the various stimuli some pass along chords of the circle, while others pass along a diameter, and so through the centre. Or it might be represented by a reference to the great circles of navigation. These pass through the centre of the earth. Apperceived mental contents correspond to great circles, which pass through the centre of consciousness. These spatial illustrations do not add much to our knowledge, yet the distinction between perception and apperception might be very helpful, if writers on Psychology were to use the terms in precisely the same sense.

With regard both to our perceptions and to our apperceptions we are never wholly passive. We have seen that even in the immediate sensations, as well as in the flow of them, the attention is determined by interest, and the interest has a determining influence on sensations selected for closer examination. So it is in the flow of ideas. Here, too, interest has a determining influence. We can never account for the association of ideas, or for the ways in which ideas are clustered together in the mind, by a mere regard to the laws of association, or to any other laws of a general kind. There are laws of association, as there are laws of science, of logic, of psychology, but these do not act as if they aggregated themselves together merely by their own action. Like other general laws, they are used by life, and as regards mental laws they are used by the mind. The determining influence is in the conscious mind itself, which guides its action by its own law of action, so that each experience is essentially a unique experience. To determine accurately the practical problem of attention for any individual would be to determine the real character of personality. But that is beyond the scope of science, which deals with the general, and with the super-personal, or the infra-personal.

The characteristic difference between perception and apperception, or between involuntary and voluntary attention, is that in the one case the strain follows directly on the presentation of the stimulus, and in the other case the strain, or the turning of the mind in a certain direction towards a certain object, is present before the stimulus.

'The fusion of the sensation with the corresponding idea, whence perception arises, thus takes place in inverse order in voluntary and involuntary attention. We see in great measure what we wish to see, and as a general rule are able to see only what we wish. Hence the possibility of strokes of genius and prophecies, as also of illusory interpretations of facts. The originally sanguine tendency of human nature anticipates experience, and only gradually accepts correction from it. Fortunately experience has the power to open our eyes and force us to see. But the activity of the will is always an essential condition' (Höffding, *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 315).

The relation of attention to the general laws of the system in which we live is too large a subject to be discussed here. Generally it is analogous to the relation of life to the system of which life forms a part. The conscious subject lives in relation to an environment. In interaction with it, it realizes itself. But the process of self-realization is an active process. It reacts against the environment, it selects out of it what it can use, and what it needs and wants, and it makes out of it something new. Merely organic life modifies itself in order to adapt itself to its surroundings. Conscious life modifies its environment so as to make it in a measure accomplish its ends. It impresses itself on the environment, and modifies the earth so as to command its resources in the shape of food, clothing, and houses. Homes are built, cities are founded, facilities of travel are made to abound. We need not enumerate the resources of civilization. The forces of nature are at the service of man, just because man has modified nature to accomplish his ends. But these are the outcome of attentive activity, and cast light on the nature of attention, and on the relation of attention to the laws of the system. Attention of the intellectual kind may be set forth as the activity arising out of the desire to know what are really the laws of the system in which we live. No doubt this is the characteristic of the highest form of intellectual life. But it exists, and ought to be recognized. Into this also choice enters, for it is allowable for a man to think twice, or more than twice, in order that his thoughts in their flow may correspond with reality. Thus into the most abstract and intellectual of our pursuits voluntary activity may enter.

Truth has thus a value of its own, and the greatest determinant of attention is just the scale of values which human judgment has set up for itself. It is this scale of values that determines our interest, and our interest dominates our attention. Referring to the art. VALUE for the full account of the doctrine of values, we state briefly here that it is the characteristic quality of highly-evolved, conscious, moral, spiritual life to transform the given world into a world which will correspond with its highest ideal, and be the image of its deepest thought. What forms these may take, and what strivings may issue from the attempt to make a world in which our values may be realized, cannot be described here. But whatever value may be striven

after by this people or by that, or by this man or by that, it can be realized only by thinking about it, attending to it, working at it, till airy nothing obtains a local habitation and a name. Thus, for the man of science, truth may have the highest value, and he may concentrate his attention on the effort to see the flow of things as it is; for philosophy, everything else may be neglected in the desire to know reality, and to see it in its wholeness; while for the artist a thing of beauty is a joy for ever, and the beautiful is the value that is highest. On the other hand, for some the highest of the values is the good, and so on, around the whole circle of human activity. In whatever direction we look, we find that it is the scale of values that determines the interest of man, and sets him to work for its realization. Values—artistic, scientific, ethical, spiritual—are the dominating interests of conscious life, and these are the ends which all men seek to realize.

For the conscious spirit, then, the given world is plastic, something to be formed into a world of specific value in which it may find its appropriate home. The machinery of the world, its laws, whether mental or material, may submit to new directions, take on new meanings, and issue in results not to be accounted for apart from the activity of the conscious spirit. Material laws may find a new expression in the *Principia* of Newton, which, after all, is as much poetry as science. It is nature as transformed in the mind of Newton. The philosophy of Hegel, *e.g.*, or of other great masters in philosophy, is a revelation of personality, as much as, or even more than, it is a transcript of the meaning of reality. For each mind in the world has to make a world for itself, and it will be the centre of its own world. How each world so made corresponds to the world which is common to all, how the general is related to the individual world, is another question. What concerns us here is that the phenomenon which we call voluntary attention is the chief means by which the world of values is made; and without its working no world is possible for man.

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JAMES IVERACH.

ATTIS.—Attis was a male Asiatic deity whose relation to Cybele, the Great Mother, was analogous to that borne by Adonis to Aphrodite, Baal to Astarte, Osiris to Isis, etc. Of Semitic origin, or at least greatly influenced by Semitic religion, his worship, always in dual connexion with that of the Great Mother, and never independent of it, became strongly centralized in Phrygia and Lydia, spread to the adjacent countries, was introduced into Greece, and finally became known throughout the Roman Empire. According to the legend given by Pausanias (vii. 17) as current among the Phrygians, the seed of Zeus, discharged in sleep upon the earth, begot the hermaphroditic monster Agdistis, who was afterwards deprived of male organs by the gods. An almond tree having sprung from these, the daughter of the river Sangarius ate of its fruit and bore Attis, who, after having been exposed, was reared by a he-goat, became very beautiful, and inspired passion in Agdistis. Being about to wed the king's daughter, Attis was struck with madness by Agdistis (who suddenly appeared during the nuptial hymn), and emasculated himself. Agdistis in repentance prevailed upon Zeus to preserve the body of Attis from wasting away or decaying. In Arnobius (*adv. Nationes*, v. 5–8) the fruit is the pomegranate, the daughter of the river-god is named Nana, and the king and his daughter are Midas and Ia. The Great Mother, created by Deucalion and Pyrrha on Mount Agdus, also loves Attis, and plans the marriage in order to rescue him from the shameless love of Agdistis, who strikes the entire company with madness. Attis mutilates himself under a pine tree, and Ia, after wrapping Attis in wool and mourning over him, kills herself. The fatal pine is borne by the Mother into her cave, where she and Agdistis wildly lament Attis. Zeus allows the body of the youth to remain undecayed, his hair to grow, and his little finger to move. Agdistis has the body of the youth consecrated at Pessinus, a city in Galatia near the borders of Phrygia, and also institutes annual ceremonies in his honour. The little finger (*digitus*, δάκτυλος) is interpreted as the phallus by Georg Kaibel (*GGN*, 1901, p. 513). In Diodorus Siculus (iii. 58, 59), Attis is a stripling whom Meion, the king of Phrygia and Lydia, slays because of an intrigue between him and the king's daughter Cybele. As a consequence of plague and famine, worship of both is instituted by the Phrygians. In Ovid's version of the legend (*Fast.* iv. 223 ff.), Attis breaks his pledge of chastity to Cybele; Sagaritis, the nymph who has sinned with him, is destroyed by the goddess; while the youth himself mutilates his own person in a frenzy on Mount Dindymon. In the version of Arnobius the blending of two forms of the Attis legend is apparent—one accounting for the birth of Attis, the other for his relation to Cybele—and the latter and Agdistis are really identical. A Lydian form of the legend, in which the youth is killed by a boar, is found (Paus. vii. 17).

There is no evidence of an Attis cult in Asia Minor until the 4th cent. B.C., though it must have existed long before that time. It never attained to great prominence in Greece, because of the strange and un-Hellenic nature of its rites. The same is true of it in Italy up to the Empire. There is no direct evidence of the existence of the worship of Attis at Rome under the Republic, and the general probability of its existence is rendered very slight by the lack of monumental and literary evidence where such evidence might be expected (Showerman, 'Was Attis at Rome under the Republic?' in *TAPA* xxi., 1900, pp. 46–59). Under the Empire, however, from the time of Claudius onward, it rapidly increased in importance, Attis being worshipped side by side with the Great Mother, and frequently appearing in literature and on the monuments with her. His prominence in the cult is indicated by his part in the annual season of festivals in honour of the Great Mother which covered the period March 15–27 (Hepding, *Attis, seine Mythen und sein Kult*, Giessen, 1903, pp. 123–176). On March 15 the college of *Cannophori*, or reed-bearers, took part in the ceremonies of the day by carrying reeds in procession—a custom explained as a commemoration of the finding of Attis by the Great Mother on the reedy banks of the river Gallus, but more likely a reminiscence of a primitive phallic procession (see Showerman, 'Canna intrat and the Cannophori,' in the *Classical Journal*, ii. 28–31). Sexual abstinence and fasting were prescribed for the day. On March 22 the sacred pine, the emblem of the self-mutilation of Attis, was borne in procession by the *Dendrophori* to the temple of the Mother on the Palatine, its trunk wound with fillets of wool and its branches hung with garlands of violets, the whole being regarded as a commemoration of the wrapping of Attis's body in wool by Ia and the decking of the original tree by the

Mother with the violets which sprang from Attis's blood. On March 24, *Dies Sanguinis*, fasting and mourning symbolized the grief of the Mother at the death of Attis. The special feature was the orgiastic dance and song of the priests, culminating in self-laceration, and even self-emasculation (not attested at Rome), in commemoration of the final deed of Attis. At night the mystics partook of a sacrament, and perhaps underwent the baptism of blood in the *taurobolium* (wh. see). March 25 was the day of rejoicing (*Hilaria*) at the resurrection of Attis. On March 27, after a day of rest known as *Requietio*, occurred the *Lavatio*, a ceremonial bathing of the goddess in the Almo, a stream a short distance south of Rome, followed by universal rejoicing, a feature of which was dramatic representation of the story of the Mother and Attis. The *criobolium* (wh. see), or sacrifice of a ram, involving the blood-baptism, and consequent purification and regeneration, of the person who performed it, was a ceremony created on the analogy of the *taurobolium*, a similar sacrifice to the Great Mother, for the purpose of giving full recognition to Attis in the dual worship. The high priest of the cult bore the traditional title of Attis. The Attis in Catullus lxiii. is intended to represent a type of the priesthood.

The Cybele-Attis myth, according to the philosophers, symbolized the relations of Mother Earth and her fruitage. Attis is the plant kingdom beloved by her; his emasculation is the cutting of her fruits; his death, his burial, and his preservation by the mourning Mother symbolize the death and preservation of plant life through the cold and gloom of winter; his resurrection is the return of the warmth of spring. The festival of the *Hilaria* occurred on March 25, the first day of the ascent of the sun, while the *Dies Sanguinis*—the day of lamentation and self-scourging—was the last day of winter. In the 4th cent. A.D., under the influence of syncretism, Attis came to be regarded as a symbol of the sun. He and the Great Mother were also sometimes thought of as a parallel to Christ and the Virgin (Isidor. *Ep.* iv. 31. 28).

In art, Attis appears only under the Empire, and for the most part in connexion with the Mother. He is usually standing or leaning against the pine, wears the Phrygian cap, and carries the pedum or syrinx. The most important statue of him is the Lateran Attis, discovered at Ostia, representing him as the shepherd-lover of the Mother, the symbol of the fruits of the earth and of the sun. Half nude, with a long mantle fastened over his breast, he reclines on a rock representing Mount Ida, his left elbow on the head of Idæan Zeus. In the left hand is the pedum, in the right fruit, flowers, and three spears of grain, on the head a pine garland with fruits, and a tiara with five rays, a half moon, and two spears of grain. The half moon indicates his identity with the Phrygian moon-god, Men.

LITERATURE.—Hugo Hepding, *Attis, seine Mythen und sein Kult*, Giessen, 1903; Grant Showerman, 'Was Attis at Rome under the Republic?' in *TAPA* xxi. (1900) pp. 46–59, and 'The Great Mother of the Gods' in *Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin*, No. xliii., Madison, 1901. See also artt. CYBELE and GREAT MOTHER.

GRANT SHOWERMAN.

ATTRACTION and REPULSION.—'Attraction' is the name given to those forces exerted between bodies which tend to draw the bodies together or to resist their separation. 'Repulsion' is the name given to forces that have the opposite effect. Both forces are to be seen exerted in the following familiar phenomena: in gravitating bodies, in various magnetic and electric phenomena, in chemical affinity, in the cohesion of the parts of a body, and in the adhesion of one body to another.

If we adopt the analysis given by Kant (*Monadologia physica*, 1756, and *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*, 1786), we may even add: the very existence of a space-filling body presupposes these two forces or tendencies. A body must resist compression (repulsion), or it would become a mere mathematical point; and, again, it must resist expansion, or it would be scattered indefinitely through space.

Attraction and repulsion are to be differentiated from two other similar forces, tension and pressure, in that they act from a distance; and this characteristic has made them especially the subject of philosophical discussion. Can a body exert a force where it is not? The day has gone by when the metaphysician had the temerity to give an *a priori* answer to the question thus simply put; but in the 17th and 18th cents. the correct answer was a frequent matter of debate. The followers of Descartes, including Leibniz, were strongly opposed to the affirmative answer; for it seemed contrary to 'natural light' that a body can act where it is not (cf. Leibniz, Erdmann's ed. p. 767). For us of to-day the question is more complicated; but it still involves a truly metaphysical or *a priori* problem. On the one hand, empirical evidence leads us to believe that we do not know of any instance in nature of absolute contiguity between bodies. Moreover, mathematical intuition would add that the only true contiguity is where bodies have one point in common, and this, in turn, would involve complete coincidence of the two bodies; for the same problem of contiguity must be raised regarding all the points in each body. On the other hand, there is much prejudice, well or ill grounded, against the doctrine that a body acts at a distance. Faraday, it seems, had this prejudice; and his discovery of a medium between two bodies acted upon by magnetic forces, along with evidence of tension and pressure within this medium, justified his point of view. Again, there have been repeated attempts to reduce the forces operating in the phenomena of gravitation to pressure (cf. the theory of Le Sage, and Clerk Maxwell's article 'Attraction' in *EBr*[9]). Possibly this prejudice has its origin in the fact that our bodies must come in contact with objects to move them or to exert a force upon them, and, in turn, that when we are moved we feel the pressure of the outside body, or medium, upon the surface of our body. Such an explanation of this prejudice does not, however, do it full justice.

Here, then, the metaphysical problem arises: Is there an ultimate presupposition actually present in man's attempt to explain nature, forbidding him to rest satisfied with an explanation that involves the action of one body upon another from a distance? Whenever we are forced to adopt as an explanation such a force as gravity, ought we not simply to regard it, not as a final solution, but as a confession of ignorance? Does there not remain in all such cases an unsolved problem bidding us seek for a medium between the two bodies? Faraday sought a medium in one set of cases, and found it. Ought not science to seek it in all cases? Hence, is not this prejudice a fundamental methodological attitude? If so, we can call it an axiom, meaning by an axiom an assumption that seemingly we have to make, but have no hope of either proving or disproving. We cannot prove that bodies do not act upon one another from a distance, nor can we prove that they do; for these latter cases mean, at the most, that we have not as yet been able to find any known medium.

Moreover, the mathematical statement that in a continuous space all particles of matter must be separated, and therefore cannot be in absolute

contiguity, does not contradict this axiom. It simply introduces the larger metaphysical question: Is not nature a continuum, and therefore an inexhaustible source of problems; that is, does not all scientific explanation leave residual problems which arise the moment we think of any given system analyzed into yet minuter entities than those which we are considering, and so on *ad infinitum*? In short, our axiom means contiguity relative to the type of spatial objects involved in the problem at hand, not absolute or mathematical contiguity. Cf. artt. ATOMIC THEORY.

LITERATURE.—Clerk Maxwell, art. 'Attraction,' *EBr*[9] iii. 63; Mach, *The Science of Mechanics*, Eng. tr., 3rd ed., Chicago and London, 1907, p. 245 ff.; Ostwald, *Naturphilosophie*[9], Leipzig, 1902, 'Das energetische Weltbild'; Pearson, *Grammar of Science*[2], London, 1900, p. 272 ff.: Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge*, 1710, sect. 103 ff.; Leibniz, Erdmann's ed., p. 767; Kant, *Monadologia physica*, 1756, and *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*, 1786; Lotze, *Metaphysics*, Eng. tr., Oxford, 1887, bk. ii., chs. v. and vii. For attraction in the sense of the influence of one person upon another, see A. W. Small, *General Sociology*, Chicago and London, 1905, p. 564 ff.; Harless, *System of Christian Ethics*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1868, p. 433; and art. LOVE.

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AUGSBURG CONFESSION.—See CONFESSIONS.

AUGURY.—See DIVINATION.

AUGUSTINE.—1. **Life.**—Aurelius Augustine (the prænomen 'Aurelius' is attested by contemporaries but does not occur in his own works or in his correspondence) was born of mixed heathen and Christian parentage, 13 Nov., A.D. 354, at Tagaste, a small municipality in proconsular Numidia. He was taught in his childhood the principles of Christianity, and great sacrifices were made to give him a liberal education. From his youth he was consumed by an insatiable thirst for knowledge, and was so inflamed by the reading of Cicero's *Hortensius* in his nineteenth year that he thenceforth devoted his life to the pursuit of truth. The profession to which he was bred was that of rhetorician, and this profession he practised first at Tagaste, and then successively at Carthage, Rome, and Milan up to the great crisis of his life (386). In his early manhood he had fallen away from his Christian training to the Manichæans, who were the rationalists of the age (373); and subsequently (383) had lapsed into a general scepticism; but he had already fought his way out of this, under the influence of the Neo-Platonists, before his conversion to Catholic Christianity took place at Milan in the late summer of 386. He spent the interval between this crisis and his baptism (Easter, 387) in philosophical retirement at Cassiciacum, and then, after a short sojourn at Rome, returned to Africa (autumn, 388) and established at his native town a sort of religio-philosophical retreat for himself and his friends. Early in 391 he was almost forcibly ordained presbyter at Hippo Regius, and nearly five years later (shortly before Christmas, 395) was raised to the rank of coadjutor-bishop. From the first he sustained practically the entire burden of the administration, and, soon succeeding to its sole responsibility, continued bishop of that second-rate diocese until his death, 28 August 430.

In this simple framework was lived out the life of one who has been strikingly called incomparably the greatest man whom, 'between Paul the Apostle and Luther the Reformer, the Christian Church has possessed.'* We cannot date from him, it is true, an epoch in the external fortunes of the Church in the same sense in which we may from, say, Gregory the Great or Hildebrand. He was not, indeed, without ecclesiastico-political significance. He did much to heal the schisms which tore the African Church. He regenerated the clergy of Africa by his monastic training school. And it must not be forgotten that the two great Gregorys stood upon his shoulders. But his direct work as a reformer of Church life was done in a corner, and its results were immediately swept away by the flood of the Vandal invasion.

2. **Writings.**—It was through his voluminous writings, by which his wider influence was exerted, that he entered both the Church and the world as a revolutionary force, and not merely created an epoch in the history of the Church, but has determined the course of its history in the West up to the present day. He was already an author when he became a Christian, having published (about 380) an æsthetical study (now lost), on *De pulchro et apto*. But his amazing literary productivity began with his conversion. His first Christian writings were a series of religio-philosophical treatises, in which he sought to lay the foundations of a specifically Christian philosophy. These were followed by a great number of controversial works against the Manichæans, Donatists, Pelagians, interspersed with Biblical expositions and dogmatic and ethical studies. The whole was crowned by four or five great books in which his genius finds perhaps its fullest expression. These are his *Confessiones* (397–400), in which he gives an analysis of his religious experience and creates a new *genre* in literary form; the *de Doctrina Christiana* (397–426), in which the principles of his Biblical exposition are expounded; the *Enchiridion ad Laurentium* on Faith, Hope, and Charity (421), which contains his most serious attempt to systematize his thought; the *de Trinitate* (395–420), in which its final formulation was given to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity; and the *de Civitate Dei* (413–426), in which are laid the foundations of a rational philosophy of history.

He seems to have been himself aware of the significance of the writings into which he had so unstintedly poured himself, and he devoted some of his last years to a careful survey and revision of them in his unique *Retractationes* (426–428), in which he seeks to compact them into an ultimate whole. The influence which they exerted from the beginning is attested no less by the spiteful comments on their volume which escaped from those less well affected to them (*e.g.* the interpolators of Gennadius), than by the wondering admiration of the better disposed (already, Possidius, *Vita*, ch. vii.). In point of fact they entered the Church as a leaven which has ever since wrought powerfully towards leavening the whole mass.

3. **Influence.**—(*a*) *Its extent.*—The greatness of the influence exerted by Augustine is fairly intimated by the suggestion that the division between the Eastern and Western Churches may properly be represented as having been 'prepared' by him.* No doubt, according to Renan's saying, the building of Constantinople contained in it the prophecy of the division of the Empire, and the division of the Empire the prophecy of the division of the Church. But it was Augustine who imprinted upon the Western section of the Church a character so specific as naturally to bring the separation of the Churches in its train. It must not be inferred, however, that his influence was felt only in the West. The prevailing impression to this effect implies some failure to appreciate not only the extent of the intercourse between the East and the West in Augustine's day, but also the indebtedness of the East to the West for its theological constructions. The interest of the Antiochenes in Western Christo-

* Harnack, *Monasticism and the Confessions of Augustine*, p. 123.

* Reuter, *Augustinische Studien*, vii. 499.

logical thought, as illustrated, for instance, in the *Eranistes* and the correspondence of Theodoret, is only one example of a much wider fact; and in any event, the great doctrines of the Trinity and the Person of Christ, which form almost the entirety of 'dogma' in the East, so far from being a gift from the East to the West, as often represented, had their origin in the West, and were thence communicated to the East—the former through the intermediation of 'the great Hosius,' and the latter through that of Leo the Great. Augustine, through whom—working, no doubt, in full knowledge of what had been done by the Greeks, but in entire independence of them—the doctrine of the Trinity received its completed statement, came too late to affect the Greek construction of this doctrine, and accordingly gave form on this great topic only to the thought of the West. But his Christological conceptions underlay the formulations of Leo, as those of Ambrose underlay his, and through Leo determined the Christological definitions of the East as well as of the West. Accordingly, while the doctrines of the East and the West on the Person of Christ have remained identical, in their doctrines of the Trinity the two sections draw somewhat apart, not only with respect to that perennial bone of contention, the *filioque* clause in the definition of the procession of the Spirit, but in what underlies this difference—their general conception of the relations of the Trinitarian Persons. This in the East is ruled by subtle subordinational inheritances (embedded in the Nicene formulary in the phrase *θεὸς ἐκ θεοῦ* and its equivalents), while in the West it is dominated by that principle of equalization which found its sharpest assertion in the ascription of *αὐτοθεότης* to Christ by Calvin, whose construction marks the only new (subordinate) epoch in the development of the doctrine of the Trinity after Augustine. This complete determination of Western thought on the fundamental Christian doctrine of the Trinity fairly illustrates at once the place of Augustine in Western Christian thought, and the effect of his supreme influence there in creating a specifically Western type of Christianity.

It is worth while, no doubt, to distinguish between the actual influence exerted by Augustine in the West, and what may perhaps, in a more external sense, be called the authority enjoyed by his name in the Latin Church. To no other doctor of the Church has anything like the same authority been accorded, and it seemed for long as if his doctrine of grace at least was to be treated as a definitely defined dogma, *de fide* in the Church. Already in 431 Celestine sharply reproved the bishops of Gaul for permitting Augustine's authority to be questioned in their dioceses; and soon afterwards, Gelasius (493) addressed to the bishop of Picenum a similar letter of rebuke for the like carelessness. Subsequent deliverances of Hormisdas (520), and Boniface II. (530–531), and John II. (534) confirmed the authority thus assigned him; and their encomiums were repeated by many later Roman bishops. It very naturally became, therefore, the custom of the 'Augustinians' in the Church of Rome—like Diego Alvarez, Jansen, Noris—to ascribe 'irrefragable authority' to his teaching; and the question was gravely debated among the theologians whether a truly plenary authority were really to be attributed to him, or whether he were only to rank as the first of the Church's authorized teachers. The result was very naturally that every tendency of thought in the Church was eager to claim for itself the support of his name; and the extraordinary richness of his mind, and the remarkable variety of, so to say, the facets of his teaching, lent him more than ordinarily to the appeal of numerous and even divergent points of view. The possibility of this was increased by the long period of time covered by his literary activity, and the only gradual crystallization of his thought around his really formative ideas. The Augustine of Cassiciacum or even of the presbyterate was a somewhat different Augustine from the Augustine of the episcopate; and not even at his death had perfect consistency been attained in his teaching. Accordingly the most amazing variety of doctrine, on almost every conceivable subject, throughout the Middle Ages, and later in the Church of Rome, has sought support for itself in some saying or other of his; and both sides of almost every controversy have appealed with confidence to his teaching. Schools of thought which had drifted entirely away from his most fundamental postulates still regarded and represented themselves as 'Augustinian'; and the Church of Rome itself, whose whole history since the second Council of Orange (529) has been marked by the progressive elimination of Augustinianism from its teaching, is still able to look upon him as the chief doctor of the Church, upon whom its fabric is especially built. Confusion became so confounded that the Confession of Faith which Pelagius presented to Innocent was inserted quite innocently into the *Libri Carolini*, and was even produced by the Sorbonne in 1521 against Luther as Augustine's own.

Obviously this universal deference to the name of Augustine furnishes no accurate measure of his real influence. It supplies, however, a fair general reflexion of its extent. In point of fact the whole development of Western life, in all its phases, was powerfully affected by his teaching. This, his unique ascendancy in the direction of the thought and life of the West, is due in part to the particular period in history in which his work was done, in part to the richness and depth of his mind and the force of his individuality, and in part to the special circumstances of his conversion to Christianity. He stood on the watershed of two worlds. The old world was passing away; the new world was entering upon its heritage; and it fell to him to mediate the transference of the culture of the one to the other. It has been strikingly remarked that the miserable existence of the Roman Empire in the West almost seems to have been prolonged for the express purpose of affording an opportunity for the influence of Augustine to be exerted on universal history.* He was fortunate even in the place of his birth and formative years; although on the very eve of its destruction, Africa was at this precise moment, in the midst of the universal decadence, the scene of intense intellectual activity—into which he entered with all the force of his ardent nature. He gathered up into himself all that the old world had to offer, and re-coining it sent it forth again bearing the stamp of his profound character. It belonged to the peculiarity of his genius that he embraced all that he took up into himself 'with all the fibres of his soul'; not, as has been said, 'with his heart alone, for the heart does not think, nor with the mind only; he never grasps truth in the abstract, and as if it were dead,'† but with his whole being, giving himself to it and sending it forth from himself as living truth, driven on by all the force of his great and inspiring personality. Accordingly, when, having tested everything that the old world had to offer and found it wanting, he gave himself at last to Catholic Christianity, it was with no reserves. Catholicism, frankly accepted as such, became his

* Harnack, *Grundriss d. Dogmengeschichte*, Eng. tr. p. 835.
† Portalié, in Vacant-Mangenot, *Dictionnaire de la Théologie Catholique*, i. 2453.

passion, and into the enthusiastic maintenance of it he threw all his forces. It was primarily as a Catholic Christian, therefore, that he thought, and worked, and lived. But the man who threw himself with such zeal into the service of Catholic Christianity was a man who had already lived through many experiences and had gathered much spoil in the process. He had sounded the depths of heresy in its most attractive form, and had drunk the waters of philosophy in its culminating development; life in the conventicles of the sects and in the circle of cultured heathenism was alike familiar to him. But, above all the spoil he brought from without, he brought with him himself. He was a man of the highest and most individual genius—intellectual, but far beyond that, religious—who had his own personal contribution to make to thought and life. If we cannot quite allow that there were in very truth many Augustines, we must at least recognize that within the one Augustine there were very various and not always consistent currents flowing, each of which had its part to play in the future. Within the Catholic Christian a philosopher of the first rank was restlessly active; and within both a religious genius of the highest order was working; while for the expression of the resulting complex of feelings and ideas a literary talent was available second to none in the annals of the Church.

It is no wonder, therefore, that the Western Church has felt the force of his influence in all the main lines of its development, and in no one of its prominent characteristics could it have been without him what it has become. In him are found at once the seed out of which the tree that we know as the Roman Catholic Church has grown; the spring or strength of all the leading anti-hierarchical and mystical movements which succeeded one another through the Middle Ages; at least the promise and pre-formation of the great types of Western philosophical thought; and, above all, the potent leaven of vital religion. Beginning in the first force of its fresh promulgation by overcoming the ingrained rationalism of the popular Christianity expressed in Pelagianism and its daughter movements, it refused to be bound by the compromises of the Council of Orange, compacted though they were into a system by the genius of a Thomas, and given irrefragable authority in the Church of Rome by the decrees of Trent, but manifested its power by outbreak after outbreak, from Gottschalk in the 9th to Jansen in the 17th cent.; and then burst all bonds and issued in the Protestant Reformation in the 16th century.

(*b*) *Augustine as a Church-teacher.*—No doubt it is pre-eminently as the great Catholic doctor that Augustine stands out on the page of history. To his own consciousness he was just a Catholic Christian; and the whole mass of his teaching was conceived by him as simply the body of Catholic doctrine. It is, accordingly, interesting to observe that it is precisely as the Catholic doctor that he has lived in the hearts of the people. The legends which have gathered around his name picture him pre-eminently as the expounder of the *principia* of the Christian faith, particularly of the mysteries of the Godhead, who abode continually *in excelsis disputans de gloria excellentissimæ Trinitatis*, and communicated to the Church the results of his high meditations 'as he was able'—a note of humility caught from his own habitual tone when speaking of himself.* The task to which he consciously gave himself was to apprehend, so far as it was given to him to apprehend, to proclaim, maintain, and defend the Catholic truth; and from this task he never swerved. It was no empty formula with him when he declared, as he repeatedly declared, 'This is the Catholic faith, and it is therefore also my faith'; and he was altogether in earnest when he exhorted his readers not to love him more than the Catholic faith, and his critics not to love themselves more than the Catholic truth.* The body of Catholic doctrine constitutes thus the traditional element in Augustine's teaching. But, of course, it by no means left his hands precisely as it entered them. Nor did he contribute to it merely intellectual precision and logical completeness; he impressed on it the stamp of his religious fervour, and transmuted its elements into religious entities.

It was particularly in the doctrine of the Church, which he thus took up and transfigured, that he became in a true sense the founder of Roman Catholicism, and thus called into being a new type of Christianity, in which 'the idea of the Church became the central power in the religious feeling' and 'in ecclesiastical activity,' 'in a fashion which has remained unknown to the East.'† This idea of the Church was, to be sure, so little the creation of Augustine that he took it over whole from his predecessors, and in his innermost thought, indeed, never thoroughly homologated it. It was Cyprian, not Augustine, who identified the Church with the Episcopate, and to whom the Church outside which there is no salvation was fundamentally the hierarchical institution. It was Gregory the Great who first spoke of the organized Church as the Divine *civitas*. To Augustine the Church was fundamentally the *congregatio sanctorum*, the Body of Christ, and it is this Church which he has in mind when he calls it the *Civitas Dei*, or the Kingdom of God on earth. He is, however, not carefully observant of the distinction between the empirical and the ideal Church, and repeatedly—often apparently quite unconsciously—carries over to the one the predicates which, in his fundamental thought, belonged properly to the other. Thus the hierarchically organized Church tends ever with him to take the place of the *congregatio sanctorum*, even when he is speaking of it as the Kingdom or City of God in which alone any communion with God is possible here, and through which alone eternal blessedness with God is attainable hereafter.

In the Donatist controversy, although the distinction between *habere* and *utiliter* or *salubriter habere* is made to do yeoman service, the conception of the Church as the sole sphere of salvation, passing into the conception of the Church as the sole mediatrix of grace, and therefore the sole distributor of salvation, was necessarily thrown into high emphasis; and the logic of the situation too directly and too powerfully identified this Church with the empirical Church for the deeper-lying conception of the *congregatio sanctorum* to remain in sight. Thus Augustine, almost against his will, became the stay of that doctrine of the Church as the sole instrument at once of true knowledge of the Divine revelation and of saving grace which provides the two *foci* about which the ellipse of Roman Catholic doctrine revolves. What before him was matter of assertion became in his hands a religion, and went forth to conquer the world. His profounder conception of the Church as the *congregatio sanctorum*, and the consequent distinction between the empirical and the ideal Church, with all its implications with respect to the action of the sacraments and the effect of ecclesiastical decrees, and even of excommunication, did not indeed remain unobserved or unutilized when occasion demanded. Thus, for example, they came forward in their completeness

* Cf. Stilling, *Acta Sanctorum*, Aug. vi.

* *De Trinitate*, I. iv. 7; III. *præf.* 2.

† Reuter, *op. cit.* p. 499.

in the arguments of the Imperialists in the great controversies of the later 11th century.* These also, and in a truer sense than the Papalists in that debate, were 'Augustinians.' But the main stream of Augustine's influence flowed meanwhile in the traditionalist channel, and gave the world the Church as the authoritative organ of Divine truth and the miraculous vehicle of saving grace, through which alone the assured knowledge of the revelation of God could be attained, or the effective operations of His redeeming love experienced. Many of the subsidiary conceptions which fill out the system of Roman Catholic doctrine also find their direct prop in his teaching — its doctrine of merit, the distinctions between precepts and counsels, mortal and venial sins, and particularly the elaborate sacramental system, with its distinction between matter and form, its assertion of *ex opere operato* action, and of the indelible character of baptism and ordination, and even the doctrine of intention. On this side of his teaching the Roman Catholic Church may well be accounted Augustine's monument.

(*c*) *As a thinker.*—But beneath Augustine the traditionalist lay Augustine the thinker, and as a thinker he gave law not only to the Church but to the world. From the moment of his conversion, to be sure, religion became paramount with him. But this did not quench his philosophical impulse; it only made his specifically a religious philosophy, and himself, to adopt Rudolph Eucken's more precise definition,† 'the single great philosopher on the basis of Christianity proper the world has had'—in the richness of his thought and poetry of his expression alike, not unworthy of comparison even with his great master Plato.‡ He brought with him into Catholic Christianity not only a sufficient equipment of philosophical knowledge, but a powerful and trained intelligence, and an intellectual instinct which had to find scope. It was in the rôle of Christian philosopher, seeking to give form and substance to fundamental verities from the Christian standpoint, that he first came forward in the service of faith; and though later the religious teacher and defender of the faith seemed likely to swallow up the philosophical inquirer, they never really did so, but his rich and active mind kept continually at work sounding all depths. Thus not only was there imparted to all his teaching an unwonted vitality, originality, and profundity, but 'the activities set in motion were not confined to the narrow circle of theological science, but extended, directly or indirectly, to all forms of human life.'§ In every department of philosophical inquiry he became normative for the succeeding centuries; and until the rise of Aristotelianism in the 12th cent. and its establishment in influence by the advocacy of such teachers as Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, Augustinianism reigned supreme. Throughout the remainder of the Middle Ages it contended masterfully with its great rival, forming many compromises with it, and tending to off-set the rationalism into which Aristotelianism was ever degenerating by itself falling into mysticism. It thus became the support of the tendency towards Mysticism which prevailed through the Middle Ages, or rather its protection from the pantheism into which, when drawing more directly from Neo-Platonic sources, it was ever liable to deteriorate. From it every Catholic Reformer drew his strength, and to it the whole body of Reformers before the Reformation made their appeal. From its partial obscuration it emerged at the Renaissance, and burst again into full view in the 17th cent. to lay the foundations of modern thought. Siebeck accordingly bids us see in Augustine 'the first modern man'; * and, if Eucken questions the exactness of the designation, he is free to allow that the modern world finds in Augustine many points of contact, and, not only in questions of religious philosophy may wisely take its start from him rather than from Luther or Thomas, Schleiermacher or Kant, but in purely philosophical matters will find him in many respects more modern than Hegel or Schleiermacher.†

It was in the spheres of psychology and metaphysics that the dominion of Augustine was most complete. He aspired to know nothing, he tells us, but God and the soul; but these he strove with all his might to know altogether. His characteristic mark as a thinker was the inward gaze; the realities of consciousness were the primary objects of his contemplation; and from them he took his starting-point for reflexion on the world. Antiquity supplies no second to him in the breadth and acuteness of his psychological observation. And in his establishment of 'self-assured subjectivity,' as Windelband calls it,‡ in 'the controlling central position of philosophical thought' he transcended his times, and became 'one of the founders of modern thought.' If he may truly be said to have derived from Plato and Plotinus, in a far truer sense he stood above his Neo-Platonic teachers, and of his lineage have come Descartes and Malebranche and all that has proceeded from the movements of thought inaugurated by them. Even the famous ontological argument for the being of God, and, indeed, the very *cogito, ergo sum* of Descartes, have not merely their material but their formal pre-formation in him. It was not, however, in abstract thought alone, or chiefly, that he made his mark on the ages; his own thinking was markedly concrete, and nothing characterized it more strongly than the firmness of its grasp upon the realities of life, to the understanding and direction of which it was held strictly ancillary.

His impact upon the world might accordingly not unfairly be summed up, from one point of view, in the ethical revolution which he wrought. 'In essence,' remarks Harnack,§ 'Augustine's importance in the history of the Church and dogma lies in his giving to the West in the place of the Stoic-Christian popular morals, as that was recapitulated in Pelagianism, a religious, specifically Christian ethics, and so strongly impressing this on the Church that at least its formulas maintain up to to-day their supremacy in the whole extent of Western Christianity.' Indeed, we might do worse, in seeking an index of his influence as a thinker, than fix upon the place he has occupied in political theory and practice. The entire political development of the Middle Ages was dominated by him; and he was in a true sense the creator of the Holy Roman Empire. It was no accident that the *de Civitate Dei* was the favourite reading of Charlemagne: 'he delighted,' Einhard tells us (*Vita Caroli*, 24), 'in the books of St. Augustine, and especially in those that bear the title *Of the City of God*.' And in the great struggle between the Empire and the Papacy in the later 11th cent. it was expressly to him that the controversialists on both sides made their appeal. No Father is quoted by them as often as he, except, perhaps, Gregory the Great; and no series of documents is cited more frequently than his writings, except, perhaps, the pseudo-

* Mirbt, *Die Stellung Augustins in der Publicistik*, etc., p. 80.
† Eucken, *Die Lebensanschauungen*, etc.[2], p. 216.
‡ Cf. E. Norden, in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, i. 8, 1905, p. 394: 'Augustine was the great poet of the ancient Church, though just as little as Plato did he write in verse. These two go together as the great poet-philosophers of all time.'
§ Mirbt, *op. cit.* p. 1.

* *ZPhP*, 1888, p. 190.
† Eucken, *op. cit.* p. 249.
‡ *A History of Philosophy*, pp. 264, 270, 276.
§ *Dogmengesch.* [Eng. tr. v. 36]; cf. on Augustine's place in the history of ethics, Joseph Mausbach, in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, i. 4, 1906, p. 526.

Isidorian decretals.* Not only do writers like Walram of Naumburg and Widó of Ferrara reflect accurately his conception of the Church, with its emphasis on unity and its vacillation between the ideas of the *congregatio sanctorum* and a hierarchical organization—echoes of which still sound in William of Occam's *Defensor Pacis* and the discussions of the conciliatory party in the Roman Church whose ornament was Gerson—but they made their appeal to Augustine in their endeavours to give validity to their defence 'of the State as a Divine institution, of the moral significance and relative independence of the earthly sovereignty, of the necessary concordance of the *Sacerdotium* and *Imperium*,' and the like.†

On the theoretical side he must be accredited, in this aspect of his thought, with the creation of the science of the Philosophy of History. For the primary significance of the *City of God* lies in the fact that 'in it for the first time an ideal consideration, a comprehensive survey of human history found its expression.'‡ No doubt his external position at the division of the ages, when the old world was dying and the new world, under the dominion of Christianity, was struggling into its place, supplied him with incitement for the creation of this new science; and the demands which the times, in the crash of the secular order, made for an apology for Christianity, powerfully determined him to a general historical philosophy. But it was Christianity itself, as the entrance into the world of a renovating force, and his own particular conception of Christianity (leading him to conceive the history of human society no less than the course of the individual life, as the continuous evolution of the Divine purpose, and impelling him to interpret all the forces of time as working harmoniously onward towards that far-off Divine event to which all creation moves) that gave him not only the impulse to work out a philosophy of history, but the elements of the particular philosophy of history which he actually presents in his epoch-making treatise, which, incomplete and perhaps one-sided as it is, still retains full validity in its fundamental traits.

(*d*) *As a religious genius.*—Not even, however, in Augustine the philosopher do we find the Augustine whose influence has wrought most powerfully in the world. The crisis through which he passed at his conversion was a profound religious revolution; and if he gave himself at once to the task of constructing a philosophy, it was distinctively a Christian philosophy he sought to construct, built though it was largely out of Platonic materials: the authority of Christ, he tells us in the earliest of the writings in which this task was prosecuted, ranked with him even above that of reason. And if he devoted all his powers to the exposition and defence of the Catholic faith, it was because he saw in the Catholic faith the pure expression of religion, and poured into the Catholic faith all the fullness of his religious emotion. It is not Augustine the traditionalist, or Augustine the thinker, but Augustine the religious genius, who has most profoundly influenced the world. The most significant fact about him is that he, first among Church teachers, gave adequate expression to that type of religion which has since attached to itself the name of 'evangelical'; the religion, that is to say, of faith, as distinct from the religion of works; the religion which, despairing of self, casts all its hope on God, as opposed to the religion which, in a greater or less degree, trusts in itself; in a word —since religion in its very nature is dependence on God—religion in the purity of its conception, as over against a *quasi*-religious moralism. What requires particularly to be noted is that he gave full expression to this type of religion both in its vital and in its thetical aspects—the former most adequately in that unique book in which he reveals his soul, and admits us as spectators to the struggles of his great heart as it seeks to cleanse itself of all trust in itself and to lay hold with the grasp, first, of despair, next of discerning trust, and then of grateful love, on the God who was its salvation; and the latter most adequately in that long series of writings in which he expounds, defends, and enforces with logical argument and moving exhortation the fundamental elements of the theology of grace, as against the most direct assailants which that theology has been called upon to meet in the whole history of Christian thought. The great contribution which Augustine has made to the world's life and thought is embodied in the theology of grace, which he has presented with remarkable clearness and force, vitally in his *Confessions*, and thetically in his anti-Pelagian treatises.

It would be altogether a mistake to suppose that Augustine consciously discriminated between the theology of grace which was his personal contribution to Christian thought, and the traditional Catholicism which he gave his life to defend and propagate. In his own consciousness, the two were one: in his theology of grace he was in his own apprehension only giving voice to the Catholic faith in its purity. Nevertheless, however unconsciously, he worked with it a revolution both in Christian teaching and in Christian life, second in its depth and its far-reaching results to no revolution which has been wrought in Christian feeling and thought in the whole course of its history. A new Christian piety dates from him, in which, in place of the alternations of hope and fear which vex the lives of those who, in whatever degree, hang their hopes on their own merits, a mood of assured trust in the mercy of a gracious God is substituted as the spring of Christian life. And a new theology corresponding to this new type of piety dates from him; a theology which, recalling man from all dependence on his own powers or merits, casts him decisively on the grace of God alone for his salvation. Of course, this doctrine was not new in the sense that it was Augustine's invention; it was the doctrine of Paul, for example, before it was the doctrine of Augustine, and was only recovered for the Church by Augustine, though in that age, dominated in all its thinking by the dregs of Stoic rationalism, it came with all the force of a new discovery. And, of course, Augustine did not discover it all at once. Because his conversion was a vital religious experience, in which the religious relation was realized in thought and life in unwonted purity and power, the fundamental elements of his religious revolution were from the first present in his mind and heart; in his earliest Christian writings he already gives expression to both the formal and the material principles, as we may term them, of the theology of grace. The authority of the Divine revelation in and through Christ, embodied in the Scriptures, and the utter dependence of man on God for all good (*potestas nostra Ipse est, da fidem*), are already the most intimate expression of his thought and life. But just because the religious system to which he gave himself on his conversion was taken over by him as a whole, time was requisite for the transfusion of the whole mass by the consistent explication and conscious exposition of the 'Augustinianism' implicitly summed up in such maxims. The adjustment went on slowly, although it went on unbrokenly. It required ten years before the revived Paulinism attained even a fully consistent positive enunciation (first in the work, *De diversis quæstioni-*

* Mirbt, *op. cit.* p. 75. † Reuter, *op. cit.* p. 503.
‡ Seyrich, *Die Geschichtsphilosophie Augustins*, 1891, p. 68.

bus ad Simplicianum, 396); and, though the leaven worked steadily thereafter more and more deeply and widely into his thought, death intervened before all the elements of his thinking were completely leavened. That is the reason why Augustine was both the founder of Roman Catholicism and the author of that doctrine of grace which it has been the constantly pursued effort of Roman Catholicism to neutralize, and which in very fact either must be neutralized by, or will neutralize, Roman Catholicism. Two children were struggling in the womb of his mind. There can be no doubt which was the child of his heart. His doctrine of the Church he had received whole from his predecessors, and he gave it merely the precision and vitality which ensured its persistence. His doctrine of grace was all his own: it represented the very core of his being; and his whole progress in Christian thinking consists in the growing completeness with which its fundamental principles applied themselves in his mind to every department of life and thought. In this gradual subjection to them of every element of his inherited teaching, it was inevitable, had time been allowed, that his inherited doctrine of the Church, too, with all its implications, would have gone down before it, and Augustine would have bequeathed to the Church, not 'problems,' but a thoroughly worked out system of evangelical religion.

(*e*) *Augustine and Protestantism.*—The problem which Augustine bequeathed to the Church for solution, the Church required a thousand years to solve. But even so, it is Augustine who gave us the Reformation. For the Reformation, inwardly considered, was just the ultimate triumph of Augustine's doctrine of grace over Augustine's doctrine of the Church. This doctrine of grace came from Augustine's hands in its positive outline completely formulated: sinful man depends, for his recovery to good and to God, entirely on the free grace of God; this grace is therefore indispensable, prevenient, irresistible, indefectible; and, being thus the free grace of God, must have lain, in all the details of its conference and working, in the intention of God from all eternity. But, however clearly announced and forcefully commended by him, it required to make its way against great obstacles in the Church. As over against the Pelagians, the indispensableness of grace was quickly established; as over against the Semi-Pelagians, its prevenience was with almost equal rapidity made good. But there advance paused. If the necessity of prevenient grace was thereafter (after the second Council of Orange, 529) the established doctrine of the Church, the irresistibility of this prevenient grace was put under the ban, and there remained no place for a complete 'Augustinianism' within the Church, as Gottschalk and Jansen were fully to discover. Therefore, when the great revival of religion which we call the Reformation came, seeing that it was, on its theological side, a revival of 'Augustinianism,' as all great revivals of religion must be (for 'Augustinianism' is but the thetical expression of religion in its purity), there was nothing for it but the rending of the Church. And therefore also the greatest peril to the Reformation was and remains the diffused anti-'Augustinianism' in the world; and, by a curious combination of circumstances, this, its greatest enemy, showed itself most dangerous in the hands of what we must otherwise look upon as the chief ally of the Reformation—that is to say, Humanism. Humanism was the ally of the Reformation in so far as it too worked for the emancipation of the human spirit; and, wherever it was religious, it became the seed-plot of the Reformation. But there was a strong anti-'Augustinian' party among the Humanists, and from it emanated the gravest danger which threatened the Reformation. Where this tone of thought was dominant the Reformation failed, because religious depth was wanting. What Spain, for example, lacked, says R. Saint-Hilaire justly, was not freedom of thought, but the gospel.* In the first stages of the Reformation movement in the North, this anti-'Augustinianism' may be looked upon as summed up in Erasmus; and Erasmus, on this very ground, held himself aloof from the Reformation movement, and that movement held itself aloof from him. 'I am at present reading our Erasmus,' wrote Luther six months before he nailed his theses on the door of the Schloss-Kirche at Wittenberg, 'but my heart recoils more and more from him. . . . Those who ascribe something to man's freedom of will regard these things differently from those who know only God's free grace.' Do we realize how much we owe to Erasmus and his friends that they remained Roman Catholics, and thus permitted the 'Augustinianism' of the Reformation to plant its seed and to bear its fruit?

LITERATURE.—The literature upon Augustine is immense. An excellent selection from it is given by Loofs at the head of the art. 'Augustinus' in *PRE*[3], with which should be compared that given by Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, v. 61 f. The following deal directly with the influence of Augustine: Feuerlein, 'Ueber die Stellung Augustins in der Kirchen- und Kulturgeschichte,' in von Sybel's *Historische Zeitschrift*, 1869, xxii. 270–313; Reuter, *Augustinische Studien*, Gotha, 1887, vii. 479–516; Cunningham, *S. Austin and his place in the History of Christian Thought* (Hulsean Lectures for 1885), London, 1886; Schaff, *History of the Christian Church*, iii., New York, 1884, § 180, pp. 1116–1128; Eucken, *Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker*, Leipzig, 1890 (2nd ed. 1896, pp. 216–250; 4th ed. 1902, p. 211, etc.); Nourrisson, *La Philosophie de Saint Augustin*, Paris, 1886, ii. 147–276; Werner, *Die Scholastik des späteren Mittelalters*, iii., Vienna, 1883, and 'Die Augustinische Psychologie in ihrer mittelalterlich-scholastischen Einkleidung und Gestaltung,' *SWAW*, Vienna, 1882, pp. 435–494; Siebeck, 'Die Anfänge der neueren Psychologie,' in *ZPhP*, 1888, p. 161 f., cf. his *Geschichte d. Psychologie*; Ehrle, 'Der Augustinismus und der Aristotelismus in der Scholastik gegen Ende des xiii. Jahrhundert,' *Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters*, 1889, v. 603–635, cf. also *ZKT*, Innsbruck, 1889, xiii. 172–193; Mirbt, *Die Stellung Augustins in der Publicistik des gregorianischen Kirchenstreits*, Leipzig, 1888; Koch, *Der heilige Faustus Bischof von Riez*, Stuttgart, 1895, pp. 129–191; Gwatkin, *The Knowledge of God*[2], 1908, ii. 179: Portalié, 'Augustine,' in *Catholic Encyclopædia*, ii. 84–104, New York, 1908. The text of Augustine is most generally accessible in *PL* xxxii.–xlvii.; and his chief writings are translated in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, 1st ser. i.–viii., Oxf. and N.Y., 1886–88.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

AURANGZĪB. — Aurangzīb (Abū-l-Muẓaffar Muḥyī-ad-dīn Muḥammad Aurangzīb 'Ālamgīr Pādishāh Ghāzī), sixth of the so-called Mughal emperors of India, and third son of Shāh-Jahān, was born at Duhad, on the borders of Mālwa, on Nov. 4th, 1618. Nothing is recorded of his early years, except that he was held by his grandfather Jahāngīr as a hostage for his father's loyalty, and was educated in the conventional manner of Ḥanafī Muhammadanism. In 1636 he was appointed nominal governor of the Deccan, but his religious exaltation led him seven years later to renounce the world, and to adopt the rigorous rules of a *faqīr*. For a year he practised self-mortification in his retreat in the Western Ghāts, to the indignation of his father and the ridicule of his family. His active spirit, however, was not satisfied with the life of contemplation; he resumed public duties as governor of Gujarāt, and in 1647 was ordered to command the recently annexed provinces of Balḫ and Badaḫshān beyond the Hindū Kūsh. A brief experience convinced him of the uselessness of attempting to hold these distant provinces against the resistance of the Uzbegs, and he retired with heavy loss. He was equally unsuccessful in his next command, when he was sent in 1649 to relieve Kandahār, then besieged and soon captured by the Persians; nor was a second attempt in 1652 more fortunate. These campaigns, however fruitless to the empire

* *RCA*, 1857, p. 146.

taught Aurangzīb the lessons of strategy, and taught his followers to respect their commander's courage. They laid the foundations of his future dominating influence. He was again governor of the Deccan in 1655–57, when the illness of his father brought about a fratricidal struggle for the throne. Allying himself with his youngest brother, Murād Baḥsh, Aurangzīb defeated the Imperial army under Jaswant Singh at Dharmātpūr on April 25th, 1658, and again at Samūgarh on June 2nd, when his eldest brother Dārā was forced to fly. Agra fell into the hands of the victors; Shāh-Jahān was held a prisoner till his death seven years later; the other brothers were ruthlessly killed; and Aurangzīb, who had already been proclaimed Emperor at Delhi in July, 1658, formally ascended the throne on May 26th, 1659, with the title of '*Ālamgīr*, 'World-grasper.'

Though he had won the throne by treachery and by the murder of his brothers, Aurangzīb was humane by nature, and no subsequent act of barbarity has been proved against him during his reign of half a century. The keynote of his character was a rigid Muslim's puritanism. It is impossible to doubt his sincerity, for he had nothing earthly to gain and everything to lose by his stern adherence to every tittle of the law of Islām. He might have cast Muhammad's precepts to the winds, as his father and grandfather had done, and only strengthened his hold of his Hindu empire.

'There was nothing but his own conscience to prevent Aurangzīb from adopting the eclectic philosophy of Akbar, the luxurious profligacy of Jahāngīr, or the splendid ease of Shāh-Jahān. The Hindus would have preferred anything to a Muhammadan bigot. The Rājput princes only wanted to be let alone. The Deccan would never have troubled Hindūstān if Hindūstān had not invaded it. Probably any other Mughal prince would have followed in the steps of the kings and his forefathers, and emulated the indolence and vice of the court in which he had received his earliest impressions. Aurangzīb did none of these things. For the first time in their history the Mughals beheld a rigid Muslim in their Emperor, a Muslim as sternly repressive of himself as of the people around him, a king who was prepared to stake his throne for the sake of the faith' (Lane-Poole, *Aurangzīb*, p. 69).

In his daily life Aurangzīb observed not only the minute details of the Muslim ritual, but an extreme austerity. He ate no meat, drank only water, kept all the fasts and vigils, passed whole nights in prayer and reading the Qur'ān in the mosque, gave alms profusely, and used the utmost simplicity in his dress and manners. In accordance with the Prophet's precept that every Muslim should practise a trade, he made skull-caps; he was also a fine calligraphist, and twice copied the whole Qur'ān, which he knew by heart. Laxity of morals, lewd conversation, the dancing of the Nāch girls, even music, were his detestation. Since to the fanatical puritanism of a strict Muslim were added an indomitable will and a courage so cool that he would dismount and recite the ordained prayers at the customary hour in the very thick of a battle, it is clear that far-reaching changes were in store for the mixed populations and religions of India. The storm began to gather in 1669, when the temple of Viṣṇu at Benares was destroyed by his order, and the idols buried under the feet of good Muslims at the mosque at Agra. Three years later came a rebellion of the Hindu devotees called Satnāmīs at Nārnaul, which was sternly suppressed. Soon afterwards Aurangzīb imposed the intolerable *jizya*, or poll-tax, upon all non-Muslims, and turned the whole Hindu population against him. An interference with the infant princes of Mārwār led to a revolt of the Rājputs, and though this was more or less extinguished in 1681, Aurangzīb lost thereby the support of the finest fighting force in Hindūstān.

The loss of Rājput loyalty was felt as soon as the Emperor undertook the reduction of the Deccan, which he regarded as 'infidels' land,' *Dār el-ḥarb*, and resolved to make *Dār el-Islām*. He had nearly conquered Gulkanda when he was called away to fight for the throne in 1657, but since then a new Hindu power, more formidable than the Muhammadan kingdoms of Bījāpūr and Gulkanda, had arisen by the energy of Sivājī the Marātha freebooter, who had gradually established an era of brigandage on an heroic scale, built up a kingdom in the Western Ghāts, and widened his authority to the extent of levying blackmail over a great part of the Deccan. His death in 1680 did not end the revolt, and Aurangzīb found that he had to deal with an indomitable nation of freebooters, whose strength and skill in guerrilla warfare he was never able to break. The Mughal generals had been too often repulsed, and the Emperor took the field in person in 1681. He first attacked the old Deccan kingdoms which appeared to shelter the Marāthas: Bījāpūr fell in 1686, and Gulkanda in the following year. Their extinction, however, only strengthened the Marāthas, whose disbanded armies swelled the forces of rebellion. The effeminate Mughal troops, deprived of the Rājput 'stiffening,' grew more and more demoralized by year after year of guerrilla fighting; and, whilst Aurangzīb effected a kind of military occupation of the whole Deccan, except the Portuguese possessions and the extreme point south of Trichinopoly, his hold of the country was illusory; and the moment the Mughals turned their backs the hardy Marāthas emerged from their mountain fastnesses and recovered the territory lately occupied by their enemy. The country, devastated by the horde of invaders, welcomed the mountaineers as deliverers from a hateful foreign yoke. Aurangzīb was engaged in a hopeless struggle, yet he never lost heart. For twenty years he fought his evasive foe, planned every campaign himself, issued all general orders and controlled every detail, conducted sieges in person, and in extreme age was barely withheld from leading the assault. It was all in vain; Hindūstān itself was full of revolt in the prolonged absence of its Emperor; the Deccan was a desert; the army was enfeebled and clamouring for its pay; and the Marāthas ever hung about its skirts and insolently defied it. Finally Aurangzīb died, alone as alone he had lived, with all the puritan's sense of sin and unworthiness and dread of death, and full of the dejection of a colossal failure, on March 4th, 1707, in the 49th year of his reign, and the 89th of his age. With him the orthodox Muhammadan revival in India died also.

LITERATURE.—The native annalists are quoted in substance in Elliot and Dowson's *History of India as told by its own Historians*, vol. vii. (London, 1876). European contemporary observers are Bernier, *Travels*, ed. Constable (London, 1891); Manucci, *Storia do Mogor*, ed. W. Irvine (4 vols., London, 1907–8); Gemelli Careri, in Churchill's *Voyages*, vol. iv. (London, 1745); Tavernier, *Travels*, tr. V. Ball (2 vols., London, 1889). Fryer's *New Account of India* (London, 1698); and Hedges' *Diary*, ed. Sir H. Yule (3 vols., London, Hakluyt Society, 1887–9), may be consulted. The present writer contributed a biography of Aurangzīb to the 'Rulers of India' series (Oxford, 1893).

STANLEY LANE-POOLE.

AURELIUS.—See MARCUS AURELIUS.

AUSTERITIES.—**1. Introduction.**—Asceticism, strictly so called, is not found among peoples of lower grades of culture, but the practice of various kinds of austerities is very common. These take the place in the social, moral, magical, and religious life of savages which asceticism holds in that of more advanced peoples, but it is also noticeable that in certain instances, as where these austerities have the form of a self-discipline or are performed as part of the service of the gods, they approach very near to some aspects of asceticism. In savage life the precarious nature of existence, exposure, the struggle for food, the constant state

of warfare between different peoples, the ravages of diseases whose nature and cause are misunderstood, and many other things, are productive of much suffering and call for great endurance on the part of those whom they affect. More particularly women must undergo many austerities, whether as mothers, or as workers, or as suppliers of food; yet many of these are cheerfully undergone. Thus in carrying her child for miles on long journeys in great heat and often with little food, and in relieving its wants at the expense of her own comfort, the savage mother, in thus fulfilling her functions of motherhood, will willingly bear pain and discomfort. Nor are similar forms of austerity lacking, especially among the poor, even in our highest forms of civilization, where want, toil, and suffering must be undergone to satisfy the conditions of existence. The savage methods of punishment, the various forms of the ordeal, of revenge or recrimination, are usually of the most cruel and painful kind. But all such forms of austerity do not concern us here. Those alone are dealt with which are self-inflicted or which are willingly borne, for definite purposes, subserving now magical, now religious, now ethical ends.

Unwilling as the savage is to suffer pain, his theory of the universe constrains him to undergo it on many occasions in order to fit him better for the ends of life, or to make life more tolerable, or to please the gods or spirits by whom he believes himself to be surrounded. Such austerities, undergone at one time for magical purposes, frequently change their nature. Thus they may come to be regarded as possessing a disciplinary character, in which case they are hardly to be differentiated outwardly from the disciplinary exercises, often of the same kind, of a higher asceticism, though they may not possess the same ethical or religious content. Others, again, as time goes on, may assume a more or less symbolic character, their excessive severity being then much lessened. On the other hand, even where such earlier forms of austerity survive in higher forms of religion, their severity is often by no means decreased, although the motive may have become a nobler one. Examples of this will be found in the various forms of austerity discussed here. These are mainly austerities connected with a variety of initiatory ceremonies, flagellation, fasting, mutilations of the body, tatuing, and medical rites, while some notice must be taken of self-restraint among savage races.

Before passing on to these, we may notice that the universal custom of sacrifice, involving a greater or less renunciation of property and possessions, of food-stuffs, and not infrequently life itself, or, as a substitute for that, of some part of the body, is a marked form of austerity; and its equivalent in the higher ascetic life—the devotion to poverty, the willing renunciation of comfort and luxury for the sake of love to God—has surely received a considerable impulse from this wide-spread custom of ethnic religion, though by no means wholly derived from it. In other cases, which need not be more fully detailed here, life itself is sacrificed in suicide, often through pride or shame or a sense of duty (see A. Sutherland, *Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct*, London, 1898, ii. 35). Or, where it is thought that one ought to pass into the other world before the body and mind have become frail, decrepit, and worn out, life is often freely yielded up by the aged or the sick (see ABANDONMENT AND EXPOSURE). Though the custom may appear cruel and frequently is accomplished by cruel means, it is mostly a willing self-surrender of life that a higher life may be attained beyond the grave (see Letourneau, *Sociology*, London, 1893, 154 ff.; Westermarck, *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, vol. i., London, 1906, p. 383 ff.).

2. Adolescence initiation ceremonies.—Among savage tribes the passing of a boy or girl to manhood or womanhood is usually accompanied by a number of ceremonies, several of which are most severe and painful, but must be undergone willingly in order to preserve their effect. This stage of life, being a highly critical one, the beginning of sexual existence properly so called, demands many safeguards, and, taken as a whole, the various ceremonies are intended to ward off or neutralize the evil influences incident to that period. Where a youth is concerned, there is the beginning of a new life which requires ceremonies of a purificatory kind, besides preparation for entrance upon a stage of new relations with the other sex. Hence there must be seclusion for a time, while the youth is usually debarred from intercourse of any kind with the other sex, and silence is frequently imposed. Fasting is also made use of, either in the sense of complete abstinence from food for a longer or shorter period, or abstinence from certain foods which are tabu at such a stage. This is intended to prevent the entrance of evil influences to the body with such foods, or to prepare the way for receiving them later on. Other ceremonies have the purpose of strengthening the youth for manhood; these are often of a severe character, and, joined with others which are intended to purify from the contagion of evil, easily pass over into tests of endurance. Some form of mutilation, more or less severe—the more severe forms being circumcision, loss of a tooth, or cutting of the flesh, —is frequent. In this case, perhaps, the primary intention is, by losing some part of the body, to secure the rest from evil influences; but it easily passes over into the idea of sacrifice, or some purificatory ceremony, or simply a test of endurance. Again, the youth at this period sometimes obtains a guardian spirit, whose nature is revealed to him in most cases by fasting in solitude, exposed to all the terrors which imagination and the sense of mystery may conjure up. This sense of mystery exciting fear is usually present at all these initiatory ceremonies, for now the youth is instructed not only in sexual matters but in such tribal lore—magical, religious, moral, or otherwise —as is confined to the men. Thus, though in different places the nature of the rites may vary, or their severity be greater or less, they call for the endurance of great austerities on the part of the youth. See art. INITIATION.

A few examples chosen from different localities will show the nature of the austerities undergone at this period. Among the northern tribes of Central Australia the long and complicated ceremonies of initiation to manhood include beating, which must not be resented, circumcision, sub-incision or cutting open the urethra, and biting the youth's scalp; while, as a rule, though fasting is not carried to an extreme, several foods are tabu. During the painful rites of circumcision and sub-incision the youth's mouth is gagged with 'fur-string' to prevent his crying out, while no attempt is made to spare him pain when his scalp is bitten, the object being to cause a plentiful growth of hair. With some of the tribes knocking out a tooth is part of the ceremony, with others it has no connexion with it (Spencer-Gillen[b], ch. i.). Among the Macquarrie tribes any exhibition of shrinking when the tooth is knocked out or the body scarified makes the youth unfit for manhood (Angas, *Savage Life*, London, 1847, ii. 224). With other tribes scourging is practised, and the young men must endure it silently (Ridley, *Kamilaroi and other Aust. Lang.*, Sydney, 1877, 154). With the Andamanese the initiatory period—for both youths and girls a period of fasting from several tabued foods—begins from the 11th to the 13th year, and lasts from one to five years, though sometimes a youth will extend the period in order to boast of his powers of endurance afterwards. It is said to be intended as a test of endurance or self-denial, but as various complicated ceremonies mark the first partaking of these foods at the time when tabu is raised from each, the intention probably goes further than this (Man, *JAI*, 1882, xii. 94, 129). In New Guinea the initiation of boys to the Malu cult is attended with great mystery and severity. They are not allowed to cut or dress the hair, to dance, feast, smoke, or behave in an unseemly way; they are beaten with clubs and severely wounded. These rites are said to have had a strong educative effect. Boys among the Cape York natives were secluded for a year, at the

end of this time a tooth was knocked out, and a year later a further test of endurance was applied (Haddon, *Head Hunters*, London, 1901, 50 ff., 191). Similarly in Mabuiaig lads were tortured and chastised, and the tests increased with a refractory boy, who was speared, scraped, or beaten with the nests of green ants which stung him furiously (*ib.* 140). In many parts of Africa similar rites are found. Thus among the natives of the Bondei region the *galo* ceremonies include passing the boy through a narrow pit smeared with the juices of a plant which burn his skin, incision of tribal marks on the arm, and the performance of secret ceremonials in some of which he is severely handled, death occasionally resulting (Dale, *JAI*, 1895, xxv. 189 ff.).

But it was among the tribes of North America that such austerities at initiation were most severe, especially where they were connected with the choice of a *manitou*. Thus among the Californian tribes abstinence and indifference to hardship and privations were insisted upon, and before the youth could rank as a warrior his naked body was stung with nettles till he could not move, after which he was laid on the nest of a virulent species of ant, which, swarming over his body and stinging it, caused him fearful agony. To discover his *manitou* he was made to fast for three or four days, and was intoxicated and harassed until he confessed to seeing it. A figure of the *manitou* was then moulded and placed on his breast, where it was ignited so that the figure might be indelibly marked on the flesh (Bancroft, *Native Races of the Pacific States*, London, 1875, i. 413 ff.). Among the New Mexicans the ordeal consisted in scarifying the skin till the blood ran, the candidate being expected to show no sign of pain (*ib.* i. 580). With the tribes of British Columbia boys were secluded at puberty and made to eat and drink very sparingly; in other cases they were made to bathe in all weathers, their naked bodies were whipped daily, they had to gash themselves with knives in the sweat-house, or lie out exposed to the elements all night. Prolonged fasts, bathings, forced vomitings, and other exhausting exercises for a longer or shorter period were among the means employed in solitude for obtaining mystic dreams and a knowledge of the *manitou* (Hill Tout, *JAI*, 1904, xxxiv. 32, 316; 1905, xxxv. 143–144). Rigorous fasting was compulsory on boys and girls among the Algonquin tribes, and the longer the period of abstinence the greater the merit which accrued. During these fasts, which were common to practically all the American Indian tribes, the greatest attention was paid to dreams, for it was mainly through these that the revelation of the *manitou* came (Tanner, *Narrative*, New York, 1830, 288; Schoolcraft, *Indian Tribes*, Philadelphia, 1857–1860, *passim*; Beverley, *Hist. of Virginia*, London, 1722, 177 ff.).

Similar austerities are found among the South American tribes. Thus, in Guiana, before the youth can marry he must endure the infliction of flesh-wounds, or he is sewn up in a hammock full of fire-ants, or undergoes other hardships (Im Thurn, *Indians of Guiana*, London, 1883, 221). Among the ancient Peruvians, at fifteen or sixteen years, boys had to practise rigorous fasts until they were worn out, to watch for twelve nights in succession, to fight with each other at the risk of wounds, or death, to undergo flogging, and many other privations, before receiving the signs of their new position as men (Garc. de la Vega, *Comm. Real.*, Madrid, 1609, vi. 35). So in ancient Mexico, before being introduced to the aristocratic warrior class, the youth, covered with rags, was shut up in different temples in succession, offering his blood to the divinity, watching and fasting for periods of four days and four nights (Lopez de Gomara, *Hist.*, Madrid, 1852, ii. 78). See § 8 (3).

In the case of girls, the arrival of puberty, in accordance with the universal theory of menstruation as containing an element of danger to the girl herself, but more especially to others, and even to nature itself, is marked by several painful ordeals. Among these the most common is the absolute seclusion of the girl for a longer or shorter period, so that no man may see her and that the sun may not shine on her. Fasting, excision, cuttings, and other barbarities are also commonly found at this period.

Girls in New Guinea, on the first signs of puberty, are shut up for three months and permitted only vegetable food (Haddon, *op. cit.* 135). In New Ireland they are confined for several years in the dark in small cages, and this custom is general over Melanesia (*JAI*, 1888, xviii. 284). Seclusion is also found among most African tribes, as among the Kafirs (MacLean, *Kaffir Laws and Customs*, Mount Coke, 1858, 101) and in Loango (Ploss, *Das Kind*, Leipzig, 1884, ii. 439). With the Bondei people the rite for girls, corresponding to the *galo* of the boys, lasts for twelve days. On the last day the girl fasts. During this period she is taught the *vihili*, or secrets, and this teaching is accompanied by severe and painful ordeals (*JAI*, 1895, xxv. 193). The custom of seclusion is common among the N. American tribes, varying from a few days to a year or longer. Girls among the Ahts are hidden behind mats in the house, where they can see neither sun nor fire, and are allowed no food for several days (Sproat, *Savage Life*, London, 1868, 93 ff.). Among Alaskan tribes the girl was shut up in a cage with a small air-hole, or in a hut, where she remained on hands and knees. This treatment lasted for a year, and no communication with others or exercise of any kind was allowed (*GB*² iii. 211). Bancroft cites many instances among the tribes of the Pacific coast. Thus among the Isthmian tribes the girl was closely confined, sometimes for a period of two years (*NR* i. 772, cf. 82, 110, 197, 278). Among the Californian tribes she was laid over a hole previously heated, and kept without food for some days. Or she was buried up to the neck and the ground about her beaten till she perspired profusely (*ib.* 414). Among the Salish tribes of British Columbia, seclusion in a cubicle for ten days was the rule, the girl being allowed little food or water. With other Salish tribes she was secluded outside the settlement for a month under many food restrictions (*JAI*, 1905, xxxv. 32, 319). In other tribes she had to squat for some days in a hole made in the hut, while her seclusion lasted for a much longer period. She fasted entirely for four days, and afterwards abstained from all fresh meats (*ib.* xxxv. 136). In S. America these customs also flourished among most of the tribes, as in Brazil, where the girl's back was cut with a sharp tooth, after which she was bound and hung in a hammock, in which she remained without food or drink for three days. New gashes were then inflicted upon her, and she remained in the hammock under less strict rules of abstinence until the third month (Lafitau, *Mœurs des Sauvages Amér.*, Paris, 1724, i. 290 ff.). The Uaupes of Brazil also seclude the girl for a month on an abstemious diet. When released she receives several severe scourgings at intervals, death sometimes ensuing as the result (Wallace, *Amazon*, London, 1895, 345). In Guiana the hammock seclusion lasted for a month, after which the girl's naked body was exposed to the bites of venomous ants (Labat, *Voy. en Guinée*, Amsterdam, 1731, iv. 365).

Similar instances might be cited, occurring among more advanced races, *e.g.* the Hindus, though with less severity. Here it may also be noted that, on account of similar beliefs regarding the danger and impurity of menstruation, women, among most savage tribes, must go into seclusion, often at some distance from the village, abstain from certain foods, or fast (see Stoll, *Geschlechtsleben in der Völkerpsychologie*, Leipzig, 1908, 835 ff.; *NR* i. 549; *JAI*, 1904, xxxiv. 323; *GB*² iii. 222 ff.). This is also found at higher levels of civilization (cf. Lv 15¹⁹ᵃ; Avesta, *Vendidād*, xvi.). Similarly, women, being tabu among many peoples at pregnancy on account of the danger arising from this critical period of their life, have frequently to go into entire seclusion, or are in some way separated from others, and must abstain from certain kinds of food (Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, London, 1902, 9, 167, 200, 417; *NR* i. 413, 734; *JAI*, 1882, xii. 354). See also §§ 6 (*b*), 8 (*b*).

3. Admission to secret societies or 'mysteries' at opening manhood or womanhood was, in many cases, also characterized by severe austerities, which, though no doubt intended as a preparation for the revelation of secret knowledge, myths, or ritual, can hardly be separated in their origin from the pains undergone at puberty, while in some cases they seem to have been intended also as puberty ceremonies. Yet, in so far as these and certain ordinary initiatory ceremonies pave the way for the communication of religious and, occasionally, moral teaching, we see such forms of austerity almost passing over to a kind of disciplinary asceticism, and certainly possessing the primitive meaning of ἄσκησις as 'training.' In Australian mysteries, for example, the advice given by the old men was intended to 'soften the heart,' and, as among the Kurnai, the stomachs of the boys were kneaded to drive out selfishness and greed (*JAI*, 1883, xiii. 296; 1884, xiv. 313), while unselfishness is taught in the Yao mysteries, a selfish person being called 'uninitiated' (Macdonald, *Africana*, London, 1882, i. 130; cf. the moral teaching given by headmen to boys at circumcision and initiation during the painful rites attendant thereon among the Mavendas of S. Africa, *JAI*, 1905, xxxv. 268). Further, in many of these mysteries, the initiation to which lasts for a long period of time, the candidate is supposed to die and come to life again as a new being. Although this idea may not have the intention of ascetic renunciation—*Stirb und werde*—yet in it and in the moral training for the attainment of 'selflessness,' so far as a savage can grasp the idea, we see a connexion with the later ascetic ideals.

In Africa, examples of such initiations are numerous. Among others may be cited those of the west coast, in which the youths are taken by their instructors into the depth of the forest, where they are subjected to a severe course of training during a year; they are naked and smeared with clay (M. H. Kingsley, *Travels in W. Africa*, London, 1897, 531). In the Mwetyi society of the Shekani tribes—a woman's society—the initiation lasts for two weeks, and is accompanied by severe ordeals and fasting, while the girls must gaze at the sun until they fall back in a swoon. Most of the ordeals are intentionally hard, so that the wills of the candidates may be broken and secrecy ensured (Nassau,

Fetichism in W. Africa, London, 1904, 249). With candidates for the Malanda society among the Batangas the sungazing ordeal is applied to the lads; then, while everything is done to augment their sense of awe and mystery, they are confined in a hut for twenty days along with a corpse, and beaten severely with rods until they are submissive (*ib.* 322). In Melanesia entrance to such societies is possible only after a severe initiation, including hardships and tortures. In other cases the candidates are stung with leaves of the nettle-tree, made to fast and to take live embers in their hands, and are trodden upon, or, as in the Welu society, they are each placed in a hole in the ground and burning fronds of the coco-nut palm are thrown on their backs, yet they must not utter a cry (Codrington, *The Melanesians*, London, 1891, 82, 87, 88). In these and many similar initiation rites the youths are daubed with clay, charcoal, mud, or filth, which must not be washed off till the ordeal is at an end; this rite may signify the putting away of the old life, as it did in certain Greek mysteries (Lang, *Custom and Myth*, London, 1884, 40; *JAI*, 1889, xix. 261; Demosthenes, *de Corona*, 313). Here, too, may be noted the initiatory customs used in the Eleusinian and other Greek mysteries, in which, besides other tests, the candidates had to prepare themselves by fasting for several days; the similar fasting before initiation to the cult of Osiris and Isis in Egypt; and the various tests of endurance undergone by candidates for initiation to Mithraism (see artt. MYSTERIES, MITHRA, SECRET SOCIETIES, and Apul. *Metam.* xi.).

4. **Initiation to the priesthood.**—As in savage societies the priest, sorcerer, or medicine-man has a commanding station and exercises so much influence by virtue of his relation to the spiritual world, it is natural that those who seek to enter upon that profession should be subjected to a severe course of training, involving many austerities. And as the communications of the medicine-man with the other world are usually associated with a state of trance, or his revelations are given in some ecstatic condition, the candidate's course of training is intended to adapt him for the production of these states either by reducing him to an abnormal condition of body and mind, or by accustoming him to the use of such severe methods as will readily produce them. The phenomena of hysteria, epilepsy, catalepsy, and such-like diseases are believed by savages, and indeed by many peoples at a higher grade, to denote possession or inspiration by gods, spirits, or demons. Hence such persons as are subject to them are often deliberately chosen for the profession of medicine-man, while their abnormal states are only heightened by the austerities undergone. In other cases, in accordance with the prevailing theory of the nature of inspiration and of the state into which the inspired person is thrown, the production of such states at will is the object of the painful processes to which the candidate must submit. The course of training includes solitude, exposure to the elements, scarifying the body, castigation, fasting, and drinking various unwholesome beverages. By all these means the candidate soon arrives at a hysterical or abnormal state. He acquires the faculty of seeing visions, of producing a convulsionary state of body, or of falling into a trance. A few examples of the method of training will suffice to show its severity and the painful nature of the austerities undergone (see also artt. MEDICINE-MAN and PRIEST).

In Greenland the preparation for the profession of *angakok* begins at an early age, and includes retirement into solitary places and a severe course of fasting. By these methods trances are produced in which the novice obtains a *tornak*, or guardian spirit, or falls into fits in which his ravings are held to be communications from the spirits (Rink, *Tales and Traditions of the Eskimo*, London, 1875, 58; Cranz, *Grönland*, Leipzig, 1770, 268). Among the American Indians similar methods are adopted: protracted fasts, severe bodily exercises, and solitary vigils all reduce the candidate to a hysterical state, in which he dreams or has revelations; and the greater his austerities the more vivid and copious are his visions, and hence the higher is the estimation in which he is held (*JAI*, 1904, xxxiv. 26; Schoolcraft, *Indian Tribes, passim*). Among the Isthmian tribes, youths are chosen for their natural aptitude to the office of *piaces*, or sorcerers, and are confined in a solitary place, subjected to a severe discipline for two years, fasting from all flesh meat and living only on a scanty diet of vegetables and water; while all sexual intercourse is prohibited (*NR* i. 777). In S. America we find similar methods employed. Among the Abipones the aspirants had to remain seated on the branches of a tree and to fast for several days. By this means they contracted 'a weakness of brain, a giddiness, and kind of delirium, which makes them imagine that they are gifted with superior wisdom, and give themselves out for magicians' (Dobrizhoffer, *Abipones*, London, 1822, ii. 68). Training for the office of *peaiman* in Guiana involves a painful and severe trial of endurance. The candidate fasts for protracted periods, wanders alone in the forest, and accustoms himself to drinking large draughts of tobacco-juice mixed with water. The terrors of solitude and the drinking of the nicotine produce intense delirium, in which he holds converse with spirits. Epileptic subjects are preferred for the office (Im Thurn, 334).

In Africa, among the Zulus, those who wish to become diviners have to acquire the power of intercourse with the spirits in states of coma or ecstasy by solitude, prolonged fastings, and flagellation, until they become a 'house of dreams' (Callaway, *Rel. of Amazulu*, London, 1884, 387; Grout, *Zulu-Land*, London, 1865, 158). Among the Bondeis the youth who aspires to be a doctor must submit to be scarified all over his body (*JAI*, 1895, xxv. 213). The *manangs*, or medicine-men, among the Sea Dayaks must prove their call to the office by prolonged fasting, and by ecstatic states and trances in which they foam at the mouth (Ling Roth, *Natives of Sarawak*, London, 1896, i. 266). And among the Todas, the *palal*, or priest, at his initiation must remain naked for three days and two nights, whether the weather is hot or freezing, and eat only a little porridge at night (Reclus, *Primitive Folk*, London, 1891, 221).

For similar trials among American tribes before appointment to the office of chief, etc., including fasting, flagellation, stinging with ants, see Letourneau, *Sociology*, 473; Biet, *Voy. en l'Isle de Cayenne*, Paris, 1664, iii. 10.

In these and hundreds of similar cases the discipline may be more or less severe, and its period longer or shorter, but the intention in all is the same. Not only so, but in future the medicine-man, or shaman, previous to communicating with the spirits, giving oracles, healing, and the like, must produce the abnormal state by these painful processes, which will, of course, be more or less extensive according as he readily passes over into that state or not. Frequently it is spontaneously produced, either because the shaman is a hysterical subject or on account of the training he has undergone; but generally it is artificially produced by fasting, by wild dances and screams, by contortions of the body, by flagellation, by cutting the flesh, or by swallowing various narcotics and herbs (cf. Parish, *Hallucinations*, London, 1897, 40). The result is a trance, a nervous seizure, frenzied movements, foaming at the mouth, and raving utterances. Similar results followed the hysterical excitement which attacked whole communities in the Middle Ages, and which was often produced by such artificial means, especially convulsive movements and dancing. They are seen again in the American Indian ghost-dances, in which, following convulsive gyrations, trance and catalepsy are induced, or in the indifference to pain and wounds among Muhammadan dervishes in consequence of ecstasy produced by similar movements (Tuckey, *Psycho-Therapeutics*[3], London, 1891, 12; Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, London, 1902, ii. 161; Myers, *Human Personality*, London, 1903, ii. 190; and *Proc. Psych. Research Soc.* 1885, p. 31).

5. **Flagellation.** — As has been said above, scourging or beating is a frequent practice at the various forms of initiation. A wider view of this rite among savages and as a folk-survival leaves little doubt as to its original purpose. The scourging is intended to drive away the contagion of evil, and the malignant presence of demoniacal powers. The pain is inflicted less as a means of hurting the victim than of making these evil influences suffer, or of frightening them so that they will depart. This is especially noticeable where the scourging is done not with rods, but with branches or plants which are supposed to possess magical virtues; in such cases it is not always necessarily painful. It may, however, be made painful where the plant has poisonous juices or is of a stinging variety. But its original intention soon passes over into that of simply inflicting pain or undergoing voluntary suffering, either by way of hardening or as a means of self-discipline with a definitely religious or moral end. Here it becomes a true ascetic

austerity, but it may also be a pathological form of asceticism. Or, again, it may be used as an erotic stimulation, though here it assumes a pathological form as subserving genesic excitability. In other cases its religious disciplinary use is conjoined with some pathological erotic purpose, as in the case of Brother Cornelius and his penitents, or of Père Girard (Cooper, *Hist. of the Rod*, London, 1870, 122 ff. ; Zöckler, *Askese und Mönchtum*[2], 609). The pain caused by flagellation, again, made it an obvious and well-nigh universal form of punishment. With this and its previous use we are not concerned here. Finally, it remains to notice how, while subserving its primitive purpose or used simply as a means of producing pain, it may be regarded as a form of sacrifice to gods who will that their worshippers should suffer, or it may pass as a substitute for an offering of the person himself as a human sacrifice. Most of these purposes are also served by using instead of a scourge some stinging plant or some substance causing pain to the tissues when applied to the body, as has been seen in several cases of initiation rites.

The primitive purpose of flagellation is seen in the fact that those animals or men on whom the evils of a community were laid (scape-goat), and who were driven away or slain, had probably in the first instance been regarded as representatives of a spirit of vegetation who was slain. They were frequently scourged, and the scourging had the effect of driving off 'any malignant influence by which at the supreme moment they might conceivably be beset' (*GB*[2] iii. 128). When they were regarded simply as scapegoats, the scourging became a means of causing pain. Instances of this use of flagellation to drive away evil are found in many places. When a king was installed in the Sandwich Islands, the priest struck him on the back with a sacred branch, in order to purify him from defilement (Ellis, *Polynes. Researches*, London, 1829, iii. 110). Brazilian Indians scourge themselves on the genital organs with a certain plant at the time of the new moon (Nery, *Folk-lore brésilien*, Paris, 1889, 253). Sometimes the scourging is done on a substitute, as in New Caledonia, where, when a chief is ill, a girl is severely whipped to drive away the evil (Featherman, *Soc. Hist. of Races of Mankind*, London, 1891, ii. 92). Or it may be mutually inflicted, as in Peru at an autumn festival, where the people beat each other with torches, saying, 'Let all harm go away' (Acosta, *Hist. of the Indies*, Hakl. Soc. 1880, ii. 375). Similar practices still survive in folk-custom (*GB*[2] iii. 131 ff.).

With the same object of driving out the demon of disease which has entered into a patient's body, in accordance with the universal primitive view of the cause of sickness, flagellation is resorted to in savage medicine, the patient often undergoing great suffering through this cure. Thus among the Californian Indians, in cases of paralysis, the affected parts are whipped with nettles (*NR* i. 419). Among the Ainus beating with herbs to drive out the demons of sickness is part of the healer's method (Batchelor, *Ainus and their Folklore*, London, 1901, 313). In Timor-Laut, if a smallpox *prao* should be stranded on the coast, the people are beaten with branches, which are then put on the *prao* before it is launched away again, and the demon of smallpox is besought to depart (*GB*[2] iii. 98, citing Riedel). Women suffering from demoniacal possession in Burma are thrashed with a stick, the demon alone being supposed to feel the blows (Bastian, *Östl. Asien*, Jena, 1866–71, ii. 152). These methods survived into later medicine, especially in the case of madness, though here the curative virtue was evidently supposed to lie in the rough treatment to which the patient was subjected (Cooper, *op. cit.* 204).

The magical value of flagellation is seen in the flogging of women with thongs cut from the skins of the sacrificial goats by the Luperci at the Lupercalia in Rome. This act, communicating to them magically the beneficent influence of divinity, was believed to render them prolific (Ovid, *Fasti*, ii. 267 ff.). Although the numerous cases of scourging or stinging at initiation frequently have the primitive purpose here discovered, they are sometimes expressly said to be done with the view of causing pain or testing endurance. Thus, among the Bavendas, after circumcision, the youths, stripped naked, are beaten and suffer other hardships by exposure to the intense night cold, in order to harden them (*JAI*, 1905, xxxv. 252). Among other Bechuana tribes, after circumcision the youths are scourged at intervals with great severity, and it is a point of honour that they should show absolute impassibility even though the blood spouts from their backs, and the whip leaves life-long scars. At the same time they are allowed no flesh meat but what they can themselves obtain, and are subjected to the endurance of cold and hunger (Livingstone, *Missionary Travels*, London, 1857, 146 ff. ; *JAI*, 1889, xix. 268 ff.).

The primitive view of scourging has here, as in other cases, been superseded by a later conception of it as a painful test of endurance. At this point the cruel flogging of youths at Sparta in connexion with the cult of Artemis—the blood from the wounds caused by the whip being shed on the altar—can scarcely be viewed in any other light than that of a survival of earlier rites of initiation, especially as the Spartan youths, like the Bechuanas, were allowed no food save what they could discover for themselves. The flogging was done in presence of their parents, who encouraged them to show no sign of suffering; and so severe was it that the youths sometimes died. Various mythical explanations of this flogging were current, but it was generally regarded as a substitute for human sacrifice ordained by Lycurgus (Paus. iii. 16; Lucian, *Anacharsis*). But in the light of similar customs elsewhere, the origin must be sought in old initiation rites of a savage past, remains of which, like the 'bull-roarer' (βόμβος) and daubing with mud, were also found in the Greek mysteries. Similar scourgings took place elsewhere in Greece (Potter, *Antiq. of Greece*, Edinburgh, 1824, i. 258); and among the Thracians, according to Artemidorus, flagellation in honour of their Artemis was also practised.

Such tests of endurance by flagellation enter sometimes into festival dances, as among the Arawaks, where the men armed with whips lashed each other alternately until they were covered with bleeding wounds, yet the pain was 'borne and inflicted with perfect good temper' (Im Thurn, 326 ; cf. a striking match, resulting often in death, among the Mosquito Indians, *NR* i. 735). Probably this is to be connected with a group of rites in which blows, effusion of blood, etc., are intended to promote fertility (see § 8 (*b*)). For the discipline of self-flagellation in the Christian Church, see artt. ASCETICISM, FLAGELLANTS ; Zöckler, *op. cit.* 458, 528 ff. ; Cooper, *op. cit.* Beginning as an act of monastic asceticism in the 11th cent., it assumed a pathological form with the later orders of Flagellants (especially during the ravages of the Black Death), who regarded it as more efficacious than the sacraments.

Flagellation as a sacrifice or as a substitute for sacrifice has already appeared in the case of the Spartan youths. Perhaps the mutual flagellation of the Galli at the spring festival at Hierapolis, accompanied as it was by self-cuttings (Lucian,

de Dea Syria, 50), and the flagellation of the Egyptians at Busiris during the festival of Isis (Herod. ii. 61, 'for whom they beat themselves it would be impious for me to divulge'), also had this character. An analogous instance may be found in the custom of the Indians of Guiana who rub red pepper into their eyes when approaching any place haunted by spirits, in order that the latter may not see them. But it is probably in its intention a sacrificial act—the suffering endured being intended to placate the spirits (Im Thurn, 368). See art. FLAGELLANTS.

6. Fasting.—Fasting as a form of austerity enters largely into savage life. Hunger is one of the most pressing trials of the savage, although he can go for long periods with little food, like the Bushman observed to live for fifteen days on water and salt (Thompson, *Trav. in S. Africa*, London, 1827, 99). Sometimes, too, the savage will undergo fasting as a purely unselfish act, giving his food to his starving children or sharing his scanty supply with his fellows, who, when it is exhausted, starve to death with him (Nansen, *Eskimo Life*, London, 1893, 103, 115). Frequent periods of abstinence, especially in regions where the food supply is scarce, are forced upon him. We are here concerned, however, with voluntary fasts rather than with those imposed upon savage man. Although he regards fasting quite differently from the civilized ascetic, and probably has no strong wish to suffer the pangs of hunger, yet voluntary fasting is forced upon him for different reasons.

The origin of fasting is complex, but on the whole it seems to have been adopted at first for magical reasons. Man's experience of hunger in times of scarcity may have suggested to him that to fast voluntarily might guarantee him against scarcity, and also have the effect of increasing the food supply. Thus at the Intichiuma ceremonies of Central Australian tribes, which have for their purpose the increase of the totem food supply, fasting is a part of the rite (Spencer-Gillen[b], 290). On more purely religious grounds an analogy is found where the sacrifice of one person wards off danger menacing a whole group. Fasting is also intimately connected with the system of food tabus. In some cases these may arise from the selfishness of stronger members of a human group, who forbid others to touch certain foods sacred to themselves, or again from the wise practice of establishing a 'close' time when certain foods are likely to become scarce, as in Polynesia, where, if a bad harvest is feared, a tabu is placed on bananas, hens, etc., to establish a reserve (Letourneau, *Sociology*, 489). But they often arose out of man's peculiar views regarding the contagion of evil influences which might be warded off by, so to say, sacrificing a part in lieu of the whole. Food was eminently a vehicle for evil influences entering the body, hence by the tabuing of some particular food other foods would be rendered harmless. Tabu is also connected with totemism, where some particular animal or plant species is not eaten by those whose totem it is. But it also has a much wider range, and affects foods which may not be eaten at certain periods of life, *e.g.* before a youth is initiated, before marriage, during pregnancy, at the time of the couvade, during hunting or war. In this aspect fasting from the tabued food also acts as a kind of purification. Fasting in all such cases includes such varieties as abstinence from certain foods, or from meat, or from food with which women have had to do (sexual tabu), or from all food for a varying period. In certain cases kings or priests might not eat certain foods for tabu and other magical reasons, such as their being recognized as incarnate divinity, which often occurs. Frequently, too, women might not eat men's food, and *vice versa* (see Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 172, etc.; cf. an instance cited by Im Thurn, 256, where the Indians would have starved rather than resort to cooking some cassava roots, because cooking was woman's work).

Whatever be the reason for a food-tabu, it argues considerable self-restraint, akin to the restraint which desires to discipline the body through fasting among peoples of a higher culture. To break such a tabu is universally considered the greatest crime, to be visited by severe punishment or by automatic results—sickness or death. Many instances are known where a savage would rather starve to death than eat some tabued food though that alone was available, and though all risk of detection by fellow-clansmen was out of the question. Again, since during periods of fasting as the result of famine, morbid conditions of psychic life are induced, with dreams and visions, fasting is in turn resorted to in order to produce these, as has already been seen (§ 4). Finally, since it is believed that the gods are pleased with suffering, fasting becomes a painful service rendered to them, or, again, it is used as a penitential discipline. This occurs in many barbaric cults at a higher stage than mere savagery, and in the later usage fasting speedily becomes an ascetic exercise (see art. FASTING).

(*a*) Fasting before marriage has mainly a magical aspect, and is doubtless intended as one means out of many of lessening the dangers supposed to attend this critical stage of sexual life, while it avoids the possibility of evil influences entering the body through food. The following typical examples will suffice. Among the Macusis the man must abstain from meat for some time before marriage, and will rather go without food altogether upon occasion than break this tabu (Im Thurn, 222). The newly-married pair among the Wa-teetas are shut up for three days without food, and among the Bondeis they eat nothing and only wash out their mouths with water on the day of the wedding (Thompson, *Travels in S. Africa*, London, 1827, 343; *JAI*, 1895, xxv. 199). Similarly with the Thlinkets, bride and bridegroom must fast for two days, then eat a little food, and again fast for two days (*NR* i. 111).

(*b*) The custom of a woman's abstaining from certain foods or fasting before the birth of a child, in which abstinence the husband frequently joins her, is intimately associated with and has the same *rationale* as the husband's fasting during the period of the couvade in which he lies in instead of his wife. The reason for the practice of fasting here is the intimate connexion between parents and child which is emphasized at such a time, so that they must abstain from all such foods as might injure the child through eating them. Thus in the Andaman Islands the mother abstains from pork, turtle, honey, iguana, and paradoxurus, and after a time her husband avoids the two last, 'in the belief that the embryo would suffer were he to indulge in such food' (*JAI*, 1882, xii. 354). Among the Californian Indians the mother fasted for three days after the birth, drinking nothing but warm water. This formed part of a ceremony of purification, and for two moons she was allowed no meat (*NR* i. 413). Where the couvade is concerned, the husband usually abstains for some weeks from all flesh food and lives on a very abstemious diet, and such customs are widely prevalent among most savage peoples (see art. COUVADE, and Lubbock, *Origin of Civilization*, London, 1870, 16 ff.).

(*c*) In many cases where fasting occurs at initiation, we almost see it passing over from its magical intention of the avoidance of evil influences and of a preparation for the reception of new food to an act of religious preparation for the divine and ethical revelations about to be made to the lad. A similar transition to a more religious view of fasting is seen in other cases. Among many peoples when the harvest, whether of corn, yams, bananas, etc., has been gathered in, no one may eat of it until the first fruits have been offered to a divinity or partaken of by a priest, chief, or king, and in some cases a fast of several days' duration takes place. This, though it is primarily a preparation for the reception of new food, is also part of a group of purificatory rites, while it has also a religious element. Thus, among the Creek Indians, part of the elaborate ceremonies included a strict fast for two nights and one day, while a bitter decoction was drunk in order 'to purge their sinful bodies.' This was followed by a sacramental eating of the new crops (Adair, *Hist. of the Amer. Ind.*, London, 1775, 96 ff.). A similar solemn fast took place among the Natchez for three days along with the observance of silence at the Fire Festival, when the maize was offered on the altar of the Sun; and was also observed among the Cherokees by the warriors, who at the same time abstained from sexual intercourse (Chateaubriand, *Voyage en Amérique*, Paris, 1835, 180 ff.; Featherman, *op. cit.* iii. 157). The Comanches had yearly gatherings to light the sacred fires, when they took 'medicine' for purification and fasted for seven days. Those who could endure to keep the fast unbroken became sacred in the eyes of the others (Palmer,

Harper's Magazine, 1889, xvii. 451). Again, where foods are tabu, either through totem restrictions or for some other reason, abstinence from them is frequently regarded as an honour done to the totem animal or to a divinity who would resent any breach of the rule, or it has the nature of a sacrificial act of self-denial. Thus among the Samoans, Fijians, and others, certain animals, which were probably earlier totems, were believed to be incarnate gods or sacred to particular deities, and each man had some particular animal species, which he would under no circumstances eat (Turner, *Samoa*, London, 1884, 112; Williams, *Fiji*, Lond. 1858, i. 219). Or among the Andaman Islanders at certain seasons a number of foods are abstained from because the god Puluga requires them at those times (*JAI* xii. 154). Or, as among various West African tribes, certain prohibited foods, or *orunda*, which a man will not eat even when suffering from hunger, are 'literally a sacrifice ordained for the child by its parents and the magic doctor as a gift to the governing spirit of his life,' and to eat of it would be a sin at once punished by the spirit and requiring atonement by expensive ceremonies and gifts (Nassau, *op. cit.* 73; M. H. Kingsley, *Travels*, 456), or they are not eaten because they are dedicated by man to the use of his attendant spirit (Dennett, *Folk-lore of the Fjort*, London, 1898, xxix.). Abstinence in all such cases is a religious rather than a magical act.

(*d*) Fasting to induce visions in which the spirits or divinities reveal themselves has already been noticed, but a few further instances will serve to show the austere character of the act. The Algonquins would fast six or seven days, 'till both their bodies and their minds became free and light, which prepared them to dream' (Tylor, ii. 411–412). Chiefs among the Columbians in times of perplexity practise both fasting and laceration (*NR* i. 203). In general, the American Indian fasted before any undertaking in order to receive direction in his dreams. Among the Caribs a father fasted for a long period in order to see in a vision the destiny of his newly-born son (Müller, *Amer. Urrel.* Basel, 1855, 214). Similar fasts were customary in Greece among the priests and priestesses of oracular shrines, in order to obtain visions (Paus. i. 24); and in India fasting is a recognized mode of obtaining intercourse with the gods (Meiners, *Gesch. der Relig.*, Hanover, 1806–1807, ii. 147). The visions and revelations obtained by Christian saints and ascetics are in some degree due to similar austerities.

(*e*) From the use of abstinence and fasting as a general religious act to its use as a species of sacrifice by which the gods are appeased, or as a penitential discipline, the step is not a long one. Instances of such uses are found mainly among barbaric and civilized peoples, though not unknown among savages; while fasting, either as a means of purification, or as a penitential discipline, or as a preparation for mystical illumination, rapidly became part of the practice of the Christian Church. Penance, including fasting, self-torture, and confession of evil, is found among many tribes of the American Indian stock, but among the ancient Mexicans it had an especially prominent place. Some fasts of a rigorous kind lasted from three to five days; others, probably less rigorous, from twenty to 160 days. These were binding upon either individuals or the whole people, were intended both as purifications and as penances, and, in the latter form, were accompanied by other extreme forms of self-discipline for sins committed. Such were generally imposed by the priests (Clavigero, *Hist. Mex.*, London, 1787, i. 353, 397 ff.). Fasts of a similar character and intention were also common in Peru. In Babylonia and Assyria fasting had also a systematic form, either for the whole people in times of danger (cf. Jon 3[5]), or for individuals as part of the penitential discipline with which men approached the gods seeking forgiveness, as is seen in the penitential psalms, *e.g.* 'Food I have not eaten, weeping is my neurishment' (Jastrow, *Rel. of Bab.*, Lond. 1898, 332; Sayce, *Rel. of Anc. Egypt and Bab.*, Edin. 1902, 418, 477). The more primitive savage custom of appealing to the gods through the pain borne by their worshippers is seen in a Fijian custom. A priest, after unsuccessfully supplicating his god for rain, slept for several successive nights exposed on the top of a rock without mat or pillow, hoping thus to move the obdurate deity to send a shower (Williams, i. 232).

In certain cases men fast until some act of revenge is performed, as in Fiji, where, to indicate sworn revenge, a man would deprive himself of favourite or necessary food (Williams, i. 129). Compare the curious Celtic custom of 'fasting against' a person (see ASCETICISM [Celtic]). This was a legal process in Ireland, by which any one who desired a stronger person to yield to his plaint sat fasting at his door until he yielded (*Ancient Laws of Ireland*, Dublin, 1869–79, i. 112 ff., ii. 46; Joyce, *Social Hist. of Ancient Ireland*, Lond. 1903, i. 204–207).

7. Mourning ceremonies.—Here again universally in savage and barbaric life the death of a relative or of some chief or great warrior, etc., involves the practice of many austerities, varying in degree, among the survivors. The motive of these is complex; and, though all may be regarded as different ways of showing grief, it seems certain that they did not all originate from that ground. Among mourning ceremonies of a simpler and less painful class may be enumerated wailing, wearing old or unusual clothes, the rejection of ornaments, rubbing charcoal, clay, and other substances on the body, shaving the hair or allowing it to grow unusually long, the discarding of pleasant food or of customary unguents, sleeping on the grave or in the open air (cf. Nassau, 10; Williams, *Fiji*, London, 1858, i. 4; M. H. Kingsley, *Travels in W. Africa*, 483, 487; Haddon, *Head Hunters*, 206; *JAI*, 1905, xxxv. 417). But others of a much more severe character are also extremely common, *e.g.* gashing or cutting the body, amputating a finger, and fasting.

(1) The origin of gashing or cutting the body may be found simply in an ecstatic expression of grief, at first spontaneous, then reduced to a custom. The pain caused by such methods of wounding, though in the ecstasy and delirium of grief it may be less than we imagine (Beckworth says of the horrible gashings of the Crow Indians that 'they seemed to feel no pain,' *14 RBEW*, p. 898), is itself an expression of sorrow. But other meanings were perhaps given to these self-inflicted wounds. Thus there may have been some idea of union with the dead through the blood spilt on the grave, as in N. S. Wales, where the men stood over it and cut each other with their boomerangs, letting the blood trickle down into it (cf. W. R. Smith, 305). This bond of union with the dead implies 'on the one side submission, on the other friendliness' (Spencer, *Cerem. Inst.*, London, 1879, 70). Or, again, the blood may be an offering to the dead in order to refresh them (*ib.*; cf. Westermarck, *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, i. 476). In either case the rite would have a propitiatory aspect. It is found among the Australians, Melanesians, Polynesians, in Africa and America, and it existed in ancient Israel (Lv 19[28]), among the Greeks, Turks, Huns, etc. (cf. Stoll, *op. cit.* 88 ff.; Spencer, *op. cit.* 70–71), and with some of these peoples assumed a ghastly form, while it was frequently proportionate to the rank of the dead person. The wounds included lacerating or cutting the arms, breasts, or legs, piercing them, slitting the ear lobes, wounding the head, etc. Thus the Crow Indians made two cuts down the length of the arm, tearing away the skin, or cut the flesh on the breast and shoulders (*BE*, *loc. cit.*); the Tongans cut and bruised themselves with shark's teeth, shells, axes, clubs, and knives (Mariner, *Tonga Islands*, London, 1817, i. 380, 403); the Spartans tore the flesh from their foreheads with pins and needles to gratify the ghosts of the dead (Potter, *op. cit.* ii. 204). The descriptions of mourning ceremonies among all savage tribes supply copious instances of the severity of these lacerations.

(2) The mutilation of some member of the body, usually a finger, occasionally an ear, is also found as a common sign of grief at mourning ceremonies. Spencer regards this as an act of sacrificial propitiation of the dead and a sign of submission (*op. cit.* 56), and it certainly has the significance of a propitiation of divinities or spirits, *e.g.* in cases of illness, etc. (see § 8, 2). In some cases it may be regarded as a substitute for human sacrifice, giving a part in place of the whole, as when a widow has her finger chopped off in the Nicobar Islands, evidently in place of being slain at her husband's grave (Tylor, ii. 363). But it might readily become a formal expression of grief, as in Fiji, where, on the death of a chief, orders were given that a hundred fingers should be cut off (Williams, i. 197). Yet even in Fiji a child's finger was cut off as a sign of affection for a dead father (*ib.* i. 177). Usually a joint or the whole of the little finger is cut off, though another finger may be removed later when this is lacking. This painful custom is found among some Australian tribes, in Tonga and Fiji, among various N. and S. American Indian tribes, among the Hottentots

when a widow re-marries, and occasionally with Chinese widows as a sign that they will not re-marry (Stoll, *op. cit.* 274 ff.; Spencer, *op. cit.* 55 ff.; Kolb, *Caput Bonæ Spei*, Nuremberg, 1719, 572; Giles, *China and the Chinese*, London, 1879, 202).

(3) The custom of fasting is here met with once more as a natural expression of mourning, often of a severe and prolonged character. The Fijians fasted for a dead chief for ten or twenty days (Williams, i. 197). Some of the Salish tribes of British Columbia fast for four days after a death, while a widow must not eat fresh meat for a year, a widower for a shorter period (*JAI*, 1905, xxxv. 138–9). The Andamanese must abstain from certain favourite foods, and here relations are often joined in this custom by other members of the tribe as a token of sympathy (*JAI*, 1882, xii. 142, 146). The Japanese partake only of a spare vegetable diet during the period of mourning, while in Korea the mourners drink rice water for some days, and then are allowed to partake of gruel for the rest of the time (*JAI* xii. 225, xxv. 350).

(4) Finally, though the custom of a wife's being slain at her husband's death may have become a mere customary rite, and though its origin may be sought in sacrificial ideas and in the belief that she must accompany him beyond the grave, it is frequently found as an extreme act of austere devotion, the wife devoting herself to death out of affection. Instances of this are found in Fiji (Williams, i. 189), where wives were frequently sacrificed at their own instance; in India, where a wife lit the pyre with her own hands; in China, where wives will take their own lives to follow their husbands into the next world (de Groot, *Rel. System of China*, Leyden, 1894, ii. 1. 735 ff.); among the ancient Greeks, with whom historic instances of this suicidal devotion are recorded (Euripides, *Supp.* 1000 ff.; Paus. iv. 2. 7); and among the ancient Celts (Leahy, *Heroic Romances of Ireland*, London, 1905, i. 105; cf. Cæsar, vi. 19, slaves and clients beloved by the dead; Mela, iii. 2. 19; see artt. SĀTĪ and MOURNING).

8. Mutilations.—A great variety of ethnic mutilations involving a considerable degree of pain may be classed among austerities. Each one of these may have a different origin or intention, some may be mere customary or symbolic followings of archaic rites, but this makes no difference in the degree of suffering which is borne or in the stoical patience with which it is endured (see art. MUTILATIONS).

(1) The custom of *cutting the body* and using the blood for some specific purpose is widely extended, and has already been met with as a mourning ceremony.

(*a*) It is found as part of the ceremonies of initiation in various quarters. Thus in North Central Australia the final ceremony among several of the tribes consists of making a series of cuts on the back and one on the neck of the candidate. These are said to commemorate certain events in the *Alcheringa*, or mythical period (Spencer and Gillen[b], 335). A similar rite is found among S. Australian tribes (Schürmann, in *Nat. Tribes of S.A.*, Adelaide, 1879, 231 ff.). Scars are also made on the face and body at puberty among the Ba-Mbalas (*JAI*, 1905, xxxv. 402) and elsewhere in Africa (Burton, *Abeokuta*, London, 1863, i. 104; Denham, *Travels in Africa*, London, 1828, iii. 175: 'the process is said to be extremely painful on account of the heat and flies'). These appear to be of the nature of totem or tribal marks. Among the Abipones the marks were made with thorns, and ashes were rubbed into the wounds—a species of tatuing (Dobrizhoffer, ii. 36 ff.).

(*b*) Cutting or gashing the body in order to obtain blood, usually for magical purposes or for use in various ceremonies, is found all over Australia. Thus among the Dieri two men are bled with a sharp flint, and the blood is allowed to flow on others of the tribe. The ceremony was intended to produce rain, the blood representing rain (Gason, in *Nat. Tribes of S. Aust.* 276). Among the Wiradthuri tribes, at initiation rites men wounded their gums or the flesh under their tongues with sharp pieces of bone, and allowed the blood to fall on the seat used in the ceremony; and among the Kamilaroi, at the *bora*, quantities of blood were collected from gashes made in men's arms with flint or shell (*JAI*, 1895, xxv. 301, 325). Among the Central Australian tribes 'it is astonishing what an enormous amount of blood is used for decorative purposes by these savages, one of whom will think nothing of bleeding himself perhaps twice a day for a week or two in succession.' Here it is also drawn from gashes in the body for a variety of other purposes—to seal a covenant, to be administered as a strengthening potion, or applied to the body of the sick or aged (Spencer-Gillen[b], 596 ff.). Among the Basutos the hands of those who have carried a corpse to the grave are scratched with a knife, and magic stuff is put into the wounds to remove the contagion of death (*GB*[2] i. 302). Here, too, may be mentioned a group of customs already alluded to (§ 5), in which the inhabitants of a district divide into two parties and engage in a sham fight, in which, however, severe blows are given and received, blood is shed, limbs are broken, and sometimes life itself is taken, the fight lasting for some hours. This fight takes place at some given moment in the processes of agriculture, and has for its object the promotion of fertility. The *rationale* probably is that the blood shed fertilizes the earth, for among the Acobambans of Peru women caught the blood and sprinkled it on the fields (Bastian, *Der Mensch in der Geschichte*, Jena, 1860, iii. 73). Similar fights, more or less severe, have been observed among the Tongans, American Indians, African tribes, among the Khonds, in China; they occurred in the form of stone-throwing in Greece at certain festivals; and they still occur in modified form in European folk-custom (see Frazer, *Pausanias*, iii. 267).

(*c*) Incisions in the flesh and blood-letting are also customary before marriage in many places. Incisions which leave raised scars are made on the bodies of young men and women among the Kikuyus of E. Africa, the purpose being ornamental (*JAI*, 1905, xxxv. 255). Elsewhere the blood-letting, followed by each spouse drinking or swallowing the blood in food, has the purpose of uniting them, and shrinks in some cases to a mere symbol (Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 385; see artt. BLOOD, BROTHERHOOD [artificial]). Or, again, the opening of a vein in both bride and bridegroom is a species of blood-offering, mainly among American Indian tribes (Zöckler, *op. cit.* 80).

(*d*) Frequently the making of scars and cicatrices, painful as the process is, seems to have mainly an ornamental purpose, as among the Australians (Spencer-Gillen[b], 56), Tasmanians and Melanesians (Letourneau, *Sociology*, 80), and N. American tribes, *e.g.* the Thlinkets (*NR* i. 97), though with most of these they are also made for other purposes. Among West Coast African tribes, with whom tatuing is rare, cicatrices are made by cutting the skin and then placing in the wound the fluff of the silk cotton tree (M. H. Kingsley, *op. cit.* 530). In New Guinea women make scars on the chest when a brother spears his first dugong (Haddon, 113).

(*e*) Finally, gashes are frequently used to draw blood as a propitiation of the gods. Thus, among

the Mosquito tribes of Central America, besides sacrifices to influence the gods before war or any important undertaking, blood was drawn from tongue, ears, or other parts of the body (*NR* i. 723, 740). Similar gashings were made by the priests of Baal (1 K 18^{28}, cf. Jer 41^{5}), the Aztecs at the feast of the Earth-goddess, and the Peruvians, both of whom drew blood from gashes in arms, legs, ears, nose, etc. (Garcilasso de la Vega, i. 52; Zöckler, *op. cit.* 84). These are sometimes thought to be relics of earlier human sacrifice, like the commutation of a human victim among the Gauls, who made an incision in the victim's flesh (Pomp. Mela, iii. 2, 18). But possibly they may have been intended to promote union with the divinity through the vehicle of blood. Connected with this is the custom of self-castration seen in the Phrygian worship of Cybele and analogous cults in Syria, etc. In these the priests also wounded themselves in the arms and scourged each other (Tert. *Apol.* 25; Lucian, *de Dea Syria*, 50). Similarly in the Roman cult of Bellona the priests made gashes in their shoulders and the blood was sprinkled on the image of the goddess and used in the sacrifices (Lactantius, i. 21; W. R. Smith, 304).

(2) *Amputation of fingers.*—This practice, already met with as a mourning ceremony, is also found sporadically as a sacrificial observance. In sickness Bushmen sacrifice a joint of their fingers (Farrer, *Prim. Manners and Customs*, London, 1879, 143). The Cochimis of California, when all other means had failed, cut off a finger from a daughter or sister of a sick man, in the belief that the blood would preserve him (Adelung, *Gesch. von Califor.*, Lemgo, 1769, i. 76). This was also done by the Tongans in cases of illness as a propitiatory offering to the gods, while a man would also cut off his own finger to avert their anger when danger threatened (Mariner, *Tonga Islands*, i. 454, ii. 210). During initiation the candidate among the Mandans held up his finger to the Great Spirit expressing his willingness to offer it, and then had it chopped off with a hatchet (Lewis and Clarke, *Travels*, London, 1817, 86). In India the practice is found in custom and myth. Mothers will cut off their own fingers as sacrifices for the preservation of their children, while Siva is said to have cut off his finger to appease the wrath of Kali (Tylor, ii. 401). Mothers in Bengal frequently draw blood from their chests, when a husband or son is ill, to propitiate the goddess Chandika (Rajendralāla Mitra, *Indo-Aryans*, London, 1881, i. 111). This may also have been a Celtic practice, since in one legend Ethne the Horrible is said to have cut off the ends of her children's little fingers to make them longer-lived (Windisch-Stokes, *Irische Texte*, Leipzig, 1891–1897, iii. 363). We may compare with these rites the Chinese custom of cutting pieces of flesh from the thighs, while offering a prayer to Heaven to accept this as a species of self-immolation on behalf of a sick relative, who then was given the flesh to eat (de Groot, *op. cit.* iv. 2, 386).

(3) *Circumcision.*—This has already been found as one of the rites of initiation to manhood; and, in general, where it occurs it is performed at puberty, though sometimes, as with the Jews, it takes place in childhood. We are not concerned here with the various reasons assigned for it by the different peoples who practise it, or with its original intention, though this may have been, as already suggested in other cases, to ward off danger from the whole organ by removing a part, which part might also harbour dangerous influences. What concerns us here is the painful nature of the rite, and its wide-spread use. Practised by many peoples of antiquity, Egyptians and others (Herod. ii. 104), it is found among most African tribes, in N. and S. America, in Polynesia, Australia, and parts of Melanesia, and sporadically elsewhere. Among most of these peoples it is regarded as a disgrace not to have it done, or as rendering a man unclean. If the patient shrieks or cries, this is frequently considered unmanly, but occasionally he is in such a frenzied state as not to feel pain at the moment. But sometimes, besides the actual pain of the cutting, the youth has to undergo other ordeals. Thus, among the Bantu peoples of W. Africa cayenne pepper is squirted on the wound (Nassau, *op. cit.* 12), and among the Mavendas of S. Africa the candidates are subjected to exposure for some time in a nude condition and to treatment of a harsh nature (*JAI* xxxv. 268). See art. CIRCUMCISION, and Andree, *Ethnographische Parallelen*, Leipzig, 1889, 166 ff.; Ploss, *Das Kind*, Leipzig, 1884, i. 340 ff.; Stoll, *op. cit.* 499 ff.; Wellhausen, *Prolegomena*, Edinburgh, 1885, 360; *L'Anthropologie*, Paris, 1896, vii. 653 ff.

(4) The practice of *sub-incision* or *mika* or *pura-arilṭha-kuma* has already been referred to (§ 2). This terrible rite involves the slitting open of the under side of the urethra, and is found in Queensland, N. S. Wales, S. Australia, and among N. and W. Australian tribes (Spencer-Gillen[a], 212 ff.; *ib.*[b] 133, 328 ff.). Analogous to this is the custom of semi-castration, practised, according to Kolb, by the Hottentots (*op. cit.* 420 ff.), though it has been questioned by later observers; it is also found among the Ponapes in the Caroline Islands and in the Friendly Islands (Finsch, *ZE* xii. 316). For other mutilations of the sexual organs for different purposes among the Dayaks, Battas, ancient Romans, etc., see O. Hovorka, *Mitt. der Anthr. Gesell. in Wien*, 1894, xxiv. fasc. 3; *JAI*, 1892, xxii. 45; Stoll, *op. cit.* 496 ff., 921 ff.

(5) Girls at puberty among many separate peoples must also undergo the equally painful rite of excision, probably with the same original intention as circumcision, and like it frequently an initiation ceremony. It is found among various African peoples, in Nubia, Abyssinia, Galla and Masai Lands, on the west coast, and also in the south, while it is also met with among several S. American peoples, occasionally in N. America, and sporadically in Indonesia (Stoll, *op. cit.* 523; Ploss, *Das Kind*, i. 379 ff.; Merker, *Die Masai*, Berlin, 1904, 60 ff.; Martius, *Zur Ethnog. Amerikas*, Leipzig, 1867, 445; *JAI*, 1904, xxxiv. 133). With it may be classed the cutting or artificial rupture of the hymen, mainly among several Australian tribes, but occurring elsewhere also. With the Australians it is an initiatory rite, and also serves as an immediate preparation for marriage (Spencer-Gillen[a], 93; *ib.*[b] 133). Even more painful is the rite of 'infibulation' of marriageable girls, which is found mainly in the Nile region, the Sudan, Galla and Somali Lands, Nubia, Kordofan, and the Abyssinian highlands, and also in Pegu (Stoll, *op. cit.* 548 ff.).

(6) Among other forms of mutilation causing considerable suffering may be mentioned (*a*) knocking out one or more of the front teeth, usually as an initiation ceremony, though various interpretations of its purpose are current among those who practise it, and with some it is regarded as an ornament. Perhaps arising as a preparation for the reception of new food at puberty, it soon became a mark of acquired manhood, and sometimes, as with the Kavirondos, any one not undergoing it endangered his life in battle (Johnston, *Uganda Protectorate*, London, 1902, ii. 728). Among many Australian tribes it is found as a regular initiation ceremony performed only on youths, but among the central tribes it has ceased to be so, and is performed on both sexes indifferently (Spencer-Gillen[a], 588 ff.). The custom is found among most African tribes,

Bantu and Negro; in N. America, *e.g.* among the Seri Indians, who practise it on girls before marriage (*17 RBEW*, p. 169); in Formosa among the Pepos, who think it assists breathing (Ploss, *Das Kind*, ii. 424); while it was practised by the ancient Peruvians, who regarded it as a punishment ordained on their ancestors and binding upon themselves, or as a service rendered to the divinity (Garcilasso de la Vega, ix. 3; Herrera, *Historia general*, Madrid, 1730, v. 6, 1). It is also found as a mourning mutilation at the death of a chief in the Sandwich Islands (Ellis, *Tour through Hawaii*, London, 1826, 146).

(*b*) Filing the teeth, usually to sharp points, grinding them down, and breaking part of them, are found sporadically, sometimes as initiation ceremonies. Among the Malays the first method takes place soon after circumcision; the rite, though painful to behold, is borne with great patience (Skeat, *Malay Magic*, London, 1900, 355). Elsewhere, as in Sumatra, Borneo, etc., the teeth are filed, broken, or pierced, and then ornamented with gold or blackened, the operation sometimes causing great pain (Marsden, *Sumatra*, London, 1811, 52; *Hist. gén. des voyages*, Hague, 1757, xv. 97; Ling Roth, *Natives of Sarawak*, ii. 78). But the custom is also supposed to preserve the teeth. Filing the teeth was also practised by the Mayas of Yucatan (Diego de Landa, *Relación*, Paris, 1864, 31), as it is still among some East African tribes (*JAI*, 1904, xxxiv. 138), and peoples of the Congo region (Stoll, *op. cit.* 255); and, as among the Californian tribes, they were ground down to the gums (*NR* i. 333 f.; see also Frazer, *Totemism*, Edinburgh, 1887, 28; *ZE* xiv. 213).

(*c*) Making holes or slits in the nose, lips, cheek, or ears, in which are inserted various objects, is a world-wide practice, and, though regarded as a means of ornamentation, was probably in its origin of a magical character (the objects serving as amulets), while it was also and still is in many cases associated with initiation rites. Frequently the hole or slit is begun in childhood, but the permanent object is inserted only at puberty. Only the most extreme instances of this form of mutilation need be referred to here. Among the Thlinkets the under lip of female children is pierced and a small object inserted. As time goes on, a larger object is placed in the slit to extend the aperture, causing a painful and continuous strain, until, at the age of maturity, a grooved block of wood sometimes six inches long and half an inch thick can be inserted (*NR* i. 99). The Botocudos of S. America treat the under lip and the ear lobe in the same manner, gradually enlarging the apertures, until wooden plugs of a considerable size can be inserted, the ear lobe sometimes reaching to the shoulder (von Wied-Neuwied, *Reise nach Brasilien*, Frankfort, 1820, ii. 5). Every variety of these mutilations, either singly or together, is found over the American continent; lip-slitting occurs in Africa, ear-slitting and ear-extension in Fiji, Easter Island, and the Nicobar islands, while ear-piercing, with a religious significance, occurs all over India, Burma, and the Malay Peninsula (see Stoll, *op. cit.* 98 ff.; Hovorka, 'Verzierungen der Nase,' *Mitt. der anthr. Ges. in Wien*, xxv. pts. 4 and 5, 1875; *3 RBEW*, p. 76 ff.).

(*d*) The well-known and painful custom of deformation of the foot among Chinese women is regarded as the chief point of beauty and attractiveness, while it has apparently also some erotic character. The process is begun in early childhood by bandaging the feet firmly so that all growth is hindered, until they become little more than stumps, rendering walking a matter of difficulty (Brandt, *Sittenbilder aus China*, Stuttgart, 1895, 53 ff.; Ploss-Bartels, *Das Weib*, Leipzig, 1904, i. 173 ff.). A similar custom is found among the Kutchin Indians, where a child's feet are bandaged to prevent growth, small feet being there thought handsome (Richardson, *Arctic Searching Expedition*, London, 1851, 384).

9. Tatuing.—This custom is of world-wide extent; but while every variety of motive is ascribed to it, it frequently has a religious or magical significance, and it is commonly done as an initiation rite. Among the Eskimos the process usually consists in passing a needle and thread dipped in soot below the skin (Egede, *Besch. von Grönland*, Copenhagen, 1790, 153). More usually pricking the skin or cutting it, and then rubbing in some pigment, is resorted to. Or in some cases figures are cut or cauterized on the skin and the cicatrices painted, as in the Deccan and among the Mosquito Indians (Forster, *Voyage round the World*, London, 1777, 588; *NR* i. 716). Still, however done, the process involves much suffering, especially where great parts of the body are tatued; but to shrink from it or to show signs of suffering is held as evidence of cowardice. Mœrenhout says of the operation in Polynesia that it was the cause of such sufferings that sometimes the girl died under them. Yet in spite of this the operation, which is a tedious one, is seldom or never refused (Wilson, *Miss. Voyage*, London, 1799, 339). Nearly every observer of the actual carrying out of the process speaks of its extremely painful and even dangerous character. Hence it may be regarded, for whatever purpose it is undergone, as by no means the least serious of the many kinds of austerities practised by lower races. Thus, when it is undergone at puberty, it affords a test of the individual's capacity for enduring pain and showing courage (cf. *JAI*, 1882, xii. 331). Where it has a religious significance, as in Fiji, where it was held to have been appointed by the god Ndengei, it may be regarded as a kind of offering made to a divinity, while it also secured the entrance to, or the recognition of the individual in, the other world, un-tatued persons being there subjected to torture (Williams, *Fiji*, i. 160; cf. *FL*, 1894, v. 33, 318; Hall, *U.S. Explor. Exped.*, Philadelphia, 1846, 99, for other instances). The practice of making marks or designs on the body by cuts or scars, into which some pigment is often rubbed, is found among many peoples, especially those with darker skins (Australians, Tasmanians, Papuans, etc.), and must involve considerable suffering. See art. TATUING; Joest, *Tätowiren, Narbenzeichnen und Körperbemalen*, Berlin, 1887.

10. Medical austerities.—The methods of healing used by the medicine-man, or doctor, in savage societies are often of a drastic and acutely painful nature, though they are generally borne submissively by the patient. Resting mainly upon the theory that all disease is caused by evil spirits, the object of the treatment is to drive these away or to obtain possession of the object which they have placed in the body. Hence a great part of the treatment consists of yelling and singing, noises of all kinds, dances, and fumigations. But in addition the patient is subjected to a variety of vigorous remedies wrought upon his person. Among the most common of these are scarifying the flesh and bleeding. Thus among the Andamanese the flesh is cut with quartz or glass flakes (*JAI*, 1882, xii. 85), elsewhere, as among the Dinkas (*JAI*, 1904, xxxiv. 156), with knives, and sometimes, as among the Bondeis, a very smarting medicine is rubbed in (*JAI*, 1895, xxv. 215). Similar scarifications are used by many other peoples—Australians, Papuans, American Indians, both north and south. A primitive method of cupping is found in different parts of Africa, consisting of making an incision in the flesh, placing a horn above the incision, exhausting the air by

suction, and then closing the orifice. The horn is then gradually filled with blood (Nassau, *op. cit.* 183). Sucking the surface of the skin till it is blistered, or sucking blood from an incision in the flesh, is common, *e.g.* in N. America (Bancroft, *passim*; Pétitot, *Traditions indiennes*, Paris, 1886, 434). There, too, kneading and pounding the body violently, and pressing the fists into the pit of the stomach until the patient's strength is exhausted, are in great favour, and occasionally the medicine-man bites the patient with his teeth and shakes him (*NR* i. 246, 355; Kane, *Wanderings*, London, 1859, 225). Another remedy is to make the skin smart by applying pungent spices, or by stinging it with ants or whipping it with nettles (*GB*[3] i. 301, iii. 216). This, like flagellation in cases of madness, is intended to drive off the demon of disease. A favourite remedy for fever and other diseases among American Indians is the sweat-bath. This is a small hut which by various means is heated to suffocation. In it the patient is placed, and afterwards, dripping with perspiration, he rushes out and plunges into cold water. This treatment sometimes causes death, but it is also in use as a purificatory rite (*NR* i. 246, 285). A similar remedy for madness is found in Gabun (Nassau, *op. cit.* 273). It is to be noticed also that sometimes the relatives of the patient, or even of the medicine-man, fast, to assist the progress of the remedy (Ploss, *Das Kind*, i. 150; Dall, *3 RBEW*, p. 426). See Bartels, *Medecin der Naturvölker*, Leipzig, 1893.

11. Self-restraint.—A certain degree of self-restraint, especially in marital relations, though scarcely coming under the heading of 'Austerities' as do other forms of self-restraint, *e.g.* fasting, is found on particular occasions among lower races and may be taken notice of here, since it shows the power of current theories or beliefs or customs to strengthen the will even of a savage, and cause it to stifle bodily desires. Thus, though the ultimate purpose is no doubt different, such forms of self-restraint are yet akin to the self-discipline and continence of later forms of asceticism. Examples of continence are most marked during war or hunting, the intention probably being the avoidance of possible loss of strength and also of the potential dangers lurking in sexual relations generally. But in some cases the prohibition has assumed a religious sanction, especially among American Indian tribes. The Winnebagos observe continence in war because it was commanded by the Great Spirit; among other tribes it is said to be based on religious grounds, and the Dakotas thought that the violation of captives would be resented by the spirits of the dead (Drake, *Ind. Tribes*, Philadelphia, 1884, i. 188; Waitz-Gerland, *Anthrop.*, Leipzig, 1859–1871, iii. 158; Schoolcraft, *op. cit.* iv. 63).

A religious motive is also to be seen in those cases where such continence has become a binding form of tabu, as among the Maoris, with whom, not only during war, but on other important occasions, women are strictly tabu to men, who must not approach their wives until war is over (*JAI*, 1889, xix. 111; Waitz-Gerland, vi. 349). This is also found in parts of New Guinea, where the warriors are *helega*, or sacred, for some days before fighting, and must not even see a woman (Chalmers, *Pioneering in N. G.*, London, 1885, 65). But the original basis of such continence may be seen in the Seminole belief that connexion with women enervated men and unfitted them for their duties as warriors (Schoolcraft, v. 272); or, as in Halmahera, that they must practise continence during war else they will lose their strength (Riedel, *ZE* xvii. 69). This rule of continence is practically universal among savages, and applies to the period immediately preceding war or during the actual course of the war, while it also appears at higher levels of civilization (cf. Cæsar, vii. 66; 2 S 11[11]). The rule also applies frequently before or during a hunting or fishing expedition. Chastity is part of a seven days' tabu among the Malays when fishing (Skeat, *op. cit.* 315), but a similar rule prevails generally in such cases; while, as among the Aleuts, it is connected with religious beliefs, since during a whaling expedition unfaithfulness on the part of the men or their wives would be punished by the whale, an object of reverence to them (Reclus, *op. cit.* 53). In some cases, too, the rule of continence is accompanied by fasting, ceremonial preparations, and the infliction of pain. Thus, among the Nutkas, before war, some weeks are spent in preparation, which consists mainly of abstinence from women, bathing, scrubbing the skin with briers till it bleeds, and finally painting the whole body jet-black (*NR* i. 189). Among the Bondeis a man is scarified down the arms as a charm against sword-cuts (*JAI*, 1895, xxv. 205); while, before hunting, the Indians of Guiana subject themselves to the stings of ants and the irritation caused by the hairs of certain caterpillars (Im Thurn, 229). Again, probably on the principle of sympathetic magic and the intimate connexion between a man and his wife, fasting and other forms of rigorous discipline are enjoined on women in many quarters while the men are absent on war or the chase, as in the Babar Islands, where women must fast and abstain from sexual intercourse (Riedel, *Selebes en Papua*, Hague, 1886, 341).

The rule of continence is also followed in various other circumstances. In Congo, when the *Chitomé* is on circuit, a fast of continence is proclaimed, the penalty for breaking it being death. By such continence 'they preserve the life of their common father' (Reade, *Savage Africa*, London, 1863, 362). Strict continence is also observed by men during the Cherokee new year's festival of purification already referred to (§ 6 (*c*)). It is also a common tabu after slaying a man or touching the dead, here probably connected with the contagion of death, which necessitates the avoidance of one's fellows till a certain time has elapsed or certain purifications have been performed. Fasting frequently accompanies continence on such occasions. Contact with women is forbidden for one month after the shedding of blood among the Kikuyus of E. Africa (*JAI*, 1904, xxxiv. 264); and among the Natchez, after the first scalp-taking or securing a prisoner, the warrior had to abstain from seeing his wife or eating flesh for a month (Charlevoix, *Histoire de la Nouvelle France*, Paris, 1744, vi. 186; cf. Westermarck, *op. cit.* i. 375). In many places continence must be observed for a time after marriage and after a birth (Crawley, *op. cit.* 345 ff.; Lubbock, *op. cit.* 81).

Even among savages chastity on the part of the priesthood is sometimes a necessity. Thus Algonquin priests were ordained to a life of chastity, and could not eat food prepared by a woman (*NR* ii. 212), and in Yucatan the 'captain,' during his three years' tenure of office, had to observe the same rule (*ib.* ii. 741). This corresponds to the general rule of chastity found among higher priesthoods, while there, too, celibate orders are found, *e.g.* those in Mexico dedicated to the service of Quetzalcoatl, and the virgins of the sun in Peru, who, though regarded as the brides of the Inca, had otherwise, on pain of a cruel death, to live in chastity, in this exactly resembling the Vestal virgins in Rome (Zöckler, *op. cit.* 85; Prescott, *Peru*, London, 1890, 53; cf. also the purity enjoined on the Roman Flamen Dialis and his household).

See also the articles on ASCETICISM.

LITERATURE.—This is given in the article.

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AUSTRALASIA (Ethnology, Religions, and Ethics).—*Australasia* is here taken in its widest sense, so as to cover the great insular world which comprises nearly the whole of the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, and constitutes one of the five main divisions of the globe. The term is practically synonymous with *Oceania*, which is still favoured by most Continental geographers, but for which English writers now generally substitute *Australasia*, as harmonizing better with the other divisions, and at the same time serving to recall its essential characteristics—'firstly, that it is geographically a southern extension of Asia; and secondly, that the great island-continent of Australia forms its central and most important feature' (A. R. Wallace, *Australasia*, p. 2).

As thus understood, this Oceanic region comprises five main insular groups, which form the subjects of separate articles, but may here be summarily tabulated with their more important subdivisions:

I. Australia with Tasmania.
II. Malaysia, comprising the Malay Peninsula; the large Sunda Islands (Sumatra and Java); the Lesser Sunda Islands (Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa, Flores, Sumba, Allor or Ombay, Timor, Wetta, Serwatti); Borneo; Celebes; Jilolo or Halmahera; Ceram; the Moluccas; Sulu; the Philippines; Formosa; and the outlying Andaman and Nicobar groups.
III. Papuasia, with two sections:
  1. *New Guinea*, with the D'Entrecasteaux, Louisiade, and other insular dependencies.
  2. *Melanesia*, comprising the Bismarck Archipelago (New Britain, New Ireland, Duke of York); Solomon; Santa Cruz; Banks; Fiji; New Hebrides; New Caledonia; and Loyalty Archipelagoes.
IV. Polynesia, including New Zealand; Tonga (Friendly); Cook or Hervey (Mangaia, Rarotonga, etc.); Austral (Tubuai); Society (Tahiti); Low (Tuamotu); Marquesas (Nukahiva, Fatuhiva, etc.); Navigator (Samoa); Union (Tokelau); Ellice (Funafuti); Savage (Niuë); Sandwich (Hawaii) and Easter (Rapanui) groups.
V. Micronesia, comprising the Pelew (Palau); Ladrones (Marianne); Caroline; Marshall (Ralick, Radak); Gilbert (Kingsmill); Phœnix and Penrhyn (Manahiki) groups.

For Madagascar, which should properly be included in No. II., see art. Africa. The Seychelles, Mascarenhas, and other scattered clusters in the Indian Ocean are excluded because uninhabited when discovered, and the same remark applies also to Norfolk, Kermadec, Pitcairn, and a few other South Sea islands. Note that South Sea is synonymous with Pacific Ocean.

All the lands in this table have been occupied by man since the remotest times, and it is argued in the art. Asia that the cradle of the human family lay most probably in Malaysia (Java). From this central area of dispersion the first migratory movements ranged north to Asia, west to Africa, and east and south over the whole of the Oceanic world by land connexions which have since been greatly reduced by subsidence (see art. Ethnology, § 3). It would thus appear that the first inhabitants of Australasia must have been direct descendants of a Pleistocene precursor whose prototype is found in the Javanese *pithecanthropus erectus*, and who are themselves represented by the black elements still persisting in Malaysia (Malay Peninsula, Flores, Timor), in Papuasia, Australia, and even in Polynesia and Micronesia, though here mostly absorbed or assimilated by later intruders from Asia. As in Africa, there are two black elements in Oceania: (*a*) the dwarfish *Negritos* surviving in the Andamans, in the Malay Peninsula (Sakais, Semangs), in the Philippines (Aëtas), and in Java (the nearly extinct Kalangs); and (*b*) the medium-sized or even tall *Papuasians*, who form nearly the whole of the population in New Guinea (Papuans proper), and throughout Melanesia. For several reasons, such as their physical, linguistic, and religious differences, it is desirable to treat the Papuans proper and the Melanesians as two distinct though closely related sub-groups, while both may be conveniently comprised under the collective name of *Papuasians*. The Melanesians, for instance, are of Malayo-Polynesian speech, and worship no devils, whereas the Papuans speak numerous languages fundamentally distinct from any others, and are pronounced demonolaters. Dr. Hamy speaks of their origins as lost 'dans les profondeurs d'un insondable passé,' while W. Volz shows that in pre-Malay times they occupied all the Pacific Ocean (*AA*, Nov. 1894). Their westward extension to the large Sunda Islands, where no full-blood Papuans are now found, is also established by B. Hagen, who groups together the Battas, Gayos, and Alas of Sumatra, the Ulu-ayars of Borneo, the Semangs and Aëtas of Malacca and the Philippines, the Torajas, and the Toalas recently discovered by Dr. Sarasin in Celebes, the Melanesians, Papuans, and Australians, 'as local varieties and remains of a great wide-spread primitive southern race,' which he calls 'the old pre-Malay ethnical element' in Oceania (*Globus*, 1904, 76, No. 2, p. 24 f.). These pre-Malayans therefore constitute the substratum, the true aborigines, everywhere in Australasia.

Their watery domain was later, but still in remote pre-historic times, encroached upon first by Caucasic and then by Mongoloid immigrants, both from the Asiatic mainland. It is shown in art. Asia that during the Stone Ages two branches of the western Caucasians reached the uttermost confines of the continent, one probably from Europe through Mongolia to Korea and Japan, the other from North Africa through Irania to India and Indo-China. Some of the northern branch, all dolmen or megalithic builders, appear to have passed from Japan to Micronesia, where they may have joined hands with those of the southern branch who ranged from Indo-China southwards to Malaysia and thence eastwards to Polynesia. Thus are explained those astonishing *marais* and other monolithic structures which are found scattered over the Pacific islands as far east as Rapanui (Easter Island), and culminating in the stupendous works of Ponapé (Eastern Carolinas) with cyclopean walls 10 to 18 feet thick, constructed of huge basaltic blocks, some measuring 25 ft. in length by 8 ft. in circumference (F. J. Moss, *Atolls and Islands*, *passim*). There is a trilithon at Maui (Tonga group) which looks like one of those 'Druidical-like shrines' seen by Mr. R. T. Turley in North Korea, where some of the people 'show Caucasian and not Mongolian features' (*Geograph. Jour.*, April 1904, pp. 478, 479). That the two Caucasic streams must have met and commingled in these North Pacific waters is shown, amongst other indications, by the fact that the Nukuor islanders near Mortlock (Central Carolinas) still speak a pure but archaic form of the Maori language away to the south (New Zealand).

In order to distinguish between the Mongoloid (Malayan) peoples and these primitive Caucasians who long sojourned in the Eastern Archipelago, and are there still represented, amongst others, by the Mentawi islanders (west coast Sumatra), Logan introduced the term *Indonesian*, which has now been extended to all the natives of European type throughout Australasia. They are found sporadically in Papuasia and Melanesia, and are in exclusive possession of Polynesia, so that all the South Sea Islanders east of a line running from New Zealand by Samoa to Hawaii may be called Indonesians, and the collective names *Mahori*, *Sawaiori*, and others formerly applied tentatively to them may now be discarded. Their claim to be regarded as an Oceanic section, not of the 'Aryans,' as is sometimes assumed, but of the pre-Aryan Hamitic and Iberian Caucasians, can no longer be seriously questioned, since by the unanimous testimony of all competent observers they are one of the very finest races on the globe, with physical characters connecting them anthropologically with

the western Caucasians. Of the Tonga natives Lord George Campbell writes:

'There are no people in the world who strike one at first so much as these Friendly Islanders. Their clear light copper-brown coloured skins, yellow and curly hair, handsome faces, their *tout ensemble*, formed a novel and splendid picture of the *genus homo*; and, as far as physique and appearance go, they gave one certainly an impression of being a superior race to ours' (*Log Letters from 'The Challenger'*; and see also Guillemard's *Australasia*, ch. 14).

But it was shown above that the whole Oceanic area was first peopled by the Papuasians, which explains the constant occurrence of a black strain, very marked in Micronesia, but also met with all over Polynesia. The natives of Niuë (Savage Island) have a tradition that, when they occupied the island from Samoa, they found a black population with whom they intermixed. The same statement is made by the Hervey people, and is confirmed by their dark complexion and kinky hair, while in Mangaia the Melanesian features—frizzled hair, dark-brown skin, and full beard—predominate. Even the Tahitians and Maoris, both in other respects splendid Caucasians, here and there betray the dark element in their protruding lips, very dark-brown skins, curly hair, and slightly developed beard. In Malaysia the above-mentioned Mentawi islanders are the finest of all the surviving Indonesians, and of them Von Rosenberg writes that, 'as regards physical appearance, speech, customs, and usages, they stand almost quite apart. They bear such a decided stamp of a Polynesian race that one might far sooner compare them with an inhabitant of the South Sea Islands' (*Der malayische Archipel*. i. 189).

'It is somewhat difficult to say what the original type of the true Polynesian was; but it is probable that the handsome, tall, oval-faced, high-browed, lithe, active, light brown, black straight-haired, black or very dark brown-eyed, cheerful, dignified individual so frequently met with, is the nearest to the true original Polynesian' (Percy Smith, *Hawaiiki*, p. 14).

As the western Indonesians moved eastwards to their present homes in the Pacific, their place was taken by the Asiatic Mongols, who are now represented in the Eastern Archipelago by the light- or olive-brown populations commonly called *Malays*. They form, in fact, the Oceanic section of the Mongol family, and as their right to be regarded as members of this family is no longer contested, the point need not here be laboured. Interminglings with the pre-Malayan dark and fair elements (Papuans and Indonesians) have caused considerable local modifications and given rise to some marked varieties, such as the Nias Islanders, the Bornean Dayaks and Kayans, the Bugis and Minahassas of Celebes, the Tagalogs and others of the Philippines, and the Formosan aborigines. But the dominant historical Malays, whose original home was in the Menangkabau district of Sumatra, and whose language has become the *lingua franca* of the Archipelago, are a true Mongoloid people, distinguished by their 'light yellowish and brownish skins, long lank and black hair, small stature, rather oblique eyes, and prominent cheek-bones' (Meyer, *Minahassa auf Celebes*, Berlin, 1876, p. 7). These Oceanic Mongols do not occupy the whole of the Archipelago, the eastern parts of which are still held by full-blood and half-caste Papuans, the ethnical parting line, as drawn by Wallace, running from east of the Philippines along the west side of Jilolo through Bouro, and curving round the west end of Flores, then bending back by Sandalwood so as to take in Rotti near Timor (Wallace, *Malay Archipelago*[5], p. 590).

Now comes a difficulty. All the Australasian peoples except the Papuans and Australians—Malayans, Malagasy, Philippine Islanders, Melanesians, Indonesians, and Micronesians—speak numerous idioms which differ greatly in their lexical and phonetic characters, and often even in their grammatical structure, but are none the less regarded as members of a common stock language which is usually called Malayo-Polynesian, and has a prodigious range—from Madagascar to Easter Island, within some 2000 miles of the South American coast, and from New Zealand across the Pacific to Hawaii. All are *polysyllabic* and *untoned*, whereas those of the south-eastern Mongols—Indo-Chinese and others—are *monosyllabic* and *toned*. But the Malayans belong to this connexion, hence should presumably speak toned languages like Burmese, for instance, or Siamese, or Annamese. The explanation seems to be that the Oceanic Mongols reached their present domain in remote times, before the Indo-Chinese tongues had become disintegrated—that is, before the development of monosyllabism by phonetic decay. Not only do such untoned languages still survive on the mainland, but they so closely resemble the Oceanic tongues that they may be called proto- or archaic-Malayan. Of the continental Malay mother tongue there are several varieties, such as Khmer (Cambodian), Redais, Bahnar, Samré, and Charay, which are all toneless, and have a great number of words in common with the Oceanic Malay, while 'the grammatical structure of both is absolutely identical' (C. Fontaine, quoted by H. Mouhot, in *Voyage dans les royaumes de Siam*, etc., Paris, 1868, p. 216). The organic kinship is seen especially in the characteristic infix system, which is everywhere precisely the same, as in the Khmer *sauk*, 'to corrupt,' *samnauk*, 'a bribe'; the Malagasy *tady*, 'twisted,' 'a rope,' *tomady*, 'strong'; the Javanese *hurub*, 'flame,' *humurub*, 'to flare up'; the Tagalog *kapatir*, 'brother,' *kinapatir*, 'brotherly'; the Malay *sipit*, 'to grasp,' *sinipit*, 'an anchor,' and so on (the infix elements always the same, *m*, *n*, and *mn*).

A harder problem is the extension of this *vrai groupe malay continental* (Dr. Hamy) not only to the Mongoloid Oceanic lands, but also to Melanesia, whose black inhabitants speak many more primitive varieties of Malayo-Polynesian than either the Polynesians or the Malayans, although they are neither Polynesians nor Malays themselves, but a branch of the primordial Oceanic Negroid race. Here Dr. Codrington, the leading authority on the subject, vouches for three essential points: (1) the substantial unity and homogeneous character of the Melanesian tongues, under considerable dialectic diversity, and apart from a number of Indonesian enclaves, such as Uea, Futuna, Fate, Mae, Tikopia, and Ongtong Java; (2) their fundamental kinship with the Malayo-Polynesian family; and (3) their archaic character as compared with all the other members of that family. 'As compared with Fiji [a Melanesian tongue], the languages of Tonga and Samoa [Indonesian] are late, simplified, and decayed' (Codrington, *Melanesian Languages*, Oxf. 1885, p. 26). The question therefore arises, How came these savage head-hunters and cannibals to lose their original forms of speech, such as still survive amongst the kindred black peoples of New Guinea and of Australia, and have but recently become extinct in Tasmania? And then, how did they everywhere, from the Bismarck to the Loyalty groups, acquire Malayo-Polynesian languages of primitive type? Early Indonesian or Malayan conquests, followed by miscegenation, naturally suggest themselves, but are excluded by the absence of those modified Negroid physical characters which must necessarily have resulted from such postulated interminglings. The Melanesians are quite as full-blood Negroes as the Papuans, and show even more marked Negro features than the somewhat modified Australian aborigines. Codrington, who gives a few instances of mutual assimilation and interchange of type and speech, especially in Fiji, remarks that—

'It is conceivable, on the supposition that the languages now spoken by Melanesians are not originally their own, that the original stock is not now represented anywhere, either in vocabulary or in grammar, that languages derived from without have entirely taken the place of some earlier [Papuasian?] speech; but it is difficult to allow it to be more than possible. . . . There is the great difficulty that the present Melanesian languages certainly have not been introduced by intruders speaking the present Malay or Polynesian languages.' He then suggests a tentative solution of the problem which 'would account for the Polynesians having a language allied both to the Malay and to the Melanesian' (p. 81).

It should be added that Malayo-Polynesian has not the remotest connexion either with the heterogeneous tongues of the New Guinea Papuans or with the homogeneous agglutinating languages of the Australian aborigines. As a rule the Negritos both of the Philippines and of Malacca have lost their original tongues, and now generally speak those of the surrounding Malayan peoples. On the other hand, the Andamanese may claim to have developed in their long secluded island homes perhaps the most remarkable form of speech known to philology. It has no kinship with any other, and its most striking feature is a superabundance of pronominal prefixes and formative postfixes, so that 'in adding their affixes they follow the principles of the ordinary agglutinative tongues; in adding their prefixes they follow the well-defined principles of the South African [Bantu] tongues. Hitherto, as far as I know, the two principles in full play have never been found together in any other language. In Andamanese both are fully developed, so much so as to interfere with each other's grammatical functions' (R. C. Temple, *Anthrop. Journ.* 1882, p. 123). Yet, like the Australians, these paradoxical 'Mincopies,' as they were formerly called, have an infantile arithmetic with no words for the numerals beyond *two*.

In the Oceanic area the various religious systems may be broadly described as consisting of diverse forms of the crudest and the most advanced animism, leading in some places to the purest psycholatry, in others to nature- and ancestor-worship, above which has been raised a luxuriant growth of myth and legend. With all this are combined some strange aspects of demonology and tabu, wide-spread over the Indo-Pacific domain, besides totemism, ordeals, omens, and fetishism, in forms which throw light on the origin of these practices. Less wide-spread are true idolatry, shamanism, priestcraft, animal and human sacrifices, lycanthropy, tree-cult, witchcraft, the evil eye, rain- and weather-doctoring, and the other superstitions usually associated with primitive religions. The ethical standards present enormous differences, although the Oceanic peoples may in a general way be spoken of rather as non-moral than immoral. In fact, the moral sense, as understood by more advanced races, must be regarded as still dormant amongst Polynesians, who indulge openly in unbridled licence; Melanesians and Borneans, who glory in the trophies acquired in their head-hunting expeditions; and Papuan marauders, who treat with fiendish cruelty the captives secured for their cannibal feasts. Nor are these atrocities confined to the lower races, as seen by the unspeakable horrors of the cage-prisons in the unprotected Malay States described by H. Clifford (*In Court and Kampong*, p. 161 f.).

In Sumatra also the Battas open hostilities by offering to their war-god a boy eight or ten years old, who is buried to his neck in the ground and then stuffed with a mixture of sliced ginger, red pepper, and salt. When he is nearly raving mad with thirst, he is induced by the offer of a little water to promise to plead the tribal cause in the next world. But, the promise made, molten lead instead of water is poured down his throat, and his head is cut off and buried in an earthenware pot under a large tree in the village. These Battas are idolatrous cannibals, who, before the fight begins, prepare a rudely carved wooden effigy with a square hole in the place of the navel. The pot is then dug up and the soft parts of the head are thrust into the hole, which is closed with a leaden plate. The idol thus becomes animated (*hat hierdurch seine Seele bekommen*), and is at once sent off to the enemy, from whom another is received in exchange, and the pot is put aside for future use (Von Rosenberg, *Die malayische Archipel*, i. 60). And thus we seem to get a hint of how crude animism may in some places have passed through the fetish stage of the indwelling soul up to true idolatry or image-worship. The *Panghulu-balang*, as the Battas call this wooden effigy, has already become a true anthropomorphic entity—'has received its soul'—and, like the war-gods of Olympus, can now champion their cause in this and the next world.

Amongst the Karo Battas the doctrine of soul receives its utmost development. Here the *tendi*, like the *kra* of the Gold Coast negroes (see art. ETHNOLOGY, § 9), is a second *ego*—a sort of 'double' dwelling in the body, which it may occasionally leave—and at death becomes a *begu* (spirit, properly 'shade') on earth, or a *dibatta* (god) of the middle spaces. Often there are as many as seven such *tendis*, which are partly generated as individualized activities or properties of man. Two are clearly distinguished, one more specialized which later becomes a *begu*, the other representing more generally the vital force, and after death resolved into breath, or becoming wind, and returning to the soul of the world (*Weltseele*). Not only men, but animals and even plants, are endowed with *tendis*, and the *Si Dayang*, as the rice *tendi* is called, is represented as a goddess who plays a great part in the creation myth. She is the maker of man, the creative and sustaining power of the universe, the All-life, the gracious mother of nature, these cosmic notions being no doubt due to later Hindu influences (J. H. Neumann, quoted by W. Foy, in *Centralblatt f. Anthrop.* 1904, v. 299).

In the neighbouring Nias archipelago the Malayan natives are both idol- and devil-worshippers, and also head-hunters in the southern districts. Having no idea of a pure bodiless spirit, they fabricate numerous stone and wooden statuettes as tutelar deities, protectors of the chief, of the village, of the weapon, or else guardians against sickness and other troubles. The chief god, however, is *Lubu-langi*, who dwells in the wind, which, although it is invisible, can still be felt. This god is conceived as a tree waving in the atmosphere and shedding fruits which become either spirits or men, forefathers of the present generation, according as they fall in space or on the ground. In fact, Lubu-langi is the origin of everything, and from him comes nothing but good. Their forefathers dwell in constant association with him, and that is why they are invoked for blessings and against all kinds of evils. Here we have a peculiar form of ancestor-cult, which is paid also to the subordinate chthonic god *Batu-beana*, while appeal is likewise made to the other deities, amongst them some goddesses, all collectively called *Aju*. But more numerous appear to be the demons, of whom the most powerful and most dreaded is *Nadáiya*. Of them no images are made, since they dwell in the woods, the fields, the gardens, the houses, even in men and animals when they fall sick. Then they send for the *Éré* (wizard), who smells out the particular spook that is causing the mischief, and bribes him with the heart and blood of a fowl to leave the sick man and go away. If this and stronger measures fail, it is concluded that there are several devils about, and these are got rid of by stopping all the

doorways except one, through which they are driven off by cutting and slashing in all directions and making a tremendous uproar with much shouting, tom-tomming, and beating of pots and cans. The Nias people are not clear about an after-life, but say that the body came from and returns to nothing, while the soul joins the company of the ancestors with Lubu-langi, nothing being said about rewards or penalties. Earthquakes, the tides, eclipses, and other natural phenomena are due to sinister influences, even the rainbow being a net cast out by Nadáiya to ensnare mortals, while comets consist of an ordinary star with a long tail to which a devil clings, careering through space to strew the (Nias) world with woes.

Farther south the Indonesian Mentawi people are similarly plagued with demons, and here, strange to say, the natives of Pora Island migrate after death to an adjacent islet where all become devils, hence this is called 'Devil Island.' Hence also after the burial everybody makes off in all haste, fearing the return of the new-made demon. There are no idols or religious rites, but numerous oracles and omens and divinations by the inspection of birds' entrails, exactly as amongst the old Etruscan *haruspices*; and children are specially guarded against the evil eye of passing strangers. Much dancing accompanies all festive gatherings, which would appear to have a sacred character, since they wind up, if possible, with a human sacrifice, the victim being obtained by raiding a neighbouring island. The *sinétu* (fiends) are of course the root of all evil, and when they are appealed to in the woodlands which they infest, they are supposed to reply in the thin squeaking voice of an old man (Von Rosenberg, i. *passim*).

Most of the other Sumatrans, and all the Javanese, formerly Buddhists and Brāhmans, have been Muhammadans since about the close of the 15th cent.; but the new religion is merely lip service, a threadbare cloak thrown over the still fresh garb of Hinduism, which itself barely conceals the everlasting vesture of pagan times. Here, therefore, and especially in Java, we have three religious systems intermingled, or rather superimposed one on the other (cf. art. ABORIGINES, § 5). Hindu blood still flows in the veins of the Javanese nobility, such as the 'Emperor' of Solo (Surakarta), and the Prince of Jokjokarta, while the triumphs of Hindu architecture are still everywhere conspicuous, as on the Batta and Padang uplands of Sumatra, even in Bali and Sumbawa, and culminate in the stupendous temple of Boro-budur in Central Java. Hence it is not perhaps surprising that the early Indian religious and moral notions still survive and display a more vigorous growth than the arid teachings of Islām. The Qur'ānic texts may be daily read in the tasteless mosques, but in serious trouble Allāh and his Prophet are forgotten, and resort is had to the ancient shrines, where sacrifices and prayers are still offered to the old Hindu deities. Even the primeval tree-cult is kept alive, the chief objects of veneration being various species of the fig-tree, such as the pipal (*Ficus religiosa*) and *F. benjamina*. Beneath the shade of these wide-branching giants the natives often gather to worship the old earth-gods, for whose long-forgotten names those of the Hindu pantheon are substituted. Respect is also paid to the turtle-doves and to the monkeys (*Cercopithecus* and *Somnopithecus*) which have their homes in the branches of the sacred pipal-tree, and even to certain strangely shaped blocks and rocks, carrying the mind back to the stone-cult of primeval times (E. Carthaus, in *Kölnische Zeit.*, Aug. 26, 1906).

Hinduism still holds its ground in Bali and parts of Lombok, but is here also associated with many old superstitions, so that these islands present the strange spectacle of large Hindu communities professing every form of belief, from the grossest heathendom to pure pantheism. It is everywhere evident enough that 'just as Hinduism has only touched the outer surface of their religion, it has failed to penetrate into their social institutions, which, like their gods, originate from the time when Polynesian [Indonesian] heathendom was all-powerful' (W. Cool, *With the Dutch in the East*, p. 139).

A local myth relates how these gods established themselves in Bali after their expulsion from Java by the Muslim invaders in the 15th century. They had first to contend with the wicked Rakshasas, who fiercely resented the intrusion, but in the struggle were annihilated, all but the still worshipped Mraya Dewana. Then new thrones for the Olympians had to be erected as in Java; but there being no mountains at that time in Bali, the four nearest hills in East Java were brought over and set down in the east, west, north, and south, and assigned to the different gods according to their respective ranks.

Hinduism never made much progress in Borneo; nor has Islām anywhere penetrated much beyond the seaboard, so that the great bulk of the Dayaks, Kayans, and other aborigines are still pagans. Head-hunting, cannibalism, and human sacrifices, attended with shocking barbarities, are being slowly repressed by the British and Dutch authorities; but the Muslim and Christian propagandists appear to make little headway amongst the heathen tribes of the interior. All are still in the wild state, and the whole island has not inaptly been described as '300,000 square miles of savagery.' As in Africa, the human sacrifices, formerly universal, were the direct outcome of the prevalent ancestor-worship, the ostensible motive being to dispatch messages to dead relatives, or to honour them by these sanguinary rites. For this purpose a slave was tied up and bound round with cloths, and then, 'after some preliminary dancing and singing, one after another would stick a spear a little way—an inch or so—into his body, each one sending a message to his deceased friend as he did so' (W. B. Pryer, *JAI*, 1886, xvi. 234). The wicked, however, cannot receive their messages, since they are doomed, Sisyphus-like, to be everlastingly clambering up the rugged slopes of Kina Balu, the highest peak in Borneo (nearly 14,000 feet). The good, that is, those who have collected most human heads in this world for provision in the next, easily reach the top, whence they are ushered into heaven. But in other places, where the mountains are not so high, even the elect have to overcome many obstacles during their long wanderings up hill and down dale, across rivers, through fire and water, until 'at last they are safely landed in the heaven of their tribe' (C. Bock, *Headhunters of Borneo*, p. 223).

Dr. W. H. Furness describes the Borneans as 'savages of a high order,' without 'any definite forms of religious worship,' although they make 'wooden idols,' regarded apparently as mere 'scarecrows to frighten off evil spirits' (*Folklore in Borneo*, p. 4). They are 'saturated with superstitions; every pool, every tree, every rock is the home of an evil spirit, and all mysterious noises in the forest are ghostly whisperings. Everywhere are signs and omens to warn man of danger, or direct his course,' and the mountains are so infested with *antu* (demons) that 'the summits can be gained only at the risk of body, and, still worse, of soul' (*ib.* p. 6). Head-hunting 'is part of their religion; no house is blest which is not sanctified by a row of human skulls, and no man can hope to attain to the happy region of *Apo Leggan* unless he, or some relative of his, has added a head to the household collection' (p. 14). The practice is explained by the myth of the great chief *Tokong*, who when on a raid was told by *Kop*, the frog, to carry off the heads of the enemy. Having done so, the war party retreated quickly to the river

down which they had come. After they had again embarked, the current of the stream was, for their sakes, reversed, and like a flash they were carried up-stream to their homes. During their short absence the rice crop had ripened, the sick were all well again, the lame could walk and the blind see; so they ever afterwards observed the custom that Kop had taught them (p. 15). In the Kayan cosmogony there was at first nothing but sky and water, when a huge rock fell from the heavens, and rising above the surface was covered with soil by the action of the little *halang* worms. Then from the sun was dropped the wooden handle of a big sword, which, taking root in the soil, grew to a great tree, with branches spreading over all the new land, and this was followed by a rope-like vine from the moon, which also took root and twined round the tree. Now the vine became the husband of the tree, which gave birth to a male and a female, from whose union are sprung the Kayans and all the other Bornean tribes, and lastly Tokong, father of head-hunting. At first they were only half-human, with head, chest, and arms, but no legs, so that they had to crawl along the ground by their arms, an idea perhaps suggested by the octopus, which plays such a large part in the Oceanic mythologies (pp. 7–9). The Kayan Hades is not in the sky but underground, and, like the Greek Hades, has its Charon and its Styx, a deep wide ditch swarming with worms, and crossed, not by a ferry, but by a fallen tree-trunk which is guarded by the great demon *Maligang*. By him all comers are challenged, and if they have no record of bravery, no store of captured heads, the tree-trunk is shaken until they fall into the ditch, to be tortured for ever by the worm that dieth not. But there are 'many mansions,' as for those dying a violent death, or on the battlefield; for mothers dying in child-birth, or for suicides. In *Apo Leggan*, one of the chief divisions, dwell those dying of sickness or old age, and these 'have much the same lot as they had in this world; the poor remain poor, and the rich maintain their rich estate' (p. 16).

In Malacca the dominant Malays are all nominal Muhammadans; but here, as elsewhere in the Malay world, the cloak of religion is a very loose garment which covers a multitude of primeval rags and tatters. These were never touched or repaired by Brāhman or Buddhist, who appear to have got no farther than *Singapore*, the 'Lion City' over against the mainland. Hence Islām is here directly superimposed on the old heathendom, which it has barely penetrated a little below the surface. Raja Dris, himself a Musalmān, tells us that the people of Perak are still specially noted for many strange customs and superstitions 'utterly opposed to Muhammadan teaching, and savouring strongly of devil-worship. . . . An enormous belief in the supernatural is possibly a relic of the pre-Islām state' (*JAI*, 1886, xvi. 227). One is here reminded, however, that even the Arabs, if they do not worship the devil, still pelt him with stones at Muna near Mecca 'in the name of Allāh.' Referring to the Malays generally, Miss Bird (Mrs. Bishop) wishes that 'it were possible to know to what extent they are a *religious* people as Muslims. That they are bigots and have successfully resisted all attempts to convert them to Christianity there is no doubt, as well as that they are ignorant and grossly superstitious' (*Golden Chersonese*, Lond. 1883, p. 361). Elsewhere (p. 314) she tells us that 'buffaloes are sacrificed on religious occasions, and at the births, circumcisions, marriages, and shaving of the heads of the children of wealthy people. The buffalo sacrificed for religious purposes must be always without blemish. Its bones must not be broken after death, neither must its horns be used for common purposes. It is slain near the mosque with solemn sacrificial ceremonies, and one half is usually cooked and eaten on the spot by the "parishioners."'

But the most striking survival from pagan times is the universal belief in the wer-wolf superstition, which here of course takes the form of the wer-tiger. In Borneo there are wooden idols of tigers with indwelling souls (C. Bock, *op. cit.* p. 226). But in the Malay lands the tiger himself is worshipped, and the belief that men assume his form at night is inextinguishable. H. Clifford remarks that—

'In the Malay Peninsula we live in the Middle Ages. Magic and evil spirits, witchcraft and sorcery, spells and love-potions, charms and incantations are as real and as much a matter of everyday life as are the miracle of the growing rice and the mysteries of the reproduction of species. Tales of the marvellous and the supernatural excite interest and fear in the Malay, but they occasion no surprise. Every Malay knows that strange things have happened in the past, and are daily occurring to them and to their fellows. Thus the existence of the Malayan Loup Garou to the native mind is a fact and not a mere belief. The Malay *knows* that it is true' (*op. cit.* p. 65).

Then follows a wer-tiger story which for vividness and intense horror could scarcely be surpassed. For details, see art. LYCANTHROPY; and for prevalent religious notions in Minahassa and other parts of Celebes, see art. AIR.

Even magic, which becomes gradually divorced from the religions of more advanced peoples, is still interwoven with the beliefs and practices of the Malayan Muhammadans. In his *Malay Magic* (p. 60) W. Skeat tells us that one of the ways by which the Malays 'get magic' is to run against the ghost of a murdered man. As this is not easy, a mystic ceremony must be performed at the grave on a Tuesday at full moon, when the person needing help conjures the departed spirit and states his request. After a time an aged man appears, and to him the request is repeated, and is supposed to be ultimately granted. The magic here in question appears to be what is elsewhere called *mana* (Melanesians), *wakanda* (Dakotans), *orenda* (Iroquoians), *arungquiltha* (Aruntas), and by other names. It colours all primitive beliefs, from which it is inseparable, although by some recent theorists it has been regarded as something apart from religion.

A link between the Malayan and Papuan domains was discovered by Wallace in the island of Jilolo (Halmahera), whose 'Alfuro' inhabitants 'are radically distinct from all the Malay races. Their stature and their features, as well as their disposition and habits, are almost the same as those of the Papuans; their hair is semi-Papuan, neither straight, smooth and glossy, like all true Malays, nor so frizzly and woolly as the perfect Papuan type, but always crisp, waved, and rough, such as often occurs among the true Papuans, but never among the Malays' (*op. cit.* p. 316). The term *Alfuro* applied to these aborigines has no ethnical value, being the general Malay designation of the uncultured non-Muslim peoples in the eastern parts of Malaysia.

From them the transition is easy to New Guinea, the home of the true *Papuans*, on whose religious views much light has been thrown in recent years. In the western parts, subject to Holland as far as 140° E., prevalent features are pure demonolatry and the worship of ancestors represented by the so-called wooden *karwar* effigies of the dead, fashioned by the wizards. In the Sekar district, lately visited by J. S. A. van Dissel, scraps of food, tobacco, and sugar-cane are scattered about wherever goblins are suspected to be lurking. Here the arch-fiends are the so-called *Atitigi*, gigantic monsters of white colour, with an eye in front and another behind, six fingers on each hand, and the right index finger furnished with a very

ong sharp nail. They dwell in underground caves, and hunt down mortals, whom they eat if the flesh is found to their taste. To test the quality, a piece of the flesh is first scooped out with the long finger-nail, and if palatable the victim is roasted and eaten, but otherwise is allowed to go free. These supernatural beings are vulnerable only in the eye-sockets. Here the tabu marks (*kèra-kèra*)—leaves, rags, shells, bast, and the like, with a painted male figure attached to a post sunk in the ground—are very effective, since their violation would bring on not only the vengeance of the owner, but also the wrath of the presiding deity, causing illness and death (W. Foy, *loc. cit.* p. 305).

Dr. A. B. Meyer has made a careful study of the above-mentioned *karwars*, which are met with among the *Mafors* (not *Nufors*) of the North-West Coast, and appear to be real idols, not merely ornaments or emblems, as is often asserted. He calls them *Ahnenbilder*, 'ancestral effigies.'

'After a burial a block of wood is brought from the forest, and first roughly hewn and then furnished with eyes, nose, ears, and mouth, usually by the village magician, all amid much feasting and dancing, which is kept up for several days. When the supplies, mostly sago and palm-wine, run out, more is sent for. Meanwhile the soul of the departed is still flitting about, and every effort is now made to entice him into the finished image. A tremendous uproar is raised with shouting, yelling, and drum-beating in all the houses and neighbouring hamlets, and this is continued for several evenings, a wizard all the time holding the block in his hands with much contortion of face until he falls down—a sign that the soul has entered its future abode, from which it can no longer escape and go about working mischief. Henceforth much homage is paid to the idol, which is carefully put away under the best mats in a corner of the house, and hidden from the eyes of any uninvited guests. It is consulted and invoked on all occasions by the near relatives, its intercession being sought by offerings of tobacco, by adorning it with shreds of bright cloth, and holding it in the hand till it moves, that is, till it answers. It accompanies travellers on long journeys to guard them from harm, until at last, having lost its virtue [its *mana* ?], it is thrown aside as so much lumber, or otherwise disposed of, for this point still remains obscure. But there is no doubt that 'the Mafors worship the departed spirits. This belief in the immortality of the soul is the main principle of their religion, and with it are associated many rites and usages' (*Glauben u. Sitten der Papúas*, etc., *passim*).

In recent times the upper reaches of the Fly River, about the Anglo-Dutch frontiers, have been depopulated by the incessant razzias of the ferocious west coast tribes, especially the *Tugare* or *Tugere* cannibals, whose extreme savagery and cruelty may be taken as representing the lowest state of human culture in New Guinea, if not in the whole world. Little is known about their religious views, if they have any; but we have now *official* information regarding the almost incredible horrors accompanying their slave-raiding expeditions. 'They are a cannibal tribe of pirates,' writes the Rev. S. MacFarlane, 'who make periodical raids upon the villages along the eastern coast. They break the arms and legs of the prisoners, so as to prevent their fighting or running away, and then keep them as fresh meat until required, cooking one or two bodies at a time' (*Cannibals of New Guinea*, London, 1888, p. 106). Or else the captives' palms are pierced, a string passed through the holes, and the arms tied together at the back. When the flotilla arrives they are thrown into the water, and fished out by those on the beach sticking barbed spears into the fleshy parts. Then they are put on mats, a rope secured to a tree is passed round their necks to make them sit up, and after much slow torture they are wrapped in dry coco-nut leaves, hoisted some six feet from the ground, and slowly roasted with fire-sticks. 'When the rope is burnt, and the body falls to the ground, the wildest and most savage scene takes place. The natives rush with knives in their hands, each slashing a piece of the body, which may be still alive, in the midst of diabolical noise and yells of rejoicing' (L. Loria, *Official Report*, 1895, Appendix S, p. 44 f.).

In British New Guinea, witchcraft causes much trouble, and everywhere presents the same general features. A sorcerer, paid for the purpose, prepares a parcel of rubbish containing a hair or something taken from the person to be operated upon. The parcel then acquires diabolical powers and frightens people, who sometimes sicken and die through fear. Thus the sorcerers cause great trouble, and 'the people generally would gladly see them put down, but fear keeps them from reporting their threats and swindles' (*Report* for 1892–4, p. 37).

Various forms of tabu are met everywhere, but in the British districts 'it has never been grounded on any deep religious sentiment, consequently has never taken deep root. So far as is known at present, it is used only in order to store up food for a coming feast. It is most frequently applied to coco-nut and betel-nut trees. In some places the prohibition is announced by a syren of wood on a string wielded by a fishing-rod. From the Fly River to the far east, branches, usually of sago, are tied on the prohibited trees. Sometimes strings are put round gardens; branches are tied into the door of a house that is not to be entered, or are laid across a road that is not to be traversed' (*ib.* p. 38). With the statement about storing up food should be compared the practice in New Caledonia at the other end of Papuasia. Here *tapu* has no religious significance, and is associated exclusively with the question of food—that is, the question which most interested primitive man. It is much the same in the Marshall Islands, where Mr. F. J. Moss tells us that recently the despotic king of Majuro speared a man for picking a green coco-nut 'when the tapu had been placed upon them' (*Through Atolls and Islands*, p. 126). The reservation and safeguarding of food, particularly in times of scarcity, would thus appear to be the original purpose of the institution, the religious sanction being a later development, as amongst the more advanced Indonesians of New Zealand, where 'tapu and its observances, in a sense, took the place of religion' (A. Hamilton, *Art Workmanship of N. Z. Maori Race*, 1898, p. 370).

Both in British and German New Guinea ancestor-worship is a prominent feature of the religious systems, and here the moral sense is scarcely yet awakened, so that little or no provision is made for saints and sinners in the after life. Thus in Murua (Woodlark Island), at the east end of New Guinea, 'all people, whether good or bad, when snatched away by death, go like the wind to the small island of Watum; there they enjoy the full pleasures of life, the women cultivating and cooking food for their lords and masters' (J. P. Thomson, *British New Guinea*, p. 184).

A far higher plane of thought has been reached by the kindred *Melanesians*, though not in the ethical order. They are still mostly inveterate head-hunters and cannibals, as is clearly shown by the very latest observers, such as Dr. H. Schnee and Carl Ribbe. The treacherous and sanguinary head-hunters of the Solomon Islands are referred to by Ribbe as 'von Natur lügnerisch, verräterisch, räuberisch, hinterlistig, diebisch, und grausam angelegten Kannibalen' (*Zwei Jahre unter den Kannibalen der Salomo-Insulen*, 1903). They appear to have even deteriorated since their first contact with Europeans; and, if not devil-worshippers in the strict sense of the term, they certainly betray great fear of the surrounding demons, in many places setting up scarecrows to drive them away. An equally dark picture is drawn by Dr. Schnee of the Bismarck and Admiralty natives, amongst whom cannibalism with all its attendant horrors, such as the lingering death of the victims and the bartering of dead bodies in the local 'markets,' is far more prevalent than had hitherto been sup-

pected (*Bilder aus der Südsee*, 1904, *passim*). Yet the strictly religious views of these undoubted savages may be called 'respectable,' in some instances almost elevated—a phenomenon obviously due, perhaps like their language, to the proximity of the Indonesians of the Eastern Pacific. Although the English word 'devil' is common enough, adopted by the natives in ignorance of its meaning, there is very little true demonolatry. Dr. Codrington says none at all: 'It may be asserted with confidence that a belief in a devil, that is, of an evil spirit, has no place whatever in the native Melanesian mind' (*The Melanesians*, p. 117). This seems to be stated rather too forcibly; but the writer is our very best authority on the religious beliefs of these aborigines. Even gods are little in evidence; at least, there is not a Supreme Being nor are there any very powerful subordinate deities, nor yet true fetishes, that is, natural objects, such as a tree, rock, storm, or waterfall animated by an indwelling spirit; nor professional shamans, or hereditary priests. 'There is no priestly order, and no persons who can properly be called priests,' but any one may undertake the priestly functions who can gain access to some object of worship, and such a man 'is in a way their priest and sacrifices for them all' (*ib.* p. 127).

The quintessence of the Melanesian system appears to be a belief in spirits and in the subtle power called *mana*, which is common also to Polynesia, and presents analogies with the *wakanda* of the Dakotans (see art. AMERICA, i. 382[a]) and with the Augustinian *grace*.

For Maoriland, Hamilton defines *mana* as 'power, authority, influence, prestige' (*op. cit.* p. 396). The same definition would also apply to the *orenda* of the Iroquoians, 'which exactly expresses this potentiality, this atmosphere, which they believe inheres in and surrounds every personality. . . . Anything reputed to have been instrumental in obtaining some good or accomplishing some end is said to possess *orenda*' (Sidney Hartland, *Address*, 1906, p. 5).

With regard to spiritual beings, the essential point to note is the distinction clearly drawn by the natives between two classes of spirits, the *bodiless* and the *disembodied*—that is, pure spirits that never were men, and the ghosts of the departed. Both are worshipped, the homage paid to the first being pure psycholatry, to the second ancestor-cult, so that the two primitive forms of animism have been evolved in Melanesia. In general, all pure spirits, most ghosts, and some men have *mana*, and after death those souls alone are worshipped who are supposed to possess it. These are, of course, mainly the chiefs; hence the remark of the Fijian chief that after death he would be a *kalou*, that is, would be invoked and worshipped; while common people, having no *mana* in this life, would have none in the next, and so would be neglected and soon forgotten. There are numerous minor deities—gods of the sea, land, mountains, valleys; and these may apparently be either pure spirits or ghosts, the natives themselves getting confused when it comes to particulars. For details and accessories (magic, witchcraft, weather-doctoring, sacrifices, Hades, and the like), see art. MELANESIA.

For *Micronesia*, where both Papuasian and Polynesian elements are represented, one of our best guides is J. Kubary, who has made a thorough study especially of the *Mortlock Islanders* on the south-central fringe of the Caroline Archipelago. Here the influence of the Indonesian myth-mongers already begins to be felt, while the dominant ancestor-worship presents some peculiar features, its main purpose being to uphold the prestige of the chiefs both in this and in the next world. In some places the headmen have both a temporal and a divine aspect, being at once the supreme rulers, the supreme gods (*die Hauptgottheiten*), and the priests of their several tribes. At the same time, the officials honour the spirits of their own forefathers, invoking them on all ordinary occasions before the somewhat costly appeal in the last resort to the supreme god—that is, to the tribal chief. In theory this chief is absolute, but does not receive divine honours till after his death, and, as the souls of all the departed are also supposed to be deified, the number of the *anu* (spirits, minor gods) would be legion, but for the provision that practically only those are honoured who were distinguished by some special qualities when alive. They do not communicate directly with mortals, but only through the *au-ua-ro-ar*, a kind of shaman, whose office is not hereditary, each deity choosing one for himself without monopolizing his services, since he is still free to act on behalf of any other god willing to employ him. Besides the tribal (ancestral) gods there are several others, such as the war-god *Arong*, honoured in the form of a fish, and *Anu-set*, the sea-god. Arong represents a famous hero, Rassau, who was slain in the island of Lukunor and buried in the sea; hence all warriors who fall in battle are now also buried in the sea, so that they may join the brave Rassau, the mythical god of the sea. Whether the myth was invented to explain the practice, or is a local tradition coloured by the surroundings, is uncertain, but it shows how 'religion, like all other institutions, has been profoundly influenced by physical environment, and cannot be understood without some appreciation of those aspects of external nature which stamp themselves indelibly on the thoughts, the habits, the whole life of a people' (J. G. Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*).

Besides the ancestral and other gods, there is no lack of demons, one of whom infests the large trees, but is dangerous only to young girls and children. Apparitions and other supernatural phenomena are much dreaded, and no Micronesian would venture from home alone after nightfall. They also believe in divination, and 'have two ways of foretelling the future, one by means of knotted cocoa leaves, the other more complicated, but known only to the professional soothsayers' (Kubary, *Die Bewohner der Mortlock Inseln*, p. 259). Tabu is universal, and there is a 'mourning tabu' for the great chiefs, which is exceedingly burdensome to their bereaved subjects. Other forms are concerned with the food question, as in New Guinea and New Caledonia.

Polynesia (see Table, p. 236[a], No. IV.) is a region of surprising, almost monotonous, uniformity in the physical and mental characters, the speech, social and religious institutions, and oral literature of its Indonesian inhabitants. The oral literature is partly historical and traditional, but mainly sacred and religious—cosmogonies and theogonies merging into semi-divine dynastic genealogies, all based on an underlying system of primitive religious notions, without some knowledge of which it is impossible to understand them. Despite the labours of Sir G. Grey, G. Turner, W. W. Gill, A. Fornander, Percy Smith, and some other Indonesian students, only a few of these legends have yet been rescued from oblivion, and so great are their volume and variety that Adolph Bastian, their chief interpreter, ventures to say that 'the Polynesian range of thought is next to or beside the Buddhist the most extensive in the world, stretching through the length and breadth of the Pacific Ocean, and even farther if Micronesia and Melanesia as far as Malaya be included'; and he adds that the mythologies are meaningless without a knowledge of the religious substratum on which they are

raised (*Die heilige Sage der Polynesier*, p. ix.). In this work Bastian himself has published three priceless documents with valuable commentaries: a very old creation myth from New Zealand (*Die Schöpfungssage der Maori*); from Hawaii a complete theogony, beginning, like all Polynesian myths, with Chaos and Night; and *The History of Ancient Hawaii* in the Hawaiian language, by David Malo, a converted native.

Apart from their great variety and the sublime cosmic concepts often embodied in the texts, students are puzzled to understand how such voluminous unwritten records could be accurately handed down from very remote times, as many of them certainly have been. On this point Mr. Percy Smith remarks that 'it is difficult for a civilized people which habitually uses writing in recording events to conceive of the powers of memory possessed by people who have nothing but the memory to trust to. Some few instances of this may be mentioned. A Maori and his wife dictated to Mr. Elsdon Best over 400 songs, and could generally tell the names of the composers and the incidents alluded to in them. Another dictated to the writer 164 songs, and these were so impressed on his memory that the quotation of one line was sufficient to recall the whole of the song at once. Another has written eleven volumes of MS. treating of the traditions, songs, customs, etc., of the Maoris, and this at a very advanced age, all of this matter having been retained in his mind, and including hundreds of proper names' (Smith, *Hawaiiki*, p. 20). It is to be remembered that most of the documents are of a sacred character, hence jealously guarded by the priests, who were mostly hereditary, so that 'it was the duty of the father, and very often the grandfather, to educate their offspring in the tribal lore. This teaching was accompanied with many ceremonies and *karakias*, or incantations, invocations, etc., in order to impress the pupil with the importance of the matter. There was a special sanctity attached to many things taught; deviation from the accepted doctrines was supposed to bring on the offender the wrath of the gods' (*ib.* p. 19). The statement may thus be accepted that the Maori cosmogony is of immense antiquity, having been transmitted *verbatim* from priest to priest for thousands of years.

In this as in many other such records the distinction is not always clearly drawn between the divine and the human elements. Sometimes gods become men and men gods, while the theogonies are called genealogies, and often merge imperceptibly in the human genealogies, as if the 'inspired singers,' after deriving the deities from mortals, had redressed the balance by reversing th process. Thus *Maui*, who looms so largely in Polynesian romance, appears to be at first human, and then through his exploits becomes clothed by later generations with divine attributes, and in another place we are told that one Maui (for there are several) is the son of *Tangaroa*, and becomes man, Tangaroa himself being both god and man. The renowned chief Tu-tarangi also, who in Rarotonga is only an eponymous hero, or at most a demigod, is known to the Niuë islanders as a deified ancestor. Now Turner, a great authority, tells s that 'the Savage [Niuë] islanders worshipped the spirits of their ancestors' (*Samoa a Hundred Years Ago*, p. 306). Here perhaps we have n explanation of the apparent confusion. The a l-pervading ancestor-cult evidently underlies the whole mythological superstructure, and from this source were derived the gods of the Polynesian Olympus.* But the living chiefs are the direct heirs of these Olympians, consequently their genealogies are mere continuations of the theogonies, and to the native mind there is no real confusion at all. Thus it is that, as above remarked (by Bastian), everything becomes clear when we grasp the root ideas out of which flourish these wonderful efflorescences of Indonesian thought.

At times the Polynesian singers appear to soar into the ethereal spaces and to realize the concept of a Supreme Being, as when out of the transformed body of Tangaroa (Taaroa and other variants) the lesser gods, the demiurges, fabricate the universe, and Taaroa himself is spoken of as *Toivi*, the 'Eternal,' or else, like the Hindu Brahma, or the Dodonian Zeus that 'was, is, and shall be,' is described in the loftiest language as dwelling 'in the limitless void of space, when the World was not yet, nor the Heavens, nor the Sea, nor Man; from on high he calleth, changing to fresh forms, root of the earth, under-prop of the rocks, Taaroa as the Sea-sands in the broad expanse, bursts into Light, cometh down as Wisdom, born the Hawaii land, Hawaii the Great, the Holy.' Similar elevated language pervades the Mangaian cosmogony, which begins with *Te-aka-ia-Roe*, the 'Root of all Being,' and is logically developed in harmony with those of the other Polynesian systems (Gill, *Myths and Songs, passim*). Here, too, the genealogies of the gods pass gradually, as in Hawaii, and with scarcely a break, to those of mortals, all in the interest of the living rulers of the land. Such sublime conceptions, such subtle theosophies, such personifications of Chaos, Immensity, Gloomy Night, and other pure abstractions, in these children of nature, excite wonder and remain inexplicable in their present fragmentary state. Everywhere we find Heaven, Earth, the Universe, the After-World, recurring under diverse names and forms, personified by language, embodied in theocratic and anthropomorphic philosophies — echoes, as it were, of the Vedic hymns reverberating from isle to isle over the broad Pacific waters. The question arises, Have there been Vedic contacts? It is a chronological question which cannot be answered until the date is approximately determined of the eastward migration of the Indonesians from Malaysia. Did the migration precede or follow the arrival of the Hindu missionaries in that region? This vital point has engaged the attention of Mr. R. Studholme Thompson, whose 'Origin of the Maori' appeared in *The Maori Record* for 1906–1907.

Some light is thrown on the origin of a whole class of bird-omens by what Dr. Turner tells us of a superstition prevalent in Savaii (Samoa group), where '*Sepo Malosi* ("Sepo the Strong") was worshipped as a war-god, and incarnate in the large bat, or flying-fox. While the bat flew before the warriors all was right, but if it turned round and shut up the way it was a sign of defeat and a warning to go back' (*op. cit.* p. 51). And again: 'The bat was also an incarnation [of Taisumalie, "Tide gently Rising"]. One flying ahead of the troops was always a good omen' (p. 57). We are at once reminded of the flights of the eagles seen by Romulus and Remus at the foundation of Rome, although at that time the Western Aryans may have ceased to believe in any spirits incorporated in the birds. We also learn something about the origin of ordeals from the statement that in the Samoan temples were kept conchs, stones, coconut shells, and other such objects of superstitious veneration, which were used as aids in the administration of justice. In the presence of such ordeals 'the truth was rarely concealed. They firmly believed that it would be death to touch the cup [coco-nut shell] and tell a lie' (*ib.*). And when these things became discredited, as having lost their hidden virtue—their *mana*, so to say—they were replaced by more efficacious processes: the poison-cup, hot iron bars, stones to be fished out

of boiling water, duelling, and the like. But the principle was the same, a steadfast belief in a supernatural power regulating the application of the tests in the interests of justice. For other Indonesian beliefs and religious observances, see art. POLYNESIA.

Owing perhaps to the difficulty of distinguishing between the purely social and the religious institutions of primitive peoples, a great diversity of opinion prevails even amongst the best observers regarding the religious views of the *Australian aborigines*. Some hold with Ernest Giles that they have no beliefs on the subject of gods or an after-life, and that those who credit them with such notions 'have been imposed upon, and that until they had learned something of Christianity from missionaries and others, the blacks had no beliefs or practices of the sort' (*Australia Twice Traversed*, Lond. i., 1889, 45). This may be taken as the extreme view on the negative side, and with it Carl Lumholtz so far agrees as to assert that 'at all events it is certain that neither idolatry nor sacrifices are to be found in Australia. Nor have the natives, so far as I know, ever been seen to pray' (*Among Cannibals*, p. 284). Elsewhere we read that 'it is a well-known fact that the Australian natives are almost wholly devoid of religious susceptibilities' (p. 339), and that to deposit food or other things with the dead 'was an idea which they could not comprehend' (p. 275), implying disbelief in an after-life. And the remarks of George Angas are quoted (p. 284) on the Murray River tribes, who 'appear to have no religious observances whatever. They acknowledge no Supreme Being, worship no idols, and believe only in the existence of a spirit, whom they consider as the author of ill, and regard with superstitious dread. They are in perpetual fear of malignant spirits, or bad men, who, they say, go abroad at night; and they seldom venture from the encampment after dusk . . . without carrying a fire-stick in their hands, which they consider has the property of repelling these evil spirits.'

This belief in an evil spirit is already something; but Lumholtz himself goes much further, and after referring inconsistently to 'their fear of *the spirits of the departed*' (p. 277), admits 'a wide-spread belief in the soul's existence independently of matter, the Kulin tribe (Victoria) believing that every man and animal has a *Muurup* (spirit) which can pass into other bodies, leave a person in his lifetime, and visit other people in their dreams. After death it may appear again, visit the grave of its former possessor, eat remnants of food lying near the camp, and warm itself by their night fires. A similar belief has been observed among the blacks of Lower Guinea' (p. 279; here read 'Upper Guinea,' and cf. the *kra* described in art. ETHNOLOGY, § 9). Then a native woman is mentioned who 'repeatedly brought food to the grave of her deceased husband' (p. 282); and 'definite religious notions' are credited to the southern tribes, while 'some very interesting information in regard to the idea of a God . . . has been furnished by Mr. Manning, who in 1845 discovered among some tribes of New South Wales a doctrine of the Trinity (*sic*), which bears so striking a resemblance to that of the Christian religion that we are tempted to take it to be the result of the influence of missionaries. But according to the author, the missionaries did not visit these tribes until many years later' (p. 283). They recognize a supreme, benevolent, omnipotent Being, *Boyma*, with an omniscient son, *Grogoragally*, mediator between Boyma and mortals, and a third person, half human, half divine, *Moogeegally*, the great lawgiver to men, and lastly 'a hell with everlasting fire, and a heaven where the blessed dance and amuse themselves' (*ib.*). After this the passage quoted in *Primitive Culture*[3] (i. 418) by Tylor, that they have no idea of a supreme divinity, creator, and judge—that, 'in short, they have nothing whatever of the character of religion, or of religious observance, to distinguish them from the beasts that perish'—will appear extravagant to all competent observers of these aborigines.

The extreme view on the positive side of the question, that is, the belief in 'a tribal All-Father,' is perhaps most clearly emphasized by Dr. A. W. Howitt, who finds this belief wide-spread in 'the whole of Victoria and of New South Wales, up to the eastern boundaries of the tribes of the Darling River' (*Tribes of South-East Australia*, p. 500). Amongst those of New South Wales are the *Euahlayi*, whom Mrs. Langloh Parker (*Euahlayi Tribe*, Lond. 1905) describes as having a more advanced theology and a more developed worship than any other Australian tribe. These now eat their hereditary totems without scruple—a sure sign that the totemic system is dying out, although still outwardly in full force. Amongst the Aruntas, Kaitish, and the other Central and Northern tribes studied by Spencer and Gillen, the system still survives, and totems are even assigned to the mysterious *Iruntarinia* entities, vague and invisible incarnations of the ghosts of ancestors who lived in the *Alcheringa* (*q.v.*) time, the dim remote past, the beginning of everything. They are far more powerful than living men, because their spirit part is associated with the so-called *churinga*, stocks, stones, or any other object which is deemed sacred as possessing a kind of *mana* which makes the yams and grass to grow, enables a man to capture game, and so forth. That the *churinga* are simply objects endowed with *mana* is the happy suggestion of Sidney Hartland, whose explanation has dispelled the dense fog of mystification hitherto enveloping the strange beliefs and observances of these Central and Northern tribes.

> 'They are mysterious objects in the closest association with the tribal ancestors, the outward and visible sign, if not the embodiment, of the ancestral souls or invisible portions, and as such regarded with veneration. They are endowed with *mana*, emanating from the ancestors whom they represent—*mana*, which not merely heals wounds, but when the churinga are brought ceremonially in contact with the body, produces other physical, mental, and even moral effects. . . . The churinga is intimately associated with the ancestor, and has "feelings" just as human beings have, which can be soothed by the rubbing in the same way in which those of living men can be' (Address at Brit. Assoc., York, 1906).

Hence a man, as he sings and rubs it with his hand, 'gradually comes to feel that there is some special association between him and the sacred object—that a virtue of some kind passes from it to him, and also from him to it' (Spencer-Gillen, *Northern Tribes*, ch. viii. p. 278 f.). By whatever name it be called, this is obviously *arungquiltha*, the Australian *mana*, and it is equally obvious that the primitive Australian religions are still interwoven with magic (see above).

About the religious and ethical views of the extinct *Tasmanians* a good deal of information has been gathered from various sources by Brough Smyth (*Aborigines of Victoria*), J. Bonwick (*Daily Life*, etc., *of the Tasmanians*), and Tylor (*JAI* xxiii. 141, Nov. 1893). Socially they appear 'to have remained to our day living representatives of the early Stone Age, left behind in industrial development even by the ancient tribes of the Somme and the Ouse. . . . The life of these savages proves to be of undeveloped type alike in arts and institutions, so much so that the distinction of being the lowest of normal tribes may be claimed for them' (Tylor, *loc. cit.* 148, 152). Yet the religious sense had certainly been awakened. They feared to move about after dark, believing that their deceased relatives might be hovering about, and

there was a god who presided over the day and an evil spirit or demon over the night, and to the god the women addressed songs or prayers to secure the safe return of their absent husbands (Smyth, ii. 390). Bonwick, however, doubts this, while admitting that 'the Tasmanians had some dim apprehension of a future state' (p. 167), and refers to the case of a native who put a spear in a tree beside a dead body, 'to fight with when he sleep' (p. 174). The evidence is altogether very conflicting, although on the whole rather against the belief in a beneficent deity, and Dr. Nixon, first bishop of Tasmania, is quoted as saying that 'no trace can be found of the existence of any religious usage, or even sentiment, amongst them, unless, indeed, we may call by that name the dread of a malignant and destructive spirit, which seems to have been their predominant, if not their only, feeling on the subject' (p. 172). And there the matter must rest, since the last of the race died about 1890.

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A. H. KEANE.

AUSTRALIA.—1. Introduction.—Linguistic research shows that Australia is occupied by three distinct groups of languages, of which two are related to each other, while the third is independent of them in vocabulary and grammar, and shows little internal cohesion. The last group, named 'northern' by Schmidt, occupies the north of Australia and descends beyond 20° S. only in the centre, where it is found as far as 27° S. (the Aruntas). The other two groups, 'old' and 'new' Australian, distinguished by the way in which they form the genitive, occupy the remainder of the continent. By far the greater area falls to the 'new' group, split into nine sub-groups. The main 'old' Australian area is in Victoria with traces along the east coast; it seems to be related to the Tasmanian languages. The two Australian groups are related to each other in syntax and vocabulary, but less intimately than are the component parts of each group among themselves (*Man*, 1908). The grouping of tribes arrived at on this philological basis does not correspond very closely to those given by any other mode of classification, for material culture, social organization, initiation ceremonies, and burial customs give somewhat conflicting results; but on the whole the three last are distributed in a way which may be harmonized with the linguistic data, if we allow for a certain amount of lateral transmission. Thus, the eight-class tribes are wholly within the 'northern' area; they reckon descent in the male line, and though there are other districts in Australia—notably parts of Victoria and the coast of Queensland—where there is patrilineal descent of the classes or phratries, both these and the no-class areas belong to the old Australian speech-groups or are contiguous to them.

The same holds good with regard to the initiation ceremonies. The rites of circumcision and sub-incision are unknown in Victoria, New South Wales, the greater part of Queensland, and the coastal portions of West Australia; but we may readily explain their penetration into the Neo-Australian south-central area as the result of transmission, though, of course, some amount of infusion of foreign blood may have contributed to the result. Simple burial is, as a rule, characteristic of both the Australian groups, and in the old group it is accompanied by the practice of building a hut upon the grave—a custom which they shared with their neighbours, the Tasmanians. The grave seems to be looked upon as the abode of the soul, though we find sporadically the belief that the spirits of the dead travel to the west, or, where there is a belief in a god, to reside with him. In the 'Northern' area, on the other hand, and certain adjacent districts, the body is submitted to various processes, and the essential funerary rite seems to be the disposal of the bones, which marks the time at which the spirit of the dead is believed to go to its own place. It may be noted that special treatment of the bones is a well-marked feature of funeral rites in parts of New Guinea.

When we come to deal with the more intangible sphere of beliefs, we are on more uncertain ground; it is indisputable that belief in a tribal All-Father prevailed in Victoria, New South Wales, and parts of South Australia; that it has been recorded but rarely outside this area does not necessarily mean more than that the recorder has not penetrated very far into the ideas of the natives with whom he was familiar. So far, however, as our evidence goes, it seems that the All-Father belief is pre-eminently characteristic of the old Australian group; it is found among important tribes of the Neo-Australian group, such as the Wiradjuri and the Kamilaroi, but there is no record of it among the Darling tribes and in the greater part of Queensland. So far as we have evidence for it, the totemism of the northern area seems to differ widely from that which is found elsewhere in Australia, and save among the Dieri and other contiguous tribes there is no record of *Intichiuma* ceremonies except in this part of the continent.

2. Religion.—There has been a good deal of controversy as to the genuine aboriginal character, and, this being conceded, the real status of the Australian All-Father. There is, however, satisfactory evidence that Baiame, about whom the controversy has turned in the main, was recognized in the Wellington valley before the advent of the Church of England Mission in 1832 (*Man*, 1905, No. 28); and, though a Wesleyan mission existed there in 1828, before Henderson collected his facts, there is no reason to suppose that it could have exerted any great influence, certainly not enough to introduce such a figure as Baiame into the initiation rites of the aborigines, as it must have done if the theory of the missionary origin of these anthropomorphic beings is to be maintained.

There is naturally more doubt as to the precise position occupied in the aboriginal view of the universe by Baiame and his congeners; some authors have denied that the term 'god' can properly be applied to them (*Folklore*, ix. 290–329), while others have maintained that they are eternal, omniscient, all-powerful creators. Probably the truth lies nearer the latter than the former view. At the initiation ceremonies of the Euahlayi tribe, according to Mrs. Langloh Parker, an excellent

authority, Baiame is proclaimed as 'Father of All, whose laws the tribes are now obeying.' He established the rule that tribes at the fishing ground should keep peace; he gives rain to the orphan who cries for it; he is prayed to at the *bora* ('initiation ceremonies') and at funerals, and his name means 'great'; his figure is made in earth on the *bora* ground (Parker, *Euahlayi Tribe*, 7 f.). Some of the difficulties which surround the question of the status of the Australian All-Father have arisen, however, because the disputants have overlooked the fact that the beliefs of the various tribes show not only different degrees of development, but actual differences in kind. Schmidt has pointed out (*Anthropos*, 1908) that we seem to have three strata: (1) the belief in an All-Father pure and simple; (2) the belief in an All-Father who has taken over features of a tribal ancestor; (3) the belief in a being of this kind who is also the creator, has wives and children, and (in the case of Baiame) is sometimes depicted as ruling the world through a subordinate. As examples of these three classes of belief may be cited: (1) the Kurnai view of Mungan-ngaua; (2) the Theddora, Wolgal, Ngarego, and Yuin view of Daramulun; and (3) the Wiradjuri, Kamilaroi, and Euahlayi view of Baiame. Bunjil also, the All-Father of the Central Victorian tribes, belongs to the third category. This theory depends on complicated considerations connected with the distribution (*a*) of phratries, (*b*) of totems, and (*c*) of sex-totems, from which Schmidt has produced evidence in favour of a primary dark race, represented by the crow, upon which two successive waves of migration, represented by the eaglehawk and the emu, have descended. He argues that both Daramulun and Baiame were not indigenous, but originally tribal heroes of the invaders, the former of the eaglehawk race, the latter of the emu race; or, at any rate, that Baiame, if he were the All-Father of the indigenous tribes, combined therewith the character of tribal ancestor of the invading tribes. On this point there is not much evidence on either side, but, such as it is, it tells in favour of the view that Baiame was introduced by the invaders; for it is reported (*Australian Anthropological Journal*, i. 14) that the Minkins, on the Lower Leichardt, south of the Gulf of Carpentaria, believe in a god Gooaree who lives in Warnoo; Baiamai came from Warderah and taught them initiation ceremonies. So, too, the Mikadoons in the same neighbourhood believe in Gumboo, and say that Baiamai, who taught them initiation ceremonies, came from an island beyond Australia. Howitt has already called attention (*Native Tribes*, p. 498) to the fact that the evil spirit, Coen, at Sydney, had a namesake Kohin on the Herbert River; and if, as it seems, we are entitled to regard these as identical, there is no reason for mistrusting the evidence for a belief in Baiame just south of the Gulf on the score of its distance from the seat of the Baiame-cult in N. S. Wales. In this connexion it may be noted that precisely at this point south of the Gulf the Neo-Australian languages stretch northwards into the territory of the northern group. In this account Baiame figures as tribal hero, not as creator or All-Father, precisely as Schmidt's theory requires.

The following tribes are mentioned by Howitt (*op. cit.* 488 ff.) as having the All-Father belief: Narrinyeri (Nurrundere or Martummere); Wiimbaio (Nurelli); S. W. Victoria (Pirnmeheal); Wotjobaluk, Kulin, and Woĕworung (Bunjil, Mamingorak, or Mamingata); Kurnai (Mungan-ngaua); Wathiwathi (Tha-tha-puli); Tatathi (Tulong); Theddora, Ngarego, and Yuiñ (Daramulun, Papang, or Biamban); Kamilaroi and Wiradjuri (Baiame); Port Stephens and Herbert River (Coen); S. Queensland (Maamba and Birral). About some of these, however, *e.g.* Birral, we have no information, and it is mere guesswork to include them among the All-Fathers. Birral may well be identical with Bedall (Thorne, *Queen of the Colonies*, 317), who is said to have made the world long ago, when he floated on the water, in form like a huge turtle two miles across the back. In this being we see few or none of the traits of the All-Father. In the Moreton Bay district, however, Buddai seems to have been the equivalent of Baiame (Lang, *Cooksland*, 1847, 459).

There is therefore good *prima facie* evidence for the existence of the belief in an All-Father south-east of the line from the mouth of the Murray to Moreton Bay. Beyond this area we have certain evidence only from the west coast between Geraldton and Albany, where Mamma Gnara, Father of All, is reverenced (*Trans. Roy. Soc. S. Aust.* xvi. 488). Captain Bradshaw has informed the present writer that on the Victoria River a being is recognized who watches over the morals of the tribes, and the same is reported of Kohin on the Herbert River; but in neither case is the epithet 'Father of All' reported, and there is no evidence even of moral influence on the part of the beings reported from the Larrakia of Port Darwin by Foelsche (Curr, *Australian Race*, i. 253). The Cape River tribes are said (*ib.* iii. 146) to believe in a being in the sky, to whom good men go when they die.

In the central area some tribes seem to believe in a being not unlike Baiame; but the evidence as to the beliefs of these peoples is hardly satisfactory. Spencer and Gillen (*Northern Tribes*, 502 f.) say that Twanyirika of the Aruntas and Unmatjeras, and Katajalina of the Binbingas are bugbears, pure and simple, whose function is to keep the women and children in subjection; Tumana of the Kaitish and Murtu-murtu of the Warramungas are simply Alcheringa (*q.v.*) ancestors. Atnatu of the Kaitish stands by himself; he made the Alcheringa and stands in a real relation to the initiation ceremonies; for he is pleased when the operators sound the bull-roarer, and angry when they do not; but he does not trouble himself about morality.

In this account, however, there is no mention of the being known as Altjira, whom Strehlow reports as known to the Aruntas (*Veröffentlichungen aus dem Völker-Museum Frankfurt*, i. 1), and who seems to have been mentioned by Gillen in the *Report of the Horn Expedition* (1896) under the name of Ulthaana ('spirit'). It is therefore open to question how far the account given by Spencer and Gillen in *Northern Tribes* can be regarded as exhaustive.

For the Dieri our evidence is equally uncertain. Gason reported that they believed in a good spirit Mura-mura; but subsequently the Mura-mura were ascertained to be mythical ancestors, like the Muk-Kurnai and the Alcheringa ancestors generally (Howitt, *op. cit.* 487). Recently, however, it has been asserted that the Dieri believe in Mura, a good spirit, distinct from the Mura-mura.

Associated with the All-Father of the south-eastern area is often an evil being, sometimes described as his son, sometimes independent. Thus Henderson (*Notes*, 147) says:

'Mudgegong is an evil spirit, who, after having derived his existence from Piame (= Baiame), declared war upon him and now endeavours with all his power to frustrate his undertakings. The offspring of Piame were numerous, but the whole with the exception of two were destroyed by Mudgegong, who converted them into different wild animals. . . . The evil spirit seemed to be described under the form of the eaglehawk. . . . Certain dramatic representations appear to be performed; the principal one is emblematic of the destruction of the eaglehawk by Piame.'

Another account (Macarthur, *N. S. Wales*, 1837, ii. 301) makes Wandong—one of the sons of Baiame mentioned by Henderson—the author of evil; and a third makes Daramulun himself the opponent (on these myths and their explanation see Schmidt,

in *Anthropos*, iii.). The same antithesis is made between Bunjil and Palyan, Coen and Potoyan, etc. Schmidt's view is that these myths date from the racial conflicts: where the crow race gained the day, Bunjil ('eaglehawk') is the defeated; elsewhere Mudgegong ('eaglehawk') is also defeated, but not by the crow.

It should be noted that there is a certain amount of confusion in the various reports; thus Coen, whom Howitt regards as equivalent to Daramulun, is depicted as an evil being (see Howitt, *op. cit.* 486). Other evil beings are Brewin among the Kurnai (*JAI* xiii. 191, xiv. 321, note 2), Tou in South Australia, Koochie among the Dieri, Jingi in West Australia.

It has, however, frequently happened that an evil being has been reported, who, on examination, turns out to be simply the spirit of a dead man. Thus among the Wiradjuri *buggeen* is not a proper name; in Western Victoria Nisbet (*Colonial Tramp*, 1891, 99) reports an evil deity Muurup, who comes in the lightning to destroy them, eats children, etc.; the owl is his messenger; he lives under ground and commands the evil spirits. But we learn from Howitt that *Muurup* is the soul of a dead man; hence the name can hardly be of any specific deity, but must apply to the dead in general, who are especially feared in the south of Australia.

Female deities are unknown in Australia, but in a certain number of cases the evil being is believed to be of the female sex; thus Kurriwilban, wife of Kogorowen, is described as an enemy of mankind (Threlkeld, *Aust. Language*, 1892, 48).

3. **Burial.**—From the point of view of burial customs, the Australian tribes fall into two groups. (1) In New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, and the coastal portions of West Australia, simple burial without alternative rites, such as cremation, is the rule, save in an enclave near the mouth of the Murray River. (2) In Northern Territory and Queensland, simple burial without alternative rites is also found, though how far the absence of alternative rites means that our information is defective is an open question; but, as a rule, the body is exposed on a platform, or the flesh is eaten, or the body is buried and the bones subsequently exhumed. The main funeral ceremony is connected with the disposal of the bones. This rite, however, is often reserved, as is cannibalism, for specially favoured individuals, such as warriors, magicians, etc. Alternative rites are used where the subject was unimportant, owing to old age or youth.

Corresponding to these two classes—simple burial and complex rites—there seem to be different views as to the destiny of the soul. In the south the grave seems to be regarded in many cases as its abode; in the north it remains with the body or the bones till the latter are finally disposed of, and then goes to its own place. Fear of the dead seems to be more prominent in the south.

In Victoria and the south of N. S. Wales a hut was frequently built upon the grave, in which the widow or another relative sat during the time of mourning. This is also a Tasmanian custom, and strengthens the evidence for the intimate connexion of the Victorian tribes with the Tasmanian (see *Folklore*, vol. xix. [1908] p. 388).

4. **Future life.**—Australian beliefs as to a future life are generally vague, and our information is defective. At Port Lincoln (*Trans. Philosophical Institute of Victoria*, v. 188) it was believed that the soul was so small as to be able to pass through a chink; after death it went to an island, and could dispense with further nourishment; a redbill accompanied the soul on its journey. Near Adelaide, however (Gerstäcker, *Reisen*, 1854, iv. 364), it was held that the soul lived in trees during the day, and came down at night to eat caterpillars, frogs, etc.; concurrently with this (?), it was believed that the soul went west to an abyss at death. The Euahlayi believe that the spirit of a dead man goes with the spirits of dead relatives to Oobi Oobi, a sacred mountain, from which he is hoisted to Bullimah, Baiame's residence, by certain spirits called *Mooroobeaigunnil* (Parker, *Euahlayi Tribe*, 90 f.).

According to Spencer-Gillen[b] (145, 174), re-incarnation is everywhere the creed. This has been questioned by Strehlow (*Globus*, xci. 285, xcii. 123; *Veröffentlichungen aus dem Völker-Museum Frankfurt*, i., Introduction), and the real facts are not yet ascertained. Strehlow, however, reports two Aranda beliefs. According to one, there is an island of the dead, from which a spirit returns for temporary re-incarnation, lasting for a year or two, and is finally annihilated; the other affirms that the good dead live with Altjira, the sky-being. In the place of the re-incarnation doctrine, Strehlow finds the belief that the germ (*ratapa*) of a child issues from the body of a totemic ancestor, or that an ancestor throws a small bull-roarer at a woman, in whose body it changes to a child.

5. **Cult of the dead.**—Although totemic ancestors figure largely in myth in some parts, there is nothing in the nature of a cult of ancestors. The dead are feared; certain powers are ascribed to them, such as raising storms, sending rain, procuring a good catch of fish, and appeals of various sorts are made to them (Collins, *Eng. Colony in N. S. Wales*, 1798–1802, i. 601; J. S. Lang, *Aborigines*, 31; Lumholtz, *Among Cannibals*, 1889, 282; Ogle, *Colony of West Aust.*, 1839, 58; Salvado, *Mémoires historiques*, 1854, 276; Stephens, *Hist. of S. Aust.*, 1838, 78, etc.), but not specially as ancestors. Near Adelaide the spirits of enemies were kept quiet by magic spells (*Verh. d. Gesell. f. Erdkunde*, i. 194). Sleeping on the grave of a dead man was one of the methods of becoming a magician (Mauss, *Pouvoirs*, 17, etc.). There is a wide-spread belief that natives, when they die, return as white men (Roth, *Bull.* 5, p. 16). There are also traces of a belief in transmigration (*Man*, 1905, No. 28).

6. **Soul.**—All natives of Australia seem to have held an animistic view of man, though the sky-beings are regarded as corporeal. But as to their view of the soul, etc., we have only scanty information. Mrs. K. L. Parker records that the Euahlayi attributed to each person three spirits: Yowee, the soul which leaves the body only at death; Dowee, a dream spirit; Mulloowil, a shadow spirit; and, sometimes, Yunbeai, or tutelary animal ([?] spirit) (*Euahlayi Tribe*, 35).

On the Tully R., Qu., the soul is associated with the shadow and the breath; the *koi* goes away during sleep; after death it goes into the bush. On the Bloomfield R. the *wau-wu* is associated with the breath, but is independent of the ghost. At Cape Bedford it is part and parcel of a man's spiritual part. On the Pennefather R. the *ngai* and the *choi* are distinguished; the latter leaves the corpse at death and wanders in the bush; the former passes into the body of son, daughter, or sister. Both are associated with the heart and afterbirth (Roth, *Bull.* 5. 17–19).

7. **Magic.**—With regard to magical practices, there are well-marked differences between the northern group and the remainder of Australia. Among the central tribes magic is practised by both men and women without special initiation, save in the Anula tribe, where the magician is the producer of evil, not the doctor. The initiated medicine-man has the duty of protecting the community or individual members against the magic of others. Among the south-eastern tribes, however, the medicine-man is both worker of magic and doctor indifferently; and, so far as can be seen,

the practice of magic is usually confined to initiated men, though Mrs. Parker mentions a witch-woman among the Euahlayi.

In some tribes the magician is so by birth; among the Anulas only one kin performs these functions; among the Tongarankas a boy inherits his powers from his father (Mauss, *op. cit.* 10; Howitt, 404). More often, however, initiation is by revelation from the dead, from spirits, or from the All-Father, or else knowledge is communicated by other magicians. Occasionally a man who has escaped miraculously from a violent death is reputed a magician.

It is commonly believed that at their initiation medicine-men have introduced into their bodies certain stones, usually fragments of quartz, upon which their magic powers depend, and which may be caused to leave their bodies if they partake of alcohol, hot drinks, etc., or are bitten by ants. The Euahlayi believe that all magicians have a *nagual* ('individual totem'), which is forbidden food to them, which they can cause to appear to others, and whose shape they can themselves assume.

The commonest form of magic, practised all over Australia, is 'pointing'; hair, etc., are used in the south and east; spells are common; in Queensland a man's lifeblood is said to be withdrawn by the *mangani*; and magic may be worked by an effigy of the victim (Roth, 5. 28; Howitt, 354; Spencer-Gillen [b], 455; Mauss, *Pouvoirs, passim*, etc.).

In connexion with magic, mention must be made of rain-making. The office of rain-maker was often distinct from that of medicine-man, especially among the Dieri, where all participated in the rites; the ceremonies may almost be termed religious. The same remark applies to the totemic ceremonies of the centre and north.

8. Totemism.—The *nagual*, associated with the magician among the Euahlayi and elsewhere, is probably rare in most parts of Australia (for possible cases see *Aust. Assoc. for the Advancement of Science Reports*, iii. 515, v. 638; *Science of Man*, vii. 91; cf. *Man*, 1904, No. 53). Of kin totemism in the S. and E. we know little beyond the names of the animals. In some cases the killing of the animal is forbidden, but among the Euahlayi there is no restriction. It is the *nagual* that is sacrosanct, but it is forbidden to mimic or speak ill of a totem. The totem also helps the human being (Howitt, 400; Parker, 21).

The totemism of the north and centre appears to be generically different from that on the south and east. The local grouping, the great number of totems, and their connexion with *Intichiuma* ceremonies, are all important differentia. Still more important perhaps is the fact that in the south-east totems are animals; in the south, centre, and in South Queensland, animals and plants, the latter fewer than the former; among the Aruntas both in fairly equal numbers; and in North Australia, as in New Guinea, the plant totems outnumber the animals (see Schmidt, in *Anthropos*, iii.).

A progressive change is also noticeable with regard to the eating of the totem, which is permitted among the Arandas alone; in both the Aranda and the Kaitish tribes the totem must be eaten at the *Intichiuma* ceremonies. Among the Warramungas it is offered to men of the totem by others, but not eaten. Finally, in the Binbinga and other tribes it is neither eaten nor offered. It has been mentioned above that the *yunbeai* ('nagual') may be regarded as a fourth soul. There are traces of a similar animistic view of ordinary totemism. Among both the Euahlayi and the Warramungas one of the divinatory ceremonies to discover a murderer consists in observing the tracks near the body; the track of a snake indicates that a man of the snake totem is the culprit (Spencer-Gillen [b], 519, 526; K. L. Parker, *op. cit.* 89).

So-called 'sex-totemism' is found in South Australia, Victoria, and New South Wales, mainly on the coast. Each sex has a 'brother' or 'sister,' whom they respect and regard as the creator of their sex. The sacrosanct animals are usually small birds (wren, nightjar, etc.) or the bat.

9. Initiation ceremonies.—The initiation ceremonies fall into two main groups: (1) the central tribes west of a line from near Adelaide to the south end of the Gulf of Carpentaria practise circumcision, and, with the exception of a small area near Adelaide, sub-incision also; knocking out of teeth is known and practised in this part of Australia, but has no special significance; and (2) along the west coast and in Victoria and New South Wales the initiation ceremony consists in the knocking out of the boy's tooth. North of the Queensland border even this feature is wanting, and combats, real, not simulated, with spears, clubs, etc., test the manhood of the youths. Whereas in the central area the ceremonies are performed by successive stages, so that a youth attains his privileges gradually, the initiation customs of the eastern tribes admit him at once to all the privileges of manhood, though, of course, his share in the government of the tribe is naturally small until he has attained riper years (Howitt, 509–677; Curr, *op. cit.*, *passim*; Spencer-Gillen [b], *passim*).

In connexion with the initiation ceremonies, mention must be made of the system of food prohibitions, which perhaps attains a greater development in Australia than in any other part of the world. Eyre (*Journal*, 1845, ii. 293) records particulars of South Australian customs. Up to the age of nine or ten, boys were free to eat any food; then twenty or thirty different animals and birds were forbidden them; ten years later some of these restrictions were relaxed, but new ones were imposed; married men up to the age of thirty-five were forbidden eight or ten articles of diet; old men were, again, free to follow their inclinations. There were similar lists of prohibited foods for girls and women.

10. Bull-roarer.—There are well-marked variations with regard to the bull-roarer. In the south-east of New South Wales it is associated with Daramulun; elsewhere in the colony and in Central and North Australia it is associated with a spirit or spirits in the exoteric doctrine; but the young men are taught its real nature at initiation. Both in New South Wales and in South Australia two bull-roarers were used, one large, the other small, which were sometimes said to be male and female. Among the west coast tribes of the Gulf the bull-roarer is rare, but here too the women are told that it is the voice of an evil spirit. On the Georgina River a large sacred bull-roarer is found, and side by side with it a small one, which is simply a toy. In some parts of North Queensland children of both sexes use it as a toy, in others only boys. On the Bloomfield River the boys are taught the use of it at the initiation ceremonies; but they are permitted to use it in the presence of women, so that it partakes more of the character of a toy. See BULL-ROARER.

LITERATURE.—i. GENERAL: W. E. Roth, *Ethnological Studies*, Brisbane, 1897; J. Mathew, *Eaglehawk and Crow*, London, 1898; Spencer and Gillen, *Native Tribes*, London, 1899, and *Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, London, 1904; A. W. Howitt, *Native Tribes of S.-E. Australia*, London, 1904; K. L. Parker, *Euahlayi Tribe*, London, 1905: N. W. Thomas, *Natives of Australia*, London, 1906. Older works are: R. Salvado, *Mémoires historiques*, Paris, 1854; R. Brough Smyth, *Aborigines of Victoria*, Melbourne, 1878; J. D. Woods, *Native Tribes of S. Australia*, Adelaide, 1879; E. M. Curr, *Australian Race*, London, 1886. Roth's *Bulletins of N. Queensland Ethnography* may also be consulted.

ii. RELIGION: *Folklore*, ix. 290-329, x. 1–57; *Anthropos*, 1908.

iii. MAGIC: Mauss, *L'Origine des pouvoirs magiques*, Paris, 1904; Van Gennep, *Mythes et légendes d'Australie*, Paris, 1906

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AUTHORITY.—*Definition and scope.*—The word 'authority,' as used in ordinary language, always implies a certain amount of coerciveness. The most common meaning is that of a power to enforce obedience. But the sense varies according to the sphere in which the authoritative power is exercised. As regards action, it is the power which enforces obedience. Authority and obedience are correlative terms, supremacy being implied on the part of authority, and dependence on the part of those who have to obey. Authority has the right and the power to say the last word, and to give a decision from which there is no appeal. Its judgment is final. But there is also a use of the word which reveals it as operative in the sphere of opinion, belief, and action. The final test of belief and of opinion is action, and authority in this regard is the power which is held to have the right to influence opinion, to induce belief, and so to lead to action. That is to say, this view really is a phase of the view which looks on authority as the power that enforces obedience, for it shows authority at work in that sphere which ultimately issues in obedience. It reveals the process by which obedience is won. The right to influence opinion, to induce belief, to persuade a man to take a certain course of conduct, which belongs to authority, is thus the way to command obedience. Yet there is a shade of difference in the two aspects of authority set forth above. In that view which regards authority as the power that commands obedience, we abstract from the way and means by which it persuades the man to obey, and fix our attention on the categorical command which must be obeyed. In the other case, authority is presented as rational, as proving its right to command, as presenting itself in an attitude of persuasion, as leading the object of authority to lend his own assent to the demand made on him. The power to create opinion, to influence belief, and to constrain to action is exercised with a view to enforce obedience. This power may be exercised in many ways, varying according to the sphere of operation, the means available, and the end in view. In the intellectual sphere it may take the form of authoritative opinion, the view of a man who has the expert knowledge which few others have at command. It may take the form of testimony as to matters of fact of which he is or has been the only witness. In short, it may take a thousand forms; but the outcome in every case is to win assent, to constrain belief, and to influence action.

The common element in all forms of authority is ultimately to enforce opinion, and to constrain belief. Without this element of coerciveness, authority has no real meaning. All authority inhibits, forces, or pains. It is of its very nature so to act. But, on the other hand, authority must be prepared to justify itself, and to show that it has the right to command, and the power to enforce its behests. It is not an end in itself; it is a means to an end. What that end may be it is not necessary here to determine. It may be that Höffding is correct when he says:

'Authority can never be anything but a means, and the principle of authority is subordinate to the principle of personality, as mediate value must always be subordinate to immediate value. The burden of proof must always lie with those who wish to inhibit, limit, force, or pain. Authority pleads as its justification that it is the necessary condition for the complete carrying out of the principle of personality' (*The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 279).

To Höffding the principle of authority, while it has its own place and function, is subordinate to the principle of personality. This is a different contrast from the familiar one of the antithesis of authority and reason, with which literature is so well acquainted. Höffding is concerned with the principle of the Conservation of Values, and for the right estimate of values the principle of personality, he holds, is of supreme worth. It is not necessary to enter into his theory, or to discuss it. The main thing is that for him the principle of authority is not ultimate. It must justify itself. There is another view which we may take from Mr. Arthur Balfour.

'Authority, as I have been using the term, is in all cases contrasted with Reason, and stands for that group of non-rational causes, moral, social, and educational, which produces its results by psychic processes other than reasoning (*The Foundations of Belief*, p. 219). 'If we are to judge with equity between these rival claimants, we must not forget that it is Authority rather than Reason to which, in the main, we owe not religion only, but ethics and politics; that it is Authority which supplies us with essential elements in the premises of science; that it is Authority rather than Reason which lays deep the foundations of social life; that it is Authority rather than Reason which cements its superstructure. And though it may seem to savour of paradox, it is yet no exaggeration to say that, if we would find the quality in which we most notably excel the brute creation, we should look for it not so much in our faculty of convincing and being convinced by the exercise of reasoning, as in our capacity for influencing and being influenced through the action of Authority' (*ib.* p. 229 f.).

In drawing out the contrast between authority and reason, Mr. Balfour dwells with delight on customary opinion, habit, and on that 'group of non-rational causes—moral, social, and educational—which produces its results by psychic processes other than reasoning.' He has forgotten to observe that in all these processes reason is, at all events, implicit. For the customs, traditions, and social, moral, and educational influences in the midst of which we live, have been the products of rational beings, of beings, in short, who have been implicitly rational from the beginning. All the causes which he claims for authority may be better assigned to reason. He refuses to let reason possess authority, for, he says, 'Authority as such is, from the nature of the case, dumb in the presence of argument.' It is instructive to read why it should be so. But we may not linger over his ingenious argumentation. Our contention is that authority need not fear argument, when it insists on its legitimate claim to influence or coerce men. But then its claim must, like all claims, submit to criticism; and, when it does so, it need not take refuge in groups of non-rational causes, or in that dim mysterious region of instinct to which Mr. Balfour consigns it. For there are many voices which speak to us with authority, and to none of them can we turn a deaf ear without paying an appropriate penalty. That penalty may be stated, and the sanction of any true authority may be vindicated, to the satisfaction of reason.

It may be broadly stated that in every sphere of human activity, and in every sphere of human thought, there is something which may rightly be called authority. The sanctions by which authority vindicates its attitude may vary with each sphere, but in all of them there is authority with its appropriate sanctions. It is not our purpose to make an exhaustive enumeration of the spheres in which authority has its appropriate place and function. To do so would be to enumerate all the sciences, all the arts, all the philosophies, and, in short, all those achievements of the human mind which are embodied in the literature of the world. But we may ask—

1. Is there an authority in science? And if so, what are its functions, and what are its sanctions? Waiving the question as to the abstract nature of science, and as to the depreciation of it on that account, may we not say that it is through the achievements of science that we have won control over the external world, and subdued it to the uses of man? It may be quite true that nature is more complex and more subtle than our sciences, and that, while we speak of heat, light, electricity, gravitation, and dwell on these in our abstract fashion, every particle of matter is at the same

time in some state of temperature, in some electric condition, and so on. Yet so far science has read the meaning of nature, and has subjected itself to the authority of nature. The external world has been controlled by man, and subdued to his uses only because he has submitted himself to its authority. It is possible for a man to strive to ignore the law of gravitation, but, if he does so, he will never build a house. Practical work in the external world is possible only if a man submits to the authority placed on him by the nature of that world. We do not mean only that he must recognize those great and universal characteristics of nature which science has expressed under such generalizations as the law of gravitation, the law of the conservation of energy, and such like,—he must have regard to the particular nature of every natural object with which he has to do. He must deal with stones according to the qualities of stones, with timber according to the qualities of timber, and with other things after their kind. These dictate to science and to men generally the conditions under which work must be done. In building his bridges man must make allowance for the contraction of iron under cold and for its expansion under heat. The nature of his material and the laws of physics speak to him with an authoritative voice, and if he ventures to disregard that authority, he must pay the price. He will find it sanctioned by tumbling houses, falling bridges, and general wreck and ruin. Nature will do anything for one who knows how to make her work, but she will do nothing for one who does not know her way and her limitations. We take from the sciences our first example of authority, and we have begun here because we find that the authority of nature can be justified, and that reason quite recognizes the validity of the claim which nature presents to man in the system in which he lives.

Reason can recognize the processes and methods of nature. Indeed, the possibility of science depends on the presupposition of the rationality of nature. Acting on that supposition, science has questioned nature, has experimented with her, has come to know her, has summed up its knowledge of nature in the special sciences, and has succeeded in this venture just because it has recognized the order of nature as real, objective, authoritative. The value of the generalizations of science lies in the fact that they represent nature, and that they may be verified in the processes and in the facts of nature. This means that the order of nature is recognized by man as authoritative, and science has taken it as such. No doubt, there is a correspondence between the order of nature and the constitution of the human mind. The correspondence exists, whatever the explanation of it may be. It would lead us too far afield to inquire into the origin and character of the correspondence. Nor is it necessary; for, whether we hold that mind gives laws to nature or the converse, the correspondence stands. Mind and nature are related the one to the other. So, whether we inquire into the order of nature or into the constitution of mind, we are led to something common to both. For nature is rational, is a system, and mind finds that the rationality in nature is akin to the rationality of which it is conscious in itself.

2. Authority of the laws of reason.—When we inquire, therefore, into the constitution of mind, we start with the presupposition that we shall find it rational, just as we have found nature to be rational. One of the chief characteristics of mind is that it has the power of transcending particular experiences, and of making universal and necessary propositions, which it believes to be true always and everywhere. These judgments are disclosed to it on reflexion, but from their very nature they lie at the foundation of all experience, and without them experience would not be possible. They are of such a kind that the mind recognizes their truth and validity as soon as it understands them. They bear on the face of them their own irresistible evidence. It is impossible for us to think of an event happening without a cause. The law of causation rules our thinking, and of an unrelated event we are unable to conceive. Axioms are axiomatic. We cannot think without them. It makes no difference whether we call them 'axioms,' or designate them 'postulates'; in either case they are there as the foundation of all our thinking. Without them we should fall into contradiction, and lapse into confusion. Thought must be consistent with itself, that is, it must not be self-contradictory, and thought must be consistent with reality. On the other hand, these universal and necessary judgments must be prepared to vindicate their validity. They must submit to criticism, and show themselves in their universal and necessary character. They must show themselves in all the glory of their self-evidence; they must be prepared to prove that the opposite of them is inconceivable; and they must prove that, unless we accept them, our thinking will be self-contradictory. It is not necessary to enumerate these axioms. Two and two make four, a thing cannot be and not be at the same time—on such axioms as these all are agreed, whatever the explanation of their validity may be. All thinking must assume the law of non-contradiction, as all fruitful thinking must recognize the validity of the laws of logic.

These axioms are authoritative, and are authoritative in the ordinary meaning of the term. They enforce obedience to them under the sanction that, if they are disregarded, thinking will be inept, unfruitful, nonsensical. In this sphere the antinomy between authority and freedom, between authority and reason, between the principle of authority and the principle of personality, does not emerge. For the principle of authority here is the very principle of reason itself, and these necessary and universal judgments are those which make freedom, personality, and reason possible. For reason can be exercised only on the basis of universality and necessity. Because there is a fixed order of nature, and necessary laws of reason, freedom is possible, and ideals may be conceived and realized. If there were no axioms, if there were no universal and necessary judgments, no fixed properties of things, it would not be possible for mind to conceive ends and adopt means for their realization. Nor would it be possible for man to maintain a rational relation to a random world. The main thing, however, to insist on here is that these universal and necessary judgments speak to us with authority, coerce our opinions and beliefs, and constrain us to action consistent with them. They have thus the note of authority, and enforce themselves on us with very drastic sanctions. Our thinking, our action, and even our feeling must be consistent with them, and must proceed with a due regard to their supremacy.

3. Authority in the sphere of civil life.—We have seen that authority is rightly exercised over us by the external order of the world, and by the laws of mind itself, and that the sanctions are of the most real and emphatic order. Can we find a legitimate sphere for authority, with appropriate sanctions, in the sphere of civil life, in the sphere of morals, and in the sphere of religion? It is impossible to say that in these spheres a denial of authority involves self-contradiction. Disloyalty,

disobedience, and anarchy are possible, as history abundantly shows. Take the case of government, and ask, What is the place of authority in it? Here clearly we must bring in a number of considerations which were not needed in relation to the authoritativeness of laws of nature and laws of mind. With his usual insight and sagacity, Bishop Butler sets forth the essential note of government when he says:

'The annexing pleasure to some actions, and pain to others, in our power to do or forbear, and giving notice of this appointment beforehand to those whom it concerns, is the proper formal notion of government. . . . If civil magistrates could make the sanctions of their laws take place, without interposing at all, after they had passed them, without a trial and the formalities of an execution; if they were able to make their laws execute themselves, or every offender to execute them upon himself—we should be just in the same sense under their government then as we are now; but in a much higher degree, and more perfect manner' (*Analogy*, pt. 1, ch. ii.).

Attaching pleasure to some actions and pains to others, and giving notice of the appointment beforehand, is the proper notion of government. Let us take this conception with us, as we seek to investigate the function of authority in civil government. The State is the source of authority within its dominions. It is the maker of laws: in its judicial function it is the administrator, and in its executive function it is the active agency in enforcing obedience. All local authorities are derived from the State. These may be administrative, like town and county authorities, authorities dealing with public health, and so on; they may be judicial; or they may be commercial; yet each delegated authority derives its power from the State, and is responsible to the State for its exercise. The authority of each independent State is supreme within its own dominion. It might be asked, What is the State, and from what source is its authority derived? That is too large a question to be discussed here (see art. GOVERNMENT). But it may be well to learn from competent authority what is meant by law, by sovereignty, and by subjection and obedience. Austin tells us that—

'Laws set by God to men, laws established by political superiors, and laws set by men to men (though not by political superiors) are distinguished by numerous and important differences, but agree in this, that all of them are set by rational and intelligent beings to intelligent and rational beings' (*Lectures on Jurisprudence*, vol. i. p. 3 [3-vol. ed. 1861]). Again, 'Of the laws set by men to men, some are established by political superiors, sovereign and subject; by persons exercising supreme and subordinate government, in independent nations, or independent political societies' (p. 2). As to the source of law, it is thus stated: 'Every positive law, or every law simply and strictly so called, is set by a sovereign person, or a sovereign body of persons, to a member or members of the independent political society wherein that person or body is sovereign or supreme. Or, changing the expression, it is set by a monarch or sovereign member to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author' (p. 169). Again, 'The notions of sovereignty and independent political society may be expressed concisely thus: if a determinate human superior, not in a habit of obedience to a like superior, receive habitual obedience from the bulk of a given society, that determinate superior is sovereign in that society, and the society (including the superior) is a society political and independent' (p. 170).

It may be well to refer in this connexion to Maine's *The Early History of Institutions*, p. 349 f., for an independent contribution to Austin's theory of sovereignty and subjection. As to the theory itself, it is very abstract, and the great political facts are reduced and attenuated to abstractions, in which the fact of sovereign service and the loyalty of subjects have disappeared. It is well to have a description of abstract sovereignty and abstract obedience attenuated to the uttermost. Yet, after all, it does not help us much in our inquiry. It may be desirable for the student to read more modern contributions to the theory of the State, especially those which have been influenced by the philosophy of Kant, and by the great idealist school more or less dominated in this regard by Hegel. Reference may be made to Green's 'Principles of Political Obligation' (*Collected Works*, vol. ii. p. 445):

'It is a mistake to think of the State as an aggregation of individuals under a sovereign—equally so whether we suppose the individuals as such, or apart from what they derive from society, to possess natural rights, or suppose them to depend on the sovereign for the possession of rights. A State presupposes other forms of community, with the rights which arise out of them, and exists only as sustaining, securing, and completing them. In order to make a State, there must have been families of which the members recognized rights in each other (recognized in each other powers capable of direction by reference to a common Good): there must further have been intercourse between families, or between tribes that have grown out of families, of which each in the same sense recognized rights in the other. The recognition of a right being very far short of the definition, the admission of a right in each other by two parties, whether individuals, families, or tribes, being very different from agreement as to what the right consists in—what it is a right to do or acquire—the rights recognized require definition and reconciliation in a general law. When such a general law has been arrived at, regulating the position of members of a family towards each other and the dealings of families or tribes with each other; when it is voluntarily recognized by a community of families or tribes, and maintained by a power strong enough at once to enforce it within the community and to defend the integrity of the community against attacks from without, then the elementary State has been formed.'

For the vindication of the exercise of authority in a State, it is not sufficient to dwell on the abstract relationship of sovereign and subject or on the independence of a State; the authority must be vindicated on other grounds. Green has shown that a State is not an assemblage of mere individuals under a common government. Individuals are already united by moral bonds; they are in families, in tribes, and as such are in mutual recognition of rights and duties. Those in authority must do service, and must justify their action on the ground of recognized worth or good achieved; or even on the lower ground of utility. Authority must justify its existence. Aristotle has well recognized and insisted on the obligation to service which attaches to those who exercise authority. He shows that a State is not an association formed exclusively for the acquisition of wealth, or for military strength, or for the encouragement of commerce. The object of the State is the promotion of the higher life. When men are associated together in a State, 'the object of their association is to live well—not merely to live.'

'Virtue and vice are matters of earnest consideration to all whose hearts are set upon good and orderly government. And from this fact it is evident that a State which is not merely nominally, but in the true sense of the word a State, should devote its attention to virtue. To neglect virtue is to convert the political association into an alliance differing in nothing except in the local contiguity of its members from the alliance formed between distant States, to convert the law into a mere covenant, or, as the sophist Lycophron said, a mere surety for the mutual respect of rights, without any qualification for producing goodness or justice in the citizens. But it is clear that this is the true view of the State, *i.e.* that it promotes the virtue of its citizens' (Aristotle's *Politics*, bk. iii. ch. 9, Welldon's tr. p. 124 *f.*).

The authority of a State is not justified by the mere fact of sovereignty; the sovereignty must be of a certain character. According to Aristotle, it must be an institution in which goodness, virtue, and justice are produced in the citizens. The State, in more modern phraseology, must be an institution in which a man can find himself, realize himself, and by its means be able to live a rich, full, and gracious life. It must be the home in which his ideals are so far realized, which in the history of the past and in the situation of the present affords ideals worthy of imitation to the citizen in all the variety of his manifold endeavour. The authority of a nation over its citizens is thus justified by the tradition of the nation, by its achievement in former ages, by the ideal it sets before them at the present hour, and by its promise for the future. The authority of a State can neither be measured nor justified by the material force which it has at its command to enforce obedience. Force is no remedy, nor can it win

the loyalty of the governed. Without loyalty the exercise of authority is hindered, confined, rendered ineffective. It makes no difference in the final issue whether power is exercised by a king or by the citizens themselves; for, if it is exercised unworthily, it casts a blight on the flower of loyalty, which is essential to the full exercise of authority. Briefly, it may be said that the State is an ethical institution, and while material force is needed, yet the exercise of that force is conditioned by the fact that it must always be exercised for the good of the community, and in the interests of the higher values. Authority and loyalty must go hand in hand in every State which is worthy of the name. Of the manifold relations of governor and governed, of the claims which the State has a right to make on its citizens, of the freedom of the individual over against the State, and of the limits of civil obedience it is not possible to speak here. Nor is it necessary, for the due exercise of authority in this sphere must always be in such ways as to carry with it the consent of the citizen, to arouse his loyalty, to deepen his sense of obligation to the State, and to quicken him to do the State enthusiastic service. In this sphere, too, authority has to justify itself by its fruits.

4. **Authority in morals.**—We have passed insensibly to the exercise of authority in the sphere of moral life. Is there a Categorical Imperative? Is there an Ought, a law binding on us, which we must obey unconditionally, and cannot disobey except at our direst peril? To these questions it is not possible to give an exhaustive answer within our limits. The facts of the moral life are so various, the explanations of them so numerous, and the theories of ethics so manifold, that it is difficult to isolate the voice of authority, and to give here a distinct and categorical answer. Yet the ordinary moral consciousness speaks of virtue and vice, of good and evil, and of right and wrong, and it has definite meanings when it uses these ethical contrasts. It has a notion that virtue and vice relate to character, that good and evil relate to the end of life, and that right and wrong refer to a standard. It is conscious, also, that they all relate somehow to an ideal of conduct. When it speaks of right and wrong, it sets up a standard of conduct; when it speaks of good and evil, it passes a judgment on the end and purpose of life; and when it speaks of virtue and vice, it recognizes an ideal of character which it feels ought to be realized in practical life.

Students of ethics will remember Kant's treatment of the ordinary moral consciousness, which in his *Metaphysic of Ethic* he analyzes, on the way towards his theoretical exposition of ethic. Kant lays stress on the Good Will as the absolute example of Good. He insists that the aim of the practical reason is to produce an absolutely good will, not a will which is good only as a means to happiness. A good will is the supreme good, though it may not have attained to completeness. Inasmuch, however, as a perfectly goodwill is not attainable in its fullness here, Kant proceeds to set forth the notion of duty. He assumes that the good will in its completeness is wholly rational, and obeys without question or hesitation the law of reason. But in a being like man, who has passions and desires as well as reason, the good will is not wholly good. Hence the need of the conception of Duty. Kant insists that duty excludes not only all direct violation of morality but all acts the motive of which is inclination, even when these are not in themselves opposed to duty. In the second place, he shows that the moral value of an action is determined by the maxim or subjective principle of will which it manifests, not in relation to the object which acts upon desire. And he concludes, in the third place, that duty may be defined as the obligation to act from reverence for law (cf. J. Watson, *The Philosophy of Kant Explained* [1901], to which the present writer is deeply indebted). Man, however, is a being whose desires are not invariably in harmony with reason. But a good will cannot be determined by natural inclination; it must be determined solely by the principle of duty for duty's sake. There is thus a dualism in human nature, there are wants and desires which demand satisfaction, and there is reason, which prescribes conformity to duty. What is the relation of duty to desire? In answering this question, Kant passes from the analysis of the moral consciousness to the problem of moral philosophy. And among other questions he asks this one, What is the nature of the supreme good? He derives it from the idea of moral perfection, which reason forms *a priori* and connects inseparably with the conception of a free will. The principle of morality is, and must be, independent of experience, and derives its authority solely from reason. As Dr. Watson says:

> 'We learn three things: firstly, that all moral conceptions proceed from reason entirely *a priori*; secondly, that it is of supreme importance to set the conceptions of morality before the mind in their purity, and not merely in the interest of a true theory of morality, but also as an aid in practical life; and thirdly, that the principles of pure practical reason, unlike those of theoretical reason, do not depend in a sense upon the peculiar nature of man, but are derived from the very conception of a rational being, and therefore apply to all rational beings' (*op. cit.* p. 317).

Following out these assumptions, Kant proceeds to set forth the metaphysic of morality. The Categorical Imperative is expounded, and in pursuance of it he sets forth the laws of the universal imperative of duty. 'Act as if the maxim from which you act were to become through your will a universal law of nature.' Another law reached by him after a prolonged discussion, into which we cannot enter, is, 'Act so as to use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always as an end, never as merely a means.' And a third law arises to complete the series: 'Act in conformity with the idea of the will of every rational being as a will which lays down universal laws of action.' [We use the translation of Dr. Watson.] Enthusiastic Kantians have compared these with Newton's three laws of motion. There need be no hesitation in recognizing their abiding worth. Nor need there be any hesitation in acknowledging the indebtedness of mankind to Kant for his lofty teaching regarding the conception of Duty. It is a permanent gain that he has shown the impossibility of deriving the Categorical Imperative from what he calls the Hypothetical Imperative. It is the practice in some schools of thought to derive the binding character of obligation from the fact that, if we are to gain an end, we must use the appropriate means. This is quite true. If I am to become a teacher, I must qualify myself for the office. And so with regard to the use of any other means by which an end is gained. I may decline to be a teacher, and so be discharged from the training needed for a teacher. But I may not decline to be moral. The demand of morality on me is absolute. For this demonstration the world is indebted to Kant.

The severely abstract character of Kant's ethic has given rise to difficulties. It is hard for the student of his ethic to find a point of contact with this working-day world. It is also severely intellectual, and seems to disregard the real nature of man. A common prayer of religious men, both in the congregation and in solitude, is, 'Incline my heart to keep Thy law.' If this prayer is answered,

and the heart is inclined to keep the law, immediately the act is removed from the sphere of duty, for inclination has nothing to do with duty. To touch morality with emotion would seem to destroy its character. Yet on some occasions Kant seems himself to be filled with emotion. This is specially the case in his commanding and striking address to Duty, and when he contemplates the majesty of the starry heavens above and the moral law within. Are we to say that in these moments Kant is lifted out of the sphere of morality? The truth seems to be that Kant in his analysis of the moral consciousness has forgotten the feelings and emotions and desires. Or, when he remembers them, he thinks of them only as disturbing elements, as hindrances to the working of the Categorical Imperative. He has not apparently contemplated the possibility of a man doing his duty because he likes to do it. If statutes may become songs, if a man may learn to love the law, how does it stand with him? Is he moral or is he outside of morality? Apparently in his analysis Kant has left out this possibility. It is curious to reflect that Herbert Spencer also comes to a similar conclusion, for he thinks that in a perfectly evolved State the sense of obligation will cease, as duty will become pleasure, and the strain will no longer be needed (*Data of Ethics*, § 47). In his exposition Dr. Watson says:

'A perfectly good will agrees with the rational will of man in conforming to objective laws, but it differs in not being under an obligation to conform to them. An imperative has no meaning as applied to the Divine will or any other holy will, such a will being by its very nature in harmony with the law of reason. Imperatives are therefore limited to beings whose will is imperfect, such as the will of man, expressing as they do the relation of objective law to an imperfect will' (*op. cit.* p. 318).

It seems a somewhat curious outcome. Is an Imperative less imperative when I consent to its rationality, and consent with my whole nature so completely that all its impulses, desires, and longings are constrained so thoroughly that all opposition to it passes away? Is the imperativeness of the Imperative less than before? Does an Imperative ever become real and operative until I lay it on myself, and make it binding on myself? Does it cease when I am able to make it wholly operative? It would seem, therefore, that there is something lacking in the analysis of the moral consciousness instituted by Kant. It neglects feeling. It forgets that the moral appeal is directed not to the intellect alone; to the will alone. It commands that the inclinations, the passions, and the desires shall be yoked to duty, and that man as a whole and as a community shall become moral. Moral authority does not cease when the will of man becomes wholly the good will, nor does obligation cease when man is wholly moralized. The statute does not cease to be a statute when it becomes a song, nor does the law vanish when the heart of man is inclined to keep it. We may not inquire further, in this place, into the nature of moral obligation, nor need we discuss the various views of it which have appeared in the history of ethics. It is sufficient for us to have indicated that morality has authority, from whatsoever source it may be conceived to flow. Man feels that he is bound to attain a certain character, to live up to a certain standard, and to attain to that ideal of life which can be described as good. The inward moral feeling must agree with an objective reality, and his judgment of values must be rooted in reality. The objective worth must be realized in the inward life. Here, however, we pass beyond the bounds of ethics, and enter into the sphere of religion.

5. **Authority in religion.**—In the sphere of religion, authority takes on a new form, speaks to us with a new voice, and passes from the sphere of the impersonal into that of the personal life. As Hegel finely says:

'All the various peoples feel that it is in the religious consciousness they possess truth, and they have always regarded religion as constituting their true dignity and the Sabbath of their lives. Whatever awakens in us doubt and fear, all sorrow, all care, . . . we leave behind on the shores of time; and as from the highest peak of a mountain, far away from all definite view of what is earthly, we look down calmly on all the limitations of the landscape and of the world, so with the spiritual eye man, lifted out of the hard realities of this actual world, contemplates it as something having only the semblance of existence, which, seen from this pure region, bathed in the beams of the spiritual sun, merely reflects back its shades of colour, its varied tints and lights, softened away into eternal rest' (*Philosophy of Religion*, Eng. tr., vol. i. p. 3).

It is in the sphere of religion that all the authorities referred to above are harmonized, unified, and made effective in a grander manner. For it is here that we can gather them into a unity, and see them to be one, for they reflect the absolute, central unity of the universe. When we speak of the unity of nature and the authoritative character of its system, we really mean the unity which is given to the universe by the mind which informs it, and by the presence enshrined in it. It is the primary revelation of God, and speaks to us with a Divine meaning; and when we read its meaning we are thinking the thoughts of God. So, also, when we read and decipher the laws of reason, think out the first principles of reason, and act on its axioms, we are dealing with reason which is not merely ours, but is also objective and authoritative. So, also, when we read history, dwell on the life of man organized into communities, and realize what in this sphere authority and subjection mean, here too we are in a Divine presence, and the powers which be have been ordained of God. All authority is thus ultimately Divine authority. This is true whether we regard the world from the theistic or from the pantheistic point of view. In the latter case authority comes from the perfect whole, in the former case it comes from the living God who has made, sustains, and rules the world. So, too, the binding power of morality flows from God. It is for this reason mainly that we are dissatisfied with the analysis of Kant, and regard it as imperfect. For religion comes to ethics and seeks to deliver it from the dry abstractions on which it delights to dwell, and strives to bring it into the warm relation of personal affection. It would relate moral feeling, moral aspiration, and moral obligation not to an impersonal law or to abstract truth, but to a Living Presence, to a Holy Person, to a Loving Will. Religion would not distinguish minutely between a Divine nature and a Divine will, nor would it seek to derive the Divine authority from a Divine will as distinguished from a Divine nature, for to religion the Divine will is only the expression of the Divine character.

As to the authority of nature, of truth, of civil society, of moral law, religion regards it as valid in its own place and way. They are expressions of the Divine nature, and express it as far as they can. But nature is an imperfect expression of the Divine nature. It may show forth certain aspects of the Divine nature, but the full meaning of God cannot be expressed in nature, or in human reason, or even in man as yet. God has really put a meaning into His works, and that meaning we are bound to read. Science is our interpretation of that meaning so far as we have been able to read it. There is a wider, deeper meaning in history, and in the nature of man, for here we deal with a world of persons, each of whom has or may have a meaning in himself. But even here the language of human life and destiny which God has had to use to express His meaning is not adequate to its work. For man is imperfect, man has been so far non-rational and

non-moral, and the meaning of an absolutely moral and rational Personality cannot be expressed by these imperfect means. Yet nature and history do in some measure reveal God, and their value for religion consists in the fact that they reveal the living, personal God. It is for this reason that they speak with an authoritative voice. They reveal God. But the source of all authority is God, and the motive to obedience is love to God, who has thus revealed Himself to man through nature, reason, and history. The ultimate sanction of this authority is transformed from the old mode of coercion, and has become something new. No longer is man impelled by the fear of consequences, or by the dread of an external penalty somehow connected with disobedience. The strongest sanction is that he dreads with unspeakable terror the possibility of estrangement from God, and of losing that fellowship which is his very life.

This, then, is the nature of authority in religion. And it sums up in itself all other authorities. It deepens the sources of authority, it transforms its sanctions, and in so doing makes them more than ever coercive. It is also to be observed that this authority is wielded by God Himself and by Him alone. God alone is Lord of the conscience, and He alone can command the conscience. Any other authority is at best ministerial, and is authoritative only in so far as it can produce and substantiate its credentials from Him. Laws of nature, laws of reason, laws of civil authority, laws of morals, are binding on men so far as they are laws of God, and no further. This seems to be what authority is from the religious point of view.

Again, from the religious point of view all things and agencies have their value in this, that they express God's meaning, and are of worth just so far as they are able to express that meaning. Thus they have to be supplemented and added to by those other ways of Divine expression which are to be found in the history of man and in the fullest revelations of God. This is not the place for a lengthy discussion of revelation, or of that form of it which Christians believe to be the highest and fullest, viz. the revelation of God given to man in Christ. Nor can we even indicate how in the revelation of God in Christ there is a complete expression of the Divine nature, and the manifestation of authority binding on all. Truth for the intelligence, life for the heart, and energy for the will are summed up in Him who is the Way, the Truth, and the Life.

Leaving these topics for adequate treatment in their proper places, we may note here that the authority of God vindicates itself on every ground on which it could be vindicated. We instinctively bow down in obedience to the highest and the best, to the wisest and the most pure, to the mightiest and the greatest. We bow down to this authority and regard its behests as binding, not merely because we recognize its right to command, but because we find also that its service is perfect freedom, because we are persuaded that it can guide, strengthen, comfort, and console. Here also authority appears finally in its strongest and most persuasive form. Perhaps the most picturesque, as it is also the strongest form of authority, is that exerted by a person upon persons. Think of the loyalty of soldiers to the general in whom they trust, think of the devotion of disciples to a master, think of the loyalty of men to a great political leader; they will work for him, serve him, live for him, die for him; his word will send them forth to fulfil his will or die. This element of personal devotion appears in religion in the very form which religion in its highest flights takes. From this point of view natural laws, laws of reason, laws of morals, become ways by which we acquaint ourselves with God; but these do not satisfy, they simply impel us on to acquaint ourselves with God and be at peace.

From this point of view certain discussions regarding the ways by which God makes Himself known simply become irrelevant. There is no need to inquire into infallibility, or inerrancy, or any other categories of the same kind. These are categories which men cannot use. Nor are they needed. For the ways by which God makes Himself known are simply means to an end, and we need not spend time on their characteristics. We only ask, Do they lead to God? However good and sure the ways may be, their ultimate value lies in this—that they lead to God. Yet men may linger in them, admire them, speculate about them, their beauty, inerrancy, and so on, till they place them in a position which belongs to God alone. It is time that men should use them as they are meant to be used, and cease to attribute to them qualities which belong to God alone.

Authority then is real, is ever present with men, is indispensable for the training and education of man. It is exercised in many ways and in many degrees. It has to justify itself not merely by the exercise of power, and by the ruder kinds of penalty; it has to meet the demands of human reason, to satisfy the requirements of the human conscience, and to prove itself the guide, the counsellor, the friend of man. The will must find in it purpose, guidance, and energy; the heart must find in it something to stir the emotions, to win the affections, and to arouse the higher passions of love and desire. And the intelligence must find in it truth, principle, and reality. When we trace all authority up to God, we have named that name which at once satisfies all the demands that men have a right to make on the authority which confronts them with an absolute claim to loyalty and obedience.

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JAMES IVERACH.

AUTOMATISM.—Originally the 'automatic meant that which happens of itself and without any visible external cause, and the uses of the word in the various sciences may all be traced back to this etymological signification.

1. The first of these is the *physiological*. When motions are observed in an organism which are not apparently initiated by any external stimulation, the action is described as automatic, and this automatism is one of the chief marks of a living body. Physiologists, however, generally hold that such spontaneity is only apparent, being really a secondary rearrangement and interaction of the chemical and physical forces which have been taken into the organism.* All physiological activity is thus taken as continuous with and included in the general scheme of physical interactions.

* See, however, art. ATTENTION, p. 213[a], and H. Driesch, *The Science and Philosophy of the Organism*, London, 1908.

2. When this point of view is extended to the *psychological* plane and confronted with the fact of consciousness, it may engender that form of psycho-physical parallelism known as psycho-physical automatism, or the Automaton Theory. As the various physical energies are taken to form a closed system with a fixed amount of energy and incapable of being affected by anything alien or extraneous (such as consciousness), it must on this theory be denied that consciousness has any efficacy, *i.e.* that its presence in any way alters the course of physical change. Why it should exist at all becomes a problem; but it may be regarded as an *epi-phenomenon*, a sort of unsubstantial reflexion which accompanies, and is probably in some unexplained way produced by, the flux of physical changes, or as a series of changes running parallel to, and somehow corresponding with, the physical changes, but of a fundamentally different order. The scientific aim of the doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism is to distinguish sharply between psychical and physical process, and it has the methodological advantage of freeing the consideration of the latter from the perplexing influence of the former. It may assume a double form, according as the automatism is supposed to be conscious or not. If the automatism is unconscious, the motions of the organism merely simulate the phenomena of feeling and consciousness. According to Descartes, animals are unconscious automata of this kind. But inasmuch as the only consciousness of which any one has direct experience is his own, this argument may, and indeed must, be extended also to human actions. Another's consciousness is always an inference by analogy drawn from his actions. We assume our fellow-men to be conscious, because they behave as we do, who are. But though in our own case we have direct experience of the existence of consciousness, we have not even here direct experience of its *efficacy*, if (with, *e.g.*, Hume) we choose to set aside the testimony of the direct experience of agency as a proof of 'causation.' The theory of psycho-physical automatism, then, fits in well enough with the assumptions of physics; but it comes into conflict with the biological presumption of the survival-value of any characteristic of life which has been progressively developed. For, unless consciousness possessed efficacy and altered the course of physical change, it is hard to see how it could have had survival-value. A complete refutation of psycho-physical automatism, however, can be achieved only by displaying the methodological nature of its fundamental assumptions.

3. *In psychology proper*, action is said to be automatic wherever the organism functions without the voluntary control (and in extreme cases even without the knowledge) of consciousness. Thus functions which are 'automatic' in the first sense may or may not be 'automatic' also in this; while, if the second sense of 'automatism' is adopted, it follows that *all* bodily motions are 'automatic' also, in this third sense. In practice, however, psychologists do not work with this theory, but are wont to distinguish between voluntary and automatic psychic processes. Automatism in this sense is closely related to the phenomena of Volition (*q.v.*) and Habit (*q.v.*). Fully conscious volition occupies an extreme position on a continuous scale, the other end of which is steeped in complete automatism. Such volition appears to be the condition of organic response only to relatively *new* situations, and, as involving effort, strain, thought, and time, is too expensive a process biologically not to be economized as much as possible. Accordingly, the volitional character of an action recedes more and more into the background as a function becomes established. As actions become familiar and habitual by repetition, volition and consciousness both tend to fade from the experience which accompanies the action, though for a long time the continuance of these factors as powers kept in reserve is suggested by their re-appearance in emergencies. In this way what was originally a highly conscious, difficult, and volitional act (*e.g.* walking or reading) may become degraded into almost any degree of facile automatism, though it should always be remembered that this psychological declension means a biological gain. Hence it may even be maintained that the distinction between the *secondary* automatism which is acquired, and the *primary* automatism of all the organic functions which are not (normally) under the control of the will or within the cognizance of consciousness, may ultimately be abolished. The difference between them may be reduced to one between acquisitions of a newer and of an older date, and primary automatism may be regarded as that part of vital functioning which has become so regular and certain as no longer to require conscious supervision. This interpretation is evidently attractive from an evolutionary standpoint, but as evidently it needs to be combined with some biologically acceptable theory of the transmission (or apparent transmission) of habits.

The philosophic importance of this secondary automatism is considerable. For it enables the moralist to include within the sphere of his competence many acts and processes which *as experienced* are no longer voluntary or even conscious, and so facilitates the evolutionary treatment of ethical data. It plainly suggests, moreover, a definite theory of the origin, function, and future of consciousness. If it is a law of function to tend from the conscious and volitional towards the habitual, involuntary, and unconscious, it would seem that any perfectly adjusted functioning must be unconscious, that consciousness itself was essentially a concomitant of a disturbance of habit, and that unconscious functioning was both the beginning and the end of conscious life. Thus consciousness would be essentially evanescent and transitory. This inference can be avoided only by denying that the growth of automatism is to be conceived as a mechanical process. It must be conceived as teleologically conditioned throughout, *i.e.* as a device for the facilitation of reactions upon stimulation, and for the economizing of a consciousness which always has more work than it can properly attend to, and so attends to the calls upon it in the order of their urgency. A good deal of evidence may be adduced, from the actual distribution of consciousness and automatism in the performance of organic functions of the same antiquity, to show that the lapsing into automatism does in point of fact occur in this teleological way.

4. In addition, however, to the actions which are removed from conscious control after having once been conscious, other automatisms are found to occur which seem never to have formed part of the conscious personality. They seem to be initiated outside the normal course of experience, and to intrude upon it as aliens. They may assist it, or more frequently disturb it, whence they are usually regarded as *pathological*. Such automatisms are usually sporadic and discontinuous, but may attain to a considerable degree of coherence and persistence in cases of 'multiple' and 'alternating' personality (*q.v.*). They have been classified as *sensory* (*e.g.* dreams [*q.v.*] and visual and auditory hallucinations [*q.v.*]) and *motor* (automatic speaking and writing), and their interpretation raises the important question of *sub-*

conscious mental life (see SUBCONSCIOUSNESS) and its relation to consciousness. It is also thought by some that in such automatisms traces of supernormal knowledge and powers may be detected, and these have been claimed as evidence of the possibility of communications from the departed. Their biological value for the guidance of conduct is not as a rule great, and this is precisely the reason why they are usually treated as pathological. But the whole subject has not yet been adequately studied. It is clear, however, that historically these automatisms have contributed greatly to the belief in possession, inspiration, and in the supernatural generally.

LITERATURE.—1.* Michael Foster, *Text-book of Physiology*, Lond. 1900.—2. T. H. Huxley, *Collected Essays*, Lond. 1893–94; S. H. Hodgson, *Metaphysic of Experience*, Lond. 1898, ii. 2. § 6; J. Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Lond. 1903, Lect. 12; W. James, *Principles of Psychology*, Lond. 1890, i. ch. 5.—3. H. Spencer, *Principles of Psychology*, Lond. 1881, §§ 212, 218, 244; W. James, *l.c.*—4. F. W. H. Myers, *Human Personality*, Lond. 1903; P. Janet, *Automatisme Psychologique*, Paris, 1889; T. Flournoy, *Des Indes à la planète Mars*, Paris, 1900; Sidis and Goodhart, *Multiple Personality*, New York, 1905; Morton Prince, *The Dissociation of a Personality*, New York, 1906.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

AUTONOMY.—The term 'autonomy,' as employed by very early writers, is distinctly political, signifying civil or national independence. Some authors of the 17th and 18th cents. use it to denote the freedom of the religious conscience. Kant is the only one who introduces it into the language of moral philosophy, in a truly characteristic sense ('Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten,' *Sämmtliche Werke*, ed. Rosenkranz, Leipzig, 1838–1842, viii. 71 ff.; 'Kritik der praktischen Vernunft,' *ib.* p. 145 ff.). By autonomy of the will, Kant means the faculty that the will possesses of being its own lawgiver, of being itself, by its own nature, the source and substance of the moral law, the moral law itself.

Under what conditions can the will be autonomous? When it is determined by its own form, not by its object. This condition is fulfilled if the will obeys only general laws, if it admits only of those maxims (*i.e.* motives) which can be transformed into general laws. The will which always acts with regard to the universal, as such, provides its own laws: it is autonomous; it is free. For to be free is to obey absolute imperatives, and imperatives of this kind are not the outcome of experience, but solely of reason as practical reason.

The opposite of autonomy is heteronomy. It is simply the subjection of the will to some object or other, *i.e.* ultimately, to the desire of being happy. Heteronomous imperatives are never absolute, because they imply empirical conditions in the subject and object, which do not exist everywhere and at all times. They therefore cannot submit to that moral position which consists in the unconditional surrender of the free will to absolute laws (*i.e.* of the will to itself, for nothing is absolute in the practical order of things except liberty itself); or, in other words, of the empirical will to the pure will. One form of heteronomy is theonomy. It consists in obeying God, because He has sanctioned certain laws, arbitrarily imposed by Him, by means of punishments and rewards.

The ethics of autonomy, therefore, is the ethics of the pure will or of liberty. This pure will naturally has an object, but it is not the matter of this object that determines it; it is its form only, or rather the quality that makes it worthy of being sought after by a will which aims at realizing the universal, *i.e.* general, laws. Thus general happiness can be sought after by a free will; yet not always so far as to embrace the well-being of humanity, which is of interest to our human sensibilities, but only in so far as it can form the contents of a general law, which concerns the understanding of all rational beings.

Autonomy is a kind of summary, forming the kernel, of Kantian ethics. Before it can be thoroughly appreciated and criticized, a general examination of the ethics must be made. We shall confine ourselves to a few brief remarks. In particular, notice that in Kant the idea of an autonomous will has two motives. (1) The first is the conception of liberty that it has within it. According to Kant, the will ceases to be free when it is determined by the attraction which any object other than itself may exercise over it. This is what might be called the ascetic element of Kant's ethics. In all love, of whatever kind it is, he perceives only motives that are governed by the passions and self. (2) We must desire the universal, for only the universal is presented to us as an element of pure reason; all that is empirical is contingent. Here we find ourselves in the presence of the rational and social element of Kant's ethics. These two arguments, which in Kant are blended in one, are in reality of very different kinds. The submission of the empirical will to the pure will is not connected with the idea of the universal, which Kant identifies elsewhere with the social; on the other hand, this notion of the universal affects the will only when it becomes the object of an attraction, the contents of a feeling. Kant's ideal is a will which is identical with reason, but experience does not bear out the inference, and it is not conclusively proved, that the man whose will has become 'pure,' in the sense implied by Kant, is the moral man *par excellence*. It seems, indeed, that he would lack what constitutes the soul of all complete and profound morality. The Kantian idea of autonomy is an abstract idea stripped of all psychological basis. It expresses an ideal of liberty indeed, but Kant was quite unable to deduce from it practical rules for human conduct.

Of present-day philosophers, the chief to revive the idea of autonomy is Cohen ('Die Ethik des reinen Willens,' *System der Philosophie*[2], 1907, pt. ii.). But, inspired by Fichte's ideas, Cohen conceives autonomy, not as the faculty of practical reason, producing laws freely for human conduct, but as the faculty of man, making the human individual the supreme end of all his actions. Under this conception, autonomy becomes, in a direct and positive manner, a social principle, which it is in Kant only indirectly or rather negatively.

LITERATURE.—F. Jodl, *Geschichte der Ethik in der neueren Philosophie*, Stuttgart, 1882–89; F. Paulsen, *Kant*, Stuttgart, 1898; V. Delbos, *La philosophie pratique de Kant*, Paris, 1904.

EUGÈNE EHRHARDT.

AVALOKITEŚVARA.—1. *The name.**—(*a*) Īśvara, which, among *naiyāyikas* (philosophers) and *bhāktas* (devotees) alike, refers to the personal and supreme god, means etymologically 'king,' 'monarch.' It is an epithet common to the Bodhisattvas, or at least—for that name includes every individual who seeks to attain the Bodhi, even although he is still a 'natural man' (*pṛthagjana*)—to all the Bodhisattvas who are in complete possession of the qualifications of Bodhisattvas, viz. those who are 'great Bodhisattvas' (Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva), 'masters of the ten stages of Bodhisattva-ship' (*daśabhūmi-īśvara*) (see *Mahāvyutpatti*, 22, 15). But, when speaking of Avalokita, who is not only a 'great god' but a 'god-providence,' we cannot forget that Śiva is called the 'great lord' (Maheśvara) or simply, 'the lord' (Īśvara).

(*b*) The meaning of the compound 'Avalokiteśvara' is not at all clear. Scholars do not agree as to its signification. It may mean either 'the lord of what we see,' *i.e.* 'of the present world,' or 'of

* See Kern, *Gesch.* i. 324, *Inscr. uit Battambang*, 76; Burnouf, *Introduction*, 226; Minayeff, *Grammaire palie*, p. 7: 'le souverain qui voit tout'; Grünwedel, *Lamaism*, p. 130; Rhys Davids, *Buddhism* (1880), p. 200 ff.; Waddell, *Lamaism*, p. 40, and *JRAS*, 1894; Watters, *Yuan-Chwang*, i. 343: 'the beholding lord.'

* These numbers refer to the paragraphs of the article.

the view,' or 'the lord whom we see,' 'the lord revealed,' 'the master who is or was seen.'*

But the Tibetans, and no doubt their Indian authorities also, took it to mean 'the lord who looks'; for their translation 'Spyan-ras-gzigs' seems to dispense with the idea of 'visible lord.'† Some modern interpreters have understood the Sanskrit name to signify: 'lord who looks down from on high.' This meaning is not quite satisfactory, for Avalokita, like all Bodhisattvas, looks both at the Buddha (*'Bhagavanmukhāvalokanapara'*) and at the creatures with a look of compassion (*'karuṇāsnigdhāvalokana'*).‡

This interpretation makes Avalokita an active present participle, which, as M. Kern remarks, is bad grammar; but Burnouf failed to see in this inaccuracy a decisive argument against the current interpretation, and we may agree with him.§ Further, from the grammatical point of view, Avalokiteśvara, 'lord of compassionate glances' = Avalokana, 'lord of special mercies,' 'lord with compassionate glances.'‖ Avalokita is the god whose face is turned in every direction in order to see everything and to save everybody; he is called 'the all-sided one,' '*samantamukha*.'¶

(*c*) One of the most notable names of Avalokita, and certainly the one which gives us the best idea of the character which had been ascribed to him for a very long time, is *Lokeśvara, Lokanātha*, 'Lord, Protector of the world.' M. Kern expresses it very well when he says that he is the 'god of the present,' 'he who bears the world,' 'son of a Buddha (Amitābha), as the present is the son of the past,' the concrete counterpart of the 'Body of Law' (*Dharmakāya*), the present form of the Buddha, 'the god of daylight and of the living, as Amitābha, who dwells in the setting sun, is the god of Paradise.'** The texts clearly show that Avalokita is the sun; and, in fact, Padmapāṇi, 'lotus-bearer,' which is a name of Avalokita, is also a name of Sūrya ('sun'). Avalokita is the Viṣṇu of the Buddhists.

2. If Avalokiteśvara signified originally 'the lord who is seen,' 'de geopenbaarde Herr,' 'the revealed god,' it looks as if we ought to trace back this conception to the very origin of the personage under discussion. This would present difficulties.* However that may be, as it is very difficult to arrange our literary and iconographic material historically, we shall content ourselves with placing it in logical order. There will be good reason to doubt whether this plan gives an accurate idea of the evolution of Avalokita, because popular religion and religion as described by the sources are two very different things.

3. Although the *Mahāvastu* gives a sketch of the theory of the *bhūmis* ('spiritual stages') of the Bodhisattvas, although it abounds with 'areas' or 'fields of Buddhas' (*Buddhakṣetra*), there are no Great Bodhisattvas in it, playing the part of protector of creatures and patron of Buddhas, and there is not a trace of Avalokita.

In the *Lalita*, among the 32,000 Bodhisattvas, who listen to Buddha, the author mentions Maitreya, Dharaṇīśvara,† several others, and particularly a *Mahākaruṇāchandrin*. Dr. Waddell remarks that, in the Tibetan translation, this last name is replaced by *Mahākaruṇasattva* ('Sñin-rje chen-po sems-dpa'); now *Mahākaruṇa*, 'the great and merciful one,' is one of the innumerable synonyms of Avalokita. We leave it to the reader to judge whether this information is sufficient to contradict the popular opinion that there is no mention of Avalokita in the *Lalita*.‡

4. A great many authorities§ do not give Avalokita unrivalled supremacy, but place him along with a certain number of companions, five or eight, apart from the crowd of Bodhisattvas, and accord him a kind of pre-eminence: 'the sons of Buddha, with Avalokita and Mañjughoṣa at their head . . .,' 'Avalokita, Samantabhadra ('the wholly auspicious'), Mañjughoṣa ('lovely voice' = Mañjuśrī'), Kṣitigarbha ('earth-womb'), and Vajrin ('thunderbolt-holder' = Vajrapāṇi),' whose special task is the struggle against the demons.

In these texts we are confronted with a great superhuman saint, the chief of that noble group of Bodhisattvas who, according to the Great Vehicle, constitute 'the congregation' (*Saṅgha*) or third jewel. Avalokita plays a most important part in some of the sūtras, *e.g.* in the *Dharmasaṅgīti*, where he extols charity, 'the great compassion,' the only function of the Bodhisattvas, to which one must give oneself up entirely without fear of committing sin; if the exercise of charity involves wrong-doing, it is yet better to suffer the pains of hell than to deprive a creature of the hope he has

* See Kern, *Insor. uit Battambang*: 'lord contemplated' = Avalokita īśvara = vyakta īśvara, *i.e.* a name of Śiva; 'lord of the view *or* of that which is seen' = dṛṣṭi-guru, *i.e.* another name of Śiva.

† *Spyan-ras = chakṣus*, 'eye.' It is a lofty expression. We have, *e.g.*, 'thugs-rjei spyan-ras-kyis gzigs-pa: karuṇāchakṣuṣā avalokayan' (Sarat Chandra, *Dict.*). *Gzigs* also is a word of elevated style, meaning 'to see,' and, owing to the influence of the name of Avalokita, meaning 'to give,' 'compassion.' If the Tibetan translation caused any doubt, the following quotation from the versified Kāraṇḍa (Burnouf, *Introd.* p. 226) would dispel it: 'He is so called because he regards with compassion beings suffering from the evils of existence.' The Mongol has *niduber utchektchi*, 'who beholds,' from *niduber utchego*, 'to see,' from *nidun*, 'eye.'

‡ *Sādhana* (text of incantation), quoted by Foucher, *Icon.* ii. pp. 16, 18. Waddell explains 'look down from on high' by the fact that the usual dwelling-place of Avalokita is on mountains. This information is correct, and establishes a point of contact between Avalokita and Śiva. But the prefix *ava* has no such precise meaning. The *vyavalokana*, 'glance,' like the smile (*smita*) and the beam (*raśmi*), is a mode of communication.

§ Burnouf, *Introd.* p. 226, note. *Parijita* (*Mahāvyutpatti*, 126, 63) seems quite clearly to mean *parijitavān*, and it is possible that there are other examples.

‖ See Böthlinck-Roth, *s.v. lok* with *ava* (§ 2). Further, *avalokita* means 'a person to whom good-bye has been said,' 'one who has been seen for the last time' (see indexes to *Divyāvadāna* and *Mahāvastu*). Avalokiteśvara is indeed the lord of the departed and the help of the dying. The present writer owes these valuable observations to Mr. F. W. Thomas.

¶ *Lotus*, ch. xxiv.; Kern, ii. 171; Beal, *Catena*, 384. Like *samantachandra* and *samantālokha*, it is an epithet common to all the Bodhisattvas (*Lalitavistara*, 550, 11).

** See Kern, *op. cit.* With regard to the solar character of Amitābha and Avalokita, the first of the meditations on Amitābha, as it is described in the *Amitāyurdhyāna*, is full of information: 'all beings . . . see the setting sun' (see § 9). Amitābha is Śiva unrevealed; Avalokita is Śiva revealed. The infinite indivisible light which characterizes the former (*amita-ābhā*) is contrasted with the finite light (*mita*) of the latter: 'Brilliant is Lokeśvara, who bears on his head Amitābha, brilliant with, as it were, the appearance of the sun and the moon with their finite splendour.' Elsewhere Avalokita is represented as having the sun as his body (*dinakaravapus*). The Paradise of Amitābha is closely connected with the town of Varuṇa in the West, the city of the sunset, which is usually called Sukhā (Max Müller, *SBE* xlix. p. 22). It may also have some connexion with the city of Kusāvatī, where the 'great King of Glory' reigns (*Mahāsudassanasutta*, *SBE* xi. p. 247).

* The present writer thinks that M. Kern gives a perfect explanation of the nature of Avalokiteśvara, who is a Buddhist Śiva in visible form, while Amitābha is the Śiva Brahman. The former is characterized by the 'measured' light of the sun and the moon, the latter is ethereal and infinite light (*amita*). The Battambang inscription is very clear. But the present writer thinks that before becoming Śiva, Avalokiteśvara was a Bodhisattva, and, as such, was named Avalokita.

† 'Lord of the earth,' one of Śiva's names, a 'dhyānibuddha' in the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa*; according to Waddell, 'a common title for Mañjuśrī' (*JRAS*, 1894, p. 55).

‡ Lunar names (*chandra*) are frequent among the Bodhisattvas (cf. *Mahāvyutpatti*, 23).

§ *e.g. Bodhicharyāvatāra* (ch. ii. 1, 48). In *Mahāvyutpatti* (published A.D. 816–838) 23, we find the following order: Avalokiteśvara, Maitreya, Ākāśagarbha, Samantabhadra, Vajrapāṇi, Mañjuśrīkumārabhūta, Sarvanīvaraṇaviṣkambhin, Kṣitigarbha, Mahāsthāmaprāpta, Ratnaketu, Ratnapāṇi, etc. It must be observed that Ratnapāṇi (a future so-called Dhyānibodhisattva) is not the first of the Bodhisattvas 'beginning with Ratna,' and also that Mañjuśrī holds quite a subordinate place. Cf. *Dharmasaṅgraha*, xii., where among the eight Bodhisattvas there is no mention of Avalokita.

placed in you.* Avalokita is a Great Bodhisattva, but he is not the only one, nor is he unquestionably the first.

It is probably this stage in the history of Avalokita that is represented in the very old reliefs, where a 'Lotus-bearer' Padmapāṇi (afterwards the equivalent of Avalokita) appears with four or seven other Bodhisattvas, surrounding a Buddha or below a Buddha.†

There is reason to believe that Maitreya (the future Buddha), for example, whose doctrinal position is better established, must originally have taken precedence of him,‡ and there are noteworthy and well-authenticated writings, such as the Sanskrit-Tibetan Lexicon (*Mahāvyutpatti*) and the Chinese records, which lead us to believe that Maitreya was able to maintain his position. In any case, it must be noticed that the rôle of 'Good Bodhisattva,' helpful and divine, the very noble (*paramārya*), the giver of security (*abhayanduda*), etc., was divided among Kṣitigarbha and his companions, before it became the more or less exclusive designation of Avalokita.§ Now it must be borne in mind that the preceding remarks are very hypothetical; for, from the dawn of the Christian era, in certain circles at least, Avalokita became an important personage and a jealous god.

5. *Lotus of the True Law, Sukhāvatīvyūha, Amitāyurdhyānasūtra.*—(*a*) Avalokita is not the protagonist of the *Lotus*, but there is a whole chapter on his *ἀριστεία*, his 'gesta,' in Skr. his *māhātmya*.‖ He is far superior to the other Great Bodhisattvas (Akṣayamatī, etc.), who along with him listen to Śākyamuni, with the single exception of Mañjuśrī, who is probably his equal. He is the 'saviour'; it is better to think of him than to do honour to thousands of Buddhas. He assumes the form¶ of Buddha, Bodhisattva, Maheśvara, Kuvera, Vajrapāṇi,** as the case may be, the more easily to fulfil his task of mercy. Akṣayamati ('undecaying intelligence') presents him with flowers; he divides them between Śākya and the stūpa of an 'extinct' Buddha. According to the versified text, his real dwelling-place is in the 'Sukhākara,' the paradise of Amitābha, where he sits sometimes on the right and sometimes on the left of Buddha.

(*b*) The *Sukhāvatī* and the *Amitāyurdhyānasūtra*†† supply us with a very fine theology of Amitābha and Avalokita, a theology which has the twofold distinction of being almost orthodox, while seeking to present a rational account of all the exaggerations of *bhakti*, or devotion.

Amitābha or Lokanātha was in ancient times a *bhikṣu* called Dharmākara,† 'mine of the law'; it is now ten ages (*kalpas*) since he became Buddha, and it will be a very long time before he is extinct. In principle all the Buddhas are equal; they possess the same intrinsic perfections, the same knowledge.‡ But it is very probable that they are differentiated in the exercise of their Buddhahood, according to the vow that they have made. Now Dharmākara, the future Amitābha, under the Buddha Lokeśvararāja,§ vowed that, when he reached Buddhahood, he would have a 'Buddha field,' wondrously blessed, the happy land (*Sukhāvatī*),‖ and that is why there flock to him from all the 'Buddha fields' the beings appointed to *nirvāṇa*, either as future arhats or as Buddhas.¶ It is with Amitābha that those who are guilty but possess the promise and potency of deliverance spend their period of probation in lotus-flowers; with him also the Bodhisattvas become prepared for their last birth, by having good opportunities of going to visit, to honour, and to listen to the Buddhas of all the worlds.** After this period these Bodhisattvas will become Buddhas, and will have in their turn spheres of their own. As regards Avalokita, it is at the end of our age that he will appear as the thousandth and last Buddha of the age.††

The Bodhisattvas are not equal among themselves. In the heaven of Amitābha there are two, Avalokita and Mahāsthāmaprāpta,‡‡ almost as great and luminous as Buddha, who sit on thrones equal to his. Avalokita is the more majestic; this is due to his vow to bring all beings, without exception, into the 'happy land.' And while his glorious body illumines a great many worlds, he traverses them all in different forms, sometimes real and sometimes magical; like Amitābha himself, he has parts of himself incarnated here and there; he never forgets for a moment his rôle as provider of the Sukhāvatī. And it is he, rather

* See *Śikṣās*, p. 286; *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, p. 314.

† See Grünwedel, *Buddh. Art in India*, pp. 196, 201 ff.

‡ Maitreya is the only Bodhisattva acknowledged in the Little Vehicle. He is the second in *Mahāvyutpatti*, 23, the first in *Dharmasaṅgraha*, xii; and plays the chief part in the foundation of the Great Vehicle. Grünwedel (*Buddhistische Kunst*) has some hesitation in recognizing Avalokita in the Gāndhāra sculptures, and is certain only of the identification of Maitreya (*Buddh. Art in India*, p. 192 n.). Nevertheless, the view which, following his example, we express on the chronological and dogmatic priority of Maitreya is supported not only by the fact that Maitreya alone is recognized by the Little Vehicle (Beal, *Buddhist Records*, ii. 61), but also by certain statements of the Chinese pilgrims, who were more interested in the heaven of Maitreya than in that of Amitābha, more interested in the coming of Maitreya than in the present living Avalokita (see especially *ib.* ii. 223, i. 227).

§ More or less exclusive, according to Wassilieff, as is proved by the collections of the one hundred and eight names, of divinities in Kandjur, *Rgyu*, xiv.: Avalokita, Maitreya, Ākāśagarbha (Khagarbha), Samantabhadra, Vajrapāṇi, Mañjuśrī, Sarvanivaraṇaviṣkambhin and Kṣitigarbha (Wass., 175), the eight Bodhisattvas of the *Dharmasaṅgraha*, with the addition of Avalokita and the omission of Gaganagañja.

‖ See the translations of Burnouf and Kern. The *Māhātmya* forms ch. xxv. of the Chinese edition. In China it is one of the official texts of the religion of Avalokita (see I-tsing, in Takakusu, 162; Beal's tr., *Catena*, p. 389).

¶ The *Śikṣās* ascribes to every Bodhisattva this power of transformation. Even the wish of all the Bodhisattvas to become food and drink (*pānabhojana*) in times of famine is taken literally.

** The association of Vajrapāṇi with divinities who are anything but Buddhist is worthy of note. In the hundred and eight names of Tārā (ed. de Blonay) Vajrapāṇi begs for mystical recipes from Avalokita. See E. Senart, *Congrès d'Alger*, 'Vajrapāṇi'; and below, p. 259ᵇ n. ‖.

* *Sukhāvatīvyūha* (Chinese tr. 147–186), in two redactions, edited by Max Müller, *Anecd. Oxoniensia*, and also in fac-simile Musée Guimet, II., translated in *SBE* xlix, with the *Amitāyus*, the Skr. original of which seems to be lost (translated into Chinese in 424). On this text cf. also *JBTS*, 1894, 2, 1.

† On the human antecedents of Amita and Avalokita, cf. also Rémusat, *Fo-kous-ki*.

‡ There are two things which have no limit, the brilliance of Amitābha and the *prajñāpratibhāna* of every Buddha. The light of Amitābha illumines all the fields of Buddha, owing to the 'special vow' of this Buddha to lighten his own field and an infinite number of other fields. Although Amitābha is praised, glorified, and preached by all the Buddhas, he cannot lay claim to any kind of monarchy. A fairly just idea of the system may be formed by regarding the Buddhas as saints (in the Roman Catholic sense of the word), who are all saints for the same reason, but among whom piety distinguishes more or less powerful saints. Cf. *Mahāvastu*, iii. 330. 15.

§ A name of Avalokita.

‖ More refined in charity is the wish expressed in *Karuṇapuṇḍarika* 'to have a Buddha field' inhabited by inferior beings overwhelmed by calamities, in order to have a more worthy object of pity.

¶ In the kingdom of Amitābha all the Bodhisattvas are in their last birth, and live there without limit, owing to their special wish (*praṇidhānaviśeṣa*) to save others. It is noteworthy that our text admits the existence of arhats, saints according to the Little Vehicle, *i.e.* beings appointed to attain to *nirvāṇa* without passing through the stage of Buddhahood. The Great Vehicle believes that all beings will become Buddhas, but this was not the belief of Hiuen Tsiang.

** They do not even have to move in order to worship and listen to the Buddhas of all the worlds.

†† Schmidt, *Über die tausend Buddhas* (p. 106); and Rémusat, *Cosmogonie, Mélanges Posthumes*.

‡‡ In modern (Tibetan) pictures of the Sukhāvatī, Vajrapāṇi takes the place of Mahāsthāma (Foucher, *Catalogue*, p. 33). The Japanese representation of the Sukhāvatī is nearer the original text. Maitreya, Avalokita, and Mahāsthāma often have stūpas on their heads (Grünwedel, *Buddh. Kunst*, p. 193 and fig. 83).

chan Amitābha himself, who is the lord of the Sukhāvatī.*

This ostentatious and short-sighted glorification of Amitābha and Avalokita corresponds, in our opinion, to a doctrine of salvation, very different from the ordinary doctrine of the Great Vehicle. According to the Little Vehicle, the Buddhas were only instructors; in the 'rationalist' Great Vehicle they have become models, and the Bodhisattvas appear as friends, counsellors, protectors;† their presence does not in any way lessen the necessity for personal effort. In the Sukhāvatī, Amitābha and Avalokita save the faithful almost in spite of themselves, as the cat saves her young by taking them in her mouth (a Kraiṣnavite metaphor). There is, however, one reservation: beings guilty of 'mortal sins' are excluded from the Sukhāvatī. The *Amitāyurdhyāna* does away with this restriction: the parricide is saved if he pronounces the name of Amita. In a word, our theologians, as well as those of the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, have to distinguish between ordinary people who are liable to hell, etc., and devotees who are naturally exempt.

(*c*) It is to this period that the iconographic monuments seem to belong, about which the Chinese pilgrims had given us their testimony, before the archæologists examined them; and we are quite justified in referring to them here, as the *Amitāyurdhyāna* speaks of statues in which the characteristics of the god are reproduced. We find isolated statues of Avalokita, among which the giant statues deserve mention, and groups in which he is facing Maitreya, Tārā, and Mañjuśrī, and probably also Mahāsthāma—wonderful statues, recurring throughout the whole Buddhist world from the extreme North-West to Ceylon.‡ They give us a sculptured representation of the texts, which describe in detail the attitude, colour, and qualities of the gods. The *Amitāyurdhyānasūtra* places a 'magical' Buddha, twenty-five leagues high, on the head of the glorious body of Avalokita, seated on the left of Amitābha; this is clearly represented in the icons (to which attention has already been drawn by Hiuen Tsiang), where Avalokita wears in his head-dress a seated statue of a Buddha, who, at a very early date, if not from the very beginning, was identified with Amitābha.§

The Chinese pilgrims seem to have recognized a characteristic of the Great Vehicle in the fact that worship was bestowed on the Bodhisattvas, Mañjuśrī and Avalokita, and on the Prajñā. Hiuen Tsiang mentions that a statue of Maitreya was worshipped in a district which is quite 'hīnayānistic' (*Buddh. Records*, ii. 61)—the same thing happened with the statues of Avalokita in Ceylon—but he tells the curious story of Guṇaprabha, who, when he was transferred to the heaven of Maitreya, refused to worship him, because an 'ordained bhikṣu' is superior to a Bodhisattva (i. 192).‖

6. Avalokita rises still higher in the *Kāraṇḍavyūha** and in the *Śūraṅgama*;† but here the theology seems to be extremely involved; we have now to deal not with a sūtra, but with Purāṇic literature. On the other hand, the iconography and the manuals on incantation demonstrate that, on account of the above-described notion of the providential polymorphism of Avalokita, that god is identified with all the Hindu deities, both mild and cruel. Avalokita is a Buddhist Śiva, an ascetic and a magician.

(*a*) In some of its features the *Kāraṇḍavyūha*‡ recalls the *Lotus* and the *Amitāyurdhyāna*: Avalokita learns the law from Amitābha, he comes to worship Śākyamuni, and brings him flowers and Amitābha's compliments; he is therefore in some way inferior to the Buddhas. But, on the other hand, he is far superior to the Buddhas and also to Samantabhadra: no Buddha possesses clairvoyance (*pratibhāna*) equal to his, all the Buddhas together could not estimate his worth. No other being besides him has a marvellous body, which the Buddhas have difficulty in seeing, and each pore of which contains thousands of Buddhas, saints of all kinds, and entire worlds. And it is from the body of Avalokita (Foucher, *Cat.* p. 25), regarded from another point of view, that the inferior gods issue: the sun and the moon come out of his eyes;§ Maheśvara, who will be called Mahādeva, and receives the promise of Buddhahood, comes from his forehead; Brahmā from his shoulder, etc. We have said that, in addition to being demiurge, Avalokita is also a saviour; from his fingers flow rivers which cool the hells and feed the *pretas* ('ghosts'); he terrifies all the demons and puts Vajrapāṇi to flight.‖

There is no need for astonishment at this extraordinary mastery over men and things. Avalokita is the great yogin, the great magician (*vidyādhipati, anekamantraśatāvakīrṇa*); he is in possession of the formulæ (in which he glories in the *Amitāyurdhyāna*); but, above all, he possesses the only, the true, formula *ōṁ maṇi padme hūṁ*.¶

* He is called Sukhāvatīśvara (*Trikāṇḍaśeṣa*).

† See the 'Code du Mahāyāna en Chine,' where Avalokita does not play any part at all (J. J. M. de Groot, p. 98).

‡ The information of the Buddhist pilgrims on this point is confirmed and explained by the miniatures published by M. Foucher. The last inscription devoted to Avalokita is dated 1229 (Oudh). On Avalokita in Ceylon, cf. Foucher, *Icon.* 110; Beal, *Buddhist Records*, ii. 247; *JRAS*, 1900, p. 42. Some authors think that Mount Potala, to the east of the Malay Mountains, is perhaps the original home of Avalokita. It is well known that this Potala has been transported to China and to Tibet (*Tāranātha*, 144, 203; Foucher, *Icon.*, 28; Waddell, *Lhasa*, 1905, pp. 364, 388).

§ The relation between 'Dhyānibuddhas' and their Bodhisattvas is explained in the art. Ādibuddha. Wassilieff mentions Vairochana as the father of Avalokita. Cf. Grünwedel, *Buddh. Art in India*, p. 196 *f.*

‖ For a study of this problem the reader is referred to art. Mahāyāna. To avoid any misunderstanding, let us merely point out that the *Avalokitavrata* and the *Bhadracharīpraṇidhāna* (Nanjio, 1142), which corresponds closely to it, are looked upon as sacred texts by the Sautrāntikas, who are supposed to belong to the Little Vehicle.

* See the Calcutta edition, 1873; Csoma-Feer, p. 246; Hodgson, *Extracts*; the summary of Rajendralāla (*Buddh. Lit.* pp. 95, 101); the masterly exposition of Burnouf (*Introd.* p. 221). The Tibetan translation probably belongs to A.D. 616 (Schlagintweit, p. 84; Rockhill, p. 212), but the original is supposed to have been in existence from the time of the mythical king Lha-tho-tho-ri (A.D. 427); see Grünwedel, *Myth.* 451, 247. On the *Maṇi-bka-hbum*, 'the hundred thousand precious commandments,' a glorification of Avalokita, which is wrongly supposed to belong to this time, see Rockhill, 212, and Schlagintweit, 84. For the history of the Rākṣasīs, cf. Beal, *Buddhist Records*, ii. 241.

† Ch. vi. See Beal, *Catena*, 39. 284; Nanjio, 399 (tr. A.D. 384–417); Wass., 175; Csoma-Feer, 249; and the quotations from the *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*. Enumerating the innumerable, we distinguish 32 manifestations of the god, 14 cases in which he provides safety, etc. For the worship of Avalokita and Amitābha the reader is referred also to the Chinese sources.

‡ Śākyamuni speaks to Maitreya, Sarvanīvaraṇaviṣkambhin and Ratnapāṇi. Avalokita receives 61 designations. Are the lists of 108 names later?

§ *Śūryāvalokanakara* (see Foucher, *loc. cit.*); cf. the name Avalokita.

‖ *Vajrapāṇividrāvaṇakara*. In the *Bodhicharyāvatāra*, Vajrapāṇi is *par excellence* the demon-dispeller, and the charitable visitor of hells; but from most ancient times Avalokita too has been engaged in the salvation of infernal beings.

¶ It is this famous formula that is in view in the *Divyāvadāna* (foot of p. 613) which makes no mention of Avalokita. Śākyamuni imparts it to Ānanda; it was preached by the six Buddhas, it is known to Śakra, Indra, etc.; it constitutes a talisman of the first rank (see Burnouf, *Introd.* p. 541; Kern, *Gesch.* i. 400). The Tibetans claim that it fell down to them from heaven about A.D. 400. So far as the present writer knows, it is neither mentioned nor contemplated in Nanjio, No. 326 (tr. A.D. 420), which contains two *dhāraṇīs* and two *bījas*. A great deal has been written about the 'formula of six syllables.' We may mention Klaproth, *JA*, March 1831; Rémusat, *Mélanges*, p. 99, *Fo-koue-ki*, p. 118; Schlagintweit, pp. 54 and 55; Grünwedel, *Lamaism*, p. 82.

There is no doubt that the tantrik literature gives it an obscene interpretation. *Maṇi* and *padme* in this jargon have a very distinct value. On the other hand, Rémusat's cosmological explanation does not seem altogether improbable. See F. W. Thomas, *JRAS*, 1906, p. 464.

Is there a Buddha who possesses this 'hexasyllabic (*ṣaḍakṣarī*) knowledge (*vidyā*)'? No. Is there a being who possesses it? No. It belongs to Avalokita alone, and he reveals it to whomsoever he pleases. This magical omnipotence has its other side: whoever knows the formula does away with the god, whose 'heart,' *i.e.* 'mystery,' the formula is, and in his way is another Avalokita.*

Further, the single word 'Adored one' (*vandita*) is a sufficient description of him. He is the refuge, Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha all in one. Whosoever pronounces or traces on his body the magical syllables receives a body which participates in the body of the thunderbolt (*vajrakāyaśarīra*), the apex of knowledge of the Buddhas (*Tathāgata-jñānakoṭi*), and becomes like a *dhātustūpa*, a stūpa with relics.†

(*b*) Iconography and the manuals of incantation,‡ which illustrate and supplement each other in a marvellous way, prove that this deification of Avalokita is not merely verbal, but that it is in close connexion with worship and daily idolatry.§ All the Tibetan forms of Avalokita are replicas of the Hindu cults, which are attested as early as the 10th and 11th cents., but are undoubtedly much more ancient. In fact, our literary evidences (*sādhanas*) prove that the foreigner had had an influence on the mother-country, for there are representations of Avalokita, as well as of other gods, after the fashion of Udyāna, of China and other places.

It would be impossible to describe the whole iconography of Avalokita; that task has quite recently been performed extremely well.‖ We shall merely notice a few characteristic features.

Avalokita is polymorphous; but, in many cases and until the more degenerate times, he retains the human form, two arms and a head. There is usually on his head a small figure of the Jina Amitābha.¶ In one hand he bears the lotus (*padma*),** with the other he makes the gesture of the 'bestower of favour,' and a ghost (*preta*) is represented holding up its thin lips towards the ambrosia which flows from his fingers. As satellites Avalokita has Tārā (sometimes in two forms, calm and angry), Hayagrīva ('horse-necked'), the guardian of the 30,500,000 magical formulæ, and Sudhana, who is also a friend of Maitreya. When Avalokita has four arms, two of them are joined in *añjali* (the hands forming a cup) as a sign of respect; the other two hold the lotus and the rosary. But the ascetic attributes are the antelope's skin and the water-pot. And then, when the god receives the names of Śiva, Amoghapāśa, Hālāhala, Nīlakaṇṭha, Padmanarteśvara, etc., his arms, his faces, and his eyes become multiplied, and he carries tridents encircled with serpents, skulls filled with flowers, bows, arrows, etc.

Among the curious figures, besides those which clearly show the identification with Śiva, the following are noteworthy: (1) the figure of Siṁhanāda ('lion's cry'). This was the name given to the solemn declarations of Śākyamuni; Mañjuśrī, who in Buddhism is the personification of wisdom, is mounted on a lion. Avalokita becomes confused with Mañjuśrī, is seated on the lion, carries the book and the sword of Mañjuśrī, but all the time retains his own attributes as well. (2) The figure with the thousand arms, in which the arms, arranged in the form of a peacock's tail, give a graphic representation of the metaphor;* this is a sculptured interpretation of the universality of the god. (3) The figure with eleven heads (three, three, three, one, one, the last one being the head of Amitābha) and a thousand arms is the translation, as it were, of his former name Samantamukha.† It corresponds to a legend which shows very clearly the character of Avalokita: 'May my head split asunder,' the god had said, 'if I fail in my vow to save beings!'—an old Buddhist expression. As a matter of fact, he did give way for an instant to discouragement, on seeing the inefficacy of his efforts; his head split into a thousand pieces, and Amitābha put it together again. There are several forms of this story, in which the old is mixed with the new.

We shall also quote a modern Nepalese inscription which gives a good account of the dignity and the physiognomy of our hero: 'The chiefs of the Yogins call him the King of the Fishes (*Matsyendra*), the devotees of the female deities (*śāktas*) call him *Śakti*, the Buddhists call him *Lokeśvara*. All honour to this being, whose true form is Brahman.'‡ This identification of Avalokita with the Śakti *par excellence*, *i.e.* with the personification of the cosmic female energy, shows, in a more striking way than the coupling of the god with the twenty-one Tāras, § that the Chinese transformation of Avalokita into a woman had probably been already effected in India.‖

7. We need not say very much about the Tibetan doctrine of incarnations, according to which all

* This magician (*māyāvin*) with eleven heads—this shows the best and truest form of his polymorphism—is incomprehensible. He appears and disappears like a meteor (*jvalann ivāgnipiṇḍaḥ*). He has a hundred thousand arms and a hundred thousand times ten million eyes. He exists in the past, the present, and the future (*trikāla*). He was at work when Śākyamuni was merely a worshipper. There is no limit put upon his activity except when all beings have entered nirvāṇa. The Buddhas, in fact, are only some of the saints whom he has 'matured,' and who owe everything to him; there is deliverance only in the hexasyllabic formula.

† Let us recall the fact that the *Kāraṇḍavyūha* in verse adds some details in the 'Ādibuddhistic' sense (see art. ĀDIBUDDHA). But note that there is nothing to indicate the generation of Avalokita by Amitābha (in the *Maṇi-bka-ḥbum*, Avalokita is born from a white ray from Amitābha's left eye, or he issues from a lotus as a young man of sixteen years of age); nor is there any trace to be found of the system of the 'Dhyāni-buddhas' and their 'sons'; Vajrapāṇi is a malevolent being, Ratnapāṇi is a personage of secondary rank. Avalokita is nowhere, so far as we can see, called Padmapāṇi.

‡ The *bīja* of Avalokita seems always to be *hrīḥ*; his *mantra* is the hexasyllabic formula (see the beautiful plate, Schlagintweit, p. 55), but sometimes we find *oṁ vajradharma hrīḥ*.

§ There are representations of Avalokita after the style of the *Kāraṇḍavyūha* and of the *Māyājālābhisambodhi*.

‖ Foucher, *Iconographie*, i. and ii.

¶ *Trikāṇḍaśeṣa*, which gets its information from Vyāḍi (Vindhyavāsin ?) gives the names Lokeśvara, Amitābhaśekhara, Padmapāṇi, and also Khasarpana, Kāraṇḍavyūha, Sukhāvatiśvara. Tārā is the daughter of Avalokita.

** Already at Sāñchi the 'lotus' is represented in the hand of a great many personages, as an offering intended for Buddha. Those who carry lotuses are not all Avalokitas, for Maitreya is among them (see Grünwedel, *Buddh. Kunst*, p. 167). It is worthy of notice that neither the *Lotus of the True Law* nor the *Sukhāvatī* nor the *Amitāyus* nor the *Kāraṇḍa* seems to know Padmapāṇi.

* 'With an eye in the palm of each hand' (Sandberg, *Colloquial Tibetan*, p. 197). Sometimes *only* sixty-six arms are represented (Foucher, *Catal.* 15).

† See Schlagintweit, p. 54; Schmidt, *Forschungen*, p. 202 (the head is broken into ten pieces). This number *eleven* recalls the eleven Rudras, and shows us Avalokita as a disguised Śiva. [Being Vāgiśvara, he is none the less Brahmā when he becomes Śiva.] It may be useful to mention that the *Avalokitaekadaśamukhadhāraṇīs* (Nanjio, 327, 328) were translated into Chinese in 557–581. Among the other *Samantao* (*Mahāvyutpatti*, 23, 31, 36, 38, 63) the most famous is Samantabhadra (*Lotus*, xxvi.; Kern, p. 437, note), a double of Śiva, and the only one of the 'Dhyānibodhisattvas' who is not a *pāṇi* (*vajra*, *ratna*, *padma*, *viśvapāṇi*).

‡ Inscription dated 792; see *Ind. Antiquary*, ix. 192, Kern, *Vermenging*, p. 14; on Matsyendra, see Wilson, ii. 80, and i. 214; Kern, *op. cit.*, 42, and Lévi, *Népal*, i. 349 ff. He belongs to the mysterious line of 'Siddhas,' masters of the Haṭhayoga, civilizers (?) of Nepal. Sometimes he is the son of Ādinātha, and is placed five spiritual generations previous to Gorakhnāth; sometimes he is Gorakhnāth's disciple. There may be concealed under his name a historical personage identified with Abjapāṇi = Padmapāṇi. But although the mythical explanation finds very little favour, euhemerism in such a subject seems almost chimerical. An important iconographic detail is that Avalokita is white, except in Nepal, where he is red (Foucher, *Cat.* 15, etc.).

§ *JBTS*, 1894, 2. 1.

‖ On the Chinese Avalokita, see Eitel, *Handbook*, p. 23.

the monastic dignitaries are *nirmāṇas* (sprul-pa = khoubilgan) of the chief deities; it will be sufficient to refer the reader to the article LĀMAISM and to the sources. We shall merely say that Avalokiteśvara, the patron of the Tibetan Church, is incarnated in the person of the Great Lāma (rgyal-ba ryga-mtsho), while Amitābha dwells in the Great Pandit (Pan-chen) of the rival monastery. Waddell, though without adequately setting forth his proofs, maintains that the theory is a recent invention (1640). There is no doubt that Lāmaic hierarchy is peculiarly Tibetan; but it is quite as certain that many Hindu Siddhas or Yogins have, by their magic, succeeded in identifying themselves with gods.

LITERATURE.—Detailed bibliography in Burgess, *Arch. Survey of Western India*, No. 5 (1883), p. 14, and Grünwedel, *Mythologie*, 1900, notes 29.

ORIGINAL SOURCES.—Lexicons; Mahāvyutpatti, Dharmasaṅgraha, Trikāṇḍaśeṣa, Saddharmapuṇḍarika, Sukhāvatīvyūha, Amitāyurdhyānasūtra, Bodhicharyāvatāra, Kāraṇḍavyūha.

TIBETAN SOURCES.—Csoma-Feer, *AMG* ii. 330; Sarat Chandra Das, *Dictionary*, p. 806, *JASB* (1882) ii. 126.

CHINESE SOURCES.—Nanjio, *Catalogue*, 1883, Nos. 327 ff.; Beal, *Catena*, 1878 (Śūraṅgama); the Buddhist pilgrims.

Besides the general works of Hodgson, Burnouf, Wassilieff, Kern, Köppen, Schlagintweit, Pander, Waddell, and Grünwedel, the reader is referred to Wilson, *Select Works*, i. 213, ii. 1–39, *Bauddha Tracts from Nepal*, 1862; Kern, *Inscrip. uit Battambang*, Amsterdam, 1899, *Vermenging van Çivaisme*, 1888; Foucher, *Iconographie*, i., 1899, and ii., 1905; Blonay, *Déesse Tārā*, 1895; Grünwedel-Burgess, *Buddh. Art in India*[2], 1901; Waddell, 'The Indian Cult of Avalokita,' *JRAS*, 1894, 51–89, *Gazetteer of Sikhim*, 1893, p. 250; specially on Iconography, Burgess, *Arch. Surv. Rep. of Western India*, No. 9, Bombay, 1879, and No. 5, 1883; Pander, *Panthéon des Tschangtscha Hutuktu*, Berlin, 1890.

L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

AVARICE.—Avarice may be defined as an absorbing passion for earthly possessions and a selfish gratification in their retention. It includes both the getting and the keeping of wealth. In the getting the avaricious man is tempted to put aside all considerations that stand between him and his object, and in the retention he looks less to the beneficial use to which any possession can be put than to his own luxury in possessing it. In ordinary language, avarice is largely restricted to this second feature, while the passionate desire that begets the avaricious character is described as covetousness (wh. see). Avarice is thus applied more frequently to parsimony in the storing of wealth, and covetousness to rapacity in seeking after wealth. Covetousness stirs up the discontented to clutch at what other people have; avarice begets the miser who hoards greedily all that he has.

The avaricious mind seems almost to make money or possessions ends in themselves, and yet it may be doubted whether money is not always thought of as a means of gratifying the love of pleasure or the love of power in some of their many forms. The miser gloats over his gold, but even in his most debased state he probably sees in it the possibility of acquiring ease or satisfying ambition. He probably pictures in his imagination the splendour with which he might surround himself, the security he has against poverty, or the greatness of the one who will inherit all as his heir. Certainly, at first, avarice leads men to amass money because of the command it gives over the conveniences and luxuries of life, and because of its efficacy as an instrument of ambition (cf. Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*[2], 1886, ii. 172).

Avarice springs, therefore, from two of the strongest human passions, the love of pleasure and the love of power; although it may continue even when pleasure and power seem no longer likely to be gratified. In its last stage it becomes repellent to all, as its selfish absorption reveals the degradation and folly of the mammon-worshipper.

The degradation of avarice is graphically described by Dante, who represents the miser as cleaving to the dust, in *Purgatory* (Longfellow's tr. xix. 120 ff.)—

> 'Even as our eye did not uplift itself
> Aloft, being fastened upon earthly things,
> So justice here has merged it in the earth.'

A similar conception is found in Milton's description of Mammon (*Par. Lost*, i. 680 ff.), whose looks and thoughts even in heaven were always downward bent—

> 'admiring more
> The riches of heav'n's pavement, trodden gold,
> Than aught, divine or holy, else enjoy'd,
> In vision beatific.'

Cf. also Bunyan's account of the man with the muck-rake, who was so intent upon the things of earth that he had no eye for the crown of glory. It is little wonder that the folly of the miser in giving up his life to the hoarding of earthly possessions is keenly felt by the noblest writers. Dante (*Inferno*, vii. 64) expresses the thought of all spiritual minds when he depicts the ignorance and folly of avarice—

> 'For all the gold that is beneath the moon,
> Or ever has been, of these weary souls
> Could never make a single one repose.'

The miser is represented frequently in literature, as in Molière's *L'Avare* and in Plautus's *Aulularia*, on which Molière's play was founded. The unhappiness of the avaricious is well summed up in the closing words of Euclio, the miser in the *Aulularia*: 'Nec noctu, nec diu, quietus unquam eram: nunc dormiam.' He has bestowed his treasure upon his son-in-law, and has thus divested himself of all future cares. *Now* he hopes to sleep quietly, while formerly he had no rest by day or night.

The petty meannesses of the miser are illustrated in the *Characters* of Theophrastus (ed. Ussing): 'If he gives a dinner, he does not serve up as much food as is necessary. . . . When sent out . . . on a public commission, he leaves the provisions for the journey to his family, and lives at the expense of his fellow-travellers. . . . If one of his friends is to have a wedding, or is about to have his daughter married, he speedily undertakes a journey to spare the marriage present.'

Restraints may be put upon avarice by the laws of a country. Thus, certain methods of increasing wealth may be declared illegal. Stealing, fraudulent practices in trade, adulteration to make extra profit, the exaction of exorbitant interest, may all be declared punishable offences. Law may also deal with the misuse of wealth, *e.g.* money may not be hoarded by any one in such a way that his functions as a citizen are not performed. A man is not allowed to be dependent on the State for support while he has money at his command. A father is bound to use his wealth to support his children. Children are bound to support their parents. In these and other ways law may put limits to the right of a citizen to hoard possessions.

A further extension of these social restraints is bound up with all theories of socialism or communism. Under these all private capital would be almost, if not altogether, abolished. Rent might still be paid to the community, but interest would cease. Each individual would be remunerated in proportion to the services he had rendered. Thus socialism would seek, by abolishing the present system of competing capitalists, served by competitive wage-labour, to strike at the system that encourages the avaricious nature.

In the individual life an effort may be made to check avarice by one great act, as by the vow of poverty, depriving the subject of all personal interest in property and all power over it. This vow, along with the vow of chastity and obedience, was adopted by the Dominicans and Franciscans to complete the irrevocable surrender of those who entered the religious state.

For the most part avarice has been restrained by the application of general ethical and Christian truths to the personal life, and in particular to the earning, saving, and spending of wealth. Christianity teaches that selfishness is a deadly sin which must give place to a supreme love for God, and to the love of neighbour as well as self. Wealth is to be looked upon not as an end in itself, but only as a means towards attaining higher ends in life. When a man earns money, he should not be taken possession of by worldly things, but possess them as if he possessed them not. He should not hoard wealth uselessly in fear of want, for he should believe that, if he seeks first the kingdom of God, all things needful for life will be added by God.

In using wealth, he is not to allow himself to be dominated by the selfish love of pleasure or of power, but, regarding himself as a steward of God, he is to use it as a means of procuring a free and independent human existence and development for himself and those around him.

LITERATURE.—Hume, *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary*, ed. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, London, 1875; Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*[2], London, 1886; Stalker, *Seven Deadly Sins*, London, 1901; Mozley, *University Sermons*[2], London, 1876; Fowler and Wilson, *Principles of Morals*, Oxford, 1894; Hannay, *Spirit and Origin of Christian Monasticism*, London, 1903.

D. MACRAE TOD.

AVERROËS, AVERROISM.—1. Life.—'Averroës' is a corruption of the Arabic name Ibn Rushd. Abu 'l-Walid Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Rushd was born at Cordova in the year A.H. 520 (A.D. 1126), of a family of standing. His grandfather, who was kādi of Cordova, wrote some important works on law. His father also, and afterwards Averroës himself, held the post of kādi. He studied law in his native town, and medicine under the guidance of Abū Jafar Hārūn of Truxillo. He enjoyed the friendship of Ibn Zuhr, a famous physician, and the acquaintance of the celebrated theosophist Ibn 'Arabī. In 548 we find him at Marrakesh (Morocco), being presented by Ibn Ṭufail to the Amir of the Faithful, the Almohad Abū Ya'qūb Yusūf. His account of this introduction has been communicated as follows:

'When I came into the presence of the Amir of the Faithful,' he says, 'I found him alone with Ibn Ṭufail, who began to eulogize me. . . . After asking my own, my father's, and my family name, the Amir opened the conversation with the question: "What is the opinion of philosophers on the sky? Is it an eternal substance, or did it have a beginning?" A sudden fear seized me, and rendered me speechless.' The Amir, however, soon put him at ease by himself treating the question with a knowledge unlooked for in a prince, and sent him away laden with presents.

It was Ibn Ṭufail too who advised Averroës to write a commentary on Aristotle. He told him that the Amir often complained about the obscurity of the Greek philosophers, and of the translations then existing, and said that he ought to undertake the explaining and arranging of them. There is a passage in Ibn Ṭufail's philosophical romance, *Ḥay ben Yaḳẓān*, that is supposed to be an allusion to Averroës, who was just then beginning to write.

In A.H. 565 Averroës was appointed a kādi at Seville, and, about 567, was installed at Cordova. From this time onwards he devoted himself to the composition of his greatest works, although he felt burdened all the time with public duties. He travelled a great deal. In 574 he was at Marrakesh, in 575 at Seville, and in 578 back again at Marrakesh, where Yusūf appointed him his chief physician, a post that had been held by Ibn Ṭufail. When Yusūf sent him back to Cordova, he bore the title of 'Grand Kādi.'

Averroës continued in favour during the beginning of the reign of Ya'qūb al-Mansūr, Yusūf's successor; then he fell into disgrace. This was the result of the opposition his writings encountered from the theologians, and it bears witness to the influence that his philosophy was beginning to exercise. They accused him of various heresies (see below, § 3); and even went the length of trying to make him pass for a Jew. After undergoing an examination on the subject of his orthodoxy, he was banished to Lucena, near Cordova. The Amir also ordered (*c.* 1195 A.D.) all the works of the philosophers to be burned except treatises on Medicine, Arithmetic, and elementary Astronomy.

These decrees were afterwards reversed, and Averroës was recalled to Marrakesh; but he did not long enjoy his return to favour, dying on the 9th of Safar, A.H. 595 (11th Dec. A.D. 1198). His tomb is at Marrakesh, outside the Tagazūt gate.

2. Works.—Averroës' great claim to glory lie in his being pre-eminently Aristotle's commentator. To this he owes his renown and popularity in the West in the Middle Ages. His philosophy proper has been fiercely attacked, and, in the present writer's opinion, often misunderstood. But the care with which he composed his commentaries, their compass, their abundance, and their ingenuity, have caused them to be used as a basis for the study of philosophy in schools.

In accordance with a custom which still prevails in Musalmān teaching, these commentaries are of three kinds: short, medium, and long. These three degrees correspond to the three years or three periods into which philosophical instruction was divided. It is in this way too that the Qur'ān or the *'aḳāid* ('articles of faith') is commented on in the universities of Islām, recourse being had to more and more comprehensive glosses, according to the progress of the pupils.

In Latin or Hebrew we have the three kinds of Averroistic commentaries for the *Second Analytics*, the *Physics*, the treatises on the *Sky* and the *Soul*, and the *Metaphysics*; but no long commentaries for the other works, and none at all for the *History of Animals*, and the *Politics*. In Arabic we have the medium commentaries on *Politics* and *Rhetoric*, a treatise on four books of Aristotle on *Logic*, and a translation of fragments of Alexander's commentary on *Metaphysics*. H. Derenbourg has brought into evidence the existence of an Arabic collection of short commentaries or compendiums (*jawāmi'*) in the library of the Escurial. This work has almost exactly the same contents as that mentioned by the author of the *History of the Almohads* (Fagnan's tr. p. 211).

Besides this great work, his commentaries, we have a somewhat important work on Polemics, the *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* ('Vanity of Vanities'), which was levelled against the theologians. It is in the Arabic text. There are also a few fragments in Arabic which are not so important. Among the works that Renan mentions as having been written by Averroës besides his commentaries, but which are perhaps not all clearly distinct from them, are: commentary on Plato's *Republic*, opinions on al-Fārābī's *Logic* and on his manner of comprehending Aristotle, discussions on a few of Avicenna's theories, commentary on Nicolaus's *Metaphysics*, treatises on the abstract intellect and its relation to man's, and a commentary on the Profession of Faith (*'Aḳīdah*) of the Mahdī Ibn Tūmart. Averroës was the author also of works on Jurisprudence, Astronomy, and Medicine. Of the last named, we possess the text of a treatise which, in the Middle Ages, enjoyed a somewhat wide-spread reputation, the *Kulliyāt* (*i.e.* 'Generalities').

3. Doctrine.—It is by no means certain that the Western writings which we possess on Averroës give us a very true idea of his doctrine. His philosophy was fiercely attacked by the theologians, who represented it in the light most favourable for their own ends. With the intention of pointing out the dangers that it presented to the faith, they forced assertions out of it, they drew overstrained inferences from it, they told whither, according to them, this doctrine led rather than what it really was. We know this method of procedure well from the work of al-Ghazālī entitled *Tahāfut* ('Destruction,' or 'Vanity of Philosophers'), where he applies it to al-Fārābī and Avicenna. This work has now been carefully studied. It is clear that al-Ghazālī reproaches 'philosophers,' not so much for explicitly professing anti-religious doctrines, as for holding opinions and hypotheses which are not likely to be useful for proving religious truth, but from which conclusions contrary to the faith would rather be

inferred. This does not mean that al-Fārābī and Avicenna did not seek sincerely to establish a philosophy compatible with dogma.

Now the same thing happened in the case of Averroës. He was opposed by theologians, not only by Musalmāns, but by Christians as well; and we see his system not from his own point of view, but through the distorting criticism of these theologians. Some of these authors are, indeed, more accessible than Averroës, whose ideas have to be sought either in the rare Arabic texts or in the Latin translations, whose style is very obscure and difficult.

It seems that even Renan, in spite of all his intelligence, his facility, and his perspicacity, has not absolutely guarded against this fundamental injustice; and too often, in his slightly wavering explanation of Averroës' philosophy, he presents not so much the authentic doctrine of Averroës as that which has been attributed to him. The following is, very briefly, Averroës' doctrine according to Renan:

> It had a very evolutionary character. Eternal matter, the evolution of the germ by its latent power, an undetermined God, the impersonality of the intelligence, the emersion and re-absorption of the individual, constitute its essential points. He further represents Averroës as a downright determinist, whose God does not recognize individuals, but can recognize only the general laws of the universe. He says, moreover, in several places that Averroës denies resurrection. Not firmly enough impressed with the great influence of Neo-Platonism in Islām—an influence brought into evidence by Dieterici—he tries to trace the ideas of the Arabic philosopher to Aristotle, which he sometimes finds rather difficult, and is surprised that the theories to which the Arabs give preference are precisely those that appear in Aristotle only in an obscure and secondary manner.

We cannot quite agree with these different ways of looking at Averroës. We believe that he must be studied as belonging to the school called *al-falāsifa* ('Philosophers'), of which we shall hear more in connexion with al-Fārābī and Avicenna; that the doctrine of this school is more Neo-Platonic than Peripatetic; that Averroës' doctrine is precisely the same in principle, differing from it only in unessentials; and this is exactly what appears from a perusal of the work entitled *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* ('Vanity of Vanities') which Averroës wrote in reply to al-Ghazālī's *Tahāfut*. Al-Ghazālī attacked al-Fārābī and Avicenna. Now it frequently happens that Averroës finds al-Ghazālī's criticism justified, and he reproaches his predecessors for giving him this advantage. Then he modifies something in their system; but these modifications deal only with details, or with the manner of exhibiting the doctrines; they are not really essential.

Is there any need, as has been suggested, to regard these modifications of Averroës on the doctrines of the school of 'Philosophers' as an approximation to the system of the Peripatetics? This, again, is by no means certain. It is doubtful whether there is much less Neo-Platonism in Averroës than in his predecessors. His opponents in the Middle Ages accused him of having often misunderstood Aristotle, and sometimes their criticism seems well founded.

Let us now exhibit some of the chief points in Averroës' philosophy by comparing them with the corresponding points in Avicenna's philosophy. This is not a very easy task; for Averroës himself seems, more than Avicenna, to feel the difficulties of the philosophical problems. He is less confident, less systematic, more analytic; he disputes more, is more troubled about the opinions of others, and seems to have less firmness about his own conclusions.

(1) *Eternity of the world.*—The doctrine of the eternity of the world had early partisans in Islām in the *Mu'tazilites*, such as Abu'l-Hudaīl and Tumāmah. The former considered the creation as simply the act of putting the universe in motion. We have a fragment of Averroës, published by Dr. Worms, which is very clear on this question. He recognizes that there is a creation, and that the world needs a motive power; but he interprets these two ideas in a different manner from the theologians. He believes in a creation that is being renewed every instant in a constantly changing world, always taking its new form from the preceding; but he does not admit creation *ex nihilo*. According to him, this continuous and incessant creation is more worthy of the name of creation than that which is accomplished once for all. Averroës claims that fundamentally this idea does not differ from that of the theologians. The fact remains, however, that in his system infinity can be reached in time—a point which the orthodox doctrine does not admit. But for him, as well as for the theologians, creation does not take place in time: it is produced for all eternity; and time is produced and created at the same moment as the world, according to the doctrine of the orthodox school. Time, for all these Musalmān thinkers, is the result of the existence of the world, and is manifested in the movement of the spheres.

The world then, although it is eternal, has a 'mover' or 'agent.' On this point Averroës rectifies a proof of Avicenna's which does not seem conclusive to him. The mover or agent is that cause of the world, eternal, like it, which produces it each instant and moves it. Celestial bodies, indeed, do not have a perfected existence except through movement; that which gives them this movement is their 'agent.' In this way Averroës distinguishes between eternity with cause and eternity without cause (*æternitas secundum tempus, æternitas secundum essentiam*). God alone is eternal without cause and without mover or agent. The world is eternal, but has an agent.

(2) *Origin of multiplicity.*—Renan remarks that the problem which engrossed Averroës most was that of the origin of beings; we might say, with more precision, the origin of multiplicity. Indeed, it engrossed the whole Arabic school. God being one, how does multiplicity emerge from Him? Avicenna recognized the principle that 'out of one only one can spring'; consequently, he thought that first of all there came from God a primary being, one alone, called the 'first cause,' from whom then evolved the multiplicity of beings. Averroës does not absolutely maintain this principle. The opinion he professes is neither so clear nor so absolute, although he meant it to be more supple and synthetic.

He admits, like all his school, the succession of the celestial spheres, considered as incorruptible, animated, and moved by intelligences. He makes a few changes in the details of their procession. He holds that multiplicity exists, not only in the different aspects of knowledge that they have of one another, but also in their mutual distances and in the 'dispositions' that they have in them. Averroës, moreover, does not admit that the celestial bodies are composed of matter and form, as Avicenna admitted—an opinion which leads to the conclusion that the existence of these bodies is not necessary, for matter and form depend on one another for subsistence. By rejecting this opinion, Averroës continues to diminish the importance of the rôle of creator.

A single power, he holds, comes from the first principle. The whole world results from it, and all its parts are so ordered and connected that the whole, moved by this single energy, acts in concert. Thus, in animals, the different faculties, the members, and the actions, are united in a single body; and each animal is judged a single being, having at its disposal a single power. It is because of this diffusion of power, intellect, and soul, in the

heavens and in the sublunary sphere, that it can be said that God created, maintains, and preserves the world, as we read in the Qur'ān. It does not necessarily follow that, because this power penetrates into manifold beings, it is itself manifold. There flows then from the unit, *i.e.* from the first principle, a power, single itself, which becomes manifold in the beings that participate in it.

This system certainly shows how the lives of the different beings that compose the world harmonize. But Averroës seems to have avoided explaining the origin of these beings.

(3) *Knowledge in God.*—Averroës gives us his idea of the philosophic argument that 'the first principle comprehends only its own essence.' He does not agree with the theologians that we are then driven to the conclusion that God is ignorant of the whole world, and does not know His own creation. The meaning of this assertion is that God comprehends in His essence beings in their most exalted state of existence; and when the philosophers say that He does not comprehend the beings that are below Him, it signifies that He does not know them in the way in which we know them, but in a certain manner that is peculiar to Him. For if any other being existed who possessed a knowledge similar to God's, God would have an 'associate' in His knowledge, and He would no longer be unique. This is why it is impossible to say that Divine knowledge is general, or that it is particular; these are modes of human knowledge, and they refer to beings, who are the causes of human knowledge, but who cannot be the cause of God's knowledge.

To sum up: we cannot, according to Averroës, admit that the knowledge of God depends on beings, for then the less perfect would be necessary to the more perfect; nor that God does not comprehend in His essence things and their order, for then He would not be intelligent. It stands to reason, therefore, that He conceives things in a higher order of existence than that in which we know them.

This theory of the different orders of existence is, nevertheless, a little obscure. Averroës tries to explain it by comparing it to colour, which is one in its essence but has different degrees of existence, according as it is in bodies, or in our sight, or our imagination, or our other faculties in their order. In view of this explanation it would be unjust to claim that Averroës' system denies Providence.

(4) *The soul and the intellect.*—We may take it that Averroës' psychology is, as a whole, constructed like that of Avicenna. But there is one point in this system which we must not forget, the distinction between the soul and the intellect.

This distinction is especially important in its bearing on the question of the survival of the soul and its 'unity.' It has often been said that Averroës taught the 'unity of the soul' and the unity of the intellect in the universe, and that he denied the immortality of the individual soul. The present writer does not believe that this latter assertion is correct; the former, about the universal unity of the soul or of the intellect, undoubtedly is. But still we must try to discover the exact meaning of this expression.

According to the school of 'Philosophers,' the intellect and the soul are not merely distinct in degree; that is to say, the intellect is not merely the most elevated kind of soul. We feel that there is a more profound difference between these two ideas, a real difference in their nature. The intellect alone seems absolutely free from all matter; it is essentially that which is opposed to the common idea of matter; it represents the higher domain of general or abstract; it is pure thought. The same can by no means be said of the soul. The idea of soul, in Musalmān philosophy, is closely allied to our modern ideas of power and energy. The soul is the energy that animates matter; and as such, far from being absolutely opposed to matter, it is, on the contrary, profoundly mixed up with and involved in it. At times we are inclined to believe that the Arabic philosophers have an idea of this power similar to that of the modern psychical schools, and that they believe that it depends on some subtle matter, which is more delicate than ordinary matter, and is not usually apprehended by the senses. That is the impression given by reading passages like the following:—

'There are some who say that the soul resides in a subtle thing called celestial heat, in which are the souls that form the bodies. No philosopher will deny that there is a celestial heat in the elements which serve as support for the faculties of animals and plants. Some call this heat the "natural celestial faculty." Galen calls it the "informing faculty." These souls form bodies; this is the reason why Plato says that the soul is separate from the body; for if it depended on it, it would not create it. The soul is something that is added to the innate celestial heat. Each species has its soul, intermediary between those of the celestial bodies and the souls that are here below in the visible bodies. It has therefore been said: "At the death of the bodies, the souls return to their spiritual condition and to those subtle bodies which none can see."' (*Tahāfut*, p. 138).

It follows, then, that if the intellect exists perfectly and actually only when general and freed from the conditions of individuality, the soul, on the contrary, though belonging to the universal power that circulates in the world, may be individual and remain so. That is what Averroës points out after a passage in which he has been speaking of the unity of the intelligence: 'This argument,' he says, 'is of value for the intelligence, for there is nothing in the intelligence of the nature of individuality; but it is a different thing with the soul; for even if it is despoiled of the accidents by which individuals are multiplied, the most celebrated of the sages say: "It is not exempt from the condition of individuality"' (*op. cit.* p. 137).

The soul, therefore, according to this doctrine, may remain individualized after the death of the body. It *may* do so. Arguments of a purely philosophical order do not force us to believe that this individuality really exists, but they show that it is possible. Such seems to be Averroës' point of view on the question of the immortality of the soul. In the end, he leaves it to revelation to settle this question. 'It is a very difficult problem,' he says. The philosophical introduction to the problem is pushed to the point we have just seen—the knowledge that the soul forms the body, and that, since it forms it, it cannot depend upon it. We cannot therefore deduce the destruction of the soul from that of the body. This agrees with what we find in Avicenna.

Belief in the survival of individual souls, combined with belief in the eternity of the world, brings up a difficulty with regard to infinite number. Since the number of souls produced at the beginning of the world is without end, there would be an infinite number of individuals existing at one and the same time. Now, most of the Arabic philosophers, Avicenna excepted, refused to admit infinite number. Averroës agrees with the majority. He seems to solve the difficulty by counting only a single soul as a principle; he does not apply number to the particular souls that are bound to it. There is but one soul, just as there is but one light; its multiplication to infinity in individuals is only a secondary matter. In short, Averroës refuses to admit infinite number in the case of objects that are quite detached from one another; but he does admit it, in a secondary manner, in the case of objects previously bound to a general unity.

Such is, as nearly as we can judge, the real import of Averroës' system on the problem of the unity and the survival of the soul. It is also evident that it is quite impossible to admit the contrary opinion, which is that Averroës denied the survival of the soul. For there is no doubt that Averroës claimed to remain one of the faithful. Now it is an absolute impossibility that he could believe himself a Musalmān and at the same time deny the immortality of the soul. His thought must have been, like that of the whole school of Philosophers, that the former philosophy was true in the main, and that the Muhammadan faith was also true; that consequently there should be no essential point of contradiction between them,

but that, on the contrary, the one should complete and explain the other.

As for the question of 'the unity of the intellect,' it is by no means the same as that of 'the unity of the soul.' It is, moreover, a question that presents no difficulty if it is made quite clear what the author means by the terms in question.

The unity of the intellect signifies merely the universality of general ideas. Averroës explains this universality of rational knowledge at the same time as its perpetuity: 'Ghazālī,' he says, 'has taken this argument from the Philosophers: the intelligence, starting with the individuals of any species, lays hold on a single conception, which is the quiddity of this species, and which is not divided with the persons that are multiplied through origin, position, or constituent. This conception, therefore, cannot be subjected to birth and destruction, like the individuals to which it pertains. This is why the sciences are eternal; neither are they born nor do they die except by accident, that is to say, by their relation to such and such an individual. They are not perishable in themselves.'

General ideas, according to the school of Philosophers, exist really in the active intellect, *i.e.* in the world of celestial intelligences. This world is eternal, and is harmoniously arranged under the First Principle, which is God. The human intelligence perceives general ideas only in so far as they succeed in entering into relation with the active intellect, in which these ideas reside. These exist actually. Whenever man's intellect perceives them, this intellect itself becomes perfect; it is completely developed and actual. Before this, it was incomplete, unfinished; it was not yet the intelligence but only a prelude to the intelligence, a general possibility of understanding, what the Philosophers call the 'material,' or passive, intellect. We see in the works of al-Kindī, al-Fārābī, and Avicenna the different degrees through which the intelligence passes in order to become actual instead of 'material,' as it originally was, *i.e.* to pass from the potentiality to the fact.

This system is quite clear. It is very evident that the material intelligence, which is a mere possibility, is not persistent in itself. The only persistent intellect is the realized, 'acquired,' or 'perfected' intellect, as the Philosophers call it. It is, therefore, a grave error to deduce, as Munk has done, from the non-immortality of this material intellect, the non-immortality of the human soul.

From this point of view, then, it can easily be understood why the Philosophers considered the question of individual survival in connexion with the unity of the soul, but not in connexion with the unity of the intellect.

(5) *Resurrection.*—Al-Ghazālī accused the school of Philosophers of denying resurrection. The accusation was grave, considering the importance of this dogma in the Qur'ān. Averroës denies the charge, and gives his views on this subject at the end of his *Tahāfut*. Renan gives a somewhat free translation of a few lines of this passage (*Aver.* p. 158). Averroës says that the theory that denies resurrection is nowhere found among the Philosophers. He remarks that the religious law, prior to philosophy, always taught resurrection, and that this dogma is useful for leading people to seek after the happiness of the beyond. 'Philosophers,' he says, 'teach happiness only to a few well-educated men, while religions make it their aim to teach the crowd; but this special class of philosophers arrive at complete existence and perfect happiness only by associating with the multitude' (*Tahāfut*, p. 139). They must therefore accept the teaching that suits the people, interpreting it as best they can.

Averroës interpreted this doctrine thus: the body which we shall have in the other life will not be the same as that of this life; 'that which will be resuscitated will be a representation of what is seen in this world; it will not be that very thing *in essentia*. For what has perished cannot be born again, except in so far as it is individualized; and existence can be bestowed only on the semblance of what has perished, not on the object that has perished in its identity.' To strengthen his argument, he uses the words of Ibn 'Abbās, a traditionist who had great authority in Islām: 'There is of the other world nothing but names in this world.' 'That proves,' says Averroës, 'that the future existence has a kind of generation more elevated than that of actual existence, and constitutes a more excellent order than the order of this world' (*op. cit.* p. 140).

Here again it is clearly a question of interpretation, not a denial of the doctrine. In the same way, we must not understand in a dogmatical sense passages such as Renan quotes (pp. 156, 157), in which Averroës disapproves of the use of myths regarding the state of souls after death, or says that it is not the sanctions of the other life that must press men on towards virtue in this life. That simply means that too precise a representation of the other world may be false and dangerous, and that virtue may have nobler motives than fear of punishment or promise of reward.

(6) *Truth and law.*—In politics, Averroës, like al-Fārābī, follows in the footsteps of Plato, whose *Republic* he commented on; and, according to the custom of Oriental thinkers of his school, he does not criticize the text he comments on. He accepts it as truth, almost as religious truth. He accepts, therefore, that political ideal, half socialistic, half mystic, which on many points, such as the status of woman, does not at all agree with the customs of Islām.

We must not lose sight of the part played by syncretism, which dominated the whole philosophy of the Oriental Middle Ages. Ancient philosophy was considered true as a whole; and all its documents, even the most diverse, could be brought into accord, the commentator having the settled conviction that they could neither contradict one another nor contradict religious truth. There are two important treatises of Averroës in which he tries to point out this conformity between religious truth and philosophical truth. This work required some 'interpreting' of the Qur'ān and a slight changing of its meaning. We get used to efforts of this kind in the study of the philosophers previous to Averroës, and certain more or less heterodox sects in Islām, like those of the Faithful Brothers of Baṣra or the Brothers of Purity. We find, too, in Averroës the extreme form of this conception, which, admitting *a priori* the two truths, philosophical and prophetic, ends in assimilating the philosopher and the prophet. Just as there must always be prophets here on earth, or at least great mystics, who bring the human world into relation with the world beyond, so also must there be philosophers. And here the idea takes a distinct turn that makes it still more unusual. As the human intelligence exists in actuality only by its union with the active intellect, there must always be in the human race, if this intelligence is really to exist and subsist, a few men of great intellectual gifts, a few great philosophers whose spirit participates in eternal truth.

In this passage, Averroës is no longer Peripatetic; but neither is he original; he is merely in accord with his world and his time. He is a syncretist; he is combining mysticism with a system that, from many points of view, is somewhat antagonistic to it. He is placing a kind of illuminative

system at the end and summit of his philosophy, just as his predecessors did, although he himself did not give the impression of being naturally much drawn to considerations of that kind.

4. Short history of Averroism.—Averroës' influence was felt in Jewish philosophy and Christian scholasticism. His commentaries were translated into Rabbinic Hebrew and into Latin. The Jews translated them during the 13th and the first half of the 14th century. In the 13th cent., Jacob, son of Rabbi Anatoli, of Naples, and Moses ben Tibbon, of Lunel, edited versions of several treatises; in the 14th, Kalonymus translated some others. Samuel b. Tibbon and Juda b. Solomon Cohen, of Toledo, compiled philosophical encyclopædias in which, we might say, they transcribe Averroës' works. The Spaniard Shem-Ṭob b. Joseph b. Falaquera inserted several long passages from Averroës in his own works. Towards the middle of the 14th cent. Averroism reached its zenith in Jewish schools, and Levi b. Gerson of Bagnols commented on Averroës, just as Averroës had commented on Aristotle. This great influence on the Jews lasted until the 15th century. At this period, we still find Pico della Mirandola following the teaching of Elias del Medigo, professor at Padua, the last representative of Averroism among the Jews.

Avicenna was translated into Latin before Averroës. The first translators were Dominico Gondisalvus, Archdeacon of Toledo, and the Jew, Juan Avendeath of Seville; they worked under the direction of Raymond, Archbishop of Toledo. Their translations were made from 1130 to 1150. The Jews had cut down the work; the translators put into form the version prepared by the Jews.

A few years later, translations of al-Kindi and al-Fārābī were edited by Gerard of Cremona and Alfred of Morlay. In 1230, Michael Scot, a courtier of Frederick of Hohenstaufen, began to translate Averroës. Of most importance are his interpretations of the commentary on *de Cœlo et Mundo* and of the treatise *On the Soul*. Hermann, a German, likewise attached to the house of Hohenstaufen, translated, from Averroës, the *Ethics* in 1240 and the *Poetics* in 1256. Alfonso X. and Frederick II. were the patrons of these works. It is well known that in 1240 Frederick addressed a series of philosophical questions to the Musalmān scholars, to which he received only very vague answers.

Is it really owing to these versions, executed from the Arabic, that Aristotle's works have passed into the West; or have the Latin versions, taken directly from the Greek, played the principal part in this transmission? M. Forget, who, a few years ago, again took up this question, concluded that the priority cannot be given comprehensively either to the one or to the other group of versions. It depends upon the treatise. The Arabic was the first to make known the eight books of *Physics*, the nineteen books on *History of Animals*, the treatises *On the Sky and the World*, *On Plants*, *On Meteors*, and summaries of the *Rhetoric*, and the *Poetics*. The first complete version of the *Ethics* was from the Arabic. The treatise on *The Soul* and a part at least of the *Metaphysics* were first known from the versions made directly from the Greek.

At the end of the 15th and the beginning of the 16th cent., when Averroism reached its zenith in North Italy, Niphus and Zimara made some corrections on the old versions of the commentaries of Averroës. Then new versions were written, based on the Hebrew translations. These new translations were, for the most part, very obscure. Among the translators may be mentioned Jacob Mantino of Tortosa, a Jew, physician to Paul III., Abraham of Balmes, also a Jew, and Giovanni Francesco Burana of Verona, a Christian.

Averroism encountered the same opposition from the theologians in the Christian world as it had met with from the Musalmāns. Later, because of its unusual form, it was opposed by the Humanists, who loved to philosophize in a freer manner and a more elegant style. The Hellenistic scholars criticized Averroës' interpretation of Aristotle, and the Platonists, having Marsilio Ficino in their mind, placed the doctrine of the Academy in all the freshness of its renaissance in opposition to Aristotle and his commentator.

In the Middle Ages, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and Gilles of Rome wrote against Averroism. Raymond Lully attacked it fiercely. Petrarch declared his dislike towards it, and intended to refute it. Formal condemnations of Averroism were passed at different periods: by the provincial council of Paris in 1209; by Robert de Courson in 1215; by William, bishop of Paris, in 1240; by Etienne Tempier, also bishop of Paris, in 1270 and 1277. Shortly after, these censures were ratified by the theologians of Oxford, over whom Robert of Kilwardeby, Archbishop of Canterbury, presided.

Averroism, which, through the Jews, had held sway in the centre of France until the 14th cent., continued in vogue in the schools of Northern Italy until the 16th century. In the school of Padua it raised the famous disputes in which Achillini and Pomponazzi took part. Its reign extends down to the appearance of modern experimental science, that is, to the time of Galileo.

LITERATURE.—I. *EDITIONS OF AVERROËS' WORKS.*—The two most important Latin editions of Averroës are those of Niphus, 1495–97, and of Junta, 1553. Arabic or Hebrew texts: *Taḥāfut al-Taḥāfut*, Cairo, A.H. 1303; J. Müller, *Philosophy and Theology of Averroës*, Munich, 1859 (Germ. tr. 1875); *Il commento medio di Averroe alla Poetica di Aristotile*, edited in Arabic and in Hebrew by Lasinio, with Ital. tr., 1872; *Il testo arabo del commento medio di Averroe alla Rettorica di Aristotile*, by the same editor; Freudenthal and Fränkel, 'Die durch Averroes erhaltenen Fragmente Alexanders zur Metaphysik des Aristoteles,' with translation into German, in *MBAW*, 1884; M. Worms, 'Die Lehre von der Anfangslosigkeit der Welt bei den mittelalterlichen arabischen Philosophen,' in Baeumker and von Hertling's *Beiträge*, Münster, 1900.

II. *WORKS ON AVERROISM.*—Renan, *Averroès et l'Averroïsme*[3], Paris, 1869; Munk, *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe*, Paris, 1857, also art. in Franck's *Dictionnaire des Sciences philosophiques*; F. Lasinio, 'Studi sopra Averroe,' *Annuario della società italiana per gli studii or.*, 1872–73; A. F. Mehren, 'Et sur la philosophie d'Averroès, concernant ses rapports avec celle d' Avicenne et de Gazzâli,' *Muséon*, vii. 613; Forget, 'Les philosophes arabes et la philosophie scolastique,' *Compte rendu du troisième congrès scientifique international des catholiques*, Brussels, 1895; P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant l'Averroïsme latin au xiiie siècle*, 1899; T. J. de Boer, *The History of Philosophy in Islam*, London, 1903.

BON CARRA DE VAUX.

AVESTA.—The Avesta, the sacred book of ancient Iran, contains the teachings of the prophet Zarathushtra, or Zoroaster, and serves at the present day as the holy scriptures of the Parsis of India and the so-called Gabars of Persia (see artt. GABARS, PARSIS). Although fragmentary in its present form, the Avesta is one of the great religious monuments of antiquity, and preserves the records of a faith that was once among the greatest in the Orient, and that might well have spread through Europe in early ages, but for the victories of the Greeks over the Persians at Marathon, Platæa, and Salamis, and for the triumphal incursion of Alexander into the East.

1. Name.—The designation 'Avesta' is derived from the Pazand *avastā*, Pahlavi *āpastāk*, or *avistāk*, a word of uncertain meaning and derivation. Possibly this term, like the Sanskrit *veda*, may signify 'wisdom,' 'knowledge'; more probably, however, it is derived from a presumable Av. form *upastā*, and denotes 'the original text,' 'the scriptures,' as opposed to the term *zand* (cf. Av. *āzainti*), 'commentary,' 'explanation.' In the exegetical and religious works of the Middle

Persian period these two words occur together constantly in the phrase *āpastāk va zand*, which refers to the original Avestan text and its Pahlavi paraphrase and commentary, and it is the erroneous inversion of these words that gave rise to the name *Zend-Avesta*, which was used by Hyde (1700) and by Anquetil du Perron (1771), and was adopted from the latter by the earliest succeeding translators.

2. Original form.—The Avesta in its present form is only a small remnant of a sacred literature of considerable extent. Pahlavi tradition tells of scriptures in 1200 chapters, the Arab historians Ṭabarī (*Annales*, i. 675) and Mas'ūdī (ed. Barbier de Meynard, ii. 123) refer to a copy inscribed on 12,000 cowhides, various Syriac writers allude to an extensive sacred book, and Pliny the Elder (*HN* xxx. 1. 2) mentions 2,000,000 verses composed by Zoroaster. Such direct references to the extent of the original Avestan writings are in agreement with the frequent insistence in Pahlavi literature on the loss of texts during the dark centuries after Alexander, and they are further confirmed by the fragmentary character of the Avesta as now extant. All doubts as to the existence of that larger literature, however, are removed by the Pahlavi *Dīnkarṭ* and the later Persian *Rivāyats*, which give a detailed account of the early scriptures and a summary of their contents.

According to these works, there were originally 21 Nasks (Nosks), or books, each of which was considered to correspond with one of the 21 words of the Ahuna-Vairya (*q.v.*) prayer, and comprised both the Avestan text and the Pahlavi commentary. These 21 Nasks were divided into three groups of seven books each, the first (called *gāsān*, or Gāthā group, and consisting of Nasks 21, 1, 2, 3, 11, 20, 13) containing the spiritual and moral teachings, the second (called *dāṭik*, or legal group, and consisting of Nasks 15–19, 12, 14) containing laws and prescriptions, and the third (called *hāṭak-mānsarik*, or Hadhamanthra group, and consisting of Nasks 4–10) containing matters belonging partly to the first and partly to the second group. The number of sections in each Nask varied from 22 to 65, but many of these sections were no longer extant at the time of the composition of the *Dīnkarṭ*. Of Nasks 8, 9, and 10, for example, each of which had originally 60 sections, only 12, 15, and 10 sections respectively are said to have existed 'after Alexander.' The subjects treated in the Nasks may be briefly summed up as follows: Nask 1, virtue and piety; 2, religious observances; 3, exegetical—the three chief prayers of the religion being explained in it; 4, cosmogony; 5, astronomy and astrology; 6, performance of the ritual, and the benefit to be derived therefrom; 7, qualifications and duties of the priesthood; 8, ethical considerations and various aspects of human life; 9, directions for various ceremonies; 10, conversion and instruction of King Gushtāsp (Vishtāspa) and his wars with Arjāsp; 11, various religious and worldly duties; 12, an account of mankind from the creation of the primeval man to the advent of Zoroaster, and various genealogical information; 13, account of Zoroaster and the Saviour that is to come; 14, worship of Ormazd and the archangels; 15, dispensing of justice and various laws; 16, criminal, civil, and military law; 17, priestly and ritual code, general regulations; 18, law of property and family relations; 19, the Vidēvdād, or Vendīdād, pollution and purification; 20, religious duties, good attributes and qualities; 21, praise of Ormazd and the archangels. From this summary it appears that the original work was not purely religious, but was somewhat encyclopædic in character.

3. History.—According to traditions, the substance of which there is no good reason to doubt, the Zoroastrian scriptures were preserved with great care in the early centuries of the faith, especially under the later Achæmenians. Ṭabarī states that King Vishtāspa, Zoroaster's patron, sent the original copy of the Avesta, written in letters of gold, to the 'Stronghold of Records' at Stakhra (Persepolis)—a tradition which is in substantial agreement with the Pahlavi account in the *Dīnkarṭ* (III. 3, VII. vii. 3 n., V. iii. 4) of a sumptuous copy that was preserved in the 'treasury of Shapīgān' at Persepolis (cf. Jackson, *Persia Past and Present*, p. 306 f.). According to the Pahlavi treatise *Shatroīhā-ī Airān*, another copy, containing 1200 chapters inscribed on gilded tablets, was kept in the 'treasury' of the fire-temple at Samarkand (cf. Modi, *Aiyādgār-i Zarirān, Shatroīhā-i Airān*, Bombay, 1899, pp. 133–136, and *JRASBo* xx, No. 54; and Jackson, *Nöldeke Studien*, Strassburg, 1906, pp. 1031–1033). These two archetype copies, hitherto preserved with zealous care, were destroyed in the invasion of 'the accursed Iskandar' (Alexander) in B.C. 330, when he burned the palace of the Achæmenians at Persepolis, and when his conquering hosts took possession of Samarkand.

The ravages of Alexander broke the power of the Zoroastrian faith, and the Seleucid and Parthian rule in the five following centuries forms a period of depression and darkness in its history, entailing a loss of extensive portions of the original scriptures. Despite the consequent neglect, considerable portions of the texts were preserved in scattered works and in the memory of the priests. Under the last of the Arsacids, early in the 3rd cent. A.D., an attempt was made to collect such parts of the Avesta as had survived. According to a proclamation of Khusru Anūshirvān (A.D. 531–579), King Valkhash, who is generally identified with Vologeses I., ordered that all sacred writings should be searched for, and that such portions as were preserved only in oral tradition should again be written down. This work was eagerly continued by the founder of the Sasanian dynasty, Artakhshīr Pāpakān (A.D. 226–240), who commissioned the high priest Tansar to collect the scattered fragments, and by his son, Shāhpūhr I. (A.D. 241–272). In the reign of Shāhpūhr II. (A.D. 309–380) a final revision of the Avestan texts was made by his prime minister, Ādarbād Māraspand, and this collection, consisting of a fixed number of books, was then declared canonical (see Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta*, iii. Introd. pp. xx–xxxvi, 'Zend-Avesta,' *SBE* iv. pp. xxx–xlvii, and *JA*, new series, iii., Paris, 1894, pp. 185–250, 502–555; consult also the discussion of Darmesteter's article, in two papers, by the Parsi High Priest Darab Dastur Peshotan Sanjana, *Tansar's Alleged Letter*, Leipzig, 1898, and the same author's *Observations on Darmesteter's Theory*, Leipzig, 1898; and Mills, *Zarathushtra, Philo, the Achæmenids, and Israel*, Chicago, 1906, pp. 21–76).

Far more serious even than the ravages of Alexander and the centuries of neglect, were the results of the Muhammadan conquest of Persia and the inroads of the Qur'ān. Through religious persecutions and civic disabilities the worshippers of Ormazd were compelled to abandon their faith or go into exile, and as many Zoroastrian books as could be found were ordered to be burned. The small body of texts that escaped destruction and loss was preserved by the few Zoroastrians who remained in Persia and by the Parsis, their co-religionists who had taken refuge in India; and the books contained in these manuscripts, recopied from time to time, constitute the Avesta as we now have it. The oldest Indian manuscripts date from the 13th and 14th centuries; the Persian are not older than the 17th. No single manuscript contains all the extant texts.

4. Present contents.—The Avesta in its present form consists of the following divisions: (*a*) *Yasna*, including (*b*) the *Gāthās*, (*c*) *Visparad*, (*d*) *Yashts*, (*e*) Minor Texts, such as *Nyaishes*, *Gāhs*, etc., (*f*) *Vendīdād*, (*g*) *Fragments*. These divisions fall naturally into two groups. (1) The first group comprises the Vendīdād, Visparad, and Yasna, which are classed together for liturgical purposes. In the ritual these are not recited as separate books, but are intermingled with one another, and the manuscripts often present them in the order in which they are to be used in the service. In this case the Pahlavi translation is omitted, and the collection is called *Vendīdād Sādah*, 'Vendīdād Pure,' that is, without commentary. On the other hand, these books also appear in some manuscripts

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as separate entities, and in that case each part is usually accompanied by a rendering in Pahlavi. (2) The second group comprises the Minor Prayers and the Yashts, which are often included with these in the manuscripts, and is called *Khordah Avesta*, 'Abridged Avesta,' or 'Small Avesta.' This forms a species of prayer-book for the laity.

(*a*) *Yasna.*—The Yasna is the chief liturgical work of the canon. It is recited in its entirety in the Yasna ceremony, which, apart from a number of subordinate rites, is devoted chiefly to the preparation and offering of the *parāhōm* (the juice of the Haoma plant, mingled with milk and aromatic ingredients). Parts of the book, however, deal only indirectly with the ritual. The Yasna is composed of 72 chapters, called *Hāiti*, *Hā*, which are symbolized in the girdle of the Parsis (*kusti*), woven of 72 strands. Several of these chapters are mere repetitions to swell the apparent number. Chapters v. and xviii. are substantially identical with chapters xxxvii. and xlvii., and chapters lxiii., lxiv., lxvi., lxvii., and lxxii. are composed of texts occurring elsewhere. The book falls into three nearly equal divisions (i.–xxvii., xxviii.–lv., lvi.–lxxii.). The first part begins with an invocation of Ormazd and the other divinities in order of rank (i.–ii.), and the dedication of the oblation (*myazda*) and other offerings with similar formulas (iii. 1–8, iv.). After a short prayer (viii. 5–8) there follows the *Hom Yasht* (ix.–xi.), in which Haoma, the branch from whose twigs, like the Soma of the Hindus, a sacred drink was prepared, is personified and worshipped both as plant and as divinity. This section is in turn succeeded by the Zoroastrian creed (xii.) and by other formulas (xiii.). With chapter xiv. begin the so-called *Staota Yesnya*, chapters of the *Stōt-Yasht*, or twenty-first Nask, of the earlier Avesta, which continue, with interruptions, as far as chapter lviii. In the early chapters of the *Staota Yesnya* are found invocations of the spirits of the day (xvi.), of the periods of day and year, and of the various forms of fire (xvii.). Chapters xix.–xxi. contain commentaries on the three most sacred prayers, the *Ahuna Vairya*, *Ashem Vohū*, and *Yenghē Hātām*, and represent part of the third original Nask, called the Bak Nask. The succeeding chapters (xxii.–xxvii.) make up a further liturgical sequence, called *Hōmāst Yasht*, which accompanies the second preparation of the Haoma juice in the ceremony. The five *Gāthās*, which together with the *Yasna Haptanghāiti* form chapters xxviii.–liii. (excepting lii.), stand out in marked contrast with the other parts of the Yasna, and are described in the next paragraph below. Chapter liii. is a brief interpolation between the fourth and fifth Gāthās. Chapter liv. consists of but a single verse, aside from the introductory formulas, and forms the *Airyaman Ishya* prayer, with which the Saoshyants are to restore the dead to life at the day of resurrection. After a brief poetical summary of the Gāthās (lv.) comes the *Srōsh Yasht* (lvii.), a long and detailed glorification of the angel Sraosha, preceded by a briefer chapter in the same vein (lvi.) by way of introduction. Chapter lviii. is in praise of prayer in general, and especially of the prayer to be recited at the Last Judgment. The following chapter (lix.), with its renewed invocations, leads over to a formula of blessing on the house of a pious worshipper (lx.), a formula of exorcism (lxi.), and a series of stanzas to be recited in propitiation of the sacred fire (lxii.). Chapters lxiii.–lxviii. constitute the *Āb-zōr*, 'offering to the waters,' which consists of an introduction (lxiii.–lxiv.), praises of Anāhitā, the goddess of the waters (lxv.), and the formulas used in the consecration and offering of the holy water (lxvi.–lxviii.). The book ends with further invocations (lxix.–lxxii.), which mark the conclusion of the Yasna ceremony.

(*b*) *Gāthās.* — The metrical Gāthās ('songs,' 'psalms') constitute the oldest as well as the most important part of the whole Avesta, and differ from the other parts in language, metre, and style. They are five in number, comprising 17 hymns (*Yas.* xxviii.–xxxiv., xliii.–xlvi., xlvii.–l., li., liii.), and are arranged according to their metres, and named Ahunavaiti, Ushtavaiti, Spenta Mainyu, Vohu Khshathra, and Vahishtoishti, after their opening words. These Zoroastrian psalms contain the teachings, exhortations, and revelations of the prophet Zoroaster himself, who seems a more distinct personality here than elsewhere in the Avesta. The style of the Gāthās is noticeably different from that of other parts, being almost free from the tiresome uniformity and barren reiteration of some of the later portions; and although there is a constant recurrence of the cardinal tenets, these do not become monotonous, because of their varying expression. Ceremonies and ritual observances are but little referred to, and the Haoma-cult, the *Fravashis*, and the whole naturalistic pantheon do not appear in these hymns, either because they present the religion in an earlier and loftier form, or, more probably, because they are concerned chiefly with the prophet's teaching regarding the conflict between Ormazd and Ahriman, the relation of the human individual to that conflict, its ultimate outcome in the routing of the forces of evil and the final victory of Ormazd, the last judgment, and the longed-for kingdom of Ormazd. The detached character of the verses, which nevertheless are a logical sequence, has led to the supposition that, like the verse portions of many Buddhistic works, they were the text of discourses of the prophet and a summary of his teachings in a form available for oral tradition (cf. Pischel and Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, Stuttgart, 1889, i. 287).

In the midst of the Gāthās is inserted the so-called 'Yasna of the Seven Chapters' (*Yasna Haptanghāiti*), which is written in prose, but in the same dialect as the Gāthās. It consists of a number of prayers and ascriptions of praise to Ormazd, the Amesha Spentas, or archangels, the souls of the righteous, the fire, the waters, and the earth. By some scholars it is held to represent a later and more developed form of the religion than appears in the Gāthās. Its language, in fact, shows certain departures from the Gāthic dialect. Under the Gāthās are also included four specially sacred prayers or formulas. These are the *Ahuna Vairya* (*Yas.* xxvii. 13), the *Ashem Vohū* (*Yas.* xxvii. 14), *Yenghē Hātām* (*Yas.* iv. 26), and the *Airyaman Ishya* previously mentioned (*Yas.* liv. 1).

(*c*) *Vīsparad.*—The Vīsparad (Av. *vīspē ratavō*, 'all the lords') is not a body of connected texts, but consists merely of additions to portions of the Yasna, which it resembles in language and form. It comprises 24 (according to some, 23 or 27) chapters, called Kardah, and is about one-seventh as long as the Yasna. The Vīsparad contains invocations and offerings of homage to 'all the lords,' whence its name. In the ritual its chapters are inserted among those of the Yasna.

(*d*) *Yashts.*—The Yashts (Av. *yeshti*, 'worship by praise') form a poetical book of 21 hymns, chiefly in verse, in which the angels of the religion (*yazatas*) and the heroes of ancient Iran are praised and glorified. The order in which the divinities are worshipped corresponds largely with the sequence in which they are used to name the days of the month. In external form the Yashts are characterized by their identical introduction and conclusion, but they differ greatly in length, age, and character. The first four are largely composed of

late and ungrammatical material, and the last two consist chiefly of regular Yasht formulas with a number of quotations from other passages. On the other hand, the intervening longer Yashts are almost entirely in verse, and have considerable poetic merit. Of chief importance among these are: Yasht v., in praise of Ardvī Sūrā Anāhitā, the goddess of the waters; Yasht viii., which exalts the star Tishtrya, and recounts his victory over the demon of drought; Yasht x., dedicated to Mithra, who, as the god of light and of truth, rides out in lordly array to wreak vengeance on those who have belied their oath or broken their pledge; Yasht xiii., devoted to glorifying and propitiating the guardian spirits (*fravashis*) of the righteous; Yasht xiv., in honour of Verethraghna, the incarnation of victory; and Yasht xix., which sings the praises of the Kingly Glory (*kavaya hvarenah*), a sort of halo or radiance said to have been possessed by kings and heroes of Iran in olden times as a sign of their rulership by divine right. Much of the material in the Yashts is evidently drawn from pre-Zoroastrian sages; there is a mythological and legendary atmosphere about them, and Firdausi's *Shāh Nāmah* serves to throw light on many of the events which they portray, and on allusions that would otherwise be obscure.

(*e*) *Minor Texts.*—Chief among the Minor Texts are the *Nyaishes*, or Zoroastrian Litanies, a collection of five short prayers or ascriptions of praise addressed to the Sun, Moon, Water, and Fire, and to the angels Khurshēd, Mihr (Mithra), Māh, Ardvisūr (Ardvī Sūrā Anāhitā), and Ātash, who preside over these elements. These litanies form an important part of the Khordah Avesta. They are composed of fragments from the Yasna and Yashts, and contain invocations, supplications, deprecations, and obsecrations employed daily by the laity as well as by the priesthood. Under the heading of Minor Texts come also the five *Gāhs*, addressed to the spirits of the five periods of the day; the two *Sīrōzahs*, the greater and the lesser, which in their 30 paragraphs invoke in turn the divinities of each day of the month, and which are recited especially on the thirtieth day after the death of a Zoroastrian; the *Āfrīngāns*, or blessings, four in number, used for various purposes with an accompanying offering: the *Āfrīngān-i Dahmān*, repeated in honour of those who have died in the faith; the *Āfrīngān-i Gāthā*, recited on the five concluding days of the year, when the souls of the dead revisit the earth; the *Āfrīngān-i Gahanbār*, composed chiefly of instructions to worshippers concerning participation in the celebration of the six special festivals of the year; and the *Āfrīngān-i Rapithwin*, recited at the beginning and end of summer. All of these belong to the Khordah Avesta.

(*f*) *Vendīdād.*—The Vendīdād (Av. *vīdaēvodāta*, 'the law against the demons'), although inserted for liturgical purposes among the Gāthās in the Zoroastrian ritual, is not actually a liturgical work but a priestly code prescribing the various purifications, penalties, and expiations. It originally formed the nineteenth Nask of the Avesta handed down to Sasanian times, but its parts vary greatly both in point of style and in time of composition. Much of it must be of late origin.

In its present form it contains 22 chapters, called fargards. Chapter i. is a dualistic account of creation that attributes all the disagreeable features of the otherwise delightful regions of the earth to the counter-creative activity of Ahriman. Chapter ii. tells the legend of Yima, of the Golden Age, and of the coming of a terrible winter and destructive floods, to preserve mankind from which the princely Yima is directed by Ormazd to build an enclosure (*vara*). The following chapter (iii.) treats of the pleasures and pains of earthly life, the manner of life prescribed for bearers of corpses (a special class of men), praise of agriculture, and the defilement of the earth by corpses. Chapter iv. concerns legal matters—breaches of contract, assault, punishments. Chapters v.–xii. relate mainly to impurity incurred through contact with the dead and to the methods of purification for removing the pollution, notably by undergoing an elaborate lustration for nine nights, the so-called *Barashnūm* (ix.). Chapters xiii.–xv. are devoted chiefly to the treatment to be accorded to the dog, an animal held in almost reverential regard by the early pastoral Zoroastrians. In chapters xvi.–xvii. instructions are given for purification from several sorts of uncleanness, and for the disposal of parings of the nails and clipped ends of the hair. Chapter xviii., one of the most interesting and instructive in the Vendīdād, deals, among other things, with the character of the true and the false priest, and with the cock that wakes the pious to prayer early in the morning; and it relates a conversation between the angel Sraosha, club in hand, and the evil spirit Druj, concerning the progeny of the latter. In chapter xix. are found an account of the temptation of Zoroaster and the revelation of the destiny of the soul after death. Chapters xx.–xxii. are chiefly of a medical character.

(*g*) *Fragments.*—In addition to the preceding books there are also a considerable number of fragments. There survive, for example, three chapters from the original Hādōkht Nask, the last two of which are eschatological in character, and deal with the destiny of the soul after death. Of special interest is a similar metrical fragment (Fr. W. 4), which refers to the efficacy of the *Airyaman Ishya* prayer, which is to be chanted by the Messianic Saoshyants at the day of judgment, to confound Ahriman and his hellish crew and to raise up the dead (cf. Haas, 'An Avestan Fragment on the Resurrection,' *Spiegel Memorial Volume*, Bombay, 1908, pp. 181–187). Among the longer fragmentary texts may be mentioned also the *Āfrīn-i Paighambar Zartusht* in honour of Zoroaster, a blessing invoked upon kings, and the so-called *Vīshtāsp Yasht*, an enigmatical compilation, disconnected and ungrammatical, which is in no wise related to the regular Yashts. Many fragments are found as quotations in the Pahlavi ancillary literature. Most important of these is the *Nīrangistān*, a work in three fargards, or chapters, collecting and commenting upon a number of Avestan *Nīrangs*, or ritual prescriptions. The commentary cites additional directions of the same kind from another source. This work is of value for our knowledge of the ritual and for Avestan lexicography, but unfortunately the manuscript material is poor and the text consequently imperfect. Another Pahlavi treatise that contains Avestan passages is the *Āfrīn-i Dahmān*, also called *Aogemadaēcā* after the first quoted Avestan word. The Pahlavi commentaries on the Vendīdād and the Yasna, and other Pahlavi works, such as the *Shāyast-lā-Shāyast*, the *Vijīrkart-i Dīnīk*, and the *Pursishnīhā*, contain a large number of Avestan quotations, many of them from the lost Nasks, and brief formulas and prayers are found here and there in manuscripts of the Khordah Avesta. Mention should likewise be made of the additions to Avestan lexicography in the *Frahang ī-Ōīm*, an Avesta-Pahlavi glossary (ed. Hoshangji Jamaspji and Haug, Bombay, 1867; cf. Reichelt, in *WZKM* xiv. 172–213, xv. 117–186). For a complete list of fragments and their editions see Bartholomae, *Altiran. Wörterbuch*, pp. viii–x.

The extant parts of the Avesta owe their preservation chiefly to their employment in the ritual. The liturgical portions, constantly used in priestly observances and ceremonies, were naturally considered of greater importance and cherished with greater care, whereas the other books that may have escaped destruction gradually fell into desuetude and neglect, were not copied as much as the parts occurring in the ritual, and finally disappeared altogether. Thus it happens that the present Avesta corresponds but little with the traditional 21 Nasks in arrangement or in extent. Only two of these original 21 books are now represented with any degree of completeness. The Vendīdād, or nineteenth Nask, has

survived in approximately its full form; yet even this shows evidence of having been patched up and pieced together. Many of the chapters of the Stōt-Yasht, or twenty-first Nask, are contained in the Yasna, where they extend, with interruptions, from chapter xiv. to chapter lviii. (cf. Geldner, 'Awesta-litteratur,' in *GIrP* ii. 25–26). There exist also, in addition to these two remnants, an important part of the Bakān Yasht, or fourteenth Nask (most of the Yashts being referred back to this otherwise lost book), and portions or fragments of others are extant. Altogether there are preserved specimens of about 15 of the original 21 Nasks. This material is supplemented, however, by various passages that have been translated from the Avesta into Pahlavi, and have come down to us in that form. The Pahlavi *Būndahishn*, for example, is largely based on the old Avestan Dāmdāt Nask, and serves in a measure to replace its loss.

5. Age and growth.—The present form of the Avesta dates, as has been mentioned above, from the Sasanian period, but the various portions differ considerably from one another in age. The relative age of the component parts can be approximately determined by a study of their metre, grammar, and style. Although it is impossible to go into details here, it may be said in general that the later texts as a rule are written in prose, show lack of grammatical knowledge on the part of their authors or compilers, and consist to a very great extent of formulaic material. The application of this threefold criterion shows the chronological order of the texts to be somewhat as follows: (1) Gāthās (*Yas.* xxviii.–liii.), including (2) the Yasna Haptanghāiti (*Yas.* xxxv.–xlii.) and some other compositions in the Gāthā dialect (*Yas.* xii., lviii. and the four most sacred prayers, or formulas, mentioned above), (3) metrical Yasna and Yashts (*Yas.* ix.–xi., lvii., lxii., lxv.; *Yt.* v., viii.–x., xiv., xv., xvii., xix.), portions of Vendīdād ii.–v., xviii.–xix., and scattered verses in the Vīsparad, Nyaishes, Āfringāns, etc., and (4) the remaining prose portions of the Avesta.

The determination of the actual date of composition of the different parts of the Avesta is largely a matter of speculation. According to the generally accepted view, the Gāthās, the oldest part in substance as well as in form, date back to an early period of the religion, if not to the prophet Zoroaster himself, whereas certain minor portions of the scriptures may have been written or compiled as late as the time of Shāhpūhr II. of the Sasanian dynasty. The extreme limits of the period of development would thus be about B.C. 560 and A.D. 375. In his latest works (*Le Zend-Avesta*, iii., Introd.; see also *Zend-Avesta*², *SBE* iv.), the brilliant French scholar, Darmesteter, put forth a radical theory in regard to the composition of the Avesta as we now have it. In his opinion all sacred writings that may have existed under the Achæmenians were lost after the invasion of Alexander, and not a page of any earlier work has come down intact. The pre-Alexandrian spirit may be recognized, however, in the Vendīdād, which, although later than the Gāthās in composition, is older in material and Achæmenian in tone. According to this theory, the Gāthās, though the oldest part of the Avesta in form, represent the latest growth of the Zoroastrian spirit and show the influence of Gnosticism, the school of Philo Judæus, and Judaism. Darmesteter assigns their origin to the middle of the 1st cent. A.D. This radical hypothesis concerning the age and growth of the Avesta met at once with spirited opposition on the part of scholars best qualified to judge, and can hardly be said to have any acceptance to-day. Avestan specialists are at present agreed that there is no adequate reason for making so strong a claim that the tradition was lost. It is known that the latest Parthian monarchs were filled with the true Zoroastrian spirit, and it can be proved from Greek, Latin, and other writings that the tradition of the wisdom of Zoroaster lived on during the long period between Alexander and the rise of the house of Sāsān in the 3rd cent. A.D.

6. Language.—The language in which the Avesta is written is named 'Avestan.' It belongs to the Iranian branch of the Indo-Germanic family of tongues, and is most closely allied to the Sanskrit, though individually quite distinct from the latter. This relation to the Sanskrit was one of the means of establishing the authenticity of the Avesta, and is still of the greatest importance in its interpretation. In its phonology Avestan agrees with Sanskrit in its vowels in general, but shows a greater variety in its *e* and *o* sounds. Final vowels, except *ō*, are, as a rule, short. A striking peculiarity is the insertion of transitional and epenthetic vowels, the latter giving rise to improper diphthongs. Some of the consonants are identical with those of Sanskrit, others correspond uniformly with certain Sanskrit sounds. The Sanskrit voiceless stops *k*, *t*, *p*, for example, are generally represented in Avestan by the spirants *kh*, *th*, *f*, when followed by consonants; Sanskrit initial *s* appears in Avestan as *h*. Because of this close correspondence, many Avestan words and phrases may be changed at once into their Sanskrit equivalents by the mere application of certain phonetic laws. In inflexion the language shows nearly the richness of Vedic Sanskrit, and it possesses almost equal facility of word-formation. In syntax it differs from the Sanskrit in certain points, showing marked individuality, especially in the later portions.

Two dialects may be recognized in the Avesta: one the Gāthā dialect, the language of the oldest parts, often called *Gāthā Avestan* (*GAv.*); the other, the language of the great body of the Avesta, called *Younger Avestan* (*YAv.*). The Gāthā dialect is more archaic, bearing to the Younger Avestan somewhat the relation of the Vedic to the classical Sanskrit. Possibly this older dialect may owe some of its peculiarities also to an original difference of locality. Its chief characteristic is the lengthening of all final vowels and the frequent use of parasitic vowels. Its grammatical structure is remarkably pure. The same cannot be said of all the texts written in Younger Avestan, as the late compositions in this dialect, owing to linguistic decay, show many corruptions and confusions. All that is old or written in metre, however, is correct, and occasional inaccuracies in such parts must be attributed to faulty transmission.

7. Metres.—The metres of the Avesta deserve considerable attention, because they assist in determining the relative age of the various parts. Almost all the oldest portions of the texts are found to be metrical; the later, or inserted portions, are, as a rule, though not always, written in prose. The Gāthās are composed in metres that have analogies in the Vedas. These were the only metrical parts known to the later Zoroastrians until Western scholars discovered the rhythmical structure of many passages in the later texts. Almost all of these versified portions, especially frequent in the Yashts, are written in eight-syllable lines (cf. Geldner, *Über die Metrik des jüngeren Avesta*, Tübingen, 1877).

8. Alphabet.—The Avesta is written in an alphabet far younger than the language it presents. The characters are derived from the Sasanian Pahlavi, which was used to record the oral tradition when the texts were collected and edited in Sasanian times. The writing is read from right

to left. Nothing is known about the original Avestan script.

9. Pahlavi version.—The Pahlavi version of the Avesta was made in Persia in Sasanian times, when the general understanding of the sacred texts became more and more imperfect. Some of the exegetical portions and works of interpretation belong even to Muhammadan times, and may be assigned to the period between 700 and 900 A.D. Of the Pahlavi version there are now extant the entire Yasna, Vīsparad, and Vendīdād, with some portions of other texts. The rendering is a word for word translation of the original, with the addition of occasional independent explanatory glosses. The original Avestan construction is usually adhered to verbatim, and the glossator has to eke out the inflexional poverty of the language in his day by the use of particles. These determinatives, however, are often omitted, and the loss of the sole means of indicating syntactical relation adds greatly to the ambiguity of the Pahlavi paraphrase. This version, with the accompanying glosses, presents the traditional Zoroastrian interpretation from an early time, and is of the greatest value for an understanding of obscure ideas and an insight into native thought. It is also of material assistance in determining the meaning of a word or phrase, and it serves to check the results of purely linguistic analysis. It must be conceded, nevertheless, that it abounds in errors and inaccuracies, and that its explanations are often fanciful. Furthermore, the more abstract or obscure the original, the less the commentator attempts to explain it. The Gāthās, for example, have in general very few glosses, whereas some other parts of the Avesta are accompanied by an elaborate commentary. The chief defect of the version lies in its disregard of the principles of the grammar, of which its authors seem to have had scarcely any knowledge. As a result of the slavish adherence to the original, the style of the Pahlavi version is very clumsy in comparison with the Pahlavi of independent treatises.

About the year 1200 a large part of the Pahlavi version was translated into Sanskrit by Neryosangh, son of Dhaval, a Zoroastrian priest, who seems to have possessed a thorough knowledge of Pahlavi. His translation is of great value as a help in understanding the Pahlavi version, which he follows in construction and renders word for word. This method often obliges him to sacrifice the Sanskrit syntax to that of the original Pahlavi, and his language consequently assumes a peculiar Iranicized aspect. A further striking peculiarity of the Sanskrit of Neryosangh's version is his disregard of the rules of *sandhi*, or euphonic vowel-combination, so uniformly observed in other Sanskrit works. Neryosangh seems on occasion to have correeted the Pahlavi rendering when he thought it at fault, thus showing that he must have referred at times to the Avestan text itself and reached an independent decision as to its meaning.

A modern Persian translation of portions of the Pahlavi version of the Khordah Avesta was prepared in Persia at some time between 1600 and 1800 A.D., and two separate translations into Gujarati were made in India early in the last century, and appeared at Bombay in 1818 within five months of one another. These are the last independent native versions made before the percolation into India of the influence of Western scholarship. These later versions have some merit, in that they occasionally help us to understand an obscure or ambiguous passage in the Pahlavi, but they never venture upon an explanation other than that of the version on which they are based, and consequently they content themselves with reproducing the Pahlavi paraphrase and commentary without change.

10. Discovery.—The story of the discovery, or opening, of the Avesta to Europe has a special interest, since the Avesta has been known to the Western world for only a little more than a century. A manuscript of the Yasna seems to have been brought to Canterbury as early as 1633, and a copy of the Vendīdād Sādah was brought from Surat in 1723 by an Englishman, George Boucher, and deposited in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, where it was for a long time chained to the wall as a curiosity. No one, however, was able to read these manuscripts, and Thomas Hyde (*Historia Religionis Veterum Persarum*, Oxford, 1700) drew his information chiefly from later Parsi sources. To a young Frenchman, Anquetil du Perron, belongs the honour of being the first to decipher these texts. Some tracings made from the Oxford manuscript were sent to Paris and came to his notice. Du Perron at once conceived the idea of going to India or Persia and obtaining from the priests themselves the knowledge of their sacred books. In his eagerness to carry out his plan he did not wait for promised financial support from the French Academy, but enlisted as a soldier among the troops about to start for India, and left Paris with them in November, 1754. Before he had gone far on his journey, however, the government gave him his discharge from the army, and presented him with his passage to India. After innumerable discouragements, and in spite of almost insurmountable obstacles, he succeeded in winning the confidence of the priests, with whom he was able to communicate after learning Modern Persian. These he gradually induced to teach him the language of the Avesta, to let him have some of the manuscripts, and even to initiate him into some of the rites and ceremonies of their religion. After seven years among the Parsis, he returned to Europe in 1761, stopping at Oxford, before he returned to Paris, to compare his manuscripts with the one in the Bodleian Library in order to assure himself of their authenticity. During the next ten years he worked upon the texts and prepared a translation, which, together with explanatory material, he published in 1771 under the title *Zend-Avesta, Ouvrage de Zoroastre*.

The enthusiasm aroused by this discovery was soon followed by discussions regarding the authenticity of the scriptures that had been made accessible. Some scholars were disappointed not to find the important philosophical and religious ideas they had expected, and did not sufficiently realize the difficulties of pioneer work of this kind. It was suggested, therefore, that the so-called Zend-Avesta was not genuine, but a forgery. The foremost advocate of this view was the Orientalist Sir William Jones, who claimed that the Parsis had palmed off on du Perron a conglomeration of worthless fabrications and absurdities. In France the genuineness of the book was accepted almost universally, and the German scholar Kleuker was an ardent supporter of its authenticity, translating du Perron's work into German, and adding a collection of classical allusions to the Magi and the religion of the ancient Persians (9 parts, Riga and Leipzig, 1776–83). This discussion as to the authenticity lasted for fifty years, during which time little or no work was done on the texts themselves.

About the year 1825 the texts began to be studied by Sanskrit scholars. The close affinity between the two languages had already been noticed by various scholars, but the Danish philologian Rask first pointed out more exactly the relation between them. He had travelled in Persia and India, and had brought back with him many valuable manuscripts of the Avesta and the Pahlavi writings. In a little volume published in 1826 he

proved the antiquity of the language in which the Avesta was preserved, showed that it was distinct from Sanskrit, though closely related to it, and made some investigation into the alphabet of the texts. At about the same time the French scholar Burnouf began to study the Avesta. He soon found philological inaccuracies in Anquetil's translation; and with the help of Neryosangh's Sanskrit version, he was able to restore sense in many passages where before there had been but little. These further steps soon settled the question of authenticity. The foundation thus laid was built upon by such scholars as Bopp, Haug, Windischmann, Westergaard, Roth, and Spiegel, whose efforts were directed mainly to the establishment of a better text and the development of principles of investigation. For a long time the battle raged about the question of the relative value of the traditional and the linguistic methods, some scholars extolling the value of the Pahlavi version and the priestly tradition, and others placing supreme faith in the results of comparison with Sanskrit and other tongues. It is only in recent years that it has become generally recognized that in the interpretation of the Avesta neither of these methods should be employed to the exclusion of the other. Both have positive value, and a judicious balance of these two principles will henceforth doubtless be a fundamental requisite for sound scholarship in this field, which is being cultivated by a small but active band of workers.

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ii. *TRANSLATIONS*: Anquetil du Perron, *Zend-Avesta, Ouvrage de Zoroastre*, 2 vols., Paris, 1771; Kleuker, *Zend-Avesta*, 9 parts, Riga and Leipzig, 1776-83 (a German translation, with additions, of the preceding); Spiegel, *Avesta . . . übersetzt*, 3 vols., Leipzig, 1852-63 (tr. into English by Bleeck, 3 parts, London, 1864); Pietrazewski, i., Berlin, 1864 (a *curiosum* of distorted learning); Darmesteter and Mills, in *SBE* iv., xxiii., xxxi.; de Harlez, *Avesta*[2], Paris, 1881; Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta*, 3 vols., Paris, 1892-93; Söderblom, *Ur Avesta*, Stockholm, 1908; Mills, *The Gāthās of Zarathushtra*, London, 1900; Bartholomae, *Die Gāthās des Awesta*, Strassburg, 1905.

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v. *GENERAL DISCUSSIONS*: West, 'Contents of the Nasks' (translation of the Dīnkarṭ passages on the subject)=*SBE* xxxvii.; Spiegel, *Erānische Alterthumskunde*, iii., Leipzig, 1878, pp. 771-797; Haug, *Essays on the Parsis*[3], London, 1884; Ayuso, *Los Pueblos iranios y Zoroastro*, Madrid, 1874, pp. 31-55; Geldner, 'Awestalitteratur,' in *GIrP* ii., Strassburg, 1896-1904, pp. 1-53 (Eng. translation by Mackichan, in *Avesta, Pahlavi, and Ancient Persian Studies in Honour of . . . Sanjana*, Strassburg, 1904, pp. 2-82); Browne, *Literary History of Persia*, i., London, 1902, pp. 95-102; Sanjana, *Zarathushtra and Zarathushtrianism in the Avesta*, Leipzig, 1906; Mills, *Zarathushtra (Zoroaster), Philo, the Achæmenids, and Israel*, Chicago, 1906. See also the literature cited under artt. GABARS, PARSIS, ZOROASTER, etc.

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AVICENNA, AVICENNISM.—1. **Life.**—The name 'Avicenna' is the Latinized form of the Hebrew 'Aven Sīnā,' the transcription of the Arabic 'Ibn Sīnā.' Abū 'Alī al-Ḥusain ibn 'Abd Allah ibn Sīnā was born in the year A.H. 370 (A.D 980-981), in the city of Kharmaitan. The son of a money-changer, and very precocious as a child, he received a first-class education. According to Musalmān custom, he began by learning the Qur'ān and belles-lettres (*adab*). He then studied Indian arithmetic under the guidance of a greengrocer. His next tutor was a philosopher called Nātili, otherwise unknown, who came to reside with his father at Bokhara, and taught the boy the elements of Logic, Euclid, and the Almagest. Avicenna studied medicine without the help of a teacher, and, while quite young, began to visit the sick. Aristotle's *Metaphysics* presented great difficulty to him at first. He read it forty times without understanding it, but at last grasped its purport by means of al-Fārābī's commentaries.

His medical talent soon brought him into favour with royal households. He cured the Sāmānid Sultan of Bokhara, Nuḥ, son of Manṣūr, and then became one of his intimate friends. This gave him access to the Sultan's library, a very valuable one, which shortly afterwards was unfortunately burned. Avicenna was officially employed at the court of Bokhara. Nevertheless, he soon turned his back on it, and travelled through many towns in search of a suitable patron. After short sojourns in Korkanj, Nasā, Abīward, and Tūs, he arrived at Jorjān, where he became connected with al-Juzjānī, who afterwards became his disciple. In fact, it is to him we are indebted for the rest of his life-story. The first part of this biography is culled from Avicenna's own account, which has been preserved by Ibn Abī Uṣaibia. This work is doubly precious to us because there are very few autobiographies in Arabic literature.

The *Shaikh*, as Avicenna was called, continued to lead this wandering life, like many savants of his time, in the hope of finding a powerful and faithful patron, whose influence and favour would be lasting. He became, for a time, the protégé of an admirer in Jorjān, then of the Princess of Rai; but he soon passed on to Kazvīn and Hamadān. He cured the Amir of Hamadān, and was entrusted with the post of Vizier. But his term of government was not a happy one. He accordingly renounced all public functions, and, hidden in the house of a druggist, became immersed in the composition of his greatest works. As he had a strong desire to leave Hamadān, he applied secretly to the Amir of Iṣfahān. The Amir of Hamadān discovered this step and straightway imprisoned him; but his captivity did not interrupt his literary work. After many adventures, he succeeded in escaping along with his brother, Juzjānī, and two servants, all five disguised as Ṣūfīs, and at last found a sure refuge with the Buwayhid prince Alā ad-Daula, who reigned in Iṣfahān. There he received the honour and dignities he so well deserved; and there he enjoyed, what he appreciated far more than any honours, tranquillity. At night, he held philosophical meetings, over which the Amir himself sometimes presided.

And meantime he finished his greatest works. Avicenna died in A.H. 428 (A.D. 1036–7), at the age of 58, in the course of a journey, made in the train of his master, to Hamadan.

His biography gives the impression of very great activity—an activity, too, which was exercised in more ways than one. Avicenna loved wine and pleasure almost as much as intellectual work; and he committed excesses which shortened his life. Legend has seized upon his character, and has made of him a sort of powerful but beneficent sorcerer, the hero of strange adventures and burlesque farces. A whole volume of Turkish tales is devoted to him.

2. Works.—Avicenna's works are very numerous. In Philosophy, the greatest is *ash Shifā* ('the Cure'). The Shaikh composed it by degrees at his different residences during his wanderings. When it was finished, he made an abridgment of it entitled *Najāt* ('Healing'). This abridgment, written in very concise language, but clear and logical, is suitable for study. Another famous philosophical work is entitled *Ishārāt*. The full title is *Kitāb al-ishārāt wa'l-tanbīhāt*, that is to say, 'Book of theorems and propositions.' Juzjāni considered this Avicenna's best work, while he himself put a high value on it. It has been commented on by the scholar Nasīr ad-Dīn Tusi († A.H. 672 [A.D. 1273–4]).

Avicenna's other philosophical treatises are: *Philosophy el-Arudi*, *Philosophy el-Alāi*, so called from the names of the patrons to whom they are dedicated; *Guide to Wisdom*, composed by the Shaikh when in prison, and often commented on; an epistle on *The Fountains of Wisdom*, printed several times in the East; several treatises on *Logic*, one of which forms a part of the *Najāt*; a treatise *On the Soul*; a short poem on *The Soul*, rather a mysterious piece, which has been commented on; an epistle on *The Human Faculties and their Perceptions*, printed at Constantinople; lastly, a series of mystical treatises, and a few poems in Persian.

In Medicine, Avicenna composed the voluminous work entitled *Canon of Medicine*, so celebrated in the Middle Ages. He also produced works on the different sciences, abridged Euclid and the Almagest, and devoted some time to Astronomy. Shortly before his death, he asked Ala ad-Daula for permission to resume the astronomical observations which had been interrupted by troubles and wars. He was also credited in the Middle Ages with some treatises on Alchemy.

3. Antecedents and characteristics.—Avicenna belongs to the school which in Arabic literature took the name of 'School of Philosophers' (*al-falāsifa*). This name denotes all the philosophers who made a special study of Greek works, and the scholars who translated them. Shahrastāni (tr. Haarbrücker, ii. 212 f.) gives a list of about twenty who, before Avicenna's time, received this title of Philosopher. Among them are the Christian or Sabæan translators, Hunain son of Isḥāq, Thābit son of Qurra, Yaḥyā son of Adi. Among the Musalmāns, the most celebrated representatives of this school, before Avicenna, are al-Kindi and al-Fārābī. Of these, al-Kindi is the real organizer of Arabic Scholasticism, while to al-Fārābī Avicenna is greatly indebted in Metaphysics, as he acknowledges, and probably also in Logic and Psychology. It is now generally granted that this school was a development of Neo-Platonism rather than strictly Peripatetic. Avicenna seems to have cleared up and systematized the work of his predecessors. In the following account of his original work, we shall not consider the medical or merely scientific portions, but confine our attention to his philosophical outlook.

4. Philosophy.—Avicenna's Philosophy may be sub-divided as follows: Logic, Physics, Psychology, Metaphysics, Mysticism, and Ethics. This division is in conformity with the custom of his school.

(1) *Logic.*—The parts of the *Najāt* relating to Logic were translated into French by Pierre Vattier (see Lit. at end of art.). The *Ishārāt* also contains some important passages in this connexion. In a treatise on the *Classification of the Sciences*, Avicenna gives Logic a very prominent place indeed among the sciences. His reason is not only the importance of Logic in itself, but also the comparatively extensive knowledge that the Arabs had of Aristotle's logical works. They were not so intimate with his other philosophical works. In this same treatise Avicenna further subdivides the science of Logic into nine different parts, which correspond respectively to the eight books of Aristotle, preceded by Porphyry's *Isagoge*, one of the best-known works of the Oriental Middle Ages.

The first part, corresponding to the *Isagoge*, is a kind of general philosophy of language, and is occupied with the terms of speech and their abstract elements; the second treats of simple abstract ideas, applicable to all beings, and is called by Aristotle the *Categories*; the third deals with the composition of simple ideas in order to form propositions, which is the subject of the *Hermeneutics*; the fourth unites the propositions together to form demonstrations, and corresponds to the First *Analytics*; the fifth discusses the conditions to be fulfilled by the premisses of reasoning, and is like the Second *Analytics*; the sixth, seventh, and eighth parts respectively treat of probable reasoning, false reasoning, and the art of persuading, and correspond to the *Topics* or *Dialectics*, the *Sophistic*, and *Rhetoric*. The ninth and last part treats of discourses whose aim is to stir the soul or the imagination, like the *Poetics*.

Logic, then, is taken here in a very broad sense; syllogistic is only a part of it. Syllogistic with Avicenna has no very special quality except that of being clear and well arranged, free from vain subtleties and all scholastic trifling.

Although, as we have seen, Avicenna gave Logic a very important place, he did not, at the same time, exaggerate its power. He shows very clearly that this power is, above all, negative. 'The aim of Logic,' he says in the *Ishārāt*, 'is to provide mankind with a rule, the observance of which will prevent him from erring in his reasoning.' Logic then, strictly speaking, does not discover truths, but helps man to make the best use of those he already possesses, and prevents him from making a wrong use of them.

Reasoning, according to Avicenna, starts from terms settled at the outset — the first data of experience and the first principles of understanding. The chain of deductions proceeding by a known deduced from a previously known is not unlimited; it must have a starting-point, found outside of the reasoning, which will be the base of the logical fabric. First, from direct experiences or ideas, descriptions or definitions are formed, and then, by means of these, arguments are arranged. Avicenna cleverly explains what definition is: by definition man is enabled to represent objects; by argument he is able to persuade. Avicenna gives both the senses and the reason a share in the formation of the primary data of the sciences. According to him, imagination always supports reason; opinion also, and even memory, fulfil the same office. There are primary principles which all hold because of common feeling, or because of the opinion of scholars which the illiterate do not contradict; others, again, arise from habits formed in childhood; and others are based on the experiences of life. All these principles (of feeling) join with the first principles, or principles of reason, which are produced in a man by his intellectual faculty without requiring the slightest conscious effort to persuade him of them. The mind realizes itself convinced and is

not even aware of how the conviction has arisen. A self-evident example of these first principles is: 'The whole is greater than the part.' This philosophy is very sound. It is a scholasticism, not yet antiquated, open and sincere, in many places recalling the analyses of Leibniz.

Avicenna further discusses the form and matter of definitions and arguments, distinguishes between definition and description, and sums up, in the manner of the Peripatetics, the different kinds of questions that arise in science: first of all, what a thing is, and if it is; next, where it is, when it is, how it is; and, lastly, why it is. We see here an application of the doctrine of the Categories. Avicenna recognizes the four causes — material, formal, efficient, and final. He shows that they may all appear together in a definition. Thus an axe may be defined as 'an iron implement, of such and such a shape, for cutting wood.' At the very beginning of his Logic, Avicenna explains species, difference, property, and common accident, which together furnish another method of constituting definition.

The Sciences are founded on experiences and reasonings. They have objects, questions, and premisses. As there are universal premisses (see above), so each science has its own peculiar premisses. The different objects of the sciences establish a hierarchy among themselves, according to their dignity. Besides this, the sciences are divided into theoretical science and practical science. The principal subjects of theoretical science are Physics, Mathematics, and Theology; and of practical, Applied Physics, Mechanics and Art, and Ethics. The problem of the classification of the sciences was very popular in the Middle Ages, both in the East and in the West.

(2) *Physics.*—In the philosophical part of his Physics, Avicenna discusses several of the primary ideas of the human intellect, *e.g.* power, time, and movement. He desires from Physics a first acquaintance with the ideas which Scholasticism employs in Logic and Metaphysics, that is to say, with the ideas of form and matter and the categories. The ideas of form and matter are suggested by observation of the physical world: 'Physical bodies, strictly speaking, are constituted of two principles, matter and form; then there are attached to them the accidents which arise from the existence of the nine categories.' Scholasticism divides these accidents into primary qualities, which are inherent in the body, and secondary qualities, which can be taken away without annihilating the body, but which contribute to its perfection.

Avicenna's conception of power is more closely allied to dynamics than to statics. He is interested in the energy acting from within the body rather than in the forces which move it from without. Like Aristotle, he allows that each body has a natural place, to which it always returns, by some hidden power, when it has been removed from it. The commonest example of these innate powers is 'weight.' This idea of power is developed in Psychology and Metaphysics. In Physics there is no infinite power. Its effects are always either greater or less. Avicenna recognized the principle of mechanics that 'what is gained in power is lost in speed.'

Time he explains by movement, and it cannot be imagined otherwise. Time cannot be conceived in immobility; it would then be of fixed duration, and no longer true time. 'Bodies,' says Avicenna, 'are in time, not in their essence, but because they are in movement, and movement is in time.' Time was created, and it is nowhere except in itself. For the world in general, it is measured by the movement of the stars.

Avicenna also speaks of the locality of bodies, then of space and impenetrability. He tries to show, by somewhat subtle reasoning, that bodies cannot move in a vacuum, because, he thinks, the dimensions of a vacuum are impenetrable, from which he concludes that a vacuum does not exist. He does not admit the possibility of actual infinity. Like the ancients, he believes that the world is finite, and that there is outside of it neither fullness nor emptiness, but absolute nothingness. He admits, again, that bodies are divisible *in potentia* to infinity, and he rejects atomism. Atomism had its partisans at this time, the *mutakallim* ('theologians'), with whom Avicenna disputes. In this connexion too, he analyzes the idea of contact very cleverly.

Avicenna unfortunately hardly managed to rid himself of the errors of Peripatetic Physics, although he had the opportunity several times. Yet, from a philosophical point of view, his account, besides forming interesting reading, bears witness to a very acute intellect.

(3) *Psychology.*—In Avicenna's doctrine, Psychology is carefully systematized, and adheres to the scholastic form. Beings, and also the faculties, are classified methodically according to a hierarchic arrangement. The general plan of this grand construction is as follows:

There are three kinds of minds. These are, in ascending order, the vegetable mind, the animal mind, and the reasonable or human mind.

The vegetable mind, or nature, possesses three faculties: (1) nutritive power, which, when resident in a body, changes another body into the form of the first; (2) power of growing, by which the body itself increases, without changing its form, until it has attained its full maturity; (3) power of generation, which draws from the body a part similar to itself *in potentia*, which will, in its turn, produce other bodies similar to it *in actu*.

The animal mind possesses two kinds of faculties: motive faculties and apprehensive or perceptive faculties. (1) The motive faculties embrace appetitive power and efficient power. The appetitive power itself is either attractive or repulsive. If attractive, it is simply desire, concupiscence; if repulsive, it is irascibility, passion. The efficient power, which is the producer of movement, resides in the motor nerves and the muscles. (2) The perceptive faculties of the animal mind are classified as external and internal. The former include the five senses—sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. The latter have their beginning in the common sense, a sort of centre in which all the perceptions assemble before being elaborated by the higher faculties. The common sense is situated in the front part of the brain. The first faculty to act on the perceptions is the formative faculty or imagination. It strips the sensible form of the conditions of place, situation, and quantity, and then retains it after the object has ceased to make an impression on the senses. The formative is followed by the cogitative faculty, which works first of all by way of abstraction on the perceptions, now prepared, and draws notions out of them. The estimative faculty next groups these notions into what might be called judgments, but which are quite instinctive and not intellectual. This faculty it is which constitutes 'animal intelligence.' For example, the sheep knows by it to flee from the wolf. The last of the faculties of the animal mind is memory, which is situated in the back part of the brain.

The human mind alone possesses intelligence. This intelligence is divided into active intelligence, or practical reason, upon which morality depends, and speculative intelligence, or theoretical reason, which perceives ideas. The perception of ideas is built up through three faculties, which act so as to make the intelligence pass from mere power to actuality. The first of these faculties, the material intellect, is only a general possibility of knowing; the second, the intellect of possession, recognizes first principles; the third is that which is directly fitted to receive the forms of things that are intelligible. It is called the perfected intellect. It seizes hold of that which is intelligible, when, outside the human mind, it unites with the 'active intellect.'

There naturally arise, in the course of this theory, physiological questions regarding the functions of the senses and the localization of the different faculties. Avicenna treats of these as

best he could at a time when the biological sciences were as yet hardly in their infancy.

For example, he discusses the manner in which visual images are transmitted to the eyes, and draws a parallel between two processes of explanation, which he attributes respectively to Aristotle and Plato. He accepts Aristotle's method and rejects Plato's.

The discussion of the intelligence also brings up the question of universals. This question was not so pre-eminently important in Arabic as in Western scholasticism. Avicenna is a realist. Like the Neo-Platonists, he admits that the intelligibles, which are universals, exist in the active intellect. The human intelligence comprehends them *in actu*, when it unites with the active intellect. It also frees them from the particulars which the senses recognize. But this process of abstraction is not sufficient; it is only preparatory, and gives the comprehension of the universals only *in potentia*. Before this can pass to actuality, man's intelligence must become united with a superior intelligence. The reasonable mind starts from the sensible, and little by little rises above it, approaching meanwhile the region of universal realities. Psychology ends in Metaphysics.

The following are Avicenna's proofs of the spirituality of the soul. The soul perceives its own peculiar essence; intellectual power perceives ideas apart from organs; the locale of intelligibility cannot be a body. The immortality of the soul follows directly from its spirituality. The dependence of the soul on the body is not essential but accidental. Another form of this proof is that the soul is a simple substance.

Avicenna believes that the soul is created at the same time as the body is formed, and is to a certain extent in harmony with the body it is to animate. This condition of compatibility with the body makes metempsychosis impossible.

(4) *METAPHYSICS.*—There is one part of Avicenna's Metaphysics which seems quite old-fashioned now, and we must go back in imagination to the beginning of science to find any sense in it. It treats of the procession of the superior intelligences and the production of the celestial spheres. On the other hand, there is a part which seems still good and sound, although it has a systematic character no longer found in modern works of philosophy. This part treats of primary cause and necessary being. The following is, very briefly, the theory of the spheres:

The scale of beings, mentioned above [see § (3)], from the vegetable world up to man, is continued beyond man into the region of the stars. At the top of this scale is the Necessary Being, the principle of principles, who is perfect unity. From this first Being emerges the world of ideas, which is a collection of pure intelligences, simple substances, exempt from multiplicity and change. Below this world of ideas or intelligences is the world of souls. The souls are essences, bound to pure intelligences, which animate bodies. The bodies that they animate in this supra-human region are the stars, which are classed after the manner of ancient astronomy. Beneath the intelligences of the stars, below the last of them, which animates the moon, is the active intellect. From it flows the sublunary world.

Very noticeable in this theory is the analysis of the world of ideas into active intellect and astronomical intelligences. The unchangeableness of the stars is an old belief which was disputed down to the time of Galileo; and the comparison of their spheres with a superior kind of animal is an idea which dates back further than the Hellenic world, and which was long dear to the East.

In connexion with this system, which strikes a modern reader as uncouth, Avicenna discusses in a dignified manner the metaphysical theory of causality. He considers that the pure intelligences are the causes of each other in descending order, and the causes also of the souls of the spheres, and, through them, of their bodies. He holds, then, that intelligence is essentially active; it is even productive of being; and cause usually is simply intelligence. Elsewhere cause is identified with being itself; it is perceptible especially in the primary Being, who is intelligence and principle at the same time, and includes in His essence everything of which He is the principle. 'He comprehends everything in a universal manner, and at the same time no attribute of any particular thing, in the heavens or on the earth, is hid from Him, not even the weight of a *dirrah* (an atom).' He is, at the same time, a final and an efficient cause. The final cause precedes the efficient *in potentia; in actu* the efficient precedes. The cause of the efficient cause is the final end and aim.

God is not the actual moving power of the stars, for this function would beget a certain multiplicity in Him, and, according to the spirit of Avicennism, He must above all safeguard His simplicity. He moves the stars by the intermediation of the first caused, that is, of the first intelligence which springs from Him. This intelligence knows itself and it knows God. From this double knowledge arises a duality. The duality then changes to triplicity when the first caused still knows itself as possible in itself, and as necessary in the primary Being. In this way this philosophy introduces multiplicity into the world.

The doctrine of universals reappears in connexion with that of causes. There are causes of kind and causes of individual; the general has its own causes, the particular has others. A thing has a cause of its quiddity and another of its being, *i.e.* a cause by which it is what it is, and another by which it exists. If a thing is to be individualized, its idea must be able to receive the effect of particular causes.

The idea of the necessary Being is the terminus of the theory of causality. The necessary Being as such has no need of causes. He exists from the beginning complete, with all His qualities. He is absolute. He is pure good, for He possesses the perfection of existence, and existence in itself is goodness: existence, always *in actu*, is pure good. He is pure truth, for that is called true which can justly be said to exist, and, as His existence is necessary, He is therefore absolute truth.

The theory then takes quite a geometrical form. A demonstration composed of three lemmas proves the necessary Being:

(1) All possibles cannot spring from one possible cause, on which their series mounts up infinitely; (2) a series of causes finite in number cannot be possible in themselves and necessary to each other, so that they depend on one another in a circle; (3) everything produced has a cause, and every cause is determinating. This consequently signifies that all possibles must have cause, that causes are not linked together infinitely, and do not return on themselves. Therefore the series of possibles ends in the necessary Being.

This theory is a very fine effort to prove God and to deduce the world from Him in a vigorous way, by a dialectic of mathematical precision. Faith in the power of reason is manifested in this system. To us, who are now more sceptical, it seems pure rationalism, but rationalism in its infancy and slightly deceived by itself. It is redeemed, however, by its vigour and power.

(5) *MYSTICISM.*—It is doubtful whether Avicenna was really a mystic in the religious sense of the word. Here again he has followed the custom of the Neo-Platonic school, regarding mysticism as primarily a subdivision of philosophy. Ibn Ṭufail seems to say that Avicenna had a kind of esoteric doctrine called *ḥikmat-al-ishrāq*, 'philosophy of illumination,' which really contained his true ideas. But we know from one of the treatises of Suhrawardi al-Maqtūl that this philosophy is almost exactly Avicenna's own Neo-Platonism with a different nomenclature.

Passing over mysticism as related to asceticism,

ecstasies, and illumination, we shall confine our attention to Avicenna's teachings on Providence and the future happiness of the soul, in so far as they are complementary to metaphysics and morals. He describes Providence as the fact that the whole world is encompassed by the knowledge of primary Being. This knowledge is cognizant of the most perfect order as that which flows naturally from the Being. The theory of optimism, exhibited in this idea, is similar to Leibniz's: evil is not a part of Divine decree *in essentia*; its place there is accidental. Avicenna recognizes the three kinds of evil: want, physical suffering, and sin. We find evil only in what is still *in potentia*, and has not yet attained perfection. It affects only the individual; species are shielded from it. Evil, moreover, is always a good from some superior point of view. 'It does not enter into the plan of Divine wisdom to abandon lasting and universal good, because of fleeting evil in individual things.' Like Leibniz, Avicenna decides that, however common it may be, evil is not the general rule; it is only the exception to the good.

After death, the reasonable soul attains perfection. To effect this, it must become conscious and intelligent, and receive within it the form of harmony and well-being which pervades the world of superior essences. It unites with this idea of perfection, and so becomes like it. Only the soul which has been prepared by the practice of the virtues enjoys this happiness. Otherwise its taste is vitiated; it cannot attain its end, and accordingly suffers. But if a man has lived a mediocre life, his actions never reaching the height of his intentions, his soul, when freed from the body, becomes the centre of a struggle between his pure desires and his bad habits. Only when purified by this grievous struggle does it attain perfect bliss.

(6) *ETHICS.*—Avicenna, enamoured of the speculative part of philosophy, was on that account less interested in practical philosophy and moral analysis. In his mystical works, he has some fine pages on morals, but their character is distinctly metaphysical. He also wrote on ethics as well as a short treatise on *Government*, which was published recently. It is written in a practical spirit, but is really an elementary treatise in economics. It explains how a man should govern himself, his wives, his children, and his servants.

From the very earliest times, humanity felt a need of organization. First of all, man had to settle in places where he could most easily and comfortably live. This led to the setting up and choice of dwellings. Once established, these required looking after. This duty was entrusted to the woman. From the woman the family was born, and, as it increased, servants were added to the household.

Man's need of subsistence was also the primary promoter of commerce and the arts. Avicenna divides the arts into three kinds: (1) those which are dependent on intelligence of the highest order, *e.g.* guidance, judgment, counsel; these are exercised only by the great; (2) those dependent on education, *e.g.* writing, speaking, medicine; (3) those founded on strength and courage, as military arts. Every individual should learn one of these and apply himself to it.

The good wife is her husband's associate in ruling and guiding. The best kind of wife is intelligent, religious, fond of her children, and sparing in words.

The management of the family is based on fear, dignity, and care. If a man does not make himself feared, his wives will domineer over him. The husband must see to the dignity of the family life by providing for clothing, veiling his wives, and preventing any jealousy from arising among them. The wife must give unremitting attention to her children and servants. Avicenna says a few words about the education of the one and the choice of the other. The woman whose mind is not occupied with domestic cares thinks of nothing except how she can best attract the attention of men by the beauty of her dress, and forgets the honour due to her husband.

5. Avicenna's school.—The school of Avicenna does not boast any very celebrated names. His philosophy was combated and refuted among the Musalmāns of the East by orthodox theologians, especially by al-Ghazālī. For the history of the school of 'Philosophers' proper in Western Islām, see AVERROËS, AVERROISM.

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(*b*) The *Najāt* was published at Rome along with the *Canon of Medicine* in 1593; the *Ishārāt*, ed. Forget, Leyden, 1892; *La Logique du fils de Sīnā*, tr. Vattier, Paris, 1658.

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BON CARRA DE VAUX.

AWE.—In the presence of an awe-inspiring object, we feel ourselves subdued, but are placid: we are powerfully laid hold of, but neither resist nor desire to be set free. On the contrary, we are drawn towards the object, and its presence is welcomed by us, though with a serious and pensive joy. The affections, then, are enlisted, as well as the imagination. The appeal is made to that part of our nature that is open to influences from what is higher or greater or grander or better than ourselves. We feel our inferiority, indeed, but there is no resentment; we are conscious that the superiority in the case is the complement, and not the contradiction, of ourselves. This is in line with the experience of the finite resting on, and complemented by, the infinite, and of 'the less being blessed of the better.'

Greater, higher, grander, better—these are the conditions of the possibility of the emotion of awe; and there is the further condition that these should not appear as threatening us with danger, but as friendly, or, at any rate, as not unfriendly. If all were on our own level, this peculiar emotion could not arise; and if we were threatened with evil, a contrary emotion would be aroused. The antithesis to the awe-inspiring in objects is the commonplace and the obvious, or the despicable and the mean—everything that tends to lower, and not to elevate, the soul. Dealing with what impresses us, awe is by its very nature contemplative and ennobling; it allies itself with our ideals and our aspirations, and is helpful towards enabling us to purify and to perfect character. That is its ethical value. Hence, mystery intensifies it—the unknown and the unknowable. We cannot but be serious in the presence of mystery. The feeling of the mysterious, when it takes possession of us, necessarily subdues us and keeps us humble.

We shall better understand the nature of the emotion, if we note the objects that call it forth. Some of these are impersonal, and some are personal. Of the impersonal causes, we have (*a*) phenomena of nature showing either the vast or the incomprehensible, objects that transcend our power of understanding or that give special scope and exercise to our imagination—such, therefore, as are exceptionally impressive and create in us a certain indefinite yearning, wonder, and admiration; *e.g.*, the starry heavens, the magnitude or vastness of

space, the infinity of time, the origin of life, the mystery of generation, and the like. But, besides these, we have (*b*) intellectual theories and moral principles—generalizations of commanding sweep and laws of transcendent excellence. Of the two things that made the profoundest impression on Kant, the Moral Law was one: the grandeur of it, the unconditionality of it, the authority of it—all contributed to make it awe-inspiring to a degree. In all this we have the feeling of feebleness or unworthiness on our part, and the contrast of might and worth set over against our impotence and imperfections. Next, we have (*c*) awe as associated with persons—an intellectual genius like Plato or Aristotle, a literary genius like Shakespeare or Goethe, a scientific genius like Newton, an ethical or a religious genius like St. John or St. Paul. But, of course, the highest of all examples is God—supreme in Majesty, the source of all the excellences ('wisdom, love, might'), and the fountain of Holiness. We have here the realization of the Ideal, which points the contrast, —'Woe is me! for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips: for mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord of hosts' (Is 6^5). It is the contrast of the sinful and the weak, in presence of the Pure and the Strong; and yet, the purity and strength do not repel but attract us. It is felt that underneath the majesty and greatness lie beneficence and mercy: in the hands of the Supreme, we feel ourselves secure. Again, we have (*d*) things sacred causing awe—things associated, therefore, with the Divine. Such are shrines and holy places (see art. 'Bethel' in Hastings' *DB* and in *EBi*), the soul-moving services of religion on special occasions—the dispensing of Communion in Protestant Churches and the Elevation of the Host in the Church of Rome. Last of all, and akin to this, is (*e*) the awe that is associated with solemnity—*e.g.* the presence of Death, the death-chamber, funeral rites. Speaking of St. Edmund, Carlyle says:—

'They embalmed him with myrrh and sweet spices, with love, pity, and all high and awful thoughts; consecrating him with a very storm of melodious adoring admiration, and sun-dyed showers of tears;—joyfully, yet with awe (as all deep joy has something of the awful in it), commemorating his noble deeds and Godlike walk and conversation while on Earth' (*Past and Present*, bk. ii. ch. iii.).

Now, this being so, there can be little difficulty in perceiving the relation between awe and fear. The dictionary subsumes the one under the other: it makes awe simply a species of fear or dread. No greater error could be committed; for neither in their nature nor in their results have the two much in common. It would be ill both for ethics and for religion if they had.

It is the peculiarity of fear (*q.v.*) to agitate and unsettle us. It deranges the body and unhinges the nerves, producing well-marked outward effects (shaking of the limbs and frame, disturbance of vocal utterance, erection of the hair, and such like); but it has well-marked psychical effects also—intellectual and volitional. The first effect of fear is to stimulate us to resistance or to circumvention, and, if the terror is not excessive, it braces us for the effort; but, beyond that stage, it becomes detrimental and may be ultimately disastrous. However exhilarating fear in moderation may be, its normal action on the intellect is disturbing and disconcerting: it destroys the power of correctly appreciating the situation, and creates a tendency to magnify the danger, and so an inability to perceive the right course of action to be pursued if the impending evil is to be prevented. If at one moment the intellect, under fear, counsels resistance, at another moment it encourages to flight; till, last of all, it becomes powerless to counsel in any form—it simply collapses. So that, thus far, fear may be defined as 'nothing else but a surrender of the succours which reason offereth' (*Wisdom of Solomon* 17^{12}). But the effect on the will is no less conspicuous. Danger, if moderate, may act advantageously on the will and arouse it to effective opposition; but, beyond this point, the result is disquieting and weakening, until, in extreme cases, absolute paralysis sets in, and the subject can do nothing but remain helpless and await his fate. And so, fear *repels*, and does not attract; and its tendency is to *paralyze* both intellect and will and bring about disaster. Moreover, when the moment of fear is past, our attitude towards the object that created it is one of *hatred* or *dislike*.

Not so with awe. In most of the respects now enumerated, it is the antithesis of fear. It has a calming and quieting influence on the body (as seen in the bowed head, the soft walk, the restrained speech, and the reverential look, of the subject of it); and, inasmuch as it *attracts*, instead of repelling, it produces satisfaction and contentment, and a desire to continue in the presence or under the influence of the object that inspires it. In awe, we feel ourselves in the hands of superior power, but power that is conceived as beneficent or not maleficent, as well-disposed, or at least not ill-disposed, towards us, and under whose protection we may rest *secure*. The consciousness of danger (and therefore fear) is wanting, and the feeling of reliance takes its place. We trust the awe-inspiring object, and are attracted towards it, and we rest in the experience of it, and are satisfied. Hence the importance and significance of awe as a religious emotion, with its concomitants of reverence and veneration. It lies at the root of worship, and is the indispensable condition of the highest spiritual peace.

Hence, further, awe enters into the sublime. Not every sublime object, indeed, need beget awe (for pain sometimes is associated with sublimity, and fear is a distinctly felt ingredient of it, producing uneasiness); but much that is sublime also impresses us with awe. Both are results of the manifestation of power or excellence, and both are most effective when associated with Personality. Moral heroism, for instance, and magnanimity are of this stamp—greatness of soul rising superior to misfortune or adverse circumstances. 'Athanasius contra mundum' (a unique figure defying opposition, standing erect in solitary grandeur in the face of fearful odds) can never cease to move us strongly—to draw forth our admiration and to enlist our regard; and there are many acts of self-sacrifice and many lives of disinterested devotion that are sublime and awe-inspiring in the highest degree. They elevate our thoughts and win our affections; they purify our souls, and we feel that we are all the better for the contemplation of them.

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WILLIAM L. DAVIDSON.

AXE.—There were several forms of axe, or adze, in use amongst the Greeks, as amongst other nations; but a special controversy has arisen over the πέλεκυς or λάβρυς with double blade, owing to its association with Zeus Labrandeus.

The double axe is derived from one of the Stone Age types, in which the handle passes through the middle, and the stone is thinned away to the two flanges. Examples of this type may be seen in

any good collection, such as the Pitt-Rivers Museum at Oxford. The type was first translated into bronze, and then the form was modified, the wings growing and assuming a more curved outline. It may have been some variety of this axe that permitted the feat of Odysseus.[1] The axe is an ordinary tool or weapon in common use. In the black-figured vase-paintings of the Birth of Athene, Hephaistos uses it to split the divine skull.[2] Specimens with the marks of use on them have been found with other tools in a carpenter's shop at Anthedon,[3] and with other tools at Gournia and Palaikastro in Crete,[4] and at Troy.[5] A late Attic relief shows a youth holding one as a tool.[6] On other works of art, Ino attempts to kill Phrixus with this axe,[7] Theseus fights with it,[8] the Amazons are frequently armed with it.[9] It is represented as part of Gaulish war-spoil, along with other arms and weapons, upon many reliefs;[10] and it was dedicated as war-spoil.[11] It was used to slay the sacrificial victim by the Hittites and at Pagasæ,[12] and in Crete, where a priestess is represented with one in each hand,[13] and there is other evidence to be considered anon. Here is enough to prove that this axe was a war-weapon, or tool, and a sacrificial implement in common use.

We are now in a position to understand its meaning in the hands of divine persons. Zeus of Labranda is well known to have held it:[14] but so does Artemis,[15] so does Dionysus,[16] so does Apollo in Asia Minor,[17] so do the local heroes in Asia[18] and elsewhere.[19] These use it, no doubt, as a weapon of war; and Zeus with his axe manifestly protects Labranda as Athene armed cap-à-pie protects Athens, or any other armed deity stands forth in his might. We may even fairly suggest that the name Labranda has some such relation to *labrys* as Damascus or Toledo to their famous sword-blades.

The use of the axe in sacrifice seems to be enough to account for its representation along with the ox-skull, first as a memorial of sacrifice, and then as a decorative scheme. Here our evidence comes largely from Crete and the Mycenæan age. Mr. A. J. Evans has found representations in which the ox-head is surmounted by an axe, the handle being fixed in the skull: one is a Knossian seal,[20] another a Mycenæan vase-painting from Salamis.[21] The object called by Evans 'horns of consecration' (see ÆGEAN RELIGION), which is obviously a stand of some sort, and apparently is a conventionalized ox-skull,[22] also had the axe fixed in it;[23] one was found in the Knossian shrine with a hole, and a small double axe of steatite lying near, so that it may be fairly assumed that the axe stood in the hole.[24] The axe also becomes an ornament of vases and other works of art.[1] We may compare with this the use of the ox-head with wreaths in a frieze, so common in Roman times; and the reliefs of ox-heads with other sacrificial implements carved on altars.[2] The axe shown is found carved with a late dedication to Apollo in Asia Minor, once apparently to commemorate the sacrifice of a bull.[3] It may perhaps be mentioned that the ox-skull, or its model, is hung up as a charm in gardens and vineyards by the modern Greeks, commonly in the Asiatic islands, and less commonly elsewhere.

The axe was an object of dedication, like any other weapon or tool. We have seen it as part of war-spoil; the axe was also dedicated to Apollo at Delphi;[4] and in the Dictæan cave of Zeus 19 axes were found,[5] along with 20 lance-heads, 25 darts, 160 knives, pins, and tweezers, a cart drawn by oxen, human and animal figures, vases, and other things. All the Cretan axes are *simulacra*, being too thin or too small for use; but most are perforated, and some have handles. Other tiny axes of this sort have been found, of different types: thick and solid, like stone axes; thin, and sometimes marked with dots like dice; sometimes the handles are perforated for hanging. These have been also dedicated to Zeus in Dodona, Olympia, and Palaikastro (Crete);[6] to Artemis in Arcadia,[7] in Ithaca,[8] and at Ephesus;[9] and to Athene and Artemis Orthia at Sparta.[10] The axe also becomes a motive of ornament;[11] and axes were found made of gold and bone in tombs and elsewhere.[12]

It is obvious that these dedications cannot be held to have any peculiar appropriateness to Zeus, because they are dedicated also to Athene, Apollo, and Artemis, and with them are found many other things that are not peculiar to Zeus. They are not for use; they may be either models of war-spoil,[13] or ornaments, or perhaps fractions of the axe-unit of exchange. Similar axes are known in modern times as fractions of the axe-unit, and there are indications that the unit was known in Greece;[14] or again, the shape may have remained as traditional after they ceased to be used in exchange.

It remains to discuss the graphic representations of the axe. The blocks that compose the walls of the palaces at Knossos and Phaistos are scored with a number of different signs, which occur either alone or in conjunction, just as the symbols of writing might do. Amongst these is the double axe, which is repeated alone a number of times on the four sides of a square pillar in the corridor at Knossos. Whether the pillar be sacred or not[15]—and there is at least room for doubt—there is no sufficient ground for regarding these signs as sacred. Such an explanation would account for only one out of many signs, all used together in the same way. It must also be

1 *Od.* xix. 572, with Monro's note.
2 Gerhard, *Auserlesene Vasenbilder*.
3 *Am. Journ. Arch.* vi. 104, pl. xv.
4 *Jahreshefte*, p. 44, pl. xii.; *BSA* ix. 133 (found in a dwelling-house, with needle, chisel, and knife).
5 Schmidt, *Schliemann's Sammlung*, 6135.
6 *Jahreshefte*, vi. 98. 7 *Annali*, xxxix. pl. c.
8 Stephani, *Compt. rend. S. Petersb.* 1867, 77.
9 *Ib.*, 1863, 128 ff.; *Recueil*, 148.
10 Espérandieu, *Recueil Gén. des Basrel. de la Gaule romaine*, i. 46, 533, 688, 691, 692, 700, 701, 712, 713, 715, 726, 733, 826; cf. 234, 239, 532, 698.
11 Plutarch, *Quæst. Gr.* 45.
12 Perrot and Chipiez, iv. 637; Ridgeway, *Early Age*, i. 270.
13 'Εφ' 'Αρχ., 1900, 37. 14 Plutarch, *Quæst. Gr.* 45.
15 On coins of Laodicea in Syria; Hogarth, *Ephesus*, 333.
16 Stephani, *loc. cit.* 1863, 128 ff.
17 *Cat. Brit. Sculpt.* 680; cf. *BSA* xi. 28.
18 *Ath. Mitth.* x. 12; *BCH* iv. 294.
19 *Jahresh.* vi. 98, fig. 96.
20 *BSA* ix. 114, fig. 70. 21 *JHS* xxi. 107, fig. 3.
22 *JHS* xxi. 135: the title really begs the question, as implying an ideal meaning.
23 *Ib.* 107. The silver ox-head found at Mycenæ had a hole, perhaps for the same purpose (*Arch. Anzeiger*, xviii. 161).
24 *BSA* viii. 96, fig. 55.

1 *BSA* vi. 109, ix. 115, fig. 71, etc.
2 *Recueil*, 317, 318, 320 ('taurobolium'). So at Eleusis we have carvings of crossed torches, sheaf, basket, and cista.
3 *BSA* xi. 38 ('Απόλλωνι Προπυλαίῳ 'Αχιλεὺς εὐξάμενος ἀνέθηκεν); *Arch. Zeit.* 28, p. 38, *Cat. Brit. Sculpt.* 681 (ἀνθέστησαν οἱ 'Αρτέμωνος υἱοὶ τὸ κατηαχθὲν στηλλάριον ὑπὸ τοῦ βοὸς 'Απόλλωνι Ταρσί).
4 Plutarch, *de Pyth. Or.* 12; Pausanias, v. xxix. 9, x. ix. 3, x. xiv. 1. An axe found in Calabria is inscribed as a butcher's tithe to Hera (*IGA* 543).
5 *BSA* vi. 109.
6 Carapanos, *Dodona*, pl. liv.; *Bronzen von Ol.* xxvi. 520–7; *BSA* xi. 306; Rouse, *Greek Votive Offerings*, 387–88, with figs.
7 *Jahresh.* iv. 69. 8 *BCH* xxx. 149.
9 Hogarth, *Ephesus*, 103, 333.
10 *BSA* xiii. 154, 46, fig. 6 *e*, with ten circular eyes stamped on it.
11 Hogarth, *Ephesus*, 333, pl. vi.; *BCH* iii. 129.
12 Rouse, *op. cit.* 388. 13 Cf. *BSA* viii. 258.
14 Rouse, *op. cit.* 92, 389, with pl. ii. and fig. 63.
15 A. J. Evans, 'Mycenean Tree and Pillar Cult,' in *JHS* xxi 106 ff.

remembered that these signs were certainly covered over with plaster, as some of them still partially are. The Italian excavators of Phaistos regard them as literary signs; they all, or nearly all, occur on gems. Several, including the double axe, occur on the literary tablets of Knossos, and are interpreted as writing by Evans himself.[1] They are probably masons' marks; and some of them, including the double axe, have been noticed on stone blocks, apparently used for masons' marks, in other places, as the old Hellenic blocks used to build the mediæval fortress of Cos,[2] and the stones of Heriot's Hospital, Edinburgh.[3]

The above is enough to show that the double axe is not necessarily sacred, or necessarily connected with Zeus. But this is no reason why the axe should not have been the object of worship. Axe-worship is, of course, not fetish-worship, as some have loosely called it; but instances are not uncommon of weapons being worshipped, whether as weapons or as iron. Evans, in his paper on 'Mycenean Tree and Pillar Cult,'[4] has alluded to the subject; and A. B. Cook has collected evidence for axe-worship outside Crete.[5] The evidence for Crete is of varying value: the most weighty piece of evidence is the representation on the Hagia Triadha sarcophagus: a priestess is pouring some red liquid into a jar between two double axes.[6] The other evidence, such as axes set between horns, held in the hands of god or priestess, or visible on the ground of engraved seals, is indeterminate; but these may strengthen the case for worship, if it be established otherwise. Cook publishes a cut of a priest sacrificing before a number of objects, including an ibex, a star, a crescent moon, and two knobbed sceptres with a (one-flanged) axe set upright upon a stool (Assyrian); a Persian seal shows a worshipper before a stool with similar objects upon it. A coin of Tenedos[7] shows an axe upright standing on steps between two supports; another, an axe connected with a jar by a fillet. These seem to be the most significant facts that bear on an axe-cult; it is impossible here to recount all that has been brought in evidence to prove it, or to discuss the far-reaching and often fanciful inferences that have been drawn from them. The reader, however, may be reminded that there are several distinct questions, which have been often confused: (1) Was there an axe-cult? (2) Was the axe specially connected with Zeus? (3) Was the axe a symbol of Zeus, that is, was it treated as Zeus because associated with Zeus? (4) Is λαβύρινθος derived from λάβρυς? (5) Is the Knossian palace the Labyrinth?

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given throughout the article. W. H. D. ROUSE.

AXIOM.—I. Meanings of the term.—The various senses in which the term 'axiom' is used are easily confused, and require to be carefully distinguished. We may mention five senses of the term, all of which are historically important. (1) Axiom in a predominantly *epistemological* sense: a proposition whose truth is self-evident; an immediately certain, objective truth. (2) Axiom in a predominantly *psychological* sense: a proposition of whose truth the man who calls it an axiom feels a fixed persuasion, while he regards the proposition as indemonstrable, and his faith as something fundamental and, for him, necessary; a proposition held to be true with an unwavering faith. (3) Axiom in a predominantly *logical* sense: a first principle which, itself not demonstrated, can be used as a basis for demonstrations. (4) Axiom in a predominantly *social* sense: an opinion which is, as a fact, accepted by all who are competent to understand its import. (5) Axiom in a predominantly *psycho-genetic* sense: an opinion which the innate constitution and the original instinctive tendencies of the mind lead us to accept, and which we therefore do not derive merely from our experience.

1. From the point of view of sense (1) all our knowledge is supposed to be either 'mediate' or 'immediate.' An axiom is a proposition known to be true, not 'mediately,' but 'immediately.' For this view, 'intuitive knowledge,' 'immediate insight,' 'direct assurance,' or 'evidence' is presupposed, as a possible form of knowledge and of consciousness. The criterion of an axiom is said to be that, when we consider the import of a given axiomatic proposition, this state of consciousness, this direct assurance, arises, and makes wholly unquestionable the truth of the particular axiom which comes under our observation. Here the stress is laid, therefore, first upon the *immediacy* of the insight in question. To think the axiom, and to know it to be true, are supposed to be simply inseparable acts. The assurance or 'intuitive knowledge' in question is further regarded according to sense (1) as *objective*. One does not mean by the term 'axiom,' when thus used, merely to point out the fact that a given person *feels sure* that this axiom is true. Sense (1) implies that whoever accepts the truth of the axiom 'intuitively knows,' that is, directly observes, the perfectly objective fact that the axiom is true.

2. Sense (2), on the contrary, lays stress upon what may turn out to be the *subjective necessity* with which some one *feels convinced* of the truth of the proposition. When such a feeling of necessity attends a conviction, and when no demonstration of the truth of the conviction can be given beyond the mere observation that, so long as one conceives the meaning of the proposition, one feels thus convinced, sense (2) requires one to call the proposition an axiom. Sense (2) therefore makes the criterion of an axiom *relative to the subject who feels the necessity*, and who is unable to give other reason for his conviction.

Sense (1) is present in the mind of Descartes when he speaks of propositions which we 'clearly and distinctly perceive to be true.' Sense (2) is emphasized if one lays stress upon some sort of 'unswerving' and, as one conceives, necessary 'faith' or 'assurance.' Aristotle maintains that the 'principle of contradiction' is immediately evident in sense (1). But in sense (2) various subjects, appealing each to his own subjective necessity, may regard as axioms propositions which other thinkers are known to regard as false. Thus the proposition that 'water cannot turn solid' might be regarded as an axiom in sense (2) by a dweller in the tropics, who, hearing for the first time a story of frosty weather in high latitudes, rejected it as essentially incredible, and found his unbelief wholly insurmountable.

Senses (1) and (2) are often confused. The question as to the relation between objective 'evidence' and subjective 'certainty' is central in the theory of knowledge, and only a thoroughgoing sceptic will deny that there is indeed a close connexion between at least *some* of our 'assurances' and the objective truth. But the danger of confounding mere 'conviction' with objective 'evidence' is manifest throughout the history both of science and of religion.

3. Sense (3) makes the use of the term 'axiom' *relative to a given or proposed theory or system*, consisting of propositions and of reasonings. In this third sense an axiom is a proposition which is not demonstrated in the course of the development of the system in question, but is assumed or accepted at the outset, and used as a basis for demonstrations that form parts of that system. If the system in question constitutes, or is regarded as constituting, the *whole* of the possible system of knowledge, then the axioms in sense (3) appear as

1 *JHS* xvii. 38–46, xxi. 273; *BSA* vi. pl. ii.
2 *Arch. Anzeiger*, xvi. 133.
3 *Heriot's Hospital* (Edinburgh), plates facing p. 174.
4 *JHS* xxi. 106 ff.
5 *Transactions of the Third International Congress for the History of Religions*, 1908, ii. 184–194; A. B. Cook, *Cretan Axe-Cult outside Crete*.
6 Cook, p. 189.
7 *Ib.* p. 184, figs. 2, 4; p. 191, fig. 14.

'absolutely first principles,' since, by hypothesis, they are essential to the rational demonstration of the truths of this system, and are nowhere to be proved in the course of any investigation that we can make. But if one is explicitly confining one's attention to some more or less *limited* province of knowledge, or to some special system of propositions, axioms in sense (3) may be entirely relative to that special system, and are then merely the principles presupposed, used, but not demonstrated, by the system in question.

Axioms in sense (3) might therefore be neither self-evident truths nor yet necessary convictions of anybody, but merely 'assumptions' or 'postulates.' On the other hand, sense (3), in so far as it requires an axiom to be a 'first principle,' emphasizes a character which we are all especially accustomed to connect with the term, namely, that character of logical *universality* which a majority of axiomatic propositions are very commonly regarded as possessing. Senses (1) and (2) could be satisfied by particular, or even by individual, propositions. Thus the proposition 'I suffer,' uttered by one who has toothache, may be viewed by the sufferer either as a necessary persuasion of his own or as a 'self-evident' objective truth. Various theories of knowledge have used such 'intuitive evidence' of present experience as the very type of axiomatic knowledge. But particular propositions and reports of experience can be used as the principles of a set of demonstrations only when they are asserted along with universal propositions. And therefore at least some axioms, in sense (3) of the term, must be universal assertions. It especially belongs to sense (3) to emphasize this universal character of at least part of the axioms of any theories.

Sense (3), in contrast with, and sometimes to the exclusion of, senses (1) and (2), has been made prominent in various modern logical discussions of the principles of theoretical science. Thus, by the 'axioms' of a given mathematical theory, recent writers mean, in many cases, propositions which one uses simply as the 'fundamental hypotheses' of the theory in question (*e.g.*, of the theory of some one of the 'non-Euclidean' or 'non-Archimedean' geometries, or of the Cantorean 'Theory of Assemblages'). One need not assert such hypotheses to be true, except in the sense that one treats them, at least provisionally, as self-consistent assumptions about a logically possible state of things, and uses them as 'principles' or as 'primitive propositions' in some statement of a theory. An axiom, in this sense, is often opposed to a *theorem*, which is a proposition that is shown to follow from the principles, and that is, in this sense, demonstrated in the course of the theory in question. In two different statements of a theory (*e.g.* in two different theoretical developments of geometry or of number-theory) decidedly different sets of 'hypotheses' or 'postulates' may be used as the axioms of the theory. In such cases what is an axiom in one statement of a theory may appear as a theorem in another statement, and conversely; and the concept of a 'first principle' becomes then relative, not merely to the theory in question, but to a particular way of stating that theory, and of showing that certain propositions follow from certain other propositions.

If one insists, as Aristotle did, upon sense (3) as applying to certain propositions which are said to form the indemonstrable principles of *all* science, so that, without these absolutely first principles, no system of knowledge whatever is possible, then indeed, *unless* one is a philosophical sceptic, one has to assert that the absolutely first principles are also axioms in sense (1). For if all science rests upon a determinate set of absolutely first principles, and if no science can demonstrate these principles, then either all science is uncertain or some principle is 'immediately evident.' Hence for Aristotle, and for those who follow his way of treating the theory of knowledge, there are propositions which are axioms both in sense (1) and in sense (3). In consequence of the Aristotelian tradition, senses (1) and (3) have therefore come to be viewed by many philosophers as actually inseparable; so that the 'first and fundamental truths' and the 'self-evident' or 'immediately known' propositions are, in discussions of the problems relating to axioms, not infrequently simply identified. But the logically important distinction between the relatively first principles of a given theory and the intuitively evident propositions (if such there be) has been brought afresh to light, especially by the modern logical investigations of scientific theories, and should never be forgotten in dealing with the topic. If a proposition is to be called an axiom both in sense (1) and in sense (3), special reasons (such, for instance, as those of Aristotle) should be advanced for asserting that this is the case. As a fact, it can never be 'self-evident' that a proposition is an axiom in sense (3); for one can ascertain that a principle is indeed a logical basis for certain demonstrations only by taking the trouble to go through the demonstrations themselves—a highly 'mediated' procedure.

4. Sense (4) uses as the criterion of an axiom the 'universal assent,' the 'consensus' of 'all rational beings,' or sometimes the consensus of all the 'competent,' of all the 'normal,' or of the 'wise,' or of some class of knowing beings whose common opinion in the matter is treated as the standard opinion. The criterion here in question has frequently been emphasized, and its history forms part of the long annals of the doctrine of Nature, or of 'the natural,' or of the 'Law of Nature' and the 'consensus of humanity' as the standard whereby both opinions and deeds are to be judged. Criterion (4) becomes an exact one only for those who hold that, as a fact of human nature, there are indeed propositions which *nobody* denies, or which *all* who understand their import affirm. In practice, however, those who appeal to 'universal assent' as the warrant for an axiom usually render their criterion somewhat inexact, by the very fact that they employ this criterion in arguments directed against opponents, who, as appears, call in question either the truth, or the evidence, or the interpretation, of the axiom that is under consideration. If the opponent himself does not wholly assent, one can hardly appeal to 'universal assent' as an evidence against him, without modifying the sense in which one calls the assent 'universal.' Such modification occurs if one regards the consensus in question as that of the 'wise,' or of the 'competent,' or if one insists, in a well-known polemic fashion, that 'nobody who is in his senses' doubts the supposed axiom. Thus, in practice, an axiom in sense (4) is usually conceived in some close connexion with senses (1) and (2)—the connexion being often much confused in controversy. Not infrequently a thinker first explicitly asserts that a proposition is, for himself personally, an axiom in sense (2); then he draws the conclusion that it therefore must be an axiom in sense (1); and thus he proves, by a more or less lengthy mediate course of reasoning, that the proposition, being 'immediately evident,' cannot be proved. Since, perhaps, some opponent still remains unconvinced, and declines to admit the 'immediate evidence,' the defender of the proposition in question hereupon makes use of sense (4), and now undertakes quite convincingly to silence the objector by assuring him that nobody objects to the proposition, since it is 'known to all.' Or, if the opponent even yet persists in calling attention to the 'immediately evident' truth that at least he himself objects, the defender of the axiom finally confuses sense (4) itself by a convenient definition of the 'assent of all,' whereby the opponent is excluded from the 'all' who are worthy of consideration; and hereupon the matter becomes, of course, quite clear, although not to the opponent.

Such processes have played a great part in the history of controversy. A famous example is furnished by the controversies which have been suggested by Locke's revival, in

the First Book of the *Essay on the Human Understanding*, of the ancient questions as to whether all men possess in common a knowledge of logical, of mathematical, and of moral truths. Especially in the case of moral principles has the interest in making out whether there is any agreement amongst all men regarding the distinction between Right and Wrong been prominent in controversy ever since Locke. Numerous defenders of an axiomatic basis for morals have sought in Anthropology for the evidence that, regarding some moral opinions, all men agree, and have conceived their principles as definable in terms of sense (4).

5. Finally, in sense (5) of our list, an axiom is defined by reference to the famous doctrine of 'innate ideas.' This doctrine is one which Locke's equally famous attack upon it, in the First Book of his *Essay*, long made central in controversy; and the partisans of innate ideas, in the various forms which this doctrine has since assumed, have frequently connected, in many often conflicting ways, senses (1), (2), and (4), and to a certain extent sense (3), with the use of the criterion for an axiom which sense (5) emphasizes. From the point of view of sense (5) it is essential to an axiom that it should come to our consciousness by reason of the very 'constitution' or 'original nature' of the mind. Since the modern evolutionary view of the mind emphasizes the importance of our instinctive tendencies and inherited aptitudes as psychologically determining our whole intellectual life, evolutionists of the type of Spencer have been led to favour a theory of the innateness of those predispositions which, when developed through our individual experience, lead us to regard some propositions as certainly true, and as true far beyond the range of our personal experience. For Spencer an axiom is, in general, an expression in an individual of the results of the 'experience of the race,' and is in so far, indeed, innate in the individual. Such a doctrine has established new connexions between senses (4), (5), and (2), and has to some extent connected senses (1) and (3) with (5).

Nevertheless, it is at least possible that an axiom in sense (5) might prove to be an actually false proposition, for the 'innate constitution of the mind' might involve one or another aptitude to believe error. In fact, an evolutionary view, closely resembling Spencer's, might lead, in a thinker less optimistic about human nature than is Spencer, to the doctrine that certain instinctive tendencies, determined by evolution, are still such as to deceive the individual. Thus the innate hostility and resentfulness which form one aspect of human nature may be viewed, by an evolutionist, as a necessary result of the conditions of conflict under which humanity has developed. And such tendencies might easily lead, in a civilized man, to a belief regarded by the individual as axiomatic in sense (5), and probably also in sense (2). This belief might take the form of the principle that one ought to avenge all injuries, and to destroy, if possible, all enemies. As a fact, however, this belief, although dependent upon the very 'constitution' of the mind of one whose ancestors have lived by war and have enjoyed blood revenge, may be, and is, a false principle of ethics. Or again, a lover's beliefs about his beloved are deeply affected by the innate constitution of his mind, and may appear to him to be, not only in sense (5) but also in sense (2), axiomatic. Yet they may be in many respects false. A pessimist, such as Schopenhauer, is fond of emphasizing the innate 'illusions' which, according to him, characterize human nature. Buddhistic doctrine is equally emphatic in characterizing the most cherished and innate convictions of common sense as both logically false and morally destructive. Salvation for the Buddhist depends upon discovering axioms in sense (1) which are extremely hard to discover, so that only the Buddhas ever attain to them. But, when once seen, these axioms are for the enlightened indeed 'self-evident.' And the knowledge of them sets aside those axioms in sense (2) which are also axioms in sense (5), and which, according to Buddhism, are due to the innate deceitfulness of desire. So little, for some men, does either innateness or subjective necessity imply self-evidence and truth.

Axioms in sense (5), furthermore, need not always be axioms in sense (2); for, as partisans of innate ideas generally admit, any individual may remain unaware of some of his inherited aptitudes for conviction. On the other hand, there is no reason why a *new* assurance, or an axiom in sense (2), may not appear in the life of somebody whom revelation or a sudden growth or 'mutation' (such as may occur in the course of evolution) endows with a faith which, just because it is novel, does not constitute an axiom in sense (5).

As for senses (4) and (5), they very frequently coincide in their denotation, but need not do so. Although what 'the very constitution of the human mind determines us to believe' is, *ipso facto*, 'believed by all,' *in case* the constitution in question is precisely the constitution 'common to all human minds,' there is no reason why the innate might not also be the individual, the congenital *variation* of this or of that mind. The individual may possess an aptitude for conviction which belongs to his 'constitution,' but which no other man, or nobody who has preceded him, possesses or has possessed. This is as possible as is a new individual revelation due to any other source than the inherited temperament of the individual. Prophets, Buddhas, poets, geniuses generally, have often been credited with such aptitudes for forming out of the depths of their own natures new convictions, which they have then taught to other men. On the other hand, as Locke and other empiricists have frequently insisted, those convictions which in sense (4) are more or less common to many or even to all men need not on that account be regarded as mainly determined by our innate constitution. They may be supposed to be due to experience, which moulds men to common results.

The foregoing survey shows us that the five senses of the term 'axiom' here in question are in a large measure independent of one another, so far as their logical intension is concerned, while by virtue of their various applications, now to the same, now to different sets of propositions, these five meanings of the term 'axiom' have become painfully confused in the history of controversy and of the theory of knowledge. The result is that the term 'axiom' is a very attractive and a very dangerous term, which should never be employed by a careful thinker without a due consideration of the sense in which he himself proposes to employ it.

II. History of the term.—As to the history of the term 'axiom' and of its uses, the ancient sources are above all: (i.) Aristotle's theory of the axioms as propositions conforming both to our sense (1) and to sense (3); (ii.) Euclid's actual use of his axioms in his geometry, especially in sense (3), and in union with certain propositions called 'postulates' (which were also theoretical principles in our sense (3)). The treatment of the principles of science and of morals in sense (4) as principles 'known to all,' or as known to the 'wise' or to the 'competent,' has its beginnings in pre-Socratic philosophy, plays an important part in the Platonic *Dialogues*, and is in various special cases and passages carefully considered by Aristotle; but becomes especially prominent in the Stoical theory of knowledge and of ethics. While sense (2) plays a part throughout the history of ancient thought, it becomes especially important in Christianity and in modern discussions of the psychological aspects of the problem of knowledge.

Sense (5), implied by the Platonic theory of reminiscence, but long put into the background by the Aristotelian theory of knowledge, has come to play a very great part in modern discussion. Its completest classic expression is probably the one to be found in Leibniz's *Nouveaux Essais*.

The later discussion of the nature, the existence, the various senses, and the use of axiomatic truths, has been dominated since 1781 by three great movements: (1) the critical philosophy of Kant; (2) the various forms of modern Empiricism, Positivism, 'Pragmatism'; (3) the modern logical investigations of the principles of science—investigations which were especially stimulated by the famous inquiry into the axioms of Euclid's geometry, and which have since extended to the whole range of the foundations of mathematics, and also to the principles of theoretical physics, and to still other branches of scientific theory.

III. **Significance for modern philosophy.**—In the attempt to deal with the extremely complex philosophical problems which are suggested by the foregoing five senses of the term 'axiom,' there are one or two guiding considerations which any student of the topic may well bear in mind.

(*a*) First, not every philosophy which tries to avoid scepticism is forced to admit the existence of axioms in sense (1). The necessity of such an admission as the sole alternative to scepticism exists, indeed, for one who holds the opinions ascribed in the foregoing sketch to Aristotle. If all science depends upon a determinate set of absolutely 'first principles' (in sense (3)), then, unless these principles are also axioms in sense (1), our result would remain sceptical, for all scientific theory would lack basis. But the Aristotelian theory of scientific procedure is not the only possible one. That theory depends upon conceiving the structure of scientific theory as necessarily linear, with chains of syllogisms leading from determinate beginnings to the conclusions that constitute the scientific theory. But for a thinker such as Hegel, the ideal form of the totality of scientific theory is cyclical rather than linear. Truth may be, as a whole, a system of mutually supporting truths, whose absoluteness does not depend upon any one set of first principles, but consists in the rational coherence and inevitableness of the *totality* of the system. To assert such a doctrine involves considerations which cannot be developed here. It is enough that such a thesis has been attempted. From the point of view there would indeed be axioms in sense (3), viz., in relation to certain *partial* systems, such as this or that mathematical or logical doctrine, whose theoretical development would indeed depend upon chains of deductive reasoning. And there would also be necessary truth, both in the parts and in the whole system. But there would be no *absolutely* first principles, and there would also be no *immediate* certainties—nothing, in fact, that is *purely* immediate in the whole system of truth. The whole would be mediated by the parts, and conversely.

(*b*) Second, the traditional alternative: either this proposition is self-evident or else it is dependent upon some other proposition from which it is deduced, or else it remains uncertain, does *not* exhaust the logical possibilities regarding the rational discovery of truth. Omitting here the complex problem as to the relation between our experience of particular facts and the general truths which our scientific theories aim at establishing, we may point out that there are propositions such that *to deny them implies that they are true.* As Aristotle already observed, the principle of contradiction is itself a proposition of this type. Euclid's geometry contains more than one instance where a proposition is demonstrated by showing that the contradictory of the *probandum* implies the truth of this *probandum*. The proof that this is, in fact, the case may be no easy one, and may involve elaborate mediations. But any proposition A, such that the contradictory of A implies A, is, *ipso facto*, a true proposition, although nobody may yet have come to *feel* its necessity.

When we prove a proposition, however, by showing that its contradictory implies it, we do not make this proposition 'self-evident.' Nor yet do we demonstrate the proposition merely by reference to other propositions which we have to assume as prior certainties. What we find, in such cases, is not so much 'self-evidence,' as 'self-mediation'—an essentially cyclical process of developing the inter-relations which constitute the system of truth. In case, then, there are no axioms in sense (1), we need not abandon either the ideal or the hope of the attainment of rational truth.

(*c*) Third, axioms in sense (2) we need and use wherever and whenever we are engaged in practical activities, or are absorbed in contemplations, such as require a laying aside of the critical sense and a limitation of the business of reflexion. But the assertion 'I am sure of this' is never logically equivalent to the assertion 'This is true.' And it is no part of the business of science or of philosophy to seek, or to remain content with, merely private 'convictions' or 'persuasions,' however 'necessary' the subject feels them to be.

(*d*) Fourth, axioms in senses (4) and (5) interest the anthropologist, and the student of society, of history, of religion, of psychology; they can never satisfy the student of philosophy, or in particular, of logic, and of truth for its own sake.

(*e*) Finally, sense (3), interpreted not absolutely but relatively, so that an axiom is a principle which lies at the basis of a certain selected system of propositions, and which is not demonstrated in the course of that system, remains *the sense in which the term 'axiom' is still most serviceably employed in modern theory.* Philosophy seeks not absolute first principles, nor yet purely immediate insights, but the self-mediation of the system of truth, and an insight into this self-mediation. Axioms, in the language of modern theory, are best defined, neither as certainties nor as absolutely first principles, but as those principles which are used as the first in a special theory.

LITERATURE.—A complete view of the literature of the problems regarding axioms is impossible, since the topic is connected with all the fundamental philosophical issues. A few sources are:—Aristotle, *Analyt. Post.* i. 2, 3, *Metaphys.* iii. 2, iv. 3, 4; see also Zeller, *Philos. d. Griechen*[3], II. ii. 234-240. Of works bearing on the topic we may specially name:—Descartes, *Discourse on Method*, and *Meditations*; Spinoza, *Tract. de Emend. Intellectus*, and *Ethics*, especially pts. i. and ii.; Locke, *Essay on the Human Understanding*, esp. bks. i. and iv.; Leibniz, *Nouveaux Essais*; Reid, *Inquiry into the Human Mind*[7], 1814, and *Essay on the Powers of the Human Mind*[3], 1812; Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*; J. S. Mill, *Logic*[8], 1872; Hegel, *Logic*; H. Spencer, *Principles of Psychology*[2], 1870–72. Bertrand Russell's *Foundations of Geometry*, 1897, and *Principles of Mathematics*, 1903, and L. Couturat's *Logique mathématique*, contain summaries of the principal problems and results regarding the mathematical 'first principles' which are of philosophical importance.

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AZAZEL.—When the word 'Azazel' was first introduced into a Western Bible or language is unknown to the present writer. It does not occur in the Concordances of the Greek, Latin, and German Bibles; it found a place in AVm at Lv 16[8. 10. 26] for the 'scapegoat' of the text, and in the text of the RV, 'dismissal' being its interpretation on the margin. In Greek it seems to have appeared first in print in Montfaucon's *Hexapla*, 1713, at Lv 16[26], from Cod. X (Coislinianus, now M). It is found a second time, according to Field, in the text of that Codex at v.[10], *εἰς ἀζαζὴλ εἰς τὴν ἔρημον τὴν ἀποπομπήν*; this reading

being shared, according to Holmes-Parsons, by Cod. 18. (In Redpath, *Concordance to the Proper Names of LXX*, p. 7, this reference to v.[16] is missing.) Though it appears in the Hebrew Bible three times in the famous chapter on the yearly Feast of the Atonement, lexicographers as yet completely disagree as to its explanation. The latest work on Hebrew lexicography, that of Brown-Driver-Briggs (1900), explains the word as '*entire removal*,' seeing in the form a 'redupl. intens. abstr.' from √[עול]=Arab. عزل, 'remove' =='entire removal' of sin and guilt from sacred places into the desert on the back of a goat, the symbol of entire forgiveness. This explanation is said to be preferable to another, which finds in it a proper name, either of a rough and rocky mountain (*Yoma*, 67*b*, קשה שבהרים), or of a spirit haunting the desert. The form עֲזָאזֵל is, in this case, considered as changed from עַזָּאזֵל; עַזָּא, עַזָּאל being another name of a fallen angel. The name is not found elsewhere in Hebrew. In the Syriac Bible it is pronounced 'ăzāzā'īl, and explained by the lexicographers as another name of the archangel Michael (after Theodore of Mopsuestia, *Thesaurus Syriacus*, p. 285*i*). The name became well known among the Syrians as that of a martyr in the days of Maximian, identified with St. Pancras of the Western calendars; see 'Histoire de Saint Azazaïl, texte syriaque inédit avec introduction et traduction française: précédée des actes grecs de Saint Pancrace, publiés pour la première fois par Frédéric Macler,' Paris, 1902 (*Bibliothèque de l'École pratique des hautes études*, fasc. 141), and cf. on it H. Delahaye, *Analecta Bollandiana*, xxiv. 93–95, and Brockelmann, *ZDMG* lviii. 499–501. Recently the whole conception has been derived from the Babylonians; cf. J. Dyneley Prince, 'Le Bouc Emissaire chez les Babyloniens' (*JA* x. 2. 1, pp. 133–156, Ju.-Ao. 1903); but M. Fossey (*La Magie assyrienne*, Paris, 1902, p. 85) seems to be right when he declares: 'Je ne puis rien voir de semblable.' If one reads Lv 16 with an open mind, the impression is that Azazel must be a being related to Jahweh in something of the same way as Ahriman to Ormazd, or Satan (Beelzebub) to God. To go into details on the rite of Atonement or the stories about the fallen angels (Gn 6[1-2]) is outside the scope of this article.*

LITERATURE.—Driver, art. 'Azazel,' in Hastings' *DB*; Benzinger-Cheyne in *Encyc. Bibl.*; Volck in *PRE*[3]; *Jew. Encyc.*; the Comm. on Leviticus; Marmorstein, *Studien zum Pseudo-Jonathan Targum*, 1905, p. 37 ff. EB. NESTLE.

* In the Book of Enoch (ch. 6), *Asael* is the name of one of them, in the Greek text (ed. Radermacher) Ἀσεάλ, Syncellus Ἀζαήλ; in ch. 8 ff. *Azazel* in the Ethiopic, Ἀζαήλ in the Greek and Syncellus, Ἀζαζήλ according to Irenæus; he is thrown εἰς τὴν ἔρημον τὴν οὖσαν ἐν τῷ Δουδαήλ (Gr. Δαδουήλ), explained by Geiger as abbreviated from *Beth Ḥadudo* (the modern *Beth-ḥudēdun*), the crag down which the goat for Azazel was pushed.

B

BAAL, BEEL, BEL (fem. **Baalat, Beela, Beltu**). — Ba'al is a primitive title of divinities, which is found in all branches of the Semitic race (Arab. بَعْل, *ba'l*; Eth. *ba'ăl*, *bâ'l*; Min. and Sab. *ba'l*; Sin. בעלו, *ba'lu*; Nab. בעל; Canaanite and Heb. בַּעַל, *ba'al*; Phœn. and Pun. בעל, *ba'l*; Aram. and Syr. בַּעֲל, ܒܥܠ, *be'ēl*; Palm. בול, *bôl*, and בל, *bēl*; Bab. and Assyr. *bēl*).

i. *PRIMITIVE MEANING OF THE NAME.*—The application of this name to deities is secondary; primarily it is a common noun denoting 'possessor,' 'owner.'

(1) It denotes ownership of physical objects. Thus the *ba'al* of a house, field, ditch, or animal is its 'proprietor'; the *ba'alat*, its 'proprietrix' (so in Heb. Phœn. Aram. Assyr. Arab. Eth.). The *be'ālīm* of a town are its 'citizens' (so in Heb. Phœn.). Even in the singular the word may be used for 'citizen' (cf. *CIS* 120, חרנא בעלת בונתי, 'Irene, a citizen of Byzantium'). (2) It denotes a 'possessor' of certain physical characteristics. Thus a two-horned ram is described as a *ba'al* of two horns; a bird, as a *ba'al* of two wings; a hairy man, as a *ba'al* of hair (so in Heb. Assyr. Aram. Eth.). (3) It denotes a 'possessor' of certain mental qualities. Thus a discerning man is called a *ba'al* of discernment; a hostile man, a *ba'al* of hostility; a sinful man, a *ba'al* of sin; a dreamer, a *ba'al* of dreams; an eloquent man, a *ba'al* of the tongue (so in Heb. Assyr. Aram. Eth.). (4) It denotes a 'possessor' of certain rights or claims over others. Thus a plaintiff is called *ba'al* of a case; a prosecutor, *ba'al* of one's justice; a confederate, *ba'al* of one's covenant (so Heb. Assyr. Aram. Eth.). (5) *ba'al* denotes a 'husband' as the 'owner' of a wife (cf. Dt 5[18 (21)] where house, field, male slave, female slave, ox, and ass are enumerated with wife as a man's possessions) (so in Heb. Nab. Palm. Aram. Arab. Assyr.). It is noteworthy, however, that *ba'al* is not used of the master of a slave, or of any other person who exercises authority over men. For the idea 'master,' or 'lord,' the Semitic languages in general use the words *'ādhôn*, *mār*, *rabb*, but not *ba'al*. Only in Bab.-Assyr. has *bēl* (=*ba'al*) developed the general meaning of 'lord' and become a synonym of the other names of authority; but this usage is evidently secondary, since it is not found in the other dialects. Even the meaning 'husband' cannot be primitive, because the *ba'al* or 'owner' type of marriage was not original among the Semites. The evidence is abundant that the primitive constitution of Semitic society, as of so many other early peoples, was matriarchal (see 'ASHTART, 2). In such a society, where the mother was supreme and marriage was only a temporary union with men of other tribes, the husband obviously could not be called *ba'al* or 'owner,' since the wife was far too independent. He was known rather as *'abu*, 'nourisher,' which in the meaning of 'husband' is older than in the meaning of 'father' (cf. Jer 3[4] and old Bab. usage). In the stage of fraternal polyandry, which among some at least of the Semites succeeded the matriarchal stage, the husband was not yet a *ba'al*, and was probably still known as *'abu* (see 'AMM). Only at a relatively late date, when society had finally passed to the monogamous or polygamous stage and wives were secured by purchase, did the husband become an 'owner.' The old word *abu* could no longer be used in the sense of 'husband,' and was set apart to express the idea of 'father,' which now for the first time became important, since children now first knew their fathers. A new term, accordingly, had to be found to express the new conception of the husband as an 'owner.' The other names of authority, *'ādhôn*, *mār*, *rabb*, had already been pre-empted to express the relation of master to slave and of superior to inferior; but *ba'al*, 'owner,' was an indefinite word that might be applied to the new relationship. It appears, accordingly, that in primitive Semitic usage *ba'al* designated an owner of things or qualities, but not an owner of persons.

As a title of deity, *ba'al* retained its primitive meaning as a common noun, and described the divinity in question as an 'owner' or 'occupier' of some physical object or locality, possibly also as a 'possessor' of some attribute (see below, ii. 10). If the numen was regarded as masculine, it was called a *ba'al*; if feminine, a *ba'alat*. The name was thus the equivalent of Arab. *dhû* (fem. *dhât*), 'he of, possessor of,' which in the South Arabian inscriptions alternates with *ba'al* in names of gods. In Babylonian the common noun *bēl* (=*ba'al*) developed the secondary meaning of 'master,' or 'lord,' and, corresponding to this, in the Assyro-Babylonian religion *bēl* described the god as an 'owner' or 'lord' of persons. Thus in their inscriptions the Assyrian kings group the great gods of the nation under the general formula *bêlê rabûte bêlêya*, 'the great lords, my lords.' In such cases we have *ba'als* of tribes and *ba'als* of persons, but this conception is

not found among the other Semites and cannot be primitive. Corresponding to the original usage which limited the name *ba'al* to owners of things, the *be'ālîm* are elsewhere uniformly regarded as proprietors of objects and of places, not as owners of persons. Lords of tribes or of individuals are *'ĕlôhîm*, *'ădhônîm*, *mᵉlākhîm*, *rabbîm*, *martn*, but never *bᵉ'ālîm*. One never meets *Ba'al-Israel*, *Ba'al-Moab*, *Ba'al-Ammon*, as one meets *Ba'al-Sidon*, *Ba'al-Lebanon*, *Ba'al-Maon*, but instead *'Ĕlôhê-* or *Melek-Israel*, *-Moab*, *-Ammon*.

In Bab.-Assyr. the worshipper addresses his god as *Bêlî*, 'my lord,' or *Bêltî*, 'my lady' (cf. *Madonna*, *Notre Dame*); but this is not found in the other dialects, except where there is direct borrowing from the Babylonian. This is the case in *Bêltî* of Palmyra (de Vogüé, *Inscr. Sémit.* 1868, 52, 155). She is the consort of the Babylonian *Bêl*, who is worshipped alongside of the native *Bôl*. The *Ba'alat* of Gebal appears in Greek and Latin writers as *Bēltis* (=בעלתי), Βῆλτις (Abydenus in Müller, *FHG* iv. 283, 9), Βήλθης (Hesychius, *s.v.*), Βαάλτις (Philo Byblius in *FHG* iii. 569, 25), *Balti* (*CIL* iii. Suppl. 10393, 10964); but this is never found in native Sem. inscriptions, and is due to late syncretistic identification of the *Ba'alat* of Gebal with *Bêltis* of Babylon. The same is true of Βαλάνιος (=בעלן), 'our ba'al,' a title of Juppiter Heliopolitanus in *Chron. Pasch.* i. 561. It is noteworthy, however, that, while the worshipper does not speak of the god as 'my *ba'al*,' he may call himself 'slave of the *ba'al*,' e.g. in the Phœn. proper names *'Abd-ba'l*, and the Palmyrene name *'Abdi-bôl*.

Where *ba'al*, 'proprietor,' is identified with *mélek*, 'king,' as is the case in certain Phœnician inscriptions, this is due to syncretistic combination of the tribal god of the invading Semites with the local numen of Tyre, and is analogous to the syncretism that is seen in such Heb. proper names as *Ba'al-Yah*, 'the *ba'al* is Jahweh' (1 Ch 12⁵), or *Yo-ba'al*, 'Jahweh is the *ba'al*,' if Kuenen's restoration of Jg 9²⁶ be correct. Here Jahweh, the conquering God of Israel, is identified with one of the local *ba'als*. Thus Melkart (=מלך קרית), 'king of the city,' is called the *ba'al* of Tyre (*CIS* 121, לארון לסלקת בעל צר, 'to our lord, to Melkart, the *ba'al* of Tyre'). Similarly we find *Milk-Ba'l*, 'king-owner,' a compound deity like *Milk-'Ashtart* (*CIS* 123*a*, 147, 194, 380); *Ba'al-Malûku*, the name of a son of the king of Arvad (*KIB* ii. 173), perhaps the prototype of the obscure *Ba-al-ma-la-gi-e* of the treaty of Esarhaddon (*KAT*³ 357); and *Malak-bêl* in Palmyra (cf. also Jer 32³⁵). In *CIS*, p. 155, the god בעלאדן (=*Ba'al-Adonis*) occurs; cf. the proper name ארובעל, Lat. *Idnibal* (*CIS* 139), and Βεελ-μαρι (*CIS* I. i. p. 111). Such late combinations in Phœnician do not invalidate the general conclusion that *ba'al* as a divine name designates primarily the owner of a sanctuary and not the master of his worshippers.

If this be true, it follows that there are as many *bᵉ'ālîm* as there are sacred objects and sacred places which they inhabit. Except in late theological abstraction, there is no such thing as a god *Ba'al*. The OT speaks habitually of the *bᵉ'ālîm* in the plural (Jg 2¹¹ 3⁷ 8³³ 10⁶· ¹⁰, 1 S 7⁴ 12¹⁰, 1 K 18¹⁸, 2 Ch 17³ 24⁷ 28² 33³ 34⁴, Jer 2²³ 9¹³ (¹⁴), Hos 2¹⁶ (¹⁸)· ¹⁹ (¹⁷) 11²). According to Jer 2²⁸ 11¹³, they were as numerous as the cities. This plural cannot be understood of images of one god *Ba'al* (so the older interpreters, and more recently Baethgen and Baudissin), for idols are never mentioned along with altars, standing stones, or asheras as part of the equipment of sanctuaries of the *bᵉ'ālîm*. Neither can it be treated as a 'plural of majesty' like *Elohim*, for, unlike *Elohim*, when a divine name it is never construed as a singular. It can be taken only as indicating a multitude of local numina. When the singular *ba'al* is used, it requires a noun in the genitive to indicate which *ba'al* is meant; e.g. *Ba'al-Ḥazor*, *Ba'al-Ṣidon*, *Ba'al-Ḥarran*, etc. The contention of Baudissin (*PRE*³ 326) that these are merely the local forms of one god *Ba'al*, like the local forms of *Zeus* among the Greeks, is untenable, because there is no evidence that *ba'al* ever became a proper name like *Zeus*, and because the Semites never combined names of gods with names of places in this fashion; *e.g.* we never meet such combinations as *'Ashtart-Ṣidon*, *'Ashtart-Gebal* to distinguish the various forms under which *'Ashtart* was worshipped.

If *ba'al* is used without a following genitive, it regularly takes the article in the OT and in the inscriptions. Thus the *ba'al* of Jg 6²⁵· ²⁸· ³⁰· ³¹· ³² is the local numen of Ophrah, 'the *ba'al*' of 1 K 16³¹· ³² 18²¹· ²²· ²⁵· ²⁶· ⁴⁰ 19¹⁸ 22⁵⁴ (⁵³), 2 K 3² 10¹⁸⁻²⁸ 11¹⁸ 17¹⁶ 21³ 23⁴· ⁵ (and the corresponding passages in Ch), Jer 2⁸ 7⁹ 11¹³· ¹⁷ 12¹⁶ 19⁵ 23¹³· ²⁷ 32²⁹· ³⁵, Hos 2¹⁰ (⁸) 13¹, Zeph 1⁴ is Melkart, the *ba'al* of Tyre, whose cult was introduced into Israel in the reign of Ahab (1 K 16³¹ᶠ.), whence it spread to Judah through the influence of Ahab's daughter Athaliah (1 K 22⁵⁴ (⁵³), 2 K 8¹⁸). In these cases it cannot be said that 'the *ba'al*' means the image of one god Ba'al, or that the article is used to distinguish the local manifestations of one deity (Baudissin, *PRE*³ 328).

In Babylonian, where there is no article, *Bêl* alone, as a designation of Marduk, the chief god of Babylon, becomes a true proper name; but this usage is not found in the other dialects. The insertion of the article in Heb. and in Phœn. shows that *ba'al* has not yet lost its appellative force.

Only in proper names is the article with *ba'al* omitted, *e.g.* in the place names *Bamoth-ba'al* *Ḳiryath-ba'al*, in the Heb. personal names *Jerub-ba'al*, *Ish-ba'al*, *Meri-ba'al*, *Ba'al-yada'*, *Ba'al-Yah*, *Ba'al-ḥanan*, and in numerous similar Phœn. personal names, such as *Ba'al-ḥanan*, *Ḥanni-bal*, *Ba'al-yaton* (see Bloch, *Phön. Glossar. s.v.* בעל; Scholz, *Götzendienst*, 168 ff.); but these formations do not prove that *ba'al* is a proper name any more than the similar formations with *'ab*, 'father,' *'aḥ*, 'brother,' *'am*, 'uncle,' *melek*, 'king,' *'ādhôn*, 'lord,' prove that these words are personal names of deities. The absence of the article in these cases is due to the fact that these formations go back to a time when the article had not yet been developed in the various Semitic dialects. *Ba'al* is no more a proper name in these compounds than *θεός* in analogous Greek names. In the same manner we must estimate the omission of the article in names of gods compounded with *ba'al*, e.g. *Milk-ba'al*, *'Adhôn-ba'al*, *'Ashtart-shêm-ba'al*, *Tanit-pen-ba'al*, perhaps *Ba'al-Gad* and *Ba'al-Ẓāphôn* (see below, ii. 8, 10). When Βῆλος without the article is mentioned in the Greek inscriptions, the context shows that only the local deity is meant. Even in the Occident no one god Ba'al arose, but there were many local *ba'als*, whose names were either transliterated or translated into Greek or Latin. Augustine was still conscious of the appellative force of the name in Punic, when in his commentary on Judges (*PL* iii. 797) he translated *ba'al* 'dominus.' Jerome in his commentary on Hos 1² translates it 'ἔχων, id est habens'; and Servius (*ad Æn.* i. 621) says, 'lingua Punica Baal deus dicitur.' In view of these facts it is impossible to agree with Baethgen (*Beiträge*, p. 16) when he says, 'It is clear that there was originally always one and the same Ba'al, who stood in relations to various localities'; or with Baudissin (*PRE*³ 327), 'Ba'al was apparently originally a title of the male divinity in general. Afterwards, when a number of such divinities were worshipped alongside of one an-

other, this word became the designation of the chief god of each locality.' On the contrary, in Sem. inscriptions and in Sem. literature, outside of Babylonia and Assyria, *ba'al* never loses its appellative force. Only in the theological speculations of Gr. and Lat. writers does *Belus* appear as a great god. This syncretism is to be regarded as the work of the Greeks, who were ignorant of the primitive meaning of *ba'al*, and thus were able to identify all the Sem. *b'ālîm* with the Bab. *Belus* (see below, iii. 7).

If there was no such thing as a god *Ba'al*, and this name designated merely the individual proprietor of a particular sanctuary, then it is evident that the traditional identification of this deity with the sun has no foundation. It is true that the sun was the *ba'al* of certain places, as Larsa, Sippar, Heliopolis (Ba'al-bek), Beth-Shemesh; but this was only one of many kinds of *ba'als*. The moon was the *ba'al* of Ur, of Ḥarran, of Palmyra, and perhaps also originally of Sin-ai (from Sin, the moon-god). Other gods of all sorts were *ba'als* of other places. If *Ba'al-ḥammān* has anything to do with the sun, this proves only that the sun was the *ba'al* of certain places (see below, ii. 5). By the Greeks and the Romans the local *ba'als* were identified with Zeus, Saturn, and Herakles as well as Sol. Only in the speculations of late writers such as Macrobius, who are disposed to regard all gods as of solar origin, is *Ba'al* formally identified with the sun. This theory has been revived and has been given wide currency in modern times (*e.g.* Creuzer, *Symbolik u. Mythologie*[3], ii. 413; Movers, *Phönizier*, i. 169; Baudissin, *PRE*[3] 329 ff.), but is nevertheless destitute of scientific foundation. So also Baethgen's theory that *ba'al* was primarily the god of heaven (*Beiträge*, p. 264), or any other theory that identifies *ba'al* with a single god, goes to pieces on the fact that this word is not a proper name but an appellative.

In the light of these facts it appears that the *ba'al*-cult carries us back to the polydæmonistic stage of religion (see POLYDÆMONISM). Among the Semites, as among other ancient peoples, and as among savages in all parts of the world, every object in nature that could do something, or that was believed to be able to do something, was reverenced as divine. The objects of worship were conceived, after the analogy of human beings, as living persons consisting of soul and body. The phenomenon was the body, the indwelling spirit was the *ba'al* or 'owner.' In the case of celestial or atmospheric phenomena the name of the divinity was usually the same as that of the phenomenon (see below, ii. 8). Thus Shemesh was at once the sun and the sun-god; Ramman, the thunder and the thunder-god. In other cases the numen was distinguished from the physical object by being called its *ba'al*. This is a striking difference between Indo-European and Semitic polydæmonism. Among the Indo-Europeans *Daphne*, 'the laurel,' is also the name of the nymph that inhabits this tree; *Amymone*, the sacred spring at Nauplia, is also the name of its indwelling nymph; *Athene*, the patron goddess of Athens, bears the same name as her city: but among the Semites the numen of a palm-tree is not called *Tamar* but *Ba'al-tamar* (Jg 20[33]); the numen of a well, not *Be'ēr* but *Ba'alath-be'ēr* (Jos 19[8]); the numen of a mountain, not *Lebanon* but *Ba'al-Lebanon* (*CIS* 5); the numen of a city, not *Sidon* or *Gebal* but *Ba'al-Sidon* (*CIS* 3) and *Ba'alat-Gebal* (*CIS* 177). This difference of conception is significant for the later developments of Indo-European and of Semitic religion. The Indo-European could never free himself from the identification of his gods with nature, and consequently the highest forms of his religion remained pantheistic. The Semite, on the other hand, was accustomed from the earliest times to distinguish between the object and its *ba'al*. His religion tended towards transcendentalism, and in its highest form among the Hebrews became pure theism. Apart from this more independent relation of Semitic numina towards the physical objects that they inhabited, there was no essential difference between the *b'ālîm* and the nymphs, dryads, satyrs, fauns, genii, fairies, gnomes, elves, and local gods of primitive Indo-European religion (see Usener, *Götternamen*). The *b'ālîm*, as a rule, had no names of their own and no identity or existence apart from the objects or localities that they inhabited. Their cult was a lower stage of religion than polytheism, for they were not gods in any proper sense, but only *δαίμονες*, *numina*, spirits. Hence the name polydæmonism, which recent writers apply to this sort of religion instead of the ambiguous term 'animism' used by earlier writers. Out of the *b'ālîm* gods might grow by groups of phenomena coming to be regarded as manifestations of a single power, or by a particular *ba'al* coming to be the patron of a tribe or of a city; but, apart from such developments, the *b'ālîm* remained simply local dæmons.

ii. *CLASSIFICATION OF THE BA'ALS.* — The ba'als may be classified, according to the physical objects which they inhabit, as terrestrial and celestial. Among the terrestrial ba'als we may enumerate:

1. **Ba'als of springs.**—For the primitive Semitic nomad in the desert the spring was the most wonderful object in nature. Its waters gushed miraculously out of the arid sands, giving life to vegetation, to man, and to beast. On it the existence of the tribe depended, and about it as a centre the tribe rallied. It is no wonder, therefore, that it was reverenced as divine, and that its numen was regarded as the mother of the tribe, the giver of all earthly blessings (see ASHTART, 3). In all branches of the Sem. race springs retained their sanctity down to the latest times.

The following sacred springs may be mentioned.—Among the Arabs: the *Zemzem* at Mecca (Wellhausen, *Reste*[2], 103 f.); among the Canaanites and Hebrews, *'En-mishpāṭ*, 'the spring of decision,' an oracular fountain at Kadesh, 'the sanctuary' (Gn 14[7]); *Beer-laḥai-roi*, between Kadesh and Bered (Gn 16[14]); *Beer-sheba'*, 'well of seven' (Gn 21[31] 26[33], Am 5[5] 8[14]); *'En-rogel*, near Jerusalem, by the sacred stone Zoheleth, where Adonijah offered sacrifices and was proclaimed king (1 K 1[9]); *Gihon*, 'the gusher,' an intermittent spring near Jerusalem, where Solomon was crowned (1 K 1[33]), probably the same as Bethesda (Jn 5[2-4]), the modern Virgin's Fountain, which is still regarded with superstitious reverence by the people of Jerusalem; the *Dragon's Well*, also near Jerusalem (Neh 2[13]); *'En-shemesh*, 'spring of the sun' (Jos 15[7] 18[17]); *Baal-Gad*, or *Baal-Hermon*, probably the sanctuary at the source of the Jordan at Paniας (belonging to the god Pan), or Cæsarea Philippi, the modern Baniας.—Among the Phœnicians: a spring at Joppa connected with the myth of Perseus and Andromeda (Paus. iv. 35. 9); the 'sanctuary of the spring *Yidlaʿ*' (*Eshmunazar Inscr.*, line 17); the nymph Ἀνωβρέτ (=עין עברת, 'overflowing spring') in Philo Byb. (*FHG* iii. 570 *f.*, frag. 4, 5); the river *Adonis* (=אדוני, 'my lord'), the modern Nahr Ibrahim, which bursts from a cave in the side of Lebanon at Afḳa, the seat of the cult of 'Ashtart and Adonis, according to Lucian (*Dea Syr.* 6) and Euseb. (*Vit. Const.* iii. 55); the river *Asklepios* (the Gr. equivalent of the Phœn. Eshmun), near Sidon (Antoninus Martyr, ed. Tobler, p. 4; Levy, *Phön. Stud.* i. 30 *f.*).—In the Phœnician colonies: the spring Μακαρία (=מקור, 'fountain'), the daughter of Herakles (Melḳart), at Marathon (Paus. i. 32. 6); the spring Κυάνη at Syracuse (Diod. Sic. v. 4. 1), and the hot springs at Himera, in Sicily (*ib.* iv. 23. 1), both of which were connected with myths of the Tyrian Melḳart-Herakles; the spring at Gades, in Spain (Strabo, iii. 5. 7; Pliny, *HN* 97 [100], 219).—In Syria: *Mabbog* (=מבוג, 'spring'), the native name of Bambyce or Hierapolis, the sanctuary of the goddess Atargatis (see ATARGATIS); the oracular spring Kandalia, at Antioch (Sozomen, *HE* v. 19).—In Assyria: *Rish-Eni*, 'the fountain-head' (Ashurnaṣirpal, *Annals*, i. 104). Many of these sanctuaries have retained their holiness down to the present time, being regarded as the seats of Christian saints or Muslim *auliyā'* (pl. of *walī*, 'patron saint'); and in all parts of the Muslim world springs are still regarded as the abodes of powerful spirits, whose favour is sought through sacrifice and offerings

(see Curtiss, *Ursem. Religion*, pp. 94 ff., 113 ff., 121 f., 163, 270). On spring-worship in general see Baudissin, *Studien*, ii. 154–170, and the bibliography there given on p. 154.

The numina that inhabited the sacred springs were known as their *bᵉʿālîm*; thus Baʿalath-bᵉʾēr, 'proprietrix of the well,' is the name of a town in the Negeb (Jos 19⁸, cf. Bēālôth, Jos 15²⁴, 1 K 4¹⁶). In 2 S 5²⁰ (=1 Ch 14¹¹) the name Baʿal-pᵉrāzîm is explained in such a way as to indicate that it meant originally 'proprietor of the breaking forth of waters.' It was one of the fountains that gush out of the sides of the Valley of Rephaim, the modern Wady el-Werd. The sacred river Bēlus, near Ptolemais (Acre), took its name from the *baʿal* that inhabited it (Pliny, *HN* xxxvi. 26 [65], 190; Jos. *BJ* ii. 10. 2). In Arabic the phrase 'that which the *baʿl* waters,' or simply '*baʿl*,' means land irrigated by subterranean waters (Lane, *Arab. Lex. s.v.*; Nestle, *Isr. Eigennamen*, p. 126; W. R. Smith, p. 99 ff.; Wellhausen, *Reste*², p. 146). The same usage survives in Mishnic Heb. שדה הבעל (*Baba bathra*, iii. 1), or simply בעל (*Suk.* iii. 3; *Terum.* x. 11; *Shebi.* ii. 9), and in the Gemara בית הבעל, in the meaning of 'land subterraneously watered' (see Levy, *Chald. Wörterb. s.v.*). If the text of Ca 8¹¹ be correct, Baʿal-hāmôn can mean only 'owner of the torrent,' but it is possible that this name is corrupted out of the better known *Baʿal-Ḥermôn* (see below, 4) or *Baʿal-ḥammān* (see 5). The title בעלמי, which follows the name of Hadad on the Hadad statue from Zenjirli, possibly means 'owner of water' (see D. H. Müller, *WZKM* vii., 1893, p. 50 ff.). On the strength of the Arabic expression *baʿl* for 'land subterraneously watered,' and of Hos 2⁸ᵗ, which speaks of the *bᵉʿālîm* as givers of corn, wine, oil, wool, flax, vines, and fig-trees, W. R. Smith (p. 104 ff.) concludes that the *bᵉʿālîm* were primarily the numina of subterranean waters, and that they became the 'owners' of land by making it fruitful, just as the husbandman creates ownership in otherwise worthless land by irrigating it. These were doubtless an important class of the *bᵉʿālîm*; but in view of the numerous other sorts that we shall consider in the following paragraphs, it cannot be said that they were the only kind, or even the original kind. Here, as elsewhere, the attempt to trace religious conceptions to a single root is a failure. Polydæmonism was complex in its origin and protean in its manifestations.

2. Baʿals of trees.—In the Arabian desert, trees grew only in watered oases, consequently they shared the sanctity of springs in the esteem of the primitive Semites. The date-palm in particular, whose fruit formed one of the staples of life, could not fail to be worshipped as a divine benefactor. The Garden of Eden, with the tree of knowledge of good and evil and the tree of life, in Gn 2⁸⁻¹⁷ is a primitive Sem. tradition of an oasis with its sacred palm-trees.

According to Ṭabarî (ed. de Goeje, i. 922; ed. Nöldeke, p. 181), in the city of Najrân, before the introduction of Christianity, a great palm was worshipped and hung with garments and ornaments at the time of the annual feasts (see Osiander, *ZDMG* vii., 1853, p. 481). The sanctuary of the goddess al-ʿUzza at Naḫla, 'the date-palm,' consisted of three *samura* trees, of which one was regarded as the proper abode of the goddess (Wellhausen, *Reste*², p. 38). This seems to have been the same as the tree known as *Dhât anwâṭ*, 'she of the hanging,' to which the people of Mecca resorted yearly to adorn it with their weapons and to offer sacrifice (Krehl, *Rel. der vorislam. Araber*, p. 73 f.). By the holy spring Zemzem, at Mecca, there once stood a sacred tree (Dozy, *Israeliten zu Mekka*, p. 93). According to the Qurʾân (*Sura* xix. 23–25), the Virgin Mary was nourished before the birth of Jesus by the fruit of a palm-tree miraculously produced out of season.

Among the Canaanites and Hebrews the cult of trees is copiously attested by the OT. According to Hos 4¹³, they sacrificed under oaks, and poplars, and terebinths (cf. Is 1²⁹). Dt 12², Jer 2²⁰ 3³·¹³ 17², Ezk 6¹³ 20²³, 1 K 14²³, 2 K 16⁴ 17¹⁰, Is 57⁵ state that they sacrificed 'under every green tree,' and Is 65³ 66¹⁷ speak of sacrifice in gardens. The following individual holy trees are mentioned: the burning bush at Sinai (Ex 3²); the tamarisk at Beersheba (Gn 21³³, cf. 26²⁵ 46¹); the oracular mulberry trees in the valley of Rephaim (2 S 5²⁴= 1 Ch 14¹⁵); the pomegranate at Gibeah (1 S 14²); the tamarisk at Ramah (1 S 22⁶); the palm-tree of Deborah between Ramah and Bethel (Jg 4⁵); the 'oak of weeping' below Bethel (Gn 35⁸); the terebinth at Ophrah, where the angel appeared to Gideon, and where he offered sacrifice and built an altar (Jg 6¹¹. ¹⁹. ²⁴); the terebinth of Moreh, 'the diviner,' at Shechem, where Jahweh appeared unto Abram, and Abram built an altar (Gn 12⁶ᶠ. 13¹⁸), and where Jacob buried the images and the jewels (35⁴), probably the same as 'the terebinth of the diviners' (Jg 9³⁷) and 'the terebinth of the standing stone that was by the sanctuary of Jahweh' (Jos 24²⁶, Jg 9⁶); the tamarisk at Jabesh (1 S 31¹³, cf. 1 Ch 10¹²). The *ʾăšērāh*, or sacred post, so often mentioned in the OT as part of the equipment of a sanctuary, was perhaps merely a conventionalized symbol of a living tree. If so, its use is an additional evidence of tree-worship among the Canaanites and Hebrews (see Poles). The persistence of this cult among the Hebrews is shown also by the combination of cherubim and palm-trees in the decoration of the Temple (1 K 6²⁹. ³². ³⁵). Such passages as Ps 52¹⁰ (8) and 92¹⁴ (13) suggest also that trees were planted in the court of the Temple, as in the modern Ḥaram. Even so late a writer as Zechariah sees myrtle trees at the entrance to Jahweh's abode (Zec 1⁸⁻¹¹). The cult still lingers in the Talmud, in the belief that certain trees are inhabited by demons (Grünbaum, *ZDMG* xxxi. 253 ff.).

Of the Phœnicians, Philo Byblius says that the plants of the earth were in ancient times esteemed as gods and honoured with libations and sacrifices, because from them the successive generations of men drew the support of their life (Müller, *FHG* iii. 565). Tyrian coins frequently exhibit cypresses standing in temple enclosures and palm-trees adored by a worshipper. There was a grove of Asklepios (Eshmun) between Beirut and Sidon (Strabo, xvi. 2. 6), a tree believed to enclose the body of Adonis at Gebal (Plut. *de Is. et Osir.* 15 f.), and a grove sacred to ʿAshtart at Aphaka (Euseb. *Vit. Const.* iii. 55; *Laud. Const.* 8). In the Phœn. colonies sacred trees existed in Arados (Lajard, *Mithra*, pl. vi. 1, 2), in Cyprus (Servius, *ad Æn.* v. 72; Athenæus, iii. 27; Strabo, xiii. 1. 51–65), in Rhodes (Paus. iii. 19. 10), in Crete (Diod. Sic. v. 66, 1; Athen. l. 49), at Corinth (Paus. ii. 1. 3, ii. 2. 4; Athen. xv. 22, p. 678*b*), in Arcadia (Paus. viii. 24), at Naukratis (Athen. xv. 18, p. 675 f.), at Carthage (Virg. *Æn.* i. 441 ff.; Tert. *Apol.* 9), in Iberia (Lajard, *Mithra*, p. 287 ff.).

In Syria holy trees were known at Baalbek (Mionnet, *Médailles Antiques*, v. 302 f.), at Damascus (Mionnet, v. 292 ff.), at Palmyra (Lajard, *Cyprès*, pl. iii. 1), at Antioch (Strabo, xvi. 2. 6; Soz. *HE* v. 19), at Mount Kasios (Servius, *ad Æn.* iii. 680). The early Syrian Christians felt it their duty to cut down 'the trees of the demons,' but many could not resist the temptation to turn to them for help when they were sick (Kayser, *Jacob v. Edessa*, p. 141). For survivals of tree-worship among the Sabians of Mesopotamia, see Chwolson, *Ssabier*, i. 293, ii. 29, 33, 34. The cult of trees in Babylonia and Assyria is attested by numerous reliefs and inscriptions on seals. Most frequently the female date-palm is depicted being fertilized by winged figures that symbolize the winds (see Schrader, *MBAW*, 1882, p. 426 ff.; Bonavia, *Bab. and Or. Record*, iii.; Tylor, *PSBA* xii. 181–184). In all parts of the modern Sem. world holy trees are still found which are visited with prayer and sacrifice, and on which bits of cloth torn from the garments are hung to serve as reminders of the worshipper (Doughty, *Arabia Deserta*, i. 448 f.; Curtiss, *Ursem. Rel.* pp. 96 ff., 154 ff.). For literature on tree-worship see Baudissin, *Studien*, ii. 184.

The numina that inhabited such sacred trees were known as their *bᵉʿālîm* or *bᵉʿālôth*, as the case might be. Thus in Arab. a palm-tree that imbibed water with its roots, and did not need to be watered, was known as *baʿl* (Lane, *Arab. Lex. s.v.*). A village near Gibeah bore the name of Baʿal-tamar, abbreviated from *Beth-baʿal-tamar*, 'house of the baʿal of the palm' (see below, iii. 2; Jg 20³³; Euseb. *Onom. Sac.* 238. 75). With this Baudissin (*Studien*, ii. 211) compares Zeus Demarous, the father of Herakles-Melḳart in Philo Byblius (Müller, *FHG* iii. 569, fr. 2, 24), which represents a Sem. *Baʿal-Timār*, or *Baʿal-Timārôn*, just as *Zeus Karmelos* represents *Baʿal-Carmel* (see below, 4). With this is also to be compared the river *Tamuras*, in Strabo (xvi. 2. 22), the modern Nahr Damûr. Precisely analogous are the Arab. names of gods Dhu-ʾAnama (*ZDMG*, 1875, p. 611) and Dhu-l-Ḫalaṣa (Wellhausen, *Reste*², p. 47), which describe the deities in question as owners of the plants known as *ʿanama* and *ḫalaṣa*.

3. Animal baʿals.—In all branches of the Sem. race names of animals used as proper names, particularly of clans and of places, prove a primitive totemistic cult.

Thus in the OT we have the names *Aiah*, 'vulture'; *Aijalon*, 'stag'; *Arieh*, 'lion'; *Becher* and *Bichri*, 'young camel'; *Gemalli*, 'camel'; *Gedi*, 'kid'; *Deborah*, 'bee'; *Dishon*, 'mountain goat'; *Zeeb*, 'wolf'; *Zimran*, 'mountain sheep';

Hagabah, 'locust'; *Hezir*, 'swine'; *Huldah*, 'weasel'; *Hamor*, 'ass'; *Humṭah*, 'lizard'; *Telaim*, 'lambs'; *Jonah*, 'dove'; *Ja'el*, 'mountain goat'; *Car* and *Cheran*, 'lamb'; *Caleb*, 'dog'; *Lebaoth*, 'lions'; *Laish*, 'lion'; *Naḥash*, 'serpent'; *Nimrah*, 'leopard'; *Susah*, 'mare'; *'Eglah*, 'heifer'; *'Epher*, 'young gazelle'; *'Achbor*, 'mouse'; *'Oreb*, 'raven'; *'Arad*, 'wild ass'; *'Etam*, 'vulture'; *'Akrabbim*, 'scorpions'; *Parah*, 'cow'; *Ẓibiah*, 'gazelle'; *Ẓippor*, 'sparrow'; *Ẓorah*, 'hornet'; *Pir'am*, 'wild ass'; *Par'osh*, 'flea'; *Rachel*, 'ewe'; *Seirah*, 'goat'; *Shu'al*, 'fox'; *Shaphan*, 'badger'; *Shephuphan*, 'a kind of serpent'; *Tola'*, 'worm'; *Taḥash*, 'porpoise'; *Ẓibe'on*, 'hyæna'; *Sha'albim*, 'fox'; *Leah*, 'wild cow'; *Nun*, 'fish'; *Ḥoglah*, 'partridge' (list taken from Gray, *Heb. Proper Names*, p. 88 f.). For similar animal names among the Arabs and Syrians see W. R. Smith, *JPh* ix. 75–100; Nöldeke, *ZDMG*, 1886, pp. 148–187. The worship of the bullock among the Hebrews is attested by Ex $32^{4ff.}$, 1 K $12^{28f.}$, Hos 8^6 10^5 13^2, and by the survival of אַבִּיר, 'bullock,' as a title of Jahweh. Such place names as *Beth-car*, 'house of the lamb'; *Beth-lebaoth*, 'house of lions'; *Beth-nimrah*, 'house of the leopard'; *Beth-ḥoglah*, 'house of the partridge,' are analogous to *Beth-Dagon*, *Beth-El*, *Beth-Shemesh*, compounded with names of gods, and seem to indicate that these places were seats of totemic animal-worship. If the name Dagon be derived from *dag*, 'fish,' this is an additional evidence of Sem. animal-worship (see DAGON). The *śe'irim*, 'hairy ones, he-goats,' of Lv 17^7, Is 13^{21} 34^{14}, 2 Ch 11^{15}, like the hairy Jinn of the Arabs (W. R. Smith, p. 119 ff.), are survivals of the same sort of cult. In Arabia we find also *Asad*, 'lion'; *Nasr*, 'vulture'; *'Auf*, 'bird of prey' (see ARABS, I. 3); in Babylonia, *NIN-SHAḪ* = *Bêl-shaḫi*, 'lord of the wild boar.'

Totemic animals were classed by OT writers along with other local numina under the general name of the *be'ālim*, but it was not Semitic usage to speak of the *ba'al* of an animal as one spoke of the *ba'al* of a spring or of a tree. The bullock was worshipped directly, not the *ba'al* of the bullock (yet compare *Bêl-shaḫi* above). The reason for this, apparently, was a stronger sense of personality in the animal. It was an individual like a man, while a spring or tree was not an individual but an abode of one. The only exception to this rule is the name Ba'al-zebub, the god of Ekron, whose oracle was consulted by Ahaziah (2 K $1^{2.3.6.16}$). If the text be sound, this means 'owner of flies'; so LXX Βάαλ μυῖα θεός. Baudissin (*PRE*^{3} ii. 515) compares Ζεὺς ἀπόμυιος in Pans. v. 14. 1, viii. 26. 7; Clem. of Alex. *Protrept.* ii. 38, ed. Dindorf (cf. Pliny, *HN* x. 28 [40]. 75; Aelian, *Nat. Anim.* v. 17), but there is no evidence that the cult of this deity was of Sem. origin. The name *Ba'al-Zebub* occurs nowhere else than in the passage just cited in 2 Kings. Cheyne (*EBi* i. 407) holds that this form is a contemptuous Jewish perversion of Ba'al-zebul = *Be'el-zebul*, 'owner of the dwelling,' the form which occurs in the best MSS of Mt 10^{25} 12^{24}, Mk 3^{22}, Lk $11^{15.18f.}$ (see below, 6). If so, this name has nothing to do with flies, and the one instance of a compounding of *Ba'al* with the name of an animal disappears (see BAALZEBUB).

4. Ba'als of mountains.—The sanctity of mountains among all the Semites was due, perhaps, to the awe which their grandeur inspired, perhaps to their connexion with clouds and storms.

In Arabia, Sinai was counted holy from the earliest times (Ex 3^1 4^{27} 24^{13}). Its name is probably derived from the moon-god Sin. It retained its sanctity down to a late date (1 K 19^8). Other Arabian holy mountains were Hirâ, Taur, Tabîr, Ko'aika'ân, and 'Arafât (v. Kremer, *Culturgeschichte des Orients*, ii. 14). In Ethiopic *dabr* means both 'mountain' and 'monastery.' According to Dt 12^2, Jer 2^{20} 3^6 17^2, Ezk 6^{13} 20^{28}, 1 K 14^{23}, 2 K 16^4 17^{10}, Is 57^7, Hos 4^{13}, the Canaanites and Hebrews sacrificed 'upon every high hill.' So conspicuous was this cult that it seemed to the Aramæans that the gods of the Hebrews were gods of the hills (1 K $20^{23.28}$). The following holy mountains are known in Canaan:—Hor (Nu $20^{25ff.}$), Peor (Nu $23^{28f.}$), Nebo (Dt 32^{49} 34^1), which derives its name from the Babylonian god Nebo (Is 46^1); the hill at Kiriath-jearim where the ark was kept (1 S 7^1), the mountain of the land of Moriah (Gn 22^2. ^{14}), Zion (Is 2^2. ^{3} and often), the Mount of Olives (2 S 15^{32}, 1 ℣ 117), Mizpah (Jg 20^1. $^{18.26.28}$ 21^1. $^{2.5}$, 1 S 7^5), Ramah (1 S 7^{17} $9^{12.14.19.25}$), Gibeah (1 S 10^5. ^{13}), Gibeon (1 K 3^4), the mountain at Ophrah (Jg 6^{26}), Ebal and Gerizim (Dt 27^4. ^{12}, Jos $8^{30.33}$, Jn 4^{20}), Tabor (Jg 4^6. $^{12.14}$, Hos 5^1), Carmel (1 K $18^{20.30}$), Gilead (Gn 31^{45-54}), Hermon (Jerome, *Onom. Sac.*, ed. Lagarde, p. 90, 19 ff.; Euseb. *Onom. s.v.* Ἀερμών). In the case of Hermon the ancient sanctity is still attested by the numerous ruins of temples that remain upon its slopes. The word *bāmāh*, which in the OT has come to be the general designation of seats of idolatrous worship, seems to denote primarily a 'height.' It is thus a witness to the wide diffusion of worship on hill-tops (see HIGH PLACE). Among the Phœnicians, Philo Byblius names Anti-lebanon, Lebanon, Kasios, and Brathy as holy mountains (Müller, *FHG* p. 566, frag. 2, 7). Baudissin (*Studien*, ii. 247) conjectures that Brathy is a corruption of Tabor. Strabo (xvi. 2. 15 f.) also mentions a sacred promontory near Tripolis. For holy mountains in the Phœn. colonies see Baudissin, *Studien*, ii. 249. For holy mountains in Northern Syria and Mesopotamia see Baudissin, ii. 246. For modern survivals of this cult see Curtiss, *Ursem. Rel.* p. 153 ff.

The divinities that inhabited these mountains were their *be'ālim*. The name of Serbâl, the traditional Sinai, is probably compounded with *ba'al*. An Egyptian text speaks of the '*ba'al* upon the mountains' (W. M. Müller, *Asien u. Europa*, p. 309). In Canaan we find Ba'al-Pe'or (Nu 25^{3-5}, Dt 4^3, Hos 9^{10}, Ps 106^{28}), or simply *Pe'or*, as the name of the god (Nu 25^{18} 31^{16}, Jos 22^{17}, cf. *Beth-Pe'or*, Dt 3^{29} etc.); Bāmôth-ba'al, 'the high places of the *ba'al*' (Nu 22^{41} $23^{1f.}$, Jos 13^{17}); Har-hab-ba'ālāh, 'mount of the *ba'ālāh*' (Jos 15^{11}); *Zeus Atabyrios* = Ba'al-Tabor (Gesenius, *Thes. s.v.* תבור); Ba'al-Hermon (Jg 3^3, 1 Ch 5^{23}); *Zeus Karmelos* = Ba'al-Carmel (Tac. *Hist.* ii. 78); among the Phœnicians, Ba'al-Lebanon (*CIS* 5), probably the same as the god 'Amurru, lord of the mountain' (Reisner, *Hymn.* p. 139, lines 143, 145; cf. *KAT*^{3} 433), and Ζεὺς ὄρειος of Philo Byblius; *Ba'li-ra'si* = Ba'al-ra's, 'ba'al of the promontory' (Shalmaneser II., fragment of annals, *KIB* i. 141); *Zeus Kasios* = Ba'al-Ḳasiw, 'ba'al of the precipice,' in Nabatæan inscriptions אלה קציו (Baudissin, *Studien* ii. 238); at Carthage, *Saturnus Balcaranensis* = Ba'al-Ḳarnaim, '*ba'al* of the two horns,' who was worshipped on a two-peaked mountain near Carthage, the modern Jebel bû Ḳurnein, where a temenos and altar have been discovered with hundreds of stelæ, dating from the 2nd and 3rd cents. A.D., bearing the inscription 'Saturno Balcaranensi, domino, magno, sancto, augusto' (Toutain, *Mélanges école franç.*, Rome, 1892, pp. 1–124, pl. i.–iv.).

5. Ba'als of stones.—Among the Semites, as among other primitive peoples, *maṣṣēbôth*, or fetish-stones, were reverenced as abodes of spirits.

Among the Arabs the most famous instance is the black stone at Mecca, which still forms the religious centre of the Muslim world. There was also a holy stone at the sanctuary of al-'Uzzâ at Naḫla (Wellhausen, *Reste*^{2}, p. 39), and at the sanctuary of the god of Petra (Suidas, *s.v.* Ζεὺς ἄρτης; Epiphan. *Panarion*, li.). The prohibitions of the Law assume that such stones were standing in all parts of Canaan, and were adopted by the Israelites as part of the worship of Jahweh (Lv 26^1, Dt 12^3 16^{22}, Jer 27^9 39^5). The following holy stones are particularly mentioned: the twelve pillars at Sinai (Ex 24^4); 'Lot's Wife' (Gn 19^{26}); the stones at Gilgal, 'the circle' (Jos $4^{3.20}$); the stone at Beth-Shemesh (1 S 6^{18}), at Zor'ah (Jg 13^{19}); the pillar of Rachel's grave at Bethlehem (Gn 35^{20}); the stone of Bohan (Jos 15^6 18^{17}); the stone Zoheleth, near Jerusalem (1 K 1^9); the 'foundation-stone' in the Temple (Bab. Talm. *Yoma*, 54*a*); the stone of help at Mizpah (1 S 7^{12}); the stone 'Ezel, near Gibeah (1 S 20^{19}); the stone at Bethel (Gn 28^{18-22} 31^{13} 35^{14}), at Ophrah (Jg 6^{20}), at Shechem (Jos 24^{27}, Jg 9^6); the stones on Ebal (Dt 27^4), on Mount Gilead (Gn 31^{45-52}). Among the Phœnicians the name Ẓur, Tyre, 'rock,' is perhaps derived from the sacred stone of the local god. Coins of Seleucia, in Pieria, bear the inscription 'Zeus Kasios,' and show an upright stone standing in a temple (Mionnet, *Médailles Ant.* v. 276 f.). The goddesses of Gebal and of Paphos were similarly represented (see ASHTART, 4), so also in Syria the god Elagabal at Emesa (Cohen, *Déscription des monnaies*, p. 530 ff., Nos. 126–129, pl. xv. 127). At Nisibis in the 4th cent. there was a similar holy stone (*Beitr. z. Alterthumskunde*, 1880, p. 772; see MAṢṢĒBĀH). For stone-worship in modern Arabia see Zwemer, *Arabia*, pp. 36, 39, 284, and for modern Syria see Curtiss, *Ursem. Rel.* p. 90 ff.

Similar in character to the *maṣṣēbôth*, or 'standing stones' were the *ḥammānîm*, which along with altars, *'ăshērîm*, and idols formed part of the equipment of high places (Lv 26^{30}, Is 17^8 27^9, Ezk $6^{4.6}$, 2 Ch $14^{4.(5)}$ $34^{4.7}$). In the Palmyrene inscription (de Vogüé, *op. cit.* 123*a*) a *ḥammāna* is dedicated to the sun. In an inscription from Um el-'Awamid (*CIS* 8) and in the Ma'sub inscription (Hoffmann, 'Phön. Inschr,' *AGG* xxxvi., 1890, p. 20 ff.) the deity *'El-ḥammān* occurs. Over 2000 inscriptions on small upright stelæ, like gravestones, from Carthage, bear the inscription, 'To the Lady Tanit, face of Ba'al, and to the Lord *Ba'al-ḥammān*, so and so has dedicated this.' Ba'al-hammān is also mentioned frequently in inscriptions from Malta, Sicily, and Sardinia. In three inscriptions (*CIS* 404, 405; Euting, *Karth. Inschr.* 123) the dedication is to *Hammān* without the prefixed *Ba'al*. Rashi first suggested that *ḥammān* was derived from the late Heb. and Rabbinic word *ḥammā*, 'sun,' and translated it

'sun-images'—an opinion that has been followed by many modern versions and commentators; but this translation is unknown to the ancient versions. LXX renders ξύλινα, βδελύγματα, εἴδωλα, τεμένη, ὑψηλά; Jerome, *simulacra, delubra*. No support is afforded to this theory by the fact that a *ḥammāna* is dedicated to the sun, since, according to 2 Ch 34[4], the *ḥammānîm* belonged to 'the *bĕ'ālîm*' in general. That *Ba'al-ḥamman* had solar attributes, or that the name means 'owner of the sun' or 'glowing *ba'al*,' has not been proved. *Ba'al* is never compounded with *shemesh*, 'the sun,' or with the names of any of the other heavenly bodies (see below, 8); it is unnatural, therefore, to regard *ḥammān* as a synonym of *shemesh*. To take it as an adjective, 'glowing,' agreeing with *Ba'al*, is also without analogy (see below, 10). The suggestion of Renan (*CIS* I. i. 288 f.), that *ḥammān* is the same as the Egyptian god Amun Ra, is untenable, because in Heb. his name appears as 'Amon. The theory of Halévy (*Mélanges*, p. 426), that *ḥammān* is Mt. Amanus, and that *Ba'al-ḥammān* is the *Ba'al* of this mountain, is more in accordance with Sem. analogy; but in the Bab.-Assyr. inscriptions Amanus appears as Amana without the strong initial guttural. It is also hard to see how objects used in the cult of this deity should have been called 'Amanuses.' For such a usage there is no analogy in the worship of other mountain-gods. We seem accordingly to be shut up to the view that *ḥammān* is a cult-object of unknown etymology, and that *Ba'al-ḥammān* is the deity that inhabits this object. This is strictly in accordance with the analogy of such names as *Ba'al-tamar*, 'Ba'al of the palm,' and *Ba'alath-be'ēr*, 'Ba'alath of the well.' From the OT references it appears that the *ḥammānîm* were artificial products, 'the work of their fingers' (Is 17[8]), that they 'rose up' (Is 27[9]) 'above the altars' (2 Ch 34[4]), that they could be 'cut off' (Lv 26[30]), 'broken' (Ezk 6[4]), and 'hewn down' (Ezk 6[6], 2 Ch 34[7]). These expressions seem most applicable to stone pillars similar to the *maṣṣēbôth*. It is interesting to note that in none of the passages where *ḥammānîm* are mentioned are *maṣṣēbôth* mentioned. On the contrary, the *ḥammānîm* are combined with the *'ăshērîm* in Is 17[8] 27[9], 2 Ch 34[4. 7], just as the *maṣṣēbôth* and the *'ăshērîm* are ordinarily combined. This suggests that the *ḥammānîm* are only variant forms of the *maṣṣēbôth*, perhaps artificially hewn, while the latter were native rock. In all probability the stelæ dedicated to *Ba'al-ḥammān* at Carthage and other Phœn. colonies were just such *ḥammānîm*.

A survival of stone-worship is seen in proper names compounded with צוּר, צֻר, 'rock,' *e.g.* *Ẓuri-el*, 'my rock is a god'; *Ẓur-Shaddai*, 'a rock is Shaddai'; *Eli-ẓur*, 'my god is a rock'; *Beth-ẓur*, 'house of rock'; and, in the Panammu inscription from Zenjirli, *Bar-ẓur*, 'son of rock' (Lidzbarski, *Nordsem. Epig.* p. 442). In the light of these facts we should probably estimate the use of *Ẓûr* as a name of Jahweh (Dt 32[4. 15. 18. 30f.], 1 S 2[2], 2 S 22[3. 32. 47], Is 17[10] 30[29], Hab 1[12] etc.). The proper name *Riẓpah*, 'hot stone,' probably refers to a meteoric stone or supposed 'thunderbolt' that was reverenced as a fetish.

The sacred stone was regarded as the residence of a divinity, and therefore was known as *beth-el*, 'abode of deity' (cf. Gn 28[18-22], where Jacob calls the stone that he sets up *beth-el*, and Gn 31[13], where God says, 'I am the God of Bethel, where thou didst anoint a *maṣṣēbāh*, where thou didst vow a vow'). This name for holy stones was common also among the Phœnicians, from whom it spread to the Greeks and the Romans as βαίτυλος, βαιτύλιον (see STONES).

The divine proprietor of the 'house of deity' was its *ba'al*, just as the human owner of a house was its *ba'al*; *e.g.* Ba'al-ḥammān, 'owner of the stele,' in the numerous Punic inscriptions referred to above. The form *Ba'al-maṣṣēbāh* does not happen to occur, but is perfectly in accord with Sem. habits of thought, and is the necessary counterpart to the conception of the *maṣṣēbāh* as a *beth-el*.

6. Ba'als of sanctuaries.—In a few cases, apparently, the *ba'al* is not named from the sacred object in which he is supposed to reside, but from the sacred enclosure that surrounds this object. The Sabæan goddess Dhât Himâ, 'she of the holy ground' (*ZDMG*, 1877, p. 84), thus takes her name from her temenos. A similar formation seems to be found in בעלת ההרמת (*CIS* 41), which with Renan is probably to be rendered '*Ba'alat* of the inner sanctuary.' After this analogy also we should perhaps interpret Bal-addiris (=בעל חדר), who was worshipped at Sigus, in Numidia (*CIL* viii. 5279; Suppl. 19121-19123). If Ba'al-zebul be the correct reading instead of *Ba'al-Zebub* (see above, 3), then this '*ba'al* of the dwelling' may take his name from the sanctuary in which he was worshipped (but see below, 8).

7. Ba'als of places.—In the foregoing cases we are told what the particular natural phenomenon was with which the *ba'al* was connected. In other cases the phenomenon is not mentioned, but the *ba'al* is named from the place in which he was worshipped. Thus in Canaan we find Ba'al-Me'on (Nu 32[38], Jos 13[17], Ezk 25[9], 1 Ch 5[8]), Ba'al-Shalishah (2 K 4[42]), Ba'al-Ḥaẓor (2 S 13[23]); in Phœnicia, Ba'al-Ṣidon (*CIS* 3), Ba'al-Tyre (Hoffmann, *AGG* xxxvi., 1890, p. 19), Ba'alat-Gebal (*CIS* 1, 177); in Syria, Belos of Apamea (*CIL* xii. 1277); in Asia Minor, Ba'al-Tarsus (Scholz, *Götzendienst*, 149), Ba'al-Gazur (Head, *Hist. Num.* 631). In all these cases we must suppose that the divinity was connected with some striking physical phenomenon, only we are not told what this was, but are merely given the name of the town where it was located. Sometimes we know from other sources that there were sacred springs, trees, or stones in the places in question.

8. Celestial ba'als.—The object with which the divinity was connected was not necessarily situated on the earth; it might be the sky, one of the heavenly bodies, or some atmospheric phenomenon. Thus in Palmyrene, Phœnician, and Punic inscriptions we find frequent mention of Be'ēl-she'mayin, Ba'al-shāmēm. This name is not derived from *shemesh*, 'sun,' as many have supposed, on the strength of identifications of this god with the sun by late Greek writers, but is derived from *shāmayim*, 'sky,' as Augustine (*Quæst. in Jud.* xvi.) correctly translates, 'Balsamem quasi dominum cœli Punici intelliguntur dicere.' It does not mean 'Lord of Heaven' in any abstract theological sense, but 'the one who lives in the sky.' It is thus the exact equivalent of the Sabæan god, *Dhû-Samâwî*, 'he of the sky.' *Ba'al-Shāmēm* is the Sem. counterpart of Varuṇa, Οὐρανός, among the Indo-Europeans. It is noteworthy, however, that, while the latter worship the sky directly, the former worship the *ba'al* of the sky (Lidzbarski, *Ephemeris*, i. 3).

Closely connected with *Ba'al-shāmēm* in conception is Ba'al-ẓephôn (ẓāphôn), 'owner of the north.' This was the name of a town on the Red Sea (Ex 14[2. 9], Nu 33[7]). A goddess, Ba'alat-ẓāphôn, was also worshipped at Memphis (W. M. Müller, *Asien u. Europa*, p. 315). In the annals of Tiglath-pileser III. (*KIB* ii. 26 f.) a peak of Lebanon bears the name *Ba'ali-ṣapuna* (cf. Sargon, *Annals*, 204). In the treaty between Ba'al, king of Tyre, and Esarhaddon, king of Assyria, one of the gods mentioned is *Ba'al-ṣapunu* (*KAT*[2] 357). There was a town Zaphon in Gad (Jos 13[27], Jg 12[1]), also in Southern Palestine (*KIB* v., No. 174, 16), but it does not seem likely that this god can have derived his name from either of these insignificant places, since his cult spread all the way from Phœnicia to Egypt. *Ẓāphôn* is rather an abbreviation of *Ba'al-ẓāphôn*, and that in its turn of *Bêth-ba'al-ẓāphôn*, just as we find the series *Mā'ôn*, *Ba'al-Mā'ôn*, and *Beth-ba'al-Mā'ôn* (Nu 32[3. 38], Jos 13[17]). Moreover, *Ẓāphôn* alone occurs as the name of a deity in the Phœn. proper names בדצפן from Abydos (*CIS* 108), עבדצפן from Carthage (*CIS* 265), צפנבעל from Carthage (*CIS* 207, 857). The last name is *Ba'al-ẓāphôn*, with the elements reversed. The name *Gîr-ṣapûnu*, 'client of *Ẓāphôn*,' appears also as the name of an eponym in the time of Ashurbanipal (*KIB* i. 207, iv. 139). These names throw light upon the Heb. proper names Ẓaphon, Ẓephon, Ẓephonites, Ẓiphion. If *Ẓāphôn* is a god, we may either suppose with Gray (*Heb. Pr. Names*, p. 135) that this is a case of compounding two divine names, like Jahweh-Elohim, or, more probably, we may regard *Ẓāphôn*, 'the north,' as an object that might either be worshipped directly or be regarded as the abode of a deity, so that the god might be called indifferently *Ẓāphôn* or *Ba'al-Ẓāphôn*. The sanctity of the north as the dwelling-place of the gods is widely attested among the Semites (Is 14[13]; cf. Baethgen, *Beiträge*, p. 22f.; Baudissin, *Studien*, i. 278). *Ba'al-*

ṣāphôn, 'owner of the north,' accordingly, is nearly synonymous with *Ba'al-shāmēm*, 'owner of the sky,' although in the Phœn. pantheon the two deities existed side by side (*KAT*[2] 357). The name *Ba'al-zebul*, 'owner of the dwelling' (see above, 3 and 6), may be given with reference to this heavenly abode rather than with reference to an earthly sanctuary (so Cheyne, *EBi* 514).

The worship of the sun, moon, and stars was universal among the ancient Semites (cf. Baethgen, *Beiträge*, p. 61; Grunwald, *Eigennamen*, pp. 30–35; Jastrow, *Rel. Bab.*[2] pp. 134, 151; *KAT*[2] pp. 361–370); but, as noted above, it was not customary to speak of the *bᵉ'ālîm* of these celestial objects as one spoke of the *ba'al* of the sky or the *ba'al* of the north. Like animals, they seemed to possess personality, and were worshipped directly as gods rather than as the abodes of gods. By the Hebrews they were spoken of collectively, not as the *bᵉ'ālîm*, but as 'the host of heaven.' The same holds true of atmospheric phenomena. *Ramman*, 'thunder' (*KAT*[2] 442); *Regem*, 'storm'; *Baraḳ*, 'lightning' (*KAT*[2] 446); *Resheph*, 'flame' (*KAT*[2] 478); *Riẓpah*, 'thunderbolt' (?); *Barad*, 'hail'; *Maṭar*, 'rain'; *Geshem*, 'shower'; *Ṭal*, 'dew'; *Ḥôreph*, 'frost,' are shown by the evidence of proper names to have been objects of worship in all branches of the Semitic race (Grunwald, *Eigennamen*, p. 28 f.). These phenomena are worshipped directly. *Ramman*, *Regem*, *Baraḳ*, and *Resheph* are the gods' own names, and we never meet *Ba'al-Ramman* or *Ba'al-Regem* as the name of a god, although such formations are common in names of men (see below, 9). In this respect Semitic and Indo-European nature-worship were strictly parallel (see ARABS, I. 1).

9. **Adopted ba'als.**—Celestial and atmospheric phenomena that could not be reached in their proper abodes like terrestrial *bᵉ'ālîm* often had sanctuaries built for them on earth, and thus by a sort of adoption became the *bᵉ'ālîm* of these places. Thus *Dhû-Samâwî*, 'he of the sky,' appears in the Sabæan inscriptions also as *ba'al* of Baqîr; and in like manner *Ba'al-shāmēm*, 'owner of the sky,' is *ba'al* of Tyre (*KAT*[2] 357), of the Phœnician colonies (Baethgen, *Beitr.* p. 25), and of Palmyra (de Vogüé, *op. cit.* 50). *Ba'al-ṣāphôn*, 'owner of the north,' as we have seen above, is also a *ba'al* of Egypt and of Phœnicia. *Shams*, 'the sun,' is in the Sabæan inscriptions also *ba'alat* of Ǧuhfat (*CIS* iv. 11. 1) and *ba'alat* of Gabbaran (*CIS* iv. 43. 3). The sun was the *ba'al* of Ba'al-bek (Heliopolis), and Marduk, the spring sun, was the *bêl* of Babylon. Sin, the moon-god, was the *bêl* of Ur and of Ḥarran (Lidzbarski, *Nordsem. Epig.* p. 444, pl. xxiv.), and in Palmyra a god bore the name *Yarchi-bôl* (ירחבול), 'the moon is *ba'al*.' On a Syrian seal (Lidzbarski, *Ephemeris*, i. 12) the name *Ba'al-Regem* appears, which shows that in some districts *Regem*, 'the storm,' had become the local *ba'al*. Similarly, various *'ădhônîm*, *mᵉlākhîm*, *'ashtārôth*, and other tribal gods, that had originally no connexion with physical phenomena, might become the *bᵉ'ālîm* of certain places, through the circumstance that their worshippers settled in these places. Thus Jahweh became for the ancient Hebrews the *ba'al* of Canaan, Melḳart for the Phœnicians the *ba'al* of Tyre, and Ashtart for the Gebalites the *ba'alat* of Gebal. Certain local *bᵉ'ālîm* also became so important that their cults migrated to other cities, so that they became the *bᵉ'ālîm* of these new places. Under the name of *Zeus Atabyrios* the cult of *Ba'al-Tabor* spread to Rhodes and Sicily (Baudissin, *Studien*, ii. 247). *Zeus Kasios* (=*Ba'al-Ḳaṣiw*) was also the *ba'al* of Pelusium (Strabo, xvi. 2. 33; Philo Bybl. in Müller, *FHG* p. 568). Melḳart, the *ba'al* of Tyre, was also worshipped at Carthage and the other Phœn. colonies. *Ba'al-Ḥarran* was also one of the gods of Sam'al (Lidzbarski, *Nordsem. Epig.* 444, pl. xxiv.). In such cases as these, where *bᵉ'ālîm* were not originally connected with sanctuaries, but became their proprietors by adoption, they might have individual personal names; ordinarily they were nameless, and were known merely by the locality in which they had their abode.

10. **Departmental ba'als.**—The *ba'als* studied thus far all derived their titles from the fact that they were the 'proprietors' of certain physical objects or places. This usage of the divine name corresponds to the meaning 'owner' or 'citizen' of the common noun *ba'al*. The question now arises whether the divine name is also used like the common noun in the sense of 'possessor of an activity. Numina, which preside over abstract qualities or activities, are very common in the Indo-European religions, and by Usener (*Götternamen*) have been entitled 'departmental deities.' Of the existence of such *bᵉ'ālîm* in the Semitic religions there is no clear evidence. At the temple of Deir el-Qal'a, near Beirut, inscriptions have been found in honour of Βαλμαρκώδης, Βαλμαρκώθ. This name is translated κοίρανος κώμων, 'leader of dances' (le Bas, 1855=Kaibel, *Epig. Gr.* 835), which indicates that the Phœn. original is **Ba'al-Marqôd**. *Marqôd* is evidently a derivative of *raqad*, 'dance,' and may express the abstract idea of 'dancing.' This interpretation seems to be favoured by the Greek translation. In this case we have a *ba'al* who presided over a human activity, like the Indo-European departmental deities. *Marqôd*, however, also denotes 'dancing-place,' and may have been the name of the locality where the temple was situated. 'Owner of the dancing-place' could easily have been paraphrased in Greek as 'leader of dances.' In this case we have simply a *ba'al* who takes his name from the locality where he is worshipped, like all the other *ba'als* we have studied thus far.

In an inscription from Cyprus (*CIS* 41) we meet בעל מרפא. This is commonly read **Ba'al-marpē**, 'possessor of healing,' or *Ba'al-mᵉrappē*, 'Baal the healer,' in which case we have another departmental *ba'al*; but *marpē*, 'healing-place,' or *mᵉrappē*, 'healer,' may equally well have been the name of a medicinal spring of which this *ba'al* was the owner. This will then be a local *ba'al* of the familiar type.

In Jg 8[33] 9[4] mention is made of **Ba'al-berîth** (cf. 9[46] *El-berîth*). This is commonly interpreted '*Ba'al* of the covenant.' The 'covenant' is then understood of the relation between the deity and his worshippers (Baethgen, Sayce), or of an alliance between Israelites and Canaanites (Bertheau, Kittel), or of an alliance between Shechem and neighbouring Canaanite towns (Ewald, Kuenen, Wellhausen, Cheyne), or of agreements in general, as Ζεὺς Ὅρκιος (Nöldeke, *ZDMG* xlii., 1888, p. 478). On any of these interpretations the name stands without confirmation elsewhere in the OT, and without analogy in the whole field of Semitic religion. Under these circumstances it is reasonable to suspect textual corruption in the passage in Judges. Instead of ברית, *bᵉrîth*, we should perhaps read ברות, *bᵉrûth*, 'cypress' (Ca 1[17]). The worship of a Phœn. goddess, *Bērouth*, is attested by Philo Bybl. (Müller, *FHG* p. 567, fr. 2, 12). There was a famous holy tree at Shechem (see above, ii. 2). Or perhaps we should read בארות, *bᵉ'ērôth*, 'wells.' *Ba'al-bᵉ'ērôth* would then be the counterpart of *Ba'alath-bᵉ'ēr* (Jos 19[8]). Less likely is the suggestion of Bochart and Creuzer, that we should read *Ba'al-Bērôth*, Ba'al of Beirut (Berytus).

Ba'al-Gad (Jos 11[17] 12[7] 13[5]) is commonly rendered 'lord of fortune,' and is supposed to be a deity whose function it was to bring good luck; but *Gad* is also the name of a god in Is 65[11], probably also in the proper names *Migdal-Gad* (Jos 15[37]) and *Gaddi-El* (Nu 13[10]), *Gaddi* (Nu 13[11]), and the tribal name *Gad*. The name *Gad-melek*, 'Gad is king,' occurs on a

Heb. seal; *Gudu-bal* = *Gad-ba'al* (Hoffmann, *Phœn. Inscr.* 27) and such names as *Gadi-ya, Gadi-ilu*, in Assyrian business documents (Johns, *Deeds*, No. 275, 5; 443, etc.). For the cult of this god in Syria see Baethgen (*Beitr.* p. 76), and in Arabia, Wellhausen (*Reste*², p. 146); see 'Gad' in *HDB* and *EBi*. If *Gad* be regarded as the name of a deity in *Ba'al-Gad*, the difficulty arises that this is an abnormal formation for names of places. Such compounds as *Ba'al-Gad*, 'the owner is Gad,' and *Gudu-ba'l*, 'Gad is the owner,' are common as names of persons, but not as names of places (Gray, *Heb. Pr. Names*, p. 134). *Ba'al-Ẓāphôn* furnishes no real analogy, since *Ẓāphôn* is not only the name of a god, but also the name of a place, 'the north.' If we might suppose that *Ba'al-Gad* was originally the name of a man, and that the place was named after him, the difficulty would be solved; but there are no trustworthy analogies for such a procedure. Baethgen (*Beitr.* pp. 79, 254) regards this as a case of the synthesis of two deities, like *'Ashtar-Chemosh*, *'Atar-'Ate, Jahweh-Elohim*; but this implies that *ba'al* had become a proper name, and of this there is no evidence among the Hebrews or among any of the other West Semites until a late period. Accordingly, it is best to follow with Stade (*Gesch. Isr.* i. 272 n.) the analogy of the other *ba'als*, and to regard *Gad* as the name of the district occupied by the tribe of Gad. The name of *Ba'al-Gad* will then be parallel to *Ba'al-Judah*. Even if *Ba'al-Gad* were not situated in the tribe of Gad, this would make no difference, for, as we have just seen, *be'ālîm* frequently migrated.

The name בעל ימם (*CIS* 86*b*. 4) is commonly regarded as the equivalent of Heb. Ba'al-yāmîm, 'owner of days,' and is supposed to be a sort of Sem. Kronos; but the reading is very uncertain, and the name may be the equivalent of *Ba'al-yammim*, 'owner of the seas.'

These are all the cases that can be cited of apparent departmental *ba'als*. All are capable of an interpretation which makes them local *ba'als* of the familiar type. Accordingly we are probably justified in concluding that *ba'als* who presided over human activities or abstract qualities were unknown to Semitic thought. Such functions belonged rather to *'ădhônîm, mᵉlākhîm*, and other tribal deities. Thus Eshmun, the great god of the Phœnicians, was the god of healing, and Ishtar of Babylon was known as *Mu'allidtu, Mylitta*, the goddess of childbirth. From our investigation, we reach the conclusion that the *be'ālîm* were originally all numina of physical objects or localities, and that the only sense in which *ba'al* was used as a divine name was that of 'owner' or 'proprietor.'

iii. *HISTORY OF THE BA'AL-CULT.* — 1. **In Arabia.**—In South Arabian inscriptions *ba'al* is constantly used to describe the great gods as 'proprietors' of particular shrines established in their honour. Thus, Ta'lab Riyam, *ba'al* of Tur'at, or *ba'al* of Ḳaduman; Ḥagar, *ba'al* of Maryab; Ilmaḳḳâh, *ba'al* of 'Awwam, or *ba'al* of Bar'ān; 'Athtar, *ba'al* of 'Alam; Shams, *ba'alat* of Guḥfat, or *ba'alat* of Gabbaran (*CIS* iv. 2. 3, 11. 1, 19. 2 f., 28. 1 f., 41. 2 f., 43. 2 f., 46. 5, 67. 3, 74. 3 f., 80. 2 f., 99. 2 ff., 100. 1). These names all belong to the ninth class noted above, 'adopted *ba'als*.' To express the primary relation of a god to the physical objects that he inhabits, or the sanctuary where he is originally at home, the Minæan and Sabæan inscriptions use *dhû* (fem. *dhât*), 'he of,' 'she of.' Thus instead of *Ba'al-Shāmēm* we meet *Dhû-Samâwi*, 'he of the sky,' who is also *ba'al* of Baqîr; and similarly *Dhât Ḥimay, Dhât-Ba'dân, Dhât-Gadrân*, who also become the *ba'als* of various shrines (*CIS* iv. 145, 155).

In Ethiopic *ba'al* occurs as a loan-word in the version of the OT as a name of the Canaanitish deity, but is not used elsewhere. A trace of the old religious meaning of the word survives, however, in *ba'āl*, 'feast.' In the Sinaitic inscriptions *ba'al* occurs as a designation of the god of the mountain. Thus קדם אלבעלו, 'in the presence of the *ba'al*' (Euting, *Sin. Inschr.* 327); also in proper names, e.g. *Ausalba'lī, Garmalba'lī, 'Abdalba'lī* (see Euting). In Nabatæan the name occurs in *Bᵉ'ēl-Shāmîn* (*CIS* 163, cf. 176) and in the personal names *Aiti-bêl* (*CIS* 196) and *Ba'al-Adhôn* (? *CIS* 192). This *ba'al* apparently has been borrowed from Syria. In classical Arabic *ba'al* is not used as a title of divinities. From this W. R. Smith (109 ff.) infers that the *be'ālîm* were deities of watered land and of agriculture, who were unknown to the desert Semites, and were first worshipped in the fruitful lands of Syria and Mesopotamia. This conclusion is unwarranted, (1) because, as noted above, the *be'ālîm* cannot be limited to watered land, and *be'ālîm* of trees, stones, mountains, celestial bodies, etc., can be worshipped in the desert as well as anywhere else; (2) because there is no evidence that the phrase *ba'l*, or what the *ba'l* waters (='Athtar-land) or a *ba'l*-palm, is borrowed from the Aramaic; (3) because the word can be used in such expressions as 'the (Christian) Igal have the cross as their *ba'l*,' and the verb *ba'ila*, 'be *ba'l*-struck, frightened'; (4) because the sacred mountain *Serbal* is probably a compound of *sarw* and *ba'l*. These are sufficient indications that *ba'l* was once a designation of deities in Arabic, although in the classical literature it has dropped out of use (so Nöldeke, *ZDMG* xl., 1886, p. 174; Wellhausen, *Reste*², p. 146; art. ARABS, I. 9). Instead of *ba'l, dhû*, which has already begun to displace it in Sabæan and Minæan, is commonly used in Arabic in forming titles of gods, e.g. *Dhû-l-Ḫalaṣa, Dhû-l-Rigl, Dhû-l-Kaffain, Dhû-'Anama, Dhât-Anwât, Dhû-l-Labba, Dhât-Ḥima, Dhû-sh-Sharâ*. These all describe the divinity in question as belonging to a particular object or locality, and are thus the exact equivalent of *ba'al* names. On *Dhû-sh-Sharâ*, Wellhausen (p. 51) remarks that three Sharâs are known, all wooded thickets with water. This god was widely worshipped in Arabia (Wellhausen, *op. cit.* pp. 48–51), and was the chief god of the Nabatæans (Baethgen, *Beitr.* pp. 92, 108). The primitive religion of Arabia was evidently the worship of a multitude of local numina. Subsequently, through trade and shifting of population, cults migrated, and gods became *ba'als* of regions far removed from their original homes. Thus at Mecca, in the time of the Prophet, there were 360 different gods. Under Islām these old *be'ālîm* still survive as the *jinn* (W. R. Smith, 119 ff.) and the *ulia* (Zwemer, *Arabia*, p. 47 ff.).

2. **In Canaan.**—The earliest evidence of the *ba'al*-cult in Canaan is found in the Egyptian inscriptions, where *b-'-r* (=*ba'al*) is mentioned as a god of the Canaanites and of the Hyksos invaders (see E. Meyer, *Set-Typhon*, p. 47; *ZDMG* xxxi., 1877, p. 725; W. M. Müller, *Asien*, p. 309). In the Tell-el-Amarna letters the *ba'alat* of Gebal is frequently mentioned (*KIB* v., Nos. 18. 25, 55 ff.; 61. 54). *Ba'al* does not occur. In the personal names *Bêl-garib* and *Bêl-ram*, the god may be the Babylonian *Bêl*. It is probable that the ideogram *IM* in these letters should often be read *Ba'al* instead of *Adad* (Hommel, *Altisr. Ueberlief.* p. 220; Knudtzon, *Beitr. Ass.* iv. 320 f.; Zimmern, *KAT*² 357). The OT says that the *be'ālîm* were the gods of the Canaanites, and that they were adopted by Israel after the conquest of the land (Jg 2^{11-13} 10^{6}, Hos 2^{2-13}); consequently it is possible to learn a good deal about them from survivals in Israel. With the exception of *Ba'al-Judah* (2 S 6^{2}), and possibly *Ba'al-Gad* (Jos 11^{17}), all the place names

in the OT compounded with *ba'al* were probably derived from the earlier inhabitants. The original form of such names was like *Beth-ba'al-Ma'on*, 'house of the owner of Ma'on' (Jos 13^{17}), which might then be abbreviated into *Ba'al-Ma'on* (Nu 32^{38}) or *Beth-Ma'on* (Jer 48^{23}). The following names occur: *Ba'alath-be'ēr* or *Ba'al* (Jos 19^{8}, 1 Ch 4^{33}), *Ba'alah* (Jos 15^{29}), *Ba'alath* (Jos 19^{44}), *Be'aloth* (Jos 15^{24}), *Ba'al-berîth* (Jg 9^{4}), *Ba'al-Ḥāmôn* (Ca 8^{11}), *Ba'al-Ḥazor* (2 S 13^{23}), *Ba'al-Ḥermon* (Jg 3^{3}), *Ba'al-p'rāẓîm* (2 S 5^{20}), *Ba'al-Shalishah* (2 K 4^{42}), *Ba'al-tamar* (Jg 20^{33}), *Har-ḥab-ba'ălah* (Jos 15^{11}), *Kiryath-ba'al* (Jos 15^{60}). These names are found in Benjamin, Gad, Judah, Simeon, Reuben, Dan, so that they witness to a general diffusion of the *ba'al*-cult throughout Canaan. There must have been innumerable other *be'ālîm* whose names have not come down to us, since, according to Jer 2^{28} 11^{13} 2^{30}, they were as numerous as the towns, and were worshipped on every high hill and under every green tree. The existence of *ba'al*-worship in Philistia is attested by the name *Ba'al-zebub* (*Ba'al-zebul*) at Ekron (2 K $1^{2f.}$); in Edom by the personal name *Ba'al-ḥanan* (Gn $36^{38ff.}$); in Moab, by the names *Ba'al-Peor* (Nu 25^{3}), *Bamoth-ba'al* (Nu 22^{41}), *Beth-ba'al-Ma'on* (Jos 13^{17}, *Mesha Inscr.* lines 9, 30); in Ammon perhaps by the personal name *Ba'alis* (Jer 40^{14}; see AMMONITES).

The *be'ālîm* who were worshipped in the fertile region of Israel where Hosea lived were regarded as the givers of wool and flax, oil and wine, grain, vines, and fig-trees (Hos $2^{5.\ 9.\ 12}$); but it is unsafe to infer from this that all the *be'ālîm* of Canaan had an agricultural character. As the names just enumerated show, there were also *be'ālîm* of springs, trees, mountains, and cities that did not necessarily have such a character. The Old Testament often combines the *be'ālîm* with the *'ashtārôth* in such a way as to suggest that the *'ashtārôth* were regarded as the consorts of the local *be'ālîm* (*e.g.* Jg 2^{13} 10^{6}, 1 S 7^{4} 12^{10}). Perhaps we may suppose that, under the influence of the meaning 'husband,' which the common noun *ba'al* had, every *ba'al* was regarded as the 'husband' of an *'ashtart*. It was the introduction of this sexual element into the *ba'al*-cult of Canaan that made it peculiarly obnoxious to the prophets, and led them to stigmatize it as adultery (Am 2^{7}, Hos 4^{11-14} 7^{4}). The places where the *be'ālîm* were worshipped were known as *bāmôth*, 'high places' (see HIGH PLACE; cf. the place-names *Bamoth-ba'al* [Nu 22^{41}] and *Bambula* at Citium in Cyprus [?]). The rock-hewn high places that have lately been discovered at Petra give a good idea of the arrangement of such sanctuaries (see Robinson, *Bibl. World*, 1908, pp. 8–21). Such high places contained altars, *'ăshērîm*, *maṣṣēbhôth*, and *ḥammānîm* (Jg 6^{25}, 2 Ch 14^{3-5} 34^{4-7}). Idols are not mentioned in connexion with the *be'ālîm*, and were probably not found in most of the high places. They belonged rather to the temples of the great gods. The existence of altars implies sacrifice. The offerings were doubtless similar to those which Israel brought Jahweh in the developed Hebrew cult, and to the offerings of the Phœnicians. Hos 2^{8} indicates that grain, new wine, oil, silver and gold were presented to the *be'ālîm*. Hos 2^{13} speaks of 'the days of the *be'ālîm* unto which she (Israel) burned incense, when she decked herself with her ear-rings and her jewels, and went after her lovers' (see CANAANITES).

3. **In Israel.**—The conquest of Canaan by Israel was a process extending over several centuries. The Hebrews did not exterminate the aborigines, but certain clans forced their way into the land, and occupied the rural districts, while the cities remained in the hands of the Canaanites. For some time there was constant warfare between the two races, but gradually hostilities ceased and they began to mingle. Little by little Israel acquired agriculture, industries, and all the other forms of Canaanitish civilization. With this came inevitably the adoption of the worship of the local gods of Canaan. Agriculture could not be carried on without observing the ceremonies that accompanied the planting of the grain and the reaping of the harvest. Altars, shrines, sacred trees, and holy stones in all parts of the land could not be appropriated without taking with them the divinities that belonged to them. As the Book of Judges and the early prophets repeatedly inform us, 'Israel served the *be'ālîm*'; that is, alongside of Jahweh the national God it also worshipped the local numina of the land that it had conquered. Through this process it was in danger of losing the measure of national unity that had been achieved by Moses, and of splitting up into a number of small communities that rallied about the local *ba'al*. Consciousness of this peril was awakened through the rapid development of the Philistine power. About B.C. 1050 the Philistines conquered Israel, taking captive the ark and burning its sanctuary at Shiloh (1 S 4, Jer 26^{6}). Hebrew nationality was now in danger of extinction, and the only thing that could save it was a union of all the clans in a supreme effort to shake off the Philistine yoke. No one of the *be'ālîm* of Canaan was important enough to form a centre for such a union; but Jahweh, the God of Sinai, who had brought Israel out of Egypt, and who had united the clans in a common cult in the desert, was able once more to rally them for the common defence. The leaders of Hebrew thought perceived that the only way to save Israel was to forsake the *be'ālîm* and to return to Jahweh. Some extremists, such as the Kenites and the Nazirites, wished also to reject agriculture, life in towns, and the other elements of Canaanitish civilization that were associated with the *be'ālîm*; but the wisest men saw that it was impossible to return to the life of the desert. If the *be'ālîm* were to be conquered, it could only be by appropriating to the service of Jahweh all that had hitherto belonged to them. Through the efforts of the Levites, the so-called 'Judges' or Vindicators, the Seers, and other enthusiasts for Jahweh, He finally triumphed over the *be'ālîm*, not by avoiding them, or by destroying them, but by absorbing them. The name *ba'al* became a synonym of Jahweh, and the *be'ālîm* were regarded as local manifestations of Jahweh. He ceased to be the God of Sinai and became the God of Canaan, the patron of agriculture and civilization. The ancient shrines of the land became His shrines, and the legends connected with them were retold as stories of His dealings with the patriarchs. The agricultural ritual and the harvest festivals of the *be'ālîm* were re-consecrated to His service. By the time of David the process was complete. Jahweh had appropriated everything that belonged to the *be'ālîm* that was worth saving. Observe how in 2 S 5^{20} David interprets the name *Ba'al-p'rāẓîm* as meaning 'Jahweh hath broken mine enemies before me like the breach of waters.'

This process of syncretism has left an interesting monument in some personal names of the period of the early monarchy. These are as follows: *Jerub-ba'al*, 'the *ba'al* contends' (Jg 8^{35}); *Ish-ba'al*, 'man of the *ba'al*,' a son of Saul (1 Ch 8^{33}), also one of David's heroes (1 Ch 11^{11}); *Merib-ba'al*, a son of Jonathan (1 Ch 9^{40} 8^{34}); *Ba'al-yāda'*, 'the *ba'al* knows,' a son of David (1 Ch 14^{7}); *Ba'al-ḥanan*, 'the *ba'al* is gracious,' a Gederite (1 Ch 27^{28}). No names of this type are found after the time of David. In most of these cases it is certain that *ba'al* is not a foreign god, but a title of

Jahweh, who has become the *ba'al* of Canaan, since Jerub-ba'al, Saul and David, were all loyal adherents of Jahweh. In *Ba'al-Yah*, 'the *ba'al* is Jahweh,' the name of one of David's helpers (1 Ch 12^5), the identity of the *ba'al* with Jahweh is asserted; so also in *Yo-ba'al* (Jg 9^{26}), if Kuenen's emendation be correct. These names accordingly belong to a period when worshippers of Jahweh were conquering the *be'ālîm* by identifying them with Jahweh. In popular conception in the time of Hosea the *be'ālîm* were not foreign gods, but local Jahwehs. Hos 2^{16} says that Israel has called Jahweh *ba'al*, and $2^{11.13}$ identify the feasts of Jahweh with the days of the *be'ālîm*. As a result of this process the *be'ālîm* lost their power, and Jahweh became the God of Canaan; but the victory was purchased at the cost of a mixture of the religion of Jahweh with all sorts of alien elements. The early prophets faced the problem how to maintain the supremacy of Jahweh; the later prophets from Amos onward faced the problem how to purge the religion of Jahweh from the heathen innovations that had entered it. Their efforts were only partially successful, and Judaism, as seen in its chief literary monument, the Law, is properly regarded as a compromise between Prophetism and Ba'alism.

A totally different sort of *ba'al*-cult was the worship of Melḳart, ba'al of Tyre (see below, 4), which was introduced into Israel in the time of Ahab. Pressed by repeated attacks of Damascus, Ahab was constrained to seek the help of Phœnicia, and formed an alliance by marrying Jezebel, the daughter of Ethba'al, king of Tyre (1 K 16^{31}). Such a relation of dependence usually involved the worship of the chief god of the protecting State (cf. 2 K 16^{7-16}); consequently Ahab was compelled to establish the cult of Melḳart in Samaria (1 K $16^{31f.}$). Against this religious innovation Elijah and Elisha warred (1 K 18. 19^{16-18}, 2 K 9. 10). There is no record that either of these prophets opposed the old native *be'ālîm* that were identified with Jahweh. The golden bullock at Bethel, for instance, they never attacked as Hosea did subsequently; but the *ba'al* of Tyre was a foreign god, and to worship him was to repudiate Jahweh (1 K 18^{21}), hence the intensity of the opposition of these prophets. According to 1 K 18, Elijah was successful, and in agreement with this we learn from the annals of Shalmaneser II. that in B.C. 856 Ahab was no longer in alliance with Phœnicia, but was fighting with Damascus against Assyria. Probably Damascus was so hard pushed that it was willing to grant an alliance without the condition of the adoption of its god Rimmon by Israel, and public sentiment was sufficiently strong in Israel to compel Ahab to give up the Phœnicians and their god and seek this new ally. Subsequently Ahab must have repudiated the Syrian alliance and have re-established relations with Phœnicia, for he died fighting against the Syrians (1 K 22^{35}). After his death, under the influence of the queen-mother, Jezebel, the cult of the Tyrian *ba'al* was introduced once more in full force (1 K 22^{53}). This cost the dynasty of Omri the throne. Instigated by Elisha, Jehu slew Jezebel and her son Jehoram, and exterminated the worship of Melḳart with fire and sword (2 K 9. 10). Immediately after this, in B.C. 842, we find him paying tribute to Assyria instead of Phœnicia, apparently on terms that did not demand the worship of Ashur. Melḳart never again gained a foothold in the northern kingdom. The problem which confronted Amos and Hosea was not the expulsion of this foreign deity, but the purification of the religion of Jahweh from admixture with rites of the ancient *be'ālîm* of Canaan.

The worship of the Tyrian *ba'al* was introduced into Judah by Athaliah, the daughter of Jezebel (1 K 22^{44} (53), 2 K 8^{18}), doubtless as the price of a Phœnician alliance that maintained her on the throne. In the subsequent revolution that was incited by the priests Athaliah perished, 'and all the people of the land went into the house of the *ba'al* and brake it down; his altars and his images brake they in pieces thoroughly, and slew Mattan the priest of the *ba'al* before the altars' (2 K 11^{18}). In the recrudescence of all sorts of heathenism under Manasseh, the Tyrian *ba'al* was once more worshipped (2 K 21^3). To this Jeremiah and Ezekiel allude whenever they speak of 'the *ba'al*' in contrast to 'the *be'ālîm*.' Under Josiah this cult was stamped out (2 K $23^{4.5ff.}$), and did not again gain a foothold in Judah. It was a foreign religion that never appealed strongly to the mass of the people.

With the old *be'ālîm* of Canaan it was very different. They were so thoroughly identified with Jahweh in the conception of the nation that it was unconscious of apostasy in worshipping them. All the efforts of the pre-exilic prophets to banish them were unsuccessful. Under the reign of every good king, and after every attempted reformation, the editor of Kings records: 'Nevertheless the high places were not taken away, the people still sacrificed and burned incense in the high places.' The Book of Deuteronomy and the reformation of Josiah had for their central aim the destruction of the *be'ālîm* by the centralization of worship at Jerusalem; but both Jeremiah and Ezekiel confess that the effort was unsuccessful. It was the Exile, which removed Israel from the old holy places and old religious associations of Canaan, that finally eradicated this cult. Orthodox Judaism detested this inveterate habit of the forefathers, and, interpreting literally the words of Hos 2^{19} (17) 'I will take away the names of the *be'ālîm* out of her mouth,' substituted *bôsheth*, 'shameful thing,' in the place of *ba'al* in the reading of the Scriptures. In Jer 3^{24} and elsewhere *bôsheth* has actually taken the place of *ba'al* in the Heb. text. The Greek version often has ἡ Βάαλ to indicate that the reader is to substitute αἰσχύνη for *ba'al*, and in 1 K 18^{19-25} this alternates with *ba'al* in the text. Particularly in the Books of Samuel *ba'al* has been eliminated from names of persons, although it has been allowed to stand in the parallels in Chronicles. Thus *Ish-ba'al* (1 Ch 8^{33}) = *Ish-bosheth* throughout Samuel (*Ish-vi*, 1 S 14^{49}); *Ish-ba'al* (1 Ch 11^{11}) = *Josheb-bashshebeth* (2 S 23^8); *Meri-ba'al* (1 Ch 9^{40b}), or *Merib-ba'al* (1 Ch 9^{40a}, 1 Ch 8^{34}) = *Mephi-bosheth* (2 S 4^4, cf. the other *Mephi-bosheth*, 2 S 21^8); *Ba'al-yāda'* (1 Ch 14^7) = *El-yāda'* (2 S 5^{16}). *Abi-albon* (2 S 23^{31}) is perhaps a perversion of *Abi-ba'al*, and *'Ebed*, 'slave' (Jg 9^{26}), of some *ba'al* compound (see Geiger, *ZDMG* xvi., 1862, pp. 728–732; Nestle, *Die isr. Eigennamen*, pp. 108–132; Dillmann, *SBAW*, phil.-hist. Kl., 1881, p. 609 ff.; Wellhausen, *B. Samuelis*, pp. xii ff., 30 f.; Driver, *Samuel*, pp. 186, 195 f., 279; Gray, *Heb. Proper Names*, pp. 121–136). In spite of these efforts, however, *ba'al* remained in Mishnic Heb. as a designation of naturally irrigated land (see above, ii. 1), and under modified forms the *ba'al* cult lingered in the rural districts. In modern Palestine, the Jews unite with the Christians and Muslims in reverencing numerous local saints that are only the thinly-disguised *be'ālîm* of earlier days. In spite of all the efforts of Judaism, Christianity, and Muhammadanism, one may still say with the author of Kings, 'Nevertheless the high places are not taken away, the people still sacrifice and burn incense in the high places' (see Curtiss, *Ursem. Rel.* p. 81 ff.).

4. **In Phœnicia and the Phœnician colonies.**—In Phœnicia the name seems to have been pronounced *ba'l*, to judge from such proper names as

Hannibal, *Asdrubal* (Schröder, *Die Phön. Sprache*, p. 84). The most important of all the Phœn. *bᵉʿālîm* was 'our lord Melḳart, the ba'al of Tyre' (*CIS* 121). He is mentioned in the treaty of Esarhaddon with Ba'al, king of Tyre (*KAT*³ 357), as (*ilu*) *Mi-il-ḳar-ti*, one of the great gods of Tyre. His name Melḳart (= *Melek-ḳiryath*, 'king of the city') shows that he was originally a tribal god who was identified with the local *ba'al*, just as Jahweh was identified with the *bᵉʿālîm* of Canaan. In all the names of the kings of Tyre the element *ba'al* refers to Melḳart: thus, *Abi-ba'al*, the father of Hiram; *Ba'al-'azar I.*, the contemporary of Rehoboam; *Eth-ba'al* (Assyr. *Tu-ba-'-lu*), the contemporary of Ahab (1 K 16³¹); *Ba'al-'azar II.*, the successor of Eth-ba'al; *Ba'al I.*, the contemporary of Sennacherib; *Eth-ba'al II.*, the contemporary of Nebuchadrezzar; *Ba'al II.* (B.C. 573–564), and somewhat later *Mer-ba'al*. He is also the *ba'al* meant in the numerous Tyrian proper names compounded with this name (see Lidzbarski, *Nordsem. Epig.* 239 ff.). Under the name of Herakles his temple at Tyre is mentioned by Menander in Josephus (*Ant.* VIII. v. 3, *cont. Ap.* i. 18) and by Herodotus (ii. 44). In regard to his cult little is known from native sources. Our fullest information is derived from the OT accounts of his worship in Israel. He had a temple, an altar, and an *'ăshērāh* (1 K 16³³, 2 K 10²¹ 11¹⁸), also a *maṣṣēbāh*, or standing stone (2 K 3³ 10²⁶). An image is mentioned (2 K 11¹⁸), and is implied in 1 K 19¹⁸, Hos 2¹⁰ (⁸). There were prophets of the *ba'al* and of the associated *'ăshērāh* (1 K 18¹⁹), also *Chemarim*, or priests of the *ba'al* (2 K 23⁵, Zeph 1⁴). The bullock was sacrificed to him (1 K 18²⁶). Like other *mᵉlākhîm*, Melḳart received human sacrifice (see under art. AMMONITES, vol. i. p. 391; and cf. Jer 19⁵ 32³⁵), but this was in his capacity as *melek* and not as *ba'al*. From this the inference cannot be drawn that such sacrifices were customary in the service of other *bᵉʿālîm*. Kissing his image is mentioned as a rite in 1 K 19¹⁸; dancing round the altar, and cutting the body with knives and shouting the name of the god, in 1 K 18²⁶⁻²⁸.

Distinguished from *Ba'al-Melḳart* in the treaty of Esarhaddon, in spite of its identical etymology, is *Ba'al-ma-la-gi-e* (*KAT*³ 357). This is apparently Ba'al-Malki, 'Ba'al my king,' and is the same as *Milk-ba'al* of the Phœnician colonies (*CIS* 123*a*, 147, 194, 380). What his character was, and how he was differentiated from Melḳart is unknown. *Ba-al-sa-me-me* = Ba'al-shāmēm, 'owner of the sky' (see above, ii. 8), is also mentioned as one of the great gods of Tyre in the treaty of Esarhaddon (*KAT*³ 357). In an inscription from Um-el-'Awamid, near Tyre (*CIS* 7), a certain Abdelim states that he has dedicated to *Ba'al-shāmēm* a doorway and its doors, that it may serve as a memorial of him and a good name under the feet of his lord *Ba'al-shāmēm*. Philo Byblius also records the worship of Βεελσάμην in Phœnicia (Müller, *FHG* p. 566). Menander and Dius in Josephus (*Ant.* VIII. v. 3; *cont. Ap.* i. 17 f.) speak of the golden pillar in the temple of *Zeus Olympios* (*Ba'al-shāmēm*), which they distinguish from the temple of Herakles (Melḳart). Herodotus (ii. 44) also distinguishes the temple of the Thasian Herakles from that of Melḳart. As a different deity from *Ba'al-shāmēm* the treaty of Esarhaddon mentions *Ba-al-ṣa-pu-nu* = Ba'al-ṣāphôn, 'owner of the north' (see above, ii. 8). *Ba'al-ḥammān* (see above, ii. 5) is apparently mentioned in the Ma'sub inscription, line 3 (*RA*, 1885, p. 380 ff.), and in the second inscription from Um-el-'Awamid (*CIS* i. 8). Besides these *bᵉʿālîm* which had risen to the rank of great gods, there were numerous local *bᵉʿālîm* of a more primitive character. *Ba'al-Lebanon* is mentioned in *CIS* 5 (see above, ii. 4). The worship of *Zeus Atabyrios* (= *Ba'al-Tabor*) in the Phœnician colonies makes it certain that he must also have been worshipped in the mother-country (see above, ii. 4). The river *Belus*, near Acre, proves the existence of a local *ba'al* of the stream (see above, ii. 1). *Ba'al-Ṣidon* is mentioned in *CIS* 3. With him was associated *'Ashtart shem-ba'al*, "'Ashtart name of the *ba'al*.' He still survives in *Neby Ṣaida*, the Muslim patron saint of modern Ṣidon. At Deir el-Qal'a, near Beirut, there was *Ba'al-Marqôd* (see above, ii. 10), and *Ba'al-rosh*, 'owner of the promontory,' at the mouth of the Nahr el-Kelb just north of Beirut (*KAT*³ 43). At Gebal 'Ashtart was worshipped as the local *ba'alat* in connexion with her spouse Adonis (*CIS* 1; *KIB* v., No. 55; Philo Bybl., ed. Müller, p. 569; Lucian, *Dea Syr.* 6; see ASHTART).

In the Phœnician colonies all the great *bᵉʿālîm* of the mother-country were worshipped, and in addition a number of new local *bᵉʿālîm*. Ba'al-Ẓāphôn is found in Egypt (Ex 14²·⁹, Nu 33⁷), and in the proper name *Bod-Ẓāphôn* at Abydos (*CIS* 108); also *Ba'alti-ṣapunā* at Memphis (Müller, *Asien*, p. 315). *Zeus Kasios* (= Ba'al-Ḳaṣiw) was transplanted from his mountain near Antioch to Pelusium (see above, ii. 9). In Cyprus we find Melḳart the *ba'al* of Tyre (*CIS* 88. 3–7) and the proper name *Abd-Melḳart* (*CIS* 14. 7); *Zeus Keraunios* (Waddington, 2739), who in a Palmyrene bilingual is equated with Ba'al-shāmēm (de Vogüé, 50 = le Bas, iii. 2631); Ba'al-Lebanon (*CIS* 5); Ba'al-Mrp' (*CIS* 41) and Ba'al-ymm (*CIS* 84*b*. 4; see above, ii. 10). In Rhodes there is *Zeus Atabyrios* (= Ba'al-Tabor) (see Baudissin, *Studien*, ii. 247); in Corcyra, *Zeus Kasios* (Baudissin, ii. 243); in Thasos, *Melḳart* (Paus. v. 25; Herod. ii. 44). At Carthage, Melḳart the *ba'al* of Tyre appears frequently in proper names, *e.g.* *'Abd-Melḳart* (*CIS* 179, 234, and often). *'Abd-Melḳar* (Euting, *Karth. Inschr.* 18 = *Ammicar*, *CIL* viii. 68), *Ammat-Melḳart* or *Mat-Melḳart* (Euting, 153, 320), *Bod-Melḳart* (Euting, 28, 261) = *Bodmilcar* (*CIL* 9618), *Ḥat-Melḳart* (Euting, 213), *Ba'm-Melḳart* for *Ba'l-Melḳart* (Euting, 15), *Melḳart-mashal* (Euting, 130), *Melḳart-ḥalaz* (*CIS* 234; Euting, 48), *Ḥan-Melḳart* (Euting, 165), and many others. The compound deity Milk-Ba'al is also found, as in Phœnicia (*CIS* 123*a*, 147, 194). Ba'al-Adon (*CIS* i. p. 155) is a combination of the *ba'al* of Tyre with the *Adonis* of Gebal. Ba'al-shāmēm also appears (*CIS* 379). In Plautus (*Pœnulus*, 1027), Hanno swears *guneb Balsamem* (= גנאי בעלשמם). Augustine also knows him as a Punic deity (*PL* iii. 797). The worship of Ba'al-Ẓāphôn at Carthage is attested by the proper names *Ẓāphôn-ba'al* (*CIS* 207, 857) and *'Abd-Ẓāphôn* (*CIS* 265). Ba'al-ḥammān (see above, ii. 5) attained at Carthage the rank of a patron deity. More inscriptions have been found in honour of him than of any other Punic god. In Carthage itself he is always associated with the goddess Tanit, whose name stands first, showing that she was considered the more important deity. In the Carthaginian dependencies Ba'al-ḥammān is named alone. The god is represented with rays surrounding his head, and holds a tree in his hand. Above him stands the sun. On another stele he grasps a grape-vine with his right hand and a pomegranate with his left. Still other stelæ bear representations of palms, flowers, and fishes. The god is thus seen to have been a patron of fertility, like the *bᵉʿālîm* of Canaan (see Gesenius, *Phœn. Monumenta*, 'Numid.' i. ii. iv.). Balcaranensis (= *Ba'al-Ḳarnaim*, 'owner of the two horns'), was a local divinity who was worshipped on a two-peaked mountain near Carthage (see above, ii. 4). Ba'alatha-hdrt and Bal-addiris are also local Numidian deities (see above, ii. 6). In Malta, Melḳart *ba'a'*

of Tyre is named in inscriptions on two votive pillars (*CIS* 121). Another pillar from Malta bears the inscription, 'Pillar of Milk-Ba'al, which Nahum has placed for Ba'al Ḥamman the lord, because he has heard the voice of his words' (*CIS* 123*a*). This shows syncretism of the already compound deity *Milk-Ba'al* with *Ba'al-ḥammān*. In Sicily we find a *Rosh-Melḳart* (Renan, *Mission*, p. 145) and *Zeus Atabyrios* (= *Ba'al-Tabor*, see Baudissin, *Studien*, ii. 247); in Sardinia, the proper names *'Abd-Melḳart* (*CIS* 152) and *Bod-Melḳart* (*CIS* 138), *Milk-Ba'al* and *Ba'al-ḥammān* (*CIS* 147), *Ba'al-shāmēm* (*CIS* 139). The sacrificial tablet of Marseilles belonged perhaps to a temple of *Ba'al-ṣāphôn* (*CIS* i. 227). At Tartessus in Spain the Tyrian Hercules (Melḳart) was worshipped (Arrian, *Alex.* ii. 16. 5); also at Gades (Scholz, *Götzendienst*, p. 201 ff.), and at Lixus on the West Coast of Africa (Pliny, *HN* v. 1, 19–22).

5. In Syria, Asia Minor, and Mesopotamia.—In the Aramaic dialects the name assumes the form בְּעֵל *bᵉ'ēl* (cf. LXX *Beelphegor* [Nu 25³·⁵], *Beelzebul* [Mt 10²⁵]). The name *Ba'albek* is evidently a compound with *ba'al*, but what the second element of the name means is uncertain. Hoffmann (*ZA* xi. 246 f.) thinks that it is a broken-down form of *melek* (cf. *Milk-Ba'al* in Tyre and *Malak-bel* in Palmyra). *Balanios* (=*ba'alan*, 'our *ba'al*') is given as a title of Jupiter Heliopolitanus (*Chron. Pasch.* i. 561). The Greek name of this place, Heliopolis, shows that the sun was the local *ba'al*. In Damascus, *Juppiter Damascenus* (= בעל דמשק) was worshipped with *'Athtar* (='*Ashtart*) as his consort (Justin, xxxvi. 2; *Etym. Mag. s.v.* Δαμασκός). Inscriptions from Damascus show that his temple was richly endowed (le Bas-Waddington, 1879; cf. 2549 f.). His cult was important enough to spread to Italy (*CIL* vi. 405, x. 1576).

The recently discovered inscription of Zakir, king of Hamath and La'ash, which probably comes from a place lying between Hamath and Damascus, states that *Beelshamayin* (written as one word) has given Zakir his sovereignty, and has helped him against Bar-Hadad, son of Hazael, king of Aram, and his allies. Seven kings have besieged his city, but Zakir has raised his hands to *Beelshamayin*, and he through his seers has spoken to him a message of cheer. This inscription by its mention of the Benhadad of the OT is shown to belong to 8th cent. B.C.; and, like the inscription of Esarhaddon mentioned above, witnesses to the antiquity of the cult of *Ba'al-shamayim* (see Pognon, *Inscriptions sémitiques*, 1908, pp. 156–178).

In Palmyra, *Ba'al-shāmēm*, 'owner of the sky,' whom we have met already among the Nabatæans, the Phœnicians, and in the Phœnician colonies, appears as the chief god under the form Bᵉ'ēl-shāmîn, בעל שמן (de Vogüé, *Inscr. Sem.* 19, No. 16; 50, note 1; 53, No. 73; Euting, *Berichte Akad. Berlin*, 1885, 669, 4). His full Sem. title בעל שמן מרא עלמא, 'owner of the sky, lord of the world,' is in the Gr. parallel translated, Διὶ μεγίστῳ κεραυνίῳ. Most of the altars dedicated to him do not bear his name, but have the inscription, 'To Him whose name is for ever blessed, the good and compassionate' (de Vogüé, *Palm.* 74–105 *al.*); that he is meant, however, seems to be clear from the Greek parallels which read, Διὶ ὑψίστῳ καὶ ἐπηκόῳ. One inscription (de Vogüé, 16) is so restored by de Vogüé as to identify him with Ἥλιος; but this is very doubtful. The form *bᵉ'ēl* in his name shows that he is of foreign origin. בעל does not appear in Palmyrene proper names, and is not used except in the sense of 'husband.' Instead of this the native form of the word as a title of gods and in proper names is *bôl*. *Ba'al-shāmēm* was probably originally a Phœnician deity. Thence, as *Bᵉ'ēl-shāmîn*, his cult migrated to Syria, Palmyra, and the Nabatæans. In the Palmyrene inscriptions the god has a lofty ethical character beyond that of most of the *bᵉ'ālim* of the Sem. world.

Associated with him are the subordinate deities *'Agli-bôl* and *Malak-bêl* (de Vogüé, 93). Apart from *Be'ēl-shāmîn*, these two deities are also frequently mentioned in the inscriptions (*ZDMG* xviii. 99 f.; *CIG* 6015; de Vogüé, 140, 153). 'Agli-bôl (עגלבול, Ἀγλίβωλος) was evidently a moon-god, since he is depicted as a young warrior with a crescent on his shoulders. The etymology of his name is obscure. De Vogüé connects *'Agli* with עגל, 'bullock,' as a symbol of the new moon. He was probably the original *ba'al* of Palmyra, and he is meant in proper names compounded with *bôl*; *e.g.* *'Abdi-bôl*, Ἀβδίβωλος (Vog. 6), *Zebad-bôl* (frequently), *Repha-bôl*, Ῥεφάβωλος (Vog. 66), Δαυίβωλος (*CIG* 4665), Μαθθαβωλίων (Waddington, 2579), *Bôl-barak*, *Bôl-laḥa*, *Bôl-'azor*, etc. (On the use of *bôl* over against *bᵉ'ēl* and *bēl* in Palm. see Nöldeke, *ZDMG* xlii., 1888, p. 474; Baudissin, *PRE*³ 324; on the proper names, Ledrain, *Dictionnaire des noms propres palmyréniens.*) Malak-bêl (מלכבל, Μαλάχβηλος), like *Milk-ba'al* (see above, i., iii. 4), is a compound of *Malak* (= *Melek*, *Molech*, *Milcom*), 'king,' with *bēl* (=*ba'al*). The form *bēl* suggests that the deity is of Bab. origin (on *Malik* as a Babylonian god see Zimmern, *KAT*³ 469; Jastrow, *Die Rel. Bab. u. Ass.* p. 162). The rays with which this god is represented on the monuments (Lajard, *Cyprès*, pl. I., II.) suggest that he was a sun-god like the Babylonian *Bēl-Marduk* (see below, 6). In the Lat. version of the Palmyrene inscription of the Capitol (*ZDMG* xviii. 101 f.) the god is called 'sol sanctissimus.'

Another pair of Palmyrene deities that appear together in the inscriptions are *Bēl* and *Yarḥi-bôl* (de Vogüé, p. 64). Bêl, as the form of his name and his conjunction with *Belti* show, is imported from Babylonia. He is *Marduk*, the great *bēl* of Babylon (see below, 6). His name occurs with special frequency on seals (Mordtmann, 50, 51; de Vogüé, *op. cit.* 132, 133, 134). Many proper names are compounded with *bēl* as with *bôl*, *e.g.* *Ela-bēl* (Ἐλάβηλος), *Bēl-'aqab* (Βηλάκαβος), *Bēl-barak*, *Bēl-suri* (Βηλσούρου), *Nûr-bēl* (Νουρβήλου), *'Abdi-bēl* (see Ledrain, *Dictionnaire*). As in Babylon, so in Palmyra *Bēl* is a solar deity. Seals bearing his name show also the disc of the sun (Mordtmann, 77, 78), and one seal (Mordtmann, 77) bears the two names *Bēl*, *Shemesh*. As in Babylonia, *Bēl* has his consort Bêltî, 'my lady' (de Vogüé, 52, 155). Bêl's *paredros* Yarḥi-bôl ('Ιαρίβωλος) has the masculine predicates אלה and *θεός*. The name is compounded of ירח, 'the moon,' and בול=*ba'al* (de Vogüé, 93; Waddington, 2571*c*). *Yarḥi* alone occurs as a personal name (de Vogüé, 16). To *Yarḥi-bôl* a medicinal spring called Ἔφκα (=אפקא) was dedicated (de Vogüé, 99; Waddington, 2571*c*). Like *'Agli-bôl*, *Yarḥi-bôl* is to be regarded as a genuine Palmyrene deity. How these two moon-*ba'als* came to be worshipped side by side, or how they were differentiated from one another, is unknown. Still another Palmyrene *ba'al* seems to be found in Βωλάθη, known to Damascius (in Photius, cod. 242). This is a compound of the two gods *Bôl* and *'Ate* (see 'Ate). On the *ba'al*-cult at Palmyra see de Vogüé, *Palmyra*; and Baethgen, *Beiträge*, pp. 81–88.

A Ba'al of Apamea, 'fortunæ rector mentisque magister,' is mentioned in a Gallic inscription (*CIL* xii. 1277). From him Caracalla received an oracle, according to Dio Cass. (lxxviii. 8). He is perhaps to be identified with *Zeus Baitokaikeus*, the *ba'al* of the village of Baitokaike, near Apamea (*CIG* 4474=Le Bas, 2720*a*; *CIL* iii. 184 and p. 972). Specially famous was *Zeus Kasios* (=Ba'al-Ḳaṣiw), whose cult we have found al

ready in Egypt. Among the Nabatæans he appears as *Ḳaśiw* or *Ela Ḳaśiw* (de Vogüé, *Syr. Cent. Nabat.* iv. 2, vi. 2, vii. 1, 2; *Hauran.* v.). Baudissin conjectures that he is the same as *Koze*, the chief god of the Edomites (see EDOMITES). He was worshipped on a lofty mountain on the sea-coast near Antioch. His name, which is evidently derived from the root כזב, 'cut off,' de Vogüé refers to the 'precipice' on which his temple stood. Baudissin thinks that it rather means 'decider, judge.' The former interpretation is more in accordance with the local character of most *ba'al* names. At his sanctuary a feast was celebrated by the people of Antioch (Strabo, xvi. 2. 5). Seleucus Nicator obtained an oracle from him concerning the building of Seleucia (Malalas, ed. Dindorf, p. 199). The emperor Julian also consulted him (*Misopog.*, ed. Spanheim, p. 361; Ammianus Marcellinus, xx. 14. 4). Trajan dedicated gifts to his temple, and an epigram of Hadrian was preserved there (Suidas, *s.v.* Κάσιον ὄρος). Euhemerus (in Euseb. *Præp. Evang.* ii. 2) and Philo Byblius (*FHG*, p. 566) say that Kasios was formerly a ruler of this part of the country. Coins of Northern Syria bear the name *Zeus Kasios*, and show the sacred stone of the god standing in his temple (Mionnet, *Description des médailles*, iv. 276–280). It is evident that *Ba'al-Ḳaśiw* was one of the chief divinities of Northern Syria (on his cult see de Vogüé, *Syr. Cent. Inscriptions*, pp. 103–105; Scholz, *Götzendienst*, p. 144; Baudissin, *Studien*, ii. 238–242). The famous **Ba'alat of Mabbog** (Bambyce, Hierapolis), on the road between Antioch and the Euphrates, was Atargatis (see ATARGATIS). At Śam'al (Zenjirli), at the foot of Mt. Amanus, *Ba'al-Ḥarran*, *i.e.* Sin, the moon-god of Ḥarran, was worshipped (Lidzbarski, *Nordsem. Epig.* p. 444, pl. xxiv.). At Tarsus there was a *Zeus Tarsios*=בעל תרז (Scholz, *Götzendienst*, p. 149). In Cappadocia the name **Ba'al-Gazur** appears on coins of Ariarathes I. († B.C. 322) that were probably minted in the old capital Gaziura. The god is represented seated on a throne with a sceptre and an eagle, holding an ear of grain and a dove (Head, *Hist. Num.* 631; Reinach, *Trois royaumes d'Asie Mineure*, p. 28 f.).

The **Ba'al of Ḥarran** in Mesopotamia is mentioned in the inscription from Zenjirli referred to above, and occurs in numerous Assyrian proper names of the time of Sennacherib, Esarhaddon, and Ashurbanipal. This was Sin, the ancient Babylonian moon-god. His cult seems to have been indigenous in Ur in Southern Babylonia, and to have migrated to Ḥarran at a very early period (cf. Abram's journey from Ur of the Chaldees to Ḥarran in Gn 11^{31}). From the earliest to the latest times he received the homage of the Babylonians and Assyrians along with their domestic deities. Sargon, king of Assyria (B.C. 722–706), confirmed the exemption from taxes that Ḥarran enjoyed as the city of Sin (*Annals*, ed. Winckler, xiv. 5). Nabonidus, the last king of Babylon (B.C. 555–539), rebuilt the temple of Sin at Ḥarran (Rawlinson, v. 64, col. i. 8–ii. 46). At a later date we find the cult of **Be'ēl-shāmîn**, 'the owner of the sky,' at Ḥarran, perhaps through syncretism of the Syrian god with the ancient moon-god (Jacob of Sarug, in *ZDMG* xxix. p. 131). *Be'ēl-shāmîn* is also found in Nisibis (Isaac of Antioch, i. 209, v. 78 ff.; Bickel, *Be'ēl-Shamin princeps deorum Nisibis*, etc.). From Mesopotamia the worship of this god spread even into Armenia. Βαρσαμήνης (*Barshimnia*, *Parshamin*, *Parsham*), who had a famous temple in the town of Thoran in Armenia, was none other than *Be'ēl-shāmîn* (Agathang. 131, and Lagarde's note). According to Moses of Chorene, Tigranes brought back his image of gold, silver, and crystal from Mesopotamia (Langlois, *Historiens de l'Arménie*, i. 24, 40, 166; ii. 66, 88). It is clear that during the Greek period the cult of Be'ēl-shāmîn was generally diffused throughout Syria and Mesopotamia, and that he attained the rank of *summus deus*. This was doubtless due to his identification with *Zeus Olympios* in Phœnicia, Palmyra, and elsewhere. Zeus was the chief god of the Greek pantheon, and, therefore, wherever the Greeks went, his supposed Syrian counterpart enjoyed his pre-eminence (cf. his titles 'lord of the world,' μέγιστος, ὕψιστος, at Palmyra). Identification with Anu, the Lord of Heaven, in the Bab. religion may also have assisted in the process. In Syriac writers his name appears as a translation of Zeus (2 Mac 6^2; Isocrates in Lagarde, *Analecta Syriaca*, 176, line 24). In Dn 12^{11} *Ba'al-shāmēm*, as a translation of *Zeus Olympios*, whose cult Antiochus Epiphanes established in the Temple at Jerusalem, has been perverted by the Jewish scribes into *shiḳḳûṣ-shômēm*, 'the appalling abomination.'

6. **In Babylonia.** — Babylonia was originally occupied by the non-Semitic race now commonly known as Sumerian. The religion of these people was a polydæmonism that differed in no essential respect from the polydæmonism of the Semites. There was a multitude of divinities presiding over all sorts of natural objects and localities. A male numen was known as *en*, 'owner, lord,' and a female one as *nin*, 'proprietrix, mistress'; thus, *En-ki*, 'master of the sea'; *En-zu*, 'master of wisdom'; *Nin-ki*, 'mistress of the sea'; *Nin-ḫarsag*, 'mistress of the great mountain'; *Nin-sun*, 'mistress of destruction'; *Nin-e-gal*, 'mistress of the great house (temple)'; *Nin-Mar*, 'mistress of Mar'; *Nin-a*, 'mistress of water' (?). By a process common among the Semites (cf. 'ASHTART, 2) many originally feminine divinities were transformed into masculine ones (cf. Barton, *Sem. Origins*, p. 192), so that *nin* eventually became an element in names of gods in the same sense as *en*; thus, *Nin-Girsu*, 'master of Girsu'; *Nin-a-gal*, 'master of great strength,' the patron of blacksmiths; *Nin-shaḫ*, 'master of the wild boar'; *Nin-gish-zida*, 'master of the tree of life.' Celestial phenomena were objects of special reverence, and gave the religion of Babylonia an astral character which it retained down to the latest times. Here may be mentioned *Anu*, 'the sky'; *En-lil*, 'master of the wind,' not 'master of the spirits,' as many have rendered his name, since Gudea (*Cylinder*, A 23. 14, 19=*VAB* [*Vorderasiatische Bibliothek*], I. i. 114) calls him 'king of the storm, king of the whirlwind'; *Utu*, 'the sun'; *Ur* or *En-zu*, 'the moon'; and all the planets. As among the Semites, these celestial powers became in one way or another the 'proprietors' of certain cities that were specially devoted to their worship. Thus Erech became 'the residence of Anu' (*KIB* vi. 63) and Der 'the city of Anu' (*KIB* iii. 165); Nippur, the residence of *En-lil*; Sippar and Larsa of *Utu*; and Ur, of *Ur*. Through the growth and the conquests of certain cities their local divinities became great gods whose worship spread throughout all Babylonia. If, subsequently, these centres declined in political importance, their patrons still retained much of their old dignity, though they might be subordinated in the theological systems to the god of the conquering city.

At the earliest period disclosed to us by the Babylonian inscriptions, En-lil, the god of Nippur, had become the most important of all the Sumerian deities. He was the *en*, or 'lord,' *par excellence*, and was worshipped in all parts of Babylonia as well as at his proper residence. He bore the titles 'king of heaven and earth' (*VAB* p. 15), 'king of the lands, father of the gods' (*VAB* p. 37). As chief of the gods, who had his seat upon the

mountain of the north where the gods assembled, he was called 'great mountain.' His tower-temple at Nippur was known as *E-kur*, 'the mountain house.' All this indicates that Nippur must once have been the political as well as the religious centre of Babylonia; but this was in pre-historic times. In the period represented by the earliest inscriptions (*c.* 4000 B.C.), Nippur had lost the political hegemony, although its god still retained his ancient pre-eminence.

Alongside of *En-lil* stood his consort Nin-lil, who shared the high rank of her husband. She was known as 'the lady of the lower world, the mistress of heaven and earth.' One of her common titles was *Nin-ḫar-sag*, 'lady of the great mountain,' with reference to her supremacy on the mountain of the gods. Associated with *En-lil* as the greatest gods of the Sumerian pantheon were *Anu*, 'the sky,' and *En-ki*, 'lord of the sea.' Anu is mentioned in the earliest inscriptions, and, like *En-lil*, had temples in all parts of Babylonia. En-ki, otherwise known as *E-a*, 'house of water,' was the patron-god of Eridu. In pre-historic times this city lay at the head of the Persian Gulf, and must have been politically one of the most important cities of Babylonia. In the inscriptions of Lugalzaggizi (perhaps as early as B.C. 4000) the triad *En-lil*, *Anu*, and *En-ki* is already known (*VAB* i. 155), and it is frequently mentioned in the oldest inscriptions. Thus the visible universe was portioned out between *Anu*, lord of the sky; *En-lil*, lord of the earth; and *En-ki* or *E-a*, lord of the sea. There is reference perhaps to this triad in the words of the second commandment, 'the heavens above, and the earth beneath, and the waters under the earth' (Jastrow, *Die Rel. Bab.* p. 140). A second triad of inferior dignity consisted of Ur, the moon-god of Ur; Utu, the sun-god of Sippar; and Nana, the goddess of Erech. The superior rank of the moon-god in this triad was due to the greater political importance of his city, Ur.

The Semites who entered Babylonia used the word *bêl* (=*ba'al*, cf. Aram. בַּעַל) in all the senses in which it was used by the other Semites, and, in addition, developed the meaning 'master' or 'lord,' which is not found in the other dialects. They spoke of their gods as *bêl*, both with reference to their ownership of physical objects and places, and with reference to their authority over tribes and individuals. The worshipper addressed his god as *bêli*, 'my lord'—a usage that is not found in the other Semitic languages. When they conquered Babylonia, they found the Sumerian gods on the ground, and adopted them as their own, just as Israel adopted the *bᵉ'ālîm* of Canaan. The *en* of a particular object or locality became for them the *bêl*; the *nin*, the *bêlit*. The old Sumerian moon-god *Ur* became *Sin*, the *bêl* of Ur; the sun-god of Sippar, *Shamash*, the *bêl* of Sippar; *Nana* of Erech, *Ishtar*, the *bêlit* of Erech. The names of other Sumerian gods, such as *Ea* and *Ningirsu*, were retained untranslated, and they were known as the *bêls* or *bêlits* of their respective sanctuaries. *En-lil*, as the chief god of Babylonia, was known as Bêl *par excellence* (there is no article in Bab.), and in course of time this appellative drove the old name out of use and became the common designation of the god, so that, when *Bêl* was mentioned without any qualifying word, *En-lil* was understood to be meant. Thus in Babylonia *Bêl* became the name of an individual god in a way that was never true of *Ba'al* among the West Semites. In like manner, *Nin-ḫar-sag*, the consort of *En-lil*, was known as *Bêlit*, 'the lady.' For many centuries after the conquest of Babylonia by the Semites their language was not reduced to writing, and the ancient Sumerian was employed as a sacred tongue for all the inscriptions in the temples. The result is that before the time of Ḫammurabi the name of the god of Nippur is always written *En-lil*, although it is certain that the Semites habitually called him *Bêl*. From the time of Ḫammurabi onward Semitic inscriptions begin to be common, and then the name of the god appears written phonetically *Bêl* or *Bêlu*. The old name *En-lil* continued, however, to be used as an ideogram for *Bêl* down to the latest times. The Sem. kings of all parts of Babylonia have left inscriptions in honour of this god. Eannatum, king of Lagash (*c.* 3000 B.C.), calls him 'the lord of heaven and earth,' and speaks of Sin, the moon-god of Ur, as 'the strong calf of *En-lil*.' When he conquers the people of Gishḫu, it is in the name of *En-lil* (*VAB* i. 14). He speaks of himself as 'endued with strength by *En-lil*, nourished with holy milk by *Nin-ḫar-sag*' (*VAB* i. 19). He owes his position as king to the fact that 'his name has been spoken by *En-lil*' (*VAB* i. 19). Entemena of Lagash undertook restorations of the temple at Nippur, and constructed there a laver for the god (*VAB* i. 34). Gudea also ascribes his appointment as king of Lagash to *En-lil* (*VAB* i. 114), and wages his wars in the name of *En-lil* (*VAB* i. 128, 130). *Ningirsu*, the patron-god of Lagash, is called the son of *En-lil* (*VAB* i. 123). The temple of *En-lil* at Shirpurla, the capital of Lagash, was called *E-adda*, 'house of the father,' which shows the superior position that he held over against the local god. Ur-engur, king of Ur, rebuilt *E-kur*, the temple of *En-lil* at Nippur (*VAB* i. 189). By the dynasty of Ur *En-lil* was honoured to an extraordinary degree (cf. *VAB* 196*b–c*, 198, 200*b–d*). Aradsin of Larsa calls *En-lil* his god, who has given him the throne (*VAB* i. 212). Votive inscriptions in his honour from kings in all parts of Babylonia have been found by the expedition of the University of Pennsylvania at Nippur. His worship spread even as far as Elam (*VAB* i. 181).

The primitive character of *Bêl* of Nippur is difficult to determine, on account of the confusion of this god with Marduk in all the later religious texts. From the oldest inscriptions we gather that he was conceived as a mighty warrior, armed with a net, who marched forth for the destruction of the enemies of his worshippers (*VAB* i. 14, 19, 128, 130). The Creation-epic shows that in its original form he was regarded as the creator of heaven and earth. He determined the fates of men (*VAB* i. 21, 122). Oaths were administered in his name, and he punished those who violated them (*VAB* i. 14). On his temple at Nippur and the remains there found see Peters, *Nippur*; Hilprecht, *Babylonian Expedition of the University of Pennsylvania*, and *Explorations in Bible Lands*.

The high position that *Bêl* of Nippur maintained for centuries he finally lost through the rise of the city of Babylon to political supremacy. Before the time of Ḫammurabi (*c.* 2200 B.C.), Babylon was a relatively obscure place, and its chief god, Marduk, enjoyed only a local celebrity. He is never mentioned in the inscriptions of kings who reigned before the first dynasty of Babylon. He was originally the god of the morning and the spring sun, who had become the *bêl* of Babylon by a process similar to that by which Sin, the moon-god, had become the *bêl* of Ur. When Ḫammurabi expelled the Elamites and united all Babylonia beneath his rule, Babylon became the chief city of the empire, and Marduk, its god, was suddenly exalted to the chief place in the pantheon. He now became Bêl, or 'lord,' *par excellence*; and this title presently became a proper name that was used even more frequently than his real name, Marduk. There were now two *Bêls* in Babylonia —the old *Bêl* of Nippur, who, in spite of the fallen state of his city, was still reverenced through force

of religious conservatism, and the new *Bêl* of Babylon, who had proved himself to be the *de facto* lord through the strength of Ḫammurabi's arms. What was more natural than to attempt to prevent conflict between the two potentates by affirming their identity? This step was taken by the priests of Babylon as early as the reign of Ḫammurabi. All the attributes of the old *Bêl* of Nippur, 'lord of lords,' 'lord of heaven and earth,' 'lord of the lands,' 'creator,' etc., were transferred directly to the new *Bêl* of Babylon. All the ancient hymns and prayers to *Bêl* of Nippur were appropriated to the use of his rival. When Ḫammurabi and his successors of the first dynasty speak of *Bêl*, and use the language of the ancient inscriptions, they mean Marduk. In spite of this attempted syncretism, however, the priests were unable to banish the old *Bêl* entirely even from Babylon. As a member of the supreme triad—*Anu*, *Bêl*, *Ea*—*Bêl* held his own, and was constantly invoked in the inscriptions along with *Bel-Marduk*; but this was more a religious formula inherited from the past than an active belief. For all practical purposes of worship, *Enlil-Bêl* was absorbed by *Marduk-Bêl*. Outside of the city of Babylon the claim of *Marduk* to be the same as the older *Bêl* was not received without opposition, and there are evidences of a long struggle before it became a dogma acknowledged throughout Babylonia. The priests of Nippur naturally never accepted it, and throughout the entire period of the Kassite third dynasty Nippur retained its place as a sanctuary, to which pilgrims flocked from all parts of Babylonia. The Kassite kings had no special fondness for the patron-god of the dynasty of Ḫammurabi, and they bestowed special honour upon the old *Bêl* of Nippur (Hilprecht, *Old Bab. Inscr.* I. i. Nos. 28–32). With the fall of the Kassites and the establishment of a native Babylonian dynasty, *Marduk* regained the place that Ḫammurabi had given him, and *Bêl* of Nippur waned until little remained but the memory of his former glory. Curiously enough, *Bêlit* of Nippur did not share the fate of her husband and become the wife of *Marduk* when he was identified with *Bêl*. *Marduk* had already a consort, *Sarpanitum*, a relatively unimportant goddess, who was in no way comparable with the old *Bêlit* of Nippur. The two were never identified, as logical consistency would have demanded, but *Bêlit* held her own as an independent great goddess.

In the inscriptions of the Assyrian kings, *Bêl* usually means *Marduk*. He occupies the second place in the pantheon (after *Ashur*), and is usually named in connexion with his 'son' *Nabu*, the patron-god of Borsippa. The Assyrian kings showed him the highest reverence; and even when they conquered Babylonia, they claimed to do it in the service of *Bêl*, and took the throne by the formal ceremony of grasping the hands of *Bêl* at Babylon. Along with this there existed also the cult of the older *Bêl* of Nippur. The old triad, *Anu*, *Bêl*, *Ea*, still stands at the head of lists of gods in which *Marduk* appears as a separate deity; and when the Assyrian kings speak of *Bêl*, the lord of the lands, who dwells on the holy mountain, they mean the *Bêl* of Nippur. Tiglath-Pileser I. states expressly that he restored a temple of 'the old *Bêl*' at Ashur (Rawlinson, i. pl. 14, col. vi. 87). This double use of *Bêl* as a proper name lasted through the entire Assyrian period, and, besides this, *bêl* retained its generic meaning as a title of all the gods. The standing formula for the gods in general is *ilâni rabûti bêlêya*, 'the great gods my lords.' *Bêlit* was worshipped in Assyria partly as the ancient goddess of Nippur, partly as the consort of *Anu* or *Ashur*. Her name is also used as a title of the Assyrian *Ishtar*. This confusion is due to the fact that the common noun *bêlit* never lost its appellative meaning of 'mistress.' Many goddesses might be called 'mistress,' and then through this similarity of title be confused with one another. When Ashurbanipal wishes to distinguish the older *Bêlit*, he calls her *Bêlit* of Nippur (Rawlinson, v. 8, col. viii. 98, 99).

In the New Bab. period *Bêl-Marduk* regained the supremacy that in the Assyr. period he temporarily surrendered to Ashur. His cult was revived with great glory by Nabopolassar, Nebuchadrezzar, and Nabonidus, and all the attributes of supreme divinity were heaped upon him. Throughout Babylonia he was acknowledged without question as the *Bêl*, and his cult spread widely in the provinces of the empire. We have found it already at Palmyra (see above, iii. 5). Its presence at Edessa is attested by Jacob of Sarug (*ZDMG* xxix., 1875, p. 131). When *Bêl* is mentioned in the OT and Apoc. it is always *Marduk* that is meant. The old *Bêl* is unknown, except in so far as his character survives in his successor. In Jer 51^{44} he is called '*Bêl* of Babylon.' In Is 46^{1} he is named in connexion with *Nebo*, the god of Borsippa, the suburb of Babylon. In Jer 50^{2} *Merodach* (=*Marduk*) stands in poetic parallelism with *Bêl*. Cf. also *Bel and the Dragon* (=Dn 14 in LXX), Baruch 6^{41} (cf. 6^{12}). *Bêl* also occurs in a few late Heb. proper names.

7. **Among the Greeks and Romans.**—Through Phœn. colonies in all parts of the coast of the Mediterranean, and through Greek colonies in Syria, the worship of the old Sem. *bᵉ'ālîm* was widely disseminated throughout the Græco-Roman world, and exerted a deep influence upon Occidental thought. The local divinity was either called by his original Sem. name, *e.g.* **Balanios** at Heliopolis, **Balsamem** at Tyre, Palmyra, and the Phœnician colonies, **Balmarcodes** at Deir el-Qal'a, **Beelmaris** at Tyre, **Balcaranensis** at Carthage, **Baladdiris** at Sigus, **Aglibolos** and **Iaribolos** at Palmyra; or else his name was translated into its supposed Gr. or Lat. equivalent. The local *ba'al* was everywhere regarded as the supreme god, hence he was frequently identified with Zeus or Juppiter, the name of his city being appended to distinguish him from other similar divinities, *e.g.* **Zeus Kasios**, **Zeus Damascenos**, **Zeus Karmelos**, **Zeus Atabyrios**, **Zeus Tarsios**, **Juppiter Heliopolitanus** (see above under the corresponding Semitic names). Other *ba'als* had peculiarities which led to their identification with *Kronos-Saturn*. *Balcaranensis* of Carthage, for instance, is regularly called *Saturnus* in the inscriptions (cf. Alex. Polyh., frag. 3 in *FHG* iii. 212; Servius, *Aen.* i. 642, 729; Damascius, *Vit. Isid.* § 115; Joh. Chrys. on Ps. 105, § 3; Theodoret on Ps 105^{28} in *PG* liii. 1730). The *ba'al* of Heliopolis, who was the sun, was, of course, identified with *Helios* and *Sol*. *Malak-Bel* at Palmyra is in the Latin parallel called 'Sol sanctissimus' (cf. Servius, *Aen.* i. 642, 729; Nonn. *Dionys.* xl. 392 ff.; Macrobius, *Saturn.* i. 23). Hesychius (*s.v.* Βῆλος), the *Etym. Mag.* (*s.v.* Βῆλ), and Parmenius (in Becker, *Anecd.* 225), connect *ba'al* with *Ouranos*. *Ba'al-Melḳart* of Tyre is almost uniformly identified by classical writers with *Herakles* (cf. Baethgen, *Beiträge*, 20 f.). Late writers assert that in Persian *Ba'al* is the same as *Ares* (Malalas, p. 19; John of Antioch, frag. 5, in *FHG* iv. 542; *Chron. Pasch.* i. 18). This variety in the identification bears witness to the multiplicity of the *bᵉ'ālîm* with which Greeks and Romans came into contact (see Scholz, *Götzendienst*, p. 148 ff.; Baethgen, *Beiträge*, p. 19 ff.).

The Bab. *Bêl* is also known to the classical writers. In Servius (*Aen.* i. 612) a dim memory survives of a distinction between the older and the younger *Bêl*, but in general only *Marduk-Bêl* is known, and all the attributes of *Enlil-Bêl* are

ascribed to him, as in the later Bab. theology. Eudemos (in Damascius, *de Princip.* 125) knows that he is the son of *Aos* (*Ea*) and *Dauke* (*Damkina*). Berossus (in *FHG* ii. 497, 4 ff.) and Castor (in Euseb. *Chron.*, ed. Schoene, p. 53) narrate, in direct dependence upon the Bab. Creation-story, how *Bêl* slew the dragon of the deep, and out of her body created heaven and earth. Of him Arrian (*Anab.* iii. 16. 4) says that the Babylonians honour him most of all the gods (cf. Minucius Felix, vi. 1). The building of his temple at Babylon is ascribed to Semiramis (Diod. ii. 9; Dionysius Periegetes, 1007). Berossus (in Euseb. *Chron.* ed. Schoene, p. 48) and Josephus (*Ant.* x. xi. 1) tell how it was beautified by Nebuchadrezzar; Arrian (*Anab.* iii. 16. 4), how it was destroyed by Xerxes and rebuilt by Alexander. It is often mentioned by the classical writers (Herod. i. 181; Paus. i. 16. 3, viii. 33. 3; Pliny, vi. 121; Mart. Capell. vi. 701; Solin. lx. 3). A grave of *Bêl* at Babylon was known to Ctesias (frag. 29, 216; cf. Aelian, xii. 3; Strabo, xvi. 738; Diod. xvii. 102). The cult of the Bab. *Bêl* was never directly adopted by the Greeks or the Romans, as were the cults of the Phœn. and Syr. *bᵉ'ālîm*; but indirectly many elements of Bab. theological speculation concerning his character and his creation of the world drifted into the Occident, and re-appear in the worship of Mithra (see MITHRA). Through the Bab. use of *Bêl* as a proper name, and through the exalted Bab. conception of his character as creator and supreme god, the Greeks were led to the idea that there was a single god *Bêl*, of whom the numerous Syr. and Phœn. *bᵉ'ālîm* were only the local manifestations. Strabo speaks of *Bêlos* as a great god, worshipped throughout Africa and in Asia as far as Persia (xvi. 744; cf. *Excerpta Barbari* in Frick, *Chron. Min.* 281, 27; Curtius, iii. 3, 16). The form *Bêlos* as a proper name without additional determinative is evidently derived from the Bab. *Bêl* rather than from the Phœn. *ba'al*, and shows that the idea of a single god *Ba'al* is ultimately of Babylonian origin. On the Bab. *Bêl* in Greek writers see Scholz, *Götzendienst* (p. 365 ff.).

LITERATURE.—In addition to the special discussions mentioned above, see on the *ba'al*-cult in general, Selden, *de Dis Syris*, 1617; J. G. Voss, *de Theol. Gentili*, 1642; Gesenius, art. 'Bel' in Ersch and Gruber's *Enc.*; Creuzer, *Symbolik u. Mythologie*³, 1841, ii. 411 ff.; Winer, *RWB*, art. 'Baal'; Diestel, 'Monotheismus des ältesten Heidenthums,' *JDTh*, 1860, 719 ff.; Merx, art. 'Baal' in Schenkel, 1869; Schlottmann, art. 'Baal,' in Riehm's *HWB*, 1875; Scholz, *Götzendienst u. Zauberwesen bei den alten Hebräern*, 1877, 137 ff.; Baudissin, *Studien zur sem. Religionsgesch.* ii. 1878; E. Meyer, art. 'Baal,' in Roscher's *Lex.*, 1884; Baethgen, *Beitr. zur sem. Religionsgesch.* 1888, 17 ff.; W. R. Smith, *Rel. of Semites*², 1894, 93 ff.; Baudissin, art. 'Baal, Bel,' in *PRE*³, 1897; Peake, art. 'Baal,' in *HDB*, i. (1898) p. 209, and Kautzsch, *ib.* v. (1904) p. 645; Moore, art. 'Baal,' in *EBi*, 1899.

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On the *ba'al*-cult in Syria and Mesopotamia see Chwolson, *Die Ssabier*, 1856, ii. 165 ff.; Levy, *ZDMG* xviii., 1864, 99 ff.; de Vogüé, *Syrie Centrale, Inscr. Sémit.*, 1868, 62 ff.; Sachau, 'Baal-Harran in einer altaramäischen Inschrift,' *SBAW*, 1895, 174 ff.; Lidzbarski, *Nordsem. Epigraphik*, 1898, 239, and *Ephemeris für semit. Epigraphik*, vol. i. pt. iii. 1901.

On the *ba'al*-cult in Babylonia see Munter, *Religion der Babylonier*, 1827, 14 ff.; Schrader, 'Baal und Bel,' in *Theol. Stud. u. Krit.*, 1874, 335 ff.; Schrader, *KAT*², 1883, 173 ff.; Jensen, *Kosmologie der Babylonier*, 1890, 19 ff., 84 ff.; Jeremias, art. 'Marduk,' in Roscher's *Lex.*, 1895; Tiele, *Gesch. der Rel. im Alterthum*, I., 1896, 125 ff.; Jeremias, in de La Saussaye³, 1905, i. 281 f.; Jastrow, *The Rel. of Bab. and Assyria*, 1898, 2nd ed. in German (1902 ff.), and art. 'Rel. of Babylonia,' in *HDB* v. (1904), p. 538; Zimmern, *Vater, Sohn, und Fürsprecher in der Babylonischen Gottesvorstellung*, 1896, and *KAT*³, 1902, 354 ff., 370 ff.; Clay, 'Ellil, the God of Nippur,' in *AJSL* xxiii., 1907, p. 289 ff.; Radau, *Bel the Christ of Ancient Times*, 1908.

LEWIS BAYLES PATON.

BAALZEBUB and BEELZEBOUL.—These two names probably refer to the same supernatural being; or, at any rate, the second of them is derived from the first. Baalzebub (בעל זבוב) is the OT form (2 K 1[2. 3. 6. 16]), and Beelzeboul * (*βεελζεβούλ*, WH *βεεζεβούλ*) the NT form (Mt 10[25] 12[24. 27], Mk 3[22], Lk 11[15. 18. 19]).

Baalzebub is in the OT represented as the god of the Philistine city of Ekron, whose oracle was so famous that Ahaziah, king of Israel, sent to consult it, to the neglect of the oracles of Jahweh. The Hebrew word בעל זבוב would mean 'lord of flies'; זבוב = Assyrian *zumbu*, 'a fly' (cf. Ec 10[1]). The LXX and Josephus so understood it, since they make the name of the god *βάαλ μυῖαν* (cf. LXX, *ad loc.*, and Jos. *Ant.* IX. ii. 1). Aquila supports the same reading by transliterating *βααλζεβούβ*, while Symmachus supports the NT form *βεελζεβούλ*. Bezold found, in an inscription of the Assyrian king Assur-bel-Kala (11th cent.), mention made among the gods of *Ebir-nari* (a name applied in Neh 2[7. 9] to Syria and Palestine) of a god Bel-ze-bubi (or-na). Were the last syllable certain, it would show that *Baalzebub* was found there earlier (see *Catalogue*, K. 3500, and Hommel, *AHT* 195). Movers (*Die Phönizier*, i. 260 ff.) held that the original name was זבול = בעל 'lord of the mansion,' which originally meant a heavenly mansion, but afterwards the god of the nether world. This view is of very doubtful certainty, since זְבֻל in the sense of 'house' (1 K 8[13] and Ps 49[14]) is very uncertain (cf. LXX). In Is 63[15] and Hab 3[11] it is used of a station or abode in the heavens, while in the Talmud (*Chagiga*, 12*b*) זבול is the fourth heaven, in which are the heavenly Jerusalem and the altar. This would hardly be possible, if in Jewish thought the word had ever represented a region the lord of which was the prince of demons. Halévy (*JA* xix. [1892] p. 304 and *CAIBL* xx. [1892] p. 74) thinks Zebub the name of a place, comparing the *Ṣapuna* of the el-Amarna letters (*KB* v. 174. 16)—a theory which Kittel ('Könige,' in Nowack's *Handkommentar, ad loc.*) rightly rejects. The resemblance between Zebub and Ṣapuna is too slight, and the Biblical text states that the deity in question was the god of Ekron. In all probability Baalzebub means 'lord of flies,' which are very numerous in the neighbourhood of Ekron (see Barton, *A Year's Wandering in Bible Lands*, 1904, p. 216 ff.). This title was given as an epithet to the god, whether by the Ekronites or the Hebrews we do not know, though Baethgen (*Beit. z. sem. Religionsgesch.* 1888, p. 25) holds that he represented a process of divination by flies. In the NT, as already noted, the name is *βεελζεβούλ* and is applied to the lord of the devils, and made a synonym of Satan (cf. Mk 3[22. 23], Lk 11[15. 18]). Cf. above, p. 287[a].

These facts have given rise to various conjectures. (1) The theory of Movers already referred to, that the name was בעל זבול, is thought by some to receive confirmation from the fact that in Mt 10[25] *οἰκοδεσπότης* (='master of the house' †) may be considered a translation of it. There is no real reason, however, to consider one of these words a translation of the other. If זבול (='house') was an original element of the name, a punning Jew would easily have זיבול (=Syr. זִבְלָא='dung') suggested to him, and might so understand the

* Beelzebub of AV has no authority in Greek MSS. It owes its currency to the Vulgate.

† Cheyne (*EBi*, col. 514) holds that *οἰκοδεσπότης* suggests the reading בעל זביר, ו= Aram. 'of,' and זביר changed from בית='house.'

name (so Gould, 'Mark,' in *Inter. Crit. Com.* p. 62). (2) It is supposed that the name is a variation of *Baalzebub*, and that both the form and the significance have undergone change. As to the form, it is supposed (*a*) that the final *b* was changed to *l* by conscious perversion, so as to make it mean 'dung,' as *ba'al* (='lord') is sometimes changed to *bôsheth* ('shame') (cf. *Esh-baal*, 1 Ch 9^{39}, with *Ish-bosheth*, 2 S 2^{10}); this perversion transformed 'fly' to 'dung,' or 'filth.' (*b*) Baudissin (*PRE*^{3}) holds that *b* was changed to *l* in popular pronunciation, without intent to change the meaning, as *Bab-el-Mandeb* is sometimes changed to Bab-el-Mandel; and (*c*) Riehm (*HWB*^{2}) held that in the time of Christ *Baal-zebub* was Aramaized to בעל דבבא (='lord of enmity'), and so was the exact equivalent of Διάβολος, or Satan.

As to the significance of Beel-zeboul in the NT period different theories have been proposed to account for his evolution from the OT god. Geiger (*Urschrift*, p. 53) thought that the god of the hated Philistines became the representative of heathen power, and so the arch-enemy of Israel. He found confirmation of his view in the fact that, in Aramaic, זבוב would be phonetically transformed into דבב ('hostility'). This theory, though plausible, lacks historical confirmation. The Philistines were not a formidable enemy after the early days of the kingdom. Syrians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, and Romans took successively the place of principal enemy, and it is hardly probable that the god of Ekron, who is mentioned in but one narrative of the OT, could have continued to hold this place. Had he done so, he could not have escaped mention.

Another view is expressed in the Talmud, which regards the fly as the representative of evil. In *B^{e}rākhōth*, 61*a*, it is said: 'The evil spirit lies like a fly at the door of the human heart.' Again, in *B^{e}rākhōth*, 10*b*, it is said that the Shunammite woman (2 K 4^8 ff.) perceived that Elisha was a man of God, because no fly crossed his table. This estimate of the fly goes back to the *Mishna*, for in *Aboth*, 5^8, we read: 'A fly, being an impure thing, was never seen in the slaughter-house of the temple.' In reality the revival of interest in Baal-zebub in the NT was due to literary causes. Cheyne has pointed out that Lk 9^{54} shows that in the time of Christ the narrative of 2 K 1 possessed a strange fascination for people. Probably both the hostility to Baal-zebub expressed in that narrative and the perversion of his name into the Aramaic בעל דבבא (='lord of hostility') helped this literary interest to make Beel-zebub a synonym of Satan. As the name meant 'lord of flies,' this would be sufficient to call into existence the Talmudic conception that the fly is a kind of imp, especially as Lv 11 and Dt 14 imply that it was to be reckoned among unclean flying things.

The change of *zebub* to *zebul* in the NT was, no doubt, due to conscious perversion. In addition to the analogy of *bôsheth*, cited above, the Talmud (*'Abōdā zārā*, 18*b*, cf. Dalman, *Aram. Gram.* p. 137) shows that זבח as applied to the sacrifices of the heathen was changed to זבל ('dung').

LITERATURE.—Lightfoot, *Horæ Hebraicæ* on Mt 12^{24}, Lk 11^{15}; Movers, *Phönizier*, 1841, i. 260 ff.; Geiger, *Urschrift*, Breslau, 1857, p. 53; Riehm, *HWB*^{2}; Baudissin, *PRE*^{3}; Winckler, *Geschichte Israels*, 1895–1900, i. 223, 225; Peake, in Hastings' *DB* i. 211^b; Cheyne, *EBi*, col. 407 ff.; Kohler, *JE* ii. 629^b; Kittel, 'Könige,' in Nowack's *Handkommentar*, p. 182; Allen, 'Matthew' (Edin. 1907), in *Inter. Crit. Comm.* p. 107; Gould, 'Mark,' 1896 (*ib.*), p. 62; Plummer, 'Luke^2,' 1898 (*ib.*), p. 301.

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BĀB, BĀBIS.—*Bāb* (باب='Gate' in Arabic) was the title first assumed by Mīrzā 'Alī Muḥammad, a young Sayyid of Shīrāz, who in A.H. 1260 (=A.D. 1844) began to preach a new religion, which spread through Persia with extraordinary rapidity, and, in spite of violent persecutions, culminating in the execution of the founder on July 9, 1850, and of some twenty-eight of his principal disciples on September 15, 1852, has continued to gain strength until the present day. Both the history and the doctrines of this religion present so many remarkable features, that the subject has, almost from the first, attracted a great deal of attention, not only in the East but in Europe, and latterly in America; and the literature dealing with it, even in European languages, is very extensive; while the Arabic and Persian writings, manuscript, lithographed and printed, connected with it are so numerous and, in some cases, so voluminous, that it would hardly be possible for the most industrious student to read in their entirety even those which are accessible in half a dozen of the best-known collections in Europe. An exhaustive treatment of the subject is therefore impossible, and we must content ourselves with a sketch of the most important outlines of the history, doctrines, and literature of the religion in question.

1. **Antecedents.**—In order to understand properly the origins and developments of Bābī doctrine, it is, of course, essential to have a fair knowledge of Islām, and especially of that form of Islām (the doctrine of the *Ithnā 'ashariyya* division of the Shī'a, or 'Sect of the Twelve' Imāms), of which Persia has from the earliest Muhammadan times been the stronghold, and which, since the 16th cent. of our era, has been the State religion of that kingdom. Information on this subject must be sought elsewhere in this Encyclopædia under the appropriate headings; but, even for the most elementary comprehension of the early Bābī doctrine, it is essential to grasp the Shī'ite doctrine of the Imāmate, and especially the Messianic teaching concerning the Twelfth Imām, or Imām Mahdī.

According to the Shī'ite view, the prophet Muḥammad appointed to succeed him, as the spiritual head of Islām, his cousin 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, who, being married to Fāṭima, was also his son-in-law. 'Alī's rights were, however, usurped in turn by Abū Bakr, 'Umar, and 'Uthmān; and though he was elected Khalīfa after 'Uthmān's death, he was assassinated after a brief and troubled reign of five years (A.D. 656–661). His eldest son, al-Ḥasan, the second Imām, abdicated five or six months after his father's death in favour of the Umayyad Mu'āwiya. His younger son, al-Ḥusayn, the third Imām, attempted to regain his temporal rights by a rash revolt against the Umayyads, but perished on the fatal field of Karbalā (Kerbelā) on Muḥarram 10, A.H. 61 (Oct. 10, A.D. 680), a day still celebrated with wailing and mourning in all Shī'ite communities, especially in Persia. The nine remaining Imāms all lived in more or less dread of the Umayyad, and afterwards of the 'Abbāsid khalīfas, and many of them died by poison or other violent means. They were all descended from al-Ḥusayn, and, according to the popular belief, from a daughter of Yazdigird III., the last Sāsānian king, who was taken captive by the Arabs after the battle of Qādisiyya, and given in marriage to al-Ḥusayn. This belief, which was prevalent at least as early as the 3rd cent. of the Hijra, since it is mentioned by the historian al-Ya'qūbī (ed. Houtsma, ii. 293, 363), undoubtedly explains, as remarked by Gobineau,* the affection in which the Imāms are held in Persia, since they are regarded as the direct descendants not only of the prophet Muḥammad, but also of the old royal house of Sāsān. The Divine Right of the Imāms to the temporal supremacy of which they had been unjustly deprived, and the absolute dependence

* *Rel. et Philos. dans l'Asie Centrale* (ed. 1866), p. 275.

of the faithful on the spiritual guidance of the 'Imām of the Age,' thus became the two most characteristic and essential dogmas of all the various Shī'ite sects. 'Whosoever dies,' says a well-known Shī'ite tradition, 'without recognizing the Imām of his time, dies the death of a pagan.'

Now, according to the 'Sect of the Twelve,' the Twelfth Imām, or Imām Mahdī, was the last of the series. But since, according to their belief, the world cannot do without an Imām, and since this last Imām, who succeeded his father in A.H. 260 (=A.D. 873–4), disappeared from mortal ken in A.H. 329 (=A.D. 940–1), it is held that he never died, but is still living in the mysterious city of Jābulqā, or Jābulsā, surrounded by a band of faithful disciples, and that at the end of time he will issue forth and 'fill the earth with justice after it has been filled with iniquity.' This Messianic Advent is ever present in the mind of the Persian Shī'ite, who, when he has occasion to mention the Twelfth Imām, or Imām Mahdī (also entitled *Ḥujjatu'llāh*, 'the Proof of God,' *Baqiyyatu'llāh*, 'the Remnant of God,' *Ṣāḥibu'z-Zamān*, 'the Lord of the Age,' and *Qā'imu Āli Muḥammad*, 'He who shall arise out of the house of Muḥammad'), always adds the formula عجّل الله فرجه ('May God hasten his glad Advent!').

Now, in connexion with Bābī doctrine, it is to be noticed first of all that the 'Manifestation' (ظهور) of Mīrzā 'Alī Muḥammad the Bāb took place, as already said, in A.H. 1260, exactly a thousand years after the succession of the Imām Mahdī to the Imāmate, or, in other words, at the completion of a millennium of 'Occultation' (غیبت). For the Imām Mahdī, according to the Shī'ite belief, appeared in public once only, on his accession, when he performed the funeral service over his father, after which he became invisible to the bulk of his followers. During the first 69 years of the millennium of 'Occultation,' however, his instructions and directions were communicated to his followers, the Shī'a, through four successive intermediaries, each of whom bore the title of *Bāb*, or 'Gate.'* This period is known as 'the Minor Occultation' (غیبت صغری). In A.H. 329, however, this series of 'Gates,' or channels of communication between the Imām and his followers, came to an end, and such communication became impossible. This later and longer period (which, according to the Bābī view, lasted from A.H. 329 to A.H. 1260) is known as 'the Major Occultation' (غیبت کبری).

It was in this sense, then, that Mīrzā 'Alī Muḥammad, at the beginning of his career, declared himself to be the *Bāb*, or 'Gate,' viz., the gate whereby communication, closed since the end of the 'Minor Occultation,' was re-opened between the Hidden Imām and his faithful followers. He did not invent this term, nor was he even the first to revive it, for it was used in the same sense by ash-Shalmaghānī, a Messiah of the 10th cent. of our era, and by others.† So far as recent times are concerned, however, it was the Shaykhī school, founded by Shaykh Aḥmad al-Aḥsā'ī (b. A.D. 1733, d. A.D. 1826) which revived the idea that amongst the faithful followers of the Twelfth Imām there must always exist one, whom they entitled *Shī'a-i-Kāmil* (شیعهٔ کامل), 'the Perfect Shī'ite,' who was in direct spiritual communication with him. Neither Shaykh Aḥmad nor his successor Sayyid Kāẓim of Rasht (d. A.D. 1843–1844) made use of the title 'Bāb,' but their conception of 'the Perfect Shī'ite' was practically identical with the idea connoted by that title. To this Shaykhī school, or sect, belonged not only Mīrzā 'Alī Muḥammad himself, but Mullā Ḥusayn of Bushrawayh, Qurratu'l-'Ayn, and many others of his first and most zealous disciples. On the death of Sayyid Kāẓim his followers were naturally impelled by their doctrine concerning 'the Perfect Shī'ite' to seek his successor. There were two claimants, Mīrzā 'Alī Muḥammad, who on May 23, 1844,* within a short time of Sayyid Kāẓim's death, announced himself to be the 'Bāb,' and whose followers were consequently called 'Bābīs'; and Ḥājjī Muḥammad Karīm Khān, a scion of the Qājār Royal Family, who was recognized, and whose descendants are still recognized, by the conservative or stationary Shaykhīs as their spiritual head. It is in the teachings of the Shaykhī school, therefore, that the immediate origins of early Bābī doctrine must be sought; but no European scholar has yet made a critical study of the works and doctrines of Shaykh Aḥmad and Sayyid Kāẓim. Those who desire somewhat fuller information on this subject may be referred to the *Traveller's Narrative*, ii. 234–244. A full and critical study of the Shaykhī doctrines would, however, form an indispensable preliminary to such a philosophical history of the Bābīs as must some day be written.

2. **History of the movement during the life of the founder.** — The first period of Bābī history begins with the 'Manifestation' on May 23, 1844, and ends with the martyrdom of the Bāb at Tabrīz on July 9, 1850. The detailed history of these six years will be found in the translations of the *Traveller's Narrative* (Camb. 1891) and the *New History of . . . the Báb* (Camb. 1893), while a fairly complete bibliography of earlier works on the subject, both European and Oriental, is given in the former work (ii. 173–211). In the *JRAS* for 1889 (vol. xxi. new ser. pp. 485–526 and 881–1009) are also discussed critically various matters connected with both the history and the doctrines of the sect. Of the three chief histories composed in Persian by members of the sect, the earliest and most instructive is that written between 1850 and 1852 by Ḥājjī Mīrzā Jānī of Kāshān, who must have finished it only a little while before he was put to death among the twenty-eight Bābīs who suffered martyrdom at Ṭihrān (Teheran) on September 15, 1852. Of this work the only complete manuscript, so far as the present writer can ascertain, which existed (until he caused it to be transcribed for himself) was *Suppl. Pers.* 1071 in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris, one of the MSS brought from Persia by M. le Comte de Gobineau, the talented author of *Les Religions et les philosophies dans l'Asie Centrale*. Another MS in the same collection (*Suppl. Pers.* 1070) contains the first third of it, while the *New History* (تاریخ جدید) is a recension made (about A.D. 1875–1880) by Mīrzā Ḥusayn of Hamadān, containing many additions, but also remarkable for some extremely important omissions and alterations. There is thus sufficient material for an edition of this most important document, which the present writer is now (1908) printing. The *Traveller's Narrative*, the third of the three principal systematic accounts compiled by the

* For their names, and a fuller account of the whole matter, see the present writer's tr. of the *Traveller's Narrative*, ii. 296 ff.

† For a full discussion of this matter, see the note on the meaning of the title 'Báb' in the tr. of the *Traveller's Narrative*, ii. 226–234.

* This date, and even the exact hour of his 'Manifestation,' is given by the Báb in two passages of the Persian *Bayán* (Wáḥid ii. 7, and vi. 13). See *Trav. Narr.* ii. 218–226.

Bábís of their history, is not only later, but deals less with the early history of the movement than with the biography and writings of Bahá'u'lláh, to whose son 'Abbás Efendi (also called 'Abdu'l-Bahá) its authorship is ascribed. The accounts of Bábí history given by Muḥammadan writers (notably by the Lisánu'l-Mulk in the *Násikhu't-Tawárikh* and by Riżá-qulí-Khán in his supplement to the *Rawżatu'ṣ-Ṣafá*) must, as a rule, be used with great caution, but exception must be made in favour of the late Sayyid Jamálu'd-Dín al-Afghání's article on the Bábís in Buṭrusu'l-Bustání's Arabic encyclopædia the *Dá'iratu'l-Ma'árif* (Beirut, 1881), and of a more recent history compiled in Arabic by a Persian doctor named Za'ímu'd-Dawla, and published at Cairo in A.H. 1321 (A.D. 1903–4),* from both of which, in spite of the prejudice against the Bábís which they display, important facts may be gleaned.

A very brief summary of the events of this first period (A.D. 1844–1850) is all that can be given here. The Báb himself, who was only twenty-four years old at the time of his 'Manifestation,'† and not thirty when he suffered martyrdom, was a captive in the hands of his enemies during the greater portion of his brief career, first at Shíráz (August–September 1845—March 1846), then at Iṣfahán (March 1846—March 1847), then at Mákú near Urumiyya, and, for the last six months of his life, at the neighbouring castle of Chihríq. He enjoyed the greatest freedom at Iṣfahán, where the governor, Minúchihr Khán, a Georgian eunuch, treated him with consideration and even favour; but he was able to continue his writings and to correspond with, and even receive, his followers during the greater part of his captivity, save, perhaps, the last portion. He himself, however, took no part in the bloody battles which presently broke out between his followers and their Muslim antagonists. Of these armed risings of the Bábís the chief were in Mázandarán, at Shaykh Ṭabarsí near Bárfurúsh, under the leadership of Mullá Ḥusayn of Bushrawayh and Ḥájjí Mullá Muḥammad 'Alí of Bárfurúsh (autumn of 1848 to summer of 1849); at Zanján, under Mullá Muḥammad 'Alí Zanjání (May–December 1850); and at Yazd and Níríz, under Ághá Sayyid Yaḥyá (summer of 1850), while a second rising at Níríz seems to have occurred in 1852.‡ Amongst other events of this period to which the Bábís attach special importance, and of which they have preserved detailed accounts, is the martyrdom of 'the Seven Martyrs' at Ṭihrán, which also took place in the summer of 1850.§ During the later period of his career Mírzá 'Alí Muḥammad discarded the title of 'Báb' (which he conferred on one of his disciples) and announced that he was the *Qá'im*, or expected Imám, and even more than this, the *Nuqṭa* (نقطة), or 'Point.' It is by this title (*Ḥaẓrat-i-Nuqṭa-i-Úlá*, 'His Holiness the First Point'), or by that of *Ḥaẓrat-i-Rabbiyu'l-A'lá*, 'His Holiness my Lord Most High,' that he is generally spoken of by his followers, though latterly the Bahá'ís, desiring to represent him as a mere forerunner of Bahá'u'lláh—a sort of John the Baptist—seem to have abandoned the use of these later and higher titles. But from the Báb's own later writings, such as the Persian *Bayán*, as well as from what is said by Mírzá Jání and other contemporary writers, it is clear that he was regarded as a divine being, and that in a very full sense, as will be shown when the doctrines of the Bábís are discussed, when the term 'Point' (*Nuqṭa*) will also be explained. The circumstances attending the execution of the Báb at Tabríz on July 9, 1850, and especially his strange escape from the first volley fired at him,* are fully recorded in the histories already mentioned, and need not be recapitulated here. His body, after being exposed for several days, was recovered by his disciples, together with that of his fellow-martyr Mírzá Muḥammad 'Alí of Tabríz, wrapped in white silk, placed in a coffin, and concealed for some seventeen years in a little shrine called Imám-záda-i-Ma'ṣúm between Ṭihrán and Ribáṭ-Karím. At a later date it was transferred to 'Akká (St. Jean d'Acre) by order of Bahá'u'lláh, where it was placed in a shrine specially built for that purpose.†

3. Period of Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel's supremacy (A.D. 1850–1868).—Before his death the Báb had nominated as his successor a lad named Mírzá Yaḥyá, son of Mírzá Buzurg of Núr, and half-brother of the afterwards more famous Mírzá Ḥusayn 'Alí, better known as Bahá'u'lláh. Mírzá Yaḥyá was, according to Mírzá Jání, only 14 years old at the time of the Báb's 'Manifestation,' so that he must have been born about A.H. 1246 (=A.D. 1830–1831). His mother died when he was a child, and he was brought up by his step-mother, the mother of his elder half-brother Bahá'u'lláh, who was about 13 years his senior.‡ Mírzá Jání, our oldest, best, and most unprejudiced authority (since he was killed in 1852, long before the schism between the Ezelís and Bahá'ís took place) reports Bahá'u'lláh as saying that he did not then know how high a position Mírzá Yaḥyá was destined to occupy. At the early age of 15, about a year after the 'Manifestation,' he was so attracted by what he heard of the Báb and read of his writings, that he set off for Khurásán and Mázandarán, met Janáb-i-Quddús (*i.e.* Mullá Muḥammad 'Alí of Bárfurúsh) and Qurratu'l-'Ayn, and, with Bahá-'u'lláh, attempted to join the Bábís who were besieged at Shaykh Ṭabarsí, but was prevented by the governor of Amul. In the fifth year of the 'Manifestation' (A.H. 1265=A.D. 1849), shortly after the fall of Shaykh Ṭabarsí, the Báb, having heard of Mírzá Yaḥyá's youth, zeal, and devotion, declared that in him was fulfilled the sign of the Fifth Year given in the tradition of Kumayl, 'A Light shining from the Dawn of Eternity,' conferred on him the title *Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel* ('the Dawn of Eternity'), sent him his own rings and other personal possessions, authorized him, at such time as he should see fit, to add 8 *wáḥids* (or 'Unities' of 19 chapters each) to the *Bayán*, and appointed him his successor. On the Báb's death, therefore, Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel, as we shall now continue to call him, was recognized with practical unanimity by the Bábís as their spiritual head; but, owing to his youth and the secluded life which he adopted, the practical conduct of the affairs of the Bábí community devolved chiefly on his elder half-brother Bahá'u'lláh, or Janáb-i-Bahá, as he is called by Mírzá Jání. There seem to have been some rival claimants, notably Mírzá Asadu'lláh of Tabríz, entitled 'Dayyán,' who was, according to Gobineau (p. 277 f.), drowned in the Shaṭṭu'l-'Arab by some of the Bábís who wished to put an end to his pretensions; and, according to Mírzá Jání, certain other persons, such as 'the Indian believer' Sayyid Baṣír, Ághá Muḥammad Karáwí, and a young confectioner entitled 'Dhabíḥ' (ذبيح)

* This work is entitled *Miftáḥu Báb'il-Abwáb* ('the Key of the Gate of Gates').

† The most reliable evidence points to October 9, 1820, as the date of his birth. Mírzá Ḥusayn 'Alí, afterwards known as *Bahá'u'lláh* was a year or two older (see *Trav. Narr.* ii. 218 ff.).

‡ See *Trav. Narr.* ii. 253–261. § *Ib.* ii. 211–218.

* See, however, the *New History*, p. 301, n. 1 *ad calc.*, which contains a correction of a detail given by Gobineau.

† See the *Traveller's Narrative*, ii. 46, and n. 1 *ad calc.*

‡ The date of Bahá'u'lláh's birth is given in Nabíl's rhymed chronicle as 2 Muḥarram, A.H. 1233 (=November 12, 1817). See *JRAS*, 1889, p. 521.

(قنّاد), claimed to be theophanies or Divine Manifestations.* Mírzá Jání actually exulted in this state of things, declaring that just as the tree which bears most fruit is the most perfect, so the religion which produces most divine or *quasi*-Divine Manifestations thereby shows its superiority to other creeds. But none of these persons appears to have had any considerable following, and for some time Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel enjoyed, nominally at least, an uncontested supremacy.

For two years (July 1850–August 1852) little was heard of the Bábís; but on August 15, 1852, three or four adherents of the sect made an attempt on the life of Náṣiru'd-Dín Sháh as he was leaving his palace at Niyávarán to go out hunting. The attempt, which appears to have had no countenance from the leaders of the Bábís, failed, but led to the fierce persecution of the sect, of whom some twenty-eight prominent members, including the beautiful poetess Qurratu'l-'Ayn, Mullá Shaykh 'Alí, called 'Janáb-i-Aʿẓím,' Ághá Sayyid Ḥusayn of Yazd the Báb's secretary Sulaymán Khán, and our historian Ḥájji Mírzá Jání, were among the most conspicuous victims. The object being to make all classes participators in their blood, the doomed Bábís were divided among the different classes and gilds, beginning with the *'ulamá*, the princes of the Royal House, and the different Government offices, and ending with the royal pages and students of the *Dáru'l-Funún*, one victim being assigned to each, and a rivalry in cruelty was thus produced which made that day, Wednesday, September 15, 1852, equally memorable and horrible to all who witnessed it. The fortitude of the Bábí martyrs, and especially the death-ecstasy of Sulaymán Khán, produced a profound impression, and, as Gobineau says, probably did more to win converts to the new faith than all the previous propaganda.†

Bahá'u'lláh and Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel both escaped death on this occasion, though the former was arrested,‡ and a price was set on the apprehension of the latter.§ Both ultimately escaped to Baghdad, where they arrived about the end of 1852, Bahá'u'lláh, who was imprisoned in Ṭihrán for four months, arriving soon after his half-brother.‖ For the next eleven or twelve years (1853–1864) Baghdad was the headquarters of the sect, of which Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel continued to be the ostensible head, and is even implicitly acknowledged as such by Bahá'u'lláh in the *Íqán*, composed by him in 1861–1862. In the *Traveller's Narrative* (ii. 54 ff., especially pp. 55 and 62–63 of the translation), which contains the official Bahá'í version of these transactions, it is implied that the nomination of Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel was a mere blind, that Bahá'u'lláh was from the first intended, and that his 'Manifestation' took place in A.H. 1269 (=A.D. 1853), which the Bábís call the year of 'after a while' (سنة بعد حين, for حين, 'while,' = 8 + 10 + 50 = 68, and the year 'after' is '69). Ostensibly, however, his claim to be 'He whom God shall manifest' dates from A.H. 1283 (A.D. 1866–1867), the end of the Adrianople period, which agrees with Nabíl's statement ¶ that he was fifty years old when he thus manifested his true nature, for he was born in A.H. 1233 (=A.D. 1817).

* Another such claimant, according to Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel, was Ḥusayn of Mílán, who perished in the persecution of 1852 (see the *Traveller's Narrative*, ii. 330 f.), while two other claimants, Sayyid Ḥusayn of Hindiyán and Shaykh Ismá'íl, are mentioned (see also p. 357 f. of the same, where other pretenders are named).

† For further details see the *Traveller's Narrative*, ii. 323–334.

‡ *Ib.* pp. 51–53 and 327. § *Ib.* p. 374 f.

‖ See *JRAS*, 1889, pp. 945–948.

¶ *JRAS*, 1889, pp. 984 and 988, verse 10.

The records of the Baghdad period are comparatively scanty, but the propaganda went steadily on, though conducted with a caution and prudence foreign to the early days of the sect. About a year after his arrival at Baghdad, Bahá'u'lláh retired alone for two years into the highlands of Turkish Kurdistán, living chiefly at a place called Sarkalú, and occasionally visiting Sulaymániyya.* By the Bahá'ís this retirement is regarded as a kind of preparation and purification; by the Ezelís, as due to annoyance at the opposition which he encountered in his plans from several prominent Bábís of the old school. Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel, a man of modest and retiring disposition, seems to have lived in great seclusion both before and after this event, and the disputes which appear to have occurred at this period seem to have been chiefly between Bahá'u'lláh and his adherents on the one hand, and Mullá Muḥammad Ja'far of Niráq, Mullá Rajab 'Alí *Qahír*, Sayyid Muḥammad of Isfahán, Sayyid Jawád of Kerbelá and the like on the other. Ultimately, owing to the hostility of the Persian Consul at Baghdad, Mírzá Buzurg Khán of Qazwín, and Mírzá Ḥusayn Khán *Mushíru'd-Dawla*, the Persian Ambassador at Constantinople, the Turkish government was induced to expel the Bábís from Baghdad, where their proximity to the Persian frontier, and to the Shí'ite shrines of Kerbelá and Najaf, afforded them great opportunities of proselytizing among their countrymen. This took place in the spring or early summer of 1864. They were first taken to Constantinople, where they remained for four months, and thence banished to Adrianople, where they arrived about the end of the year above mentioned. There they remained for nearly four years (Dec. 1864–August 1868), and there it was that in A.H. 1283 (A.D. 1866–67) Bahá'u'lláh publicly announced that he was 'He whom God shall manifest,' foretold by the Báb, and called on all the Bábís to recognize him as such, and to pay their allegiance to him, not merely as the Báb's successor, but as him of whose Advent the Báb was a mere herald and forerunner.

This announcement, which naturally convulsed the whole Bábí community, was gradually accepted by the majority, but was strenuously opposed not only by Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel but by a considerable number of prominent Bábís, including more than one of the original 18 disciples of the Báb known as the 'Letters of the Living' (حروف حي). The strife waxed fierce; several persons were killed;† charges of attempted poisoning were hurled backwards and forwards between the two half-brothers;‡ and at length the Turkish government again intervened and divided the two rival factions, sending Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel with his family to Famagusta in Cyprus, and Bahá'u'lláh with his family and a number of his followers to 'Akká in Syria, which places they respectively reached about the end of August 1868. To check their activities, however, and provide the government with the services of a band of unpaid informers, they caused four Bahá'ís with their families and dependents to accompany Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel, and four of the Ezelís to accompany Bahá'u'lláh. All of the latter were killed, one before they left Adrianople, and the other three soon after their arrival at 'Akká. Of the Bahá'ís at Famagusta, one died in 1871 and one in 1872, while the third escaped to Syria in 1870. The fourth, Mushkín Qalam, a celebrated calligraphist, remained in Cyprus for some time after the British occupation, but finally left on

* *Traveller's Narr.* ii. 64 f., 356 f. Nabíl says that he was 38 years of age when he withdrew, and 40 when he returned.

† See *Traveller's Narrative*, ii. 362–364.

‡ *Ib.* pp. 359 f. and 365–369.

Sept. 14, 1886, for 'Akkā, where the present writer met him in April 1890. The Famagusta exiles numbered in all thirty persons, of whom full particulars are preserved, in consequence of the allowances to which they are entitled, in the State Papers of the Island government, which are epitomized in the *Traveller's Narrative* (ii. 376–389). Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel and some of his family are still (1908) residing at Famagusta, while descendants of some of the other exiles are also living in the island in various capacities. Concerning those banished to 'Akkā the same detailed information is not available, but their number appears to have considerably exceeded that of the Ezelīs.

4. Period of Bahā'u'llāh's supremacy (A.D. 1868–1892).—The schism which divided the Bābīs into the two sects of Bahā'īs and Ezelīs, though its beginnings go back to the earlier period of which we have just spoken, now became formal and final, and henceforth we have to consider two opposed centres of Bābī doctrine, 'Akkā in Syria, and Famagusta in Cyprus. Although there is much to be urged in favour of Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel's position, it cannot be denied that practically his influence is very slight and his followers very few. When the present writer visited him in 1890, apart from his own family only one of his adherents, an old man named 'Abdu'l-Aḥad, whose father was among the Bābīs who perished at Zanjān in 1850,* was resident at Famagusta. In Persia very few Ezelīs were met, and those chiefly at Kirmān. One of Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel's sons-in-law, Shaykh Aḥmad of Kirmān, was a man of considerable talent and learning, but he was put to death at Tabrīz in 1896 on a charge of complicity in the assassination of Nāṣiru'd-Dīn Shāh in May of that year. He was the author of the *Hasht Bihisht*, a lengthy treatise on the philosophy, doctrine, and history of the Bābī religion, from the polemical portions of which, directed against Bahā'u'llāh, extracts are cited in the *Traveller's Narrative* (ii. 351–373). Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel is still (July 1908) alive and well; but, interesting as he is historically and personally, he can no longer be reckoned a force in the world, though as a source of information about the early history and doctrines of the Bābīs he is without a rival, and speaks with a freedom and frankness not to be found at 'Akkā, where policy and 'the expediency of the time' necessarily play a much larger part. Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel may, in short, in his island seclusion, be compared to Napoleon I. in St. Helena—a man who has played a great rôle in stirring events and times, but whose active life and power to mould men's thoughts and deeds have passed away. His writings are numerous, but little known or read outside his immediate circle, and no one has yet devoted himself to the study of the large collection of those acquired by the British Museum in recent years, through the instrumentality of Mr. C. Delaval Cobham, lately Commissioner at Larnaca in Cyprus. Of Bābīism as a living force, affecting both East and West, 'Akkā has been the centre for the last forty years, and seems likely so to remain; and thither we must now divert our attention.

The claim of Bahā'u'llāh to be a new and transcendent 'Manifestation' of God steadily and rapidly gained ground among the Bābīs, and involved a complete re-construction of the earlier Bābī conceptions. For if, as Bahā'u'llāh declared, the Bāb was a mere precursor and harbinger of his advent, then, in the blaze of light of the New Day, the candle lit by Mīrzā 'Alī Muḥammad ceased to merit attention, and, indeed, became invisible. The Bahā'īs, as a rule, show a marked disinclination to talk about the Bāb or his early disciples, or to discuss his life or doctrines, or to place his writings in the hands of the inquirer, while latterly they have avoided calling themselves Bābīs, preferring to be known simply as Bahā'īs. The Bāb's doctrines were, in their eyes, only preparatory, and his ordinances only provisional, and Bahā'u'llāh was entitled to modify or abrogate them as seemed good to him. The real question at issue between Ezel and Bahā was admirably described by Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, lately British Minister at Tihrān, as entirely similar to that which divided the respective followers of St. Peter and St. Paul in the early days of the Christian Church—the question, namely, whether Christianity was to be a Jewish sect or a new World-religion. The old Bābī doctrine, continued unchanged by the Ezelīs, was in its essence Shī'ite; for, though the Bābīs put themselves outside the pale of Islām by rejecting the finality of the Qur'ān and the mission of Muḥammad, as well as by many other innovations both in doctrine and practice, their whole thought is deeply tinged with Shī'ite conceptions, shown, for example, even by their heterodox views as to the 'return to the life of the world' of the Prophet Muḥammad, his daughter Fāṭima, and the Twelve Imāms, and their identification of their own protagonists with one or other of these holy personages.

A wholly different spirit pervades the teachings of Bahā. His religion is more practical, his teaching more ethical and less mystical and metaphysical, and his appeal is to all men, not especially to Shī'ite Muḥammadans. His attitude towards the Shāh and the Persian government is, moreover, much more conciliatory, as is well seen in the celebrated Epistle to the King of Persia (*Lawḥ-i-Sulṭān*) which he addressed to Nāṣiru'd-Dīn Shāh soon after his arrival at 'Akkā.* This letter, of which a translation will be found in the *Traveller's Narrative* (ii. 108–151 and 390–400), was sent by the hand of a young Bahā'ī called Mīrzā Badī', who succeeded in carrying out his instructions and delivered it in person to the Shāh, for which boldness he was tortured and put to death.† At the same time Bahā'u'llāh addressed other letters (called by the Bahā'īs *Alwāḥ-i-Salāṭīn*, 'Epistles to the Kings') to several other rulers, including Queen Victoria, the Tsar of Russia, Napoleon III., and the Pope.‡

For a complete history of the sect during this period full materials are not available, but generally speaking it may be said to consist, so far as 'Akkā itself is concerned, of alternations of greater and less strict supervision of the exiles by the Ottoman government, gradual development of organization and propaganda, and the arrival and departure of innumerable pilgrims, mostly Persians, but, since the successful propaganda in the United States, including a good many Americans. In Persia, where the religion naturally counts most of its adherents, there have been sporadic persecutions, to which the Bahā'īs, in accordance with Bahā's command, 'It is better that you should be killed than that you should kill,' have patiently submitted. Among these persecutions may be especially mentioned, since the execution of Mīrzā Badī' in July 1869, the following. About 1880 two Sayyids of Iṣfahān, now known to their co-religionists as *Sulṭānu'sh-Shuhadā* ('the King of Martyrs'), and *Maḥbūbu'sh-Shuhadā* ('the Beloved of Martyrs'), were put to death by the clergy of that city.§ In October 1888, Āghā Mīrzā Ashraf of Ābāda was put to death in the same

* In *JRAS*, 1897, pp. 761–827, the present writer published a tr. of a memoir on the insurrection at Zanjān, written for him by this old man.

* Probably in the summer of 1869 (see *Trav. Narr.* ii. 392).

† See *Trav. Narr.* ii. 102–106.

‡ Extracts from these, translated into English, will be found in *JRAS*, 1889, pp. 953–972.

§ See *JRAS*, 1889, pp. 489–492; *Trav. Narr.* ii. 166–169.

place, and his body mutilated and burned.* In the summer of the following year, seven or eight Bābīs were put to death with great cruelty, at the instigation of Āghā-yi-Najafī, in the villages of Si-dih and Najaf-ābād near Iṣfahān.† On Sept. 8, 1889, a prominent Bahā'ī named Ḥājji Muḥammad Riẓā of Iṣfahān was stabbed to death in broad daylight in one of the chief thoroughfares of 'Ishqābād (Askabad) by two Shī'ite *fidā'īs* sent from Mashhad for that purpose. The assassins were sentenced to death by the Russian military tribunal before which they were tried, but this sentence was commuted to one of hard labour for life. This was the first time in the fifty years during which the sect had existed that condign punishment had been inflicted on any of their persecutors; their rejoicings were proportionately great, and Bahā'u'llāh made the event the occasion of two revelations in which Russian justice was highly extolled,‡ and Bahā's followers were enjoined not to forget it. In May 1891 there was a persecution of Bābīs at Yazd, in which seven of them were brutally killed (on May 18), while another, an old man, was secretly put to death a few days later. In the summer of 1903 there was another fierce persecution in the same town, of the horrors of which some account is given by Napier Malcolm in his *Five Years in a Persian Town* (Lond. 1905).

One of the most interesting phenomena in the recent history of the Bahā'īs has been the propaganda carried on with considerable success in America. This appears to have been begun by a Syrian convert to Bahāism named Ibrāhīm George Khayru'llāh, who is the author of many English works on the subject, and is married to an English wife. He seems first to have lectured on the subject at Chicago about 1892, for in the Preface to his book, *Behā'u'llāh* (Chicago, 1900), he says (p. vii.) that he 'began to preach the fulfilment of the truth which Christ and the Prophets foretold over seven years ago.'§ Born in Mount Lebanon, he lived twenty-one years in Cairo, and was then converted to the Bahā'ī doctrine by a certain 'Abdu'l-Karīm of Ṭihrān. Afterwards he settled in America and became naturalized as a citizen of the United States. The propaganda which he inaugurated seems to have been at its height in 1897 and 1898, and there is now a community of several thousand American Bahā'īs, a considerable American literature on the subject, and a certain amount of actual intercourse between America and the headquarters of the religion at 'Akkā. More will be said on this subject presently.

5. From the death of Bahā'u'llāh until the present day (A.D. 1892–1908).—Bahā'u'llāh died on May 16, 1892, leaving four sons and three daughters. Differences as to the succession arose between the two elder sons, 'Abbās Efendi (also called *'Abdu'l-Bahā*, 'the Servant of Bahā,' and *Ghuṣn-i-A'ẓam*, 'the Most Mighty Branch') and Mīrzā Muḥammad 'Alī (called *Ghuṣn-i-Akbar*, 'the Most Great Branch'). Bahā'u'llāh left a testament, entitled *Kitābu 'Ahdī*, which was published, with some introductory remarks and a Russian tr., by Lieut. Tumanski in the *Zapiski* of the Oriental Section of the Imperial Russian Archæological Society, viii. (1892). In this important document he says:

'God's injunction is that the Branches (*Aghṣān*), and Twigs (*Afnān*),* and Kinsfolk† (*Muntasabīn*) should all look to the Most Mighty Branch (*Ghuṣn-i-A'ẓam*, i.e. 'Abbās Efendi). Look at what We have revealed in my (*sic*) Most Holy Book (*Kitāb-i-Aqdas*): "When the Ocean of Union ebbs, and the Book of the Beginning and the Conclusion is finished, then turn to Him whom God intendeth (*man arādahu'llāh*), who is derived from this Ancient Stock." He who is meant by this blessed verse is the Most Mighty Branch: thus have we made clear the command as an act of grace on our part. Verily, I am the Bountiful, the Gracious. God hath determined the position of the Most Great Branch (*Ghuṣn-i-Akbar*, i.e. Mīrzā Muḥammad 'Alī)‡ after his position. Verily, He is the Commanding, the Wise. Verily, we have chosen the Most Great after the Most Mighty, a command on the part of One All-knowing and Wise. . . . Say, O Servants! Do not make the means of order a means of disorder, nor an instrument for [producing] union into an instrument for [producing] discord . . .'

Thus far, then, it would appear that, in face of so clear a pronouncement, no room for dissension was left to Bahā'u'llāh's followers. But almost immediately, it would seem (for the history of this fresh schism has not yet been dispassionately investigated, though much has been written on either side, not only in Persian but in English), the old struggle between what may be described as the 'stationary' and the 'progressive' elements broke out. 'Abbās Efendi apparently claimed that the Revelation was not ended, and that henceforth he was to be its channel. This claim was strenuously resisted by his brother Mīrzā Muḥammad 'Alī and those who followed him, among whom were included his two younger brothers, Mīrzā Badī'u'llāh and Mīrzā Ẓiyā'u'llāh,§ Bahā'u'llāh's amanuensis, entitled *Janāb-i-Khādimu'llāh* ('the servant of God,' Mīrzā Āghā Jān of Kāshān), and many other prominent Bahā'īs, who held that, so far as this manifestation was concerned, the book of Revelation was closed, in proof of which view they adduced the following verse from the *Kitāb-i-Aqdas*, or 'Most Holy Book': 'Whosoever lays claim to any authority‖ before the completion of a millennium is assuredly a liar and a calumniator.' The dispute has been darkened by a mass of words, but in essence it is a conflict between these two sayings, viewed in the light of the supernatural claim—whatever its exact nature—which 'Abbās Efendi did and does advance. On the one hand, Bahā'u'llāh's *Testament* explicitly puts him first in the succession; on the other, being so preferred, he did 'lay claim to an authority' regarded by the partisans of his brother as bringing him under the condemnation equally explicitly enunciated by Bahā'u'llāh in the *Kitāb-i-Aqdas*. As in the case of the previous schism between Bahā'u'llāh and Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel, so here also the conflict was between those who held that every day of Theophany must be succeeded by a night of Occultation, and those who felt that the Light by which they had walked could not be extinguished, but must rather increase in brightness. And, as before, the conservative or stationary party was worsted. For a time a certain equilibrium seems to have been maintained, but steadily and surely the power and authority of 'Abbās Efendi waxed, while that of his brother waned. Very bitter feeling was again aroused, and this time over a large area; for not only Persia, but Egypt, Syria, and America were involved. Ibrāhīm Khayru'llāh, the protagonist of the Bahā'ī faith in America, finally espoused the cause of Muḥammad 'Alī;¶

* See *Trav. Narr.* ii. 169 and 400–406.

† *Ib.* i. 406–410.

‡ See *Trav. Narr.* ii. 411 f. The texts of the revelations were published by Baron Rosen on pp. 247–250 of *Collections Scientifiques de l'Institut des Langues Orientales*, vi. (St. Petersburg, 1891).

§ It was at the 'Parliament of Religions,' held at Chicago in 1893, that the Bahā'ī doctrines first began to arouse considerable attention in America.

* 'The Branches' (*Ghuṣn*, pl. *Aghṣān*) are Bahā'u'llāh's descendants; the 'Twigs' (*Afnān*) are the Bāb's kinsfolk.

† Or perhaps 'adherents' is meant by *Muntasabīn*.

‡ *i.e.* We have placed 'Abbās Efendi first, then Mīrzā Muḥammad 'Alī.

§ One of these brothers subsequently died, and in 1903 the other joined 'Abbās Efendi and renounced his previous allegiance.

‖ *i.e.* authority to promulgate fresh revelations, and enact new or repeal old ordinances.

¶ According to his own statement (*The Three Questions*, p. 23), he visited 'Akkā and was well received by 'Abbās Efendi, but was not allowed to hold intercourse with the other brothers. Only seven months after his return to America did he denounce 'Abbās Efendi and declare his allegiance to Muḥammad 'Alī.

but missionaries, including the aged and learned Mírzá Abu'l-Faẓl of Gulpáyagán, were sent out in the beginning of 1902 to the United States to oppose him,* and at one time he professed to be in fear of his life.

6. Doctrine.—A full discussion of Bábí and Bahá'í doctrine, even were the time ripe for it, would far exceed the limits of an encyclopædia article. Before proceeding to set forth such a sketch of its most salient features as is possible within these limits, we must call the reader's attention to one or two general considerations.

(1) The Báb's own doctrine underwent considerable development and change during the six years (A.D. 1844–1850) which elapsed between his 'Manifestation' and his death, and to trace this development it would be necessary to examine all his voluminous writings in a much more careful, detailed, and systematic manner than has yet been done. To mention only a few of the chief substantive works which issued from his pen, there is the *Ziyárat-náma* (of which Gobineau quite misunderstood the nature when he described it as the *Journal du Pèlerinage*, for it is a devotional work designed for the use of pilgrims to the shrines of the Imáms) and the *Ṣaḥífatu Bayna'l-Ḥaramayn*, both composed in the year of the 'Manifestation.' Then there is the *Dalá'il-i-sab'a* ('Seven Proofs'), and a number of Commentaries (*Tafásír*) on different *súras* of the Qur'án, notably the *Commentary on the Chapter of Joseph* (also called *Qayyúmu'l-Asmá*), and the Commentaries on the *súras* entitled respectively *al-Baqara*, *al-Kawthar*, *al-'Aṣr*, etc., all of which belong to the earlier period before the Báb announced that he was not merely the 'Gate' leading to the hidden Imám, but the Imám himself, nay the 'Point' (*Nuqṭa*) of a new Revelation. Of his later writings, to all of which, as we shall see, the name *Bayán* ('explanation,' 'utterance') is applied, the Persian *Bayán* is, perhaps, the most systematic, but there are also several Arabic *Bayáns*, a *Kitábu'l-Aḥkám*, or 'Book of Laws' (tr. by Gobineau at the end of his *Religions et Philosophies dans l'Asie Centrale*), and one or two 'Books of Names' (*Kitábu'l-Asmá*). Few of these books are easy reading, and he who has read even one or two of them will be inclined to agree with Gobineau's judgment, 'le style de Mírza Alí Mohammed est terne, raide et sans éclat'; while some are so confused, so full of repetitions, extraordinary words, and fantastic derivatives of Arabic roots, that they defy the most industrious and indefatigable reader. The works of Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel closely resemble those of the Báb, but the Bahá'í writings, especially in the later period, are much clearer and easier of comprehension, besides which the tendency of Bahá'í thought was to avoid abstruse metaphysics and unintelligible rhapsodies, and to treat chiefly of ethical subjects.

(2) As there has never been anything corresponding to a 'Church Council' among the Bábis, the greatest divergence of opinion will be found among them even on questions so important as the Future Life. All agree in denying the Resurrection of the Body as held by the Muḥammadans; but while certain passages in the Persian *Bayán* seem to indicate that the spirit of the deceased continues to take an interest in his earthly affairs, and while certain sayings of the older Bábis lend colour to the assertion of their enemies that they inclined to the doctrine of Metempsychosis (*Tanásukh-i-Arwáḥ*), generally held in abhorrence by the Musalmáns, other Bábis understand the 'Return (*Ríj'at*) to the life of this World' in a less material and more symbolic sense, while some disbelieve in personal immortality, or limit it to those holy beings who are endowed with a spirit of a higher grade than is vouchsafed to ordinary mortals.

(3) It must be clearly understood that Bábíism is in no sense latitudinarian or eclectic, and stands, therefore, in the sharpest antagonism to Ṣúfiism. However vague Bábí doctrine may be on certain points, it is essentially dogmatic, and every utterance or command uttered by the 'Manifestation' of the period (*i.e.* by the Báb, Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel, Bahá'u'lláh, 'Abbás Efendi, and Muḥammad 'Alí respectively) must be accepted without reserve. Tolerance is, indeed, inculcated by Bahá'u'lláh: 'Associate with [those of other] religions with amity and harmony' is one of the commands given in the *Kitáb-i-Aqdas*. But the same book begins as follows: 'The first thing which God has prescribed unto His servants is Knowledge of the Day-spring of His Revelation and the Dawning-place of His Command, which is the Station of His Spirit in the World of Creation and Command. Whosoever attaineth unto this hath attained unto all good, and whosoever is debarred therefrom is of the people of error, even though he produce all [manner of good] deeds.' In other words, works without faith are dead. The Báb himself, and his immediate followers, were still less inclined to tolerance; according to the *Bayán*, no unbelievers were to be suffered to dwell in the five principal provinces of Persia, and everywhere they were, as far as possible, to be subjected to restrictions, and kept in a position of inferiority. The Bábis are strongly antagonistic alike to the Ṣúfis and to the Muḥammadans, but for quite different reasons. In the case of the Ṣúfis they object to their latitudinarianism, their pantheism, their individualism, and their doctrine of the 'Inner Light.' With the Muḥammadan outlook they have really more in common; but, apart from the natural resentment which they feel on account of the persecutions which they have suffered at the hands of the *'ulamá* of Islám, they condemn the refusal of the Muslims to see in this new 'Manifestation' the fulfilment of Islám, and, in short, regard them much as the Christians regard the Jews. For similar reasons the Bahá'ís detest the Ezelís, whilst among the former the followers of 'Abbás Efendi dislike and despise the followers of his brother Muḥammad 'Alí.

According to the Bábí conception, the Essence of God, the Primal Divine Unity, is unknowable, and entirely transcends human comprehension, and all that we can know is its Manifestations, that succession of theophanies which constitutes the series of Prophets. In essence all the Prophets are one; that is to say, one Universal Reason or Intelligence speaks to mankind successively, always according to their actual capacities and the exigencies of the age, through Abraham, Moses, David, Christ, Muḥammad, and now through this last Manifestation, by which the old Bábís and the present Ezelís understand the Báb (whom they commonly speak of as *Ḥaẓrat-i-Nuqṭa*, 'His Holiness the Point'; *Ḥaẓrat-i-Rabbiyu'l-A'lá*, 'His Holiness my Lord the Supreme,' etc.), while the Bahá'ís, who reduce the Báb's position to that of a mere forerunner, or herald (*mubashshir*), comparing him to John the Baptist, understand Bahá-u'lláh. In essence all the Prophets are one, and their teaching is one; but (to use one of the favourite illustrations of the Bábís) just as the same teacher, expounding the same science, will speak in different, even in apparently contradictory, terms, according to whether he is addressing small children, young boys and girls, or persons of mature age and ripe understanding, so will the Prophet regulate his utterances and adjust his ordinances according to the degree of development attained by the community to which he is sent. Thus the material Paradise and Hell preached by Muḥammad do not really exist, but no more accurate conception of the realities which they symbolize could be conveyed to the rough Arabs to whom he was sent. When the world has outgrown the teaching of one 'Manifestation,' a new 'Manifestation' appears; and as the world and the human race are, according to the Bábí view, eternal, and progress is a universal law, there can be no final Revelation, and no 'last of the Prophets and seal of the Prophets,' as the Muḥammadans suppose. No point of the Báb's doctrine is more strongly emphasized than this. Every Prophet has foretold his successor, and in every case that successor, when he finally came, has been rejected by the majority of that Prophet's followers. The Jews rejected their Messiah, whose advent they professed to be awaiting with such eagerness; the Christians rejected the Paraclete or Comforter whom Christ foretold in prophecies supposed by the Muḥammadans to have been fulfilled by the coming of Muḥammad; the Shí'ite Muḥammadans never mention the Twelfth Imám, or Mahdí, without adding the formula عجل الله فرجه ('May God hasten his glad Advent!'), yet when at last after a thousand years the expected Imám returned (in the shape of the Báb), they rejected, reviled, imprisoned, and finally slew him. The Báb was determined that, so far as it lay in his power to prevent it, his followers should not fall into this error, and he again and again speaks of the succeeding Revelation which 'He whom God shall manifest' (من يظهره الله) shall bring, and of other later Revelations which in turn shall succeed that *ad infinitum*. Indeed, he goes so far as to

* Several American papers describing this mission are in the present writer's possession. One (*The North American*, Feb. 16, 1902) gives portraits of Mírzá Abu'l-Faẓl, his companion Ḥájji Niyáz of Kirmán, and of 'Abbás Efendi himself, and heads its leading article 'Astonishing Spread of Babism.'

say that if any one shall appear claiming to be 'He whom God shall manifest,' it is the duty of every believer to put aside all other business and hasten to investigate the proofs adduced in support of this claim, and that, even if he cannot convince himself of its truth, he must refrain from repudiating it, or denouncing him who advances it as an impostor. It is these provisions, no doubt, which have always given so great an advantage to every fresh claimant in the history of Bābīism, and have placed what may be called the 'Stationary Party' (*e.g.* the followers of Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel and, later, of Muḥammad 'Alī) at so great a disadvantage.

From what has been said above, the Western reader may be tempted to think of the Bābī doctrine as embodying, to a certain extent, the modern Western rationalistic spirit. No mistake could be greater. The belief in the fulfilment of prophecies; the love of apocalyptic sayings culled from the Jewish, Christian, and Muḥammadan Scriptures and traditions; the value attached to talismans (especially among the early Bābīs); the theory of correspondences, as illustrated by the mystical doctrine of the Unity and its manifestation in the number 19, and the whole elaborate system of equivalences between names, based on the numerical values of letters, point to a totally different order of ideas, and are, moreover, ingrained in the true Bābī doctrine, as distinguished from the same doctrine as presented to and understood by most American and European believers. Even the practical reforms enjoined or suggested by the Báb are generally based on some quite non-utilitarian ground. Thus the severe chastisement of children is forbidden, and consideration for their feelings enjoined; but the reason for this is that when 'He whom God shall manifest' comes, he will come first as a child, and it would be a fearful thing for any one to have to reproach himself afterwards for having harshly treated the august infant. This and other similar social reforms, such as the amelioration of the position of women, are not, as some Europeans have supposed, the motive power of a heroism which has astonished the world, but rather the mystical ideas connected with the 'Manifestations,' 'Unities,' numbers, letters, and fulfilment of prophecies, which to European rationalists appear so fantastic and fanciful. But, above all, the essence of being a Bābī or a Bahā'ī is a boundless devotion to the 'Person of the Manifestation,' and a profound belief that he is divine and of a different order from all other beings. The Báb, as we have seen, was called by his followers 'His Holiness my Lord the Supreme,' and Bahā'u'llāh is called not only 'the Blessed Perfection' (*Jamāl-i-Mubārak*), but, especially in Persia, 'God Almighty' (*Ḥaqq ta'ālā*). Then also there are differences of opinion as to the degree of divinity possessed by the 'Person of the Manifestation,' and not all the faithful go so far as the poet who exclaims: 'Men call thee "God," and I am filled with angry wonder as to how long thou wilt endure the shame of Godhead!'

Something more must now be said as to the 'Point,' the 'Unity,' and its manifestation in the number 19, and other kindred matters. The idea of the 'Point' (نقطة) seems to rest chiefly on two (probably spurious) Shī'ite traditions. 'Knowledge,' says one of these, 'is a point which the ignorant made multiple.' It was this 'point of knowledge'—not detailed knowledge of subsidiary matters, but vivid, essential, 'compendious' knowledge of the eternal realities of things—to which the Báb laid claim. The second tradition is ascribed to 'Alī, the first Imām, who is alleged to have declared that all that was in the Qur'ān was contained implicitly in the *Sūratu'l-Fātiḥa*, or opening chapter of the Qur'ān, and that this in turn was contained in the *Bismi'llāh* which stands over it, this in turn in the initial B (ب) of the *Bismi'llāh*, and this in turn 'in the Point which stands under the ب'; 'and,' 'Alī is said to have added, 'I am the Point which stands under the ب.'

Now the formula بسم الله الرّحمن الرّحيم ('In the Name of God the Merciful, the Forgiving') comprises 19 letters, which, therefore, are the 'Manifestation' of the 'Point under the ب,' just as the whole Qur'ān is the further 'Manifestation,' on a plane of greater plurality, of the *Bismi'llāh*. Moreover, the Arabic word for 'One' is *Wāḥid* (واحد), and the letters composing the word *Wāḥid* (و=6; ا=1; ح=8; د=4) give the sum-total of 19. This 'first Unity' of 19 in turn manifests itself as 19 × 19 (19^2) or 361, which the Bābīs call 'the Number of All Things' (عدد كلّ شئ), and the words *Kullu shay* ('All Things') are numerically equivalent to (ك=20 + ل=30 + ش =300 + ى=10) 360, to which, by adding 'the one which underlies all plurality,' 361, 'the Number of All Things,' or 19^2, is obtained.

To the number 19 great importance is attached by the Bābīs, and, so far as possible, it is made the basis of all divisions of time, money, and the like. Thus the Bābī year comprises 19 months of 19 days each, to which intercalary days 'according to the number of the H (ه),' *i.e.* 5, are added to bring the solar year (which they proposed to restore in place of the Muḥammadan lunar year) up to the requisite length. The same names (*Bahā, Jalāl, Jamāl*, etc.) serve for the months and the days, so that once in each month the day and the month (as in the Zoroastrian calendar) correspond, and such days are observed as festivals. The year begins with the old Persian *Naw-rūz*, or New Year's Day, corresponding with the Vernal Equinox, and conventionally observed on March 21. The month of fasting, which replaces the Ramaḍān of Islām, is the last month of the year, *i.e.* the 19 days preceding the *Naw-rūz*. The Báb's idea of a coinage having 19 as its basis has been abandoned, along with many other impracticable ordinances, some of which are explicitly abrogated in the *Kitāb-i-Aqdas* or others of Bahā'u'llāh's writings. The 'Unity' is also manifested in the divine attribute *Ḥayy* (حى), 'the Living,' which equals 8+10=18, or, with the 'one which underlies all plurality,' 19. The Báb accordingly chose 18 disciples, who, with himself, constituted the 'Letters of the Living' (حروف الحىّ) or 'First Unity.' The choice of Mīrzā Yaḥyā, 'Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel' ('the Dawn of Eternity'), by the Báb as his successor, was probably also determined by the fact that the name *Yaḥyā* (يحيى = 36) was a multiple of 18, on which account Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel was also called *Wāḥid* (وحيد), which is numerically equivalent to 28 (the number of the letters constituting the Arabic alphabet), and signifies 'unique,' *i.e.* manifesting the Unity.

The importance attached by the Bābīs to the numerical equivalents of words is seen elsewhere,

and especially in their habit of referring cryptically to towns connected with their history by names of an equivalent value. Thus Adrianople, called in Turkish *Edirné* (ادرنه), is named *Arḍu's-Sirr* (ارض السّر), 'the Land of the Mystery,' both words, *Edirné* and *Sirr*, being numerically equivalent to 260. So Zanjān (زنجان=111) is called *Arḍu'l-A'lā* (اعلی=111), and so on. Other strange expressions with which the Bābī writings (especially the earlier writings) abound constantly puzzle the uninitiated reader, who will have to discover for himself that, for example, the expression 'the Person of the Seven Letters' (ذات الحروف السبعة) is one of the titles of the Báb, whose name, 'Alī Muḥammad, consists of seven letters. Even in Bahā'u'llāh's works such obscure terms occur as *al-Buq'atu'l-Ḥamrā*, 'the Red Place,' which means 'Akkā, and the like.

The Báb laid down a number of laws, dictated in many cases by his personal tastes and feelings, which have practically fallen into abeyance. Such are his prohibition of smoking and the eating of onions (though these are still observed by the Ezelīs), his regulations as to clothing, forms of salutation, the use of rings and perfumes, the names by which children might be named 'in the *Bayān*,' the burial of the dead, and the like. The laws enacted by Bahā'u'llāh in the *Kitāb-i-Aqdas*, with the exception of the law of Inheritance, are simpler and more practical, and the whole tone of the Bahā'ī scriptures (which, of course, according to the Bahā'ī view, entirely abrogate the Báb's writings) is more simple, more practical, and more concerned with ethical than metaphysical questions. Historically, there is much to be said in favour of Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel's claim, since he was certainly nominated by the Báb as his immediate successor, and was equally certainly so recognized for a good many years by the whole Bābī community; while, assuming the Báb to have been divinely inspired (and this assumption must be made not only by every Bābī but by every Bahā'ī), it is difficult to suppose that he should choose to succeed himself one who was destined to be the chief opponent of 'Him whom God shall manifest.' Yet practically it cannot be doubted that the survival and extension of the religion formed by the Báb were secured by the modifications effected in it by Bahā'u'llāh, for in its original form it could never have been intelligible, much less attractive, outside Persia; and even there, when once the ferment attending its introduction had subsided, it would probably have sunk into the insignificance shared by so many Muslim sects which once played an important rôle in history.

At the present day there are a few Bābīs of the old school who call themselves 'Kullu-shay'īs,' and decline to enter into the Ezelī and Bahā'ī quarrel at all; there is a small, and probably diminishing, number of Ezelīs; and a large, but indeterminable number of Bahā'īs, of whom the great majority follow 'Abbās Efendi ('Abdu'l-Bahā), and the minority his brother Muḥammad 'Alī. Latterly the followers of Bahā'u'llāh have shown a strong disposition to drop the name of Bābī altogether, and call themselves Bahā'ī, and to ignore or suppress the earlier history and literature of their religion. Alike in intelligence and in morals the Bābīs (or Bahā'īs) stand high; but it is not certain to the present writer that their triumph over Islām in Persia would ultimately conduce to the welfare of that distracted land, or that the tolerance they now advocate would stand the test of success and supremacy.

LITERATURE.—An exhaustive treatment of the literature of this subject would have to deal with the following divisions:

i. *BĀBĪ SCRIPTURES*, all in Arabic or Persian, regarded by all or by certain sections of the Bābīs as revelations, and including:

(*a*) *Writings of* Mīrzā 'Alī Muḥammad the Báb (A.D. 1844–1850).—These were divided by the Báb himself into 'five grades' (*Shu'ūn-i-Khamse*, شؤون خمسه), viz. verses (*āyāt*, آيات), supplications (*munājāt*, مناجات), commentaries (*tafāsīr*, تفاسير), scientific treatises (*Shu'ūn-i-'Ilmiyya*, شؤون علميه, or *ṣuwar-i-'Ilmiyya*, صور علميه), and Persian writings (*Kalimāt-i-Fārsiyya*). The term *Bayān* applies especially to the writings of the 'first grade,' and includes all the *āyāt*, or verses in the style of the Qur'ān, produced by the Báb during his whole career. To special collections of such verses the term *Bayān* is also applied, and in this sense there are several Arabic *Bayāns* and one Persian *Bayān*, which last is, on the whole, the most systematic and intelligible of the Báb's writings.*

(*b*) *Writings of* Mīrzā Yaḥyā, 'Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel.'—Of these one of the earliest (composed before 1865, since it is mentioned by Gobineau, whose book was published in that year) is the *Kitāb-i-Nūr*, or 'Book of Light.' A list of some of Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel's writings, drawn up by himself, will be found in *Traveller's Narrative*, ii. 340 ff. Others are described in the 'Catalogue and Description of 27 Bābī Manuscripts' by the present writer, published in *JRAS*, 1892 (xxiv. 483–493, 600–662, etc.). In the last few years the British Museum Library has, through the good offices of Mr. Claude Delaval Cobham, lately Commissioner at Larnaca in Cyprus, been enriched by an extensive collection of manuscript works by Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel.

(*c*) *Writings of* Mīrzā Ḥusayn 'Alī 'Bahā'u'llāh.'—One at least of these—a polemical work in Persian named *Iqān*, 'the Assurance'—was composed about A.D. 1858–1859, during the Baghdad period, that is to say, previously to Bahā'u'llāh's 'Manifestation.' The remainder belong chiefly to the period intervening between that event and Bahā'u'llāh's death (A.D. 1866–1892). Since every letter (*lawḥ*, لوح='tablet') written at Bahā'u'llāh's dictation—and many were written every day—is regarded by his followers as a revelation, it would be manifestly impossible for any human being (except, possibly, his amanuensis) to enumerate them. The most important of his books, besides the earlier *Iqān*, the *Sūra-i-Haykal*, the *Alwāḥ-i-Salāṭīn*, or 'Letters to the Kings' (including the letter sent to Nāṣiru'd-Dīn Shāh, as above described, in A.D. 1869), are the *Kitāb-i-Aqdas* (which contains the most systematic and compendious statement of the doctrines, laws, and ordinances promulgated by Bahā'u'llah), the *Lawḥ-i-Bashārāt*, the *Kalimāt-i-Maknūna*, and, lastly, the final Testament (*Kitābu 'Ahdī*) already mentioned. Several 'authorized' collections of these and other Bahā'ī scriptures have been lithographed in the East. The *Kitāb-i-Aqdas* has been printed at St. Petersburg, in 1899, with a Russ. tr., by Captain Tumanski, who also published the *Kitābu 'Ahdī* in 1892. In the same year Baron Victor Rosen published the *Lawḥ-i-Bashārāt*. The whole of the Epistle to Nāṣiru'd-Dīn Shāh and portions of the other Epistles to the Kings have been translated by the present writer in the *JRAS*, 1889, and in *Traveller's Narrative*, ii.; and a French translation of the *Iqān* ('Livre de la Certitude') was published by M. Hippolyte Dreyfus and Mīrzā Ḥabību'llāh Shīrāzī in 190-.

(*d*) *Writings of* 'Abbās Efendi (now called 'Abdu'l-Bahā).—Of these mention may be made of the *Mufāwaḍāt* (مفاوضات), or 'Outpourings,' recently published in the original Persian, and in Fr. and Eng. translations, by Miss Laura Barney and M. Hippolyte Dreyfus.

(*e*) *Writings of* Mīrzā Muḥammad 'Alī, the brother and rival of 'Abbās Efendi.

ii. *DEVOTIONAL, DOCTRINAL, AND APOLOGETIC WORKS* by companions and disciples of the Báb, Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel, Bahā'u'llāh, 'Abbās Efendi, and Mīrzā Muḥammad 'Alī, of which in recent times a considerable number have been composed in English by American believers and a smaller number in French. Many of the early Bābīs, such as Mullā Muḥammad 'Alī of Bārfurūsh (*Janāb-i-Quddūs*), left writings which have been preserved in manuscript.† Mīrzā Abu'l-Faḍl of Gulpāyagān, a devoted fol-

* See the *Traveller's Narrative*, ii. 335–347, especially the definitions from the Persian *Bayān* given on p. 344 f. concerning the 'five grades'; see also *JRAS* xxiv. (1892) 452 f.

† For description of such a collection of the writings of *Janāb-i-Quddūs*, see *JRAS*, 1892, 483–487.

lower of Bahā'u'llāh, composed, about A.D. 1887, a Persian tract called *Istidlāliyya*,* in which he endeavoured to prove to the Jews that the advent of their expected Messiah was fulfilled by the 'Manifestation' of Bahā'u'llāh; and he also wrote and published in Cairo a Persian work of 731 pages entitled *Kitābu'l-Farā'id*, in which he replied to attacks made on the Bahā'is by Shaykh 'Abdu's-Salām. In defence of Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel's position and in elucidation of the primitive Bābī doctrine and the philosophical ideas underlying it, there is the very rare and instructive *Hasht Bihisht*† of Shaykh Aḥmad of Kirmān (called Rūḥī), who was put to death at Tabriz about 1896. There is also a considerable literature, manuscript and lithographed, connected with the controversy which arose after the death of Bahā'u'llāh between his sons,‡ and this controversy is reflected in numerous English printed works produced in America by the respective partisans of the two brothers.

iii. *HISTORICAL WORKS* written by believers (such as the *History of Mirzā Jānī of Kāshān*, the *New History*, the *Traveller's Narrative*, and part of the *Hasht Bihisht*), or by opponents (such as the account given by the official historians of the Persian Court, Riżā-quli-Khān and the Lisānu'l-Mulk, in the supplement to the *Rawżatu's-Ṣafā* and the *Nāsikhu't-Tawārikh* respectively), or by more or less impartial observers, Asiatic or European. Among the most valuable of those written in the East from a hostile, or at least a critical and not very friendly, point of view, mention should especially be made of Sayyid Jamālu'd-Dīn's art. in the *Dā'iratu'l-Ma'ārif*, or Arabic Encyclopædia, of Buṭrusu'l-Bustānī, and of Mīrzā Muḥammad Mahdī-Khān Za'imu'd-Dawla's *Miftāḥu Bābi'l-Abwāb*, also in Arabic, published at Cairo in A.H. 1321 (A.D. 1903–1904). This last, though written in the form of a history, is rather polemical than historical, but it contains important information obtained from original oral sources, and a certain number of *pièces justificatives*. Another more purely polemical work, composed in Persian by a Christian convert to Islām, named Ḥusayn-quli, dedicated to some of the *mujtahids* of Kerbelā and Najaf, entitled *Minhāju't-Ṭālibīn fi raddi'l-Bābiyya*, and lithographed at Bombay in A.H. 1320 (A.D. 1902), also deserves mention.

iv. *BĀBĪ POEMS.*—From the time of Qurratu'l-'Ayn, the Bābī heroine who suffered martyrdom in A.D. 1852, until the present day, poetry of a religious and often of a rhapsodical character has been produced, though not in very great abundance, by Bābī writers. The most celebrated Bābī poets since the time of Qurratu'l-'Ayn are Nabīl, 'Andalīb, Na'īm of Ābāda, and Mirzā Yaḥyā *Sar-Khush*; but their poems are sporadic, and there does not seem to be any considerable collection of Bābī poems, either from one or from diverse pens.

v. *POLEMICAL WORKS.*—Some of these have been incidentally mentioned above under classes ii. and iii., but there exist others, such as the *Rajmu'sh-Shaytān fi raza'ili'l-Bayān* ('Stoning of the Devil, on the vices of the *Bayān*'), by Ḥājjī 'Abdu'r-Raḥīm, lithographed (without date or place of issue) about A.D. 1892. This tract professes to be written in refutation of a Bābī apology entitled *Kitābu'l-Imān fi idhhāri-Nuqtati'l-Bayān* ('the Book of Belief, setting forth the Point of Revelation,' *i.e.* the Báb), which apology is incorporated in the refutation. There are, however, reasons for believing that, under the guise of a weak and unconvincing refutation, the writer's object was to argue in favour of the Bābī doctrine, as held by the elder Bābīs and the Ezelīs, since he speaks respectfully of the Báb 'on account of his holy lineage,' makes the refutation of Ṣubḥ-i-Ezel depend on that of the Báb (whom he does not effectively refute), and practically confines his attacks to Bahā'u'llāh.

vi. *THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH WRITINGS* of American and French believers in Bahā'ism (for only in the latter days of Bahā'u'llah did the doctrines of which the Báb was the originator spread beyond Asia) may conveniently be placed in a separate class. The chief of those which have come into the present writer's hands (and there are, no doubt, many others with which he is unacquainted, for Bahā'ism is now active in America, and has its centres, associations, schools, and endowments) are, in chronological order, as follows:

Ibrāhīm George Kheiralla (*i.e.* Khayru'llāh) assisted by Howard MacNutt, *Behā'u'llāh* ('The Glory of God'), 2 vols., Chicago, 1900; *Facts for Behaists*, tr. and ed. by I. G. Kheiralla (this pamphlet deals with the dispute between 'Abbās Efendi and his brother Muḥammad 'Alī, and supports the claims of the latter), Chicago, 1901; Ibrāhīm George Kheiralla, *The Three Questions*, 26 pp. of English and 15 pp. of Arabic *pièces justificatives* (n.d.); Stoyan Krstoff Vatralsky, *Mohammedan Gnosticism in America: the origin, history, character, and esoteric doctrines of the Truth-knowers* (from *AJTh*, Jan. 1902, pp. 57–78), Boston, 1902; Gabriel Sacy, *Le Règne de Dieu et de l'Agneau, connu sous le nom de Babysme*, Cairo, 1902; *Le Livre des Sept Preuves* (a tr. of the Báb's *Dalā'il-i-Sab'a*), tr. by A. L. M. Nicolas, Paris, 1902; *The Revelation of Bahā'u'llāh*, compiled by Isabella D. Brittingham, U.S.A., 1902; Myron H. Phelps, *The Life and Teachings of Abbās Effendi*, with Introduction by Edward G. Browne, London and New York, 1903; *Le Livre de la Certitude* (a tr. of the *Īqān*), tr. by Hippolyte Dreyfus and Mīrzā Ḥabību'llāh Shīrāzī, Paris, 1904; *Le Béyân Arabe, le livre sacré du Babysme de Séyyèd Alī Mohammed dit le Bab*, tr. from the Arabic by A. L. M. Nicolas, Paris, 1905; Arthur Pilsbury Dodge, *Whence? Why? Whither? Man: Things: Other things*, Westwood, Mass., 1907. One Ezelī manifesto, consisting chiefly of extracts from the *New History*, the *Traveller's Narrative*, and other works by the writer of this article, has also appeared in America under the title of *A Call of Attention to the Behaists or Babists of America*, by August J. Stenstrand, and is dated from Naperville, Ill., Feb. 13, 1907; Miss Laura Clifford Barney, who at different periods spent a considerable time at 'Akkā, and has also travelled in Persia, collected orally the answers of 'Abbās Efendi to a number of questions which she put to him on all sorts of subjects, and to which he replied from time to time. These replies have been published in the original Persian, in English, and in French almost simultaneously. The Persian text is entitled *An-Nūru'l-abhā fi Mufāwaḍāti 'Abdi'l Bahā*, and on the English title-page *Table Talks, collected by Laura Clifford Barney*, London, 1908. The English version is entitled *Some Questions answered . . . from the Persian of 'Abdul-Bahā*, translated by Miss L. C. Barney. The French version, translated from the Persian by Hippolyte Dreyfus, is entitled *Les Leçons de St. Jean d'Acre . . recueillies par Laura Clifford Barney*, Paris, 1908.

EDWARD G. BROWNE.

BĀBĀ LĀLĪS.—The name of a modern Indian monotheistic sect founded by one Bābā Lāl in the first half of the 17th cent. A.D. The sect is apparently now extinct. Bābā Lāl was a Khattrī by caste, born in Mālwā in Rājputāna. He became the pupil of a *Bhakti* apostle (see BHAKTI-MĀRGA) named Chetan Swāmi, whom he followed to Lahore. He finally settled at Dehanpur, near Sarhind (Sirhind) in the Panjāb, where he founded the sect which bears his name.

Bābā Lāl was one of those Indian reformers of the 16th and 17th cents. who, like Kabīr, Dādū, and the Emperor Akbar, endeavoured to found a purely monotheistic religion, combining elements derived partly from the beliefs of the Musalmān Sūfīs and partly from those of the followers of the Hindū Bhakti-mārga. Like Kabīr, he followed the Bhakti-mārga in the name by which he referred to the Supreme, viz. Rāma; but also, as in Kabīr's teaching, this Rāma was not to him the Deity incarnate as the earthly prince of Oudh, but was God the Father Himself, or, in other words, Rāma after he had returned to heaven from his incarnate sojourn upon earth. The doctrine of incarnation, which is an important part of the teaching of the Bhakti-mārga, had no place in his system. On the other hand, as in the Bhakti-mārga and as in Sūfīism, the keynote of his system was an all-absorbing love directed to a gracious personal God. As he himself says, 'The feelings of a perfect disciple have not been, and cannot be, described; as it is said: "A person asked me, What are the sensations of a lover?" I replied: "When you are a lover, you will know."'

Bābā Lāl's doctrine attracted the attention of the liberal-minded prince Dārā Shukoh, the eldest and favourite son of the Emperor Shāh Jahān, who sent for him and had several interviews with him in the year A.D. 1649. A report of these interviews is preserved in a Persian work entitled the *Nādiru'n-nikāt*, our only authority on Bābā Lāl's teaching. From this we gather that, besides the devoted love which was the essence and foundation of his religion, he taught that the human soul is a particle of the Supreme Soul, just as water contained in a flask is a part of the water of, say, the river Ganges. The flask which separates it from its source is the body, and blessed is the moment when the flask ceases to exist, and the water once contained in it can be reunited with the parent stream. The difference between the water in the flask and that in the Ganges is that a drop of wine added to the former would impart to

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* *JRAS*, 1892, pp. 701–705. † *Ib.* pp. 685–695.

‡ Of works belonging to this class the two following (published in A.H. 1318 and 1319 [= A.D. 1900–1901 respectively]), of which the present writer happens to possess copies, are in defence of Mīrzā Muḥammad 'Alī and against the claims of 'Abbās Efendi. The first is entitled *Ityānu'd-Dalīl li-man yurīdu'l-Iqbāla ila siwā'i's-sabīl*, and the second appears to be from the pen of Mīrzā Āqā Jān of Kāshān, called *Khādimu'llāh* ('the Servant of God'), who was for many years Bahā'u'llāh's amanuensis, and was afterwards among the most prominent of the supporters of Mīrzā Muḥammad 'Alī and the opponents of 'Abbās Efendi.

it its flavour, but would be lost in the river. Similarly the Supreme Soul, or in other words the Deity, is beyond accident, while the human soul is afflicted by sense and passion.

Withdrawal from worldly life is prudent, but not necessary. The real 'world' from which the disciple must withdraw is forgetfulness of God, not clothes, or wealth, or wife, or offspring. All created things are derived from one material source, or Nature, as the tree is derived from the seed, but the evolution of the former from the latter requires the interference of an evolving Cause, or the interposition of the Creator.

LITERATURE.—A fuller account of the sect will be found in Wilson, *Religious Sects of the Hindus* (vol. i. of 'Works'), London, 1862, p. 347 ff., from which most of the above has been drawn.

GEORGE A. GRIERSON.

BABYLONIANS AND ASSYRIANS.

[H. ZIMMERN.]

Introduction.—At the present moment it is an exceedingly difficult task to give a short comprehensive account of the Babylonian religion. In the first place, in spite of much diligent research, particularly in the course of the last two decades, the copious materials derived from the cuneiform inscriptions, which are ever increasing through new discoveries and publications, are far from being thoroughly investigated or arranged in a systematic form. The difficulty of acquiring a clear knowledge of the fundamental principles and the historical development of the Bab. religion is increased by its complex character, due to an intermingling, not only of Sumerian and Semitic, but of other foreign elements which find expression in it. Then, finally, it must be noted that among students of the subject great differences of opinion exist as to the essential character and historical evolution of this religion. In an objective account, such as is here demanded, these differences must necessarily be referred to. We have to deal, in the first place, with the following question: Are we to hold, with Winckler especially, that the religion of the Babylonians and their theory of the universe in general are to be regarded, at the time when our sources begin, *i.e.* about B.C. 3000, as essentially complete—a fixed system, based on astronomical principles, which arose in a period which, for us, is entirely pre-historic? Or, are the undoubted traces of the systematizing of the religion, which are found in our sources, and its close connexion with an astral scheme, only the product of a comparatively late period? Was it only in the post-Babylonian, the Hellenistic, period that the system was perfectly completed, instead of having taken place, as Winckler supposes, in the earliest known historical period? The present writer feels compelled, from his study and interpretation of the sources, to adopt an intermediate theory between the two extremes just mentioned. It seems to him undeniable that there was among the Babylonians, even at an early date, a tendency to reduce the world of the gods to a single system, and to carry out the law of correspondence between great and small, heavenly and earthly, time and space, the macrocosm and the microcosm. At the same time, he does not feel inclined to exclude the element of historical evolution from the actually known period of Assyro-Babylonian history to the same extent as Winckler does. In particular, it seems to him that the close connexion between almost all the chief deities and heavenly bodies and the proportionate distribution of the cosmos among them rest on a secondary element in our sources, which it is still possible to trace, at least partially, in the history. The present writer further feels inclined to ascribe a more individual character to the several Babylonian divinities than is done by Winckler, and to harbour a strong suspicion of the theory that even in ancient times the several divine forms were regarded in Babylonia as only partial manifestations of a single deity, so that they could at will be substituted for each other. Moreover, to a far larger extent than Winckler is disposed to admit, we seem to have to deal in the Babylonian religion with unreconciled differences, due partly to widely deviating local cults which once existed, and partly to the combination of Sumerian and Semitic elements already mentioned, as well as to the varied survivals from older stages of the Babylonian religion. We cannot, then, speak of a finished scheme as present in the Bab. *Weltanschauung* and consequently in its religion. At the same time, it must be conceded that Winckler's construction of a Bab. *Weltanschauung* has in many ways, in spite of its one-sidedness and evident exaggeration, made possible a better understanding of the religion of the Babylonians.

1. **History: The principal places of worship and the character of the Babylonian religion in general.**—At the very commencement of the cuneiform sources, about the year B.C. 3000, we find in the original documents—royal inscriptions and documents pertaining to civil law—a perfectly confusing multitude of divine figures and names of temples. On closer inspection, these distribute themselves among various local cults, which possess greater or less importance, according to the political or religious eminence of the respective seats of worship. Now, seeing that in Babylonia, in the earliest times, the seat of the supreme political power often changed, it is clear that the city-gods of different and successive capitals might, in turn, have supreme significance for the whole land—a significance which, as a rule, continued to influence the cult long after the city in question had lost its political supremacy. In connexion with this change of the seat of political power, it must early have been felt necessary to harmonize the local cults, which originally differed widely, and to bring the gods of the different places of worship into some definite relation to each other. In this way would be formed a divine State and divine families—preferably in the triad of father, mother, son—after the model of the earthly State and the human family. Along with this went the division of the different parts of the cosmos among the several gods. The matter is still further complicated by the fact that in most cases, particularly in towns of South and Middle Babylonia, the cult of an earlier Sumerian population was taken over by their Semitic successors. Here there must naturally have taken place new combinations of the original Sumerian and the imported Semitic religious ideas.

The most important seats of worship and their local deities which have to be considered are, proceeding from south to north, as follows: *Eridu* with the cult of Ea, *Uru* (Ur) with Sin (the moon-god), *Larsa* with Shamash (the sun-god), *Uruk* (Erech) with Anu and Ishtar-Nanâ, *Lagash* with Ningirsu, *Nippur* with Enlil, *Isin* with Bêlit-Isin, *Kish* with Zamama (Ninib), *Kutû* (Cuthah) with Nergal, *Babilu* (Babylon) with Marduk (Merodach), *Barsip* (Borsippa) with Nabû (Nebo), *Sippar* with Shamash, *Akkad* with Ishtar-Anunîtu. In addition to these, we have in the Assyrian domain: *Ashshur* with the god Ashshur, *Ninua* (Nineveh) with Ishtar, *Arbail* (Arbela) with Ishtar, and in Mesopotamia *Harrân* with Sin.

Among these cities or seats of worship, Uruk, Nippur, and Eridu must in the earliest times have been very specially prominent, since their gods, Anu, Enlil, and Ea, occupy from ancient days the chief place in the Babylonian pantheon—a position which they retained (even if this was often a mere

form) down to the latest times. But Uru and Larsa must also at one time have held a chief place (as can be partially traced in the actual history), for their local deities, Sin and Shamash, play quite a pre-eminent part in the whole scheme of the Babylonian religion. We cannot say with equal certainty whether the important rôle assigned to Ishtar is due to her position as city-goddess of Uruk or as that of Akkad. Undoubtedly in the case of the cults of Shamash and Sin we have from the very beginning to do with worship of the sun and the moon; but it is not so certain that, in the later systematic scheme of the pantheon, the connexion of heaven with Anu, the earth with Enlil, and the water with Ea, corresponds entirely with the original nature of these three gods. Rather may it have been that, under the influence of the systematizing process which had set in, particular features connecting one of these gods with heaven, a second with earth, a third with water, were so utilized as afterwards to distinguish them sharply in these three directions, and to distribute the cosmos among them correspondingly. Again, in the case of Ishtar it is a question whether her cult had originally to do with the worship of the morning (and the evening) star, the planet Venus, or whether here once more the astral character of Ishtar is not a secondary phenomenon, so that we have originally in this deity a personification of fertility in human, animal, and plant life. It is still less certain that the gods Marduk, Nabû, Ninib, Nergal, who in later times were associated on the one hand with phases of the sun, and on the other with the four remaining planets known to the ancients, had, to begin with, any solar or astral significance. There is much, on the other hand, to indicate that the connexion of these gods with the heavenly bodies did not belong to their original cult and nature, but that other features connecting them with nature and human life are the real key to their original character.

Accordingly, we are of opinion that it is impossible to postulate a purely astral basis for the Babylonian religion, either in its Sumerian or its Semitic elements. On the other hand, it must certainly be granted that at a relatively very early date, *i.e.* partially at least, in the period represented by our oldest sources, all the chief gods, and not merely those who, like Shamash and Sin, had their origin in the worship of the heavenly bodies, had been connected with the stars and the cosmos, and that the Babylonian religion had assumed an astral stamp. This comes to light in all the outward forms of the religion, and finds particularly clear expression in the cults and the mythology. This wide-spread astral vein must undoubtedly be regarded as an inheritance from the Sumerians. In its origin it is connected with the remarkable conception of the world as a unity—another undoubted heirloom received from the Sumerians, which Winckler has set before us so clearly. According to this view of the universe, all phenomena in the macrocosm and in the microcosm, in heaven and on earth, are in a relation of mutual correspondence.

2. The chief figures of the pantheon.—Some of these have been already mentioned, but we must now proceed to notice and characterize them more fully.

Anu (Anum) stands at the head of the supreme divine triad—Anu, Enlil, Ea. Whatever may have been the original signification of the name, it was interpreted as meaning 'heaven,' corresponding to the Sumerian *ana*, 'heaven,' and thus the deity was regarded as the heaven-god, over-against Enlil (the earth-god) and Ea (the water-god). He was thought of as enthroned in heaven, especially on the northern pole, which is eternally at rest. Here he reigned as king and father of the gods, who, for their part, had their homes in the stars which circle round the pole. Even the evil demons are in the last resort subject to him. The chief seat of the worship of Anu was Uruk; but in later times he had also a temple at Ashshur, in common with the storm-god Adad. But, at least in the period known to us from our sources, his cult retired strangely into the background. On the other hand, he continues to play a certain part in the mythology, where he is regarded as the supreme disposer of all events. The high esteem which, notwithstanding, Anu at all periods continued to enjoy as the chief of the gods, can only be explained as the after effect of a wide-spread Anu-worship belonging to a pre-historic time. We find *Antu*, or *Anatu*, mentioned as the wife of Anu. She appears sometimes as the goddess of the earth, in contrast with her husband, the god of the heavens.

Enlil (Ellil)—a name which used to be generally misread *Bel*—is the second god of the highest triad. Here he is regarded as the lord of lands, as contrasted with Anu, the lord of the heavens. From the mythical (cosmic) great mountain of the world (earth-mountain), where he had his dwelling-place, he bears the frequent epithet of the 'great mountain.' His wife is called *Ninlil*, also *Bêlit-mâtâte*, the 'lady of lands,' as well as *Bêlit-ile*, the 'lady of the gods,' the mother-goddess *κατ' ἐξοχήν*. Enlil's seat of worship was the city Nippur, with the temple E-kur, whose remains have been excavated by an American expedition. The worship of this deity must have held a specially important place in the earlier Babylonian period. This can be gathered, not only from the direct evidence of the excavations at Nippur, but also from the rôle which, down to the latest times, Enlil plays in the Bab. mythology (cf. the story of the Flood) and hymns. For, although in later days much which had been ascribed to Enlil was transferred to other gods, particularly to Marduk of Babylon, this very fact proves that at a certain period Enlil must have occupied the chief place.

Ea is the third god of the highest triad, and, as such, ruler of the water-depths. The pronunciation of the name as *Ea* has not yet been quite fully established. Perhaps, judging from the *Aós* in Damascius, the name ought rather to be read *Ae* or something similar. His seat of worship was Eridu in the south of Babylonia, lying near the sea and the embouchure of the Euphrates and the Tigris. The cult of Ea must also once have enjoyed the highest reputation, as is indicated by the after-effects in the myths (cf., again, the story of the Flood) and the literature of exorcism. Owing to the fact that at a later date the cult of Eridu came, in a way that is not yet quite clear, to be combined with the cult of Babylon, Ea as the father of Marduk remained an object of living worship to the latest period of the Babylonian religion. He is regarded as the one of the great gods who stands nearest to mankind, and is thus most ready to help in difficult situations, and who, as the wise god, the lord of wisdom, has always the necessary means of assistance at hand. In particular, he helps by means of his own element, the healing water of the streams and the underground springs, which play an exceedingly important part in exorcism—the peculiar domain of the Ea-cult. Here he is assisted by his son Marduk, who in this connexion is to be regarded not as the city-god of Babylon, but rather as a deity of Eridu, whose identification with the god of Babylon was only secondary. Ea's wife is *Damkina*.

Sin, the moon-god, the first of the second triad of gods consisting of Sin, Shamash, and Ishtar (or also Sin, Shamash, and Adad), is the city-god of

Uru (OT *Ur*) in South Babylonia, where his temple, *E-kishshirgal* ('house of light'), stood. But the Sin-cult had a strong hold at an early date also at Harrān in Mesopotamia. For even as early as the sources derived from Boghazköi (middle of the 2nd mill. B.C.), Sin of Harrān is mentioned. Here also a name readily applied to him is *Bēl-Ḫarrān*, 'lord of Harrān.' His wife is always called *Ningal*, 'the great lady,' 'the queen.' His son is Shamash, the sun-god (in Harrān, Nusku specially appears as the son of Sin). According to the one view at least, Ishtar is regarded as his daughter. The figure of Sin was undoubtedly connected from the very first with the worship of the moon, for the name *Sin* was actually used by the Babylonians as an appellative for the moon. Moreover, in the hymns addressed to Sin his character as moon-god is quite clear; and it may be noted in this connexion that the moon-god is regarded as a pre-eminently benignant and well-disposed deity. Also connected with the moon is Sin's rôle as the god of oracles, although in this respect he is somewhat overshadowed by Shamash, the oracle-god *κατ' ἐξοχήν*.

Shamash, the sun-god, comes next to Sin in the series of deities, and is regarded as his son—a circumstance to be explained perhaps by a later sun-cult having displaced an earlier cult of the moon. In the case of Shamash also the name of the god is identical with the Babylonian and the common Semitic name for the sun, so that here also the connexion of this deity with the great star of day is at all events original. The sun-god, moreover, of Babylonian religion is always of the male sex; whereas in South Arabia, *e.g.*, the sun was worshipped as a goddess. The seats of worship peculiar to Shamash are: in Southern Babylonia, Larsa; in Northern, Sippar. In both of these places his temple was called *E-babbar*, 'clear shining house,' that which 'is as the dwelling of heaven.' His wife or mistress is *Aja*, 'the bride.' As son of Sin he is also regarded as the brother of Ishtar. As children of his we find mentioned Kettu, 'justice,' and Mēsharu, 'rectitude'—personifications of qualities which belong to Shamash pre-eminently as the supreme divine judge. There is further associated with him his charioteer, Bunene. In many hymns Shamash is celebrated as the sun-god, who every morning favours mankind with his light, who is the champion of all good and the enemy and avenger of all evil. Thus he is specially regarded, as is noted above, as the supreme judge in heaven and on the earth, to whom all legislation is ascribed (cf. the introduction to the laws of Ḫammurabi and the relief figure of Shamash on the stele containing this code). As sun-god he was at the same time the supreme oracle-god, in whose name all soothsaying was carried on, and who was the patron-god of the gild of soothsaying priests which held so important a place in Babylonia.

Ishtar, often placed third in the triad of divinities along with Sin and Shamash, is the most prominent female deity in the Babylonian pantheon. Starting with local cults in which, as a female deity, she occupied the chief place, Ishtar came in the end practically to absorb all other goddesses of the Assyro-Babylonian pantheon, so that her name became, even at an early date, a Bab. appellative for 'goddess.' Whether her cult, like that of Sin and Shamash, was from the beginning connected with star-worship—especially that of Venus—cannot be decided with certainty, although this connexion of Ishtar with the planet Venus and her character as 'queen of heaven' may go back to remote antiquity. The name *Ishtar*, whose origin and etymology are still matter of dispute, does not enable us to come to any definite conclusion on this point. As little can we gather any certain information from the Astarte figures of the other Semitic religions, which are in name and character closely related to the Babylonian Ishtar. Possibly we ought rather to assume a greater antiquity for her character as the goddess of fertility. Her principal seats of worship were Uruk (where she was also worshipped as Nanā), Akkad (here worshipped as Anunītu), Nineveh, and Arbela. Here too, as is indicated by the very names Nanā and Anunītu, we have undoubtedly to do with what were originally independent local deities, who came only in the course of time to be connected and identified. This no doubt also accounts for the way in which, in the later Assyro-Babylonian religion, quite heterogeneous elements are combined in the figure of Ishtar. Her many-sided origin is again reflected in the varying genealogical relation in which she is placed to the other gods. Thus she appears at one time as the daughter of Anu, at another as the daughter of Sin. The following are the most prominent of the varied qualities of Ishtar. She is the goddess of love and of the life of Nature in general, the goddess in whose cult, particularly at Uruk, temple-prostitution was a feature. In the mythological literature, especially in 'Ishtar's descent to Hades,' this characteristic of Ishtar as the goddess of the sexual impulse occupies a prominent place. On the other hand, she is expressly the goddess of war and of the chase. In this aspect she is hailed with predilection by the Assyrian kings who were lovers of war and the chase. The character of a mother-goddess appears to have been attached to the person of Ishtar only after the figures of other mother-goddesses, particularly Ninlil (Bēlit-ile) and Damkina, had been assimilated by her. In respect of astral connexion, we find Ishtar associated not only with the planet Venus, but also with the brightest fixed star Sirius. Her sacred animal is the lion, but perhaps the dove also belongs to her. In the countless hymns addressed to her Ishtar is hailed as goddess in all the aspects mentioned above. But these Ishtar-hymns sometimes reach also a relatively high ethical level, glorifying her as the mightiest and most merciful helper of mankind, who frees from curse and sickness, and forgives sin and guilt. A unique feature in Bab. mythology is the relation between Ishtar and Tammūz (see below, under 'Tammūz').

Marduk (OT *Merodach*), the city-god of Babylon, is, from the point of view of his significance in the Bab. mythology, most closely connected with the fate of the city of Babylon. Just as Babylon came to the front politically at a late date as compared with the other cities of Babylonia, but thereafter always overshadowed the whole in importance and power, so also Marduk is a younger figure in the Babylonian system of deities, and yet he finally comes near to absorbing all the other gods. The meaning of the name *Marduk* has not yet been satisfactorily explained. His temple in Babylon was called *E-sagila* ('lofty house'), with the temple-tower *E-temenanki* ('house of the foundation of heaven and earth'). Mention is found of his wife *Sarpanitu* ('the silver-gleaming one'), of his father Ea, and of his son Nabū. But this connecting of Marduk with Ea and Nabū is undoubtedly accounted for by an assimilation of the local cults of Eridu and Borsippa and their gods Ea and Nabū with those of Babylon. On the other hand, an original feature of the Marduk-cult at Babylon appears to be present in the fact that his chief feast, the later general New Year festival of Babylonia, fell at the time of the spring equinox. This fact, along with many other phenomena,

leads us to conclude that Marduk was essentially a deity who, as far as the year is concerned, was conceived as embodied in the spring sun bringing new life and light, and similarly embodied in the morning sun by day. At a still earlier date, perhaps, he was regarded as only a god of vegetation, who had his chief form of manifestation in the reviving vegetation of spring-time. On the other hand, the rôle of arbiter of destiny, which Marduk assumes at this New Year festival, seems to have been first taken over from Nabû. The same holds good with regard to further features, which came later to be regarded as essential characteristics of Marduk, although certain original traits in his character may have facilitated this assimilation. Thus the quality of Marduk as the god of healing and the helper in all sickness and need—the rôle which he accordingly plays in the literature of exorcism—is derived, as we saw in the case of Ea, from the cult of Eridu. The same source, in all likelihood, is responsible for the emphasis laid on Marduk as the wise and prudent among the gods. In like manner, the rôle of creator, ascribed to Marduk in the Bab. mythology, was only secondary and transferred to him from other gods, like Enlil of Nippur and Ea of Eridu—a conclusion clearly indicated by the respective myths themselves. The connecting of Marduk with one of the planets—during the supremacy of the city of Babylon, with the clear shining Juppiter—is certainly not original, but merely a product of priestly astral speculation. We have still to mention that the proper name *Marduk* was, in the later period, more and more displaced by the appellative *bēlu*, 'the lord,' so that finally Marduk was almost exclusively designated as *Bēl*. In like manner, his spouse came to be called by preference *Bēlit*, 'lady.' In the extant hymns to Marduk naturally all the features are reflected which were finally ascribed to him as the supreme being, the king of all the gods. Like the hymns addressed to Ishtar and Shamash, the Marduk-hymns belong to the noblest and relatively highest ethical products of the Babylonian literature.

Nabû (OT *Nebo*), the city-god of Barsip (Borsippa), occupied, it would seem, in the more ancient period before the rise of Babylon as the recognized capital, a more important position than later, when in the system of the Babylonian priesthood he is regarded merely as 'son' of Marduk and as 'recorder' of destiny at the New Year festival. The name *Nabû* is Semitic, and signifies 'announcer.' What kind of 'announcement'—possibly that of destiny—is in view is uncertain. His later function, already mentioned as recorder, writer of destiny, at all events favours the notion that the determining of destiny belonged originally to him, and was perhaps transferred from him to Marduk. Nabû is regarded not only as the writer of destiny, but in general as the god of the art of writing and of science. Among other essential qualities of Nabû we have to note that he often appears as a god of vegetation—probably one of the most original traits in his nature. On the other hand, Nabû probably owes his connexion with a planet—latterly Mercury, in the pre-Babylonian period possibly Juppiter—to priestly speculation, which drew all the deities into its astro-mythological system. The same reason will account also for sporadic references associating him with the darker half of the year, in opposition to Marduk, the god of the bright half. The temple of Nabû in Borsippa bore the name *E-zida* ('perpetual house'), with the tower *E-uriminanki* ('house of the seven rulers of heaven and earth'). Nabû's wife is called *Tashmētu*, a personification of an abstract idea, 'audience,' without much living content. Nanâ, too, frequently appears as the wife of Nabû, and so does Nisaba the goddess of corn.

Ninib is merely the conventional pronunciation of the name of a chief god of the Babylonians and Assyrians. Unfortunately we are still in ignorance as to the real phonetic reading of the name. Lately, indeed, we have got nearer the goal by the discovery that the Aramaic reproduction of the name of this god was composed of the consonants *'-n-w-š-t*; but opinion is still divided as to the Bab. prototype of this Aram. equivalent. Ninib originally belonged to the cult which had its seat at Nippur. Here he was regarded as the first-born son of Enlil, and the third of a triad composed of father, mother, and son (Enlil, Ninlil and Ninib), which we encounter in a similar fashion in most of the old Bab. seats of worship. His essential character is that of a mighty hero, who victoriously casts down all opposing powers—the aspect under which he was afterwards taken over by the Assyrians as specially the god of war and the chase. In this aspect Zamama of Kish closely resembles Ninib, and is occasionally directly identified with him. At the same time, Ninib is a god of healing—a quality which is specially ascribed also to his wife *Gula*, the great physician, the guardian patroness of the healing art. He is further regarded as a god of the fields—a trait which brings him into close contact with Ningirsu, the city-god of Lagash, a deity who in later times was very often directly identified with Ninib. Here again, perhaps, as in the similar case of Nabû, it is possible that this relation to vegetation is one of the oldest features in the character of Ninib. On the other hand, the solar and astral traits in Ninib may again be due to his introduction into the priestly astro-mythological system. As far as his solar character is concerned, it is still doubtful whether he is to be regarded as connected with the morning and spring sun, or rather to be thought of as associated with the sun of noon and summer. The planet associated with him is called Kaimānu (Kēwān)—the name in the Babylonian period at least for Saturn, but perhaps in the earlier period for Mars. In the heaven of fixed stars he was localized in Orion, and it is very likely that the conception of the constellation of Orion as a warrior goes back to the elevation of the warlike Ninib to the skies.

Nergal is properly the city-god of Kutû (OT *Cuthah*), where his temple bore the name of *E-shitlam*. The (Sumerian) name *Nergal* is unfortunately of uncertain significance, although the pronunciation is fixed by its reproduction in the OT and on other grounds. Nergal has quite a peculiar position in the Babylonian pantheon and mythology, being expressly the god of the under world, ruler of the realm of the dead, and as such the husband of *Eresh-kigal*, the sovereign lady of the under world (although goddesses with other names—Laṣ (Laz) and Mamītu—are associated with him as city-goddesses of Cuthah). It is very questionable, however, whether this relation of Nergal to the realm of the dead is original, and not a later development due to some other trait in his character, or some peculiarity of the city of Cuthah. Thus Nergal is also a god of plague and fever, and as such stands very close to Ira, the plague-god proper, and is often identified with him. Like Ninib, he also appears as the god of war and of the chase. Again, in the same way as Ninib, he also appears as a benevolent god of the fields, granting fertility. It is possible, as was suggested in the case of Ninib, that in this relation to vegetation is to be found the original feature of his character. On the other hand, the solar and astral associations may in his case also be secondary. For the connexion of Nergal with

the sun, the destructive influence of the noonday and midsummer sun would be the determining factor. As far as connexion with the planets is concerned, he was, at least in the Babylonian period, associated with Mars, but possibly at an earlier date with Saturn. In the firmament of fixed stars he was probably represented in the constellation of Leo (which was known in the Babylonian age), as we meet elsewhere with the lion as the symbol of Nergal.

Nusku (or Nushku), the meaning of whose name is still uncertain, belongs to the cult-group of Nippur, where he appears as the great plenipotentiary of Enlil. Besides, he is met with in the sphere of Sin of Harrān, and is here occasionally introduced directly as the son of Sin. As to his nature, we are at least certain that he is a god of light. Frequently his name even alternates with that of the fire-god Girru (Gibil). Hence, like the latter, Nusku is ethically regarded as the enemy and conqueror of all evil and the promoter of all good. As thus connected with the moon-god Sin, Nusku is specially associated with the sickle of the crescent moon.

Girru (the Sem. form of the Sumer. *Gibil*) is the personification of fire, the fire-god proper of the Bab. pantheon. As such, he is, for instance, the god of smith-craft; he is also the god of the holy sacrificial fire. But, above all, he readily assumes an ethical aspect, as the terrible god, who destroys evil by his purifying fire.

Ramman (also called **Adad**) is the special storm- and thunder-god of the Babylonians. Both forms of his name, Ramman and Adad, of which the latter is the more common in Assyria, are of Semitic origin, and may refer to the roar of the thunderstorm. It is likely that the designation Adad is not native to Assyro-Babylonia, but goes back to the Western Semitic *Hadad*. But in any case the figure of a storm-god as such is of very old standing in the Babylonian pantheon, being found even in the Sumerian period, when he seems to have borne the name *Ishkur*. The great importance assigned to the storm-god in the Babylonian pantheon is evident not only from the rôle which he plays in the myths (*e.g.* the story of the Flood), but also, *e.g.*, from the fact that, in the official lists of the gods, he often occupies the third place in the second divine triad, namely, Sin, Shamash, and Adad, instead of the usual Sin, Shamash, and Ishtar. As storm-god he was naturally hailed as the giver of the beneficent rains; while, on the other hand, by withholding rain he could bring drought and famine on the land. In his aspect as thunder-god he is readily viewed as one who by his thunder and lightning destroys the host of the enemy. His symbol is the thunderbolt, his sacred animal the ox. In Babylonia, among other seats of Ramman-worship, there is mention of Karkara and Khallab; in Assyria, at the ancient capital Ashshur, a temple was consecrated to him in common with Anu, who is represented as his father. Ramman also appears with Shamash as the god of oracles. The name of his wife is given as *Shala*.

Tammūz is a deity who occupies an altogether unique position in the Bab. pantheon. He does not belong to the number of the great principal gods. His cult must, notwithstanding, have enjoyed great prestige. This is indicated by the fact that the Tammūz-cult survived in the lands adjoining Babylonia on the west, and in the post-Babylonian period. The name *Tammūz* is derived from the Sumer. *Dumuzi*, and signifies literally 'real child'; the older form is *Dumuzi-zuab* = 'real child of the water-depths.' He is described as the god of the green plant-growth, which is produced and nourished by fresh water. For Tammūz is essentially the god of vegetation, whose reviving in spring and withering in midsummer this deity personifies. Our sources do not, so far at least, enable us to decide whether (as in the Egyptian Osiris-cult and probably in the later Tammūz-Adonis-cult outside Babylonia) the native Bab. Tammūz-cult saw in that deity a figure of human life with its growth and decay, and even included the hope of a continuance of life for man after death. One of the main features of this cult is the mourning for the premature death of the youthful Tammūz, which found expression in the weeping for him by male and female professional mourners—a custom witnessed to by a number of hymns referring to it. There are also traces of a joyous festival in honour of the revivification of Tammūz. The myth of Tammūz brings him into close connexion with Ishtar, making him her husband, or rather her lover. True, it is Ishtar also at whose door, according to the Gilgamesh epic, lies the responsibility for the yearly mourning for Tammūz. But side by side with this appears another conception, for instance in several Tammūz-hymns and in the so-called 'Descent of Ishtar to Hades,' according to which it is Ishtar that follows Tammūz to the depths of the under world and seeks to bring him up again. The sister of Tammūz, Geshtinanna, is also found playing this part.

Ashshur, the national god of the Assyrians, also deserves special mention. Originally the local god of the city bearing the same name, the old capital of Assyria, Ashshur thus gained the position of supreme god of Assyria. As such he appears at the time of the Assyrian supremacy especially as a god of war, who during campaigns gives the Assyrian kings victory over their enemies, and calls them to hold sway over all nations. It is easy to understand how all that was attributed originally to the supreme gods of Babylon—such as Anu, Enlil, and Marduk—came to be transferred, not only in the mythology but elsewhere, to Ashshur, as the chief god of Assyria. Thus, *e.g.*, he undertakes the conflict with the sea-monster Tiāmat, which plays so large a part in the Bab. Creation epic.

Finally, mention must be made of the names *Igigi* and *Anunnaki*—designations for the Bab. deities as a whole, in their arrangement as gods of heaven and gods of the earth (under world). In the astral sense, in particular, we have to understand by the *Igigi* the gods who were thought of as embodied in the stars above the horizon; while the star-gods, who had sunk below the horizon, were regarded as *Anunnaki*.

Alongside of the great gods, properly speaking, whose chief representatives have been described above, the Babylonians included in their religious system a great number of lesser divine beings. These again were divided into those who manifested a character positively good and well-disposed to mankind, and those who showed a disposition positively hostile to man, and a desire to injure him. To the *good spirits* belong, among others, the guardian deities (god and goddess), one of whom was supposed to be assigned to every man. The *evil demons* by a favourite conception make their appearance in groups of seven. They play a very important part in the literature of exorcism, as all misfortune and sickness against which the exorcisms were directed were traced back to their evil influence. In the same category with these evil demons were placed the spirits of the dead, the ghosts, to whom all kinds of hostile action towards the living were ascribed.

3. The myths and epics.—In the study of the Babylonian religion we have at our command a considerable treasure of myths and epics. The following is a list of those which are most important for our purpose, and thus far best known from the excavations: the Creation and cognate

myths, the Adapa myth, the story of the Flood with the other Atrakhasīs myths and the myth of the primeval kings, the Ira myth, the Labbu myth, the Zū myth, the Etana myth, Nergal and Eresh-kigal, Ishtar's descent to Hades, the Gilgamesh epic. Most of these literary remains are derived, in the form in which we now have them, for the greater part, from the library of Ashurbanipal. But internal and external evidence shows that their composition belongs to a much earlier period. In the case of some of them we have even actual copies of an earlier date (*c.* 2000–1500 B.C.).

(*a*) *The Creation.*—This part of the Babylonian mythology—partially known to us, even before the re-discovery of ancient Babylonia, from the Greek tradition of Berossus—receives fullest treatment in the cuneiform mythological literature in the seven-tablet epic *Enuma elish*, so called from its opening words. The contents are briefly as follows: Before the heavens and the earth were made, the primeval father Apsū and the primeval mother Tiāmat (both personifications of the primeval ocean) along with their son Mummu were in existence. From these in a succession of generations sprang the gods. Apsū and Tiāmat, disturbed in the peace they had up to this time enjoyed, and accordingly discontented with the new condition of affairs, devise a plan against the new world of gods. Apsū perishes at this stage. But Tiāmat vigorously prosecutes the scheme, and chooses for herself a new husband and assistant in the person of Kingu, to whom she gives the tablets of destiny. She attracts a section of gods to her side, and creates a number of monsters—the eleven—to help her in the battle against the gods. The contest at once begins. After several other gods have attempted in vain to overcome Tiāmat, Marduk at last offers to enter the lists against her. But he stipulates that, if he is victorious, the highest place among the gods shall in future belong to him. In a solemn conclave of the gods this condition is accepted, and homage is done to him as the future king of the gods. Then comes a detailed and most vivid picture of the preparations for the battle of Marduk with Tiāmat and of the battle itself. Marduk proves victor, and puts an end to Tiāmat. He then turns his attention to the gods in her train, overcomes these also, and makes them prisoners. In the same way he renders harmless the monsters she has created to assist her, and finally her husband Kingu suffers the same fate. Marduk then returns to the corpse of Tiāmat and cuts it in two parts, from which he fashions the heavens and the earth. Then follow the several acts of creation. Accounts have been discovered of the formation of the heavenly bodies, and, after a large gap, the beginning of an account of the creation of man. The whole concludes with a hymn to Marduk as the creator-god. It is worthy of note that this version of the Creation myth is clearly adapted to the position of Marduk as city-god of Babylon, the rôle of creator being ascribed to him, although in other versions and at other centres of worship it was filled by such gods as Anu, Enlil, or Ea. The creation of the world by Marduk forms at the same time the festal legend of the Babylonian New Year festival, the creation of the world being evidently paralleled with the annual reviving of nature in the spring. Alongside of this highly detailed version of the Creation myth we possess a shorter one, which, apart from a number of other marked variations, differs from the other particularly in this, that it knows nothing of the battle of Marduk with Tiāmat, but describes the world as arising—here also out of the ocean—without conflict, in quite a peaceful manner.

(*b*) While, as yet at least, we cannot prove the existence in Babylon of a so-called Paradise legend proper, we have in the myth of *Adapa* a story which seems intended to explain the mortality of man as opposed to the immortality of the gods. Adapa, a son of Ea, has received from his father a high degree of wisdom—hence his designation 'the superlatively prudent' (*Atrakhasīs*)—but not the gift of eternal life. On account of an act of violence committed by him, he is cited to appear before the throne of Anu, the god of heaven. Adapa here had the opportunity, by partaking of the food and water of life which Anu offered him, of acquiring immortality for himself. But, acting on a prior counsel of Ea, he rejected the offered gifts, and thus forfeited eternal life.

(*c*) Between the Creation and the Flood the Bab. mythical chronology, at least as we know it from Berossus,—the cuneiform originals supply as yet only sporadic traces,—interposes a list of *ten primeval kings*, of whom the hero of the Flood, Utnapishtim-Atrakhasīs (in Berossus, *Xisuthros*), is the last. The inscriptions hitherto have yielded no details concerning any of these kings except the seventh in Berossus' list, Evedoranchos. According to them, Enmeduranki—the native form of the name—was king in Sippar, the city of the sun-god Shamash. The latter adopted him as his associate, and taught him all the secrets of the soothsayer's art. Hence Enmeduranki was regarded by the Babylonians as the ancestor of the highly esteemed soothsaying priests.

(*d*) It is most likely the same *Atrakhasīs* as the hero of the legend of the Flood that meets us in another mythical story. This myth tells how all kinds of plague, blight, pestilence, famine, and sickness were sent upon men by Enlil, the lord of gods, on account of their constantly repeated transgressions. But Atrakhasīs, who also appears in this myth as a confidant of Ea, always succeeds by his intercession in securing the cessation of the judgment. The connexion of this with the Flood myth is probably that the Flood was thought of as the last great judgment of Enlil on men because of their continual relapses into sin—a judgment from which there was no escape except for Atrakhasīs himself.

(*e*) It is not so certain whether the myth of the destroying god *Ira* should be placed in the same category, *i.e.* among the judgments preceding the Flood. In this myth Ira's plenipotentiary, Ishum, at his command traverses all lands, and works a frightful carnage among men.

(*f*) The Bab. *Flood narrative*, like that of the Creation, was long known from the pages of Berossus. In the original recovered by the excavations, the story forms part of the Gilgamesh epic, although there are clear indications that it once existed independently. The chief features of the story are briefly as follows. The gods in solemn assembly determine to send a flood in order to punish men for their sins (this is plainly stated, at least at the close of the narrative). The god Ea, who had been present at the council, reveals this design to a protégé of his, Utnapishtim—also called *Atrakhasīs*, 'the superlatively prudent'—of the city of Shurippak, and commands him to build a ship for his safety, and to take living creatures of every kind with him into it. Utnapishtim carries out the command, builds his ship according to a scale supplied by the god, and introduces his family and relatives, as well as all kinds of animals, into it. Shortly before the beginning of the flood, whose advent had been previously indicated to him by a divine sign, he enters the ship himself and closes the door, entrusting the steersman with the guidance of the vessel. Early next morning the flood breaks forth, accompanied by violent storms and thick darkness. The gods themselves are afraid of the

flood, and ascend to heaven. The mother of the gods laments over the destruction of her human offspring, and repents having given her assent to the flood in the conclave of the gods. Six days and six nights the flood rages. But on the seventh day the sea is calm and the storm ceases. Utnapishtim opens an air-hole, and the light falls on his cheeks. Then land begins to appear, and the ship grounds on the mountain Niṣir. After seven days, Utnapishtim lets a dove fly from the ship. But she comes back because she finds no resting-place. The same happens with a swallow, which Utnapishtim next sets free. At last a raven, which was the third bird liberated, does not return, having settled down to feed. Then Utnapishtim brings out all that are in the ship, and offers a sacrifice, whose sweet smell the gods perceive with pleasure. Then follows a scene in which the mother of the gods and Ea wrangle with Enlil for having caused the flood. Enlil himself, however, is enraged that all men did not perish, and that one, Utnapishtim, with his family, has been saved. In the end, however, he changes his mind, and even endows Utnapishtim and his wife with the divine nature, and removes them to the realm far distant, to the 'estuary of the streams.'

We do not purpose here to discuss the real meaning of the Babylonian Flood myth—a subject on which the opinions of students are very much divided. We may say, however, that in all probability no actual historical occurrence is even reflected in it; it is more likely that we have to do with a nature myth whose background is formed by events in the daily and yearly course of the sun.

(*g*) The subject of the *Labbu myth* is the raging of a fabulous lion-like monster, allied with a mythical water-serpent, against men on the earth. After vain attempts on the part of other gods, one god finally succeeds in overcoming this lion (*labbu*), and thereby procures for himself divine supremacy, as Marduk did after his victory over Tiâmat.

(*h*) The *Zû myth* relates how the tablets of destiny, whose possession ensures the supreme power, were once stolen from Enlil by the storm-god Zû. Here, again, the supremacy is promised to whoever recovers the tablets from Zû. And, as in the case of Tiâmat and of Labbu, it happens that various gods make vain attempts till at last—for so we may complete the defective text—one of them is successful.

(*i*) The *Etana myth* has for its principal figure Etana, a primeval hero, who seems to be regarded as the founder of the kingship on earth. In order to bring about the happy birth of his son, who is to be the first king on earth, he applies, by the advice of Shamash, to the eagle for help to bring from heaven the medicinal herb which shall secure a safe delivery. Etana, seated upon the eagle, undertakes a journey, described with epic fulness of detail, to the highest heaven, to the throne of the queen of heaven, Ishtar, where the wonder-working plant is kept. But when he has almost reached his goal, Etana is overcome with fear, and drags the eagle down with him till both fall on the earth. Unfortunately, the conclusion is wanting, but presumably it was to the effect that the child, in spite of the deadly fall of Etana, came happily into the world and became the ruler of the land. The same myth further tells how this eagle, as an enemy of the serpent, once devoured its brood, in return for which the serpent plucked his wings and left him in a pitiable condition in a ditch. This event seems to have taken place before the flight to heaven with Etana; hence we may assume that, after his misfortune with the serpent, the eagle regained his lost powers.

(*j*) The myth of *Nergal and Eresh-kigal* tells how Nergal effected a violent entrance into the under world and threatened its goddess, Eresh-kigal, but afterwards became her husband and king of that realm. The visit of Nergal to the lower world was occasioned by a dispute, caused by Nergal, between Eresh-kigal and the gods of the upper world. In his passage he is accompanied by twice seven fever-demons.

(*k*) The following are the principal points in the so-called *Descent of Ishtar to Hades*. Ishtar, the daughter of Sin, directs her steps to the realm of the dead, which, so far as its appearance and inhabitants are concerned, is painted in the darkest colours. On arriving at the door of the realm of death, she imperiously demands entrance from the doorkeeper, and, on the command of Eresh-kigal, this is granted. At every one of the seven doors, however, an article of clothing is taken from her by the doorkeepers, so that finally she has to enter the kingdom of the dead perfectly naked. Here she is imprisoned by Namtaru, at the command of his mistress Eresh-kigal. Coincident with Ishtar's descent to the lower world, all sexual intercourse ceases on earth among both men and animals. In this extremity Ea interposes. He creates a messenger, Ṣitushunamir, and sends him to the under world, with the result that Eresh-kigal, although against her will, commands Namtaru to sprinkle Ishtar with 'water of life' and to lead her out through the seven doors of the under world, restoring her garments as she goes. The conclusion of the mythical narrative then refers, in a way as yet not very clearly understood, to Tammûz, the youthful husband of Ishtar, and his worship, which seems to be connected with the cult of the dead.

(*l*) The *Gilgamesh epic* is, so far as we can now judge, the most extensive epic poem of the Babylonians. It is specially rich in mythological matter, and hence, in spite of its being for the most part a heroic epic, its main contents deserve to be indicated here. The story is as follows. Gilgamesh is the ruler of the city of Uruk. His yoke rests heavily on the citizens. In answer to the prayer of the people of Uruk, the goddess Aruru creates Eabani in order that he may go on adventures with Gilgamesh. Eabani, a creature possessed of great strength of body and violent sensual desires, dwells at first in the steppes with the wild beasts. It is only by means of a variety of treacherous devices, among which the seductive arts of a prostitute play the chief rôle, that he can be prevailed upon to enter Uruk and become the companion of Gilgamesh. Together, the two make an expedition to the cedar mountain in the East, where dwells the goddess Ishtar—probably the city-goddess of Uruk, who had been carried off by the Elamites—guarded by the watchman Ḫumbaba. Their aim is to kill the watchman and obtain possession of Ishtar. After a fierce conflict, Gilgamesh and Eabani succeed in slaying Ḫumbaba. Ishtar then offers her love to the victorious Gilgamesh, who, however, repels her advances, because she has had many lovers and has always destroyed them. Highly incensed at this affront, Ishtar gets her father Anu to create the ox of heaven, and sends him against Gilgamesh to destroy him. But Gilgamesh and Eabani succeed in slaying the ox, and thereby rouse afresh the wrath of Ishtar, who is besides cruelly taunted by Eabani. It may be as a consequence of this conduct that we find Eabani attacked by severe sickness which ends in his death. Gilgamesh, deeply affected by the death of his comrade, hurries unresting over the steppes. His object is to seek in the far distance, at 'the estuary of the streams,' his deified ancestor, Utnapishtim—

also called Khasīsatra (Atrakhasīs), 'the superlatively wise'—the hero of the Flood. But the way is exceedingly difficult. First it leads through the uncultivated steppe, where lions have their dens; then it goes through the dark mountain Mashu, whose entrance is guarded by two terrible scorpion-like men, who only with difficulty allow him to pass. When he emerges on the other side of the mountain Mashu, Gilgamesh comes to a wonderful park of the gods, lying on the seashore, where the goddess Ṣabītu, covered with a veil, sits on the 'throne of the sea.' From her Gilgamesh receives directions as to the way to Utnapishtim, and is advised to apply to his boatman in the neighbourhood that he may ferry him over the sea and the 'water of death' to his great ancestor. Gilgamesh follows this counsel, finds the boatman, and after all kinds of adventures, especially in crossing the 'water of death,' he reaches Utnapishtim. That hero imparts to the new arrival instruction regarding the meaning of human life, and, at his request, gives him a detailed account of the Flood and of his own translation to his present dwelling-place at the close of the Flood. It is, in fact, the Babylonian account of the Deluge, shortly sketched above, which is here interwoven as an episode into the Gilgamesh epic. At the close of this narrative, Utnapishtim and his wife have recourse to all kinds of magic manipulations, in order to assist their guest to 'life,' but only with very imperfect success. By direction of Utnapishtim, the boatman then causes Gilgamesh to bathe at the place of purification, and thereafter embarks with him to restore him to his home. Gilgamesh luckily finds in the deep waters a wonder-working plant mentioned by Utnapishtim, to which he gives the name 'when grey-haired, the man becomes young again.' This he intends to take with him to Uruk, to eat it, and to return to the condition of youth. But on the way the wondrous plant is snatched from him by a serpent. Great lamentation follows. Finally, along with the boatman, he reaches Uruk, but without the plant. The conclusion of the epic then relates how Gilgamesh, by means of necromancy, enters into communication with the spirit of his dead friend Eabani, and obtains information from him regarding the nature of the realm of the dead.

4. The realm of the dead and belief in a future life.—The ideas of the Babylonians regarding a life after death are to be discovered from various passages in the mythological literature containing descriptions of the realm of the dead: *e.g.* the Descent of Ishtar to Hades, the IInd, Xth, and XIIth tablets of the Gilgamesh epic, the myth of Nergal and Eresh-kigal, and a variety of sporadic passages. On the other hand, certain pictorial representations, the so-called Hades reliefs, which were formerly regarded as pictures of funeral rites and of the Babylonian hell, cannot, according to later investigation, be viewed in this light. The Bab. realm of the dead is depicted in the above passages as a dark place under the surface of the earth, full of dust, wherein the dead, clothed in winged raiment, spend a shadowy existence, having the dust of the earth as their food. The approach to this home of the dead appears to be situated in the western region of the earth, and is effected through seven gates, and therefore seven walls. The entrance is guarded by sentinels. The fate of the dead in the lower world seems to vary according to the way in which they passed from life—those, for instance, who fell in battle obtain a relatively endurable lot (drinking pure water)—or according to the degree in which they are provided with offerings by surviving relatives. The worst fate, according to Bab. notions, that could befall a dead person was to remain unburied. The judgment, too, which the *Anunnaki* pronounced at the entrance of a dead man into the under world no doubt determined largely the conditions of his sojourn there. The ruler of the realm of the dead is the goddess Eresh-kigal, also called Allatu, who is enthroned in a palace as queen. Her husband appears sometimes as Nergal and again as Ninazu. To her retinue belong also Bēlit-ṣēri, the great recorderess of the under world, and Namtaru, the attendant of Eresh-kigal, who carries out her commands. In this place of the departed there is also to be found a spring of 'the water of life,' which seems to be under the control of the *Anunnaki*. The fate of the dead in the under world seems, according to Bab. conceptions, to have been unalterable and permanent. Thus far, at all events, no certain traces have been found in the Bab. literature of any belief in a general resurrection or in the transmigration of souls. The deification of the kings in the old Bab. period—partially during their lifetime and especially after their death—is to be otherwise interpreted, and proves nothing regarding a belief in a general resurrection.

The cult of the dead had an important place in Babylonia and Assyria, although not nearly to the same extent as in Egypt. Among its rites were the arranging of the obsequies, coupled with the appropriate funeral dirge and the usual mourning ceremonies, as well as the regular provision of food and drink as offerings to the departed. The method of disposing of the corpse was always, at least in the historic period (as we learn from the inscriptions and the excavations), that of burial; and all kinds of ornaments and utensils accompanied the body into the grave.

5. Soothsaying and exorcism. — Soothsaying and exorcism in their various forms play a very large rôle in the Bab. religion. Both of these arts were not merely practised unofficially, but formed an important part of the official State religion. Thus in all the inscriptions of the Bab. and Assyr. kings, from the earliest to the latest date, we read of their having recourse to the soothsayer and exorcist at every critical moment of their undertakings as well as in connexion with all important religious ceremonies. This accounts for the high esteem which was always enjoyed by the priestly soothsayer and the priestly exorcist in Babylonia and Assyria. For the same reason the texts relating to soothsaying and exorcism are so exceedingly numerous as to form the chief component of the whole Bab. religious literature.

The principal spheres from which the soothsayer drew his omens were the heavens—particularly solar, lunar, and planetary phenomena—and entrails—particularly the liver of sheep offered in sacrifice. Thus, astrology on the one hand and examination of livers on the other could almost be described as the characteristic features of Bab. soothsaying. There were, however, numerous other phenomena from which omens were obtained. Thus, even as early as the Ḥammurabi period, we have texts relating to hydromancy. There are also numerous instances of soothsaying from dreams, from the action of animals of all kinds, especially from the flight of birds, from unnatural phenomena such as monstrous births — human or animal, — from atmospheric changes, and so on. The copious Bab. literature on the subject consists of exhaustive catechism-like text-books for the soothsaying priests. All possible occurrences are casuistically stated, and their various interpretations given, according to a scheme such as the following: 'If such and such is the condition of the liver of the sheep, then the king (or the land) will have such and such an experience (happy or otherwise).' Inscribed clay models of sheep livers, of which only two specimens have as yet been discovered, were

even used to educate in this kind of soothsaying. There have also come down to us very minute instructions regarding the ritual to be observed in practising the art in question. The patron of the soothsaying priests was Shamash, although Adad's name is frequently coupled with his as occupying a secondary place.

From a religious point of view a much higher stage than this act of soothsaying in the narrower sense exhibits is to be found in oracular responses of a comforting and encouraging character, which were given by priests and especially by priestesses, in the name of the deity. But the extant literature belonging to this department cannot with certainty be dated earlier than the 7th cent., the time of Esarhaddon and Ashurbanipal.

The art of exorcism occupies a similarly important place in the Assyro-Babylonian religion. The priest-exorcist found his sphere of work especially in cases of sickness, where the function of the physician was only gradually evolved from that of the exorcist. It was the duty of the latter to remove the ban which was supposed to lie on the sick person, and to drive out the hostile demons who had presumably caused the trouble. But in addition to cases of actual sickness, the exorcist was called in whenever there was any suspicion of enchantment by evil demons or human beings—witches and wizards—who were conceived to act as the instruments of demons. In the same way it fell to the exorcist to assist at all kinds of ceremonial actions, such as the consecration of temples, the erection of pictures of the gods, etc., and also at the worship of the dead—in short, on every occasion on which men believed they had to fear the interposition of hostile divine powers, and where accordingly the exorcist by means of his charms would be able to counteract the activity of evil spirits. The means used by the exorcist in the ritual consisted, in the first place, in the repetition of incantations, a huge mass of which have been handed down to us in the Babylonian and Assyrian literatures. In addition, there were a great many ritual actions, such as sprinkling with water, smearing the body of the patient, the practice of symbolic ceremonies such as the burning of all kinds of objects, and the like. An important rôle was played also by the penitent who was the subject of exorcism. He had to take a multiform part in the whole proceeding, by recitation and various other actions, such as casting himself on the ground, kneeling, etc. As in the case of soothsaying so in the service of exorcism, an extremely complicated ritual was in use, of which we possess extensive fragments in the form of texts relating to liturgical arrangements. Ea and Marduk appear as the chief gods of the exorcist cult. Eridu, the seat of Ea's worship, is regarded as the home of the rites of exorcism.

6. **Hymns and prayers.**—The Bab. hymns and prayers to the gods reach a much higher religious level than the extensive literature of soothsaying and exorcism. Here again a large literature is at our disposal, although much of it is unfortunately as yet in a very fragmentary condition. This hymn-literature, as we are now able to prove from identical copies belonging to the old Bab. period, emanated preponderatingly from this very early date. From that time they were handed down with little variation, through thousands of years, to the latest times of the cuneiform inscriptions. We obtain from these hymns valuable insight into the religious ideas of the earliest Babylonian period. On the other hand, they can hardly be used as sources for the knowledge of the Assyro-Babylonian religion of the later epochs. For this we have rather to take account of the prayers and hymn-like invocations which are frequently introduced in the royal inscriptions of Bab. and Assyr. rulers, and whose date can thus be exactly fixed. It must also be noted that the Babylonian hymnology, so far as yet known, is almost exclusively of a liturgical character. Further, by far the greater number of the hymns in question belong to the ritual of exorcism, although the connexion of a hymn with this cult must often have been only secondary. As to form, the Bab. hymns are, as was to be expected, characterized by a strongly marked rhythm. This strikes the eye at once from the fact that the verses each occupy a separate line, and often half-verses are indicated by the writing being in columns. The same impression is made on the eye by the frequent combination of two verses into a double verse. Similar phenomena are found in the other poetical literature of the Babylonians, in the myths, epics, incantations, etc.

Most of the liturgical pieces, so far as they are not formulæ for exorcism, consist of festal hymns in honour of a god or goddess. These were sung by the priests or priestesses on the particular feast days, and were intended for the glorification of a particular deity—often through the description of his exploits as portrayed in the myths. Thus we possess a series of New Year hymns, which were intended to be sung at the New Year festival, Marduk's festival in the spring. So there are a number of hymns to Tammūz, which no doubt were used especially on the occasions of the weeping for Tammūz and the rejoicing for his return. In the case of many other hymns, such, for instance, as those to Sin, Shamash, or Ishtar, there is little doubt that these also were intended mainly for festivals in honour of these deities. On the other hand, the numerous incantation hymns, as is at once indicated through their frequent introduction into the exorcistic liturgies, were destined for the mouth either of the priest or of the penitent, to be employed for purposes of exorcism. These incantation formulæ, like the act of exorcism itself, exhibit a fixed type, the different successive acts of the ritual finding expression in the hymn, now in a shorter and now in a longer form. In the case of the priest we have the recitation of his credentials, the description of the action of the demon, the praise of the god who overcomes the hostile demon, and finally the act of exorcism proper. In the case of the penitent, there is the confession of sin, the singing of a lament, the repetition of a penitential litany, and, finally, the offering of a prayer of thanksgiving, and the singing of a hymn of praise for the divine help received. So far as their contents are concerned, we constantly encounter, alike in the festal hymns and the incantation formulæ, the most elevated religious and ethical conceptions to be met with in the whole Babylonian literature.

7. **Temples, priests, sacrifices, rites, festivals.**—The inscriptions, from the earliest to the latest period, all go to show how numerous were the *temples* which the Babylonians and Assyrians erected for the worship of their gods. Not only had every city-god his chief sanctuary at his special seat of worship, but also all the gods belonging to the same group with him, as well as a multitude of gods outside it, had temples erected for their worship, at least in all the larger cities. The structural plan of the Babylonian temple can to a certain extent be gathered from the numerous inscriptions of Bab. and Assyr. kings relating to temples built by them. Lately our information has been extended by the discoveries in Nippur, Babylon, and Ashshur, where a number of ground-plans have been unearthed. Allowing for all kinds of variations in detail, the general type of building seems to have been as follows. A large rectangular

court, approached through a smaller fore-court, occupied the principal space. At the end farthest from the entrance there was a small sanctuary, the most holy place of the temple, where the image of the god was set up. At the sides of the great hall there were to be found a variety of side-chambers, used for keeping the temple-vessels, and as apartments for the priests. The temple proper had attached to it a storeyed tower (*ziqqurat*) rising from a square foundation. This tower was regarded as specially sacred, and bore a special name. Like the temple as a whole, the tower in particular was looked on as an earthly copy of the world-structure, which was also conceived as of storeyed form. The tower seems also to have been frequently looked on as the 'grave' of the god to whom the temple belonged. The names of the temples and temple-towers belong almost exclusively to the old sacred Sumerian language —an indication of the influence which ideas originally Sumerian continued to exert on the Bab. cult. We must note also a very important part that was played by the temples in the great cities such as Babylon, Nippur, and Sippar, altogether apart from the religious sphere. Owing to their possession of extensive lands and their wealth derived from other sources, they were a determining factor in the economic life of Babylon, becoming to a large extent centres of trade. Proof of this is found in the numerous commercial contracts, belonging to the earliest as well as the latest period, which have been discovered in the temple archives.

In view of the important place which religion occupied in the life of the Babylonians and Assyrians, the prestige and power of the *priests* were at all periods naturally very great. Whenever any of the kings, as, *e.g.*, Sennacherib, attempted to free himself from the tyranny of the priesthood, his action simply recoiled upon himself, and a reaction always set in which only intensified the power of the priests. The subdivisions of the priesthood were many, as is sufficiently evidenced by the great variety of designations applied to them. A specially important place was held by the priestly soothsayers and the exorcists or propitiatory priests, whose functions have been dealt with in the foregoing section on 'Soothsaying and exorcism.' A peculiar position was occupied also by the priestly musicians, whose duty it was to sing the hymns in the performance of the cult. For each of these separate classes of priests there were special ritual instructions, which are still partially extant. These give most minute directions regarding the separate functions of the priests in the various acts of worship. The different classes of priests also formed among themselves exclusive bodies with their own traditions. In this connexion the gild of soothsayers was specially exclusive, the office descending from father to son, and very strict rules being laid down as to physical condition as a qualification for priestly service. Similar, though presumably not quite so stringent, regulations would apply to other priestly gilds. The fact that the arts of reading and writing, and indeed every branch of knowledge, were in the hands of the priests, readily explains why in the Bab. literature almost every subject is looked at from the point of view of religion and priestly wisdom. This knowledge as well as acquaintance with writing and literature—in Babylonia no easy attainment—were communicated esoterically in the priestly schools, where successive generations of priests underwent long years of instruction. Of this we have abundant evidence through our possession of the actual tablets used in this training. Priestesses are also repeatedly to be met with in Babylonia, especially in connexion with the cult of Ishtar; but women make their appearance in the cult more especially as discharging the function of *hierodouloi* or temple-prostitutes.

At all periods of the Assyro-Babylonian religion the *sacrificial system* was extensive and multiform. Much can be gathered about Bab. sacrificial customs not only from numerous notices in the inscriptions, but also from pictorial representations of sacrificial scenes. Very frequently the sacrifice is regarded, quite in accordance with its original idea, as a gift, supplying the god with food or drink, or (in the case of the 'incense'-offering) causing him to smell a sweet odour. But in other passages the idea clearly emerges that the animal sacrifice is a substitute for a human sacrifice that would otherwise have to be offered to the gods. At the same time, there is not any certain trace of actual human sacrifice either in the literature or in the pictorial representations. The offerings came to be regarded to a large extent as simply a temple-due, and as means of support for the numerous priests. The materials of the bloodless offerings were chiefly bread, wine, water, mead, honey, butter, milk, oil, grain, and fruit. The animal sacrifices usually consisted of oxen and sheep, but other domestic animals were also offered, as well as fowls and fish, and even wild animals. For the 'incense'-offering cedar and cypress wood, and flour, cane, and myrtle were used. In the case of the animal sacrifices, definite parts were reserved for the god, while other parts became the portion of the priests. Strangely enough, the blood of the sacrificial victim does not seem to have played any conspicuous part in the Bab. ritual. In addition to the offerings proper, it was customary at all periods of Bab. antiquity to bring the most varied gifts to the temple as votive offerings.

Side by side with sacrifices and votive offerings, there was a great variety of other *rites* in the Bab. religion. Among these an important place is held by the propitiatory rites practised by the exorcizing priests, who have been referred to in the section on 'Soothsaying and exorcism.' Then we have also the mourning customs connected with the cult of the dead. These included such practices as the beating of the thigh and the breast, the plucking out of the beard, and the mutilation of the body by means of knives. The supreme occasions of the cult were naturally *the festivals*. Of these by far the most prominent was the Babylonian New Year festival. This feast was in earlier times held in honour of other gods. But when the Marduk-cult of the capital, Babylon, came to the forefront, the New Year feast became at once the chief festival of Marduk and the greatest and most important festival in the Bab. calendar. It was celebrated on the first days of the month Nisan, at the time of the spring equinox. One feature of it was a procession, in which the image of Marduk was taken in a gorgeously equipped ship-car along the festal street from his temple, E-sagilā, to the house of the New Year festival, and thence back to his temple. Neighbouring towns also brought the images of their gods to Babylon to join in this procession. At the time of the festival the gods were supposed to sit in solemn conclave, under the presidency of Marduk, in the chamber of destiny, in order to determine the fates for the coming year. Among other festivals mentioned in the Bab. literature, a special place belongs to the lament for Tammūz in midsummer, in the month called after him. Prominent also is the feast of Ishtar in the following month, Ab. Among the days of each month the 7th, 14th, 21st, 28th, and also the 19th were supposed to be specially unlucky, and therefore there was a general suspension of business on these days.

GENERAL REMARKS ON THE CHARACTER OF THE BABYLONIAN RELIGION.—It is very difficult to form a just estimate of the value and relative standing of Babylonian religious thought. This is due to the fact that we are for the most part dependent on official documents, such as royal inscriptions, liturgical collections, etc.; we have very few documents of a private and individual nature which would give us actual insight into the religious ideas which the people connected with the external and traditional ritual forms and doctrines. But we may regard it as practically certain that in course of time, even when external religious forms were retained unaltered, the mental attitude towards them underwent important changes. This may be assumed, in particular, for the later Assyrian and the New Bab. period, and it finds support in isolated expressions in the inscriptions. Again, it is difficult to judge whether, and to what extent, there existed a simple unquestioning piety among the people, alongside of the learning and partially conscious deception of the priestly speculations. The presence among the Babylonians of this simple piety, a child-like trust in the divine help in all situations of life, is proved—and that even in the earliest period—by many deeply religious passages in the hymns and prayers, as well as by other indications, *e.g.* the religious ideas which find expression in the formation of Bab. proper names. The religious sense of the Babylonians admittedly never rose beyond a certain limit. They never attained to a stage at all corresponding to the ethical monotheism of the Hebrew prophets, or even the ethically elevated Ahura Mazda religion of the Persians. A purer development of the nobler germs present in the Babylonian religion was hampered by the strong predominance of the magical and superstitious element, which at all periods played so great a part in it. At the same time, the Babylonian religion is a historical factor whose importance in its own genus must be fully recognized. Even the strong emphasis laid on the astral element led, in movements historically connected with it, to many pure and elevated ideas, if also to much that was abstruse and superstitious.

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II. *ON SPECIAL POINTS.*—In addition to the general accounts contained in the works just cited, cf. the following (omitting works which consist exclusively of editions of the original texts):

(*a*) *Myths and Epics*: P. Jensen, 'Assyr.-bab. Mythen und Epen,' Berlin, 1900 (*KIB* vi. 1); L. W. King, *The Seven Tablets of Creation*, 2 vols., London, 1902; F. Hrozný, 'Sumer.-bab. Mythen von dem Gotte Ninrag (Ninib),' Berlin, 1903 (*Mitteil. der vorderas. Gesellschaft*, viii. 5); P. Dhorme, *Choix de textes rel. assyr.-bab.*, Paris, 1907.

(*b*) *Realm of the dead and belief in a future life*: A. Jeremias, *Die bab.-assyr. Vorstellungen vom Leben nach dem Tode*, Leipzig, 1887, also 'Hölle und Paradies bei den Babyloniern'[2], Leipzig, 1903 (*Der Alte Orient*, i. 3).

(*c*) *Soothsaying and Exorcism*: K. Tallqvist, *Die Assyr. Beschwörungsserie Maqlû*, Leipzig, 1895; H. Zimmern, 'Die Beschwörungstafeln "Shurpu",' in his *Beiträge zur Kenntnis der bab. Rel.* (i.), Leipzig, 1896; J. A. Knudtzon, *Assyr. Gebete an den Sonnengott*, Leipzig, 1893; R. C. Thompson, *The Devils and Evil Spirits of Babylonia*, 2 vols., London, 1903–1904, also *The Reports of the Magicians and Astrologers of Nineveh and Babylon*, 2 vols., London, 1900; J. Hunger, *Becherwahrsagung bei den Babyloniern*, Leipzig, 1903; D. W. Myhrman, 'Die Labartu-Texte,' in *ZA* xvi., 1902; A. Boissier, *Choix de textes relatifs à la divination assyr.-bab.*, 2 vols., Geneva, 1905–1906; F. Küchler, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis der assyr.-babylonischen Medizin*, Leipzig, 1904; C. Virolleaud, *L'astrologie chaldéenne*, Paris, 1903 ff.; C. Fossey, *La magie assyrienne*, Paris, 1902; K. Frank, *Bab. Beschwörungsreliefs*, Leipzig, 1908.

(*d*) *Hymns and Prayers*: H. Zimmern, *Bab. Busspsalmen*, Leipzig, 1885, also 'Bab. Hymnen u. Gebete in Auswahl,' Leipzig, 1905 (*Der Alte Orient*, vii. 3), and 'Sumer.-bab. Tamûzlieder,' Leipzig, 1907 (*SSGW*, philol.-histor. Klasse, lix. 4); L. W. King, *Bab. Magic and Sorcery*, London, 1896; F. Hehn, 'Hymnen und Gebete an Marduk,' in *Beiträge zur Assyriologie*, v. 3, 1905; J. Böllenrücher, *Gebete und Hymnen an Nergal*, Leipzig, 1904; E. G. Perry, *Hymnen und Gebete an Sin*, Leipzig, 1907; Et. Combe, *Hist. du culte de Sin*, Paris, 1908; S. Langdon, *Sumerian and Bab. Psalms*, Paris, 1909.

(*e*) *Rites, Festivals, etc.*: H. Zimmern, 'Ritualtafeln für den Wahrsager, Beschwörer und Sänger,' in his *Beiträge zur Kenntnis der bab. Rel.*, ii., Leipzig, 1901, also 'Zum bab. Neujahrsfest,' Leipzig, 1906 (*SSGW*, philol.-histor. Klasse, lviii. 3); W. Schrank, *Bab. Sühnriten*, Leipzig, 1908; J. Morgenstern, 'The Doctrine of Sin in the Bab. Religion,' Berlin, 1905 (*Mitteil. der vorderas. Gesellschaft*, x. 3).

(*f*) *Miscellaneous*: F. Martin, *Textes religieux assyr. et bab.*, Paris, 1900, 1903; E. Behrens, *Assyr.-bab. Briefe kultischen Inhalts aus der Sargonidenzeit*, Leipzig, 1906; K. Frank, *Bilder und Symbole bab.-assyr. Götter*, Leipzig, 1906; J. Hehn, *Siebenzahl und Sabbat bei den Babyloniern und im AT*, Leipzig, 1907.

H. ZIMMERN.

BACKSLIDING.—A falling from grace after identification with religion, a reversion to sin and worldly ways after conversion, or a return to old habits after reformation. The term historically has several times shifted the centre of weight of meaning. One can distinguish perhaps four different qualities of interpretation, although the various meanings will much overlap. (1) The first is that before it acquired any special technical significance. This applies, for example, to the use of 'backsliding' (מְשׁוּבָה) in the OT, although the more special sense is recognized in the numerous Scripture precepts to constancy, and in such examples as Saul, Judas, and Demas. Our Lord predicts times of falling away in times of trial (Mt 24[10. 12]) and the First Epistle of John and the Epistle to the Hebrews are full of warnings against the same danger. During early Christian centuries the fact of backsliding was also fully appreciated, but the content of the term had its discussion chiefly under the heading of 'apostasy' (*q.v.*), or of 'perseverance' (*q.v.*).

(2) The second stage in its use was that in which it assumed a theological meaning. It was at the time of and following the Calvinist and Arminian controversy that the distinctly practical human interest in the idea was drafted off in the direction of speculative theology. If the salvation of the elect is foreordained, how can it be otherwise than that the chosen of the Lord shall persevere to the end? The Arminians said, however, that if the will of man is in any sense free, if the unction of the gospel has any significance, and if the efforts of the righteous have any value, there must be not only the possibility, but the danger of falling away. The Arminians busied themselves in explaining away such passages as Ro 8[28-30], which formulate a doctrine of predestination and election, and in softening the 'impossibility of repentance' on the part of those who 'fall away,' as presented in He 6[4-6] (cf., *e.g.*, Tillotson, *Works* [London, 1820], vi. 65 ff.). It is an interesting fact that Calvinists have been almost as diligent in preaching the need

of perseverance as have the Arminians. Jonathan Edwards, for example, writes:

'As persons are commanded and counselled to repent and be converted, though it is already determined whether they shall be converted or no; after the same manner, and with the same propriety, persons are commanded and counselled to persevere, although by their being already converted, it is certain that they shall persevere. By their resolutely and steadfastly persevering through all difficulties, opposition, and trials, they obtain an evidence of the truth and soundness of their conversion; and by their unstableness and backsliding, they procure an evidence of their unsoundness and hypocrisy' (*Works*, N.Y. 1880, vol. vii. p. 483).

(3) Another change in meaning was that in which the idea assumed an evangelistic flavour. After pronounced conversions came to receive a high degree of emphasis among Protestants as the desirable, if not the only, method of regeneration, the danger of backsliding came to be accepted as a matter of course, and was made the subject of the most zealous admonitions and sermons (cf. Baxter, *Works* [London, 1830], iv. 351–371). The need of a 'renewal' after backsliding was a common experience, and the frequency of such an occurrence may be regarded as the occasion of the formulation of the notion of the 'second experience' or 'sanctification' (*q.v.*).

(4) Later there has arisen the psychological interpretation of the term. Even at the height of the evangelical interest in the question, say during the first half of the nineteenth century, the groundwork was being laid for an explanation of the lapses from the lively experiences at the inception of the religious life. Among the causes of backsliding usually specified in treatises and theological dictionaries were: 'the cares of the world, improper connexions, inattention to secret and closet duties, self-conceit and dependence, indolence and listening to and parleying with temptations.' As early as 1835 there was published a novel in Boston, entitled *The Backslider*, the chief point of which seems to have been to show the differences in the temperamental and other characteristics of the hero and heroine of the tale, which would account for the constancy of the one and the backsliding of the other; and a reviewer in the *Christian Register* [1836], vol. ii. pp. 198–206) expresses the conviction that we shall 'succeed in the attempt to arrange the present multifarious mass of mental phenomena, and evolve the first principles to which they must all be referable,' as is being done in the material sciences; and he appeals by analogy to the success of Mr. Louis in the investigation of the causes and conditions of diseases. Recently, something of a study has been made, of a statistical and psychological character, upon backsliding (see Starbuck, *Psychology of Religion*, 1899, pp. 354–391).

It appears that nearly all persons who experience conversion are sooner or later beset with difficulties. When the character of these difficulties is catalogued, they are clearly the same in kind, essentially, as those which ordinarily belong to adolescent development when not attended with conversion. It is worthy of note that the frequency of troubles is slightly greater among those who have undergone conversion than among the others. One may look for the cause of this difference in several directions. In the first place, those who experience conversion are more open to suggestion and more impressionable, and accordingly more liable to have mental crises. Their emotional difficulties predominate, while intellectual doubts and questionings are more common among those whose growth is not attended by conversion. The difference seems to be due in part, likewise, to the fact that at conversion the ideal life and the past life are brought into definite conflict. There is a sharper cleavage between the higher and lower selves; an ideal is established which is more difficult to attain because of its great incongruity with the old life. The person is suddenly expected to identify himself with the conventional ways of the Churches, which are at variance with his usual habits of life. It seems natural, if these causes obtain, that the conflict and friction in the adjustment of life to the new standard should be greater in the case of the conversion type.

Still another cause of backsliding is the persistence of old habits which for the time have lost their force, and are hidden from view in the presence of new lines of activity. When, after a time, the newly-acquired enthusiasm has partially spent itself, the old habits re-assert themselves. The difficulties usually continue until there is formed a new set of neural habits which correspond to the conduct of life on the spiritual plane, and have become so deeply ingrained that life expresses itself naturally and easily through them.

A very central condition underlying backsliding seems to be found in the natural tendency of human interests to ebb and flow. Nervous energy, when directed vigorously in a certain way, completely expends itself, and must then have a period of recuperation. Rhythms in the supply of available energy are fully recognized, as is shown in experiments upon continuous muscular activity, in the rise and fall of the wave of attention when focused upon a continuous object, in the successive presence and absence of a stimulus on the threshold of sensation, and in many like phenomena. It is observable in the spells of depression that follow an exceptionally busy day, and in subnormal temperatures following fever. Persons very active in religious matters are apt to have ups and downs in their degree of religious enthusiasm. Those have been found who have experienced wave-like fluctuations of religious interest at pretty regular intervals. If a rhythmical flow of energy is a law of life, it should be expected that, following the great enthusiasm attendant upon conversion, there should be a decline.

The rise and fall of religious feelings may sometimes be the attendant of other natural rhythms. One person reports that during five successive years he was awakened to a religious enthusiasm during the winter, which declined during the summer; and many other similar, though less striking, instances are on record. It has been ascertained by Malling-Hausen that physical growth is accelerated during the autumn months and retarded from April to July. The rise and fall of religious feeling may be conditioned somewhat by the rate of the metabolisms going on in the organism at different times of the year. It is an interesting coincidence that religious revivals are held most commonly during the winter.

There is a distinction between backsliding in so far as it affects the will-attitudes and that which centres in a fluctuation of warmth of feeling. While there are many instances of the former, due, perhaps, to the re-assertion of old habitual modes of reaction, the analysis of religious confessions shows another type, in whom the changed attitude towards life brought about through conversion is fairly constant, in spite of the fact that the intensity of their religious ardour suffers a decline. Their real religious status seems not to be affected even while they are inactive in the direction of the new life. These would seem to require a different spiritual regimen from those who backslide in the former sense.

The point of greatest practical significance, perhaps, in respect of the post-conversion experience, is that the new insight or mode of conduct, however genuine it may be, must, in order to be permanent, become so incorporated into a new set of neural habits that the new life may be as natural and spontaneous as the old. The former

type of life which is still structurally a part of consciousness, must either be refined and co-ordinated with the new, or the newly acquired spiritual selfhood become so persistent and constant as to draft off the available energy and so cast out the evil with the good.

LITERATURE. — Tillotson, *Works*, London, 1820, vi. 65 ff.; Calvin, *Institutes*, bk. iii. ch. 23; Wesley, *Works*, vi. 50 ff.; Edwards, *Works*, New York, 1830, vii. 483 ff.; Baxter, *Works*, London, 1830, iv. 351–371; Starbuck, *The Psychology of Religion*, London, 1899, pp. 354–391; William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, New York and London, 1902; J. B. Pratt, *The Psychology of Religious Belief*, New York, 1907.

EDWIN D. STARBUCK.

BACON, FRANCIS. — **1. Life.** — The second greatest of the stars that shed their brilliance upon Elizabethan England,—great both in power and achievement within his chosen field of speculation,—Francis Bacon has left a name that is a byword among popular moralists. Conscious of failure in his own time, he trusted his name and memory 'to men's charitable speeches, to foreign nations, and the next ages,' but the stain of his deeds, or of his omissions, has not yet allowed the splendour of his intellect to be clearly seen and understood.

He was born in London on the 22nd of January 1561, his father, Sir Nicholas Bacon, being then Lord Keeper to Queen Elizabeth. His mother, second wife of Sir Nicholas, was a sister of the wife of Sir William Cecil, afterwards Lord Burghley, the Queen's chief minister. His father had the gifts of humour, audacity, and duplicity essential to success at Elizabeth's court; his mother possessed a classical training and resultant taste, which were grafted upon a rigid Calvinism in religion. Some trace of all of these influences may be found in the character and attainments of the son. At the age of twelve, Francis Bacon entered Trinity College, Cambridge, of which Whitgift, the future 'moderate' Archbishop, was the head. He remained till he was almost fifteen (Christmas 1575), forming at the time a boyish disapproval of Aristotle's philosophy, which was afterwards gravely recorded. In 1576 he became a member of the Society of Gray's Inn, being destined no doubt for political office, to be secured through the profession of the Law. From 1576 to 1579 he was in the retinue of Sir Amyas Paulet, Ambassador of the Queen to France, but was summoned home on the sudden death of his father in the latter year. Dean Church dates from this event, and the immediate downfall of his reasonable hopes which it occasioned, the deterioration of Bacon's character. At any rate he began soon afterwards the series of canvassing, importuning, obsequious, and servile letters to his relatives and others, asking for promotion or help, which are so pitiful to read, as coming from one so nobly endowed. He entered into residence at Gray's Inn, became an 'Utter Barrister' in 1582, and a 'Bencher' (which gave him the right to practise) in 1586. Meantime he had entered Parliament as member for Melcombe Regis in 1584, and in subsequent Parliaments he sat successively for Taunton, Liverpool, and Middlesex. He became one of the foremost speakers of the day, and one of the most eloquent, according to the well-known description of Ben Jonson: 'There happened in my time one noble speaker who was full of gravity in his speaking. His language, when he could spare or pass by a jest, was nobly censorious. No man ever spoke more neatly, more pressly, more weightily, or suffered less emptiness, less idleness, in what he uttered. No member of his speech but consisted of his own graces. . . . The fear of every man that heard him was lest he should make an end' (Ben Jonson, *Timber or Discoveries*, ed. Schelling, p. 30).

In politics, both in the reign of Elizabeth and in that of her successor, he supported the supremacy of the *personal* authority of the sovereign, but urged, wherever possible, toleration and moderate reform. In 1591 he made the acquaintance of the Earl of Essex, a young favourite of the Queen, between whom and Bacon a strong friendship speedily grew up. In 1593, Bacon's action in the House of Commons upon the Subsidy Bill, which he opposed for good reasons, brought him into disfavour with the Queen. Although he did not recant his opinion, Bacon prostrated himself at the feet of the Queen and her Minister, but beyond his recognition as one of the Counsel to the Crown, he did not either then or during the Queen's lifetime receive any public appointment. His uncle seems to have looked with distrust upon his brilliant abilities, and may have feared him as a rival to his own son (and successor), Sir Robert Cecil. Queen Elizabeth herself, it is recorded, said of him that he had 'a great wit, and an excellent gift of speech, and much other good learning, but in law thought he could rather show to the uttermost of his knowledge, than that he was deep' (Spedding, *Letters and Life of Bacon*, vol. i. p. 297). His share in the trial and condemnation of Essex will always remain a blot upon his character, however many the extenuating circumstances that may be urged. To strengthen his waning authority with the Queen, Essex obtained the appointment of Commander-in-Chief in Ireland for himself. He failed lamentably and utterly, and returned to face his 'enemies' at Court, after being expressly forbidden to leave his post. Placed under arrest, but afterwards released, he entered into a plot to seize the Queen's person, control the appointment of her ministers, and, above all, force the nomination of her successor. The rash attempt, foolishly conceived and recklessly begun, might have had the gravest consequences. Essex was (along with the conspirators) arrested, arraigned for high treason, condemned and executed (1601). Bacon, as Counsel to the Crown, was one of those selected to carry out the preliminary examination, and he took active part in the trial—to the prejudice of the prisoner's chances. Essex being a popular hero, it was necessary to justify his execution, and Bacon was entrusted with the task of blackening the memory of his friend and benefactor. It is true that Bacon was bound, and had always professed, to place the service of his Queen and country above that of his friend; and, as it has been pointed out, it is difficult to see at what stage he could either honourably, or even safely, have withheld his services. One can only regret that he showed himself so zealous. Perhaps he could not, and should not, have saved the life of Essex, but he need not have lent a hand in vilifying his name.

After the death of the Queen and the accession of James in 1603, Bacon rapidly rose in honour and position. He married the daughter of an alderman, with a good dowry, in 1606, became Solicitor-General in 1607, Attorney-General in 1613, and Lord Keeper (a title which was soon exchanged for the higher one of Lord Chancellor) in March 1616–17. When he was Attorney-General there occurred the famous Peacham case, of which Macaulay has made unscrupulous use against Bacon. The discovery of a sermon, evidently intended for publication, and containing treasonable language, suggested a conspiracy, and it was decided to apply torture to Peacham in order to elicit the names of his fellow-conspirators. The warrant was signed by the Archbishop of Canterbury and by leading members of the Lords and of the Commons. Bacon, as Attorney-General, attended the examination, but cannot by any stretch of the imagination be held responsible for it. It was one of the last occasions on which torture was applied in England; Bacon, however, was not, in this matter, in advance of his time. Another of the unpopular cases in which Bacon, owing to his position, was involved, was that of the trial and execution of Sir Walter Raleigh (1618) after his worse than foolish expedition to South America.

The real evil of his life, however, now as ever, was his subservience, sometimes immoral, and always mean, to the great men of the day, who under King James were invariably selfish, grasping, regardless of popular rights and even of the common virtues of life. Buckingham, whom Bacon allowed to intervene in the Courts and to influence the judges, is the most conspicuous instance. Bacon, who had been knighted in 1603, was in 1618 made Baron Verulam, and in January 1620–21 Viscount St. Albans.

But at the very moment when fortune seemed to smile most sweetly upon him, she was preparing a *volte-face* unparalleled in history. James, who for many years had been governing without a Parliament, but who was in urgent need of subsidies, called a Parliament at last, which began to sit in 1621. From the first the members showed that money would not be voted for nothing: they began an investigation into certain abuses, the infamous monopoly-system and other matters. But it was soon clear that the Lord Chancellor himself was the principal quarry they hunted. Certain evidence was brought forward of his having taken presents of money from suitors after, and even during, the hearing of their cases. It was not proved that Bacon had ever actually given a wrongous decision on account of the bribes; the practice was common at the time, along with much worse practices. But the fact remains that Bacon, from the moment he discovered that he himself was in danger, showed the white feather. He was in ill health and unable to attend the House of Lords when his case was being tried; he confessed to every item of a long series of charges, and was condemned to be imprisoned in the Tower, to pay a fine of £40,000, to be deprived of all his offices, and to forfeit the right to sit in Parliament. The imprisonment lasted only a few days, and the fine appears never to have been enforced, but Bacon was irretrievably ruined in character and in fortune. He had never been wise in money matters, or indeed in any of the practical affairs of life, and he now found himself hard pressed. He showed courage, however, in his misfortune, declaring, 'I was the justest judge that was in England these fifty years: but it was the justest censure in Parliament that was these two hundred years.' Melodramatic as the statement sounds, it was probably correct. He had certainly been one of the most expeditious judges of his time. Although in 1624 Bacon's punishment was finally remitted and he was even summoned to sit in Parliament, he did not return to public life. The remainder of his life he spent in retirement, working at his great project of the renovation of the sciences. His death was directly caused by an experiment entered upon to determine whether animal bodies can be preserved by cold. He caught a sudden chill in the process, and was carried to the house of Lord Arundel, where he died on 9th April 1626. To his host he had written, shortly before his death,—in expectation of a speedy recovery—'As for the experiment itself, it succeeded excellently well' (printed in Sir Tobie Matthew's *Collection of Letters*, 1660, p. 57).

2. Works.—Bacon's earliest printed work, and the most famous of all, was the *Essays*. It was published first in 1597, and consisted of ten essays, along with which were printed the *Meditationes Sacræ* and the *Colours of Good and Evil*. This edition was reprinted several times, but in 1612 it

was expanded into forty essays, and in 1625 into fifty-eight, the final number. Within its own field, it is undoubtedly one of the great books of the world. The terseness and brilliancy of its phrases, the delicacy and point of its criticisms upon life's various phases, the depth and yet the lightness of its observations, have made it a 'classic' almost from the date of its publication. It was followed in 1605 by the *Two Books on the Advancement of Learning*. This work was afterwards regarded by Bacon as a part of the 'Great Renovation' (*Instauratio Magna*), was translated into Latin (the second book being expanded into eight new books), and published in 1623 as the *de Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum, Libri IX*. It is a review of the whole state of knowledge as it was in Bacon's time, and as Bacon desired it should be. It pointed out the defects of man's present knowledge, the *lacunæ* or *desiderata*, and suggested a detailed classification and systematization of the various branches of knowledge. The *de Sapientia Veterum*, 1609, is a fanciful attempt to show that in the Myths of the Ancients lies concealed a body of physical and moral knowledge which dates from an earlier, greater, golden age of man. The work on which Bacon's fame as a philosopher chiefly rests is the *Novum Organum*, published, although incomplete, in 1620. It contains his logical method, his criticism of earlier methods of scientific study, his warnings as to the dangers of fallacy which lie in wait for human thought—the famous doctrine of the *Idola*, etc. The treatise had been written and re-written by Bacon no fewer than twelve times. 'Severe as it is,' says Church, 'it is instinct with enthusiasm, sometimes with passion. The Latin in which it is written answers to it; it has the conciseness, the breadth, the lordliness of a great piece of philosophical legislation' (*Bacon*, p. 225). Few other works (*Historia Ventorum*, *Historia Vitæ et Mortis*, *History of Henry the Seventh*) were published during Bacon's lifetime, but a great number of works and fragments appeared at different dates after his death. The *Sylva Sylvarum*—a collection of facts, fables, and problems in various branches of Natural History—and the *New Atlantis*—Bacon's scientific Utopia—were edited by Rawley in 1627. Others followed in 1629 (*Certaine Miscellany Works*), 1638 (*Opera Moralia et Civilia*), 1648 (*Remains of Francis, Lord Verulam*), 1653 (*Scripta in Nat. et Univ. Philosophia*: Gruter), 1657 (*Resuscitatio*), 1658 (*Opuscula Varia Posthuma*), 1679 (*Baconiana*: Tenison). The majority of these were edited by Rawley, who was Bacon's secretary in the last years of his life, and who remained his profound admirer. The complete works are to be found in Ellis, Spedding, and Heath's edition, referred to below. The works include many occasional pieces of historical and legal interest, as well as a number of sketches and appendixes to Bacon's *Instauratio Magna* of the Sciences. The majority of these are in Latin, but the more important pieces, along with the *de Augmentis*, and the *Novum Organum*, are translated by Spedding in the 4th and 5th volumes of the Complete Edition.

3. Philosophy.—Bacon, said Macaulay, 'moved the intellects which have moved the world': he did not himself produce anything original in Science, in Philosophy, or in his own chosen region of the latter, Logic. But he inspired others with his enthusiasm for Natural Science, his hopes of the great issues for man which depended on its study, his ideal of the methods by which it was to be approached. It is largely through his inspiration that what is vaguely described as the Scientific Method, the Positive or Empirical Method, is universally applied to-day to the investigation not merely of natural, but of psychological, ethical, social, and religious phenomena. When Bacon wrote, thought had already awakened from the sleep of the Middle Ages; here and there observers had arisen who looked to nature itself rather than to human authority for information, and who had recourse to experiment to compel nature to answer their questions. Such were Roger Bacon, Nicolaus of Cusa, Leonardo da Vinci, Copernicus, Vesalius, Telesio, Severinus, Tycho Brahe, Bruno, Gilbert, Galileo, Kepler, and Harvey. The mental horizon had been widened equally with the physical horizon: the discovery of America and the invention of printing were still novelties to the world into which Bacon was born. There seemed no limit to the possibilities of wealth, of happiness, of knowledge, within man's reach. In Bacon's view it was the last of these, knowledge, that was to be the means of gaining the other two: and from the beginning of his maturer life he set himself the task of showing men how the knowledge, which was also power, was to be attained. At 25 he wrote an essay on the subject which he called the 'Greatest Birth of Time' (*Temporis Partus Maximus*), and, six years later, sent to Burghley the letter in which occur the famous words, 'I confess I have as vast contemplative ends as I have moderate civil ends: for I have taken all knowledge to be my province' (*Letters and Life*, i. 108 f.). In the fragment called *de Interpretatione Naturæ Proœmium* (complete ed. iii. 518), he describes his qualifications for the task:

> 'For myself, I found that I was fitted for nothing so well as for the study of Truth; as having a mind nimble and versatile enough to catch the resemblances of things (which is the chief point), and at the same time steady enough to fix and distinguish their subtler differences; as being gifted by nature with desire to seek, patience to doubt, fondness to meditate, slowness to assert, readiness to reconsider, carefulness to dispose and set in order; and as being a man that neither affects what is new nor admires what is old, and that hates every kind of imposture. So I thought my nature had a kind of familiarity and relationship with Truth' (Spedding's tr., *Letters and Life*, iii. 85).

This is no mere bombast, for these were strictly the real qualities of Bacon's mind when face to face with the facts of nature. Truth became the passion of his life—or rather the discovery of truth, for truth itself he regarded rather as a means to man's advancement than as an end in itself. From the first he set before him as his goal the Kingdom or Empire of Man—*Regnum Hominis*—the dominion of man over nature, and, *through* this power, the increase of his happiness and his dignity. In this sense, no doubt, he was the true forerunner of the Utilitarians in England. Of Salomon's House—the college which was the 'eye' of the kingdom of *New Atlantis*—it is said: 'The end of our foundation is the knowledge of causes and secret motions of things; and the *enlarging of the bounds of human empire, to the effecting of all things possible.*'

In Bacon's design the *Instauratio Magna* was to consist of six parts, only one of which, the first, was completed by him. The parts are as follows: (1) *Partitiones Scientiarum*: classification of the sciences, and the distribution of inquiries among them, a map of the conquests already made, and a survey of the unoccupied lands. (2) *Novum Organum, sive Indicia de Interpretatione Naturæ*: the new method of discovery, or suggestions on the interpretation of nature, by which the old and futile method of 'anticipating' nature was to be displaced. (3) *Phænomena Universi*: tables of facts, the results of observation and experiment, on which philosophy (or science) was to be built up. (4) *Scala Intellectus sive Filum Labyrinthi*: 'the ladder of the intellect,' or 'clue of the labyrinth,' was to consist in examples, types, or models of the method in actual working, concrete applications of Bacon's inductive scheme. (5) *Prodromi, sive Anticipationes Philosophiæ Secundæ*: anticipations of the new philosophy, before the latter should have been completed, a kind of foretaste, or, as

Bacon suggests, a kind of interest before the principal is produced. The last part (6), *Philosophia Secunda*, or *Scientia Activa*, was to be the final completion and crowning of the whole structure. Bacon himself was merely laying the foundations, it was to be left to others to finish; indeed, it could only be the work of many hands and brains. Bacon long hoped for royal support for his cause; he constantly writes as if he desired wealth and position only that he might have more influence and authority in promulgating his ideas. He was to be the bell-ringer, who is 'first up, to call others to church,' the man who sounds the clarion, but enters not into the battle. His hope was in a Society such as he describes in *New Atlantis*, and such as the Royal Society became soon after his day—a body of workers directing their powers of observation and inference upon limited fields of inquiry, after the first great collection of facts has been made. In one passage he anticipates that the future judgment passed upon himself would be that he did no great things, but simply made less account of the things that were accounted great (*Nov. Org.* i. Aph. 97).

(1) It is unnecessary here to give Bacon's classification of the Sciences in full, although it is important in the history of scientific method. It appears in the *Advancement of Learning*, the *de Augmentis*, and the *Descriptio Globi Intellectualis*, with certain variations. The ground of division is the radically false one of the human mental faculties—*Memory*, *Imagination*, *Reason*. Thus the branches of knowledge are classified under three heads: History (corresponding to Memory, and dealing with Individuals), Poetry (corresponding to Imagination, and also dealing with Individuals), and Philosophy (corresponding to Reason, dealing with General Notions or Universals). Poetry is merely feigned history. 'As all knowledge is the exercise and *work* of the mind, so poesy may be regarded as its *sport*. In philosophy the mind is bound to things, in poesy it is released from that bond, and wanders forth, and feigns what it pleases' (complete ed. v. 503). The term 'Philosophy' with Bacon covers all Arts and Sciences, as well as Philosophy in the narrow sense. Parallel to the three divisions of Rational or Acquired Knowledge are those of Theology, or Revealed Knowledge. Like Locke, Bacon regarded the senses as the ultimate and only source of natural knowledge; the *notions* of science are abstracted from sense-impressions by composition and division according to the Laws of Nature and evidence of the things themselves (*ib.* i. 494). Bacon anticipates modern methods in his insistence on keeping close to nature, and in his suggestion that Natural History should take special account of aberrations and monsters, *i.e.* pathological or morbid phenomena, and also of the products of human art, as well as of the normal and unmodified phenomena of Nature. In other words, he insisted both on the unity of Nature, on the identity in substance of the natural and the artificial, and on the value to science of a knowledge of limiting cases and borderland phenomena (cf. also *Nov. Org.* ii. 28, 30). Philosophy or Science, with its three subdivisions—Divine Philosophy or Natural Theology, Philosophy of Nature, and Philosophy of Man—was to be preceded by a *Prima Philosophia*, a form of Metaphysics; the Sciences were to be 'like branches of a tree that meet in one stem, which stem grows for some distance entire and continuous before it divides itself into arms and boughs' (complete ed. i. 540). It was intended by Bacon to deal with two sets of subjects: (*a*) the most general principles, those which are common to several of the sciences, and (*b*) the 'adventitious conditions of essences,' such as Much-Little, Like-Unlike, Possible-Impossible. The second part was to be a kind of Teleology; it was to give the reasons or grounds of the distribution of Much-Little, etc.—why there is much of one thing, little of another. In other words, *Prima Philosophia* was to take the parts which are played now by the Theory of Knowledge on the one hand, and the Doctrine of Evolution on the other. Metaphysics was also to form one of the divisions (Physics being the other) of the Speculative part of Natural Philosophy, or that which was to inquire into the *causes* of things. Physics was to deal with the Efficient and Material Causes, Metaphysics with the Formal and Final Causes. The latter Bacon therefore excluded from Physics, but not from Natural Philosophy itself. 'The inquisition of Final Causes is barren, and, like a virgin consecrated to God, produces nothing,' he said in the *de Aug.* (iii. ch. 5). According to Fowler, Bacon meant not that the knowledge of them is useless, but that knowing the purpose or end an object serves does not help us to produce the object, which is the true aim of Science.

The Classification, with its wealth of subdivisions, details, appendixes, should be studied, as showing the remarkable comprehensiveness, fertility, and penetration of Bacon's mind. It has, of course, been superseded by the actual advance of the Sciences themselves, in many instances along different lines from those anticipated by Bacon, but it is still fruitful of suggestion in this age of specialists.

(2) The second part of the *Instauratio*, to which the *Novum Organum* belongs, and which remains incomplete, was to reveal the New Logic of Discovery. It was to differ from the ordinary Logic in three things—its end, its methods of proof, its principles of inquiry. Its end was to be, not arguments, but arts; its method, not syllogism, but induction; its principles, not the first notions of the mind, or the immediate data of the senses, but notions duly abstracted by the mind purified of its errors and prejudices, according to the evidence of things themselves (complete ed. i. 135 ff.).

Bacon's influence on scientific method has lain chiefly in the fact that he showed so clearly and incisively the errors and the psychological sources of the errors to which inquirers are liable, and to which they had before his day so conspicuously fallen victims. The mind must become as far as possible a *tabula abrasa*, if it is to be a true mirror of Nature; to this end it must first be cleared of its prejudices or preconceptions. The famous doctrine of the *Idola* (or 'phantoms') of the mind (see *Nov. Org.* i. Aph. 38–70, and the *Distrib. Operis*) classifies these as: (1) *Idola Tribus*, Phantoms of the Tribe, or those common to all men; (2) *Idola Specus*, Phantoms of the Cave, those which depend on the nature, character, or training of the individual; (3) *Idola Fori*, Phantoms of the Market-place, those that spring from words, the counters which men exchange so carelessly in society, but which so often are false coins, suggesting a value which does not exist; (4) *Idola Theatri*, Phantoms of the Theatre, which include the false philosophies, the Sophistical, the Empirical, and the Superstitious (see also the *Redargutio Philosophiarum* and the *Cogitata et Visa*), which had held the stage of thought until Bacon's time, and which, it was necessary to show, were mere vain imaginations, fantastic shows, neither realities nor copies of reality; this is the idea underlying the term 'Theatre.' But the mind, once cleared, would only grow another crop of weeds if left to itself (*intellectus sibi permissus*). How the Tree of Knowledge is to spring, to branch and to blossom in the mind, it is the purpose of the Method to show. It was to be purely mechanical: 'My way of discovering sciences goes far to level men's wits, and leaves but

little to their individual excellence, because it performs everything by the surest rules and demonstrations' (*Nov. Org.* i. Aph. 122). The steps are (*a*) the collection of facts in the Natural and Experimental History, (*b*) the arrangement of these facts according to Topics or Natures. Bacon thought Nature was like a printed book, containing many and varied combinations of a few simple natures or elementary qualities or forces. Given the knowledge of these, the book might be read by any one. Further, he seems to have thought that each *nature* is a limitation or 'mode' of some more general nature, irrespective of the supposed simplicity of the former nature. This more general nature is the *Form*. At other times, however, the 'form' seems to mean the nature itself which is being inquired into, *i.e.* its essence, or simple state, when apart from the many other natures with which it is combined in things. Thus the 'form' of heat is something which is common to all instances of heat, diverse as these may be in other respects, and which is absent from all instances from which heat is absent. According to Fowler (*Nov. Org.*[2] Introd.), Bacon's 'Form' sometimes means *Essence* or *Definition*, at other times *Cause* or *Law* of Production ('veræ rerum differentiæ,' 'res ipsissima,' 'natura alia quæ sit cum natura data convertibilis et tamen sit limitatio naturæ notioris,' 'fons emanationis,' 'lex actus puri,' etc., *Nov. Org.* i. 75, ii. 1, 2, 4). Both of these conceptions are contained in the modern idea of Cause. Thus, in his own remarkable example of the working of his method, he shows that heat is a kind of motion, a motion of restrained or checked expansion, in the smaller particles of a body (*Nov. Org.* ii. 20); this motion would be the 'form' of heat, *i.e.* its statement would give the definition of heat, and its production would mean the production of heat. Needless to say, it was the latter result, *operation*, that Bacon aimed at, although he held that Light-bringing experiments should be tried rather than Fruit-bringing, in the first instance.

(3) The third step in the Method is the arrangement of the Material, for a given nature or quality, into certain Tables as a basis for Induction—*Tables* of *Essence* or *Presence*, i.e. of instances which agree in the presence of the given quality, *e.g.* all cases and kinds of heat; *Tables* of *Deviation*, or of *Absence*, i.e. negative instances, or instances, *analogous to the affirmative instances*, in which the nature is absent; and *Tables* of *Degrees* or *Comparison*, instances in which the nature occurs in varying degrees.

(4) The fourth step was to be the *Exclusion* of all those natures which are either absent when the given nature is present (by the first Table), present when the latter is absent (by the second Table), or which increase when the given nature decreases, or *vice versa* (by the third Table). And it is on the application of Exclusion that Bacon places the main stress of his Induction. He expected that within a few years after the Experimental History had been formed, everything would be known about Nature! As a matter of fact, the Exclusion itself, for a single quality, would have been an endless process.

The two chief flaws in Bacon's Method are his erroneous conception of the simplicity of Nature, and his disregard of hypothesis, of the scientific imagination, as a source of 'probable' knowledge. Bacon looked for certainty, not probability. Yet he recognizes the value of hypothesis, first, in his own *Vindemiatio Prima*, or First Vintage—the example he gives of an anticipatory induction (*Nov. Org.* ii. 20, on the Form of Heat); and secondly, in the aids to Induction, of which only one class were dealt with by him, viz. the *Prerogativæ Instantiarum*, or Prerogative Instances (*ib.* ii. 21–51). These are instances such as throw light more readily or effectively than others upon the true nature of a quality; they include such well-known terms as 'Solitary,' 'Striking' or 'Glaring,' 'Parallel,' 'Limiting' or 'Borderland,' and 'Crucial' or 'Finger-post' Instances. It is possible to say that his statement of these Prerogative Instances, and the illustrations he gives, have had more influence upon scientific procedure than his Method itself has had. For the rest, the laws expressing the Forms were to give the lowest principles of Induction, from which men were to rise, first, to Middle Principles, and thence to the Highest Principles; from these, and from these only, the *Deduction* of new particulars and operations was to take place; they were to express the very heart or marrow of Nature. Such axioms, so derived and abstracted, would, Bacon believed, bring whole 'flocks of works' in their train.

Of the remaining parts of the intended *Instauratio*, Bacon wrote only some chapters of a description of the Universe—the Natural and Experimental History—in the History of the Winds, of Life and Death, of the Dense and the Rare, the *Sylva Sylvarum*, etc.; but it was not a work for which he felt himself fitted, and much that he has collected is absurd, superstitious, or unverified report from unknown or untested authorities. Active science was not his part in life. But he undertook the work only because it was a necessary preliminary, and he could get no others to do it for him. It remains true of his Method as a whole, that it was neither so novel as he believed nor so effective as he hoped. No discoveries were made by its use, and the great scientific masters that followed him employed the imagination much more than his doctrine allowed. Nor can it be otherwise; science is further than ever from Bacon's ideal, viz. that of a method which any one whatever may learn and apply. At the same time, Bacon stands, along with Aristotle, as one of the 'masters of those who know'; he stimulated, if he did not awaken, the passionate devotion to Nature and to the pursuit of truth which has been a characteristic of European science since his day. Directly or indirectly, he initiated the study of mental, moral, and social phenomena by scientific and experimental methods. He laid the foundation-stone of English Empiricism, and of the French Enlightenment. A more specific claim is made by Fowler (*Francis Bacon*, p. 91): 'Inductive Logic, that is, the systematic analysis and arrangement of inductive evidence, as distinct from the natural induction which all men practise, is almost as much the creation of Bacon as Deductive Logic is that of Aristotle.' And of both Dean Church says: 'The combination of patient and careful industry, with the courage and divination of genius, in doing what none had done before, makes it equally stupid and idle to impeach their greatness' (*Bacon*, p. 204). While ignorant or unappreciative of many of the great discoveries of his predecessors and contemporaries, Bacon's remarkable catholicity of interest and impartial judgment enabled him to anticipate, or at least to foreshadow, many of the most recent generalizations of science.

Moral Philosophy Bacon still regarded as the Handmaid of Theology; and neither in his division of its parts (*de Augmentis*, bk. 7) nor in the practical rules and wisdom of the *Essays* is he ahead of his time. In Theology he was whole-heartedly with the Moderate party in his Church; he defended toleration both by his voice and by his pen, but he preferred Atheism to Superstition (*i.e.* Romanism). Theoretically, he insisted on the complete separation between Theology and Philosophy or Science, between Faith and Reason, Revelation and Natural Experience, just as in Psychology also

he recognized in the soul of man two principles or parts, the one divine, inspired, immortal, the other animal, created, perishing—a doctrine adopted from Telesio, but ultimately Aristotle's. For the deeper questions of Metaphysics or of Theology he had, however, no taste, and it is only in his criticism of his predecessors and in his inspired proclamation of the New Method of Discovery that he has influenced the thought of the world.

LITERATURE.—I. *WORKS.*—The most complete and accurate edition is that of Ellis, Spedding, and Heath (with valuable introductions), 7 vols., 1857–59 (reprinted 1879–90). Annotated editions of separate works are: *Advancement of Learning*[4], by Aldis Wright, 1891; *Novum Organum*[2], by Fowler, 1889; *Essays*, by Whately (1864), Aldis Wright (1862), Abbott (1889), and Reynolds (1890).

II. *LIFE.*—James Spedding, *Letters and Life of Francis Bacon*, 7 vols., Lond. 1861–74, *Life and Times of Francis Bacon*, 2 vols., Lond. 1878, and *Evenings with a Reviewer; or, Macaulay and Bacon*, 2 vols., Lond. 1881; Macaulay, 'Essay on Bacon' (*Edin. Rev.* 1837); E. A. Abbott, *Bacon and Essex*, Lond. 1877, and *Francis Bacon, an Account of his Life and Works*, 1885; R. W. Church, 'Bacon' (*Eng. Men of Letters*), Lond. 1884; T. Fowler, 'Francis Bacon' (*Eng. Philosophers*), Edin. 1881; John Nichol, *Francis Bacon, His Life and Philosophy*, 2 vols., Edin. 1888, 1889 (reprinted 1901); Charles de Rémusat, *Bacon, sa vie, son temps, sa philosophie*[2], etc., Paris, 1877; Sidney Lee, *Great Englishmen of the Sixteenth Century*, 1904.

III. *PHILOSOPHY, METHOD, ETC.*—Ch. Adam, *Philosophie de Fr. Bacon*, Paris, 1890; Barthélemy St.-Hilaire, *Étude sur Fr. Bacon*, Paris, 1890; Kuno Fischer, *Francis Bacon von Verulam, die Real-philosophie und ihre Zeitalter*, 1856 [2nd ed. 1875; Eng. tr. by John Oxenford, 1857]; Efraim Liljequist, *Om Francis Bacon's filosofi*, Upsala, 1894 (with special reference to Bacon's Moral Philosophy); Hans Natge, *Ueber Francis Bacons Formenlehre*, Leipzig, 1891.

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BĀDARĀYAṆA.—The name of the supposed author of the *Vedānta-* or *Brahma-sūtras*. In Indian tradition he also bears the name of *Vyāsa, Vedavyāsa*, or *Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana*; but nothing is known of his person or life. Cf. F. Max Müller, *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, London, 1899, p. 153 ff., and art. VEDĀNTA.

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BAD(A)RĪNĀTH.—A famous temple and place of pilgrimage situated on the banks of the Vishṇugangā, a tributary of the Alaknandā (wh. see), in British Gaṛhwāl, on the lower slopes of the Himālaya, lat. 30° 44′ 15″ N.; long. 79° 30′ 40″ E. The place takes its name from the worship of Vishṇu in his manifestation as Badarīnātha or Badarīnārāyaṇa, 'Lord of the *badarī* or jujube tree' (*Zizyphus jujuba*), which, however, does not now grow there. Probably an ancient tree-cult is here associated with the thermal spring close by, which suggested the sanctity of the place; and it has been from time immemorial a resort of pilgrims, the merit of the pilgrimage being enhanced by the difficulties of the journey to the spot. The temple is said to owe its foundation to the great teacher Śankarāchārya, a Malabar Brāhman, who lived about the beginning of the 8th cent. A.D., and was the leading Brāhmanical missionary to Northern India. But the building has been repeatedly devastated by earthquakes and avalanches, and the present temple has no appearance of great antiquity.

'The idol in the principal temple,' writes Atkinson (*Himalayan Gazetteer*, iii. 24 f.), 'is formed of black stone or marble about three feet high. It is usually clothed with rich gold brocade, and above its head is a small mirror which reflects the objects from the outside. In front are several lamps always burning, and a table also covered with brocade. To the right are images of Nar and Nārāyaṇa, and on the left those of Kuvera and Nārada. The idol is adorned with one jewel, a diamond of moderate size, in the middle of its forehead, whilst the whole of the properties, including dresses, eating vessels, and other paraphernalia are not worth more than Rs. 5000 (£333).'

'A good deal of ostentatious attention is paid to the personal comfort of the idol at Badarī. It is daily provided with meals, which are placed before it; the doors of the sanctuary are then closed, and the idol is left to consume its meals in quietness. The doors are not opened again till after sunset; and at a late hour, its bed being prepared by the attendants, the doors are again closed until morning. The vessels in which the idol is served are of gold and silver, and a large establishment of servants is kept up, both male and female, the latter as dancing-girls and mistresses of the celibate priests. The only persons who have access to the inner apartments are the servants, and no one but the Rāwal himself is allowed to touch the idol' (*ib.*).

The temple is closed in November, and the treasure and valuable utensils are shut up in a vault beneath the shrine, after which all the establishment retires to a lower valley in the hills. As a rule, from November until the end of May the temple is covered with snow. The idol itself is said to have been miraculously discovered in the bed of the river, and, as it bears scarcely any resemblance to the human form and exhibits obvious traces of having been worn by water action, this seems probable. As an illustration of the miraculous powers attributed to the image, it is said that a Sonār, or goldsmith, visited the shrine, and, finding that his iron ring on touching the image became gold, cut off one of the god's fingers for his private use. But the stump began to ooze with unmistakable blood, and from that day to this no Sonār dares to approach the shrine and risk incurring the judgment which befell the sinner, who was immediately struck blind (Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, iv. 340).

The close connexion of the temple and its ritual with Southern India is shown by the fact that the principal priests are Nambūri or Nambūtiri Brāhmans from Malabar, the head man of whom is called Rāval (Skr. *rāja-kula*, 'king's family'). In order to provide for the succession in the event of the illness or death of the Rāval, a disciple (*chelā*) is always in attendance to take his place. Formerly the priests were supposed to be celibate, but they excuse their failure to maintain this rule by the fact that they have almost altogether broken off their connexion with Southern India. The chief pilgrims to the shrine, which can be reached only after a dangerous and difficult journey, are Yogin (*q.v.*) and Bairāgin (*q.v.*) ascetics. Every twelfth year, when the sun is in the sign of Aquarius, is held the Kumbha fair, and the Ādhkumbha, or 'half Kumbha,' every sixth year. On these occasions the shrine is visited by large numbers of pilgrims.

LITERATURE.—Atkinson, *Himalayan Gazetteer*, iii. 23 ff.; Traill, *Statistical Account of Kumaun*, ed. Batten, p. 57; *Punjab Notes and Queries*, iv. 196. For a full account of the Nambūtiri Brāhmans of the Malabar Coast, see Fawcett, *Bulletin of the Madras Museum*, iii. pt. i. 33 ff.

W. CROOKE.

BADGES.—**1. Totem marks and tribal badges.**—The earliest and most wide-spread use of badges was their employment on the persons of men; among savage peoples every man bore on his body his *totemic mark*, in addition to his *tribal badge*. These two are quite distinct; the totem mark, which is by far the more ancient, was intended to indicate the totem from which the bearer believed himself to be descended, so that all the members of the same stock were recognized by their totem mark. It was a later stage in civilization when a number of stocks, or clans, joined together, and thus brought about the formation of tribes; the communities which were so formed were differentiated from each other by their tribal badge. The religious significance of these badges must at one time have been very great; for, though the totem mark was not originally religious in character, yet with the development of the religious instinct it became so in process of time.

'A totem tribe—which is not necessarily a local unity . . . is one in which the belief that all members of the tribe are of one blood is associated with a conviction, more or less religious in character, that the life of the tribe is in some mysterious way derived from an animal, a plant, or more rarely some other natural object.'

'Totem tribesmen in savage countries often affect a resemblance to their sacred animal, even at the cost of slight mutilations and other self-inflicted deformities. In other cases stocks are distinguished by the patterns of their tattooing, which there is reason to believe were in many cases originally meant as rude pictorial representations of the totem.'*

* Robertson Smith, *Kinship*[2] (1903), pp. 217 f., 247.

Some examples of these totemic badges are as follows. Among the Omahas, a North American tribe, the Buffalo clan wear two locks of hair in imitation of horns; the members of another Buffalo clan 'wear a crest of hair about two inches long, standing erect and extending from ear to ear; this is in imitation of the back of a buffalo.' A bird clan among the same people 'leave a little hair in front, over the forehead, for a bill, and some at the back of the head, for the bird's tail, with much over each ear for the wings.' The Bakotas, in Africa, knock out the upper front teeth in order, as they say, to be like oxen; the Mangangas chip their teeth in order to make them resemble those of a cat or a crocodile.* Tatuings, cicatrices, and the like are now often of a merely ornamental character, but it seems certain that originally they always denoted something more specific; the fact that they are very frequently made at initiation ceremonies is significant.† The tribal badge, as indicating kinship with a god, was probably a religious emblem from the beginning.

2. Totem dress.—A badge of a different kind, but lineally descended from the totem badge, is that which indicates being under the special protection of a totem-god; this is the totem dress. It is represented in a great variety of forms, but the principle underlying each is the same, namely, that of effecting a resemblance as close as possible to the totem-god, and thus ensuring his protection. Association of ideas, not reason, is what guides men in the stage of undeveloped civilization in these things. It is at the great crises of life, such as initiation, marriage, and death, that these badges are assumed; for example, among many savage peoples, when a youth is definitely made a member of his tribe by being initiated into the tribal mysteries, he is dressed or painted or otherwise made to resemble the totem—or god, as the case may be—by some means or other; that is to say, he is brought into closer contact than usual with it. The custom of which Lucian gives an example is probably connected with this:

'When a man intends to go on a pilgrimage to Hierapolis, he offers up a sheep and eats some of its flesh. He then kneels down and draws its head over his own head, and prays at the same time to his god.'‡

3. Secret Society badge.—Of an entirely different character are the badges worn among certain savage peoples to indicate membership of a secret society. Among the most striking examples of this category are the leaf or flower badges of the various *tamate* associations which exist in the Banks Islands and the neighbouring Torres group. Here the badge is usually worn on the head, the distinctive flower or leaf being stuck in the hair.§ To assume the badge without being a member of the *tamate* is an offence against the society, and is punished according to the power and position of the society offended.‖

4. Analogous customs among Semites.—What has been said may be paralleled by analogous customs among races within the Semitic area. While direct evidence for the existence of the totem badge among the Semites is wanting, there are a good number of data to be gathered from various sources which suggest that examples of this must at one time have existed among them. Thus among the Arabs every tribe has its *wasm* ('tribal mark'), which is branded on its cattle;* this is paralleled by the custom of the Bechuanas, who mark the ears of their cattle with an incision which resembles the open jaws of a crocodile, one of their totems.† The Indian hook-cross, or *swastika*—whatever its origin—was likewise a badge of ownership, which was branded on the ears of the cattle.‡ The same custom, though the badge was different, was practised by the ancient Icelanders, by the Madagascans, Somalis, etc.;§ as regards the Romans, Columella gives the following testimony: 'His etiam diebus maturi agni, et reliqui fœtus pecudum, nec minus majora quadrupedia charactere signari debent.'‖ These, and many other examples that might be given, doubtless all descend from similar origins.

Such analogous instances among peoples, some of whom still use totem badges on their persons, suggest the probability that originally the *wasm* among the Arabs was branded on the tribesmen as well as on their cattle;¶ this is confirmed by the fact that, according to Lucian, all the Syrians bore *stigmata* of religious significance on their wrist or neck.** Just as the cattle were marked with the badge of ownership, so, one may reasonably surmise, in earlier days men were marked with the badge of their god to denote that they belonged to him and were under his protection. Herodotus tells us that fugitive slaves who fled for sanctuary to the Heracleum at the fish-curing station near the Canopic mouth of the Nile, were dedicated by being tatued with sacred marks, and were thus made over to the god, so that they could not be reclaimed by their master.†† Among the Semites generally it may be said that all marks upon the body, within the categories referred to, were badges of relationship either to a god or to a fellow-creature. The nature of these relationships differed, of course. In a large number of cases, as we have seen, it denoted ownership; but it is probable that both types of relationship go back to a common original, viz. the totemic badge.‡‡ Perhaps one may conceive the sequence of ideas and practice to have been, roughly speaking, something of this kind. The totem formed the background; from this arose the totem mark, or badge of kinship with the totem; the next step would be the development of totem gods, necessarily conceived of as tribal ancestors, to whom worshippers would dedicate themselves by stigmatization; closely related to the latter would be the mourning custom known as 'cuttings for the dead,' which was a remnant of part of the ritual connected with ancestor-worship. Thus the badge of kinship became the god's mark of ownership. Regarding the relationship between the god and his worshippers there were always reciprocal duties; in return for worship, and all that this implied, the god was bound to look after his people. It was always, therefore, a question of *covenant*, and the stigmatization became thus the *badge of the covenant* between the god and his worshippers. This is brought out by the fact that the ultimate Semitic root is the same for 'mark' and 'covenant' (cf. the

* Frazer, *Totemism* (1887), p. 27 *f.*, where many other examples are given.

† Cf., *e.g.*, Haberlandt, *Mittheilungen der anthrop. Ges. in Wien*, xv. (1885) p. 53 ff.; Brough Smyth, *Aborigines of Victoria* (1878), i. 295, ii. 313; Frazer, *op. cit.* p. 29; Lang, *Modern Mythology* (1897), p. 71; A. W. Howitt, *The Native Tribes of South-east Australia* (1904), pp. 619–636, 658 *f.*, 743 ff.

‡ *de Dea Syria*, 55.

§ Ornamentations of this kind must not be confused with the head decorations of the most varied character worn to indicate success in battle and the like, *i.e.* honorific badges; for examples of these see R. Andree, *Ethnographische Parallelen und Vergleiche*, Stuttgart (1878), p. 190 *f.*

‖ Codrington, *The Melanesians* (1891), pp. 75, 76, 87.

* Robertson Smith, *Kinship*[2], p. 247; Burckhardt, *Notes on the Bedouins and Wahdbys* (1830), p. 112 *f.*; see, in the latter work, the plates containing a large number of these marks.

† E. Casalis, *Les Bassoutos* (1859), p. 221.

‡ R. Andree, *Ethnog. Par. und Vergleiche* (new ser.) (1889), pp. 75, 76.

§ *ib.* p. 77 ff., where many examples are given.

‖ *de Re rustica*, xi. 2, quoted by A. L. J. Michelsen, *Die Hausmarke* (1853), p. 17.

¶ Cf. Robertson Smith, *Kinship*[2], p. 248; Wetzstein, *Verhandl. der Berl. anthropol. Ges.* xiv. (1877).

** *de Dea Syria*, 59.

†† Herodotus, ii. 113; cf. Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*[2], p. 148.

‡‡ Cf. Andree, *op. cit.* p. 82 ff.

Arabic *sharaṭ*, 'a mark,' and *sharṭ*, 'a covenant'; cf. Gn 9^{12} 31^{48}).* On the analogy of this badge of covenant between a god and his people arose that of a covenant between man and man. Among the Arabs, when two men made a covenant, they inflicted a wound in their flesh, either in the hand or arm, and drank each other's blood.† It is true that the reciprocal blood-drinking constituted the central act, but the mark left on the person of each party to the covenant was the visible badge of the covenant.‡

What has been said may be illustrated by some Old Testament data. We shall not expect to find here any reference to marks which could be considered as directly totemic, for it is only remnants of the later stages, referred to above, that we come across in the OT; at the same time, the existence of animal names of clans and men§ suggests the probability that totemism existed among the early ancestors of the Israelites. Circumcision was the badge of the covenant between Jahweh and His worshippers (cf. Gn 17^{14}). Originally it must have denoted something else. This is proved by the very wide observance of the custom by a great variety of peoples,‖ and more especially by the fact that there are strong reasons for the belief that the rite came to the Israelites through Egypt;¶ but to the Israelites it became the distinguishing mark of Jahweh's ownership. Belonging to the same category was the *prophet's badge*. The story preserved in 1 K 20^{35-43} is sufficient evidence of the existence of such a badge. As the prophets were dedicated to the service of Jahweh in a special manner, a badge peculiar to their order in early times would be appropriate enough. Of the character of this badge nothing is known beyond the fact that it was made on the forehead or on the top of the head (cf. the tonsure of later days). An interesting parallel is the Buddhist badge of priesthood. After having served his novitiate, the candidate goes through the ceremony of admission to the priesthood; he kneels before the idol, and 'three small heaps of incense are laid upon his forehead, and these are set fire to. The man must kneel till the incense heaps burn down, and thus burn an indelible mark on the head. This ordeal is repeated, as the man rises in the priesthood, till he bears nine scars upon his scalp.'** The distinctive dress of the Israelite prophet, which may be regarded as a badge of office, is paralleled by the yellow robe of the Buddhist priest. The Taoist priest also wears a distinctive dress, which differs from that of the Buddhist priest.

'Cuttings for the dead' (cf. above) are mentioned in Lv 19^{28} (cf. 21^{5}, Dt 14^{1}). In the last passage it says: 'Ye shall not cut yourselves, nor make any baldness [the cognate Arabic root means 'wound'] between your eyes for the dead.' The custom is prohibited on account of its being a heathen rite. From this it is permissible to assume that it was both ancient and widely prevalent. Cuttings in the body such as those mentioned in 1 K 18^{27-29} may perhaps be a remnant of a practice whereby a god was, in times of great emergency, reminded of the badge denoting his ownership, and thereby called upon to fulfil his part of the covenant.

Badges which may also have at one time pro-

* Robertson Smith, *Kinship*², p. 250.

† Wellhausen, *Reste arab. Heident.*² p. 125; Doughty, *Travels in Arab. Des.* i. 540, ii. 41 (1888).

‡ On another covenant-sign, viz. the cairn, see Frazer, in *Anthrop. Essays*, 1907, p. 131 ff.

§ *e.g.* 'the house of Caleb' (1 S 25^{3}); cf. the 'dog tribes' in various parts of Arabia; see Robertson Smith, *Kinship*², p. 233 ff.; 'Akbor (2 K 22^{12}), 'mouse'; Levi, 'antelope'; Rachel, 'ewe'; see, further, Robertson Smith in *JPh* ix. (1879) p. 75 ff.

‖ See, *e.g.*, Frazer, 'The Origin of Circumcision,' in *The Independent Review* (Nov. 1904).

¶ Cf. Stade, *Biblische Theologie des AT* (1905), p. 45.

** Deane, in *Expos. Times*, xviii. (Dec. 1906) p. 144.

claimed Jahweh's ownership were the 'sign' on the hand and the 'memorial' between the eyes mentioned in Ex $13^{9.\ 16}$ (cf. Rev 20^{4}). These must originally have been marks cut into the hands and forehead, and were preserved perhaps in their original form only by the prophetical order; later on the 'phylacteries' took their place (see Dt 6^{8} 11^{18} etc.).* Lineally descended from these, too, is perhaps the badge referred to in Job 31^{35} ('Lo, here is my mark, let the Almighty answer me'). The word used here for 'mark' comes from the root meaning 'to wound,' and it is the same as that used in Ezk 9^{4-6}, the reference being to those who are true to God, and therefore belong to Him.

A mark of an entirely different character is the badge of the manslayer, mentioned only once in the OT, in reference to Cain.†

5. **Jewish Badge.**—One of the most extraordinary uses of badges is exemplified in the various forms of the 'Jewish badge' worn by the Jews during the Middle Ages. This first originated among the Muhammadans; by the 'Pact of Omar' (640) all Jews living in Muhammadan countries were ordered to wear a yellow seam on their upper garments.‡ In later times Jews in Egypt were compelled to wear bells on their garments, and a little calf carved of wood; the latter, according to Lane-Poole, was to remind them of the Golden Calf. In the 14th cent. the badge took the form of a yellow turban§ among Jews in Egypt; in other parts, *e.g.* in Tripoli, a particoloured turban marked the Jew.‖ It was, in the first instance, the Muhammadan precedent which was followed when in Christian lands the Jewish badge was introduced. It appears that this badge was already in use in some lands before the central authority in Rome put forth an ordinance on the subject applying to all Christendom; thus in France the badge was in use in 1208;¶ but its use was made universal by a decree, prompted by Innocent III., of the fourth Lateran Council (1215), and it applied to Muhammadans as well as to Jews. The reason given for the decree was the need of preventing inter-marriage and concubinage between Christians and non-Christians.

'Contingit interdum quod per errorem Christiani Judæorum seu Saracenorum et Judæi seu Saraceni Christianorum mulieribus commisceantur. Ne igitur tam damnatæ commixtionis excessus per velamentum erroris hujusmodi excusationis ulterius possint habere diffugium, statuimus ut tales utriusque sexus in omni Christianorum provincia et omni tempore qualitate habitus publici ab aliis populis distinguantur.'**

In accordance with this the badge was everywhere enforced; but it differed in size, shape, and colour in different countries. In France it was a circular piece of cloth, usually yellow in colour, sewn on to the outer garment. The alternative of a yellow head-dress was permitted, while Jewesses wore a distinctive veil. The age at which Jews had to begin to wear the badge varied in different parts of France, at some places seven years, at others not until fourteen. The badge could be worn on the breast, or left shoulder, or on the girdle, or even on the hat. In France, Spain, and Italy the customs were similar; in these countries, too, exemptions from wearing the badge were often permitted, usually in consideration of a money payment. In Germany the badge took the form of a special hat, the 'Judenhut.' It was pointed

* At the present day all orthodox Jews wear the 'head-tefillah' and the 'hand-tefillah' when at their prayers; see Oesterley and Box, *The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue* (1907), p. 418 ff.

† See Frazer, in *Anthropological Essays* (1907), pp. 102–110; Hastings' *SDB*, *s.v.* 'Marks.'

‡ D'Ohsson, *Hist. des Mongols*, iii. (1854) p. 274, quoted in *JE* ii. 425b.

§ Lane-Poole, *Hist. of Egypt*, vi. (1901) pp. 126 ff., 300 ff.

‖ Abrahams, *Jewish Life in the Middle Ages* (1896), p. 302.

¶ Robert, *Les Signes d'infamie au moyen-âge* (1891), p. 11.

** Labbe, *Sacrosancta concilia ad regiam editionem exacta*, xiii. col. 1003 and 1006, quoted by Abrahams, *op. cit.* p. 296.

at the top, and the brim was often twisted into the shape of a pair of horns. Red was the usual colour, in later times green. But the wheel-badge, of yellow or saffron and of various sizes, was also worn in Germany in the 15th cent. by the men, while Jewesses were obliged to wear two blue stripes on their veils or cloaks. Sometimes the letter S (=*signum*) appeared in the yellow circle. In Switzerland the badge took the form of a piece of red cloth shaped like a pointed hat; later on it became a wheel fixed on the back.* In Crete the circle was worn; this was also marked upon the houses of Jews, a custom which is in vogue even at the present day.† In England it would almost seem as though the badge was at first introduced as a safeguard for the Jews. The Earl of Pembroke, who was regent during the early years of the minority of Henry III., sought to encourage the settlement of the Jews again in England after their cruel experiences during the reign of John. It was to ensure their security, so that no one could plead that he had assaulted a Jew in ignorance of his race, that the badge was, so far as is known, first introduced into England, and worn by Jews whenever they appeared in public. The ordinance containing this provision was put forth in 1218. The badge consisted of two strips of white linen or parchment, imitative of the Two Tables of stone, which were fastened to the dress in a prominent manner. Originally these were white in colour, but later yellow was ordered. By the statute of Edward I., *de Judaismo* (3 Edw. I. 1274–1275),‡ which dealt exhaustively with the Jewish Question, Jewesses as well as Jews were forced to wear a badge, and its object now was to mark out Jews, who by this statute were prohibited from mixing with Christians. Thus it became, as in other countries, a badge of shame.§

LITERATURE.—There do not seem to be any works definitely occupied with the subject of badges. Data have to be gathered from a great variety of sources. See the references in the footnotes above, which represent only a selection.

W. O. E. OESTERLEY.

BĀGDĪ.—A Dravidian, cultivating, fishing, and menial caste of Central and Western Bengal, which at the Census of 1901 numbered 1,042,550. Their religion is a compound of orthodox Hinduism with survivals of animism and nature-worship. In the former stage, the regular Hindu deities are worshipped in a more or less intelligent fashion. But besides these they venerate Guṣain Erā, the goddess of the Santāls, and Bar Pahār or Marang Buru, the mountain-god of the hill races (see ORĀON). According to their own statement, their favourite deity is the snake-goddess, Manasā, whose image, represented with four arms, crowned by a tiara of snakes, and grasping a cobra in each hand, is paraded through their villages, and finally flung into a tank—apparently a rite of mimetic magic intended to remove her dangerous influence. They also parade the effigy of a female saint named Bhādū, who is said to have been daughter of the Rājā of Pachet, and who died a virgin for the good of the people. Her worship consists of songs and wild dances, in which men, women, and children take part. The legend supplies one more instance of the development of local gods in India from actual historical personages, as illustrated by Lyall (*Asiatic Studies*[2], i. 39 ff.).

LITERATURE.—Risley, *Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, 1891, i. 41 f.

W. CROOKE.

BAGHDAD.—1. Sketch of history.—Baghdad is the capital of the Eastern Khalifate, founded in A.D. 754 (A.H. 136) by al-Manṣûr, second Khalîf of the 'Abbâsid dynasty, whose metropolis it remained, except for the period 836–862, when the court was transferred to Samarra, until the overthrow of the dynasty by the Mongol Hûlâgû in 1258 (A.H. 656), after which the seat of the Khalîfate was removed to Cairo. Baghdad remained in the hands of the Ilchans, or Persian Mongols, till 1507, when it was taken by Shah Ismâ'îl, founder of the Safawid dynasty, from whom it was taken in 1534 by the Ottomans, in whose hands it has ever since continued, except for the brief period of occupation by the Persians.

The name Baghdad (*bâgha-dâta*, 'given by Bagha *or* God') is one of the many cases in which the older name of a locality outlasts newer appellations. The name which Manṣûr gave his city was either his own, or *Madînat al-Salâm*, 'City of Peace.' Another appellation was *al-Zaurâ*, 'the Crooked,' on the analogy of similar names given to the chief cities of Islâm. Of the older name there are several dialectic forms. Jews and Christians often called it Babel.

An account of the secular history of this city should be sought in historical works dealing with the Khalîfate, or in the monograph of Guy le Strange, *Baghdad under the Abbasid Caliphate*, Oxford, 1900. We shall confine ourselves to its importance for the history of Religion and Ethics.

The accession of the 'Abbâsid dynasty marked the recognition in Islâm of a principle which at the first had been vehemently repudiated—the hereditary right of the Prophet's family to the sovereignty (*imâma*). The rise of this is clearly due to the hereditary principle having been adopted by the usurper Mu'âwiyah, founder of the Umayyad dynasty; when it was once recognized that the sovereignty belonged to one family, the majority of Muslims would be disposed to agree that that family should be the Prophet's. Only, since the Prophet's line was continued through a daughter, there was room for difference of opinion as to which of two families had the right to his inheritance. The law of the Qur'ân seemed to favour the doctrine that, where there was no male issue, the father's brother succeeded, and on this theory the claim of the 'Abbâsids was based. But to those who held that there could be succession through the female line the Prophet's heirs were the descendants of his daughter Fâṭima and her husband 'Alî—the 'Alids, 'Alawids, or Fâṭimids.

So long as the problem was to dispossess the Umayyads, these two families worked together, leaving the question between themselves to be decided later; but when the organizing genius of Abû Muslim had won the throne for the 'Abbâsids, they fell out, and, the latter being in possession, the 'Alids were perpetually rising, but never produced in the Eastern provinces a leader capable of securing success; they were decimated by massacres, and were intimidated by torture and imprisonment. Nevertheless they formed a potent factor in Baghdad politics till the coming of the Mongols, and in the *fatwâ* which decided the assassination of the last of the Khalîfs of Baghdad the influence of 'Alid sentiment is noticeable. The Mongol general asked whether it was true that the execution of the Khalîf would cause a general convulsion of nature. The jurists whom he consulted replied that, if such an act could cause a natural convulsion, nature would have been convulsed by the death of 'Alî and that of his son Ḥusain.

The site of the 'Abbâsid capital was selected with a view to avoid Syria, where the Umayyads were popular, and Arabia, where the 'Alid cause was strong, and to be near Persia, especially Khorasan, where the 'Abbâsids had their chief adherents. And, indeed, the triumph of the 'Abbâ-

* Abrahams, *op. cit.* p. 298.
† *JE* ii. 427[a]; see, too, the interesting plate given.
‡ See Rigg, *Select Pleas, Starrs, and Records of the Jewish Exchequer* (1902), p. xxxviii.
§ See, further, A. M. Hyamson, *A History of the Jews in England* (1908), pp. 62, 94 ff.

sids is sometimes regarded as the re-conquest by Persia of its ancient hegemony. Persian influence speedily grew strong at the Khalîf's court, and the institution of a foreign bodyguard soon took all power out of the Khalîf's hands, and placed it in those of a Dailemite or a Turkish Sultan.

2. Literary importance of the foundation of Baghdad.—The rise of the new dynasty synchronized with the popularization of *paper*, an invention nearly as momentous for the diffusion of knowledge as that of printing. It also broke with the illiterate tradition of the earlier periods of Islâm, which indeed some of the Umayyads had shown a tendency to discard. The production of literary works proceeded apace, and the 3rd cent. of Islâm produced polygraphs such as Isḥâḳ of Mauṣil and Jâḥiẓ of Baṣra. Translation from foreign languages was encouraged, especially Greek, Syriac, and Pahlavi; a royal library was founded by Ma'mûn (ob. A.D. 833), and his example was followed by other men of eminence, such as the vizier of Mutawakkil, al-Fatḥ b. Khâḳân (ob. 861). The respect which the creations of the Greek genius have universally won was accorded to them at Baghdad, where indeed the dogma of the infallibility of the Greeks in all scientific questions had its adherents. Debates, in which religious questions were not absolutely avoided, were encouraged by literary viziers, and fanaticism on such occasions was at times unfashionable (cf. Yâḳût, ed. D. S. Margoliouth, ii. 46 and the Pahlavi *Gujastak-Abâlish*, ed. Barthélemy, Paris, 1887). A public library with endowments for the assistance of students was founded in the 4th cent. A.H. by the vizier Sâbûr b. Ardashîr; and the building of colleges on a large scale characterized Seljûḳ rule in the 5th.

3. Islâmic religious buildings in Baghdad.—The founder of the city, Manṣûr, built a mosque, known subsequently as *al-Ṣaḥn al-'Atîḳ*, 'the Old Court,' side by side with his Palace of the Golden Gate. This was subsequently enlarged by succeeding Khalîfs, and appears to have survived the sack of the city by Hûlâgû, though no trace remains of it now (le Strange, *op. cit.* 32-37). Since the building of mosques counted as a meritorious act, apart from the needs of worshippers, they continued to be erected so long as the Khalîfate lasted; and the quarter called 'the Baṣra Gate' was said to contain 30,000 of these edifices (Ṣafadî, *Com. on Lâmiyyat al-'Ajam*, i. 64). Round the tombs of famous men several notable sanctuaries arose; such were the *mashhads* of Abû Ḥanîfa and Mûsâ b. Ja'far, the tomb of Ma'rûf of Karkh, etc. Preachers and teachers built or had built for themselves hermitages, called *ribâṭ*, of which the number must have been very great; perhaps the most celebrated of these was the *ribâṭ* of the Shaikh al-Shuyûkh, built by order of 'Amîd al-'Irâḳ for the Ṣûfî Abû Sa'd of Nisabur (ob. 1086: Ibn al-Athir, *annis* 450 and 479 A.H.). Another of some note was the *ribâṭ* of al-Zauzanî, opposite the mosque of Manṣûr, built for 'Alî b. Maḥmûd al-Zauzanî (ob. 1060). The preacher 'Abd al-Ḳâdir al-Jîlânî (*q.v.*) had a *ribâṭ* as well as a school. The works hitherto made accessible on the topography of Baghdad do not offer the same variety of names for mosques as is exhibited by the topographies of Cairo, but this is likely to be accidental. The doors of the mosques were used for placarding government notices (Ibn al-Athir, A.H. 533), and the inside of the buildings served for many uses not directly connected with religion, *e.g.* the recitation of verses, and the narrating of stories (Jâḥiẓ, *Ḥayawân*, iii. 8: 'Mosque of 'Attâb'), or the publication of political intelligence (Ṭabarî, iii. 2216: 'in the two public mosques of Baghdad'; 2224, 13: 2249, 3, etc.).

4. Religious history of Baghdad.—Shortly after the founding of the city an inquisition was started by Manṣûr with the view of suppressing the *zindîḳs* (see art. ATHEISM [Muhammadan]), and this was continued by his successors Mahdî and Hâdî (*Aghanî*, xii. 100, xiii. 74; Ṭabarî, iii. 517, 548); on the accession of Hârûn al-Rashîd all criminals except those under this charge were released. After the taking of the city by Ma'mûn's forces (A.D. 813) the dogma of the createdness of the Qur'ân was adopted by the new Khalîf, who instituted an inquisition into the tenets of his subjects, and violently persecuted those who rejected this doctrine: the inquisition was maintained by the two succeeding Khalîfs, and was finally stopped in the second year of Mutawakkil (A.D. 848–849, W. M. Patton, *Aḥmed Ibn Ḥanbal and the Miḥna*, Leyden, 1897). The followers of the most distinguished martyr in these persecutions, Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal, presently became a power in the city, and riots between them and the Shâfi'ites took place at many periods; they are first mentioned in the year 934, when the Ḥanbalites endeavoured to enforce their ascetic rules on the population by a variety of violent proceedings. A furious manifesto was fulminated against them by the Khalîf Râḍî, charging them with anthropomorphism, and threatening them with the extreme penalty of the law unless they abandoned their system. Similar troubles are mentioned as late as 1082. The Khalîf Râḍî, immediately after his accession (A.H. 322, A.D. 934), had started an inquisition, having for its purpose the suppression of the sect which believed the deity to be incarnate in one Ibn Abî' l-'Azâḳir al-Shalmaghânî. His published letter on this subject is in part preserved (see Yâḳût, *op. cit.* i. 298). One of this person's followers refused to retract his opinion even when the alleged possessor of deity was publicly scourged. The sect was not extinguished by this persecution, as in the year 952 a fresh inquisition was instituted by the vizier Muhallabî.

The chief cause for religious riots, however, was the ceaseless dispute between Sunnites and Shî'ites, whose differences, in spite of the centuries that have intervened, are still a cause of trouble in India and elsewhere. The dispute was in origin, as has been seen, more political than religious; and although the founder of Baghdad massacred the Alids, some of the later 'Abbâsids were inclined to favour their cause, and it is asserted that Ma'mûn had the intention of willing away the sovereignty to a member of their family. This was frustrated; and the perpetual risings of the 'Alids led Mutawakkil in the year 850 to destroy the grave of al-Ḥusain, and penalize visits to it, an act which was regarded by his son as justifying parricide. The process by which Shî'ism was transformed from a political movement into a religion is not quite easy to trace; but it seems likely that the fantastic beliefs which gathered round the person of 'Alî and his descendants were due to the infusion of Indian and Persian ideas into Islâm. It is probable that the separation of Shî'ism from Sunnism, as a system with a code and a liturgy of its own, was due to the rise of the Fâṭimid dynasty of N. Africa, whose rulers after their conquest of Egypt proceeded to the work of codification, their practice having doubtless existed some time before. In the disputes between Turks and Dailemites which marked the 4th and 5th cents. of Islâm, the former theoretically favoured Sunnism, the latter Shî'ism; and the Buyid (Dailemite) conqueror of Baghdad, Mu'izz al-Daula, in 962 ordered certain Shî'ite execrations to be affixed to the mosque doors. These were erased by the populace; and on the advice of his vizier Muhallabî he had a harmless formula substituted. The next

year, however (963), he insisted on the observance of the fast of Muḥarram 10 in Shî'ite fashion; and this practice continued some time after his death, as in 968 it is spoken of as 'celebrated as usual.' His successors appear to have been far less keenly attached to Shî'ite doctrine; and it is asserted by a good authority (*Rasâ'il* of Hamadhânî, p. 424) that 'Aḍud al-Daula went so far as to impose a poll-tax on the Shî'ites, as being members of a tolerated religion. The practice of the fast appears to have become gradually restricted to the Shî'ite quarter of the city, which in 971 (perhaps for the first time) appears as Karkh, also at that time 'the quarter of the merchants.' In the first riot (of that year) many sects and parties are involved, but on subsequent occasions the Sunnites and Shî'ites appear to have been the chief combatants. In 973, when the dispute between Bakhtiyar and Subuktakin gave the Turkish party the upper hand for the time in Baghdad, the Sunnites, who were in possession of 'the Food Market,' mounted a woman on a camel, and called her 'Â'isha, and made two of their number represent Ṭalḥa and Zubair respectively; they then made an onslaught on the Shî'ites, thus reproducing the Battle of the Camel, in which 'Â'isha and her allies had attacked the forces of 'Alî. In 1015 there was a riot between the two parties, resulting in the Shî'ites being forbidden to celebrate the Fast by order of Fakhr al-Mulk; we find the Shî'ites still in occupation of the quarter called Karkh, whereas the Ḳallâ'în and Barley-gate were in possession of the Sunnites: in 1048 the **Bâb al-Âzaj** (Eastern side) and the 'Cobblers' are further specified as Sunnite abodes. The following year, owing to an armed force having attempted to prevent the Shî'ites from celebrating the Muḥarram lamentations, the latter began to fortify their quarter (Karkh) with a wall; and the Sunnites proceeded to do the same with their Ḳallâ'în quarter, which immediately adjoined the other. After considerable fighting the parties agreed to a truce, with the view of preventing government intervention; they proceeded, however, with their fortifications, and a fresh outbreak was caused by the Shî'ites building towers on which they inscribed the words 'Muḥammad and 'Alî are the best of mankind; whoso assents shows gratitude, but whoso denies is an unbeliever' —a formula which charged the Sunnites (with whom Abû Bakr is the *second best* of mankind) with unbelief. The Sunnites were headed by the Ḥanbalites. The *mashhad* Bâb al-Tibn (according to le Strange's maps, at a long distance from the disturbed quarter), apparently a Shî'ite sanctuary, was in the course of these riots violated, plundered, and burned by the Sunnites, to avenge the death of one of their number. The Shî'ites in revenge burned the Ḥanafite institutions. The disturbance soon spread to the eastern city, where the dwellings of the sects were also divided. At the beginning of 1053 the Turkish mercenaries mixed themselves up with the dispute, and killed a member of the 'Alid family; in the riots which followed, a large part of the Karkh quarter was burned down, and the inhabitants moved to other parts of Baghdad. Karkh, however, remained the headquarters of the Shî'ites, and in 1086 we hear of a riot between them and their Sunnite neighbours on the west, in the Baṣra Gate Quarter. Something like a final reconciliation between the two parties was effected in 1108, when the people of Karkh, fearing a fresh persecution, gave the Sunnites free passage through their quarter on a visit to the tomb of Muṣ'ab b. Zubair, a practice which had been forbidden for fear of giving offence to the Shî'ites; and the Sunnites in their turn granted some corresponding concessions. Karkh, however, remained the Shî'ite quarter after this settlement of the dispute (Sibṭ Ibn al-Ta'âwîdhî, ed. Margoliouth, p. 215).

Besides the disputes which led to riots, there were frequent bickerings between members of rival sects, and it would appear that all which were started had some representation at the capital. Attempts were at times made to suppress the discussions between them, but without permanent success.

The history of Muslim ritual was doubtless largely influenced by Baghdad practice, which itself was at times dictated by political motives. So we are told (Ibn al-Athir, *anno* 494 A.H.) that the practice of crying aloud the formula called *basmala* had been abandoned for years in the mosques of Baghdad, because it had been adopted in the rival Khalîfate of Cairo; the Khalîf who re-introduced this practice adopted another which was also against the principles of the Shî'a. Islâm in these matters is extraordinarily conservative, and innovations found little favour.

5. **Standard of morality.**—The Islâmic principles of the relations between the sexes, embodied in the practices of polygamy, concubinage, and the veiling and seclusion of women, render the morality of a Muslim community too different from that of a Christian or Aryan community to admit of comparison. Thus we find a leading theologian at Baghdad having 148 concubines (Ibn Khallikan, i. 386) without offending public opinion. Such pictures as have come down to us of Baghdad society, as in the *Arabian Nights*, imply a state of affairs on which it would be painful to dwell; of the most elaborate of these descriptions (Abu' l-Ḳâsim, *Ein Bagdâder Sittenbild*, of the 4th century; ed. A. Mez) few pages could be rendered into a modern language without infamy. The dignity of the highest offices of state, the Khalîfate and the Vizierate, did not appear inconsistent with the bandying of the grossest jests (see, *e.g.*, Ibn Khallikan, tr. de Slane, i. 29). Allusions to immoralities not sanctioned by the Muslim law are also so common in the literature of the period, that we can only suppose the practices to have been widespread. Towards drunkenness popular opinion was more decidedly unfavourable; yet this vice seems to have been prevalent in fashionable circles, and scenes in which the leading men and their associates are all under the influence of liquor are common during the whole period. An example may be taken from the middle of the fourth century, which is recorded by **Yâḳût** (*op. cit.* i. 342): a letter comes from the Sultan Mu'izz al-Daula to the vizier al-Muhallabî, who has all his secretaries and under-secretaries with him. The letter is urgent, but every man in the room has drunk deep. Ibrâhîm the Ṣabian has drunk no less than the others, but, having a stronger head than they, is able to write the necessary reply. We have another contemporary description of the wine-parties of this vizier (*Yatîmat al-dahr*, ii. 106), which took place twice a week; the chief judge of Baghdad with other judges took part on these occasions, when each 'received a gold cup weighing 1000 *mithḳâls* or less, into which he would plunge his beard; after exhausting most of the contents, they would sprinkle the remains on each other and then dance.' In the 6th cent. the poet Ibn al-Ta'âwîdhî introduces descriptions of wine-drinking into his encomiums on Khalîfs (p. 162) and other distinguished persons (p. 86). From the 4th cent. onwards the history of Baghdad is frequently occupied with the *'ayyârûn*, or robbers; and the *Maḳâmahs* of Hamadhânî (late 4th cent.) furnish us with a list of thieves' tricks showing that their trade was highly specialized; the contemporary anecdotes of Tanûkhî indicate, however, that the metropolis was fairly well policed. The same

tales indicate that the practice of banking was fairly developed, implying the existence of a well-established code of rectitude in monetary transactions; they also show that there was a considerable amount of sympathy and mutual kindness between the poorer members of the community, but great disregard for the sanctity of human life, and an insufficient sense of responsibility in the domestic relations. Public opinion seems to have been ordinarily in favour of the kindly treatment of slaves (Jâḥiẓ, *Misers*, p. 38), and against severe punishments.

6. Agencies for reform.—For dealing with the criminal classes the rulers of Baghdad employed spies, whose business it was to report at headquarters whatever seemed to them worthy of notice; certain rulers occupied themselves particularly with public morality: so the Khalîf Mu'tamid (A.D. 892) issued an edict forbidding story-tellers, astrologers, or fortune-tellers to sit in the street or in the great Mosque; while booksellers had to take an oath that they would sell no metaphysical or theological works. Similarly the Khalîf Muḳtadir (ob. A.D. 1094) banished from the capital all singing-women and *filles de joie*, forbade the entry to the public baths except in decent attire, and ordered the demolition of various galleries in which games were played, and which permitted the players to look down into people's houses. Probably the efficacy of these and similar edicts was of no long duration. In the year 816 we read (Ṭabarî, iii. 1008) of an interesting case of a voluntary organization of the peaceful citizens of Baghdad to repress crime and outrages; one of the leaders in this movement 'hung a Qur'ân on his neck, and began by exhorting the inhabitants of his locality; and when he had obtained a hearing, proceeded to admonish all the inhabitants of Baghdad, high and low, beginning with the noblest family of all, the Banû Hâshim; he established a register in which he inscribed the names of all those who undertook to observe his regulations and coerce those who disobeyed them. With the followers thus acquired he patrolled the streets of Baghdad, and put a stop to robbery and blackmailing.' His proceedings were at first disapproved by the government, but afterwards they acquiesced and bade him continue. A less drastic method of dealing with the vicious propensities of the citizens was furnished by the efforts of the preachers, of whom we have notices for all periods of the Khalîfate; the satirists Ḥamadhânî and Ḥarîrî endeavour to represent them as shameless hypocrites, whose interest lay only in the collection, but there is no reason for believing this account to have been ordinarily correct. The earliest of these preachers whose sermons have come down to us is al-Ḥârith b. 'Abdallah al-Muḥâsibî (ob. 857); they are practical in character, but are said to have attracted vast audiences, and to have produced ecstatic phenomena among their hearers. It is chiefly in and after the 5th cent. of Islâm that the historians call attention to the performances of the Baghdad preachers, for whom colleges (or, as we should say, chapels) were often erected. In 1093 the capital was visited by a preacher from Merv, Ardashîr b. Manṣûr; he met with such signal success that, when the ground occupied by his hearers was measured, it was found to cover 157 by 120 cubits. The Khalîf himself at times condescended to attend these discourses, which were occasionally used for political or seditious purposes. The aim of the preachers was not only to ameliorate the morals of their co-religionists, but to convert members of other communities to Islâm; and fabulous accounts are given in their biographies of their success in both endeavours. The preacher about whom we possess the largest amount of information is 'Abd al-Qâdir al-Jîlânî (ob. A.D. 1165). He appears to have carried on an agency in which the temporal as well as the spiritual wants of his converts were served. Money for the purpose was provided partly by four wealthy wives of the preacher, and partly by gifts taking the form of thank-offerings which came in from the many regions whither his fame had spread; and others who followed this calling were financed in the same way.

7. Christian communities in Baghdad.—Religious toleration, as understood by the Muslim community, was practised by the 'Abbâsid Khalîfs, and a Christian community began to gather in Baghdad almost immediately after its foundation. Perhaps the earliest scene which introduces Christians in this city is one recorded in the *Chronicle* of Dionysius of Tell-Mahré, when the Jacobites in the year A.D. 767 refer to the Khalîf Manṣûr the question of appointing a Patriarch for their sect. The Khalîf, ordinarily terrible, treats them with courtesy, and tells them to make the choice themselves; they select one David of Dara, and the Khalîf gives him a deed of investiture, authorizing him to punish with the extreme penalty of the law any Jacobite who fails to acknowledge his authority. The Nestorian sect, however, was of greater importance than that of the Jacobites at the 'Abbâsid capital. In the reign of Mahdî (A.D. 775–785) the great Nestorian monastery, called Dair al-Rûm, was founded in the Shammasiya Quarter, where the chief Christian settlement, called Dar al-Rum, was located. It was followed by the erection of many more churches and monasteries, several of which were destroyed when Baghdad was taken by Hûlâgû; their names are collected by le Strange (*op. cit.* 208–212). The different sects had different churches, and kept apart in religious matters; only at some time the Nestorian Patriarch, whose residence was in Baghdad, came to be regarded as the official head of the whole Christian community, and as such he is described in the deed of investiture of the year A.D. 1138 (H. F. Amedroz, in *JRAS*, 1908, p. 448). The sects there enumerated are four: the two already mentioned, the Melchites, or Greek orthodox, and the Rûm, whom there is some reason for identifying with the Franks, or Roman Catholics. Owing, probably, to the superiority of Christian morality and education, the members of these communities had a tendency to monopolize all the professions, trades, and situations in which skill and trustworthiness were required. The humiliating and intolerant edicts of Omar I. had repeatedly to be proclaimed, owing to outbreaks of Muslim jealousy (A.D. 849, 853, 1091, etc.), but fell quickly into abeyance; Mutawakkil, who in the year A.D. 849 tried to enforce them, ten years later put into the charge of a Christian scribe the money for the building of his contemplated city, Jafariyyah. Normally it would appear that the Christian doctors (in all senses of the word) enjoyed high favour at the Khalîfs' and Sultans' courts. The *History of the Nestorian Patriarchs* (ed. Gismondi, Rome, 1896) tells of the familiar intercourse enjoyed by the Patriarch Timotheus with the Khalîfs Hâdî (A.D. 785–786) and his son the famous Hârûn al-Rashîd. A specimen of their conversation is there given (p. 65): 'O father of the Christians,' said Hârûn to the Patriarch, 'tell me briefly which religion is the true one in God's eyes.' Without hesitation Timotheus answered: 'That religion of which the rules and precepts correspond with the works of God.' The reply was regarded as felicitous, because the Khalîf's request contained a dangerous trap; and the mere rumour that a Christian had spoken disrespectfully of Islâm or its Prophet would have been sufficient

to cause a riot (Ṭabarî, iii. 2162). The sanguinary rule that punished apostasy from Islâm with death remained unaltered (*ib.* 1434, A.D. 856); but, owing to the mild spirit of Abû Ḥanîfa's legislation, there was a tendency to mitigate the more barbarous regulations of 'the Pious Khalîfs,' and the tone of the code drawn up by his pupil Abû Yûsuf for the Khalîf Hârûn is decidedly humane. The magnificence with which the Christian feasts were celebrated attracted many Muslims to take part in these occasions, and even attend services in the churches; if the poet Sibṭ Ibn al-Ta'âwîdhî may be believed (ed. D. S. Margoliouth, p. 400), he went so far as to fast fifty days in order to gratify his Christian friends. The monasteries were also visited by Muslims anxious to purchase wine, the sale of which in shops was, nominally at least, forbidden (*ib.* 240, 14–18); while the beauty of the youthful deacons attracted other visitors for a still less reputable reason (*ib.* 52). The form of immorality alluded to appears at times to have led to shameful persecution (Yâḳût, *op. cit.* ii. 26, where the scene is at Edessa).

8. Other religious communities.—The Jews enjoyed the same rights as Christians in Baghdad, and had a special quarter, with a bridge called after them. Numerous synagogues were founded, of which the largest was called Bar-Nashala (?) (Grätz, *Geschichte der Juden*, v. [1895] 198). References to the Jews are not very common in the historical and anecdotic literature concerned with the city; they appear, however, to have had their share of the State appointments, and, indeed, in A.D. 1091 we read of one holding the very high posts of Vice-Sultan (*wakîl al-Sulṭân*) and Manager of the Empire (*Niẓâm al-Mulk*). They practised the medical profession, and probably various trades, including that of scribe; as early as the time of Ma'mûn (813–833) we read of one who made his living by executing copies of the Old and New Testaments and the Qur'ân (Amedroz, in *JRAS*, 1907, p. 38). At times they were in possession of great wealth, and were notorious for the display of finery (Ghazâlî, *Revival of the Religious Sciences*, iii. 182). It was thought meritorious to refuse to teach them Arabic grammar even for large sums, as the proof-passages came from the Qur'ân; and insulting language about them is used by poets (Sibṭ Ibn al-Ta'âwîdhî, 75, 246). Nevertheless the foundation of Baghdad and the improvement in their condition, due to the greater toleration of the 'Abbâsids, seem to have been epoch-making for the Jewish community. Jewish literature from this time follows Muslim literature almost slavishly, the various departments of grammar, codification, philosophy, poetry, elegant prose, homiletics, collections of anecdotes, all taking their rise from Arabic models; and since no Jewish non-Biblical MS earlier than the 'Abbâsid period has hitherto been discovered, it has been argued by the present writer that the remaining departments of Jewish literature (notably the collections of Tradition) are based on Islâmic models also (cf. *JE* ii. 435–8).

A community which produced some men of eminence in the scientific and literary world of Baghdad, chiefly in the 4th cent. of Islâm, were the *Ṣabians*, who arbitrarily took a Qur'ânic appellation, properly belonging to a very different sect. The most distinguished member of it, the state-secretary Ibrâhîm, appears to have found in his religion no obstacle in the way of promotion, and to have enjoyed the friendship of even such ecclesiastical dignitaries as the Registrar of the 'Alids, who honoured him with a memorial poem; while the familiar acquaintance with the Qur'ân which his profession demanded was regarded as a merit. His grandson, however, found it desirable to embrace Islâm. The *Magian*, or Mazdayân, system enjoyed fewer privileges than the above-named sects, as intermarriage with them and the use of meat slaughtered by them were forbidden the Muslims; nor were they allowed to have acknowledged places of worship. Nevertheless it would appear that some of them were settled in Baghdad, and even enjoyed wealth. They were to be found (according to Jâḥiẓ, *Misers*, p. 111) all over Baghdad and the other cities of Irâḳ, distinguished by their bare feet or their laceless shoes. Of other sects, usually offshoots of those which have been mentioned, there are occasional notices.

LITERATURE.—To the references given throughout the article there may be added the historical romance (Arabic), *Ḥaḍârat al-Islâm fî Dâr al-Salâm*, by a modern writer, Jamîl Nakhlah al-Mudawwar (Cairo, 1905). D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

BAHAISM.—See BĀB, BĀBĪS.

BAHELIA (Skr. *vyâdha*, 'one who wounds').—A tribe of hunters and fowlers in Northern India, which at the Census of 1901 numbered 53,554, the majority of whom are found in the United Provinces and Bengal. They are probably survivors of a non-Aryan race, who still practise their primitive occupation of hunting, trapping birds, and collecting jungle produce. They are, in name at least, all Hindus, but are never initiated into any of the orthodox sects. They worship a pantheon of deified ghosts, such as Kālū Bīr, Parihār, Hardeo or Hardaur Lālā, the cholera godling, Kālē Deo, and Miyān, probably the Musalmān saint of Amrohā in the Morādābād district. To these, sacrifices of fowls, goats, or pigs are made, with offerings of cakes, fruits, and grain. Parched grain and milk are offered to the household snake at his festival, the Nāgpañchamī, or Dragon's Fifth. Besides these they observe the ordinary Hindu feasts, and their religious rites are superintended by a low class of village Brāhmans.

LITERATURE.—Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, 1896, i. 109. W. CROOKE.

BAIDYĀ (Skr. *vaidya*, 'one learned in the Veda,' esp. in the Āyur Veda, on which the Hindu system of medicine is based).—The Bengal caste of physicians, which at the Census of 1901 numbered 90,036, found under this name only in Bengal and Assam. They are a highly respected caste, claiming descent from a Brāhman father and Vaiśya mother. Their religion is that of the orthodox high-caste Hindu. The older families worship the Śaktis, or Mother-goddesses. Some among the poorer classes follow the rule of Viṣṇu. Many have in recent years joined the Brahmo Samāj. They were closely associated with the Neo-Vaiṣṇavism preached by Chaitanya (*q.v.*) in Bengal (*q.v.*), and several of the best known Guṣains, or spiritual guides, of that sect are drawn from the ranks of the Baidyās. The business of a physician is naturally confined to men of high caste, because taking medicine from the hands of a Baidyā is a sort of sacramental act, so that some orthodox Hindus in Bengal, when at the point of death, call in a Baidyā to prescribe for them, in the belief that by swallowing the drugs he orders they obtain absolution from their sins. In the Deccan the Vaidūs, who have adopted a name derived from the same Skr. root, are wandering Telugu beggars, who gather healing drugs and simples and hawk them from door to door, or beg for alms. Their religion is of the vaguest type, their family-god being Vyānkoba of Girī or Tirupati (*q.v.*), in North Arcot. But when they are on their begging tours they seldom carry his image with them. They never go on pilgrimages or keep any fast or feast, except the Dasahrā in September, when they offer

boiled mutton to their god, and after laying it on his altar eat it themselves.

LITERATURE.—For the Bengal Baidyās, Risley, *Tribes and Castes*, 1891, i. 49; for the Deccan Vaidūs, *Bombay Gazetteer*, xvii. 212 *f.*

W. CROOKE.

BAIGĀ.—A term of Dravidian origin, applied to designate the non-Brāhmanic priests of the Gonds and kindred races along the hills of the Cent. Prov. and Bengal. It has been specially applied to a cultivating tribe, which at the Census of 1901 numbered 33,914, found in the Cent. Prov. and in Cent. India. The best account of them is that by Ward, who found them in the Mandlā district of the Cent. Provinces. He describes them as the acknowledged superiors of the Gond races, being their priests and authorities in all points of religious observance. The decision of a Baigā in a boundary dispute is almost always accepted as final, and, from this right as children of the soil and arbiters of the land belonging to each village, they are said to have derived their title of Bhūmiyā (Skr. *bhūmi*, 'the land').

These Baigās, who are found in the eastern districts of the Cent. Prov., are reported to be quite different from the Gonds, their vocabulary consisting almost entirely of Hindi words. Those who occupy the Maikal range of hills do not show the flat head and nose and receding forehead characteristic of the Gonds, but have longer heads, more aquiline features, and particularly small hands. It is thus possible that they may represent an intruding race from the Gangetic valley, who introduced the northern culture among the Gonds and gained the position of priests among that people, with whom they afterwards intermingled. Their religion much resembles that of the Gonds (*q.v.*), and they reverence the same gods, adding to the Gond pantheon Māī Dharitrī, or Mother Earth. The god in charge of the village is Ṭhākur Deo, the 'Divine Lord,' and he is honoured accordingly. But they fully believe also in the spirits which haunt the forests—the primary basis of the religion of the Dravidians of Northern India—and in the places which are regarded as more especially the haunts of these spirits, shrines (*pāt*) are erected, each under the charge of a special member of the tribe. There is no special rule regulating the erection of these shrines, except that they are built at places where it is believed there has been a spirit manifestation. Sometimes it is a place where a man has been killed by a tiger or a snake, or has met his death in a sudden or tragical manner; and a special rite is performed to lay the ghosts of those who have died in an unexpected way. Some members of the tribe are supposed to be gifted with special powers of magic or witchcraft, and it is common for the Baigā medicine-man to be called in to bewitch the tigers and prevent them from carrying off the village cattle. The Gonds thoroughly believe that they are possessed of powers such as these.

The religious rites of the Baigās are of the same type as those of the Gonds; at marriages, births, and deaths the customs of the two tribes are identical. In the Chhattīsgarh District the Baigā worship centres round Dūlhā Deo, the deified bridegroom god, and Devī, the Mother-goddess, in her manifestation as Bhavānī. They have a peculiarly brutal mode of sacrificing a pig in honour of Nārāyan Deo, who is identified with the Sun, and is regarded as their household god. The wretched animal is crushed to death under a beam, after having been cruelly tortured—this rendering the sacrifice more acceptable to the deity.

Further east, in the hill country of the United Provinces and Bengal, the Baigās do not form a special tribe, but are the exorcists, medicine-men, and priests of the hill races. They are generally drawn from the wilder and more secluded tribes who are supposed to have maintained the race traditions in the most perfect way. They discharge all the religious duties of these peoples, the functions of the priest being as yet differentiated from those of the exorcist or sorcerer only in the most imperfect way, if at all.

LITERATURE.—*Central Provinces Gazetteer*, 1870, 278 ff.; *JASB* lviii. pt. i. 291; *Punjab Notes and Queries*, iii. 20; J. Lampard, *Imperial Gazetteer*, new ed. 1908, vi. 214 ff.

W. CROOKE.

BAIN.—I. **Life and personality.**—(1) Born in the part of Aberdeen known as Gilcomston, on the 11th of June 1818, Alexander Bain died at Ferryhill Lodge, in his native city, on the th18 of September 1903, in the eighty-sixth year of his age. Although he reached this long term of years, he was never a man of very robust constitution: on the contrary, from the time, in early days, when a serious breakdown in health occurred, he had to husband his strength, and to make the most of favouring circumstances. This he did by careful habits and a well-planned system of simple living, subjecting everything to rule and method. He was specially attentive to diet and to physical exercise; and walking in particular (his chief recreation) was timed and regulated with almost mathematical precision. As a boy, and during his student days at Aberdeen, he worked as a handloom weaver—his father's occupation. When he was a pupil at Gilcomston Church School, his ability was recognized; and as he was emerging into youth he had the good fortune to attract the attention of the Rev. John Murray, minister of the North Parish of Aberdeen, who introduced him as a promising youth to Dr. John Cruickshank, then Professor of Mathematics at Marischal College, and a patron of talented and aspiring young men. This was in 1835. From that moment, Dr. Cruickshank took young Bain by the hand; and his interest in him was fully rewarded by the high position that the pupil achieved in most of the University classes. In 1841, Bain (having just passed from studentdom) received an appointment in the University as Assistant to Dr. Glennie, Professor of Moral Philosophy, who had fallen into ill health. In this capacity he had to conduct the class on the Professor's approved methods, and to read the Professor's lectures, being responsible for the order of the class. In the interests of discipline, he made innovations little by little in the teaching, bringing the subject more up to date, and giving expression (in more or less guarded fashion) to his own views. This, when discovered by the Professor, was resented, and led, after three sessions, to Bain's losing the post of Assistant. Thereafter he made his way to London, the goal of all ambitious Scotsmen, where, in 1848, he was appointed to an office in the Board of Health under Edwin Chadwick. In London he soon came into contact with great literary and political leaders—more especially with George Grote and J. S. Mill, who became his fast friends, and with whom he was closely associated in philosophical and other work. From London he returned to Scotland, where he wrote many literary productions for Messrs. Chambers of Edinburgh; then went again to London, where he married and settled down for a time, producing there his two great philosophical works, *The Senses and the Intellect* in 1855, and *The Emotions and the Will* in 1859.

These works raised him at once to the front rank of psychologists. Consequently, when the two Universities of Aberdeen (King's and Marischal) were united (or, as the local term is, 'fused') in 1860, Bain was presented by the Crown, on the

recommendation of Sir G. Cornewall Lewis, then Home Secretary, to the Chair of Logic and English in the united University. For twenty years from this date—down, that is, to the year 1880—he occupied this Chair with great distinction, teaching the two subjects of English and Logic (including in the latter Psychology) and making his influence felt. These were years of enormous intellectual activity and literary productiveness, when there issued from his pen in unceasing flow works on English Grammar, on Rhetoric, on Logic, on Psychology, on Ethics, and on Education; when also he originated the philosophical journal *Mind*, which he owned and financially carried on for sixteen years at considerable pecuniary loss; and when, in the Senatus and the Council of his University, he pushed forward with untiring energy, and in the face of strenuous opposition, projects of University reform. Nor did his activity diminish when he resigned the Chair in 1880. There ceased only, at that time, his class-teaching. His writing of books went on, as well as his active interest in local affairs; and it was while he was Emeritus Professor that the students of the University, appreciating his genius and his faculty for practical work, and proud of his fame, elected him their Lord Rector for two separate terms of three years each. This entailed his constant attendance at, and presiding over, the meetings of the University Court, and his indefatigable piloting of University schemes to successful issue at a most important and electrically charged moment of the University's existence.

His professorial labours were in part rewarded when former pupils, in 1884, had his portrait painted by Sir George Reid, and presented as a lasting memorial to the University. Reward for services done to the community came also about the same time, or somewhat later—in particular, the presentation of his bust in marble to the Free Public Library, in 1892, in recognition of his long-continued and whole-hearted interest in the education of the masses, dating from his student days, and his early connexion, as lecturer and as secretary, with the Mechanics' Institute of the city. All the while, his pen continued active. New works appeared, old works were revised (often in large part re-written); and, though the energy slackened by degrees as the years advanced, it could hardly be said ever to have actually ceased, for, as late as 1903 (the year of his death), appeared his *Dissertations on Leading Philosophical Topics*, and to the end he retained a keen interest in the progress of Psychology and the movement of Philosophy. Passing by minor productions, his chief works are these:—*The Senses and the Intellect* (1855), *The Emotions and the Will* (1859), *On the Study of Character, including an Estimate of Phrenology* (1861), *An English Grammar* (1863), *English Composition and Rhetoric* (1866, enlarged ed. 1887–8), *Mental and Moral Science* (1868), *Logic* (1870), *Mind and Body* (1872), *A Higher English Grammar* (1873), *Education as a Science* (1879), *James Mill—a Biography* (1882), *John Stuart Mill—a Criticism, with Personal Recollections*, (1882), *Practical Essays* (1884), *On Teaching English* (1887), *Dissertations on Leading Philosophical Topics* (1903), *Autobiography* (1904).

(2) His personality was striking; and a stranger seeing him for the first time could not but ask who he was. A dapper figure, somewhat under medium height, he had a well-knit frame, with expansive chest and broad shoulders; a finely formed head, with a brow marked by notable prominences at the temples; keen, piercing hazel eyes, with unusually long eyelids; a strong curved nose; thin lips, which gave the mouth the character of determination, and readily expressive either of satisfaction or of contempt; a face covered by a copious beard—all save the upper part of the chin, which, till his later years, was clean shaved; hands with long fingers, and particularly expressive thumbs, which bent back in a significant fashion as he gesticulated. His gait was peculiar. While walking, he bent his body forward and placed a hand behind his back, as if steadying the movement, and forthwith accelerated his pace till it became a moderated run—indicative of mental activity, exhilaration, and the utter absence of self-consciousness and regard for outward appearance. Keen as a needle intellectually, he never spoke in public or wrote for publication without showing the logician's subtle power; and, in private talk, one could not help feeling that one was in the presence of a supremely observant and analytic mind—a modern Aristotle, noting and dissecting everything. Yet he was a man of very wide interests and of warm heart. He took an active part in many public duties—School Board, Mechanics' Institute, Free Library, etc. His feelings were always under control, and those who met him casually (and to whom he would be dry and reserved) pronounced him to be hard and unsympathetic (as, indeed, he not infrequently was, if he met conventional and commonplace people). But let genius or sterling character appear, no matter where (it might be in the humblest ranks of life), and he was immediately attracted. It was genuine worth alone that counted with him.

Readers of his works have often complained that his writings are devoid of emotion. They have ground for their complaint. Bain did himself an injustice here. Whenever he took up the pen, his feelings seemed to forsake him. But with a special friend—say, a favourite student (these were not many, but they were choice)—looking to him for help or counsel, his real nature came forth. All his resources—his advice, his ideas, his MSS, his library, his patronage—were put at his disposal; and he spared no effort to further his interests and aspirations. Underlying all was true generosity of disposition. In like manner, in the small circle of his intimates, his gentler and more attractive qualities came out. He had wit and humour; and he possessed a fund of anecdotes, which he told well. He was a kind host, and a staunch friend. On the other hand, he had his dislikes and his animosities. Like all true-hearted people, he was sensitive to insult and determined in his opposition. It was no light matter to arouse his enmity. He was a man of strong convictions and loved a controversy; and in debate he hit hard, but never took a mean advantage of an opponent. Meanness raised his indignation and contempt, and he had none of it himself. He was dominated by a sense of justice and of truthfulness (few men more so), and his judgment was ever balanced—a fact that comes clearly out in his published writings, as it did in his daily life. He had the power of judging apart from personal feeling, to a degree that is very unusual. Hence his criticisms were pre-eminently impartial. And it mattered not whether he were criticizing himself or others. As he looked back upon it, his own work was viewed with a clear unprejudiced eye, and commented on and appraised accordingly—as may be seen in some striking instances in the *Autobiography*. In like manner, his criticisms of others' work were frank and honest, and they frequently gave offence to friends. He had not learned the art of saying what he did not mean, and such an art he heartily despised. He had many fine qualities, which those who knew him best could best appreciate; and his defects not infrequently arose from these.

2. Position in Literature and in Philosophy.—In estimating Bain's position in Literature and in Philosophy, we must keep his offices apart.

(1) First of all, let us take him as *grammarian*. This need not detain us long. His works show his merit to be that of a subtle analyst and a clear expositor—scientific and methodical, and not afraid to express his views, even when they might be unacceptable; and when we remember the backward condition of the North of Scotland in grammatical attainments at the time when Bain came as Professor to Aberdeen, we can see the magnitude of the task that lay before him as he set forth to instruct in grammar. But the task was successfully accomplished, although not without difficulty. He had to get hold of the teachers, and these were apathetic, when not actively hostile. He solved the difficulty by indoctrinating his students, a large proportion of whom were to be teachers, with newer and progressive views, and thus by degrees revolutionized the teaching of English in Scotland, and made his name one to conjure with throughout the North.

(2) But his work as *rhetorician* is even more remarkable. Campbell and Blair had ruled supreme in this realm; but now a new impulse was given to the study and the practice of composition, and the effect for good was soon visible on all hands. It has sometimes been objected to Bain's teaching that he did not produce stylists. It may very well be doubted whether the stylist is not a man 'born and not made.' But, be that as it may, the objection is superficial. For style is wherever clearness of exposition is, and wherever there is a writer who has an intelligent appreciation of the shades of meaning in words and can give utterance to his thoughts in definite logical form and with exact precision. Such writers Bain produced in abundance. Rhetoric was to him, first and foremost, an intellectual discipline, designed to secure clearness of expression; and for this end he was supremely critical. Not even Shakespeare, still less the minor poets, neither Bacon nor De Quincey nor Macaulay nor Carlyle among our master prose writers, escaped his scalpel: all were subjected to analysis and dissection, so that the student might be warned against their faults, while encouraged to imitate their virtues. This cold, critical, dissecting process has been greatly objected to in the teaching of style; and perhaps it may be admitted that Bain made too drastic a use of it. But if it be the safeguard against that florid vacuous writing which so frequently passes for style, a little excess in the use of it may be tolerated with equanimity, if not actually excused.

(3) As an *educationist*, Bain holds a very high position. He held advanced views on University reform, and advocated the due recognition of the modern languages (as against the traditional monopoly of Classics), and the right of Natural Science to have an equal place in the University training with the older established subjects. But besides, he went outside University requirements and took a wide view of Education, raising the question of Education in general and the grading of subjects at the various stages of instruction. In this connexion he gave expression to very definite notions about the proper order of studies, and about how teaching should be conducted so as to be best suited to the harmonious development of the individual mind. His contributions to this highly important subject are to be found chiefly in his book on *Education as a Science*.

(4) As *logician*, Bain holds a place with J. S. Mill. He never pretended to start afresh here, but simply to amend and carry forward Mill. This he succeeded in doing. His amendments and additions are noteworthy, both in Deductive and in Inductive Logic; but specially valuable is his carrying of logical principles to their practical issues and his splendid application of them to the sciences in detail (see bk. v. of his *Logic*). This stands by itself in Logic manuals.

(5) But Bain's greatest fame must ever rest on his *psychology*. He was a reformer here in a supreme and lasting sense. One of the earliest in modern times to recognize the importance of bringing psychology into close relation with physiology, he devoted much attention to the elaboration of this position, and presented it in a striking fashion. From the standpoint of the cerebro-psychologist, he handled mind in all its processes—emotive, intellectual, and volitional. This led to his discarding the old 'faculty' psychology, which looked upon the mind far too much as if made up of self-contained compartments, where the processes worked in independence of each other, and in which the connexion with the body was slurred over or ignored; and it led also to his devising a natural-history plan for the description of mental phenomena—a plan where the physical embodiment of mental states was recognized as rigorously as the specifically psychical aspect of them. It is obvious that we have here the precursor of what has come to play so prominent a part in more recent psychology, viz. psychophysics and the experimental determination (determination by experiments systematically carried out in the laboratory) of the workings of mind. Next, Bain was supreme among his fellow-psychologists in the persistent application of Association and its laws to the interpretation of mind, and in the thorough treatment that these laws received at his hands (see also art. ASSOCIATION). He is first and chiefly an Associationist, and his whole strength is devoted to showing that the great problems of psychology—especially the problem of the Perception of an External (Material) World—are to be solved on Associationist principles. This stupendous task he accomplished in a way that, whether we be fully satisfied with the result or not, gives him a foremost place in the history of psychology. No one can know what modern Associationism is at its best who does not go to *The Senses and the Intellect* for information; but this must be supplemented by Bain's most recent utterances in other productions. For example, the objection had frequently been made that his Associationist explanation is too mechanical, and neglects to take account of the activity of the mind. Here is his reply, given in *Mind*, in criticism of Wundt, and reprinted in *Dissertations on Leading Philosophical Topics* (pp. 50, 51):

'I propose to remark upon the bearing of Wundt's speculation upon the laws of Association, properly so called. Notwithstanding the stress put upon the action of the will, he still allows that will is not everything: he does not shunt the associating links, and lay the whole stress of the exposition on the apperceptive volition. What he says as to the essential concurrence of emotion and will with the workings of association we fully admit. No associating link can be forged, in the first instance, except in the fire of consciousness; and the rapidity of the operation depends on the intensity of the glow. In like manner, the links thus forged are dormant and inactive, until some stimulus of consciousness is present, whether feeling or will. . . . The subsequent rise or resuscitation of ideas consequent on association is a fresh field of study. . . . Over and above the original adhesion, there are circumstances that assist in the reproduction, and make it a success or a failure. Chief among these is the power of the will, but not to the exclusion of other influences. Even the addition of emotional excitement, which of itself counts for a great deal—that is, apart from moving the will—is not all. 'The purely intellectual conditions, under which I include the number and nature of the associating connexions at work in a given case, bear a large part in the process of resuscitation. More particularly, as to the influence of the will in apperception, everything that Wundt advances is supported by our experience. The will may make up, in some small degree, for the feebleness of a contiguous linking, partly by a more strenuous attention, but far more by the search for collateral links in aid. It may likewise favour the recall of a resembling image. But neither of

these two cases represents its habitual and all-powerful efficacy: in both, the limits of its reproductive force are still narrow. The operation that represents Wundt's Apperception in its full sweep is that crowning example of voluntary power—the command of the thoughts, by detaining some and dismissing others, as they arise, and are found suitable, or the contrary. Too much cannot be said as to the importance of voluntary attention in this lofty sphere. All thinking for an end—whether it be practical or speculative, scientific or æsthetic—consists in availing ourselves of the materials afforded by association, and choosing or rejecting according to the perceived fitness or unfitness for an end. When, therefore, Wundt says that Association alone does not explain the higher intellectual functions, he only says what we all admit, namely, that Association needs the control of will and feelings, in order to bring forth our more important thinking products. In the absence of some degree of conscious intensity, Association can no more unite ideas, or restore the past by virtue of such unions, than a complete set of water-pipes can distribute water without a full reservoir to draw from. The scheme of Wundt does not lead to the slighting of Association as a great intellectual factor. His Apperception would be nothing without it.'

Next, Bain excels in his analysis of mental states and processes and his fullness of telling illustrations. We have only to look at his handling of the Sensations, or at his treatment of the Emotions, to see that he has subtlety and insight of a very exceptional kind. Even when dissenting from him, we must confess that he is penetrative and suggestive to a degree. He is too analytic at times—this we may frankly allow; but his keen dissection is a helpful preliminary to a better understanding of the phenomenon dissected. Where his psychology stands him in least stead is when the distinction between psychology and epistemology comes in and needs to be specially attended to. Though he was quite aware of this distinction, it never assumed in his thoughts its rightful place; and his exposition sometimes suffers accordingly. He is also, in his general handling of mind, too individualistic. Although in his later years he explicitly recognized that the growth of the human mind cannot be thoroughly explained without taking into consideration the fact of Heredity (see, for example, the *latest* edition of *The Senses and the Intellect*), he had originally shaped his theory on the supposition that each individual had to learn for himself what he comes ultimately to attain, and this prevented his ever giving to the wider conception the due scope in psychology that it merits. In like manner, he never laid sufficient stress on what the fact of his being born into a formed language does for the individual, enabling him to appropriate with comparative ease, at an early age and in a comparatively short time, knowledge which, if he had to acquire it for himself from the beginning without such aid, would take him an indefinitely long time, and perhaps might not be achieved at all within the three score years and ten of his life.

(6) It was in line with Bain's psychological principles and with his democratic nature that, in *Ethics*, he should be a thoroughgoing *Utilitarian*. The same analytic spirit that he had shown in his handling of intellectual and emotional phenomena he shows in his treatment of the will. His analysis of conscience and his review of moral principles in his *Moral Science* show what Associationism can do in explanation of our ethical nature. They are certainly subtle and practical, and put the matter with calm scientific precision. Ethics is to him a *science* or nothing at all. He, therefore, has no trust in high ideality: principles tested by concrete facts of experience are what he requires. Yet, the whole of the facts must be attended to. Hence, he was emphatic in acknowledging the altruistic and disinterested, as well as the egoistic, side of our ethical constitution. Consequently, if we take morality as simply concerned with our relations as members of society, having our own and other men's interests in view, then Bain's teaching commands attention and no small measure of approval. It is essentially a doctrine of justice as between man and man, and between the individual and the community, and of the right of the State, having regard to the interests of the social units, to legislate with authority. It would, if accepted and consistently acted on, produce good citizens and promote the general welfare. Where it is defective is in not recognizing the value of the *ideal* side of morality and in not making adequate allowance for the strength and potency of the emotions in moral conduct. Appeals to ideality and the dignity of man appeared to him 'gross pandering to human vanity'; and he did not think that much practical good could come from that. Man, as we actually find him, is too frail and erring, and, what is worse, too malevolent by nature (for Bain was insistent on the native malignity of human nature) to permit our catering with impunity to his self-conceit. We must view him as he is, not blinking the disagreeable facts, and legislate accordingly; and, doing so, our Ethics must be sober and reasonable. Hence, his teaching lacks the glow which the Ethics that recognizes the Ideal as supreme unquestionably possesses.

(7) Bain was not, in the strict sense of the term, a *metaphysician*. Indeed, it was his claim to have purged psychology of metaphysics, and he had an inveterate distrust of unbridled speculation. Speculation, indeed, was not absolutely forbidden; but it must be speculation based on experiential data, and verifiable by appeal to experience again. Here he was the prototype of modern Pragmatism. In both, we have the same inductive spirit, the same determination to trust experience alone, the same regard to utility or the practical needs of man—experience the test, practicality the end. True, he could not avoid occasionally being himself, at least, half metaphysical; as, for example, when, at the end of his chapter on the 'History of the Theories of the Soul' in *Mind and Body*, he says:

'The arguments for the two substances have, we believe, now entirely lost their validity. . . . The one substance, with two sets of properties, two sides, the physical and the mental—a *double-faced unity*—would appear to comply with all the exigencies of the case. We are to deal with this as, in the language of the Athanasian Creed, not confounding the persons nor dividing the substance.'

Nevertheless he regarded the higher philosophical thinking, as we find it, *e.g.*, in Spinoza or in Hegel or in Kant, with great suspicion. Such metaphysical terms as 'personality,' 'self-consciousness,' 'the Absolute,' he would, if he could, have banished from the language. He constantly protested his inability to read any meaning into them. He also refused, because of the ambiguity of the term 'self,' to accept 'self-realization' as adequate to express the ultimate ethical end. Moreover, the great metaphysical problems—those of the External World and of the Freedom of the Will—seemed to him to be in great measure mere word-puzzles: they arose from our inability to find a formula or a linguistic setting fully adequate to express what we are conscious of in our experience.

Such, then, was Professor Bain as a thinker and a writer. His attitude towards Metaphysics being discounted, he made a name in Logic and in Ethics, as well as in the spheres of Grammar and Rhetoric. But in the realm of Psychology he occupies a position all his own. It is here that his influence has been greatest, and it will continue. Not only has the professed psychologist learned from him, but his principles have been effective in their practical application to many sciences (such as Education), and they cannot be ignored by any teaching that has respect to experience and the nature of man as we actually find it. What is best in his

system has been assimilated by philosophy, and is being carried forward to greater issues. That, perhaps, is the highest compliment that can be paid to a thinker.

LITERATURE.—A. Bain, his works as enumerated in this article; Th. Ribot, *La Psychologie anglaise contemporaine* (1870); W. L. Davidson, art. in *Mind*, xiii. (new series) 151–155 and 161–179, also art. 'Bain, Alexander,' in *EBr*[10] xxvi. 77–79.
WILLIAM L. DAVIDSON.

BAIRĀGĪ (Skr. *Vairāgin* [*vi-rāga*, 'one who has subdued all earthly desires']).—A sect of Hindu ascetics, which at the Census of 1901 numbered 765,253, of whom the vast majority are found in Bengal and Rājputāna. The term is usually restricted to those who follow the cult of Vishṇu, or of one of his incarnations, especially those of Rāma and Kṛishṇa. There is some evidence to prove that this worship, which is specially popular in Northern India, arose on the spread of the Rājput power which followed the overthrow of the Buddhist dynasties. The Bairāgīs

'probably represent a very old element in Indian religion, for those of the sect who wear a leopard's skin doubtless do so as personating Narasiṁha, the leopard incarnation of Vishṇu, just as the Bhagauti faqīr imitates the dress, dance, etc., of Kṛishṇa. The priest who personates the god whom he worships is found in "almost every rude religion, while in later cults the old rite survives, at least in the use of animal masks," a practice still to be found in Tibet' (Rose, *Panjāb Census Report*, 1901, i. 131, quoting Trumpp, *Ādi-Granth*, 98; Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*[2], 437; see also Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, 64 ff.).

Though the particular cult followed by this sect is most influential in the Gangetic valley and in Rājputāna, it arose in Southern India from the teaching of Rāmānujāchārya, who was born about A.D. 1017 at Śrīperumbūdūr, near Madras. He taught the existence of a triad of principles (*padārtha-tritayam*), viz.: (1) the Supreme Spirit (*Para-Brahman* or *Īśvara*); (2) the separate spirits (*Chit*) of men; and (3) non-spirit (*A-chit*). Vishṇu is identified with the Supreme Spirit; individual beings are separate spirits; the visible world (*dṛśyam*) is non-spirit. All these have eternal existence and are inseparable; yet Chit and A-chit are different from, and at the same time dependent upon, Īśvara (Monier Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hinduism*[4], 119 f.). But the sect did not attain much prominence in Northern India until the time of Rāmānanda, who was born at the close of the 13th, and preached in Northern India at the beginning of the 14th, century. Indeed, it is only to the followers of Rāmānanda and his contemporaries that the title Bairāgī is properly applied. His teaching marked the progressive popularization of Hinduism; and in particular the ascetic Orders, which had been previously monopolized by Brāhmans and Kshatriyas, were now opened to men of lower rank. In addition to this, the religious books published by the adherents of Rāmānanda were now written in Hindī, not in Skr., and thus Northern India was provided with a new national religion of a very clear and vigorous type.

Though this liberal movement marked a decided advance, the Bairāgīs since the time of Rāmānanda have been outdone by the still more liberal teaching for which he provided the impulse, and at the present day Bairāgīs may be regarded as representing the more conservative, orthodox school of Hindu theology. As a rule, they are followers of Vishṇu in one or other of his incarnations, and they are all agreed in the veneration of both Kṛishṇa and Rāma; but some sections pay more reverence to one, and some prefer the other. In the Panjāb this divergence is represented by the Rāmānandī and Nimānandī sections, the former specially addicted to the worship of Rāma, the latter to that of Kṛishṇa. Each has different sectarian marks, and each visits the sacred places, and studies the literature, connected with the deities which are special objects of their veneration. In the Central Provinces the old rule that admission to the Order was gained only by a rite of initiation is now generally neglected, and many are married and have families. Thus the Order is gradually tending to become a caste (Russell, *Census Report*, 1901, i. 162). In the United Provinces there are four sections, of which the two most important are the Rāmānuja or Śrī Vaishṇava, and the Nīmāvat or Nīmbārak. The former, the most ancient and respectable of the reformed Vaishṇava communities, is based on the teaching of Rāmānuja, and its special tenet is that Vishṇu, the one Supreme God, though invisible as a cause, is visible as effect in a secondary form in material creation. They refuse to follow the example of other Mathura sectaries in worshipping Rādhā, the spouse of Kṛishṇa, whom they either completely ignore or regard as merely the mistress of the deity. This branch is also divided into the Tengalai or Southerners, and the Vadagalai or Northerners, who differ in some points of doctrine, which, however, they consider to be of less importance than the manner in which the frontal sectarian mark is to be made. Of the other sect, the Nīmbārak, the doctrines, so far as they are known, are of a very enlightened character. As Growse (*Mathura*, 181 f.) writes:

'Thus their doctrine of salvation by faith is thought by many scholars to have been directly derived from the Gospel; while another article in their creed, which is less known, but is equally striking in its divergence from ordinary Hindu sentiment, is the continuance of conscious individual existence in a future world, when the highest reward of the good will be, not extinction, but the enjoyment of the visible presence of the divinity whom they have served on earth; a state, therefore, absolutely identical with heaven, as our theologists define it. The one infinite and invisible God, who is the only real existence, is, they affirm, the only proper object of man's devout contemplation. But, as the incomprehensible is utterly beyond the reach of human faculties, He is partially manifested for our behoof in the book of Creation, in which natural objects are the letters of the universal alphabet, and express the sentiments of the Divine Author. A printed page, however, conveys no meaning to any one but a scholar, and is liable to be misunderstood even by him; so, too, with the book of the world. Thus it matters little whether Rādhā and Kṛishṇa were ever real personages; the mysteries of Divine love which they symbolize remain though the symbols disappear.'

Though the Bairāgī, a follower of the mild-natured Vishṇu, does not as a rule practise the austerities characteristic of Śaiva ascetics, like the Yogī or Paramahaṁsa, we find him occasionally lying on the nailed couch, the Śaraśayyā, or 'arrowy bed' of Bhīshma, as described in the Mahābhārata (*Bhīshma parva*, 119 ff., tr. M. N. Dutt, vi. 208 ff., tr. Kisari Mohan Ganguli, iv. 444). Monier Williams (*op. cit.* 560 f.) describes an ascetic of this kind whom he met at the Lake Pushkar. But even he, with the catholic feeling of Hinduism, included in his worship not only the Śālagrāma, or ammonite of Vishṇu, but the Bāṇa-linga, or white stone of Śiva, and the red stone of Gaṇeśa.

LITERATURE.—Growse, *Mathura, a District Memoir*[3], 1883, 179 f.; Jogendranath Bhattacharya, *Hindu Castes and Sects*, 443 ff.; Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, 1896, i. 112; *Panjāb Census Report*, 1891, i. 122; *Bombay Gazetteer*, viii. 155; Nagam Aiya, *Travancore State Manual*, ii. 292 f.
W. CROOKE.

BAITARANĪ.—A river of North India in the Keonjhar State of Orissa, which, after joining the Brāhmanī, flows, under the name of Dhāmra, into the Bay of Bengal. The name represents Skr. *Vaitaraṇī* (*vi-taraṇa*, in the sense of 'crossing' or 'giving'), liberality to Brāhmans being supposed to assist the soul in crossing this, the Hindu Styx or River of Death. The term *Vaitaraṇī* is also applied to one of the many Hindu hells, which, according to the Vishṇu Purāṇa (tr. Wilson, 209), is reserved for the man who destroys a beehive or pillages a hamlet. An important part of the Hindu death-rites is devoted to assisting the soul to cross this terrible river, the current of which is supposed to run with great impetuosity, hot, fetid

in odour, and filled with blood, hair, and all manner of foulness. After the lustration, done at an early period of the mourning, it is customary to present the funeral priest with a vessel full of black sesamum (*tila*), and a cow to whose tail the ghost may cling in crossing the hated waters—a belief, as Ward (*Hindoos*[2], ii. 62) suggests, based upon the common habit of cowherds in Bengal, who cross rivers in this way. He doubts whether the Hindus ever imagined the existence of a Charon to escort the dead over the stream. But Risley (*Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, i. 359) says that the Jugis place with the dead four cowries with which 'the spirit pays the Chāran (see BHĀṬ) who ferries it across the Vaitaranī.' This is an example of the world-wide belief that the departing soul on its way to the land of the dead must cross a river, which is sometimes spanned by a bridge (Tylor, *Primitive Culture*[3], ii. 94, *Researches into the Early History of Mankind*, 349 ff.). The legend of the Juāngs, that remarkable tribe which down to quite recent times, and perhaps still in some places, wears only aprons of leaves, tells that when the river-goddess, Baitaranī, emerged for the first time from a rock, she 'came suddenly on a rollicking party of Juāngs dancing naked, and, ordering them to adopt leaves on the moment as a covering, laid on them the curse that they must adhere to that costume for ever or die' (Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, 156).

LITERATURE.—To the literature mentioned throughout the art. add *Imperial Gazetteer*, new ed., 1908, vi. 218 f.

W. CROOKE.

BALI.—The term *bali*, a Kanarese word corresponding to *bari* in Tamil and *bedagu* in Telugu, means an exogamous totemistic section, that is to say, a section of a caste or tribe worshipping a totem and strictly prohibiting marriage between those who have the same totem. The term is derived from an old Kanarese word meaning (1) way, road, (2) place, spot, (3) vicinity, nearness, company, (4) way, order, (5) race or lineage.* It also means the navel. It is in use among the cultivating, fishing, and forest tribes and castes of the Kanarese tracts of the Bombay and Madras Presidencies, and of the Mysore State. A *bali* is thus the name of an exogamous section. It may be named after some well-known animal, fish, bird, tree, fruit, or flower. The following are common names of *balis* in the districts referred to: the elephant, elk, spotted deer, hog deer, mouse deer, wolf, pig, monkey, goat, porcupine, tortoise, scorpion, the nágchampa (*mesua ferrea*), turmeric, the screw pine (*pandanus odoratissimus*), the honne tree (*pterocarpus marsupium*), the neral (*eugenia jambolana*), the soapnut (*acacia concinna*), and many other local trees and shrubs.

It is noteworthy that the section named after one of these *balis* not only worships the animal or object after which it is named, but obeys strict rules framed to protect the animal or object from injury. Thus, a member of the elephant section may not wear ornaments of ivory, a woman of the *nágchampa* section must never wear the flowers of the *mesua ferrea*, and turmeric must not be used in the marriage ceremonies of the turmeric section, though commonly applied to the bride and bridegroom in the weddings of many Indian castes. The mouse deer section will not kill the mouse deer, and the screw pine section will not cut the branches, pluck the leaves, or even sit in the shade of the screw pine. The *bali*, or totem, of these primitive people, or an image of the same in stone or wood, is usually to be found installed in a rude temple near the village site. Ordinarily the temple is a mere thatched shed of mud walls, surrounded by a small mud-wall enclosure. Here will be found the image of an elk, or a branch of the tree representing the object from which the *bali* takes its name. To this coco-nuts and other suitable offerings are constantly brought, with the object of securing its favours and protection. At certain seasons the members of the section assemble from the surrounding villages, and make special offerings under the guidance of the caste priest. Contact with more advanced castes and tribes, who are organized by family stocks, or *kuls*, is tending rapidly to supplant the *balis* of the Kanarese country, which are forgotten or ignored as something to be ashamed of, by a system of family stocks named after an ancestor. It is not easy to induce these primitive people to describe their *balis* in reply to inquiries. The offspring of parents who, under the system above described, must be members of different *balis*, is sometimes allotted to the *bali* of the father, in other cases, of the mother. The practice varies with different tribes. It is probable that the earliest practice was to trace the *bali* through the mother, and that this system is gradually being supplanted by the Aryan custom of tracing descent through the father.

The *bali*, or totem, organization is a primitive system of which traces are to be found in India in many castes that stand high in the social scale. A remarkable instance of this is the Marathas and the allied castes of undoubted Maratha origin, which have crystallized into separate castes, such as washerman, carpenter, blacksmith, or grain parcher, owing to the influence of occupation. Among these, in varying degree, is to be found a system of *devaks*, or marriage guardians, closely resembling the *balis* of the Kanarese country, though the *devak*, by the progress of events, has in many cases ceased to regulate marriage, and no longer forms a bar to the union of two worshippers of one *devak*. The *devak* is usually some common tree such as the bel (*ægle marmelos*), fig (*ficus religiosa*), banyan, or the sami (*prosopis spicigera*). In its commonest form it is the leaves of five trees, of which one, as the original *devak* of the section, is held specially sacred. It is worshipped chiefly at the time of marriage, which suggests its former close connexion with marriages. It is also worshipped at the time of entering a new house. The installation of the *devak* is still an important part of the marriage ceremony in many castes in the Maratha country.

The existence of the *bali* in Southern India as an obsolescent system of totem-worship, and the survival of traces of a similar system farther north, seem to point to a time previous to the Aryan penetration into the central portion of the Indian continent, when a wide-spread system of totemism prevailed among the Dravidian population.

LITERATURE.—See literature under TOTEMISM.

R. E. ENTHOVEN.

BALLABHPUR (Skr. *Vallabhapura*, 'city of the beloved').—A suburb of Serampore in the Hooghly District of Bengal (lat. 22° 45′ 26″ N.; long. 88° 23′ 10″ E.), famous for the ceremonies performed in honour of Vishnu in the form of Jagannātha, 'Lord of the World.' Ward (*Hindoos*, ii. 164 ff.) describes the rites of the Snāna-yātra, or ceremonial bathing of the god, and the Ratha-yātra, or car procession. In the first, held in the month Jyeshṭha (May–June), Brāhmans, in the midst of an immense concourse of spectators, bathe the god by pouring water on his head, while incantations are recited. The worshippers prostrate themselves before the image, and depart after being assured by the priests that they shall not be subject to re-birth, but be admitted to heaven after the death of the body. About seventeen days after this rite the Ratha-yātra is performed. The idol, after

* Kittel, *Kanarese Dictionary*, s.v.

being worshipped, is placed in an enormous car. Jagannātha (see JAGANNĀTH) is here accompanied by his brother, Balarāma, and his sister, Subhadrā. This triad of deities is believed to be an adaptation of the Triratna of the Buddhists, or of the Triśūla, or trident. The former, the Three Jewels, symbolizes Buddha, Dharma, or Law, and Saṅgha, or the Congregation. It is, however, doubtful whether this symbolism is found in India (Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, 346). The modern triple image is probably due to a modification of the familiar Triśūla, or trident symbol (D'Alviella, *Migration of Symbols*, 254 ff.). As these idols are moved, an attendant fans them with a tail of the holy Tibetan cow. The object of the procession is that the triple deity should visit the temple of the god Rādhāvallabha, 'lover of Rādhā,' one of the forms of the erotic cult of Kṛishṇa. The visit lasts eight days, and the gods then return to their own temple. The rite is said to commemorate the sports of Kṛishṇa with the Gopīs, or milkmaids. It really marks the association of Jagannāth, a survival of Buddhism, with the cultus of Kṛishṇa and its adoption by Vaishnavism. The pilgrimage, the Rath-yātra, everything in fact connected with the worship of Jagannāth, as Fergusson says (*Hist. of Indian and Eastern Architecture*, 429), 'is redolent of Buddhism, but of Buddhism so degraded as hardly to be recognizable by those who know that faith only in its older and purer form.' The idol car is found still in the Buddhism of Tibet (Waddell, *op. cit.* 313).

LITERATURE.—The most important references have been given in the article.

W. CROOKE.

BALUCHISTĀN. — The country of Baluchistān, in the widest sense of the word, comprises all the territory occupied by the Baluch and Brāhūī races and some minor tribes subordinate to or mixed up with them, and must be understood as including not only the Baluchistān Agency under the Government of India (that is, the Khanat of Kalāt, Makrān, and Las Bela), but also the southern part of the Province of British Baluchistān, parts of the Districts of Dera Ghāzi Khān in the Panjāb, Jacobābād in Sind, and the Province of Persian Baluchistān.

The two main races, the Baluch and Brāhūī, although differing from one another in origin, appearance, and language, are yet bound together as members of one social organization. The tribes of both races live in close contact, and their religious beliefs and practices cannot easily be discriminated. The universal religion among them is Muhammadanism. The few Hindu traders found scattered through the country are either themselves immigrants from India or the descendants of recent settlers. The Baluches and Brāhūīs all profess to be Sunnīs, or followers of the orthodox creed; but in practice they show great laxity, and follow many customs rather resembling those of the Shī'ahs and others, which no doubt go back to the days of paganism. They show the greatest respect to 'Alī, Ḥasan and Ḥusain, and observe the full ten days of the Muharram fast, like the Shī'ahs, and not only the last day, as among the strict Sunnīs. The observance of the five times of prayer prescribed for all Musalmāns has till lately not been at all prevalent among the hill-tribes. It was considered sufficient for the chief of a tribe to say prayers for the whole body of tribesmen.

The Baluches all wear their hair long, and cut neither hair nor beard, except to clip the ends of their moustache in the Sunnī fashion, to show that they are not Shī'ahs. Many of their more civilized or orthodox neighbours say that Baluch orthodoxy consists of little else, and indeed deny them the possession of any religion except one of a negative kind. They are fond of repeating a Persian verse to the effect that a Baluch earns heaven for seven generations of his ancestors by committing robbery and murder. This is unjust; for although the tribesmen are addicted to raiding and the blood-feud, yet many of them have a keen sense of right and wrong, and their defects are those common to all races in the same stage of civilization. Their laxity has its good side, for it is accompanied by a tolerant spirit and an absence of the fanaticism so prevalent among their Afghan neighbours. As Sir D. Ibbetson has well observed of the Baluch, if 'he has less of God in his creed he has less of the devil in his nature.'* His faithfulness to his code of honour, and the respect shown to women and children (who are never injured in Baluch raids), are points in his favour which should not be forgotten. There are few Mullahs and Sayyids among the Baluches, nor have they great influence; on the other hand, great respect is shown to the shrines of saints, as will be described below. Mosques are not common, and, where found, often consist only of a pattern of stones roughly marked out on the hillside, sufficient to indicate the *qibla*, or direction of Mecca.

The conversion of the Baluches and Brāhūīs to the Muhammadan faith had taken place before their settlement in the country now known as Baluchistān, and may be assigned to the period following the first Arab conquest of south-east Persia. The Baluches occupied the mountains and deserts of Kirmān, and were associated with another race known to the Arabs as Qufs and to the Persians as Koch, who may possibly be identical with the Brāhūīs; but the origin of this race is obscure. In any case, there is no historical information regarding their presence in Baluchistān until after the Baluch settlement there. The conversion of these races is ascribed by the historian Istakhrī, who wrote in the 10th cent., to the period of the Abbāsid Khalīfs. Yāqūt, on the authority of er-Rohini, speaks of the Qufs as savages without religion of any sort; but er-Rohini added that they did show some respect for 'Alī out of imitation of their neighbours. The hatred of a Sunnī writer for Shī'ahs is clearly perceptible here, and his language is very like that used to-day regarding the Baluch and Brāhūī mountaineers.

The settlement of the Baluches in the country they now occupy took place during a period extending from the 13th to the 16th century. They gradually spread over Makrān, and in the beginning of the 16th cent. a great migration took place in the Indus valley, the Brāhūīs taking the place of the Baluches on the plateau of Kalāt. The invasion of India was led by Mīr Chākur and his son Shahzād. It is probable that the Shī'ah sect was still prevalent among the Baluches, for Ferishta relates that Shahzād was the first person to bring the Shī'ah creed into vogue at Multān. Baluch legend represents Shahzād as of mysterious origin. A shadow (that of 'Alī) fell upon his mother while she was bathing, during Mīr Chākur's absence at the siege of Delhi with the emperor Humāyūn. She conceived and gave birth to a son shortly before her husband's return. When he returned, the child, who was then three months old, addressed him and told him to fear nothing, as he had been begotten by the influence of the saint. A mystical poem, half in Baluchi and half in corrupt Persian, which is attributed to Shahzād has been verbally handed down to the present day. The following extract will give an idea of its nature:

'I gaze upon the brightness of the King; he created the golden throne of Heaven; his speech was sweet and heart-entrancing; he was like unto the Lord of Light. Day and night he created, day and night are of small account to him.

* D. Ibbetson, *Outlines of Panjāb Ethnography*, 1883.

The dry earth he created, and the smoke that went upwards. There was neither sky nor firmanent: there was neither existence nor speech; there was neither Grandmother Eve nor Grandfather Adam. There was no Ibrāhīm the Friend of God, nor was there the ark of Noah, nor Isā the Spirit of God, nor the throne of Sulaimān. He himself was "He is," Hamīd 'Alī.'

After this period the Baluches seem gradually to have adopted the Sunnī faith, in name at least, although the change has made little practical difference.

'Alī figures largely in Baluch legend, and in some of the stories about him it is impossible not to suspect a Buddhist origin. Such is the legend of the hawk and the pigeon. A pigeon was struck down by a hawk at 'Alī's feet and appealed to him for protection. The hawk, on the other hand, represented that he had left his young ones starving, and could find no other food for them but the pigeon. 'Alī in order to satisfy the hawk cut off a piece of his own flesh. Whereupon both the pigeon and hawk revealed themselves as angels sent by God to try him.

On another occasion 'Alī had himself sold as a slave in order to pay the marriage portion of the daughter of a petitioner. Again he is said to have given a whole caravan of money to a blind beggar by the roadside, who afterwards developed into the celebrated saint Sakhī Sarwar, whose shrine at Nigāhā, near Dera Ghāzi Khān, is one of the chief places of pilgrimage, not only for Baluches but equally for Hindus and Musalmāns from all parts of the Panjāb.

The shrines of saints, or *pīrs*, are centres of worship and pilgrimage throughout the country, and form the most important feature in the actual religion of the people. In many cases there can be no doubt that these shrines have been in existence from times preceding the introduction of Islām, and that most of them were found already established by the Baluches and Brāhūīs when they settled in the country. Some are of great importance, and attract visitors from far and wide, while others are known only locally. Pieces of cloth, bells, horns, fossils, and other objects are left at the shrines by pilgrims in fulfilment of their vows.* Among the most frequented shrines are those of Sakhī Sarwar (already mentioned); Sulaimān Shāh of Tauńsa Sharīf, a modern orthodox Muhammadan shrine; Hazrat Ghaus on Mt. Chihl-tan, or Forty Saints, so called from the saint's forty children who were exposed on the mountain;† Pīr Sohrī at Sohrī Kushtagh in the Bughti country, a truly Baluch shrine;‡ Chetan Shah near Kalāt; Pīr 'Umar near Khozdār, where the ordeal by water is applied; Sultan Shāh in Zehri, visited by sufferers from fever;§ and Jīve Lāl (otherwise called Lāl Shāhbāz) at Sehwān in Sind.‖

A strict adhesion to the tribal code of honour is regarded by all Baluches as of supreme importance, and this code has greater influence than the tenets of their nominal religion. Liberality to all petitioners and hospitality to all comers stand first, and all people are judged by this standard, which plays a large part in the legends of the saints. The legendary hero most admired is Nodhbandagh, who gave away all his possessions; and his verses in praise of giving are often quoted:

'Whatsoever comes to me from the Creator, a hundred treasures without blemish, I will seize with my right hand, I will cut with my knife, I will deal out with my heart, I will let nothing be kept back.'

Next comes the duty of supporting and protecting refugees, and refusing to surrender them to their enemies or to the law. The maintenance of family honour by the punishment of infidelity in wives is considered also of the greatest importance, and death is the penalty both for the woman and for her paramour, although in modern times under British influence compensation is accepted. This is fixed in money, but in practice the debt is generally discharged by the marriage or betrothal of a woman belonging to the family of the aggressor to a man of the family of the injured husband. These are the principal articles of the tribal code, and in addition to these customs there are others of a superstitious nature. Signs and omens are observed, and augury is carried out by examining the blood-vessels on the surface of the shoulder-blade of a newly killed sheep. To see a shrike on the left hand when starting on a journey is an inauspicious omen, and is sufficient to make a whole band of horsemen turn back. The flesh of swine is, of course, forbidden, as to all Musalmāns, but the Baluches add certain national or tribal prohibitions. Fish is universally avoided by them, the reason assigned being that they cannot be killed in the orthodox fashion by cutting the throat; and eggs also are often considered carrion or unclean. The Sardār Khels among the Rinds of Kachhi will not eat camels' flesh, and the Lashari clan of the same tract avoid the *ālro* or *lauńsh*, a small milky-juiced plant much eaten by the hillmen generally. It is possible that some of these prohibitions have a totemistic origin. A few tribal or clan names are derived from the names of plants or animals—which gives some countenance to this idea. There is, however, no instance of an actual survival of totemistic practice among either Baluches or Brāhūīs. The wearing of the hair and beard long is a national custom almost possessing the force of a religious precept, as among the Sikhs. It is considered most disgraceful for a Baluch to cut either hair or beard, although the moustache is trimmed in the Sunnī fashion.

The ordeal by fire and water is still occasionally met with. A case of the ordeal by fire occurred among the Bozdars in the present writer's own experience in 1889,* and Mr. Hughes-Buller describes a slightly differing form, as also the ordeal by water.

There are certain tribes or sections of tribes which have special Levitical functions, and whose members are believed to have the power of curing the sick by breathing on them. Such are the Nothani clan among the Bughtis, the Kahiri tribe, and the Kalmati tribe. The last named are probably not Baluch by origin, although now assimilated. There seems to be a probability that they are the descendants of the Karmatī or Karmathian heretics who were expelled from Multān by Mahmūd of Ghaznī at the commencement of the 11th century.

The only heretical sect which now has any influence in Baluchistān is that known as the Zikrī, which is powerful in Makrān and Las Bela. Its members appear not to be Baluches but Jats and other tribes of Indian or indigenous origin, and some Brāhūīs, especially the Bizanjo tribe. The Zikrīs believe that their founder, Dost Muhammad, was the twelfth Mahdī, and his abode, Koh-i-Murād, near Turbat, takes the place of Mecca as the object of their pilgrimages. Their Mullahs have great power.†

The Baluches are much given to poetry, both ancient and modern; and, in addition to their ballads of war and love, poems on religious subjects are by no means uncommon. To illustrate their feelings and ideas on these subjects, we append translations of some extracts from religious poems taken down from verbal recitation among the Baluches, in the case of the first poem from the author himself:

1. *By Brahīm Shambānī:*

'I remember 'Alī the King, who has poured a torrent into my heart, and the pure Prophet who sits upon his throne to do judgment and justice.

'The true God is merciful, with him is neither greed nor avarice; nor is he father of any fair son; nor is there mother

* See 'Balochi Folklore,' in *Folklore*, 1902, pp. 259–263.
† Masson, *Travels*, ii. pp. 83–85; *Folklore*, 1893, p. 295.
‡ Hetu-Rām, *Bilūchi-nāma*, tr. by Douie, Calcutta, 1885, p. 77.
§ *Baluchistan Census Report*, p. 40.
‖ Burton, *Sind Revisited*, 1877, ch. xxv.

* See *JRASBo*, 1890.
† A full account of this sect is given by Mr. Hughes-Buller in the *Baluchistan Census Report*, 1902.

or sister with him. I cannot tell who has begotten him, nor can I fathom his might. Five angels stand close to him in his service to do his bidding. The first is Wahī (Jibrā'īl or Gabriel), then 'Azrā'īl, the third is Khwaja Khidr (instead of Mīkā'īl or Michael), and the fourth is the trumpet-blower (Isrāfīl), who sends forth the winds that blow upon the earth. Lastly, there is Shaitān, who rebelled on account of the creation of mankind.

He sits alone, and adds up the full reckoning of every man, and then he gives his command to 'Azrā'īl to take his breath at once. He looks not at good or evil, he heeds not prayer or supplication, he carries away sons from parents, nor does he take their money or sheep or goats with them. He carries a man away by the hair; there is no pity in his stony heart, and he is no man's enemy.

The poet Brahīm has spoken. Listen to my words, to the story of God. I have heard with my ears that there was no heaven and earth, neither Mother Eve nor Adam. In a moment he made the firmament; by his might he made the water; from the foam he created the dry land; he spread forth the mountains and trees and placed them on the earth, and the smoke he made to go upwards. He built up the seven heavens, and the Garden of Paradise, and hell.

And these are the tokens of heaven. A tree stands by the gate to shade the city. The fruit of the garden ripens at all seasons; by his might there are figs and olives, grapes, pomegranates, and mangoes, and the scent of musk and attar. There the Peris may not enter. There is the place of the great assembly where he himself sits with the martyrs, the king Kāsim sits by him, and royal Husain with his followers. Beds and couches are spread, hūris are their attendants standing in their service. There dwell the men of Paradise and eat of the fruit of the garden.

Listen, oh young men! I have seen the greatness of God, of the Lord the breaker-down of strongholds. I have seen, and am terrified, how hundreds of thousands are born, and if he does not give them breath their bodies are dust and their souls go to meet their fate. Some are lords of the land, some are poor and hungry. I am not a great man, I fear how I shall speak, I ask of the Mullahs. . . .

Save me from Doomsday, from the fiery flames of hell; make my passage over Sirāt like the crossing of a bridge. May I pass over at once by the order of God the Creator, and enter into Paradise!'

2. *By Lashkarān Sumelānī:*

'. . . No one is free from sin. I am in dread of thy wrath. When Munkar and Nakīr examine me, and the clouds come rolling up, and the turbaned heads are laid low, with both hands they heave up a weighty fiery club. God preserve my body in the heat of that fiery wrath! Having gone through that narrow pass, clouds again gather beyond. Have mercy at that time! . . .

When the earth heats like copper, the son will not love his father, brother will be separated from brother, the babe torn from the mother. Each must bear his burden on his own head, each pour forth his own sweat. Eve and Adam are departed, they have gathered what their hands sowed. . . . Have mercy through the Prophet's intercession; let me pass over Sirāt behind him. Those who are misers, cowards, and usurers lose their souls in their accounts, the Kārūns (Corahs) are the world's carrion; the cowardly wretches groan in their grief; they are cut off from the scent of Paradise. Their eyes are fixed on the sun so that their heads boil in hell. My brethren and friends, hear the words of a Rind. This is the song of the hospitable. Their sins are forgotten, they sit on an equality with martyrs and pluck the fruit of the Tūba-tree by the golden dwellings of Paradise and the noble fountains of Kaunsar.'

3. *Another by the same author:*

'Mighty is the Lord without companion; by his power he created the world. God is King, Muhammad his minister, 'Alī the helper and attendant of the Imāmat. There are four angels at the holy gate; one (*Jibrā'īl*) is the ambassador to the prophet, the second (*Mīkā'īl*) rides upon the storm-clouds, the third (*Azrā'īl*) wanders about at deaths, the fourth (*Isrāfīl*) has the trumpet in his mouth, his loins girt up, his eyes on his Lord: the north wind blows from his mouth, and when the Lord gives the order he sweeps all things away.

The pure spirit looks upon his creation; one half he colours like a skilful craftsman, the other half is left plain, with a life of distress. My soul! Do not possess your heart in grief, the place of all is one, in the dust and clay. The prophet is responsible for all creation, men of the faith carry their own provisions for the journey, the five times of prayer and fasting for their sins. Debts are due to God by his slaves, for all are mad and out of their minds; the Almighty will demand his debts, and our hope of paying is in our Surety. With my hands I cling to thy skirt, my eyes are open, my trust is in thee.

When he attacks the infidels and beats the gong of the faith against the ranks of the heathen, men and horses fall in the midst as a tree sheds its leaves. The King breaks the rear of the infidels and they flee at the sight of the Lord Jesus. Then by God's mercy the clouds come, rain pours down with a rainbow, and the earth becomes cool. The prophet will return and proclaim his message to the four quarters, the gardens will bloom for those firm in the faith.'

4. *A Story of Moses the prophet and Sultān Zumzum:*

'Moses the prince was given to wandering, and one day while out hunting he saw a skull lying in a desert place. Seven times did he address the skull, and at the eighth it spoke to him and said:

"I was a king, my name was Sultān Zumzum. I was a king, but I was blind in my rule, a tyrant, and harsh to the poor. I had wealth beyond that of Kārūn. Your herd of camels is three thousand all told (*i.e.* including females and young), but I had three thousand strong male camels of burden, and three thousand youths rode with me, all with golden rings in their ears. As many as your friends are, so many drank of my cup, and when they raced their steeds they spread mattresses on the ground lest the dust which arose from the hard hoofs of the chestnuts should settle on the turban of Zumzum.

One day I took the fancy to go a-hunting; I saw a wild goat in the wilderness and spurred after it, but it disappeared into the air, and I thereupon fell sick of a fever. I became insensible, delirium seized me, and my tongue wandered. Men came to give medicine to Zumzum, but with the Angel of Death medicine is worthless. One hundred and thirty remedies were in my red pouch, but when *he* swoops down he comes on a man suddenly. With a thousand insults he dragged out my breath; they carried out my body to bury it, and when they had buried it, and the funeral procession turned back, I was brought to the Lords of the Club (Munkar and Nakīr), who raised their clubs and struck me in the face, and made my body earth and ashes and fine dust. Ants and snakes feed under my ears, and black wasps make their nests in the hollow of my nostrils. My shrunken eyes are filled with earth and dry sand, and my dried-up teeth are like shrunken betel-nut. . . .

For a while I stayed in that place, and there I saw women with their locks all matted, women who had killed their little children; they were ground under rocky millstones, and their loud lamentations came over the blue water.

For a while I stayed in that place, and there I saw men with their faces and beards all withered up. These are those men who followed unlawful lusts, and cast their eyes on their fathers' and brothers' wives, and trod their brethren under foot.

Pass on now, and tell all the youths who follow after to stay their passions, and to give freely to all who come, without dissimulation. Leave me now and do good to the poor." '

LITERATURE.—Little information is to be found in the works of most travellers in Baluchistān, with the exception of Pottinger (1815) and Masson (1844). Some information may be obtained from Burton's *Sind Revisited* (1877), and from Douie's translation of Hetū-Rām's *Bilūchi-nāma* (Calcutta, 1885). The chapter on Religions by Hughes-Buller in the *Baluchistan Census Report*, 1902, is most valuable. The present writer's monograph, 'The Baluch Race' (*Royal Asiatic Society*, 1904) and an article on 'Balochi Folklore' (*Folklore*, 1902) may also be referred to.

M. LONGWORTH DAMES.

BAMBINO.—'Bambino' is the Italian word for a male infant, especially applied to artistic representations of the Infant Christ, but particularly to certain images or doll-like figures exhibited in churches about the time of the Christmas and Epiphany festivals.

1. Early representations of the Christ Child.—Christian art only by degrees ventured to depict the Saviour. Yet as early as the 2nd cent. a fresco in the catacomb of S. Priscilla at Rome has for its subject the Virgin (represented as a woman of classical type) holding on her knee the Child, naked, his hand on her breast, his face turned round towards the spectator, as in the best artistic types of much later times. To the left stands a male figure, the prophet Isaiah, pointing to a star (Michel, *Histoire de l'Art*, Paris, 1906, i. 134; Liell, *Die Darstellungen der allerseligsten Jungfrau und Gottesgebärerin Maria*, Freiburg, 1887, 316). A similar fresco with the same figures is found in the catacomb of Domitilla, and dates from the 3rd century. The Virgin and Child is the subject of several other frescoes on the walls of the catacombs, and doubtless many more have perished. In certain cases the adoration of the Magi before the Child is represented, the Magi being two (catacomb of SS. Peter and Marcellin, 3rd cent.), three, or four (catacomb of Domitilla) in number. Here the infant is naked, in swaddling-clothes, or clad in a tunic and seated on his mother's knee (Michel, i. 34; Leclercq, *Manuel d'Archéol. chrétienne*, Paris, 1907, i. 194). The prototype of all these Magi representations occurs in the catacomb of Priscilla, where the Child is in swaddling-clothes (Liell, 225). From the time of Constantine onwards, if not before, the scenes of the Infancy were depicted in fresco on the walls of churches—the Nativity, the crib with the Child, the ox and ass looking on, the shepherds, the adoration of the Magi, etc. (S. John Damascene, *Epist. ad Theophilum*, c. 3; Michel, i. 171; Leclercq, ii. 186). To the period after the peace of the Church belongs a

new method of representing these scenes of the Infancy, viz. in mosaic, an art already in use in the catacombs. An early example is found in the decorations of S. Maria Maggiore in the 5th cent. by Sixtus III., where among other subjects is that of the Adoration, the Magi presenting gifts to the Child, who is seated on a throne and makes a gesture of benediction (Michel, i. 49). The arts of bas-relief and sculpture also depicted the scenes of the Infancy. The earliest known examples of these are found on sarcophagi from the catacombs, which give the first representation of the crib. The Child lies in a basket crib; the ox and ass, Joseph and the Virgin, the Magi, and the shepherds are also represented. To the year A.D. 343 belongs the first example which has been preserved (Michel, i. 66; Leclercq, ii. 317). Similar scenes were represented in statuesque decorations of churches. Figures of the Magi seeking and adoring the Infant Christ seated on his mother's knee were sculptured on the ambon of a church at Salonica, dating from the 5th cent. (Michel, i. 261); while a fragment of a statue of the Virgin and Child, probably from another 4th cent. church, exists in a museum at Constantinople (Reinach, *Catalogue du musée d'antiquités*, Constantinople, 1882, 62). The Virgin and Child are also represented on early gems, one in the Cabinet de France being dated before A.D. 340 (Babelon, *Guide Illustré*, Paris, 1900, 1400*b*), and on a variety of works in metal, glass, etc. The themes of the Nativity, and the Madonna and Child, were favourite subjects for art treatment in every department, but especially in painting, which down to the present time has produced innumerable examples, some attaining the highest degree of artistic skill, of the Mother and her Divine Child.

It has sometimes been claimed that the representations of the Madonna and Child are founded on those of the Egyptian Isis suckling Horus (cf. Budge, ii. 220–221). But whatever the stories of the Apocryphal Gospels and the later cult of the Virgin may owe to the myth and cult of Isis, the earliest examples in which the Madonna and Child are represented are purely classical in form, and there is no reason to doubt their originality. Certain Coptic representations may continue the pagan Egyptian types, since there is a close resemblance between the two; while later Byzantine images or paintings probably borrow certain accessories from pagan sources, perhaps through Gnostic influences, especially after the cult of the Virgin developed. But the simplicity of the composition—a mother suckling or holding her child, would tend to make all representations, whether pagan (a goddess and child) or Christian (the Madonna and the Infant Christ), similar in character and type; and there is no reason to suppose that the early Christian artists had to borrow the *motif* from existing pagan models. Thus certain Buddhist examples closely resemble the Christian representations, while an Egyptian stele, which almost certainly depicts Isis and Horus and a worshipper, had been adapted to Christian uses, and has frequently been regarded as depicting the Virgin and Child (Leclercq, ii. 325). The same *motif* is found in Græco-Roman, Assyro-Babylonian, and Hindu religious art. The council of Ephesus (A.D. 431) defined the manner in which the Virgin and Child were to be represented.

2. Liturgical drama.—The Bambino as an image is connected with the liturgical and symbolic elements of the Christmas festival. The dramatic aspect of Christian beliefs, culminating in the Mystery-plays, was already present in germ both in liturgy and ceremonial. First, the custom of antiphonal singing and the use of antiphons suggested dialogue, while the symbolical actions in various parts of the service suggested dramatic action. But more particularly the tropes sung at festivals in the form of dialogue were a point of departure for the Mystery-play. Thus a 9th cent. MS at S. Gall already has a dialogued trope for Easter (Gautier, *Hist. de la poésie liturgique*, Paris, 1887, i. 216). This seems to have given rise to others of the same character for Christmas. One of these is found in an 11th cent. MS, in which two *cantores* represent the shepherds, and are addressed by two deacons in the words: 'Quem quæritis in præsepe, pastores, dicite?' They answer: 'Salvatorem Christum Dominum, infantem pannis involutum, secundum sermonem angelicum.' To this the deacons reply: 'Adest hic parvulus cum Maria,' etc. (Gautier, 215). These tropes at first had their place before mass, but were sometimes separated from it. In the 10th cent. the Easter tropes are connected with the mimetic action and exhibition of the empty sepulchre, which probably had a separate origin as a symbolic act (see the *Concordia Regularis* of S. Ethelwold, Dugdale, *Monasticon*, I. xxvii.). Similarly the Christmas tropes gave rise to a liturgical drama, in which a *præsepe* ('manger' or 'crib') with an image of the Virgin and Child was the central feature. Clergy as shepherds approached the choir, and heard a boy as the angel singing 'Gloria in excelsis.' They were met by priests *quasi obstetrices* singing 'Quem quæritis,' etc., and the dialogue of the trope and adoration by the shepherds followed. This is from an *Officium Pastorum* used in the 14th cent., and probably earlier, at Rouen (Davidson, *English Mystery Plays*, 1892, 173). A similar office occurs in the *Ordinarium* of Amiens, 1291; and here the figure of a child was placed in the *præsepe*, and it is supposed that the office originated not later than the 11th century. But here, as in the Easter drama, the *præsepe* probably had a separate existence before it was connected with the dialogued trope. This *Officium Pastorum* was early connected with a similar dramatic representation of the Three Kings, which originally had also a central symbolic action, that of the movement of a star across the church. In a Rouen *Officium Stellæ* (Davidson, 176) the kings point to a star and sing. The office included the showing of the Virgin and Child to the kings, while they worshipped and offered their gifts. Elsewhere the two offices followed each other, and occasionally they were combined into one drama. In 1336, at Milan, an elaborate representation took place, the kings, with their attendants, walking in procession to a church, on one side of the high altar of which was a *præsepe* with the ox and ass, and the Madonna and Child (Chambers, *Book of Days*, 1863, i. 62). To such early dramatic forms the rise of the Mystery-play must be traced. But the exhibition of the *præsepe* was probably not at first connected with the liturgical office, and it still exists as a mere spectacle, without accompanying dramatic action (see Chambers, *Mediæval Stage*, 1903, ii. chs. 18, 19).

3. The præsepe.—Later tradition ascribed the origin of the *præsepe* to S. Francis of Assisi in the year 1223. Having obtained the Pope's permission, he caused a scenic representation to be prepared in the church at Greccio on Christmas Eve. In it an ox and ass figured, and all was prepared in accordance with the narrative of the Nativity in realistic detail. The whole population flocked to see the sight, the saint stood rapt by the manger, and mass was said (Mrs. Oliphant, *Francis of Assisi*, 1871, 223). But such *præsepia* were certainly in existence long before. The earliest form of such representations is probably not now discoverable, but Origen says: 'There is shown at Bethlehem the cave where Christ was born, and the manger in the cave where He was wrapped in swaddling-clothes. And this sight is greatly talked of in surrounding places' (*adv. Celsum*, bk. i. cap. 1). S. Jerome complains that pagans celebrated the rites of Adonis in the cave (*Ep. ad Paulinum*, 58), but after S. Helena built the basilica over the cave in A.D. 335 it became a regular place of pilgrimage, and was luxuriously adorned. A homily ascribed to S. Gregory Thaumaturgus, and dating at latest about the beginning of the 5th cent., and certain sermons of S. Proclus, bp. of Constantinople (A.D. 432–446), both use language which suggests actual representations in churches of the Virgin and Child and Joseph in a Nativity scene (Pitra, *Anal.*

Sacra, iv. 394; *PG* lxv. 711). Such figured representations may first have been introduced in connexion with the manger-cave of the basilica at Bethlehem, and, if so, would rapidly be imitated elsewhere. In the West the earliest notices of a *præsepe* are connected with the Church of S. Maria Maggiore at Rome. This church, originally built in the 4th cent. by Pope Liberius, was re-constructed and dedicated to the Virgin by Sixtus III. (432–440). In the 7th cent., if not earlier, it was known as *S. Maria ad præsepe*; and this points to a 'crib' in the church, which may even have existed in the basilica as built by Liberius (Usener, *Religionsgesch. Untersuchungen*, Bonn, 1889, i. 288, 290). This 'crib' was in a chapel in the right aisle, described in the time of Gregory III. (731–741) as an 'oratory,' and in that of Sergius II. (843–847) as a 'chamber' (*Lib. pontif.*, *ap.* Usener, i. 280). Here the Pope celebrated mass on Christmas Eve, the crib serving as an altar. Probably the 'manger' was at first only a copy of that in the cave at Bethlehem, but figures may have been associated with it at an early date. Gregory III. furnished it with a statue of the Madonna and Child in gold. This crib-chapel became the model for others. Gregory IV. (827–843) erected a similar one in the Church of S. Maria in Trastevere, which he provided with 'imaginem auream habentem historiam dominæ nostræ cum diversis et pretiosis gemmis.' This probably refers to actual figures in a Nativity scene (Usener, i. 291). To such crib-chapels may be traced all others, whether permanent or temporary, in mediæval and later church usage.

4. **The Santissimo Bambino.**—Of all examples of the *præsepe* with figures of the Child, that of the Church of S. Maria in Ara-Cœli at Rome is the most famous. It is arranged with many accessories—side-scenes, vistas, and lights in the Chapel of the Presepio—and exhibited from Christmas to Epiphany. In a grotto are the Virgin, with the Bambino on her knee, and S. Joseph. Behind are the ox and ass, and grouped around are the shepherds and kings. Arranged in perspective in the background is a pastoral landscape, with small figures of shepherds and flocks, giving the idea of distance. Women are represented bringing presents of fruit. The whole scene is beautifully arranged to give the illusory effect of reality, while above is represented the Father, with angels and cherubs. Formerly Augustus and the Sibyl pointed to the Child, the legend being that the Emperor raised an altar on the site of the church to the Son of God, whose advent was made known to him from the Sibylline books. During the festival season the Presepio is visited by crowds of people. On Epiphany, mass being concluded, a procession of clergy moves towards the chapel, and, arrived there, the bishop removes the Bambino from the arms of the Madonna with much solemnity. To the strains of triumphal music, the image is borne through the church to the great outer steps. There it is elevated by the bishop before the kneeling crowd, while the music thunders and censers are swung. This done, it is carried back to the chapel. The more important figures are of life-size, painted and appropriately dressed. The Bambino is of olive wood, rudely carved and painted. It is magnificently dressed, and covered with great numbers of costly jewels, while during the period of its exhibition it wears a crown encrusted with rich gems. During the festal season the stairway of the church is thronged with pedlars selling sacred objects, among others prints of the Bambino, and wax dolls clad in cotton wool representing the Child. During the rest of the year the Bambino is kept in the inner sacristy, where it is shown to pilgrims and visitors. An inscription in the sacristy relates that a devout Minorite carved the image in Jerusalem out of wood from the Mount of Olives, that it might be used at this festival. But, as paint was lacking to make it more lifelike, prayer was offered that fresh colours might be bestowed upon it by Divine interposition. The vessel which carried it to Rome was wrecked, but the image was floated ashore in its case, and, being recognized by the brethren there (for its fame had spread from Jerusalem to Italy), it was brought to its destination in safety. According to popular belief, the painting was miraculously done by St. Luke or by an angel.

To the Bambino are ascribed miraculous powers of healing, and it is taken with great ceremony to patients in cases of severe illness. A special carriage is provided for the image, which is accompanied by two *frati*; and, as it passes through the streets, the people show it great devotion, kneeling or crossing themselves, while some implore its assistance for their needs, spiritual or temporal. At one time the Bambino was left on the bed of the patient, but now it is never out of sight of its attendants; because on one occasion a woman, feigning illness, exchanged another image for the Bambino, sending the fraud back in its place. During the night the *frati* were disturbed by knocking at the door of the church. Hastening thither and opening it, they found the Bambino waiting to be admitted, having returned of its own accord. In a variant of this tale, the Bambino was stolen from the church and returned at night, the thief being thus discomfited. The story is referred to in the inscription. It is obvious that the Bambino is regarded as a species of fetish; and this appears further in the popular belief that, when carried to the sick-bed of a child, it reddens if the child is to recover, and turns pale if it is to die (Story, *Roba di Roma*, 1875, 74 ff.; Rouse, *FL*, 1894, v. 7; Hare, *Walks in Rome*, 1903, i. 102; Tuker and Malleson, *Handbook to Christian and Eccl. Rome*, 1900, ii. 212). Similar exhibitions of the *præsepe*, some of them equally elaborate, are seen in other Italian churches (see Rouse, *loc. cit.*), and they are a usual feature in most Roman Catholic and in some Anglican churches, the equivalent name being *crèche* or 'crib.'

Other images of the Infant Christ, though not used in the representation of a *præsepe*, have acquired great fame. Some of these are black, as in the parish church of Mont-Saint-Michel in Brittany, and some are well known as being equally miraculous with the Santissimo Bambino, *e.g.* the famous miraculous image, dating from the 17th cent., in the church of the Carmelite Fathers at Prague.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given in full in the course of the article.

J. A. MacCULLOCH.

BAN.—See CURSING AND BLESSING.

BANERJEA, KRISHNA MOHAN.—Krishna Mohan Banerjea was one of the early converts of the North India Protestant Missions, and one of the most learned Indians of his time. He was born at Calcutta in 1813, and spent his life in that city. A Brāhman by caste, even among Brāhmans he belonged to the *kulins*, or recognized aristocracy, his family claiming descent from one of the *ṛṣis* or ancient sages. The distinguished Indians of the 19th cent. were the product of the new life inspired by India's contact with the West through British rule. Dr. K. M. Banerjea was no exception, and in the capital of India, where he was brought up, the new influences were naturally most direct and concentrated. In 1828 the Brāhmo Samāj, or Indian Theistic Church, had been founded at Calcutta by Rammohun Roy and others. In

1830, Dr. Duff, first missionary of the Church of Scotland, had landed in Calcutta. But the influence that confessedly formed young Banerjea in his teens was that of a Eurasian, Derozio, a master in the Calcutta Hindu College, which Banerjea had entered in 1824. Derozio's openness of manner, his enthusiasm, and his thoroughgoing rationalism and radicalism quite carried away his youthful disciples, and indeed affected the minds of a whole generation in Calcutta. In that atmosphere of negation and destruction, in 1830, we find K. M. Banerjea leader of a youthful band publicly repudiating Hinduism and all religious belief, and demanding the abolition of caste and the education of Hindu women. On one occasion, in 1831, the leaders went to the extreme of throwing pieces of beef into Hindu houses, wantonly and grossly outraging the feelings of Hindus. The insult was naturally followed by the excommunication of young Banerjea from his family and caste; but a few European, Eurasian, and Hindu friends still gave him countenance, and the reformer thus contrived to continue what he felt to be a holy war on behalf of religion and his countrymen. Gradually he came under the influence of Dr. Duff, in whom he found an equally ardent temperament, but also convictions as definite and positive as his own had been merely negative and critical. October 1832 finally saw Krishna Mohan Banerjea received into the Christian Church by Dr. Duff.

The great native reformer, Rammohun Roy, was still living in 1832 at the time of Banerjea's conversion. Both men possessed an acute and powerful intellect, and manifested an independence of character which would have been noteworthy even in a European. But the younger possessed an intensity of temperament lacking in his great contemporary. Rammohun Roy's campaign had been that of reason against unreason, and his progress was from Hinduism to Hindu Theism [as he conceived it to be], and thence to non-militant Unitarian Christianity, of an orthodox type. The progress of K. M. Banerjea, on the other hand, was from Hinduism to repudiation of religious belief; out of which, again, he passed, as decidedly, to strong personal Christian faith and strenuous advocacy of what he believed.

Taking orders in the Church of England in 1839, K. M. Banerjea thus became the first ordained native clergyman of that Church in North India, the first in all probability of any non-Roman Church. In the Anglican community in Calcutta he soon became the leading figure, taking a large share in the work of the Anglican Mission College [Bishop's College] and in the translation of theological and religious literature for the young Christian community. He has justly been called the Father of Bengali Christian Literature. But his activity was by no means limited to the Indian Christian community. In journalism and in every public movement connected with education or the general welfare, he was in the forefront. Two of his articles in the early numbers of the *Calcutta Review*, founded in 1844, on 'The Kulin Brāhman of Bengal' and 'Hindu Caste,' are of special value to the historical student as first-hand and reliable evidence of former socio-religious conditions now considerably modified. With these may be conjoined a later paper on 'Human Sacrifice' in the *JRAS*, written in 1876. In 1846 he began the publication of a work of great importance in its day, the *Encyclopædia Bengalensis*, a series of thirteen volumes in English and Bengali. In it, for the first time, Euclid was presented to the people of India in one of their vernaculars. In later years we find his attention devoted more particularly to Sanskrit and Hindu Philosophy. For the Asiatic Society of Bengal he edited two Sanskrit texts, the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* and the *Nārada Pañcharātra*, both published in the Society's *Bibliotheca Indica*; subsequently also, for the same Society, an English translation of the *Brahma Sūtras* with Śaṅkara's Commentary, and of the *Mahimnastava*, a hymn to Śiva. An edition of a portion of the *Rigveda* with notes and an introductory essay appeared in 1875.

The work by which Dr. K. M. Banerjea is best known to students of India is his *Dialogues on the Hindu Philosophy*, an English work, published in 1861 both at Calcutta and London, and afterwards translated into Bengali. In the dialogues, Satyakāma [Desire of Truth], representing the modern spirit of impartial philosophic inquiry, discusses with representatives of traditional orthodoxy the relationship of the Vedas, Buddhism, the six philosophical systems, and Brāhmanism. Satyakāma proceeds by the historical method, setting forth as foundation the chronological relationship of the various systems to one another and to Buddhism. The six systems he regards as rationalizing efforts on the part of the Brāhmanical order, partly the outcome of the rationalistic spirit that had already called forth Buddhism, and partly designed to controvert Buddhism. Of the philosophical systems, all of which Dr. Banerjea thus dates later than Buddhism, he puts the Nyāya earliest, then the Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṅkhya. The application of the historical method to a subject so involved and obscure constitutes the chief merit and originality of the *Dialogues*. As a critic in the *Westminster Review* in 1862, believed to be Professor Goldstücker of London University, observes, no writer before Dr. Banerjea 'had ever attempted to give so continuous and graphic a sketch of the origin and sequence of the various portions of Hindu Philosophy.' It was, of course, almost inevitable, where so much is mere inference, that the historical conclusions of the pioneer should not go unchallenged. Dr. Goldstücker himself regarded the Mīmāṁsa system as the oldest. Professor Macdonell (*Sanskrit Literature*) and others regard the Sāṅkhya as the oldest among the Hindu rationalizing and systematizing schemes, and as forming the basis of the two heterodox systems of Buddhism and Jainism. Apart from the chronological order, however, Dr. Banerjea's exposition of the systems is justified by the latest writers as against his early critic. His declaration regarding the Sāṅkhya denial of a Supreme Soul is now accepted without question by modern students. The atheism of the Sāṅkhya system and the fundamental ignoring of deity in other systems Dr. Banerjea associates with the conception of the eternity of souls implied in the doctrine of transmigration common to all the systems alike. That again is virtually the position of Professor Macdonell, viz. that the doctrine of transmigration scarcely leaves room for the idea of deity. Dr. Banerjea's position in regard to Vedāntic pantheism, repudiated by his critic in the *Westminster Review*, is similarly not far from the position of modern Sanskritists. Vedāntic pantheism, according to the *Dialogues*, is essentially as much a denial of deity as it is professedly a denial of man, and fails to supply the dualism implied and inherent in the idea of duty.

The author's erudition we find more directly enlisted in the cause of Christianity and his countrymen in *The Arian* [Aryan] *Witness to Christianity*, published in 1875. It belongs to the period of Indian missionary work in the 19th cent., in which stress was laid upon the discovering in Hinduism of a preparation or call for Christianity, if not also of the rudiments of Christian doctrines. Dr. Banerjea's main point, for example, is that in

the sacrifice of Puruṣa, the primeval male,* elsewhere put as the self-sacrifice of Prajāpati himself, the Lord of Creation, we have ideas closely akin to those of the voluntary atoning death of Christ, the Eternal Son of God, who was both God and Man. Such reasoning, however, has no longer the same prominence. Experience has shown that such parallels, while confirmatory and helpful to men already convinced, bring Christianity no nearer to Hindus than it brings Christianity to Hinduism.

Dr. Banerjea was all his life a standing refutation of the libel on Indian Christians that they are unpatriotic. He was one of the first *elected* representatives to the Calcutta Municipality in 1876; and in his old age, in 1883, he identified himself with a movement for constitutional political agitation both in India and Britain, of which the National Congress may be called the fruit. Native education likewise had no warmer advocate, as his earlier publications and his evidence before the Education Commission of 1883 testify. Without fear of either native or English opinion, he was a man of public spirit in the truest sense. The University of Calcutta recognized his position as a scholar by electing him President of the Faculty of Arts, 1867–1869, and further, in 1876, by the bestowal of the honorary degree of D.L., which has been given to only two other Indians during the fifty years' existence of the University. His public services were recognized by the conferring upon him of the 'Companionship of the Indian Empire' in 1885, the year of his death.

LITERATURE.—*Biographical Sketch* by Ramachandra Ghosha, Calcutta, 1893; cf. *History of the Church Missionary Society*, London, 1899, vol. i. pp. 307 *f.*, 315, vol. ii. pp. 503–524; G. Smith, *Life of Alexander Duff*, London, 1879.

JOHN MORRISON.

BANIĀ, BANYĀ (Skr. *vaṇijya, baṇijya*, 'trade, traffic').—A generic name for the great merchant caste of Northern and Western India. Under the titles of Baniā, Banyā, or Vānī, persons numbering 2,898,126 recorded themselves at the Census of 1901. But this does not include numerous practically identical castes, like the Agarwālā, numbering 557,596; the Oswāl, 382,712; the Māṛwāṛī, 49,108, and many others. These may be taken as examples of the religion of this caste in general.

The Agarwālā, who are found in greatest numbers in the United Provinces and Rājputāna, are mostly orthodox Hindus, the Jaina element being quite inconsiderable. Like all classes of the population who, under the protection of British rule, obtain promotion to a higher social rank than they ever acquired under the native governments, they are precise and liberal in the observances of their religion; and at domestic ceremonies, such as birth, marriage, and death, are notorious for their lavish expenditure on Brāhmans. Most of them follow the humanitarian cult of Vishṇu; and though a small minority observe the rule of Śiva and of the Śakti, or Mother-goddesses, in deference to tribal feeling they abstain from sacrificing animals and consuming meat and spirituous liquor. The small Jaina section observe the same social rules, and are even more careful of animal life than those who are orthodox Hindus. Hence, owing, perhaps, to the uniformity in matters of diet and other social observances, there is no bar to intermarriage between the followers of the two creeds. When husband and wife differ in religion, the wife is usually admitted formally into the religion of her husband, and, accordingly, when she visits the home of her parents, she must have her food separately cooked. The usual tribal deity of the Agarwālā sub-caste is Lakshmī, goddess of fortune and beauty, who in the later mythology is frequently identified with Śrī, and is regarded as the consort of Vishṇu. They are careful to perform the *Śrāddha*, or mind-rite, for the repose of the souls of their deceased ancestors. Their tribal legends connect them closely with a primitive snake-cult, and the women worship the snake as an important part of the domestic rites. Among trees they pay special reverence to the *pīpal*, or sacred fig.

The other side of Baniā religion appears among the Oswāl, who, except an insignificant minority, belong to the Jaina faith. They take their name from the old town of Osī in Mārwār, and all their associations connect them with Rājputāna. They employ for their domestic rites a class of Brāhmans, who, when their clients adopted the new Jaina rule, fell from their high estate, and became known by the significant name of Bhojak, 'eaters.' They preside over and receive the offerings dedicated to the footprints of the saints who have passed into a state of beatitude. But the real priests of the Oswāl are the Jaina Jatīs, who are bound by the strictest rules of ceremonial purity, and in particular must avoid any possibility of destroying animal life. The Oswāl make pilgrimage to the chief holy places of Jainism—Mount Ābū, Palitānā, Parasnāth (see artt.); Sametā Sikharā, in Western Bengal, where twenty of the Jinas are said to have attained beatitude; Satrañjāyā and Girnār in Kāthiāwār, sacred respectively to the Jinas Ṛishabhanātha and Neminātha; Charidrapuri, where Vāsupūjya died; and Pāwā in Bengal, the scene of the death of Vardhamāna. The worship thus largely concentrates itself on the cult of the Tīrthakaras, 'the finders of the ford' through the ocean of *saṁsāra*, the revolution of birth and death. They also visit the sacred places of the Hindus, like Benares and Ajudhyā. Of course, no animal sacrifice of any kind is permitted in their temples, and the sordid ostentation of the worshippers is shown by the rule which prevails in some of the Western Indian temples, under which the right to make the daily offerings is set up to auction and sold to the highest bidder. Their chief solemnity is that held in the rainy season, which resembles the retreat (*vārśika*) of the Buddhists, when the wandering monks rested during the inclemency of the monsoon (Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, 80).

Another important sub-caste of the Baniās is the Māṛwāṛī, who take their name from the State of Māṛwāṛ in Rājputāna. According to the Census of 1901, they number 49,108, the vast majority being Hindus. They are most numerous in Hyderābād, but settle in all parts of the Peninsula in search of trade. They are the most active, niggardly money-lenders and small traders in the country. They generally worship the local gods of their native land. Thus in Kanara they worship as their family deities Ambū, Jaypāl, and Hilājī, whose shrines are at Sirohī in Māṛwāṛ; but those of Ahmadnagar worship Bālājī of Tirupati in North Arcot, and in Poona, Kshetrapāla, the guardian deity of Mount Ābū.

Many Baniās, again, are members of the sect of the Vallabhāchārya or Gokulaṣṭha Guṣains. This sect, or rather its pontiffs, known as Mahārājā, or 'great king,' acquired rather disgraceful notoriety in connexion with the celebrated Mahārājā libel case which was tried in Bombay in 1862.

They are thus described by Growse at Mathura:

'They are the Epicureans of the East, and are not ashamed to avow their belief that the ideal life consists rather in social enjoyment than in solitude and mortification. Such a creed is naturally destructive of all self-restraint, even in matters where indulgence is by common consent held criminal; and the profligacy to which it has given rise is so notorious, that the Mahārājā of Jaipur was moved to expel from his capital the ancient image of Gokul Chandrama, for which the sect entertained special veneration, and has further conceived such a prejudice against Vaishṇavas in general, that all his subjects

* *Ṛigveda*, Maṇḍala, x. 90.

are compelled, before they appear in his presence, to mark their foreheads with the three horizontal lines that indicate a votary of Śiva.'

LITERATURE.—For the Agarwālā and Oswāl, see Risley, *Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, 1891, i. 4 ff., ii. 150 f.; Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, 1896, i. 23, iv. 104 f. For the Mārwāri, *Bombay Gazetteer*, xv. pt. i. 191, xvii. 75, xviii. pt. i. 278; *Rājputāna Census Report*, 1901, i. 155; *Panjāb*, do. i. 327 f. For the Vallabhāchārya, [Karsandas Mulji], *History of the Sect of the Maharajas or Vallabhacharyas in Western India*, 1865; *Report of the Maharaj Libel Case*, Bombay, 1862; Growse, *Mathura, a District Memoir*[2], 1883, 261 ff.

W. CROOKE.

BANISHMENT.—1. Banishment (putting under 'ban' or proclamation as an outlaw) is the punishment of expelling an offender from his native land. By analogy with the most primitive surviving social systems, we can infer that in very early stages of civilization the family was the unit of society, and that any member of a family who disputed the rule of its head was cast out. As civilization advanced, and families and tribes united to form States, the easiest way, short of summary execution, to rid the State of an evil-doer was to expel him from its boundaries. We find evidence of this in the records of all ancient nations.

2. In ancient Israel, banishment invariably occurs as a Divine, not a human, punishment. Such was the banishment of Adam from the Garden of Eden (Gn 3^{24}), and of Cain from the presence of the Lord (Gn 4^{16}). This penalty was inflicted not only on individuals, but on the whole nation. The Captivities befell the idolatrous people, but the assurance, 'the Lord will gather thee, and will bring thee into the land which thy fathers possessed' (Dt $30^{4ff.}$), lent to banishment the character of a temporary punishment, of a trial of faith. In Rabbinical Law, banishment (*gālūth*) is the name given to the fleeing of the manslayer, in cases of unintentional murder, to one of the Cities of Refuge (*Sifrê Num.* 60; *Mak.* ii. 6). The banishment spoken of by Abtalion (*Aboth.* i. 12, ed. Taylor) as befalling 'the wise' refers to political events. The Pharisees, during the reign of Queen Salome Alexandra, exerted 'the power and authority of banishing and bringing back whomsoever they chose' (Jos. *BJ* I. v. 2; cf. also *JE* ii. 490 f.).

3. In India, banishment was a recognized form of punishment as early as the Vedic period, for *Rigveda* X. lxi. 8 clearly alludes to the 'exile' (*parāvṛj*) as fleeing to the south; while the later codes prescribe banishment for those who express hostile sentiments concerning the king, or for false witnesses; and crimes punished by death in the case of the lower castes, were visited with banishment in the case of Brāhmans (Jolly, *Recht und Sitte*, Strassburg, 1896, pp. 127, 129, 142). Among the Teutonic peoples, banishment was equally well known, as is shown by Old High German *reccho*, Old Norse *rekr*, Old Saxon *wrekkio*, and Anglo-Saxon *wrecca*, 'exile,' 'outcast,' 'wretch' (cf. Schrader, *Reallexikon der indogerm. Altertumskunde*, Strassburg, 1901, p. 835); while among the Gauls, at least in some cases, murder of a compatriot was punished by banishment, at all events from the territory of the city (Dottin, *Manuel pour servir à l'étude de l'antiquité celtique*, Paris, 1906, p. 191 f.).

4. In Greece, banishment seldom appears as a punishment appointed by law for particular offences. The general term *φυγή*, in heroic times, was applied, for the most part, to those who, to escape some punishment or danger, fled from their own State to another. This was the rule in cases of homicide. Even in historical times, exile was usually voluntary, to escape the death-sentence for murder. The accused was permitted to leave the country after the first day of trial; but in that case he was condemned to perpetual banishment and confiscation of property. When appointed by law as the punishment for certain offences, banishment might be for a specified period, as in cases of accidental homicide; or, if the crime was sacrilege, the murder of a non-citizen, or wounding with intent to kill, the penalty was exile for life. Ostracism (*q.v.*), a form of banishment peculiar to Athens, was designed to guard against any citizen becoming a tyrant. After passing a decree that an ostracism should take place, on a fixed day the citizens voted by tribes in the agora, each writing on an *ὄστρακον* the name of the man he considered a danger to the State. He who obtained the majority of votes, provided there was a minimum of 6000, was banished for ten years, though he might be recalled earlier by a special vote.

5. In Rome, during the Republic, *exsilium* meant banishment inflicted by the State as a punishment, accompanied by loss of *civitas*; if the person banished did not cease to be a *civis*, it was not properly *exsilium* but *relegatio*. Since the Romans shrank from depriving a man of his citizenship, *exsilium* was very rare. The accused, however, might voluntarily go into exile to escape capital punishment; and in the earlier times of the Republic, a Roman citizen had the right of going into *exsilium* to another State, by virtue of the isopolitical relations between that State and Rome. The voluntary withdrawal of the criminal being regarded as an admission of his guilt, the Romans confirmed it by a *plebiscitum*, which gave it a legal character; and, to prevent his return, forbade the citizens to afford him shelter, fire and water (*aquæ ignis tecti interdictio*). In later times it became usual to inflict this punishment as an ordinary penalty, independent of any voluntary withdrawal on the part of the criminal. The Emperors introduced a new form of banishment—*deportatio in insulam*—by which the criminal was confined for life, or for an indefinite time, to an island or other prescribed space, within which he had personal liberty though he suffered loss of *civitas*. This gradually supplanted the old *interdictio*.

6. During the Middle Ages banishment was a common punishment, and indeed still occurs among many nations. In England the punishment of banishment was prohibited by Magna Charta, but was still practised, as a criminal was permitted to go into voluntary exile to escape death. The punishment was again made legal by the Vagrancy Act of Queen Elizabeth, which, by giving Justices power 'to banish offenders and remove them to such parts beyond the seas as should be assigned by H.M. Privy Council,' contained the germ of transportation. This Act was given full effect in the reign of James I., 1619 ('100 dissolute persons to be sent to Virginia'), though the name 'transportation' does not occur till the reign of Charles II. In 1718 the system of transportation became more fully developed; political offenders and others who had escaped the death-penalty were handed over to contractors for transportation to the American Colonies, and these contractors farmed out the convicts to the planters as labourers. The War of Independence, however, ended this system. After 1787, Penal Colonies were founded in Australia, in New South Wales. At first the convicts were employed on Government works, but as their numbers increased they were hired out to private employers. Supervision was necessarily lax, and the convicts terrorized the country, so that the worst offenders were returned to the care of the Government and confined in the penal settlements. The Australians began to protest in 1835, and transportation gradually diminished, till in 1867 the penal settlements in Australia and Tasmania were abolished in favour of convict prisons at home. France and Russia still maintain the system of transportation. The French penal settlements founded in French

Guiana in 1853 were disastrous, owing to the unhealthy climate and the harsh regulations, so they were abandoned in 1864 except for Negro and Arab convicts. The Settlements in New Caledonia, however, are still continued. Russia transports criminals and political offenders to Siberia, where, after a term of imprisonment, they are employed in mining and agriculture.

Transportation has not been found to act as a deterrent from crime. It does not possess the reformatory qualities which are an essential part of an effective system of punishment. See OSTRACISM, OUTLAWRY, PUNISHMENT.

W. D. MORRISON and I. LOW.

BANJĀRA (Skr. *vanij*, 'a merchant,' *kāraka*, 'doing').—The tribe of wandering grain-carriers in India, which at the Census of 1901 numbered 765,861, most numerous in Hyderābād, but found in all the Indian provinces. As a result of their wandering habits, which have now much decreased since the carrying trade has fallen into the hands of the railway authorities, they are a very mixed race. Their origin is probably Dravidian, but they now all trace their descent from the Brāhman or Rājput tribes of Northern India. It is in the Deccan and in the State of Hyderābād that they still retain more of their primitive beliefs and customs than in the scattered colonies in the more northern parts of the country, where they have largely fallen under Hindu or Muhammadan influence. Of the Deccan branch an excellent account has been given by Cumberlege from the Wūn district of the province of Berār. There they seem to be descendants of the emigrant sutlers who followed the Muhammadan armies into Southern India. Though some vague references to them have been traced in the earlier Sanskrit literature, the first mention of them in Musalmān history is in the account of Sikandar's attack on Dholpur in A.D. 1504 (Elliot, *History of India*, v. 100; Briggs, *Ferishta*, i. 579).

1. *Religion of the Deccan Banjāras: witchcraft.*—In the legends of the Deccan branch of the tribe, Guru Nānak, the founder of the Sikh faith, figures as a worker of miracles and as their spiritual adviser. They have a priest or medicine-man, known as a *bhagat*, or devotee (Skr. *bhakti*, 'faith,' 'devotion'). He is called in to cure all manner of disease, which they believe to be the result of the attacks of evil spirits, sorcery, or witchcraft. In fact, there are few Indian tribes more witch-ridden than the Banjāra. They are, says Lyall (*Asiatic Studies*[2], 1st series, 117 f.),

'terribly vexed by witchcraft, to which their wandering and precarious existence especially exposes them, in the shape of fever, rheumatism, and dysentery. Solemn inquiries are still held in the wild jungles where these people camp out like gypsies, and many an unlucky hag has been strangled by sentence of their secret tribunals. In difficult cases they consult the most eminent of their spiritual advisers or holy men who may be within reach; but it is usual, as a proper precaution against mistakes which even learned divines may commit, to buy some trifling article on the road to the consultation, and to try the diviner's faculty by making him guess what it may be, before proceeding to matters of life or death. The saint works himself into a state of demoniac possession, and gasps out some woman's name. She is killed by her nearest relative or allowed to commit suicide, unless indeed her family are able to make it worth the diviner's while to have another fit, and to detect some one else.'

2. *Gods of the Deccan branch.*—These Deccan Banjāras have a large pantheon of deities. First comes Mariyāī or Mahākālī, the great Mother-goddess in her most terrible form. It is she who is supposed to enter the *bhagat* medicine-man and inspire him to utter oracles. The Chāran branch are deists, with special proclivities towards Sikhism, which they brought with them from their original home in the Panjāb. With them Guru Nānak, the founder of Sikhism, is supreme. They also worship Bālājī, or Kṛishṇa in his infant form; Tuljā Devī, the famous South Indian Mother of Tuljāpur in the State of Hyderābād; a number of deified men, such as Śiva Bhaiyyā, a holy man of Pohorā in the Wūn district in the Berār province; Satī, the ghost of some noted woman who perished on the funeral pyre of her husband; and Miṭṭhū Bhūkiyā, a famous freebooter of olden days. For the last a hut is set apart in every camp, and, when a white flag is raised before it, this is a sign that the people are engaged in the worship of Miṭṭhū Bhūkiyā, who is always invoked to give his aid when any plundering expedition or other crime is being planned. In such cases an appeal is also made to the deified Satī. Clarified butter is placed in a saucer, and in this a wick is lighted. Appeal is then made to Satī for an omen, the worshippers mentioning in a low tone the object of the contemplated expedition. The wick is watched, and, should it drop, the omen is regarded as auspicious.

3. *Ox-worship in Central India.*—In Central India the Banjāras have a peculiar form of ox-worship. This animal is known as Hatādiyā (Skr. *hatya-ādhya*, 'he whom it is an exceeding sin to slay'), and he is devoted to the service of the god Bālājī, or Kṛishṇa in his infant form. No burden is ever laid upon the animal, and he is decorated with streamers of red silk and tinkling bells, with many brass chains and rings on his neck and feet, and strings of cowry shells and tassels. He moves steadily at the head of the convoy, and wherever he lies down there they make their halting-place during the heat of the day. At his feet they make vows whenever trouble befalls them, and in illness, whether of themselves or among their cattle, they trust to the worship of him for a cure.

4. *Forms of worship in Kāṭhiāwār.*—In Kāṭhiāwār their worship is paid to the dread Mother-goddess, Kālikā Mātā. In Khāndesh they mostly worship Bālājī and Khaṇḍobā, and in honour of the latter a dance known as the Gondhal is often performed in discharge of a vow or on the completion of a marriage. On the day after the Holī, or spring fire-festival, the Lād branch of the tribe have what is known as the Vīra, or hero procession, when one of the descendants of an ancient warrior who died in battle is led in triumph round the camp. At marriages, two married couples, one representing the bride and the other the bridegroom, fast all day, and at night cook a mess of rice, grain, molasses, and butter. While cooking this they cover their faces with a cloth, as the touch of the steam rising from the pot bodes evil to the couple. This food, when cooked, is eaten by the men of the party, and anything that remains must be given to a cow or thrown into a river. To allow a stranger, or the son of a slave, to partake of this holy food is considered a grievous sin, which will bring a fatal curse upon the family. This is known as the worship of Vādhī Devatā, the god of increase. If this rite, which seems to be an elaborate form of *confarreatio*, be not performed at a wedding, the married pair are looked down on by the community. All the sections of the tribe in Khāndesh wear the sacred Brāhmanical thread, worship Bālājī, and celebrate the Gokul-ashṭamī feast, or birthday of Kṛishṇa, with rejoicings and public entertainments. In Nāsik the Lād section worship Khaṇḍobā, Bhairobā, Devī, and Gaṇapati or Gaṇeśa, and keep in their houses images representing their ancestors. When they arrive at a village where there is a temple of Māruti or Hanumān, the monkey god, they worship him daily. In Ahmadnagar their family deities are Vyānkobā of Tirupatī in North Arcot, and Mariyāī, the Mother-goddess, whom they worship in conjunction with the other Hindu gods. Their special pilgrimages are made to Jejurī in Poona, Pandharpur in Sholāpur, and

Tuljāpur in Hyderābād. In Kanara they are specially devoted to the Kṛishṇa cultus.

5. *Religion of the North India Banjāras.* — Passing to Northern India—in Chhattīsgaṛh of the Cent. Prov. they have a special tribal goddess, Banjārī, the impersonated female energy of the tribe, who is represented by a piece of stone daubed with vermilion at the Divālī, or feast of lamps. Farther north those who are Hindus worship the local gods of the places where their camps or settlements are situated. This pantheon is of a very heterogeneous description, including Musalmān saints, like Zāhir Pīr and the Miyān of Amrohā in the Moradābād District, and deified ghosts like Hardaur Lālā, the cholera-god, and Kālū Deo. To these, sacrifices of goats are offered; but sometimes there is not a complete sacrifice, the ear of the animal being only pierced, and a drop or two of blood sprinkled on the altar. In some places, as in the Kherī District of Oudh, they incline towards monotheism, and worship a single Creator under the name of Bhagvān or Parameśvara.

LITERATURE.—The best account of the Banjāras of the Deccan is to be found in a pamphlet by N. R. Cumberlege, printed in abstract in *Berar Gazetteer*, 195 ff., and in full with additions in *North Indian Notes and Queries*, iv. 163 ff. For the United Provinces, see Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, 1896, i. 149 ff., where references to the literature will be found. For the Bombay branch, *BG* viii. 159, xii. 107, 112, xv. pt. i. 330, xvi. 62, xvii. 161 ff. For Central India and the Central Provinces, *JASB* lviii. pt. i. 299.

W. CROOKE.

BANNERS.—1. In considering the use of banners from very early times, and onwards, we must employ the word in a wide sense, for both in form and significance banners have passed through a long and varied history. In their origin, and throughout their history—until down to, comparatively speaking, recent times—banners served primarily a 'religious' purpose, and their object was, in the first instance, to *indicate* something rather than to gather people together. The including of banners, standards, flags, and ensigns within one comprehensive category, while justifiable perhaps in view of modern usage, tends to obscure the originally clear distinction between what corresponded to the staff and the flag respectively. There seems to be no doubt that each of these was represented in very early times; nevertheless, the 'staff'—whether of stone or, later on, of wood—might, and evidently often did, do service for the 'flag' as well. Sometimes what corresponded to the 'flag' was a rude engraving figured *upon* the 'staff,' while at other times the 'flag' was a separate object which was attached to the 'staff'; for as banners always had the primary purpose of indicating something, or of drawing attention to something, the thing indicated could be represented upon the upper part of the 'staff' itself, or else it might be a separate object attached to the 'staff.' The Phœnician *cippi*, for example, dedicated to Tanith and Baal Ḥamman, which often have a hand figured on them, must be objects which have a long history behind them, and represent, as one may reasonably suppose, an early form of 'sign-post.' That primitive pillars of this kind were the originals from which in later times monuments on the one hand, and banners on the other, developed and diverged, seems fairly obvious when all the facts are taken into consideration. An instructive example of a very early kind may be seen, for instance, in the 'banner-stones' of the American Indians. In form these vary greatly, but there are certain fundamental features of their shape which are practically constant, and which are of such a nature as to suggest the justifiable use of this term 'banner-stone.' These features are the 'axial perforations and the extension of the body or midrib into two wing-like projections.' They are strongly reminiscent of the 'double axe' which played such an important part in Minoan worship.* The presence of the perforations makes it probable that these 'banner-stones' were mounted for use on a staff, or on a handle as a ceremonial weapon, or on the stem of a calumet.

'These objects are usually made of varieties of stone selected for their fine grain and pleasing colour, and are carefully shaped and finished. In Florida, and perhaps elsewhere, examples made of shell are found. The perforation is cylindrical, and is bored with great precision longitudinally through the thick portion or midrib, which may symbolically represent the body of a bird. . . . They are found in burial mounds and on formerly inhabited sites generally, and were probably as a class the outgrowth of the remarkable culture development which accompanied and resulted in the construction of the great earthworks of the Mississippi valley.' †

2. Banners of a different character were the poles carried in battle by the *North American Indians*, to the top of which eagles' feathers were attached. A similar custom prevailed among many other savage tribes. These were probably the predecessors of the types of banners in vogue among the nations of ancient civilization. Thus the banners of the *Egyptians* consisted of representations of various kinds—holy animals, the sacred boat, and other emblems, sometimes also the name of a king,‡ fans and feather-shaped symbols—which were raised on the end of a staff, and carried by the standard-bearers of each company when an army was marching out to battle.

'Being raised on a spear or staff, which an officer bore aloft, each standard served to point out to the men their respective regiments, enabled them more effectually to keep their ranks, encouraged them to the charge, and offered a conspicuous rallying point in the confusion of battle.' §

Besides these ordinary banners, there were also the royal banners and those borne by the principal persons of the household near the king himself. Only royal princes or sons of the nobility could carry these.‖ The earliest known representations of Egyptian banners are those found on the votive tablet of Nar-Mer (B.C. 4000–5000) at Hierakonpolis; on this are represented four bearers carrying poles with various emblems on the top of them. Something similar, though the pole is not so long, is found on a relief of Rameses I.; the banner-bearer precedes a company of archers. Banners seem also to have been placed on fortresses; on the Heta-fortress of Dapuru, for example, a standard is fixed; it consists of a shield pierced with arrows upon a pole. This is shown in the representation of a siege.¶ Mention should also be made of the masts which stood in front of the *pylons* and *propylons* of Egyptian temples. These masts were decorated with small flags.** The *Assyrian* banners usually took the form of the representation of a deity placed within a disc fixed to the top of a pole. Immediately beneath the disc there was sometimes a species of ornamentation in the shape of flag-like streamers. Judging from the inscriptions, they were fixed to the chariots. It is noteworthy that in none of the battle scenes given in Layard's magnificent series

*See Evans, 'The Minoan Cult of the Double Axe,' in the *Report of the Third International Congress for the History of Religions* (1908), and art. AXE.

† See F. W. Hodge in the *Handbook of American Indians* ('Bureau of American Ethnology,' Bulletin 30, pt. i., 1907), art. 'Banner Stones,' where the whole subject is treated, and where further literature is referred to. See also Squier and Davis, *Ancient Monuments of the Mississippi Valley* (1848); Wilson, *Prehistoric Man* (1862); Fergusson, *Rude Stone Monuments* (1872); Squier, *Peru* (1877); Schliemann, *Mycenæ* (1878); Moorehead, *Prehistoric Implements* (1900); Evans, *The Ancient Stone Implements, Weapons, and Ornaments of Great Britain*[2] (1897).

‡ D'Alviella, *Migration of Symbols*, p. 220 ff.

§ Diodorus, i. 86, quoted by Wilkinson, *The Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians* (new ed. 1878), i. 196.

‖ Wilkinson, *ib.*; see, further, Rosellini, *Mon. Civili*, pl. cxxi. Nos. 1–15; Rawlinson, *Hist. of Ancient Egypt* (1881), i. 463 ff.

¶ Perrot and Chipiez, *Hist. of Art in Ancient Egypt* (1883), ii. 46.

** Perrot and Chipiez, *op. cit.* ii. 158 f.; cf. Champollion, *Monuments de l'Égypte et de la Nubie, notices descriptives* (1831), p. 504.

do banners figure in connexion with foot-soldiers, though in several cases chariots are furnished with them.* The device usually represented is that of a deity.† In the few *Phœnician* battle-scenes and the like which are extant no sign of any banners appears.‡ The *Persians*, like the Assyrians, fixed their banners on chariots. One of their banner-designs consisted of a golden eagle upon a lance. They also appear to have had masts, similar to those which stood in front of the entrances to Egyptian temples. These, too, were probably decorated with flags.§ The earliest form of banner among the *Greeks* consisted of a piece of armour fixed to the top of a spear; in later times different cities carried sacred emblems, *e.g.* the Athenians the owl and the olive, the Thebans a sphinx, and so on. The Dacians carried on their standard the representation of a serpent, also a dragon; this latter was the military ensign of the Parthians, and is that of the Chinese at the present day. Among the *Romans* there was, firstly, the *vexillum*. This appears to have been the oldest form of banner in the Roman army.‖ It corresponds to the modern flag, its main feature being a piece of cloth with a fringe which hung down from a transverse beam; the name of the legion was embroidered on this. The *vexilla* were the 'standards of those divisions of infantry which were separated from the main division for some special duty, or of the troops of discharged veterans called out for further service.'¶ Secondly, in the Roman army each *maniple* had its own *signum*. When the army was on the march the *signa* were borne in front, but during the battle the *signiferi* stood behind the hindmost rank. The pole of the *signum* was a lance pointed at the lower end so that it might the more easily be fixed into the ground. It had a transverse bar near the top from which ribands hung down. Below this bar there were several discs, varying in number from two to seven. These were usually of silver; below them was the crescent moon, above them either a small shield, or a *corona aurea*, or a symbol of some other kind. These discs could be removed from the pole; this was done at military funerals. The *signum* was also carried on war-galleys.** The standards of the prætorians differed from those of the legions in that crowns took the place of the *phaleræ*; a medallion containing a picture of the Emperor was placed in the middle of the pole. These *imagines*, 'effigies' (*προτομαί*), represented the reigning and earlier Emperors. Another of the Roman standards was the *aquila*, i.e. an eagle with outstretched wings, placed on the top of a long pole; this was usually of silver, but sometimes of gold. The eagle was sometimes represented with an oak-leaf in its beak, perhaps as a presage of victory.††

Among the Indo-Germanic peoples, indeed, the use of banners goes back to very early times. The *Atharva Veda* (v. xxi. 12) speaks of the armies of the gods as *sūryaketu* ('sun-bannered'), and the *Mahābhārata* (XIV. lxxxii. 23) of the hero Meghasandhi as *vānaraketana* ('monkey-bannered'), while *vṛṣabhadhvaja* ('bull-bannered') and *makaraketana* ('dolphin-bannered') are conventional epithets of Śiva and Kāma (the god of love) respectively. In the Avesta (*Yasna* x. 14) there is mention of the 'kine banner' (*gāuš drafšō*), which, in view of the sanctity attached to kine by the Indo-Iranians, may not be without an ultimate totemistic significance. In Rome, besides the instances already noted, previous to the second consulate of Caius Marius, wolves, minotaurs, horses, and boars had figured on the standards of the army in addition to the eagle (Pliny, *HN* x. 16). A similar state of things is implied for the ancient Teutons by Tacitus (*Germania*, vii.), and this is borne out by the fact that the Old High German *chumbirra*, 'tribe,' is cognate etymologically with the Anglo-Saxon *cumbor*, *cumbol*, 'sign' (especially 'military standard'). The Gauls, in like manner, possessed banners with images of theriomorphic deities which were carried into battle, 'car ces enseignes à représentations animales ont une sorte de vie magique; elles menacent véritablement ceux vers qui on les tourne; . . . il se dégageait d'elles des effluves magiques, salutaires à leurs défenseurs, funestes à leurs ennemis, et les dieux se mêlaient ainsi aux guerres des hommes' (Renel, *Religions de la Gaule avant le christianisme*, p. 185). The Arch of Orange represents a number of the Gallic banners, chiefly of boars, though the horse also occurs. It should also be noted that the figure of the theriomorphic deity was often affixed to the helmet among the Gauls as among the Anglo-Saxons (cf. Anglo-Saxon *eoforcumbol*, 'boar-sign,' 'helmet'). The use of banners in war was equally common among the ancient Irish, their word for 'banner' being *meirge*, cognate with the English *mark*, 'sign.'*

All these were originally, without doubt, carried in the belief that they would ensure victory,† a fact which further emphasizes their religious character. The employment of banners as rallying-centres, though very ancient, was a secondary idea; this, however, appears to have been their main use among the *Israelites*. An ensign was set up upon a hill for the purpose of gathering the people together (Is 13^2, cf. 11^{10} 18^3).‡ This was called a נֵס (*nēs*), a word which is used in connexion with the setting up of the brazen serpent in the wilderness (Nu 21^9). Another word used in the OT is דֶּגֶל (*degel*); this would perhaps correspond more with banner in the stricter sense, though the character of both types is conjectural, since no hints as to this are given in the OT.§ According to Nu $2^{2ff.}$ each tribe had its own standard. In *Midrashic literature*‖ it is said that the various emblems and colours of these standards corresponded to the twelve precious stones set in the breast-plate of the high priest. The emblems comprised a lion, a mandrake, the sun and moon, a ship, a snake, etc.¶ On the analogy of the character of other ancient banners, it is possible that a substratum of historical truth may underlie this statement. According to a legend preserved in the *Targum Jerushalmi*, the banner of the Hasmonæans had inscribed upon it the letters מכבי, an abbreviation for מי כמוך באלים יי ('Who is like thee among the mighty, Jahweh!').

3. As an example of another and altogether different use of banners, reference may be made to what

* Layard, *The Monuments of Nineveh*, 1st series (1849), pl. 14, 22, 27; 2nd series (1853), pl. 24.
† See also Ragozin, *Assyria*, 1888, p. 252.
‡ See Perrot and Chipiez, *Hist. of Art in Phœnicia* (1885).
§ Perrot and Chipiez, *Hist. of Art in Persia* (1892), ii. 342.
‖ On a tombstone found at Worms, belonging to the 1st cent. A.D., a soldier is represented carrying this on horseback.
¶ Smith, *Dict. of Greek and Roman Antiquities*, ii. 673.
** An illustration of this may be seen, for example, in Du Fresne, *Familiæ Augustæ Byzantinæ* (1682), pl. v. p. 21.
†† See the exhaustive treatment of the subject in von Domaszewski, *Die Fahnen im römischen Heere* (1885).

* Renel, *Religions de la Gaule avant le christianisme* (1906), pp. 185–186; Jullian, *Recherches sur la religion gauloise* (1903), pp. 70–71; Joyce, *Social History of Ancient Ireland* (1903), i. 135–137. On Indo-Germanic banners in general, see Schrader, *Reallexikon der indog. Altertumskunde* (1901), pp. 207–209, *s.v.* 'Fahne.'
† Cf. the Ark of Israel in battle, 1 S 4[4-8], and the little dwarf figures (*pittuḥîm*) carved on the prow of Phœnician war-galleys.
‡ Cf. the 'Eighteen Blessings' in the modern Jewish Liturgy; in the tenth Blessing occur the words: 'Sound the great horn for our freedom; lift up the ensign to gather our exiles, and gather us from the four corners of the earth'; see Oesterley and Box, *The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue* (1907), p. 222.
§ Cf., for OT data on the subject, Cheyne's art. 'Ensigns and Standards,' in *EBi* ii. 1298 f.
‖ *Bamidbar Rabbah*, ii. ¶ *JE* v. 405[b]

are called 'Trees of the Law' among the *Tibetans*. These are lofty flagstaffs, with silk flags upon them emblazoned with that mystic charm of wonder-working power, the sacred words: *Om Mani padme hūm* ('Ah, the jewel is in the lotus,' *i.e.* [?] the Self-creative force is in the Kosmos).

'Whenever the flags are blown open by the wind, and "the holy six syllables" are turned towards heaven, it counts as if a prayer were uttered—a prayer which brings down blessings, not only upon the pious devotee at whose expense it was put up, but also upon the whole country-side. Everywhere in Tibet these flagstaffs meet the eye.' *

4. Ecclesiastical banners, which were adapted from military usage, have always played a great part in Church ceremonial. The idea underlying the use of these is that of the Christian emblem, figured on the banner, going before the army of Christian soldiers. They are thus intended for processional use. Banners of this kind are, as a rule, attached to a transverse bar which is fixed by means of a cord to the staff; in this way the representation of a cross is made. The banner itself is made of silk, linen, or other material, on which is embroidered or painted the picture of a saint, or a sacred symbol expressive of some Christian truth, or else mottoes, either Biblical or based on some Scripture passage, are inscribed upon it. The use of banners in the Christian Church dates from a very early period, namely, from the time of the Emperor Constantine, at the beginning of the 4th century. According to the well-known story, Constantine saw in a vision the Cross upon a banner which bore the inscription, *τουτῳ νίκα*. On awaking, he caused a banner to be made after the pattern of this, and henceforward the *labarum*, as it was called, was carried before his troops. Upon it was figured the Cross in combination with the initial letters of the name of Christ. The *labarum* was the ordinary cavalry standard (*vexillum*) adapted to a specifically Christian use by having Christian symbols upon it. The eagle of victory surmounting the pole gave place to the sacred monogram placed within a chaplet; other Christian emblems were embroidered upon the banner itself.† Banners used in procession must have come into vogue soon after this. The bearers were called *draconii* or *vexilliferi*. Bede, in describing the approach of St. Augustine and his followers to King Ethelbert, says that they came 'bearing a silver cross for a standard, and the image of the Lord and Saviour painted on a panel.'‡ Gregory of Tours, also, in referring to a procession to a basilica, uses the words 'post crucem præcedentibus signis.'§ A later custom was that of carrying a banner of sackcloth in processions of the reconciliation of penitents. This is prescribed, for example, in the Sarum Use.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given fully throughout the article.

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BĀṄSPHOR (Hindī *bāṅs*, 'a bamboo,' *phoṛna*, 'to split').—A branch of the Ḍom tribe (wh. see), with whom in the Census returns of 1901 the Basor and Basuhā are included, the whole numbering 95,979, of whom a large majority are found in the United and Central Provinces. The chief occupation of Bāṅsphors is, as their name implies, working in bamboo, out of which they make fans, baskets, and boxes. But they also occasionally take service as sweepers, and are therefore subject to the tabu which all orthodox Hindus impose on those who practise a trade of this kind. Their religion is of the animistic type found among all branches of the Ḍom tribe, their chief deities being in Upper India the Vindhyabāsinī Devī, the mountain-goddess of the Vindhyan hills, whose temple is at Bindhāchal in the Mirzāpur District. They also worship local village gods who are venerated in the places where they settle, such as Kālikā and Samai. To the former, at household celebrations, such as marriage and childbirth, a young pig, spirituous liquor, flowers, and ground rice boiled in treacle and milk are offered, all the food after dedication being consumed by the worshippers. The offering to Samai is a yearling pig. The ordinary Hindu feasts are observed, among which in particular the Holī, or fire feast, in spring is celebrated with drinking and coarse revelry, and the Kajarī in the rainy season, when drunkenness prevails and all rules of sexual morality are disregarded. They have a great respect for the snake, and, at the Guṛiyā feast, girls make dolls of rags, which are supposed to represent snakes and are beaten with rods by boys and flung into a tank—the real origin of the celebration probably being the expulsion of the powers of evil impersonated in the snake. They fear the spirits of the dead, and propitiate them by laying out food for them, which is afterwards eaten by the children and by crows. The ancestors, especially, rejoice in the savour of roast pork, and if not honoured by the sacrifice of a pig, which is cooked and eaten by the worshippers, may bring trouble upon the household. At a birth the Bāṅsphor worship the spirit of the well from which they draw water, and they hold the Pīpal tree (*Ficus indica*) in great respect, and will not cut or injure it. The same reverence is felt with regard to the Gūlar (*Ficus glomerata*) and the Semal (*Bombax heptaphyllum*). No Brāhman officiates at any of their rites, all of which are performed by a member of the tribe or household.

LITERATURE.—Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, 1896, i. 171 f.

W. CROOKE.

BANTU AND S. AFRICA.

[E. SIDNEY HARTLAND.]

1. Race and geographical distribution of the Bantu.
2. Culture and organization.
3. Totemism.
4. Worship of the dead and other spirits. Burial rites.
5. Idols.
6. Priests, medicine-men, diviners, and sorcerers.
7. Supreme Being, Nature-spirits.

1. Race and geographical distribution of the Bantu.—The term *Bantu* (pl. of *Muntu*, a native word meaning 'man') is applied to that variety of the Negro race which, prior to the coming of Europeans, was politically, and still is numerically, predominant in South Africa. The Bantu are distinct alike from the West African or true Negroes, and from the Nilotic Negroes of the Sudan and adjacent lands. They were differentiated at some remote period, probably by intermixture with a Hamitic stock. They seem to have originated as a distinct variety somewhere in the neighbourhood of the Great Lakes, and thence to have spread southward and westward over the greater part of the continent. North of the equator they are found from the northern shores of Lake Victoria Nyanza right across to the Gulf of Guinea, thus embracing the entire valley of the Congo. Still further to the north they have thrown out numerous colonies, as far as the northern Cameroon, among the true Negroes. On the other hand, the latter are traceable down the eastern side of the Gulf of Guinea until they finally disappear in French Congo, giving place to the Bantu not very far south of the Equator. The Bantu never penetrated

* Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, new ed. 1899, p. 210 f.

† See, further, Eusebius, *Vit. Const.* i. 31; and for illustrations of the *labarum* see Du Fresne, *op. cit.* pl. xii. xiii. pp. 34, 37; Lowrie, *Chr. Art and Archæol.* p. 240. One of the earliest extant representations of it is on a gold coin of the Emperor Theodosius (d. 395).

‡ *Eccles. Hist.* i. xxv. For a cross instead of a standard see the illustrations in Cabrol's *Dict. d'Archéologie Chrét.*, fasc. xii. p. 247.

§ *Hist. Franc.* v. 4. See, further, Maskell, *Monumenta Ritualia*², 1882, i. cxi.

into that part of Cape Colony which lies west of the Great Fish River, or into the southern portion of German South-west Africa.

The Bantu are usually divided into three main groups, distinguished by the manner in which the plural name is formed, viz. :—

1. The South-eastern tribes (Ama-Zulu, Ama-Xosa, etc.).
2. The Central tribes (Be-Chuana, Ba-Suto, Ma-Shuna, etc.).
3. The South-western tribes (Ova-Mbo, Ova-Herero, etc.).

To these, however, we may conveniently add as distinct groups—

4. The Northern tribes still living in the region of the Great Lakes, such as the Baganda, Warundi, Awemba, and others.
5. The Western or Forest tribes, occupying the Congo valley and a large tract of country north and south of that region, such as the Ovimbundu, Bavili, etc.

This distribution, though geographical, corresponds in the main to the ethnical peculiarities of the different groups, due doubtless to the streams of emigration and the various influences, human and climatic, which met the immigrant tribes on their way to the regions where they finally settled. It would occupy too great a space to discuss the details here. The causes of difference are largely conjectural, and the questions raised are greatly complicated by the incessant wars which have resulted in the intermingling or extermination of many distinct tribes, or in wholesale emigrations of hordes which have broken away from the parent stock after it had settled in its present *habitat*.

2. Culture and organization. — The primary application of the term *Bantu* is linguistic. The Bantu languages are formed on common principles, and are related to one another in the same way as the Aryan languages of Europe and Asia are related to one another. But, since the peoples speaking those languages belong, with few exceptions, to a well-marked anthropological type, it is usually and conveniently applied to that type. The Bantu peoples are in a fairly uniform stage of culture, and may be generally described as both pastoral and agricultural. As the climate of the continent varies from desert to forest, from table-land intersected by broad but often intermittent rivers to mountain regions embracing deep fertile valleys and vast inland seas, so necessarily do the occupations of the people differ. On the western side the extremes are found—that of the Hereros, who, living in a waste and well-nigh waterless country, practise no agriculture at all, and that of the tribes of the Congo, among whom the rearing of domestic animals is reduced to a minimum. All the Negroid peoples of Africa are acquainted with the use of iron; some of them are capable and ingenious smiths. Excellent spears, or assagais, knives, and hoes are produced by their simple forges. Small implements are carved from horn or bone; and among many tribes basket-work is much developed. The typical Bantu house is a circular hut, beehive-shaped among some tribes such as the Zulus, or with a true roof. These huts are built in groups, or villages, enclosed with a palisade, a hedge, or a wall of mud or stones. Every village is ruled by a chief, who in some tribes may be a woman, and whose authority varies, according to the tribe, from absolute rule to a rule exercised with the concurrence of the heads of the houses composing the village. In the more highly organized and military tribes the village chiefs are subject to a very real control by the supreme chief or king, who is surrounded by a number of ministers, and often keeps up a large measure of barbaric state. His power is in such cases exercised ruthlessly, and, however limited in theory, is in practice checked only by the dread of assassination, or (at all events in the southern portions of the continent) by the knowledge that his people may gradually desert him and go to augment the following of a more popular rival. The continuance, therefore, of a Bantu realm depends upon the political genius of its king. Within a couple of generations the mightiest kingdom is apt to fall to pieces, and another will arise on its ruins. This instability could be illustrated again and again from South African history; it has been a serious barrier to the progress of the arts of peace, has frequently depopulated large tracts of country, and has caused endless confusion and misery in every direction.

In addition to their political divisions, all the Bantu peoples are divided into stocks or clans. The members of each of these clans are united by a real or imputed community of blood, symbolized by a common name, usually derived from some animal or plant. Two opposite methods of reckoning the kinship are in use. It is probable that mankind originally reckoned kinship only through females. This mode of reckoning is called mother-right. The Western, or Forest, and some of the Northern tribes are still in this stage. Consequently the husband and father, though the head of the household, has a very limited power over the children, who in many cases are liable to be sold into slavery by their mother's brother, or pawned for his debts. Their mother's brother is their nearest male relative, and they inherit his property and liabilities. When a Bantu marries, he is required to pay what is usually, but inaccurately, called a 'bride-price.' Where kinship is reckoned through women only, this is often paid to the bride's maternal uncle. On the other hand, the Eastern and Central tribes have advanced to the stage of father-right, or the reckoning of kinship through males only. The husband and father owns the children of his wife, by whomsoever they are begotten. He has extensive powers over them, though these powers are often, as among the Basuto, limited by the rights of the wife's eldest brother. The *malume*, as the wife's brother is called, is the special protector of the child. The Basuto perform the rite of circumcision about the age of puberty. On this occasion the *malume* makes his nephew a present of a javelin and a heifer. He subsequently furnishes a part of the bride-price on the youth's marriage; and, if surviving, he presides at his funeral. He is entitled to a share of the spoil taken by his sisters' sons in war, and of the cattle which form the bride-price of his sisters' daughters. These rights and duties are best explained as a survival from the stage of mother-right.

If we turn to the South-western tribes, we find among the Ovaherero a peculiar organization intermediate between mother-right and father-right. The Ovaherero are the predominant Bantu people of German territory. According to the older organization, they were divided into clans called *eanda* (pl. *omaanda*), in which kinship was reckoned exclusively through females. These are now being superseded by clans called *oruzo* (pl. *otuzo*), in which kinship is reckoned exclusively through males. The consequence is that every Herero belongs to two distinct stocks—to an *eanda* through his mother, and to an *oruzo* through his father. Kinship is thus reckoned through both lines. The *patria potestas* is, as might be surmised, greatly limited. The husband and father is responsible to his wife's kin for the death of wife or child in consequence of his acts. The wife is capable of owning property apart from her husband, to which on her death he does not as a rule succeed. It is taken by her kin reckoned through the *eanda*. On the death of a man his property does not necessarily fall to his son as in strict father-right; but the claims of the son as *oruzo*-heir and of his sisters' sons or other *eanda*-heirs are the subject of adjustment (Dannert, 32, 47, 58).

3. Totemism.—The object from which a Bantu clan or *gens* derives its name is, as already stated, usually a species of animal or plant, generally the former. More rarely, such an object as the sun or rain, iron or an artificial product like the hoe, is found as the name and symbol of a clan.

The organization in clans thus distinguished was first observed among the North American Indians; and *totem*, the name scientifically adopted to denote the clan-symbol, is derived from an Ojibwa word. The condition or status of peoples thus organized and possessing totems is known as totemism. Much obscurity still hangs over the origin of totemism. Without discussing the question here, it is sufficient to observe that totemism takes its rise in savagery and among peoples who trace their descent exclusively through the mother. A special bond unites every member of the clan to every individual of the totem-species, all of which are under a ban or tabu. They are sacrosanct. Save in special cases, they may not be killed or eaten or used in any way; if killed or found dead, they are often honoured with funeral rites and mourning, like human members of the clan. At puberty the children of the clan usually undergo initiation into the mysteries and privileges of the clan; not until then are they considered full members. Marriage is contracted exclusively outside the clan, sexual relations being wholly forbidden between members of the same clan. As soon as the stage of pure savagery is passed, totemism begins to decay. No Bantu tribe is in the stage of pure savagery. Consequently totemism, though found among them as the basis of their social organization, is nowhere in its pristine power and development. From many of the tribes, indeed, it has disappeared, leaving only traces of its former presence. Totemism is often regarded as an incipient form of religion; but it should be observed that it lacks some of what we are accustomed to consider distinctive features of religion, such as prayer and sacrifice. See, further, art. TOTEMISM.

(*a*) *Central and South-eastern tribes.*—The **Bechuana** are a congeries of tribes in the centre of South Africa, for the most part of common origin. Livingstone tells us that the different tribes 'are named after certain animals. . . . The term *Bakatla* means "they of the monkey"; *Bakuena*, "they of the alligator"; *Batlapi*, "they of the fish"; each tribe having a superstitious dread of the animal after which it is called. They also use the word *bina*, "to dance," in reference to the custom of thus naming themselves, so that, when you wish to ascertain what tribe they belong to, you say, "What do you dance?" It would seem as if that had been a part of the worship of old. A tribe never eats the animal which is its namesake, using the term *ila*, "hate *or* dread," in reference to killing it. We find traces of many ancient tribes in the country in individual members of those now extinct, as the *Batau*, "they of the lion"; the *Banoga*, "they of the serpent"; though no such tribes now exist' (*Missionary Travels*, 13).

It is right to call attention here to the confusion between *tribe*, the local or political unit, and *clan*, the social unit. This arises partly from the great explorer's loose terminology; but it must be said that the tracing of descent through the father instead of through the mother tends to localize the clans, and the political instability already mentioned from time to time wipes out many of the clans thus localized, or absorbs them among the followers and subjects of one or more of the powerful chiefs. A body of men belonging to different clans localized under the rule of a chief soon learns, in the stage of father-right, to reverence his ancestors and his totem, and to regard their own as of less importance.

In the middle of the 19th cent. the clan of the Bakuena was thus an important tribe living about the sources of the Notuani river. They are reported as calling the crocodile their father, celebrating it in their festivals, swearing by it, and making an incision, resembling the mouth of a crocodile, in the ears of their cattle to distinguish them from others. The chief was called 'Great Man of the Crocodile' (Casalis, *The Basutos*, Lond. 1861, 211). None of the Bakuena would approach a crocodile. If they happened to go near one, they would spit on the ground, and indicate its presence by saying *Boleo ki bo*, 'There is sin.' They imagined the mere sight of it would give inflammation of the eyes (Livingstone, *op. cit.* 255). In the decay of totemism, however, either the wide distribution of the crocodile clan, or the power of chiefs belonging to it, has resulted in an extension of *quasi*-religious practices relating to the crocodile far beyond the bounds of the Bakuena clan. The nation of the Basuto was formed by the genius of its great ruler, Moshesh, of men belonging to many clans and, indeed, of different tribes. But Moshesh belonged to the Bakuena; and he succeeded in transmitting his rule to his descendants, one of whom still wields the power under British protection. Consequently the crocodile has become the sacred animal of the whole nation, and is the subject of various rites. The blood of a young crocodile, caught alive and afterwards returned to the water, is a favourite 'medicine' to make a chief 'strong.' 'Medicine' for a kraal is prepared with the brain of a crocodile mixed with that of a man. Both among the Basuto and the Bechuana a man who is bitten by a crocodile is expelled from his village; for the people say, 'A man who is so bad that the crocodile bites him can come no more into our community,' as if they saw in this bite a Divine judgment. The death of a crocodile causes the children to cough. Its body is handed over to the medicine-men, who slay a black sheep on the spot where it was killed, as a sort of atonement for its death. The crocodile's blood kneaded up with mud, its hide, teeth, and claws, are used as talismans (Merensky, *Beiträge zur Kenntniss Süd-Afrikas*, Berlin, 1875, 92, 132). These usages and others that might be named probably result from a decay of totemism under the social and political influences dominant on the central plateau of South Africa. Among more certain evidences of still existing totemism is the practice of addressing the chief of a clan as the animal itself. The totem of Khama, the famous chief of the Bamangwato, was a duyker antelope. If one were in agreement with something he had just said, it would be highly respectful to reply, 'Yes, Duyker.' Similarly it would be proper to say to the chief of the Bakuena, 'Yes, Crocodile' (W. C. Willoughby, in *JAI* xxxv. 301). No one dares to eat the flesh or clothe himself with the skin of the animal whose name he bears. Even if this animal be hurtful, as a lion for instance, it may not be killed without great apologies being made to it, and its pardon being asked. Purification is necessary after the commission of such sacrilege (Casalis, 211). The great oath of the Baperi 'is that of *ka noku*, "by the porcupine," because the majority of them *sing*, to use the consecrated phrase, intimating that they feast, worship, or revere that animal. . . . When they see any one maltreat that animal, they afflict themselves, grieve, collect with religious care the quills, if it has been killed, spit upon them, and rub their eyebrows with them, saying, "They have slain our brother, our master, one of ours, him whom we sing." They fear that they will die if they eat the flesh of one' (Arbousset, *An Exploratory Tour to the N.E. of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope*, Lond. 1852, 176).

Most of the central tribes practise *circumcision*. The ceremony is performed upon boys about the age of puberty. It takes place at intervals of time which depend on the number of candidates. The lads who are to be subjected to it are gathered into a hut, where they have to reside for several weeks, and where they are initiated into the traditions of the tribe and the duties of manhood. When they are at length released, they issue with the rights of adult and fully qualified members of the tribe. Among some tribes, such as the Basuto of the Transvaal, the 'schools,' as they are often called, are spread over three periods, held at intervals of three years; but they are more usually completed in one term. The discipline undergone by the candidates is intended to harden them and develop their endurance and self-restraint. In regard to sexual matters, however, it is the reverse of what we should consider moral. The actual performance of circumcision is not an original or necessary part of the initiation ceremonies. Though ancient among many of the tribes, it has only recently been introduced among some, and is still rejected by others. Among the Baronga it fell into

desuetude in the early years of the last century; and Chaka, the great Zulu king, abolished it about the same time among the Zulus (Maclean, 94, 153; Alberti, *De Kaffers*, Amsterdam, 1810, p. 73; *Journ. African Soc.* v. 247; *JAI* xxxv. 251, 267, 372; Junod, 28). The Basuto of Basutoland, the Bechuana, and many other tribes require a similar period of retirement and instruction to be undergone by girls before they are esteemed marriageable.

The Zulus, the Xosas, the Pondos, and other tribes of the south-east, observe the rule of *exogamy*. They are forbidden to marry members of the same clan, though belonging to different tribes. The rule, however, is breaking down (Theal, *Kaffir Folk-Lore*, Lond. 1882, 198; Shooter, *Kafirs of Natal*, Lond. 1857, 45). Among the tribes of the interior it has rarely been recorded. A somewhat similar rule forbidding marriage within the kin has recently, however, been noted by a German traveller as characteristic of the Batauana, an offshoot of the Bamangwato inhabiting the Okawango marshland near Lake Ngami (*ZE* xxxvi. 704); and though it has escaped record, it is possible that it may be observed by others of the central and south-eastern tribes.

(*b*) *Northern tribes.*—Among the northern tribes, such as the Baganda and the Banyoro around the Victoria Nyanza, totemism is still a powerful part of the social organization. Sir Harry Johnston gives a list of twenty-nine clans in Uganda proper and its southern province of Buddu, named after various animals and vegetables. The object which serves as the name of the clan is in some way identified with the original founder, though there is no evidence that the clan is believed to be actually descended from it. It is held so far sacred that the members of the clan do not willingly destroy or eat it. The *mamba*, or lung-fish, though generally appreciated as an article of diet, is not killed or eaten by the Mamba clan; the elephant is not injured by the members of the Elephant clan; members of the Leopard or the Lion clan will endeavour to avoid killing the animal whose name they bear; and so on. The word used for 'totem' is *muziro*, 'something tabued or avoided,' and is, Sir Harry Johnston declares, 'a fair translation' of the word *totem* (Johnston, ii. 587, 588, 691, 692). The same distinguished author was of opinion that there was no prohibition of marriage within the clan. More recent investigations, however, have resulted in a different conclusion; and it seems fairly certain that, whatever was the custom among the Banyoro, the Baganda and probably the Basoga forbade marriage between even the most distant members of the same clan. As elsewhere, the kin is reckoned through the father, and has the consequent tendency to localize itself. Every family has its *kialo*, or place of origin; and the residents in a given village usually belong to the same totem. Circumcision and other initiatory ceremonies appear to be unknown.

Meagre as is our information with regard to the Uganda Protectorate, we know still less of the totemism of the other northern peoples. Father van der Burgt, to whose monograph we are indebted for all that we know of the Warundi of German East Africa, uses the word without any clear notion of its meaning. The goat, the wild boar, and the domestic fowl are not eaten, though the first and last are offered in sacrifice. Mutton is not eaten by every one. Fish is not eaten, save on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. But whether these tabus are totemic we cannot say. The Warundi seem to count kinship through the father. The wife, however, occupies a much better position than among the tribes south of the Zambesi. Indications given here and there by Father van der Burgt point to an organization in clans. How far it is effective, and whether the clans are exogamous, does not appear. Circumcision is not practised. On puberty rites we have no information; but secret societies exist, and serpents and other animals are said to play a part in their ceremonies. Nothing, however, is really known of the facts.

On the Shire Highlands, between Lake Nyasa and the Zambesi, the Wayao and Mang'anja reckon descent through the mother. When a man marries, he settles in his wife's village. He does not, as a rule, take a second wife while the first is living, unless he inherits her from his elder brother or maternal uncle. When he dies, any property he may have which is not buried with him or consumed in the funeral feast and expenses devolves on his next brother, or, failing younger brothers, on his eldest sister's son, and so on (Macdonald, *Africana*, i. 187; Werner, 132). The Wayao are divided into exogamous clans. These clans appear to be totemic, but no list has been made of them. Each of them is said to have a *mwiko*, or tabu, with regard to some animal. The subject, however, still awaits investigation (Werner, 252). Girls and boys undergo initiation about the age of puberty. The retirement and ceremonies for a girl occupy about a month, for a boy about six weeks. A boy's name is changed, and after he has gone through the mysteries it is not permitted to call him by his previous name. Among the Mang'anja only the girls undergo puberty rites. Their names are changed, like those of the Yao boys (Macdonald, *op. cit.* i. 125; Werner, 123). The front teeth of both sexes are chipped into saw-like points; but this does not appear to be done at the puberty rites.

The Awemba inhabiting North-Eastern Rhodesia between Lake Tanganyika and Lake Bangweolo have totems which descend exclusively through women. The crocodile, the hoe, and the mushroom are stated to be totems. 'But no special worship is paid to the crocodile, though the natives believe that the souls of the drowned migrate into the bodies of crocodiles' (*JAI* xxxvi. 154). Our information is at present too meagre to enable us to judge how far totemism is still the basis of society.

(*c*) *South-western tribes.*—Turning to the Hereros in the south-west, we find a curious condition corresponding to the double reckoning of kinship already noted. Each *eanda* has a totem, and nearly all of them a number of sub-totems. Most of the characteristics of totemism have, however, been taken over by the *otuzo*, and are no longer observed by the *omaanda*. Thus the chameleon is sacred to the *oru-esembi* (the *oruzo* of the chameleon). The members of the clan call it 'Our Old Ancestor,' and they will not touch it. The members of the *oruzo* of the sun eat and drink only while the sun is above the horizon. The chief tabus of the *oruzo* have been concentrated on domestic animals. The *oruzo* of the chameleon prefer brown and especially piebald cattle; they neither keep nor eat sheep or oxen into the colour of which grey enters. Another *oruzo* neither keep nor eat yellow or grey cattle; they are forbidden to eat the tongue or other part of the flesh of pack-oxen. The *oruzo* of the Koodoos not only eat no koodoo-flesh; they keep no cattle or sheep without horns or with mutilated horns; nor will they eat of such as have lost their ears. At the death of a member of the clan no sacrifice is offered. Hence the characteristic ornament of Herero graves —that of the ox-horns—is wanting; but koodoo-horns are laid on the grave and by the sacred fire at the *werft* ('village'). These tabus of domestic animals having certain colours and other marks, and of portions of animals, bear the stamp of comparatively recent origin—an attempt to import into the *oruzo* a distinctive series of observances parallel with, and yet different from, those which were pro-

bably characteristic of the *eanda*, but which have now disappeared. The blood-feud, however, still attaches to the *eanda*, and has not been transferred to the *oruzo*. It is to be inferred that the *eanda* was exogamous. At present the Herero prefers to marry within the circle of his relatives; but—significant exception—children of two sisters or of two brothers cannot intermarry. According to the Herero reckoning, they are themselves brother and sister. If children of two sisters, they would belong to the same *eanda*; if children of two brothers, to the same *oruzo*. There appear to be no puberty-mysteries for either boys or girls. Circumcision is practised, but it is an individual rite performed for the most part at a very early age. The hair of a girl, except a tuft on the middle of the head, is shaved in her eighth year. The lower front teeth of both sexes are broken out, and the upper teeth chipped into a pointed form, between their eleventh and fourteenth years. These appear to be relics of puberty-rites; but none of them are said to be performed collectively when the parents can afford the sole expense of the festivities usual on the occasion. Only from motives of economy are these rites now imposed upon the young people in companies.

(*d*) *Western or Forest tribes.*—So far as our information goes, the vestiges of totemism among the Western tribes are few and uncertain—and this in spite of the fact that most of the tribes are still in the stage of mother-right. The prevalent tabus, especially those of food, however, point to a totemic origin. They are generally known under the name of *xina*, *orunda*, or *kazila* (compare the *ila* of the Bechuana), or some dialectic variation of one or another of those words. The Congo tribes inhabiting the lower reaches of the river as far inland as Stanley Pool call a tabu *mpangu*. These tabus are of two kinds.

There is, first, the personal *orunda*, observed by virtue of a vow by the individual concerned or of the directions of a medicine-man, or else promised and vowed, after divination, for an infant at birth, and sometimes expressed in his name. Many of these prohibitions are attributed to the direct commands of a *Nkici* (tutelary god or 'fetish'). Many are self-imposed as a religious observance in honour of a *Nkici*, or as a measure of precaution. Some are connected with a secret society, and are required of all its members. Natives are frequently named after animals; and such of the prohibitions as go with the name of an animal may have been taken over from totemism. The rest are perhaps due to the development of 'fetishism' and idol-worship (see § 5).

The other kind of *orunda* is observed by entire families. In Calabar, as we are told by a missionary, 'certain kinds of food are forbidden by some juju law or custom of their own to families and persons bearing certain names' (Waddell, *Twenty-nine Years in the West Indies and Central Africa*, Lond. 1863, 369). Among the Bavili or Fyât, in French Congo, the pig is forbidden to all royal blood; other families 'will not touch certain animals because their ancestors owe such animals a debt of gratitude.' The buffalo is forbidden 'to the Bakutu, as a punishment to them for not listening to the words of Maloango; the antelope to a family round about Fahi, for refusing to give water to a voice in the bush when asked for it; fish of certain inland waters to certain people, near Cabinda, for not giving water to Nzambi (§ 7) and her child; and so on' (Dennett, *Folkl. of the Fjort*, 10, 149; cf. Bastian, *Loango-Küste*, i. 183 ff.). Du Chaillu's evidence is to the same effect. He tells us that the flesh of the *Bos brachiceros* was an abomination to the king of the Bakalai and all his family, because many generations previously one of their women gave birth to a calf instead of a child; that the crocodile was forbidden food to another family for the same reason; and that further inquiry disclosed the fact that 'scarce a man could be found to whom some article of food' was not *orunda*. Crocodile, hippopotamus, monkey, boa, wild pig are enumerated by the traveller as objects of such prohibition, which is observed even at the risk of starvation, and under the belief of supernatural punishment by miscarriage of women of the family or the birth of monstrosities in the shape of the prohibited animal (du Chaillu, *Equat. Afr.*, Lond. 1861, 308). The word 'family' used by our authorities corresponds with little doubt to a clan tracing its membership through women; and the fact that the name frequently indicates the prohibited food lends countenance to the belief that we have here a survival of a genuine totemic tabu. It seems, however, that by a curious exception, the totem, if totem it be, descends, among the tribes of the Lower Congo, always from father to son, though in other respects the tribes in question are in the stage of mother-right (Bentley, *Pioneering on the Congo*, i. 263). Further investigation is needed on this point.

The Barotse are an outlying Western tribe on the upper waters of the Zambesi. They reckon descent through the father only, though traces linger of the earlier form of organization. Our information as to their food-prohibitions is very meagre. The members of the royal family are forbidden the flesh of the sheep and the goat. The pig seems more generally tabued; and the young women abstain from a certain fish lest it render them sterile (Béguin, *Les Ma-Rotsé*, Lausanne, 1903, p. 124). But whether the latter prohibitions are confined to the Barotse themselves or apply also to any of their subject peoples does not appear.

More uncertain as a trace of totemism are the puberty-rites. Circumcision is very general, except among the Barotse; and though sometimes performed upon boys individually when they arrive at the proper age, and, indeed, among certain of the Upper Congo tribes a few days after birth, it is frequently, as in Angola, a collective rite, at which the boys who are subjected to it live for a month in seclusion under the care of a *nganga* (§ 6). Girls on reaching puberty are required to undergo seclusion in a hut called 'the paint-house,' where they are instructed by an old woman in the duties of adult life, and whence they often do not issue until they are about to be married. But this is an individual rite. Secret Societies flourish all down the West Coast. They have probably been introduced from the Negro tribes, and seem to be connected with the worship of special gods. Boys and often girls about the age of puberty are compelled to be initiated. They are taken away into the bush for a season and there instructed in the cult of the Society. Absolute obedience to its commands is required; and oaths of secrecy are imposed. So well are these kept that even converted natives refuse to speak of the rites. Consequently very little is known of them. As among many of the Australian tribes, it is believed by the uninitiated that the novices are killed and brought to life again. On returning to the village they feign ignorance of their language, and even of their nearest relatives and the most familiar objects of their daily life. 'They appear dazed, and cannot talk. They want whatever they see, seize whatever takes their fancy. No one is allowed to resist, because "they do not know any better." They behave like lunatics, and pretend not to know how to eat; even food has to be masticated for them, so well do they act their part. After a few days the excitement and interest of the deception

wear off, and they gradually resume intelligence' (Bentley, i. 287). The Societies wield enormous political and social power, of which they frequently give public demonstration; and it is one of the main objects of civilized governments to put them down. We may conjecture that here, as elsewhere in the lower culture, they are a development of the puberty-rites arising on the decay of totemism.

Certain of the tribes also, both inland and on the coast, knock out the two middle front teeth in the upper jaw at puberty. The Mushicongos, like the Hereros, chip all their front teeth into points (Decle, *Three Years in Savage Africa*, Lond. 1898, 81; Monteiro, *Angola and the River Congo*, Lond. 1875, i. 262). The one or the other mutilation is common in Africa, as well as in other parts of the world; and although generally connected with puberty cannot be reckoned as necessarily a relic of totemism.

The laws of marriage, so far as relates to prohibited degrees, have scarcely been investigated; but at all events some of the tribes forbid marriage within the clan, however remote the relationship according to our reckoning.

4. Worship of the dead and other spirits. Burial rites.—(*a*) *Central and South-eastern tribes.*—The principal factors in the decay of the totemism of the Central and South-eastern tribes have been their pastoral and warlike habits. These have necessitated a higher social organization with father-right as its basis. As already pointed out, the change from mother-right to father-right tends to localize the clans, and to merge them in the local organization under the recognized head of the clan. The social and religious rites of each household are performed by its head; those of the tribe are performed by its chief. Thus they gradually centre round him while living; nor does his power cease with his death. The very ancient and world-wide belief in the life after death leads to the conviction that the chief is still a chief; the father of a household still exercises his functions of owner, provider, controller, preserver, behind the veil that separates him from his survivors and descendants. No other life can be imagined for him; and the people over whom and for whom he exercises these functions are the same whom he ruled in his lifetime. The chief is the father of his tribe; he is its head, and his tribesmen are in a sense his children. In South Africa the tribe is often called by his name. Many a tribe credits its chief with extraordinary powers: he controls the rain; he gives or withholds plenty; he performs the ceremonies which give success in war. 'The chief,' says Merensky, 'is the focus of witchcraft and superstition; he is the high priest of his people; and faith in his supernatural power is the strongest bond which unites his subjects to himself' (*Beiträge*, 116). Such an one receives in his lifetime a reverence hardly distinguishable from worship. That reverence is exalted and intensified by death. His powers are now released from many of their limitations, and are exercised in more terrible, because more mysterious, ways. He becomes part of the tribal religion, for the moment the most prominent object of worship; and such he remains until his successor in his turn supplants him.

Ancestor-worship thus developed—worship of their ancestors by the members of a family, and of their departed chiefs by a whole tribe—is the religion of the Central and South-eastern Bantu peoples.

It is to the ancestors of the reigning chief, says M. Junod, speaking of the Baronga, 'that prayers and sacrifices are always presented when the interest of the tribe as a whole is concerned—in national calamities, in time of famine, drought, war, or at the opening of a new season when it is desired to obtain from the divinities an abundant harvest. Their names compose the genealogy of the royal family. They are invoked one after another; and it is doubtless this religious practice which has saved from oblivion the names of these revered chiefs, become the protecting genii of the tribe. Moreover, each family possesses also its string of *chikwembo* [ancestral *manes*], longer or shorter, better or worse preserved. If the family pride be well developed, if the ancestors have been men of mark, and if their sons have guarded the family tradition with intelligence, this family religion will be well developed' (*Les Baronga*, 382).

As the ancestors of the chief are worshipped on national occasions, the ancestors of the family are worshipped on occasions of family interest, such as marriage, death, or sickness, or any occasion of rejoicing, prayer, or mourning.

The Central and South-eastern Bantu believe that the ordinary existence of the soul after death is led underground (a conception which is the natural consequence of burial), often in villages like those on earth, and with cattle variously said to be entirely white or (among the Basuto) of a blue colour with red and white spots. But the dead retain the power of appearing in dreams, or of assuming the form of animals. Sometimes they enter into men and inspire them. They retain their human feelings, and desire to be remembered by their descendants and nourished by sacrifice. It would seem as if they were dependent for their continued existence, or at all events for their comfort, on the continuance of their line. If they have no one to remember them and to offer sacrifices to them, they will be reduced to eating grasshoppers, and they will 'die of cold on the mountains.' This expression is perhaps not to be taken literally; but at least it indicates a state of extreme misery (Callaway, *Rel. Syst.* 145, 225; Arbousset, 237). Though worshipped, the dead are feared rather than loved. They are possessed of more than human power and knowledge, and appear sometimes for beneficent purposes, as to warn of danger, or to reveal medicines. Sneezing is caused by the *manes*; it is a sign that the spirit of an ancestor is with the man to help him. More usually, however, the visits of the dead are to demand sacrifice or to call the living. They often harass the living by their presence, and must be laid. The dead husband is jealous of his wife; and, before she marries another, the spirit must be laid, and she must be 'purified.' When the dead reveal themselves to their descendants and tribesmen in dreams, they usually appear in their own proper forms. When they appear otherwise than in dreams, it is as animals. Buffaloes, hippopotami, lizards, and even mice are mentioned among the animals held by the Zulus to be manifestations of their dead. Among the Matabele and the Mashuna the dead may be changed into animals such as elephants, bucks, lions, and so forth. Other tribes hold crocodiles or hyænas to be manifestations of their departed members. In fact, almost any animal may be credited with being an incarnation of the dead. But by far the commonest form assumed is that of a snake. Several kinds of such snakes are distinguished by the Zulus. Some of them are appropriated to deceased chiefs; others are incarnations of the common people; and one kind is shared by chieftainesses with commoners (Callaway, *op. cit.* 196). All animals to which these beliefs attach are, of course, treated with respect; offerings are made to them; and they are never killed or injured.

In addition to the animals referred to in the foregoing paragraph, a sacred character attaches to the ox. The chief wealth of these tribes consists of their domestic cattle. The Zulu cattle-pen, or *kraal*, is placed in the centre of the village, and the human habitations are built round it in a circle. The Pondos build their villages in horse-shoe form, with the kraal between the two ends. Farther to the north the Bavenda huts are scattered irregularly in a palisaded enclosure on a hill-side, the kraal occupying one of the lower corners. Each tribe has its own type of village; but in any case, the kraal

is the most sacred spot. There the chief of the village receives and feasts his visitors and people on great occasions; there he offers his sacrifices to the *manes*; and often, when he dies, he is buried there. All public assemblies are held there, and all solemn rites performed. The burial of the chief in the kraal involves the identification in some sense of the cattle with the deceased. A Bechuana chief is frequently addressed as 'One who came forth from cattle.' Among the Basuto the cattle are called '*melimo* (spirits, *manes*) of the wet noses.' Yet the cattle are not regarded with the reverence and fear which the animals previously mentioned enjoy. As domestic animals they are treated as the property of their owners; they are driven forth to pasture and back to their kraal; they are milked; superfluous bull-calves are castrated; above all, they are killed for sacrifice and for food. Probably, in the first instance, they were never slain except for sacrifice. But a sacrifice to the *manes* results in a feast on the slaughtered animals by the living members of the village or the tribe; and now among tribes like the Baronga the cattle are killed for food, while the goat, a less valuable beast, is the largest sacrifice (Junod, *op. cit.* 200). Among the Bechuana and other tribes a bull or an ox is still offered on all important occasions. In extreme emergencies, when the ordinary prayers for rain have been of no avail, the Bamangwato offer an ox on the grave of a chief. On setting out for war the Bechuana sacrifice a bull with special ceremonies, and the contents of its stomach are carried before the host as a talisman of victory. The same uninviting substance is smeared over warriors in the purification ceremony after returning from a fight; and chiefs who have quarrelled, meeting in a reconciliation ceremony, smear it over one another's arms as they clasp hands. At a Bechuana marriage the fat surrounding the entrails of the slaughtered ox is rubbed with 'medicine' and laid about the shoulders and bosom of the bride. Among the Basuto an ox is sacrificed at a death, the corpse is buried wrapped in the skin with a piece of the meat and some grain, and the contents of the victim's stomach are placed on the grave. The ritual in all these cases indicates the sacredness of the animal; and many other native customs and phrases point in the same direction (*JAI* xxxv. 301 ff.; Martin, *Basutoland*, London, 1903, p. 90 f.; Junod, *op. cit.* 200).

The origin and exact bearing of these practices are still undetermined. They are possibly to be traced to the special care and affection with which cattle are thought to be regarded by the deceased ancestors whose chief possessions they were, and who are held to incarnate themselves in, or to inspire, them from time to time. The Sesuto phrase, for instance, above quoted, is said to be used because it is believed by the Basuto that the spirits of the departed take up their abode for a time in the bodies of the cattle (Mrs. Cartwright, in *FL* xv. 246). It would seem, however, that such possessions are to be distinguished from those previously referred to, being usually no more than temporary.

Some tribes are accustomed to bury their chiefs in a special burial-ground. The royal burial-grounds of the Baronga are described as vast and almost impenetrable thickets. A small path hardly traceable leads into them, trodden only at intervals by the reigning chief, the descendant of the sacred line, for the purpose of sacrificing to his ancestors. To all others entrance is forbidden. Within the thicket the illustrious dead rest beneath barrows, on which are to be seen the dried and decaying remains of offerings, and often calabashes and other household utensils, broken and cast upon the grave at the time of burial. Naturally serpents abound in the underwood, probably deemed to be manifestations of the deceased. These cemeteries are invested with all the terrors of superstition; and awful tales are told of sacrilegious persons who have dared to pluck the fruits of the trees, or even to cut a branch of dried wood for fuel (Junod, *op. cit.* 383 ff.). The kings of the Bavenda are similarly buried with their ancestors in the holy grove. Formerly the body was laid on a low wooden scaffold and left until the flesh had fallen off, when the skeleton alone was buried. Kings are not said to 'die,' but to 'go away for a time.' At their graves sacrifice is offered from time to time. The altar consists of three stones fixed in the ground, in the centre of which a shrub, flower, or rush has been planted. This plant is probably the *modzimo* ('soul' or 'manifestation') of an ancestor; for among the Bavenda the dead return into various objects, such as cattle, goats, sheep, or weapons and tools of the defunct, which are then held sacred (*JAI* xxxv. 376 ff.). In the same way among the Baronga, at a chief's death his nails, hair, and beard are cut, and the cuttings are kneaded up, together with some of the dung of the oxen slain at his death, into a ball, which is carefully surrounded with thongs of hide. When his successor dies, a second ball is made and added to the first, and so on. The sacred object thus formed is called a *mhamba*. It is not an idol, but a sort of national palladium. It is placed in the custody of an officer, who is specially chosen for his calmness and sobriety. He becomes a sort of high priest of the tribe; and on all national occasions he offers the sacrifice and brandishes the *mhamba* before the eyes of the people (Junod, *op. cit.* 398). The Basuto of the Transvaal have sacred trees in which the *manes* dwell (Merensky, 132).

(*b*) *South-western tribes.*—Among the Hereros the worship of the dead is well developed. When a man dies, he is buried near a tree, or, if the chief of a *werft*, or village, in his cattle-kraal; cattle are slain, especially any supposed to be favourites of the deceased, cut to pieces, and cast away as offerings to him, the horns being taken to adorn the tree beside the grave. The *werft* is then abandoned and allowed to fall into decay. Nor do the people return, unless the deceased has himself expressed the wish to hear again after his death the lowing of his cattle about his grave. When they do return to rebuild the *werft*, they lament for the dead at the grave and address the *omukuru* ('deceased'): 'See, father! we are here, we thy children. See, we have done as thou hast ordered us. We have brought the cattle thou gavest us here,' and so on. New fire is kindled on the old hearth, a sheep is slaughtered, of which all the people eat. Every son of the deceased then approaches the fire with a branch or a small tree. These are set up in a row half-way between the fire and the cattle-kraal. An ox or sheep is slaughtered for each of the sons, and its flesh is laid upon the grave. When it is thus consecrated at the grave, it is further consecrated by tasting by the sons of the deceased. Married men who have children are the only persons allowed to eat of this flesh. So long as these ceremonies are proceeding (apparently for some days), all milk must in the same way be consecrated by presentation at the grave, and a little of it is always left standing in a pail on the grave. Another ceremony is also performed, but it does not seem clear whether it is an invariable part of the rites. The eldest son, standing at the grave, personates his father, and pretending to be angry throws stones at the assembled people. At first they are frightened and flee, crying out, 'Our father is angry! Our father fights!' Regaining courage, they return to the grave and throw stones back. After a sham fight of this kind for a little while the *omukuru* is supposed to become quiet; and the son standing at the grave begins to speak in his father's name. He asks first about the cattle individually by name or colour, and then about the people. The people reply suitably to the questions (*S. Afr. F. L. Journ.* i. 55 ff.). Here we have beyond doubt the recognition of a new divinity with whom direct relations of worship on the one side and tutelage on the other are entered into. But he is not taken as a divinity in substitution for another. He is only the most recent of the *ovakuru*, or deceased ancestors, all of whom are regarded as powerful beings.

In the closest connexion with the worship of ancestors is *the sacred fire*. The household fire burns before every hut. The chief's hearth is between his hut and the cattle-kraal. The fire is in charge of his eldest unmarried daughter, who is responsible for keeping it alight. Its extinction is a calamity to be expiated only by solemn offerings of cattle (Andersson, *Lake Ngami*, 223), and it must be re-kindled with the fire-sticks which represent the male and female ancestors. It is thus that the new fire is kindled at the ceremony just described. When, as sometimes happens, a portion of the population swarms off from an old *werft* under the leadership of a son of the chief, a portion of

the old fire is taken with them; and if it go out, it must, if possible, be re-kindled by a brand from the old hearth; if not, then by means of the fire-sticks. Every child is presented a few days after birth at the sacred hearth to the *omukuru*. The father then takes the child into his arms and gives it a name, calling upon his ancestors and presenting the child to them. Birth takes place in a special hut, and until this ceremony has been performed the mother is not re-admitted into her own house. The meat slaughtered at the festival when a youth is circumcised is holy, and must be cooked at the *okuruo* ('sacred fire'). It is solemnly eaten there in the presence of sticks representing the *ovakuru*, which are brought for the purpose from the sacred house where they are kept. The ceremony of breaking-out and chipping the teeth of children (§ 3) is likewise performed at the sacred hearth. Marriage rites, too, are performed before the *okuruo*. The sick are carried round and round the sacred fire with a chant addressed to the *omukuru*, praying for their recovery (*S. Afr. F. L. Journ.* i. 41 ff., ii. 166; Dannert, 23, 48).

(c) *Northern tribes.*—We turn to the Northern tribes, and first to the Protectorate of Uganda. Ancestor-worship is described as 'the foundation of such religious beliefs as are held by the Banyoro.' Every clan has its own *muchwezi* (pl. *bachwezi*), or ancestral spirit, sometimes confused with the totem. The same word is applied to the priest or medicine-man who conducts the worship. It is also given to the individual members of the light-coloured Galla race which is dominant in these lands and, mingled with Bantu blood, now forms the Bahima aristocracy. The fearful thunderstorms common in the Protectorate are looked upon by the Banyoro as caused by the *bachwezi*. When a person is killed by lightning, his death is regarded as the manifestation of anger on the part of the *bachwezi*, either against him or his clan. A great ceremony is performed; the medicine-man is summoned to investigate the cause; and sacrifices are duly offered to appease the *bachwezi* (Johnston, *Uganda Prot.* ii. 588 ff.).

The religion of the Bahima, as we might expect from their Hamitic ancestry, is somewhat more developed. They have small huts, built close to the houses in every village, where offerings are made. Either in addition to the ancestral spirits, or as a specialized form of them, a number of beings are believed in who are looked upon as 'devils' or evil influences, and who therefore require to be constantly propitiated. The Bahima worship deceased chiefs and prominent personages, though they have 'little definite belief in a future life on the part of any individual man or woman.' Nevertheless, they are said to believe in a land of the departed, called *mitoma*, away to the east, whither all Bahima go (Johnston, *op. cit.* ii. 631; Cunningham, 22).

The Baganda, now nominally either Christians or Muhammadans, formerly worshipped a number of ancestral and other spirits. Their religion appears to have been somewhat nearer to a genuine polytheism than that of their Western neighbours the Banyoro and Bahima. The most influential of their gods was Mukasa, who is believed by Sir Harry Johnston to have been originally 'an ancestral spirit, and whose place of origin and principal temple was on the biggest of the Sese Islands.' He became in time the god of Lake Victoria Nyanza. He was propitiated by those making a long voyage. He and some of the other gods were provided with earthly wives in the persons of virgins, who were required to live chaste, though it is a question how far they complied with the requirement. Mukasa is, however, of uncertain sex, being often referred to as female. The highest god was the sky-god *Kazoba*, whose name is derived from a word signifying 'sun.' There were other departmental gods.

On the east of Uganda proper and immediately to the north of the lake lies a district called Busoga. The people, called Basoga, closely related to the Baganda, are said to worship a number of spirits (*balubare*), each of which has its priests. Here, as among the Baganda, the worship is frequently localized. Certain rivers are reputed to be the homes of special *lubare*. Thus the river Ntakwe is the home of the *lubare* Takwe, who 'personifies that stream.' If a virgin had been seduced and become pregnant, she and the man, with stones tied to their ankles and legs, and with a sacrificial sheep, were thrown into the river to be drowned. Human sacrifices with revolting details were offered to the river Nagua on the occasion of a chief's death. Certain trees also were associated with spirits. Johnston relates the performance of a ceremony at the native town of Luba at a time when the famine was threatened. In this ceremony all the details of sacrifice of a young girl at the foot of a sacred tree were performed in mimicry, but in fact her life was spared to be devoted to perpetual virginity (Johnston, *op. cit.* ii. 718 ff.).

Little need be said of the burial rites of these tribes as indicative of their religion. The Bahima are a purely pastoral people. At each cattle-kraal there is a huge heap of manure, which is of course daily added to. In this heap the dead are buried. Peasants, who do not belong to the Bahima, or ruling aristocracy, are buried at the hut-door. The Banyoro kings were put into a circular pit about twelve feet deep, along with nine living men. The pit was then covered with a cowhide tightly pegged down all round, and a temple built over it. A headman was placed as watcher; and many of the personal servants of the deceased were appointed to live in the temple. They and their descendants (who continued their duty) were supplied with food by the surrounding country. Bahima chiefs are buried beneath their huts; other persons are exposed to be eaten by hyænas. The kings of Uganda were buried at a place called Emerera. A great house was built to receive the royal corpse. Wrapped round with many layers of native bark-cloth, the body was laid on a low wooden scaffold in the middle of the house. The door was then closed and securely fastened, not to be opened again. The deceased king's cook, his headman of the beer-pots, and his chief herdsman were seized, together with three women of corresponding rank; they were dragged in front of the house and there slaughtered, their bodies being left to the vultures. The king's under-jaw had been cut off previously to his entombment. It was ornamented with cowries and kept in a house in an adjacent enclosure. Hard by in the same enclosure lived a chief who was appointed guardian of the jaw, another chief who was guardian of the tomb, and the wives of the deceased and their successors, who were supposed to keep watch over the tomb for ever. The late king, Mutesa, abolished this custom; but his wives, so long as they lived, were to be, and they remain, the official guardians, dwelling in the great house which has been erected over his grave (Cunningham, 10, 29, 224). A chief of the Basoga is buried beneath his own house, which is then suffered to fall into decay. An ordinary peasant is buried in front of his dwelling. If a man die at a distance from home, a reed or stick, over which the deceased has been called to come for burial, is wrapped up in bark-cloth and buried as the dead man.

Passing by a number of tribes about which we are even more imperfectly informed than about those of the Uganda Protectorate, we turn to the Mang'anja and the Wa-yao in the Shire Highlands. These two tribes believe themselves to be of common origin. The latter are an intrusive people, whose original seat was probably the Unango mountains between Lake Nyasa and the Mozambique coast, whence they were driven by pressure of other tribes from the north in the earlier half of last

century. They conquered the Mang'anja, ultimately settling side by side with them and intermarrying. In all probability at no distant date they will fuse into one people. To that fusion their religion will offer no difficulties, for it is in all essentials the same. It is primarily a worship of the dead. The soul or spirit is called *lisoka* (pl. *masoka*). As usual in the lower culture, it is believed to depart from the body during sleep, and its adventures are the cause of dreams. At death it departs to return to the body no more. One of the words for 'spirit' is *msimu*, obviously related to the Sechuana *morimo* (p. 364[a]). Just as a lunatic, moreover, is called by the Bechuana *barimo*, so among the Yaos sufferers from madness, idiocy, or delirium are *wa masoka* ('they of the spirits'). After death the *lisoka* is said to have 'gone to *Mulungu*': it is even called *mulungu*. This word is used by the missionaries to translate 'God,' for which it is no more the equivalent than is the Sechuana *morimo*. But the fuller discussion of *mulungu* must be reserved for a subsequent section (see p. 365[a]).

Besides the *manes*, the Yaos recognize other personal beings who receive worship. Of these the chief is Mtanga, often identified with *Mulungu*. Mtanga is said to have pinched up the earth into mountains, dug channels for the rivers, and brought down the rain to fill them. He is associated with Mangochi, the great hill in the country to the north-east of their present *habitat*, which the Yaos occupied until the middle of last century. He does not appear to be identified with Mangochi, but there is some evidence that tribes at no great distance worshipped remarkable hills. Some of these divinities seem to have been originally spirits of the departed. It is possible that some or all of them may have been local objects of worship, and in consequence of the removal of the tribe from its earlier seats they may have become more or less generalized in character and attributes. In any case a tendency is discernible on the part of the Yaos, as of other Northern tribes, to develop from ancestor-worship to polytheism (Macdonald, *Africana*, i. 58 ff.; *JAI* xxxii. 89).

The spirits are approached with offerings of native flour or beer, or of fowls or goats. These are presented at the shrine and left for the spirit's consumption. In the case of a goat, however, only one leg is usually presented, the remainder being eaten by the villagers themselves. Sometimes the spirit asks for some other offering. If for tobacco, a quantity is put on a plate and set on fire; if for a house, a new hut is built for him. Offerings are made not only at the grave or shrine of a dead man. The first-fruits of the crops are placed in a rough shed outside the village or near the hut of the chief or head-man. Occasional small offerings of flour or beer are placed at the foot of the tree in the village courtyard where men sit and talk or work. On sitting down to a meal the native throws a piece of the food at the root of the nearest tree. On a journey a little flour is often laid at the foot of a wayside tree or at an angle where two roads meet. All these offerings are made to *Mulungu*, and the act is *kulomba Mulungu*, 'to worship *Mulungu*.'

The reigning chief is the priest of his deceased ancestors, and the head of a family is the priest of the departed of his family. When a man dies, he is buried in his own house, or in the forest. If he owned slaves, some of them are put to death or buried alive with him; his body rests on theirs in the grave. Valuables such as ivory and beads are ground to powder and put into the grave with him; food and drink are left upon the surface. If he is buried in his house, the house becomes a shrine or temple for his worship; otherwise it is broken down, but still considered sacred to him, and offerings are presented on the site. At a chief's death the village is abandoned—at all events, for the time. Prayer is made to the deceased before hunting, for rain, for crops, and on other occasions. He manifests himself in dreams or in animal-form. A great hunter takes the form of a lion or a leopard; witches appear as hyænas; other spirits often appear as serpents. The chief's principal wife or some other woman is set apart as prophetess or oracle of the spirit. He inspires her at night; she becomes frenzied, and her ravings are heard all over the village. Sometimes she announces the demand for a human sacrifice. If the divinity be resident on a mountain, the victim is bound and left to be eaten by wild beasts or to die of hunger. If, on the other hand, the divinity's abode be near a lake or river, the victim is tied to a stone and thrown into the water.

In almost every Yao village is found a shrine, consisting of a hut within a strong fence of cactus enclosing the grave of some chief. Such a shrine is regarded with awe. If the village be removed the old shrine is not forgotten; periodical visits are made to it. On the occasion of a long journey or a warlike expedition, or in case of drought, prayers are offered to the deceased, and a feast is held, his successor or some other near relative officiating as priest. Slaves and common people are regarded as of no account. Their graves are in the thick bush, and no offerings are made to them, for they can have no influence in the spirit-world.

The Mang'anja bury in groves or thickets, called *nkalango*, which often form landmarks; but important men may be buried in their own houses. Miss Werner describes one such grove visited by her. Pots of all sorts and sizes, each with a hole broken in the bottom, were scattered over the graves, and broken sifting-baskets, and handles of hoes or axes were laid upon them. Among the other graves was a body wrapped in a red mat slung from a pole supported between two trees—a case of what is called sub-aerial burial (Werner, 155).

Upwards of 800 miles to the north-north-west, in German territory, the Warundi hold beliefs in all essentials similar to those of the Yaos. The foundation of their religion is the worship of the dead. Father van der Burgt gives a list of thirty names of spirits distinct from the ordinary *manes*. Many of these turn out on examination to be collective appellations. One of them, Umugassa, little regarded by the Warundi, is, as the good Father points out, Mukasa, the god of Lake Victoria Nyanza venerated by the Baganda. Another, Rugaba, is said to be the name of the most ancient king of the Wahinda, the parent tribe of the Warundi. Others seem to be departmental spirits; but the natives are vague about the matter, and there is reason to think that some of them at least are local divinities on their way to a more general acceptance. Several are declared to be identical with Imana, who is spoken of in the same way as is Mulungu among the Wa-yao. The name Mulungu is found among the Warundi, but is not employed as that of an object of worship: Imana seems to take its place. Imana is vaguely said to make all, see all, and be able to do all; to give life, health, death, the fruits of the earth, and so forth. But there is no idea of creation, properly so called; at most Imana or one of the other spirits is an arranger, a transformer. The name *Imana* is, however, a collective name, like *Mulungu* (p. 365[a]). Another spirit, Kiranga, often identified with Imana, receives most of the practical worship. As the name *Imana* is applied to the sacred grove or ancestral kraal of the king,

and to the king himself as invested with a religious character, so the priests and hierophants of Kiranga are called by his name and he is believed to inspire them.

The great national rite is the adoration of the sacred spear of Kiranga. It is performed at the birth of twins, in case of grave sickness, at a marriage, or on some other important occasion. The chief priest, wearing a cap of tiger-cat skin with the tail hanging down his back, and with the sacred spear grasped in his hand, sits between his assistants. When the priest is a man, his assistants are women. But the priest may be a woman, in which case her assistants are men. Carrying gourd-rattles, the people gravely dance to a solemn chant. Then each, taking a little quantity of straw, bows before the spear, offering the straw with a short prayer. When all the participants have performed this rite, they quit the hut and go to the *ikitabo*, or place of assembly, found in every village. This consists of a bed of fine white grass strewn round a sycamore tree, bordered by a circle of branches or stalks of manioc. Hither sick persons are brought to sleep and recover; dying persons are carried hither, and over them is recited a formula ascribing their condition to the *manes*, or to witchcraft or other suspected cause. The *ikitabo* is in fact sacred to the *manes*. At the adoration of the spear the opportunity is often taken to consecrate a new *ikitabo* by the solemn planting of a young tree as its centre. After a certain time of silent rest at the *ikitabo* from the fatigues of the rite, the hut is re-entered, one of the priests takes a winnowing basket, and, turning it upside down, pours water over it. He then asperses the assembly by striking it with his hand, so that drops of water are scattered round. This is perhaps a rain-charm, for the upturned bottom of the basket is said to represent the vault of heaven, whence the priest causes the blessing to descend on the expectant people, who are meanwhile murmuring prayers. A pot of sacrificial beer is brought in, and each one drinks of it in turn. The assembly is then dismissed, and the chief priest is paid for his services with beads and a mat.

The Warundi also possess small huts or votive shrines dedicated specially to the *mizimu* (pl. of *umuzimu*, the Kirundi form of the Sechuana *morimo*), or *manes*. Such huts are also dedicated with the adoration of the spear. The men eat beside the hut ritual food by way of communion with the *manes*, and what is left is put into the hut. A little beer is put into a pot, and the pot placed in the hut. Every time afterwards that the adoration of the spear takes place, a little food and beer are deposited in the hut. This is also done on other occasions; and it is believed that the *manes* often visit these huts, if they do not reside there. Heaps of stones are also to be found by the roadside, to which every passer-by adds. These are said to be dedicated to the *mizimu*. They may perhaps now be connected in the people's minds with the *manes*; but this must be considered doubtful, unless the statement be limited to the *manes* of the Watwa, a subject pygmy tribe, who, though having many customs in common with the Warundi, bury in the bush, raise a heap of stones over the grave, and plant a hedge of thorns around it. Such heaps are found practically all over the world, and are usually raised to more or less vaguely conceived local spirits.

The Warundi bury not by the roadside, but in the village. A father's grave is dug in the midst of his courtyard, opposite the door of the principal hut. A heap of stones is made over the grave, and on it are flung the door of the hut and the basket used to remove the earth from the grave. Before the body is put into the grave, the wife of the deceased anoints the head with butter, praying to the departed to be propitious to those who are left behind, to herself and to the children. The tumulus in the courtyard becomes a shrine, at which rites similar to those just described are performed: prayers and sacrifices are offered, and the sick are laid upon it. When the king dies, his remains are wrapped in the skin of a black ox and desiccated at a fire. The body is then laid on a low scaffold in the middle of his courtyard. The people come from all parts to pay homage to the deceased, to adore his *manes*, and to pray for favours. The body remains until the ants have eaten away the feet of the scaffold. It is then buried on the spot. Many of the chiefs and of the royal widows are sacrificed to the *manes*. The burial ceremony is accompanied by that of the adoration of the sacred spear; a sycamore is planted over the grave; and the royal kraal then abandoned becomes a sacred grove, haunted, mysterious, which no one enters but the official guardian whose duty it is from time to time to bring food and beer for the spirits. These groves are numerous, though the country is in general bare of trees. Tree-worship proper, however, can hardly be said to exist.

Elsewhere Father van der Burgt tells us that, when the king or a member of the royal family dies, one of the worms generated in the process of putrefaction is said to be chosen and fed with milk. Hence we should infer that desiccation is not invariably practised. The worm is subsequently transformed into a lion, or in the case of one of the king's wives into a python, or in the case of a prince of the blood royal into a leopard. The spirit of the deceased is thought to reside in the animal. It is regarded as sacred; sacrifices are offered to it, and it must not be injured.

Sacrifices usually consist of beer and sorghum-meal. Goats, cocks, and oxen are, however, also offered. A special kind of pipe with two bowls is smoked on certain occasions by the father or mother of the family as chief priest of the *manes*. This ceremony is a sort of offering.

At the head of the pantheon of the Awemba stands Leza, the consideration of whose character and position is reserved for § 7. Inferior to him are the *milungu* (a word obviously the same as *mulungu* of the Wa-yao). The *milungu* reside in hills, mountains, and rivers, and their chief function is to send rain and to fertilize the crops, for which they are worshipped with prayers and sacrifice. Another being with a similar name is Mulenga, the 'god' of the rinderpest, who is said to come periodically to wreak vengeance on chiefs who have not worshipped him with offerings of cattle. He is reputed to be the father of all albino children. The spirits of dead ancestors are called *mipashi*. They appear to be distinct from the *milungu*, who, it is conjectured, are either the nature-spirits worshipped by the aborigines of the country before the Awemba conquest and subsequently taken over by the conquerors, or *mipashi* of very ancient chiefs of the Awemba exalted to something like deity. At any rate, they now bear the characteristics of nature-spirits, haunting prominent natural objects rather than the groves and burial-places which are the resort of the *mipashi*. The spirit of the head of each family is worshipped inside the hut, at the hearth. The *mipashi* of chiefs are worshipped at the thickets or groves which are the royal burial places. Occasionally they take the form of a python. More usually they communicate with the living by appearing in dreams, or by 'possession.' There is another class of spirits called *vibanda*, which are regarded as malicious. They appear to be spirits of deceased wizards and other criminals. They are said to be worshipped by the *waloshi* (wizards), of whom more hereafter (p. 363[b]).

Burial takes place in a thicket or grove near the village where the deceased lived. The corpse is rolled in a mat in the crouching position common in the lower culture. Flour is sprinkled over the body on the way to the grave. After the body has been lowered into the grave, the nearest relative is let down and cuts a hole in the mat, over the ear of the deceased, that 'he may hear when God [presumably Leza] calls him.' One of the relatives then makes a speech (probably to the deceased), promising that they will take care of his wife and children, and expressing the hope that he will become a good spirit in the next world (see § 7). Food, calico, and his pipe are buried with the corpse.

If he was an iron- or ivory-worker, his implements are broken over the tomb. When the late king died, two of his wives were instantly sacrificed. The body was then shut up in his principal hut until the funeral, which could not take place before his successor was appointed and had given permission for it. By that time the corpse was reduced to a skeleton. It was buried wrapped in a bull's hide, and all the servants, councillors, and wives were paraded before the tomb, smitten between the eyes with a club, and left for dead. Those who survived were not afterwards troubled, as they were declared to be unacceptable to the dead chief's spirit. When a chief of the Wabisa (one of the tribes subject to the Awemba) was buried, only his head wife was killed. Her body was split in two, the bones of the chief were put inside, and so buried. The successor offered libations and sacrifices to his predecessor's *mupashi*.

(*d*) *Western tribes.*—One of the chief elements in the religion of the Western tribes is the fear of the spirits of the dead; but seeing that mother-right still prevails, it has not become so highly organized a worship of ancestors as among the Central and South-eastern tribes. Dr. Nassau distinguishes five kinds or classes of spirits:—(1) *Inina* (Mpongwe; pl. *anina*) or *Ilina* (Benga; pl. *malina*), a human embodied soul. This appears to be divided by some native philosophers into two, three, or even four. Of these the first is the body-soul or animal-soul, which dies with the body; the second is the personal soul, which survives death; the third is the dream-soul, which leaves the body during sleep and whose adventures are the dreams; the fourth is 'vaguely spoken of by some as a component part of the human personality, by others as separate but closely associated from birth to death, and called the life-spirit.' Worship is paid to the last by its possessor, and it seems to be looked upon much in the light of a genius or guardian-angel.—(2) *Ibambo* (Mpongwe; pl. *abambo*), the spirits of ancestors, as distinguished from the spirits of strangers. The *ibambo* is regarded with superstitious dread, like a European ghost.—(3) *Ombwiri* (Mpongwe; pl. *awiri*), a localized spirit, but spoken of by Dr. Nassau with the *nkinda* and *olaga* mentioned below as all coming from the spirits of the dead. The *ombwiri* has its seat on a rock, tree, or mountain-top, or in a cavern or some such place. It resents trespass there, and passers-by must go reverently and with an offering, even if it be only a pebble or a leaf. It is also regarded as a tutelary spirit; and almost every man has his own *ombwiri*, for which he provides a small house or shrine. 'Ombwiri is also regarded as the author of everything in the world which is marvellous or mysterious. Any remarkable feature in the physical aspect of the country, any notable phenomenon in the heavens, or extraordinary event in the affairs of men [is] ascribed to Ombwiri.' He has no priest, 'his intercourse with men being direct and immediate.' Souls of great chiefs and other important persons become *awiri*. White men are themselves *awiri*. *Awiri* are in general well-disposed, especially to their human kindred. They are gratified by these with worship; and among the special boons they grant is the gift of children. They continue to dwell in the district of their own people even if the latter remove, when they remain on the old site and enter into relations with any new-comers who may occupy it. A curious belief about them is that they become small and inert during the cold dry season.—(4) *Nkinda* (pl. *sinkinda*), a class partly consisting of spirits of common people deceased, partly of uncertain origin. *Sinkinda* are usually evil-disposed. They enter the bodies of living persons, causing disease, or, if many of them enter, raving or delirium.—(5) *Mondi* (Benga; pl. *myondi*), a class resembling *sinkinda*, but more evil-disposed, powerful, and independent. They require to be exorcized. *Ilâgâ* (the spirits of deceased strangers), *sinkinda*, and *awiri* are invoked for their expulsion from a patient of whom they have taken possession. They are worshipped, especially at new moon, almost always in a deprecatory way (Nassau, *Fetichism in W. Africa*, 64 ff.).

The classes of spirits thus recognized by the Mpongwe and their neighbouring tribes are not always enumerated in the same way. But we have in Dr. Nassau's analysis a fair illustration of the beliefs of the Western Bantu with regard to the soul. They are intimately related to those of the true Negroes (*q.v.*). Excepting the first class, which is rather an earlier condition of some of the others than a separate class of spirits, they are by no means distinctly defined. As Dr. Nassau observes, their 'powers and functions shade into each other, or may be assumed by members of almost any class.' Individual spirits differ in kind and degree of power; none is omnipotent. All 'can be influenced and made subservient to human wishes by a variety of incantations'; in other words, they are objects of worship. However, therefore, we are to regard these class distinctions, it is clear that the essential fact is that the worship is to a large extent the worship of the dead. That it is not entirely so appears from the fact that spirits are very often localized in particularly prominent natural objects. Localities are spoken of as having good or bad (that is, favourable or malignant) spirits. Such objects and localities are found all over West Africa. It is very improbable that all the spirits haunting them are spirits of the dead. Rather they would seem to be vague nature-spirits, the product of awe, wonder, fear, and the sense of mystery. As we shall see in a subsequent section (§ 7), an idea of sacredness and mystery attaches to various objects of the external world; and though many of them are not objects of worship, still they are something apart, they contain a germ, or it may be a vestige, of nature-worship. One means by which the localization of spirits, especially the spirits of the dead, is effected is by images. Contrary to the general practice of the Bantu tribes previously discussed, images are in frequent use among the Western Bantu. Even more than images the skulls and other bones of distinguished men and ancestors are venerated. Among the Benga on Corisco Bay, the family fetish, called by the name of *yâkâ*, consists of a bundle of finger- and toe-joints, nail and hair clippings, eyes, and other portions of the anatomy of deceased members of the family. The spirits of these deceased members are associated in the native belief with their relics. Their efficiency is called into action by prayer and the medicine-man's incantations. Among the Bavili, the *nkulu*, or spirit of the deceased, is secured by picking up at the funeral a portion of the earth from the grave and mixing it with some 'medicine,' to be afterwards put by the *nganga* (priest, or medicine-man) into an antelope's horn or other receptacle. Having thus been secured, the spirit is ultimately transferred by means of a special ceremony to an abiding-place in the head of a relative. Those spirits which are not fortunate enough to obtain such a habitation continue to haunt unseen the abodes of their kindred, and to mourn with them in trouble, though without the power to help them. Like the *Ombwiri* mentioned above, they tend to become local spirits, for it is believed 'that, if every one of the Bavili were destroyed to-morrow, these *bakulu* would hover about in the grass around their towns for ever and ever' (Dennett, *Black Man's Mind*, 82).

In accordance with these beliefs, the dead are buried in the forest, or in low-lying lands and tangled thickets along the sea-beach or the river-bank away from the villages, or occasionally in the plantain-ground behind the houses. Some of the Coast tribes, however, bury such of their dead as they specially desire to honour under the floor of the hut. This is more common among certain of the inland tribes. A considerable part of the dead man's property is laid upon his grave—if a rich man, in a little hut built upon the grave. The body itself is often wrapped in a large amount of cloths and habiliments; food, drink, and tobacco are placed in the coffin. Slaves and wives are buried with a man of importance, that he may not enter the spirit-world unattended. The usual purification by bathing, to rid them of the contact of the spirit, is undergone immediately after the burial by those who have dug the grave or taken part in the ceremony. The next day the medicine-man sprinkles the survivors, their property, and the entrances to the village with a decoction of balondo-bark for the same purpose, while the people ejaculate prayers to the spirit for wealth or food. The mourners remove to another house and remain there during the period of mourning, lest the spirit return and eat with them, thus causing

sickness. For any important person, dances are held from time to time as a gratification to his spirit during the mourning. Improvised songs are sung in praise of the deceased. Wailing, rending of garments, and other signs of woe are practised in abundance. When anything untoward happens of which the cause is unknown, it is put down to the spirit, and prayers are made with offerings of food and drink at the grave, that the spirit may cease from disturbing the survivors, and bless them instead. The usual inquiry is held as to the cause of death, and the person accused is compelled to disprove the charge of witchcraft by the poison-ordeal, to which he generally succumbs.

Whether it is held definitely and dogmatically that spirits never die may be doubted. But they are unquestionably believed by many of the tribes to be capable of re-incarnation. Some of them, at all events, are born again, either in their own family or another, or even as beasts. This, it seems, may happen repeatedly.

The Barotse are firm believers in the transmigration of the soul after death into an animal. A chief re-appears as a hippopotamus; others come back as snakes, hyænas, crocodiles, and so forth (Decle, 74; Bertrand, *The Kingdom of the Barotsi*, London, 1899, 278). The deceased monarchs are the principal divinities. They are called *ditino*. The town where a king has lived has a sacred grove adjacent to it, surrounded by a palisade covered with mats; and in that grove is his tomb. It is kept scrupulously clean and tidy. At every new moon the women piously sweep both the tomb and its approaches, as well as the village itself. The custodian of the tomb is a kind of priest; he may enter the immediate presence of the divinity; he is an intermediary between the latter and those who come to pray. No others are allowed to enter the grove. Even the reigning king, when he comes to consult the ancestor who reposes there, must remain without; he must make known his request to the custodian, deposit his offering, and await the result of his petition. The *ditino* are consulted in case of sickness, drought, and public calamity of various kinds. In 1896, when the cattle-plague swept through the continent, the Barotse had recourse to their *ditino*; and it is curious that their cattle escaped the pestilence, thereby greatly adding to the prestige of the *ditino*. No one thinks of passing by the shrine of one of these divinities without leaving an offering, however trifling, to show respect and pray for a prosperous journey, or to render thanks on a safe return (Béguin, 120). An ordinary chief is usually buried, as among the Zulus, in his cattle-kraal. A father's grave, we are told, is respected and visited by his offspring on certain occasions (Bertrand, 278), probably for purposes of worship.

5. Idols.—Among the Central, South-eastern, and South-western tribes idols are unknown. The objects which have sometimes been described as idols are merely dolls. Most of these dolls are no more than playthings, though some are carried by women as amulets to produce children. A sort of amulet or fetish is made, as already mentioned (p. 356[a]), by the Baronga at a chief's death, of portions of his *exuviæ*. Among the Northern tribes idols are of the rarest occurrence. The sacred spear of the Warundi is hardly an idol. The Achewa of North-eastern Rhodesia are said to conjure the spirit of the dead into a doll or image composed of small pieces of wood enclosing a tiny box made of the handle of a gourd-cup; the whole is bound round with calico and bark-rope, and afterwards receives the prayers of the survivors. Elsewhere in the neighbourhood of Lake Tanganyika, the habitation of the disembodied soul is a carved human image. It is set up in or near a village, and prayers and sacrifices are addressed to it (*FL* xiv. 61). An image of a god is reported on apparently good authority to have existed at Mwaruli, tended by priestesses, who were called the wives of the god. This seems to require further investigation. Among the Western tribes the case is different. As has been already (§ 4) noted, images are used in the worship of the dead, as well as family fetishes comparable with those of the Baronga chiefs. On the West Coast the objects most usually associated in the mind of Europeans with the religion of the natives are called 'fetishes.' Properly speaking, the word fetish (from the Portuguese *feitiço*) means 'sorcery' or 'amulet.' Fetishes are of two kinds, protective and imprecatory. The protective class consists of wooden human (frequently ithyphallic) figures and objects of various other substances and shapes. Some of them are regarded as personal beings, or, at least, as possessed of an indwelling spirit; others are mere amulets. When one of the former is made, a man (or, according to the kind of fetish, a woman) who is a member of the family for which it is made is chosen as its custodian and spokesman. A ceremony of consecration is performed by the *nganga*, by which the spirit, or voice, is supposed to enter the spokesman's head. The spirits of such fetishes are said to be brought by one or other of the winds. The imprecatory fetishes consist entirely of wooden figures, generally human, into which nails are driven from time to time, and which are therefore known as nail-fetishes. Into every one of these fetishes the spirit of some known person is conjured when it is made. It is first decided whose spirit is to be secured. The *nganga* then goes with a party into the bush and calls out the name of the doomed man. Having done that, he proceeds to cut down a tree, from which it is believed that blood gushes forth. A fowl is killed, and its blood is mingled with that of the tree. The fetish is shaped from the tree, and the person named dies, certainly within ten days; his spirit, in fact, is thenceforth united with the fetish. The nail-fetish is used for two purposes. Oaths are sworn by it: the person swearing calls upon it to kill him if he do or have done such and such a thing, and he thereupon drives a nail into it. At a 'big palaver' (dispute or lawsuit) the fetish is brought out, and each of the parties strikes it, thus imprecating death upon himself if he do not speak the truth. The other purpose for which nail-fetishes are used is to call down evil upon another person. The client goes to the fetish, makes his demand, and drives a nail into it. The palaver is then settled, so far as he is concerned. 'The *kulu* (spirit) of the man whose life was sacrificed upon the cutting of the tree sees to the rest' (Dennett, *Black Man's Mind*, 85 ff.). Numerous examples of the nail-fetish are to be seen in European museums, of which the finest, perhaps, is one called 'Mavungu,' left by Miss Kingsley to the Pitt-Rivers Museum at Oxford. The nail-fetishes, however, because used for purely imprecatory purposes, are regarded quite differently from all other objects of prayer or supernatural beings. They are connected in the minds of the people with hostile magic rather than with religion. Their priests form a class apart.

6. Priests, medicine-men, diviners, and sorcerers.—(*a*) *Central and South-eastern tribes.*—Among the Central and South-eastern tribes sacrifice is usually offered by the living head of the family or tribe to his ancestors. But there is an order of men some of whom among certain tribes are charged with this duty. These men, who are now suppressed as far as possible by the law of the white man, are commonly called witch-doctors or medicine-men. Among the Bavenda they are divided by a recent observer into nine

distinct classes, viz. (1) rain-makers; (2) witch-finders; (3) medicine-doctors; (4) a class whose duty it is to consecrate weapons and make the warriors invulnerable; (5) women who, armed with a calabash-rattle, foretell fortune or misfortune; (6) another kind of medical practitioners who cure illness by sucking the evil out of the patient's body; (7) a third kind of medical practitioners whose duty it is to cure insanity; (8) a further kind who undertake the cure of the sick by dancing during the night; (9) family or clan priests, called *chefi* (sing.). The head of each clan or family chooses his *chefi*, whose duty it is to sacrifice once a year at the beginning of harvest; who speaks with the divine ancestors, and brings their answers to mankind. The *chefi* of the Bavenda king is a woman, his eldest sister or nearest female relative. In all other cases it is a man. The generic name of all these classes is *dzi-ñanga* (sing. *ñanga*) (*JAI* xxxv. 379). The word *ñanga* is common to many of the Bantu tongues, and means in strictness a man who is skilled in any particular matter (Callaway, *op. cit.* 131). The Zulus have a class of *ñanga* who are diviners, another class of rain-makers, whose business it is to make rain and drive away lightning and hail, a third who practise medical magic, and so forth. To become a diviner a man must be entered by the *amatongo* (*manes*). They are said to 'walk in his body.' He complains of pain, conceives a distaste for food, and habitually avoids certain kinds. He becomes 'a house of dreams.' After some time he manifests possession by repeated yawning and sneezing. Then he has convulsions. He sleeps merely by snatches; he begins to sing. Sacrifices are offered for him. Finally, he takes an emetic which 'makes the Itongo white,' and after being subjected to various tests he is recognized as a diviner. Candidates for the class of rain-makers, on the other hand, are chosen by other *iziñanga*, who put them through a course of fasting (Callaway, *op. cit.* 259 ff., 388). Further to the south the Xosa tribes enumerate five kinds of doctors: (1) witch-doctors, including diviners and prophets; (2) surgeons or bone-setters; (3) herb-doctors; (4) rain-doctors; and (5) war-doctors. Except the last, who are always men, they may be of either sex. The word used for 'doctor' among these tribes is *iggira*, perhaps of Hottentot derivation (Hewat, *Bantu Folklore*, 1905, p. 27 ff.).

Sickness is caused by the *manes*, or by fabulous monsters, or by the magical practices of some evil-disposed person, or else it is 'only sickness and nothing more.' The first thing when attacked with disease is to ascertain to which of these kinds of sickness it belongs. This is done by divination; and the diviner often knows or can divine the remedy. In cases of sickness declared to be due to witchcraft, the next step is to divine, or 'smell out,' the sorcerer, and to counteract his magic. 'The one subject that all Kafirs are agreed upon,' we are told (and the statement is true of the whole Bantu race, and indeed of all peoples in their stage of civilization), 'is the reality of magic. No Kafir in his senses dreams of doubting the tremendous power of magic' (Kidd, *The Essential Kafir*, 1904, p. 139). Magic is inextricably mixed up with religion. It is applied to everything. In worship, in war, at birth, at marriage, it is part of all ceremonies. It protects the cattle, the cultivated grain and roots, the lives and health of the people. It is performed at puberty, in sickness, on a journey. By magic, rain is made to bring forth the fruits of the earth, or thunderstorms, hail, and blighting droughts are averted. All these are beneficent applications of magic, approved by public opinion. But there is another aspect of magic. The power that can work good can work evil. Some of the ceremonies on the occasion of a war are intended to terrify or to injure the enemy. In like manner an evil-disposed individual can cause misfortune, sickness, or death to any one of whom he may be envious, or against whom he may have a grudge or an injury to avenge. It is the business of the *ñanga* on any such occasion to discover the witch. On every death (at any rate, on the death of every wealthy or important person) an inquest is held to ascertain the cause, and, if determined to be witchcraft, then to divine the criminal. A favourite method of divining is by means of small bones, stones, and shells, which are used as dice. According as they fall when thrown by the diviner, they indicate the answer to the questions he puts. The diviner is generally a shrewd, experienced man, who knows how to attune his discoveries to the expectations and the prejudices of his clients. The penalty of witchcraft exercised against individuals is death and confiscation to the chief of all the offender's goods. The practice of 'smelling out,' or discovering, witches is therefore profitable to the ruler, and is, besides, a means of keeping his subjects in continual fear and subjection. Its result has very often been so disastrous, and has spread so much misery, devastation, and death among the tribes, that it has been prohibited in all the British colonies.

(*b*) *South-western tribes.*—The Herero medicine-men are divided into three classes, viz. (1) witch-doctors proper (*onganga*, pl. *ozonganga*), who combine the professions of physician and poisoner; (2) soothsayers (*ombuhe*, pl. *ozombuhe*), who foretell the outcome of political action by the inspection of the entrails of slaughtered cattle; (3) diviners (*ombetere*, pl. *ozombetere*). These last are called in to ascertain the person who has caused misfortune, disease, or evil of any kind. The *modus operandi* is to take three iron beads or small round stones in the left hand, and slowly move the hand up and down. From the way in which the beads arrange themselves, on the lines of the hand and the fingers, as this is done, the diviner arrives at his conclusions. The medicine-man's art descends from father to son, or if there be no son, to the practitioner's younger brothers, to whom it is secretly taught. Ordeals are not in use. There is no order of priests strictly so called. The father of a household is the priest of his ancestors; he offers the sacrifices and prayers (see § 4).

(*c*) *Northern tribes.*—It has already been mentioned (§ 4 (*c*)) that the priests of the Banyoro in the Uganda Protectorate are called, equally with the ancestral spirits whose worship they conduct, *bachwezi*. They combine the functions of priest, sorcerer, and witch-doctor, and each clan seems to rejoice in one such accredited official. But there are, besides these, private practitioners in black or white magic. The Bahima aristocracy have a profound belief in witchcraft. The country of Ankole used to be continually agitated by the 'smelling-out' of witches and wizards, and their execution. The Hima medicine-men collect a certain grass, of which they make hay. This hay is put into a jar of mead, banana-wine, or sorghum-beer, and left for twenty-four hours in one of the small huts or shrines already (§ 4) described. The liquor is afterwards removed, and drunk as a medicine. The medicine-men also make little oval-shaped or cubical pieces of wood, over which they mutter incantations, and then sell them for amulets, especially to persons who are troubled with sickness or bad dreams (Johnston, *Uganda*, ii. 588, 632).

Among the Baganda the priests of gods and ancestral spirits were termed *bamandwa*. They wore aprons consisting of little white goat-skins, and were adorned with amulets. They were also diviners. If a man was travelling, and wished for news of his parents and his wife, he went to the *mandwa*, who, furnished with his nine cowry shells sewn on a strip of leather, would with this strip make the sign of the cross and fling it before him, and then, as if inspired, would reply to the questions. The cross was employed as a symbol by the priests before the introduction of Christianity. Besides the priests there were three classes of 'doctors' in Uganda, viz. (1) *musawo*, a physician, skilled in herbs and the treatment of ulcers, wounds, and skin-diseases; (2) *mulogo*, a sorcerer; (3) *mwabutwa*, a poisoner. The *mulogo* is reputed to travel about at night stark naked, a disembodied spirit at all events in some respects, and in his own belief as well as in that of others. If in this condition he dance at midnight before a banana plantation, the trees will wither and the fruit shrivel. He is said to exercise mesmeric influence over weak-minded people, 'He is used as a detective of criminals' (presumably a 'smeller-out'), and for casting love-charms or secretly injuring an

enemy. He is often confounded with the priest, and carries on the worship of spirits (Johnston, *op. cit.* ii. 678, 676).

The Wa-yao and Mang'anja seem to possess no priests as a special order in whom are vested the right and duty of approaching the higher powers. As already mentioned (§ 4), the head of every family offers the prayers and sacrifices to his ancestors, and a woman is often set apart as prophetess or diviner. The *msinganga* practises as a physician, using simples and charms, and performing rough surgical operations. The diviner or sorcerer (*mchisango*) determines the cause of disease, 'smells-out' the witch who has produced sickness or misfortune, and generally advises (for a substantial consideration) any clients who may seek his aid. This he does ostensibly by inspecting the contents of a gourd filled with sticks, bones, claws, pieces of pottery, and so forth, much in the way previously described, and by shaking a gourd-rattle filled with pebbles. After a death and on other occasions an inquiry is held. The diviner is usually a woman. On the day appointed for the ceremony she proceeds, accompanied by a strong guard of armed men, to the place, and goes through a dance, wherein she is gradually wrought up into a more or less delirious condition, and is then supposed to be under the influence of the *masoka*. Witches are believed not only to have supernatural knowledge, but also to be addicted to cannibalism. They kill, as Hamlet's father was killed, by instilling a powerful poison into the ear as the victim sleeps. When he is dead, they are believed to hold midnight orgies and eat the body. The person accused of witchcraft is required to undergo the poison-ordeal, which is rarely refused, everybody, of course, being confident of innocence. Sometimes it is administered by proxy, the recipient being a dog or a fowl, which is tied to the accused. In case of refusal to undergo the test, the alleged witch used to be burnt. One who dies under the poison-ordeal is denied the ordinary rites of sepulture (Macdonald, chs. ii. iii. iv. v. xv.). Rain-making is practised, but there is no professional class of rain-makers. There is some evidence that the ceremonial clearing-out of wells by women, as among the Baronga, is a rain-charm. Mpambe is supplicated for rain. In an account given by a missionary of one such ceremony, which may probably be taken as representative, the leading part was taken by the chief's sister, who occupies an important position in the tribe. After prayer and dancing, 'a large jar of water was brought and placed before the chief; first Mbudzi (his sister) washed her hands, arms, and face; then water was poured over her by another woman; then all the women rushed forward with calabashes in their hands, and, dipping them into the jar, threw the water into the air, with loud cries and wild gesticulations.' Amulets and 'medicine' of different kinds are used for various purposes, offensive and defensive—for protection against thieves, against crocodiles and other fierce animals, to assist hunters, warriors, thieves, and so forth; and objects are buried to bewitch, or at least they are discovered by diviners in the process of 'smelling-out.' These practices, however, offer no striking peculiarity (Werner, 56, 76, 80).

Among the Warundi the father or mother of the family acts as priest of the *manes*. Other objects of worship are served by special priests. The chief of these is Kiranga. As we have seen (p. 359[a]), his priest may be either a man or a woman, who is called by the same name as the divinity, and is held to be inspired by him. A *kiranga* is made in one or other of three ways: (1) by inheritance; (2) by being struck by lightning; or (3) by inspiration or possession during the adoration of the sacred spear. Divination is practised by professors of the art similar to those among other Bantu tribes. The belief in witchcraft presents no special features. When sickness occurs, a medicine-man is called in to counteract the sorcery, though various vegetable remedies are known, as well as bleeding and cautery. Ordeals (red-hot iron or boiling water) are resorted to in order to discover the witch. The dead bodies of such as are convicted of sorcery are left unburied.

The Awemba king was the chief priest of the *milungu* and of his ancestors, though the management of the ritual was generally left to the *basing'anga* (pl. of *sing'anga*), who formed the regular priesthood. 'Their main function was to interpret the will of the *milungu* and the *mipashi* (p. 359[b]), and to combat the evil enchantments of the sorcerers. They named children at birth, superintended the sacrifices, tended the sick, and charmed away diseases by divination and their amulets' (*JAI* xxxvi. 155). Their office was not hereditary. Most of the old people claimed to be *basing'anga*, by virtue of their position as the oldest members of the family. There is a class of women who assert that they are possessed by some dead chief. They hold what may be described as *séances* at times, and are regarded with great veneration. It need hardly be said that sorcery is an article of belief. The *waloshi* (wizards or sorcerers) are reputed to compass, by means of black arts and powerful 'medicines,' the death of anybody who comes under their ban. They and they alone worship the *vibanda* (p. 359[b]), who impart to them instructions, 'medicines,' and power to change into predatory wild beasts. Wizards are sometimes possessed by *vibanda* (*JAI*, *loc. cit.*).

(*d*) *Western tribes.* — Turning to the Western tribes, we have already mentioned the *nganga* in treating of the nail-fetishes (p. 361[b]). The other *zinganga* (pl. of *nganga*)—at any rate, among the Bavili—form a hierarchy, at the head of which is the king. Some of them are attached to special divinities or sacred groves. As might be expected, many of them officiate not merely as priests, but also as physicians; for disease and misfortunes of all sorts are held here, as elsewhere, to be due to more than what we call natural causes. The *nganga*, therefore, treats the sick, and, like his brethren among other branches of the Bantu race, provides preventive 'medicines' intended to avert danger from witchcraft, weapons, wild beasts, and other possible fatalities. He also divines the origin and remedy for sickness, the wizard who has caused it, and many other matters connected with the hopes and fears of his clients. On the death of the king, the *nganga mpuku*, or chief diviner, decides by the aid of a magical mirror, in case of doubt, which of the eligible children of the royal princesses is to be the new king. Certain of the *zinganga* officiate in the administration of ordeals. In so far as these ordeals are distinguishable from other methods of divination, they may be described as the taking of powdered bark of the Ukasa (tree) or the Bundu (herb), or passing of hot knives across the palms and calves of the accused. Some of the Upper Congo tribes are said to be happy enough to be destitute of any ordeal for witchcraft, and indeed of any *nganga*.

7. Supreme Being. Nature-spirits.—(*a*) *Central and S.E. tribes.*—The most obscure and difficult question connected with the religion of the Bantu is whether they have any belief in a Supreme God, a Creator, an overruling Providence. Confining our attention for the moment to the Central and South-eastern tribes, we may say without fear of contradiction that the notion of creation is foreign to their minds. As they dwelt on a great continent, the question of the origin of heaven and earth never entered their thoughts. Concerning the origin of men and of animals, they were not wholly devoid

of speculation. The Zulus speak of Unkulunkulu as the first of men, the man who in some way brought men into existence. But they are by no means agreed as to how he did so. He himself is said to have sprung out of a bed of reeds. It is not clear, however, that this expression is to be taken literally. Some were of opinion that he begat men, or that he made them out of a reed. Others thought he had dug them up or split them out of a stone. The word *Unkulunkulu* simply means the most remote ancestor known to a tribe or a clan. Every clan has its own *Unkulunkulu*, and the word is ordinarily used as equivalent indifferently to our 'great-great-grandfather' and 'great-great-grandmother' (compare the *nkulu* of the Bavili, pp. 360[b], 361[b]). *Uthlanga* is another name frequently cited as that of a Zulu creator. The word means a reed, and is metaphorically used for a source of being. Thus a father is described as the *Uthlanga* of his children, from which they stooled or broke off as the offsets from a reed. Unkulunkulu, in the sense of First Man, is sometimes said to have begotten men by Uthlanga; in such a case Uthlanga is regarded as his wife. *Umdabuko* (from *ukudabuka*, 'to be broken off') is a third expression, sometimes used in a personal sense as 'the lord or chief who gives life,' and identified with Uthlanga.

Nor have the Zulus any belief in a personal, supreme, overruling Providence. There are traditions of a lord, or chief, in heaven. Bishop Callaway, however, after a most patient inquiry, came to the conclusion that in the native mind there is hardly any notion of Deity, if any at all, wrapt up in their sayings about a heavenly chief. 'When [this expression] is applied to God, it is simply the result of [Christian] teaching. Among themselves he is not regarded as the Creator, nor as the Preserver of Men, but as a power' (Callaway, *op. cit.* 124). The result of M. Junod's inquiries among the allied tribe of the Baronga is to the same effect. The problem of creation does not trouble the Ronga mind. But the word *Tilo*, 'Heaven,' ordinarily applied to the sky, embraces a much vaguer, vaster, but quite embryonic notion. As such it means a place, and more than a place, a power which manifests itself in thunder or in portents such as twins. It is called 'Lord,' but is regarded for the most part as essentially impersonal.

(*b*) *Central tribes.*—The religious beliefs of the inland tribes have never been the subject of inquiry so systematic and minute as that to which Callaway subjected the beliefs of the Zulus. But the evidence, so far as it goes, concerning the Basuto and the Bechuana is to the same effect. There is a word common to these and other tribes of the interior which has been adopted by the missionaries to translate 'God.' It was adopted many years ago before the native ideas were fully understood; and it is now too late to displace it, although, as it turns out, it was an unfortunate choice. That word is, in its Sechuana form, *Morimo*. It means a ghost or disembodied spirit, and it has a strong flavour of malevolence.

'Morimo,' says Moffat, 'to those who knew anything about it, had been represented as a malevolent *selo* or thing.' Arbousset declares: 'All the blacks whom I have known are atheists, but it would not be difficult to find amongst them some theists.' This seems contradictory. What he probably means is that individuals might be found, though he had not met them, who had a vague speculative notion of a Supreme Being. He goes on: 'Their atheism, however, does not prevent their being extremely superstitious, or from rendering a kind of worship to their ancestors, whom they call *Barimo*, or in the singular *Morimo*' (Arbousset, 39). *Barimo* beyond doubt means the ancestral *manes*. A phrase for dying is 'going to Barimo.' A lunatic, or one delirious or talking foolishly, is called *Barimo*, that is, one possessed by one or more of the *manes*. There is another plural of *Morimo*, namely, *Merimo*, which is often translated 'gods,' and which is the word used in the Sesuto phrase above cited (§ 4) for cattle. In the tongue of the Bavenda the word *Modzimo*, which is a dialectic form of *Morimo*, means 'nothing else but the totality of the good souls of their ancestors, who have not been *valoi* [maleficent sorcerers], with the founder of their tribe as head, and the ruling chief as living representative. Besides this *Modzimo*, of which the plural is *Vadzimo* [corresponding to *Barimo*], meaning the single souls of their ancestors, they also have *Medzimo* [corresponding to *Merimo*], another plural of *Modzimo*, which denotes the many objects on earth which have been made the visible representative of the ancestors of each clan and family.' Among these *Medzimo* are enumerated 'cattle, goats, sheep, or weapons and tools of old dead ancestors.' 'Even shrubs, flowers, or rushes,' we are told, 'may be created *Medzimo*' (*JAI* xxxv. 378 f.).

Besides the *Modzimo*, the Bavenda are said to have a dim idea of a Creator, whom they call Kosana, and who no longer interferes with the affairs of the world. He has left the business in the hands of another divinity named Ralowimba, who is the rewarder of good and the punisher of evil. Ralowimba is much feared, and in everyday life the people pray to him, though the two annual sacrifices at ploughing and at harvest, and sacrifices ordered by the witch-doctors on account of illness or calamities, are offered exclusively to Modzimo. There is a third deity named Thovela, the protector of pregnant women and unborn children, and of the stranger and visitor travelling through the country. The Bavenda have a tradition that they are immigrants into the Transvaal from another country. Their language points to their affinity with the peoples of the Great Lakes, though it has been thought that they came from the Lower Congo (*ib.* 378, 365). The belief in the gods just mentioned is quite different from that of the more southerly tribes, and it seems to need more extended inquiry. All attributions, for example, to savage and barbarous peoples of belief in a god who dispenses rewards and punishments after death are to be received with great caution. Such statements are generally foreign to their religious ideas, and on close examination are discovered to be founded on a misapprehension.

(*c*) *South-western tribes.*—The Herero word used by the missionaries to translate 'God' is *Mukuru*—a choice as unfortunate as the others we have noted, since it is the same word as that used for a deceased father or person of importance who has attained *quasi*-divine honours. When the Hereros entered what is now German territory, they found in possession of the country, besides the Bushmen, a people called the Ovambo, or Hill Damaras. Concerning the Ovambo little is known. They are, unlike the Hereros, a peaceful and retiring people, and are probably earlier Bantu immigrants considerably mingled with Hottentot blood. In common with the Ovambo, the Hereros have a word, *Kalunga* or *Karunga*, which seems to be etymologically related to the Zulu word *Unkulunkulu*. Kalunga is said to be the name among the Ovambo of a mythical being who gives fertility to the fields, and kills only very bad people. He has, according to Ovambo tradition, a wife named Musisi, and two children, a girl and a boy. He lives in the ground near the chief village. In one tale it is related how he came up from the earth and 'created' from *ouna* ('little things') which he set up three couples, the ancestors of the Ovambo, the Bushmen, and the Hereros. His residence in the ground, and the fact that the word *musisi* is the singular of *aasisi*, the spirits of the dead, point to his being a deified ancestor. This identification is the more probable if it be the fact, as reported by one of the missionaries, that the Hereros hold Mukuru, Musisi, and Karunga to be one and the same. Yet, according to another missionary, Karunga is to be distinguished from the *ovakuru*, and never was a human being. On the whole, the same vagueness and uncertainty on these subjects as in the case of the Central and South-eastern tribes is characteristic of the Ovambo and Hereros. Their practical interest is centred in

the *ovakuru*, to whom alone they offer sacrifice, though the Hereros sometimes cry to Karunga for help in danger, and on the occasion of a violent thunderstorm they pray to Karunga and Musisi to go away and flash into the animals of the field and into the trees. According to their legend of origin, the human race is to be traced to a tree called Omumborombonga, near Ondonga, out of which a man and woman came in the beginning (*S. Afr. F. L. Journ.* i. 67, ii. 88 ff.).

(*d*) *Northern tribes.*—Dr. Bleek, whose etymology has been generally accepted, connects with Kalunga and Unkulunkulu a word we have already found in use among several of the Northern tribes, and translated by the missionaries as 'God.' That word, *Mulungu*, is applied by the Wa-yao 'to the human *lisoka* (p. 358[a]) when regarded as an object of worship or as an inhabitant of the spirit-world. But it is also used to denote that spirit-world in general or, more properly speaking, the aggregate of the spirits of all the dead. The plural form of the word is rarely heard, unless when the allusion is made to the souls in their individualities. . . . The untaught Yao refuses to assign to it any idea of being or personality. It is to him more a quality or faculty of the human nature whose signification he has extended so as to embrace the whole spirit-world. . . . Yet the Yao approaches closely to the idea of personality and a personal being when he speaks of what *Mulungu* has done and is doing. It is *Mulungu* who made the world and man and animals. . . . *Mulungu* is also regarded as the agent in anything mysterious. "It's *Mulungu*" is the Yao exclamation on being shown anything that is beyond the range of his understanding.' When it thunders Mulungu is speaking; and the rainbow is Mulungu's bow. Mulungu is sometimes represented as assigning to the spirits their various places in the spirit-world. He arranges them in rows or tiers. If, however, we consider the various applications of the name and the usages connected with it, and compare it with the Zulu *Unkulunkulu* and the Ronga *Tilo*, we are compelled to the inference that there is a very small element of personality in it. It is vague, and essentially impersonal. When a missionary endeavoured by means of it to convey to a Yao the idea of a personal God, such as Christians entertain, the heathen beginning to grasp the idea spoke of *Che Mulungu* (Mr. God!), as if without the personal prefix it meant something quite different to him (*JAI* xxxii. 94; Macdonald, i. 67).

The Mang'anja are acquainted with the word *Mulungu*, which in their dialect is *Morungo*. But the word they generally use for the same conception is *Mpambe*. Mpambe is invoked for rain. In some parts the word is reported as meaning thunder, and sometimes lightning. Among the tribes of the coast *Muungu* or *Mulungu* seems to mean 'Heaven,' and thus to correspond with the Ronga *Tilo* (Krapf, *Suahili Dict.*, Lond. 1882, *s.v.*). Molonka, which appears to be the same word, is the name given by the Batonga on the banks of the Zambesi to that river (Thomas, *Eleven Years in Central S. Africa*, 377).

The use of the word *Mulungu* by the Warundi and Awemba has been explained in § 4. The latter people acknowledge but do not worship a vague being, in some sense supreme, called Leza. He is said to be the judge of the dead, dividing them into *vibanda*, or evil spirits, and *mipashi*, or good spirits. This recalls the Yao representation of Mulungu as arranging the dead in tiers. Probably neither statement is indigenous to the Bantu mind. The name of Leza is invoked only in blessing or in cursing; but the ordeal which a man accused of witchcraft or other serious crime is required to undergo is said to be regarded as an appeal to Leza. In any case he is not anthropomorphic, and receives no direct worship; he is little if anything more than a name.

Further still to the north the Bahima have no clear idea of an overruling God. It is said indeed that they have a name for God; but such name is apparently associated only with the sky, the rain, and the thunderstorm. Whether the Baganda recognized any Supreme Being is at least doubtful.

It appears from the foregoing account of the beliefs of the Northern tribes that, while among none of them, so far as we know, is there, any more than among the Central and Southern tribes, a definite idea of a Supreme Being, there is a tendency towards polytheism. Many, indeed, of the tribes recognize and have entered into relations of worship with beings so much above mankind, either living in the flesh or in the state of disembodied spirits, that they may fairly be described as gods (see § 4). Whether these gods have been developed, as Sir Harry Johnston and others think, from ancestral *manes*, or owe their origin to local spirits, or to vaster, more vaguely conceived nature-spirits, is a very difficult question.

(*e*) *Western tribes.*—Nature-spirits at all events seem to play their part in the religion of the Western tribes. We have seen (§ 4) that localized spirits are commonly known.

According to the belief of the Bavili (if we may trust Mr. Dennett's exposition in his book, *At the Back of the Black Man's Mind*), the world as conceived by them is filled with *Bakici Baci* (pl. of *Nkici Ci*). This phrase he translates as 'speaking powers on earth.' To these Bakici Baci a number of sacred groves, which are known by their various names, are dedicated. Various kinds of trees and animals are also held sacred, or Bakici Baci. All the provinces of the kingdom and the rivers are in addition reckoned sacred, and the representatives of all the different families owning sacred ground within the kingdom are Bakici Baci. One of the titles of the king is Nkici Ci; and he is said to be regarded as the product and final effect of the Bakici Baci. Certain of the Bakici Baci, such as Xikamaci, the north wind, and others, besides the king, are regarded as living beings and are propitiated. But, speaking generally, they are not objects of worship—still less actual gods. They may be vaguely recognized as 'powers'; they are rather, it would seem, sacred categories, in which practically everything (including many things that to us are mere abstractions) is included.

They are said to be the personal attributes or manifestations of Nzambi. Over the concept of Nzambi, however, no little obscurity hangs. The name is found under various forms among all the Western Bantu, and perhaps even among the true Negroes to the north of the Gulf of Guinea. Its meaning is quite unknown. A wider knowledge of Bantu philology is required to interpret it than is possessed by anybody who has hitherto guessed at it. Among the South-western tribe of the Hereros, Ndyambi is said to be identical with Karunga, already discussed. By the Barotse, Nyambe is sometimes identified with the sun, sometimes regarded more vaguely as a kind of Supreme Being, and the progenitor by a female being of the animals and man. Concerning the Mpongwe our information is contradictory. Dr. Nassau represents the people as speaking of Njambi as their father, and attributing to him the making of things in general. They suppose him to exist from an indefinite time past, and to have made some spirits, but not necessarily all. Those whom he has made live with him in Njambi's Town. Dr. Nassau, however, quotes an earlier missionary who refers to Onyambe as hateful and wicked, and as only one of two spirits associated under 'God' in

the government of the world, but apparently with very little influence. The Fans, near neighbours of the Mpongwe, are reported to believe in a number of gods at the head of whom stands Nzame, or Anyambi, the Father who made or begat all things. But the accounts given by the missionaries vary so much that it is impossible, in the present state of our information, to be sure of the exact status of the 'god' in question. In any case he has long ago deserted the world, and is indifferent to human wants and sufferings. On the Upper Congo, Njambe figures as only one of four seemingly equal beings. He is the author of death, sickness, and evils of all kinds; Libanza, another of the four, being called 'Creator.' On the Lower Congo two beings are spoken of: Nzambi and Nzambi Mpungu. The latter is generally represented as superior to the former, who is sometimes called his daughter, sometimes his wife, and sometimes is a male undergod. Nzambi, as a female being, is the subject of many legends. She is always 'spoken of as the "mother," generally of a beautiful daughter, or as a great princess calling all the animals about her to some great meeting, or palaver; or as a poor woman carrying a thirsty or hungry infant on her back, begging for food, who then reveals herself and punishes those who refused her drink or food by drowning them, or by rewarding with great and rich presents those who have given her child drink. Animals and people refer their palavers to her as judge' (Dennett, *Fjort*, 2). Mr. Dennett has, however, in a more recent work given a different version of Nzambi. According to this, Nzambi is the abstract idea, the cause. 'From the abstract Nzambi proceed Nzambi Mpungu, Nzambi Ci, and Kici.' Nzambi Mpungu is 'God Almighty, the father God who dwells in the heavens and is the guardian of the fire'; Nzambi Ci is 'God the essence, the God on earth, the great princess, the mother of all the animals, the one who promises her daughter to the animal who shall bring her the fire from heaven,' the Nzambi, in short, of his earlier account; Kici is 'the mysterious inherent quality in things that causes the Bavili to fear and respect.' Mr. Dennett proceeds to say that 'it is not unnatural that, one of the personalities of Zambi being Kici, his powers (or perhaps attributes) are called Bakici Baci, the speaking powers on earth, and that their product or final effect is Nkici'ci (Kici on earth), one of the tribes of the king Maluango' (*Black Man's Mind*, 105, 166). Elsewhere, however, he makes Nyambi (to which he attaches the same meaning as to Nzambi) the nephew of Bunzi, the South Wind, and one of the Bakici Baci, while admitting that 'some people call God Nyambi instead of Nzambi' (*ib.* 116). This agrees more nearly with Bastian's account. He represents Nzambi as a family fetish, originally descended from Bunzi, the Father and Mother of All, a local fetish or divinity of Moanda. It is, however, a fetish of high rank, since special powers for the consecration of other fetishes are assigned to it. It seems, in fact, to be the royal fetish; for pork is the *orunda* of all its worshippers, and pork, as we know, is forbidden to the royal family. When a woman becomes pregnant she is required to appear before Nzambi, in order that the *nganga* inspired by the fetish may formally declare her condition, paint her, and put a girdle round her as an amulet for easy delivery. Not until then is she permitted to mention the fact of her pregnancy (Bastian, *Loango-Küste*, i. 175, 173).

On the whole, we may probably conclude that the Western tribes have developed the belief in 'a relatively Supreme Being,' to use Mr. Andrew Lang's phrase, to a point at which, though still vague, it does embrace the idea of the author of the present condition of the world as they know it, and that of a far-away, somnolent and indifferent overlord, whose government is exercised by inferior and practically independent chiefs, comparable with the subordinate chiefs of a Bantu realm. These, the real powers with which mankind comes into contact, are not arranged in any system intelligible to us from our present information. They comprise all the personal beings imagined to infest the native's environment, whether unseen or attached to a 'fetish,' or to superintend the affairs of the world, including a vast variety of more or less vaguely conceived nature-spirits. Unless secured to a protective fetish, or unless ancestral spirits, their activity is dreaded as at all events primarily hostile. Even their favour is of a very precarious description, easily lost by the neglect, voluntary or involuntary, of offerings or of some *orunda*.

Conclusion.—Bantu religion thus divides into two great branches. The religion of the roving and warlike tribes of the centre and south of the continent is pure, or nearly pure, worship of ancestors. That of the more settled and agricultural tribes of the Great Lakes and the west of the continent is a mingled worship of nature-spirits and ancestors. Partly corresponding with this division is the distribution of the names Unkulunkulu and Nzambi. Neither of these names has been reported from the north-eastern region, which was the centre of distribution of the Bantu peoples. The one has been developed on the eastern side of the continent among the ancestor-worshipping tribes; the other on the western side among the tribes acknowledging nature-spirits and paying worship to them as well as to the *manes*. But, whereas the former do not, so far as we can discover, attach a definite personal concept to Unkulunkulu or its etymological variants, Nzambi, on the other hand, among the Western tribes, does seem to convey a personal meaning, and is the subject of many mythological stories. It has been suggested with probability that these two names, with the two different types of mental and religious evolution which they mark, indicate separate streams of emigration by distinct branches of the Bantu race. But whether the distinction had arisen before these two branches parted company, or how far the evolution was helped or hindered by the climate, the nature of the country, the habits consequently acquired by the people, and the influence of other races, has yet to be determined.

Literature.—Our information with regard to nearly all the Bantu peoples is of a fragmentary description. Those best known to us are the tribes inhabiting the southern part of the central plateau of South Africa and the coast-fringe from Delagoa Bay southwards. In the following list no attempt is made to enumerate more than the principal works to which we are indebted for our knowledge of the customs and religion of the Bantu. Incidental contributions of value are often to be found in other writings by missionaries, travellers, and administrators.

I. *South-eastern tribes*: John Maclean, *A Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs*, Cape Town, 1866 [intended for use in the courts of British Kaffraria]; H. Callaway, *Nursery Tales, Traditions and Histories of the Zulus*, London, 1868, also *Religious System of the Amazulu*, London, 1870 [both fragments, but of the highest value]; Henri Junod, *Les Baronga*, Neuchatel, 1898 [the only systematic monograph on any of the tribes hitherto published]; Report of the Cape Government Commission on *Native Laws and Customs*, Cape Town, 1883.

II. *Central tribes*: General reference may be made to the writings of the missionaries: Moffat, *Missionary Labours in S. Africa*, London, 1842; Campbell, *Travels in South Africa*, 3 vols., Lond. 1815–22; Casalis, *Les Bassoutos*, Paris, 1859 (Eng. tr. London, 1861); Merensky, *Beiträge zur Kenntniss Süd-Afrikas*, Berlin, 1875; Mackenzie, *Ten Years North of the Orange River*, Edinburgh, 1871, *Day-Dawn in Dark Places*, London, 1884, *Austral Africa*, 2 vols., *ib.* 1887; Thomas, *Eleven Years in Central S. Africa*, London, 1872; Arbousset and Daumas, *Exploratory Tour*, Cape Town, 1846, and others, and of numerous explorers.

III. *South-western tribes*: Andersson, *Lake Ngami: Explorations and Discoveries during four Years' Wanderings in the Wilds of South-western Africa*, London, 1856; Edward

Dannert, *Zum Rechte der Herero*, Berlin, 1906 [a juridical treatise by a German official]; articles on the Herero and Ovambo by German missionaries in the *South African Folk-Lore Journal*, Cape Town, 1879–1880.

IV. *Northern tribes*: Sir Harry H. Johnston, *The Uganda Protectorate*, 2 vols., London, 1902, also *British Central Africa*, London, 1897; J. F. Cunningham, *Uganda and its Peoples*, London, 1905; J. M. M. van der Burgt, *Un Grand Peuple de l'Afrique Equatoriale*, Bois-le-Duc, 1904 [a work by a Roman Catholic missionary on the Warundi]; Duff Macdonald, *Africana; or, the Heart of Heathen Africa*, 2 vols., London, 1882 [a valuable work by a Scottish missionary to the Wa-yao and Mang'anja of the Shire Highlands]; A. Werner, *The Natives of British Central Africa*, London, 1906 [dealing chiefly with the same two tribes]. The Swahili and other tribes of the east coast have been to a large extent Arabized. For the most part they profess Muhammadanism, which is, however, greatly debased by native superstitions. They need no special treatment. The Masai, and neighbouring peoples of mingled Hamitic and Negro or Bantu blood, do not come within the limits of this article.

V. *Western or Forest tribes.*—For the coastal tribes, A. Bastian, *Ein Besuch in San Salvador*, Bremen, 1859, also *Die Deutsche Expedition an der Loango-Küste*, 2 vols., Jena, 1874; Heli Chatelain, *Folk-tales of Angola*, Boston, 1894; M. H. Kingsley, *Travels in West Africa*, London, 1897, also *West African Studies*, 1899; R. E. Dennett, *Notes on the Folklore of the Fjort*, London, 1898, also *At the Back of the Black Man's Mind*, 1906. To these must be added the old writers Proyart, *Histoire de Loango, Kakongo, et autres royaumes d'Afrique*, Paris, 1776, and Merolla, 'A Voyage to Congo, and several other Countries in the South Africk . . . in the Year 1682,' in Churchill, *Collection of Voyages and Travels*, i., Lond. 1732, as first-hand authorities, all the more important because they describe (though often without understanding it) the condition of native society before it became so largely contaminated by foreign intercourse. For the more inland tribes, see Du Chaillu, *Explorations and Adventures in South Africa*, London, 1861, also *A Journey to Ashangoland*, 1867; Sir H. H. Johnston, *The River Congo*, London, 1884. Bentley, *Pioneering on the Congo*, 2 vols., London, 1900, the works of other members of the Baptist mission to the Congo, and Coillard, *On the Threshold of Central Africa*, Lond. 1897, and the works of other French Protestant missionaries to the Barotse, should also be mentioned. E. Sidney Hartland.

BAPTISM.

Ethnic (J. A. MacCulloch), p. 367.
Christian—
New Testament (J. V. Bartlet), p. 375.
Early (Kirsopp Lake), p. 379.
Later (H. G. Wood), p. 390.
Greek and Roman.—See Initiation.
Hindu (D. Mackichan), p. 406.
Jewish (A. J. H. W. Brandt), p. 408.
Muhammadan (D. B. Macdonald), p. 409.
Parsi.—See 'Hindu' and Initiation (Parsi).
Polynesian (L. H. Gray), p. 410.
Sikh.—See 'Hindu,' p. 406.
Teutonic (E. Mogk), p. 410.
Ugro-Finnic.—See Initiation.

BAPTISM (Ethnic).—Among many peoples a rite is found, performed either at infancy or later in life, which has considerable likeness to the ceremony of Christian baptism. Sometimes that likeness is only on the surface; in other cases it extends deeper, and the pagan rite has also a religious and ethical purpose. The use of water in such a ceremony is connected with its more general ceremonial use among heathen races as a means of ritual purification. This subject will be considered by itself (see Purification); we confine ourselves here to such rites as may be described as baptismal, and to an inquiry into the rationale of these, as well as into the causes which have led to water being used for this purpose.

1. *Origin of ethnic baptismal rites.*—First, let it be clearly understood that the ceremonial use of water in rites which are sometimes exceedingly simple, but at other times are profoundly symbolic and complex, though now inextricably connected with other opinions regarding its nature and power, has proceeded by a regular process of evolution from the simple use of water as a cleansing and purifying medium. Water obviously purifies the body from dirt; then, as its powers become enhanced in the primitive mind, it can cleanse from evil considered as a material or spiritual pollution, or can ward it off by a species of magical virtue; until, finally, it comes to be thought that it can also cleanse from the stain of moral guilt. This comes into view when it is considered that the ceremonial use of water occurs frequently at precisely those times which require its ordinary purifying powers, *e.g.* childbirth, or after contact of the person with disease or death. We shall now refer to some of the causes which have extended the idea of simple purification by water, or have transformed it into a special ceremonial purificatory rite, more or less symbolic, and connected with the giving of a name.

2. *Mother and child tabu at birth.*—As a result of the general theory of sexual tabu, by which, through the mystery which surrounds certain periodic or occasional functions of woman's life, she is considered more or less dangerous, and must therefore be avoided, it is usual among savage races for the woman, during and after childbirth, to be set apart from her fellows. She is frequently isolated in a special hut prepared for her, as in certain parts of Australia, in North America, and in New Zealand (*JAI* ii. 268; Petitot, *Traditions indiennes du Canada nord-ouest*, Paris, 1886, p. 257; Shortland, *Traditions and Superstitions of the New Zealanders*, London, 1854, p. 143); elsewhere she is set apart for some days after the birth to undergo rites of purification. Childbirth is one of those crises in human life, occasional or periodic, in which the persons passing through them are regarded as centres of danger either to themselves or to others. It is as a result of this primitive belief that the period of maternity is a period of ceremonial 'uncleanness'; the woman is then tabu. But equally the child, which is part of herself, and has been in such close contact with the mother, is also unclean—another centre of danger. As a rule, therefore, whatever ceremonies have to be undergone by the mother to remove the tabu have also to be participated in by the child. Thus, with the Koragars of West India, mother and child are ceremonially unclean for five days, and both are restored to purity by a tepid bath (Walhouse, *JAI* iv. 375).

Among the Polynesians the child is *tapu*, and can be touched by none but sacred persons. He becomes *noa* (free from *tapu*) by the father touching him with roast fern root, which he then eats. Next morning the eldest relative in the female line does the same (Shortland, *op. cit.* 143). Lustration of the woman and newborn child is practised among the American Indians, Negroes, and Hottentots, who purify both mother and child by smearing them 'after the uncleanly native fashion' (Tylor, *Prim. Cult.*[3] ii. 432). Among the Karens 'children are supposed to come into the world defiled, and, unless that defilement is removed, they will be unfortunate and unsuccessful in their undertakings.' This defilement is therefore fanned away by one of the elders with appropriate words, after which he binds thread round the child's wrist and gives it a name (*JRASBe* xxxvii. pt. 2, 131). So with the Malays, infants are purified by fumigation, and women after childbirth are half-roasted over the purificatory fire (Skeat, *Malay Magic*, London, 1900, 77).

3. *Mother and child at the mercy of evil spirits.*—In addition to mother and child being regarded

as unclean or tabu, they are also, according to a widely distributed opinion, especially subject to the attack of evil spirits. Their very helplessness probably suggested this idea among peoples who believed themselves surrounded at all times by hosts of spirits ready to snatch them away or to do them an ill turn. The child is thought by the people of East Central Africa to be most open to attack until seven days old. Here the spirits are propitiated by sacrifice (Macdonald, *Africana*, London, 1882, i. 224). The Kalmuks drive off the evil spirits from mother and child by rushing about, shouting and brandishing cudgels (Pallas, *Reisen*, St. Petersburg, 1771–76, i. 360), while the tribes of the Malay Peninsula scare them away with bonfires (*Jour. Ind. Arch.* i. 270). A similar precaution is prescribed by the Parsi sacred books—a fire or a lamp is kept lit for three days to keep away the Devs and Drujs, wizards and witches, who use their utmost efforts to kill mother and child (West, *Pahlavi Texts*, i. 316, 343–344, iii. 277). Such beliefs have survived among the European peasantry, but with them it is now mostly either witches or fairies who are feared. In some districts witches were believed to carry off children to devour them in a ritual orgy at the Sabbat; while fairies stole the child in order to bring it up among themselves, leaving a puny changeling in its place. Hence the recent Scandinavian custom of never letting the fire out till the child is baptized —a custom identical with one followed by the ancient Romans; and the Celtic practice of protecting mother and child from fairies, spirits, and the like by carrying fire round them sunwise.

4. *Removal of tabu.*—In order to remove the dangerous influences which were supposed to emanate from the child and to neutralize the evils to which it was in turn exposed, various methods were and are resorted to. Among these are purification by water, or by blood, or by fire, while analogous rites at birth or puberty, frequently in connexion with the name-giving ceremony, are tatuing, circumcision, and other bodily mutilations, or initiation, with the simulation of death and re-birth. Where such efforts had for their end the removal of tabu, they were mainly of a purificatory nature. The tabu, in savage opinion, resembles both a contagious and an infectious disease. It is a kind of invisible essence, surrounding the tabued person or thing, and easily passing over to other things and persons. All rites for removal of tabu are, therefore, largely purificatory. Much the same may be said of the evil influences to which mother or child is exposed. But their removal is effected not only by purificatory rites, but by magical ceremonies, by sacrifices, or by terrorizing them. Examples of various methods of removing tabu or external evil influences may be referred to. The subject is frequently placed by the fire, or fumigated with smoke or incense. Or the tabu or the evil is wiped or scraped off with the hands, which are then washed, or with a scraper, which is afterwards buried or destroyed. Or, again, the evil is transferred bodily to some other person or thing, according to a wide-spread series of rites of which that of the scapegoat is an instance, and that of 'carrying out death' another. But the most natural method of all is that of washing or lustration with water. 'The tabu essence, as if exuding from the pores and clinging to the skin, like a contagious disease, is wiped off with water, the universal cleanser' (Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, London, 1902, 228). With the Jews, washing with water was one of the necessary ceremonial methods of removing uncleanness or tabu; so among the Navahos the man who has touched a dead body must remove his clothes and wash himself before he mingles with his fellows (*BE*, First Report, p. 123); and Skeat tells us that among the Malays purification of mother and child is usually accomplished by means of fire or a mixture of rice-flour and water (*op. cit.* 77), the process not only removing tabu, but 'destroying the active potentialities of evil spirits.' This ceremonial use of water is further illustrated by its use among the Kafirs, who, as Lichtenstein says (*Travels in Southern Africa*, London, 1812–15, i. 257), remove the contagion of the guilt of murder, of death, or of magic, by washing. So Basuto warriors bathe after battle to wash off the ghosts of their victims, 'medicines' being put in the water by a sorcerer farther up the stream (Casalis, *Basutos*, London, 1861, p. 258). The washing with lustral water is thus necessary to remove the contagion of 'uncleanness'; it is also a safeguard against impending evil, and acts as a kind of magic armour which turns aside the attacks of a visible or invisible foe. We go on now to ask why water should have this efficacy, as a preliminary to showing its actual use in ethnic baptismal rites.

5. *Water as a safeguard.*—The animistic theory of the universe which underlies all primitive religion and philosophy suggested that water was a living being, which, in so far as it assisted the processes of growth and aided men in other ways, might be presumed to be beneficent. But even apart from the animistic theory, water, more than any other thing in the universe, seemed to be alive. Its motion, its sound, its power, hinted at life; hence the vivid Hebrew phrase (occurring with other peoples also) of 'living water.' It may be presumed also that man soon discovered the purifying effects of water for himself; its power of quenching thirst he already knew; that of invigorating the body by a plunge in its cool waves he must soon have found out, for he did not confine this invigorating process to himself, but even bathed the images of his gods on stated occasions, in order to renew their powers. The further idea arose, aided by the belief in a spirit or divinity of the waters, that certain waters, more usually springs, lakes, or wells, had miraculous healing properties —a belief which has survived centuries of Christianity. We find these various beliefs about the Water of Life conferring immortality, strength, or beauty, or about the Fountain of Youth, idealized in folk-lore in the many European folk-tales, with parallels from all stages of barbaric and savage culture (cf. MacCulloch, *CF*, London, 1905, ch. 3). Another concrete survival of such primitive ideas is the belief that no spirit or power of evil can cross running water. It was thus by a logical process that water, considered as having all these various powers and as being itself the vehicle or abode of spirits favourable to man, should have been used as one method of removing the contagion of tabu or the influence of evil spirits, or at a higher stage should have been held to possess the power of removing the guilt of sin. This last function may be conveniently illustrated by the Hindu belief in sacred rivers, *e.g.* the Ganges, in which the sins of a lifetime may be removed by a plunge—a process known also to the superstitious Roman whom Juvenal (vi. 520–23) satirizes for washing away his sins by dipping his head three times in the waters of the Tiber. Water, which removed dirt from the body, could therefore remove the contagion of tabu; and if it could do this, it was presumed that it had the further power of removing the stain of moral evil. It is on such a basis that what are justly to be called ethnic baptismal rites are founded. Primarily, they are simple purifications to remove tabu, or to ward off spirits who are intent on doing the child an injury. Then they are con-

nected with the process of name-giving. Lastly, with some correspondence to Christian adult baptism, they are used at initiations or before the celebration of Mysteries, and have then a certain ethical content; they remove sin. But all alike arose out of the necessary washing of the child after birth, which is itself sometimes a religious rite, connected also with name-giving, and from those primitive ideas about water just referred to. Each of these stages will now be considered separately.

6. *Ceremonial lustration without name-giving.*—Among the people of Sarac, E. Africa, it is customary to wash the child, when it is three days old, with water which has been specially blessed for this purpose (Munzinger, *Ostafr. Stud.*, Gotha, 1865, p. 387). The act has even greater significance among the Basutos, with whom the Naka, when he comes to consecrate the child, makes a foam out of water and various 'medicines,' with which he lathers the child's head. He then binds a medicine bag round his thighs (Tylor, *Prim. Cult.*[2] ii. 435). Among many S. African tribes—Giacas, Gcalekas, Tembus, Pondos, Pondomisi, Fingoes, etc.—the mother is secluded for a month after the birth. The father slaughters an ox to obtain the favour of the ancestral spirits, and during the month wise women sprinkle the child daily with a decoction of herbs, and repeat meaningless hymns to ensure its development and health. It is also passed through the smoke of aromatic wood to bring it wisdom, vigour, and valour. Later the father gives the child a name, usually from some passing event. Similar customs prevail among the Yaos, Makololo, Machuas, Angoni, and other East African peoples (Macdonald, *JAI* xix. 267, xxii. 100). A combined use of water and fire is found among the Jakun tribes of the Malay Peninsula, who wash the newborn child in a stream, and then, bringing it back to the hut, pass it frequently over a newly-kindled fire on which pieces of sweet-smelling wood have been thrown (*Jour. Ind. Arch.* ii. 264); while in Java the ceremony consists in shaving the child's head forty days after birth, before an assembled throng, after which he is dipped in a brook. In Fiji the child's first bath is made the occasion of a feast; in Uvea, at the feast held after the birth of a child, his head is ceremonially sprinkled with water; while in Rotuma the head, face, gums and lips of the newly-born are rubbed with salt water and coco-nut oil (Ploss, *Das Kind*, i. 258). With these ceremonies may be compared the custom of the Chinese, who, when the child is washed at three days old, hold a religious rite in connexion with this act of purification (Doolittle, *Social Life of the Chinese*, New York, 1867, i. 120). The intended effect of such ceremonies is seen in the custom, common in Upper Egypt, of bathing the child at its fortieth day and then pronouncing it 'clean.' All the examples cited show that the first washing of the child is itself made a religious and social rite, or that such a rite, more or less symbolic, occurs soon after birth.

7. *Lustration with name-giving.*—The custom of name-giving may occur at birth, or again at puberty, when the boy is initiated into the totem-clan, the tribe, or the tribal mysteries, at which time, as entering upon a newer or fuller life, he usually receives a new name. Among the Zuñis the initiation and first name-giving occur any time after the child, till then called 'baby,' is four years old. Although there is no use of water, the rite is so like that of Christian baptism in other respects that it may be described. A 'sponsor' breathes on a wand which he extends towards the child's mouth as he receives his name. The initiation is 'mainly done by sponsors, and the boy must personally take the vows as soon as he is old enough' (*BE*, Fifth Report, p. 553). Among most races the name-giving is usually a religio-social ceremony of great importance, since the name is considered among primitive folk to be a part of one's personality (see NAME), and since the ceremony admits the child to the privileges of the clan or tribe. We are here concerned with the ceremony only as it is accompanied with a ritual use of water. First it should be observed that the custom of giving a name at a ceremonial washing which has become 'baptismal' has probably arisen accidentally. We have seen that the newly-born child is washed as a protection against evil, or to make him ceremonially pure. But an equally important part of the child's dawning life was the conferring of a name upon him—the name, as a part of the personality, being a thing of magic or sacred import. What more natural, then, than the combination of two rites, which must frequently have been performed successively, into one which included both? But as a further stage in the evolution of the rite, the purificatory act becomes then more and more symbolic, and, in certain aspects, subsidiary to the name-giving ceremony. Actual washing and name-giving immediately after birth occur among the Kichtak Islanders (Billings, *N. Russia*, 1802, p. 175).

(1) Africa.—The more ceremonial act is well marked among several African tribes. Among the Yoruba Negroes a priest is sent for at a birth, and it is his duty to discover from the deities which ancestor means to dwell in the child, so that he may be called by his name. At the actual name-giving ceremony the child's face is sprinkled with water from a vessel which stands under a sacred tree (Bastian, *Geog. und Eth. Bilder*, Jena, 1873, p. 182). Such ceremonies are general in West Africa. Further south, among the Mfiote people of Loanga, when the child is three or four months old he is sprinkled with water in presence of all the dwellers in the village, and is called by the name of an illustrious ancestor (Ploss, *Das Kind*, i. 259). The same social significance of the religious rite—the reception of the child into the corporate community—is well marked among the tribes of the Gabun. When a birth has taken place, the fact is announced by a public crier, who claims for the child a name and place among the living. Some member of the community then promises for the people that the child will be received, and will have a right to all their privileges and immunities. The people then assemble, and the child is brought out before them. The headman of the family or village sprinkles water upon it, gives it a name, and blesses it—the blessing usually referring to its future material welfare (Nassau, *Fetichism in W. Africa*, N. Y. 1904, p. 212). This social significance of the rite will be met with in other cases. With the Baganda of Central Africa the ceremony forms part of another which tests the legitimacy of the child. Several children of two years old are usually brought together. Each mother throws the fragment of the umbilical cord which she has preserved into a bowl containing a mixture of water, palm-wine, and milk. If it floats, the child is declared legitimate. A name is conferred, and part of the fluid is then poured upon the child's head (J. Roscoe, in *JAI* xxxii. 25). Among the Ova-Herero the rite is most elaborate. The child is carried by the mother from the lying-in house to a sacred fire which is constantly tended by the headman's eldest daughter, who sprinkles child and mother with water as they proceed. Arrived at the place, mother and child are again sprinkled with water by the headman, who then addresses the child's ancestors, and, after various acts, touches its forehead with his own and gives it a name. Each man present does the same, repeat-

ing this name or conferring a new one; thus a child may have several names. After this ceremony the child's forehead is touched with that of a cow, which now becomes his property. He is then considered an Ova-Herero (*Globus*, xxxviii. 364).

(2) Malay Archipelago.—Similar rites are found all over the Malay Archipelago, as the following instances will show. In Sumatra, at the name-giving ceremony, the child is carried to the nearest running water by the men; there the father dips it, and gives it a name (Ploss, *op. cit.* i. 258). Among the Papuans the name-giving takes place as soon as the child can run; at the same time it is taken to a spring and there solemnly bathed several times (*ZE*, 1876, p. 185). The rite is made the occasion of a feast among the relatives. With the Negritoes of the Philippines the mouth of the newborn child is filled with salt; after this women hasten with it to the nearest brook, in which they bathe it. The name-giving occurs at the same time (Ploss, *op. cit.* i. 258). The use of salt occurs among several peoples as a ritual act, and is part of the baptismal ceremony of the Roman Church.

(3) Among various Polynesian tribes the rite was usually connected with the removal of tabu from the child. The priest asperged the head with a green twig dipped in water, or else immersed the child bodily in the water, accompanying the act with prayers and conjurations in dialogue form, and in an archaic language. With the Maoris, the priest repeated a number of names borne by ancestors till the child sneezed, and the name spoken at that moment was bestowed upon him, along with the act of asperging or dipping him in water. The child was, at the same time, dedicated to the war-god Tu (Tregear, *JAI* xix. 98; Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, 4 vols., London, 1832–34, i. 259; Taylor, *New Zealand*, London, 1868, p. 184). Sir George Grey, in his *Polynesian Mythology* (p. 32), cites a myth which shows the importance attached to the exact observance of the ritual. When Maui's father baptized him, he hurried over or omitted some of the *karakias*—prayers offered to make him sacred and free from impurities—and for this he afterwards feared that the gods would be angry. This, of course, is akin to the fear shown by savages everywhere regarding the non-observance of tabu rites. At a later period, when the child had grown up to be a youth, he was again sprinkled with water, in order to be admitted to the rank of warrior.

(4) Similar observances are found among the American Indian tribes. The Cherokees performed the rite when the child was three days old, and firmly believed that, if it were omitted, the child would certainly die (Whipple, *Report on Indian Tribes*, Washington, 1855, p. 35). The Mayas believed that the ceremonial ablution washed away evil, hindered the influence of evil demons, and gave the child inclinations to good. The priest having appointed a lucky day, a feast was prepared, and the father fasted for three days. Among the customs observed at the rite were cleansing the house to drive out evil, throwing maize and incense on a fire by each child who was to be baptized, striking the child to drive away unclean thoughts. The priest then signed the child and sprinkled him with sacred water; this act was repeated by the father, and the rite concluded with the cutting of a lock of the child's hair by means of a stone knife (Bancroft, *NR*, San Francisco, 1883, i. 664). This most elaborate ceremony had an evidently ethical as well as a religious import; the same is true of the Mexican and Peruvian rites, though we should be careful to observe that the ethical standard of these races was far from being that of our own. Dr. Brinton has pointed out that the purification of the child by water was, with several of the native races of America, styled by a word signifying 'to be born again' (*Myths of the New World*, N. Y. 1868, p. 148). Astonishing as this may appear, it is on a level with the psychology of other savage religious rites, *e.g.* those of initiation to the mysteries, or at the making of sorcerers, when the youth is believed to die and come to life again, receiving a new name, and acting in all respects as if all life was new to him. It is well known that both Aztecs and Peruvians used some kind of baptism; and while the facts may have been exaggerated by contemporary reporters, the Christian priests who witnessed the rites believed firmly that the devil, for his own evil ends, had mimicked the Christian sacrament. We may therefore assume that the description of the rite among these peoples is, on the whole, correct. Sahagun says that the order of baptism among the Aztecs began, 'O child, receive the water of the Lord of the world, which is our life; it is to wash and purify; may these drops remove the sin which was given thee before the creation of the world, since all of us are under its power'; and concluded, 'Now he liveth anew and is born anew, now is he purified and cleansed, now our Mother the Water again bringeth him into the world.' The ceremonial washing was repeated twice, at birth and four days later, and at the later ceremony the child received its name, usually that of some ancestor, who, it was hoped, would watch over it until the time of the second name-giving and baptism in later life (*Hist. de la Nueva España*, lib. vi. cap. 37). The expressions used here concerning the water show that the rite was based on those primitive ideas of the power of water which have already been referred to. The Peruvian rite had much the same purpose. A priest immersed the child in water, at the same time exorcizing evil spirits from it, and bidding them enter the water, which was then buried in the ground. A first name was at the same time conferred upon the child (Réville, *Religions of Mexico and of Peru*, London, 1884, p. 234). Both Aztecs and Peruvians had a considerable sense of moral evil. This is especially noticeable in the Mexican rite, where also it was sought to free the child from evil spirits as well as from inherited sin. With both peoples, it should also be noted, as with the Hindus, ritual ablutions were used to remove the guilt of sins when these were confessed to the priests. Similar rites were common among the wild tribes of Mexico, after the name had been selected at the moment of birth (Bancroft, *op. cit.* i. 661); and they are known to exist among various tribes of S. America, *e.g.* the Yumanas of Brazil, with whom the child is, as it were, made one of the family by receiving an ancestral name, while it is sprinkled at the same time with a decoction of herbs (Martius, *Beiträge zur Ethnographie und Sprachenkunde Amerikas*, 2 vols., Leipz. 1867, i. 485). The Eskimos of North America, who believe that the name is a living thing, call the child after a dead ancestor. Its mouth is damped with water, the name is repeated, and it is believed to enter the child at that moment. Until then, the name having left the body of the dead man, both he and it have been restless, but now both are at peace (Nansen, *Eskimo Life*, Lond. 1893, p. 228).

(5) Asiatic races and religions frequently combine name-giving and lustration. Among the Tibetan and Mongolian Buddhists the ceremony takes place from three to ten days after birth. Candles are lit on the house-altars, and over a vessel of water the lama repeats the consecration formulæ. He then immerses the child in the water three times, signs it, and calls it by its

name. He also draws its horoscope by means of certain 'medicines' which he places in the baptismal water, and names the guardian divinity of the child. The ceremony ends with a feast and the offering of a present to the lama (Köppen, *Rel. des Buddha*, Berlin, 1857–59, ii. 320). Frequently, as Smolev relates of the Buriats, the name is changed if it proves unlucky (*L'Anthropologie*, xii. 482). In Japan the name is given to the child when it is a month old, water being at the same time sprinkled upon it (Siebold, *Nippon*, v. 22). The ceremonies, as conducted among the Chinese, are of an elaborate character. On the third day after the birth a Taoist priest comes to the house and sprinkles the rooms with water—a rite known as 'the Purification.' Onions, garlic, celery, and other things with magical virtues are then placed in the water in which the child is to be washed, after which its fortune is told and its mythic guardian tree is ascertained. The next step is for the priest to inquire through 'cup-divination' by what name the child shall be called, and when this has been discovered, he then bestows it on the infant. It should be noted that, to prevent a demon soul taking possession of the child's body in the absence of its own soul, the mother mixes the ash of banana-skin with water, and paints a cross with this mixture on the sleeping child's forehead (*FLJ* v. 222 f.). With the Buddhists of Ceylon and Burma, on the fourteenth day after birth, at an hour fixed by an astrologer, the relatives and friends feast together, the child is named, and its head is washed for the first time. The ceremony is analogous to the Brāhmanic rite of Jātakarman (M. Williams, *Buddhism*, 1889, p. 353).

(6) The Indian and Iranian rites, though scarcely baptismal, are worth noting, especially when they are taken in connexion with the rites of initiation (see § 12) which are their complement. Among the ancient Hindus (and, less completely, in modern times) the following ceremonies were performed. Before the navel-string was cut the Jātakarman rite was performed for male children, and while the sacred formulæ were recited, the child was fed with honey and butter. Ten or twelve days after birth the father performed, or caused to be performed, the Nāmadheya, or rite of naming, giving the child a secret name besides the name for common use, which had to be auspicious if he were a Brāhman, connected with power if a Kṣatriya, with wealth if a Vaiśya, or contemptible if a Sūdra. Later, there were rites in connexion with first leaving the house, making the tonsure, etc. Other writers speak of the child being ceremonially washed, or dipped in the sacred waters of the Ganges or some other river (*Laws of Manu*, ii. 29, 30; Dutt, *Civ. in Ancient India*, London, 1893, i. 262; Zimmer, *Altindisches Leben*, Berlin, 1879, p. 320). Little is known of the birth ceremonies among the ancient Iranians beyond those already described, and the statements sometimes made regarding the use of a kind of baptism may rest on erroneous renderings of passages in the sacred books (see Geiger, *Civ. of E. Iran*, London, 1885, i. 56, and translator's note). Beausobre (*Hist. Manich.*, Amsterdam, 1734–39, lib. ix. cap. 6, sec. 16) says the child was carried to the temple, where the priest plunged it into a vessel of water, and the father gave it a name. Corresponding to the Hindu feeding with honey and butter is perhaps the old custom of giving the newly-born child some haoma-juice and aloes, in order to confer wisdom upon it, as well as to drive off fiends and evil spirits (*Sad Dar*, xxiv.; *Shāyast la-Shāyast*, x. 15–16; and cf. Gomme, *Eth. in Folk-lore*, London, 1892, p. 129, for the purpose of this ceremonial feeding). Among modern Parsis there are no formalities in connexion with name-giving, the mother conferring a name upon the child (Geiger, i. 57, translator's note), although the *joshi* (astrologer) 'first gives out the names the child can bear according to its affinity to the stars under whose influence it was born' (Karaka, *History of the Parsis*, London, 1884, i. 161–162). With them, the Bareshnum rite (see § 12 (2)) washes away all defilement contracted in the womb.

(7) Among the ancient pagan races of Europe similar customs were also found. The heathen Teutons had a baptismal rite long before Christian influences had reached them. The ceremony took place immediately after birth, the father sprinkling the child, giving it a name, and consecrating it to the household gods. In this way he acknowledged it as his own, and after the rite the child could not be exposed, as it had now become one of the kin. The ceremony was known as *vatni ausa*, 'sprinkling with water' (Grimm, *Teut. Myth.*, London, 1880–83, ii. 592). References to the rite occur in the *Chronicles*. Snorro Sturleson (*Chron.* c. 70) relates that a noble, in the reign of Harold Harfagr, took a newborn child, and, pouring water upon its head, called it Haco. Pope Gregory III. directed the missionary Boniface how to proceed in such cases where this pagan baptism had already been used. Mallet (*North. Antiq.*, London, 1770, i. 335) rightly shows the true nature of such rites when he says they were intended to preserve children 'from the sorceries and evil charms which wicked spirits might employ against them at the moment of their birth.' The Celts also had similar customs; and here the priest is more in evidence, although, as some think, the method of naming and the whole of Druidism were taken over from the non-Celtic races with whom the Celts found themselves in contact. Saga and legend alike give many instances of the Druid bestowing a name on the child from some casual circumstance which had happened at the birth or after, —a method of name-giving common among various savage races. As with the Eskimos, the name was an entity, an actual substance put upon the child by the Druid. Occasionally, also, a baptismal rite is mentioned as performed by the Druid; *e.g.* Conall Cernach was so baptized (Windisch, *Irische Texte*, Leipzig, 1891–97, iii. 392, 423). There is no reason to think with M. D'Arbois de Jubainville (*Rev. Celt.* xix. 90), that there is here only a product of the imagination of the saga-writers, reflecting Christian ideas, since such a rite is so wide-spread in paganism, while (see (8)) some trace of it still remains as a survival on Celtic ground (Rhys and Jones, *The Welsh People*, London, 1900, 66 f.; W. Stokes, *Cóir Anmann* [in Windisch, *Irische Texte*, iii.] sec. 251; and *Academy*, 1896, p. 137). The birth-ritual of the Greeks (among whom ritual purification occupied so large a place) was as follows: The child was at once bathed in water, sometimes mixed with oil or wine. On the fifth or seventh day, a more formal purification took place (the ἀμφιδρόμια), and the child was also carried round the fire. On this day or on the tenth day, on the occasion of a family festival, which was also sacrificial, the father recognized the child, which (as in the Teutonic instance) could not then be exposed, and the name, usually that of a grandparent, was given (see scholium on Aristotle, *Lysistr.* 757). The Romans, on the Dies Lustricus,—the ninth day after birth for boys, the eighth for girls,—conferred a name on the child, which was passed through water, the nurse at the same time touching its lips and forehead with saliva to avert magical and demoniac arts (Macrobius, *Saturnalia*, lib. i. cap. 16).

(8) It is curious to observe how, occasionally, a pre-Christian rite remains as a superstitious observance, even where Christian baptism is common.

A good example of this occurs among the Lapps, who, in heathen times, had a ceremony called *laugo* (see more fully art. BIRTH, Finns and Lapps). This consisted in bathing or sprinkling the child with water in which alder-twigs had been placed, while a name was given to it, and it was placed under the protection of Sarakha, the birth-goddess. At any illness the ceremony was repeated and a new name given. But when Christian baptism was introduced, the old rite was still continued privately, both by way of confirming the Christian rite and continuing the advantages supposed to be given by the heathen ceremony (Pinkerton, *General Collection of . . . Voyages and Travels*, London, 1808–1814, i. 483; Ploss, i. 257, 258). Such a case as this distinctly points to the rationale of ethnic baptismal rites as already set forth, viz. a defence against evil influences as well as a removal of 'uncleanness.' The baptismal ceremony of the pagan Celts already referred to has not altogether been destroyed by the use of the Christian rite; for even now, in remote districts, the following survival is found. After birth, the nurse drops three drops of water on the child's forehead *in Nomine*. A temporary name is given until the real name is conferred in the Christian ceremony. This earlier baptism keeps off fairies (evil influences) and ensures burial in consecrated ground. It is thus a clear survival of an earlier purificatory and protective rite, which at the same time admitted to the tribal religious privileges (Carmichael, *Carmina Gadelica*, 1900, i. 115). The pagan rite also persists with the Lithuanian peoples on the Baltic coast. On the evening before the baptism by the priest, the child is bathed in warm water, while an old woman kills a cock at the place where the child was born (*L'Anthropologie*, v. 713).

8. *Suggested influence of Christian and Jewish rites.*—The possibility of the derivation of some of these ethnic baptismal rites from Jewish or Christian sources should not be overlooked. Dr. Nassau suggests this in the case of the West African ceremonies; nor is it improbable in this and in other cases when we consider the diffusion of belief, ritual, myth, folk-tale, or of art and industrial products outwards from various centres, and their ready acceptance by races at a great distance from such centres. But, on the other hand, similar beliefs everywhere produce similar results, and the universality of the opinions regarding uncleanness, the contagion of evil, and harmful spirits, as well as concerning the power of water, may quite easily have given rise to similar purificatory rites in various regions and religions, without any necessary recourse to imitation of Jewish or Christian rites. To these, name-giving was sometimes attached, here by accident, there by intention. Frequently, too, what makes these heathen rites appear so much to resemble the Christian sacrament is the use of Christian formulæ in describing them by those who have witnessed them and have been struck with the resemblances rather than with the differences. The universality and, in some cases, the antiquity of these rites point to their originality.

9. *Religious and social aspect of the rites.*—Analyzing the various examples of ethnic baptism, we note several points. First, the purificatory washing frequently passes over into a mere symbolic act of sprinkling, a process analogous to the change in the Christian rite from dipping to pouring water over the candidate. Next, the religious aspect of the rite is emphasized by the dedication of the child to the gods (Polynesia, Mexico, etc.); by the solemnity of the act; by its frequent performance by priest or medicine-man (various African tribes, Polynesians, Mexicans, Peruvians, Mayas, Tibetans, Chinese, Hindus, Iranians, and Celts), or by the father as house-priest; by the use of 'medicine' in addition to, or in place of, water; and by the general intention of the rite as already pointed out. Lastly, the social aspect of the rite is emphasized in its public performance, occasionally by the headman of the community; by the reception of the child into the kin; by the feast held on the occasion, which is attended by the relatives; and also by the common custom of naming after an ancestor. (For examples of name-giving by itself, accompanied by a feast attended by relatives, or as making the child a member of the kin, see Hind, *Labrador*, 2 vols., Lond. 1863, i. 286; *JAI* xix. 324 [Torres Straits]; *BE*, Third Report, p. 246 [Omahas, the child's face is marked with the privileged symbolic decoration]; *L'Anthrop.* x. 729 [Borneo]). Thus ethnic baptism, accompanying the act of name-giving, cannot be considered as a casual rite, but must be regarded as one of considerable importance for the religious and social life of the child. The occasional performance of the rite by the mother or by other women of the tribe must have originated through the matriarchate and descent through the mother.

10. *Baptism with blood.*—The aspect of the baptismal rite as a formal admission into the clan or tribe is further seen in those cases where the child or, later, the youth is sprinkled with his father's or kinsman's, or with sacrificial, blood. Among the Caribs the newborn child was sprinkled with blood drawn from the father's shoulder, to give it courage and generosity, and, since the life of the clan is in the blood, to admit it to the circle of the kin (Rochefort, *Iles Antilles*, 1660, p. 550). Among certain Australian tribes at the initiation of youths, it is customary for the older men to cut themselves and let the blood run upon the novice, the object being to strengthen him, or to transfuse the kin-life into him. Especially is this the case where the smearing with blood takes place after the pretended killing and restoration of the candidate, when he also receives a new name (Howitt, pp. 658, 668; Frazer, *Totemism*; and for corresponding uses of blood, Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 596 f.). Among the Alfoers the child is smeared with swine's blood (Bastian, *Die Völker der östlichen Asien*, Jena, 1866–1871, v. 270); and on the Gold Coast, rum (replacing blood) is squirted over him by the father (Ellis, *Tshi-speaking Peoples*, London, 1887, p. 233). The modern Arabs retain the custom from heathen times of washing a child's forehead with the blood of an animal sacrificed to a saint whose favour has caused the child's birth, and whose protection is thus expected to be given to him. There is also some idea of identifying the child with the sacrifice by which he is redeemed (Curtiss, *Prim. Sem. Rel.*, Chicago, 1902, p. 201). In heathen times this rite had greater significance as bringing the child within the stock; he was dedicated to the stock-god in connexion with a sacrifice, the blood of which was daubed on his head. The blood united god and child. The child was also named and its gums rubbed with masticated dates (symbolic food-giving rite, cf. § 7(6), India, Persia) on the morning after its birth, probably by the priest. All these rites signified reception into the privileges, social and religious, of the kin-group (W. R. Smith, *Kinship in Arabia*, Cambridge, 1903, p. 152 f.).

11. *Use of saliva.*—The same intention of acknowledging kinship, and of bestowing it ceremonially through contact of the child with something belonging to the kinsman, is seen in several rites where the child is rubbed with the saliva of a relative or is spat upon. Actual examples in connexion with the giving of a name are found among the

Mandingos and Bambaras of West Africa, the priest spitting thrice in the child's face (Park, *Interior Districts of Africa*, Edin. 1860, p. 246). Among the Banyoro of Uganda, on the third or fourth day after the child is born, the priest presents it to the ancestral spirits and begs their favour for it, accompanying each special request by spitting on the child's body and pinching it (Sir H. Johnston, *Uganda Protectorate*, Lond. 1902, ii. 587). Muhammad is said to have done the same when he named his grandson Ḥasan (Ockley, *Saracens*[4], Lond. 1847, p. 351). Persius, in his *Satires* (ii. 31), ridicules the female relative who rubs the baby's forehead with saliva when it receives its name (see § 7 (7) for the Roman custom). The practice survives in the use of spittle in baptism in the early Church and in modern Roman Catholic usage, as well as in folk-custom in Europe. Here the intention is altered, and the purpose is to ward off the evil eye, spells, witches, and fairies. But this, which brings the custom into line with the general powers of water in this direction, is probably derivative. Saliva is in many other instances used to ward off evil, but it probably does so because it is a bond between two or more persons who thus form a strong array against the powers of evil (see Hartland, *LP*, London, 1894–96, ii. 261 f.).

12. *Baptism at initiation.* — These social and religious aspects of the rite are also marked in the ceremonies at initiation to tribal or totem-group privileges, or to sacred mysteries. As an example of those initiatory rites, we may first refer to such a simple form as the sprinkling of girls who have just reached womanhood, as practised among the Basutos (Casalis, p. 267). This form of purification is analogous to the tatuing, scourging, fasting, etc., of other peoples, undergone by the boy or girl on arriving at puberty, as a means of driving out evil (see under these titles). We have noted that baptismal and cognate rites at birth or soon after have the effect of admitting the child into the community or into the religious privileges of the tribe. But sometimes this admission, however it is accomplished, is deferred until the dawn of manhood or womanhood, or a little earlier, or is repeated then, as in savage initiations to the totem clan or to the tribal mysteries (see TOTEM, MYSTERIES). In such cases the same ideas of purification from the infection of evil, sometimes by means of water, or again by sprinkling with or bathing in blood, by circumcision, or by simulated death and re-birth, are found, with the intention of introducing the postulant to a fuller life.

(1) As an example of such ceremonies in the higher religions, the Brāhmanic rites may be referred to. The ceremony of *Upanaya*, or initiation to the privileges of religion, took place when a boy had arrived at years of discretion. The *guru* asked the boy's name, and, taking water, sprinkled his hands with it three times. In modern times the investiture with the threefold sacred thread, which is blessed by a Brāhman, while texts from the sacred books are recited over it and it is sprinkled with holy water, is the chief part of this rite. Before this the boy is not called a Brāhman; but now he becomes 'twice-born' or regenerate, and it is open to him to read the sacred books, and to take part in prayers and in the religious ceremonies (Manu, ii. 36; Dutt, i. 263; M. Williams, *Rel. Thought and Life in India*, London, 1883, p. 358).

(2) This ceremony resembles that of the Parsis, whose sacred books lay strong emphasis upon the uncleanness contracted by the child in the womb of its mother (see § 2). In order to be free from all such defilement, it is necessary for each one at or before the age of 15 to perform the elaborate purificatory ceremonies of the Bareshnum, else at death he will not pass the Chinvat bridge. The rite includes sprinkling with *gomez* and washing with *gomez* and water (for the ceremony see *SBE* i. 122; xviii.). About the same time, and still in view of the pre-natal defilement, the sacred girdle thread is assumed, 'to establish the wearer in the department of Ormazd, and to take him out of the department of Ahriman' (*Sad Dar*, x.). The result of these ceremonies is to make the youth *navazad*, 'newly-born,' a term corresponding to the Brāhmanic 'twice-born,' and to the view taken of such ceremonies elsewhere, while he now becomes a member of the community (West, *Pahlavi Texts*, i. 320, iii. 262; *Shāyast la-Shāyast*, x. 11).

(3) A species of baptismal rite occurred as a formula of admission in separate religious societies or mysteries. Candidates for admission to the Egyptian mysteries of Isis were baptized by the priest, the result being purification and forgiveness of sins. '[Sacerdos] stipatum me religiosa cohorte deducit ad proximas balneas et prius sueto lavacro traditum, præfatus deûm veniam, purissime circumrorans abluit' (Apuleius, *Met.* xi.).

(4) In the ritual of the Orphic mysteries the mystic affirmed ἔριφος ἐς γάλ' ἔπεσον, 'a kid I have fallen into milk,' but the significance of the words is uncertain, and they do not seem to point to a rite of immersion in milk. The use of milk in early Christian baptism—the newborn in Christ drinking the food of babes—may suggest a symbolic drinking of milk in the rite (for a discussion of the formula see Miss Harrison, *Proleg. to Greek Rel.*, Cambridge, 1908, p. 596 f.).

(5) But of all such purificatory rites the best known are those of the Greek Eleusinia, in which the initiation was most searching, and no one could be admitted to the celebration of the mysteries who had not undergone it, while to reveal these to the uninitiated was a criminal act. Purification by water was part of the preliminary rites, which were regarded as a kind of new birth. The candidate bathed, and emerged from the bath a new man with a new name. This purification, or κάθαρσις, is constantly referred to by the Greek Fathers, especially Clem. Alex., as a parallel to the Christian rite of baptism both in its nature and in its intended effects of admitting to a higher life, to the 'Greater Mysteries' (*Strom.* v. 71, 72). Whatever view of sin was held in the doctrine of the Mysteries, whether it was highly ethical or simply ceremonial, these purificatory rites freed the candidate from the stain of sin and prepared him for the revelation to come, while he himself was required to be ἀγαθὸς εὐσεβὴς καὶ ἅγνος. By the preliminary ceremonies the candidates became τεληταί, and were admitted to the τελεστήριον and the revelations which awaited them there (Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, Königsberg, 1829; Foucart, *Recherches sur les mystères d'Eleusis*, Paris, 1895).

(6) Similar purificatory rites entered into the ceremonies of the various Religious Associations which, entering Greece from the east, gained such a hold over the people. The candidate was examined to prove whether he was 'pure, pious, and good,' ἅγνος εὐσεβὴς κἀγαθός, and all members who had become impure had to submit to purificatory rites. Such impurities were, however, material rather than moral, and correspond on the whole to those savage tabus which had to be removed by various rites. The eating of pork or garlic, connexion with a woman, contact with a corpse, the defilement of murder, are some of those enumerated on inscriptions or in Greek writers. Purification was of different kinds, according to the society; sometimes it was by means of water thrown on the head, as in savage baptismal rites. Plutarch describes these vigorously as ῥυπαραὶ ἀγνεῖαι, ἀκάθαρτοι καθαρμοί, but all alike had to do with outward

purification alone. Theophrastus and Plutarch (*Char.* 16; *de Super.* 3) give an excellent picture of the man who was careful to perform all such purifications after every defilement, imaginary or real —'Call the old woman who will purify thee by rubbing thee with bran and clay; plunge in the sea and pass the day seated on the ground.' Menander also refers to purifications by means of water drawn from three different sources, and into which salt and lentils had been thrown (*Deisidaimon*, frag. 3). Later, the philosophers explained them by saying they were the image of that purity of the soul which alone was agreeable to the gods (Cicero, *de Leg.* ii. 10); but their nature and intention obviously connect them with primitive purificatory and baptismal rites, and explain the existence of the latter as a preliminary of entrance to the Mysteries.

Of all these associations, the initiatory rites of the worshippers of Sabazios, a Phrygian god, corresponding on the whole to Dionysus, are best known to us from the scorn which Demosthenes poured upon them (*de Corona*, 313). They are an excellent type of such initiatory baptismal rites as form our third class. The period is B.C. 315, and Demosthenes says to Æschines: 'When you became a man, you assisted your mother in the initiations. At night you clothed yourself in a fawn-skin. *You poured on the candidates water from a bowl*, you purified them, you rubbed them with clay and bran; then you made them stand upright after the purification, and say, "I have fled the evil, I have found a better"' (*ἔφυγον κακόν, εὗρον ἄμεινον*). These rites, which had only the slenderest ethical value, led up to the revealing of the Mysteries and the sacred symbols of the association. The society which worshipped the Thracian goddess Cotytto was ridiculed under the title of *βάπται* by dramatists like Eupolis and poets like Juvenal, and the title suggests a purification by water similar to that practised by the worshippers of Sabazios (Foucart, *Associations rel. chez les Grecs*, Paris, 1873). The daubing with clay or dirt is a common savage practice at initiations, and doubtless in the Mysteries it was a survival of some earlier primitive rite. In the Mandan mysteries the candidate was covered with clay and then washed (Catlin, *O-Kee-Pa*, London, 1867, p. 21); the same is recorded of the Busk festival of the Cree Indians—the ceremony removing them 'out of the reach of temporal punishment for their past vicious conduct' (Adair, *Hist. of Amer. Ind.*, London, 1875, p. 98 f.); in the Victorian and other Australian rites of initiation, as well as in Fiji, the body was covered with charcoal, mud, and clay, and then washed (Brough Smyth, *Abor. of Vict.*, London, 1878, i. 60; Howitt, *op. cit.* p. 536); in Banks Island the youth is blackened with dirt and soot and then washed (Codrington, *Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 87); and a similar rite is referred to as occurring in West Africa (W. Reade, *Savage Africa*, London, 1863). Name-giving accompanies most of these ceremonies which introduce the candidate to a new life; the symbolism of removing the dirt is expressive of the passing from an old to a new life.

(7) Mithraism, perhaps the most eclectic of all religious faiths, is frequently accused of borrowing many of its ceremonies from Christianity. The early Fathers, like the Roman Catholic missionaries in the case of the religions of Mexico and Peru, and of Buddhism, did not hesitate to say that Mithraism was the devil's counterfeit of Christianity, as they described its rites with their ready resemblance to Baptism, Confirmation, and Holy Communion. But while there may have been deliberate imitation, the actual rites were already in use both in Persia and Greece, and, as Cumont says, Mithraism was *Parsisme hellénisé*. The initiatory ceremonies were many—by blood, by fire, by fasting; while, as in many savage mysteries, death and resurrection were simulated as typifying the dawn of a better life. The purification by water washed away sin, and was thus a kind of adult baptism, while the later stage of sealing the candidate's forehead as the mark of his initiation to the grade of 'soldier,' was compared by Tertullian to the rite of confirmation (Cumont, *Mysteries of Mithra*, Chicago, 1903, p. 157). We may refer, finally, to a baptism of blood, the Taurobolium, used for purification, whether personally or by proxy, as well as in initiating the candidate to the rites of the Great Mother, which became so popular all over the Roman Empire at the dawn of Christianity. The underlying idea of the Taurobolium (*q.v.*) bears a curious resemblance to the doctrine of regeneration in Christian life. The candidate was seated in a trench underneath an open grating on which a bull was sacrificed. The blood, as it fell through the roof, gushed all over him, and he was then declared to be re-born. Monuments which commemorate this baptismal rite on the part of its grateful recipients, speak of him by whom it was received as 'regenerate,' *renatus in æternum Taurobolio* (Prudentius, *Peristeph.* x. 101 f.; Sainte-Croix, *Mystères du paganisme*, Paris, 1817, i. 95). Whether original or imitated from Christianity, these later classic Mysteries speak of the growing need of a new life and of certitude in matters of faith. These were supplied by Christianity, and, after a long struggle, it gave the deathblow to the pagan Mysteries.

13. *Ethnic rites in folk-custom.*—Finally, reference must be made to the superstitious views entertained by European peasants regarding Christian baptism. These are a direct inheritance from pre-Christian beliefs as to the vulnerability of the newly-born child to attack from evil spirits until certain rites, such as those enumerated above, have been performed. Christian baptism, taking the place of those earlier baptismal rites, has in folk-belief been credited with their efficacy; the beliefs concerning them have been directly transferred to it; and the unanimity as concerns this transference is seen by the similarity of the superstitions among Celts, Scandinavians, Germans, Slavs, and the Latin-speaking races. With the first three groups fairies are feared, and they have taken the place of evil spirits. These have great power over an unbaptized child; hence the utmost precautions are taken to guard it from their power, and to prevent its being stolen away and an ugly changeling left in its place. Baptism, however, is the complete safeguard against these terrors. Among the last two groups it is generally some evil demon or witch whose power over the child is neutralized by baptism; with some of the Slavs and with the Greeks (a survival from classical times) it is the *Lamia*, regarded as a being half-demon, half-witch, who has power over the unbaptized. But even where the fairy belief is prevalent, the witch's power over the unbaptized is also feared. In early mediæval times, witch and wise-woman and midwife were hardly discriminated; all alike were the survival of the priestesses of a goddess of fertility, to whom an occasional sacrifice of a child was made. This custom survived as a vague belief that witches took a toll of unbaptized children on Walpurgis night (Grimm, *op. cit.* iii. 1060–1061; Pearson, *Chances of Death*, London, 1897, ii. *passim*). But in all cases the real power of fairy, demon, or witch over the unbaptized child lay in this, that the child was yet a pagan, and therefore, until it had been received into the Christian fold, was the natural prey of those who were clearly pagan witches, fairies, and demons. This is emphasized

in the fact that the child, till baptized, is in Sicily and Spain called by some name signifying its unregenerate character—Jew, Moor, Turk, Pagan, or (in Greece) Drakos (see Hartland, *Science of Fairy Tales*, London, 1891, p. 100 f.). In Greece, too, it is believed that an unbaptized child may disappear as a snake. This belief in the unbaptized child's being a pagan is further illustrated by the idea, found in various parts of England and in Scotland, that such children, if they die, become fairies, or that their souls wander about restlessly in the air till the day of judgment, as well as in the curious 16th cent. Irish custom of leaving the male child's right arm unchristened so that it might deal a deadlier blow. All these customs denote not only the survival of paganism and its ideas in Christianity, but also the continued struggle between the two forces when the latter had ostensibly triumphed (see a paper by G. L. Gomme, *Folk-Lore*, iii. 17).

LITERATURE.—Ploss, *Das Kind*, vol. i., Berlin, 1882; E. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*[3], vol. ii., London, 1891; Baring-Gould, *Origin and Development of Religious Belief*, London, 1869–70, i. 397 ff.; MacCulloch, *Comparative Theology*, London, 1902, ch. xii.; Nassau, *Fetichism in West Africa*, 1904, p. 212 f.; Grey, *Polynesian Mythology*, 1855, p. 32; Mallet, *Northern Antiquities*, Eng. tr., London, 1770, i. 335.

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BAPTISM (New Testament).—The term 'baptism' does not occur in the LXX, either in its more general (*βαπτισμός*) or more special form (*βάπτισμα*). While the verb *βάπτειν*, 'to dip' or 'immerse' (*e.g.* Ex 12[22], Lv 4[6. 17], Job 9[31]), occurs there frequently, we find the intensive *βαπτίζειν*—with which alone we are concerned when dealing with baptism—only four times: twice in a literal sense, of bathing (2 K 5[14], Jth 12[7]), once metaphorically (Is 21[4] *ἡ ἀνομία με βαπτίζει*, cf. Mk 10[38f.], Lk 12[50]), and once of ritual lustration (Sir 31[30] [34[25]] *βαπτιζόμενος ἀπὸ νεκροῦ*).* The earlier and more usual word for such lustration is *λούεσθαι* (Lv 14[8f.] 15[5ff.], cf. Jn 13[10], He 10[22] *λελουσμένοι τὸ σῶμα ὕδατι καθαρῷ*), the middle voice denoting the active participation of the subject of purification, as also in the NT use of *ἀπολούεσθαι* in connexion with baptism (Ac 22[16], 1 Co 6[11]). But with the NT *βαπτίζειν* emerges prominently and without any explanation of its specific sense, viz. thorough washing for religious cleansing, as though this were already fixed by the current usage of later Judaism, of which Sir 31[30] is itself a significant instance (cf. Lk 11[38], Mk 7[4]). Both forms of the substantive, *βαπτισμός*, *βάπτισμα*, occur, the former in a more general sense (Mk 7[4], He 9[10], cf. 6[2] where the specific meaning is included), the latter in the specific sense of 'cleansing rite of initiation' into a new religious status (defined by the context), whether John's or Christ's (Mk 1[4] ‖, Lk 7[29] 20[4], Ac 1[22] 10[37] 13[24] 18[25] 19[3f.], Ro 6[4], Eph 4[5], Col 2[12], 1 P 3[21]). Naturally *βάπτισμα* becomes the regular ecclesiastical term for the rite, along with *λουτρόν* ('washing,' later passing into the more concrete sense of 'laver,' *lavacrum*), already found in Sir 31[30] [34[25]], cf. Ca 4[2] 6[5 (6)]; thus *λουτρὸν τοῦ ὕδατος* (Eph 5[26]), *λ. παλιγγενεσίας* (Tit 3[5]).

1. **Sources.**—In what follows we have to do, not with ritual washings or lustrations generally, but only with that special form of religious washing which admitted to the Christian sphere or community. Accordingly we say nothing about the prevalence, both on Semitic and non-Semitic soil, of such lustrations (like those of the Essenes) as have no bearing on baptism as a public rite of incorporation into a religious fellowship with God and man, and that once for all. In fact we need begin our study no further back than the point at which the term first emerges in the Bible—the baptism of John the Baptist, and what it assumes.

(*a*) *The baptism of John and its associations.*—OT religion rests upon the notion of *a covenant relation* between Jahweh the God of Israel and Israel as a people or religious unit. When the actual state of Israel was in accord with the will of God, as expressed in the Torah unfolding the contents of His covenant, then Israel was 'righteous' and in the enjoyment of 'salvation,' or full well-being as determined by Divine favour. But such a state, conceived as indicated by obvious national prosperity, was felt to have been fully realized only at intervals in the past, and was certainly not Israel's when John the Baptist appeared. For was not the alien in power in the Holy Land? It was felt, also, that only by that supreme intervention of God, as Israel's true King, which was thought of as His Messianic Kingdom, —and beyond which there was no further horizon, —could that betterment or 'redemption of Israel' come for which all true Israelites longed and waited. Yet the best among them, and John in particular, knew that only through a radical change in the nation's religious state, in conduct both public and private, could this deliverance be reached. Messiah would come only to a righteous Israel, fit and ready for God's holy rule in its midst. Hence a general repentance towards God and His covenant, such as the prophets of old had called for, was needed ere the Spirit of the Lord could be 'poured forth' in that fullness which was to mark the Messianic age. John stood forth, then, in the spirit of those prophets, to preach his 'baptism of repentance'—a repentance symbolized by cleansing with water (Jer 4[14], Ezk 36[25ff.], Zec 13[1])—with a view to the near approach of 'the Kingdom of God.' Such a baptism was primarily corporate in idea, relative to salvation as of a holy people—an Israel answering to its idea as in vital covenant with its God. This is the main reason, at least, why Jesus was able to accept John's 'baptism of repentance' without any feeling of sin save in a corporate sense. To Him personally it was but an act of obedience to a Divine ordinance — 'a righteousness' (Mt 3[15]). But as yet salvation, even for Israel, was only a promise conditional upon obedience to Messiah when He should be manifested, and with Him the Kingdom or real Sovereignty of God. Hence John claimed no saving virtue for his baptism, only a certain preparedness when it was the outward sign of an inward penitence; the real gift of a new experience was to come with the higher order of 'baptism' which Messiah Himself would impart. This was not to be with 'water' at all, but with Holy Spirit, *i.e.* a holy inspiration of soul, such as the prophets had foretold (Mk 1[8], cf. Mt 3[11], Lk 3[16] 'holy spirit and fire').

(*b*) *The relation of Messiah's baptism to the Forerunner's.*—Of this contrast, however, there was at first no sign in Christ's ministry. While not Himself administering water-baptism, like His forerunner, Jesus permitted His disciples (themselves doubtless baptized by John [cf. Lk 7[29f.], Jn 1[35ff.]], and so forward to do for their new Master's preaching what John had done to seal his own) to do so for a time, *i.e.* during the preliminary stage when He was preaching parallel, as it were, with John (Jn 3[22ff.] 4[1f.]). During this period Jesus' message was outwardly the same as John's in tenor, viz. 'Repent ye; for the kingdom of heaven is at hand' (Mt 4[17], cf. Mk 1[15], which is perhaps rather less accurate here). Such a practice, however, seems confined to the early Judæan preaching; we find no trace of it in the later stages, which began with John's imprisonment and Jesus' return to Galilee (Mk 1[14] ‖).

* In 2 K 5[14] *ἐβαπτίσατο* translates טבל, 'dip,' and in Is 21[4] *βαπτίζει* paraphrases בעת, 'fall upon, startle.' The Heb. original of Judith and of Sir 31[30] is no longer extant.

Baptism never appears among the conditions of discipleship (*e.g.* Mt $8^{21f.}$, Lk 9^{59-62}); and this silence can hardly be accidental. We find instead, in final interviews with the inner circle, promise of a Spirit-baptism, to which John had referred as distinctive of Messiah (see Lk 24^{49}, Ac $1^{4f.}$ 11^{16}, Jn 20^{22}, cf. Jn 14–16). But nothing is said as to water-baptism as entering into Messianic baptism (the two are contrasted in Ac 1^5 11^{16}), which is referred to in terms recalling His own words about the purely spiritual baptism of suffering (Mk $10^{38f.}$‖). Christ's direct sanction, then, for water-baptism by His followers after His own earthly life (Jn 3^5 does not apply here) must depend on our view of Mt 28^{19} [Mk 16^{16} not being an original part of Mark's Gospel].

There is no real ground for doubting the authenticity of Mt 28^{19} as part of Mt.'s Gospel in its final form (cf. F. H. Chase in *J ThSt* vi. 483 ff.). But this is far from settling its historicity as a word of Jesus Himself. The clause touching baptism as part of the 'discipling' of 'all the nations' might easily arise as merely descriptive and directive of the Church's actual practice in the matter, whenever and wherever this Gospel was composed. For the same reasons it cannot be held to settle the question of the formula originally used (see the careful discussion in Rendtorff, *Die Taufe im Urchristentum*, 1905, p. 89 ff., for both points). Further, had Paul known of such a commission to baptize, he could hardly have said, as he does in 1 Co 1^{17} 'Christ did not commission me to baptize, but to evangelize.' Cf. p. 881^a.

(*c*) *Apostolic baptism.*—This, in its conjunction of water-baptism with the Spirit sensibly outpoured, seems due to the Apostles' own initiative, like other primitive Christian rites, the forms of which were adopted instinctively from their Jewish training. Thus when, on the crucial Day of Pentecost, the Messianic Spirit described in Jl $2^{28ff.}$ was felt to be 'poured out' upon Messianic Israel, in fulfilment of Jesus' promise and in ratification of His Messianic dignity (Ac 2^{33-36}), it was most natural that Peter, appealed to for the terms of participation in the manifest Divine presence, should reply: 'Repent, and let each of you get baptized in the name of Jesus Messiah unto remission of your sins, and ye shall receive the free gift of the Holy Spirit,' and so escape the fate of 'this crooked generation'—revealed as such in its treatment of Messiah. This thought connected itself with the closing words of the passage just cited from Joel: 'And it shall be, that whosoever shall invoke the name of the Lord shall be saved,' *i.e.* from wrath in 'the day of the Lord, the great and notable day.' There was a recognized connexion between solemn invocation of the Lord as Protector and the rite of baptism. Possibly this had existed in John's baptism; it certainly did so in that of proselytes, with which the former was perhaps felt to have affinity—an affinity which affronted Pharisees and scribes (Lk 7^{30}). Thus Maimonides (*Issure Biah*, 13) says: 'Israel was admitted into covenant by three things; namely, by circumcision, baptism, and sacrifice. Circumcision was in Egypt. . . . Baptism was in the wilderness before the giving of the Law, for it is said: "Thou shalt sanctify them . . . and let them wash their garments . . ." So, whenever a Gentile desires to enter the Covenant of Israel and place himself under the wings of the Divine Majesty, and take the yoke of the Law upon him, he must be circumcised and baptized, and bring a sacrifice.' This passage bears directly upon the baptism of Gentile Christians; but it casts light also on the genesis of Jewish Christian baptism; for, apart from circumcision, the cases were largely parallel. Sinful Israelites, too, needed to re-enter the covenant in a deeper sense ('the new covenant' of Jer $31^{31ff.}$, Mk 14^{24}‖, 1 Co 11^{25})—on the basis of Messiah's 'sacrifice' for them (Is $53^{4ff.}$, cf. Ac $8^{30ff.}$, He 9–10)—so placing themselves 'under the wings of the Shekinah' for protection (cf. He 6^1 'Repentance from dead works and faith fixed upon God,' and Ac 20^{21} 'Repentance towards God and faith towards our Lord Jesus'), and pledging themselves to obedience to the Lord's will, under the yoke of His Law; and in this connexion the 'clean water' of Ezk $36^{25ff.}$ would readily occur to mind (cf. Zec 13^1). Here the words of Ananias to Saul are instructive: 'Arise, get thyself baptized (middle voice, as usual), and so wash away from thyself thy sins, invoking his name' (Ac 22^{16}).

How fundamental was this conception of water-baptism as denoting, on the one hand, confession of sins and renunciation of the old, false allegiance they involved, and, on the other, confession of Jesus as Messiah or Lord (as Jahweh was Israel's Lord) and loyalty to the new and true allegiance (cf. Ac 20^{21}), appears from Ro $10^{8ff.}$, in allusion to the act of baptism. In that passage Christians are described as 'those who invoke Jesus as Lord,' Jl 2^{32} being cited in support of the description (cf. Ac $9^{14.\ 21}$). 'With the mouth confession is made unto salvation' (Ro 10^{10}); that is the outward or objective side of the faith in the heart on which 'righteousness' is bestowed, and which expresses itself both in the water of baptism and in the word of the mouth to which Paul here directs attention. The very phrasing of this parallel statement suggests that salvation was at first thought of mainly in its collective aspect (in keeping with OT religion). It was the community's state of true prosperity, in which through confession of faith in baptism—*from* the old sinful state *to* the new, holy, or consecrate one—the justified individual came to participate. Indeed, Judæo-Christians tended always to realize this objective side of admission to the covenant sphere of 'the saints' (cf. Col $1^{12f.}$ 'who rescued us from the sway (ἐξουσία) of darkness, and transferred us into the kingdom of the Son of his love; in whom we have the redemption, the remission of sins') more than the subjective side of the believer's fitness, *qua* believer, for such admission, formally and definitively, in the act and article of baptism, 'sealed' by manifest Holy Spirit power or inspiration. Hence, though Paul's teaching as to baptism starts from the common basis of primitive Judæo-Christian thought, it goes far further in inwardness and psychological analysis; and it is needful to study the two types of representation apart, when we come to consider more closely the significance attaching to the rite and its symbolism.

Baptismal 'laying on of hands' confirms the view of baptism as simply an Apostolic practice derived from Jewish usage. As referred to in He 6^2, 'doctrine of baptisms (Christian and Jewish, *e.g.* John's, cf. Jn 3^{25}, Ac $19^{2ff.}$) and of laying on of hands,' it is a piece of Jewish symbolism for which no word of Christ can be cited, adopted to express union between the new believer and the holy community. As such it constituted the psychological moment when the Messianic gift, or Spirit-baptism, was, as a rule, experienced (Ac 8^{17} 19^6, yet see $10^{44ff.}$ for 'the gift' before baptism and apart from laying on of hands). There is no evidence that this act was confined to Apostles (the case in Ac $8^{15ff.}$ is exceptional, as the admission through Apostles of a *new class* of believers, the Samaritans); it might be performed by any member of the Spirit-bearing community. This appears not only from Ac $9^{17f.}$ (cf. 8^{38}) but also from 1 Co 1^{14}, where Paul could not so have spoken had he performed this most impressive part of baptism in the case of his Corinthian converts generally. It was an edifying symbol, with no constant or essential relation (save, perhaps, in the minds of the simpler sort) to Spirit-baptism, God's 'seal' of 'ownership' upon His 'heritage' in 'the saints' (Eph $1^{14.\ 18}$, cf. Tit 2^{14}).

2. Significance of baptism.—(*a*) *One, yet various.*—From the first, and in all circles, baptism implied definite identification with Jesus as Messiah or Lord, the head of the Messianic kingdom or the Body, the determinative centre of life for the whole spiritual organism. After 'baptism in the name of the Lord,' a man was regarded as 'in Christ' or 'in the Lord.' Jesus the Christ was Himself the Covenant (Is 49^8) for His own, and He,

as Lord, became the very sphere of the religious personality of the baptized, hence fitly called 'Christians.' The metaphor of the marriage bond, used in the OT of the moral union between Jahweh and Israel, is in the NT applied to the relation between Christ and the Church; and baptism was as the marriage rite, openly sealing for the individual this intimate spiritual relation already virtually present in faith, as marriage is in plighted love (Eph 5^{23-32}, cf. 1 Co 6^{17} 'he that is joined unto the Lord is one spirit'). The matter was, however, conceived rather differently in different circles. Jewish Christians viewed baptism mainly on its objective or collective side, through the OT associations of covenant and Messiah, as related to the solidarity of Israel, the chosen people; while Paul thought more of the subjective and personal side, bound up with his profound idea of faith as the bond between the believer and his spiritual Head, 'our life' (Col 3^4). But to both baptism was corporate in idea, 'into one body' (1 Co 12^{13}, cf. $10^{1f.}$), while repentance and faith were presupposed in the baptized, by Jewish Christians no less than by Paul. Still the difference of emphasis remains, and shows itself in the figures used, Paul's being the more experimental or psychological. He alone could pen passages like Ro $6^{2ff.}$, Gal 2^{19-21}, implying such spiritual identity with Christ by faith as resulted in his distinctive metaphor of baptism as formally marking transition from death to new life (Ro $6^{1ff.}$, 2 Co 5^{14-17}, cf. 1 P 3^{21} $4^{1f.}$ $1^{2.}$ $2^{2f.}$, which are probably adaptations of Pauline ideas to a less mystical mode of thought).

(*b*) *The psychological side of baptism.*—In all attempts to extract from the NT a connected view of primitive baptismal thought and practice, we must never forget its essentially experimental nature. Really to enter into its meaning, we must enter the very souls of the primitive Christians and share their experiences. In so doing, we get our best aid from analogous fresh Christian beginnings, whether in revivals of religious life, as seen, *e.g.*, in George Fox's *Journal*, or on the more virgin soil of the mission field. While the former analogy warns us against exaggerating the value of the rite, as compared with the Spirit-baptism—the distinctive Christian element (Ac 1^5),—the latter saves us from divorcing the inner reality altogether from the outer symbol. Due proportion between the two is preserved by the vital experiences of mission converts, in relation both to previous state and to alien environment. So seen, baptism is the seal by which life-giving faith (as in Abraham's circumcision, Ro $4^{10f.}$) is ratified, and so confirmed through a definitive *act* in which consciousness of separation *from* the sphere of moral deadness, and *unto* that of full moral life, is enhanced and made the more effective for the subsequent 'walk in newness of life.' It is thus truly an 'efficacious seal' for faith, yet only for faith. It completes and makes more vivid the experience of 'regeneration'—both objective, as between the old social world and the new, and subjective, as between two inner states of the soul. So is it 'regenerative washing and Holy Spirit renewal' (Tit 3^5) in an experimental, a religiously real sense; it is the final stage in experience of 'salvation' (in principle) from self and 'the world' to God and His Kingdom of Christian fellowship.

(*c*) *Symbol and sacrament.*—It is not a bare symbol, as of something already complete, but a sacrament, *i.e.* a symbol conditioning a present deeper and decisive experience of the Divine grace, already embraced by faith. But all is psychologically conditioned, being thereby raised above the level of the magical or *quasi*-physical conception of sacramental grace, native to paganism, but alien to perfected Hebraism—the religion of revelation and faith.

The recent attempt of the strict 'religious-historical' school in Germany and elsewhere to trace the influence of the magical, non-ethical notion of sacraments, prevalent in the 'syncretist' or mixed religious consciousness of the age, upon the NT writers and their circles, is for the most part mistaken. It minimizes the Hebraic basis of primitive Christianity, not only in Palestine, but also outside it. In particular, it fails to read Paul's language sufficiently in relation to his personal experience and essential teaching of faith as the universal coefficient of all spiritual blessing (ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν, Ro 1^{17}); while it does not distinguish enough between Paul's own belief and the suggestions of terminology used by him in becoming 'to the Greeks a Greek.' In a word, it confuses Paul the missionary with Paul the theologian. The only excuse for this theory as regards baptism lies in false exegesis of a single passage, 1 Co 15^{29}, where Paul in passing seized upon an *arg. ad hom.* from a usage existing among his Christian converts, without meaning to give it his positive sanction (see 11^{34} for minor abuses as left over against his own coming). On the whole subject see Rendtorff, *Die Taufe im Urchristentum*, pp. 16–37.

3. **The baptismal formula.**—To sum up: as baptism had in Judaism come to mean *purificatory consecration*, with a twofold reference—from an old state and to a new—, so was it in Christianity. It denoted (1) the convert's attitude towards his past sinful state with its 'dead works,' or towards God as sinned against (He 6^1, Ac 20^{21})—repentance; and (2) his new attitude, faith towards God (He 6^1) or Christ (Ac 20^{21}), as the ground of hope for the future, of which Christ's resurrection was the guarantee or type (cf. 1 P 3^{21}). The practical effect was remission of past sins or justification, the token of which was the gift of the Holy Spirit, in sensible experience, as marking Divine acceptance of the new subject of Messiah's Kingdom.

All this is present in germ in Peter's words (Ac 2^{38-40}), 'Repent, and let each of you get himself baptized in the name of Jesus Christ unto remission of sins,' etc. The phrase 'in the name' now calls for closer consideration. It is clear from contemporary usage (*e.g.* Ac 1^{15}, Rev 3^4 11^{13}) that 'name' was an ancient synonym for 'person.' Parallels, moreover, from the colloquial Greek of the time show that the expression 'in the name' was itself widely used, especially in solemn or formal connexions, and with special reference to proprietorship. Thus a payment is made εἰς ὄνομά τινος, 'into so-and-so's account'; a petition is presented εἰς τὸ τοῦ βασιλέως ὄνομα, 'to the king's person'; and, still more significantly in our connexion, soldiers swear 'in the king's name' (Rendtorff, *op. cit.* p. 9 f.). Such solemn invocation of the king's name in token of personal allegiance answers exactly to one marked aspect of baptism (cf. 2 Ti $2^{3f.}$), which was further developed in Christian thought after the Apostolic Age, in the notion of the *militia Christi* (see Harnack's monograph so entitled). Only, in primitive Christian baptism, 'the name,' possibly as sum of the Divine perfections (cf. Ps 115^1 where 'mercy' and 'truth' are elements of God's name), was invoked, in the first instance, for mercy and protection. In any case the formula 'in the name of,' with or without associations from OT usage (= בְּשֵׁם rather than בְּ, so Dalman), came to have in all Christian circles—though with different shades of thought, as between typical Jews and others—the pregnant sense of identification between the baptized and Him in whose name baptism took place. The one became thereby the personal property of the other, as part of the people of peculiar possession (λαὸς εἰς περιποίησιν with other synonyms in 1 P $2^{9f.}$; περιούσιος, Tit 2^{14}) and the 'bondservant' of the true Lord (see 2 Co 4^5), as all NT writers agree in putting it. That this was the essence of the matter appears from the very title, 'the Lord Jesus,' usual among Gentile converts, just as 'the Christ' or 'Christ Jesus' was in more Jewish circles. 'The Lord Jesus' seems, indeed, to grow out of the central phrase of the baptismal con

fession, viz., 'Jesus is Lord.' Reading 1 Co 12^{3} 'No man can say Κύριος Ἰησοῦς save in Holy Spirit' (cf. 1^{2b} 6^{11}), in the light of Ro 10^{9} 'If thou confess "the utterance" (ῥῆμα, more fully τὸ ῥ. τῆς πίστεως ὃ κηρύσσομεν) in thy mouth (phrases just quoted from Dt 30^{14}, cf. Eph 5^{26} 'cleansing it with the washing of water ἐν ῥήματι'), to wit, Κύριος Ἰησοῦς (cf. Ph 2^{11}), and believe in thy heart that God raised him from out the dead (in proof of Messianic Lordship, Ro 1^{4}), thou shalt be saved'—one perceives this clearly. 'Christ Jesus,' as distinct from 'Jesus Christ' (=Jesus the Christ), perhaps arose from a similar Jewish Christian form of confession, 'Jesus is Christ (Messiah)'—whence 'one Lord, one faith, one baptism' (Eph 4^{5}). But did the formula used in baptism, εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ (Ac 8^{16} 19^{5}, 1 Co 6^{11}), embrace more than this distinctive element, having, for instance, such explicit reference to the unity of God as must have been the heart of proselyte baptism? This is suggested not only by 1 Co 8^{6} (ἡμῖν εἷς θεός, ὁ πατήρ, ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτόν, καὶ εἷς Κύριος, Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς δι' αὐτοῦ, cf. Eph $4^{5f.}$), but also by the constant dual form of Apostolic salutations and benedictions (cf. Rev 14^{1} 'having his name and the name of his Father written on their foreheads'). The use of a Trinitarian formula of any sort is not similarly suggested, in spite of 2 Co 13^{14}. Ac $19^{2f.\,5}$ tells against any view that explicit reference to the Holy Spirit occurred in baptism: so also 1 Co 6^{11}. It is probable, then, that God the Creator was in some way confessed in baptism (cf. Hermas, *Mand.* i. 1: 'First of all yield belief [πίστευσον] that God is one,' etc.); yet exactly in what form remains an open question, one which depends upon another, to which attention has recently been directed (see A. Seeberg, *Der Katechismus der Urchristenheit*, 1903).

4. Procedure in baptism.—Here light is cast forward by Jewish proselyte baptism and backward by sub-Apostolic Christian usage, both of which make it unlikely that baptism was a bare rite of confessing a sacred Name, followed by immersion in water. This were too formal and abstract a conception to suit the intense moral reality of the religious crisis in question. The rite itself had a concrete setting of ethical exhortation and pledging, to which missionary experience of all ages affords parallels. According to this conception, the confession Κύριος Ἰησοῦς was probably the answer of practical allegiance, given by the candidate for baptism, to instruction in the rudiments of Christian piety, on lines best indicated by the 'Two Ways' of Life and Death, preserved in expanded form in the first half of the *Didache*. Thus the confession in baptism ('in the name of the Lord,' *Did.* 9^{5}, and perhaps originally in 7^{1} likewise) pledged the baptized to the Christian obedience (cf. Justin, *Apol.* 6, βιοῦν οὕτως δύνασθαι ὑπισχνῶνται)—a pledge which may have been weekly renewed in early Christian worship, at least in certain regions. For in Bithynia-Pontus, according to Pliny's *Epistle* of *c.* 112 A.D., the Christians used in their Lord's Day morning meeting to 'pledge themselves with a solemn oath (*sacramento se obstringere*) not to the commission of any crime, but to avoidance of theft, robbery, adultery, breach of faith, denial of deposit when called upon.' This is most suggestive, not only as to the genius of primitive Christian worship as profoundly ethical in tone, but also as to the obligations undertaken in baptism, no doubt in very solemn and explicit fashion, including the witness of those best able to answer (sponsors) for the candidate's good faith and fitness. Thus the *Didache*, after giving the 'Two Ways,' continues: 'All these things first pronounce and so baptize,' a practice probably referred to in Mt 28^{19} 'Disciple all nations, baptizing them into the name . . ., teaching (διδάσκοντες) them to observe all the precepts I have given to you' (ὅσα ἐνετειλάμην=a διδαχὴ Κυρίου consisting of ἐντολαί). There is, moreover, hardly a doubt that the bulk of the 'Two Ways,' as found in the *Didache* and related documents, goes back to the Jewish ethical instruction, on a monotheistic basis, given to proselytes among the Diaspora, under the figure of a Way of Life and a Way of Death set before men, found in the OT, but also among Greek moralists. To this, in its earliest Christian form, reference may be found even in the Pauline letters (*e.g.* 2 Th 2^{15} παραδόσεις ἃς ἐδιδάχθητε, Ro 16^{17} τοὺς . . . παρὰ τὴν διδαχὴν ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐμάθετε ποιοῦντας, where διχοστασίαι and σκάνδαλα are in view, 1 Co 4^{17} τὰς ὁδούς μου τὰς ἐν Χριστῷ [Ἰησοῦ], καθὼς πανταχοῦ ἐν πάσῃ ἐκκλησίᾳ διδάσκω). Most significant is the language of Ro $6^{15ff.}$, where occurs the notion of prior 'bond-service' to sin 'unto death,' followed by obedience to a τύπος διδαχῆς issuing in new 'bond-service' to 'righteousness,' or to God and Christ, and the end 'life eternal.' So again 2 Ti 2^{19} 'Let every one that nameth the name of the Lord forthwith abstain from iniquity,' which is the human side of the seal placed on God's firm 'foundation' of piety among men. All this suggests such a formal renunciation of the service of Sin as the Way of Death, and a placing of oneself under obedience to Christ as Lord, as emerges after the sub-Apostolic age in the *abrenuntiatio diaboli* and the ranging of oneself with Christ (Χριστῷ συντάσσομαι; cf. the Two Ways of 'teaching and dominion' in Barn. 18). This is perhaps the key to the description of baptism in 1 P 3^{21}, 'not a putting away of filth in the sphere of the flesh (as by water), but the appeal of a good conscience directed to God,' as pledged to give part and lot in Christ's resurrection to those who yield 'obedience of faith' to God in Him. This appeal may refer specially to the invocation of the Name by the candidate, in answer to the baptizer's interrogation as to his acceptance *ex animo* of the true allegiance; whereupon the latter sealed the reception of the candidate into the holy community by invoking 'the fair name' of the Lord Jesus upon his head (see Ja 2^{7}, cf. Rev 7^{3} 9^{4} 14^{1} 22^{4}).

This human sealing by sacred formula was normally countersigned, as it were, on the Divine part by the Messianic gift of a holy enthusiasm ('Holy Spirit' as a phenomenon in the human spirit), the spirit of adoption, through the deeper and abiding consciousness of which the Christian henceforth utters his soul in the word 'Father' (Ro 8^{15}, the Aramaic exclamation, *Abba*, even passing into use in Gentile circles; cf. *Maranatha*, 'Lord come,' 1 Co 16^{22}, *Did.* 10). Such Divine 'confirming' of the baptized 'into Christ' as a member of His Body, by an 'unction,' a sealing, a giving of the Spirit in 'earnest' (ἀρραβών, 2 Co $1^{21f.}$), took place in experience at baptism. But as it issued from a more secret working of the Spirit, as author of the faith which qualified for baptism, so it gave place to an abiding 'fellowship of the Holy Spirit' (2 Co 13^{14}) in which Christians shared and by which they were 'led' in their 'walk' (Ro $8^{9.\,14.\,16}$, Gal 5^{16-26}). The effect of all this was such a spiritually real, or mystical, union with Christ that in baptism Paul regarded Christ as 'put on' like a robe (Gal 3^{27}), or again as entering the believer as his 'life' (Ro 8^{10}, Gal 2^{20}).

Immersion and affusion.—Immersion seems to have been the practice of the Apostolic age, in continuity with Jewish proselyte baptism; and it is implied in Paul's language, especially in his figure of baptism as spiritual burial and resurrection (Ro 6^{3-5}, Col 2^{12}). But the form was not held

essential; and when conditions presented practical difficulties—whether local, climatic, or due to physical weakness—it came to be modified (cf. *Did.* 7). The most usual form, of which we have evidence from the 2nd cent. onwards, as regards adults, was that of standing semi-immersed in water, up to knees or waist, combined with threefold pouring over the head (trine affusion).

5. Adult and infant baptism.—So far we have been dealing with adult baptism only. It alone occupies attention in the NT, as it does mainly in missionary literature to-day. But this by no means exhausts the facts of the case, as we may learn from the analogy of Jewish missions and their baptism of proselytes. The idea that a parent should enter a religion or covenant-relation with God as an individual merely, *i.e.* by himself as distinct from his immediate family, would never occur to the ancients, least of all to a Jew. There were no 'individuals' in our sharp modern sense of the term. All were seen as members of larger units, of which the family was the chief in the time of Christ, when the clan and nation were no longer so overshadowing as in earlier days. The *paterfamilias* included legally and in social ethics the members of his household. Any change in his religious status *ipso facto* affected them. Hence to any one familiar with the modes of antique thought, no proof in any given case is needed that children from their birth were regarded as sharing their parents' religious status, objectively or socially considered: the *onus probandi* falls entirely on those who, under the influence of certain modern modes of thought, would maintain the contrary. Now, not only is there no evidence in the NT read historically, *i.e.* with due regard to the interest of the writer and his original readers in what is said or implied, that children stood to the Christian community in a different relation from that belonging to them in ancient religions generally, and especially in Judaism; but what we know of the Jewish practice touching proselytes—which usually regulated practice among Gentile Christians—makes it most improbable that Christianity here introduced any novel usage. Had such been the case, it must have been emphasized, and could hardly have failed to leave its mark somewhere on the NT. Those who were to be reared 'in the Lord's training and admonition,' and to obey their parents 'in the Lord' (*i.e.* for Christian motives, Eph 6^{1-4}), must have been viewed as already Christians in status or objectively—ranking, according to their stage of development, with 'those of the household of faith' and not with 'those without.' This went back to infancy; for Paul regards the child of faith, even on one side only, as thereby 'holy,' *i.e.* objectively in covenant with God (1 Co 7^{14}). No subjective difference between such children and others is implied any more than in Judaism itself. But as in Judaism the child's objective status was conditioned by circumcision, it is natural to suppose that in the Church it was so by baptism (cf. Col $2^{11ff.}$). The only possible doubt is whether the child was regarded as baptized vicariously in its parent, or whether the rite was administered to it also. For the latter alternative we have not only the analogy of circumcision in Israel, but also proselyte baptism. Thus we read that 'a little proselyte' is baptized without his intelligent consent, on the principle that one may act for another to his advantage, though not to his disadvantage, apart from his knowledge and consent. Where the proselyte father brings the children, their solidarity with him as their head or authority is enough to warrant baptism; where only the mother, baptism is conferred 'on the authority of a *beth din*' or Jewish court of law (see C. Taylor, *Two Lectures on the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles*, p. 54 ff.). In either case its effect is only provisional; the child is brought within the covenant so far as social or family life goes, but his personal or subjective relation to the covenant waits on the development of reflective will, just as with the circumcision of a born Jew, who, as a rule, became a 'son of the Law,' and was publicly accepted into the visible membership of the Synagogue, only on his thirteenth birthday. Thereupon a father became free from the burden of his son's sins, *i.e.* full responsibility for his religious condition. Here is the obvious analogue of Christian 'Confirmation,' or joining the Church on personal confession. The regeneration effected by baptism in the case of an adult proselyte was meant in an objective sense, to define his new relations with his holy environment; for 'a newly made proselyte is like a newborn child' (Bab. *Yebamoth* 48*b*). So was it with children both of proselytes and of Christians. Their status of holiness or salvation was objective, and from the nature of the case only objective. It related to the holy or saving environment amid which they stood, first by birth and then by formal covenant seal—ratifying their birthright of good (cf. Ac 2^{39}) so far as human act and recognition could, *i.e.* corporately and as basis for 'training and admonition' in the Lord. The subjective reality waited for the emergence of the subjective conditions, as with child proselytes, who, on coming to years of discretion (like young Jews), were free to repudiate the objective relations in which they found themselves, without thereby being classed and treated as 'apostates.' That is, all was provisional as regards subjective reality. There was no idea of infant baptismal 'regeneration' in the later and still prevalent sense, a confusion of thought responsible for anti-pædobaptist reaction—away from primitive practice, to some extent also away from the primitive attitude to the 'children of the covenant.' Such confusion between the objective and subjective senses of holiness and salvation (united in the case of adult subjects of baptism) arose naturally enough once terms were transferred from Jewish to Gentile soil, with its less ethical and more physical notions of religious grace. Here the influence of the 'Mysteries' played a considerable part in working a change, which was unconscious for the most part in the minds of Gentile converts. See, further, § 2 of next article.

LITERATURE.—For Jewish baptisms, especially that of proselytes: Schürer, *HJP* II. ii. 319 ff. (later German ed. 1898, iii. 129 ff.); see also separate article BAPTISM (Jewish), and *JE* art. 'Baptism.' For Jewish practice in relation to Christian: C. Taylor, *Two Lectures on the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles*, 1886, p. 54 ff.; J. E. Hanauer, *Baptism, Jewish and Christian*, 1906. For the Greek and other ethnic analogies: F. M. Rendtorff, *Die Taufe im Urchristentum*, Leipzig, 1905, where full references will be found to recent German discussions of the *Religionsgeschichtliche* type and a sober criticism of the same (cf. preceding art.). Fuller refs. in Hastings' *DB*, art. 'Baptism,' to which may be added E. Vaucher, *Le Baptême*, Paris, 1894.

J. V. BARTLET.

BAPTISM (Early Christian).—*1.* **The origin of Christian baptism.**—There are three possible views. The traditional belief is that baptism was instituted by Christ in His parting address to His disciples; but in recent times it has been maintained either that baptism was a custom used by the Jews, practised by John the Baptist, and inherited by the early Christians, or that it was adopted by the Christians from the Græco-Roman world. Of these three the choice must probably be made between the first and the second—the third is not by itself adequate to explain the facts, though it is probable that the general ideas of the Græco-Roman world did much to determine and modify the exact form which early Christian baptism took. The evidence consists so largely of the

exegesis and criticism of the same passages that the case for and against each view cannot be put separately. The main Scripture passages concerned are Mt 28^{19}, Mk 16^{16}, and Jn 3^5, of which Mt 28^{19} is the central piece of evidence for the traditional view of the institution of baptism by Christ. It describes the Risen Lord as saying to His disciples, 'Go ye and make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them into the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.' If it were undisputed, this would, of course, be decisive, but its trustworthiness is impugned on the grounds of textual criticism, literary criticism, and historical criticism.

(*a*) *Textual criticism.*—In all extant MSS and versions the text is found in the traditional form, *πορευθέντες οὖν μαθητεύσατε πάντα τὰ ἔθνη, βαπτίζοντες αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος, διδάσκοντες αὐτοὺς τηρεῖν πάντα ὅσα ἐνετειλάμην ὑμῖν*, though it must be remembered that the best manuscripts both of the African Old Latin and of the Old Syriac versions are defective at this point. The evidence of Patristic quotations is not so clear. It was formerly thought to be as unanimous as that of the MSS and Versions, but F. C. Conybeare (*ZNTW*, 1901, p. 275 ff.) has shown that this is not true, at least in the case of Eusebius of Cæsarea.

The facts are in summary that Eusebius quotes Mt 28^{19} twenty-one times, either omitting everything between *ἔθνη* and *διδάσκοντες* or in the form *πορευθέντες μαθητεύσατε πάντα τὰ ἔθνη ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου, διδάσκοντες, κ.τ.λ.*, the latter form being the more frequent. He also quotes it four times in the ordinary text; but it is significant that these four quotations are all in the later writings of Eusebius [once in the Syriac Theophany, iv. 8 (Lee's tr. p. 223), once in *contra Marcellum*, p. 3 O, once in the *de Ecclesiastica Theologia*, v. p. 174*a*, and once in the letter of Eusebius to the Church at Cæsarea quoted by Socrates, *HE* i. 8. 33; it should be noted that there is reason to think that the Syriac translator is giving, not the text of Eusebius, but the version to which he was accustomed (cf. Burkitt, *Evangelion da-Mepharreshe*, ii. 171), and that the authorship of the *contra Marcellum* and the *de Ecclesiastica Theologia* is doubtful (cf. Conybeare, *ZNTW*, 1905, p. 250 ff., and a reply by Gerhard Loeschcke, *ib.* 1906, p. 69 ff.)]. At first sight this evidence seems to prove that Eusebius, in his earlier writings at all events, used MSS of the Gospels which omitted the command to baptize in Mt 28^{19}, but Riggenbach ('Die trinitarische Taufbefehl,' *Beiträge zur Forderung christl. Theol.* 1903) and Chase (*JThSt*, 1905, p. 481 ff.) have argued that his method of quotation is due to the influence of the *arcani disciplina*. This suggestion does not seem to bear examination, for the quotations in Eusebius are not found in works intended for unbelievers or for catechumens. The most reasonable view seems to be that Conybeare has shown that the quotations in Eusebius point to a text which omitted the baptismal formula, though it is still open to question whether Eusebius knew also the traditional form. It is naturally important to ask whether there is any other evidence for the 'Eusebian' type of text. Conybeare thinks that he can see traces of it in Justin Martyr, *Dial.* xxxix. 258, and liii. 272, and in Hermas, *Simil.* ix. 17. 4; but none of these passages is convincing, and perhaps more striking than any of them is the passage in which Justin gives a description of the regeneration of Christian converts in connexion with baptism (*Apol.* i. 61). Here he quotes a saying of Christ ('Except ye be born again ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven') as a proof of the necessity of regeneration, but falls back upon the use of Isaiah and Apostolic tradition to justify the practice of baptism and the use of the trine formula. This certainly suggests that Justin did not know the traditional text of Mt 28^{19}.

Whether the 'Eusebian' text, if its existence be granted, has any real claim to be regarded as a serious rival to the traditional form, is a wholly different question. The answer depends on the view taken of the general problem of textual criticism. If a high value be attached to the existing MSS of the NT, the traditional text, though no longer unassailed, must be accepted. But if it be thought (as many critics think) that no MSS represent more than comparatively late recensions of the text, it is necessary to set against the mass of manuscript evidence the influence of baptismal practice. It seems easier to believe that the traditional text was brought about by this influence working on the 'Eusebian' text, than that the latter arose out of the former in spite of it.

(*b*) *Literary criticism.*—The objection raised to Mt 28^{19} by literary criticism is that it can be shown by a comparison with the other Gospels to be no part of the earliest tradition. The greater part of Mt 28 rests on a source almost or quite identical with our Mark, which is generally recognized as the oldest and best account of the life of Christ; it is possible, though perhaps improbable, that the writer was acquainted with the lost conclusion of Mark, but the method in which Matthew treats his sources is such that it is impossible to be certain that any one sentence (such as 28^{19}) was found in it. The other accounts of the parting words of our Lord differ so much, that it is improbable that they may be traced to any common documentary source. Still it is possible that they represent a common tradition which reported our Lord's parting words, and they may be examined in order to see if they suggest that those parting words contained any command to baptize, whether in the trine name or in the name of the Lord.

The accounts which we possess are Mt $28^{18\text{-}20}$, Mk $16^{15\text{-}18}$, Lk $24^{44\text{-}49}$, and perhaps Jn $20^{21\text{-}23}$. Of these Mk $16^{15\text{-}18}$ is generally considered to be a patchwork composition based on Matthew and Luke. If this be so, it affords evidence that at the time when it was written baptism was connected with the preaching of the gospel. It does not support the trine formula, but rather the 'Eusebian' text (cf. *ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου* in 16^{17}), and it is as easy to think that the reference to baptism was derived from contemporary usage as from Mt 28^{19}. Lk 24^{47} is more closely allied with the Eusebian than with the traditional text, and both this passage and Jn $20^{21\text{-}23}$ suggest that the earliest form of tradition as to the Lord's parting words to the disciples said nothing about baptism. It may be argued that the idea of repentance and forgiveness of sin was for early Christianity so closely connected with that of baptism that one implies the other. But this is not the point. It is probable that baptism and the preaching of the gospel went hand in hand from the beginning. The question is whether this was due to their direct association in the 'parting words' of the Lord, or to other causes. The evidence of Mt 28^{19}, if the traditional text be sound, points to the former alternative; but the Third and Fourth Gospels suggest that the earliest tradition knew only of a command to preach the gospel of repentance for the forgiveness of sins. In the case of the Third Gospel this argument is especially strong. Either Luke knew of the commission to baptize (whether in the trine name or not) and omitted it, or he did not know it. It seems impossible to find any reason why he should have omitted it. At first sight this argument holds equally good for the Fourth Gospel, but it is not nearly so strong, as the writer has not unreasonably been thought to show a tendency to omit the material side of the sacramental rites of early Christianity, because of a tendency to over-emphasize its importance. Hence he omits the institution of the Eucharist. So that his omission to connect baptism with the forgiveness of sins in Jn 20^{23} is not so strong an argument as is the similar omission by Luke.

On the whole, then, the evidence of literary criticism is against the historical character of the traditional text of Mt 28^{19}.

(*c*) *Historical criticism.*—The objection made to the authenticity of Mt 28^{19} from the standpoint of historical criticism is that the references to baptism in the Acts point to the earliest form as baptism 'in the name of the Lord.' Thus it is not, like the previous objections, directed against the command as a whole, but against the formula used in it.

Christian baptism, when connected with the mention of a formula, is alluded to four times in the Acts (2^{38} 8^{16} 10^{48} 19^5), and the formula is never that of Mt 28^{19}, but is twice *ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* (2^{38} 10^{48}) and twice *εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ* (8^{16} 19^5). That this was the usual formula of Christian baptism is supported by the evidence of the Pauline Epistles, which speak of being baptized only *εἰς Χριστόν* (Gal 3^{27}) or *εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν* (Ro 6^3). Is it possible to reconcile these facts with the belief that Christ commanded the disciples to baptize in the trine name? The obvious explanation of the silence of the NT on the trine name, and the use of another formula in Acts and Paul, is that this other formula was the earlier, and that the trine formula is a later addition. It would require very strong arguments to controvert this presumption, and none seems to exist (a statement of curious attempts, ancient and modern, is given in 'Baptism' in Hastings' *DB*, vol. i., by Dr. A. Plummer).

The cumulative evidence of these three lines of criticism is thus distinctly against the view that Mt 28^{19} represents the *ipsissima verba* of Christ in

instituting Christian baptism. If this be so, it is plain that neither Mk 16^{16} nor Jn 3^5 can prove the institution. Mk 16^{16} has been incidentally dealt with; Jn 3^5 is more difficult. Doubts have been cast on the text of this verse, so far as the reference to water is concerned, but for the present it is enough to point out that, even if the reference to baptism be undisputed, it does not follow that it implies the institution of baptism by Christ; it rather suggests a practice which He found existing and accepted. It is also necessary to remember that in the present position of the criticism of the Fourth Gospel no one can confidently build on historical statements which are found only in that document.

The case against the indirect evidence in support of the traditional view is less convincing. The position in defence of that view is that, even if the evidence in Acts be admitted to prove that baptism in the trine name was not instituted by Christ, it shows that from the beginning it was unquestioningly practised by all Christians, and it is urged that this would not be so if it had not been instituted by Christ. Against this it is alleged that the last conclusion is unwarranted, and that some of the evidence in the Epistles, properly regarded, tells against rather than for the traditional view. The crucial passage is 1 Co 1^{14-17}:

εὐχαριστῶ ὅτι οὐδένα ὑμῶν ἐβάπτισα εἰ μὴ Κρίσπον καὶ Γάϊον ἵνα μή τις εἴπῃ ὅτι εἰς τὸ ἐμὸν ὄνομα ἐβαπτίσθητε. ἐβάπτισα δὲ καὶ τὸν Στεφανᾶ οἶκον· λοιπὸν οὐκ οἶδα εἴ τινα ἄλλον ἐβάπτισα. οὐ γὰρ ἀπέστειλέν με Χριστὸς βαπτίζειν ἀλλ' εὐαγγελίζεσθαι.

It is urged with great force that Paul could not possibly have written this if Christ had given the definite command to baptize, related in Mt 28^{19}. It is possible to argue that Paul is speaking of himself, not of the other disciples; but this introduces a limitation into the commission to baptize which cannot be supported, and is also contrary to the constant claim of Paul that he has the Apostolic commission as fully as any of the other apostles.

Thus, so far as the negative side of the argument is concerned, the opponents of the traditional view have decidedly the better case. The weak spot in their position is when they attempt to give any positive explanation of the origin of Christian baptism. The suggestion is that baptism was an already existing custom which the Church took over from the beginning. But if so, from what source did it take it? The answer is that that side of baptism which is concerned with cleansing from sin is found in Græco-Roman and Jewish as well as in Christian baptism, and was a feature of John's baptism, in which also it had an eschatological significance. It was, in fact, part of the common stock of ideas of the 1st century.

Similarly, the use of the 'name' in baptism is only part of the complex of doctrine connected with the use of names as a means of employing the power which belonged to the original owner of the name. This also was common to Jew and Gentile alike. It is therefore plain that, on what may be termed the negative side of baptism, *i.e.* the side which is especially connected with purification, and so far as the use of the 'name' is concerned, there is no reason to quarrel with the view that Christian baptism is an adaptation of customs and ideas which were common to the whole world in the time of Christ. There is nothing in them so strange as to force us to suppose that they were due to the special institution of Christ. The more difficult side of the question is concerned with the relation of baptism to the gift of the Spirit. The baptism of John did not claim to give the Spirit, nor did Jewish baptism. It is also not quite possible to prove the existence of exactly the same thing in the Mysteries, though they did undoubtedly present cognate ideas, especially that of regeneration. This is therefore the strongest point of the argument for either a specifically Christian or a specifically Græco-Roman origin for baptism. The Pauline Epistles are the earliest evidence for a connexion between baptism and the gift of the Spirit. If this view was not known to the Jews, St. Paul must have received it from the original disciples (who again received it from Christ), or have adopted it from the general stock of Græco-Roman ideas. Yet the *prima facie* strength of this argument must be qualified by the following considerations:

(1) In the first place, it may be thought with much reason that Christ spoke of the Spirit, and compared it, as the ground of Christian life, with baptism, which was the ground of discipleship to John the Baptist. If so, a natural confusion of thought would be made stronger by the fact that the beginning of the life in the Spirit did, in fact, often coincide with the water-baptism which marked the initiation of the Christian. That it was coincidence and not identity would not be observed until later, but that it was observed can be seen in the Acts.

(2) In the second place, there seems no reason to doubt the tradition in the Gospels that John the Baptist himself referred to a baptism in the Spirit. Such a reference seems to go back to the use of a passage in the OT which lies behind his baptism, viz. Ezk 36^{25-27}. In $36^{25f.}$ we read: 'I will sprinkle clean water upon you and ye shall be clean (baptism). . . . A new heart will I put within you (μετάνοια [?]).' This clearly is the background of John's preaching; but it leads up to the next verse: 'And I will put my spirit within you.' It does not therefore seem too much to say that the teaching by John the Baptist of a water-baptism of repentance for the remission of sins, to the mind of any Jew familiar with the OT, seemed to fulfil this passage, and so inevitably suggested that the gift of the Spirit, which fulfilled the second half and was found in the Christian Church, was to be looked for also in baptism.

(3) Moreover, our real knowledge of popular Jewish theology and religious observances in the time of Christ is small. It is true that the official Rabbinical religion had no sacramental washings or baptisms, and probably did not give any such interpretation to the baptism of proselytes; but the Essenes probably went further in this direction, attaching a sacramental meaning to their baptisms; and it is possible that this view was common among the people outside the official classes. If so, this may have been an important factor in the genesis of Christian baptism (see Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums*, pp. 230 and 529 ff.).

These arguments cannot be said to prove that Christ did not institute baptism, but they may fairly be said to show that the existence of Christian baptism is most intelligible on the supposition that it was a Jewish custom which the Christians took over, modifying it by the natural adoption of the 'name,' and by an equally natural connexion with the gift of the Spirit. Moreover, there is certainly no satisfactory positive evidence that Christ did institute baptism. It is therefore more probable that the origin of Christian baptism is the adoption and adaptation of a Jewish custom than that it was directly and specially instituted by Christ. This is also far more probable than that it was first borrowed by St. Paul from the Græco-Roman world. At the same time, baptism was certainly one of the elements in Christianity which was most likely to obtain a favourable reception from the Roman world, and this may have led to the emphasis which was laid upon it, and to the rapid development of the doctrine connected with it.

2. Baptism in the NT.—i. *DOCTRINE OF BAPTISM.*—(1) IN THE PAULINE EPISTLES.—There are four main ways in which baptism is regarded in the Pauline Epistles.

(*a*) *Union with Christ.*—In Ro $6^{3ff.}$ the immersion in and the rising out of the water are regarded as a union with the death and resurrection of Christ. 'Are ye ignorant that all we who were baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death? We were buried with him through baptism into death: that like as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, so we also might walk in newness of life.' Baptism is thus the beginning of a new life of union with the risen Christ. The same idea is found in Gal 3^{27} 'As many of you as were baptized into Christ did put on Christ,' and in Col 2^{12} '. . . buried with him

in baptism, wherein ye were also raised with him . . .' In the light of these passages it is difficult to doubt that St. Paul regarded baptism as more than symbolical; it was an act which really brought about the result ascribed to it, and not merely an acted description of that result, which was actually caused by something else.

(*b*) *The gift of the Spirit.*—In 1 Co 12[12] the baptized are regarded as members of Christ's body, inspired by the same Divine spirit: 'For as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of the body, being many, are one body; so also is Christ. For in one Spirit were we all baptized into one body . . .' At first sight this seems an idea which is difficult to reconcile with the former; but the difference is probably quite superficial. To St. Paul the Christ of spiritual experience and the Spirit were almost if not quite identical. This may be seen in Ro 8[9-17] and 2 Co 3[17].

(*c*) *Cleansing from sin.*—In 1 Co 6[11], where baptism is not mentioned but certainly implied, it is represented as a cleansing effected through the name of the Lord and through the Divine spirit: 'Ye were washed, ye were sanctified, ye were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and in the Spirit of our God.' This view is complementary to the others, and describes some of the results which follow from them. The importance of this passage is that it explains that baptism can produce these effects because it works 'in the name,' and so links up baptism with the view, prevalent at the time in almost every circle, that the pronunciation of the name of any one could, if properly used, enable the user to enjoy the benefit of the attributes attached to the original owner of the name (see also art. NAME).

Thus the Pauline doctrine of baptism is that on the positive side it gives the Christian union with Christ, which may also be described as inspiration with the Holy Spirit, while on the negative side it cleanses from sin. This it accomplishes by the power of the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, and by the sacramental effect of the water, according to the well-known idea that results could be reached in the unseen spiritual world by the performance of analogous acts in the visible material world. Baptism is regarded as really giving these results, and not merely as a sign that they have been, or can be, obtained in some other way.

(*d*) *Vicarious baptism.*—It would also seem from 1 Co 15[29] that St. Paul recognized the practice of vicarious baptism for the dead. It is impossible that 'Else what shall they do who are baptized for the dead? If the dead are not raised at all, why then are they baptized for them?' can refer to anything except vicarious baptism.

(2) IN THE PAULINE EPISTLES OF DOUBTFUL AUTHENTICITY.—Under this heading it is perhaps wisest to deal with the evidence of Eph 5[26f.], Tit 3[5-7].

In Ephesians the cleansing efficacy of the water is emphasized, and is connected with the 'word' ('having cleansed it by the washing of water with the word'). This emphasis is somewhat stronger than anything in the unquestioned Epistles, but it is practically implied in 1 Co 6[11], in which passage also the 'name' may correspond to the 'word' (ῥῆμα) of Ephesians. In Titus the union with Christ's risen life is regarded as a new birth; 'according to his mercy he saved us through the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Spirit.' The phrase 'regeneration' is strange to the Pauline vocabulary, but the idea which it conveys is involved in Ro 8[14] 'For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are sons of God,' when taken in connexion with the view that the Spirit was given in baptism (cf. also Gal 3[26f.], where the idea of sonship to God and baptism are closely connected).

(3) IN 1 PETER.—The only place in the Catholic Epistles which explicitly speaks of baptism is 1 P 3[21] '. . . which (*i.e.* water) in the antitype doth now save you, namely baptism, not a putting away of the filth of the flesh, but a "question" of a good conscience toward God. . . .' Here the doctrine of the 'real' efficacy of baptism is clearly asserted; but there is a protest against too material an emphasis on the water, to counteract which mention is made of a συνειδήσεως ἀγαθῆς ἐπερώτημα. It is not quite certain what this phrase means. It is improbable that it refers to prayer to God, for ἐπερωτῶ is never used in this sense, or of inquiry after God, for this would require ἐπερώτησις, and the best interpretation seems to be that it is a reference to the question directed to a convert at his baptism (see C. Bigg, '1 Peter' in *The Intern. Crit. Comment.* p. 165). In this 'a good conscience' probably defines the content of the demand made on the candidate—it was of a moral rather than a doctrinal nature. The writer also goes on to explain that the water of baptism receives this power 'through the resurrection of Jesus Christ, who is on the right hand of God, having gone into heaven, angels and authorities and powers being made subject unto him' This seems to be an explanation why the name of the Lord was so potent in baptism: He had triumphed over death, and regained life, and those who used His name were able to use His power to do the same. It is true that no actual statement is made in 1 Peter that baptism was in the name of the Lord, but no one is likely to dispute that this was the case.

(4) IN THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS.—Christian baptism is mentioned only in Mt 28[19] and Mk 16[16]. The former passage ('Go ye into all the world and make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them into the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit') claims the direct institution of baptism by Christ, but its authenticity is open to doubt (see § 1).

Here it is only necessary to ask, What is the meaning of the formula translated 'in the name of'? The question is whether εἰς τὸ ὄνομα means the same as ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι. The probability seems to be that the two phrases are, in the late Greek of the NT, identical. It is now common knowledge that εἰς and ἐν were interchangeable in late Greek, and the Latin and Syriac translators of Mt 28[19] clearly took this view, which is convincingly defended by J. Armitage Robinson in *JThSt* vii. (Jan. 1906) in answer to an article by F. H. Chase in *JThSt* vi. (July 1905). The meaning of the writer of the Gospel (or of the redactor who added the clause relating to baptism) was that Christians had the power of baptizing in the name communicated to them by the Lord who had gained the power (ἐξουσία) over everything in heaven and earth. The idea is parallel with that in 1 P 3[21f.].

In Mk 16[16] ('He that believes and is baptized shall be saved') baptism is regarded as a necessary means to salvation, but no further details are given.

(5) IN THE ACTS.—The references to baptism in the Acts are doctrinally important in connexion with the formula used, and with the relation between baptism and the gift of the Spirit. The former point is sufficiently discussed in § 1. The latter may best be formulated thus: (*a*) There is in the Acts a series of passages in which baptism seems to be clearly identified with the gift of the Spirit; (*b*) there is a second series in which it is clearly distinguished from this gift; and (*c*) there is a third series which either does not allude to the point, or may be interpreted equally well on either hypothesis. This third series can, of course, be disregarded (such passages are Ac 8[36-39] 16[15] 16[33] 18[8] 22[16]); but an attempt must be made either to interpret the two others in such a way as to remove the apparent contradiction, or to see in the difference between them an indication of different sources.

(*a*) The passages which seem to identify baptism with the gift of the Spirit are Ac 1[5] 2[38] 11[16] and 19[2-6]. In 1[5] ('John indeed baptized with water; but ye shall be baptized with the Holy Spirit not many days hence') a contrast is apparently drawn between John's baptism and Christian baptism, the latter being regarded as baptism with the Holy Spirit; but as the narrative goes on to describe the fulfilment of this promise on the day of Pentecost, in which there is no suggestion of baptism

in the ordinary literal sense, it is probable that the word 'baptize' in 1^5 is used metaphorically, and not with reference to ordinary Christian baptism. This interpretation is supported by Ac 11^{16}, where the words of 1^5 are quoted by St. Peter in connexion with the episode of Cornelius, for here the gift of the Spirit is conferred without baptism in water, and baptism in water is given to those who have already received the Spirit. In Ac 2^{38} St. Peter says: 'Repent and be baptized . . . and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Spirit.' This certainly seems to identify the gift of the Spirit with baptism, but it is not decisive. The context is that the promise made in Ac 1^5 has just been fulfilled, and St. Peter says, 'Be baptized and you also shall receive the same gift.' The *prima facie* suggestion that this means: 'You shall receive it through baptism,' is discounted by the fact that this was not the way in which the disciples had received it, and it is significant that we are not told that those who were baptized did receive the Spirit, but merely that they were added to the Church. Thus it is possible that the meaning of the passage really is that baptism was the means of entry into the Church, to the members of which the Spirit would ultimately be given. Similarly ambiguous is Ac $19^{2\text{-}6}$. Here we have the case of certain Ephesians who had become Christians, but had been baptized not with Christian baptism, but with the baptism of John. St. Paul said to them: 'Did ye receive the Holy Spirit when ye believed? And they said unto him, Nay, we did not so much as hear whether the Holy Spirit was given. And he said, Into what then were ye baptized? And they said, Into John's baptism. And Paul said, John baptized with the baptism of repentance, saying unto the people that they should believe on him which should come after him, that is, on Jesus. And when they heard this, they were baptized into the name of the Lord Jesus. And when Paul had laid his hands upon them, the Holy Spirit came on them.' The *prima facie* interpretation certainly connects the gift of the Spirit with baptism; not so much because the Spirit was actually given, as because of St. Paul's second question. It is, however, possible that his surprised question was due, not to the non-reception of the Spirit, but to their ignorance; his first question supports this view, for it seems to contemplate the possibility of Christian belief and baptism without the gift of the Spirit. If so, the writer may have intended to connect the gift of the Spirit with the laying on of hands rather than with baptism. Thus in each case the *prima facie* connexion of baptism with the gift of the Spirit is indecisive: a different interpretation is possible, and which of the two should be followed must depend on the evidence of the other series of passages.

(*b*) The passages which distinguish baptism from the gift of the Spirit are Ac $8^{12\text{ff.}}$ and $10^{47\text{f.}}$ The former is the incident of the first Samaritan converts. When Peter and John came to Samaria, they prayed for the converts 'that they might receive the Holy Spirit, for as yet he was fallen upon none of them, only they had been baptized into the name of the Lord Jesus. Then laid they their hands on them, and they received the Holy Spirit.' Here it is plain that the gift of the Spirit was separate from baptism, and there is no suggestion that the baptism was imperfect; the 'name of the Lord Jesus' is the usual formula in Acts for Christian baptism. In $10^{47\text{f.}}$ the matter is less simple. The narrative relates that, while St. Peter was speaking, the Holy Spirit fell on Cornelius and his company. 'Then answered Peter, Can any man forbid water that these should not be baptized, which have received the Holy Ghost as well as we? And he commanded them to be baptized in the name of Jesus Christ.' Obviously in this case the gift of the Spirit was not dependent on baptism, but it appears true that the case of Cornelius was regarded as an exception. The general rule was that baptism came first, and the gift of the Spirit afterwards. The implication is that the two were separate even in normal cases, but this is not definitely stated.

If an attempt be made to bring these data together, and so establish the doctrine of baptism held by the writer of the Acts, the starting-point must be Ac $8^{12\text{f.}}$ as the most definite of all the passages. It shows that (*a*) baptism was the regular and general initiation to membership in the Church; (*b*) the Spirit was not conferred in baptism, but given after it, and was specially connected with the laying on of hands by the Apostles. This explains Ac $19^{2\text{ff.}}$, in which the situation partly resembles that in Ac $8^{12\text{ff.}}$. The Ephesians, like the Samaritans, were, at least in some sense, Christians, but had not received the Spirit. The difference between the two incidents is that the Ephesians, unlike the Samaritans, had received imperfect baptism. Therefore St. Paul did not merely 'lay hands' on the Ephesians, as the Apostles did on the Samaritans, but first had them baptized. The gift of the Spirit was, however, due to the laying on of hands, and not to the baptism. In this way the two classes of passages can be so interpreted that they all fall into place in one system of doctrine, and there is no need to postulate a variety of sources in the Acts with different views on baptism.

A difficulty, however, arises out of the relation of Acts to the Pauline Epistles. Which is the truer or earlier presentment of early Christian thought—that which closely connects baptism and the gift of the Spirit, as the Epistles do, or that which separates them, as the Acts does? The followers of van Manen would probably say that Acts represents an earlier stratum of thought, that early Christian baptism was like John's—only for the remission of sin—and that the idea of the gift of the Spirit in this connexion was a late ecclesiastical figment due to external influences, which has left traces in the Epistles. But this is probably an inadequate view. The fact is that the Acts distinguishes where the Epistles do not, and so is probably the later document. St. Paul simply connects baptism with the gift of the Spirit; he makes no fine distinctions. St. Luke, while constantly bringing the two together, is apparently anxious to maintain that the gift of the Spirit is not the direct result of baptism, but is more closely bound up with the laying on of hands by the Apostles.

(6) In the Epistle to the Hebrews.—In He $6^{4\text{-}6}$ and in $10^{22.\ 23}$ the references to baptism are probable but not explicit. In the latter passage the writer says:

'Let us draw near with a true heart in fulness of faith, having our hearts sprinkled from an evil conscience, and our body washed with pure water: let us hold fast the confession of our hope that it waver not.'

It is almost certain that this is an indication that the writer regarded baptism as the necessary beginning of Christian life; but, like the writer of 1 Peter, he connects the spiritual cleansing with a good conscience (though he expresses it negatively and 1 Peter positively); and in the last sentence it is probably possible to see a reference to the baptismal profession of faith represented in 1 Peter by *ἐπερώτημα*. In the former passage he says:

'For as touching those who were once enlightened and tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Spirit, and tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the age to come, and fell away, it is impossible to renew them again unto repentance.'

Here the reference to baptism is rendered probable by the fact that *φωτισμός* afterwards became a technical term for baptism. It is, however, necessary to point out one qualification to the view that 'enlightenment' means baptism.

In the immediately preceding verses the writer says: 'Therefore let us cease to speak of the first principles of Christ, and press on unto perfection; not laying again a foundation of repentance from dead works and of faith towards God, of the teaching (*v.l.* namely, the teaching) of baptisms and laying on of hands, and of resurrection from the dead, and eternal judgment' (He $6^{1.\ 2}$). Here he regards baptism as one of the foundations of Christian life, but he joins to it the laying on of hands. Now it seems probable that St. Luke connected the gift of the Spirit with the laying on of hands rather than with baptism itself (see § 2, i. (*b*)), whereas St. Paul connected it with the latter. Therefore it is impossible to say precisely what the writer of Hebrews regarded as the effect of baptism, and what as the effect of the laying on of hands. It is possible that enlightenment and tasting of the heavenly gift may be intended to be especially connected with baptism, and the gift of the Spirit with the laying on of hands; but in the absence of further evidence certainty is impossible, and perhaps the writer was not concerned with this question. His interest lay rather in the question of sin after baptism; from passages such as $2^{1\text{-}4}$ $3^{12\text{-}4^{11}}$ $6^{4\text{-}12}$ and $10^{19\text{-}31}$, it is clear that he regarded a relapse into sin as unforgivable, and it is probable that 6^6 ought to be regarded as implying the existence of a school of thought which maintained the possibility of a second baptism in case of relapse.

(7) In the Johannine writings.—These books give little information on the subject of baptism. In Jn 3^{22} it is stated that Jesus baptized, but the text is open to suspicion in view of Jn 4^2 which denies that He did so: 'Jesus himself used not to baptize, but his disciples.' In any case there is no reference to the doctrine of baptism. In Jn 3^5 in the received text there is a clear reference to baptism, which is described as regeneration by

water and the Spirit. It may, however, fairly be questioned whether the words 'water and' are really original in the text. They are without connexion with the context, and seem to have been unknown to Justin Martyr. If they be omitted, the reference to baptism is only indirect; in view of such passages as Tit 3^{5-7} it can scarcely be doubted that there is some connexion, but it would seem to be rather of the nature of a significant silence as to the material element, which amounts to a protest against the emphasis laid on it in other circles. Even if the words be retained, it remains true that the emphasis in the passage is entirely on the Spirit and not the water. This characteristic treatment of baptism is exactly parallel with that of the Eucharist, the institution of which is not mentioned, but the doctrine of which is fully expounded on the spiritual side.

In the Johannine Epistles there is no definite allusion to baptism; there are many references to the gift of the Holy Spirit, but there is no proof that the writer connected it with baptism, though in the light of the information of other documents it is extremely probable that this is the meaning in 1 Jn $2^{20\text{-}27}$ of the reference to an 'anointing from above'—it is the gift of the Spirit bestowed in (or at least connected with) baptism. Perhaps more important, though even less explicit, is $5^{16f.}$ 'If any man see his brother sinning a sin not unto death, he shall ask, and God will give him life for them that sin not unto death. There is sin unto death: not concerning this do I say that he should make request. All unrighteousness is sin, and there is sin not unto death.' This passage is intelligible only in light of the discussion as to the possibility of forgiveness for sin after baptism. The writer tries to solve the difficulty by introducing a distinction between mortal and venial sin.

Summary of doctrine of baptism in NT.—As a summary of these results from a study of the NT, certain lines of development of doctrine which begin to manifest themselves may be pointed out. The earliest writings, the Pauline Epistles, regard baptism as a cleansing from sin and as the means whereby Christians join the life of Christ—which in Pauline thought is almost (and probably quite) identical with the gift of the Spirit. There is, however, no attempt to explain its working except that it was 'in the name of,' and so endued with the power of, the Lord Jesus Christ, who had been raised from the dead. In later documents the development of more than one line of thought may be traced. In the Pauline Epistles of doubtful authenticity emphasis is laid on the cleansing from sin given by the water of baptism, and the idea (already implied by the other Epistles) of regeneration is formulated. This development was rather in the direction of a magical conception of baptism. Against this we find traces of protest. (*a*) The writer of the Acts would seem to represent a school of thought which associated the gift of the Spirit with the laying on of the hands of the Apostles rather than with baptism itself. (*b*) In 1 Peter and perhaps in Hebrews emphasis is laid on a confession of faith by the baptized person, probably of a moral rather than a theological nature. It is possible that this is a protest against a magical view of 'the name' in baptism. (*c*) The writer of the Fourth Gospel is anxious to emphasize the importance of the gift of the Spirit rather than that of the water; obviously this is closely related to the line of thought represented by Acts; and if 1 Peter represents a protest against a magical view of 'the name,' these documents represent a protest against a magical view of the water. (*d*) A different line of development is testified to by the Epistle to the Hebrews and 1 John. As soon as baptism was regarded as the forgiveness of sin,—that is, from the beginning,—the question of sin after baptism must have arisen. Hebrews bears witness to, and protests against, a tendency to allow a repetition of baptism. The writer regards sin after baptism as beyond forgiveness. The writer of 1 John, on the other hand, bears witness to the fact that this teaching was already found to be too severe, and begins the distinction, so important for the later Church, between mortal and venial sin.

ii. *METHOD OF BAPTISM.*—On this point we have hardly any information in the NT. The language of Ro $6^{1ff.}$ is thought to point to immersion, and it is said that this is confirmed by the descriptions in the Gospels of the baptism of Christ; but these arguments cannot be pressed. It is still less safe to argue from the etymological meaning of *βαπτίζω* as a frequentative of *βάπτω*; for the meaning of words depends ultimately on use, not on etymology, and *βαπτίζω* means by use 'to wash ceremonially' (cf. Lk 11^{38} 'he wondered that he had not washed [*ἐβαπτίσθη*] before dinner'). Here partial ablution is certainly intended; and it must remain doubtful whether immersion was ever actually practised, though St. Paul's language certainly points to the view that it was regarded as an ideal. The formula used was 'in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ' or some synonymous phrase; there is no evidence for the use of the trine name. There was no doubt from the beginning a confession of faith by the convert, but the only probable reference to this as a formal part of the act of baptism is 1 P 3^{21} [the text of Ac 8^{37} in the AV is certainly late].

There is no indication of the baptism of children, and no suggestion that baptizing was the privilege of a class; but it would seem from 1 Co 1 that St. Paul delegated the office of baptizing to some one else, and Blass argues that this is implied by Ac 10^{48} 'And he (St. Peter) commanded them to be baptized in the name of Jesus Christ.' The suggestion is that he did not actually baptize them himself.

3. **Baptism in the 1st and 2nd centuries.**—i. *IN ORTHODOX CIRCLES.*—(1) BARNABAS.—The writer of Barnabas is interested in baptism only so far as it concerns his main thesis that the promises in the OT refer to the Christians and not to the Jews. In ch. 11 he illustrates this thesis from baptism. He argues that Is $16^{1f.}$ $45^{2ff.}$ $33^{16ff.}$, Ps 1^{3-6} are all prophecies which find a fulfilment in Christian baptism. It is only incidentally in the last paragraph (§ 11) that he gives any description of baptism: *καταβαίνομεν εἰς τὸ ὕδωρ γέμοντες ἁμαρτιῶν καὶ ῥύπου, καὶ ἀναβαίνομεν καρποφοροῦντες ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ τὸν φόβον καὶ τὴν ἐλπίδα εἰς τὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐν τῷ πνεύματι ἔχοντες.* This seems to imply immersion, but otherwise throws no light on baptismal practice. Doctrinally it shows that the writer regarded baptism as a 'real' cleansing from sin *opere operato*. It is possible that he regarded it as conferring the gift of the Spirit, and that this is the meaning of the phrase *ἐν τῷ πνεύματι*; but obviously this exegesis is open to doubt. Finally, the phrase *εἰς τὸν Ἰησοῦν* may be a reference to the baptismal formula, but the text is uncertain.

(2) I CLEMENT. — There is no reference to baptism in this document.

(3) IGNATIUS.—Nothing in the genuine epistles of Ignatius throws any light on the doctrine of baptism, but in accordance with his general emphasis on episcopal supremacy he insists that baptism may not be performed 'without the bishop'—*οὐκ ἐξόν ἐστιν χωρὶς τοῦ ἐπισκόπου . . . βαπτίζειν* (*Smyrn.* viii. 2)—which probably means without the permission of, rather than without the presence of, the bishop.

(4) HERMAS. —The *Shepherd* of Hermas gives little information as to the practice of baptism, but manifests a considerable interest in the doctrine. The passages which are important are *Vis.* iii. 3, iii. 7, *Mand.* iv. 3, *Sim.* ix. 16. The foundation, he says, is a belief in the necessity and efficacy of baptism. In *Vis.* iii. 2 the Church is represented as a tower built over water, and in iii. 3 it is explained that this is because *ἡ ζωὴ ὑμῶν*

διὰ ὕδατος ἐσώθη καὶ σωθήσεται. This must mean that baptism is the foundation of the Christian life, and the next sentence may be a reference to the baptismal formula: τεθεμελίωται δὲ ὁ πύργος τῷ ῥήματι τοῦ παντοκράτορος καὶ ἐνδόξου ὀνόματος. This is rendered probable by the fact that in *Sim.* ix. the condition of entry is described as the 'name of the Son of God.' It is also clear that baptism was regarded as really effecting an essential change in Christians; and from the emphasis which is laid upon it, it would seem that this was regarded as primarily due to 'the name'; but the water is also mentioned. The most important passage is *Sim.* ix. 16. 3 f.:

πρὶν γάρ, φησί, φορέσαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ νεκρός ἐστιν· ὅταν δὲ λάβῃ τὴν σφραγῖδα, ἀποτίθεται τὴν νέκρωσιν καὶ ἀναλαμβάνει τὴν ζωήν. ἡ σφραγὶς οὖν τὸ ὕδωρ ἐστίν· εἰς τὸ ὕδωρ οὖν καταβαίνουσι νεκροὶ καὶ ἀναβαίνουσι ζῶντες.

But this strongly defined doctrine naturally called for development on various points.

(*a*) There was the danger of a purely magical and unethical view of baptism. To counteract this, in *Sim.* ix. great emphasis is laid on the insufficiency of 'the name' if it be not accompanied by the Christian virtues. These are represented as twelve virgins, and the explanation given of them in *Sim.* ix. 13. 2 is that they are ἅγια πνεύματα. Without being endued with them no one can enter the kingdom of God—ἐὰν γὰρ τὸ ὄνομα μόνον λάβῃς, τὸ δὲ ἔνδυμα παρὰ τούτων μὴ λάβῃς, οὐδὲν ὠφελήσῃ· αὗται γὰρ αἱ παρθένοι δυνάμεις εἰσὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ. ἐὰν τὸ ὄνομα φορῇς, τὴν δὲ δύναμιν μὴ φορῇς αὐτοῦ, εἰς μάτην ἔσῃ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ φορῶν.

(*b*) A natural result of the emphasis laid on the insufficiency of baptism without virtue was a proportionately increased emphasis on the question as to sin after baptism which (cf. § 2 i. (*b*)) seems to be discussed in Hebrews and to be implied in 1 John. The distinction between various sins which appears in 1 John is unknown, and the position adopted in Hebrews, though substantially confirmed, is in some degree relaxed. This question is dealt with in *Mand.* iv. 3. Hermas asks the Shepherd ἤκουσα, φημί, κύριε, παρά τινων διδασκάλων ὅτι ἑτέρα μετάνοια οὐκ ἔστιν εἰ μὴ ἐκείνη, ὅτε εἰς ὕδωρ κατέβημεν καὶ ἐλάβομεν ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν τῶν προτέρων (considering that Hermas is a Roman document, and that the earliest witness to Hebrews is the earlier Roman document I Clement, it is not impossible that this is a reference to Hebrews 6[4-6]) and the answer is καλῶς ἤκουσας, οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ἔδει γὰρ τὸν εἰληφότα ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν μηκέτι ἁμαρτάνειν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἁγνείᾳ κατοικεῖν. This is simply a re-affirmation of the doctrine of Hebrews, but a relaxation is then introduced. God has instituted μετάνοιαν, and has appointed the Shepherd as the angel to watch over it; but this may be used only once—μετὰ τὴν κλῆσιν ἐκείνην τὴν μεγάλην καὶ σεμνὴν ἐάν τις ἐκπειρασθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ διαβόλου ἁμάρτῃ μίαν μετάνοιαν ἔχει. One of the main objects of the Shepherd seems to have been the emphasizing of μετάνοια, which is clearly (cf. esp. the *Similitudes*) regarded in a concrete way which approached the later ecclesiastical use, and is half-way to meaning 'penance.'

(*c*) Another result in practice of the assertion of the high standard of Christian life, and the danger of relapse after baptism, was a tendency to postpone baptism. Against this Hermas protests in *Vis.* iii. 7, where those who shrink from baptism for this reason are compared with the stones which he saw in *Vis.* iii, 2: πίπτοντας ἐγγὺς ὑδάτων καὶ μὴ δυναμένους κυλισθῆναι καὶ ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὸ ὕδωρ.

(*d*) In the sphere of doctrine a natural consequence of the stress laid on the necessity of baptism was inquiry into the ultimate fate of the righteous unbaptized dead. Hermas settled this inquiry by ascribing to the apostles the function of baptizing in Hades (cf. esp. *Sim.* ix. 16. 5 and 6: οἱ ἀπόστολοι καὶ οἱ διδάσκαλοι οἱ κηρύξαντες τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ, κοιμηθέντες ἐν δυνάμει καὶ πίστει τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐκήρυξαν καὶ τοῖς προκεκοιμημένοις, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔδωκαν αὐτοῖς τὴν σφραγῖδα τοῦ κηρύγματος. . . . ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ γὰρ ἐκοιμήθησαν καὶ ἐν μεγάλῃ ἁγνείᾳ· μόνον δὲ τὴν σφραγῖδα ταύτην οὐκ εἶχον).

(5) THE DIDACHE.—In this document there is no information as to the doctrine of baptism, but much concerning the practice, and it is unfortunate that there is no possibility of fixing either its date or provenance with certainty. The passage which actually deals with baptism is ch. vii., and runs thus:

Περὶ δὲ τοῦ βαπτίσματος, οὕτω βαπτίσατε· ταῦτα πάντα προειπόντες βαπτίσατε εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος ἐν ὕδατι ζῶντι. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἔχῃς ὕδωρ ζῶν, εἰς ἄλλο ὕδωρ βάπτισον· εἰ δ' οὐ δύνασαι ἐν ψυχρῷ, ἐν θερμῷ. ἐὰν δὲ ἀμφότερα μὴ ἔχῃς, ἔγχεον εἰς τὴν κεφαλὴν τρὶς ὕδωρ εἰς ὄνομα πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου πνεύματος. πρὸ δὲ τοῦ βαπτίσματος προνηστευσάτω ὁ βαπτίζων καὶ ὁ βαπτιζόμενος καὶ εἴ τινες ἄλλοι δύνανται· κελεύεις δὲ νηστεῦσαι τὸν βαπτιζόμενον πρὸ μιᾶς ἢ δύο.

The main points in the ceremony thus described seem to be these:

(*a*) The recitation of the previous part of the *Didache* (the 'Two Ways'). This seems to imply a developed system of preparation for candidates for baptism, of a moral rather than a theological kind.

(*b*) Baptism in the trine name. But it must be noted that in the following Eucharistic section mention is made of those who are baptized 'into the name of the Lord.'

(*c*) Immersion, by preference in running (ζῶν) water, is the rule, but affusion is recognized as legitimate.

(*d*) Previous to the ceremony, the baptizer, the baptizand, and any other who will are to fast.

It is probable that this document belongs to the 2nd cent., perhaps to the earlier half; but the evidence is not conclusive, and one must not regard arguments based on the 'Two Ways' as valid for the dating of the *Didache* as a whole.

(6) II CLEMENT.—In II Clement vi. 9, vii. 6, and viii. 5–6 there are three indirect references to baptism, which is spoken of as the seal (σφραγίς). They are all concerned with emphasizing the necessity of sinless life after baptism, and so form one of the links between this document and Hermas; but they are only homiletic, and do not throw any light on the question of repentance after baptism.

The use of σφραγίς, which afterwards became very common, has sometimes been traced to the influence of the Mysteries; but this is probably not the case—at least directly. More than any other expression it emphasizes the eschatological hope which was never far from the early Christian mind: those who had the correct seal would pass into the Messianic Kingdom at the day of judgment. It thus helped to unite the two—logically somewhat inconsistent—ideas of sacramental and eschatological salvation. Passages of importance, besides those in II Clem., are Hermas, *Sim.* viii. 6, ix. 16; Clem. Al. *Quis Deus salv.* 39. 42, *Strom.* ii. 3, *Exc. Th.* 83. 86, *Ecl. Proph.* 25: and in later writers, *Clem. Hom.* xvi. 19; *Acta Theclæ*, 25; *Const. Apost.* 2. 14, 39, 3. 16; Hippol. *de Antichristo*, 6. 59; Ps.-Hippol. *de Consumm.* 42; *Acta Philippi*, 28; Eus. *HE* 6. 5, 6, *Vit. Const.* 4. 62. 1. See also Hatch, *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 295 ff.; Anrich, *Das antike Mysterienwesen*, p. 120 f.; and Gebhardt and Harnack, *Patres Apost.*, note on II Clem. vi. 6.

(7) JUSTIN MARTYR.—In his first *Apology* (*c.* 150) Justin gives (ch. 61 ff.) a description of Christian baptism. It may be best treated as falling under three heads: (*a*) a description of the rite, (*b*) an exposition of the doctrine concerning it, and (*c*) a justification of this doctrine.

(*a*) *Description of the rite.*—This is given in ch. 61. 65:

Ὅσοι ἂν πεισθῶσι καὶ πιστεύσωσιν ἀληθῆ ταῦτα τὰ ὑφ' ἡμῶν διδασκόμενα καὶ λεγόμενα εἶναι, καὶ βιοῦν οὕτως δύνασθαι ὑπισχνῶνται, εὔχεσθαί τε καὶ αἰτεῖν νηστεύοντες παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ προημαρτημένων ἄφεσιν διδάσκονται, ἡμῶν συνευχομένων καὶ συννηστευόντων αὐτοῖς. ἔπειτα ἀγονται ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἔνθα ὕδωρ ἐστί, καὶ τρόπον ἀναγεννήσεως, ὃν καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ ἀναγεννήθημεν, ἀναγεννῶνται. ἐπ' ὀνόματος γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν ὅλων καὶ τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ πνεύματος ἁγίου τὸ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι τότε λουτρὸν ποιοῦνται . . . (c. 65) ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ τὸ οὕτως λοῦσαι τὸν πεπεισμένον καὶ συγκατατεθειμένον ἐπὶ τοὺς λεγομένους ἀδελφοὺς ἀγομεν, ἔνθα συνηγμένοι εἰσί, κοινὰς εὐχὰς ποιησόμενοι ὑπέρ τε ἑαυτῶν καὶ τοῦ φωτισθέντος καὶ ἄλλων πανταχοῦ πάντων εὐτόνως, ὅπως καταξιωθῶμεν τὰ ἀληθῆ μαθόντες καὶ δι' ἔργων ἀγαθοὶ πολιτευταὶ καὶ φύλακες τῶν ἐντεταλμένων εὑρεθῆναι, ὅπως τὴν αἰώνιον σωτηρίαν σωθῶμεν. Ἀλλήλους φιλήματι ἀσπαζόμεθα παυσάμενοι τῶν εὐχῶν . . . and then follows an account of the Eucharist, which was immediately celebrated.

The important points in this description are the definite allusion to a period of instruction preceding baptism; the trine formula; the 'moral' vow; and the obviously developed character of the service. It is also usually thought, probably rightly, that the opening words of the description imply a reference to a definite creed; if so, this may perhaps be identified with an early form of the *Symbolum Romanum*, to which some critics see allusions in *I Apol.* 13, 21, 31, 42, 46, 52, in *Dial.* 32, and in some other passages which are collected in Gebhardt and Harnack's *Patres Apost.* 1. 2, p. 128 ff. Negatively it is remarkable that there is no allusion to the laying on of hands, such as is prominent in Acts, or to any connexion of baptism with the bishops, such as is found in Ignatius. The agreement with the *Didache*, both negatively and positively, is remarkable.

(*b*) *The doctrine of baptism.*—Justin regards baptism chiefly as a new birth, and in the passage quoted above refers to it as ἀναγέννησις. He also regards it as a forgiveness for past sin; and he

expresses his doctrine (apparently using some older source, see below) on this point in ch. 61:

ἐπειδὴ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν ἡμῶν ἀγνοοῦντες κατ' ἀνάγκην γεγεννήμεθα ἐξ ὑγρᾶς σπορᾶς κατὰ μίξιν τὴν τῶν γονέων πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἐν ἔθεσι φαύλοις καὶ πονηραῖς ἀνατροφαῖς γεγόναμεν, ὅπως μὴ ἀνάγκης τέκνα μηδὲ ἀγνοίας μένωμεν, ἀλλὰ προαιρέσεως καὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἀφέσεως δὲ ἁμαρτιῶν ὑπὲρ ὧν προημάρτομεν τύχωμεν ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, ἐπονομάζεται τῷ ὕδατι τῷ ἐλομένῳ ἀναγεννηθῆναι καὶ μετανοήσαντι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἡμαρτημένοις τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν ὅλων καὶ δεσπότου θεοῦ ὄνομα, κ.τ.λ.

Thus, if one may press his words, he seems to have connected forgiveness especially with the water, and the new life with 'the name.' It was, however, the name that gave the water the power to remove sin. Justin also regarded baptism as bestowing the gift of the Spirit. In *Dial.* 29 he says: τίς ἐκείνου (*i.e.* Jewish) τοῦ βαπτίσματος χρεία ἁγίῳ πνεύματι βεβαπτισμένῳ. Also, at the conclusion of the passage just quoted from ch. 61, he describes baptism as an 'enlightenment' (καλεῖται δὲ τοῦτο τὸ λουτρὸν φωτισμός, ὡς φωτιζομένων τὴν διάνοιαν τῶν ταῦτα μανθανόντων).

(*c*) *Justification of baptism.*—The correctness of the doctrine and practice of baptism is proved by Justin by an appeal to the OT, to the words of Christ, and to Apostolic tradition. The necessity of regeneration is proved by the saying of Christ, ἂν μὴ ἀναγεννηθῆτε οὐ μὴ εἰσέλθητε εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν, which seems to be a free quotation of Jn 3[3]. That this regeneration can be effected by baptism is proved by Is 1[16-20] 'Wash you, make you clean,' etc.; and the explanation of the way in which this was effected is introduced by καὶ λόγον δὲ εἰς τοῦτο παρὰ τῶν ἀποστόλων ἐμάθομεν τοῦτον, and then follows the passage quoted above (*Apol.* 61). It is remarkable that it is to this λόγος, and not to Mt 28[19], that Justin turns for a justification of the trine formula.

Besides this direct justification, Justin uses a curious argument from heathen religion. His view was that this was the result of demonic attempts to deceive the world by producing false fulfilments of prophecy. This theory he applied to the whole of Christian and heathen systems, which represented the true and false fulfilment of OT prophecy. Thus the lustrations of the Greeks were demonic recognition of the truth of baptismal doctrine.

(8) IRENÆUS.—This writer nowhere gives an account of the practice of baptism, but his doctrine concerning it is expressed positively in the Ἀπόδειξις τοῦ ἀποστολικοῦ κηρύγματος and negatively in his *adversus Hæreses*, while from these passages it is also possible to find some reference to the practice of the Church in his time.

In the Ἀπόδειξις, ch. 3 (*TU* xxxi. 1), he says:

'The Faith . . . as the Presbyters, the disciples of the Apostles, have delivered it to us . . . above all teaches us that we have received baptism for the forgiveness of sins in the name of God the Father, and in the name of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, who was incarnate, died, and rose again, and in the Holy Spirit of God; and that this baptism is the seal of eternal life, and the regeneration to God, by which we become the children, not of mortal man, but of the eternal and everlasting God.'

In ch. 7 he explains why the trine formula was necessary:

'And therefore the baptism of our regeneration takes place through these three points, because God the Father blesses us with regeneration through the Holy Spirit by means of His Son. For those who bear the Spirit of God in themselves are led to the Word, that is, to the Son, but the Son leads them to the Father, and the Father lets them receive incorruptibility. Therefore without the Spirit it is impossible to see the Word of God, and without the Son no one can approach the Father. For the recognition of the Father is the Son, and the recognition of the Son is through the Holy Spirit, but the Son gives the Spirit, in accordance with His function, following the good pleasure of the Father, to those whom the Father will have and as the Father will.'

This positive statement is borne out by the negative statements in the *adversus Hæreses*. In III. xviii. 1 (ed. Harvey) he refers to baptism as the *potestatem regenerationis in Deum*, and identifies it with the gift of the Holy Spirit. Similarly in I. xiv., when speaking of the Marcosian heresy in relation to baptism, he implies that baptism is the ἀπολύτρωσις τοῦ Χριστοῦ κατελθόντος, which the Marcosians regarded as a separate rite, though his own phrase is again τοῦ βαπτίσματος τῆς εἰς θεὸν ἀναγεννήσεως.

The two important pieces of information concerning the practice of baptism conveyed in these passages are (1) the use of the trine formula, which for the first time is connected definitely with Mt 28[19]; and (2) the use of a Confession of Faith, as distinct from any moral or ethical vow. The allusions to this Confession in *adversus Hæreses*, I. i. 20 and I. ii. 1 identify it with an early form of the *Symbolum Romanum*; and the passage quoted above from the Ἀπόδειξις, ch. 3, suggests that Irenæus derived it from the teaching of those Presbyters of Asia Minor to whom he so often alludes. The fact mentioned above (7), that Justin also seems to show signs of a knowledge of the *Symbolum Romanum*, suggests that the λόγος of the Apostles to which he alludes in *Apol.* i. 61 may be the same writing or tradition of the Presbyters as that referred to by Irenæus.

(9) TERTULLIAN.—This writer tells us more about the practice and doctrine of baptism than any previous authority.

(*a*) *The practice.*—This is summed up in *de Corona*, 3:

'Aquam adituri ibidem sed et aliquanto prius in ecclesia sub antistitis manu contestamur nos renuntiare diabolo et pompæ et angelis ejus. Dehinc ter mergitamur amplius aliquid respondentes quam dominus in evangelio determinavit. Inde suscepti lactis et mellis concordiam prægustamus, exque ea die lavacro quotidiano per totam hebdomadem abstinemus.'

But this sketch was not intended to be complete, being given only as a proof that catholic practice outran Scripture, and must be supplemented by numerous allusions in other books. From these we can form the following scheme for the practice of baptism in the Church of Africa in the time of Tertullian.

(α) There was a preliminary period of preparation by fasting, vigils, and confession (cf. *de Bapt.* 20: 'Ingressuros baptismum orationibus crebris jejuniis et geniculationibus et pervigiliis orare oportet et cum confessione omnium retro delictorum').

(β) A public renunciation of the devil before the head of the community (*antistes*) followed (cf. *de Cor.* 3), at which sponsors or a sponsor were also present (*de Bapt.* 18). This 'renunciatio' seems to take the place of the moral vow implied by 1 Peter, Justin Martyr, and the *Didache*. As it is practically certain that Tertullian was acquainted with the *Symbolum Apostolicum*, it is probable that this also formed part of the baptismal rite; but there appears to be no definite statement to that effect in Tertullian.

(γ) The name of God was invoked on the water, in order to give it the power of sanctifying those who were baptized (*de Bapt.* 4): see passages quoted below.

(δ) Trine immersion in the trine name (cf. *de Cor.* 3 6c and *adv. Prax.* 26: 'nam nec semel sed ter ad singula nomina in personas singulas tinguimur').

(ε) Immediately after coming out of the water unction was administered (*de Bapt.* 7: 'Exinde egressi de lavacro perunguimur benedicta unctione de pristina disciplina, qua ungui oleo de cornu in sacerdotio solebant,' etc.).

(ζ) There followed the laying on of hands (*de Bapt.* 8): 'Dehinc manus imponitur per benedictionem advocans et invitans spiritum sanctum').

(η) After this there was a ceremonial tasting of milk and honey (*de Cor.* 3: 'Inde suscepti lactis et mellis concordiam prægustamus,' and *adv. Marc.* I. 14: 'sed ille quidem usque nunc nec aquam reprobavit creatoris qua suos abluit . . . nec mellis et lactis societatem qua suos infantat'), followed by abstinence from washing for the whole of the next week (*de Cor.* 3: 'exque ea die lavacro quotidiano per totam hebdomadem abstinemus'). The minister of this ceremony was usually the bishop or, with his sanction, the presbyters and deacons; but this was a 'right of order' not 'of necessity,' and every Christian man (but not woman) might baptize in case of need (*de Bapt.* 17: 'Dandi quidem habet jus summus sacerdos qui est episcopus; dehinc presbyteri et diaconi, non tamen sine episcopi auctoritate, propter ecclesiæ honorem, quo salvo salva pax est. Alioquin etiam laicis jus est. Quod enim ex æquo accipitur ex æquo dari potest . . . proinde et baptismus æque dei census ab omnibus exerceri potest'). No special time was necessary for baptism, but Easter and Whitsun were especially suitable (*de Bapt.* 19: 'Diem baptismo sollemniorem Pascha

præstat . . . exinde Pentecoste ordinandis lavacris lætissimum spatium est. . . . Ceterum omnis dies domini est, omnis hora, omne tempus habile baptismo; si de sollemnitate interest, de gratia nihil refert').

(*b*) *The doctrine of baptism.*—Tertullian's views, though in the main the same as those of earlier writers, show a development on certain points. Baptism is the source of salvation and of forgiveness of sins, a regeneration, and a gift of the Holy Spirit. But the following points are elaborated:—

(*a*) The question is raised in the *de Baptismo* 3–6 why and how sanctification was to be found in baptism. The answer given by Tertullian is too long to quote in full, but the argument is as follows:—There was from the beginning a special affinity between water and the spirit, which had hovered over it at the Creation (Gn 1^2), and the same spirit returns to the water if God be invoked, and so gives it the power of imparting sanctification. He argues that there is no reason for doubting this, seeing that it is generally recognized that water is frequently the means by which evil spirits entrap unwary men. Moreover the incident of the pool of Bethsaida (Bethesda) in Jn 5^{1-9} led him to think that the sanctification of the water was effected by an angel who descended for the purpose. It is not plain, nor is it for the present purpose material, how far Tertullian identified this angel with the Spirit itself (cf. Adam, 'Lehre v. d. hl. Geist in Hermas und Tertullian' in the *Theol. Quartalschrift*, Jan. 1906).

(*β*) The distinction between cleansing from sin and the gift of the Spirit, which is made in Acts, is emphasized, and a further distinction is introduced between the cleansing of the soul and of the body. The body is cleansed from sin by the water, the soul by the 'answer' of the candidate (*de Resurr. Carn.* 48 [where it is argued that baptism implies a resurrection of the flesh]: 'anima enim non lavatione sed responsione sancitur'). The gift of the Spirit in baptism is connected with the laying on of hands and not with the water (*de Bapt.* 6 and 8: 'non quod in aquis spiritum sanctum consequamur, sed in aqua emundati sub angelo spiritui sancto præparamur . . . dehinc manus imponitur. . . . Tunc ille sanctissimus spiritus super emundata et benedicta corpora libens a patre descendit . . .'). The 'benedicta' in the last phrase explains the meaning attached by Tertullian to the unction: it blessed the body (and sacramentally the soul) of the candidate just as the water cleansed it, and so prepared it for the gift of the Spirit.

(*γ*) Tertullian held strong views as to the proper recipients of baptism. These were due to his belief that sin after baptism was either unforgivable (only martyrdom could atone for some sins [cf. *de Pud.* 9]), or at least exceedingly dangerous (cf. *e.g. de Bapt.* 8: 'Itaque igni [*sc.* mundus] destinatur, sicut et homo qui post baptismum delicta restaurat'). The result was that he objected to child baptism as dangerous both to the child and to the sponsors (*de Bapt.* 18: 'Itaque pro cuiusque personæ condicione ac dispositione etiam ætate cunctatio baptismi utilior est, præcipue tamen circa parvulos . . .'). For the same reason he dissuaded the unmarried and widows from baptism (*de Bapt.* 18: 'non minore de causa innupti quoque procrastinandi in quibus tentatio præparata est tam virginibus per maturitatem quam viduis per vacationem, donec aut nubant aut continentiæ corroborentur'). The suggestion of his words is that he would not countenance the marriage of the baptized, a position maintained later on in Edessa by Aphraates, but was willing to baptize those who were already married—unlike Marcion, who would consent to baptize only those who were unmarried or had divorced their wives.

(*δ*) In two passages (*de Resurr. Carn.* 48, and *adv. Marcion.* *b.* 10) Tertullian speaks of the reference in 1 Co 15^{29} to a baptism for the dead. In the former place he uses it as an argument for the resurrection of the flesh: 'certe illa præsumptione hoc eos instituisse contendit qua alii etiam carni ut vicarium baptisma profuturum existimarent ad spem resurrectionis, quæ nisi corporalis non alias sic baptismate corporali obligaretur.' Here there is nothing to show whether Tertullian was actually acquainted with a vicarious baptism for the dead, but the suggestion of the other passage is that he had no such knowledge. Here he uses the same argument in favour of a material resurrection, but prefaces the following obscure statement: 'quid, ait, facient qui pro mortuis baptizantur si mortui non resurgunt? Viderit institutio illa. Kalendæ si forte Februariæ respondebunt illi pro mortuis petere. Noli ergo apostolum novum statim auctorem aut confirmatorem eius denotare, ut tanto magis sisteret carnis resurrectionem, quanto illi qui vane pro mortuis baptizarentur fide resurrectionis hoc facerent.' In view of the generally affirmative sense of 'si forte' in Tertullian, it seems probable that he means that St. Paul was using an argument from the Roman custom of special sacrifices for the departed (cf. Oehler's note, *ad loc.*), and this renders it improbable that Tertullian was acquainted with any contemporary Christian custom of baptism for the dead.

(*ε*) The question of heretical baptism first appears in Tertullian. He did not recognize it as in any sense valid, and a heretic who afterwards joined the Church was re-baptized (*de Pud.* 19: 'unde et apud nos ut ethnico par immo et super ethnicum hæreticus etiam per baptisma veritatis utroque homine purgatus admittitur'; *de Bapt.* 15: 'Hæretici autem nullum habent consortium nostræ disciplinæ, quos extraneos utique testatur ipsa ademptio communicationis. Non debeo in illis cognoscere quod mihi est præceptum, quia non idem deus est nobis et illis, nec unus Christus, id est idem, ideoque nec baptismus unus quia non idem, quem cum rite non habent sine dubio non habent . . .'; cf. also *de Præscr. Hær.* 12). It should be noted that the *de Baptismo* probably belongs to the pre-Montanist period of Tertullian, while the *de Pud.* is Montanist.

(10) CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA.—Clement does not so frequently discuss baptism as do some of the other writers, but his standpoint seems to be similar to theirs. The chief passages in which he deals with baptism are in the *Pædagogus*. He draws a parallel between the baptism of Christ and that of Christians, and claims that each had the same effect. Christ, on the side of His human nature, was regenerated in baptism and made perfect by the regeneration; so also with Christians: *τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ συμβαίνει τοῦτο καὶ περὶ ἡμᾶς, ὧν γέγονεν ὑπογραφὴ ὁ κύριος· βαπτιζόμενοι φωτιζόμεθα, φωτιζόμενοι υἱοποιούμεθα, υἱοποιούμενοι τελειούμεθα, τελειούμενοι ἀπαθανατιζόμεθα 'ἐγώ' φησί 'εἶπα, θεοί ἐστε καὶ υἱοὶ ὑψίστου πάντες'· καλεῖται δὲ πολλαχῶς τὸ ἔργον τοῦτο, χάρισμα καὶ φώτισμα καὶ τέλεον καὶ λουτρόν* (*Pæd.* 1. 6, the whole of which chapter is important for defining Clement's attitude).

But Clement's chief interest was directed to proving not so much that baptism was the beginning of the new life as that it was complete, in opposition to the Gnostics, who introduced a series of stages. Of course, Clement did not mean to exclude the idea of progress, but only to assert that baptism was the dividing line between two states essentially differing from each other. Probably the doctrine of Tertullian as to the relation between the water and the Spirit would not have been strange to Clement. He argues that there is a special reason for water in baptism, because of its power of mixing with milk, which represents the Logos, and thinks that the union of the Logos with baptism is similar to that of milk with water: *καὶ ἡν ὁ Λόγος ἔχει πρὸς τὸ βάπτισμα κοινωνίαν, ταύτην ἔχει τὸ γάλα τὴν συναλλαγὴν πρὸς τὸ ὕδωρ, δέχεται γὰρ μόνον τῶν ὑγρῶν τοῦτο καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸ ὕδωρ μίξιν ἐπὶ κάθαρσιν παραλαμβανόμενον καθάπερ τὸ βάπτισμα ἐπὶ ἀφέσει ἁμαρτιῶν* (*Pæd.* 1. 6, p. 120, ed. Stählin).

Similarly in *Protrep.* 10 (p. 72, ed. Stählin) he speaks of the *ὕδωρ λογικόν*. Yet it must be admitted that it is not easy to say precisely what was Clement's view as to the exact relation between symbols and their signification; there is room for a good monograph on his sacramental doctrine.

Clement, like Tertullian, did not recognize the baptism of heretics as genuine. This is proved by an exegesis of Pr 9^{18a}: *εἶτα ἐπιφωνεῖ 'οὕτω γὰρ διαβήσῃ ὕδωρ ἀλλότριον' τὸ βάπτισμα αἱρετικὸν οὐκ οἰκεῖον καὶ γνήσιον ὕδωρ λογιζομένη* (*Strom.* I. 19, p. 62, ed. Stählin).

On the question of repentance after baptism, Clement takes a much more lenient position than Tertullian or even Hermas. In the *Quis dives salvetur* (chs. 39–42) he devotes a long argument to proving that genuine repentance and consequent salvation is never too late, and supports it by the long and well-known story of St. John and the brigand captain.

ii. *AMONG HERETICS.*—(1) MENANDER.—Menander, who, according to Irenæus, was the successor of Simon Magus, attributed to baptism the power of conferring immortality.

Cf. Iren. I. 17: 'Resurrectionem enim per id quod est in eum baptisma accipere ejus discipulos et ultra non posse mori sed perseverare non senescentes et immortales,' and Tert. *de Anima*, 50: 'Menandri Samaritani furor conspuatur dicentis mortem ad suos non modo non pertinere, verum nec pervenire. In hoc scilicet se a superna et arcana potestate legatum, ut immortales et incorruptibiles et statim resurrectionis compotes fiant qui baptisma ejus induerint.'

It is, however, difficult to think that a view of this kind could have long endured; that baptism, in a certain sense, conveyed immortality was a generally received Christian teaching, and possibly Menander did not mean much more than this.

(2) THE VALENTINIANS.—The main authority for the doctrine of these heretics is the *Excerpta Theodoti* of Clement of Alexandria. The whole passage, *Exc. Theod.* 76–86, is most instructive, and is the most important extant passage for deter-

mining the doctrine of baptism as it existed among the Valentinians, or, indeed, any other heretics, for it differs from the evidence of almost all other writers in being extracted from heretical writings, and not from orthodox polemical books.

Baptism is an *ἀναγέννησις*. By its means we are born into the world dominated by Father, Son, and Spirit, and so become superior to all other powers. It is also a death to the previous life; but this refers to the soul (*ψυχή*), not to the body (*σῶμα*). Up to the time of baptism man is under the control of Fate (*εἱμαρμένη*), but by baptism and *γνῶσις* he is released from this control, and the verdict of astrologers (which is recognized as valid for the rest of mankind) is rendered unimportant. The baptized person is, through regeneration by Christ, taken up into the Ogdoad. It was further explained that as the water of baptism quenched *τὸ αἰσθητὸν πῦρ*, the invisible part could quench the *νοητὸν πῦρ*. So far as the rite is concerned, we are told that fasting and prayer are desirable before baptism in order to prevent the entrance of evil spirits in addition to the Holy Spirit. From ch. 22 of the *Excerpta Theodoti* it also appears that the rite of baptism contained an imposition of hands, and that the formula used ended with the phrase *εἰς λύτρωσιν ἀγγελικήν* (for a formula used by the Marcosians containing this phrase see below). The doctrine underlying this is that the angels, with whom we are in some way connected, have been baptized for us; and this explanation is given to 1 Co 15[29]—in which the 'they' refers to the angels, and 'the dead' for whom they are baptized is mankind.

(3) THE MARCOSIANS.—The authorities for these heretics are Irenæus and Hippolytus. They belonged to the Valentinian school, and, like the class of heretics who are represented later in a more developed form by the Pistis Sophia, did not merely, as Marcion, allow a repetition of baptism in case of sin, but had actually two forms differing from each other in function. Their first baptism was not a means of regeneration; it merely had the negative function of the forgiveness of sin, and is described in Iren. I. xiv. 1 as a baptism *τοῦ φαινομένου Ἰησοῦ ἀφέσεως ἁμαρτιῶν*. The second baptism was called *ἀπολύτρωσις*, and according to Hippolytus was regarded as raising those who participated in it above the power of sin, even though they committed it (. . . *εὐκόλους μὲν εἶναι διδάξας πρὸς τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν, ἀκινδύνους δὲ διὰ τὸ εἶναι τῆς τελείας δυνάμεως, καὶ μετέχειν τῆς ἀνεννοήτου ἐξουσίας, οἷς καὶ μετὰ τὸ βάπτισμα ἕτερον ἐπαγγέλλονται ὃ καλοῦσιν ἀπολύτρωσιν* . . . Hippol. *Refut.* vi. 41). The justification for this was found, as Marcion found his for a renewed baptism, in Lk 12[50] ('I have a baptism,' etc.); and the references in the Epistles to an *ἀπολύτρωσις ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ* were explained as references to this sacrament (Iren. *l.c.*). This 'redemption' was regarded as the same as that of the Spirit which entered Jesus at His baptism, and was the power of regeneration and of entrance into the Pleroma (*λέγουσι δὲ αὐτὴν ἀναγκαίαν εἶναι τοῖς τὴν τέλειαν γνῶσιν εἰληφόσιν, ἵνα εἰς τὴν ὑπὲρ πάντα δύναμιν ὧσιν ἀναγεγεννημένοι· ἄλλως γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἐντὸς πληρώματος εἰσελθεῖν, ἐπειδὴ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ εἰς τὸ βάθος [τοῦ βύθου] κατάγουσα αὐτούς*, Iren. *l.c.*).

As to the rite itself there seems to have been no uniformity of practice. Irenæus distinguishes seven varieties, and leaves it quite uncertain what was the relationship subsisting between them (Iren. I. xiv. 2).

The seven varieties are as follows: (*a*) A ceremony referred to as a spiritual marriage. There is no definite statement that a water-baptism formed part of it, and perhaps the contrary is to be inferred from the general drift of Irenæus's language. (*b*) A ceremony of baptism with the formula *Εἰς ὄνομα ἀγνώστου πατρὸς τῶν ὅλων, εἰς ἀλήθειαν μητέρα πάντων, εἰς τὸν κατελθόντα εἰς Ἰησοῦν, εἰς ἕνωσιν καὶ ἀπολύτρωσιν καὶ κοινωνίαν τῶν δυνάμεων*. (*c*) In another circle a Hebrew or Syriac formula was used, of which the text is very corrupt in Irenæus, but the meaning, according to Harvey's re-construction, was 'in the name of the Wisdom of the Father, and of Light, which is called the Spirit of Holiness, for the Angelic Redemption.' It is not stated whether this formula was used in connexion with water; but it probably was. (*d*) Irenæus gives an important extract from the rites of a fourth, but his meaning is not clear, and the Syriac words are difficult to re-construct (see Harvey's note); it is therefore best to give the text: *Ἄλλοι δὲ πάλιν τὴν λύτρωσιν ἐπιλέγουσιν οὕτως· τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ἀποκεκρυμμένον ἀπὸ πάσης θεότητος, καὶ κυριότητος, καὶ ἀληθείας, ὃ ἐνεδύσατο Ἰησοῦς ὁ Ναζαρηνὸς ἐν ταῖς ζωαῖς τοῦ φωτὸς τοῦ Χριστοῦ, Χριστοῦ ζῶντος διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου εἰς λύτρωσιν ἀγγελικήν. Ὄνομα τὸ τῆς καταστάσεως· Μεσσία οὐφαρὲν ναμεμψαιμὰν χαλδαίαν μοσομηδαία ἀκφρανὰ ψαούα Ἰησοῦ Ναζαρία. καὶ τούτων δὲ ἑρμηνεία ἐστὶ τοιαύτη· οὐ διαιρῶ τὸ πνεῦμα, τὴν καρδίαν καὶ τὴν ὑπερουράνιον δύναμιν τὴν οἰκτίρμονα· ὀναίμην τοῦ ὀνόματός σου, Σωτὴρ ἀληθείας. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἐπιλέγουσιν οἱ αὐτοὶ τελοῦντες. Ὁ δὲ τετελεσμένος ἀποκρίνεται· ἐστήριγμαι, καὶ λελύτρωμαι, καὶ λυτροῦμαι τὴν ψυχήν μου ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου, καὶ πάντων τῶν παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι τοῦ Ἰαώ, ὃς ἐλυτρώσατο τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ εἰς ἀπολύτρωσιν ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ τῷ ζῶντι. Εἶτα ἐπιλέγουσιν οἱ παρόντες· Εἰρήνη πᾶσιν, ἐφ' οὓς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο ἐπαναπαύεται· ἔπειτα μυρίζουσι τὸν τετελεσμένον τῷ ὀπῷ τῷ ἀπὸ βαλσάμου [τῷ ὀποβαλσάμῳ]· τὸ γὰρ μύρον τοῦτο τύπον τῆς ὑπὲρ τὰ ὅλα εὐωδίας εἶναι λέγουσιν.* Whatever the precise meaning of this extract may be, it is clear that the service bore a marked resemblance to Catholic practice. There is the use of a formula 'in the name of'; a service of question and answer alternating between the administrator and the recipient of the rite; unction; and apparently at an earlier part of the ceremony water-baptism. This last point is rendered probable by the beginning of the next section. (*e*) A fifth party rejected water, but used instead an unguent of water and oil, with a formula similar to those given above, and also using balsam. (*f*) A sixth party rejected the whole of the outward ceremony, and said that knowledge alone was the true Redemption. (*g*) Finally, there were those who in other respects seem to have agreed with those mentioned above as the fifth party, but deferred baptism until after death. Epiphanius perhaps thought that this must mean 'in articulo mortis' (Epiph. xxxvi. 2), but the text of the Latin Irenæus is clear: 'Alii sunt qui mortuos redimunt ad finem defunctionis, mittentes eorum capitibus oleum et aquam,' etc. (Iren. I. xiv. 4); for 'mortuos' can only mean dead, and Theodoret (*HE* i. 11) alludes to the same practice. The object of this was to safeguard the soul of the dead person in its journey through the realm of the spirit-world. This view may be paralleled with the Pistis Sophia, and seems to have Egyptian affinities.

(4) THE CARPOCRATIANS.—Irenæus (I. xx. 3) says of these heretics: *τούτων τινὲς καὶ καυτηριάζουσι τοὺς ἰδίους μαθητὰς ἐν τοῖς ὀπίσω μέρεσι τοῦ λοβοῦ τοῦ δεξίου ὠτός*. It seems probable that this was an attempt to provide a literal fulfilment of the promise of a baptism with the Holy Spirit and with Fire.

(5) MARCION.—The evidence for Marcion is given by Tertullian and Epiphanius. According to Tertullian (*adv. Marc.* iv. 11), Marcion 'morti aut repudio baptisma servat,' which seems to mean that he refused baptism except to those who were prepared to put away their wives, or were at the point of death. The reason for this provision was that Marcion's doctrine led him to exclude married life. Epiphanius (*adv. Hær.* I. xlii. 3) says that Marcion admitted a second and third baptism in case of sin after baptism (*ἔξεστιν ἕως τριῶν λουτρῶν, τουτέστι βαπτισμῶν, εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν διδόσθαι*). He adds that Marcion had himself been obliged to make use of this provision, and that a Scripture basis was found in Lk 12[50] (*βαπτισθεὶς ὁ κύριος ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἰωάννου ἔλεγε τοῖς μαθηταῖς, βάπτισμα ἔχω βαπτισθῆναι . . . καὶ οὕτω τὸ διδόναι πλείω βαπτίσματα ἐδογμάτισεν*). Esnik, an Armenian writer, also attributes vicarious baptism to him.

(6) TERTULLIAN'S OPPONENTS.—From the language used by Tertullian in the *de Baptismo* it is clear that there was a party which denied the necessity of baptism. One of them he identifies (*de Bapt.* i. 1) with the Cainites, but it does not follow that this applies to them all. From his treatise we can re-construct, at least partially, their arguments.

The following can be distinguished:—(*a*) The Lord Himself did not baptize (see the reply in *de Bapt.* 11). (*b*) The Apostles were never baptized (answered in *de Bapt.* 12). (*c*) Baptism is not necessary to those who have faith, as Abraham had (answered in *de Bapt.* 13). (*d*) St. Paul says: 'Christ sent me not to baptize' (answered in *de Bapt.* 14).

(7) THE ACTS OF THOMAS.—This curious document probably represents views and practices which obtained in the neighbourhood of Edessa towards the close of the 2nd century. It is doubtful whether they come from an orthodox circle, and it is perhaps probable that they represent the views of Bardesanes.

The following accounts of baptism are to be found:—(*a*) In chs. 26–27, the baptism of King Gundaphorus and his brother Gad. Of this the text presents two recensions. The shorter (probably a 'Catholic' version) only relates the fact; it mentions the water and the trine formula. The longer (apparently Gnostic) does not mention water, but only an anointing with

oil, which is called *σφραγίς*. The formula which is used is: *ἐλθὲ τὸ ἅγιον ὄνομα τοῦ Χριστοῦ τὸ ὑπὲρ πᾶν ὄνομα· ἐλθὲ ἡ δύναμις τοῦ ὑψίστου καὶ ἡ εὐσπλαγχνία ἡ τελεία· ἐλθὲ τὸ χάρισμα τὸ ὕψιστον· ἐλθὲ ἡ μήτηρ ἡ εὔσπλαγχνος· ἐλθὲ ἡ κοινωνία τοῦ ἄρρενος· ἐλθὲ ἡ τὰ μυστήρια ἀποκαλύπτουσα τὰ ἀπόκρυφα· ἐλθὲ ἡ μήτηρ τῶν ἑπτὰ οἴκων ἵνα ἡ ἀνάπαυσίς σου εἰς τὸν ὄγδοον οἶκον γένηται· ἐλθὲ ὁ πρεσβύτερος τῶν πέντε μελῶν, νοὸς ἐννοίας φρονήσεως ἐνθυμήσεως λογισμοῦ, κοινώνησον μετὰ τούτων τῶν νεωτέρων· ἐλθὲ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα καὶ καθάρισον τοὺς νεφροὺς αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν καρδίαν, καὶ ἐπισφράγισον αὐτοὺς εἰς ὄνομα πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου πνεύματος.* After this baptism the Eucharist followed immediately.

(*b*) In ch. 121 Mygdonia is baptized in the trine name, and the Eucharist follows immediately.

(*c*) In chs. 131–133 is the account of the baptism of Siphor. Here we are given a valuable statement of the doctrine of baptism: *τὸ βάπτισμα τοῦτο ἁμαρτιῶν ἐστὶν ἄφεσις· τοῦτο ἀναγεννᾷ φῶς περιεκχυνόμενον· τοῦτο ἀναγεννᾷ τὸν νέον ἄνθρωπον· τοὺς ἀνθρώπους μειγνύον πνεῦμα καινοῦν ψυχήν, ἀνιστῶν τρισσῶς καινὸν ἄνθρωπον, καί ἐστι κοινωνὸν τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἀφέσεως.* So far as the rite is concerned, it consists of unction with the formula *Σοὶ δόξα ἡ τῶν σπλάγχνων ἀγάπη· σοὶ δόξα τὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ὄνομα· σοὶ δόξα ἡ ἐν Χριστῷ δύναμις ἱδρυμένη.* After this follows baptism in water (for which purpose a basin [*σκάφην*] is used—so that submersion was not practised) in the trine name, and finally the Eucharist.

(*d*) In chs. 157–158 is the account of the baptism of Ouazenes, Tertia, and Mnesara. The main features are the same: first, unction with oil (over which the name of Jesus has been invoked) with the formula—*Ἐν ὀνόματί σου, Ἰησοῦ Χριστέ, γενέσθω ταῖς ψυχαῖς ταύταις εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν καὶ εἰς ἀποτροπὴν τοῦ ἐναντίου καὶ εἰς σωτηρίαν τῶν ψυχῶν αὐτῶν*; secondly, baptism in water in the trine name; and, thirdly, the Eucharist. It is noteworthy, in view of Tertullian's protest against the custom of baptism by women, that Mygdonia, not Judas Thomas, anoints the women.

Thus it would seem that the circle of Christians whose practice is represented by the *Acts of Thomas* used a form of baptism in which unction with an elaborate formula of consecration preceded baptism, properly so called, in the trine name, and that the Eucharist always followed immediately. The unction with oil was more important than the water-baptism—so much so that in ch. 26 the latter is not mentioned at all. It is even possible that the references to water-baptism in the other passages are interpolations. The doctrinal ideas which play the greatest part are regeneration, forgiveness of sin, a new life, and the gift of the Spirit, which seem to be communicated directly through the unction. It is also noticeable that the *Acts of Thomas* regards baptism and married life as incompatible.

Summary of 1st and 2nd centuries.—The data supplied by the preceding paragraphs give the material for making certain generalizations as to the practice and doctrine of baptism, during the 1st and 2nd centuries. It is, of course, the special object of an Encyclopædia article to give information rather than draw conclusions; but attention may be directed to the following points, which seem to be cardinal:—

(1) The information given as to the practice of baptism is, as a rule, incidental, and never quite explicit; yet the main features are fairly clear. As might have been expected, the rite gradually became more and more complicated. The earliest form, represented in the Acts, was simple immersion (not necessarily submersion) in water, the use of the name of the Lord, and the laying on of hands. To these were added, at various times and places which cannot be safely identified, (*a*) the trine name (Justin), (*b*) a moral vow (Justin and perhaps Hermas, as well as already in the NT in 1 Peter), (*c*) trine immersion (Justin), (*d*) a confession of faith (Irenæus, or perhaps Justin), (*e*) unction (Tertullian), (*f*) sponsors (Tertullian), (*g*) milk and honey (Tertullian). There was also, no doubt, an infinite variety of expansion in detail, especially among heretical sects (cf. especially the Marcosians), and there were probably fixed forms for the administration of the sacraments, of which traces may be seen even in this period (Justin, Tertullian, and especially the *Didache*), but the existing baptismal services strictly belong to the 3rd century.

(2) As to the doctrine of baptism we have more information, though here also much of it is incidental. The dominant ideas were those of forgiveness of sin, regeneration, and the gift of the Holy Spirit. To some extent these three ideas may be fairly described as three ways of regarding baptism rather than as three separate benefits conferred by it. In baptism, the Christian passes from one sphere of life to another. He is born again to another world, and, whereas in the world which he leaves he was under the control of sin, evil spirits, and fate,* in the world which he enters he is under the control of the Holy Spirit. So far is this view carried, that baptism can be spoken of as a resurrection, though, as a rule, the gift conferred in baptism was regarded eschatologically so far as its complete realization was concerned (see the use of *σφραγίς* in II Clem., p. 385[b] above).

The change effected by baptism was attributed to the 'name' and to the water, which were regarded as actually effective and not merely symbolic. This view is strange to modern minds, especially to Protestants, but it was part of the common stock of ideas of the 2nd cent., among heathen and Christians alike. A somewhat subordinate part is usually played by the laying on of hands and by unction; but probably both of these were regarded as cardinal in some places (see especially Tertullian and the *Acts of Thomas*). The general theory which underlies these views seems to be the well-known belief that by using the correct name it was possible to exercise the power of the bearer of the name. By this means the Spirit was brought into the water (in the *Acts of Thomas* into the oil) and thus communicated to the baptized person. The clearest expression of this view is found in Tertullian, but in a more or less developed form it was no doubt universal, except among a few heretics (*e.g.* Tertullian's opponents, and some of the Marcosians).

As the rite became more complicated, there was a tendency to connect various details with various sides of the doctrine. Especially was this so with regard to the laying on of hands; this, at least sometimes, was peculiarly connected with the gift of the Spirit, and the effect of the immersion in water was limited to the forgiveness of sins (see especially Tertullian, and compare the same tendency even earlier in the Acts). But this distinction was probably never universal, or to any large extent the subject of discussion.

In its crudest form the theory of baptism was quite unethical; and there are many traces among early writers that they were aware of this difficulty. None of them, however, really succeeded in doing more than putting ethical requirements side by side with their sacramental theories, and demanding both without really co-ordinating them intelligibly (cf. Hermas and the development of the moral vow of which the first traces can probably be found in 1 Peter).

In connexion with the name (which may mean one or more names) the question of formula arises. The earliest known formula is 'in the name of the Lord Jesus,' or some similar phrase; this is found in the Acts, and was perhaps still used by Hermas, but by the time of Justin Martyr the trine formula had become general. It is possible that the older formula survived in isolated communities, but there is no decisive contemporary evidence. The tendency was all the other way, and it is probable that there were in use many formulæ of an elaborate nature (see the Marcosians and the *Acts of Thomas*). The difficulty is to distinguish between

* The question of Fate will receive a full treatment in a separate article. Justin and orthodox writers generally were inclined to deny its influence, but some Gnostics recognized its supremacy over the unbaptized (Theodotus in Clement of Alexandria).

the formula properly so called, and what we should now call the baptismal service attached to it. Probably the truth is that this distinction was somewhat foreign to the spirit of the 2nd cent.; it was only gradually that a difference began to be made between the essential formula and other words which were connected with it.

Starting from the belief that baptism was the beginning of a new life, released from sin and inspired by the Holy Spirit, men naturally were forced to ask what was the relation of the regenerate person to sin. The earliest view was that sin was excluded. Probably some even thought that sin was impossible to the baptized, but at least it is clear from the Epistle to the Hebrews that sin after baptism was in some circles regarded as irremediable. Practical experience must soon have shown that if this view were held few could hope to see salvation, and the problem which thus arose was dealt with in diverse ways. The most obvious solution was to re-baptize those who sinned. This view was adopted by the school opposed to that of the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and was common to most of the Gnostic sects (see *e.g.* Marcion). In the orthodox (as they afterwards came to be) circles this view was always rejected, and the difficulty was met in two ways—by the introduction of the theory of *μετάνοια*, rapidly developing into Penance, and by the attempt to distinguish between deadly and venial sin (cf. especially Hermas and 1 John). Among the practical results of this difficulty was the tendency, which long survived, to postpone baptism until death was approaching (cf. especially Hermas and Tertullian; similarly the Marcosians, whose sacrament of 'Redemption' was partly a repetition of baptism, partly a new rite that seems sometimes to have postponed its reception to the time of death). It would be an interesting subject for study how far the Catholic practice of extreme unction may once have been connected with a similar view. It is, however, plain that this postponement must sometimes have been carried too far, and death anticipated baptism. Baptism for the dead seems to have been practised by the Marcosians in such cases, and there are a few traces of a parallel custom of vicarious baptism.

Besides this line of development, which recognized that sin after baptism was possible, there was another which denied that the regenerate were able to sin. They were risen from death, and any sin which their bodies might commit belonged to the realm of death: it was thus indifferent, and could not affect the risen life of the regenerate. This theory, which was obviously likely to give rise to the wildest excesses, is probably a partial explanation of the charge of immorality often brought against Christians. It appears from Hippolytus that some of the Marcosians adopted this view, and it is probable that the same is true of the Carpocratians.

The relation of baptism to marriage is a cognate question. Some sects certainly thought that marriage was of the nature of sin, and rejected it altogether (cf. especially Marcion and the *Acts of Thomas*). The Church in general never seems to have taken this view; but Tertullian, probably even in his pre-Montanist days, regarded marriage as forbidden to those who had already been baptized.

In the earliest part of this period it seems probable that baptism was regarded as a sacrament which could be administered by all Christians, though it was in practice doubtless reserved for the head of the community (cf. Justin Martyr). The line of thought, as mentioned above, represented in the Acts, which distinguished between the actual immersion in water (which gave forgiveness of sins, and could be administered by every Christian) and the laying on of hands (which gave the Spirit, and was the prerogative of the Apostles), perhaps survived only in part. Tertullian shows that the doctrinal distinction was observed in the African Church (it seems very doubtful if this was true of every Church), but the evidence is not clear that the distinction was made between the ministerial rights of clergy and laity. In any case, as it was certainly the practice for the clergy—not the laity—to baptize, the question was not likely to come to the front. But a similar problem began to appear during the 2nd century. What was the value of heretical baptism? The answer, of course, turned on that given to the implied previous question, 'What is a Christian?' The 2nd cent. writers did not really reach a more advanced point than the affirmation that only a Christian could give Christian baptism (the attempt of Ignatius to confine the administration of the rite to the bishop and those whom he licensed was really only a secondary result of quite a different question), and the Catholic Church triumphed in its attempt to exclude all the heretical sects as non-Christian. Thus the rule was more or less fixed that heretical baptism was invalid, but 'heretical' meant heretics such as the Marcosians and other Gnostics, and the question probably never became a burning one. Still the principle was established, and became extremely important in the 3rd cent., when it was applied to the quite different types of heresy which then became predominant.

LITERATURE.—There is no satisfactory book on the history of early Christian baptism before the great baptismal controversy in the 3rd century. Useful information will be found in Höfling, *Das Sacrament d. Taufe*, Erlangen, 1848; W. Heitmüller, *Im Namen Jesu*, Göttingen, 1903, and *Taufe und Abendmahl bei Paulus*, Göttingen, 1905; F. M. Rendtorff *Die Taufe im Urchristentum*, Leipzig, 1905; W. Bousset, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, Göttingen, 1907; H. Windisch, *Taufe und Sünde im ältesten Christentum*, Tübingen, 1908.

KIRSOPP LAKE.

BAPTISM (Later Christian).—1. From the second to the eighth century.—'Since the middle of the second century the notions of baptism in the Church have not essentially altered. The result of baptism was universally considered to be forgiveness of sins, and this pardon was supposed to effect an actual sinlessness which now required to be maintained' (Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, Eng. tr. vol. ii. p. 140). Baptism, in the words of Firmilian, was the life-giving bath (*lavacrum salutare*), the second nativity: it involved the washing away of the filth of the old man, the forgiveness of the old sins of death, the becoming sons of God through a heavenly re-birth, the being renewed unto life eternal by the sanctification of the Divine bath (see *Ep.* 75, *ap.* Cyprian). How the nature and effects of regeneration were conceived by some of the leading writers in these centuries will be discussed in a later paragraph. The net result of the development of thought and practice in this period was to define the essentials of Baptism, and to lay stress on the importance of the ritual act, as itself conferring indispensable spiritual blessings. 'In Baptism by the institution of God, the material element of water, together with the prescribed form of words, is used to confer spiritual gifts' (Stone, *Holy Baptism*, p. 214). This sentence from a modern writer adequately describes the conviction which, with increasing clearness, controlled the mind of the Church subsequently to the 2nd century.

I. *THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF THE RITUAL ACT.*—This was emphasized principally (*a*) in the dread of repetition, (*b*) in the diminished importance attaching to the administrator of the rite, (*c*) in the tendency to regard conscious faith on the part of the recipient as non-essential. The first two points are evidenced mainly by the recognition of schis-

matic and even of heretical baptism as valid, provided water was used, and the subjects were baptized in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. The third point most clearly emerges in the growing custom of infant baptism.

(*a*) The question of *heretical baptism* was raised acutely in the controversy between Cyprian and Pope Stephen. In dealing with converted heretics, different Churches followed divergent traditions. The Roman Church required only that the returning heretic be received with the laying on of hands. Pope Stephen's position is summed up in the sentence: 'Si quis ergo a quacumque hæresi venerit ad vos, nihil innovetur nisi quod traditum est, ut manus illi imponatur in pœnitentiam' (Cyp. *Ep.* 74). The practice in Alexandria appears to have been the same (Eus. vii. 2, 7). Firmilian, bp. of Cæsarea in Cappadocia, opposes the custom of Asia Minor to the custom of the Romans. There it had always been assumed that any baptism outside the Church was invalid. Returning heretics were re-baptized, or rather received true baptism for the first time. At Carthage, the Roman custom seems to have prevailed (in spite of the attitude of Tertullian [see above, p. 386 f.]), and Cyprian was making an innovation when he insisted that all heretics should be baptized on joining the Church (see Eus. *HE* vii. 3, and note Cyprian's defence of truth against custom in *Epp.* 70–76). The African bishops followed Cyprian's lead.

The divergence in the customs of Rome and Asia may be accounted for by the differing characters of the heresies with which each had to deal. Asia Minor in particular and the East in general were troubled with a variety of fantastic sects, and it appears from a letter of Dionysius, in Eus. *HE* vii. 9, that some who came over from heresy had the gravest misgivings as to the worth of the baptism they had received. The sects in the East frequently adopted such peculiarities both in creed and practice as to render the position of Firmilian natural, if not inevitable. At Rome, on the other hand, the practical issue lay in the re-admission of Novatians, who were schismatics rather than heretics. They had broken from the Church on a question of discipline. In matters of faith they were quite orthodox. Their baptism did not seriously depart from the Church's model. There was no difficulty in accepting such baptism as valid.

The central arguments advanced by Stephen and his supporters were: (1) the appeal to tradition, for which Stephen claimed Apostolic authority (cf. Anon. *de Rebaptismate*, opening); (2) the majesty of the name of Jesus, which could not but be effective wherever and however pronounced. Thus Cyp. in *Ep.* 74 states his adversaries' position as follows: 'Effectum baptismi majestati nominis tribuunt, ut qui in nomine Jesu Christi ubicumque et quomodocumque baptizantur, innovati et sanctificati judicentur' (cf. also Firmilian, *Ep.* 75, *ap.* Cyp.). It is not clear that Stephen regarded baptism 'in nomine Jesu Christi' as valid; but the anonymous author of the *de Rebaptismate* apparently accepted the use of the earlier formula as sufficient. 'The invocation of the name of Jesus ought never to seem vain to us, because of the reverence due to it and the power that resides in it.' Stephen was prepared to adopt the conclusion that, where water and the correct formula were used, the character and creed of the administrators became a matter of indifference.

The positions laid down by the author of the *de Rebapt.* are not necessarily representative of his side, but they deserve notice. He held that heretical baptism did not of itself confer the gift of the Spirit, but it created a possibility of spiritual receptiveness which made its repetition superfluous. The imposition of hands supplied all defects. He distinguished baptism with water from baptism with the Spirit; and though within the Church the two were usually connected, they are clearly separable in the NT, and may be administered distinctly at all times; so that a man may receive water-baptism among the heretics, and the baptism with the Spirit through the laying on of hands at his entrance into the Church. He also claims that sound faith in the administrator cannot be an essential to the validity of water-baptism; for the disciples baptized while the Lord was with them, and while they understood His doctrine very imperfectly. The Divine name possesses peculiar powers, even when invoked by men who do not believe. Strangers to Christ, workers of iniquity, have cast out devils in His name. Consequently the name, by whomsoever invoked in baptism, is of itself operative, and a further invocation means reiterating baptism.

This distinction between water-baptism and baptism with the Spirit really turned the flank of Cyprian's position. He maintained that heretics could not give Christian baptism, because they did not possess the Holy Spirit. To Cyprian, the Romans seemed to be involved in the contradiction of asserting that a man could be born spiritually in a community destitute of the Spirit (*Ep.* 74). A valid baptism requires the invocation of the Holy Spirit; but it is impossible for heretics who do not possess the Holy Spirit to call down His blessing on the water (*Ep.* 70). If baptism is essentially spiritual, if it means regeneration, then it is impossible outside the Church. Nor can it be contended that the heretics hold the same faith. Even mere schismatics, like the Novatians, are at bottom heretics, and do not hold the same creed. Their baptismal confession does not coincide with that of the Catholic Church; for when they question the candidate and say, 'Credis remissionem peccatorum et vitam æternam per sanctam ecclesiam?' then they lie, because they have not the Church. The heretic and the schismatic cannot bestow forgiveness of sins; that is, their baptism cannot confer any of the blessings associated with baptism. In other words, they cannot baptize. There is only one baptism, that of the Church; and so, Cyprian maintained, those who come over from heresy are not re-baptized in the Church, but baptized (*Ep.* 71).

The controversy did not immediately arrive at a definitive issue. The divergence of practice did not at once disappear. The Donatists in the 4th century practically took their stand on Cyprian's rejection of heretical baptism, and they seem at one time to have represented national feeling in Africa. But in general neither Cyprian's sweeping rejection nor Stephen's indiscriminate acceptance received the approval of the Church. The Catholic line was that laid down in the Council of Arles (314), whose eighth canon runs thus: 'De Afris quod propria lege sua utuntur ut rebaptizent, placuit ut si ad ecclesiam aliquis de hæreticis venerit, interrogant eum symbolum, et si perviderint eum in Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum esse baptizatum, manus ei tantum imponatur ut accipiat Spiritum Sanctum. Quod si interrogatus non responderit hanc trinitatem, baptizetur.' In this council the African bishops, who sided with Cæcilian against the Donatists, abandoned Cyprian's attitude towards heretical baptism. This rule eventually met with general acceptance. In the East, at any rate in Asia, it was reluctantly adopted (Cyril) and carefully applied. The title-deeds of any heretical baptism were carefully scrutinized. Any departure from orthodox custom, such as the Eunomians' substitution of one immersion for three, was eagerly noted and condemned. Basil clearly leans to the view of Firmilian and Cyprian, but grudgingly admits the canonical validity of baptism by the Cathari (see letter 1881 in 'Library of Post-Nicene Fathers'). In the West, the rule was more readily adopted and more graciously applied. The weight of Augustine's authority was thrown on this side (see *de unico bapt. c. Petil.* ch. 3, for the main principle).

The central significance of the whole controversy lay (1) in the assumption, common to both parties, that there can be only one baptism,* and that this baptism is essential to salvation; and (2) in the progress made towards establishing the objective validity of the sacrament, defined as complete in the use of the correct material and the orthodox formula.

(*b*) *The Donatist controversy* carried the insistence on the objective validity of the sacrament still further. The gist of the Donatist contention was that the sacrament was invalidated by the misbelief or misconduct of the administrator. More particularly, the denial of the faith in time of persecution rendered all the sacramental acts of such traitors worthless. The Donatists followed Cyprian in believing that the character of the administrator affected the value of the rite. To admit this would have thrown doubt on the sacramental life of the past, and would have made the efficacy of the sacraments depend upon men. The defenders of the Catholic position would never consent to this conclu-

* Ultimately this was disputed only by the obscure sect of Hemerobaptists.

sion. Optatus asserts unhesitatingly the essential efficacy of the ritual act: 'The sacraments are holy in themselves, not through men' ('sacramenta per se esse sancta, non per homines,' *de Schismate Don.* v. 4). The three essentials to baptism are the Holy Trinity, the believer, and the administrator. But, while the first two are indispensable, the last is only *quasi*-necessary. The administrator is not the lord of baptism, but the agent: *i.e.* any administrator will serve the purpose (see Harnack, *op. cit.* v. 45). Augustine took up a similar standpoint. Baptism, as defined in the 8th canon of the Council of Arles, confers an indelible stamp on the recipient, which *ipso facto* requires no renewal. To suppose that it does not is to do wrong to the sacrament, to deny the power of God in it. It is impossible to summarize here the numerous writings of Aug. against the Donatists, but the following points may be noted:—

(1) Aug. is clear that the use of water, together with the words prescribed in the Gospel, suffices to make a valid baptism. The correct episcopal benediction is not essential. Heretical prayers may even be pernicious, but they cannot destroy the efficacy of the sacrament, provided the Gospel words are employed (*de Bapt. contra Don.* vi. 25). Here Aug. distinctly denies the importance attributed by Cyprian (see above) to the cleansing of the water by a correct benediction.—(2) In accordance with his own principles, Aug. regards lay baptism as valid. He is inclined to assert that any one who has truly received baptism* can pass on the gift, though, of course, he distinguishes the *sacramentum baptismi* from the *sacramentum dandi baptismum*. But Aug. does not doubt that a layman who baptizes in the name of the Trinity has conferred a valid baptism, whether he acts under the pressure of necessity or not. If he acts in a case of urgency, his action is at least pardonable, if not praiseworthy. If he baptizes when there is no need for him to undertake another man's office, his action is wrong, and may mean damnation for baptizer and baptized alike, but none the less is the baptism valid (*contra Ep. Parm.* ii. 13). This is an emphatic statement of the comparative unimportance of the minister, and of the all-importance of the ritual act.—(3) It is difficult to see what Aug. understood by the stamp (χαρακτήρ) conveyed in baptism, but it seems to be a permanent possibility of spiritual receptiveness, such as is suggested by the author of the *de Rebaptismate*. At least, Aug. is prepared to concede this efficacy to heretical baptism, because in itself the stamp does not connote the spiritual blessings secured by baptism within the Church. Heretical baptism conveys a something which is essential to salvation,—this must be maintained, if the sacrament is not to suffer wrong,—but the heretic derives no benefit from this possession so long as he remains a heretic. He possesses baptism, but he does not possess it unto salvation. 'Aliud est non habere, aliud non utiliter habere.' In fact, the stubborn heretic or schismatic receives baptism, not to his profit, but to his eternal loss. The man who has received heretical baptism carries about with him a hidden treasure, which he can enjoy only in the bosom of the Church. In this way Aug. was able to reconcile his belief in the objective efficacy of the sacrament with his conviction that union with the Catholic Church could alone ensure a saving use of baptismal grace.

The Donatist controversy thus completed the development initiated in the dispute between Cyprian and Stephen. The two essentials of baptism, water and the Gospel formula, stand out with increasing clearness, and the minister is recognized to be of comparative unimportance.

(*c*) The insistence on the intrinsic efficacy of the ritual act is further evidenced by *the tendency to regard conscious faith on the part of the recipient as non-essential*. It is interesting to notice that this was one of the points of difference between the Manichæans and the Christians. To the former, a baptism apart from conscious faith was absurd.

There is an illuminating story in Aug.'s *Confessions*, bearing on this point. A sick friend of his was baptized while unconscious. Aug., who was at the time under the influence of Manichæan ideas, was ready to treat the matter as a joke, thinking that he would laugh at a baptism which he had received 'while utterly absent both in mind and feeling' (*mente ac sensu absentissimus*). The friend, however, took the matter more seriously, and Aug., as he tells the tale, clearly thinks that the baptism had wrought a real change *in corpore necientis* (*Conf.* Iv. 4).

But the principal evidence for the growth of the view that baptism was of worth apart from conscious faith in the recipient is to be found in the custom of infant baptism. The existence of the custom from the time of Tertullian is undeniable, and Tertullian's plea for delaying the baptism of children does not imply that the practice against which he protests was of recent growth.*

Origen is familiar with the practice of child baptism, and assumes that it comes down from Apostolic times (*Com. in Rom.* v.). Cyprian's letter to Fidus (*Ep.* 59) discusses the question whether, in the case of infants, baptism should be postponed till the eighth day or not. Fidus wished to make the rite parallel with circumcision, and suggested that the babe was unclean immediately after birth. Cyprian and his colleagues decided that a babe might be baptized at the earliest possible moment, and they repudiated Fidus's suggestion, by saying that to kiss a new-born babe is in a manner to kiss the hands of God the creator. The whole discussion implies that infant baptism had long been in vogue. In the third century, infant baptism was regarded as an Apostolic institution at least in North Africa and in the Alexandrian churches. But while the evidence for the existence of the custom in the third century is overwhelming, we are, as Harnack says, 'in complete obscurity as to the Church's adoption of the practice.' The clear 3rd cent. references to child baptism interpret it in the light of original sin, and if the adoption of the practice is due to this interpretation, it is almost certainly a late 2nd cent. development. Cyprian clearly understands infant baptism in this sense (*Ep.* 59). Origen seems to have based its necessity on the pollution acquired in birth (*Hom.* viii. and xii. *in 1 Cor.*), while in his case the idea of pre-existence also suggested that infants were burdened with the sins of a previous life which might be removed in baptism (*de Prin.* iii. 5). This deduction of the need of infant baptism from the idea of original sin, or from that of pre-existence, may safely be regarded as a theological after-thought. The first is the product of reflexion on the writings of St. Paul. It is probable that men pondered long on the conception of original sin before they drew any such conclusion. References to original sin in Clement of Rome or other writers earlier than Cyprian cannot be held to imply a knowledge of the custom of infant baptism. Moreover, the idea that infants needed to be baptized for the remission of sins is contrary to all that is known of early Christian feeling towards childhood. The teaching of Jesus about children runs counter to any such notion, and, however little His sympathy for the young was appreciated, it was not forgotten (see Burkitt, *Gospel Hist. and its Transmission*, p. 285 f.). The most natural interpretation of the much-disputed text in St. Paul, 1 Co 7^{14}, is that Christian parentage in itself somehow hallowed childhood. Tert. speaks of the innocence, the guiltlessness of children, and apparently deduced from it that baptism was unnecessary (see *de Bapt.*, ed. Lupton, p. 52, n. 1). In this he represents what seems to have been the primitive Christian feeling, if the *Apology of Aristides* interprets that feeling aright: 'And when a child is born to any one of them, they praise God; and if, again, it chance to die in its infancy, they praise God mightily, as for one who has passed through the world without sins' (Syriac Version, c. 15, ed. J. Rendel Harris, Camb. *TS*). Perpetua's vision of her little brother Dinocrates, as in heaven, alive and well, shows how people clung to the idea that children as such belong to the

* This is Jerome's position: 'Ut enim accipit quis, ita et dare potest' (*Dial. c. Luciferianos, ap.* Höfling, i. p. 505).

* The fact that Tert. uses the term *parvulus* and not *infans* is of no particular significance. He is not thinking of new-born babes, but the reference to sponsors (and indeed his whole discussion) implies that the children concerned are incapable of a public profession of faith. The principle involved is the same, though clear evidence for the baptism of new-born babes is not forthcoming till Cyprian's letter to Fidus.

Kingdom. In such an atmosphere, a baptism of infants for the remission of sins is hardly conceivable.

But it is probable that the custom did not originate with theologians. It should be noted that even in the 3rd cent. infant baptism cannot be described as a Church-custom. That the Church allowed parents to bring their infants to be baptized is obvious: that some teachers and bishops may have encouraged them to do so is probable, though there is no reason to suppose that Tertullian's position was peculiarly his own. But infant baptism was not at this time enjoined or incorporated in the standing orders of the Church. [It was not till the middle of the 5th cent. that the Syrian Church made infant baptism obligatory (see *DCA* p. 170).] Indeed, in the 4th cent. so prominent a teacher as Gregory of Nazianzus, who was in general eager to persuade people not to postpone baptism, urged the inadvisability of baptizing children before they were three years old, 'when they are capable to hear and answer some of the holy words' (*Or. de Bapt., ap.* Wall, ch. 11, § 7). Again, this does not sound like a personal idiosyncrasy of Gregory. In any case, it is probable that the custom arose from the pressure of parents and not through the direct advocacy of the Church. If this be so, the reason for the adoption of the custom may perhaps be sought outside the idea of the remission of sins. The Pelagians held that infants were baptized, not in order that their sins might be remitted, but in order that they might be sure of admission into the Kingdom of Heaven. Unbaptized infants would not be punished, but could not go to Heaven. Among other passages, they set great store by a well-known utterance of John Chrysostom, which runs thus:

'You see how many are the benefits of Baptism. And yet some think that the Heavenly grace consists only in forgiveness of sins: but I have reckoned up ten advantages of it. For this cause we baptize infants also, though they are not defiled with sin: that there may be superadded to them Holiness, Righteousness, Adoption, Inheritance, a Brotherhood with Christ, and to be made Members of him' (see Aug. *c. Julian.* I. vi. *t.*).

Aug., in commenting on this extract, has no difficulty in showing that Chrysostom believed in original sin; but he does not succeed in disproving the Pelagian contention that Chrysostom found a reason for baptizing infants other than the need of the remission of sins or the need of getting rid of original sin. And though at first sight the Pelagian view of the necessity of infant baptism—the view that through it alone can certain positive advantages be secured—looks as if it were hammered out in the exigencies of controversy, yet it may after all be more primitive than that which eventually came to the front through the influence of Augustine.

Undoubtedly the Pelagian position harmonizes with some seemingly primitive Christian ideas about baptism. It has been suggested that baptism was fromt he first regarded as a Messianic sign. To be baptized was to be sealed for the coming Kingdom (see Schweitzer, *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*, p. 373 f.; and note use of term σφραγίς referred to on p. 385[b], and on Hermas, p. 384 f.). Baptism had a positive eschatological importance. To enter the Kingdom at all, one must wear the seal. The thought is expressed most simply in the apocryphal *Acts of Thomas*, where one of the Apostle's converts says: 'Give us the seal: for we have heard you say that the God whom you preach recognizes His sheep by the seal.' In the narrative, an anointing with oil follows; but this not improbably represents a primitive Christian view of baptism. Now it is possible that this thought even in NT times may have led parents to wish to have their children baptized. The primitive eschatological expectations may have introduced the custom—in which case it will be very early. In any event, the influence of Jn 3[5], as Höfling points out, played an all-important part in developing the custom of infant baptism. This text laid hold of the imagination in the 2nd century. Before any explanation of the necessity of re-birth had been thought out, the mere statement that to see the Kingdom a man must be born of water would trouble the minds of some whose children had died unbaptized. To such doubt and fear the practice probably owed its origin. The influence of the OT, and especially of the rite of circumcision, must also be taken into consideration; but, in general, the idea *extra ecclesiam nulla salus* made people anxious to enrol their children as Church members as quickly as possible.

When once the custom had been introduced, the interpretation which Aug. put upon it was almost inevitable. The conviction that there could be only one baptism, and that therefore baptism means always the same thing, to wit, remission of sins (the reference to 'one baptism' in Eph. is a constant factor in all discussions in this period); the use of the term 're-birth' in Jn 3, suggesting that baptism is a necessary supplement to natural birth; the ascetic view of marriage; the Pauline doctrine that flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God—all these elements combined to establish Aug.'s view. The Pelagians, in saying that children must be baptized, not in order to secure the remission of sins, but in order to secure the Kingdom, were introducing two baptisms—as clear a heresy as re-baptism itself. Moreover, the Pelagians could give no satisfactory account of the fate of infants who died unbaptized. They would obtain eternal life and happiness, but not the Kingdom. Aug. denies the distinction (see *ad Marc.* i. 20, and *Sermo* 294, where he says: 'hoc novum in ecclesia prius inauditum est, esse salutem æternam præter regnum Dei'). If those who die unbaptized are outside the Kingdom, they must be in eternal misery, even though their torment be *mitissima et tolerabilior* (*Enchiridion*, 93). Baptism would be needless if it did not mean remission of sin. Since then the Pelagians admit that children should be baptized, and since children are innocent, the sin remitted to them must be original sin. That they are sinful is clear from the fact that Jesus called them to Himself, and He came to call not the righteous, but sinners (*ad Marc.* i. 19). But from Aug.'s standpoint the more serious error of the Pelagians lay in their optimistic view of human nature. To Aug. original sin was the most awful and obvious fact about men. The impossibility of keeping God's law apart from God's grace is written clear in all experience. The human will in itself is hopeless. 'We cannot do justly unless we are helped of God' (*ad Marc.* ii. 5). Human nature is tainted, and grace is a necessity from the first. The taint is explained monastically. Aug. admits that there is such a thing as a *bonum conjugii*, a legitimate use of wedlock, but he claims that all men are born of incontinence, and 'hoc est malum peccati in quo nascitur omnis homo. . . . Sed nemo renascitur in Christi corpore, nisi prius nascitur in peccati corpore' (*ad Marc.* i. 29; cf. the discussion of the significance of virgin-birth, *Ench.* 34). In all this, Aug. is developing the thought already suggested in Cyprian. His position found emphatic approval in the Council of Carthage held in 418–9, which promulgated the following canon:

'Item placuit ut quicunque parvulos recentes ab uteris matrum baptizandos negat, aut dicit in remissionem quidem peccatorum eos baptizari sed nihil ex Adam trahere originalis peccati quod lavacro regenerationis expietur (unde sit consequens ut in eis forma baptismatis in remissionem peccatorum non vera sed falsa intelligatur) Anathema sit' (*ap.* Wall, *Infant Baptism*, ch. 19).

Though, as Höfling maintains, the final preva-

lence of infant baptism must not be ascribed entirely to Aug., yet his defence of the practice must have done much to commend it. The emphasis on original sin made the rite seem natural and reasonable; for if, by their first unconscious and involuntary birth, children were born into an inheritance of sin, it was just that a second birth equally involuntary and unconscious should give them at least the chance of being co-heirs with Christ.* But however they interpreted the practice, the whole development implies the concentration of attention on the intrinsic efficacy of the ritual act. Aug. commends the African Christians because they spoke of baptism as salvation (*salus*). The giving of the sacrament to those 'who could not with their own heart believe unto righteousness, nor with their own mouth make confession unto salvation' witnesses to man's conviction of its inherent power to bestow spiritual blessings.

The growth of the practice of infant baptism broke in on the natural connexion between instruction, conscious faith, and the sacrament. The customary arrangements for the ceremony and the prescribed order rested on the assumption of conscious faith in the subjects. Up to the close of the 5th cent., baptism was still administered as a rule by the bishop (though later on the presbyters became the usual ministers—the anointing with oil on the forehead and confirmation being reserved for the bishop), and special seasons were devoted to the administration of baptism. Easter and Pentecost were observed in the West, and from the close of the 4th cent. many Popes made repeated attempts to confine baptisms to those seasons (see *DCA*, p. 165). The Eastern Churches further set apart Epiphany for this purpose, and local churches developed special usages. In case of necessity, baptism was administered at any time. Arrangements of this kind were natural when baptism regularly followed the catechumenate. The special seasons disappear when infant baptism becomes universal. Similarly, the whole ritual was designed for adults. The confession of faith in particular points to this; and it must be admitted that the institution of sponsors was a somewhat clumsy device to adapt to infants a ceremony which had clearly been ordered at a time when their baptism was not thought of. The Church reckoned baptized children as being among the faithful. The awkwardness of speaking of infants as *fideles* was felt by Bp. Boniface, to whom Aug. addresses a letter on the subject (*Ep.* 23). In the 8th cent., Theodulph (*de Ordine Baptism.* 1) naively remarks: 'Infantes ergo et audientes et catechumeni fiunt, non quo in eadem ætate et instrui et doceri possint, sed ut antiquus mos servetur, quo apostoli eos quos baptizaturi erant primum docebant et instruebant.' The ritual is frankly unsuitable for infants, but it is retained because the tradition that instruction and faith precede baptism is undeniably primitive.†

It should, however, be noted in this connexion, that it was never supposed that baptism apart from faith would suffice to secure eternal life.‡ Faith was still essential; but whereas faith had as a rule preceded baptism, it was now held that baptism would be equally effective if it preceded faith. And even so, a vicarious faith was required for the valid baptism of infants. Not only the sponsors, but the whole congregation, help to forward the communication of the Holy Spirit to the baptized child (see Aug. *Ep.* 23 *ad Bonifacium*). It is also true that baptism was administered only to children who would be instructed and trained in the Christian faith. It was never thought, or at least men were never encouraged to think, that the mere isolated act of baptism ensured salvation, even though the African Christians called it *salus*.

It remains to explain the ultimate prevalence of infant baptism. The catechumenate, and with it adult baptism, continued so long as the Church was making converts from heathenism. But infant baptism was not universally adopted by believers. For not only was the example of Constantine the Great, who postponed his baptism till near death, undoubtedly fashionable, and not only did many who were within the close range of Christian influence delay the decisive step, but there is reason to suppose that many baptized Christians did not in the 4th cent. push forward the baptism of their children. Gregory of Nazianzus, whose parents were both Christians, was not baptized till he was come to years of discretion (see Wall, vol. ii. ch. 3). The same was true of Ephraim Syrus (Butler, *Lives of the Saints*), and probably of Basil the Great (see Introd. to vol. viii. in 'Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers,' p. xvi). The want of reference to infant baptism in Basil's discussions of the subject, and the general character of his treatise, suggest that many were brought up in their homes, and were not put forward as candidates for baptism until they entered the catechumenate in riper years. The postponement of Aug.'s baptism till he was thirty-three years old is usually attributed to the heathenism of his father. But the passage in the *Confessions* (bk. I. ch. xi. in Gibb and Montgomery's ed.) suggests that Monica was not anxious to have Aug. baptized, except when he was in danger of dying. During an illness, Aug. was on the point of being baptized, when he recovered. The crucial passage runs thus: 'Dilata est itaque mundatio mea, quasi necesse esset, ut adhuc sordidarer, si viverem, quia videlicet post lavacrum illud maior et periculosior in sordibus delictorum reatus foret.' The alleged reason must have weighed with his Christian mother, not with his heathen father. If this interpretation be correct, then Monica's view was characteristic of many Christians in the 4th century. 'Although,' says Harnack, 'the principle was maintained that baptism was indispensable to salvation, still people dreaded more the unworthy reception of it than the risk of ultimately failing to receive it. In the 4th cent. it was still very common to postpone it, in order not to use this sovereign remedy till the hour of death' (*op. cit.* iv. 284). Another motive of such conduct lay in the thought that a life of indulgence could be washed clean by a deferred baptism. The unbaptized man could safely enjoy himself. 'Let him alone, let him do what he will; he is not yet baptized' (Aug. *Conf.* I. xi.). This sentiment is re-echoed by the objectors to whom Basil addresses his work. Aug. and other Church teachers could not deny the main premiss here assumed. They could urge the dangers of delay, but they did not deny that baptism, so deferred, would still be efficacious if received. Aug. regards it as one of the signs that grace does much more abound that, whereas Adam's fall involves us in original sin, the grace of the Second Adam in baptism removes not only original sin but all the sins we have ourselves committed. Many were anxious that they and their children should secure this more abounding grace. Moreover, men hesitated before the *pondus baptismi*, the moral obligations of the step. In Edessa, at the time of Aphraates, baptism may have meant the adoption of celibacy and been confined to a spiritual aristocracy, 'the sons of the

* Cf. *e.g.* the sentence in Theodulph, the 8th cent. bp. of Orleans, who says (*de Ordine Baptism.* 7): 'nec immerito dignum est ut qui aliorum peccatis obnoxii sunt, aliorum etiam confessione per mysterium baptismatis remissionem originalium percipiant peccatorum.' Aug. provided just this kind of *raison d'être* for infant baptism.

† Incidentally, the evidence of the ritual is against a very early date for the practice of infant baptism.

‡ That faith and baptism are inseparable is emphasized in Basil, *de Sp. Sanc.* 12.

Covenant' (see Burkitt, *Early Eastern Christianity*, p. 255 f.; but see also Connolly, *JThSt* vi.).

In the course of the 5th cent. infant baptism became the prevailing usage. The action of the Syrian Church in enforcing on parents the duty of having their children baptized has already been noticed. Many causes contributed to this result. The Christianization of society diminished the numbers of adult converts, and so lowered the importance of the catechumenate. The influence of Aug. and other Church Fathers was cast on this side. The growth of the penitential system served to remove in part man's fear of the *pondus baptismi*, while the readiness of the Church to administer the *viaticum*, or last sacrament, to all (see *DCA*, p. 2014), and eventually the practice of Extreme Unction, combined to meet the needs which had previously sought satisfaction in deferred and clinic baptism. Also, towards the latter part of this period, the penitential system became the means of moral instruction, which had previously been provided by the catechumenate. In the Church's dealings with the Teutonic nations, the baptism of converts resembled the baptism of infants in so far as systematic instruction in the faith was postponed till after baptism. It is true, Clovis and his followers were baptized on confession of faith; but the rude German warriors did not submit, and were not expected to submit, to a course of instruction such as had been given to catechumens. The catechumenate disappeared in the West, 'because, as whole peoples were baptized at once, infant baptism was introduced as a matter of course' (K. Müller). The Church opened her doors to infant and barbarian, partly because only so could she influence them, and partly because she believed that baptism could of itself confer benefits before faith was instructed or even existent.

(*d*) Some further illustrations of the importance attached to baptism, at least in the earlier portion of this period, may be adduced here. (1) As soon as Christianity became the State religion, *baptisteries* were among the first public buildings to be erected by believers. 'Of the construction of baptisteries in the time of Constantine the Great we have abundant proof' (*DCA*, p. 174). The practice of erecting separate buildings for the celebration of baptism continued in the West at least all through this period. It served to add solemnity to the rite of initiation. (2) The *elaboration of the ritual* served the same end. On p. 386 f. the development up to the time of Tert. is briefly summarized. If we compare the account in Theodulph of Orleans with that statement, the following additions are obvious. The practice of infant baptism by the close of the 8th cent. has led to the inclusion of the rites of the catechumenate in the *Ordo Baptismi*. The infants are first made catechumens, then breathed upon by the priest to receive the breath of the new life (insufflation). This is followed by exorcism and the reception of salt. It is probable, from Aug.'s reference in *de Pecc. remiss.* c. *Pel.* i. 34, that those rites were associated with infant baptism as early as his day. The *scrutinium*, to which Theodulph next refers, can have been only a form in the case of infants. The nose and ears were then touched with spittle, while the priest said 'Ephphatha.' This was followed by an anointing of the breast and shoulders with oil. This seems to be a weakened form of the preparatory unction which was certainly in use in the East in the time of Cyril of Jerusalem (see *Catech. Lect.* xx. 3). After baptism, Theodulph mentions the bestowing of white robes and of a mystic veil on the candidate, in addition to the chrism referred to by Tertullian. The clothing of the baptized with white garments is quite early, well-attested in the 4th century. Theodulph does not refer to the practice of handing over candles or torches to the neophytes to be lit up towards the close of the service, but the usage is clearly evidenced in Gregory of Nazianzus and in Ambrose, and is still preserved in the Roman ritual (see Höfling, i. 543). The use of milk and honey, mentioned in Tert., does not appear in Theodulph, and the history of this usage is obscure. As late as the 9th cent. there seems to have been a custom in some Western churches of mixing milk and honey in the communion wine offered to infants (Höfling, i. 546). A Gallican sacramentary adds the washing of the feet (*lotio pedum, pedilavium*) to the other ceremonies. Perhaps the most important addition after the 2nd cent. was the elaborate renunciation of the devil, together with all his works and pomps. The ceremonial development is an elaborate repetition of the central idea of the rite in additional symbolic acts. It tended to increase the mystery element in baptism. (3) A well-known story related in Socrates (*HE* ii. 16) forms the most striking illustration of the 4th cent. belief in the objective validity of the sacrament. The story is simply that the bishop of Alexandria accepted as valid a baptism administered by Athanasius as a boy to some companions who joined him in a game of pretence in which the ceremonial was imitated. The writer in *DCA* (p. 167) remarks that, whether true or legendary, 'it serves equally to illustrate the feeling of the Church at the time the story was first told.' Though baptism declined somewhat in importance after the 5th cent., the point of view here obtained was never lost. It was held (1) that baptism is essential to salvation;* (2) that baptism is valid if water and the true formula be used; (3) that baptism so administered confers an indispensable spiritual gift. This leads on to the discussion of—

II. *THE CONCEPTION OF BAPTISMAL GRACE IN THIS PERIOD.*—The primary gift in baptism is, of course, the remission of sins. 'Baptizati sumus, et fugit a nobis solicitudo vitæ præteritæ' (Aug. *Conf.* ix. 6). In the case of children, it is the guilt of original sin which is removed. There is an interesting observation in Cyril to the effect that 'remission of sins is given equally to all, but the communication of the Holy Ghost is bestowed according to each man's faith' (*Catech. Lect.* i. 5). The grace of forgiveness was, at any rate, assured. But baptism means more than this. It is essentially regeneration, and perhaps two main ideas may be grouped under this head: (1) the loosening of Satan's hold over the soul, (2) an organic inward change. (1) It is clear that to Cyprian baptism appealed as a peculiarly strong form of exorcism. Just as the Red Sea drowned Pharaoh, so baptism drowns the devil out of a man. 'Cum tamen ad aquam salutarem, atque ad baptismi sanctificationem venitur, scire debemus et fidere, quia illic diabolus opprimitur et homo Deo dicatus divina indulgentia liberatur . . . Spiritus nequam . . . permanere ultra non possunt in hominis corpore, in quo baptizato et sanctificato incipit spiritus sanctus habitare' (*Ep.* 76). Cyprian has previously pointed out that in exorcism the devil often plays the deceiver and says he has gone out when he has not; but the life-giving water is a sure means of expulsion. Somewhat similarly, in the apocryphal *Acts of Thomas*, a woman out of whom a devil has been cast asks the Apostle to give her the seal, 'that yonder fiend may not return to me again' ('Thomasakten,' § 49; *ap.* Hennecke, *Neutest. Apoc.*). In the baptism of infants, the exorcism and the renunciation were but parts of the process which was

* The only exception contemplated was martyrdom. Thus Cyril: 'If a man receive not baptism he has not salvation, excepting only the martyrs, who even without water enter the Kingdom' (*Catech. Lect.* iii. 10; cf. Baptism by Blood).

completed in immersion. Every one, in virtue of birth, stands within the kingdom of Satan. This, to Aug., is clear from the fact that the soul of a new-born infant suffers 'several passions and torturings of the body, and, what is more dreadful, the outrage of evil spirits' (*de Pecc.* iii. 10). Why are infants exorcised at all, if they do not belong to the household of Satan? (*de Pecc.* i. 34). Aug.'s views here rest ultimately on the grand conception of the two cities, the City of God and its rival. The transition from the latter to the former is effected in baptism.

(2) Not only, however, is the devil driven out of possession, but the soul is cleansed and reformed in the process of regeneration. At times, and in the case of some persons, even bodily tendencies are completely removed. In a wonderful letter (*Ep.* 1), Cyp. speaks of the thorough change of character wrought in baptism. He explains to Donatus that for a long time he was sceptical on the subject. He could not believe that the extravagant man could be made thrifty, the luxurious induced to return to simplicity, the licentious persuaded into chastity.

'With enticements always gripping a man fast, revelling must as usual attract, pride as usual inflate, anger inflame. Greed will not cease to disquiet, cruelty will not lose its sting. The delight of ambition, the overwhelming power of lust, will not be less. So I thought. . . . But after the taint of my past life had been washed away with the aid of the regenerating wave, after light had poured from above into my cleansed heart, now calm and pure, after the second birth had made me a new man by the draught of the heaven-born spirit, then forthwith, in a wonderful fashion, things I had doubted became certain; closed doors opened; dark places were filled with light; what had seemed difficult was now easy; what I thought impossible became possible; so that I could not but see that the "I" of my previous fleshly birth, which had lived bound to sins, had been of the earth, whereas the "I," in which the Holy Spirit now breathed, had begun to be of God' (*Ep.* i. 3).

Without attempting to analyze this beautiful passage, we may recognize that for Cyp. baptism meant the lessening of temptation. On this he is elsewhere very emphatic; for, when a correspondent is puzzled that sick persons after being baptized are still tempted of the devil, Cyprian's answer is practically to deny the fact (see *Ep.* 76). The same thought is expressed more crudely in the *Acts of Paul and Thekla*, where Thekla says, 'Give me the seal in Christ, and no temptation will invade me' (Hennecke, *op. cit.* 'Paulusakten,' § 25). The passage in the *Confessions* (i. 11), where Aug. wonders whether it would not have been better for him to have been baptized earlier, suggests that he would have sinned less in that case, not only because of the sense of responsibility attaching to baptism, but also because of the grace to live up to that responsibility which he would thereby have received. But this idea hardly needs illustration. The lessening of the power of temptation is brought about in two ways, viz. by the loosening of the hold of previously formed sinful habits, and by the gift of new life in the Spirit. The distinction is most interestingly presented in a passage from Basil:

'Hence it follows that the answer to our question why the water was associated with the Spirit is clear; the reason is because in baptism two ends are proposed: on the one hand, the destroying of the body of sin that it may never bear fruit unto death; on the other hand, our living with the Spirit and having our fruit in holiness: the water receiving the body as in a tomb figures death, while the Spirit pours in the quickening power, renewing our souls from the deadness of sin unto their original life. This then is what it is to be born again of water and of the Spirit, the being made dead being effected in the water, while our life is wrought in us through the Spirit' (*de Sp. Sanc.* 15; Oxford tr. by C. H. Johnston).

This first end—the death unto sin in baptism—is, of course, a commonplace in all discussions of the subject. The tendency was to conceive the grace of baptism as specially directed to counteract concupiscence, which formed the primary factor in original sin (see Aug. *Ench.* 64). Among the rhetorical epithets which Gregory of Nazianzus applies to baptism, not the least significant is his description of the new birth as λυτικὴ παθῶν, in contrast to carnal birth. Basil, again, explains the pillar of cloud as 'a shadow of the gift of the Spirit who cools the flame of our passions by the mortification of our members' (*de Sp. Sanc.* ch. 14).* So much, indeed, was expected of this destruction of sinward tendencies, that Hilary had to warn his readers against supposing that baptism would restore to them the innocence of childhood. Similarly Aug. is very careful not to exaggerate the benefits of baptism when he says (*de Pecc.* i. 39):

'Evacuatur [caro peccati] non ut in ipsa vivente carne concupiscentia conspersa et innata repente absumatur et non sit, sed ne obsit mortuo [parvulo] quæ inerat nato. Nam si post baptismum vixerit, . . . ibi habet cum qua pugnet, eamque adiuvante Deo superet, si non in vacuum gratiam eius susceperit. . . . Nam nec grandibus hoc præstatur in baptismo (nisi forte miraculo ineffabili omnipotentissimi creatoris) ut lex peccati quæ inest in membris repugnans legi mentis, penitus extinguatur et non sit: sed ut quicquid mali ab homine factum, dictum, cogitatum est, cum eidem concupiscentiæ subjecta mente serviret, totum abo-leatur, ac velut factum non fuerit, habeatur.'

For Aug. baptism means the breaking down of sinful habit, the bestowal of a special grace of resistance, but not the entire removal of the enemy. The new life in the Holy Spirit is not altogether distinct from this loosening of sinful habit, but it is something more than this. 'Baptism purges our sins and conveys to us the gift of the Holy Spirit' (Cyril, *Catech. Lect.* xx. 6). More than once in the 4th and 5th cent. literature the thought appears that baptism makes a Divine impress (*effigies*) on the raw material (*terra*) of human nature (Aug. *Conf.* i. 11, xiii. 12). The raw material is, so to speak, cleansed for the reception of the Spirit, and then receives the stamp of the image of God. 'The water cleanses the body, the Spirit seals the soul' (Cyril, *Catech. Lect.* iii. 4). The natural powers of men did then and there receive a Divine reinforcement. Hilary claims that the doctrine of the Trinity can be understood only by the regenerate mind. 'Novis enim regenerati ingenii sensibus opus est ut unumquemque conscientia sua secundum cœlestis originis munus illuminet' (Hil. *de Trin.* i. 18). The power and presence of the Spirit were bestowed in baptism, though, according to Cyril, the gift of the Spirit was proportioned to faith (*Catech. Lect.* i. 5). Thus baptism did not simply secure the remission of sins: it tamed the fierceness of temptation; it broke 'the power of cancelled sin'; it began the new life.

Note on Confirmation and Baptism.—At the beginning of the 3rd cent., Confirmation and Baptism were universally parts of the same rite. This close connexion continued to be normal for the 3rd and 4th cents., though in the West Confirmation began to be detached from Baptism 'shortly before the middle of the 3rd century' (Harnack, *op. cit.* ii. 141, n. 3). By the close of the period, they are usually separated in the West (see Theodulph, *de Ordine Baptism.* 17); but 'it was not till the thirteenth century that the two ordinances were permanently separated, and an interval of from seven to fourteen years allowed to intervene' (*DCA*, p. 425).

The writers of this period do not hesitate to attribute the very highest spiritual blessings to baptism (see, *e.g.*, the authorities cited in Stone, *Holy Baptism*, ch. v. n. 11). But it is difficult to say how far they attributed these blessings to baptism in the narrow sense of the term, as distinct from Confirmation. A definite line of doctrine associated the cleansing with immersion, and the gift of the Holy Spirit with the imposition of the hands of the bishop. The man who was baptized and not confirmed was like a cleansed temple without a Divine tenant. This view rested on a very early tradition (see p. 382 f. on Acts and 387 on Tert.). It appears in Cyp. (*Ep.* 74, § 5), and most clearly in Cornelius's verdict on Novatian (Eus. *HE* vi. 43). Novatian had been baptized on his bed during sickness. On recovery he failed to receive the supplementary rites: more particularly he was not sealed by the bishop. Since he missed this, how could he have received the Holy Ghost? (οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ἔτυχε, διαφυγὼν τὴν νόσον, ὧν χρὴ μεταλαμβάνειν κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἐκκλησίας κανόνα, τοῦ τε σφραγισθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπισκόπου. Τούτου δὲ μὴ τυχών, πῶς ἂν τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος ἔτυχε;). Perhaps this passage should not be pressed, as it is the product of controversy; but it is evidence for the practice of the Church in the case of 'clinics.' If they recovered, their baptism, which would otherwise have been counted sufficient in itself, must be completed by Confirmation

* The connexion between chastity and baptism had been over-emphasized in some heretical sects. Cf. p. 388 on Marcion, and also note *Acts of Thomas* here.

if it was to be effective.* It further shows that normally baptism was not complete without the laying on of hands, and consequently this part of the ceremony was essential to the reception of the Holy Ghost.

The development of thought on the subject during this period seems to have been briefly this :—

(1) Cyprian and his supporters regarded immersion and the laying on of hands as inseparable parts of the same sacrament, which could not safely be administered apart. This latter assertion is aimed at the Roman view. See *Ep.* 73, and note the strong view of Remesianus (in *Cypriani Opera*, ed. Hartel, i. p. 639): 'Neque enim spiritus sanctus sine aqua separatim operari potest nec aqua sine spiritu. Male ergo sibi quidam interpretantur ut dicant quod per manus impositionem spiritum sanctum accipiant et sic recipiantur, cum manifestum sit utroque sacramento debere eos renasci in ecclesia catholica' (Harnack, ii. p. 141, n. 1).

(2) As we have seen earlier, the author of the *de Rebaptismate* contends that spiritual baptism is essentially bound up with the laying on of hands, and that, though water and Confirmation are necessary to a complete Christian baptism, yet the two parts of the one rite may be sundered in time. The benefits of immersion are latent until the rite is supplemented by the laying on of hands. On this view, as on Cyprian's, the laying on of hands is essential to the gift of the Holy Spirit, but the two parts of the one sacrament are separable. It may be noted here that, even after baptism began to be more frequently administered by presbyters and deacons, and the episcopal Confirmation was separated from baptism in point of time, they were not immediately regarded as distinct sacraments. Confirmation completes baptism. Thus the Council of Elvira (324 ?) ordered that in the case of those who had been baptized by a deacon, 'sine episcopo vel presbytero,' the bishop 'per benedictionem perficere debet.' In this edict, baptism by the presbyter includes the laying on of hands: but Jerome seems to confine the latter to bishops, who were to travel round their districts and lay hands on the baptized *ad invocationem Sp. Sancti* (see *DCA*, 'Confirmation,' p. 425, where *c. Lucifer.* 4 is cited). In the 8th cent. Theodulph, as noted, expressly reserves Confirmation to the bishop. However, the canon of the Council of Elvira clearly shows that Confirmation was regarded as the necessary complement to Baptism, and that the two ordinances could be received at different times (cf. also *Tracts for the Times*, 67, p. 153 n.).

(3) Jerome, in his discussion with the Luciferians, asserts that the Holy Spirit is bestowed in true baptism; and he regards the insistence on episcopal Confirmation as mainly a matter of Church order, intended rather for the honour of the priesthood than for any rule of necessity ('ad honorem potius sacerdotii quam ad legem necessitatis'). He argues that those who are baptized in outlying districts, and who fail to be confirmed, would be in a deplorable position, if the gift of the Holy Spirit can be received only through the laying on of hands. He claims that the case of the eunuch whom Philip baptized proves that the Holy Spirit is really given in baptism (*Dial. c. Lucif.*, *ap.* Höfling, i. 505). In this position, Jerome represents the development which was almost inevitable as soon as baptism and Confirmation were considered as separable within the Church, and the separation was no longer that between heretical baptism and orthodox Confirmation. In the latter case, it was natural to assert that the gift of the Holy Spirit depended on Confirmation; in the former it was equally natural to claim that there was a clear bestowal of the Holy Spirit in baptism apart from Confirmation. The ultimately predominant view in the West was expressed in a Gallician homily (author unknown) on Pentecost, from which the following sentences are taken: 'Ergo Sp. Sanctus, qui super aquas baptismi salutifero descendit illapsu, in fonte tribuit plenitudinem ad innocentiam, in confirmatione augmentum præstat ad gratiam. Quia in hoc mundo tota ætate victuris inter invisibiles hostes et pericula gradiendum est, in baptismo regeneramur ad vitam, post baptismum confirmamur ad pugnam, in b. abluimur, post b. roboramur. Ac sic continuo transituris sufficiunt regenerationis beneficia, victuris autem necessaria sunt confirmationis auxilia.' In this way Baptism and Confirmation tend to become two independent sacraments, each really bestowing the Spirit, and each endowed with a special grace.

In Augustine's discussion of heretical baptism, the conception of special graces attaching to baptism and the laying on of hands had been clearly emphasized. Baptism of itself imparted a certain stamp to the soul, and the *manus impositio* resulted in the bestowal of that highest gift of the Spirit, the bond of love which could be received only in communion with the Catholic Church (see passages collected in Höfling, i. 506 f.). This highest gift of love was necessary to the heretic if what he had received in baptism was not to work him eternal ruin; it was equally necessary to the orthodox believer, *ad confirmationem unitatis in ecclesia*—to borrow the phrase of a later writer, Haymo.

It should further be noted that all the effects of baptism were the work of the Holy Spirit. Even where there is a tendency to regard baptism as a preparatory cleansing, this cleansing is in itself the gift of the Holy Spirit, an evidence of the operation of the Holy Spirit in the soul of the baptized. The emphasis on this is universal. Take, *e.g.*, Origen's insistence on the importance of the invocation: 'The bath of regeneration . . . is no longer mere water: for it is sanctified by a mystic invocation' . . . οὐκέτι μὲν ψιλὸν ὕδωρ· ἁγιάζεται γὰρ μυστικῇ τινι ἐπικλήσει (*ad* Jn 3[5] fr. 36). If in Aug. the invocation is not felt to be indispensable, the reason is that all water has been consecrated, both by the baptism of Jesus and by the fact of the Holy Spirit brooding over it at creation. Water is the natural instrument of the Spirit, and it is cleansing only because the Spirit works through it. Thus in the *Ench.* Aug. points out that, though Christians are said to be born of water, they are not sons of water, but sons of the Spirit and of their mother the Church (cf. Basil, *de Sp. Sanc.* 15). All that takes place in baptism is spiritual; and even those who connect the Holy Spirit most closely with Confirmation recognize a gift of the Spirit in baptism, if they accept baptism as valid at all. Indeed it is mainly in limiting the benefits of heretical baptism that the earlier view found in Tert. is pressed. When men's thoughts were not troubled with the question presented by the separation of the two ordinances, they unhesitatingly attributed the gift of the Spirit in the fullest sense to baptism. Thus Basil (*op. cit.* 15) distinctly connects the pouring in of the Spirit and the beginning of the new life with immersion. 'The water receiving the body as in a tomb figures death, while the Spirit pours in the quickening power, renewing our souls from the deadness of sin unto their original life. . . . In three immersions, then, and with three invocations, the great mystery of baptism is performed.' Though Basil even here does not use the term 'the indwelling of the Spirit,' yet surely it is implied; and this is the unembarrassed expression of the natural Christian view of baptism. For further discussion see Mason, *Relation of Confirmation to Baptism*, and Höfling, § 94.

III. *THE BEARING OF BAPTISM ON THE CHURCH LIFE OF THIS PERIOD.* — One or two general observations must be added here.

(*a*) The whole development in the earlier centuries here under review reflects *the influence of the pagan background on the Church's life.* It is true that the institution of baptism cannot be traced to a Gentile source. But the insistence on the objective efficacy of the sacrament is largely the result of pagan presuppositions. The idea of regeneration may not be derived from the heathen world; men's preoccupation with it comes from this source (cf. Heitmüller on John, in *Die Schriften des NT*, ii. 743). It may be that no parts of the Christian ceremonial are borrowed from the Mysteries: but the tendency to add to the solemnity of initiation, which is implied in the ceremonial development, is one of the characteristics of the Mysteries. The close connexion of baptism with exorcism and with the renunciation of the devil is derived not from the NT, but from the demon environment in which the Church was actually living. If the bestowal of grace through visible objects be a primitive Christian conception, the emphasis on the material means was largely evoked by pagan feeling. The purpose of the sacramental side of the Church's life may have been designed to give that assurance of real contact with God somewhere which so many despairing pagans failed to find anywhere. It may be doubted whether the certainty about God for which men longed intensely could have been mediated on any large scale to the world at that time except through the conception of sacramental means of grace.

In this connexion the reader must be referred to the popular views mentioned on p. 394. Some of these betray a non-Christian emphasis. It is probable that the Punic Christians who spoke of baptism as *salus* implied much that Aug. would have hesitated to endorse. A perhaps more than Christian confidence seems to be displayed on sarcophagi of the 4th and 5th centuries, since the present writer understands that the description of the deceased as 'baptized' was as reassuring as phrases like *inter sanctos*.

(*b*) The rite of baptism *focused attention on some central Christian truths.* Thus, those who received it were led to reflect on the doctrine of the Trinity. In the teaching of Aug. the idea of regeneration in itself suggested and enforced the fundamental concept of grace. Baptism meant that salvation is God's work, and apart from Him it does not even begin (cf. *Tracts for the Times*, 67, pp. 91–97).

(*c*) As interpreted by the great teachers, *e.g.* Basil and Cyril of Jerusalem, *baptism became a powerful moral lever.* The ethical and the sacra-

* This consideration rather weakens the force of the argument based on Cyp. *Ep.* 76. There Cyp. argues that *clinici*, although merely sprinkled (*perfusi*) and not immersed (*loti*), are as truly baptized as any, and that in them the Holy Spirit dwells. But, as he seems to be speaking of recovered *clinici*, it cannot be assumed with Darwell Stone (*op. cit.* p. 80) that they had not been confirmed.

mental were neither separated nor opposed in the minds of the Fathers of the 4th and 5th centuries. *ἆρα πᾶς ὁ βαπτισθεὶς τὸ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου βάπτισμα ὀφειλέτης ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ζῆν*—is the conclusion of the discussion of the first question in Bk. ii. of Basil's work on Baptism. It is the motto of all his treatment of the subject. To him baptism is primarily a death, which commits us to a new life (see his *de Bapt.* i., and *de Sp. Sanc.* 15, § 35, and cf. Cyril, *Catech. Lect.*, Introd. § 4, and Lect. ii.). Clearly his view of baptism and its moral effects is derived from the conversions which must have been constantly associated with the rite. And his exposition of the life demanded from the baptized shows that it was possible only to a morally renewed character. The association of this moral change with baptism, and the emphasis on the moral obligations therein assumed, must have made it a powerful factor in raising the moral life. Moreover, the preparation for baptism and the actual ceremony marked most impressively the convert's complete break with paganism. The Christians thought of themselves as a distinct race (cf. Aristides); it is difficult to over-estimate the moral stimulus of the solemn initiation which made a man a member of that race. But the influence of baptism in this direction was certainly diminished as the catechumenate decayed. The moral power of infant baptism could never be as great.

(*d*) It must, however, be remembered that the decay of the catechumenate and the practice of infant baptism enabled the Church to Christianize the barbarian nations more rapidly than if the older system had been retained. 'At a later time, baptism brought a man under the jurisdiction of the Church. The Inquisition had no authority over a non-baptized person. To baptize a man was therefore to bring him under jurisdiction. Thus, in the case of the Saxons in Charles the Great's day, and the Danes in Alfred's, baptism was a token of submission' (note by Foakes-Jackson). With this readier admission to the Church went, no doubt, *the decay of the Puritan conception of the Church*. 'But it is clear that if the Church was to gain any hold upon the society of the old world which was to pass away, or upon the new races that were to take their place, it must receive them into its fold as they were' (A. V. G. Allen, *Christian Institutions*, p. 408). This was certainly true of the new races.

2. The Middle Ages and the Council of Trent.—Though Scholasticism devoted much attention to the sacraments, the mediæval Church added little to the doctrine of Baptism. The position arrived at in the earlier period was simply defended and defined against heresy and malpractice. Developments were few. The re-statement of the orthodox view in the Lateran Council of 1216 may be taken as the starting-point for a few observations. The definition there adopted was 'Sacramentum vero baptismi, quod ad invocationem individuæ trinitatis, videlicet, Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti, consecratur in aqua tam parvulis quam adultis, in forma ecclesiæ a quocumque rite collatum, proficit ad salutem' (Labbe, *Concilia*, xi. 143).

(*a*) The main point asserted here is that *baptism does produce a real effect which makes for salvation, even in infants.* Innocent III. held that, as original sin was contracted by infants *sine consensu*, so they could be freed from it, *per vim sacramenti*, before they were of an age to understand and consent. Similarly, he thought that baptism would be effective if administered to men asleep or mad, provided they had previously shown an intention of receiving the sacrament. Only a definite resistance at the time of baptism could render it inoperative (Denzinger, *Enchiridion*, 341 f.). Repentant Waldensians must approve the baptism of infants (*ib.* 370). Earlier Councils had anathematized heretics who asserted 'parvulis inutiliter baptismum conferre.' The Lateran Council of 1139 condemned those who rejected the *baptisma puerorum*. Denzinger identifies these heretics with the followers of Peter of Bruys and Arnold of Brescia. Similarly, the Council of Rheims in 1148 condemned the Henricians. The general sacramentalism of most Scholastics, early and late, emphasized the real effectiveness of baptism. To Hugo de S. Victor, Augustine's definition of a sacrament as *signum rei divinæ* seemed inadequate. He preferred to speak of a sacrament as 'corporale vel materiale elementum foris sensibiliter propositum, ex similitudine repræsentans, ex institutione significans, et ex sanctificatione continens aliquam invisibilem et spiritualem gratiam.' Similarly, the sacraments of the NT differ from those of the OT by being more effective. The latter promise, whereas the former give, salvation (see the well-known sentence in Peter Lombard *ap.* Hagenbach, *Dogmengesch.*[3] 452). Later, Thomas Aquinas holds that 'necesse est dicere sacramenta novæ legis per aliquem modum gratiam causare.' That the NT sacraments work *ex opere operato* was a not uncommon view (cf. Hagenbach, p. 453, n. 7). Consequently Thomas Aquinas regarded baptism as a *causa instrumentalis* of grace, though he held that it 'does not act by virtue of its own form, but only through the impulse it receives from the principal agent' (Harnack, vi. 206). For this reason the institution or appointment of the sacrament is all-important to Aquinas. He was the first to trace all the seven sacraments of the Schoolmen back to Christ, whose Passion made them of worth. More especially in Baptism, as in Confirmation and Ordination, a certain stamp (*character*) is irrevocably assumed by the recipient (see the definition by Eugenius IV.: 'Inter hæc sacramenta, tria sunt, Baptisma, Confirmatio, et Ordo, quæ characterem *i.e.* spirituale quoddam signum a ceteris distinctivum imprimunt in anima indelebile, unde in eadem persona non reiterantur'). From this standpoint the Lateran Council of 1216 had rebuked the Greeks for re-baptizing those whom the Latins had already baptized (Denz. 361). Some of the Schoolmen seem to have doubted whether baptism conveyed to infants anything more than the remission of the guilt of original sin. But in 1312, Clement V. lent the weight of his authority to the alternative doctrine that not only was guilt remitted, but 'virtutes ac informans gratia infunduntur quoad habitum, etsi non pro illo tempore quoad usum' (Denzinger, 411).

(*b*) *The general necessity of water-baptism to salvation was steadily maintained*, Jn 3[5] being the chief authority for the position (see Bull of Eug. IV.; cf. Denz. 591). Thomas Aquinas, however, regarded Flagellants as, equally with the martyrs, baptized in blood; and such baptism made the use of water non-essential. Also, the clear intention to be baptized might stand for the deed. Thus Innocent III. declares that an unbaptized priest (!), who died *sine unda baptismatis* but strong in faith, must be held to have reached the joy of the land celestial (see Denz. 343). But baptism *aut in voto aut in re* is necessary. This position was maintained against the Cathari, who rejected water-baptism as an empty ceremony. It would also be maintained against those who, following Joachim de Flore, regarded sacraments as a temporary expedient, doomed to disappear in the Kingdom of the Spirit. That the sacraments might ultimately be left behind was not denied; but that such a stage had been reached or was imminent, or that such a stage would ever come to the Church Militant on earth, was not to be admitted.

(*c*) *The minister of baptism was usually the priest*, and in the mission churches of Germany

the ceremony was by preference administered in the mother-church of a given group (Hauck, *Kirchengesch. Deutschlands*, iv. 23). But the Lateran Council of 1216 is careful to state that baptism is valid, by whomsoever duly administered. In cases of necessity, no restriction is observed, provided the minister keeps to the Church's form and intends to do what the Church does. Eugenius IV. states the matter thus: 'Minister huius sacramenti est sacerdos, cui ex officio competit baptizare. In causa autem necessitatis non solum sacerdos vel diaconus, sed etiam laicus vel mulier, immo etiam paganus et hæreticus baptizare potest dummodo formam servet Ecclesiæ et facere intendat quod facit Ecclesia' (Denz. 591). Innocent III. does not even emphasize the occasion of necessity, and in the earlier Middle Ages lay baptism may have been not infrequent. The Church was also careful to assert that the character of the minister did not impugn the validity of the sacrament. This view was urged against the Waldensians, on whom Innocent III. imposed the following recantation: 'Sacramenta quoque . . . licet a peccatore sacerdote ministrentur, dum Ecclesia eum recipit, in nullo reprobamus' (Denz. 370). This position needed also to be upheld in the face of popular superstition. Thus, somnambulists were popularly supposed to have been baptized by drunken priests, and in 1375 there was an uproar in a Dutch town because an epidemic of St. Vitus's dance was attributed to the incontinence of the priests who had administered baptism (see Lecky, *Hist. of Rationalism*, i. 399, note). The prevalence of such ideas would make it necessary to assert that the sacrament depended on the intention and not on the character of the minister. That, however, a minister was necessary was as steadily maintained. Innocent III. condemns the self-baptism of a dying Jew (Denz. 344).

(*d*) *The essentials of baptism remained unchanged.* The rite was duly administered if the name of the Trinity was invoked, and if water was used. Some phrase must be used to state the fact that the candidate is being baptized. It is not enough to say 'In nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti,' and immerse. The omission of 'Ego baptizo te' is condemned by Alexander III., and the condemnation was repeated in 1690 (Denz. 331, 1184). But both the Latin formula 'Ego baptizo te in nomine . . .' and the Greek 'Baptizatus est talis in nomine . . .' are recognized as valid by the Bull of Eugenius IV. (Denz. 591).

As to the second element, the use of true natural water, hot or cold, was alone recognized in baptism (see Eug. Bull). Innocent III. declared a baptism of an infant *in extremis* with human saliva to be invalid (Denz. 345). A special sanctity attached to water. The earlier discussions as to the possibility of baptizing in wine or milk or sand were not seriously revived.

Perhaps the only important change in the form of baptism was the general substitution in the West of sprinkling for immersion. The West seems always to have been readier to alter tradition in this matter than the East. Thus, while the East retained trine immersion, Gregory the Great had permitted, in Spain, the adoption of one immersion (*Ep.* i. 43, ratified in Council of Toledo, 633). Affusion had from the earliest times been permitted, at least in cases of necessity. In the Middle Ages, from the 13th cent. onwards, *baptisma per aspersionem* became more and more common. The decree of Innocent III., cited in the previous paragraph, implies it. Thomas Aquinas compared sprinkling with immersion, and, while preferring the latter as better representing the death to sin, regarded the former as valid. Clement V. formally recognized the practice (1305), and in the 15th century Lyndwood (iii. 25) declared that 'it is sufficient that a small drop of water thrown by the baptizer touch him who is to be baptized. It is sufficient that water which has been sprinkled touch some part of the body' (cited *ap.* Stone, p. 272). It appears that England did not so readily abandon the older practice of immersion as the Continental churches. According to Floyer (*History of Cold Bathing*, p. 63, ed. 1706), Erasmus noted it as a singularity in England that infants were still immersed, and sprinkling did not become general till after the Reformation (see Wall, pt. ii. ch. 9, for full discussion).

(*e*) In Germany, at least, *an attempt was made to magnify the office of godfather.* It was expected that godfathers would instruct their godchildren in the Creed and the Lord's Prayer (Hauck, *op. cit.* iv. 38). This was a poor substitute for systematic instruction by the priest, but it was an attempt to attach a real responsibility to the office of godfather. The Council of Trent subsequently emphasized the importance of sponsors by forbidding marriage between persons who stood in the relationship of godfather and godchild. They were regarded as within the prohibited degrees (Sessio 24, ch. 2).

The moral power and general importance of baptism were diminished by the enhanced value set on the sacrament of Penance. In the decrees of the Lateran Council of 1216, the decree relative to baptism is immediately followed by a reference to penance: 'Et si post susceptionem baptismi quisquam prolapsus fuerit in peccatum, per veram pœnitentiam *semper* potest reparari.' The early Church had refused to follow the Novatians and condemn penitents to despair; but, whereas the early Church held out hope to the penitent, the mediæval Church offered them the assurance of recovery in the sacrament of Penance. This tended to minimize the horror of post-baptismal sin, or, perhaps it would be truer to say, it recognized the absence of any such distress in the mediæval believer.

The Council of Trent systematized the mediæval doctrine and practice. In the 5th session, original sin and the relation of baptism to original sin were discussed. Adam's transgression meant that he lost his original righteousness, incurred God's wrath, became liable to death, was under the power of Satan, and suffered a change for the worse in body and spirit. These effects are transmitted to all his posterity. This sin of Adam is passed on to every one, and can be removed only by the merit of Christ. His merit avails for young and old in the sacrament of baptism. Infants are to be baptized, not that sins of their own committing may be forgiven, but 'ut in eis regeneratione mundetur quod generatione contraxerunt.' The necessity of regeneration rests on Jn 3^5. The guilt of original sin is removed in baptism, and the regenerate are no longer sinful in the eyes of God, though there remains in them a root of concupiscence which is left for them to struggle against. This concupiscence must not be called 'sin,' if by the term it is implied that there is anything in the regenerate which can properly be called sin. It is sin only in so far as it comes from sin and leads to it. During the 7th session, the Council put forth 16 anathemas on the subject of baptism. They assert the following points: the baptism of John is not the same as that of Christ; natural water is necessary to baptism; the Church of Rome has the true doctrine on this subject; heretical baptism, administered in the name of the Trinity and with the true intention of the Church, is valid; baptism is not a matter of choice, but is necessary to salvation; the baptized can lose grace, through sin, even if they retain faith; the baptized are bound not simply to believe, but also to keep the whole

law of Christ: the baptized must conform to the teaching of the Church; vows made after baptism cannot be regarded as cancelled by the baptismal confession; post-baptismal sin cannot be done away with merely by the memory of baptism; a repentant apostate does not need to be re-baptized; no one should assert that a candidate for baptism must be of the same age as our Lord at His baptism; infants must not be denied baptism because they cannot exercise conscious faith; the ratification of baptism by the baptized when of age is not optional.

The Council regarded baptism as the *causa instrumentalis* of justification, adopting the phrase of Thomas Aquinas (Sess. vi. ch. 7), and further distinguished between Baptism and Penance. In the former the priest does not act as judge. He must admit all to baptism. Baptism means a new creation, and is the free gift of grace. It cannot be repeated. Penance, on the other hand, is controlled by the priest as a judge, can be repeated, and is rightly described as a laborious baptism.

A brief analysis of the Roman ritual for administering baptism to infants may complete this section. The priest meets the company at the door of the church. After the question, What do you want of the Church? and the answer, the priest drives out the unclean spirit by exsufflation. He then makes the sign of the cross with his finger over the forehead and over the heart of the child. After two prayers, salt—the salt of wisdom—is given to the child. A further prayer is followed by exorcism. The priest now brings the child into the church and approaches the font, repeating the Creed and the Lord's Prayer as he goes. A second exorcism is pronounced, and the priest wets his finger, and with it touches the ears and nostrils of the child, saying 'Be opened.' The sponsors on behalf of the child renounce the devil with all his pomps and works, and the priest proceeds to anoint the child with holy oil, on the breast and between the shoulders, in the form of a cross. The sponsors repeat the Creed. Baptism follows by triple affusion or by immersion. Where there is a doubt whether the child has not already been baptized, the priest prefaces the formula with the words 'si non es baptizatus.' The child is now anointed with the holy chrism on the top of the head. A white cloth is placed on his head and a lighted candle is given to him or his godfather to hold. The ceremony concludes with a benediction.

The developments of the Reformation will most readily be classified by their relation to this standard of doctrine and practice.

3. The Reformation Period and after.—The mediæval development, summed up in the Tridentine decrees, had emphasized the paramount importance of the sacraments for religion. The sacraments are pre-eminently the means of grace, and by them the Divine influence is accommodated to the varying necessities of differing periods of the Christian life. With Baptism is bound up the grace of regeneration, the forgiveness of original sin, and of all actual sins committed before its reception. Without it we cannot enter on the Christian life. Other sacraments—Confirmation, Penance, and the Eucharist—are ordained of God to provide the grace demanded by the later needs of the believer. The essential efficacy of baptism was strongly asserted. It imprints even on passive recipients a Divine impress or character.* An elaborate ritual, if explained and understood, enforced the central idea of the new birth by symbolic reiteration; if unexplained and misunderstood, it still enhanced the sense of mystery surrounding the sacrament, though it tended to produce popular superstition.* For good or ill, it increased the importance of the ceremony. This standard of doctrine and practice underwent considerable modification in the Protestant Churches.

It would involve needless repetition to discuss in detail the position of each Church. Instead, we shall show how the views of the sacrament were affected by some of the leading ideas of the Reformation, giving illustrations from the formularies and practices of particular Churches. The changed conception of grace which carried with it a revised conception of the means of grace; the new idea of faith, and the fresh emphasis thrown upon it; the appeal from tradition to the Bible; the humanism and rationalism of the Renaissance—all these influences in their several ways profoundly affected the doctrine and practice of baptism. These leading forces may be discussed in order, though any attempt to keep them rigidly apart must be artificial.

A. The Conceptions of Grace and Faith.—The Reformers' conceptions of grace and faith are inseparably connected. It is a commonplace that the fundamental fact in the Reformation, at least as dominated by Luther, was the renewal of the Pauline experience of justification by faith. Forgiveness of sins and fellowship with God became realities to a penitent trust in the Divine Love. The assurance to which faith clung was mediated through the word or promise of God, however preached. The entry of the grace of God into the believing heart might be effected in many ways—by prayer, by the ministry of a preacher, by the reading of the Bible. Faith comes by hearing. Wherever the influence of Luther or of Calvin went, this kind of faith—a conscious penitent trust in the Gospel—was aroused, and it tended to revolutionize men's views of the sacraments.

(1) *The sacraments came to be regarded as one means of grace among others.* To Luther the sacraments are nothing but 'a peculiar form of the saving word of God (of the self-realizing promise of God)' (Harnack, vii. p. 216). The influence of the sacraments was thus assimilated to the influence of preaching. Calvin, in the first edition of the *Institutes*, discusses prayer and faith before he comes to the sacraments at all. *The sacraments have ceased to be central.* Other means of grace—prayer, the devotional study of the Scriptures, the development of preaching—have been placed alongside of and even above them. This tendency has worked itself out in Protestantism over against Roman Catholicism, in Calvinism as contrasted with Lutheranism, and in the Puritanism of Dissent in distinction from Anglicanism. To illustrate from the last only, the Puritans wanted lectures, Archbishop Laud wanted an altar; and, as Dr. Forsyth says, the sermon holds the central place in the church life of Nonconformity which the Mass holds in Roman Catholicism. In general, it followed that for the Reformers the sacraments were not absolutely indispensable; they did not communicate a grace which could not otherwise be mediated. 'Believers before and without the use of sacraments communicate with Christ' is one of the heads of agreement between Zürich and Geneva in 1554. It is not true, of course, that all Reformers or Reformed Churches would have accepted the following position of Calvin, but it represents an undeniable characteristic of Protestantism:

* See Tyndale, *Doctrinal Treatises*, p. 276f

* Attention was in the main concentrated on the gift of God in the sacrament. The grace accorded in baptism was held by the Thomists to be necessarily and reasonably associated with water, while the Scotists would regard the spiritual effect as an arbitrarily predetermined synchronism with the use of the element. In either case, emphasis is thrown on the sacrament as a certain and indispensable means of grace.

necessary, and could not be a result of argument, but was a state of heart.'

But if baptism be the public confession of such a faith, and if it be the assurance of God's forgiveness in answer to such faith, then it is a natural corollary that baptism should be administered only to such as have passed through this experience.

'If the fundamental evangelical and Lutheran principle is valid, that grace and faith are inseparably inter-related . . . then infant baptism is in itself no Sacrament, but an ecclesiastical observance: if it is in the strict sense a Sacrament, then that principle is no longer valid' (Harnack, vii. 251).

Not many Protestants were prepared to draw the logical conclusion and abandon the practice of infant baptism. A threefold division of the Reformed Churches followed. (*a*) There were those who confined baptism to adults, or rather to conscious believers, *e.g.* the Mennonites in Holland and Germany (see separate article), the Baptists in England and America, and the Plymouth Brethren. (*b*) Some Churches retained infant baptism, and fell back on earlier ideas of baptismal regeneration. The Lutheran and Anglican Churches represent this tendency. (*c*) Yet other Churches retained the custom, but altered its significance.

(*a*) The position of the first requires little further explanation. The earliest Baptist Confession, printed at Amsterdam in 1611, is quite explicit.

Art. 13 declares that 'every Church is to receive all their members by baptism upon the confession of their faith and sins, wrought by the preaching of the gospel, according to the primitive institution and practice. And therefore Churches constituted after any other manner, or of any other persons, are not according to Christ's testament.' Art. 14: 'Baptism, or washing with water, is the outward manifestation of dying unto sin and walking in newness of life: and therefore in nowise appertaineth to infants.' Other Confessions add little to this.

The following points deserve attention: (*a*) The Baptist position involved the Puritan conception of the Church. The Church is the communion of saints. As one of the Confessions says (Hanserd Knollys Soc. i. 40), the servants of God are 'to lead their lives in a walled sheepfold, and in a watered garden.' The early Baptist Churches were apt to be strongly disciplinary. (*β*) Though in other Confessions (*op. cit.* pp. 42, 226) the benefits signified by baptism are unfolded, yet the emphasis falls on the idea of baptism as a public profession of personal faith. This is still characteristic (cf. art. ANABAPTISM, i. 410[b]). (*γ*) The essence of the Baptist doctrine was, and is, the contention that no one can or should be made a Christian without the conscious co-operation of his own will. They asserted the liberty of the individual conscience. Their opposition to 'the Bloudy Tenent of Persecution' was based on first principles, and was not simply due to their being in a minority. Similarly, it seems a natural development of their position that communion should be open. At first, most Baptists were strict Baptists, *i.e.* only baptized believers could join the Church and take part in the communion (see Art. 13 of Confession just cited). The American Churches still lean to this side. But from early days some Baptists held that the question must be left to the individual for decision, *i.e.* those who were personally convinced of the truth of believers' baptism must act up to the conviction. Those who did not share this conviction, but still professed belief in Jesus Christ, were welcomed to Church-fellowship. See app. to Confession drawn up in 1688 (*Conf. of Faith*, Hanserd Knollys Soc. p. 244): 'The known principle and state of the consciences of divers of us . . . is such that we cannot hold church communion with any other than baptized believers, and Churches constituted of such: yet some others of us have a greater liberty and freedom in our spirits that way.' The majority of Baptist Churches in England to-day are open in this sense, and the throwing open of Church membership in the face of trust-deeds led to one or two interesting lawsuits in the 19th cent. (see G. Gould, *Open Communion and the Baptists of Norwich*, 1860). The practice of open communion seems to be the natural issue of the stress laid on the individual will. (For the whole point cf. Harnack, vii. 125, on 'The Anabaptists.') (*δ*) The dangers of the Baptist position clearly lie on the side of spiritual pride and the over-development of religious self-consciousness. An exceptional, because boyish but still instructive, instance may be studied in Gosse, *Father and Son*, pp. 211–217.

(*b*) The dilemma as to infant baptism, occasioned by the new emphasis on faith, was met by Luther in another manner. 'Luther retained infant baptism rather as the sacrament of regeneration' (Harnack, vii. 251). He fell back on the Roman doctrine. He strove to retain the connexion between faith and baptism by continuing the *interrogatio de Fide* and the presence of sponsors in the rite, and by supposing that there is a kind of faith bestowed on infants. Similarly, Calvin maintained that 'infants may have infused into them a kind of faith and knowledge, though not ours.' Or, again, the faith of the parents might be taken as standing for the faith of the children. Thus Beveridge claims that the children of Christian parents are disciples. This was, in fact, the abandonment of the Protestant view of faith (see Harnack, *loc. cit.*). As already pointed out, some Calvinists were prepared to give baptism as a sign of a regeneration that should follow (see p. 401). Luther, on the other hand, distinguished between regeneration and justification. Regeneration was an inward effect, wrought in baptism. Justification, the inner experience of repentance and forgiveness, was a distinct and later stage in religious development. The Church of England retained infant baptism on somewhat similar terms. Regeneration is carefully distinguished from conversion, and the former may precede the latter.

'Conversion is the act whereby, in response to and by the power of divine grace, the soul turns to God in the desire to accept and do His will. Regeneration is the gift which God bestows on the soul by producing in its nature such a change as imparts to it the forgiveness of original sin, and makes it to be accepted by God instead of under His wrath' (Darwell Stone, *op. cit.* p. 35).

The Church of England likewise retained sponsors and the *interrogatio de Fide*, which is essentially an attempt to make faith still the introduction to baptism. Again, the Reformers' first conceptions of faith and of regeneration are abandoned, and an approximation is made to the Roman doctrine.

(*c*) The retention of infant baptism did not, however, always mean the restoration of the older interpretation of the practice. The Puritans in England objected to the institution of godfathers and godmothers, and in their Admonition of 1571 complained that 'they prophane holye baptisme, in toying folishly, for that they ask questions of an infante which cannot answere' (*Puritan Manifestoes*, p. 26). In the form of baptism adopted in Geneva there are no sponsors, and no profession of faith is made on behalf of the child. The parents or other responsible persons recite the Creed, as the faith which they hold and in which they intend to bring up the child. Thus in the order for the administration of baptism in the Presbyterian Church of England, based on the Westminster Confession, the minister says to the parents: 'Seeing it is your duty to nourish and bring up this child for God, it is fitting that you renew the confession of your faith before God and this congregation.' There is no attempt to preserve the connexion between faith and baptism by a vicarious declaration of faith and of willingness to be bap-

for original sin and for sins committed before baptism. According to Luther, baptism is, for penitent faith, the assurance that God is a forgiving God. According to the former, baptism brings a definite grace, a limited forgiveness, to meet particular sins. According to the latter, baptism witnesses to the constant attitude of God towards a contrite heart. It follows from this, that in the Roman view post-baptismal sin requires a fresh bestowal of grace, a further sacrament; in Luther's view, it suffices to remember the assurance of forgiveness once received in baptism. So the Council of Trent aimed the 9th anathema of Session vii. at this latter doctrine, while Luther held that the Council did not understand the Gospel.

Calvin's teaching does not differ in essentials from that of Luther on this point. Baptism is first and foremost an assurance of forgiveness and of imputed righteousness. 'In baptism we perceive that we are covered and protected by the blood of Christ, lest the wrath of God, which is truly an intolerable flame, should lie upon us' (*Inst.* IV. xv. 9). Or, as Becon says, 'By it we are removed from the fierce judging-place to the court of mercy' (2 Bec. 635, Parker Society). Calvin, too, says that 'at whatsoever time we are baptized, we are washed and purified once for our whole life. Wherefore as often as we fall we must recall the remembrance of our baptism, and thus fortify our minds' (cf. 4 Bul. 356 and 3 Whitg. 17 and 141 in Parker Society). The grace given in baptism is not confined to forgiveness. According to Calvin, baptism is conducive to faith, not only by being an assurance of forgiveness, but also by giving us the grace of the Holy Spirit, to form us again to newness of life. Christ by baptism has made us partakers of His death, ingrafting us into it. This is mortification (the death of the old man) and regeneration (the birth of the new). Moreover, baptism so unites us to Christ Himself as to make us partakers of all His blessings (*Inst.* IV. xv. 6). Somewhat similar definitions of baptismal grace may be found in Article 27 of the Church of England and in the Westminster Confession.

It should be noted that, though Calvin speaks of regeneration in baptism, his master-thought is still the forgiveness of sins and the imputing of Christ's righteousness to us. For he holds that baptism means the removal of the guilt of original sin and not the destruction of original sin itself. Ro 7 is the experience of the baptized Christian. Here he would fall under the anathema pronounced in the Tridentine decree about original sin (Sessio v. § 5). For a vigorous statement of Calvin's view, compare the Westminster Confession, 'Of the Fall.'

But more important than the definition of baptismal grace is the thought that baptism is not so much the means whereby God conveys these blessings to the soul, as the sign and seal whereby He confirms and ratifies His promises to the believer. The obsignatory view of the sacrament is the essentially Calvinist view. Baptism is a kind of sealed instrument assuring us of forgiveness. It is an authoritative declaration on God's part of His willingness to fulfil the new covenant with the baptized. The phrase 'sign and seal' is the characteristic one. Depraved human nature can dispense with no props for faith. In the sacrament, God condescends to give an outward attestation of inward blessings.

The following illustrations may be adduced:—(1) Art. 27, Church of England: 'Baptism is . . . also *a sign of regeneration* or new birth, whereby, as by an instrument, they that receive Baptism rightly are grafted into the Church: *the promises of the forgiveness of sin* and of our adoption to be the sons of God by the Holy Ghost *are visibly signed and sealed: Faith is confirmed*, and Grace increased by virtue of prayer unto God.' It has already been observed that this article goes beyond the Calvinist standpoint in regarding the sacrament as something more than a sign or seal (see above, under (2)). But the blessing of the forgiveness of sin is surely understood in the broader Protestant and not in the narrower Roman sense, and the language about the signing and sealing of the promises is quite in accord with Geneva.* (2) The Westminster Confession (ch. xxviii.): 'Baptism is a sacrament of the New Testament, ordained by Jesus Christ . . . to be unto (the party baptized) *a sign and seal of the Covenant of Grace*, of his ingrafting into Christ, of regeneration, of remission of sins, and of his giving up unto God through Jesus Christ to walk in newness of life.' The Confession goes on to say that in baptism 'the grace promised is not only offered, but really exhibited and conferred by the Holy Ghost, to such (whether of age or infants) as that grace belongeth unto, according to the counsel of God's own will.' But this means little more than that baptism was a reliable sign of assurance—for the elect! The last words throw the whole into doubt. The position is simply Calvinist. A Particular Baptist (*i.e.* Calvinistic Baptist) Confession of 1688 holds almost exactly the same language (see *Confessions*, Hanserd Knollys Soc. p. 226).

It was in pursuance of this obsignatory view of the sacraments that those of the OT were placed by Calvinists alongside of those of the NT. The OT sacraments and the baptism of John were similarly signs witnessing to the Divine promises. They were as effective signs as the sacraments of the NT. Calvin maintained, against the Schoolmen, that the baptism of John was the same as Christian baptism, 'only he baptized in the name of him who was to come, the Apostles in the name of him who was already manifested.' Similarly, the Westminster Confession (ch. xxvii.) asserts that 'the Sacraments of the Old Testament in regard of the spiritual things thereby signified and exhibited were, for substance, the same with those of the New' (cf. 4 Bul. 354, Parker Soc.).

(4) As Baptism is primarily a confirmation of faith, *it presupposes conscious faith.* The effectiveness of the sacraments depends on faith. The sacraments, including baptism, are appeals to faith; they cannot act where faith is not. Of sacraments in general, Luther laid down the proposition that they are efficacious, *non dum fiunt sed dum creduntur* (Harnack, vii. 216). Leo X. condemned Luther for considering it heretical to suppose that the sacraments could confer justifying grace on all who did not make active objection (Denz. 625). In other words, Luther held that passive reception was not enough, positive faith was essential. Of Baptism in particular, the Larger Catechism asserts that 'in the absence of faith, baptism continues to be a bare and ineffectual sign' (Harnack, vii. 251). Luther also claimed that baptism represents and requires a continual penitence. 'Baptism means that the old Adam must be drowned in us day by day through daily sorrow and repentance, . . . and that there must daily come forth and arise a new man' (Harnack, vii. 217 n.). Calvin is equally clear: 'From this sacrament, as from all others, we gain nothing, unless in so far as we receive in faith' (*Inst.* IV. xv. 15). The assurance of Divine forgiveness can come only to a living faith. Moreover, baptism is also a confession of such faith. It is not only God's seal to the New Covenant; it is man's. It is 'a sign of profession' (Art. 27, Church of England). Baptism had always been a confession of faith. Almost every *Ordo Baptismi* contains a recital of the Creed. But to the Protestant, faith meant more than the recital of the Creed. It presupposed penitence, and was an undertaking to walk in newness of life. A passage in Gosse, *Father and Son* (p. 200 f.) represents an idea of faith which obtained a wide currency in Protestantism:

'As a rule, no one could possess the Spirit of Christ without a conscious and full abandonment of the soul; and this, however carefully led up to and prepared for with tears and renunciations, was not, could not be, made except at a set moment of time. *Faith in an esoteric and almost symbolic sense was*

* Parallels among the Elizabethans are frequent. Thus Bradford: 'It requires that we should be regenerate, and confirms and seals our regeneration.' Or Becon: 'Of itself it brings not grace, but testifies that he who is baptized has received grace' (2 Brad. 289; 2 Bec. 220). And later, Burnet's view that 'our Saviour has made baptism one of the precepts though not one of the means necessary to salvation' develops a somewhat similar, though not exactly parallel, teaching (Burnet on Art. 27).

necessary, and could not be a result of argument, but was a state of heart.'

But if baptism be the public confession of such a faith, and if it be the assurance of God's forgiveness in answer to such faith, then it is a natural corollary that baptism should be administered only to such as have passed through this experience.

'If the fundamental evangelical and Lutheran principle is valid, that grace and faith are inseparably inter-related . . . then infant baptism is in itself no Sacrament, but an ecclesiastical observance: if it is in the strict sense a Sacrament, then that principle is no longer valid' (Harnack, vii. 251).

Not many Protestants were prepared to draw the logical conclusion and abandon the practice of infant baptism. A threefold division of the Reformed Churches followed. (*a*) There were those who confined baptism to adults, or rather to conscious believers, *e.g.* the Mennonites in Holland and Germany (see separate article), the Baptists in England and America, and the Plymouth Brethren. (*b*) Some Churches retained infant baptism, and fell back on earlier ideas of baptismal regeneration. The Lutheran and Anglican Churches represent this tendency. (*c*) Yet other Churches retained the custom, but altered its significance.

(*a*) The position of the first requires little further explanation. The earliest Baptist Confession, printed at Amsterdam in 1611, is quite explicit.

Art. 13 declares that 'every Church is to receive all their members by baptism upon the confession of their faith and sins, wrought by the preaching of the gospel, according to the primitive institution and practice. And therefore Churches constituted after any other manner, or of any other persons, are not according to Christ's testament.' Art. 14: 'Baptism, or washing with water, is the outward manifestation of dying unto sin and walking in newness of life: and therefore in nowise appertaineth to infants.' Other Confessions add little to this.

The following points deserve attention: (*a*) The Baptist position involved the Puritan conception of the Church. The Church is the communion of saints. As one of the Confessions says (Hanserd Knollys Soc. i. 40), the servants of God are 'to lead their lives in a walled sheepfold, and in a watered garden.' The early Baptist Churches were apt to be strongly disciplinary. (*β*) Though in other Confessions (*op. cit.* pp. 42, 226) the benefits signified by baptism are unfolded, yet the emphasis falls on the idea of baptism as a public profession of personal faith. This is still characteristic (cf. art. ANABAPTISM, i. 410[b]). (*γ*) The essence of the Baptist doctrine was, and is, the contention that no one can or should be made a Christian without the conscious co-operation of his own will. They asserted the liberty of the individual conscience. Their opposition to 'the Bloudy Tenent of Persecution' was based on first principles, and was not simply due to their being in a minority. Similarly, it seems a natural development of their position that communion should be open. At first, most Baptists were strict Baptists, *i.e.* only baptized believers could join the Church and take part in the communion (see Art. 13 of Confession just cited). The American Churches still lean to this side. But from early days some Baptists held that the question must be left to the individual for decision, *i.e.* those who were personally convinced of the truth of believers' baptism must act up to the conviction. Those who did not share this conviction, but still professed belief in Jesus Christ, were welcomed to Church-fellowship. See app. to Confession drawn up in 1688 (*Conf. of Faith*, Hanserd Knollys Soc. p. 244): 'The known principle and state of the consciences of divers of us . . . is such that we cannot hold church communion with any other than baptized believers, and Churches constituted of such: yet some others of us have a greater liberty and freedom in our spirits that way.' The majority of Baptist Churches in England to-day are open in this sense, and the throwing open of Church membership in the face of trust-deeds led to one or two interesting lawsuits in the 19th cent. (see G. Gould, *Open Communion and the Baptists of Norwich*, 1860). The practice of open communion seems to be the natural issue of the stress laid on the individual will. (For the whole point cf. Harnack, vii. 125, on 'The Anabaptists.') (*δ*) The dangers of the Baptist position clearly lie on the side of spiritual pride and the over-development of religious self-consciousness. An exceptional, because boyish but still instructive, instance may be studied in Gosse, *Father and Son*, pp. 211–217.

(*b*) The dilemma as to infant baptism, occasioned by the new emphasis on faith, was met by Luther in another manner. 'Luther retained infant baptism rather as the sacrament of regeneration' (Harnack, vii. 251). He fell back on the Roman doctrine. He strove to retain the connexion between faith and baptism by continuing the *interrogatio de Fide* and the presence of sponsors in the rite, and by supposing that there is a kind of faith bestowed on infants. Similarly, Calvin maintained that 'infants may have infused into them a kind of faith and knowledge, though not ours.' Or, again, the faith of the parents might be taken as standing for the faith of the children. Thus Beveridge claims that the children of Christian parents are disciples. This was, in fact, the abandonment of the Protestant view of faith (see Harnack, *loc. cit.*). As already pointed out, some Calvinists were prepared to give baptism as a sign of a regeneration that should follow (see p. 401). Luther, on the other hand, distinguished between regeneration and justification. Regeneration was an inward effect, wrought in baptism. Justification, the inner experience of repentance and forgiveness, was a distinct and later stage in religious development. The Church of England retained infant baptism on somewhat similar terms. Regeneration is carefully distinguished from conversion, and the former may precede the latter.

'Conversion is the act whereby, in response to and by the power of divine grace, the soul turns to God in the desire to accept and do His will. Regeneration is the gift which God bestows on the soul by producing in its nature such a change as imparts to it the forgiveness of original sin, and makes it to be accepted by God instead of under His wrath' (Darwell Stone, *op. cit.* p. 35).

The Church of England likewise retained sponsors and the *interrogatio de Fide*, which is essentially an attempt to make faith still the introduction to baptism. Again, the Reformers' first conceptions of faith and of regeneration are abandoned, and an approximation is made to the Roman doctrine.

(*c*) The retention of infant baptism did not, however, always mean the restoration of the older interpretation of the practice. The Puritans in England objected to the institution of godfathers and godmothers, and in their Admonition of 1571 complained that 'they prophane holye baptisme, in toying folishly, for that they ask questions of an infante which cannot answere' (*Puritan Manifestoes*, p. 26). In the form of baptism adopted in Geneva there are no sponsors, and no profession of faith is made on behalf of the child. The parents or other responsible persons recite the Creed, as the faith which they hold and in which they intend to bring up the child. Thus in the order for the administration of baptism in the Presbyterian Church of England, based on the Westminster Confession, the minister says to the parents: 'Seeing it is your duty to nourish and bring up this child for God, it is fitting that you renew the confession of your faith before God and this congregation.' There is no attempt to preserve the connexion between faith and baptism by a vicarious declaration of faith and of willingness to be bap-

tized, made in the name and on behalf of the child. The Calvinist Churches thus broke with a practice that claimed to come down from Hyginus in the 2nd century. Moreover, the ritual act is not conceived as in itself conveying regeneration at the time. 'Baptism (is) the sacrament of admission into the visible Church, in which are *set forth* our union to Christ and regeneration by the Spirit, the remission of our sins and our engagement to be the Lord's' (Articles of Faith, Presbyterian Ch. of Eng. 20). And in the ritual service, the minister is directed to pray that God will grant 'that this child, *having been in God's own good time born again by the Holy Ghost*, may come to years of understanding, that he may confess the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom He has sent.' Baptism then stands not for an inner change necessarily wrought at the moment in the unconscious child, but for the recognition of the fact that the children of believers are already part of the visible Church, and should be at once admitted. It is, further, a declaration of God's goodwill towards the child, and the sign and seal that He will in His good time fulfil in the child the promises set forth therein. In baptism the parents solemnly engage themselves to bring up the child in the fear of the Lord.

The Wesleyan Church, which did not start from the Calvinist basis, but made much of conversion, retains infant baptism in a similar sense. There is no recitation of the Creed at all. After baptizing the child, the minister says: 'We receive this child into the congregation of Christ's flock, *that he may be instructed* and trained in the doctrines, privileges, and duties of the Christian religion; and *trust* that he will be Christ's faithful soldier and servant unto his life's end.' It is most significant that this declaration is followed by the four short petitions (*e.g.* 'Grant that the old Adam in this child may be buried') which in the Church of England service precede baptism. The Wesleyans pray that God will fulfil in the future the promises symbolized in the ritual act: in the Church of England, prayer is offered that these results may then and there be initiated.

To the Congregationalists infant baptism is little more than a dedication service. The Calvinist Churches generally, and some other bodies, have thus retained the practice and altered its meaning.

In the Churches which retained infant baptism, the sense of personal responsibility connected with believers' baptism was attached to a later rite of admission to the full privileges of Church membership. Confirmation in the Lutheran Church and in the Church of England, First Communion among the Presbyterians, Covenanting with God among the Wesleyans, are in practice equivalent to believers' baptism. Confirmation in the Church of England is administered to the baptized when they have come to years of discretion, 'to the end that they may themselves with their own mouth and consent ratify and confirm' the promises made for them in baptism. This view and use of Confirmation is distinctly Protestant. In the West, Baptism and Confirmation had become separated in point of time; they were still united in the East, and were administered to children in succession, being immediately followed by the Communion. The Western separation of the two Sacraments did not, however, imply that Confirmation was to be given only to those who had made a profession of conscious faith after reaching years of discretion. Confirmation was not intended to be the ratification of baptismal vows. The Council of Trent anathematized those who regarded Confirmation as nothing else than a catechetical exercise by which those on the borders of manhood professed the grounds of their faith before the Church (Sessio 7, 'De Conf.,' canon 1). The Church of England did not treat Confirmation as simply this, but, under the influence of Protestantism, she did limit it to adolescents, in order that it might serve this purpose.

[Cf. D. Stone's plea for restoring the primitive and Greek practice of confirming infants. He notes that the Church of England continued and emphasized the mediæval separation of Confirmation from Baptism. He does not sufficiently recognize that this emphasis is the result of the Reformation—a concession to the Protestant conception of faith (*Holy Baptism*, p. 186).]

The sacrament of Confirmation is in effect dependent on the previous confession of faith. This meant a recognition of the fundamental connexion between grace and faith. Instead of abandoning infant baptism, most Protestant Churches put a fresh meaning into Confirmation or its equivalent. They thus adhered to the view that the full privileges of the Christian life could not be bestowed unless consciously desired.

The reasons for the retention of infant baptism were many and complex. The Reformers were not all eager iconoclasts. Luther and the most influential Elizabethans departed only slowly from traditional doctrine and custom. Moreover, the new practice of adult baptism was connected with a party that was socially despised and politically discredited. A supporter of adult baptism might be supposed to come from Münster. All the leading Reformers ascribed Anabaptism to the devil. A cloud of suspicion and contempt hung over Baptists and Mennonites in the 17th century. They were suspected of being ignorant and revolutionary.

The Baptist historian, Thomas Crosby, is constantly twitting Neal, the learned author of the *History of the Puritans*, with an affected contempt for Baptists. Here is one passage: 'the Rev. Mr. Neal has given us an account of [Vavasor Powell] and tells us he was educated at Jesus Coll., Oxon.; and had he been an illiterate man, it's not unlikely but he would have told us also that he was a Baptist' (Crosby, *Hist. of Baptists*, iii. 6).

But there were deeper reasons than conservatism and the bad name attaching to the practice of believers' baptism through the early Anabaptists. (*α*) Wherever a lively belief in original sin and the guilt attaching thereto continued, it was natural to bestow on infants the sign of the forgiveness of sins. It is perhaps noteworthy in this connexion that the first little group of Baptists were General or *Arminian* Baptists. (*β*) The doctrine of election made some recoil from the Puritan conception of the Church. It is, they argued, presumption to anticipate God's judgment by confining church membership to those apparently saved. The very attempt tends to hypocrisy. The Church ought rather to welcome all men. Along these lines Zwingli very strongly criticizes the 'Catabaptists' and defends the practice of infant baptism. As baptism is admission to the visible Church, it is not for human judgment to attach conditions. (*γ*) But more important than these was the feeling that in religion one cannot separate parent and child. The child of believing parents has, *ipso facto*, a claim on the Church. The Church must recognize 'the spiritual unity of the family' by welcoming the child. Burnet (on Art. 27) says, 'It is legitimate that parents be allowed to bring their children under federal obligations, and, therefore, procure to them a share in federal blessings.' The idea of the covenant, and the parallel between baptism and circumcision, powerfully influenced men's minds. A covenant that binds the parent binds the child also. And if the covenant of the OT admitted children by circumcision on the eighth day, surely the terms of the new covenant are not so harsh as to exclude children altogether. The Lord's welcome to little children, and the fact that children were reckoned holy through their parentage alone (1 Co 7^{14}), were held to put any such restriction out of court. The anomalies presented

by infant baptism to the Protestant conception of faith were met by an appeal to the parallel institution of circumcision. Baptism, Calvin admits, implies repentance; but so did circumcision, as is clear from Jer 4^4. The rule that baptism should follow faith is not invariable: for circumcision comes after faith in Abraham and before intelligence in Isaac. It may be said that the parallel with circumcision was the chief ground for defending infant baptism as agreeable with the Scriptures, while Mk $10^{14.\ 15}$ and 1 Co 7^{14} were the chief reasons for supposing it to be 'agreeable with the institution of Christ.' It was further urged that, since men believed in God's goodwill towards children, the sign of that goodwill should not be withheld from them. 'How sweet is it to pious minds to be assured not only by word, but even by ocular demonstration, that they are so much in favour with their heavenly Father, that He interests Himself in their posterity! . . . It is no slight stimulus to us to bring them up in the fear of God' (Calvin, *Inst.* IV. xvi. 32). (*δ*) With others, especially in the Church of England, the earlier ideas of sacramental efficacy, coupled with the obvious sense of Jn 3^5, were the dominant influence.

(5) Before passing on to discuss the effect of the Protestant appeal to Scripture, one other development of the conceptions of faith and grace as essentially inward must be examined. *The Quakers' rejection of water-baptism* was based, no doubt, in part on principles peculiar or almost peculiar to them; but it also sprang from the renewed experience of justification by faith which they possessed in common with other Protestants. Both points require illustration.

(*a*) The doctrine of the inner light was not a universally accepted doctrine among the Reformers. Its assertion sundered the Quakers from the Calvinists. Calvin advocated the use of sacraments because carnal, depraved, human nature could grasp the spiritual only through the material, and needed every sort of aid if it was to retain faith at all. To Calvin, sin was the fundamental thing in men. But if Calvin preached sin, G. Fox preached perfection. He and his followers denied the dogma of human depravity. Deeper than sin lies the something of God in every man. Men must be turned to this inward teacher, and cease to trust in the outward and the creaturely. From this point of view sacraments are not a means of grace but a source of error, an entanglement in the lower realms of religious life.

(*b*) But, without pushing their peculiar tenets, the Quakers had a strong case in the ground they shared with Protestants in general. It was admitted that God's answer to faith was not tied to the sacraments. All Protestants agreed that the grace of God was conveyed, if not as certainly, yet as really, through preaching and through prayer as through the sacraments. To the Calvinist, baptism was the sign and seal of a spiritual reality, which it did not necessarily confer. But if this be so, if the forgiveness signified in baptism and the communion with Christ offered in the Eucharist are granted to us in other ways, why insist thus on the outward ceremonies? Our opponents, says Barclay,

> 'account not those who are surely baptized with the baptism of the Spirit, baptized, neither will they have them so denominated, unless they be also sprinkled with or dipped in water: but we, on the contrary, do always prefer the power to the form, the substance to the shadow: and where the substance and power is, we doubt not to denominate the person accordingly, though the form be wanting. And, therefore, we always seek first and plead for the substance and power, as knowing that to be indispensably necessary, though the form sometimes may be dispensed with, and the figure or type may cease, when the substance and antitype come to be enjoyed, as it doth in this case' (*Apology*, p. 300).

The essential thing in baptism is the answer of a good conscience towards God. Where that pure and spiritual baptism is present, the use of water is indifferent. The Quaker position raised the question of the nature of the New Covenant. Did not the new differ essentially from the old in this, that now God would directly and immediately commune with the individual? Barclay's attempts to explain away NT references to water-baptism are bits of unsuccessful exegesis; but the truth 'the kingdom of God is within you' (Lk 17^{21}) does not depend on the correct interpretation of *ἐντός*.

(*c*) The Quakers were indirectly the successors of Joachim de Flore, who thought sacraments would disappear in the realm of the Spirit. 'The baptism of John,' said Barclay, 'was a figure, commanded for a time, and not to continue for ever' (*Apol.* Prop. xii.). He, with good reason, identified water-baptism with that of John. The other Protestant Churches vehemently denied this view of baptism as a temporary institution. Thus the Westminster Confession (ch. xxviii.) asserts that 'Baptism is by Christ's own appointment to be continued until the end of the world.' With this compare the orthodox creed in the Baptist Confessions of Faith (Hanserd Knollys Soc. p. 147).

B. The Appeal from Tradition to the Bible.—The influence of the Reformers' appeal to Scripture is more easily traced in the realm of practice than in that of doctrine. That the study of the Scriptures suggested some new doctrines is beyond doubt. Thus the beginnings of the Baptist denomination consisted of two small groups who successively detached themselves from the Independents because they were convinced, rightly or wrongly, that in the NT baptism was administered only to believers. The first group, the General or Arminian Baptists, broke off from the Independents in Amsterdam in 1611, under John Smith and Helwisse. These two had derived their views from their own study of the Scriptures. They first baptized themselves; but when John Smith discovered that the Mennonites were already teaching the doctrine of believers' baptism, he was baptized again by a Mennonite pastor. The first Particular or Calvinistic Baptist Church was formed in a similar way in England about the year 1638. Certain members of an Independent church in London became convinced that 'Baptism was not for infants, but professed believers' (see Shakespeare, *Baptist and Congregational Pioneers*, pp. 180–184). Here, too, the influence of the study of the Scriptures was the prime factor. But all Protestant Churches claimed to justify their positions from the Scriptures, and it would be tedious to explain the justification each advanced. The more general effects of the appeal to Scripture may be traced in (*a*) the Protestant simplification of ritual, and (*b*) the tendency to take a somewhat legalistic view of the obligation of baptism.

(*a*) *The simplification of ritual* was not everywhere carried out with equal thoroughness. Luther at first retained the Roman *Ordo* almost exactly as it stood, though the traditional developments were accorded a steadily diminishing importance. When the demand for a simpler ritual, based on the appeal to Scripture, made itself effectively heard, it was resisted on the ground that the Church is free to make modifications in such comparatively non-essential matters. (For the whole history, see Höfling, vol. ii. §§ 119–121.) In England, the signing with the cross and the presence of sponsors were retained, and the other ceremonies summarized in a previous section were discarded. The Church of England, like the Lutherans, showed a greater reverence for tradition: at the same time, the simplifications introduced to avoid superstition, and to promote decency and order, were really the outcome of a desire to get nearer to NT usage

The Puritans objected to the traditional elements still remaining in the Prayer-Book Order of Baptism, as having no warrant in Scripture. The Genevan Order was still simpler. 'Chrisms, tapers, and other pomposities' were abolished, as 'they have been devised without authority from the word of God.' Baptism by immersion was reintroduced by the believers in adult baptism, as being the Scriptural and only lawful method.* In brief, all Protestant Churches held themselves at liberty to revise the baptismal office, in so far as its elements were derived from tradition and not from Scripture; while some wished to make the ritual conform to a Scripture model.

(*b*) The authority attributed to the Scriptures went some way to create *a new legalism*. Thus the Baptists insisted on the duty of accepting immersion. This was the form instituted by Christ, and it became part of religious obedience to follow it. To be immersed was to fulfil more perfectly than others a command of Christ. This tended to legalize the religion of Jesus, and to emphasize the value of obedience to a ceremonial observance—a step towards Pharisaism. From a literalism of this kind the more conservative Churches were preserved by their adherence to tradition, and Calvin escaped through his strong common sense.† The other Churches did not escape legalism in other directions. When the sacramental efficacy of Baptism and its bearing on salvation were questioned by Rationalism, the defence was apt to be: this is part of the Divine will revealed in the NT, and it must simply be accepted. Hooker's defence of the Church of England doctrine of Baptism rests largely on the plain sense of Jn 3^5, which is taken as the final ruling of the Divine Lawgiver on this subject. This kind of appeal to Scripture is simply legalistic. It may further be paralleled in the strong tendency to interpret the NT in harmony with the OT. The explanation of baptism by means of circumcision seems to belong to a new Judaistic Christianity.

C. The Humanism and Rationalism of the Renaissance.—The Reformation was influenced by the growing interest in the natural as opposed to the supernatural, and the assertion of individual independence which marked the later Middle Ages. This favoured views of baptism which removed mystery, and which made it the sign, not of a man's dependence on, but of his adhesion to, the Church. Baptism then becomes a mere symbol or a confession of faith.

Zwingli treated baptism as a symbol, though by no means as insignificant. 'Baptismus est regenerationis symbolum . . . sed non ita ut qui baptisati sunt ob id renati sunt' (Answer to Quest. 17, in a letter on some questions raised by a Catabaptist). Some account of his views may be found in Lecky's *Hist. of Rationalism*.

Socinus emphasized the confession-side of Baptism. It is—

'the rite of initiation by which men, after obtaining knowledge of the doctrine of Christ and acquiring faith in Him, become bound to Christ and His disciples, or are enrolled in the Church, renouncing the world . . . professing, besides, that they will regard the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as the only Guide and Master in religion, and in the whole of their life and conversation, and by their ablution and immersion and emersion, declaring and as it were exhibiting that they lay aside the defilement of sin, that they are buried with Christ, that they desire henceforth to die with Him and to rise to newness of life, and pledging themselves that they will really carry this out, receiving also at the same time at which this profession is made and this pledge taken the symbol and sign of the remission of sins and even the remission itself' (Harnack, vii. 151).

As Harnack says, the stress is laid here on the confession, and the last clause sounds like an afterthought. The tendency to emphasize the confession made in baptism was not confined to Socinianism; the Anabaptists, *e.g.*, regarded baptism mainly as a badge or mark distinguishing Christians from others (cf. art. Anabaptism, i. 410). This shows the influence of Rationalism in so far as it implies less interest in the sacramental side.

But the ultimate influence of Rationalism is to be discerned in the serious issues, for the doctrine of baptism, raised by Biblical criticism, by the science of comparative religion, and by the study of religious experience.

Literature.—*General*: Höfling, *Das Sacrament der Taufe*, 2 vols., Erlangen, 1846–8; Harnack, *History of Dogma*, Eng tr., 7 vols., London, 1896–9; Hagenbach, *Dogmengeschichte*^{5}, 1845 [useful quotations]; A. V. G. Allen, *Christian Institutions*, London, 1898; Darwell Stone, *Holy Baptism*^{4}, London, 1905; Marriott, art. 'Baptism,' in Smith's *DCA*; art. 'Taufe,' in *PRE*^{3}.

Roman position: Wilhelm and Scannell; *Manual of Theology*, vol. ii. [1898], give a clear concise statement; Denzinger, *Enchiridion*^{5}, 1874, is indispensable.

Church of England: for mediæval practice, consult Maskell, *Monumenta Ritualia*, vol. i. p. ccxl f. For Reformation settlement, see index vol. to the Parker Society's publications; Hooker, *Eccl. Pol.* bk. v. [ed. Bayne in *Every Man's Lib.* 1909]. Besides Stone, see *Tracts for the Times*, Nos. 67 and 76, and various commentators on the Articles, esp. Gibson, E.C.S. F. W. Robertson put forward a fresh and interesting view, in sermons 4 and 5 of the second series, 1889.

Lutheran Church: see Höfling, whose book, besides being of great historic value, represents the distinctly conservative Lutheran attitude.

Calvinism: Calvin, *Inst.* iv. chs. xiv.–xvi. in Beveridge's later tr. vol. ii. [1863]; *Westminster Confession*, any edition.

Baptists: *Confessions of Faith*, Hanserd Knollys Soc. 1854; T. Crosby, *Hist. of Baptists*, 1738–40; Cramp, *Baptist History*, 1871; Shakespeare, *Baptist and Congregational Pioneers*^{2}, 1907.

Infant baptism: W. Wall, *Hist. of Infant Baptism*, 1705 [new ed., London, 1862].

H. G. Wood.

BAPTISM (Indian).—In the initiatory rites which are peculiar to the great religions of India and their various sects, there is nothing which can be regarded as exactly parallel to Christian baptism, except the general fact that such rites imply admission to or public recognition of a definite religious status. In the Christian rite the use of water is based on a natural symbolism which has appealed to the human mind in all ages, and of this we have abundant examples in the purificatory ceremonies of all Indian religions. Hinduism abounds in such *baptisms* or washings as are referred to in Mk 7^4. These are founded on the association of religious purity with water used either in bathing or in sprinkling the person or thing to be sanctified.

In the rite of initiation into the Sikh religion we have the nearest approach to the form of Christian baptism; but even in the symbolism of the rite there is, as we shall see, a fundamental difference.

* *Sprinkling and immersion.*—It has already been noted that the dipping of infants continued in England after the custom had altered in Europe. Sprinkling became more general in England about 1600, and was apparently the accepted custom by 1640 (Denne, *Contention for Truth*, 1658). With regard to adults, the first Mennonites and Baptists received the rite by affusion. Mr. Shakespeare says of the former, that 'they administered baptism by affusion, until in 1620 a section called the Collegianten, at Rhynsberg, began to immerse.' A certain Mr. Blunt introduced baptism by immersion among the Particular Baptists at the beginning of 1642. The practice was widely taken up, many being baptized for the second, or for the third time, as the case might be. It was this that roused up Dr. Daniel Featley to write his book against Baptists, in which he claimed to dip the dippers head over ears in argument. Partly in reply to this work, the Baptist Churches published a Confession in 1646, which is their first public declaration in favour of immersion. 'That the way and manner of the dispensing this ordinance is dipping or plunging the body under water: it being a sign must answer the thing signified, which is the interest the saints have in the death, burial, and resurrection of Christ' (*Confessions*, p. 42). For the whole subject, see Shakespeare, *op. cit.* pp. 186–189.

The Socinians, as is clear from the Racovian catechism of 1619, and some Anabaptists had baptized by immersion before this.

† 'Whether a person is to be wholly immersed, and that whether once or thrice, or whether he is only to be sprinkled with water, is not of the least consequence: Churches should be at liberty to adopt either according to the diversity of climates, although it is evident that the term *baptize* means "to immerse," and that this was the form used by the primitive Church' (*Inst.* iv. xv. 19).

The Sikh religion, which is professed by about two millions of the people of the Panjāb, is of comparatively modern origin. Nānak, its founder, who flourished in the 16th cent., was one of the many religious scholars of India in whose mind the philosophy which underlies Hinduism awakened a protest against the current idolatry. He was a follower of Kabīr, and was also influenced by the writings of the Marāṭhī poet Nāmdeva, who flourished about the year A.D. 1300. Passages from the writings of Kabīr and Nāmdeva are found incorporated in the *Granth* ('the Book'), the religious book of the Sikhs ('disciples'). While Hindu pantheism easily lends itself to the support of polytheism and idolatry, that side of it which emphasizes the oneness of the Supreme Existence has always been cropping up in the form of protests against the worship of the many. Nānak may be taken as an example of this frequently repeated tendency. From the movement which he initiated, there emerged under him as its first *guru*, and under his nine successors ending with Guru Govind Singh, a religion which, rejecting idolatry and caste, emphasizes the doctrine of the Divine unity. So far as this doctrine dissociated itself from its original pantheistic foundation and approached the deistic conception, we may recognize in its subsequent development the influence of the Muhammadan religion with which it was in constant contact.

The distinct religious community into which the followers of Nānak were ultimately organized bears the name of the *Khālsa*. Initiation into the Sikh religion takes place by admission to the Khālsa by means of a rite called the *Pahuḷ*.

The *Pahuḷ* is thus described in the *Life of Govind Singh*, the last of the gurus:

'When the guru had returned from the hills to Anandpur, he assembled the societies of the disciples and told them that he required the head of a disciple, and that he who loved his guru should make this offering. Most of them were terror-stricken, and fled; but five of them rose and offered resolutely their heads. These five he took into a room, and told them that, as he had found them true, he would give them the *pahuḷ* of the true religion. He made them bathe, and seated them side by side; he dissolved purified sugar in water and stirred it with a two-edged dagger, and, having recited over it some verses taken from his Granth in praise of the Timeless One, he made them drink some of this sherbet; some of it he poured on their heads and the rest he sprinkled on their bodies. Then, patting them with his hand, he cried with a loud voice, "Say, The Khālsa of the Vah Guru! Victory to the holy Vah Guru!" After he had given the *pahuḷ* to these five in this manner, he took it likewise from them; and in this way all the rest of his disciples were initiated, to whom he gave the name of the Khālsa, adding to the name of each the epithet Singh ('lion'). Then he gave the order that whoever desired to be his disciple must always have five things with him, the names of which begin with the letter *k*, viz., his hair (*kes*) which must not be cut, a comb (*karppa*), a knife (*kathar*), a sword (*kithpal*), and breeches reaching to the knee (*kachh*); otherwise he would not consider him a disciple.'

The rite itself is older than this mention of it in the *Life of Govind Singh*, for it is referred to in the *Life of Nānak*, written by Guru Arjun, the fifth guru, in the beginning of the 17th century. As it is not mentioned in the *Granth*, it would appear to be later in origin than the time of Nānak. It was not, however, instituted by the last guru, Govind Singh, who in the passage just quoted from his life is described as administering an old-established rite.

It is by no means clear that we ought to regard this rite as parallel to baptism except in the mere fact that it marks initiation into the membership of a religious community. The place given to bathing in the description quoted is subsidiary; the essential parts are the drinking of the sherbet and the utterance of the words 'Vah Guru!' In its oldest form the rite included nothing more than this, and its original as well as its later purpose is to express communion and fellowship through joint participation in food and drink. This, according to all Hindu standards, is the ultimate test of religious fellowship, and the Sikh *pahuḷ* appears to be only one form of expressing this fact of religious communion. It is interesting to notice that, while devotion to the guru is included in the ceremony, the stress is laid on the marks of fellowship. The Christian rite of baptism admits to the fellowship of the visible Church; but the emphasis is not laid on this side of the sacrament. The sacrament of baptism expresses in the first instance a relation of the individual to God, not to the community of His people. Even in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, while the communion of believers with each other is an important element in the meaning of the rite, the thought of the believer's relation to his Lord is predominant in every interpretation of the sacrament. This is an illustration of a characteristic difference between Indian religions and Christianity.

In orthodox Hinduism the ceremony that approaches nearest in its specific function to baptism is the *Muñj* ceremony, called also *Upanayana* (Skr. *upa* and *nī*, 'leading up to a teacher,' 'initiation'), by which the members of the twice-born (*dvija*) castes are admitted to their respective privileges. The material element in this ceremony is the investiture with the sacred thread; and, as one part of the rite consists in investing the subject with a girdle made of *muñj* grass, in the case of Brāhmans, it is known amongst them as the *Muñj* ceremony. This investiture with the sacred thread, called *upavīta* (*upa* and *vyā*, 'to cover' or 'clothe') or *yajñopavīta* because it entitles to the privilege of offering sacrifices, must take place between the ages of 8 and 16, 11 and 22, 12 and 24, in the Brāhman, Kṣatriya, and Vaiśya castes respectively.

Bathing is not an integral part of this ceremony. The *yajñopavīta*, or sacred thread, which in the case of the Brāhman is a triple thread of cotton yarn, in the case of the Kṣatriya of hemp, and in the case of the Vaiśya of wool, is placed over the left shoulder and allowed to hang down on the right side of the wearer. At the time of investiture the youth is placed with his face turned towards the sun, and is made to walk round a fire three times. Then the guru, taking the thread in his hand, consecrates it by repeating the *Gāyatrī*, the invocation to Savitṛ, the sun, taken from *Rigveda*, iii. 62. 10—*tat savitur varenyaṁ bhargo devasya dhīmahi dhiyo yo naḥ prachodayāt*, 'that we may attain the glorious light of the god Savitṛ, may he further our prayer.'

After the thread is put on, the youth takes a staff in his hand (of different kinds of wood, according to caste) and goes forth to beg alms. This alms he begs of his mother, or, if she is dead, of his maternal aunt, and, failing her, of a sister. This symbolizes a covenant to support his guru and himself.

The next step is the learning of the *sandhyā*, or prayers appointed for the principal parts of the day, morning, noon, and evening.

The last act of the ceremony is the *mauñjibandham*, or the tying on of a girdle of *muñj* grass. Before the girdle is put on, the guru teaches the boy the Savitṛ *mantra*. Bending with his right knee on the ground and saluting the guru with *namaskār*, he says, 'Repeat to me the Savitṛ *mantra*.' Then the guru, wrapping the hands of the boy with his garment, takes hold of them with both his hands and makes him repeat the *mantra*, at first line by line, and finally the whole. The young man thus initiated enters on the *Brahmachāri* ('disciple') period of his life (see ĀSRAMA

Now, while all the external features of baptism are absent from this rite, there is a certain inner

resemblance between the two in the place which each occupies in the scheme of the religious life. The most striking fact in connexion with the Hindu rite is that by virtue of its performance the initiated ranks as twice-born. The idea that a certain act of religion marks the second birth presents a parallel to the Christian idea of baptism, whether regarded as 'a sensible sign' or as a sacrament carrying with it a spiritual effect, in its relation to regeneration. Looking beneath the outward surface of the rite, may we not recognize in it the expression of a deep human conviction that man as he enters this world is not fit for his spiritual kingdom, that he must be born again if he is to possess it? 'Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God' (Jn 3^3).

If we look for any parallel to baptism in the Zoroastrian religion, which, although the ancient home of the faith is in more northern lands, is to-day an Indian religion, we may find it in the ceremony called *Naujot*, by which Parsi children, both boys and girls, receive religious initiation after they have attained the age of six years and three months. Indeed the modern Parsi sometimes actually speaks of it as baptism. The name *Naujot* indicates that it marks the beginning of a new religious authorization, the outward symbol of which is the investiture with the *sudra*, or sacred shirt, and the *kusti*, or sacred thread, a thread of seventy-two strands worn round the body. In this ceremony the officiating priest recites verses from the Avesta Scriptures, and with his own hands places the *sudra* on the boy or girl to be initiated, and binds the sacred thread. On each side stands a brazier from which flames arise, fed by pieces of fragrant sandal-wood; and, while the verses are being chanted, grains of rice are thrown towards the recipient of the ordinance. The *Naujot* is frequently made the occasion of a great social gathering, followed by a feast in which sometimes many hundreds of persons participate. So much does the social aspect predominate over the religious, that the chanting of the priest is sometimes drowned by the strains of a brass band discoursing the most secular and jovial airs. The sense of incongruity is felt by any one who tries to associate the ceremony with a spiritual purpose. In their origin such ceremonies had, no doubt, a religious meaning; but they have to a large extent lost it, and have become the badges of a community rather than a vehicle of spiritual instruction. An interesting fact in connexion with the *Naujot* ceremony is its administration to girls as well as to boys. The Parsi woman wears the sacred thread. No Hindu woman can wear it.

In the light of such developments the high spiritual significance of Christian baptism stands out more clearly; but even Christian baptism may lose its higher meaning if the purpose which it subserves as a mark of the Christian faith be permitted to overshadow its meaning for the individual soul.

LITERATURE.—See under INITIATION.

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BAPTISM (Jewish).—The fact that Judaism gained accessions from the Gentile world gave rise to an application of the practice of ceremonial ablution altogether new in Jewish religious life, viz., the baptism of proselytes. Precisely as the rite of bathing after cohabitation or nocturnal pollution was, in the period after the destruction of the Temple, regarded by the Rabbis both as a purification and as a kind of consecration for intercourse with the sacred words of the Law, so was the bathing of proselytes considered as at once a purification from heathenism and an initiation or consecration of the convert before his admission amongst the people of God. It was a ceremony not unlike Christian baptism so far as the individual who desired to become a Jew was conducted to the bath, and there immersed himself in the presence of the Rabbis, who recited to him portions of the Law. The proper term, however, is the 'immersion of proselytism' (טבילת גרות), as it is designated, *e.g.*, by Rashi.

The antiquity of proselyte baptism.—Epictetus, the Stoic philosopher, who taught in Rome till A.D. 94, and subsequently lived at Nicopolis, in Epirus, had heard of the practice, and speaks of it, indeed, as a matter of common knowledge. In his conversations, as recorded by the historian Arrian, prefect of Cappadocia, he illustrates the maxim that a man's profession of faith should be carried out in practical life, by referring to the fact that many Hellenes are called, or call themselves, Jews, Syrians, or Egyptians, simply because they have adopted the religious usages of one or other of those peoples. But, he proceeds, when a man goes only half-way in such a matter, it is usually said of him that 'he is no Jew, but has merely the semblance of one'; while, if he takes upon himself the arduous life of 'the baptized and the elect,' he is really what he calls himself (viz. a Jew).*

In the Rabbinical literature (*Mechilta*, on Ex 12^{48}) it is stated that a lady named Valeria, along with her female slaves, was received into Judaism by a bath of immersion. This story may possibly go back to a time at least equally remote. The Babylonian Talmud (*Yebhāmōth*, fol. 46*a*, at foot) contains the tradition that Eliezer and Joshua, who both flourished towards the end of the 1st cent. A.D., disagreed in their views regarding the conditions under which a proselyte should be received, Rabbi Eliezer asserting that circumcision without immersion, Rabbi Joshua that immersion without circumcision, was sufficient. It has been handed down as the admittedly valid finding that both immersion and circumcision, and—in theory at least—an oblation as well, were indispensable conditions of admission to the Jewish communion.

We have thus good authority for believing that proselyte baptism was practised towards the end of the 1st century. It is probable, however, that till about this time baptism was not regarded by all teachers or in all countries as a ceremony associated with the act of embracing Judaism. In view of this circumstance the silence of certain writers, in passages of their works where a reference to the practice might have been expected, loses the force which has sometimes been attributed to this particular case of *testimonium e silentio*.† In one passage of the Mishna, proselyte baptism seems to be merely a bath of ceremonial purification, which the proselyte must take as one who 'comes from the foreskin.'‡ The ceremonial of the practice likewise would be developed gradually. Making all the reservations necessary in view of the diffusion, conception, and various forms of the rite, we may safely assume that the Jewish baptism of proselytes was not of later origin than Christian baptism.

According to Talmudic testimony, the baptism of proselytes took the form of an immersion carried out in accordance with the Rabbinical regulations for ceremonial purification, and in presence of three, or at least two, witnesses. The candidate, if a male, was first of all circumcised, and when the wound had healed [this is left out of account in *Pes.* viii. 8] he was taken to the bath. While he stood in the water the Rabbis ('disciples of the wise') who happened to be among the witnesses once more recited to him some of the great and the lesser commandments. Then the convert made a complete immersion, and stepped forth as a fully privileged Israelite. A female was, for modesty's sake, taken to the water by women, the 'disciples of the wise,' as legal witnesses, standing behind the curtain that served as a door. She was then placed in water up to the neck, and, while she remained in this position, the Rabbis, without seeing her, but within hearing, gave their prelection upon the commandments. She thereafter drew her head under water, and at that moment it was necessary for the witnesses to look on; then, as she came out of the bath, the men retired with averted faces. The bap-

* *Dissert. Epicteti*, ii. 9 (ed. Upton, London, 1841, i. 214 *f.*): ὅταν δ' ἀναλάβῃ τὸ πάθος τὸ τοῦ βεβαμμένου καὶ ᾐρμένου, τότε καὶ ἔστι τῷ ὄντι καὶ καλεῖται Ἰουδαῖος. The perfect participles are conclusive.

† This applies specially to Philo Alex., Josephus (*Ant.* XIII. ix., XX. ii.), and Juvenal (*Sat.* xiv. 96).

‡ *Pes.* viii. 8: 'A mourner may bathe and eat his *pesach* in the evening, but *not along with* the sacred meats. One who receives news of a death and one who gathers bones [a gravedigger] may bathe and eat (his *pesach*) *along with* the sacred meats. A proselyte who has become a proselyte on the evening before the *pesach* [*i.e.* the day before] (concerning him) the school of Shammai says: "He may bathe and eat his *pesach* in the evening." But the school of Hillel says: "One who comes from the foreskin is as one who comes from the grave."' Note that, according to Nu 19^{16}, one who touches a grave remains unclean for seven days.

tism of a proselyte could not legally be performed by night, or on a Sabbath or any other holy day.*

This description is to be understood as one of constitutive validity. Baptism, according to it, must be administered by orthodox Judaism whenever proselytes are to be received into its community.

The necessity of proselyte baptism was argued by the Talmudic scholars from the fact that, according to Ex 19[10. 14. 22], the Israelites were commanded 'to sanctify themselves' before the deliverance of the Law at Sinai. That sanctification involved ablution, but was designed by the writer as a necessary condition of meeting with Deity. The Rabbis, however, believed that this act was ordained in view of the holy covenant which was to be completed by a sacrifice (Ex 24[4-8]), but which was about to be instituted from the Divine side by the giving of the Law (Ex 20). They thus assumed that even at that early stage an ablution was the ordained means of gaining admission into the covenant.† We find, however, that proselyte baptism was regarded also as a bath of purification, designed to remove the uncleanness of heathenism (cf. the passage of the Mishna, *Pes.* viii. 8, already cited). Thus, in the case of a woman who was desirous of embracing Judaism, and who had taken the bath required after menstruation, this act was credited to her by a certain Rabbi Joshua as equivalent to the bath required of proselytes.‡ It is a current opinion among Christian theologians that baptism (of children) takes the place of circumcision. The incident just referred to might suggest the idea that proselyte baptism was originally sanctioned by Jewish teachers anxious to make converts, as a more agreeable rite than the other. This surmise, however, has not a shred of evidence to support it; while in the case mentioned by Josephus (*Ant.* XX. ii. 4), circumcision was simply remitted.

From the fact that the Jewish religion claimed to be a Divine revelation, and from such utterances as that of Philo (*de Pœn.* i.), 'the proselyte comes from darkness into light,' or the Rabbinical principle that 'the proselyte is like a newborn child,' it would be erroneous to infer that the baptism of proselytes was the rite of initiation into the mysteries of the Jewish religion. As a matter of fact, the baptism was always preceded by instruction in religious doctrine, and thenceforward there were no further revelations to be made. The Rabbinical principle just quoted, to judge from its discussion amongst the teachers themselves, was concerned exclusively with the *civil* relations of the proselyte: he was required, on this interpretation, to alienate himself entirely from his former interests, and even from his still heathen kindred; he must not inherit their property, he cannot commit incest with them, etc.§

Our prefatory note regarding the characteristics of proselyte baptism is thus confirmed by these early references. This testimony, at the very most, encourages the idea that the ceremony in question, with its twofold signification, was not seldom understood as merely a bath of purification.

LITERATURE.—Rabbinic texts (Talmudic, etc.) are collected by H. Ainsworth, *Annotations on the Pentateuch*, 1612 ff. (at Gn 17); John Lightfoot, *Horae Hebraicae* (at Mt 3[6]); J. A. Bengel, *Ueber das Alter der jüdischen Proselytentaufe*, 1814; M. Schneckenburger, *Ueber d. Alter d. jüd. Proselytentaufe und deren Zusammenhang mit dem johann. u. christl. Ritus*, Berlin, 1828 (pp. 4–32 are a survey of the older literature); E. Schürer, *GJV*[3], iii. 129 ff.; artt. 'Baptism,' by S. Krauss, and 'Proselyte,' by E. G. Hirsch, in *JE*; also art. 'Proselyte,' by F. C. Porter, in *HDB*.

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* All this is set forth in the Bab. Talmud, *Yebhāmōth*, fol. 45–47.
† Bab. *Yebhāmōth*, fol. 46 *a*, *b*; *Kerithōth*, fol. 9 *a*.
‡ Bab. *Yebhāmōth*, 46 *b*; cf. the Heb. commentators.
§ גר שנתגייר בקטן שנולד רמי : Mishna, *Yebhāmōth*, xi. 2; Bab. *Yebh.* fol. 62 *a*; Jerus. *Yebh.* fol. 4 *a*, *et aliis locis*.

BAPTISM (Muhammadan).—Historically considered, the Muslim rite of purificatory ablution, *wuḍū'* and *ghusl* (see MUHAMMADANISM, § 6), goes back to divergent forms of Christian baptism. Muhammad and his early followers were called by the heathen Arabs Sabæans (*q.v.*), a name applied also in the Qur'ān (ii. 59, v. 73, xxii. 17) to a sect mentioned with respect beside the Jews and the Christians. This name, evidently, is derived from the Aramaic root *ṣabā'*, or *ṣabā'*, 'to dip,' 'immerse,' and means 'dippers,' or 'baptizers,' and was used originally for different heretical Christian sects of Hemerobaptists, Elkesaites (*q.v.*), and Mandæans (*q.v.*), who practised frequent ceremonial ablution (see Wellhausen, *Reste*[2], p. 236 f.; in 1st ed. p. 205 ff.). Of baptism, however, in the precise sense, no trace appears in Islām, although there are many stories in European crusading legend of Muslims who accepted it; and that some distinguished Muslims were knighted by Christians, with all the necessary ceremonies, appears to be practically certain (Lane-Poole, *Saladin*, p. 387 ff.).

Baptism among Christians is regarded by Muslims as an initiatory rite of purification, parallel with circumcision. A very curious description of the rite, as viewed by them, is given by al-Bīrūnī, from Abū-l-Ḥusain al-Ahwāzī, in his *Chronology of Ancient Nations* (tr. Sachau, p. 288 ff.). He introduces it under Epiphany, in giving an account of the calendar of the Melkite Syrian Christians in Khwarizm, as Epiphany for the Oriental Church is a commemoration of the baptism of Christ. This description is either fanciful and imaginary or is of some obscure local rite. It agrees with none of the great Oriental rites. In Egypt the Copts used to observe the Eve of Epiphany (*laīlat al-ghiṭās*), the 10th of Tūba (=the 17th or 18th of January), as a great river-festival, plunging into the Nile as a memorial of the baptism of Christ, and believing that on that night it could prevent and cure all illnesses. In this festival and usage the Muslims also joined, and al-Mas'ūdī, who was in Egypt in A.D. 942, describes it as a great popular ceremony presided over by the Iḫshīd himself (*Murūj adh-dhahab*, ii. 364 f. of Paris ed.). It is now observed by Copts only, and by them not to any great extent. Even the plunging into the Epiphany tank in churches has become greatly disused, and the foot-washing of Maundy Thursday has taken its place. For the religious ceremony see *The Blessing of the Waters on the Eve of the Epiphany*, by John, Marquess of Bute, London, 1901. But among Muslims there is at least one curious custom which appears to be a survival. In the mosque of ad-Dashṭūṭī, just outside of the Bāb ash-Sharīya at Cairo, there is a well and a tank (*maghṭis*), and it is the popular belief that if any one afflicted with a fever (*ḥummā*) plunges into the tank three times in three weeks he will be healed (*Al-ḫiṭaṭ al-jadīda*, iv. 112). Others make the healing power of this *maghṭis* much more general, and describe how the sick folk descend into it by the light of a candle (Michell, *Egyptian Calendar*, p. 122).

One obscure passage in the Qur'ān has generally been held by Muslims to be an allusion to baptism, and most translators of the Qur'ān have accepted that view. In Qur'ān ii. 132, after the story of Abraham, how he was a *ḥanīf* of the primitive religion as contrasted with the faiths of the Jews and Christians, there is an exclamatory outburst, 'The kind of dipping (*or* dip, *ṣibgha*) of Allāh! And who is better than Allāh as to a kind of dipping (*or* dip)? And we are worshippers of him.' The precise syntactical construction of *ṣibgha* we need not here consider. It is plain that, lexicographically, in the oldest Arabic usage (*Lisān*, x. 319 ff.) the word means either the act of dipping one thing into another, as, *e.g.*, a camel dips its lips

into water; or the thing into which something else is dipped. Thus *ṣibgha* came to be the regular word for 'dye,' and *ṣibgh* is used in Qur'ān xxiii. 20 for 'sauce.' The oldest exegetical tradition (Ṭabarī's *Tafsīr*, i. 423) sees in Qur. ii. 132 a reference to Christian baptism. It differs only as to the nature of 'the kind of dipping of Allāh,' some holding that it is the *fiṭrat Allāh*, the original nature in which Allāh constituted all creatures, and from which Jews and Christians are perverted only by their parents (see Krehl, in *SSGW*, hist.-phil. Klasse, July 1st, 1870, p. 99), and others that it is Islām, the religion (*dīn*) of Allāh.

In the great scholastic commentary *Mafātīḥ al-ghaib* of Rāzī (d. A.D. 1209) a considerable advance is made, and the idea of 'dipping' has become distinctly 'dyeing' (i. 505). The first explanation is that the 'dyeing' of Allāh is the religion of Islām, and that it is so called (*a*) because Christians dip their children in a yellow water and say that it is a purification, and that they have thereby become Christians; or (*b*) because Jews and Christians dye their children in their respective faiths, in the sense that they instil these into them (said to be a possible meaning of the Arabic); or (*c*) because the form of Islām appears evidently from the traces left by purification and prayer, as Allāh has said (Qur. xlviii. 29), 'Their signs are on their faces from the trace of prostration,' *i.e.* the mark of dust on the forehead; or (*d*) the difference between the true faith and the false is as evident as that between colours or dyes. Or it may be the original nature of man mentioned above, or circumcision; but Rāzī inclines to the first view.

It may, however, be doubted whether any idea of baptism was in Muhammad's mind. To him baptism would have suggested either *wuḍū'* or *ghusl*, which, indeed, had sprung from it. The chapter in which the word *ṣibgha* occurs is called 'Of the Heifer,' from a section (vv. 63–68) evidently derived from Nu 19, which prescribes how a red heifer should be slaughtered and burned and its ashes used for ritual purification ('Red Heifer' in Hastings' *DB* iv. 207 ff.). Further, the same root *ṣaba'*, used in Qur. ii. 132, is that used in Aramaic for the purificatory dipping connected with the ritual of the Red Heifer (Levy, *Chaldäisches Wörterbuch*, p. 312, *s.v.*). It seems, then, at least possible that Muhammad had in mind some such process, and not either baptism or dyeing. That the oldest exegetical tradition should be in error is not surprising. The earliest interpreters of the Qur'ān were evidently as far from a genuine oral tradition going back to Muhammad himself as were the translators of the LXX from a tradition going back to the Hebrew prophets.

LITERATURE.—Wellhausen, *Reste arabischen Heidentums*², Berlin, 1897; Lane-Poole, *Saladin and the Fall of the Kingdom of Jerusalem*, London, 1898; al-Bīrūnī, *Chronology of Ancient Nations*, tr. Sachau, London, 1879; John, Marquess of Bute, *The Blessing of the Waters on the Eve of the Epiphany*, London, 1901; Michell, *Egyptian Calendar*, London, 1900; Krehl, 'Ueber die Koranische Lehre von der Predestination,' in *SSGW*, hist.-phil. Klasse, July 1st, 1870; Levy, *Chaldäisches Wörterbuch*, Leipzig, 1866.

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BAPTISM (Polynesian).—A rite closely resembling baptism has been observed in some of the Polynesian Islands. The best-known custom is that of New Zealand. For five days after the birth of a child both the mother and the infant are *tabu*, and remain in a sacred house. The women of the neighbourhood then assemble and give the child its first name, meanwhile dipping a twig in water and sprinkling the infant with it. Some months later, at the feast of the giving of the (second) name, the *tohunga* (priest) dips a twig in water and sprinkles the child's head, uttering formulas in an archaic and practically unintelligible dialect, the words varying according to sex. In the northern island of New Zealand the child was not sprinkled, but was immersed. In both islands the infant was dedicated to Tu, the god of war, and the mother was forbidden to see the ceremony, although, on rare occasions, young people were allowed to be present. An additional baptism was also performed when a boy reached the age of eight, that he might become strong and manly. In the Fiji Islands the first bath of a child was celebrated with a feast, although this is hardly baptism. On the other hand, there is at least an approach to baptism in the custom observed in the island of Rotuma, by which the chief rubbed the face, gums, and lips of the newborn child with a mixture of sea-water and coconut oil; while in the island of Uvea the birth of an infant was celebrated with a feast, at which the child's head was sprinkled with water. The ceremony has been described as the removal of the *tabu* which rests upon the newborn child.

LITERATURE.—Waitz-Gerland, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, vi. 131–133 (Leipzig, 1872); Ploss, *Das Kind*², i. 258 (Leipzig, 1884); Réville, *Les Religions des peuples non-civilisés*, ii. iii. (Paris, 1883).

LOUIS H. GRAY.

BAPTISM (Teutonic).—The practice of sprinkling children with water shortly after birth, as found among many aboriginal races, prevailed also among the Teutons in heathen times. In the 2nd cent. A.D. the famous physician Galen had learned that it was their custom to immerse the infant directly after birth in cold river-water; and about the same period, as well as later, it is recorded by Greek writers that the inhabitants of the Rhine country, who are designated Celts, but who were unquestionably Teutons, employed the river as a test of legitimacy, immersing all their infants therein in the belief that the illegitimate would sink. Unfortunately our authorities for the southern Teutons, and, to a large extent, those for the northern, yield no evidence regarding this primitive rite, the reason being that those authorities date almost entirely from Christian times, when Christian baptism had become the general custom. On the other hand, the practice finds frequent mention in the Icelandic sagas and the Eddic poetry. It is there spoken of as *ausa vatni*, 'to sprinkle with water,' and in the sources it is clearly discriminated from *skíra*, 'to cleanse,' 'to baptize' in the Christian sense.

The writings in which the expression occurs belong in all likelihood to the Christian period, but the people spoken of as actually observing the practice were certainly pagans (cf. K. Maurer, *Wasserweihe*, 5 ff.). The custom probably took its rise in religious ceremonial. By the Teutons, as by many other races, water was thought to be the *habitat* of supernatural, and especially of beneficent, powers, and the act of suffusion therefore brought the child under the influence of these. Hence the claim of the master-magician in the *Hávamál* (v. 158): 'This I can make sure when I suffuse a man-child with water—he shall not fall when he fights in the host; no sword shall bring him low.' The rite was performed by the child's father, or by one near of kin, or by some person of standing with whom the father was socially on familiar terms.

Intimately connected with this initiation by water was the act of naming the child. Both ceremonies, in fact, were performed at the same time by one and the same person, and between the infant and the name-giver there was thus constituted a special bond of union, which was of life-long duration, and was signalized by the name-giver's bestowing a gift upon the child at the ceremony itself. In connexion with the birth of Harald Gráfeld, for instance, we are told that 'Eirikr and Gunnhild had a son whom Haraldr

Haarfager suffused with water, and to whom he gave the name, ordaining that he should be king after his father Eirik' (*Heimskringla*, ed. F. Jónsson, i. 161). In virtue of this act of naming, which counted as the first legal transaction relative to the child, the latter acquired its status, so to speak, as a human being, and was admitted into the legal union of consanguinity. Hence, while initiation by water was in the first instance a religious function, the giving of the name was a legal one; as both were performed by the same individual, however, the former soon acquired a legal significance likewise. So long as a child had not gone through the ceremony of suffusion, its life was as fully at the father's disposal as that of a child who had taken no nourishment; he might expose it, or even kill it. After suffusion, however, the child enjoyed the full legal protection involved in consanguinity. This legal provision still remained in force in the legislation of the Northern Teutons even after the introduction of Christianity, and when baptism had superseded the older rite; according to the earlier Norwegian law, indeed, the murder of an unbaptized child was much more leniently dealt with than that of one who had been baptized. This distinction was not abolished till king Magnus Erlingsson altered the law in the latter half of the 12th century. The provincial codes of Sweden and Denmark still retain traces of this ancient heathen point of view. Even when the slayer was a stranger, *i.e.* a person other than the parents, a much more moderate wergeld was exacted by Swedish law if the victim was still a heathen, *i.e.* unbaptized. Similar enactments are found in the Anglo-Saxon and the Frankish codes.

In the legislation of the Southern Teutons, no doubt, it was the ceremony of naming rather than that of baptism that gained prominence as the function which brought the child under the higher protection of the law. From this circumstance it is inferred by Maurer that the rite of initiation by water was not of Teutonic origin at all, but was adopted from the Christian peoples with whom the Northern Teutons came into contact upon the islands of the Western Sea. Bearing in mind, however, the genuinely Teutonic principle, still firmly rooted among many Teutonic peoples, that baptism invests the child with a higher legal status, and, above all, the fact that throughout practically the entire Teutonic race a child's right of inheritance first becomes operative at its baptism—regulations never found among non-Teutonic peoples—we feel that Maurer's contention is untenable. The circumstance that among the Southern Teutons the ceremony of naming, as marking the child's entrance into his higher legal rights, took the leading place, and that, further, this ceremony was fixed for the ninth day after birth, goes rather to show the influence of the Roman practice of naming the child and presenting him in the temple on the *dies lustricus*.

LITERATURE.—K. Maurer, 'Über die Wasserweihe des germanischen Heidentums' (*Abhand. d. k. Bayr. Akad. der Wiss.*, Cl. i. vol. xv. pt. iii., Munich, 1880); K. Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, iv. 314, 632 ff. (Berlin, 1900); H. Pfannenschmid, *Das Weihwasser im heidnischen u. christlichen Cultus* (Hanover, 1869); W. Mannhardt, *Germanische Mythen* (Berlin, 1858), 310 ff.; J. Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsaltertümer*[4] (Leipzig, 1899), i. 680 ff.

E. MOGK.

BAPTISM BY BLOOD.—Two uses of the expression 'baptism by blood' must be distinguished: (1) a literal use as applied to the practices of pre-Christian and ethnic religion, and (2) a metaphorical use, denoting the sufferings of Christian martyrs.

(1) *Literal use.*—Among all primitive races the blood of beasts or of men plays an important part in religious ceremonies. In the East especially it had peculiar purgative and propitiatory properties ascribed to it, as being the seat and vehicle of life. The ancient Arabs sprinkled blood to lay evil spirits (cf. Wellhausen, *Reste arab. Heidentums*[2], 127), and a similar act was observed in Vedic ritual (cf. Hillebrandt, *Vedische Opfer und Zauber*, 176, 179). Hebrew notions concerning blood were so far spiritualized that there is only one instance in the OT (1 K 22[38]) which can properly be described as indicating a merely superstitious or magical use of blood (cf. Hastings' *DB* i. 257, *s.v.* 'Bath, Bathing'). For its employment in Jewish ceremonial see separate artt. COVENANT, PURIFICATION, SACRIFICE. Hellenic ritual is not without examples of cathartic sprinkling of blood (cf. Apollonius Rhod. *Argonaut.* iv. 704 f.; Æschylus, *Eum.* 282 f.), and in the Roman Lupercalia there was a piacular use of dog's and goat's blood (cf. Warde Fowler, *Roman Festivals*, 311). But it was probably at a somewhat late date and under the influence of prevailing Eastern cults that the practice of immersion in blood, resulting in moral cleanness, was brought into the Empire. In the Taurobolium and Criobolium (Hæmobolium, cf. Orelli's *CIL*, No. 2334) the worshipper, issuing drenched with blood of bull or ram from the pit over which the beast had been slaughtered, was regarded as being cleansed from his sins and ready for eternity (cf. 'taurobolio criobolioque renatus in æternum,' *Berlin CIL* vi. 510). See separate artt. CRIOBOLIUM, GREAT MOTHER, TAUROBOLIUM. For savage rites of purification by blood-sprinkling, cf. J. G. Frazer, *Adonis Attis Osiris*, 251; and for Scandinavian and German parallels, cf. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*[4], i. 45; and U. Jahn, *Opfergebräuche*, 31. Cf. also p. 372[b].

(2) *Metaphorical use.*—In the Christian Church allusion is very early made to a baptism by blood in connexion with martyrdom. Polycarp (A.D. 156), who stripped himself of his garments at the stake, may very well have wished to signify by so doing a preparation for baptism by blood and fire; and although the action seems to have been unusual enough to attract the attention of Lucian, who in his *de morte Peregrini* describes Peregrinus as making a similar preparation for death, it was probably not the first time that a Christian martyr tried to carry out in his own person the prophecy of Mk 10[39] (cf. H. F. Stewart, *Invocation of Saints*, 54, 55). The germ of the idea that death for Christ had the effect of baptism, viz., remission of sin, is found in Melito of Sardis (*c.* 170 A.D.), who in an extant fragment (ed. Otto, xii.) says that two things confer forgiveness of sins, viz., baptism and suffering for Christ. Hermas (*Pastor*, iii., *Simil.* 9, § 20) says much the same: 'Omnium eorum deleta sunt delicta, quia propter nomen Filii Dei mortem obierunt.'

But the first definite mention of baptism by blood in Christian literature is probably a passage in the *Passio S. Perpetuæ* (A.D. 202): 'a sanguine ad sanguinem ab obstetrice ad retiarium lotura post partum secundo baptismo' (*Passio S. Perpetuæ*, 118). To about the same date may be assigned the *de Baptismo* of Tertullian, who says: 'est quidem nobis etiam secundum lauacrum, unum et ipsum, sanguinis scilicet, de quo dominus, habeo, inquit, baptismo tingui, cum iam tinctus fuisset' (*de Baptismo*, 16, cf. Lupton's ed. *ad loc.*).

The distinction between the first and second baptism made by Tertullian in this passage and elsewhere is maintained by the anonymous author of *de Rebaptismo*, and by Cyprian, who says (*de Exhort. Martyr.* præf. 3) that the first baptism (by water) gives remission of sins, while the second (by blood) gives union with God and man, or the final victory of God and Christ.

Origen holds that baptism by blood excludes the possibility of sin, and ventures to assert its superiority over baptism by water (*Hom. in Jud.* vii. 473; cf. Redepenning, *Origenes*, ii. 28).

These notions, struck out under stress of persecution, were taken up in times of peace by later writers, *e.g.* Ambrose, Augustine, Cyril of Jerusalem, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Gennadius, and became the established teaching, until finally scholastic divinity definitely adopted the scheme of *baptismum sanguinis aquæ flaminis* (sc. *spiritus sancti*) (cf. Thomas Aq. *Summa*, p. iii., q. xi. xii., where baptism by blood is assigned a higher place than the other two).

It is doubtless possible to regard the expression baptism by blood, fire, tears as merely rhetorical (so *DCA* i. 169, *s.v.* 'Baptism'); but Hagenbach (*History of Christian Doctrine*[6], i. 286) points out that the parallel between the efficacy of water and blood rests upon the antithesis which the Fathers desired to maintain between man's free will and the influence of Divine Grace. In baptism by water man appears as a passive recipient; in baptism by blood he contributes something of his own.

LITERATURE. — H. Dodwell, *Dissertationes Cyprianicæ* Bremen, 1690; J. G. Frazer, *Adonis Attis Osiris*, London, 1907; F. W. Gass, 'Das christliche Märtyrtum in den ersten Jahrhunderten' in *Zeitschrift für die historische Theologie*, Gotha, 1859; Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*[4], Berlin, 1875; Hagenbach, *History of Christian Doctrine*[6] (Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1880); U. Jahn, *Die deutschen Opfergebräuche*, Breslau, 1884; J. M. Lupton, *Tertullian de Baptismo*, Cambridge, 1908; H. F. Stewart, *Doctrina Romanensium de Invocatione Sanctorum*, London, 1907. H. F. STEWART.

BAQILĀNI.—Baqilāni († A.H. 403 = A.D. 1012) was initiated into the system of orthodox theology associated with the Ash'arites—so named from the founder of the school—by his teacher Mugāhid, a pupil of Ash'arī himself († A.H. 324 = A.D. 935) and Bāhili († A.H. 327 = A.D. 938). The aim of this school was to safeguard the doctrines of the Qur'ān against the rationalistic tendencies of the Mu'tazilites, and at the same time to maintain a conciliatory attitude towards the claims of reason and the philosophy which contended for the rational interpretation of the Qur'ān and the exclusion of all its irrational elements. Baqilāni, in his endeavour to hold the balance even between the two conflicting parties, was regarded by some as simply a Mu'tazilite, *i.e.* a rationalist and an infidel, but the majority saw in him the champion of orthodoxy among the Ash'arites. His whole active life was given to his polemic against the liberalism of the Mu'tazilites. That he had a potent influence upon Muslim theology may be inferred from the fact that his opinions are cited in conjunction with those of al-Ghazālī († A.H. 505 = A.D. 1111), the greatest theologian of Islām, and his teacher Juwaini († A.H. 478 = A.D. 1085), by ibn Taimīya († A.H. 728 = A.D. 1327) in his Letters (Cairo, 1323), p. 62, by Qushgi († A.H. 879 = A.D. 1474) in his Commentary on Tūsi's († A.H. 672 = A.D. 1273) 'System of Doctrine,' (*Tagrid*), Treatise ii., 'Inquiry concerning the will,' and by many others. Baqilāni's system is practically that of Ash'arī (see AL-ASH'ARĪ, p. 111), although he certainly grafted several philosophical doctrines upon the orthodox theology, such as the doctrine of atoms, the doctrine of empty space, the idea that the will (especially in God) abhors the contrary of the thing willed, and that one accident cannot become the substratum of a second. The extant dicta of Baqilāni, however, are too meagre to substantiate any further differences of note.

All we know of his external life is that he was born in humble circumstances, his father being a greengrocer in Baṣra, and that he held the office of a judge in the same city. From the latter fact comes the title by which he is best known, viz., Qādī Abū Bakr, but his full name was Abū Bakr Aḥmed ibn Ali ibn at-Taiyib al-Baqilāni.

M. HORTEN.

BARASHNUM, BARESHNUM.—See PURIFICATION (Parsi).

BAR COCHBA, BAR KOCHBA. — See MESSIAHS (PSEUDO-).

BARDS.

Breton (E. ANWYL), p. 412.
Irish (DOUGLAS HYDE), p. 414.
Welsh (E. ANWYL), p. 416.

BARDS (Breton).—Though the Breton tongue is closely related to Welsh, the history of Breton poetry is far more meagre than that of Wales. The reason for this is that in Brittany the ruling classes and those sections of the community that had literary interests turned, even in the early Middle Ages, to the French tongue for the satisfaction of their literary wants. The result was that in mediæval times there appears to have been in Brittany no powerful and clearly established literary tradition, carried on by professional or semi-professional bards, as there was in Wales; while, in later times, there was no popular demand for native poetry except when it was of a purely popular kind (such as the ballads called *Gwerziou* and *Soniou*), or took the form of religious drama. Count Hersart de la Villemarqué, in his zeal for his native land, imagined that in mediæval Brittany a body of heroic poetry had flourished; but there are, unfortunately, nowhere to be found any traces of such poetry. Nor have we in the case of Breton, as we have in the case of Welsh, marked evidences of that linguistic conservatism which tends to keep the literary tongue distinct from the spoken language of a people. Breton has far more of the characteristics of a colloquial language than Welsh, and it approaches nearer in many respects to some of the Southern Welsh dialects than to the Welsh literary tongue. One of the great obstacles to the view that Chrétien de Troyes derived his Arthurian material and nomenclature from Brittany is that, apart from popular folklore, there is no evidence of any Arthurian literary cycle in mediæval Brittany at all; and the other British heroes, who are associated with Arthur, do not appear even to have been known in Brittany; while in Wales, on the other hand, they were the leading heroes both of prose and of verse narrative. In Wales the centres of the bardic system were the courts of the princes, but in Brittany there is no evidence whatsoever of any systematic princely patronage given to Breton poetry. As M. Loth of Rennes says, there is no continuous Breton text of any kind before the end of the 15th century. The language certainly was written before then, since we have Breton glosses and Breton proper names in writing; so that it is all the more strange, if Brittany had a flourishing literature in Breton, that there should be in existence no single fragment of it. In his *Chrestomathie bretonne* M. Loth says:

'After having invaded all the coasts of the Armorican peninsula from the Couesnon to the Loire, after having had the upper hand in the old dioceses of Dol, Saint-Malo, Saint-Brieuc, Tréguier, Léon, Cornouailles, and Vannes on the Nantes coast, and in the interior having commenced to cross, from the 8th to the 9th cent., even the Vilaine to the neighbourhood of Redon, Breton is found, after the 11-12th cent., suddenly thrust back

towards the West, and from this period it occupies almost the same area as it does to-day. The alliances of Breton chiefs with French families, whether of French Brittany or of France itself, or of the Anglo-Norman zone, were not slow to make French the language of the aristocracy and the instrument of intellectual culture, even in the Breton-speaking zone. The most ancient texts in mediæval Breton bear witness to this: they are almost all translations or imitations from the French; they are entirely penetrated with French words.'

M. Loth shows how Breton was, even in mediæval times, relegated to a lower place. Yet, as he points out, we should not be justified in thinking that there had never been in Brittany such a thing as Breton culture or Breton literature. He argues quite justly that the very existence up to the 16th cent. of the complicated Breton system of versification implies a literary period during which that system was evolved; such a system, which, he says, has features in common with the versification of Wales and Cornwall, implies the existence at one time of a school of bards or wandering Breton poets (*trouvères bretons*). It is significant, however, that the Breton metres bear far fewer traces of professional elaboration than do those of Wales. In this case M. Loth is inclined to explain the complete disappearance of the older body of poetry by the very limited circle to which it appealed or the oral character of its transmission. The significant fact for all students of Celtic influences on French mediæval literature is that not a line of Breton mediæval literature exists before the 15th century. How meagre the remnants of Breton poetry are, as compared with those of Wales, will be seen from the following list of the fragments and portions of Middle Breton poetry from the 15th and subsequent centuries that have come down to us:

(1) A Breton fragment in the farce of M. Pathelin (Loth, *RCel* iv. 451, v. 225). (2) A score of quite mutilated verses, probably in the Vannes dialect and of the end of the 15th cent. (published by Loth, *ib.* viii. 161). (3) A metrical life of St. Nonn, the mother of St. David, in the form of a Mystery play (published in 1837 by the Abbé Sionnet, with a translation by the Breton grammarian and lexicographer, Le Gonidec, and by M. Ernault, *ib.* viii. 230 ff.). The only source of this mystery is a MS in the Bibliothèque Nationale of the 15th century. The story is that of the Latin *Life of St. David* dramatized. The scene is laid mainly in Wales, but an attempt is made to localize some features of the story in Brittany, such as the burial of St. Nonn at Dirinon.

From the 16th cent. onwards the chief compositions written in Breton have been Mystery plays, which show unmistakably the influence of French models.

In 1530 there was published *Le Grand Mystère de Jésus*, of which a copy exists in the Bibliothèque Nationale. From the evidence of language, M. Loth believes that this Mystery was written about the date of its publication. A second edition was published at Morlaix in 1622 by Georges Allienne. M. Loth points out that the edition followed by the Breton translator is that of Arnoul Gresban, or rather that of Jean Michel, played at Angers in 1486, and soon afterwards printed by Vérard. The same book also contains a Breton version of the *Transitus Beatæ Mariæ* (*Tremenvan an ytron guerches Maria*), the *Fifteen Joys of Mary* (*Pemzec leuenez Maria*), and the *Life of Man* (*Buhez Mabden*). For the two latter there are no known French originals. Another Breton Mystery, which was published in the 16th cent. and afterwards in the 17th, was *Le Mystère de Sainte Barbe*. The first edition was published in 1557, and the second in 1647. The former was printed at Paris for Bernard de Leau, printer of Morlaix (see 'Bibliographie des traditions et de la littérature populaire de la Bretagne' [pp. 315–316], by H. Gaidoz and Paul Sébillot, published at Paris [1882] as an extract from the *RCel*). This Mystery has been reprinted after the 1557 edition, with the variant readings of the 1647 edition, by a distinguished Breton scholar, M. E. Ernault, professor at the Faculty of Letters of Poitiers (Nantes, Société des bibliophiles bretons, 1885). This drama is substantially the same as the printed French drama of the same name, but M. Loth shows that there are differences between the two plays sufficiently marked to justify the supposition that the Breton drama is an adaptation of a French version parallel to that which has been printed. Another Breton Mystery is *The Mirror of Death*, composed in 1519 and printed in 1575, at the Convent of St. Francis of Cuburien. This Mystery is in private hands, and M. Loth states that he was able to obtain a copy of a portion of it only through the good offices of the Abbé Corré of Lesneven, who transcribed it.

In the 17th cent. we find also some Breton hymns published by Tanguy Gueguen in 1650, but there has been no development of hymnology in Breton comparable for a moment with that of Wales. In the 18th cent. the work of adapting and copying Mystery plays was carried on vigorously, and we have the following among other compositions of this type:

(1) *Robert le Diable*, a Mystery in six acts and two days. This bears the date 30th November 1741. M. Loth shows it to be of French origin, but states that it is very different from the play of 'Robert le Diable' in the *Miracles de Notre-Dame*, t. vi. (Société des anciens textes français), and also from the *Mystère du xive siècle*, published at Rouen in 1836. (2) *The Creation of the World*. The oldest known MS of this play was written in 1760, and is, like the Cornish *Gwreans an bys* ('The Creation of the World'), an imitation of the French. (3) *The Tragedy of St. Alexis*. This was represented in 1799, and is a translation into Breton from French, though its precise French source is not known. M. Loth points out that it is very different from the Miracle play of 'St. Alexis' in the *Miracles de Notre-Dame*, t. iii. p. 282 (Société des anciens textes français).

The leading Breton poet of the 19th cent. is Luzel (François-Marie), who was born on 6th June 1821 at Plouaret, Côtes-du-Nord, on the boundary of Lannion and Guingamp. Breton literature and the revival of Breton life in the 19th cent. owe probably more to the work of Luzel than to that of any other man. The Vicomte Hersart de la Villemarqué (1st half of 19th cent.) undoubtedly did much to call attention to the history and literature of Brittany, but his uncritical attitude towards popular Breton poetry, which he imagined to be of remote antiquity, and his readiness even to alter, in accordance with his preconceived ideas, the text of the popular poems which he published, led to a reaction. Luzel, on the other hand, possessed the true scientific as well as the poetic spirit of his age, and was alive to the importance of basing theory on ascertained concrete fact. It is to his zeal that we owe the collection of numerous copies of Mystery plays that were scattered over Brittany. Nor did he confine his researches to plays; he also gathered together a considerable body of popular Breton ballad poetry, the *Gwerziou Breiz-Izel* and the *Soniou Breiz-Izel*. It is in these simple popular poems that we see the true reflexion of the poetic spirit of Brittany. Wales has, indeed, in her *Penillion telyn* a certain body of popular poetry, but it consists for the most part of isolated verses; and, by the side of the earlier and later traditions of that poetry which is the fruit of conscious personal skill, the popular poetry of Wales has perhaps not been adequately prized. In Wales, too, there is a considerable ballad literature, which has characteristics that are very similar to those of the popular poems of Brittany.

Breton popular poetry has a simple and artless character, but its very simplicity gives it a charm of its own. It is fond of those narrative and dramatic incidents which often occur even in the humbler life of man. It has various moods, but the graver and sadder strain of a life of toil predominates. This poetry is especially interesting as the expression of a racial psychology that has been in close touch with Nature through hard toil on land and sea, and which has had, moreover, a life far away from that of the great centres of the wider world. In spite of the close kinship of the Welsh and Breton tongues, the Welsh and Breton types of mind are at the present day in many respects very different. The Breton mind is conservative, the Welsh mind is progressive; Brittany is the great Roman Catholic stronghold of France, Wales is the great Nonconformist stronghold of Southern Britain. The individualistic as well as the collective movements of the 19th cent. have met with a hearty response in Wales; and the industrial problems of the age are nowhere more keenly felt than in some of the populous centres of Wales. The spirit of competition has pervaded even her literary sphere. Yet it is pleasing to see the growth at the present day of a certain *rapprochement* between Wales and Brittany, which is proving a stimulus to Breton literature and to Breton institutions. One feature of this *rapproche-*

ment has been the exchange of visits at the National Eisteddfod of Wales and the Celtic festivals of Brittany by delegates from the two countries. In these visits the Marquis de l'Estourbeillon, M. Fustec, M. le Goffic, and M. Jaffrennou, one of the ablest living poets of Brittany, have taken an active part. To M. le Goffic Brittany owes a deep debt of gratitude for the active part which he has taken in the publication of Breton ballads, and the stimulus which these have been to the further composition of those simple poems in which the Breton mind delights.

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E. ANWYL.

BARDS (Irish).—The earliest poems of the Irish bards are lost; but although it is not easy to re-construct for ourselves, with any degree of fullness, the functions and surroundings of the pre-Christian poets, we are by no means without data to attempt such re-construction. We know, in the first place, that the poet was regarded as possessed of powers sufficiently supernatural to make even princes tremble; for with a well-aimed satire he could raise boils and disfiguring blotches upon the countenance of his opponents, or even do them to death by it. This belief continued until the later Middle Ages; and, even down to the days of Dean Swift, the Irish poet was credited with the power of being able to rhyme at least rats and vermin to death. Again, the early Irish poet was, by virtue of his office, a judge in all cases of tribal disputes and in other matters. He was also, if not a Druid himself, probably closely allied with the Druidic order; and when Christianity superseded Druidism in the 5th cent., the mantle of Druidic learning seems to have fallen upon his shoulders; and amid Christian times he seems to a large extent to have continued the Druidic traditions. His verses prior to the 6th or 7th cent. were not rhymed, but seem to have depended for their effect upon diction—a sort of rhythm, and perhaps to some extent alliteration.

The Irish memory, always very tenacious, has handed down to us in some of our oldest MSS several verses said to be the first ever made in Ireland. These are ascribed to no less a person than Amergin, brother of Eber, Ir, and Eremon, the three early Milesian conquerors, sons of Milesius himself, to whom (or to whose uncle Ith) every free Celtic family in Ireland traces itself back to this day, just as the Teutonic races of Germany traced themselves to one of the three main stems that sprang from the sons of Mannus, whose father was the god Tuisco. These verses of Amergin, like all other very early Irish poems that have come down to us, are composed in a kind of rhetoric or unrhymed outburst, called *rosg* by the Irish; and there can be little doubt that they were handed down from grandfather to father and from father to son, perhaps for hundreds of years before the Irish Celts became acquainted with the art of writing, which they probably did in the 3rd cent., when, having become acquainted with letters through the Romanized Britons, they invented for themselves their curious Ogam alphabet. As it has always been the belief of the Gaels that these verses of Amergin's were the earliest ever composed in Ireland, it may very well be that they actually do represent the oldest surviving lines in the vernacular of any country in Europe except Greece alone:

'I am the wind which breathes upon the sea,
I am the wave of the ocean,
I am the murmur of the billows,
I am the ox of seven combats,
I am the vulture upon the rock,
I am a beam of the sun,
I am the fairest of plants,
I am a wild boar in valour,
I am a salmon in the water,
I am a lake in the plain,
I am a word of science,
I am a point of the lance of battle,
I am the man who creates in the head (*i.e.* of man) the fire (*i.e.* the thought).
Who is it that throws light upon the meeting on the mountain (if not I)?
Who announces the ages of the moon (if not I)?
Who teaches the place where couches the sea (if not I)?'

It is only natural that D'Arbois de Jubainville, whose translation of these very difficult verses is here given, should discern in them a strong vein of Pantheism, which appears to run through the poem. It may, however, have no such pregnant signification, and may be merely a panegyric, couched in metaphor, upon the prowess of the singer himself. Another poem ascribed to the same Amergin appears to be an invocation of Ireland, of which he and his brothers took possession for the Milesians. It is unrhymed, has a tendency towards alliteration, and shows a strongly marked leaning towards dissyllabic diction, as—

'I invoke thee, Erin,
Brilliant, brilliant sea,
Fertile, fertile hill,
Wavy, wavy wood,
Flowing, flowing stream,
Fishy, fishy lake,' etc.

The Irish annalists themselves have never been agreed as to the time when Amergin is supposed to have sung these verses, some dating it as far back as 1700 B.C., and others placing it as late as 800 B.C.. All that we can say with certainty is that they are very old. In like manner we find preserved the earliest satire said to have ever been pronounced in Ireland, and other pieces of the same nature, all undoubtedly of great antiquity and almost unintelligible, despite the heavy glosses added to them by the Irish of the Middle Ages.

After the general establishment of Christianity in Ireland, which was largely owing to Saint Patrick, who commenced his missionary labours about the year 432—though there were Christians in the South of Ireland before his time—we find the poets still occupying a very high position. In the preface to the old law-book the *Seanchus Mór*, some of whose tracts in their present form cannot, says Jubainville, be later than the close of the 6th cent., we read that the Old Law had been reduced to form by the Irish poets long before St. Patrick's time. 'Whoever the poet was,' says the text, 'who connected it by a thread of poetry before Patrick, it lived until it was exhibited to Patrick. The preserving shrine is the poetry, and the Seanchus, or Law, is what is preserved therein.' The tract itself begins thus:

'The Seanchus of the men of Erin—what has preserved it? The joint memory of two seniors, the tradition from one to another, *the composition of poets*.'

Here it is that we probably come upon the real secret of the early poet's importance, which, as we know, placed him next to the prince and rendered

his person sacrosanct. This importance arose from the fact that, in an age when writing was not known or used, he, and he alone, possessed the power of throwing law, history, and, above all, genealogy, into such forms as could be stereotyped upon the only material then available—the human memory. We know from Cæsar (*de Bell. Gall.* VI. xiv. 4) that the Gaulish Druids who could write, and who used Greek letters for ordinary purposes, nevertheless refused to commit to writing any of the considerable number of verses which they were obliged to learn. Cæsar seems to think that they did this partly to keep their lore a secret known only to themselves, and partly to strengthen the memory of their disciples. It is very probable, however, that the Druids' verses, in which, as in the verses of the early Irish poets, laws, genealogies, rights, and prohibitions were enshrined, had had their origin, in Gaul as in Ireland, long before the art of writing had been diffused, and the priestly class, always conservative by nature, had continued to hold fast to tradition, not only in the matter of their learning, but also in their manner of transmitting it. There is no indication, however, that the Irish ever imitated them in this respect, or showed any repugnance to committing to writing their own traditional lore, so soon as letters had once become common amongst them.

The schools of the Irish poets subsisted for generations, side by side with the colleges of the clergy, in Ireland, but they were perhaps less firmly localized, and showed a tendency to attach themselves to the personalities of their master-poets and teachers rather than to particular localities. It is also probable that there may have been a certain amount of confusion when the ancient Druidic schools began to break up and disintegrate, or rather before the 'sons of learning,' as the Irish called the students who attended them, began to specialize; and it is nearly certain that the offices of historian, judge, poet, and genealogist were not sharply distinguished from one another for many generations. This will be the more readily understood if we remember that one of the principal tasks of the historian in early times was to preserve the tribal genealogies upon which the holding of land, and indeed the entire tribal system, depended. But both his history and genealogy were preserved in a shrine of poetry, and whoever was master of the contents of this poetry became, naturally and inevitably, the judge, who alone was able, from his own knowledge, to settle the disputes of the tribe and the suits of its individual members. Indeed, the office of poet did once legally carry with it the office of judge as well, according to Irish accounts, until the reign of Conor Mac Messa, shortly before the birth of Christ. He it was who first made a law that the office of poet should not of necessity carry with it the office of judge also; for, says the old text, 'poets alone had the power of judicature from the time that Amergin Whiteknee [the son of Milesius mentioned above as being the first Irish poet] delivered the first judgment in Erin.'

The profession of poet was so popular in early Ireland, that at one time, it is said, one third of the patrician families followed this calling. They expected to be supported by the general public, and terrorized the wealthy with the threat of their satire. They constituted an intolerable burden upon the productive working part of the nation, and three distinct attempts were made to get rid of them altogether, the last at the Synod of Drumceat in A.D. 590, where their numbers were greatly cut down and their prerogatives restricted, though, to counterbalance this, certain endowments of land were apportioned to provide for their schools. These institutions actually continued, with scarcely a break, until the 17th cent., when those few who escaped the spear of Elizabeth fell beneath the sword of Cromwell. In these schools, which were the lineal descendants of the old pre-Christian Druidic foundations, there gradually arose a complete system of specialization in learning. There still exist fragments of the metrical text-books used in these schools, preserved in the *Book of Leinster* (*c.* 1150) and other MSS, and that they date, partially at least, from pre-Christian times seems certain from their prescribing, amongst other items of the poet's course, a knowledge of the magical incantations called *Tenmlaida*, *Imbas forosnai*, and *Dichetal do chennaibh na tuaithe*. The poet was also obliged to learn an incantation called *Cétnad*, of which the text says:

'It is used for finding out a theft: one sings it, that is to say, through the right fist on the track of the stolen beast [observe the antique assumption that the only kind of wealth to be stolen is cattle], or on the track of the thief in case the beast is dead, and one sings it three times on the one track or the other. If, however, one does not find the track, one sings it through the right fist and goes to sleep upon it, and in one's sleep the man who has brought it away is clearly shown and made known,' etc.

Another *Cétnad* to be learned is one which desires length of life, and is addressed to 'the Seven Daughters of the Sea, who shape the thread of the long-lived children.' Another curious operation with which the poet had to make himself familiar was the *glam dichinn*, intended to punish any king or prince who should refuse to a poet the reward of his poem. The poet, says the text,

'was to fast upon the lands of the king for whom the poem was to be made; and the consent of thirty laymen, thirty bishops [a Christian touch added in later times to make the passage pass muster], and thirty poets should be had to compose the satire.'

The proceedings were weird and terrifying. There were seven grades of poets, of which the *ollamh* [*ollav*] was the highest, and the whole seven were to go,

'at the rising of the sun, to a hill which should be situated at the boundary of seven lands, and each of them was to turn his face to a different land, and the *ollamh's* face was to be turned to the land of the king who was to be satirized, and their backs should be turned to a hawthorn which should be growing on the top of a hill; and the wind should be blowing from the north; and each man was to hold a perforated stone and a thorn of the hawthorn bush in his hand; and each man was to sing a verse of his composition for the king, the chief poet to take the lead with his own verse, and the others in concert after him with theirs; and each of them should place his stone and his thorn under the stem of the hawthorn tree; and, if it was they who were in the wrong in the case, the ground of the hill would swallow them; and, if it was the king who was in the wrong, the ground would swallow him, and his wife, and his son, and his steed, and his robes, and his hound,' etc.

It is evident that these magic incantations and terrifying ceremonies found amongst the remnants of the poets' books are really remnants of the pre-Christian teaching of the Druidic schools, which had embodied themselves in the text-books of later times. They show at once the superstitious reverence with which the poets must have been regarded, and the extreme antiquity of their schools and text-books; for it can scarcely be contended that such pieces of obvious Paganism had their origin after Ireland had been Christianized.

The Irish poet was not called a 'bard' but a *file* (*filla*). The bard was, in comparison with him, only a rhymester; and, though both existed side by side, there was the greatest disparity of status. Where the *file* received his three cows for a poem, the bard bore away only a calf. The distinction between the *file* and the bard seems to have come to an end during the long-continued wars with the Norsemen, when much of Ireland's internal policy was thrown into the melting-pot. There were seven orders of *file*, and the highest had something like a twelve years' course before he attained his degree. The bards were divided into 'free' and 'un-free' bards. There were eight classes of each, and each class was allotted by law the metres which it was allowed to make use of. A lower class could not use the metres belonging to a higher

class. Whether the Celts invented rhyme seems open to doubt. Zeuss, the father of Celtic learning, asserts that they did. One thing is certain: we find the Irish as early as the 7th century—that is, long before any other people in Europe made use of it—bringing rhymed poetry to a high pitch of perfection. It is no exaggeration to say that by no people on the globe, at any period of the world's history, was poetry so cultivated and so remunerated as it was in Ireland during the Middle Ages, and even down to the 17th century. In the 16th and following centuries the poets fell under the ban of the English State, because, as Spenser puts it, their poems were 'tending for the most parte to the hurte of the English or [the] mayntenaunce of theyre owne lewde libertye, they being most desirous thereof.' The severest Acts were passed against them, and numbers of them were hanged. The present writer cannot recall a single poet who took the side either of the English invaders or of the Reformation. So thoroughly was all indigenous Irish civilization stamped out under the Penal Laws, that, by the close of the 18th cent., there was probably not a single person living who could compose in any of the 400 metres practised by the ancient schools. A new school of poetry arose among the unlearned, and accentual metres took the place of syllabic poetry, and so it continues to this day.

Outside of its marvellous development of metric, the most interesting feature of Irish poetry is perhaps its appreciation of nature in all its moods, its love of the sea, the forest, and wild scenery, which it seems to have developed long before other European literatures.

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DOUGLAS HYDE.

BARDS (Welsh).—1. Definition and scope of the term.—In Welsh the modern form of the term for a poet is *bardd* [*dd* = English soft *th*], but, at an earlier stage in the history of the language, the form was *bard*. In one of the old Welsh glosses (8th or 9th cent.) on Martianus Capella the word 'epica' is glossed as *bardaul* [= mod. Welsh *barddol*]. In the Cornish Vocabulary (Zeuss-Ebel, p. 1070), 'tubicen' is explained as *barth* [*th* = W. *dd*] *hirgorn* ('the bard of the long horn'), while in Breton the corresponding form *barz* is given in the Catholicon as *menestrier* ('a mime'). In Welsh, as in Irish, the term 'bard' preserved the meaning which it had in Gaulish. Posidonius, quoted by Athenæus (vi. 49, p. 246[c-d]), refers to the poets of the Celts as βάρδοι (*bardoi*), and says that these are poets who utter praises with song. The same writer, quoted by Strabo (iv. 4. 4, p. 197), speaks of βάρδοι, οὐάτεις (*vates*), and δρυίδαι (*druidai*) as 'three tribes' (-ρία φῦλα) among the Celts, the bards being 'composers of hymns and poets' (ὑμνηταὶ καὶ ποιηταί). Diodorus, also (v. 31. 2), speaks of the bards of the Gauls as 'composers of songs' (ποιηταὶ μελῶν), while he further states that they sang, accompanied by instruments like lyres, praising some and reviling others. One of these instruments in use among the Britons, as we learn from Venantius Fortunatus, was called *crotta* (Welsh, *crwth*). It will be seen from these references that the bards appear to have had a recognized place in Celtic social life, and one of the most characteristic features of the development of poetry in Wales has been the close association of the bards and their productions with the satisfaction of certain social needs of a literary character.

The existence of the term 'bard' in the same form in both the Goidelic and the Brythonic branches of the Celtic family shows that it was in use before the separation of these two branches. At the same time it can hardly have been used as a professional term in the period of Italo-Celtic unity (to which philological considerations point), since there is no trace of it in the Italic languages, while the term corresponding to οὐάτεις (Lat. *vates*, Irish *fáith*, Welsh *gwawd*, 'song') appears to have been common to Italic and Celtic in that period. It was probably as the official spokesman in song of the feelings of his tribe on important occasions that the Celtic bard gained his name. He would be the recognized composer for his community of elegies and eulogies and, if need were, of satires. His elegies and eulogies may well have included in their scope not only the recently dead, but also the famous heroes of the tribe or family with which he was associated, while hymns in praise of the gods were no doubt from time to time composed by these official interpreters of tribal feeling. Cæsar (*de Bell. Gall.* VI. xiv. 4) tells us that it was the practice of the Druids to teach their disciples a large body of oral poetry, which they were not allowed to commit to writing, lest thereby their memory should be impaired.

Much of the interest of the evolution of Welsh poetry consists in a study of its correlation with the varying social needs of the Welsh community, and also the gradual growth of a body of poetry which, as in modern countries generally, is an individual rather than a social product. It is of interest, too, to note how the poetry of Wales has been the expression, not only of various literary wants of a social character, but also of the thoughts generated by the beauty of Nature and by the vicissitudes of human life. It contains many poems and lines of true insight and real æsthetic beauty, and shows that the minds of many Welsh poets have been attuned to the signal grandeur and charm of the scenery of Wales.

2. The bards in the Welsh laws.—In the Welsh laws of Howel Dda (10th cent.), the bards have a recognized place in the social order, and have official representatives in the royal household. The three bardic grades appear to have been (1) *Pencerdd* ('chief of song'), or *Bardd Cadeiriog* ('the throned bard'); (2) *Bardd teulu* ('the bard of the house-host or retinue'); and (3) bards of the lowest grade, who were called sometimes *Clerwyr*, sometimes *Oferfeirdd* ('superfluous bards'), and sometimes *Beirdd Yspydeit* ('bards receiving entertainment'). The throned bard sat next below the judge of the court in the upper portion of the hall, while the bard of the household sat on one hand of the chief of the household in the lower portion, the chief of the household being a son of the king, or his nephew, or some other member of the blood-royal. One of the duties of the chief of the household, we are told, was to place the harp in the hands of the bard of the household at the three principal feasts (Easter, Whitsuntide, and Christmas). One of his privileges, too, was that he could have a song from the bard of the household whenever he might desire it. One section of the Welsh laws enumerates the duties and privileges of 'the bard of the household,' and among them the following:—

'He is to have his land free, and his horse in attendance, and his linen clothing from the queen, and his woollen clothing from the king. He is to have the clothes of the steward at the three principal festivals. When a song is desired, the chaired bard is to begin, the first song of God and the second of the king who shall own the palace, or, if there be none, let him

sing of another king. After the chaired bard, the bard of the household, is to sing three songs on various subjects. If the queen desire a song, let the bard of the household go to sing to her without limitation, in a low voice, so that the hall may not be disturbed by him. He is to have a cow, or an ox, from the booty obtained by the household from a border-country, after a third has gone to the king; and he is, when they share the spoil, to sing the "Monarchy of Britain" to them. When he shall go with other bards he is to have the share of two.'

The throned bard, or chief of song, who stood in the highest position of all, has his functions and privileges also described.

'He is to have his land free. He is to begin with a song of the Deity, and next of the king who shall own the palace, or of another. The chief of song only is to solicit, and of the common gains of himself and companions he is to have two shares. He is to have twenty-four pence from every minstrel, when he may have finished his instruction. He is to have twenty-four pence from every woman on marriage, if he have not received it from her before. He is to have the *amobyr* ("marriage-fee") of the daughters of the minstrels. He is to lodge with the *edling* ("heir-apparent").'

For a bard of unusual skill the term *prydydd* was sometimes employed, and the chieftainship of song was obtained by a bardic contest (*ymrysson*) in the form of a dispute between the two candidates. An *ymrysson* of this kind (probably incomplete) is still extant (see *Myvyrian Archaiology*[2], p. 154*a*). Other terms used in the mediæval period were *Culfardd* (found in the *ymrysson* in question), and *Posfardd*, the earliest instance of which is in the Book of Taliessin (14th cent.), poem i., l. 13, but the precise force of these terms is uncertain.

It is clear from these indications that the professions of the poet and the minstrel were closely linked together, and practised, not infrequently at any rate, by the same person. The chief of song appears to have exercised magisterial functions over those of lower rank, and also to have been the umpire in bardic disputes. Another function which the Welsh bards (even the *pencerdd*) exercised was that of the story-teller (*cyfarwydd*), and the term *Mabinogi*, representing the oldest stratum of Welsh mediæval narrative, appears to be derived from *mabinog*, a term found in some of the triads for an apprentice or disciple bard, possibly because this body of narrative was committed to memory by the bardic beginner. The men who composed the mediæval vaticinations (*daroganau*), such as we find in the Black Book of Carmarthen and the Book of Taliessin, were called *derwyddon*. In the *Collatio Canonum* (Paris, *Bibl. nat.*), 3182 (prior to end of 11th cent.), *dorguid* (or *darguid*=*derwydd*) is a gloss on 'pithonicus,' and means 'a seer.'

3. The oldest remains of Welsh poetry.—The oldest remains of Welsh poetry now extant are contained in the following documents: (1) *A MS of the paraphrase of the Gospels into Latin hexameters, made by C. Vettius Aquilinus Iuvencus*, in the University Library at Cambridge, transcribed in the 9th century.

This MS contains two Welsh poems written in the pre-Norman Welsh script and orthography, which are from all indications contemporary with the Welsh glosses of the 9th century. The first poem is a hymn, not unlike some of those contained in the Black Book of Carmarthen (see below), and the second a personal poem expressive of loneliness and sadness, of the same *genre* as the 'Llywarch Hen' poetry of the Black Book of Carmarthen and the Red Book of Hergest. The subjective strain of this fragment is characteristic of this type of early poetry.

(2) *An 11th cent. MS of St. Augustine's 'de Trinitate,'* now in the Library of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge.

In the opinion of the late Mr. Henry Bradshaw, three lines and a word of Welsh verse have been written by Johannes, son of Sulien, Bishop of St. David's (1071–1089). These lines are of interest, because they are undoubtedly taken from a poem of which we have some fragments in the Book of Aneirin (see below).

(3) *The Black Book of Carmarthen* (12th and early 13th cent.).

This MS contains some poems by Cynddelw Brydydd Mawr, which are undoubtedly of the 12th cent.; also certain vaticinations put into the mouth of Myrddin (Merlin), which clearly refer to historical events of the 12th century. These vaticinations are expansions of the legend of Myrddin and the story of the battle of Arderydd (see MERLIN). The first poem in this MS deals with the same topic in the form of a short dialogue between Myrddin and Taliessin. One of the features of the poetry of the Black Book of Carmarthen is the fondness which it shows for the dialogue form. The fragments of old Welsh poetry which it contains consist, in addition to the preceding poems, of hymns, a dialogue between the soul and the body, a series of stanzas commemoratory of Welsh heroes, called 'The Stanzas of the Graves,' a group of poems which are related to the Arthurian legend, and a few other poems referring to legendary characters and episodes. Part of the interest of these poems consists in the indications which they give of the existence of a body of Welsh poetry forming a heroic cycle, parallel to the prose narratives of the Mabinogion and Geoffrey of Monmouth, and to the allusions and summaries of the Triads. The poems of this cycle were not, as a rule, long, and consisted sometimes only of a few *englynion* ('stanzas'). Occasionally, as in the poems attributed to Llywarch Hen, we find a note of genuine poetry, as in the graphic description of the scenes of winter. Some of this poetry doubtless goes back at least to the 9th cent., since it is similar in style to the second Welsh poem of the Codex Juvenci. It is not improbable that subjective soliloquies of this kind were evolved out of more objective heroic poems descriptive of battle and adventure.

(4) *The Book of Aneirin* (early 13th cent.).

This MS contains the poem called 'Y Gododin,' a long poem of 938 lines, together with shorter poems called 'Gorchan Tutvulch,' 'Gorchan Adebon,' 'Gorchan Cynvelyn,' and 'Gorchan Maelderw,' the last-mentioned poem being attributed in the MS to Taliessin. Part of it is written in an orthography akin to that of the glosses, and a close analysis of it shows that it consists in parts of fragments of poems identical with portions of 'the Gododin.' 'The Gododin,' too, when analyzed, reveals signs of being of a composite character; it contains some repetition of stanzas, and series of stanzas have been broken up by intervening matter. 'The Gododin' is best regarded as a corpus of short poems relating mainly to the battle of Catraeth, fought between the Britons of the North and the men of Deira and Bernicia. The family which holds the leading place in this body of verse is that of Cynvarch, to which Cynon ab Clydno Eiddin and Urien Rheged belonged. It is of interest to notice that, in one line of 'Gorchan Maelderw,' Arthur is mentioned in words which imply that he was a leading figure in this cycle.

(5) *The Book of Taliessin* (14th cent.).

This MS contains a collection of poetry that has clear links of connexion with the earlier heroic cycle. Just as in the vaticinations the personality of Myrddin is brought into the foreground and made the mouthpiece of prophecy, so in the Book of Taliessin the legend of Taliessin is taken as a basis, and he is made the mouthpiece of verses narrating events legendary and historical in the past, at which in the course of his transformations he had been present. The poetry that is attributed to him is interspersed with allusions to the monastic studies of the Middle Ages, which suggest that it was composed by a monk (or monks) rather than a professional bard. Much of the interest of this poetry, which is very difficult and obscure, is that it has preserved for us many verse parallels to narratives contained in the Mabinogion and the Triads, and, among them, some very interesting fragments of Welsh Arthurian legend. We here find, too, references to certain of the characters of the Four Branches of the Mabinogi, which enable us to supplement the account given of them in prose. Some of the poems in the book bear evidence of being poems of the heroic type, cognate with 'the Gododin' and the oldest parts of the Black Book of Carmarthen, and it is worthy of note that the interest appears to centre round Urien Rheged.

(6) *The Red Book of Hergest* (14th and 15th cents.).

This MS, which belongs to Jesus College, Oxford, and which is deposited for greater safety in the Bodleian Library, contains a considerable body of poetry belonging to the same strata as the MSS already mentioned. It is especially rich in poetry of the type attributed to Llywarch Hen, as, for instance, the elegies on Cynddylan and Urien Rheged. Doubtless much of this poetry has grown by accretion round an older nucleus, and the topography suggests that Powys (Mid-Wales) was the chief region where it was developed. It is in this body of poetry that much of the charm of early Welsh verse consists, though much that was once thought to be pre-Norman was doubtless composed in the Norman period; and some of the poetry may even owe its origin to the Abbey of Strata Marcella (in Welsh *Ystrad Marchell*), near Welshpool, in Montgomeryshire, where it is probable that the Red Book of Hergest was copied.

(7) In the White Book of Rhydderch and the Red Book of Hergest texts of the Mabinogion there are a few *englynion* embedded in the narrative, as, for example, in Branwen, daughter of Llyr, Math ab Mathonwy, and Kulhwch and Olwen. Possibly these *englynion* may be older than the prose narrative, and may be as old as any portion that is extant of Welsh poetry.

There can be little doubt that the struggle with the English gave rise to a series of poems commemorative of the chief battles and their heroes, but it is difficult to say whether any of these poems

are now extant. The existing body of pre-Norman Welsh poetry shows signs of evolution, due to the emphasizing of the personality of the poets who were connected with the chief heroic figures, and the attribution to them of sentiments and poetry that seemed appropriate to them. For example, Aneirin is made to relate his own visit to the warriors at Catraeth, his imprisonment, and his escape; Taliessin is made to give the story of his transformations and his relations with Maelgwn Gwynedd and Elphin; Llywarch Hen is made to utter lamentations over the past, and Myrddin' prophecies as to the future. Behind these developments, however, there lies in each case the older and simpler objective type of Welsh poetry.

4. The historical poetry of the 'Gogynfeirdd.'—This body of poetry is contained in the *Myvyrian Archaiology*, and is undoubtedly contemporaneous with the persons and the events which it describes. It was written by the leading Welsh poets of their day, who were in close touch with the princes whose elegies and eulogies they for the most part sing. It is not improbable that much other poetry was composed in Wales at the time, but it is the work of the court-poets alone that has come down to us. This poetry shows all the traces of professional skill and technique: the language is singularly terse, the vocabulary and grammar are largely archaic and traditional, and there are not a few reminiscences of the older poetry. Bravery and generosity are the qualities most extolled in the princes. Allusions to battles and similar historical events are frequent. War is the dominant theme, though there are occasional glimpses of an interest in nature and even of the poetry of love. The spirit of this historical poetry is clearly akin to that of the earlier heroic poetry, to the characters of which it is full of allusions. There is not a trace within it of colloquialism, or of an effort after the simplicity of prose. Here and there we find lines of signal strength and beauty; but the poet, as a rule, aims far more at vigour and force than at æsthetic charm. The following are the chief representatives of this type of Welsh poetry in the 12th and 13th centuries:—

Meilir (1120–1160), the bard of Gruffydd ab Cynan, prince of Gwynedd. Gwalchmai, son of Meilir (1150–1190), the bard of Gruffydd ab Cynan's son, Owain Gwynedd. This poet, as his poem 'Gwalchmai's Delight' shows, had a genuine appreciation of nature. Cynddelw Brydydd Mawr (1150–1200), the bard of Madog ab Meredydd, prince of Powys (Mid-Wales). His verse is distinguished by strength and terseness rather than beauty, but he too, in a poem addressed to Eva, daughter of Madog, shows something of that delicate sense of beauty which characterized his contemporary Gwalchmai. Owain Cyveiliog (1150–1197), a prince, whose elegy on his dead warriors shows traces of the study of 'The Gododin' and of genuine poetic feeling. In Hywel ab Owain Gwynedd (1140–1172) we have a princely bard, whose love-poems have the true ring of Welsh amatory poetry, and show unmistakably that the poetic appreciation of Nature had its representatives in Wales even amid the stress of war. Llywarch ab Llywelyn (1160–1220) wrote for the most part in honour of the line of Gwynedd and of Llywelyn ab Iorwerth, perhaps the greatest prince of that line. The same tradition was carried on by Dafydd Benvras (1190–1240), Einiawn ab Gwalchmai (1170–1220), Einiawn Wann (1200–1250), Elidyr Sais, Llywelyn Fardd, Bleddyn Fardd, and others. Einiawn ab Gwalchmai composed a very striking elegy on Nest, daughter of Hywel. During this period poetry, too, was composed in honour of the Lord Rhys of Deheubarth (S. Wales) and his descendants, by Cynddelw Brydydd Mawr, Phylip Brydydd (1200–1250), and by Prydydd Bychan (1210–1260). In this body of poetry we find, too, several religious poems, which show that there was no definite cleavage between the ecclesiastical and the secular poetry of Wales. The spirit of this epoch of Welsh poetry may be regarded as culminating in the elegy written by Gruffydd ab Yr Ynad Coch (1260–1300) on Llywelyn ab Gruffydd, the last prince of Gwynedd, who was killed in 1282. This elegy is one of the finest in the Welsh language.

5. Welsh poetry from the death of Llywelyn to the Reformation.—It is a striking testimony to the vitality of Welsh poetry that the fall of Llywelyn appears to have made no appreciable difference to its progress. In Gwynedd, as had already been the case in other parts of Wales, some of the leading families became successors to the princes in their support of the poets. Among these families, none was more prominent than that of Tudur ab Goronwy of Penmynydd, Anglesey, the ancestor of Henry VII. In various parts of Wales new zones of poetry grew up, grouped round centres of lay and ecclesiastical patronage; for the great abbeys of Basingwerk, Valle Crucis, Aberconwy, Cymmer, Strata Marcella, Strata Florida, Whitland, Neath, Talley, Margam, and Tintern, together with the priories of Beddgelert, Cardigan, Carmarthen, and Monmouth, were important factors in the encouragement of Welsh literature. Side by side with the composition of original works had gone the translation of secular and religious legends from French, and the works of the poets bear abundant evidence of acquaintance with the names and the atmosphere of romance, both native and foreign. The fall of Llywelyn would appear to have turned the current of the Welsh Muse towards those gentler themes which were never alien to her. The language became simpler and more intelligible, though in formal eulogies and elegies the older style still maintained itself.

Of the newer poetry the chief representatives were Gruffudd ab Maredydd, Gruffydd ab Dafydd ab Tudur, Hywel ab Einion Lygliw, Llywelyn Goch ab Meurig Hen, and Dafydd ab Gwilym. Of these, Hywel ab Einion Lygliw is best known as the author of a poem on Mynanwy of Dinas Bran, Llywelyn Goch as the author of a remarkably fine elegy on Lleucu Llwyd of Pennal, while Dafydd ab Gwilym is the author of about three hundred poems characterized in many instances by vivid observation of nature, fertility of imagination, a most catholic sympathy, and genuine poetic insight. His exact date cannot be determined with certainty, but he flourished approximately in the first half of the 14th century. It is clear from his poetry that he was in touch with all the leading zones of Welsh poetry in his time, those of Anglesey, North Cardiganshire, Emlyn, Morgannwg, and Gwent. In Anglesey he would appear to have been in his youth associated in some capacity with a monastic institution, but his poetry is animated by a deliberate anti-ascetic tendency and an intense passion for nature. Much of Dafydd ab Gwilym's skill consists in his power of describing the essentials of an object or a scene in a few telling lines. His spirit is that of a refined humanism, and his verse bears the impress of elegant and cultured surroundings. His poems abound in allusions to native and other legends and romances, and the various series, which certain of his poems form, are, as it were, so many romances in verse. His favourite metre is the *Cywydd*, a metre invented either by himself or by one of his contemporaries, by stringing together a series of couplets consisting of the last two lines of an *englyn*; or else this metre, if not then invented, was one which had been kept in the background of the poetry of the earlier period, since no instance of it before the time of Dafydd ab Gwilym appears to be extant. In all his poems, except his formal eulogies and elegies, Dafydd ab Gwilym eschews archaisms, and aims at a simple and lucid, yet original and artistic, style. The singular richness of his genius created a new epoch in Welsh poetry, and he is succeeded by a number of imitators, especially in his love-poetry. It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that his was the sole influence current in Welsh poetry at this time. We find in Sion Cent (about 1350), for instance, emphasis laid on the ethical rather than the ritual or ascetic side of religion, and a note of poetic realism in a poem expressing sympathy with the toiler.

One of the most characteristic features of Welsh poetry at all periods has been its fidelity to the facts of human life in Wales, a life mainly of toil by land and sea; to the prominence in consciousness of the essential facts of the common lot of man, those of birth, of death, of the uncertainty of life, of disappointment, of failure, of poverty and struggle, relieved by love, by the beauty of Nature, by occasional success, by the kindness and generosity of friends, and by the charm of the muse. Until the accession of Henry VII. we find at intervals the continuance of the older tradition of the poetry of war and political interest, as in the poems of Iolo Goch (late 14th and early 15th cent.), the friend of Owen Glyndwr (Glendower), Gutto'r Glyn (1430–1468), and Lewis Glyn Cothi (1440–1490). The political interests of these periods are reflected also in the *Brudiau*, or 'Vaticinia,' to which they gave rise. In some of its aspects Welsh poetry was closely associated with the highly developed social life of the time, and requests for favours and thanks for favours granted

were not complete without being embodied in verse. This led to the practice of minute descriptions of various objects, animate and inanimate, and at times there is a tendency to have recourse to over-ingenious and far-fetched comparisons.

The chief imitators of Dafydd ab Gwilym are Dafydd Nanmor (1330–1390), Bedo Aerddren (*c.* 1480) and Bedo Brwynllys (*c.* 1450), Bedo Phylip Bach (*c.* 1480), Ieuan Deulwyn (1460–1490), and Dafydd ab Edmwnt (1440–1480).

The intimate connexion of the Welsh poets of this period with the life of their country, and their often high sense of literary art, make their works invaluable for a study of the Welsh mind and of its social and other ideals at this time. Here, again, certain zones of poetry, often flourishing around the home of some powerful patron, rise into prominence, such as the North-East zone, where we have the 'three brothers of Marchwiail' (*c.* 1350), and also Iolo Goch, Meredydd ab Rhys, Gutto'r Glyn, Dafydd ab Edmwnt, and Guttyn Owain (1450–1480); the South-East zone, where Bedo Brwynllys, Hywel Dafi (*c.* 1450), Lewis Glyn Cothi, Iorwerth Fynglwyd, Ieuan Deulwyn, and others flourished; while there were other important zones around Tywyn in South-West Cardiganshire, and Machynlleth in Montgomeryshire. A large portion of the poetry of this period is still extant in MS, and, under the encouragement of the University of Wales, its serious and thorough study is now commencing. As the poets of the period were in close touch with the leading families of Wales, they reflect very faithfully the dominant ideas of the circles wherein they moved, especially during the Wars of the Roses. In these poems, too, we see the contrast between Welsh rural life, which was in harmony with the Welsh tradition, and that of the boroughs, which were practically English garrisons established in Wales.

In some cases the bardic profession was continued from father to son, as in the case of Howel Swrdwal (1370–1420) and Ieuan ap Howel Swrdwal, Tudur Penllyn and Ieuan ap Tudur Penllyn, Dafydd Nanmor the elder, Rhys Nanmor, and Dafydd Nanmor the younger. The poets who most reflect political movements during this period are Iolo Goch, Dafydd Nanmor, Lewis Glyn Cothi, and Gutto'r Glyn. The joy felt by Wales in the accession of Henry VII. is reflected in a poem by Dafydd Llwyd addressed to 'Henry VII. after he had won the kingdom, and to Arthur his son when he was born.' Several of the Welsh bards appear to have regarded the accession of Henry VII. as in some degree a restoration of the prestige of Wales.

One of the most striking features of this period is the interest taken in the language and metre of Welsh poetry, and even in the Red Book of Hergest there is a grammar of the Welsh language and an account of Welsh versification, which appears to have been widely copied and studied. During this period, too, the bardic profession became so popular that its maintenance threatened to become a burden on the country, and means had to be devised to distinguish between the competent and the incompetent. Whatever gatherings of their own the Welsh bards may have had when they met from time to time at the courts of the princes and the houses of their patrons, it is certain that the Carmarthen Eisteddfod of 1451 had a very definite aim and purpose, namely, to serve as a bardic assize for the repression of the wanderings of uncertified bards and minstrels. The leading spirits at this Eisteddfod were Gruffudd ab Nicolas, a prominent Carmarthenshire gentleman; Llawdden, a bard from South Wales; and Dafydd ab Edmwnt, from the zone of North-East Wales. These emphasized the importance of skill in the twenty-four alliterative metres of Welsh poetry, and devised a regular system of bardic graduation. The Glamorganshire bards rebelled against the stringency of this system, and set up a system of their own. There are indications that, coincident with the introduction of English music into Wales, English metres, easier in character than those of the Welsh tradition, came in also. The consequence was that a new impetus was given to poetic composition, and the number of professional bards steadily grew. In 1524 and 1568, Eisteddfodau, or Bardic Assizes, had again to be held to seek once more to classify the bards. It is significant that these two Eisteddfodau were held at Caerwys, in Flintshire, within the North-East zone, where Welsh poetry was at this time most flourishing. The leading bard of the first Caerwys Eisteddfod was Tudur Aled, from Llansannan, in Denbighshire, a nephew and pupil of Dafydd ab Edmwnt. This brilliant poet is distinguished by his skill in description and in the composition of striking couplets. His pupil, Gruffudd Hiraethog, was the teacher of some of the leading bards of the Second Caerwys Eisteddfod, such as Simwnt Fychan, William Cynwal, Sion Tudur, and William Llŷn. In North Wales poetry flourished at this time chiefly in the North-East zone, but there was also an important zone in South Carnarvonshire and West Merionethshire and another in Montgomeryshire, with which Dr. John Davies of Mallwyd, a prominent Welsh grammarian and lexicographer of the reigns of Elizabeth and James I., was in contact. The Mostyn family at Gloddaeth, near Llandudno, and Mostyn, in Flintshire, and the family of Salisbury of Rug, near Corwen, were great patrons of Welsh poetry at this time. Some of the most beautiful poetry of the Tudor period is that attributed to Rhys Goch ab Rhiccert (see Iolo MSS). It is characterized by intense feeling for Nature and a genuine æsthetic sense. The older social poetry, too, contains, especially in William Llŷn, some very striking and graphic lines. The period of the Reformation was one of great activity in the poetic zones, especially of N. Wales.

6. **Welsh poetry from the Reformation to the present day.**—During the period of the Commonwealth, Welsh poetry received little support or encouragement, owing to the decay of several of the older Welsh families, which were strongly Royalist in sympathy. Moreover, the Welsh gentry had ceased by this time, apart from exceptional cases, to cultivate the Welsh tongue, so that the older social poetry fell into the background. Nevertheless, it was in the period of the Commonwealth that Huw Morus of Pontymeibion in East Denbighshire, a strong Royalist and a brilliant composer of love poems, continued the tradition of the 'Rhys Goch ab Rhiccert' poetry, which was largely the outcome of the newer musical needs of Wales. The brothers Gruffudd, William, and Rhisiart Phylip of Ardudwy carried on the literary tradition of their father, Sion Phylip, and there is extant a poem on the death of Charles I. written by William Phylip. After the Restoration we find this tradition carried on in Merionethshire by Sion Dafydd Laes, who wrote an elegy on Charles II., and in South Carnarvonshire from about 1692–1714 by Owen Griffith of Llanystumdwy. The newer and freer type of poetry was also represented by the hymns, carols, ballads, etc., which began to emerge into prominence and show that Welsh poetry was beginning to appeal to a new Welsh-speaking public. In the middle of the 18th cent. an able family of Welshmen, of whom Lewis Morris (the great-grandfather of the late Sir Lewis Morris) is the best known representative, gave a great impetus to the revival of Welsh poetry by collecting MSS and by encouraging young Welshmen of scholarship and genius to compose and publish poetry of a high order in the Welsh tongue. The antiquarian

movement, chiefly inaugurated by Edward Llwyd (Lhuyd), keeper of the Ashmolean Museum at Oxford, also quickened an interest in the Welsh language in young Welshmen of ability and education; and it is significant that some of the leading Welsh poets of the new movement were Oxford graduates, such as Goronwy Owen, Evan Evans (Ieuan Brydydd Hir), and William Wynn. At the same time the great religious awakening of the 18th cent. bore fruit in Wales in the publication of a large number of hymns by writers of real poetic power, such as William Williams of Pantycelyn in Carmarthenshire (author of the English hymns 'Guide me, O thou great Jehovah,' and 'O'er those gloomy hills of darkness'), Dafydd Jones of Caio, and others. The new Welsh-reading public of the middle and poorer classes, whose vernacular was still Welsh, read the new poetry, both secular and sacred, with avidity, and literary societies for the cultivation of Welsh literature sprang up in the Welsh community of London and in many parts of Wales. Many members of the Welsh aristocracy, too, gave their patronage to the new movement by contributing prizes to successful competitors in the revived Eisteddfodau, the most prominent result of the new interest taken in Welsh poetry being the revival of the Eisteddfod, mainly through the exertions of Owain Jones (Owain Myfyr), Dr. Owen Pughe, and Iolo Morgannwg. The competitions connected with the Eisteddfod and the facilities which the Welsh press now afforded to the publication of poetry led to renewed activity in various poetic zones, as, for instance, that of Carnarvonshire, where Dafydd Ddu Eryri, Robert ab Gwilym Ddu, Dewi Wyn o Eifion, and others rose into prominence, and that of Denbighshire, associated with the names of Robert Davies of Nantglyn and Twm o'r Nant, the latter of whom, by his 'Interludes,' sought to supply the rudiments of a Welsh drama, which had been only meagrely represented in the past by some portions of Biblical plays. The national Eisteddfod was followed by the institution of provincial and local competitions, which have stimulated the composition of a great deal of Welsh poetry in addition to what is spontaneously composed as in other countries. Much of the Welsh poetry of the 19th cent. is of high literary merit, and is a very true and worthy interpretation of the life and aspirations of Wales, both on the religious and on the secular side. Many of the best Welsh poets of the 19th cent. have been ministers of religion, and, with rare exceptions, the poetry of Wales in this important period, which may be truly called the Golden Age of Welsh poetry, has a high and serious purpose, and is not marred by meanness or frivolity. The Welsh language has had for centuries a literary tradition, which is distinct from the spoken dialects, and the literary tongue is the speech of public speaking and of Welsh literature.

The chief poets of the 19th cent., in addition to those already named, have been Eben Fardd (1802–1863), Islwyn (1832–1878), Emrys (1813–1873), Hiraethog (1802–1883), Ceiriog (1832–1887), and Hwfa Mon. Of recent years lyric poetry has been especially cultivated, and the younger generation of poets show in their works clear traces of the study of current English, and in some cases of Continental, poetry. The æsthetic spirit and a conscious striving after beauty of form are very conspicuous in current Welsh poetry, but, apart from certain brilliant exceptions, there is often a lack of naturalness and spontaneous grace. At the same time, Welsh poetry is very living at the present day, and poetic expression is in no sense behind the remarkable evolution of Welsh social life in education, politics, etc. It is no mere antiquarian resuscitation of past ideals, but a living exponent of the mind of the Welsh people.

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BARLAAM AND JOSAPHAT.—See BUDDHA.

BARNABITES.—The Congregation of the Regular Clergy of S. Paul Decollato (commonly called 'Barnabites' from their ancient house of S. Barnabas in Milan, which was opened in 1547) goes back to the beginning of the 16th century. Its founder was Antonio Maria Zaccaria, a nobleman of Cremona, recently canonized by the Church of Rome (May 27, 1897). About the year 1530 Zaccaria united himself with Bartolomeo Ferrari and Giacomo Antonio Morigia (Milanese gentlemen, who after their death gained through their reputation for holiness the title of 'venerable'), for the purpose of founding a Congregation of priests who should employ themselves in arousing the somnolent faith, in removing abuses, in reforming the manners of the clergy and of the people, and in bringing them back to the practice of true Christian piety.

By his Brief dated Bologna, Feb. 18, 1533, which commences, *Vota per quæ in humilitatis spiritu*, Clement VII. granted to Zaccaria and to Ferrari authority to set up the new religious Order. Paul III. by two other Briefs, *Dudum felicis recordationis Clementi*, etc. (July 25, 1535), and *Pastoralis*

officii cura, etc. (Dec. 1, 1543), placed the Order in direct dependence on the Holy See, granting it likewise many rights and privileges; and finally, Julius III. confirmed the Order by his Brief of Feb. 22, 1550, *Rationi congruit et convenit honestati*, etc. (cf. *Litteræ et Constitutiones SS. PP. pro Congregat. Clerr. Regg. S. Pauli Apostoli*, Rome, 1853, p. 3 ff.). In the meantime Zaccaria died prematurely in 1539 at the age of 37, after having set on foot in Milan various pious works, viz. spiritual conferences for ecclesiastics; a pious society of married people; and, in conjunction with the Countess Ludovica Torelli, an Order called the 'Angelicals of S. Paul,' for which he had also obtained the approval of Paul III. in 1535.

But the work of Zaccaria was continued by his two companions who outlived him, Ferrari († Nov. 25, 1544) and Morigia († Oct. 23, 1545), and by their successors. Towards the middle of the 16th cent. we find them scattered in Brescia, Verona, Padua, Vicenza, Venice, Cremona, and Ferrara, intent on preaching with zeal to the people, instituting confraternities of lay persons, and reforming monasteries, regardless of the hatred which they began to excite and of the persecutions which were directed against them. A fierce persecution arose against them where one would least have expected it, viz. in the territory of the free Venetian Republic. They were accused before the Republic of being political revolutionaries, emissaries of the Spaniards to the injury of the Venetian seigniory, and as being infected with heresy; and they were compelled to quit the territory of the Republic within the space of ten days. Nor did the matter end here, for, when Father Gianpietro Besozzi and Father Paolo Melso went to Rome, whither the same accusations had been carried, they were immediately thrown into prison, where they remained until, by the assistance of Ignatius Loyola and others, they were able to make their position clear and to unmask the conspiracy formed against the Congregation (cf. Arist. Sala, *Biografia di S. Carlo Barromeo*, Milan, 1858, Dissert. ii. p. 251).

1. **Colleges.**—Shortly after this time the Barnabites began to establish themselves definitely outside Milan; but, as we need not trace minutely their later vicissitudes, we give here some dates which will serve to afford an idea of their subsequent diffusion and increase in Italy and beyond.

In Italy the first college, or house, of the Barnabites outside Milan was founded at Pavia in 1558, for the purpose of educating their young adherents in literature and sacred learning. Next in chronological order come: in Cremona, the college or house of S. Vincenzo, founded in 1570 and suppressed in 1810, and the house of S. Luca, founded in 1881; in Monza, S. Maria di Carrobiolo, consecrated by the help of S. Carlo Borromeo, opened in 1571, suppressed in 1810, and re-established in 1825; Casale in 1573; Vercelli in 1574; in Rome, S. Biagio in 1575, afterwards S. Carlo ai Catinari in 1611, suppressed in 1810 and re-established in 1814, by the Bull of Alexander VII. the residence of the General Superior of the Congregation from 1660 onwards; in Milan, S. Alessandro, founded in 1589, suppressed in 1810, and re-established in 1825; Zagarolo in 1592; Pisa in 1594; in Bologna, S. Andrea in 1598, the Seminary of S. Peter in 1743, further, the college of S. Luigi in 1774, renewed, after its suppression, in 1816; Novara in 1539; Sanseverino in 1601; in Lodi, S. Giovanni delle Vigne founded in 1605, suppressed in 1810, and re-established at S. Francesco in Lodi in 1833; in Asti (in Piedmont), S. Martino, founded in 1606, suppressed in 1802, and re-established in 1822; in Perugia, S. Ercolano, founded in 1607, suppressed in 1775, and then passing to the House of Jesus, which was likewise suppressed in 1804 and re-established in 1837; Acqui in the same year 1607; in Naples in 1608, S. Caterina della Corona di Spine, in 1610, S. Maria di Portanova, which was suppressed in 1809, S. Giuseppe-in-Pontecorvo after 1818, S. Maria di Caravaggio in 1821, the college Bianchi at Monte Santo from 1860; in Turin, S. Dalmazzo, a parish which was entrusted to the Barnabites in 1609 and taken from them only from 1810 to 1826; in Genoa, S. Paolo il Vecchio in 1609, then in 1650 S. Bartolomeo degli Armeni, in 1895 the Institute Vittorino da Feltre; Aquila, 1610; Foligno, 1612; Tortona, 1618; Chieti and Pescia, 1664; in Florence, S. Carlo from 1627 to 1783, the Institute della Querce from 1867; in Leghorn, S. Sebastiano, founded in 1629, suppressed in 1810, and re-established in 1814; Piacenza, 1632; Reggio, 1664; Alessandria, 1659; Crema, 1664; Parma, 1668; Udine, 1680; Finale Marina and Bergamo, 1711; Porto Maurizio, 1736; Aosta, 1748; in Moncalieri (in Piedmont), the Royal College Carlo Alberto, founded in 1836; S. Felice-a-Cancello (Terra di Lavoro), founded in 1854.

2. **Missions.**—The first mission of the Barnabites outside of Italy was in the island of Malta, whither they went in 1582 at the urgent solicitation of the principal heads of the Order of Malta, Father Paolo Maletta of Milan and Father Antonio Marchesi of Bergamo, and where they remained two years with profit to the inhabitants and to the Order of Malta itself. Later, in 1610, as we gather from a Brief of Paul V., King Henry IV. of France obtained some Barnabites to labour in Béarn in the work of destroying the heresy of Calvin, viz. Fathers Fortuné Colome, Remigio Polidori, Hilaire Martin, etc. Almost at the same time S. Francis de Sales introduced them into Savoy to direct the college of Annecy. The Barnabites were thus able to penetrate from Béarn and Savoy into France. We may cite among the houses of Savoy and of France those of Annecy, Thonon, Montargis, Lescar, Paris, Estampes, Dax, Bonneville, Mont-de-Marsan, Bourg-Saint-Andéol, Loches, Bazas, Guéret, Oléron, Condamines-sur-Arve, and, after the Revolution, the college of Gien (Loiret), opened in 1856 under the auspices of Dupanloup, and the house in Paris, re-opened in 1857, owing to the influence and goodwill of the celebrated Russian count, Gregory Schouvaloff, who had passed from the Orthodox to the Catholic faith, and then had entered the Order of Barnabites. In 1820 the Holy Congregation of the Propaganda sent Fathers Mario Malagnino, Alfonso Caccia, and Cornelio Porzio into Valtellina; but this mission, notwithstanding its fruitfulness, did not lead to the establishment of the Barnabites in that region infested by heretics. In 1625 some Barnabites were sent into Austria by Urban VIII. in consequence of a request made to him by Ferdinand II. for some 'religious' fitted to labour in the conversion of heretics and unbelievers; and these Barnabites were placed in possession of the parish of S. Michael in Vienna, which was the parish of the Imperial court. They afterwards occupied other parishes, as, for instance, that of Mittelbach from 1661, and that of S. Margaret in Uligine from 1774. In 1719 the Barnabites took part in the missions in Asia. Among the first were Fathers Filippo M. Cesati and Sigismondo Calchi (both of Milan), and Onorato Ferrari (of Vercelli), who, as members of an embassage of Clement XI. to the Emperor of China, went to Pekin. The result of the embassage did not correspond to the hopes entertained of it; and, in fact, an Imperial edict forbade the preaching of the gospel. Notwithstanding, it came about that Father Ferrari was able to stay some time in China, where in a few years he converted many adults to the faith, and baptized very many abandoned and dying

children. Father Cesati with a companion repaired to Cochin-China with the title of 'vicar apostolic,' and Father Calchi with some others went into the Indian kingdoms of Ava and Pegu, where they all afterwards concentrated themselves. The mission in these two kingdoms was entirely entrusted to the Barnabites by Benedict XIV. in 1740, and there they maintained missionaries (of whom more than one suffered martyrdom) until the suppression of the religious orders (Sala, *op. cit.* p. 284).

The history of this mission is recorded in the *Description of the Burmese Empire* by the Barnabite missionary Sangermano, who laboured in Burma in 1783–1808 (d. 1819). After Calchi went to Syriam (then the chief port of Pegu) in 1721, a number of other missionaries came about 1728, meeting with such success that Benedict XIV. appointed a vicar apostolic. Many churches were built—at Syriam were a house and church, a college for 40 students, and an orphanage for girls; at Ava a church; at Pegu a church and house; at Monla a church, presbytery, and college, with 6 churches in the environs of the city and 2 churches in Subaroa; at Chiam-sua-rocca 6 churches; at Rangoon a church, a house, an orphan-school, and a convent. In 1745 the Vicar Apostolic Galizia and two priests were treacherously murdered, and the mission languished until 1749, when Fr. Nerini, who had been forced by the disturbances to leave Burma, returned. A second severe blow befell the mission at the capture of Syriam in 1756, when Nerini was killed. The mission soon recovered, however, and continued its activity until 1832, when the religious orders were suppressed by Napoleon III. Among the Barnabite scholars attached to this mission special mention is due Fr. Percoto (d. at Ava, Dec. 12, 1776), who is recorded to have translated some Buddhist works from Burmese into Italian, and also to have made Burmese versions of Genesis, Tobit, Matthew, the Gospels, the Mass, and prayers and catechisms.

At that ill-omened epoch the Congregation counted not a few conspicuous members; and, not to mention Cardinal Gerdil of Savoy (1718–1802), a distinguished philosopher, Fathers Quadrupani (ascetic writer), Paolo Frisi and Francesco de Regi (eminent scientists), and others, who had been dead but a few years, it numbered among its members Father Francesco Fontana (1750–1822), General Superior of the Congregation, companion of Pius VII. in his imprisonment, and afterwards Cardinal; Father Luigi Lambruschini (1776–1854), who was afterwards archbishop of Genoa, Cardinal and Secretary of State; Francesco Saverio Bianchi, who has recently been beatified; Father Antonio Maria Cadolini, afterwards bishop of Ancona and cardinal († 1851); Fathers Stanislao Tomba († 1847) and Carlo Giuseppe Peda († 1843), who were made bishops, the former of Forlì, the latter of Assisi; and Fathers Felice and Gaetano De Vecchi (ascetics), Ermenegildo Pini and Mariano Fontana (scientists), Antonio Grandi (orator and poet), Giuseppe Racagni and Bartolomeo Ferrari (scientists), and others. In the preceding centuries the Congregation had already given to the Church: Alessandro Sauli, bishop of Aleria in Corsica, and afterwards of Pavia, who has recently been canonized († 1592); Carlo Bascapè, bishop of Novara († 1615); Juste Guérin, prince and bishop of Genoa; Francesco Gattinara, bishop of Turin; Giacomo Morigia, archbishop of Florence and afterwards Cardinal; Cristoforo Giarda, bishop of Castro; Giovanni Maria Percoto, bishop of Mosul and vicar apostolic of Ava and Pegu; Pio Manador, bishop of Segna and Modruss in Croatia; and, in the various branches of learning, Agostino Tornielli (annalist); Redento Baranzano (1590–622; scientist); the Venerable Bartolomeo Canale (ascetic writer); Bartolomeo Gavanti (writer on ritual); Dominique De la Motte, Maurice Arpaud, Jean Niceron (historians); Remi Montmeslier, Gabriele Valenzuela, Cosme De Champigny, Tommaso Rovere (Rotarius), Salvatore Corticelli (grammarians); Isidore Mirasson, Father Colome, etc.

Commencing with the year 1865, missions were established in Sweden and Norway by Father Paul Stub († 1892 at Bergen), who was afterwards joined by other Fathers (Moro, Tondini, Almerici). In Belgium the Barnabites opened a house in 1886 at Mouscron, and another in Brussels in 1895; while, on the expulsion of all 'religious' from France in 1905, the majority of the Barnabites sought refuge in Great Britain. In 1903 the Order undertook some missions in Brazil. At present the Barnabites, who number almost 300, have about 20 monasteries in Italy, 5 in Austria, and some in Spain, besides those already noted in Belgium.

3. Constitutions.—The Constitutions, or Statutes, of the Barnabites, of which the first nucleus is traceable back to the founder Zaccaria, and of which a first body was already formulated and published in 1552, were not definitive until 1579 (*Constitutiones Clerr. Regg. S. Pauli Decollati libris quattuor distinctæ*, Milan, 1579; other editions, Milan, 1617; Naples, 1829; Milan, 1902), when, after the examination made of them by S. Carlo Borromeo and their approval by the General Chapter, they finally had the sanction of Pope Gregory XIII. by his Brief of Nov. 7.

The greater part of these Constitutions have reference either to personal sanctification, of which they urge the attainment by suggesting suitable exercises as an aid to the observance of the three vows of obedience, chastity, and poverty; or they refer to the sanctification of others, to be attained through the ministry of preaching, of confession, of the school, etc. Others have reference to the reception of new members into the Order, mode of dress, etc.; and, finally, others concern the administration of the Order.

With regard to this last the following are some of the rules:—The General Superior of the Congregation is elected by suffrage. His office lasts three years, but he may be re-elected, though not more than once. All the members of the Order owe him obedience, but at the same time every member may have recourse to him, since he is their common Father. His ordinary Council is composed of four Assistants, who are nominated by the General Chapter every time it meets. His usual residence was changed from Milan to Rome during the pontificate of Alexander VIII. (1690). The habit of the members is a coarse black soutane, closely resembling that of the regular clergy. Unlike the Jesuits and Theatines, they recite Office in choir; and their other distinguishing characteristics are thus summed up by Currier (*History of Religious Orders*, p. 363):

'Besides the fast-days of the Church, these Religious fast on every Friday of the year, the two last days of Carnival, and from the first Sunday of Advent until Christmas. They abstain every Wednesday and observe a rigorous silence from the evening examination until after Matins the following day. In the beginning, like the Theatines, they practised extreme poverty, neither possessing revenues nor begging, but at a later period they accepted real estate and revenues. Besides the three vows, they bind themselves by a fourth, never to seek after dignities within or without the Order, and not to accept them outside of the Order without the permission of the Pope. Their lay-brothers are not admitted to the habit until after a trial of five years.'

The Congregation of the Barnabites, like all the other religious Orders, is divided into provinces, which until a few years ago were six, namely, the province of Lombardy; that of Piedmont, which included Liguria; the Roman province, which embraced Lazio, Umbria, and Emilia; and the Neapolitan, the German, and Franco-Belgian-Brazilian provinces. In each province a Father is nominated as Superior of the houses which the province contains. Every house has its own Superior, who, like the General and Provincial Superiors, has a Council which he must consult on the affairs of his own particular administration. All Superiors are nominated for three years only at the most. The local Superiors may be changed at the end of every year, or may be re-elected after the termination of the three years. The General Chapter meets every three years in Rome. Several

of the members who compose it are elected by the local and provincial chapters. The General Chapter examines the affairs of the Order, nominates or confirms the Superiors, and provides for the general well-being by means of monitions and decrees. The Barnabites, like all the great religious Orders, are in immediate subjection to the Supreme Pontiff.

LITERATURE.—Fr. L. Barelli, *Memorie dell' origine fondazione avanzamenti ecc. della Congregaz. de Chierici Regolari di S. Paolo*, 2 vols., Bologna, 1703-1707; Ant. Gabuzio, *Historia Congregat. Clerr. Regg. S. P. ab ejus primordiis ad initium sæc. xvi.*, Rome, 1852; L. Ungarelli, *Bibliotheca Scriptorum e Congreg. Clerr. Regg. S. Pauli*, vol. i. (the only one published), Rome, 1846; Pietro Grazioli, *Præstantium Virorum qui in Congregat. S. Pauli vulgo Barnabitarum memoria nostra floruerunt*, Bologna, 1751; G. Colombo, *Profili biografici di insigni Barnabiti*, Crema, 1870; *Collezione di vite dei più distinti religiosi della Congregazione dei Chier. RR. di S. Paolo detti Barnabiti*, 20 vols., Milan, 1858–1862; Helyot, *Histoire des ordres monastiques*, iv. 100-116, 8 vols., Paris, 1714-19; Currier, *History of Religious Orders*, pp. 360–363, New York, 1894; Heimbucher, *Orden und Kongregationen der katholischen Kirche*[2], iii. 270–274, 3 vols., Paderborn, 1908; Sangermano, *Description of the Burmese Empire, compiled chiefly from native Documents . . . and translated from his MS by William Tandy*, Rome, 1833 (reprinted, Rangoon, 1885); Griffini, *Della Vita di Monsignor Giovanni Maria Percoto*, Udine, 1781. The continuation of the *Bibliotheca* of Ungarelli will shortly be published by the writer of this article.

G. BOFFITO.

BARODA.—1. Name and history.—The original form of the name Baroda is said to be Skr. *Vaṭodara* (*vaṭa*, 'banyan-tree,' *udara*, 'cavity') 'in the heart of a banyan grove'; according to others, it is based on the shape of the city, supposed to resemble a banyan leaf; a local legend (*BG* vii. 829) suggests a cult of this sacred tree. The name is given to an important native State and its capital, situated in the provinces of Gujarāt and Kāṭhiāwāṛ in W. India. Other early names were Chandāvatī, 'city of sandalwood' or 'of the Jain king Chandan'; Vīrāvatī or Vīrakshetra, 'land or field of heroes.' The State consists of various fragments of territory enclosed within the British dominions, this condition being due to the troublous times which followed the Marāthā occupation from A.D. 1705 onwards, and successive annexations and re-distributions in contests with the Marāthā Peshwā and the British Government. The dominions of the Gāikwār ('cowherd'; cf. the ritual tendance of cattle in Central India, *NINQ* i. 154 f.) occupy an area of 8099 square miles. They formed in ancient times part of the kingdom of Anhilvāda, the capital of which is now represented by the ruins of Pāṭan at the extreme N. boundary. This kingdom, weakened by the raids of Maḥmūd of Ghaznī, who sacked the temple of Dwārka (wh. see) in 1206, finally succumbed to the attack of Alā-ud-dīn Khiljī in 1298. The present Marāthā dynasty was founded by Pīlājī Gāikwār (1721–32).

2. Statistics of religion.—The total population amounted in 1901 to 1,952,692, including 1,546,992 Hindus (79·22 per cent.); 165,014 Muhammadans (8·54 per cent.); 176,250 Animists (9·02 per cent.); the balance (3·31 per cent.) being made up of Jains, Parsis, Christians, Sikhs, and Jews. Of the Hindus, who form the vast majority of the population, about two-thirds are Vaishṇavas, or followers of Viṣṇu, and the remainder are nearly equally divided between Śaivas, or worshippers of Śiva, and Śāktas, or worshippers of the Mother-goddesses. Among the two last classes there are few sub-sects, the divisions among the Śaivas representing the Orders of ascetics, whose differences are based more upon external observances than upon doctrine; and the Śāktas, as usual, fall into the two classes of 'right-hand' (*Dakshiṇa-mārgī*) and 'left-hand' (*Vāma-mārgī*), the former worshipping their deities in public, the latter following the foul secret Tantrik cultus. The Vaishṇavas have been more fertile in forming sub-sects, of which eleven were recorded at the last enumeration. Of these, five worship Kṛishṇa (Kṛṣṇa) in one or other of his manifestations; four the demi-god Rāma; the Kabīrpanthīs are followers of Kabīr, the saintly founder of the sub-sect (A.D. 1485–1512); and the Gaṇeśapanthi are worshippers of Gaṇeśa or Gaṇpati, god of luck and remover of obstacles. This enumeration, however, tends to exaggerate the sectarian character of the local Hinduism. According to the latest authority:

'Though thus there are three principal sects in the Hindu religion prevalent in this State, the followers of neither are exclusive; they pay homage to all the deities, but are bound more to the special deity of their cult. It is only the bigoted of any one sect who despise the worshippers of deities other than their own. But only few such are found amongst the extremists' (*Census Report*, 1901, i. 187).

The Marāthā ruling dynasty have brought with them from the Deccan as their family god Khaṇḍobā, 'sword father,' the chief guardian deity of the Kunbī caste, from which the Marāthās have mainly sprung (*BG* xviii. pt. i. 290). Regarding this and similar gods Sir A. Lyall (*Asiatic Studies*[2], i. 30) writes:

'These are now grand incarnations of the Supreme Triad; yet, by examining the legends of their embodiment and appearance upon earth, we obtain fair ground for surmising that all of them must have been notable living men not so very long ago.'

3. Hinduism.—In its public and private worship (*pūjā*) the local form of Hinduism differs little from the standard type. The public service carefully provides for the exclusion of all castes regarded as unclean; and even those of lower rank than the 'twice-born' (*dvija*) are kept at a distance and are not allowed to touch the temple images. Each household, again, has its private deities, and the animistic basis of the faith is shown in the general cult of Śītalā, the goddess of smallpox; the sun and planets; cows, bulls, serpents, and the mongoose (*Herpestes mungo*), the destroyer of noxious snakes; of trees, such as the banyan, *pīpal* (*Ficus religiosa*), and the acacia; of stones representing Śiva, Viṣṇu, and Gaṇeśa, and the conch-shell; of jewellery and books of account; and of arms carried by the military classes (*Census Rep.* 1901, i. 122 ff.).

Among other observances the chief are fasts; vows (most of which are special to women); pilgrimages; and the domestic rules of ritual (*saṁskāra*) prescribed for each stage of life—conception, birth, marriage, death. The chief holy places within the State are Dwārkā (wh. see), Sidhpur, the place where obsequial rites for the repose of the soul of a mother can most properly be performed, as those for a father are done at Gayā (wh. see) in Bengal; Bechrājī, where a married woman of the Chāran or herald caste has been deified as an incarnation of the Mātā, or Divine Mother, and is worshipped in the form of the *yoni*, or symbol of the female sex (*BG* vii. 609 ff.); and Karnālī on the banks of the sacred river, the Narbadā.

4. Jains.—The Jains, though numerically weak, are important on account of their wealth and their lavish expenditure on temples, many of which are of recent construction and examples of exquisite workmanship and decoration (*Census Rep.* 1901, i. 149).

5. Animists.—The animistic tribes, found in the forest tracts, belong chiefly to the Gāmit, Bhil (wh. see), Dublā, and Chodhrā tribes. Each of these has its special tribal deity, which is worshipped either in a public service conducted by the *bhagat*, or medicine-man, or in less important cases by the votary himself. One of these, Kavādio Dev, has no image or temple; but he is supposed to live in a gloomy ravine; another, one of the Mother-goddesses, is represented by a huge boulder. Besides these, the tiger, alligator, and various Mothers who repel disease are worshipped, the

ritual being like that common to the other N. Dravidian (wh. see) tribes (*ib.* i. 155 ff.).

6. Parsis.—One of the chief sacred places of the Parsis is Navsāri, which they occupied in A.D. 1142, after leaving their first settlement at Sanjan. Here they have erected numerous fire-temples, and towers of silence for the exposure of the dead. Here burns the sacred fire, which they claim to have brought with them from Persia (*BG* vii. 566 ff.; Dosabhai Framji Karaka, *Hist. of the Parsis*, 1884, i. 37; Modi, *A Few Events in the Early History of the Parsis*, Bombay, 1905).

7. Christians.—The increase in the number of Christians, due to missionary work among the forest tribes and to the establishment of orphanages during the recent famines and plague epidemics, is noteworthy. The community which in 1872 numbered 313 had in 1901 increased to 7691.

LITERATURE.—J. A. Dalal, *Census Report*, 1901, vol. xviii. of *Reports of the Census of India*; F. A. H. Elliott, *Bombay Gazetteer*, vol. vii., 1883; J. Forbes, *Oriental Memoirs*, 1813; A. K. Forbes, *Rās Mālā, or Hindoo Annals of the Province of Goozerat*[2], 1878. For the early Muhammadan history see Elliot-Dowson, *Hist. of India*, 1866–77; Sir E. C. Bayley, *Local Muhammadan Dynasties of Gujarat*, 1886; J. Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*[3], 1873. W. CROOKE.

BARSOM (Av. *baresman*).—'Barsom' is the name given at the present day to a collection of small metal-wire rods (*tāī*)—used in the chief ceremonies of the Parsis—representing the cut stems of a plant which can no longer be identified. The number of the rods varies, according to the ritual in which they are used; the lowest permissible number seems to have been three, while the numbers five, seven, and nine are also mentioned. The number now varies between five and thirty-three. These small rods, as used to-day, are bound together with a girdle formed of a date leaf or leaves. For the particular ceremonial recitals in which they are used see Haug's *Essays*, p. 396 ff., and Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta*, i. p. lxxiii. f.; see also there the description of the detailed operations with which their use is accompanied. It may be mentioned that the *barsom* is frequently sprinkled with the holy water (*zaoθra, zōr*), and with the consecrated milk in the *yasna*, or chief ceremony.

The number *thirty-three* shows that the rods represent, even yet, most sacred objects and personified ideas, for that number is especially mentioned in *Yasna* i. 10, iii. 12, as applying to the *ratus* of the *yasna* ceremony. What these special ideas originally were is no longer clearly defined. But, reasoning from the origin of their application, we may readily arrive at their significance. Few doubt that we have in the *barsom* (*baresman*) a form of *barezi§*, Vedic Skr. *barhis*, the 'straw cushion' upon which the gods of the Veda were supposed to sit, as they descended in response to the sacrifice, and upon which also offerings to them were spread—and this at a time when the ancestors of the present Indian deva-worshippers and of the *Ahura-* (*Asura-*) worshippers were one and the same people, and when 'Veda' and 'Avesta' were blended in some now lost name for the one common holy lore. Several points are in favour of this, apart from the etymology: chiefly the word 'spread,' which is used of the *barsom* as of the Vedic *barhis*. The rod-twigs, indeed, are hardly 'spread' now, except upon the *māh-rū* (a sort of rack with two crescents for supports), the moon-faced stand upon which they, for the most part, rest. But the *barhis* was and is 'spread' as 'straw'; compare the passage in Herodotus (i. 132), where he describes, if somewhat loosely, the offering of a Persian Mazda-worshipper: 'He "spreads" [the verb used is *ὑποστάσσειν*] the softest grass he can get, and places the pieces of flesh upon it.' (This item, by the way, is one of many which show how widely this form of worship was diffused in Persia, and how long it had been implanted there, seeing that the Greeks could speak of it so familiarly as belonging to Persia in general, and not merely to a province of it. See also the Inscriptions of Darius at Behistūn, etc., where *Auramazda* is regularly mentioned as the God of all the Empire 'who made this earth and yon heaven.'*)

The *barsom* is, and was then, a sacred object frequently used in the holiest sacrificial ceremonies, especially in the celebration of the main Sacrificial Service, in the course of which the Gāthas were sung without curtailment. It must therefore be understood by all serious Parsi worshippers to represent something of the most sacred character; and on closer examination it may recall at times the entire throng of personified ideas which we might, with some reason, describe as 'godlets,' whose worship, however, when sincere, did not in any conceivable sense approach idolatry, but was a mere sacrificial reverence. Further, all the symbolic rods were united by the sacred 'girdle,' as if to express the thought of oneness. And when we press our inquiries a little further, we see that the *barsom* with its uses is but the persistence of an original idea which was dear to the Indo-Iranian peoples while as yet they were undivided.

Avesta and Pahlavi literatures add a number of details concerning the barsom, for which some similar plant might be substituted (*Yas.* xxii. 3). In conjunction with the 'libation' (*zaoθra*), it is used in calling Ahura Mazda and all other sacred beings, to whom it, with other holy objects, is duly consecrated (*Yas.* iv.; *Vīsp.* xi. 2), to the sacrifice (*Yas.* ii., which bears the special name of *Barsam Yašt*; cf. *Yas.* xxii.; *Vīsp.* ii.); an important part of the worship of Ahura Mazda is that 'one should offer barsom an *aēša* long, a *yava* (grain?) broad' (*Vend.* xix. 19); and it is also used in the *Šrōš Darūn*, which grants to the soul of the dead the protection of Sraosha on its passage to the future life (*Yas.* iii.). Sraosha was, indeed, 'the first who spread forth the barsom, both of three twigs, and of five twigs, and of seven twigs, and of nine twigs [the Pahlavi commentary on *Nīrangistān* xc. raising the number of twigs to 551], (reaching) both to the knee and to the midleg, for both the worship and the prayer and the propitiation and the glorification of the Amesha Spentas' (*Yas.* lvii. 6), and the offering of barsom to the sacred fire is one of the acts which bring the blessing of that element (*Yas.* lxii. 9). The barsom is numbered among the sacred beings and objects to which sacrifice is offered (*Yas.* lxxi. 23) and which are invoked to be present at the sacrifice (*Vīsp.* x. 2), besides having obedience to them solemnly inculcated (*Vīsp.* xii. 3). The barsom is among the offerings to be made by the 'Aryan lands' to Tishtrya (*Yt.* viii. 58); with it Haoma offered sacrifice to Mithra (*Yt.* x. 88), who, if a pious priest sacrifices with barsom, bestows blessings on him who employs the sacerdotal

* [The barsom is also alluded to at least thrice by other Greek writers: Strabo, p. 733, *τὰς δ' ἐσφδὰς ποιοῦνται* [*sc.* οἱ Μάγοι] *πολὺν χρόνον ῥάβδων μυρικίνων λεπτῶν δέσμην κατέχοντες*; Dinon, as quoted by the scholiast on Nicander's *Theriaca*, 618, *καὶ τοὺς μάντεις φησὶ Μήδους ῥάβδοις μαντεύεσθαι*; and the *Acts of St. Sīra, Rom.*, May, iv. 17. 6 (written in the reign of Chosroës II., d. 628), *τὰ ξύλα δι' ὧν ἐμάγευσεν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Ζωροάστρου δαιμονιώδη παράδοσιν*. It is likewise mentioned by Armenian and Syriac writers (as by Eznik, *Against the Sects*, tr. Schmid, Vienna, 1900, pp. 92, 97; Hoffmann, *Auszüge aus syr. Akten pers. Märtyrer*, Leipzig, 1880, pp. 94, 111). It should furthermore be noted that many scholars (*e.g.* Pinches, *DB* iv. 629) see in the words of Ezk 8[17], 'and, lo, they put the branch to their nose,' an allusion to the barsom. Herein they are probably right (for an opposing view see Toy, *EBi* ii. 1463), and it may also be suggested, at least tentatively, that the זְמֹרָה, 'twigs of a strange one (*i.e.* of a foreign god),' of Is 17[10] may likewise refer to the barsom.—L. H. G.]

mediator (*Yt.* x. 137–139); and, in turn, barsom is among the offerings to be made to Haoma (*Yas.* xxv. 3). Even Ahura Mazda, who did sacrifice with it to Vāyu, the Wind (*Yt.* xv. 2), and to Ashi, Righteousness (*Yt.* xvii. 61), comes swiftly to one whose offering includes the barsom (*Yt.* xii. 2–3), and with it the Fravashis (*q.v.*) must be invoked (*Yt.* xiii. 27). In like manner it is used in sacrifice to the sun (*Nyāyiš* i. 16), the fire (*Yas.* lxii. 1), Mithra and Rāma Hvāstra (*Vend.* iii. 1), and Anāhita (*Yt.* v. 98, 126–127), as well as at the Rapithwina, or midday sacrifice (*Āfrīngān* iv. 5–7). So great, indeed, is the virtue of a single offering of barsom, as of a single offering of wood for the sacred fire, that by it the just is exalted and the Druj (the demon of evil) is weakened, Asha (Righteousness) is increased, and all the just are borne to Paradise (*Fragments of Tahmuras*, xxiv.).

Turning to the Avesta ritual concerning the barsom, we observe that the corrupt passage *Yašt* xv. 55 seems to imply that it should be gathered after dawn but before full daylight. He who has carried a corpse alone must remain thirty paces from the barsom (*Vend.* iii. 15–17; cf. *Šāyast lā-Šāyast* ii. 18), and a menstruous woman or one suffering from leucorrhea must keep half that distance (*Vend.* xvi. 4; cf. *Šāyast lā-Šāyast* iii. 10–11, 20, 32–33; *Sad Dar* lxviii. 14), while cuttings of the hair and nails must be buried the latter space away (*Vend.* xvii. 4). The barsom must be removed from a house in which either a human being or a dog (a sacred animal in Zoroastrianism) has died (*Vend.* v. 39–40), though in the purification of a house, after the expiration of the proper period of mourning, which varies according to the degree of kinship, the barsom plays an important rôle (*Vend.* xii. 1 ff.). Barsom may not be carried along a road over which the corpse of a human being or a dog has been borne until the path has been duly purified (*Vend.* xviii. 14–22), and milk drawn from a cow that has eaten of such a corpse may not be used in connexion with the barsom within a year after such an act (*Vend.* vii. 77). Prosperity shuns the place where a heretic (*aśemaoγa*) dwells, until he is slain and sacrifice is offered to Sraosha for three days and three nights with barsom, fire, and *haoma* (*Vend.* ix. 56–57). Among the penalties for killing an otter (*udra*) are the binding of 10,000 bundles of barsom and the presentation of barsom to 'holy men,' *i.e.* priests (*Vend.* xiv. 4, 8), while 1000 bundles must be tied up by him who has had intercourse with a menstruous woman or one suffering from leucorrhea (*Vend.* xviii. 72). If a libation be poured into the barsom or the sacred fire, it becomes operative 'for the victory of the non-Aryan lands' (*Nīrangistān* lxviii.), and the binding of the barsom is one of the most important parts of the sacrifice (*Nīrang.* lx.). For a variety of ritual prescriptions relating to the barsom, reference may be made to *Nīrang.* (ed. Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta* iii., and Darab Dastur Peshotan Sanjana, Bombay, 1894) lxix.–lxx., lxxiv., lxxix., xcvii. ff. (although the greater part of the text of the last passage is so corrupt in its present form as to defy translation); *Šāyast lā-Šāyast* viii. 18; *Dādistān-ī Dīnīk* xliii. 4–5, xlviii. 17; *Epistles of Mānūščihar* iii. 13; Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta* i. 398, 407.

According to Pahlavi literature, the evils of the last times will be such that the barsom may be arranged in the very house of the dead (*Bahrām Yt.* ii. 36), although the righteous man will still strew it, even if he cannot do it 'as in the reign of King Vištāsp' (*Bahrām Yt.* ii. 58; for other eschatological data connected with the barsom see *Bahrām Yt.* iii. 29, 37). The barsom might be consecrated by women (*Šāyast lā-Šāyast* x. 35). Faulty consecration was, however, possible if the barsom had too many twigs, or was cut from an improper plant, or was held toward the north, the region of the demons (*Šāyast lā-Šāyast* xiv. 2), an intentional substitution of such improper barsom being a very serious sin (*Dīnkarṭ* VIII. xliv. 65). The barsom was a powerful agent against all demons, fiends, wizards, and witches (*Dīnā-ī-Māīnōg ī-Khraṭ* lvii. 28); it played a part 'on the day of battle and evil deeds of war' (*Dīnkarṭ* VIII. xxvi. 24); and it is particularly interesting to note that a distinct barsom-ordeal (*baresmōk-varīh*) was known (*Dīnkarṭ* VIII. xix. 38, xx. 12, 66), although no details are given concerning it.

The barsom is also mentioned in the Persian *Šāh-Nāmah*, which records that King Bahrām Gūr and his bride were met by a Zoroastrian priest bearing barsom in his hand, and also that Yazdigird, the last Sasanian king, asked the miller who gave him shelter in flight for a bundle of barsom that he might say grace before eating (Pizzi, *Il Libro dei re*, Turin, 1886–88, vi. 465, viii. 442), a custom to which allusion is also made elsewhere (Rehatsek, *JRASBo* xiii. 88). It is possible that the five-twigged barsom is represented on a coin of Bahrām II. (276–293), which shows two figures on opposite sides of a fire altar, one of the men holding the 'ring of sovereignty' and the other the object in question (Dorn, *Collection de monnaies sassanides de feu le lieutenant-général J. de Bartholomaei*, i., St. Petersburg, 1873, pl. iv. No. 13). In modern times, as has already been noted, the barsom in India is ritually represented by small wire rods; but in Kirman, Anquetil du Perron (*Zend-Avesta*, Paris, 1771, ii. 532) records the use of twigs of the pomegranate, tamarind, or date-tree; and at the present time 'in Yezd the tamarisk bush is used to form this bundle, and it is bound with a slender strip of bark from the mulberry tree, probably in exactly the same manner as it was in Zoroaster's day,' brass rods being substituted only in winter or at other times when it is impossible to obtain living branches (Jackson, *Persia Past and Present*, New York, 1906, p. 369 f. and plate). See also YASNA.

LITERATURE.—Oldenberg, *Religion des Veda*, Berlin, 1894, pp. 31, 342 ff.; Haug, *Essays on the Parsis*[3], London, 1884, p. 390 ff.; Wilson, *Parsi Religion*, Bombay, 1843, p. 231; Windischmann, *Zoroastrische Studien*, Berlin, 1863, pp. 223, 276; and other works mentioned in the article.

L. H. MILLS and LOUIS H. GRAY.

BARTER.—Barter is the name given to the simple and elementary form of traffic in which goods are directly offered in exchange for goods. An article upon barter is from one point of view an essay on the functions of money and the inconvenience of its absence, since barter is that form of exchange in which money is not employed as the intermediary of trading. Barter was the primitive mode of doing business before a measure of value or a common medium of exchange was devised. In such a set of conditions there are manifest difficulties; without a common denominator it is not easy to compare the values of the articles exchanged or to arrive at an economic principle of bargaining. In any particular exchange the two parties must adjust their contract by their respective wants for each other's commodity and the desire of each to part with his own superfluities. Thus the fisherman would need to measure his fish against the potatoes of the gardener at one moment and the bread of the baker at another, and so on round the whole circle of his purchases. It is obvious that a system of exchange so elementary and so casual must belong to a primitive period of society. A very slight advance in the methods of production, in separation of employments, and in traffic would inevitably lead to the use of a medium of exchange which would serve at once as a standard measure and as an accepted go-between;

some substance would be adopted for the double purpose, which all would willingly receive in exchange for their own commodities, and which could in turn be parted with easily for others. The thing selected to serve these utilities in any community would be in the first place something much in common demand for its service or its attractiveness, and such a substance would have certain qualities of durability and approximate stability which would recommend it. The article adopted would vary with the locality. The various stages in this early employment of a primitive money need not be here pursued; by degrees the more essential qualities of good money would emerge, and thus the currency of modern times would be gradually evolved. See art. MONEY.

The term *barter* or *truck* is more usually applied to the exchange of articles for use; the term *purchase* suggests the employment of money and buying for future sale or commerce. The Old Testament supplies a good example of a transaction by payment in kind or barter. In 1 K $5^{10f.}$ we read that Hiram king of Tyre 'gave Solomon cedar trees and fir trees according to all his desire,' and that 'Solomon gave Hiram 20,000 measures of wheat for food to his household and 20 measures of pure oil.'

Many forms of barter still exist in highly civilized communities; the domestic servant barters her services for food, housing, and a sum of money; the farm labourer is often paid partly in *kind*, by the use of a cottage, a garden, supply of milk, butter, etc., and partly by money wages. If we consider *real* wages, *i.e.* what money wages will buy, we see that in reality labour is exchanged for a supply of necessaries and comforts. In modern times we find some publications such as *The Exchange and Mart*, which revive the old form of barter by advertising certain articles for sale and stating the articles desired in exchange for them. Private individuals, like schoolboys, often practise barter; and bits of furniture, old garments, and even plots of land are exchanged for other desirable things.

In uncivilized countries barter is widely prevalent. Stanley in his journeys through Africa took quantities of cloth, brass rods, etc., with which to purchase food; similarly cargoes of old rifles, knives, bottles, powder, etc., have been sent to some places to be exchanged for the natural products of the country.

Under a system of barter there is a difficulty in securing mutuality of wants, or what Jevons called 'the double coincidence of exchange,' viz., that each party shall desire that which the other offers. Again, barter requires each article to be measured in terms of every other article of traffic, necessitating a separate bargain for each, and consequently a large and varied list of the ratios of exchange. A further drawback is the impossibility in some cases of dividing the article or of fractional payments; the pig or the rifle must be exchanged for something which is deemed an exact equivalent.

Competition (*q.v.*) has little play under barter. The mode of exchange is not such as can supply a market and give a market value. It is usually a case of a single exchange in which the values are determined by the individual wants and capacities of the two parties to the exchange.

The evolution of trade was from barter to money purchases. Modern trade tends to revert to a refined form of barter by the employment of paper substitutes for money currency; promises, credit documents, and what is called 'representative money' take the place of coin. The highly organized systems of Banking and the Clearing House have provided a mechanism which in effect reduces much of trade and commerce to barter, while preserving a measure of value and a reserve of the standard for reference and for use in emergency.

And if home trade has been reduced mainly to barter again, much more has foreign commerce. Imports pay for exports; goods and services are the only ultimate means of buying goods and services from other countries. Their values are expressed in terms of money, but the actual exchange is effected almost without the passage of a coin. The foreign trade of Great Britain, amounting to more than £1,000,000,000 a year (or nearly £25 per head of her population), is transacted with the transmission of a very trivial sum in gold.

Imports and exports are balanced against each other by means of bills, and the mechanism of the money market enables the exchange of these instruments of credit representing debts to accomplish the equalization of the debts. The operations become a vast series of barter transactions, reduced to simplicity by the ingenious arrangements of a highly organized commercial system.

Under this refined system of trading no particular parcel of goods is exchanged for any other particular parcel of goods, but each is represented by a bill. These bills are exchanged, *i.e.* bought and sold freely, by the persons doing business in the different countries, so that the equation is ultimately secured. The settlements need not be, nor are they, direct. Each country need not balance its accounts for goods with each of its customer countries so as to equalize their actual imports and exports to one another. But country A may pay its debts to country B by a bill upon C, just as is done by merchants at home. By this system of foreign exchanges bills become an article of commerce; and, following the law of supply and demand, they rise and fall in value, and are a means of regulating commerce and equalizing sales and purchases all over the world.

Thus trade which started with simple exchange by barter has come, under a highly complex civilization and a world-wide commerce, to be once more only barter of a very refined kind, after passing through many stages and degrees of money purchase. Much the greater part of the business of nations is accomplished without the actual employment of money at all, except as a unit of measurement and a reserve force hidden away in the strong rooms of banks.

LITERATURE.—Jevons, *Money* (Lond. 1876); Bastable, *Theory of International Trade* (Dublin, 1887); Marshall, *Principles of Economics*, Note on 'Barter' (Lond. 1907).

G. ARMITAGE-SMITH.

BASIL.—See CAPPADOCIAN THEOLOGY.

BASILIDES, BASILIDIANS.—1. Sources.—Basilides was one of the most famous Gnostic teachers in the 2nd century. We are told by Epiphanius (*Hær.* xxiii. 1) that he was a fellow-pupil of Saturnilus in the school of Menander, at Antioch. This statement has been largely accepted, though it is by no means certain that Epiphanius had any trustworthy information on the subject. It is quite as likely to be simply an inference of his own from the fact that Saturnilus and Basilides are coupled by Irenæus (I. xxiv. 1), who, however, says that Saturnilus put forward his system in Syria, but Basilides in Alexandria. Apart from the reference in the *Acts of Archelaus* (c. 55 in Routh, *Rel. Sac.* v. 196) to his preaching among the Persians, to be discussed later, we have no evidence for any activity outside Egypt. Possibly Epiphanius, who visited Egypt, had some warrant for his account of the places outside Alexandria where Basilides worked. The same uncertainty surrounds the date of his activity, but we shall probably be safe in accepting the usual view (cf. Clem. *Strom.* vii. 106) that his work fell mainly

within the reign of Hadrian (A.D. 117–138).* He claimed to have received his doctrine from the Apostle Peter through Glaucias (Clem. *l.c.*). His chief disciple was his son Isidore. According to Hippolytus (*Philos.* vii. 20), they asserted that Matthias communicated to them a doctrine which he had received from Christ. They also appealed apparently to Zoroastrian authorities. Basilides wrote a work entitled *Exegetica*, that is, 'Expositions,' in 24 books (*Strom.* iv. 88; Euseb. *HE* iv. 7. 7). This was apparently an exposition of the Gospels. We learn from Origen (*Hom. 1 in Luc.*) that he wrote a Gospel. It is extremely unlikely that Origen with his facilities for information should be mistaken upon this point. From the fragments which are preserved to us, we may infer that Basilides probably commented on the First, Third, and Fourth Evangelists, possibly also on Mark; and it is by no means unlikely that he based his commentary on his own compilation from the Gospels. He is also said to have written incantations and odes; but these are entirely lost. His son Isidore wrote several works —first, a treatise on Ethics, which, perhaps, is identical with the *Parænetics* mentioned by Epiphanius (xxxii. 3); secondly, a treatise on the Parasitic Soul (*Strom.* ii. 113); and, thirdly, *Expositions of the Prophet Parchor*, which must have contained at least two books, since we have a quotation from the second (*Strom.* vi. 53).

The problems which are presented to us by this school of Gnostics are of an exceptionally perplexing and baffling kind. The accounts given of Basilides' system are hopelessly irreconcilable, and the new evidence which has come to light has made the problem still more difficult. Before the publication of the *Philosophumena* of Hippolytus in 1851, the main sources of information were the account of the system in Irenæus' great work against heresies, and the related accounts in later heresiologists; information given by Eusebius concerning a refutation of Basilides by Agrippa Castor; and some extracts from the works of Basilides and his son Isidore, given by Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and the author of the *Acts of Archelaus*. Even these authorities were so difficult to reconcile, that Neander (followed by Gieseler) treated the account of Irenæus as referring to a later development of the sect, and said that, were it not for the fact that Clement of Alexandria referred to the misconduct of later Basilidians in language similar to that employed by Irenæus, we should be tempted to suspect that the Basilidians whom the latter describes had no connexion whatever with the founder. The discovery of the long lost *Philosophumena* or *Refutation of all Heresies*, now unanimously assigned to Hippolytus, introduced a new complication. Hippolytus gives an account of Basilides' system which differs fundamentally from that of Irenæus. The majority of scholars, including Jacobi, Uhlhorn, Baur, Möller, and Hort, accepted the new evidence. The attack on Hippolytus' account was led by Hilgenfeld (see Literature at end of present art.), who received the very influential support of Lipsius, and at a later time of Harnack and other scholars. At present the tendency seems to be to regard the account of Hippolytus as valueless (except in isolated details) for the re-construction of Basilides' own system. But the theory that Hippolytus was duped by a forgery seems to be losing ground, and the opinion prevails that the document he employed was a genuine Gnostic treatise circulated among the later Basilidians. Finally, a new manuscript of the *Acts of Archelaus*, containing the complete Latin translation, was discovered by Traube a few years ago, and made accessible by C. H. Beeson in 1906 ('Hegemonius, Acta Archelai,' in *Die gr. christl. Schriftsteller in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten*). The text we previously possessed broke off in the middle of an important extract from Basilides. The newly found manuscript completes the quotation. It should be added that the task of the scholar is rendered more difficult by the fact that the texts are often corrupt, and, even where this is not the case, frequently not very intelligible.

The view that the account of Hippolytus rested on a forgery was first suggested in 1885 by George Salmon in an article in *Hermathena*, entitled 'The Cross References in the Philosophumena.' In reading the work of Hippolytus he had often been struck by the coincidences between the various systems. These had, in fact, drawn the attention of earlier scholars; but Salmon thought them suspicious, and formulated a theory to account for them. This was that Hippolytus became known as a zealous purchaser of Gnostic documents, the demand created a supply, the unscrupulous dealer forged a certain number of treatises purporting to be documents of Gnostic schools, and these were eagerly purchased by the credulous bishop, who in this way included in his work accounts of systems which had never really existed. Attention was drawn to Salmon's article by Harnack (*ThLZ* x. [1885] 506 f.), and in his *Gesch. des NT Canons* (1889, i. 765 f.) Zahn signified his adhesion. Salmon's theory was taken up by Stähelin in a special investigation, 'Die gnost. Quellen Hippolyts,' *TU*, 1890. Salmon had said comparatively little about Basilides, but Stähelin sought to show that the theory applied to this part of Hippolytus' account as well as to that of the minor sects. For a time the theory found several supporters, including C. Schmidt (*Gnost. Schriften in kopt. Sprache*, 1892, p. 557) and G. Krüger (*PRE*^{3}, *s.v.*). It has, however, been rejected not only by those who, like J. Drummond (*Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel*, 1903, pp. 316–331), assert the originality of Hippolytus' account, but by Anz (*Zur Frage nach dem Ursprung des Gnostizismus*, 1897, p. 9) and Bousset (*Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, 1907, p. 128). Bardenhewer in his *Patrology* also judges that 'this hypothesis offers too violent a solution of the problem.' Even Harnack, who in his *Gesch. der altchristl. Literatur* (1893, vol. i. p. 157) spoke of Hippolytus' sources as probably a forgery, expresses himself with greater reserve in his *Chronol. der altchristl. Literatur* (1904, vol. ii. p. 231). The present writer can only repeat the unfavourable judgment he expressed in a notice of Stähelin's work in the *Classical Review*, 1892. In the first place, the coincidences may readily be accounted for by the fact, which Stähelin himself admits, that Gnostic documents circulated freely from one school to another. Secondly, since they were thus in a measure public property, it is difficult to understand how the forger could command prices high enough to reward him for his trouble. Thirdly, it is still more difficult to explain the very striking difference in the level of speculative power which is displayed in the different systems. Few, it may be imagined, would assent to Stähelin's view that the author, in the words he quotes from Basilides on the non-existent God, was trying to turn the whole Gnostic scheme into ridicule, which would surely have been a dangerous game to play if he had wished to palm off his forgeries as genuine. Rather they will recognize in the system a speculative power not inferior to that displayed in Valentinianism,

* E. Schwartz argues that we must take Basilides and Saturnilus at least to the time of Trajan, probably earlier (*Ueber den Tod der Söhne Zebedaei*, 1904, p. 20 f.). He thinks that, while we need not accept the Gnostic claims to possess a tradition from the Apostles, we may well distrust the 'tendency' chronology of their opponents.

and account for the strange language which the author employs by his effort to explain the inexplicable—all the more that his language has parallels in that of other deep thinkers. Moreover, Stählin assumes rather than proves that Clement is on the side of Irenæus, whereas several scholars who have no preference for Hippolytus' account have recognized that it is very difficult to harmonize Irenæus with the quotations given by Clement. For these reasons we may justifiably reject this theory, which postulates a writer of incredible versatility combined with such strange limitations, and assume that, whether Hippolytus presents us with the genuine system of Basilides or not, he at any rate communicates a system which was really professed in the Basilidian school.

The account of Basilides given by Hegemonius in the *Acts of Archelaus* has also created suspicion. Gieseler argued that the Basilides there mentioned was to be distinguished from the heresiarch of Alexandria, inasmuch as he is said in the *Acts* to have been a preacher among the Persians. Hort considered that his denial had some show of reason, but on the whole regarded the arguments in favour of the identification as preponderating (Smith-Wace, *DCB* i. 277[a]). He should therefore not have been quoted by G. Krüger (*PRE*[3] ii. 431) as agreeing with Gieseler. Usually the assertion that he was a preacher among the Persians is regarded as incredible. Thus Lipsius declares that, if the Disputation of Archelaus makes Basilides a Persian, 'the remark is hardly necessary that this false statement is simply a deduction from the dualism of the Basilidian system' (*Gnosticismus*, 1860, col. 109). It is also rejected by Zahn and Harnack; while Krüger thinks that, although we cannot control the statement, it is not so improbable as Zahn considers it; and Hilgenfeld says that Basilides may quite well have been in Persia and learnt Persian dualism at first hand. The statement should probably be set aside and accounted for as by Lipsius. It is quite another question, however, whether we should reject the author's account of Basilides' beliefs, and, in particular, the extract which he gives from his work. This is said to be taken from the thirteenth book of his treatises, and, inasmuch as it contains an exposition of the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus, the work should probably be identified with Basilides' twenty-four books on the Gospels which bore the title *Exegetica*. The real objection felt by those who accept the genuineness of Hippolytus' account is that, while this is monistic in character, the account of Hegemonius seems to pledge Basilides to dualism. There can be no question that the author of the *Acts* understood him to be a dualist, but that, of course, does not settle the question. He may have misunderstood Basilides, especially since his preoccupation with Manichæism made such an interpretation of the Gnostic not unnatural for him. Accordingly we cannot attach decisive weight to his impression, in spite of the fact that he had the complete work before him. If, however, the extract given is genuine, it must rank with those preserved by Clement of Alexandria, and it seems to the present writer that we have no good ground for disputing its authenticity.

2. System of doctrine.—We may now proceed to an exposition of the various systems which have come down to us. Unfortunately it is not possible to re-construct the somewhat desultory references in Clement of Alexandria, treating of ethics rather than metaphysics, into a complete system. It will accordingly be best to begin with the accounts which profess to give us the original system.

(*a*) We take first that of *Irenæus* (I. xxiv. 3–7), which presents points of contact especially with the description he gives of the views of Saturnilus.

According to Irenæus, Basilides began with the unborn Father, and represented Nous as His firstborn. Nous gave birth to Logos, Logos to Phronesis, Phronesis to Sophia and Dynamis. From the last two came the first series of principalities, powers, and angels, who created the first heaven. From these emanated the second angelic series, who created the second heaven; and so on till 365 heavens came into existence. The angels in the lowest heaven created the world, and divided it among themselves. Their chief was the God of the Jews, who aroused hostility by His favouritism to His own people. Thus all other nations were stirred up to be at enmity with the Jews. Hereupon the supreme God interfered to save the world from destruction, and sent His firstborn Nous, *i.e.* Christ, to deliver those that believe in Him from the world-angels. He appeared in human form and taught, but at the crucifixion changed forms with Simon of Cyrene, so that the latter was crucified in the form of Jesus, while Christ Himself stood by and mocked at His enemies in the form of Simon; for, since He was incorporeal, He was essentially invisible, and so He returned to the Father. Hence no one who really knows the truth will confess the Crucified, for, if he does so, he is a slave to the world-angels; but, if he understands what really happened at the crucifixion, he is freed from them. The Basilidians denied the salvation of the body, asserting that it was subject to corruption, and that the soul alone is saved. They had no hesitation in eating meats offered to idols, and regarded every form of immorality as a matter of complete indifference. They also practised all kinds of magical arts, and sought to enumerate the names of the angels in the 365 heavens. The name given to Christ, in which He ascended and descended, was *Caulacau*; and just as Caulacau passed through the various heavens in His descent from the Father and returned to Him and remained invisible and unknown to all, so those who have learnt the doctrines of the system and known the names of the angels may themselves know all, but be known of none. Their mysteries they kept secret, and said that only one out of a thousand, or two out of ten thousand, were capable of knowing them. They had no hesitation in denying their faith under stress of persecution. They adopted the theories of mathematicians, and thus made out the positions of the 365 heavens. The chief of these they asserted to be Abraxas, and on that account the numerical sum of the letters in this word was 365.

It is unnecessary to supplement the account of Irenæus by reference to the other heresiologists who give us an essentially identical system; but there are some features which call for notice at this point. Even those scholars who most warmly vindicate the superiority of Irenæus' exposition generally recognize that he is quite unjustified in the charge of immorality which he brings against Basilides. Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* iii. 508 ff.) rebukes the misconduct of the later members of the sect by reference to the teaching of the founder and his son. The docetic character of the Christology and the denial of the real humanity of Jesus must also be decidedly rejected, in view of Clement's explicit testimony to the effect that from a certain taint of sinfulness Basilides held Jesus, in virtue of His humanity, not to be exempt. The story that Basilides taught the crucifixion of Simon of Cyrene is generally rejected, though Pfleiderer (*Urchristentum*[2], ii. 384) considers that the statement in the Fourth Gospel that Jesus went out bearing the cross for Himself (Jn 19[17]), was intended to repudiate the Synoptic statement that Simon of Cyrene helped Jesus to carry His cross, and was elicited by the turn given to the story by Basilides. It is further noteworthy that in this account only five Æons are interpolated between the supreme God and the angels of the first heaven. Those who re-construct the original system by a fusion of this account with that of Clement of Alexandria, make the five into seven by borrowing two from Clement of Alexandria, and thus attribute to Basilides the usual Heptad. It is very questionable, however, whether they are correct in doing so. In any case nothing can be built on a combination of this kind. Moreover, Bousset has pointed out parallels to the scheme as given by Irenæus. The name *Caulacau* occurs in an unfortunately corrupt sentence,* but it is

* 'Quemadmodum et mundus nomen esse in quo dicunt descendisse et ascendisse saluatorem, esse Caulacau' (Iren. *adv. Hær.* i. 24). The general sense must be that given above, but the text is unintelligible in its present form. Hilgenfeld

sufficiently clear that it is intended to be the mystic name of Christ. It occurs in other Gnostic systems, and was probably derived from Is 28[10]. The statement in Tertullian (*de Præscr. Hær.* 4) that Abraxas was the name given by Basilides to the supreme God is quite incorrect, and is not in harmony even with Irenæus. The fact that a considerable number of gems bear the word *Abrasax*, or more rarely *Abraxas*, on them has caused them to be regarded as Gnostic gems, many of them produced by the Basilidians. An enormous literature has been devoted to them, but it is now generally agreed that if any connexion existed it was of the slightest kind, most of the gems being of pagan origin. Harnack says: 'Not everywhere where Abraxas is mentioned are we to think exclusively of the Basilidians. It is doubtful whether even a single Abraxas gem is Basilidian' (*Altchrist. Lit.* i. 161). Numerous suggestions have been put forward as to the origin and meaning of the term. None of them can be regarded as in any way satisfactory. The word is more probably an artificial formation, which may have originated in some form of speaking with tongues, and been brought into prominence by the fact that, like Μειθράς and Νεῖλος, it was the numerical equivalent of 365.

(*b*) The account given by *Hippolytus*.

This account starts with a very transcendental doctrine of God. A definition is quoted from Basilides, in which language is strained to raise God above all the limitations involved in affirmations about Him. Even to predicate existence would be to limit Him, and thus to negative His absoluteness. Accordingly Basilides starts with the time when there was Nothing—using the term in a sense similar to that in which John Scotus Erigena spoke of God as Pure Nothing. That the author does not intend his words to be taken as a negation of all existence is clear from what follows. If we speak of God as Ineffable, we fall into self-contradiction, for the epithet is in itself a description; but God is not even Ineffable, since He is infinitely above every name that can be named. This non-existent Deity willed to create a world, though we are warned that the term 'willed' is a necessary accommodation to the imperfections of human language. In pursuance of this purpose He deposited a seed, also non-existent, but containing within it the promise and potency of all life. In opposition to the usual Gnostic doctrines, Basilides firmly rejected the conception of emanation from God, who was no spider spinning the world out of Himself. The seed was rather the creative word of which we read in Genesis. Thus, against the gross and material conception of emanation he sets the doctrine of Creation out of Nothing. Just as the seed contains within itself the tree, or the peacock's egg contains the bird with all its rich diversity of colour, so the world-seed holds within itself all that is subsequently to be developed into the manifold forms of being which the universe embraces.

Within this seed there was a threefold Sonship, one part pure and subtle, the second gross, the third needing purification. As soon as the seed was deposited, the pure Sonship burst forth, and by its unaided power rose with the swiftness of thought to the non-existent God. The gross Sonship strove to follow, but was unable to do so since his substance was not light in texture like that of the first. But he escaped from his detention within the seed by providing himself with a wing, identified by Basilides with the Holy Spirit. So helped in his infirmity by the Spirit and giving help to the Spirit in turn, he followed the First Sonship in his flight to the non-existent. But here the Holy Spirit was compelled to leave the Second Sonship; so he dwelt between the supra-cosmic space and the world, and became the firmament, since he had nothing in common with the non-existent God. Yet, as the perfume of an ointment still clings about a vessel even after the ointment has been taken from it, so the Holy Spirit was filled with the fragrance of the Second Sonship.* The Third Sonship, however, still remained in the confused mass of germs within the seed, giving and receiving kindness. Then there burst forth from the seed the Great Archon, better in every way than all beings in the world save the Third Sonship. His upward flight, however, was stayed when he reached the firmament, for this he thought to be the limit of space. And since he was ignorant of what lay beyond the firmament and knew of no power higher than himself, he imagined himself to be the supreme God. Then he formed from the seed a son far wiser than himself, and, wondering at his loveliness, bade him sit at his right hand in the Ogdoad. This son inspired the Archon to create the whole ethereal creation, downwards to the moon. A similar process was repeated with a second Archon, far inferior to the first, who rose to the region below the Ogdoad and dwelt in the Hebdomad. He, too, formed a son far wiser than himself, who inspired his father to form the creation below the Ogdoad. But as to what takes place in the world itself, that is determined by the nature implanted within it at the outset by the non-existent God. But still there remained the Third Sonship, whose true place was with the First and Second Sonships near the non-existent God. To him St. Paul's words refer, where he spoke of the creation groaning and travailing in pain together until now, waiting for the manifestation of the sons of God (Ro 8[19ff.]). And the sons of God are the spiritual, whose task it is to train the souls which are destined to abide within the world. The redemptive process began with the great Archon.

Basilides repudiated the common conception of a descent of a heavenly being from the highest region. He would not admit that the Pure Sonship left his place and came down through the heavens to the regions below. This would have been to contradict his fundamental principle that ascent and not descent is the law of the universe. Accordingly, he represented the son of the great Archon as catching illumination from the pure Sonship. He illustrated this by a reference to naphtha, which takes fire though the flame that kindles it is some distance from it. So the thoughts of the Archon's son aspired till they reached the Sonship, and then the intuition of the truth flashed upon him. Having thus learnt the truth, the great Archon's son revealed it to his father, who, when he learned that he was not, as he had imagined, the supreme God, was converted and filled with fear, as it is written, 'The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.' The truth was then revealed to all the creatures in the Ogdoad. Similarly, the son of the second Archon learnt the truth from the son of the great Archon, and communicated it to his father. Similarly, the 365 heavens in the Hebdomad, with their ruler Abrasax, learnt the truth.† Thus the Gospel had come down through the Ogdoad and Hebdomad, and now it was fitting that it should reach the seed. And so it came upon Jesus the Son of Mary, and through Him redemption was effected. For within the seed all grades of existence were tangled together in confusion, so that it was necessary not only that the truth should be revealed, but that the various orders of being should be sorted into their proper classes. This was effected by the death of Jesus. The accounts of Jesus in the Gospels were received by Basilides as historical, and he was far from believing that the body of Christ was unreal. So far from that, it was an essential condition of the redemption He achieved that all the grades of existence which had to be sorted should be combined in Him, and then, by their separation in His experience, a similar separation should be effected throughout the seed. Thus, by His death the material element was removed and reverted to formlessness. After His resurrection He ascended through the Hebdomad, leaving His psychical part there; then through the Ogdoad and the Holy Spirit, leaving with each those parts which belonged to them; and finally rose to the region where the blessed Sonship dwells. The Third Sonship followed Jesus and passed through a similar process of purification, and then, refined like the First Sonship, ascended to the non-existent God. The same experience is repeated in the case of spiritual men who ascend to the Father.

When the three Sonships have been thus re-united, and all the spiritual have achieved their task in the world and followed Jesus and the Sonships to the non-existent God, then God will be merciful to creation and bring on all the realms from the Ogdoad downwards the Great Ignorance, so that no rank of being shall know of any rank superior to itself. For it is the nature of all creatures to long for that which is above them, and be tormented because they cannot attain it. But they do not know that the satisfaction of their desire would be fatal to

(*Ketzergeschichte*, p. 197) proposes to strike out *mundus* as a marginal gloss on *Caulacau*, and to read *ejus* for *esse* after *nomen*. This gives a smooth text. Harvey in his note retranslates the Latin as follows: ὸν τρόπον καὶ τὸν Κόσμον ὄνομα εἶναι, ἐν ᾧ, κ.τ.λ. This he then emends: ὸν τρόπον καὶ τὸ ἄκοσμον ὄνομα, ἐν ᾧ, κ.τ.λ., 'as also that the barbarous name in which the Saviour, as they say, descended and ascended, is Caulacau.' Whether we accept this very ingenious suggestion or that of Hilgenfeld makes no difference to the main point, which is that the Saviour in His descent and ascent bore the name *Caulacau*; Irenæus cannot have meant that the world bore this name, since in the following sentence it is clear that the name was that of the Saviour. The term was not confined to the Basilidians, but is said to have been found among the Ophites and Nicolaitans. Epiphanius derives it from קַו־לָקָו, 'line upon line,' in Is 28[10]. This is corroborated by a statement of Hippolytus, in which the names *Saulasau* and *Zeesar* are added. These obviously go back to the Hebrew words in the same passage, meaning 'precept upon precept' and 'here a little.' Bousset hesitates between this, which is the usual explanation, and the view that the term may have been a Gnostic loan-word to which the explanation was subsequently attached.

* The Sethians spoke of the pure Spirit which was between light and darkness as not like a wind, but like an odour of ointment or an incense. It is a mistake to lay any stress on this parallel, as Stähelin does. The point of the metaphor in the two cases is entirely different (see Drummond, *Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel*, p. 317); and Bousset points out (*Hauptprobleme*, p. 120) that it is quite a common Persian idea that the heavenly worlds are sweet-smelling, but the world of Ahriman is malodorous.

† It has been suggested that this section on 365 heavens, with their ruler Abrasax, does not properly belong to the system (see Uhlhorn, *Das basilid. System*, p. 65 f., and Hort, art. 'Abrasax' in *DCB*).

them, for they can live only in the conditions in which they are placed, and could not breathe the rarer atmospheres of the higher spheres. If, then, they remain content in their place, they will have eternal existence; but if they escape from it, they become corruptible. And thus, with this allocation of all orders of existence to the place fitted for them, and the ignorance of any superior order, and universal contentment, there will come the restitution of all things.

The fundamental difference between this system and that of some other Gnostic leaders, notably Valentinus, lies in its emphatic rejection of the principle of emanation. For this rejection there were two reasons. One was that the theory of emanation is gross and repulsive in its conception of God. The other was that the natural tendency of all being is upwards, not downwards. Since, then, the world at present displays a scene of terrible confusion, we must assume that its development started from a condition of things even worse than that which now prevails; hence the doctrine of the seed, in which everything is huddled together, from the pure Sonship down to the grossest matter, the goal of history being the establishment of all things in their proper rank. Valentinus, on the contrary, starts with the principle that evolution is degeneration. Each pair of Æons is inferior to its parent. The process continues till the catastrophe is possible, and the plunge over the precipice follows. Spirit sinks to psychical forms of existence, thence to the material, and lastly the limit is found in the diabolical. The evolutionary process has then to become revolutionary; but, though the spiritual may return to the pleroma, the psychical and material must remain outside. Thus Basilides leaps the gulf between the infinite and the finite, whereas Valentinus bridges it. It is quite clear that there was a polemical element in Basilides' scheme, and that it was elaborated in conscious antithesis to the popular theory of emanation. It is quite possible, as some consider, that Basilides had the system of Valentinus in mind, since they were probably both teaching at the same time in Alexandria. It is not at all necessary, however, to take this view, since, although Valentinus was probably the junior, he was the more conservative of the two, and was not the first to put forward the theory of emanation.

The doctrine of the triple Sonship is difficult, and we could have wished for fuller information as to its significance. In spite of the fact that the First Sonship is regarded as refined and the Second as gross, they do not stand for different orders of being, for both of them pass to the highest realm of all, and are therefore essentially spiritual in character. And the same is true of the Third Sonship, the parts which he leaves behind him being accretions foreign to his essential nature. Probably Basilides has been influenced by the fondness for triplicity, which is so characteristic of such schemes. He has also been influenced by the first chapter of Genesis. The connexion between the Second Sonship and the Holy Spirit, who is identified with the firmament, reminds one of 'the waters above the firmament' in the story of Creation, in which case we may perhaps identify the First Sonship with the light, which was the first to be created, and in comparison with the fineness of which the waters would seem coarse. But how in plain language the author would have interpreted the waters above the firmament we do not know. The Third Sonship is apparently the spiritual principle which is at present combined with the material universe.

The Ogdoad and Hebdomad, which are astronomical in their origin, are conceptions familiar in other Gnostic schemes. The duplication of the Archons is interesting. It corresponds in a measure to the position of Achamoth and Demiourgos in the system of Valentinus, though there are marked differences in detail. Historically considered, they represent two stages in the world's history. The great Archon reigned from Adam till Moses, the second Archon from the time of Moses onwards, and it was he who revealed himself to Moses and inspired the Hebrew prophets. The kindly and compassionate spirit which pervades the system is very noteworthy. This comes out especially in the doctrine of the Great Ignorance, which is intended to save the creature from fatal aspirations towards a sphere which lies above it. But there are other illustrations of it. The Second Sonship and the Holy Spirit give and receive mutual kindness. The Third Sonship remains within the seed, giving and receiving benefit. The ascent of the spiritual to their true home is delayed by their duty of training those who have to remain within the seed. No evil principle is recognized. There is no hostility on the part of the Archons to the supreme God. They reverently acquiesce in the revelation of their inferiority.

(*c*) If we now inquire as to the relative originality of the system as presented by Irenæus and that given by Hippolytus, the advantage seems to lie on the side of the latter. In the first place, Hippolytus, who often follows Irenæus, and had almost certainly done so in his earlier work on heresies, which is no longer extant, here deliberately abandons Irenæus' account and gives one entirely different. He must have thought that in doing so he had access to better information, and it is hazardous to suppose that he took no precautions to ensure that the new information was superior. Basilides was a famous teacher, his works were extant at the time, and it would have been quite easy to satisfy oneself as to which account should have the preference by going to the fountainhead. In the next place, Irenæus shows himself badly informed in several particulars. Hilgenfeld himself admits this, and infers from the vagueness of Irenæus' language that he knew nothing of the sect or its founder at first hand, and depended simply on his source, which he believes (in harmony with Lipsius' earlier but not his later view) to have been Justin's lost *Syntagma*. Some of the mistakes of Irenæus have already been pointed out, and they must damage the credit of his whole account. Again, the system as presented by Irenæus goes on very conventional lines. It is quite a commonplace presentation of ordinary Gnostic beliefs, and it is not easy to understand why Basilides gained his immense reputation if he was capable of nothing better than this. On the other hand, the system as set forth by Hippolytus is characterized by extraordinary speculative power, to which we must not be blinded by the fantastic elements in the detailed working out. With the account of Hippolytus before us, we can understand the impression Basilides made on the Church, and the vitality of the sect in spite of the fact that, apart from his son Isidore, he seems to have had no distinguished followers, such as adorned the school of Valentinus. We have no right to condemn the system on the ground that it does not follow the ordinary lines. When, for example, C. Schmidt says that the emanation theory is the characteristic mark of all Gnostic systems, the cardinal dogma of all Gnostic teaching, and that the evolutionary theory is incompatible with the nature of Gnosticism, and that on this account the presentation in Hippolytus is utterly untenable (*Gnost. Schriften in kopt. Sprache*, 1892, p. 423), this is simply an illegitimate assumption. There is no reason in the nature of things why Basilides could not have followed the line which Hippolytus ascribes to him. If to do so is to forfeit one's title to be a Gnostic, that is, after all, a matter of

terminology. Questions of this kind cannot be settled by *a priori* considerations.*

(*d*) The evidence supplied by Clement of Alexandria has naturally been claimed both by those who favour the representation in Irenæus and by those who accept that of Hippolytus. Owing to the limitation of the evidence of the *Stromata* to the ethical parts of the system, the metaphysical doctrines of the school are but slightly touched upon, so that Clement is not engaged with the same side of the system as Hippolytus or the speculative portions of Irenæus' account. It must be urged, however, against the latter, that in several points Irenæus is convicted of misstatement by Clement's evidence, whereas there is no actual conflict between Clement and Hippolytus, though it is not easy to unite their representations into a single coherent scheme. There is, however, a very striking parallel in Clement's reference to the Archon's amazement when the glad tidings were announced to him. This amazement was called 'fear,' and Clement tells us that Basilides interpreted it of the passage, 'The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.' It is very noteworthy that precisely the same interpretation is given by Hippolytus with reference to the great Archon's reception of the Gospel. Clement also attests the view that things must be discriminated into their classes and the various intervals or stages which are to be found in the universe. His description of an original disorder and confusion forcibly reminds us of the doctrine of the seed, though *τάραχος* is not perhaps the expression we should have thought most appropriate to Hippolytus' description. The points of contact with Irenæus are slight and general, and they are also points of contact with Hippolytus, for both speak of an Ogdoad and of an Archon. Even if Hippolytus were left out of account altogether, it would be very difficult to reconcile Irenæus with Clement. And several modern writers who entirely reject the account of Hippolytus hold that Irenæus does not present us with the pure Basilidian doctrine. We are therefore probably justified in any case in treating Irenæus as a secondary authority who employed a source which described a degenerate development of the school, far removed alike in speculative power and ethical elevation from the founder.

(*e*) We should be warranted in accepting the account of Hippolytus without further hesitation if it were not for the difficulty of harmonizing it with the quotation in the *Acts of Archelaus*. Probably we should not be justified in denying that the quotation is really a genuine extract from Basilides' work. We cannot confidently attach much weight to the author's view of Basilides' doctrine, since the quotation, so far as we have it in the complete work of Hegemonius, does not commit Basilides himself to the dualism it describes. Basilides turns from vain inquiries, apparently into Western opinions, to the views entertained by the barbarians, *i.e.* presumably the Persians. Then he quotes the opinion of some of them to the effect that there were two original self-existent first principles—light and darkness—leading their own life in ignorance of each other. When, however, they came to mutual knowledge, the darkness was seized by desire for the light and sought to mingle with it. The light, however, received nothing from the darkness nor desired it, but was simply affected with the wish to behold it, and did so as in a mirror. All then that the darkness received was not the true light, but a reflexion and semblance of the light. Unfortunately, the text at this point is corrupt, but possibly the meaning may be that the light tried to recover what had been taken by the darkness. In any case, this intermingling accounts for the fact that there is no perfect good in the world, since the good that was received at the beginning was so slight. Nevertheless, in virtue of this slender appearance of light, the creatures have been able to form the creation which we see. It is regrettable that the author considered it unnecessary to quote any further, for we should perhaps have been in a better position to discover how far his accusation of dualism was borne out by Basilides' own expression of opinion on the views which he reports. It is quite possible that the approximately Manichæan theory which is here put forward was quoted by Basilides because it had points of contact with his own system. It would be no easy task to harmonize this dualistic doctrine with the monistic system of the *Philosophumena*. But possibly Basilides may have felt that it illustrated his own view of the original confusion of all things in the seed and the process of disentanglement that was consequently necessary. In spite of the monism that characterizes the system as described by Hippolytus, there is a dualistic strain within it, and Basilides may have recognized an affinity with Persian dualism, even though he constructed his own system along other lines. It is significant, as testifying to such affinity with Persia, that Isidore wrote an exposition of the prophet Parchor, and Basilides is said to have named as his prophets Barcabbas and Barcoph. It is generally agreed that Barcoph is the same as Parchor. Isidore is also said to have accused Pherecydes of borrowing from the prophecy of Ham, *i.e.* probably Zoroaster. The question is difficult to decide, but, in view of the uncertainty which hangs over the passage of Hegemonius, we may perhaps still accept the account of Hippolytus as substantially accurate, though we must allow for misunderstanding and unskilful abridgment where Hippolytus explained the system, not by quotations, but in his own words.

(*f*) It remains to touch upon some of the points that are referred to by *Clement of Alexandria* and *Origen*. Clement tells us that Basilides taught that, in virtue of the original disorder and confusion, the rational soul received as appendages certain passions which are really spirits, and then other natures became attached to these, including animal properties, as well as qualities of plants, and even inanimate objects. Thus man's actions may be to some extent traced to the foreign elements which have adhered to the rational soul, the passions of irrational animals accounting for his lusts, and such a quality as hardness being derived from steel. This doctrine of the parasitic elements which have attached themselves to the soul reminds one to a certain extent of the modern conception of multiple personality, though, of course, there are obvious differences between the two. Clement illustrates this conception of man by the Trojan horse which embraced in one body so considerable a host. Isidore wrote a separate treatise on the parasitic soul. In this treatise he found it necessary to repudiate the inference that a man could rightly lay the blame for his ill deeds upon these foreign appendages. He does not retract the doctrine itself, but asserts that the

* Bousset considers that the *Philosophumena* presents us with a monistic transformation of the original system of Basilides. Accordingly, his remarks on the general thesis that the doctrine of emanation is a specific characteristic of Gnosticism are, quite apart from their intrinsic importance, very pertinent here, since they are not inspired by any prejudice in favour of Hippolytus' version: 'One is usually inclined to regard this thought of emanation as specifically characteristic of the Gnosis. I cannot discover that this is correct. It is found only in a few systems, and in none so pure as in the Basilidian. Everywhere else the stress lies, not on the thought of a gradual emanation and deterioration of the Æons, but on the sudden fall of one of these Æons (Barbelo Gnosis, Valentinianism). Accordingly, the question as to the origin of the idea of emanation is fairly irrelevant for the comprehension of the Gnosis' (*Hauptprobleme*, p. 329).

rational soul ought to be supreme and govern the inferior creation within, and that a man should not excuse his misdeeds by the plea that he was at the mercy of these foreign passions. This doctrine was probably connected with Basilides' theory of transmigration which is attested by Origen. In his *Com. on Romans* (bk. v.), Origen tells us that Basilides explained Ro 7^9, 'I was alive apart from the law once,' to mean that before St. Paul came into the body in which he then lived he had inhabited a form of body which was not under the law, *i.e.* the body of a beast or a bird. We must assume then that, at the first, inferior spirits clustered about the rational soul, but that in the course of transmigration it brought with it elements from the various types of creation in which its successive incarnations had been realized.

Basilides also considered, as we learn from Clement, that suffering invariably presupposes sin, since to affirm the suffering of the righteous would be to indict the morality of God. Even in the case of the martyrs he believed that this held good. They were really suffering for sins which they had committed either in an earlier state or in their present life. But by the mercy of God their punishment was allowed to take the form of martyrdom, so that it might seem to be honourable rather than disgraceful. Even infants suffered on account of the sinfulness of their nature, for sin does not lie in the act so much as in the disposition which prompts it, inasmuch as frequently the difference between one who has committed a sin and one who has not committed it lies simply in the fact that the latter has had no opportunity. Naturally, from the orthodox side the criticism was made that the suffering of Christ would, on Basilides' theory, imply His sinfulness. Such a conclusion Basilides would not evade, though it was obviously distasteful to him. He will say: 'He has not sinned, but was like a child suffering'; but if he were pressed further, he would reply: 'The man you name is man, but God is righteous, for no one is pure from pollution.' To Clement the doctrine that martyrdom was punishment for sin was so repugnant, that he accuses Basilides of deifying the devil. It is a mistake to interpret this in a dualistic sense. He simply means that Basilides attributes to God the torments of the martyrs which were really inflicted by the devil. In any case, one must admire the principle which animated Basilides' whole treatment of this subject, expressed in his great saying, 'I will assert anything rather than call Providence evil.' It may be added that Basilides affirmed that only involuntary sins and sins in ignorance could be forgiven. Clement also criticizes the necessitarian character of Basilides' ethics. A man's destiny was determined by election, according to which each creature was assigned to his proper rank in the scale of being. The election, strictly so called, was regarded as a stranger in this world, since it was hypercosmic by nature. In other words, that portion of mankind which is chosen to rise to the highest sphere cannot properly belong to the world from which it is destined to escape. Faith was held in high esteem by the Basilidians; and in this they were distinguished from the Valentinians, who exalted knowledge in comparison with it. They did not regard it, however, as a grace to be exercised by a man's free will, but as one which he possesses by nature. It was interpreted as the faculty of spiritual insight which penetrates behind the phenomenal and gives assent to the unseen.

3. Formative influences.—The uncertainty which hangs over the system of Basilides in general extends also to its sources. Those who accept the account of the *Philosophumena* generally recognize a marked influence from *Greek Philosophy*, but they do not follow Hippolytus in treating the system as substantially Aristotelian. They are divided, nevertheless, on the question whether this influence was derived from Stoicism or Platonism. It is, however, only what we should expect, that at the present day the Oriental affinities of the system should be emphasized. The greatest stress is naturally laid on *Zoroastrianism*, but a few scholars are convinced that *Indian influence* must also be invoked. Pfleiderer, for example, considers that the Basilidian doctrine of the restitution of all things has such surprising resemblances to the Indian doctrine of redemption that we can hardly avoid thinking of direct influence from it. Similar is the case with the doctrine of transmigration; while the doctrine of the parasitic passions finds a parallel in Buddhist psychology. Moreover, the exposition of the so-called will of God, quoted by Clement (*Strom.* iv. 12), that one should love all since all have relation to the whole, that man should desire nothing and that he should hate nothing, what is this, Pfleiderer asks, but the quintessence of Buddhist ethics? Accordingly, he thinks that the later form of Basilides' doctrine, which we learn from Hippolytus, Clement, and Origen, is to be traced back still more to Indian than to Greek influence. He explicitly sets aside the derivation from Stoicism which has found favour with several modern writers. The question of Indian influence can, of course, hardly be settled apart from the wider problem of the diffusion of Indian thought in the nearer East, and on this subject it is safest at present to keep the judgment in suspense.* Perhaps it will be best to recognize that many sources contributed to the philosophy. Basilides was indebted to earlier Gnostic systems, not necessarily to Valentinianism (which would have a dubious claim to priority), but to theories which were subsequently incorporated in it. These stimulated him in the way of antagonism even more than of acceptance. He had been influenced by the NT, though his treatment of it was vitiated by the allegorical method. He appears to have compiled a Gospel which contained portions of Matthew, Luke, and John, and possibly of Mark. He had also been influenced by the Epistle to the Romans. He was naturally indebted to Alexandrian eclecticism. It is by no means improbable that he was influenced by Platonism, though Stoicism seems to have contributed even more important elements. Finally, it is practically certain, for reasons already given, that, whether he had ever been in Persia or not, he owed a good deal to Zoroastrianism.

Apart from his son Isidore, Basilides had no disciples of distinction. His abstruse speculations as to the non-existent God, the universal seed, and the threefold sonship, were too exalted for many of his followers; and the system quickly experienced a moral and speculative degradation, probably under the influence of Valentinianism. We have no evidence for the existence of the sect beyond Egypt, where Epiphanius (xxiv. 1) found it flourishing towards the close of the 4th century. The statement made by Jerome (*Ep.* 75. 3; *ad Vigilant.* 6), that there were Basilidians in Spain in his time, is incorrect. They were Manichæans with Gnostic elements in their doctrine (see C. Schmidt, *Gnost. Schriften*, 562).

LITERATURE.—Much of the literature has already been mentioned. Reference is made to the system of Basilides in the various Church Histories and Histories of Doctrine. It is naturally much more thoroughly discussed in works on Gnosticism and Heresy generally. Of the older literature, special praise is due to Beausobre's discussion in his *Histoire de Manichée et du*

* Cf. what Harnack says as to the blending of religions: 'It is still a moot point of controversy whether India had any share in this, and, if so, to what extent; some connexion with India, however, does seem probable' (*Mission and Expansion*[2], Eng. tr. vol. i. p. 28). The whole subject is discussed by Clemen in his *Religionsgesch. Erklärung*, 1909.

Manichéisme, 1734–39, ii. 1-68. Lardner's discussion in his *History of Heretics*, 1780, rests a good deal on Beausobre.

Of the later literature the following may be mentioned: Neander, *Genet. Entwickl. der vornehmst. gnost. Systeme*, 1818, and *Church History*, Eng. tr. 1850–58; Gieseler, in *Hall. Allg. Ltztg.* 1824, p. 825 ff., and *SK*, 1830, p. 395 ff.; Baur, *Christl. Gnosis*, 1835, *History*, Eng. tr. 1879; Lipsius, *Gnosticismus*, 1860; Möller, *Gesch. der Kosmologie*, 1860; Mansel, *The Gnostic Heresies*, 1875; Hilgenfeld, *Ketzergesch. des Urchristentums*, 1884; King, *The Gnostics and their Remains*, 1887; Mead, *Fragments of a Faith Forgotten*, 1900; de Faye, *Introd. à l'étude du Gnosticisme*, Eng. tr. 1903; Bousset, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, 1907. The following special monographs have been devoted to the subject: Jacobi, *Basilidis Philosophi gnostici Sententias*, 1852; Uhlhorn, *Das Basilid. System*, 1855.

The controversy as to the trustworthiness of Hippolytus' account called forth a considerable number of publications, Hilgenfeld being specially active. We may mention among his discussions that in *Theol. Jahrbücher* (1856), his *Jüd. Apocalyptik* (1857), and articles in his *Ztschr. d. wissenschaftl. Theol.* for 1862 and 1878. His results are summed up in his *Ketzergeschichte*. On the other side may be mentioned Baur's discussion in the *Theol. Jahrbücher* for 1856, and the article by Jacobi, 'Das ursprüngl. Basilid. System,' in *Ztschr. f. Kirchengesch.*, 1877. Jacobi also contributed an article to *PRE*[2]. The article in *PRE*[3] by G. Krüger rules out the *Philosophumena*, and bases the account of the original system on Clement of Alexandria and the *Acts of Archelaus*. Irenæus being treated as secondary. Bousset takes the *Acts of Archelaus* as his main authority, and weaves in the fragmentary information we get from Clement of Alexandria. Pfleiderer's *Urchristentum*[2] (1902) recognizes two distinct stages in Basilides' theological development: the former, his Syrian stage, represented by Irenæus and Epiphanius; the latter, his Alexandrian stage, represented by Hippolytus, Clement, and Origen. This re-construction is extremely dubious, but it is at least interesting as showing that in Pfleiderer's judgment Clement of Alexandria supports the account of Hippolytus. The question of Indian origin is discussed by F. Kennedy in an article entitled 'Buddhist Gnosticisms: the System of Basilides' (*JRAS*, 1902). It should finally be added that English readers are fortunate in possessing the very valuable article by Hort in Smith-Wace's *DCB*, with which should be taken his articles on 'Abrasax' and 'Barcabbas and Barcoph' (*ib.*), and the chapter in J. Drummond's *Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel*, 1903. Works on the History of Philosophy usually contain some account of Basilides. A very interesting recent discussion may be seen in J. Watson's *Philosophical Basis of Religion*, 1907. A. S. PEAKE.

BASKET.—Two kinds of baskets must be considered as belonging to the service of the gods: the κανοῦν (κάνεον, κάναστρον, κάνιστρον, κανίσκιον, Lat. *canistrum*) and the κάλαθος. The κανοῦν is a flat broad basket, originally made of rush or cane (Aristoph. fr. 160 [Kock]; Pollux, vii. 176), and therefore to be derived from κάνα or κάννα (Lat. *canna*, cf. Koraïs in Heliod. *Æthiopica*, p. 114). At an early date the shape was imitated in metal: in bronze (Hom. *Il.* xi. 630) and in gold (Hom. *Od.* x. 355). The plaiting was clearly indicated in the metal (Athen. vi. 229[d]). Wooden κάνεα are recorded for his own time by Eustath. (*Od.* i. 141). This basket was used as a receptacle for bread and food to be served at meals (cf. Hom. *ll. cc.*). In the same vessel the meals were served to the gods; hence it was used for sacrifice. As an important passage describing a rite of archaic simplicity, compare Hom. *Od.* iv. 761, where Penelope pours οὐλοχύται, 'sacrificial barley' (cf. Ziehen, *Hermes*, xxxvii. 391 ff.; Stengel, *ib.* xxxviii. 38 ff.), into the basket for Athene before making a vow. A less important part is played by the κανοῦν with the οὐλαί in the sacrifice of a victim (Hom. *Od.* iii. 441 f.). On this occasion the sacrificial knife was placed for convenience (not as Ziehen supposes, *op. cit.* 398 f.) in the basket (Eur. *El.* 810 f., 1142; Aristoph. *Peace*, 948 + schol.). As the basket was a flat one, the expression 'to place the knife *on* the basket' was likewise used (Philostr. *Vita Apoll., init.*, cf. Stengel, *Herm.* xliii. 465, 1). The basket was adorned with sacred fillets (στέμματα, Aristoph. *l.c.*), and wreathed with sacred twigs (cf. Ov. *Met.* ii. 713, and, for the Attic Thargelia, Proclus on Hes. *Works and Days*, 767 [p. 419, Gaisford]; see also Dieterich, *ARW* viii. Usenerheft, p. 100, 1). Fillets and twigs are often visible on vase-paintings (cf. Hock, *Griech. Weihegebräuche*, p. 94). In Delphi, the sacrificial basket contained cake and incense (Æl. *Var. Hist.* xi. 5; Heliodor. *Æth.* iii. 2). The ritual of sacrifice was begun by the basket and the water for ablution, which closely belonged to it (Demosth. xxii. 78), being carried round the altar from left to right (Aristoph. *Peace*, 956 f.; Eur. *Her. Fur.* 926 f., cf. also Ziehen's opinion, *op. cit.* p. 400, 1). To get the sacrificial basket ready for the sacred action is expressed by ἐνάρχεσθαι κανοῦν (Eur. *El.* 1142, *Iph. Aul.* 1470; Æschin. *in Ctes.* 120; Menand. *Perik.* 346 f., *Sam.* 7; Poll. viii. 83). Stengel (*Herm.* xliii. 465) has misinterpreted the meaning of the expression by using the term 'to consecrate,' which does not suit here; the correct explanation is found in Abresch, *Animad. ad Æschyl.* i. 505 ff. (cf. also schol. Æschin. *l.c.*). That ἐνάρχεσθαι is not a sacred action is clearly shown in Menand. *Sam.* 7, where it is mentioned with house-cleaning and cake-baking, as preparation for the wedding. The use of more than one sacrificial basket is attested (Eur. *El.* 800). As a chief requisite at sacrifice (Aristoph. *Birds*, 43 + schol., 863; Pherecrates, fr. 137 [Kock]; Dittenberger, *Syll.*[2] 628, 23, from Eleusis), the κανοῦν is often found in temple-inventories. Cf. for the Parthenon, Michaelis, *Parthenon*, p. 259; and, *e.g.*, *IGA* i. p. 73, *a* 6, 10, etc. (two in gilt wood), ii. 668, 3 f. (in gilt bronze), 5 f. (*ib.*); 676, 45 f. (in bronze); 678, B 7 (1 large one, 20 'old' ones); 724, B 3 f. (in silver, dedicated to Asklepios) 5 ff. (silver, dedicated to Athene), ii. 5, 653, 15 (with wooden frame: ὑπόξυλον); 685, 2; 700*b*, B 32 (in bronze); κανᾶ χαλκᾶ πομπικά in the inventory of the Chalkotheke (Michaelis, *op. cit.* p. 307, 29; cf. *IGA* ii. 162, *ab.* 16). A basket dedicated to Demeter and Kore in Eleusis is mentioned in the statement of accounts of the ἐπιστάται Ἐλευσινόθεν of the year 329–8 (Dittenberger, *Syll.*[2] 587, 116; cf. *IGA* ii. 5, 767, *b* 62). A basket is spoken of in an inventory from Oropos (Amphiaraos) (*IGA* vii. 303, 55), from Thebes (*ib.* 2424, 13), from Ægina (Mnia and Auzesia), *IGA* iv. 1588, 5 f. (in bronze), 16 (9 rush-baskets, see above), 33 (small bronze basket), from Delos (Dittenberger, *Syll.*[2] 588, 93 (Apollo), 185 (in silver with silver handles dedicated to the Delian Apollo), 186 (a gilt one of upright shape [?]: ὀρθόν, with same dedication), 205 (the three latter out of the temple of Artemis), from Mitylene, *IGA* xii. 2, 13, 1 (κανῆια χρ[ύσια], golden baskets: 'inscriptionum templi Dianæ Thermiæ longe antiquissima'), from Didyma (Apollo) (*CIG*, 2855, 20). The shape of the sacrificial basket can be well observed in the very numerous sacrificial scenes; this, however, requires a special study. A handsome specimen is *Röm. Mitt.* v. 324; more examples are enumerated on p. 326, also in Michaelis, *Parthenon*, p. 259. It must be remarked here that the shape frequently designated as three-pointed is in fact four-pointed. In the present writer's opinion, Gisela Richter wrongly interprets the object held by a woman on a red-figured skyphos as being a sacrificial basket (*Amer. Journ. of Archæol.* xi. 423 ff.; *ib.* six similar examples); more probably the object depicted in *Arch. Zeit.* xxix., pl. 45 (cf. *Röm. Mitt. l.c.* p. 326 1) belongs to this class. An affinity seems to exist between the sacrificial basket and the object occurring on Mycenæan monuments, and known as 'horns of consecration' (cf. *e.g.* Evans, *Mycenæan Tree and Pillar Cult*, p. 3 (101), fig. 1; p. 44 (142), fig. 25; see Hub. Schmidt, *Berl. philol. Wochenschr.* 1898, p. 945; Hock, *Griech. Weihegebr.* p. 94, 3). A small Mycenæan clay basket with four rows of double axes (therefore sacred) has recently been found on the small island of Pseira near Crete (Pernier, *Ausonia*, i. 110; *Arch. Anz.* 1907, p. 109, cf. Bulle, 'Orchomenos,' *ABAW*, philos.-philol. Kl. xxiv. 2, p. 81, pl. xxviii. 15). The use of the basket during sacrifice led to its being

classed as a sacred thing. Hesych. (*s.v.* *λατριανίδες*) records that the Athenians covered their 'sacred baskets' (cf. *IGA* ii. 420, 10 f.). Perhaps Leacock (*de Pompis Græcis*, Harvard Stud. xi. 23) rightly connects the garment lying on the basket (*IGA* ii. 754, 29 f.) with this custom. As a sacred object the basket is touched by the Geraræ when they swear an oath to the Basilissa in front of the altar ([Demosth.] lix. 78, entirely misinterpreted by Gerhard, *Rhein. Mus.* xiii. 474* ff.).

If a solemn procession preceded the sacrifice, the basket was carried in it by a girl (*κανηφόρος*). Leacock's opinion (*loc. cit.* p. 12), that in private procession boys also carried the basket, finds no sufficient support in Aristoph. *Birds*, 850, 864. The *canephoros*, who was of good family (Philochorus *ap.* Harpocr. *s.v.*) and of virtuous demeanour (Aristoph. *Ach.* 253 f.; *CIG* 3602 f.; Ov. *Met.* ii. 711; Porphyr. *ad Hor. Serm.* i. 3, 10 f.), was rubbed over with flour (Aristoph. *Ekkl.* 732; Hermipp. fr. 26 [Kock]; Pfuhl, *de Athen. pompis sacris*, 22, 141) and richly adorned (Aristoph. *Ach.* 258, *Lys.* 1188 ff.; [Plut.] *X. Orat. vit.* p. 852^{b} + *IGA* ii. 162, *c* 10, with Kohler's remarks, cf. ii. 2, p. 98 ff.); behind her follows a *diphrophoros*, 'girl carrying a settle' (Aristoph. *Birds*, 1552, schol. 1551, *Ekkl.* 732 f.; Hesych. *s.v.*). Some of these reports may bear special reference to the Panathenæa (cf., for all, Pfuhl, *op. cit.* 20 ff.; Leacock, *loc. cit.* 9 ff.). As a preparation for the *pompe*, the *canephoros* took a cleansing bath in flowing water ([Plut.] *Amat. narr.* p. 771 f.). According to Menander's *Epitrep.* 221 ff., married women also participated as *canephoroi*, probably of Demeter (*τῆς θεοῦ*), after having abstained from cohabitation for three days (from Menander is derived Diogenianus, ii. 46; cf. Headlam, *Restorations of Menand.* p. 7). The simplest form of a procession with basket-bearing is shown by the Attic 'Dionysia in the Country' (Aristoph. *Ach.* 241 ff.). First comes the *canephoros*, then the *phallos*, and the rear is formed by Dicæopolis, at the same time the priest and the representative of the congregation (cf. *IGA* ii. 844, 15 ff.), while symbols of the gods seem to follow the basket (see Petersen, *Burgtempel d. Athenaia*, p. 81; there is a *canephoros* at the head of the procession on the black-figure vase-painting in Stengel, *Kultusalt.*^{2} pl. i. 4). Basket and *phallos* are found in the same order in the primitive form of the procession in the Great Dionysia, which were formed on the model of the Lesser Dionysia. In front of the basket were borne a jar of wine and a vine-twig, and a he-goat was led ([Plut.] *de Cupid. div.* p. 527^{d}, cf. Dioscorides, *Anth. Pal.* vii. 410, 3 f.)—the specifically Dionysian addition to the ancient phallic foundation. In the basket, which is carried by a man, there are figs; therefore, the present writer classes among references to the Great Dionysia the passage Aristoph. *Lys.* 646 f., where the basket-bearer wears a chain made of figs. This *canephoros* was more than ten years of age (*ib.* 643 ff.). Golden baskets with *ἀπαρχαὶ ἁπάντων* are recorded in schol. ad Aristoph. *Ach.* 242 = Suid. *s.v.* *κανοῦν*. The basket-bearers of the Great Dionysia were elected by the Archon Eponymos (*RA* xxv. 1873, 178; *IGA* ii. 420; for other basket-bearers of Dionysos, see *IGA* ii. 1388*b*, Add. p. 349; ii. 5, 318*b*, 32). At the Panathenæan festival a great number of basket-bearers participated. The orator Lycurgus procured amongst other things golden ornaments for 100 girls (*X. orat. v.* p. 852^{b}, cf. his speech *περὶ κανηφόρων*, Harpocrat. *s.v.*). On the frieze of the Parthenon numerous girls with and without implements are represented, who have rightly been recognized as basket-bearers (Pfuhl, *op. cit.* p. 20, 133); but it is not probable that the girls would carry the objects in their hands instead of in baskets on their heads for purely artistic reasons (Pfuhl, *op. cit.* p. 21, 137); we must give preference to Leacock's opinion (*loc. cit.* p. 14) that most of these girls were only basket-bearers *honoris causa*. The *κανοῦν* is held by the *hieropoios* (49, Michaelis), who has taken it over from the girl standing before him (the object seems to the present writer to be wrongly interpreted as a sacred chest by Frickenhaus, *Ath. Mitt.* xxxiii. 31, 1); the visible boring-holes seem to point to fillets (Michaelis, *op. cit.* p. 259); it is inadmissible to suppose the presence of other baskets (Robert, *GGA* clxi. 533 f.). Other references are the election of the basket-bearers by the Agonothetes (*IGA* ii. 5, 421*c d*, 51 f. [soon after B.C. 308]), and the inscription in honour of a Panathenaic *canephoros* (*IGA* ii. 1388). For the minor Panathenæa a number of basket-bearers is likewise recorded, who participated in the portions of sacrificial meat (Dittenberger, *Syll.*^{2} 634, 14 f.), and there are eleven statuettes of *canephoroi* (*κόραι ἀπὸ τῶν κανῶν*) in the inventory of the Parthenon (*IGA* ii. 678, B 45 f.). Moreover, basket-bearers are recorded in Athens for the following cults: three permanent *canephoroi* at the Palladion, inscribed on a seat of the Dionysos-theatre (*IGA* iii. 338); *canephoros* of Athene Soteira (?) (*IGA* ii. 1387); of the Pythian Apollo (*IGA* ii. 1388 [catalogues of basket-bearers, who participated in greater number in the Pythian State-embassy, on inscriptions, Colin, *Le Culte d'Apollon Pythien à Athènes*, Paris, 1905, p. 46, 87]); of the Eleusinia (*IGA* iii. 916 [a sunshade for this *pompe* is recorded, schol. Aristoph. *Birds*, 1508 = Suid. *s.v.* *σκιάδειον*]); of Asklepios (*IGA* iii. 921; cf. the *canephoros* of the Epidauria, *IGA* iii. 916); of Asklepios and Hygieia, used for dating, therefore annual (*IGA* ii. 1204); of the mother of the gods (*IGA* ii. 1388*b*, Add. p. 249); of Serapis (*Ephem. arch.* 1895, 102); of Isis (*IGA* ii. 1355); of Serapis and Isis (*IGA* iii. 923; cf. Rusch, *de Serapide et Iside in Græcia cultis*, p. 16). Basket-bearers of uncertain cults are found in *IGA* iii. 920, 922, 924; 920*a* (Add. p. 508). Basket-bearing of brides to Artemis is recorded in Theocrit. ii. 66 f. + schol., and a *canephoros* in the *pompe* of the Epaulia the day after the wedding, in *Arch. Jahrb.* xv. 151; cf. the *κανᾶ ν[υμφικά]*, *IGA* ii. 678 B, 9, ii. 5, 700*b* B, 25. There were basket-bearers in Bœotia (Lebadeia) of Zeus Basileus ([Plut.] *Amat. narr.* p. 771^{b}); at Delphi (Heliod. *Æth.* iii. 2); on Delos (cf. Schoeffer, 'de Deli insulæ rebus,' *Berliner Stud.* ix. 1, 240 f.) of Delia and Apollonia (cf. Nilsson, *Griech. Feste*, 145 f.; *BCH* iii. 379), of Apollo (Artemis and Leto) (*ib.* 380 f.), of Artemis (*BCH* xi. 262, 22), of Dionysos (*BCH* vi. 338, 41, 4, xxix. 239), of Serapis (Isis, Anubis, and Harpocrates) (*BCH* vii. 368, 18, 6), a basket-bearer of Isis used for dating (therefore annual, cf. Rusch, *op. cit.* p. 52) (*CIG* 2298), of the Egyptian gods (Rusch, *op. cit.* p. 51 n., 35, 2. 3, and the stones from the sanctuaries of these gods in Dittenberger, *Orientis Gr. Inscr.* 170, 8; *BCH* vi. 348, 74, 8), of the Syrian Aphrodite (and Apollo) (*BCH* vii. 368, 17 [the quotation, *BCH* vi. 346 added by Schoeffer, *op. cit.* p. 241, is not to be found]), of the same goddess used for dating (*Ἀθηναῖον*, iv. 462, 16); in the Troad of the Ilian Athene (*CIG* 3602 f.); in Pisidia (Termessos) of Artemis (*CIG* 4362); in Karia (Kasossos) of Zeus (*SWAW*, phil.-hist. Kl. cxxxii. 24, 4). Ptolemaios Philadelphos transferred the institution of the *canephoros* to the cult of Arsinoë Philadelphos (cf. Walter Otto, *Priester und Tempel im hellenistischen Aegypten*, ii. 266 f.). This *canephoros* is the oldest Alexandrian eponymous Ptolemaïc priestess, first recorded B.C. 267–6 (Otto, *op. cit.* i. 157, 3; a list of these basket-bearers, *ib.* 185 ff., ii. 324 f.). The same *canephoros* in Ptolemaïs is first recorded B.C. 183–2 (*ib.* i. 161 f., list, *ib.* 195, ii. 325 f.). Comedies entitled 'the cane

phoros' were written by Anaxandrides (Kock, ii. 143) and Menander (iii. 73). Two bronze statues of basket-bearers were made by Polykletos (Cic. *Verr.* iv. 5); a basket-bearer by Skopas (Plin. *HN* xxxvi. 25). Two basket-bearers are depicted on each side of a *thymiaterion* on a terra-cotta relief of the Collection Campana (Daremberg-Saglio, *s.v.* p. 877, fig. 1101, cf. Reinach, *Rép. de la stat.* i. 217, ii. 425 f.).

The *canistrum* (mostly of willow) was also plaited (cf. Isid. *Or.* xx. 9, 8; *Thesaur. l. l.* iii. 259), was broad and flat (Ov. *Fast.* ii. 650, *Met.* viii. 665), and was used as a receptacle for bread, food, fruit, flowers and liquids (specimens in silver, Serv. *Æn.* i. 706; Symm. *Ep.* ii. 81). The basket is rarely mentioned in Roman cult: at the Terminalia (Ov. *Fast.* ii. 650 [with fruit]), in private worship (Tibullus, i. 10, 27 [wreathed with myrtle-twigs, see above, p. 433ª])—both poetic passages perhaps under Greek influence. In scenes of sacrifice a kind of basket occasionally appears (Mau, *Pompeji*, p. 100). *Canistrariæ*, corresponding to *canephoroi*, are recorded only in Africa (*CIL* viii. 9321 [Cæsarea: of Ceres Aug. apparently] 9337, [*ib.*] 12919 [Carthage]); the *canistrariæ* of the *dea Cœlestis* in Rome likewise point to Africa (Dessau, *Inscr. Lat. Sel.* 4438). There are nine *canistrarii* of the same goddess (Cælestis Aug.) at Timgad (*Rev. arch.* x. 1907, 25). No connexion exists between the *canistrarii* and the *cannophori* (=*cannarum gestatores*) of the Great Mother in Milan, Ostia, Locri (cf. the *col*(*legium*) *canoforo*(*rum*) at Sæpinum, *CIL* ix. 2480); see Mommsen, *CIL* viii. p. 974 to n. 9337.

The *κάλαθος* (*καλαθίσκος*) originally served practical purposes as did the *κανοῦν*; it was used in the women's apartment (Aristoph. *Lys.* 579; Poll. x. 125) and as a receptacle for flowers and fruit (cf. *e.g.* Heliod. *Æth.* iii. 2; Eustath. *Od.* iv. 131; Reinach, *Répert. de la stat.* i. 76; Stephani, *Compt. rend. de S. Petersb.* 1865, 24, 1). Its form is that of a lily (Plin. *HN* xxi. 23). As a symbol of plenty the *calathos* is given as an attribute to Demeter and other goddesses in art (cf. Stephani, *l.c.* 25 f.; Daremberg-Saglio, *s.v.* p. 814). In the same capacity it figures in the cults of Demeter and Artemis. A *calathos* on a cart drawn by four white horses occurs in the Alexandrian Eleusis; the women taking part in the festival submitted to special regulations. It was forbidden to look inside the *calathos* (Callim. *h. Cer.* 1 ff., 120 ff.). This *calathos* is depicted on a bronze coin of Trajan (Daremberg-Saglio, i. p. 1071, fig. 1312). Usener (*Rhein. Mus.* l. 146) explained the procession, perhaps correctly, as a spring-festival, referring to Callim. *op. cit.* v. 121 ff., 136. The sheaf visible on the bronze coin is not necessarily a counter instance (Pringsheim, *Archæol. Beitr. zur Gesch. d. Eleusin. Kults*, p. 13 footnote). According to the schol. *ad loc.*, Ptolemaios Philadelphos took over the *pompe* from Attica. This is probably the case, for a *calathos*-festival of Demeter doubtless forms the basis of the confusion in schol. to Æsch. *in Ctes.* 120. That the *calathos* played a mystic part in the Eleusinian liturgy is shown in the formula cleverly interpreted by Dieterich (*Mithrasliturgie*, p. 125 f.). On the other hand, the basket of Kore must be regarded as a flower basket only (Rohde, *Kl. Schr.* ii. 361 f.). It is inadmissible to consider the seat of the Eleusinian image of Demeter as being a *calathos* in its origin (Nilsson, *Griech. Feste*, p. 350); we do not sit on open baskets. Nor is there any foundation for the derivation of the chest out of the *calathos* (*ib.*). A *calathos*-procession in honour of Demeter in Asia Minor is recorded on an inscription from the valley of the Kayster (*Ath. Mitt.* xx. 242), according to which a priest of Demeter presented a plaited *calathos*, and attended to the *ἀναφορά* of the *calathos*, which took place every year and was participated in by men chosen by lot. Eustath. (*Od.* ix. 247) records dancing *calathoi* for some festival of Demeter. This leads us to Artemis, for whose sanctuary on the Gygæan lake (not far from Sardis) the same record exists (Strabo, xiii. 626). The present writer considers Nilsson's supposition (*Gr. Feste*, p. 253) correct, that there were men inside the dancing *calathoi*, who thus imitated dæmonic *calathoi*. If really Helena was originally nothing but the mystic rush-basket of the Helenephoria (Poll. x. 191; Gruppe, *Griech. Mythol.* p. 163; his connecting the festival with the Brauronic cult [p. 56] is founded on a reading rejected by Kaibel, *Athen.* vi. 223ª), then here, too, we have a dæmonic basket. Possibly the sacred dance of the *calathoi* bears a distant affinity to the *calathiscos*-dance (Athen. xi. 267 f.; Poll. iv. 105; Hes. *s.v.*). Under the appellation *calathos* of Artemis (Bendis) a Bithynian spring-festival (Usener, *op. cit.* p. 145 f.) is recorded by Callinicus (*Vita Hypatii*, p. 96, ed. Bonn). For fifty days, while this festival lasted, no journey was undertaken. We must, therefore, suppose a procession of long duration, as in the cult of Liber of Lavinium (Augustine, *de Civ. Dei*, vii. 21). The Bithynian metrical inscription of the 1st cent. before or after Christ (*Ath. Mitt.* xxiv. p. 413, 13) is certainly closely connected with this procession. Here women are invited to follow the *calathos* in a special attire. The regulations for attire, whose existence this inscription indicates, point to an affinity to the cult of Demeter, but do not imply a dependence upon it (Nilsson, *op. cit.* p. 352); such regulations were common property (cf. Koerte, *Ath. Mitt. l.c.* 414 f.). The *calathos*-worship of Bithynia and Lydia is probably justly traced back by Nilsson (*op. cit.* p. 254 f.) to the Thraco-Phrygo-Bithynian cult of Bendis. About the Helena basket, which is related to the *calathos* of Artemis, see above. A basket in the worship of Dionysos must also be supposed to have had mystical significance (cf. Stat. *Theb.* iv. 378 and also the Pompeian painting in Daremberg-Saglio, i. 891, fig. 1124, where the basket is almost entirely covered, cf. above, p. 434ª). The *liknon* does not belong here (Gruppe, *Griech. Mythol.* p. 1172, footnote, erroneous, in the present writer's opinion). The figures bearing real *calathoi* on their heads are very difficult to class (cf. Stephani, *l.c.*, 1865, 27, 1). Significance in worship has thus far not been demonstrated (cf. Stephani, *l.c.* 26 f.). The connexion of the head-gear designated as *calathos* (first by Macrobius, i. 20, 13, and *passim*) with the real basket is equally uncertain. Primary forms can already be observed in the Mycenæan age (Thiersch, *Aegina*, p. 372). Demeter above all receives it as a symbol (also her servants; cf. Stephani, *l.c.* 21 ff., pl. i. 1, iii. 2. 3); then it is transferred to the chthonic deities, especially Serapis, and thence under Severus to the 'great god' of Odessos and the Thracian riding-god (Pick, *Arch. Jahrb.* xiii. 156, 165).

L. DEUBNER.

BASQUES.—The Basques, *Eskualdunac*,* are confined to the Provincias Vascongadas of Spain, part of Navarre, and a smaller section of the French Département des Basses Pyrénées. They number about 450,000 in Spain, and 150,000 in France—600,000 in all—*i.e.* less than the population of a second-rate capital. Thus we have only the fragment of a race, the *débris* of a language.

1. Language.—Of the vocabulary of the spoken Basque 70 per cent. is borrowed. The grammatical forms are so worn down that scarcely two grammarians agree in the analysis of them. The toponymy of ancient Spain shows that this race

* Leiçarraga (Pref. to NT, 1571) calls them *Heuscaldunac*, and their language *Heuscara*. Their name means 'Holders of Heuscara.'—[E. S. Dodgson.]

once covered the whole of the Peninsula as well as the Pyrenean slopes of Southern France.* This we consider proved, in spite of the objections of Prof. Vinson. Throughout this region we find inscriptions in characters still partly undeciphered, the so-called Celtiberian, or 'letras desconocidas' of Spain. They exhibit a difference of alphabet in different parts of Spain,† but are probably only dialects of one language spoken on both sides of the Pyrenees.‡ That this language is an earlier form of Basque is not yet thoroughly established, and would be denied by the above-mentioned writer.

2. Religion.—There is a like difficulty with regard to the religion of the ancient inhabitants of Spain. It is almost impossible to distinguish what belongs to each people or tribe. Strabo tells us that the morning star was worshipped under the strange title of 'lucem dubiam.'§ The Basque shepherds still call Venus at a certain time of the year *Art-izarra*,‖ 'the between star,' the star between night and day. Strabo also tells of dances in honour of an anonymous deity during the night of the full moon,¶ and of the immolation of goats, of captives, and of horses to Ares.** Silius Italicus speaks of a hatred of cremation, of corpses being left unburied in order to be eaten by birds and thus carried up to heaven, implying a belief in immortality of some kind.†† Iberian deities were assimilated and adopted into the Roman pantheon, like those of other peoples; the names of strange deities abound in the Latin inscriptions.‡‡ Some are certainly Celtic. The only ones that seem undoubtedly Basque are 'Deo Baicorix,' and 'Heraus-corrtsehe.'§§ Worship of nymphs, fountains, and trees appears to have been common in Basque-speaking countries. Classical authors mention the skill of the Iberians in augury.

3. Pre-historic remains.—The pre-historic remains and megalithic monuments of Spain and Southern France do not differ materially from those common to Western Europe. The exceptions are the so-called *Toros*, 'bulls,' of Guisando; though they are more often boars, sometimes calves, or horses. Some 3500 of them have been noted from fifty different localities. (There is only one of these in Basqueland, namely the pig at Durango, noted by Mr. Dodgson.) Several bear Latin sepulchral inscriptions of the Augustan age.* The synthesis of Oriental and Western religions began early in Spain. At Astorga we find the figure of an open hand, above, and on the palm Εις Ζευς Σεραπις Ιαω,† another in Portugal 'Serapi Pantheo.' The remains of the Cerro de los Santos in Murcia have a like character. Celtiberian, Greek, and Latin inscriptions are associated with coins of Constantine and Theodosius.‡

4. Name of God.—The name of God in modern Basque is *Jaungoiko*, *Jainko*, *Jeinko*, *Jinko*. The last three are considered to be dialectic contractions of the first. The meaning would be literally *Jaun*, 'the Lord *or* Master,' *goiko* 'of the Height.' *Jaun* is used in Basque like *Señor* in Spanish—applied to men as well as to God. But in the dialect of la Soule and Roncal *Gaiko* means 'the moon.' Here Basque scholars are again divided. Prince L. L. Bonaparte maintains that *Jaungoiko* is a contraction for *Jaungoikoa*, 'the Lord of the Moon.'§ Vinson holds that the 'Lord Moon' makes as good sense in mythology as 'the Lord of the Moon.' Both appeal to Strabo, the one to the phrases *ἀνωνύμῳ τινὶ θεῷ*, and *Ἔνιοι δὲ τοὺς Καλλαϊκοὺς ἀθέους φασί*, the other to *ταῖς πανσελήνοις νύκτωρ*.‖ The writings of the early Christian missionaries and Fathers and the *Acta Sanctorum* give us no help; they speak in a vague way of idolatry, but do not tell us what the idols were. Neither folklore, nor the popular drama, the Pastorales, nor the poetry helps us. The tales are all found elsewhere. The only peculiarity of the poetry is a fondness for allegory, which perhaps arises from thinking in a language which has few native abstract or collective terms, but expresses nearly everything in the concrete. We mentioned above the skill of the Iberians in augury. In the 16th and 17th centuries we have full accounts of a strange moral epidemic of witchcraft among the Basques; victims went to the stake confessing perfectly impossible crimes.¶

5. Religious dances and other customs.—Still the attitude of the Basques in ecclesiastical matters is very different from that of ordinary mediæval Christianity. Alone of Western Europeans they have preserved a whole series of manly dances from the time when dancing was an act of the highest ceremonial importance. We can notice only two of the series, the animal dances and the religious dances. The animal dances still preserved are: in la Soule, the *Hartz*, or bear dance, in which the

* Wilhelm von Humboldt, *Prüfung der Untersuchungen über Urbewohner Hispaniens vermittelst der vaskischen Sprache* (Berlin, 1821 [French tr. by A. Marrast, Paris, 1866]); Theodor Mommsen, *Röm. Gesch.*[4] vol. v. cap. ii. p. 72 (Berlin, 1894).

† Puyol y Campo, in *Boletin de la R. A. de la Historia*, vol. xvi. p. 321 (Madrid, 1890); Strabo, lib. iii. (cap. i. vol. i. p. 223, ed. Tauchnitz, 1829).

‡ *Monumenta Linguæ Ibericæ*, ed. Aemilius Hübner, p. cxli (Berlin, 1893).

§ Lib. iii. cap. ii. p. 225 (*ἣν καλοῦσι Λουκεμδουβίαν*).

‖ *Art-izarra* means the 'morning-star' at any time of the year. It is translated by *lucero, estrella del Norte*, i.e. 'morning-star,' 'day-star,' 'star of the North' in the *Dictionary* of Don Pedro Novia de Salcedo (Tolosa, 1902); and by 'belle étoile qui paraît à l'horizon, à l'est, annonçant l'aurore' in that of M. Salaberry (Bayonne, 1857). The syllable *art* here has (probably) nothing to do with *arte* meaning 'middle,' 'between,' but would be derived from *argitu*, 'enlightened,' like *arthatse* (Ac 5[21]) in Leiçarraga's New Testament of 1571, republished, with alterations, by the Trinitarian Bible Society of London in 1903 and 1908. Here *hatse* means 'beginning' and *art* is a contraction of *argitu*, 'brightened,' 'lighted,' or, just possibly, of *argi*, 'light,' with a euphonic *t* interpolated, as in other composite words. Thus the word means 'dawn' or 'beginning-of-light.'—[E.S.D.]

¶ Lib. iii. cap. iv. (vol. i. p. 263, ed. Tauchnitz, Leipzig, 1829).

** Lib. iii. cap. iii. p. 248.

†† Silius Italicus, *Punicorum*, iii. 340–343.

‡‡ *CIL*, vol. ii. (Berlin, 1869) 2598. IOM, Anderon, 2599. IOM, Candiedoni; so, on this side of the Pyrenees, Marti Lehernni, Minervæ Belisamæ, etc.

§§ Julien Sacaze, *Inscriptions antiques des Pyrénées*, Toulouse, 1892, Nos. 167, 210, 214, 344; I. F. Bladé, *Epigraphie antique de la Gascogne*, No. 166 (Bordeaux, 1885). In the inscription in the chapel of S. Mary Magdalene on the summit of a hill near Atheratze (Tardets), in La Soule, the name occurs thus

HERAVS
CORR†SE
HE.

The † rises above the other letters. Can it be a double T? Hübner thought it was for IT. *Herauscor* might mean 'inclined to talk ravingly, to trouble, to break, or to pulverize.' *Sehe* may stand for modern Basque *sehi*, 'servant,' possibly a Moorish word, as in *Seixes* at Seville. *Corri*, now *gorri*, when used without a prefix as a compound, means 'naked,' 'bare,' 'stripped,' and, in a secondary sense, 'red,' like the flesh of an animal which has been skinned. The whole inscription is

FANO
HERAUS
CORR†SE
HE-SACRVM
O VAL.VALE
RIANVS. [E.S.D.]

* D. Emilio Hübner, *La Arqueología de España*, p. 254 (Barcelona, 1888).

† *Boletín de la R. A. de la Historia*, tom. x. 242, xiv. 5667; *CIL* ii. No. 46. The Souletin Basques, when they dance on feast days, still cry *Yau*. Is it the Hebrew Jahweh, or is it the root of *yautzi*, meaning 'jump'?—[E.S.D.]

‡ *Discursos leídos ante la Academia de la Historia en la recepcion pública de D. J. de Dios de la Rada y Delgado* (Madrid, 1875); A. Engel, 'Rapport sur une Mission Archéologique en Espagne (1891),' in *Nouvelles Archives des Missions scientifiques et littéraires*, tom. iii. p. 197 (Paris, 1892).

§ A. Hovelacque, E. Picot, and J. Vinson, *Mélanges de Linguistique et d'Anthropologie*, p. 209 (Paris, 1880), and *The Academy*, 3 March 1877.

‖ Lib. iii. cap. iv. p. 263. But both are wrong. *Gaiko* is the Southern Basque equivalent of *gauko*, 'of the night.' The moon is considered in that part of Basqueland as 'the night-light.'—[E.S.D.]

¶ Pierre de Lancre, *Tableaux de l'inconstance des mauvais anges et démons* (Paris, 1612); D. J. A. Lorente, *Hist. Crit. de la Inquisición de España*, cap. xv. (Madrid, 1822); *Litteræ Societatis Jesu, Annorum duorum*, 1613, 1614, reprinted by Prof. Vinson in *Revue de Linguistique*, xxxiii. 209 (Paris, 1900).

lambs (*achouriac*) also appear; the *Zamalzain*, or horse dance, and the *Acheri*, or fox dance, in Guipúzcoa. These may suggest some early form of totem custom or worship.* The dance of the *seixes* at Seville is well known; but the habit of religious dancing was much more widely spread. In Aragon it survived till the end of the 19th century. It is still practised at Jaca, and existed till 1830 at Iholdy in the French Pays Basque.† Religious dances formed a prominent feature in the festivals which took place at Azpeitia on the canonization of Ignatius Loyola in 1622. They were objected to by some, but are warmly defended by the great Basque scholar and preacher, Manuel de Larramendi, who quotes largely from the OT and the Fathers in commendation of the practice.

Another custom which points back to some kind of offerings to or for the dead long survived among the Basques. Travellers in the 15th cent. were struck by the lighted tapers, and prayers said before tombs adorned with flowers.‡ Offerings to the priest at funerals formed the greater part of his income, and were almost incredible in amount. These were made at the tomb, after being offered to the priest in church. Wealthy people gave a pair of oxen, others one, or lambs and fowls. The oxen and sheep were led to the church porch, and there ransomed. The bread and the tapers were taken from the tomb and offered in the church at the reading of the Gospel. At length the civil authorities passed sumptuary laws to restrict these offerings, and they are gradually ceasing, although the Basques still carry candles to church and fix them in elaborate, and often very ancient, carved wooden taper-holders over the tombs of their parents who lie beneath the pavement of the church; the candles are lighted during mass.§ The lavishness of the Basques in offerings was noted by the Pilgrim of the 12th cent., who was otherwise most hostile to them:

'In decimis dandis legitimi, in oblationibus altarium assueti approbantur per unumquemque enim diem, dum ad ecclesiam Navarrus vadit, aut panis aut vini aut tritici aut alicujus substantiæ oblationem Deo facit.'‖

6. Civil laws.—In striking contrast with this generosity to the clergy in religious matters is the conduct of the Basques towards them in merely civil matters. The Basques are the most religious people in Spain.¶ The Englishman who knows their language best says: 'The Basques are fanatically Catholic, almost disagreeably religious, and detest Calvin as much as all loyal monarchists hate Oliver Cromwell, but with less cause.'** A writer not at all suspected of anti-clericalism remarks on this 'double caractère éminemment religieux et démocratique.'†† Bascle de Lagrèze, a decidedly clerical writer, points out that for a long time marriage was a purely civil act among the Basques: 'le For (*i.e.* el Fuero) n'exige aucune intervention du prêtre dans la célébration du mariage, qu'il considère comme un contrat civil.' Gradually the stipulation began to be made that the marriage should be solemnized 'segun el Fuero de la Iglesia' or 'segun la ley de Roma'; finally, marriage before the priest was alone valid.* It was the same with the administration of oaths, of judicial combats, and of ordeals.† The election of the clergy by the parishioners continued in some places down to the beginning of the 19th cent.‡ The rest of Church patronage was in the hands of the king, the nobles, and the municipalities. No bishop had a right to any part of the tithes in Guipúzcoa.§ But the peculiar attitude of the Basques towards the clergy is best seen in the elections to the *Juntas*, or local parliaments. No ecclesiastic could be a deputy, nor could he intervene in any civil or criminal case under any pretext whatever;‖ no priest, except those belonging to the place, might enter into the town where the *Junta* was sitting; in Tolosa any deputy seen talking to a priest before a session lost his vote for that day.¶ When, in 1477, Ferdinand the Catholic made a progress through Biscay, and tried to take with him the Bishop of Pamplona, he was obliged to send him back, and the Basques burnt the soil whereon the bishop had stood, and threw the ashes into the sea.** Later, in 1757, when Ferdinand VI., under the advice of the bishops, sent an order to the Cortes of Navarre to forbid the acting of plays, he was compelled to rescind it; the Cortes refused to obey the mandate of any bishops.†† This attitude towards the clergy in civil matters was persistently maintained down to the Revolution. The position of women was high among the Basques. Along with some other Pyrenean populations, they followed the rule of absolute primogeniture: the firstborn, whether male or female, inherited the ancestral property.‡‡ The marriage of the clergy lingered longer among the Basques than in other parts of Spain.§§ They alone have preserved the ancient order of deaconesses, the *Serorac*, with functions in some respects like those of elders in the Presbyterian Kirk of Scotland.‖‖ Yet, with all this jealousy of the ecclesiastical power in civil matters, it is from the Basques that Jesuitism, the most devoted militia of the Papal power, has sprung. Ignatius de Loyola and Francisco Xavier,¶¶ were typical Basques, the one a Guipúzcoan, the other a Navarrese; both retained some of their Basque habits and customs to the end of their lives, and the influence of these and Basque modes of thought can be traced in their writings. In this way this little people has influenced the course of religious history in the greater part of Europe since the 16th century.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the authorities cited above, see J. M. Pereira de Lima, *Iberos e Bascos*, Paris-Lisbon, 1902; Campbell, *Monumental Evidence of an Iberian Population of the British Islands*, Montreal, 1887.

WENTWORTH WEBSTER.

* Augustin Chaho, *Biarritz, entre les Pyrénées et l'Océan*, vol. ii. caps. xxxviii., xlii. (Bayonne, 1845); D. T. Ignacio de Iztueta, *Guipúzcoaco Dantza*, p. 13, *R. Baroja Donostian*, 1824; Manuel de Larramendi S. J., *Corografía de Guipúzcoa*, pp. 201–245.

† Eskualduna, *Le Manuscrit du vieux curé*, 1 Dec. 1898. It still exists at Deva, in Guipúzcoa, on the feast of San Roque.—[E.S.D.]

‡ J. J. Riaño, *Viajes de Extranjeros por España en el Siglo xv.* (Madrid, 1879).

§ Larramendi, *Corografía*, p. 194: 'No es creible, si no se ve el mucho pan y cera que se ofrece'; D. Pablo de Gorosabel, *Noticias de las cosas memorables de Guipúzcoa*, tom. iv. lib. viii. cap. 4, sec. 4 (Tolosa, 1900).

‖ *Codex de Saint-Jacques-de-Compostelle*, p. 18.

¶ Dom Pierdait, in *Revue du Clergé français*, tom. xxv. p. 625, 15 Feb. 1901.

** E. Spencer Dodgson, *Venoms Antidote, being a reply to Dr. Schuchardt's Criticism*, p. 39 (privately printed, 1901).

†† Ch. Bernadou, *Les Fêtes de la Tradition Basque à St. Jean de Luz*, 1897, p. 44 f. (Bayonne, 1897).

* G. B. de Lagrèze, *La Navarre française*, vol. ii. pp. 168, 181 (Paris, 1882).

† *Fuero Général de Navarre*, lib. v. tit. iii.-vi. (Pamplona, 1869).

‡ Larramendi, *Corografía de Guipúzcoa*, p. 109 f.; *Diccionario Geografico-Historico de España*, sec. i. t. i. *s.vv.* 'Adios,' 'Alquiza,' and *passim* (Madrid, 1802).

§ Larramendi, *op. cit.* p. 109.

‖ *Fueros de Guipúzcoa*, tit. xxvi. cap. iv. (re-impression, Tolosa, 1867).

¶ Ch. Bernadou, *Les Fêtes de la Tradition Basque*, p. 44 f.

** John Talbot Dillon, *The History of the Reign of Peter the Cruel, King of Castille and Leon*, vol. i., Preface xxii.-xxv.; Don Juan Margarit (el Gerundense), 'Paralipomenon Hispaniæ,' in Andreas Schott's *Hispaniæ illustratæ*, 4 vols. (Frankfort, 1603–8): 'illiusque cineres . . . in mare projecerunt.'

†† *Quaderno de las Leyes y Agravios reparados del año de 1757, Ley* xxvii. p. 69 (Pamplona, 1758).

‡‡ G. B. de Lagrèze, *La Navarre française*, vol. ii. p. 210, *Histoire du droit dans les Pyrénées*, p. 182 (Paris, 1867).

§§ Council of Valladolid, 1322; H. C. Lea, *An Historical Sketch of Sacerdotal Celibacy*[2], p. 310 (Boston, 1884).

‖‖ Larramendi, *op. cit.* p. 113 ff.

¶¶ Echeverri = 'house new' = Newhouse, viz. Echaverri, Chaverri, Chaver, Xavier. These variations, and several more, are found in Navarre.

BAṬESAR.—A town situated on the right bank of the river Jumnā, in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, in Northern India, lat. 26° 56′ 6″ N.; long. 78° 35′ 7″ E. It is important as the scene of a popular bathing and trading fair held on the last day of the month Kārttik (October–November). The place takes its name from the worship of Śiva in his form as Vaṭeśvaranātha, 'lord of the sacred banyan tree (*vaṭa*).' The present temple was built by one of the Rājās of Bhadāvar in A.D. 1646. In earlier times the place was known as Sūryapura, 'city of the sun'; the ruins of the old town are still visible near the present site.

LITERATURE.—Cunningham, *Archæological Reports*, iv. 221 ff., vii. 5 ff. W. CROOKE.

BATH, BATHING.—See PURIFICATION.

BĀWARIYA (probably derived from Hindī *bāṅvar*, Skr. *bhramara*, 'a creeper,' in the sense of a noose made originally from some vegetable fibre, and used in snaring and trapping animals).—A criminal and hunting tribe of Dravidian origin, found in Northern India to the number of 30,321, of whom the great majority inhabit the Panjāb. Here they worship the Mother-goddess under the title of Kālī-Bhavānī, and the local saint Gūgā under the name of Zāhir Dīvān (Crooke, *Popular Religion and Folk-lore*, i. 211 f.). Farther west they specially worship Dūlhā Deo, the bridegroom-god who is invoked at marriages (*ib.* i. 119 f.). A burnt-offering is made with butter, and water is poured on the floor of the house in his honour. They also worship a deified ascetic named Siṁha Bābā, a member of the Nānakshāhī Sikh sect of Faqīrs. It is possible that they may be a branch of the important Bauri caste, which, to the number of 735,937, is found chiefly in Bengal (Risley, *Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, i. 78 ff.). The connexion of this tribe with Hinduism is of the slightest kind. Their chief objects of worship are Manasā, the snake-goddess, Mānsingh, a local village-god, and Bar Pahārī, the mountain-deity, which is only another form of Marang Buru, the hill-god of the Santāls and other Dravidian tribes.

'Pigs, fowls, rice, sugar, and ghee are offered to Kudrasinī, on Saturdays and Sundays at the Akhrā or dancing-place of the village, through a Bauri priest, who abstains from flesh or fish on the day preceding the sacrifice. The priest gets as his fee the fowls that are offered and the head or leg of the pig; the worshippers eat the rest.' They do not employ Brāhmans, their religious duties being performed by a member of the tribe or by the headman. In some places they bury the dead face downwards, the object 'being to prevent the spirit from getting out and giving trouble to the living' (Risley, *ib.* i. 80 f.).

LITERATURE.—For the true Bāwariyas, J. Wilson, *Settlement Report of the Sirsa District*, 1886, p. 123; Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, 1896, i. 228 ff. W. CROOKE.

BAXTER.—

1. **Life.**—Richard Baxter was born on 12th November 1615. His father was Richard Baxter of Eaton-Constantine, in Shropshire; and his mother, Beatrice Adeney of Rowton, in the same county. The elder Baxter had been addicted to gambling, but by the time his son was born he had become a changed man, and it was to his father's instruction and example that Baxter was mainly indebted for his earliest religious impressions. His mother died in 1634, and his father married again.

Baxter's early education was entrusted to worthless and incompetent tutors. At length he was placed under the tuition of Mr. John Owen, master of the Free School of Wroxeter, who instructed him in classics and prepared him for the University. To the University, however, he was never sent. He was placed instead under a clergyman at Ludlow, from whom he profited little in learning, but with whom he had the run of a great library, and became a passionate reader of books. He came early under religious impressions. Other books touched his conscience, and awakened in him the sense of Divine things; but *The Bruised Reed*, by Dr. Richard Sibbes, seems first to have shown him, when a lad of fifteen, the greatness of the love of God and the freeness of the redemption of Christ. From his youth in his father's house he was deeply read in the Scriptures. It was within the Church of England that Baxter was baptized, confirmed, and ordained to the ministry. Though he was ejected with two thousand more in 1662, and cast in his lot with the Presbyterians, to the end he regarded his orders as derived from her, and to the very close of his life, like other moderate Presbyterians, he followed the practice of occasional Communion in her churches. What would have been for other men an insuperable barrier to either bodily or mental activity and to a career of usefulness in any calling, was the lack of physical stamina and even of ordinary health all through life. 'Never,' says Sir James Stephen, 'was the alliance of soul and body formed on terms of greater inequality than in Baxter's person. . . . The mournful list of his chronic diseases renders almost miraculous the mental vigour which bore him through exertions resembling those of a disembodied spirit' (*Essays in Ecclesiastical Biography*, p. 361). He nevertheless lived to the age of seventy-six, and his labours as a preacher, a pastor, and an author were herculean.

In 1638 Baxter was offered the headmastership of the Endowed School at Dudley, and took orders to qualify him to hold the appointment. In 1640 he was called to Kidderminster to occupy the place of an incompetent vicar, and with Kidderminster his name was henceforward to be associated as Samuel Rutherford's with Anwoth, or Thomas Boston's with Etārick. His ministry, however, was seriously interrupted by the Civil Wars, in which he took the side of the Parliament, though he had no sympathy with those who proceeded to put the King to death and to overturn the throne. He laboured incessantly for the good of the soldiers of Cromwell's army, and had interviews and discussions on religious and political questions with the Lord General himself. His labours, however, proved too much for his strength, and it was when suffering from one of his dangerous illnesses about this time that he conceived *The Saints' Everlasting Rest*. Before he had completed this, his first work, he was back to his pastorate in Kidderminster, where he remained till 1660.

His ministry here fell mostly within the period of the Commonwealth, when a state of anarchy prevailed in the Church of England. Cromwell's religious establishment did not deserve the name of a Church; it repudiated Prelacy without enforcing Presbyterianism or recognizing Congregationalism. One object of his government was the purification of the ministry. For this end he set up an Ecclesiastical Commission, called the Committee of Triers, including Presbyterians, Congregationalists, and Baptists, who examined presentees and sanctioned appointments to parishes. Baxter had no love for this body any more than he had for Cromwell, but he rejoiced in the growing spirituality of the ministry and the marked spread of vital religion amongst the people in the days of the Commonwealth.

On the death of Cromwell, Baxter joined with the Presbyterians on both sides of the Border in working for the overthrow of the Commonwealth and the restoration of the Monarchy. He had now taken farewell of Kidderminster, and was appointed one of the King's chaplains. The King even offered him through Clarendon, the Lord Chancellor, the See of Hereford, but he declined the honour. He would have been content to return to Kidderminster as a humble curate, but this was denied him, and when the Act of Uniformity, on 24th August (St. Bartholomew's Day) 1662, silenced over two thousand of the most earnest ministers, and deprived them of their livings, Baxter's formal ministry within the Church of England came to an end. He signalized the event by entering into the married state; and his wife, Margaret Charlton, proved a real helpmeet to him.

Meanwhile penal legislation against the Nonconformists became more exacting and severe. It became a crime to attend a dissenting place of worship. Those ministers who would not take the test were prohibited from coming within five miles of any town which was represented in Parliament, or any town where they had resided as ministers. Baxter got into trouble on both counts; and neither the favour of the King nor the friendship of Sir Matthew Hale, Lord Chief Justice, availed to save him from fine and imprisonment.

In 1681 Baxter lost by death both his wife and his stepmother, who had lived to the age of ninety-six, and troubles thickened around the desolate man. But, as he says, he 'never wanted less what man can give than when men had taken all away,' and so, preaching as often as he found liberty and opportunity, and producing theological treatises one after another without intermission, he survived to experience the dark days of James II. and the brighter days of the Revolution Settlement under William and Mary. In the former reign, when weighed down with age and infirmities, he was brought before the infamous Chief Justice Jeffreys, and under sentence by him would have lain in prison till death had not the King remitted his fine. In the Revolution of 1688 he was too feeble to take any part. At length death, with whose approaches he had been long familiar, came upon him in stern reality, and on 8th December 1691 he passed to the saints' everlasting rest.

2. **Works and influence.**—Baxter was a most prolific author, perhaps the most voluminous theological writer in the English language. From the time when he first discovered his powers and wrote *The Saints' Everlasting Rest*, scarcely a year passed without several works from his pen. Even at Kidderminster, with its many claims, he regarded his labours in the pulpit and congregation as a recreation, and threw his strength into his writings. The reading displayed in them, the

correspondence to which they frequently led, and the diversity of subjects which they embrace, illustrate the extraordinary versatility of the man and the indefatigable diligence with which he toiled. It has been suggested that he never recast a sentence, and never bestowed a thought on its rhythm and the balance of its parts; and his extraordinary productiveness as a writer as well as his own statements make it certain he did not. No fewer than one hundred and sixty-eight treatises came from his hand, many of them filling volumes. Most of them are now forgotten, but some of them are classics of evangelical religion which his countrymen would not willingly let die. When Boswell asked Dr. Samuel Johnson what works of Richard Baxter he should read, he received for answer, 'Read any of them, for they are all good.'

Mr. Orme, the editor of the standard edition of Baxter's works, classifies them under the following heads:—Works on the Evidences of Religion; on the Doctrines of Religion; on Conversion; on Christian Experience; on Christian Ethics; on Catholic Communion; on Nonconformity; on Popery; on Anti-Romanism; on the Baptist, Quaker, and Millenarian Controversies; Historical and Political Works; Devotional, Expository, and Poetical Works. The cast of Baxter's mind was eminently speculative and inquiring, and any question of the Schools which met him in the course of an argument had for him an irresistible fascination, and received instant and perhaps prolonged attention. But such was his satisfaction in the great truths of revealed religion and his conviction of their absolute certitude—won through experience as well as ratiocination—that he shirks no difficulty, shrinks from no combat, and grudges no pains, if only he can place his readers—even though it be through divisions and subdivisions of argument and proof—upon the same rock of assured conviction as himself. Of his numerous works there are at least three which are still in demand, and, after two centuries and a half, seem destined to live on. These are *The Saints' Everlasting Rest*, *The Call to the Unconverted*, and *The Reformed Pastor*.

The first of these, the first considerable work which he produced, is the masterpiece with which his name is associated. It was published in 1650, having been conceived and for the most part written towards the close of the Civil War. The title-page of the original edition bears that it was 'written by the author for his own use, in the time of his languishing, when God took him off from all public employment.' He was at the time the guest of Sir Thomas Rouse in Worcestershire, and away from his books. 'The marginal citations,' he explains, 'I put in after I came home to my books, but almost all the book itself was written when I had no book but a Bible and a Concordance; and I found that the transcript of the heart hath the greatest force on the hearts of others.' It is a work almost of inspiration, certainly of spontaneous birth, like *The Pilgrim's Progress*, or *The Imitation of Christ*; and though the two volumes, comprising in Orme's edition more than a thousand pages, are beyond the powers or the patience of most readers, the popular abridgments leave out much that gives reality and pathos in the complete work. In a volume of St. James's Lectures (1875, Lect. iv.) on *Companions of the Devout Life*, the late Archbishop Trench, a master both in literary taste and in theology, has given a remarkable appreciation of 'Baxter and The Saints' Rest.'

'There reigns in Baxter's writings, and not least in "The Saints' Rest," a robust and masculine eloquence; nor do these want from time to time rare and unsought felicities of language, which once heard can scarcely be forgotten. In regard, indeed, to the choice of words, the book might have been written yesterday. There is hardly one which has become obsolete; hardly one which has drifted away from the meaning which it has in his writings. This may not be a great matter; but it argues a rare insight, conscious or unconscious, into all that was truest, into all which was furthest removed from affectation and untruthfulness in the language that after more than two hundred years so it should be; and we may recognize here an element not to be overlooked, of the abiding popularity of the book' (*Companions of the Devout Life*, p. 88 f.).

In the work itself Baxter first dwells upon the excellence of the 'Rest,' and then characteristically sets himself to prove the infallibility and Divine origin of the Holy Scripture in which it is promised, thus contributing an able treatise on Christian evidences. The ground having been firmly established, he develops the uses of the Doctrine of Rest, and concludes with a directory for the getting and keeping of the heart in heaven. The work abounds in fervent appeals and felicitous phrases and striking similitudes.

The Call to the Unconverted appears to be the substance of a sermon which Baxter had preached from the well-known text in Ezk 33[11] 'Turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways; for why will ye die, O house of Israel?' Next to the *Saints' Rest* it was the most successful and most greatly used of all his publications. In his lifetime it had the distinction of being translated by John Eliot into the language of the Massachusetts Indians (1664), and it has passed through editions well-nigh innumerable, and been translated into most of the European languages. It has been compared in its character and influence with Law's *Serious Call* and Joseph Alleine's *Alarm*; but it is simpler in its teaching than the one, and more tender and kindly in spirit than the other. It breathes a spirit of intense earnestness, and, though its language would not now be used in its entirety in pulpit address, the fervour and force of its reasoned appeal to the understanding and the heart are as powerful as ever.

Gildas Salvianus: The Reformed Pastor is one of the classics of pastoral theology. Dr. Shedd, in his *Homiletics and Pastoral Theology*, recommends ministers to read it through once a year; and Principal Oswald Dykes (*The Christian Minister*, p. 49) describes it as one of the most searching and widely helpful books in English literature on its subject. The second chapter, and especially the pages devoted to pastoral oversight (vol. xiv. pp. 96–114), are replete with maxims and counsels of sanctified wisdom and practical good sense, the outcome of long and intimate acquaintance with the duties of the pastor's office. Both in its original and in its abridged forms *The Reformed Pastor* has had a very wide circulation.

No one can read Baxter's writings without perceiving that he has in him the soul of true poetry. His occasional quotations and references to George Herbert reveal sympathies in this direction. But he was too intensely in earnest and too absorbed in his various labours to master the technique of the poet's art, or to take pains with niceties and refinements of versification. A small volume of 'Poetical Fragments' is, however, included among his works, and at least one of his pieces, 'Lord, it belongs not to my care,' has found its way into hymnals for congregational praise.

The influence of Richard Baxter exerted from the pulpit, as well as by his works during his lifetime, must have been great. His power and fervour in the pulpit were unique in an age of great preachers, and he exemplified his own lines in a most literal sense, for

> 'He preached, as never sure to preach again,
> And as a dying man to dying men.'

In a time of ecclesiastical anxiety and strife, he strove to be a peacemaker. Schemes of a comprehensive union of all who truly loved the Lord and held fast by the essentials of Christian truth and experience, like those of John Durie and

Archbishop Ussher, had in him, in season and out of season, a steadfast supporter. If his combative turn of mind and his fondness for precise definition did not allow him to see much success in his unflagging efforts for union among Christians, he laboured long and patiently to earn the blessing of the peacemakers. In one important sphere, not recognized in that age of theological controversy as it is now, he was a pioneer. He was firmly convinced of the Christian obligation to evangelize the world. He was a warm supporter of John Eliot, the Apostle of the Indians, and it is to Baxter more than any other that the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel owes its charter. If we cannot trace the great Evangelical Revival at the close of the 18th cent. directly to Baxter, we know that his works influenced some of the most prominent members of the Clapham sect, and helped to sustain the fervour of many of the leaders of that movement.

LITERATURE.—There is an excellent edition of Baxter's practical works by William Orme in 23 vols., London, 1830, upon which Sir James Stephen's famous essay is based. There is an edition of the 'Poetical Fragments' by Pickering, London, 1829. In the notice in the *Dictionary of National Biography*, and in a volume of *Representative Nonconformists*, A. B. Grosart has dealt fully with Baxter's life and works. In the early chapters of Macaulay's *History of England* there are appreciative notices of Baxter, and also in J. Stoughton's *Religion in England*, 1878, ii. 180–186; see also F. J. Powicke, 'Baxter as a Catholic Christian,' in *Prim. Meth. Quart. Rev.*, April 1909. See also end of § 3. THOMAS NICOL.

3. Distinctive doctrine.—In Baxter's *Confession of Faith* he sets forth three parallel columns; on one side 'Antinomianism,' on the other the doctrine of 'Papists and others in the Contrary Extream,' and in the centre 'Truth,' 'that which I take to be both the Truth and the Doctrine of the Reformed Churches.' This table is significant. The key to Baxter's doctrinal position is to be found in the fact that he always endeavoured to avoid the falsehood of extremes, and to find truth and harmony in the golden mean. He wished to be a son of peace in theology no less than in ecclesiastical affairs. His *Catholic Theology* is entitled 'Plain, Pure, Peaceable, for Pacification of the Dogmatical Word Warriors,' and consists of three books: 'Pacifying Principles,' 'Dialogues,' and 'Disputations.' He waged war to restore peace. *Ex bello pax* was his motto; and even when he attacked opponents with the polemical acrimony of the time, in keen words for which he afterwards expressed regret, it was always with the aim of maintaining some central position which he firmly believed would reconcile the hostile parties. The immediate result was that he was fiercely assailed from both sides, and became 'a butt for every man to shoot at.' The Arminians rejected him as a Calvinist, while the Calvinists denounced him as an Arminian; he was called in turn a Papist, a Quaker, and even a Socinian. But he appealed to posterity for vindication 'when sad experience hath taught men to hate Theological Logical Wars, and to love, and seek, and call for Peace'; and the broader vision of the present age, which has learnt his love of unity and concord, will appreciate his anxiety to do justice to both sides. Dean Stanley ranked Baxter with Anselm as a great Christian thinker, and Dr. Benjamin Jowett in Westminster Abbey called him 'one of the greatest of Englishmen not only of his own time but of any time.' He always sought to draw forth the measure of truth which lay at the heart of an extreme or erroneous doctrine. He tried to harmonize Divine destiny with moral freedom; he granted that the Romanist was right in insisting on the necessity of good works, and the Quaker in maintaining the reality of the Inner Light, and the Socinian in upholding the claims of reason. His own general position was certainly that of a moderate and liberal Calvinist, for he gave unstinted praise to the Shorter Catechism ('the best catechism I ever saw yet'), and he assented to the decisions of the Synod of Dort, but his exact views on controverted questions are often difficult to define. His subtle intellect revelled in fine-spun distinctions; he modified, explained, and made concessions for the sake of conciliation; and his views expanded and mellowed with the advance of time. The following are, however, some of his most characteristic doctrines.

(*a*) On *the Atonement* he held in the main the modern Evangelical view:

'It is not God but man that lost his goodness; nor is it necessary to our reparation that a change be made on Him but on us. Christ came not into the world to make God better, but to make us better. Nor did He die to make God more disposed to do good, but to dispose us to receive it. . . . (Christ's) purpose was not actually to change the mind of God nor to incline Him to have mercy who before was disinclined, but to make the pardon of man's sin a thing convenient for the Righteous and Holy Governor to bestow, without any impeachment of the honour of His wisdom, holiness, and justice, yea, to the more eminent glorifying of them all.' 'Christ came not to possess God with any false opinion of us, nor is He such a physician as to perform but a supposed cure; He came not to persuade His Father to judge us well, because He is well. We must bear His own image and be holy as He is holy, before He can approve us or love us in complacency. This is the work of our blessed Redeemer to make man fit for God's approbation and delight.' 'Christ could not possibly take upon Himself the numerical guilt which lay on us, nor yet a guilt of the same sort' (*Confession of Faith*, Preface).

(*b*) *Extent of Redemption.*—'Christ died for all, but not for all alike or equally: this is, He intended good for all, but not an equal good' (*End of Controversies*). The sacrifice was for the sins of all in the sense that all should have a conditional promise or gift of life by the merits of it.

(*c*) *Justification.*—'Justifying faith is not the reception of the knowledge or sense of our former justification, but it is the true belief of the Gospel and the sincere acceptance of Christ' (*Conf. of Faith*). Baxter held that faith is what is imputed for righteousness, because faith contains the germ of sincere obedience to Christ. He seems to place regeneration in time before justification. 'He regenerates that He may pardon.' He lays the greatest stress on the necessity of repentance for justification, and, indeed, seems to aim at combining the Roman and Reformed doctrines.

(*d*) *Grace.*—Baxter believed in a common grace bestowed on all mankind, which, if improved, would lead on to sufficient and effectual grace, but even sufficient grace might be resisted and rendered ineffectual (Pref. to *Conf. of Faith*).

(*e*) *Election.*—He accepted election, but not reprobation, for God is the cause of grace but not of sin.

(*f*) *Immanence of God.*—Baxter's doctrine is profound and discriminating:

'As all being is originally from God, so there is continual Divine causation of creatures without which they would all cease, or be annihilated, which some call a continued creation, and some an emanation.' 'The beams do not more depend on the sun, or light or heat or motion on the sun; or the branches, fruit and leaves more depend on the tree, than the creation on God. But yet these are not parts of God as the fruit and leaves are of the tree, but they are creatures because God's emanation or causation is creation, causing the whole being of the effect.'

(*g*) *The Trinity.*—In his *Methodus Theologiæ*—his only Latin work—Baxter attempts to find a rational basis by showing the threefold nature of man and all things. Coleridge and others have followed somewhat similar lines, and though Baxter's reasoning is often fantastical, his philosophic power was highly estimated by Mansel.

(*h*) *Inspiration of Scripture.*—There is a passage in the *Saints' Rest*, omitted from some editions because it gave offence, which anticipates the attitude of many modern Christian scholars.

'They that take the Scriptures to be but the writings of godly, honest men, and so to be only a means of making known Christ, having a gradual precedency to the writings of other godly men, and do believe in Christ upon those strong grounds which

are drawn from the doctrine and miracles rather than upon the testimony of the writing as being purely infallible and Divine, may have saving faith. More much those that believe the whole writing to be of Divine inspiration when it handleth the substance, but doubt whether God infallibly guided in every circumstance.'

On this, as on many other questions, his views were far in advance of those of most of his contemporaries, and they often foreshadowed modern positions only slowly reached after two centuries.

In his last large work, *Reliquiæ Baxterianæ* (1696), Baxter wrote down 'the changes God had wrought since the unriper times of youth,' and one of them is that he now sees a gradation of certainty in truths:

'My certainty that I am a man is before my certainty that there is a God: my certainty that there is a God is greater than my certainty that He requireth love and holiness: my certainty of this is greater than my certainty of the life of reward and punishment hereafter: my certainty of the Deity is greater than my certainty of the Christian faith: my certainty of the Christian faith is greater than my certainty of the perfection and infallibility of Holy Scripture: my certainty of this is greater than of the canonicalness of some books.'

Baxter expressed warm admiration for the missionary efforts of John Eliot, the Apostle of the Indians, and yet he is 'not so much inclined to pass a peremptory sentence of damnation upon all who never heard of Christ, having some more reason than I knew of before to think that God's dealings with such are much unknown to us.'

Those who shared Baxter's spirit of broad catholicity were called, often in reproach, 'Baxterians.' They never formed a sect or even a school, but were men of independent minds who struck out paths for themselves, and in accordance with his principles distinguished between the essentials and non-essentials. 'In things necessary, unity; in things doubtful, liberty; in all things, charity.'

LITERATURE.—Baxter's principal doctrinal works are: *Aphorisms of Justification*, 1649; *Confession of Faith*, 1655; *Catholic Theology*, 1675; *Methodus Theologiæ Christianæ*, 1681; *An End of Doctrinal Controversies*, 1691; *Reliquiæ Baxterianæ*, 1696; cf. also Dean Boyle, *Richard Baxter*, 1883, chs. viii.–x.; J. Stalker, Lecture on 'Baxter' in *The Evangelical Succession*, 2nd series, 1883, p. 209 ff.; B. Jowett's *Biographical Sermons*, 1899; M'Adam Muir, *Religious Writers of England*, 1901. See also the Literature above, at end of § 2.

MARTIN LEWIS.

BEADLE, BEDELLUS.—The word 'beadle' was in Old English, *bydel, büdel, bidell*, from O.E. *beodan* (from which our word 'bid' is derived), 'to offer, announce, command'; in mediæval Latin, *bidellus* or *bedellus*; Old French, *bedel*, whence the Middle English *bedel*.

The primary meaning of the word appears to be 'herald,' 'one who announces or proclaims something.' So Ælfric (A.D. 1000), translating Ex 32^5; Ormulum 632 (A.D. 1200), where John the Baptist is 'Cristess bidell'; and Coverdale (A.D. 1535), when translating Dn 3^4. The secondary meaning is 'an executive officer who represents, and acts under, a higher authority.'

Apart from the metaphorical use of the term (*e.g.* in describing a bishop as 'Godes budel,' R. Morris, *O.E. Hom.* i. 117, A.D. 1175), it is applied to:

(1) The officer of a Court, in particular, of a Forest Court, who administers citations, etc. (Manwood, *Lawes of the Forest*, xxi., A.D. 1598).

(2) The agent of the Lord of a Manor (Coke, *Comm. upon Littleton*, 234, A.D. 1628).

(3) An official in Universities, to whom various duties, ceremonial and executive, pertain. In Oxford there is a bedel for each of the Faculties of Divinity, Law, Medicine, and Arts. The bedels, each bearing a mace, walk before the Chancellor or Vice-Chancellor in processions. The Arts bedel is in constant attendance on the Vice-Chancellor. In Cambridge there are two 'Esquire bedells,' Masters of Arts, who supervise academic ceremonials, and attend on the highest official present. In the University of Glasgow there is a 'bedellus' who is mace-bearer and also janitor. In the Laws of Yale College (1837) provision is made for a 'beadle who shall direct the procession and preserve order.'

(4) The officer of a Trades Gild, who acts as messenger of the Corporation (see *English Gilds*, pp. 35, 121, Early English Texts Society).

(5) A parish officer, whose duty is to attend meetings of the Vestry, to give notice of these meetings, and to execute its orders (Stephen, *Laws of England*, ii. 701). In the ancient Statutes of Scottish Burghs, 112 (quoted in Du Cange, *Glossarium, s.v.* 'Bedelli'), it is declared that 'any citation made without the bedellus is not valid.' Formerly the functions of the parish bedell or beadle included punishment of petty offences (cf. Shakespeare, *2 Henry VI.*, II. i. 140 ff., where the Mayor is represented as bidding an attendant 'fetch the beadle,' who, when he comes, whips the impostor).

(6) A church-officer, chiefly, although not exclusively, in Scotland. Du Cange quotes, from the *Concilia Hispan.* iv. 667, a reference to the bedellus as an official who in ecclesiastical processions precedes the Sacrist and the Acolytus; and in England the parish beadle has sometimes a certain status in the parish church. In Scotland, the church-beadle (Scoticé, *bederal, bedral, beddal, betheral*) has charge (under kirk-session and heritors) of the fabric of the church, and is responsible for its due preparation for Divine service. He is the minister's attendant in the church, and also, more or less, in the parish. He carries the Bible, Psalter, and Hymn-book up to the pulpit; and he is the messenger of the minister in parochial work. He acts, also, as the officer of the kirk-session at meetings, in citations, etc. With the office of beadle are often, but not necessarily, conjoined, especially in the country, the functions of gravedigger, bell-ringer, manse gardener, etc.

The Scottish beadle has always been regarded, and has regarded himself, as an important official. 'I'm half a minister mysel', now that I am bedel,' said the beadle in the *Bride of Lammermoor*. The present writer has heard a church-officer of long standing speak of the various ministers who had been '*with him*.' The pride of a beadle in his own kirk is notorious. A country official, whose church was of plain architecture, was taken to see and admire Glasgow Cathedral. 'It's sair fashed wi' thae pillars,' was his depreciatory comment. Sense of official responsibility, and in many cases long experience, render the beadle a keen and often shrewd critic of services and sermons. 'Gude coorse (coarse) country wark' was a city church-officer's estimate of a rural minister's pulpit performance: and young licentiates, on entering the vestry after service, have been known to quail before an old beadle's terse criticism or significant and 'dour' silence. 'I allus (always) liked that sermon' was the caustic response received by a minister who had preached an old sermon, and wishing to know if it had been recognized had given his church-officer the opportunity of 'remarking.' The old practice of the beadle being employed to carry some intimation to the entire body of parishioners, along with the notion, which within living memory prevailed widely, that to allow a caller to go on his way without 'tasting' was a breach of hospitality, led to the character of beadles as a class for sobriety being impugned. At the present day, however, when the special temptation just referred to has been removed, the temperance of the order is at least equal to that of other classes of society.

LITERATURE.—Murray, *Oxford English Dictionary*, vol. I. (from which the majority of the references in this article to old writers have been taken); Du Cange, *Glossarium, s.v.* 'Bedelli'; Hunter, *Encyclopædic Dict.* vol. II.; Wright, *English Dialect Dict.* vol. I.; Whitney, *Century Dict.*; Ramsay, *Reminiscences of Scottish Life and Character*[7], Edinburgh, 1860; R. Ford, *Thistledown*, 1891; art. on 'Church Officers' in *Scottish Review*, Sept. 3, 1908.

HENRY COWAN.

BEARD.—The permanence of the structure and colour of the hair makes it an important key to race-classification. As a characteristic of the face, it appears long and flowing as a beard chiefly among the Caucasian group; the Mongolians, Negroes, and American aborigines are usually beardless, exceptions occurring among the Australian natives and the Melanesians. So rare was the beardless face in an age when a race knew little of mankind outside its own borders, that

Herodotus (i. 105) explains how the Scythians 'who had plundered the temple of Aphrodite Urania at Ascalon, and their descendants for ever, were smitten by the divinity with a disease which made them women instead of men,' for women the ancient Greeks assumed them to be. The more rationalistic Hippocrates offers a different explanation. 'For my own part, I think these ailments are from God, and all the other ailments too; and no one of them more divine than another, or more human either, but all alike from God. Each of such things has a process of growth, and nothing comes into being without a process of growth' (J. L. Myres, in *Anthropology and the Classics*, p. 139 f., Oxford, 1908).

It is probably as a distinguishing sign of manhood that importance has been attached to the beard, there following from this many customs and superstitions, reference to which falls within the province of this article. It is still a mark of honour in the East; the well-bearded man is one 'who has never hungered' (Doughty, *Arabia Deserta*, i. 250). To pull it is to inflict an indignity; to have it forcibly cut off, or only mutilated, is a symbol of disgrace; to remove it voluntarily is a sign of mourning; to stroke it is the preface to uttering seeming words of weight. 'Let me stroake my beard thrice like a Germin, before I speak a wise word,' says an old writer Pappe W. Hatchet, 1589 (cf. *Oxford Dict. s.v.*), bearded age lending impressiveness to the thing uttered.

It is among Orientals, notably those of Semitic race, or under Semitic influence, that the beard has acquired sanctity. Its place in the old Hebrew ritual is shown in the command not to 'mar the corners of thy beard' (Lv 19^{27}); the degradation or contempt indicated by its mutilation is exemplified in the cutting off one half of the beards of David's servants by the Ammonites (2 S 10^{4}), and its neglect or removal as a symbol of mourning is referred to in Job 1^{20}, 2 S 19^{24}, Ezr 9^{3}, Is 15^{2}, Jer 41^{5}. The vagaries and vanities of custom marking its history find illustration in Herod. ii. 36: 'The priests of the gods in other lands wear long hair, but in Egypt they shave their heads; among other men the custom is that in mourning those whom the matter concerns most nearly have their hair cut short, but the Egyptians, when death occurs, let their hair grow long, both that on the head and that on the chin.' While the lower classes among the Egyptians appear as bearded [Joseph shaves himself before he enters the presence of Pharaoh, Gn 41^{14}], the priests and court officials kept the barbers busy. Sometimes artificial beards were worn as symbols of dignity at solemn festivals, the king's being cut square at the bottom. The beards on the statues of the gods were curled at the end. Among the Assyrians and Babylonians the lower castes were shaven, while kings and others, probably as members of the sacerdotal or military caste, wore beards, frizzled and anointed (cf. Lv 8^{12}). The example of Muhammad in keeping his beard unshorn was followed by the faithful, and it is by the beard of the Prophet and their own that they swear, as in the presence of Allāh. In Muslim custom, perhaps gradually becoming obsolete, there is zealous care of the hairs that fall from the beard, these being preserved by their owner for burial with him, or sometimes deposited in the grave during his lifetime. Tradition says that they were broken 'as a sort of stipulation with some angel who was supposed to be on the watch, and who would look to the safe passage of the consigners of the treasure to paradise' (*EBr*^{9}, *s. v.*). Such a practice is in keeping with the blurred conception of the barbaric mind as to the 'me' and 'not me,' wherein all that pertains to the individual, from the several parts of his body even to his name, is assumed to be integrally bound up with him, and to be media whereby sorcery may be worked upon him. The story goes that Selim I. (1512–20) was the first Khalīf to appear beardless, and when the Shaikh ul-Islām remonstrated, the monarch replied, 'I have cut off my beard, that the Vizier may have nothing to lead me by.' A more veracious history records that Alexander the Great commanded his soldiers to cut off their beards, so that the enemy could not lay hold of them. The presence or absence of the beard is one of the distinctive marks between the priests of the Greek and Latin Churches, although the bearded images on the coins of Popes of the 16th and 17th centuries prove that the clean-shaven face has not the antiquity of the tonsure. The Franciscans are at variance as to whether the founder of their order wore a beard, and on this ground are divided into the 'bearded' and the 'shaven.'

It is amusing to notice that James Ward (1769–1859), a painter of some renown, published a *Defence of the Beard* on Scriptural grounds, 'giving eighteen reasons why man was bound to grow a beard, unless he was indifferent as to offending the Creator and good taste,' while in 1860 one Theologos published a book entitled *Shaving a breach of the Sabbath and a hindrance to the spread of the Gospel*, arguing that the beard was a Divinely provided chest-protector, and adding, 'were it in any other position, its benefit and purpose might be doubted.' A more ancient contribution was made by the Emperor Julian in his *Misopogon*, or *Enemy of the Beard*, a satire on the effeminate manners of the citizens of Antioch, who had laughed at him for allowing his 'shaggy and populous beard' (the phrase is Gibbon's) to grow after the fashion of the Greek philosophers. Samuel Butler, in his *Characters and Passages* (ed. A. R. Waller, Cambridge, 1908), thus humorously describes the sage: 'Heretofore his Beard was the Badge of his Profession, and Length of that in all his Polemics was ever accounted the Length of his Weapon; but when the Trade fell, that fell too.' Monumental and other evidence shows that the Greeks wore beards until the time of Alexander the Great [readers of Herodotus will remember his reference to the great beard of the priestess of Athene (i. 175; viii. 104)], about which period the Romans submitted their chins to barbers from Sicily.

How the treatment of a natural feature of the human male was from time to time made a matter of dispute, even to the shedding of blood, finds illustration in the war between Persians and Tartars because the former would not cut off their beards, while the retention or removal of these became the symbol of the dominant or subject races. Among the West Goths and Burgundians the lower classes were beardless, in contrast to their rulers, and under Norman rule some of the English chose to exile themselves rather than lose their beards. But not long after the Conquest the Normans ceased to shave. The part that fashion and sycophancy have played in the history of the beard is not wholly removed from the domain of Ethics, in the changing standards of which 'custom,' as Pindar says (Herod. iii. 38), 'is king of all.' The Spaniards shaved off their beards because Philip V. could not grow one; and the French did the same because Louis XIII. was beardless; while the latter people, a century earlier, wore beards in imitation of Francis I., who grew one to hide the scar of a wound on his chin. It is said that 'three hairs from a French king's beard under the waxen seal stamped on the royal letter or charter

were supposed to add greater security for the fulfilment of all promises made in the document itself' (*EBr*[9], *s. v.*).

Turning to England, we find that, in the reign of Henry VIII., 'the authorities of Lincoln's Inn prohibited wearers of beards from sitting at the great table unless they paid double commons.' Then came (*temp.* Elizabeth) taxation of beards, assessed according to their age or to the social position of their wearers, beards of above a fortnight's growth being subject to a yearly tax of 3s. 4d. But the impost (which Peter the Great copied, under barbarous conditions, in Russia) failed in its object, perhaps finding a substitute in the duty on hair-powder, which was abolished in 1869. In his *Survey of London*, Stow records that in 1563 'Sir Thomas Lodge, being Mayor of London, wore a beard. He was the first that ever ventured thus to deforme his office, and hardly did the city support the shock.' The well-known Vandyke portraits of Charles I. and of the Cavaliers show what mode of trimming the beard was then in vogue, but by the time that Charles II. came to the throne all Europe shaved, only the moustache being worn. It is within the memory of the middle-aged that the wearing of beards rendered the individual liable to assault and insult, and that it met with opposition and prohibition from employers of labour and persons in authority, until such interference with individual liberty on so unimportant a matter was found to be as futile as has been proved in the case of all sumptuary laws.

LITERATURE.—In addition to authorities cited above: Duckworth, *Morphology and Anthropology*, Cambridge, 1904, pp. 354–360, and *Social England*, London, 1894, i. 480, iii. 573; Perrot, *Art. in Chaldea*, ii. 137; art. 'Beard,' in *EBr*[9] iii. 462.

EDWARD CLODD.

BEAST (Apocalyptic).—See ANTICHRIST.

BEATIFICATION.—1. Definition.—Beatification at the present day in the Church of Rome is a formal act by which the Church permits, under Papal authority, that a person who has died in the Catholic faith shall be honoured with a public veneration, and be formally styled *Beatus* or *Beata* ('blessed'). The cult, however, is limited. Veneration is not required or authorized throughout the whole Church; it is permitted in a particular diocese or country, or by a particular religious order or other associated body. Only with this restriction are the picture or relics of the person who has received beatification allowed to be exhibited, or is the recitation of his particular office or mass permitted. Beatification is thus a preparatory act, preliminary to the definitive *canonization* (*q.v.*) by which a servant of God is formally ranked among the saints of the Universal Church.

2. History.—The present custom dates from a Bull of Urban VIII. in 1634 (*Cœlestis Hierusalem cives*, July 5, 1634). It is fully described in the classic authority on the subject, the work of Pope Benedict XIV. (Lambertini), *de Servorum Dei Beatificatione et Beatorum Canonizatione*. It marks the conclusion of a long historical process, which must here be very briefly sketched. The distinction between beatification and canonization arose very gradually, and, even when the distinction was recognized as existing, the dividing line was not exactly drawn; *e.g.* it was long disputed whether the Emperor Charles the Great (Charlemagne) was to be regarded as canonized or only beatified (*de Servorum Dei*, etc., tom. i. cap. ix.). It is thus impossible to trace the history of the one process, from its origin, apart from that of the other.

Local veneration may be traced back to the earliest Christian ages, and, as in the case of Polycarp (Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* iv. 15), often grew into a wider recognition in the Church. At certain periods an association can be traced with the pagan custom of apotheosis, from which, however, it differs essentially in the fact that the Christian saints were never in any way ranked as Divine or semi-Divine, but merely as those whose virtues had been specially rewarded by God (cf. G. Boissier, 'Apothéose' in Daremberg-Saglio, *Dictionnaire des antiquités grecques et romaines*, t. i. pp. 323–327). But none the less many rites and symbols common to the Christian and pagan cults have been traced, and there was in the Christian hagiology occasional indebtedness to pagan sources as well as inevitable analogy and surviving superstition (cf. Hippolyte Delehaye, *Les Légendes hagiographiques*[2], Brussels, 1906). Bellarmine, on the other hand, traces the Christian custom to the Old Testament and the veneration of the Jewish Church for Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, etc. (*Controv.*, Paris, 1613, t. ii. col. 700). In the Christian Church it originated in the veneration of martyrs (*q.v.*), whose relics were regarded with reverence, and on whose tombs altars were set up (cf. Duchesne, *Origines du culte chrétien*, 1889, Eng. ed. 1904, pp. 283–284, etc.). But no public veneration was allowed except by authority of the bishop. Registers of those who were thus honoured were kept, and their names were recited at the Eucharist. 'From these diptychs came the kalendars, and from the kalendars in later days the martyrologies (W. H. Hutton, *The Influence of Christianity upon National Character, illustrated by the Lives and Legends of the English Saints*, Bampton Lectures, 1903, London, 1903, p. 21). But veneration was not long restricted to the martyrs; it was extended to 'confessors,' *i.e.* those in whom a peaceful death followed a life of heroic or conspicuous virtue; and it soon spread still more widely. In the recognition of saintliness different usages grew up and were developed, as at Rome (cf. Duchesne, *Liber Pontificalis*, tom. i. pp. c.–ci.) and in Africa (Optatus, *Hist. Donat.* in *PL* t. xi. col. 916–917). The rights of the episcopate to authorize the veneration of departed saints continued at least till the second half of the 12th century. In their own dioceses, and after a formal and semi-judicial process, the bishops exercised their power as part of their authority to regulate all that related to Divine service. There has been a tendency among Roman Catholics in recent years to distinguish thus between beatification and canonization, and to consider that the former alone lay within the power of the episcopate, the latter never having been declared except by the Roman Pontiff (so T. Ortolan, in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, Paris, 1905, fasc. xv. col. 1632); but the late survival of the claim on behalf of local bishops, and its exercise (as still in the Eastern Church) by Councils, would seem to conflict with this view. [Thus the Council of Cloveshoo (747) fixed the veneration in England of St. Gregory and St. Augustine of Canterbury; and cf. vindication by St. Martin of Tours of his right in the matter of veneration, in his *Vita*, by Sulpicius Severus, c. xi.] A survival of the rights of the episcopate is still found in the preliminaries which now precede beatification. The bishop of a diocese in which a special reverence is felt for some departed Christian collects evidence by what is known as the 'Informative Process,' and transmits this to Rome. If it is regarded as sufficient, the Pope issues a decree by which the cause of 'the venerable servant of God' is introduced to the Congregation of Sacred Rites. From this moment the title of 'Venerable' is given, and the first step towards beatification is taken.

3. **Method.** — Beatification is of two kinds—formal and equipollent (or equivalent). The latter is due not to a positive declaration of the Church, but to a tacit acceptance. Veneration of a particular person has begun, and spread, without formal approbation, till an ancient cult and the testimony of historians are accepted as grounds for a general permission. To this class belong the cases of St. Romwald, St. Norbert, St. Margaret of Scotland, Pope Gregory VII., all eventually canonized saints (for comparatively modern evidence of how this grew up, cf. the case of St. Osmund, Malden, *Canonization of S. Osmund*, Wilts Records Society, 1901, pp. 108–110). Formal beatification is regarded by Benedict XIV. as far more weighty than equipollent beatification (*op. cit.* lib. i. cap. lii. n. 10), since the former is the result of a long and careful process of minute examination, whereas the latter originates in popular sympathy, which the Church has come to accept without any such definite testing. Though there has been dispute on the point (see CANONIZATION), it appears that the brief of Alexander IV., *De reliquiis et veneratione sanctorum*, 1170 (in *Corpus juris Canonici*, l. iii. tit. 45), was the first definite reservation of cases of beatification for the decision of the Roman See. From this time the power of beatification was withdrawn from prelates of whatever dignity, and from Councils, and it is now considered not to be within the rights even of General Councils during a vacancy in the Papal See.

For formal beatification, testimony not only of holiness of life but of miracles (which need not necessarily have been wrought during life) is required (cf. L. Ferrari, *Prompta Bibliotheca*, Rome, 1766, tom. vii. f. 276: 'duo copulative requiruntur, scilicet excellentia virtutum in gradu heroico, et miracula, ita ut nec excellentia virtutum sine miraculis nec miracula sine virtutibus sufficiant'). From the time of Alexander VII. the process of beatification has taken place at the Vatican (Benedict XIV., *op. cit.* lib. i. cap. xxiv.). The writings (if there are any), virtues, and miracles are strictly examined by the Sacred Congregation of Rites. 'Postulators' are appointed to plead in favour of the claim: a 'Promoter of the Faith' (popularly known as *Advocatus Diaboli*) has the duty of seeking for flaws in the case. If the claim is regarded as proved, a decree of Beatification is solemnly proclaimed in St. Peter's (a modern process, in the case of the 'English Martyrs,' is described in Camm, *Lives of the English Martyrs*, London, 1904, vol. i. p. 14 ff.). But the decision, though given by the Pope, is not regarded as infallible, because the ultimate decision of the Church is not reached until the process is completed by canonization (cf. Benedict XIV., *op. cit.* lib. i. cap. xlii. n. 10). Before this stage is reached a further examination is held, which may result in the name being struck off the list of *Beati*. The Pope is therefore not considered as infallible in pronouncing a decree of beatification. It is, however, regarded as extremely rash to dispute or criticize such a decree.

Beatification authorizes a cult limited to particular districts and to particular acts, which are defined in the terms of the particular decree or indult. If no special terms are laid down the cult is regulated by a general decree of the Congregation of Rites of September 27, 1659 (Gardellini, *Decreta Authentica*, Rome, 1898, t. i. pp. 231–232), which orders that (1) the name of the *Beatus* shall not be inscribed in Martyrologies, local calendars, or those of religious orders; (2) images, pictures, or statues of him may not be publicly exposed in churches without permission of the Holy See; (3) his relics are not to be carried in procession; (4) he may not be chosen as patron saint of a church; (5) the cult may not be extended from the place allowed to another without indult.

For the customs which regulate beatification in the Orthodox Eastern Church, where it is not distinguished from canonization, see article CANONIZATION.

LITERATURE.—Benedict XIV., *de Servorum Dei Beatificatione et Beatorum Canonizatione*, 1st ed., 4 vols., Bologna, 1734–1738, completed in *Benedicti XIV. Pont. Opt. Max. Opera Omnia*, Venice, 1767 (the edition used for the purpose of this article is that in 15 vols., Rome, 1787–1792); Ferrari, *Prompta Bibliotheca Canonica*, Rome, 1766, and Paris, 1884; Gardellini *Decreta Authentica Congregationis Sacrorum Rituum*, Rome, 1898–1901; Vacant and Mangenot, *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, fasc. xi., Paris, 1903; Beccari, in *Catholic Encyclopædia*, ii. 364–369, New York, 1908. W. H. HUTTON.

BEATING AND STRIKING.—See STRIKING.

BEATITUDE.—See BLESSEDNESS.

BEAUTY.—It is impossible within the limits of this article to discuss all the theories that have been advanced on the conception of Beauty. No conception, indeed, has received more attention from philosophers. We shall select out of the general history of ideas the most outstanding theories of the Beautiful, with the special aim of tracing their relationship. The subject will be dealt with under the following heads: (i.) in Greek philosophy, (ii.) in the philosophy of the Church Fathers, (iii.) in the philosophy of the Middle Ages, (iv.) in modern philosophy, (v.) in contemporary philosophy, (vi.) conclusion, in which the author will endeavour to point out the principles that arise from this discussion, and the course which, according to him, should be pursued in order to arrive at a true conception of Beauty.

i. *IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.*—The Greek is a born artist, and his education affords him plenty of scope for all the manifestations of the Beautiful. Nevertheless, the appearance of æsthetic theories comes very late in Greece. It is not until the time of Socrates. The reason is that nothing comes of the study of Beauty except in an integrally constituted philosophy, and before the age of Pericles Greek thought was unable to attain to true systematization.

One common feature, we believe, characterizes all the æsthetic theories of the Greeks: Beauty is considered as an *attribute of things*. If they think at all of the impression that it makes on one, they do so only in a secondary way, and not in order to see in the impression an *essential* element of Beauty. The result is that Greek speculations on Beauty are closely allied to metaphysics.

There are two principal theories which have successively held favour in the schools: (1) the Platonic-Aristotelian theory, and (2) the Plotinian or Neo-Platonic theory.

1. **Platonic-Aristotelian theory.**—We do not possess a special treatise on Beauty either from Plato or from Aristotle, their ideas on the subject being scattered throughout their different works. Plato's chief references to Beauty are in his *Symposium*, *First Hippias*, *Gorgias*, and a few books of the *Republic*. Aristotle informs us, at the end of his *Metaphysics*, that he will deal more fully with Beauty in a special treatise, which, if it was ever written, has not come down to us. In his *Poetics* some general principles are found, although tragedy alone is specially dealt with.

The intellectual relationship between Aristotle and Plato in æsthetics is so close that their doctrines may be summarized together, as follows:

(*a*) *Beauty resides in order*, and in the metaphysical elements included in order, namely, unity and multiplicity (harmony, symmetry, proportion). It is well known that the study of unity and

multiplicity forms one of the favourite problems of Greek speculation; the study of order is the æsthetic aspect of this problem. And Greek art, chiefly the architecture and sculpture of the time of Pericles, provides an eloquent and perfect commentary on the Platonic-Aristotelian formula. The masterpieces of Greek sculpture symbolize in stone and marble the theory of numbers and their attributes.

Measure and proportion, says Plato, are the elements of beauty and of perfection. 'I do not mean by beauty of form such beauty as that of animals or pictures, which the many would suppose to be my meaning; but . . . understand me to mean straight lines and circles, and the plane and solid figures which are formed out of them; . . . for these I affirm to be not only relatively beautiful, like other things, but they are eternally and absolutely beautiful' (*Philebus*, 51; Jowett's *Dialogues of Plato*[3], 1892, iv. 625). Aristotle likewise writes τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει, 'Beauty consists of order united to magnitude' (*Poetics*, vii. 4). And Plato applies his theory to the elements of the universe—air, water, earth, fire. These he reduces to geometrical figures, which he thinks perfectly beautiful—in the same way as Aristotle applies his theory to the State.

In the case of a body, popular sentiment added to the element of order the charm of colour (*suavitas coloris*), as characteristic of the beautiful. Xenophon, the Stoics, Cicero, and others are upholders of this conception, and we shall see that Plotinus mentions it as a common way of representing beauty among his contemporaries and immediate predecessors.

(*b*) *The beautiful is the good.*—This identity applies chiefly to moral good, or virtue. (Conversely, vice is the deformity of the soul.) It is the philosophical translation of the word καλοκάγαθός. Is not Thersites, in Homer, both ill-favoured in body and evil in heart? 'Beautiful, too, as are both truth and knowledge, you will be right in esteeming this other nature [the idea of good] as more beautiful than either' (Plato, *Republic*, vi. 508; Jowett, *op. cit.* iii. 210). And when we remember that the central idea of Plato's metaphysics is the Good and not the True, we understand how defective is the saying, erroneously attributed to him, 'The Beautiful is the brightness of the True.' Aristotle tried to establish certain distinctions between the Beautiful and the Good, but these are superficial, and we conclude with Bénard: 'Quand on signale ici un grand progrès dans la science du beau, on se trompe' ('L'Esthétique d'Aristote,' in *Acad. Sc. mor. et polit.* 1887, p. 683).

This short account of the Platonic-Aristotelian doctrine requires a few further remarks. (1) Naturally the theories which have just been expounded are influenced by the differences of doctrine in metaphysics that separate these two great Greek minds. For Plato, reality (and, consequently, beauty, order, and harmony) is enthroned in a supra-sensual world, of which things perceived by our senses are only a fleeting shadow; for Aristotle, reality dwells on the earth, and the beautiful is immanent in well-ordered beings, where our intelligence perceives it, through the channel of the senses and its power of imagination. (2) Aristotle agrees with Plato in separating the beautiful from art, the latter having its whole *raison d'être* in the imitation (μίμησις) of nature, as such, without taking into account the æsthetic value of this imitation. And, inasmuch as it is an imitation of the actual, art is somewhat depreciated, the only value recognized in it being the help it gives to the production and diffusion of morality. (3) Plato and Aristotle (especially the latter) imply in certain texts that the beautiful *should make an impression*, and that it gives us pleasure; but neither of them analyzes the nature of this pleasure or the psychical activities that produce it. The *objective* and ontological point of view dominates their æsthetics.

2. Plotinian or Neo-Platonic theory.—In the 3rd cent. of the Christian era there arose in Alexandria, the centre then of civilization and culture, a new æsthetic formula, which was not long in spreading to other Greek centres. Plotinus (A.D. 204–270), the most brilliant representative of Neo-Platonism, explained these new ideas in a noble book, full of inspiration and mystical exaltation, the *Enneads*. The first chapter of Book VI is devoted to 'Beauty.' There are in his doctrine two distinct parts.

(*a*) First, there is a *critical* part, or a prosecuting speech against the Platonic-Aristotelian argument. 'Is it, as everybody holds, the relative proportion of each part to the other and to the whole, with the additional charm of colour, that constitutes beauty, when it addresses itself to sight? In this case, since the beauty of bodies in general consists of the symmetry and just proportion of their parts, it cannot be found in anything *simple*, it can appear only in composites. The whole alone is beautiful; the parts cannot of themselves possess any beauty. They are beautiful only in their relation to the whole. If, however, the whole is beautiful, it seems necessary that the parts also should be beautiful; beauty cannot result from a collection of ugly things' (*Enneads*, i. 6).

(*b*) Secondly, there is a *constructive* part. The new argument may be given thus: Beauty is a transcendental idea, that is, everything is beautiful in the measure of its own reality. 'Everything is beautiful in its own essential being' (*Enneads*, v. 8). It is well known that in the emanative philosophy of Plotinus the universe springs from the unalterable generating power of a primary being, called the One or the Good (Platonic influence), from whom, by a method of loss, is derived a series of principles, produced the one from the other, each less perfect than its predecessor: the intelligence, the soul of the world, and, lastly, matter and the sensible world. Like this descending scale of Being and the Good, there is a descending scale of Beauty, and, in order to make it clearly understood, Plotinus had recourse to a comparison with light and its spatial diffusion—an image borrowed from Plato's *Republic* (bk. vi.). Further, light becomes synonymous with Being, with Goodness, and with Beauty. 'Everything shines in the world of intelligence. . . . In the world of sense the most beautiful thing is fire' (*Enneads*, v. 8, § 10; cf. i. 6, § 3, and *passim*). It is of great importance to notice that the glory of light (ἀγλαία) has, according to Plotinus, a metaphysical value, and is correlative with the conception of being, and that it is not a question of the impression produced, or of a relation between the splendour of the thing and the capacity of the subject who contemplates it.

Another innovation of Plotinus is that art is not excluded from the domain of the Beautiful, his logical argument being as follows:—The artist realizes the Beautiful in the proportion in which his work is *real*. And that is why the artist should not slavishly copy Nature; but, with his eye fixed on the λόγοι, or archetypal ideas, he should endeavour to reach the very source from which all life springs, and in accordance with it correct the imperfections of sensible things.

ii. *In the Philosophy of the Church Fathers.*—Indebted to Neo-Platonism for a great number of their philosophical doctrines, the Church Fathers assumed and even accentuated its æsthetic optimism. They exalted Nature, they sang its beauty, and many (*e.g.* St. John Chrysostom) depreciated art, the work of man, in order to make the beauty of the world, the work of God, more glorious. There is nothing in the Church Fathers' conception of beauty that is not directly due to the Greeks. St. Augustine, the most representative, who, in his youth, wrote a treatise *de Pulchro*, inclines somewhat towards the Platonic-Aristotelian theories. 'Omnis corporis pulcritudo est

partium congruentia cum quadam coloris suavitate' (*de Civitate Dei*, xxii. 19). He has bequeathed to us a famous definition of the conception of *order*: 'Ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua loca tribuens dispositio' (*ib.* xix. 3). On the other hand, St. Basil and pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite adopt the Neo-Platonic theories. The latter exercised great influence on the æsthetics of the Middle Ages by means of his treatise *On Divine Names*, for it was the commentary on this treatise that drew forth all the dissertations of Scholasticism on the Beautiful.

iii. *IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES.*—It was principally Scholastic philosophy that developed the ideas of Beauty in the Middle Ages. But these ideas did not appear in a systematic form until the 13th century. And even then no treatises or discussions were written on Beauty as at the beginning of the 18th century. We know only one short work, *de Pulcro*, belonging to this period. It is attributed to Thomas Aquinas, but probably belongs to one of his immediate disciples. Among the great Scholastics, ideas on æsthetics appear in an incidental way, intermingled with other subjects and nearly always in the form of commentaries on the text of pseudo-Dionysius. They form a systematic whole, however, if one takes the trouble to connect the texts; and a new thought is evident in them. The Beautiful no longer appears under purely objective aspects, as in the Greek schools, but as a complex notion, which belongs partly to the things and partly to the psychic subject who receives the impression of them: the Beautiful is the result of a close connexion between the two. We shall now sum up the fundamental doctrines of Thomas Aquinas, the prince of Scholastic philosophers.

(1) *Subjective aspect of the Beautiful.*—Æsthetic activity is an activity of perception: 'Pulcrum respicit vim cognoscitivam' (*Summa Theol.* i. quæst. 5, art. 4), or, more precisely, it is a disinterested contemplation by the eye, the ear, and the intelligence. This contemplation begets a specific enjoyment, the pleasure of the Beautiful: 'Unde pulcra dicuntur quæ visa placent' (*ib.*). (Here 'visa' refers not only to sight, but to other perceptive faculties of an æsthetic kind.) And now from this psychological point of view there appears a profound difference between the pleasure of the Beautiful and the pleasure of the Good: we enjoy the Good by taking possession of the object itself, and we enjoy the Beautiful by the simple perception of it. 'Et sic patet quod pulcrum addit supra bonum quemdam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam; ita quod bonum dicatur id quod simpliciter complacet appetitui, pulcrum autem dicatur id cujus apprehensio placet' (*ib.* 1ª 2ᵃᵉ, quæst. 27, art. 1).

(2) *Objective aspect of the Beautiful.*—It is quite wrong to refer the Scholastic doctrines concerning what constitutes beauty in things to the influence of Neo-Platonism. The theory that was unanimously accepted was the Platonic-Aristotelian, broadened and brought into harmony with other metaphysical theories of Beauty. Order and its elements constitute the Beautiful; *ordo, magnitudo, integritas, debita proportio, æqualitas numerosa, commensuratio partium elegans*, etc. 'Unde pulcrum,' says St. Thomas, 'in debita proportione consistit' (*ib.* i. quæst. 5, art. 4). And æsthetic order is closely connected, on the one hand, with the form of beings (*forma*), that is to say, with the principles of their constitution and of their perfection ('pulcrum congregat omnia et hoc habet ex parte formæ'), and, on the other, with the finality of beings, which dominates the constitution of Scholastic metaphysics: 'Dispositio naturæ conveniens est pulcritudo' (*ib.* 1ª 2ᵃᵉ, quæst. 54, art. 1).

(3) *Relation of the object to the subject*, or the *claritas pulcri.*—The order of the Beautiful is not any order whatever, but such an order as is capable of giving to the subject that perceives it the natural and entire satisfaction which engenders æsthetic pleasure. Order must be bright, it must be luminous to the eyes. The more *form* strikes the spectator (and form is the principle of unity in a work of art or of nature), the more resplendent it is ('resplendentia,' 'supersplendens claritas'), and the more æsthetic will be the value that the impression experienced possesses. Although the Scholastics make use of the theories of pseudo-Dionysius regarding the *light* of the Beautiful, their doctrine rises above his formula, and, therefore, above Neo-Platonism, with which pseudo-Dionysius was inspired. While for Plotinus the theory of *light* has a metaphysical bearing, for Thomas Aquinas and the other great Scholastics it is a pyschological phenomenon, for it has to do with the mysterious connexion between the object and the subject which forms the basis of the complex phenomenon of Beauty. And from the historical point of view this is a noteworthy conquest on the part of the philosophy of the Middle Ages.

iv. *IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY.*—From the beginning of the 17th cent., which is usually regarded as the commencement of modern philosophy, the study of Beauty has steadily gained in importance and extent; and from the day on which Baumgarten, a disciple of Leibniz, detached it from the domain of philosophy and made it a separate branch of knowledge, the number of treatises devoted *ex professo* to æsthetics has continued to multiply. The great burst of artistic criticism after the Renaissance has often been assigned as the cause of this development. And indeed it is a factor whose incontestable influence we are bound to recognize. Artistic culture, greatly aided by archæological excavations and the analysis of statuary and ancient drama, had prepared the way for the discussion of the great problems of Beauty. But there seems to be a second reason: the progress of psychological research, which is one of the salient characteristics of modern philosophy, naturally stimulated the study of æsthetic phenomena; and this influence is clearly seen when it is remembered that in modern and contemporary philosophy Beauty is usually studied only under its *cognitive* and *emotive* aspect, *i.e.* as a *psychic fact*.

As the development of modern æsthetics has a course parallel to that of philosophy, we shall follow the great historical divisions generally agreed upon: (1) philosophy from Descartes to Kant (17th and 18th cents.), (2) Kantian philosophy (18th cent.), and (3) post-Kantian philosophy (19th cent.).

1. **From Descartes to Kant.**—Just as there are two lines of psychological systems, empiricism and rationalism, originating from Francis Bacon and Descartes respectively, so there are two lines of æsthetic systems.

(1) *Empiricism.*—The Empiricists, reducing all our conscient states to sensation, understand by Beauty an *agreeable sensation*. For Hume, the Beautiful exists only in us, not in things, and obeys the general laws of association. This principle was adopted and developed in England by Hutcheson (1694–1747), Home (1696–1782), and Burke (1730–1797); in France by Batteux (1713–1780) and Diderot (1713–1784); and in Holland by Hemsterhuys (1720–1790). Home gives the best expression of the leading ideas of the school in his *Elements of Criticism*, and Burke carries the

sensualistic idea that inspires him to its extreme limits in a work entitled *Inquiry into the Origin of the Sublime and the Beautiful*. Nearly all these philosophers admitted the existence of a special sense, the sense of artistic taste, which was afterwards called the sixth sense, and the object of which was enjoyment of things beautiful.

(2) *Rationalism.*—Among the intellectualists or rationalists (*ratio*, 'reason'), who establish a fundamental distinction between sensation, or the perception of sensible qualities, and the idea, or the general representation, it is in Leibniz and his immediate successors that we find the most noteworthy treatments of the Beautiful. It has been truly said that Leibniz is the father of modern æsthetics. It seems as if the intellectualists, inspired by Descartes, had reserved the character of Beauty for the most exalted psychic activities, *i.e.* for *clear and distinct ideas*, which play such a prominent part in the Cartesian doctrine. For some men, indeed, like Crousaz (*Traité du Beau*, 1715), the Beautiful is something that may be approved of just like a theory, and Boileau expresses this intellectualism when he writes in his *Art Poétique*: 'Mais nous que la raison à ses règles engage.' But Leibniz introduces into æsthetics a tendency contrary to this spirit. And while he relegates the clear perceptions of our psychic life to the domain of *science*, he consigns æsthetic knowledge of things to the dull and loss conscient regions of the soul. The æsthetic phenomenon, he says, is a *confused perception* of the order and the harmony of things, and by this doctrine he thought he was explaining that mysterious and indecomposable characteristic which constitutes the charm of Beauty.

In order to understand the whole meaning of this statement, we should have to give a full account of the philosophy of Leibniz, which cannot be undertaken here. It will be sufficient to recall the law of continuity and hierarchy, which arranges all the monads and the monadic activities in a grand order.

Each monad differs in perfection from that which precedes it, and from that immediately fohowing, by infinitely small differences; the activities or the representations of each monad—and, therefore, of the monad that we are—differ in degree by infinitely small differences, so that between our least conscient representations ('obscure ideas') and our most conscient ('distinct ideas') there is room for an indefinite number of stages corresponding to all the degrees of clearness. Now, Beauty is one of those activities which are inferior in quality to the clear and scientific knowledge of things; it is the *confused*, therefore indefinite, perception of all that constitutes order. Whereupon Lotze says that German æsthetics is brought into being by belittling its object.

Baumgarten, who arranges Leibniz's theories, and is the author of the first treatise on Beauty (*Æsthetica et Æstheticorum altera pars*), associates the sentiment of Beauty with obscurity of representation. In the Wolffian classification of the sciences, æsthetics becomes a kind of inferior logic. The same ideas are found in Eschenburg (1743–1820), Sulzer (1720–1779), and Mendelssohn (1729–1786). 'Beauty,' says Mendelssohn, 'vanishes away as soon as we try to analyze it.' And Meier, another disciple of Baumgarten (in § 23 of his *Anfangsgründe der schönen Wissenschaften*, 1748–1750) thus expresses himself: 'The cheeks of a beautiful woman are beautiful as long as they are seen with the naked eye. Look at them with a magnifying glass and their beauty departs.'

2. In Kantian philosophy.—The disciples of Leibniz and Baumgarten had considerably furthered the problem of the Beautiful, but all were eclipsed by the gigantic figure of Kant. Kant's æsthetics made as profound an impression as his theory of science and his ethics; and just as, in the *Kritik der reinen theoretischen Vernunft*, and the *Kritik der reinen praktischen Vernunft*, he had established human knowledge and human duty in the very *constitution* of our theoretical and practical reason, so he explains opinions on the Beautiful and the Sublime by calling for the *construction* of a third faculty, the source of contemplation and sentiment. This is the subject of a chapter of his third critique, *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*. The subjectivity of the Beautiful is no longer merely a *fact* (Hume), but a *law*. Beauty is an attribute, not of things, but of our representative states. It is the predicate of an æsthetic judgment which unites all men by reason of their nature (synthetic judgment *a priori*) to a subject when that subject calls disinterested contemplation into free play. The object of representation is intended to please me—subjective finality; but at the moment of enjoying it I am unconscious of this finality; to be conscious of it would be to break the charm. 'Schönheit ist Form der Zweckmässigkeit eines Gegenstandes, sofern sie ohne Vorstellung eines Zwecks an ihr wahrgenommen wird' (*Kritik d. Urtheilskraft*, I. i. bk. 1, § 15). Similarly the *sublime* is the result of our subjective powerlessness to grasp an object, mingled with a definite feeling of the superiority of our supra-sensible being. 'Erhaben ist was uns erhebt.'

3. In post-Kantian philosophy.—The chief currents of modern philosophy and æsthetics after Kant are:—

(1) *Post-Kantian criticism in Germany* (first half of 19th cent.).—Powerful in itself, the new theory proposed by Kant (assisted by the brilliant flight of Romanticism in Germany and the æsthetics of the philosophy of Königsberg, and accepted by such men as Schiller and Schelling—philosophers as well as *littérateurs*) dominates all modern criticism. It is true that a characteristic innovation was introduced into German criticism by those who are called idealistic critics as well as by the realistic critics: the Beautiful remains a creation of our mind (Kant), but this 'mind' becomes a monistic principle, the 'ego absolute' of Fichte, the 'absolute' of Schelling, the 'mind' of Hegel, the 'will' of Schopenhauer. Schiller (1759–1805) returns to the theory of *play*. To 'play' is to contemplate phenomena with an utter indifference as to their representative value. And just on this account does æsthetic activity become human activity *par excellence*: 'Man is truly man only when he plays.' It is intimacy with the Beautiful that produces the restfulness of life, that balance of all the faculties which Kantism tries to secure by the exercise of freewill ('Vom Erhabenen,' *Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschengeschlechtes*, 1795). In 1800 and 1801, Schelling, in the second form of his philosophy, æsthetic idealism, revived this governing idea, and made æsthetic activity and 'play' the fundamental function of the mind, that which reconciles its opposite tendencies. The work of art is the only perfect production of the Ego. Thus Jena, where Schelling was a professor along with Fichte and then with Hegel, became the centre of the closely allied philosophic criticism and literary romanticism. Novalis identified the imagination of the poet with the productive imagination of the Ego; and von Schlegel, whose name is connected with the movement called *Ironism*, claimed for the poet the right of not troubling himself either about the contents of his work, or about its representative value, or about the public who make the unjust claim to judge it.

Then Hegel appeared (1770–1831), and ruled the German schools for half a century. For Hegel, art is placed at the highest point of the development of the mind. Art is the last step in the dialectic procession of the Logos. When the mind has traversed the numerous stages of its development sketched in the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1807), and when, in conformity with the threefold procession (thesis, antithesis, synthesis) that governs it, it becomes conscious of itself, this auto-contemplation is realized by Art, Religion, and Philosophy. Art,

and the Beautiful in which it is realized, are the 'perfect identity of the ideal and the real.'

Schopenhauer (1788–1860), who may be considered the last of this line of pantheists belonging to the first generation of Kantians, reserves for Art and for Beauty this high position in the cycle of psychic activity (*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, 1819). Although the thing exists in itself, science is doomed to recognize only its representation ('Vorstellung'). But, besides this knowledge of the phenomenal world, which is directed by the *a priori* constitution of our mind, we may have 'the immediate intuition' of the cosmic Ideas, or of the thing-in-itself, and this pure contemplation is the æsthetic contemplation. As such, it is freed from desire and withdrawn from the sufferings that accompany every voluntary action; and this is the secret of the penetrating charm of Beauty. By art, man makes the idea the ruling power—a symbol which nature never realizes in its absolute purity. Art becomes an intoxicating drink, causing the woes of existence to be momentarily forgotten.

(2) *The conflict between Hegelians and Herbartians in Germany* (middle of 19th cent.).—The pantheistic Germans whom we have just mentioned all agreed in making the Beautiful an impersonal manifestation of Being. The Hegelian theory, in spite of the ascendancy in official spheres enjoyed by its promoter, was not long in bringing on a reaction: there was a desire to remove Beauty from the sphere of metaphysical reverie to the ground of psychological observation. In the name of observation, Herbart made Beauty consist of the mere perception of *relations* and forms. The æsthetics of content ('Gehaltsästhetik') of the Hegelian school was now opposed by the æsthetics of form ('Formaästhetik'), and the conflict between the two tendencies lasted in Germany until the end of the 19th century. Hegelianism includes among its most zealous defenders Fr. Th. Vischer, who published some important works on the Beautiful (e.g. *Aesthetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen*, 3 vols. 1846–57), while Zimmermann carried the reactionary doctrine to an extreme (*Allgemeine Aesthetik als Formwissenschaft*, 1865). The Hegelian party was not defeated in this strife, but we see several of their partisans departing from the rigour of their principles and giving a place to beauty of form. Among these moderates we may mention Moriz Carrière (*Aesthetik*, 1859), as well as Schasler and Ed. von Hartmann, both of whom are authors of works on the history of Æsthetics.

German idealism enjoyed some fame in Italy through Gioberti, who favoured Schelling, de Sanctis (Professor in the University of Naples after 1870), and Antonio Tari (Professor in the University of Naples from 1861 to 1884), who were all affected by the preponderating influence of Hegel.

(3) *Eclectic spiritualism.*—In France, during the first half of the 19th cent., Cousin (1792–1867), by his lectures in the Sorbonne, and then through his influential official positions, both academic and political, exercised a dictatorship similar to that enjoyed by Hegel in Germany. He popularized a philosophy, somewhat deficient in originality, which he himself called Eclecticism; and in a well-known book, *Du vrai, du beau et du bien* (1818), gave prominence to an æsthetic made up of fine phrases and pompous homage to the Ideal, which he identified with the Infinite or the perfection of God. While exalted in their aspiration, these thoughts on Beauty have the fault of being remote from reality. They are, moreover, derived from recollections of Hegel and the Scottish school of Reid. The same tendencies are to be seen in de Lamennais, although he followed another direction of thought-traditionalism (*De l'Art et du beau*, 1843). On the other hand, Th. Jouffroy (1796–1842), the most noteworthy of Cousin's disciples, wrote a *Cours d'esthétique* (1843), in which he insisted on the rights of the psychological method in the study of the Beautiful. And to the same metaphysical tendencies may be traced *La Science du beau* (1861), by Charles Lévêque, who returns to Plato in his treatment of the characteristics of Beauty. By the middle of the century only faint traces of Cousin's eclecticism were left in France.

(4) *The æsthetics of Positivism.*—Sensualism, represented at the beginning of the 19th cent. by Condillac in France and the Associationists in England, does not leave much room for æsthetic phenomena. But when it reappears with renewed vigour under the form of Positivism, which may be called a sensualism suited to contemporary minds, there is room for new conceptions of Beauty and of Art. These, however, did not appear either in Comte, the founder of the new doctrine, or in Stuart Mill, its most brilliant logician; but after the system seemed perfectly balanced, and systematized in all its parts, Herbert Spencer devoted a chapter of his *Principles of Psychology* to a study of the genesis of æsthetic phenomena, in conformity, however, with the governing ideas of his cosmic evolutionism. The sentiment of Beauty has its origin in 'play,' *i.e.* in the exercise of an excess of activity independent of any function useful to the being. Useful activity becomes beautiful as soon as it ceases to be useful. And as humanity evolves unceasingly 'from the unstable homogeneous to the stable heterogeneous,' art increases with the progress: the more perfect society becomes, the more time will its members have for 'play.'

Hippolyte Taine (1828–1893), in his noteworthy work, *Philosophie de l'art* (1865), studies art as a social fact, and he tries to reduce it, like all other social facts—such as literature and politics—to factors or primordial facts, which are three in number: race, circumstances, time. From this point of view, æsthetics becomes, in the author's words, 'a kind of botany, applied, not to plants, but to human works.' M. J. Guyau emphasizes, while exaggerating, the social side of art, and recognizes in it no function except that of developing sympathy and social life (*L'Art au point de vue sociologique*, 1889; *Problèmes de l'esthétique contemporaine*, 1884).

(5) *Psycho-æsthetics.*—The increasing progress of physiological sciences and of the application of psycho-physiology to the study of æsthetic states furnished a new element of research during the latter part of the 19th century. Helmholtz in Germany, and Grant Allen in England, tried to determine the physiological concomitants of certain phenomena of the Beautiful. Fechner (*Vorschule der Aesthetik*, 1876) carried on numerous experiments in the same direction.

v. *CONTEMPORARY TENDENCIES.*—During the last ten years the number of works treating of æsthetic questions has been multiplied in all countries. There is not one of our numerous periodical publications that does not devote some attention to them. Moreover, there has been appearing at Stuttgart since 1906 a *Zeitschrift für Aesthetik und allgemeine Kuntswissenschaft*, under the direction of Max Dessoir, which allows large space to philosophical problems of the Beautiful. Now all these writings, with a few exceptions, show this common characteristic: Beauty is considered only under its subjective aspect as a psychological phenomenon. The salient features of modern æsthetics reappear, exaggerated, in the æsthetics of our own time.

In the first place, Kantism, in this as in other

subjects, is again received into favour—not the idealistic and pantheistic criticism which had been established by the triumvirs of the University of Jena, but psychological Kantism in its primitive form. **Jonas Cohn** (*Allgemeine Aesthetik*, Leipzig, 1901) transfers the results obtained to transcendental ground ('ins Transcendentale umschreiben'). **Stephan Witasek** (*Grundzüge der allgemeinen Aesthetik*, Leipzig, 1904) shows the same tendencies; and a German critic, **A. Tumarkin**, in a criticism of a group of German works on æsthetics, is able to write: 'Jede wissenschaftlich begründete Aesthetik, von welchen Voraussetzungen sie auch ausgehen mag, führt immer auf Kant zurück' (*Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 1905, p. 360). On the other hand, psycho-æsthetic researches are being actively pursued in the psycho-physiological laboratories; pupils of **Wundt**, Ebbinghaus, and others have turned their attention to this side of the subject. Some also apply to æsthetics the historical and inductive method which has produced such excellent results in other departments. **E. Grosse** publishes a work on the origin of art (*Die Anfänge der Kunst*, Freiburg i. Breisgau, 1894); **J. Volkelt** (*System der Aesthetik*, Munich, 1903) makes æsthetics 'normative and experimental'; while, in another line of observation, we trace the development of the artistic sense in the child, especially in his first attempts at drawing.

The most noteworthy representative of the pure psychological tendency is **Theodore Lipps** (*Aesthetik*, Leipzig, 1903), whose opinion is that the only *raison d'être* of æsthetics is to analyze the sentiment of Beauty, and this in the final analysis rests on the *Einfühlung* ('innate feeling'). **Karl Groos** (*Der ästhetische Genuss*, Giessen, 1902), a disciple of the school of Lipps, follows the same tendency of dealing with the Beautiful only by internal analysis. The same may be said of **Véron's** treatise (*L'Esthétique*, Paris, 1878), and of the discriminating analyses of **Léchalas** (*Études esthétiques*, 1902). Even if these authors do not deny the objectivity of the Beautiful, they neglect it, and regard the phenomena of consciousness as the only object of their investigations. The Italian professor, **Benedetto Croce**, whose treatise on æsthetics (*Estetica come scienza dell' Espressione e Linguistica generale*, Milan, 1902) is translated into several languages, is true to this contemporary attitude of mind when he writes: 'Beauty does not belong to things; it is not a psychic fact, it belongs to man's activity, to spiritual energy'; and he holds that æsthetic activity is the imaginative and concrete intuition, as opposed to the logical and general conception. **Ruskin**, whose ideas are known in France through Robert de la Sizeranne (*Ruskin et la religion de la beauté*), occupies a place apart. It is impossible to assign this great and passionate admirer of Nature to any contemporary system of philosophy.

vi. *CONCLUSION.*—From this rapid survey of the evolution of æsthetical doctrines, we may gather a few principles.

By studying in the Beautiful the psychological impression and all that belongs to it, our contemporaries have established æsthetics on firm and fertile soil—that of observation. Let us observe the origin of art in the child, in primitive societies, as well as in the centres of advanced civilization; let us analyze the works to which we ascribe the character of beautiful, that we may understand the secrets of the enjoyment of art which they produce; let us study the physiological phenomena that accompany this delicious thrill of our conscient being when it perceives the Beautiful; let us, above all, determine by examination of our consciousness the psychical aspects of the Beautiful. Nothing more is required. Beauty resides in the *disinterested contemplation of a representative content* of consciousness, followed by an *enjoyment* or a pleasure which can be compared with no other in the scale of emotions.

But is it sufficient to regard merely the impression produced? Are we in the study of the Beautiful to lose all interest in the æsthetical factors springing from the object? Surely not. Contemporary philosophy is wrong in ostracizing metaphysics and adorning psychology with its spoils. On the question whether the Beautiful possesses an objective reality, we agree with the Greeks: Beauty is an attribute of things. But we complete the Greek point of view by adding the modern: Beauty is not an *absolute*, but a *relative*, conception. It exists neither as a physical fact nor as a psychic fact; it is the result of a close connexion between an object and a subject, for the attributes of the one form the appropriate origin of the perceptive enjoyment of the other. The objective attributes were demonstrated by Plato and Aristotle: Beauty resides in order, but, we add, in *expressed* order. That is to say, if the order realized in a work of nature or of art is to be æsthetic, it must *be manifest*, *evident* to the senses and the intelligence. The more evident and attractive an artist can make the dominant character or principle of the chosen order, the more complete and more penetrating will be the contemplation of the percipient mind: consequently the more beautiful will the work be.

LITERATURE.—C. Bénard, *L'Esthétique d'Aristote et de ses successeurs*, Paris, 1887; E. Vacherot, *Histoire critique de l'école d'Alexandrie*, Paris, 1846-51; M. de Wulf, *Études historiques sur l'esthétique de saint Thomas d'Aquin*, Louvain, 1896. Works on the modern period are very numerous. Only a few general histories of æsthetics can be mentioned: H. Lotze, *Geschichte der Aesthetik in Deutschland*, Munich, 1868; E. von Hartmann, *Die deutsche Aesthetik seit Kant*, Berlin, 1886; Max Schasler, *Kritische Geschichte der Aesthetik*, Berlin, 1872; Bernard Bosanquet, *History of Æsthetic*, Lond. and N.Y. 1892; B. Croce, *Estetica come scienza dell' Espressione e Linguistica generale*, Milan, 1902; W. Knight, *Philosophy of the Beautiful*, 2 vols., London, 1891-93.

MAURICE DE WULF.

BEḌIYĀ, BERIYĀ.—A generic name for a number of vagrant, gipsy-like groups, who at the Census of 1901 numbered 57,489, most of whom are found in Bengal and in the United Provinces. In Bengal they practise various disreputable occupations. Some are pedlars and mountebanks, who pretend to be Muhammadans, but exhibit pictures of Hindu gods; others tatu girls, sell simples and quack remedies, and pretend to extract worms from carious teeth; others, again, are acrobats, bird-snarers, or snake-charmers. The Beriyās of the United Provinces are pilferers and petty thieves, and make their living by various kinds of rascality. Their appearance indicates that they are members of the pure Indian gipsy race, allied to Ḍoms (wh. see) and other vagrants of the same kind. Risley makes no reference to their religious beliefs in Bengal; but Rājendralāla Mitra states that the Beḍiyā is a Hindu or a Musalmān according to the prevailing beliefs of the people among whom he dwells. Some are Deists, some Kabīr panthīs or Sikhs, while some are Pachpiriyas. It is extremely unlikely that people in this stage of culture can have really adopted the faith of Nānak or of Kabīr; but it is quite possible that they may sometimes adopt the Pachpiriyā (wh. see) cult. In the United Provinces, where they are in a much more degraded condition than in Bengal, they worship as their tribal deity the Mother-goddess in the form of Devī, Kālī, or Juālamukhī. Many of them worship a deity called Sayyid, who is probably a Muhammadan saint like him of Amroha, but is identified by the Beriyās with the Prophet Muhammad. They seem, however, to depend more upon the cultus of ancestors than on any other

form of belief, and rarely employ Brāhmans, and those only of the very lowest grade, for their domestic rites.

LITERATURE.—Rājendralāla Mitra, *Memoirs Anthropological Society*, iii. 122 ff.; Risley, *Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, 1891, i. 88; Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, 1896, i. 242 ff.

W. CROOKE.

BEELZEBOUL.—See BAALZEBUB.

BEGGARS, BEGGING.—See CHARITY.

BEHISTŪN.—1. Locality and name.—Behistūn is a mountainous elevation which rises somewhat abruptly from the surrounding country—presenting from one point of view a double aspect—about sixty miles from Hamadan, on the main caravan route between Baghdad and Teheran (the present capital of Persia). At its highest point it reaches about 3800 feet, but it is really the continuation of an otherwise low range of hills rather than an isolated eminence.

The name at present made use of by the neighbouring inhabitants is *Bīsitūn* or *Bīsutūn*, which is supposed to have been derived from that of a small village in the immediate vicinity. One is, however, tempted to reverse the relation, as the termination *-sitūn* suggests 'columns' (*sitūn* = Skr. *sthūṇā*), and the opening part may be *bazah* or the like (= Skr. *bahú*). Thus the name would mean 'high columns,' referring to the lofty, and often hewn, face of the rock. The name at present most in use among Westerns is *Behistūn*, or *Bahistūn*. This was handed down to us from the Arabic historian Yāqūt, by Sir H. Rawlinson. Diodorus Siculus (A.D. 1st cent.) seems to have made the earliest mention of the more ancient title as τὸ Βαγίστανον ὄρος.

2. Inscriptions.—The Inscriptions, which chiefly concern us here, render Behistūn famous, as they are perhaps the most important of their kind which have survived to us. They are chiselled upon its hewn surface at about 500 feet above the level of the plain, or about 200 feet above the base of the particular cliff. They occupy, all included, a space of about 60 feet in breadth and 20 in height.

3. The language in general.—The Inscriptions are written *in three languages*—Old Persian, Susian, and Babylonian—in letters a little over an inch in height, it having been found necessary to economize the space. The last two are more naturally to be regarded as translations of the first; but this is not strictly the fact, as there are several sections in the Persian whose equivalents are wanting in the Susian; while, on the other hand, the Babylonian contains some particulars omitted from the Persian. The Persian Inscription consists of five columns, about 12 feet in height and 6 feet broad, flanked on the left, as one views them, by the three columns of the Susian version. A ledge of narrow dimensions—about 2 feet—runs along the foot of them.

4. The sculptured figures and the position of the Inscriptions.—The sculptured figures of Darius and his captives appear immediately above. The nine figures are roped together in a row at the neck. The tenth, that of Gaumata, pseudo-Smerdes (-Smerdis), or Bardiya, is prostrate under the left foot of Darius, who stands 5 ft. 8 ins. in height, with two attendants behind, who are each 4 ft. 10 ins. tall. The height of each of the nine prisoners is only 3 ft. 10 ins., while Auramazda, under the shadow of whose wings the transactions transpire, flutters above, but 3 ft. 9 ins. by 4 ft. 2 ins. in dimensions. The ninth captive has an enormously tall Scythian cap, and occupies space taken from one of the supplementary texts. Under the first prostrate figure is written his name with his crime: 'This Gaumata, the Magian, lied, saying, "I am Smerdes (-dis), the son of Cyrus."' Similar inscriptions in the three languages appear over the other eight.

The Babylonian version stands over the Susian, on the left of the figures, as the observer regards them, on the right-hand side of the forms themselves. Supplementary, but now obliterated, texts appear also above the Persian, but more to the left of the sculptures, as they face us. The three languages were evidently made use of in order to render the Inscription intelligible to the inhabitants of the main divisions of the Empire. That they were copied in multiplied replicas hardly needed the proof which has actually come to light: for what appear to be really fragments from such a reproduction have been found by Koldewey (see *Bab. Miscellen*, pl. 9, p. 24 ff., quoted by King and Thompson, p. 179).

5. The Old Persian language.—The language in which the Inscriptions were written is, like the Avesta, quite Aryan in all its grammatical forms, though it is rather a younger sister than a direct daughter of the Avesta speech; and it is the direct mother of New Persian so far as it survives in its Aryan elements.*

We have recurring examples of a dialect common to the Avesta and the Dario. The pronoun *dim*, *dīm*, e.g., is Dario and Avestan, but not Vedic; the word *yānā*, 'a boon,' has no such application in the Veda, but it is familiar in this sense in both Avesta and inscription; such an expression as 'the right path' in its unmistakably figurative sense is very Gāthic; the proper name *Fravarti* also is Av. *Fravashi*, with no immediate Indian correspondent; and so with the pronoun *ava*, 'yon.' 'This earth and yon heaven' occurs in the Avesta as in the Inscription, while it only remotely lingers in the Sanskrit. So the Dario-inscriptional preserves some of the Avesta-Vedic peculiarities of Avesta, as against those of the *later* Sanskrit. Among the more striking of these is the termination of the nom. plu. masc. of the *a* declension in *-āha*, Av. *-āŋhō* (cf. the Vedic *-āsas*, as against the later Indian *-ās*; see also some of the infinitives). It would be an exaggeration to say that the inscriptional was at all at the same stage of 'preservation' or 'deterioration' as the language of the Avesta. Its distance, as a spoken dialect, from the Gāthic speech must have been about two hundred years. It can be easily restored in Avestan or in Sanskrit.

6. Religion of the inscriptions.—The personifications are best considered in their analogy with, and their differences from, those of the Avesta.

(*a*) *Auramazda* is, of course, Ahura Mazda, Vedic *Ásura* (*su-*)*Medhás* (or *Asura Mahádhās*). Notice the fall of the *h* in the inscriptional *Aura* for *Ahura*. Was not this owing here to the strong accent upon *á* in *áura* (cf. Vedic *Ásura*)?† The presence of a God-unity in the Inscriptions must not be denied because of the supremacy ascribed to Ahura in the words 'the greatest of the gods.' There can be but One 'greatest of the gods'—equivalent to the concept of a 'Supreme Being.' The 'other gods' referred to were inferior, ranking with our archangels. This is confirmed conclusively by the fact that the next chiefest of the gods were said to have been created by Ahura—this in the Avesta (these 'other gods' do not therefore negative the idea of One-God-ism)—whereas the *Amesha-spentas* were originally His *attributes*.

As Ahura was one of the most distinctive expressional manifestations of God-unity which the world had till then, or has since then, possessed, so the *name* is most effective; it is the 'Life-Spirit-Lord,' the 'Great-Creator,' or the 'Great-Wise-One'—infinitely more impressive than our English word 'God,' a term possibly of heathen origin.

(*b*) *Other so-called gods.*—Besides Áura there are *Mithra* and *Anāhita*, two of the noblest subdeities of Aryan literature, who seem to have stepped bodily out of the Avesta into the Inscriptions; but with them we appear to have reached our limit as regards analogies between personifications in the Avesta and the Inscriptions. For where are the *Amesha-spentas* upon the Inscrip-

* Take even a few words like *daušťar*, with which cf. the forms from Av. *zuš*, *zaoša*, Indian *juṣ*; see also *dast*, with which cf. Av. *zast*, Indian *hásta*, etc.

† We do not forget the normal disappearance of the expressed *h* throughout the Inscriptions, for the 'rough breathing' may have been left to be understood; and we may recall how very slight a mark expresses it in Greek.

tions (as has often been, perhaps, too thoughtlessly asked), and, above all, where is *Angra Mainyu*?

(*c*) The absence of the *Amesha-spentas* certainly shows that these personified attributes regarded as archangels were not at all prominent in the author's mind when he composed the sentences for the chisellers. Full references to them had long existed in the earlier Gāthas, or perhaps in the pre-Gāthic and other literature of North Iran. But any argument *e silentio* here verges close upon the fatuous, for there are whole masses of Avesta text itself without a trace of any one of them. That the personified attributes were not known in Middle Persia, and at the seat of Government, is out of the question. Ragha with its surrounding province was a very hot-bed of that form of Mazda-worship which revelled in the great names, and every post brought down despatches from the interesting place. Yet the *Amesha-spentas* appear upon the Inscriptions as attributes only, in expressive qualifying words, and in proper names (cf. *Arta-khshatra*, which may be *A(r)sha + khshathra; Vahuka*, which recalls *Vohu* of *Vohu-manah*; and possibly the mutilated name of *Haurvatāt* appears bodily in that of the province *Harauvatī*). The truth appears to be that Darius was lukewarm in the matter of recognizing those superbly personified ideas. Yet, among many sections of the Persians, the *Amesha-spentas* were, and had never ceased to be, grand abstract characteristics, for they actually retained their significance as reported to the Greeks (see the extraordinary citations by Plutarch from Theopompus [the latter only about two centuries after Darius], where the 'six gods' of the Persians retain all their meaning as ideas, so that Windischmann justly pronounces the passage 'unschätzbar'). Darius knew—as he must have known, when he cared to reflect upon it—that the so-called archangels had in reality much to do with those glorious principles of Truth which he was so continuously signalizing upon the tablets, as well as with Benevolence, Sovereign Authority, Energizing Power, Weal and Deathlessness. It is but a tribute to the greatness of his mind that he overlooked their status as mere archangels. Moreover, he may have been influenced by prejudice—a diseased passion which is also universal elsewhere. For it must not be forgotten that Darius was, above all, an anti-Magian,* and that the *Maga* (*Magha*) was probably originally a purely Gāthic concept closely interwoven with the conception of the archangels. Here, then, is an 'omission,' at once most easily accounted for.

(*d*) But how as regards *Angra Mainyu*? Surely, if ever there was occasion for the mention of such a Being, this was the proper place. But let us pause. That Angra Mainyu was a name only too well known in every sub-kingdom of the Empire may be assumed as extremely probable, for evil concepts readily become familiar. As a matter of fact, the main and central activity attributed to Angra Mainyu is constantly the subject of severe denunciation in the Inscriptions. 'He lied' occurs throughout; the *Draugha* is the Avesta *Draogha*, a variant of the *Druj*, 'she-Devil of the Lie,' first child of Angra Mainyu, though the latter is not actually named. Here we have another signal instance of the essential conception being present in the Inscriptions, although the language invests it only in plain words. Do the facts compel us here again to attribute to Darius such a depth and refinement of ideas as would lead him to overlook even the concept of a chief personal Evil Being? In view of the shrewdness and sagacity manifested by him throughout, it is hard, indeed, to resist this simple solution, although we should seldom relax our vigilance against 'seeing too much meaning' anywhere. Darius had beyond doubt heard the Great Devil's name, but he attached little importance to him, being occupied with more serious considerations.

(*e*) *Devá*.—Let us not fail to notice here another marked feature of a negative character pointing to the Daric Mazda-worship as a separate strain from that of Ragha. Strange to say—and, we might almost add, fortunately—the most sacred name *Devá* is not here perverted, as it was in Avestan Ragha, and as it unfortunately became at last universally in Iran. In Ragha it became permanently the designation of the evil Spiritual Hosts. *Baga* (*Bagha*) was the word made use of upon the Inscriptions for the Deity, and this with no evil connotation as regards the character of the being or beings believed in—in fact, 'goodness' is fully implied in the word. It is a strange historical fact that a glorious name should have been dethroned within one vast territory alone, while it has remained undisturbed over all India, Europe, and the European West—as *Devá*, *Deus*, *Zio*, *Dia*, *Dēws*. Yet, while the name became so sadly degraded before and after Darius, in (nearly) all the territory included within his Empire and even in that bordering upon his central province, it nowhere appears for good or ill upon his Inscriptions or upon those of his line. It would be daring to risk once more the hypothesis of 'intention' in such an omission. This would be to attribute to Darius too close a mental analysis as to the subjects involved, momentous though they were. It is more likely that the omission was purely accidental. The very form of Mazda-worship which prevailed at the Persian capital was more Vedic, and, shall we say, more original—judging from this negative respect for the Vedic word—than that which was developing with such strides in the northern province, and which was destined to become universal throughout Iran. This fact obtrudes itself, but it is very difficult to explain how an otherwise universal, nay, almost a supreme expression, came to be omitted, and that for either good or evil. The word soon differentiated the two branches of the Asiatic Aryan race as a chief name for 'God.' The highest word in the oldest half-world becomes the lowest in the new. This is a plain and most convincing proof that a Mazda-worship of a *quasi*-pre-Vedic type prevailed not only in Persia proper, but everywhere in Central Asia, at a very early period before any *other* form of worship now known there had appeared, and indeed before future *Rishis* ever invaded the southern peninsula.*

(*f*) *Dualism*.—Close upon this follows the still more vital question as to how far Darius, with his teachers, accepted *dualism*. That this relatively profound doctrine was brought into greater prominence through the animosities of that conflict which induced Zarathushtra, or his predecessors, to turn one of the very names for 'god' into their name for 'demon' seems probable. The fury of the reform movement must at times have become acute; and this all the more decided Zarathushtra to pronounce the one formula of all time for such a doctrine.† He saw, as most people—if dimly—

* As the Avesta has it, a *Moghuṭbish*, 'Magian-hater'; the *o* in *Moghu* taking the place of *a* in *Magha*. This is simply due to epenthesis, anticipating the final *u*, whereby *a + u = o*; while the final *u* in place of *a* is a mere shifting of the suffix. A great many roots exhibit a similar variety of forms. Some might dispute the validity of this comparison with the Gāthic *Maga*. but they will not question that with Av. *Moghu*.

* Attention should be called to the expression recorded of Cyrus in 2 Ch 36^{23}, as in Ezr 1^{2}, where he is cited as speaking of the Almighty as 'the God of heaven.' Was not this *Devá*, 'Heaven-god,' pure and simple? The expression seems undoubtedly exilic.

† See *Yasna* XXX.

saw and see, that the two forces in the Universe tending towards good and evil were the more distinctly severed, since the masses whom he most accused of infamy sang aloud their hymns to *devâs* (beings called their gods). But did Darius share this view?

All the elements of antagonism are more in evidence upon the Inscriptions than in most Iranian writings. Everywhere there is denunciation side by side with adoration (see above); and the question whether Darius had actually accepted the clearly defined formulas of Zarathushtra and his predecessors or not is hardly to be considered of secondary importance. It is simply a question—though a somewhat fine one—of fact. One able writer* speaks broadly and familiarly even of the excessive 'dualism' of the NT with its Satanic and demoniac manifestations, though a definite theoretical dualism is alone in question wherever the discussion reaches to ultimate, or rather primordial, origins. Whether, viewed in this light, some of the Jews of the OT were not actually dualists is also a serious question, which demands a word of attention here in view of the close connexion between it and the case of Darius.

A comparison between Jahweh Elohīm and the gods of the nations is often instituted in the OT, and this involves the *recognition of the existence* of those supposed supernatural beings. It remains for us simply to ask whether the Jews—leaders or laymen—ever really believed that the Supreme *Jahweh* was the responsible creator of those diabolical personal accretions or not. Can we suppose for a moment that they held to such a view, or even believed that these fell creatures unfolded themselves, through a degeneration, under the eye and hand of an Almighty Providence. It is quite clear that they never thought of such a problem; but if they held these evil beings to be of separate origin, this involves at once a theoretical dualism. They may not have held distinctly to the doctrine that there were Two First Spirits, but some of them must have come pretty near it. So also must the religious section of the countrymen of Darius, the priests of Old Persia proper; but where is the trace of a *definitely co-ordinated statement* of it in the Inscriptions?

(*g*) *Eschatology.*—Where, amid all their contents and allusions, is there a trace of any theological eschatology in the Inscriptions? The Avesta is one mass of eschatology, but we are startlingly reminded of pre-exilic Israel when we find upon the Inscriptions rewards held out *for this life only.* Where, as has so often been asked, is the doctrine of immortality to be found in the OT prior to the Exile, although the Avesta and post-exilic Pharisaism are quite full of it? Where is it in the Behistūn Inscriptions? Where is the Avestan and the exilic final judgment in our own pre-exilic theology? The latter conception is equally absent from these Persian panels, which, we should say, were the very place for it. Where is the Heaven of the Avesta, with its golden thrones, upon which sit Justice, Love, and Order, as archangels?† The notion of future reward in Heaven is as foreign to the Behistūn Inscriptions as it is to Moses. And where is there a trace of a *millennium*?

(*h*) *Soteriology.*—We should naturally expect also to find in the Inscriptions some allusion to a coming Restorer, like the one expected in the Avesta and in exilic Israel, all the more so because the texts in question breathe hope as they denounce offences—both on an almost unprecedented scale; but there is no trace of such a concept there any more than there is in the pre-exilic books of the OT. The composer's mind seems wholly possessed with the conviction that a supreme, all-powerful, and good God was watching over every circumstance within His immense dominions. Darius seems to have risen each day with the burden of a new civil war within some twenty-three nationalities, each with its kinglet. His faith, at times somewhat like a fixed idea, at times perhaps affected, convinced him that God's activity extended to a minute administration of compensatory justice, which was, however, to have its effect *now*, and *now only*, in this present life. Perhaps he felt that only a supernatural power could have made his past position possible for so long a time. He prays to Auramazda in terms largely stereotyped by his successors, although in the most striking of these prayers recorded he is not so closely imitated (see the passage cited below). But, fervent as are the prayers of Darius, and signal as is his testimony to the unity of God, and His creative energy and providential omnipotence, the eschatology of the Inscriptions is a blank. The writer seems to have been so full of God—or so engrossed with business—that he could not think of anything further that was supernatural. We may compare the OT book of Ecclesiastes, which urges in touching terms the 'remembrance of the Creator' (12^1, if the passage belong to the original and the tr. be correct), but cares little for objective futurity. Koheleth is not disturbed by the failure of retributive justice in this world; he sees little difference between the treatment of the evil and the good; yet he has no dream of a future judgment, or even of any life at all beyond the grave. The same appears to be the case with Darius. What is true of Behistūn holds also for Persepolis, Naksh-i-Rustam, and the other Inscriptions; for, as was said above, the expressions later become stereotyped. Hence they, too, must have had predecessors of a fixed type, all of which goes to prove that Darius was not the spokesman of an innovating creed. Though he was the first prominent prophet of his theology, that theology was thoroughly Old Persian and *sui generis.* It was in the *North* that detailed eschatology flourished. There it was a concentration of the original elements of the primeval doctrine, and was destined, as said above, to spread over all Iran; whereas in Persia proper (the present *Fārsistān*), which was more specifically Darius's home, the primeval lore of Veda and Avesta had, if anything, rather stagnated. Such are our conclusions from the obvious facts. The Behistūn columns are almost *the* document of the Divine unity, creative energy, and providential omnipotence, as they are also the exemplar of intense spiritual fervour, in view of these doctrines; but they are absolutely silent about the other life, whereas, at the very moment when they were being composed, the Avesta and some of the exilic and post-exilic books of the OT contained the standard records of those doctrines of futurity—a sort of *Christianity before Christ.**

As a valuable specimen of the intense religious fervour of the chief composer of the Inscriptions, we may cite a few lines from the sister inscription of Naksh-i-Rustam at the tomb of Darius, near Persepolis: 'A great God is Auramazda, who made this earth and yon heaven,† who made man and amenity (civilization) for men, who made Darius king—the one king of many, the one commander of many.‡ I am Darius, the great king, the King of Kings,§ the king of the lands of all tribes, the king of

* Erik Stave, *Über den Einfluss des Parsismus*, Haarlem, 1898.
† Cf. the twelve thrones of Mt 19^{28} ‖ Lk 22^{30} (cf. Rev 20^4).

* Common to the Avesta and post-exilic Pharisaism are, in addition to the three doctrines specified above, the doctrines of immortality, resurrection, final personal judgment, millennium, Heaven and Hell, while the Avesta has the prior claim to be termed the document of these views, owing to their long native growth in Iran, centuries before they became the elements of post-exilic Pharisaism.

† This expression occurs about a dozen times within the short Inscriptions; 'yon Heaven' is also very Avestan in its ring.

‡ His authority was effective.

§ Notice that this expression was Aryan, for Darius must have

this great earth for afar,* the son of Vishtāspa, the Achæmenid, a Persian, son of a Persian, an Aryan of Aryan race. Through the grace of Auramazda these are the lands which I captured beyond Persia. . . . I conquered them—beyond Persia. I brought them under my authority. They brought me tribute.† What I said to them that they did.† The law which was promulgated by me, which was mine, was maintained.† [Here follows a list of the provinces or sub-kingdoms]. . . . (Thus) saith Darius, As Auramazda saw this earth . . . in war . . . (?) he delivered it over to me :‡ he made me (its) king : I am king. Through the gracious will of Auramazda have I settled this earth through my throne § [or 'through my government,' or 'under my throne'; others render 'in place,' 'to rights': but see the same word 'throne' just under]. What I said, that was fulfilled as was my wish.† If thou thus thinkest "How manifold are the lands which Darius the King governed," then look upon this sculpture which bears my throne, that thou mayest know. Then it will be known to thee that the lance of the Persian hero has reached afar ; then wilt thou know that the Persian hero has fought battles far from Persia. (Thus) saith Darius, the king, What I have done, I have done all through the gracious will of Auramazda. Auramazda gave me aid ‖ till I had completed this work. May Auramazda protect me, and my clan, and this province against . . . hosts (?). For this I pray ¶ Auramazda—this may Auramazda afford me. O man, may what is the command of Auramazda be to thee acceptable, let that not be obsolete (or repulsive) to thee. Leave not the right way.** Sin not.' ††

(*i*) *Darius as a restorer of temples.*—As bearing upon 2 Ch 36[23] and Ezr 1[2ff.] and the marvellous assertions of Is 44 f., we have the valuable statement that Darius restored the *āyadana*, 'places of sacrifice'; so the Susian and Babylonian translations render the word. An activity in the construction, or re-construction, of temples in general is also perhaps later shown in regard to the *apadāna* in the inscription of Artaxerxes Mnemon found at Susa upon one of the ruined columns of an ancient hall. He seems to have re(?)-placed the images of the Daric-Avestan Anāhita and Mithra in the *apadāna*, which, if not actually and exclusively a temple, was obviously an edifice fitted for the reception of figures of those two most prominent Avestan sub-deities. If, then, Darius at once restored the places of worship [note that the *āyadana*, at least, were not necessarily actually 'temples'],‡‡ this recalls the restoration of the gods of Sumer and Akkad to their own homes by Cyrus immediately after his first conquest of Babylon, and shows all the more clearly the general policy of the Achæmenians as regards such acts of courtesy towards the religious feelings of their newly conquered subjects. This makes the decree of Cyrus for the restoration of the Jewish temple all the more credible.

7. Political and military history.—As to the importance of Daric Behistūn, with its companions and successors, for military and political history, little needs to be added here. As is known, Iranian history without the Achæmenian Inscriptions was for a long period a blank, and until they were deciphered by our own eminent Rawlinson, these now leading sources were ridiculously misunderstood and curiously misleading.* We are now assured of those vast political and military movements which took place in Central Asia, upon which the history of the Asiatic, and, indeed, of the whole world, so largely depended. But to us chief among them are those events under whose influence Israel became Persian for two centuries or more, and which determined what we must regard —even if we view them from an anti-Christian standpoint—as stupendous religious circumstances, which, however trivial they may have seemed to the Persian Government, and however relatively insignificant they may really have been in comparison with the other great facts which were then transpiring in province after province of the Achæmenian Empire, must yet force themselves upon us as crucial for all time. Had not Zion become Persian, she would have remained Babylonian, and might never have 'reared her head'; and the dawn of that day might have been hindered when Jesus, the Christ, was to preach within the porches of her temple, and expiate on Calvary the sins of both Jews and Gentiles.

8. The Parthian Inscription at the foot of Behistūn.—This bas-relief contains two distinct compositions. In one of them were sculptured colossal bearded figures, from 8 to 9 ft. in height. Only three of these, however, are still approximately complete. This relatively valuable relief has unfortunately suffered from the vanity and folly of a 'Persian overlord,' one Shaikh 'Alī Khān Zanganah, who, about a hundred years ago, had a large panel cut in the middle of the monument, in the hope of immortalizing (in Arabic) the memory of his own beneficence in building a caravanserai at Bīsitūn and supporting it from the tribute of two villages. This vandalizing abomination extends to 12 ft. in width, and rises to the top of the panel. In the other part of the composition, the figures are in lower relief and on a smaller scale ; and, though they are much mutilated, it is possible to make out some details. In the centre is a horseman, and above his head is a winged figure about to crown him with a wreath. He is unhorsing a second horseman. From the mutilated inscription† we learn that the victorious cavalier represents the Parthian king Gotarzes (A.D. 46–50) overcoming his opponent Meherdates, who was also a Parthian. Behind Gotarzes are the remains of another figure with lance in rest.

9. The extensive hewn panel-surface.—Near the middle of the base of the rock and almost opposite the village, a huge bare space attracts the eye. It measures nearly five hundred feet in breadth and over a hundred feet in height.‡ The tool-marks of the stone-cutters are in curved lines, and above the cutting the natural rock in some places projects several feet. In front of it is a terrace or platform, made of earth and rocks heaped up and extending forward for a distance of nearly 300 feet. At the end of this appear the remains of a massive wall. Some writers hold this space to have been prepared for the reception of

adopted it from remotely distant predecessors. A similar form seems to have been adopted in the Scriptures, where, however, it is seldom applied to a human monarch. Its original use in Iran doubtless preceded its occurrence in Ezk 26[7].

* This expression 'for afar' seems thrown in to modify his 'universal' statement. Notice that the terms were doubtless inherited from his ancestors, as was the original of the Scriptural terms cited at the end of 2 Ch. and at the beginning of Ezra as originating from Cyrus : 'All the kingdoms of the earth hath the Lord, the God of heaven (Deva ?), delivered over unto me.'

† Notice these emphatic assertions as regards the colossal successes ; they are by no means wasted words.

‡ He checked all interior conflicts, and established approximately complete 'guarantees of peace' between some twenty-three otherwise conflicting nationalities. See the note above on p. 451[b], referring to the passage from 2 Chronicles and from Ezra.

§ This is the present writer's suggestion ; see the word *gāthum* just below.

‖ This expression, with the most incisive evidence of *some kind* of personal faith in God, recurs about thirty times within the inscriptions, showing perhaps the highest intensity of such a fervour ever recorded, in view of the necessarily limited extent of the inscription when regarded as mere literature. It indicates a fervour surpassed only, if at all, by what we read in the Psalms.

¶ Note his actual prayer in the first person singular present.

** Note the absolute necessity of recognizing this exhortation in the moral sense ; and cf. the Gāthic passages where the same expression is used ('the straight paths in which Ahura lives . . . in the paths of the Good Mind [the good man] . . ., the straight paths of welfare . . .,' etc. [*Yasna* 33, 5 ; 34, 12 ; 53, 2]).

†† *Naksh-i-Rustam*, 1–22, 31–60.

‡‡ Recall Herodotus' remark (i. 131) that the 'Persians have no temples.'

* Recall among interpretations the truly quaint opinion of Ker Porter, that the nine (?) captive kings, whose names we now read so easily, were the representatives of the ten (?) lost tribes of Israel.

† For the discussion of the text, which, but for the name 'Gotarzes,' has now all but disappeared, see Justi, *ZIrP* ii. 504 f.

‡ See A. V. Williams Jackson (*Persia Past and Present*, p. 188), who says he made a special study of the rock-surface and 'paced off' its breadth.

an inscription, in spite of its enormous dimensions (so de Morgan, cited by Jackson). Others, judging from the large platform, suppose that it was meant to be the back-wall of a palace (so King and Thompson). Nothing is written upon it.

10. The site of an ancient building.—From the foot of the cliff the site of an ancient building is to be recognized, with the outlines of its walls. It is called by the natives *Gāh-i Kai Khosru*, 'the seat of Kai Khosru,' the Sasanian king (A.D. 531–578)—possibly with some reason, though there is nothing further to indicate the accuracy of such a tradition.

11. The monolith.—At a quarter of a mile from the mountain or rock, there lies a sort of huge boulder, about 20 ft. in circumference and 10 in height. It is carved on three sides with life-sized figures in low relief. The central figure is described as bearded, with moustache, and wearing a round cap, and a necklace at the throat, some rings of the necklace being still distinctly visible. It has a close-fitting, undecorated upper garment, girdled; the right hand is extended over a low column, which may be a fire-altar, and the left holds some object, possibly a cup. The legs are very thick, and apart as if in walking, while their lower parts are covered with leggings which look like 'those of a cricketer.' Jackson suggests a Magian priest. King and Thompson speak of a king; and a king might be a priest. The second figure is on the right-hand side of the boulder. It is smooth-faced—the effect suggesting the head of a woman or of a boy. There is a necklace about the throat, and a bracelet on the left arm. The third figure on the left side of the boulder is again bearded; the pose is life-like. Jackson thought the figures were Achæmenian, from the absence of flowing trousers and balloon-shaped hats; King and Thompson regard them as Sasanian, mentioning the 'streamers' on the central figure. No writing is recorded as having been discovered upon this monolith.*

LITERATURE.—For the history of the decipherment of the Persian cuneiform Inscriptions, etc., see H. Rawlinson, *JRAS* x. 3 ff.; Spiegel, *Die altpers. Keilinschriften*, Leipzig, 1881, p. 133 ff.; Fleming, *Beiträge zur Assyriologie*, vol. ii. 1894; Weissbach, in *GIrP*, vol. ii. 1896, etc. p. 64 ff.; King, *Assyrian Language*, 1901, p. 18 ff.; Booth, *Decipherment of the Trilingual Cuneiform Inscriptions*, 1902, p. 149 ff.; Williams Jackson, *Persia Past and Present*, 1906; Mills, *Zarathushtra, Philo, the Achæmenids, and Israel*, 1906, vol. ii. *passim*; Sayce, *The Archæology of Cuneiform Inscriptions*, 1907. See also art. ACHÆMENIANS.

L. H. MILLS.

BEHMEN.—See BOEHME.

BEING.—The term 'Being' indicates the subject-matter of Metaphysics in general, although it is usually discussed under the particular head of Ontology. As a problem, Being is discussed with the aim of discovering a criterion of reality which shall interpret the phenomena of nature and consciousness, whose objective and subjective data respectively are elaborated in the forms of Cosmology and Psychology.

1. History of the term.—The terminology of the fundamental metaphysical principle shows how Western thought is indebted to the Greeks and the Germans; from the one we receive the expression ὄν, from the other the term *Ding*. With the early Greek philosophers are found κόσμος (Parmenides, 92; Heraclitus, 20) and φύσις (Parm. 133; Herac. 2). Parmenides, who usually speaks of Being as ἔστιν εἶναι, also uses the more suggestive term ἐόν (59, 91); and, according to some authorities, Melissus uses περὶ ὄντος as the title to his work (Erdmann, *Hist. Philos.* § 38. 1). Plato selects οὐσία to indicate the subject of Being, and looks upon this as ἰδέα (*Rep.* vii. 533–534); at the same time, when he speaks of the reality of the Idea, he indicates it by ὄντως (*ib.* ix. 585). Aristotle popularizes οὐσία by placing it first among the categories (*Met.* vi. 1), and reduces Eleatic Being to τὸ ὄν. The weight of Greek philosophy was turned in favour of οὐσία as a concept, and of ὄν as a term.

From Latin writers come the terms *essentia* and *substantia*. Seneca uses *substantia* in *Ep.* 113. 4, but seems more inclined towards *essentia* (*Ep.* 58). Quintilian uses *substantia* (viii. 3. 33). Mediæval writers vacillate between these classic terms, but theological motives incline them to *essentia* as a more appropriate characterization of the Divine Being. Among these Augustine was the earliest and most influential, and it is significant that, as a Christian, he unites the idea of God with the antique οὐσία and *essentia*. 'Essentiam dico, quæ οὐσία Græce dicitur, quam usitatius substantiam vocamus' (*de Trin.* v. 9). When Anselm seeks the most general predicate of things, he follows Augustinian terminology and thus prefers *essentia* to *substantia* (Erdmann, § 156. 3). Aquinas employs both *essentia* and *substantia*. In the strife between Nominalist and Realist, there comes about a change in terminology when *realia* is put as the predicate of *universalia*. The defender of the orthodox, or Realistic, view was called a *realis* (Erdmann, § 158). Abelard introduces *realiter* into the discussion of the problem (Eucken, *Gesch. d. philos. Terminol.* p. 65), while, at a later period, Duns Scotus adds *realitas* (*ib.* p. 68). English thought, as in Locke, was inclined to adopt 'substance' and 'essence' as expressions of Being, while the Germans use the Greek ὄν and the Latin *res*. Meister Eckhart uses *Dink* (*Meister Eckhart u. s. Jünger*, ed. Jostes, pp. 66, 89, 90, etc.), as also *Ding* (*ib.* pp. 1, 80, etc.). Eckhart further employs *würklich* (*ib.* p. 86, etc.). Clauberg the Cartesian originated 'ontosophy' (*Metaphysica de ente quæ rectius Ontosophia*, 1660). Kant's preference for *Ding* is well known; Herbart uses *real*.

2. History of the subject.—The 7th cent. B.C. marks the beginning of ontological study. In China, Lao-tse, the founder of Taoism, advanced a metaphysical conception of Being under the head of *Tao*, or 'Nature.' Lao-tse gives the *Tao* a purely negative significance, and from it follows a nihilistic morality of 'doing nothing.' Like the emptiness of a clay vessel, the hollow of an axle, the open space of a door, the *Tao* consists of nothing (*Tao Teh King*, i. 11); yet from it were all things produced (*ib.* ii. 42). Among the ancient Hindus, the development of the philosophic Veda resulted in a more intellectualistic conception of Being. The Upaniṣads advance the idea of world-unity, and in their spiritual monism identify Nature with the Ego. As the juices of plants unite in honey, as rivers mingle in the sea, as salt pervades the ocean, so one element is found in all things. Thus teaches the Veda, whose philosophic formula is found in the following expression: 'That which is that subtle essence—in it all that exists has its self. It is the true. It is the self, and thou art it—*tat tvam asi*' (*Chhāndogya Upan.* vi. 8 ff.). This lofty conception of Being was unknown to the Greeks, for it did not receive recognition in Europe until 1801–1802, when Anquetil du Perron translated the Upaniṣads, whence it was taken up by Schopenhauer in 1819 and related to German philosophy.

Among the Greeks, the preparation for a genuine conception of Being was made by the primitive Ionian philosophers, or physicists, who sought to explain Nature in terms of such physical phenomena as water, air, ether. In a more worthy fashion,

* For other descriptions of this monolith see Oskar Mann, *Globus*, vol. lxxxiii. No. 21, June 1903, p. 328; Williams Jackson *Persia Past and Present*, New York, 1906, p. 210 ff.

Parmenides develops a static monism which is directed against the ideas of both not-Being and Becoming; at the same time, it is sufficiently intellectualistic to identify Thought and Thing. In this spirit, he declares that Thinking and Being are the same—*τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι* (40). It is Being that is truly existent and not not-Being—*ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι, μηδὲν δ' οὐκ εἶναι* (43–44). This rather pointless utterance seems to indicate that, while Being exists as something permanent in thought, not-Being is an appearance which exists only in perception—*δόξα*. In opposition to this static view, Heraclitus urges that Becoming is the highest principle, and points out that, since all things change—*πάντα ῥεῖ*—there is no principle of permanence to be found (see 90–91). Plato's speculative philosophy tends to reconcile the opposed views of Parmenides, who taught him to seek the unchanging as the real, and Heraclitus, from whom he learned that substance could not be found in ever-changing phenomena. Plato's own conception of Being reposes in his theory of Ideas, which latter represent realities in the midst of changing phenomena. The Idea, or Concept, not only includes various things under it, but exercises a certain ontological function among them, giving them of its own reality. On the practical side, the Idea is the perfect type, of which the individual thing is an inferior imitation. This plastic conception of Ideas leads Plato to ascribe objective reality to them. The ground of this profound view seems to be found in the principle of permanence. The Idea possesses Being because it is permanent, while the individual thing is unreal because it constantly changes. In the myth of the *Phædrus* (247), the Idea is looked upon as the 'colourless, formless, and intangible essence,' which becomes visible to the mind as the latter rises to the celestial regions. In the *Parmenides* dialogue, the unity and permanence of the objective Idea are pointed out. In contrast to Plato, Aristotle emphasizes the *dynamic* phase of reality, and develops a view which, with appropriate intellectualistic qualifications, is energistic. In the Aristotelian metaphysics, the principle of Form takes the place of the Platonic Idea. This Form is contrasted with Matter, and both are regarded as causes, in addition to which are two others—Efficient and Final. These four principles constitute the foundation of Aristotle's notion of Being (*Met.* i. 3). Aristotle thus inclines towards a causal conception of Being, where Plato had introduced a substantial one. In general, the results of Greek philosophy were idealistic and static; they inculcated a spirit which was plastic and formal.

While Christianity, which had its root in practical Semitic traditions, had no systematic philosophy to offer, it furnished subsequent speculation with ideas of the soul, the world-whole, and God. At the same time, there resulted a new metaphysics which was marked by the methods of *inwardness* and *transcendentalism*. With Plotinus, the classic conception of Reality was superseded by 'that nature which is beyond Being' (*Enneads*, xiv.). And that which is *ultra esse* is also *ultra percipi*, so that it is known only by means of ecstatic contemplation. Augustine is less mystical in his deduction of *sensus interior*, for it is in a more psychological manner that he seeks to prove the existence of the self. His method, which a thousand years later was made famous by Descartes, is the sceptical one, in accordance with which the *dubito* implies a *cogito* (*Beata Vita*, § 7; *Solil.* ii. § 1; *de Trin.* x. § 14). According to the same method, the Being of God is deduced (*Confess.* x. 40). In Scholastic philosophy, the doctrine of Being connects itself with the idea of God and the nature of the Catholic Church. Anselm, following Augustine, endeavours to deduce the Being of God from the idea which we have of Him: for the Being of God which is both *in intellectu et in re* is more perfect as an idea than that which is *in intellectu solo* (*Proslog.* ii.). There is a second way in which the idealism of Plato was united in Scholastic fashion with the Christian religion; that is, in the opposition between Nominalism and Realism, which led to the conflicting metaphysical mottoes 'universalia sunt nomina,' 'universalia sunt realia.' The resulting conception of Being was something more than the plastic one of Plato; it was both internal and universal. For modern thinking, the way was still further prepared by the conflict over the supremacy of intellect (Thomas Aquinas) and will (Duns Scotus). Intellectualistic Thomism re-appeared in Cudworth's *Intellectual System* and Clarke's *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*. The voluntarism of Scotus ('Quaestiones in secundum librum sententiarum,' Distinc. xlii. [Op. xiii. p. 443]) was unconsciously imitated by Kant and Schopenhauer, and by them related to the modern psychology of the will.

Modernism (which is not quite independent of a mediævalism which, in the instance of Cassiodorus, used the term *modernus* in the 6th cent.) witnessed a continuation of Christian views of Being in Descartes's scepticism. Like Augustine, Descartes connects *cogito* with *dubito*, and to the *cogito* adds *ergo sum*. Doubting is thinking, and thinking is existing. In this fashion, the Cartesian '*Cogito, ergo sum*' (*Medit.* ii.) evinces the *inness* of the Christian conception of Being, while his Anselmic ontology rehabilitates the ideal of *transcendence*. Descartes, whose psychology lacks sufficient content, states the modern problem of Being, and prepares the way for Spinoza, whose mediæval forerunner was Averroës. Spinoza revises Descartes's view of mind and matter by regarding them, not as *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, but as the attributes—*cogitatio* and *extensio*—of the one substance. The result of his teaching is a rationalistic monism which identifies Being with Nature, and sets up a parallelism between mind and body. Leibniz, who makes possible the transition to Kant, takes a pluralistic view of Being, and regards the world as made up of an indefinite number of monads, which still admit of unity in the world-whole, since they, being reflexions of the same world, represent reality in different grades of perception (*Monadology*, § 14) and participate in the one world-plan by means of 'pre-established harmony' (*New System*, 1695).

From dogmatism, Kant led modern metaphysics into criticism. Not only does he oppose his modern forerunners, but he defies the whole Indo-Germanic tendency which in Vedānta, Platonism, and Spinozism had united Being with Thinking. In a certain sense, it was a sort of Semitism which led Kant to affirm the supremacy of practical reason, and to put ethics in the place of logic. Kant creates a dualism between Reason and Reality, between Thinking and Being, and thus declares that we cannot know things-in-themselves. First in order, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which leads to this conception, is the idealization of Time and Space ('Trans. Æsthetic'), both of which Kant regards, not as objective things, but as purely subjective and yet permanent forms of sense. Kant's motive for making Space and Time intuitive does not appear in the 'Æsthetic,' but is confessed later on in the discussion of the 'Antinomies of Cosmology.' Here, in commenting upon the inevitable contradictions of reason, in connexion with which one may with equal cogency argue for the finitude or the infinitude of the world in time and space, Kant points out that these forms of sense are purely subjective, so that our attempt

to find the beginning of the world in time and its limits in space is a regressus of representations, but not ontological progress (*Kritik*, pp. 505–507). Therefore, God as the creator of the world, the soul as eternal, the world as a whole—can never be known by the human mind. The categories of Quantity and Quality, Causality and Substance are deduced transcendentally from the understanding itself (*ib.* p. 77 ff.), but the application of these is determined by the conditions of a possible experience (*ib.* p. 115), and thus relates to the world of phenomena, not to that of noumena (*ib.* p. 236). Mathematics and physics are made possible by a transcendental method which forbids all metaphysical and theological reasoning. Kant's constructive theory of Being appears in the *Critique of Practical Reason* and the *Metaphysic of Morals*, where he seeks to show how God, Freedom, and Immortality, which are not premisses of the speculative understanding, are still involved as 'postulates' of practical reason.

Romantic philosophy in Germany accepted Kant's transcendental *method* of deducing knowledge from the understanding itself, but did not find it necessary to adopt the restrictive *results* of his investigation. Fichte found Being to consist in the self-positing '*Ich*, whose fate it is to oppose itself to the *nicht-Ich* for the sake of achieving moral destiny' (*Wissenschaftslehre*). Schelling's notion of Being recalls the monism of Spinoza; yet, when Schelling seeks in his *Identitätsphilosophie* to reconcile Being and Thinking as opposites, he employs an *œsthetical* method. Hegel accomplishes this same reconciliation by means of the *logical* evolution of Being, through stages of *Sein*, *Dasein*, *Fürsichsein*, which correspond to the familiar metaphysical divisions of Ontology, Cosmology, and Psychology. Realistic philosophy in Germany found expression, first of all, in Herbart, who notes Kant's distinction between phenomena and noumena, and yet believes that appearance is a sure indication of reality—*Wie viel Schein so viel Hindeutung auf Sein* (*Allgemeine Met.* § 307). With this assumption of modern Realism before him, Herbart constructs a static pluralism which seems to unite Parmenides with Leibniz; at the same time, and, after the manner of Aquinas and Descartes, he elaborates an intellectualistic view of the soul as the function of representation. Schopenhauer accepts Kant's doctrine of Time, Space, and Causality, and relates these to the 'world as idea' (*Vorstellung*). Reality is found in the will, which is the true thing-in-itself, known immediately to the mind (*Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, § 1). To be is thus to will, and the various kinds of Being—mineral, vegetable, animal, human—are so many grades of objectification of the will-to-live (*ib.* §§ 21, 23). As another realist, Lotze heeds Kant's warning against the empty thing-in-itself and seeks Being in connexion with its qualities. The origin of Being he puts down as unknowable (*Met.* 5), and turns away from the idea of 'pure Being' as something fictitious (*ib.* §§ 8, 9). Lotze follows Herbart in making Being consist of relation, and formulates the expression, 'A thing is the realized individual law of its behaviour' (*ib.* § 36).

3. The philosophy of Being.—The history thus presents some general principles, and indicates certain points by way of thought and terminology which speculation may fitly use. In contrast with the ancient setting of the problem, which consisted in a conflict between Being and not-Being, modern metaphysics involves the more decisive antithesis between the real and the phenomenal, between thing and appearance. The modern conception is further enriched by a psychological content which enables the thinker to re-cast formal distinctions concerning Being in general upon the basis of consciousness.

From the standpoint of methodology, two considerations seem to guide all metaphysical speculations: on the one side, thought is based upon the principle of *Substance*, on the other it is swayed by that of *Causality*. Behind this distinction between the substantial and the causal categories lies the difference between the laws of the mind—*principium identitatis, principium rationis sufficientis*. The Principle of Identity, which asserts that everything is what it is, persuades speculation to premise an immutable Being which ever maintains its identity in the midst of change. In another way, the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which affirms that everything that happens has a cause, makes possible a second method of speculation which is as anxious to account for *change* as the first one was to elucidate Being. As a result, philosophy has witnessed the development of a *static* conception of Being, which, with Parmenides, Plato, and Spinoza, has exalted Substance to the highest station. Parallel to this, a *dynamic* conception of the problem led to a more active formulation of the world-course, and, with Heraclitus, Aristotle, and Leibniz, it tended to raise Causality to a similar eminence. In keeping with this broad and far-reaching distinction, modern philosophy has re-cast this difference between the substantial and the causal so that it assumes the contrast of *intellect* and *will*. The static Principle of Identity led metaphysics to postulate a Substance as the true expression of Being, and it was urged accordingly that a thing cannot *possess* qualities unless it exist as something superior to them; while the dynamic principle felt itself confronted by a series of changes for which a Sufficient Cause must be furnished. Substantial *intellectualism*, as defended by Aquinas, Descartes, Herbart, and Lotze, sought to show how a thing must exist before it can act; while, in opposition to this dogmatic view, the causal *voluntarism* of Scotus, Kant, Schopenhauer, and Wundt found the Being of things to consist in the active principle which ruled their several states of change. Where the substantial view prevailed, it was 'No causality without substance'; the causalist retorted, '*Keine Substantialität ohne Causalität*' (Wundt, *Syst. d. Philos.* p. 312). Of these two schools, the static, substantial, intellectual one is the more orthodox; the dynamic, causal, voluntaristic one is more advanced and critical. The perpetual conflict between the two may be seen in Aristotle's criticism of Plato; Scotus's opposition to Aquinas; and Kant's critique of Leibniz's dogmatism. On the purely formal side only two views of Being would thus seem possible.

On behalf of the *substantial view*, it is pointed out that Being has a certain affinity for Substance, and is equally inclined towards the idea of permanence. For this reason the advocate of the substantial view has not found it necessary to defend a notion which consisted in the mere assertion of what seemed obvious. If anything *is*, it must be substantial, and that which is in a state of constant change cannot be real. The inherent weakness of this view of Being became manifest when the metaphysics of substantialism endeavoured to relate the world of concepts to the world of percepts. Plato's all-sufficient idealism is at variance with the notion of creation developed in the *Timæus*. Mediævalism, with its idea of Being as *essentia*, could hardly advance beyond a negative view of reality. Spinoza regards Substance as self-conceived and self-dependent, but cannot justify the attributes which, with the modifications, represent the actual world of minds and

bodies. Kant, who saw the emptiness of the thing as Substance, placed reality beyond the realm of knowledge. The substantial view has the weakness that its 'Being' never reveals its own properties, and is incapable of explaining the existence of things in human experience. On the psychological side, the substantial view looks upon the mind as something intellectual. Since the path to the mind was originally through *cogito*, as with Augustine and Descartes, it was to be expected that the soul should be looked upon as something intellectual—*res cogitans*. Moreover, consciousness seems ever to have a cognitive form, while mentality itself seems hardly separable from thought. With regard to the conscious content, the richness and manifoldness of the cognitive process seem calculated to express the range of mentality, while there appears to be no recess of the mind which is not accessible to self-conscious thinking. This Cartesian confidence has led philosophy to believe that every act of mind is an operation of thought. Where, as a second process, feeling enters in, its determining feature, as Herbart pointed out, is something which by way of arrest happens to the idea; so that feeling is a consciousness, or a cognition, of our mental state. In the same way, volition is explained away as a *cogitatio volitionis* (Descartes), while the whole mind is surveyed in the light of the supremacy or sufficiency of the intellect.

The *causal view* of Being is critical where the substantial one is constructive and dogmatic. Accordingly, it is claimed that the mere existence of Being explains nothing, inasmuch as it does not account for action which takes place in the world. Where the Law of Identity seems to satisfy the mind that a thing is what it is, as 'Gold is gold,' the Law of Sufficient Reason must further enter in to show how a thing relates to its own qualities, as gold and its colour, its fusibility, its solubility, its value, etc. Hence, in Logic, it is said, 'Gold is yellow in the light, fusible in the fire, soluble in *aqua regia*, valuable in the market,' etc. The Principle of Causality is as efficient in relating a thing to its qualities as the notion of Substance is in adjusting it to itself, and metaphysics since Kant has tried to find not so much the thing-in-itself as the thing in its qualities. Iron does not exist apart from hardness, ductility, and other metallic properties; colour is nothing in independence of qualities, from red to violet; mind does not exist except as thinking, feeling, willing. That which unites these several states in so many distinct groups is the Thing, and in the inviolable connexion among metallic, chromatic, and conscious states is found the Being of metal, of colour, of mind. The causal view of Being relates a thing immanently to its qualities and not transcendentally to its self, and thus it is in a position to explain the manifest fact of change which to substantialism is a paradox. Since Being does not consist in one substance which can never abandon its ontological place, but is the causal principle which relates the various states of Being to one another, it is conceivable that, within the circle of its own qualities, a thing may change from one state to another, just as colour may be red or blue, consciousness may be thought or volition, man may be child or adult. In this spirit Lotze, who departs from the substantial view without accepting the causal one, declares that it is the Thing that changes, not its qualities (*Met.* §§ 21, 24). The causal view, which pays attention to a thing's qualities and its changing states, hopes to find the real as the result of causality.

On the psychological side, the causal view of Being is furthered by voluntarism. This school involves a larger view of mind than that of self-conscious thought, just as it extends its borders beyond the human to the animal mind. The origin of mind seems more intelligible when interpreted voluntaristically, for life begins in action rather than in thought (cf. Paulsen, *Introd. to Philos.* bk. i. ch. i.) Further, the goal of life appears to be set by practical interests rather than by speculative ideals, and life is realized in action rather than in thought. Like Fichte, Faust describes the root of life in the will, and begins his translation of St. John by saying, '*Im Anfang war die That.*' In addition to these popular considerations, voluntarism is entitled to some ontological respect when it is observed how simple and self-evident volition really is. Schopenhauer, who has advanced this view most vigorously, affirmed, 'The will is groundless' (*Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, § 20), for which reason he reduced all reality to it. In this way, the simplicity of the will seems to satisfy the philosophical demand for unity as the essence of reality and mentality. On the psychological side, Höffding has declared, 'As Eros was made one of the oldest and at the same time one of the youngest of the gods (as also the child of poverty and wealth), so the will may, according to the point of view, be represented as the most primitive or as the most complex and derivative of mental products' (*Psych.* ch. vii. § 1). Such considerations seem to indicate that the will, while not so characteristic as cognition, is possessed of as much ontological significance. The substantial view is a survival of an antiquity which reposed in the ideas of the plastic and intellectual; causal voluntarism is the typical modern view of those who are Kantians rather than Platonists. The causal view has the advantage of explaining the world of phenomena as seen in modern science, just as it is in harmony with the modern life-ideal of energism.

A more restricted view of Being is discussed in connexion with *monism* and *dualism* (*qq.v.*). These theories are one remove from the central problem of the real, for they concern themselves with the idea of Being in its forms of the mental and material; nevertheless, modern philosophy has laid upon them a certain amount of metaphysical responsibility. In the larger sense, classic speculation was monistic, while Christianity, with its distinction between the natural and the spiritual, emphasized dualism. But in connexion with philosophy, the issue was not raised until the dawn of modernism, when Descartes separated *mens* from *corpus*, and distinguished *res cogitans* from *res extensa*. At a later date, Wolff distinguished 'monist' from 'dualist,' although at an earlier period Thomas Hyde had employed 'dualism' to describe the religion of Zoroaster. These two theories do not attempt to solve the problem of Being, but confine their attention to the relation existing between its two phases, mind and matter. Of the two, dualism has the advantage on the side of *statement*, when it declares that we are confronted by a twofold series of things, between which there is a causal connexion. But, from the standpoint of *solution*, monism seems to be in the ascendancy, inasmuch as it is better calculated to avoid certain metaphysical pitfalls. The devices of dualism appear at once when Descartes, unable to justify the causal connexion between mind and matter, attributes the interaction to the intervention of the Deity. This precipitated Occasionalism, which looked upon the *motive* which arouses bodily motion, as well as on the *stimulus* which produces sensation, as occasional, but not efficient, causes of the interaction. Man is innocent of it, as we know from the lack of causal consciousness, argues

Geulincx; for, just as Descartes had evinced Being by his *Cogito, ergo sum*, so the want of causal efficiency appears in a *Nescio, ergo non facio* (K. Fischer, *Descartes and his School*, tr. Gordy, p. 532 note). Malebranche accounted for the connexion between stimulus and sensation by declaring, 'Nous voyons toutes choses en Dieu' (*Recherches de la vérité*, p. 378). Leibniz sought to explain apparent interaction by means of a pre-established harmony, in accordance with which the phases of mind and body corresponded, like the dials of two mutually adjusted, but disconnected, clocks (*New System*, 1695)—an analogy which Geulincx before him had employed (*Ethica*, p. 124 note). That which stands in the way of dualistic interaction between the mental and corporeal phases of Being is, first, *causality* which, as a category, seems to be limited to the physical world. At the same time, the scepticism of Hume, the criticism of Kant, and the realism of Lotze tend to make all interaction between things impossible, just as they leave the way open to a view of *causa immanens*, as a result of which all things, material and mental alike, interact by virtue of their participation in the one real Being who is the World-Ground. A second difficulty appears in the form of the *conservation of energy* which, as a physical theory, can suffer no addition to or subtraction from the given amount of energy in nature. Certain curious devices to surmount this difficulty are summed up by Naville (*La Liberté et le déterminisme*, 1890).

Monism, which advances a theory of psycho-physical parallelism between the mental and material phases of Being, tends to do away with the sharp difference between mind and body. Spinoza, who founded monism, makes interaction unnecessary by assuming, 'ordo et connexio rerum idem est atque ordo et connexio idearum' (*Ethica*, lib. ii. prop. vii.). The whole problem, which lapsed for a century between Leibniz and the new psychology, is taken up in a Spinozistic fashion by Höffding, who declares that 'both the parallelism and the proportionality between the activity of consciousness and cerebral activity point to an identity at bottom. The difference which remains in spite of points of agreement compels us to suppose that one and the same principle has found expression in a double form' (*Psych.* ii. 8). But the monist of to-day, who hesitates to characterize this tertiary principle which embraces mind and body, lapses from the pantheism of Spinoza into an agnosticism of his own. The statement of monism is unsatisfactory in still other ways. On the *logical* side, the Law of Identity prevents our saying 'Mens est corpus,' and it is towards such an identification that the monist constantly tends. Secondly, monism is confronted by an *empirical* challenge, when it seeks to treat mind and body as though they were not dissimilar. Both monism and dualism are shortsighted in regarding mind and body as though they were parallel phases of Being which meet upon the same plane; a more satisfactory view escapes the dilemmas of the problem by relegating the body to a place lower than the ontological position of the mind, as is done by Hegel and Schopenhauer.

The result of this survey of Being as an ontological problem has been to show how a static, substantial, and monistic conception of Being was elaborated by the intellectualism of antiquity; while a dynamic, causal, and dualistic notion was the product of voluntaristic modernity. In general, it appears that Being, which does not consist of any particular thing, is best understood in connexion with the idea of *order*, which with the ancients was *κόσμος*, with moderns *natura*. *To be* thus means to have position in the one world-order, so that a thing receives reality, not by partaking of a certain imaginary world-stuff, but by participating in the world-order. A critical doctrine of Being will not find it necessary to assume a negative attitude towards phenomena which were prized by the ancients because of their æsthetic fitness, by moderns on account of their scientific significance. At the same time, it is unwise to repose all faith in noumena, as though the world were one of mere things and contained no persons. In the totality of the world of Being, phenomena, noumena, and pneumata have their place, and a theory of reality is compelled to examine the phenomena of inner as well as of outer experience. A total view of Being thus includes humanity and nature, just as it is made up of the world of persons and the world of things.

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BEL.—See BAAL.

BELIAL, BELIAR.—These two names, as will be shown below, are but different forms of the same word. Belial is the older; Beliar is a modification of it.

1. **Belial.** — In the AV Belial was usually rendered as a proper name, as, *e.g.*, 'daughter of Belial' (1 S 1^{16}); but RV usually translates such phrases as though Belial were an adjective. Thus 'daughter of Belial' becomes in RVm 'wicked woman.'

Belial occurs in the earliest strata of the narratives of Judges and Samuel, in writing that is coeval with the J document, if not a part of it. From this time on, the word is used in prose narratives and late poetry as a genitive descriptive of certain classes of people. Thus we find 'man (or men) of Belial' (1 S 25^{25} 30^{22}, 2 S 16^7 20^1, Pr 6^{12}); 'son (or sons) of Belial' (Dt 13^{13}, Jg 19^{22} 20^{13}, 1 S 2^{12} 10^{27} 25^{17}, 2 S 23^6, 1 K $21^{10.\ 13}$, 2 Ch 13^7); 'daughter of Belial' (1 S 1^{16}); 'person of Belial' (Pr 6^{12}); 'witness of Belial' (Pr 19^{28}); 'counsellor of Belial' (Nah 1^{11} [AV, 'a wicked counsellor']); 'thing of Belial' (Dt 15^9 [RV 'base thought'], Ps $41^{9\ (8)}$ [RV 'an evil disease'] 101^3 [RV, 'base thing']). In but two instances in the OT is it used differently: in Ps $18^{5.\ 6\ (4.\ 5)}$ (=2 S 22^5) the 'wadys of Belial' (נחלי בליעל) are made synonymous with the 'cords of death,' 'cords of Sheol,' and 'snares of death,' as though Belial, like Sheol, were a proper name for the under world. Again, in Nah 2^1 (1^{15}) Belial is used as a name for a great evil power. RV translates it here 'the wicked one.'

There are, then, three uses of the word in the OT: (1) as a genitive, designating a worthless, wicked, or disagreeable person or thing; (2) the under world; and (3) a great wicked power.* Of these uses, the first is by far the most common, there being but one example each of the second and third.

The etymology of Belial has long puzzled interpreters. It is explained in the Talmud (*Sanhedrin*, 111*b*) as from בלי (='without') and עול (='yoke')—an explanation which Rashi echoes (see Rashi on Dt 13^{14}). Cheyne (*loc. cit.*) regards it as from בלי יעלה (='one may not ascend'). He compares the Babylonian *matu la tarat*, the 'land without return,' and believes the word to designate 'the depth which lets no man return,' and so 'the watery abyss.' These two are not quite synonymous in Semitic thought. The 'land without return'

* Cheyne, *Expositor*, 1895, 435–439, held the three uses to mean: (1) 'subterranean waters'; (2) 'hopeless ruin'; and (3) 'worthless scoundrel'; but this classification does not seem so accurate.

would suit the meaning in Ps 18[5] (=2 S 22[5]) only. Garvie (Hastings' *DB*, *s.v.*) thinks בל may be for בעל, and יעל philologically changed from יער, the whole meaning 'lord of the forest'—an etymology which, so far as the present writer can see, has nothing to commend it. Hommel (*ExpT* viii. 472) regards it as a transliteration of the Babylonian Belili, with which Cheyne had previously compared it—a deity worshipped in early times who afterwards made a journey to the lower world (cf. Jastrow, *Rel. of Bab. and Ass.* pp. 417, 575, 588, 589, and 593). Baudissin (*ExpT* ix. 40 ff.) and *Oxford Heb. Lexicon* (p. 116*a*) hold to the etymology יעל, בלי = 'without worth.' יעל is a good Hebrew root used only in the Hiph. in the sense of 'avail' 'profit.' This etymology suits the great majority of OT passages. Baudissin regards the meaning 'wickedness' as late. Moore remarks ('Judges' [19[22]] in *Inter. Crit. Com.*) that the etymology is dubious.

This must be said of the comparison of Belial with Belili: Belial is clearly a designation of Sheol in Ps 18[5], while at the end of the Babylonian poem called 'Ishtar's Descent,' Belili is a sister of Tammuz, whose lover Ishtar rescued him from the under world. If Ps 18 contains an early substratum, or if we may look to poetry, even when late, to preserve archaic usage, we might regard Belial as originally a name for Sheol. Since the shades were unsubstantial beings, Belial as a qualitative genitive might easily come to signify 'worthless,' 'disagreeable,' then 'wicked.' Its application to the arch-enemy in Nahum would also be natural. Briggs ('Psalms,' in *ICC*. i. 142, 152) regards 'worthless' as the original meaning, and the application to Sheol as the derived significance. Its real origin is, however, still obscure.

2. Beliar.—Beliar is a later form of Belial, the final liquid *l* having been changed into its kindred liquid *r* in accordance with a phonetic law common to many languages. The earliest occurrence of this form of the name is in the *Sibylline Oracles*, ii. 167 and iii. 63 and 72.* In the former of these passages Beliar is the great evil power of the world, or Antichrist; in the latter, he is represented as an emissary proceeding from Rome. In the *Ascension of Isaiah*, Beliar † is mentioned in the following passages: 1[8. 9] 2[4] 3[11. 13] 4[2. 4. 16. 18] 5[1. 4. 15]. He is invariably regarded as the Antichrist, or great king of this world who has ruled it since it came into being. In this character he practically takes the place of Satan; king Manasseh is, for example, said (2[4]) to have 'turned in his heart to serve Beliar.' In the *Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs* considerable light is shed on the conceptions of Beliar then current. He is the source of impurity; he sends evil spirits against men; but he cannot overcome a chaste man (Reuben, 2, 4, and 6). His works are to God's law as darkness to light, but the Messiah will bind him (Levi, 18 and 19). He is the source of lying, but he flees from the man who avoids wrath and lies, and the Messiah will wrest from him his captives (Daniel, 5).

The conception of Beliar in this apocryphal literature is identical with that of 2 Co 6[15], where, according to the best attested reading, Paul asks: 'What concord hath Christ with Beliar?'—Beliar being evidently equivalent to Satan, or Antichrist.

The character of Beliar as Antichrist is a natural outgrowth of the personification of Belial in Nah 1[15] (2[1]).

LITERATURE.—*ExpT* viii. (1897) 423, 472, ix. 40 ff.; Bousset, *Antichrist Legend*, 1895, pp. 26, 171, 172; Charles, *Ascension of Isaiah*, 1900, p. 7; Kautzsch, *Apokryphen*, 1900, ii. 461; Garvie, in Hastings' *DB* i. 268 f.; Cheyne, *EBi*, col. 525–527; Kohler, *JE* ii. 658.

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BELIEF.—1. Definition.—'Belief' is the mental state of assurance or conviction, the attitude of a mind towards its own experiences in which it accepts and endorses them as referring to reality, as having real significance or value. In taking over the term from popular terminology, Psychology has had to encounter the difficulties usually involved in such transference. The vagueness and consequent ambiguity of a term as popularly employed tend to cling to it when it passes into the hands of the scientist, and it is only after considerable controversy that its connotation settles down into the definite and stable form necessary for scientific purposes. This has been the case with the term 'belief.' By certain writers, *e.g.* Sir W. Hamilton, 'belief' has been employed to denote a state of mind specifically differing from that to which the name 'knowledge' is given, namely, that state in which we accept as true a proposition for which rational grounds are not forthcoming. According to Hamilton, we *believe* first principles or axioms, we *know* whatever is logically deduced from such. James Mill, on the other hand, assigns the name to every species of assurance and conviction, the assurance of what is before our eyes as of that which we only remember or expect; of what we know by direct perception, as well as of what we accept on the evidence of testimony or of reasoning. To this Bain and others have objected that, in the case of a present reality, belief has no place; it can be introduced only by a fiction or figure. The believing state relates to representative not to presentative experiences. The judgment 'I see the sun' is full fruition, the judgment 'I can see the sun by going out of doors' affords scope for belief or disbelief. All these differing views could no doubt be supported and illustrated by reference to popular usage. But, as J. S. Mill properly pointed out, the strife between philosophers 'is not likely to terminate until they perceive that the real question is, not what the distinction is, but what it shall be; what one among several differences already known and recognized the word shall be employed to denote' (*Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, 1872, p. 78 n.). The contribution of Brentano has assisted materially towards this desired end. By his analysis of judgment (*Urtheil*) he has been largely instrumental in giving to the concept of belief definiteness and fixity of meaning—logical connotation in short. 'Judgment,' as regarded by Brentano (*Psychologie*, p. 266 ff.), is the attitude of mind assumed towards suggested fact, either by affirmation or denial. It is to be distinguished from the mere thinking of, the simple awareness of, the suggestion; inasmuch as in the act of judgment there goes with the presented suggestion acceptance or rejection on the part of the subject. Stout calls this state 'the Yes-No consciousness,' and proposes to use the two terms 'judgment' and 'belief' as equivalent. There are methodological objections to this, but the suggestion is nevertheless significant. It is more accurate to say, as Baldwin does, that belief is the subjective side of judgment. This statement represents what may be called the prevalent view among present-day psychologists. In the act of belief, then, the individual conscious subject orientates himself towards reality in one of two ways. Either he accepts the suggestion as applying to, as qualifying, reality; or he refuses it, puts it away from him. This latter aspect of the act it is customary to call 'disbelief.' But, as is now generally recognized, disbelief is a kind of belief which, with reference to the particular suggestion, takes a negative form. It, as much as the affirmative form, entails a given attitude on the part of the subject towards the real. The opposite of belief is not disbelief but doubt.

(1) *Psychological character.*—When we directly inspect or introspect this state of consciousness, we find that it possesses a character akin to that

* The variant Belias arose from the naturalizing of the word as a Greek noun.

† The Ethiopic form, Berial, is a corruption.

of an emotional experience. There is a pleasurable sense or feeling of repose, of inward stability, such as comes from the resolution of difficulties, the demolition of obstacles, the harmonizing of conflicting elements. Bagehot has called belief the emotion of conviction. From this point of view, belief may be regarded as a primary psychical experience, a state which cannot be reduced to factors more fundamental than itself. It is contributed to and determined by various psychical factors, but in itself it is distinctive, unique, and unmistakable. It is easily distinguishable from doubt, which, in itself and apart from supporting beliefs, is a disagreeable experience, involving a sense of suspense and strain, of instability and bafflement—a state which the subject normally strives to transcend.

(2) *Belief and the feeling of reality.*—Belief ought to be, but is not always, distinguished from another modification of consciousness, namely, the feeling of reality, or 'reality feeling,' as it is termed by Baldwin, to whom the distinction is due. This is also a primitive and unanalyzable mode of conscious experience. It accompanies simple sense-presentations—a colour, a tone, a smell, etc.; these are 'just there,' coming to us with a vividness and indubitability which put all considerations of accepting or rejecting out of the question. There is no thought of competing or conflicting alternatives; each experience exists, so to speak, absolutely in its own moment and in its own right. To give this state the name of primitive credulity, as Bain does, is to identify different experiences. The 'reality feeling' state, no doubt, furnishes the stuff out of which judgments are formed, but as such it has not arrived at that stage. Judgment involves selection, the definite choice of 'this' from 'other' irrelevant or conflicting so-called facts; and belief, in this regard as the subjective side of judgment, may be called a state of resolved doubt. Now, in the 'reality feeling' state doubt cannot appear.

(3) *Belief and apprehension.*—It is worth while also to insist further on the distinction mentioned above between belief and the mere presence of an idea or complex of ideas, or, as Brentano would say, between 'judgment' and 'apprehension.' The distinction is between thinking of something and accepting that thought as applying to reality. It is possible to entertain an idea, to give it for a time mental hospitality, without coming to the point of definitely assenting to it or definitely refusing to assent to it. We may think, *e.g.*, of Macbeth or Bluebeard, without necessarily involving ourselves, at the time of thinking, in the affirmation or denial of the existence of these personages. The non-scientific person may receive statements as to the speed of light or the distance of the moon from the earth, and feel no obligation to pass a judgment on their truth or falsity. It is no doubt true, as Stout has pointed out, that 'the existence of an object means for us that . . . it forms a determination or qualification of reality in general. Unless the thought of this reality, however vague it may be, is at the same time an affirmation of it, no specific thought of a specific object is possible' (*Analytic Psychology*, i. 112). But this remark affects the case only in the event of the distinction between mere apprehension and belief being drawn so that the latter falls out of cognitive consciousness entirely. It is a relative distinction, in the sense that both members of it must be regarded as aspects of the cognitive act. But, as Stout himself allows, it is ultimate from the point of view of analysis, and is a distinction well worthy of being borne in mind.

(4) *Belief and knowledge.*—It is customary to distinguish 'belief' from 'knowledge,' and some philosophical writers, as we have seen, have drawn a sharp line of demarcation between them. There is, on epistemological grounds, undoubtedly warrant for the distinction. But this must not lead to the conclusion that knowledge is intrinsically different from belief when these two are considered psychologically. From this point of view we may rather say that knowledge is belief at its highest power.

'To know' is to have the completest assurance, to recognize that which is 'known' as definitely and firmly fixed within a system of fact. We can assign the ground for it, *i.e.*, we can show how it is related to and consists with the other elements of the system. We hold it fast. The high degree of assurance here leads to wrong distinctions as in 'I do not believe, I know.' The correct, if pedantic, statement in such a case would be, 'I know and therefore I believe.' 'Knowledge' refers to the objective grounds on which the subjective assurance (belief) rests. It is clear, however, at the same time that the two states are not conterminous. While it is impossible to refer to a knowledge-state which is not also a belief-state, it is, of course, manifest that not every case of belief is a case of knowledge. Thus, truly enough, knowledge is sometimes referred to as a species of the genus belief. Beliefs are judged to be either true or false. This in itself indicates the wider denotation of the term as compared with 'knowledge.' Here it may not be unprofitable to remark that the passing of such judgments involves reference to criteria which are beyond the purview of psychology. Beliefs, 'false' as well as 'true,' are facts of mental experience, and from the psychologist's point of view both are of equal interest and worth. The question for him is not how they come to be valued as true or false, but how they come to be beliefs—this special kind of mental existent. The justification or condemnation of a belief is a logical or epistemological task. The explanation of this belief is another matter. Belief does not inevitably wait upon knowledge; it is not always ratification of a clear insight into the truth of things. On the contrary, belief as a rule is antecedent to knowledge; proof is an afterthought. It is not, therefore, sufficient to refer to the rational grounds of a belief, in the attempt to explain it; the causes which bring it about, the sources from which it derives its vitality, are to be sought not merely in the region of the logical understanding.

2. Factors in Belief.—(1) *The cognitive factor.*—Undoubtedly belief must be in relation to some mode of cognitive consciousness: a sense-percept, a memory-image, an idea or train or complex of ideas. These furnish the immediate points of reference for any belief. The question remains as to how far they may be regarded as the effective causes, the important and central determining factors, in any given case of belief. To put it otherwise, are we to consider the development of belief to be governed by purely cognitive or intellectual conditions?

James Mill, following Hume, may be taken as an example of those who have a bias towards an affirmative answer to this question. H. Spencer and Bain (in the amended version of his view on this subject) follow suit. Hume, who speaks (*Inquiry concerning Human Understanding*, § v. pt. ii. 1) of belief as a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object than that which the imagination alone is ever likely to attain, seeks to show that the superiority of belief in these regards arises from a customary conjunction of the object with something present to the memory or sense. James Mill devotes his elaborate and suggestive chapter on 'Belief' in his *Analysis of the Phenomena*

of the Human Mind to the working out of Hume's hint and to attempting to trace all forms of belief to the 'grand comprehensive law of association.' No instance can be adduced, he boldly says (*op. cit.* p. 367), in which anything besides an indissoluble association can be shown in belief. Thus, for example, the belief that we see extension and figure as well as colour, is referred to the almost invariable and constant conjunction of our visual, tactile, and muscular sensations. So that, when we have the sensation of colour, we cannot avoid having the ideas of extension and figure along with it. There is a certain inner incoherence in this doctrine, as has, indeed, been pointed out by J. S. Mill. The elder Mill, in introducing the illustrations here quoted, states that in these cases it is generally admitted that we receive no sensation but that of modification of light. This at once brings the doctrine of indissoluble association into question, because we have here a case (one of many) in which such an association does not lead to belief. For, those who are interested in these matters, and who follow in Mill's track, do not believe that they see extension and figure, or they declare that they entertain this belief only at times when they are off their guard. There are thus two conflicting attitudes possible with regard to the same fact, and there clearly must be in at least one of the two cases a determining factor other than association. Association cannot be made the key-word with regard to belief any more than it can with regard to knowledge. It should, nevertheless, be recognized here that the operation of association has undoubtedly an influence on many beliefs. It appears, however, that association is effective not so much as a factor in setting up the belief as in conserving and supporting it once it is set up. This is hinted at by Hume (*op. cit.* § v. pt. ii.). When H. Spencer tries to show that association is the central principle, the ultimate mental uniformity here, he is not successful. It is true, as he says, that if certain states of consciousness absolutely cohere in certain ways, we are obliged to think them in those ways. But this proves nothing; it would be equally true and equally unedifying to state that, if we are obliged to think certain facts in certain ways, then they must absolutely cohere in consciousness in these ways. We cannot solve the problem of belief by the mechanical formula 'indissoluble connexion.' To complain, as J. S. Mill has done, that it leaves no distinction between the belief of the wise and the belief of fools, is beside the mark, because it introduces an epistemological point. But the complaint indicates a point worthy of note in this connexion, namely, that a belief rooted in and supported by an association and widely held may be refused and contradicted by a few who have 'thought more' about the facts in question. And, as more and more people are induced to think with or after the pioneers, the new belief begins to overtop the old and finally almost, if not altogether, obscures it. The familiar case of the belief that the sun moves round the earth illustrates this point. To say that the new belief that the earth moves round the sun is due to a counter-association is to play with words. It is due to the fact that this relation has come to be seen as a necessary part of a whole system of ideas with reference to the physical universe. And it is here that we come upon the most important condition of belief so far as cognitive factors are concerned. The perception of a given element of experience as fitting into and harmonizing with the rest of experience, in so far as this has been thought by us, gives it an irresistible claim upon our acceptance. The requirement of system, of ordered connexion, is the profoundest need of the intellect, and according as this need is met will belief be induced. Belief determined on such grounds is equivalent to knowledge, and the further discussion of the conditions here would lead us into the heart of the problems of the theory of knowledge. See EPISTEMOLOGY.

(2) *The emotional factor.*—It is manifest, however, that, as has already been pointed out, human beliefs do not always rest upon such grounds. It is not unusual to find belief determined by other considerations than reference to systematic connexion. It has been widely recognized that emotional elements appear as factors in the incitement and sustenance of beliefs. It has been noted that the state of belief has in itself a certain emotional colouring. Thus Hume says that 'the difference between fiction and belief lies in some sentiment or feeling which is annexed to the latter, not to the former' (*op. cit.* § v. pt. ii.). But it is not as an aspect of the resultant that feeling is here to be considered, but rather as a determinant of the process leading to that result. The prevailing emotional disposition, the mood of an hour or of an epoch in life, will materially influence the beliefs of the individual. Such influences act mediately. Religious fervour, social enthusiasm, love, anger, *e.g.*, predispose the subject to select and to accept those ideas which harmonize with and nourish the disposition or mood. In the most general aspect of this consideration it is to be noted that in the sanguine, youthful period of life, when vitality is high, belief as a rule flourishes more abundantly than in the colder and more discriminating period of advanced years. Again, as James has pointed out, theories of a pessimistic type, which tend to darken and chill the life of feeling, are not readily or widely believed, even though they may appear satisfactory to the understanding. They meet with an inarticulate, but none the less stubborn, opposition in the region of the emotions. They run counter to the average mood of humanity. On the one hand, the harmony of a particular belief with the emotional mood intensifies and enriches the feeling with which the idea is suffused; on the other hand, with the decay of a particular mood, related beliefs suffer proportionally. With the dwindling of religious enthusiasm, when 'love grows cold,' belief in the objects round which these feelings cluster becomes more feeble, a tendency to criticism, undreamt of in the intenser emotional hours, makes its appearance, and the beliefs readily disintegrate. Bain, in suggesting that the saying of Jeremy Taylor, 'Believe and you shall love,' should more fitly read, 'Love and you shall believe,' has, at any rate, recognized the efficiency of the emotional factor in belief. We believe with the heart as well as with the head. The search for truth itself is supported by its emotional coefficient—love of truth—which, as has been wittily said, is often utilized in order to prove that that which we love is true.

(3) *The conative factor.*—In the volitional or active aspect of conscious experience we find an even more important determinant of belief. This is not correctly separable from the foregoing. The various factors will be found together, in varying measure, in any act of belief; but, for purposes of clear exposition, the conative factor can be treated as though it were separate. At first sight volition seems to have little, if anything, to do with belief. It has been widely recognized since Hume that there is a certain coerciveness in belief; it 'depends,' he says, 'not on the will, nor can be commanded at pleasure' (*op. cit.* § v. pt. ii.). The experience of being 'compelled to assent' to a proposition is familiar to most people. It is certain that belief cannot be commanded at pleasure, that it cannot be brought forth by a simple fiat of will, in that abstract sense of will. It is nevertheless

true that will plays a leading rôle in the constitution of our belief. So impressed by this was Bain, that in his main treatment of this phenomenon (*Emotions and Will*[3], p. 371 ff.) he maintains that belief is a growth or development of the will—a phase of our active nature. He does not rule out the cognitive factor, he recognizes it in what he terms the intellectual Association of our Experiences; nor does he deny the influence of feeling, but he argues that these are subsidiary to the volitional or conative factor, and maintains that belief is most vitally related to activity or the will. He bases this judgment principally upon the fact that what we believe we act upon. Action is the test of belief. Thus, if a politician declares Free Trade to be good and yet will not allow it to be acted on (there being no extraneous barriers in the way), people say he does not believe his own assertion. To maintain his thesis, Bain is sometimes driven to somewhat extreme measures. He recognizes that there are cases where the connexion between belief and activity is not obvious, and alludes to them as 'apparent exceptions' where, though not obviously, the connexion still exists. 'Many men that will never cross the Sahara desert believe what is told of its surface, of its burning days and chilling nights.' But the connexion with activity here is, he holds, present, for their attitude may be expressed by saying that, *if* they went to Africa, they would do certain things in consequence of this information. This, as has been suggested (Stout, *Analytic Psychology*, ii. 257), is beside the mark; for where we believe without actual reference to practice, the mental attitude of believing must be actually distinct from the practical attitude. Bain does not show that action is a condition of belief; he only shows that action is an empirical test of belief, and even so he weakens and embroils his position by unnecessarily limiting activity to forms of bodily movement. Granting all that Bain puts forward, we have still to ask with Brentano (*Psychologie*, p. 268) why it is that one idea has an influence upon action and another has not. In short, he shows that action depends upon belief, and not that belief depends upon action. Bain afterwards (*op. cit.*, Appendix, p. 100) briefly recanted this view in favour of a more intellectualistic treatment of belief on associationist lines. In so far as his first position involved the doctrine that belief is wholly volitional in its nature, the recantation was justified. At the same time Bain's discussion did excellent service to the psychology of this subject, in drawing attention to a vital constituent of belief; and his contribution from that point of view has permanent value. It leads us close to the centre of the matter. A brief inspection of the facts of the case brings us to perceive that without beliefs of some kind man cannot maintain himself in the universe at all, and that the fullness of life and the fullness of belief are in a direct ratio. This does not contradict the truth that beliefs are shed as experience advances. They are replaced by deeper and more comprehensive beliefs. We discover certain needs, and in the measure of our satisfaction of them is the measure of our life. This satisfaction is obtained through the establishment of some *rapport* between the subject and the objective world or worlds in which it seeks to maintain itself. Those things which are found to satisfy the need, to fulfil desire, are accepted and clung to. They are, in fact, believed in. Without such belief one would be endeavouring to operate in a vacuum. This is vigorously and rightly insisted upon by the Pragmatists. The question of the organization within a scheme of values of these needs, vitally important though it be, is not one which concerns us here. It may be said in a parenthesis, however, that it is one to which Pragmatists have not as yet in their metaphysical and epistemological discussions devoted sufficient attention. It is enough to point out in this place that there are needs of various kinds—physical, logical, æsthetic, and religious—and that in the experience of finding satisfaction for them we find belief. The belief emerges at that point where the desire which is the expression of the need finds the means of its adequate fulfilment. This applies, *e.g.*, in the sphere of science, where we seek for a continuous and coherent system of objective fact, as in the sphere of religion, where we seek for an adequate support for our moral and spiritual needs (cf. Royce, *Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 330 f.). We orientate ourselves in this direction or in that, according to the pressure of the need, by means of the power of attention (*q.v.*), which involves selection, self-determination In brief, and in a somewhat misunderstood phrase, we 'will to believe.' This, of course, does not involve unchartered freedom or the introduction of sheer caprice. Our needs are not created by whims. They are the expressions of a nature striving to realize itself, and we but recognize their appearance. It is true that they may be regarded as the needs of a particular subject, and that the ends which they adumbrate are posited by that subject. But that does not necessarily involve us in indeterminism. Here, however, we are breaking ground upon the problem of Freedom. Keeping to our proper theme, we have further to observe that, though the end is posited by the subject and without prejudice to what is thereby implied, there is a certain objective limitation in the media through which it is to be realized. The nature of the process by which the end is attained is, so to speak, fixed independently of the subject. The subject finds it and accepts it as leading up to his end. The urgency of the need will no doubt often lead to the over-hasty and uncritical acceptance of means as real which further tests condemn, but the central element in these tests is just the need referred to; that which has been proved fictitious did not really meet the need. What is here said connects itself with the statement regarding the emotional factor, for the emotions are intimately connected with the furtherance or the obstruction of our conative tendencies.

(4) *Belief and personality.*—The stream of belief then is fed from various springs. We cannot truly say that it is a cognitive, an emotional, or a conative state, in the sense that it depends solely on any one of these forms of the conscious life. We believe with the whole, many-sided self. Belief expresses the definite attitude of the personality towards its experience. In Baldwin's definition of belief as the 'consciousness of the personal endorsement of reality' the adjective bears unusual fullness of meaning. 'Nulle manifestation de notre personnalité n'exprime plus adéquatement celle-ci que la croyance,' says Jules Payot (*La Croyance*, p. 173), and we may sum up this portion of our statement with his emphatic pronouncement: 'Nous croyons avec tout ce que nous sommes' (*ib.* p. 174).

(5) *The social factor.*—This reference to belief and personality introduces the mention of a factor in the constitution of belief which is of a different order from the above-mentioned, but which deserves special notice because of its import. This may be called the social factor. One of the most vital parts of that environment to which a man must make adjustments, in order to maintain and realize himself, is what we call the social environment, the *milieu* of personalities and their products in which we all find ourselves planted. Our equation to that is one of our great life-tasks. An important part of that environment is the body of

beliefs—including what are called superstitions, traditions, and prejudices—in which the communal life expresses itself. These we acquire for the most part unconsciously, as a portion of inherited experience, through our necessary participation in this life in its various forms—the family, the school, the Church—and in the common interchange of social talk. If and when we arrive at the self-conscious and reflective stage, these may be criticized and modified or abandoned. Their abandonment, even when a substitution is made, is as a rule achieved only after considerable effort. For on the abandonment follows a sense of the loss of something of that solidarity, of participation in the life of our society which is so necessary and precious to us. A barrier is placed between the 'unbeliever' or the 'doubter' and his fellows. Only the very strong or the very headstrong man will dare to erect it. And he will do so only on the assumption that the barrier is a temporary one. The fervour with which a novel idea or doctrine is promulgated is due largely to a desire to regain that sense of social support which for the time being has been lost through departing from generally accepted belief. Even so, the heretics and reformers must be a small minority in any society; to the great majority of its members the social sanction of a belief is so strong as to be practically invincible. The social need is imperative, and orthodoxy appears to them to be a necessary means to its satisfaction. The unfriendly attitude of the community or society towards the heterodox is in this regard intelligible. The insurgence of a small part against the whole threatens, or appears to threaten, the integrity of the whole; and this is, so far rightly, something to be thwarted and put down. In certain extreme cases the community places the heterodox and insurgents under constraint, by committing them to a prison or a lunatic asylum. Society, in any form, is then a great conservator of beliefs; and the social factor is one which cannot be neglected in tracing out the causes of belief.

(6) *Religious belief.*—The detailed discussion of various forms and stages of belief—the beliefs of primitive peoples, the superstitions of civilized man, belief in an objective world, in Nature as uniform and under law, belief in the objects and ideals of æsthetics, morals, and religion—would be a long and an arduous undertaking, and it would add nothing but illustrative material to the general discussion. One of these forms, however, calls for special remark for a special reason. Religious belief has sometimes, particularly, though not exclusively, by Catholic theologians, had a claim to uniqueness put forward on its behalf. It is suggested that it is not determined or built up in the same way as other modes of belief. Thus we find Newman, quoting Dmouski and others in support (*Grammar of Assent*, pp. 186–7), laying it down that there is a marked distinction between human or natural faith and Divine or supernatural faith—the latter being defined by him as 'the assent which follows on a Divine announcement, and is vivified by Divine grace.' This form of belief, it is maintained, differs from 'human' belief not merely in degree but in kind, being intrinsically superior to it. This superiority, it is further somewhat obscurely stated, is not a matter of experience, but is above experience. The distinction is one which depends on a metaphysical theory as to the ultimate source of belief. Dealing with the phenomena by the psychological method, we cannot say that religious belief reveals differences of such a kind as to compel us to isolate it completely from other forms. It undoubtedly differs in content, and this again no doubt affects the intensity or quantitative character of the state, but in a psychological regard there is no deep-lying or fundamental qualitative distinction revealed. In this form of belief the reality referred to and endorsed is of a wider and more comprehensive character than that elsewhere dealt with. The issues involved are of a more tremendous and far-reaching kind. Life, in the light of religious belief, is no more the brief drama of an isolated self acted out against the shifting background of the world of time and space; it becomes part of an all-comprising reality, subsumed in the life of God. The narrow limits of the self are transcended; the personality is enriched and dignified by the sense of this; it acquires a fuller and more permanent value. It is intelligible how with the emergence of belief of this kind there comes the sense that salvation has been found. It is also intelligible how it should come about that such a belief is regarded as given to the subject, not formed by him. For the subject is not always clearly aware of all that is here set forth as contained in it. It does not, as a rule, come as the result of a clearly reasoned process, it usually arises out of a more or less inarticulate sense of great need, and in the measure of the need is the measure of the emotion accompanying the satisfaction of it; it is so powerful that it comes with a certain invasive character, it rushes in upon the subject. The believer has an overwhelming feeling of the reality of his experience. The investigation of the grounds of the belief is a matter for later reflexion; it is the business of the theologian and philosopher, who come in after the act of belief. Indeed, the individual believer may feel averse from any such reflexion or examination, on the ground that it tends to trouble and obscure the purity of the emotional state. Without prejudice to the question as to the rationality of religious belief, and dealing with it simply as it presents itself as a psychological phenomenon, we may say that here the emotional and volitional factors are markedly present, the intellectual factor playing apparently a minor rôle. The volitional factor has already been hinted at. The believer arrives at his belief by seeking, by turning himself in a certain direction, putting himself in a certain mental attitude. This, it may be, does not take place through the formation of a deliberately conceived and clearly conscious resolve, but it is nevertheless volitional. The believer finds because he seeks. There is nothing more constantly urged in the literature of religious belief than this, that the subject must act, he must turn his face in the right direction for the light to fall upon it. There is marked insistence also on the point that it is not by appealing to the reason directly, but in acting upon the will and the emotions, that religious belief is implanted and fostered. This is corroborated by psychological knowledge. It does not follow that this means an appeal to the irrational rather than to the rational in man. And when James speaks (*Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 73) of 'the inferiority of the rationalistic level in founding belief,' he is presumably referring to the articulately rational. As to the specific forms which religious belief may take, this obviously depends largely on the social factor, on the influence of the institutions, the forms of instruction, and the like, through which the society in which one lives expresses its religious consciousness, and realizes and satisfies its religious need. See also FAITH.

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A. MAIR.

BELIEF (logical).—Belief, as the mere subjective correlate to reality in general, does not give rise to problems of logical method, though it may not be a 'sapless abstraction' within a system of epistemology, as Hegel considered it to be. Other contexts, however, raise questions as to the validity and tests of belief as compared with knowledge. Our cognitions are to some extent beyond test or challenge, being inevitable under the laws of sense intuition and understanding, or through the conscious sequences of experience; to some extent they can be tested in detail by appeal in each case to the unchallenged part of the cognitive system itself; and to some extent by appeal only to aspects of our complete nature which are over and above cognition itself. It would be convenient in logical discussion to use the term 'belief,' as distinguished from 'knowledge,' only for those cognitions which can be tested by the latter method. In this sense it would follow in general a distinction traceable from Kant, through Beneke, Ulrici, Adamson, James, Ormond (*Foundations of Knowledge*, pt. 3, ch. 1) and others, between objective and subjective 'grounds' of cognition. Belief so defined shares with knowledge the function of 'presenting to us realities, and thus influencing the passions and imagination'; and it may present them as primary or as inferences, and as certain or probable, whether sensible or super-sensible.

Laws of thought regarded as structural forms in the system of our cognitions are absolutely primal. It is only when thought includes expectation as to concrete matters of fact that any challenge is possible. Kant offered as a basis for expectation certain 'Principles of the Understanding'—the permanence of substance, the universality of law, and the inter-connexion of the world. If these Principles could be shown from the structural forms of cognition, they also would be beyond question. But subsequent developments of the Kantian epistemology admit that they cannot.

'We might have the right to say that the laws of space . . . must of necessity hold good of all objects of our experience, for nothing will ever make its way into experience without having been already moulded in that form of space through which alone it becomes an object for us at all. But we cannot attempt to prove in the same way that, unless there was a connection according to law in the real world, the experience which we possess would be impossible' (Lotze, *Logic*, § 349).

Empirical epistemology has come to the same final issue. Mill's attempt to justify logically the principle of the Uniformity of Nature, by appeal to accepted inductions of lower grade, has been repudiated by recent Empirical Logic (Mill, *Logic*, Bk. iii.; Venn, *Emp. Logic*, ch. 5). Expectation, therefore, is grounded in our complete nature, and its most general postulates are primary beliefs.

'A reign of law embracing all reality . . . is only an assumption with which every enlargement of experience is accompanied . . . an immediate confidence or faith . . . as is also the universal tendency of thought to turn the observed facts of co-existence into coherent connection' (Lotze, *Logic*, § 349).

Super-sensible realities also, so far as the plan of our complete nature requires that they shall 'be made present to us . . . and influence the passions and imagination,' are certified in belief. How far they are primary in relation to other contents of belief, how far they can be logically elaborated, and how far corroborated by the independent process of strict knowledge, must be considered in their own special literature. As primary, they are in line with the postulates of scientific expectation.

'We assume, on the one hand, that our perceptions submit to the claims of thought in so far as to allow of their being arranged in a conceptual system and in orderly connection; on the other hand, that all our actions can be subordinated to a single end. These assumptions are postulates, and our acceptance rests in the last instance upon our will' (Sigwart, *Logic*, § 62).

'If we require that the conception of the Universe be that of a whole and an essentially complete unit, and at the same time that it should comprehend all individuals, we follow in this and other requirements . . . the inspiration of a *reason appreciative of worth*' (Lotze, *Microcosmus*, ii. 5, § 2).

'If no better ground for accepting as fact a material world more or less in correspondence with our ordinary judgments of sense perceptions can be alleged than the practical need for doing so, there is nothing irrational in postulating a like harmony between the Universe and other Elements in our nature of a later, a more uncertain, but no ignobler growth' (Balfour, *Foundations of Belief*[8], p. 391 f.).

'That there is no ultimate test of truth besides the testimony borne to the truth by the mind itself . . . is a normal but inevitable characteristic of the mental constitution of a being like man on a stage like the world' (Newman, *Grammar of Assent*, ch. ix. § 1).

Such quotations as these are not intended to appeal to an obtrusive 'wish' that becomes 'father to the thought,' or to a purposeful 'ignorance' that may be chosen as 'bliss,' but to a final trend of our spiritual development and to methodical analysis of the complete structure and function implied in it. Historic instances of such analysis are Butler's, for the purpose of 'showing moral obligation,' and Kant's, for establishing, through the primacy of Practical Reason, our judgments as to Freedom, God, and Immortality.

The topic 'belief' comes to be a doctrine of uncertainties, as in Locke, Beneke, Fechner, Ulrici, and James, when, instead of presenting a primary postulate or reality, it supplements knowledge in dealing with some detailed problem of science or life. Sometimes our complete nature guides the interest or interprets the final outcome of scientific inquiry; as in such conceptions as force, organic function, creation (Ulrici), or such principles as indestructibility of matter and conservation of energy (Jevons, *Principles of Science*, ch. 31). Sometimes it sustains scientific methods that are of themselves inconclusive; as in the analogy which attributes consciousness to other organisms than our own, or even to larger systems of Nature (Fechner). Sometimes it decides an option between alternative judgments which otherwise might remain always in problematic form, as between fatalism and personal responsibility (James, *The Will to Believe*). Sometimes it introduces inference to an otherwise alien region of fact, by supplying some mediating principle; as when history and prediction become possible through the postulate of the persistence of natural collocations and the recurrence of causes (Hugl as, *Theory of Inference*, chs. 8–11; Sigwart, § 99). Sometimes it

opens empirical facts to explanation by reference to super-sensible realities; as in historical Free-choice or Miracles or Incarnation (Lotze, *Logic*, § 349, *Philos. of Rel.* § 62; Balfour, pt. 4, ch. 3).

Belief, like knowledge, may vary in certainty and influence and take special titles accordingly, without ceasing to be valid for human nature as such.

'In the empirical branches of knowledge,' Kant remarks, 'physics, psychology, and the like . . . we may have "Opinion," an assent which is consciously held as neither objectively nor subjectively adequate' . . . while 'of many cognitions we are conscious only in such a manner as not to be able to judge whether the grounds of our assent are objective or subjective . . . and this is "Persuasion." Both fall short of Conviction, whether logical Conviction, that is, Knowledge, or practical, that is, Belief; because they are not "necessary"' (*Introduction to Logic*).

But belief, unlike knowledge, may be valid for rational nature as such, without being valid for all persons. The individual mind realizes its development under conditions much more special than those for the racial or collective mind, and admits details not admitted into the cognitive system common to all. Among the examples are the following: (1) Our common cognition assumes that objects of thought are not altered by the mere event of their being thought of (Venn, *Empirical Logic*, ch. 2); yet for the individual mind this postulate may be suspended in favour of maxims of expectation that lead to their own fulfilment. Such are the mutual confidence of social co-operation, self-reliance in personal enterprise, hope during illness (James); and, on a higher level, our assumption of moral sufficiency for an occasion, or of personal acceptance with the Divine Being. (2) The option of uncertainties must often be closed for the individual, though remaining still open for science or for common belief. Inferences that are 'informal,' and under the sanction of an 'illative sense' like the insight or 'tact' of an expert, must be substituted for explicit thought. In practical discretion, taste, conscientious scruple, and personal faith we must thus interpret our own personal nature (Newman, chs. 8 and 9; Germar, *Glauben oder Wissen*, 1856). (3) External authority must be accepted in default of personal inference; the spirit of our time, the dogmas of specialists in science, testimony for historical events, moral conventions, creeds of the Churches (Balfour).

As possible principles for constructing a scale of certainty in belief, have been suggested: (*a*) the narrowness of the void in our scheme of reality which is left by strict knowledge; (*b*) the finality, in value for development, of the subjective need which attempts to fill it; (*c*) the intrinsic inaccessibility of the void to knowledge itself (Beneke).

LITERATURE.—See end of preceding article.

J. BROUGH.

BELIEF (theological). — See AGNOSTICISM, ATHEISM, and especially FAITH.

BELLS.—See GONGS AND BELLS.

BENARES.—1. Name and history.—Benares (Banāras), the largest city in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh except Lucknow, is situated in the Benares District (lat. 25° 18′ N., long. 83° 3′ E.), on the left bank of the Ganges, which flows past the city for a distance of nearly 3½ miles. The river bends to the N.E., so that the city stands for the most part on the N.W. bank, which is in places 100 feet high. A census taken in 1803, which gave the population as 582,000, was vitiated by the assumption that twenty persons should be assigned to each house. The true population (1901) is returned as 209,331, comprising: Hindus, 153,821; Musalmāns, 53,566; Christians, about 1200, chiefly in the cantonment, civil station, and mission grounds; with a few adherents of other religions.

At the present day Hindus speak of the city, which is acknowledged to be the religious capital of Hinduism ('the general school of the Gentiles, the Athens of India,' to use Bernier's words), indifferently as either *Kāśī* or *Banāras*, but the latter name, anglicized as *Benares*, is that commonly used by people of other nationalities and in literature.

The name *Kāśi* (*Kāśī*, in Pāli *Kāsī*) was originally the name of a tribe or nation inhabiting the country between the Ganges and Ghāghrā (Gogra), and at times apparently extending its authority over territory to the north of the Ghāghrā and the south of the Ganges. Legends of Kāśi Rājā are current in the Gorakhpur District, north of the Ghāghrā, and the small town of Rūdarpur in that district is said to bear the alternative name of Kāśī (Martin, *Eastern India*, ii. 338). To the south of the Ganges, the Karamnāsā river, now forming part of the boundary between the Mirzāpur and Shāhābād Districts, was recognized traditionally as the frontier between the kingdom of the Kāśis (Benares) and that of the Magadhas (S. Bihār). The waters of that river are regarded by high-caste Hindus from other regions as impure and polluting. We shall presently quote another legend in proof of the aversion felt by orthodox Hindus towards the non-Aryan, Buddhist kingdom of Māgadha. The Rāmāyana (*Uttarakāṇḍa*, lix. 18, 19) describes the 'excellent town' of Pratiṣṭhāna, that is to say Jhūsi opposite Allahābād, as being situated in the 'Kāśi kingdom.' Putting all indications together, we may conclude that the realm of the Kāśis was equivalent to the modern Districts of Benares, Ghāzīpur, Balliā, Azamgarh, and Jaunpur, together with portions of the Mirzāpur, Gorakhpur, Allāhābād, Partābgarh, Sultānpur, and Fyzābād Districts, all of which are now included in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. The Kāśi people are mentioned by Pāṇini and other authors in both Sanskrit and Pāli prior to the Christian era. Gradually the name was transferred from the people to their capital city, and the transition is marked in the *Bṛhat Saṁhitā*, an early work, which applies the name *Kāśi* to both people and city. The Kāśis lost their independence at an early date, their kingdom being absorbed by Northern Kosala (Oudh) before the time of Buddha. An ancient Kosalan king, named Kaṁsa, of uncertain date, is described as 'the conqueror of Kāśi.' Nevertheless, the older Buddhist books include Kāsī in the list of the sixteen principal States of India, although it was never independent in historical times. Gradually the name *Kāśi* or *Kāśi* (Pāli *Kāsī*) was transferred from the tribe to the city. The form *Kāśikā* also occurs.

The alternative name *Varāṇasī* (also *Vārāṇasī*, *Varaṇasī*) appears to be more ancient than *Kāśi* as the designation of the city, and to be really its proper name. The Buddhist Jātakas and early Sanskrit books describe the city of Varāṇasī as being situated in the Kāśi country. Fa-hien, the Chinese pilgrim (A.D. 400), writes the name as *Po-lo-nai*, which seems to correspond with a spoken form *Bārānas*. Hiuen Tsiang (Yuan Chwang, A.D. 637) writes *Po-lo-na-se* (= *Vārānasī* or *Bārānasī*). Popular etymology derives the name *Baṇārns* (by metathesis of *Barānas*), either from an imaginary Rājā *Banār* or from a combination of the names of the rivers *Varaṇā* (*Barnā*) and *Asi* or *Aśī*, but neither derivation can be accepted. In the Purāṇas the name *Avimukta* is given to the city, which is mentioned in the Buddhist Jātakas under various fanciful names, *Sudassana*, *Pupphavatī*, etc.

Local tradition restricts the name of *Banāras* to the northern and apparently most ancient part of the city, the central block, also ancient, being

called *Kāś*, and the south-western section, the most recent, being known as *Kedār*. The attempt made by Muhammad Shāh, Emperor of Delhi (1719–48), to give his own name to the city, which he called *Muhammadābād*, failed so far as general usage is concerned, but on his coins the name frequently occurs as that of a mint, and sometimes is written as *Muhammadābād-Banāras*.

Hindu legend associates the foundation of the city with Rājā Divodāsa, who is the subject of wild mythological stories, and the Buddhist tales constantly mention Rājā Brahmadatta as having been king of Benares 'once upon a time,' but it is impossible to discover any basis of fact for either the names or the stories. Benares, with its surrounding territory, was absorbed, as already stated, by the greater kingdom of Kosala, about B.C. 600, or earlier, and when Kosala in its turn was forced to bow to the growing power of Magadha (wh. see), Benares passed under the rule of the Śaiśunāga lords of that province about B.C. 500. It was included in succession in the dominions of the Maurya, Śunga, and Gupta dynasties. In the 7th cent. the city passed under the rule of Harsha-vardhana, the powerful Vaiśya king of Kanauj, and in the 9th cent. it was included in the dominions of the Parihār kings of Kanauj. In the 12th cent. it was held by the Gaharwārs of Kanauj, of whom the last, Rājā Jaychand (Jayachchand), was killed in A.D. 1193 (A.H. 589) in battle with Muhammad of Ghor (Shihāb-ud-dīn, Muhammad ibn Sām). From that time Benares remained under Musalmān domination until 1775, when it was ceded to the government of Warren Hastings by the Nawāb Vazīr of Oudh. Since that date it has been British territory.

Abū-l-Fazl (*Āīn-i-Akbari*, ii. 28 [Gladwin's tr.]) seems to have been misinformed in stating that Benares was visited twice by Sultan Mahmūd of Ghaznī in A.H. 410 (A.D. 1019–20) and A.H. 413 (A.D. 1022–23). The contemporary author of the *Tārīkh-i-Sabuktigīn* expressly states that no Musalmān army had ever visited Benares until Ahmad Niāltigīn made a hurried raid on the city for a few hours one day in A.D. 1033 (424–25 A.H.). The raiders were not in force sufficient to enable them to do more than plunder the richer shops. Muhammadan influence was not felt seriously by Benares until the city was taken by Muhammad of Ghor in A.D. 1193. The considerable effect of the long Muhammadan occupation for six centuries is shown by the fact that at the last census in 1901 Musalmāns formed 28 per cent. of the population of this intensely Hindu city. The Madanpura quarter is almost exclusively occupied by Muhammadans, who are largely engaged in weaving the rich brocades (*kīnkhwāb*, vulgo 'kincob') for which the city is famous.

Benares suffered severely from the persecuting policy of Aurangzīb, who went so far as to order 'the governors of provinces to destroy with a willing hand the schools and temples of the infidels; and they were strictly enjoined to put an entire stop to the teaching and practising of idolatrous forms of worship' (W. Hunter, *Aurangzīb*, 1896, p. 135). Complete general execution of such orders was impossible, but in Benares much was done, and multitudes of temples were destroyed. Very few of the existing buildings are earlier than the time of Aurangzīb. The temple beside which stood the Aśoka pillar seen by Hiuen Tsiang was converted into a mosque, although the massive pillar was allowed to remain until 1809, when it was broken to pieces by a furious Muhammadan mob in the course of a fierce riot between the adherents of the rival religions. This riot was still fresh in men's minds when Bishop Heber visited the city in 1824. The pillar, the stump of which is known as *Lāṭ Bhairo*, and considered to be an object of great sanctity, is correctly described by the Chinese pilgrim in A.D. 637 as standing to the N.E. of the city and west of the Barnā river, whose course is due north and south for about a mile. Bernier mentions that the chief of the Benares pundits had been granted by Shahjahān a pension of two thousand rupees, which was withdrawn by Aurangzīb immediately after his accession.

The most conspicuous evidence of Aurangzīb's bigotry is the mosque above Panchgangā Ghāt, the minarets of which (147 ft. 2 in. high) are by far the most imposing edifices in Benares. The mosque occupies the site of a large ancient temple dedicated to Śiva under the name of Bisheshar (Viśveśvara), and is largely composed of the materials of the Hindu shrine. The modern temple of Bisheshar, generally called the 'Golden Temple,' close by is small, but notable for its dome and tower covered with plates of gilt copper, the gift of Mahārājā Ranjit Singh, the 'Lion of the Panjāb.' It is the most holy temple in Benares, Bisheshar being regarded as the actual ruler of the city.

2. Sacred places.—During the predominance of the Marāthās in the 18th cent., and still more after the establishment of the British power, temple-building, which had been either forbidden or discouraged by the Muhammadan rulers, received a great impetus, and hundreds of new shrines have been constructed. Sherring estimates that out of 600 temples along the Panch-kosī, or pilgrims' road, round the city, no fewer than 500 date from the British period, and very few are 250 years old. This vigorous modern development of temple-building is the outward and visible sign of the marked revival of Hinduism under British protection, which is still in progress and daily growing in strength. Most of the unrest at present (1909) agitating India is closely connected with the Hindu revival. Forty years ago the number of Hindu temples in Benares, excluding petty niches and shrines, was estimated as 1454, and now it must be considerably greater.

But, as already observed, Musalmāns form 28 per cent. of the population, and they were credited by Sherring with 272 mosques. Notwithstanding the considerable success of the Muslim propaganda indicated by these figures, Benares has always continued to be the most Hindu of cities, and few visitors find occasion to take note of the large Muhammadan population. The mosques, although numerous, are not remarkable for architectural merit, and even the mosque of Aurangzīb offers little worthy of notice beyond the noble minarets which tower above the city.

The most striking feature of Benares, best viewed from the river, is the long series of *ghāṭs*, or stairs leading to the water, which line the bank of the Ganges. They number about forty, and vary much in sanctity and popularity. The five principal ones, visited by all pilgrims, are, as reckoned from the south, Asi Saṅgam (the junction of the Asi rivulet with the Ganges), Daśāśamedh (Daśāśvamedha), Maṇikarṇikā, Panchgangā, and Barnā Saṅgam (the junction of the Barnā river with the Ganges). Hindus always regard the junctions of streams with peculiar reverence. A visit to the five *ghāṭs* named above is in itself a complete course of pilgrimage, and the merit of bathing at Daśāśamedh Ghāt is equal to that of a pilgrimage to Prayāg (Allāhābād), where the Jumna unites its waters with those of the Ganges. The legends invented to explain the sanctity of the Daśāśamedh and Maṇikarṇikā Ghāṭs are too long for quotation, but we may note that five rivers, four being invisible to mortal eyes, are

supposed to meet at Panchgangā ('five-river') Ghāṭ. Their names are given as Dhūtapāpā, Sarasvatī, Kiraṇā, Jarṇa (*alias* Yamunā = Jumna), and Gangā (Ganges). The belief in invisible subterranean streams is common among Hindus in many localities.

A considerable area round Benares shares in the sanctity of the city and rivers, and is circumambulated by pilgrims travelling along the Panchkosī Road, which does not seem to be ancient in its existing form.

'The Panch-kosī is regarded as an exceedingly sacred road. While even a foot or an inch beyond its precincts is devoid of any special virtue, every inch of soil within the boundary is, in the Hindu's imagination, hallowed. It would seem, too, that every object, animate and inanimate, existing within the enclosed space, participates in the general and all-pervading sanctity. The entire area is called Benares; and the religious privileges of the city are extended to every part of it. Whoever dies in any spot of this enclosure is, the natives think, sure of happiness after death; and so wide is the application of this privilege, that it embraces, they say, even Europeans and Muhammadans, even Pariahs and other outcasts, even liars, murderers, and thieves. That no soul can perish in Benares is thus the charitable superstition of the Hindus' (Sherring, *The Sacred City of the Hindus*).

The road is designed to describe the arc of a radius of five *kōs*, or ten miles, with the Maṇikarṇikā well as a centre, and is therefore called the 'five-kōs road.'

The votary starts from the Maṇikarṇikā Ghāṭ to Asi Saṅgam, and thence to the village of Kandhawa, where he stays for the night. The second day he marches ten miles to Dhūpchandī; on the third day he has a long walk of fourteen miles to Rāmeśvar; on the fourth day he goes to Sheopur (Śivapur); and on the fifth day he advances to Kapildhārā; the sixth and last stage being from Kapildhārā to Barnā Saṅgam, and so back to the starting-place at Maṇikarṇikā Ghāṭ. The whole journey is nearly fifty miles in length, and at each stage worship has to be performed and Brāhmans must be paid. Liberal payments to Brāhmans are an indispensable element in the programme of a Hindu pilgrimage, and the Benares Brāhmans know how to use their opportunities. The Gangaputras ('sons of the Ganges'), who attend on pilgrims at the *ghāṭs*, have a sinister reputation for unscrupulous greed.

It is impossible within the limits of an article to give a detailed account of even the principal temples at Benares and of the fantastic mythology associated with them by exuberant Hindu imagination, but some slight notice of a few of the most favoured holy places and their legends is indispensable. We shall take Sherring as our guide.

The *Trilochan temple and ghāṭ* dedicated to 'three-eyed' Śiva have the special merit of securing everlasting happiness to the worshipper there if he should die elsewhere. If a devotee spends a whole day and night in the month of Baisākh (April-May), without sleeping, and uninterruptedly engaged in religious exercises at this temple, he is promised final liberation (*mokṣa*) from the miseries of existence. Kāśī-devī, the tutelary goddess of the city, is housed in a temple in Mahalla (ward) Kāśīpura, which is believed to be the centre of the city.

A shrine close by, called *Vyāseśvar*, is dedicated to Vyāsa, the reputed compiler of the Vedas, who is also honoured at a temple in the palace of the Mahārāja at Rāmnagar on the other side of the river, which is associated with a quaint myth. People who die on the Rāmnagar side are believed to incur imminent danger of being re-born as asses—an unpleasant fate which may be averted by a pilgrimage to the shrine of Vyāsa (*Veda Vyās*) there during the month of Māgh (Jan.-Feb.). Multitudes of people from Benares as well as from Rāmnagar make their pilgrimage during that month, and so doubly assure immunity from re-birth as a despised ass. The Hindus of Patna share the fears of the Rāmnagar people, and for the same reason are cremated on the northern side of the river. The explanation given is that Magadha or S. Bihār, a non-Aryan and Buddhist land, is considered so unholy that if a man die and is burnt within its limits he is sure to be reborn as an ass (*NINQ*, vol. v. [1896], par. 533).

A visit to the very holy tank called *Piśāchmochan*, or 'deliverance from devils,' situated on the western side of the city, is compulsory on all pilgrims, who find its waters a valuable prophylactic against evil spirits and bad dreams. Pilgrims to Gayā are required to certify that they have bathed in Piśāch-mochan, but if for any reason the essential ceremony has been omitted, the fault may be repaired by ablution in a duplicate tank at Gayā. Sun-worship is practised at the *Sūraj-kuṇḍ*, or 'sun-pool,' in the south-western quarter, and a temple in the same region is devoted to *Dhruveśvar*, the personified Pole-star. Another temple is dedicated to the moon-god. *Chaukī Ghāṭ* and *Nāg Kuā* are devoted to serpent-worship. The existence of such shrines illustrates the immense variety of the elements constituting popular Hinduism. Hindu interest in astronomy and its sister lore of astrology is testified by the *Mān-mandir*, the famous observatory with gigantic instruments of masonry constructed by Rājā Jay Singh of Amber or Jaipur in A.D. 1693.

The *Daśāśamedh* (*Daśāśvamedha*) *Ghāṭ*, the reputed scene of the celebration of ten horse-sacrifices (*aśvamedha*) by the god Brahmā, is one of the five principal places of pilgrimage on the bank of the Ganges. The large colony of Bengālīs, including many pensioners who retire to end their days in the holy city, occupies a separate ward, and is perhaps even more devoted to its gods than are the less educated sections of the population. The principal Bengālī temple is dedicated to Śiva as Kedāreśvar, 'the lord of Kedār,' a renowned shrine in the Himālayas.

The holy wells occupy prominent places in the pilgrim's circular tour. One of the most noted is the *Gyān Kūp*, or 'well of knowledge,' situated between the temple of Bisheshar and Aurangzīb's mosque. The god Śiva, who supports Benares on the point of his trident, is believed to reside in this well. The most sacred of all the wells is *Maṇikarṇikā*, supposed to be filled with the sweat of Viṣṇu. No pilgrim fails to smear his head and body with the stinking water.

The *temple of Annpūrnā*, the goddess who is credited with the responsibility of feeding the citizens under the orders of Bisheshar, the divine lord of the city, is much frequented, and is the scene of indiscriminate almsgiving to crowds of beggars. It is known to Europeans as the 'cow temple,' and is the dirtiest in the city. It was built by the Peshwā, Bājī Rao, about 1721. At a little distance stands a temple dedicated to the minor deity, *Gaṇeśa* or *Vināyakapāla*, under the title of Sakhī, 'the witness.' 'Pilgrims, on completing their journey of the Panchkosī Road, must pay a visit to this shrine in order that the fact of their pilgrimage may be verified. Should they neglect to do this, all their pilgrimage would be without merit or profit' (Sherring, *op. cit.*).

Bisheshar, or Śiva, with the title of Viśveśvara, 'Lord of all,' is held to be, as already observed, the divine ruler of Benares, charged with the duty of controlling all the other innumerable gods and goddesses and keeping the city free from demons. The sacred boundary of the Panch-kosī Road is guarded by the deities of six hundred shrines, and the only demon allowed within the holy precinct is the one who dwells in the Piśāch-mochan tank. Bisheshar's vicegerent, the divine Kotwāl, or

chief of police, is Bhaironāth, whose shrine is situated more than a mile to the north of that of his sovereign, under whose orders he exercises authority over both gods and men. He is bound to keep the city free from all malignant spirits and evil persons, and, should he find any such within its precincts, to expel them forthwith. Bhaironāth is supposed to exercise his authority by means of a huge stone truncheon, *Daṇḍpāṇ*, which has a temple to itself. The stone, about 4 feet in height, is sometimes capped by a silver mask, and is specially worshipped on Sunday and Tuesday. Bhaironāth is believed to ride on a dog, a figure of that animal being painted beside the entrance to his temple, which dogs are permitted to enter. This is but one of many traces of dog-worship—one of the innumerable incongruous factors combined in popular Hinduism. The existing temple is modern. (For dog-worship see Crooke, *PR* ii. 218–221).

So much may suffice to give the reader some notion of the multitude of temples which crowd the narrow streets of Benares. Almost all the holy places which were open to Sherring forty years ago are now closed to Europeans, and it is not now possible for a European writer to give exact descriptions of the Benares shrines from personal knowledge. Every visitor is struck by the swarms of sacred bulls blocking the lanes, and the bands of mischievous monkeys which have licence to pilfer eatables and damage tiled roofs to their hearts' content. These animals are specially numerous around the shrine of Durgā, known to European visitors as the 'monkey temple.'

3. Various religious elements.—No man can tell how the notion of the supreme sanctity of Benares originated, but there is no doubt that the city dates from remote antiquity, and that as far back as tradition can reach the site was always the holy of holies. The fact that about B.C. 500 Buddha selected the neighbourhood of Benares as the scene of his earliest public preaching, the place where he first turned the 'wheel of the Law,' and set it rolling over the world, is good evidence that in his days the city already enjoyed a reputation for pre-eminent sanctity, and was the most suitable place in which to proclaim a new creed.

Buddhism was still a strong force at Sārnāth (wh. see) at the time of Hiuen Tsiang's visit in A.D. 637, and no doubt continued to enjoy a large share of favour under the Pāla kings of Bengal, whose dominions certainly included Benares, at times, at all events. The religion of Gautama probably held its own until the Muhammadan conquest of 1193, when the multitude of images crowding the Buddhist shrines must have excited the fury of the warriors of Islām, as happened in other places. The buildings at Sārnāth bear clear traces of destruction by fire, which may be safely attributed to the date mentioned.

But even while Buddhism enjoyed the patronage of kings, the religion of the Brāhman was always predominant, and Benares proper would seem to have been throughout the ages a Hindu Brāhmanical city rather than a Buddhist one. In Hiuen Tsiang's days the followers of Śiva, the great local deity, far outnumbered the adherents of Buddha, and Śiva, in many forms and under many names, is still the deity whose worship characterizes Benares. Of course other deities have their votaries there, but all are regarded as subordinate to Śiva, the 'Lord of all.' Some Hindus believe that the fifth, or dwarf, incarnation of Viṣṇu was born at Benares (*IA* xxxv. 243), and one of the many *melās*, or religious fairs, is held in honour of that incarnation at Barnā Saṅgam in the month of Bhādon (Aug.–Sept.).

Benares is sacred to the Jains as the reputed birthplace of Supārśvanāth, the seventh Tīrthaṅkara, but at the present day the Jain cult is not very prominent in the city. Bishop Heber (*Narrative*, ch. xii.) gives an interesting account of his visit to a Jain temple which few Europeans have been permitted to see. Several Jain temples stand along the bank of the river between Bachraj Ghāṭ and the Asi confluence, and from regard to Jain feeling the shooting of birds and the capture of fish are forbidden in this section of the stream. The Jains under the name of Nirgranthas are noticed by Hiuen Tsiang. All lists of the Hindu sacred cities, which slightly vary, include Benares. The traditional enumeration quoted by Sherring specifies seven such cities, namely, (1) Kāśī, (2) Kāntī, (3) Māyā (=Hardwār), (4) Ayodhyā, (5) Dvāravatī (=Dvārakā), (6) Mathurā, and (7) Avantikā (=Ujjain).

A 12th cent. grant places Kāśi at the head of a list of four famous places for bathing pilgrimages, the others being Kuśika (prob. =Kanauj), Uttarakosalā (=Ayodhyā), and Indrapura (prob. =Indraprastha near Delhi) (*IA* xviii. 13).

A minor religion largely favoured by the lower classes of Hindus in Benares is the cult of the Pānch (Panj) Pīr, or Five Saints, who are variously enumerated in different lists, but always headed by Ghāzī Miyān, the deified son of the sister of Sultan Maḥmūd of Ghaznī. The cult is a degraded adaptation of the Shī'ah Muhammadans' reverence for the five great saints of Islām, namely, the prophet Muhammad, his son-in-law 'Alī, his daughter Fatima, and Ḥasan and Ḥusain, the sons of 'Alī and Fatima. The subject was investigated exhaustively by R. Greeven, who collected the legends and popular songs of the cult. The ceremonies are invariably performed by Musalmān drummers (*dafālī*), and the Muhammadan origin of the worship is fully recognized by its Hindu votaries. Most probably it originated in the inveterate Hindu habit of venerating any manifestation of power. Ghāzī Miyān, the 'prince of martyrs,' was a specially fierce fanatic, and so made his mark upon the popular imagination. Many examples might be cited of the indiscriminate mixture of the rites of Islām and Hinduism by the common people in various parts of India.

4. A seat of learning.—From time immemorial Benares has been a seat of Hindu learning as well as of worship, and has been the resort of the most famous teachers. The city still holds the highest rank as the centre of the intellectual life of India, and its pundits succeed, although not without difficulty, in keeping alight the torch of the wisdom of their ancestors.

Bernier, writing in 1667, accurately described the Indian method of study. 'The town,' he writes, 'contains no colleges or regular classes, as in our universities, but rather resembles the schools of the ancients, the masters being dispersed over different parts of the town in private houses, and principally in the gardens of the suburbs, which the rich merchants permit them to occupy. Some of these masters have four disciples, others six or seven, and the most eminent may have twelve or fifteen; but this is the largest number. It is usual for the pupils to remain ten or twelve years under their respective preceptors, during which the work of instruction proceeds but slowly,' etc. (*Travels in the Mogul Empire*, ed. Constable, p. 334).

In 1817, the year in which the Marāthā power was broken, Ward obtained the names of the men who taught the *śāstras*, or Hindu scriptures, in Benares. Forty-eight teachers then instructed 893 pupils in the Vedas only, while seventeen initiated 218 disciples in the mysteries of Pāṇini's grammar. The other sections of the scriptures, including law, were little favoured. The Benares school of law—one of the five recognized schools—follows in its main lines the system of Vijñāneśvara, the author

of the *Mitākṣarā*, who lived at Kalyāna in the Deccan in the 12th century.

At the present day the competition of European learning must have reduced the attendance at the Sanskrit schools, and the number of pupils must be far less than it was a century ago, when Marāthā patronage was available. It is an established rule that a teacher of the scriptures should not be paid wages for his work, and must be content to trust to the voluntary benevolence of his patrons. This rule caused the failure of the Sanskrit College established in 1791, which could not easily secure the services of the local savants. The building erected for that college is now the mission house of the Baptists. The Queen's College, dating from 1853, which has been worked on other lines under the direction of eminent European principals and professors, has done much to promote the scientific study of Sanskrit. The Central Hindu College, founded by Mrs. Besant in 1898, with the object of bringing up young men on the best Hindu principles, while giving them free access to European learning, is an interesting experiment, which may or may not survive its founder.

5. Religious teachers, etc.—A full account of all the distinguished religious reformers who have dwelt or sojourned in Benares from the time of Buddha, twenty-four centuries ago, to the present day would almost amount to a history of Indian religions, and particularly of Hinduism (wh. see). The connexion of *Buddha* with Benares will be dealt with in the art. SĀRNĀTH, and it will be sufficient here merely to give the names of some of the leaders of Indian thought who have been more or less closely associated with the sacred city; they will be dealt with in separate articles.

The earliest of such leaders about whom we know anything definite is the renowned *Śaṅkarāchārya*, the Brāhman of Malabar, who lived for a considerable time at Benares, surrounded by a large circle of disciples. The weaver-poet *Kabīr*, founder of the Kabīr Panthī sect, a disciple of Rāmānand, was a native of Benares, and lived there from about 1380 to 1420. *Chaitanya*, the revered Vaiṣṇava apostle of Bengal (1485–1533), resided at Benares for some years. *Vallabhāchārya* (1478–1530), who established the Rādhāballabhī sect, died in the holy city. No name sheds more glory upon Benares than that of *Tulsī Dās* (1532–1624), author of the *Rām-charit-mānas*, the Hindī equivalent of the Rāmāyaṇa, the favourite book and justly loved treasure of the people of Northern India. He spent the greater part of his long life at Benares, and a manuscript of his chief work, written about twenty-four years after his death, is in the possession of the Mahārājā, who is the owner of a fine library and an interesting collection of old Indian paintings. The monastery (*maṭh*) where the poet lived and the ruinous *ghāṭ* called after his name are near the Asi confluence. During the 18th and 19th centuries many Hindu authors of more or less note, whose names have been laboriously collected by Grierson, resided at Benares, the most notable, perhaps, being *Gokul Nāth*, whose Hindī version of the *Mahābhārata* was published at Calcutta in 1829, and *Hariśchandra* (1850–85), the poet, critic, and journalist. Ward notices the remarkable case of Hatī Vidyālaṅkarā, a learned Bengālī lady, who taught the *śāstras* at Benares a few years prior to 1817. The Sanskrit College issues a periodical called *The Pandit*, which deals with Sanskrit texts.

The pundits of the sacred city probably are still the most learned in India, but they are so intensely conservative that most of them will have nothing to do with modern notions, and so are losing influence over the young men of these days, who cannot shut their eyes and ears to the signs of the times. Mrs. Besant's College, already mentioned, has been organized to teach a modernized Hinduism of a broad and liberal kind. In connexion with it there is a Girls' School attended by about 120 high-caste girls.

6. Missions.—The long-continued labours of the European missionaries settled at Benares for nearly a century deserve notice. The Church of England Mission was established in 1817, and in the same year the Baptists of Serampore formed a branch of their organization under charge of an Eurasian agent. The work of the London Missionary Society began four years later. The Wesleyans established a mission about 1880. The chief missionary institutions are in the suburb of Sigra. The college founded in the 17th cent. by Rājā Jay Singh, who established the observatory, has passed into the hands of the Church Missionary Society. The missionaries have done much good service in the cause of secular education, especially during the years prior to the foundation of universities in 1857. Since that date their institutions have been overshadowed by those immediately under the Department of Public Instruction. The direct outcome of missionary effort in the way of conversions of adults appears to be very small, and it is obvious that Benares must always present special difficulties to the preacher of Christian doctrines.

LITERATURE.—*North-West Cantonment Survey Map*, 6 inches to mile (Calcutta, 1869); *IGI*, 1908; Thornton, *Gazetteer*, 1858; Hamilton, *Description of Hindostan* (London, 1820); James Prinsep, *Benares Illustrated* (Calcutta and London, three series, folio, with fine plates, 1830–34); M. A. Sherring, *The Sacred City of the Hindus* (London, 1868), and *Handbook for Visitors to Benares* (Calcutta, 1875; an abstract from the larger work); J. Ewen, *Benares: A Handbook for Visitors* (Calcutta, 1886; inaccurate in details); E. B. Havell, *Benares, the Sacred City* (London, 1905; well illustrated); Fa-hien, *A Record of Buddhistic Kingdoms*, tr. Legge (Oxford, 1886); Hiuen Tsiang (or Yuan Chwang), *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, tr. Beal (London, 1885); Watters, *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India, 629–45 A.D.* (London, 1904): Bernier, *Travels in the Mogul Empire, 1656–68 A.D.*, ed. Constable (London, 1891); Tavernier, *Travels in India*, tr. V. Ball (London, 1889); Bishop Heber, *Narrative of a Journey through the Upper Provinces of India, 1824–25* (London, 1844); Ward, *The Hindoos*[2] (2 vols. quarto, Serampore, 1818); Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India* (1903); Grierson, *The Modern Vernacular Literature of Hindustan* (special No. of *JASB*, Calcutta, 1889); C. N. K. Aiyar, *Śrī Śankarāchārya* (Madras, n.d., ? 1904); R. Greeven, 'Worship of the *Pānchon Pīr*' (*NINQ*, vol. ii. 1892; republished as *Heroes Five*, Allāhābād, 1895); *9th Annual Rep. of Central Hindu College* (1906–07).

VINCENT A. SMITH.

BENE-ISRAEL (more correctly *B'nei-Israel* = בני־ישראל, *i.e.* 'Children of Israel').—By this name is designated a body of Jews inhabiting the Bombay Presidency of India. The community is important in its numbers, amounting to some ten thousand souls, and remarkable in its character. A number of peculiar religious usages among them reward careful attention.

1. Origin and history.—No historical records of their past are possessed by the Bene-Israel. The legend preserved by them as to their arrival in India is to the effect that in long bygone times seven men and seven women were cast by a shipwreck on the Indian coast at a point some thirty miles south of the island of Bombay. Many of the less fortunate of their company were drowned in the disaster, and their bodies when washed ashore were buried by their comrades in two *tumuli*—those of the men in one, and those of the women in the other. These mounds the Bene-Israel still show in the village of Naugaon (or 'New Village'), near the Collectorate town of Alībāg. The fourteen survivors, as they increased in numbers, are said to have spread themselves throughout the villages of the Konkan, in the neighbourhood of their first Indian home. In these places they practised chiefly the trade of

oil-pressing; and this avocation, coupled with their habit of observing Saturday and giving their oxen rest from the oil-mills on that day, gained for them among their Hindu neighbours the name of *Shanvār Teli*, or 'Saturday Oil-men,' whereby they distinguished them from their own Hindu oil-men, who rested their bullocks on Mondays, and were therefore called *Somvār Teli*. This name is in use to the present day.

It is worthy of note that, in the immediate neighbourhood of the spot which the Bene-Israel claim as the place of their first landing in India, there used to exist an important seaport and emporium of trade, which was frequented by the ancient navigation hailing from the Egyptian, Arabian, Persian, and other ports. It was known by the name of 'Chemul' * (pronounced 'Tsemvul'), and was almost certainly the 'Simulla' or 'Timoula' of Ptolemy the geographer (A.D. 150) and others.† In Buddhist inscriptions it appears in the form 'Chemula.' Chinese travellers have called it 'Tchi-Mo-Lo'; Arabic writers, 'Ṣaimur' and 'Jaimur.' It is represented by the present insignificant village and port of Revadanda, dating from the time of the Portuguese, and situated some two miles from the older site, the sea having receded owing to the silting up of the creek. The caprices of local misrule at one period closed this ancient port to foreign trade, and this perhaps may have been the means of cutting off the Bene-Israel from further opportunities of contact with their people elsewhere; for they present the appearance of a community who, having up to a certain point preserved intercourse with the main body of their nation, were at some stage in their history separated from the same, and left to develop in their own independent way. They differ greatly even from the better known Indian remnant of their people inhabiting the Malabar coast. For example, the latter, owing doubtless to their having preserved the means of communication with their brethren in other parts of the world, have retained their knowledge of Hebrew, whereas the Bene-Israel had, till lately, lost all knowledge of their ancient tongue.

Though ranking among the fairest of the people of the country, the Bene-Israel, as to complexion, share the colour of the inhabitants of India. In most of their habits and modes of life and dress they have also accommodated themselves to the ways of the land they live in, and they speak the Marāthī vernacular. Till lately they have wholly rejected the name of 'Jew,' even to the degree of regarding the title as a stigma if applied to them, and have insisted instead on the appellation 'Bene-Israel.' Some would account for this by supposing that at some time or other the adoption of the latter title may have served to screen them from persecution by Muhammadans; but it is, on the whole, more probable that the origin of the name is to be sought in some more positive source. One's eyes naturally turn to the lands which first received the deportations of the Israelites of both captivities, and which continued for many centuries to be the centre of the life of Israelites both of the ten tribes and of the two tribes last taken captive. J. Brühl ‡ relates that in Persia he found the Jews almost invariably calling themselves 'Israel' instead of 'Yahūdī,' and he believes it very probable that many of the Jews of Persia and of Kurdistan (which is partly under Persian and partly under Turkish rule), as well as numbers of the Nestorian Christians, § are descendants of the ten tribes. There are several cogent reasons for connecting the early Jews of India with those of Persia as to origin. Early navigation made the transit between Persia and India easy. Again, in South India the Jews of Malabar are found located side by side with an historic body of Christians, no less unique in character than themselves, known as the Christians of St. Thomé, and these, if not actually derived originally from Persia, as some would have us believe,* were at any rate in their early history most intimately associated with that country, as is witnessed by the discovery of three ancient Persian stone crosses,† and also by the well-known fact that this community long drew its presiding bishops direct from Persia itself.‡ There is therefore no difficulty in believing that Persia, the depositing ground of the Israelites of both exiles, and the place in which they were long massed together in the greatest numbers, and where, also, in later times they were not infrequently subjected to severe persecutions,§ may have been the country which furnished Indian shores with many a contingent of Israelite immigrants. These would probably have been, after all, but the successors of many earlier Hebrew pioneers who had passed to and fro along the well-known trade routes to India, for purposes of merchandise. It is, however, at the same time right to mention that some have believed the Bene-Israel to be an offshoot of the Jews of Yemen (Arabia Felix).‖ Against this not impossible, or, indeed, altogether unlikely view, may be set the fact that no marks of intimacy or tradition of any common origin survive to the present day; nor is there traceable much that is common to the Yemenite Jews and the Bene-Israel in their distinctive observances.¶ To the unbiased observer the Bene-Israel suggest themselves as the descendants of Hebrews who at their first introduction into India must have made somewhat free alliances with the women of the land (as, according to ancient pre-Talmudic Hebrew practice, there was hardly a bar to their doing **), and thus an infiltration of Indian blood into their community would have taken place at an early stage of their sojourn in India. This was doubtless soon succeeded by a rigid practice of allowing marriage only with members of their own body—a rule which the example and influence of the Hindu caste system around them would have tended to encourage, and to which they have doubtless ever since most strictly adhered.

At the present time no Hindu caste could be more exclusive in regard to this custom of allowing racial intermixture than the Bene-Israel. They outban and stigmatize at once as *Kālā Israel*, or 'Black Israel,' all offspring of mixed unions. Such are not allowed at communal feasts to sit in close proximity to the rest of the community, or to

* See Yule-Burnett, *Hobson-Jobson*, Lond. 1903, 210 f.

† The author of the *Periplus Maris Erythræi* (A.D. 247) refers to it as 'Semulla.'

‡ *The Ten Tribes; Where are They?* London, 1880.

§ For the Israelitish descent of many of the Nestorian Christians of Kurdistan, see, besides Brühl, Rabbi Benjamin II., *Eight Years in Asia and Africa*, pp. 93–96; also, Athelstan Riley, *The Archbp. of Cant. Mission to the Assyrian Christians* (S.P.C.K., London, 1891), p. 5, footnote.

* See G. Milne Rae, *Syrian Church in India* (Edinburgh, 1892), pp. 15–26.

† *Ib.* pp. 114–130.

‡ The Jews of China, whose early connexions were with Persia, entered China by sea, *via* India, if tradition be correct.

§ As in the year A.D. 468, under Firuz (or Peroz), 'The Wicked.'

‖ Wilson, *The Bene-Israel of Bombay: an Appeal*, also *Lands of the Bible*, ii. 668. Rabbi J. Saphir, like Dr. Wilson, considers that the physiognomy of the Bene-Israel resembles that of the Jews of Arabia (see *Eben Saphir*, p. 43).

¶ The Bene-Israel possess a tradition that they came to India from 'the northern provinces.' This, Mr. Haeem S. Kehimkar would interpret of the Galilæan northern parts of Palestine, and he thinks that the Bene-Israel may have come direct to India by way of Ezion-geber and the Red Sea, for Jews settled in Galilee just before the Christian era. See Wyse, *History of the Hebrews' Second Commonwealth*.

** See Dt 21^{10-14}; also Smith's *DB*, *s.v.* 'Marriage.' From Dt 23^{3-8} may be inferred what might be done in regard to foreigners *other* than the Ammonite or Moabite.

intermarry with any except their own class. An analogy would seem to exist between the Bene-Israel and some other more or less unique Jewish communities, such as the Falashas of Abyssinia, the Jews of K'ai-feng-fu in China, the Jews of Yemen, and some among the so-called 'Black Jews' of Malabar, all of whom, while they manifest unmistakably the presence of the Hebrew stamina, reveal no less clearly traces of some intermixture with the people among whom they have sojourned. In the case of the Bene-Israel there is a characteristic type pervading the whole community which bespeaks the genuine Hebrew stock from which they have undoubtedly sprung.*

2. Religious customs.—It would be expected beforehand that a people with the antecedents we have described would exhibit much that was peculiar and interesting in their religious customs, when they again came into notice; and this is certainly the case with the Bene-Israel.

Three characteristic Hebrew observances which never died out among them first claim notice. These are (1) the practice of circumcision, (2) the keeping of the Sabbath, and (3) the retention in memory of at least part of the great Jewish formula, the *Shema' Yisrael* (commencing, 'Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is One Lord!'). For want of a liturgy they were accustomed to use, in their ignorance, the words of the latter formula on every occasion of their religious gatherings, repeating the sentence several times over. We have noted their acquirement of the title *Shanvār Teli* ('Saturday Oil-men'), on account of their unyoking their oxen on Saturdays in observance of the Jewish Sabbath. A further distinctive habit which has clung to them, though some are dropping it now, is the custom of wearing side-locks of hair (פְּאוֹת), in reference to Lv 19^{27} 21^{5}. To this custom the fashion commonly adopted of shaving most or all of the rest of the head is wont to give a peculiarly exaggerated appearance.

(*a*) *Fasts and festivals.*—A regular sequence of religious seasons, fasts, and festivals has been in vogue among the Bene-Israel, and these when examined are found to coincide remarkably with the usual festivals and fasts of the Jews. They were preserved, however, wholly under Indian names, the latter being often connected with some special kind of food partaken of, or abstained from, on the occasion of, or being given on account of the festivity or fast bearing some resemblance to, or coinciding in point of time with, some Hindu or Muhammadan observance. Thus, the Feast of Tabernacles (kept, however, a fortnight out of time) was known as the 'Feast of partaking of Khir,'† a kind of confection made of new rice, sugar, scraped coco-nut, and spices. The Day of Atonement was termed 'Fast of Door-closing,'‡ because on this day all rigidly shut themselves up in their houses, wearing white clothing even to their very caps, and avoiding converse or contact with others. Purim was called 'Feast of Holi,'§ because the time of keeping it coincided with a Hindu festival of the same name (one of rowdy and debased character), observed at the same time. Passover was known as the 'Festival of Jar-closing,'‖ the jar being one containing a sour mixture or sauce, to which conceivably a suspicion of fermentation or leaven may have been held to attach.* The Fast of Ab (for the destruction of the first Temple) was characterized as 'Fast of [partaking of] Birdya,'† the latter being a sort of pulse put into the curry on this day, a vegetable diet having been adhered to during the eight days previous. The Feast of Weeks had somehow dropped out of use.‡

The festivals and fasts so far mentioned appear to form a class of their own among the Bene-Israel. They are all alike designated by the word *san* (pronounced to rhyme with 'turn'), which is a Marāthī word of Sanskritic origin (a word which can denote both 'fast' and 'festival'). It will be observed that the seasons of observance already described relate uniformly to the chief and oldest Jewish festivals and fasts. There is a further set of festivals and fasts, also in vogue among the Bene-Israel, which have every appearance of being a class by themselves, and which have probably been superinduced in later times upon their older observances, presumably at the instigation of comparatively recent Jewish visitors and reformers from without.§ The festivals and fasts now alluded to, while relating almost entirely to Jewish holidays of later institution, are known among the Bene-Israel by names derived from the Hindustani language only, such as *roza*, of Persian origin, and *'urs*, of Arabic origin. To the latter class belong the ten days of expiation observed by Jews preceding the Day of Atonement, on which special penitential prayers called *selihoth* are used, and which, because of their bearing some resemblance to the long fast of the Muhammadans, were called by the Bene-Israel *Ramzan*.‖ A day after the keeping of *Navyāchā San*, or 'New Year's Festival,' occurs the *Navyāchā Rozā*, or 'Fast of the New [Year].' It corresponds probably to the Fast of Gedaliah, kept by Jews on the 23rd of Tishri; but if so, precedes it by twenty days. Two fasts occurring at two different seasons of the year are observed under the one name of *Sabābi Rozā*, the one fast apparently corresponding to the Fast of the 10th of Tebeth, commemorating the beginning of the siege of Jerusalem, and the other to the Fast of the 17th of Tammuz, kept in remembrance of the breach made in the wall of Jerusalem. The meaning of the word *Sabābi* is obscure. According to its Hindustani meaning of 'meritorious,' it might denote that the keeping of these additional fasts was considered a work of special merit; or, if referred to the Hebrew root סָבַב (=to surround), an allusion to the investment of the city would be obvious.¶

* A thoroughly good idea of the appearance of the Bene-Israel may be gained from the excellent portraits from photographs given in the *JE* under heading 'Beni-Israel.' Two out of the three synagogues shown there, however, do not belong to the Bene-Israel.

† *Khiricha San.*

‡ *Dārfalnicha San.* Rabbi J. Saphir (*Eben Saphir*, p. 45) says that he was puzzled to account for this name till he bethought himself of a prayer entitled תְּפִלַּת נְעִילַת שְׁעָרִים ('prayer of the shutting of the gates'), forming part of the concluding section of the Service of the Day of Atonement in the Modern Jewish Prayer Book.

§ *Holicha San.* ‖ *Anasi Dākhāchā San.*

* The rice-bread almost exclusively used by the Bene-Israel is at all times an unleavened bread.

† *Birdyāchā San.*

‡ The modern Jewish habit of doubling the first and last days of many festivals was not known to the Bene-Israel.

§ Such a reformer may have been David Rahabi, who is said by the Bene-Israel to have visited them long ago, and to have instituted this reform. He may have come from Cochin, where the surname 'Rahabi' (signifying 'Egyptian') still exists in the form of 'Roby.' Such an one would have doubtless communicated with the Bene-Israel through the medium of the Hindustani dialect, only in that case he must have visited them subsequently to about A.D. 1400, before which date Hindustani (or Urdu) was not a spoken language—not, as the Bene-Israel think, 900 years ago.

‖ The Bene-Israel add to these days a special fast during the preceding month of Elul (cf. Leo Modena [Rabbi of Venice, 1637], *History of the Rites, Customs, and Manner of Life of the Present Jews throughout the World* [tr. London, 1650]: 'Therefore do they begin on the first day of Elul, which is the moneth immediately going before, to think of Acts of *Penance*; and in some places, they rise before day, and say Prayers, make Confession of their sins, and rehearse the *Penelentiall Psalms*. And there are many amongst them, that Indict themselves *Fasts*, do *Penance*, and give alms to the Poor, continuing on this course, till the Day of Pardon comes; that is to say, for the space of Fourty daies').

¶ These are the explanations suggested as possible by Mr. Haeem S. Kehimkar. The writer of this article would take the

A very extraordinary festival, and one now hardly observed, was that known as *Eliyah hanabichā 'urs*, or 'the Fair of Elijah the Prophet.' To keep it the Bene-Israel resorted annually to a village-spot in the Konkan, named Khandalla, where, according to a legend, Elijah the prophet had once appeared to them, and thence had ascended to heaven. In date this festival corresponds to a Jewish one known as the 'New Year of the Trees' (ראש השנה לאלנות), in reference to Lv 19^{23-25}. The observance of such a festival as this seems indicative of a very prolonged sojourn of the Bene-Israel in India; for such a mixture of knowledge and ignorance in regard to the prophet Elijah, and its incrustation into such a practice as that mentioned, can hardly have sprung up and taken fixed form in a short time.* Hindus are accustomed to keep *melas*, or 'religious fairs,' in honour of their temples, and the Indian Muhammadans have also similar fairs, called by them *'urs*, in honour of the tombs of their *pirs*, or departed saints; and the Bene-Israel, in the strange custom that we have mentioned, must have been adopting the habits of the country.

(*b*) *Nazirite vow.*—Besides these rites and holidays of Judaism in general, the Bene-Israel have several interesting customs not so generally in use among Jews elsewhere, one of which is an apparent survival of the Nazirite vow. A boy in infancy is made the subject of a vow on the part of his parents.† The cause may perhaps be that for long they had no male offspring, or that former children had died. From the time when the vow is made till the time of its redemption no razor is permitted to pass over the head of the child. In consequence, a lad comparatively grown up may often be seen with long hair tressed up behind his head after the manner of a woman. When the time arrives that his parents feel able to redeem their vow, the hair is shaved off and weighed in the scales against gold or silver, or whatever else the parents may have before decided to give, and the equivalent so obtained is devoted to religious purposes. The shaved-off hair, instead of being burnt (Nu 6^{18}), is thrown into some tank or river, probably in keeping with the customs of Hindus and Indian Muhammadans, who are much given to letting their religious ceremonies culminate in the immersing of something in the water, the custom probably having its roots in Hindu veneration for the river Ganges, which is commonly credited with the power of re-appearing in all sorts of impossible places.

(*c*) *Burning of frankincense.*—A custom hardly less interesting than the foregoing, and one which prevailed till quite lately among the Bene-Israel, was the burning of frankincense on a number of religious occasions. Quite recently they have been dissuaded from its use by their Jewish co-religionists of other lands, who have represented to them that the practice was a superstitious one, copied from surrounding idolatry. It is by no means certain, however, that this custom had not its own ancient and independent Hebrew origin. It is significant that the Jews in China had a provision for burning incense in their synagogue at K'ai-feng-fu, it being a mark of Imperial favour that the incense for the purpose was provided free of cost by the Emperor himself. As already mentioned, the tradition was that the Jews had entered China by sea, *via* India, in the first instance.*

An indispensable concomitant in a number of the religious ceremonies of the Bene-Israel is a sweet-smelling herb named *sabzā*. Botanically it is the *Ocymum pilosum vel basilicum*, and somewhat resembles mint. It is much used, also, in religious rites by the Indian Muhammadans. A smaller species of the same herb is the *Ocymum sanctum*, or 'holy basil,' the well-known sacred plant of the Hindus, called by them the *tulsī*. The important place which the *sabzā* twig occupies in numerous ceremonies of the Bene-Israel suggests the possible idea of its being used as a substitute for the hyssop of Mosaic ordinances.

(*d*) *Offerings.*—Certain religious offerings are made by the Bene-Israel which invite careful attention. A singular feature in them is the offering of goats' liver or of the gizzards of fowls (whichever animals may have been slain on the occasion). These portions, after being cooked, are brought and offered to the ministrant of a religious ceremony, the rest of the flesh of the animals slain being eaten by the host and guests assembled. It should be observed here that the Bene-Israel rarely, if ever, partake of any other flesh than that of goats (including occasionally sheep) and fowls. Again, a certain confection known as *malīdā* (a Persian word), a kind of cake or pudding, is used ceremonially by them. The impression irresistibly conveyed to the observer by all this is that these are survivals in this community of the ancient meat-offerings of Mosaic times, if not also vestiges of ancient sacrifices themselves. As a typical example of the way in which the various articles mentioned above, including frankincense, *sabzā*, and *malīdā*, were employed by the Bene-Israel in various ceremonies connected with festivals, vows, marriage, burial, etc., we may quote the following description of the ceremony performed at the fulfilment of a vow, as given by Haeem S. Kehimkar, in his *Sketch of the History of the Bene-Israel*:—

'A feast was given in the evening in the following manner:—After the invited party came in, a clean white towel or clean white sheet was spread on the floor, whereon a dish containing *malīdā*, five pieces of unleavened bread made of rice-flour besmeared with sweets, twigs of *sabzā*, and five pieces of the cooked liver of a goat, was placed. Another dish containing cakes of wheaten flour fried in oil, and wafers of unleavened bread also fried in oil, and livers and gizzards of as many fowls as may have been killed on the occasion, was also placed there. The dish also contained a glass of wine or other liquor as a drink-offering; and several other plates filled with all sorts of fruits were placed upon the sheet, over which they said the *Kiriyath Shema* about a dozen times. . . . After the ceremony was over, a handful of *malīdā*, together with a twig of *sabzā* and a piece of each of the articles placed in the dish and in the plates, were taken by the man who officiated as priest in his own hands, and before presenting these to the lady who had made the vow, he asked her what had caused her to make the vow. On her giving the reason, she was told that she was free from her vow, and the *malīdā* was given to her. The articles in the dish and plates were distributed among the party, except the pieces of liver and gizzard, as well as the five pieces of cakes and wafers, which were kept by the officiating priest for himself, while the guests were served with the feast.'

(*e*) *Dietary rules.*—With regard to dietary rules, it was customary with the Bene-Israel either to remove the sinew in the leg, in accordance with Gn 32^{32}, or, if skill sufficient for this somewhat intricate operation did not exist, to reject as food

* See *JE*, *s.v.* 'China.' Note also what is said there as to certain customs in use among Chinese Jews pointing to a pre-Talmudic origin.

opportunity of stating here his very great indebtedness to this gentleman's writings for much information embodied in this article. Mr. Haeem's unpretending pamphlet, *A Sketch of the History of the Bene-Israel*, has thrown a flood of light on many an unknown custom among his people. Especially is what is here written as to festivals and fasts largely due to his pamphlet.

* See in *JE*, *s.v.* 'China' the arguments advanced for a very early date of the Jewish settlement in China. It is significant that the tradition was that the earliest introduction of the Jews into China was from the West, by crossing the sea, from India. It is no less worthy of notice that the MSS of the Jews of China show a connexion with the Jews of Persia.

† Or the vow may have been made before birth, contingent upon a son being given. The rite is not confined to lads. The writer was himself present when the subject of it was a girl, whose hair was shaved off as described above. If this be held to show that the vow-ceremony among the Bene-Israel is derived from Hindus (among whom such a practice does exist), it surely only removes the question of the origin of such vows in Eastern lands a stage further back.

the hindquarters of the animal altogether.* Blood, fat, animals strangled or maimed by beasts of prey, the Bene-Israel shunned altogether as food. In regard to fish, they would eat only those which had both fins and scales.

(*f*) *Kiss of peace.*—In common with the Jews of Cochin, the Bene-Israel preserve the custom of parting at their religious gatherings with the Kiss of Peace. The custom likewise prevails among the Christians of St. Thomé in Malabar, and is found, again, amongst the East Syrian Christians of Kurdistan.† This may be taken as one more indication of the probable link of connexion between the Jews of India and those of Persia in ancient times, especially when it is remembered, as we have already mentioned (see above, p. 470), that the Nestorian Christians of Kurdistan have a tradition of having been originally converts from Judaism. In performing the salutation among the Bene-Israel, the chief minister first bestows it on the most important persons present near to him, by receiving the fingers of the outstretched hand (the palms held vertically) between his own hands, after which the hands of both are simultaneously released, and the tips of the fingers of each person passed to his own lips and kissed. Those already saluted turn to bestow the salutation on others, the younger usually seeking it from the older, and inferiors from their superiors, till all have saluted each other. The procedure continues for some two or three minutes, during which an audible sound of the lips is heard throughout the synagogue.

(*g*) *Cup of blessing.*—At the close of some services in their newly-revived synagogues a ceremony takes place which has been termed by Christians who have observed it, 'the Cup of Blessing.'‡ A cup, containing a juice pressed from raisins for the purpose, is put into the hands of the minister, who, after first pronouncing a blessing over it, partakes of a portion of it. The remainder is then poured by the attendants into a large vessel containing much more of the same mixture. The *shamāsh*, or sexton, then passing round the assembly, with one or more assistants, distributes the contents of the vessel to each member of the assembly by means of pairs of little silver cups, one of which is being filled while the other is being emptied. As to the antiquity of this custom it is difficult to pronounce. In the opinion of some it is merely the performance of the usual Jewish ceremony of the *Habdālāh* (חבדלה)§ in the synagogue instead of in the home; and if so, it may be of comparatively recent introduction among the Bene-Israel.

3. **Use of Hebrew names.**—The Bene-Israel have mostly retained the use of Biblical names, but the latter have commonly assumed an Indianized form, as *Banaji* for Benjamin, *'Abaji* for Abraham, and the like.‖ Similarly the names of the women receive the Indian affix *bai* (corresponding to our Mrs. and Miss) appended to them, as, for example, *Sarahbai*, *Miriambai*, and the like. Where the names of men and women of the Bene-Israel are purely Indian, they do not appear to be in any case compounded with the name of any Hindu deity, as is largely the case among Hindus. Surnames (which the Bene-Israel are gradually discarding) were formed by the addition of the syllable *kar* (pronounced to rhyme with 'stir,' and equivalent in meaning to 'inhabitant of') to the name of the village with which a man's family had become identified in the earlier days of Israelite settlement, such as *Kihimkar*='resident in [the village of] Kihim.' Dr. Wilson has remarked that at the time when he made his investigations the name 'Reuben' was the most common amongst men, and that the favourite Jewish names of *Jehudah* and *Esther* were not found. Both names have come into use among the Bene-Israel now.

4. **Hindu customs.**—Though preserving their characteristics and religion remarkably in the midst of an unfavourable environment, the Bene-Israel have not survived their long isolation altogether uninfected by the surrounding idolatry. Certain domestic customs and usages, too numerous and intricate to detail at any length, still linger among them, more particularly in rural parts, and specially among the women of the community. These owe their origin purely to Hinduism, though not all of them are of an idolatrous or superstitious character. Such customs are found plentifully connected with marriage ceremonies; also with occasions of birth, puberty, betrothal, sickness, and death.* On an occurrence of smallpox, or even during a performance of vaccination, the goddess of small-pox, *Shītalvādī* by name, is sought to be propitiated by some, and the furtive keeping of Hindu idols has not been unknown. As to the use of charms, and superstitious usages at childbirth, many parallels of a no less debased kind could be drawn from Kabbalistic practices under the sanction of modern rabbinical Judaism (see BIRTH [Jewish]). Rabbi Solomon in his *Travels* mentions that in the year 1846 he saw at Belgaum (a town in the south of the Bombay Presidency) the wives of [Israelite] men in the army stretching forth the fingers of their hands to the fire and kissing them as they lit the lamps.† It is right to say that a great effort has been made in recent years by the Bene-Israel as a body to throw off all this, and that a great change has taken place already.

5. **Organization.**—As to communal organization, the Bene-Israel, under the older order of things, recognized the authority of a headman, called a *muqaddam*, over each village community where sufficient in numbers, whose powers were considerable. He would assemble the community when necessary, preside over their deliberations, and act as their executive in matters relating to caste-discipline or organization generally. Besides this officer, there was another (not, however, found in every village) named the *qāzī*, meaning properly 'judge.' To him pertained the religious duties of ministrations at religious ceremonies, the performance of circumcision, marriage, rites of burial, and frequently the slaughtering of animals. With the *muqaddam* and *qāzī* were associated certain

* In regard to China, it is observable that this practice, even more than the keeping of Saturday as the Sabbath, attracted the notice of the Chinese, so that the Jews were accorded the title of *Tiao Kiu-Kiao*, 'the sect which extracts the sinew.' The writer of the article on 'China' in *JE* iv. 33 deduces from this appellation a further argument for the great antiquity of the arrival of the Jews in China, for he says, 'Rabbinical Judaism would have suggested more distinctive peculiarities of the Jews to the Chinese.' If so in China, how much more may we suppose great antiquity for the arrival of Israelites in India?

† Note the following from Maclean and Browne, *The Catholicos of the East and His People* (S.P.C.K., London, 1892), p. 255: 'One [deacon] goes to the Bema and says a litany; another gives the Kiss of Peace to the people, somewhat as at the daily services, except that the celebrant first kisses the altar and the deacon takes his hands between his own and kisses them, and then goes to the sanctuary door and gives the peace to the person of highest rank, and then to the next, and so on.'

‡ Wilson, *Lands of the Bible*, ii. 672.

§ A ceremony for placing a distinction or line of demarcation between times secular and sacred, as, for example, between week-day and Sabbath.

‖ A good example is the name of the retired commandant who built the first synagogue of the Bene-Israel in Bombay in 1796. His name was *Samaji* (=Samuel) *Hassaji* (=Haskel, *i.e.* Ezekiel) *Divekar* (=resident of the village of Dive).

* Many of these practices will be found described in *BG* (Bombay, 1885) xviii. i. 515–535.

† *Travels of Solomon* (מסעות שלמה), p. 100: בעיני ראיתי בשנת 1846 כאשר הייתי בעיר בלגים את נשות אנשי הצבא אשר שם כאשר הדליקו את הנרות שלחו את אצבעות ידיהן אל האש ותנשקנה אותם.

chaugale, or 'elders' (properly four in number) who assisted them as counsellors. At communal meetings all adult members had a voice.*

6. Modern conditions.—It is only in quite recent times that the Bene-Israel have emerged into the light of history. It is through the observations and researches of Christians that they have become known, and in fact have been raised to some degree of education and advancement, and provided with their Scriptures and fresh beginnings of a knowledge of Hebrew.

(*a*) *State of transition.*—The long centuries during which they had previously remained hidden from notice can, it may safely be surmised, never have their story told. We now see the Bene-Israel at the parting of the ways, just as they are reaching out towards modern modes of life and culture. Their present tendency and aim is to forsake the ancient landmarks of the past, which it has been the object of this article to try to search out and describe. Their present effort is to conform themselves in all respects to the ways of modern Judaism, choosing as their standard the easier and more liberal principles of the Reformed School of Judaism rather than the more rigid ones of strict Talmudic Judaism, which, indeed, their present ignorance of Hebrew would ill fit them to follow. While they are in this transition state, it is now and then difficult to determine what has been of ancient usage among them and what has been of late, or of comparatively late, introduction. The study is further complicated by the probable occasional engrafting that has taken place, upon their original observances, of some of later date by occasional visitors and reformers at long intervals, in the way we have described. Previously the home of the Bene-Israel was exclusively among the villages of the mainland, extending over a tract running parallel with, and southwards for some fifty miles of, the island of Bombay. But since the establishment of British rule in India the Bene-Israel have commenced to migrate largely into the city of Bombay, where over four thousand of them now reside.

(*b*) *Occupations.*—Formerly, besides following their hereditary occupation of oil-pressing, many became also owners of land, cartmen, carpenters, stone-cutters, and cultivators. Now, in addition to these and similar occupations, they are pressing forward into positions as office-clerks and mechanics, and into the services of government, railways, and the municipalities; and some into the learned professions also. In ancient times they displayed great prowess as soldiers, and under the East India Company rarely failed to rise to the position of non-commissioned and commissioned officers. They proved loyal to a man to the British at the time of the Mutiny. The new system of 'promotion by caste returns,' by which the numerical strength of a particular caste is required, as well as intrinsic merit, to secure advancement, has served greatly to deter a minority like the Bene-Israel from now entering to any large extent on a military profession. Not many are possessed of wealth at present, and it is a regrettable fact that some who at one time were well off have squandered their patrimony and become poor.

(*c*) *Synagogues and worship.*—Originally the Bene-Israel had no synagogues or houses of prayer. The oldest of their synagogues in Bombay (which is also the oldest Jewish synagogue in Western India) bears the date A.D. 1796. In Bombay they have erected, mostly within the last hundred years, four or five synagogues of their own, two of which are of a permanent character, specially built as synagogues, and outside of Bombay eight or nine in different townships. In all of these worship is conducted in the modern Jewish manner,* and they possess the usual staff of synagogue officers, namely, the *ḥazzān*, or reader, the *gubbai*, or treasurer, the *shamāsh*, or sexton, etc.; and use the modern Jewish Prayer-Book of the *Sephardim*. They have now procured rolls of the Law, and read from them in the usual way. They have, however, no *kohanim* (supposed Levitical priests); and therefore the few functions assigned to such in the usual Jewish ritual have to go unperformed. They hardly now maintain their old character for the keeping of the Sabbath, for in Bombay and other centres of trade they attend offices, factories, and workshops in large numbers on that day. Though domiciled for a long course of centuries in India, they have done nothing to convert their Indian neighbours to the faith of the God of Abraham. In this respect their influence appears to have been *nil*.

(*d*) *Chief characteristics.*—The Bene-Israel are as yet but a feeble folk. Nevertheless they possess many sterling qualities, which might readily place them in advance of many around them. Though too ready to be quarrelsome, and displaying too great a fondness for liquor on festive occasions, especially on the part of the rising generation living amongst the temptations of large cities, they have always borne a good character for morality; and for courtesy and hospitality they are unsurpassed. Their women show considerable aptitude as teachers and nurses, when properly trained. In regard to religious inquiry, great indolence and want of earnestness prevail. Keenness as to material progress—and indifference to almost everything else—seems at present a ruling characteristic. A great future in India may be in store for such a people as this, if they will live fully up to their opportunities.

LITERATURE.—John Wilson, *Lands of the Bible* (Edinburgh, 1847, ii. 667–678), and (pamphlet) *The Beni-Israel of Bombay: An Appeal for their Christian Education*[2] (Edinburgh, 1866); Haeem S. Kehimkar, (pamphlet) *Sketch of the History of the Bene-Israel and an Appeal for their Education* (Bombay, about 1885); Sir James Campbell, *BG* (Bombay, 1883–1885) xviii. (on Poona) 506–536, xi. (on Kolaba and Janjira) 85, 86, and 421, 422; C. Buchanan, *Christian Researches* (London, 1819), p. 235; Rabbi David D'Beth Hillel, *Travels* (Madras, 1832), pp. 133–135; Herr J. J. Benjamin II., *Eight Years in Asia and Africa* (Hanover, 1859), pp. 143–147; Solomon Reinman (שלמה ריינמאן), *Travels of Solomon* (מסעות שלמה) [in Hebrew], ed. W. Schur (Vienna, 1884), pp. 99–112; Rabbi Jacob Saphir, *Eben Saphir* [in Hebrew] (Mentz, 1874), ii. 42–50; J. H. Lord, *Jewish Mission Field in the Bombay Diocese* (Bombay, 1894), and in *Church and Synagogue* (London), v. (1903) 100–109, 133–142, vi. (1904) 13–24, 55–65, 117–134, viii. (1906) 6–19 (since re-published in amplified form as *Jews in India and Far East*, Bombay, 1907), and on Jews of Cochin, vii. (1905); J. Wolff, *Travels and Adventures* (London, 1861), p. 468 f.; Ritter, *Erdkunde* (Berlin, 1835–1836), vol. iv. pt. i. 594–601, pt. ii. 1087; W. T. Gidney, *Sites and Scenes* (London, 1898), ii. 224–228. See also the *Bombay Census Reports*, 1891, 1901; the *JE*, *s.v.* 'Beni-Israel' (New York and London, 1902); and the *Jewish Year Book* (London) for 1902–1903, pp. 196–202, for 1903–1904, pp. 228–234.

J. HENRY LORD.

BENEVOLENCE.—I. *AS A QUALITY OF HUMAN CHARACTER.*—1. The New Testament usage.—The NT writers are concerned mainly with practical morality. They make no attempt to frame a system of ethics. In studying one of the NT virtues, accordingly, we need hardly try to reach a scientific definition of it. We ought rather to note the working in it of the ultimate principle of NT morality, viz. love, and to trace

* The most modern religious revival amongst the Bene-Israel is connected with the names of a group of Jews from Cochin in the early part of the last century. Prominent amongst these stands out the name of Hacham Shellomo (Solomon) Salem Shurabbi, who died in 1856, after twenty years spent in endeavours for the religious resuscitation of the Bene-Israel (see Haeem S. Kehimkar, *Sketch*, p. 22).

* Their services are in Hebrew, a language which many can now read, but hardly any can understand. Some creditable efforts have been made of late years to provide service-books having the Hebrew interleaved with Marāthi. The daily service-book thus treated is a handsome volume, produced at some expense.

the phases of character and conduct in which its presence is marked.

In considering the operation of the supreme principle of love, we find one broad distinction. The object of love is man in his twofold aspect as a possessor of sacred rights and as a creature of manifold needs. On the one hand, accordingly, love requires the fulfilment of justice. A man must be protected in all the rights of his humanity, inasmuch as he is no mere thing or chattel, but a being made in the Divine image, and meant for the Divine fellowship. On the other hand, with equal emphasis the NT declares the obligation of benevolence. Our fellow-men are sacred not merely in their rights, but in their needs; and we are bound by the principle of love not merely to defend the former, but to meet and relieve the latter. The needs of men are meant to evoke the virtue which we designate by the term 'benevolence,' and by the other cognate words which in various aspects develop its meaning.

In the NT the following aspects of benevolence are the most clearly marked:—

(1) *χρηστότης.*—This beautiful term may be rendered by our word 'benevolence,' giving us the idea of a disposition in which there is nothing harsh or bitter, because the love of self has been swallowed up in a love larger and more compelling. In such a disposition there is a fountain of goodwill which flows forth freely and spontaneously in emotions of loving-kindness and deeds of helpfulness. Closely parallel is the term 'benignity,' by which, indeed, *χρηστότης* is rendered in the Rheims version of Gal 5[22]. It suggests a character large in charity, tolerant in judgment, gentle in speech, of ripe wisdom in the affairs of the soul, finding its delight and its reward in the comfort with which it relieves distress. Our familiar word 'kindness,' however, brings us nearest the heart of this very lovely phase of character. It is the very hall-mark of love (1 Co 13[4]). It has close affinities with forbearance and long-suffering (Ro 2[4], 2 Co 6[6]). It is its very nature to be patient and hopeful, and not to be turned aside by the frowardness and thanklessness of those whom it would help. Its conspicuous contrast is 'severity' (Ro 11[22]). Not, indeed, as though severity were reprehensible; but only that under the limitations of human insight, kindness ought to prevail, while severity must be kept within the restraints of love. Kindness in thought, word, and deed is the homely yet hard requirement of the NT law of love.

(2) *ἀγαθωσύνη.*—This may best be rendered 'goodness' (Ro 15[14], Gal 5[22], Eph 5[9], 2 Th 1[11]), in the sense of active goodness or 'beneficence' (*bonitas*). It emphasizes conduct, while *χρηστότης* emphasizes disposition. '*χρηστότης* is potential *ἀγαθωσύνη*; *ἀγαθωσύνη* is energizing *χρηστότης*' (Lightfoot on Gal 5[22]). Kindness issues in goodness, and is a characteristic of it. It has often been remarked that *ἀγαθωσύνη* does not occur in classical Greek, and that the virtue it expresses is not to be found in the Greek ideal of character. It has no place, for instance, in Aristotle's famous account of the 'high-minded' man. The *μεγαλόψυχος* will, indeed, confer benefits. He will do so, however, not from the love of man as such, but from a sense of what is suited to the artistic completeness of his character. In the NT, man is looked at under the light of the Divine love, and duty is construed from the point of view of the Divine purpose. The God-like man, accordingly, is the good man, in whom love manifests itself as a ceaseless beneficence, which is a finite reproduction of the infinite goodness of God. The good man, unlike the *μεγαλόψυχος*, thinks not of himself in his beneficence, save as the recipient and the steward of the Divine bountifulness.

(3) *εὐδοκία* and *εὔνοια.*—The former describes the gracious will, which is the source of the benevolent deed (Eph 1[5, 9], Ro 10[1], Ph 1[15] 2[13]). The latter is applied to the inner spring of conduct, which, viewed from without, might seem mechanical or compulsory. Even slaves may redeem their enforced labour from the taint of servility by performing it with goodwill to their masters as part of a Divine service (Eph 6[7]).

(4) *φιλανθρωπία.*—Benevolence has for its object every sentient creature, and thus includes kindness to animals. Its proper object is, however, man, whose greatness, as a being made in the image of God, is combined with the frailties of the 'fleshly' side of his nature; and in this connexion it is described as 'philanthropy.' With singular felicity the NT speaks of the 'philanthropy of God' (Tit 3[4]). Ordinarily, the term is applied to the love which man owes to his fellows (Ac 27[3] 28[2]). These references show that philanthropy has a less distinctively Christian note than goodness. It is exhibited by those who have not known the love of God in Christ. In this virtue Christianity has not made an absolutely new discovery. It has rather recovered and reinforced a native energy of human nature, which, amid terrible defacement of the Divine image, has not lost all trace of its original and prototype.

(5) *ἁπλότης.*—'It is not exactly liberality . . . it is the quality of a mind which has no *arrière-pensée* in what it does; when it gives, it does so because it sees and feels the need, and for no other reason; this is the sort of mind which *is* liberal, and God assigns a man the function of *μεταδιδόναι* when He bestows this mind on him by His Spirit' (Denney in *Expos. Gr. Test.* on Ro 12[8]). Liberality describes benevolence in its absorption in the need which it relieves. It has a finer quality than the corresponding virtue described by Aristotle (*Nic. Eth.* bk. iv. ch. i.). A parallel to our Lord's word, 'It is more blessed to give than to receive,' may, indeed, be found in Aristotle's sentence, 'It is more distinctive of virtue to do good to others than to have good done to you.' Yet there is a significant difference. In the one, liberality is a product of a Divine grace, and awakens a Divine gladness. In the other, it is an artistic achievement, and awakens an æsthetic delight. In Aristotle's whole account we do not find 'a word about benevolence, or love to others, as prompting acts of liberality. We find no other motive but the splendour (*καλόν*) of the acts themselves' (Sir A. Grant, *Aristotle's Ethics*, ii. 60).

In the teaching of Jesus benevolence is not discussed, but it is depicted with consummate skill in His parable of the Good Samaritan, in whose action kindness and goodness, goodwill, philanthropy, and liberality are exquisitely blended. In the character of Jesus no aspect of benevolence is wanting. *χρηστότης* is seen in His bearing towards those who were excluded from the respect of men. *ἀγαθωσύνη* is illustrated in the whole ministry of Him who 'went about doing good.' *εὐδοκία* characterizes His attitude towards all men, even those who rejected Him. His *φιλανθρωπία* breaks through all barriers of race or creed or artificial conventionality. His *ἁπλότης* pours forth endless benefits, physical and spiritual; He bestows not merely life, but abundance. This virtue, which Jesus thus portrayed and exemplified, He laid upon His disciples as a sacred obligation. There must be no limit to their liberality (Mt 10[8]). Only by ceaseless beneficence can they realize the privilege of sonship toward God, for He is 'kind unto the unthankful and to the evil' (Mt 5[45, 46], Lk 6[35]).

2. Its place in the history of ethics.—Benevolence is not an isolated ethical unit. It is an element in the organism of virtue, and gives tone and quality

to the complex of virtues which constitute the character as a whole. The value of an ethical system, like that of an individual character, may be estimated by the place which benevolence occupies in it. To trace the varying recognition of this virtue in the history of ethics would be to write the moral history of man. A few steps in the great development may here be indicated.

(1) *Greek ethic.*—We have seen that benevolence does not appear in those systems which reflect the life of citizenship in the independent and intensely aristocratic free cities of the Hellenic world. The reason is that man as man has not yet arisen on the view of the Greek moralist. He is thinking of life within the limits of a Greek city. The intellectual and æsthetic interests prevail. There is room for patriotism. Self-interest must yield to the claims of the State. But goodwill to man, the obligation of helpfulness to all the children of need, and the 'enthusiasm of humanity,' have scarcely dawned on the Greek mind in its quest for ethical completeness. When the independent city falls, and the barrier of its walls is levelled, men are able to look abroad, and to discern more clearly the bonds that connect them with their fellows. The age of the great individualistic philosophies marks the entrance of benevolence into the circle of the virtues. Epicureanism (*q.v.*), indeed, might seem to be selfish and destitute of sympathy. It may be urged, however, that its primary impulse was humanitarian, and that its true purpose was to deliver men from the spiritual bondage in which their souls were sunk. Its gospel of *ἀταραξία* was proclaimed to a despairing world by men who, like Epicurus and Lucretius, were full of sympathy for their fellow-sufferers (see Masson, *Lucretius*, 307, 321). Yet it is in Stoicism (*q.v.*) that we find the first explicit recognition of benevolence. The high ethical rank of Stoicism has been universally recognized. Its description of humanity as an organism,—often in Seneca and Epictetus with striking verbal resemblance to the language of St. Paul,—its ample assertion of the value of man as man, its emphasis on the duty of boundless helpfulness, its beneficent influence on social reform and Roman jurisprudence, indicate a great advance in the moral history of man.

At the same time, the failure of Stoicism is as evident as its triumph. (*a*) Its ideal is empty and unrealizable. Stoic cosmopolitanism is no more than a formal unity of men as beings possessed of reason.

'What is meant by a *φιλανθρωπία* that is not fertile in special affections to individual human beings, affections which adapt themselves to their special character and the special relations into which they are brought? And what is meant by an organic unity of mankind in a *πολιτεία τοῦ κόσμου*, if the reason that is to bind them together be taken merely as a common element in the nature of each, which connects them in spite of their differences in other respects?' (Caird, *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, ii. 126).

(*b*) It failed to exemplify in the details of life the very virtue which it was the first to introduce into the ethical ideal. It proclaims a universal bond and a world-wide sympathy. It too often exhibits a revolting hardness and inhumanity.

'The framework or theory of benevolence might be there, but the animating spirit was absent. Men who taught that the husband or the father should look with perfect indifference on the death of his wife or his child, and that the philosopher, though he may shed tears of pretended sympathy in order to console his suffering friend, must suffer no real emotion to penetrate his breast, could never found a true or lasting religion of benevolence' (Lecky, *European Morals*, i. 191 f.).

(2) *Christian ethic.*—The requirement of a 'religion of benevolence' is satisfied in Christianity. (*a*) Christianity was the fulfilment of the OT religion, which was marked by an intensely social spirit. No doubt, the limits of this social impulse were fixed by the Jewish nationality. At the same time, the great prophetic ideas of the righteousness and grace of God, and of the supreme worth of morality as compared with ritual, were seed sown in the soil of humanity which could not fail of fruit. They found their glorious harvest in the 'new commandment' of love, set forth by Jesus as the law of the Christian fellowship. (*b*) Christianity is fundamentally the life of Christ. His character made one deep and ineffaceable impression upon His followers. They felt that He loved men. They worshipped Him; and they believed that they could truly honour Him only when they poured forth on others the love of which they had been the recipients. Benevolence in the Christian religion is more than the precept of a teacher, more even than a lovely example. It is the very Spirit of Jesus, breathing upon those who adore Him, and quickening them to a life like His. (*c*) Christianity is the consciousness of redemption. God is in Christ reconciling the world to Himself. The Christian is a citizen in the Israel of God, which includes Gentile as well as Jew. He is a member of the household of which God is Father, and which therefore has room for all the children of men. To accept Jesus as Saviour and Lord is to recognize all men as the objects of the Divine benevolence, and to be pledged to its service in the interests of humanity. The NT abounds in exhortations to benevolence (1 Co 13, Eph 5^2, Col 3^{14}, Gal 5^{14} 6^2, 1 Jn 3^{11} 4^{7-9}). The everyday life of the Christian lies within the concentric circles of *φιλαδελφία* and *φιλανθρωπία*. The Christian character presents a new type of virtue; and in it benevolence shines resplendent. The failure of Stoic cosmopolitanism is met by the triumph of Christian benevolence. Instead of being abstract and unreal, Christianity is practical and concrete. Instead of being cold and hard, Christianity has sanctified the emotional side of human nature, and has made love (*ἀγάπη* not *ἔρως*) a virtue, nay, the sum of virtue, and the dynamic of all the virtues.

Christianity proved more effective than Stoicism in suppressing or mitigating great social evils, *e.g.* the exposure of infants, the gladiatorial combats, slavery. Above all, Christianity has established the paramount claims of love. In spite of many sins committed by Christians against the spirit of love, the religion of Jesus has succeeded in binding the obligation of benevolence upon the conscience of the race.

After Christianity lost the fervour and freshness of the Apostolic age, it was invaded by the parallel influences of Stoicism and Judaism, and became dominated by a legal spirit. With the entrance of legalism, the virtues tended to lose their character as elements in a living, spiritual whole, and were subjected to a process of definition and classification. Love ceases to be the sum of virtue. It takes its place as one of the three theological virtues; and to these are added the four virtues of the old Greek lists, revised with more or less success by theologians like Origen, Ambrose, and Augustine.

These lists were elaborated throughout the mediæval period not without real ethical insight, and in them benevolence was amply recognized. From the emblazoned ceilings and walls of churches, from the carved pillars and porticoes of palaces and market-places, from the pages of poets like Dante and divines like Aquinas, the appeal for practical goodness went forth. These exhortations were far from ineffective. 'Nothing shows how the Church of the 13th and 14th centuries had instilled the mind of Jesus into the peoples of Europe like the zeal with which they tried to do their duty by the poor, the sick, and the helpless' (Lindsay, *History of the Reformation*, i. 141). It was a grave defect, however, to substitute lists of duties and virtues for the organization of virtue through one controlling principle. There was also the danger of

over-emphasizing one isolated virtue, till it should become a curse rather than a blessing.

In this way benevolence drew to itself an exaggerated devotion, which had the effect of filling Europe with mendicants and sturdy idlers.

The Reformation was a reaction from legalism. It was a return to primitive Christianity, which was not an ecclesiastical system, but a life in fellowship with Christ. Christianity made a new beginning in its Divine task of educating and regenerating humanity. It is not, however, in one crisis that mankind is brought to its goal. The principle of the Reformation—the spiritual fellowship of man with God—had to be applied in all the fields of man's moral activity; and this implied a process of centuries. The recognition of the fact that virtue, as a spiritual reality, cannot be dismembered and articulated into a code makes its practice far harder than under a legal system. This is specially true of such a virtue as benevolence, when it is no longer defined and limited by a series of outward actions, but has regained its place as an organic outcome of love, boundless in scope and infinitely varied in exercise.

The very success of the Reformation, moreover, in breaking the formal unity of mediæval Catholicism and emphasizing the narrower unities of family and society, as well as the sacredness of the individual, made the problem of benevolence the harder. To maintain it against the perennial selfishness of man, and to apply it amid the increasing complexities of modern civilization, remain the tasks of the moralist and the social reformer.

(3) *The ethic of the 18th century.*—It was inevitable that the abandonment of the principle of outward authority should raise in the most acute form the question as to the sanctions of morality. If moral precepts do not rest on the authority of the Church, from what do they derive their obligatory character? Why, in particular, should men be required to surrender their individual preference to further the advantage of others? The moral problem, accordingly, for a hundred years of post-Reformation thought, during which individualism held the field in psychology and ethics, turned mainly upon the question of benevolence. Is it a radical instinct of human nature? If not, how has it come to occupy the place which common opinion assigns it? The controversy was waged, mainly, in England. *Hobbes* states the question. He finds man's primary condition to be that of appetite and desire. All man's natural tendencies are 'self-regarding.' The *jus naturale* 'is the liberty each man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature' (*Leviathan*, ed. 1839, ch. xiv.). A vivid picture is drawn of the evils to which the exercise of this natural right would expose humanity; and a strong appeal is made for the surrender of individual independence to the rule of the sovereign.

Such a cynical estimate of human nature could not but provoke reply. *Shaftesbury* distinguishes two classes of natural tendency, some being directed to the good of others, and some to that of self. Virtue lies in the due proportion of these two sets of natural instincts, a proportion discerned by the special faculty of the moral sense. *Hutcheson* even more forcibly vindicates the reality of benevolence, and resolves all virtue into it. *Butler*, in like manner, argues for the disinterested character of benevolence, and regards it as 'the sum of virtue.' All these thinkers are under the control of individualism; and, from the point of view of 18th cent. individualism, the only possible question was: 'Is benevolence one among the tendencies and impulses which are found in the individual human being?' To this question, the answer could only be a simple 'yes' or 'no.' When, however, individualism began to give way, and an organic view of society to take its place, a fresh study of human nature, and of the 'good' corresponding to it, had to be made. The psychology which enumerates faculties, instincts, etc., has been abandoned. Man is no longer viewed as a mass of tendencies, among which benevolence may be enumerated. He is a living being, a true organism, or 'unity in differences.' His moral nature has been formed by a long process of education and discipline. This historic development has disclosed the deepest fact regarding man's moral nature, viz., that, when man is most 'self-regarding,' he is least himself; that he reaches his true being only when he abandons the point of view of the isolated individual, and goes out to his fellows in self-forgetfulness, and so enriches his own personality through sharing their experience.

Benevolence, therefore, is not an instinct about which it may be disputed whether we do or do not possess it. It is the very energy of the soul, according to its highest excellence, in a perfect life. We come back, accordingly, by another path to the dictum of Hutcheson and Butler that benevolence is 'the sum of virtue,' or rather to the position of the NT that 'love is the fulfilling of the law.' The 20th cent. has begun by accepting the organic principle, and has addressed itself with deep seriousness to the task of its practical application. Amid schemes of social amelioration, however, we need constantly to remember that benevolence cannot be made to order. It is begotten of the sense of membership in a society, which cannot be constructed by any sociological machinery, however ingenious. The message of Christianity is that this society exists. It has descended out of heaven from God. It consists in the fellowship of those who have surrendered themselves to the Divine love in Christ, and are impelled and quickened by a debt whose magnitude grows the more loyally they discharge it. Benevolence, as a social energy, cannot live unless it be revived at the springs of the Divine philanthropy. As the inspiration of the individual life, it must be derived from, indeed it consists in, the constraint of the love of Christ.

II. *AS A DIVINE ATTRIBUTE.*—1. **Its place in the character of God.**—Consideration of the moral attributes of God can be fruitful only if two principles are borne in mind. (*a*) The attributes are not 'things' or 'forces.' It is a profound mistake first to isolate them, and then to endeavour to relate them to one another logically or mechanically. They exist in the unity of the Divine character, and are partial manifestations of its inexhaustible wealth. (*b*) They are not to be viewed as given, in their truth and fullness, in man, and then applied to the Divine character as copies or reflexions of what they are in human nature. The moral attributes of God are to be learned, primarily, from the revelation which Christ has given, in His own person, of the Being whom He, alone among men, perfectly knew. The God whom we know in Christ is love. This is the absolute truth of His nature, in the light of which every aspect of his character is to be viewed. His love is scarcely to be classed among His attributes. It is rather the central principle in which they all meet, the spiritual power from which each derives efficiency.

'Wisdom is its intelligence; might its productivity; the entire natural creation and the entire revelation of righteousness in history are the means by which it attains its teleological aims (Martensen, *Dogmatics*, 99).

In pursuing its teleological aim, which may be defined as the Kingdom of God, the Divine love follows two great lines of action. In the first place, it requires the vindication of righteousness. The

'rights' of every creature must be maintained; that is to say, every creature must be preserved in the fulfilment of its special vocation, and guarded in its realization of its own proper nature. These rights are sacred. The violation of them must be marked, in the administration of the universe, by definite retribution. The harmonious development of the vast and delicate order of the universe, by the subjection of every part to the living Will which animates the whole, is an essential interest of the Divine love. In the second place, the love of God manifests itself as goodness, or benevolence. It is pledged to the task of furthering the good of every creature. God has brought the universe into being as the means of His self-revelation; and it is only by His revelation of Himself to it that it reaches its perfection. His love takes shape in ceaseless goodness, pouring forth benefits in proportion to need; and, in this constant communication, its own glory and blessedness are eternally increased. 'It is the nature of goodness to possess its own fullness only in communication, to have only as it gives' (Martensen, *op. cit.* 98). It is important thus to connect the Divine benevolence with the aim of the Divine love. The Divine benevolence is part of the operation of the Divine love, which, from the beginning of creation, has been preparing a world in and to which God could fully reveal Himself. It signifies His goodwill toward all the creatures of His power, His determination to bless them according to their utmost capacity, and to bring them to the highest perfection of their nature. His love is not altered by the fact that man, the head of the lower creation, has rebelled against Him. Rather it has become stronger and deeper, in view of the unspeakable tragedy of human sin. The goodness, which is marked in all creation and providence, has become the mercy whose crowning manifestation is the Cross of Christ.

The Biblical usage confirms this view of the relation between the benevolence of God and the highest aim of His love. The OT believers are profoundly convinced of the goodness of Jahweh. But they do not mean by the Divine goodness such a sentiment as a pantheistic æstheticism might attribute to God. By goodness they mean a quality of the Divine character which comes into operation as God pursues His great aim of redeeming and blessing His people. Even when physical nature is summoned as evidence of the Divine goodness, it is viewed as the sphere wherein God carries on His redemptive work; and the goodness of God manifest therein is an argument for confiding in His faithfulness to His saving purpose and in His ability to carry it to completion. More commonly, the goodness of God is manifest in the lives of those whom He is preparing for Himself. Often the Divine goodness has high spiritual qualities, and is expressly referred to as an element in redeeming grace (*e.g.* Ps 23^6 25^7 65^4). Verbal references to the goodness of God are much less frequent in the NT. Its main theme is the love manifest in Christ. The goodness of God is an aspect of that gracious working whereby He leads men to the knowledge of His Son (Ro 2^4 11^{22}).

2. Its operation in creation and providence.—Christian apologetic is not bound to construct a complete theodicy. It must make the love of God, proved in Christ, its presupposition and its starting-point. Thence it must review the life of nature and of man, and seek to exhibit the evidence it finds therein of God's wise and benevolent working. If it can show that, in creation and providence, God's goodness has been operative, preparing the way for the triumph of His love, its task is sufficiently performed, even though it cannot produce an intellectual solution of every mystery in the Divine dealing with men. The evidences of the Divine goodness are such as these:—

(1) *The adaptation of the physical universe to the development of man.*—By its resistance to human effort, quite as much as by its fertility, it furthers the physical, intellectual, and moral well-being of man. By its beauty and its wonder, as well as by its pathos and decay, it quickens man's sense of the unseen, deepens his capacity for worship, and gives him intimations of his immortality.

(2) *The competence of human nature for a Divine vocation.*—The powers which man possesses fit him for the service of God, and the blessedness of fellowship with Him. While being, in one aspect, himself a part of physical nature, man is able to live above natural conditions, to penetrate to the significance of the world, and make it the home and the instrument of his spirit. His dependence upon his fellows prepares him for a social good, wider and richer than could be attained by any merely individual achievement. There are traces, growing ever clearer with the progress of humanity, that man is capable of a higher fellowship and a nobler blessedness than that which can be obtained in the most cultured human society.

(3) *The organization of human life for ideal needs.*—The history of the growth of the various forms of organized human life exhibits the powers and destiny of man. In the Family, he learns to be human, and finds in love, trust, reverence, and self-denial the very glory of humanity. In the State, he is called and enabled to serve his fellow-men, and to save his life by losing it. In the Church, he breathes the atmosphere of the love of God, and enters upon the blessedness of a Divine Sonship.

(4) *The direction of human history towards the goal of the Kingdom of God.*—The goodness of God is seen in His education of the race by the long teaching of experience, and by the moral discipline of ages. The slowness of the process may not be wholly explicable; but, at least, it is not inconsistent with the goodness of God, who is not slack, as some men count slackness. The cosmic movement of the great Divine design must, in any case, be slow.

(5) *The training of individual character.*—The necessity of connecting the idea of the Divine benevolence with that of the saving purpose of the Divine love is specially urgent here. The benevolence of God is seen not in a promiscuous bestowal of good things, but in the steadfast pursuit of His gracious purpose, which seeks, by common beneficences of every day, and by significant dealings in judgment and mercy, to bring men into the Kingdom.

Christian experience has learned, in communion with Christ, that God is love. Under the illumination of this thought, it surveys the whole field of nature and of human history, and discovers therein unfailing tokens of the presence and operation of the Divine goodness.

3. Its vindication in view of objections.—Three great facts traverse the argument for the goodness of God: pain and death and sin. Many who do not doubt the Being of God are brought by these terrible realities into grave perplexity and profound spiritual distress. It ought to be admitted that a complete intellectual solution of the problems thus raised is impossible under the conditions of our present experience. In view of them, we ought to occupy the true ground of Christian theology, as that is given in Christian experience. Deeper than the deepest analysis of pessimism, Christianity pierces to the need of man, and finds that need met in Christ. God is love because, in Christ, He saves and perfects men. Here is a fact of experience, which outweighs the facts that seem to impugn the goodness of God. Living in this experience, the mind is able to maintain its con

fidence in God, even under the strain of ignorance and doubt. Pain and death and sin come within the scope of the Divine purpose, and we have warrant to believe, though no human calculus can adjust every detail, that they subserve the Divine end.

Pain is a terrible reality. It has, however, such noble uses that we can well understand how a good God might include it in the scope of His working. When, moreover, it is not merely borne as an infliction, but taken up as a ministry, the last shadow of inconsistency with the Divine goodwill is removed. 'It not only passes into the category of good things, but it becomes emphatically *the good*' (Hinton, *The Mystery of Pain*, 11 f.).

Death fills the world with sorrow. Yet two facts counterbalance its desolation. In the first place, the ultimate source of its terror, viz. the separation from God, of which, to the sinner, it is the sign and seal, has been removed. For those who have accepted the reconciliation the terror of death no longer exists. In the second place, death, like pain, becomes no longer in any sense an evil, when it is accepted as a service. Interpreted by the death of Christ, death becomes the crowning service of the living, for the deepening and expansion of the life of others. The principle of vicarious suffering runs through the whole universe, and reaches its highest application in the life of man.

Such considerations are not available to heal entirely the hurt of the human heart. Enough of mystery remains to foster a deep humility and a tender and catholic sympathy. In thus binding human beings in the bonds of mutual compassion, Death fulfils one of its most precious functions.

Sin is the most awful fact, the most terrible mystery of the world. To the question, how a benevolent Supreme Being could permit the entrance of Sin into His world, there can be given no complete answer. The fact of sin can be met only by the fact of redemption. Christianity does not solve the speculative question, but it meets the spiritual need with the message that God was in Christ, reconciling the world to Himself. To enter into the experience of reconciliation is not to be put in possession of a theoretic proof of the consistency of the existence of sin with the Divine benevolence. It is, however, to be enabled to wrest from sin, which seemed utterly incompatible with the existence of goodness in God, the profoundest testimony to the presence and supremacy of love in the Divine character. Without sin, we could not have known the depth of our need, and the uttermost of our dependence upon God. Without sin, we could not have known the exceeding greatness of His love, and the uttermost of His capacity for sacrifice. Without sin, as a fact in the experience of men, we could not come so close to them in sympathy, and could not become partakers of Christ's sufferings.

From all survey of the operations of the Divine goodness, we return to the experience of redemption. The Being who spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all, is good, of unerring wisdom and untainted holiness. From the character of God, as it is known in Christ, we pass to a judgment upon the whole universe, and declare, with unclouded assurance, that it confirms the conviction of faith that God is good.

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BENGAL.—1. General description.—The Province of Bengal, or, as it is sometimes designated, Lower Bengal, is that portion of the Indian Empire comprising the lower valleys of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra. In its original form the Province occupied the region lying between 19° 18′ and 28° 15′ north latitude, and between 82° and 97° east longitude. Since the British occupation the boundaries have been several times re-arranged. In 1874 Assam (wh. see) was constituted a separate administration; in 1905 the boundaries of Bengal, Assam, and the Central Provinces were re-constructed, the eastern portion of the old province of Bengal, containing the Dacca and Chittagong divisions with the Districts of Rājshāhī, Dināj̄pur, Jalpaigurī, Rangpur, Bogrā, Pābnā, and Māldā being, with Assam, constituted a new province under the name of Eastern Bengal. The present province of Bengal proper is bounded on the north by Nepāl and Sikkim; on the west by the United and Central Provinces; on the south by the Bay of Bengal and portions of the Madras Presidency; on the east by the new Eastern Bengal-Assam province, from which it is divided by the rivers Ganges and Madhumatī; on the east by Burma and hilly country occupied by independent tribes; on the south by the Bay of Bengal.

The following table shows the area and population of the new provinces as at present constituted:—

Name of Province.	Area in Square Miles.	Population.	Religions.		
			Hindus.	Muhammadans.	Others.
Bengal Proper	110,054	50,723,318	39,267,801	9,027,069	2,428,948
Eastern Bengal with Assam	101,147	30,788,184	11,519,574	17,823,129	1,445,481

This rearrangement of boundaries came into effect after the completion of the Census of 1901; and as it is now impossible to rearrange the details of the religious statistics to correspond with the present position, it is more convenient to treat the province as it was constituted prior to the partition in 1905. The physical conditions of the region are much diversified. It consists of the alluvial plains forming the valleys of the two great rivers; of the crystalline plateau of Chotā Nāgpur, and the hills extending from the south-east towards the Ganges at Rājmahāl; the narrow strip of alluvium forming the commissionership of Orissa; and, lastly, a portion of sub-Himālayan region including the sanatorium of Dārjīling, and the rough hilly country on the Burma frontier.

2. Name and historical geography.—The name of Bengal, derived from the Skr. *Vaṅga*, does not appear in Muhammadan or Western literature before the latter part of the 13th cent., when it took the place of the earlier title, Lakhnāotī (Yule, *Anglo-Indian Gloss. s.v.*). The name Vaṅga was in early times strictly applied to the country stretching south-east from Bhāgalpur to the sea, in other words, to the Delta formed by the lower reaches of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra. The Province is usually divided into four sub-provinces—(*a*) Bihār to the west, including the ancient kingdom of Magadha, which is now represented by the Districts of Patna, Gayā, and Shāhābād, with its capital at Rājagriha, some thirty miles north-east of the present city of Gayā. North of the Ganges was Videha or Mithilā, now included in the Districts of Darbhanga, Sāran, Champāran, and North Muzaffarpur. The south portion of the last-named District constituted the small kingdom of Vaiśālī. To the east lay Aṅga, including the modern Districts of Monghyr, Bhāgalpur, and Puraniya (Purnea). From the religious point of view Bihār is important as the place of origin of both the Buddhist and the Jaina faith. (*b*) Bengal Proper, which occupies the deltaic region. In the time of the *Mahābhārata*, North and East Bengal, with Assam, formed the kingdom of Prāgjyotisha, or, as it was called later, Kāmarūpa. East of Bengal Proper lay Vaṅga, which gave its name to the province, its population living principally in boats, and represented by the modern Chaṇḍāls. (*c*)

Orissa, the old name of which was Kaliṅga, stretching from the mouth of the Ganges to that of the Krishna. In later times the name Kaliṅga was applied only to the Delta of the Godāvari, while that of the Mahānadī became known as Utkala or Odra, whence the modern name of the sub-province was derived. (*d*) Chotā Nāgpur and the Tributary States of Orissa, a region of hill jungle inhabited by tribes of non-Aryan origin, parts of which were known to Muhammadan writers as Jhārkhand, 'the jungle region,' which the lords of Northern India never attempted to occupy.

3. Modern geography.—The Province may be described generally as consisting for the most part of the lower valleys of the great rivers, the Ganges which enters it on the west frontier and passes through it diagonally, and the Brahmaputra which, after forcing its way through a break in the Himālayan chain, flows through Assam and the eastern portion of the Province. These alluvial tracts are flanked by a series of highlands—to the north the outlying lower range of the Himālaya; to the south-west the hilly region of Chotā Nāgpur and Orissa; to the east the hilly tract of Tippera, which is the boundary between the Province and Burma.

4. The plain country.—The Province thus displays great diversities of aspect and climate, which have affected the ethnology, social character, and beliefs of the people. Beginning from the west, where the Province marches with the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, we have the sub-province of Bihār, divided into two portions by the Ganges. To the extreme north is the submontane strip, part of which constitutes the Tarāī, or region of fen and forest beneath the lower slopes of the Himālaya; south of this is the Gangetic zone, a country with an ancient civilization, large towns, and a well-developed system of agriculture. This is the finest and most healthy part of the Province, a country producing wheat, sugar, and the other staples characteristic of the upper valley of the Ganges, and supporting a number of indigo factories managed by Europeans, whose industry has in recent years suffered grievously through competition with the artificial dye prepared in Germany. The people here are a fine, manly, sturdy race, many of whom used to enlist in the old sepoy army, but now find occupation as porters and messengers in Calcutta. Bihār south of the Ganges is a less fertile country, which, except in the neighbourhood of Gayā, has only recently come within the influence of Aryan civilization. The physical appearance and beliefs of the people indicate intermixture with the non-Aryan races occupying the adjoining plateau of Chotā Nāgpur. Passing eastward along the valley of the Ganges, we gradually reach the dank steamy Delta, the product of the great rivers which here enter the sea. The compact mud villages of Bihār here give place to little thatched hamlets, each hidden within a plantain clump or grove of shady trees. Rice is the staple crop and the universal food, instead of the wheat, barley, and millet which support the peasant of Bihār. The people, though their intelligence is sharper, have little of the manly vigour and independence of the Bihārīs. They belong, in fact, to different race-types (see below, § 6). Where the Delta advances into the Bay of Bengal is the great forest swamp of the Sundarbans, a network of rivers and estuaries enclosing numerous islands, which are often half swamp. This region has hardly any permanent population save a few fishermen, hunters, and woodcutters, who brave the malaria and wild beasts which its jungles contain. The Orissa Delta farther south is the work of three rivers, the Mahānadī, Brāhmanī, and Baitaranī (which see). These rivers, as they approach the sea, deposit masses of silt which raise their beds above the level of the surrounding country, with the result that it becomes a water-logged swamp, a network of creeks and muddy channels, forming a district pregnant with malaria.

5. The hill tracts.—To the student of ethnology and primitive religion the most interesting portions of the Province are the plateau of Chotā Nāgpur, the hill tracts which rise above the Orissa Delta, and the tangled region of hills which separates the Province from Burma. Chotā or Chūtia Nāgpur consists of a confused mass of hills, plateaux, and ravines interspersed with jungle, which forms the most easterly extension of the hill country of Central India and of the Central Provinces abutting on the Gangetic valley near Bhāgalpur. This and the hill tracts of Orissa to the south-west form the last refuge of the Dravidian and Mundā races, and are occupied by non-Aryan tribes like the Santāls, Hos, Orāons, and Kandhs, who still preserve their original languages and beliefs comparatively unaffected by the Aryan immigrants from the west who colonized the plain country beneath them. Similarly, the Chittagong hill tracts on the eastern frontier are inhabited by Maghs, Chakmās, Tipārās, and Kūkīs, races of Mongoloid stock, who 'build their houses on bamboo platforms raised ten feet from the ground, and cultivate on the *jhūm* system; that is to say, they make clearances in the jungle, and, when the trees and undergrowth which they have cut down become sufficiently dry, they burn them; then, after the ground has been softened by rain, they dibble in seeds of rice, cotton, maize, melons, and yams, all mixed together' (Gait, *Census Rep.* 1901, i. 81). In the Tarāī at the base of the lower Himālaya we find a malarious tract occupied by primitive tribes like the Thārus (wh. see), or immigrants from Nepāl or the hill country.

6. Ethnological character of the people and their languages.—The races inhabiting the Delta of the Ganges and its tributaries from the confines of Bihār to the Bay of Bengal have been included by Risley in the Mongolo-Dravidian or Bengālī division, one of the most distinctive types in India, characterized as regards its Mongoloid element by a high cephalic index, in other words, included within the brachycephalic class, while the breadth of the nose suggests an infusion of Dravidian blood. In Western Bengal the Dravidian element, as might be expected from the fact of this part of the Province abutting on the Dravidian stronghold on the Chotā Nāgpur plateau, is predominant; while to the east the form is modified owing to closer contact with the Mongolian race which probably entered Bengal down the valley of the Brahmaputra. To the west, again, in Bihār, the type assimilates to that of the Aryo-Dravidian prevailing in the upper Gangetic valley. This is characterized by a longer form of head and a narrower and finer moulded nose. In the hill tracts to the south the Dravidian type is predominant, that of a race distinguished by short stature, long form of head, plentiful hair, with the nose very broad and depressed at the root. From the point of view of ethnology, therefore, the population is of very mixed origin. The Dravidian type, which was probably that of the earliest inhabitants of the country, has been overlaid and modified in various degrees by the Aryan type, which worked its way from the west down the valley of the Ganges, and by the Mongoloid races who advanced down that of the Brahmaputra. There is no ethnical frontier, such as impassable rivers or mountain ranges, serving to control the movement of the population

from one end of the Province to another. The Ganges, and in a lesser degree the Karatoyā, the old sacred river which divided Bihār from the rest of Bengal, did in some degree effect this purpose (O'Donnell, *Census Report*, 1891, i. 38); but the divisions thus formed did not remain permanently distinct. The same may be said of the languages, one dialect merging gradually and almost imperceptibly into the next. The vast majority of the people (94 per cent.) now speak one or other of the tongues of the Aryan family, of which the most important are Bengālī to the east, Hindī to the west, and the Oriyā of Orissa to the south. The second group of tongues is that known as the Mundā, spoken by the Santāls, Hos, and cognate tribes. These represent only 3·54 of the total population. Still less numerically important are the languages of the Dravidian group, of which the most numerous speakers belong to the Orāons (wh. see) and allied tribes; and the small Tibeto-Burman element used by tribes on the northern frontier towards Nepāl or eastward in the direction of Burma.

7. **Statistics of religion.**—The diverse ethnical characteristics of the people are reflected in the variety of the religions which they follow. The population recorded at the last Census is distributed among the chief religious denominations as follows:—

Hindus .	49,687,362,	being 63·3	% of total.
Muhammadans	25,495,416	,, 32·48	,,
Christians .	278,366	,, ·36	,,
Animists .	2,780,468	,, 3·54	,,
Buddhists .	237,893	,, ·30	,,
Others . .	13,905	,, ·02	,,

8. **Animism.**—It will be convenient to deal first with Animism, the most primitive form of the religion of Bengal, and the basis of the beliefs which are held by the majority of the people. But, as it appears in the Census returns, the term is used in a sense different from that usually accepted by writers on primitive religion. This form of belief is founded on the conception adopted by primitive man, 'that every object which had activity enough to affect him in any way was animated by a life and will like his own.' It was, however, found impossible to obtain correct returns of an indefinite, amorphous religion like this, for which those who hold it have no special name, and which merges so directly into Hinduism and into Islām in its most debased form that the line dividing it from either of these faiths is uncertain. Hence, in the returns of those who are represented as professing Animism only those persons were included who followed a tribal religion, or worshipped tribal gods quite distinct from those of the orthodox Hindu pantheon. On the other hand, the great majority of the lower classes, whose religion is to a great extent of an animistic type, and even those members of the purely animistic tribes who lived at a distance from their tribal headquarters, were recorded as Hindus. Hence the Animists of the Census really represent only the well-organized non-Aryan or Dravidian or Mongoloid tribes, such as Santāls, Mundās, or Orāons who inhabit the hilly tracts to the south-east or east of the Province; and the lower castes of the plain country, whose beliefs are of an analogous type, appear in the Census returns as Hindus. The returns show Animists, as thus defined, to be most numerous in the Districts of Rānchī and Singhbhūm, where they represent nearly half the total population, and in a smaller proportion in the Santāl Parganas and the other hilly tracts of Chotā Nāgpur and Orissa.

The characteristics of Animism in Bengal, which does not differ to any important extent from that found in other parts of Northern India (see DRAVIDIANS), have been thus summarized by Gait (*Census Report*, 1901, i. 152):

> 'There is a vague but very general belief in some one omnipotent being, who is well-disposed towards men, and whom, therefore, it is unnecessary to propitiate. Then come a number of evil spirits, who are ill-disposed towards human beings, and to whose malevolent influence are ascribed all the woes which afflict mankind. To them, therefore, sacrifices must be offered. These malevolent spirits are sylvan deities, spirits of the trees, the rocks, and the streams, and sometimes also of the tribal ancestors. There is no regular priesthood, but some persons are supposed to be better endowed with the powers of divination than others. When a calamity occurs, one of these diviners, *shamans*, or soothsayers, is called on to ascertain the particular demon who is offended and who requires to be pacified by a sacrifice. This is done, either by devil-dancing, when the diviner works himself into a paroxysm of drunkenness and excitement, and then holds converse with the unseen spirits around him, or by the examination of omens—eggs, grains of rice, or the entrails of a fowl. There is a profound belief in omens of all sorts; no journey is undertaken unless it is ascertained that the fates are propitious, while persons who have started on a journey will turn back should adverse omens be met with on the way.'

It would perhaps be impossible to find in Bengal a single tribe which is in the purely animistic stage. Most of the people have come more or less under the influence of Hindu missionaries, who have introduced among them the nominal worship and some of the ritual of the orthodox gods, while at the same time the basis of their beliefs is some form of Animism. Thus, in the case of the Tipārās (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 186 f.) we have an instance of a secluded jungle tribe, some of whose deities are of a distinctively primitive type—the *numina* of the forest, which would naturally be regarded as objects of dread by people exposed to the myriad accidents and diseases which accompany the work of clearing the jungle. Thus, Burāsā is their forest-god, who is old, carries a mace, and has his home in the woods. But even here we see some signs of Hindu influence when we find that his son, the god of death, is coming to be identified with the Hindu Yama. Again, among the same tribe we find Maimungmā, the goddess of paddy fields, who, like many of these agricultural deities, has a male consort, Thunāī, and Khulungmā, the goddess of cotton. Deities like these represent a much higher stage of culture, when the community has cleared the forest and settled down to a life of agriculture. In another class of animistic deities these Tipārās worship the *numina* of the powers of Nature—Tuimā, a river-goddess, who is now coming to be identified with the Gangā, or Ganges, of the dwellers in the plains; and Lāmprā or Khabdī, who rules sky and ocean; and Sāngrama, the deity who presides over the Himālaya. Again, by a natural course of evolution, the agricultural goddesses, who are primarily regarded as beneficent, develop on their chthonic or malignant side into seven goddesses who preside over witchcraft.

But this assignment of special functions to a number of distinct deities is not the most primitive form of belief. The earlier conception is rather the belief in a host of ill-defined spirits, mostly malevolent, to whom no departments in the control of human affairs have been assigned. Such is practically the religion of the Mundās and Orāons (wh. see). The Gulguliās, a wandering non-Aryan tribe, worship 'a host of spiritual powers, whose attributes are ill-defined, and who are not conceived as wearing any bodily form. This at least may be inferred from the fact that they make no images, and that Baktāwar, the tutelary deity of the Patnā Gulguliās, is represented by a small mound of hardened clay set up in an earthen plate' (Risley, *Tribes and Castes*, i. 302). The Bhuiyās, again, worship a number of communal ghosts with 'ill-defined functions and general capacity for mischief and malevolence'; and 'the vague shapes of ghosts or demons who haunt the jungle and the rock are the real powers

to whom the average Kurmī looks for the ordering of his moral and physical welfare' (*ib.* i. 115, 534).

9. **Worship of forest-spirits and tree-spirits.**—Beginning, then, from what is probably the earliest stage, the worship by a tribe of colonists of the vague spirits which people the jungle, we find among the Juāngs, a very primitive tribe, who have only quite recently abandoned the wearing of a dress of leaves, that Barām, a forest-deity, stands at the head of their system and is regarded with great veneration, while, just as might have been expected, in subordination to him are Thānpatī, the patron of the village, and Basumatī, Mother Earth, whose worship marks the adoption of a settled village and agricultural life. At this stage we also naturally find the worship of trees, or rather of the spirits immanent in them, which prevails widely among the non-Aryan tribes, and is well established in the lower grades of Hinduism. Thus, the Cheros and Kharwārs sacrifice every three years a buffalo and other animals in the Sarnā, or sacred grove; each village of the Kisāns has two or more Sā, or sacred groves; the Bhuiyās preserve Deotā Sarā, or sacred groves, which are dedicated to four deities; in the sacred grove of the Mundās, 'if a tree be destroyed, the gods evince their displeasure by withholding seasonable rain'; and 'every village has in its vicinity a grove reputed to be the remains of the primitive forest left intact for the local gods when the clearing was made' (Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology*, 129, 132, 141, 186, 188). Besides the fear that the total destruction of the jungle may rouse the anger of the tree-gods in case a suitable asylum is not provided for them, there is the general belief that all tree-cutting is offensive to them. Of the Maghs of Eastern Bengal we learn that

'nothing but positive orders and the presence of Europeans would induce them to trespass on many of the hilltops, which were inhabited, they said, by these demons. With the Europeans, however, they would advance fearlessly, and did not hesitate to fell the trees, the blame of such sacrilege being laid upon their visitors. On felling any very large tree one of the party at work upon it was always ready prepared with a green twig, which he ran and placed in the centre of the stump the instant the tree fell, as a propitiation to the spirit which had been displaced so roughly, pleading at the same time the orders of the strangers for the work. In clearing one spot an orderly had to take the *dāh* (felling-knife) and fell the first tree himself before a Magh would make a stroke, and was considered to bear all the odium of the work with the dispossessed spirits, till the arrival of the Europeans relieved him of his burden' (*Calcutta Review*, xxvi. 512).

We may compare with this superstition the early Brāhmanical rule, based on primitive animistic belief, according to which, when the priest cuts a tree for the preparation of the sacrificial post, he places a blade of the sacred *darbha* grass between the axe and the tree, and says, 'O plant, shield it! O axe, hurt it not!' (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, tr. Eggeling, *SBE* xxvi. 164). The woodcutters in the Sundarbans never enter the jungle without sending their *faqīr* in advance, who takes upon himself the wrath of the woodland spirits (Wise, *Notes*, 13). The same writer remarks (*ib.* 137) that 'it is a curious fact that one of the latest outgrowths of the corrupt Vaishnavism is the veneration of trees. The Dervish *faqīr* will not permit a leaf or twig to be plucked from the trees growing within the *akhārās* ("convents"), although flowers are the ordinary offering at the tomb of a *mahant* ("abbot").'

The non-Aryan tribes have special tree-feasts of their own. Such is the Sarhūl feast of the Orāons (wh. see), when flowers of the Sāl (*shorea robusta*) are collected by the *pahān*, or local priest, from a remnant of the old forest, which is the home of Sarnā Būrhī, 'the old woman of the grove,' who corresponds to the Jāhir Erā and Desaulī of the Mundās (Dalton, *op. cit.* 261). The Orāons have a similar feast, the Karamā, in which a branch of this sacred tree is cut, and planted in the village assembly-ground, and the youth of both sexes dance round it (*ib.* 259). The same dance and feast in connexion with this tree prevail among the Kharwārs, Mānjhīs, and other allied non-Aryan tribes of the western Vindhyan and Kaimūr ranges (Crooke, *PR* ii. 94 ff.).

Besides this there is the cult of special trees, which marks an advance in the development of popular belief. In some cases it is associated with totemism, the tree being specially worshipped by the tribe or giving a name to some of its sections. The Pīpal (*Ficus religiosa*) is held particularly sacred. Its trunk is the habitation of Brahmā, its twigs of Vishṇu, its leaves of the other gods. The tree is deified under the name of Vasudeva, and water is poured on its roots by pious people after the morning bath, especially in the month of Baisākh (April–May), and when people are in trouble; the Bel (*Ægle marmelos*) is sacred to Śiva, its leaves are used in his worship and in that of the Śaktis, or female powers, and as it is the abode of Śiva none except Brāhmans may use its wood for fuel; but pious Hindus of the Vaishnava sect will not so much as mention its name. The Tulasī (*Ocymum sanctum*) stands in the same relation to Vishṇu as the Bel does to Śiva, and the plant is grown in the courtyards of all who specially make him their object of worship.

'It is watered after the daily bath, and in Baisākh a pot filled with water, which drips through a hole in the bottom, is suspended over the plant. In the evening a lamp is lit at its foot. Hari [Vishṇu] is believed to be present in it. Its leaves are essential for the proper worship of Vishṇu. They are believed to have a certain medicinal effect in the case of malarial affections, and are much used by native practitioners' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 191).

The non-Aryan emigrants to Bogra pay similar veneration to the plantain tree after reaping the rice crop. Goats and pigs are sacrificed to it; it is worshipped before weddings, and after the ceremony the bridal garland is thrown into a bamboo clump. The practice of marrying brides to trees before the regular service is performed is common. It appears to be done either with the intention of transferring to the tree any possible dangers which may result from the marriage; or it is a form of sympathetic, mimetic, or homœopathic magic by which the fertilizing powers of the spirit which animates the tree and revives it after its winter rest are communicated to the girl (*PR* ii. 115 ff.).

10. **Mountain-worship.**—The worship of the mountain springs from conceptions analogous to those which suggest the cult of trees. The hill, with its thick jungle, its mysterious caves which seem to be entrances to the lower world, the danger of accident from a fall from a precipice, an avalanche or a falling boulder, the risk of attack from wild animals which shelter themselves in its recesses—all promote the idea that it is infested by malignant spirits. Again, as we might expect, hills are favourite sites for the worship of the sun or other heavenly objects. This was the case in Greece, where many of the old hill-shrines of the sun have now been taken over by his successor, St. Elias (Frazer, *Pausanias*, iii. 364). Mountain-worship is naturally uncommon in the plains, except in those places from which a view of the mighty chain of the Himālayas can be obtained. But it prevails widely among the non-Aryan hill tribes, like the Mundās, Santāls, and other races occupying the plateau of Chotā Nāgpur, who worship a mountain-god known as Marang Burū or Bar Pahār, 'the great mountain,' to whom the tribal priest offers a sacrifice of buffaloes or other animals (Dalton, *op. cit.* 135, 187 f., 199, 210, 214, 220 f., 257, 321). In the same way the Kisāns recognize various sacred heights (*pāt*) as devoted to their gods (*ib.* 132). Of the same type is Sārū Pennū, the mountain-god of the Kandhs.

'He is a jealous god, and does not like people to trespass on his domain, and the chief object of the worship which is performed in his honour in April and May is to induce him to protect from the attacks of wild animals people whose business takes them among the forest-clad hills of the Kandhmals, and also to secure a full yield of the jungle products which the Kandhs, like most similar tribes, use so largely for food. The priests of Sārū Pennū are called *dehurī*, and the appropriate offerings are a goat and a fowl with rice and strong drink' (Risley, *op. cit.* i. 403).

11. **Worship of water-spirits.**—The agency which causes water to flow is regarded as that of an indwelling spirit. Hence comes the worship of rivers, rapids, cataracts, wells, and streams. Chief of all, among the people of the plains, is Gangā Mā, or Mother Ganges, who is a beneficent deity. Though in origin an animistic goddess, she is now recognized by many Hindus as the wife of Śiva.

'Low caste Hindus,' writes Gait (*op. cit.* i. 190), 'throw offerings of fruits and sweets into the river when bathing, and its water is believed to be so sacred that to touch it will purify any one. It has special virtue on the occurrence of certain *yogas*, or auspicious conjunctions of the planets, when large crowds assemble on its banks in order to wash and be clean. Goats are sacrificed on these occasions, and in some parts they are thrown alive into the water, whence they are taken and eaten by the Mallāhs. Other offerings are the perquisite of a special class of degraded Brāhmans known as Gangāputra. Sometimes the goddess is represented by a simple earthen jug filled with water and surmounted by a mango twig, and sometimes as a female figure with four hands, riding on a *makar*, or fabulous marine monster like a shark. In this form she is worshipped by the fishing castes of Bengal Proper, who sacrifice white goats to her before starting on a fishing expedition, and also on some special occasion, the date of which varies. Pilgrims at Gayā offer their first *piṇḍa* (rice-cake) to her in the name of their deceased ancestors. In the Sonthāl Parganas a woman worships her on the sixth and twelfth days after giving birth to a child. She goes to a river or pond and pours oil on a slab of stone, on which she then draws five perpendicular lines, and prays for entire restoration to health. Certain ascetics perform a special penance in her honour called *jalsāīn*, which consists in spending every night in the month of Māgh [January-February] seated stark naked on a small platform erected over the river, engaged in such prayer and meditation as their sufferings from the cold will allow. The town of Tribenī in Hooghly is held to be specially holy because three sacred streams,—the Ganges, the Jamunā, and the Saraswatī,—which meet at Allahābād, here once more separate from each other.'

In Eastern Bengal the observances are of a similar character (Wise, *op. cit.* 138 f.). The Brahmaputra, 'son of Brahmā,' is less sacred, having only a single feast-day on which people assemble to bathe on its banks.

This form of worship seems to have been independently adopted by the non-Aryan tribes, who have sacred rivers of their own, the cult of which is not derived from Hindu influence. Thus the Kharriās of Singhbhūm venerate the river Koil, and the Santāl depends on the piety of his descendants that his ashes will be finally committed to the sacred river, the Damudā, 'to be borne on its swift current into the bosom of the mighty ocean, whence the race first had its being, and where, returning, it fittingly seeks its final rest' (Dalton, *op. cit.* 159; Bradley-Birt, *Story of an Indian Upland*, 285). In these cases the river is little more than a vague personality; but in many cases this spirit is personified, and we thus arrive at the host of water-gods who are specially revered among the large fishing and boating population of the Delta. Thus the deity of the river Tīstā is supposed to be an old woman, Būṛhī Ṭhakurānī ('the Old Lady'), and 'is one of the common objects of worship (*Grāmdevatā*) among the simple pagans of the vicinity' (Buchanan, in Martin, *Eastern India*, iii. 361).

'Not satisfied,' writes Wise (*op. cit.* 139), 'with attributing a divine character to the rivers of their native land, the Hindus have peopled the waters themselves with animistic beings, who protect or destroy the unguarded boatmen.'

Such is Zindah Ghāzī, 'the living destroyer of the infidel,' now a Muhammadan saint, but evidently a promoted animistic spirit (*ib.* 13 f.). Like him is Pīr Bhadr, whose home is at Chittagong. According to one legend, he is a deified Portuguese sailor who long ago reached the shore by clinging to a fragment of a wreck. His *dargāh*, or cenotaph, is regarded as the palladium of the city; here lamps are lighted at night, and pilgrims from all parts of Bengal resort to his shrine in obedience to a vow, or to obtain the favour and intercession of the saint; while Hindu fishermen regard him with as much awe as do the Muhammadans (*ib.* 14 f.). The Mallāh boatmen worship a water-god, Koilā Bābā, 'Father Charcoal,' described as an old grey-bearded personage, who as the 'navvy of the Ganges' (*Gangāji kā Beldār*) saps and swallows up whatever opposes the sacred stream.

'Before casting a new net, or starting on a commercial venture, offerings of molasses and seven kinds of grain kneaded into balls, are offered to him; and at the end of the ceremony one of the balls is placed on the edge of the water, another on the bow of the boat' (*ib.* 347).

The Paṭnī boatmen never enter on the work of a ferry without sacrificing a white goat to the river-goddess, Gangājī (*ib.* 358). Another water-goddess is Khālā Kumārī, 'the Creek Maiden,' to whom fishermen offer the first-fruits of their labour (*ib.* 393). The most mysterious of these water-deities of Bengal is Khwājah Khizr, who by one legend is identified with Zu'l-qarnain, 'he of the two horns,' or Alexander the Great, as described in the Qur'ān, *Sūra* xviii. Others connect him with the prophet Elias or Elijah. Whatever may be the real origin of his cultus, Khwājah Khizr is supposed to reside in the Indian rivers and seas, protecting mariners from shipwreck, and visible only to those who perform a forty days' vigil on the river bank. In his honour a raft (*beṛā*) made of paper, ornamented with tinsel, the prow resembling a female face, with the crest and breast of a peacock, is set afloat at sunset on a support made of plantain stems, when its flickering lights give a picturesque aspect to the dark, flooded stream. The person launching the raft deposits on the bank some ginger, rice, and plantains, which are usually appropriated by some wretched beggar (*ib.* 12 f.). The basis of the rite, of which Frazer (*GB*[2] iii. 87) has collected numerous examples, is possibly the expulsion of the spirits of evil by launching a raft or boat in a river or in the sea.

12. **Worship of the powers of nature.**—The personification and adoration of the powers of nature are probably later in origin than the animistic beliefs which have up to this point been considered. The most primitive objects of worship seem to be in Bengal purely local—the spirits of hill or rock, of the animals which attack the wood-cutter, of spring and stream, of all connected with man's immediate wants or occupation. It is only at a later stage that he seems to be able to generalize and direct his attention to more distant powers and energies like those of the planetary bodies.

(*a*) *Sun-worship.*—Among the orthodox Hindus the sun (Sūrya or Grāharājā, 'King of the planets') has fallen from the high estate which he secured in Vedic times, and has now become a mere godling or minor god. He is, however, still worshipped, especially in Bihār and among the non-Aryan tribes of the southern hills. Temples have been erected in his honour, the most important of which are those at Kanārak, near Puri in Orissa, and at Gayā.

'The Gāyatrī, or sacred verse, which each Brāhman must recite daily, is dedicated to him. Sunday is sacred to him, and on that day many abstain from eating fish or flesh; in some districts salt also is abstained from. The Sundays in the month of Kārttik [October-November] are specially set aside for his worship in Bihār and parts of Bengal. The great festival in his honour, known as the Chhaṭ Pūjā, is held on the 6th day of the light half of Kārttik, when the people gather at a river or pool and offer libations to the setting sun, and repeat the ceremony on the following morning. They also make offerings of white flowers, sandal paste, betel-nut, rice, milk, plantains, etc. Brāhman priests are not employed, but an elderly member of the family, usually a female, conducts the worship' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 188). Even Muhammadans join in these ceremonies.

Sun-worship prevails widely among the non

Aryan tribes. The Orāons (wh. see) identify him with Dharmesh, their supreme deity, as do the Muṇḍās, Bhūmij, and Hos, who worship him with offerings of fowls and spirits, and swear by his name. The Hārīs of Bīrbhūm sacrifice a goat to him on some Sunday in spring, and, strictly in accordance with the animistic conception, he is, in Rājshāhī, provided with a female consort, Chhaṭmātā, 'the mother of the sixth day rite'; that is to say, his festal day, when women make offerings at his shrine.

(*b*) *Moon-worship.*—Though all Hindu ceremonies are regulated by the rising or setting, the waxing or waning of the moon, its worship is much less general than that of the sun. Soma in Bengal is represented by a figure of a white man sitting on a water-lily and drawn by ten horses. With his right hand he gives a blessing, and in the other he holds a club (Ward, *Hindoos*, ii. 72). His cult is common among the non-Aryan tribes. For instance, the Kharriās offer to him a black cock under the name of Jyolo Dubo; the Binjhiās worship him as Nind Bongā; the Muṇḍās as Chando Omal. The Muṇḍā legend tells how on one occasion the moon deceived the sun, her husband, and in his anger he cut her in two; but he afterwards repented of his wrath, and allows her at times to shine forth in full beauty amidst her daughters, the stars (Risley, *op. cit.* i. 468, 136; Dalton, *op. cit.* 186). The curious rite of expulsion of evil by flinging brickbats at the house of the person afflicted by it is in Bihār connected with moon-worship. But it is probable that this is merely a suggestion of periodicity in the observance, and it is rather to be compared with the numerous cases in India and elsewhere, when railing at women, stone-throwing, and mock fights, especially in connexion with spring customs, are regarded as modes of promoting the fertility of the crops by the expulsion of the influences which cause injury to them (Frazer, *Pausanias*, iii. 266 f.). As in many other places, the moon is regarded as the deity who presides over crops, heals wounds, and cures diseases, especially those of the eye (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 189; Frazer, *GB*[2] ii. 154 ff.). It is a favourite object of worship with women, but in Bengal no fixed dates are appointed for these observances.

(*c*) *Planet-worship.*—Of the planets the most regarded is Śani, or Saturn.

'He is much dreaded and is carefully propitiated, either on Saturdays or on particular occasions when astrological calculations indicate that a visitation from him is to be specially feared. He has no image, but is represented by an earthen pot filled with water. A seat is placed in front of it, and on it are laid five fruits and five flowers. A Brāhman priest officiates at the ceremony, and the *prasād*, or offering, which consists of a sort of pudding made of flour, plantains, sugar, and milk, must be eaten on the spot by the devotees, who must wash their mouths carefully before leaving. If any casual visitor should arrive while the ceremony is in progress, he must wait till it is concluded, and eat a share of the *prasād*, otherwise he will incur the godling's displeasure' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 189 f.).

The rule that the sacrifice is to be consumed at once in the presence, as it were, of the deity, is probably based on the fear that the sacred food might be profaned if it were carried outside the sanctuary (W. R. Smith, 282; Frazer, *Pausanias*, iii. 240). Every one present is required to share in consuming the offering, In other words, he must seek communion with the deity by eating part of the sacred meal.

Rāhu, 'the looser,' or 'the seizer,' is the demon who causes eclipses by devouring the moon for a time. He must be scared by music or noise, or by bathing at a holy place during the eclipse. Rāhu has now become the special deity of two menial tribes, the Dosādhs and the Ḍhāngars, who worship him by walking through a pit filled with hot cinders. One of the tribal priests, becoming possessed by the god walks through the fire, and, it is said, escapes injury. Connected with this is another function, in which a ladder is made of wood, the rungs shaped in the form of a sword-blade, up which the priest has to climb, and decapitate a white cock tied to the summit of the ladder. A fowl of this colour is the appropriate offering to the sun-god. The object of the rite appears to be, by a form of symbolic or sympathetic magic, to propitiate the deities who control the rain and the harvests (*PR* i. 19 f.).

13. Earth-worship.—(*a*) *The benign mother.*—The earth-deity, impersonated as a goddess, has a twofold aspect—on the one hand benignant, on the other malignant. On her benevolent side she is regarded as the mother of all living things and the giver of food. In this province she is known as Bhūdevī, 'earth-goddess'; Dhartī Māī, 'Mother Earth'; or Basundharā, 'wealth-bearer'; Ambabāchī, and Basumatī Ṭhakurāṇi. Pious Hindus say a prayer to her on waking in the early morning; the dying man and the mother in parturition are laid upon her breast; when a calf is born the herdsman lets the first drop of milk from the cow's udder fall on the ground.

'On the first day of the month Āsāṛh (June–July) she is supposed to menstruate, and there is an entire cessation of all ploughing, sowing, and other agricultural operations, and widows refrain from eating cooked rice. On the fourth day the bathing ceremony is performed, in accordance with the Hindu idea that a woman who menstruates is unclean until she bathes on the fourth day. A stone, taken to represent the goddess, is placed erect on the ground, and the top of it is painted with vermilion. The housewife bathes it with turmeric water, and a betel-nut is placed on a piece of wood close by. The stone is then bedecked with flowers, and offerings of milk, plantains, etc., are made' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 189). The smearing of the stone with vermilion indicates a reminiscence of an older rite of blood-sacrifice.

As will be shown in connexion with the Dravidian religion, the popular idea regarding the Earth is that her fertility periodically diminishes, and must be restored by various methods, the most common of which is blood-sacrifice. Among the Kandhs (wh. see) the victim was a human being, and fragments of the flesh of the victim were scattered or buried in the fields to renew the strength of the earth-spirit. In other places it is supposed that the same result will be attained by the annual symbolic marriage of the earth-goddess, and she is accordingly provided with a male consort, who is often the head of the *grāma-devatā*, or guardian gods of the village. In Western Bengal this god is usually known as Khetṛpāl, 'earth-guardian,' or Bhūmiya, 'earth-deity' (see DRAVIDIANS).

(*b*) *The earth-goddess in her malignant form.*—But though the earth-goddess is usually regarded as benevolent, she has a chthonic or malignant side to her character. While she is regarded as the village guardian, and protects the folk and their cattle from disease, yet, with the curious inconsistency which characterizes cults of this amorphous kind, she is believed to be the causer of epidemics, especially those of a sudden, unexpected, or unaccountable kind, such as cholera or smallpox. In this malignant manifestation the universal earth-mother is the prototype, and probably the primitive form of the destructive goddess in her manifold forms—Kālī, Devī, Durgā, and numberless others of the same kind. Her functions, again, as the causer and at the same time the averter of disease, have become divided into departments, and special maladies have been placed in charge of one or other of her various manifestations. We thus reach the beginnings of a pantheon, when each department of human activity is superintended by a special deity. This result may have been reached in Bengal by one of two ways: either the local earth-goddess of a particular locality gains a reputation by remarkable cures being worked at her shrine, and she is accordingly en-

trusted with the healing of a special class of maladies; or it may mark the aggregation of several septs to form a tribe, when, for the sake of convenience, the functions of the deities, once separate but now revered in common, are discriminated.

(*c*) *The small-pox goddess.*—The small-pox deity, Śītalā, 'she that loves coolness,' so called euphemistically in relation to the fever which accompanies the malady, is also known as Basantī Būṛhī ('the old lady of spring'), or Basantī Chaṇḍī ('the cruel spring-goddess'), probably because epidemics are most usual at this season. She, by a further differentiation of function, is now one of seven sisters, the enumeration of whom differs in various parts of the Province. Of those usually named, Kankar Mātā is the most dreaded, but happily her attacks are rare; Phūlmātā and Pānsāhī Mātā attack children under the age of seven, Badī Mātā those between seven and fifteen, Gulsaliā Mātā those of any age. Śītalā and her six sisters are often represented by seven balls of clay placed in a line in a shed erected outside the village site, where sweetmeats and flowers are offered. In times of emergency the higher castes sacrifice goats or pigeons, and the menials pigs.* In cases of severe epidemics even the higher castes offer swine to the seven sisters; but the worshippers, who are usually women, employ men of some low caste to perform the actual sacrifice.

The collective worship of the sisters is usually subordinated to that of Śītalā, their leader, who is often represented as a naked woman, painted red and mounted on an ass, with a bundle of broomsticks in one hand with which she sweeps away the disease, an earthen pot under her left arm, and a winnowing fan upon her head. But her image sometimes assumes more grotesque forms.

'Sometimes the image is a piece of wood or stone with a human face carved on it, besmeared with oil and vermilion and studded with spots or nails of gold, silver, or brass, in imitation of the pustules of the disease. In Jessore and Noākhāli she takes the form assigned to her in the *Purāṇas* of a white figure in a state of perfect nudity, while in Orissa and Champāran she is represented by an earthen pot. In Khulnā she is regarded by the Pods, not merely as the goddess of small-pox, but as their main deity; and if a person is carried off by a tiger, or his crops are destroyed by wild animals, it is thought it is because he has incurred the displeasure of the goddess' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 192).

This appears to show that the limitation of the goddess to superintend disease is a later conception. Elsewhere she is worshipped only when epidemics of small-pox, measles, or cholera break out, or when children are inoculated or vaccinated. Sometimes the image is kept in a temple; sometimes it is in charge of priests drawn from the lowest castes. But when the higher castes worship her they perform the service with the aid of a Brāhman (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 192). Her priest is very often selected from the Mālī, or gardener caste, and his treatment of the disease, which consists in fanning the patient with a branch of the sacred *nīm* tree (*azadirachta indica*), bathing the image of the goddess to alleviate the fever, and mumbling spells of various kinds, has been fully described by Wise (*op. cit.* 343 f.).

(*d*) *The cholera-goddess.*—Akin to Śītalā is the goddess of cholera, Olā Bībī, 'lady of the flux,' or Olā Chaṇḍī, 'the cruel one.' She is, according to Gait (*op. cit.* i. 193), sometimes represented as wearing a gown and mounted on a horse, but usually her emblem is an earthen pot placed under a *nīm* tree. Her priest is generally drawn from the lower castes, and her favourite offering is a goat.

(*e*) *Other deities of disease.*—Besides the deities of disease already enumerated, there are many others, which illustrate the development of Indian polytheism from an animistic substratum. Like the earth-goddess, they are sometimes provided with a male consort. Śītalā herself is attended by her male counterpart, Ghaṇṭākaraṇā, 'he who has ears as broad as a bell,' or 'he who wears bells in his ears.' In the Himālayas he is supposed to possess great personal attractions, is worshipped under the emblem of a water-jar as the healer of cutaneous disease, and is a gatekeeper, or, in other words, a minor god on his promotion to a seat in the orthodox pantheon (*PR* i. 131). Fever is provided with a special godling, Jwārā Nārāyan, and the cholera-goddess, Olā-Bībī, has kindred deities of the same kind, the Joginī of Orissa, and Dīdī Ṭhakurāṇī of Bardwān. The Rājbansī caste have in Chitan Ṭhakrūn a special deity who removes barrenness in women. Kālī, again, 'the destroyer,' develops in her benignant aspect into Rakshyā Kālī, 'the protectrix,' who, while she brings disease, also repels it.

14. **Animal-worship.**—It is difficult to determine how far animal-worship in Bengal is connected with totemism, of which there is some evidence (see below, § 28), and how far it is merely a development of Animism. Here it is practically identical with the cult as it prevails throughout Northern India.

(*a*) *Worship of the cow.*—In Eastern Bengal the cow receives divine honours at least twice a year, on the first day of Baisākh (April–May), and on the second day of the moon in Jyeshṭhā (May–June). The custom is similar to that of the Baisākh Bihū, or cattle-feast of Assam, in which on the first day the cattle are rubbed with oil and turmeric, and bathed in rivers and tanks; on the second day the owners prepare a feast, invite their neighbours and friends, and wear new clothes. The remaining five days of the festival, which since the Vaishṇava reformation has become associated with the cult of Kṛṣna, are spent by men and women in dancing, beating of drums, and the singing of amorous and wanton songs (*Calcutta Review*, xxi. 413). The animal, of course, is everywhere protected by a most efficient tabu; and serious penance, such as marching up one bank of the Ganges from the ocean as far as Hardwār, where the river leaves the hills, and returning eastward along the opposite bank, is imposed on any one who slays the sacred beast even by misadventure. But this respect for cows does not prevent neglect, starvation, and wanton cruelty. Among Aryans the regard for the cow is comparatively modern. In the Vedas we find instances of cow-sacrifice and beef-eating (Rājendralāla Mitra, *Indo-Aryans*, i. 354 ff.). It does not extend to the non-Aryan tribes, and it seems to have arisen at a stage of culture higher than that to which most of them have attained, when permanent cultivation finally takes the place of the rude methods of periodically burning down patches of jungle, and sowing the seeds, which is the habit still pursued by the less advanced tribes. Among the half-Hinduized Gonds the sacrifice of a cow is part of the funeral rites, being probably connected with the death-feast which the departed soul is believed to share with the survivors. After the cremation of the corpse the ashes are buried and covered with a large slab of stone, and the tail of the victim is attached to this as a sign that the obsequies of the deceased have been decently performed. The prejudice against the use of milk, which is regarded as a foul secretion, is characteristic of the Indo-Chinese races; but it is also found among the Kols and the Kandhs of Ganjām (Dalton, *op. cit.* 283; Maltby-Leman, *Manual of Ganjam*, 69).

(*b*) *Other sacred animals.*—The monkey is a

* With this pig-sacrifice may be compared the pig of purification at the Greek Thesmophoria (Frazer, *Pausanias*, iii. 296; J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to Greek Rel.* 152 f.). Women in Greece and elsewhere were often specially selected to offer sacrifice (Frazer, *op. cit.* iii. 593, iv. 187).

sacred beast, particularly that variety known as the Langūr (*Semnopithecus entellus*), which is identified with the monkey-god, Hanumān. The common Hindu theory that the beast is worshipped as the representative of the demigod or hero who assisted Rāma in his wars with Rāvaṇa to recover his ravished wife, Sītā, is obviously a late invention. The worship of the human-like animal was more primitive than the legend by which it is now explained, and may have been independently adopted by the Aryan as well as by the non-Aryan races. Among the latter the aboriginal Savaras of Shāhābād make images of him which differ from the orthodox Hindu type; and the Bhuiyās of Keonjhar revere him under the title of Bīr, that is, Vīra or Mahāvīra, 'great hero' (Buchanan, *op. cit.* i. 467; Dalton, *op. cit.* 140, 147). In Western Bengal the first duty of the founder of a hamlet is to erect an image of Hanumān, which is kept duly decorated with daubs of vermilion. He is regarded as typifying the virile element, and thus, as the protector of crops and cattle, is conceived to stand to the Earth-Mother in the relation of consort. Even the *Macacus*, the common monkey, is protected though he is exceedingly mischievous. It is believed that no one can live where a monkey has met his death, and his bones are so unlucky that a special class of exorcists in Bihār find their occupation in ascertaining that such bones do not pollute the ground on which a new house is about to be erected (Buchanan, *op. cit.* ii. 141 f.). According to one tradition, the monkey is known as *Pavan kā pūt*, 'son of the wind,' a belief accepted by the Bhuiyās of Singhbhūm, who revere him and call themselves Pavanbans, 'the wind children,' to the present day. The same belief prevails among the fisher castes of Eastern Bengal, who invoke him in a calm, instead of whistling as the British tar does (Wise, *op. cit.* 137).

The tiger among the forest tribes is naturally supposed to represent the evil spirit of the woods, and the fear which he causes leads to reverence and propitiation. As Banrājā, 'lord of the jungle,' he is the chief object of worship among the Kisāns and Santāls. The former will not kill him, and believe that in return for their devotion he will spare a tribesman (Dalton, *op. cit.* 132). The Santāls, especially those who have suffered loss from his attacks, adore him. When a Santāl is carried off by the beast, the head of the family deems it necessary to propitiate the Bāgh Bhūt, or 'tiger devil.' Samuells gives a curious account of a shamanistic rite among the Gonds, in which two men possessed of the spirit of Bāghīśvar, 'the tiger lord,' fell ravenously upon a bleating kid, and tore it with their teeth till it expired (Dalton, *op. cit.* 280). The *baghaut*, or shrine erected on the spot where a tiger has killed a man, is regarded as a place where offerings of propitiation should be made. Every passer-by adds a stone to the cairn, and wood-cutters light a lamp or make an oblation to appease the angry *bhūt*, or spirit of the man who was slain.

15. **The patron deities of the village.**—The deities who have been enumerated are those connected with the clearing of the forest and the beginnings of an agricultural life. When the village has been founded and farming becomes well established, another form of worship to a large extent replaces beliefs of this kind. This is the cult of the Grāma-devatā or Grāmya-devatā, the tutelary deities of the village, who preside over the welfare of the community. These deities differ from the jungle godlings inasmuch as, for the most part, they are purely local and attached to a single village. Those whose range is wider than the village boundaries seem usually to be akin to the jungle spirits. Thus, one of this class, Dholāī Chand, inhabits a sacred grove where rags are tied to the branches to secure the birth of children, and people make obeisance whenever they pass her abode. Another, Banā Durgā, in Mymensingh, is worshipped on behalf of children; sacrifices of pigeons or goats are made to her, and the flesh is eaten by people of low caste (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 200). Again, it sometimes happens that one of these village-deities acquires a reputation for curing disease or procuring other benefits for its worshippers. It thus becomes known beyond its own special area; a cult is started; a temple is built; and, finally, the place becomes the resort of pilgrims. This was probably the origin of famous shrines, like that of Kālī at Kālighāṭ, near Calcutta,—the Kalkattēwālī Kālī, as she is called,—a well-known deity throughout Northern India; or, again, the village may develop into a town or city, and the Grāma-devatā becomes its guardian, as has been the case with Patanadevī or Patanīśvarī, the protecting goddess of the city of Patna. The Brāhmans who have taken up her cult no longer recognize her as a Grāma-devatā, and assert that she is one form of the spouse of Śiva (Buchanan, *op. cit.* i. 191).

16. **The village shrine.**—The shrine of these village-gods is rarely of more pretensions than a pile of stones set up under the village tree, which is often one of the species regarded as sacred. Sometimes there is no visible representation of the deity beyond a stone or mound. Occasionally a bell is provided which the worshipper rings to announce his presence to the god, who may be sleeping or on a journey. In Hooghly an earthen pot filled with water, with a mango twig placed on the top, the whole covered with a piece of white cloth, represents the deity. In some cases the common worship on behalf of the village is done by the headman; sometimes the priest is drawn from one of the lowest castes; and, even in those villages in which persons of high caste reside, the business of controlling and propitiating the local spirits is left in charge of a hedge priest, because he, being regarded as one of the aboriginal inhabitants, is supposed to understand the ways of the village-gods better than any newcomer. For the same reason, the uncanny duty of watching the fields at night is entrusted to the menial castes, who are supposed to understand how to control the spirits which walk in the darkness. The offerings at the village shrine consist usually of the fruits of the earth, milk or spirituous liquor, food cooked or uncooked; but in cases of special emergency, goats or pigeons or pigs are sacrificed. The offerings are generally taken and consumed by the worshipper and his family, except the head, which was probably the god's share, and is appropriated by the officiant after he has let a few drops of blood from it fall upon the altar.

17. **Titles of the Grāma-devatā.**—Among the jungle tribes, where the cult is in its most primitive phase, the term *Grāma-devatā* has, as we might expect, an uncertain connotation. It is not limited to the actual village-deities, but is extended to the tribal gods of forest or mountain, like Marang Burū of the Santāls, Thānpatī of the Savarās, Juāngs, Baurīs, and Bāgdīs, Sarnā Būṛhī of the Orāons, and Duār Pahār or Durā of the Cheros (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 200). As settled life progresses, these deities gradually merge in the village pantheon. In the plain country the titles of the Grāma-devatā are legion. Buchanan (*op. cit.* ii. 131) gives a long list of those worshipped in the District of Bhāgalpur; but he illustrates the uncertain character of the cult by classing Śiva and Kālī as Grāma-devatās. This, no doubt, was the primitive conception; but these have now become national gods, of much higher rank than the

local village-godlings. In Bhāgalpur, Buchanan states, one of the most common of these deities is Bishaharī, who controls snakes; Siddheśvarī, Chandī, and Mahāmāyā are not very common, while he saw no shrine in honour of Śītalā. He mentions also that a very common village-god was Dūbēbhayharan, the ghost of a Brāhman who, to revenge a wrong which he had sustained, committed suicide (see below, § 25). Wise (*op. cit.* 133 ff.), among the most popular of the Grāma-devatā worshipped in Eastern Bengal, names Būṛhā-Būṛhī, the androgynous form of the Earth-deity; Panchanandā, who preserves children from sickness; Araṇyā or Jamāī Sashṭhī, the favourite goddess of Bengali women, who ensures the health of children, and cures barrenness; Siddheśvarī and Vriddheśvarī, who are now regarded by Brāhmans as 'parts' (*aṁśa*) of Durgā; in other words, these have now taken their place among the greater gods.

18. Promotion of the Grāma-devatā to higher rank.—The mode by which these deities are promoted will be considered in connexion with the Dravidians (wh. see). But a few instances of the fact may be given from Bengal. Ṭhakurāṇī Māī, whom Dalton (*op. cit.* 147, 149) calls 'the bloodthirsty goddess' of the Bhuiyās, has now become a form of Durgā or Kālī, and in Singhbhūm and Lohārdagā is served by a Bhuiyā priest with sacrifices of goats and sheep, the flesh of which he shares with the worshippers. The Birhors now call the piece of wood which they worship Mahāmāyā, who is supposed to be the daughter of the Hindu Devī; and a trident painted red is worshipped as the monkey-god, Hanumān, who is believed to be an officer of Devī (*ib.* 220). The Kādars of Bhāgalpur and the Santāl Parganas worship animistic gods, but,

> if questioned about their religion, will reply that they are Hindus, and will talk vaguely about Parameśwar, Mahādeo, and Vishṇu, as if they lived in the very odour of orthodoxy instead of being, as in fact they are, wholly outside of the Brāhmanical system. To talk about the Hindu gods is usually the first step towards that insensible adoption of the externals of Hinduism which takes the place of the formal and open conversion which sterner and less adaptive creeds demand. The next thing is to set up Brāhmans whose influence, furthered by a variety of social forces, gradually deposes the tribal gods, transforms them into orthodox shapes, and gives them places in the regular Pantheon as local manifestations of this or that well-known principle, or relegates them to a decent and inoffensive obscurity as household or village deities. Last of all, if the tribe is an influential one, and its leading men hold land, they give themselves brevet rank as Rājputs' (Risley, *op. cit.* i. 369)

19. Development of Animism into Hinduism.—In Bengal, perhaps more clearly than in any other part of Northern India, it is possible to trace the stages by which people in the animistic stage of belief are promoted, if this phrase accurately expresses the fact, into Hinduism. It is very difficult, as we have seen, to find a purely animistic tribe in the plains. The degraded Śūdras of Orissa seem to recognize none of the regular Hindu gods. They worship an animistic goddess of their own, Pañcha-khandā, 'she of the five swords,' with offerings of he-goats, fowls, and rice, which are consumed by the performers of the sacrifice. The headman officiates at all acts of public worship; they have no Brāhmans, and perform no *śrāddha*, or mind-rite, for the dead (Risley, *op. cit.* ii. 267 f.). But even the Ḍoms (wh. see), the lowest menials of the plains, worship, at least in name, the regular Hindu deities, such as Rādhā, Kṛṣṇa, Kālī, and Nārāyan (*ib.* i. 246), the explanation being that they have been for ages helots in the service of Hindu masters, whose religion they naturally imitate. Sometimes, again, it is found that, while one part of a tribe has to some indefinite extent adopted the Hindu religion, another division remains animistic. Among the Bhūmij, while the well-to-do tenants employ Brāhmans as their family priests and worship the Mother-goddess under the forms of Kālī or Mahāmāyā, the mass of the tribe reveres the Sun as Sing-bongā or Dharamā, and worships a host of minor gods of the animistic class (Risley, *op. cit.* i. 124). The same is the case with the Binjhiās, Birhors, and Cheros (*ib.* i. 136, 138, 202). The Koirī and Kurmī tribes furnish examples of people whose religion obviously depends upon their environment. That portion of these tribes which still occupies the animistic area of Chotā Nāgpur continues the worship of the non-Aryan deities, while those who have migrated to the plains in Bihār have come almost completely under Hindu influence (*ib.* i. 503, 534).

20. Development of the tribal priesthood.—This process of evolution is clearly shown by the character of the priesthood. The Korwās, according to Dalton (*op. cit.* 229), have no priests, because, as he asserts, they have no gods, their worship being entirely confined to that of the *manes* of their ancestors—a rite which must necessarily be performed by the head of the family. Elsewhere, however, they employ *baigās*, or tribal priests. The same is the case with the Māl Pahāṛias, among whom the head of the household performs all religious and ceremonial observances. These people are, however, on the road to promotion, because they hold Brāhmans in some degree of honour, and presents are given to them on festal occasions (Risley, *op. cit.* ii. 71). The Baurīs of Western Bengal appoint as their priests men of their own caste, termed *lavā* or *dehariā*, some of whom hold patches of land rent-free or at a nominal rent as remuneration for their services; but the tribe in Eastern Bengal employs a low class of Brāhmans (*ib.* i. 81). One section of the Ḍoms appoints the son of the dead man's sister or of his female cousin to perform the obsequial rites, and to recite the appropriate sacred verses (*mantra*) at the funeral. For these services he receives a fee when the inheritance comes to be divided. This has been supposed to be a survival of the primitive rule by which kinship is traced through the female. No other indications of an extinct custom of female kinship are now traceable among these people, and the fact that in Western Bengal the eldest son on the division of the inheritance gets an extra share seems to show that kinship through males must have been in force for a long period (*ib.* i. 245). This custom, however, seems to have been at one time widely spread among many of the North Indian tribes. The Khāsīs and Gāros of Assam still trace succession through the female; so do the Hāṛis, Pāsīs, and Tāntīs of Bihār; forest tribes in the United Provinces, like the Bhuiyārs and the Kols, and even, according to Wise, the Mithilā and Sarvariā groups of Brāhmans, who recognize the sister's son as family priest (Risley, *Census of India Rep.* 1901, i. 448; Wise, *op. cit.* 127; Crooke, *Tribes and Castes*, ii. 95, iii. 309; Dalton, *op. cit.* 63).

The next stage is reached among those tribes which employ Brāhmans only for special functions, and perform their ordinary religious rites through the agency of their own kinsmen. The Bhandārī, or barber caste of Orissa, perform the service of the orthodox gods through Brāhmans, who are received on equal terms by other members of the sacred order; but the worship of the village goddess, Grām-devatī, is done by the head of the household (Risley, *Tribes*, i. 93 f.). In the same way the Binds and Cheros of Bihār, who have copied with more or less accuracy the external observances of Brāhmanism, employ Brāhmans in the worship of the higher gods, while the household worship of the local deities is done by the men of the family, or by a *baigā*, or hedge priest,

drawn from one of the non-Aryan tribes (*ib.* i. 132, 202). Even a caste like the Kāndūs, or grain-parchers of Bihār and Bengal, who pretend to a high standard of orthodoxy, worship the godling Goraiyā in a fashion which is hardly in keeping with their high social position.

'A lump of clay is set up outside the house to represent the deity, a Dosādh (wh. see) officiates as priest, and the victim is a pig which is bought for a price from the Dosādh, slain by him at the instance of the Kāndū worshippers, and then eaten by the family of the priest' (*ib.* i. 416).

Finally, some tribes who do employ Brāhmans for all religious services and family ceremonies are unable to secure the services of the highest groups of the priestly order, and are forced to content themselves with those of lower rank. Sometimes, as in the case of the Bhakat Orāons,—a branch of the great non-Aryan tribe which is now gradually adopting the Hindu religion and its rites,—Brāhmans deign to offer their services as *gurus*, or spiritual guides, but refuse to officiate as their priests. The sacrifice is accordingly done by any influential member of the tribe who happens to be acquainted with the ritual. In their marriages they try to imitate the Hindu ceremony; the priest, however, is not a Brāhman, but a tribesman (*ib.* i. 91). The Koirīs, a cultivating tribe of Bihār and Chotā Nāgpur, profess to be orthodox Hindus; but their orthodoxy, as we have already seen (above, § 19), seems to vary with locality, and may be estimated by the degree of consideration accorded to their Brāhmans and by the nature of their local gods. In Chotā Nāgpur those Brāhmans who serve them as priests are not received on equal terms by other Brāhmans; and among their minor gods we find non-Aryan deities, like Marang Burū and Baṛ Pahāṛī, side by side with Hindu gods, or rather perhaps aboriginal gods invested with Hindu titles, like Parameśvarī and Hanumān. Mounds of dried clay representing these are found in every house; and there is often a larger mound under a sacred tree which is dedicated to the entire group of deities (Dalton, *op. cit.* 321; Risley, *op. cit.* i. 503).

21. Bhūta-worship.—Another form of worship which illustrates the transition from Animism to Brāhmanism is that of Bhūtas, which prevails more or less among all classes of the population of Bengal, from the non-Aryan tribes up to those who have accepted the beliefs of Hinduism. The term *bhūt*, or *bhūta*, meaning in Sanskrit 'formed' or 'created,' is in the earlier sacred literature applied to the powers of Nature, and even to deities. Śiva himself is called Bhūtīśvara, or 'Lord of spirits.' But the name is now popularly applied to a malignant evil spirit, properly the ghost of a man who has died a violent death, either by accident, suicide, or capital punishment. The malignancy of such a spirit is increased if he has been denied proper funeral rites. In Bengal, according to Wise (*op. cit.* 131 f.), such spirits are most numerous in forest tracts where lofty trees afford shade and silence, or in the sombre valleys of hilly districts, where the original clearers of the jungle were exposed to many forms of violent death. Some, again, dwell in ancient trees, others in cities, in ruined temples, graveyards, cremation grounds, or dry wells.

'They are met with on the arid treeless plain, the flooded river, and the lonely forest glade. The timid recognize their cry in the hooting of the owl, the howling of the jackal, the yelp of the village cur, and the whistle of the plover. One kind of demon, sedentary in its habits, attaches itself to a village, another to a household; some inflict plagues, others blight the opening bud, or convulse the newborn babe. The Bengālī sees in every accident the work of evil spirits, and his longing desire is to obtain some means of counteracting their influence. The women are naturally the chief adherents of this superstition, and while engaged in the most commonplace work are ever watchful against the entrance of a devil' (Wise, *op. cit.* 131).

If the rice be mildewed, if wild rice or weeds appear in the paddy fields, or murrain among the herds, if hail strikes the green crops, or the weevil spoils the mangoes—all these are the work of those malignant spirits. Many means are adopted to overcome their dangerous influence. Some Brāhmans, not those of the highest class, supply magical formulæ (*mantra*); Musalmān teachers prepare copper amulets, each containing a sentence from the Qur'ān; the wandering Bairāgī furnishes charms, such as a bone, tooth, or scale of a fish, a seed, or a fragment of wood.

22. The evil eye.—Closely allied to beliefs of this class is the evil eye superstition. To avert this danger the field or garden is protected by a black pot painted with a white cross or the mystic symbol, the *swastika*. See EVIL EYE.

23. Disease exorcism.—Disease, in particular, is seldom supposed to be the result of natural causes; it is almost invariably ascribed to *bhūtas*, or evil spirits.

'Even an educated gentleman, acting under female dictation, calls in the aid of magicians to cast out the devil haunting his house, or tormenting his child. Infants and pregnant women are especially subject to the malign influence of a Bhūta; but all convulsive diseases, the delirium of fever, and raving madness, are referred to possession by an evil spirit' (Wise, *op. cit.* 132).

In such cases, the *ojhā*, or exorcist, takes the place of the *kabirāj*, or physician, and magic the place of medicine. Beliefs of this kind are common throughout the Dravidian area. One form of this belief to which there is no exact parallel in other parts of India—the propitiation of Ghenṭū, the spirit which presides over itch—may be given as an example. A broken earthenware pot, its bottom blackened by constant use in cooking, daubed white with lime interspersed with a few streaks of turmeric, a branch or two of the *ghenṭū* plant (*Clerodendron infortunatum*) used as a febrifuge and anthelmintic, and, last though not least, a broomstick of palmyra or coco-nut tree, represent the evil spirit. The mistress of the family in whose house the malady appears acts as priestess. A few doggerel verses are recited, the pot is broken into fragments, and these are collected by the children, who sing songs about the itch-god. This rite is believed to be effective in removing the disease (*Calcutta Review*, xviii. 68).

24. Shamanism.—Rites like these, with the object of expelling disease or other evils caused by malignant spirits, are often accompanied by a form of shamanism, in which the officiant becomes possessed by the deity which he has invoked, and, letting his hair loose, falls into a frenzy of religious excitement, in the course of which he pours forth incoherent cries which are believed to be oracular. This form of frenzy often appears among non-Aryan races like the Santāls. Their *baigā*, or priest, assembles the people to assist him in the invocation.

'Musical instruments are produced, dancing commences, and the invocation to the spirits is chanted until one or more of the performers manifest possession by wild rolling of the eyes and involuntary spasmodic action of the muscles. The affection appears contagious, and old women and others who have not been dancing become influenced by it in a manner that is horrible to contemplate. Captain Samuells, who frequently witnessed the incantation, is confident that no deception whatever is practised. . . . "The affection," says Captain Samuells, "comes on like a fit of ague, lasting sometimes for a quarter of an hour, the patient or possessed person writhing and trembling with intense violence, especially at the commencement of the paroxysm. Then he is seen to spring from the ground into the air, and a succession of leaps follows, all executed as though he were shot at by unseen agency. During this stage of the seizure he is supposed to be quite unconscious, and rolls into the fire, if there be one, or under the feet of the dancers, without sustaining injury from the heat or the pressure. This lasts for a few minutes only, and is followed by the spasmodic stage. With hands and knees on the ground and hair loosened, the body is convulsed, and the head shakes violently, while from the mouth issues a hissing or gurgling noise. The patient next evincing an inclination to stand on his legs, the bystanders assist him and place a stick in his hands, with the aid of which he hops about, the spas-

modic action of the body still continuing, and the head performing by jerks a fatiguing circular movement." The Baigā is then supposed to identify the spirit which has possessed the patient. He implores it to desist, and by degrees, after being anointed with butter, the patient becomes calm and conscious, and when restored to his normal state is said to feel no fatigue or other ill effects from the attack' (Dalton, *op. cit.* 232 f.).

In Eastern Bengal the shaman prepares for the performance by fasting * for a whole day, drinking or smoking intoxicating preparations of the hemp-plant, and quaffing the freshly-drawn blood of a goat or other animal sacrificed on the occasion. Practices such as these are found among both Hindus and Muhammadans in that part of the Province (Wise, *op. cit.* 128).

25. Worship of individual bhūtas. — Besides the general worship of evil spirits, some members of this class are worshipped, or rather propitiated, because they are specially feared. Such spirits are usually malignant on account of the tragical circumstances of their death.

(*a*) *Deified Brāhmans.*—Many of this kind of evil spirits are deified Brāhmans. Such is Harśū Pāṇḍē, or Harśū Bābā, the local godling of Chayanpur, near Sasarām, in the Shāhābād district. He is of the class known as Brahm, Barham, or Brāhman ghosts. He was, according to the current legend, one of the Kanaujiyā division of Brāhmans, and family priest of Rājā Sālivāhanā, the ruler of that country. The Rānī disliked the Brāhman, and induced her husband to believe that the priest was conspiring to deprive him of his kingdom. Accordingly the Rājā caused the house of the Brāhman to be demolished, and resumed the lands which he had previously conferred upon him. The enraged Brāhman did *dharṇā*, in other words, fasted till he died of starvation at the gate of the palace. So he became a Brahm, and is now worshipped with the fire-sacrifice (*haoma*) and offerings of Brāhmanical cords. If any one obtains his desire through Harśū's intercession, he makes an offering of a golden cord, and feeds Brāhmans in his honour. Harśū's speciality is, if rightly approached, to cure disease by expelling the evil spirits to which it is due. His worship is rapidly spreading beyond Bengal westward into the adjoining districts of the United Provinces (*PR* i. 191 f.). Deified spirits of this class are very common. They are sometimes represented by a headless trunk, with an eye staring from the breast; they inhabit large trees on the banks of rivers or in some lonely place, whence they throw stones at belated travellers, and lead them astray on dark nights. Woe betide the unfortunate person who gives one of them cause of offence, as, for instance, by unwittingly felling the tree in which the Brahm has taken up his abode, or who has been in any way responsible for his death.

'He can escape the evil consequences only by making the Barham his family deity, and worshipping him regularly. In Bihār he often becomes the *dihwār*, or tutelary deity of the whole village. The worship is usually performed under the tree, usually a banyan, which he is supposed to frequent. The trunk is painted vermilion, and a mound of earth is erected, on which are placed clay figures of horses or elephants, and offerings are made of flowers, betel-nuts, and the like. The worship is conducted by a special priest called the *bhaktā*, who is not necessarily a Brāhman, and occasionally he is inspired by the spirit and utters prophecies, which are implicitly believed in by the devotees' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 198 f.).

The same writer gives a catalogue of numerous deified Brāhmans. In many cases they are ghosts of members of the priestly order who have committed suicide on account of some insult or the deprivation of some privilege (*PR* i. 191 ff.). In one Bengal case a Rājput having no offspring consulted his family priest.

'The latter told him to stand next morning at a certain cross road and to behead the first person whom he might meet. To his horror and surprise, Mahi [the priest] himself appeared. He would have drawn back, but the Brāhman told him not to hesitate to carry out his advice, and merely stipulated that he should be installed as his family god. The Rājput then killed him, and he has ever since been worshipped by the clan' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 199).

(*b*) *Low-caste bhūtas.*—The lower castes have many deified spirits of this kind. The malignant ghost of a sweeper is specially feared, and in many places the higher castes insist that a member of that caste shall be buried face downwards, or that the grave shall be filled with thorns, to prevent the ghost from 'walking.'

26. The Churel.—Another class of evil spirit widely feared is the Churel, or Kichin, the spirit of a woman who dies in childbirth or in a state of ceremonial impurity. She is regarded as specially malignant, because fate has snatched her from this world just at the time when she was about to attain the happiness of becoming a mother, or in a state of impurity which would cling to her in the other world.

This belief is widely spread. We find it in China (*FL* i. 360 f.), in Japan (*ib.* xiii. 276), among the Malays (Skeat, *Malay Magic*, 318, 327), in New Caledonia (*FL* xiv. 258), New Britain (*JAI* xvii. 292), Papuan Gulf (*ib.* xxxii. 423), Borneo (Roth, *Natives of Sarawak*, i. 100, 140, 167, 219), Fiji (*JAI* x. 145). In Central America the spirits of women who died in their first childbirth were supposed to dwell with the dead warriors in the house of the Sun. At certain times they descended to earth, wandering through the pueblos and bringing deadly disease to those women and children who crossed their path (Payne, *Hist. of New World*, ii. 334). If the child lives it is generally believed that the mother returns to seek it. Hence in West Africa when a woman dies in childbirth her child is buried with her (Ellis, *Tshi-Speaking Peoples*, 234). In Melanesia it is supposed that a woman who has died in childbirth cannot go to Panoi, or Deadland, if her child lives, because she cannot leave it behind. They therefore deceive her ghost by packing up a piece of banana trunk in leaves, and laying it on her breast when she is buried. Then, as she departs, she imagines that she is carrying her child with her (Codrington, *Melanesians*, 275). For other instances of the belief in India, see *PR* i. 269 ff. It prevails in Burma (*Report 9th Oriental Congress*, i. 185), in Manipur (*JAI* xvi. 355), among the Nāgas (*ib.* xxvi. 200), and among the Vellalars of Madras Pres. (Thurston, *Bulletin Madras Museum*, II. ii. 165).

The Churel usually appears as a woman who has no mouth, who haunts filthy places, and whose feet are turned backwards. This last is a characteristic of demons in many parts of the world (Tylor, i. 307). Again, she often assumes the form of a beautiful young woman, and at night seduces youths, especially those who are good-looking. She carries them off to a kingdom of her own, where she kills them by a slow process of emaciation, or keeps them until they lose all their manly vigour, and then sends them back to the world in the shape of grey-haired old men, who find all their friends long dead. The Churel superstition is probably derived from the demonolatry of the non-Aryan races. It is found fully developed among the Orāons, who imagine the Churel to be a woman clad in robes of white, her face fair and lovely, her back black as charcoal, and her feet inverted (*FL* xvii. 131 ff.). She hovers over gravestones, lays hold of passers-by, wrestles with them or tickles them, and he who is thus caught is lucky if he escapes injury. Often he is found next morning senseless, with his neck twisted, and the services of a sorcerer or medicine-man are necessary to set him right again (Dalton, *op. cit.* 258). The methods of getting rid of such a spirit are twofold—either by propitiation or by exorcism. The Bhuiyās of Keonjhar, if a woman should die before delivery, extract the embryo from the corpse and burn the bodies at opposite sides of a hill stream. As no spirit can cross water, and the mother cannot become a witch unless united to her child, this precaution is believed to render her harmless (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 199).

* For fasting and other means of producing ecstasy and other forms of morbid exaltation for religious ends, see Tylor, ii. 410 ff. It prevails widely in modern Lāmaism, which owes much to the Tantrik cultus (Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, 34), and in South India (Burnell, 'Devil Worship of the Tulavas,' *IA*, 1894; Caldwell, *Dravidian Grammar*[3], 579 ff.).

27. Animism the basis of modern Hinduism.—The Hinduism, and much of the Muhammadanism, of modern Bengal is thus in a large measure the result of the fusion of these non-Aryan animistic beliefs with the foreign faiths—first, the Brāhmanism of North-Western India, which gradually worked its way from the Holy Land of the Hindus in the eastern Panjāb, down the valley of the Ganges; and second, Islām, which advanced by the same route at a much later period. These animistic beliefs are to such a large extent the foundation of modern Hinduism in Bengal that it is impossible to draw a line of demarcation between the two, or to say where one ends and the other begins. Hinduism, in fact, is such a vague term as not to admit of definition.

'The term in its modern acceptation denotes neither a creed nor a race, neither a church nor a people, but is a general expression devoid of precision, and embracing alike the most punctilious disciple of pure Vedantism, the Agnostic youth who is the product of Western education, and the semi-barbarous hillman, who eats without scruple anything that he can procure, and is as ignorant of the Hindu theology as the stone which he worships in times of danger or sickness' (Bourdillon, *Census Rep. Bengal*, 1881, i. 71).

28. Totemism.—Totemism, which in other countries seems to have produced important results in moulding the national faith, appears in Bengal rather as a social than as a religious force. Here we find it chiefly in connexion with the exogamous septs of the non-Aryan tribes, each of which bears the name of some animal, tree, plant, or material object, natural or artificial, which the members of that sept are prohibited from killing, eating, cutting, burning, carrying, using, etc. Thus, among the Orāons, we find septs designated by names meaning 'young mice,' 'tortoise,' 'hyæna,' 'eel,' 'squirrel,' 'rat'; and among the Santāls 'wild goose,' 'hawk,' 'betel-palm,' 'conch-shell,' etc. One curious fact about these Orāon 'totems' is that they are not whole animals, but parts of animals, as the head of a tortoise, the stomach of a pig, which special parts the tribesmen are forbidden to eat (Risley, *op. cit.* i., Introd. 43; Dalton, *op. cit.* 189, 254).

The respect for the totem is shown in various ways. The Bāorī totem is the heron, and they are forbidden to eat its flesh (Dalton, *op. cit.* 327). The Kumhārs of Orissa abstain from eating, and go so far as to worship, the *sāl* fish, because the rings on its scales resemble the wheel which is the symbol of their craft. The Khattyā branch of the same tribe have only one section, Kaśyapā, which in Skr. means 'tortoise,' and is also the name of a famous *rishi*, or saint, with whom they claim connexion. But as they venerate the tortoise, Risley suggests (*op. cit.* i., Introd. 48) that the name of the saint has been substituted for the original totemistic name derived from the animal. The Parheyās of Palamāu have a tradition that their tribe formerly held sheep and deer sacred, and used the dung of these animals to plaster the floors of their huts, as they now use cow-dung; the Kharriās do not eat the flesh of sheep, and may not use a woollen rug—tabus the observance of which is now becoming relaxed (Dalton, *op. cit.* 131; Ball, *Jungle Life*, 89; Risley, *op. cit.* i. 466). Some Kandhs refused to carry a basket containing the skin of a young leopard which Ball had shot, because, as far as he could ascertain, 'the animal was the totem, or sacred beast of the tribe' (*op. cit.* 600). Many instances of similar belief have been collected by Dalton and Risley. The Asurās have thirteen totemistic sections; a man may not marry a woman belonging to the same section as himself, nor may he eat, cut, or injure the plant or animal whose name his section bears (Risley, *op. cit.* i. 25). The Koirīs have as sections the *nāga*, or snake, and the *kaśyapā*, or tortoise, and will not molest either animal. The Kaśyapā branch carry their reverence for the tortoise to such an extent that, if one be caught, they smear its shell with oil and vermilion, and put it back into the water (*ib.* i. 501). The Mahilī Muṇḍās regard the pig as their totem, and will not eat pork (*ib.* ii. 40). The Pāns have a host of totems, including among animals the tiger, buffalo, monkey, tortoise, cobra, mongoose, owl, king-crow, peacock, centipede, and among plants the wild fig, wild plum, and many others (*ib.* ii. 156).

Many of the non-Aryan tribes, again, claim descent from animals. The Cheros say that they are descended from the *nāga*, or dragon (Dalton, *op. cit.* 126, 162, 165 f.); the Santāls have as one of their totems the wild goose, from the eggs of which they assert that their ancestors were created (*ib.* 209); the Ho creation-legend seems to connect the various tribes—Kols, Bhūmij, Brāhmans, Kṣatriyas, Śūdras, Bhuiyās—and even the English with animals selected by each after their creation by Otē Borām and Sing Bongā, who were self-created.

Another proof of the existence of totemism in Bengal has been traced in the reluctance to mention animals by their real names, and the preference for a descriptive epithet (Frazer, *Totemism*, 15). Thus, the Kharwārs call the hare 'the four-footed one'; and the Paṭāris call the bear 'the hairy creature,' and the elephant 'he with the tusks' (Crooke, *Tribes and Castes*, iii. 249; *PR* ii. 54, 142). But in his later examination of tabus of this kind Frazer seems to have abandoned the idea that they can be traced to totemism.

The evidence for the existence of totemism as a force affecting religious beliefs is thus very dubious, and many of the examples given above can be explained by animal- or plant-worship.

29. Hinduism.—Nearly two-thirds of the present population of the Province are Hindus, and rather less than one-third Muhammadans, the followers of other creeds being in small numbers. The diagrams prepared by Gait (*op. cit.* i. 154, 156) show clearly the geographical distribution of these, the two main religions of the Province. What may be called the most conservative parts of the country, those which were settled at the earliest period, continued to be the seats of an historic civilization, and what were centres of Buddhism are now districts in which Hinduism is predominant. These are the sub-provinces of Bihār and Orissa, and the line of districts along the eastern edge of the Chotā Nāgpur plateau and the western fringe of Bengal Proper, which link these two tracts together. The south-western hill region, the home of the Muṇḍā or Dravidian tribes, is the domain of pure Animism, which in the plain region is overlaid by Hinduism or Islām. Muhammadanism, again, is predominant to the east, in that portion of the Province which has now been formed into a separate Administration.

30. The sects of Hindus.—No attempt was made at the last Census to obtain a record of the multitudinous sects of Hindus. Of these the two most important are the Śāktas, or followers of the Mother-goddesses, and the Vaishṇavas, or worshippers of Vishṇu.

In Bihār the distinctions of sect are ill-defined, and the more ignorant classes would find it difficult to say to which of the conventional divisions of Hinduism they belong. But in Bengal and Orissa, owing to the great Vaishṇava movement inaugurated by Chaitanyā, the case is otherwise, and there would be but little difficulty in obtaining a fairly accurate record of the sectarian distribution of the population (cf. Gait, *op. cit.* i. 181).

Speaking generally, we may say that the sectarian divisions of the people are not clearly defined. As in other parts of the Indian Empire, the membership of or nominal adherence to the principles of a sect often depends on the question of food; to be a Śākta is very often merely to

be an eater of meat and a drinker of spirituous liquor, both being permitted luxuries; while inclusion in the Vaishṇava sect implies vegetarianism. Hinduism, again, is perhaps more eclectic than most of the great world-religions, freely admitting into its fold the followers of many different sects provided they submit to the social rules of the body in which they accept membership. They are allowed perfect freedom to worship any or all of the sectarian gods, though to suit his own inclinations a man may devote special honour to one of the many forms of the Mother-goddess, to Śiva, or to Vishṇu in one or other of his many incarnations. His private chapel may contain an image of Devī or Durgā side by side with the *śālagrāma*, or ammonite, representing Vishṇu, or the phallic symbol of Śiva. When he visits a holy place he will be careful to pay respect to all the principal shrines, and to worship all the gods or goddesses who are represented by images. He does this because his deities are jealous gods, easily offended if they be neglected, and prone to punish any one who fails to honour them (Jogendra Nath Bhattacharya, *Hindu Castes and Sects*, 364).

Hence, among individual castes we find a remarkable mixture of sectarian beliefs. Thus, among the Bābhans, yeomen of Bihār, representatives of all sects are found in much the same proportion as in the population at large. Vaishṇavism is said to have been only recently introduced among them, and in north Bihār most of them are worshippers of either Śiva or the Śakti. In this, as in many other castes of the same social status, no social consequences result from professing the tenets of any of the regular sects, and intermarriage between their members goes on freely within the limits of the caste (Risley, *op. cit.* i. 33). Passing to castes of a much lower grade, we find that the Bāgdī, cultivators, fishermen, and menials of Central and West Bengal, worship, under the guidance of degraded Brāhmans, Śiva, Vishṇu, and the Śakti, as well as Yama or Dharmarājā, god of Dead-land, and the myriad names of the modern pantheon, besides animistic deities like Guṣāin Erā, the goddess, and Bar Pahār, the mountain-god of the Santāls; but their favourite object of worship is Manasā, the snake-goddess. The Barui, cultivators of *pān* (*Piper betel*), are mostly Śāktas, and only a few are Vaishṇavas, but with the worship of these great gods they combine the cult of Ushas of the Veda, the Eos or Aurora of the West. The Dhobī, or washerman caste, worship Śiva, Vishṇu, Kārttikeya, god of war, or the Śakti, very much as the personal taste of the worshipper may dictate, and they venerate, besides these, non-Aryan gods such as Bhuiyā, the earth-god, and Barham Ghāsī, the deified ghost of a Brāhman. The Pods, a mixed tribe in the Delta, include Śaivas, Śāktas, and Vaishṇavas, as well as Sauras, or Sun-worshippers, and Ganapatyas, or followers of Gaṇapati or Gaṇeśa, god of wisdom and remover of obstacles, the two last sects being very sparingly represented among the higher classes of Hindus (*ib.* i. 41, 72, 235, ii. 177).

We find, again, instances of beliefs held in common by both Hindus and Musalmāns. In Rangpur, Buchanan (*op. cit.* iii. 512) found Hindus worshipping a spirit known as Satya-nārāyan, 'the true Lord,' whom Musalmāns venerated under the title of Satya-pīr, 'the true saint.' Hymns to him were sung by both Brāhmans and Śūdras; and while the Musalmāns used different hymns, the worship was identical.

In Bihār, the same writer remarks (i. 186) that 'when an Hindu is said to belong to such and such a sect, it does not in genera absolutely imply that he worships only such and such a god; but that such or such is his family-god (*kula-devatā*) or favourite god (*iśhṭa-devatā*). In some parts of India strict men will pray to no god but their favourite and his connexions, such as his spouse, sons, and servants; but in this district it is not usual to be so wedded; and though the daily prayers of the pious Hindu are offered to some one god, he without scruple has recourse to any other of whom he thinks he may be in need; and never approaches any image or holy place without some mark of respect.' The *gurus*, or sages, he adds, who instruct both Śaivas and Śāktas, are identical, and many Hindus are so careless or ignorant 'that they never have taken the trouble to inquire from their instructor whether the secret prayer is addressed to Śiva or Śakti, and they do not understand a word of it.'

It must, therefore, be understood that the Hindu sects of this Province are not in any sense analogous to the divisions found in other religions, as, for example, those of Christianity. Certain classes of the people may be generally described as Śāktas, Vaishṇavas, or Śaivas; but the fact of nominal adherence to one of these sects does not exclude the possibility of the worshipper paying reverence to gods other than those which his sect specially honours. It is in Bihār particularly, as we have seen, that the line between Vaishṇavas and Śāktas is not clearly defined. This is not the case in Bengal proper. Here a strict Vaishṇava will not even mention the names of goddesses like Kālī or Durgā, or the Bel tree (*Ægle marmelos*) the leaves of which are used in the worship of the Śakti. The reasons for this peculiarity, Gait suggests, are 'that Bihār was never so deeply infected as Bengal with the worst forms of Śākta worship, and that the Vaishṇava revival of Chaitanya which represented a revulsion from Śāktism never spread thither' (*op. cit.* i. 188).

31. The Śāktas.—Śāktism * was probably a development of the animistic belief in the Mother-goddesses which, as we have seen (above, § 13), is widely spread among the non-Aryan tribes. In the more highly developed form of the cult the functions of the primitive goddess 'of all work' have become divided into departments, and the various forces of Nature are personified under separate personalities, known as the Divine Mothers (*mātrigān*). These female energies are conceived as the Śakti of the primeval male, Puruśa or Śiva, who is the counterpart of non-Aryan gods like Bhūmiya or Khetrapāla, the male consort of the Earth-Mother, by union with whom her fertility is periodically renewed (see § 13).

The Śākta cult is supposed to have originated in East Bengal or Assam about the 5th cent. A.D., and the headquarters of Tāntrik worship are believed to have been Kāmākhya in the latter Province, whence it was introduced into Tibet, Nepāl, and Gujarāt. The cult in this Province takes many forms.

(*a*) *General worship of the Śakti.*—We have, first, the Mātrikā pūjā, the general worship of the Mothers of the universe personified as the wives of the gods, that is to say, Śakti in all her various forms, usually eight in number, and co-ordinated with the different gods—Vaishṇavī and Lakshmī with Vishṇu; Brahmā or Brahmānī with Brahmā; Kārttikeyī with Kārttikeya, god of war; Indrānī with Indra; Yamī with Yama, god of death; Vārāhī with Vārāha, the boar incarnation of Vishṇu; Devī or Īśānī with Śiva.

(*b*) *Kālī.*—Secondly, there is the worship of Kālī, which, according to Buchanan (*op. cit.* ii. 374, 477), was in his time of comparatively recent introduction into Bihār, 'since the English took possession, some of the wise men of the East having told the wiseacres that she is the deity of the English, to whose favour they entirely owe their great success.' Until the deity was introduced, he

* For a sketch of the development of Śāktism see Gait, *Assam Census Report*, 1891, i. 80 ff.; Jogendra Nath Bhattacharya, *Hindu Castes and Sects*, 407 ff.; Hopkins, *Religions of India*, 489 ff.; Barth, *Religions of India*, Eng. tr. 199 ff. The course of the development of Greek belief is supposed to have been on similar lines, the earliest conception being that of the Mother and the Maid, which may reflect primitive matriarchal customs (J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena*, 260 ff.).

goes on to say, it was not common to call the female power by any particular name. She was commonly spoken of and worshipped as Devī or Bhavānī, two appellations implying merely 'the goddess,' 'although by the latter term Sītalā is commonly understood.' The original female power, in short, is thus seen undergoing the process of development, a number of special entities being created to whom each department of human action is assigned. The cult of Kālī appears in one of its lowest forms among the Tipārās of the State of Tippera and the Chittagong hill tracts to the east of the Province. This tribe offers to Kālī black goats (her name meaning 'the black one'), rice, plantains, and other fruits of the earth. The goddess has no image; she is represented for sacrificial purposes by a round lump of clay, the edges of which are drawn out into four points or legs, so that the whole, seen from above, bears a rough resemblance to a sea-urchin with four arms (Risley, *op. cit.* ii. 325).

In her temples Kālī is represented as a 'very black female, with four arms, having in one hand a scymitar, and in another the head of a giant which she holds by the hair; another hand is spread open bestowing a blessing; and with the other she is forbidding fear. She wears two dead bodies for earrings, and a necklace of skulls, and her tongue hangs down to her chin. The hands of several giants are hung as a girdle round her loins, and her tresses fall down to her heels. Having drunk the blood of the giants she has slain in combat, her eyebrows are bloody, and the blood is falling in a stream down her breast; her eyes are red like those of a drunkard. She stands with one leg on the breast of her husband Shiva, and rests the other on his thigh' (Ward, *op. cit.* ii. 117 f.).

At the present time, pigeons, goats, and more rarely buffaloes, are the victims usually offered. The ceremony commences with the adoration of the sacrificial axe. Various spells (*mantra*) are recited, and the animal is decapitated at one stroke. As soon as the head falls to the ground the votaries rush forward and smear their foreheads with the blood. These sacrifices are specially performed during the three days of the Durgā Pūjā (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 182).

Rites such as these represent the goddess in her malevolent aspect. But she is also Rākhyā or Bhadrā Kālī, the guardian of every Bengali village, to whom prayers and sacrifices are offered on the outbreak of pestilence. Wise remarks that, when cholera broke out at the great Vārunī fair in 1874, a subscription was collected for the performance of a special worship of Kālī. Her image was paraded through the fair, after which an operatic entertainment was given, at which crowds of people assembled. 'The cholera, which had been only sporadic, ceased, and the stoppage was attributed to the beneficent Kālī' (*op. cit.* 135 f.).

(*c*) *Devī.*—The cult of Devī is similar to that of Kālī. It sometimes represents her as benignant, but more often in her chthonic or malignant aspect. It is, in fact, practically impossible to distinguish the double manifestation of the goddess. Speaking generally, when kindly she is Umā, 'light,' Gaurī, 'the yellow or brilliant one,' Pārvatī or Haimavatī, 'she that has her birth in the Himālaya,' Jaganmātā, 'mother of the world,' and Bhavānī; while in her terrible form she is called Durgā, 'the inaccessible,' Kālī or Śyāmā, 'the dark one,' Chandī or Chandikā, 'the fierce,' Bhairavī, 'the terrible.' But in the popular conception these functions so completely merge and interchange that more precise definition is impossible. In Bihār during the Naurātrī or 'nine nights'' feast of the goddess, held during the fortnight of the waxing moon in the month of Chaitra (March), the rite of infusing by means of spells (*mantra*) the spirit of the goddess into an earthenware jar is performed. A space within the temple is purified by plastering the surface with mud and cow-dung. The jar is filled with water and covered with shoots of the mango tree, and over it is placed an earthenware saucer containing barley and rice, which is covered with a yellow cloth. The priest recites verses, and, sprinkling water on the jar and its contents with a few blades of the sacred *kuśa* grass, he invites the goddess to enter it. As a sign that she has occupied it, the outside of the jar is sprinkled with red powder. During the period occupied in the rite the priest practises abstinence, eating only roots and fruits. The service concludes with a fire-sacrifice (*haoma*), in which barley, sugar, butter, and sesamum are burned before the jar which holds the goddess. The ashes of the sacrifice and portions of the red powder with which the jar was smeared are brought to the houses of his clients by the priest, who smears their foreheads with these substances, thus bringing them into communion with the deity. Here we find fetish rites in their crudest form (*North Indian Notes and Queries*, iv. 19 f.).

(*d*) *Divisions of the Śāktas.*—The Śākta sect is divided into three main sections—first, the Dakshināchārī or Dakshinamārgī, 'the right-hand' section, who are comparatively free from sensuality, and do not offer spirits or flesh to the deity. They follow the Purānas as their Veda, and are devoted to either Śiva or Vishnu in his androgynous character, at once male and female. Besides these there are two bodies of extremists—the Vāmachārī or Vāmamārgī, 'the left-hand' sect, who follow the teaching of the Tāntrik literature, and the Kaulas or Kaulikas, following the Kaula Upaniṣad, whence they take their name, whose practices are even more grossly licentious. Their object of veneration is the great Śakti, or power of Nature. Jaganmātā or Jagadambā, 'the mighty mysterious force, whose function is to direct and control two quite distinct operations: namely, first, the working of the natural appetites and passions, whether for the support of the body by eating and drinking or for the propagation of living organisms through sexual cohabitation; secondly, the acquisition of supernatural faculties (*siddhi*), whether for a man's own individual exaltation or for the annihilation of his opponents' (Monier Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*[4], 185 f.). The foul orgies which accompany such celebrations have been described by Jogendra Nath Bhattacharya (*Hindu Castes and Sects*, 411 f.), Ward (*Hindoos*, ii. 295 ff.), and others, and need not be further discussed here. The animistic side of the cultus appears in the Panjāb worship of young girls as Devī, apparently a form of sympathetic magic to induce fertility (Rose, *Census Rep.* 1901, i. 126).

32. **The Vaishṇavas.**—The revolt against this gross and debasing cultus was led by the reformer Chaitanya,* a Vaidik Brāhman who was born at Nabadwīp, in Bengal, A.D. 1484.

'He preached mainly in Central Bengal and Orissa, and his doctrines found ready acceptance amongst large numbers of the people, especially amongst those who were still, or had only recently been, Buddhists. This was due mainly to the fact that he ignored caste and drew his followers from all sources, so much so that even Muhammadans followed him. He preached vehemently against the immolation of animals in sacrifice and the use of animal food and stimulants, and taught that the true road to salvation lay in *bhakti*, or fervent devotion to God. He recommended Rādhā worship, and taught that the love felt by her for Krishna was the best form of devotion. The acceptable offerings were flowers, money, and the like; but the great form of worship was that of the *saṅkirtan*, or procession of worshippers playing and singing. A peculiarity of Chaitanya's cult is that the post of spiritual guide, or Gosāin, is not confined to Brāhmans, and several of those best known belong to the Baidyā caste, who practise medicine in Bengal Proper. They are all of them descended from the leading men of Chaitanya's immediate entourage. The holy places of the cult are Nabadvīp [or Nadīya], Chaitanya's birthplace, and in a still greater degree, Brindaban [wh. see], the scene of Krishna's sports with the milk-maids, which Chaitanya and his disciples reclaimed from jungle, and where he personally identified the various sacred spots, on which great shrines have now been erected' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 182).

* His life and the principles of his sect are fully described by Jogendra Nath Bhattacharya (*Hindu Castes and Sects*, 459 ff.).

Chaitanya, after spending six years in pilgrimage between Mathurā and Jagannāth, finally settled in the latter place, where in A.D. 1527, at the age of forty-three, he disappeared from the world. There is reason to believe that he was drowned in the sea, into which he had walked in an ecstasy, mistaking it for the shallow waters of the Jumna, where he saw in a vision Kṛṣṇa sporting with his Gopīs (Growse, *Mathurā*[3], 1883, 197). After his death his followers split up into two bodies: those who retained, and those who rejected caste. The latter are known as Jāt Baishtam or Bairāgī (*q.v.*), are recruited from all castes, and profess to intermarry freely amongst themselves; but caste distinctions are not entirely obliterated, and the recruits from the higher hold aloof from those drawn from the lower castes.

'Except for the fact that outsiders are still admitted, they form a community very similar to the ordinary Hindu caste. Its reputation at the present day is tarnished by the fact that most of its new recruits have joined owing to love intrigues, or because they have been turned out of their own caste, or for some other sordid motive' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 182).

The other division, those who have retained the system of caste, is in no way connected with the Jāt Baishtams. They practise a cultus much purer than that of the Śāktas, and the stricter members of the body are vegetarians, and abhor the Śākta beliefs. But among those of the lower castes some freely eat animal food, and even join in processions in honour of Durgā, but will not be present when blood sacrifices are offered. The various subdivisions of the Bengal Vaishṇavas have been fully described by Wise (*op. cit.* 147 ff.) and by Risley (*op. cit.* ii. 339 ff.).

The Vaishṇavism of Bengal is thus strongly opposed to Śākta beliefs, and is probably to a large extent derived from the traditions of Buddhism.

'Apart from metaphysical subtleties, which naturally have but little hold on the minds of the populace, the social tenet of the Bengali Vaishṇavas is the all-sufficiency of faith in the divine Kṛishṇa; such faith being adequately expressed by the mere repetition of his name, without any added prayer or concomitant feeling of genuine devotion. Thus roughly stated, the doctrine appears absurd; and possibly its true bearing is as little regarded by many of the more ignorant of the Vaishṇavas themselves as it is by the majority of superficial outside observers. It is, however, a legitimate deduction from sound principles; for it may be presumed that the formal act of devotion would never have been commenced had it not been prompted at the outset by a devotional intention, which intention is virtually continued so long as the act is in performance' (Growse, *Mathurā*[3], 197).

As a parallel case, Growse, himself a member of the Roman Catholic Church, quotes from one of its manuals the rule: 'It is not necessary that the intention should be actual throughout; it is sufficient if we pray in a human manner, and for this only a virtual intention is required; that is to say, an intention which has been actual and is supposed to continue, although, through inadvertence or distraction, we may have lost sight of it.'

(*a*) *Prevalence of Vaishṇavism.*—The Vaishṇava cultus is one of the most important among the beliefs of the Province. Ward in 1815 stated that six out of ten of the whole Hindu population were worshippers of Kṛṣṇa (*Hindoos*, ii. 158); in 1828 Wilson (*Religious Sects*, i. 152) calculated them at one-fifth; and in 1872 Hunter (*Orissa*, i. 144) at from one-fifth to one-third of the whole number of Hindus. Wise (*op. cit.* 147), from a catalogue of the temples in the Dacca District, found that 74 per cent. belonged to Kṛṣṇa in one or other of his numerous forms, and only 21 per cent. to Kālī, Durgā, and Śiva. The predominance of Kṛṣṇa-worship is largely due to the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* assigned by Wilson (*Vishṇu Purāṇa*, xxxi.) to the 12th cent. of our era. It has, however, been recently established that the Purānic literature goes back to the 6th or 8th cent., and thus the movement which led to the rise of Neo-Brāhmanism must be assigned to an earlier date than that fixed by the older authorities. The *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* is now regarded as the chief book among the Vaishṇava scriptures.

'Since his death in 1528, Chaitanya has been identified with Krishṇa, and this deification has been ratified by the *Chaitāmṛta*, written thirty years after his death. The moral and tolerant doctrines of this national teacher penetrated the hearts of the people, and roused an enthusiastic spirit that has, unfortunately, driven many into strange and perilous wanderings. Among the pure Śūdras there is less deviation from the original creed than among the lower mixed classes, who have been always neglected. The religious sentiments of the latter, instead of being properly guided, have been left to develop as fancy or bias disposed them. Whether this be a satisfactory explanation or not, it is certain that the corrupt, often immoral, sects now existing are chiefly patronized by the lower and most ignorant classes of the community. The equality of all men, a doctrine preached by Chaitanya, but repudiated by the Gosāins, has been restored by most of the later offshoots of Vaishṇavism, and with them no distinction conferred by birth, wealth, or prescription is ever recognized' (Wise, *op. cit.* 147).

(*b*) *The erotic Vaishṇavism.*—The development of Vaishṇavism on the erotic side marks the degradation of the cultus. The original doctrine of *bhakti*, or loving faith, was afterwards conceived to appear in five stages, the higher of which, as in the case of the Ṣūfī mystics, could be attained only by a few privileged persons, after prolonged austerities and mortifications: (1) *śānti*, or quietism, 'in which the Vaishṇava enjoys perfect contentment and peace of mind, ever dwelling on the happiness of his lot, and grateful to Hari for his mercy'; (2) *dāsya*, the relation between a master and his purchased slave, of which the keynote is self-denial, the dedication of all the believer's energy and thought to the service of the god; (3) *sakhya*, or friendship, at which stage 'the disciple worships Chaitanya as his bosom friend, and regards his own soul as an emanation from and a particle of the *paramātman*, or supreme spirit'; (4) *vātsalya*, 'affection towards offspring,' in which the deity is regarded 'not as a common Father of all men, but as the parent of the worshipper'; and (5) *mādhurya*, 'sweetness,' 'the efflorescence of *bhakti*,' as it has been called. 'In this, the highest and most exquisite condition, the disciple glows with the same uncontrollable desire that Krishṇa felt for the absent Rādhā' (Wise, *op. cit.* 155). This last development of erotic Vaishṇavism finds its most complete and degrading exposition in the practices of the sect of the Vallabhāchāryas, according to whom body, soul, and property (*tan, man, dhan*) are to be made over to the Mahārājās, or successors and vicars of Kṛṣṇa upon earth, by the rite of self-devotion (*samarpaṇa*); and women are taught that their highest bliss results from the caresses of the representative of the god (Monier Williams, *op. cit.*[4] 134 ff.; Growse, *Mathurā*[3], 199 ff.; [Karsandas Mulji,] *Hist. of the Sect of the Maharajas or Vallabhacharyas of West. India*, 1865).

33. **The cult of Śiva.**—The cult of Śiva is of less importance than that of either the Śakti or Vishṇu. In Eastern Bengal the Śaiva fraternities, those of the Kanphaṭās, or 'ear-pierced' Yogīs, and the Brahmachārīs, never gained popularity, and their conventual establishments, which are few, would have disappeared long since, but for the charitable endowments of former ages. The Śaiva mendicants or cenobites are, according to Wise (*op. cit.* 174 f.), notorious for their licentious lives and dissipated habits; but, notwithstanding the scandal which they cause, their *ākhāras*, or convents, are thronged by crowds of devotees, chiefly women. In Bengal proper, according to Ward (*op. cit.* ii., Introd. xxi.), few Hindus adopt Śiva as their guardian deity. His temples generally represent him in the form of the *liṅgam*, or as Pañchānana, the figure of the deity with five faces. Further west, in Bihār, the worship of Śiva is more common, and prevails widely among Brāhmans. Here village temples in honour of the deity, with images of the *liṅgam* and of Nandi, the bull 'vehicle' of the god, are common, and the worship is adopted in preference to that of

Vishnu in one or other of his many forms, because the ritual and offerings made to him are much less elaborate and expensive. The Śaiva cultus thus suits the thrifty habits of the yeomen among whom it chiefly prevails.

Among the castes who are specially devoted to this form of belief may be mentioned the Yugīs or Yogīs, now a weaving caste in Eastern Bengal, of whom the great majority worship Śiva or Mahādeva, especially at the Śivarātri or 'night feast' of Śiva, held in the month of Māgh (January–February). The chief religious centres of the Māsya Yugīs are Brindāban, Mathurā, and Gokul, all in the United Provinces; but their chief places of pilgrimage are Benares, Gayā, and Sītākund in Chittagong (Risley, *op. cit.* i. 358). These Yogīs, as they prefer to be called, are supposed by Gait (*op. cit.* i. 381) to be descended from a religious community, not necessarily from the regular Yogī or Jogī ascetics, but possibly from some Buddhist Order. The same writer supposes that their present degraded condition is due to their having remained in the Buddhist faith after the general population had reverted to Hinduism. They call their priests, who belong to their own communion, *Mahātmas* or *Paṇḍits*, both of which terms were formerly in use among Buddhists; they bury their dead in a sitting posture, with the legs crossed in the conventional attitude of Buddha, and with the feet turned to the north-west. The Yogī sects of Northern India freely admit outsiders to their body; and their present occupation in Bengal, weaving, is one often practised by decayed religious communities. Their devotion to Śiva is possibly connected with his manifestation as the typical ascetic and self-mortifier—a conception which perhaps owed much to the influence of Buddhism. The Śaiva mendicants are popularly divided into ten classes, known collectively as the Daśnāmīs, or 'ten names.' Besides that of the more respectable Order, the Sannyāsīs, the cult gives shelter to loathsome ascetics, like the Aghorīs (wh. see), the Urdhvabāhus, who contort their limbs, and the Ākāśamukhins, who keep their necks bent back in a fixed gaze on the sky until the muscles become withered.

34. **Buddhism.**—Buddhism, which had its origin in the western part of the Province, and finally became one of the great religions of the world, is now represented in Bengal by only 237,893 adherents. In so far as they follow the orthodox standard of belief, they are included in the Mahāyāna, or Great Vehicle, which is the basis of Tibetan Lāmaism, and also of the Buddhism of Bengal. The Buddhists of this Province may be divided into at least four groups.

(*a*) *Chinese Buddhists.*—First comes the small body of immigrant Chinese in Calcutta, where they follow many occupations, such as carpentry and shoemaking, boil down pigs' fat into lard, and deal in opium and hemp drugs. Their temples seem to be usually seats of Buddhist as well as of Shinto worship, that at Calcutta being dedicated to Kwan-te, generally called the 'god of war.' In the courtyard is the god's horse, comfortably stabled. Climbing a flight of stairs, one reaches chapels and rooms for attendants, in which animals intended in the first instance as food for the god, and which are afterwards consumed by the worshippers, are being cooked (*Calcutta Review*, xxxi. 368 ff.).

(*b*) *Himālayan Buddhists.*—Secondly come the Buddhists of North Bengal, who are either natives of the Himālayan State of Sikkim, or immigrants from Bhutān, Tibet, and Nepāl. By race they are mostly Tibetans, Lepchas, and Murmīs. In Nepāl itself Buddhism is steadily losing ground under the attacks of the militant form of Hinduism professed by the rulers of that kingdom, who, like all recent converts, are more ardent supporters of the new faith than even their more orthodox brethren in the plains. Nothing, again, has contributed so much to the decline of Buddhism in Nepāl as the adoption of caste by the Buddhist Newārs, and the consequent decay of monastic institutions (Oldfield, *Sketches*, ii. 131 ff.). Besides this, the heterodox Buddhists constitute a large majority of the Buddhist population. They avowedly combine the worship of Śiva and of the other Hindu deities with that of Buddha; they publicly attend the religious services of Hindu temples, and at the more important domestic ceremonies, such as those of marriage and death, they conjoin Hindu forms with those of the Buddhist church, and employ a Brāhman priest to assist their own Buddhist Vajra Āchārya, or 'thunderbolt teacher,' in the performance of his sacred duties.

These classes of Newārs are 'Buddhist only in name; for although they profess to esteem Buddha before all other deities, yet their practices belie their professions, and prove that they are steadily abandoning that faith to which they still nominally belong, and are rapidly adopting the more corrupt and more attractive religion of the Hindus' (Oldfield, *op. cit.* ii. 147).

The same is the case with those Himālayan Buddhists who have migrated into British territory. Thus, among the Lepchas of Sikkim and the adjoining region, Buddhistic usage forms only a thin veil over their primitive shamanistic Animism. Their religion consists mainly in the propitiation of the spirits of forest, hill, or stream which are considered malignant.

'The snow-clad giant Kinchinjanga, chief among the elemental deities of the Lepchas, who vexes men with storm and hail and sends down avalanches and torrents to wreck their fields and sweep away their homes, has been translated to the milder system of Buddhism, where he figures as the tutor of Śakya Muni himself' (Risley, *op. cit.* ii. 10).

Similarly the Limbūs of Dārjīling adapt their religion to their surroundings. Where their environment is Hindu, they call themselves Śaivas, and profess to worship Mahādeva and his consort Gaurī, the favourite deities of the Nepālese.

'In a Buddhist neighbourhood the yoke of conformity is still more easy to bear; the Limbū has only to mutter the pious formula, *Om maṇi padme om* [or, as Waddell transcribes and translates it, '*Om* ! The Jewel in the Lotus ! *Hūṃ*'—*Om-maṇi pad-me Hūṃ*, the first and last word bearing a mystic meaning (*Buddhism of Tibet*, 148)], and to pay respect and moderate tribute to the Lāmas, in order to be accepted as an average Buddhist. Beneath this veneer of conformity with whatever faith happens to have gained local acceptation, the vague shapes of their original Pantheon have survived in the form of household or forest gods, much in the same way as Dionysus and other of the Greek gods may be traced in the names and attributes of the saints who preside over the vintage, the harvest, and rural festivals of various kinds in remote parts of Greece at the present day' (Risley, *op. cit.* ii. 17).

The degraded condition of the popular Buddhism of the Lower Himālayas is shown by the adoption of rites of blood sacrifice, a relic of the old devil-worship of the country, but absolutely repugnant to the rules of the orthodox faith (Waddell, *Among the Himalayas*, 74).

(*c*) *Buddhists of East Bengal.*—The third group of Bengal Buddhists—that of Chittagong and the hill tracts of Chittagong — consists mainly of Chakmās and Maghs, the latter divided into two classes: first, descendants of Arakanese immigrants who entered the country when Arakan was conquered by the Burmese in A.D. 1785; and, secondly, the mixed race descended from Magh women by Bengali fathers, who are known as Rājbansī or Baruā Maghs, and are less numerous than the first branch. There are also some Tipārās in the hill tracts who described themselves at the last census as Buddhists.

'In the Tippera State the Tipārās now call themselves Hindus; but this country was formerly a great Buddhist centre, and some sacred shrines there were visited by the Tibetan traveller, Buddha Gupta Nāth, who travelled in India in the seventh century A.D.' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 158).

The Chakmās profess to be Buddhists, but their religious practices have been much corrupted by

the gross Hinduism of Eastern Bengal. This change was brought about by the influence of the local Rājā, Dharm Bakhsh Khān, who was a bigoted Hindu, patronized the cult of Kālī, and pretended to be a descendant of the ancient Kṣatriyas. Much of the more primitive Animism still survives under the upper layer of Buddhism (Risley, *op. cit.* i. 172 f.). The same fusion of beliefs appears among the Maghs of Chittagong, who profess to be Buddhists of the Southern school, and regard the followers of the faith in Tibet as unorthodox. The worship of Śiva and Durgā has here been added to the Buddhist observances. While their priests are Buddhist, *phungyis* or *raolis*, Brāhmans are much respected, and are employed to determine auspicious days for particular actions, and to assist in the worship of the Hindu gods (*ib.* ii. 33).

(*d*) *Survivals of Buddhism and Hinduism.*—The last and most interesting group of so-called Buddhists in Bengal is found among the caste known as Sarāks, resident in the Baramba State in Orissa, whose beliefs have been fully investigated by Gait (*op. cit.* i. 427 ff.). Their name appears to be derived from the Skr. *śrāvaka*, 'a hearer,' a term applied among the Jains to indicate the lay brethren affiliated to the community, as distinguished from the Yatis, monks, and ascetics; it still survives in the name Sarāogi or Sarāvagi, applied to a merchant community of Jains which is rapidly becoming a regular caste of the usual type. The centre of the Baramba Sarāk worship is at the celebrated cave-temple of Khandagirī, where they assemble once a year to do homage to the idols there and to confer on religious matters. They worship, under the name of Chaturbhuja, 'the four-armed one,' an idol which usually has only two arms, and is undoubtedly a representation of Buddha. This worship is performed on what is supposed to be the anniversary of Buddha's wedding, a fact which may with some probability be considered to connect the cult with the primitive animistic conception of the union of the male consort with the primeval Mother (see above, § 13). The family rites of the caste are performed by one of their own members, who calls himself Āchārya, or 'teacher,' and Brāhmans are employed only to perform the rites of the *haoma*, or fire sacrifice, at marriage, after which the Āchārya concludes the proceedings by calling upon Buddha to bless the young couple.

The evidence, so far as it has been collected, seems to indicate that the Sarāks have retained many beliefs and practices which have descended to them from the Buddhism which was the creed of a large number of the people of Orissa. Here its place was taken by Brāhmanism, and it is now difficult to say how many of the beliefs of the Sarāks are due to direct inheritance of the Buddhist tradition, and how many have been transmitted to them with a leaven of Vaishnavism. Too much stress must not be laid upon the worship of images of Buddha by the people of our time. All through Northern India are to be found statues or pillars disinterred from the ruins of *stūpas* or *vihāras*, which have been adopted as images of the village gods, and even of the orthodox Hindu deities. Thus Buchanan (*op. cit.* i. 73) found in a Bihār temple of Tārā Devī (the female power in her most destructive form) an image of the goddess, which was really one of Buddha himself.

Another survival of Buddhism has been traced in the worship of Dharmarāj or Dharma by low-caste tribes like the Pods, Yogīs, Ḍoms, and Bāgdīs. By some he is identified with Yama, by others with the sun; by others, again, he is regarded as a snake-god; or, finally, as an incarnation of Śiva or Viṣṇu.

'He is usually worshipped by a low caste priest, a Pod, a Yogi, a Dom, or a Bāgdi. In a few places he has temples, but, as a rule, he is represented by a shapeless stone daubed with vermilion and placed under a tree. In a village in the Arāmbāgh subdivision he is worshipped in the form of a tortoise. His shrines are common all over West Bengal, and also in Dināj̄pur, Murshidābād, and the Twenty-four Parganas. He is frequently believed to possess certain curative powers, and his priests administer medicines as specifics for various diseases. Hogs, fowls, and ducks are sacrificed before him, and offerings are made of rice, flowers, milk, and *pachwāi* ['rice-beer'], but never of cooked food. The worship takes place in the months of Baisākh, Jaishṭa, and Āsārh, on the day of the full moon, and in some places on the last day of Bhādra. All castes, even Brāhmans, make offerings through the medium of the officiating priest' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 201).

The worship of this animistic deity has been adduced as a survival of Buddhism by Mahāmahopādhyāya Hara Prasād Śāstri (*JRASBe*, 1895), and in a further statement given by Gait (i. 201) the writer supplements this by inferring that because Dharma is worshipped in meditation as void (*śūnya-mūrti*) the cult represents the philosophical conception of *śūnyatā*—'concerning which neither existence nor non-existence nor a combination of the two can be predicated. It is zero.' Again, the ceremonies and fasts in honour of Dharma all take place on the full-moon day of Baisākh, the birthday of Buddha, and his worshippers are aware that Dharma is respected in Ceylon, that he is not an inferior deity, but superior to Vishṇu or Śiva. Finally, he is represented in many places as a tortoise, which is a Buddhist emblem (Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, 395). It is possible that some traditions of the worship of Buddha may survive in that of Dharma; but if so, very little of the original conception remains.

35. Jainism.—Jainism, like Buddhism, had its birthplace in Bihār. The origin of this form of belief and its relation to Hinduism and Buddhism will be considered in another article (see JAINISM). Here it is sufficient to say that recent research by Jacobi, Hoernle, and others (Hoernle, 'Presidential Address,' *JRASBe*, 1898; Bühler-Burgess, *The Indian Sect of the Jainas*) has established that Jainism, so far from being an offshoot of Buddhism, was the result of an independent and contemporaneous religious movement under a Kṣatriya prince named Vardhamāna or Mahāvīra, who was born in the neighbourhood of Patna about B.C. 599, and died about B.C. 527. The dates of Buddha's career are still to some extent uncertain; but the most recent investigations place the period of his life between B.C. 588 and 508. It is thus possible that the founders of these two sects, who were both of Kṣatriya descent, may have met in the course of their preaching tours through Western Bengal. Neither sect is a religion in the true sense of the word; both are rather monastic organizations of a type very common in the age when they were founded. Both arose from the circumstance that the Brāhmans were then claiming the monopoly of admission to the monastic Orders. As a protest against this action, many non-Brāhmanical Orders were founded. They were gradually led to discontinue the use of the Vedic ritual, with the natural result that they came to be excluded from the pale of Brāhmanism. Jainism differs from Buddhism in rejecting the doctrine of *nirvāṇa*, and in asserting instead that, when the soul has gained freedom from the trammels of the successive series of existences, it passes into a state of blessedness which is vague and ill-defined. Those saintly men who have attained the rest of the blessed are known as Tīrthaṅkara; those 'who have created a passage through the circuit of life,' form the body of saints who are worshipped by Jains. From the chief of these, Parśvanātha, the hill of Pārasnāth (wh. see), the centre of Jain pilgrimage in Bengal, takes its name. Jainism, by its more democratic constitution, freely admitting

lay adherents to communion, adopting a less active missionary career than Buddhism, and preferring as its chief centres of worship more secluded sites, like Parasnāth, was able to resist more successfully the stress of the Brāhmanical revival and Muhammadan persecution, under which the Buddhism of Bengal collapsed.

The Bengal Jains, who have their headquarters at Murshīdābād, are found also in Calcutta and the chief towns of the Patna Division. But though they are permanently settled there, they are rarely accompanied by their women-folk. Most of them are temporary visitors from Western and Central India. After making money by shopkeeping in Bengal, the heads of their firms often return to their original homes, their places being taken by younger men. Many of them are Mārwārīs from Mārwār in Central India, and belong to the Agarwāla and Oswāl sub-castes of Baniyās, the former being of the Digambara or 'naked,' and the latter of the Śvetāmbara or 'white-clad' section. These distinctions, as far as questions of dress are concerned, are now obsolete; but the titles represent the contrast between the more primitive naked ascetics of Southern India and those from the North and West. Of these merchant families some follow the Hindu and some the Jain rule; but this does not operate as a bar to intermarriage, because even when some Baniyās adopt the Śaiva or Śākta sect, in deference to the prejudices of the majority of their brethren they do not sacrifice animals or partake of meat and spirits. A large proportion of the Hindu merchant class belongs to the Vaishnava sect, and these are as strict in their regard for animal life as the Jains themselves. When husband and wife belong to different sects, the wife is formally adopted into the sect of her husband, but continues to practise her original religious rites. When, however, she visits the home of her parents, she must have her food cooked separately and eat apart from the other members of her family (Risley, *op. cit.* i. 7, ii. 151).

36. Sikhs and Kabīrpanthīs.—Like the Jains, Sikhs profess to be Hindus, and at each successive enumeration it would seem that their numbers have been underrated, as they have been included in some Hindu sect. They are, as a rule, temporary residents, and their strength depends largely upon the number of Panjābi regiments which happen to be serving in the Province. The only place with which they have any permanent connexion is Patna, where the Har Mandir is said to mark the place where their tenth *guru*, Govind Singh (A.D. 1675–1708), is believed to have been born while his mother halted there during a pilgrimage. In Eastern Bengal the Sikh sects best known are the Suthrashāhī and the Nanakshāhī. Wise (*op. cit.* 181 f.) describes the members of the former sect at Dacca as disreputable, generally drunkards and smokers of hemp drugs. They are often Brāhmans who do not discard the sacred cord on joining the Sikh communion, and continue to eat with Brāhmans of their own tribe, and not with all grades of Sikhs. No Sikh, however, will refuse to partake of the consecrated food (*prasād*) when offered by them. They observe all the great Hindu festivals, and pay special adoration to the *śālagrāma*, or ammonite, which represents Vishnu. The account given of this sect by Maclagan (*Panjāb Census*, 1891, i. 154) is not more favourable. He describes them as importunate beggars whose profligacy is notorious, most of them being spendthrifts who have lost their wealth in gambling, and spend their lives in roving mendicancy. Nānakpanthī is a term of less definite meaning, as it is often applied to Sikhs in general, who are all followers of their *guru*, Nānak (A.D. 1469–1538). They have some connexion with Dacca, which is said to have been visited by Nānak Shāh; but their *ākhāra*, or convent, in that city possesses no endowment, and depends largely on the charity of Armenian or Muhammadan residents (Wise, *op. cit.* 182 ff.).

Kabīr was closely connected with Nānak. The chief note of his teaching was the endeavour to link Hinduism to Islām. 'Alī and Rāma, he said, are only different names for the same god. His teaching seems to be rapidly gaining adherents in Western Bengal and the United Provinces. Differences in rank and religion are all, he taught, but *māyā*, or illusion. Emancipation and peace are to be gained only by recognizing the Divine Spirit under these manifold illusions. The way to union with the Divine is not by means of formula or sacrifice, but by fervent faith (*bhakti*) and meditation on the Godhead. The use of spirituous liquor and the worship of idols were prohibited by the founder of the sect; but, as often happens, in process of time practice lags behind precept, and the successors of the teacher fail to maintain the ideal which he set before them. In the case of the Kabīrpanthīs it is said that there is now a tendency to revert to idolatry, while at the same time they pretend to maintain the teaching of Kabīr.

37. Deistic sects.—(*a*) *The Brahmo Samāj.*—Of the Hindu deistic sects the best known is the Brahmo Samāj, though its numbers are small, and show no tendency to rapid increase. In Bengal it is divided into three sections: the Ādi, or 'original'; the Nababidhān, or 'new dispensation'; and the Sādhāran, or 'common.' All alike believe in the unity of the Godhead, the brotherhood of man, and direct communion with God in spirit without the intervention of any mediator.

'The differences which exist are ritualistic and social rather than religious. The Adi Samāj, or oldest section, is also the most conservative. While discarding all idolatrous forms, it follows as closely as possible the rites of Hinduism, and draws its inspiration solely from the religious books of the Hindus, especially the Upanishads, and not from the Bible or Qur'ān. It has only once allowed a non-Brāhman to officiate as its minister. Inter-caste marriages are not allowed, and a considerable agitation was raised when one of its Brāhman members recently married the daughter of the Mahārājā of Kūch Bihār. In other respects the restrictions of the caste system sit lightly on the members of the Samāj, but they are particular to style themselves Hindus, and before the Census of 1891 they submitted a memorial intimating their desire to be entered as Theistic Hindus, and not as Brāhmos' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 159).

The second section, known as the Nababidhān Samāj, or Church of the New Dispensation, was founded by the well-known Keshab Chandra Sen. It is more eclectic than the Ādi Samāj in its tendencies, and has assimilated what it considers right not only in the sacred books of Hinduism, but also in the religious teaching of Christianity, Buddhism, and Islām.

The most advanced of these Churches is the Sādhāran, or 'common' Samāj. It rejects all the essentials of what is commonly regarded as Hinduism; disapproves of ritual and set forms of worship; absolutely rejects caste; disapproves of the custom of secluding women, gives them a liberal education, and allows them equal voice in Church government. It freely permits marriage between persons of different castes.

'They are thus,' as Gait remarks, 'gradually becoming a separate caste, recruited from a variety of different sources, but mainly from the ranks of the Brāhmans, Baidyas, and Kāyasths. . . . Most Indian gentlemen who have received an European education join this community, not so much perhaps on account of religious conviction as because of the freedom which it allows to them from the irksome trammels of caste and from the necessity of undergoing a ceremony of purification' (*op. cit.* i. 159 f.).

(*b*) *The Śivanārāyaṇīs.*—The Śivanārāyaṇī or Śrīnārāyaṇī is an interesting sect, founded about two centuries ago by a Rājput named Śiva Nārāyan from Ghāzipur in the United Provinces. It was first described by Buchanan in Patna and Bhāgal-

pur (*op. cit.* i. 214, ii. 137), who notices its adherents under the name of Santā, or 'pious.'

'They believe in one formless (*nirākār*) God, forbid idolatry, and venerate their original Guru, whom they regard as an incarnation of the Almighty. The eating of flesh and drinking of wine were forbidden by the founder of the sect, but this rule has now been relaxed. *Mantras* ['spells'] were composed by the founder, to be uttered from time to time during the day, *e.g.* when bathing. The sacred book of the sect is known as the *Sabda-Sant* or *Guru Granth*. It contains moral precepts, and declares that salvation is to be attained only by unswerving faith in God, control over the passions, and implicit obedience to the teaching of the Guru. The Guru is said to be held in such respect that all his leavings are most scrupulously partaken of by his disciples. Their great annual festival is on the fifth night after the new moon of Māgh [January–February], when they assemble in the house of one of their fraternity, and sing songs and read extracts from the *Guru Granth*. When a man wishes to become a Seo Nārāyaṇi, he selects one of the sect, belonging to a caste not inferior to his own, who imparts to him the *mantra* ['formula'] of initiation. He is then enjoined to have faith in God (*Bhagabān*) and the original Guru, and is given a certificate of admission. This is done in the presence of several members of the sect, whose names and addresses are noted in the certificate. All castes are admitted, but most of the disciples come from the lower grades of society, such as the Tatwā, Chamār, and Dosādh castes. The cult was formerly more popular than it is now, and higher castes are said to have supplied it with recruits. The Seo Nārāyaṇis bury their dead, and one of the great inducements to join the fraternity is said to be the knowledge that they will give a decent burial to their comrades when they die, and will not allow their bodies to be touched by sweepers. Their funeral processions are conducted with some pomp, and are accompanied by songs and music. The ordinary caste restrictions are observed, save only in the case of the extremists who adopt an ascetic life' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 185; *cf.* Crooke, *Tribes and Castes*, ii. 185 ff.).

This sect is only one of many which have recently grown up in Northern India, founded on a revolt against idolatry, and the pretensions of the Brāhmanical Order. They have adopted many of the principles of the reformed Vaishnava communities. Movements of this kind in India tend to degenerate, and once the enthusiasm which animated the founder has ceased to inspire later generations of disciples, the new community, having shaken itself free from the restrictions of caste and the control of the tribal council, often surrenders itself to licence. This has been the fate of this sect at Dacca, where the meetings, which occupied several nights in succession, degenerated into drunken orgies.

'The lower Hindu castes, ever willing to repudiate Brāhmanical interference, and assert spiritual independence, have always been notorious for profligacy and intemperate habits. Intoxication is with them an irresistible passion, and no threats or corrections have the slightest effect in weaning them from the vice. Faithful servants, kind parents, and affectionate husbands, they have no conception of a moral religion; and their untutored minds can neither understand nor comply with a faith inculcating morality and the mortification of all worldly lusts and passions' (Wise, *op. cit.* 181).*

38. The Pañchpiriyas.—The important sect of the Pañchpiriyas or Pachpiriyas forms the subject of a special article (wh. see).

39. Muhammadans.—The map prepared by Gait (*op. cit.* i. 156) clearly shows the distribution of Muhammadans in the Province. Prior to the Census of 1872 it was generally believed that they were most numerous in Bihār. That Census established, on the contrary, that the chief seat of Musalmān influence was in Eastern Bengal and to the north, where respectively two-thirds and nearly three-fifths of the people were found to be followers of the Prophet. On the other hand, in North Bihār less than a sixth, and in South Bihār less than a tenth, of the population accept his authority. Orissa, the most backward division, except the hill districts, and the most conservative in matters of religion, is the region where the Muhammadan element is weakest. The area of Musalmān predominance consists of a compact territory lying north of Calcutta and stretching westward from the frontier of Assam, including the Districts of Mymensingh, Pābna, Bogra, and Rājshāhi, and a second tract lying south and west of this and east of Calcutta, including the Districts of Noākhāli, Chittagong, and Backergunge. In these two regions the proportion of Muhammadans to the total population ranges from 82 per cent in Bogra to 71 per cent in Chittagong.

The extraordinary increase in the numbers of the followers of Islām in Bengal, and particularly in its eastern region, is the most remarkable fact in the recent religious history of the Indian Empire. The following table shows in a compact form the relative positions of Hinduism and Islām during the period for which fairly trustworthy statistics of religious belief become available:

Year of Census.	Hindus.	Per cent of Total Population.	Muhammadans.	Per cent of Total Population.
1872	39,996,575	63·76	19,559,252	31·19
1881	45,452,806	65·36	21,704,724	31·21
1891	47,821,468	64·07	23,658,347	31·70
1901	49,687,362	63·30	25,495,416	32·48

It is obvious from these figures that, while during the period of thirty years the proportion of Hindus in the total population has slightly decreased, the increase of Muhammadans has been steady and considerable.

The second remarkable fact in connexion with the spread of Islām is that it has occurred not in those parts of the Province which were centres of Musalmān influence and where their great cities were established. Dacca, for instance, for long the seat of Musalmān government in Eastern Bengal, though it contains 62 per cent of Muhammadans, presents an average much lower than that of the rural districts in its vicinity. Mālda, which contained the great capital city of Gaur, and Murshīdābād, an important seat of government, show no startling increase of Musalmāns; Bihār, Bhāgalpur, and Monghyr were important Muhammadan cities; but in spite of this the Musalmāns furnish barely one-tenth of the total population of the districts in which they are situated. The conclusion to be drawn from these facts is that the increase of Islām was largely due to causes independent of the action of the native government.

40. Origin of the present Muhammadan population.—It was, of course, ultimately due to the occupation of the Province by the Muhammadans that their faith began to spread among the Hindus and Animists whom they found in occupation of the country. The rule of the Muhammadan government lasted from the invasion of Bakhtiyār Khilji in A.D. 1203 until the British acquired the Divānī, or control of the revenue administration, in 1765—a period of more than five and a half centuries. During this time the ruling power occupied the country with a foreign army, and many soldiers after retirement from the service remained as colonists. Grants of land were made to grandees and officers of the empire, as well as to men of learning and piety whom the government encouraged to take up their permanent residence in the land. Bengal also became a place of refuge for many families driven from North-Western India by war and revolution. On these grounds various recent Musalmān writers, in their desire to enhance the social position of their co-religionists, have endeavoured to prove that they are in the main of foreign extraction. This question has been examined at length by Gait (*op. cit.* i. 165 ff.). While not denying that there are certain aristocratic families, like that of the Nawāb of Murshīdābād, who, originally of foreign descent, have

* For the Śivanārāyaṇis see also Risley (*op. cit.* i. 178, ii. 334). The ritual code of the sect is described and some of the songs quoted in *North Indian Notes and Queries*, v. 58 *f.*

preserved the purity of their blood by refraining from intermarriage with persons of more doubtful ancestry, and also that many families of foreign origin have, owing to the rules of the Muhammadan law of inheritance, gradually lost their estates and become merged in the general mass of the population, he regards it as impossible to suppose that the whole or even a great majority of the Musalmān population can be the descendants of immigrants from North-Western India. Such a theory does not account for the present distribution of the Musalmān population. If they were really descendants of foreign immigrants, they would now be found in occupation of the more healthy tracts in the neighbourhood of the ancient capitals, not in the rice-swamps of Noākhāli, Bogra, and Backergunge. Anthropometry, again, so far as statistics are available, shows that the foreign element among the Muhammadans of Eastern Bengal is inconsiderable, and that physically they are akin to the aboriginal or non-Aryan races whom the first Musalmān invaders found in occupation. On the whole, Gait (*op. cit.* i. 169) comes to the conclusion that the foreign element in the Muhammadan population cannot exceed four millions, or one-sixth of the total number of those professing the faith of Islām.

41. Causes of the spread of Islām.—(*a*) *Conversions.*—When we come to consider the causes which led to the spread of Islām, we find that while the Mughals were generally tolerant in matters of religion, the Afghāns who preceded them were often fanatical; local traditions, supplemented by the scanty historical evidence of the character of their rule, describe numerous cases of forcible conversions of Hindus and Animists, while the ranks of the true believers were recruited by slaves and criminals who on conversion were pardoned.

'In spite, however, of the fact that cases of forcible conversion were by no means rare, it seems probable that very many of the ancestors of the Bengal Muhammadans voluntarily gave in their adhesion to Islām. The advantages which that religion offered to persons held in low esteem by the Hindus have already been pointed out, and under Muslim rule there was no lack of pious Pīrs and Fakīrs (holy men and religious mendicants) who devoted their lives to gaining converts to the faith. There were special reasons which, during the early years of the Muhammadan supremacy, made conversion comparatively easy. Although the days when Buddhism was a glowing faith had long since passed, the people of Bengal were still to a great extent Buddhistic, and when Bakhtiyār Khiljī conquered Bihār and massacred the Buddhist monks assembled at Odantapuri, the common people, who were already lukewarm, deprived of their priests and teachers, were easily attracted from their old form of belief, some to Hinduism and others to the creed of Muhammad. The higher castes probably found their way back to Hinduism, while the non-Aryan tribes, who had, in all probability, never been Hindus, preferred the greater attractions of Islām' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 171).

(*b*) *Physical causes of the increase of Muhammadanism.*—The faith thus started progressed rapidly, owing to causes which were not so much moral or religious as physical, and due to the environment of the people. These have been carefully examined by O'Donnell and Gait (*Census Report*, 1891, i. 146 f.; 1901, i. 172). It has been established from these investigations that the main explanation of the spread of Islām in Eastern Bengal must be the greater fecundity of its adherents. In the first place, we find among Muhammadans a much larger number of potential mothers than among Hindus. While the higher caste Hindus throughout the Province, and in Bengal proper many of the castes of less importance, rigorously prohibit widow-remarriage, the Muhammadan widow usually finds a second husband. Statistics show that of every 100 Hindu women between the ages of 15 and 40 more than 16 are widows prohibited to re-marry; among Muhammadans the percentage is only 12. O'Donnell, again, remarks that ill-assorted marriages are far more common among Hindus—men well advanced in years being united to girl wives, who in the natural course of human life are left widows, debarred from further maternity, at a comparatively early age. On the other hand, Musalmāns, particularly in Eastern Bengal, are polygamists whenever they have the means to support a second wife, generally a widow, 'married as often as a convenient unpaid domestic drudge as for the sake of the children she usually bears her master.' Lastly, in Eastern Bengal the Musalmān is generally more prosperous and better fed than the Hindu in other parts of the Province. Bihār and Orissa, the headquarters of Hinduism, are fully developed, congested regions, where a large proportion of the people live in a condition of permanent depression. Eastern Bengal, on the contrary, is a land of promise, enriched by a large trade in rice and jute. It is improbable that the enterprise of the Hindu wedded to his hamlet and his local gods would have been sufficient to bring its fertile alluvial soil under the plough. But the Muhammadan has no prejudice against leaving his birthplace, and gladly migrates in search of remunerative work. While the Hindu is very often a vegetarian, and, if he eats meat, does so only when he makes a sacrifice, the Musalmān with his more varied and nutritious dietary is more vigorous and fertile. The conditions thus described sufficiently account for the fact that, while Hinduism barely holds its ground, Islām prospers and increases the number of its adherents.

42. Characteristics of Muhammadanism in Bengal.—Islām throughout Northern India falls far short of the standard of faith laid down by the Prophet and his immediate successors. As might have been expected, this degeneration is specially apparent in Eastern Bengal, where its followers have been to a large extent recruited from an Animistic population. Thus, the Pañchpiriya sect (wh. see) shows obvious signs of the fusion of Musalmān traditions with Animistic beliefs. The Wahhābī movement (see below, § 43) has in some measure checked the corruption of the faith, but before the recent crusade against idolatry it was common for low-class Muhammadans to join in the Durgā Pūjā and other Hindu festivals.

'Although,' writes Gait (*op. cit.* i. 176), 'they have been purged of many superstitions, many still remain. In particular, they are very careful about omens and auspicious days. Dates for weddings are often fixed after consulting a Hindu astrologer; bamboos are not cut, nor the building of new houses commenced, on certain days of the week, and journeys are often undertaken only after referring to the Hindu almanac to see if the proposed day is auspicious. When disease is prevalent, Sītalā and Rākshyā Kālī (see above, § 13) are worshipped. Dharmarāj, Mānasā, and Bishahrī (see above, § 30) are also venerated by many ignorant Muhammadans, who make over goats to Hindus in order that they may perform the sacrifice on their account. Sasthī is worshipped when a child is born. Even now in some parts of Bengal they observe the Durgā Pūjā, and buy new clothes for the festival like the Hindus. In Bihār they join in the worship of the Sun, and when a child is born they light a fire and place cactus and a sword at the door to prevent the demon Jawān from entering and killing the infant. At marriage the bridegroom often follows the Hindu practice of smearing the bride's forehead with vermilion or sandal-wood paste. In the Sonthāl Parganas Muhammadans are often seen to carry sacred water to the shrine of Baidyanāth, and, as they may not enter the shrine, pour it as a libation on the outside verandah. Offerings are made to the Grāmyā-devatā (see above, § 15) before sowing or transplanting rice seedlings, and exorcism is resorted to in case of sickness. Ghosts are propitiated by offerings of black fowls and pigeons before a figure drawn in vermilion on a plantain leaf. These practices are gradually disappearing, but they die hard, and amulets containing a text from the Qur'ān are commonly worn, even by the Mullahs who inveigh against these survivals of Hindu beliefs' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 176).

As is the case throughout Northern India, customs like these are practised especially by women, who are much more conservative in their religious beliefs.

Worship of pīrs and deified men.—In the same category of corruptions of the primitive faith may be placed the adoration of *pīrs*, or saints, and other

deified men, a practice for which no authority can be found in the Qur'ān or in the older commentaries on it. The *pīr* after death is supposed to be present in spirit, and to offer daily prayers of propitiation at Mecca or Medīna. Hence a *dargāh*, or tomb, covers his ashes and becomes a place of pilgrimage, to which people resort for the cure of disease, or the exorcism of evil spirits, to obtain the fulfilment of some cherished wish, such as the birth of a child, or success in pending litigation. Gait (*op. cit.* i. 177) and Wise (*op. cit.* 10 ff.) have given full catalogues of the more famous saints (see SAINTS, [Hindu]). The educated Musalmān denies that he worships the *pir*, he merely prays that he will intercede for him with the Almighty; 'but amongst the lower classes it is very doubtful if this distinction is clearly recognized, even if it actually exists.'

43. **Sects of Islām.**—The familiar division of Muhammadans into the two sects of Sunni and Shī'a is of less importance in Bengal than that which classes them as 'reformed' or 'unreformed.' The former is the title applied to those who are connected with the movement which resulted in the formation of the Wahhābī sect (wh. see). The sectarian movement in Islām usually follows one of two lines: it is either puritanical or pietistic. The Wahhābī sect is an example of the former, Ṣūfiism of the latter. The Wahhābī movement was started in India by Saiyid Ahmad Shāh, of Rāē Bareli in Oudh, who in 1826 proclaimed a holy war (*jihād*) against the Sikhs. He and his followers finally made Patna their headquarters, whence a propaganda was spread through Northern India. The principles of the sect, as announced by another Bengal teacher, Hājī Shariatu'llah of Farīdpur, prohibited all association with Hindu rites and ceremonies, the preparation of models (*ta'ziya*) of the martyrs Ḥasan and Ḥusain (see Pelly, *Miracle Play of Hasan and Husain*), and the offering of prayers to saints or martyrs. He also announced the principle which brought the sect under the notice of the Indian Government, that India was a 'land of warfare' (*dāru'l-ḥarb*), where the observance of the Friday service is unlawful and resistance to the infidel a religious duty. These principles were to some extent modified by another teacher, Maulāna Karāmat 'Alī of Jaunpur, who made two important alterations in the tenets of the sect. First, he declined to reject altogether, as other teachers had done, the authority of the glosses on the *Ḥadīth*, or traditions, which were assumed to represent the teaching of the Prophet; secondly, he withdrew the doctrine that India was *dāru'l-ḥarb*, and thus removed the chief cause which brought the sect into collision with the British Government. These two sects of reformers are known collectively as Farāḍī (Arab. *farīḍa*, pl. *farā'id*, 'the obligatory ordinances of law and religion,' those which are believed to have been established by God Himself, as distinguished from those which are founded on the precept or practice of the Prophet, and called *sunna*). Other titles used are Namāz-i-hāfiḍ, 'those who know the prayers by rote'; Shāre', 'followers of the *shar'*, or divine way of religion,' as opposed to the Sābiqī, 'those who follow the old rule,' 'the conservative party.' The distinctive name of the followers of Karāmat 'Alī and his successors is Ta'aiyunī, 'those who appoint,' from their practice of appointing as their leader a member of their own body, who decides religious questions, and takes the place of a *qāḍī*, thereby making the practice of Friday prayer lawful for true believers. The followers of Dudhu Miyān are known as Wahhābī, from the founder of the sect, Muhammad ibn Abdu'l-Wahhāb; but this name is now held in bad odour, and they prefer to be called Muhammadī, 'followers of the Prophet'; Ahl-i-ḥadīth, 'persons of the tradition'; or Rafi'yādain, the last with reference to their custom of raising their hands to their ears when praying, in opposition to the practice of the Sunnis, who fold their arms in front, and of the Shī'as, who allow them to hang by their sides. Other titles for them are Amīnī, because they pronounce the 'Amen' formula in a loud voice; and Lāmaẕhabī, 'without doctrine,' because they reject all doctrines except those contained in the Qur'ān.

The information regarding the tendency of this reform movement in Islām, so far as it is based on the scanty facts which the Government has permitted to appear in official publications, is insufficient to enable us to appreciate fully its religious and political importance. Risley is of opinion that 'at the present day the fanatical element of the Wahhābī movement seems in many parts to have died out; and the efforts of the reformers are directed mainly to the eradication of superstitious practices not sanctioned by the Qur'ān, and to the inculcation of the true principles of the religion' (*Census Report*, India, 1901, i. 373). At the same time it would be idle to assert that the principle upon which the sect largely depends—that India is a 'land of war'—has quite disappeared; and a movement which, as is the case with the Wāhhābī movement in Bihār, draws its adherents from the lowest and most ignorant classes of the Muhammadans, must always be regarded with watchful suspicion by the ruling power.*

44. **Christianity.**—The following figures illustrate the remarkable progress of Christianity in the Province during the last thirty years:

Year of Census.	Number of Christians.
1872	91,063
1881	128,134
1891	192,484
1901	278,366

The scope for missionary effort in the future may be estimated by the fact that at present only 36 in 10,000 of the total population belong to the Christian faith. Of the total number of Christians enumerated at the Census of 1901, 27,489 (including 1081 Armenians) or 9·9 per cent belong to European races; 23,114 or 8·3 per cent are Eurasians; and 227,763 or 81·8 per cent are native converts.

'More than three-fifths of the European Christians belong to the Anglican communion, and about one-fifth are Roman Catholics. According to the returns, the Presbyterians number less than one-tenth, but it is believed that the real number is greater, and that some of those who described themselves as belonging to the Church of England were brought up as Presbyterians. Of the Eurasians, more than half are Roman Catholics, and nearly two-fifths belong to the Anglican communion. . . . The proportion of Roman Catholics is swollen by the inclusion of 2221 Feringis, of whom all but 194 belong to this persuasion' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 161).

These Feringis (Pers. *Farangī*, *Firangī*, 'Frank') are a degraded mixed race, largely found in the Backergunge District.

'In the southern quarter [of the Backerganj district] there still exist several original Portuguese colonies, of probably two centuries' duration, which exhibit a melancholy example to what an extreme degree it is possible for Europeans to degenerate. They are a meagre, puny, imbecile race, blacker than the natives, who hold them in the utmost contempt, and designate them by the appellation of Caula Ferenghies (Hind. Beng. *kāla*, 'black') or "black Europeans"' (Hamilton, *Description of Hindostan*, 1820, i. 133).

* This account of the Wahhābī movement in Bengal is largely based on Gait's summary (*Census Report*, 1901, i. 173 ff.), which, again, is founded on Wise, 'Muhammadans of Eastern Bengal' in *JRASBe*, 1894. Also see his account in *Notes on the Races, Castes, and Trades of E. Bengal*, 21 ff. The question has been discussed by Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans; are they bound in conscience to rebel?* and the reply by Saiyid Ahmad Khan; Ibbetson, *Punjab Ethnography*, 147 f.; Maclagan, *Census Report Punjab*, 1891, i. 189 f. For the Wahhābīs of Arabia see Palgrave, *Central and Eastern Arabia*; Lady Ann Blunt, *Pilgrimage to Nejd*; Badger, *Imams and Seyyids of 'Oman*; Blunt, *Future of Islam*.

In recent times there has been little improvement in their industrial, social, or moral condition (Beveridge, *The District of Bakarganj*, 1876, p. 110).

(*a*) *Sectarial divisions of Christians.*—The ignorance of the native converts and the inability of the Census enumerators to understand the European names of the various denominations of Christians have made it very difficult to collect information regarding the sectarial divisions of the native converts.

'So far as the returns go, about two-fifths of the native Christians are members of the Roman Catholic Church; nearly one-third are Lutherans; rather more than a seventh belong to the Anglican communion, and nearly one-eleventh are Baptists. The other denominations combined account for only about one in every nineteen native Christians' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 162).

(*b*) *Roman Catholics.*—The total number of Roman Catholics has increased from 78,000 in 1891 to 90,000 in 1901. Their chief sphere of missionary work is in the Rānchi District of Chotā Nāgpur, where the converts exceed 54,000, or form about three-fifths of the total number in the Province. Their work in this District is shared among the non-Aryan Mundās and Orāons by Anglican and Lutheran missions. Christianity has here made more rapid strides than in any other part of N. India, with the result that the total number of Christians affiliated to the three missions now amounts to 124,958, as compared with 36,263 at the previous decennial enumeration. The Roman Catholics have also important communities at Dacca in Eastern Bengal, Calcutta, the Twenty-four Parganas, Nadiyā, and Champāran.

'Although small in point of numbers, the Roman Catholic Mission in Champāran has an interesting history. There are two main centres, at Bettiah and Chuhri. The former was established about 1740 by Father Joseph Mary, an Italian missionary of the Capuchin Order, who was passing near Bettiah on his way to Nepāl, when he was summoned by Rājā Dhruva Shāh of Bettiah to attend his daughter, who was dangerously ill. He succeeded in curing her, and the grateful Rājā invited him to stay at Bettiah, and gave him a house and about ninety acres of land. The Chuhri Mission owes its origin to some missionaries who left Italy in 1707 for Tibet. Two reached Lhassa, and were followed by others. They built a mission-house and chapel; but as soon as the number of their converts began to increase, they incurred the ill-will of the Grand Lāma and were forced to leave. They then settled in Nepāl (in 1713) and established missions at Khātmāndū, Pātan, and Bhatgāon. They received grants of land from the Newār kings, and prospered considerably till 1769, when the Newār dynasty was overthrown by the Gorkhas, who were instigated by their priests to exterminate the Christians. Being warned in time, the missionaries, with sixteen families of their converts, fled to Bettiah and were given a small land-grant at Chuhri. Many of the present Christians in Chuhri are the descendants of the original fugitives from Nepāl and still speak their old language, but they have intermarried to a considerable extent with the native Christians of Bettiah' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 162; for these Nepāl Missions see Oldfield, *Sketches from Nepal*, i. 189 *f.*; Hamilton, *Account of the Kingdom of Nepal*, 1819, p. 38).

(*c*) *Lutherans.*—The converts of the Lutheran Mission have increased from 23,000 in 1891 to rather more than 69,000 in 1901. Their operations extend to the non-Aryan tribes of Chotā Nāgpur, in Rānchi, the Santāl Parganas, Singhbhūm, and Manbhūm. The Rānchi Mission, known as that of Gossner, was founded by six German missionaries in 1846; but twenty-three years later an unfortunate disagreement occurred, and the Mission was split into two sections, one enrolling itself under the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, and the other retaining the name of Gossner's Mission.

'The progress made during the decade in the Rānchi District has been phenomenal. Ten years ago the number of converts was less than 19,000, and it is now three times as great. Some years ago the Mundās were greatly agitated by disputes with their landlords; their cause was espoused by the missionaries, and it is thought by some that political reasons may have artificially augmented the number of professed Christians. Unlike the Hindus, the Mundās receive apostates from Christianity back into their community, and it is said that cases of backsliding are by no means rare. We must, therefore, wait for the next Census before we can pronounce how far the wonderful progress made in the past decade is genuine and permanent' (Gait, *op. cit.* i. 162 *f.*).

On the other hand, Bradley-Birt, writing of the Mission to the Hos of Singhbhūm, remarks that the barrier of exclusiveness which the race has always maintained affects the Christian missions established in the District.

'Though without the caste prejudices of the Hindus, they have no mercy on any one who disobeys the traditions of their race. No Ho would take water or food from one of another race; and as such a Christian is practically considered, being outside the pale of the Ho community, and not participating in the rites and festivals of his family. Converts thus fare badly among the Hos, and few adults have broken through the rigid customs of a lifetime and embraced Christianity. It is to the children that the missionaries chiefly turn their attention' (Bradley-Birt, *Chota Nagpore*, 104).

The same writer, when treating of the Santāls and Pahārias, remarks that it is only among people who have not yet come under the spell of Hinduism that missionary efforts have met with success.

'But hopeful as is the progress of Christianity among them, it has exercised as yet no influence beyond a certain radius from the Mission Stations, and it is even now of too recent a growth in their midst to influence whole races, as Hinduism has done, and is still doing, to embrace its tenets and beliefs. Everything to-day points to Hinduism—even the Hinduism that has lost its first faith and is fighting its own battle of doubt and scepticism—as the absorbing force of the future among the aborigines of Bengal' (*Story of an Indian Upland*, 20 *f.*).

On this question the views of Dalton, one of the best authorities on these races, deserve quotation.

'If we analyze the views of most of the Oraon converts to Christianity, we shall, I think, be able to discern the influence of their pagan doctrines and superstitions in the motives which first led them to become catechumens. The Supreme Being who does not protect them from the spite of malevolent spirits has, they are assured, the Christians under His special care. They consider that, in consequence of this guardianship, the witches and *bhūts* have no power over Christians, and it is therefore good for them to join that body. They are taught that for the salvation of Christians one great sacrifice has been made, and they see that those who are baptized do not in fact reduce their live-stock to propitiate the evil spirits. They grasp at this notion, and long afterwards, when they understand it better, the atonement, the mystical washing away of sin by the blood of Christ, is the doctrine on which their simple minds most dwell' (Dalton, *op. cit.* 257).

(*d*) *Baptist and other Missions.*—Farther east the Baptist Mission is at work in the swamps of Backergunge and Farīdpur, where from the menial castes of Chandāls and Nāmasūdras they have made 19,000 converts. The only other important Mission is that of the Church of Scotland, which is engaged in parts of the Dārjīling and Jalpaigurī Districts. The total number of their converts is about 2000.

(*e*) *Classes among whom Christianity progresses.*—The classes most receptive of Christianity are those outside the Hindu system, as in Chotā Nāgpur and the depressed communities of Backergunge and Farīdpur. It is thus summed up by Gait (*op. cit.* i. 164):

'The influence of Christian teaching is no doubt far-reaching, and there are many whose acts and opinions have been greatly modified thereby, but amongst the higher castes the number who at the present time are moved to make a public profession of their faith in Christ is very small. At one time there seemed a prospect of numerous converts being gained from the ranks of the educated Hindus, but the efforts of Keshab Chandra Sen and other eloquent Brāhmo preachers turned their thoughts and aspirations into another channel.'

LITERATURE.—The best recent authorities are the last three Census Reports—by J. A. Bourdillon, 1881; C. J. O'Donnell, 1891; E. A. Gait, 1901, the last being the most complete and valuable. To it this article is very largely indebted. Among the older authorities may be named: Ward, *A View of the History, Literature, and Mythology of the Hindoos*[2], 1815; Francis Buchanan, afterwards Hamilton, *The History, Antiquities, Topography, and Statistics of Eastern India*, edited in 1838 from the author's MSS by Montgomery Martin, who does not name the original author on his title-page; J. Campbell, *A Personal Narrative of Thirteen Years' Service among the Wild Tribes of Kondistan, for the Suppression of Human Sacrifice*, 1864; S. C. Macpherson, *Memorials of Service in India*, 1865; E. G. Man, *Sonthalia and the Sonthals*, 1867; Sir W. W. Hunter, *The Annals of Rural Bengal*, 1868, *Orissa*, 1872, *Statistical Account of Bengal*, v.d.; T. H. Lewin, *The Hill Tracts of Chittagong*, 1869, *The Wild Races of South-east India*, 1870; E. T. Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology of*

Bengal, 1872; J. Wise, *Notes on the Races, Castes, and Trades of Eastern Bengal*, 1883; H. H. Risley, *The Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, 1891; J. F. Hewitt, *The Ruling Races of Prehistoric Times in India, South-west Asia, and South Europe*, 1894–5; M. A. Sherring, *Hindu Tribes and Castes*, 1872–81; L. A. Waddell, *The Buddhism of Tibet*, 1895, *Among the Himalayas*, 1899; Jogendra Nath Bhattacharya, *Hindu Castes and Sects*, 1896; F. B. Bradley-Birt, *Chota Nagpore, a little-known Province of the Empire*, 1903, *The Story of an Indian Upland*, 1905. For the folk-lore and popular beliefs, Lal Behari Day, *Folk-tales of Bengal*, 1883, *Govinda Samanta, or History of a Bengal Raiyat*, 1874, re-published as *Bengal Peasant Life*, 1880; G. A. Grierson, *Bihar Peasant Life*, 1885, *An Introduction to the Maithili Language of North Bihar*, 1882; A. Campbell, *Santal Folk-tales*, 1891.

W. CROOKE.

BEOTHUKS.—The Beothuks were the aboriginal inhabitants of Newfoundland, and the sole representatives, so far as is known, of the Beothukan stock. The race is now extinct, and its history is wrapped in obscurity, although the attention of early voyagers to Newfoundland (or Baccalaos, as it was called from the native name of the codfish caught along its shores) was quickly attracted by the Beothuks who then inhabited the island. Though the allusions of these first explorers regarding this vanished race are scanty and frequently contradictory, they are of special interest as being almost the only sources for a knowledge of one of the most primitive of all North American Indian stocks.

1. **Early accounts and culture.**—The first allusion to the Beothuks is found in an 'addition' in Stephens' edition of the *Chronicon* of Eusebius (Paris, 1512, f. 172; quoted by Harrisse, *Découverte et évolution cartographique de Terre-Neuve*, London, 1900, p. 162), and is as follows:

'Septem homines sylvestres ex ea insula (quæ terra nova dicitur) Rothomagum [Rouen] adducti sunt cum vestimentis et armis eorum. Fuliginei sunt coloris, grossis labris, stigmata in facie gerentes ab aure ad medium mentum, instar lividæ venulæ per maxillas deducta. Crine nigro et grosso ut equæ iuba. Barba per totam vitam nulla, neque pubes neque ullus in toto corpore pillus præter capillos et supercilia. Baltheum gerunt in quo est bursula quædam ad tegenda verenda. Idioma labis formatur, religio nulla, cymba eorum corticea, quam homo una manu evehat in humeros. Arma eorum arcus lati, chordæ ex intestinis aut nervis animalium; sagittæ, cannæ saxo, aut ossæ piscis accuminatæ. Cibus eorum carnes tostæ. Potus aqua. Panis et vini et pecuniarum nullus omnino usus. Nudi incedunt aut vestiti pellibus animalium ursorum, cervorum, vitulorum marinorum et similium.'

Of the personal adornment of the Beothuks, Jacques Cartier, in 1534, gives the following account (quoted by Harrisse, *op. cit.* p. 163):

'Il y a des gens à la dite terre qui sont assez de belle corpulance, mais ilz sont gens effarables et sauuaiges. Ilz ont leurs cheueulz liez sur leurs testes en fazon d'vne pougnye de fain teurcze et vng clou passé par my ou aultre chosse et y lient aulcunes plumes des ouaiseaulx. Ilz se voistent de peaulx de bestes, tant hommes que femmes; mais les femmes sont plus closes et serrées en leurs dites peaux et sçaintes par le corps. Ilz se paingnent de certaines couleurs tannées. Ilz ont des barques en quoy ilz vont par la mer, qui sont faletes d'escorche de bouays de boul, o quoy ilz peschent force loups marins.'

To the list of Beothuk weapons Cabot (in 1542) adds lances, darts, clubs, and slings (Harrisse, *op. cit.* p. 164). The wearing of skins and loincloths ('a small payre of breeches') by both sexes, and the use of leggings and moccasins, are alluded to, in addition to their mode of dressing the hair, by Jehan Alfonse (? in 1543; while the Siennese Mattioli (1547) states that the Beothuks went naked in summer, but were clad in skins in winter. Unlike Stephens, who described the Beothuks as 'sooty,' Alfonse and Mattioli term them 'white' ('très blanche,' 'gente bianca'). According to the former, moreover, the Beothuks were nomadic, while 'touching their victuals, they eate good meate, but all unsalted, but they drye it, and afterward they broyle it, as well fish as flesh. . . . They drinke seale oyle, but this is at their great feasts.' Mattioli, however, affirmed that they ate both fish and flesh raw, and added that 'some of them eat human flesh, yet secretly, that their "caciqui" may not know it.' The latter author also adds a scanty note on the Beothuk religion: 'Sono idolatri, chi adora il sole, e chi la luna, e molte altre sorti de idoli' (see Harrisse, p. 164 ff.; cf. Bonnycastle, *Newfoundland in 1842*, London, 1842, i. 25 f.).

Whitbourne, the first historian of Newfoundland, describes the aborigines in the following terms (Purchas, *His Pilgrimes*, London, 1625, IV. x. 1884):

'The naturall Inhabitants of the Countrie, as they are but few in number, so are they something rude and sauage people. . . . In their habits, customs, and manners they resemble the *Indians* of the Continent . . . they liue altogether in the North and West part of the Country, which is seldome frequented by the English: But the French and Biscaines . . . report them to be an ingenious and tractable people . . . (being well vsed) they are ready to assist them with great labour and patience . . . without expectation of other reward, than a little Bread, or some such small hire.'

In a letter written July 29, 1612, John Guy thus describes the Beothuks at length (Purchas, IV. x. 1881):

'They are of a reasonable stature, of an ordinary middle sise, they goe bare-headed, wearing their haire somewhat long, but round; they haue no Beards; behind they haue a great locke of haire platted with feathers, like a Hawkes Lure, with a feather in it standing vpright by the crowne of the head, and a small locke platted before: a short Gown made of Stags skins, the Furre innermost, that ranne downe to the middle of their legges, with sleeues to the middle of their arme, and a Beuer skin about their necke, was all their apparell, saue that one of them had shooes and Mittens, so that all went bare-legged, and most bare-foote. They are full eyed, of a blacke colour; the colour of their haire was diuers, some blacke, some browne, and some yellow, and their faces something flat and broad, red with Oker, as all their apparell is, and the rest of their body: they are broad brested, and bould, and stand very vpright.'

Like Hayes, the second in command under Sir Humphrey Gilbert (Hakluyt, *Voyages*, London, 1600, iii. 153), Guy found the Beothuks friendly, although inclined to be thievish. He describes their houses as 'nothing but Poles set in round forme meeting altogether aloft, which they couer with Deere skins, they are about ten foote broad, and in the middle they make their fires.' Another variety of dwelling was 'made in a square forme with a small roofe.' Their adornments included 'shell chains' (doubtless wampum), 'chains of leather full of small Periwinckle shels,' and a 'spitting knife.' They likewise possessed spruce bark boiling-baskets, and had hats 'sewed handsomely with narrow bands about them, set round with fine white shels' (Whitbourne, in Purchas, IV. x. 1887). It is also tolerably certain that they used gaming discs of bone similar to those of the Micmacs (Culin, *24 RBEW* p. 97).

The highest art of the Beothuks was evidently attained in their ochre-stained canoes, to which Cartier alludes. These were usually built to hold four persons, and are thus described by de Laet (*Novus orbis*, Leyden, 1633, p. 34):

'Cymbæ ipsis ex corticibus arborum compositæ, viginti ut plurimum pedes longæ, quinque aut circiter latæ et semilunæ in modum, ad proram atque puppim erectæ atque incurvæ, quinque ad summum vectorum capaces; illis utpote levissimis undas summa velocitate secant, easdemque cum opus fuerit humeris gestant.'

The last authentic record of this vanished stock is contained in John Cartwright's *Remarks on the Situation of the Aborigines of Newfoundland*, written in 1788 (printed in his daughter's *Life and Correspondence of Major Cartwright*, London, 1826, ii. 307 ff.). This, however, adds little new, except that the square type of building already noted was relatively rare, and that its roof was a pyramid rising to a hoop tied to the rafters, thus forming a chimney. His most interesting information concerns the canoes, which ran straight from keel to gunwale, being kept apart at the top by a 'spreader,' the removal of which rendered it possible to fold the canoe up like a cocked hat.

The Beothuks lived chiefly by the chase and

by fishing. Their canoes have already received mention, and for their hunting they enclosed large areas with deer fences, 8 to 10 ft. high, made by felling trees in line. These fences, which often extended for miles into the interior, served to bring the deer down to water, where they were taken by the hunters (cf. Jukes, *Excursions in and about Newfoundland*, London, 1842, ii. 132–133). A distinct racial characteristic of the Beothuks, if we may judge from the account of Bonnycastle (*op. cit.* ii. 267 f.), was that they dug within their wigwams small cavities which they lined with moss or the soft twigs of trees, thus forming their beds. Their winter wigwams, moreover, had small store-pits, about four feet deep and usually lined with birch bark; while each village possessed a wigwam for vapour baths. It is also interesting to note that their wigwams of skin are said by Peyton to have been raised on wooden platforms (Jukes, *op. cit.* ii. 126).

The Beothuks also received the name of '*Red* Indians' (a term often applied erroneously to North American Indians in general) from their custom, to which repeated allusion is made from the time of Guy, of painting themselves, as well as their bows, arrows, and canoes, with red ochre. Physically they were of a finer type than the Micmacs, whose bitter enemies they were. The last member of the race, Shawnandithit, a woman who died at St. John's in 1829, is described as having a round face with prominent cheek bones, somewhat sunken eyes, small nose, and black hair (Lloyd, *JAI*, 1875, p. 31; cf. the portrait of the Beothuk woman Demasduit or Waunathoake ['Mary March'], reproduced from Lady Hamilton's drawing, in Prowse, *Hist. of Newfoundland*, London, 1895, p. 384). The Beothuks were monogamous, and the women were chaste (Lloyd, *JAI*, 1876, p. 228).

2. History.—The history of the Beothuks finds its wretched parallel only too readily. The brutal excesses of the English in Tasmania and Australia, of American frontiersmen and cowboys, of the Spaniards in the Antilles, and of the Belgians in the Congo—it is all the same dreary story. It is evident that, when Newfoundland was first discovered, its inhabitants were peaceful, and they long remained on friendly terms with the French and Basque fishermen. With the inability of primitive peoples to recognize property rights of others than their own tribes, however, they, in their excursions to the seacoast in summer for cod and salmon, appropriated European nets, iron, or whatever else they could lay their hands on. The Europeans sought revenge, and, as Cartwright says, 'they were harassed from post to post, from island to island, so that neither sea nor land could afford them shelter.' By the time of the English settlements the Beothuks had fled to the north and north-west of Newfoundland. Thence they carried on such depredations against the whites that by the middle of the 18th cent. the French offered rewards for their heads. To add to their distress, Micmacs emigrated from Nova Scotia in considerable numbers during the 18th cent., and bitter war broke out between the two stocks, culminating in a battle at the eastern end of Grand Pond about 1770. With the Naskapi, or Algonquian Montagnais of Labrador, on the other hand, they remained on terms of friendship, though they despised the Eskimos for their uncleanly habits (Jukes, *op. cit.* ii. 131); and it was even supposed by Bonnycastle (*op. cit.* ii. 251 f.) that the few remnants of the Beothuks migrated in a body to Labrador, since in the Bay of Seven Islands there suddenly appeared a party of Indians who were neither Eskimos nor Montagnais. Though the actual fate of the stock is not certainly known, they probably perished gradually from the hostility of whites and Micmacs, complicated by famine and disease. Their number seems never to have been large. John Mason, writing between 1618 and 1619, records 'few savages in the north, none in the south' (Prowse, *op. cit.* p. 107); Cartwright (1798) estimated them at 450; but about 1825, Shawnandithit said that only fourteen of her tribe were alive (Lloyd, *JAI*, 1876, p. 228). The last Beothuks, except three women, one of whom (Shawnandithit) was brought to St. John's, were seen on the ice in New Bay in the winter of 1823 (Bonnycastle, *op. cit.* ii. 263 f.). In 1827 the Beothic Institution was founded for the civilization of the Beothuks; but the expedition of Cormack, undertaken under its auspices, utterly failed to find even a single member of the tribe, though there was evidence that Beothuks had fled just before his approach (Bonnycastle, *op. cit.* ii. 265–276).

3. Relics.—The relics of the Beothukan stock, of which the Public Museum of St. John's contains important specimens, include mortar-shaped vessels, spear-heads, arrow-heads, gouges, and axes, all of stone. Bone ornaments, used for adorning the hair or dress, and decorated with right-angled triangles, have also been found, as well as carvings on ivory and on the tusks or bones of walrus, seals, and deer, all these objects being dyed a deep sienna. On the skeleton of a man found near Comfort Head in 1888 was a medicine bag containing several charms of carved bone, strips of wampum, a brilliant piece of iron pyrites, and a number of bird skulls, some of these objects obviously being religious in character (Macdougall, in *Trans. Canadian Inst.* ii. 101 f.). In this connexion it should be noted that the Beothuks kindled their fires from the down of the *cyanocitta cristata* (Lloyd, *JAI*, 1876, p. 225). The stock seems, however, to have had no knowledge of pottery, though they possibly made soapstone vessels (*ib.* p. 29), unless these were of Eskimo origin (cf. Prowse, *op. cit.* p. 591), especially as the Eskimos in Labrador manufactured soapstone lamps (Hough, in *Report of U. S. Nat. Museum*, 1896, p. 1041 f.). What is still more extraordinary, they remained ignorant throughout their history of the use not only of firearms, but even of the dog (Bonnycastle, *op. cit.* ii. 259, 277). A point of more than usual interest is the fact that the Beothuks apparently did not practise scalping, but the more primitive American Indian custom of cutting off the head (cf. Friederici, *Skalpieren und ähnliche Kriegsgebräuche in Amerika*, Brunswick, 1906, *passim*). Thus when, in 1810, the Beothuks killed two of the marines of Lieutenant Buchan, the heads of the victims were cut off and carried away (Prowse, *op. cit.* p. 385).

4. Language.—Our knowledge of the Beothuk language, which bears no known relation to any other American Indian tongue, rests on two vocabularies (not altogether free from Micmac loan-words) obtained from the women Shawnandithit and Demasduit ('Mary March'), and containing about 330 words. These are only lexicographical in value, giving no hint of morphology or syntax.

5. Religious beliefs.—Naturally data concerning the religion of the Beothuks are extremely scanty, and must in part be re-constructed cautiously from rather vague implications. According to Broughton (quoted by Anspach, *Hist. of the Island of Newfoundland*, London, 1819, p. 457), 'they had some knowledge of a Supreme Being,' and they believed that men and women were originally created from a certain number of 'arrows stuck fast in the ground, and that the dead went into a far country,

there to make merry with their friends.' The implication of a hostile Micmac, that the Beothuks possessed no religion, is without value, especially as he expressly declared that no Micmac understood the Beothukan dialect (Chappell, *Voyage of H.M.S. Rosamond to Newfoundland*, London, 1818, p. 71). That they had a very keen sense of the future life is shown by their care in the disposal of the dead, and by the objects found interred with them. There were four types of graves. One class of burial-place resembled a hut 10 ft. long, 8–9 ft. broad, and 4–5 ft. high in the centre, with a floor of square poles and a roof covered with bark, the whole being well protected against the weather and the intrusions of wild beasts (cf. the description of the grave of Demasduit [' Mary March '] given by Lloyd, *JAI*, 1875, p. 32). In the second mode of burial the body was wrapped in birch bark, and, with the property of the deceased, was placed on a sort of scaffold about 4½ ft. from the ground. This scaffold was made of four posts, about 7 ft. high, fixed perpendicularly in the ground so as to sustain a kind of crib 5½ ft. long by 4 ft. broad, with a floor, made of small squared beams laid close together horizontally, on which the corpse and its belongings rested. A third method was by bending the body together, wrapping it in birch bark, and enclosing it in a kind of box. This receptacle, which was made of small squared sticks laid on each other horizontally and notched at the corners to fit closely, was laid on the ground. It was about 4 ft. long, 3 ft. broad, and 2½ ft. deep, and was lined with birch bark for protection against the weather. The body usually lay on the right side, though the skeleton of a boy found in 1886 (Macdougall, *op. cit.* ii. 102) had been placed on the left. A fourth, and more common, mode of Beothuk burial was to wrap the body in birch bark, and to lay it, covered with a heap of stones, on the surface of the ground in some retired spot. Occasionally in this last form of burial, the body, thus wrapped up, was put a foot or two underground, the grave then being covered with stones. If, however, the soil was sandy, graves were dug, and no stones were placed above them. The Beothuk cemeteries were located at definite places, to which the dead were brought from long distances (Lloyd, *loc. cit.*).

The Beothukan belief in a future life receives additional testimony from their custom of laying beside or on the grave, bows, arrows, and other implements of warfare. The grave of Demasduit (' Mary March ') and her husband, moreover, contained small models of a male and female child and of canoes, in addition to cooking utensils of birch bark; while with the body of the boy already alluded to were buried food (salmon and trout), two pairs of moccasins, and other things. The interment of religious objects with a corpse near Comfort Head has been noted above (§ 3; cf. also Lloyd and Macdougall, *loc. cit.*).

LITERATURE.—Harrisse, *Découverte et évolution cartographique de Terre-Neuve*, London, 1900, pp. 162–166; Hakluyt, *Voyages*, London, 1600, iii.; Purchas, *His Pilgrimes*, London, 1625, iv. x.; de Laet, *Novus Orbis*, Leyden, 1633, p. 34; Chappell, *Voyage of H.M.S. Rosamond to Newfoundland*, London, 1818, pp. 169–187; Anspach, *Hist. of the Island of Newfoundland*, London, 1819, p. 457; Cartwright, *Life and Correspondence of Major Cartwright*, London, 1826, ii. 307 ff.; Bonnycastle, *Newfoundland in 1842*, London, 1842, ii. 251–278; Jukes, *Excursions in and about Newfoundland*, London, 1842, ii. 126–133; Pedley, *Hist. of Newfoundland from the Earliest Times to 1860*, London, 1863, pp. 338 ff., 506–522; Hatton and Harvey, *Newfoundland*, London, 1883, pp. 200–221; Prowse, *Hist. of Newfoundland*, London, 1895, Index, *s.v.*; Hewitt and Gatschet, in Hodge, *Handb. of American Indians*, i. (=*Bull. 30 BE*), Washington, 1907, p. 141 f.; Lloyd, in *JAI*, 1875, pp. 21–39, 1876, pp. 222–230, 233–248; Busk, in *JAI*, 1876, pp. 230–233; Gatschet, in *Proc. Am. Philosophical Soc.*, 1885, pp. 408–424, 1886, pp. 411–432; Macdougall, in *Trans. Canadian Inst.* ii. (1890–91).

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BERĀR.—1. Position.—Berār, otherwise known as the Hyderābād Assigned Districts, is a province of India, lying between 19° 35′ and 21° 47′ north latitude, and 75° 59′ and 79° 11′ east longitude. It is bounded on the north by the Sātpurā range and the river Tāptī, which separate it from the Central Provinces; on the east its boundary is the river Wardhā, on the south the Pengangā; on the west lie portions of the Nizām's Dominions and of the Presidency of Bombay. Its total area is 17,710 square miles; and it is divided into three regions: the Melghāṭ, or hilly tract to the north, the Pāyānghāṭ, or central plain, and the Bālāghāṭ, or upland to the south.

2. History.—The history of the Province is so far relevant to its religion that it illustrates the mixture of races and the disturbing influence of the successive governments.

In the Epic period it formed part of the kingdom of Vidarbha, the first settled Aryan country south of the Vindhyan range (*BG* i. i. 135). Its name survives in that of Bīdar in the Hyderābād State, and has been doubtfully connected with that of Berār, the derivation of which is uncertain. Authentic history begins with the occupation by the Āndhra dynasty (B.C. 220–A.D. 236). They were followed by various non-Aryan chieftains, who gave way to the Chālukya, Rāshṭrakūṭa, Hoysala Ballāla, and Yādava dynasties in succession. In A.D. 1294 the Muhammadans appeared on the scene, when Alā-ud-dīn captured the stronghold of Deogirī or Daulatābād—a raid which was repeated by Malik Kāfūr in A.D. 1309. The country subsequently fell to the Bahmanī kings of the Deccan and to those of Ahmadnagar. It was conquered by the Mughals under Akbar in 1596, and remained under them until the fall of the Empire, when, desolated by constant war in the 18th cent., it passed to the Nizām of Hyderābād in 1804. In 1853 the Nizām leased it to the British, and in 1902 a fresh treaty confirming this cession was concluded. In the following year it ceased to be an independent administration, and was incorporated with the Central Provinces.

3. Population.—At the Census of 1901 the population amounted to 2,754,016. In the more fertile parts the predominant caste is the Kunbī, which forms the chief element in the Marāthā people. They are classed by Risley (*Census India*, 1901, i. 503) as Scytho-Dravidian; but there is no evidence that the Śaka or Scythian tribes ever penetrated this region, and the Kunbī are of non-Aryan origin, possibly leavened by some intruding strain from the eastern or western coast. Next in numerical importance are the Mhār and Māng, almost pure non-Aryans, regarded by orthodox Hindus as foul out-castes. The forest tribes principally occupy the Gāwīlgarh hills in the Melghāṭ to the north, those of the greatest numerical importance being the Gond (74,280), Āndh (39,679), Korkū (28,393), and Bhīl (5,704). In the population as a whole the Aryan element is scanty. There is a notable absence of important cities or towns, and the population is largely rural. Naturally their religion is of a primitive type, little influenced by the movements which in the more advanced provinces have so profoundly affected belief.

4. Religious statistics.—According to the Census of 1901, Hindus numbered 2,388,016 (86·7 per cent of the total); Animists, 129,964 (4·7 per cent); Muhammadans, 212,040 (7·6 per cent); Christians, 2,375 (0·08 per cent). Hinduism is thus the chief religion, and here, as is the case in other provinces, it is impossible to draw a clear line of distinction between Hindus and Animists.

5. The higher Hinduism.—(*a*) *Śaivism.*—The beliefs of the higher classes do not materially differ from those prevailing in other provinces. The creed most popular with Brāhmans is that known as Smārta (Skr. *smṛti*, 'authoritative tradition') preached by Śaṅkarāchārya in the beginning of the 8th cent. A.D. It is the highest form of Vedāntic pantheism. From the point of view of sect most Brāhmans rank as Śaivas, the simplicity of the cult of Śiva recommending it in preference to that of the other greater gods. But, as is the case in other parts of India, the mass of the population is

ignorant or careless of the restrictions of sect, and they worship all or any of the recognized deities. Next to the Smārta the most important Śaiva sects are the Lingāyat and the Nāth. The former is described in a special article; the latter are connected with the Gosāīn or Gosāvī of other parts of the country. Most of the Nāth adopt a secular life and are known as Sanyogī, the ascetic minority being called Yogī. The latter are now very rare, and the majority of the Order live by weaving, fortune-telling, and charming, such as making magical passes over the sick with a bunch of peacocks' feathers; others are simple mendicants, leading about a little performing bull, known as *nandi*, the 'vehicle' of Śiva. The regular Gosāvī Order is chiefly made up of youths dedicated by their parents to the god. They act as spiritual advisers (*guru*) to the lower castes, by whom they are found more accommodating than Brāhmans, as they permit the use of meat and spirituous liquor (Kitts, 65). Most of the Śaivas, however, prefer to worship the local manifestations of the deity, such as Khaṇḍobā and Bhairobā or Bhairava, the great guardian-deities of the Deccan. A dog is tied at the shrine of the former when sacrifice is done before his image, and the Haṭkar, a pastoral tribe, flog each other severely at the temples of the latter (Lyall, *Gazetteer*, 190).

(*b*) *Vaiṣṇavism.*—The Vaiṣṇavas of Berār include a few followers of Rāmānuja and of Rāmānand; but many are disciples of Madhavāchārya, some of Vallabhāchārya, and others of the Bengal school of Chaitanya. Their increase in modern times is largely due to immigration from N. and W. India (Kitts, 61). Their favourite deity is Bālājī, the infant Kṛṣṇa, who is regarded as the god of wealth and prosperity, and at Bāsim he has the finest modern temple in the province.

The most interesting modern Vaiṣṇava sect is that of the Mānbhāv (Skr. *mahānubhāva*, 'dignified,' 'virtuous'). It was founded by Chakradhara, a Karhāda Brāhman, who is regarded as an incarnation of their deity Dattātreya, and was propagated by his disciple Nāgabhaṭa, who is called the Last Preceptor (A.D. 1236–1302) under the Yādava princes of Mahārāshṭra (R. G. Bhandarkar, *Times of India*, 15th Nov. 1907). They are divided into a celibate section (*Bairāgī*) and one of married householders (*Gharvāsī*). The former include both monks and nuns; the latter are divided into the nominal adherents (*Bholā*), who accept the principles of the Order so far as they do not conflict with the rules of caste, and those who ignore caste distinctions. The celibate monks shave the whole head and face, while the nuns have their hair removed by a male barber. They either live in monasteries or wander from place to place; they eat no meat and drink no water in the presence of an idol; both sexes wear black clothes and ear-rings and rosaries of the black basil wood (*tulasī*) sacred to Viṣṇu-Kṛṣṇa. They are a quiet, thrifty, orderly people; one of their chief rules is never to take life, and they are careful not to visit or eat at a place where a murder or an accidental death may have occurred. Their gods are Dattātreya, a deified saint worshipped as an incarnation of the triad—Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva—or more especially of Viṣṇu and Kṛṣṇa. Their scripture is the *Bhāgavad-gītā*, and they follow the teaching of a pontiff, known as the Kārañjkar Mahant, whose seat is at Ridhpur in Berār. Their rejection of the manifold saints and orthodox gods has brought them into conflict with Brāhmans; but they are held in much respect by lower caste Hindus. They have no belief in the agency of spirits, holding that the diseases usually attributed to them are the result of sins committed in this or in a former life. The initiation formula is communicated to the female branch by a senior nun. Each sex contains five grades of greater or inferior dignity. The dead are buried, not cremated. When a Mahant, or pontiff, dies, his corpse is washed, placed in a raised seat, worshipped, tied in a litter in a sitting posture, and carried to burial, not in one of the ordinary cemeteries, but in a clean place selected by the brethren, where the grave is spread with salt, the corpse laid on its left side facing the east, and a coconut is broken on the skull as a commutation of a sacrifice (*PR* ii. 106). After burial all traces of the grave are obliterated, and no tomb is raised—to avoid the possibility of the growth of a cult of the dead man. Like many Vaiṣṇava sects, they have been accused of immorality; in former times it is said that marriage between a monk and a nun was symbolized by the pair laying their wallets close together—a practice now denied by the members. Their numbers are decreasing, but this is perhaps due to the fact that in the present day fewer join the celibate section. In 1901 they numbered 2,566 in Berār (Kitts, 62 ff.; *BG* xix. 120 ff. xvii. 181 ff.).

6. **Popular Hinduism.**—The popular faith of the province has been fully described by Sir A. Lyall, whose classification (*Asiatic Studies*[3], i. 9 ff.) is here followed. (1) The worship of mere stocks and stones, and of local configurations, which are unusual or grotesque in size, shape, or position. This includes not only the worship of natural objects connected by legend with some deity or saint, but extends to 'the phallic rites, to the Sāligrām, or fossil, in which Vishnu is manifest, and to all that class of notions which entirely separate the outward image from the power really worshipped. So that at last we emerge into pure symbolism, as when anything appears to be selected arbitrarily to serve as a visible point for spiritual adoration.' (2) The worship of things inanimate, which are gifted with mysterious motion, such as water, fire, the sun, and trees. For instance, in an eddy of the Tāptī, wood, when floated down, sometimes disappears in a subterranean passage, to avoid which the Gonds propitiate the river-deity with the sacrifice of a goat; Mahishobā (Skr. *mahisha*, 'a buffalo') is a buffalo-god which lives under water and demands propitiation. The worship of fire in the form of the Vedic Agni has disappeared, but it is reverenced at the Brāhman fire-sacrifice (*haoma*). The sun is the tribal deity of the wild Korkū of the northern hills, and he is also worshipped by all Hindus under different conceptions and doctrines regarding his personality. By the jungle-dweller the tree is feared as possessing sentient existence and mysterious potency, proved by its waving branches and the weird sounds which occasionally proceed from it. At a later stage trees which are fruitful or toxic are honoured, or a certain species is appropriated by one god, or a spirit seems to dwell in a great solitary trunk or in a gloomy grove. In the last case such places are laid under tabu, and no one dares to cut a tree or even to use the fallen branches as firewood. The custom of tying rags on trees, in order to bring the worshipper into communion with the indwelling spirit, is common, and one class of such trees is known as Chindiyā Deo, 'the deity of tatters,' where, if one present a rag in season, one may chance to get good clothes (Lyall, *Gazetteer*, 191; Kitts, 47 f.). (3) The worship of animals which are feared. This is illustrated by the cult of Wāgh Deo (Skr. *vyāghra*, 'tiger'), who is propitiated by those who frequent the jungle; and by the refusal of gardeners to inform sportsmen when a tiger or a leopard has taken up its quarters in their plantations, as they believe that the garden ceases to produce fruit when one of these animals is killed there (Lyall, *Gazetteer*, 61 f., 190 f.). In the same class is the cult of the snake, which is everywhere feared and reverenced, and of the monkey, which has now been appropriated by the Vaiṣṇavas in the form of the monkey-god, Hanumān. (4) The worship of visible things, animate or inanimate, which are directly or indirectly useful and profitable, or which possess any incomprehensible function or property. Such is the reverence paid to oxen, and the worship of implements, such as the fisherman's net, the scribe's pen, the banker's account-books (*PR* ii. 185 ff.; cf. MacCulloch, *Childhood of Fiction*, 200 ff.). (5) The worship of a spirit (*deo*), a thing without form and void—the vague impersonation of the uneasy sensations which come upon people in the dark, in forests, or deserts. The site of the manifestation of such spirits is marked by a pile of stones, to which every passer-by contributes, or by rags or charms tied to a cliff or tree; or such beings are supposed to haunt an old banyan-tree or a ruined temple. (6) The worship of dead relatives, and other deceased persons known in life to the worshipper. Such are the worship of ancestors, and the attempt to recall

the spirit in a stone picked up at the grave, which is reverently worshipped for a time and then decently disposed of. (7) The worship at shrines of persons who had a great reputation during life, or who died in some strange or mysterious way. In the worship of Chānd Khān at almost every fort in Berār we have perhaps a survival of the foundation-sacrifice (Tylor, *Primitive Culture*[3], i. 104 ff.; MacCulloch, *Childhood of Fiction*, 427). The Banjārā (*q.v.*) tribe worship a notorious bandit, and M. Raymond, the French commander, has been canonized. Besides these there is a host of saints and worthies whose shrines are found in all parts of the Province. (8) In some cases persons of this class rise to the rank of demi-gods or subordinate deities, and are worshipped in temples —a phase of the local beliefs fully illustrated by Lyall (*Asiatic Studies*[3], i. 30 ff.), who has, however, extended too far the ancestor-cult as an assumed origin of the theogony (see ANCESTOR-WORSHIP). The remaining forms of the local beliefs illustrated by the same writer—the worship of manifold local incarnations of the elder deities; of departmental deities; of the supreme gods of Hinduism and of their ancient incarnations and personifications, as recorded in the Brāhmanical scriptures—form part of the general official Hinduism, which is not peculiar to Berār.

7. **Animism.**—The general types of Animism current in the province have been described in the last paragraph. That of the forest-dwellers closely agrees with the beliefs of the cognate tribes (see DRAVIDIANS, BHĪLS, GONDS). The religion of the Korkūs, Gonds, and Āndhs has been described by Kitts (p. 77 f.) and C. A. Elliott (*Settlement Rep. Hoshangabad*, 1867, p. 250 ff.). The special class of sorcerers who are believed to control hailstorms and exercise wide influence over the peasantry is noteworthy. At the Dasahra feast the sorcerer (*gārpagārī*) mixes up samples of all kinds of grain grown in the village, and over them sprinkles the blood of the victim offered to Durgā. The grain is then shaken up and divided among a number of small pots, each of which is assigned to a certain period of the season during which hail may be expected. Over these, secret charms are recited. The pots are inspected daily, and, if there be danger of hail during the period represented by any pot, the grain in it is believed to bubble up, in which event Durgā must be propitiated with a victim, whose blood is allowed to drip into the pot—after which the ominous bubbling ceases. Māruti, the monkey-god and village-protector, must also be propitiated; but this is simply done by blowing a horn at his shrine or in some other part of the village (Lyall, *Gazetteer*, 208; Kitts, 60).

Totemism is indicated by the institution of guardians (*devak*), also common to the Deccan and the west Districts of the Bombay Presidency. The guardian is usually some animal or tree; but sometimes natural objects are included, such as one of their trade implements among artisans. Whatever the guardian may be, it is treated with respect. If it be an animal, its flesh is tabu; if it be a material object, it is worshipped at marriage and at the attainment of puberty. The Prabhū caste, when a youth is initiated into the privileges of caste by the binding of the sacred cord, mark their guardian-pot with coloured paint, place various offerings in it, close the lid and tie a string round it, and finally light a stone lamp before it (Campbell, *Notes on the Spirit Basis of Belief and Custom*, 1885, p. 8 ff.). The guardian is regarded as the head of the family, and persons possessing a common guardian cannot intermarry. Totemism is thus at present largely a social institution, and is closely analogous to the customs in Bengal (see BENGAL, p. 490; Frazer, *Totemism*, 58 ff.).

The spirits of the dead are supposed to bring disease upon children. The *mūnjā*, or ghost of a boy invested with the sacred thread who has died before marriage, is believed to be envious of the good fortune of others, and specially malignant. To avoid his ill-will, the child is called by an opprobrious name (see Crooke, *PR* ii. 4); or his father gives a feast at a banyan-tree to the unmarried males of the village; or he employs an exorcist, who propitiates the unmarried male dead of the household, sprinkles water over which sacred texts have been recited over the mouth and eyes of the child, and calls on the evil spirit to state who he is and how he gained entry. Finally, the spirit, by a tap of the wand of the exorcist, is persuaded to depart, whereupon the child takes an old shoe—an article which repels spirits—to a sacred fig-tree, at the foot of which he is supposed to fall senseless, and thus to become freed from the incubus. A nail is then driven into the tree to confine the spirit, or it is induced to enter a bottle which is buried deep underground (*ib.* i. 162, ii. 14). Rites of a similar kind are performed to repel or propitiate the ghost of a married woman (*manwin*) who is specially hostile to her own sex, and that of a child (*jhoting*) who has died before investiture with the sacred thread (Kitts, 53 f.).

The belief in sorcery and witchcraft affecting man and beast is wide-spread. The witch is feared rather than respected, but her power is believed to cease when her teeth fall out. The more Hinduized peasantry worship Gaṇpati or Gaṇeśa, god of luck, before starting on a journey or other enterprise; but the common people trust more to meeting omens. If a ring-dove enters the house, it is abandoned for three days, and purified by leading a cow inside, and giving food and alms to Brāhmans (*ib.* 49).

8. **Sikhs and Jains.**—Besides the orthodox Sikhs —immigrants from the Panjāb—some members of the Banjārā (*q.v.*) tribe recorded themselves as Sikhs at the last Census. Sikhs generally are most numerous on the Hyderābād frontier in the neighbourhood of the tomb of their Guru Govind at Nānder (Chinoy, 57 f.). The early influence of the Jains is shown by numerous temples, such as those at Sirpur, Muktagirī, and Kāranja. The present Jains consist largely of immigrants from Bombay, Rājputāna, and Central India, who are attracted by trade. The cave-temples at Pātūr Shaikh Bābā—a site which, as its name shows, has been since occupied by a Musalmān saint—seem to be Brāhmanical (Fergusson-Burgess, *Cave Temples*, 428).

9. **Muhammadans.**—Islām is increasing its numbers not so much from proselytism as by the greater fecundity of its members, the facts of which have been fully illustrated in the case of Bengal (see BENGAL, § 41). The faith has been much corrupted by the local Animism, as is shown by the prevalence of the cult of hermits and martyrs, to whose shrines, for the sake of their offerings, even Hindus are admitted. Some Muhammadans secretly engage Brāhmans to worship the local gods, retain their Hindu surnames, and employ the village astrologer to select an auspicious day for marriages (Lyall, *Gazetteer*, 194; Chinoy, i. 55 f.).

10. **Christians.**—Christians, now numbering 2375, have increased owing to missionary efforts during recent famines. The vast majority of them are native converts attached to the fourteen mission stations established in the Province. Enumerated by denominations, the largest congregations belong, in order, to the Roman Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, and Presbyterian Churches.

LITERATURE.—Sir A. C. Lyall, *Asiatic Studies*[2], 1899; *Gazetteer for the Haidarābād Assigned Districts, commonly called Berar*, 1870 [this is under revision at present]; the *Census Reports* by E. J. Kitts, 1882, W. Hastings, 1892, A. D. Chinoy, 1902, of which the first is the most valuable. For the history: V. A. Smith, *Early History of India*[2], 1908; J. Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*[3], 1873; articles in the *Provincial Gazetteer* and *Imperial Gazetteer*.

W. CROOKE.

BERBERS AND N. AFRICA.

[RENÉ BASSET.]

1. *PAGANISM.*—Whatever opinion may be held regarding the complex origin of the races which, under the general name of Berbers, inhabited, and still inhabit, all the north of North Africa, from the Mediterranean to the Sudan and from the Atlantic to Egypt, they form a linguistic unity; and it is only by starting from this point of view that we can hope to re-construct their ancient religion. But, at the very outset, we find ourselves faced with a difficulty which is almost insoluble. Although there was unity in their language, this was by no means the case in their religion, *i.e.* their pagan religion. Moreover, the uncertainty which still exists concerning the deciphering of the Libyan inscriptions deprives us of their help, and obliges us to have recourse to the scanty information supplied by foreigners, who have not always distinguished the native from the borrowed elements in the beliefs and ceremonies of which they have handed down accounts.

1. **Mountain-worship.**—It seems that irregularities of the ground—mountains, caves, and rocks—were regarded by the Berbers, if not as deities, at least as seats of divine beings. Therefore, at least in the west, Mount Atlas—'the pillar of Heaven,' as it was called by the people of the country in the time of Herodotus (*Hist.* iv. 184)—must have been the object of their worship. Pliny the Elder (*HN* v. i. 6) writes as follows:

'In the very middle of the sands Mount Atlas rears its head to the skies, rugged and bare on the side facing the ocean to which it gives its name; but, on the side which faces Africa, very shady, covered with woods and watered by gushing springs; fertile in fruits of all kinds, which grow of their own accord . . . and are sufficient to satisfy all desire. During the day not a single inhabitant is seen; everything preserves a deep silence, like the awful silence of the desert. As men approach the mountain, a religious fear seizes their hearts, especially at the sight of the summit raised above the clouds and apparently close to the circle of the moon.'

This information is confirmed by Maximus of Tyre (*Dissertationes*, viii. 57):

'The Western Libyans inhabit a long narrow strip of land surrounded by the sea. The extremity of this peninsula the ocean envelopes with heavy waves and currents. This they regard as the sanctuary and the image of Atlas. Now, Atlas is a hollow mountain, very lofty, opening out towards the sea as a theatre towards the sky. The space which stretches to the middle of the mountain is a narrow fertile valley covered with trees on which fruits are seen. Looking from the summit is like looking into the depths of a well. It is impossible to go down into it because of the steepness of the slope; besides, it is not allowed. The wonderful thing about this place is that, at high tide, the ocean covers the banks and spreads all over the fields; the waves rise up towards Atlas, and the water can be seen standing up against it like a wall, without flowing into the hollow part or falling to the ground; but between the mountain and the water there is a great deal of air and a hollow wood. *For the Libyans it is both a temple and a god*, the object by which they swear, and a statue.'

The Atlas of which he is speaking is evidently the Atlas of Morocco. Its native name, Dyris or Addiris (cf. in the Guanch dialect of Teneriffe, *adar*, 'cliff'; in Awelimmiden Tuareg, *adar*, 'mountain'), has been preserved by Pliny the Elder (*HN* v. i. 13) and Solinus (*Polyhistor*, § 29). But the Greek and Manichæan conception of Atlas supporting the world might be found in the name which, according to Galindo, the Guanches of Teneriffe gave to God, viz. *Atguayhcefunataman*,* 'he who supports the Heavens.' It would naturally have been applied to Mount Teyde in Teneriffe. Guanch mythology, however, assigned another rôle to this mountain. It must be taken for granted that the present Bul Qornin (the ancient Balcaranensis), who rules Tunis, and whose name re-appears in the deity worshipped there (Saturnus Balcaranensis), was venerated in primitive times by the Berbers, before the Phœnicians had installed their Ba'al† there, on whom Saturn was superimposed, sometimes represented as mounted on a lion (*CIL* viii. 20437, 20448) or accompanied by the epithet Sobare(n)sis at Henchir Bu Beker (*ib.* 12390, 12392). The Ba'al Ḳarnaim, who was worshipped there by the Phœnicians, and, undoubtedly in imitation of them, by the natives, was a purely Semitic deity, like the Ba'al of Hermon or the Ba'al of Lebanon,† whose *paredros* was Tanit Pené Ba'al, mentioned in a Punic inscription of Borj Jedid. Probably the same thing happened with the cult of Ba'al Hamān at Dugga.‡ Dedications to Saturn are, however, very frequent in the Latin inscriptions of Africa, and the name of Saturnius is often mentioned. We may cite at Ain Zana (Diana) a dedication, 'Deo frugum Saturno frugifero Augusto' (*CIL* viii. 4581), and at Fontaine-Chaude an inscription, 'Deo Sancto frugifero' (*ib.* 17720). A Latin inscription, found at some distance from Aumale, is addressed to the genius of the mountain, Pastoria(nen)sis, who gives shelter from the violence of the wind (*ib.* 9180); there is also one at Chemtu in Tunisia to the genius of the mountain (*ib.* 14588). Even in our day certain mountains excite among the Tuaregs a religious fear which they cannot overcome. But it is not the terrifying appearance of the mountains that inspires the fear; it is the genii who dwell in them. This belief existed even from the time of Pliny the Elder. Reproducing a passage from the *Periplus* of Hanno, he places in Atlas the Ægipanes and the Satyrs, whom the Carthaginian traveller locates much further south (*Periplus*, § 14); the same passage is also quoted by Solinus (*Polyhistor*, § 29). In the 12th cent. of our era an anonymous Arabian writer mentioned similar beings in a mountain of the Sahara, but his story bears the clear stamp of Musalmān beliefs.§ It tells of the mountain of Felfel, which holds within it the remains of numerous towns abandoned because of the genii; during the night people see their fires there and hear their whistling and singing. Among the Azger Tuaregs the grove of Idinen, 30 kilometres to the north of Ghāt, is the object of a superstitious terror, and no one would dare to penetrate it. Barth, who explored it, almost died of thirst without, however, having found any of the ruins which were said to be there.‖ Among the Ahaggar, Mount Udan is regarded in the same way, and the name given to the mysterious beings who inhabit it, *alhīnan* (from Arab. *al-jinn*), shows clearly that an Arab belief has come to be added to a superstition of Berber origin.¶ The Kudiat, to the north of Temanghaset and to the east of Ilaman, is likewise the object of fears of this kind.** In the Canary Islands, Mount Teyde,

* In this extraordinary and evidently corrupted name, it is impossible to decipher, even approximately, more than the last part *ataman*, which is an erroneous form of *achaman*, 'god.'

* Cf. Toutain, 'Le Sanctuaire de Saturnus Balcaranensis au Djebel Bou Kornin,' in *Mélanges de l'École de Rome*, vol. xii., and *De Saturni dei in Africa romana cultu*, Paris, 1894; Ferrère, *La Situation religieuse de l'Afrique romaine depuis la fin du ive siècle*, Paris, 1897, p. 80.

† Cf. Lagrange, *Étude sur les religions sémitiques*, Paris, 1905.

‡ Carton, *Le Sanctuaire de Ba'al Saturne à Dougga*, Paris, 1897.

§ A. de Kremer, *Description de l'Afrique*, Vienna, 1852, p. 69.

‖ Barth, *Reisen u. Entdeck. in Nord- u. Centr.-Afrika*, Gotha, 1856, i. 228–236; Duveyrier, *Les Touaregs du Nord*, Paris, 1864, p. 416.

¶ Duveyrier, *op. cit.* p. 416 f.; Benhazera, *Six mois chez les Touareg du Ahaggar*, Algiers, 1908, p. 60.

** de Motylinski, 'Voyage à Abalessa et à la Koudia,' in *Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique française*, Oct. 1907, p. 257 ff.

where hell (*echeyde*) was supposed to be, was inhabited by a demon of the name of *Guayota* or *Huayota*. The demon of Palma was called *Iruene*.*

2. Rock-worship.—Rock-worship is naturally joined with mountain-worship. Pliny the Elder (*HN* II. ii. 44) and Pomponius Mela (*de Situ Orbis* i. 8) tell of a rock in Cyrenaica consecrated to the South Wind: 'if it is touched by the hand of man, immediately the wind rises violently, tossing the sand like waves, and rages as it does over the billows.' In the Canary Islands, near the crater of Caldera in Palma, there was a rock, formed like an obelisk, which was called Idafe. To prevent it from falling, the people of the tribe of Tananse, who were settled in the neighbourhood, used to make offerings to it, with processions and singing; they sacrificed entrails, and then ate the animals, and sometimes whole victims were cast down from the heights of the neighbouring mountains.† In the Great Canary Island there were two rocks: the one called Tismar, in the district of Galdar, the other Vimenya, in Telde. In times of distress the inhabitants, accompanied by priests called *magadas* (Viana, p. 22, calls them *harimaguadas*), used to make pilgrimages to these two rocks, carrying in their hands palm-branches and vases filled with milk and butter. This they poured on the rocks, dancing round about them and singing lugubrious airs like funeral chants, which the Spaniards called *endechas*. They then proceeded to the seashore, and beat the waves vigorously with their rods, shouting all the time at the pitch of their voices.‡ It is evident that here we have to do with a kind of worship. Besides, if we can believe to the letter what the Spanish writers have handed down, the Guanches, differing from the other Berbers, seem to have had a settled religion. In any case, we are tempted to connect with this institution of sacrifices the use made of a stone situated near Guertufa, between Tiaret and Relizane, and known by the name of *Ḥajar Gaïd*.

'In one place a recess in the rock leaves a mound between it and the road, and it looks like a huge stone, apparently fallen from the summit and caught on the other rocks. It measures 4 metres at its highest part and 1 m. 70 at its lowest; its upper surface is 10 m. long and at least 6 m. broad at its broadest part. . . . After climbing up this rock, perfectly irregular, but possessing a sort of platform, inclined at 30 degrees, one sees a sort of cascade, formed by three basins of unequal size and depth, into which it is evident that quantities of liquid have poured. To the right are two little round holes; to the left, two little square holes, all being from 10 to 15 cms. wide. There is no doubt that there was a primitive altar there, a table for sacrifices.'§

We may quote the conclusion of this description: 'The *Ḥajar Gaïd* was a splendidly-chosen place for a bloody religion. The sacrificer, raised up 8 or 10 metres above the crowd, let the blood of the victim flow from one basin into the other. The sacrifice was performed before a vast horizon; all the races of the plain saw it, and the fire that was lit was *undoubtedly* seen from the far-off heights of the mountain of Lalla Krua.'‖

But this is merely a hypothesis. There still exist, however, in the Canary Islands places where libations of milk were made—holes and trenches hollowed out in the hard rock for the purpose of receiving the liquid. There were also sacrifice-trenches—simple cavities surrounded by carefully-arranged heaps of stones.¶ In the *qṣar* of Tamentit in Tuat, there is an aerolite which, even to this day, is the object of general veneration. Legend tells that, when it fell from the sky, near Nun en-Nas, it was gold, but God changed it into silver, and then into iron, to prevent covetousness.* Connected with natural rocks, and rocks wrought by the hands of men, are dolmens, but as these are really tombs, it is unnecessary to speak of them here.† See art. STONES.

3. Cave-worship.—Caverns seem also to have been worshipped among the ancient Berbers, in agreement with the testimony of Seneca (*ad Lucilium Ep.* xli.): 'Et si quis specus saxis penitus exesis montem suspenderit, non manu factus, sed naturalibus causis in tantam laxitatem excavatus; animum tuum quadam religionis suspicione percutiet.' But nothing has been found as yet to prove the existence of the god of caverns, Ifru or Ifri, affirmed by Masqueray.‡ The most celebrated deity who is mentioned is the god Bacax, whose grotto near Annuna (Thibilis) has been discovered and explored. In this cavern 'the apartments are not all situated in one horizontal plane, nor are they connected simply by narrow passages; they are often placed one above the other, and have communication with each other by natural stairs, sometimes even by actual wells. The difference in level between the entry-passage and the bottom of the cavern cannot be less than three or four hundred metres.'§ The name of the god Bacax, mentioned in a certain number of Latin inscriptions, *CIL* viii. 5504 (18828), 5505 (18829), 5517 (18847), 5518 (18850), 18831, 18838, has as yet defied all attempts at interpretation. It was in front of the entrance to the cave that sacrifices were offered. Perhaps it is to a cult of this kind that we should attribute the Libyan inscriptions which are found in great numbers in the grotto of Ifri n delal. There is still another cave-deity whose name must be recognized in the enigmatical GDAS, with which a certain number of inscriptions begin—the inscriptions found in the cave known as R' ar Zemma, situated on a spur of Jebel Chettaba, in the neighbourhood of Constantine. Opposed though it is by G. Mercier,‖ who has given a minute description of the cave, the proposal of Mgr. Toulotte and M. Héron de Villefosse to connect the present name Chettaba with the mountain of Giddaba mentioned by St. Augustine is tempting; and GDAS would stand for 'Giddabæ deo augusto sacrum.'¶ In the Great Canary Island, two leagues from Teyde, at the top of a volcanic mountain, there is a large cave in the rock, entered by four openings fourteen feet high, whence arises the popular name, 'Mountain of the four doors.' The openings are separated by pillars varying in diameter from seven to nine feet. In front of each pillar, on a level part cut out of the rock, and serving as a peristyle to the cave, there are several niches, some round and others square. These seem to have been intended to hold the objects of the cult. The niches are more than five feet from the ground.** In the Isle of Fer in the Canaries, the cave of Asteheyta, in the district of Tacuitunta, served as a refuge for the man who, in times of

* Viana, *Antigüedades de las Islas Afortunadas*, Tübingen, 1833, p. 24; Barker Webb and Sabin Berthelot, *Histoire naturelle des îles Canaries*, Paris, 1842, vol. i. pt. i. p. 173 f.; Verneau, *Cinq années de séjour aux îles Canaries*, Paris, 1890, p. 94.

† Glas, *The History of the Canary Islands*, London, 1764; Webb and Berthelot, *op. cit.* vol. i. pt. i. p. 172; Verneau, *op. cit.* p. 94.

‡ Glas, *op. cit.* ii. 3, 70; Webb and Berthelot, *op. cit.* vol. i. pt. i. p. 169.

§ La Blanchère, *Voyage d'études dans une partie de la Maurétanie Césarienne*, Paris, 1892, p. 42.

‖ *Ib.* p. 43.

¶ Verneau, *op. cit.* p. 90 f.

* Rohlfs, *Reise durch Marokko*, Bremen, 1862, p. 145; Laquière, *Les Reconnaissances du général Servière*, Paris, n.d., p. 21 f. (with a photograph of the aerolite); E. F. Gautier, *Le Sahara algérien*, Paris, 1908, i. 253.

† Cf. on the dolmens of Algeria, Gsell, *Les Monuments antiques de l'Algérie*, Paris, 1901, i. 20–36 (with a very full bibliography on the question).

‡ 'Comparaison du vocabulaire des Zénagas,' in *Archives des missions scientifiques*, Paris, 1879, p. 481.

§ Monceaux, *La grotte du dieu Bacax au Djebel Taïa*, Paris, 1887; G. Mercier, *Les divinités libyques*, Constantine, n. d., p. 6 f.

‖ 'La grotte du Chettaba,' in *Recueil archéologique de Constantine*, xxxv. 156–166.

¶ Cf. Gsell, *Chronique africaine*, Rome, 1903, p. 44 f. and note 8.

** Webb and Berthelot, *op. cit.* vol. i. pt. i. p. 159 f.

drought, went to implore the goddess. She appeared to him and gave him a pig, which he presented to the assembly as a token that his prayers were answered.*

4. Air-worship.—We do not know if the Berbers worshipped the air or the wind, but if they did, it was undoubtedly under foreign influence. We have an inscription in Latin verse, found at Naraggara (Sidi Yusuf), in which the air is invoked under the name of Juno (*CIL* viii. 4635); and it is perhaps to a cult of this order that we must attribute an inscription of Ain Mtirchu (*ib.* 17763). These should be compared with a passage of Firmicus Maternus (*de Errоribus Profanarum Religionum*, § 111), according to which the Assyrians and *some of the inhabitants of Africa* placed air in a sort of authority over the other elements. But, as he adds that they consecrated it under the name of Juno or of the virgin Venus, it is clear that we are here dealing with a Punic cult.

5. River-deities.—Rivers, or at least the sources of rivers, were consecrated to a particular deity. The only extant inscriptions which mention them give us, as the title of the special deity, the word 'genius,' probably due to Roman influence (*genius*). Thus near the Sig was found a dedication to the genius of the river ('genio fluminis,' *CIL* viii. 9749); at the source of the Bu Merzug, near ancient Sila, an inscription was excavated which mentions the genius of the Amsaga, the former name of the river (*ib.* 5884).† There is one in existence to the deity of the river Alexandriana (*ib.* 2662), to the deity of the waters (*ib.* 2663), to the genius of the fountain ('genio fontis') associated with Juppiter, and to the Fountain of Caïd, near Batna (*ib.* 4291).

6. Town-deities.—The application of the name 'genius' to towns, frequently found in the inscriptions, seems to be the result of an imitation of the customs of the Romans, who personified towns in some special genius, when it was not actually the work of Roman settlers rather than of the native populations. Thus the genius of a village in Lambessa ('genio vici,' *CIL* viii. 2604 f.); the genius of Lambessa ('genio Lambæsis,' *ib.* 2528, 2596, 2598 f.); the genius of Rusicada ('genio coloniæ Veneriæ Rusicadæ augusto,' *ib.* 7959 f.); the genius of Henchir Masfuna ('genio Lamasbæ augusto'); the genius of a market-town in Sur Juab ('genio pagi augusto,' *ib.* 9196); the genius of the Cirtæan colonies (*ib.* 5693, 10866); the genius of the colony of Milah (*ib.* 7960, 8202 [=19980]); the genius of Mactar (*ib.* 6352); the genius of Subzavar (*ib.* 6001); the genius of Phua (*ib.* 6267–91); the genius of the municipality of Testur (*ib.* 1353 [14891]); the genius of the municipality of Sataf (Ain Kebir, *ib.* 8389); the genius of the 'civitas Celtianensium' among the Beni-Welban (*ib.* 19688); the genius 'populi Cuiculitani' at Jamila (*ib.* 20144); the genius of the colony at Henchir Sidi Alibelqāsem (*ib.* 14687); the genius of the 'oppidum Lamsortense' at Henchir Maf'ūna (*ib.* 18596); the genius of the 'colonia Julia Veneria Chirtæ Novæ' at Henchir Jezza (*ib.* 16367); the genius of the market-town ('genio vici augusto') at Marcūna (*ib.* 424); the genius of Thibar at Henchir Amamet (*ib.* 154345); the genius of the people at Ain Zana (*ib.* 4575), at Constantine (*ib.* 6947 f.); the genius of Novar among the Beni Fūda (*ib.* 20429 f.); and the genius of Gadimefala ([?] *ib.* 18752). We may add to these the invincible deity of Gurai (Qsar Gurai, near Tebessa, *ib.* 1843), and the deity who is mentioned in an inscription of Borj Hamza, 'Auzio deo genio' (*ib.* 9014). The genius is usually a Latin or Punico-Latin deity, as at Qsar al-Ahmar, in the region of Ain Beida. In a dedication to Saturn of the 3rd cent., this god is qualified as 'genius saltus Sorothensis';* in another addressed to Juppiter, at Uzali, there is 'genius arcae frumentariae' (*ib.* 6639).

7. Sun-worship.—Besides mountains, rocks, caves, and rivers, the Berbers worshipped the stars, and, primarily, the sun. This cult existed among the nomadic Berbers between Egypt and Lake Tritonis (Herod. *Hist.* iv. 188), and among the Berbers in general.† We read in the *Life* of St. Samuel of Qalamon that the Berber who had reduced him to slavery wished to make him worship the sun.‡ There are also some Latin inscriptions dedicated to it: 'Soli deo invicto,' in the plain of Batna (*CIL* viii. 2675); 'Soli deo augusto,' at Zarai (*ib.* 4513); 'Soli invicto,' at Suk-Ahras (*ib.* 5143), at Sluguia (*ib.* 1329), at Cherchel (*ib.* 9331), at Affreville (*ib.* 9629); to the sun and the moon, near Sidi Alibelqāsem in Tunisia (*ib.* 14688 f.); but it is doubtful whether it is the ancient Berber deity that is involved when we find the sun assimilated with Mithra at el-Gan (*ib.* 18025) as well as at Ain Tukria (*ib.* 21523). On the other hand, it seems to be the Berber god that is referred to in a Latin inscription at Aumale, of the year 207 of the era of the province, in which there is mention of ceremonies in honour of Tonant, the wearer of horns, and of a Pantheia who was connected with him, was worshipped on the Libyan and Moorish borders, and had her seat between Juppiter Ammon and Dis (*ib.* 9018).

The Guanches of Palma also worshipped the sun, and gave it the name of *Mayec*,§ as well as the name *Amen*, which seems to have meant 'Lord'; in Awelimmiden Tuareg, *Amanai* has the meaning of 'God.' According to Macrobius (*Sat. conviv.* i. 21), the Libyans worshipped the setting sun, which was impersonated by Ammon (Amen). He was represented with ram's horns, in which resided his chief power, as that of the sun in its rays.‖ In the speech of Athanasius against the Gentiles (§ 14) it is said that among the Libyans the sheep was called *amen*, and that it was worshipped as a deity. The opinion, however, has been suggested, with every appearance of reason, that Ammon (Hammon, Amen) was a god of Berber origin. We may compare with this the carving on the rock found at Bu Alem in South Oranais, representing rams with their heads surmounted by an ornamentation in the form of a solar disc, surrounded with a uræus.¶ It would be a mistake, however, to see here the prototype of the Egyptian Amen; the present writer believes, with Gsell, that it is a more or less successful copy of the Egyptian representation, as probably are the rock-drawings discovered by Barth at Telissau, west of Fezzan,** and the bas-relief found in the foundations of the Borj Tasko at Ghadames.††

But there is still another proof of the worship of a ram representing the sun, and one in which we do not see an Egyptian imitation. It is found in a monument, discovered in 1851 at Old Arzeu, representing 'a roughly sculptured head with a very slightly sharpened nose, two little round holes for the eyes and for the ears, and the mouth

* Viara y Clavijo, in Webb and Berthelot, *op. cit.* vol. i. pt. i. p. 168; Verneau, *op. cit.* p. 92 f.

† Cf. also Cherbonneau, *Excursion dans les ruines de Mila, Sufavar, Sila et Sigus*, Constantine, n.d., p. 30 f.

* Gsell, *op. cit.* p. 40.

† Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'Ibar*, Bulaq, 1284, vi. 89.

‡ R. Basset, *Synaxaire arabe-jacobite*, Paris, i. 331; F. M. Esteves Pereira, *Vida de Abba Samuel*, Lisbon, 1894, pp. 22, 99, 154.

§ Cf. Alvise de Ca' Da Mosto, *Relation des voyages à la côte occidentale d'Afrique*, tr. J. Temporal, Paris, 1895, p. 34; Viana, *op. cit.* p. 24; Glas, *op. cit.* p. 139.

‖ Cf. also Martianus Capella, *De nuptiis Philologiæ*, lib. ii., ed. Eyssenhardt, Leipzig, 1866, p. 44.

¶ Gsell, *Chronique archéologique africaine*, Rome, 1902, p. 83, *Les monuments antiques de l'Algérie*, i. 93.

** *Op. cit.* i. 210–217.

†† Duveyrier, *Les Touaregs du Nord*, pl. x.

represented by a hollowed line; its horns are curved back, the points to the ground, and the arms are fixed to the body with the hands coming and joining above the navel. The under part of the body ends in a terminal.'* It is also an idol of this kind that was found at Tuat, and is designated 'getule idol' (?).† This may be identified with *Gurzil*, whose priest was Terna. He was the son of Juppiter Ammon (Corippus, *Johannidos*, ii. 109 f., v. 494 f., vi. 116) by a heifer (*ib.* ii. 111). This Gurzil is regarded as an Apollo; he was represented by an image of a bull being carried to fight (*ib.* iv. 666–673, v. 22–29). The cult of this deity was maintained for a long time, for in the 11th cent. of our era al-Bakrī mentions a stone idol in Tripoli, set up on a hill and named Gorza, to which the tribes round about—the Howara amongst others—offered sacrifices and addressed prayers in order to recover their riches.‡ Al-Bakrī, unfortunately, gives no information about the shape of this idol. Probably it was also a Berber idol of this kind that the same author calls 'Maghmades' (perhaps the *Macomades* of the ancients), and describes as being set up on the seashore between Egypt and the Maghrib, and surrounded by several others.§ The name 'Gorza' seems to recur as an element of the names of the locality in a town placed by Polybius (*Hist.* i. 74) near Utica, and in a *tessera* of hospitality and patronage in the reign of L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (*CIL* viii. 68): 'Senatus populusque civitatium stipendiariarum Pago Gurzenses hospitium fecerunt . . . Faciundum coeraverunt Ammicar Milchatonis f. Cynasyn Boncar Azzrubalis f. *Æthogurzensis* Muthunbal f. . . .' The Punic names of the donors will be noticed.‖ Another brass plate mentions the 'civitas Gurzensis' (*CIL* viii. 69), and perhaps we must recognize *Gurza* in the *Gurra* of the *Peutinger Tables*. In the 11th cent., also, al-Bakrī mentions in Atlas, near the B. Lamās, between Aghmāt and the Sūs, a tribe of idolatrous Berbers who worshipped a ram. Not one of them would dare to come into the markets of the neighbouring tribes except in disguise (*Description de l'Afrique*, p. 161). In this cult of the sun, one single tribe, the Atlantes (or *Atarantes*), was an exception; they had no individual names to distinguish them, and they watched the rising and the setting sun, uttering terrible imprecations all the time, as though against a planet deadly to them and to their fields; they had no dreams like other men. This is what is recorded by Herodotus (*Hist.* iv. 184) and Pliny the Elder (*HN* v. 8). The only imprecations mentioned by Nicolaus of Damascus (frag. 140, ed. Müller) are against the rising sun.

8. Moon-worship. — The moon was also worshipped by the nomadic Berbers between Lake Tritonis and Egypt (Herod. iv. 188), by other Berbers in the West (ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'Ibar*, vi. 89), and by the Guanches. The latter observed all its phases with great accuracy, especially the new moon and the full moon.¶ Had the Berbers assimilated it to the celestial goddess of Dugga and Carthage, the latter title being borne, according to tradition, by Dido, called by the Phœnicians Astro Arkhe, and transported to Rome by Caracalla (Herodian, *Historia Romana*, v. vi. 4)? As is seen from a passage in *Historiae Augustae*, the predictions coming from the temple of Cœlestis in Carthage caused a great number of seditions in Africa—seditions in which the Berbers probably took part, and which Pertinax had to repress during his proconsulship of Africa (Capitolinus, *Vita Pertinacis*, ch. iv.). We find the crescent moon at the top of a great number of inscriptions (cf. *CIL*, *passim*), one of which, among the Beni-Ukden, is in Libyan and Phœnician characters (*CIL* viii. 20186); but it is very probable that this sign, which in primitive times had signified a lunar cult, had become a meaningless ornamentation. There is no occasion for the theory, formed from inaccurate etymology and assimilations, that Tanit, the great Punic goddess, was of Berber provenance.* For, since the name of the moon in Berber is masculine, *Aiur* or *Aggur*, it could not have been represented as a goddess. There is far more probability in the hypothesis of G. Mercier,† which tends to find *Aiur* in the enigmatical *Teru*, mentioned along with the epithet 'augustus' in an inscription discovered on the Guechgach, sixteen kilometres from Constantine (*CIL* viii. 5673).

9. Worship of other planets.—It is very probable that the other celestial bodies were worshipped by the Berbers, although we have no proofs except for a few of them. Alvise de Ca' Da Mosto asserts this for the Guanches of Teneriffe (*Relation*, p. 34). The planet Venus is called *Lemr'er* at the present day in Zuawa. Among the Awelimmiden, when it is an evening star, it has the name of *tatari*, and when a morning star, that of *amawen n ehad* or *amawen achimmelech*. Among the Ahaggar, it is called *Tatrit ta n tufat*, which can be exactly translated by 'morning-star.' Following the example of other peoples, the Ahaggar have located a certain number of tales in the sky. We cannot, however, decide whether they correspond to a religious sentiment. Thus the Pleiades are the 'Daughters of Night' (*Chēt Ahadh*). Six of the stars of this constellation have each a name; the seventh is a boy's eye which had been taken out and flew up to the sky. This story is given in the following verses:

'The daughters of the night are seven in number:
Māterejre and Errejāot,
Māteseksek and Esseksāot,
Mātelaghlagh and Elleghāot;
The seventh is the eye of a boy which flew up to Heaven.'‡

We can see that the six stars reduce to three pairs whose names are derived from the same root. The Awelimmiden give them also the name of *Chettahet* (= *Chēt Ahadh*).

Orion (in Tuareg, *Amanar*) has two interpretations. According to the one, he comes out of a muddy well; and Rigel (*Adar Nelaku*, 'the Foot in the Mud') is the foot he brings out of the mud last, *i.e.* the last star when the constellation is rising in the East. According to the other, he is a hunter, with his belt on (in Ahaggar and Awelimmiden *Tajebest en Amanar*, 'Belt of Orion'), who is followed by a dog (*Eidi*, Sirius) and preceded by gazelles (*Ihenkadh*, 'constellation of the Hare').§

The Great Bear and the Little Bear represent a camel and her young one (*Talemet de roris*); the Pole Star is a negress called *Lemkechen* (*i.e.* 'hold') because she has to hold the young camel (*Aura*) to let its mother be milked. But the stars ψ, λ, μ, ν, ξ represent an assembly which deliberates whether the negress is to be killed. She (the Pole Star) stands motionless with fear.‖ According to a legend contaminated by the Musalmān religion, the Great Bear is a camel which belonged to Noah. It was slain by seven nobles, one of them a Tuareg; he was changed into an 'ourane' (*ar'ata*, a kind of large lizard), the others into a jackal, a

* Berbrugger, *Bibliothèque-musée d'Alger*, Algiers, 1860, p. 29 f.
† E. F. Gautier, *op. cit.* p. 253.
‡ Cf. J. Partsch, *Die Berbern in der Dichtung des Corippus*, Breslau, 1896, p. 16.
§ Al-Bakrī, *Description de l'Afrique septentrionale*, Arab text, ed. de Slane, Algiers, 1857, p. 12.
‖ Egger, *Latini sermonis reliquiae*, Paris, 1843, p. 427.
¶ Alvise de Ca' Da Mosto, *Relation*, p. 34; Glas, *The History of the Canary Islands*, p. 139.

* Bertholon, 'Essai sur la religion des Libyens,' in *Revue tunisienne*, Nov. 1908, pp. 484–490.
† *Les divinités libyques*, pp. 12–16.
‡ Duveyrier, *op. cit.* p. 424 f.
§ *Id.* p. 424. ‖ *Id.* p. 424.

chameleon, etc. The camel was transported to the sky. Since then, the Tuaregs have never eaten the 'ourane,' which they regard as their maternal uncle.*

The Scorpion is sometimes called *Tagherdamt* ('scorpion'), sometimes *Tazzeit* ('palm-tree'). A young man, *Amrot* (*Antaris*) is going to climb the palm-tree; but when half-way up the tree he notices some pretty girls (*tibaradin*), clothed in red *haulis*, coming from the lake (*Tesahak*); he stops half-way up to watch them.†

Other constellations have names, but no legend attaches to them. In Bougie the Milky Way is called *Ajgu n tignau*, 'beam of the sky,' and among the Tuaregs *Mahellau*. The stars ϵ, δ, η of the Great Dog are called *Ifarakraken*, 'noise of a fan or of a bird,' and β, *Auhem*, 'the young of the gazelle.' θ and o of the Boat are 'Riches' (*Tenafalet*) and 'Poverty' (*Tözzert*). Aldebaran is called *Kökoyyodh* and Canope *Wadit*.‡ In ancient times the Africans (Afri) were considered very skilled in the science of horoscopes, and particularly so was Septimius Severus—as may be seen from a saying attributed to him. Speaking of his son Geta to Juvenal, prefect of the pretorians, he said: 'It is astonishing that my son Geta is to be deified; his constellation had nothing imperial in it to my eyes' (Spartianus, 'Vita Getae,' § 2 in *Historiae Augustae*.)

The name of the rainbow, among certain Berber tribes, has preserved the trace of a myth. Although at Wad Rir' it is called *abechchi* and in Harakta *abeggas* ('girdle'), in Zuawa it is called *thislith b wanzar*, among the Bot'iwa of Rif *thislith n unzar*, among the B. Iznacen *thaslit n unzar*, which means 'bride of the rain,' and among the Beni Menacer *taslith n ujenna*, 'bride of the sky.' The rain (*Anzar*) is then considered a male being. In Jurjura, the Kabyle children, in times of drought, go from house to house singing:

'Anzar! Anzar!
O Lord, water us to the roots.' §

At Mzab, the children sing while transplanting grain:

'Give us, O Lord, the water of Anzar.' ‖

In a popular tale of Wargla, Amzar (=Anzar) is personified.¶ The rainbow is consequently regarded as the bride of the rain. This myth is not without parallel in the way in which certain Berber and Arab peoples of the Maghrib provoke rain. At Ain Sefra, at Tlemsen, and at Mazuna, they take a wooden spoon (in Kabyle *aghenja*) and dress it in bits of cloth, so as to make it a sort of doll representing a bride, called *Ghonja*; they take this in solemn procession to the tombs of the local priests, singing couplets which vary according to the locality. For example:

'Ghonja! Ghonja has uncovered her head.
O Lord, thou wilt water her ear-drops,
Her ear is thirsty;
Give her drink, O our Master!' **

At Tit, in the oasis of Tuat, during drought, the people go out of the *qsar*—men, women, boys, and girls. They take a wooden spoon and dress it in female garments. A young girl carries it, and the people keep saying: 'O spoon! O meadow! (*ar'enja—ia merja*) Lord, remove the time of heat! Lord! in the name of the Prophets!' Tertullian (*Apol.* xxiii.) gives the Virgo Cœlestis the title of 'Pluviarum Pollicitatrix.' Among the Guanches the main part of the ceremony for bringing rain was to make men and animals fast, and, in Teneriffe, even the young animals, which were separated from their mothers, and whose cries were expected to move the heavens.* Rain-making was also a gift of certain magicians. An ancient historian tells how among the Berbers a Roman army under the command of Hosidius Geta, successor of Suetonius Paulinus, almost died of thirst in the desert when in pursuit of the rebels and their chief Subulus. A native ally persuaded the general to have recourse to incantations and magic, affirming that often great quantities of water had been got by these means. This time again the process was successful, but we do not know in what it consisted (Dio Cassius, *Hist. Rom.* ix. 9).

10. Native deities.—To these deities we must add those which are made known to us by Latin epigraphy, though we are not sure about their nature and attributes. Thus we have dedications to the Moorish gods at various places in North Africa: at Cherchel (*CIL* viii. 9327), near Wed Marcūna (*ib.* 2639), near Wed Tezzulet (*ib.* 2640); at Lamoricière (*ib.* 21720), at Henchir Ramdan in Tunisia (*ib.* 1442); to the Moorish saviour-gods and to the genius of Satafis at Ain Kebira (*ib.* 20251). Possibly these Moorish gods are the deified kings of whom we are to speak below (pp. 511–512), but there is nothing to prove it. Thus Autaman, associated with Mercury in an inscription at Lambessa (*ib.* 2650), and compared with the Mastiman of Corippus (*Johannidos*, viii. 306 f.), some people used to take for the god of war.† Other Moors saw in him Jupiter Tænarius (which it has been proposed to correct to Jupiter Tartarius, corresponding to Dis Severus in the Latin inscription, *CIL* viii. 9018),‡ to whom human victims were sacrificed in times of plague (*Johannidos*, viii. 307–309). We may compare this passage with the statement of Pliny the Elder (*HN* v. 8) that the Augilæ worshipped none but the infernal gods, or, according to Pomponius Mela, the *manes* (*de Situ Orbis*, i. 8). Aulisva was worshipped in the region of Tlemsen, as is shown by two inscriptions found in Agadir (*CIL* viii. 9906 f.), and one at Ain Khial (*ib.* 21704). It is not necessary to insist on Kantus Pates—a reading which is quite sure in an inscription of Khenchela—any more than on Kaub, mentioned in the Chettaba. An inscription in Henchir Matkidas (*ib.* 16749) seems to point to five gods of the village of Magifa: it is dedicated to Masidenis, Thikikvæ, Sugganis, and Iesdanis, of whom there were statues. Another inscription, at Sidi Yusuf (*ib.* 18809), mentions an Iocolo (*Iocoloni deo patrio*). This epithet, *Deus patrius*, is given to Baliddir or Baldir in the inscriptions that mention his name: at Guela 'at Bu-Sba, between Bōna and Guelma (*ib.* 5279), and at Sigus (*ib.* 19121–19123). Is this the same as the *Genius patrius*, a priest of whom was buried at Zettara (Kef Beziua)? Another *Deus patrius*, who had priests, is located at Henchir el-Bez (*ib.* 12003). Is this name Baliddir, or at least its second part, *iddir*, a Berber word, as G. Mercier§ maintains, translating it by 'the living God'? The chief objection would come from the fact that this would be a hybrid word, compounded of Punic and Berber. It has also been identified (but this is a very improbable theory) with the name of Abbadiri Sancto,‖ mentioned in

* Benhazera, *op. cit.* p. 60 f.
† Duveyrier, *op. cit.* p. 425. ‡ *Ib.* pp. 424–426.
§ Ben Sedira, *Cours de langue Kabyle*, Algiers, 1885, p. xcviii, note 1.
‖ de Motylinski, *Le Dialecte berbère de R'damès*, Paris, 1907, p. 147.
¶ Biarnay, *Étude sur le dialecte berbère de Ouargla*, Paris, 1908, pp. 247–249.
** Cf. A. Bel, 'Quelques rites pour obtenir de la pluie en temps de sécheresse chez les Musulmans Maghribins,' in *Recueil de Mémoires et de Textes imprimés en l'honneur du xive Congrès des Orientalistes par les Professeurs de l'École des Lettres*, Algiers, 1905, pp. 49–98; Doutté, *Magie et religion dans l'Afrique du Nord*, Algiers, 1909, pp. 584–586.

* Viera, according to Espinosa, in Webb and Berthelot, *op. cit.* i. pt. i. p. 173; Verneau, *op. cit.* p. 92 f.
† Cf. G. Mercier, *Les divinités libyques*, p. 7.
‡ Partsch, *op. cit.* p. 16.
§ *Les divinités libyques*, pp. 8–12.
‖ Schmidt, Cagnat, and Dessau, *Inscriptionum Mauretaniae latinarum supplementum*, Berlin, 1904, p. 2028.

an inscription of Miliana (*ib.* 21481), and counted among the Punic deities by St. Augustine (*Ep.* xvii. 2). Priscian (vii. 313) gave the name of Abbadir to the baetyl swallowed by Saturn.

But whatever be the sense given to Iddir, it seems impossible to make him a supreme god of North Africa. Perhaps he was produced under the influence and in imitation of the Romans—a movement which set apart one of the local gods and placed him over the others, at least in Mauretania. This seems to be the indication of two inscriptions, one of which at Bougie is dedicated 'Numini Mauretaniae et Genio Thermarum' (*CIL* viii. 8926), and the other at Ain Kebira, 'Numini Maur. aug.' (*ib.* 20252). Halévy believed that this supreme god is to be found in the Iolaos who is mentioned, he says, in the treaty between Carthage and the Roman Senate, and whom he claims to have found again in a Libyan inscription.* The reading of these latter inscriptions is too uncertain, and, besides, Iol is a Punic god. If we trust the accounts of the Spaniards, the Guanches must have had a supreme god at the time of the conquest of the Canary Islands. Viana† relates that they worshipped one God, infinite, omnipotent, just and merciful, called in their language *Hucanech, Guayaxarax* (named by Viera *Achguoyaxiraxi*, 'saviour of the world'), *Acucanae* (named by Galindo *Achucana*), *Menceito, Acoron, Acaman, Acuhurajan* (called *Achahurahan* and *Achxurahan* by Viera, *Achahuaban* by Galindo)—epithets meaning 'omnipotent,' 'protector and creator of all beings,' 'without beginning and without end,' 'cause of causes.' The sense of these words is not found in Berber, except in *Acoron* and *Acaman*, which mean 'the great' and 'the sky.' The Guanch names handed down by the Spaniards are very much corrupted; this is due to errors in writing and to the authors' ignorance of the language spoken in the Canaries. Thus *Achaman*, given by Viera with the meaning of 'supreme god,' is more correct than *Acaman*, and seems akin to the Awelimmiden Tuareg *aochina*, 'the sky' (cf. the Teneriffe Guanch *achano*, 'year'); it is connected with the root *GN*, which gives in Zuawa *thignuth*, 'cloud,' and *igenni*, 'sky,' and in other dialects *ajenna* and *ijenni* with the same meaning. But we cannot place absolute confidence in Viana, who shows a tendency to see among the Guanches a religion resembling Christianity with a supreme god and a devil. He goes the length of saying that they never believed in or worshipped any idols, and that they worshipped only one God. Chil y Naranjo restricts this assertion to the natives of Lanzarote.‡ The same author has cut out several inexact data of this kind,§ and, besides, the assertion is refuted by the discovery of idols, in the 14th cent., in the Great Canary Island,‖ and the worship of one representing a nude woman in a building called Tirma.¶

According to Viera, the god of men was called *Eraoranhan* (*Eraorangan* according to Galindo) in the Island of Fer; he had his seat with Moreyba, the goddess of women, on the two rocks of Bentayga, called to this day *Santi llos de los antiguos*. After their conversion to Christianity, the natives of Fer worshipped Christ and Mary under the names of Eraoranhan and Moreyba.** The supreme god, Espinosa says, created man from earth and water—an equal number of men and women. Flocks were given them for nourishment. Afterwards he created more men, but did not give them more flocks. When they asked for more, he replied: 'Tend these others and they will give you nourishment.' This last class of beings to be created consisted of *achicaxac*, 'peasants,' while the first class comprised *achimencei*, 'nobles,' and *cichiciquitzo*,* 'knights.'

11. Deities assimilated by the Greeks and Romans.—This list of deities could be lengthened, if we had the native names of those deities mentioned by the Greeks and Romans; the latter have assimilated them to their own names, and sometimes have gone even further, the assimilation becoming simple borrowing on their part. In any case, it seems futile to linger over the mythological romance founded in all its parts on the Amazons, the Atlantes and their kings, Ammon, etc., which finishes the third book of the *Bibliothecae Historicae* of Diodorus Siculus. It has absolutely nothing in common with the religious traditions and customs of the Berbers. Herodotus (*Hist.* ii. 50) tells us that it was the Libyans who revealed Poseidon, whom no one before them had called by name, and whom they had always worshipped as a god. Ampelius (*Liber Memorialis*, ch. ix.) speaks of a fifth Apollo, born in Libya (Gurzil?). But the most celebrated of all these divinities is Athene Tritogenis, born, according to Herodotus (*Hist.* iv. 180), Pomponius Mela (*de Situ Orbis*, i. 7), and Pausanias (*Graeciae Descriptio*, i. 4), from Poseidon and the nymph of Lake Tritonis. It is beyond the scope of this article to study the personage of Triton as represented by Greek monuments,† but Herodotus (iv. 180) mentions customary rites which the maidens of the Auseans performed in honour of a native, and therefore Berber, goddess, who was no other than the goddess called Athene by the Greeks:

ὀρτῇ δὲ ἐνιαυσίῃ Ἀθηναίης αἱ παρθένοι αὐτῶν δίχα διαστᾶσαι μάχονται πρὸς ἀλλήλας λίθοισί τε καὶ ξύλοισι, . . . τὰς δὲ ἀποθνησκούσας τῶν παρθένων ἐκ τῶν τρωμάτων ψευδοπαρθένους καλέουσι· πρὶν δ' ἀνείναι αὐτὰς μάχεσθαι τάδε ποιεῦσι· κοινῇ παρθένον τὴν καλλιστεύουσαν ἑκάστοτε κοσμήσαντες κυνέῃ τε Κορινθίῃ καὶ πανοπλίῃ Ἑλληνικῇ, καὶ ἐπ' ἅρμα ἀναβιβάσαντες, περιάγουσι τὴν λίμνην κύκλῳ.

The Greeks explain this custom as a souvenir of the struggle which took place between Athene, who was brought up by Triton, and Pallas, Triton's daughter, in which Pallas was slain (Apollodorus, *Bibliothecae*, iii. 12). This custom must still have existed in the time of Pomponius Mela, unless he simply copied Herodotus. Herodotus thinks that, before the Greek helmet and shield, the maidens used to carry Egyptian arms (*Hist.* iv. 180).‡

A Latin inscription found at Ain Gulea in Tunisia (*CIL* viii. 15247) and another at Henchir el-Matria (*ib.* 15378) mention a dedication to a dragon ('Draconi augusto'). Perhaps this divinity is connected with the serpent of bronze with gilt head, which the pagans worshipped at Tipasa, on the Hill of Temples, and which, in the 5th cent., St. Salsa threw into the sea, and so earned her torture. It is not certain whether this is a relic of the worship of Eshmun§ and the summary of the sufferings of St. Salsa.‖ There is nothing anywhere to show that the cult of the serpent was ever native to the Berbers.

12. Deification of kings.—The pantheon has been enriched, on the other hand, by the apotheosis of the kings, at least during the time of independence.

* *Essai d'épigraphie libyque*, Paris, 1874, p. 157 f.

† *Antigüedades de las Islas Afortunadas*, p. 19; Webb and Berthelot, *op. cit.* i. pt. i. p. 170.

‡ *Estudios historicos de las Islas Canarias*, vol. i. 'Las Palmas,' 1876–1879, p. 427 f.

§ Chil y Naranjo, *op. cit.* i. 917 f.

‖ Verneau, *op. cit.* pp. 88–90.

¶ Bernaldes in Webb and Berthelot, *op. cit.* vol. i. pt. i. p. 170.

** Webb and Berthelot, *op. cit.* vol. i. pt. i. p. 168.

* Alonso de Espinosa, *The holy Image of Our Lady of Candelaria*, i. 8 (tr. by Markham), and *The Guanches of Tenerife*, London, 1907.

† Cf. Vater, *Triton und Euphemos*, St. Petersburg, 1849; Tissot, *de Tritonide lacu*, Dijon, 1863; Escher, *Triton und seine Bekämpfung durch Heracles*, Leipzig, 1890.

‡ Cf. Escher, *op. cit.* p. 79.

§ Cf. Gsell, *Tipasa*, Rome, 1894, p. 310 f.

‖ Gsell, *Recherches archéologiques*, Paris, 1893, pp. 1–3.

The phrase of Minucius Felix is well known: 'Et Juba, Mauris volentibus, Deus est' (*Octavius*, ch. xxiii.). A Latin inscription (*CIL* viii. 17159) is distinctly consecrated to Juba and the genius Vanisnensis at Tassammert.* Tertullian for his part said: 'Unicuique etiam provinciae et civitati deus est . . . et Mauretaniae reguli sui' (*Apol.* ch. xxiv.). There has been found at Bougie a fragment of an inscription dedicated to king Ptolemy, son of Juba (*CIL* viii. 9127), one at Algiers (*ib.* 9257), and another at Cherchel, to the genius of king Ptolemy (*ib.* 9342). Perhaps it was a retrospective worship that caused the inhabitants of Thubursicum Numidarum (Khamissa) to sanctify Hiempsal, son of Gauda, as a god (*ib.* 7* [17159])—a fact which explains the homage rendered to Gulussa, king of Numidia, son of Masinissa (*ib.* 3*), according to two inscriptions. These inscriptions were with extreme levity treated as false by Mommsen, who afterwards had to face the evidence and confess his mistake.† But it is probable that Africa followed the example given by Rome of deifying the Emperors. This may be seen from the comparison made by Lactantius: 'Hac scilicet ratione Romani Caesares suos consecraverunt et Mauri reges suos' . . . and further on: 'Singuli populi . . . summa veneratione coluerunt ut Aegyptii Isidem, Mauri Jubam' (Migne, *PL* vi. col. 194). Pomponius Mela (*de Situ Orbis*, i. 8) had established the fact:

'Orae [Africae] sic habitantur, *ad nostrum maxime ritum moratis cultoribus*, nisi quod quidam linguis differunt, et cultu Deûm, quos patrios servant, ac patrio more venerantur.'

This remark of Pomponius Mela is confirmed by ibn Khaldūn: 'It befell the Berbers from time to time to profess the religion of their conquerors, for powerful nations brought them into subjection' (*Kitāb al-'Ibar*, vi. 106). We must add that Septimius Severus, an African by birth, was regarded as a god by the Africans (*Historiae Augustae*, ch. xiii. 'Vita Septimi Severi'). This explains the large number of inscriptions in honour of deities adopted, without even assimilation, by the Berbers, who took the gods of Rome after those of Carthage: Juppiter, Juno, Pluto, Pallas, Venus, Apollo, Diana, the Nymphs, Neptune, Mercury, Silvanus, Bellona, Ceres, Hercules, Minerva, Mars, Æsculapius, the Dioscuri, Tellus, Hygiea, etc., and even the Eastern deities like Mithra, Malagbel, Mater Magna, Juppiter Dolichenus, Juppiter Heliopolitanus, Isis, Serapis. Bacchus-Liber must also be added, for it was a mistake, a false reading, that gave rise to the belief that the name of Bacchus appeared in the name of *Yakush*, which is of Berber origin, and is the translation of an Arabic epithet which has no connexion with Dionysus. The existence of vines in Africa does not justify in any way the hypotheses into which Lefébure‡ and, after him, Bertholon§ ventured. But it is almost impossible to make a separation among the worshippers, Roman colonists and soldiers, foreign soldiers, inhabitants of Punic origin, mixtures of Berbers and Phœnicians or Romans, and, lastly, pure Berbers.

13. Demi-gods, mythical beings, etc.—Perhaps we may attribute to the Berbers, alongside of the worship of their kings, the worship of beings analogous to the demi-gods of antiquity, whose giant birth and stature form the subject of various legends. The gist of them is that the sister of Ya'la ibn Muhammad al-Ifranī gave birth to a son without having intercourse with man. She was bathing in a warm spring where the wild beasts used to go to drink, and conceived by the effect of a lion's foam. The child was called *Kelmām ibn al-Asad* ('son of the lion'), and extraordinary qualities are attributed to him in stories. Ibn Khaldūn adds that the Berbers tell such a great number of stories of this kind, that if they were put in writing they would fill several volumes.* It is to similar beliefs, adapted from Greek or Jewish traditions, that we must attach the legend of the discovery of the body of Antæus, which measured at least sixty cubits (as, according to Gabinius, Sertorius declared in his *Hist. Rom.*), when the tomb of this giant was opened near Lynx in Mauretania. Juba claimed to be descended from Antæus by his son Sophax (Strabo, *Geographica*, XVII. iii. 8; Plutarch, *Sertorii Vita*, ch. ix.). Perhaps a souvenir of this kind is to be found in Prudentius, *Peristephanon*, hymn viii., where he says that Tingis contains the funeral monuments of the Massilian kings.† At the present day, the inhabitants of Arzilla in Morocco show on a rock the footprint of a gigantic foot—the trace of their ancestor.‡ Another giant, whom the Jewish and Musalmān traditions have appropriated under the name of Sidi Usha' (Joshua), is buried by the sea-shore, in the territory of the Beni Sha'būn, in the region of Nedromah. A row of stones marks the length of the body, which goes beyond the wall of the *qubba* where the grave is, and ends in a sort of *h'awita*.§

Among the mythical beings whose cult was maintained for some time after the conversion to Islām, there must be mentioned a category of genii whom we know only under the Arabic name of *Chamārikh*. In the 11th cent. of our era, among the Benu Ursifan,

'when they wished to undertake a war, they sacrificed a black cow to the Chamārikh who are their devils, and they said: "Behold a sacrifice for the Chamārikh." When they come to the fight in the morning, they watch till they see a whirlwind of dust, and say: "The Chamārikh, your friends, are coming to your aid." Then they charge confident of success. They pretend that this has never failed them, and the majority of them believe in it openly. When offering hospitality to a guest, they put food aside for the Chamārikh, and maintain that the latter eat what is reserved for them. In all this they avoid mentioning the name of God.'‖

The Arab historians have preserved an account of the familiar genii of the Kāhinah, Dihya, daughter of Tābet (?) of the tribe of the Jerawas, who made a long and successful stand against the Musalmāns, and even drove them from Ifriqyah. It was these familiar demons who foretold to this tribe the final victory of the Moors, and caused it to send its sons to launch against them before the final battle where it succumbed.¶ This prophetic faculty is again spoken of by Procopius (*de Bello Vandalico*, ii. 8). After the expedition of Belisarius against the Vandals, the Moors, afraid that some harm would result to them, had recourse to the prophecies of the women. After a few ceremonies, they foretold the future like the ancient oracles. In the middle of the 10th cent. of our era, among the Ghūmara of Morocco, Tangrit, the aunt of Ha-Mim, and Dajju, his sister, who, as we shall

* Gsell, *Recherches archéologiques*, p. 286 f.

† Cf. Masqueray, 'Les Additamenta ad corporis volumen viii. de M. Schmidt,' in *Bulletin de Correspondance africaine*, Algiers, 1885, pp. 161–163.

‡ *La politique religieuse des Grecs en Libye*, Algiers, 1902, pp. 22–38.

§ 'Essai sur la religion des Libyens,' in *Revue tunisienne*, Jan. 1909, p. 31 f.

* *Kitāb al-'Ibar*, vi. 106. Cf. on traditions of this kind 'Lucina sine concubitu,' in Van Gennep, *Religions, mœurs et légendes*, Paris, 1908, pp. 14–25.

† Migne, *PL* lx., Paris, 1862, col. 364. The commentary of D. Ruinart, *Acta primorum martyrum sincera*, Amsterdam, 1713, p. 469, note 11, recognizes its uncertainty.

‡ L. de Campou, *Un Empire qui croule*, Paris, 1886, p. 233.

§ Cf. R. Basset, *Nédromah et les Traras*, Paris, 1901, p. 76 f.

‖ Al-Bakri, *Description de l'Afrique*, p. 188 f.

¶ Ibn 'Azārī, *Histoire de l'Afrique et de l'Espagne*, ed. Dozy, Leyden, 1848–51, i. 22; Ibn Khaldūn, *op. cit.* vi. 109 f., vii. 9; Tijani, *Voyage*, tr. Rousseau, Paris, 1853, p. 65; 'Voyage de Mouley Ahmed,' in Berbrugger, *Voyages dans le sud de l'Algérie*, Paris, 1846, p. 236 f.

see below, founded a special religion, were renowned soothsayers, and belief in the former was part of the Qur'ān of her nephew.* Procopius does not describe the preliminary ceremonies employed by the Moorish women for vaticination, but the following practice takes place among the Tuaregs at el-Esnam, near Ghadames:

'During the absence of the men, the women, dressed in all their finery, go and take their stand near the tombs of the *Zabbār* (from Arabic *Jabbār*, "giant"), whom they [the Tuaregs] believe to be of a race previous to their own, and they invoke the genius who is to give them information. His name is *Idebni* (the tomb itself is called *Adebni*). He appears to them in the shape of a giant, with eyes like a camel, and gives the required information. For this consultation the women must avoid wearing anything whatever of iron or steel about them, even a needle.' †

The same ceremony takes place at Air, but during the night.‡

'On the sides of a ghūr which commands Wed Wujidit, in the North of the Sahara, are found great tombs corresponding to those on the rocky slopes of the Tabelbalet. They are elliptical in shape, with major axis, inclined East and West, varying from 20 to 45 metres. They are surrounded by heaps of moderately-sized stones. The Azger Tuaregs attribute these tombs to a former race. If a woman who has a friend, a relative, or a lover far away for any cause goes to sleep at the middle of the day in one of these enclosures of stones, she is sure to have visions, to meet spirits there, and get news of the absent one. The Tuaregs also claim that there is hidden treasure in these tombs.' §

But, in spite of what Procopius‖ says, the gift of prophecy was accorded to men as well as to women among the Berbers. To quote only two examples: among the Kotama, at the time of their civil wars, the soothsayer Failaq foretold that they would see real war when the man of the East came to them mounted on a white mule. This prediction was recalled by a schoolmaster on the arrival of the *dā'ī* 'Abd Allāh, the Fāṭimid missionary, mounted on a white mule (Ibn 'Aẓārī, i. 120). Similarly, the soothsayers in a tribe of the Maghrib had declared that, when the two superior planets met, a king would rise who would change the form of money. Malik ibn Wahib persuaded the amir of Lemtuna, 'Alī ibn Yūsuf, that it was to Mahdi ibn Tūmert that this prediction referred, as also the popular lines:

'Put fetters on his feet,
Or he will make you hear the drum'
(Ibn Khaldūn, vi. 238).

14. Ogres.—There still remains to be mentioned the belief in ogres, who play an important part in the popular tales of the Berbers. But we must keep in mind the ease with which tales travel, and take care to strip off all that is due to borrowing. Traces of originality may, however, be found in some of these stories. Among the Fadhilah and the Benu-'Aqidān—Berber tribes in the West of Egypt—it was said that often a new-born girl changed form, becoming an ogre (*ghūl*) or a *si'la*, and threw herself on people until she was bound and pinioned (al-Bakrī, p. 4). The Arab author even mentions an eye-witness of such an occurrence. It is given by a modern tale current at Wargla, *Story of a Father and his Daughter the Ogress*,¶ and is the foundation of an accusation brought against the Uled Settut ('the sons of the Megæra'), a tribe of the Rif noted for its *penchant* for brigandage.

'At first, Settut their mother used to be seen running about with her three children in a piece of land which is desert to this day, devouring the people and feeding her children on human flesh. No one knew where she came from; she was known of no male, ogre or human, and this afterwards occasioned the saying that the Uled Settut had no father. After devastating the country for many long years, she suddenly disappeared and was never seen again. But her children remained in the desert of Garet, and were the stock of the present Uled Settut.'**

The names by which the ogres are designated are, for the most part, of Berber origin. Although we find some that have come from Arabic, like *ghūl* or *zellūma*, yet among the Rif of Morocco and the K'sūr at Wargla, we find *amza*; among the Beni-Menacer *amza*, with feminine *thamzat* or *tamzat*, which is derived from the root MZ, 'seize,' 'take'; among the Zuawas *awaghzenis*. The ogress has also the name of *taghauzant* in the Chelh'a of Tazerwalt, of *tseriel* in Zuawa. But, in the tales, there is a mixture of names from stories relating to the ancient inhabitants of the country, pagans or Christians, designated also by the name of *Juhala* (Arabic for 'ignorant people'), and from stories circling around the ogres, confused to such an extent that these classes of stories are often mistaken for each other.

15. The ceremonies of worship.—Here we are reduced to conjectures, so far, at least, as the purely Berber gods are concerned. Wherever there were borrowing and assimilation, the ceremonies were those of the Phœnicians and Romans, and probably, in some parts, of the Greeks. Protected by their isolation, the Guanches were able to have a religion of their own. The way in which they practised the preservation of the mummies, for example, which was entrusted to a special caste, proves an original development among them, alongside of common traits, even before they had arrived at the idea of the immortality of the soul or of future rewards and punishments.† Viana mentions a female religious caste called *Harimaguadas* (or *Harimaguas*, *Magaas*) who lived in common, vowed virginity for a time, educated the children, and, as has been seen above, took part in certain ceremonies to get rain; the men were forbidden in that case to look at them.‡ The house where they lived was called *tamogantin acoran*, 'house of god' (in Berber, *tigimmi tin amoqran* [?]). In connexion with ceremonies, we may mention consultation by sleep.§ Examples of this have been cited above. We shall add another: in ancient times, the Augiles (of the oasis of Aujila) used to go to sleep on tombstones and take as answers the dreams they had during their sleep (Pomponius Mela, i. 8). This was also the custom of the Nasamonians (Herodotus, *Hist.* iv. 172). Al-Bakrī cites a case where this method of divination had no connexion with tombs or the dead. It was in the Rif, on the borders of Wed Lau (see, further, art. INCUBATION).

16. Feasts.—We must also speak of the feasts, which have been with reason called *saisonnières*, and which have continued among the majority of Berbers to mark the chief changes of the year. There is good ground for seeing in them the traces of a nature-worship with which may be associated some remains of agrarian rites. The feasts seem all the more ancient by being performed without the intervention of special ministrants, by being celebrated, not in the mosques, but near the tombs of popular priests, and by being addressed to invisible powers and not to consecrated persons. The principal feasts are those of *Ennair*, fixed for the whole year; the feast of *'ansera*, which may be called the water-festival; the feast of *'achūra*, etc. But it must be observed that the peculiarities characterizing these feasts, as death or re-birth of

* Al-Bakrī, *op. cit.* p. 100; Ibn Abi Zar', *Rauḍ al-Qarṭās*, ed. Tornberg, Upsala, 1843–46, i. 62; Ibn Khaldūn, *op. cit.* v. 216.

† Duveyrier, *Les Touaregs du Nord*, p. 415, *Sahara algérien et tunisien*, Paris, 1905, p. 203; Benhazera, *Six mois chez les Touaregs*, p. 63.

‡ E. de Bary, *Ghāt et les Touareg de l'Aïr*, Paris, 1898, p. 187 f.

§ Foureau, *D'Alger au Congo*, Paris, 1902, p. 65 f.

‖ Cf. Doutté, *Magie et religion dans l'Afrique du Nord*, pp. 31–33.

¶ Biarnay, *Étude sur le dialecte berbère de Ouargla*, pp. 255–257

* Mouliéras, *Le Maroc inconnu*, Oran, 1895, i. 188.

† Alonso de Espinosa, *The Guanches of Tenerife*, vol. i. ch. 9, 'The mode of Interment' p. 40 f.; Glas, *op. cit.* p. 74; Verneau, *op. cit.* pp. 79–84.

‡ Viana, *op. cit.* p. 22 f.; Gomez Escudero in Chil y Naranjo, *Estudios*, i. 520–522, 526; Glas, *op. cit.* p. 69 f.; Verneau, *op. cit.* p. 86.

§ Cf. Doutté, *op. cit.* pp. 410–416, and the authors quoted.

vegetation, or purification by fire and water, are not confined to the Berbers, but have been found among the most widely-differing peoples. It will be enough, therefore, to mention them.*

17. Traditions, etc.—It would be difficult to say whether the following tales, although current in Africa, are of Berber origin. Pliny the Elder tells that in this country 'no one begins any undertaking without first uttering the word "Africa," while in other countries affairs are begun by asking the favour of the gods' (*HN* XXVIII. v. 2). Isigonus and Nymphodorus, mentioned by the same author (*HN* VII. ii. 2, reproduced by Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae*, ix. 4), tell that there were in Africa families of sorcerers, 'who, by means of spells, cause flocks to perish, trees to wither up, and children to die.'†

But we are clearly dealing with Berbers in the following examples. In Tamernā, in the desert, between Sabāb and the mountains of Targhīn, a locality inhabited by the Beni-Geldīn and the Fuzānah, when a theft has been committed, the inhabitants trace some writing which they communicate to each other. The thief is immediately seized with a trembling, which does not stop until he has confessed his guilt and restored what he has stolen. He does not recover his calm until the writing is rubbed out (al-Bakrī, *op. cit.* p. 10). In one of the mountains of the Mejeksa of the Rif there lived a magician called Ibn Kosyah. This name, which means 'the son (man) with the little cloak,' was evidently a nickname borrowed from his way of acting. No one dared to contradict him or to disobey his wishes. If any one did, he turned the cloak in which he was wrapped, and then some malady attacked that person or his cattle instantly. No matter how numerous his opponents were, the malady fell on all the same as on one. He even made them believe that a light burned under his clothing. His sons and descendants inherited the same power (al-Bakrī, *op. cit.* p. 101). Similarly in the Rif, among the Ghūmara, a Beni-Shaddād tribe, part of the U-Halawāt, there lived a man who always carried a bag filled with animals' heads, and a cord strung with the teeth of land- and sea-animals. He used this as a chaplet. He passed it round the neck of the person who was consulting him, then shook it and tugged it violently. Next he began to smell each of the pieces separately until his hand stopped on one of them. Then he answered any questions that were put to him, and unerringly foretold illness, death, gain, loss, prosperity, disappointment, etc. (al-Bakrī, *op. cit.* p. 101). Mūsa, son of Sālih, was also a Ghūmara. He is said to have lived before the Hijra; but even in the 14th cent. there still remained his 'prophetic sayings, in the language of the country, containing a great number of predictions relating to the control which the Zenatas were going to exercise in the Maghrib. There is quoted, in proof of the accuracy of his prophecies, the fulfilment of the one that foretold the destruction of Tlemsen. The houses of this town were to become a field tilled by a negro with a one-eyed black bull. This is said to have taken place after the destruction of Tlemsen by the Merinides, between A.H. 760 [A.D. 1358] and 770 [A.D. 1368]. But if some people considered him a prophet, others took him for a magician. In any case all credited him with a supernatural power (ibn Khaldūn, *op. cit.* vi. 106, 276, vii. 51). Further mention will be found among Arab writers of persons who practised magic, such as Muhammad al-Kutamī, or 'Omar and his son 'Abd Allāh, chief of the Seksiwa; but this expression must refer to magic as understood by the Musalmāns—an imported science, not of native origin. The fame of the Berber women as sorceresses was already established in antiquity, as is shown by Virgil's anachronism when he makes a Massilian priestess be consulted by Dido, in order to keep Æneas by her magical arts (*Æneid*, iv. 483–498, 504–521). Even in our day the women of Jurjura practise incantations, for which they use certain plants. We have evidence of this in a popular song which begins thus:

'Greeting to thee, hawthorn (*id'nim*);
Men have called thee hawthorn;
For me, I call thee the *qaïd* which commands;
Transform this husband of mine into an ass,*
And I shall have straw brought him.'

The other plants mentioned are the roots of the dwarf-palm (*thagūnsa*), the wild jujube (*thazuggarth*), the fruit of the coniferæ—pine, cedar or fir (*azinba*)—and the green oak (*kerrush*).†

ii. *JUDAISM.*—It has been observed that the Jews of the North of Africa, with the exception of those who at well-known times were driven from Europe by persecution, do not belong to the race of Israel; and they have rightly been regarded as the descendants of Berbers converted to Judaism during the Roman era. In the time of Augustus we find Jewish colonies prospering in Cyrenaica and Libya, and the barbarian insurrection which broke out under Trajan at Cyprus, in Babylonia, Egypt, and Cyrenaica simultaneously, and which was repressed with great harshness, did not hinder the development of the Jewish communities. This may be seen from an inscription in a synagogue discovered at Hamman el-Enf (*CIL* viii. 12457). These communities acquired such importance that the Catholic Church took precautions to prevent relations between Christians and Jews, which soon became rigorous measures under the Christian Emperors, were suspended only by the triumph of the Vandals, and were revived with the victory of Belisarius and the Byzantines. Proselytism was naturally exercised among the lower classes of the population and even among rich Berber tribes. But we do not know what kind of proselytism it was, or to what extent the practices of the cult and the observance of the prescriptions of the Jewish Law were imposed, and we cannot give credence to a late romance with no more authority than, *e.g.*, the *Fath' Ifriqya*. The Arab writers mention several tribes which were Jewish when the Musalmāns came. But their statements are contradictory. Thus, in one place, ibn Khaldūn mentions among the Jewish tribes the Jerawas who lived in Aurās; the Nefūsa, the Fendelawa, the Mediūna, the Bahlūla, the Ghiatha, and the Fazaz in the Maghrib al-Aqsa (*Kitāb al-'Ibar*, vi. 107). But we have seen that according to tradition, the Kāhinah—a name foreign to the Arabs—had familiar genii. Al-Bakrī (*op. cit.* p. 9 f.) and ibn 'Azārī (*op. cit.* i. 3), both earlier than ibn Khaldūn, mention the Nefūsa as Christians; and traces of churches which have preserved their name in Jebel Nefūsa prove them right. But ibn Khaldūn himself in another place (*op. cit.* iv. 12) says that the tribes of the Fendelawa, the Bahlūla, the Mediūna, and the people of the territory of Fazaz professed, some magic (paganism), some Judaism, and some Christianity. The place where the town of Fas grew up was inhabited by two Zenata tribes: the Zuagha (Benu'l Khair) and the Benu Yarghosh. Some professed Islāmism, others Judaism, and others paganism. These last even had a temple at Shibuba, where later arose

* Cf. for full details on these feasts, Doutté, *op. cit.* pp. 541–584; and among the sources cited, Destaing, *L'Ennaïr chez les Beni-Snous*, Algiers, 1905, *Les fêtes saisonnières chez les Beni Snous*, Algiers, 1907; Said Bulifa, *Textes berbères en dialecte de l'Atlas marocain*, Paris, 1909, pp. 146–167.

† On the evil eye in most recent beliefs, cf. Doutté, *op. cit.* pp. 317–328, and the authors there quoted.

* The popular Berber tales include numerous examples of metamorphosis, but they are borrowed.

† Hanoteau, *Poésies populaires de la Kabylie du Jurjura*, Paris, 1867, pp. 306–312.

the Andalusian quarters. Ibn Abi Zar', who has preserved this detail (*Rauḍ al-Qarṭās*, i. 15), designates the pagans by the name of *majus* (magi), and he naturally calls their temple a house of fire. This passage has been reproduced by ibn Khaldūn (*op. cit.* iv. 13).

In the same era, the country of Temsna (the modern Shawia) and the towns of Chella and Tadla were peopled partly by Jews and partly by Christians, who submitted to accepting Islām after the conquest of that region under Idris I. It is not safe, therefore, to try to specify that such and such a tribe was exclusively Jewish or Christian. It seems nearer the truth to say that each tribe included families, or perhaps clans, of Jews, sufficient in number to be able to remain independent, at least in the Maghrib, until the end of the 2nd cent. A.H.—a long time after the conquests of 'Oqba and Mūsa. But the Judaism which is spread at the present day by the descendants of converted Berbers has nothing to distinguish it from the Judaism practised in the other regions of the civilized world; and as regards local superstitions, they are common to Jews and Musalmāns.*

iii. *CHRISTIANITY.*—We do not know how Christianity was brought to the Berbers, but probably we should look for its starting-point in the large towns, and for its first seats, as at Rome, in the Jewish communities. The separation was not long in taking place, and the Church of Africa soon became prosperous. But its history belongs rather to the history of Christianity, and it is impossible to cull from its developments and vicissitudes what refers specially to the Berbers. We may admit, however, that it was from among the latter, at least in the places under the direct control of Rome, that the Donatists were recruited—a sect which was more schismatic than heretical—and the Circumcelliones, whose movement, in spite of its religious colour, was social rather than national. The list of African bishoprics (Proconsular, Byzacene, Numidian, Mauretanian—Sitifian, Cæsarian, and Tingitan—and Tripolitan) contains a host of names of which the great majority are Berber; but it is difficult to identify them all, these names being often simply those of little villages, for the bishop's sphere of control was a very narrow one. Epigraphical evidences have enabled us to recognize some of them, and it seems very likely that the mass of the population, omitting Roman colonists and some foreigners, was composed of Berbers, or at least of a mixed race in which the Berber element was predominant. As for the half-subject or independent tribes among whom Christianity spread, we may suppose that conversion took place, as in so many other parts of the uncivilized world, by means of captives taken in incursions. The domination of the Arian Vandals made no alteration in this state of affairs further than that Catholicism, after having been the persecutor, became in its turn (except at very occasional intervals) the persecuted, and triumphed only by the success of the Byzantines.† We must mention, moreover, as having to do with the history of Christianity among the Berbers of the West of Algeria, the existence of a native dynasty at the beginning of the 5th cent., after the fall of the Vandals and before the Arab invasion. Some distance from Frenda the tombs of these princes are seen. Two names may be recognized: Mephanias, and Massonas, who seems to have been the same man as the Masema, 'rex gentium Maurorum ac Romanorum,' mentioned in a Latin inscription of Hajar el-Rūm (Lamoricière, *CIL* viii. 9835). It was a Christian Berber dynasty, as is shown by the emblems and remains of paintings which have been excavated on the tombstones known by the name of *jedar*, and already mentioned by the Arab historians. These princes probably disappeared with Christianity itself, at the first victories of the Musalmāns.*

In the other places, however, Christianity still survived for a long time: in Tripoli, among the Nefūsa, whose territory still contains a number of ruined churches; in Aurās, among the Beranes; and in the Rif, among the Ghūmara and the Sanhaja. We have seen that at the time of Idris, *i.e.* more than a century after the appearance of Islām in this country, there still existed in the Maghrib al-Aqsa, Christian tribes or parts of tribes. Wherever a treaty was concluded between the invaders and the native population, the latter, conforming to the Musalmān legislation, were able to keep their religion, but isolation and internal division hastened its fall. In the 10th cent. there were still forty bishops; in 1054, under Leo IX., only five remained, and of these two were disputing the presidency. In 1076, we see from the letters of Gregory VII. that there were only two left: Cyriacus, primate of Carthage, and Servandus, in the see of Hippo. There was still a bishop at the Qala'a of the Beni-Hammād; he had the Arabic title of *Khalīf*, and he certainly emigrated with his flock to Bougie under an-Nasīr.† A Christian community existed at the same time in Tlemsen, but we do not know whether it was under the authority of a bishop. In 1068, al-Bakrī‡ mentions a church in this town which was frequented by the remains of a Christian population surviving till that time. But everything was carried away by the current of the Almohads. No trace of Christianity remained, alongside of vague legends, except a few words, among others *Tafaski* (the Passover = Πασχα)—the name given to the fourth month of the year by the Taitaq, to the second by the Ahaggar. *Afasko* and *Tifisko* mean 'spring' among the Awelimmiden, and this word has penetrated even to the Dyolofs of Senegal, *Tabaski dya* corresponding to 'December.'

iv. *MUHAMMADANISM.*—1. History.—We have no exact information, nothing beyond the sometimes fanciful accounts of the conquest, about the way in which Islām spread in the North-West of Africa, but it is certain that it met with a lively resistance there. The first expeditions were only cavalry raids, with pillage as their main object, in which the Arabs avoided the strongholds where the natives and the descendants of the Roman colonists were taking refuge. The coast-line itself was respected, guarded as it was by the mountains and the ports which remained in Greek possession. The foundation of Kairwan by 'Oqba gave a character of stability and permanence to the spread of Islāmism, but in no decisive way. The Musalmāns were more than once driven right back to Tripoli; accordingly it is not wrong to suppose that the conversions they had succeeded in making did not last. The Arab historians themselves declare that the Berbers recanted from Islāmism twelve times; and it is probable that, if they had found an ally in a strong and well-organized neighbouring power, they themselves, instead of

* Cf. Cahen, 'Les Juifs dans l'Afrique septentrionale,' in *Notices et mémoires de la société archéologique de Constantine*, vol. xi., 1867, pp. 102–108; Monceaux, 'Les colonies juives dans l'Afrique romaine,' in *Revue des Études juives*, vol. xliv.; R. Basset, *Nédromah et les Traras*, pp. vii–xvii.

† Ferrère, *La situation religieuse de l'Afrique romaine depuis la fin du ive siècle jusqu' à l'invasion des Vandales*, Paris, 1897; Diehl, *L'Afrique byzantine*, Paris, 1896, lib. iii. pt. ii. ch. 2, 'L'Eglise d'Afrique sous le règne de Justinian,' pp. 408–449, vol. iv. pt. ii. ch. 2, 'L'Eglise d'Afrique et l'administration byzantine,' pp. 503–517.

* Cf. La Blanchère, *op. cit.* p. 78 *f.*; Gsell, *op. cit.* ii. 418–427, and the bibliography there given.

† Cf. de Mas Latrie, *Traités de paix et de commerce*, Paris, 1868, pp. 14–17, 18–23.

‡ *Op. cit.* p. 76.

the Byzantine Empire or the kingdom of the Goths, would have triumphantly repelled the Musalmān invasions. But their divisions and isolation, especially after the conquest of Spain by Mūsa, ended in securing the victory for Islām—a victory which was not absolute and decisive until the 12th century.

But if, during the earlier periods at least, they were converted more by force than by persuasion, they did not fail to retain in their new religion the independence and party-spirit which they had already shown in Christianity, by adopting schisms rather than orthodoxy. The history of the Musalmān Berbers is simple to unfold. Originally they were Sunnites, but soon they enthusiastically welcomed the most levelling ideas of Islām, and declared themselves for the various Kharijite sects. On account of a similar feeling—hostility towards the distant Khalīfate of Baghdad, or the nearer Khalīfate of Cordova—they took the side of the Alids, the opposite extreme from Islām, and became the source from which Idris ibn 'Abd Allāh and later 'Ubaid Allāh derived recruits to found their dynasties. Idris founded his in the present-day Morocco—a dynasty hostile to the Umayyads of Spain, and to the Abbāsids of Baghdad. That of 'Ubaid was at Mahadia—a dynasty which drove out the last representatives of the Abbāsids in Ifriqyah, almost succumbed to an offensive retaliation from the Kharijites, but was victorious at the last moment, and once more became mistress of North Africa and conquered Egypt. Then came a Sunnite re-action, taken part in by the Berbers of the South Sahara, the recently-converted Lemtuna—a tribe whose fortune was as brilliant as it was ephemeral. Other Berbers, the Masmūda of Atlas, whose chiefs were struggling against the gross anthropomorphism of the Almoravids (Lemtuna), founded a rival Khalīfate to the Khalīfate of Baghdad (the Khalīfate of Cordova was no longer in existence, and that of Cairo was about to disappear); but, clinging to orthodoxy, they destroyed the last remains of Christianity and all that had survived of Alid Shī'ism, while dealing a blow at the same time at Kharijism, already weakened by its struggle with the Fāṭimids—a blow from which it never recovered, so far, at least, as to be independent.

After this the North of Africa, *i.e.* the Berbers and Arabized Berbers, remained Sunnite except for some stubborn industrial communities which held out in Mzab, Jebel Nefūsa, and Jerba.

2. Sects.—(*a*) *Kharijites.*—To fill in the sketch just traced would be to give a complete history of North Africa, and would exceed the limits of this article. We shall therefore pass over the orthodox Islāmism of the Berbers and refer only to that part of their Islāmism which was characteristic, viz. the Kharijite doctrines (which, however, they were not alone in spreading), and to the attempts to found a religion which should be to Islām what Islām was to Christianity and Judaism. It must be understood that, apart from these attempts, the Berber revolts, under the name of religious sects, were essentially social; they were not due to differences of opinion or interpretation concerning dogma. As a matter of fact, the Berbers had controversialist theologians, but no great champions of orthodoxy or heterodoxy. They often attached themselves to the strictest parts of the Qur'ān text; the Lemtuna even accepted to the letter all the figurative expressions and became anthropomorphists. Thus, out of the four orthodox sects, the Berbers adopted the narrowest, the most restricted, the one which (after the Ḥanbalites) was most slavish to the letter, viz., that of Mālik ibn Anas.

Hunted down in the East, after the fall of Nahrawan and the victories of Hajjaj, which had saved the Khalīfate of Damascus and driven out the Iraq Arabi Kharijites, the latter, divided into two sects, Zubairites and Abadites, emigrated to the West. They found no difficulty in spreading their doctrine among the Berbers, the victims of the greedy Musalmān governors. In the interests of the public and also of their own private treasury, these governors did not exempt converts to Islām from the tax of a fifth—the tax paid by non-Musalmāns. The *Zubairites*, who took their name from 'Abd Allāh ibn Zubair of the Benu Tamim, were furthest advanced in the doctrine of Kharijism: they refused the name of Musalmān to any man guilty of even a venial sin, and even made it lawful to kill him and seize his goods. This doctrine was developed particularly in the north of what is now called Morocco, above all, among the Matghara and the Miknāsa. Led by an old water-carrier of Tangiers, Maisara, who took the title of Khalīf, more than 200,000 Berbers, with shaven heads and carrying the Qur'ān in front of them fastened to their spear-points, annihilated the Khalīf's armies and took possession of Tangiers and Sūs (A.H. 122 = A.D. 739–40). After an indecisive battle, they killed their chief Maisara, and put Khālid ibn Ḥamīd az-Zanātī in his place. In the following year, he destroyed two fresh Arab armies, and thus brought a general alleviation in central Maghrib. The two victories, of el-Qarn and el-Asnam, checked, but did not destroy, the Zubairite Berbers in the West; and their chief, Abu Qorrah, founded a State in the region of the Moluyya. The Idrisids destroyed this centre of strict Kharijism, concerning which we have only scanty information furnished by the orthodox writers. Nothing remained of it but a small State founded at Sijilmasa in the Tafilet. It disappeared in the great Fāṭimid struggle.*

Another group was formed in Jebel Nefūsa, South-East of Tripoli, and it was not long in spreading as far as the oases of Wargla and Wad Righ. This group is better known, because it left historical and religious records. These Kharijites were *Abadites*, dating their rise from 'Abd Allāh ibn 'Abād who lived in the 1st cent. A.H. This sect showed itself relatively more tolerant than the Zubairites, and its founder seems to have had relations with the Umayyad Khalīf Abd al-Malik. Its teaching was brought to the Maghrib by Salma ibn Sa'd, and later by 'Omar ibn Imkaten, Ismā'īl ibn Darrar, Asim as-Sadrati, etc. The most famous of its chiefs, Abu'l Khatt'āb, took the title of *imām*, and founded a centre, which was reduced to a province by his fall and death in A.H. 155 [A.D. 771], but which, nevertheless, has remained down to the present day one of the principal Abadite centres.† One of its officers, a man of Persian birth, 'Abd ar-Rahmān ibn Rustam, succeeded in founding a religious kingdom at Tahert (modern Tagdemt), which at one time comprised all the South of the modern region of Algeria, part of the region of Oran, the oases of the Constantine region, South Tunisia, and a part of the vilayet of Tripoli. But this kingdom was soon involved in divisions, as usually happened among the Berbers. Schisms arose: the Nukkarites, separated by personal questions, ending in reviving the uncompromising doctrines of the Zubairites;

* Cf. the summary of these events in Dozy, *Histoire des Musulmans d'Espagne*, Leyden, 1861, i. 141–156, 192–207, 238–250; Fournel, *Les Berbers*, i., Paris, 1875, 285–301, and the sources given; for the East specially, Wellhausen, *Das arabische Reich und sein Sturz*, Berlin, 1902, pp. 47–125.

† Cf. on the Abadites of Jebel Nefūsa, ash-Shamākhi, *Kitab as-Siar*, Cairo, n. d.; de Motylinski, *Les Livres de la secte abadhite*, Algiers, 1885, pp. 6–20, 28–35, 37–61, *Le Djebel Nefousa*, Paris, 1898–99; R. Basset, *Les Sanctuaires du Djebel Nefousa*, Paris, 1897.

and the Wasilites, with doctrines tending to Mu'tazilitism (liberalism). These dissensions greatly favoured the work of destruction accomplished later by the Fāṭimids.*

(*b*) *Alids.* — Although, on the one hand, the Berbers adopted and intensified the levelling characteristic of Islām, and the Zubairites and Nukkarites succeeded the Circumcelliones among them, on the other hand, some of them adopted an entirely opposite doctrine. These, instead of making the *imām* a chief freely elected by the community and, when necessary, deposed by it, saw in their *imām* not merely the descendant of the Prophet, but the incarnation of all the Prophets and even of the Deity. The Alid doctrine penetrated into the Maghrib, and was adopted twice as a protest against the orthodox Khalīfate. The first time, it was a descendant of 'Alī, Idris ibn Abd Allāh (who had escaped his family's disaster), that founded the dynasty of the Idrisids, and Fas afterwards became their capital. But it seems that the Shī'ite doctrine, professed at this time by the Berbers, meant simply adherence to this dynasty. It even contributed to the consolidation of Islām by converting the few Christians still surviving, and by destroying the Nukkarites settled in Tlemsen. This dynasty is of no importance in the religious history of the country. We need only observe that it had a firm ally in one Berber tribe, namely, the tribe of the Auraba.†

(*c*) *Ismā'ilians.*—The Ismā'ilian doctrine, on the other hand, made great modifications on Islām by reviving, under the mask of Shī'ism, the ancient doctrines of Persia—mixtures of Manichæism and Greek philosophy. It is hardly necessary to remark that the mass of the Berbers who rallied to this teaching always remained in the ranks lower than initiation. Those of the central Maghrib, in modern Great and Little Kabylia, became the chief adherents of the Fāṭimid prophet (*dā'ī*) 'Abd Allāh, and he recruited from them the army that was to destroy the remains of the Abbāsid government in Ifriqyah, the Zubairite-Kharijite kingdom of Sijilmasa, the Abadite-Kharijite kingdom of Tahert, and the ghost of a State which had taken the place of the Idrisid dynasty in Fas. The fall of Tahert scattered the Kharijites who were settled in it. Some of them were brought to Jerba, where one of their communities still exists; the others fled to Wargla, Sedrata, and the region of Wad Righ. Their life there was peaceful, and their prosperity increased steadily until the ravages of ibn Ghanya, and especially the expeditions of the Almohads, which brought the levelling influence of Musalmān orthodoxy over N. Africa, came to drive them from their refuge. Determined to keep their faith, they proceeded to settle in a hilly stretch, called in Arabic *chebka* ('thread'), where the Beni-Mzab-Wasilian nomads, whose name they took, used to wander about. Sheltered in this solitary place, where they made rich oases, the emigrants, like the Mormons on the shores of Great Salt Lake, prospered under the shadow of outside wars, and founded a community, a sort of ecclesiastical State. This community grew rich by commerce and agriculture; but, as usual among the Berbers, it was torn by dissensions, not only between towns (there were seven towns), but even between districts of towns. It required the authority of France, in 1882, to restore peace.

Another group of Nukkarites had remained independent in the Aurās. Abū Yazid, nicknamed 'the Man on the Ass,' brought up by an old schoolmaster who was born in the Sudan and preached the Kharijite doctrines in their utmost strictness, imperilled the existence of the Fāṭimid dynasty under its second prince. The dynasty was at this time reduced to within the walls of its capital, Mahdya. But a supreme effort saved it. The Berbers were first driven back, then utterly crushed, and the Empire of the Ismā'ilians regained all its power, which was increased later by the conquest of Egypt.* It was probably at this time that Kharijism disappeared in the central Maghrib (except in Wargla, Jebel Nefūsa, and Mzab).

As for the dynasties which followed, they were all helped by the Berber tribes from whom they were sprung, the Almoravids by the Lemtuna, the Almohads by the Masmūda, and the Kūmia by the Beni-Merin, the Beni-Zyān and the Beni-Wemannu, who ruled simultaneously. Their religious history, accordingly, offers no characteristic interest. And it is the same with the dynasties which were established in the central Maghrib and Ifriqyah before and after the great Hilālian invasion (in the eleventh century of our era).

3. **Present-day Islāmism.**—At the present day, orthodox Islāmism reigns alone (associated, of course, with local superstitions) all over North Africa, except, as has already been said, in Mzab, Jerba, and Jebel Nefūsa, where the modified Kharijism of the Abadites holds sway. It is especially in Mzab—the centre of theological studies, —that the traditions are kept up. The *iāzzaben* ('doctors') have retained an influence there which has a control over the conscience in spite of contact with Europeans. But Kharijism has lost its power of spreading, and more converts are being made by the Musalmāns.† We may form an idea of the doctrine at present in vogue from the summary given in an '*Aqidah* reduced to the Berber language, and then translated by a Nefūsi, Abu H'afs 'Omar ibn Jamia, who lived probably in the 11th cent. A.H. Several commentaries‡ have been made on it, and it forms the basis of the *Kitāb Ma'ālim* of Shaikh 'Abd al-Aziz of the Beni-Sgen, author of a treatise no less famous, the *Kitāb an-Nīl*. It is this latter that is now followed in Mzab and Jerba, while at Jebel Nefūsa it is the treatise of Shaikh Abu Tāher Ismā'īl al-Jaitāli, who died at Jerba A.H. 750 (A.D. 1349–1350). From the point of view of dogma, so far as the fundamental principles of Islām are concerned, this doctrine does not differ from orthodoxy. The only difference lies in some points of discipline: the *walāia*, the law imposing friendliness between Musalmāns of the same group, and its opposite, the *beraa* (in Mzab, *tebria*, 'punishment,' 'excommunication'); and, among the 'ways' of religion, besides the 'manifest way'—that of the first Khalīfs—the mention of the 'forbidden way,' the 'way of sacrifice,' and the 'secret way,' which, founded as they are on orthodox example, have justified the

* Cf. on the Rustamites, A. de Motylinski, *Les Livres de la secte abadhite*, pp. 20–28, 33–36; Masqueray, *Chronique d'Abou Zakaria*, Algiers, 1878; al-Barrādi, *Kitab el Djawaher*, Cairo, 1302; de Motylinski, *Chronique d'Ibn Saghir*, Paris, 1907.

† Cf. on the Idrisids, Fournel, *Les Berbers*, i. 396–401, 418 f., 447–450, 455–466, 473–477, 496–506, and the sources there cited, to which we may add Idris ben Ahmed, *Eddorar el bahyah*, Fas, A.H. 1324 [A.D. 1906].

* On the Fāṭimids, their domination in the Maghrib, and the insurrection of Abū Yazid, cf. Fournel, *Les Berbers*, ii., Paris, 1881; Masqueray, *Chronique d'Abou Zakaria*, pp. 205–251; de Goeje, *Mémoires d'histoire et de géographie orientales*, Leyden, 1886, vol. i.

† Cf. on Mzab, Coyne, *Le Mzab*, Algiers, 1879; Robin, *Le Mzab et son annexion*, Algiers, 1884; de Motylinski, *Guerara depuis sa fondation*, Algiers, 1885; Masqueray, *Formation des cités chez les populations sédentaires de l'Algérie*, Paris, 1886, pp. 173–221; Amat, *Le M'Zab et les M'Zabites*, Paris, 1888; Morand, *Les Kanouns du Mzab*, Algiers, 1903.

‡ The commentary and Arabic glosses of 'Omar ath-Tholathi and Daud ath-Tholathi were published at Constantine in A.H. 1323 [A.D. 1905] by M. de Motylinski, to whom also we owe an ed. of the text with a French tr., *L' 'Aqida populaire des Abadhites algériens*, Algiers, 1905. The *Kitāb an-Nīl* was published at Cairo in A.H. 1305 [A.D. 1887].

conduct of the Kharijites ever since their appearance.

4. Attempts to form new religions.—(*a*) *Ha-Mim.*—It remains now to speak of only two attempts to form a religion that should be the complement of Islāmism, as Islāmism claims to be of Judaism and Christianity. The first attempt took place among the Ghūmara of the Rif, in the neighbourhood of Tetūan, in the territory of Mejeksa among the Beni-Ujefūl. There is disagreement concerning the exact date of the appearance of this religion; opinions vary, from A.H. 313 to 325. In any case, it was at the beginning of the fourth century A.H., the tenth century of our era.

A certain Ha-Mim, son of Mann Allāh ('Grace of God'), son of Hariz, son of 'Amr, son of U-Jefūl, son of U-Zerūal, appeared in this tribe and preached a new religion. He cut out three of the canonical prayers, leaving only two—one for sunrise, the other for sunset. In offering these prayers, his followers had to prostrate themselves so as to touch the ground with the palms of both hands. He also dispensed with the Ramaḍān fast, except for the last three days, or, according to others, for ten days; but he established a fast till mid-day every Wednesday, and for the whole day every Thursday, as well as two days in Shauwāl. Whoever failed to keep these had to pay a fine of five or three oxen. He abolished pilgrimage, purification, and total ablution, allowed the use of pork, but forbade fish that had not had their throats cut (or been gutted), all animals' heads, and the eggs of all kinds of birds. Even to this day, a tribe in the neighbourhood of Tipasa and the Tuaregs abstain from hens' eggs. He composed a Qur'ān in Berber for the use of his partisans; the Arab writers at least call it a Qur'ān. Some fragments have been preserved. One of these began with the formula of the unity of God, then continued: 'Deliver me from my sins, O Thou who hast let Thy gaze rest upon the earth; withdraw me from my sins, as Thou didst withdraw Jonah from the whale's belly and Moses from the waters.' All prostrated themselves and repeated: 'I believe in Tanguit (or Talyah, Teba'ih), aunt of Ha-Mim.' This Tanguit was a sorceress like Dajjū, the sister of the new prophet. Ha-Mim, nicknamed *al-Muftārī* ('the forger'), made numerous converts right on till his death (A.H. 315 according to some, 325 according to others). He fell in a combat against the Masmūda in the territory of Tangiers. His sect did not disappear with him. Later on, a certain 'Asim ibn Jamil offered himself as a new prophet in this tribe.*

(*b*) *Ṣāliḥ.*—Another attempt was of more importance. In the West of the Maghrib, in Temesna (the modern Shawia, which includes Casablanca, Rabat, and Chella), the Berghūata were settled. One of their chiefs, Tarif, who seems to have been of Jewish origin (son of Simeon, son of Jacob, son of Isaac), had, along with his people, embraced the Zubairi-Kharijite doctrines and struggled against Maisara. After the fall of the Berbers, he retired to Temesna and lived there in independence. He remained faithful to the doctrines of Islām; but his son, distinguished for his learning and virtues, who had also fought in the ranks of the Zubairites, offered himself as Prophet and composed a Berber Qur'ān. But he did not spread his doctrine; he entrusted it to his son Elias, and set out for the East, declaring that he would return when the seventh king of his dynasty was on the throne. The new religion remained in seclusion until the reign of Yūnos, who proclaimed it abroad and compelled the people to adopt it whether they would or not. The doctrine of Ṣāliḥ, who presented himself as the *Ṣāliḥ al-Mu'minīn* mentioned in the Qur'ān (lxvi. 4), was as follows: to recognize the Divine purpose of all the prophets and of Ṣāliḥ himself, to fast during the month of Rajab instead of Ramaḍān, and also on a certain day of the week and the same day the following weeks; to pray five times a day and five times every night; to celebrate the feast of sacrifices on the eleventh of Muḥarram (and not on the twelfth of Dhul-ḥijja).

The manner of performing ablutions was equally definite. There was no invocation (*adān*) or introduction to prayers (*iqāma*). Sometimes prayers were offered with prostration, sometimes without; in the first case, the congregation raised their foreheads and hands half a handbreadth from the ground. In proclamation of the greatness of God (*tākbīr*), they placed one hand on the other and said: *A esm en Iakosh* ('to the name of God'), then *Mokkor Iakosh* ('God is great'). The Orientalists are wrong who have thought to recognize the name of Bacchus in this word or in its variant Bakosh, and have drawn such extraordinary conclusions about the extent of Bacchus' worship and mysteries. M. de Motylinski has shown that this name Iakosh is derived from the Berber root UKSH, which means 'to give.' It is an epithet corresponding to the Arab *al-Wahhāb*, 'the generous,' one of the epithets of God.*

Public prayer took place on Thursdays very early in the morning. When making profession of faith, they held their hands open and leaning on the ground; they repeated half (?) of their Qur'ān standing and the rest prostrate. At the end of the prayer they pronounced this formula in their own language: 'God is above us; nothing that is on the earth or in the sky is hid from Him.' Then they repeated in Berber: *Mokkor Iakosh* ('God is great'); or, as often, *Ihan* (*Ian*) *Iakosh* ('God is one') and *Ur d'am Iakosh* ('There is none like God'). The alms required by law were half of all their grain. As in the religion of Ha-Mim, it was forbidden to eat eggs, the head of any animal, or fish that had not had their throats cut. Cock's flesh was forbidden, the cock announcing prayer by its crow. Hens' flesh was allowed only in cases of dire necessity. Liars were driven from the country; thieves, when convicted by evidence or by their own confession, were put to death; fornication was punished by stoning. The blood-price was fixed at a hundred head of beasts. Any man could marry as many wives as his means allowed (cousins to the third degree being forbidden), and repudiate them and take them again as often as he pleased. But the faithful were forbidden to marry Musalmān wives, or to give their daughters to Musalmāns. The saliva of their Prophet brought Divine blessings with it, and was regarded as an infallible remedy; this kind of belief still exists among certain Musalmāns of Algeria with regard to their marabouts.

Lastly, it should be said that they were very far advanced in astronomy and highly skilled in judicial astrology. The Qur'ān which Ṣāliḥ composed in Berber contained eighty *sūras*, most of them having a prophet's name for title. The first was called *Ayyūb* (Job, cf. Qur'ān xxi. 83), the last *Yūnos* (Jonah, the title of *sūra* x. of the Qur'ān). The names show clearly that it is an imitation of the Qur'ān. There were the *sūras*

* Cf. al-Bakri, *Kitāb al-Masālik*, p. 100 f.; ibn Abi Zar', *Rauḍ al-Qarṭās*, ed. Tornberg, i. 62 f.; anonymous, *Kitāb al-Istibṣār*, ed. Kremer, p. 80; ibn 'Aẓāri, *Kitāb al-Bayān*, i. 198; ibn Khaldūn, *op. cit.* vi. 216; an-Nuairi, Appendix to *Histoire des Berbères* tr. de Slane, ii. 492 f.

* de Motylinski, *Le nom berbère de Dieu chez les Abadhites*, Algiers, 1905; R. Basset, *Le nom berbère de Dieu chez les Abadhites*, Susa, 1906.

of *Fir'aun* (Pharaoh, cf. Qur'ān xliii. 45–55); of *Qārūn* (Korah, Qur'ān xxviii. 79); of *Hāmān* (Aman, cf. Qur'ān xxviii.); of *Yājūj and Mājūj* (Gog and Magog, Qur'ān xviii. 93, xxi. 96); of *ad-Dajjāl* (Antichrist, Qur'ān xxvii. 84); of *al-'Ijl* (the Calf of Gold, cf. Qur'ān ii.); of *Hārūt and Mārūt* (cf. Qur'ān ii. 96); of *Ṭālūt* (Saul, cf. Qur'ān ii. 245 f.); of *Nimrod*; of the *Cock*, the *Partridge*, the *Grasshopper*, the *Camel*, the *Eight-footed Serpent*, and of the *Marvels of the World* which contained the most lofty knowledge. A fragment of the *sūra* of Job has been preserved in an Arab translation: 'In the name of God! He by whom God has sent his Book to men is also he by whom He has told forth His tidings. They say: Iblis has knowledge of destiny. God forbid! Iblis cannot have the knowledge of God. What can triumph over tongues in discourse? God alone can by His decree. By the tongue by which God has sent His truth to men, that truth is established. Look at Mamet [in Berber, *imūni Mamet*, i.e. Muhammad]. During his life, and right on to his death, his followers conducted themselves aright. Then his people grew corrupt. He has lied who said that truth survives where there is no messenger from God.'

The Berghūata offered a long and successful resistance to the various dynasties which followed each other in the Maghrib, and it was only to the Almohads that their sect finally succumbed.*

Must we consider as the provenance of one of these sects or of a sect analogous to them the beliefs of the Zekkara, who live in Morocco not far from the Algerian frontier, between the Beni-Iznacen, the Beni-Bū Zeggū, and the Beni-Ya'la? We have not only been informed (though it would be wise to check the information) of their absolute antagonism to the Musalmāns and their dogmas, but have even got hints of a complete indifference to every kind of belief. Some have even gone the length of regarding them as Positivists, although they claim to believe in the doctrine of the celebrated marabout buried at Miliana, Sidi Aḥmad ibn Yūsuf.† The most daring systems have found acceptance; even Druses have been seen there. Before risking any opinion on this question, we should wait until a seriously conducted inquiry is made. When this has been done, it will probably be found that this is a tribe which, on account of its isolation, has remained in the state in which the greater part of North Africa was during the anarchy of the 15th and 16th centuries, when the Musalmān missionaries succeeded in resuscitating Islāmism from a vague shadowy memory.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given fully throughout the article. In addition to the works there mentioned, the following may also be consulted:—H. Leclercq, *L'Afrique chrétienne*, 2 vols., Paris, 1904, vol. i. for paganism, and *passim* for Christianity; M. Slouschz, *Hebræo-phéniciens et Judéo-berbères*, Paris, 1908. RENÉ BASSET.

BEREANS.—The Bereans were a religious sect, originating in Edinburgh in the year 1773, who took their name from the Bereans mentioned in Ac $17^{10.11}$ ('who received the word with all readiness of mind, and searched the Scriptures daily, whether these things were so').

1. **Life of founder.**—John Barclay, their founder, was the son of a farmer, Ludovic Barclay, in the parish of Muthill. Early designed by his father for the Church, he received a good education, and was sent to the University of St. Andrews. In his theological course he came under the influence of Dr. Archibald Campbell, professor of Church History, author of an *Enquiry into the Original of Moral Virtue*, and *The Necessity of Revelation*. Campbell's views attracted considerable attention in his time, and were deemed sufficiently heretical to bring him to the bar of the General Assembly, though the case was dismissed. The first of four charges was that he held that 'man was unable by the use of his rational powers to find out the Being of a God.' This thesis Barclay was afterwards to take up and amplify.

Meantime Barclay was licensed on 27th September 1759 by the Presbytery of Auchterarder, and shortly afterwards was appointed assistant to the Rev. James Jobson of Errol. From the first he attracted attention by his preaching. He was a man of strong convictions, of great fervency of utterance, with a command of rhetorical language which readily passed into violent invective against those who opposed what he conceived to be the truth. Jobson belonged to the Evangelical party in the Church. He was a 'Marrow man,' with clear views of his own, and it is not surprising to find that after some controversial passages, culminating in a statement from the pulpit of their respective positions, he and Barclay were obliged to part. In 1763, Barclay went to Fettercairn to be assistant to the Rev. Anthony Dow, whose failing health prevented him from fulfilling the duties of his pastorate. Here he found himself in a more congenial atmosphere, as Dow's son, who was minister of Dron, had sat on the same bench with him at college, and sympathized with his opinions. Barclay's ministrations were warmly received by the people. He preached to crowded congregations, many flocking from the surrounding parishes attracted by his eloquence. He was most assiduous in his visitation and catechizing, and exercised a strong moral influence over the people. Barclay had a considerable gift of verse, though his productions scarcely rise into the region of poetry. Many of his verses were afterwards collected into a hymnary which was used in his own church.

In 1766, Barclay came into collision with the Presbytery through the publication of a book entitled *Rejoice Evermore, or Christ All in All*. The book was condemned as heretical, and Barclay received a formal censure. A list of his heresies was also drawn up and read from the pulpit of Fettercairn Church. This, however, only increased his popularity in the parish. When Barclay's connexion with the parish ceased, he asked for the usual Presbyterial certificate, which was refused, nominally on the ground that he was obstructing the peaceable settlement of the presentee. Barclay appealed from this refusal to the Synod and Assembly, but the appeal was dismissed.

On the occurrence of the vacancy at Fettercairn a petition was sent to the Crown (in whose gift the patronage lay) by the whole body of the parishioners, asking for the appointment of Barclay as their minister. The petition was refused, and the Rev. Robert Foote was presented to the living, though only three communicants could be found to sign the call. An appeal to Synod and Assembly met the usual fate. Thereupon the whole body of the congregation, to the number of over a thousand, hived off and built a church at Sauchieburn, in the neighbouring parish of Marykirk.

Meantime Barclay, by appeal in the matter of his certificate, had had an opportunity of stating his views in the General Assembly and also of preaching in various churches in Edinburgh. In the capital he gained a number of adherents, who resolved to secede from the Church, and who presented him with a formal call to be their minister. The church at Sauchieburn also wished to secure his services, but Barclay preferred to stay in Edinburgh, though his adherents there were very few (the call contains sixty signatures), and could

* Cf. on the Berghūata, al-Bakrī, *Kitāb al-Masālik*, pp. 134–141; ibn Abī Zar', *Rauḍ al-Qarṭās*, pp. 82–84; ibn Azārī, *Kitāb al-Bayān*, pp. 231–236; ibn Khaldūn, *op. cit.* vi. 207–210.

† Mouliéras, *Une tribu Zénète anti-musulmane au Maroc*, Paris, 1905.

do very little for him. It is a characteristic of Scottish dissent which is frequently overlooked that a peculiar High Church tradition has invariably run through it. The call of the people, while indispensable to a valid ministry, has never been deemed sufficient. The minister must be ordained by his brethren in the ministry, who alone can judge of his qualification, and through whom alone can come the necessary authority to administer the ordinances of religion and to dispense the sacraments. Barclay's congregation could not find any presbytery in Scotland that would furnish him with the necessary status, and so he was sent to England with a general letter addressed 'to whatever Presbytery or class of dissenting Brethren this shall be presented.' Armed with this epistle and accompanied by two commissioners from his own congregation, Barclay proceeded to Newcastle, where he was regularly ordained on 12th October 1773. The certificate of ordination is signed by John Blyth, moderator, minister at Thirsley; Robert Green, clerk; and three others. On his return to Edinburgh, the new Church was constituted as the 'Berean Assembly,' so called from 'those noble Bereans who professed to search the Scriptures for the whole counsel of God, and to have a conversation becoming the gospel of Christ.' The church at Fettercairn had meantime found a minister in Mr. James Macrae, and another congregation had been formed at Crieff which, through its proximity to Muthill, had been touched by Barclay's influence.

The internal economy of the Church in Edinburgh was troubled from the first. The congregation was very poor, and Barclay had never more than £18 a year for his services. He was more concerned, however, about the publication of his views than about the straitened means of his domestic life, and the unwillingness of the outlying congregations of Fettercairn and Crieff to subscribe to a complete edition of his works was the occasion of much searching of heart. An epistle, signed by all the managers and overseers of the Church in Edinburgh, was sent to these provincial centres, pointing out the serious detriment it was to the Berean cause, 'which is the only Christian cause on the face of the earth,' that at a time when the Truth of God was being hopelessly perverted, its defence should fail through their negligence to purchase a book containing 'an express and undeniable confutation of all the heresies of men in the power of the devil.' The arguments used by some of Barclay's followers for giving him no encouragement to publish was an inference from his own central thesis. 'Since we know nothing of God and Divine things save from the Bible,' they urged, 'what is the use of publishing theological treatises?' In 1776, however, all difficulties seem to have been got over, and there appeared *The Psalms, paraphrased according to the New Testament Interpretation*, prefaced by a long dissertation in which Barclay expounds his peculiar ideas of Scripture. This is very much a reproduction and expansion of his earlier work, *Rejoice Evermore*. His previous productions had been *Without Faith, without God, or an appeal to God concerning His own Existence*, and a *Tractate on the Eternal Generation of the Son*, called forth by a phase of the Glassite controversy in 1769, *On the Assurance of Faith, On the Observation of the Lord's Supper*, and *A Letter on Prayer*, in 1774. In 1778 these were re-published along with a *Treatise on the Sin against the Holy Ghost*. In 1783 appeared *The Epistle to the Hebrews paraphrased*, and later, *A Close Examination into the Truth of several received Publications*. A new edition of part of his works was published in 1852, with funds left for the purpose by Mr. James Carsewell, for many years a deacon of the Berean Church in Glasgow.

Barclay had the zeal of an apostle. Towards the close of 1776 he went to London on the invitation of some friends who had read his books and sympathized with his views. He meant to stay only a few weeks, but he was so warmly received and attracted such crowds of admiring hearers that he was forced to remain in order to consolidate the movement. Meanwhile he was sorely distressed by the importunities of the little flock in Edinburgh, who needed his personal influence to hold them together. He sent, as his substitute, William Nelson, a surgeon, who, before his departure, was ordained to the ministry. Nelson was a man of some gifts. He had been educated for the Church of England, but had embraced the doctrines of Whitefield, and had joined the Calvinistic Methodists. While in England, Barclay visited Bristol, where a Berean Church was founded. There is an interesting passage in the *Autobiography* of Dr. Somerville of Jedburgh which shows conclusively that Barclay made a considerable impression in London. Writing of the year 1785, he says (p. 219):

'Upon the dismission of this little congregation we were met by such an immense crowd pressing at the entrances to the chapel that we could not make an escape without a struggle; and when I enquired who came next, I was answered by one of the female sex which seemed to predominate in this new assemblage, "The Bereans, if you please." The Rev. Dr. Horsely, a few days before, had mentioned the sect (the Bereans) to me, of which I had not heard before. He said it had lately sprung up in the west of Scotland, and he seemed to speak of it as an interesting event and likely to make a figure in the Christian Church. I confess I was rather ashamed to be found ignorant of an event occurring at my own door which seemed to him so important.'

The fact that an intellect so acute as that of Horsely, the great champion of orthodoxy against Socinianism, saw possibilities in Barclay's views is sufficient evidence that they were worthy of more attention than they have since received.

Barclay returned from London in 1778, leaving the church there in charge of two ordained presbyters, James Donaldson and Samuel Bishop. He resumed his ministry in Edinburgh, and Nelson was sent throughout the provinces to strengthen the Berean churches that had sprung up in various places. There is a record of congregations in Glasgow, Crieff, Kirkcaldy, Dundee, Arbroath, Montrose, Brechin, and Fettercairn. Barclay himself took a keen interest in all these churches. His means were narrow. His stipend from his own church was trifling, and, though he had a small income from property belonging to his first wife, it was spent mainly in publishing his books. His apostolic journeys, therefore, were on foot, and were confined to Scotland—which was one reason why the cause in England languished. His exertions gradually impaired his health. He died suddenly, while on his way to church, in a friend's house, on 29th July 1798, and was buried in Calton cemetery, where a monument is erected to his memory. His work was carried on in Edinburgh by Donaldson, one of the London pastors, who had some time previously been transferred to the pastorate at Dundee. Under his charge the church for twenty-five years met with a fair measure of success, but after his death it was split up by internal dissensions and gradually melted away. The Berean churches throughout the country in course of time lost their identity and were merged in the Congregationalists.

2. Doctrine.—John Barclay's theological position is extremely interesting, and ought not to be dismissed with the scant courtesy with which it has hitherto been treated. In this obscure founder of a dead sect we see a man struggling with a theological environment that was inadequate to contain his thought, and endeavouring to express in the theological terminology of his day ideas that in our time have created their own terminology. His leading tenet is that we derive all our knowledge of God from direct revelation—the revelation given us in God's word. Now this is just the position of Ritschl, and Barclay reached it by a process of thought similar to that of the German theologian. Ritschl had Kant to fall back upon in order to find a metaphysical sanction for his system. John Barclay had to create his own metaphysics on a hint supplied to him by Dr. Archibald Campbell. His central thesis he states thus: 'We do not come to the knowledge of God by any foregoing train of reasonings to introduce it, but merely by a sovereign act of God's own power, revealing Himself in our hearts.' In short, reason is totally inadequate to reach the idea of God.

Barclay thus consciously breaks with the Scholastic distinction, held in his day by every section of the Christian Church, between Natural and Revealed Religion. The Scholastic position is that our belief in God is an inference crowning a logical process. Reason convinces us of the existence of God, but all that reason can tell us of God is the bare fact of His existence. We need revelation to supplement reason, to unfold to us the nature of God, to explain His attributes, and to teach us His relation to man. To believe otherwise is to land ourselves in a logical dilemma. To say that we believe in God because we believe the revelation of Himself He has given us in Scripture, and that we believe the Scripture revelation to be true because it comes from God, is simply reasoning in a vicious circle. We must have an antecedent belief in God before revelation becomes even a rational conception. Now John Barclay in Scotland saw as clearly as Kant did in Germany, and rather before him than after, that there is a deeper fallacy than appears underlying this method. In the first place, suppose reason could prove the bare existence of God, all that reason gives us is a mere abstraction—a mere *caput mortuum*. We cannot know God apart from His attributes any more than we can know substance apart from its qualities. The variety of ethnic ideas concerning God shows that there is no unanimity regarding any one of His attributes, or even regarding the moral or immoral consistency of His character. It was admitted by all Christian schools that the attributes of God can be known to us only through revelation. If this be so, then the God of Nature, a Being without attributes, is an impossible conception.

(1) But what of the theistic arguments themselves? Barclay criticizes them with an acumen worthy of Kant. He takes up the *a priori* proof of Dr. Samuel Clarke, which then held the field, stating it thus: 'No being can produce another being or thing before itself exists. But the world exists; therefore the world behoved to be produced by some other being which must have existed before the world, and what can that being which must have existed before the world in order to produce it be but God?' Barclay points out that the original position holds here with regard to God. On this learned divine's own showing there must be something antecedent to God in order to produce Him. In short, you cannot reason from contingency to absolute being. You can but recede through secondary causes till imagination calls a halt, and then arbitrarily posit a self-existent cause. But this is not reasoning, and the result of it is not God. And the same holds true of the argument from design: 'If you were to see a beautiful, convenient, and well-contrived house, would you not conjecture that there behoved to be some artist for the builder, and that he were eminent in his way too; you would not imagine that it came by chance.' Again, Barclay with rare acumen and a truly modern ring says: 'There is no argument here. We know men, and we know houses are their works, from experience and observation; but we have no access for experience or observation in the framing of worlds.' Moreover, he goes on to say, we cannot tell the character of the workman directly from his works, which may be fashioned for either a good or an evil purpose. It is our antecedent knowledge of that character that determines the judgment we form of his works.

No doubt there is much in this reasoning that reminds us of Hume as well as Kant, but it is doubtful whether Barclay was familiar with Hume. He was evidently a good classical scholar and well read in the theology of his day, but the present writer can find no direct reference to Hume in his works, though the analogy of his reasoning with that of the sceptical philosopher was early pointed out by the Rev. D. Thom of Liverpool, one of his disciples. Barclay's interests were purely religious and theological. He did not trouble himself with the problems of epistemology. But undoubtedly his main position is exactly that of Hume, viz., that we cannot carry our ideas of causation beyond the field of experience and observation, that we cannot argue from the finite to the infinite, and that so transcendental a fact as a Divine revelation cannot be reached by argument or established by human testimony. It was rather from Dr. Archibald Campbell that Barclay drew his inspiration. And yet the two men were of essentially different natures, and even their central tenets were by no means identical. Campbell's polemic is directed against the Deists, and all he seeks to prove is that as a matter of fact and history men never have arrived at a true conception of God by means of reason or the light of nature. He does not assert that reason is incapable of discovering God, but only that reason never has discovered God without the aid of revelation. The knowledge of God, therefore, may still be the logical prius of revelation, though it never has been the actual antecedent. Barclay's intellect, on the other hand, is metaphysical. His argument is essentially a criticism of the reasoning faculty. There is something in its very nature that prevents reason from grasping the transcendental.

(2) But what is revealed truth, and on what testimony is it to be received? To this the answer is that the objective content of revelation is to be found in the Bible, and the Bible is to be received on the testimony of the Holy Ghost. 'God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ' (2 Co 4[6]). The illumination that enables the soul to see God in the Bible is a direct act of His grace, administered by the Holy Spirit. But the Holy Ghost gives only the illumination. The knowledge of God comes from without. It is seen in the face of Jesus Christ, of whom the whole Scripture testifies. This assent to the truth of the revelation of God given in Scripture is 'faith.' Faith is not a subjective emotion or personal appropriation of Christ. It is an intellectual act. It is belief in the Bible in its totality as the word of God, on *the testimony of the Holy Ghost*, i.e. through the light thrown upon it by the Holy Ghost illumining the soul of the believer, 'without any kind of collateral support, or any other evidence or testimony whatever.' There is no mysterious meaning in the theological term 'belief.' 'Belief is our holding of a thing for truth which is told us by another person, merely on account of that person's credibility or authority.' We believe earthly things on human testimony, heavenly things on Divine. Barclay is here doing what all the great theologians have done. He is simply interpreting his own experience. He saw that all the arguments for the being of God were untenable and inconclusive. And yet he knew that this fact, instead of shaking his faith, seemed only to confirm it. His faith, therefore, came from a deeper source than logical reasoning. It was inevitable. It was the illumination of the Holy Ghost. And if he held by the intellectual nature of faith, and made it grasp an objective reality outside of the soul itself, it was because he also saw the extreme danger of allowing his faith to be merged into a mere subjective emotion which might lure him into all the vagaries of mysticism. He refused to separate between the practical and the pure reason, as Kant did. He held rather, with the later idealists, that the postulates of experience were as much intellectually apprehended and had as genuine an objective validity as the inferences of syllogistic reasoning.

(3) And this conception of the nature of faith led to the distinctive tenet which brought him into most direct collision with the theology of his time, and was the cause of his being repelled as a heretic even from the most evangelical Churches—the assurance of salvation. It was his insistence upon this point as of the very essence of faith that was the cause of the charge of antinomianism to which he was continually subjected. To understand his point of view, we must place ourselves in the theological atmosphere of his day. The 'Moderates' were ex-

treme Calvinists in theory, but moralists in their practical teaching. The distinctive doctrines of Christianity formed simply the background of their prelections, and had little vital relation with the ethical life. The 'Evangelicals,' again, were moderate in their Calvinism, insisting strongly on the universality of Christ's atonement, but they made faith a mystic quality which was inwrought with the very texture of their religious practice. The atonement was sufficient for the whole race of humanity, but the elect alone were saved; for the atonement meant simply a free offer of the gospel, which became efficacious in the soul of the believer only by an 'appropriating act' of which they could give no clear account. When a sinner became awakened to a consciousness of sin, his great endeavour was to obtain 'an interest in Christ.' This he reached through a soul-struggle in which he passed from despair, through doubts and fears and fervent prayers, to a modified assurance which was chequered, even in the case of the greatest saint, with strange misgivings lest after all he was not in a state of grace. The practical test as to whether he was in a state of grace was his good works; for good works, though powerless to secure salvation, yet necessarily flowed from the 'appropriation' of Christ.

Now Barclay opposed both of these parties with a vehemence rendered impressive by his large command of the language of invective. The Moderates, in their eloquent laudations of the beauty of virtue, had no need of faith. But the Evangelicals were even worse, for they made God a liar and blasphemed against the Holy Ghost. To believe was to be saved, and belief meant simply faith in the Scriptural record. This faith was, indeed, a gift of God. It was the illumination of the Holy Ghost making the record luminous, and commending it to the believer's heart and conscience. It came unbidden, and was not to be prayed for, nay, could not be prayed for; for only the prayer of faith was efficacious, and without faith the sinner knew neither what to pray for nor to whom to address his prayer. Barclay repudiated the religion of doubts and fears and misgivings as of the devil. For a believer to doubt of his own salvation was simply to doubt the veracity of the Holy Ghost, and proved that he was no believer. 'Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ is born of God' (1 Jn 5^1). If a man is born of God, then he is spiritually alive, and life is its own evidence. 'He that believeth hath the witness in himself, as he hath consciousness in himself of life and being, while he is alive and awake.' And again, 'Shall I then doubt or deny that I certainly see and exactly distinguish colours and objects with my own eyes, because another man is unhappy enough to be blind, or must needs be so perverse as to shut his eyes and then affirm that he cannot see the objects which I see and confess I do see? Is his blindness or perverseness any argument against my sight and my pleasure therein? I would indeed gladly open the windows of his chamber to let in light. I would set before him all the agreeable objects I myself perceive; but, alas! I cannot open the eyes of the blind or convert the perverse.'

It is plain that Barclay is not taking the word 'belief' in a mere conventional sense. It is not the general belief we give to matters we have never thought over, but accept simply as part of our environment. It is the belief which comes from personal conviction of a truth that enforces a rule of conduct, such as our belief in causation or the uniformity of natural law. And this belief comes only through the supernatural action of the Holy Ghost. It differs from the 'faith' of the Evangelicals in being more an intellectual act than a subjective emotion; for the 'appropriation' of Christ, which to them alone secures salvation, is essentially subjective in its nature. The difference between the two parties is a very real one, and Barclay is much nearer the modern standpoint than they were. In fact, Barclay is here, with Ritschl, making a 'value judgment.' Jesus Christ has to him the value of God, and simply to realize this is salvation. It is to be within the Kingdom. Barclay realizes it, not through any historical evidence as to the truth of the record, nor through any metaphysical reasoning as to the personality of the Son, but because life becomes luminous to him when he accepts it, because the Holy Ghost testifies to his soul and conscience that the fact is so. There is here no room for doubt. He is simply treading the solid rock of experience. He is trusting his own consciousness, and he cannot do otherwise. His assurance is perfect, and it is synonymous with his faith.

(4) And from this position resulted certain other tenets that ran counter to the religious ideas of his age. The sin of unbelief was the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, which could not be forgiven either under the old dispensation or under the new. For to doubt the testimony of the Holy Ghost, *i.e.* to obscure the inner illumination, was to be in a state of perdition. So long as that state lasted salvation was impossible, because light was impossible. This was evidently the meaning of his teaching, though Barclay takes the old theological words in the old theological sense. Further, it was impossible for a sinner to pray for his own conversion. Barclay knew that for him the light was shining while others were in darkness. He could account for the fact only on the old lines of predestination. The sinner could but wait and be passive till God of His free grace opened his eyes. Prayer was one of the privileges of the believer, who was to pray for greater sanctity, because that entrance into the Kingdom which was salvation was but the first step in his spiritual progress. Moreover, the Lord's Supper was not a renewal of the covenant with God—a solemn, mystic rite to be approached with fear and trembling, because Christ was present at a Communion Table as He was present nowhere else. Believers were always to be holy, and required no more special preparation to commemorate the death of Christ at a Communion Table than to commemorate His resurrection on the Lord's Day. Barclay held that the idea of covenant-renewal at the Lord's Table, with the mystic sense of a Real Presence hovering around it, led logically to the Romish doctrine of the Sacrifice of the Mass. His views were those associated with the name of Zwingli.

(5) Barclay's conception of Scripture, in which to his opponents he seemed merely to be setting himself up as the only infallible interpreter of Holy Writ, must be taken in the light of his whole system, and will be found to be an inevitable deduction from his central tenet. To Barclay the testimony of the Holy Ghost is to Jesus Christ as the only Revealer of God. 'God . . . hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ' (2 Co 4^6). But the knowledge of God through Jesus Christ came to him from the word of God. And the word of God was the Holy Scripture. Here, again, the position is exactly like that of Ritschl, but there is this difference: Ritschl approaches a Bible that has been critically examined, dissected, re-constructed. He can no longer maintain the old theory of inspiration, but he is satisfied that the spiritual process which Scripture records remains unimpaired. That process can be read and understood only through Jesus Christ, who is the One Revealer of God, a knowledge of whom is life eternal. Barclay, from the circumstances of his time, had

to accept the Bible uncritically. The Bible was a book dictated by God to inspired penmen, who wrote exactly what God told them, whether they understood it or not. This was the general idea of the age, and Barclay differs from his contemporaries only in holding it more clearly and consistently than they did. The subject of the Bible is Jesus Christ and His salvation, and in a book practically written by God there must be no irrelevancies. The Bible invites a close and prayerful study. There are some parts of it which, to the soul illumined by the Holy Ghost, are clear as crystal. There are others that are dark and obscure. The true principle of interpretation, therefore, is holding fast by Jesus Christ, the main thesis, to interpret the obscure by the clear. The Holy Ghost Himself supplies a clue to the right interpretation in the references made in the Gospels to the fulfilment of prophecy in the Messiah. Many of these passages are from the Psalms, and it was to the Psalms that Barclay specially devoted his remarkable powers of exegesis. It seemed to him that the Evangelists regarded the Psalms as simply prophetic biographies of the coming Messiah, and this idea fell in exactly with his theory of Holy Writ. The Psalms in no wise express the emotions of the penmen. If they did, it is clear that their religion must have been dangerously similar to that religion of doubts and fears which he repudiates. They are the expression either of the sufferings of the Messiah when the whole weight of the world's sin pressed upon Him, or of the sufferings and triumphs of the Church of Christ. There is no verse in the Psalter that is not a reference either to Christ Himself or to His Church. Barclay has his canons of criticism, which are too long to be detailed here, but which show a careful study of the Psalms, and a singular appreciation of those points which, in other hands, have yielded different conclusions. He notices, *e.g.*, that the last two verses of Psalm 51 have not the personal note of what precedes, and uses them to give a Messianic interpretation to the whole. He points out, too, how his method of exegesis gets over the difficulty of the cursing Psalms. It is inconceivable that any of the saints of God could have uttered such curses upon their personal enemies. But when we know that the speaker is He who said, 'Vengeance is mine,' and that those whom He is cursing are the enemies of the gospel, the difficulty disappears. Barclay translated the Psalms into English verse, bringing out in each what he conceived to be its Messianic meaning. The book was intended to be used as a book of praise in the Berean Church, but it is notable that, in 1826, the edition published for this purpose, while it contains his dissertation, falls back upon the familiar version common to all Presbyterian Churches.

Barclay's religious system has fallen into complete oblivion. Of the churches he founded not a single trace remains. He lacked the spiritual magnetism necessary to be a great religious leader, and his theological position is deficient in that mystic element which touches the heart and excites enthusiasm. He was a metaphysician rather than a prophet, an acute reasoner rather than an inspired visionary, though neither was his knowledge of philosophy sufficiently wide nor his mental grasp sufficiently strong to enable him to break from his environments and find his proper sphere. He was intensely assertive in holding his tenets, and his powers of vituperation were extraordinary, necessarily repelling instead of conciliating opponents. But, at the same time, he has his own distinctive place in the history of the development of religious thought, and his ideas have enough permanent vitality in them to entitle them to a better fate than they have received.

LITERATURE.—The account of Barclay's life has been taken from the records of the Presbytery of Fordoun, extracts relating to his case having been made by the Rev. J. Brown of Berwie, presbytery-clerk, and also from the *Memorials of the Berean Assembly*, the official record of the Church in Edinburgh, in the possession of the writer. There is a life of Barclay in Chambers's *Biographies of Eminent Scotsmen*, 1835, and the *Dictionary of National Biography*, and short accounts in *Lives* prefixed to various editions of his works. A brief exposition of his doctrines is given in a preface to an edition of *Without Faith, without God*, by D. Thom of Liverpool in 1836. See also Archibald Campbell, *Necessity of Revelation*, 1739; *Autobiography of Dr. Somerville of Jedburgh*, 1861; Cameron, *History of Fettercairn*, 1899.

A. MILLER.

BERENGAR.—Berengar (Bérenger) was born at Tours about 1000 A.D. He was educated at Chartres, and was a pupil of Fulbert, the Bishop of Chartres. In 1031 he became Director of the Cathedral School at Tours. About 1040 he was appointed Archdeacon of Angers, though he continued to live at Tours. Some eight years later it was widely reported that he was advocating an opinion that the consecrated elements in the Holy Eucharist are only figures and likenesses of the body and blood of Christ, and not the body and blood themselves. He does not appear to have made any answer to remonstrances which were addressed to him by his friends, Adelman of Liège and Hugh of Langres. In 1050 he wrote to Lanfranc, the Prior of Bec, who was afterwards Archbishop of Canterbury, that he agreed with John the Scot about the Eucharist, probably meaning by 'John the Scot' the treatise of Ratramn, *On the Body and Blood of the Lord*, under the belief that this was the work of John Scotus Erigena. In a Council held at Rome in 1050 under Pope Leo IX. this letter was read, and Berengar was excommunicated. At a Council held at Brionne, near Bec, a little later, he is said to have made some kind of retractation. King Henry I. of France imprisoned him; and in September 1050, while he was in prison, his opinions were condemned at a Council held at Vercelli. A month later there was another condemnation in a Council held at Paris. In 1054 at a Council meeting at Tours under the presidency of Hildebrand, afterwards Pope Gregory VII., as Papal legate, Berengar denied the charges brought against him, and declared that after consecration the bread and wine are really the body and blood of Christ. Five years later, at a Council held at Rome, when Nicholas II. was Pope, Berengar burnt his writings, and either actually signed, or gave some kind of assent to, a paper drawn up by Cardinal Humbert in the following terms:

'I, Berengar, an unworthy deacon of the Church of St. Maurice of Angers, acknowledging the true Catholic and Apostolic faith, anathematize every heresy, especially that concerning which I have hitherto been in ill repute, which attempts to affirm that the bread and wine which are placed on the altar are, after consecration, only a sacrament and not the real body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, and that these cannot be held or broken by the hands of the priests or crushed by the teeth of the faithful with the senses but only by way of sacrament. And I assent to the Holy Roman and Apostolic See, and with mouth and heart I profess that concerning the sacrament of the Lord's Table I hold the faith which the Lord and venerable Pope Nicholas and this Holy Synod have by Evangelical and Apostolical authority delivered to be held and have confirmed to me, namely, that the bread and wine which are placed on the altar are, after consecration, not only a sacrament, but also the real body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, and that with the senses, not only by way of sacrament but in reality, these are held and broken by the hands of the priests and are crushed by the teeth of the faithful.'*

For some time after this Council any controversy in this matter was confined to theological discussion by means of writings. Further condemnations

* The wording of this document is capable of two interpretations. It is usually thought to be the expression of a wholly natural and carnal view of the Eucharistic presence. On the other hand, it was explained by the mediæval theologians to be a loose way of stating that the consecrated sacrament held in the hand and eaten in the mouth is the body of Christ. It is not unlikely that in a panic such expression as that in the document might be given to this belief.

were passed on the teaching of Berengar at Councils held at Poitiers in 1075, and at Saint Maixent in 1076. In 1078 a Council was held at Rome under Pope Gregory VII., whose policy both before and after he became Pope was aimed at protecting Berengar by endeavouring to find a form of words, in accordance with the ordinary belief, which he could accept. At this Council Berengar assented to a statement of much more general character than that which had been required at Rome in 1059. It was in these terms:

'I profess that the bread of the altar is, after consecration, the real body of Christ, which was born of the Virgin, which suffered on the cross, which sitteth on the right hand of the Father; and that the wine of the altar, after it has been consecrated, is the real blood which flowed from the side of Christ.'

In 1079 another Council was held at Rome, and at this Berengar, after some struggles, subscribed a statement which was more explicit than that of the previous year, but without the special kind of language which had marked the declaration of 1059. This statement was as follows:

'I, Berengar, believe with my heart and confess with my mouth that the bread and wine which are placed on the altar are, by the mystery of the holy prayer and the words of our Redeemer, substantially converted into the real, and true, and life-giving flesh and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, and are, after the consecration, the real body of Christ, which was born of the Virgin, and which was offered and hung on the cross for the salvation of the world, and which sitteth on the right hand of the Father; and the real blood of Christ, which was shed from His side, not only by way of sign and sacramental power, but in peculiarity of nature and reality of substance.'

In 1080 a Council was held at Bordeaux, at which Berengar made a statement as to his belief, which appears to have been accepted by the Council as satisfactory. He died in 1088 at St. Cosme, an island in the Loire near Tours.

There is considerable difficulty in forming a judgment as to what the opinions of Berengar really were. There is no doubt of his vacillations under persecution; and it is probable that his mind changed to some extent from time to time. Of contemporary authorities who wrote against him, Lanfranc and Durand of Troarn say that he regarded the consecrated elements as being merely figures of the body and blood of Christ; while Witmund of Aversa records a view that he held an opinion that the body and blood of Christ are united with the elements so that, without the bread and wine being changed, the body and blood are present in the consecrated sacrament. In his own treatise, *On the Holy Supper*, it is quite clear that he denies any destruction or material change or conversion of the bread and wine, and any idea of a carnal or natural presence of the body of Christ; but as to the further question whether he meant that the consecrated elements are the body and blood of Christ in actual spiritual reality or that they are so only figuratively or virtually, there are passages which tell in both directions. It is not impossible that this difficulty in interpreting his language reflects some degree of uncertainty in his own mind; and such uncertainty may afford part of the explanation of his failure to meet opposition and persecution in any steadfast and consistent way. There appear to have been two schools among his followers, one of which maintained that the consecrated elements are merely figures of the body and blood of Christ, while the other asserted a presence of the body and blood united, through the consecration, with the bread and wine, without any change in the bread and wine themselves.

LITERATURE.—*Berengar. Turon. de sacra cœna adv. Lanfrancum*, ed. Vischer, Berlin, 1834; Lanfranc, 'de corp. et sang. Domini adv. Berengar. Turon.,' in *PL* cl.; Durand of Troarn, 'Liber de corp. et sang. Christi c. Berengar. et eius sectatores,' *ib.* cxlix.; Witmund of Aversa, 'de corp. et sang. Christi veritate in Eucharistia,' in *PL* cxlix., and in Hurter, *Sanctorum Patr. Opusc. Selecta*, xxxviii.; Adelman of Liège, 'de Eucharist. sacramento ad Berengar. Epistola,' in *PL* cxliii.; Hugh of Langres, 'Tract. de corp. et sang. Christi c. Berengar.,' *ib.* cxlii.; Hardouin, *Concilia*, vi. (1), 1015, 1016, 1017, 1018, 1021, 1022, 1041, 1042, 1064, 1551–1554, 1587, 1588; Mansi, *Supplementum*, ii. 27–30; Vernet, 'Bérenger de Tours,' in Vacant-Mangenot's *Dict. de Théol. Cathol.* ii. 722–742; Gore *Dissertations on Subjects connected with the Incarnation*, 1895 pp. 248–264; Robertson, *Hist. of Christian Church*, 1876, iv 351–369; Bowden, *Life and Pontificate of Gregory the Seventh*, 1840, ii. 240–251; Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma* (Eng. tr. 1894–99) vi. 46–51; Stone, *Hist. of Doct. of Holy Eucharist*, 1909, i. 244–259; Schmitzer, *Berengar von Tours, sein Leben und seine Lehre*, Munich, 1890. DARWELL STONE.

BERIYĀ.—See BEḌIYĀ.

BERKELEY.—

1. **Life.**—George Berkeley, bishop and philosopher, was born on 12th March 1685 at Dysert in the county of Kilkenny, Ireland. At the age of 11 he was sent to Kilkenny school, and four years later, in 1700, left for Trinity College, Dublin, where in the various capacities of undergraduate, graduate, fellow, and tutor he remained for the next twelve years. The latter half of this residence at Trinity College is, so far as his philosophy is concerned, the most important period of his life. For it was then that he thought out his leading philosophical ideas and published his chief philosophical works. His later life did not lack opportunities apparently no less favourable for philosophical reflexion; but his interests had by that time been largely diverted to practical work, and, even as regards philosophy itself, his first constructive impulse seems to have yielded to the receptive mood of the meditative scholar.

The next period of Berkeley's life is divided between foreign travel and residence in London, where he speedily became intimate with, and greatly esteemed by, the cultured society of the time, including literary men such as Steele, Addison, Swift, and Pope. At the end of 1713 he went abroad as chaplain to the brilliant but eccentric Lord Peterborough, and spent nearly a year in travel in France and Italy. After an interval of two years, regarding which little is known, we find him again in Italy, this time as travelling tutor; and of this tour, prolonged over some four years, and covering a considerable part of Italy and Sicily, a partial record has survived in the shape of a private *Journal*, which copiously illustrates his impartial curiosity and close observation.

The period of his life which begins with his return to London, at the end of 1720, is marked out by the conception, attempted realization, and enforced abandonment, of his singular project for founding a missionary college at Bermuda. In 1724 he was made Dean of Derry. In the previous year he had received a totally unexpected legacy from a lady to whom, as one of his letters tells us, he was a perfect stranger—Hester Vanhomrigh, better known in connexion with the life of his friend Swift. This improvement in his fortunes enabled Berkeley to devote himself seriously to the realization of his Bermuda scheme. At length his efforts to arouse interest in it were rewarded. He obtained a Parliamentary vote of £20,000. The money, however, was never forthcoming; and in 1728, anxious to convince people that he was in earnest, Berkeley set sail with his wife, whom he had but lately married, and some friends, not directly for Bermuda, but for Rhode Island, where he was to await payment of the grant. After some three years' waiting it became clear, from a broad hint given by the minister Walpole himself, that there was little or no hope that the official assurances of payment would ever be carried out, and Berkeley set sail once more for England.

Some two years after his return he was made Bishop of Cloyne, and, in this retired spot in the county of Cork, Berkeley, whose health was now somewhat broken, spent the next eighteen years of his life, occupied partly with practical work, partly with scholarly study and meditation. In 1752 he left Cloyne to reside at Oxford, where one of his sons was going to be educated; but he did not long survive the change. His death took place on 14th January 1753.

2. **Works.**—As was said above, Berkeley's most important philosophical works were written in early life. The works referred to are the *Essay towards a new Theory of Vision* (1709), *Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* (1710), and *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* (1713). These works will be dealt with below. To this period belongs also a discourse on *Passive Obedience* (1712), which is important as containing a brief statement of his views on the fundamental principles of ethical and political obligation. The content of social and political duty is defined, according to Berkeley, by universal and immutable laws of nature, by which he means rules of action whose constant observance is plainly seen to be necessary to the general well-being of mankind. The sanction of duty lies in the Divine government of the world, and the motive of duty in that reasonable regard for our eternal happiness, which should induce us to obey laws of nature so

sanctioned. In the discourse Berkeley is more particularly concerned to show (against, *e.g.*, Locke) that unlimited passive obedience to the civil ruler is a law of nature.

Upon this early period of productive activity a long interval of almost twenty years ensued, broken only by the publication in 1721 of a Latin treatise, *de Motu*, in which motion and causation are discussed from a philosophical point of view. Continental travel, London society, and his Bermuda project occupied his interests, and, when at length the quieter years of waiting at Rhode Island enabled him to produce a considerable work, he comes before us less as a philosopher than as an apologist of morality and Christian religion. *Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher* (1732), the longest of Berkeley's writings, consists of a series of seven dialogues directed 'against those who are called Free-Thinkers.' Under the somewhat vague designation of 'Free-Thinking,' Berkeley includes practically any tendency of thought which he thinks hostile to the best interests of morality and Christian religion. And the rather undiscriminating zeal which leads him, not merely to condemn the levity of Mandeville, but to assail with somewhat inadequate criticism the genuine convictions of Shaftesbury, must be allowed to deserve the censure of being 'not without a tincture of clerical party spirit.'

The earlier dialogues are admirable examples of that literary form, and are extremely well managed for Berkeley's purpose. Two types of free-thinker are depicted for us. Alciphron, as confident in his philosophical pretensions as he is devoid of real thoroughness, is capable of taking part in reasonable discussion, but can never anticipate the effects of his own admissions, and succumbs helplessly to criticism. His constant recourse to new arguments renders only the more apparent his superficiality of mind. In Lysicles, on the other hand, free-thinking means little more than an absence of moral principle. He is ready to spout the extremest cynical views, but will not trouble himself with sustained argument, and remains quite unaffected by criticisms which he cannot answer. The later dialogues, in which Berkeley defends Christianity with the weapons of a now antiquated apologetics, are undeniably tedious. Considerations of literary art are too often forgotten, and the natural interchange of argument and answer gives place to instruction and learned disquisition.

In 1733 Berkeley was induced by the misconceptions of an anonymous critic to return, with a tract on *The Theory of Vision or Visual Language, Vindicated and Explained*, to the argument of his earliest work, which he had used for apologetic purposes in *Alciphron*. The next two years saw him involved in a mathematical controversy provoked by his attempt to show that mathematicians have no right to enlarge upon the obscurity and defective foundations of religious doctrine, since their own science is in such respects by no means beyond reproach. Berkeley's next published work, *The Querist*, which appeared in three parts (1735–1737), consists of a long series of brief and pointed questions, designed to call his fellow-countrymen's attention to the social and economic condition of Ireland and the means of improving that condition. The queries give ample evidence, not merely of the very genuine and practical character of Berkeley's philanthropy and patriotism, but also, when we consider the time at which he wrote, of a very remarkable grasp of economic truth as to the true sources of real wealth, as to money, credit, and banking, and as to the interaction of moral and economic causes. Finally, in 1744 there appeared an extraordinary work entitled *Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries concerning the Virtues of Tar-Water*, better known by the title of *Siris*, which was prefixed to the second edition. The work was produced primarily to communicate to the world Berkeley's own conviction and experience of the medicinal value of tar-water. But the chain of reflexions which is hung on this medical peg proceeds to connect

'tar with the highest thoughts about things, by links which involve botanical, chemical, physiological, and metaphysical speculations that are subtle and mystical. . . . Its successive links of ascending science are connected by a gradual evolution, first, with ancient and modern literature concerning Fire; and, next, with the meditations of the greatest of the ancients about the substantial and causal dependence of the universe upon active Mind' (Fraser's Preface in *Works*[2], vol. iii. p. 118).

The book is to be regarded rather as an illustration of the learned studies which occupied the leisure of Berkeley's later life than as a document of his own philosophy. The 'hoary maxims' of antiquity 'scattered in this Essay,' he tells us, 'are not proposed as principles, but barely as hints to awaken and exercise the inquisitive reader' (§ 350).

3. Philosophy.—For a statement of Berkeley's substantive philosophy, then, we must depend on the earlier works of 1709–1713, together with the important *Commonplace Book* (first published in Fraser's *Life and Letters of Berkeley*), which was kept by Berkeley in the immediately preceding years of his residence at Trinity College, and in which his philosophy is seen in the making. The three main doctrines set forth in these works are those of Nominalism, Immaterialism, and Acquired Visual Perception, and all three furnish real and important contributions to philosophical thought. 'Among all philosophers, ancient or modern,' says Ferrier (Essay on Berkeley in Ferrier's *Philos. Remains*, 1866, vol. ii.), there is 'none who presents fewer vulnerable points than Bishop Berkeley.' And this is probably true if we are content to criticize Berkeley in respect of the things which he actually said, not in respect of those which he left unsaid. Ferrier goes on to point out the reason of Berkeley's success:

'The peculiar endowment by which Berkeley was distinguished, far beyond his predecessors and contemporaries, and far beyond almost every philosopher who has succeeded him, was the eye he had for *facts*, and the singular pertinacity with which he refused to be dislodged from his hold upon them.' And again, 'he was a speculator in the truest sense of the word; for speculation . . . is the power of seeing true facts, and of *unseeing* false ones.' 'No man ever delighted less to expatiate in the regions of the abstract, the impalpable, the fanciful, and the unknown. His heart and soul clung with inseparable tenacity to the concrete realities of the universe.'

(1) *Nominalism.*—It is this dislike of unreal abstractions, this desire to see concrete facts and to see them as they are, that inspires Berkeley's attack on 'abstract general ideas' in the Introduction to the *Principles of Human Knowledge*. He fastens upon a well-meaning, but not altogether happy, passage in Locke's *Essay*, in which that candid inquirer asks:

'Does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle . . . for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once? In effect, it is something imperfect that cannot exist, an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together.'

Berkeley makes short work of this passage:

'Mr. Locke acknowledgeth,' he says (in a later work, *Defence of Free-Thinking in Mathematics*, § 46, where he is referring back to the *Principles*), 'it doth require pains and skill to form his general idea of a triangle. He farther expressly saith it must be neither oblique nor rectangular, neither equilateral nor scalenum; but all and none of these at once. He also saith it is an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together. All this looks very like a contradiction. But, to put the matter past dispute, it must be noted that he affirms it to be somewhat imperfect *that cannot exist*; consequently, the idea thereof is impossible or inconsistent.'

And Berkeley makes his well-known appeal to the reader 'to look a little into his own thoughts, and there try whether he has or can attain to have' such an idea as Locke describes (Introd. to *Principles*, § 13). Now Berkeley's main contention in this attack is perfectly sound, viz. that a general idea is something *toto cœlo* different from a confused image. He does not, it must be observed, deny that there are general ideas, but only that there are *abstract* general ideas, *i.e.* ideas which can be *imaged apart in their generality*. His own

example of generalized thinking makes this point perfectly clear:

'Suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the method of cutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, for instance, a black line of an inch in length: this, which in itself is a particular line, is nevertheless with regard to its signification general, since, as it is there used, it represents all particular lines whatsoever; so that what is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines, or, in other words, of a line in general' (Introd. to *Principles*, § 12).

That is to say, a percept or image may in itself be quite definite and particular, and yet be the vehicle of a general meaning. Berkeley's contention, then, could be expressed by saying that we must distinguish sharply between an image and a meaning, and must place true generality not in images but in meanings. (The recognition by modern psychology of the *generic* image does not affect the question of principle.) Now, the symbols we use to express general meanings are words, and, unfortunately, in his eagerness to avoid unreal abstractions, Berkeley tends to say that generality is simply a matter of the application of names. In the rough draft (first published by Fraser) which Berkeley made of the Introduction to the *Principles* he states this view in a very uncompromising way:

'If a man may be allowed to know his own meaning, I do declare that in my thoughts the word "animal" is neither supposed to stand for an universal nature, nor yet for an abstract idea, which to me is at least as absurd and incomprehensible as the other. Nor does it indeed [in the proposition that Melampus is an animal] stand for any idea at all. All that I intend to signify thereby being only this—that the particular thing I call Melampus has a right to be called by the name "animal"' (*Works*[2], iii. 374).

That this view cannot be maintained is certain. For it is evident (1) that the 'right to be called by the name animal' must be based on certain properties which Melampus possesses in common with other animals; and (2) that these common properties may be made an object of thought. That is to say, there must exist a 'universal nature' (though not an *abstract* universal nature, or platonic *εἶδος*), and we must be able to think that universal nature by means of a general idea (though not an *abstract* general idea or *general image*).

It is to this same tendency to let the *meaning* fall out between the image and the word, that we must trace Berkeley's algebraic theory of general discourse:

'In reading and discoursing, names [are] for the most part used as letters are in Algebra, in which, though a particular quantity be marked by each letter, yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each letter suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity it was appointed to stand for' (Introd. to *Principles*, § 19).

The fatal defect of this theory is, that, whereas in Algebra we attend to the symbols themselves, in reading and discoursing we attend, not to the words as such, but to their meanings (cf. Stout's *Analytic Psychology*, vol. i. p. 88).

(2) *Metaphysics of Immaterialism.*—There were two general ideas more especially, in respect of which men seemed to Berkeley to have become the victims of their own unreal abstractions—the ideas of Matter and Existence. Ignoring or forgetting the concrete applications on which the meaning and value of these general ideas depend, men had come to confer in thought *on the mere abstractions* another, and actually more fundamental, sort of reality than that possessed by the concrete experiences from which the abstractions are illegitimately derived. ''Tis on the discovering of the nature and meaning and import of existence that I chiefly insist,' says Berkeley in the *Commonplace Book* (*Works*[2], i. 17). Now, if we are to discover this real meaning of Existence, we must keep continually before our view the actual conditions under which alone this general idea can find particular application. We must not begin, for instance, by making the perfectly gratuitous assumption that there is a real or absolute existence of things, totally distinct from their being perceived or known. By doing so we should obviously be setting up a general idea which is abstract in the bad sense, because in the very nature of the case it can never have any application in experience. Yet this is precisely the assumption which the free and uncritical use of abstract general ideas like Matter and Existence leads men of science and philosophers to make. They wish to assert the reality of things, especially of external or material things, against sceptical doubts. But they choose the very worst possible way of doing so. For they put the real nature of things quite outside perception or knowledge, and thereby remove the only reason we have for asserting their existence or reality at all, viz. that we have actually experienced it. And thus, as a consequence of the misuse of abstractions, we land ourselves in the most absurd contradiction—the supposed real or absolute nature of things is nothing but 'the fiction of our own brain,' and yet we have made it 'inaccessible to all our faculties' (Preface to *Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*). We have by our own act delivered ourselves over bound hand and foot to the sceptic. When we are pressed as to what we mean by the absolute existence of things, we have to admit that we have no knowledge of it at all. 'Methought I had some dilute and airy notion of Pure Entity in abstract; but, upon closer attention, it hath quite vanished out of sight.' Pure being is a '*something in general*, which being interpreted proves *nothing*' (*Dialogues* [*Works*[2], i. 437]).

We must return, therefore, Berkeley argues in effect, from these empty and mischievous abstractions to observe the actual conditions under which we predicate existence. And we observe, in the first place, that the things we affirm to exist are things which we know, *i.e.* objects of knowledge—in the case of the material world, objects of perception—and that the existence we affirm of them is their known or perceived existence. We affirm them to exist in that manner in which we know or perceive them as existing. Take first the case of material or sensible things. When we speak of the existence of material things, we mean their existence as we perceive them. Their *esse*, as Berkeley puts it, is *percipi*. Of an existence on their part different in kind from that which they have as objects of perception we know, and in the nature of the case can know, nothing. 'If there were external bodies [so existing], it is impossible we should ever come to know it; and if there were not, we might have the very same reasons to think there were that we have now' (*Principles*, § 20).

To express the fact that the only kind of existence which we can intelligibly attribute to material things is that kind of existence which they have for perception, Berkeley describes them as *ideas*, i.e. objects before the mind. In view of Locke's use of the term 'idea,' this mode of expression was the natural one for Berkeley to adopt, but it has exposed him to much misunderstanding. To it, no doubt, is mainly due the constantly repeated, but largely unjust, accusation of subjective idealism. Berkeley was quite aware of the danger of what we may call the *popular* misunderstanding of his terminology. 'It sounds very harsh,' he supposes an objector to urge, 'to say we eat and drink ideas, and are clothed with ideas' (see his answer and explanation regarding the use of the term 'idea' in *Principles*, §§ 38, 39). He was also aware of the danger of a more subtle or *philosophical* misunderstanding, viz. that of attributing to ideas some other kind of relation to the mind than that simply of being objects

before it. 'It may perhaps be objected that, if extension and figure exist only in the mind, it follows that the mind is extended and figured.' His answer is that 'those qualities are in the mind only as they are perceived by it—that is, not by way of *mode* or *attribute*, but only by way of idea' (*Principles*, § 49, and cf. the important passage in *Dialogues* [*Works*², i. 470]). But the question may be raised whether Berkeley himself was really able to keep himself free from the subtle confusion which he is here trying to obviate. Does not the habit of describing things as ideas tend to make him regard external things as simply modifications, or private possessions, of the individual mind that perceives them? His critics assume as a matter of course that he did so regard them. And certainly he makes statements which can easily be understood in that sense. For instance, 'What are [material things] but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations?' (*Principles*, § 4). Or again, 'Did men but consider that the sun, moon, and stars, and every other object of the senses, are *only* so many sensations in their minds, which have no other existence but barely being perceived, doubtless they would never [as idolaters do] fall down and worship their own *ideas*' (*Principles*, § 94). In passages like these he seems to enunciate subjective idealism in its extremest form. But it must be remembered that everything depends on the prepossessions with which we read these emphatic statements. When the critic, who reads them in the light of his ready-made distinction *between ideas and things*, sees that things are said to be nothing but ideas, he straightway infers that all reality and objectivity are taken out of them. But Berkeley, who entirely denies the distinction *in the sense in which the critic intends it*, infers no such conclusion. On the contrary, he conceives himself, as we have seen, to be vindicating for our perceptions the reality which has been denied to them in order to be attributed to empty abstractions. As he himself protests, he is 'not for changing things into ideas, but rather ideas into things' (*Dialogues* [*Works*², i. 463]). 'Those immediate objects of perception,' says Philonous to Hylas, 'which, according to you, are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things themselves' (*ib.*). From this point of view, then, it is much nearer the truth to speak, with Professor Fraser, of Berkeley's Immediate Sense-Realism (*Life and Letters of Berkeley*, p. 386, where see also the illuminating footnote with its well-known illustration of the two concentric circles). What Berkeley's critics, of course, object to is that things and ideas should be identified at all. But unless the distinction between ideas and things is to be asserted in that absolute fashion, which leads, as Berkeley himself pointed out, directly to scepticism, the objection is really irrelevant. For any less extreme distinction between ideas and things is, and must be, from Berkeley's point of view, a distinction *within ideas themselves in his sense of the term.*

For it must be observed that, when we say that, according to Berkeley, the *esse* of material things is *percipi*, we are by no means giving a complete statement of his doctrine as to their reality. He affirms that all material things are ideas, but he does not affirm that all ideas are material things. The remainder of his doctrine, however, is less characteristic, and may be stated quite briefly. The important question is how those ideas or objects which we regard as real are distinguished from those which are *mere* ideas or products of the imagination. The distinction rests, according to Berkeley, on these grounds: (1) that real objects of sense are independent of our will, (2) that they are much stronger and more distinct than ideas of the imagination, (3) that they are connected together according to fixed laws (*Principles*, §§ 29, 30). That fixed connexions of some sort should obtain among our ideas of sense is the condition upon which alone we can 'regulate our actions for the benefit of life; and without this we should be eternally at a loss' (*Principles*, § 31). But why the particular laws of connexion which do obtain should be just those and not others we cannot say; so far as our insight goes, the laws of nature are contingent or, as Berkeley is fond of saying, arbitrary.

So far we have been dealing with the reality of *material* things. But the doctrine of the nature of *their* reality plainly points *beyond them* to realities of another order. To say that material things are ideas is to say that they are objects for mind, and we have therefore to develop our doctrine of existence in reference to mind. Berkeley does not, however, develop his doctrine of existence very far under this head, and we can again afford to be brief. It remains true, of course, here as in the case of material things, that the only kind of existence we can attribute to mind in general is that which we find actual particular minds to possess. In what way, then, do we know minds as existing? In other words, what manner of existence do we experience in ourselves? The answer is that we know ourselves as busied about ideas or objects, viz. (*a*) as perceiving them or thinking about them, (*b*) as willing or acting in reference to them. In both respects the existence of mind is directly contrasted in character with that of ideas. Mind is percipient, ideas are perceived; mind is active, ideas or objects are passive. To exist, then, in the case of mind, *means* to be active, whether in the way of perception or in that of volition: the *esse* of mind is *percipere*, *velle*, *agere*. From this contrast of mind and ideas two consequences follow: (1) that we have, strictly speaking, no *idea* of mind. We do, of course, have knowledge about mind, but to describe this knowledge we must use some other term than 'idea.' Berkeley himself, in the second edition of the *Principles*, suggested the term 'notion' (§§ 27, 89, 142). But the new term does not imply any alteration in his doctrine of mind. Even in the *Commonplace Book* we find him insisting again and again that 'to ask, Have we an idea of will or volition, is nonsense. An idea can resemble nothing but an idea. . . . Thought itself, or thinking, is no idea. 'Tis an act' (*Works*², i. 35, 51). (2) Since agency is known to us only as a characteristic of mind or spirit, it follows that any changes which ideas or objects undergo must ultimately be referred to the agency of mind. All that we can observe in ideas is the bare fact of motion or change. For the causal explanation of such motion or change we must invoke the agency of mind or will.

While the foregoing doctrine as to the reality of mind has necessarily been developed in the light of our knowledge of our own finite minds, it cannot stop short at the recognition of finite minds. For (1) we assume the existence of many things, which we do not perceive, or have reason to suppose any other finite mind perceives, and (2) we observe many changes, which we do not produce, or have reason to suppose any other finite mind produces. The only way, then, in which we can render intelligible such existence of things which are not perceived by any finite mind, and such change in things as is not produced by any finite agency, is to assume an Infinite Mind on whose intelligence and agency the whole order of Nature depends. And so obvious does

this assumption appear to Berkeley, that he argues that

'God is known as certainly and immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever distinct from ourselves. We may even assert that the existence of God is far more evidently perceived than the existence of men; because the effects of Nature are infinitely more numerous and considerable than those ascribed to human agents.'

And among these effects of Nature are the signs by which finite spirits communicate with each other. So that 'He alone it is who, "upholding all things by the word of his power," maintains that intercourse between spirits whereby they are able to perceive the existence of each other' (*Principles*, § 147).

Both in the *Principles* and in the supplementary *Dialogues* Berkeley was at great pains to anticipate and reply to such objections as seemed likely to be brought against his Immaterialism. It is hardly necessary to refer to these in detail, because it is evident *a priori* that any function that can be fulfilled by a perfectly unknown 'Matter' can be equally well fulfilled by Berkeley's intelligent Deity. And, on the other hand, as Berkeley himself points out (*Dialogues* [*Works*[2], i. 468]), it is no use to bring against Immaterialism objections that apply equally against 'Materialism' itself, such as that no two minds, on Berkeley's theory, perceive the same things. For, if this objection holds against Berkeley (a point on which he does not express himself very clearly, *ib.* pp. 466–468), it holds even more obviously against those whose 'same things' are *not* 'ideas,' *i.e.* are not perceived at all.

Subsequent criticism of Berkeley has been inclined to take the line that he has no right to assume the existence of that intelligent Deity which he substitutes for 'Matter,' or even the existence of fellow-men, since logically he is shut up in the circle of his own 'ideas.' The view we take of this criticism will depend, of course, on the view we take of the accusation of subjective idealism. It is a criticism which may be said to come from reading Berkeley too much in the light of Hume's scepticism—a kind of injustice from which Locke too has notoriously suffered. After the manner of Reid—who was frightened out of his original Berkeleyanism by a study of Hume's *Treatise*—the critics construct a logical evolution of thought from Locke (or Descartes) to Hume, in which Berkeley's philosophy must take its appropriate place, however much distortion it undergoes in the process.

The real difficulties of Berkeley's philosophy begin at the point where he himself left off, viz. his inadequately developed doctrines of active mind and of God. Some of the most interesting notes in the *Commonplace Book* are those which show him struggling with the problem of Will. The problem is not followed up in his published works, and yet it is of the utmost importance for his philosophy on its more constructive side, since with him Will, Activity, and Mind coincide. Reflexion soon shows that the eternal volition by which God 'upholds all things' cannot be exercised, as man's finite will is, upon a material given to it from without; and in like manner God's eternal perception of the world is not a perception to which objects are given from without. We have therefore to face this difficulty, By what right do we distinguish God's eternal perception and will from the Order of Nature at all? Berkeley protests (*Principles*, § 150) against Nature being taken for 'some being distinct from God.' He does not realize that, conversely, there is, so far as our mere knowledge of Nature goes, an equal difficulty in taking God as a being distinct from Nature. His blindness to this difficulty is no doubt due to the apparent sharpness of the contrast in finite mind between active thought or will and the ideas upon which these operate. But, even as regards the finite mind, the abstract separation of the activity of thinking and volition from the ideas which alone make thought and will concrete is one which Berkeley could hardly have retained if he had ever come to develop his doctrine of mind for its own sake.

It is noteworthy that Berkeley's negative philosophy or Immaterialism proper is represented in our own day both in science and in philosophy—in science by thinkers like Mach, in philosophy by the Immanent Philosophy of Schuppe and others, which rejects the Kantian thing-in-itself as Berkeley rejected the Lockian substratum or unknown 'Matter,' and adopts a similar identification of things with ideas. Like Berkeley, the Immanent Philosophy is, of course, accused of subjective idealism (see, *e.g.*, the criticism of both in Volkelt's *Erfahrung u. Denken*, 1886, p. 121 ff.). If we take Berkeleyanism in a broad sense as representing some kind of identification of existence with consciousness or experience, the list of recent thinkers who show more or less strong Berkeleyan sympathies might be widely extended.

(3) *Psychological Theory of Visual Perception.*—Berkeley's *New Theory of Vision* is in some ways, perhaps, the most brilliant of all his writings, and is quite unquestionably one of the most brilliant monographs ever written on a psychological subject. It is, moreover, at least as remarkable for its scientific method as for its philosophical power. The general aim of the Essay is to discriminate clearly from each other the specific data of sight and touch, and to show how visual data have acquired a tactual significance. Just as a printed page means far less to an illiterate person than to one who has learned to read, so the patches of colour which are the proper data of sight must have meant far less to us, before experience established a connexion between them and the data of our other senses (especially those of touch and movement), than they do now when that connexion has become firmly fixed. When we look at a picture of a landscape, what is actually before our eyes is a small flat-coloured surface, but this arrangement of colour is significant to us of a great expanse of country. So completely established is this significant character of colour arrangements that it is difficult for any one but a trained artist to eliminate the significance and perceive the mere colour arrangements as such. And in like manner it took the genius of a Berkeley to dissolve that established connexion of visual and tactual data, upon which our adult perception of the actual world depends, and to discover the kind of way in which the connexion must originally have been established. The first problem he deals with is that of the visual perception of distance. He takes it for granted that distance out from the eye is not directly perceived, and that our estimates of *remote* distance are plainly dependent on experience. The part of the problem of which no proper account had as yet been given was the perception of *near* distances; for the mode of treatment adopted in geometrical optics was, as Berkeley showed, quite inappropriate in psychology. The question to be answered was, By what experience is the connexion between near distance as measured by movement and near distance as signified to the eye established? What are the signs of near distance which have brought about the *acquired visual* perception of it? Berkeley discovers three such signs: those which are now known as sensations of convergence and divergence, sensations of accommodation, and diffusion circles. And he shows how, in virtue of the regular connexion of these sensations, on the one hand, with distinct or indistinct vision, and, on the other, with distances as measured by movement, the visual object whose perception brings these sensations is perceived as being at the distance which the sensations signify. *E.g.* if, in order to perceive an

object distinctly, I have to make my eyes converge, I perceive this object as nearer than that at which I was previously looking; if, next, I have also to strain my eyes to keep it distinct, I perceive it as nearer again; and if, finally, it nevertheless becomes blurred, I perceive it as quite close to the eyes. So firmly is the connexion between the specific visual perception of patches of colour and the acquired visual perception of distance now established, that we find the greatest difficulty in discriminating between them; while the sensations whose work it is to establish and maintain the connexion are hardly ever noticed, because our attention is so wholly given to what the sensations mean—viz. differences of distance—that we have none left to bestow on the sensations themselves. Berkeley illustrates his argument from our experience of understanding spoken words:

'No sooner do we hear the words of a familiar language pronounced in our ears but the ideas corresponding thereto present themselves to our minds: in the very same instant the sound and the meaning enter the understanding: so closely are they united that it is not in our power to keep out the one except we exclude the other also. We even act in all respects as if we heard the very thoughts themselves. So likewise the secondary objects, or those which are only suggested by sight, do often more strongly affect us, and are more regarded, than the proper objects of that sense; along with which they enter into the mind, and with which they have a far more strict connexion than ideas have with words' (*New Theory*, § 51).

After dealing with our acquired visual perception of Distance, Berkeley proceeds to investigate in like manner, first, our acquired visual perception of true or tactual (as distinguished from apparent or visual) Magnitude; and, next, our acquired visual perception of Situation. In the latter part of the Essay he urges, in all its breadth, the doctrine, already exemplified in dealing with Distance, Magnitude, and Situation, that the true data of vision and of touch, respectively, are radically distinct, and shows how helpless pure vision would have been if it had been wholly deprived of the aid of touch. The developed sense of vision is extremely rich, but its development depends on what it borrows from touch. It is the experienced connexion of purely visual data with tactual data that makes developed vision what it is. And, according to Berkeley, this experienced connexion is essentially an arbitrary one. *E.g.* it is a fact of experience that, as an object recedes in tactual space, the corresponding visual appearance grows smaller; but the relation might just as well have been precisely reversed, and in that case we should have interpreted decreasing visual magnitude as a sign of approach instead of the opposite. Of course, whichever relation holds must hold consistently. If vision and touch are to correspond at all, their correspondence must be consistent throughout. But that they should correspond at all, and in what manner, is, so far as we can see, an arbitrary or contingent fact (see, *e.g.*, § 143). Throughout the whole Essay, Berkeley develops the logical consequences of his general view with great acuteness and thoroughness. But he does not fail, on the other hand, to use such means of verifying his theory as offer themselves. He applies it, for instance, to solve problems in optics, and also such well-known problems as those raised by the larger appearance of the moon at the horizon, and by the inversion of retinal images.

Berkeley's theory has been both developed and criticized. It left room for development, partly, of course, because it was only a theory of the one sense of vision, whereas modern psychology gives a generalized theory of space-perception; but partly, also, because it assumed (in accordance with the current philosophy) the atomic distinctness of sensations, and therefore treated the problem of perception as a problem simply of the combination or integration of sensations, whereas in a modern psychology such as Ward's, which has learned from biology to regard mind from the point of view of development, the problem of perception is seen to be one of differentiation as well as of integration. And perception, of course, develops as a whole: we do not, as Berkeley's treatment might suggest, have tactual perception present in its completeness before any connexion with visual perception begins.

Criticism (not unaccompanied by misunderstanding) of Berkeley's theory has fastened mainly upon his account of our acquired visual perception of distance. It has been sought to show that the perception of distance is native to vision itself. But no genetic psychology can really afford to dispense with the experiences of movement of the body and limbs in accounting for the perception of space. We must not forget that, if we consider only adult or fully-developed visual perception, we are begging the question so far as Berkeley is concerned. He fully admits that *acquired* visual perception of distance is, in point of *time*, immediate enough. The look and ocular feel, so to speak, of distance in objects is now so familiar to us that we are, within limits, as immediately aware of distance as of colour itself. A table looks to be at a certain distance just as it looks hard, though mere or uneducated vision could no more inform us of distance than of hardness. Recent experimental physiology has shown, however, that, as regards adult visual perception, the primary factor in the (binocular) perception of the *relative* distances of *near* objects is one of which Berkeley was not aware, viz. (in physiological terminology) the mechanism of corresponding points in the two retinæ. And it has been shown that the perception of relative distance by means of this mechanism precedes, and probably sets up, movements of convergence and divergence, not conversely. The question, what answers *psychologically* to the physiological mechanism, *i.e.* Berkeley's question of the *psychological* signs of distance, is one with which physiology is less concerned. Finally, it should be observed that physiological inheritance of nervous co-ordinations may greatly shorten the process of the education of vision.

For the historical antecedents and reception of Berkeley's theory of vision see Fraser's Editorial Preface; on the history of the theory of visual perception generally, Sully's *Human Mind*, 1892, vol. ii. App. B, where reference is also made to the medical evidence; for a full statement of current psychological views, James's *Principles of Psychology*, 1891, ch. xx. in vol. ii.; for the physiology of vision, chap. on 'Vision,' by Rivers, in vol. ii. of *Text-book of Physiology*, ed. Schäfer, 1900. On the more philosophical questions of the 'arbitrariness' of visual signs, and the relative importance of vision and touch in our perception of the external world, there are some illuminating remarks in the chapter on the Theory of Vision, bk. i. ch. xii., in Grote's *Exploratio Philosophica*, pt. ii., 1900.

LITERATURE.—Fraser's *Complete Works of Berkeley* is now in its second edition (4 vols., Oxford, 1901); his *Life and Letters of Berkeley* (Oxford, 1871) contains also an important chapter on the Philosophy of Berkeley; it is supplemented by a smaller biography, *Berkeley*[2], 1899, in Philos. Classics, based in part on new materials.

As regards Berkeley's metaphysics, the criticisms of Reid, *Intellectual Powers* (in vol. i. of Hamilton's ed. of his works), Essay ii. chs. x. xi., are classical in their way; Green, in the General Introd. to his ed. of Hume (reprinted in Green's *Works*, vol. i., 1885), § 158 ff., treats Berkeley only as preparing the way for Hume's completer empiricism; J. S. Mill's essay in *Dissertations*, vol. iv., 1875, and the chapters on the 'Psychological Theory of the Belief in Matter,' in his *Exam. of Sir W. Hamilton's Philos.* (third, 1867, and later editions), chs. xi. xii. and Appendix, are interesting for their points of difference from, as well as of identity with, Berkeley's theory; a brief review of the English psychology of external perception in Croom-Robertson's *Elements of General Philosophy* (1896), pp. 154–180, is useful; in addition to the histories of philosophy see Lyon's *L'Idéalisme en Angleterre au xviiie siècle* (Paris, 1888), and Adamson's *Development of Modern Philosophy* (1903), vol. i. pp. 124–132 and 250 f.; for other literature see *DPhP*, vol. iii. pt. i. (1905) pp. 120–122, or Ueberweg-Heinze's *Gesch. d. Philos.*[10] iii. (1907) p. 172 f.; Ueberweg's own German tr. of the *Principles* is useful for the running criticism given in the notes.

H. BARKER.

BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX.—1. **Life.**—Bernard was born at Fontaines, two miles from Dijon, in 1090 (not 1091; see Vacandard, *Vie de S. Bernard*, i. 1). His father, Tescelin († Apr. 1117, at Clairvaux), was a knight of experience, gentle but brave, of high birth; his mother, Alith or Alice of Montbard, was of saintly character (for Bernard's noble descent see the 'diatribe' by P. F. Chifflet, 1660, *PL* clxxxv. 1383–1542). Such was Bernard's commanding will that, when (1112) at the age of 22 he determined to become a monk, he persuaded thirty young noblemen, including his brothers, to enter with him the most austere monastery of Europe, the famous Citeaux (*PL* clxxxv. 237), founded 15 years previously by Robert of Molesme († May 1110), and governed, after Robert had been forced to return to his original monastery (1099), by the real founder, Stephen Harding of Sherborne in Dorset († 28th March 1134; for his life see *DNB*, xxiv. 333). In 1115, as Citeaux had grown too big, Bernard was selected by Stephen as the leader, or abbot, of a third colony of twelve sent out from Citeaux to found a new home. Bernard struck out for the plateau of Langres in Champagne, and there (25th June 1115), in a wild valley called Wormwood, watered by the Aube, he built a rude wooden structure, with chapel, dormitory, and refectory under one roof, long afterwards preserved by the veneration of Cistercians (see Joseph Meglinger's description of a visit to it in May 1667; Meglinger, *Itin. Cist.* in *PL* clxxxv. 1608). To this rude structure Bernard gave the name of Clairvaux (i.e. *Clara Vallis*, 'Brightdale,' *vice* Wormwood, *Vallis Absinthialis*, *PL* clxxxv. 241). Here the discipline and asceticism was of the strictest, and for a time Bernard's health was impaired. But the abbey speedily grew in numbers, so that in 1118 it sent out its first colony to Trois Fontaines near Chalons.

In 1119 Bernard began his correspondence, his first efforts showing abundant vigour but little of the later skill. His activity was indefatigable, and his fame and influence rapidly grew. Miracles were assigned to him, especially the gift of prophecy (for the contemporary evidence on this matter see *PL* clxxxv. 252–7, 262, 333–50; and, above all, the astonishing diary of Hermann, bp. of Constance in 1446, in *PL* clxxxv. 374 ff.). At the Synod of Troyes (Jan. 1128) his powerful advocacy gave the Knights Templars their real start, though the Rule of the Templars, commonly assigned to him (Bouquet, *Recueil*, xiv. 232), is by a later hand, at any rate in parts (Labbé, *Conc.* xxi. 360; Mabillon, *Op. Bern.* ii. 543, in *PL* clxxxii. 919). His *de Laude novæ militiæ ad milites Templi* was written about five years later, between 1132 and 1136. Though short, it is rhetorical and somewhat weak (in *PL* clxxxii. 922 ff.). At the same Synod of Troyes he procured the deposition of the bp. of Verdun. For this he was denounced to Rome as a meddler, and received a bitter letter of rebuke from the Roman chancellor, Cardinal Haimerich (*Ep.* 48).

With the death of Honorius II. (14th Feb. 1130) Bernard's European fame began. In the schism which followed, Bernard's voice at the Council of Etampes (1130; for the date see Vacandard, *op. cit.* i. 291 n.) secured for Innocent II., whose hurried election, though prior to that of his rival the Jewish Pierleoni (Anacletus II.), had been most irregular, the support of the French clergy (Labbé, *Conc.* xxi. 441–4); and a few months later, at Chartres (Jan. 1131; see Vacandard, *op. cit.* i. 303), the allegiance of Henry I. of England, in spite of the fact that the English clergy were leaning to the anti-pope Anacletus (*PL* clxxxv. 271). In consequence, Innocent showered immunities on the Cistercians, to the disgust of Clugny, and on his return to Italy in 1132 (from which he had fled almost immediately after his election) took with him Bernard, to whose exertions and letters (Bern. *Epp.* 128 ff.) he owed no small part of his growing recognition. In 1135 Bernard returned to Clairvaux and set about the re-building of the abbey in a more convenient place (*PL* clxxxv. 283–5). In this year we date also the preaching of the first 23 *Sermones in Cantica* (Bern. *Epp.* 153–4; Vacandard, *op. cit.* i. 471). In 1137, as the schism in Italy, under the lead of the Norman Roger, whom Anacletus had crowned as the first king of Sicily, was still disturbing the Church, Bernard once more journeyed there. The death of Anacletus (25th Jan. 1138), and Innocent's recognition in Rome, left Bernard the virtual pope of Christendom, though not without opposition from the cardinals (see below, *re* Gilbert de la Porrée); and with the election of Eugenius III. (15th Feb. 1145), a Cistercian monk and pupil of Bernard, the ideas of Clairvaux became supreme.

In 1145 Bernard was called upon by Eugenius III. to preach the second Crusade at Vézelay (Easter, 31st March 1146). He was afterwards deputed to preach the same in Germany; and as a result of his meeting with the Emperor Conrad III. at Speyer, the reluctant monarch, overcome by Bernard's eloquence, took the cross (27th Dec. 1146). On the failure of the first expedition, Bernard and Suger planned a second, and at a Council at Chartres (7th May 1150; for the date of this Council, which Mabillon, Baronius, Morison, and others put in 1146, see Vacandard, *op. cit.* ii. 428–33) Bernard was actually elected commander-in-chief—an office which he refused (Bern. *Ep.* 256). In his last years Bernard suffered much pain and disappointment. The misfortunes of the second Crusade were laid at his door. He was saddened by the death of his friend, the abbot Suger (13th Jan. 1152). He died five weeks after Eugenius, on 20th Aug. 1153, and was buried at Clairvaux. He was canonized by Alexander III., 15th Jan. 1174 (*PL* clxxxv. 622), while Dante's references (*Par.* xxxi.) show the regard in which he was universally held. When in 1793 Clairvaux was turned into a glass factory and the tombs broken up, Bernard's bones were distributed as relics to surrounding churches (*PL* clxxxv. 1697).

2. **Character and place in history.**—The character of St. Bernard has already been sketched in vol. i. p. 16 (*s.v.* ABELARD). His marvellous energy, in spite of bodily weakness (see the list of his journeys in Vacandard, *op. cit.* ii. App. D), and his power as a ruler of men will be apparent from the preceding outlines of his life. His personal magnetism, as we see from the *Life* written by William of St. Thierry (c. 12 in *PL* clxxxv. 258), was extraordinary, and no doubt, in part, gave rise to the innumerable tales of his miraculous gifts (see above). Equally important was his fearlessness. In his personal humility amid all exaltation he proved himself a true saint, as also in the passion and depth of his piety.

The importance of St. Bernard as the virtual pope of his age cannot be exaggerated. For a few years the centre of Christendom was transferred from Rome to Clairvaux. His influence was generally on the side of the angels, though deduction must be made for his passion as a heresy-hunter (see below), and for a certain impatience of contradiction, which leads him at times into arrogant writing and action (*e.g.* his dispute with the gentle Peter the Venerable of Clugny with reference to the bishopric of Langres [Bernard, *Epp.* 166–87, with which cf. Peter of Clugny, *Ep.* i. 29], which resulted in the election of a prior of Clairvaux, a kinsman of Bernard). At times his restless vigilance shows a tendency to lead him into meddling with matters that did not concern him, probably, as in the case of William

Fitzherbert, archbp. of York, through the appeal to him of Cistercians looking to Clairvaux as their head.

St. Bernard was the last great founder of the older forms of monasticism. Through his influence the Cistercian order spread into every land. Within his lifetime no fewer than 160 Cistercian monasteries were founded, chiefly through his prestige and influence; of these 68 were filiations of Clairvaux (see lists in Janauschek, *Orig. Cist.* vol. i., Vienna, 1877; Vacandard, *op. cit.* ii. App. C). In England especially, the influence of the Cistercians was very great. Introduced at Waverley in Surrey in 1128, they soon established their homes in every part of the country, especially in the wilder parts of Yorkshire (*Eng. Hist. Rev.* [1893] pp. 625–76: 'The Settlement of the Cistercians in England,' by Miss Cooke; see also article MONASTICISM for the distinguishing features of the Cistercians).

3. St. Bernard's theological disputes.—The influence of Bernard as a theologian was always thrown against all change or progress. He was the last of the Fathers, as Abelard was the first of the Schoolmen. In his antagonism to all that Abelard represented (on which see ABELARD, vol. i. p. 16; to the authorities there cited add, for R.C. views, Vacandard, *Abélard, sa lutte avec S. Bernard*, Paris, 1881) Bernard was the refuge of a reactionary school destined to be swept away by the rise of Scholasticism. In later years his hatred of heresy became almost a monomania. As his contemporary, Otto of Freising, tells us:

'Bernard was, from the fervour of his Christian religion, as jealous as from his habitual meekness he was in some measure credulous; so that he held in abhorrence those who trusted in the wisdom of this world and were too much attached to human reasonings; and if anything alien to the Christian faith were said to him in reference to them he readily gave ear to it' ('de Gest. Friderici,' i. 47, in Pertz, *MGH* xx. 376).

Hence a want of fairness in dealing not only with Abelard—this perhaps was natural, for the two men were diametrically opposed—but also with Gilbert de la Porrée.

The struggle of Gilbert and Bernard has been told us on Bernard's side by his secretary, Geoffrey of Auxerre in his *Libellus contra Gilbert. Porret.* (*PL* clxxxv. 595 ff.), and in his *Epistola de Condemnatione*, written forty years later to Henry (not 'Albinus,' as Mabillon, Migne, and other editors; see *Hist. Litt. de la France*, xiv. 339 n.), cardinal bp. of Albano. This *Ep.* is in *PL* clxxxv. 587 ff. It is this version that is followed in the *Acta Sanctorum* (Aug. iv. c. 41) by R.C. writers in general, and by Cotter Morison, *op. cit.* But the publication of the *Historia Pontificalis* (written in 1163, first published in 1868 by W. Arndt in *MGH* xx. 517–45) of John of Salisbury († Oct. 1180, for whom see *DNB* xxix. 439), who was present during the trial, has shown us the inaccuracy and bias of Geoffrey. A more impartial statement is given us by Otto of Freising (*de Gest. Friderici*, i. cc. 55–7).

Gilbert, who was born at Poitiers about 1075, was trained under Bernard of Chartres and Anselm of Laon. After lecturing on theology at Paris, he retired, as bishop, to Poitiers (1141), possibly as the result of Abelard's condemnation at Sens (see vol. i. p. 16). He died in 1154. His *de Sex Principiis*, a supplement to the *Categories* of Aristotle (ed. Venice, 1489), was the recognized mediæval text-book on which Albert the Great and other schoolmen wrote extensive commentaries. By his continuation of Anselm of Laon's continuation of Walafrid Strabo's *Glossa Ordinaria* he became a joint-author of the current mediæval notes on the Bible (R. L. Poole, *Illustrations of Hist. of Med. Thought*, 1884, p. 135 n.; for Gilbert's philosophical position, see Ueberweg, i. 399).

Gilbert, who, according to John of Salisbury, 'was a monk of the clearest intellect and of the widest reading, in literary culture surpassed by none' (*Historia Pont.* viii. 522), had published a commentary on the *de Trinitate* (a collection of treatises first printed at Basel in 1570, currently assigned to Boëthius, but proved spurious by F. Nitzsch, *Das System des Boëthius*, Berlin, 1860). In this *Commentar. in Boëth.*, Gilbert, by distinguishing 'God' from 'Deity,' in which last he found the universal that his realism demanded, had laid such stress on the absolute unity of the Trinity as almost to exclude the existence within it of a Trinity, except as external, non-essential, and merely formal (see Poole, *op. cit.* 179 ff.; or, more fully, Lipsius in Ersch and Gruber's *Allgemeine Encyk.* [1858] lxvii. 209 ff.). His obscure statements led his archdeacons to lodge charges with Eugenius III., and to the attack of Bernard, first in a Synod at Paris (1147), then in an adjourned Council at Rheims (March 1148), where among the advocates for the prosecution we find Theobald, archbp. of Canterbury, and Thomas Becket. On the other side we find the sympathies of the cardinals; the struggle, in fact, in one of its aspects, was a conflict between the prelates of England and France and the cardinals, 'with the object of forcing the Apostolic See to follow Bernard' (John of Salisbury, *op. cit.* ix. 523 ff.; on the complicated politics which led the English to this support of Bernard see K. Norgate, *Angevin Kings*, i. 363 ff.). The issue was a complete failure for Bernard. When Eugenius proposed that Gilbert's commentary should be handed over to him that he might erase whatever was needful, Gilbert claimed that it was his own duty to erase what was amiss—a declaration received with loud applause by the cardinals. The Council ended with the Pope's mysterious ruling 'that the essence of God should not be predicated in the sense of the ablative case only, but also of the nominative' (Otto Freis. *op. cit.* i. 56 f.), and Gilbert returned 'with his honour unabated to his own diocese'; for Geoffrey's statement of Gilbert's recantation (*PL* clxxxv. 597) is, as John of Salisbury shows (*Hist. Pont.* xi. xii. 525 ff.), an exaggeration.

Bernard's other theological controversies may be briefly dismissed. In his attack upon Abelard at Sens (1141, not 1140; see Deutsch, *Die Synode v. Sens*, Berlin, 1880) he came into conflict with Abelard's pupil—'Goliath's armour-bearer,' as Bernard calls him—Arnold of Brescia (see 'Arnoldists,' *s.v.* SECTS [Christian]). But, beyond writing vehement letters demanding his expulsion from Zürich, Bernard had little to do with this twelfth-century Mazzini (Bern. *Epp.* 195 f., 243 f.; Vacandard, *Revue des Quest. Histor.* 1884, 52–114).

St. Bernard also came into conflict with the Henricians, so called from a monk, Henry of Lausanne, of whom we first hear as preaching at Le Mans in 1116. With many of Henry's ascetic and disciplinary views Bernard would, probably, have agreed, but in the South of France the people welcomed the doctrines as an excuse for spoiling the Church. At the instance of the Papal legate Alberic, Bernard (June 1145; for date see Vacandard, *Vie de S. Bern.* ii. 217 n., 223 n.) preached at Albi, the centre of the disorder, with some success, which became complete when his opponent Henry refused St. Bernard's challenge to a disputation. The discredited Henry was captured and brought in chains before his bishop (1146), and, probably, died in prison (Vacandard, *op. cit.* ii. 233 n.).

[For St. Bernard and the Henricians see Bern. *Ep.* 241, also *Vitae* in *PL* clxxxv. 311, 427; 'Acta Hildeberti Cenoman.' in Bouquet, *Recueil*, xii. 547–51, 554.]

On the side of tolerance, we must note Bernard's defence of the Jews of the Rhineland in 1146 against the murderous attacks of the priest Rudolph (Bern. *Ep.* 365; Otto Freis. *op. cit.* i. 37; and, for a Jewish contemporary account, the *Chronicle of Joseph ben Meir* [tr. by C. H. F. Bialloblotzky, London, 1835]). His tolerance in this matter is in notable opposition to his contemporaries, *e.g.* Peter the Venerable, *Epp.* iv. 36 (*PL* clxxxix. 366).

4. Writings and place as a thinker and theologian.—Bernard's writings may be classified as follows:—

(i.) *EPISTLES.*—Bernard's *Letters*, of which about 450 appear to be genuine (in *PL* clxxxii.), reveal the width of his influence and the range of his activities. They deal with all the affairs of the times, from the most spiritual matters through all

the tangled diplomacy of Church and State down to a theft of pigs. In their constant interest in current events they are a great contrast to the letters of Anselm (see vol. i. p. 558), and reveal the fundamental differences of the two authors. The eloquence of the letters is, at times, of a very high order, and they are of considerable value for the history of the period, as is his *Vita Malachiæ*, written in 1149 for contemporary Ireland.

(ii.) *DEVOTIONAL AND HORTATORY.*—Of these the most important are :—

(*a*) The *de Consideratione*, in 5 books (*PL* clxxxii. 727 ff.), composed by Bernard in the leisure moments of many years, but published at intervals (book ii. in 1150, book iii. in 1152 ; see the references in iii. c. 5, § 20) in the evil days which followed the return of the second Crusade (*de Consid.* ii. c. 1). The book is dedicated to Pope Eugenius III. 'Consideration' was treated by Bernard under four heads : (1) concerning oneself, (2) concerning the things which are under one, (3) concerning the things around one, (4) concerning the things above. In this last we see his Mysticism. But the work, though full of shrewd moral reflexions, owes its chief interest to its discursive treatment of other topics, especially the matter of Papal appeals (*de Consid.* iii. c. 2) and other abuses. Bernard held that the reformation of the Church must begin with the sanctity of its head. Its plain speaking has made the work a favourite weapon with Protestant controversialists, *e.g.* E. Brown, *Fasciculus rerum Expetendarum et Fugiendarum* (1690). But, in spite of its anti-ultramontanism (cf. iii. 1, 2), it has also formed a manual for Popes. Pius V. had it read aloud to him daily.

(*b*) The *de Moribus et Officio Episcoporum*, written about 1126 to Archbp. Henry of Sens, and the *Sermo de Conversione ad Clericos* (both in *PL* clxxxii.) contain much plain speaking on the vices of the clergy and the need of reform.

(*c*) The *Sermones de tempore* (*PL* clxxxiii. 35–360), *de Sanctis* (*ib.* 359–536), and *de Diversis* (*ib.* 537–748). The oratory of St. Bernard, though not perhaps of the highest order (see a criticism in Vacandard, *op. cit.* i. ch. 16), was remarkable for its effects (*e.g.* crusades), and in its 'converting' power, especially using 'conversion' in the technical monastic sense. [A remarkable instance of this is given in the *Exordium mag. Cisterciense*, ii. 13, in *PL* clxxxv. 423 ; other instances in Cæsar Heisterbach, *Dial. Miraculorum* (ed. Cologne, 1851), bk. i.]

(*d*) The *de Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* (*PL* clxxxii. 1001 ff., written before 1128, see *Ep.* 52). Bernard's recognition of prevenient grace as the source of all the good in man had appeared to an auditor to be an eulogium of grace at the expense of human merit and activity. Bernard therefore drew up an account of the relation of grace and freewill. He claims for man after his Fall formal freedom as his distinguishing feature, without which there could be no imputation of guilt, and which must consent to the grace which awakens it. But 'the beginning of our salvation comes from God, neither through us nor with us,' in a constraining influence stimulating voluntary consent. In the union of the two lies 'merit.' But his hard Augustinian doctrine of original sin leads him into the usual difficulties, not lessened by his strong evangelical stress upon God's mercy as our sole 'merit' (*e.g. Serm. in fest. omn. Sanct.* i. 11, *PL* clxxxiii. 459 : 'Sed quid potest esse omnis justitia nostra coram Deo ?' etc., or *in Cantica*, xxii. 11, in *PL*, *ib.* 883), being combined with the usual mediæval and monastic conceptions.

(iii.) *MYSTICAL.*—The most important of Bernard's mystical writings are his Homilies on the Song of Solomon (*Sermones in Cantica Canticorum*, *PL* clxxxiii. 780 ff.). To this we must add the later sections of the *de Consideratione*. Of this series, begun in 1135, 86 had been finished before his death. They were actually preached to the monks of Clairvaux, and still bear the signs of interruptions and other local circumstances (cf. Nos. 26 and 47, § 8). *Cant.* iii. 1, where Bernard left off, was thus a favourite starting-place for later imitators. [The continuation by the Cistercian abbot Gilbert († before 1202) of Swineshead Abbey, Lincolnshire, is in Migne, *PL* clxxxiv. cols. 1–251.]

'The great importance of Bernard in the history of Mysticism does not lie in the speculative side of his teaching, in which he depends almost entirely upon Augustine. His great achievement was to recall devout and loving contemplation to the image of the crucified Christ, and to found that worship of our Saviour as the "Bridegroom of the Soul," which in the next centuries inspired so much fervid devotion and lyrical sacred poetry' (W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism* [1899], 140 n.).

Bernard thus gave to the romantic, not to say erotic, side of Mysticism a great stimulus. It is true that he always speaks of the Church and not the individual as the bride of Christ, but the enforced celibacy of monasticism soon led to the transference to the individual of the luscious language of the *Canticles* (Inge, *op. cit.* App. D). The symbolism and allegorism of Bernard's methods of Scripture interpretation was, of course, no new thing, and in the Christian Church was chiefly due to the influence of Origen (see vol. i. p. 315). In his *Sermones de Diversis*, No. 92 (in *PL* clxxxiii. 714), Bernard gives a threefold interpretation of Scripture—historical, moral or figurative, and mystical. This is further expanded in his *Serm. in Cantica*, No. 23 (*PL*, *ib.* 884 ff.), with a special panegyric of the vision of God which the mystical interpretation gives (*op. cit.* 893). The mysticism of Bernard is really not systematic, but the outcome of his persuasion that faith receives all truth 'wrapped up' (*involutum*). All that reason can do is to add clearness, a certain strictly limited measure of unwrapping ; for the highest knowledge is that which comes neither by *intellectus* nor by *opinio*, but by intuition or spiritual vision. Of this there are three stages—*consideratio dispensativa*, *æstimativa*, and *speculativa*, in which last *consideratio* becomes identical with *contemplatio* (*de Consid.* v. 1–4 ; *Serm. in Cant.* v. 4, lii. 4, 5).

We see the same mystical principles in his *de Diligendo Deo* (*PL* clxxxii. 974 ff.). God is the ground and cause of a love in which there are four stages (*op. cit.* cc. 8, 15). The first stage is carnal love, in which the man loves himself. The second is a love of God which is selfish, inasmuch as it is due to suffering and experience. In the third stage he loves God for God's own sake. In the fourth stage the spirit, 'intoxicated by the Divine love, wholly forgets itself, becoming nothing in itself, and becoming one spirit with Him.' To be thus affected is to be deified ('sic affici deificari est,' *op. cit.* § 28, and cf. *Ep.* 107, 5 [the expression is a favourite with later mystics])—the annihilation of self 'in the immense sea of a luminous eternity' (§ 30).

(iv.) *POETICAL.*—Much doubt has been cast upon the authorship of the hymns usually assigned to Bernard, but by none more than by Mabillon, who pointed out (*Op. Bern.* v. 891) that the Cistercians 'denied themselves the use of metrical forms' (see the statement of Nicholas de Clairvaux, *Ep.* 15, in *Bib. Max. Pat.* xxi.) ; nor is the ascription to Bernard of very early date. That Bernard composed some hymns and had some distinction as a plain chantist is acknowledged, but he tells us himself that he 'neglected metre that he might pay more attention to sense' [Bern. *Ep.* 398, 3 ; the *Tonale* (*PL* clxxxii. 1151 ff.) owes more to his disciples than to himself (Vacandard, *op. cit.* ii. 101–5)]. The arguments of Trench and others, that 'if Bernard did not write them, it is not easy to guess who could,' are therefore of little value, more

especially as Trench owns the 'general ascription to Bernard of any poems of merit, belonging to that period, whereof the authorship was uncertain.' The *Salve, mundi salutare*, an address in 350 lines to the various limbs of Christ on the cross, shows the influence of his erotic mysticism (see above, p. 532[b]). The section *ad faciem*, 'O sacred head once wounded' (*Salve, caput cruentatum*), is in all hymn-books. The *Jubilus rhythmicus de nomine Jesu*, originally in 42 stanzas (earliest MS, 12th cent., in Bodleian; the other stanzas in printed edd. have not been traced earlier than 15th cent.; see J. Mearns, in Julian, *Dict. Hymn.* 586), is beautiful throughout, in spite of a certain lack of progress in the thought. The translations of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 5th stanzas [*Jesu, dulcis memoria*; E. Caswall († 1828), 'Jesu, the very thought of Thee'; for other versions see Julian, *s.v.*] are in all hymn-books. It is interesting to note that this hymn was specially arranged by the mystic Henry Suso († 1365) as an office for the daily use of the Friends of God. The author, who was probably not St. Bernard, but one of his school, had certainly adopted his style and thought (see Bern. *Serm. de Div.* iv. § 1, 'Bonus es, domine, animæ quærenti te,' etc.).

LITERATURE.—1. *LIFE OF ST. BERNARD.*—(*a*) *Sources.*—We gain our best knowledge of Bernard from a study of his voluminous *Letters* [*supra* § 4 (i.)]. A critical edition of their order is much needed. Contemporary biographies of value were written by (i) William of St. Thierry about 1145 (in *PL* clxxxv. 226 ff.), and continued after William's death by Arnold of Bonneval († *c.* 1156), near Chartres (*PL ib.* 267 ff.), to whom Bernard had written from his death-bed (*Ep.* 310); (ii) his secretary Geoffrey, who succeeded him as abbot of Clairvaux (*PL* clxxxv. 302 ff.); (iii) Alain († 1182), bp. of Auxerre (*PL* clxxxv. 470 ff.). To the above we must add (iv) *Liber Miraculorum* (in *PL* clxxxv. 1273 ff.) of the Spanish monk Herbert of Clairvaux, much of which is legendary; as is also (v) the *Vita Bernardi* of John the Hermit (in *PL* clxxxv. 533. John the Hermit is unknown, unless he be identical, as Vacandard, *op. cit.* i. xliv, suggests, with the prior of Clairvaux, *c.* 1180); (vi) the *Exordium Magnum Ordinis Cisterciensis* (in *PL* clxxxv. 996 ff.), written between 1206 and 1221 adds little of value.

(*b*) *Modern Lives.*—Of these we may mention the Life in the *Acta Sanctorum* (Aug. iv. d. 20); the general preface by Mabillon to his editions (see *infra*); Aug. Neander, *Der heilige Bernhard*, 1813, 1848, 1868, also 2 vols. ed. S. M. Deutsch, Gotha, 1889, Eng. tr. by M. Wrench, 1843 [Neander has also given a full treatment of the theology in his *Church History*]; G. Hüffer, *Der heilige B. von Clairvaux*, Münster, 1886, and 'Die Anfänge des zweiten Kreuzzugs,' in *Hist. Jahrb.* 1887; M. T. Ratisbonne, *Hist. de S. Bernard et son siècle*, 1848 (many later edd.). This last uncritical work has been largely used by the somewhat rhetorical but sympathetic R. S. Storrs, *Bernard of Clairvaux*, 1892. Probably the best life in English, though full allowance must be made for its angle of vision, is J. C. Morison, *St. Bernard*, 1868 (many later edd.). The fullest and best life, apart from its ultramontane standpoint, is E. Vacandard, *Vie de S. Bernard*, Paris, 1895. To this add his early studies, *S. Bernard Orateur*, Rouen, 1877, and *Abélard, sa lutte avec S. Bernard*, Paris, 1881. Kugler, *Analekten z. Gesch. des zweit. Kreuzzugs*, Tübingen, 1878 and 1882, and *Neue Analekten*, 1885, should not be overlooked. For a complete bibliography of Bernard, see L. Janauschek, *Bibliographia Bernardina*, Vienna, 1891.

ii. *THEOLOGY.*—To the well-known works of Harnack, Loofs, Seeberg, and W. R. Inge (*Christian Mysticism*, 1899), add Dieckhoff, *Justin, Augustin, Bernhard und Luther*, Leipzig, 1882.

iii. *EDITIONS.*—MSS of Bernard abound (see Potthast, *s.v.*), and testify to his hold on the Middle Ages. Some of his *Sermons* were printed at Strassburg as early as 1472; and his *Epistles* at Brussels, by the Brothers of the Common Life, in 1481. The first fairly complete ed. of his works is by Andrew Bocard, Paris, 1508. This was followed by the more complete Lyons ed. of 1520 and many others (*e.g.* 1515, 1547, 1566, 1572, 1586, 1601, 1609). These were superseded by the able ed. of J. M. Horst, 1641, 1667, on which J. Mabillon based his standard ed. (2 vols., 1667, 1690, 1719, 1839). The ed. of 1719 is that reprinted in Migne, *PL* vols. clxxxii.–v. A new critical ed. of many of the *Sermons* was brought out by Janauschek, *Xenia Bernardina*, Vienna, 1891. A more critical ed. of *Letters* and *Works* is much needed. A complete tr. into French by A. Ravelet, 1865, is in progress; also by Charpentier, Paris, 1873, in 8 vols. Many of the works and all the *Epistles* have been translated into Eng. by S. J. Eales, 4 vols., 1889–96 (with Introduction and Life). Add also M. C. and C. Patmore, *On the Love of God*, 1881. The *de Consideratione* is in Goldast, *Monarchia Rom. Imperii*, Hanover, 1612, ii. 68 ff.

H. B. WORKMAN.

BEROSUS (or BEROSSOS).—A Chaldæan priest in the temple of Bel (Marduk) at Babylon, who is said by Eusebius (*Chronicon*, 5. 8) and Tatian (*Oratio ad Græcos*) to have been a contemporary of Alexander the Great, and to have lived into the reign of Antiochus Soter. He compiled in Greek a *History of Babylonia*, which, unfortunately, like the corresponding work of Manetho in Egypt, has perished, and is known to us only by fragmentary quotations from Alexander Polyhistor and Apollodorus, preserved by Eusebius and George the Syncellus. Josephus (*c. Apion.* i. 19 f.) seems to have been acquainted with the original work of Berosus.

According to Alexander Polyhistor (see Cory, *Ancient Fragments*, 1832), he wrote the historical account of fifteen myriads of years, the history of the heavens and of the sea, of kings and their memorable actions, and of the generations of mankind and their civil polity. His *History* professed to begin with creation, and was carried down to his own time. It first described a state of chaos, presided over by the female monster Tiâmat, who was encountered and slain by the god Marduk, and whose overthrow was succeeded by the creation of the heavens and the earth. Berosus then gives a chronology of the Babylonian kingdom. Only a part of this has come down to us, and that in a condition which makes it in parts almost unintelligible. The difficulty of re-constructing his system is increased by the fact that the lists which he copied from the cuneiform originals have been mutilated by his abbreviators, and have suffered still further at the hands of those who copied the abbreviated lists. The most probable reconstruction is that of A. von Gutschmid, which is here given.

10 kings before the Flood, 432,000 years.

Ist Dynasty :	86 Chaldæans . .	34,091 years.		B.C.	2450–2226
IInd „	8 Medes . . .	224 years.			
IIIrd „	11 Chaldæans . .	248	„ „		2225–1977
IVth „	49 Chaldæans . .	458	„ „		1977–1519
Vth „	9 Arabians . . .	245	„ „		1518–1273
VIth „	45 Chaldæans . .	526	„ „		1273– 747
VIIth „	8 Assyrians . .	121	„ „		746– 625
VIIIth „	6 Chaldæans . .	87	„ „		625– 538

It has been pointed out by Brandis (*Rerum Assyriarum tempora emendata*, p. 17) and Gutschmid (*op. cit. infra*) that the post-diluvian period of 36,000 years has been adjusted to coincide with an astrological period during which the gods had granted glory and independence to the Chaldæans, and which terminated with the capture of Babylon by Cyrus.

The latter part of Berosus's historical statement has not survived except in detached fragments which have been preserved by Josephus, Eusebius, and the Syncellus. One fragment concerning Nabonassar (B.C. 747 ?) states that the Chaldæans were acquainted with astronomy only from his time onwards, because he destroyed all previous records. There are also fragments concerning the reigns of Nabopolassar and Nebuchadrezzar—the death of Nabopolassar, the succession of Nebuchadrezzar and his adornment of Babylon—and about the succession of Chaldæan kings after Nebuchadrezzar, ending with the capture of Nabonidus by Cyrus.

In comparing his work with the Babylonian and Assyrian inscriptions, it is somewhat difficult to arrive at any definite result on account of the deficiency of exact dates on both sides. In the absence of more satisfactory information, the list of Berosus must be taken as a provisional framework for Babylonian chronology, as the lists of Manetho are taken in Egyptian chronology, but with less confidence in the case of Berosus. Recent discoveries indicate, on the whole, his trustworthiness so far as regards the fact that his work actually represents the sources from which it professes to have been drawn; *e.g.* his account of

the Deluge agrees even in details with the cuneiform text. No confidence, however, can be reposed in the numbers allotted to his dynasties. In his antediluvian dynasty one or two names can be recognized with some difficulty as being possible variants of some of those which occur in the inscriptions, *e.g.* the last two kings—the name of the first of whom, Otiartes, has been suggested by Lenormant to be a corruption of Obartes, who appears in the inscriptions as Ubaratutu; while the name of the second, Xisuthros, may be Khasisatra, or Atrakhasis, the Sîtnapišti of the Gilgamesh legend. His third dynasty, consisting of eleven kings, seems to correspond with that traced by G. Smith, and suspected by Sayce to be of Arabian origin. The most prominent king in it is the famous Ḫammurabi (B.C. 2130). His Arabian dynasty, according to Sayce, appears to be the Kassite dynasty of the inscriptions; and if so, both the title and the figures of 9 kings and 245 years must be corrupt, since 36 Kassite kings are known, covering a period of 576 years. Minor dynasties seem to have been either run together or omitted altogether from Berosus's lists, as a broken tablet which once contained a complete list of Babylonian monarchs arranged in dynasties introduces a number of very short ones. This arrangement or omission may have been the work of Polyhistor or his copyists.

Apart from the chronological value of his work, the main interest of Berosus's *History* lies in the fragments of the ancient cosmogonic myths of Babylon which he has preserved. The chief of these are the legend of Tiâmat and Marduk (Bel and the Dragon); that of the giving of letters and civilization to mankind by Oannes (*Êâ-ghan*—Êâ the fish?), a composite being, partly fish and partly man (cf. the giving of letters to Egypt by the composite deity Tehuti); the legend of the great tower and the confusion of tongues; and that of Xisuthros and the Deluge. From the actually existing cuneiform records it is apparent that Berosus's account of these legends practically represents the ancient Chaldæan tradition. In particular, his story of Xisuthros and the Deluge has been found to be a fragment of the great Gilgamesh epic.

LITERATURE.—Maspero, *Histoire ancienne*, Paris, 1886, vol. i. 'Les Origines'; Lenormant, *Essai de commentaire de fragments cosmogoniques de Bérose*, Paris, 1872; Cory's 'Ancient Fragments' (*Texts and Translations*), 1832; G. Smith, *TSBA* vol. iii., and art. 'Berosus' in *EBr*; Sayce, *Ancient Empires of the East*, Lond. 1884, also *Religions of Ancient Egypt and Babylonia*, Lond. 1902, and *Hib. Lect.* on 'Babylonian Religion,' Lond. 1887; A. von Gutschmid, 'Zu den Fragmenten des Berosos und Ktesias,' in *Rheinisches Museum*, viii. 256 (1853).

JAMES BAIKIE.

BESTIALITY.—Bestiality, *i.e.* the possession or exhibition of the qualities or nature of a beast, may manifest itself in human life, and so touch the religion or ethics of a people, in three ways: in eating and drinking, in sexual matters, and in the manifestation of wanton cruelty. Apparently among all primitive peoples bestiality is in some degree exhibited. It is eradicated only after a considerable intellectual and moral development. The peculiar conditions of Arabia and North Africa, the primitive Semitic and Hamitic homes, although they compelled an advance, if life was to be maintained at all, to a relatively high degree of barbarism, made the development of a high civilization impossible. Human ingenuity was compelled to extract from the oases the greatest possible nourishment; this urged the races forward; but the hard deserts which intervened between the scattered oases bound the struggling peoples in the fetters of barbarism (see Barton, *Semitic Origins*, ch. ii.). The constant influx of large numbers of immigrants from these desert conditions into the various Semitic countries through the whole course of history tended to keep alive within them all primitive bestial elements.

1. Bestiality in eating and drinking was probably exhibited whenever an opportunity was afforded for the underfed men of the desert to obtain a plentiful supply of meat. The ordinary diet was milk and dates, supplemented occasionally by a little game (see Doughty, *Arabia Deserta*[2], 1888, i. 156 ff.; Palgrave, *Central and Eastern Arabia*, 1865, i. 60; and Barton, *op. cit.* 75 and 77 ff.). The population was always underfed and afflicted with a gnawing hunger. These facts sufficiently explain the origin of the method of sacrificing a camel among the Arabs, described by Nilus, *c.* 400 A.D. While the last words of a chant were still upon the lips of the worshippers, the leader inflicted a wound on the camel and hastily drank his blood. The whole company then fell upon the victim with their swords, hacking off pieces of the quivering flesh and devouring them raw, with such wild haste that in the short interval between the rise of the day-star, at the appearance of which the service began, and the disappearance of its rays before those of the rising sun, the entire camel, body and bones, skin, blood, and entrails, was wholly devoured (cf. W. R. Smith, *Rel. of the Semites*[1], 338 ff.). Even if some allowance is made for exaggeration on the part of Nilus, the method of consuming this sacrifice is not unlike the tearing asunder of a carcass by dogs or wolves. As religious customs preserve ancient ways longer than they survive elsewhere, we have here an exhibition of the bestiality of the primitive Semite in eating.

Some passages in the OT indicate that at the religious festivals excessive eating, or more properly drinking, occurred. Thus Eli (1 S 1^{13}) naturally thought that Hannah had become drunk at the feast which was just concluded. Again, La 2^{7} compares the turmoil in the temple, when Nebuchadrezzar sacked Jerusalem, to the noise 'in the day of a solemn assembly.' This noise could hardly have been all due to the wailing, which originally attended the death of a victim, but must in part at least have been due to revelry. Private feasts were accompanied by music and wine (Is 5^{12}), and were occasions of hilarity (Am 8^{10}); and the same was probably true of all religious feasts down to the Exile.

As the Semites moved into agricultural lands and began to cultivate the vine, their excessive drinking led naturally to some drunkenness. A classic instance of this is embodied in the tradition of Noah's drunkenness in Gn $9^{20ff.}$. That drunkenness existed in all periods of Israel's history is proved by 1 S 25^{36}, Dt 21^{20}, and Pr $23^{21ff.}$. Herodotus (ii. 60) vouches for the fact that large quantities of wine were also consumed at certain Egyptian festivals, where, no doubt, it produced similar results. Apparently, however, drunkenness among the ancients was never so flagrant a vice as it is in modern Anglo-Saxon countries.

2. Among the ancient Semites, as among other peoples at a similar stage of culture, the sexual appetite was strong. The physical conditions, which held them so long in a state of barbarism in their cradle-land, led to the crystallizing of their religious customs about sexual ideas of a primitive character; and as religion perpetuated these customs, certain primitive features bordering on the bestial appear more prominently among the Semites than other peoples of antiquity, though they can be traced to some extent also among the Egyptians, who appear to have originated under similar conditions.

In early times sexual bestiality seems also to have led occasionally to actual connexion with animals. In the Gilgamesh epic, Eabani, the

primitive man, is represented as living a wild life with the animals, and as satisfying his passion with them. He was induced to leave them only after having experienced the superior charms of a woman (cf. *KB* vi. 125–127). Jastrow (*AJSL* xv. 207 ff.) holds that this was the primitive Semitic idea of the relations of men and animals, and that the original form of the second chapter of Genesis contained a similar story. Certain it is that such relations continued to exist sporadically until comparatively late times, for such prohibitions as that in Lv $20^{15f.}$ would never have been made had there been no such practice to eradicate.*

Among the primitive Semites the marriage relations consisted of various forms of polyandry, of which Nair polyandry was the most ancient (cf. W. R. Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*, and Barton, *op. cit.* ch. ii.). This type of polyandry was, in reality, the loosest kind of marriage, and was accompanied by a good deal of promiscuity. After settlement in agricultural lands this type of marriage gave way to polygamy. Women who adhered to the older type of marriage lost caste, except where connexion with a temple gave them a certain standing. In Israel they maintained themselves down to the reform of Josiah in the year B.C. 621 (cf. Dt $23^{17.\ 18}$, 2 K 23^{7}). In Babylonia similar conditions existed. The code of Ḥammurabi shows that a class of unmarried women were connected sacredly with the temple. They might have children, who apparently were frequently adopted by other people (see *Code*, §§ 192, 193). In many parts of the Semitic world, male prostitutes, called technically 'dogs,' were also connected with the temples (Barton, *op. cit.* 188 and 251 n. 2). This is the meaning of the term in Dt 23^{18}. In Egypt similar ideas seem to have been kept alive by the ithyphallic god Min, whose festal procession is pictured on the walls of the temple of Deir el-Bahri and elsewhere, and by the god whom Herodotus (ii. 48, 49) identifies with Dionysos. At feasts in Babylonia (Herod. i. 199), in Egypt (*ib.* ii. 64), and in Israel, loose sexual practices were kept alive, protected by the sacred name of religion. This, no doubt, tended to perpetuate low and bestial ideals. The bestial influence of these practices can best be appreciated by those who have seen the objects exhumed at the Ashtart temple of ancient Gezer, but naturally not yet published. Many of these objects are the grossest sexual emblems. They reveal how great were the odds against which the ethical religion of the Hebrew prophets had to contend.

Apart from religion, bestial sexual practices were sometimes indulged in. For example, the treatment accorded by the men of Gibeon to a young woman (Jg 19) was unmitigated bestiality. Similar crimes, however, occur in modern times, especially in countries where, as in the United States, there is a considerable number of backward coloured people.

* [This crime, which still occurs sporadically, so that modern criminal codes provide penalties for its suppression, seems to have prevailed among the Greeks and Romans of the later period, as is proved by an extremely unsavoury adventure described in the *Metamorphoses* of Apuleius, so that the '*Abodā Zārā* forbids the stabling of cows in Gentile stalls (*JE* v. 621). Equal degeneracy is recounted in the *Arabian Nights* (tr. Payne, London, 1882–84, iv. 137–143), and in the Hindu Aśvamedha (*q.v.*) there was even a ritual bestiality with the *membrum virile* of the sacrificed sacred horse. In mythology, however, the majority of the amours between human beings and animals, with which every student of the classics and comparative religion is familiar, receive their explanation from totemism, so that, as MacCulloch observes, 'as man's religious conceptions advance, his worshipful spirits and gods assume more and more a human form, but preserve traces of their animal form, and from this such tales take their origin' (cf. his admirable chapter on 'Beast-Marriages,' *CF* pp. 253-278, and the literature there cited).—Louis H. Gray.]

3. Bestiality was also exhibited by some of the ancient Semites in their *warlike practices*. Thus we are told that the Ammonites ripped up women with child (Am 1^{13}). Assyrian kings seem to have practised the greatest cruelty upon their captives taken in war. Thus they boast that they flayed their prisoners alive and spread their skins on city walls (*KB* ii. 165), bored out the eyes of their prisoners (*ib.* i. 113; cf. 2 K 25^{7}), and tore out their tongues (*ib.* ii. 257), and also they impaled their victims on stakes (cf. *ib.* i. 113, ii. 165). Perhaps to future generations the warfare of the present will seem as bestial as these cruelties do to us. See, further, CRIMES.

LITERATURE.—W. R. Smith, *Religion of the Semites*[2], 1894, *passim*; Barton, *Semitic Origins*, 1902, *passim*; Post, *Grundriss der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz*, Oldenburg, 1894–95, ii. 390 ff.; Driver, art. 'Ashtoreth,' in *HDB*; and Barton, art. 'Ashtoreth,' in *JE*. GEORGE A. BARTON.

BETROTHAL.—See MARRIAGE.

BETTING.—See GAMBLING.

BHAGAVAD-GĪTĀ (the 'Song of the Blessed') is the name of the celebrated religious and philosophical poem of India, which is inserted as an episode in the sixth book of the Mahābhārata.

The two nearly related but hostile clans of the Kauravas and Pāṇḍavas, after disputes extending over many years, make ready for open combat, and advance against one another with the forces and allies on either side to the plain of the Kurus, in the neighbourhood of the modern Delhi. The two families, being nearly related, have equal claim to the name of Kurus or Kauravas; but the title is usually limited to that side which was arrayed under the leadership of the blind king Dhṛtarāṣṭra. To him the course of the battle is narrated by his charioteer Sañjaya, who has been endowed by Vyāsa, the reputed author of the Mahābhārata, with supernatural power to discern all the incidents of the fight. Almost the first place in this narrative of Sañjaya is taken by the dialogue between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna, the full title of which is *Bhagavadgītopaniṣad*, 'the secret doctrine proclaimed by the Blessed One,' usually abbreviated into *Bhagavad-Gītā*, or simply *Gītā*.

At the sight of his near relatives in the hostile army, Arjuna, the famed archer of the race of the Pāṇḍavas, hesitates to begin the fight; and is recalled to a sense of his duty by Kṛṣṇa, who in human form stands by his side as his charioteer. The admonitions and instructions of Kṛṣṇa adopt a more serious and elevated tone as he proceeds, and in the eleventh book he reveals himself to Arjuna as the one only God, the Lord of all worlds, who has assumed the form of the hero of the Yādava race.

This is not the place in which to enter into the full details of the historical development of Kṛṣṇa, who in the Mahābhārata appears at one time as a human hero, at another as semi-divine (a phenomenal form of Viṣṇu), or again as the one only God, and who finally is identified with Brahman, the All-Soul. The judgment which the author of this article has formed with regard to the lines which this development has followed may be learned from the Introduction to his translation of the Bhagavad-Gītā, ch. ii. (Leipzig, 1905). The following brief statement must suffice for a due appreciation of the contents of the Gītā.

It may be assumed as probable that Kṛṣṇa was originally the leader of a warrior and pastoral tribe of non-Brāhman race, and that he lived long before the Buddha. He became the eponymous hero of his people, not only because of his prowess in war, but also probably because he was the founder of the religion of his race—a religion independent of the Vedic tradition and monotheistic, in which a special stress was laid on *ethical* requirements. The adherents of this religion were called 'Bhāgavatas,' adopting other names later on. As the form of Kṛṣṇa within the race to which he belonged was advanced from the position of a demi-god to that of a god (identified especially with the god of the Bhāgavatas), Brāhmanism claimed as its own this popular and powerful representation of the Deity, and transformed it into an incarnation of Viṣṇu. In this way Brāhmanism

succeeded in gaining over the entire religious community of the Bhāgavatas, and the latter (a still existing sect [see BHAKTI-MARGA]) were merged in Brāhmanism. The Bhagavad-Gītā was originally a text-book of this sect, and in the course of time has won a position of such significance for the whole of Brāhman India that in recent years educated Hindus have put it forward as a rival to the New Testament. No other product of Indian religious literature is worthy to hold a place by the side of the Bhagavad-Gītā, in view of the beauty and elevated character of the thought and expression in many passages. On a metaphysical basis there has been raised in it a structure of lofty ethical teaching, which we miss in the orthodox systems of Indian philosophy.

It has long been known that we do not possess the Bhagavad-Gītā in its original form, but in a form which is the result of essential modifications. The doctrines, which are here put into the mouth of Kṛṣṇa, present a remarkable combination of pantheistic and monotheistic ideas, of philosophical thoughts, and of pure and deeply religious faith in God.

A personal God, Kṛṣṇa, manifests himself in the form of a human hero, propounds his doctrines, and demands of his hearer not only the exact fulfilment of duty, but before everything else faith and love and resignation, of which he is himself to be the object. By a special act of grace he then reveals himself in his superhuman but still bodily form, and promises to the faithful, as reward for his love to God, admission after death to His presence, and the prize of fellowship with Him. By the side, however, of this deity, thus conceived in as *personal* a manner as possible, who dominates the entire poem, there is introduced several times as the supreme first principle the neuter *impersonal* Brahman, the Absolute. At one time Kṛṣṇa says of himself that he is the one sole supreme God, the creator and ruler of the universe and of all things therein; at another he sets forth the Vedāntic doctrine of the Brahman and of *māyā*, the cosmical illusion, and proclaims that the supreme end of man is to transcend this cosmical illusion and become one with Brahman.

These two doctrines, the theistic and the pantheistic, are interwoven with one another, sometimes following one another closely and without a break, sometimes more loosely connected. Yet the one is not announced as the lower exoteric doctrine, and the other as the higher esoteric; nor is it in any way taught that theism is a grade preliminary to knowledge, or a type of the truth, and the pantheism of the Vedānta the truth itself (see art. VEDĀNTA). But the two forms of belief are throughout treated entirely as though there were no distinction at all between them, whether as regards contents or value.

The attempt has been made to explain away the contradictions of the Bhagavad-Gītā, on the theory that no definite system is here intended; that the whole is the work of a poet, who gives utterance and shape to his thoughts as they occur to him, without heeding the anomalies which are involved in detail.

The fundamental contradiction, however, which permeates the Bhagavad-Gītā cannot be set aside by an appeal to its poetical character. It can be explained only on the hypothesis that one or other of the heterogeneous doctrines propounded by Kṛṣṇa must be a later addition. Adolf Holtzmann therefore maintained the view that the Bhagavad-Gītā was originally a poem of a purely pantheistic nature, which was later modified and adapted in the interests of the Viṣṇu-Kṛṣṇa cult, and had thus impressed upon it its present form. This theory also, however, is mistaken; precisely the reverse seems to be the fact. The entire character of the poem in design and execution is so overwhelmingly theistic, that we must suppose it to have been from the very beginning of a purely theistic character, and to have been adapted later in a pantheistic sense from the standpoint of the Vedānta philosophy. In the ancient poem Kṛṣṇa speaks of himself, and Arjuna of Kṛṣṇa, as of an individual, a person, a conscious deity. In the recension the neuter Brahman appears in the added portions as the final and loftiest conception, and is occasionally identified with Kṛṣṇa. Briefly stated, then, the real facts are that in the ancient poem *a Kṛṣṇaism based upon the Sāṅkhya-Yoga philosophy is set forth; in the additions of the recension the Vedānta philosophy is taught* (see artt. SĀṄKHYA, YOGA, VEDĀNTA). It has long been known, indeed, that the doctrines of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga formed, on the whole, the basis of the philosophical speculations of the Bhagavad-Gītā, and that, as compared with them, the Vedānta holds a quite secondary position. Acting on this conviction, the author of the present article has attempted, in his translation of the Gītā, to determine the original form of the poem, and to separate the additions of the Vedāntic recension.

The doctrines of the true original Bhagavad-Gītā are briefly as follows. They may be defined as the faith of the Bhāgavatas, considerably modified by the introduction of elements from the Sāṅkhya-Yoga. In the following account it is not proposed to adhere to the line of thought of the poem, which wanders from one to the other, and especially in its practical demands constantly intermingles the different recognized standpoints of religion and philosophy.

We begin with the *systematic* part, and in the first place with the person of God. God is a conscious, eternal, and almighty Being, the 'great Lord of the universe, who is without beginning' (x. 3). He is distinct not only from the perishable world, but also from the imperishable soul of existing beings (xv. 17–19). He is therefore soul in another and higher sense than the souls of all creatures. When it is asserted in vii. 4–6 that God has two natures, one a higher spiritual nature, by which the universe is sustained, and a second, a lower and material nature, consisting of all that, according to the Sāṅkhya, belongs to *prakṛti* or matter, this statement is not to be construed in the sense that a half of the Divine essence is composed of matter; the meaning is rather that matter is not itself independent, following its own blind impulses, but that its evolution is under the control of God; in other words, that God works in matter, and acts through it. This is clearly expressed in other passages of the Bhagavad-Gītā. God deposits in matter the germ from which development takes place (xiv. 3, 4). He is therefore the father of all creatures, while matter may be compared to the mother's womb (xiv. 4). God superintends the rise, development, and decay of the universe (ix. 7, 8, 10), and in this sense He is termed the origin and end of the whole world (vii. 6, x. 8), and is identified with death (xi. 32). The creatures in all their doings and conditions of life have their origin from Him (x. 4, 5); He determines their fate, *i.e.* recompenses them according to their deeds, and in the cycle of life makes the creatures 'revolve like figures in a puppet-show' (xviii. 61). All His acts are solely for the sake of the universe, for He Himself has no wish to fulfil, no end to attain (iii. 22, 24). 'Whenever justice declines and injustice increases,' God, who is yet eternal and imperishable, re-creates Himself, *i.e.* assumes new phenomenal forms 'for the protection of the good and the destruction of the evil, in order to establish the right' (iv. 6–8). Because the action of God is due to the matter of which He is the ruler, and is never due to a selfish motive, He is not fettered by His action (iv. 13, 14, ix. 9), and can never, therefore, be entangled in worldly existence. The imaginary picture of God in Book xii. is a dramatic embellishment, which is intended to touch the fancy, but is of slight importance for the real teaching of the Gītā.

The relation of God to the world of mankind is determined not solely by the stern law of retribution, but by love to those who know Him and are whole-heartedly devoted to Him (vii. 17, xii. 14–20, xviii. 64, 65, 69), and He delivers from all sin those who take refuge in Him alone (xviii. 66). In this passage already, therefore (and also in xviii. 56, 58, 62, 73), is set forth that confidence in the Divine

grace (*prasāda*) which we meet with in some Upaniṣads of the middle period (see art. UPANIṢADS), and which in consequence holds so important a place in the Indian sects.

Although it is God who guides the processes of the world, yet, as we saw above, all acts are to be ascribed to *matter* (iii. 27, v. 14, xiii. 20, 29). Out of primitive matter the universe is evolved, and it returns back again into it (viii. 18, 19). This conception of evolution and re-absorption, like the theory of the world-periods, is therefore derived from the Sāṅkhya system; and in general all the views of the Bhagavad-Gītā with regard to matter agree with the doctrine of the Sāṅkhya. The three *guṇas* play here the same part as in that system (see art. GUṆAS); by their influences the soul is enchained (xiv. 5 ff.), and the consequences of their activity make themselves felt throughout the entire life, as is described in detail in Books xvii. and xviii. Even the physiological conceptions with regard to the inner organs and the senses are those of the Sāṅkhya system (iii. 40, 42, xiii. 5). None of these correspondences, however, is of such importance for the doctrines of the Gītā as the fundamental conception of the nature of matter, derived from the Sāṅkhya, which forms the basis of the philosophical discussion in Bk. ii. Matter, it is true, is in no sense created by God, but exists from eternity; it is, however, subject to incessant mutation and change. All its products and effects are transitory; its influences, especially those of pleasure and pain, come and go, and they do not therefore deserve that man should regulate his conduct by them (ii. 14).

Over-against this mutability of all the products of matter is set the immutability of the soul. The latter, indeed (the soul, the self), resembles matter, in so far as both are eternal and indestructible; for that which is, ever has been, and ever will be: 'existence cannot be predicated of that which is not, nor non-existence of that which is' (ii. 16). The main contrast, however, between soul and matter consists in this, that the former is never subject to change. In reality the soul dwells within the body absolutely inactive, 'neither acting nor inspiring action' (v. 13–15), and remains unaffected by all the influences and acts of matter. This thought is elaborated in choice language in the 2nd Bk. of the Bhagavad-Gītā. He who knows that the soul is the true I, which abandons the worn-out bodies and enters into new ones, as a man puts off old clothes and puts on new (ii. 22), that the soul can neither be hurt nor destroyed, laments not over human suffering and death, *i.e.* over events which affect merely the perishable body.

All this is pure Sāṅkhya doctrine. Nevertheless the conception of the spiritual principle in the Gītā is essentially different from that of the Sāṅkhya system; it is decidedly more religious than philosophical. According to the Gītā as representing the belief of the Bhāgavatas, the individual soul does not lead a separate existence from all eternity, but it has become severed as a part from the Divine soul (xv. 7, cf. also xvi. 18, xvii. 6). Individual souls are therefore of Divine origin. They have entered into a union with matter, which is incapable of effecting any change in the souls themselves, but by which life and consciousness have been brought into the universe. It is the duty of man to behave in such a way that his soul may be able to return again to its origin, to God.

We now come to the *practical* part of the doctrines of the Gītā. Here two ways of salvation are contrasted with one another, one of which consists in withdrawal from the life of the world, and seeking after knowledge, the other in acts conformable to duty and free from desire. Although the second way is repeatedly described as superior (iii. 8, v. 2, xviii. 7), and, to judge from the whole tenor, is to be regarded as the true ethical ideal of the poem, the author has nevertheless not ventured to reject the way of salvation by renunciation of the world, and abstract knowledge. The conception that deliverance from the cycle of existence was to be won by meditation in complete isolation from the world, had been for centuries so deeply rooted in all thoughtful circles among the Indian peoples that it could no longer be seriously assailed. No course remained open but to concede a place to the two ways side by side with each other, and to teach that both right action and the knowledge which implies non-action or abstinence from works lead to salvation. From the fact that in the Gītā now one and now the other standpoint is adopted, and at times the ideal of quietism is placed unreservedly above that of activity (vi. 3), all sorts of inconsistencies and ambiguities have arisen, which a decided rejection of the quietistic standpoint would have avoided. The Bhagavad-Gītā reconciles the two views by explaining that action in fulfilment of duty, which is performed without regard to success and without any personal interest, ceases to produce fruit, and accordingly for the actor does not result in any continuance of worldly existence. Action of this nature, therefore, as far as consequences are concerned, is equivalent to the abstinence from action of the way of knowledge.

The knowledge which is to be attained by the quietistic way of salvation is described in several passages of the Gītā, precisely on the lines of the Sāṅkhya system (xiii. 23, xiv. 19), as a discrimination of soul and matter; and as a consequence of this discrimination release from the necessity of re-birth is assured to him who knows, without regard to conduct (xiii. 23). This may be looked upon as an isolated recognition of the pure Sāṅkhya ideal. In general the view of the Bhagavad-Gītā is that saving knowledge is not limited to the discrimination of soul and matter, but this discrimination is to be regarded merely as a condition preliminary to the *knowledge of God*; it is this that first really opens the way to the highest salvation.

The second way of salvation, the unselfish discharge of duty, is incessantly enjoined in the Bhagavad-Gītā in the most varied manner. But the mere discharge of duty would not lead to the goal so long as there is still associated with it any expectation of fruit. What is commanded must be done without passion, with quietness and equanimity, with an even regard for every one, esteeming indifferently the pleasing or displeasing, pleasure or pain, good or evil fortune, with no trace of desire or personal interest. If a man acts in this frame of mind, without vexing himself with regard to transitory material results (ii. 14), solely according to the precepts of duty and the Divine example (iii. 22), leaving to God the outcome of all his works, his works are not subject to the law of retribution (iv. 22, 23, ix. 27, 28, xviii. 12, 17). The requirements here laid down necessitate the rejection of the Vedic conception of the merit of works, and this is expressed in the original Gītā without any limitation. All the ceremonies of the Brāhmanical ritual minister, indeed, throughout to individual desires, and therefore stand in sharp contrast to the ethical ideal of the Gītā. 'Abandon all sacred rites,' it is said in xviii. 66; and similarly, in ii. 42–45, unconcealed contempt is expressed for the promises of the Veda, which take account only of the material world and offer only transitory reward (cf. also ix. 20, 21). Indifference towards the prescriptions of the Vedic ritual is therefore also a preliminary condition for the

attainment of salvation (ii. 52, 53). In this requirement, again, pure Sāṅkhya doctrine is assumed, as will be plain to every one acquainted with the Indian systems of philosophy.

Whether, however, it is the one or the other way of salvation that is followed, a hindrance that lies in the natural disposition must be overcome. When it is said in iii. 3 that 'the creatures follow their nature,' and when in xvi. 1 ff. a distinction is drawn between men who are born to a godlike existence and those who are born to the existence of demons, this predetermination is to be conceived as an effect of previous merit or guilt. Nothing is said in the Gītā of a real predestination; rather it is apparent that, throughout, moral freedom is taken for granted. It is left to man's option whether he will contend with the hindrances that lie in the path to deliverance or not, whether he will seek to reach a lower or the highest goal. On the way to the latter, natural ignorance hinders the practice of knowledge (v. 15), as natural desire hampers the performance of duty, and is man's real enemy to the observance of duty (iii. 37, 43). But unbelief also and scepticism are fatal (iv. 40). Moderate ascetic (*yoga*) practices are recommended as aids to the successful combating of these hindrances (v. 27, 28, vi. 10 ff., viii. 10, 12 ff.). Even if a man is not successful in mental abstraction, these *yoga* observances are not useless, for such a man will be re-born under favourable conditions, and will ultimately reach the supreme goal (ii. 40, vi. 41 ff.).

We now come, finally, to the most important demand which the Gītā makes upon those men who stand in need of deliverance. As is well known, the poem is the anthem in praise of *bhakti*, or believing and trustful love to God. With unerring certainty love to God leads to the goal alike by the way of knowledge and by that of unselfish performance of duty. The entire poem is full of this thought, and it was composed with a view to its exposition. From love to God knowledge of God arises (xviii. 55), and in consequence the believer refers all his deeds to God and leaves their results to Him. To every one, without distinction of birth or regard to his former conduct, *bhakti* assures deliverance, even to evil-doers, women, Vaiśyas, and Śūdras (ix. 30–32). No transient impulse, however, of love is in question; the whole being of man must be filled with unchanging love to God. When this is the case, a man's thoughts, even in the hour of death, will be directed towards God. Especial importance is attached to this point in the Gītā (viii. 5, 9, 10, 13), because a man enters into that form of existence of which he thinks in the hour of death (viii. 6).

What, then, are we to conceive to be the condition of the soul that has been liberated from earthly existence and has attained unto God? Unconsciousness, in harmony with the doctrine of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga? Does the soul, having been part of the Divine Soul before its separation from it, lose its individuality on its return to its origin? No. Deliverance is conceived as the state of blissful peace of the soul, whose individual life continues in the presence of God. How, indeed, on the assumptions of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, the soul can lead a conscious existence without entering into relation with matter the Bhagavad-Gītā does not explain. Evidently a view is set forth here which dates from the most ancient period of the Bhāgavata religion, and which from antiquity has formed a pillar of this faith; in spite, therefore, of the subsequent introduction of elements from the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, this doctrine maintained its ground against the contrasted teaching of the two philosophical systems. A confident faith helped to remove the methodical difficulties which must have been the result.

On the whole, however, the religious and philosophical doctrines of the *original* Bhagavad-Gītā, as the above account shows, were clear and defined. Their clearness is greatly impaired by the pantheistic redaction. The form of the poem, as it has come down to us, is full of internal contradictions, seeing that in it at one time the personal God (Kṛṣṇa), at another the impersonal world-soul (Brahman), is presented as the supreme first principle—sometimes the two are also identified; and again, at one time conscious continued existence in the presence of God is put forward as the highest goal of human endeavour, and at another absorption into the world-soul.

It is difficult to determine the period of the composition of the work. We shall not, however, go materially wrong if we assign the composition of the original Gītā to the 2nd cent. B.C., its redaction to the 2nd century of our own era.

In conclusion, a few words must be devoted to the question of Buddhist or Christian influence in the Bhagavad-Gītā. Buddhist influence may perhaps be traced in the recommendation of the golden mean in Bk. vi. 16, 17; and this idea may be supported by a reference to the occurrence of the word *nirvāṇa* in the preceding verse. Since, however, the application of the term is not at all limited to the linguistic usage of Buddhism (*brahmanirvāṇa* occurs four times in the recension of the Gītā), and since the conception of a wise moderation is explained on general human considerations, Buddhist influence must be regarded as very doubtful, or may at best be due to very distant and indirect sources.

The question of the influence of Christianity on the Gītā is more important. Such an influence has often been asserted, and as often disputed. In the case of the *original* Bhagavad-Gītā, the date, which on reliable grounds may be assigned to it, is decisive for a negative answer. The historical possibility of the author of the *redaction* being acquainted with the doctrines of Christianity must unquestionably be admitted; but there are no grounds for regarding this view as even probable, much less certain. No thought is found in the Gītā which may not be satisfactorily explained from the rich storehouse of ideas at the disposal of the Indian peoples, or from their characteristic mental disposition.

LITERATURE.—The literature of the Bhagavad-Gītā is of an extent that it is almost impossible to survey. A detailed account of the manuscripts, editions, and translations of the Bhag., together with the native commentaries and the expositions of European scholars, is given by Adolf Holtzmann, *Das Mahābhārata und seine Teile*, vol. ii., 1893, pp. 121–153. No year has passed since the appearance of this volume in which there have not been issued further Indian contributions to this literature. Of older works special mention should be made of the essay of W. von Humboldt, *Ueber die unter dem Namen Bhagavad-Gītā bekannte Episode des Mahābhārata*, Berlin, 1826; of later works, the translations of K. T. Telang, *SBE*, vol. viii., 2nd ed., Oxford, 1898; J. Davies, 3rd ed., London, 1893; R. Garbe, Leipzig, 1905; L. Barnett, London, 1905; C. Johnston, N.Y. 1908. Cf. also Sir Monier Monier-Williams, *Indian Wisdom*[2], 1875, p. 136 ff.; E. W. Hopkins, *Religions of India*, London 1896, p. 389 ff.; R. W. Frazer, *Literary History of India*, London, 1898, pp. 207, 235 ff.; M. Winternitz, *Geschichte der indischen Litteratur*, i. Leipzig, 1908, pp. 365–376. R. GARBE.

BHĀGAVATAS.—See BHAKTI-MĀRGA, p. 540[b].

BHAIRAVA.—Bhairava is a name of Śiva, meaning 'fearful.' Originally it was only an epithet of the third member of the Hindu trinity in his 'fear' form. As such the word is found quite early, but the worship of Śiva under the special (separate) form of Bhairava is of recent date. Eight, sometimes twelve, forms of this Bhairava-Śiva are then recognized, those commonly used being 'Bhairava the Black' and 'Bhairava the Dog.' Śvāśva, 'he that has a dog for his horse,' is also a frequent designation of Bhairava. He has a female consort called Bhairavī. All of this side of Bhairava, however, is purely classical,

derived from Śiva's epithet. But Bhairava has another side, which is indeed the popular modern side of his character, having nothing to do with the Brāhmanic god. This is derived from the village-god, Bhairon, a peasant personification of the field-genius, and often confused with the Bhūmiya form of the earth-god. This Bhairon has passed through the usual stages. First a peasant godling, then made by the Brāhman priests an attendant of their god, then representing that higher god, and finally, as at present, the only form of the god (Śiva) recognized by the peasants of several communities, chiefly in northern India. The chance resemblance of name facilitated the identification of the peasant Bhairon with the priestly Bhairava, and the attributes of the great god were transferred by the worshippers of the little god to their own godling. A further identification has already begun with the Brāhmanic hero Bhīm, and he is therefore known as the 'club-god,' having taken over from Bhīm the weapon associated with that hero. At present it is impossible to distinguish fully the characteristics of the Śiva form of Bhairava from those of the Bhairon form. Other forms of the same name are Bhairoba and (in middle India) Vitoba. The worship of Bhairava is found in Benares and Bombay, and throughout the agricultural districts of northern and middle India, as far north as the Panjāb. In the north he is revered chiefly as a black dog. In middle India his favourite image is that of a snake-girded drummer, or simply of a red stone. As a village-deity he is worshipped with milk offerings, in towns, especially in the north, with spirituous liquors; and his exclusive adherents are ignorant peasants in the country and dissolute Yogis of the towns. But as an attendant on Śiva he has a recognized though subordinate place in the respectable temples of the great god.

LITERATURE.—E. T. Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1872; W. Crooke, *Popular Religion and Folk-lore of Northern India*, new ed., Lond. 1896.

E. WASHBURN HOPKINS.

BHAKTI-MĀRGA.—1. Introduction.—*Bhakti-Mārga* (the *bhakti*-path) is a general name given to those sects of modern Hinduism which lay stress on the importance of *bhakti*, or devotional faith, as a means of salvation, as opposed to the 'works-path' (*karma-mārga*) and the 'knowledge-path' (*jñāna-mārga*). The doctrine of *bhakti* is the foundation of modern Vishnuite Hinduism, and is professed by at least 150 millions of the inhabitants of India. The only other book-religion of modern India, whose believers are numerically important, is Śaivism. The latter is confined mainly to special localities; and even here, not only are there also many Vaiṣṇavas, but several Śaiva sects teach the doctrine of *bhakti* as directed to Śiva. The stronghold of Śaivism may be taken to be that part of India which lies east of the longitude of Benares. All India west of that line may be taken, so far as Hindus are concerned, as on the whole Vishnuite.

The word *bhakti*, with the allied words *Bhagavat* and *Bhāgavata*, is derived from the Sanskrit root *bhaj*, meaning, in this case, 'to adore.' *Bhakti*, therefore, has the primary meaning of 'adoration,' while *Bhagavat* means 'the Adorable One,' and *Bhāgavata* 'a worshipper of the Adorable One.' As a religious term *bhakti* is defined* as 'an affection fixed upon the Lord'; but the word 'affection' (*anurakti*) itself is further defined as that particular affection (*rakti*) which arises after (*anu*) a knowledge of the attributes of the Adorable One.

The best official account of *bhakti* is contained in the *Aphorisms* of Śāṇḍilya, a work of unknown date, but modern, which, with a commentary, was translated by Cowell in 1878. After defining *bhakti*, as above explained, the writer further states that it is not knowledge, though it may be the result of knowledge. Even those who hate the Adorable may have knowledge of Him. It is not worship, etc. These are merely outward acts, and *bhakti* need not necessarily be present in them. It is simply and solely an affection directed to a person, and not a belief in a system. There is a promise of immortality to him who 'abides' in Him. 'Abiding' means 'having *bhakti*.' *Bhakti* is not a wish. A wish is selfish. Affection is unselfish. It is not a 'work,' and does not depend upon an effort of the will. The fruit of 'works' is transient, that of *bhakti* is eternal life. Works, if they are pure, are a means to *bhakti*. To be pure, they must be surrendered to Him, *i.e.*, the doer must say, 'Whatever I do, with or without my will, being all surrendered to Thee, I do it as impelled by Thee.' Good actions, done for the good results which they produce in a future life, do not produce *bhakti*, but are bondage.

Bhakti, if looked upon as 'faith,' is not 'belief.' That may be merely subsidiary to ceremonial works. Not so *bhakti*. Belief is at best merely a subsidiary preliminary to *bhakti*. We have seen that knowledge may produce *bhakti*. The converse is not true. *Bhakti* is the terminus. We cannot *know* by *bhakti*, we can only *recognize* by it—a term which implies previous knowledge.

It is by its signs or 'fruits' that we know that *bhakti* is thoroughly confirmed. Such fruits are respect and honour paid to the Adorable, sorrow for sin, doubt of every other object but the Adorable, celebration of His praise, continuing to live for His sake, considering everything as His, regarding Him as being in all things, resignation to His will, absence of anger, envy, greed, and impure thoughts.

The highest *bhakti* may be directed not only to the Adorable in His highest form, but also to any of His incarnations, such as Kṛṣṇa, Rāma-chandra, and so on. The object of the Adorable in becoming incarnate was pure compassion in its highest sense. No earthly compassion is purely disinterested. His alone is disinterested. He became incarnate, and descended from His high estate, solely to abolish disinterestedly others' woes.

So far Śāṇḍilya. As a religious technical term, *bhakti* is a most difficult word to translate. Probably 'faith,' in the sense of 'devotional faith,' and not of mere 'belief,' is its best representative in English, but unless 'faith' is taken in this special sense, the word is apt to be misleading. 'Devotion' gives an idea as incomplete as 'faith'; for, though devotion is a necessary element of *bhakti*, it does not imply the *after* sense which is insisted upon by the teachers of the cult. It is devotion arising *after* the acquirement of belief. In the present article, the word 'faith,' understood as above, will be employed as the equivalent.

(*a*) *Signification and Indian origin of the word 'bhakti.'*—The use of the word *bhakti* as a religious technical term is comparatively late in Indian literature. This was to be expected, for faith requires a personal deity as its object, and for many centuries after Vedic times all Indian religious literature was confined to one form of thought which was incompatible with belief in the existence of such a God. This was the pantheistic Brahmaism* of the earliest Upaniṣads and of works based upon them (see VEDĀNTA). In the sense of 'love directed to God' the word appears first in Buddhist works of the 4th cent. B.C.; and it was also about the same time quoted in one of his rules (IV. iii. 95), with the same meaning, by the Sanskrit grammarian Pāṇini. It is fully established as a religious technical term in the older parts of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* (*q.v.*), which belong to the two centuries immediately preceding our era, and was subsequently freely used in all Sanskrit literature, both sacred and profane.

Devotional faith implies not only a personal God, but one God. It is essentially a monotheistic attitude of the religious sense. If, therefore, we assume that the word *bhakti*, as a religious technical term, cannot be traced to a period earlier than the 4th cent. B.C., it is important to inquire how far back we can trace the feeling which it represents. This feeling was very old in India. We occasionally come across what it is difficult to distinguish from *bhakti* even in Vedic hymns, especially those dedicated to Varuṇa. But this incipient monotheism fell still-born from the singers' lips. The untaught multitude adhered for many centuries to the genial, hearty, polytheistic nature-worship of their Vedic ancestors, while the Brāhmans—in that part of India the sole reposi-

* Śāṇḍilya, I. 2.

* This is the convenient name given by Hopkins to the unsystematized Brāhmanical teaching of the earliest Upaniṣads before it had developed into the systematized Vedānta of Śaṅkara.

tories of the learning of their time—carried their speculations into the region of pantheism. The origin of the monotheism from which *bhakti* sprang must be sought elsewhere than among the Brāhmans of Northern India.

The migration of the Aryans into India was a long process, extending over many generations. The earlier comers were separated from the later ones by differences of custom, religion, and language. There were internecine quarrels among them, which ultimately resolved themselves into one group of tribes establishing itself as the most powerful. This group, represented in history by the Kuru tribe, had settled in the tract known as the *Madhyadeśa* or 'Midland,' and corresponding to the country near the modern Delhi and to its immediate north. It was the Aryan language spoken in the Midland that in later times developed into Sanskrit. It was in the Midland that the Vedic hymns were collected and compiled, and it was here that the Brāhmans consolidated their priestly power and gained the social supremacy which subsequently extended over the whole of India, and which they have never lost. All the old religious literature which has come down to us had, if not its origin, at least its publishing centre, in the Midland.

(*b*) *Indian monotheism and its probable origin.*—The word 'Midland' suggests an 'Outland,' also inhabited by Aryans, encircling the Midland on the East, South, and West. In those days, besides the Brāhmans, the Aryans had another leading class—that of the *Kṣatriyas*, or warriors. In the earlier times these shared with the Brāhmans the right of sacrifice, which in the Midland was afterwards monopolized by the latter. It has long been recognized that the Aryans of the Outland were not, in later Vedic times, so thoroughly subjected to the religious influence of the Brāhmans as their kindred of the Midland. In the Outland the thinkers belonged rather to the Kṣatriya class, to whose learning and critical acumen witness is borne even in contemporary Brāhmanical writings. It was in the Outland that the old atheistic system of philosophy—the Sāṅkhya—took its birth, patronized and perhaps founded by Kṣatriyas. Here, later on, Śākya Siṁha and Mahāvīra, both Kṣatriyas, founded respectively the Buddhist and the Jain religions; and here, during the thousand years that precede our era, while the Brāhmans of the Midland were developing their pantheistic 'Brahmaism,' the leading spirits of the Kṣatriyas thought out their monotheism.

Śākya Siṁha and Mahāvīra were by no means the only Kṣatriyas of the Outland who were celebrated for their learning. Janaka, the famous king of Mithilā, was not merely intimately connected with the origins of the Bhāgavata religion, but also took a prominent part in philosophical discussions with Brāhmans of many varying views. According to the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* (III. xxi. 26), even Kapila, the founder of the Sāṅkhya system, was descended from a *Rājarṣi*, and was therefore a Kṣatriya. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (II. i. 1 ff.) and the *Kauṣītakī Brāhmaṇa Upaniṣad* (iv. 1 ff.) both tell us how Gārgya, a Brāhman of the Outland, was actually taught by the Kṣatriya Ajātaśatru of Kāśī. To the east and south of the Midland lay the country of the Pāñchālas. Here lived the Kṣatriya Jaivali, who, according to the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad* (I. viii. 1 and V. iii. ff.) put the Brāhmans to silence and taught the Brāhman Gautama. He even (V. iii. 7) claimed that his system of religious thought belonged to the Kṣatriya class alone. Again, in the same work (V. xi.) we find ourselves in another part of the Outland, the Kaikēya country of the western Panjāb. Five great theologians come to a Brāhman with hard questions, which he cannot answer. So he sends them on to a Kṣatriya, Aśvapati, the king of the land, who solves their difficulties. These Upaniṣads were all Brāhmanical, and their authors had no temptation to extol the learning of the Kṣatriyas. On the contrary, when they got a chance, they ridiculed it. Thus the teaching of an opponent is made short work of by the author of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (VIII. i. 4, 10), who contemptuously compares it to 'the words of a Kṣatriya.'

We have no literary evidence as to the train of reasoning by which this doctrine of monotheism was reached, but to the present writer it appears more than probable that it was a development of the sun-worship which was the common heritage of both branches of the Aryan people—the Iranian and the Indian.

All the legends dealing with the origins of the Bhāgavata religion are connected in some way or other with the sun. According to the *Mahābhārata* (xii. 12983), the Adorable Himself taught the religion to the seer Nārada, who taught it to, amongst others, the sun, who communicated it to mankind. The greatest and most worshipped of all the incarnations of the Adorable—that of Rāma-chandra—was by human origin a descendant of the sun, while Kṛṣṇa, the other great incarnation, was descended from the moon, and with him the branch of the lunar race to which he belonged ceased to exist. Several of the legends connected with Bhāgavata saints are also connected with the sun. Sugrīva, Rāma's ally, had the sun for his father. Many legends are told about Draupadī, the wife of the five Pāṇḍavas, but in the *Acta Sanctorum* of the Bhāgavatas, the *Bhakta-māla*, only one is thought worthy of mention, and that is connected with a miracle performed by Kṛṣṇa with the aid of a marvellous cooking-pot given to Draupadī by the sun. Satrājit, Kṛṣṇa's father-in-law, was a sun-worshipper, and received from the sun a jewel that became the subject of many stories. One of the very earliest heretics recorded in Brāhmanical literature was Yājñavalkya. According to the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* (III. v. ff.), he refused to obey his preceptor's command to join in worship with people whom he styled 'miserable and inefficient Brāhmans.' He explained that he acted 'in' or 'for' *bhakti* (the MSS differ), and rejected so much of the Yajur Veda as he had learnt from his teacher. He then departed and worshipped the sun, who imparted to him a new and schismatical Yajur Veda of its own. With this he betook himself to the Janaka referred to above, a famous king of the Outland, and the legendary father-in-law of Rāma-chandra. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (III. i.) tells how he discussed religious matters with Janaka and converted him, and how he disputed with and silenced orthodox Brāhmans. According to Bhāgavata eschatology, the saved soul first of all passes through the sun on its way to the Adorable after death. Nimbārka, the earliest of the Bhāgavata reformers, is traditionally said to have been an incarnation of the sun, and to have started his career by making the sun stand still. Even at the present day the sun is given the title of 'Bhagavat' by the peasants of Northern India. In modern language *Bhagavat Sūrya*, the Adorable Sun, becomes *Sūruj Bhagavān*. Finally, in the later stages of the Bhāgavata religion, the Adorable is identified with Viṣṇu, a deity who, in the oldest Indian literature, was worshipped as a sun-god.

(*c*) *Founder of the monotheistic Bhāgavata religion.*—Under any circumstances, whether this monotheism was a development of sun-worship or not, the following facts may be taken as accepted by most students of the subject:—The founder of the religion was one Kṛṣṇa (Krishna) Vāsudeva, a Kṣatriya. His father's name was Vasudeva (hence the patronymic of Vāsudeva), and his mother's Devakī. He was the pupil of a sage named Ghōra Āṅgirasa, who taught him 'so that he never thirsted again.'* He belonged to the Sātvata sept of the Outland Yādava tribe. In the older parts of the *Mahābhārata* he appears in the twofold character of a mighty warrior and of a religious reformer. He called the object of his worship the *Bhagavat*, or the 'Adorable,' and his followers called themselves Bhāgavatas, or 'Worshippers of the Adorable.' The religion was first adopted by the people of his own tribe, and gradually spread over the greater part of the Outland. Before the 4th cent. B.C., as in the case of the founders of many other religions, he was himself given Divine honours, and under his patronymic of Vāsudeva became identified with the Adorable. In its original form the religion was strongly mono-

* *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad*, III. xvii. 6.

theistic. Vāsudeva taught that the Supreme Being was infinite, eternal, and full of grace, and that salvation consisted in a life of perpetual bliss near him.*

2. History of Bhāgavata religion.—i. *FIRST STAGE.*—There has always been manifest in India a tendency to combine religion with philosophy, and, this being fostered by the speculative inclinations of the Kṣatriya class, it followed that, as time went on, and as interest in philosophical questions spread amongst the people of India, monotheism, as expressed by the Bhāgavata religion, was given a philosophic basis. The pantheistic Brahmaism of the Midland was altogether opposed to this monotheism, and the Bhāgavatas naturally turned to those systems of philosophy which had sprung up in the freer atmosphere of the less Brāhmanized Outland. There were two of these systems—the ancient Sāṅkhya† (*q.v.*) and its daughter, the Yoga (*q.v.*). These two systems influenced not only Bhāgavatism, but also two other important religions founded by Kṣatriyas—Buddhism and Jainism.

The Sāṅkhya system is based on pure atheism. It categorically denies the existence of any Supreme God. Moreover, it does not concern itself with ethics. The Bhāgavata religion, on the other hand, had a God, and from the first was strongly ethical in character. The bridge between those two opposing conceptions was afforded by the Yoga philosophy. The belief in the power acquired by the practice of *yoga*, or concentration, a kind of shamanism, had existed in India for centuries, and this became a branch of philosophy when the acquired power was intended to be utilized for the obtaining of the knowledge demanded by Sāṅkhya. The Yoga teaching inculcates morality, and the ethical tendency of Bhāgavatism led it to ally itself with this development of Sāṅkhya rather than with the parent system.

A system of philosophy, as distinct from a religion, is a matter for the learned alone, and the doctors of the Yoga system readily accepted an alliance with a religion, such as that of the Bhāgavatas, which brought the popular beliefs to their side. They paid a price for it. They added a God to the Sāṅkhya system, and Yoga became theistic. The God whom they accepted had nothing to do with their philosophy. The idea was added on from outside without organically affecting it. On the other hand, the philosophy supplied the Bhāgavatas with a number of technical terms, not the least important of which was the word *yoga* itself. With them the word gradually changed its meaning from 'concentration of thought' to 'devotion to God.' It thus approached the meaning of *bhakti*, but did not include the idea of love, which is an essential part of the signification connoted by that word. We shall see that in later times the word *yoga* received still further development. Another technical term which the Bhāgavatas borrowed from Sāṅkhya-Yoga was a frequently used title for 'God,' viz. *Puruṣa*, or the 'Male.' This was the word employed by the Sāṅkhyas for the human soul. According to the Yoga system, the shadowy God which it adopted was merely a particular soul possessed of supreme knowledge and power. To Him was given the title of the Puruṣa *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, and this name was adopted by the Bhāgavatas as an alternative name for the Adorable. As time went on, other names were also applied to Him, such as Nārāyaṇa, a patronymic from *Nara*, the Primal Male, and, as already explained, Vāsudeva. These bring us down to the end of the first stage of the development of the Bhāgavata religion, which we may roughly fix as coinciding with the conclusion of the 4th cent. B.C.

ii. *SECOND STAGE.*—(*a*) *Its absorption by Brahmaism.*—The second stage is marked by the capture and absorption of Bhāgavatism by the Brahmaism of the Midland. It is most probable that the immediate cause of this fusion was, as Prof. Garbe suggests, the life and death struggle between the Brāhmans and the adherents of the other great religion of the Outland, Buddhism. With Buddhism the Bhāgavatas had nothing in common. In Brahmaism there was at least a shadowy Pantheos. The Brāhmans were thus enabled to win over the Bhāgavatas to their side in the contest, but, like the teachers of Yoga, had to pay a price for the alliance. That price was, first, the identification of the Adorable with an ancient Vedic sun-god, Viṣṇu (Vishnu), still a popular object of worship among the polytheistic lower classes of the Midland; and, secondly, the confession of the religious orthodoxy of the Kṣatriya monotheism. The process was an easy one. Legends were discovered of Brāhmans who performed Kṣatriya functions, of Kṣatriya families that became Brāhmans, and even of the great Bhāgavata teacher, Janaka, becoming a Brāhman. It became convenient to remember that Manu, the great lawgiver, was a Kṣatriya, and Manu himself is made by his commentator to say that even a Brāhman can in certain circumstances go to a Kṣatriya teacher.* Finally, the Midland had one incarnation of Viṣṇu, Paraśu-Rāma, a Brāhman by birth, who had become incarnate merely for the destruction of Kṣatriyas. In consequence of the alliance with the Bhāgavatas, the Brāhmans had now to confess that this hero was ultimately defeated by the first Kṣatriya incarnation, that of Rāma-chandra. In the official Brāhman account (*Rāmāyaṇa*, I. lxxv. ff.) the unpleasant fact is slurred over, but it is nevertheless fully admitted.

The incorporation was, in short, carried out in exactly the same way as that in which we see Brahmaism extending its frontiers at the present day. The process is going on now before our eyes. Local or aboriginal deities are discovered to be identical with Śiva or some other member of the Brāhmanical pantheon, and the distinction of caste is conferred upon the converts. Usually they are declared to be Rājputs, or, in other words, of the Kṣatriya class. The aboriginal customs and beliefs are at first left untouched, and in a couple of generations no more ardent supporters of the claims of the Brāhmanical priesthood are to be found than those who are still fetish-ridden savages. In much the same way the Bhāgavatas became a sect of Brahmaized anti-Brahmaists. The treaty of peace is found in the older parts of the celebrated *Bhagavad-Gītā* (which see). All the noblest ethical sentiments found herein are clearly of Bhāgavata origin. In it the deified Vāsudeva is fully identified with Viṣṇu, but not yet with the Brahmaist Pantheos; and Kṛṣṇa, the personal name of Vāsudeva the Kṣatriya, is also given admission to the circle of Brāhmanical gods as an incarnation of the same deity.

As time went on, that occurred which history has

* In the above, and in what follows, the present writer has freely utilized the researches of Prof. Bhandarkar and of Prof. Garbe, whose conclusions have been amply borne out by his own inquiries. It must, however, be explained that some Sanskrit scholars are not prepared to accept these statements in their entirety. It may be noted that Bhāgavatas are often called 'Pāñcharātras.' This is, properly speaking, the name of one of the sects into which the religion was divided.

† The present writer is unable to follow Prof. Deussen in his theory that Sāṅkhya is a development of Vedāntism.

* See, for instance, *Mahābhārata*, xiii. 2914, 2397; *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, xi. 6. 2, 10 (*tato brahmā Janaka āsa*); *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, iv. iii. 5; Someśvara on *Mīmāṁsa Sūtra*, i. iii. 3; *Matsya Purāṇa*, cxxxii. 115; Manu, ii. 241.

many times since repeated, and Bhāgavatism fell more and more under the sway of the Brāhmans. We see this earliest in the later parts of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, which belong to the first two centuries after our era. In Northern India, where the influence of the Midland was strongest, the Bhāgavatas even admitted the truth of Brahmaism, and identified the Pantheos with the Adorable, although they never made pantheism a vital part of their religion. It never worked itself into the texture of their doctrines, but was added to their belief as loosely as their own monotheism had been added to the Yoga philosophy. In the later Bhāgavata scriptures it is proclaimed and recognized, or silently ignored, according to the passing mood of the writer. At times we come across a misty divinity, personal and gracious it is true, yet of whom they can say in Brahmaist language that He is the great 'WHO?'*, and regarding whom they can only postulate that He is neither being nor not-being.† At another time, within the same work, the Deity is represented as possessing form and substance. At one time He is said never to have been seen by mortal eye, and at another time He reveals Himself in bodily form to some favoured saint. The text-books of this Brahmaized Bhāgavatism are the latter part of the twelfth book of the *Mahābhārata*, known as the *Nārāyaṇīya*, and the famous *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*.‡

(*b*) *Worship of incarnations.*—This alliance with Brahmaism had one general effect. It removed the Adorable farther from His adorers. He became less definite, and we can well believe that even in those days true believers began the cry which has become the creed of a sect in later years, 'See ye the Unseeable' (see ALAKHNĀMĪS). Bhāgavatism thus began to fail to supply the craving felt in every human heart for a personal object of adoration, and the need was met by a development of the theory of incarnations. The Adorable was represented as becoming incarnate in various forms, on various occasions, and for various purposes. To these incarnations, instead of to the Adorable Himself, the *bhakti* of the Bhāgavatas now became directed.

The idea of a god becoming incarnate is very old in India (see art. INCARNATION). We find legends on the subject in Vedic literature. Here, sometimes one god, sometimes another—Brahmā, Viṣṇu, or Indra—becomes incarnate to save the gods or to conquer the world. By the time that Bhāgavatism was received into the Brāhmanical fold, these legends had become detached from other gods, and all centred round the person of the popular sun-god Viṣṇu. He it now was who, perhaps as a relic of totem-worship, became incarnate as the Fish, the Tortoise, the Boar, the Man-lion, the Dwarf, and so on. Then heroes, first semi-Divine and next wholly human, were added to the list, such as Rāma-chandra, Kṛṣṇa, or even the Buddha. The list of incarnations, or 'descents' (*avatāra*), drawn up by Brāhmanical orthodoxy contained ten instances; and two of these, that of the Kṣatriya Rāma-chandra, and that of the Kṣatriya Kṛṣṇa, were late additions, almost certainly added to the list in obedience to Bhāgavata susceptibilities, just as the name of the Buddha may have been added to draw weak-kneed Buddhists into the Brāhmanical fold. We have already seen how the Kṛṣṇa of the incarnation bore the personal name of Kṛṣṇa Vāsudeva. Rāma-chandra, 'the glory of the Solar Race,' was also a famous Kṣatriya hero of the Outland, and was son-in-law of the Janaka previously mentioned. To the Bhāgavatas, Rāma-chandra and Kṛṣṇa were naturally the favourite incarnations, but in their later books the list became much extended, the Adorable being represented as becoming incarnate no less than twenty-four times. These incarnations became the direct object of worship. As Tulasī-dāsa said to one of those who called upon men to 'see the Unseeable,' 'Why dost thou endeavour to see the Unseeable? Pray thou to Rāma, and all at once is seen.'

(*c*) *Worship of the Śakti.*—About this period there also arose the idea of the *Śakti*, or energic power, of a divinity as a separate personality. The worship of the energic power became a prominent feature in the cult of Śiva, but it is also found among the Bhāgavatas. Among them, as Viṣṇu has been identified with the Adorable, so his spouse Lakṣmī is looked upon as the Adorable's energic power. She is one with Him, and yet distinct from Him, 'neither confounding the persons nor dividing the substance.' So entirely is she looked upon as one with Him that the text-books are deliberately silent about her; for, say they, 'She has done all that He has done, and when we tell of Him we tell of Her.' And yet, on the other hand, she also appears as the active agent in spreading abroad the true faith, which she learnt from Him. The Bhāgavata monotheistic deity has therefore become a Trinity in Unity, consisting of the Supreme, His incarnations, and His energic power. The resemblance to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is marked, more especially when we remember that, among the Syrian Christians, the Holy Ghost was declared to be a woman, and was identified with the Virgin Mary. It is quite possible that the Bhāgavata trinitarian doctrine developed under early Christian influence (see below).

(*d*) *Relation of Bhāgavatism to popular polytheism.*—Side by side with this Bhāgavata monotheism there had always been the polytheism of the lower orders, with its great gods, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva, and its millions of godlings. Bhāgavatism did not require any denial of these from its converts. We have seen that it had identified Viṣṇu with the Adorable Himself. Brahmā was relegated to a lower place. We shall see later that he was looked upon as a finite being, created by the Adorable to superintend the general carrying out of His orders. The dread god Śiva or Rudra, appeased only by bloody sacrifices, could not be so disposed of. His worshippers were very many, especially in the Outland, where, in early times, under the name of Pāśupatas, they, like the Bhāgavatas, had been strongly influenced by Sāṅkhya-Yoga. The 344th section of the 12th book of the *Mahābhārata* contains an interesting legend of a terrible fight between Rudra and the Adorable. Brahmā intervenes and pacifies Rudra, who acknowledges the Adorable's superiority. Then the Adorable says to Rudra (13293), 'He who knows Me, knows Thee. He that follows Thee, follows Me. There is no difference between Us two.' According to another legend preserved in the 343rd section of the same book, towards the end of a cycle of time the Adorable becomes subject to wrath (at the wickedness of the world), and therefore Rudra is born from his forehead. The sum of all this is that the Bhāgavatas accepted Śiva as a form of the Adorable, and thus in legends we find the most pious Bhāgavatas, such as, for instance, Chandrahāsa, performing their morning devotions to the Adorable Himself, and continuing them in a temple devoted to Rudra or his bloodthirsty spouse Durgā. The numerous other gods of Hindu polytheism were easily disposed of. They were classed as merely subordinate creatures of the Adorable, given special

* *Ka* (*Nāradīya Bhakti-sūtras*, i. 2).

† *Mahābhārata*, xii. 13190.

‡ The *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* is a very late work, and perhaps should preferably be classed with post-reformation literature. See below.

powers or functions in order to carry out His will.

All this time the Bhāgavatas, while they were estopped from denying the truth of Brahmaist pantheism, were still nominally professors of Sāṅkhya-Yoga. The result was a series of attempts to unite the opposing lines of thought—one an unsystematized pantheism founded on the idea that everything is part of the One, the other a systematized dualism based on the essential difference between matter and spirit. The first endeavours are to be found in the latest parts of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. Attempt after attempt, given forth under the authority of highly honoured names, such as that of the Sāṅkhya teacher Pañchaśikha, of the learned Bhāgavata king Janaka, or of a female ascetic named Sulabhā, appears in the twelfth book of the *Mahābhārata*, and these finally settled down into the form in which we find them in the third book (section xxiv ff.) of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*. It is impossible to consider this result as a system of philosophy. The two opposing lines of thought, each intelligible in itself, could no more combine than oil and water, and this so-called 'Paurāṇik Sāṅkhya' can be described only as a medley of unrelated and mutually contradictory conceptions.* It has nevertheless exercised the greatest influence on the pious and more uncritical minds of India, and has to be reckoned with in dealing with the religious history of that country. Its influence is most strikingly manifest in the change that it has brought about in the meaning of the word *yoga*. We have already seen that the meaning had changed from 'concentration of thought' to 'devotion.' Even in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* this term became subdivided into *karma-yoga*, or the disinterested practice of duty, and *jñāna-yoga*, the purely theoretical side of religion. Later on, under the influence of the 'Paurāṇik Sāṅkhya,' we meet three kinds of *yoga*. *Karma-yoga* is now no longer the disinterested practice of morality, but has become attendance to religious ceremonial obligations. These give purification, and lead to *jñāna-yoga*, which is now the concentration of the mind on the Adorable, and this finally to *bhakti-yoga*, in which the devotee is full of nothing but faith, and sees nothing but the Deity.†

This brings us down to the end of the millennium after our era. In the early part of the 9th cent. A.D. the celebrated pantheistic philosopher Śaṅkara gave system to the ancient Brahmaism of the Midland, and created the Vedānta (*q.v.*) philosophy. His system, far more rigid than the Brahmaism on which it was founded, compelled him vigorously to attack the Bhāgavata monotheism, hitherto grudgingly recognized as orthodox. His assaults resulted in the Bhāgavatas not only assuming a position of defence, but also taking up two differing lines of counter-attack. On one line they remained faithful to the old alliance with Brahmaism, and contented themselves with combating Śaṅkara's arguments only so far as they were incompatible with their interpretation of Brahmaist teaching. On the other line, the alliance with Brahmaism was finally broken, and a return was made to the old Sāṅkhya-Yoga doctrines which had been abandoned, or partly abandoned, in favour of Brahmaism. The dispute culminated in the 12th cent., the leading representatives of the two lines of counter-attack being respectively Rāmānuja and Madhva, both inhabitants of Southern India.

iii. *THIRD STAGE. TENETS.*—With the appearance of these two great reformers commences the third stage in the development of the Bhāgavata religion—the modern *Bhakti-mārga*. It will here, therefore, be convenient to consider the tenets of the Bhāgavatas as they were fixed by the reformers at the commencement of this third stage of their development. Our materials are (1) the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, (2) the *Nārāyaṇīya* section of the twelfth book of the *Mahābhārata*, and (3) the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, as the old authorized scriptures, and the *Bhakta-māla* and numerous other works founded on it, as what might be called the 'New Testament' of the Bhāgavata religion. An account of the pre-reformation doctrines will be found in the article BHAGAVAD-GĪTĀ.

(1) *Monotheism and a God of grace.*—There is one and only one God, named the Bhagavat, the Adorable; Nārāyaṇa, the Son of the Male; Puruṣa, the Male; or Vāsudeva. He exists from eternity to eternity. He is therefore defined as 'the Endless' (*ananta*), 'the Imperishable' (*achyuta*), and 'the Indestructible' (*avināśin*). He is the Creator of all things out of matter, to which is given the Sāṅkhya-Yoga name of *prakṛti*, *pradhāna*, or 'the indiscrete' (*avyakta*). The original belief about matter seems to have been that He created it out of nothing, but in the mixed philosophy of the sect we sometimes come across statements agreeing with the dualistic Sāṅkhya-Yoga theory that *prakṛti* has existed independently from all eternity. From God issue all souls (*jīva*), which henceforth exist for ever as distinct individuals and are indestructible. He has created Brahmā, Śiva, and the countless subordinate deities to carry out His orders in creating and ruling the world, and to promulgate the true religion. He generally leaves the burden of ruling the world upon their shoulders, but, as occasion demands, from time to time in His infinite grace (*prasāda*)* He Himself becomes incarnate to relieve the world from sin or His followers from trouble. The greatest and most perfect of these incarnations (*avatāra*) are those of Rāma-chandra and Kṛṣṇa; but there have been twenty-three in all, and one is yet to come. *India thus owes the idea of a God of Grace—of the Fatherhood of God—to the Bhāgavatas.*

(2) *Process of creation.*—The principles according to which creation is held to have developed resemble those of Sāṅkhya-Yoga (see SĀṄKHYA), but, owing to the assumed necessity of connecting the immaterial Vāsudeva with the material world, are more complicated. The Adorable, who in this connexion is usually called Vāsudeva, is represented as passing in succession through three *vyūhas*, or phases of conditioned spirit. Vāsudeva first produces from himself *prakṛti*, the indiscrete primal matter of the Sāṅkhyas, and at the same time passes into the phase of conditioned spirit known as *saṁkarṣaṇa*. From the association of *saṁkarṣaṇa* with *prakṛti* there springs *manas*, corresponding to the Sāṅkhya *buddhi*, or the intellectual faculty, and at the same time *saṁkarṣaṇa* passes into the phase of conditioned spirit known as *pradyumna*. From the association of *pradyumna* with *manas* springs the Sāṅkhya *ahaṁkāra*, or consciousness, while *pradyumna* passes into a tertiary phase of conditioned spirit known as *aniruddha*. From *ahaṁkāra* and *aniruddha* spring the Sāṅkhya *mahābhūtas*, or grosser elements, with their respective qualities, and also the deity Brahmā, who from the elements fashions the earth and all that it contains.†

(3) *Bhakti and salvation.*—*Bhakti* directed towards the Adorable is the only means of salvation. It must be directed to Him or to one

* So also Garbe, *Sāṅkhya-Philosophie*, 52 ff. The *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* probably belongs to the 13th cent. A.D.

† So Nārāyaṇa Parivraj in the *Artha-pañchaka*, quoted by Bhandarkar, *Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts . . . during the year 1883–84*, p. 68.

* The doctrine of *prasāda*, or grace, has formed an essential part of the Bhāgavata religion so far back as literature takes us

† For further details see Colebrooke, *Essays*, i. 437 ff., and Barnett's translation of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, p. 48 ff.

of His incarnations, and to no other. The religion in this respect is strictly monotheistic. This is partly hidden by our translation of the word *deva* by 'God.' By a Bhāgavata, the word *deva* is used with exactly the same meaning as the Hebrew word *'elōhīm*. The latter sometimes signifies the Supreme God and sometimes His ministering spirits. In our versions of the OT the distinction is shown by translation, but this is not done by English writers on Indian religion, who always translate *deva* by 'God.' The word *deva* is applied not only to the Adorable, but also to His ministering spirits, Brahmā, and so on. These subordinate *devas* may, it is true, be the objects of worship, but this is δουλεία ('veneration'), not λατρεία ('adoration'), which latter is reserved for the Adorable alone. The Bhāgavata scriptures over and over again insist that the true believer must be a unitarian monotheist—an *ekāntin*.

(4) *Works and salvation.*—The question then arises as to how far works (*karma*) are necessary for salvation. This has been as much discussed in India as in Europe. The Bhāgavatas solve the problem by stating that works act only indirectly. Every work, good or bad, has its result, or, as they say, its fruit (*phala*). A good work, done for the sake of its fruits, may result in giving the soul a life of felicity in some other world, but this felicity will be merely temporary. As soon as the fruits have worked themselves out, the soul returns to this world, and to the weary round of birth and re-birth. But if a work is *niṣkāma*, or disinterested, *i.e.*, is not performed for the sake of its fruits, but is simply dedicated to the Adorable and laid before His feet, He accepts it and confers His immortal nature upon its fruits. Then the Adorable Himself enters the heart of the doer and begets therein the virtue of *bhakti*, and it is this *bhakti* that finally gives eternal salvation. *India thus owes the preservation of the doctrine of Faith to the Bhāgavatas.*

(5) *Immortality of the soul.*—We have seen that the individual soul was considered to be a part (*aṁśa*) of the Adorable, emitted by Him to a separate conscious existence. Once so emitted, it exists for ever as a separate conscious entity. Agreeably to the universal Indian belief in the doctrine of transmigration, the soul is chained to its round of births and re-births until it is saved by *bhakti*. A soul, like those of certain Divine beings, may be saved from the first, and is then known as *nitya-mukta*, 'saved from eternity,' but the ordinary human souls are not of this nature, and are classed under four heads. These are (*a*) *baddha*, those who are 'tied' to things of this life, and who are not in the way of salvation; (*b*) *mumukṣu*, those in whom there has been awakened a consciousness of the want of salvation, and who 'desire it,' but are not yet fit for it (we should call these 'awakened sinners'); (*c*) *kevala*, or *bhakta*, the pure in heart, who are 'only devoted' to the Adorable, and who are thus on the way of salvation through possessing *bhakti*; and (*d*) *mukta*, the 'released,' or saved. These last enjoy a perpetual, conscious, independent existence at the feet of the Adorable (*Bhagavat-pada*). Their only joy is serving and waiting upon Him (*kaiṁkārya*). They do not become Him, but become 'like Him' and remain in everlasting bliss. *India thus owes to the Bhāgavatas the belief in the Immortality of the Soul.*

(6) *Eschatology.*—When the soul, thus saved, leaves its earthly body, it first enters the sun as the door.* There its subtle body (*liṅga-śarīra*) is consumed and it becomes an atomic entity (*paramāṇubhūta*). Thence it enters the God, first in the phase of *aniruddha*, then in that of *pradyumna*, then in that of *saṁkarṣaṇa*, and finally the Supreme Adorable, who, by a confusion with Brahmaism in the passage now quoted from, is called 'The Supreme Self.' As in the rest of their philosophy, there is in their eschatology little that is clear and consistent. Brahmaism and Sāṅkhya-Yoga are inextricably mixed up, but the continued separate existence of the soul after it has reached the Adorable is certainly a tenet that is held through all their self-contradictory mysticism.

(7) *Sin.*—The root idea of sin is anything which is incompatible with *bhakti*. Every sin is a work (*karma*) and necessarily bears its fruit, just as much as any good work. Sins are classed as involuntary (*ajñāta*) and wilful (*jñāta*). An involuntary sin can be expiated by ceremonial acts. These expiatory works, provided they are disinterested, *i.e.*, not performed merely as counterbalances to the involuntary sins, reach the Adorable and give the everlasting fruit. As for wilful sins, when a man is devoted to disinterested works, or is in the way of *bhakti*, he does not usually commit such; and if perchance he do, then the Adorable, who is the Lord of good works, Himself forgives the sin of the evil works. A favourite comparison is with a paid workman and a slave born in the house. If a paid workman (*i.e.* a doer of interested works) does any damage, he has to make it good to his employer; but if damage is done by a faithful slave, who works not for reward but for love (*i.e.* the doer of disinterested works), the master bears the loss, and none of it falls upon the slave.*

The above doctrines represent the stage to which the Bhāgavata religion had developed by the 15th cent. of our era; but they have remained unchanged, as the doctrines of the *Bhakti-mārga*, to the present day. In their main principles they are the doctrines of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* and of the *Nārāyaṇīya*, which are, of course, much older.

3. **The four churches of the reformation.**—Since the revival of Bhāgavatism in the 12th and following centuries, the *Bhakti-mārga* has been divided into four *Saṁpradāyas*, or churches, viz. the *Śrī-saṁpradāya* founded by Rāmānuja, the *Brahma-saṁpradāya* founded by Madhva, the *Rudra-saṁpradāya* founded by Viṣnusvāmin, and the *Sanakādi-saṁpradāya* founded by Nimbāditya.

(1) *Attitude of each to the Vedānta.*—The essential differences between these churches consist in the attitude which they assume towa ds the Vedānta philosophy of Śaṅkara. It is specially stated by Bhāgavata writers† that they form really one church, and that the differences are only apparent. Further, each church has become divided into sects, but none of these is opposed to its mother-church. It has been given a name and a separate recognition only on account of the preferences (*ruchi*) of particular teachers in laying emphasis on particular points.

The Vedānta doctrine is fully described elsewhere (see VEDĀNTA), and here it will be sufficient to devote a few lines to the discussion of the particular points objected to by the Bhāgavata reformers. Being purely monistic, it is generally known as the *advaita-mata*, or doctrine of non-duality. Its professors claim to be *smārtas*, *i.e.*, 'holders to tradition,' or 'orthodox.' The Bhāgavatas allow them the title and condemn the tradition. An essential part of its teaching is the doctrine, usually stated to be an invention of Śaṅkara himself, of *māyā*, or illusion. To this the Bhāgavatas raise the strongest objection, and one of their commonest nicknames for a follower of Śaṅkara is that of *māyā-vādin*, or declarer of

* *Mahābhārata*, xii. 13383 ff.

* 'Bhakta-kalpadruma,' in *JRAS*, 1908, p. 347.

† *e.g.* by Hariśchandra in the *Vaiṣṇava-sarvasva*.

illusion. Śaṅkara's Supreme Deity (Bráhma*) is an absolutely impersonal, quality-less being who can obtain an unreal existence only by association with *māyā*. The soul is really a part of Bráhma individualized by association with *māyā*. When released from *māyā*, the soul is again merged in Bráhma and loses its identity.

All Bhāgavatas agree in rejecting the entire doctrine of *māyā*, with all its consequences. The Supreme Deity, the Bhagavat, is personal by nature. The soul, as already said, is also personal and individual by nature, and, once emitted, lives for ever. It is never merged in the Bhagavat.

The Śrī-saṁpradāya is the most important Bhāgavata church which, while rejecting Śaṅkara's Vedāntism, remains faithful to the alliance with the old Brahmaism. The Bhagavat, identified with the Pantheos or Bráhma of the Upaniṣads, is a Pantheos, but a personal Pantheos in whom everything that is exists, and who is endowed with every imaginable auspicious quality. Matter and soul alike proceed from Him, and He pervades all things as their *antaryāmin*, or Inward Restrainer. The doctrine of this church is therefore also monism, but, to distinguish it from Śaṅkara's, it is called a *viśiṣṭādvaita-mata*, or doctrine of qualified non-duality. The teaching of this sect is said to have been communicated by the Adorable to His spouse, or energic power, Lakṣmī, also called Śrī. Hence the name of the Saṁpradāya. She taught a demi-god named Viṣvak-sēna, who taught Śaṭhakōpa, and eighth in descent from the last named, in succession of master and pupil, came Rāmānuja, who flourished in the 12th cent. A.D. For further particulars see RĀMĀNUJA.

Madhva's Brahma-saṁpradāya represents the other line of defence of the Bhāgavata religion. He broke the alliance with Brahmaism and returned to the old dualism of Sāṅkhya-Yoga. His teaching is therefore said to be a *dvaita-mata*, or doctrine of duality. The sect describes Śaṅkara's Vedānta as disguised Buddhism, and lays particular stress on the five eternal distinctions, viz. (*a*) between God and the soul, (*b*) between God and matter, (*c*) between the soul and matter, (*d*) between one soul and another, and (*e*) between one particle of matter and another. Although in other respects preaching the ordinary Bhāgavata doctrines, Madhva prefers to call the Supreme 'Viṣṇu,' rather than 'Vāsudeva' or 'Bhagavat.' His followers call themselves Mādhvas or Madhvāchārīs (*q.v.*), and claim to have received the doctrine originally from Brahmā, sixth in descent from whom, in succession of teacher and pupil, came Madhva. Hence the name of the Saṁpradāya. As may be expected, the rupture with Brahmaism brought upon them vigorous attacks from the followers of Śaṅkara, and in one work, entitled the *Pāṣaṇḍa-chapeṭikā*, or 'Slap in the Face of Heretics,' they are all, as a body, genially consigned to the utmost torments of hell.

The Rudra-saṁpradāya is the most modern of all the sects. Viṣnusvāmin lived in the early part of the 15th cent.; but his followers, in order to give the authority of age to his opinions, state that he had previously existed some 4500 years earlier, and that it was then that the doctrines were first promulgated by him. They were originally communicated by the Adorable to Rudra, or Śiva, who passed them on to mankind, Viṣnusvāmin being fifteenth in descent from him in the line of teacher and pupil. His family belonged to the south of India, and his converts were mostly made in Gujrāt. One of his pupils, Lakṣmaṇa Bhaṭṭa, migrated to Northern India, where his son Vallabha (or Vallabhāchārya) became an energetic apostle of the church which is now usually called after his name, his disciples being known as Vallabhāchārīs (*q.v.*). The doctrines of this church are known as *śuddhādvaita-mata*, or doctrine of pure non-duality. According to them, the Adorable has three attributes, viz. *sat*, 'existence,' *chit*, 'consciousness,' and *ānanda*, 'bliss.' The soul is the Adorable with the attribute of bliss suppressed (*antarhita*), and inanimate matter is the Adorable with the attributes of consciousness and bliss suppressed. When the soul is 'released,' it regains the attribute of bliss, and thus becomes for ever identical in nature with the Adorable.

The Sanakādi-saṁpradāya (see NIMĀVATS), founded by Nimbārka or Nimbāditya, is certainly the oldest of the Bhāgavata churches.* Its founder is said to have been an incarnation of the sun. The Adorable in His incarnation as a swan (*haṁsa*) taught Sanaka and his brethren, the mind-born sons of Brahmā, who taught Nārada, who taught Nimbārka. The doctrine of this church is called *dvaitādvaita-mata*, or doctrine of dualistic non-duality. While admitting that the soul and matter are distinct from the Adorable, it holds that they are nevertheless intimately connected with Him, as its coils are connected with a serpent, or as its waves are with water. The Adorable is incomprehensible, but is manifest in the book of Nature, in which the natural objects form the letters constituting the words. The letters may be in different alphabets although the sounds are the same, and hence the actual facts of the incarnations, or the truth or falsehood of the accounts concerning them, are of small importance, so long as we read the Divine love that lies behind them. The church has suffered much from persecution. It is said to have been extirpated by the Jains and to have been resuscitated by a certain Nivāsa.†

(2) *Clerical and lay life.*—The members of each of these four Bhāgavata churches are divided into two classes, which we may conveniently call 'clerical' and 'lay.' The latter includes the great mass of the believers, who look to the former for religious guidance. The status of the clerical class varies according to sect. Usually these teachers are unmarried, leading, or professing to lead, an ascetic life; but sometimes, as for instance in the case of most sects of the Rudra-saṁpradāya, the clergy are encouraged to marry, and to live in the world as men of business and family. The ascetic clergy (*bairāgīs* [*q.v.*]) mostly lead a wandering existence, singly or in bodies, subsisting on such alms as they can collect. When old or infirm, they settle down in one of the numerous *maths*, or monasteries, scattered all over India. These monasteries also serve as rallying points for the travelling brethren, where any of them can find food and shelter for a reasonable time. Each is governed by a *Mahant*, or Superior, and is usually endowed with property which is under his management.

(3) *Subsequent history of each church.*—The slight philosophical details which differentiate the churches having been discussed, it will now be convenient to consider the development of each during the past seven centuries.

(*a*) *Śrī-saṁpradāya.*—Rāmānuja, who is said by his followers to have been an incarnation of Śeṣa, the serpent of eternity, belonged to Southern India, and studied and lived the best part of his life at Conjeeveram near Madras. Although teaching the theoretical equality of all castes, the teachers and leaders of his church were invariably Brāhmans, and persons of low caste were not even admitted as disciples. The mother-church has always been strongest in Southern India, where it took its birth, and where it has still numerous monasteries. It has

* Care should be taken to distinguish between Bráhma (or Bráhman) (neut.) the impersonal Pantheos of the Upaniṣads and Śaṅkara, and Brahmā (or Brahmán) (masc.) the personal member of the well-known Hindu triad (Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva).

* The *dvaitādvaita-mata* is referred to in the *Prabōdha-chandrōdaya*, a work dating from the end of the 11th cent. A.D.

† Hariśchandra, *Vaiṣṇava-sarvasva*.

never been very popular in Northern India. Rāmānuja laid down the strictest rules of conduct, even eating and drinking being bound by the most minute regulations. We have seen that in the centuries immediately following our era the faith of the Bhāgavatas was preferably directed not to the Adorable Himself, but to one of His numerous incarnations. Rāmānuja did not confine his followers to any particular one of these, but that of Rāma-chandra was usually preferred. We have also seen that Lakṣmī, Viṣṇu's spouse, looked upon as the Adorable's energic force, was considered as identical with the Adorable Himself. Hence many Rāmānujas preferred to direct their faith to her.

Fourth or fifth in spiritual descent from Rāmānuja there rose, late in the 14th cent., a teacher named Rāmānanda. He was a disciple of Rāghavānanda, the *mahant* of the monastery founded by Rāmānuja at Seringapatam in the later years of his life. Rāmānanda quarrelled with his superior on a question of discipline, and, migrating to Northern India, there founded a sect of his own called the Rāmānandī. Its principal doctrinal peculiarity is the insistence that the Rāma-chandra incarnation is the one which should be the chief object of faith in the present age. Its followers are hence also called *Rāmāvats*, or Rāmaites. Rāmānanda, instead of preaching and writing in Sanskrit, as had hitherto been the custom, taught in the vernacular, and thus brought his doctrines within reach of all classes. He also interpreted the Bhāgavata doctrine of the brotherhood of man in its most liberal sense, and admitted all castes, even the lowest, not only as lay members of the sect, but also as teachers. The fact that it was a question of discipline on which he had broken with the Rāmānujas led him to release his followers from the shackles which he had found inconvenient. They observed no particular ordinances in eating or bathing, and were named by him *Avadhūta*, or liberated.

Numerous sub-sects trace their origin to this branch of the Śrī-saṁpradāya, each of which forms the subject of a special article in the present work. See KABĪR-PANTHĪS, KHĀKĪS, MULŪK-DĀSĪS, RAI-DĀSĪS, and SENĀ-PANTHĪS, which are the most important of the sub-sects. The catholicity of Rāmānanda's teaching may be gathered from the fact that he numbered among his twelve chief disciples, or apostles, a Musalmān (Kabīr), a barber (Senā), and a low-caste *chamār*, or leather-worker (Rai-dāsa), each of whom founded a sub-sect. Kabīr's teaching was mixed not only with Christianity (see below), but also with Musalmān Ṣūfīism, which led him and his followers to neglect the worship of the incarnate Rāma-chandra, and to identify the name of Rāma not with the incarnation but with the unincarnate Adorable Himself, to whom, under the name of Rāma, *bhakti* was to be directly offered. From his schism, if it can be called a schism, there branched out two other important sub-sects, one of which has left its mark upon the political history of India—the Sikhs and the Dādū-panthīs. The great bulk of the Hindu population of Northern India, however, still adheres to the original Rāmānandī doctrines; and this sect has become the local mother-church, preserving friendly relations with its various sub-sects, although these are divided into two branches by the Kabīr schism. The most important later teacher of the Rāmānandī church was Tulasī-dāsa (end of 16th century), the great poet. He did more towards popularizing the worship of the incarnate Rāma-chandra than any of his predecessors, and his great epic, the *Rāmāyaṇa*, has been truthfully described as 'the one Bible of 100 millions of people.' It is read and studied even by members of the other Bhāgavata Saṁpradāyas.

Another member of the Rāmāvat church also deserves special mention. This is Nābhā-dāsa, or Nārāyaṇa-dāsa, a contemporary of Tulasī-dāsa, and the author of the *Bhakta-māla*. This, with its commentary by Priyā-dāsa, a member of the Brahma-saṁpradāya, may be called the *Acta Sanctorum* of the four churches. It is a storehouse of legends regarding the saints, ancient and modern, of the Bhāgavata religion. The importance of this book for a just comprehension of the religious attitude of modern Hinduism cannot be over-rated, and it is a matter for regret that the great difficulties of the text have deterred European students from its study. In its original form few natives can understand it nowadays, but numerous translations into modern Indian languages have made its contents familiar to every follower of the cult. For Northern India, it and Tulasī-dāsa's *Rāmāyaṇa* are the two text-books of modern Bhāgavatism.

(*b*) *Brahma-saṁpradāya.*—Madhva, or Ānandatīrtha, the founder of this church, was also a native of Southern India (see MADHVĀCHĀRIS). He was originally a Śaiva, but became converted to Bhāgavatism in his later years. The doctrines of the sect do not single out any particular incarnation of the Adorable for special worship, but in Northern India it has taken Kṛṣṇa as its principal object of adoration. The church is strongest in Southern India, where it has numerous monasteries; it has few votaries in the North, though they are said to have increased of late. The clerical members are Brāhmans, and profess celibacy, but the lay votaries are members of every class of society except the lowest. The church is an attempt at a compromise with Śaivism, and the votaries of the two religions pay adoration to each other's gods.

The Vaiṣṇavas of Bengal, who look upon Chaitanya (*q.v.*) as their founder, are said to be a branch of this church, of which, according to the *Bhakta-kalpadruma*, Chaitanya was himself a member. But the tenets of the Bengal Vaiṣṇavas approach much more nearly those of the Rudra-saṁpradāya.

(*c*) *Rudra-saṁpradāya.*—As already stated, the Rudra-saṁpradāya is now practically represented by the Vallabhāchāris (*q.v.*). Two or three other and unimportant sects are also referred to it. The incarnation of the Adorable which is specially worshipped by this church is that of Kṛṣṇa. The form of the devotional love of this and other Kṛṣṇa-worshipping sects is not that of a son to a father, as in the case of the Rāmāvats, but the love of a maid for a man; and this has given rise in later times to an erotic and sensual aspect of religion which has sometimes led to the most lamentable excesses. Kṛṣṇa's human spouse, Rādhā, is looked upon as an incarnation of the Adorable's energic power, and sometimes one is the object of worship, sometimes the other, and sometimes both conjointly. The clergy of the church marry and live comfortable lives, and their example is followed by the laity, who may be of any caste, but mainly consist of the opulent and luxurious members of society. Another very widely diffused form of worship, especially amongst women, is that of the *Bāla Gopāla*, or Infant Kṛṣṇa. The cult is widely extended over Northern India and the Bombay Presidency. A sub-sect is that founded in the 16th century by Mīrā Bāī, a famous princess and poetess of Rājputāna. Here the special object of worship is Kṛṣṇa Raṇachhōṛ (see MĪRĀ BĀIS).

The Vaiṣṇavas of Bengal profess much the same tenets as those of the Vallabhāchāris, and Vallabha himself was Chaitanya's father-in-law (see above under the Brahma-saṁpradāya). The Rādhā-vallabhīs, another sect which worships Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā, are also akin to the Vallabhāchāris, but they are counted as belonging to the next, or Sanakādi-saṁpradāya.

(*d*) *Sanakādi-saṁpradāya.*—This church is now of small importance. Its few adherents, who are known as Nimāvats, are found in Northern India and in Rājputāna. They are mostly adorers of Kṛṣṇa (for further particulars see NIMĀVATS). One important sect is nominally sprung from this church, that of the Rādhā-vallabhīs. It was founded by one Harī-vaṁśa, surnamed Hita, who was born in 1559 and was a Nimāvat. His teaching was little in accordance with that of his church, being nothing but a development of the tenets of the Vallabhāchāris. The tendency towards erotic mysticism which distinguishes that sect is here carried to an extreme. Rādhā, the representative of the Adorable's energic power, now throws even Kṛṣṇa himself into the shade. He is given a subordinate position under the title of *Rādhā-vallabha*, or 'Rādhā's husband,' and this name has given its title to the sect. The worship is directed almost entirely to Rādhā as the spouse of God. For further particulars see RĀDHĀ-VALLABHĪS, SAKHĪ-BHĀVAS and CHARAṆ-DĀSIS.

(4) *The guru.*—A striking characteristic of modern Bhāgavatism is the extravagant respect shown to the spiritual teacher, or *guru*. The first line of the *Bhakta-māla* gives as the essentials of religion *bhakti*, *bhakta*, *Bhagavanta*, *guru* ('faith, a faithful devotee, the Adorable, and the *guru*'); and this aptly illustrates the importance attributed to the last-named. Any one will admit that the first three are essentials, but few Westerns would think of adding the fourth. The rule that respect be shown to a spiritual teacher is very old in India. In ancient times, perfect obedience was required from his pupil. He was the pupil's second father, more to be venerated than even his natural progenitor. Once, however, the state of pupilage was over, the obligation of obedience ceased, and only respect and gratitude were subsequently required. But in modern Hinduism this proper attitude is greatly exaggerated. While some of the sects, and notably the Kabīr-panthīs, inculcate the greatest care in the selection of a guru, once selected he is to be obeyed implicitly throughout life. His voice is declared to be the voice of God, and the fullest devotion in word, act, and deed must be rendered to him. Some sects go further than others. The devotion is carried to incredible extremes among the Vallabhāchāris. The devotee of this sect offers his body, soul, and substance to God, and, as the Gusāin (properly 'Gosāī'), *i.e.* the guru, is in the later works of the sect identified with the Deity, these are in reality dedicated to him. 'By the act of dedication, a man submits to the pleasure of the Gusāin, as God's representative, not only the fruits of his wealth, but also the virginity of his daughter or of his newly-married wife.'* It is fair to explain that few sects go to this length, and that in most, although the guru is revered as an incarnation of the Deity, his influence extends only to the sphere of morality. This is one more example of the tendency in India, as elsewhere, to deify the founder of a religion. The first Bhāgavatas deified Vāsudeva, and their successors deified, in their turn, the great men who founded their churches and their sects.

* Growse, *Mathurā*, p. 266.

Lastly, they took the further step of deifying their spiritual directors.

(5) *The mantra.*—No Hindu can become a member of a sect without the permission of a guru belonging to the sect. He is at first in the position of an inquirer, and when the guru considers him fit for admission, he whispers into his ear an initiatory formula (*mantra*), corresponding, as Mr. Growse points out, to the *In nomine Patris*, etc., of Christian baptism. These formulas are generally kept secret; but we know that the earliest, dating from pre-reformation times, was the 'twelve-syllabled' *Oṁ namo Bhagavate Vāsudevāya* ('Oṁ! reverence to the Adorable Vāsudeva'). In later times, as sectarian differences increased, the Supreme became differentiated into His incarnations. Thus, the *mantra* of the Rāmānujas is the 'six-syllabled' *Oṁ Rāmāya namaḥ* ('Oṁ! reverence to Rāma), while that of the Vallabhāchārīs is the 'eight-syllabled' *Śrī-Kṛṣṇaḥ śaraṇaṁ mama* ('the holy Kṛṣṇa is my refuge').

(6) *Sectarian marks.*—Each sect is distinguished by certain marks placed by the more pious members upon the forehead or other part of the body. Thus the Rāmānujas have two perpendicular white lines, with a transverse streak connecting them above the nose. In the centre is a perpendicular streak of red. In the Brahma-sampradāya, a yellow spot is substituted for the red streak, and special marks are also branded on the shoulders and breast. It may be mentioned that worshippers of Śiva also put sectarian marks upon the forehead. As a guide for distinguishing the followers of the two religions, we may say that, as a general rule, while the essential parts of the Bhāgavata marks consist of perpendicular lines, those of the Śaiva sects are horizontal.

(7) *Bhakti and its 'flavours.'*—Later Bhāgavata writers have spent much time over the question of *bhakti* and the various modes in which it reveals itself. These modes are called *rasas*, or flavours, and as it would be difficult to understand the simplest treatise on *bhakti* without being familiar with at least the main principles according to which these flavours are held to be developed, the following brief account will be of service. The writers employ the terminology of the Indian system of poetics, but the categories are different.

Every religious attitude depends upon an objective 'dominant emotion' or *sthāyi bhāva*, considered as an abstract entity, apart from the person experiencing it. There are five of these dominant emotions: (1) resignation (*praśānta bhāva*); (2) obedience (*dāsya bhāva*); (3) friendship (*sākhya bhāva*); (4) tender fondness (*vātsalya bhāva*); (5) passionate love (*rati bhāva*). It will be observed that these are arranged in an ascending scale of emotional force.

These 'dominant emotions' may have 'accessory emotions' (*vyabhichārī bhāva*, or *sañchārī bhāva*). These are not essential to the dominant emotions, but may go along with and co-operate with them, either permanently or occasionally. These accessory emotions are thirty-three in number, and are such as 'disgust with worldly things' (*nirveda*), apprehension (*śaṅkā*), painful thoughts (*chintā*), and the like.

Each of these dominant emotions, whether accompanied by an accessory emotion or not, produces a corresponding subjective psychic condition or experience, technically called *rasa*, or flavour, in the person who is subjected to it. These flavours are, in the order of the corresponding underlying dominant emotions: (1) the resigned flavour (*śānti rasa*); (2) the obedient flavour (*dāsya rasa*); (3) the friendly flavour (*sākhya rasa*); (4) the tenderly fond flavour, (*vātsalya rasa*); (5) the passionately loving flavour (*śṛṅgāra rasa*, or *mādhurya rasa*). The last, which is the highest stage, is also called the 'king of flavours' (*rasa-rāja*) or the 'glorious flavour' (*ujjvala rasa*).

Every flavour must have an 'exciting cause' or 'excitant' (*vibhāva*) in order to induce the experience from the underlying dominant emotion, and such excitants may be either 'essential' (*ālambana*) or 'enhancing' (*uddīpana*). The absolutely essential excitant is the object towards which the underlying dominant emotion of resignation, obedience, or the like, is directed, *i.e.* the Supreme Deity. Such an excitant is called 'absolutely essential' (*viṣayālambana*). But an excitant may be 'relatively essential' (*āśrayālambana*). It then excites a flavour, the dominant emotion of which is not immediately directed to the Supreme. Such for instance is Sītā the spouse of Rāma-chandra. She can be the relatively essential excitant of the flavour of passionate love, *i.e.*, she causes the subjective flavour to arise in the heart of the devotee from the corresponding dominant emotion considered as an objective abstract entity. This ultimately leads to the flavour of passionate love directed to her husband, Rāma-chandra, who, being an incarnation of the Supreme Deity Himself, is the absolutely essential excitant.

An enhancing excitant is such an excitant as the qualities, actions, gestures, or beauty of any of the essential excitants. For instance, Rāma-chandra's cherishing of those who take refuge in him, or his love for those who serve him, is an enhancing excitant of the flavour of obedience.

When the psychic condition, or flavour, of a dominant emotion has been thus excited, certain effects occur. These are called 'ensuants' (*anubhāva*). The most important of these are the natural expressions of emotion (*sāttvika bhāva*), which are here enumerated in order of usual occurrence: (1) arrest of motion (*stambha*); (2) trembling (*kampa*); (3) disturbance of speech (*svara-bhaṅga*); (4) change of colour (*vaivarṇya*); (5) tears (*aśru*); (6) sweating (*sveda*); (7) thrills (*pulaka*); (8) unconsciousness (*pralaya*). Other ensuants may be spiritual, such as a feeling of devotion, rapture, and so on.

From the above it will be seen that the Hindu love for classification has been carried even into the province of religious emotion. It will also be noticed how closely the Indian religious experiences, and especially the phenomena attendant on what we should call 'conversion,' agree with what we observe in Christian countries.

(8) *The niṣṭhās.*—Every true Bhāgavata from his birth has his vocation allotted to him by the Adorable. For instance, his vocation may be to preach the gospel, or to wait upon saintly men, or to love hearing the scriptures, or to sing psalms, or even merely to lead a moral life. Each of these vocations is called a *niṣṭhā*; and every created being who is faithful to the Adorable must belong to at least one of them. He may belong to two or more, if the Adorable so will. These *niṣṭhās* are twenty-four in number, each being under the special protection of one of the twenty-four incarnations believed in by Bhāgavatas. In the catalogues of saints, each is carefully allotted his *niṣṭhā*, and is classified and grouped accordingly.

4. General aspects of the Bhāgavata reformation.—Nothing is more striking in the history of India than the rapidity and completeness with which the Bhāgavata reformation of the Middle Ages was accomplished. At first sight it almost seems as if a new doctrine, coming from some unknown land, had suddenly been revealed, and had swept with irresistible force in one mighty wave across the peninsula. Great modern scholars, men like Lassen and Weber, were found declaring that the only possible explanation was that the doctrine of *bhakti* arose in India as a more or less direct reflexion of Christianity. The late Professor Cowell himself, when writing in 1878 the preface to his translation of the *Bhakti-sūtras*, confessed that the date and history of the origin of the doctrine were unknown, and, in fact, it is only within the last few years that we have been able to pierce the cloud of mystery that surrounds it. The first to throw light upon the subject was Professor Bhandarkar; and though the conclusions arrived at by him in the year 1887 have been disputed, his labours have been the foundation of all subsequent inquiries. The next important step was not taken till the year 1905, when Prof. Garbe fixed with approximate certainty the date of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. We can now be as sure as we can be of anything in the history of Indian literature, that portions of this poem are pre-Christian; and, as *bhakti* is taught therein, we can safely assert that the doctrine, however Christian may be its appearance, is of indigenous Indian origin.

Nevertheless, although one is based upon the other, a whole world of difference lies between the Bhāgavatism of the reformation and that of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. Like the Brahmaism of the Midland Brāhmans, the pre-reformation Bhāgavatism was the religion of a class—the warriors. It was taught in a learned language, and was practised by learned Kṣatriya kings and men of

note.* It had its ritual and its five solemn sacrifices, and was therefore a religion of the wealthy. As has more than once been remarked,† official Vaiṣṇavism is a costly religion, while Śaivism is a cheap one. Bhāgavatism, after the identification of the Bhagavat with Viṣṇu, can hardly have been a religion of the lower castes or of the poor. In other words, it was not a religion of the people. The alliance with Brahmaism still further parted it from the lower orders. The theory of absorption peculiar to that form of belief, but now dallied with by Bhāgavatism, had nothing in common with their hopes or fears. As Hopkins rightly says,‡ 'the ordinary mortal is more averse from the bliss of absorption than from the pleasures of heaven.' At this time, and during the centuries immediately succeeding the Christian era, the needs of the common people were amply supplied by two other religions of the Outland—by Buddhism and, for those who craved for a personal God, by Śaivism. Bhāgavatism in its pure form came to be professed by fewer and fewer, and from the 9th cent., when all thinking India fell under the spell of the genius of Śaṅkara, it practically disappeared. Only at rare intervals do we come across references to it in literature and inscriptions.§ Śaṅkara himself mentions *bhakti* only once in his great philosophical work, and merely to dismiss it with contempt. It was in Southern India that the lamp of Bhāgavatism was kept burning, though with but a feeble light,‖ and it was in the South that it revived through the teaching of the four great leaders whose names have been mentioned. Then arose Rāmānanda, and within half a century Bhāgavatism became the leading religion of India. Yet there is as great a difference between the monotheism of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* and that of Rāmānanda as there was between the teaching of Plato and that of St. Paul. It now became as fully the right of the despised classes, of Musalmāns and of unclean leather-workers, as of people of repute. From Rāmānanda's time it was to the poor that the gospel was preached, and that in their own language, not in a form of speech holy but unintelligible. No one who reads the Indian religious literature of the 15th and following centuries can fail to notice the gulf that lies between the old and the new. We find ourselves in the face of the greatest religious revolution that India has ever seen—greater even than that of Buddhism, for its effects have persisted to the present day. Religion is no longer a question of knowledge. It is one of emotion. We visit a land of mysticism and rapture, and meet spirits akin, not to the giant schoolmen of Benares, but to the poets and mystics of mediæval Europe, in sympathy with Bernard of Clairvaux, with Thomas à Kempis, with Eckhart, and with St. Theresa. In the early years of the reformation the converts lived and moved in an atmosphere of the highest spiritual exaltation, while over all there hovered, with healing in its wings, a Divine gospel of love, smoothing down inevitable asperities, restoring breaches, and reconciling conflicting modes of thought. Northern India was filled with wandering devotees vowed to poverty and purity. Visions, trances, raptures, and even reputed miracles were of every-day occurrence. Rich noblemen abandoned all their possessions and gave them to the poor, and even the poorest would lay aside a bundle of sticks to light a fire for some chance wandering saint. Nor were these converts confined to the male sex. Of devout and honourable women there were not a few—Mīrā Bāī, the queen-poet of Udaipur, who gave up her throne rather than join in the bloody worship of Śiva; Bāṅkā, the poor woodcutter's wife, who could not be tempted by a purse of gold; the chaste Surasurī with her tiger guardian; Gaṇeśa Derānī, the queen of Madhukara Sāhi of Orchha, who hid the wound inflicted by a mad ascetic, lest her husband should take indiscriminating vengeance; the penitent Magdalen of Delhi, who gave her life and the only art that she possessed, her dancing, to the service of the deity in whom she had taken refuge; and many others. Of men, there were Hari-dāsa, the sweet singer, to hear whom Akbar disguised himself as a menial servant and travelled far; Nanda-dāsa, the hymn-writer, whose last words were a prayer that his soul might stand 'very close and near' the Adored; Chaturbhuja, the apostle to the savage Gonds, who taught that right initiation meant 'being born again'; Gopāla, who when smitten on one cheek turned the other to the smiter; Vilvamaṅgala, who looked after a woman to lust after her, and, because his eye offended him, made himself blind; the unnamed king, who for the same reason cut off his right hand and cast it from him; Sūra-dāsa, the blind bard of Agra; and, most famous of all, perhaps the greatest poet that India has produced, Tulasī-dāsa, the teller of the deeds of Rāma.*

The question naturally arises, whence did Rāmānanda receive the inspiration that produced this marvellous change; and an attempt is made to answer it in the following paragraphs.

5. Influence of Christianity.—The question as to how far Christianity has influenced the *Bhakti-mārga* has been much discussed. We have seen that it must now be taken as settled that the idea of *bhakti* is native to India, and that the existence of Bhāgavata monotheism can be traced back to very ancient times. It is still, however, open to us to consider the possibility of post-Christian Bhāgavatism being affected by the cognate teachings of the Western form of belief. The facts appear to be as follows:

Large colonies of Nestorian Christians and Jews migrated to the Malabar Coast in the 1st cent. A.D., and settled in Southern India in the early centuries of our era. The former have been there ever since. They had a bishop at Kalyāṇa on the Malabar Coast in the 6th cent., and another of their settlements was at the present shrine of St. Thomé, near Madras. There is a respectable tradition that the Apostle Thomas actually preached in North-Western India, and at any rate it is certain that the parts of Asia immediately adjoining had many Christian inhabitants. Not only was there in the early centuries of our era free and regular communication between India and the West, both by sea and overland, but during the same period India was more than once invaded from the North-West. In the year A.D. 639 the famous Indian king Śīlāditya of Kanauj, a patron of the Bhāgavatas, received a party of Syrian Christians, headed by the missionary Alopen, at his court.† The author of the *Dabistān*,

* *Bhagavad-Gītā*, iv. 1, 2, distinctly says that it was a Kṣatriya religion.

† *e.g.* by Monier Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*, 1889, p. 62 ff.

‡ *Religions of India*, p. 418.

§ Bopadēva, the reputed author of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, belongs to the post-reformation period (13th cent.).

‖ *e.g.* only one prince of the Valabhī kings, Dhruvasena I. (A.D. 526), is called a Bhāgavata. The others were Mahēśvaras, or worshippers of Śiva. Cf., however, the remarks on Śiva *Bhakti*, below.

* All these examples are taken from the *Bhakta-māla* (cf. the next section). The early writers were perfectly conscious of the change effected by the reformation. Priyā-dāsa says, 'the tree of *Bhakti* was once but a sapling, that might be stunted by a single kid. . . Now it hath climbed to the sky, with its glory spread manifest over the earth; for the basin from which its roots drew moisture was the bosom of the Holy. . . . Mark well its growth. Once but a feeble thing; now, shackled to its trunk, contentedly sway the mighty elephants of the passions' (*Bhakti-rasa-bodhinī*, 6).

† Edkins, *Athenæum*, July 3, 1880, p. 8. See also Takakusu,

which was written in 1645, describes (iii. 312 f.) how, when travelling in India, he had 'greatly frequented the meetings of Hindus, Jews, Magians, Nazáreans, and Muselmans'; and speaking of the Vedas, he says (ii. 45) that every one who pleases may derive from them arguments in favour of his particular creed, whether that creed be 'Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, fire-worship, the tenets of the Sonites, or those of the Shîâs, etc.'

Finally, there were the Jesuit missions to India in the latter part of the 16th cent., and their arrival at the court of the Emperor Akbar in the year 1580. They had churches in Agra, Delhi, and Lahore till Shāh Jahān came to the throne in 1628, and the Delhi church survived till the invasion of Nādir Shāh in 1789. We thus see that from the first centuries of our era Christianity has always been present in India, and that, both in the North and in the South, Hindus had every opportunity of becoming acquainted with its tenets.

Although there are many remarkable verbal coincidences, it is improbable that the latest parts of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* contain passages suggested by our Scriptures. As for the earlier portions, chronology renders it impossible. But in one of the latest passages of the *Mahābhārata*, written at least three hundred years after Christ, if not considerably later, there is an account of a visit paid by three saints to a 'White Continent,' where the people were of fair complexion, and endowed with a perfect *bhakti* that did not exist in India. A description is given of their worship which certainly suggests reminiscences of a Christian religious service, and many believe that the passage is based upon the tales of travellers who had come across Christian communities in those parts of Asia which lie north of the Hindu Kush. Besides this, there are other passages in the later parts of the *Mahābhārata* which it is difficult to believe are not borrowed from our Gospels, especially from that of St. John. These have been collected by Hopkins (*India Old and New*, p. 145 ff.). Two of his examples may be cited here. Kṛṣṇa, the incarnate Deity, is described as 'the unborn (*i.e.* the eternal) and ancient one, the only son of God, born of a virgin, very part of God'; and again, it is said of him that 'He, the guardian of his flock, the sinless God, the Lord of the world, consented to the death of (himself and) his race that he might fulfil the words of the seers.' A striking innovation, dating from about the 6th cent. A.D., was the divinity attributed by the Bhāgavatas to the *child* Kṛṣṇa. Hitherto he had been a religious teacher and a warrior, regarding whose childhood, as is usual in such cases, legends not essential to his character had accumulated. But from the 6th cent. onwards the greatest prominence is given to his childish miracles and freaks, and to his adolescent pastoral life in the country round Mathurā. It is the infant god, the *bambino*, brought up among the cowherds of Gokula, who is now a favourite object of worship. His mother Devakī, hitherto hardly mentioned, is now portrayed, like a *Madonna lactans*, suckling the infant Kṛṣṇa. His birth coincides with a massacre of the innocents, and we have other and new legends of 'the restoration to life of a woman's son, the healing of a cripple, and the pouring of a box of ointment over Kṛṣṇa' (Hopkins, *op. cit.* p. 163). Kennedy (*JRAS*, 1907, p. 951 ff.) suggests that all this is a Hindu adaptation of the Christian stories brought into the Gangetic Doāb by Gūjar immigrants from the North-West. Whether these legends have been borrowed or not may possibly be doubted, but all hesitation vanishes when we read the orthodox liturgy of the festival of Kṛṣṇa's birthday. The old legends of the birth and childhood are perfectly well known, but, as long ago shown by Weber, the ritual does not adhere to them. It actually alters the story in material facts to make it agree with the narratives of the nativity as contained in the early chapters of St. Matthew and St. Luke. Vallabha found this child-worship current in Mathurā, and adapted it to the needs of his own *Kṛṣṇa-bhakti*. As Hopkins (p. 167) says:

'So decided is the alteration and so direct is the connexion between this later phase of Krishnaism and the Christianity of the early centuries of our era, that it is no expression of extravagant fancy but a sober historical statement that in all probability the Hindus of this cult of the Madonna and Child have in reality, though unwittingly, been worshipping the Christ-child for fully a thousand years.'

The religion of Rāma presents other aspects of the case. We have seen that the modern worship of the incarnate Rāma commenced with the teaching of Rāmānuja, and was spread over Northern India by Rāmānanda and his followers. In Rāmānuja's time the Christians of St. Thomé had become paganized. They had given up baptism, while they retained the Eucharist; and a kind of mixed, or rather joint, worship, half Christian and half Hindu, had established itself in the ancient shrine. That Rāmānuja and his followers imbibed much of this teaching admits, to the present writer at least, of but little doubt. Owing to the similarity of the ground ideas of 'faith' and *bhakti*, it would indeed be extraordinary if the two religions, once brought into contact, had not influenced each other. That the Hinduism influenced the Christianity has been established as an historical fact, and that alone shows the probability of the converse also being true. According to Indian tradition, Rāmānuja was born, brought up, and spent the best part of his life near St. Thomé. In his early years he was a Vedāntist, and while he was still a young man it was in this neighbourhood that he became converted to Bhāgavatism, thought out his systematized qualified monism, refuted in a famous discussion his old Vedāntist teacher, and suffered much persecution.* Much the same as in the case of early Christianity, it is to Rāmānuja's persecution and flight from Conjeeveram that Bhāgavatism owes its acceptance over the greater part of India. Except the sects founded by Vallabha and Hari-vaṁśa, the conditions of which were altogether peculiar, the other churches have comparatively little influence beyond the localities in which they arose. But the Śrī-saṁpradāya had within it a driving force that carried it all over India from Cape Comorin to the Himālaya. Its special characteristic was the importance given to faith in a personal God, and particularly to Rāma-chandra represented as an incarnation of the Adorable, still retaining the same personality in heaven, remembering and sympathizing with the sorrows and trials of humanity. It is true that *bhakti* also plays a prominent rôle in the other churches; but it has not, with the exception of the two sects just mentioned, acquired the supreme importance in them that it has gained in the Śrī-saṁpradāya. That this is owing to the view taken of the personality of Rāma-chandra is self-evident; and though it cannot be said that the attributes with which he has been clothed are strange to the old epic accounts of him, still Christian influence may reasonably be claimed for the stress laid upon them to the comparative exclusion of others. The root conception of the

I-tsing, p. xxviii., note 8. It was at the court of this king that the poet Bāṇa refers to the presence of Bhāgavatas and Pāñcharātras (*Harṣacharita*, tr. Cowell and Thomas, p. 236).

* The similarity of the cases of Rāmānuja and Madhva is worth noting. Both were converts from Vedāntism, and both were within reach of Christian influence. Madhva was a man of Uḍipi, close to Kalyāṇa, where there was an old Christian bishopric.

Deity has been profoundly modified. The noble and pious hero has become a God of love (*δυνάμενος συμπαθῆσαι ταῖς ἀσθενείαις ἡμῶν*). The love, moreover, is that of a father for his children, not that of a man for a maid, as in the ardent *bhakti* of Vallabha and Hari-vaṁśa.

Another point of coincidence is worth noting—the institution of the *mahāprasāda*, or sacramental meal. Such meals are found in many religions, but the procedure of those partaken of by the members of the Śrī-saṁpradāya shows points of agreement with the Christian Eucharist that cannot be mere matters of chance.* The consecrated elements are even reserved for administration to the sick, and the communion, which is shared in only by those who feel themselves worthy, is followed by a love-feast attended by all members of the sect present at the time.

But it is in the literature of the church that we find the most evident reminiscences of Christianity. Kabīr, one of Rāmānanda's twelve apostles, speaks of the Word in language which is but a paraphrase of the opening verses of St. John's Gospel, and quotes sayings of our Lord almost verbatim. The authorized text-book of all believers—the *Bhakta-māla*—also contains numerous parallels to the sayings of our Lord. Attention has been drawn to several of these in the preceding section, and they need not be repeated. Here we may notice another alteration of an old legend—an alteration to make it agree with an occurrence of the most solemn hour of Christian history. In the *Mahābhārata*, Kṛṣṇa is represented as washing the feet of Brāhmans. The story, as altered by the *Bhakta-māla*, makes the incarnate God wash the feet of the disciples. In another story, which is specially mentioned as 'beloved, but hitherto not well-known,' a poor wretch is taken in and honourably entreated because he is a stranger, and therefore equivalent to Rāma. He is then told that if he has faith he can walk on the sea. He has faith, and does so.

It is possible that everything was not necessarily taken from the Nestorian Christians. There was free intercourse by sea between Christian countries and Southern India, and this may account for other coincidences, in which it is not always easy to say which side has borrowed from which. Such is the fact that the word employed in India, both by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, for the personal Deity was *Īśvara*, the exact equivalent of the Greek *Κύριος*. This may possibly be a pre-Christian coincidence. In early Christianity there was the same remarkable reverence for spiritual teachers that we have observed in Bhāgavatism. According to the *Didache*, such a teacher was to be 'known as the Lord.' In both religions there was the same extravagant belief in the mystic power attached to the *name* of the incarnate God. Thomas à Kempis speaks of the 'holy utterance, short to read, easy to retain, sweet to think upon, strong to protect,' just as Tulasī-dāsa praises 'the two gracious syllables, the eyes as it were of the soul, easy to remember, satisfying every wish, a gain in this world and felicity in the next.'† In both religions there are the same discussions as to the relative efficacy of faith and works, and as to the truth of the opposing doctrines of 'irresistible' and 'co-operative grace.' The change in the Indian idea of sin is also noteworthy. Till Rāmānuja's time, sin was disobedience to the rules of religion laid down in text-books, and was to be avoided as entailing certain consequences in a future life. Since then it has been defined as anything not done in faith. Sin is sin because it is incompatible with the nature of the incarnate God of Love, and, as quoted in the abstract of Śāṇḍilya's work given above on p. 539, even good works not done in *bhakti* partake of the nature of sin. Each of these instances of agreement taken singly might be an accident, but their cumulative effect, combined with the whole style and tone of the modern *bhakti* literature, is irresistible.

The political history of India at this period must also be taken into account. Maḥmūd of Ghazni's seventeen invasions commenced in A.D. 1001. He was succeeded by dynasty after dynasty of Musalmān conquerors, broken in 1398 by the terrible suffering entailed by the invasion of Timur. Not till Akbar ascended the throne in 1556 had the Hindus peace, and a century later the oppression was renewed by Aurangzīb (*q.v.*). For more than five centuries, from 1001 to 1556, India lay prostrate and bleeding under the feet of conquerors of alien race and alien religion. This was the period of the reformation.

To sum up the foregoing:—It is certain that in the early centuries of our era Christians visited India, and were received at a royal court. It is extremely probable that the inhabitants of Northern India were acquainted with the early Christianity of Bactria and the neighbouring parts of Central Asia, that they greatly respected it, and that they admitted that its professors possessed *bhakti* to a degree more perfect than that which ever existed in their own country. It is possible, and perhaps probable, that the worship of the infant Kṛṣṇa was a local adaptation of the worship of the infant Christ introduced to India from the North-West, and the ritual of Kṛṣṇa's birth-festival has certainly borrowed from Christian authorities. But it was in Southern India that Christianity, as a doctrine, exercised the greatest influence on Hinduism generally. Although the conceptions of the fatherhood of God and of *bhakti* were indigenous to India, they received an immense impetus owing to the beliefs of Christian communities reacting upon the mediæval Bhāgavata reformers of the South. With this leaven, their teaching swept over Hindustan, bringing balm and healing to a nation gasping in its death-throes amid the horrors of alien invasion. It is not overstating the case to say that in this reformation India re-discovered faith and love; and the fact of this discovery accounts for the passionate enthusiasm of the contemporary religious writings. In them we behold the profoundest depths of the human heart laid bare with a simplicity and freedom from self-consciousness unsurpassed in any literature with which the writer is acquainted.

6. Muhammadan influence.—The syncretism of the Bhāgavata religion has not stopped at Christianity. The later reformers, some of whom were converts from Islām, also imported into it the elements of Ṣūfīism, which will readily be recognized, and are universally acknowledged. It is sometimes difficult to decide whether a particular sectarian doctrine has been borrowed from it or from Christianity. Ṣūfīism itself has been influenced by Christian mysticism, and the doctrine of Divine love which is its distinguishing mark is so akin to the teaching of the reformed *bhakti*-churches that it could hardly fail to influence the teaching of those Bhāgavatas whose youth had been passed in a Musalmān atmosphere. But Ṣūfīism did not influence Bhāgavatism until it had reached Northern India, and, being little known in the South, it never inspired the ground doctrine of any one of the four churches.

7. Bhakti directed to Śiva.—It may be stated as a broad rule that all the followers of the Indian *bhakti-mārga* are Vaiṣṇavas. Śiva, the other

* For the whole procedure see Westcott, *Kabīr and the Kabīr Panth*, 1908, p. 127.

† For further Christian examples see Growse, *Translation of Tulasī-dāsa's Rāmāyaṇa*, i. Do. 24.

great deity of Indian worship, is associated with ideas too terrible to suggest loving devotion. There are, however, in Southern India, Śaiva sects which practise a *bhakti* cult. We have seen how the Vaiṣṇava Bhāgavatism of Northern India became infected with Brahmaism in the first few centuries of our era. In Southern India the stricter Bhāgavatas, who desired to retain their monotheism intact, began to direct their devotion to Śiva in preference to Viṣṇu, who was now, in the North, partly identified with the pantheistic Bráhma.* It is most probable that in this way there arose the Śiva-*bhakti* now sometimes met with in the South. Śiva was even provided with incarnations, such as Vīrabhadra, in imitation of those of Viṣṇu, to whom the love and devotion could be directed.

It may here be mentioned that all Indian sects agree that Śaṅkara, the promulgator of Vedāntism, was an incarnation of Śiva. Bhāgavata doctors get over the difficulty by explaining that, when the world was filled with Buddhism and other heresies, the Bhagavat directed Śiva to become incarnate and to preach a false doctrine invented by himself, so as to turn people from the Bhagavat, and thus manifest his glory by the consequent destruction of unbelievers. In other words, followers of Vedāntism were born to be damned for the greater glory of a gracious and merciful God.

The Sittars (*q.v.*), a Tamil sect, may also be noted in this connexion. Although nominal Śaivas, they are strict monotheists, who teach that 'God and love are the same.' There are other instances in Southern India of attempts to reconcile Śaivism with Bhāgavatism. The most important of these is the Brahma-saṁpradāya, founded by Madhva, already described. Regarding the true Śiva-*bhakti*, which is professedly a cult of Śiva or his incarnations, very little is known, and the subject deserves more study than it has hitherto received.

LITERATURE.—The official Sanskrit text-books of the Bhaktimārga are the Śāṇḍilya *Bhakti-sūtras*, and the Nārada *Bhakti-sūtras*. Both are quite modern works. The text of the former was edited by J. R. Ballantyne in 1861, and translated by E. B. Cowell in 1878, both appearing in the *Bibliotheca Indica* of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. Hariśchandra (see below) wrote a Hindi version of the Śāṇḍilya work under the title of the *Bhakti-sūtra-vaijayanti*, and of the Nārada under the title of the *Tadīya-sarvasva*.

There is no European work dealing with the subject as a whole. The earliest account of the doctrines of the Bhāgavatas is that given by Colebrooke, read in 1827, and published in the first volume of the *Transactions* of the *RAS*. Like everything that came from his pen, it is scholarly and accurate, and in some particulars has been the foundation of all subsequent accounts of the Bhāgavata religion. It was re-published in his *Miscellaneous Essays*, 1837 (i. 437 ff.). The history of the origin of this form of belief was first given by R. G. Bhandarkar in his *Report on the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Bombay Presidency during the Year 1883–84* (Bombay, 1887) p. 68 ff., and, more fully, in 'The Rāmānujiya and the Bhāgavata or Pañcharātra Systems,' in *Verhandlungen des VII. internationalen Orientalisten-Congresses* (Arische Section) (Vienna, 1888), p. 101 ff. His views were adopted and developed by R. Garbe in the Introduction to his German tr. of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* (Leipzig, 1905). L. Barnett, in the Introduction to his Eng. tr. of the same work, has given an independent and shorter account of the cult of Vāsudeva, in which much valuable information will be found that lay outside the lines of Garbe's thesis. An abstract of the *Nārāyaṇīya*, with an Introduction by G. A. Grierson, will be found in the *IA*, 1908.

For Rāmānuja, see the special article. The best account of his qualified monism will be found in pt. i. of G. Thibaut's tr. of the *Vedānta-sūtras* (*SBE*, xxxiv., Oxford, 1890). For the other three reformers and the churches founded by them, as well as for the various sects, see the special articles. Bhandarkar, already quoted, gives accounts of the teaching of Rāmānuja, Madhva, and Vallabha. The leading work on modern Bhāgavatism is H. H. Wilson, *Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus*, which originally appeared in vols. xvi. and xvii. of the *Asiatic Researches* (1828–32, re-published, London, 1861). Although to a certain extent out of date, Wilson's work must still be the foundation for all inquirers into modern Hinduism. Most of the popular works on the subject are mere réchauffés of what he has written, including most of his mistakes. Of more modern works which contain original research, F. S. Growse's *Mathurā, a District Memoir*[2] (Allahabad, 1880), gives much valuable information which will not be found elsewhere. E. W. Hopkins's *Religions of India* (Boston and London, 1902), is also replete with new material collected from many sources, and illumined by many suggestive remarks. Among works written by natives of India, the *Bhakta-māla* of Nābhā-dāsa, with its commentary by Priyā-dāsa, is all-important. It has often been printed in the original and also translated into modern Indian languages. A convenient Hindī paraphrase is the *Bhakta-kalpadruma* of Pratāpa Siṁha (Lucknow, 1884). It is impossible to understand reformed Bhāgavatism without a familiarity with the contents of the *Bhakta-māla*, but its many difficulties have hitherto deterred most students from the task of studying it. The late Hariśchandra of Benares, who was a devout Bhāgavata, wrote a number of works in Hindī dealing with the history of his religion. The more important are the *Vaiṣṇava-sarvasva*, the *Vallabhīya-sarvasva*, and biographies of Rāmānuja and Vallabha. These, as well as the *Bhakti-sūtra-vaijayanti* and the *Tadīya-sarvasva*, can be found in a collection of his works published at intervals during the closing decade of the 19th cent. at Bānkipur, and entitled the *Hariśchandra-kalā*.

For Early Christianity in India, see A. C. Burnell in *IA* iii. 808, iv. 153, v. 25. A. Weber in his well-known articles on the *Kṛṣṇa-janmāṣṭamī* (Eng. tr. in *IA* iii. 21, etc., vi. 161, etc.) deals with the ritual of the Kṛṣṇa birth-festival; and although all his arguments are not now accepted, his main results are universally admitted to be true. An article by the present writer (who does not adhere to all the details then advanced by him) on 'Modern Hinduism, and its Debt to the Nestorians,' in *JRAS*, 1907, may be read for the sake of the discussion to which it gave rise, and which is printed in the same volume. See also J. Kennedy, 'The Child Kṛṣṇa, Christianity, and the Gujars,' *ib.* p. 951 ff. The most complete and sane summary of the whole question is Hopkins's 'Christ in India,' in *India Old and New* (New York and London, 1902). It is, of course, earlier than the two papers just mentioned. The Bhāgavata doctrine of works is dealt with by G. A. Grierson in *JRAS*, 1908, p. 337 ff.

GEORGE A. GRIERSON.

* Cf. Hopkins, *Religions of India*, p. 488.

BHANGI.—The sweeper or scavenger caste of Hindustan, who at the Census of 1901 numbered 656,668. The caste probably takes its name, on account of the drunken habits of its members, from Skr. *bhaṅga*, 'hemp.' With the Bhangīs may also be conveniently grouped other scavenger tribes of Northern India—the Chūhrā (probably from Hindī *chūṛā-jhāṛnā*, 'to sweep up rubbish'); the Ḥalālkhor, 'one to whom any kind of food is lawful'; and the Mehtar, or 'prince,' a mock honorific term for this and other menial occupations. This group of castes numbered in all, at the Census of 1901, 2,168,594. As regards distribution, the vast majority of them were found in the Panjāb (1,316,517) and in the United Provinces (461,993). In Bengal they number only 40,971, their duties being performed in this province by still more degraded tribes, such as the Ḍom (*q.v.*) and the Hāṛī (*q.v.*). Classified according to religion, about three-fourths profess to be Hindus and nearly one-fourth Muhammadans, the small balance calling themselves either Sikhs or Animists. But the more respectable Hindus, Muhammadans, and Sikhs utterly refuse communion in worship or in the social observances of life to people whom they regard as out-castes, and believe that their touch, or even their mere presence, involves pollution.

The sweeper castes, as a whole, are the modern representatives of the Chaṇḍāla of Manu (*Institutes*, x. 12, 29, 30), who are regarded by the lawgiver as the offspring of a Śūdra father and a Brāhman woman, thus marking the Aryan abhorrence of marriage relations between women of the ruling race and men of the conquered Dravidian races. They acquired the title of Anta-vāsin or Ante-vāsin, because they were required to dwell outside the limits of the homestead. Their sole wealth must be dogs and asses—both animals which the orthodox Hindu still regards as impure. Their clothes must be made out of the cerecloths of the dead; their dishes must be broken pots, and their ornaments of rusty iron. No one who is careful of his religious duties must hold any intercourse with them, and they must marry among themselves—a rule which probably dates from early Buddhist times, when caste was only in the making. By day

they may roam about to seek work; they must be distinguished by the badges of the Rājā, and they must carry out the corpses of any who die without kindred. They should always be employed to slay those whom the law sentences to be put to death, and they may appropriate the clothes of the slain, their beds, and their ornaments.

The word Chaṇḍāla, probably a Dravidian term, but sometimes derived from the Skr. *chaṇḍa*, 'evil,' 'cruel,' 'mischievous,' is nowadays used only in a contumelious sense, and the so-called Chaṇḍāla caste of Bengal call themselves Nāmaśūdra; and their higher subdivisions, with characteristic jealousy, apply the title Chaṇḍāla to the lower, who in their turn pass it on to the Dom. In short, the title Chaṇḍāla may have been a generic title for the meaner non-Aryan races, who at an early period were reduced to servitude, and compelled to perform the more odious duties in the Aryan commonwealth. But at the present time the viler duties assigned to the Chaṇḍāla of Manu —the conveyance of corpses and the task of acting as public executioners—have passed to the Doms, and the Bhangis now owe their social degradation to their performance of the duties of scavengering. The rise of the present Bhangī caste seems, from the names applied to the caste and its subdivisions, to date from the early period of Muhammadan rule, and their appearance indicates that they are a mixture of various races, who for some reason or another have incurred social ostracism.

1. *The cult of Lāl Beg.*—The Bhangī legends and rites of worship centre round the person of their saint, Lāl Beg, about whom many wonderful tales are told. From the mass of folklore connected with him little can be definitely ascertained. He has been connected with the *rākshasa*, or demon, Aruṇakarat, and as Aruṇa in Skr. is a title of the sun, and *lāl* in Persian means 'red,' some connexion has been traced between his cult and earlier Hindu beliefs. Others would connect Lāl Beg with the *lāl Bhikshū*, or red-clad monk of Buddhist times; and he is also in some inexplicable way mixed up with the cult of Vālmīki, the poet-sage who compiled the epic of the Rāmāyaṇa, and who has also been adopted as their patron deity by low castes like the Aheria (*q.v.*) and Bahelia (*q.v.*). In the names of the tribal sections some vague indications of totemism appear, but these must not be pressed too far.

2. *Other Bhangī deities.*—The Bhangīs, as might be expected from the mixed origin of the caste, follow a combination of different faiths. The basis of their religion is the characteristic Animism of the Dravidians, but to this they have added elements derived from other sources. In the United Provinces a large number of them worship as their patron saint Lāl Beg, and with him is combined or confounded the Pachpiriyā (*q.v.*) cult of the Pāñchoñ Pīr, or five saints. In Central India Lāl Beg has no temple, but is often represented in villages by a flat stone upon which two footprints are carved, and over them a rude mud shelter, marked by a red flag, is often erected. In Rājputāna, when sacrifice is being offered to him, they cut the throat of the fowl victim in Musalmān fashion (*ḥalāl*).

Higher up the Ganges valley their favourite saint is Gūgā, or Zāhir Pīr, who, they believe, possesses the power of healing the blind, lunatics, and lepers, and bestowing offspring upon barren wives. His shrine is a small round building with a courtyard, decorated with flags hung from the neighbouring trees, and provided with poles, one of which is appropriated as a perch for the deity whenever he attends in answer to the prayers of his devotees. The offering to him is a leaf or branch of a sacred tree and some grains of millet. The cenotaph is rubbed with sandalwood, which imbibes the powers of the saint, and is taken away and used as a cure in various maladies. Sometimes a goat is offered, and the meat is consumed by the worshippers. Another favourite Bhangī saint is Ghāzī Miyāñ, supposed to be a Musalmān hero slain in one of the early invasions of Oudh. His 'marriage' is his most important feast, and there seems some reason to suspect that it is a survival of the rite of symbolic marriage of the earth, the Mother, with her male counterpart, the object of the rite being the promoting of the fertility of the earth, one of the leading features of the Dravidian religion. The Bhangīs venerate besides these a host of deified ghosts or spirits, generally those of the locality in which they happen to reside. Those who are professing Muhammadans add to the monotheistic creed of Islām a number of beliefs derived from the more primitive Animism.

3. *The religion of the Ḥalālkhors.*—The creed of the Ḥalālkhors has less Musalmān admixture, and more closely resembles that of the Ḍom and his kinsman the Bāñsphoṛ (*q.v.*).

4. *The religion of the Panjāb Chūhrās.*—The religion of the Chūhrās of the Panjāb is equally involved and perplexing, and the researches of Maclagan have done little more than increase the mystery by which it is surrounded. In the Sirsa district, they, like their brethren in the United Provinces, worship Lāl Beg, a god without form or dwelling-place. The worshipper makes a small shrine of earth, and puts over it a stick with a piece of cloth as a flag, offers a little butter or grain as a sacrifice, and prays to be delivered from sickness and other trouble. The Chūhrās are said not to believe in the transmigration of souls; but they say that the good go to heaven after death, where they spend their time bathing and sitting at ease, and enjoy happiness; while the bad go to hell, where they are tormented with wounds and fire until the deity is pleased to release them. How much of these beliefs is original and how much has been derived from Hindu, Musalmān, or even Christian sources, it is impossible to say. By other accounts they seem to believe in a Supreme Being, with whom Lāl Beg is only an intercessor. They are said also to have family-gods (*kuldeo*), whose names they never divulge, and to whom offerings are made on holidays, and at births and deaths in the family. Possibly this is a form of ancestor-worship. In the Jālandhar district Vālmīki is said to be known as Bālā Shāh, and his shrine is surmounted by five small pillars, on which lamps are lighted every Thursday. When the spring harvest is gathered in, the Chūhrās assemble at his shrine, slay a black ram, and prepare a quantity of bread. On these they feast, presenting part of the food to the deity, and making offerings of cloth and small coins, which are taken by the attendant at the shrine.

In the Panjāb, when Chūhrās adopt the Sikh faith, they are known as Maẓhabī, 'the religious.' These Maẓhabī Sikhs form a valuable element in the Indian army. They, like all converts, are particularly scrupulous in religious matters, but most Sikhs of other castes keep them at a distance. When a Chūhrā is circumcised and becomes a Muhammadan, he is ordinarily known by the title of Muṣallī, 'the righteous,' or Kotānā. But the faith of Islām sits lightly upon such people, and their religious fervour largely depends upon the price of grain. When times are good, the Chūhrā adopts Islām, and is admitted to the privilege of smoking with Muhammadans. When times change for the worse, and he is in straits to find a living, he often relapses into his original Chūhrā beliefs, because he thus gains a wider range of diet, being allowed to eat carrion and lizards. If times improve, he again repeats the Musalmān creed (*kalima*), and becomes again a Muṣallī.

LITERATURE.—For Bengal, Wise, *Notes on the Races, Castes, and Trades of Eastern Bengal*, 1883, 338 ff.; for the United Provinces, Greeven, *Heroes Five*, 1898; Crooke, *Tribes and Castes*, 1896, i. 259; *Popular Religion and Folk-lore*, 1896, i. 205 ff.; for the Panjāb, Maclagan, *Panjāb Census Report*, 1891, i. 200 ff.; Temple, *Legends of the Panjāb*, vol. i., 1884, *passim*; Purser, *Settlement Report of Jālandhar District*, 52 f., quoted in *North*

Indian Notes and Queries, ii. 164 f.; *Punjab Notes and Queries*, iv. 203 f.; for Western India, *Central India Census Report*, 1901, i. 88; *Rajputana Census Report*, 1901, i. 140.

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BHĀRHUT or BHARAHUT (the proper form of the name seems to be Barhut, but some write it Bharaut and Barāhat).—A village situated in Baghelkhand, 95 miles S.W. of Allāhābād, in Northern India, famous as the site of the great Buddhist *stūpa* discovered here by Cunningham in 1873. The *stūpa*, circular in form, was surrounded by a splendid carved railing with four openings towards the four cardinal points. It was thus divided into four quadrants, each of which consisted of sixteen pillars, joined by three crossbars, and covered by a massive stone coping. At each entrance the rail was extended, to form, as Cunningham believed, a gigantic *swastika*, or mystic cross. On each side was a splendid ornamental arch, or *toraṇa*. The medallions of these pillars are filled with most interesting sculptures—compositions of lotus and other flowers, and a number of scenes derived from Buddhist legend and history. Many of these represent scenes taken from the Jātakas, of which some twenty have been identified by Subhūti, Rhys Davids, and Hultzsch. Perhaps the most interesting of all is that of the Jetavana monastery at Srāvastī, recording the purchase of Jeta's garden by Anāthapiṇḍika, who covered the surface of the ground with gold pieces (Hardy, *Manual of Budhism*[2], 1880, p. 219; Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, 1884, p. 28). One bas-relief appears to represent a scene in the life of Rāma, which is supposed by Cunningham to be by far the earliest notice which we possess of the great solar hero and his wife. The sculptures, which extend over about a century, are particularly interesting as illustrating the dress and social and domestic life of the people of Northern India in the period after the death of Alexander the Great. They have been discussed by Grünwedel (*Buddhist Art in India*, 1901, 23, 40 ff., 141).

Images of the Buddha are wholly absent from the older sculptures at Sānchī and Bhārhut.

'Even in cases where the presence of the Lord must be presumed, it is indicated by symbols—footprints, a wheel, a seat, or altar, above which is an umbrella with garlands. A scene on the sculptures of Bhārhut represents Ajātaśatru kneeling before the footprints of the Lord, whereas the inscription distinctly says: "Ajātaśatru pays his homage to the Lord"' (Kern, *op. cit.* 94).

Among the numerous sculptures, there are no naked figures, as at Sānchī and Mathurā. All, and especially the women, are well clad, and their heads are generally covered with richly figured cloths or brocades. One gateway and a portion of the railing have been removed to the Indian Museum at Calcutta.

Cunningham assigns the *stūpa* to the Aśoka period, somewhere between B.C. 250 and 200. Hultzsch reads an inscription mentioning the Suṅgas, successors of the Maurya dynasty, on a pillar erected by Vātsī or Vāchhīputra Dhanabhūti, which gives a date in the 2nd or 1st cent. B.C.

LITERATURE.—Cunningham, *The Stūpa of Bharhut: a Buddhist Monument Ornamented with Numerous Sculpture Illustrations of Buddhist Legend and History in the Third Century B.C.*, 1879; Fergusson, *Hist. of Indian and Eastern Architecture*, 1899, 84 f.; Hultzsch, *Indian Antiquary*, xiv. 138 f., xxi. 225; Hoernle, *ib.* x. 118 ff., xi. 25 ff.; Anderson, *Handbook of the Archæological Collections in the Indian Museum*, pt. i. (1883) 1 ff.

W. CROOKE.

BHĀṬ, CHĀRAN (the former from Skr. *bhaṭṭa*, a respectful term applied to a Brāhman or man of high caste, probably connected with *bhartṛi*, 'bearer,' 'master'; the latter, Skr. *chāraṇa*, 'a wanderer,' 'a singer').—The caste of family bards and panegyrists, found throughout Northern India, which at the Census of 1901 numbered 385,993, of whom 52,164 were described as Muhammadans, and the remainder as Hindus, with a small minority professing the Sikh and Jaina faiths. Tod compares them with the Belgic genealogist of Gibbon who 'riots in all the lust of fiction, and spins from his own bowels a lineage of some thousand years.' The Bhāṭs are most numerous in the United Provinces, but they are found in smaller bodies all over Northern India, and a few have penetrated as far south as Hyderābād. The Chāraṇs, again, numbering at the same Census 74,014, are practically all Hindus by religion, and are mostly confined to the Presidency of Bombay and the province of Rājputāna.

Bhāṭs are generally supposed to be descended from a Kṣatriya father and a Brāhman widow. They have been connected by Nesfield with 'those secularized Brāhmans who frequented the courts of princes and the camps of warriors, recited their praises in public, and kept records of their genealogies.' But to this Risley objects that if the Bhāṭs of the present day are descended from a class of degraded Brāhmans, if, in other words, they are a homogeneous offshoot from the priestly class, it is difficult to understand how they come to have a number of sections which are not Brāhmanical and which appear to resemble rather the territorial groups common among Rājputs. There is no exact parallel to this supposed case of Brāhmans, however degraded, shedding their characteristic series of eponymous sections, and adopting those of another type. On the other hand, there is nothing improbable in the conjecture that Rājputs also may have become bards to the chiefs of their tribe, and Risley is inclined to regard them as a heterogeneous group made up of Brāhmans and Rājputs, welded into a single caste by virtue of their exercising identical functions. He grants, however, that the inviolability of the Bhāṭ's person, accepted in Western India towards the end of the 18th cent., tells in favour of their Brāhmanical origin, 'while the theory of Roth and Zimmer, that the first germ of the Brāhman caste is to be sought in the singers of Vedic times, may perhaps be deemed to tell in the same direction.'

1. *Religion of the United Provinces Bhāṭs.*—In the United Provinces those Bhāṭs who profess Hinduism are Hindus of the most orthodox kind, being by sect generally Vaishṇavas or worshippers of Vishṇu, or Śāktas, followers of the Mother-goddesses. But in addition to the god peculiar to their sect they worship other gods—Śiva in the form of Gaurīpati, *i.e.* 'lord of Gaurī,' 'the white one' (a title of his consort Pārvatī), Barē Bīr, Mahābīr, and Sārdā. Barē Bīr, 'the great hero,' seems to be the ghost of some deified worthy of the tribe. He is honoured by making a plastered square in the courtyard, and placing within it a lighted lamp. Mahābīr, 'the great hero,' is another name for Hanumān, the monkey-god. He is worshipped by painting a representation of him with red lead upon a brass tray, before which cakes, sweetmeats, and other bloodless offerings are laid. Sārdā is a corruption of the name of the goddess Sarasvatī, the patron of learning and eloquence, who naturally is worshipped by a caste of bards. Side by side with this worship of the orthodox kind they have adopted some of the local Animistic beliefs, as is shown by the cult of Birtiyā, for whose worship they employ a priest from the degraded Chamār or currier caste, who sacrifices a young pig, buries the head in the earth, and carries off the rest of the flesh as his perquisite. In other districts of the same Provinces they worship the Mother-goddess, Bhavānī or Devī, particularly when epidemic disease prevails.

2. *Religion in Bengal.*—In Bihār their religion differs little from that of the average middle-class Hindu, representatives of all the regular sects being found among them; and the caste as a whole cannot be said to favour the tenets of any particular sect. In Eastern Bengal, however, they are said to be mostly Śakti-worshippers. In Bengal, as in the United Provinces, they retain traces of primitive Animism in the worship of minor gods, who are propitiated with sacrifices of he-goats, with offerings of wheat, sweetmeats, coloured cloth, and vermilion, the eatable portions of the offerings being divided among the members of the household.

3. *Inviolability of Bhāṭs and Chāraṇs.*—One peculiarity common to both Bhāṭs and Chāraṇs is their inviolability—a belief based on the combina-

tion in them of the duty of herald with that of bard, a principle as old as the days of Homer, when Odysseus spares Phemius, the bard (ἀοιδός) (*Od.* xxii. 331). It is principally from West India that the stories come of what is called *trāgā*, that is to say, the custom of self-wounding or suicide performed by members of this caste when exposed to attack while in charge of treasure or entrusted with other responsible duties. In almost every part of Kāthiāwār, at the entry of villages, are to be seen the *pāliyā*, or guardian stones, erected in honour of Chāran men and women who killed themselves to prevent the capture of cattle, or to enforce their restoration by the predatory Kāthi tribe. The names of the victims, with the date and circumstances of their death, are recorded on the stones, and a rude sculpture shows the method in which the sacrifice was performed, the man generally killing himself on horseback with sword or spear; the woman transfixing her throat with a dagger. In this part of the country the Chāraṇs have now somewhat fallen from their high estate on account of permitting widow re-marriage and worshipping the local Mothers, Khodiyār, 'the mischievous one,' or Āsāpūrā, 'she that accomplishes desires.'

LITERATURE.—For Bengal, see Risley, *Tribes and Castes*, 1891, i. 101; for the United Provinces, Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, 1896, ii. 25; for Rājputāna, *Rajputana Census Report*, 1901, i. 141; for Bombay, Wilson, *Indian Caste*, ii. 179 ff., *Gazetteer*, xiii. 135 ff.; for the Muhammadan branch of the caste, *North Indian Notes and Queries*, ii. 67.

W. CROOKE.

BHĪLS.—1. Introduction.—The Bhīls (Skr. *Bhilla*, which Caldwell [*Dravidian Grammar*[2], 464] believes to represent the Dravidian *Billa*, 'bowman,' from *vil*, *bil*, 'bow') are one of the non-Aryan races of India, usually included under the unsatisfactory name 'Dravidian,' inhabiting the hilly country in the West and Central parts of the Peninsula. They seem to have been the chief of a group of tribes occupying a large portion of the hill country, now included in Mewār, Mālwā, Khāndesh, and Gujarāt. In the early Sanskrit writings they appear to be included under the names Pulinda and Nishāda, general terms applied to the non-Aryan races when they came in contact with the lighter-coloured race from the north. They have been identified with the Phyllitai (Φυλλῖται) of Ptolemy (VII. i. 66; McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*, 159 f.), a term which, like the Skr. *Parṇa-śavara*, seems to have been used to denote the 'leaf-clad' non-Aryan tribes, now represented by the Juāngs of Chotā Nāgpur, in the Vindhyan and Sātpura ranges, which stretch westward from the Gulf of Cambay to the lower Ganges valley. Their predominance during early times in W. India is implied in the fact that in many States in Rājputāna, Mālwā, and Gujarāt, when a Rājput chief succeeds to the throne, his brow is marked with blood drawn from the toe or thumb of a Bhīl, by which he secures blood-covenant with the early lords of the country, and the protection of their priesthood against the local evil spirits. The right of giving the blood is claimed by certain families, and the fact that the person from whose veins the blood flows is believed to die within a year fails to damp their zeal for the maintenance of the custom (*Trans. RAS* i. 69). At the Census of 1901 the Bhīls numbered 1,198,843, of whom 569,842 were found in the Bombay Presidency, 339,786 in Rājputāna, and 206,934 in the States of Central India. These, the three principal groups, differ to some degree in religion, custom, and culture, and may be conveniently treated separately.

2. Legends of origin.—As a whole, the Bhīls seem to have preserved little tribal tradition; and, of course, they possess no tribal literature. Their legendary lore, as we find it, is intended to explain their present degraded condition. The most common account of their origin tells that Mahādeva (Śiva), sick and unhappy, was one day reclining in a shady forest, when a beautiful woman appeared, the first sight of whom effected a complete cure of all his maladies. The intercourse between the god and this stranger resulted in the birth of many children. One of the sons, who was from infancy distinguished alike by his ugliness and vicious habits, slew the favourite bull of his father, for which crime the angry deity cursed him and expelled him from the haunts of men to dwell in the woods and mountains. His descendants have ever since been known as Bhīls and Nishādas—terms that denote outcasts (Malcolm, *Mem. of C. India*[2], i. 518 f.; A. K. Forbes, *Rās Mālā* [1878], 78 ff.).

3. Bombay branch.—These clans are found in various parts of Gujarāt, as well as in the wild region of N. Khāndesh and the Dāng forests, where they form one of the most wide-spread and characteristic forest tribes. Their occupation in Gujarāt, which is typical of the tribe in other districts, is that of peasants, labourers, woodmen, and watchmen. When they cultivate, they follow the custom of periodically burning down patches of jungle, and sowing coarse grain crops in the ashes; others collect catechu and similar forest produce, while the women gather fruits and wild berries as food. Many of them still maintain their reputation as thieves and cattle-lifters, which is often noticed by the Muhammadan historians and by the writers of reports in the early period of British rule (*BG* ix. pt. i. 300, iii. 219, vi. 27). It is said that the Bhīl is more truthful than the high-caste Hindu; but this is doubtful. In Gujarāt, when a Bhīl is being sworn as a witness, he is seated with his face towards the sun, with a handful of grain bound in the hem of his garment, and a handful of dust laid on his head; he must then walk twice or thrice round the horse-image of the god Bābā, and swear by the cushion on which the chief of his clan sits (*ib.* ix. pt. i. 300 n.). Their system of agriculture and the dread of witchcraft prevent the establishment of settled villages; and their rude, sometimes round, huts are scattered through the jungle which they occupy. Their dress is extremely scanty; but the women ornament themselves with much rude jewellery. In Khāndesh the hill Bhīls are catholic in their diet, eating various kinds of grain, vegetables, forest fruits and berries, fish, goat's flesh or mutton, carrion, animals that have died by a natural death, and probably in remote places the flesh of the cow (*ib.* xii. 85).

They fall into two main divisions: (1) those who are partly Rājput, inhabit the plains where they have in some cases acquired Rājput status, and adopt Rājput names for their clans; and (2) the more or less pure Bhīls, who occupy the more inaccessible tracts (*ib.* ix. pt. i. 295). This distinction of culture affects their religion, that of the Rājput Bhīls corresponding to the Hindu rule, that of the jungle branch preserving more of the primitive animistic beliefs. Thus, in Khāndesh the wildest clans worship only Vāghdev, the tiger-god, who, under the kindred titles of Bāgheśvar (Skr. *Vyāghra-īśvara*, 'tiger-lord') or Banrājā (Skr. *vana-rāja*, 'lord of the wood'), is worshipped by the allied tribes in the hill ranges west of the Bhīl country (*PR* ii. 213). Some who are more influenced by Hinduism worship Mātā, the Mother-goddess, and Mahādeva or Śiva; while some, again, who are more civilized, worship the ordinary local Hindu deities, such as Khaṇḍoba, Śitalā Mātā, the smallpox Mother-goddess, and

others (*ib.* xii. 93). In Gujarāt the branch of the tribe which claims kinship with Rājputs worships specially Kālikā Mātā, the Mother-goddess, in her more awful form. Here the jungle-dwelling Bhīl worships hardly any of the orthodox deities, except Devī, the impersonation of the female energy. But when he visits her temple, contrary to his usual practice, he releases, after dedication, the victim which he offers to her. According to Enthoven, the Mātā, or Mother-goddesses, are represented by symbols rather than by images—by wooden posts, earthen horses, wicker baskets, and winnowing fans (*Bombay Census Rep.* 1901, i. 63). This appears to be a local development, as the cult of the horse seems elsewhere to be connected with that of ancestors. The jungle Bhīl respects Muhammadan shrines, and makes offerings to Muhammadan saints. Besides this, he retains many of the primitive animistic beliefs. He reverences the moon and swears by it; but he chiefly worships spirits and ghosts. This worship is usually performed in high places, the shrine consisting of a pile of stones on the summit of a hill, where he occasionally makes a blood-offering to appease the spirits of evil. In the forest, near an old tree or spring, often at some spot selected by mere chance, but which he believes to be the haunt of spirits, he offers rude earthenware images of horses, jars, and beehive-shaped vessels. The horse-images seem among the non-Aryan tribes to be intended as steeds on which the spirits of the dead may ride to heaven; and the jars and other vessels are regarded as the abodes of spirits. We thus find a crude ancestor-cult attached to the animistic beliefs. The ritual of the death rites shows that the tribe recognizes, in a vague way, the existence of the soul after death. When the *rāval*, or death priest, comes to preside over the death feast, by which food is conveyed to the souls of the dead, he brings with him two small brass images, one said to represent the horse of the moon, the other a cow and calf. The latter having been placed in a pool of milk, the death chant is sung, after which the cow-image is laid on the ground. The horse-image, which is usually made out of the anklets of the widow, is presented to the *rāval* at the close of the obsequies (*BG* ix. pt. i. 304 f.). The purport of the rite is obscure; but it seems to be intended that the cow and horse, by a process of magic, may be placed at the service of the ghost of the deceased. When the spirits of the forest are being worshipped, beams are raised, poised on two uprights sometimes 12 ft. high, which the officiant mounts to sacrifice a goat or a cock (*ib.* ix. pt. i. 301). This form of 'ladder sacrifice' is found in other parts of India. It is used by the Musahars of Bengal in the worship of the *bīr*, or malignant spirits, and by the Dosādhs of the United Provinces in eclipse observances (Risley, *Tribes and Castes*, ii. 117; Crooke, *Tribes and Castes*, ii. 355). In Upper Burma, a man who aspires to become a diviner has to climb a ladder and sit on a platform set with sharp spikes; if he receives no injury, his powers are recognized (J. Anderson, *Mandalay to Momien*, 1876, p. 81). In Khāndesh the Bhils suppose that spirits reside in stones, which are smeared with red lead (a substitute for a blood-offering) and with oil. An animal sacrifice and an oblation of spirits are sometimes made at such stones, portions of which are thrown into fire in the belief that the demons delight in the sweet savour, after which the worshippers and their priest consume the flesh and liquor (*BG* xii. 93). Animal-worship, except the reverence paid to the horse, is not common. Ghoṛā Dev, 'the horse-god,' is a general object of worship. In Gujarāt, if a prayer has been granted, clay images of horses are made, and placed round the shrine-image or in the spirit haunt; and in many of their legends the plot turns on the assistance given by an enchanted horse. Only the clans most under the influence of Hinduism kill neither the cow nor the blue bull (*Portax pictus*); the jungle-dwellers have no reverence for the cow, kill it, and eat its flesh. There are no signs of snake-worship. They have a firm belief in omens of the 'meeting' class, which are usually associated with animals (*JAI* ix. 400; *Asiatic Quart. Rev.* vii. 461 f.).

4. **Festivals.**—In Gujarāt their festivals are chiefly connected with the ancestor-cult. The only regular Hindu festivals which they observe are those of the spring equinox (Holī, Shimgā), and the autumn equinox (Dasahra), and the feast of lights (Divālī) at the full moon in October–November. The first two, which are in origin forms of sympathetic magic to promote the growth and ripening of the crops, are accompanied with rude merriment and indecency (*GB*[2] iii. 306). At the Holī they celebrate, possibly with the object of expelling evil spirits, a mock fight between men and women—an incident witnessed and described by Bishop Heber among the branch of the tribe in Central India (*Narrative of a Journey*, 1861, ii. 86 f.; *GB*[2] iii. 95 ff.; *PR* ii. 176, 321). At the same feast some clans, as is the case in N. India, practise the rite of walking through a trench filled with burning embers, without, it is said, injury to the performers (*BG* vi. 29, xii. 93 n.; *PR* ii. 317).

At the Divālī, or feast of lights, they make a thanksgiving to the gods near the shed of the cattle, the protection of which is the main object of the feast. The ground near the shed is cleaned and a small circle is made with rice. In this circle seven balls of boiled rice or maize are placed on seven leaves. A fire is lighted and fed with butter. A man, generally the housemaster, lays his hands on five chickens, throws water over them, and offers them, saying, 'O Dharma Indra! We offer this sacrifice to thee! During the coming year keep our cattle free from disease, increase them and be kindly!' At the same time another man cuts the throats of the fowls. A third man sprinkles spirituous liquor on the ground, saying, 'O Dharma Indra! we pour this spirit to thee!' The cattle, with their horns painted red, are then let out of the shed, those of the headman leading the way. All are driven over the body of a Bhīl, who lies on the ground face downwards. This is probably a survival of an actual rite of human sacrifice. The invocation of Indra shows the influence of Hinduism; but the rite is part of the primitive Animism.

At the Dasahrā feast they sow barley in a dish full of earth, and keep it watered and tended for nine days, after which it is offered to the goddess Devī—a magical rite found in other parts of the world, which has been described by Frazer under the title of 'the Gardens of Adonis' (*BG* ix. pt. i. 305 ff.; Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*[2], 194 ff.).

When rain holds off and scarcity is feared, the women go with bows and arrows to the shrine of the village-goddess, abuse her, smear her image with filth,* and leap and dance; finally, they raid a neighbouring village, seize a buffalo, the owner seldom offering resistance, and drive it back to their own village, where it is beaten to death with clubs, and the flesh shared among the raiders. They say that the intention is to shame the gods into pity, and to convince them how hard the times must be when the women are compelled to resort to acts of violence (*BG* ix. pt. i. 311). When epidemic disease prevails, asses are made to plough a piece of ground (an unnatural act intended to call the attention of the gods to their troubles), and a small cart is placed before the shrine of the god who is supposed to have been offended at some neglect, and to have brought the pestilence. The cart is then believed to move of its own accord, and accompanied by a scape animal, a goat or buffalo, carries the plague beyond the limits of the village (*ib.* ix. pt. i. 311).

5. **Priesthood.**—Except among those clans which are subject to Hindu influence, Brāhmans take no part in the public or domestic rites. The exorcist, whose duty it is to propitiate the malignant gods

* For a remarkable case of obscene ritual cursing of a goddess, see the account of the Gangammā festival in Malabar (*Bulletin Madras Museum*, iii. 267 f.).

and spirits, is known as the *bhagat* (Skr. *bhakta*, 'worshipper'). His reputation depends on his occasionally becoming possessed by the Mother-goddess, when he mutters and shakes, foams at the mouth, eats raw flesh or drinks blood, and pretends to know both the past and the future. The Rājā of the Bāriyā State, in the Agency of Rīwākāṇṭha, holds a feast every twelve years in honour of a god known as Bābā Dev, 'divine father,' on the Devgad hill, when a Bhīl *bhagat* becomes possessed by the god, and foretells the condition of the crops and the fortunes of the Rājā's family (*ib.* vi. 29 f.). The duties of the *bhagat* are to consecrate household gods, to perform tribal and family rites, to secure the fertility of the crops, to heal the sick, and to thwart the machinations of enemies. In cases of sickness, he places grains of black gram (*Phaseolus mungo*) or rice on a leaf, which he passes round the head of the patient. By examining the grains, he decides whether the sick man has been attacked by an evil spirit or by one of his offended dead ancestors. The latter usually appear in the form of human beings, but sometimes in that of a bear or other wild beast. When their worship is neglected, they show their anger by throwing stones or sticks at their descendants, or by pinching them at night. They can be appeased by making an offering at their graves. The attack of an evil spirit is treated by means of incantations, and striking the patient gently with the branch of a tree. The *bhagat* is also the witch-finder; and in former times, before the period of British rule, witches were subjected to cruel ordeals, tortured, or even killed (*ib.* ix. pt. i. 302). The second class of priests is the *rāval* (Skr. *rājakula*, 'royal family'), a title, like that of the *bhagat*, obviously of Hindu origin, replacing the name of the original medicine-man. His chief duty is to preside over the funeral feast, and to propitiate the deceased ancestors. The dead are buried in deep graves or under stone cairns, the intention being to prevent the return of the ghost. On the return from the grave a fire is lit in the house of the dead man, and into it some woman's hair is sometimes dropped (cf. Frazer, *Pausanias*, iv. 136 f.). The death tabu is finally removed by the mourners passing their hands and feet through fragrant smoke, and by washing the shoulders of the corpse-bearers with a mixture of oil, milk, cow-dung, and cow-urine (*BG* xii. 91 f.).

'In the case of the decease of a Bhīl of importance, it is not uncommon for the grave in which he has been interred to be opened some two months after burial, the opening being only sufficient to disclose the head of the corpse. The wasted features thus brought to light are anointed with red lead in the same manner as the irregular shaped stones which are common objects of worship among this primitive people.* After anointment the deceased is worshipped, and the grave is then re-closed. Without this ceremony the full rights of ancestorship are not, it is alleged, obtainable. The worshippers are by no means necessarily relations of the deceased' (*Bombay Census Rep.* 1901, i. 68).

6. **Central Indian branch.**—These inhabit principally the wild hilly tracts which separate Mālwā from Nimār and Gujarāt. According to Malcolm (*Memoir of Central India*[2], ii. 181), their religious rites are confined to 'propitiatory offerings and sacrifices to some of the Hindu infernal deities,' especially Śītalā Mātā, the smallpox Mother; they also pay reverence to Mahādeva, from whom they claim descent. The Barwānī sept, which is one of the most primitive, is said to have a well-defined system of sept totems, each sept reverencing a special tree or animal. If the totem be a tree, they never cut or injure it; men bow when passing it, and women veil their heads. The tribal *tatu*, however, is said never to be a representation of the totem. Luard (*Central India Census Rep.* 1901, i. 197 ff.), who gives this account, adds that, 'as a rule, some spirit is supposed to live in the tree or other object.' It may be suspected that we have here an instance of confusion between totemism and tree- or animal-worship.

* For similar customs in India see those of the Maravan and Urāli of Madras (*FL* v. 36; Thurston, *Ethnographic Notes*, 202), the Khāsī (*JAI* i. 131), and the people of Nicobar (*ib.* xxxii. 209, 220 f.).

7. **Rājputāna branch.**—The religion of this branch has been fully described by T. H. Hendley (*JRASBe* xliv. [1875] 347 ff.). In the Mewār hills their primitive beliefs have been, to some extent, affected by Brāhmanism. Their shrines are cairns, erected on high hills, and containing clay or pottery images of the horse. Over these, poles adorned with rags are erected. Beside these are platforms of stone, on which are placed upright slabs, generally plain, or merely named after a god, and daubed with red paint or carved in the shape of Hanumān, the monkey-god. Their favourite deities are Śiva, or Mahādeva, and his consort in her various forms as Pārvatī, Devī, or Mātā, of whom Hendley (*op. cit.* p. 349) gives a list. One of them, known as Vājar Mātā, is specially worshipped by women who desire offspring. The tombs of Muhammadan holy men are also respected. Sacrifices consist of goats offered to Devī or Mātā, the flesh, after dedication, being eaten by the worshippers. The influence of Hinduism is shown in the fact that their priests are drawn from the Hindu ascetic Yogī order.

'The Bhīl has a very dim idea of a future state. He believes the soul goes before the gods, and that the spirits of the dead haunt places they lived in during life. He also holds that there is a limited transmigration of souls, especially in spirits becoming evil ones. Eclipses and the motions of the heavenly bodies are deemed to be the play of their gods, and they howl with the Hindu when the moon is eclipsed' (*ib.* 350). No tombs or cenotaphs are constructed; 'but a few days after death a relative of the deceased is said to be informed in a dream that the spirit has taken up its abode on a neighbouring hill, whereupon friends and connexions proceed to the place and erect a platform of stones, and leave there a quantity of food and liquor' (*ib.* 354).

According to Bannerman (*Census Rep.* 1901, i. 142), besides the Kul-devī, or family-goddess, Mahādeva and Hanumān, the monkey-god, are everywhere worshipped. In parts of Mewār, Rishabnāth (*i.e.* Ṛishabhadeva, the first Jaina Tīrthakara, or perfected saint) is worshipped by the Bhīls—a proof of the widely spread influence of that religion in W. India in mediæval times.

LITERATURE.—i. For Bombay branch: MS report by S. N. Dholakia, Magistrate, Idar State; *BG* ix. pt. i. 294 ff., xii. 80 ff., iii. 218 ff., and numerous other articles detailed in General Index, xxvii. 56; R. E. Enthoven, *Census Rep.* 1901, i. 62 ff.; A. K. Forbes, *Rās Mālā* (1878), 78 ff.; G. Oppert, *Original Inhabitants of Bharatavarśa or India* (1893), 79 ff.; W. H. Sinclair, *IA* iv. 335 f.

ii. For Central Indian branch: Sir J. Malcolm, *Trans. RAS* i. 69 ff., and *Memoir of Central India*[2] (1824), i. 516, 550, ii. 181; Col. Kincaid, 'Bheel Tribes of the Vindhyan Range,' in *JAI* ix. 397 ff.; E. E. Luard, *Cent. Ind. Census Rep.* 1901, i. 197 f.

iii. For Rājputāna: T. H. Hendley, 'An Account of the Maiwār Bhīls,' *JRASBe* xliv. (1875) 347 ff.; A. D. Bannerman, *Census Rep.* 1901, i. 142; *Rajputana Gazetteer* (1879), i. 117 ff., iii. 64, 114.

W. CROOKE.

8. **Language.**—Bhīls are usually credited with possessing a special language of their own, which has been named *Bhīlī*. It is probable that these wild tribes did once speak a language belonging to the Dravidian or to the Muṇḍā family, but they have long since abandoned it. At the present day they speak a mongrel form of the Gujarātī spoken by their more civilized Aryan neighbours to their west. Their speech varies according to locality, and, in the District of Khāndesh, in the Bombay Presidency, has become mixed with Marāthī, the fusion of the two main languages resulting in a well-marked and interesting dialect known as Khāndēśī.

The general Bhīl jargon has some peculiarities of pronunciation which it shares with the dialects of North Gujarāt and, through them, with other languages of the extreme North-West of India, from Sind to the Hindu Kush. These are the pronunciation of *s* as a rough *h*, as in *hōnō* for *sōnō*, 'gold'; the tendency to disaspiration and to harden soft

mutes, as in *kōḍō* or *khōḍō* instead of *ghōḍō*, 'a horse,' *līṭō* for *līdhō*, 'taken,' *ṭāhī* or *ḍāhī*, 'a cow'; and the frequent elision of a medial *r*, as in *kōi* for *kōri* or *kari*, 'having done,' *dūu* for *dūru*, 'far.' These peculiarities, although striking, and possibly giving clues to ethnologists, do not authorize us to class the so-called *Bhīlī* as an independent language.

LITERATURE.—C. S. Thompson, *Rudiments of the Bhīlī Language* (Ahmedābād, 1895); G. A. Grierson and S. Konow, *Linguistic Survey of India*, vol. ix. pt. iii., *The Bhīl Languages and Khandēśī* (Calcutta, 1907). G. A. GRIERSON.

BHĪLSA.—Bhīlsa is the name of a village in Central India. The name has been applied by Cunningham in the title of his book, *The Bhilsa Topes*, to the whole district, about 24° N. by 77° E., in which the village is situated. It is a hilly, well-watered district of considerable natural beauty. Cunningham, for instance (p. 320), speaking of the Satdhāra Hill, says:

'The hill on which the tope stands forms here a perpendicular cliff, beneath which flows the Besāli river through a deep rocky glen. The view up the river is one of the most beautiful I have seen in India.'

He then describes the view; and has similar remarks (p. 342) on the beauty of the view from the Andherī Hill. As the principal summit was called Chetiya-Giri, 'the Shrine Hill' (*Mahāvaṁsa*, xiii. 5), and Chetiya is used of pre-Buddhistic shrines, it was probably already, before the Buddhist movement, the site of one of those sacred places on the hill-tops where tribal festivals used to be held. If that be so, this may have been one of the reasons which led the Buddhists to choose the peak as the site of their hermitages, and of their religious and educational establishments.

This main summit is now called Sānchī (*q.v.*). Remains have also been found at Sonāri, Satdhāra, Bhojpur, and Andhēr. At Sonāri there are two large square terraces, one on the top of the hill, the sides of which are each 240 ft. in length, and one a little lower down, the sides of which are 165 ft. in length. The centre of the larger terrace was occupied by a solid hemispherical dome, or tope, 48 ft. in diameter, rising from a cylindrical plinth 4 ft. in height. At the height of about 30 ft. the top of the dome was level and surrounded by a stone railing now broken away. The remains of it were found by Cunningham at the foot of the dome. Cunningham sank a shaft down the centre of the dome, but found nothing. The original height, including that of the ornamental structure which occupied the centre of the levelled space at the top of the dome, must have been about 50 feet. Outside the S.W. corner of this square terrace on which the dome stood was a solid square pile of masonry, level at the top, from 12 to 15 ft. high according to the undulations of the ground, and measuring 36 ft. along each side. A flight of steps 4½ ft. wide leads from the hillside to the summit. This was evidently the site for a building of some sort, no doubt constructed entirely of wood, as nothing remains to show for what purpose it was intended. Round the foot of the dome ran a paved processional pathway enclosed by a carved stone railing, with gates at the four cardinal points. Both this and the railing round the top were of white stone brought from a distance. The tope itself was built of the claret-coloured stone found on the Sonāri Hill. There are short dedicatory inscriptions on portions of the lower railing, cut in Pāli characters of approximately the 3rd cent. B.C., giving the names of the donors of those portions.

The dome which occupied the lower terrace of 165 ft. square was of a slightly different construction. It was solid like the other, built of stone without mortar, 27½ ft. in diameter, rising from a plinth 4½ ft. in height, the plinth resting on a cylindrical foundation 12 ft. high. The level top of this foundation was reached by a fine double flight of steps, 20 ft. in breadth, leading on to a circular pathway, 6 ft. broad, running all round the dome. The height of the whole had been about 40 ft. from terrace to summit. There was no trace of any stone railing. On a shaft being sunk down the centre of the dome five relic-caskets were found, each inscribed with the name of the person of whose funeral pyre portions were enclosed in the casket. Two of these are names of missionaries who, according to the chronicles (*Dīpavaṁsa*, viii. 10, and *Mahāvaṁsa*, xii. 42), were sent to the Himālaya regions after the close of the Council at Patna, held in B.C. 254.

The discovery of these names was of the utmost importance for the criticism of the Buddhist chronicles written in Ceylon. They are given in the inscriptions as those of missionaries to the Himālaya. Some centuries afterwards they are found in the chronicles in the list of the missions sent out, as those of the men who were sent to the Himālaya. The inscriptions, buried in Northern India, were, of course, unknown in Ceylon. The traditions handed down in the island were sufficiently well guarded to have preserved these details accurately throughout this long interval of time.

Besides these two great topes, there were on the top of the Sonāri Hill six smaller ones arranged in two rows to the south-east of the larger terrace. These had all been opened before Cunningham's visit in 1852, and he found nothing in them.

On the Satdhāra Hill, three miles across the valley from Sonāri, there are seven topes remaining on as many terraces. The largest of these solid domes was no less than 101 ft. in diameter, and its height must have been approximately 75 feet. Nothing was found in it. There were three of the solid basements, such as the one found at Sonāri, on which must have stood other buildings probably made of wood. In a second, much smaller tope, 230 ft. to the N.N.W. of this huge pile, were found two caskets, empty, but inscribed with the names of Sāriputta and Mahā Moggallāna, the two principal disciples of Gautama, the Buddha. A third tope had a diameter of 24 ft., and contained relic-caskets, but no inscription. Four smaller ones, all of which had been previously opened, contained nothing.

The topes at Bhojpur, which are very numerous, stand on the southern end of a low range of hills on the opposite side from Sonāri and Satdhāra of a broad valley through which flows the river Betwā. The largest stands in the centre of a levelled terrace, 252 ft. long by 214 ft. broad, and was 61 ft. in diameter. The next in size had a diameter of 39 feet. In a third of only 31 ft. diameter the relic-caskets bore names otherwise unknown. Cunningham examined 33 other topes on the slopes of this range of hills, but they had been previously opened; and nothing of importance, and no inscriptions, were found in them.

The Andherī topes are perched on the northern declivity of a pear-shaped hill facing Bhojpur across another valley. These are on the very edge of the cliff, about 500 ft. above the plain; and the position is a very fine one, commanding a wide outlook over the Bhīlsa district with its dome-surmounted peaks and fertile valleys. The topes are only three in number, respectively 35 ft., 19 ft., and 15 ft. in diameter. At each of them inscriptions were found, some of the names recurring also at Sānchī, and belonging to contemporaries of Aśoka. One of them is Moggali-putta, who may, or may not, be the same as the Moggaliputta Tissa who presided at Aśoka's Council at Patna, and who is the traditional author of the *Kathā Vatthu*, the latest book in the Buddhist Canon, and the only book in it which is ascribed to a particular author.

Aśoka, when on his way to take up the viceroyalty of Ujjain during the last years of his father's life, stayed in the Bhīlsa district, and married a local lady, daughter of a merchant at Vedisa named Deva. Three children were born to them; and then Aśoka succeeded to the throne on the death of his father. As the marriage was a *mésalliance* he left his wife behind, and she brought up the children. Two of them, Mahinda and his sister Saṅgha Mittā, were afterwards the famous missionaries who carried Buddhism to Ceylon. It is recorded how Mahinda, before he departed on the mission, went to Bhīlsa to take leave of his mother, and stayed there at a *vihāra* she had built (*Dīpavaṁsa*, xii. 8–34; *Mahāvaṁsa*, xiii. 1–14; *Samanta Pāsādikā*, p. 318 f.; *Mahābodhivaṁsa*, p. 115 f.).

It is sufficiently clear from these notices that the district was, in the 3rd cent. B.C., and probably earlier, an important centre of Buddhist activity. The massive terraces and solid topes are all that remain of the outward signs of this activity; but its intellectual results are still working in Ceylon, and in a less degree in the Himālaya regions.

LITERATURE. — *Dīpavaṁsa*, ed. Oldenberg, London, 1879; *Mahāvaṁsa*, ed. Geiger, London, *PTS*, 1908; *Samanta Pāsādikā*, ed. Oldenberg, in vol. iii. of his *Vinaya*; A. Cunningham, *The Bhilsa Topes*, London, 1854; Fergusson, *Hist. of Ind. and East. Architecture*, London, 1876, pp. 60–65; *Mahābodhi-vaṁsa*, ed. Strong, London, *PTS*, 1891; Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, 1903, pp. 299–303.

T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

BHṚIGU.—The word *bhṛígu* occurs twenty-six times in the Rigveda,* always in the plural† except twice, where it is singular; and as each of the two passages in question is identical in purport with some other where the plural is used, it may be assumed that even as a singular the word has a collective force. Indian tradition, however,—to anticipate a little—interprets the sing. *bhṛígu* as denoting the ancestor of an ancient race of seers, and the plur. as denoting his descendants.

In the Rigveda the Bhṛigus are associated mainly with the legend of the acquisition of fire by the human race. The Bhṛigus, having discovered Agni in the bosom of the waters (ii. 4. 2; x. 46. 2), or having received him from Mātariśvan (i. 60. 1,‡ iii. 5. 10, x. 46. 9), introduced him amongst men (i. 58. 6, iii. 2. 4), deposited him in wood (vi. 15. 2), and caused him to become luminous in that substance (iv. 7. 1), bringing him forth either by friction (i. 127. 7, x. 46. 9, i. 143. 4) or by their songs (x. 122. 5).

In two passages (iv. 16. 20 and x. 39. 14) the Bhṛigus are referred to as waggon-builders: 'We have composed a song for Indra (or, for the Aśvins) [as skilfully] as the Bhṛigus [build] a waggon.'§ Roth's conjecture (*Pet. Worterb. s.v.* 'Bhṛigu'), that the word that stood originally in these passages was *ṛibhavo*, finds some support in Sāyaṇa (on x. 39. 14: *karmayogād ṛibhavo bhṛigava uchyante*), but the present writer believes that we have here the primitive nucleus of the legend, *i.e.* that *bhṛígu* was originally merely a name for a 'handicraftsman,' one of those who, working with wood, might quite naturally be the first to discover that that substance could be ignited by friction.

The other Rigveda passages‖ are rather colourless. The Bhṛigus appear as the sacrificers of remote antiquity, and along with the Aṅgirases and Atharvans (x. 14. 6); people invoke Agni in the same manner as did the Bhṛigus,* Aṅgirases, and Manu (viii. 43. 13). Indra is expected to help as he has helped the Bhṛigus and the Yatis (viii. 3. 9,† 6. 18; cf. 3. 16). They stand on an equality with the gods in viii. 35. 3 and x. 92. 10. A more personal aspect is shown in ix. 101. 13, where people are advised to drive away the niggardly dog, as the Bhṛigus [drive away] the Makha, but unfortunately we possess no further information regarding this Makha. We seem to have a historical reference in vii. 18. 6, where the Bhṛigus, along with the Druhyus, are spoken of as vassals‡ of King Sudās.

In the Atharvaveda *bhṛígu* is mentioned four times—once (xviii. 1. 58) in a strophe identical with one in the Rigveda. In iv. 14. 5 it is indefinite, merely saying that sacrificers should go to heaven along with the Bhṛigus. In ii. 5. 3 it is said that Indra clove the Vala asunder as Bhṛigu (nom.) conquered his enemy intoxicated with soma; in the same strophe the Yatis are again referred to (cf. above, Rigv. viii. 3. 9 and 6. 18), but, strange to say, it is stated here that Indra killed Vṛitra like the Yatis (acc.). The fourth passage (v. 19. 1), however, is a most interesting one: Sṛiñjayas, Vaitahavyas perished because they injured Bhṛigu. We shall return to this reference below.

In the later Vedic, as also in the epic literature, Bhṛigu stands forth as the progenitor of a celebrated family of priests; many of his posterity, the Bhṛigus—and Bhārgavas, 'scions of Bhṛigu'—are mentioned individually by name, and for the most part they enjoy a great reputation. Bhṛigu himself was held to be of Divine origin, as is attested by so ancient an authority as the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (cf. iii. 33–34): the seed of Prajāpati was cast into the fire by the gods, in order that it might not be spoilt; from that which first flamed forth arose Āditya (the sun); from the second (flame) came Bhṛigu, who was adopted by Varuṇa, and hence Bhṛigu is a son of Varuṇa; that which the third time flashed brightly forth (*adīdet*) became the Ādityas, and that which the coals (*aṅgāra*) were became the Aṅgirases, etc. A similar story is told in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (i. 4. 5. 13) regarding the origin of Atri. Yāska (Nir. 3. 17) combines the two legends, saying that the first to arise from the beam (*archis*) of the fire was Bhṛigu,§ then Aṅgiras from the coals (*aṅgāra*), and thirdly Atri from the same place.¶ The *Bṛihaddevatā* (v. 97–100) gives a similar version. In the *Mahābhārata* (xiii. 85. 96 ff.), Bhṛigu, Aṅgiras, Kavi, Marīchi, Kaśyapa, Atri, etc., are said to have sprung from seed of Brahman which had been cast into the fire.¶ According to the *Mahābhārata* (i. 66. 41), Bhṛigu was generated from the heart of Brahman, while in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* (iii. 12. 23) he is said to have issued from Brahman's skin.

That Bhṛigu was adopted by Varuṇa is intimated also in the *Mahābhārata* (xiii. 85. 124; cf. i. 5. 8); and so he appears as Bhṛigu Vāruṇi in a legend (*Śatap.* xi. 6. 1. 1), which we shall narrate presently, in *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, ix. 1,** and in Kātyāyana's

* We leave out of account the word *bhṛigavāṇa*, which is at least cognate, and occurs thrice in the Rigveda, as its meaning is doubtful.

† *Bhṛiguvát* (Rigv. viii. 43. 13) is of course, as such, ambiguous, though Sāyaṇa explains it as *yathā bhṛiguḥ*.

‡ *Bhṛigu* in the singular here.

§ The interpretations of x. 92. 10 given by Ludwig (*Der Rigveda*, 1876–88, i. 262, iv. 237): 'Für Götter durch Tüchtigkeit gelten allgemein die Bhrigu'; and by Macdonell (*Vedic Mythology*, 140): 'The Bhṛigus showed themselves as gods with their dexterity,' are unfortunately inadmissible, as the verb used here, *sam-chit*, bears a different meaning in other passages.

‖ Cf. Macdonell, *loc. cit.*

* *Bhṛiguvát.* † *Bhṛigu* in the singular.

‡ In the opinion of the present writer, as vassals by compulsion.

§ Here derived from *bhṛijjati*, 'to roast': *bhṛijyamāno na dehe.*

¶ *Atraiva tṛitīyam ṛichhatīty ūchus tasmād Atriḥ* (*Śatapatha*, i. 4. 5. 13, *atreva tyad iti*).

¶ Cf. 13. 85. 105 f.: *bhṛig ity eva bhṛiguḥ pūrvam aṅgārebhyo 'ṅgirābhavat | aṅgārasaṁsrayāch chaiva kavir ity aparo 'bhavat | saha jvālābhir utpanno bhṛigus tasmād bhṛiguḥ smṛitaḥ.*

** The story in *Taitt. Brāhmaṇa*, i. 8. 2. 5, according to which Bhṛigu sprang from a third part of Indra's force, is a mere theological speculation, designed to support the idea that a Bhārgava must have been present as Hotṛi at the festival in question.

Anukr. to the Rigveda, which speaks of him, or Jāmadagni, as the composer of Rigveda ix. 65, and of him, or Chyavana, as the composer of x. 19 (both of these individuals being of Bhṛigu's line). Beyond this, the later Vedic texts add relatively very little to our information regarding Bhṛigu. All that is worthy of interest is the legend just alluded to (*Śatap.* xi. 6. 1. 1 ff.).* It is narrated here that Bhṛigu deemed himself wiser than his father Varuṇa, who, observing this, sent him upon a pilgrimage, on the understanding that on his return he should relate what he had seen. By Varuṇa's instructions he journeyed to all the four quarters of the earth. He met with dreadful things on every hand; he saw men cutting their fellow-men in pieces, and then distributing and devouring the fragments. When he asked them why they pursued such a course, he always received the same answer: 'These men dealt thus with us in the other world, and we now deal with them in the same way.' He also inquired if there was no possible reconciliation, and received the reply: 'Certainly; your father knows of it.' He comes at last to the region lying between the East and the South,† where he sees two women, one beautiful, the other passing beautiful,‡ and between them a black man with yellow eyes, and with a stick in his hand. Bhṛigu is terrified, and returns home. From his dejected condition Varuṇa perceives that he has 'seen,' and then (8 ff.) shows him the meaning of what he has seen. But the explanation is certainly a disappointing one from our point of view, being simply a piece of absurd symbolizing in regard to certain features of the Agnihotra festival.

Amongst other references to Bhṛigu in the Brāhmaṇa literature we ought to mention *Kāuṣītaki Brāhmaṇa*, xxx. 5, where the Aitaśāyanas are spoken of as the worst of the Bhṛigus.§ In the earlier texts the Bhṛigus and the Aṅgirases are closely connected, and *bhṛigvaṅgirasaḥ* indeed is actually used as a title of the Atharvaveda.‖ They are likewise often found together in the *Mahābhārata* and the *Purāṇas*. Apart from these notices, Bhṛigu is mentioned, along with Atri, Aṅgiras, etc., mainly in the list of Brahmarṣis and patriarchs.¶ It is in these texts, of course, that he at length stands forth as in all respects a *Ṛṣi* of primitive times, while in *Mahābhārata*, iii. 99. 69 and xii. 3. 19 he is even exalted to the Devayuga.

It is recorded, moreover, in the *Mahābhārata* (i. 5–7,** ix. 47. 17–22, xii. 343. 55) that Bhṛigu, incensed because his wife Pulomā had been betrayed into the hands of the Rakṣas Puloman by Agni, cursed the latter, and ordained that he must suffer the penalty of consuming everything, no option being allowed.†† Agni rebels against this, resigns his function,‡‡ and hides himself.§§ Gods and men, however, find him indispensable, institute a search, and discover him at length in his retreat. But Agni resumes his work only after Brahman has intervened with conciliatory words, and given the assurance that he is to be the devourer of all things, not with his whole body, but merely as the fire of digestion and as the consumer of flesh.* Here, therefore, the story of Agni's withdrawal, which is already alluded to in the Rigveda as a well-known fact, is associated, strangely enough, with a curse uttered by Bhṛigu, the Vedic myth regarding the discovery of fire (see above) being thus simply reversed.

The *Mahābhārata* in another passage (xii. 343. 62) also makes mention of a curse spoken by Bhṛigu. Umā, the daughter of Himavat, was loved by Rudra, but Bhṛigu also sought to win her. Himavat, however, had to reject the latter's advances, Rudra being already the accepted suitor.† Bhṛigu, enraged at this refusal, utters against Rudra the malediction that no precious stones shall be found in him, 'and to this day the word of the *Ṛṣi* holds good.' Another legend tells how Bhṛigu, by means of a curse, rescues Agastya from the tyranny of Nahuṣa (xiii. 99–100).‡

These are all the really important myths relating to Bhṛigu himself, so far as found in the epic literature. There are numerous other legends, however, which relate to individual members of the Bhṛigu family. A special instance is the story of Chyavana, the son of Bhṛigu, which goes back even to the Rigveda;§ while Gṛitsamada, the author of the second *Maṇḍala*, ranks as a descendant of Bhṛigu.‖ As a recital of the various narratives in question, however, would go beyond the scope of this article, we confine ourselves to a congeries of myths which relate to the Bhṛigus in a general way, and which may, perhaps, throw light upon the passage in the Atharvaveda (v. 19. 1) cited above for further notice.

The following narrative is found in ***Mahābhārata***, **i. 178. 11 ff. (to the end of 180):**

King Kārtavīrya was lord of the sacrifice to the Bhṛigus, and used to load them with gifts. After his death his successors fell into penury, and began to importune the Bhṛigus for money. Only some of these, however, acceded to the request; others buried their money in the earth, while some, again, handed theirs to Brāhmans. Then the Kṣatriyas sought the money by digging, and, having discovered it, they were so moved with rage that they slew every Bhṛigu they could lay hands upon, not even sparing the child in the mother's womb. One of the women ¶ held her yet unborn babe hidden on the haunch.** But the Kṣatriyas heard of the matter, and approached the mother with the design of killing the child. Then the child forced a way through the mother's side, stood forth before the assailants, and blinded them with the splendour of his appearance, thus forcing them to cry for mercy. In order to avenge the sufferings undergone by the Bhṛigus, Aurva resolved to blot the whole world out of existence, but was induced by the entreaties of his ancestors to sink the fire of his wrath in the depths of the ocean.††

Thus the massacre of the Brāhmaṇas, according to this legend, is followed by no expiation—a circumstance which is out of keeping with the normal scheme of such narratives, and in particular with the characterization of the Bhṛigus as specially revengeful.‡‡ It need not surprise us, therefore, that in other passages of the epic and the *Purāṇas* a great deal is said regarding the great extinction of the Kṣatriyas by the 'Bhārgava' Paraśurāma.§§

* See A. Weber, 'Eine Legende des Çatapatha-Brâhmaṇa über die strafende Vergeltung nach dem Tode,' *ZDMG* ix. 237–243.

† The passage is not altogether clear.

‡ *Atikalyāṇīm*, according to Sāyaṇa=*aśobhanā*, 'one whose beauty is past.'

§ *Bhṛigūṇāṁ pāpiṣṭhāḥ*.

‖ See Bloomfield, 'Hymns of the Atharva-Veda,' *SBE* xlii. p. xxvi ff.

¶ See the catalogue in Wilson, *Vishṇu-Purāṇa* (ed. Hall), I. 101 ff., iii. 68.

** *Bhṛiguvaṁśa* in the *Paulomā-parvan*.

†† I. 6. 14: *sarvabhakṣo bhaviṣyasi*; ix. 47. 22: *sarvabhakṣaś ca so'bhavat*; xii. 343. 55: *sarvabhakṣatvam upanītaḥ*.

‡‡ I. 7. 12: *chakre saṁhāram ātmanaḥ* (*ib.* 16: *kriyāsaṁhāram*).

§§ His hiding-place, let us note, was the *śamīgarbha*, i.e. an *aśvattha*-tree which grew in a *śamī* (cf. ix. 47. 17)—the tree whose wood was commonly used for producing fire by friction.

* Cf. i. 7. 19–26.

† A different experience was that of Puloman, who had made his suit to Pulomā before Bhṛigu did so. See *Mahābhārata*, i. 5.

‡ Cf. art. AGASTYA, i. 180 f.

§ Cf. Pischel, in Pischel-Geldner's *Vedische Studien*, i. 71 f.

‖ The Anukr. to the Rigveda makes mention of the following Bhārgavas as authors of hymns: Iṭa (x. 171), Kavi (ix. 47–49, 75–79), Kṛitnu (viii. 79), Gṛitsamada (ii. 1–3, 8–43, ix. 86. 46–48), Chyavana (x. 19), Jamadagni (iii. 62. 16–18, viii. 101, ix. 62, 65, 67, 16–18, x. 110, 137. 6, 167), Nema (viii. 100), Prayoga (viii. 102), Vena (ix. 85, x. 123), Somāhuti (ii. 4–7), and Syūmaraśmi (x. 77–78).

¶ According to *Mahābhārata*, i. 66. 46, this was *Āruṣī*, the daughter of Manu and the wife of Chyavana.

** *ūru*; whence the son received the name Aurva, 'risen from the haunch.'

†† Where it has eversince remained, as hell-fire (*vaḍavāmukha*, *vāḍavānala*, *aurva*; see also Harivaṁśa, 2554 ff.). We have here another case of a Bhṛigu connected with a fire-legend.

‡‡ Cf. also *Mahābhārata*, xiii. 92. 45: *bhṛigavo hy atiroṣaṇāḥ* | *loke mithyāpravādo'yam*.

§§ See especially ***Mahābhārata*, iii. 116–117** and for the

It is alleged, however, in these passages that the original cause of the feud was that King Kārtavīrya (or his sons) had stolen a calf of the sacrificial cow of Jamadagni.* Paraśurāma, who happened to be absent at the time, learns of the atrocity on his return, and kills Kārtavīrya with an arrow. The sons of the latter avenge his death by slaying the aged Jamadagni. Then Paraśurāma takes an oath that he will extirpate the entire race of the Kṣatriyas, and 'thrice seven times did he clear the earth of the Kṣatriya caste.'†

Here, once more, the crime perpetrated against the offspring of Bhṛigu is a seizure of their property, and the culprits are again descendants of Kartavīrya. Now the latter are quite distinctly spoken of as kings of the Haihayas.‡ The Haihayas and the posterity of Kārtavīrya, however, include also the Tālajaṅghas,§ whom the Bhṛigus are reported to have conquered, as the Aṅgirases conquered the Nīpas, as Bhāradvāja the Vaitahavyas.‖ But the narrative in *Mahābhārata*, xiii. 30,¶ says that the Vaitahavyas, too, belonged to the Haihayas. Let us now examine the passage in Atharv. v. 19. 1: *bhṛiguṁ hiṁsitvā sṛiñjayā vaitahavyāḥ párābhavan*. The idea at once suggests itself that the incident recorded here should perhaps be connected with the epic legends just referred to. In that case, however, the celebrated song in Atharv. v. 18, immediately preceding the passage before us, appears in an entirely new light. We cannot here discuss the matter in detail, but we may at least quote strophes 10–11:** 'They who ruled over a thousand, and were themselves ten hundred, the Vaitahavyas, when they devoured the cow of the Brāhmaṇa, perished (11). The cow herself, when slaughtered, came down upon the Vaitahavyas, who had roasted for themselves the last she-goat of Kesaraprābandhā.' If this interpretation be correct, then the *bhṛigum* of v. 19. 1 should be regarded as meaning the Bhṛigu-family, while Kesaraprābandhā (v. 18. 11) might perhaps be identified as the wife of Jamadagni.††

As regards the etymological explanation of the word *bhṛigu*, we have already noted that Yāska (Nir. iii. 17) connects it with *bhṛijjati*, 'roast,' while according to *Mahābhārata*, xiii. 85. 105, it is derived from the onomatopœic *bhṛig*, the 'crackling' of fire. Macdonell‡‡ suggests *bhrājati*, 'to shine.' Bergaigne§§ considers the Bhṛigu-myth of the Rigveda to be merely a more developed form of the tradition regarding the descent of fire, and identifies Bhṛigu with Agni. According to A. Kuhn‖‖ and A. Barth,¶¶ the Bhṛigus are personifications of the lightning-flash. Kuhn (*op. cit.*[1] 13 ff., [2] 14 ff.), on the assumption of the linguistic equation *bhṛigu* = *φλέγν*, tried to harmonize the Greek myth regarding the descent of fire with that of the Veda. A. Weber*** had previously called attention to the affinity of *bhṛigu* and *φλέγν*, and propounded the theory that the tradition (*Śatapatha*, xi. 6. 1) outlined above is a relic of primitive Indo-Germanic mythology. 'The name Bhṛgu,' he says (p. 242), 'corresponds to a nicety with the Greek *φλέγν* in the name of Φλεγύας and of the Φλεγύαι, who on account of their arrogance were condemned to the harsh penalties of hell, while in this story Bhṛigu for arrogance is sent there to be a looker on.' But Weber must nevertheless admit that relevant passages of the Rigveda will not fit in with the idea of a punishment of the wicked in hell; and, in fact, any one who with unbiased mind compares the entire group of Greek and Roman myths about Phlegyas and the Phlegyæ* with the Indian group connected with Bhṛigu and the Bhṛigus, will be of one mind with the present writer in holding that in these we have two entirely different cycles of myths, and that accordingly the phonetic parallelism between *bhṛigu* and *φλέγν* † is a mere coincidence.‡

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given throughout the article. E. SIEG.

BHUIYĀ, BHUINYĀ ('men of the land,' 'autochthones,' Skr. *bhūmi*, 'the land').—A Dravidian caste found in the western districts of Bengal and in the Mirzapur district of the United Provinces. The term is naturally of rather vague significance. In the Census of 1901 the name includes people from all parts of the Empire. Under the names of Bhuinyā, Bhuinyār, Bhuiyā, Bhumiā, 789,078 persons are recorded, of whom the vast majority are found in Bengal.

1. *Religion in Bengal.*—Dalton, describing them in the Tributary State of Bonai, states that they have their own priests called Deorī and sacred groves known as Deotā Sarā, dedicated to four deities, Dāsum Pāt, Bāmonī Pāt, Koisar Pāt, and Borām. The first three are brethren, but there is some difference of opinion whether Bāmonī is a male or a female deity. This illustrates the vagueness of their conception of her. Borām is the sun,—a title also found among the Orāons (*q.v.*),—and he is also worshipped under the name Dharm Deotā. There is no representation of him, but the other gods are to be found, each in a stone in the sacred grove. Borām, as the Creator, the first and greatest of their gods, is worshipped at the sowing season, with the offering of a white cock. In cases of sickness, goats are offered to Dāsum Pāt and to his brethren. On such occasions the goat is given by the owner of the house in which the sick person resides. At other times the victim is provided at the common cost of the people. The sacrifices are offered at the foot of a sacred tree in the grove; only men partake of the meat, and the Deorī receives the head.

The Bhuiyās of South Lohārdagā are more advanced in the direction of orthodox Hinduism, and the bloodthirsty tutelary goddess, Ṭhakurānī Mātā, to whom less than forty years ago the Hill Bhuiyās of Keonjhar offered the head of the obnoxious minister of their chief, has now become the Hindu Durgā, to whom a Bhuiyā priest makes offerings of goats and sheep, the flesh of which is eaten by the worshippers. Besides this, their chief deity, they have a host of communal ghosts, like the evil spirits which beset the Muṇḍās (*q.v.*) and Orāons (*q.v.*). 'To appease these ghosts,' says Risley, 'by occasional offerings of fowls and rice, and thus to guarantee the community against the consequences of their ill-will, is the special function of the village Pahan, who levies small subscriptions for this sort of spiritual insurance. The tribal deities Rikhmun [probably Skr. Ṛishi-muni, "holy saint"] and Tulsī-bīr ["Tulsī, the hero"] belong to a different and less primitive type. Rikhmun is believed to be the original ancestor of the tribe; while Tulsī-bīr was a restless and valorous Bhuiyā, who made war upon the gods until they appeased his wrath by admitting him to divine honours. I venture the conjecture that both Rikhmun and Tulsī-bīr are merely transmuted totems.' It seems simpler to suppose that we have here cases of tribal ancestor- and hero-worship. And it is well to note that the names of these deities, which must have come from the Hindus, show that the cult

English translation and parallel passages see Wilson, *Vishṇu-Purāṇa*, 4. 19 ff.

* According to *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa*, ix. 15. 26, both calf and cow.

† Cf. iii. 117. 9 (Wilson, *op. cit.* 23).

‡ Cf. *e.g.* iii. 115. 9.

§ See, *e.g.*, Hariv. 1893, *Bhag. Pur.* ix. 23. 23 ff.

‖ *Mahābhārata*, xiii. 34. 15 ff.

¶ Here King Vitahavya, by favour of Bhṛigu, becomes a Brāhmaṇa. Hariv. 1893, and *Bhag. Pur.* ix. 23. 29, call Vītihotras the descendants of the Tālajaṅghas and the Haihayas.

** Bloomfield's tr., *SBE* xlii. 170.

†† Who in the epic is called Reṇukā.

‡‡ *Vedic Mythology*, 140: 'Etymologically the word *bhṛigu* means "shining," from the root *bhrāj*, "to shine."' See also his subsequent references to works treating of the interpretation of the Bhṛigu-myth.

§§ *Religion védique*, 1878–83, i. 52–56.

‖‖ *Herabkunft d. Feuers u. d. Göttertranks* (1859), 8 ff. [2] *Mythologische Studien*, i. (1886), 10 ff.].

¶¶ *Les Religions de l'Inde*, Paris, 1885, 8.

*** See article already quoted, *ZDMG* ix. (1855) 242.

* See the exhaustive account by Türk, in Roscher, 2378–83.

† *i.e.* if any such can be established; with reference to *bhṛijjati* = *φρύγω*, *frigo*, and *bhrājate* = *φλέγω*, *φλόξ*, *fulgeo*, *flagrare*, cf. Uhlenbeck, *Kurzgef. etymol. Wörterbuch*, 1898, 204 ff.

‡ See also Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, 169 f.

must have arisen, or at least have been re-named, under Hindu influence.

2. Religion in the United Provinces.—In the United Provinces the Bhuiyās have advanced further in the direction of Hinduism than their brethren in Bengal. Their chief deity is Kālī, who, as in the case of Ṭhakurānī Mātā, has probably succeeded some aboriginal goddess, such as the Paurī or Pahārī Devī of the Bhuiyās of Singhbhūm. Kālī's shrine is a rude thatched hut, in which a mound of earth raised upon a platform represents the shrine of the goddess. They also worship, by the agency of the *baigā* (wh. see), the *dih*, or village gods, and the Earth-goddess Dhartī Mātā, with a sacrifice of goats, young pigs, and fowls. Among their legendary heroes is Lahang Bīr, who is propitiated by the rite of fire-walking. The worshipper, possessed by the spirit of the hero, is said to sustain no injury by walking over burning coals or by rolling his body among thorns. An instance of tree-worship appears in the rite at the Anant-chaudas festival in the rainy season, when a dance round a branch of the Karama tree (*Anthocephalus cadamba*) is made the occasion for licence and rude debauchery. A man killed by a tiger becomes a dangerous ghost, and is worshipped at the *baghaut*, a shrine erected at the place of his death. The field-deity is Hariyārī Devī, 'the Mother-goddess of greenery,' and to her the *baigā* offers a sacrifice of fowls and an oblation of spirits at the end of the harvest season. They are careful to propitiate the dead by making offerings of food to them. This is done simply through fear lest the ghosts, if neglected, may come back and vex the living. It thus does not amount to ancestor-worship in the true sense of the term.

LITERATURE.—For Bengal: Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology*, 1872, p. 141 *f.*; Risley, *Tribes and Castes*, 1891, i. 115 *f.*; Hunter, *Orissa*, 1872, ii. 144. For the United Provinces: Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, new ed. 1896, ii. 80 ff.

W. CROOKE.

BHUTĀN.—Bhutān is a long, narrow mountainous country occupying the southern slopes of the Eastern Himālayas for a length of about 220 miles. Its breadth from the Tibetan border to the Indian plains averages about 90 miles. It is bounded on the north by Tibet, on the west by independent Sikkim and the Darjīling District of Bengal, on the south by the province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, and on the east by Tibet and the territory of semi-independent tribes.

This art. will sketch the life and ethics of the Bhutānese. For their religion see next article.

The origin of the people is uncertain. The most likely theory is that the country was originally inhabited by peoples from the South, and was conquered some centuries ago by invaders from Tibet, who drove from the mountains the old dwellers, except those who were made slaves by the conquerors. The present inhabitants bear unmistakable trace of close affinity in appearance with the Tibetans, and this is the more striking the farther north they live. Those who inhabit the more southern parts give evidence of intermingling with the darker peoples of the plains, and of the influence of more unhealthy regions. Comparatively few Bhutānese are to be found on the outer ranges abutting on the plains. These have of late years been largely occupied by Nepāli immigrants, whose habits and customs remain much the same as those of their land of origin (see NEPĀL). The country is sparsely populated. No certain information is available as to the population, though an estimate of 110,000—90,000 Bhutānese, 30,000 Nepālis (with a few hundred Lepchas from Sikkim)—is probably over rather than under the mark.

There is no written code of laws in Bhutān. The inhabitants say that they had such a code, but it got lost in the course of their frequent fightings. The poverty and lawlessness of the people are expressed by a Tibetan proverb: 'In Bhutān there are no handles to the pots, and no law in the land.' Might has been right. The Government officers are usually unsalaried, with the inevitable result of extortion and injustice. The country has been priest-ridden in the extreme by the Lāmas, who, it is asserted, give the worst of examples from the moral point of view. The population has declined. The unsettled political state of the country has accounted for this to some extent, but polyandry and other vicious customs have probably had greater influence. Polyandry is more prevalent in the northern parts, where the connexion with Tibet is closer. It is excused on the ground of poverty, and is probably on the decline. A woman who marries the eldest brother often becomes also the wife of the other brothers. Polygamy, too, is practised by some. Government officers sometimes keep wives in different parts of the country, but the practice is being prohibited by the rulers. The marriage tie is loosely held. Chastity has been at a discount, and the proportion of the people suffering from venereal diseases is appallingly large. Woman naturally holds a freer and more independent position than in India, and does more than her share of the work of the house and the field. As a whole, the men are indolent and addicted to strong drink. Physically they are robust and muscular. Their chief amusements are archery and quoits. In character they may be described as plucky, hot-tempered, truculent, avaricious, and unforgiving. While cruel to their enemies, they are kind and charitable towards their friends. The better classes are courteous in manner. Slavery or serfdom is prevalent, and on the Indian frontier is a village largely inhabited by escaped slaves. Punishment for crimes is severe. For continuance in theft the penalty is to lose the right hand and the left foot. Capital punishment is inflicted by drowning in a river. Religious exercises are well attended to. The people are superstitious and ignorant. Education has made little or no progress, and is unknown outside the monasteries. Personal cleanliness is sadly neglected. Judged by present-day Western standards, the Bhutānese are certainly not an attractive people.

There are many indications, however, that a better day is dawning in Bhutān. A few of the boys are showing a desire for Western education. The strong character and higher ideals of the present Mahārājā, and the notable change which has come over a few individuals who have been influenced by contact with European civilization, are hopeful signs. The recent unification of power in the hands of the Mahārājā bodes well for the political future of the land, and its consequent more settled state will beneficially affect its moral condition. The people are a sturdy stock, and once awakened out of their lethargy and exclusiveness, and delivered from the domination of the Lāmas and the evils of polyandry, there is every prospect of their becoming a strong, independent, and forceful race, and of the country entering upon a career of prosperity before unknown. During the late war with Tibet, the rulers eventually threw themselves enthusiastically on the British side, and they are more amenable than ever to the advice of the Political Agent.

LITERATURE.—See the literature referred to at the end of next article.

J. A. GRAHAM.

BHUTĀN, BUDDHISM IN.—Bhutān, or more correctly 'Bhotān' (*i.e.* 'the end of Bhot [or Tibet']', the Sanskritic name by which this country is known to Europeans through the Bengalis of the British Indian province bordering it), is a large independent principality situated in the south-eastern Himālayas, wedged in between Tibet, Sikkim, and Assam. Its wild valleys are sparsely peopled by a semi-savage Mongoloid tribe which calls itself 'Duk-pa' (spelt *hBrug-pa*), a term which is also employed to denote the form of Lāmaism that is professed in

the country. The Duk-pa Buddhism, as found in Bhotān, where it appears to be the sole recognized form of religion therein prevalent, is of the primitive unreformed type of Lāmaism, and is very thickly overlaid by aboriginal animistic cults and the gross worship of malignant devils, so as to be scarcely recognizable as Buddhism at all, save for a few externals in the way of symbolism and a little deeply-embedded ethical teaching of Śākya, the Master.

Buddhism appears to have entered this country for the first time about 300 years ago, when in the beginning of the 17th cent. A.D. a Lāma from the adjoining border of Southern Tibet invaded Bhotān at the head of a band of Tibetan soldiers and forcibly occupied the country. This Lāma, named Z'ab-drung Nag-dbaṅ rnam-rgyal, established a hierarchy, somewhat on the model of that of the Grand Dalai Lāma of Lhāsa, and it still survives. Nominally, this Bhotānese Grand Lāma, or high priest, is literally a priest-king, who bears the Indian title of *Dharma Rājā*, or 'Religious King,' and combines in his hands both the spiritual and temporal rule, whilst his succession is arranged on the re-incarnation theory, by which, on his decease, his spirit is supposed to transmigrate into the body of a newly-born male child, who is to be searched for and identified by omens and supernatural portents. The regulation of the succession in this way is kept in the hands of the Lhāsa priests, who usually send a 're-incarnation' from Lhāsa or Central Tibet. During the minority of this re-incarnated priest a regent is appointed for the management of the temporal concerns, and is called *Deb-Rājā*, or 'Provincial Regent or Governor'; and he seems usually to be a secular chief. The pretentious and divine nature claimed by the Grand Lāma of Bhotān is evident in his full title as given on his seal: 'Chief of the Realm, Defender of the Faith, Equal to Sarasvatī [the Hindu goddess of learning] in learning, Chief of all the Buddhas, Head Expounder of the Commentaries, Caster out of Devils, Most Learned in the Holy Laws, God incarnate, Absolver of Sins, and Head of the Best of all Religions.'

Technically, the Duk-pa form of Lāmaism is an offshoot of the hermit section of Lāmas called *Kar-gyu-pa*, who follow the practice of the Tibetan saint Milaraspa in laying especial stress on residence in caves as a means of gaining magical powers; though otherwise the doctrines are generally similar to those of the old unreformed Lāmaism (*Nying-ma*). This Duk-pa sect arose on the rocky Tibetan hills which border upon Bhotān, and on its establishment in this latter country it adopted a fictitious so-called inspired 'revelation' alleged to have been unearthed by a Lāma named Saṅ-gyas-gliṅ, by means of which the priests were enabled to relax still further the Buddhist obligations, whilst admitting of the retention *en bloc* of the popular spirit-worship and witchcraft. Amongst the monks only a few profess to be celibate, but it is doubtful whether any even of these are really so. The distinctive hat is of a red colour, and that of the head Lāma bears as a badge a vertical cross formed by two thunderbolts, with reference to a legend of thunder-dragons (*Duk*) which is related in explanation of the etymology of the sectarian title 'Duk-pa.' The Bhotānese laity as well as the priests, unlike the Tibetans, shave their heads.

The monasteries and temples are of the general shape and appearance of those in Tibet, but roofed over with wide wooden eaves to shed off the excessive rain which falls in this climate. The largest monastery is at Tashi-cho', which is the residence of the Dharma Rājā and the capital of the country. It has been visited and described by Manning, Bogle, Turner, and others, and is said to have about 1000 monks, though other accounts place the number at 500. In British Bhotān there are small Duk-pa temples at Kalimpong and Pedong near Darjīling. The total number of Duk-pa priests cannot be stated with certainty, but has been estimated at about 5000, or about 1 to 10 of the population. Only about half reside in cloisters, the remainder being employed as State officials and traders. There are also a considerable number of hermits and a few nuns.

LITERATURE.—Sir A. Eden, *Rept. Mission to Bhotan*, 1873; W. Griffith, *Journals*, 1847; Sir J. D. Hooker, *Himalayan Journals*, 1854, i. 136, 372; Sir C. R. Markham, *Mission of Bogle and Manning*, 1876, pp. lv, 27, etc.; S. Turner, *Embassy to the Court of the Teshoo Lama in Tibet*, 1806, pp. 313, etc.; L. A. Waddell, *Among the Himalayas*, 1899, pp. 246–249, *Buddhism of Tibet*, 1895, pp. 44, 55, 68, 226, 242, 284, and *Lhasa and its Mysteries*, 1905, pp. 36, 63–66, 284.

L. A. WADDELL.

BIBLE.

[W. SANDAY.]

THE word 'Bible' has come to mean substantially a sacred book. Thus we might say that the Qur'ān is the Bible of Muhammadans. When we speak of '*the* Bible,' we mean the sacred book of Christians. But this is a derived sense. Our English word comes from the Greek through the Latin. The Greek original meant simply 'books' in the plural; τὰ βιβλία was a particular collection of books, or more strictly of rolls. In this sense the use of the word goes back to the prologue to Ecclesiasticus (*c.* 130 B.C.); cf. 1 Mac 12^9. When the Greek βιβλία was transliterated into Latin, it came to be treated as a singular and a feminine.

The earliest example of this use known to the writer is that given by Sir James Murray, *OED*, *s.v.*; it occurs in a library catalogue of the 9th cent. (Becker, *Catal. Biblioth. Antiq.* p. 42, cf. p. 172). Jerome used the term *bibliotheca [sacra]* (du Cange, *s.v.*)—an expressive designation of the 'divine library' compressed into a single volume; and this term occurs frequently in the catalogues of the 9th and 10th cents. (Becker, *op. cit.* pp. 4, 13, 16, 17, 24, 43, 59, 60, etc.). The word characteristic of Cassiodorus (*c.* 487–580) is *pandectes*; we remember that Justinian published his *Pandects* in 533, and Cassiodorus his *Institutes* about 544.

At the time when the books which we call the Bible were written, the usual form for a book to take was the roll. After the invention of writing, the material of books varied somewhat with time and place. The Babylonians wrote with a sharp point on clay. The Hebrew collection that we call the OT was written mainly, if not entirely, on skins. With the natural conservatism which obtains in matters of religion, the Jews to this day make use of leather and of the roll form for the sacred volume. The graphic scene (Jer 36) in which Jehoiakim cuts to pieces and burns the roll that had just been read to him will give an idea of the outward appearance. The Greek books that we call the NT were produced under a different and more advanced civilization, that of the Græco-Roman empire. By this time the material commonly used for books was papyrus (2 Jn^{12}); and it is probable that most of the books of NT were originally written on papyrus (though parchment is mentioned in 2 Ti 4^{13}). But alike in the case of OT and of NT the form adopted was that of the roll, with the text written in slender vertical columns. The volume was held in both hands, with one or two columns exposed to view at a time, and was rolled up with the left hand and unrolled with the right as it was read.

There was a conventional size for the roll, which determined roughly the length of a book. It was for this reason that the Twelve Minor Prophets were written on a single roll and counted as a single book. In the oldest Hebrew tradition, as given in the Talmud (*Bābā bathrā*, 14) and still observed in German and French MSS, the order of the Prophetical Books is that of length: Jer., Ezek., Is., Min. Proph., corresponding to each other as 24 : 21 : 19 : 17 (Budde). [In like manner in NT the usual order of the Pauline Epistles is roughly that of length.] From the custom of writing more than one shorter book on the same roll has arisen, quite innocently, the attribution of some writings that were originally without name to wrong authors, *e.g.* several anonymous compositions that now go under the name of Isaiah, a similar anonymous composition (or compositions) added to the prophecy of Zechariah, etc.

The Christian Bible then was a double collection of rolls. That is its external description, but only external. It is of more importance that both volumes consisted of *collections*, and that both

these collections were regarded as *sacred*. We shall have to follow the line of inquiry thus suggested for both OT and NT. And when we have done so, we shall have to consider how the Bible is regarded, or ought to be regarded, at the present day. In other words, the main treatment of our subject will naturally be historical, but the final summing up will be rather doctrinal; and the history should take such a form as to explain the doctrine.

It should be explained at the outset that in what follows the broad results of criticism, as at the present time widely accepted, are presupposed. That is to say, the usual literary analysis of the Hexateuch and the Historical Books, and so much of the criticism of the Prophets and other books as is common to the best writers, are taken for granted. It is also taken for granted that a line is practically drawn across the history by the promulgation of the Book of Deuteronomy in B.C. 621; those portions of the literature which assume the single authorized centre of worship and the fully developed hierarchical system of Priests and Levites being placed after that date, and those which do not make these assumptions being placed before it. These fundamental principles of criticism have now been before the world for so long, and they have been so closely and severely tested in the daily work of so many competent and able scholars, that at least in the opinion of the present writer they must be regarded as verified and established. The standard for most English students is substantially that of Driver, *Introd. to the Literature of the OT* (cited as *LOT*; from 1891).

The ablest presentation of the other (more completely conservative) side is Dr. Orr's *Problem of the OT* (from 1906). The present writer has much sympathy with Dr. Orr's view of the religious character and use of OT; indeed, it is part of the purpose of this art. to show that a view not essentially dissimilar emerges naturally from critical study on the lines of Dr. Driver and most at least of his English allies, though it is no doubt true that a different construction is put upon the facts by some in Great Britain and by a greater number on the Continent. It is also probably true that there is still room for considerable correction of critical theories in detail. But as a whole the writer finds it impossible to think that Dr. Orr's position is permanently tenable, or that the main lines of the construction opposed to his have been proved to be untenable. The principle underlying the present art. is that on its literary and historical side the Bible must be studied like any other book (*e.g.* like Livy, or like the mediæval chronicles, which supply a better parallel for some parts of the problem), but that it does not therefore follow that in other respects, and in particular as a religious revelation, the Bible is only on the same level with these. The object is to discover how far the analogies with other books and other religions extend, and what there is in the Bible that detaches itself from, and rises above, the broad phenomena of other religions.

In so wide and intricate a field it is inevitable that experiments should be constantly going on; and the recent incursions of the Assyriologists and students of Comparative Religion have been of this character. It cannot be said that either these experiments or others (like those of Prof. Eerdmans of Leyden) have really brought the question any nearer to the standpoint of Dr. Orr. It would be truer to say that recent years have seen a consolidation and general strengthening of the position criticized.

I. *HISTORY OF OT.*

I. How the Books of OT came to be written. We begin by asking ourselves how, humanly speaking, did the books of OT come to be written? It is just on this side that we find the same kind of influences at work as in other ancient literature. There is a general agreement among scholars that the oldest pieces in OT, and those most nearly contemporary with the earlier events described, are the Songs.

(1) *Fragments of ancient Song.*—There is more analogy than we are apt to suppose between the beginnings of Israel and the beginnings of Greece. The literatures of both peoples began with poetry, and not with prose. Sometimes one sees the generalization broadly laid down that all national literatures began with poetry; and this is doubtless widely true; but it can hardly be proved of the oldest civilizations of all, those of Babylonia and Egypt. We are struck, however, by the resemblance between the bards of the *Odyssey*, Phemius and Demodocus, singing to the lyre in the halls of chieftains, and the fragments of primitive song preserved in the Bible. The difference is due simply to the different conditions and state of society. The scene is not the almost feudal banquet in the hall of the noble, but the tribal gathering round the well (Nu $21^{71.\ 18}$, Jg $5^{11.\ 16}$). And the character of the songs is just what we might expect; they are impassioned utterances of the natural man: laments for the dead (2 Sam $1^{19\text{-}27}$ $3^{33f.}$), exultation over the fallen foe (Gn 4^{23}, 1 Sam 21^{11}), denunciation of the enemy (Nu $21^{27\text{-}30}$. 23^{7}), or of the backward and faithless friend (Jg $5^{17.\ 23}$), and praises no less fervent of the helpful ally (Jg $5^{14.\ 15.\ 18}$) even though stained with treachery (*ib.* vv.$^{24\text{-}27}$). But, along with this, we note a very genuine and enthusiastic devotion to Jahweh as Israel's God: the wars of Israel are His wars (Nu 21^{14} 1 S 18^{17} 25^{28}); Israel cannot prosper without His blessing (Jg $5^{2.\ 3.\ 9.\ 11.\ 13}$). This implies quite definitely, though, of course, in general terms, the great covenant at Sinai (compare the reference in Jg $5^{4.\ 5}$). Some of the songs are quoted expressly from the Book of Jashar, *i.e.* 'of the Upright,' apparently a book in which were sung the deeds of the heroes or worthies of Israel, where the name at least suggests something of that moral standard which began to be enforced as Israel's side of the covenant, just as 'the righteous acts of the Lord' (Jg 5^{11}) were the acts of His covenanted succour.

(2) *Continuous history in Prose.*—The snatches of song to which reference has been made, scattered and fragmentary remains of a larger body, have come down to us embedded in later texts. The latest of the songs, however, must have been little earlier than the narrative in which they are found. By the time of David a prose style must have been fully developed by the side of the poetry. The comparatively settled conditions and rapidly advancing civilization of the reigns of David and Solomon soon gave the impulse to historical composition, of which we have a fine example in the story of David's court and family contained in 2 S 9–20, with which should go 1 K 1. 2. So admirable is this narrative, so fresh and living, so truthful in its general tenor,—recording events as they really happened, without undue preference either for one party or for another,—that more than one leading scholar (*e.g.* Budde after Duhm) has traced it to 'the archives of the house of Abiathar,' the priest who followed the fortunes of David from the time when he was fleeing before Saul, but was involved in the conspiracy of Adonijah, and compelled to retire in disgrace to his home at Anathoth (1 K 2^{26}).

As Thucydides in his exile set himself to write the history of the Peloponnesian War, so Abiathar may have used his retirement to describe the events in which he had borne an active part. Without laying too much stress on the person of Abiathar, his name may well be taken as a symbol of the conditions under which this earliest and best of all the specimens of Hebrew historical writing was composed. In 1 Samuel there are two distinct strains running side by side, and several times leading to duplicate versions of the same event. It is quite possible that the earlier strain may be a continuation backwards of the narrative of 2 S 9–20. It is also possible that in these nearly contemporary chronicles we are to see the beginning of the school which first took in hand to trace back the history of Israel to its origins, and in the pursuit of these carried its researches into the traditions of the race as far back as Creation itself. Such was the work of the so-called Jahwist (known by the symbol J). If both in this case and in other later cases scholars have recourse to what may seem the refinement of distinguishing successive hands as J^1 J^2 etc., all that is meant is that there is reason to suppose that the work was produced not so much by a single author as by a school, in which one writer took up the pen from

another, as the monks did in the *scriptoria* of the Middle Ages. These writers are usually anonymous, for the idea of literary property in such departments as history had not yet arisen; indeed, it never became established among the Hebrews as it did among the Greeks.

When once the example was set on so substantial a scale as by J, it is not surprising that it should have been followed. What J did in the Southern Kingdom, after an interval of time E did in the Northern. There, too, a school of historians seems to have taken root, who, like J, undertook to commit to writing the folklore current among the Northern tribes, especially Ephraim. This Northern school would seem to have been more directly under the influence of the prophets, who by this time had become powerful. We know that the prophets joined together in bands or companies, and it is not impossible that the writing of history may have been one of the forms of their activity (cf. Kautzsch, 'Rel. of Israel,' in *HDB*, vol. v. p. 656[b]). It is interesting to possess two lines of tradition so clearly and strongly marked as J and E. It would seem that after a period of separate existence, perhaps after the fall of Samaria in B.C. 722, when the spiritual leaders of the Northern Kingdom naturally took refuge with their brethren of the South, the two lines were definitely brought together in a combined narrative, JE.

(3) *The writing Prophets of the earlier period.*—So far we have had to do with literature that was not in its primary purpose moral or religious. The national traditions, as they were first committed to writing, seem to have told an unvarnished story. They reflect the national character, with its undisciplined passions and its traits of cunning deceit and fierce revenge. These features are prominent enough in the somewhat distant and idealized biographies of the patriarchs: they are still more prominent in the wild scenes of the Book of Judges; and they are prominent even in the life of Saul and the family history of David. Throughout all these periods we can see that the religion of Israel was as yet very imperfectly moralized; and it was by no means a pure monotheism. It began, like the religions of the nations around, with the cult of sacred stones and trees; it tolerated the use and worship of images ('teraphim,' Gn $31^{19.\ 30.\ 34}$, Jg 17^{5}, 1 S 19^{13}; 'ephod' [possibly], Jg 8^{27} 17^{5} 18^{14-20}; 'strange gods,' Gn 35^{4}, Jos $24^{2.\ 14.\ 23}$).

These things should not be thought of as idolatry. They did not begin to be idolatry until the revelation contained in the Second Commandment had been clearly given and clearly apprehended. Before that time they were rather helps to worship, enabling the primitive man to realize that he had an object of worship outside himself. It was not to be expected that he should take in all at once so vast an idea as that of a Maker of heaven and earth. He was obliged to use crutches or stepping-stones to higher things.

And yet it was not for nothing that the work of Moses lies in the background. Even the earlier documents show a consciousness that Israel had a special mission among the nations. It was in pursuance of this mission that Abraham had been called from the East, and that the fortunes of his descendants were subject to a Divine guiding, bringing good out of evil (Gn 50^{20}). We might say generally that this side of things comes out in proportion as the prophetical influence makes itself felt, and therefore especially in the later strata of the narrative. Sometimes this is to the detriment of the history as such: contrast, *e.g.*, the treatment of the origin of the monarchy in the earlier version (1 S 9^{1}–10^{16} $11^{1-11.\ 15}$ $13^{2-7a.\ 15b-18.\ 23}$, 14) and in the later (1 S 7. 8. 10^{17-24} 12. 15).

The literature so far, as we have said, shows indeed to some extent a religious influence and shaping, but not as yet a definite and predominant religious purpose. We come to this first in the works of the so-called 'writing Prophets.' Prophecy had been from the first an essentially religious institution, but in its earlier phases the forms that it assumed were crude and rudimentary (1 S 10^{5-13}). The action of Nathan in the reign of David is a clear advance upon this (2 S 7^{1-17} 12^{1-25}). These activities culminate in the energetic reforms of Elijah and Elisha. But by this time, as we have seen, the prophets had probably begun to put the hand to the pen in the form of history. The impulse to this may have come with the general advance of civilization; in the court of David and Solomon there were already secretaries and perhaps a 'chronicler' (2 S 8^{16}, 1 K 4^{3} RVm). But there seems to have been something more than this general tendency at the beginning of written prophecy. There was a higher form of prophecy and a lower. The professional prophets fell into a groove, and contented themselves with repeating the accepted maxims, which were religious in their origin but did not represent the deeper insight of religion. Such a lower truth was the doctrine that had grown up of an impending judgment, a 'day of the Lord,' upon the heathen. It arose out of the genuine, if self-regarding, attachment of Israel to its God, and the confident belief that He would one day avenge His people upon their enemies and oppressors. But it was a startling novelty when the prophet Amos announced that this judgment would be turned against Israel itself, just because it was the chosen people (Am 3^{2} $5^{18.\ 20}$ 6^{8} 7^{7-9} $8^{2.\ 3}$ 9^{1-4}). As this announcement was of the nature of protest, and ran counter to all the popular ideas, it was not unnatural that the prophet should wish to place it permanently on record, so that his words might be verified by the event. We know that they were so verified, and the same kind of motive seems to have been present with the other prophets of judgment and doom. These were the greatest of the prophets, and their scathing and searching addresses were the strongest of all the influences brought to bear in the building up of Israel as a people for God.

It does not, indeed, follow that prophecy could be only in one key, and critics have probably gone too far in eliminating the notes of hope and promise. An Isaiah, when the occasion came, could himself bind up the wounds which he had made. But it is characteristic of the prophets to resist the tendencies of the natural man, and to be always pointing the people upwards to higher things.

The Prophetical Books stand out as the most characteristic and the most truly inspired of the contributions which God made through Israel to the religious education of the world. Written, many of them as with the heart's blood, in danger and suffering (Amos, Jeremiah), or under the sting of bitterest personal experience (Hos 1–3, Ezk 24, and we may surely add Is 53), they were always above the highest level of their surroundings, and the truths brought out in them form a continuous revelation.

(4) *The history of Law as far as the Deuteronomic Reformation.*—The Hebrew tradition certainly was not wrong in ascribing the importance that it did to the work of Moses. We repeatedly find the lines of later development converging backward upon that work. Although the belief to which it gave expression may be more correctly described as Henotheism than as Monotheism—although, that

is, it denoted rather the concentration of Israel's devotion upon one God than the absolute assertion that there was no God but one—it nevertheless contained within itself the seeds of the later Monotheism. The Deuteronomic 'Hear, O Israel; the Lord our God is one Lord,' is only a step beyond what Moses must have taught, or what God taught Moses.

There is also every reason to believe that the Heb. tradition was right in connecting the work of Moses with a great historical crisis and deliverance, though the account both of this and of the religious crisis that followed appears to have come down to us with a certain amount of idealization. What we have is no contemporary record, and not even a record based to any extent upon writings now lost but once more nearly contemporary. Perhaps the only instance in which we can lay the finger on such an ancient authority is the Song of the Well in Nu $21^{17.\ 18}$, with the other songs in the same chapter (vv.$^{14f.\ 27\text{-}30}$), for both Ex 15 and Nu 23. 24 are probably later. The Egyptian plagues and the story of the Exodus are idealized. So, too, is the description of the giving of the Law from Mount Sinai. In other words, from the point of view of strict historical fact the narrative of these events bears to the narrative of the revolt of Absalom the same kind of relation as (let us say) in Livy the narrative of the taking of Rome by the Gauls bears to the narrative of the Hannibalic Wars. In the one case folklore has been at work, in the other case not, or very sparingly. Just as there survived throughout the East the indistinct memory of a great destructive flood of the Euphrates or the Tigris, so also within a narrower circle there must have survived the memory of some portentous volcanic eruption, which the folklore of Israel came to associate with the greatest event in its religious history. Such association was very natural, because it was phenomena of this kind—thunder and lightning, storm and tempest, earthquake and volcano—that brought home to the Hebrew mind, as nothing else did, the presence and the power of God. So it came about that, when the more remote traditions of Israel were being collected in the earlier days of the monarchy, the story of the Wanderings in the Wilderness and the legislation of Sinai assumed their present form.

There is little doubt that a nomadic period, which may have been broken for a time by partial settlement in Egypt, preceded the permanent settlement of Israel in Canaan.* And we may well believe that Moses, taking advantage of the events of which we have spoken,—and indeed specially raised up and inspired by God for this purpose,—may have joined together the tribes in closer confederation, and cemented the bonds between them by a great and impressive religious foundation, which lived in the imagination of the people as the giving of a Law. If we seek to know more clearly the nature of this law-giving, we may find it described in Ex 18 (JE), where Jethro asks Moses:

'What is this thing that thou doest to the people? why sittest thou thyself alone, and all the people stand about thee from morning unto even? And Moses said unto his father-in-law, Because the people come unto me to inquire of God: when they have a matter, they come unto me; and I judge between a man and his neighbour, and I make them know the statutes of God, and his laws.

Or the description becomes still nearer (if we do not suppose too high a degree of organization) in the verses a little further on, where Jethro advises:

'Be thou for the people to God-ward, and bring thou the causes unto God: and thou shalt teach them the statutes and the laws, and shalt show them the way wherein they must walk, and the work that they must do. Moreover thou shalt provide out of all the people able men, such as fear God, men of truth, hating unjust gain; and place such over them, to be rulers of thousands, rulers of hundreds, rulers of fifties, and rulers of tens: and let them judge the people at all seasons: and it shall be, that every great matter they shall bring unto thee, but every small matter they shall judge themselves: so shall it be easier for thyself, and they shall bear the burden with thee.'

This description, though dating, as it would seem, from the time of the monarchy, preserves to a remarkable extent the true features of the method by which Moses wielded his authority. If we could reproduce the actual facts, it is probable that he made use of the ordinary tribal machinery of *shaikhs*, or 'elders'; but he himself must have held a more commanding position, and the decisions and laws that he gave were doubtless given as oracles from God.

In the light of what we now know about the much older Babylonian Code of Ḥammurabi, it would not be at all surprising if Moses committed some of his laws to writing. And these laws might well be the nucleus of those that have come down to us in the Pentateuch. Scholars seem to be agreed that the oldest collection that can be marked off as such is the so-called 'Book of the Covenant' (Ex 20^{22}–23^{33}). We may leave it to OT specialists to determine the succession of the different laws. The Pentateuch does not appear to have been complete until the time of Ezra.

For us it is more important to notice the landmark formed by the publication of the main body of the Book of Deuteronomy. This is perhaps the greatest of all the landmarks in the history of Israel; there is none in regard to which there seems to be a clearer division between that which falls on one side of the line and that which falls on the other. There is also a special interest in the Book of Deuteronomy, because its promulgation by king Josiah is a typical event in the process by which the OT acquired its binding authority. This event is thus described in a document that appears to be contemporary:

'And the king sent, and they gathered unto him all the elders of Judah and of Jerusalem. And the king went up to the house of the Lord, and all the men of Judah and all the inhabitants of Jerusalem with him, and the priests, and the prophets, and all the people, both small and great: and he read in their ears all the words of the book of the covenant which was found in the house of the Lord. And the king stood on the platform (RVm), and made a covenant before the Lord, to walk after the Lord, and to keep his commandments, and his testimonies, and his statutes, with all his heart, and all his soul, to confirm the words of this covenant that were written in this book: and all the people stood to the covenant' (2 K $23^{1\text{-}3}$).

We have here a solemn religious act by which king and people alike—the king in the name, and with the full consent, of the people—accept the book read before them as expressing the Divine will, and take its precepts as binding upon themselves. This is the essential meaning that, as applied to a book, is contained in the epithet 'canonical,' which means 'authoritative,'* and authoritative because in its ultimate origin Divine.

We call this a 'landmark in the history,' but we do so only because the description is so full and explicit. It is not to be supposed that the idea was a new one, or that it was applied to Deut. for the first time. It is anticipated by the description in Ex $24^{3\text{-}8}$ (E) of the no less solemn acceptance of the 'book of the covenant' (Ex 20^{22}–23^{33}, or the nucleus of that section). But, indeed, both descriptions only represent the full acknowledgment by the whole community of that which was contained implicitly from the first in the manner in which we have seen that the legal decisions and statutes were given—as oracular responses from God. The laws given by Moses were not given in his own name but in the name of God, and they were accepted in the same sense by the people as

* This is one of the current views challenged by Prof. Eerdmans (*Exp.* 1908, pp. 118 ff., 193 ff., 345 ff.) and defended by Prof. G. A. Smith (*ib.* p. 254 ff.).

* Cf. esp. Zahn, *Grundriss d. Gesch. d. NT's Kanons*², p. 10.

coming from God. In precisely the same way Hammurabi is represented as 'receiving his laws from the seated sun-god Šamaš, the judge of heaven and earth' (Johns, *Oldest Code*, p. ix). It is the common ancient conception, but at the same time a central conception to which all the habits of thought are adapted; and who shall say that it does not express substantial truth?

(5) *The later stages of History, Prophecy, and Law.*—We have seen how the earliest stages of Hebrew literature were an instinctive natural product, growing out of the national life, and receiving a permanent form by being committed to writing. Only the very earliest stages retained their original naïve simplicity. Even here (as in the Song of Deborah) the religious interest became more and more dominant. From the modern point of view, which expects that history shall be history written for its own sake and with no ulterior aims, the process is one of deterioration. More and more history comes to be written with a purpose; the prophetic ideal, the legislative ideal, the ideal of worship, get the upper hand. All three have a common root in the conception of communication with God by means of oracles; the statutes of the lawgiver and the priestly regulations for worship are equally invested with an oracular form; they are presented as having a Divine sanction behind them. So the religious interest becomes all-embracing and all-absorbing. Israel becomes the people of religion, and even its instinctive products, which might at first have been described as secular, acquire a definitely religious character.

At each new revision this character is impressed more deeply upon the historical writings. The same school which produced Deuteronomy—a coalition, as it would seem, of priest and prophet, a succession in which prophet wore the garb of priest or priest the garb of prophet—besides its great work in the sphere of law also turned its attention to history. It, too, made its own collection of older historical writings, and, as it did so, it took care to point the moral of the successive stages that the history of Israel had gone through, by hortatory or didactic paragraphs inserted at appropriate places. Thus the historian becomes a preacher, and his narrative is at the same time a sermon. It is from this point of view that we should learn to look at it and judge it. It is no longer in place to expect the disinterestedness of the secular annalist; we should look rather at the earnestness which aims at converting the people from the error of their ways and bringing them to serve the Lord.

Two more periods of literary activity complete the production of canonical history. (i.) The fifth century saw the gradual composition of the last main element in the Pentateuch (the Priests' Code, or P), and its incorporation with the already existing writings (J, E, JE, D) so as to form the Pentateuch as we now have it. It would seem that P was for the most part written in Babylonia, and that it was in fact the 'book of the law' which Ezra brought with him and promulgated in Jerusalem in the year B.C. 444. By the end of the century it had been worked up into our present Hexateuch. (ii.) Ezra and Nehemiah appear to have left behind them memoirs, which after a hundred years or rather more were embodied, along with a continuous and systematic review of the history so far as it related to Judah from David onwards, in our present books 1 and 2 Chron., Ezr., and Nehemiah.

This later historical writing is similar, though not quite identical, in its character. It has not the freshness and living human interest that marked the older narratives, nor yet the moral fervour of the Deuteronomic school. The dominant interest is now antiquarian, expressing itself in the form of lists, inventories, chronological summaries, and genealogies. In P there is a great mass of systematized law; and in Chron. there is a marked tendency to enlarge on details of worship. In both cases the style is, as a rule, dry, formal, and statistical; such warmth as there is in Chron. is thrown mainly into the liturgical descriptions and into such a view of the history as was natural from the standpoint of the priesthood.

In Prophecy, two great figures stand out, both belonging to the period of the Exile: Ezekiel (*c.* 592–570 B.C.), and the so-called 'Second Isaiah' (*c.* 546–536 B.C.), followed by a lingering train of lesser personalities (Hag., Zech., Obad., Mal., Joel, Jonah) and perhaps some fragments (Is 24–27, Zec 8–14) now bound up with larger works. Ezekiel is a significant and characteristic figure, who has a strong message to deliver, and marks with equal boldness the close of one age and the opening of another. Second Isaiah (Is 40–55) reaches perhaps the highest point of spiritual insight in the whole OT. Even the lesser names, although associated with some decline of literary force and originality, are yet all those of men who have some message from God both to their own and to future ages.

We have already spoken of the considerable codifying of law which belongs to this period. It must not be supposed that all the laws which are thus put on record represent actual existing usage. There is a tendency towards symmetry and system; the writers do not hesitate to set down not only what is, but what they think ought to be. A striking example of this may be seen in the ideal picture of the temple and its services in Ezk 40–48. But even in the Pentateuch there is not a little that was probably never actually put into practice.

The narrative of Neh 8–10 illustrates vividly the attitude of mind towards the Law which was by this time becoming common to both leaders and people. The proceedings which accompanied the promulgation of the Priests' Code were evidently modelled upon those with which we have seen that Josiah introduced and enforced the legislation of Deuteronomy. Only the ceremonies are yet more prolonged and yet more solemn, and the effect proved to be more lasting.

(6) *The Hagiographa*: (i.) *Psalms*, (ii.) *Wisdom Literature*, (iii.) *other Books*.—The central force in the history of Israel was the *prophetic spirit*, which we may take in a wide sense as attaining to permanent expression not only in the prophetic writings proper, but also in the laws and institutions which made up the concrete framework of the national life. The prophetic writings embodied great principles both of belief and practice, a high conception—gradually becoming still higher and purer—of the being and character of God, and a growing stringency and elevation in the sense of His moral and spiritual demands upon man. It was essentially the same spirit and the same principles which took effect in the work of the lawgivers, from Moses onwards. The special purpose for which Israel as a nation had been raised up was to serve as a standing example of these higher views of God and of moral duty which were the outcome of the spirit that we have called prophetic, but which was really common to prophets and lawgivers, and expressed itself in the two main branches of Hebrew literature, Prophecy and Law.

In these two branches what we may call the creative forces at work in the nation reached their fullest development; but the consequences were felt over a wider area; indeed the prophetic spirit

(if, for short, we may call it by that single name) gripped hold of the national life as a whole and made itself felt in outlying branches of the literature that did not so obviously receive their stimulus from above as Prophecy and Law. The Jews had a general name for these less central and creative writings—*Kĕthūbīm* or *Hagiographa*. These again fall into three classes: (i.) Psalms of David (so called), with the addition—outside the stricter Canon—of the Psalms of Solomon (so called); (ii.) the Wisdom literature, including Proverbs, Job, and Ecclesiastes, and—outside the narrower Jewish Canon—the Wisdom of Solomon (so called), and the Wisdom of Jesus the son of Sirach; and (iii.) certain other books, not all of the same description, and more limited in number in the Palestinian Canon than in that of Alexandria. The Jewish tradition does not exactly follow this classification by subject, but marks off the three greater poetical works: Psalms, Proverbs, Job, and the so-called 'Five Rolls'—Cant., Ruth, Lam., Eccl. (*Koheleth*), Esther—which were read respectively at the five church festivals: Passover, Weeks, the fast of 9th Ab, Tabernacles, and Purim. With this division were reckoned three books of which we have in part already spoken, Dan., Chron., Ezra-Nehemiah. For our purpose it may be better to keep to the classification by subject.

(i.) *Psalms.*—Although the Psalms are not creative in the same sense as the Prophets and the Law—in other words, although they do not supply their own principles from within but rather derive them from without—they are hardly of less capital importance in the history of Religion; because they are typical and classical examples of a *genus* which is of the deepest significance in the sphere of the religious life. If Prophecy and Law embody those leading truths which (as of Divine implanting) may be described as the gift of God to man, the Psalms represent the response of man to God. They cover the whole field of devotion: praise and thanksgiving, and prayer—with the preparation for prayer in penitence and confession, the laying before God alike of the joys and difficulties and sorrows of life, whether on the larger scale of the nation or on the smaller scale of the individual.

There are not wanting analogies to the Heb. Psalms, especially in the religious literature of Babylonia; but by common consent the Heb. Psalms take the first place, and indeed many of them are not surpassed even by the ripest productions of Christianity. The Psalms supply the ideal and pattern on which the whole devotional response of man to God has modelled itself throughout every one of those branches of religion which trace back their origin to Israel. To say this is to claim for them—and to claim beyond possibility of dispute or question—an unique place in religious history. In the case of the Psalms it is perhaps not so much the substance that is a new creation as the form and mode of expression, the underlying attitude of the soul, when it approached the presence of its God.

From the beginnings of Heb. religious poetry, there are two distinct strains in which the poet speaks: he speaks in the name of the community or nation collectively, and he speaks for himself as an individual. We may take the Song of Deborah as a specimen of the first of these classes, and the Lament of David over Saul and Jonathan as a specimen of the second. In the earlier ages there can be little doubt that the former style preponderated. It was, of course, inevitable that an individual utterance should from time to time express individual emotion; even when he sang as spokesman for the community, the Heb. poet could not help expressing the collective emotion as it was reflected in his own breast. But this was a different thing from the habit of introspection which must have become much more common after the Exile, when the national existence was broken up and the doctrine of individual responsibility had been clearly and strongly asserted. We shall be safe in referring to a post-exilic date the more introspective portions of the Psalter.

But indeed it is probable that the main body of the Psalter belongs to this later date. There is probably truth in the description of the Psalter as 'the hymn-book of the Jewish Church,' and as belonging to the time when the self-consciousness of the Church was freer and stronger than that of the nation. At the same time it seems to us a mistake to lay down any hard and fast line, or to suppose that few or none of the Psalms go back to the time before the Exile. In particular, we should be inclined to treat as pre-exilic most of the Psalms which are addressed to, or speak of, the king. There may be a greater number of early Psalms than is sometimes supposed, under the disguise of later modifications and adaptations.

(ii.) *Wisdom Literature.*—The history of the so-called 'Wisdom Literature' of the Hebrews is closely parallel to that of the Psalter. The 'wise men' form a class by the side of the priests and prophets (Jer 18^{18}). Practically this class is found in all rising civilizations; there was a natural tendency to look up to those who by age and experience and native shrewdness showed themselves capable of giving good counsel. In the East particularly, this class is clearly marked; it is found in the neighbouring nations as well as in Israel. Edom appears to have had a high reputation in this respect (Jer 49^{7}, Ob ^{8}, cf. Job 2^{11}); and so, too, had Egypt and the 'children of the east' (1 K $4^{30f.}$). In Israel no one equalled King Solomon in fame (1 K 4^{29-34}). This fame led to collections of proverbs being attributed to him (Pr 1^{1} 10^{1} 25^{1}), just as collections of Psalms were attributed to David, though it does not follow that all parts of the collections really go back to this early date. The 'wisdom' of the Hebrews differed from the philosophy of the Greeks, though it held the same kind of place in the national life. With the Greeks, philosophy belonged to a higher stage of intellectual culture; in Israel, wisdom consisted mainly in sagacious maxims bearing upon the conduct of life, though sometimes it was conceived in a higher sense, and personified as a principle guiding the Almighty in His work of creation, and determining appointments of human society (Pr $3^{19f.}$ 8, Job 28).

We observe a gradual progress, in respect both of substance and of form. Proverbs, like poetry, were in the first instance a natural spontaneous product of the soil; it was only by degrees that they came to be artistically treated as a form of literature. As such they became more elaborate and more complex as time went on; they begin with short and pithy sayings, and only gradually expand into connected paragraphs, like the praises of Wisdom in Pr 1–9. In point of elaboration, as in profundity of treatment, the climax is reached in the Book of Job. In this we have the sustained and searching discussion of one of the deepest problems that exercised the Hebrew mind. It is a mark of later date as the themes become more and more religious. The personifications of Divine Wisdom are perhaps due to the influence of the *Diaspora*, and through it of Greek philosophy. It is in this direction especially that we see development in the Wisdom of Jesus the son of Sirach, and in the Alexandrian Book of Wisdom. Ecclesiastes is a Jewish product, also late, of a

frame of mind not much represented in Hebrew literature—the tendency to scepticism and pessimism, which is, however, kept within bounds by the ingrained religious habit of the nation. This book no doubt stands on the extreme verge of the OT Canon, and it was only after a struggle that it maintained its place there. But we may be glad that this type too should have received its consecration. For all men there are times when sorrow is better than laughter, and it is better to go to the house of mourning than to the house of feasting (Ec 7^{2-3}).

(iii.) *Other Books.*—We have now accounted for nearly all the books included in the Jewish Canon, but a few remain. Of these the most important is the Book of Daniel. This is a continuation of the older Prophecy, with a considerable change of form, which becomes what we now call 'apocalyptic.' It had had some precursors in the older prophetic books (especially Is 24–27 and Joel); but from the time of the Maccabees onwards the new type definitely took the place of the old. It was distinguished from this by throwing its pictures into the more distant future; it is persistently eschatological, supernatural, and, we might say, mythological—in the sense that it makes free use of imagery derived in part from ancient myths that are not confined to Israel.

The Book of Daniel was the first of a series which extended over nearly three centuries. It was the only book of its class which found its way into the Bible, until it received a companion in the Christian Apoc. of St. John. The apocalyptic literature arose in the first instance in a time of distress and trial, and the strongest impulse was given to it in such times. The Book of Daniel was written to cheer the suffering saints in the great persecution of Antiochus Epiphanes. The oldest apocalyptic portion of the Book of Enoch appears to have been produced about the same date. 4 Ezra and Apoc. of Baruch were called forth in like manner by the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70. But it does not follow that every apocalyptic writing was a product of the same conditions. Dr. Charles has recently shown good reasons for assigning the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, which are partly apocalyptic, to the comparatively calm and settled time of John Hyrcanus (B.C. 135–105).

Another special *genre*, which we find distributed among different sections of the Canon as the Jews divided it, was the instructive tale—instructive in different ways, and admitted into the Canon for different purposes. Such would be the very pleasing idyllic story of Ruth, the deeper religious message of Jonah (which won for that book a place among the Prophets), the patriotic legend of Esther. Lamentations is really a small collection of a special group of Psalms. The Song of Songs is in like manner a collection of the kind of lyrics that were specially in use at marriage festivities.

2. Formation of the OT Canon.—We have traced the growth of OT as a number of separate books composed along the lines of the different branches of Hebrew literature. We have tried—very roughly—to put the several books into their places in the history of this literature, and to indicate their general relations to similar phenomena among the neighbouring nations. We might call this the 'natural history' of the first part of the Bible. We have indeed, it may be hoped, left room to see that there may be in the origins of this series of books something more than a natural history. But we are as yet some way from having explained how the OT came to be received as a sacred volume. Between the point which we have reached and the further point which marks the completion of OT as a body of canonical writings there intervene two main stages: (i.) the collection of the books into a volume with certain definite subdivisions; and (ii.) the investing of this volume with certain attributes by virtue of which it was regarded as sacred. The first is an external process raising only, or at least primarily, questions of quantity or dimensions—the number of books to be included in the volume. The second process relates rather to quality—the growth of a fuller and more consciously realized conception of the attributes belonging to the volume.

For both purposes it may be well to take our start from a point which happens to stand out distinctly, neither at the beginning nor at the end, but in the middle of the process. This point is supplied by the Prologue of the Wisdom of Jesus the son of Sirach, commonly known as Ecclesiasticus. The Prologue is the work of the grandson of the original author of the book, which he translated into Greek about the year B.C. 130. The younger writer refers several times to the religious literature of his nation. He speaks of it always under three heads: 'whereas many and great things have been delivered unto us by the law and the prophets, and by the others that have followed in their steps'; 'my grandfather Jesus, having much given himself to the reading of the law, and the prophets, and the other books of our fathers'; 'not only these, but the law itself, and the prophecies, and the rest of the books.'

(1) *Contents of the OT Canon.*—The threefold division, as we have just seen, corresponds to a triple collection of books embraced within a larger unity. The three collections appear to have succeeded each other in order of time, and the order of time was also, from the Jews' point of view, that of relative importance.

The five books of the Law were brought together first, as it would seem, about B.C. 400, at the end of the period of active and concentrated study that we associate with the names of Ezra and Nehemiah. The final collection and codification of the legal material inherited from the more distant past or produced to give roundness and completeness were the first-fruits of the labours of the new class of scribes. The marking off of the legal books proper (Pentateuch) was an innovation. The older documents extended further than this, J supplying in addition parts of the Book of Joshua (Hexateuch), and E perhaps running on into Samuel. From the point of view of Ezra and Nehemiah the main object was political and religious re-organization, the re-establishment of the people under stable conditions; for them, history as such was subordinate. They had a high conception—the very highest—of the obligation of law, the origin of which they believed to be in the fullest sense Divine. This deep sense of the obligation of law comes out in the narrative of Neh 8–10. The five books of the Law thus became the nucleus of the Jewish Bible. Even the Prophets, when they came to be added, did not attain to the same absolute and unqualified authority. A writer like Philo (*ob.* after 40 A.D.) builds his whole system really on the Law, and treats the rest of the OT as a kind of appendix to it.

For the completion of the collection, or Canon, of the Prophets we go down about two centuries to *c.* 200 B.C. The number of the prophetical books, according to the Jews' reckoning, was eight. The Historical Books were counted with the Prophets, as having for the most part prophets for their authors. Among the Jews, 1 and 2 Sam. and 1 and 2 Kings were contained in single rolls and were not divided; so that there were four

'Former Prophets,' as they were called (Josh., Judges, Sam., Kings), and four 'Latter Prophets' (Is., Jer., Ezek., XII.), what are now known as the Twelve Minor Prophets being all contained in a single roll. The proof that the second division of the Canon was complete by B.C. 200 is supplied by the enumeration of 'the Twelve Prophets' in Sir 49^{10} (the original work of the son of Sirach dating from about B.C. 180). This marks the end of a period which begins with the interest shown by the prophets of the Exile in the works of their predecessors (Ezk 38^{17}, Is 44^{7} 46^{10} 48^{3}, Zec $1^{4ff.}$ 7^{2-7}). The actual collection of the Prophetical Books was doubtless a further work of the scribes. It is to be noted that Jonah was included in the volume of the Twelve, though this book was not exactly a prophecy in the same sense as the others (it might seem to come rather under the head of the edifying tale); but the teaching of the book is thoroughly prophetic, a practical exemplification of Jer 18^{7-8}.

When the grandson of the son of Sirach introduced his grandfather's work to his countrymen and others in Egypt, a third division of the Canon was in process of formation, but not as yet so closed as to be beyond receiving additions. We may infer this, partly from the vagueness of the title ('other books,' 'rest of the books'), partly from the fact that the Book of Daniel and certain Psalms composed in this period (for at least Pss. 44. 74. 79. 83 may probably be set down as Maccabæan) were admitted into it. It would appear that this division must have been closed, roughly speaking, about B.C. 100, as the Psalms of Solomon (composed B.C. 70–40) could no longer be included, but form a separate collection outside.

(2) *Palestinian and Alexandrian Canon.*—It was in the course of the 1st cent. B.C. that the process of adding books to the OT was checked and came to an end. Edifying books went on being composed in Palestine as well as among the *Diaspora*, but by degrees there grew up a reluctance to place them on the same footing with the older Scriptures. It can only have been quite gradually that this reluctance gained strength sufficient to lead to the drawing of a definite line that was no longer to be passed. We have seen how the little collection of Psalms composed about B.C. 70–40 was marked off from the Psalter of David and inscribed with the name of Solomon. This shows that the authorities—in other words, the Rabbinical schools, which were by this time in full swing—were giving attention to the matter and trying to lay down a definite rule. But in spite of their efforts they were not at once completely successful. We may see this from the freedom with which books afterwards set aside as apocryphal were still quoted in NT. The real conclusion of the OT belongs to the sixty years or so between the fall of Jerusalem and the rising under Bar Cochba (A.D. 132–135). It was part of the general settlement brought about by the commanding influence of the group of Rabbis headed by R. Akiba. The settlement in the case of the Canon was based upon existing usage, which was at last formally sanctioned and defined by the religious leaders of the nation. The work by which this was done was necessarily retrospective; it was a process of reflexion based on reasoning and issuing in a decision that had the force of a dogma. The reasoning comes out clearly for the first time in a well-known passage of Josephus (*c. Apion.* i. 8), where the prophetic inspiration is traced down to the time of Artaxerxes (B.C. 465–424; but Jos. appears to mean Ahasuerus or Xerxes; cf. Ryle, *Canon*, p. 161 n.); books written before this date were inspired, but not those written beyond it. There were differences of opinion as to the limit, and there was a good deal of faulty criticism abroad, the real date of many books being forgotten; but the principle of authority co-extensive with inspiration was definitely affirmed. In the same passage we have the first enumeration of the sacred books, which are equal in number with the (22) letters of the Hebrew alphabet. Here again we may see at work the speculations of the Rabbis. According to another reckoning which prevails in the Talmud, the number of the books was twenty-four, Ruth being separated from Judges, and Lam. from Jeremiah. According to yet another, there were twenty-seven in all, which were still equal to the Heb. alphabet, the five final letters being added for the double books. Such learned trifling was characteristic of the time; it was the way in which the Jewish mind sought to give expression to its idea of permanence and law inherent in the nature of things.

In the meantime the close connexion between Jerusalem and Alexandria, which had continued so long as Palestine remained a province of Egypt (to about B.C. 198), though it did not entirely cease, was loosened, and the Greek-speaking or Hellenistic Jews, whose greatest strength was in Egypt, went on a way of their own, not regulated by the schools of the Rabbis. In the copies of the Greek OT an arrangement of the books, differing somewhat from that of the Heb. and more according to subject, was adopted; and other edifying books were added more freely to the older collection. Thus arose the fuller Alexandrian Canon, which was taken over in the main by the Christian Church when it broke with Judaism.

An additional proof that, even when the list of books was provisionally formed, it was not so fixed as it afterwards became, is supplied by the state of the text. In the older books, Sam., Kings, Jer., Job, a comparison of the LXX with the Heb. shows many marked variations; and in some that belong to the later stratum, such as Dan., Esther, Ezra, Tobit, the differences are so great as to amount to another form of the book. This condition of things, without invoking deeper considerations, would be enough to prove that the idea of the Canon was still fluid. And it is in full agreement with these phenomena that the final determination of the Canon at the beginning of the 2nd cent. A.D. appears to have gone along with an authoritative revision of the text. It has been demonstrated, especially by Lagarde, that all existing copies of the so-called Massoretic Text are traceable to a single copy of the time of Hadrian, of which not only the trivial peculiarities but even the blunders are faithfully reproduced. And a late story current in Arabic expressly stated that the extant MSS were all copied from a single original that was rescued from Bitther, where R. Akiba met his death.

(3) *The idea of the Canon.*—Thus it appears that the full conception of the OT Canon as a strictly circumscribed collection of sacred books was the ultimate result of a process spread over a long period. The strict circumscription was in the first instance peculiar to the Jews, from whom it was taken over (though in a qualified sense) by St. Jerome, and it was revived by the divines of the Reformed Church in the sixteenth century.

How far does this sharp division correspond to the real facts of the case? What substantial grounds are there for setting apart the Canonical Books of OT as in a special sense the Word of God? Our next step must be to try to indicate these grounds and to show how what was at first an instinctive deference came by degrees to be a reasoned belief and an accepted doctrine.

(*a*) *Ground of the idea.*—When we speak of the Bible as the Word of God, we are using language that arose in prophetic circles and was at first used to describe the prophetic message. The prophet was regarded as God's spokesman, one who communicated to his fellows a message put into his mouth by God, shaped in his mind by direct Divine influence, and accepted by those to whom it was delivered as expressing the Divine will. When the prophet spoke, he spoke as God's mouthpiece; his own personality dropped out of sight;

he prefaced what he had to say by the formula, 'Thus saith the Lord.'

This conception was wide-spread through antiquity. It lay behind the belief in the oracles, *e.g.* of Delphi or Dodona. But nowhere else was the belief so strong as it was in Israel. In the case of the classical nations we seem to be in the presence of something tentative and limited. There was the belief that a reply might be given to definite questions, and such replies were given, and for whole periods together (*e.g.* especially in the era of colonization in the 8th and 7th cents. B.C.) exercised a beneficent influence over the fortunes of the Hellenic race. But at other periods (*e.g.* the Persian Wars) the oracle took the wrong side, and its utterances were often halting, obscure, and ambiguous. There is a great interval between phenomena like these and the confident burning faith of the Heb. prophets and their unflinching enthusiasm in the cause of God and of morality. And although the interval is to some extent bridged over by the many steps and degrees between the lower and the higher forms of Heb. prophecy, it is only right to remember that the higher forms triumphed so completely that they entirely dominate the prophetic literature, and it is only through incidental allusions and the narrative of the historical books that the existence of the lower forms can be at all adequately realized.

The prophet was a man with a message from God; and at first this message was delivered by word of mouth, and it was only occasionally that it was preserved by tradition and so came to be embodied in writing (*e.g.* 2 S 12^{1-6}, 1 K 11^{29-39}). But a time came when (as we have seen) the prophet himself began to write down his own prophecies; and it is in this way that the *corpus* of prophetic writings has survived and confronts us with permanent witness to their greatness. It is hardly necessary to add that the essential qualities of prophecy belonged to the spoken word, and the written word did but add to this the property of permanence. But in the history of religion that one addition was of first-rate importance. It fixed the supernatural or providential element in the history of a single race, and converted it into a possession of all humanity for all time.

It is natural to seize upon these phenomena of prophecy as the most typical and central of those which made of the OT a sacred book. But they are more typical and central in the impression which they make upon us than they were in the actual course of history. The prophetic writings have been preserved, and we can see in them the psychological process out of which they arose. The whole activity of the prophets is laid bare before us to a degree that hardly obtains for any other product of Israel's religion. The pre-prophetic period is also to a large extent pre-historic. Such knowledge as we have of it has come down to us through folklore, or imperfectly controlled oral tradition. In order to form a realistic conception of the earlier period, we have to eke out the historical data with inferences backwards from later but more contemporary descriptions. It is in this way that we have to reconstruct our conception of the work of Moses. But we can succeed in this sufficiently to verify the impression which the whole subsequent history of Israel forces upon us as to the epoch-making character of that work. We have already hinted (p. 564 f.) at the general conception that we are led to form of the work of Moses. We should perhaps think of it most adequately as a combination of the priestly and prophetic functions, or as a form of prophecy which was not only the continuation of a work already begun, but the foundation of a long line of subsequent development. In any case the figure of Moses must exceed those of even the greatest of the later prophets in magnitude. By this it is not meant that the sum-total of the Mosaic revelation, so far as it can be reconstructed, is richer in contents than later stages of the revelation built upon it. The very fact that it is earlier and foundation-laying would exclude this. But the laying of foundations must always as such possess a significance that can never belong to any part, even the finest part, of the superstructure.

The Heb. people were therefore essentially right in their estimate of Moses; and if, on the score of criticism, we are compelled to make considerable deductions from the direct historical value of the narrative of the Pentateuch as it has come down to us, there are none to be made from the proportions of the dim but grand figure which looms behind it, or from the work which God accomplished through this in many ways most colossal of His human ministers. It is therefore not without reason that the Law lies at the base of the Jewish Canon, and that all the rest is subordinate to it.

There is a sense in which it is really subordinate, and another sense in which it is not. We may understand this from the way in which OT is treated in NT. We can see from many allusions, both in the Gospels and in the Epistles, that the historical importance of Moses was abundantly recognized both by our Lord and by His Apostles. It is not explicitly discussed and defined, because there was no necessity for such discussion. It was simply taken for granted as the axiom of every pious Jew. But the time had come, after all those centuries, for a new advance in the religious education of the world. And therefore it was that a greater even than Moses gave a new law from the hillside behind Capernaum. And it is not surprising that in this new law there should be elements that have their roots in the Prophets and Psalms even more distinctly than in the Books of Moses. Isaiah is the 'evangelical prophet' in a sense in which such a name could not be given to Moses; and yet the Greater Prophet of the future was to be like Moses, and not like Isaiah.

It must be allowed that, as compared with these two great divisions, the Law and the Prophets, the rest of the OT stands in a subordinate and supplemental relation. But, here again, the very idea of 'supplement' should save us from undue depreciation. A structure that admits of being supplemented is incomplete without its supplement. What a gap would be left in OT if we were to strike out the Psalms! The sense of what that gap would mean may bring home to us the value of the Psalter in the scheme of Revelation. And, in like manner, although the loss of the Wisdom Books might not be so acutely felt, it is one that we should be very loath to incur. And even the Song of Songs brings in a touch of human nature, like the flowering of a lily or a rose, that could ill be spared.

These outlying books may be described as examples of 'applied religion.' Some are higher in the species, and some are lower; some are nearer the great generative centres, and some are more remote; some are simpler and more rudimentary, and others more advanced. But they are all alike symptoms or outlets of those eruptive spiritual forces which lay at the heart of Israel as a nation, and were at once the evidence and the expression of its special mission from God.

(*b*) *Extension of the idea.*—So far we have spoken of the actual course of the growth of the Hebrew literature and of the special qualities inherent in it. These qualities are not identical

with those implied in the doctrinal conception of the Canon, but they are the ultimate facts which led up to that conception. They belong to the process of growth which, like such processes generally, is apt to be unequal in its different parts. The doctrinal conception of the Canon implies a completed process, and takes the shape of reflexion upon an accomplished fact.

We have been trying to analyze those elements in the original Scriptures which caused them to be regarded as sacred books. But the idea of sacredness in itself is not in the first instance cut and dried; it is progressive, and admits of degrees. It is this, and we see that it is this, so long as we regard it as an attribute of the living product. But when once the process of living growth has ceased, when the mind turns back upon the finished and stationary result, and sums up its reflexions in logical form, the closer touch with fact is apt to be lost, and the propositions which take its place become dogmatic and artificial. From the time that there were religious writings in Israel at all, they were regarded as sacred; but there is a certain amount of interval and inference between this instinctive reverence and the formulated definition of sanctity which by the time of Christ had won its way to general acceptance, at least in those Pharisaic circles which held control of the future. The inferences seemed to lie very near at hand; they were easy and natural: a book is sacred; it is the Word of God; does it not follow that it must be also perfect, incapable of error, absolutely binding in all its parts, a finished whole from which nothing could be subtracted and to which nothing could be added? These consequences did not really follow, but we cannot be surprised that they should have seemed to do so.

It is just here that the difference between older and newer views of the Bible comes in. The older view was in effect identical with that formulated by the Rabbis in the first century of our era. The newer view is not traditional, but aims at being scientific; it aims at correcting the current conception by a renewed comparison with the original facts. And the main effect of this renewed comparison is to make us stand by the old ideas of sacredness and inspiration, but at the same time disengage them from inferences wrongly though naturally deduced from them. To say that the Bible is sacred, and that the Spirit of God breathed in the men who wrote it, is not the same thing as to say that it is infallible, especially on points remote from its purpose as revelation. The one set of attributes can be verified, the other cannot.

(c) *Canonical and Apocryphal.*—The technical term used by the Rabbis, where we say that a book 'is canonical,' is that it 'defiles the hands.' That is only another way of saying that it is sacred; the person using it must be ceremonially purified before he can come in contact with other things. Until he has done this he is 'under a tabu,' and the contact with a sacred thing compels him to undergo a ceremony of purification. Our word 'canonical' is less expressive; it only means that the book is 'on the list,' *i.e.* the authorized list of the sacred volumes. That, at least, was the earliest Greek use; in Latin the word acquired a more active sense of authority.

The correlative term to 'canonical' is 'apocryphal,' which means, properly, 'hidden, or withdrawn from public use.' But this idea of 'hidden books' is ambiguous, and might be used in opposite senses according to the purpose of the hiding. A book might be 'hidden' because its contents were esoteric, or beyond the understanding of the vulgar; or it might be hidden because its contents were harmful. We can see that the two senses might meet, inasmuch as what was harmful for one might be helpful to another. But we may say broadly that the two senses succeeded each other. A number of books were composed which by their authors and in certain circles were highly valued because of their mysterious contents, intended only for the select few. But in course of time and in other circles they fell out of favour and were suppressed or withdrawn, for the converse reason, because they were thought to be pernicious for the many. The standard of judgment was that of Judaism; and the writings in question were in the first instance more particularly the Jewish Apocalypses (like the Book of Enoch, 4 Ezra, Apoc. of Baruch). In the century before, and in the century after, the Christian era, many works of this kind were composed, and at first they exercised considerable attraction. It is a mistake to suppose that in principle and from the outset there was any direct opposition to them on the part of the Rabbinical authorities. But at the time when the Jewish Canon was being definitely formed, they began to go out of favour, and in the 2nd cent. A.D. Judaism more and more turned its back upon them. The most scholarly among the Christian writers (Origen and Jerome), whose opinions in the end carried the day, were in touch with Judaism; and so it came about that what the Jews rejected the Christian Church ended by also rejecting, at least in the circles that had the greatest influence with the Reformers. And the word 'apocryphal,' which began by being used in a good sense, came to be used first in a neutral, and then in a bad one; esoteric writings were first prized, then tolerated, then excluded; the name which marked them as esoteric came to mark them as excluded; and all the excluded works were lumped together under the same title.

In the early ages of the Church the exclusion was only relative, and confined to a few learned men. Meantime the great body of the Church went on using freely the wider Alexandrian Canon, which admitted practically everything that was found edifying. The two standards went on side by side, with a certain amount of influence from the stricter upon that which was more lax. At the Reformation itself different shades of opinion prevailed in different quarters. The Reformed Churches were the most thoroughgoing; the Anglicans and Lutherans took up the intermediate position of Jerome; the Church of Rome does not endorse this, but permits a guarded use of the term 'deutero-canonical'—an invention of Sixtus Senensis in 1566.

LITERATURE.—Among the most recent and instructive works on the subject of this article are: Budde, *Gesch. d. althebr. Litteratur*, with Appendix on the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha by Bertholet (Leipzig, 1908) [Budde's *Kanon d. AT* (1900) is more restricted in scope]; Gunkel, 'Die isr. Literatur' (in *Kultur d. Gegenwart*, Berlin and Leipzig, 1906); Cornill, *Einleit. in d. AT* (from 1891; 6th ed., 1908); Hölscher, *Kanonisch u. Apokryph* (Leipzig, 1905). The comprehensive work ed. by Kautzsch, with the help of other scholars, *Die Heilige Schrift d. AT* (1894; 2nd ed. begun in 1908), and his *Apokryphen u. Pseudepigraphen* (1900), are of much utility. In English, we have a standard work in Driver's *Introd. to the Literature of OT* (from 1891); for the formation of the Canon, Ryle, *Canon of the OT* (1892); and a translation (by B. W. Bacon) of Wildeboer, *Origin of the Canon of the OT* (1895). Excellent editions of the Apocalyptic writings have been supplied by Charles; and Swete's *Introd. to the OT in Greek* (1900) is full of exact information as to the relation of the Heb. and Gr. Bibles. The present writer's Bampton Lectures on *Inspiration* (from 1893) may perhaps still be referred to. The reader will also naturally consult the Bible Dictionaries and Commentaries upon particular books (in the International series, the Westminster series, the Century Bible, etc.).

II. *HISTORY OF NT.*

In two points the history of NT resembles that of OT. Both proceeded in the first instance, directly or indirectly, from 'pneumatic' or inspired men, and yet both were written without any idea of founding a sacred book. These characteristics they have in common. In a single

instance (Apoc. of St. John) the attitude of the writer of the NT work is very like that of an OT prophet or apocalyptist; and he describes his book by the old name as a 'prophecy.' But in other respects the conditions under which the NT arose were different and peculiar. And before going further we must try to explain them.

How the Books of NT came to be written.—(1) *The Epistles.*—(i.) *Of St. Paul.*—The Life of Christ had been lived and ended. The fundamental *events* of the Christian Religion were all past and over. The Christian Church was launched on its career; the late comer Paul had joined the original Apostles, and had begun his new and adventurous work of planting churches in Gentile as well as in Jewish lands. This work had been going on for some years. A whole journey, taken up with preaching and church-founding, is recorded in the Acts (13^4-14^{28}), but has not left behind it any literature that is now extant. Another journey had begun and was some way advanced—it would be about the year A.D. 51—when a letter was written, followed by a second, which are both in our possession (1 and 2 Thess.). These two Epistles are the first beginnings of NT. It is highly probable that other letters had been written by St. Paul before them; occasions for letters would be as plentiful on the first journey as on the second, and St. Paul was evidently in the habit of using these occasions in a perfectly easy and natural way. But really the wonder is, not that such letters should have perished, but that the two of which we have just spoken and so many others after them should have survived. That they have done so is a measure of the strength of the impression which the personality of St. Paul made upon his contemporaries. It must have been felt from a very early date in his career by those among whom he moved, that these letters of his were no ordinary compositions, but that they well deserved to be prized and treasured. As correspondence, they began in the way natural to correspondence: the Apostle received news of his converts after he had left them; or he bethought himself of something that he wished to say but had not said; or his converts wrote to him, asking for guidance in the new relations upon which they had entered. These were just common incidents of daily life, though daily life involved in higher issues than those which occupy the mass of mankind. And St. Paul himself was no common man. It was not for nothing that his previous career should have been so eventful; it was not for nothing that he had first persecuted the faith which he came to preach; it was not for nothing that he had undergone the shock of his conversion, and that after it he had spent a prolonged time in solitude and reflexion; it was not for nothing that at Damascus, Jerusalem, and Antioch he had been at close quarters and in active discussion with leading spirits of the Christian society, apostles and prophets and teachers who were full of the Holy Ghost. He himself in marked degree was full of the Holy Ghost and of power (1 Co 2^4), and the effect of this was felt not only in the crises of action and life, but in the quieter moments in which he took the pen in hand. The consequence was that, even when the occasions which led to his writings were, or might seem to be, comparatively trivial, he never treated trivial things in a trivial way. Behind all that St. Paul wrote there was a vast momentum of character and spiritual experience and insight; and all this momentum came into play as soon as he put pen to paper. Small questions were settled on large principles; and these principles were laid down with exceptional clearness and force. And behind St. Paul's writing there was always the whole man; not intellect alone, or character alone, or spiritual experience alone, but the three things blended and fused together in an unique personality.

And then it has to be remembered that, when we speak of spiritual experience in the case of St. Paul, we are not speaking merely of subjective psychological processes; we are speaking of real and mighty influences proceeding from the living God. This opens out to us another side of the life of the Primitive Church. It is of course only in a very relative sense that we speak of even St. Paul as 'unique.' He in no sense created the extraordinary enthusiasm which, we can see, animated his churches. We can be sure that he did not let them fall below the level that prevailed elsewhere; the Epistles make it clear to us that they in no way fell below this level. But the movement that we find at work in St. Paul's Churches did not originate with them. It originated on what we call the Day of Pentecost, *i.e.* in near proximity to, and under the immediate influence of, the Resurrection. The fires were kindled in the Mother Church at Jerusalem, and in the first great colonies at Antioch and Damascus, before they spread to the sphere of the missionary labours of St. Paul. It was a contagion, like the effect of leaven, that passed from one individual Christian to another. The life of the Churches was as far as possible removed from a dead and humdrum existence. A great wave of enthusiasm, which was something more than enthusiasm, swept through them all; or rather, not a single wave but a succession of waves, a succession so sustained that it seemed to be continuous. St. Paul himself did but share in this. He knew perfectly well that whatever endowment he himself possessed was not self-generated; it was not at all that he lashed himself up into a state of excitement which required extraordinary expression. It was a force outside him that seized upon him and would not let him go. As in the case of the old prophets, the call when it once came to him was irresistible; it was useless to fight against it; as he himself says, a necessity was laid upon him (1 Co 9^{16}). The necessity came from the Spirit of Christ. We cannot do better than study the Epistles of St. Paul if we wish to understand what the working of the Spirit of Christ was. It is true that this working took some forms that to us at the present day are apt to seem uncouth (1 Co 12. 14); they were attended by physical phenomena that are apt to seem abnormal. It was to be expected that a great movement affecting masses of men should affect them in ways corresponding to the ideas current at the time. Many modern writers speak as though this were the sum of the whole matter, and as though we from the lofty platform of the discipline of science could afford to look down upon these humble phenomena. Humble they may be in themselves, but they cannot be taken by themselves; they are so far from being the sum of the whole matter that they are only as it were the rippling upon the surface of the real movement. Look, again we may say, at St. Paul's Epistles. How much is there in them of the speaking with tongues, or even of the working of miracles, such as the healing of the sick? These things certainly are implied, but they are behind the scenes; and the Epistles of St. Paul have enough to occupy us that is not behind the scenes. He himself put these phenomena into their right place, though he did not under-value them. They were just a single, and very partial, expression of that mighty force which possessed his whole soul and being. If we look at the Epistles with insight and discrimination and with a sense of the true proportions of things, we shall have no difficulty

in seeing where this force really breaks out in the main stream of its volcanic working. There are certain Epistles that we instinctively call the 'Great Epistles'; we call them so because the inspiration of which we are speaking is so visibly and unmistakably strong in them. But to form an adequate estimate, we must not confine ourselves to just so much as we see; we must take the evidence which they supply as to that which we do not see. It is to some extent a matter of accident—of Divinely-guided accident perhaps, but of that which we are in the habit of calling accident—what kind of subject-matter the inspiration has to deal with; but the same moving force is at work in small things as well as great. For instance, it would be natural enough to say that there was less of inspiration in 1 Co 5–8. 12. 14. 16, or even in 9–11, than there is in chs. 1–4. 13. 15; but it is not exactly that there is less inspiration; it is the same inspiration at work all the time; but it is this same inspiration dealing with lower things.

It is convenient to use the old-fashioned word 'inspiration.' It may well be questioned whether there is any other that better expresses the facts. We mean by it the evidence of indwelling Deity in man. We no longer suppose that this indwelling Deity imparts infallibility to every chance utterance relating to external nature or man. Really, from the modern point of view, it is hardly infallibility of any sort for which we are looking. The Divine impulse and the human expression are so inextricably mixed together that we can rarely, if ever, arrive at that which could be called infallible in the strict sense. But, after all, the idea of infallibility is only a notion of the head; and these head-notions have come to be at a discount. So, although the search for infallibility is weaker than it was, we should by no means say the same of the search for the Divine. It is the presence of this that we look for in the Epistles of St. Paul, and that we find in such abundant measure. And even the modern man, when he has found it, goes on his way rejoicing, like one that findeth goodly pearls.

It may be objected that this view of inspiration is vague in comparison with the old idea. That is just its merit. The old idea was definite enough, but it did not correspond with the facts. The new idea leaves room for a width and depth of meaning that is not, all of it, expressible in language. We can see something of the working of inspiration, and we can see something of its results. In the case of St. Paul these appear in his singular wisdom in the management of men, in his strong and clear grasp of a new type of character, in his deep insight into the attributes and will of God and His providential dealings with mankind.

The letters of St. Paul, as we have seen, from an early date made a great impression on those to whom they were addressed; and this impression soon spread to enemies as well as friends (2 Co 10^{10}). This encouraged the Apostle to make a more extended use of the letter form as a vehicle for instruction. Some of his letters, like the Epp. to Romans and Ephesians, expand into regular treatises. They cover a large area of the wide field of Christian teaching. And yet they are still at bottom essentially letters (Deissmann, *Licht vom Osten*, pp. 165–167); in each case the Apostle has definite recipients before his mind. If this is less marked in the case of Eph. than elsewhere, the reason is that it was in the first instance a circular letter addressed to several Churches at once.

Of late years attention has been called (especially by Deissmann) to the fact that there existed in antiquity, and especially about the Christian era, two distinct types of letters: the ordinary letter, arising naturally out of given conditions and addressed to definite persons, and the 'epistle,' which was a more formal composition intended for a wider public, though for literary reasons couched in the form of an open letter. The consciousness of the existence of this species of composition may have had some slight influence upon St. Paul, and still more perhaps upon some other Christian leaders; but the weightier contents of some of the Epp. grew spontaneously out of the circumstances of the case, and were a natural development of his own work by an original and unconventional mind.

We have assumed above the genuineness of all the Epistles that bear the name of St. Paul. This is in accordance with the deliberate opinion of the present writer. At the same time, it would not be right to disguise the fact that the genuineness of some at least of the Epistles is questioned, and that it does in fact stand upon a different footing in some cases and in others. We may really mark off descending grades of clearness and certainty. Putting aside the extravagant views of certain Swiss and Dutch critics, who would reject the whole body of Pauline Epp., but whose doubts have met with no support from the best authorities, and may now be regarded as definitely silenced, there would be a first class of seven Epp. which may be set aside as practically certain (1 Thess., Rom., Gal., 1 and 2 Cor., Phil., Philem.). To these may safely be added 2 Thess. and Col., which are indeed questioned, but on very insufficient grounds. There is more reason, but still (as it seems to us) insufficient reason, for hesitation as to Eph.; and perhaps a little more again as to the three so-called Pastoral Epp., 1 and 2 Tim., Titus.

(ii.) *Other Epistles.*—The Epistles of St. Paul are the typical and primary example of the epistolary literature of NT. But a further group of writings of a similar character has come down to us: Ep. to Hebrews as an outlying member of the Pauline collection, not by St. Paul himself, but by a writer of a kindred spirit, a near ally or (less probably) a direct disciple; and besides this the seven so-called 'Catholic Epistles.' All these writings follow as it were in the wake of St. Paul. He gave the impulse which led to their composition, and to a considerable extent determined their form. It is possible enough that, even though St. Paul had never lived or had never written, the force of circumstances would have brought into being a *genus scribendi* corresponding more or less to our present Epistles; but the dominating personality of the Apostle of the Gentiles, and the reputation which his letters so quickly gained (2 Co 10^{10}), gave both a stimulus and a model for imitation. The Ep. to Hebrews is indeed a letter (13^{22-25}), but it partakes more of the character of another class of writing that we have not yet mentioned, the philosophical *diatribe* (Deissmann, *op. cit.* p. 171). This is rightly described as the first work of Christian literature in the technical sense. St. Paul was not naturally a writer, but a man of thought and action who was driven into writing; the author of Ep. to Hebrews was a practised stylist, we may believe with some literary experience behind him, who instinctively cast his ideas and exhortations into a rhetorical form. Something of the same kind, though with less highly developed rhetoric, attaches to the greater Catholic Epistles—1 Pet., 1 Jn., James. We may see this at once from the wide and vague address of the two that have addresses: 1 Pet. is destined for 'the elect who are sojourners of the Dispersion' in the more northerly provinces of Asia Minor; James 'to the twelve tribes which are of the Dispersion.' Perhaps in the first case a few copies may have been sent to some of the leading churches, but in the second case the address would amount to little more than a formula for publication; we may suppose that copies would be given to strangers who happened to be in the neighbourhood of the Apostle, and that would be all. 1 Jn. has no

epistolary matter or any indication that it is intended for a particular class of readers, beyond the use of the second pers. plur.; and so it comes nearer still to the *diatribe*. When this is said, it is not intended that the writer deliberately adopted the *diatribe* form, but only that the existence of this class of literature helped unconsciously to shape the expression of his ideas. 2 and 3 Jn. are genuine letters on a small scale. 2 Pet. and Jude are both rather artificial compositions, which appear to have taken shape at no great distance from each other.

1 Pet. is not only modelled in general outline upon the Pauline Epp., but it also borrows directly from some of these (*e.g.* Rom., Eph.) in parts of its substance; and James may be said to have been produced by echoes of the Pauline teaching. But it by no means follows that this amount of derivativeness prevents the Epp. from possessing a high spiritual value. James supplies a judicious corrective for exaggerations of Pauline doctrine, and its moral teaching is at once elevated, simple, and sincere. 1 Pet. deals with profounder problems in a profounder spirit, and is at the same time a good example of the principles on which the Church was administered by its leaders. We must reckon with the possibility that something of the form of this Epistle is due to Silvanus, whom the Apostle used as his amanuensis (cf. Milligan, *Thess.* p. 125 f.). 1 Jn. in like manner is a fit pendant to the Fourth Gospel, and comes with all the impressive weight of the personality of its author. The two smaller Epp., while they reflect definite local conditions, are also evidently the work of one accustomed to wield power, and accustomed to take thought for the spiritual welfare of those whom he governs.

Ep. to Heb. is anonymous: the question both as to its authorship and as to the community to which it was addressed is intricate and difficult to bring to a clear conclusion; there is no agreement, and hardly even a tendency to agreement, at the present time. Yet the attestation of the Ep. is very early (Clem. Rom.); and its value and interpretation are not much affected by the points in dispute. There is equally early proof of the existence of Ep. of James; and 1 Pet. and 1 Jn. are also very well attested. 2 and 3 Jn. really do not need attestation any more than Philem., and they go with 1 Jn. as Philem. goes with Col. 2 Pet. appears to belong to the group of pseudepigraphic writings that bear the name of St. Peter (along with Gosp., Apoc., and Preaching of Pet.). But that does not prevent it from having some good matter (esp. ch. 1 and 3^{3-18}). Beyond some impressiveness of common Christian background there is not much that is distinctive in Jude, and the circumstances of its origin must remain vague. There are no better candidates than the traditional authors for the ownership of 1 Pet., Ja., 1, 2, 3 Jn. The last group at least may be ascribed with confidence to the Ephesian Presbyter John, whether or not he is to be identified with the Apostle the son of Zebedee. There are, however, some few questions which arise as to 1 Pet. and Ja. which with our present knowledge we are not in a position to answer.

Literature.—As to Hebrews, the main bifurcation of views is between Barnabas (Tert. and perhaps Roman tradition) as author and some limited congregation in Rome as address, and authorship mediately Pauline (through Lk. or Clement [Clem. Alex., Orig.]) and some community in Palestine. Apollos was a guess of Luther's. Novel and interesting suggestions have been made by Harnack, *ZNTW* (1900), and Ramsay, *Luke the Physician* (1908), p. 301 ff. The most thorough and satisfactory discussion of 1 and 2 Pet. is by F. H. Chase in Hastings' *DB* iii. 779; but for the possible share of Silvanus in the composition of the first Ep., see G. Milligan, *Thess.* (1908) p. 125 f.

(2) *The Gospels and Acts.*—We have seen in what an incidental and spontaneous manner the epistolary portion of NT arose and grew to considerable dimensions. The Gospels are a class of writings peculiar to Christianity. To understand them we must consider how they too arose. For the first years after the Lord's Resurrection there was no need or demand for writings of any kind. All this time the Church was living in the expectation of its Master's speedy return. It was an attitude of hope, looking upwards for the sign of the Son of Man in the heavens. Only by degrees did the intenser hope begin to subside. Meantime there can be little doubt that individual Christians, the disciples in Galilee and Jerusalem with the women and the relatives of the Lord, would compare notes with each other, with greater or less activity of intercourse according to the degree in which they were thrown together. But very few of the disciples will have had any sort of literary habits, and there would still be no idea of writing. If we go, not by any external chronology, but by the quality and character of what was written, we should probably not be wrong if we were to say that the first two chapters of St. Luke are the oldest evangelical fragment or document of NT. They are in any case the most archaic thing in the whole volume. In these chapters it might be said that Christianity was not yet out of its Jewish swaddling-clothes; the *Benedictus*, for example, is composed entirely from the standpoint of the Jewish expectation and not of the Christian fulfilment. But whoever first set them down in writing,—and this very archaic character compels us to believe that they were written,—they were in any case not at once published. They were written to satisfy the interest of a small and private circle; and they must for a number of years have been confined to that circle. Not until St. Luke came across them were they in the way towards anything like publication.

The first two chapters of St. Matthew's Gospel seem to have been in a similar position. They too appear to represent the tradition of a small circle, for a considerable time kept to itself. It is natural to think of this tradition as further removed from the facts than in the case of St. Luke. There are not the same guarantees of early date, and there is more reason to suspect the influence on the narrative of parallel situations in OT. At the same time we must not fail to notice the convergence of these two traditions, otherwise so independent, upon the Virgin Birth and the Birth at Bethlehem.

And yet these opening chapters of the two Gospels stand very much by themselves. They are altogether apart from the main stream of tradition current in the Churches. This was concerned, as we might naturally expect it to be concerned, with that part of our Lord's career which was lived directly under the public eye, and of which there were a number of living witnesses. Yet these witnesses, for reasons which have been explained, did not at first begin by setting down their recollections in writing. They doubtless made use of them in their own preaching, and they also handed them on to others who would utilize them in the same way. But the motive at work at first was not what we should call historical or biographical. It was exactly expressed by the peculiar word 'Gospel.' This was practically a coinage of the first Christians, sanctioned by, or even perhaps originating with, our Lord Himself, to express the message of hope and salvation addressed to a disheartened and despairing world. The ground of hope and salvation centred mainly in the Life and Death and Resurrection of Jesus Christ Himself. And therefore the earliest preaching was in its main contents a preaching of these things, in part a narration and description of them as facts, and in part an enlarging upon their profound significance in the spiritual sphere. This second aspect of 'the Gospel' is what meets us most frequently in the Epistles of St. Paul. But the other aspect is there implied if not expressed. We have specimens of it in important passages like 1 Co 11^{23-26} 15^{1-8}. Such narratives must have entered largely into the παραδόσεις of which we have repeated mention (1 Co $11^{2.\ 23}$ 2 Th 2^{15} 3^{6}). But in its urgent expectation of the Second Coming the Church did not at first

lay great stress on these historical facts. It presupposed them always, and it was fully assured of them as facts; but it was so well assured of them that it did not find it necessary to be constantly reminding itself about them. Its treasure was, where its heart was, in the heavens; it was more intent upon the future than upon the past, even such a past.

The impulse to the setting forth of the historical side of the Gospel came through the work of missions. On this side it soon proved necessary to supplement the oral teaching of St. Paul and the other missionaries. Especially was this the case in the newly-founded Gentile communities. These, we must remember, had to be built up from the very first. They had a great many elementary lessons to learn. Even the Jews, with the OT in their hands, had much to learn. They had to take in and to assimilate all the new teaching by which Christianity was distinguished from Judaism. The earliest Evangelical document of which we have any trace (except perhaps Lk 1. 2)—the earliest Evangelical document that was in any strict sense a possession of the whole Church—was the little book, corresponding to the common matter of Mt., Lk. (see p. 576 below), which scholars are now in the habit of calling Q, and which used (as the present writer believes, rightly) to be identified with the Matthæan *Logia* mentioned by Papias (Eus. *HE* iii. 39). We describe this work as intended for the whole Church, because there was certainly no circumscribing line beyond which it was not intended to travel, though the writer probably had in his mind Palestine and the Nearer East, *i.e.* that part of the East that was nearer to himself. The leading purpose of this little book appears to have been to set before its readers (the new converts in the different Churches) some account of the Christian ideal, the character and mode of life expected of them as Christians. It was felt that this could be best done by collecting together a number of typical sayings and discourses—*i.e.* shorter and longer sayings—of Christ. There was no idea of writing a biography, and not even in this case of composing a 'Gospel' (or full statement of the redeeming acts of Christ), but only a brief exemplar to set before the eyes and minds of converts.

Valuable as this was, it was sure not to satisfy for long the needs of Christians. It contained only a small part of the Gospel, and what they wanted was the whole Gospel. As time went on, and the expectation of Christ's Second Coming became weaker, Christians were thrown back upon themselves. They felt that they had time to reflect, and they began to reflect, upon the grounds of the faith that was in them. They had had these grounds 'placarded before their eyes' (Gal 3^1) by a number of preachers, including the greatest. But they were, so to speak, 'written on water.' They made their impression, but they were soon forgotten, and there was no guarantee of their permanence. It was the consideration of this state of things which impelled the Christians at Rome who surrounded St. Peter in the last days before his death to apply to his secretary, St. Mark, to rescue from oblivion the substance of the teaching they had had from him. St. Mark complied with their request, taking this teaching of St. Peter's as the nucleus of his work, but expanding it from materials which came to his knowledge in other ways. So arose the first complete Gospel.

When once this Gospel was given to the world, nothing could be more natural than that it should supply a pattern for others. It met (as we say) 'a felt want'; and from that time onwards St. Mark's Gospel was taken as at once a pattern and a basis of similar compositions. The Gospel that we know as St. Matthew's was just a combination of the substance of St. Mark's Gospel with Q and not a large amount of other material added by the editor. The portion derived from Q was so important—extending probably some way beyond the common matter of Mt. and Lk.—that it soon came quite to supersede the separate circulation of Q; the smaller work died out, and the larger took over its name; it passed as the work of St. Matthew (*a potiori parte*), though the framework of it was derived from St. Mark. In like manner, our present Gospel of St. Luke is also a combination of St. Mark with Q, but with a larger proportion of added matter from some further source, or sources, to which St. Luke alone had access, and to which he seems to have attached a special value.

The Second Gospel, which was the first of the three in order of time, was a sketch that we may call biographical (though it did not aim, and could not have aimed, because of the scantiness of the material, at the completeness of a modern biography). Still it took a narrative form; and its leading motive was reverence for the historical Person of Christ, and the desire to promote a like feeling of reverence and faith in others. Like St. Mark's Gospel, St. Matthew's (with the qualification mentioned above) was addressed to the Church at large. St. Luke's, on the other hand, was written at least in the first instance for the use of a particular individual, who appears to have stood to the writer in what we should call the relation of a 'patron' (Lk $1^{3t.}$). The success of this first volume, in the accomplishment of its purpose, encouraged the Evangelist to add to it another, which lies before us under the title of 'The Acts of the Apostles.' It is still addressed to the same Theophilus, and is written on the same historical lines as the Gospel. The Acts, however, can hardly have been included in the writer's original plan; because its opening paragraph differs so considerably from the conclusion of the Gospel (contrast, *e.g.*, Ac 1^3 with Lk 24^{50}) that it seems safe to infer that the second volume was of the nature of an afterthought. Whether, by the time that he came to the end of this second volume, the author had conceived the idea of producing a complete 'trilogy' is perhaps slightly suggested by the way in which the volume closes, but must remain an open question.

The Fourth Gospel is generally held to stand rather by itself. It is without doubt the latest of the Gospels, and is written with a knowledge of the other three. At the same time it is not, like the First and Third, a compilation from materials already existing. On the view taken in this article, it is a retrospect by a writer of commanding position and authority, presupposing what has been already done, but adding to it from the stores of his own experience and reflexion. In some points—none of a fundamental character—it corrects the work of predecessors; on other points it supplements their statements; but, most of all, it reinforces and deepens the impression which they had left on the most central topic of Christian teaching. It is a mistake to suppose that the Fourth Gospel is essentially different in character and purpose from the other three. When St. Mark heads his work, 'The beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God,' he is virtually saying the same thing as when St. John says, 'These things (or signs) are written that ye may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye may have life in his name' (Jn 20^{31}). This declaration of his purpose by St. John is only an emphatic expansion of the claim that his work too is a 'Gospel,' *i.e.* a message and assurance from above of life and salvation through Jesus Christ. It is not a mere biography, like the

ordinary secular biographies; it does not aim at any completeness as a record of events or teaching. More than any of his fellows, the Fourth Evangelist concentrates himself upon the proof that Jesus Christ was all that Christians supposed Him to be. Incidentally he sets right some few things that had been 'forgotten or misdelivered'; he fills up some gaps, like the great gap which omitted all or nearly all that had been done in Judæa. But the great thing that the Fourth Evangelist did and aimed at doing was to re-affirm, with the consciousness of first-hand knowledge and conviction, the faith of the Church in its Lord and Master.

In asserting thus much of the Fourth Gospel, we do not assert that its author was raised above all possibilities of human error; we do not even assert that this very concentration of aim may not have had some prejudicial effect upon his narrative, considered simply as a narrative. What we do contend for is that the conviction to which he gives expression is the honest and first-hand conviction of one who had unique opportunities of basing his belief on fact.

The views implied above as to the origin and character of the first three or 'Synoptic' Gospels are substantially those which are held at the present time by a majority of scholars. It is very generally agreed that our present First and Third Gospels rest upon previously existing documents. One of these documents is neither more nor less than our present Gospel of St. Mark. A second may be approximately reconstructed from the common matter of St. Matthew and St. Luke which is not found in St. Mark, with the addition perhaps of some portions of St. Matthew to which there are no parallels in St. Luke, the latter writer having been compelled by lack of space to omit them. It is conceivable, though less probable, that there may be a few sections peculiar to St. Luke which also originally belonged to this document. But, in our opinion, this peculiar matter is better referred to some special source or sources to which St. Luke alone had access. The present writer fully believes that the two important extracts from the work of Papias preserved by Eusebius relate, the one to our extant Gospel of St. Mark, and the other to the second document disclosed by criticism which in the extract is referred to the Apostle St. Matthew. He believes that the authority quoted for these statements is none other than the writer of the Fourth Gospel, the John who played such a leading part at Ephesus towards the end of the 1st century A.D. He would observe that the statements made bear a great stamp of verisimilitude, just because they are so little obvious and not at all such as could be inferred from a superficial study of the Gospels. The statement about St. Mark in particular points to criticisms upon that Gospel (especially as to its want of completeness and chronological order) that we can understand being made at an early stage in the history of the Gospel, and by no means so well later. It is interesting to note the calm matter-of-fact way in which the Fourth Evangelist (if it were really he) speaks of his predecessors' work; and we believe that it throws a welcome light upon the composition of his own Gospel. The tradition, for which we are ultimately indebted to Clement of Alexandria (Eus. *HE* vi. 14), that the Fourth Evangelist, while he was satisfied with the treatment of the more external facts in the other Gospels, himself sat down to compose a 'spiritual gospel,' seems to us to describe the real course of things better than any of the conjectures of modern scholars. It is to us rather an open question whether John of Ephesus is to be identified with John the son of Zebedee, though we lean to the probability that he was. In any case we have little doubt that he had been a personal disciple and follower of our Lord, though a youthful one.

(3) *The Apocalypse of St. John and other Writings.*—Only one more work remains to be considered of those included in our present Canon. This is the Apocalypse of St. John, which holds a similar place in NT to that which the Book of Daniel holds in OT. We have already pointed out that the author throughout describes his own book as 'a prophecy,' in the same sense in which that word is used in OT. It corresponds, however, rather to the later type of prophecy as it is seen in the apocalypses, than to that of the older prophets. The writer is not less certain than any of the older prophets that what he writes was put into his mind by God. We shall try to estimate the significance of this later; but in the meantime it should be noted that, in spite of this confident claim, it was not until the fourth century that this book definitely secured its place in the Canon.

The formation of the Canon, and discrimination of the books which were, or were not, to be included in it belong rather to the next article It will be seen there how, first, the Epistles of St. Paul, and then the Gospels, came to be collected; how they were then read for edification in the churches, and how by degrees they acquired a character for sanctity which ended by placing them upon the same footing with OT. There was not at first a clear dividing line at which the books belonging to the NT were complete, and beyond which no others could be admitted. The fixing of any such line was a retrospective act of the Church, reflecting upon the books which lay before it. And the process by which it did this was spread over a long time, and was hardly matured until the end of the 4th century—if it can even then be said to have been matured, when the process by which the ultimate decision was arrived at was rather one of ripening instinct and the natural gravitation of events than anything like the application of exhaustive criticism.

A sharp line does not separate the writers who fall just within the Canon from those who fall just outside it. As the writer of Wisdom and the son of Sirach, while they draw a distinction between their own writings and the older Scriptures, yet appear to claim for themselves a lower degree of inspiration (see the writer's *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 259–262), so also can we trace in Clement of Rome and Ignatius something at once of the same kind of distinction and the same kind of claim. And just as we found the MSS of the LXX adding freely to the Canonical Books whatever seemed to them to make for edification, so also do the oldest MSS of NT add works that properly belong to the sub-Apostolic age to those which are products of the Apostolic. And yet, as we have seen the consciousness grow up that the prophetic inspiration gradually exhausted itself, so also we observe a tendency to locate the higher activity of the Holy Spirit within a definite period, which is more and more identified with that of the Apostles. And the very claim on the part of the Montanists to possess within their own body a continued operation of the old gifts only led, by way of reaction, to a stronger delimitation of the privileged area and a clearer rejection of all that fell outside it. It took something like a century of gradual but imperceptible development to harden the conception of the NT Canon; and then it took about two centuries more to determine finally the number of books that were to be included in it.

III. *THE PERMANENT SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CANON OF OT AND NT.*

By the end of the 4th cent., broadly speaking, the Christian Church was in possession of a complete Bible. Even then we must not speak too absolutely, because the Syriac Canon was not yet quite made up. For an œcumenical sanction of the existing list we must wait for the Quinisextine Council of A.D. 692. But for by far the greater part of Christendom the formation of the Canon was practically finished by about A.D. 400. From that time until the present generation the traditional conception of the Canon has been in possession of the field. It is only as part of the movement that is now commonly called Modernism that it has been seriously called in question. We shall give a typical example of the way in which it is now being challenged.

1. **The Modernist challenge.**—An able member of the advanced school, now deceased, in a pamphlet on the *Work and Method of so-called New Testament Theology*, cut at the root of the current conception in the following uncompromising terms:—

'If the New Testament writings arose in the course of a particular history and are the witnesses and documents of that history, then the question at once presents itself to us: Why should our science (*i.e.* the science of NT Theology) deal

precisely with these writings and only with these? The answer is: because they alone belong to the Canon. But that answer is not satisfactory. When once we strike out the doctrine of inspiration, the dogmatic conception of the Canon can no longer be maintained.

No New Testament writing was born with the predicate "canonical." The proposition "A writing is canonical" only means in the first instance that *after the fact* it was *declared* to be by the leading authorities of the Church between the second and fourth centuries—perhaps after all kinds of vacillation in their decision. On this subject the history of the Canon is sufficiently instructive.

Whoever then still regards the conception of the Canon as valid thereby submits to the authority of the bishops and theologians of those centuries. Whoever does not acknowledge that authority in other matters—and no evangelical theologian does acknowledge it—is only acting logically when he also calls it in question here.'

It is fair to the writer to add a slight concession which he goes on to make:

'No one is therefore called upon to deny that the ancient Church, in its New Testament, brought together *on the whole* that which was from a religious point of view the most valuable, and *on the whole* that which was also the oldest and therefore in a documentary sense the most important not only of the literature that is known to us, but of all that was in circulation at the time, and that it formed a collection that is deserving of all praise. But this verdict includes the admission that the boundary lines between the canonical and the nearest extra-canonical literature are at all points altogether fluctuating.'

In order to follow up the consequences drawn from these premisses, it is worth while to quote one more paragraph:

'If, then, we are not to embrace the New Testament writings under the point of view of "an experience after the fact," which has nothing to do with their original character, they must not be considered as canonical, but only as writings that appertain to primitive Christianity. . . . The boundary line for the subject-matter of our science should be drawn at the point where a real break begins to appear in the literature. The standard for this is naturally not to be sought in religious value.'*

This is trenchant and clear enough in all conscience. The writer is certainly right in basing his argument upon the abandonment of the idea of Inspiration. If that idea is thrown over, the consequences as he states them really follow. But ought we to throw over that idea?

Here again it is fair to observe that, when the writer speaks of 'striking out the idea of inspiration,' he probably means the full dogmatic conception of verbal inerrancy as it was asserted or reasserted in the 16th century. But we have already tried to show (p. 571[a]) that this was from the first an extension, and an undue extension, of the original idea. The Christian is not called upon to go beyond this idea; and, by adhering to it, he keeps within the range of what is strictly verifiable.

2. The reply.—It is true that no book either of the New Testament or of the Old 'was born with the predicate "canonical."' But we are prepared to maintain that all the books both of OT and NT, though no doubt with very considerable differences of degree, were born with the qualities which caused them to be labelled 'canonical'; in other words, with the marks that are summed up under the name of Inspiration. In sketching the history of the two Testaments, we have tried to indicate what those marks are. We have tried to show how at each point in the history there was a certain character impressed upon the literature which in due course came to be recognized as justifying its inclusion within the conception of a Sacred Book. It may be well for us to go back upon this character, and to consider it no longer—or, no longer primarily—in connexion with its place in the history, but with reference to its permanent validity among the body of Christian ideas and Christian doctrines.

(1) *The human aspect of Inspiration.*—If we were to try to sum up in a single word the common property which runs through the whole Bible, and which, broadly speaking, may be said to distinguish it from other literature of the kind, we might say that it consists in the peculiar energy and intensity of the *God-consciousness* apparent in the writers. A general term like this will perhaps best embrace the different modes and degrees in which this consciousness manifests itself. It is true that in some of the books there is such a shading-away of degree that it may be questioned whether those particular books are rightly included in the Canon, just as there are so many analogous phenomena in some books outside the Canon as to raise a doubt whether they are rightly excluded from it. It cannot be claimed that the judgment of the Jewish and Christian Churches is infallible. All we can say is that it is sufficiently near for practical purposes. On the whole, posterity has confirmed the original verdict within those limits of approximation which usually obtain in human affairs. For the purpose of our inquiry we may take the Canon as it stands.

From the question of degree we pass to the question of different kinds or modes. We may distinguish the inspiration, or God-consciousness, of the prophet, of the lawgiver, of the psalmist, of the wise man, of the apostle or prophet of NT. Of all these, as we have said, that of the prophet is perhaps the most characteristic. We call it so, not because it is essentially higher than other kinds, but chiefly because it is more easily recognized and described. The God-consciousness of a lawgiver like Moses must have been quite as strong and quite as penetrating as that of an Isaiah; but the difference is that, whereas in the case of Isaiah we can see the mind of the prophet at work behind the word in which the influence of the Holy Spirit has found enduring expression, in the case of Moses anything so clear and definite as this eludes our search, and we have to be content with inferences backwards from analogies for which we have more contemporary attestation. We are more fortunately situated again in the case of the NT apostles. There once more we can see the mind of the writer at work, and form some conception of the intensity with which it works. The chief drawback in the case of Psalms or Wisdom Books is the anonymity of the writers, which makes the evidence they supply comparatively fragmentary and limited. And yet some of the Psalms can hardly be surpassed for depth and intimacy of communion with God.

The characteristic feature in the writing prophets is the unwavering confidence with which they assume their own commission from God. When they speak, the language they use is as though God Himself were speaking through them. We repeat that even this language does not proceed from a higher level of spiritual experience than that of St. Paul. No words either of OT or of NT enter into competition with those which we call 'words of the Lord.' We only treat the prophetic utterances as typical and as lending themselves more easily to analysis and comparison.

Looking at them in this sense, we observe that they do in fact stand alone in religious literature. For the assurance with which they are spoken, for the coherence and continuity which they present spread over a succession of centuries, for beneficence of effect upon the religious history of a people, for the impressiveness which they still retain as we look back upon them, they are practically unique.

To put all this at its lowest term, to say only that the Prophetic Books of OT were books composed under these psychological conditions, is still to claim that they are *sui generis*. The Christian looks back upon them still as he looks back on no other books besides.

Doubtless the view which the prophets took of their own calling has in it an element belonging to

* W. Wrede, *Über Aufgabe u. Methode d. sog. neutest. Theologie* (Göttingen, 1897), p. 11 f.

the time at which they spoke and wrote. Even so, that element does in some ways only strengthen their claim. It is very doubtful whether the experience of modern times will ever supply anew examples of such complete concentration of thought and aim upon the things of religion. We must allow for this utter concentration as an advantage which they possessed and which is not likely to be possessed again.

Of all the books which have attempted a psychological analysis of the prophetic consciousness, the present writer does not know one that grapples with the ultimate problem more directly than A. B. Davidson's *Old Testament Prophecy* (Edinburgh, 1903). Dr. Davidson asks some searching questions:

'When God spake to a prophet, was the latter conscious of two things, namely, of the fact that God was speaking, and also of what He spake? When the word of God came to him, did its being the word of God manifest itself to him in some distinctive manner, apart altogether from the contents? Or rather, was not the feeling of the prophet in all probability something like our own,—that double kind of feeling which we express by saying that any opinion we have is *God's truth*? . . . The same question would arise as to the kind of pressure under which the prophet felt himself to be. Did the kind of feeling he had of impulse to speak differ from the feeling men still have of impulse to utter any pressing truth that lies upon them, such men as fervent, religious teachers, or lofty, earnest statesmen? And when truth suddenly dawned upon the prophet's mind, which formerly he strove unsuccessfully to reach by means of reflexion, did the feeling he had at such a moment differ from the feel-' ig men still have when, oftentimes in peculiarly spontaneous frames of mind, difficulties are broken up, and problems solved almost involuntarily, which before resisted all conscious and direct efforts of the mind?' (*op. cit.* p. 111 f.).

We may pause for a moment to remark that, when a modern writer or speaker in order to strengthen an asseveration describes it as 'God's truth,' he is probably influenced by the traditional estimate of the Bible, and means that what he is saying is as true as if it were written in the Bible; in other words, it corresponds to the highest conception that he has of truth.

There is no reason to deprecate these modern analogies. In the effort to enter into the mental state of the prophets, we can but start from the nearest experience of our own; and the cases described are the nearest to which we have access. They bear the same kind of relation to our modern habits of thought as the language used by the prophets bears to theirs. We have seen that there was an element in their presuppositions which is wanting or much feebler in our own. That element really fits into their place in history; it is part and parcel of their whole conception of God and the world, and in particular of the relation of the Divine call to themselves. The main question that we have still to ask is, how far this conception of theirs was in agreement with the facts. But that carries us on to the next subject of our inquiry, the estimate of the prophetic message (as typical of the whole Biblical revelation) when it is seen from the side of God rather than of man.

(2) *The Divine aspect of Inspiration.*—The question that we now proceed to ask amounts to saying, Were the prophets, and the other Biblical writers represented by them, justified in the claim they make to speak for God, to use the kind of language that naturally issues from special communion with Him? Granting that this language was from their point of view wholly sincere, does it appear to be warranted when it is regarded from the other side—the side of God's providential ordering of the world and of history? We shall apply two criteria: (*a*) Is it a credible mode of statement that God has held this kind of communication with man? and (*b*) Does the Bible in particular commend itself as embodying such communication? Taking as a concise expression of the Biblical theory the famous passage He 1$^{1f.}$ 'God, having of old time spoken unto the fathers in the prophets by divers portions and in divers manners, hath at the end of these days spoken unto us in his Son,' can that still be accepted as a reasonable description from the double point of view that has just been stated?

(*a*) The question is whether, allowing for the naive and simple language of primitive times, the idea of God speaking to man and through man still expresses a substantial truth. Given a spiritual interpretation of the universe, assuming that behind the world of phenomena there is a supreme Spirit which has brought it into being, there has been a wide-spread belief that this Spirit desires to be known, and has caused itself to be known, by the most intelligent of its own creatures. It is a modern expression of this belief when the poet says:

'Speak to Him thou for He hears, and Spirit with spirit can meet—
Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet.'

The whole idea of Spirit 'speaking to' spirit is, of course, metaphor; the operations of spirit cannot be described otherwise. But if we think of the spirit of man as personal, and if we are obliged to invest the Spirit of God with personal attributes, then it must be allowed that the wide-spread belief to which we have referred harmonizes with the rest of our conception of the relation of God to man.

But if we are to suppose that God has 'spoken to' man, how should He speak? How should Spirit speak to spirit? Surely it is very credible that the method of communication chosen might well be through the influence of the higher Spirit upon the lower, not in equal degree upon all individuals but pre-eminently upon some. That is the way in which the Bible appears to describe the relation of God to man; and, simple as the language is, it seems very difficult to improve upon it. Science does not as yet seem capable of describing the facts of the case in more appropriate terms.

(*b*) But then we have also to ask whether the Biblical revelation, as we call it, is of such a kind as to approve itself to us as rational beings. As the course of it is now unrolled before us according to critical views (so far as they can be justified) of OT and NT history, there certainly does seem to be a broad correspondence between this department and other departments of God's dealings with His creatures. The history of the inorganic universe presents what we call a process of evolution; the history of life on the earth up to the advent of man is also expressed in terms of evolution; man himself as a social being has developed in accordance with ascertainable laws; and when we come to consider him as a religious being, we find again that his career has been on the whole one of gradual and progressive advance. At the present stage of our knowledge and apprehension all this appears to be homogeneous and consistent. The different parts of the Divine economy tell the same kind of story. The Christian faith, as its data lie before us in the Bible, seems, naturally and without forcing, so to fall into its place in relation to the rest of the development as to furnish it with its fitting completion or crown. Everything may not as yet have been worked out to our full satisfaction; but it seems in a fair way to be, and there are at least no valid grounds for supposing that any other mode of statement of the culminating stages of religious history will be established in preference to it. This seems to be as good verification as we can expect to have.

If we look steadily at the contents of the Bible from this point of view of 'an increasing purpose,' they seem quite worthy to have come from God. If we take them as a revelation of what God Himself is and of the method of His dealings with mankind, and if we bear in mind that this revelation has

been gradual and progressive, it is difficult to conceive one that could have been better or more completely congruous with the expansion of human thought as a whole. There is impressed upon the writings which make up the Bible a breadth and variety, an intensity and purity of religious life, that are without parallel in any other literature in the world. That is the fact which we seek to express in the doctrine of Inspiration. We know no other explanation for it than a special action of the Spirit of God. That may well be a way of speaking that is relative and imperfect. The Holy Spirit is not bound. It is not confined to any one channel. It permeates all forms of life, one after this manner and another after that. It is the same Spirit, though there are diversities of working. These diversities, or the names that we give them, are relative to our human apprehension, which cannot help classifying and defining. It cannot help observing what it calls 'degrees' and 'kinds' of operation. And this particular kind of operation that we see in the Bible is at once the highest and the most powerful that we know. It is a movement of the Divine Spirit through a long succession of human spirits, a movement which the poetic imagination of the Biblical writers themselves compared to the *wind*. And for us too that old illustration has acquired a new point. We understand more now of the nature of wind, and the analogy becomes all the more forcible. We think of a current of air, drawing in from the wide seas, charged with fresh supplies of ozone and all the other chemical constituents that vitalize and strengthen the activities of heart and brain. Such a vitalizing, such a strengthening, was that gift of God which we call Inspiration. We see the results; we can only imagine the process, and express it in the tongue of the children of men.

3. Correction of older views.—The progress of knowledge is progress in accuracy of description and definition. There are certain fundamental thoughts, wide-spread in space and time, going back to remote antiquity, and common to many races of men. The idea of an inspired and sacred Book is one of these thoughts. The common name 'inspiration' covers all its varied meaning; just as the common name 'God' covers a whole gamut of conceptions from lowest to highest. As time has gone on, the conception of God has been sifted and purified, and a like process must take place with the idea of Inspiration. It is certainly not to be denied or rejected; but it must be brought into closer correspondence with the facts.

Necessarily at first the idea was vague, figurative, and (if we must call it so) crude. To the prophet Ezekiel there is given a roll of a book which he is commanded to eat (Ezk 2^{9}–3^{3}). This is a very concrete and symbolic way of saying that he must absorb into himself a message which he is charged to deliver. In that period 'between the Testaments,' when the idea of an inspired book definitely crystallized, the attributes that most stood out were those of authority and infallibility. A book that came from God must needs be in all respects authoritative and infallible. It was an instinctive rather than a reasoned idea; but so instinctive and so natural that it held sway more or less completely for about twenty centuries. But in the course of last century it came gradually to be seen that this conception does not hold good. There are certainly some ways—many ways—in which the Bible is not infallible, and therefore not in the strict sense authoritative. More and more the authority of the Bible has come to be restricted to the spheres of ethics and religion. But more and more it is coming to be seen that, even within these spheres, allowance must be made for difference of times. All expression, even the most perfect in its kind, is necessarily conditioned by the sum-total of the body of thought of the period to which it belongs; and it has to be *translated* into the corresponding language of each succeeding period. It is impossible simply to transfer, in crude blocks without change, the thought of one age into another. From this point of view we do not so naturally look at things under the category of *authority*. It might be said that, in place of the category of authority, we think rather of the process of *assimilation*. The main question for us in these days is how much we can assimilate of the Bible. And when we speak of assimilation, we mean an act of the whole man, intellect, emotions, and will. That is the great problem before us. The working out of it is for us as the breath of life. And the material that the Bible supplies to us is as rich and as abundant as ever it was in the ages of most implicit and unquestioning faith. Our questions are not—or at least ought not to be—the questions of doubt, but only the throes and efforts of a more scientific, *i.e.* of a more accurate, apprehension.

LITERATURE.—The books of which the writer has made most use in the second half of this article are Deissmann, *Licht vom Osten* (Tübingen, 1908); Heinrici, *Der litter. Charakter d. neutest. Schriften* (Leipzig, 1908). A. B. Davidson's posthumous *OT Prophecy* (Edinburgh, 1903), from which some interesting extracts have been made, suffers as a whole from the fact that it consists of lectures spread over a considerable period of time, and all parts of it are not equally critical. Many other books might have been used: *e.g.* the *Einleitungen* of Jülicher, Weiss, Zahn, and Barth, Jülicher's 'Religion Jesu' (in *Kultur d. Gegenwart*, I. Abt. 4), and tracts on *Die Entstehung d. NT*, by H. J. Holtzmann (1904), C. Clemen (1906), W. Wrede (1907). But the subject is one that the writer has had before his mind ever since he wrote his *Oracles of God* (1889) and Bampton Lectures on *Inspiration* (1893), and he thought it better to state independently the views at which he has himself arrived.

W. SANDAY.

BIBLE IN THE CHURCH.

[E. VON DOBSCHÜTZ.]

Introduction.

I. Origin of the Bible.
  1. Church and Synagogue; the OT.
  2. The NT.
  3. The OT and the NT.

II. Spread of the Bible.
  1. Transmission.
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VII. The Bible in the Life of the People.
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  3. Bible and Law.
  4. Bible and Art.
  5. Bible and Hostile Influences.

Introduction.—Libraries might be filled with the literature to which the little book which we call the Bible or 'the Book' has given rise, and every day witnesses some new contribution to it. But no one as yet has made a comprehensive investigation of the influence which it has exerted upon the Christian Church and the life of Christian peoples

as a whole. For a long time no such question was felt to arise. Attention was confined to the theological teaching on the Bible in the Church, and then to the history of exposition, the Text and the Versions. One or two special problems were also discussed. Strictly speaking, the only comprehensive treatment of the subject is M. Kähler's *Gesch. der Bibel in ihrer Wirkung auf die Kirche, ein Vorschlag*, 1902, further developed as a contribution towards the establishing of the authority of Holy Scripture in *Dogmatische Zeitfragen*[2] (i. *Zur Bibelfrage*, 1907, pp. 266–435). What Kähler sets forth in a general way, and with the definite theological purpose of showing the significance of the Bible for the Church ('testimonium Spiritus Sancti in ecclesia'), needs to be worked out in detail and from a purely historical standpoint. The author of this article hopes to do this; but there is much preliminary work to be done, and the following sketch may induce some one to take it in hand.

The best method would be to trace the Bible in the Christian Church down through the centuries and give an account of its history. But in the narrow limits to which this article must be confined, the manifold effects produced by the Bible will come to light more clearly if we deal with each sphere separately. It must be added that the ordinary division of Church History into ancient (to 600), mediæval (to the Reformation), and modern does not by any means correspond to the separate lines which we have to follow. It is true that the Reformation is an important factor in all that is concerned with the effect of the Bible on piety, and perhaps also on public life. But it was not till the time of the 'Enlightenment' (about 1750) that the learned investigation of the Bible altered the methods which it had followed from the first. While our divisions, therefore, must be determined by the subject-matter, we shall endeavour to treat every topic in its historical development.

LITERATURE.—Apart from Kähler, reference can be made only to popular literature, mostly from Bible Societies: A. Ostertag, *Die Bibel und ihre Gesch.*, Basel, 1853, [3] 1857, [5] 1892, tr. into Fr. by Dufour with pref. by Guizot, 1857; L. N. R. (Mrs. Ellen Ranyard), *The Book and its Story*, Lond. 1853, tr. into Germ. by G. T. Phillips, with pref. by Krummacher, Elberfeld, 1858, also into Fr., 1861; H. von der Goltz, *Die universale Bedeutung der Bibel*, 1865; B. F. Westcott, *The Bible in the Church*, 1889; M. Kähler, *Die Bibel das Buch der Menschheit*, 1904; O. Zöckler, *Die Bibel in der Gesch. des Glaubens*, 1900; H. Vollmer, *Vom Lesen und Deuten heiliger Schriften*, 1907. L. Diestel's masterly *Gesch. des AT in der Christlichen Kirche*, 1869, and Ed. Reuss's *Gesch. der heil. Schriften des NT*[6], 1885, are standard works of German scholarship; they deal, however, only with parts of the subject. Reference should here be made also to *Die Bibel, Ursprache u. Übersetzungen* (from Hauck's *PRE*[3] ii., iii.), Leipzig, 1900, and art. 'Bible' in Hastings' *DB*. The *Catalogue of the Brit. Mus.* is very valuable for its bibliography on this subject: *Bible*, 1892, Appendix, 1899; also the *Hist. Cat. of the Br. and For. Bib. Soc.*, vol. i. (Eng.) 1903.

I. *ORIGIN OF THE BIBLE.*—1. **Church and Synagogue; the Old Testament.**—Christianity came from the lap of Judaism. It received from its mother a sacred book with definite ideas about it and a complete system of exposition.

The sacred writings of the Synagogue existed in twofold form. The foundation was formed by the Torah, or Law of Moses, the highest authority for faith and morals, worship and questions of law, since the proclamation under Josiah in B.C. 621. It reached its final form in the time of Ezra and Nehemiah (*c.* 430). About the year B.C. 200 there were added to this the Prophets, consisting of the four earlier—Joshua, Judges, Samuel, Kings—and the four later—Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Isaiah, the twelve Minor Prophets; and some time later a collection of writings of various content, *Kethubim* or *Hagiographa*. Designations like 'the Law,' 'the Law and the Prophets,' 'the Law and the Prophets and the other books of our fathers' (prol. to Sir.), to denote the whole Bible, show the gradual stages of its development, and also certain differences of value within the unity. At the time of Christ this stage was already reached by the Rabbis of Palestine. The discussions in the 2nd cent. A.D. about the canonicity of Ezekiel and the Song of Solomon have to do with the question of exclusion, and show that the formation of the Canon was not a matter of collection but of selection. The aim of the Canon was to winnow the materials to hand, and the motive was doctrine, not devotion. In the Greek Diaspora the development was not quite the same. As can be clearly learned from Philo, strict canonicity was accorded only to the Torah, which was translated as early as the time of Ptolemy Philadelphus (B.C. 285–247). Alongside of it, however, there was in use a much larger range of writings, mostly translated from the Hebrew, though a few of them were written in Greek, and all possessed of a *quasi*-canonical value. These were classified upon a different principle—historical, poetical, prophetic. It is an older stage of development that is represented in the sole authority of the Torah with the addition of an unsifted mass of other writings; but development went on here also, and the idea of canonical value passed from the Torah to the rest.

This twofold form of the Jewish Bible was full of significance for Christianity. Jesus, His first disciples, and the Jewish Christians of Palestine, understood by the Bible the Hebrew form of it used by the Rabbis. What Paul and Gentile Christians possessed was the Greek Bible in the Alexandrian form, including, *e.g.*, the Wisdom of Solomon.* But the knowledge that there was another form of the Bible never disappeared in the Gentile Church. In the year 170, Melito, bishop of Sardis, brought home with him from a journey to Palestine a list of the OT books which alone were recognized there (Eusebius, *HE* iv. 26. 14). Origen gives a similar list in comments on Ps 1 (*ib.* vi. 25. 2). Eusebius himself owed his knowledge to Josephus (*HE* iii. 10). But neither he, nor Athanasius (*Epist. fest.* 39, A.D. 367), nor any other Greek Father made any practical use of his knowledge. To them the Holy Scripture was the Greek Bible. It was otherwise in the case of Jerome. As he went back upon the Hebrew original, he took over the canon of his Hebrew teachers. His influence in the Western Church served to keep the knowledge of this difference between the Hebrew and the Greek Bibles alive, and more and more taste inclined to the Hebrew *veritas*. The Reformation brought the crisis. Luther followed Jerome in making a sharp separation between the canonical books and the 'Apocrypha,' but nevertheless incorporated the latter in the Bible as 'useful to read.' On the other hand, at the Council of Trent (Sess. iv., 8th Apr. 1546), Catholicism took the last step in the line of tradition, and did away with every shade of difference between the various books of the wider Canon. The Calvinists proceeded on a different line, and, breaking away from tradition, simply removed the Apocrypha from the Bible altogether. Thus they became victims of a vague and wrong use of the word 'Apocrypha,' which they owed to Jerome. To-day the British and Foreign Bible Society prints the Bible without the Apocrypha. The Bibles which the Continental societies distribute contain it, as did also the Bible upon which King Edward VII. took the oath at his accession; and the Anglican Church appoints regular lessons from the Apocrypha. In these diverging practices we see reflected the difference between the Canon of the Palestinian Rabbis and that of the Diaspora.

* On the extent to which the Wisdom of Solomon influenced St. Paul see Ed. Grafe, *Theol. Abhandlungen* dedicated to C. v Weizsäcker, 1892.

The idea of the Canon of the Holy Scripture involves its unconditional authority as the regulative principle of all thought and action. The ground of this authority is always found in its Divine origin—a phrase which can be understood in very different ways. Neither in Judaism nor in Christianity is it ever claimed for the Bible that it 'fell complete from heaven,' as it is among the Elkesaites, though at a later date Christianity knew something of 'letters from heaven.' Its historical origin was too clearly seen in the book itself. Moses, no doubt, is said to have received from God the tables on which the commandments were inscribed, but elsewhere he names himself as the author of the Torah; and so it was also with the prophets and the books which go by their names. No distinction was made between prophetic inspiration and literary activity. The latter was conceived as following mechanically upon the Divine dictation, so that Moses was able to describe his own death. But this was not enough. Even the minimum of human and historical that was involved in the recognition of different authors was stripped off by the growth of legend, which affirmed that by the help of Divine inspiration Ezra restored the whole body of writings lost at the destruction of Jerusalem. This brought the unity of the Canon into relief even in its origin. The Diaspora did not tarry behind this rabbinical development of the idea of inspiration. The story of the 72 (70) translators, which was originally applied only to the Pentateuch, was extended to the whole OT, and had added to it these further features: that the 70 translators did their work separated from one another, that they all finished at the same moment with a loud Amen, and that the 70 copies were found to be in entire agreement.* This is a conception of inspiration quite in line with that which we find in the legend of Ezra. The young Gentile Church viewed the Greek Bible, the so-called Septuagint, as immediately inspired, and not merely as derived from an inspired original.

The third point is that this high estimation of the Bible decided the course which its exposition was to take. It was not a matter of arriving at the historical meaning and import of the author's words, but of making the Divine thoughts and demands conveyed by them fruitful in lessons for the present. The exposition of the Rabbis was composed in the main of *halakha*, that is to say, of practical interpretation of the Law, the purpose being to arrive at stricter rules, and so to erect a fence round the Torah. The great aim of Biblical scholarship was to hang mountains of *halakha* upon every tittle of the Law. This was done by combining the most various passages and by paying attention to the most external coincidences and haphazard details, and was bound to lead directly away from the original purport of the Law. Another kind of exposition was the so-called *haggada*. It was similar in method but different in aim, not legal, but doctrinal or theological. It sought to explain away all expressions in the Bible which offended current theological views and practices, *e.g.* anthropomorphisms, anthropopathisms, departures from ordinary custom, and other features which belonged often to an older stage of development. Over and above that which lay to hand in the Bible, it wove with bold fancy an entirely legendary history. The two methods agree in treating the single verse or even the single word as sufficient in itself, and in allowing themselves to be guided by any arbitrary combination. The so-called 7 Rules of Hermeneutics, which are said to be given by Hillel, and enlarged to 13 by R. Ishmael, to 32 by R. Eliezer, are only an attempt to form this arbitrary method into a system.

Here, too, the Greek Diaspora took a way of its own. The Greek philosophical schools, and the Stoics in particular, had developed a system of allegorizing the venerable texts of antiquity so as to impart to them a modern sense. Besides the meaning which appeared on the surface, the words of Homer were credited with a second significance—the really important one. Zeus stood for the world, or the soul, or immaterial existence. From his head sprang Athene or Gnosis.* The fights and love-adventures of the gods were to be treated as symbolic of cosmological and psychological facts. Homer would be guilty of impiety if he did not mean this to be done (*πάντως γὰρ ἠσέβησεν, εἰ μηδὲν ἀλληγόρησεν*, pseudo-Heraclit. *Alleg. Homer*, 1). It was easy to transfer this method to the Bible, and with the help of allegory it was possible to demonstrate in Moses the Platonic or the Stoic system, or a system which borrowed from both. Such is the course taken by Philo—just as arbitrary as the Rabbinical method, but yet different, and, if we may say so, more systematic, because Greek in spirit. The Rabbis started from the text and made this or that of it as chance directed. In the case of Philo, what he had to unfold from the text was fixed from the beginning, or rather what he had to read into it in order that he might find it there. Primitive Christian exegesis followed these two paths. The method of Jesus, despite all His originality, and also the Pauline method, remind us of the Rabbis. In the Ep. to the Hebrews and in the Ep. of Barnabas we see the Alexandrian method clearly. And yet there does exist a difference, not so much of method as of aim. While the aim of the Rabbis is always a *halakha* or a *haggada*, and while Philo leans towards the ideas of his own eclectic philosophy, Christian exegesis takes its direction from the person of Christ. The whole OT is a witness to Him. Jesus treats it thus, and so do His disciples. Through the influence of this notion, it happened that Jesus was Himself conceived as the originator of this witness, and identified with the inspiring Spirit of God; *οἱ προφῆται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἔχοντες τὴν χάριν εἰς αὐτὸν ἐπροφήτευσαν* (Barn. v. 6). Notwithstanding the unhistorical nature of the exegesis, it thus contains a historical element. There is a reciprocal effect of prophecy and fulfilment which gives rise to typology. It is true that this method shares the defects of allegory: the words are given another sense than that which really belongs to them. But, as distinguished from allegory, it makes good its claim to existence, because, proceeding upon a pre-established harmony between the two, it gives to history a real as well as a typological value. Philo finds in Abraham only the idea of wisdom and piety, while Paul sees in him the father of the faithful, with a faith which was in principle the same as that of Christians. It is allegorizing when Paul simply dispenses in 1 Co 9^9 with the literal sense of Dt 25^4, and when Barnabas interprets the commandments respecting food in the same moral fashion as the Neo-Pythagoreans. It is typology, however, when in 1 Co 10^{1-11} Paul treats the history of the Exodus as actual but at the same time typical. We find the same thing in the Epistle to the Hebrews, with its doctrine of the provisional but widely significant character of the OT expiatory sacrifices. It is neither rabbinical nor Philonic.

The method of using the Holy Scripture in Divine service was developed also in the Synagogue. There were the readings from the Law (*Parashiyôth*)

* For the various forms of this legend see the passages collected in P. Wendland's *Aristeæ Epistula*, 1900, p. 85 ff.

* Cornutus, *Theologiæ Græcæ Compendium*, ed. C. Lange, 1881; *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, coll. by von Arnim; H. Vollmer, *Vom Lesen u. Deuten heil. Schriften*, 7–11.

and the Prophets (*Haphtarôth*), the Targum, or translation in the popular tongue, and the Midrash, or devotional exposition. The Synagogue practised the singing of psalms, and its liturgy had a Biblical form. All these the primitive Christian Church took over and enriched with additions of its own.

Already, too, there were to be found in Judaism the private study of the Law, the regulation of the whole life by *halakha*, and the misuse of the Bible for magical ends which its deification made inevitable. This was the case in other religions possessed of sacred books—Islām, Buddhism, and Parsiism—and cannot be regarded as brought over straight from Judaism. Similar ideas give rise to similar customs.

LITERATURE.—W. Robertson Smith, *The OT in the Jewish Church*[2], 1892 (Germ. tr. by J. W. Rothstein, 1894); Fr. Buhl, *Kanon und Text des AT*, 1891; B. Duhm, *Die Entstehung des AT*, 1897; K. Budde, *Der Kanon des AT*, 1900; H. B. Swete, *An Introd. to the OT in Greek*[2], 1902; W. Riedel, *AT Untersuch.* i., 1902, p. 90 ff., 'Einteilungen des AT Kanons'; H. E. Ryle, *The Canon of the OT*, 1902.

ON RABBINIC INTERPRETATION: F. Weber, *Jüd. Theol.*[2], 1897, 109 ff.; W. Bacher, *Agada der Tannaiten*[2], 1903, *Exeget. Terminologie der jüd. Traditionslitt.*, 1905; C. Siegfried, *Philo von Alex. als Ausleger des AT*, 1875; H. E. Ryle, *Philo on Holy Scripture*, 1895; *JE* iii. 162–174.

2. **The New Testament.**—Christianity added a New Testament to the Old. Like most great founders of religion, Jesus left nothing written behind Him, nor did He give His disciples any commission to write. Mt 28[20], Mk 14[9], 1 Co 1[17] have reference to oral teaching. The pen first became necessary to correspond with distant Churches and to record memories of Jesus as the number of eye-witnesses decreased. Neither Paul nor the Evangelists think of placing their writings on a level with those of the OT. That distinction might rather be claimed for the Revelation of St. John, which, as the work of a Christian prophet, contains a revelation of God like the OT (cf. Rev 22[18f.] with Dt 4[2]). To be sure, inspiration is also claimed by a Christian community for its epistle of exhortation addressed to a sister Church (Rome to Corinth, 1 Clem. lix. 1, lxiii. 2). The Pauline Epistles as well as those of the martyr Ignatius were perhaps collected in the lifetime of their authors, and the four Gospels were put together soon after the appearance of the fourth. At meetings for Divine service these were read like the OT. But so also were new letters as they came to hand, and prophetic writings like Hermas (see p. 602). This was not yet the same thing as a NT alongside of the Old. That did not come about until a sharp distinction was drawn between canonical and uncanonical, authoritative and unauthoritative compositions. The deciding consideration was not liturgical use, but dogmatic authority. A holy book of revelation was required as the foundation of ecclesiastical doctrine. Marcion, who rejected the OT, made a Bible for his reformed Christian Church out of 'the Gospel' and 'the Apostle.' In opposition to this, the Catholic Church formed a NT consisting of the four Gospels, the Pauline Epistles (including the Pastoral Epistles), the Catholic Epistles, the Acts of the Apostles, and the Revelation of St. John, and placed it alongside of the OT. This NT grew to form a unity with the OT, shared the dogmatic value placed upon it, and was subjected to the same expository system. In this sense the Bible was complete by the time of the old Catholic Fathers—Irenæus, Tertullian, Clement. The notion of a Canon in this sense is first found in Origen. Here, too, it can be observed that the formation of the Canon was more a matter of choosing than of collecting. The Muratorian Fragment, where the first actual list of Canonical books is found, excludes the Apocalypse of Hermas, and mentions that the Apocalypse of Peter is already rejected by some people. Down to the 5th cent. the question was whether single books were not to be expunged. Learned interests and ecclesiastical practice were often found to be in opposition, and the result was a compromise like the Canon of Eusebius (*HE* iii. 25). In the case of Athanasius (*Epist. fest.* 39) and in the West, ecclesiastical considerations had the preponderance. In spite of the Church's adherence to the idea of the Canon, there was no lack of patience shown towards local differences in its composition. The Syrian Church acknowledged two, at most three, of the seven Catholic Epistles. The Alexandrian Church would have nothing to do with the Revelation of St. John, which was so highly prized in the West. The result of this was scholarly disputation, but no disturbance of the Church's unity. Finally, as in the case of the Calendar, a compromise between the chief Churches, Rome and Alexandria, was almost universally accepted.

LITERATURE.—B. F. Westcott, *Canon of the NT*, 1855 (⁶1889), out of date; Th. Zahn, *Gesch. des NT Kanons*, 1888–92, *Grundriss*[2], 1904; A. Harnack, *Das NT um das Jahr 200*, 1889; H. Holtzmann, *Die Entstehung des NT*, 1904; H. Lietzmann, *Wie wurden die Bücher des NT h. Schrift?* 1907; J. Leipoldt, *Gesch. des NT Kanons*, 1907; C. R. Gregory, *Canon and Text*, 1907; W. Bauer, *Der Apostolos der Syrer*, 1903.

3. **Old and New Testament.**—Thus from about A.D. 180 the Christian Church possessed a Bible composed of two parts of different origin, one taken over and one formed by itself. What this meant is best shown by a comparison with the Muhammadan Qur'ān. There an entirely new book of purely native origin, and containing the revelation of the prophet Muhammad himself, takes the place of the religious books of the Jews and the Christians.

Christianity has strongly opposed every attempt to remove the OT, and will oppose, too, the modern Marcionitism. It lays stress upon the close relationship of the two parts (see III. 3), and rightly so. The OT is the pledge of historical continuity, and without it Jesus and primitive Christianity cannot be understood. It is a safeguard against such arbitrary interpretations of the NT as are inspired by Greek philosophy, syncretic mysteriosophy, and modern speculation or mysticism.

It has to be admitted that the union of the two involves a great danger, into which from time to time the Church has fallen. When, instead of their close relationship, their unity or identity is maintained, Christian worship is bound to sink to the level of the pre-Christian and inferior religion of the OT. The legal or formal conception of religion, so natural to mankind, and believed in the OT to be the object of Divine desire, can easily obscure the elevation and purity of the gospel ideal.

LITERATURE.—E. Kautzsch, *Die bleibende Bedeutung des AT*, 1901 (²1902); Ed. Grafe, *Das Urchristentum u. das AT*, 1907; M. Kähler, *Dogmat. Zeitfragen*[2], i. 279 ff.; R. L. Ottley, *Some Aspects of the OT*, 1897.

II. *SPREAD OF THE BIBLE.*—In the OT the Church received a book which existed in many and often very different copies. The Gospels and the Apocalypses were probably published in numerous copies to begin with. The Epistles were originally intended neither to be preserved nor to be multiplied, but it was not long before they came to be looked upon as Holy Scripture. The Church had the great task laid upon it of preserving and circulating all these various writings which, outwardly separate, were one in spirit.

1. **Transmission.**—For the multiplication of Bibles the Christians, like the Jews of earlier times probably, were at the outset entirely dependent upon voluntary labour. Any one who wished to possess a copy of the Scriptures had to make it himself or ask some brother to do so for him. It was only later, when well-to-do people associated themselves with the Church, that the

Bible came to be dealt in by booksellers in the ordinary way of business. A number of slaves, trained for the purpose in tachygraphy and calligraphy, were placed by a friend at Origen's disposal. His friend Pamphilus got copies of many books made, and then he corrected the copies himself.* It was his custom to carry Bibles about with him, and present them to people. Reference is also made to the purchase of Bibles or parts of the Bible (pseudo-Justin, *Quæst. ad Orth.* 134). The copying of Scripture soon came to be considered a peculiarly pious labour, and was largely undertaken by ascetics, *e.g.* the younger Melania.† Next to episcopal seats the monasteries were the great homes of Bible-copying, and before long of all kinds of literary work. So it was in the East at Constantinople in the monastery of Studium, and in the North in Russia, where, in the grotto-monasteries at Kiev, Hilarion made copies of books, while Theodosius devoted himself to prayer or span wool for the binding;‡ and even as far away as Sicily and Calabria, where the transmission of the Bible was marked by special characteristics of writing and text. So it was also in the West, where we are coming to discover with increasing clearness the differences which distinguished the various monastic schools. In the more ancient monastic foundations writing was confined to the younger men, the elders giving themselves entirely to prayer. Later on, and not with any advantage to the work, copying was often made a penance. Charlemagne showed his greatness by attending to even this small matter, and decreed that the Holy Scriptures should be copied only by grown-up men, and not by schoolboys (capit. A.D. 789, 72; 805, 3). With the rise of the universities in the 13th cent. the booksellers pushed the now profitable industry of Bible-production. It is to a bookseller's enterprise that we owe the so-called Paris Bible, whose appearance, with its divisions into chapters and other apparatus, was epoch-making in the West.§ Besides this, the Brothers of the Common Life (*q.v.*), a community founded by Gerard Groot († 1384), were very industrious as copyists.

Naturally it made a great difference whether a copy was made for one's own use or as a business order, for a private or for an ecclesiastical purpose. The MSS which have been preserved exhibit every grade from the crudest to the costliest. Two significant stages are to be noted. There was, in the first place, the change from papyrus, which was employed in the first three centuries for the Bible, to parchment. This involved the further change from roll to book form, books of papyrus being exceptional. The Church's multiplication of Bibles seems to have been largely responsible for the change. In the second place, there was the transition from parchment to paper, which had been making its way from the East since the 9th cent., but was only at a late date adopted for the Bible. There are no Greek paper MSS before the 13th cent., and no Latin ones before the 14th, while parchment codices remain in the majority up to the 15th century. Like the material, the style of writing also undergoes alteration. The flowing current hand of daily life is hardly met with in copies of the Bible. It is possible that the originals were written thus, but copies intended for reading in public all exhibit the somewhat more dignified style proper to books. First, there is the uncial, which after the 9th cent. yielded slowly and with peculiar transitional forms to the minuscule. Several MSS are known which are partly minuscule and partly majuscule (*e.g.* 566 and Λ of the Gospels; in the Gospel MS X the text is majuscule, the commentary minuscule; in other cases the marginal scholia added to the minuscule text are often written in very fine majuscule). In the West we have, at the transition from capitals and majuscule to minuscule, the national writing—Lombardic, Visigothic, and Irish.

The oldest papyrus MSS, of which only a few fragments are preserved [*e.g.* Genesis, *Brit. Mus. Pap.* 212; Psalms, *ib.* 230, Berlin, Leipzig (ed. Heinrici, 1903); the Prophets, Oxford, *Bodl. Gr. bibl. d.* 4 (pap.), Heidelberg (ed. Deissmann, 1904), etc.], were extremely simple. A single book or one or two together made a complete roll. The greater unity was indicated only by the leather covering in which several rolls were contained. In the 4th cent., however, no sooner had the Church formed its compact with the State than traces of luxury began to creep in. The oldest parchment Codices which we possess, viz. the Vatican and the Sinaitic, are huge Bibles, made evidently in response to an Imperial order, and intended for the churches of capitals. In this connexion Constantine's order to Eusebius (*Vita Const.* iv. 36) and the order of Constans mentioned in Athanasius (*Apol.* i. 297) have been thought of. These embrace the whole Old and New Testaments, but in the East this is extremely seldom the case. Not only the two Testaments, but also their separate parts, were usually handed down separately. In the West it was otherwise. There at an early date the so-called *bibliotheca* (very rarely in 1 vol., usually in 8, but up to as many as 14), or the πανδέκτης, made its appearance. It was not only their bulk, but also the manner in which they were executed, that made the oldest Bibles imposing. The wonderfully fine snow-white parchment of the Sinaitic MS seems to be of antelope skin. Both Chrysostom (*Hom. on Joh.* 32) and Jerome (*Pref. to Job*) complain of the luxury which even private people indulge in Bible MSS. Sometimes specially fine white parchment was taken; sometimes it was purple-coloured. Such MSS were not inscribed with ordinary, but with gold and silver ink: *e.g.* the Codices of Rossano, Patmos, Sinope (now Paris), and the Codex Argenteus at Upsala. We still possess an array of such precious Bibles, and, as a rule, they are associated by legendary tradition with the names of princes and princesses. The titles, initial lines, etc., are usually done in red, and initial letters beautifully ornamented. One instance is known where the text is in four different colours: the words of the narrator being in green ink, those of Jesus in red, those of His Apostles in blue, and those of His enemies in black (*Ev.* 16=*Par. Gr.* 54, sc. xiv.). From the 5th cent. onwards we find the addition of pictures (cf. VII. 4). In some cases these were placed under the text, as in the Vienna Genesis and the Sinope Matthew; sometimes they were separated from the text altogether, as in Cod. Rossanensis; in other cases they are found opposite the text, and arranged in a kind of table (*e.g.* the Itala fragments of Quedlinburg). In the East they often took the form of light marginal drawings; in the West they were often introduced into the text or set into the large initial letters. The range of these illustrations is wide. From the 24 pp. with 48 pictures that remain of the Vienna Genesis, it has been reckoned that there were 120 illustrations for Genesis and 510 for the whole Hexateuch (Wickhoff, p. 144). Such a wealth of illustration, however, is not common. The Sinope Matthew has only 5 pictures on 43 pages (out of a total of about 144), and the Syriac Gospels at

* J. A. Robinson, 'Euthaliana' (*TS* iii. 3, 1895), p. 34.
† Card. Rampolla, *S. Melania*, 1905, p. 150.
‡ L. K. Goetz, *Das Kiever Höhlenkloster*, 1904, p. 150.
§ S. Berger, *RThPh*, 1883, pp. 40–66.

Florence, written A.D. 586 by Rabbūla, have only 4 scenes from Gospel history apart from the tables of the Canon and the dedicatory engraving. In the Middle Ages there were occasionally more illustrations, but one cannot speak of increase or decrease in their number. They were plentiful or sparse according to the wish of the person ordering, or the capability of the artist. The time of Justinian was distinguished for the fine nature of its MSS; so afterwards the Renaissance of the 10th cent. in the East, and the periods of Charlemagne and Otto in the West. As in the Synagogue the Karaites set themselves against all ornamentation of the Holy Scripture, so in the Christian Church opposition to these luxurious MSS was not lacking. The complaints of individual Fathers have already been mentioned. It is still more important that the Cistercians, as opposed to the pomp-loving monks of Clugny, forbade all artistic decoration of books. The Paris Bibles, executed in the ordinary way of business (see above), exhibit quite a special style of simple red and blue. The Brothers of the Common Life write well but plainly, while at the beginning of the Renaissance great wealth of illustration again becomes a prominent feature.

The new art of printing with movable type came at once to the aid of the Scriptures, and the first printed book was a Bible. In the years 1453–56 Gutenberg's 42-line Bible made its appearance, and was shortly afterwards followed by the 36-line one. Externally these oldest printed Bibles resembled MSS. Printing sealed the victory of paper over parchment, but some examples of the oldest printing on parchment still exist. The movement for simplicity of finish, started by Paris booksellers, was maintained, although the first Bibles printed are not only masterpieces of printing, but are in some cases also beautifully illuminated. In place of illumination and pictures there soon appeared engravings on wood. These were either marginal or embodied in the text, and in the older Bibles they are often very numerous. The German Cologne Bible (1480) contains 110; the Italian Malermi Bible (1490) 383. Luther's NT of 1522 has woodcuts by Lucas Cranach. Later on these became fewer. At last they were omitted altogether, and the Bible acquired its present sober appearance. Never, however, has there been an entire absence of picture-Bibles, though it must be said that the addition of pictures serves less for ornamentation than for instruction. Speaking generally, the effort now is to make Bibles as cheap and as easy to handle as possible, and to increase their number. In the Middle Ages almost the only complete Bible was the *bibliotheca* of 8 folio vols., and the first printed Bibles were of gigantic proportions. The size, however, has always become less and the price always lower, till we have now reached the pocket Bible and the penny NT. Attempts have lately been made to secure something finer. The 19th cent. produced a series of beautiful picture-Bibles. Some of these are completely illustrated by the same artist, as, *e.g.*, Schnorr von Carolsfeld (1852 ff.), Doré (1865), and Tissot (1896). In others we find reproductions of the famous old masters, *e.g.*, R. Pfleiderer (1896). The aim of these is to assist the eye by bringing vividly before it what has been read. The historical character of modern exegesis, however, makes use of archæological and geographical illustration to explain the Bible (Pfeilstücker, 1887; Müller-Benzinger, 1900).

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2. Translation.—Besides the preservation of the Bible, its circulation was also necessary, and this involved the task of translation. The gospel soon left the soil of Palestine and the Aramaic speech. As a world-religion Christianity employed the universal language, Greek, even in Rome. The Church used the OT in the Greek translation or LXX. The other translations by Theodotion, Symmachus, and Aquila seem also to have been possessed of importance, especially at the outset, in controversies with the Jews. Their use, however, which was facilitated by Origen's giant work, the *Hexapla*,* sank to mere scholarly ornamentation. Almost all the books of the NT were composed in Greek. The Hebrew Gospel of Matthew, of which report had spoken since the time of Papias, was really a lost work. The Hebrew original of the Epistle to the Hebrews originated in an unlucky guess of an Alexandrian scholar. The Latin originals of the Gospel of Mark and the Epistle to the Romans are inventions of the Middle Ages. As late as the year 200 the Roman Hippolytus wrote in Greek, though in Africa Tertullian already composed in Latin. Whether he employed a Latin Bible in his work, or translated from the Greek Bible, is not yet beyond the range of doubt. From that point onwards, however, Greek visibly declined. About 250, at the time of Novatian, the language in Rome, as also in Gaul and Spain, was Latin. Celtic and Iberian, like Punic, do not seem to have reached a Christian literature though they continued to be spoken by country people. In the East, Aramaic-Syriac again gained strength; in Egypt the native language (Coptic) assumed a new Hellenized form. This was a movement that the Church could not think of opposing. She had to share in it if she was to bring her Bible to the people. As yet there was no idea that the sacredness of the Bible was to be sought in its incomprehensibility. Thus at the beginning of the 3rd cent. certainly, if not about the end of the 2nd, there appeared Latin, Syriac, and perhaps Coptic translations. The origin and early history of these versions are still very obscure. What is certain is that in the OT the LXX formed the basis (the Hebrew text being employed nowhere except in Syria), and in the NT remarkably free texts differing much from those otherwise known to us. It is possible that different translations came into being independently of one another; perhaps the first translation was much edited and gradually approximated in language to various Greek texts. Generally at the outset translations are exceedingly free. One can trace the joy which was felt in the new treasure, the difficulty of finding adequate expressions, the attempt to express the thought in the form most familiar. There is to be observed an inward assimilation of the gospel, a transference of it into the common thought and speech. Not till afterwards did philological accuracy make its appearance, with the high valuation of the letter characteristic of theology. So it is always: first Luther, then Weizsäcker; first AV, then RV.

* Fragments were collected by Field in 1875; new finds have been made by Mercati in the Ambrosian Library at Milan, and by Schechter and Taylor in the Genizah at Cairo.

Almost simultaneously there came the revisions which established themselves throughout the Church—the Latin revision in 378 ff. by Jerome, and the Syrian by Rabbūla about 410. The Vulgate established itself only after a keen struggle with the Vetus Latina; but before the Peshiṭṭā the Vetus Syra disappeared, leaving almost no trace. The Latin tradition approached the Syrian also in the fact that Jerome made a new translation of the OT direct from the Hebrew. In the case of the Copts, according to present research, it was less a gradual process than a conjoining of various dialects. Yet here, too, further investigation will likely show a succession of Akhmīmic, Sahidic, and Bohairic, representing not only dialectic but also textual differences, and corresponding in some measure to the African, European, and Italian of the Vetus Latina.

To these oldest and constantly developing translations which reveal the spread of Christianity in the first three centuries, there have to be added in the 4th and 5th cents. the Gothic and the Armenian together with the Georgian and the Ethiopic. These not only indicate the further spread of Christianity, but also bring to light its power as a civilizing agent. As so often in the later history of missions, the translation of the Bible is the first literary work in these tongues, the first monument of a system of writing developed for the purpose from the Greek. The Gothic Bible survived the rapid overthrow of that proud people only as a literary relic. The Codex Argenteus (now at Upsala), one of the most beautiful Bibles of the ancient Church, is a worthy witness to their former splendour. At the same time the translation, which was evidently executed from the Greek text in the Balkan peninsula, and afterwards brought into conformity with the Latin in Italy, shows the wanderings of the people and the different civilizing influences under which they came, just as we can observe in the Armenian Bible the displacement of the originally predominant Syriac by Byzantine influences. The Georgian Bible lived till the 19th cent., when it died through the Russianizing of this ancient Christian Church. The Armenian Bible, which in the time of the Crusades had points of contact with the Latin, was threatened by the same fate, but still exists. The general view that after this period Oriental Christianity was paralyzed is disproved by the missionary labours which were carried on by Greeks, and especially by Syrians, to the very farthest East. We have, indeed, no traces of ancient Indian and Chinese translations of the Bible (about 781, however, according to the Nestorian inscription of Singan-fu [J. Legge, 1888], 27 books of Jesus, *i.e.* the NT, were known in China), the reason being that the Syriac Bible was everywhere used even among the Thomas-Christians in India. Among the Syrians themselves, however, there arose new translations more learned than popular in character. Following the Greek very closely, Paul of Tella translated the OT (616–617), and Philoxenus of Mabūg the NT (508), the latter being revised by Thomas of Harkel (616). There does not seem to have been any Persian Bible before the 14th century.* On the other hand, the domination of the Arabs after the 7th cent. in Syria and Egypt brought a whole series of translations into existence, and these to some extent displaced the older Coptic and Syriac versions. Subsequently, when Spain was overrun, the same thing happened there, though the translation in that case was from the Latin. The 9th cent., which gave the Slavs a Bible of their own as the first written work in their language, saw also the beginning of Anglo-Saxon and German translations. Like Charlemagne, King Alfred was intensely patriotic, and favoured the popular tongue both in Divine service and in literature. But Latin, having the support of the Church, kept the lead, and the national language suddenly disappeared. In the time following, the oldest translations were forgotten.

Apart from poetical renderings of the Bible, only fragments were preserved till the end of the 12th cent. brought new motives of another kind. On the one hand, there was the popular religious movement associated with the name of Peter Waldes, which spread from South France towards the S. and E. as far as Bohemia. On the other hand, there was the sudden outburst of nationalism, suggesting to us in many ways our own time, which can be traced simultaneously in France, England, and Germany, and, however paradoxical it may seem, found its centre in the *studium generale* of Paris University. Thus there came to be two series of Bible translations in the popular tongue. From Paris University, which gave to the Latin Bible the form that was to obtain in the later Middle Ages, there came, through the use of an old Norman Psalter and Apocalypse, the French Bible. To us it is known chiefly in connexion with the *histoire écolâtre* of Guyard des Moulins as the 'Bible historiale.' With it there stand in more or less clear connexion some Dutch Bibles. Of more importance was the set belonging to S. France. It influenced the whole S. of Europe as far as Bohemia until Albigensian and Waldensian tendencies spread widely. The Italian as well as the Catalonian Bibles come originally, not from the Vulgate direct, but from the Provençal translation. It was only afterwards that they were conformed to the Vulgate and polished in language. Distinct from these there is only the Castilian Bible, which was translated in 1422 at the instance of Luis de Guzman by Jewish and Christian scholars in common on the basis of the original text, and was a forerunner of the great Polyglot Bible of Cardinal Ximenes. A side-piece to this is formed by the so-called Græcus Venetus (ed. by O. von Gebhardt, 1875), a new translation of the OT, which was probably a private work of the 14th cent. and never attained to any considerable influence. In the 14th cent., in England, Bohemia, and Germany simultaneously, the work of translation was again revived under Waldensian influence. John Wyclif (†1384) gave his people the first complete translation of the Bible. It is known in about 170 MSS, including the revision by John Purvey. Hus and his friends revised the somewhat older Czech Bible, and thus fashioned the pattern that was to regulate the future. In Germany no such great name appeared before Luther. There we find a great number of independent translations which have been carefully classified in Walther's thorough work on the subject. He mentions 34 Branches and 24 Psalteries, also 6 Branches and 8 Psalteries in the dialect of Lower Germany; altogether over 200 MSS and over 50 printed works. The most important Branch, to which the 14 pre-Lutheran printed Bibles belong, points in its origin to Bohemia and the time of Charles IV. Not till the 15th cent. did the northern lands receive translations of their own.

With the single exception of the Castilian, all these go back directly or indirectly to the Vulgate,

* It should, however, be borne in mind that the Pahlavi *Šikand-gūmānig Vijār* (late 9th cent.) contains a number of fragments of both the OT and the NT, cited in anti-Christian polemics and apparently derived from a Syriac version, with possible traces of the Targum of the pseudo-Jonathan (Gray, in *Actes du xiv. congrès international des orientalistes*, i. 182–186, Paris, 1905); and other fragments in an Iranian dialect (probably Sogdian) have recently been discovered by the expedition of Grünwedel and Le Coq to Chinese Turkestan (F. W. K. Müller, *ABAW*, 1904, Appendix, pp. 34–37 and *SBAW*, 1907, pp. 260–270).

whose influence is also traceable in the later forms of the South Slavonic Bible which was originally inspired from the East. Its influence was first broken by Humanism, which made the original text generally accessible, and also sought to replace the Vulgate of the monks by Latin translations of its own: Santes Pagninus, Erasmus, Seb. Münster, Castellio, etc. The first really effective factor, however, was the German Reformation. The importance of Luther's translation is shown by a twofold consideration. In the first place, in spite of many attempts in Germany, no other translation has been able to secure a position alongside of it. In especial the numerous attempts of the Catholics prior to the Council of Trent to oust Luther's by another translation show the great importance of his work, and all the more so since he was able to show that they systematically stole from him. The later Protestant attempts are not, as a rule, intended to enter into competition with Luther's Bible, but are meant for scholars. In the second place, even outside of Germany, the popular translations of the Reformation period are nearly all influenced more or less by it. Christian III. of Denmark gave an express order that the Danish Bible was to resemble Luther's as nearly as possible. There are further to be named as modelled on Luther's work—apart from the Zürich and Low German Bibles mentioned above—the Swedish, Finnic, Lithuanian, Lettic, Slavonic, Croatian, and Hungarian Bibles. From the time of Tindale the English Bible has contained a strong stream of Lutheran influence, which the Authorized Version still preserves, in spite of the opposing influence of the Douai Bible, which goes back to the Vulgate, and of the Genevan Bible of the Calvinists, which follows Beza. There is a remarkable difference between the evolution of the English Bible and that of the German. Luther's work was the first and the best, while in England the first work did not prove at once the matchless masterpiece, but the Bible finally established itself as the product of a century's labour. This enables us to understand how it was that England decided upon a thorough revision sooner than Germany, where the revision (1863–1892) was executed with the greatest caution.

Properly speaking, the Romanic translations are the only ones belonging to the Reformation that are entirely independent of Luther. In these, Humanism (Castellio, Calvin, Beza) won a greater influence, but when they were not killed altogether by the counter-Reformation they underwent constant alteration.

In most lands the following centuries have seen all sorts of attempts at improvement and also new and scholarly translations. These, however, cannot cope with the work of the fundamental creative Reform period. Notice must be taken, however, of the isolated attempts which were made from time to time by Catholics when a warmer Christian piety inspired the effort to find relief from Jesuitical oppression. In the 19th cent. an entirely new element appears. The work of Bible-translation has been greatly stimulated by the B. and F. B. Soc. in the interests of flourishing missionary enterprise. What we saw in the early Christian centuries, viz. that the effort to make the Bible available gave to peoples a written language and literature, is being widely repeated nowadays. In the year 600 the Bible (or parts of it) existed in about 8 languages; by 1500 it had been translated into 24; in 1600 the number had risen to quite 30 (the older translations being now replaced by new). During the last 100 years the number has advanced to nearly 400, and there is hardly a tongue in the world into which at least portions of the Bible have not been translated.

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3. Circulation.—How great the number of MS Bibles once in existence was we can no longer reckon accurately. Probably we are inclined to under-estimate them. The Diocletian persecution made away altogether with those of the first three centuries which did not perish naturally through the frailty of papyrus. The storms of natural migration in the W., the inundation of Arabs in the E. and S., and the outbreaks of iconoclasm in Byzantium, were responsible for great destruction. There were times when parchment was so scarce that Bible MSS (contrary to the command of the Church) were used as palimpsests. Later on they were employed for binding. Remembering all this, we shall draw no false conclusion from the small number still to hand. While the circulation in ancient times was great, and in Byzantium even enormous, in regard to the W. at the beginning of the Middle Ages we must indulge very modest notions. According to the old book-catalogues (see G. Becker, *Catalogi bibliothecarum antiqui*, 1885), a royal foundation like St. Vaudrille about the year 800 did not possess a complete Bible, and Boniface had to be satisfied with parts. But from century to century the circulation increased. When we find the Bible altogether wanting in the later catalogues of the 13th cent., the explanation must be that it was not inventoried with other books. The number of MSS grew steadily with the increase of wealth, culture, and religious interest. Of Greek MSS we possess still the two complete Bibles of the 4th cent. and the two belonging to the 5th cent. (ℵ, B, A, C). There are also 7 portions of the OT, and 14 of the NT, besides fragments on papyrus, the number of which increases every year. Belonging to the 6th cent. we have 5 OT and 28 NT MSS, and belonging to the period between the 7th and the 10th cents. there are 18 of the OT, and about 80 of the NT, all these being uncial MSS. To these have to be added about 2000 Gr. minuscule MSS of the NT which date from the 9th to the 16th cent., while the number of OT MSS preserved cannot as yet be accurately determined. The Latin MSS which we still possess go back to the 4th cent., as do also the Syriac and the Coptic. We are acquainted with 400 Latin and 100 Syriac MSS of the NT dating from the 4th to the 10th cent., and 3000 Latin MSS in all. So far as the OT is concerned, no classification has been made. When it is remembered what a labour it was to make a fair copy even of one Gospel, it is possible to estimate the pains that were devoted to the multiplication of the Bible. But when we think of the millions of Christians who have lived since the 4th cent., those numbers will seem rather

small. For the later part of the Middle Ages about 170 MSS of Wyclif's Bible, and over 200 German MSS enumerated by Walther (see § 2), give some idea of the spread of the Bible.

The invention of printing altered the conditions. Every setting up of type meant a great number of copies. Till this time every copy was a thing by itself, with its own faults and its own excellences, but these were now extended to the whole edition, which might run to any number desired. In the first stages of printing the editions were not large. Gutenberg and Schöffer cannot have made more than from 100 to 200 impressions from every setting, and the prices were so high that it still paid to copy a printed pattern by hand (see the Greek NT copied by Zwingli from Erasmus's ed. at the Stadtbibliothek of Zürich, C. 163). Even when an edition mounted to 1000 copies, its circulation remained within narrow bounds, as is proved by the numberless reprints. Up to 1500 there have been counted 109 Latin printings, and from 1500–1520 the number is 56. In German there were 17, in Italian 10, in French 4, and so on. Even when these figures are multiplied by 100, or even 1000, we reach no great total. In the first two centuries of the Reformation the Bibles reached what according to our present ideas is a very small circulation, however large it may seem as compared with past ages.

Improvements in the process of printing made larger editions possible. Freiherr von Canstein could boast that in his establishment at Halle, between the years 1710 and 1719 he had made 100,000 copies of the NT in 28 editions, and 40,000 Bibles in 16 editions (8 in 8vo, and 8 in 12mo). Now the B. and F. Bible Soc. prints in one year almost 1,000,000 Bibles, more than 1,000,000 NT's, and 3,000,000 parts of the Bible; in all 5,000,000. We must remember, too, that the oldest printers earned their living by their work, that the Bible was an article of commerce, and that, although Luther took no pay for his services, yet the printers made a large enough charge. It was the voluntary support of friends of the Bible like the Baron von Canstein (†1719), the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge (since 1698), and the Christentumsgesellschaft of Basel, extended by Urlsperger (since 1780), that made it possible to aim at a real circulation of the Bible among the people. This was finally realized by the Bible Societies which after the foundation of the B. and F. B. Soc. in 1804 established themselves everywhere (Basel, 1806; Stuttgart, 1812; Berlin and Dresden, 1814; America, 1816; Paris, 1818, etc.).

In many places in our own day every married couple is presented with a Bible as a marriage gift. Every schoolboy possesses one. Among soldiers the Bible is diligently circulated, and in the mission field it is spread with great zeal. Often it is given for nothing, and usually the price is astonishingly small. Never has the Bible been so easy to acquire. What one cannot but regret is that this extensive circulation does not go hand in hand with a high estimation of the Book of books among the great mass of men. The colporteur was right when he gave it as the result of his 20 years' experience, that to make a present of the Bible is easy but not effective.

LITERATURE.—P. Schaff, *A Companion to the Gr. Test. and the Eng. Version*, 1883.

For Lists of MSS: H. B. Swete, *Introd. to the OT in Gr.*[2] 1902; C. R. Gregory, *Proleg. zu Tischendorfs NT*, ed. viii. crit. major, 1884–94 (=*Textkritik des NT*, 1900), and *Versuche u. Entwürfe*[2], 1908; F. H. A. Scrivener, *Introd. to the Crit. of the NT*[4] (by E. Miller), 1894; Eb. Nestle, *Einführung in das griech. NT*[2], 1899; H. von Soden, *Die Schriften des NT*, i. 1902.

For lists of Printed Bibles: Copinger, *Incunabula biblica, or The first half-century of the Lat. Bible* (1450–1500), 1890; Falk, *Die Bibel am Ausgange des Mittelalters*, 1905, p. 91 ff.; Le Long, *Bibliotheca Sacra*, 1709, ed. Mash, 1778; Ed. Reuss, *Bibliotheca NT Græci*, 1872. For Luther's German Bible: Palm, 1772; Panzer, 1783; Hopf, 1847; cf. the *Catalogues of the Brit. Mus.* 1892 ff., and of the B. and F. B. Soc., by T. H. Darlow and H. F. Moule, 1907.

For number of copies: P. Schwenke, 'Untersuch. zur Gesch des ersten Buchdrucks,' *Festschrift der Kgl. Bibliothek zu Berlin zur Gutenbergfeier*, 1900 (he computes 200 copies of the 42-line Bible and from 80–120 of the 36-line Bible).

For Bible Societies: J. Owen, *Hist. of the Orig. and the First Ten Years of the B. and F.B. Soc.*, 1816; Wm. Canton, *History of the B. and F.B. Soc.*, 1904; E. Breest, *Die Entwicklung der preuss. Hauptbibelgesells.*, 1864–91; O. Bertram, *Gesch. der von Cansteinschen Bibelanstalt*, 1863; O. Douen, *Hist. de la soc. biblique de Paris* (*1818–1868*), Paris, 1868.

III. *AUTHORITY OF THE BIBLE.*—1. Titles and citations.—That the Bible was authoritative was an axiom taken over by the Church from the Synagogue (see above, I. 1). The words which the first Christians used to make reference to the OT, 'The Scripture saith,' were extended by their successors to the whole Bible—OT and NT alike. 'Scripture saith,' or 'It says,' was synonymous with 'God saith.'* Soon the Scripture came to be known as ἡ ἁγία γραφή, *sacra* or *divina scriptura*, or, to commemorate its formation out of single books, αἱ θεῖαι γραφαί, *divini libri*. From the 3rd to the 5th cent. the Latins gave the name of *lex Dei* to the whole. Vincent of Lerinum used the designation *sanctæ legis volumina*. The Greeks described it as τὰ ἱερὰ λόγια (='oracles'). τὰ βιβλία is the favourite expression in Chrysostom. From *biblia*(*-orum*) was derived in late Latin the feminine form *biblia-æ* (cf. *gaudia*), and this form was carried over into all other tongues. *Sacra pagina* and *sacra elogia* were used by mediæval scholars, and at the time of the Reformation the usual designation was *literæ divinæ* or *sacræ*. The expression *veritas dicit* (='Scripture saith'), as distinguished from *auctoritas* (='ecclesiastical doctrine'), was taken by the scholastics from Augustine, who, however, employed it specially of the words of Jesus.

A single verse from the Bible was always considered the word of God. In the Middle Ages occasionally, and frequently by Carlstadt and Zwingli, *verbum Dei* is used to describe the whole Bible. Luther employs 'Word of God' in a sense different from the Bible or Holy Scripture (='verbum prædicatum'), but the terms are interchangeable even with him. In later Protestant theology the phrase is common. It is a favourite expression of Pietism, which also introduced hymns on the Bible, *e.g.* 'Teures Wort aus Gottes Munde' (Benj. Schmolck, †1737).

Often the whole Bible is designated by its parts. As the Jews used the phrase 'Moses and the Prophets' (Lk $16^{29ff.}$, Jn 1^{45}) or 'the Law and the Prophets' (Mt 5^{17} 7^{12} 22^{40}, Lk 16^{16}, Ac 24^{14} 28^{23}), so we find 'the Lord and the Apostles' or, more seldom, 'the Gospel and the Apostles.' In Hippolytus this fourfold division is the usual one, while Hegesippus says, 'the Law and the Prophets and the Lord,' and Clem. Al. 'the Prophets, the Gospel, and the words of the Apostles.' The whole Bible is also referred to as 'the Prophets and the Apostles' (*e.g.* Murat. Canon, 79 f.). This corresponds to the *Vetus et Novum Testamentum* or Tertullian's *Instrumentum*. 'The Lord' was used specially to indicate the Gospels, so much so that the Marcionites claimed the Lord as the author of their Gospel, just as they claimed Paul as the author of their Apostolos (Adamantius, *Dial.* ii. 13, p. 84). As the Prophets and the Apostles also acquired their authority from Him, it was possible to say, 'the Lord in His Prophets and Apostles.'

With the growth of scientific accuracy, the formula of citation became more adequate. The deliberate indefiniteness of Philo (εἴρηται γάρ που καλῶς) is still found in a Gnostic like Valentinus (ὥσπερ εἴπέ τις), but the growth of Biblicism does not favour it. Paul mentions the prophets by

* B. B. Warfield, *PRR*, 1899, pp. 472–510.

name (*e.g.* Ro $9^{25.27}$), and it becomes general to name the specific books: *Μωϋσῆς ἐν Ἐξόδῳ, ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν Βασιλέων, Παῦλος ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ πρὸς Κορινθίους.* Tertullian says, 'Habes Genesim, habes Danielum.' In one instance Origen defines the passage more exactly by the *στίχος* number. The Eusebian sections of the Gospels, arranged in ten canons for purposes of comparison, served the whole Middle Ages as a handy concordance. After the 4th cent. we meet with chapter-divisions, which differed among the Greeks and the Latins. Citations were made by the titles or the first words of the chapter. It was not till the Middle Ages that they were made by the number of the chapter. This became common in the 13th cent., when the Paris Bible established itself everywhere (see above, II. 1). There we have the chapter-divisions of Stephen Langton, with 8 subdivisions of each chapter (A–H), serving the purpose of the *concordantia biblica* of the Paris doctors. Not till modern times did the easy method of verse-enumeration come in, and with it the practice of exact citation. The germ of this was found in a concordance which R. Isaac Nathan formed in 1447 (printed Venice, 1523; taken over in Santes Pagninus's Lat. Bible, 1528). The NT was divided into verses by Robt. Stephen in 1551, on a journey from Paris to Lyons. The fact that it was done 'inter equitandum' is, unfortunately, only too evident. Moreover, in different editions there are variations. Above all, the bad habit of setting the number of the verse in the text, or printing each verse separately, destroyed the connexions, and deepened the impression that every verse was complete in itself. As the result of Bengel's initiative, the custom has recently become more general of making larger paragraphs. On the other hand, the minuteness characteristic of recent critical exegesis has made an advance upon the division into verses, and such citations as Ro 1^{16a} or Rev 1^{1d} are now used.

Literature.—C. R. Gregory, *Prolegomena*, 140–182; Scrivener, *Introd.* i. 56–71; O. Schmid, *Über verschiedene Einteilungen der h. Schrift*, 1892; E. von Dobschütz, *Vulgatastudien*, 1895; J. Chapman, *History of the Vulgate Gospels*, 1908.

Formulas of citation have another side. Veneration of the Holy Scripture and its authors finds increasing fullness of expression in them. Soon what we meet with is not 'Isaiah says,' 'Peter (or Paul) writes,' but 'The Holy Prophet Isaiah says,' 'The Holy Apostle Peter writes,' and 'According to the Blessed Paul.' In this connexion, the otherwise almost valueless epithet of martyrs, *μακάριος* (*beatus*), continued long in use. Even this, however, is not enough. Peter must be called *ὁ κορυφαῖος τῶν ἀποστόλων, princeps apostolorum*, John *ὁ ἐπιστήθιος*, Paul *ὁ τρισμακάριος*. The ordinary title is *οἱ θεηγόροι*. In the Byzantine Renaissance *δαυϊδικῶς* or *ψαλμικῶς εἰπεῖν, Σολομώντεια ἔπη*, are favourite phrases to introduce quotations from the Psalms or Proverbs, and a citation from the Gospels is hardly ever introduced without words like *τὸ ἅγιον εὐαγγέλιον διαπρυσίως βοᾷ*. As compared with such Eastern verbosity, Western formulas always appear simple. But *sanctus apostolus dicit* has really the same significance. It is an expression of unconditional veneration, and emphasizes Scriptural authority. It makes no difference here that in the Middle Ages prophets and apostles shared this epithet with the doctors of the Church. These also possessed the weight of authority. The Reformation retained 'St.' Matt., 'St.' Mark, etc., and in Romance lands and England 'St.' Paul is still usual. It was the period of 'Enlightenment,' with its purely human handling of Scripture, that first stripped off, even in the form, all such symbols of authority, returning thus to the simplicity of the early Church. With a false conception of accuracy, the Gospel 'according to' Matthew, Mark, Luke, or John was spoken of, the ancient Church desiring to express by *εὐαγγέλιον κατὰ . . .* nothing more than the unity of the Gospel amidst the variety of its literary forms.

However various these formulas may appear, they nevertheless establish the one important fact of the unconditional authority of every word in the Bible. The mention of the various authors is due to a conscious or unconscious instinct for accuracy. It is not upon them, but upon the Bible itself, that authority rests. In every century we find numerous instances of wrong sources given for quotations (*e.g.* Mt 27^{9}). This only shows how little depended upon any personal authority. The prophetic name is a guarantee of Scripture; prophets and apostles are possessed of authority because they are 'holy Scripture,' and all that stands in Scripture is authoritative, even when it is neither a prophet nor an apostle who speaks, but a very unholy mortal. Mt 19^{5} quotes a word of Adam as God's word. Jn $11^{50f.}$, spoken by Caiaphas, contains a Divine prophecy. The Bible as a whole and in every word of it is authoritative.

Literature.—On the names of the Bible, see Suicer, *Thesaurus*, 1682, *s.v.* *βιβλίον, γραφή*; du Cange, *Glossarium*, *s.v.* 'Biblia.' On citations, see Harnack, *Dogmengesch.*[3] i. 337 ff. Formulas are collected, *e.g.*, from the *Didascalia* by Achelis, p. 333; from Didymus by Leipoldt, 38; from Diodorus by Harnack, 56.

2. **Inspiration of the Scriptures.**—Like the authority of the Bible, the idea of its inspiration was taken over from Judaism (cf. I. 1). No distinction was made between the Divine revelation accorded to the prophets and its preservation in writing (cf. Ro 1^{2}, He 1^{1}). We have the statement in 2 P 1^{21} that 'holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost'; but, besides this, the Scripture itself is said to be *θεόπνευστος* in 2 Ti 3^{16} (whence 'inspiration'). Descriptions like those of Ezk $1^{3f.}$, Zec $1^{8ff.}$, Rev $1^{10ff.}$ point to an ecstatic origin, and this idea, helped by the influence of Plato and Philo, was extended to writings that were not apocalyptic (Justin). At the same time, there is another view, according to which God speaks to men without any extraordinary ecstatic operation. Paul does not think that his Epistles are due to any supernatural inspiration. He draws a clear line between his own opinions and the absolutely authoritative words of the Lord, yet he claims the possession of the Spirit, and therefore authority for what he writes (1 Co $7^{10.25.40}$); so also Clement of Rome (i. 59), and even Origen (*de Orat.* 18). The pseudo-Clementine Homilies (xvi. 18) formulate a theory to the effect that the revelations which are not due to ecstasies (*ἄνευ ὀπτασίας καὶ ὀνείρων*) are preferable to those which are, and the Church adopted this view. She dismissed books like the *Shepherd* of Hermas, and repudiated the Montanistic prophets and similar phases; but she claimed inspiration for her bishops. And if Ignatius and even Cyprian still think of visions and ecstasies in this connexion, the inspiration of Synods, which Constantine solemnly proclaimed so early as the First Ecumenical Council of Nicæa, had little in common with ecstasies. The *θεοφόροι πατέρες*, or inspired Fathers, contended with arguments drawn from the Bible and logic, sometimes even with the fists, and the result depended upon the decision of the majority, while ecstatic revelation rests on the authority of a single inspired person. At the Council of Trent it was a standing joke that the Spirit came from Rome in fetters; and with regard to the infallibility of Papal utterances, no one ever dreamed of ecstasy. Naturally the idea of the Bible's inspiration corresponded with this. The Alexandrians were critical of style. Eusebius and Augustine talked harmlessly of the literary methods of Biblical authors—that was in line with their ideas of inspiration. When, however, exegetical science weakened, and the popular monastic ideas of visions

and ecstasies spread, we find these notions appearing more frequently, and in popular literature they found vivid expression. Prochorus' picture in the Acts of John of how the Gospel of John came into existence (ed. Zahn, p. 154 ff.) shows that its origin was conceived as quite ecstatic. This influenced art, and the task of investigating the way in which inspiration is represented would repay labour. As the Muse appeared to the poet Aratus, so the Divine Wisdom appeared to the Evangelist Mark (Cod. Rossan.). A hand beckons out of heaven; a dove whispers in the ear; we hear also of inspiration following the drinking of a cup (2 Es $14^{37f.}$). The idea of a book-roll which the seer had to swallow (Ezk 3^1, Rev 10^9) has its artistic analogy in the so-called *traditio legis*, 'giving over of the law,' to Peter. So far as is known, the notion of a book fallen direct from heaven, like that which Oriental Gnosticism developed in regard to the book of Elxai, and to which ecclesiastical piety gave some colour in the so-called 'letters from heaven,' was never applied to the Bible as such. Athenagoras (*Leg.* 9) illustrates the operation of the Holy Ghost by the picture of the flute-player who blows into the instrument and makes it sound. Ps.-Justin (*Coh.* 8) and Chrysostom speak of the lyre upon which the Holy Ghost plays; there are different strings, but they give forth a harmony. The conception is quite spiritual. Much more realistic is the picture of the pencil (*stylus*) of the Holy Spirit which we find in Gregory I. In the Middle Ages the representation gradually took a more popular form, and single individuals like Agobard of Lyons and Abelard protested against it in vain. It was never thoroughly developed in theory. Luther's lively piety, like the oldest Christianity, combines faith in Divine inspiration with quite human ideas as to the method: he gives a vivid picture of the way in which one prophet uses the writings of the others. In his hands the ancient traditions which mediævalism brought down alongside of its theory of inspiration became of importance again. But orthodoxy did not follow him here. It ranged itself on the side of the strictly supernatural idea of inspiration, and carried the view to its extremest consequences. The Biblical authors are only the hands and pens of the Holy Spirit. They are perhaps *notarii et actuarii*, but never can they be called *auctores*. That epithet belongs to God or to the Holy Ghost alone. From Him proceeds not only the impulse to write, but also the matter and the method (*suggestio rerum et verborum*). In the end all human participation in the composition of Scripture is denied. Men wrote, but did not understand or know what. This inspiration of the letter, applied to the Textus Receptus of the NT and to the Textus Massoreticus of the OT, is at last extended to the mere accessories; above all, to the punctuation of the Hebrew (John Gerhard, †1637; John Buxtorf, father, †1629, and son, †1664). The theory was embodied in an ecclesiastical confession (*Formula Consensus Helvetici*, 1675), but as a theological system it was soon overturned by actual facts. Mill's multitudes of variants destroyed the theory of textual inspiration. Deism and 'Enlightenment' sought out every little contradiction and absurdity. Biblical philology renewed the criticism of style. Soon rationalistic theology spoke of a purely human Scripture.

The attempt of 19th cent. theology to revive the old orthodox doctrine has been vain (Kölling, *Theopneustie*, 1891). Even in the milder form, which added to the personal inspiration of prophets and apostles (Schleiermacher) a particular guidance only *in actu scribendi* ('kanonische Inspiration,' Luthardt), it was not able to secure a hold. The newest phase of religious-historical inquiry gives wide scope to ecstasy again, but Protestant theology tends always more and more to the conviction that the old conception of *θεοπνευστία* is not the one best suited in our time to express the actual significance and authority of the Scripture. Inspiration applies to men, not to written words.

LITERATURE.—J. Delitzsch, *de Inspiratione script. s. quid statuerint patres apostolici et apologetæ sec. æcuili*, 1872; Ed. Rabaud, *Hist. de la doctrine de l'inspiration des saintes écritures*, 1883; W. Sanday, *Inspiration*, 1893; H. Cremer, in *PRE*[3] ix. 183–203: Kähler, *Zur Bibelfrage*, 1907; A. Houtin, *La Question biblique au xxe siècle*, 1906, 27 ff.; F. Watson, *Inspiration*, 1906; M. Dods, *The Bible, its Origin and Nature*, 1905.

3. **Doctrine.**—Of course it is not enough to see in the books of the Bible only historically interesting monuments of old Israelite and old Christian literature. They were and are more than this to Christendom. From the beginning they were held to be immediately binding upon the present.

One of the first tasks of Christianity was to put the OT in the same position of authority as the NT. Primitive Christianity, filled with the living power of the Spirit, strongly emphasized the newness of the Divine revelation given in Christ as compared with the OT stage of religion. Paul did away with the Law which was the kernel of the OT in Judaism, and yet he argued with words of 'the Law.' He cast aside the nomistic system, and yet held the Law to be Holy Scripture. That could not continue. The Gnostics and Marcion rejected the authority of the OT altogether; the Church sought to discover a more positive relationship to the OT Law. In the ceremonial rules of the OT the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews found the type and prophecy of the saving work of Christ. Barnabas considered that he had only to transmute the Ceremonial Law by allegorical interpretation into moral commandments to show that it was constantly obligatory, and that the verbal understanding of it by the Jews was a mistake into which the devil had brought them. I Clem. comes very near to deducing the principles of Christian worship from the ceremonial system of the OT, and the 3rd cent. actually did so. Tertullian (*de Monog.* 7) extracts laws for the Christian life from the OT. Later authors like Cyril of Alexandria make the sacerdotal and sacrificial law somewhat spiritualized, the basis of Christian ecclesiastical order.

When the difficulties which arose in the controversy about legalism were removed, the value of OT prophecy caused the OT to be claimed as the sacred book of Christendom, in opposition to the Jews, who made it their own special possession, and it was declared to be inseparably associated with the NT. The same Christ, the same Spirit, spoke in prophets and apostles. Marcion's criticism only served to make the Church all the more zealous in maintaining the complete unity of the two Testaments. They were the two breasts of the Church (Hippolytus on Canticles, i. 344). Very soon all sense of difference, all thought of any gradation in time, disappeared. Out of the unity of the Spirit there was evolved a mechanical uniformity, a complete equality of the contents of all parts. Even the first verses of Genesis were made to witness to the deepest mysteries of the Christian faith, the high dogmas of the Trinity, and the participation of the Son in Creation. *ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν = ἐν τῷ υἱῷ* (cf. Harnack, *TU* i. 3, 130 ff.). Protestant orthodoxy went even further than this in the discovery that בְּרֵאשִׁית contained the initial letters of the Trinity, אָב, בֵּן, רוּחַ twice over.

In spite of this purely dogmatizing method, it was never altogether forgotten that revelation underwent an historical development. It is this feature that constitutes the peculiar charm of the Antiochene school for us, and raises the Dutch federal theologians above their own orthodox pre-

decessors. In the new orthodoxy of the 19th cent. the Erlangen school (Hofmann) laboured this thought at great length. These, however, are only individual instances, and hardly affect the doctrine of Biblical authority. They did not attain to a recognition of any differences of value in the books of the Bible. Whatever was found in the Bible was canonical and authoritative.

The dogmatic elaboration of this theory began with Origen's *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, and his results were adopted by his pupil Theognostus. As the Synagogue never dealt systematically with questions of the kind, the Greek theology had quite a new field here. In the West, Augustine's *de Doctrina Christiana* laid the foundation. Augustine declares repeatedly and strongly that only the canonical Scriptures are unconditionally binding (*de Nat. et Grat.* lxi. 71; *Epist.* lxxxii. 3. 24). But we find none the less that he sets ecclesiastical authority alongside of, or rather above, the authority of the Bible more markedly than the Alexandrians. The often-quoted remark is well known (*c. Epist. Manich.* 6): 'ego vero evangelio non crederem nisi me catholicæ ecclesiæ commoveret auctoritas.' This supplied the Middle Ages with a standard. The authority of the Bible was the very highest: it was absolutely infallible; everything that was found in it had to be believed whether understood or not. All this, however, was due to the living authority of the Church, and that because of two considerations: (1) it was the Church that formed the Bible as such; the Church decided which books were canonical and which were not; and (2) the Church alone had to say what was contained in the Bible, in other words, how it was to be interpreted. Even heretics appealed to the Bible, and often with a great show of right. That made a superior authority necessary—the Church. Tertullian declares that in combating heresy the Scriptures should not be referred to for proof (*de Præscr.* 19). Similarly Salvian (*de Gub. Dei*) complains that the Arians drew their proofs from the Bible, while the Catholics employed force. Naturally it was always maintained that the authority of the Bible lay in itself, came from its Divine origin. The Church could never invest with canonical authority a book that was not Divine. But—and this is the important point in the mediæval Catholic conception—the Church took over the guarantee of canonicity. Hence came the fixing of the Canon by Councils, from the Synods under Damasus and Augustine down to the Councils of Trent and the Vatican. The correct interpretation, however, was obtained from the 'unanimous consent of the Fathers,' and in this way the Fathers, who were credited to a certain extent with the same inspiration as the Scripture, came to be equally valuable authorities. Employed in the first place to interpret, they were afterwards called in to supplement Scripture. Thus there arose the idea of the double tradition, *ἐγγράφως* and *ἀγράφως* as the Greeks said, *in libris scriptis et sine scripto traditionibus* as the Council of Trent expressed it. The question whether the revelation given in Scripture was sufficient to answer every religious inquiry received different replies within the Catholic system. The really correct answer was in the affirmative, and allegory supplied a means of drawing anything out of Scripture that was wanted. In mystic circles, however, the view was always maintained that God supplemented what He had given to the Church by immediate revelations to chosen individuals. Montanism, which brought a new and extensive revelation, the Church repudiated, just as at a later date she did also the *evangelium æternum* of the Spiritualists and the visions of many fanatics. But the visions of Saint Birgitta and similar phenomena she acknowledged; and at the present time the question is being vigorously discussed in Catholicism, how far the visions of Catherine of Emmerich can be safely reckoned credible supplements to the Gospel story in regard to the life of Jesus and the Virgin Mary. From the time of Anastasius of Sinai until the present day there have not been wanting pious men who believed that they could cajole or wrest from evil spirits some light upon the mysteries of the other world.

In this domain the Reformation brought the crisis. The 'reformers before the Reformation,' as Wyclif, Hus, etc., were called, were representatives of Augustinianism, and as such of a Biblicism within Catholic ecclesiastical bounds. Zwingli and Calvin represent a Biblicism that overran these bounds but finally took its stand upon the same formal principles. Creeds of the Zwinglian and Calvinistic type nearly all contain decisions in regard to the Canon of the Bible. It was quite unobserved that this only continued ecclesiastical or synagogue tradition in opposition to the decisions of the Roman Church and the Council of Trent. It is quite otherwise with Luther. Not only did he shatter the authority of the Pope, the Councils, and the Fathers, but also from the idea of the dominating authority of Scripture he stripped off everything formal. Not because something was found in Scripture but because it witnessed to Christ, because he traced God's word in it, was it authoritative in his view. 'The right principle to follow in the criticism of all the books is to ask whether they show Christ or not, for all that is Scripture points to Christ (Ro 3^{21}), and St. Paul wants to know nothing save Christ (1 Co 2^{2}). What does not teach Christ is not apostolic even though St. Peter or St. Paul teaches it; what preaches Christ is apostolic even though it comes from Judas, Annas, Pilate, or Herod' (Pref. to Ep. of James, 1522, Erlangen ed. 63, 157). This valuation according to content, harmonizing as it does with personal experience, gave Luther the opportunity not only of criticizing the ecclesiastical Canon (he makes the NT end with 3 John and calls Hebrews, James, Jude, and Revelation an appendix like the OT Apocrypha), but also of claiming value for other writings like the *loci* of Melanchthon, and investing them with the same value as the Bible. It is true that Luther did not carry this principle to its logical conclusion. His contests with fanatics who trusted entirely to the inner light compelled the Reformer, who was at heart conservative, to lay all the importance on the historically given revelation, *i.e.* the Scripture. However much he distinguished in theory between the word of God and the Scripture, yet he found it easy to identify them, and he could then (as in the Lord's Supper) insist stubbornly upon the letter of the Scripture. The Lutheran Church has inherited both these views from him. Lutherans always speak of the *verbum Dei*, but they do not imply any formal limitation to certain books (no Lutheran confession contains a catalogue of the Canon). The phrase has reference only to the content of the Bible, the revelation of God's grace in the Law and the Gospels. On the other hand, the Lutheran Church developed the doctrine of the authority of the Bible in scholastic fashion, so that it became possible to speak of Bibliology as well as Theology and Christology. And Bellarmine had a certain amount of right on his side when he spoke of the 'paper Pope of the Protestants.' Nevertheless the distinction between a formal and a material principle in Protestantism belongs to the Calvinistic theology, and first became a feature of Lutheran dogmatics in the 19th century (Ritschl, *Zeitschr. f. Kirchengesch.*, 1876, 397 ff.).

In opposition to the mediæval conception which,

under the influence of the Neo-Platonic idea of God and in the interests of ecclesiastical authority, emphasized the mysterious, difficult, or unintelligible elements and the insufficiency of the Bible, Protestant dogmatics laid all the stress on its clearness and sufficiency (*perspicuitas et sufficientia*), and emphasized, along with its authority, its *efficacia* as a means of salvation. This made its authority—in the true Reformation spirit—altogether dependent on the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum*. But this witness, in consequence of the mechanical way in which inspiration was conceived, was extended to things which had nothing to do with the inward experience of a pious Christian. Pietism, having no great scientific interests, was very well satisfied; honest Rationalism admitted that it had never perceived any trace of this witness of the Holy Spirit. The scholastic system was broken up, and no artificial reconstruction was possible. Under Schleiermacher's lead the theology of the 19th cent. worked zealously and honestly to solve the problem of how the authority of the Bible should really be conceived and be impressively founded. There was plenty of fierce controversy. In opposition to the overthrow of all authority by the liberal theology, conservative circles sought support for the authority of the Bible elsewhere. Grundtvig seizes, as Lessing did, upon the Apostles' Creed as the living word of God. Calixtus's *Consensus patrum quinquesecularis* (1629) finds a powerful echo in the Oxford Movement in England. Between the two extremes numerous endeavours of a mediating character assert now the religious interests attaching to the absolute authority of the Scripture and now the scientific aspects of its historical limitations. It has to be said that a satisfactory solution will be found only when the Bible is felt to speak to the human heart with the authority of God. This experience must be expressed in clear theological terms. In religious matters the authority of the Bible is absolute, but only in religious matters. Its authority is internal, not external.

LITERATURE.—H. J. Holtzmann, *Kanon u. Tradition*, 1859; A. Sabatier, *Religions d'autorité et la religion de l'esprit*[3], 1904, pp. 346–403 (Eng. tr. 1904); O. Scheel, *Luthers Stellung zur h. Schrift*, 1902; K. Timme, *Luthers Stellung zur h. Schrift*, 1904; K. Walz, *Die Lehre der Kirche von der h. Schrift nach der Schrift selbst geprüft*, 1884; J. Reinhard, *Die Prinzipienlehre d. luth. Dogmatiker*, 1906; P. Gennrich, *Der Kampf um die Schrift in der deutschevang. Kirche des 19 Jahrh.*, 1898 (with a complete bibliography); J. Estlin Carpenter, *The Bible in the 19th cent.*, 1903; A. Houtin, *La Question biblique chez les Cath. de France au xixe siècle*, 1902, *au xxe siècle*, 1906.

4. Practical significance.—From the very first the authority of the Bible was concerned with dogma, that is to say, it was used to prove the articles of faith. It was in this way that the Messiahship of Jesus was demonstrated by primitive Christians and afterwards by apologists in the controversy with Jewish Christians. Cyprian brings together *testimonia adversus Judæos*, **i.e.** proof passages, and he thus provides the pattern of Scriptural proof for many centuries. Soon this method came to be employed in the dogmatic disputes arising within the Church. Athanasius collects proof from Scripture of the unity of the Son with the Father—a course that was all the more necessary since the Arian party pointed out the un-Biblical character of the word ὁμοούσιος. The Cappadocian Fathers gathered proof passages in support of the Trinity. In the Monophysite and Monothelite discussions the practice was extended, with the difference that citations from the Fathers were now added to those of the Scripture; and in the disputes regarding iconoclasm John of Damascus and the patriarch Nicephorus as well as the hostile party made collections of the same kind from Scripture and tradition. Augustine begins his work *de Trinitate* with a very detailed Scripture proof (i.–vii.), and then (viii.–xiii.) adds a dogmatic elaboration. This example was followed by all scholastic theologians, and the practice attained to still greater importance after the removal of all other authorities by the orthodox theology of Protestantism. For every single topic of the system all *loci probantes* in the Scripture were carefully gathered, and their interpretation became more and more a subordinate discipline to scientific dogmatics, viz. the so-called *theologia biblica*, out of which, after a long process in which it underwent complete transformation, there arose at last the independent discipline which is now called 'Biblical Theology.' Modern theology has long seen that an enumeration of Scripture passages torn from their context is not only a forcing of the Bible but also no real proof of the dogma in question. Dogmatic theology, however, emancipates itself but slowly from the old method of Scriptural proof. It is bound to do so more and more, because with the grossly supernatural idea of inspiration the proof which rests upon it vanishes also. How different is Hofmann's attempt to reach a new kind of Scripture proof, in which everything is made to turn upon the context—upon the general view of Scripture. At the present day even this is considered by most to be too external a method, especially as Hofmann's attempt to show the organic unity of the whole content of Scripture cannot be described as happy. It is somewhat different when P. Lobstein sets the organic method of proof from Scripture over-against the atomistic. It is only a real harmony with the fundamental ideas of the Bible that can be legitimized by dogmatics. Wendt departs from the normative significance of Scripture, and has recourse to the teaching of Jesus as the only norm.

The old theology took pride in ranging itself under the authority of the Bible, in making its infallible statements the basis of its findings. As a matter of fact, what it did was to make the Bible subservient to its system. It put its views into the Bible only to drag them out again in emphasized form. That is perhaps made most evident by the numerous works on the *Hexaëmeron* (the 'six days' in Gn 1). What was there that the short account of creation was not made responsible for? All the knowledge which the cosmological speculation of Greece and late Judaism thought it had discovered was held to be already contained in Gn 1. This was the case everywhere—an entirely mechanical idea of revelation, as if God had torn asunder the details of His revelation and strewn them over the whole sacred book, in order that men might painfully gather them together again, as if He had purposely kept things mysterious in order that theologians might sharpen their wits on them.

But the Bible returned good for evil. It admitted of continual glimpses into the true nature of revelation, into the actual course of history, and provided facts which necessitated the correction of the dogmatic system. If the theoretical recognition of the right relationship between Scripture and doctrine is an achievement of recent times, yet it is possible to arrange the whole history of theology and dogma in particular under the point of view of a gradual process of biblicizing. In ancient as in modern times, there were instances of theologians who did not make the Scripture a cover for their own ideas, but propounded and solved their problems from the Bible. To these belong the Antiochene theologians, and above all Calvin, whose *Institutio* deals with much whose only claim was that it seemed to him to be required by the Bible. In later times, Bengel and J. T. Beck, with the Württemberg Biblicists as a whole, proceed on the same lines. The history of salvation which is contained in the Bible con-

tinually reacts against the attempts of dogmatics to do violence to it. As we learn from the apocryphal Acts of John, the Greeks made out their Saviour to be a docetic appearance only, and the Cross an idea; but the doctrine of Cerinthus is already a compromise with actual history: Jesus, a true man, for a time bearer of the æon Christ. Our Fourth Gospel goes further in the direction of actuality: Jesus Christ, wholly man and at the same time the full revelation of God. Alongside of the Synoptic representation of the human life of Jesus, this might appear in the nature of a theological supplement. In combination the effect was more potent. Not the Arian but the Nestorian Christology indicates a reaction of Bible history against dogmatic speculation. In Monophysitism Docetism takes a new lease of life. Alongside of the Gospels stood Paul. His influence was hardly felt for centuries, and the Greek dogmatics can be understood almost without him, but when Augustine was captured by him, Paulinism kept Christendom busy until in Luther a herald of Divine grace still more congenial to the Apostle of Justification by Faith arose. As in the ancient Church, so also was it in the modern. The theological labours of orthodox scholarship always moved further away from the facts of history. Each party endeavoured to establish the truth of its own doctrine of the Bible. Hence Werenfels of Basel (†1740) said of it:

> 'Hic liber est in quo quærit sua dogmata quisque,
> invenit et pariter dogmata quisque sua.'

But the proof from Scripture, however perverted and coerced, necessitated the continual study of the Bible, until in the time of 'Enlightenment' it shook off the chains of dogmatic tradition and established its claim to existence again. This becomes even clearer when we follow up the history of piety (see below, VII. 2, p. 612).

Though the authority of the Bible is concerned chiefly with dogma, it is not exclusively so. The Bible regulates the whole Christian life, and especially the life of the Church. Here more than anywhere the OT foundation comes to light with its legal conception (cf. p. 589). It is sufficient to recall how large a space the Decalogue occupies in Christian instruction. Along with the *precepta Dei* there appear the *consilia evangelica*, the latter often not less strictly handled than the former. In Catholicism the Bible is the foundation of ecclesiastical organization as well as of ecclesiastical law. Here, indeed, the proof from Scripture is as arbitrary as in dogmatics. All Christian festivals and the hours of prayer were grounded on the Bible; also the legal rights of the clergy. Such an un-evangelical theory as the union of all spiritual and material power in the hand of the Pope had to take refuge in the figure of the two swords (Lk 22^{38}). The Papal bull in which Leo X. banned Luther's doctrine (15th June, 1520) begins with references to Ps 74^{22} 80^{13}. Protestantism carried this method of founding all its theories upon Holy Scripture much further. In Calvinism the strictest legalism regulated not only the ecclesiastical but also the whole public life (see VII. 3), until, with the secularizing of culture on the one hand, and the altered historical conception of the Bible on the other, the fact established itself more and more that in the records of long past ages ideals might be found for the individual and social life, but never again an immediate legal system.

So in the most recent times the idea of any external authority pertaining to the Bible is everywhere losing ground. This will not be to the injury of Christianity, if only at the same time the untold inner value of the Bible as the unparalleled religious guide-book and the inexhaustible fountain of religious inspiration gains wider recognition.

LITERATURE.—On the proof from Scripture: Harnack, *Dog. mengesch.*[3] ii. 68–82; Th. Schermann, 'Die Gesch. der dogmat. Florilegien vom v.-viii. Jahrh.' in *TU*, new ser. xiii. 1, 1904; F. Kropatschek, *Das Schriftprincip in der luther. Kirche*, i. 1905; C. Stange, *Was ist Schriftgemäss?* 1904; H. H. Wendt, *System der christl. Lehre*, 1907, pp. 25–58; P. Lobstein, *Études sur la doctrine chrét. de Dieu*, i. 1907; W. Newton Clarke, *The Use of the Scriptures in Theology*, 1905; E. Haupt, *Die Bedeut. der h. Schrift für den evangelischen Christen*, 1891; J. H. Thayer, *The Change of Attitude towards the Bible*, 1891; Er. Stave, *Der Einfluss der Bibelkritik auf das christl. Glaubensleben*. 1903; J. Wordsworth, *The Devotional Study of Holy Script. in reference to the Higher Crit. of the NT*, 1902; M. Reischle, *Was kann und soll uns die Bibel sein?* Wartburg, 1904, p. 93 ff.; U. Muhs, *Die Kritik und die Stellung zur h. Schrift* (1905); W. B. Carpenter (Bishop of Ripon), *My Bible*, 1884, Germ. tr. by L. Pfeiffer, 1902. Cf. art. APOLOGETICS, vol. i. p. 621.

IV. *BIBLICAL STUDIES.*—1. Methods.—Much against the original intention of the Bible, the Church looked upon it as a book for theologians, a book which as the source of all dogmatic and theological knowledge called for thorough study. The Gnostics were the first to handle it in this scientific way, and the Alexandrians adopted the method. It is true that the Catechetical school was interested more in philosophy than in history. Great as were the services which Origen rendered as a Biblical scholar, he was not a Biblical theologian, and in his school philosophy always maintained the upper hand. Even his admirer and successor, the blind Didymus of Alexandria, whose interest in exegesis was greater than that of others, gave the chief place to dogmatics. In the strict sense of the term we hear of exegetical lectures only in the school of Antioch. Such lectures were delivered by Lucian, Diodorus, and Theodore, and later by Paul the Persian after the flight to Nisibis. Here among the Nestorians outside the Empire there was established a regular school for the scientific study of the Bible. Among the Greeks and Latins it was sometimes by means of commentary and sometimes by 'answers to correspondents' (*Erotapokriseis, Quæstiones*) that Bible instruction was carried on. The services of the monasteries in this connexion were of more value to the ascetic view of the Bible than to its scientific study (see VI. 3). At the same time, both in East and West, the monasteries were for long the only places where the study of the Bible was fostered. In their libraries lay the old commentaries of the Fathers. From them excerpts were taken for handier use (*e.g.* from Gregory the Great by Paterius, Odo of Clugny, etc.), and these were made into new compilations. Pupils were taught the Bible. It was all very elementary, but it nevertheless supplied the means by which, to some degree, the continuity of scientific study was maintained. The credit here is due to the Rule of St. Basil and its renewal by Theodore of Studium, and in the West to Cassiodorus and the later Benedictines. The Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 required that in every cathedral-school at least one theologian should be appointed who would instruct priests and others in the Bible (*in sacra pagina*). In the Academy of Constantinople, founded by Bardas about 860, no theology of any kind was taught. Even in the oldest high schools of the West—the legal school of Bologna and the medical school at Salerno—it was the same. In the case of Paris the studies were entirely scholastic to start with, and not Biblical at all. The Bible first received recognition at the universities when the mendicant friars—the Franciscans first and then the Dominicans—joined their monastic schools to them. Even then the *lectiones biblicæ* were delivered in the monasteries before a mainly monastic audience—as a practical preparation for the cure of souls. It is true that a course of Bible instruction was part of the ordinary curriculum. In Paris there was a fixed course for the scholars extending over four years. The bachelor had to lecture

cursorie on the Bible for two years. But in both cases the Bible was hurried over with all possible speed as a stepping-stone to the 'sentences.' Roger Bacon (*Opus min.* 328) complains of the excessive value laid upon the sentences of the Lombard which the influence of Alexander of Hales caused people to prefer to the Bible itself.

All this was changed at the Reformation. Luther, himself a monk, attached supreme importance to exegetical lectures, as did Melanchthon and Calvin. In Zürich there was established the so-called 'Prophecy,' *i.e.* the public discussion of Scripture among theological students in the form of debate. This was taken up by Pietism in its *collegia biblica* again after Protestant orthodoxy had almost fallen back into the old mistake of the scholastic method. What Spener established in Frankfort was more of the nature of a prayer-meeting. A. H. Francke and his friends in Leipzig desired real lectures in the form of Bible-exposition. Their success proved the need of them. Since that time the study of the Bible has won a leading place within the Protestant teaching of all denominations. It is a fixed feature of the work of the German universities, and specialization becomes commoner every day. Even in the Roman Church more value is beginning to be laid upon it, as is shown by the Encyclica 'Providentissimus Deus' of Leo XIII. (18th Nov. 1893) and the formation of a Bible Commission in 1901, as well as by a series of works which these called into being. Attempts are frequently made to show that the Roman Church has always zealously furthered the study of the Bible, but the arguments which have been gathered (by Falk *e.g.*) only prove the opposite.

LITERATURE.—Denifle, *Die Universitäten des Mittelalters*, 1885; G. Kaufmann, *Gesch. der deutschen Universitäten*, 1888-96; Hastings Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, 1895; Saul, *Das Bibelstudium im Predigerorden*, 1902; Felder, *Gesch. der wissenschaftl. Studien im Franciscanerorden*, 1904; F. Falk, *Die Mainzer Hochschule 1477 und ihr Lehrstuhl für Bibelkunde*, 1899, *Bibelstudien, Bibelhandschriften und Bibeldrucke in Mainz*, 1901, and *Die Bibel am Ausgange des Mittelalters, ihre Kenntniss und ihre Verbreitung*, 1905; N. Peters, *Papst Pius X. und das Bibelstudium*, 1906; A. S. Peake, *A Guide to Biblical Study*, 1897; W. F. Adeney, *How to read the Bible*, 1896; M. L. G. Petrie, *Clews to Holy Writ*, 1892.

2. Textual criticism.—When we consider the Bible as the object of scientific study, one of the first things to demand our attention is the critical labour bestowed upon its text. The earliest Christians had no idea of anything of the kind. We learn this from the freedom of the citations from the OT which are contained in the NT. It must be admitted that the Jewish complaints about Christian interpolations in the LXX text were not without foundation (see, *e.g.* Ex 17^{14} in Barn. 12^{9}; Justin's citation of Ps 96^{10} in *Dial.* 72–73; Ps 37^{14} and 50^{9} in the Leipzig papyrus, edited by Heinrici, *Beitr.* iv. 1903). In the first two centuries nearly all the various readings of the NT came into existence, the majority of them by deliberate alteration of the text, many for the sake of style, and several in the interests of dogma (Jn 1^{18}, 1 Ti 3^{16}, He 2^{9} etc.). The most noticeable instances of this are provided by the heads of schools and churches, like Marcion and Tatian. The beginning of theology in the Church, however, gave rise to a systematic criticism of the text, such as we find in Irenæus's fine treatment of the variant 616 for 666 in Rev 13^{18} (*adv. Haer.* v. 29, 30). We know very little of the textual criticism by the Artemonites in Rome. All the more brightly, however, shines the star of the master Origen, though his great work in the OT province, the *Hexapla*, where the original text and the various versions are set side by side with the avowed intention of purifying the LXX text, led, it must be owned, to greater confusion (E. Schwartz, 'Zur Geschichte der Hexapla,' in *GGN*, 1903, 693 ff.). There is no evidence of a similar work for the NT, or, indeed, of any recension of the text at all, but in the numerous commentaries there is rich material for it. Even Origen could not establish his work everywhere. Different places developed different texts spontaneously. When the ecclesiastical authorities began to pay attention to this fact, revisions by the particular Churches came into existence in the various provinces. We know from Jerome (*Præf. in Paralip.*) that in Egypt the recension in use was that of Hesychius, in Syria that of Lucian, and in Palestine that of Pamphilus, the pupil of Origen. Lagarde, Bousset, Rahlfs, and others have begun to detect traces of these recensions in the still existing MSS, which, however, mostly give a mixed text. Hesychius is fond of choosing the shortest of competing readings, Lucian makes a broad text by comparing and combining, and Pamphilus admires a good Greek style. Everywhere in these ancient exegetical works we find notes on textual criticism, drawn usually, either directly or indirectly, from Origen's *Hexapla* in the OT and from various MSS in the NT. The deciding factor of criticism was sometimes dogma and sometimes the authority of individual scholars (cf. the scholion to Jn 7^{53} in A). Often readings were rejected as the falsifications of heretics, but often the heretics were right in their counter-complaint. For examples of Trinitarian interpolation, see 1 Co 8^{6} in the Cappadocian Fathers and 1 Jn 5^{7} in the Latin Church. We possess a wonderful instance of the careful tradition of a text in the Peshittâ, which is almost devoid of variant readings. In the case of the Copts the numerous scholia testify to continual comparison with the Greek text on the one hand and with the Arabic on the other. In Constantinople the influence of Chrysostom established the later Antiochene text, without, however, ousting the others entirely. The Athos-Codex, discovered by von der Goltz, and the labours of an Arethas, show how much interest was taken in criticism at Constantinople even in the 10th century. The continual revisions of the old versions, of which we have spoken above, are also evidence of textual criticism, whether they are concerned only with deciding between various translations or go back to the original. In the West, Cassiodorus in the 6th cent., and Theodulf and Alcuin in the 9th, did excellent work in the critical revision of the Vulgate; but none of them gained a hold. Every province, every order, every monastery, had a tradition of its own, which was based in some cases upon the work of some great individual Greek or even Hebrew scholar. In the *correctoria biblica* these traditions were laid down for guidance in the correcting of copies of the Bible. The Cistercians employed as their norm a copy by Abbot Stephen Harding; the Franciscans adopted the corrections of William of Mara; the Dominicans followed Hugo of St. Caro; the Augustinians had as their pattern a Windesheim Bible. The keen criticism of Roger Bacon proves that the success of the Paris text was due more to the renown of the *studium generale* than to its inherent excellence.

Even the introduction of printing made no difference at first. The oldest Latin prints are reproductions of a single MS. So far as the LXX is concerned, the Complutensian, the Aldine, and the Sixtine, with their reprints, represent three classes of texts. Erasmus formed the text of his NT out of very few and very late MSS. The next editors, especially Stephen and Beza, made use of others. Humanism did not rise beyond a dilettante textual criticism, and employed few materials. Still, printing brought about that which up till now was impossible, viz. the supremacy of a single

text (apart from the small errors that are unavoidable in a reprint). This was done for the Vulgate by the (Sixtine) Clementine text of (1590) 1592, which owed its origin to the carrying out of a decree of the Council of Trent. So far as the Greek text was concerned, the high esteem attached to the *textus jam ab omnibus receptus* was due to a bookseller's advertisement, the text itself being Stephen's text of 1550 in the Elzevir reprint of (1624) 1633, which was itself influenced by Beza's editions. In the year 1707, John Mill shattered all faith in the infallibility of this text by the 30,000 various readings which he found in about 80 MSS. The task of gathering together various readings, to which this Englishman devoted himself, was continued by Johann Jakob Wetstein, a Swiss who had settled in Holland (1751–52); the Saxon Chr. Fr. Matthæi, who collected and stole in Russia (1782–88, 1803–07);* the Viennese F. C. Alter (1786–87); the Dane Andr. Birch (1788); and the Catholic professor of theology at Bonn, J. M. A. Scholz (1823). The climax was reached in the editions of the Englishman S. Pr. Tregelles (1844, 1857–72), and above all in the diligent and fortunate work of G. Fr. Const. Tischendorf in Leipzig (1841, viii. crit. maj. 1869). Tischendorf used in his work 15 majuscule codices which he discovered, among them the Sinaitic (ℵ) found in 1844 and 1859. He made new editions of 21 MSS,† and collected testimonies from the Versions and the Fathers as no one before him had done. Since that time some extremely valuable finds have been made. Von Soden has made the attempt to work through all the minuscules catalogued by Gregory and Scrivener. An enormous amount of industry is employed upon the investigation of texts, especially by German and English scholars. But this is not the last word in textual criticism. What is of the utmost importance is that the right method of passing judgment upon tradition should be followed. The Württemberg theologian Joh. Alb. Bengel (1734), with his method of distinguishing between different families of texts, here took the first step. His motive was love for God's word, in which even the slightest particular was golden in value. The rationalist, Johann Salomon Semler of Halle, carried this on, and introduced to German science the labours of the Dutch Arminians and the French Catholic Oratorian Richard Simon. He was joined by Johann Jakob Griesbach of Jena (1774–77) and Hug of Freiburg (1808), the former a Protestant, the latter a Catholic, who laboured more fully the scheme of the text-recensions which sprang from the ancient Church—a course continued in our own time most successfully by W. Bousset in his *Textkrit. Studien zum NT* (1894). While these all started from the textus receptus, improving, shortening, and transposing it, C. Lachmann, the Berlin philologist, took up Richard Bentley's suggestion (1742), and established the principle that the start should be made, not from the late printed text, but from the ancient MSS: it was possible to give the text of the 4th cent. with certainty instead of that of the 16th. Further progress is due to the two Cambridge friends, B. F. Westcott and F. J. A. Hort, whose great service was that they overcame the scruples of conservative English theology in spite of Dean Burgon's violent attacks. Their carefully elaborated method was considered by many to represent all that was attainable. C. R. Gregory, O. von Gebhardt, and E. Nestle were content to compare Tischendorf and WH. The great agreement of the newer text-critics from Lachmann to WH in their opposition to the textus receptus is shown very clearly by the editions of F. H. A. Scrivener (1859, revised by E. Nestle, 1906), though that was far from the intention of the strongly conservative author. A new textus receptus, however, was and must be an impossibility. With fine instinct Hort himself called special attention to a series of Western readings which he did not consider genuine, but which for the history of the text were well worthy of note. The more thorough investigation of the history of the oldest translations, especially the Vet. Lat. and the Vet. Syr., with which latter Mrs. Lewis's find at Sinai first made us acquainted, has led to more and more attention being attached to them. Now it is clear that not only all the important variants were in existence before the 4th cent., but also that it was just the so-called Western text that was most widely circulated in the 2nd century. In opposition to WH, a great number of English scholars, in particular F. C. Burkitt and J. R. Harris, with the Germans F. Blass, E. Nestle, etc., give this text, which was current from Carthage to Edessa, the highest place, while others, like Jülicher and Wellhausen, advocate an eclectic method. And, indeed, the history of the text can be of service now only in making clear the later developments of the text. In most cases, what it does is to bring us to a stop before the fact that two readings, equally witnessed and equally wide-spread, reach back to the earliest time. If we are not satisfied with a choice of two readings, or assume, like Blass, two editions by the Biblical author himself, then it is to exegetical considerations that we must look for finality. Thus, the method which B. Weiss has always advocated and practised has to be combined with the other one, based on the history of the text.

In the matter of the OT, lower criticism was not so active. Here the tradition of the Synagogue was the guide. So early as the 2nd cent. this had fixed the consonantal text and its pronunciation (by oral traditions in the first instance) so firmly that it never altered. The so-called Massorah, which was committed to writing in the 8th to 10th cents. made an effort to attain an almost faultless multiplication and tradition of the text. Although the oldest Hebrew MSS do not go beyond the 9th cent. A.D., it is yet possible to maintain that we possess the text of the 2nd cent., and that it is to hand in print (Soncino, 1488, Brescia, 1494 [Gerson]; Complutensian Polyglot, 1514–17; *Biblia Rabbinica Bombergiana*, ii., Ven. 1525–26). Even the collections of numerous variants which B. Kennicott (1776–80) and de Rossi (1784–88) have brought together do not go beyond this Massoretic revision. On the other hand, the old translations, especially the LXX, the Samaritan text, and several papyri of recent discovery, show that there was a pre-Massoretic text. While editors down to Delitzsch-Baer and Ginsburg (1894) conceived their task to be the reproduction in the most exact form of the Massoretic text with all its delicacies of punctuation, the newest editions (Haupt, *SBOT*, 1893 ff.; Kittel, *Bibl. Heb.*, 1905–06) make it their aim, with the help of the versions and of conjecture, to reach an older text. How far that has been successful, and what value is to be attached to the LXX traditions, are still open questions.

In the investigation of the ancient versions of the Bible, whose value for textual criticism is increasing from day to day, excellent work has been done, especially by English scholars. There are, *e.g.*, the new Oxford editions: the Vulgate by J. Wordsworth and H. J. White (1889 ff.), the Peshiṭṭā by G. H. Gwilliam (1901), the Northern Coptic (Bohairic) NT by G. Horner (1898 ff.); while Cambridge provides us with the Septuagint by A. E. Brooke and N. McLean (1906 ff.), the Old Syriac Gospels by F. C. Burkitt (1904), the Peshiṭṭā Psalter by W. E. Barnes (1904), etc.

* O. von Gebhardt, *Centralbl. f. Bibliothekswesen*, xv., 1898.
† C. R. Gregory, *Prolegomena*, 25 ff.

The main point, however, is that the claim of the Biblical text-critic is now recognized on all hands, and that criticism has almost entirely freed itself from the dogmatic prejudices which so long met it with opposition. It carries on its work by a scientific method. Naturally in this particular case, with the rich and complex nature of its materials, the method receives special application. It is to be regretted that this is often forgotten by philologists who labour upon the Bible. Yet the method remains entirely scientific, and in principle could be applied in any similar field of study.

LITERATURE.—Gregory, Scrivener, Nestle, von Soden (see II. 3); Hammond, *Textual Criticism*, 1894; M. R. Vincent, *A History of the Textual Criticism of the NT*, 1899; Kenyon, *Handb. of Text. Crit. of the NT*, 1901; E. Rüegg, *Die NTliche Textkritik seit Lachmann*, 1892; B. Weiss, *Textkritik der Apocalypse*, 1891, *Kath. Briefe*, 1892, *Paul. Briefe*, 1896, and *Evangelien*, 1899; H. Strack, art. 'Massorah' in *PRE*[3] xii. 393; Chr. D. Ginsburg, *Introd. to the Massoretico-critical ed. of the Heb. Bible*, 1897; R. Kittel, *Über die Notwendigkeit und Möglichkeit einer neuen Ausgabe der hebr. Bibel*, 1901; Paul de Lagarde, *Ankündigung einer neuen Ausgabe der griech. Übersetzung des AT*, 1886; H. B. Swete, *The OT in Gr.*, 1887 ff., and *Introd.*[2], 1902; A. Rahlfs, *Septuaginta-Studien*, 1904, 1907; W. Bousset, *Textkritische Studien zum NT*, 1894; E. von der Goltz, 'Eine textkritische Arbeit des 10. bezw. 6. Jahrh.,' *TU*, new ser. ii. 4, 1899; S. Berger, *Hist. de la Vulgate*, 1893; P. Denifle, 'Die Handschriften der Bibelkorrektorien des 13 Jahrh.,' *Arch. f. Litt. u. Kirchengesch. des Mittelalters*, iv., 1888.

3. Higher criticism.—Along with the criticism of the text, and often hand in hand with it, there has always gone the literary and material criticism. It is not a modern discovery; only the methods have changed here also. The relation between the higher and what is called the lower criticism is characteristic of the different periods. The awakening scientific consciousness attaches chief importance to the criticism of the text, while higher criticism comes afterwards. So long as science is bound by tradition and the dogma of the Church, it confines itself as much as possible to the former, and even tries to find in it the solution of higher literary problems. Modern instances may be cited in A. Klostermann, Ed. König, and Fr. Blass. As soon, however, as it becomes free, it lays the stress upon the latter, without, however, neglecting those questions which arise in connexion with the text.

Literary criticism finds its starting-point in the formation of the Canon itself. If the pre-condition of any book's canonicity is its prophetic or apostolic origin, then the book itself and the tradition concerning it must be examined to discover whether such origin can be claimed for it or not. The Muratorian Fragment, *e.g.*, denies canonicity to the *Shepherd* of Hermas, because it is neither of prophetic nor of apostolic origin. The Epistle to the Hebrews, which Roman tradition rejected as anonymous, must come from Barnabas (Africa) or Paul himself (Alexandria) to secure recognition. This was the motive which prompted the gathering of literary information regarding the individual books of the Bible, such as Eusebius of Cæsarea in particular collected with great diligence. In some cases this information found its way into the Bible MSS in the shape of prologues, titles, and subscriptions, and in a certain measure it kept alive all through the Middle Ages the knowledge of the origin of the books of the Bible. Its collection into the Bibliotheca Sancta of Sixtus of Siena († 1599) was done in this mediæval spirit. It was with the same material that the Protestant theology of the 16th and 17th centuries worked, and even modern critical investigators cannot dispense with tradition, however much they may subject it to examination.

The criticism of the ancient Church proceeded in the first place not upon literary and historical, but upon dogmatic considerations. It was from dogmatic motives that in Asia Minor the so-called 'Alogi' rejected all Johannine writings, that the Roman presbyter Gaius declared the Apocalypse to have come from the hand of Cerinthus, and that Dionysius of Alexandria reached the fine conclusion—adopted among the very latest scholars—that there were two Johns working in Ephesus simultaneously. We have the clearest evidence of this in the casting aside of everything which came from the Twelve Apostles by Marcion, who combined with this the hypothesis of an interpolation of the Gospel (Luke) and the Epistles of Paul. The repudiation of the OT also by Marcion and many Gnostics has a dogmatic basis in the dualism between the creating and the redeeming God, this being the shape which the Pauline antithesis—law and grace—took among pagan Christians. Along with this we find all manner of stages, from partial to complete recognition of the OT, often with very fine differentiation of the contents according to their significance and value (Ptolemæus, *Ep. to Flora*; Harnack, *SBAW*, 1902).

Criticism, however, became more minute. Just as Marcion in his antitheses called attention to a great number of contradictions between the OT and the NT (*e.g.* Is 45[7], Lk 6[43]; Ex 3[21], Lk 10[4]; 2 K 2[23f.], Lk 18[15f.]), so inconsistencies in the NT itself soon came to be observed. The Muratorian Canon and the Monarchian Prologues deal with the differences which mark the beginning and the end of the Gospels. The disparity between the two genealogies forms the subject-matter of a correspondence between Julius Africanus and Aristides (Euseb. *HE* i. 72 ff., cf. F. Spitta, 1877). Eusebius deals with the various accounts of the appearances of the risen Lord. It was the opponents of Christianity who called attention to these difficulties. The Jews questioned the Christian proof from prophecy and the credibility of the Gospel tradition. There were also heathen philosophers like Celsus, and very notably Porphyry, who declared the OT to be incredible and full of myths, and pointed out inconsistencies in the Gospels themselves. It is against Porphyry or Hierocles that the *Apokritikos* of Macarius Magnes is directed. Ecclesiastical theologians, who were as little capable of a real literary and historical survey as their opponents, were driven in this combat to a method of harmonizing, which at all costs had to explain away those inconsistencies; and they prided themselves that they successfully accomplished this task, by means of a mental ingenuity that was often surprising. One has the impression, it is true, that they did not feel any great certainty themselves, for instead of one explanation they often offer a choice, or they smother the question at issue by abusing the malevolence of unbelief and doubt. This was the course taken by Augustine himself, whose *de Consensu Evangelistarum* is probably the best work which the ancient Church produced in this field (see iii. 40–50: the harmonizing of Jn 19[14], 'the sixth hour,' and Mk 15[25], 'the third hour'). But Christian readers also observed difficulties—often very subtle ones—in reading their Bibles, and they demanded the explanation of them from their spiritual advisers. This is shown very clearly by Jerome's correspondence with his lady friend in Rome, and later by Alcuin's interchange of letters. In this way there arose the rich literature of Biblical *Erotapokriseis*, or *Quaestiones*. So long as these critical questions were put in the faith that the inspired Scriptures were infallible and free from inconsistency, and in the blind trust that the theologians of the Church were able to solve every problem of the kind that could arise, they were welcomed as a means of exercising and displaying the mental acumen of ecclesiastical theologians.

But whenever these inconsistencies were seriously entertained they were at once condemned as heresy. The Manichæans, who continued the critical tradition of the Marcionites, gave the Church most trouble in this matter, and they were followed by Paulicians, Albigenses, and all the tendencies which were gathered together under the name of Catharists. Even within the Church itself rationalistic views were to be found. In the 9th cent. Abbot Hucbert of St. Maurice made fun of our Lord's saying in Mt 11^{29}—a piece of unparalleled levity. In 1376 the Parisian students declared that the Gospel, like other books, contained what was fabulous and false, but their thesis was immediately condemned by the bishop. Such frivolous criticism as this could not possess any lasting effect.

The Humanists introduced a new feature into criticism. They were no longer content only to hand down Patristic references, but they also—especially Laurentius Valla and Desiderius Erasmus (*Annotationes* and *Paraphrases*)—attached real importance to them. It is this that enables us to understand Carlstadt's criticism of the Canon (1520; K. A. Credner, *Zur Gesch. des Kanons*, 1847, p. 291 ff.) and the later treatment of the question by the Lutheran dogmatists from Chemnitz to Gerhard. Their distinction between canonical and deutero-canonical books corresponds generally to Eusebius's *homologumena* and *antilegomena*. Quite different was Luther's position (see III. 3). In his case literary and historical considerations were entirely secondary. It was his personal faith that was the decisive element. The books which did not bear clear testimony to Christ he considered non-apostolic. His principle was a purely religious, we may say dogmatic, valuation without any literary or historical considerations. Even in the same book one verse might be apostolic in this sense and another not. According to this view, the old idea of the Canon as representing the united authority of the Apostles was lost sight of. It was the last step in what may be called the dissolution of the Canon. Luther himself, however, did not admit this result, but identified the principle upon which he proceeded with the literary method of the Fathers and the Humanists. His own opinion was that Hebrews, James, Jude, and the Apocalypse should be excluded from the NT. There he drew a clear line. But he was far too conservative and cautious to wish to press such a personal judgment upon others. He felt that he possessed the power and the right to make an alteration upon the Canon, but he left it as it was. Gradually the line which he drew disappeared, and the consciousness of any difference of value within the Canon faded away. Later dogmatists were unaware of it. Only the order which Luther's Bible follows bears witness, in its variation from tradition, to the critical experiment of the reformer.

The new period of Biblical criticism began about the middle of the 18th cent., at the time of 'Enlightenment.' The way was prepared for it on the one hand by the pains which Catholics expended to destroy faith in the infallibility of the Bible, the Protestants' paper Pope, and on the other hand by the strictly scientific method of investigation which was adopted by the Arminians. The new feature was that it was no longer the traditions about the separate books that were made to speak, but the books themselves. Richard Simon attacked the trustworthiness of the Bible text; Astruc, Louis XIV.'s physician, by his discovery of the two strata distinguished by separate Divine names in the Pentateuch, assailed the ordinary view of the origin of the books of the Bible. The hypothesis of the two sources was taken over later by the Protestants, and further developed and extended. Ilgen and Hupfeld (1853) discovered the 2nd Elohist. Deuteronomy was disentangled, and finally J E P and Dt were found to have undergone a series of redactions. In spite of its great significance for the understanding of Israel's religious development, the dispute as to the age of these sources between the school of Ewald and that of Reuss, Graf, and Wellhausen, in which the latter emerged victorious, is quite a secondary matter compared with the fact that the gradual growth of the Pentateuch from different sources and strata ranging over centuries is acknowledged generally. Even such conservative theologians in Germany as the late Franz Delitzsch, Ed. König, and H. Strack no longer refuse to admit this fact. In Scotland, Robertson Smith was the pioneer. So much progress has now been made that not only does Haupt's 'Rainbow Bible' (1893 ff.) bring the various sources before the eyes of all who are versed in Hebrew, but learned and popular new translations like those of Kautzsch (1894), Kuenen, Hooykaas, Kosters, and Oort (1897 ff.) exhibit them also to the laity. Upholders of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch are almost entirely dumb, while books like Schlatter's *Einleitung in die Bibel* (Calw, 1889, 3rd ed. 1901), which come from and are intended for evangelical circles, set forth the principles of this criticism as the result of the latest investigation.

Naturally this did not stop at the Pentateuch. The method spread automatically to the other historical books of the OT. Those same sources of which we have spoken include Joshua also, while in the case of Judges, Samuel, and Kings the conditions are largely similar. The prophetical books, especially Isaiah, but also some of the Minor Prophets, bear evidence that they are not unities; so, too, the poetical books, Job, Ecclesiastes (Siegfried), Proverbs. The 'Psalms of David' themselves confess that they do not all come from his pen, and the fact was always recognized. Theodore of Mopsuestia in his day connected some of them with princes of the Maccabæan dynasty. The systematic investigation of different collections, strata, and dates led to the conclusion that there was as little of David in the Psalms as there was of Moses in the Pentateuch. The results of OT criticism are in matters of detail quite fluctuating. The revision of ideas about the development of Israel's religion, which we owe to the comparative history of religion, will lead to many modifications (Br. Baentsch, *Altoriental. u. israelit. Monotheismus*, 1906). But the necessity for criticism and the method which is to be followed are established (E. Kautzsch, *Abriss der Gesch. des AT Schriftums* [a supplement to his translation], 1894).

In the field of the NT, which has been separating itself from the OT more and more for a century, the topic which has received most investigation since 1750 has been the Synoptic problem. So far as any literary relationship between the Gospels was thought of in former times, the view most widely taken was that of St. Augustine, that the order observed in the Canon was also the historical order. With astonishing rapidity, however, various possibilities were now put to the test: (1) the use of the oldest Gospel by more recent ones, (2) a common source, and (3) independent use of oral tradition. Gradually a combination of these various hypotheses emerged as the only possible solution, viz. the use of Mark by Matthew and Luke, with the addition of a common source, and much drawn from oral tradition. In matters of detail this leaves room for any number of suggestions, and science can hardly come to any

definite conclusion, because no explanation can be found to clear up the whole question. But the principle has been found, and will never again be lost sight of. In regard to the rest of the NT books, it was questions of genuineness that exercised critics until the middle of the 19th century. What had to be proved, in the first place, was the claim of the various books to canonicity, *i.e.* their genuineness, integrity, and trustworthiness. Rationalistic critics confined their attention to single and often very external points. Schleiermacher and his school made a real advance in the literary method. But it was Baur that first achieved a general conception of the significance of each book from a consideration of the place which it filled in the general development of primitive Christianity. Subsequent examination proved Baur's conception to be false, resting, as it did, upon Hegel's philosophical scheme of the movement of ideas through thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. The conception of the separate books as having been written with the express intention of making them effective factors in the contest between the Church parties is now given up. What is left, however, is the necessity for dealing with each individual book as a whole, and finding out the part which it played in a great development. The method which was followed by Baur (and still by Holtzmann), of starting from the criticism of the Canon, has yielded more and more to the literary method (Reuss, Jülicher, Krüger, von Soden). The great advance from the scientific point of view consists in the fact that Biblical criticism has attained the greatest possible freedom from all dogmatic prepossessions. Externally this is shown in the fact that the question of genuineness is now discussed quite calmly, conservative theologians occasionally denying it, while critical theologians often maintain it or pronounce a *non liquet*. Recent criticism also speaks freely of different sources, and propounds theories of interpolation or some similar literary attempt at solution. Baur held only the four chief Pauline epistles to be genuine, but now the majority of them (eight to ten) are recognized. It has to be admitted that the integrity of 2 Cor. is still keenly disputed. The radical criticism of the Dutch school, which repudiates all the apostolic epistles, finds as little support as that of the few who desire at any price to maintain the genuineness of all. The Acts of the Apostles is everywhere handled upon the theory of different sources, though the methods differ much in detail. How much vigour used to be spent on the discussion of the genuineness, the Johannine origin of the Fourth Gospel, and the Revelation *pro et contra!* At the present time we have an increasing number of attempts to show that neither is a unity. Undoubtedly this search for rents or joinings, these outvying theories of sources and interpolations, may become to some extent unnatural. But in the meantime they form the most valuable instrument we have —an instrument which is not yet by any means worn out.

LITERATURE.—The Ancient Church: K. J. Neumann, *Hippolytus von Rom*, 1902, p. 144 ff.
The Middle Ages: H. Reuter, *Gesch. der relig. Aufklärung im Mittelalter*, 1875–77.
Recent times: T. K. Cheyne, *The Founders of OT Criticism*, 1893; W. Robertson Smith, see I. 1; H. Holzinger, *Einleit. in den Hexateuch*, 1893; C. A. Briggs, *The Higher Crit. of the Hexateuch*, 1893 (3rd ed. 1897); Baron Fr. von Hügel (Cath.), *The Hist. Method and the Documents of the Hexateuch*, 1898; J. Orr, *The Problem of the OT*, 1907; W. G. Jordan, *Bibl. Criticism and Modern Thought*, 1909; H. S. Nash, *The Hist. of the Higher Crit. of the NT*, New York, 1900; L. Pullan, *NT Criticism*, 1907; H. Holtzmann, *Lehrb. der Einleit. in das NT*[3], 1897; A. Jülicher, *An Introd. to the NT*, Eng. tr., Lond. 1904; B. Weiss, *Manual of Introd. to the NT*, Eng. tr., Edin. 1887–88; Th. Zahn, *Introd. to NT*, Eng. tr., Edin. 1909.

4. Exegesis.—All criticism, higher and lower, is ultimately only a means to the correct understanding of the text. It is a serious mistake to suppose, as has sometimes been done, that criticism is an end in itself. Literary criticism is a part, a very important part, of exegesis as it is now understood, just as allegory was its most important feature in former times.

We have already learned that the Christian Church found elaborate exegetical methods to hand, and have seen how she provided these with new aims. The allegorical method, which the Stoics developed and the Jews of Alexandria applied to the OT, discovered a hidden and profound meaning, such as was alone worthy of the old conception of God and His Spirit, and this meaning, often with the utmost disregard for the plain sense of the words, it tried to establish by all kinds of artifices. In contra-distinction to philosophical speculations which disregarded history, Christianity was by its whole nature bound up in history. The notion of prophecy and fulfilment took the place of the Platonic *noumenon* and *phainomenon*. Thus it comes about that the history of Christian exegesis is a continual conflict between a historical interpretation and the old allegorical method. The Gnostics, who were the first real exegetes and wrote commentaries to the OT and the NT, fell under the influence of this latter method in its most marked form. The Gospel dealt not with the earthly life of Jesus, but with events in the supramundane world. Heracleon understood the saying that Jesus went down to Capernaum (Jn 2^{12}) as referring to the descent of the æon Christus from the region of light into this material world. Among the twelve apostles the traitor Judas was the lowest of the twelve æons, and his fall brought the world of sense into being. At the same time, the Apologists adopted a method of interpretation which reminds us of the exegesis of Palestinian Rabbinism and early Christianity, mainly in the form of fulfilment of prophecy. It was reserved for the theologians of Alexandria to remove this contradiction by maintaining the rightfulness of both methods, considering them, however, to represent two separate stages. In especial there was Origen's brilliant formula that, as man contains body, soul, and spirit, so exegesis shows the strictly verbal, the moral, and the mystical senses, challenging, supplementing, and qualifying one another. This theory of the greatest thinker and Biblical scholar in the ancient Church continued to dominate exegesis. He himself, however, did not always put it into practice, and there were very few of his followers who had the capacity to do so. The majority of them made his allegorical method a means of coaxing from the text things which it did not contain at all. The interpretation of the parables provides an instance. No regard was had for the simple hortatory lesson of the parable of the Good Samaritan. The parable was the representation of Christ's own work of salvation from the Fall to the Judgment-Day. There were some who went further in this direction than others. Origen's school contained a Pamphilus and a Eusebius as well as the great Cappadocians. The Alexandrians were the keenest allegorizers. At the same time they were spiritualists in regard to the eschatology of the ancient Church, while a section of Christian theologians (Nepos, Methodius) accepted it literally. More important was the exegesis of Lucian's school. These Antiochenes wrote Greek, but there was evidently a Semitic element in them. They understood Syriac and Hebrew and had sympathy with Rabbinical exegesis. Thus in the case of Diodorus of Tarsus and his greater pupil Theodore of Mopsuestia, exegesis is much less allegorical than typological (though the two are always inter-

woven), and occasionally it becomes almost wholly historical in method.

As this Antiochene school acquired much influence in the Greek Church through the great preacher Chrysostom, whose expositions were quite unfettered by school tradition, so through Theodore, the interpreter κατ' ἐξοχήν, it assumed quite supreme influence among the Syrian Nestorians. We are astonished to find among these in the late Middle Ages excellent commentators like Išodad and others, while the Monophysites followed the Alexandrian traditions. Bar-Hebræus, in exegesis as in politics, approximates to both. The school of Antioch gained influence also in the West. The much used *Instituta regularia divinae legis* of Junilius are reproductions of the lectures of Paul of Nisibis.* Ambrose was a faithful follower of Origen; and Augustine, in spite of his more practical Latin nature, which made him akin to the Syrians, resembled him greatly. He has laid down the principles which he followed in *de Doctrina Christiana*. Tychonius and Eucherius wrote text-books on the allegorical method. But it was Jerome who, under the direct influence of Rabbinical exegesis and a verbal understanding of the original, brought about the change from the method of Origen and the Cappadocians to an exegesis that fixed the verbal or grammatical sense and made interpretation historical. In practice, it must be admitted, he himself fell short; but the effect of his influence is to be seen in the fact that the West has never quite ceased to be alive to the significance of a verbal and historical exegesis. In general, in the Middle Ages there was a much more active exegetical movement among the Latins than among the Greeks. In the 6th cent. there began the period of *catenae*, that is to say, exegetical compilations from various authors. At first the authors were named; then the names were omitted; the excerpts were connected by some suitable phrases, and then the Byzantine compiler placed his name before the result. It may be said without fear of contradiction, that since the time of Justinian hardly a new exegetical thought has found expression—at least in the way of sound interpretation. The same conditions prevailed in the West until the 12th century. The Carlovingian commentators give nothing of their own, and make a formal excuse when, once in a way, they venture to add something to the authority of the Fathers. These commentaries, destitute of any spark of individuality, differ from one another only in the way in which they combine Ambrose, Augustine, Jerome, Pelagius, etc. Ultimately, however, the speculations of scholasticism infused new life even into exegesis. The Patristic exegesis was displaced by a dialectic method. The theory of the fourfold sense of scripture became developed:

> 'litera gesta docet; quid credas allegoria;
> moralis quid agas; quo tendas anagogia;

and it was carried into practice with almost painful consequences. For example, Lk 2^{21} means (1) verbally, that Jesus was circumcised on the 8th day (the best time for the operation), (2) allegorically, the eight parts of Holy Scripture, (3) morally, the eight stages of repentance, (4) anagogically, the octave of the Resurrection, the eight ages of the world, the eight blessings of future salvation (*Leg. aur.* 13). This method, like that of the Rabbis, thinks nothing of placing the most varied and often contradictory interpretations side by side. They are gathered in from all quarters, and the more the better, provided only that by a good *partitio* the appearance of some system is maintained. At the same time there is preserved a certain philological element fostered by Jerome's works, especially his *Interpretatio nominum hebraicorum*, and Isidore's *Etymologica*, though now and again by an independent acquaintance with the language. As a great many of the monasteries taught Greek, so we find an occasional Hebrew scholar, controversies with the Jews making a knowledge of Hebrew necessary (Sam. Berger, *Quam notitiam linguae Hebraicae habuerint Christiani medii ævi temporibus in Gallia*, 1893). Roger Bacon († c. 1292) was an excellent philologist. He found fault with the scholastic exegesis of his time, because it confined itself to *divisiones per membra varia*, after the manner of artists, forced concordances after the manner of jurists, and rhythmic consonances after the manner of the grammarians (*Opus min.* 323). It resulted probably from the controversy with the Rabbinical exegesis that Nicolaus of Lyra († 1340), the Minorite, first set up the principle of literalism in complete clearness, though, indeed, his acceptance of a *duplex sensus literalis* became a side-door to allegorical interpretation. Knowledge of the Rabbinical exposition increased through Jewish converts like Paul of Burgos, and therewith also the doubt as to the sole accuracy of the Patristic exegesis.

Here, now, we meet with the Reformation exegesis, whose principle was that the literal sense was the only right one. The new religious principle of confidence in the revealed God overcame the Neo-Platonic delight in mystery. The new interest which Humanism awakened in the original languages also helped (Reuchlin, Erasmus). Its effect is seen in Melanchthon and Calvin more than in Luther, to whom the religious motive was always the deciding one. It has to be said that exegesis did not by any means free itself at once from the custom of centuries. The example of the Fathers produced an after-effect, and all the more so since exegesis continued to be preponderatingly interested in dogma or edification. However diligently exegetes laboured, systematic interests held the first place in the orthodox period, and the exposition of Pietism aimed always at practical edification. Rationalism, which read the Bible no longer as God's word, but as the product of human composition, arrived, in theory at least, at a purely historical exegesis, whose aim was to establish clearly what the author really meant by his words. In the working out of this, however, it came to grief, and indeed fell into the mistake of modernizing. It could not think of the Biblical authors as less enlightened than it prided itself on being. It was only last century that historical exegesis came to be practised; and at the close of the century it was practised to excess in the effort to exhibit the views of the Biblical writers with archaic realism, and to render as clear as possible the difference between the ideas of then and now. Exegesis received a tremendous impulse. Everywhere great enterprises were called into life, chiefly by the collaboration of several exegetes.

Exegesis still exhibits the greatest possible differences in dealing with the text, but the principle that the meaning is to be reached by means of a grammatico-historical exegesis is being more firmly established. It cannot fail to become more widely recognized, moreover, that such an exegesis needs no supplementing to become theological. To explain the Bible historically means to grasp and expound it in its spirit, and the spirit of the Bible is religious. It is matter of rejoicing that this idea is gaining ground among exegetes, and we may rejoice too in the fact that more attention is given now than formerly to form, and that, following Herder's successful start, æsthetic questions receive consideration. At the same time the beauty of the Bible will never

* Kihn, *Theodor von Mopsuestia und Junilius Afr. als Exegeten*, 1880.

reveal its chief aspect. Theological exegesis has rather to learn from the general investigation of the history of religions. When the old conception of inspiration is given up, it follows that in the domain of exegesis the isolating of the Bible in regard to language and subject-matter must cease. As the OT cannot be understood without the study of Babylonian texts, so in the NT regard must be had not only to the OT, but also to profane sources. Religious ideas are to be followed up in their general development in the history of humanity and not only of Israel. What we find peculiar to the Bible has to be observed as carefully as what it possesses in common with other sources. Exegesis is not to be dissolved into isolated studies in religious history; it must make its aim the understanding of the religious personalities which speak to us in these writings as bearers of Divine revelation.

It would take us too far to add to this sketch of exegesis a detailed survey of individual exegetes and their services. Much of the Patristic work is lost. A beginning has just been made in the task of recovering these older works from excerpts made by succeeding ages (*e.g.* Apollinaris of Laodicea, H. Lietzmann, 1904; Petrus of Laodicea, G. Heinrici, 1908; Titus of Bostra, J. Sickenberger, 1901, cf. C. H. Turner in *HDB*, ext. vol. 484 ff.) in connexion with the investigation of mediæval compilations (Heinrici, art. 'Catenen' in *PRE*[3], iii. 754 ff.; H. Lietzmann, *Catenen*, 1897; Karo-Lietzmann, *Catenarum Græc. Catalogus*, 1902; M. Faulhaber, *Die Prophetenkatenen*, 1899; J. Sickenberger, 'Die Lukaskatene des Niketas von Herakleia,' *TU*, new ser., vii. 4, 1902; A. E. Schönbach, *Über einige Evangelienkommentare des Mittelalters*, 1903 [*SWAW*, cxlvi.]; Ed. Riggenbach, 'Die ältesten latein. Kommentare zum Hebräerbrief,' in Zahn's *Forschungen*, viii. 1, 1907; J. Haussleiter, *Victorin von Pettau*, 1900; A. Souter, 'The Commentary of Pelagius on the Epp. of Paul,' 1907 [*Proceedings of the Brit. Acad.* ii.]; H. L. Ramsay, 'Le Commentaire de l'apocalypse par Beatus de Liebana,' in *RHLR*, 1902). Notwithstanding all investigation, the greatest part will remain lost. On the *Glossa ordinaria* of Walafrid Strabo, the authoritative text-book of mediæval exegesis, and the commentaries of Nicolaus of Lyra, which were often printed together with the *Glossa*, see Ed. Reuss and R. Schmid in *PRE*[3] xx. 790, xii. 28. A bibliography of modern exegetical literature would need a volume to itself.

In place of the old collections of *Critici sacri* (1660) and the Synopses of M. Polus (1669) and Starke (1733 ff.), we have in Germany, for the OT, specially the Biblical commentary of Keil and Delitzsch (1861 ff.) and the short commentary of Strack and Zöckler (1884 ff.), both conservative. From the critical standpoint we have Hitzig's short text-book (Knobel, Dillmann, etc., 1841 ff.), now superseded by the commentaries of Nowack (1892 ff.) and of Marti (1897 ff.). For the NT we have Meyer's critical and exegetical commentary (1832), still a standard work in its new editions (by B. Weiss, Wendt, Heinrici, and others), and de Wette's short exegetical handbook (1836 ff.), superseded by Holtzmann's short commentary (1889), which has itself been supplemented by Lietzmann's essentially philological text-book (1906). A more conservative commentary began to be published by Zahn in 1903 ff. Of a more practical nature are the Bible-works of Josias Bunsen (1858 ff.) and J. P. Lange (1857 ff.); recently J. Weiss (1906). England has the *Speaker's Commentary* (1871 ff.), the *Pulpit Commentary*, by Dean Spence and J. S. Exell (1880 ff.), the *International Critical Commentary*, edited by Driver, Plummer, Briggs (1895 ff.), and Robertson Nicoll's *Expositor's Bible* (1895 ff.). France has the fine unified work of Ed. Reuss, *La Bible* (1874–81). Catholicism has to add to the *Cursus Scripturae Sanctae*, by the Jesuits Cornely, Knabenbauer, and Hummelauer (1886 ff.), something a little more modern in the *Manuel Biblique* by Vigouroux (1881 ff.).

LITERATURE.—Ed. Reuss, *Gesch. der h. Schriften des NT*[6], 1887, pp. 574–679; L. Diestel, *Gesch. des AT in der christl. Kirche*, 1869; H. Holtzmann, 'Das Problem der Gesch. der Auslegung' (*Heidelberger Festschrift*, 1880); G. Heinrici, art. 'Hermeneutik,' in *PRE*[3] vii. 718–750; F. W. Farrar, *Hist. of Interpretation* (*BL*, 1885), 1886; G. H. Gilbert, *Interpretation of the Bible*, 1908; H. Dechent, *Herder und die aesthet. Betrachtung der h. Schrift*, 1904; Eb. Schrader, *Die Keilinschriften und das AT*, 3rd ed. by H. Zimmern and H. Winckler, 1903; A. Jeremias, *Das AT im Lichte des alten Orients*[2], 1906, *Babylonisches im NT*, 1905; H. Gunkel, *Zum religionsgeschichtl. Verständnis des NT*, 1903; E. von Dobschütz, *Der gegenwärtige Stand der NT Exegese*, 1906; J. Weiss, *Die Aufgaben der NT Wissenschaft*, 1908.

5. **Biblical sciences.**—Exegesis presupposes the subsidiary sciences of philology and archæology, and includes the general, historical, and systematic study of the Bible's contents. In this sense the Biblical sciences have always existed, although the strictly scientific method is a modern achievement.

It is easy to undervalue the scientific labours of the early Church upon the Bible. It is true that these were often of an elementary character, and not devoid of the element of fancy. We possess an instance of this in the explanation of Biblical names in the *OS* (ed. Lagarde, 1870, [2]1887), which, though ultimately traceable to Philo, is probably rightly considered the work of Origen. It is preserved only in Gr. excerpts, and in the Lat. revision by Jerome. Eusebius's Biblical topography, also translated by Jerome, is of the same kind (*Eusebius' Works*, vol. iii., by Klostermann, 1904). Here, alongside of monstrosities like the Hebrew derivation of Latin proper names (Pilatus = פה לטש), we find excellent geographical notes. All through the Middle Ages these explanations of names were considered such valuable aids to allegorizing, that the two translations by Jerome were usually bound up with the Bible. Many of the homilies presuppose the use of alphabetically arranged collections of texts such as we find in concordances. The concordance which was organized in the 13th cent. (*c.* 1243) by Paris theologians under the lead of Hugo of St. Caro, and afterwards revised and improved by Franc. Luca, Hub. Phalesius, Balth. Tournaire, Dutripon, etc., was certainly not the first attempt of the kind. Fragments of even a Coptic work of this kind are preserved (Pleyte and Boeser, *Manuscrits Coptes du Musée . . . à Leyde*, 1897; O. von Lemm, *Kopt. Misc.* lii. 4–7).

Aids of a mnemonic kind to the understanding of the Bible were sought with special diligence. This purpose was served by the *Synopsis Script. Sacrae*, which may perhaps have come from Chrysostom himself, and by many of the *capitulationes*. The *Hypomnesticon* of the so-called Josephus Christianus contains all that was considered worthy of remark (*PG* cvi.). The most curious work of this kind is the *Caena Cypriani*, probably a Gallic product of the 5th cent., revised by Rabanus Maurus about 840 (ed. Harnack, *TU*, new ser., iv. 3, 1899). The Middle Ages made both Gr. and Lat. *versus memoriales*, in which the contents of the different books and various Biblical questions were contained. In the 15th cent. what was called the *Ars Memorandi* appeared in the form of a block-print. This whole material requires to be thoroughly collected and investigated.

We have already dealt with the literary material and its tradition. On the one hand, there were the *Church History* of Eusebius (tr. by Rufinus) and Jerome's *de Viris illustribus*, to which must be added the pseudo-Athanasian *Synopsis Scr. S.*, and also Isidore of Seville's *Proœmiorum liber* and

de Ortu et Obitu Patrum. On the other hand, there were the *Prologues* (ὑποθέσεις, *argumenta, praefationes*). In this way there was produced a work similar to the Jewish Massorah, equally anonymous, indefinite in date, growing with time, and fluctuating in tradition. Under the name of 'Euthalius,' the portion referring to Paul, the Acts, and the Cath. Epp. has received special attention and investigation, though without as yet quite definite results. What the ancients called εἰσαγωγὴ εἰς τὰς θείας γραφάς (*e.g.* Adrianos, *c.* 430) does not correspond to what we understand by Biblical introduction. It was what we should now find in some handbook on Biblical hermeneutic. It belonged to the same class as the *Instituta regularia divinae legis* of Junilius Africanus, who lived in Constantinople and took them from the lectures of Paul of Nisibis (551), the *Liber de VII regulis* of the Donatist Tychonius Afer, Augustine's *de Doctrina Christiana*, bk. iii., the *Formulæ Spiritalis Intellegentiae* of Eucherius of Lyons, and similar interpretative works.

Biblical history, in spite of its importance for teaching (see V. 3), did not receive scientific treatment in the older period. Mingled with general history, it appears in the form of *chronicles* by Hippolytus, Junilius Africanus, Eusebius, Hieronymus, and many others. For the purpose of apologetics, Augustine put sacred and profane history side by side in his great work, *de Civitate Dei*. The unified presentation of tradition, with some additions from universal history, and here and there a critical note upon various attempts at harmonizing, was best found in the *Historia scholastica* of the Paris teacher, Petrus Comestor († 1179), and the *Speculum historiale* of Vincent of Beauvais (*c.* 1264). The *Lives* of Jesus, which increased so much in number towards the end of the Middle Ages, belong entirely to the literature of devotion. The most widely circulated of such Lives was the *Vita Jesu Christi*, by the Carthusian Ludolf of Saxony (*c.* 1330). The Biblical theology which Roger Bacon demanded, in contrast to the scholastic sentences, remained a pious wish.

It was not till within modern times that Biblical sciences actually appeared. Their cradle was found in Holland among the Arminians. It was there that the great foundation compilations were made both in classical and in Biblical philology and archæology. For the study of the Hebrew language Reuchlin's labours provided the start (1506), and his work was extended mainly by the elder Buxtorf († 1629; *Thesaurus Grammaticus* and *Lexicon*). From the Dutchman, Alb. Schultens († 1750), Johann Dav. Michaelis († 1791) took over the comparative method. In the work of Gesenius († 1842) this combined with the statistical to produce a system which was considered a pattern for long. Then J. Olshausen († 1882) and, above all, B. Stade († 1907) applied the historical method developed by Germanic philology to the study of Hebrew with the greatest success. In the case of the NT the Biblical philology of Georg Pasor († 1637, Franecker), Sal. Glassius († 1656, Jena), and Joh. Jakob Wetstein († 1754, Amsterdam) was again taken up by Ernesti's school at Leipzig, and reached in the *Grammar* of J. B. Winer (1822) and Grimm's *Lexicon* (1867) a position which it maintained till the knowledge of Hellenistic popular speech, made possible by the new papyrus discoveries, widened the horizon (A. Deissmann, *Bibelstudien*, 1895, *Neue Bibelstudien*, 1897, *Licht vom Osten*, 1908). In the 19th cent. the Erlangen school and H. Cremer renewed the attempt to isolate the language of the Bible as much as possible, but this newest turn made the idea of *philologia sacra* impossible. Classical philologists now work in competition with theologians in this field (F. Blass, *Grammatik*, 1896; E. Norden, *Antike Kunstprosa*, 1898; Thumb, *Die griech. Sprache im Zeitalter des Hellenismus*, 1901). In regard to *physica sacra*, the course has been the same. The *Hierozoïcon* of Sam. Bochart († 1667) and similar compilations still show us the transition from the manual of science based upon revelation to the modern archæological method which we find in our newer Bible dictionaries. Biblical archæology has won its way from a collection of scholarly observations to a unified presentation of the subject, made possible by the idea of evolution, to which we owe the fact that archæology has become a fruitful subject of study for the history of religion.

It is owing to the activity of the Palestine Exploration Fund and the Deutscher Palästina-Verein that Biblical geography, formerly a mere collection of travel-notes, is coming to form a systematic and complete discipline, showing how to appraise the witnesses of tradition by reference to local conditions (Fr. Buhl, 1896). Geography is thus becoming an important aid to Bible history, which is no longer content merely to repeat tradition or even to criticize tradition, but is gradually winning its way to a general view of the actual historical development, with its motive powers, including persons as well as ideas. In this process naturally the unity of the Biblical point of view is more and more lost sight of. We have the History of the People of Israel (Ewald, Renan), or, more accurately, Israelitish and Jewish History (Wellhausen). Distinct from that, there are the History or the Life of Jesus (Keim, P. W. Schmidt, B. Weiss, and many others), and the History of Apostolic and post-Apostolic Times (Weizsäcker, Knopf, McGiffert, Vernon Bartlet). The Middle Ages did not altogether reject secular evidence, and now the bringing of Biblical history into the frame of general history is a principle. The background acquires increasing significance through the Egyptian and Assyro-Babylonian discoveries and the clearer knowledge which we possess of Judaism and Hellenism in NT times, and threatens, under the influence of the modern positive treatment of history, almost to overshadow the really important features. By way of reaction, we have the treatment of the 'history of salvation' by itself.

A greater degree of advance than in those Biblical subsidiary sciences is to be observed in the two comprehensive disciplines which in the academic studies of our time bear the traditional names of 'Biblical Introduction' and 'Biblical Theology.' It was the 18th cent. that first transformed these into the independent sciences which they now are, through an entire re-arrangement, in the spirit of historical criticism, of the material received from the Middle Ages and orthodox theology. From scattered traditions concerning the Biblical books and their authors there arose the historico-critical introduction to the OT and the NT by the subjection of the material to external and internal criticism. The Scriptures themselves were carefully examined to discover how far they corresponded with traditional views about them. This negative procedure, which was due to the dogmatic consideration of canonicity, was superseded by the literary method (see above, 3), which acknowledges the Scriptures to be part of a great development. In this field the distinction between canonical and uncanonical books remains more and more outside consideration (see the collections of the apocryphal and pseudepigraphic books of the OT by Kautzsch, 1900, and of the NT Apocrypha by Hennecke, 1904; the splendid editions of R. H. Charles and M. R. James; Budde's *History of Hebrew Literature*, 1907; the Histories of old Christian Literature by A. Harnack, 1893, and G. Krüger, 1895). Con-

trariwise on the philological side, the Jewish-Christian literature is given a place in the general literature of the Orient and Greece (von Wilamowitz, in *Kultur der Gegenwart*, i. 8², 1907; Gunkel, *ib.* i. 7).

The so-called Biblical theology, which originated in the collection of passages to prove dogma, first became an independent study as a system of Biblical dogma urged by Pietism, in opposition to the scholastic dogma of orthodoxy. Soon it began to draw historical distinctions (OT and NT and then their various parts), and developed into a representation of the various Biblical systems of doctrine. Hegel's philosophy taught us to see therein a complete development. Thus we arrive at the modern study of the religious history of Israel and Judah and early Christianity, the doctrinal element being more and more consciously subordinated to the study of pious feeling and its effects in the life and thought of men. In place of the Divine story of revelation, we find a history of human piety and pious ideas. In view of the current conception of science, this is unavoidable. But faith is always at liberty to recognize in such human piety and its continual advance the effect of Divine revelation. In this distinction of methods of treatment (scientific and devotional) there lies the guarantee of sound development.

Altogether, the present position of Bible study is quite remarkable. No age has seen such intense study; no age has spent such a wealth of mental energy in Bible investigation; no age has produced such a rich literature on the Bible. The field is so enlarged and the labour so minute, that individuals can hardly keep the whole field in view. Therein lies a danger, and each individual discipline must always remember the common aim. Above all, the study of the OT must never lose sight of its goal in the NT, and the study of the NT never lose sight of its foundation in the OT. Otherwise the living nerve will be snapped; and, however necessary scientifically a clear view of the external relations of the Bible is, on the one hand, it must be remembered, on the other, that the Christian interest which confines itself to the Bible is equally justified. The methods which theology employs in its Biblical sciences are the same as those of all other sciences, but the standpoint is different. The interest with which it handles the material is the interest of Christian piety.

LITERATURE.—G. Hoberg, *Überblick über die Entwickl. u. den Fortschritt der bibl. Wissenschaften auf christl. Boden von ihrem Anfang an bis zur Jetztzeit*, 1902: C. A. Briggs, *The Study of Holy Scripture*, 1899.

History of Biblical Introduction: H. Holtzmann, *Lehrb. der hist.-krit. Einleit. in das NT*³, 1892, 1-16; Jülicher, *Einleit. in das NT*⁶, 1906, pp. 7-21.

History of Biblical Theology: B. Stade, *Bibl. Theol. des AT*, 1905, i. 6-11; H. Holtzmann, *Lehrb. der NT Theol.*, 1897, i. 5-22.

History of Biblical Archæology: W. Nowack, *Lehrb. der hebräischen Archäol.*, 1894, pp. 15-24.

History of Biblical Philology: Winer's *Grammatik*⁸, revised by P. W. Schmiedel, 1894, pp. 4-15.

There is as yet no history of Biblical History, but see H. Vollmer, *Vom Lesen und Deuten h. Schriften*, 1907.

History of Research in the Life of Jesus: C. Hase, *Gesch. Jesu*, 1876, pp. 150-174, more objective than A. Schweitzer's *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*, 1906, which is dominated by its eschatological point of view.

The best information as to the enormous growth of Biblical literature in the last decades is to be found in the *Theologische Jahresbericht*, founded in 1881 by Pünjer, continued by Lipsius, H. Holtzmann, and now ed. by Krüger (OT reviewed by Siegfried, Baentsch, Beer, Gressmann, Volz; NT reviewed by H. Holtzmann, A. Meyer, Knopf, J. Weiss, etc.). In addition there is the *Theologische Rundschau*, ed. by W. Bousset and W. Heitmüller—since 1897.

In place of the *Jahrbücher für Biblische Wissenschaft*, by H. Ewald (1849-1865), and similar publications, such as Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr. für wissenschaftl. Theologie*, 1858-1907, we now have the *Zeitschr. für AT Wissenschaft*, by B. Stade (now K. Marti), 1881, and the *Zeitschr. für die NT Wissenschaft und die Kunde des Urchristentums*, by E. Preuschen, 1900—a testimony to the progress of specialization. In America there are devoted to Biblical studies in especial the *Journ. of Bibl. Lit.* (1880 ff.) and the *Bibl. World* (1893 ff.), and in Britain the *Expositor*, 1875 ff., the *Expository Times*, 1899 ff., and the *Interpreter*, 1905 ff. For scientific Biblical research by the Catholics of France the central point is the *Revue Biblique*, by Lagrange, 1892; in Germany, the *Biblische Studien* of Bardenhewer, 1895 ff., and the *Biblische Zeitschrift* of Göttsberger and J. Sickenberger, 1903.

In encyclopædic form the whole material is offered at an earlier stage by G. B. Winer, *Biblisches Realwörterb.*³, 1847 f.; D. Schenkel, *Bibellexicon*, 1869-73; E. Riehm, *Handwörterb. des bibl. Altertums*, 1884, 2nd ed. 1893-94; Wm Smith, *Dictionary of the Bible*, 1863 (Amer. ed. Smith-Hackett, 1892; 2nd Eng. of vol. i., ed. Smith-Fuller, 1893); J. P. Migne, *Scripturae Sacrae Cursus Completus*, 1861-63; Hamburger, *Realencyclopädie für Bibel und Talmud*, 1883 ff.

All these, however valuable they were in their own time, are now superseded by recent works. Now we have the exhaustive articles of Hauck's *Realencyc. für Prot. Theol.*³, 1896-1908. There are also the *Kalw. Bibellexicon*, by P. Zeller², 1893; H. Guthe, *Kurzes Bibelwörterbuch*, 1903; J. Hastings, *Dict. of the Bible*, 1898-1904, *Dict. of Christ and the Gospels*, 1906-08, and *Dict. of the Bible*, in one vol., 1909; T. K. Cheyne-J. S. Black, *Encyc. Bibl.* 1899-1903; F. Vigouroux, *Dict. de la Bible*, 1895 ff.; *Jewish Encyc.* 1901 ff.—an imposing array, in itself a proof of the high standard to which Biblical science has attained in our time.

V. *THE BIBLE IN DIVINE SERVICE.*—The Bible was not only the authoritative standard of Church doctrine in the hands of the learned theologian; it was also the book from which the Church drew instruction and exhortation, consolation and inspiration. It was a book to be used in Divine service, just as it had been in the Synagogue. Here we come upon the great distinction between Christian and all other forms of worship. The object elsewhere is to produce some theurgic effect. The idea is to operate upon the Deity through sacrifice and prayer, and by effective symbolism to attain to some connexion, some union, with the god. This is the case in the heathen world generally, and also in the temple-worship of Judaism. Only in the Synagogue and in the Christian form of service is the central place given to God's word, as it speaks to the assembled congregation out of the sacred book with voice of instruction, edification, and exhortation.

LITERATURE.—A. C. A. Hall, *The Use of Holy Scripture in the Public Worship of the Church*, 1903.

1. Reading.—The use of the Bible in the services of the Church has been rich and varied. In the forefront stands reading. In the Synagogue the practice followed was the continuous reading of whole books. In the course of three years, *e.g.*, the Law with 154 *parashiyôth* was read through. The young Christian Church adhered to the same plan. It is to be regretted that we know nothing very definite about the reading of the Bible in the first three centuries. But from the acquaintance with the books of the Bible which is taken for granted, and which in many cases could have been gained only through the services of the Church, we may conclude that it was extensive. It is certain that the Law and the Prophets, and afterwards the Gospels and the Epistles, came to be read *seriatim*. In his description of the Christian service about 150, Justin speaks of the reading of the ἀπομνημονεύματα τῶν ἀποστόλων (*i.e.* the Gospels) and the συγγράμματα τῶν προφητῶν (*i.e.* the OT—or is it the writings of Christian prophets, in other words, Apocalypses, that he means?) μέχρις ἐγχωρεῖ (*Apol.* i. 67). These last much-disputed words seem to lead to the conclusion that there was no special division of the Scripture into portions for reading, and that the time allotted to it was not definitely fixed. Justin's statement is perhaps best understood by comparison with the custom which the present writer found in some outlying Swiss churches. At the beginning of the service, and while the congregation was still gathering ('donec totus populus congregetur,' *Can. Hipp.* xxxvii. 203), instead of the organ playing, which is customary in other places, the teacher read from the Bible, and after going through several chapters in succession suddenly broke off at the entrance of the clergyman. Naturally there

was more read than the OT books and the Gospels. The Divine service for which the congregation assembled afforded opportunity for bringing newly-received letters from other churches to the knowledge of the congregation (1 Th 5^{27}, Col 4^{16}), and also written addresses from distant teachers and prophets (He 13^{22}; II Clem. 19), particularly the records of revelations (Rev 1^{3} 22^{18}; Herm. *Vis.* ii. 4. 3). In the beginning probably some distinction was drawn between the reading of the sacred Scripture and the reading of these new letters. But the custom of reading these over and over again (see Dionysius of Corinth *ap.* Euseb. *HE* iv. 23. 11, on I Clem. and the letter from Rome by Soter) was itself enough to give them a place alongside of Holy Scripture. The effect of this was twofold. On the one hand, the extent of Scripture read in this way was increased. There are 4th and 5th cent. MSS which contain the Epistles of Clement (*Cod. Alex.*; cf. the *Syr. Codex*, dated 1170, at Cambridge and *Can. Apost.* 86), the *Shepherd* of Hermas, and the Epistle of Barnabas (*Codex Sin.*), and Athanasius makes Wis., Sir., Est., Jth., Tob., *Didache*, and Hermas into a special class of *ἀναγινωσκόμενα* (*Epist.* 39, A.D. 367). On the other hand, the Church insisted on having everything uncanonical excluded from the reading of the Bible in public worship (Synod of Laodicea, 363 [?], Can. 59; Carthage, 397, Can. 39; Westcott, p. 540)—a step specially directed against the introduction of the Apocryphal literature fostered by Montanists, Marcionites, Manichæans, and Priscillianists. The limitation to what was canonical was never quite adhered to in the mediæval Church. So early as the 4th cent. the custom was adopted of reading Martyrdoms of Saints on the days dedicated to their memory (Carthage, 397, Can. 39: 'liceat autem legi passiones martyrum cum anniversarii eorum dies celebrantur'; Liturg. Gall. *PL* lxxii., xc.). The Roman Church, always specially cautious—as, *e.g.*, in the matter of the Epistle to the Hebrews (Euseb. *HE* iii. 3. 5)—refused for a long period to read them in the services of the Church, on the ground of uncertainty of authorship and suspicion of heretical falsification (*Decr. Gelas.* v. 16, Preuschen, 151). Very soon there thus came about the reading not only of the passions of the martyrs, but also of other sacred legends (Augustine allowed miracles of healing to be read [*de Civ. Dei* xxii. 8]). All through the Middle Ages the Bible shared the honour of being read in church with these books of legends and passions. The Reformation really established the principle of reading only the Bible.

In the matter of the choice of passages for reading, the various national churches developed various practices. The Aquitanian pilgrim (Silvia, or Etheria) presents us with a picture of the extremely rich supply of readings on Easter Friday in Jerusalem (*Itin. Hieros.*, ed. Geyer, p. 89). The Syrian practice, laid down in the *Apost. Const.* ii. 57, viii. 5, seems to prescribe two lessons from the OT, one from the Epistles and one from the Gospels. Tertullian bears witness that the Roman Church and the African Church of his time followed the same custom: 'legem et prophetas cum evangelicis et apostolicis litteris miscet' (*Praescr. Haer.* 36). OT lessons are also presupposed in *Praes. Hær.* 51, *Monog.* 12, *adv. Gentes*, 22. At the time of Cyprian these seem to have been wanting in the African Church (*Epist.* xxxiv. 4, xxv.). Three readings—Prophetic, Epistolary, and Gospel—are known in the Asia Minor Church (Basil, *PG* xxxi. 425), as also in Gaul (Germanus of Paris, *PL* lxxii. 90, Liturg. Gall. *ib.* 171 ff.) and in Spain (*Liber Comicus*, ed. Morin; *Anecdota Maredsolana*, i., *Liturg. Mozarab.* ed. Cabrol-Leclerq I.). But here, too, the OT lesson was often wanting.

Later on, the number of readings was everywhere reduced to two—Epistle and Gospel. This was the case in Rome, perhaps from the time of Damasus (if it was really Jerome who compiled the first *comes*), and certainly from the time of the *Sacramentarium Gregorianum* (*PL* lxxviii. 25). The order followed—Prophets, Epistles, Gospels—is evidently everywhere considered an ascending one. That is shown in the special treatment of the Gospel. While the other lections were left to the *anagnostes* (placed in the beginning almost on the same level as the prophets as being a pneumatic, but later on taking a place among the lower clergy [Harnack, 'Über den Ursprung des Lektorats,' in *TU* ii. 4 (1886), 57 ff.]), the reading of the Gospel was reserved for a deacon or a presbyter (*Canon. Apost.* ii. 57; Sozom. vii. 19, 6). At Easter the bishop himself read (*Peregr. Silviae*, p. 73, Geyer; Sozom. *loc. cit.*). Candles were first lit for the Gospel-reading (Jerome, *adv. Vigil.* 7, *PL* xxiii. 361; Isidore, *de Offic. eccl.* ii. 14, *PL* lxxxiii. 793) [cf. Bellarmine, *de Reliquiis Sanctorum* ii. 3 (Rome, 1613, ii. 775)]. The *laudes* ('hymns') were to follow the lesson from the Gospel and not that from the Epistles (*Syn. Toledo*, 633, Can. 12, Mansi, x. 622).

Gradually the habit of reading certain books at certain periods of the Church year became fixed (*Lectiones annuæ*, Augustine, *PL* xxxv. 1977). In Lent, Genesis was read (Chrysostom, *PG* liii. 22); in Easter week, Job (pseudo-Origen on Job, *PG* xii. 103; Ambrosius, *PL* xvi. 1040); on Maundy Thursday, Jonah (Ambr. *l.c.* 1044); on Good Friday, in many churches of Palestine, the Apocalypse of Peter (Sozom. vii. 19); on the four Easter days, the reports of the Resurrection according to Matthew, Luke, Mark, John (Augustine, *PL* xxxviii. 1156; Fulgentius, *PL* lxv. 903 f.). Between Easter and Whitsuntide, the Gospel according to John and Acts (Chrys. *PG* li. 97; Augustine, *PL* xxxv. 1433, xxxviii. 1426) were read; in Spain during this season the Apoc. of John (*Syn. Toledo* 633, Can. 17, Mansi x. 624), and in Gaul the Acts and the Apocalypse (Germ. Par. *PL* lxxii. 90). On Victor of Capua see *ZNTW*, 1909, pp. 90 ff., 175 ff.

The Euthalian apparatus contains a system of *lectio continua* for the Epistles of the NT in 57 *ἀναγνώσεις* (see G. Rietschel, *Lehrb. der Liturgik* i. 1, 225). Chrysostom (*Joh. Hom.* 57, 1, *PG* lix. 311) clearly implies the *lectio continua*.

Soon, however, it came to be that special lessons were taken for every day, the reason probably being that the lessons had to be suited to the commemoration of the particular saint for the day. Gennadius (*Vir. ill.* 80) mentions the presbyter Musæus of Marseilles († 460) as the compiler of a pericope system of this kind. It is certain, however, that at the same time various systems of the kind came into existence, *e.g.* that of Claudian of Arverni (Clermont), referred to by Apollin. Sidonius (*Ep.* iv. 11). These were frequently combined with the older system. The Armenian Church broke through its *lectio continua* only on the great feast-days when it had special lessons. The Greek Church had a peculiar system of *sabbatokyriaka*: besides the *lectio continua* for the days of the week, there was also a special system of pericopes for Saturday and Sunday (so in a great many Gr. MSS; cf. C. R. Gregory, *Textkritik*, i. 327 ff.). Excellent service has been done by E. Ranke in investigating the very confused history of the various pericope systems. In the Middle Ages Charlemagne was the first to give attention to this matter. Improvements were essayed in all countries, usually in the vain endeavour to bring about uniformity. The Roman practice established itself more and more generally. It was this *usus Romanus* that the Reformers found

to hand, and there were many attempts at improvement. These have not ceased even in modern times, nor has any unanimity been reached even in the churches of Germany. In 1898, *e.g.*, in Prussia, besides the usual lessons from the Epistles and the Gospels, others were introduced, in which OT passages were included. The lectionary put together for Rhineland by Nitzsch, and the Bavarian system revised by Thomasius, contain a series of OT lessons extending over a year, while in the Palatinate the system in use extends to a four years' course.

There is great uncertainty as to the motives which induced the choice of the different pericopes. Many of them owed their existence to chance, and were afterwards justified by ingenious theories.

In the ancient Church the principle was always strictly adhered to that the reading of Scripture was for the congregation, and must therefore be intelligible. When this was not immediately possible for everybody, the reading was accompanied by translation, just as formerly in the Targums of the Synagogue. In the whole of the Western half of the Empire Greek was almost everywhere read and understood. In many parts of Syria and Egypt recourse was had to oral explanation, until translations in the respective tongues were made. In the case of Jerusalem we know that the Greek lessons and also the Greek sermon were immediately translated into Syriac for the people, and when there were pilgrims present from the West a translation was made for them into Latin (*Peregr. Silviae*, p. 99, Geyer). In the same way in the West, translations of the Latin were given in the Celtic, Punic, and Iberian tongues.

In any case it was understood that the whole congregation could follow the reading. Attention to the reading of Scripture is mentioned in an episcopal letter of the 4th cent. (Petrus Alex. [?], C. Schmidt, *TU*, new ser. ii. 4[b], 5) as the most important part of the Sunday regulations. The reading of Scripture was also expected to produce a direct effect upon the hearers. In a great number of records of conversion the crisis was reached suddenly while some passage of Scripture was being read in Divine service. Athanasius relates that the conversion of St. Anthony (*Vita*, ch. 2, *PG* xxvi. 841) was due to his chance hearing of Mt 19[21]. Augustine remembered this at his own conversion, when, hearing a voice say 'Tolle, lege,' he took the Scripture and read Ro 13[13] (*Confess.* viii. 12, 29). It was hearing Mt 19[29] read that induced Hypatius, a youth of 18 years, to leave his home, though the biographer states naïvely enough that his father had previously thrashed him (*Vita*, by Callinicus, p. 9, ed. Bonn). Similar stories are related of Babylas the actor (Moschos, *PG* lxxxvi. 2880), and of Simeon Stylites (Lietzmann, *TU*, 3rd ser., ii. pp. 2, 20, 81, *Synaxarium Constantinopolitanum*, 1 Sept).

Not until the Middle Ages did it happen that in almost all churches, both Oriental and Latin, the Holy Scripture was read in a tongue unintelligible to the people. Even Charlemagne would have none of this, and demanded that wherever necessary there should be an interpreter. This practice, however, entirely ceased, until in the 13th cent. some attempt was again made to have the sermon delivered in the language of the country. Thus a custom which arose only through tenacity of ecclesiastical practice and clerical remissness was afterwards justified by the theory that a holy speech was seemly for the Holy Scripture. The abandonment of intelligibility was connected with the development of the Catholic service to a business of the priests, before and for the passively interested congregation. The Reformation broke away from this idea of worship and from the view of sacred unintelligibility, and returned to the principle of the ancient Church.

LITERATURE.—P. Glaue, *Die Vorlesung heil. Schriften im Gottesdienst*, 1906; E. Ranke, *Perikopensystem*, 1847; Scrivener, art. 'Lectionary' in Smith-Cheetham, *DCA* ii. 550 ff.; G. Rietschel, *Lehrb. der Liturgik*, i. 1900, 223 ff.; W. Caspari, art. 'Perikopen,' in *PRE*[3] xv. 131–159; artt. in *ExpT* from Oct. 1905 to May 1907.

2. Preaching.—The reading of the Scripture was not all. An attempt was made to come still more to the congregation's aid. To the reading there was nearly always added an exposition, with a hortatory, explanatory, and devotional application (cf. Lk 4[17ff.]). According to Justin (*Apol.* i. 67), the reading was followed by an admonitory and inspiring address by the presiding presbyter. The second Epistle of Clement seems to be a homily on Is 54–56 (Knopf, *Preuschens ZNTW* iii. 206 ff.; cf. *Acta Petri c. Simone*, 20; Augustine, *de Civ. Dei* xxii. 8, p. 611, 9, 10; *CSEL* xl. 2).

Often the preachers refer in the introduction of the sermon to the passage of Scripture read. This is the practice of Augustine, Cæsarius of Arles, Petrus Chrysologus of Ravenna, Chrysostom, and even Theophanes Kerameus. Bede often begins, 'Lectio sancti evangelii quam modo, fratres, audivimus . . .' At a later date the words used were, 'Post illa verba s. scripturae,' and hence from the 14th cent. the name *postilla*, 'postil,' was applied to collections of sermons (Nicolaus of Lyra, Geiler of Kaysersberg, Luther, etc.).

In many cases these sermons are nothing more than the devotional exposition of the Scripture. This is the nature of the homilies of Origen, who, besides his commentaries and scholia, expounded almost the whole of the sacred Scripture. We are acquainted with 17 homilies on Gen., 13 on Exod., 16 on Levit., 28 on Numbers, 13 on Deut., 26 on Joshua, 9 on Judges, 4 on 1 Sam. and 1 on 2 Sam., 1 on 2 Chron., 2 on Ezra, 22 on Job, more than 100 on Psalms, 2 on Proverbs, 8 on Eccles., 2 on Song of Sol., 32 on Isaiah, 45 on Jeremiah, 14 on Ezekiel. There are 25 homilies on Matt., 39 on Luke, 27 on Acts, 11 on 2 Cor., 7 on Gal., 2 on Thess., 1 on Titus, 18 on Heb.—altogether close on 500. In the same way we possess continuous expositions of whole books of the Bible in the form of sermons by Ambrose, Augustine, Chrysostom, etc. In Lent there was a sermon every day, and on Sundays there were two. The peculiar method followed by Chrysostom is worthy of remark. First he gives a complete practical exposition of the passage, and then in a second part he deals with some theme that has often very little connexion with it.

A special kind of such exposition is represented by the discourses which Jerome delivered in the monastery (ed. Morin, in *Anecd. Mareds.* ii.). These have not been preserved in their complete form, but only as they were written down freely afterwards from shorthand notes. Occasionally he expounds a Psalm, and immediately afterwards a passage from the Gospels (*Rev. Ben.* xix. 30). The so-called little catecheses of Theodore of Studium originated in the same way (ed. Auvray and Tougard, 1891; cf. A. Gardner, *Theodore*, p. 82 ff.).

But even where sermons do not deal with continuous passages in this way, as in those of Petrus Chrysologus of Ravenna and Maximus of Turin (both about 450), the majority of them have texts from the Bible as their foundation. Even occasional addresses are joined to a definite text, and the sermons are so full of Scripture references, that, despite their elevated rhetoric, they amount to centos made from passages of the Bible, as, *e.g.*, the opening sermon delivered by Gregory of Nazianzus at the Council in 381 (Mansi, iii. 529 ff.).

Gennadius (*Vir. ill.* 100) boasts of the extraordinary facility which his countryman, Bishop Honoratus of Marseilles, showed in extempore preaching, and accounts for it mainly by his rare acquaintance with Scripture.

It is true that in the matter of preaching, too, the Bible had to compete with the legends of the saints. Chrysostom and Augustine preach a great deal about the glorious deeds of the martyrs and the miracles of the saints. In the collections of sermons which are characteristic of the later Middle Ages, such as the *Homiliarium* of Paulus Warnefrid * made to the order of Charlemagne, or the *Homiliae Toletanae*,† sermons of both classes are found side by side. Later on a distinction was drawn between the *sermones de tempore* (on the Biblical pericopes of the Church year) and *de sanctis* (on the legends of the saints), *e.g.* by Hildebert of Tours († 1134), Bonaventura († 1274), Heinrich of Frimar (about 1340), Pelbart of Temesvar (about 1500), and many more.

Generally speaking, in the Middle Ages the sermon fell more and more into the background or assumed a barren form. In many Oriental churches it almost ceased. Among the Copts the only preacher was the Patriarch, and he preached only once a year. The Byzantine liturgy has scarcely a proper place for the sermon. The Western mass can not only do without it, but is then much more of a unity. Hence it is that the sermon is often a feature of supplementary services. But even where we find it in ordinary connexion with the reading of the Bible in the later Middle Ages, it has wandered far from its original purpose. It has become dogmatic, and is Biblical only so far as scholasticism operates with the authority of the Bible for its own purposes. It was otherwise in popular preaching, and especially preaching in the languages of the country, such as the exhortations of the Franciscans like Berthold of Regensburg († 1272); the German preaching of the mystics and popular men like Tauler († 1361) and Geiler of Kaysersberg († 1510); and in England Richard Rolle of Hampole († 1349).

Nevertheless it must be acknowledged that it was not till the Reformation that preaching again returned to its task of expounding the Bible. Apart from exceptional cases like Mathesius's sermons on Luther's life, Sermons on the Catechism or the Hymn-book, or even the modern experiment of preaching upon Schiller, the Holy Scripture is acknowledged in all Protestant Churches as the exclusive foundation of the sermon. It cannot be denied that, partly through the coercion of the pericope system, but chiefly in consequence of the scholastic tendency of thought in the orthodox period, its connexion with the text often became very loose. In Pietism, however, the connexion again gained strength, and to-day it may be laid down as the general requisite of Protestant preaching that it should be in keeping with the text, or, in other words, Biblical. In Luther we meet again with the exposition of whole books in a series of sermons—a form that has lately gained much vogue (*e.g.* the four Gospels in 'Predigten und Homilien,' ed. by Kögel, in association with Dryander, Frommel, and Pank, 1889 ff.).

Even where, in opposition to the style of homily which follows the text step by step (developed with special success by Menken), the so-called thematic sermon is preferred, not only is the theme drawn out of the text or chosen because of its close connexion with the text, but also in its elaboration the effort is made to exhaust the text as far as may be.

* F. Wiegand, in Bonwetsch-Seeberg, *Studien zur Gesch. der Theol. u. Kirche*, i. 2.
† G. Morin, *Anecd. Mareds.* i. 1893.

In addition to this, we have within recent times the Bible-class by way of supplement to the sermon. It was introduced by Pietism (Collegium biblicum directed by Spener and A. H. Francke), and is becoming more and more common. In entire freedom from the compulsion of the pericope, which is still followed in some churches, it supplies a connected system of Scriptural exposition.

LITERATURE.—Hering, *Gesch. der Predigt*, 1897; Schian, in *PRE*[3] xv. 623–747; *Altdeutsche Predigten*, ed. A. E. Schönbach, 3 vols. 1886–91; G. Cruel, *Gesch. der deutschen Predigt im Mittelalter*, 1879; F. R. Albert, *Die Gesch. der Predigt in Deutschland bis Luther*, 1892–96; F. Landmann, 'Das Predigtwesen in Westphalen in der letzten Zeit des Mittelalters' (*Vorreformationsgeschichtl. Forschungen*, i.), 1900; L. Pfleger, *Geschichte des Predigtwesens in Strassburg*, 1907; P. Drews, *Die Predigt im 19 Jahrhundert*, 1903; C. Clemen, *Predigt und biblischer Text*, 1906; E. Bindemann, *Die Bedeutung des AT für die Christl. Predigt*, 1886; A. Meinhof, *Die Wichtigkeit der Bibelstunde für das Gemeindeleben und ihre zweckmässige Gestaltung*, 1903; E. C. Dargan, *A History of Preaching*, 1905; J. Ker, *Lectures on the History of Preaching*, 1888.

3. Catechetics.—Besides the sermon as a means of explaining the Holy Scripture, we must not forget the instruction given in catechetics. In the classic form which it bore in the ancient Church this began with a survey of Bible-history, having regard to its typological and allegorical significance. A splendid instance is given in the newly-discovered work of Irenæus entitled *εἰς ἐπίδειξιν τοῦ ἀποστολικοῦ κηρύγματος* (*TU* xxxi. 1, 1907). In Jerusalem during the Lent season three hours daily were given to this instruction (*Peregr. Silviae*, p. 97; cf. Augustine, *de Catechiz. rudibus*).

With regard to the catechumens, the teacher could take for granted their wide acquaintance with the Holy Scriptures. The reading of Scripture took place during the first part of the service, to which catechumens were admitted (*missa catechumenorum*); they, indeed, were the 'hearers' (*ἀκροώμενοι*). Over and above this, Cyril of Jerusalem exhorted his catechumens to diligent reading in private of the Scriptures recognized by the Church (*Cat.* iv. 33 ff., *PG* xxxiii. 493). In the West, indeed, the creed (*symbolum*) was more emphasized than the sacred Scriptures, and so it happened that, as time went on, instruction in the Bible received less attention. The age of Charlemagne was content with the Decalogue and the Paternoster.

This catechetical tradition influenced even Luther, although, so far as was possible, he strove for the widening and deepening of Bible knowledge. When the practice of catechetics received a fresh lease of life in connexion with confirmation under pietistic influence, Biblical material came to be more handled again, and nowadays the catechism most favoured is that which adduces many Bible-texts as proofs or is altogether couched in Biblical phraseology. Bible-history forms a main subject of popular education. Where this is not the case, or the religious aspect is neglected, the attempt is made to make up, for what has been missed, by Sunday Schools and Children's Services. The modern tendency of the Herbart-Ziller school to make the Biblical history yield to other narratives (*Märchen*, Robinson Crusoe) undervalues the religious and moral, and therefore the pædagogic, value of the Scriptures. Modern theology of the historico-critical school, too, has raised many objections to the old method of treating Bible-history. It is not, however, merely a matter of history, but of the spirit in which it is handled. Bible-history is not now what it was in the Middle Ages, the history of humanity. For us it is but a history of faith. The important feature is not the knowledge of history, but the perception of faith. The aim must be to get the child to reach beyond the history into the spirit of the prophets and the perfection of Christ. This being so, the newer critical Biblical science sets religious instruction

the difficult task of making the Bible a cherished and beloved book to the child, of investing it with honour and authority in his eyes, and at the same time of making him adopt such an attitude towards it as the knowledge of defects and mistakes in its record of history and natural history will not disturb. See art. CATECHISMS AND CATECHIZATION.

LITERATURE.—H. Vollmer, 'Beitr. zur Gesch. des bibl. Unterrichts,' in *Mittheil. der Gesellsch. f. deutsche Erziehungs- und Schulgesch.* 1904, *Monatschrift f. d. kirchl. Praxis*, 1904, and *Evangelische Religionslehre*, 1906; Caspari, art. 'Gesch. biblische,' in *PRE*[3], vi. 619–22; J. Hoffmann, *Die h. Schrift, ein Volks- und Schulbuch in der Vergangenheit*, 1902; E. Chr. Achelis, *Der Dekalog als katechet. Lehrstück*, 1905; E. Kautzsch, *Bibelwissensch. u. Religionsunterricht*, 1900.

4. Prayer and praise.—To the direct devotional value of the Bible in reading and exposition there have to be added yet other elements of Biblical origin. Nearly all the liturgical formulæ—Amen, Alleluia, Hosanna, Kyrie Eleison, Gloria, and Pax—find a place here. The single exception to this in the ancient Christian liturgy is the *Sursum Corda*, whose origin still remains uncertain. The Lord's Prayer, which is to be heard at every Christian service, is Biblical, and so also are the different forms of the Benedictions. The Reformed Churches have also the Decalogue as a part of the service, while—the difference is significant—the Lutherans adhere to the Credo of the Catholic mass, usually in the form of a hymn of faith. The foundation and the language of most prayers are Biblical. Often whole Psalms are taken over, or single passages from the Psalms are worked in. The Psalter as the prayer-book of personal devotion is dealt with in VI. 1 and 3.

Then also there is the singing of psalms. In the ritual of the Temple this formed a most important part of the service, almost all the spoken part. In meetings of the Synagogue also it had a part to play. So it was immediately adopted by the Christians and diligently cultivated. It is disputed whether by *ψαλμοί, ὕμνοι, ᾠδαὶ πνευματικαί* (Col 3[16], Eph 5[19]) we are to understand the Psalms of the OT or specially Christian poems (or both together). The canonical Psalter was of course completed, but the poetry of the Synagogue was not yet exhausted, as is witnessed by the eighteen 'Psalms of Solomon' from the period subsequent to B.C. 63. The exalted mood of the early Christians, the wonderful experience of the new salvation, must have fostered poetry. 1 Co 14[15. 26] as well as Pliny's statement 'Christo quasi deo carmen dicere' suggest new Christian poems. We find samples of these in 1 Ti 3[16], Rev 11[15. 17f.] 12[10ff.] 15[3f.] 19[1f. 5. 6ff.]. But these fragments, like the hymns in Luke's Gospel (*Magnificat* 1[46ff.], *Benedictus* 1[68ff.], *Nunc Dimittis* 2[29ff.], *Gloria* 2[14] [cf. 19[38]]) show clear dependence upon the OT patterns. In their form, too, they follow the Semitic rhythm and not the Greek prosody. The same may be said of the eleven psalms of repentance in the *Pistis Sophia* which are modelled on the Biblical psalms. The Greek form was first brought into Christianity by the heads of Gnostic schools who were possessed of literary culture. The Muratorian Fragment mentions Marcionite and Basilidian psalms. The Naassene hymn in Hippolytus, v. 10, already possesses the Greek form, as does also the hymn to Christ in Clemens Alex. (*Paed.* iii. 12 fin.). The hymns of the Syrian Bardesanes and his son Harmonius were famous, and it was to repress them that Ephraim wrote others. At the same time, Ambrose in the West laid the foundation of Latin hymnology. The poems of Gregory of Nazianzus and Synesius are not much concerned with congregational worship. At this time, however, a tendency made itself felt in the Church to have the congregational praise restricted to the Canonical Psalter (which included, in addition to the 150 [151] Psalms, the 9 [10] *ᾠδαί, cantica*: Ex 15, Dt 32, 1 S 2, Hab 3, Jon 2, Dn 3 [Apoc], Lk 1, 2, as they are gathered together in Codex A and in a great number of subsequent MSS and liturgies) in order to counteract the attempts of heretics (Arians, Apollinarists, etc.) to misuse the Church hymns for their own special ends (see Conc. Laod. 363 [?], Can. 59: *ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἰδιωτικοὺς ψαλμοὺς λέγεσθαι ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ οὐδὲ ἀκανόνιστα βιβλία*; cf. Theodoret, *HE* ii. 24 [19], iii. 10 [6], iv. 22 [19]). The *Apost. Constit.* (ii. 57) require the singing of the Davidic psalms between the readings from Scripture. Two tendencies thus run through the whole history of Church praise. The more severe of these adheres to the Biblical psalms. They formed the basis of mediæval worship, and still hold the chief place with Roman Catholics and Anglicans. In the strictly Calvinistic Churches they were in invariable use, though in paraphrastic versions. On the other hand, the Church has never ceased to produce poetry. Influenced by the Syrians, Romanus brought hymns to the Greeks in the 6th century. John of Damascus put in place of such free compositions the more correct and formal Canon, which is still used by all the Oriental Churches, Greek and Slavonic. In the West, from the time of Ambrose down to the end of the Middle Ages, there was an unbroken line of hymn-writers, and soon alongside of the Latin hymns of the Church others in the popular speech were abundant. In Germany these were specially numerous, and the Reformation introduced a new and powerful stimulus. By their paraphrases of what was ancient and their new compositions, Luther, Paul Gerhardt, and many others have supplied us with the highest that is possible in the strong and fervent expression of Christian faith and pious feeling. Here the Biblical psalm is found usually in the form of the motet, which is sung by the choir as an addition to the congregational praise. From the very beginning the Lutheran Churches have devoted special attention to praise, and thereby not only has the Roman Catholic Church been roused to new activity, but the later Calvinistic Church has been induced to permit, alongside of the Psalms, hymns which in the meantime displace the old psalms more and more. In view of what has been said about the ancient Church, it is certainly not mere chance that in Dissenting circles hymns play such an important part. A pious Moravian legitimizes his opinions by declaring them to 'conform to Scripture and the hymns.'

It has to be said that the distinction between Biblical psalms and Church hymns is in the main a formal one. Often the hymn is nothing but a free poetic rendering of the psalm; cf. *e.g.* Luther's 'Ein feste Burg' with Ps 46 and 'Aus tiefer Not' with Ps 130. The congregation is rightly kept in mind of this by the quotation of the text in the hymn-books. The best and most effective hymns are of this nature, and they show to great advantage when compared with the martyrolatry of Greek and Roman hymns and the sweet emptiness of the hymns belonging to modern sects. Instead of any opposition between Biblical psalms and Church hymns, it is, in fact, more correct to speak of the direct and indirect effect of Biblical hymns upon Christian worship, and it will be found impossible to rate either too highly.

LITERATURE.—P. Drews, art. 'Liturgische Formeln,' in *PRE*[3] xi. 545–557; F. H. Chase, 'The Lord's Prayer in the Early Church,' *TS* i. 3, 1891; Ed. von der Goltz, *Das Gebet in der ält. Christenheit*, 1901; P. Wagner, 'Über Psalmen und Psalmengesang im christl. Altertum,' in *Röm. Quartalschr.* xii. 1898, 245–279; G. Rietschel, P. Drews, H. Hering, R. Wolkan, R. Buddensieg, Fr. Nielsen, art. 'Kirchenlied,' in *PRE*[3] x. 399–443; Daniel, *Thesaurus hymnologicus*, 1841 ff.; Christ and Paranikas, *Anthologia graeca carminum christianorum*, 1871; G. M. Dreves, *Analecta hymnica medii aevi*, 1886 ff.; Ph. Wackernagel, *Das deutsche Kirchenlied*, 1864 ff.;

A. Fischer and W. Tümpel, *Das deutsche evangelische Kirchenlied des 17ten Jahrh.* 1904 ff.; Fr. Spitta, 'Ein feste Burg ist unser Gott,' *Die Lieder Luthers*, 1905; Julian, *Dict. of Hymnology*, 1892, 2nd ed. (enlarged), 1907.

5. Biblical symbolism.—It was not only the spoken word that was Biblical. The whole service was intended to bear a Biblical stamp. This, it is true, involved a great danger. The NT has little to say on the subject of worship; the OT has a great deal. This being so, it soon happened that in the Christian service analogies were discovered with the OT priestly and sacrificial system, and the service was thus lowered to a pre- and sub-Christian level. We find the fullest expression of this in Cyril of Alexandria, whose work on worship in spirit and in truth is just an allegorical transference to Christianity of the OT sacrificial laws. The later Greek Mystagogy (Theodore of Andida, 11th cent.) made an endeavour to carry through the idea of a parallelism between the history of salvation (especially the life of Jesus) and the liturgy. In the West, Isidore of Seville (†636), in his *de Officiis ecclesiasticis*, set the precedent of justifying all Church usages by the Bible (cf. Rabanus Maurus, *de Clericorum institutione, de Ecclesiastica disciplina*; Walafrid Strabo, *de Exordiis et incrementis rerum eccles.*; Wilh. Durandus, *Rationale divinorum officiorum*; Honorius of Autun, *Sacramentarium*).

We do not know how far these interpretations of Divine service, written for the instruction of the clergy, found their way among the people, but from the walls of the church the Bible stories and ideas shone down even upon the unlearned, in beautiful pictures. The large wall-spaces of the ancient Christian basilicas (*e.g.* Santa Maria Maggiore) formed early picture-books of this kind. In the East an extremely complicated system of decorating church-interiors was established, partly in brilliant mosaic (Hagia Sophia, San Marco, Capella Palatina at Palermo), partly in varied colours (cave-churches of Cappadocia, the monasteries on Athos). The Roman churches of the West were also, as a rule, richly decorated. Gothic art resolved those picture-cycles into a system of statues, into groups of sculpture. The Renaissance baroco and rococo returned to coloured decorations, though the original educative purpose now disappeared behind the artistic idea of ornamentation. The Biblical stories had occasionally to yield to the accessory of lovely landscape (as in Poussin's pictures in S. Pietro ai Monti in Rome). According to the principles of the newer art, the understanding of the pious beholder can no longer be helped, as was formerly the case, by inscriptions. So far as Lutheran Protestantism is concerned, the pictures which decorate the panels of the galleries in churches are only by way of ornament. They are far too small to be effective. Lately, Ed. von Gebhardt has endeavoured with great success to decorate the Friedenskirche at Düsseldorf with large and effective Gospel designs. Calvinism rejects entirely, or rather forbids, every kind of pictorial ornamentation. Instead, it makes some Biblical text in large letters speak from the wall to the assembled congregation. In the 17th cent., when the Graf von Dohna, till then a Lutheran, turned Calvinist, the family tombstone at the church of Mohrungen (Prussia), which was ornamented with a representation of the Holy Trinity, was whitened and inscribed with verses from the Bible. Calvinism has also in some cases made the reading of the Bible take the place of organ music. The liturgy begins with the recitation of the Decalogue. In this domain it is the Bible—in somewhat legal fashion indeed—that rules the whole Divine service.

LITERATURE.—On Greek Mystagogy: F. Kattenbusch, in *PRE*[3] xiii. 612–662; P. Drews, *Theol. Stud. u. Krit.*, 1900, p. 481 ff.; E. von Dobschütz, *Byz. Zeitschr.* xii., 1903, p. 559 ff.; F. E. Brightman, *JThSt* ix., 1908; J. Sauer, *Symbolik des Kirchengebäudes u. seiner Ausstattung in der Auffassung des Mittelalters*, 1903; F. X. Krauss, *Gesch. der kirchl. Kunst*, 1896–97, i. 383 ff., ii. 22, 52 ff.; H. Brockhaus, *Die Kunst in den Athos-Klöstern*, 1891; H. Rott and K. Michel, 'Kleinasiat. Denkmäler' in Ficker's *Studien über christl. Denkmäler*, vi., 1908.

VI. *THE BIBLE IN PRIVATE USE.*—1. The Bible in the Christian home.—The Bible was not only a book to be used by learned theologians or for liturgical purposes. From the first and always it aimed at being the devotional book of every Christian. That was its special end and value. At the time of Jesus the Jews had the OT, and, as Wellhausen says, 'Die Bibel war die Fibel,' 'The Bible was the first reading-book.' Timothy knew the Holy Scriptures 'from a child' (2 Ti 3^{15}). Some of the books of the NT were written as aids to private devotion (Lk 1^{1-4}). The passage 2 Ti 3^{16} applies not only to the public but also to the private use of the Bible. It is probable that in the early period many Christians were limited to the public reading of the Bible, as they possessed no books of their own. In the opinion of the present writer, however, the number of Bibles to be found in private houses in the first three centuries has been under-estimated by Prof. C. Bigg (*The Church's Task under the Roman Empire*, 1905, p. 28). Paul presupposes quite a remarkable acquaintance with the OT among the members of his Churches. Polycarp writes to the Church at Philippi (12^{1}): 'Confido enim vos bene exercitatos esse in sacris litteris.' We learn from Tertullian that the reading of the Bible in common was one of the practices of the Christian home, and he urges this fact as an argument against 'mixed' marriages, because in such a case the custom becomes impracticable (*ad Uxorem*, ii. 8). In the *Didascalia of the Apostles* (ch. ii.) Christians are exhorted in the following terms: 'Sit at home and read in the Law, in the Book of Kings and in the Prophets and in the Gospel which is their fulfilment,' while in ch. xxii. the rod of discipline (Pr 13^{24} 19^{18} 23^{13}) is interpreted as the word of God, in which youth must be diligently instructed. Family prayers, as well as those of the Church, are Biblical in character. The morning-prayer makes reference to Lk 2^{14}, the evening-prayer to Ps 113 and Lk $2^{29ff.}$. The grace before meat, preserved in *Const. Apost.* (vii. 49), is drawn from Gn 48^{15}, Ps 136^{25}, 2 Co 9^{8}. The real prayer-book is the Psalter; Christian maidens sit at the distaff and sing about the Divine revelation (Tatian, *Orat.* 33); husband and wife entertain one another with psalms and hymns, and vie with one another as to who shall best sing to God's praise (Tertullian, *ad Uxorem*, ii. 8). On the occasion of Monica's death, when Augustine and his son Adeodatus were overcome by grief, Euodius took the Psalter and intoned the 100th Ps., all present making response (Augustine, *Confess.* ix. 31). All the teachers of the first centuries counted upon this private use of the Scripture, and encouraged it (Justin, *Apol.* 44; Cyprian, *Ep.* i. *ad Donatum*). Pamphilus is said always to have kept copies ready to give to Christians who desired them (Hieronymus, *ad Ruf.* i. 9). The Acts of the Diocletian persecution indicate the extent to which the Christians honoured and defended the Bible as their sacred possession and their dearest treasure. More than one martyr was discovered while reading the Scripture, and brought to account for it, *e.g.*, Euplius of Catana, who read Mt 5^{10} 10^{28} before the judge, and, when asked why he had not obeyed the Emperor's injunction (dated 24th Feb. 303) to deliver up all Bibles, quietly answered: 'Quia Christianus sum et tradere non licebat magisque expedit mori quam tradere' (cf. *Mart. s. Irenae*, and Eusebius, *Mart. Pal.* 8. 4). The reproach which

was made against the Catholics by the Donatists, 'velut traditores in persecutione divinarum scripturarum,' was keenly felt by the former as an attack upon their Christianity. No difference was made later on when the time of Constantine began to see the masses streaming into the Christian Churches, except that exhortations to use the Bible at home were rendered more frequent by the neglect of the custom. Chrysostom assumes that his hearers possess a Bible, in which they can read the text at home; if they do not, he urges them to buy one. In many places a Bible was probably laid out for public use. The lending of sacred books was considered to be pleasing to God. The diligent reading of the Bible took a specially high place among the virtues and merits of holy men and women. The acquaintance which these people had with the Bible was really astonishing. The sermons of the great preachers of the time were composed of Biblical quotations, and preachers counted upon their hearers to take note of and understand them. Pilgrimages to the scenes of sacred story, which at this time were becoming more and more common, added to the knowledge of the Bible a certain knowledge of localities, however superficial and superstitious it may have been. The Aquitanian pilgrim (Silvia or Etheria?) informs us that at each place the pertinent passage of Scripture was read to the pilgrims.

With the collapse of the ancient civilization and the decay of learning, the following centuries, naturally enough, brought a decline in the reading of the Bible. There came times when it was rare to find the art of reading outside the monasteries. Perhaps in the boudoir of a great lady there was still opportunity for the study of the Bible and Virgil. The laity, whether prince or peasant, and even the secular priests, were illiterate. We hear complaints about the meagre acquaintance with the Bible to be found even in the ranks of the clergy. Charlemagne had to insist upon every priest knowing at least the Catechism. Petrus Damiani († 1072) and Æneas Silvio (Pius II., † 1464) complained similarly of the small knowledge which priests possessed as compared with heretics. The Bible exerted only an indirect influence through the medium of preaching, poetry, and pictures, and even that was shared with much other material. It was not till the 12th cent. that the people again began to show a wide interest in the Bible as such. This movement, though viewed with suspicion by the Church, and occasionally violently opposed, continued and increased in intensity and extent in proportion as ecclesiastic theology and piety became dissociated from the Bible. There were circles where Biblicism went so far as to remove from the Bible everything that was not strictly Biblical, as, *e.g.*, the prefaces—a purism to which sometimes even the prologue to the Gospel of Luke (1^{1-4}) was sacrificed. But though the Bible was really the devotional book of these circles (Thomas à Kempis, Geiler of Kaysersberg on *Right Reading of the Bible*), the circles themselves were limited. Only few possessed a Bible, and the attempts to make it accessible to all in the adjoining rooms of churches benefited only individuals, and helped study rather than devotion.

With the aid of the new art of printing the Reformation first made the Bible in reality the people's book. From that point onward one can speak of daily Bible-reading as a Christian duty. Along with the hymn-book and the Catechism, it is the only book that many evangelical Christians know. It is their manual of devotion, and still more their reading-book. The wider circulation of the Bible, which followed the improvements effected upon printing, made its acquirement increasingly easy. At the same time, however, competition increased. Thus we find that, simultaneously with the widest circulation of the Bible which has ever been reached, there is a decline in the pious use of it. Here, however, there is this comfort to be laid to heart, that where it is read a really pious desire is the motive. Many German Bibles are wisely prefaced by A. H. Francke's fine 'Kurzer Unterricht, wie man die h. Schrift zu seiner wahren Erbauung lesen solle.' Then also the emphasizing of the supreme verses of Scripture by special type, which we find in many Bibles, is significant. These are the utterances in which the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum* ever reveals itself in experience, in which the troubled soul finds richest consolation, inspiration, and strength. We find this illustrated in an old family Bible mentioned by Hesselbacher. It was underlined in the 18th cent. by his great-grandfather in four different colours. 'What touched the sin of my heart:—Black. What inspired me to good:—Blue. What comforted me in sorrow:—Red. What promised me the grace of God in eternity:—Gold' (cf. with this the Gospels mentioned above, p. 583b, belonging to the 14th cent. and written in four colours of ink, in order to see the difference between the objective treatment of the Bible by the Catholics and its subjective treatment by the Evangelicals, who always kept in view the thirst of their own sinful hearts for comfort). Naturally, we have no documentary evidence of the reading of the Bible in families or in retirement. An unusually favourable opportunity is afforded in the letters of Bismarck to his wife, from which we learn that the Bible was read daily by one of the greatest statesmen, one, too, who was certainly no pietist. Naturally, in biographies and memoirs there is little said of the devotional reading of the Bible in the quiet closet or in the small family-circle; it is taken for granted or considered immaterial. All true effect of Bible-reading takes place in secret. So far as it is possible to observe, it would seem that the desire for God's word and the eternal truth which the Bible contains is again on the increase (A. W. Robinson, *Co-operation with God*, 1908, 114).

LITERATURE.—Bartlett and Peters, *The Bible for Home and School*, 1898; C. G. Montefiore, *The Bible for Home Reading*, 1896, 1899.

2. Bible-reading by the laity.—In the ancient Church every Christian could obtain access to the Bible, and exhortations to read it were general. The idea characteristic of late Judaism, that certain Scriptures were to be confined to a select circle, is to be found only in the pseudo-Clementine Homilies—a fact which is to be connected with the sectarianisms of Jewish Christianity and esoteric literature. Elsewhere the warning is limited to the reading of heretical works (Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catech.* iv. 33). The sacred Scriptures included those which were for use in church and those which were for private devotional use (cf. Murat. Canon. on the *Shepherd* of Hermas). But the canonical Scriptures were to be within everybody's reach. Athanasius reproaches heretics with preventing people from reading the Bible. Chrysostom combats the idea prevalent among the laity that the reading of the Bible was a thing for the clergy and monks. Later on this giving up of the Bible on the part of the laity led to its being withdrawn altogether, exactly as in the case of the communion cup. There came a time when laymen could not read, and when they had again learned the art they were not allowed to read the Bible. This was part of the mediæval system of keeping the laity in dependence upon ecclesiastical authority, and was based upon the idea of the unfathomableness of the mysteries which the Scripture contained. The traditional exegesis of the Church was the only means of reaching these, and the laity, left to themselves, always

wandered from the track. As a matter of fact, where Bible study was fostered in lay circles, there was to be found, as a rule, an anti-hierarchical, anti-clerical, sectarian tendency. It was believed that, in the Bible-reading conventicles of South France and Lorraine, Albigensian and Catharist tendencies were to be observed. Thus Innocent III. wrote to the Bishop of Metz that conventicles of the laity for the purpose of reading the Bible were to be suppressed. The study of the Bible was to be encouraged, but theological training was necessary: the *profunditas* of the sacred Scripture was so great that even scholars could not quite understand it; the *arcana fidei* were not for every man. Ex 19[12] was the passage which was founded upon in this connexion: the beast that touched Mount Sinai was to be stoned. Of course this did not amount to a general prohibition of the reading of Scripture by the laity, but it bore a close resemblance to it, and without doubt the tendency gained ground. Against the Bible in the popular tongue especially, a continual, though sometimes veiled, and certainly unsuccessful war was waged. Where the Church had no patience with these conventicles, people were driven into the arms of the sectaries, because it was these—especially Albigensians, Waldensians, Wyclifites, and Hussites—who gave the laity free access to the Bible and a free field for its exegesis, which developed in increasingly acute form upon anti-papal, anti-ecclesiastical lines. This made the Church all the more anxious to keep its members apart from the movement. Soon it came to be that the reading of the Bible brought people under the suspicion of heresy. The decrees passed by Councils of the 13th and 14th centuries against the reading of the Bible by Waldensians, Wyclifites, Beghards, and Beguines were followed by occasional local prohibitions like that of Archbishop Berthold of Mainz (1485). This caused printers of the Bible not perhaps to suspend operations, but to omit their names from their work. In the period prior to the Council of Trent, therefore, we cannot speak of any general prohibition of the Bible. It was a time of unreadiness and confusion, when mystic piety contended with ecclesiasticism for the supremacy.

The crisis was brought about even in Catholicism by the Reformation, which successfully established the unconditional right of every layman to the Bible. It rested upon the *perspicuitas*, that is to say, the intelligibility of the Scripture to the ordinary pious mind—the victory of the devotional use of the Bible over the theological—and compelled Catholicism to take up a more definite attitude to the whole question. In England the first endeavour to spread the gospel brought about a persecution which recalled the time of Diocletian. The Council of Trent (Sess. iv. *Decr. de editione et usu sacrorum librorum*) decreed, *ad coercenda petulantia ingenia*, that the exposition of Holy Scripture was to be guided by ecclesiastical tradition or the *unanimis consensus patrum* (cf. Conc. Vatic., Sess. iii. *Const. de fide*, c. 2). Resting on this decree, the Pope announced that only Bibles containing annotations approved by the Church could be published, and their use was dependent upon the special permission of the *parochus*, or the bishop of the diocese. Practically this was almost the withdrawal of the Bible. The Protestant Bibles were assailed, especially by the Jesuits, as falsified and dangerous to the soul. The same treatment was meted out to the Jansenists, especially in connexion with the translation and exposition of du Quesnell (Clement IX., *Const. Unigenitus*, 1713, *prop.* 79–82). In 1794 Pius VI. condemned *prop.* 67 of the Synod of Pistoja, which stated that the neglect of Bible-reading was innocent only in the case of inability to read, and that this neglect was responsible for the great ignorance in matters of faith. Hardly had the Jesuit order again attained influence when the Bible Societies in Catholic spheres were everywhere suppressed. Leo XII. published an encyclical against them in 1824, and Pius IX., in the syllabus of 1864, § 4, condemned them along with Socialism, Communism, and Secret Societies (*e.g.*, Freemasons) as *ejusmodi pestes*. It is one of the most remarkable indications of an internal change of system that there is at present in Italy a 'Società di San Girolamo' for the spreading of the Gospels among the people, which has a cardinal for its protector, and whose patron Pius X. is said to have been, before he took his place upon the Papal throne.

Within all Protestant Churches the Bible is the assured possession of the laity, and any isolated opposition to it is hopeless. The great necessity now is to emphasize, along with the right to the Bible, the duty of a true use of it in opposition to the contempt in which it is now widely held.

LITERATURE.—C. W. Fr. Walch, *Krit. Untersuch. vom Gebrauch der h. Schrift unter den alten Christen*, 1779; T. G. Hegelmaier, *Gesch. des Bibelverbots*, 1783; Leander van Ess, *Über das notwendige und nützliche Bibellesen*, 1808–24; Malon, *La Lect. de la sainte Bible*, 1846; F. H. Reusch, *Der Index der verbotenen Bücher*, 1883–85; G. Rietschel, art. 'Bibellesen,' in *PRE*[3] ii. 700; O. Schmidt in Wetzer und Welte, *Kirchenlex.*[2] ii. 679 ff.; R. C. Moulton, *The Modern Reader's Bible*, 1907.

3. The Bible in monasteries and reading-circles.—From the moment when the masses entered the Church, and a distinction came to be drawn between half-Christians and whole-Christians, that is to say, between the secular world on the one hand, and monks, ascetics, and conventuals on the other, Bible-reading among Christians as such decayed, while in ascetic circles, where religion was taken seriously, it increased. Chrysostom was aware of the opinion popularly entertained that the Bible was for priests and monks. As a matter of fact, it was in ascetic circles like those which gathered round Jerome and Rufinus that Bible-reading was most diligently fostered. Melania, *e.g.*, a noble Roman lady who renounced the world entirely, read the whole Bible four times every year, and knew large portions of it by heart. Jerome was quite pestered by the puzzles which his admirers put him from Scripture. Marcella showed intelligence in her queries, and suggested real difficulties; the less gifted Paula adopted more the style of the modern Biblical riddle. The same thing was repeated in the court of Charlemagne, where Alcuin was looked upon as an oracle for the solution of all difficulties. We possess the correspondence of two nuns of the 6th cent., and find it to be entirely composed of passages from Scripture.

In these pious circles the Psalter, as the daily prayer-book, played the chief part. The Egyptian anchorites passed days and nights in reciting psalms which they learned by heart. This was held to be the surest weapon against the temptations of Satan. In the monasteries the *Psalmodia* (chanting of psalms) was regulated (at Studium and St. Maurice chanting never ceased, one choir relieving the other [Acœmetæ]). At the same time, a free field was left to the piety of the individual. It was in the monasteries, too, that the reading of Scripture was most practised. Not only were several services held every day (or were provided for by the regulations), but at meal-times, etc., some book was read aloud. Sometimes it was the Scriptures, sometimes it was legends of the martyrs or lives of the monks. In the early period of the Middle Ages the monasteries were the only places where the Scriptures were to be found. Only there was it known how to use them and communicate them in some degree to the people. The monasteries

were the homes of writing, reading, meditation, and study. In the schools of the various orders we have already seen that Biblical sciences were fostered.

This condition of things was altered by the Reformation, in so far as the distinction between whole- and half-Christian was now done away with. It was impossible, however, to remove the distinction between those who desired with their whole soul to be Christians and those who were Christian only in appearance. With all the emphasis which it laid upon the right and the duty of all Christians to read the Bible, Protestantism also possessed small circles of particularly zealous friends of the Bible. Just as these circles occur here and there in modern Catholicism, often in connexion with some monastery, *e.g.* Port Royal, so in Protestantism the influence of Pietism made itself felt. The necessary impulse was given by the *pia desideria* of Spener, who thus came into line with the work of his opponent, Carpzow, in Leipzig. Thus there originated 'Collegia Philobiblica.' At the outset these combined the features of the exegetical lecture and the devotional meeting, as was also the case with the Zürich 'Prophecy'; but afterwards the strictly scientific lecture of the university became more and more separated from the devotional meeting of the Church. The latter frequently stood in a sort of opposition to the Church service, as in the case of the Lay-preachers of Württemberg and the Stundists of Russia; but it found acceptance outside the strictly pietistic circles, and came to be a regular part of Church life in the shape of a week-day service. The more strongly pietistic circles possess reading-circles of their own, as well as Bible-classes for students and schoolboys. It is here that extraordinary achievements in the way of continuous Bible-reading are accomplished. It reminds us of what we are told about ascetics in the ancient Church, when we hear that the whole Bible from Gn 1^1 to Rev 22^{21} was read through several times in one year (A. H. Francke is said to have read the Hebrew OT seven times in one year). The tables of lessons which are published by many societies (*e.g.*, the Prussian Bible Society) distribute the material of the Bible over a year, not in continuous portions, but in selected passages.

LITERATURE.—Falk, *Bibel am Ausgange des Mittelalters*, 56 ff.

4. Substitutes and favourite passages.—It was not always in its complete form that the Bible was in use. The substitutes which existed alongside of it were of great importance, and in the Middle Ages exerted a greater influence than the immediate use of the Bible. There were the select passages for Sunday in the so-called Plenaries, Postils, and Books of the Gospels and the Epistles. These were intended to be used not only in the services of the Church, but also, as is shown by the MSS and copies printed in the popular tongue, in private devotions, partly at least to explain the reading of the Bible in the Church service. There were also excerpts from the Bible in the form of Bible histories (*Bible historiale*, 'History-Bible'). These were characterized by the almost complete absence of the more important Didactic Books, the Prophets, and the Apostolical Epistles. Then also there were rhymed Bibles, containing the same material, but in verse, which, though not by any means good, was easy to remember. To these must be added the picture-Bibles, with their short descriptive paragraphs, including the so-called *Biblia Pauperum* ('Bible of the Poor'), which contained from 24 to 48 woodcuts illustrating the most important events in the OT and the NT in harmony. Lastly, there was the *Ars Memorandi*, where the contents of the four Gospels were suggested in rebus fashion. Towards the end of the Middle Ages these were widely circulated instead of the Bible, not only because the great majority of the people were still too ignorant to read the Bible, and because the Church did not wish them to do so, but also because the piety of the age took more delight in the marvellous stories which the Bible contained than in the hard fare of the Prophets and the Epistles of Paul. Even for the Psalms a substitute existed in the *Psalterium Puerorum*, a collection of certain Psalms much employed in Divine service, and of other important features in Christian instruction, *e.g.* the Lord's Prayer and the Creed.

The Reformation demanded that the whole Bible should be given to the people and made free to everybody. Some difference of attitude, however, can be observed in the two Protestant Confessions. In Lutheranism the Catechism, with Biblical notes, took the place of the Bible to a large extent both in private use and in ecclesiastical teaching, while Calvinism adhered to the Bible itself. At the same time, the mediæval substitutes continued in use, especially in schools, where Bible-history formed the foundation of the entire education, as it will probably do for long, in spite of recent attacks. The efforts which are now made to give a due place to the Prophets and the Apostles, as well as the Historical Books, are significant and deserving of success. On the other hand, the desire for a school- and home-Bible that shall be intermediate between Bible and Bible-history is to be looked on with suspicion, both from the educational and from the ecclesiastical point of view.

The pious Bible-reader of the old school read the whole Bible as the word of God. But it may be observed that various parts of the Bible produce various effects, according to the period and the people. In the ancient Church and the Middle Ages, Paul is little understood and valued, and yet Pauline reactions mark the critical epochs both in theology and in the Church. Mysticism adheres either to the Song of Songs or to John. The Spiritualists who broke with the Church, the fanatics of the Reformation period, and many sects of modern Protestantism, build almost entirely upon the Revelation of John. In the later Middle Ages there were wide circles where the historical parts of the Bible were the only parts known, and even these only indirectly, through the so-called history-Bibles—that is to say, Scripture excerpts, with many legendary additions from extra-Biblical sources. The Didactic portions, the Prophets and the Apostolic Epistles, had to be re-discovered. The 'Enlightenment' laid supreme value upon the moralizing Wisdom-literature. As has been recently noted, Frederick the Great's favourite book was Ecclesiastes. Of the Gospels, Luke's edifying narrative has enjoyed the greatest vogue among pious readers, while speculative theology (*e.g.*, Schleiermacher's school) prefers John, and the historical school abides by Mark. Modern socialistic tendencies, again, do honour to the Epistle of James, which Luther once very wrongly threw into the fire as an 'epistle of straw.' Speaking generally, interest in the Bible, which under the influence of materialism and naturalism was reduced to a very low ebb at the close of the 19th cent., has again happily revived. The chief motive is the æsthetic one. Pearls of Biblical poetry are selected for books of wisdom and beauty (Freiherr von Grotthus). Works on the beauty of the Bible (A. Wünsche, 1906) and on the poetry of Christ's gospel (O. Frommel, 1906) find a grateful public. Modern investigation and criticism of the Bible are beginning to create interest (Schiele's *Religionsgeschichtl. Volksbücher*, and the more conservative *Biblische Zeit- und Streitfragen*, by Kropatschek). More and more space is being given to Biblical

material in popular collections, which are meant to provide a general culture (Goeschen's *Sammlung*, Teubner's *Aus Natur und Geisteswelt*, etc.). As the inevitable result of this, the religious interest in the Bible must receive a powerful stimulus, and Christian consciousness become re-awakened.

LITERATURE.—Alzog, *Die deutschen Plenarien im 15. und zu Anfang des 16. Jahrh.*, 1874; E. Reuss (S. Berger), art. 'Historienbibel,' in *PRE*[3], viii. 152–157; J. Kell, *Die Schulbibel*, 1845; Enders, *Die Schulbibelfrage*, 1896; F. M. Schiele, *Die Bibel und ihre Surrogate in der Volksschule*, 1900; *The Child's Bible*, 1883; Rogers, *School and Children's Bible*, 1873; J. G. Frazer, *Passages of the Bible chosen for their Literary Beauty and Interest*, 1895; J. W. Mackail, *Biblia Innocentium*, 1893, 1901.

On the influence of Paulinism: C. Bigg, *The Christian Platonists of Alex.*, 1886, pp. 53, 283 f.; A. Harnack, *Dogmengesch.*[3], i. 129; E. Serfass, *Essai sur l'influence du paulinisme dans les réveils religieux*, 1900; E. Langlade, *Le Rôle des psaumes dans la vie religieuse*, Cahors, 1905.

5. **The Bible and the Classics.**—The Bible satisfies Christian piety, but it nevertheless has its place in history as a link in a long process of civilization. This fact explains the speedy development of two tendencies. On the one hand, there were those who placed the Bible, the book of Christian devotion, side by side with universal literature. In their opinion, both were possessed of rights, and the Bible was in alliance with culture. On the other hand, there were Biblicists pure and simple. These condemned all reading of profane (*i.e.* heathen) literature as un-Christian, and put on a level with the Bible only the devotional Christian literature of a distinct ascetic colour. This was the view entertained in ascetic and monastic circles. Even in the ancient Church we meet with it in Syria, the home of ascetic tendencies. The *Didascalia* of the Apostles, *e.g.*, ch. ii., contains the following exhortation:

'Keep away from the books of the heathen. What hast thou to do with the strange words, the laws, and the lying prophecies which tempt young people from the faith? What fault hast thou to find with the word of God that thou stayest thyself upon heathen fables? Wilt thou read history? thou hast the Book of Kings; wise men and philosophers? then thou hast the Prophets, in whom thou wilt find more wisdom and knowledge than in the wise men and philosophers, because theirs are the words of God, who alone is wise; dost thou wish songs? then thou hast the Psalms of David; an explanation of the world? then thou hast Genesis, by the great Moses; laws and commandments? thou hast the Divine law in Exodus. Keep entirely away from all strange things which are in opposition to these.'

Later we find the same way of thinking in the monastic circles of Syria and Egypt, although it is to the everlasting credit of Syrian Nestorians that they communicated the Greek philosophy—Aristotle and his commentators—to the Arabs, from whom they were taken over again by Christians in the West. There is a typical presentation of this sentiment in the famous dream of Jerome. This master of rhetoric, who prided himself on his classical knowledge, wants the pious Eustochium to believe that he had been thoroughly chastised in the night-time for his admiration of Plautus and Cicero, and compelled to give up the Classics (*Ep.* 22)—a delicate little piece of rhetoric that quite gives its author the lie. This renunciation on the part of Jerome was not to be taken seriously. Later he insisted strongly that in education there should be a union of Christian and general culture, of the Bible and the Classics. But his fiction produced its effect, and in many a cloister-cell during the Middle Ages the dream was actualized.

It is true that the Greek theologians, and also the monastics, among whom were Basil and Theodore of Studium, etc., never quite gave up the idea of a union of classic beauty of form with Biblical content. Thus the Alexandrian Clement and Origen were steeped in Greek philosophy. Clement quotes the Bible with remarkable freedom, adopting a Greek style unawares. The same thing can be observed in the whole school of Origen (cf. the thanksgiving speech of Gregory Thaumaturgus). But his opponent Methodius, the Biblical realist, also writes a Christian symposium. Specially noteworthy, because they regulated the succeeding age, were the great orators of the 4th cent., Basil and the two Gregorys, who as young men at Athens had, along with their heathen comrades, familiarized themselves with the whole profane culture. Chrysostom, the pupil of Libanius, believed it his duty to apologize for the rusticity of Biblical Greek: the Apostles were uncultured fishermen, but that only made the miracle which the Holy Ghost effected by them the greater. At the same time, Chrysostom felt the peculiar strength of the Biblical language. He adorned his brilliant orations with Scripture quotations, and so gave them the impressiveness which lifts them above the contemporary speeches of heathen orators, with their hollow phrases. The monastic tendency in the 6th cent. sought to introduce the popular Greek, which resembled more closely the Semitic element in the Bible (John Malalas of Antioch). It would be a valuable service to investigate the influence which the language of the Bible exercised upon the popular legendary literature and Christian revisions of older material like the *Romance* of Alexander. But although monastic circles prided themselves no less on their modesty than on their simplicity of language, classicism, or the union of Christian and Greek culture, was always maintained in Byzantium, and after short periods of decline it never failed to revive. This was the case after the iconoclastic struggle in the 9th cent., chiefly through the instrumentality of Photius, and also, after the Latin invasion of the 13th cent., through the Palæologi. Arethas, the Archbishop of Cæsarea († *c.* 932), wrote a commentary on the Apocalypse, and studied Plato and Lucian diligently. Eustathius, the Homeric commentator, who was afterwards Archbishop of Thessalonica († *c.* 1192), complained bitterly of the want of culture on the part of the monks, who could not appreciate the treasures of the monastic libraries. This classicism was specifically Greek in character, and it was not transmitted by the Byzantines to the Slavonic peoples converted by them.

In the West the development took a somewhat different course. There Jerome and Augustine provided a model of the noble union of Biblical and secular culture. But, just as Jerome sometimes felt that the latter was forbidden fruit, so in the case of Augustine, from the moment when he entered the service of the Church, an increasing Biblical element is found to colour his views and language. Cassiodorus and Boethius were still familiar with pagan culture, but such familiarity soon ceased. What little culture survived the migration of the peoples is monastic and Biblical. At the Court of Charlemagne the first revival of learning occurred. Along with the Bible, Virgil was studied. The Emperor himself was liberal enough to appreciate the value of the German epics. But so early as the time of the monk-emperor, Ludwig the Pious, this disappeared. As a matter of fact, Plautus and Terence were still read even by pious nuns, but Hroswitha of Gandersheim endeavoured to suppress these heathen writers by her Biblical imitations. In the time of the Swabian dynasty there occurred another revival, and after the fall of the Empire (from middle of 13th cent. onwards) the foundation was everywhere laid of a real national secular culture, in opposition to ecclesiastical Latin. This spread from France to England and the German Imperial cities, and in an entirely independent manner it united Biblical and extra-Biblical material. Much more dangerous was the classicism of the Renaissance. In their admiration of the ancient form the Humanists made sport of the ancient religion as they understood it, and

some of them were ashamed of the Biblical element. This led to a strong Biblical reaction, especially in Calvinistic countries, while Lutheranism tried to reach a combination of both tendencies. The 'Enlightenment' confined strict Biblicism to a narrow pietistic circle, while general culture, characterized in some cases by tendencies hostile to religion and the Bible, spread more widely. Here, too, a wholesome reaction can be hoped for only from the perception that the Bible, in its true nature as the supreme book of devotion, can never come into collision with any other means of culture.

LITERATURE.—C. Neumann, *Byzant. Kultur und Renaissancekultur*, 1903; J. E. Sandys, *Hist. of Class. Scholarship*, 3 vols., 1906–08; G. Kaufmann, 'Rhetorenschulen und Klosterschulen, oder histor. und christl. Kultur in Gallien während des 5. und 6. Jahrh.,' in Raumer's *Hist. Taschenbuch*, 1869; Zappert, *Virgils Fortleben im Mittelalter*, 1851; Comparetti, *Vergilio nel medio evo*, 1872.

6. Misuse of the Bible.—Our sketch would be incomplete without some mention of the abuse of the Bible by misguided Christian piety. Although the idea that the Bible had fallen from heaven was never entertained, yet the conception of its sanctity had become so strong among the Jews that the roll of the Law was held to be inviolable. A Roman soldier who had seized one of these rolls was executed by the Procurator Cumanus to please the Jews (Josephus, *Ant.* XX. v. 4, *BJ* II. xii. 2). Copies which had grown useless had to be carefully preserved in sacred burying-places made for the purpose (the Genizah at Cairo has yielded a rich harvest of extremely valuable ancient copies of the Bible). This material notion of sacredness, which was familiar both to heathenism and Judaism, was at first quite foreign to Christianity. It soon found its way into the Christian masses, however, and made the Bible, like other sacred things, tabu. Especially was this the case with the book of the Gospels which, along with the Host and the likeness of Christ, speedily came to be one of the most effective guarantees of the presence of Christ Himself and His miraculous power. This was the origin of kissing the book—still an important feature of the liturgies of the East—and also of the double procession, first with the Gospels and afterwards with the Communion elements. The official valuation by the Councils gave to the Gospels, as representative of Christ, the place of honour. In the consecration of a bishop the Gospels were laid upon his head as the means of communicating the Spirit and Christ's indwelling, whereas they were placed in the reader's hand only as the symbol of his ecclesiastical function. They played a similar part in the consecration of the highest grade of Catharists. From the 4th cent. it became the custom to take the oath upon the Gospels, and on these occasions it was usual to turn up the beginning of John. In the Middle Ages we find, along with or in place of the Gospels which represented Christ, relics as representing the saints. The idea here is no higher than that which is embodied in the monastic legend that a Christian who was sorely beset by fleshly lust was enabled to resist temptation by having the Gospels hung upon his neck by a cord. One must beware of spiritualizing this to the extent of making it the psychological effect of reflexion upon the content of the book. It was to the book itself that talismanic virtue was ascribed. The explanation of inserting a finger or 'dipping' in the Bible is similar. The method which the Romans followed with Virgil and other authors whose works were considered inspired and sacred was taken over by Christians and applied to their sacred book (*sortes legere*), and, in spite of the opposition which it met at the beginning from ecclesiastical authority, this method of consulting the oracle about the future was long maintained among the people. We can observe the material view which was entertained of the magical qualities resident in the book, from the practice of writing the answers to the most usual questions on its margin. Such queries could also be answered by means of slips of paper or threads, but when the answers were read out of the Gospels they possessed a greater guarantee of being Divine oracles.

The magical effect of the Bible reached still further into the dark regions of human superstition. There were certain passages of Scripture which were considered specially effective in defence and attack. The Lord's Prayer, inscribed upon a disc of clay found at Megara, was certainly possessed of this significance, just as in ancient and modern times Jesus' letter to Abgar was attached to the doors in order to keep all evil and hurtful influences far away from the house and its members. A sheet of lead inscribed with the 80th Psalm, which Hiller von Gärtringen found in a vineyard on the island of Rhodes, belongs rather to the ancient formulas of malediction, by which evil was supposed to be brought upon some definite person. Chrysostom complained of the superstitious abuse of sayings from the Gospels (*δέλτια, εὐαγγέλια*) which women and children wore round the neck. Augustine relates how the Gospel of John was laid upon the head of those who were ill with fever. Gregory M. sanctioned by word and example what the Church till then contended against as abuse. In the later Middle Ages the only reason why this superstition in regard to the Bible decayed was the keen competition which it had to face in the superstitious valuation of saintly relics.

The Reformation destroyed the material notion of sacredness which lay at the basis of all this error. The bibliolatry which Lessing and others opposed in the time of 'Enlightenment' had nothing in common with this Biblical magic. It was the dogmatic valuation of the Bible as possessed of infallible authority. Evangelical Christians have in the Bible not a book that is to be handled with timidity and awe, but one which is for the intimacy of home and private devotion. Where searching with the finger or 'dipping' in the Bible still exists as a practice in Protestant circles (Pietists and Moravian brethren), it has acquired an inward and spiritual significance. At the same time it has to be said that the practice in Evangelical circles of making the Bible serve for pastimes (*e.g.* Biblical riddles) amounts to excessive familiarity and abuse; the Bible is to be handled not indeed with timidity, but with all due reverence.

LITERATURE.—For the ecclesiastical use of the Gospels see St. Beissel, *Gesch. der Evangelienbücher*, 1906, pp. 1–10, who tries to dissociate this use from every element of superstition; Kayser, 'Gebrauch von Psalmen zur Zauberei,' *ZDMG* xlii., 1888, 456; Hiller von Gärtringen, *SBAW*, 1898, p. 582; N. Wilcken, *APF* i. 430 ff.; Knopf, *Mitt. d. deutsch. archäol. Inst. zu Athen*, xxv., 1900, pp. 313–324; Joh. Ficker, *PRE*[3] i. 469; E. von Dobschütz, *PRE*[3] xviii. 537; E. Nestle, *ZNTW* vii. 96. See also art. BIBLIOLATRY.

VII. *THE BIBLE IN THE LIFE OF THE PEOPLE.*—The Bible is pre-eminently the book of religious devotion, but its operations are not limited thereto. They embrace the whole life of Christendom.

1. Bible and language.—The Bible has exercised great influence on the development of language. Not only have translations of the Bible made literature possible to a whole array of peoples by giving them a written language in the same way as missionary enterprise still does, but in other ways language has been powerfully influenced by the Bible. The Biblical vocabulary supplied Latin, and thence the Romance and German languages, with the terms 'manna,' 'Passover,' 'Sabbath,' 'angel,' 'devil,' 'Paradise,' etc. The Biblical structure

of sentences—loose co-ordination of clauses and *parallelismus membrorum*—has been largely adopted as a model. It may be noted that here three methods are to be distinguished: (1) The conscious imitation of the solemn music of the Prophets, which hardly exists in the ancient period, but of which Lamennais is a modern instance. (2) The allegorical use of Biblical names and expressions—a method specially favoured among the Greeks, who applied the typical names of the Bible to the men of the times (*πάλιν Ἡρωδιὰς μαίνεται*, Chrysostom). Speaking of the bull of Canonization dated 1228, which is composed in this style, Sabatier rightly remarks that one can learn the history of the Philistines, of Samson, and also of Jacob from it better than that of St. Francis. In later times the 'speech of Canaan' has been much adopted in pietistic circles, while it has been abhorred in others. (3) The unconscious absorption of familiar Biblical phrases—the normal and most widely spread form. Not only do the great preachers of the ancient Church and moderns like Bossuet, Schleiermacher, and Spurgeon employ the language of their Bible, but the masters of literature do so also. If Dante is the creator of modern Italian, Luther deserves the same title in regard to modern German, and it was through his translation of the Bible chiefly that his influence was felt. In reading Goethe, one becomes aware of his life-long familiarity with the Bible. The style of many Catholic authors shows that they do not have the same familiarity with it. It is an obvious mistake when Janssen's school attempts to transfer the credit which belongs to Luther to an obscure chronicler of the 13th cent., Eike of Repkow. In English-speaking countries the Authorized Version possessed the same importance. It came too late for Shakespeare, but even he could not have written as he did without the older translations. The best age of French literature has more than a temporal connexion with the Biblical activity of Port Royal. The influence which the Bible has exerted upon literature deserves to receive more attention than it has done in the past. That, however, would require a wider acquaintance with the Bible than most moderns possess. More than any other book, the Bible has contributed to the familiar phrases used by numberless people who know nothing of their origin. It is to be regretted that these phrases are often used in a sense quite false and entirely opposed to their original meaning.

LITERATURE.—R. v. Raumer, *Die Einwirkung des Christentums auf die althochdeutsche Sprache*, 1845; E. Stein von Nordenstein, *Über den Einfluss der Bibel auf deut. Sprache und Litt.* 1856; P. Frédéricq, 'Les Conséquences de l'évangélisation par Rome et par Byzance sur le développement de la langue maternelle des peuples convertis,' in *Bull. de l'acad. roy. de Belg.* 1903; A. S. Cook, *Bibl. Quotations in old Eng. Prose Writers*, 2 vols., 1898 and 1903; C. Wordsworth, *Shakespeare's Knowledge and Use of the Bible*, 1864; C. von Kügelgen, *Die Bibel bei Kant*, 1904; E. Höhne, *Umfang und Art der Bibelbenutzung in Goethe's Faust*, 1906; L. Rosenthal, *Schiller und die Bibel*, 1905; R. de la Broise, *Bossuet et la Bible*, 1890; J. Trénel, *L'ancien test. et la langue française du moyen âge*, 1904; G. Büchmann, *Geflügelte Worte*[21], 1903.

2. Bible and views of the world and human life.—To the language of the Bible must be added the general view which it takes of the world and human life; speech and thought are intimately related. The Bible contains no conception of the universe peculiar to itself. What we find in it is the view entertained by the ancient world, and especially the ancient East. To the early Christians there was nothing strange in this, because their own view resembled it, and where there were differences it was easy to harmonize them. The Scriptures themselves, covering as they did a space of 1000 years, were not at one in this regard. The transition from the Semitic to the Greek method of thought was effected as easily as in the domain of language. Plato and Aristotle were read into the Bible involuntarily. This is shown very clearly by the abundant literature on the *Hexaëmeron*. The Middle Ages looked upon this mixture of old Oriental Biblical ideas and Greek philosophy as authoritative ecclesiastical doctrine. It was surrounded by the nimbus of revelation, and was therefore infallibly true. Every consideration against it and every attempt to account for the world empirically (as Bacon, *e.g.*, demanded) was authoritatively suppressed. The effect of this was felt till within recent times. Luther was so far from seeing how little of the Bible there was in this ecclesiastical theory of the world, that he called Copernicus a fool (*Table-Talk*, Förstemann-Bindseil, iv. 575); the Roman Inquisition compelled Galileo to retract; Kepler encountered great internal and external difficulties in accepting the credibility of the Bible as it was conceived in his time; while Newton combined with the exactitude of his physical theories a Biblicism which we find it difficult to understand. The 'Enlightenment' completed what the Renaissance had begun. It secularized science and emancipated views of the world from all Biblical ecclesiastical authority.

The great discoveries of the 15th cent., the transition from the speculative methods of scholasticism to empirical research, not only in the domain of natural science but also in that of history, brought about an entire change of opinion. The confidence of the 'Enlightenment' and the modern love of truth have brought this clearly to light, and with it the immense gulf between the ordinary and the Biblical view of the world. Here we come upon the leading problem of the Bible for moderns. Can the Bible still possess value when it contains views about the world and man belonging to a stage of human thought now outgrown? That heaven (or the 3 to 7 heavens) arches over this earth, that the stars encircle it, that the earth is surrounded by the great ocean (only the parts bordering on the Mediterranean being then known), that its central point is Jerusalem, that all the peoples on the earth are descended from the three sons of Noah, who was rescued from the Flood, that their languages can be traced back to one single confusion—all these ideas represent only the primitive thought which the Biblical authors shared with their contemporaries in Babylon and Egypt. It cannot be denied that we have ceased to entertain these notions nowadays. But this admission does not by any means overthrow all Biblical authority. What the theology of the last decade has toiled to show and has succeeded in showing is gaining increasing recognition, viz., that the Bible is not a revealed text-book of nature and history, but that God speaks in it to men about the salvation of their souls. To every pious conception of the world and its course as a whole and in detail, the Bible will always be possessed of validity because of the way in which it sees God's hand in everything and teaches people to see God's saving intention in fortune and misfortune, the way in which it places the whole history of mankind under the point of view of an education to the stature of manhood and independence in Christ. In a word, the Bible will always remain the book of pious devotion, and such pious devotion will always be easily able to surmount any difficulties which arise from different conceptions of creation. As in language, a kind of translation is possible. What apologetics must learn, however, is to abandon the desire to justify every Biblical utterance, and after every discovery in natural science and history to begin at once to search about for some statement in the Bible which it confirms. That only leads to confusion where what is needed is clearness. It is true that, so long as men read the Bible, the

Biblical view of the world and human life will remain popular. Without regard to the millions of stars, men will speak of heaven as the Divine dwelling-place and the goal of pious desire, and of the earth as the central point of the Divine plan of salvation with man as its special object. In their thoughts about love and hate, joy and sadness, good and evil, they will speak of the heart and not the brain. But what there must be no doubt about is that these are only poetical forms of speech, which, though fully justified in ordinary life, ought not to be put on the same platform as what is strictly scientific.

LITERATURE.—Van Eicken, *Gesch. und System der mittelalterl. Weltanschauung*, 1887 (with little attention to the Biblical element); E. F. Apelt, *Die Reformation der Sternkunde*, 1852; A. Deissmann, *Joh. Kepler und die Bibel*, 1895; L. Günther, *Kepler u. d. Theol.* 1904; L. Keller, 'Bibel, Winkelmass und Zirkel,' *Monatshefte der Comeniusgesellschaft*, 1908.

3. **Bible and law.**—Of greater practical significance is the influence of the Bible upon the life of the people. The adoption of Christianity by the State made it necessary that the revealed book of Divine law should regulate constitutional law. As early as 400 a *Collatio legum Mosaicarum et Romanarum* was prepared (ed. Th. Mommsen, 1890; *Collectio librorum iuris anteiustinianei*, iii.). In most ancient Christian legislations this principle finds expression in the preface. The so-called Syriac-Roman statute-book (ed. by Bruns and Sachau, 1880) affirms that the law of Moses is older than that of all other nations, but declares that, since the time of Christ, the only obligatory law is the law of Christ given through the Christian emperors, Constantine, Theodosius, and Leo. As a matter of fact, this was etiquette more than anything else; for the legislation is drawn almost wholly from Græco-Roman law. The same thing may be observed in the case of German law. Alfred the Great placed the Decalogue in front of his *Laws of England*. The ancient Bavarian and Frisian codes, as well as those of the Swabians and ancient Saxons, contain introductions full of ecclesiastical Biblical ideas. The law itself, however, is national. There are only a few traces of any Christian Biblical influence to be observed. These may perhaps be made out, however, as early as Constantine's legislation. The abolition of branding the face is based upon the Biblical doctrine of the Divine likeness (*C. Th.* ix. 40. 2); the second marriage of a divorced person is punished except when in the first marriage the other partner was guilty of adultery (*C. Th.* iii. 16. 1, cf. Mt $5^{31f.}$); two witnesses are required (*C. Th.* xi. 39. 3, cf. Dt 19^{15}). The influence of Christianity becomes commoner under Theodosius, Leo, and Justinian, whose 'novels' (*i.e.* supplementary laws) refer directly to the *sacrae scripturae* (e.g. *Nov.* clx. 1). The severe language of the OT is echoed in the legislation of Charlemagne; the continually recurring *morte moriatur* of the pitiless Saxon law is Hebraic. Justification was found for the bloody persecution of heretics in the OT condemnations of the disobedient. Demands which were originally made by the Church to safeguard Christian morals were all incorporated in constitutional law under Charlemagne: keeping the Sabbath-day holy, the prohibition of interest, etc. What is still more important for Charlemagne's conception, however, is that the whole theocratic idea was considered to possess immediate significance for the present. He felt himself a modern David, Solomon, Hezekiah, Josiah. This state of things, however, soon gave way under the pressure of the ecclesiastical idea that the State was opposed to God and was to receive recognition only in the service of the Church. The conflict gave birth to the modern State, which takes no interest in ecclesiastical or Bible authority. In Biblicist circles the obligation of the OT, and especially of the commandments of the Gospel, is more and more emphasized. This gave rise to the refusal to take an oath (Mt 5^{34}, Ja 5^{12}) among many sects down even to the Mennonites, while the Church sought to Christianize the oath by furnishing it with the Trinitarian formula and causing it to be sworn on the Gospels, and in the Middle Ages on the relics of saints. It was from the OT that ecclesiastical law derived the prohibition of marriage with a sister-in-law, and from it also Joseph Smith drew the Mormon commandment of polygamy. In a purely legal way the Baptists of the Reformation endeavoured to realize the theocratic idea, as Calvin aimed at training Geneva to be a city of God. The Sabbath commandment still calls for Sunday rest in Calvinistic countries. These genuinely Biblical influences are to be distinguished from those which are due to the century-long effect of Christianity upon the life, the customs, and the legislation of the nations. It is to this latter influence, *e.g.*, that we owe the abolition of slavery—not in the 1st or in the 4th, but in the 13th cent. for N. Europe, and in the 19th for the S. and the New World. With this the Bible had no direct connexion, for in the American Civil War both sides took their stand upon Biblical authority. Here too, however, there was an indirect and educative influence exerted by the Bible upon the moral sympathy and social thought of mankind.

LITERATURE.—Troplong, *De l'influence du christianisme sur le droit civil des Romains*, 1844; C. Schmid, *Die bürgerliche Gesells. in der altröm. Welt und ihre Umgestaltung durch das Christentum*, 1857 (Fr. and Germ.); C. Bigg, *The Church's Task under the Roman Empire*, 1905; C. Loring Brace, *Gesta Christi, or A Hist. of Human Progress under Christianity*, 1882; L. Seuffert, *Konstantins Gesetze u. das Christentum*, 1891; W. Ohr, *Der Carolingische Gottesstaat*, Leipzig, 1902; W. E. H. Lecky, *Hist. of European Morals*[12], 1899.

4. **Bible and art.**—Specially interesting is the powerful effect which Biblical *motifs* exercised upon art and through it upon the national consciousness. The Christians of the first centuries adorned with Biblical symbols not only the graves of their dead in the Catacombs, but also the articles which they employed in daily life—lamps, tumblers, etc. Noah in the ark with the dove, Jonah swallowed by the whale or lying under the gourd, Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac, etc., were favourite subjects. At first these scenes were of a purely symbolic nature. The 4th cent. began to show interest in the story, and continuous Bible illustrations are then found in MSS (cf. above, p. 583). But the picture became separated from the text; the illustrations suppressed and took the place of the text. In the famous Joshua-roll in the Vatican, supposed to be a 9th cent. copy of an ancient Christian original, there is a series of scenes with small inscriptions like those upon the Trajan and Marc. Aurelian pillar. Towards the close of the Middle Ages the history-Bible shrank more and more to a picture-book. Great favour was accorded to the *Biblia Pauperum*, a pictorial representation of the Gospel story with its OT types, and occasionally with explanatory notes. Picture-Bibles of this kind without any text, or with at most brief explanations like those which were made by Hans Beham (1537) and Mich. Graff (1536–53), were known occasionally also in the 17th and 18th cents., while the 19th returned again to the complete Bible and illustrated it.

Besides Bible illustration, however, there was the art of painting in general. The long walls of the basilicas were picture-books of Bible-history, and continued so until the end of the Romanesque period (cf. above, p. 606). Gothic art changed the telling of a story into the sculpture of individual figures, and preferred the multitude of ecclesiastical saints to the Biblical characters. Then the Renaissance went back again to Bible-story, and at

this stage it was ancient mythology instead of the legends of the saints that entered into serious competition with the Bible. The Churches were ornamented with stories from the Bible (Giotto's cycle in Padua, Madonna dell' Arena, indicates the beginning; and the culmination is found in the twelve scenes on the walls of the Sistine Chapel by Tintoretto, Botticelli, etc.). Private rooms also contained similar ornamentation, and it was in the *loggie* that Rafael executed his famous Bible in fifty-two pictures. So far as altar-pictures, stained windows, and other ornamentations are fostered in the modern Lutheran Church, the subjects are always drawn from the Bible instead of from favourite stories of the saints, as was the custom earlier.

Besides the sculpture of sarcophagi in the 4th and 5th cents., there is also the stone- and wood-work of the doors of churches (S. Sabina in Rome, S. Ambroggio in Milan). At a later date bronze-castings became usual (baptistery at Florence). The art of weaving was also employed in Bible-illustration. We hear of Biblical scenes not only upon hangings for churches (*vela*), but also upon private draperies (Asterius of Amaseia). In the Middle Ages, besides the rich ecclesiastical vestments, there were embroideries for household use. From the 15th cent. onward the crafts received a stimulus and showed a preference for Biblical material. Painted and inlaid cupboards and presses of the 16th and 17th cents. show whole rows of Biblical pictures, and even the easy-going Rococo period ornamented the toilet tables of its ladies with pictures from sacred history. Nor did this custom, in itself a profanation of the Scripture, cease until the art of the 'empire' began to look for themes in the Classics. The following period made extreme simplicity its goal, while to the eyes of modern naturalism Biblical themes present no attractions. This, however, is not to be deplored, for Biblical art must always be of a pious character.

The number of passages employed for illustration naturally varied very much. In certain branches of art a strict tradition came to be formed. Walls provided scope for more scenes than sarcophagi, and book-illustration made more detail possible. It would be a useful task to investigate systematically the differences which mark the various series of illustrations. Great interest attaches to the scenes which were preferred by individual periods and artists. To some extent it is possible in this way to discover what acquaintance with the Bible different periods possessed, not only in regard to the artists who were dependent frequently upon a pattern, but also in regard to the beholders upon whom the pictures—usually explained by notes—produced their effect.

It must not be overlooked here that the subjects were often drawn not directly from the Bible but from some intermediate source or other. The peculiar choice of scenes which the early period of Christianity made has been connected with their employment in sermons or in prayer. In the Middle Ages, St. Augustine's *de Civitate Dei*, the *Historia scholastica* of Peter Comestor, and the *Speculum historiale* of Vincent of Beauvais provided artists with their Biblical material. This explains the Apocryphal features, the story of Christ ranging from the birth of the Virgin Mary to her ascension and coronation. Not till the advent of Protestantism did the immediate influence of the Bible again assert itself strongly. Then there was a different choice of scenes and a different arrangement of them. Much legendary material was dispensed with, and in its place much that had long been unobserved was utilized. The finest service was here rendered by Rembrandt. As a good Calvinist, he was so familiar with his Bible that he could always find new and unused subjects for his etchings. He could always count, moreover, upon their being understood at once by the public. See ART (Christian), vol. i. p. 855.

Besides the graphic arts, the art of language and tone is also naturally concerned with the word of Scripture. Poetry has found its highest impulses in the Bible. In this field there is much bad rhyming to be met with, and literary recreations like the turning of the Gospels into Homeric and Virgilian centos are common (4th and 5th cent.). There are also the rhymed Bibles of the Middle Ages, and in the later period, influenced by humanism, we find the Christiades and Christeïs. But there are also masterpieces to be included here—the old Anglo-Saxon poetry, the *Heliand*, Milton's *Paradise Lost*, and Klopstock's *Messias*. This is to take no account of the inspiration, the images, and the expressions for which the greatest poets, Walther von der Vogelweide, Dante, Shakespeare, and Goethe, are indebted to the Bible. As a rule, Biblical poetry is epic, but occasionally, and especially in imitations of the Psalms, it is lyrical. The small dramatic element is specially interesting. Not the clumsy Byzantine Χριστὸς πάσχων (about 1100), which lays hands upon the verses of Euripides but despises all stage-craft and probably was never produced, not even the Biblical and legendary compositions with which the pious Hroswitha of Gandersheim († 1001) tried to suppress the comedies of Plautus among the nuns, but the ecclesiastical dramas of the end of the Middle Ages, which, with a gradually increasing and finally almost exclusive participation of the laity, brought the Bible-history to the popular eye and ear simultaneously in the most effective manner possible. Adam's fall, the stories of the patriarchs, and above all the life and bitter sufferings of Jesus, were lived over again by actors and audience, sometimes with the most emotional realism. Mediævalism was naïve enough simply to transfer the story to its own time in matters of costume and background. There was besides, however, a reciprocal action between the ecclesiastical drama and the reports which pilgrims brought about the holy places of Jerusalem.* Here, too, there was an admixture of the Apocryphal element. A complete play (four days) begins with the creation and goes on to the judgment day, following the Church practice rather than the Bible. Only a single instance, the Oberammergau Passion Play, has survived, in a greatly altered form, to our own time. Humanism and the Reformation opposed those plays equally, though from different motives, and when modern dramatic art makes an attempt to bring Biblical material upon the boards, cultivated Christian taste rightly feels it to be a profanation.

Protestantism possesses something which the more ancient period entirely lacked—the Biblical musical composition. The 'Bible sonatas' of Joh. Kuhnau († 1722) may be considered trifling, but the oratorios of Heinr. Schütz († 1672), J. Seb. Bach († 1750), and G. Fr. Händel († 1759) have attained to the most perfect artistic rendering of Biblical material. A distinction is marked by the fact that while a Palestrina felt his task to be the creation of Masses and Requiems, they devoted their attention to Cantatas (Psalms) and Oratorios. And if the Catholics Joseph Haydn († 1809) and H. von Herzogenberg († 1900) joined them, they did it under Protestant influence. When a Passion by Bach, with its moving arias between the recitatives, is compared with the mediæval Passion Play, the same difference meets us which we found in our comparison of the two coloured Bibles (see above, p. 607). In the one

* E. von Dobschütz, *Christusbilder*, 253 ff., 334*.

case, what we find is the objective presentation of history, in the other, the adoption of a subjective relation to it.

LITERATURE.—E. Hennecke, *Altchristl. Malerei und altkirchl. Lit.* 1896; L. von Sybel, *Die christl. Antike*, i. 1906; F. X. Krauss, *Gesch. der christl. Kunst*, 1896 ff.; E. Mâle, *L'Art relig. du xiiie siècle en France*, 1898; Pokrowski, *The Gospel in iconographic Monuments* (Russ.); A. Wünsche, *Schönheit der Bibel*, i. 1906, p. 330 ff.; H. Grimm, 'Raffael und das NT' in *Preuss. Jahrb.* lx. 1888; *The Gospels in Art: Life of Christ by Great Painters*, Lond. 1904; Petit de Julleville, *Les Mystères*, 1880; A. W. Ward, *Hist. of Eng. Dramatic Lit.*[2], 1899; A. Hohlfeld, 'Die Altengl. Kollektivmysterien,' *Anglia*, xi. 1889; K. Lange, *Passionspiele*, 1887; Ph. Spitta, *J. S. Bach*, 1873–80; F. Spitta, *Die Passionen von Heinr. Schütz*, 1886, and *Händel und Bach*, 1885; A. W. Pollard, *Eng. Miracle Plays*, 1904.

5. **Bible and hostile influences.**—The picture would be incomplete were we not to mention, along with the operations of the Bible, the counteractions which proceed from an impious spirit. We are not thinking here of the attacks upon the Bible by the heathen State under Diocletian (see above, VI. 1) or by the ecclesiastical and political hierarchy of the Middle Ages (see VI. 3), but of the opposition to the Bible which characterizes modern 'Enlightenment,' materialism, and socialism. The clever ridicule of a Voltaire, the absurd attacks of a Haeckel, and the vulgar insults of social-democratic literature, it must be said, are not really directed against the Bible as such, but against a false doctrine of the Bible. What has Balaam's ass that spake, or Joshua's sun that stood still—to mention two things most widely assailed—to do with the Sermon on the Mount or the great hymn on love (1 Co 13)? They show that the Bible is not inspired in the old mechanical sense, but that is not maintained any longer by any competent judges. They will not cause any pious reader who heeds God's voice to have any doubt in regard to the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum*, which he is always tracing. For the unfortunate antithesis between the Bible and Science, ecclesiastical theology is itself most to blame, for it made the Bible something that it was never meant to be

The chief enemy of the Bible is ignorance of it. Doubts and suspicions do not arise from Bible-reading, but they are communicated from outside to those who are not acquainted with the Bible. Of the whole book these people know only those passages which are attacked by the modern 'Enlightenment.' Consequently they hold it in contempt and even detest it as a hindrance to education and culture. Had they ever experienced any of the comfort and gladness which the pious reader can draw from its pages, they would be of a different opinion. The history of the Bible is an objective proof of its beneficent operation.

LITERATURE.—H. Köhler, *Socialist. Irrlehren von der Entstehung des Christentums*, 1899; H. Meinhof, *Bibl. Schutz- und Trutzbüchlein*, 1895.

In order to rob the Bible of its value, it has been pointed out that other religions make the same claim for their sacred books. That is true only to a limited extent. But the Bible does not need to dispute its position with the book of any other religion. 'This portion of universal literature is the most influential book that ever existed,' says Jülicher (*Introd.* p. 2); and Harnack (*Reden und Aufsätze*, ii. 168) speaks as follows: 'It is enough to reflect upon the Bible as the book of the ancient world, the book of the Middle Ages, and—though not perhaps in the market-place—the book of modern times. Where does Homer stand compared with the Bible? Where the Vedas or the Qur'ān? The Bible is inexhaustible. Each succeeding period has revealed some new aspect of it. The Doctor of Divinity is rightly called Doctor of the Sacred Scriptures. It is upon and round the Bible that all the studies of the theological faculties ultimately concentrate and group themselves. Whenever a single individual—layman or theologian—has been enabled to draw fresh and full out of the Bible and present to others what he has thus obtained, the inward life of Christendom has been raised to a higher level.'

E. VON DOBSCHÜTZ.

BIBLE CHRISTIANS.—See METHODISM.

BIBLIOLATRY.—This term usually means the excessive veneration of a book regarded as being Divinely inspired. The phenomenon is a religious one, and is found in the faiths known as 'book-religions.' It is to be noted, however, that our view of the merits of any given book-religion or sacred book will deeply affect our judgment as to the presence or absence of bibliolatry in that particular case. One who rejects the infallible authority of a certain book will see bibliolatry where another sees no more than a legitimate reverence. Hence, if we would accurately define the term, we must lay down the limits of its exact usage, seeking to determine not merely the qualities that give it a relative and variable applicability, but rather its essential characteristics. For this purpose a preliminary historical survey will be of service; after which we shall seek a more precise definition, and then proceed to a discussion of the causes and consequences of the phenomenon.

1. **Historical survey.**—Nearly all the higher religions are book-religions, *i.e.* their teaching is deposited in a sacred book, which ranks as a Divine revelation. These religions usually have a *clerus*, who regards himself as the official interpreter of the book, and bases his authority upon it, and whose concern it therefore is to have the book recognized as of Divine character. So true is this, indeed, that even where the book is of set purpose given to the people for their private instruction and edification, the *clerus* still remains its accredited interpreter. This is precisely what we might expect, since the homage paid to the book rests upon the authority of the community and of their representative, the *clerus*. This authority, however, commonly involves a perfectly definite doctrine as to the sacred volume—a doctrine which sets forth its unique position in the most express form. In fine, the *clerus* supports the authority of the book, and the book that of the *clerus*; and there are few exceptions to this general rule.

We must, however, bear in mind that no such sacred book is ever a complete whole from the outset, and that the several parts which go to the formation of the Canon are never appraised as absolutely Divine from the first. The truth is, indeed, that the deification of the work is always a later process, as will be shown by the following examples:—

(*a*) The *Vedas* (which, be it remembered, were not committed to writing till long after they had been collected, but were handed down orally from one generation to another by precise and highly elaborate methods) were not regarded by their writers as they are now regarded by the Brāhmans. The Vedic poets compare their work to that of the weaver or the carpenter. Their hymns are 'shapen in the heart, brought forth by the mouth,' or they are inspired by the Soma-cup. But at a later period they are looked upon as of Divine origin; the gods themselves are the authors. The poems are collected, and form a sacred code, declared to be infallible. Their authority, in the period of the Sūtras, is pitted against all gainsaying. Only the systems which recognize their authority are reckoned orthodox. The infallibility, the divinity, the eternity of the Vedas become dogmas. 'The immortal Veda embraces all created things'; so speaks the Law-book of Manu. The Brāhmans base their own authority upon the eternal Veda, and such support can be dispensed with only by those who, in virtue of a direct intuition, have become one with Brahma. This development is all the more striking in view of the fact that Brāhmanism looks upon no historical personality as its founder, around whom or whose apostles a sacred literature might have gathered.

(*b*) In *Buddhism* also there has grown up a sacred literature, though Buddha himself left behind him no legacy of written words. The sayings of Buddha, however, have been garnered in one division of the Tripiṭaka, though, of course, the authenticity of these cannot be vouched for in detail. But reverence

for a sacred book holds no such place in Buddhism as it does in Brāhmanism. In point of fact, it is admitted that Buddha did not reveal everything to his disciples: the Mahāyāna doctrine is said to have been taken from the breasts of the serpents which listened to his discourses; while, again, verses flash upon the minds of his disciples, notably Vangisa, by inner illumination. Hence it is maintained that that alone which is at one with reason can be the teaching of Buddha. Did Buddha himself not say that he had turned the wheel of doctrine in various ways, now rightly and now wrongly? Buddhism, in fact, lays too much stress on individual knowledge to be susceptible of a genuine bibliolatry; every man must for himself tread the path which Buddha trod. But the reverence subsequently accorded to Buddha as a deity doubtless opened the way to a species of bibliolatry, particularly when his followers became bent upon tracing back to him every detail of ordinance and doctrine; and the fact that the sacred writings of Buddhism became a nucleus for the accretion of endless commentaries shows again the importance of these writings for *clerus* and community alike.

(*c*) In *Parsiism* the law of Zarathushtra plays a great rôle. This religion, being of a more pragmatic type than the foregoing, bears a markedly authoritative character. He who would champion the cause of Ahura Mazda must stringently keep the law of Zarathushtra. This quite accords with the fact that the sacred word is regarded as the soul of the holy spirit, the holy *fravashi* of Ahura Mazda; that this word expresses itself in sacred formulas; that, in particular, such a formula is found in the *Ahuna-Vairya*, a prayer corresponding to the Buddhist's *Om mani padme om;* that generally the ceremonies are considered as of the utmost importance; and, above all, that the sacred book, the Avesta, is still acknowledged as a Divine revelation, even by the reforming party in Parsiism, though its language is now scarcely understood. The guardians of the tradition and of the authority of the revealed word are the priests, while the dogma of the Divine character of the sacred writings vested with authority the Atharvans, or priests of the later Avesta, as being the interpreters thereof.

(*d, e*) The two great Semitic religions, Judaism and Muhammadanism, have developed a bibliolatry in keeping with their authoritative character. The prophets of *Judaism* regarded their utterances as Divine oracles—a view which, however, did not exclude a certain elaboration of what they had experienced in the ecstatic state. The various writings show extensive traces of redaction. The Canon was of gradual formation. A beginning was made by the people pledging themselves upon oath to the acceptance of Deuteronomy; a further step was the obligation to observe the Torah of Ezra. The lower limit for the production of canonical books was the period of Ezra, although the collection of these works was made in three stages, viz. first, the Torah, in Ezra's own day; then the Prophets, about the middle of the 3rd cent. B.C.; finally, the Hagiographa, the strictures upon which, however, had not been silenced even at the beginning of the Christian era. At length, after the doubts regarding certain antilegomena had been set at rest by the Synod of Jamnia (A.D. 90) and Rabbi 'Akiba, all the books of the Canon were recognized by the Mishna (*c.* 200 A.D.). The traditional Heb. text is the Massoretic, as it existed in the reign of Hadrian, and its vocalization represents the pronunciation current at that time, while the actual vowel signs date from cents. 7–9 A.D. The Alexandrian version of the LXX had come by the time of Christ to enjoy such a repute that the OT quotations in the NT, as well as in Josephus and Philo, are taken from it. After the destruction of Jerusalem, however, the Jews in their growing exclusiveness began to rank the LXX as no better than Aaron's golden calf, mainly because the Church appealed to it in controversies with the Synagogue. In fact, the Jewish Canon of 'Akiba stood in such favour that arguments were founded upon its letters, and the minutiæ of its text were reckoned all-important. This reverence for the text was on all-fours with the theory of inspiration of which Philo is the most outstanding representative, viz., that the OT scriptures are the immediate product of the Spirit of God. Readers will not need to be reminded that in the Christian Church, particularly in Protestant orthodoxy, the Massoretic text, embracing even the vocalization, was regarded as plenarily inspired. Nevertheless, a corrective was furnished by Philo himself in his use of the allegorical method of interpretation, by means of which he could make a patchwork of Greek and Jewish materials without the risk of infringing the Canon—a practice which also found its way into the Church (St. Paul, Origen), while, again, Protestant orthodoxy controlled its exegesis by its Confessions. The first, within the pale of Judaism, to impugn this bibliolatry was Spinoza, in his *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, but it was of course impossible that such a theory of inspiration, extending even to the OT, could be permanently maintained by Protestantism.

In *Muhammadanism* we find an analogous reverence for the Qur'ān. Again, however, this does not represent the original state of things. Muhammad, of course, as a prophet, claimed to have received revelations, which he dictated, and even subjected to later revision. But he set no great store by the form of the revelations, altering it as he thought fit, and holding that the substance should live in men's hearts. Various scattered memoranda were extant at his death. Obbai had begun to gather the fragments together during the prophet's lifetime; Zaid subsequently arranged his literary remains in a corpus which became the basis of the definitive collection made under Othman. Under Abd al-Malik the text was fixed by means of vowel signs. By this time Muhammad's widow, 'A'isha, had announced that the prophet himself, with the assistance of the archangel Gabriel, had collated the Qur'ān with the original text in heaven. The doctrinal theory regarding the book was also a gradual growth. Under the Sasanians it became a civic dogma that the Qur'ān was a thing of time, neither supreme nor final. In opposition to the Mu'tazilites, however, the Mutakallim brought the doctrine of the non-created character of the Qur'ān to the front; while Ash'arī adopted a characteristic mediating position, holding that the heavenly original was from eternity, but distinguishing from it the earthly exemplar as the work of human hands. The Arabian philosophers Avicenna and Averroës differentiate also between the religion of the people and that of the scholar, asserting that it is the task of philosophy to furnish proofs for the faith which speaks in popular metaphor, and that a distinction must be drawn between the external word, which is for the masses, and the inner interpretation, which is for learned men. The doctrine of the Mutakallim eventually prevailed, and the Qur'ān was accepted as Divinely inspired, even to letter and sound, with punctuation and vocalization to boot. One sect of Muhammadans makes tradition co-ordinate with the Qur'ān. Muhammad had explained that in matters regarding which he had given no instructions men must act according to their own judgment. But after his death the need for an authority became clamant, precepts being desired for every detail of life. Accordingly there grew up the *Sunna*, or Tradition, which is said to have embraced the biography and utterances of the prophet. It was compiled by Abu Hurayra, but was received by only one sect, the Sunnis. In any case, it is certain that there arose such a reverence for the written word, the Qur'ān, as extinguished all liberty of thought.

(*f*) Finally, bibliolatry also appears at certain stages in the development of *Christianity*. At first Christianity had no Canon of its own, but simply appropriated that of the OT, which, however, it set in a new light. There sprang up, however, a distinctively Christian literature, which presently came to be used in worship. The story of Jesus, the Gospels, and the lessons read at the Church services formed the beginnings of the Canon. The selection of approved writings, which did not exist before the middle of the 2nd cent., is traditionally said to have been made at the *sedes apostolicæ*. The criterion was that the writings should be of Apostolic authorship, and conform to the Rule of Faith. The common substratum was the Rule of Faith itself, which grew around the Baptismal Formula, and at length appeared as the Apostolicum. How vague as yet were the limits of the Canon, appears from the fact that both Origen and Eusebius still speak of Antilegomena (Rev., James, Jude, 1 Peter, 2 Peter, 2 Jn., 3 Jn.) and accept the *Shepherd* of Hermas. Only at the Council of Laodicea (A.D. 360) was it decreed that none but canonical writings should be read in churches; and Augustine, at the Councils of Carthage (A.D. 393 and 397), was the first to determine the Canon for the Western Church, taking in the OT Apocrypha and Rev., while for the Eastern Church the Canon was fixed by the Trullan Council of A.D. 692, the *Apostolic Canons* being still attached to the NT. It is thus evident that the Canon is a group of writings which was ratified by the Church, and which, moreover, still required to be expounded by tradition, even as tradition had been a factor in the process of compilation. It was the Church that invested the Canon with authority, since it was the Church that laid down the conditions of canonicity. Though inspiration and sufficiency were ascribed to the Scriptures, thus giving them pre-eminence over all other literature, as containing a Divine revelation, yet they were read with the Church's eyes, and the doctrine held regarding them was an ecclesiastical doctrine, a dogma of the Church. Whoever appealed to the authority of Holy Writ, and at the same time took a course of his own, had to avail himself of the allegorical method of interpretation and the theory of the 'manifold sense' of Scripture. But, such courses notwithstanding, the fact remains that, when controversy arose, the word was interpreted on traditional lines, i.e. according to the *regula fidei* and the decisions of the Councils, which were now becoming recognized as infallible—a belief necessarily engendered by the sense of incompatibility between a fixed interpretation and the doctrine of the 'manifold sense.' In reality an infallible Scripture without an infallible interpretation would have been destitute of value. Only with the rise of the Churches of the *Reformation*, however, was the doctrine of Scriptural authority pushed to its final consequences, as the Reformers, following the example of outstanding personalities who lived at the close of the Middle Ages (Wyclif, Hus), and in view of the frequent errors of the Church tradition, and of the fallibility of the Church and its representatives, believed it possible to fall back upon the authority of Scripture alone. In this course they really proceeded upon their personal experience of faith; as we know, Luther himself criticized the Canon with faith as his criterion. But the Lutheran orthodoxy recognized the Canon as something given, and appealed to Scripture as the sole *norma et judex* in all matters of belief, thus surrendering the independent testimony of a living faith and the certitude which springs therefrom. Scripture must now be the basis of religion; man must now find God in it, since the theory of direct intercourse with God has been repudiated. Scripture has become the depository of the Holy Spirit; the *vis intrinseca et efficacia verbi* is the *ultima ratio* of our belief. Whereas, on the Roman Catholic view, the Church, as being in possession of the Holy Spirit, was the trustee of infallibility, in the Reformed Churches, this prerogative is accorded to Scripture. The written word is no less than God incarnate. It is *aliquid Dei; formaliter consideratum*, its place is not among created things at all; so Hollaz: '*male creaturis accensetur.*' Thus there grew around Scripture a group of attributes designed to signify that it was its own guarantee, e.g., *sufficientia, perspicuitas, facultas semet ipsam interpretandi, efficacia.* It is the sole arbiter

in matters of faith. Philo's doctrine of inspiration is thus again to the front. Inspiration was held to be verbal. The authors of Scripture were simply the pens (*calami*) of the Holy Spirit. It implied great naïveness to suppose that Scripture was self-interpreting, whereas, as a matter of fact, in this instance too it was interpreted in the sense of the Confessions.

The theory of the 'manifold sense' had now been abandoned, and the demand was all for grammatico-historical interpretation. But it is obvious that an absolutely infallible Scripture could be of no service without an infallible interpreter, which, according to the theory, should have been found in Scripture itself, but which was in fact sought in dogma. This view still survives, though only in less important communities. Those who desire to possess the Divine in a finite form, immediately present to the senses, who in their religion waive all claim to self-reliance, *i.e.* to personal experience of the indwelling Deity, will always hold with a community that proffers guarantees of salvation, in virtue either of its alleged possession of the Holy Spirit, or of its actual possession of objects which embody the Divine, such as the Host or a sacred book. When the early Protestant dogmatists took their stand upon Scripture alone, they forgot that the corpus of Scripture, the Canon, was a product of the Church, and that only an infallible interpretation of the Canon could make the infallible book infallibly intelligible. As a matter of fact, the logical outcome of the situation was the institution of a *ministerium verbi divini*, an office of the means of grace, the function of which was the proper exposition of the word—the work of the *clerus*.

The Reformed Church also maintained the view of verbal inspiration, but its pre-eminent and distinguishing feature was its doctrine of predestination. Hence the Scripture was for this Church but the infallible document from which men could ascertain the will of God, and in which the will of God was enshrined in all its purity. In this case it is the need of an authority which makes an infallible word necessary. But as the means of grace was not put in place of God, or, more generally, as the distinction between creature and Creator was still upheld, the Scripture was not deified. The Reformed Church was satisfied to see in Scripture the absolutely inerrant revelation of the Divine will, as something to be personally appropriated; but it likewise recognized that Scripture gave no information regarding the election of any particular person. Men must win the conviction of their own election from other sources; such certainty was in fact given by the Holy Spirit. But the claim for the unconditional recognition of Scripture as the expression of the Divine will was still held to be valid. The word is, so to speak, the Divine will *in persona*, in which man must acquiesce. Again, indeed, we see that the absolute infallibility and plenary inspiration of Scripture consort but ill with the principle of inner certainty. If such certainty be a fact, infallibility is superfluous. But if infallibility be necessary, then salvation is unconditionally dependent upon Scripture as the depository of the Divine will, and inner certainty is a chimera. Besides, that the community fixes the Canon is corroborated by the fact that the Reformed Confessions expressly enumerate the several books contained therein; and that scholars interpret in the sense of these Confessions is beyond the need of proof.

Bibliolatry, then, as the foregoing survey shows, is found in book-religions generally. Its essential character consists in the belief that a group of sacred writings is the plenary depository of the Divine Spirit, and that, as such, it is of eternal duration and of superhuman origin; that it transcends all created things, or that, at all events, it possesses the quality of absolute infallibility, being, in fact, the perfect channel of Divine revelation. In the eyes of those who so estimate it, such a book proscribes all criticism, and ranks as the one all-sufficient standard of appeal in questions of belief. We are thus dealing with a conception which is to be defined not quantitatively but qualitatively, *i.e.* which marks out the particular sacred book as possessing qualities absent from all other literature, namely, exclusively Divine authorship, absolute infallibility, immunity from all natural influences in its origin; and hence also its recognition as of unconditional authority, and its supremacy in comparison with all individual judgment. Absolute submission to this sacred book is the obligation of the bibliolater. Outside it there exists no final tribunal in matters of faith. It is all-sufficient, and shares in the sovereign prerogative of God.

2. Causes of bibliolatry.—We would first of all observe that bibliolatry never exists where religion has the character of spontaneity, or where the religious consciousness finds free and natural utterance. But whenever religion loses this spontaneous enthusiastic character, when the Deity is no longer supposed to manifest Himself directly, then, in place of such immediate intercourse with the Divine, there comes into operation the mediating function of the community and of its recognized sacred book. Men begin to feel the need of a guarantee of salvation, of a sacred authority, and this they find in Scripture only when they regard themselves as being, so to speak, yet in their nonage, *i.e.* at that stage of consciousness when man assumes his entire incapacity of making judgments regarding the Divine, and when the individual makes full surrender of his private judgment. The necessary condition for the acceptance of any new revelation is that it must move the souls of men. But it is only after a society has been constituted upon the basis of an accepted revelation that means are employed, in the succeeding generations, to preserve the original message. Accordingly the message is committed to writing, and in its written form is looked upon as the authentic source of the revelation. Now, the less capable people are of personally experiencing the truths thus won, the more eager are they to find guarantees thereof, and such they believe to exist in the inspiration and Divine character of the written word, and not in the actual message, which they could of course verify for themselves. In fact, even when the sacred writings contain such a maxim as 'Prove all things: hold fast that which is good' (1 Th 5^{21}), men still prefer not to 'prove,' but rather to give a blind adherence to the authority of the Divine book. But now, such a course can be justified only upon the assumption that this book is free from all human elements, and thus arises the theory of unconditional inspiration and the act of deification. Wherever we find men holding to a revelation in external and perfect form, we find also the need of infallibly preserving the revelation to all time, *i.e* of a Scripture whose inspiration is absolute, pure, and Divine.

The origin of bibliolatry is therefore in part subjective; it presupposes the complete religious nonage of man, and his need of an absolute authority, as also his lack of such genuine religious emotion as might furnish a personal experience of the Deity. But bibliolatry has likewise an objective source, viz. the belief in an external revelation supposed to be infallibly and unchangeably embodied in Holy Writ.

This explanation, however, does not cover the whole case. Since the seal of sacredness is stamped upon the Scripture not by the individual but by the community, bibliolatry in the event leads the former to recognize his dependence upon the latter; and when the individual assumes his entire incompetence in religious things, he will pin his faith, not to his own understanding, but to that of the expert, *i.e.* the *clerus*. Thus bibliolatry brings us back to the infallibility of the Church, upon which it originally rests, since it is the Church that determines the Canon. Such has been the process in the religions of India as in Muhammadanism, in Judaism as in Christianity. And if the same cannot be said of all, as, *e.g.*, Protestantism, which puts the Bible freely into the people's hands, the exception is but apparent, particularly in professedly orthodox circles, since, for one thing, the sacred book owes its prestige to the Church, which brought its contents together; and for another, the laity are dependent upon the translator; while, finally, orthodoxy holds to the necessity of a *ministerium verbi divini*, an office of the means of grace, by which Scripture shall be interpreted in the sense of the Confessions. The moment, however, that the Bible-worshipping laity casts about for an interpretation of its own, bibliolatry begins to wane, and is seen to be a mere transition stage; the unmethodical exegesis of non-experts reveals

such diversity as convinces even the unprejudiced observer that these interpreters are the victims of a subjectivity which but ill accords with their assumption of the purely Divine nature of Scripture. It thus becomes obvious that bibliolatry either issues in the recognition of an infallible Church, which delimits and interprets the Canon, or, in other words, in the supremacy of the *clerus*, of whose authority the Scripture provides the grand support; or else it disintegrates itself by subjective exegesis, thus losing whatever significance it may have had—a result ever the more certain the more religion is required to meet the needs of the age.

Not only, however, is bibliolatry indicative of a lower stage of the religious consciousness, and in itself untenable, but the very conception of revelation which underlies it is unsound. Were the Deity revealed in a manner which excludes the co-operation of the soul, such revelation would of course be purely objective, free from every human element, especially in the case of its authoritative document being unconditionally inspired. But in religion the chief thing is ever the intercourse of man with God, and a revelation that is truly such must always be some delineation of this intercourse. The conception of the individual soul as entirely outside the current of revelation, leading, as it does, to a belief in verbal inspiration and to bibliolatry, is radically unethical.

3. Consequences of bibliolatry. — The consequence of bibliolatry is that the people upon whom it is laid as an obligation become bound hand and foot to a fixed point of view—a result specially disastrous when the sacred book not only prescribes religious or ceremonial ordinances, but also enacts laws for social and political affairs. Muhammadanism wrecks itself upon the Qur'ān. The Christianity which is tied to a stereotyped interpretation of a supposed infallible book becomes ossified; and the same may be said of a Christianity which would make the Bible the standard for life as a whole, or which in particular cases uses random passages as oracles, thus assuming the individual's incapacity for moral freedom. The existence of innumerable commentaries to the sacred books of all religions is at least partly explained by the desire to find an interpretation which shall be of service to the contemporary generation, or to harmonize the writings with some private point of view. Men have often tried the experiment of combining their recognition of the absolute authority of Scripture with the germs of spiritual freedom; by the device of virtually emancipating themselves from the burden of the book, while preserving their nominal adherence to it by exegetic methods, they have striven to satisfy the demands of progress. Such methods, of course, do scant justice to the requirements of historical veracity. Then the ossification resulting from bibliolatry is sometimes kept in abeyance by dint of associating tradition, especially a *traditio constitutiva*, with Scripture. But in truth both interpretation and tradition are mere palliatives. Only on condition that religion be a living fact, and that the personal element therein be given its full due, and not suppressed, is the escape from bibliolatry sure. For then the venerable documents become but incitations to the personal experience of religion, and are by no means to be accepted without examination. It is impossible that a genuine piety should curb the spontaneity of the individual soul; it should rather animate the same in its various manifestations. Accordingly it is the privilege of the individual to assimilate whatever in the sacred volume answers to his own experience, and at the same time to subject the documents themselves to continuous process of criticism, in order to separate between what is merely temporary therein and their permanent eternal truth.

LITERATURE.—Ladd, *Doctrine of Sacred Scripture* (1883), i. 283 f., 340, 413 f., 486 f., 575 f., 720 f.; ii. 462 f.; Mead, *Supernatural Revelation* (1889), chs. ix.-xi.; Sanday, *The Oracles of God*[3] (1891); M. Dods, *The Bible: Its Origin and Nature* (1905); Schleiermacher, *Glaubenslehre*, §§ 127–129, 27; Lipsius, *Lehrb. der ev.-prot. Dogmatik* (1876), §§ 179–204, 793–804 (3rd ed. 1893, §§ 196–222, 812–824); I. A. Dorner, *Syst. of Chr. Doct.* (1880–96) §§ 7, 7b, 58, 59, 135; A. Dorner, *Grundr. der Dogmengesch.* (1899), 467 f. (with leading passages from orthodox Lutherans), 494 f.; Turretin, *Inst. theol. elenticae* (1734), 69 f.; Wolleb, *Compend. theol.* (1638) 2–7; Heidegger, *Medulla Theologiæ Christ.* (1713) 15, 21 f.; Rhossis, Σύστημα δογματικῆς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου καθολικῆς ἐκκλησίας, i. (1903) 466 f.; *Canones et Decreta Conc. Trident.*, ed. Richter, Sess. iv., v. (Decretum de Reformatione); 'Decreta Dogmat. Conc. Vat.,' ch. ii., in Schaff's *Bibliotheca symbolica ecclesiae universalis* (1877), ii. 240 f.; Sprenger, *Leben Muhameds* (1868-69), ii. 451 f., iii. 18 f.; Dillmann, *Verfall des Islam* (1876); Nöldeke, *Gesch. d. Qorâns* (1860); Max Müller, *Origin and Growth of Religion* (1878); *SBE* xxv. 'Laws of Manu,' 12, 94 f.; Tiele, *Gesch. der Rel. im Altertum* (1896), ii. 18 f., 28, 311–319; Cornill, *Einleit. in das AT* (1891), 277 f., 289 f., 296 f.; A. Dorner, *Grundriss der Religionsphilosophie* (1903), 327 f.

A. DORNER.

BIGOTRY.—A term of disputed etymology, denoting the moral characteristic which combines strong will with narrow intelligence in its direction. It appears sometimes in that lack of moral perspective which distinguishes the stickler for trifles, exalting trivial and variable forms into equal rank with the immutable principles of moral and religious life. Sometimes a strong will may grasp tenaciously even a doctrine or line of conduct that is wrong, and then we may have the cruel intolerance of an inquisitor or of the leaders in the Reign of Terror during the French Revolution. When a strong will is supported by religious enthusiasm, bigotry is well described as 'a zeal for God, but not according to knowledge' (Ro 10^2).

J. CLARK MURRAY.

BIJĀPUR (Skr. *vijayapura*, 'city of victory'). —The capital of the District of the same name in the Bombay Presidency, lat. 16° 49′ 45″ N.; long. 75° 46′ 5″ E. The present city was founded on an ancient site which was already the site of Hindu and Jaina worship. It became the seat of the famous Adil Shāhi dynasty, the existence of which terminated on its capture by Aurangzīb in A.D. 1686. In recent years the British Government has taken steps to conserve the splendid series of buildings which were erected by this Musalmān dynasty. Among those of a religious character may be noticed the Jāmi' Masjid, or Cathedral Mosque, commenced by 'Alī Adil Shāh (A.D. 1557–1579), but never completely finished, which Fergusson calls 'one of the finest mosques in India.' Equally remarkable are the splendid tombs of 'Alī Adil Shāh, and his successors, Ibrahīm and Maḥmūd, the last remarkable for its wonderful dome, supported by a method much less clumsy than that employed in the Pantheon and in most of the domes of Europe.

LITERATURE.—Meadows Taylor and Fergusson, *Architecture at Bijapur* (1866); Fergusson, *History of Indian and Eastern Architecture* (1876), 558 ff.; *Bombay Gazetteer*, xxiii. 601 ff. For the old Hindu and Jaina remains, *IA* vii. 121 ff.

W. CROOKE.

BINDING AND LOOSING.—In Mt 16^{19} and 18^{18} Christ bestows the power of binding and loosing upon St. Peter and all the Apostles respectively, with the promise that what they bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and what they loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven. For a right understanding of the nature of the power involved in this gift, it is necessary to consider what must have been the meaning conveyed to the minds of the Apostles, typical Jews of their time, by these words of Jesus. First, we notice that the power to bind and loose is granted in connexion with *things*, not with persons, which concurs with the common use of the terms in the Talmuds. In them the phrases are applied to such questions as the sending of letters by the

hands of a Gentile on the eve of the Sabbath (Jerus. *Shabb.* fol. 4. 1), the beginning of voyages, or the gathering of wood (Jerus. *Jom. Tobh.* fol. 61. 1). They are used, in doctrinal and judicial matters, of things allowed or not allowed in the Law; in particular, there is the recurrent formula, 'The House of Shammai binds . . . the House of Hillel looses.' Interpreting the former passage in Mt. by the normal usage of the time, we shall conclude that our Lord declared St. Peter to be a competent Rabbi, whose decisions in the matter of conduct (*halakha*) would be ratified by the Heavenly Tribunal. In the exercise of his authority, he would forbid (bind) certain things, and permit (loose) others. In view of the close connexion in Mt 16[18, 19] between the keys and the power of binding and loosing, we may note that the power of the keys (*q.v.*), equally with that of binding and loosing, belonged to the office of scribe or teacher; the scribe, when admitted to office, received 'the key of knowledge' (Lk 11[52]). Thus St. Peter was qualified to be a scribe fully instructed unto the Kingdom of Heaven, endowed with legislative power concerning things, not judicial power concerning persons. In Mt 18[18] the sense of 'bind' and 'loose' has developed in view of the context, and its positive content has become greater: the power to exclude from the society in view of a stubbornly maintained refusal to rectify an offence is involved; vv.[19, 20] as well as vv.[15-17] show that the new society is regarded as possessing powers of self-government from God, and that its decisions will be ratified by God.

Mt 16[19] and 18[18] cannot legitimately be connected with Jn 20[23] ('whose soever sins ye forgive, they are forgiven unto them; whose soever sins ye retain, they are retained'), though, as we shall see, the identification began very soon and became normal. δέειν corresponds to Heb. אָסַר and Aram. אסר; λύειν to Heb. הִתִּיר and Aram. שְׁרָא. The most that we can say is that in Mt 18[18] the context seems to show that the power of binding and loosing implies, among other things, the power of treating sin as pardonable or the reverse, with reference to admission into, or exclusion from, the community. And this conception can be obtained only from the context; it must not be read into the words, for whereas such a phrase as λύειν ἁμαρτίας might be allowed, the corresponding δέειν ἁμαρτίας would be impossible. Dalman (*Words of Jesus*, 216) partially supports the Patristic connexion of Mt 16[19] and 18[18] with Jn 20[23]. He thinks it doubtful whether Matthew understood Jesus as merely bestowing on His disciples power to give authoritative decisions in matters of conduct, and points to the exclusion from the community, which, admittedly, is involved in the context of Mt 18[18]. Therefore, with the inclusion of the conception of St. Peter as the steward of God's house on earth, who possesses the keys, and has power to open or shut, he allows that the sense of Jn 20[23] is latent in the passages of Mt., since 'exclusion from the community on account of some offence includes the "retaining" of the sins; the re-admission of the sinner includes the "remission" of his sins.' Yet, while the natural connexion in thought between the passages in Mt. and Jn. is not to be denied, we ought not to interpret the Matthæan passages by the later passage in Jn.; nor can we say that the gift of the power to open and shut, to bind and loose, was only promised in Mt 16[18, 19], and not actually conferred till Jn 20[23]—a position adopted in *The Pulpit Commentary*.

The power to remit and to retain sins is not without analogy with the power to bind and loose; but it was a distinct and additional power. The interpretation of 'bind' and 'loose' in accordance with the practice of the Rabbinic schools is the natural and obvious one. Neither Lange's objection, in his commentary on St. Matthew's Gospel, that Christ would not have spoken merely after the Rabbinic pattern, nor Dalman's inference that Mt. can hardly have understood Christ in that sense, since δέειν and λύειν do not in his Greek mean 'forbid' and 'permit,' is really a serious objection to this view. Lange does not give adequate weight to the fact that our Lord and His disciples must be interpreted as far as possible in accordance with the Jewish usages of the time, while Dalman's objection loses its force when we remember that the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus, if they can be obtained, are of more importance for the interpreter than the Greek translation given in Mt. It is agreed that the Aramaic words used by Jesus were the same as those so constantly found in the Talmuds in the sense indicated above. Moreover, there is no need to suppose that Mt. found in the passage some force other than 'forbid,' 'permit'; he used δέειν and λύειν as being the nearest Greek equivalents in literal meaning to אסר and שְׁרָא.

We may regard as instances of loosing and binding in the Apostolic Church, the action of St. Peter in having intercourse with Gentiles (Ac 10), and the letter of the Church of Jerusalem with reference to abstention from things offered to idols, blood, and fornication (15[29]). The same assembly refused to bind distinctively Jewish customs upon Gentile Christians. St. Paul's action with regard to the incestuous person (1 Co 5), which was ratified by the community, and led to the excommunication of the offender, at least for a time, may also, in view of Mt 18[15-18], be regarded as a case of binding.

An account of the various ways in which discipline has been exercised in the Christian Church, based largely on the two passages in Mt., would hardly be in place in the present article; but it is possible to gather from the Fathers considerable information as to the influence of these texts, and the manner in which they were utilized in the interests of disciplinary authority. In the *Clementine Homilies, ad Jac.* ii., St. Peter is represented as communicating to Clement the power of binding and loosing, 'so that with respect to everything which he shall ordain in the earth, it shall be decreed in the heavens. For he shall bind what ought to be bound, and loose what ought to be loosed, as knowing the rule of the Church.' The natural, Rabbinic meaning of the words is clearly kept here, though the sentences which immediately follow seem to point to a power extended over persons as well as things. Tertullian deals with the question in *de Pudicitia*, xxi. His strictness in his Montanist days led him to combat the notion of discipline and forgiveness generally prevalent in the Church. In the chapter referred to he distinguishes between the doctrine of the Apostles and their power, and argues that, even if they had forgiven any sin committed against God, the prerogative to pardon which, in accordance with Mk 2[7], belonged to God alone, they did so in the exercise of power, not of discipline; such power was akin to their power of performing miracles, both of healing and destruction. Tertullian demands an equal display of power before he will recognize in the Catholic clergy the power to remit sin; since the mere fact that the functions of discipline had been entrusted to them carried with it no such capacity. As to the argument that, in view of Mt 16[18] (it is interesting to note that he does not deal with Jn 20[23]), the Church has the power to bind and loose, Tertullian answers that this gift was conferred personally upon St. Peter, who made use of it by bringing men to Christian baptism, and so into the Kingdom, 'in which are loosed the sins beforetime bound, and those which have not been loosed are bound in accordance with true salvation.' The same power was exhibited in the death of Ananias and the healing of the impotent man, while both operations were seen in St. Peter's speech, recorded in Ac 15, when certain parts of the law were loosed and others bound. Tertullian does not give any proper weight to the fact that the letter of the Jerusalem assembly was the work of the whole local Church, and not the mere outcome of a number of individual opinions, of which St. Peter's was the first. In any case,

if we accept Tertullian's distinction between the doctrine (*i.e.* discipline) of the Apostles and their power, it can hardly be denied that the 'binding and loosing' letter falls under the former head. But Tertullian's chief anxiety in his discussion is to show that nowhere has authority to *remit sins against God*—the only point round which controversy could rage—been granted to the Apostles, much less to the Church.

Questions with regard to binding and loosing naturally arose in connexion with the controversies in which Cyprian was involved, on the one hand with the Novatians concerning the lapsed, on the other with Stephen in the matter of the re-baptism of heretics. While he urged with ever-increasing force against the Novatians that the power of loosing from even the gravest sins existed in the Church, Cyprian maintained against Stephen that outside the Church there was no one to bind and loose, to baptize and give remission of sins (*Ep.* 73. 7, *ad Jub.*). In the same letter he shows that he completely identifies the power given to St. Peter in Mt 16 with the power given to all the Apostles in Jn 20. To 'loose' is for him the same as to 'remit sins'; and as in *Ep. ad Magnum* 11 he seems to make of 'baptizare et remissum peccatorum dare' one idea, it is likely that 'loosing' was in his mind specially connected with baptism. The same identification of Mt 16[19] with Jn 20[23] is seen in the letter of Firmilian to Cyprian (Migne, *PL* iii. 1201); he insists on the power of forgiveness having been given to the Apostles, from whom it descended to the bishops ordained by them, and so on in continual succession. We see from this how the use of the power to bind and loose was being regularized in the interests of Church order and a ministry that was becoming increasingly sacerdotal. Ambrose, as well as Cyprian, attacked the Novatian restrictions on the Church's power to loose. Novatian and his followers had denied that the Church could extend forgiveness to the lapsed or to those who had fallen into any of the graver sins. Ambrose (*de Pœn.* i. 2), relying on Jn 20[23], replied that the Church had power both to bind and to loose, and turned the attack upon the Novatians by arguing that, as they rejected the power of loosing, clearly they had not the power of binding.

Origen, in his treatment of Mt 16[19] (*Com. in Mt.*, tom. xii.) is more careful to insist on the spiritual character of the gift. According to his interpretation, St. Peter was entrusted with the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven, to open to *those who* were loosed on earth, that they might be loosed and free in heaven. While allowing that bishops also had the right to pronounce *things* bound on earth, which would then be bound in heaven, Origen insists on two qualifications for them, before they can exercise such power. (i.) They must possess that ἔργον in virtue of which it was said to St. Peter, 'Thou art Peter.' (ii.) Their character must be such that the Church can be built upon them: a bishop 'tied by ropes of his own sins' would bind and loose in vain. It is clear that Origen is maintaining the necessity for soundness of faith and life, if the bishop is to be able to bind and loose—a doctrine of the worthiness of the minister which not unnaturally alarmed the annotator of Jerome's exposition of the same passage (*PL* xxvi. 131). In another place, Origen shows the same tendency to urge spirituality rather than office as the essential thing for one seeking to forgive sins. In *de Orat.* 28 he says that, while we can all forgive sins against ourselves, he on whom Jesus has breathed as on the Apostles, and who can be recognized as made spiritual through the gift of the Holy Spirit, forgives what God would forgive, and, on the other hand, retains sins which cannot be healed. Of other Eastern teachers we may notice Chrysostom and Cyril of Alexandria. Chrysostom (*in Mt.*, Hom. liv.), while interpreting binding and loosing as the power to retain and remit sins, which belongs to God alone, in which he agrees with Tertullian, differs from the African theologian in seeing in Christ's words a specific promise to bestow this very power on St. Peter. Cyril Alex. (*Com. in Mt.* lv.), commenting on Mt 16[19], postpones the actual delivery of the power of the keys till after the Resurrection, as recorded in Jn.; on Mt 18[18] he writes that Christ gives to those who have obtained the office of teaching the power to bind and loose, which suggests a possible appreciation of the original force of the words, and their connexion with Jewish custom.

The *Apostolic Constitutions* (ii. 11) connects binding and loosing with the bishop's authority to judge offenders, and interprets Mt 18[18] as specially addressed to the bishops. The great Fathers of the West came to connect binding and loosing more and more strictly with penance and priestly absolution. Thus Augustine (*Sermo* lxvii. 2) makes 'loose' equivalent to letting go free, and makes use of the words of Jesus to Lazarus in Jn 11[44], λύσατε αὐτὸν καὶ ἄφετε αὐτὸν ὑπάγειν, to enforce his meaning. As Lazarus was awakened to life, and came forth at the word of Christ, so does the sinner spiritually revive when he penitently confesses his sins; but, as all had not been done for Lazarus till the disciples loosed him and let him go free, so the penitent needs the Church's absolution. Hilary interprets binding on earth as leaving entangled in the noose of sin, and loosing as receiving into the safety of pardon (*PL* xi. 1021). Jerome, commenting on Mt 18[18] (*Comment. in Ev. Mt.* iii. cap. 18), says that priests and bishops have no power to bind and loose of themselves, but can only decide who is pure and who is not, who is to be bound and who loosed, and compares Lv 14[2-4]; elsewhere (*in Ev. Mt.* iii. cap. 16) he says that the Church has judicial power to declare those freed whom God's grace has freed within; those bound who are not so loosed. Gregory the Great (Hom. 26 *in Evangelia*) says that the bishops have the power of binding and loosing, but that it is lost by those who use it for their own ends, and not for the advantage of their penitents. He also makes use of the raising of Lazarus to show that the Church has power to absolve those whose hearts God has touched and revived by His grace. Gregory warns against unjust binding; yet, at the same time, bids the penitent ever fear, lest, even if he be unjustly bound in connexion with the particular matter which he confesses, the binding may be merited, and therefore valid, owing to some other fault. Gregory connects the official sentence most closely with the sinner's inner feeling, which, in fact, the loosing and binding of the bishop regularizes. Rabanus (*Com. in Mt.* lib. v.), differentiating between the gift to St. Peter and the gift to all the Apostles, points out that, while the power of binding and loosing was given to all, as is clear from Jn 20[23], St. Peter had it conferred upon him in a special way, so that no one separated from the unity of faith and communion with him could be loosed, *i.e.* absolved. Paschasius Radbertus distinguishes between the power of binding and loosing given to St. Peter in Mt 16[19] and that given to all the Apostles in Mt 18[18]. The latter, he says, are urged to argue three times with the offender before binding him, while St. Peter has the keys of all heavens, not merely the power of binding in heaven (*Exp. in Mt.* lib. viii. cap. 16). Bernard, Abbot Fontis Calidi, interprets 1 Co 5[5] as a possible instance of binding by excommunication. In Thomas Aquinas the power of the keys and the

power of binding and loosing are identical, and he distinguishes, in binding and loosing, between the power of authority, which belongs to God alone, the power of excellence, which belongs to Christ, and the power of ministering, which belongs to the priests (*Summa Theol.* 3ª s. Qu. xvii.–xx.).

Of the Reformers, Luther makes the power to bind and loose equivalent to the power of the keys, and interprets it of absolving or retaining sins. Mt 18[18] was addressed to all Christians, and may apply to any one who confesses his sins privately before a brother. He does not distinguish the passages in Mt. from Jn 20[23]. These words are intended to call forth the faith of penitents, so that the word of the Divine promise may free them. A Christian should know that, if he believes and is absolved, he will be truly absolved in heaven. For Luther the power of the keys belongs to the Church, not to the Pope, and the Church's judgment, if the Church be truly spiritual, is God's judgment. Binding and loosing could be exercised both in preaching and in private absolution. The Church, which possesses the power, allows particular individuals to exercise it ('Babylonish Captivity of the Church,' in Luther's *Primary Works*, ed. Wace-Buchheim; also 'Of the Keys'). Melanchthon (*Loci Comm.*, 'de Confess.') interprets Mt 18[18] of the giving of the power of absolution—a power operative in dealing with the lapsed and excommunicate. Calvin distinguishes Mt 16[19] and Jn 20[23] from Mt 18[18]: the former passages have to do with the ministry of the word by preaching, the latter with the spiritual jurisdiction and discipline of the Church. Of Mt 16[18, 19] he says that the keys apply to teaching, and he compares Lk 11[52]. Loosing is directly connected with the forgiveness of sins; the doctrine of the gospel is applied to the loosing of our bonds—that being loosed on earth through man's testimony we may be loosed in heaven also; binding, on the other hand, is accidental to the gospel. In Mt 18[18] the discipline exercised by the Church is in question, and Calvin understands by the Church's sentence on the offenders, which God ratifies, the sentence presided over by Christ through His word (*Works*, 'Harmony of Matthew, Mark, and Luke,' ii. 292).

The Council of Trent (sess. 14, vi.), in opposition to the teachers of the Reformation, insisted on the application of Mt 18[18] strictly to bishops and priests, and to them alone. Bellarmine (*Disput. de cleric.* 5) argues that by the keys delivered to St. Peter the supreme power is intended, as may be seen from Mt 16[19], since in the Scriptures he is said to bind who gives orders and punishes. Cornelius a Lapide (*Commentarius*, tom. 15) goes with some fullness into the question. He argues that in Mt 16[19] 'quodcumque' (ὃ ἐὰν δήσῃς) is equivalent to 'quemcumque,' but that the neuter is used as more universal, since the Pope binds and looses sins, vows, etc., as well as men. Binding is exercised in (1) retaining sins and denying absolution, (2) enjoining penance, (3) excommunication and other censures, (4) laws and councils, (5) binding Christians to a confession of faith; while loosing is to release from these obligations. By a curious piece of exegesis he refers 'super terram' (ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς) to St. Peter, not to the thing bound.

Hooker (*Eccl. Pol.* vi. 4) discusses the question. He argues that the office of regiment over God's Church consists of functions both of doctrine and of discipline, contained in the name of the keys: there is in the Church power to excommunicate, and make sinners as heathens and publicans. God has promised to ratify what is done by His Church, first by the Apostles, then by their successors. The custom of binding by ecclesiastical censure and retaining till repentance leads to loosing has been adopted as the most expedient method for the cure of sin.

Modern commentaries on Mt., while slightly differing among themselves as to the exact force of the words, agree in dissociating the passages in Mt. from Jn 20[23]. For a point of view which denies that the power conferred has reference to any discipline in the visible Church, admission to or exclusion from the Kingdom of Heaven, or specific authority of the Apostles over the Jewish law, see Lyman Abbot's *New Testament with Notes and Comments*. He interprets the promised power as power in the spiritual life: whatever Christians permit themselves, God will permit; whatever they prohibit, God will prohibit; the passage is therefore the spiritual Magna Charta of Christ's disciples. But such an interpretation is too individualistic, and does not do justice to the historic situation, or to the obviously present idea of a community in Mt 18[17]. The idea of the power of self-government in the Church is the nearest modern parallel to the idea conveyed in Mt 16[19] and 18[18].

LITERATURE.—J. Lightfoot, *Hor. Heb. et Talmud.* (ed. Pitman, London, 1823, vol. xi. pp. 226–231); Dalman, *Worte Jesu* (Eng. tr., *Words of Jesus*, 1902, p. 213 f.); *PRE*[3], *s.v.* 'Schlüsselgewalt, 1906; *HDB*, *s.v.* 'Power of the Keys'; of modern commentaries (in addition to those cited in the article), esp. Th. Zahn (*Kom. z. NT*) and W. C. Allen (in *ICC*) on Matthew, and B. Weiss (*Die vier Evangelien*, Leipzig, 1900; also in Meyer's *Kommentar*[8], 1893) on John; Ahrem, *Das Amt der Schlüssel*, 1864; Steitz, 'Ueber den neutest. Begriff der Schlüsselgewalt,' in *SK*, 1866, pp. 435–483; Cremer, *Lex. der neutest. Gräcität*[9], 1902, *s.v.* λύειν; and other authorities cited in the article.

J. K. MOZLEY.

BIOGENESIS.—Biogenesis is a term used to express a fact of observation in regard to the present-day beginning of living organisms, that they arise from parents approximately like themselves, and in no other way. It is perhaps possible that they may arise in some other way, *e.g.* from not-living matter, or from parents quite different from themselves—both of these hypotheses have their supporters, but as yet no exception to the fact of biogenesis has been proved. The fact is often expressed in the aphorism *omne vivum e vivo*, which in most cases may read *omne vivum ex ovo*. It is unnecessary to speak of this as 'the law of biogenesis,' for the biologist who states that he does not know of any form of life arising except from a parent form of the same kind is not thereby denying the possibility of abiogenesis in the past, the present, or the future. See ABIOGENESIS.

The term 'biogenesis' is sometimes used to mean individual development—a usage which should not be encouraged. Thus Haeckel's 'fundamental law of biogenesis' states that individual development (ontogeny) tends to recapitulate racial evolution (phylogeny). See RECAPITULATION.

J. ARTHUR THOMSON.

BIOLOGY (βίος, 'life'; λόγος, 'discourse') is the science of life in the widest acceptation of that term. It deals with the general conclusions relating to life that may be drawn as the result of study of the structure and activities of all living things. As such it is as intimately connected with the activities of the human organism as with those of the malarial parasite that passes a stage of its existence in man's blood; it concerns itself with every feature in the apparently passive manifestation of the oak tree's vitality, as in that of the active gall-fly, whose developing eggs stimulate the gall-formations upon its leaves. In popular thought, life displays itself in two great, apparently unrelated, fashions corresponding to the animal and vegetable kingdoms respectively—types which undoubtedly are sufficiently distinctive and apart in their most highly developed representatives, but which, as they are studied in a descending series, are found to become ever more

simple until forms are reached which, from the point of view of morphology, are practically alike in the two instances, although still differentiable physiologically; while eventually, certain forms are reached when the last *differentia* ceases to hold, and no unequivocal judgment can be passed upon their animal or vegetable nature. Yet let it not be imagined that to study life in these simpler forms does anything more than eliminate certain secondary constituent elements. 'Livingness' in itself is not more intelligible in the amœba than in the elephant.

At the same time it is convenient to think of the subject-matter of Biology as comprising, in the first instance, the two great realms of animal and vegetable life, corresponding to the sciences of Zoology and Botany. Any individual in either of these realms may be studied from the point of view of its gross build and form (Anatomy = Morphology, in the strictest sense of that term), or minute structure (Histology); from the point of view of general functional and adaptive relation to the external environment (Ecology), or particular ability to do work, associated with definite organs (Physiology proper). Morphology and Physiology suffer, however, more than any other two aspects, from separate consideration, for in life they are most intimately connected, inasmuch as form is conditioned by the function to be performed; in fact, they are the dynamical and statical aspects of one and the same thing. Further, the living organism may be studied stage by stage as a developing organism (Ontogeny), or the historical treatment may be extended to its racial ancestry (Phylogeny, expressed in some classes by Palæontology); it may be regarded in connexion with its various *habitats* on the earth's surface (Geographical Distribution), or its place in a scheme of classification (Taxonomy); investigation may further be directed into the causes that have combined to make it what we find it to be (Ætiology). Finally, in each of these subdivisions the individual may be studied in relation to other individuals more or less like it, which will give us, as in the first instance, Comparative Anatomy and Comparative Histology. Nor should it ever be forgotten in what intimate and often conditioning relation these different aspects stand to one another, so that biological interpretation is incomplete to the extent in which it fails to realize this co-ordination.

The importance of biological study, not merely as a discipline, but from the bearing of its varied subject-matter upon human life in general, can hardly be exaggerated. To recognize the truths of Biology, and appreciate them aright, is a great aid to living; the life of the spirit is grounded in them. In connexion with questions of human health and food supply, and the various other economic aspects of living forms that stand in desirable and undesirable relations to man, a knowledge of Biology should be part of the equipment of every educated man; Psychology and Sociology are torso-like studies in so far as they are not recognized as grounded on Biology. In the same way Biology rests in great measure on Physics and Chemistry, while the relations to and influence on Philosophy, Sociology, and Theology of such an integral component of biological construction as Evolution are a leading element in modern thought.

The initial question of Biology is the nature and characteristics of living matter—the determination of that wherein 'livingness' consists. Conceivably, this may be best attempted by consideration of the simplest forms of life; yet to solve the problem of their 'greatest common measure' does not necessarily mean that we have determined the unit of life. Wherein, then, does 'livingness' consist? Possibly we should instinctively reply, movement—movement, either purely locomotive, or such as is involved in the maintenance of the functions of nutrition and reproduction. Yet in the case of any seed or egg, life is somehow there, but we see no movement. We can ask about either the seed or the egg, Is it alive? or, Is it capable of living? but these are obviously two very different questions. It is known that if dry seeds be kept for a long period in hermetically sealed jars they cease to respire, failing to manifest any chemical production of CO_2, one of the great signs of life. Hence their chemical answer to the question, Are you alive? is No. But does this answer necessarily imply that they are dead? And again the answer is No; for, if released from their prison and placed in suitable conditions, they will germinate and produce new plants. 'So that a seed, in so far as it does not manifest chemical change, is not proved to be living; and, inasmuch as it germinates, is proved not to be dead' (Waller, *The Signs of Life*, p. 5). Of course, the usual escape from this dilemma is to say that the seed is in a state of latent life, during which there is a complete suspension of all the chemical changes that are characteristic of the living state. But a more correct statement is that we have no means of chemical investigation sufficiently refined to reveal to us the infinitesimal changes that are probably going on in the apparently dry and perfectly dormant seed; and it is further possible that chemical change may be completely arrested for a time (*e.g.* by low temperature) without that arrest being of necessity final and definitive. The reason for believing that infinitesimal changes, which our methods are too crude to detect, are going on in the seeds, simply is the experience in the first place that seeds that are kept for a long time do wear out, and that the percentage of seeds that germinate and grow gets smaller and smaller the longer they are kept. The deterioration is more or less rapid according to the nature of the seed and its coats, but in every known instance there is deterioration sooner or later—deterioration, *i.e.* change, chemical change. We do not know, but it is not unreasonable to suppose, that the change is of the nature of a tendency towards stability on the part of the seed molecules because of the lack of stimulation. A stage is reached when no response is offered. Similarly, in the contrary direction, the process of growth when once begun cannot be arrested; it must proceed, or the organism will disintegrate immediately. Life is a process rather than a condition. When once, as in the case of the developing egg, a certain temperature has disturbed its statically arranged molecules, proper energy must be furnished for continuing the process, or the whole structure comes tumbling down, and we say that the thing is dead.

Hence, with Waller, we ought probably to specify the character of the seed or the egg in this way: Matter—Not living—Formerly living—Capable of living again. They are physico-chemical structures whose life may begin, rather than living things themselves. Further, it has been shown that the vitality of seeds can be tested by the electromotive method (electrical changes being taken as the token of chemical changes, which are in turn a sign of life); so that in addition to the question, Are you alive? we can put the question, How much are you alive? to the seed, and learn its answer in terms of electric units. Plants are obviously not as alive as animals, and in the case of the seed, different degrees of vitality will be shown corresponding with its age. At the same time we have made little advance in our inquiry as to wherein livingness consists. For the simple truth is that we cannot tell what life is. Yet if we cannot tell what life is, we can state what living things do. It is possible to make a series of statements descriptive, if not definitive, of living things.

(1) All living things consist of a colloidal substance called **Protoplasm**. As seen in the simplest plants and animals, it is viscid and translucent,

generally colourless, immiscible in water, and yet composed of it sometimes to the extent of 90 per cent. Chemically analyzed, after treatment by re-agents, which rob it of its essential character, it is found to consist of carbon, oxygen, nitrogen, hydrogen, and sulphur, together with traces of various salts; but this complex of proteids ($C_{72}H_{112}N_{18}O_{22}S$ = possible minimal composition of a molecule of egg albumen) exhibits such a variety of qualities that the mere chemical synthesis of protoplasm is no longer a useful conception. Whether these proteids should be thought of as the actual constituents of protoplasm or its first decomposition products is difficult to decide.

Chief amongst these characteristic qualities is the fact of its organization. Careful examination shows that under the morphological aspect two main constituents are present, one of which, the more liquid ground-substance, is continuously distributed throughout the meshes of the more active and, at the same time, firmer spongioplasm or *reticulum*, as the second constituent is called. But it is just here that the greatest divergence of opinion occurs, possibly because each of the two views that are most in favour expresses a part of the truth. Bütschli, and with him a considerable and latterly increasing number of biologists, look upon protoplasm as essentially liquid, or rather a mixture of liquids showing a foam-like structure in which the firmer portion forms the walls of separate chambers that are filled with minute, closely crowded drops of the more fluid portion. Any reticular appearance is therefore an illusion, being simply the sectional aspect of the alveolar structure. With singular skill that investigator has succeeded in preparing artificial emulsions which show a striking resemblance to actual protoplasm. The majority of the earlier observers, together with a large modern school, hold to the view that asserts the presence of extremely delicate, though coherent, threads which extend through the more liquid ground-substance, either forming an uneven but continuous meshwork like the fibres of a sponge (Klein, van Beneden), or consisting of disconnected threads and their branches (Flemming). Now, although it is undoubtedly true that in many instances protoplasm does present a vacuolar or foam-like structure, to admit this does not necessarily commit us to Bütschli's special theory of its intimate structure. On the other hand, the fibrillar network so often and so widely demonstrated, especially during cell-division, seems to be a general, perhaps the more typical structure. Hence we come with Oscar Hertwig to the conclusion that 'the protoplasm of different organisms varies in its material, composition and structure. Apparently, however, these important differences are due to variations in molecular structure.' There is no universal mode in its structure; protoplasm is polymorphic, and it is just possible that the different types represent different phases.

In virtue of this organization, the attempt is continually made to offer a complete explanation of the living thing in terms of mechanics. The living organism is certainly more of a mechanism than of a chemical compound, and its activities will find a better explanation along these lines than in the mere consideration of its chemical nature. Doubtless the properties of the living cell may in the end be traced to chemical forces, just as in the case of the activities of the steam engine; yet no one will maintain that chemical forces explain the motion of the steam engine. The action of the living cell will be better explained in terms of its mechanism than of its chemistry, yet even here imperfectly. Superficial resemblances disclose themselves, that in their greater or less completeness simply serve to hide the critical points of difference. Thus it is obvious that in either case suitable fuel or food requires to be more or less continuously supplied, that this fuel or food is subjected to definite changes in the interior of the mechanism, in the course of which heat is evolved, and that waste products are formed. Yet the living organism is unlike a mechanism in various respects. (*a*) The organism is itself continually being changed in the course of its automatic developmental activity. The engine may be said to consume the fuel supplied to it, but it does not incorporate it with its own substance. The food, self-procured, of an organism is in a sense its fuel, but it becomes directly transformed into the machinery that is at work. (*b*) The organism has a power of self-adjustment and regulation amounting to self-preservation, which has not been added to it from the outside, nor is a necessary property of the substance of which it is composed; the activity of a machine, on the other hand, is of no use to it in the line of preserving its integrity. (*c*) The organism has a certain regenerative power; in its case that which is consumed is the actual machinery, and food repairs both the gaps left in the mechanism and any damage within definite limits, self- or otherwise inflicted. The coal supplied to an engine does nothing to repair its tear and wear, nor can the engine execute its own repairs. (*d*) A machine is constructed to execute a certain function or limited number of functions, and these it perpetually performs in the same way; the organism's range of activity is as wide and varied as its methods of operation. (*e*) The organism can completely reproduce itself by means of parts thrown off from itself; there is nothing analogous to sexual reproduction in the inorganic kingdom. (*f*) The activity of a machine is usually the sum of the activities of its constituent parts, but in the case of the organism it is something more, for its living unity is not merely represented by the sum of its organs, but involves a certain subtle interplay and mutual influence of its constituent activities. In fact, the differences are so great that unless they are steadily held in view, the analogy becomes positively misleading. To attempt, then, to explain the living organism and its activities in physico-chemical terminology, is permissible as a scientific ideal. Even in that most difficult of all realms, the study of nervous process, Professor Gotch is perfectly entitled to claim that nervous activity 'does not owe its physiological mystery to a new form of energy, but to the circumstance that a mode of energy displayed in the non-living world occurs in colloidal electrolytic substances of great chemical complexity' (*Brit. Assoc. Report*, 1906, p. 716). On the other hand, to pretend that even an approximation has already been reached in general or in detail is mere myopia.

Further, protoplasm has no other mode of origin than from pre-existing protoplasm (see art. ABIOGENESIS).

The above discussion may be considered as having indicated the relation of life to matter. The mere fact that the first touch of the chemical re-agent in the analysis of protoplasm robs it of its distinctive character shows that life is not material; we know life only in association with matter, yet it is not matter. A cat weighs no more or no less after the loss of its proverbial nine lives than it did in life. If life were material, then *ex hypothesi* it ought to weigh more in life than in death. On the contrary, an equally false impression that dead things weigh more, instead of less, than living things is preserved in the popular expression, 'a dead weight.' Life, then, is not matter, nor is it exhausted by the concept of matter. In itself it occupies no space; it has no weight as we know gravity. It may be figured as the flow of something—a procession.

(2) All living things exhibit a directive control over energy which leads to its further availability. They are able *to transform energy* in their own interests, for their self-maintenance.

These statements deal with the relation of life to energy—in some ways the most complicated of all the problems that fall to be considered in this connexion. In comparing what we know of life with all other forms of energy, we realize in the first place that the origin of the latter is under command in a way that is not predicable of the origin of life. Numerous experiments prove the transformation of energy and the ease of this transformation; but as yet there has been no hint of the direct transformation of any known form of energy into life.

Nevertheless, living matter is able to effect such transformations; it is, in fact, the seat of continuous transformation of energy. Now, in these transformations there is nothing that goes contrary to the fundamental laws of the conservation of matter and of energy: the potential energy in any food can be calculated, and the value found unimpaired in some type of equivalent work done or heat evolved. But this does not mean that there is nothing distinctive in connexion with these

transformations. Certain physical and chemical characteristics abide with the organism in death as in life; but when the typical energy phenomena are no longer in evidence, we say that the thing is dead. Life, then, has to do with energy, but is not itself energy, not even a specific kind of energy; its characteristic is seen in the way in which that energy is directed and controlled. Every living thing is not merely a centre at which energy is being constantly transformed—a mechanical energy-transformer—a centre, further, at which the tendency to degradation of energy is resisted, but it also acts as a directive channel along which energy can flow to accomplish specific work: as long as the organism is alive it is continually disturbing the equilibrium which should otherwise arise between itself and the environment. Life is unceasing, directive, and selective* control of energy; but it is also accumulation of energy, *e.g.* in specific tissues, and a transformation of it leading to further availability. The organism up to a certain stage appears to be continually gaining energy at the expense of the environment, and in reproduction the process is perpetuated.

There are, however, other controls of energy: temperature, *e.g.*, controls its passage in the form of heat from the hotter to the colder body. But this passage involves not merely degradation in that particular form. Hibbert brings out very clearly that the difference in temperature is a determining factor, and that in any calculation of the work done it will find a place; whereas it is impossible to show that life is a factorial element in any calculation of the work done by a living organism. The nearest parallel, yet hardly a parallel, would be in the unique characteristic of reproduction, when, owing to the accumulation of energy, it may reasonably be conceived that the control or potential factor exhibits itself in the process of division. This control is superlatively seen in the development of the segmenting egg to its predestined goal in the typical adult form. Accordingly we conclude that after the methods borrowed from the analysis of inorganic nature are exhausted, there is a residuum of fact which is untouched by them, viz. the directive control and co-ordinated adaptation of every element of its activity by the organism to its own end. The biological whole is greater than the sum of its physical or chemical parts. And it is no objection to urge that we are not objectively aware of this peculiar control, for the same is true of all physical actions, as, *e.g.*, gravitational attraction. Life is known to us as control and guidance of energy, interacting with matter in ways that, if not yet wholly intelligible to us, are clearly not covered by what we know of its physico-chemical properties.

(3) All living things are characterized by *cellular structure*. Life, that is to say, so far as we know it, appears only in one form—that of the cell. The further apart living forms are from the point of view of classification, the deeper is it necessary to go to find community. In extreme cases this may be found only in their cell-structure and protoplasm; hence the fundamental importance of these aspects. Briefly, the cell-theory amounts to the statement that the bodies of every form of life, plant or animal, are composed of one or more minute structural units known as cells, out of which, in the case of higher forms, directly or indirectly, every part is built; all organisms consist of cells and of cell-products. The body is a mosaic rather than an asphalt, but the cells are in communication, unisolated by cement. From the view-point of this cell-theory, the animal kingdom (as likewise the plant kingdom) may be regarded as an ascending series, at the bottom of



Fig. 1.—General view of cells in the growing root-tip of the onion, from a longitudinal section (×300). (*a*) Non-dividing cells with chromatin-network and deeply-stained nucleoli; (*b*) nuclei preparing for division (chromatin in form of continuous thread); (*c*) dividing cells showing mitotic figures; (*e*) pair of daughter-cells shortly after division. (From Wilson's *The Cell*, by kind permission of the publishers.)

which may be put those forms that are unicellular—the Protozoa; next above them, although essentially of them, come forms that are mere balls or colonies of cells, *e.g. Volvox globator*; thereafter we reach the sponges, where tissues, *i.e.* aggregates of similar cells performing a single function in common, are, as it were, in the making; next come the simpler members of the Cœlenterata—mere two-layered sacs of cells, with hints of organs, *i.e.* higher complexes of tissues devoted to one or more specific functions—and so we arrive at those higher forms, the substance of whose skin, bone, or muscle is not homogeneous according to the naked-eye impression, but with the help of the microscope is resolved into aggregates of those countless minute units called cells. And it may be here remarked that Ontogeny discloses the remarkable fact that every one of these higher forms, in its individual life-history, passes through a broadly corresponding series, of which the first stage is likewise a single cell, the fertilized ovum. Palæontology, as interpreted by Evolution, teaches the further striking fact that what is thus true of the individual history holds likewise for the history of the race, which began in the farthest æons with the simplest forms, and progressed through ever higher forms, till it culminated, mentally and spiritually, in man.

But in addition to thus furnishing us with a valuable point of view from which to regard the organic world in relation to structure (Morphology), the cell-theory performs a similar service from the point of view of function or activity (Physiology). The cell is not merely the unit of organization; it is the unit of function. In every Protozoon the vital functions—locomotion, respiration (or whatever corresponds to it), absorption of food, digestion, excretion, which in the higher forms are distributed amongst different groups of cells or organs devoted to the discharge of these specific functions—are all performed by the single cell.

The theory that organisms are composed of cells was first suggested by the study of plant-structure. As long ago as 1665 Hook discovered 'the chambered structure of plants,' but nearly 200 years passed before anything comparable to the modern understanding of the fact was attained. By the middle of the 18th cent. Caspar Wolff and others had in a measure got on to modern lines in their study of development, endeavouring to show that the various ducts and vessels of the plant are all derived from cells; and by the beginning of last century it was already recognized that in the cell we have the structural and physiological unit of the plant. If the nature of botanical material kept the early investigators' attention fixed on the cell-wall, the softer tissues—the skeleton apart—that constitute animal substances first incited study of the nature of living

* In the sense that it selects this or that mode of attaining an end.

matter. Already in 1835 Dujardin gave the name of 'sarcode' to the substance composing the bodies of the ciliate protozoa he was examining. But it is not till we reach the names of Schleiden and Schwann (1837–1839) that we have before us the foundation upon which all the more recent work upon the cell has been built. The former first drew attention to the significance of the nucleus in the life-history of the cell; the latter, by carefully demonstrating a corresponding development from cells in the case of the tissues of the animal body, arrived at a theory of the essential correspondence in structure of both plant and animal. Much error, however, was combined with the brilliant work of these investigators. Although they partially perceived the importance of the nucleus, they still imagined that the membrane was the most essential part of the cell, and it remained for Max Schultze (1861) to dethrone the cell-membrane from the high place it had hitherto held in the biological world, by showing that certain cells were apparently on occasion able to do without it, whilst in other cases it did not exist: he also maintained the primary importance, on the other hand, of the nucleus and protoplasm. It was likewise through the labours of Schultze, Cohn, and De Bary that the identity of plant and of animal protoplasm was completely established. The word 'protoplasm' was first used in its specific sense, however, in 1846 by Hugo von Mohl, who, perhaps, first clearly recognized the importance of the formative substance of the cell.



Fig. 2.—Semi-diagrammatic representation of a cell. (*a*) Nuclear membrane; (*b*) linin reticulum; (*c*) chromatin masses contained in envelopes of linin (chromatin nucleoli); (*d*) true nucleolus; (*e*) vacuole; (*f*) plastids; (*g*) centrosomes; (*h*) archoplasm, from which attraction-sphere, astral rays etc., are developed; (*i*) food particles. (From Walker's *Essentials of Cytology*, by kind permission of the publishers.)

Next to protoplasm—the fundamental constituent of the cell—the second most important element is the nucleus: indeed, its significance is hardly less than that of protoplasm itself. The nucleus, with few exceptions, is a characteristic of every cell. Modern theories of heredity are theories of the cell-nucleus.

In any ordinary nucleus, the following structural elements may commonly be recognized:

(*a*) The nuclear membrane, which is probably a condensation of the general protoplasmic reticulum, although its existence has not been demonstrated in every case. It has a variable staining capacity.

(*b*) The nuclear reticulum, which is composed of two distinct substances—chromatin and linin. The former is the nuclear substance *par excellence*, in that it is restricted to the nucleus, and is generally seen as irregular granules and masses, deposited, as it were, on the threads of linin; sometimes the relation is of a more intimate character, and the chromatin seems embedded in the linin, giving the impression of a very intimate relation between the two substances. Some of the most recent work, in fact, suggests that the chromatin, on which hitherto such stress has been laid in connexion with theories of inheritance, is nothing more than a secretion of the linin, and that it is really with the latter that the ideas of permanence and individuality should be associated. The most striking support for this view is found in the way in which during certain critical phases of the nuclear history the chromatin decreases in amount, sometimes even to the vanishing point, and is supposed to have been employed in nourishing the cell during the stage in question. The linin likewise after treatment shows a granular structure, and seems similar in composition to the cytoplasmic reticulum. The quantity of chromatin in a cell is not constant, but in the processes connected with cell division and fertilization the granules form into little rod-like bodies known as chromosomes, which are now regarded by many as the vehicles of inheritance. The number of chromosomes is constant for each species. It is still, however, 'an open question whether the chromatin-granules of the reticulum are individually identical with those forming the chromosomes' (Wilson, *The Cell*, p. 37). At certain stages the chromosomes appear perfectly homogeneous, and the same is sometimes true of the entire nucleus.

The evidence then goes to show that in the great majority of cases the chromatin thread is built up of a series of minute, deeply-staining granules (chromomeres) that are embedded, as it were, in the linin, sometimes irregularly, sometimes with such regularity that the meshwork seems entirely composed of them, and that these aggregate to form the typical chromosomes. The splitting of the chromosome involves actual splitting of these granules. As the living cells of an organism are capable of assimilation, growth, and division, so likewise are we compelled to think of the rôle the chromatin granule plays in its relation to the chromosome. But are these chromatin granules ultimate units, and can we assign to them the value of individuals?

The problem only becomes the more arresting when we further inquire into the relation of chromatin granules to the linin network of the nucleus and cytoplasm. Recent research tends to confirm van Beneden's conclusion, reached already in 1883, that the chromatin network of the nucleus, the cytoplasmic reticulum, and even the nuclear membrane, are all alike built up out of microsomes united by connective substance, and that even the chromatic granules may be transformed into achromatic, and *vice versa*. The sole limitation appears to be the restriction of the chromatic microsomes to the nucleus, while, on the other hand, the linin network of the nucleus appears to have the same granular structure as the cytoplasmic reticulum, and the nuclear membrane appears to originate in a condensation of the same substance. Are these microsomes, then, the ultimate units of life? Yes and no! Yes, in the sense that they are the ultimate units that we know capable of growth and division in their particular environment—incapable, however, of an independent existence. No, in the double sense that we can hardly suppose that the ultimate units of living matter happen to coincide with the revelations of the most powerful microscope of the 20th cent.; and that if we insist on independent existence in an ordinary environment they fail to respond to the criterion. We must obviously, therefore, look to our terminology. Possibly in a more restricted sense some of these elements of protoplasm might be spoken of as 'living.' 'In its fullest meaning, however,' says Wilson (*op. cit.* p. 29), 'the word "living" implies the existence of a group of co-operating activities more complex than those manifested by any one substance or structural element.' Life, perhaps, should only properly be regarded as a property of the cell-system as a whole, and we do better to designate the separate elements as 'active' and 'passive' rather than as 'living' and 'lifeless.' The enucleated cell cannot reproduce: strictly, therefore, it is not living, although for a short time it may still show a characteristic of life.

The demonstration of these microsomes—intra-cellular units of a lower order—has an interesting bearing upon biological theory. Altmann's granular theory of the constitution of protoplasm, ill-founded as it apparently was in relation to his own investigations, regarded protoplasm as a colony of more elementary, extremely minute units which he called bioblasts. In a real measure, these microsomes, evidencing assimilation, growth, and division, correspond to Altmann's theoretical units, and invite consideration as more elementary individuals than the cell, standing between the latter and the ultimate molecule of living matter. Herbert Spencer's 'physiological units,' Darwin's 'gemmules,' and Weismann's 'biophors,' all hitherto hypothetical units, playing the principal part in the theories of regeneration, development, and heredity associated with these great names, would thus appear to correspond to a reality.

As to the ultimate independent unit of living matter—the smallest mass that exhibits to the biologist the phenomena of independent life—it is, perhaps, neither necessary nor possible to make any precise statement. Everything depends upon the criterion that we use. If we demand that living matter show the phenomena of independent growth and assimilation, then the unit will need to consist of protoplasm plus nuclear substance: in the absence of nuclear material all synthetic metabolism is at an end. This has been experimentally proved on a very extended scale by merotomy and numerous investigations in regeneration. On the other hand, if irritability is all that is required, then the unit might well be smaller and simpler: for that particular manifestation within a certain limit, cytoplasm alone would be sufficient. Destructive metabolism may continue without the nucleus, where constructive metabolism is at an end. That is to say, if the question is viewed in the form 'how far the divisibility of living matter can be carried without interfering with its function,' the answer, as we have seen, is not difficult to find, and can be experimentally verified, depending as it does upon the physical structure of the cell, and varying for different cells.

(*c*) The nucleoli, rounded irregular bodies composed of a proteid substance markedly different from chromatin. They are, however, very varied both in structure and character, and in some instances, at any rate, are possibly a source of chromatin supply for the nucleus. They stain deeply, giving reactions similar to those presented by the fibrillar network.

(*d*) The nuclear sap or ground substance occupying the interstices of the network, and apparently unaffected by many of the stains that act on the chromatin. It is clear and essentially liquid.

A third element of the cell is the peculiar little centrosome first definitely discovered by van Beneden in 1885, which as the special organ of cell division is often regarded as the dynamic centre of the cell. It commonly lies outside the nucleus, although close to it; sometimes, however, inside (*Ascaris univalens*). It is generally surrounded either by a radiating area of the cyto-reticulum, termed the attraction-sphere or centrosphere; or by an area of protoplasm denser

than the rest of the cytoplasm (archoplasm): sometimes in the vegetative stage it lies unattended by any differentiated matter, and is then often very difficult to demonstrate. Typically the centrosome, which stains deeply, is a single organ; but, as a rule, dividing cells show a double centrosome due to anticipation of the succeeding division in which each of the daughter-cells receives one of them. The failure to substantiate its presence in the case of the cells of many of the higher plants, and the fact that in some instances at the close of cell division, or during fertilization in animals, it disappears entirely to appear again *de novo*, rather militate against the earlier view of its indispensable and dominant function, and tend to relegate it to a less important position. At the same time as an organ that assimilates, grows, divides, and is in many cases passed on from cell to cell, it also answers to the conception of an intra-cellular unit of independent existence: it is essentially a centre of determining activity, and it seems finally to disappear with the loss of the power of reproduction.

With regard to the cell-membrane, we have already seen that its importance is now perceived to be secondary. It is more characteristic of plant than of animal tissues. In the former case it has a more or less firm consistency, and is often of considerable thickness; on the other hand, many animal cells, *e.g.* rhizopods and leucocytes, are 'naked,' although even here some difference in consistency can be established between the outermost layer of the cytoplasm and that immediately beneath it. Where a definite membrane occurs, it usually arises as a secretion product, although cases are known where it seems to be a direct physical and chemical transformation of the peripheral layer of protoplasm. Cellulose is the name applied to the carbo-hydrate that forms the basis of the plant membrane ($C_6H_{10}O_5$): it is, however, impregnated with, or transformed into, other substances such as lignine, cork, etc.

Hitherto we have regarded the cell as an independent organism, as an organic unit. Actually, however, it is such only in the case of unicellular organisms and the germ-cells of multicellular forms. When we consider other cells, *e.g.* the tissue-cells of the higher creatures, we see that in point of origin and structure, *i.e.* morphologically, they are equivalent to a collection of unicellular organisms, but physiologically the tissue-cell can hardly be regarded as independent, inasmuch as its activity is part and parcel of that of the organism—'its autonomy,' to use Wilson's phrase, 'is merged in a greater or less degree into the general life of the organism' (*op. cit.* p. 58).

What, then, is this organic unity of the body, and how is it maintained? The problem is very much the problem of the cell and its enzymes repeated on a larger scale. There, as we shall see, the question is how the cell links together and co-ordinates the activities of various substances within it, each of them with its specific industry, so to speak. In the higher animals and plants the different tissues retain in varying capacities vestiges of the primitive power of altering their function: under normal conditions they behave according to their specific character. But evidently there is some restraining influence that limits and regulates the activity of any particular cell, or group of cells, in relation to the other cells of the organism. The older workers thought of the organism as a composite, a mosaic, whose life was simply the sum of the life of its independent, yet reciprocating parts. But it becomes increasingly clear that, so far as growth and development are concerned, cells can be regarded as co-operative units in a limited degree only. 'They are rather,' says Wilson, 'local centres of a formative power pervading the growing mass as a whole, and the physiological autonomy of the individual cell falls into the background' (*op. cit.* p. 59). No true conception of the life of a multi-cellular organism is gained except in so far as that life is conceived of as a whole, untrammelled by cell boundaries. Doubtless it expresses itself in many ways, particularly in the form of the cell, thereby giving to itself an apparently composite character. But in reality this mosaic-like character is due to the secondary distribution of the organism's energy among local centres of action. This does not, however, as already stated, prevent tissues from occasionally asserting their primitive independence and functioning in an unusual way under certain special conditions: such, at any rate, is one modern explanation of cancerous growth.

(4) A further characteristic of living things is *irritability*, by which is understood the capacity for response or reaction to stimulus. Life, in fact, resolves itself into the science of response,—response to various external and internal stimuli,—simple at first in the case of the lower forms, but infinitely complex, embracing in the last instance all that is implied in the word 'education' in the higher forms; the unresponsive is the dead, that peculiar condition in which the capacity for response is gone.

Now, in all applications of stimuli to living matter, what we see as a direct consequence is a series of very complex phenomena due to the fact that these stimuli have affected an exceedingly complex object in the organism upon which they act. When we analyze these phenomena of irritability, as exemplified in a Protozoon, we find a series of specific capacities for response which we may call the various tactisms. *Paramecium* is sensitive to light in that it moves towards it; it is positively phototactic. Irritability, then, usually expresses itself in some form of movement of the organic mass, which has often led to this feature being set down as a characteristic of living matter: but while every response need not necessarily be in the form of obvious movement (the energy liberated may take some other form, *e.g.* heat), on the other hand, in many cases of apparently spontaneous movement, the cause is to be found in internal changes rather than in the external environment. It is essentially a liberation of energy,—the transformation of potential into kinetic energy, and this commonly shows itself in movement.

In the case of the higher animals and plants, the distinctive elements of irritability, studied singly as tactisms in the case of unicellular forms, may function in a specific way in the parts of a multicellular organism, giving rise to those movements that are known as the various tropisms: thus a characteristic turning towards the sun gives its name to the flower heliotrope. It is found that many movements of animals and attitudes of plants depend upon mechanisms that are 'a function of the symmetrical structure and symmetrical distribution of irritability on the surface of the body of the organisms' (Loeb, *Dynamics of Living Matter*, p. 5). Now, if lines of force (*e.g.* light rays, gravitation lines, lines of diffusion) strike an organism with greater profusion on one side than on another, the tension of the contractile elements is unequal, and if the animal moves, it tends to turn in such a direction that the lines of force impinge with equal density at symmetrical points, and at the same angle on both sides, and will continue to move in that direction, or away from it, according as it is apparently attracted or repelled. Such automatic orientation is known as a tropism.

The external stimuli which act upon the world of life are manifold: but we may consider five important groups—(*a*) thermal stimuli, (*b*) light stimuli, (*c*) electrical stimuli, (*d*) gravitational stimuli, and (*e*) chemical stimuli. The reaction of an organism is, then, simply its response to the particular stimulus applied to it. The experience of everyday life is sufficient to show us that, under the same stimulus, the reaction will vary considerably with different individuals. In fact, the same stimulus may produce totally different effects on differently constituted objects: a kick elicits a different response in the case of a stone, a bulldog, and a Skye terrier; under electrical stimulation the salivary gland yields its saliva, the liver its bile. On the other hand, it does not strike one as quite so obvious at first sight that very different stimuli will but produce identical effects upon the same protoplasmic body. Apply to a muscle cell electrical, chemical, in short any possible form of stimulus; it has but one answer,—it contracts. The same holds true for many Protozoa: they have but a single characteristic response to all kinds of stimuli. We have thought of the stimulus as exciting, or even producing, an increase of the specific activity in various forms of living substance: its action may, however, also result in a diminution of that characteristic activity. Irritability is considered to be a fundamental property of living protoplasm, but it expresses itself in specific actions, according to the specific structure of the organism, under the influence of the external world.

(*a*) With regard to thermo-tactism, it may be noted that the temperature of the environment is of vital importance to every organism. There is a limit above and below which life ceases; this limit varies with the organism, and indeed with the stage of its development. The maximum temperature for plants

and animals is generally about 45° Centigrade. The minimum temperature is not so easily determined; temperatures below zero are, on the whole, less injurious than high ones. As a rule, however, the power that plants, for example, have of resistance to cold or heat is inversely proportional to the amount of water that they contain. Accordingly, we find that spores and bacilli can resist great extremes of high and of low temperature, there being instances on record in which they have not lost their power of development after exposure to −110° C., while in practical bacteriology the assumption is never made that life is destroyed in any particular instance before the germ has been subjected to a dry heat of 140° C. for at least three hours.

We may also note the exceedingly small range on the scale of temperature that is occupied by life. On the surface of the earth the extreme variations may be roughly placed within the scale of from 60° C. above, to about 60° C. below the freezing point, so that life, as existing for the most part between −15° C. and 45° C., occupies about half of the range that is due to the earth's climatic conditions. In fact, the restricted scale within which life ordinarily manifests itself corresponds roughly to the temperature scale of liquid water, which is an indispensable conjunct of life and an important constituent of protoplasm. Further, if we estimate the internal heat of the earth at 5500° C., we find that life has a place on not more than a $\frac{1}{110}$th part of the scale of terrestrial temperature.

(*b*) Light, also, acts as a stimulus to plants and animals. Some love it; others seem to hate and shun it; they are positively or negatively phototactic. As heliotropism, this tendency to turn towards the light is very marked in the stems of many plants, and in sessile and free-moving animals is most distinctive. Experiments with coloured screens have shown that in the case of plants and sessile animals 'the more refractive green, blue, and violet rays of the spectrum are more effective heliotropically than the less refractive red and yellow rays' (Loeb, *op. cit.* p. 113). That is to say, there is a sort of division of labour—the longer light waves (reds and yellows) accelerate assimilation; the shorter waves (blue and violet) hasten heliotropism. In cases of ordinary curvature, such as in a twining tendril, the explanation is found in an excess of growth on the outer side; but in heliotropism, if growth is associated, it is but accidentally, and the explanation is found rather in a certain protoplasmic *contractility* of the cells that are directly affected by the light. 'The essential feature of the heliotropic reaction consists in the fact that the light automatically puts the plant or the animal into such a position that the axis of symmetry of the body, or organ, falls into the direction of the rays of light' (*ib.* p. 124). Loeb has shown that in the case of free-moving animals the explanation may be given in identically the same terms. He has correlated the tendency of animals, particularly insects, to fly or creep towards the flame, with the heliotropic curvature of plants, maintaining 'that the essential effect of the light upon these animals might consist in a compulsory automatic turning of the head toward the source of light, corresponding to the turning of the head, or the tip, of a plant stem toward the light; and that the process of moving toward the source of light was only a secondary phenomenon' (*ib.* p. 125). That is to say, it is not curiosity, or love of light, that makes the moth fly to the candle flame, but the compelling power of the light in turning the creature's head towards it. Other animals (e.g. *Gammarus pulex*, a fresh-water crustacean, and the larvæ of the house-fly) are found to be negatively heliotropic, *i.e.* their heads bend automatically away from the source of light, while most creatures are probably not heliotropic at all. Further, in the case of some forms it is found that they are heliotropic at different periods in their life history, *e.g.* ants at the time of sexual maturity are markedly heliotropic, while the workers are not—a difference probably correlated with definite chemical changes in the creatures; in fact, by the addition of certain chemical substances to the media in which some forms were kept, Loeb found that he could make them negatively or positively heliotropic at will. Heliotropism plays a great part in determining the behaviour of animals, and there are some forms whose life at certain periods of their existence may almost be said to be a function of light.

(*c*) Light rays are, however, not the only lines of force that bring about an automatic orientation of animals. Definite responses to galvanic currents produce the phenomena of galvanotropism. When animals are exposed to a galvanic current, there may result compulsory reactions very similar to those produced by light, except that we substitute the current curves for the light rays. As the current not merely influences the superficial layers of an organism, as in the case of the light rays, but permeates the whole body, the responses in galvanotropic orientation are not so ideal as in the case of heliotropism.

(*d*) The orientation seen in plants and animals, due to gravitation, is known as geotropism. Geotropism expresses the fact that, whilst the tips of the roots of plants show a tendency to grow vertically downwards, the tip of the main stem seems constrained to grow in the opposite direction; the same holds true with limitations in the case of sessile animals, and it is probable that the attempts of free-moving creatures to keep the axis of their eyes as much as possible in the normal position when their bodies are maintained in an abnormal position is also due to the stimulus of gravitation. Although the problem is still far from solution, Loeb (*op. cit.* p. 152) considers it probable that the really geotropic reactions of higher animals are determined in certain cells of the inner ear, or in certain cells of the brain, 'through an influence upon the reaction velocity of certain chemical processes.'

(*e*) Chemotropism is the name applied to the reply made by organisms to the stimulus from particles of substances emanating from a centre of diffusion: the organism is found to bend or move itself in the direction of the lines of diffusion. The orientation is, however, rarely as perfect as in that of the other tropisms, inasmuch as the 'lines of diffusion are commonly disturbed by currents due to changes and variations in temperature' (*ib.* p. 153). Thus oxygen is known to exercise a great attractive power over freely moving cells. Experiments can be arranged by which that gas can be introduced into water crowded with unicellular organisms, when they will be seen to rush for the point from which the gas is liberated. Engelmann put small algæ into a fluid containing certain bacteria, and observed that very quickly they surrounded the weed, for the sake of the oxygen that it liberated by means of its chlorophyll. It then occurred to him that several species of bacteria might be used as a delicate test for minute quantities of oxygen.

The whole question of the chemical irritability of cells has a very human interest when we investigate it in relation to the colourless blood corpuscles known as leucocytes. The modern germ-theory as applied to most diseases holds that inflammation is set up by micro-organisms and their metabolic products (*i.e.* the products due to chemical change in the micro-organisms themselves); these various toxines are carried in the circulatory system to all parts of the body. Now Metchnikoff has shown how certain of these colourless corpuscles, by their power of absorbing the injurious elements, constitute themselves the very guardians of the organism. He has shown that, *e.g.*, the cocci of erysipelas, the spirilla of relapsing fever, and the bacilli of anthrax are eaten up, or their toxines neutralized, by the antidotes elaborated by these wandering amœboid cells, and thus rendered harmless. Hence, between these foreign micro-organisms and the leucocytes continual war is waged, and the life or death of the organism depends upon the result of the struggle. Now, if, as is practically certain, the leucocytes are initially stimulated by means of chemical substances produced by the micro-organisms, such stimulation can occur only in accordance with laws similar to those that are known to hold in the case of free cells. Recently, Wright and Douglas have shown that in the blood serum there is something that makes the bacteria more acceptable to the leucocytes: this substance they have termed generically opsonin (*ὀψωνέω*, 'I cater'). Its action is to sensitize the bacteria so that they more readily stimulate the leucocytes to absorb them. The opsonic value of the serum in any specific case can be heightened by the injection of suitable substances.

(5) All living things are further characterized by *continual change*, physical and chemical, of the material composing the body in every part. Certain parts are being continually used up, and fresh material is brought in and built up into its place. This ceaseless internal cycle of supply and waste, waste and supply, is designated by the term metabolism. The living organism is as a flame that, fed with oil, preserves its outward form, yet all the while the substance by which the flame is fed is being decomposed into its constituent elements and passes off transformed. Biology, apart from Morphology, knows no statics. Nutrition and digestion, respiration and circulation, secretion and excretion, are various phases of this comprehensive activity. In order to live, the cell must absorb nutrient substances which it proceeds to elaborate, retaining some portions within its body, and rejecting others. Continually, in the living cell, substances of complex molecular, and in that measure unstable, structure are being built up from substances less complex and more stable, with the absorption of energy; concurrently, other substances—food reserves, or the protoplasm itself—are being broken down in order to provide the energy required. The more intense the life, the more comprehensive are those parallel processes of construction and destruction. And yet, if parallel, they are hardly equal. In the period of youth the constructive is in excess of the destructive, and we say the organism grows.

Now, all living things grow in a sense that is not predicable of other objects to which the word may be applied. For in the saturated solution of salt or alum the crystal grows by accretion—particles are added on the outside, layer by layer; living things grow by taking up particles of matter in between already existing particles at every point—interstitial growth. Further, the crystal grows by adding to itself particles of the same matter as itself—particles that it takes up, already existing, out of the fluid around it; whereas the living thing

makes the materials of its growth, manufacturing particles like itself out of material different from itself, which it then uses for growth—by assimilation. The ciliate protozoon, *Paramecium caud.*, if kept in a hay infusion at a definite temperature, will grow and reproduce by binary fission at a definite rate. This growth and reproduction are accomplished at the expense of elements in the medium which are transformed into Paramecium; at the same time other substances appear in the medium which are the waste from the growth process. If we call these last *b*, and let *a* represent the material that goes to form new Paramecium, then $P+a=nP+b$. This growth formula may be constructively compared with that of any purely chemical equation, with the result that a striking difference is noticeable. In the case of an effective chemical reaction between different compounds, the result will be found to be of the general character $A+B=C+D$; *i.e.* different substances are found in the two terms (*e.g.* $Zn+H_2SO_4=ZnSO_4+H_2$). In the former equation the fact that P appears on either side constitutes a veiled expression of a characteristic of life: that it occurs in a greatly increased quantity indicates the amount of growth. As a matter of fact, however, this formula represents but half of what is actually in progress; for at the same time other processes of a contrary or destructive character are in operation, and the organism is alive only so long as they do not gain the ascendancy over the assimilative activities.

From the work of destruction, which may involve the breaking up of complex substances into simpler ones, or their combination with oxygen, various end products arise, some useful to the organism, *e.g.* bile, others not so useful, or positively harmful, as urea, carbon dioxide, and mineral salts. In the case of animals the whole of their energy is derived from waste; in plants only a small part is thus derived, the rest being obtained from sunlight. The metabolic processes that are going on in any higher organism, plant or animal, are manifold in the extreme, and even in the case of unicellular forms our understanding of them is far from complete. At the same time the unity of the entire organic kingdom is well illustrated in a restricted series of fundamental metabolic processes which are common to every living creature.

(*a*) Every plant and animal respires, *i.e.* it takes up oxygen from its environment, whereby it oxidizes the carbo-hydrates and albuminous substances of its own body, producing as final products carbon dioxide and water.

(*b*) The food materials of all living organisms, plant and animal alike, are originally prepared from the inorganic world through the instrumentality of chloroplasts. Further, while it is true that growing plants are able to live on simpler compounds than animals, yet a study of the development of the embryo in the seed (also the growing cells in a young stem or root) shows it to be without the adult capacity, and dependent on manufactured carbo-hydrates, proteids, and fats, as in the case of animals. The differences relating to the mode of supply in the case of the two kingdoms are ultimately referable to differences in the cell structure. The exaggerated development of the vegetable cell-wall prevents the ingestion of solid material.

(*c*) In both animal and vegetable kingdoms, characteristic corresponding substances make their appearance during metabolism, such as ptyalin in animals, and diastase in plants. These substances are known as ferments or enzymes, and particularly in the constructive process, as it occurs in plants and animals, they play a very important part. In many cases of breaking up of reserves, *i.e.* in destructive processes, it is also found that the cell produces an enzyme for this end. So fundamental is the action of these enzymes that there is a very true, but limited sense, in which it may be said that life is a series of fermentations. The evidence goes to show that a soluble enzyme is at the basis of every functional activity. Digestion is due in part to the action of pepsin which breaks up proteids. Respiration is achieved only through the presence of oxidase, which seizes the oxygen in the lungs, and hands it over to the red corpuscles of the blood. Under certain conditions—commonly greater condensation of the solution—the action of some enzymes is reversible, *i.e.* they can put together again what they have taken apart, and there are others that devote themselves solely to this aspect of the matter. What the enzyme is in its inner nature is still unknown. It appears to be colloidal, and, in several cases, is certainly not proteid; still, as a rule, in elementary structure it is more like a proteid than anything else. Possibly it is produced through a partial breakdown of the protoplasm. Its activity seems to be bound up with the peculiarities of its atomic structure rather than with any mysteries of ingredients, which are quite simple. The action of the enzymes appears, however, in large measure to be a hydrolysis: the substance acted upon is made to take up water and then undergo decomposition.

(*d*) As the result of these metabolic processes, corresponding products are organized in the plant and animal kingdoms, *e.g.* starch in plants and glycogen in animals, oxidases and trypsins in both.

We have spoken of the point of view that likens life to a series of fermentations. Investigation into the nature of these enzymes proceeds apace, and marvellous success has been achieved in the separation of them and the instigation of them to work apart from the living environment (*e.g.* rennet). Nevertheless it should not be forgotten that this does not in the least help our ultimate account of life, because no account of enzyme-action, however complete, gives us any clue to the characteristic achievement of the cell in co-ordinating and regulating these various activities that take place within it. Each enzyme is usually able to act in its specific way only upon one definite type of molecular arrangement; but the cell as an energy transformer is distinguished by the way in which it connects the varied complex reactions effected by these enzymes which it has itself produced. Accordingly, to consider the cell activity as simply the sum of its varied enzyme activity, is to make the same mistake as to suppose that an organism is the sum of its organs. It is to offer only a partial account of cell life. If regard were had only to the action of the enzymes, the interpretation would be purely katabolic, and there could be no account of the building up of compounds with higher chemical potential, which is so distinctive a feature of life. The study of enzymes is the study of isolated, yet highly selective, activities—each enzyme must fit its substratum like lock and key, or the reaction does not occur; but the characteristic of the living cell is seen in the connecting of one reaction with another, and in the using of the free energy of one reaction to carry on another. The cell directs and co-ordinates the enzymic activities, but in the more difficult cases of metabolic change, as in the conversion of carbo-hydrates into fats, or of CO_2 and H_2O into organic compounds, energy is taken up from other sources, and this the cell alone can do. 'This is the part taken up by the living cell, which in one oxidizing action obtains free energy, and in an accompanying reducing action stores this energy up, at least in part, in a new synthesized body at a higher potential of chemical energy than that from which it came. In this process, enzymes may freely be used by the cell, but they are co-ordinated and regulated in the process' (Moore, *Recent Advances in Physiology and Biochemistry*, p. 138). All this fundamental metabolic activity then is in some way controlled for the good of the individual, and in this directed control we have the distinctive character of life.

In metabolism there are three great stages which may each be characterized by a single word—Absorption (of new material); Transformation (in the interior of the protoplasm); leading to Retention and Excretion. Protoplasm is found capable of absorbing or excreting matter in either a gaseous, a fluid, or a solid condition.

The differences between Metazoa and Metaphyta are based on broad lines, physiological rather than morphological. From the food point of view we have seen that all the organic substance in the world is ultimately created by plants under the influence of sunlight. Animals, so far from creating, are continually destroying organic matter and re solving it again into its original components. Th food of plants exists in a gaseous state in the atmosphere, or as salts in solution in water; it requires therefore no preparation, and can be directly absorbed by the surface of the roots and leaves. But the food of animals, being organic matter, is usually in a more or less solid condition, which necessitates the presence of an internal reservoir in which the food can be stored until it is reduced to a more or less liquid absorbable condition. That is to say, almost all animals require a stomach, and in the case of the Protozoa the whole creature functions as such for the time being.

Again, the food of plants is everywhere present. Every wind that blows brings food to the leaves: rain-water with salts in solution bathes the roots. Their food-taking is essentially passive. Animals have to seek their food—it does not usually come to them. Hence the nature of animal food requires that they shall have a definite mouth, a digestive tract, organs to carry the body in search of food, organs to seize it when found, and definite ex-

cretory organs to get rid of the waste. Free locomotion in the case of plants, apart from the Protophyta, is confined temporarily to the male cells, and, with the absence of movement, the function of sensation is at a minimum. Plants and animals thus differ in the nature of their food, yet both are dependent on the environment for supply, and that food, when elaborated into 'the physical basis of life' by contact with the living body, shows little chemical difference as animal or vegetable protoplasm.

(6) All living things exhibit *cyclical phases of activity* known collectively as a life history, in which they manifest various degrees of vitality, sometimes with accompanying change of form. Every living creature, unicellular and multicellular alike, passes through a regular cycle of changes mainly determined by forces within itself, to which there is nothing comparable in the inorganic realm. Reference has been made to a period of youth characterized in both cases by active cell-proliferation; the constructive (anabolic) phase of metabolism is then in excess of the destructive (katabolic), and the creature grows. This is followed by a period of adolescence, in which, although at first the two phases practically balance, yet the energy of division sooner or later diminishes, and is accompanied by certain morphological changes in the cells previous to fertilization—that process whereby the energy for division is renewed. This in turn—particularly in the case of unicellular forms, when fertilization is not effected—is succeeded by the period of old age, in which destruction slowly overtakes construction, and eventually the organism dies. The unicellular organism dies from protoplasmic senile degeneration just as surely as does the multicellular form. Now this 'capacity for death' is in a sense a distinguishing feature of living things. In a very real way, moreover, death is the servant of life, holding the balance between unlimited reproduction and limited feeding area. To it is due the circumstance that life is periodic in appearance; the recurrence of the living individual is a phenomenon unique in the realm of nature. This intermittent character of life is, however, seeming only. The death of the individual that has reproduced by means of a germ cell divided from off its body involves no break in that series of continuous cell divisions which thus extends backwards to the dawn of life.

To this cyclical movement there are apparent exceptions. Weismann long ago suggested the immortality of the protozoa, but it is incapable of verification, and experience is against it. In some cases of parthenogenesis that procedure is apparently strictly followed throughout the specific history, but again there is always, ultimately, death of the individual. In some of the higher plants and trees, construction appears to be continually in excess of destruction, and the tree may be said to grow as long as it lives: nevertheless the individual eventually dies, even although, *e.g.* by grafting, we have perpetuation of the race without fertilization.

Further, we remark that not merely during those internal changes of every part which comprise metabolism, but in those changes of the whole which are involved in the conception of its life history, the living organism maintains its individuality and its integrity. In spite of the constant metabolic change, in spite of growth and decay, the living organism possesses a more or less constant form which serves as the arena in which those changes are displayed. We are aware of the persistence of a state of dynamic equivalence between the organism and its environment which has no parallel in the inorganic realm. Continuously it is alive, and yet its material identity does not depend upon identity of matter. The matter changes, but the form remains more or less constant, the individuality usually even more so. These forms, with their similarities and dissimilarities, serve as the basis of classification; Morphology in its account of the internal structures that give rise to forms is the basis of classification. We may speak of life in general, but we never know it except as the special phenomena of a particular organism. Life clearly has unity or individuality at the core of its meaning, and in the scheme of nature, one of whose dominant features is a tendency towards ever higher individuation, the supreme example is found in man, with his characteristic awareness of individuality.

(7) All living things are *capable of reproduction*. Having a definite term of existence, they must reproduce themselves; otherwise the organic kingdom would soon pass out of existence. The individual dies—life is intermittent in form—not, however, before having, in most cases, by a kind of discontinuous growth, given rise to forms more or less like itself, which in their turn grow and reproduce their kind. No non-living thing reproduces itself in this way.

(*a*) *Cell-division.*—The simplest form of reproduction is by cell-division. The need for this arises directly out of assimilation. For the due interchanges (*e.g.* respiration) between a cell and its environment, a certain ratio is necessary between surface and bulk. But this ratio is disturbed by growth in the case of an organism that retains its shape, inasmuch as, while the bulk varies as the cube of the diameter, the surface grows but with the square. Further, as we have learned, the nucleus which is so intimately concerned with assimilation, is limited in the area of cytoplasm which it affects through the continual intercourse between the two. Accordingly the requisite surface is gained through division of the mass, and the mother cell loses her identity in that of the two daughter cells. Such reproduction accordingly takes the form of discontinuous growth. Growth, then, is primarily assimilation, secondarily cell-division—the multiplication of cells.

Since 1846 it has been clearly recognized that new plant cells arise only from previously existing cells by the division of a mother cell into two daughter cells (Biogenesis): it was not till many years later that enough was known about the genesis of cells in the animal kingdom to overthrow for ever the doctrine of spontaneous generation.

To-day, then, we maintain that the cell has no other mode of origin than by division of a pre-existing cell; and knowing something of the importance and permanence of the nucleus, we are prepared to believe that it plays a leading part in this process of multiplication by division. Fifty years ago Remak very naturally thought that division must commence in the very centre of the cell and work gradually outwards. Accordingly he pictured the process as beginning by division of the nucleolus, followed by constriction and division of the nucleus, and completed by division of the cell-body and membrane. Now, if we do not press the point about the nucleolus, this description holds good for several cases of cell-division in both animal and vegetable kingdoms. It is termed Direct Division (Amitotic Division).

Such a method of division seems very natural, and, if it were conducted with regularity, it would obviously result in a fair division of the total mass of nuclear substance. But so delicate is the balance of nature that this method is found to be in operation with comparative rarity; nay more, evidence is gradually accumulating to show that direct division, which is a division of the mass of the nuclear substance without formation of chromatic thread or chromosomes, rarely occurs in embryonic cells or such as are in the course of rapid multiplication; while, on the contrary, it is often characteristic of such cells as are on the way towards degeneration, of tumours and various other pathological formations. Direct division seems often to be associated with highly specialized cells whose nuclei are commonly of unusually large size; here it has proved again and again to be the forerunner of destruction. Germ-cells and fundamental tissues do not usually divide by amitosis, although certain exceptions only make the whole process more difficult to understand. The other method typically known as Indirect Division, or Mitosis (*μίτος*, 'a thread'), is complicated, and involves the arrangement of the linin and chromatin in a continuous thread, the breaking up of this thread into the characteristic number of chromosomes, their arrangement by the aid of the centrosomes on the equator of a spindle formed of linin, their exact longitudinal halving, regression towards the polar centrosomes, and re-construction as the nuclei of the daughter cells that are thus formed as the result of a division of the cytoplasm of the mother cell in the region of that same equator.

Biologists speak glibly of the separation of the chromosomes

by contraction of the spindle fibres, but it is certain that other factors, *e.g.* chemical and physical changes going on in the centrosphere and nucleus, must be taken into account before any satisfactory explanation of these marvellous phenomena is attempted. Possibly the persistent centrosome is the vehicle of ferments, which in their activity produce the characteristic cell-division phenomena. Further, it is possible that, while only the outer fibres attached to the chromosomes contract, the central fibres of the spindle actually elongate, and push the spindle poles apart: certainly the chromosomes themselves play a passive rôle at this particular stage. Boveri regards the splitting of the chromosomes 'as an independent vital manifestation, an act of reproduction' on their part. The splitting of the chromosomes is now known to involve the splitting of the actual chromatin granules, which possibly alone have the value of individuals (inasmuch as in the case of the Protozoa chromosomes are in many instances not formed), and which are found in the fashion of granules firstly to allow of their uniform growth, and secondly to admit of their precisely equal quantitative and qualitative division; for it is the end of mitosis to divide every particle of the chromatin of the mother cell equally between the daughter nuclei. Further, this splitting seems in some cases to take place independently of the centrosome, making the relation between the two more doubtful than was formerly supposed.

(*b*) *Fertilization.*—Cell division, however, is only one aspect of reproduction. With the possible exception of a few extremely low organisms, there comes a time in the life history of all unicellular forms when, after a greater or less number of ordinary divisions, it appears as if the cells were becoming worn out, were gradually shrinking in size after every such division, and showing signs of nuclear degeneration, so that a prospect of final extinction looms in the future, unless they are able to fuse together in pairs with cells of different origin, thus producing an elementary organism that becomes the starting-point for a new series of multiplications by division. Accordingly, amongst the Protozoa, the life history resolves itself into a cycle, the starting-point being furnished by any two cells which, after fusion, either separate and divide, or commence to divide as a single organism when fused, and continue so to multiply a-sexually, sometimes to the number of thousands, till what has been described as senile degeneration sets in. At this stage union of these cells with others of different origin is absolutely necessary for the perpetuation of the species. This process of cell union, of which, in those instances where the organisms latterly separate, the fundamental characteristic is a reciprocal exchange and fusion of nuclear substance —an exchange of experiences—between the uniting or conjugating elements, illustrates the simplest type of that second aspect of cell reproduction which we know as fertilization.

The number of divisions that may occur before the a-sexual cycle of reproduction closes, varies considerably with different species. Maupas in certain classical studies (*Archives de Zoologie expérimentale*, 2nd series, tome vi. pp. 165–273; *Recherches expérimentales sur la Multiplication des Infusoires ciliés*, tome vii. pp. 149–517; *Le Rajeunissement karyogamique chez les Ciliés*) shows that in the case of *Stylonichia pust.* the ability to conjugate is reached after 128–130 fissions, that at the 175th degeneration sets in if conjugation has not been effected, and that the creature dies by the 316th fission. In the case of *Paramecium caudatum*, maturity is often reached much sooner, and degeneration commences after 170 divisions. Maupas' statements have been subjected to re-examination by experiment and careful criticism, most particularly by G. Calkins, who succeeded in keeping cultures of Paramecium for 742 generations, by feeding the infusorians with various kinds of stimulating food (brain extract, beef, pancreas), and thus tiding them over three depression periods corresponding to the need for conjugation, and so prolonging their life without that process. Any argument, however, for the immortality of the Protozoa based on such artificial experimentation cannot be said to rest on a very secure basis.

In the higher forms of life, instances of parthenogenesis apart, we have a similar process—a fusion of cells of different origin; here, however, the fusing cells never separate, so that the element of exchange drops quite out of sight. The essential feature of fertilization is the union of a nucleus of paternal origin, with a nucleus of maternal origin, to form the primary nucleus of the next generation. In multicellular organisms the cells which result from the division of the fertilized egg remain associated together, thus forming a complex colony of cells, an organic individual, however, of a higher order than the *Volvox* community. In a sense this multicellular organism is morphologically comparable with the sum of the cells produced by a-sexual division from two unicellular ex-conjugates. The cycle closes in the higher forms when the sexual cells have become mature, and separate from the parent to unite in the process of fertilization, which forms the starting-point for the new generation of dividing cells. All this, of course, is a very complicated process in the case of the vertebrates and invertebrates, but in the lower multicellular Algæ it is simple enough. The capacity which every cell, *e.g.* of *Pandorina*, exhibits of helping to reproduce the whole multicellular organism is not seen when the organism is somewhat more highly developed. For in that case the cells of the body sooner or later become differentiated into two great classes, the members of which Weismann has termed somatic and germ cells respectively. The former are of prime importance for the individual life, being differentiated into those various tissues which collectively form the 'body.' The germ cells, on the other hand, are of less significance for the individual life, but in eventually giving rise to new creatures are intimately concerned with the interests of the species. This differentiation is already noticeable so far down in the animal scale as *Volvox globator*. Amongst the very numerous cells that constitute this colonial form some remain vegetative and others are transformed into reproductive cells. The eggs are large, and are fertilized by minute biflagellate male spores which are produced in dozens by the division of a mother sperm-cell. Indeed, we may consider that in the plant world egg- and sperm-cells are derived from reproductive cells which initially are similar in size, appearance, and origin, but have become differentiated through developing in different directions. The evolution can particularly well be traced in the group of the Algæ. At the same time it is right to bear in mind that the distinction, even in the case of the higher animals, is only relative, since both sets of cells ultimately have a common origin in the parent germ-cell.

Associated with fertilization in some of these higher forms is at least one interesting phenomenon complicating the life history. We have seen, *e.g.* in the case of *Paramecium*, that between two acts of conjugation a great deal occurs in the way and as the result of cell division. Now, there is an analogous state of affairs amongst higher forms. Sometimes the individual proceeding from the fertilized egg is unable itself to form reproductive cells. It can multiply only by means of buds, spores, or parthenogenetic eggs. These, or their a-sexually produced descendants, become sexually mature and produce eggs and sperms. Such a cycle is known as an alternation of generations. It occurs in the life history of some worms, as also particularly in the case of some members of the Cœlenterata.

There is, then, a stage in the development of every multicellular organism at which the progenitors of the germ-cells are apparently alike in the two sexes, and for that matter indistinguishable from the surrounding somatic cells. Then in the course of development follows their differentiation from these somatic cells, and eventually a divergence in themselves corresponding to the different functions that they will have to perform later. The female germ-cell, ovum, or egg supplies most of the substance for the body of the embryo, and stores the food whereby it is nourished. Accordingly not only is it large, but its cytoplasm is laden with yolk or food-matter, and it is usually

surrounded by one or more membranes for the protection of the developing individual. All its activities are, therefore, anabolic or constructive on the whole; for the early life of the egg consists in the accumulation of cytoplasm and the storage of potential energy. On the other hand, the metabolism of the male germ-cell or spermatozoon is destructive or katabolic. To the mass of the embryo it contributes merely a nucleus, centrosome, and a minimum of cytoplasm. Its early life is not spent in the accumulation of food material; it has about it no more protoplasm than is sufficient to form the typically single flagellum by whose active, rapid movements it seeks the ovum. Hence in their final mature state the ovum and spermatozoon have no external similarity. What we find is a physiological division of labour between the cells which are to join in the act of fertilization, in virtue of which one of them becomes active and a fertilizer, while the other remains passive and capable of being fertilized. In fact, we are forced to the conclusion that all the arrangements and adaptations connected with sex have the same two-fold object, namely, to facilitate the meeting of the sexual cells and to arrange for the nourishment and protection of the egg. The organization that effects the one part of the scheme we call male; the organization that carries out the other we term female. These relationships are secondary and have nothing whatever to do with the process of fertilization itself, which consists of the union of two equivalent and apparently similar nuclear substances derived from different cells. This means, in its turn, that the original morphological equivalence of the germ-cells (seen, *e.g.*, in the Protozoa) is lost; what is left is an equivalence of nuclei. Hence the essential fact of fertilization and sexual reproduction comes to be a union of equivalent nuclei; and to this all other processes are tributary. Although the cell character of the ovum was perhaps recognized by Schwann, yet it is not so many years ago (*c.* 1878) since the fact that the spermatozoon is likewise a cell was universally admitted.

With regard to the growth and origin of the germ-cells, it may be stated that both ova and spermatozoa take their rise from primordial germ-cells which are at first identical in appearance in the two sexes. These identical primordial germ-cells in turn arise in the case of sponges, in a jelly-like mesogloea that separates ectoderm and endoderm. In the Cœlenterata they arise in a germinal epithelium which may be either ecto-dermal or endodermal, but in the higher groups is mesodermal. What exactly determines the subsequent differentiation is not yet clearly made out. External conditions play an important, a determining part in some instances. Yung, experimenting upon tadpoles, found that by increasing the richness of the nutrition in which he kept the early undifferentiated (?) forms, he could raise the percentage of females. Maupas seemed to show with regard to rotifers that a high temperature results in the production of males. A truer reading of the facts shows that the higher temperature induced greater activity, resulting in a speedier exhaustion of the food, and, in consequence, a tendency to the production of males. It is doubtful, however, how far these experiments correspond to real facts. The decisive factor in the determination of sex is still unknown: indeed, there is evidence to show that it probably is determined previous to fertilization, which simply in that case provides the egg with the necessary stimulus to development.

The prior history of these primordial germ-cells has been very carefully investigated by different workers (Hertwig, Häcker, Boveri). They have been tracked very far back in the developing egg, and identified at their earliest appearance. In the case of the roundworm *Ascaris*, Boveri already recognizes the progenitor of the germ-cells at the two-cell stage. Further, it has been shown that this progenitor of the germ-cells differs from the somatic cells, not only in its greater size and richness in chromatin of the nucleus, but also in the manner of the subsequent distribution of this chromatin. It has been observed that only the germ-cells proper receive the sum-total of the egg-chromatin handed down from the parent, since the germ-cells in the early (5 or 6) divisions cast out a portion of that substance in the case of one of the daughter cells into the surrounding cytoplasm, where it degenerates, so forming somatic cells with less chromatin.

Fertilization we can now state to be a process by which the energy lost in a continuous cycle of divisions is restored by the admixture of living matter from another cell. It consequently entails

Fig. 8.—Fertilized ovum of Ascaris; male and female germ-nuclei, with chromatin at continuous thread stage; the centrosomes are separating. To the right are the extruded polar bodies. (From Walker's *Essentials of Cytology*, by kind permission of the publishers.)

the blending of two independent lines of descent. But when we ask—What then is the *ultimate* end of fertilization? an answer cannot be given with certainty. The mere asking of the question involves that introduction of teleological considerations which is the bane of Science, according to some of her foremost exponents; yet every one has attempted his rationale of the phenomenon.

Fertilization may be, as Maupas and others believe, rejuvenescence of the conjugating individuals: in the case of the Protozoa it certainly has this effect, for it is always the commencement of a new series of divisions—in fact, strictly it means the formation of a new individual in protozoon and metazoon alike. Further, the usual assumption in the case of *Paramecium* has been that the two ex-conjugates were equally stimulated to divide; but the more recent work of Calkins shows that in the majority of cases, 'while one individual of the original pair is markedly vigorous after conjugation, the other one either forms a weak strain or dies off at an early period' (*Biol. Bull.* vol. xi. p. 242). Now, if this is the case, it suggests in these apparently isogamous conjugants a hint of that differentiation that results in a spermatozoon losing its identity in the egg which it has fertilized. Nevertheless, experiments have shown that Ciliata can be induced to continue dividing long after the usual term has passed, and parthenogenetic eggs develop without the stimulus of fertilization. Weismann sees in it a means of mixing germ-plasms whereby variations are produced and multiplied; these variations are the material upon which natural selection is supposed to work in the production of new species. This, then, is the purpose of fertilization for him. But considerable variation has been shown to exist in the case of forms reproducing by binary fission and by parthenogenesis, contrary to the older view, which considered the forms so resulting to be mere duplicates. Consequently it is not permissible for him to say more than that fertilization is a source of variation, or is accompanied by it. But it is also possible to regard fertilization, with Darwin, Spencer, Hatschek, and others, as a means of checking variations, and so, on the contrary, of keeping the species true to the specific type. The offspring of sexual reproduction, instead of being more variable than either parent, is, so to speak, half-way between them, and so departs less widely from the mean than either of them. Which of these statements represents the truest and most complete interpretation of fertilization it is not yet possible to decide. No one of them can well be applied universally in face of the groups that show no such gametic unions, and those numerous cases in which the uniting cells are very closely related.

Previous to fertilization, a ripening process takes place in both ovum and spermatozoon, which is usually termed maturation. With this phenomenon is intimately connected a reduction in the number of the chromosomes to one-half the number characteristic of the species; in this way a progressive summation of the chromosomes throughout succeeding generations is prevented. The procedure is very complicated, and still imperfectly understood; but it is probable that, previous to the penultimate of the two final divisions by which the definitive germ-cells are formed, the peculiar condensation of the chromatin thread (synapsis), and its appearance ultimately in a number of bodies corresponding to half the typical number of chromosomes, really represent in each case a conjugation of the paternal and maternal chromosomes which have hitherto remained distinct, followed by a division in which these double chromosomes divide longi-

tudinally, succeeded in turn by a reducing division in which they divide transversely, so bringing the number to half that which is characteristic of the species, but really also segregating the paternal and maternal chromosomes into separate cells. Accordingly, the life cycle of the organism is after this fashion—conjugation of maternal and paternal cells, somatic divisions, and conjugation of maternal and paternal chromosomes.

Fig. 4.—Later stage in fertilization (Ascaris). The membranes of the germ-nuclei have disappeared, and the two chromosomes derived from each, four in all, have become attached to the spindle fibres. (From Walker's *Essentials of Cytology*, by kind permission of the publishers.)

Boveri has summarized the process of fertilization in the following words: 'The ripe egg possesses all of the organs and qualities necessary for division excepting the centrosome, by which division is initiated. The spermatozoon, on the other hand, is provided with a centrosome, but lacks the substance in which this organ of division may exert its activity. Through the union of the two cells in fertilization, all of the essential organs necessary for division are brought together; the egg now contains a centrosome which by its own division leads the way in the embryonic development' (*Sitz.-Ber. Ges. Morph. Phys.*, Munich, iii. p. 155). If this were an exact account, we should be further warranted in saying that during segmentation the blastomeres, or earliest cells of the embyro, derive their cytoplasm from that of the egg, their centrosomes from the spermatozoon, and their nuclei, *i.e.* their chromatin, in equal amounts from both germ-cells. In general terms the statement is true, but it is doubtful whether the actual centrosome of the spermatozoon identically persists as the organ around which the dividing aster directing the division of the egg is formed, or whether it is simply a locus, *e.g.* of enzymes, under whose influence a new centrosome is formed in the egg cytoplasm. Further, it has been questioned whether the sperm centrosomes are actually identical with the segmentation centrosomes, for there are cases where the former seem to disappear for a time, although this may be due to variation in staining capacity at a critical period. Still the general fact remains, that something certainly is introduced into the egg by the middle piece of the fertilizing sperm which either is the original centrosome, or has the power to stimulate the formation of one out of the egg cytoplasm—something that can divide and produce division of the cell-mass independently even of fusion of the nuclei, something that is in some way directly connected with the corresponding apparatus of the succeeding division. What it is, however, that actually starts the segmentation cannot be definitely determined; but it need not necessarily be the spermatozoon or even its centrosome. Artificially fertilization has been induced in sea-urchin eggs by exposing them to sea water whose concentration has been increased some 50 per cent. by the addition of Na Cl; development takes place right up to the larval stage (Loeb). Nathansohn has caused the parthenogenetic development of the eggs of a fern (*Marsilia*) by simply keeping them at a sufficiently high temperature, thus suggesting that the mechanism of development is in the egg, and that all it requires is a certain stimulus to set it in motion; such a stimulus in this case is the difference in metabolic activity induced by the high temperature. Accordingly we conclude generally that while the stimulus to development is normally connected with the sperm centrosome, yet this is not the only way of supplying the conditions requisite to initiate the process. While undoubtedly in some forms (*e.g.* the sea-urchin *Toxopneustes*) a real fusion of the sperm- and egg-nuclei takes place, and out of the mixed chromatins chromosomes arise, yet in other and probably the majority of animals the two nuclei simply lie closely side by side, and in that position give rise each to its own group of chromosomes preparatory to the first division. Thus the paternal and maternal chromatin may remain distinct and separate in the later stages of development, possibly throughout life. Accordingly the possibility arises that 'every cell in the body of the child may receive from each parent not only half of its chromatin-substance, but one half of its chromosomes, as distinct and individual descendants of those of the parents' (Wilson, *op. cit.* p. 208).

Every nucleus, then, arising by the segmentation of a fertilized egg-cell contains a double set of chromosomes, nuclear substance derived from both parents. As a matter of experimental fact, however, it has been ascertained in certain instances that either set is sufficient for complete development, at least as far as the larval stages. The egg may be caused to develop without the presence of paternal chromosomes, while, conversely, development has been induced in a sperm-fertilized egg from which the maternal nucleus was removed. For these and other reasons the chromosomes are now regarded as the vehicles of inheritance.

The question of the individuality of the chromosomes has lately received very close attention. From a theoretical point of view the denial of their individuality seems to make mitosis meaningless. Why this careful and accurate division of the chromosomes, if after every such division the substances of the different chromosomes are jumbled up in a common mass at nuclear re-construction? The assumption of their stability likewise gives us the better explanation of their constant number. From the practical side Rabl, so long ago as 1885, maintained, as the result of study of mitosis in the epithelial cells in the salamander, that the chromosomes do not lose their individuality between succeeding divisions, but persist in the chromatic reticulum of the resting nucleus. His idea was that the reticulum arose as the result of a transformation of the chromosomes, which gave off anastomosing branches, causing the temporary appearance of a network that was again lost as the reticulum contracted at various definite points to form the typical number of original chromosomes. Boveri, in particular, and others have further shown that, whatever be the number of chromosomes entering into the composition of a nuclear reticulum, the same number issues from it at a later stage, and in very much the same position. This is particularly striking in certain abnormal cases of fertilization, where it was noticed that the irregular number of chromosomes persisted from one cell generation to another, so suggesting that 'the number of chromosomes appearing in a nucleus during mitosis is the same as the number of chromosomes from which it was originally formed' (Walker, *The Essentials of Cytology*, p. 92). In certain species the chromosomes can be distinguished during the resting stage of the nucleus; and even if in most cases it looks as if the identity of the chromosomes was lost at this stage, yet this does not prove, of course, that it is so lost. In other species the chromosomes appear to show constant differences of size and shape, so suggesting that they may possess specific individual characters. Finally, Häcker, Herla, and Zoja have shown that, in several cases (*Ascaris*, *Cyclops*), not merely do the germ-nuclei not fuse, but they give rise to two separate yet parallel series of paternal and maternal chromosomes that remain perfectly distinct, as far, at any rate (in *Ascaris*), as the twelve-cell stage, and probably throughout life. Indeed, as the result of the later researches of Montgomery, we consider that in synapsis there is a conjugation of homologous chromosomes which are later separated in the reduction division; as a final result we have the separation of whole somatic chromosomes. Here then, in general, is an important—if it can be absolutely demonstrated—an epoch-making discovery. With Harvey's name we associate the discovery *Omne vivum e vivo*. To

Virchow we owe the induction *Omnis cellula e cellula*. Strasburger first clearly established the truth *Omnis nucleus e nucleo*. And with Boveri's name it is just possible that we shall have to establish the further truth that there are chromosome generations corresponding to cell generations, that the chromosomes of one generation arise endogenously in the chromosomes of a previous generation, that growth and reproduction, characteristic features of living things, are predicable of these intracellular units—in short, *Omne chromosoma e chromosomate*.

Boveri has further shown experimentally that qualitative physiological differences exist amongst the chromosomes; complete development is apparently possible only in presence of a particular combination of them. This suggests that some definite relation exists between individual chromosomes (or possibly the chromomeres composing them) and the development of definite characters or groups of characters. What interaction takes place during the conjugation of chromosomes we do not know. If we assume that the hereditary characters are distributed amongst different chromosomes, then their segregation is achieved at the reduction division, the results are in accordance with the Mendelian view-point (see art. HEREDITY), and the individuality of the chromosomes is fairly established. But in any case it is difficult to banish the idea of some more or less persistent morphological organization corresponding to what we at present roughly include within the conception of the chromosomes.



FIG. 5.—Cleavage of the ovum of the sea-urchin Toxopneustes (×330). The successive divisions up to the 16-cell stage (*H*) occupy about two hours. *I* is a section of the embryo of three hours, consisting of approximately 128 cells surrounding a central cavity. (From Wilson's *The Cell*, by kind permission of the publishers.)

As a result of some form of stimulus consequent on fertilization, the egg commences to segment. These cleavage divisions are similar to what has been described in connexion with mitosis, except that very early they are accompanied by differentiation. Differentiation in the higher forms of life is expressed in the establishment of tissues and later of organs, in connexion with that physiological division of labour which usually means so much greater capacity for doing work. The more complex the organic structure, the more detailed is this subdivision of labour; the greater the degree of co-ordination and unification of these activities, the higher the creature stands, as a general rule, in the scale of life. How all the different stages have arisen with their genetic continuity is the story of evolution, most interesting, if most difficult, in the lower grades of life, where, however, modern study, *e.g.*, of the Protozoa, sheds floods of light upon the question. In the course of this differentiation considerable change is often noticed in the functions of organs—what at one stage played one particular rôle is found at a later stage to function in a different manner.

Again, the cleavage divisions of the developing egg are often effected in planes that show some definite relation to the structural axes of the adult body. Typically the cells tend rhythmically to divide into exactly equal parts, and any new plane of division tends to intersect the preceding one at right angles. Variations, however, occur not merely in the rhythm, but in the quantitative character of the divisions, as also in the direction of the cleavage planes; these variations are often of regular occurrence. Not merely do the cells divide in accordance with the requirements of definite mechanical conditions, but also, and more distinctively, with reference to the future cell-orientation and structure of the animal: of this forward look, as of the unequal division that sometimes sets in as early as the first segmentation, and in every case appears sooner or later, no sufficient account has been offered. In fact, as Wilson puts it (*op. cit.* p. 377), 'we cannot comprehend the forms of cleavage without reference to the end-result.' Study of all purely mechanical factors, such as pressure, form, etc., only makes it more obvious that the work is subordinated to that of some superior controlling law of growth.

How far the later structure of the developmental form is already determined in the structure of the egg is one of the root problems of Embryology. In many cases a definite relationship appears to exist between early blastomeres and the later adult areas to which they give rise; in other cases, again, it becomes evident, particularly as the result of experiment, that there can be no definite, unalterable, pre-localization of parts of the egg. In several cases the egg axis is not established until after fertilization, and is even then experimentally alterable. But no general consideration holds in any number of cases. Cell-formation and localization of areas seem, ultimately, alike subordinate to some controlling formative process that expresses itself in growth. Development takes the form of an orderly correlated progress towards a definite end. The egg in each case in a remarkably short time evolves into a type about which certain general statements can be prophetically hazarded, but of the inwardness of this process no account can yet be given. To speak of developmental capacities as being involved in the organization of the egg is, perhaps, effective, but not informing; at the most an accurate descriptive account of the stages is within our power.

The idea of pre-determination or pre-localization of embryonic parts in the fertilized (possibly even in the unfertilized) egg cytoplasm has fascinated many workers; not, of course, in the crude sense of the early evolutionists, who maintained the existence of a pre-formed though invisible embryo, or even in some cases a miniature of the adult, in the egg, but in the more general sense that definite areas, perhaps definite substances, in the apparently homogeneous cytoplasm, correspond to definite parts which will later be built up out of them. Segmentation would then simply reveal what is already pre-determined. On the other hand, the identification of the physical basis of hereditary with nuclear material shows that such cytoplasmic pre-localization — if it exists — must be determined and controlled from the nucleus; and the attempt has been made, notably by De Vries and Weismann in their respective theories, to transfer the assumed germinal localization from the cytoplasm to the nucleus. The differentiation corresponding to later embryonic regions, which is early noticeable in the cytoplasm, is induced secondarily through the influence of the ultimate nuclear units that migrate into the cytoplasm and direct its development. In Weismann's theory, development resolves itself into the gradual qualitative distribution of these units from their massed

condition in the early cells, until at last in each cell there is simply left that particular determinant which controls it. But of these qualitative divisions, save in the reduction division in maturation, there is no evidence whatever; and facts like regeneration, and the ability of a single cell of the two- or four-cell stage to reproduce the whole embryo (*Amphioxus*), although on a reduced scale, seem to negative it; while in the cases where, as in the frog, the right cell of the two-cell stage appears to contain the material for the right half of the body, that cell if isolated can yet in great measure supply the deficiency by a peculiar kind of regeneration.

If, then, there be no qualitative distribution of the chromatin (idioplasm), if, on the contrary, it be equally distributed at every cell division, how is differentiation accomplished? Driesch has suggested that the answer lies in part in the relation of a blastomere to the remainder of the embryo. 'The relative position of a blastomere in the whole determines in general what develops from it; if its position be changed, it gives rise to something different; in other words, its prospective value is a function of its position' (*Studien*, iv. 39). The suggestion bears a true relation to what does occur in many instances; but it is evident that not merely the position of a blastomere to its neighbours, but the position of its own constituents has to be considered, for Morgan has shown that even in the case of the two-cell frog the single isolated cell may give rise to a half embryo or to a whole embryo of half size, as in *Amphioxus*, according as the isolated cell is left in its normal position, or turned upside down. This seems to indicate that all the material for a complete, if half-sized, embryo exists in the single cell of the two-cell stage, and that at this stage, as in *Amphioxus*, the blastomere is not so firmly set that it can only develop into the half of the creature that normally it would. In fact, embryology discloses a whole series of forms in which this equivalence of the cells at the early stages is greater or less, some easily overcoming the tendency to develop only (as normally) into a part, others doing so with greater difficulty, and even failing, with the result that a monster (defective larva or adult) is formed. Accordingly it would seem as if primarily the egg cytoplasm is equipotential, in the sense that the various regions do not stand in any fixed relation to parts which may develop out of them, but that sooner or later differentiation of these regions, resulting in a mosaic-like development, does take place from causes that we do not understand—sooner, as in the case of the mollusc *Dentalium*, whose single cells when separated cannot completely overcome the tendency to form a part and develop into monsters resembling pieces of a single embryo (and the same result is achieved by artificially cutting off pieces of the egg); later, as in the case of *Amphioxus*, where a cell of the two-cell stage or the four-cell stage may develop into a complete dwarf adult, either half or quarter size. A suggested solution of this phenomenon consists in assuming the various protoplasmic constituents as arranged in bands or zones (cf. Wilson, *Science*, vol. xxi., No. 530). In *Amphioxus* the first division would separate these symmetrically and equally. In *Dentalium* the division may be apparently symmetrical but really qualitative, so that all of one band or zone passes into one of the cells.

Further, it is difficult to avoid believing that differentiation of a kind, slight perhaps but still effective, has not occurred much earlier, even previous to fertilization, for the egg has a developmental history previous to that experience. These axial differentiations are probably due to the nucleus, and form the scaffolding, as it were, within which the development after fertilization goes on. The ability to re-adjust displayed by the isolated blastomeres largely depends on the degree to which this scaffolding has been effectively reared.

At the same time it must not be forgotten that this ability of the cells of an embryo to reproduce the whole organism is confined merely to the earliest stages of the developing form. Cells do become differentiated, and this seems to imply nuclear differentiation of some sort, even if not after the manner of qualitative division. It is possible that part of the chromatin may be cast out of the nucleus, or dissolved, or be transformed into something else. The former circumstance has been indeed observed by Boveri in the early somatic cells of the developing *Ascaris*. Driesch's conception of the nucleus as a 'storehouse of ferments which pass out into the cytoplasm and there set up specific activities,' is at least interesting. Certain it is that 'specific protoplasmic stuffs' are distributed to the cells in a definite way during division; and since they have a definite arrangement in the egg, to this extent development is mechanical, and the cleavage mosaic is an actual mosaic. If it could be shown that initially protoplasm contains only a few of these specific stuffs, that, as development proceeds, new stuffs are progressively formed and distributed, and finally that their number decreases and that they weaken as differentiation progresses, we should have an interpretation of development that is essentially epigenetic — progressive in the sense that new additional parts not already there are formed; and in this combination of the two older and contrasted view-points of pre-formation and epigenesis the truth is probably to be found.

Finally, we are unable to forget the dominating rôle of the environment in all development; without its stimuli the inherited organization of the living creature would not work itself out. The living form is at any moment the resultant of external stimuli acting upon its inherited organization. This has been experimentally proved time and again: a normal development is the response to normal conditions. The development is thus educed, and it may be modified by the environment; but the fundamental character and cause of it lie in the inherited organization. The developing organism and its environment react the one upon the other independently; yet in virtue of its adaptiveness the organism continually sets itself free from the control of the environment and proves itself the more constant of the two. Separation of the two is practically impossible; we are almost compelled to consider the organism and its environment as a single system undergoing change.

In conclusion, we re-affirm that of that marvellous co-ordinating power which guides development rhythmically and orderly to its predestined goal we have no explanation. As Wilson puts it, 'we no more know how the organization of the germ-cell involves the properties of the adult body than we know how the properties of hydrogen and oxygen involve those of water' (*op. cit.* 433). Of the origin of that 'co-ordinated fitness, that power of active adjustment between internal and external relations,' that capacity of the idioplasm of the germ-cell to respond to the influence of the environment so as to call forth an adaptive variation, we are in complete ignorance. This directive control, as we already saw, is a distinctive characteristic of life. See also artt. DEVELOPMENT, EVOLUTION, HEREDITY.

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BIRDS.—See ANIMALS.

BIRTH.

Introduction (E. S. HARTLAND), p. 635.
Assyro-Babylonian (T. G. PINCHES), p. 643.
Celtic (L. H. GRAY), p. 645.
Chinese (W. GILBERT WALSHE), p. 645.
Egyptian (F. Ll. GRIFFITH), p. 646.
Finns and Lapps (K. KROHN), p. 647.
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Hindu, literary (A. HILLEBRANDT), p. 649.
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Muhammadan (S. LANE-POOLE), p. 659.
Parsi (J. J. MODI), p. 660.
Roman.—See 'Greek and Roman,' p. 648.
Teutonic (E. MOGK), p. 662.

BIRTH (Introduction).—In the lowest stages of civilization the observances connected with pregnancy and child-birth are relatively simple, though the germs, and frequently something more than germs, are found of ceremonies which undergo elaboration as civilization advances. Such rites and observances may be considered under six heads:

1. The condition of tabu entailed by gestation and birth.
2. The dangers from evil spirits and from witchcraft.
3. The attempt to secure an easy delivery.
4. The attempt to secure good fortune for the child.
5 and 6. The admission of the child, and the re-admission of the parents, into society.

1. **The condition of tabu.**—It is rare to find an express statement like that made by an experienced missionary in reference to the Murray Islands, that 'the woman was not considered unclean after child-birth, nor was any ceremony necessary for her re-admission into society' (*JAI* xxviii. 11). On the other hand, this condition of tabu is sometimes, as among many Bantu peoples, emphasized by the separation of husband and wife at an early stage of the pregnancy. It is continued right into the higher civilizations, in which, even at the present day, it is perpetuated in various ecclesiastical and traditional observances. The husband and sometimes all the household are also affected by the condition of tabu, according to the well-known law of its contagiousness. A condition of tabu is conceived of as a material infection communicated by contact with the person or with anything used by him, or even by relations of kinship or neighbourhood. Women are, during the whole of their reproductive life, specially subject to it. From the attainment of puberty, at every recurrence of menstruation, as well as at every pregnancy and parturition, they are under its ban. It is a condition associated with the mysterious, the awful, and the relations of beings more than human with mankind. The processes of generation and reproduction, so mysterious even to us, are in lower stages of culture the object of emotions that we can hardly understand. Blood, too, is regarded with horror. The slaughter even of an enemy is enough to place a man under tabu: hence warriors returning from even a successful raid are required to be purified. But of all the blood that inspires horror, that which proceeds from the female organs of sex is the most effective, perhaps because its normal cause is unknown. A menstruating woman is set apart; her touch defiles; her ordinary ministrations to husband and household are suspended. It is therefore not wonderful that pregnancy and child-birth are conditions of tabu, and that others than the woman, especially her husband, are involved.

(*a*) *Couvade.*—It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that all the prohibitions imposed on husband and wife during pregnancy and at child-birth have reference to the considerations just mentioned. Many of them concern the welfare, present and future, of the child. Such, it is now well recognized, is the intention of the couvade. This custom, which has been in modern times the subject of innumerable jests at the expense of the savage husband, is very wide-spread. It is practised by a considerable number of peoples in the lower culture, but is not strictly a primitive rite. A fairly-developed example is given by Sir Everard im Thurn. Speaking of the native tribes of British Guiana, he says:

'Even before the child is born, the father abstains for a time from certain kinds of animal food. The woman works as usual up to a few hours before the birth of the child. At last she retires alone, or accompanied only by some other women, to the forest, where she ties up her hammock; and then the child is born. Then in a few hours—often less than a day—the woman, who, like all women living in a very unartificial condition, suffers but little, gets up and resumes her ordinary work. . . . In any case, no sooner is the child born than the father takes to his hammock, and, abstaining from every sort of work, from meat and all other food, except weak gruel of cassava meal, from smoking, from washing himself, and, above all, from touching weapons of any sort, is nursed and cared for by all the women of the place. One other regulation, mentioned by Schomburgk, is certainly quaint: the interesting father may not scratch himself with his finger-nails, but he may use for this purpose a splinter, specially provided, from the mid-rib of a cokerite palm. This continues for many days, and sometimes even weeks' (im Thurn, *Indians of Guiana*, p. 217).

The name *couvade* as applied to this custom, also known as the 'man-childbed,' is traceable to a misunderstanding of a phrase used by Rochefort, a French writer of the 17th cent., in his *Histoire Naturelle et Morale des Antilles*. But the 'man-childbed' is only one of a large number of observances by the husband intended for the protection and advantage of the child and of the child's mother. The close relationship between husband and wife engenders a mystic sympathy between them, so that the acts of the one are reflected in the physical condition and success or failure in enterprises of the other: each becomes, so long as the relationship endures, as it were an outlying portion of the other. Thus, when the great national hunt, held every year by the Santals of Rājmahāl, is organized, the master of the hunt leaves his wife at home lightly bound and facing a bowl of water in the centre of the room. She must remain exactly as her husband left her and continue to gaze into the bowl until she sees its contents turn to blood. If she move or divert her gaze before this occurrence, which, of course, always takes place, the success of the hunt will be imperilled. Once the change is accomplished, she is free to go about her ordinary avocations (Bradley-Birt, *Story of an Indian Upland*, 1905, p. 273). Among the tribes about Lake Nyasa, while a woman's husband is absent on a journey, she must not anoint her head or wash her face, she must neither bathe nor cut her hair, she may hardly wash her arms; her oil-vessel is kept full of oil hung up in the house or at her bedside. Any indiscretion may not merely mar the husband's domestic peace, but even cause his death (Macdonald, *Africana*, 1882, i. 80). Conversely, her absent husband will eat no salt, lest, if his wife misconduct herself, the salt may act as a potent poison (*Archivio*, xiii. 489). A married man of Timor-Laut may not cut his

hair, otherwise his wife will speedily die (Riedel, *Sluik- en kroesharige rassen*, p. 292).

This mystic sympathy extends to parent and child. Many peoples are still at the stage in which relationship is not reckoned between father and offspring; and it is probable that the purely matrilineal reckoning of kinship generally preceded that which recognizes the father's relationship. The custom of couvade proper does not appear to exist among purely matrilineal peoples,* for the sufficient reason that they do not recognize the tie of kinship on which it depends. As the result of inquiries by Prof. Tylor and Mr. Ling Roth, it is found in the greatest force among those peoples in which matrilineal is in process of transition to patrilineal kinship, and its frequency and elaboration diminish with the gathering strength and prevalence of paternal kinship, although, even in the higher civilizations, where kinship is reckoned through both parents, observances linger which are based upon the same idea of mystic sympathy (*JAI* xviii. 255; xxii. 204). Whether its gradual disappearance is due to this idea having fallen into the background with the advance in civilization has not finally been determined. Another cause has been suggested. Bachofen (*Mutterrecht*[2], 1897, pp. 17, 255) saw in the couvade the assertion of the father's relation to his child, the mode by which he claimed it for his stock rather than the mother's. Prof. Tylor, after hesitation, gave the great weight of his authority to this opinion, which is supported by some of the cases. But it is clear that the *quasi*-legal fiction which would be thus created must be founded on the pre-existing idea of mystic sympathy and the practices connected therewith. When patrilineal reckoning became fully established, the stage of legal fiction was past. The couvade became unnecessary as an assertion of paternity, and therefore would in time be dropped. (In addition to the works cited above, discussions on the couvade will be found in Tylor, *Early Hist. of Mankind*[3], 1878, p. 291; Hartland, *Legend of Perseus*, 1894–96, ii. 400; Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 1902, p. 416.)

(*b*) *Delivery in seclusion.*—It follows from the condition of tabu imposed on a parturient that child-birth must almost always take place in seclusion. Among many peoples, where the climate permits, the event takes place in the open air. The Herero woman in South Africa is delivered behind her mother's hut; and after the birth she is placed in a small hut, where she remains until the navel-string drops from the child (Dannert, *Zum Rechte der Herero*, Berlin, 1906, p. 19; *S. Afr. F. L. Journ.* i. 41, ii. 61). In British Columbia the Kwakiutl woman is delivered out of doors; the Sk'qomic woman retires to the woods, unless it be winter or retirement to the woods be for any other reason inconvenient, in which case she is delivered behind a screen of reed-mats in the general dwelling, which is of considerable size (Boas, *Brit. Ass. Rep.*, 1896, p. 573; 1900, p. 479). Among some of the tribes of New South Wales it is said that the spot to which the parturient withdraws is fixed upon by the elders of the band (Mathews, *Ethnol. Notes*, Sydney, 1905, p. 15). In tropical countries delivery frequently takes place in the forest; in the Babar Archipelago, on the seashore (Riedel, p. 354). The Indians of Rio de la Plata are delivered on the shore of a lagoon or river, where immediately afterwards they wash themselves and the infant (Granada, *Superst. del Rio de la Plata*, Montevideo, 1896, p. 56). Where parturition does not take place in the open air, a special hut is commonly provided for the purpose. In Japan this hut used to be a mere shed without a door (Aston, *Shinto*, 1907, p. 113). Where a separate dwelling is provided for menstruant women, as is often the case, the parturient retires thither to be delivered; the other occupants also being under tabu, no harm can be inflicted on them by her presence. This is the practice, for example, of the Kotas of the Nilgiri Hills and other tribes in the south of India. In comparatively civilized countries like Russia, among the peasants of the Government of Smolensk, the woman is placed for delivery in a barn or a hut at a distance from the house (*L'Anthropologie*, xiv. 716). The Votiak woman gives birth in the family dwelling, but behind a curtain, for it would be a bad omen for any one but the woman in attendance as midwife to see the birth (*Rev. Trad. Pop.* xiii. 254). This clearly means that it is not a desire for privacy on the part of the patient that leads to the seclusion, so much as a ban on the part of the other members of the household.

Where the seclusion cannot be carried out by delivery in the open air away from the community, or where by custom or special circumstances delivery takes place in the hut usually occupied, the tabu is none the less strict. In the west of Victoria the Australian woman remains in her husband's *wuurn*, or shelter, but he is required to live elsewhere; the neighbouring shelters are temporarily deserted, and every one is sent away from the vicinity except two married women, who stay with her (Dawson, *Austr. Aborigines*, p. 38). Among the Koragars of the western coast of India the hut is deserted by the other inmates for five days (*JAI* iv. 375). The Visayans of the Philippine Islands remove the fishing-nets and the fighting cocks from the house, just as when a person is dying there, else they would be unlucky (*JAFL* xix. 209). When a birth takes place in the house, the Indians of the Uaupes Valley in Brazil take everything out of the house, even the pans and pots and bows and arrows, until the next day (Wallace, *Trav. on the Amazon*, p. 345). All these objects would be affected by the uncleanness of child-birth if allowed to remain, and probably would have to be destroyed, as is done, among some of the tribes of New South Wales, with every vessel used by the parturient during her seclusion (*JAI* ii. 268). So contagious is the tabu, that, if the men do not avoid the neighbourhood of the hut, they, it is widely believed, will be unlucky in their own occupations, as in the New Hebrides, where the yams they cultivate will be spoiled (*ARW* x. 515).

(*c*) *Absence of the father at birth.*—As a rule the husband, in common with all other men, is required to be absent on the occasion of child-birth. The reason of this requirement has been supposed to be the condition of tabu under which the parturient woman lies—a condition that would be communicated to every one present. But the explanation will not fit the facts everywhere. Thus among the Opatas of Mexico a parturient is attended by her nearest relatives; but so little is seclusion deemed necessary, that men, and even children, may be present (*Amer. Anthr.* [N.S.] vi. 80). In the Loyalty Islands, again, the act of birth is a spectacle that everybody—men, women, and children—flocks to enjoy, except the husband, who alone must be absent. During the whole of the woman's subsequent seclusion, which lasts until the child is big enough to crawl, her husband never pays her a visit, though he occasionally sends her food (*JAI* xix. 503). He is under a special ban. On the other hand, some tribes require the husband to be present and act as midwife, while all other

* The present writer is aware of only one case, that of the Arawak of British Guiana (Brett, *Ind. Tribes of Guiana*, 1868, p. 101). A reference to Mr. Ling Roth's table (*JAI* xxii. 232), and to his authority (Codrington, *The Melanesians*, 1891), shows that in the other alleged case mother-right, though still the rule, has begun to give way. More information is desirable on the Arawak and their surroundings.

men must keep away. This is the custom of some of the wild tribes in the Malay Peninsula (Skeat and Blagden, *Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula*, 1906, ii. 20, 22, 25). Among the Yaroinga of Queensland the parturient is attended by an old woman as midwife, but the husband is at liberty to be present and witness the process of delivery, contrary to the practice of the neighbouring Kalkadoon, who allow only a very old man or two to be present (Roth, *Ethnol. Studies*, pp. 182, 183). The active assistance of the husband is expected in the Andaman Islands (*JAI* xii. 86) and the Babar Archipelago (Riedel, *op. cit.* 354), as well as among the Basques (*ZE* xxxi. Verhandl. 292); while among the Bontoc Igorot of Luzon he is at least present (Jenks, *Ethnol. Survey, Philippine Islands*, i. 59). In the Marquesas Islands he is not only at hand, but must have conjugal relations with his wife almost immediately after the birth when she goes to bathe (*L'Anthrop.* vii. 546).

Moreover, presence at the birth is not necessary to render the husband unclean, or, in other words, to place him in the condition of tabu. He is already subjected to it by the mere fact of his relationship to the parturient. In many cases his uncleanness is expressly affirmed; in others it is to be inferred from some of the tabus by which he is bound, and which are not to be explained by mystic sympathy with the newborn child. Indeed, the tabu extends more or less to the whole household, or sometimes even to the whole community. The Kafirs of South Africa seem to regard all the members of the kraal as unclean, for they 'eat medicine,' as on the occasion of a death (Leslie, *Among the Zulus*, p. 197). The Sulkas of New Pomerania are similarly affected; and not only the men, but their weapons and the cuttings of plants they are about to put in the ground, require to be purified (*AA* [N.F.] i. 209). To the same origin we may probably attribute the stories, framed as they now stand at a period when the custom was no longer understood, of the famous couvade of the Ulstermen, when all the male population was annually laid up as a penalty for an act of cruelty to a woman about to be delivered.

Without dogmatizing on the matter, an alternative conjecture may be hazarded that the husband's enforced absence is to be regarded as a relic of earlier social conditions, when the wife dwelt at her mother's house, and descent was counted only through women. In such a case the identity of the father of the child would be of small importance, and might even be unknown, and the occurrence would be one in which he had small concern. The conjecture is supported by the frequent, if not ordinary, presence and assistance of the parturient woman's mother when alive and within reach. This might be supposed to be merely natural, were it not that the large divergences of custom and feeling between the lower culture and our own hinder any cautious anthropologist from laying down a general rule as to what is natural and what is not. It is further supported by the custom of sundry African and Indian peoples, whereby a woman, particularly at her first confinement, returns to her maternal home, and is there delivered and remains in seclusion for a ritual period, apart from her husband and unvisited by him. Among one of these peoples at least (the Basuto) the first child belongs to, and remains with, the mother's parents (*FL* xv. 250).

(*d*) *Tabu of the child.*—The condition of tabu thus affecting father and mother extends, it need not be said, to the newborn child. It is unclean, and must be cleansed by a rite of purification which assumes various forms among different peoples; and this purification, as in Christian baptism (*q.v.*), is the rite of introduction to, and incorporation in, the community. Sometimes father, mother, and child are all purified together in one and the same rite. Among certain Indians in the north-west of Brazil both parents and child remain in seclusion for five days. The parents neither work nor wash, and their diet is strictly limited. Any transgression of these rules will be injurious to the child. At the end of the five days the husband's father gives them permission to bathe and resume their ordinary food, and a common bath by the young parents and their little one brings to a close the period of seclusion. It may be noted in reference to what has been said above, that though the father shares the mother's seclusion and abstinence, *all* men are expressly stated to be absent at parturition (*Globus*, xc. 351). The Swahili of East Africa, who are nominally Muhammadan, have a similar rite for putting an end to the forty days' seclusion and dieting of the mother. At the end of that period she and the father are required to resume cohabitation. After the first occasion of cohabitation, the father, mother, and child bathe one after the other in the same water. This ceremony is called *Kurinja Miko*, 'diet-breaking,' and it is held necessary for the child's health. Ordinary life is then resumed (*ZE* xxxi. 61). It was perhaps some rite incidental to the tabu and purification of the infant among the ancient Trausi of Thrace which was misunderstood by Herodotus (v. 4) when he described the kinsmen as sitting round the child and lamenting the ills to which it was heir. That the Trausi, in opposition to the general sentiment and practice of mankind, were pessimistic philosophers of the type implied by the historian is hardly credible.

2. **Dangers attendant on child-birth.**—That very serious dangers, however, attend the entrance upon human existence is widely, if not universally, believed. These dangers (which can be but briefly alluded to here) affect the mother as well as the child, and in some cases the father also. They arise from two sources—evil spirits and witchcraft. Against them a pregnant woman provides by means of ceremonies (often with the co-operation of priests and shamans), abstinence, and amulets. Ceremonies and amulets are also used for the protection of the newborn child. In Christian countries baptism is of all protective ceremonies the most effectual. It is probably due as much to the belief that the devil and other evil spirits have special powers for inflicting physical evil on an unbaptized child, and often for snatching it away, as to the theological doctrine of original sin, that baptism has been hastened so eagerly and widely. At Gossensass in the Tirol the devil is believed to have power over both mother and babe. Until the one is churched and the other christened, something may befall them. They must not be left in the house alone; and the nurse in attendance must not sleep, but pray without ceasing. It would be useless to make the sign of the cross by way of prophylactic over the child before it is baptized, for it is not yet a Christian, and the mother is no longer a real Christian until she is churched, for she has been despoiled of her Christianity by the child in the act of birth (*ZVK* vi. 309). By many peoples one of the kinds of spirit most to be dreaded on these occasions is that of a woman who has died in childbed. Special ceremonies are performed over the corpse of such a woman to prevent her returning for mischief (cf. *PR* ii. 269–274). To evil spirits are ascribed difficulty of parturition, the death of the parturient or of the child, the infliction of disease on the child, the carrying off of a child or its exchange (see CHANGELINGS). Witchcraft is often practised by means of the evil eye (*q.v.*). Where the exclusion of all strangers, as such, is rigid, the reason,

express or implied, very often, if not always, is the danger from this source. For the same reason precautions are observed, as in Macedonia (Abbott, *Maced. Folkl.* p. 123), in summoning the midwife. On the island of Kythnos, in the Greek Archipelago, all the mirrors are covered during labour, no one is allowed to enter the birth-chamber after sundown, and, during the first three nights, to turn away the evil eye and conciliate the Fates, all the mother's trinkets (such as ear-rings, brooches, rings, and so forth) are laid out on the bed with a pot of jam (Hauttecœur, *Folkl. Kythnos*, 7). On the island of Karpathos the child is washed and swaddled in public, and no one is allowed to enter or leave the house until this ceremony is over and the priest has blessed the babe (Bent, *Macmillan's Mag.*, July 1886, p. 201). But witchcraft may also be practised by ceremonies, as in Ovid's account of the birth of Hercules retarded by Lucina sitting before the door muttering charms, her knees pressed together, and her fingers interlocked about them, until the yellow-haired Galanthis, one of Alcmene's attendants, induced her by a false report of her mistress' delivery to spring up in surprise, and thus undo the spell (*Metam.* ix. 295). Difficult delivery may also be caused by the acts, even unintentional, of the husband. Among the fisher-folk of Lower Brittany delivery is harder when the husband is away at sea following his occupation of fisherman (Sébillot, *Folkl. des Pêcheurs*, p. 3).

3. Attempt to obtain easy delivery.—Against the agony thus inflicted and the disasters which may ensue, various countervailing means are employed. It is not an unreasonable conjecture that this is the reason why delivery is often required among savage and barbarous peoples to be effected in the open air. Probably not merely the convenience of washing but the sympathetic influence of the free waves causes the seashore to be selected in some of the Moluccas as the proper place for parturition. In the Philippines the husband strips stark naked, and stands on guard either inside the house or on the roof, flourishing his sword incessantly to drive away the evil spirits until the child is born. The recitation of charms is common. Offerings and prayers are made to benevolent gods and spirits, wherever the development of religious belief sanctions them; and these are sometimes combined with a banning of the malevolent spirits. Thus, among the Chingpaw of Upper Burma sacrifices are offered to the house-spirit, and ceremonies are performed to drive away the Jungle-*Nât* and the *swawn* or *munla*, the ghost of a woman who has died in child-birth (*Internat. Arch.* xvi., Suppl. 59). In extreme cases obscene performances take place by a band of young men in the presence of the patient, when it is believed that the evil spirits for very shame take to flight (Stoll, *Geschlechtsleben*, p. 681); though it may be doubted whether the original intention of the ceremony was not rather to overcome sterility and sterilizing influence by the exhibition of generative acts. A common spell against difficult labour is the opening of all doors and cupboards, the untying of all knots, the loosening of garments, or even stripping by all present. The Arunta husband in Central Australia, though not present at the birth, takes off all his personal adornments, and empties his wallet of knick-knacks on the ground; and his hair-girdle is taken to the woman and tied tightly round her body just under her breast, apparently with the object of driving out the child. If this be ineffectual, the husband walks slowly up and down, quite unadorned, in front of the women's camp, where his wife lies about fifty yards away, with a view to inducing the child to follow him (Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 466). In Malta a specimen of the dried flower known as the Rose of Jericho is procured and put into water in the parturient's chamber. It is believed that when it opens the child will be born. Analogous to this piece of sympathetic magic is the custom in the Mark of Brandenburg of boiling peas to bring about the birth (*ZVK* i. 183); in Karpathos the patient holds an olive branch in her hand. Then, again, care must be taken to avoid doing certain acts in the house. Nobody, for instance, in Bavaria may step over a broom—a prohibition current also in India. Nor, by a widely-diffused superstition, may anything be lent out of the house; especially fire must not be given, for fear of witchcraft. Adultery among many peoples is held to be a cause retarding delivery. In cases of difficult labour the unhappy woman is closely questioned and made to confess. It is believed that, until she does so, the child cannot be born. In Europe various saints are invoked to aid delivery. They are often successors of pagan divinities; or rather they are pagan divinities under the thin disguise of a slight change of name. In continental and insular Greece, for example, St. Eleutherios has taken the place of the goddess Eileithyia.

Amulets are intended to provide against dangers to the mother both before and after delivery, and also to the child. They are hung on the person of the mother and on that of the child, or about the house, either inside or out; or they are laid or hung in or upon the bed of the lying-in woman, or the cradle of the child. When a population has passed into the age of metals, metallic objects are held to be of special value as amulets. But such various objects as parts of sundry animals and plants, stones of remarkable shape or rarity, egg-shells, bread, besoms, salt, pitch, the husband's clothes, mirrors, crosses, consecrated girdles, magical or sacred texts, Bibles—anything, in short, that may be supposed, though for reasons often obscure to us, to cause difficulty or be repugnant to malignant spirits or evil influences—are employed; and they avail not only for assisting delivery but for protecting the mother and babe during the perilous time preceding and following birth. The use of fire and lights is almost universal. The rule that, where a mother and new-born child are lying, fire and light must never be allowed to go out, is equally binding in the Highlands of Scotland, in Korea, and in Basutoland; it was observed by the ancient Romans; and the sacred books of the Parsis enjoin it as a religious duty; for the evil powers hate and fear nothing so much as fire and light.

4. Attempt to secure good fortune for the child.—The child's future must be divined and provided for. Before birth, means are frequently taken to divine the sex of the infant, or even to ensure the sex desired. There are lucky and unlucky times for birth. The qualities and fate of a child born on one day of the week or of the month differ from those of a child born on another day—a superstition not quite extinct in England. In Greece the three Fates are believed to visit the child three days after birth, at midnight, and decide its destiny—another relic of pagan belief. To welcome and propitiate them a feast is provided. In Karpathos the ceremony is very elaborate. The child is placed, stark naked, on a pile of its father's clothes in the wooden bowl from which the family eat on feast-days. This stands in the middle of the room, and around it seven jars containing honey. In every one stands a long candle specially made for the occasion. The priest blesses the candles, and they are named after various saints. They are then lighted, and the extinction of one of them is awaited in silence.

The first to go out indicates the saint who is to be the child's protector. In the evening, guests assemble round the bowl to eat from it a confection of flour, water, honey, and butter. When they disperse, the bowl is again filled with the same mixture and left all night for the enjoyment of the Fates, who are invoked to come and bless the child (Bent, *loc. cit.* p. 203). The child's destiny is supposed to be written by the Fates on its nose or forehead, and any little mark or abrasion of the skin is called 'the fating of the Fates' (*τὸ μοίρωμα τῶν Μοιρῶν*). But they never spin the lot of a wholly happy life (Rodd, *Customs and Lore of Modern Greece*, 1892, p. 111). Elsewhere, ceremonies are performed to ascertain the child's fate and to provide, according to its sex, that it shall grow up with all the qualities necessary for its after-life. First, however, where exposure of children or infanticide is practised, a decision must be taken whether it is to live or die. Where the lineage is reckoned through the father, the child's life is usually in his hands, as among the ancient Romans and Scandinavians. In other cases the mother often decides, and herself puts the child to death. If the mother die in child-birth, savage peoples as a rule bury the child with her, on account of the difficulty in rearing it; or sometimes because they fear that she will not rest without it.

Afterbirth, etc.—A point of great importance is the disposal of the afterbirth and navel-cord, and of the caul when there is one. The Swahili inter the placenta on the spot where the delivery took place, in order that the child, through a mystic power, even after it has grown up, may feel itself continually drawn to its parents' house. The cord is worn round the child's neck for some years, and afterwards is buried in the same place. By this proceeding it is believed that the child's growth is promoted (*ZE* xxxi. 62). The Australian natives on the Pennefather River in Queensland hold that part of the *cho-i* ('vital principle,' 'soul') of the child remains in the afterbirth. The latter, as soon as it comes away from the mother, is buried in the sand, and a number of twigs are stuck in the ground to mark the place, and bound together at the top in a conical form. It is believed that Anjea—a supernatural being whose business is the making of babies out of mud and their insertion in the womb—recognizes the spot, takes out the *cho-i*, carries it to one of his haunts, and keeps it for years, until it is wanted for the completion of another baby. When he has formed a baby, he puts into it, if a boy, a portion of the father's *cho-i*, or, if a girl, a portion of the father's sister's *cho-i*. He takes an opportunity of secretly placing the baby, thus completed, in the womb of the mother for whom it is intended (Roth, *Bull. North Queensland Ethnog.* v. 68). The Toba-bataks call the placenta the younger brother of the child. They hold that every man has seven souls. One of these abides with the placenta, which is buried, but can leave it to warn the child to whom it belongs, or, if he be acting rightly, to encourage him and thus play the part of conscience. The Javanese believe that the souls of their forefathers are housed in crocodiles. In the interior of the island, after the birth of a child, the women are accustomed to take the placenta, surrounded with fruits and flowers, and lighted by little lamps, in the dusk of the evening to the river, and commit it to the waters as a gift for the crocodiles, or rather by way of dedication to the forefathers whose souls inhabit them (Kruyt, *Animisme in den Ind. Archipel*, pp. 25, 189). In Europe, on the other hand, what is most dreaded is that the afterbirth and cord should be eaten by an animal, or exposed to the evil offices of fairies or sorcerers. In Spain, for example, if the least part of the placenta were eaten by an animal, the infant would be possessed of all the bad qualities of the animal in question (Sébillot, *Paganisme*, p. 30); for the placenta and cord are regarded as being an essential part of the child. Moved by the same belief, the Kwakiutl of British Columbia take precisely the opposite course of exposing a boy's placenta where it will be eaten by ravens: he will then have the gift of foreseeing the future. The same tribe bury a girl's placenta at high-water mark, in order that she may grow up an expert clam-digger (Boas, *Rep. Brit. Ass.*, 1896, p. 574). The Swahili practice, already mentioned, of wearing the cord is wide-spread. Even in Europe the cord is preserved and often worn as a talisman, or given to the child at different crises of life to suck.

The custom of planting a tree at a birth is common among sedentary nations. Such a tree is regarded as having a mystic relationship with the child. It is an index of the child's condition and fate: it grows, prospers, and decays with the child. Very often the placenta and cord are buried beneath it, as in countries so far apart as New Zealand and Old Calabar. In Pomerania the afterbirth is buried at the foot of a young tree. The Hupa of California split a small Douglas spruce, place the umbilical cord in the opening, and tie the tree together again. 'The fate of the tree is watched, and the future of the child is judged accordingly' (Goddard, *Life and Culture of the Hupa*, p. 52). Elsewhere, as in the Moluccas, the afterbirth is hidden in a tree. If we are not always told that the tree is in these various ways united with the child's fate, we may suspect that very generally a mystic connexion with the child is established.

Similar superstitions attach to the *caul*. A child born with a caul is endowed with extraordinary powers. Among the Negroes of the West Indies and North America, and among the Dutch, he can see ghosts. In England it is believed that he cannot be drowned, perhaps because (as the Icelanders believe) the caul contains the child's guardian spirit (*fylgia*) or a part of its soul. The Icelandic midwife therefore is careful not to injure the caul. She buries it beneath the threshold over which the mother has to pass (Grimm, *Teut. Myth.*, 1880–88, ii. 874). It is probable that this proceeding is adopted in order that in the event of the child's death the soul may re-enter the mother and so the child may be born again—a belief frequently implicit, and sometimes more than implicit, in the like burial of dead and still-born babes. However that may be, the caul is everywhere prized. In many places it is sewed up in a bag and hung round the child's neck, or preserved elsewhere. In Königsberg it is carried to baptism with the child (Ploss, *Kind*, i. 13). It is also regarded as a talisman valuable in itself, and is sold and bought as a preservative against shipwreck and for other luck-bringing purposes. In England, a century ago, or even less, advertisements of such objects for sale were not very rare in the newspapers.

5. **Admission of the child into the community.**—The moment comes at length when the most imperious tabus relating to the child are put an end to and the child is introduced into the community. He cannot, as a rule, become a full-fledged member of the community until he has, years later, passed through the puberty ceremonies; but he may be recognized as a portion, however imperfect, of the family or clan on emerging from the seclusion which follows his birth. The ceremony of reception and that of release from tabu (or purification) are, as already pointed out, the same. The giving of a name in many cases forms part of it, though the name so given is not neces-

sarily that which the child will bear throughout life. These three objects are effected in Christianity by baptism; and there can be little doubt that Christianity has in infant baptism taken up and modified, to suit its own teaching, certain pre-existing ideas and rites (see BAPTISM).

(*a*) *Visit of friends.*—Prior to the ceremony of reception, however, the relatives, and especially the female friends of the mother, despite her tabu, often pay her a formal visit to offer their congratulations and inspect the baby. It is an occasion for rejoicing, on which the visitors either bring or receive presents. It is not, however, without danger for mother or child. The evil eye is particularly dreaded, and the guests are expected to put themselves above suspicion by their expressions and conduct. They must, as is usual at other times for this purpose, either salute the child in the name of God, or speak of it as a nasty, ugly little thing, or use some such offensive expression. This is the only way open to them of praising it: direct praise is dangerous. A very common rite is to spit on it—a rite known equally well in Eastern Uganda and in Western Ireland, indeed, throughout Europe (see EVIL EYE, SALIVA). In Austria, visitors are sprinkled with holy water. Among some peoples the neighbouring children are invited to see the child, and take part in a ceremony, and are feasted—a custom practised by the Continental Jews, the Watubela Islanders, the ancient natives of Mexico, and others. It is perhaps a rite of sympathetic magic.

(*b*) *Recognition by the father.*—Formal recognition of the child as his by the husband is among various peoples a preliminary to the actual reception into the community, though it is sometimes combined with that ceremony. Occasionally it is preceded by a test of legitimacy, as among the Baganda (*JAI* xxxii. 31), where the rite is performed not by the husband, but by his father. Recognition is effected in various ways. The Santal father murmurs the name of his ancestral deity, and puts his hand on the child's head (Hunter, *Annals of Rural Bengal*, p. 203). The Fijian father makes a gift of food (*JAI*, xiv. 23). Among the ancient Norse the child was laid on the earth when born, and not lifted up until the father gave permission. This permission decided the child's fate, for otherwise it would have been exposed or put to death; but doubtless it involved also an acknowledgment of paternity. Recognition by the father involves reception into the immediate kin. Among the Amaxosa a feast is given on the occasion; the father goes to the kraal and chooses a cow from whose tail he pulls a tuft of hair and hands it to the mother. She fastens it round the child's neck. Neither the cow nor any of her posterity may be sold or disposed of in any way to strangers; but if the child be a girl, they are handed over with her on her marriage (Fritsch, *Eingeb. Süd-Afr.* p. 108). Among the ancient Welsh it would seem that there was no binding recognition by the father until the mother had first taken a solemn oath upon the altar and the relics that he and none other was the father. If the father then did not deny the child by an equally solemn ceremony within a year and a day, he could not afterwards deny him. The mode of reception into the kin was by a kiss; for a kiss, says the code of Gwynedd, is a sign of affinity. If the father were dead, the ceremony was performed by the chief of the kindred with six of the best men of the kindred; if there were no chief of the kindred, then by twenty-one of the best men of the kindred; and once performed it was conclusive (*Anc. Laws of Wales*, Venedotian Code, ii. 31).

(*c*) *Presentation to the god.*—Sometimes the child is presented to the divinity. The Chingpaw of Upper Burma formally announce the birth to the house-spirit, and place the infant under its protection (*Internat. Arch.* xvi., Suppl. 60). In Mexico the Tarahumara mother on the fourth day after delivery goes to bathe, and lays the child down naked and exposed to the sun for an hour, that Father Sun may see and know his new child (Lumholtz, *Unknown Mexico*, i. 273). The Wichita present the child to the moon, praying for its growth and other blessings (Dorsey, *Myth. Wichita*, pp. 11, 19, 29). A somewhat similar ceremony is performed by the Ronga mother in South Africa; but, since the Baronga do not worship the moon, the words used are rather an incantation than a prayer; 'Grow, grow, grow; there is thy moon!' (Junod, *Baronga*, p. 17). Among the Basuto, in the second month after birth, the child is made to look at the moon, which is called his wife if a boy, or her playmate if a girl (*Bull. Soc. Neuchat. Géog.* ix. 121). On the island of Kythnos, if the child suffers from any complaint, it is presented to the new moon with the prayer: 'O new moon, I shall be very grateful if thou wilt cure my child' (Hautte-cœur, 9). In direct contrast to these practices is the Albanian forbidding of children to look at the moon. The Euahlayi of New South Wales also forbid them to look at the full moon. Among the Hupa of California a curious method of presentation to the divinities is practised. Parturition takes place in the house set apart for women in a state of tabu. The first ten days are a period of great danger to the child; and they are spent in rites to ward off the evil spirits. At the end of the period a little of the child's hair is cut off and put in the fire. 'It was thought that the divinities on smelling the burning hair became cognizant for the first time of the child's existence.' The ceremonies culminating in the burning of the hair are thus, it would seem, not merely intended to ward off evil spirits: we are justified in thinking that they are ceremonies of purification. After they are over, the mother and child leave the parturition-house, though the mother is under tabu for some time longer (Goddard, *Hupa*, Berkeley, Cal. 1903–4, p. 51. The author states elsewhere that the mother remains in the parturition-house for a longer period [p. 18]).

(*d*) *Ceremonies of admission.*—The community into which the child in lower stages of civilization is more or less formally introduced is primarily that of the kin; and, wherever ancestor-worship or the cult of a divinity in the more accurate acceptation of that term is practised, reception into the community and presentation to the divinity are, as a rule, only two aspects of the same ceremony. Thus, among the Chukchi, on the fifth day after birth the mother and child are drawn in a sledge round the tent, sunwise, to the place of sacrifice. The reindeer employed to draw the sledge is then slaughtered; the mother and child, at least two other members of the family, the sacred amulets, and the three central poles of the tent-frame are painted with the blood. The mother then proceeds to divine which of the deceased relatives has returned; and, on this being ascertained, the name of the relative in question is imposed upon the child by acclamation of the people present (*Jesup Exped.* vii. 511). The painting with blood of the sacrificed reindeer has placed the mother and child under the protection of the divinities, and has also united them with the kin represented by those members who have been painted and by the other persons present. And this is completed by the identification of the ancestor who has returned in the person of the child. The Herero of German South-West Africa perform an elaborate ceremony when the mother is released from her seclusion. She takes the

child to the sacred fire, which burns on the hearth in the open air at the eastern side of the hut where the chief of the *werft* lives. She is sprinkled with water by the chief's eldest unmarried daughter, whose duty it is to keep the fire always burning. She seats herself on the outspread hide of an ox, and the chief spurts a mouthful of water over her and the child, afterwards addressing his ancestors: 'To you is a child born in your village; may this [village] never come to an end!' Then he rubs mother and child with fat and water, taking the child upon his knees in doing so. He takes the child in his arms, and, touching its forehead with his own, he gives it a name. The other men present repeat this action on the child, uttering the name already given by the chief of the *werft* or the father, or, if they please, each giving a new name (*S. Afr. F. L. Journ.* ii. 66). Here both the mother and child are purified, and the child is presented to the ancestral spirits and received into the kin. Where, as, for instance, among the ancient Mexicans, the worship of gods had been evolved, the ceremony took place at the temple. There the child was presented to the god, and there it received the gifts which were a recognition of its membership of the kin (Payne, *Hist. of New World*, 1899, ii. 479). Among the Santals of Bengal the child is admitted into the family by a secret rite which includes the recognition by the father of his paternity. Admission into the clan is more public; it takes place three days after the birth of a girl, or five days after the birth of a boy. The child's head is shaven. The clansmen stand round and sip water mingled with a bitter vegetable juice. The father solemnly names the child, and the midwife thereupon sprinkles rice-water over each of the visitors, pronouncing, as she does so, the child's name. The family, which up to this moment has been unclean, is by the ceremony re-admitted with the newborn babe into the clan, and the kinsmen on both sides sit down to huge earthen pitchers of beer previously provided. Admission into the wider circle of the race takes place some four or five years later. It consists in marking the child's right arm with the spots indicating his Santal nationality, and the drinking of beer by the friends of the family, who, irrespective of clan, have been invited (Hunter, *Rural Bengal*[7], 1897, p. 203). The bestowal of a name among the Kayans and Kenyahs of Borneo is accompanied with great formalities. It is the starting-point of the child's life in its social aspects; before it is named, the child would not be enumerated as one of the family, and would not be mourned for any more than if it had been still-born—it is, in fact, non-existent (Furness, *Born. Head-hunters*, p. 18).

(*e*) *Admission in the higher religions: baptism.*—In the higher religions, as in Muhammadanism and Christianity, the dedication of the child to God effects its entrance into a wider society than that of the kin, and the importance of the ecclesiastical rite tends to efface its social meaning. The ecclesiastical rite insists on the relation between the child and the Deity, and the effect on the child as a social being falls into the background. But outside the ecclesiastical rite the occasion is often made one of social interest. The Swahili, a Bantu people of East Africa, have accepted Islām, which they practise diluted with much of the ancient paganism. Forty days after its birth, all friends of the house assemble for the baptism of the child. The whole night is occupied with ritual readings from a sacred book, repeated after the reader by all present. At four o'clock in the morning (the hour when the Prophet was born) the actual baptism and naming take place. The celebration is then closed with a feast (*ZE* xxxi. 67).

Throughout Europe the most curious ceremonies and superstitions attend the baptism of a child. The utmost importance is attached to the choice of godparents, for the child inherits their qualities. They must therefore be morally and physically in a state of purity and without any bodily defect. In the Sollinger Wald, for example, they must take care to rinse their mouths with water before going to the ceremony, and abstain from spirituous liquors until it is over (*Am Urquell*, ii. 198). In Provence, if one of them were one-eyed, a stammerer, bandy-legged, or a hunchback, the child would be afflicted in the same way (Bérenger-Féraud, *Trad. de la Provence*, p. 171). The invitation to become godparents is frequently of the most formal and deferential character, by special messenger or the father in person, or else by letter. It is sometimes, as in the south-west of France, given before the birth. This is a practical necessity where baptism follows speedily on birth. The number of godparents varies: in one German family as many as twenty-three are recorded on one occasion—a luxury in which only wealth could indulge. The child's future depends on the conduct and even the dress of the godparents. On the way to the church they must not look round, or stand about, or perform any bodily needs. Their thoughts must not wander during the ceremony. Above all, they must make no mistake in repeating the Creed; nor must the clergyman stutter or make a mistake in the service. On the way back from church the same care is necessary; but now they are expected to give alms, especially to children. There are also rules as to the manner in which the children are held at the font, as to the order in which they are to be presented if more than one child be baptized on the same day, and so forth, on which much of the child's luck depends. The parents themselves do not attend the baptism. They are (at least the mother is) still under the ban, being as yet unchurched. But where this is the case, their occupations during the absence of the little one do not affect it any the less. The Esthonian father runs rapidly round the church during the service, that his child may be endowed with fleetness of foot (Grimm, *Teut. Myth.* iv. 1845). The mother, in some parts of Germany, must read her Bible and hymn-book, that the child may be able to learn easily. Elsewhere she has to perform nine kinds of work, that the child may be active. The child's conduct at the font, too, is much regarded. If it cries, in most parts of England the devil has gone out of it. But this is not the universal belief. In Auvergne, if it does not cry, it will be good; at Liège, if it cries, it will become a bad character. At Marseilles, to cry is a sign of a good constitution; but it is also the sign of an arbitrary and choleric temper. In Germany, the child who cries will not live to grow old; in Portugal and elsewhere, on the other hand, the child who does not cry will hardly live. On leaving and returning to the house a special ritual has frequently to be followed. Among the Masurs about Gilgenburg the midwife carries out the child, stepping over an axe on which three glowing charcoal brands are laid: this is held to be the best preservative against everything evil. A piece of steel is elsewhere among the same people packed in the child's swaddling clothes, or laid from time to time upon its eyes. The midwife says three times as she goes: 'I take away a heathen and bring you back a Christian' (Töppen, *Abergl. aus Masuren*[2], 1867, p. 81)—a sentiment of very common provenance. The child, on returning, is carried thrice round the table. These and other ceremonies, too numerous to be detailed here, intended to affect the child's after-life, are found

in some form or other all over Europe. When they are at an end, the feast begins, sometimes in the inn, sometimes in the parental dwelling, at which the child is now qualified to be, and frequently is, present. The godparents, the clergyman and sacrist, and the midwife are joined by the relatives and neighbours. Christening cakes are everywhere a special feature of the meal. The godparents must taste of every dish, in order that the child may speedily learn to eat and may thrive accordingly. The occasion is one for merriment, games, practical jokes, and dancing. It need not be said that the godparents are expected to present gifts to the child and to the midwife. So far as the child is concerned, that is only the beginning of their duties. He will expect gifts and help from them whenever in the course of his life he needs them. In some places, as in the Tyrol, the godparents of the first child of a family fulfil the same office for the subsequent children: it would be an insult to them to ask any others. In Greece the unbaptized child is called *drakos*, or dragon. It is not yet a fellow-Christian. The epithet, moreover, is probably deemed to have an influence on its future development by promoting its strength. At baptism the priest and godparents dance round the font. In Karpathos, on its return home the mother meets the little procession on the threshold with a ploughshare, the hollow of which is filled with embers. She waves this before the child to secure for it strength and skill in agriculture. The child is then solemnly delivered by the godfather into her hands, no longer a *drakos* but a Christian; and sweets and raki conclude the rites (Bent, *loc. cit.* p. 204).

The christening feast is the analogue of the merry-making which very generally in the lower culture follows a birth. Thus is celebrated the accession of a new member to the community. Children are the greatest asset of a people; they are a pledge of its continuance; and in a barbarous society they are often a source of wealth rather than a drain and an encumbrance. The ideas of barbarism persist in the peasant classes of Europe, among whom the various and complicated ceremonies roughly enumerated above are observed. The actual rite of reception into the community has taken an ecclesiastical form, that of baptism; and round it these other ceremonies cluster. They present, it is true, the appearance of regarding only the child. But this is delusive. It is to the interest of the entire community that the new member should grow up well-conducted, strong, and prosperous. The auguries, the omens, the provision for securing the child's future luck, are an index of the importance which the community, first in the narrower sense of the family, and in a less degree, but still really in the wider sense of the village and neighbourhood, feels to attach to the moral and mental qualities and the material prosperity of the neophyte.

6. **Re-admission of the parents into the community.**—The tabu of the mother is in the lowest stages of civilization often comparatively light. Among the Arunta of Central Australia the mother leaves her husband's camp and goes to that of the unmarried girls, where she is delivered; and there she remains for three or four weeks. She then resumes her ordinary life, so far as appears, without any special ceremony of purification. When among the Uaupes of Brazil birth takes place in the hut, everything, as we have already seen, is taken out of the house until the next day. The mother then washes herself and her child in the river, and returns to her hut, where she remains without doing any work for four or five days (Wallace, *Trav. Amazon*, 1853, p. 345). She is perhaps not yet completely pure, but the traveller's account does not enable us to say whether any further ceremony is performed. In the west of India the hut in which a Koragar mother is delivered is deserted by the other inmates for five days. On the sixth day the mother and child are restored to purity by a tepid bath, and the child is named. Rice and vegetables are presented to the mother; several coco-nuts are split, and given, one half to her, the other half to her husband (*JAI* iv. 375). When the mother is returning to ordinary life, in some of the tribes of New South Wales part of her hair is burnt off: this is doubtless a ceremony of purification (*JAI* ii. 268). The Maori have two alternative ceremonies to deliver the mother and child from *tapu* and make them *noa* (common). The one consists in the cooking on new fire (made by friction) of fern-root, which is waved over the child and brought into contact with it, and then offered to the *atua* (gods or ancestral spirits). In the other, mother and child are sprinkled with water by means of a branch, food is offered to the *atua*, and the branch is planted in the ground; if it grows, the child will become a warrior (*JAI* xix. 98).

Much more complex rites, elsewhere repeated, are required to restore the new mother to purity. The Hopi mother must not see the sun or put on her moccasins until the fifth day. She then bathes her head and her baby's with amole, and is at liberty to go out of doors and to resume the charge of household affairs. She is not, however, fully cleansed. She cannot yet eat meat or salt, and may drink only warm water or juniper-tea. The bathing must be repeated on the tenth and fifteenth days. On the twentieth day a much more elaborate rite takes place, including a vapour-bath administered to the mother, usually by her husband's mother or sister. The house is thoroughly cleansed. The child is formally bathed and rubbed with corn-meal, named, and presented by the mother to the sun at the moment it rises above the horizon. In the house a feast is prepared, and presents are made to the guests in return for those which the mother has received from them during her confinement (*Journ. Am. Ethn. and Arch.* ii. 165). Here it will be observed that the unbroken series of ceremonies culminating on the twentieth day effects the restoration of the mother to purity, and at the same time the purification and naming of the child. Mother and child are thus admitted together into the community. In some cases, as we have already observed (§ 1 (*d*)), father, mother, and child are simultaneously thus purified and admitted.

But while it may be possible in many stages of society for a mother to remain for a length of time under the ban, this would be very inconvenient, not to say impossible, for the father, upon whom lies the duty of providing for the wants of his family. As a rule, therefore, his tabu is light and easily got rid of, while that of the mother may extend over a lengthened period and be only progressively removed. Suckling often goes on for a lengthened period—two, three, or even four years. Among many peoples the mother is in some degree unclean until the child is weaned: she may not eat certain food or have matrimonial relations with her husband. This rule is general, for example, among the Bantu and negro tribes of Africa, and is the excuse given for the polygyny so largely practised by those peoples. The same rule applies to the Sakalava of Madagascar; but it is said that, although the Southern Sakalava woman is tabu at this time to her husband, she may admit to her bed any other man, subject to a fine payable to the husband if he discover the infidelity (van Gennep, *Tabou et Totémisme*, 1904, p. 168).

The tabu on the mother is practised also in Europe. The rule is very general that she must not go outside her home until she goes to be churched. Before that ceremony she is distinctly regarded as impure. Special precautions must be taken to drive away the powers of evil. She must eat apart; she must not work; she must not enter another house lest she bring ill-luck. When she goes to be churched (usually on the fortieth day), she steps over a hatchet or a knife fixed in the threshold of the house; a flaming brand or a packet of salt is thrown after her. On her return a feast is provided to celebrate her re-entry into ordinary life. In Karpathos the mother takes her child and a jug of water to church. The water is blessed after the churching ceremony. She then visits her neighbours, sprinkling water from the jug at each house, 'that your jugs may not break.' As she crosses the threshold she puts the handle of the door-key into her mouth, 'to make the plates as strong as the iron of the key' (Bent, *loc. cit.* p. 205). Newly fortified and cleansed by the rites she has undergone, she is no longer *tabu*, a centre of infection, but, with her child in her arms, a fountain of beneficent and in particular of prolific influence; and the interpretations of her proceedings just quoted must not be taken literally.

The foregoing general account of the rites and superstitions connected with birth is, of course, the merest sketch. But it is believed that it will suffice to give a notion of the meaning of, at all events, the most important and wide-spread customs, and of the ideas attached to them. See also BAPTISM, CHANGELINGS, CHARMS AND AMULETS, DIVINATION, EVIL EYE, FAMILY, INFANTICIDE, NAMES, PURIFICATION, TABU, TWINS.

LITERATURE.—The best general accounts of birth customs and superstitions are to be found in *Das Kind in Brauch und Sitte der Völker*, by H. Ploss, 2nd ed., 2 vols., Leipzig, 1884, and *Das Weib in der Natur- und Völkerkunde*, by the same author, 3rd ed., edited by Max Bartels, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1891, and subsequent editions. For the customs and superstitions of particular peoples, reference may be made to the various works cited above, and to others too numerous to mention here. In this, as in other departments of anthropology, there is now a large accumulation of materials in monographs, works of scientific explorers and missionaries, the journals of anthropological (including folklore) and geographical societies, and the publications of American and European museums and universities, and of the Bureau of Ethnology at Washington.

E. SIDNEY HARTLAND.

BIRTH (Assyro-Babylonian).—With the Assyro-Babylonians, as with other nationalities, especially the Semites, the birth of a child was an event of importance, and all the more so if the newborn happened to be a male. It is true that records of births are rare, but the attention paid to such events may be judged from the reference to the 'geometrical number' in Plato's *Republic*, viii. 546 B–D.* Even the ideal city, it is there stated, will come to decay, the cause thereof not being in the city itself, but from without. This degeneration was brought about by wrong or inopportune marriages and births. Plato then constructs a 'geometrical number' out of the elements which express the shortest period of gestation in man (216 days), the number in question being 12,960,000, which he calls 'the lord of better and worse births.' The connexion of 216 with 12,960,000 is rather complicated, but the former may be obtained by cubing 3, 4, and 5, and adding together the results. These numbers are also the elements of the Bab. sexagesimal unit (60), which, multiplied three times by itself, produces the 'geometrical number' referred to. As that high number, and numerous others connected with it, are found in the Assyr.-Bab. mathematical texts, there would seem to be no doubt that both that and the idea connected with it originated with the older of the nations which have handed down to us the tablets. It is natural that parents should desire to have fine and healthy offspring, but, in addition to this, the Assyro-Babylonians seem to have sought the improvement of the race by trying to arrange that births should take place at the proper time—with them, the periods when the moon had reached certain positions, either in its phases or in its course, probably the former. The numbers expressing these positions are contained in the British Museum fragment 80–7–19, 273, and are all fractions of the 'geometrical number.' They show the progress of the phases of the moon, culminating on the 15th (the moon's 'Sabbath'*), and decreasing afterwards.†

Naturally, there is at present much doubt as to how these numbers were used in deciding the times for propitious births, but certain celestial forecasts referring to the moon will give an idea of the method employed. Thus, if on the 16th of the month Tammuz an eclipse of the moon, or on the 16th of Chislev an eclipse of the sun, take place, pregnant women, it is said, will not have their offspring prosper (a variant has 'their offspring will fall').‡ This is the day after the moon was regarded as reaching its maximum fullness; and as that date would be an unexpected time for an eclipse, it seems to have been regarded as an evil omen. Independently, however, of the lunar numbers and dates influencing births, the moon was supposed to affect the offspring in other ways; for, when a halo surrounded our satellite, women, it was believed, would bring forth male children. Also, if the star Lugala or Šarru, 'the king' (*Regulus*, Merodach), stood in its place, women would likewise bring forth male offspring.§

Notwithstanding the moon's importance in its influence over births, it seems to have been less regarded than Ištar or Venus, and that goddess less than Zēr-panîtum, the spouse of Merodach, as is indicated by the name *Eru'a*, 'conception,' or the like, which she bore. It is on this account that, in the bi-lingual legend of the Creation, she appears under the name of *Aruru*, as the one who formed, with Merodach, the creator of all things, the seed of mankind.‖ Among the names of Ištar-Zēr-panîtum bearing on this subject were *Ama-du-bat=ummu pitât burki*, 'the mother who openeth the loins'; *Nagar-šaga*, 'the framer of the fetus'; *Šasuru*, 'the goddess of the fetus'; *Nin-tur*, 'the lady of the womb'; *Nin-zizna=bêlit binti*, 'the lady of birth(?)'; *Nin-dim*, 'the lady of procreation'; *Ani*, *Ama*, *Mama*, and *Mami*,¶ all, apparently, meaning 'mother.' It will thus be seen that the Assyr.-Bab. name of Zēr-panîtum (for Zēr-banîtum, 'seed-creatress'), which she bore (often transformed by Assyriologists into *Šarpanitum*, 'the bright one'), is more than justified.

In addition to his spouse, however, Merodach himself appears as a deity of generation, or god of birth—whether by reflexion, as it were, of his spouse Zēr-panîtum, or because he was regarded as 'begetter of the gods,' is uncertain; though the theory of reflected power is possibly the right one, since Merodach was the creator of the gods only because identified with them—an identification due to the theory by which, after the rise of Babylon (the city of which he was patron), the

* See Hilprecht's excellent exposition of the connexion of Plato's and Pythagoras' numbers in *The Babylonian Expedition of the University of Pennsylvania*, 1893 ff., vol. xx. pl. 1, p. 29 ff.

* See *PSBA*, 1904, p. 55.

† See *JRAS*, April 1909, p. 537, footnote.

‡ See *WAI* iii. 60. 28 (*a*); and for the same day of the 5th month, 114 (*b*). The same omen is given for the 20th of Tishri in 57 (*a*).

§ Pinches, *Texts*, pl. 2, K 178, lines 5–6.

‖ *JRAS*, 1891, p. 395, line 21. See also pp. 397, 399, 400 405.

¶ *PSBA*, vol. xxxi., 1909, p. 21 and pl. 3; cf. *Cuneiform Texts from Bab. Tablets*, xxv. pl. 30, K. 2109, lines 9–12.

other gods, including the older ones, became merely his manifestations. The name which he bore in this connexion was Tutu,* which is rendered *mûllid îlâni, mûddiš îlâni*, 'begetter of the gods, renewer of the gods.'†

Children being naturally desired, it is not to be wondered at that a letter should exist congratulating a woman that she was likely to become a mother. In this text Arad-Bêl writes to Epirtum, whom he calls his sister,‡ 'My heart hath rejoiced that thou art *enceinte* (*libbâa ilṣi* (?) *kî târi*).'§ Notwithstanding this natural desire, however, the Babylonians believed in the existence of certain stones and plants, of which they presumably made use, which furthered or prevented not only love, but also conception and bearing—*âban êri, âban lâ êri*, 'stone of conception, stone of non-conception'; *âban âlâdi, âban lâ âlâdi*, 'stone of bearing, stone of not-bearing'; *šammi êri, šammi lâ êri*, 'plant of conception, plant of non-conception'; *šammi âlâdi, šammi lâ âlâdi*, 'plant of bearing, plant of not-bearing.'‖ The 'plant of bearing' is referred to in the Etana-legend, in which the hero says to the sun-god Šamaš: 'Give me then the herb of bearing—show me then the herb of bearing! Bring forth my offspring and shape for me a name.' Whether this implies that a glance at the plant was sufficient is uncertain; in all probability a potion was made from the herb which one or both of the prospective parents had to drink. The sun-god tells Etana how to acquire the plant, and he goes and asks the eagle, which is one of the personages in the legend. It was probably in search of this plant that Etana, on the eagle's back, mounted up to heaven, and apparently appealed to the goddess Ištar; but the mutilation of the record deprives us of the sequel.¶

References to birth-rites in the Assyr.-Bab. inscriptions are rare, but there is every probability that the present material will be greatly augmented by the discovery of further stores of inscribed tablets. In the account of the birth and exposure of the infant Sargon of Agadé by his mother, there is no reference to any ceremonies or incantations which she may have made on his behalf. In all probability, however, the mother of a newly-born infant was regarded as being incapable of initiating any prayers or ceremonies herself, and another person, possibly a priest, would seem to have been employed to perform the duty. The British Museum fragment K 879 has apparently part of a prayer, or incantation, recited on behalf of a pregnant woman and her prospective offspring:

'The woman . . . . . .
Her binding, which is before thy divinity, may it be relieved;
. . . . . safely may she bring forth—
May she bring forth, and may she live; may what is there prosper.
Into the presence of thy divinity safely may she go,
Safe[ly may she bring forth, and] may she perform thy service.'

This fragment, which has neither beginning nor end, is bi-lingual, having been used by the Sumero-Akkadians as well as by the Semitic Babylonians.

A rather remarkable reference to creation and birth occurs in the 4th column of the legend of Atarpi, or, as Jensen* reads the name, Atar-ḫasis (the Chaldæan Noah, if this be correct). Apparently the mother-goddess, Maḫ or Mami (Zēr-panîtum, the spouse of Merodach), after uttering her incantation, threw down clay, and detached therefrom 14 pieces, laying 7 to the right and 7 to the left, placing a brick or tile between. Then, seemingly, she called out, 'Women, husbands!' There were 7 and 7 fetus (representatives of future living things)—7 were made male, and 7 female—fate formed (each) fetus. 'Forms of human beings Mami shaped them.' In the house of the undelivered woman about to bear, a brick was to be placed for 7 days, for the protectress (?) of the house, Maḫ, the spouse Mami. They (apparently the fetus) were to become swarms (?), and there was to be joy in the house of the undelivered woman. When the woman about to bear brought forth, the mother of the child was expected to withhold (?) (her)self. Two mutilated lines follow containing the words *zikaru*, 'male,' and *elli-*, . , probably part of *êllitu* (*-ti, -ta*), 'pure,' suggesting that she was to keep from men, and purify herself. This text being exceedingly difficult, there is much therein which is doubtful, but the words which are certain make it a valuable contribution to the subject of the ritual attending births in Babylonia. It is not implied in this inscription that images of children were made when the birth of a child was expected, but the brick, which is referred to, was probably regarded as sufficient. It would seem to have typified the building up of the house or family.

Tablets of late date show that the hour of birth was carefully noted, and celestial observations were made for the purpose of casting the horoscope, if the child was a male; and, probably, other ceremonies followed. If a conclusion may be drawn from the tablet K 1285, it would seem that, at least in the case of the children of people of note, certain ceremonies took place in the temple of Ištar, and also, perhaps, at the fanes of other deities:

'Young wast thou, Aššur-bani-âpli, whom I (Nebo) left unto the Queen of Nineveh;
A suckling wast thou, Aššur-bani-âpli, whom I satisfied on the lap of the Queen of Nineveh;
The fullness of the teats which are placed in thy mouth, twain thou suckest, twain thou pressest to thy face.'†

The expression, 'Queen of Nineveh,' has the determinative for divinity before it, showing that the personage intended is none other than Ištar, the patron of that city. The third line of the extract has the verbs in the present tense, probably to give the phrase greater vividness.

Naturally certain days of the month, and probably certain months of the year, were regarded as especially lucky for births. At the time of the dynasty of Babylon (about 2000 years B.C.), such names as 'the son of the 20th day' (*Mâr-âmi-êsrâ*) are met with; and from a student's exercise-tablet of late date, we learn that the 20th was the festival of the sun-god, not because, according to the Calendar in the British Museum,‡ eclipses could then take place (the days quoted are the 20th of Sivan, the 20th of Tishri, and the 20th of Chislev, the common expression, *antalu îlu Šamaš*, 'eclipse of the sun,' being used), but probably because, after the eclipse, the sun was regarded as shining victoriously. *Ululâa* (*Elulâa* = *Elulœus*), 'he of the month Elul,' and *Ṭebetâa*, 'he of the month Tebet,' are also found; but though this, to all appearance, records the month of the

* The word for 'bring forth,' 'beget,' in Sumero-Akkadian, was *utu*, of which *Tutu* is evidently a reduplicate form.

† In what way Merodach was regarded as the renewer of the gods is uncertain; the phrase may refer simply to the 'captive-gods,' who had been Tiamat's helpers in the fight with her. He is said to have visited them in prison and comforted them, apparently with the promise of ultimate release.

‡ Probably a term of affection for a beloved wife, as in Heb. (*cf.* Ca 4[9] ‖ כַּלָּה, 'bride'), etc.

§ Campbell Thompson, *Late Babylonian Letters*, 1906, No. 40. The text is not certain in some places.

‖ *Cuneiform Texts from Babylonian Tablets*, xvi., plates 26 and 31. See also pl. 36: *šami sinništi lâ âlâdi*, 'the plant of a woman who is not to bear'; and pl. 27: *šam muš ša-tur* (or, *ša-sur*), 'the plant of the serpent of conception,' or 'of the fetus.'

¶ See Jensen, 'Mythen und Epen' (*Assyr. Bibliothek*, vol. vi.), p. 108 ff.

* Jensen, 'Mythen und Epen,' p. 287; notes thereon, pp. 543–548.

† S. A. Strong in the *Transactions of the 9th International Congress of Orientalists*, London, 1893, vol. ii. pp. 203, 205, 206. (His translation differs somewhat from the above, but not on essential points.)

‡ *WAI*, vol. v. plates 48 and 49.

bearer's birth, it is doubtful whether any lucky omen was attached thereto.

As may be gathered from the reference to fate forming each fetus, the Babylonians seem to have believed that the sexes were foreordained by the gods, who were the 'makers of fate.' A disturbing element probably existed in the influence of Tiamat, the spirit of confusion, and on this account they believed also that there was nothing absolutely constant in nature, and that the species could change, so that a woman, or a sheep, might bring forth a lion, etc., and infants might have parts of the body like those of animals, such as the eye of a boar, the ear of a lion, etc. To all these departures from the normal, omens were attached; and in all probability they were regarded as being sent by the gods for the information or the warning of men. The following will give some idea of the nature of these forecasts:

'If a woman has brought forth, and there is the ear of a lion, there will be a powerful king in the land.
If a woman has brought forth, and its right ear does not exist, the life of the prince will be long.*
If a woman has brought forth, and its right ear is small, the house of the man will be destroyed.
If a woman has brought forth, and from the first his head is filled with grey hairs, the life of the prince will be long.*
If a woman has brought forth 2 males, there will be hardship in the land, etc.
If a woman has brought forth twins for the second time, that country will be destroyed.
If a cow has brought forth 3, and (they are) 2 male and 1 female, hardship of a year—the harvest will not prosper.'†

These omens are exceedingly numerous, and often very difficult to translate.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given in the foot-notes.

T. G. PINCHES.

BIRTH (Celtic).—The data concerning the birth-rites of the pagan Celts are lamentably scanty. Aristotle (*Politica*, VII. xv. [xvii.] 2) records that 'many of the barbarians have the custom either of plunging their newborn children (ἀποβάπτειν τὰ γιγνόμενα) into a cold river, or of putting on them scanty covering, as among the Celts.' The Emperor Julian states (*Orationes*, ii.) that with the Celts (though with him this may mean the Germans) the father placed his newborn child on a shield, which was put in the Rhine. If the child was legitimate, the shield would float, but otherwise it would sink, thus affording a test of the fidelity of the mother to her husband. The only other passage which seems to bear upon the birth-rites of the Continental Celts is the curious statement of Strabo (p. 165), that among the Celts, as among the Thracians and Scythians, 'the women themselves, after giving birth, go on with agriculture and also tend their husbands, putting them to bed in their own steads.' This implies the couvade (above, p. 635[a]); but this custom is reported in Europe only of the Corsicans (Diodorus Siculus, v. 14)—a fact which would seem to imply a confusion on the part of Strabo between the Celts and the Iberians, a race entirely different ethnologically (cf. Schrader, *Reallexikon der indogerm. Altertumskunde*, Strassburg, 1901, p. 347 f.; Hirt, *Indogermanen*, Strassburg, 1905–7, p. 717 f.; in favour of the Celtic explanation, Jullian, *Recherches sur la religion gauloise*, Bordeaux, 1903, p. 64 f.). At the same time, it should be noted that, whatever its racial origin, the couvade existed, at least in clear reminiscence, to a late period in Provence, as is shown by the Picard romance of *Aucassin et Nicolette* (probably early 13th cent.), ch. 39. Another apparent survival of ancient custom is recorded from a 14th cent. source by Ploss (*Das Weib*, Leipzig, 1885, ii. 70), to the effect that no woman was allowed to give birth to a child on certain islands in the mouth of the Loire, but when her time approached was sent to the mainland or placed in a boat in the river until the child was born. Herein, as Ploss notes, we may have a reminiscence of an island, sacred to 'Dionysus,' at the mouth of the Loire (described by Strabo, p. 198), where only women dwelt, all sexual intercourse (which, like birth, would thus be ceremonially impure in Celtic religion) being held on the mainland (but cf. below, p. 692 f.).

The pagan Irish material on birth-rites is still more meagre. According to Stowe MS, No. 992 (ed. and tr. Meyer, *RCel* vi. 173 ff.), Ness, when about to become the mother of Concobar, 'went to the meadow that was on the bank of the river Concobar. There she sat her down on a flagstone (*nos fuirim iarum for in licc cloichthi*) that was on the brink of the river. So there came the pangs of childbirth upon her.' Too much must not, however, be drawn from this, for the *Cóir Anmann*, 213 (ed. and tr. Stokes, in Stokes and Windisch, *Irische Texte*, Leipzig, 1880–1905, iii.), states that a band of girls (*inghenraidh*) kept watch round a prospective mother. After the birth had taken place, the mother 'waited for a lucky hour for the child' (*ib.* 273), *i.e.* probably for the casting of the horoscope, etc. Thus the Druid Cathfaidh observed omens from the stars, the clouds, and the age of the moon immediately after the birth of Déirdre (Hyde, in *Zeit. f. kelt. Philologie*, ii. 143). In the case of the infant who afterwards became the hero Conall Cernach, 'Druids came to baptize the child into heathen baptism, and they sang the heathen baptism (*chansat an mbaithis ngeintlidhe*) over the little child' (*Cóir Anmann*, 251).

LITERATURE.—Jullian, *Recherches sur la religion gauloise*, Bordeaux, 1903, p. 64 f.; Dottin, *Manuel pour servir à l'étude de l'antiquité celtique*, Paris, 1906, pp. 141, 143 *f.*

LOUIS H. GRAY.

BIRTH (Chinese).—The customs which are observed in China, in connexion with child-birth, differ widely in the various portions of the Empire, and it would be almost as difficult to describe them in general terms as to include in one article 'Birth customs in Europe.'

Many of these customs are significant of religious preconceptions, though it is not always possible to trace the connexion, owing to the gradual deflexion from the ancient usage; and modern explanations tend to emphasize the physical benefits which are supposed to accrue from these observances.

It should be remembered that the elaborate preparations which are made previous to birth are intended to secure not only a happy issue to the anxious crisis—the safety of the child and mother—but their first and primary purpose is to prevent the awful contingency of death before delivery, which would involve the mother in endless torments in the 'Lake of Blood,' which is the special department of the under-world reserved for such unfortunates. From this point of view, therefore, the anxious care which surrounds the birth-chamber may be said to be replete with religious significance.

A month previous to the expected date of birth, the bride's mother, or other near relative on that side of the house, is expected to arrive with the accustomed gifts, and perform the office known as 'undoing the fastening.' The gifts include eatables, various articles of clothing required by the expected arrival (in the South, it seems, no provision of this kind is made), and tonics for the mother with a view to producing a quiet and successful parturition. Charms from the neighbouring temple are sometimes procured to fasten on the baby's body as soon as born, for the event is supposed to be attended by hosts of

* Lit. 'the days of the prince will be old.'
† From *WAI* ii. pl. 65, No. 1, obv. lines 1, 2, 4, rev. line 7; Boissier, *Documents relatifs aux présages*, Paris, 1894–99, p. 115, verso 11, p. 116, 19; and B.M. tablet K 78, ll. 2–8.

spirits with malicious designs upon both mother and child.

As soon as the birth-pangs begin to be felt, the female members of the family hasten to light candles and burn incense before the ancestral tablets, in the little shrine over the main partition of the entrance hall, and also in front of the 'god of wealth' and the 'kitchen god,' offering extempore prayers, as no settled form is provided for the occasion, and taking vows of future deeds of merit in the event of a favourable response—and all with a view to securing the assistance of the 'birth-speeding goddess,' who is supposed to have the ordering of such affairs. The midwife is at the same time summoned, together with other assistants, whose office it is to 'clasp the waist' of the expectant mother, who is maintained in a sitting posture throughout the ordeal, and is encouraged to drink a brew of dried 'longan' fruit and thin gruel to sustain her, together with certain medical potions which are held to be very efficacious. Red candles are lighted in the chamber, as for a wedding, and all words of ill-omen are carefully omitted—the idea being the ostentation of a cheerful confidence, and the avoidance of any suggestion of ill or fear.

As soon as the child is born, a messenger is despatched to the nearest lake or pond to procure a small quantity of water, which is then heated for the baby's first bath. (The bath is in some places postponed till the 3rd day; in the farther North it is generally omitted, and a little oil dabbed on the body instead.) The use of such water is said to ensure that the child, when he grows up, will become an expert fisherman. After the bath the child's body is rubbed dry with alum (in some places a raw egg is applied). A pad of fresh cotton-wool is placed over the navel, and the umbilical cord, which is cut at about a foot's length from the body, is rolled up and tightly bound, the long end sloughing away in about a week. The infant's clothes are then put on, in shape like the robes of a Buddhist *bonze*, or monk, probably with a view to deceiving the malignant spirits. (In the South, old garments warm from the wearer's body are put round the child in lieu of baby-clothes.) The male and female 'guardians of the bed' are then respectfully 'worshipped.' The placenta and its attachment are placed in a bottle, hermetically sealed, and put under the bedstead, or sometimes disposed of for the manufacture of pills.

No food is given to the infant during the first twenty-four hours, but at the end of this period three tea-spoonfuls of a liquid compounded of materials representing the five flavours—salt, sour, bitter, pungent, and sweet—are administered before the first drop of milk is allowed. The infant is not supposed to sample its own mother's milk until it has first been supplied from another household, where a baby of the opposite sex is being reared. A bowlful of this milk is obtained, and artificially warmed before being given to the child. A second bath is sometimes administered on the 3rd day, and a great number of articles are presented to neighbours and friends, each symbolical of some good wish, and duck-eggs dyed red are also sent, with the idea of advertising the fact of birth.

At the end of the first month the elaborate ceremonial of head-shaving takes place, and the various gods are 'invited,' *i.e.* by offerings of food, lighted candles, fireworks, etc. The baby-hair is shaved off with the exception of a little spot over the fontanel, which is allowed to grow and is called the 'filial lock.' In the afternoon the ancestors are 'worshipped,' and then follows a feast to which the neighbours and others are invited, each guest arriving armed with some gift, generally some object of superstitious use, such as silver necklets or bangles, which are supposed to moor the infant in the harbour of life, in view of the terrible mortality which prevails amongst young children in China. The child is sometimes taken out for an airing on this day, dressed in all the finery which can be imposed upon him, with amulets and charms to protect him from evil influences—a row of silver-gilt genii upon his bonnet, or perhaps a bright mirror to ward off the evil eye. In some of the country districts he is placed in a boat and subjected to violent rocking, to accustom him to the motion, or he is carried over a bridge in the hope that he may have a 'rise in life,' and also be able to keep his head when high promotion comes.

On the fortieth day the mother goes to the temple to offer incense (in some places, in the case of a boy being born, she goes on the 30th day), and to acknowledge the good hand of the gods in her safe delivery and happy fortune.

LITERATURE.—Dyer Ball, *Things Chinese*[3], Lond. 1900; Women's Conference in China on *Home Life of Chinese Women*.

W. GILBERT WALSHE.

BIRTH (Egyptian).—A tale dating from the end of the Middle Kingdom relates how the wife of the priest of Rē in a local temple gave birth to three sons destined to be kings of Egypt. Four goddesses, Isis, Nephthys, Hôki (*Ḥq·t*, the frog-goddess, consort of Khnum), and Meskhôni (see below), officiated as midwives, having disguised themselves as strolling dancers, while Khnum accompanied them as baggage-carrier. They accepted a bushel of barley for their services; and the mother, we are told, was purified for 14 days ('Le roi Khoufoui et les magiciens,' in Maspero's *Contes popul. de l'Egypte ancienne*[3], 1882, pp. 36–40; Petrie, *Egyp. Tales*, 1895, i. 33ff.). At Deir el-Bahari is pictured the divine birth of Queen Hatshepsut amidst a crowd of deities of birth, food, fortune, etc. (Naville, *Deir el Bahari*, 1898–1901, iii., plates xlvii.–lv.), and at Luxor that of Amenhotep III. (Champollion, *Monumens*, 1825, pl. cccxl.–xli.; Gayet, *Temple de Louxor*, pl. lxv.).

The name of Meskhôni, the goddess perhaps of female functions, is generally characterized by a brick, referring to that which supported the mother, or on which the child was laid. In Ex 1[16], where late Egyptian customs may be reflected, the Hebrew women are represented as delivered on 'stones,' *i.e.* bricks (?) (cf. Spiegelberg, *Randglossen z. AT*, p. 19); and the Coptic *Apocalypse of Elias* (4th cent. A.D., ed. Steindorff) still refers to the 'birth-stool' as 'the brick.' A wooden couch is also figured early as the 'determinative' of Meskhôni as well as in the birth scenes, and probably among the wealthy the brick had only ceremonial importance. The word *tôbi*, 'brick,' is feminine, and the birth-brick, figured with the head of a goddess, is present in detailed illustrations of the Psychostasia; in the Papyrus of Ani (Brit. Mus., ed. Budge) it is accompanied by Shai the god of Fate and the goddesses Meskhôni and Ermûti (*Rnn·t*, 'the Nurse'); in that of Anhai (Brit. Mus., ed. Budge) two bricks with female heads are named Shai (masc.) and Ermûti respectively. In a funerary papyrus at Edinburgh of the year 11–10 B.C. the deceased is stated to have completed the years which Thoth wrote upon his birth-brick (Brugsch, *Rhind's Zwei bilingue Papyri*, 1865); and in the Westcar Papyrus, quoted above, it is Meskhôni who approaches each child laid on its brick-cradle and pronounces its destiny.

In stories dating from the New Kingdom, the Hathors, seven in number in one text, pronounce the destiny; these may include the birth-goddesses already mentioned (Maspero, *l.c.* p. 51). Horoscopes have not been traced with certainty in

Egypt before the Roman age; but some traditions assigned to Egypt the invention of the art, and there are star-tables in two of the royal tombs of the New Kingdom at Thebes which may have been horoscopes (Petrie, *History*, vol. iii.). The day of birth was a day of rejoicing, but nothing is known of ceremonies for it. Circumcision of the child was not performed before puberty. A collection of gynæcological prescriptions for medical, not surgical, treatment dates from the XIIth Dyn. (Griffith, *Kahun Papyri*); and receipts for ascertaining conception and determining the sex or the vitality of the infant to be born are found in the Ebers Papyrus, in a Berlin text published by Brugsch, and in the London and Leyden Magical Papyrus of the 3rd cent. A.D. (Griffith and Thompson). Erman has published a collection of spells for the nursery (*Zaubersprüche für Mutter und Kind*, Berlin, 1901). The word *misi*, 'to bear,' is written , properly three jackals' tails or skins made into a fly-flap, the name of which had this sound; but possibly it was a birth amulet, for in modern Nubia dead jackals laid above the door of the house are considered to protect women from miscarriage, etc. (Blackman, in *Man*, 1909, p. 10).

LITERATURE.—See the references throughout the article.

F. Ll. GRIFFITH.

BIRTH (Finns and Lapps).—The only important rites connected with birth among the Finns and Lapps are those purificatory ceremonies which belong to what may be called a form of baptism (see also BAPTISM, p. 372[a]). The existence of a non-ecclesiastical form of infant baptism among the Lapps is witnessed to by Norwegian missionaries of the 18th century. The fullest description of this ceremony is found in E. J. Jessen's 'Afhandling om de norske Finners og Lappers Hedenske Religion,' pp. 33–42 (printed as an Appendix to Knud Leem's *Beskrivelse over Finmarkens Lapper*, 1767; cf. also *ib.* pp. 495–497). After the child was brought home from the official baptism in church, where it had received a Norwegian name, it could not be washed or brought into contact in any way with water until it was baptized anew with a Lapp name (*same-nabma*). The pregnant mother, who had placed herself under the protection of the *sarakka* ('creator woman'), had had the name revealed to her by a deceased person in a dream, or she had been informed, by means of the magic drum, which of the deceased meant to come to life again in the child. The baptism was not administered by the magician but by a woman, usually the mother herself. The so-called *risem-edne* ('twig-mother'), who must not have acted as Christian godmother (*Christ-edne*), presented the child with a ring or plate of brass (*nabma-skiello*), which was thrown into the baptismal water. After the ceremony this piece of brass was placed upon the child to be worn as a talisman—in the case of a son, under the arm; in the case of a daughter, upon the breast. Before the baptism both the child and the water were dedicated to the *sarakka*. Baptism with the Lapp name was regarded as one of the two sacraments of the *sarakka*.

This baptism, which was resorted to in order to secure happiness and good health for the child, often proved insufficient. If the child fell sick or cried a great deal, it was once more re-baptized and received a new name, the so-called *udde-* or *adde-nabma*, or *saivo-nabma* ('under-world name'). This fresh bestowal of baptismal names might be repeated again and again in case of sickness, even in later years. It, too, was administered by a woman, the *laugo-edne* ('wash-mother'), with almost the same ceremonies as the other.

Warm water was poured into a trough, and two birch twigs—one in its natural condition, the other bent into a ring—were laid in it. At the same time the child was thus addressed: 'Thou shalt be as fertile, sound, and strong as the birch from which this twig was taken.' Then the copper (or silver) talisman was cast into the water, with the words: 'I cast the *nabma-skiello* into the water, to wash thee; be as melodious and fair as this brass (or silver).' Then came the formula: 'I baptize thee with a new name, N.N. Thou shalt thrive better from this water, of which we make thee a partaker, than from the water wherewith the priest baptized thee. I call thee up by baptism, deceased N.N. Thou shalt now rise again to life and health, and receive new limbs. Thou, child, shalt have the same happiness and joy which the deceased enjoyed in this world.' As she uttered these words, the baptizer poured water three times on the head of the child, and then washed its whole body. Finally she said: 'Now art thou baptized *adde-nabma*, with the name of the deceased, and I will see that with this name thou wilt enjoy good health.'

In the so-called Näro MS of J. Randulf, published by J. Qvigstad (*Det Kgl. norske Videnskabers Selskabs Skrifter*, 1903, No. 1, pp. 53–55), there is mention only of a species of Lapp baptism which was administered immediately after the church baptism, or at latest within half a year, in cases where the child fell sick. In this baptism the child received a new name, *ude-nemo*. The ceremony was performed on a Thursday, in the name of the three chief Lapp gods, borrowed from the Scandinavians, namely, *Hora-Galles* (Thor), *Waralden-Olmay* (Freyr), and *Bieka-Galles* (Njordr). There was a thrice repeated pouring of water on the child. According to a supplementary note by J. Kildal, the child was baptized in the name of the *Maylmen Radien* ('world-ruler'). It is stated by S. Kildal (*Det skandinaviske Litteraturselskabs Skrifter*, vi. 458 f.) that the name selected was that of the father or grandfather.

Outside the sphere of Norwegian Lapps, our only information concerns a formerly Lapp district in N. Finland, and is to the effect that among the Finn new settlers on the rivers Kemi and Ji, about the year 1750, a re-baptism with a new name (*uusi nimi-kaste*) was not unknown. As late as the year 1803, a peasant, Erik Lampela of Tervola, who had long been an invalid, is said to have caused himself to be re-baptized at Izak, and to have recovered (J. Fellman, *Anteckningar under min vistelse i Lappmarken*, ii. 51–52).

That Lapp infant baptism is an imitation of the Christian ordinance is sufficiently proved by the existence among the Norwegian Lapps of a second sacrament of the *sarakka*, which is an imitation of the Eucharist. A similar 'nature-woman,' 'creatrix,' in magic songs of the Finns is a metamorphosed form of the Virgin Mary; and in like manner the *Radien* (father, wife, child) on the magic drums of the Lapps stand for the Trinity in its popular-Catholic form. Another Christian feature of the ceremony is the thrice repeated pouring of water. The use of a talisman of brass does not point to an original stage of Lapp civilization; it is a case of borrowing from the neighbouring Scandinavians—a conclusion that is confirmed by the mention of the three principal Scandinavian deities. The latter still survived in the popular faith of the Lapps, and their presence is in no way inconsistent with a borrowing of infant baptism during the Catholic period of Scandinavia. It is possible, however, that Lapp infant baptism had already been introduced by half-pagan Scandinavians.

The baptism in question must be distinguished from the bestowal upon the child of the name of an ancestor who was supposed to come to life again in the child's person. The determination of the

name by a revelation in a dream or by the oracle of the magical drum is no doubt a primitive Lapp custom. As late as 1534 the Finns under the dominion of Novgorod (the Chudes) had oracle-men whom they summoned to give a newborn child its name—a ceremony which they performed 'in their own peculiar way.' The magician of the Finn-Ugrian Mountain Cheremisses adopts the following method in bestowing the name. Taking the child in his arms, as it is on the point of screaming, he begins a list of names, swaying the child to and fro as he speaks; and that name which he happens to be uttering when the crying ceases is the one selected. The magician of the adjacent Chuvasses—a Finn-Turkish hybrid race—is called to the child, and is received with tokens of the greatest respect by the domestics and the assembled guests, who with one voice express the desire that he will give the child a name of good omen. He takes a bowl of water in his hand, mutters certain words over it, and gives both the mother and the child to drink. Then he works himself into an ecstasy, and at last bestows upon the child a name which he professes to have received by Divine revelation (see Julius Krohn, *Suomen suvun pakanallinen jumalanpalvelus*, pp. 104, 109).

LITERATURE.—See the references throughout the article.

KAARLE KROHN.

BIRTH (Greek and Roman).—1. Greek.—Amongst the goddesses to whom the Greek matron prayed in her throes, Eileithyia, Hera, and Artemis are the foremost (Preller-Robert, *Gr. Mythol.* i. 511 ff.). After these come a number of others, *e.g.* the Hekate-like Eilioneia of Argos, to whom a dog was sacrificed to ensure an easy delivery (Plut. *Qu. Rom.* 52); Genetyllis, who received a like sacrifice (Hesych. *s.v.*; cf. Roscher, ii. 1270; Rohde, *Psyche*, ii.[2], 1898, p. 81, 1); the Nymphs (Eur. *El.* 625 f., cf. F. G. Ballentine, *Harvard Stud.* xv. [1904] p. 74 ff.). Superstitious ceremonies, originating from the idea of binding and unbinding, whose purpose was to ease the birth, and whose age and origin cannot be fixed, are mentioned by Pliny (*HN* xxviii. 33, 34, 42; cf. 59; see also Philologus, lvii. [1898] p. 131). When the birth had ended happily, the women brought their clothes to Artemis as an offering (*Anth. Pal.* vi. 271; schol. *ad Call. Hymn.* i. 77); Artemis Brauronia also received the clothes of women who had died in childbed (Eur. *Iph. Taur.* 1465 ff.). When a child was born in Attica, if it was a boy, an olive-wreath was hung on the outer door; if a girl, a woollen fillet was used, 'because of the spinning of wool' (Hesych. *s.v.* στέφανον ἐκφέρειν). This rationalistic explanation must, of course, be discarded; the underlying artificial differentiation is to be regarded as comparatively late, if, indeed, Hesychius' words correspond to facts. At any rate, a wreath with a woollen fillet attached must be considered as the primary form. The fillet enhances the effect of the wreath. The purpose of the wreath, which still hangs on the door at the *amphidromia* (see below; cf. Ephippos in Athen. p. 370 C), is not, as Rohde (*op. cit.* 72, 1) and Samter (*Familienfeste der Gr. und Röm.* 87) suppose, to lustrate the house, *i.e.* to cleanse it from impurity; it is apotropæic: the luck which it brings drives away ill luck. The woman who is lying-in and the newborn babe require such protection, for they are weak. The numerous amulets, with which it is the custom everywhere to deck small children, have the same purpose. And an olive-wreath is expressly mentioned as one of the protectives given to Ion by his mother when she exposed him (Eur. *Ion*, 1433, Kirchhoff). According to the belief of the Cora Indians, 'the dead would come and harm the (newborn) babe if (the father) did not fix branches of the zapote-tree into the door (Preuss, *ARW* ix. [1906] p. 466). Photius lays stress upon the apotropæic character of a similar rite (*Lex. s.v.* βάμνος), when he relates that, while a child was being born, the house was painted with pitch from thorn-bushes, in order to drive away the evil spirits.* A custom in modern Greece may serve as an analogy: newborn children are rubbed with sacred oil in order to protect them (Wachsmuth, *D. alte Griechenland im Neuen*, 79).

On the fifth day after the birth, the so-called *amphidromia* were celebrated (Plat. *Theæt.* 160 E + schol.; Harpocr., Suid., Hesych. *s.v.*; *Parœmiogr.* ii. 278). Some one, probably the father (the false reading τρέχουσαι in schol. Plat. *l.c.* is explained by the preceding words; cf. Preuner, *Hestia-Vesta*, 54 n.), ran round the hearth with the child in his arms. Friends and relatives came, bringing presents, especially polypi and cuttle-fish. The women who had assisted at the birth and had thereby become unclean (cf. Stengel, *Kultusalt.*[2] 148) cleansed their hands on this day. Banquets were held (Ephippos in Athen. 370 D; Eubulos, *ib.* 65 C); a special kind of bread was baked, if we can trust the incoherent record in the *Etym. Mag. s.v.*; a sacrifice was probably among the celebrations (Plaut. *Truc.* 423 f.). Perhaps the father decided on this day whether he wished to keep the child or to expose it (Plat. *Theæt. l.c.*). Hesychius records an important trait (*s.v.* δρομιάμφιον ἦμαρ); according to him the rite of running round the hearth was performed naked. This, too, is a case of ritual nakedness (cf. *e.g.* Deubner, *de Incub.* 24; Abt, 'Die Apologie des Apulejus,' *Religionsgesch. Vers. und Vorarb.* iv. 246, 1).

Opinions regarding the meaning of running round the hearth are most divergent. The idea of the cleansing influence of the fire must probably be eliminated (Rohde, 72, 1); the interpretation as an ordeal (quoting Plato, *l.c.*, whose simile can, however, not be urged, in view of the decisive data of antiquarian literature), according to which the child originally lay in the fire during the *amphidromia*, is improbable (Gruppe, *Berl. philol. Wochenschr.* 1906, p. 1138).† According to some others, Samter has given the correct explanation (*Familienfeste*, 61), that we find here an initiative rite, which places the child under the protection of the domestic hearth. But this gives no reason for the running. Yet with this rite we seem to reach the lowest stratum of the rites celebrated on this day. By a comparison with folklore parallels, S. Reinach (*Cultes, mythes et religions*[2], 1908, i. 137 ff.) has rendered it very probable that this running round is to ensure fleet-footedness for the child.

In Esthonia the father of the child runs round the church, while the child is being baptized inside, so that it may learn to run quickly. With this compare the custom noted by Wuttke (*D. deutsche Volksaberegl.*[3] 1900, p. 390), in accordance with which, when returning from the christening, the young godfather takes the child when they arrive at the front door, and quickly runs with it into the room to its mother. This is supposed to ensure that the child will become swift (Brandenburg), or will learn walking early (East-Prussia). In Melanesia, magic formulæ promote the child's walking and talking (*ARW* x. [1907] p. 306). The ancient Mexican festival of ear-piercing gives an interesting analogy. During this festival the children born within the last three years are led round a fire, and also lifted up high, so that they may grow tall. The feast is celebrated with a sacrifice, a banquet and dance (Stoll, *Geschlechtsleben in d. Völkerpsychologie*, 118).

Reinach's explanation is very suitable to a people which gave its favourite hero the epithet ποδώκης ('swift-footed'). The derisive answer of Vürtheim (*Mnemos.* xxxiv. [1906] p. 73 ff.) is not to the point. Scenes illustrating the *amphidromia* do not exist in Greek art.

On the tenth day after its birth the child received its name. This day, too, was a festive one, celebrated with sacrifices and banquets for friends

* A very artificial explanation is given by Rohde, *l.c.*, because he understands it to be a lustrative rite.

† Cf. Glotz, *L'ordalie*, 1904, p. 103.

(Eur. *El.* 1126, fr. 2 Nauck²; Aristoph. *Birds*, 494 and 922 f. + scholl.; Isæus, iii. 30. 70; Demosth. xxxix. 20, 22 [according to whom this festival signified the official recognition of the child], 24, xl. 28, lviii. 40; Harpokr. *s.v.* *ἑβδομενομένου* and *ἐνδεκάζοντας*; Hesych. *s.v.* *δεκάτην θύομεν*; Suidas, *s.v.* *ἀμφιδρόμια*, *δεκάτην ἑστιᾶσαι* and *δεκατεύειν*; Bekker, *Anecd. Gr.* i. 237, 26). A cake called *χαρίσιος* was baked, and was given, among other things, as a prize for a women's dance that was performed on this day (Eubulos in Athen. 668 D). Besides the tenth day the seventh was used for giving the name ([Aristot.] *Hist. An.* vii. 12; Harpokr. *s.v.* *ἑβδομενομένου*; Hesych. *s.v.* *ἑβδομαι*, cf. the *ἑβδόμη* as a children's festival in Lucian, *Pseudolog.* 16). The day fixed for this festival has varied in different epochs and districts, whereas the *amphidromia* were more important as being a specifically religious custom, and therefore held to their fixed day. For, whenever these are said to have been celebrated on the 7th (Hesych. *s.v.* *δρομιάμφιον ἡμαρ*) or 10th (schol. Aristoph. *Lysistr.* 757) day, or are brought into connexion with the name-giving (schol. Aristoph. *l.c.*; schol. Plat. *Theæt.* 160 E; Hesych. *s.v.* *ἀμφιδρόμια*), this is doubtless due to a blunder (cf. also Gruppe, *Berl. philol. Wochenschr.* 1906, p. 1137). The schol. to Aristoph. *l.c.* even commits the error of supposing a running *round the child*. (Similar mistakes occur elsewhere in our records; cf. *e.g.* the form *τρέχονται* above, schol. Plat. *l.c.*) It is not warrantable to infer a coincidence of *amphidromia* and *δεκάτη* from Eur. *El.* 654 and 1126 (Preuner, *Hestia-Vesta*, 54, 1), for l. 654 cannot be forced into closer concord with l. 1126. The uncertain notice about a sacrificial feast shortly after birth (Bekker, *Anecd. Gr.* i. 207, 13) probably refers to the *δεκάτη*.

Besides the presents brought at the *amphidromia*, there were also so-called *ἀπτήρια*, gifts presented to the child by those to whom it was shown for the first time (cf. Spanheim and Schneider, *ad Call. Hymn.* iii. 74). Slaves also gave the newborn babe a present (Terence, *Phorm.* 47). Censorinus (*de Die Nat.* 11, 7) mentions the celebration of the 40th day after the birth as a Greek custom. Even in our time the 40th day is still celebrated (cf. Wachsmuth, *op. cit.* 73 f.). But this would seem traceable to Jewish influence (Wachsmuth, *op. cit.* 74, 7). The rocking of the child in the *λίκνον*, which is explained as symbolical by Mannhardt (*Mythol. Forsch.*, 1884, p. 369 f.) and Dieterich (*Mutter Erde*, 101 ff.), must be eliminated from the birth-rites. Not only is the sense of the action not clearly thought out, but for such an explanation the rocking must form part of some *rite*, which it does not. On the other hand, the fact that the babe was put into the *λίκνον* is easily explained, for it was the natural object to use as a small child's cot in a primitive household.

2. Roman.—Roman women made offerings to the Nymph Egeria (cf. the Greek custom) during pregnancy (Festus, p. 77, 10), to ensure an easy birth. While the child was being born, Lucina and Diana (Tertull. *de An.* 39; August. *Civ. Dei*, iv. 11) or Numeria (Varro, *ap.* Non. 352, 34) were called upon. A candle was lit (Tertull. *ad Nat.* ii. 11), as also in Greece in our day a candle burning in the lying-in room has the power of repelling evil (Wachsmuth, *op. cit.* 79; cf. M. Vassitz, 'Die Fackel in Kultus und Kunst der Griechen,' *Münchener Diss.*, Belgrad, 1900, p. 75 f.). The bands with which the women were bandaged were made near the image of some god, therefore probably in a sanctuary (Tertull. *de An.* 39).

When the woman had brought forth a child, three men had to stand round (*circumire*) the threshold, beat it with a hatchet, then with the pestle of a mortar, and then sweep it (August. *Civ. Dei*, vi. 9). This is a cleansing ceremony, which originally was intended to beat the impurity caused by the birth (here felt as a concrete matter) out of the threshold, and to sweep it away. At a later period the ceremony was explained (Aug. *l.c.*) as a protection against Silvanus, who, as a goblin or nightmare, might trouble the woman in childbed. In addition, there were three special deities who were regarded as protectors of mother and newborn babe: Intercidona (from *intercidere*), Pilumnus (from *pilum*), Deverra (from *deverrere*) (*ib.*)—an excellent example of the way in which gods grow out of rites. Pilumnus (together with Picumnus) even receives a sacrificial meal (*lectus*) in the house, in order to protect the woman in childbed (Varro, *ap.* Serv. *Verg. Aen.* x. 76, and *ap.* Non. 528, 15; cf. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, 357, 1). In the same way Juno was given a *lectus*, and Hercules a *mensa*, after the birth of a boy (Serv. *Verg. Ecl.* iv. 62); for a whole week a table was spread for Juno, according to Tertull. (*de An.* 39). On the last day of the week the *Fata Scribunda* were invoked (cf. Wissowa, *op. cit.* 214). It is Dieterich's merit to have drawn our attention to the custom described by Augustine (*Civ. Dei*, iv. 11), according to which the newborn babe was placed upon the ground and then picked up again (*Mutter Erde*, 6 ff.)—a custom which may be identical with the *tollere* or *suscipere* by the father (Samter, *op. cit.* 62, 3. 4). Only, the signification of this wide-spread custom cannot be that the child is placed under the protection of the earth as a goddess, but that the strength of the earth is to penetrate into the child and make it strong (*e.g.* Marcell. Empir. 32, 20). A rite which bears some affinity to this consists in placing the child erect on the ground, thereby ensuring its upright growth (Varro, *ap.* Non. 528, 12; Tertull. *de An.* 39, cf. *ad Nat.* ii. 11; Varro, *ap.* Non. 532, 18; August. *Civ. Dei*, iv. 21). As in Greece, so also in Rome, wreaths were hung outside the door (Juvenal, ix. 85).

When the first week was over, the child was given its name on the *dies lustricus*: boys on the 9th, girls on the 8th day (Festus, p. 120, 19; Plut. *Qu. Rom.* 102; Macrob. *Sat.* i. 16, 36; see, further, Marquardt-Mau, *Privatleben d. Römer*, 1879, p. 83, 6). We have no information as to the lustrative ceremonies indicated in the name of the day. A sacrificial offering is recorded by Tertull. (*de Idol.* 16), who also uses the appellation 'Nominalia' for this day (*l.c.*). The difference in the treatment of boys and of girls is perhaps originally due to the difference of length of the ancient week, which varied between seven and eight days (Mommsen, *Röm. Chronolog.*² 229).

LITERATURE.—Chr. Petersen, 'Über die Geburtstagsfeier bei den Griechen,' *Jahrb. f. klass. Philol.*, Suppl. B. ii. [1856] 285 ff.; Preuner, *Hestia-Vesta* (1864), 52 ff.; Becker-Göll, *Charikles* (1877–78), ii. 20 ff.; Hermann-Blümner, *Privataltertümer* (1882), 278 ff.; Ussing, *Erziehung und Unterricht bei d. Griech. und Röm.* (1885), 26 ff.; Iwan Müller, *Privataltertümer*³ (1893), 160 ff.; Samter, *Familienfeste d. Griech. und Röm.* (1901) 59 ff.; Schömann-Lipsius, *Altertümer*, ii. (1902) 590 f.; Daremberg-Saglio, *Dict. des antiquités*, i. 238 f.; Pauly-Wissowa, i. 1901 f.; W. R. Paton, in *CR* xvi. 290; Marquardt, *Röm. Staatsverwaltung*, iii.² (1885) 11 ff.; cf. Riess in Pauly-Wissowa, i. 91 f.

L. DEUBNER.

BIRTH (Hindu, literary).—Birth, marriage, and death are the three most important events of the natural life; and popular belief has surrounded them with a number of ceremonies, which are designed to secure the accomplishment of good wishes and to avert evil influences. The great advantage which students of Indian philology possess, as compared with those of other philologies, consists in the abundance of the materials at their disposal affording precise and detailed information on all the different branches of Indian culture.

The acts which accompany the events of the domestic life are described especially in the *Gṛhya-sūtras*, partly in the Law-Books, or, as circumstances require, in medical works. These books possess all the greater interest for the history of civilization, in that the ceremonies which they describe go back in large part to a pre-historic epoch, and are related to customs which are found in a most primitive stage of human development, and, on the other hand, have been partially preserved in India down to the present day. Into all the details of these texts it is impossible to enter. The facts which seem to be most noteworthy may here be summarized.

The *garbhādhāna*, 'the second marriage,' the ceremony of consummation, which corresponds to the *putriya vidhi* of the medical texts (Jolly, *op. cit. inf.* p. 50), marks in all cases the initial step. Although not usually referred to in the *Gṛhya-sūtras*, it is known to the Law-Books, and may be regarded as a universal practice. The appropriate time is *ṛtu*, the days or rather the nights (for the daytime is excluded) from the beginning of menstruation until the 16th day, with the exception of the first four, the 11th and 13th, and certain dates especially named, *e.g.* the time of new and full moon. Peculiar importance is attached to the selection of the *nakṣatras*. Yājñavalkya, for example (i. 80), directs that Maghā and Mūla are to be avoided. Other texts, especially the astronomical, go still further, and distinguish between constellations, the choice of which will be attended by complete or partial success, or, on the other hand, followed by failure. Manu (iii. 46 ff.), and to the same effect other texts (*e.g.* Yājñavalkya, i. 79), prescribe cohabitation on the even nights for the man who desires a son; daughters are born as a consequence of cohabitation on the uneven nights. The same texts, clearly under the influence of certain ancient teachers of physiology (Jolly, § 39, p. 51), represent the view that if the seminal fluid preponderates, a boy will be born; if the blood of menstruation is in excess, a female embryo is formed; if there is an equipoise of power, the issue will be twins or even a 'not-man,' 'impotent' (Manu, iii. 49). Bṛhaspati shows how it is possible to assist nature, and by the use of oily foods to increase the male seed. If other days than those named are chosen, *e.g.* the period *after* the *ṛtu* or the actual days of menstruation, a penalty is incurred.

The woman is impure during the first three days of the *menses*; she must avoid excessive food, laughter, or the sight of other men. Several texts, however, allow, on the appearance of the first *ṛtu*, the use of garlands, scents, and betel-nuts. On the fourth day she takes a bath, puts on clean clothes, and at his call appears adorned in the presence of her husband. Cohabitation is effected in an enclosed spot, and is subject, as regards the choice of place, to certain limitations. The *Viṣṇupurāna*, for example (iii. 11, 17 ff.), excludes sacred places and cross-roads. According to some authorities, a lamp should be kept burning, which is kindled by the woman at another light with the help of a small piece of wood, and may be extinguished only by her. The husband recites the text, 'May Viṣnu prepare thy womb,' lays aside the gold ring that he may be wearing on his forefinger, and cohabitation is completed while he repeats various sacred texts on the subject, for the details of which reference is made by the *Saṁskārāratnamālā* to the *Pañchasāyaka* and other works of the *Kāmaśāstra*. The medical texts are still more precise in details than are those that describe the ritual.

If this ceremony proves unsuccessful, recourse is had, according to the statement of the *Gṛhyapariśiṣṭa* (a collection supplementary to the *Gṛhyasūtras*), to an act that serves the purpose of driving off the obstructing *pretas*, or spirits. This is the so-called *nārāyaṇabali*, a kind of offering to the departed spirits or demons, by which Viṣnu is to 'purify' the *preta*; or the *preta* that is supposed to have assumed the form of Viṣnu is propitiated. A *nāgabali*, or offering to snakes, is also to be made, which atones for sins committed against snakes in the present or former births (a deadly blow, etc.), and which is merely a second offering to the dead for those who conceived of the dead as existing in the form of snakes. The *putriyā-iṣṭi*, which Daśaratha, for example, causes to be offered (*Raghuvaṁśa*, x. 4), is different, and is designed to secure a son. It consists, according to the *Taittiriya-Saṁhitā*, in the presentation of cakes to Agni Putravat and to Indra Putrin.

The Purāṇas and other texts prescribe for *the time of pregnancy* a large number of directions for both husband and wife, which are partly of a dietetic and partly of a superstitious nature. Thus, for example, the woman must not bathe in water, or allow her hair to be loose, or lie with the head high or low, or speak without adding an auspicious word, etc. The Law-Books also, such as Yājñavalkya (iii. 79), interpose with various regulations, making it a duty, for instance, to fulfil the wishes of the woman during this period, since otherwise the embryo would be exposed to injury.

Of other observances which follow on conception, the best known is the *puṁsavana*, the generating of a male, which takes place in the second, third, or even fourth month—as Pāraskara says, 'before the child stirs'—and is to assure the birth of a son. Here also, as elsewhere, the selection of the constellation exercises an influence on the rite. But a magical character is most clearly stamped on those usages which give external expression to the wish, and seek to modify the course of events by means of spells. The Hiranyakeśins recite the text, 'Thou art a bull,' and place in the hand of the woman a barley-corn, with two grains of mustard-seed,—in obvious imitation of the male generative organ,—add a drop of sour milk, and cause the whole to be drunk as the 'generating of a male.' Or a shoot of a Nyagrodha tree, hung on both sides with fruit, a blade of Kuśa grass, or a twig of the same plant, are pulverized and placed by the husband or other near relative in the right nostril of the woman. Even entirely different objects may be employed for the same purpose, as a silk-worm or a chip from that side of the north-eastern sacrificial post which is turned towards the fire. The inhaling also of the smoke from the fire kindled with the fire-sticks (*araṇis*) is enjoined *Saṁskārāratnamālā*, p. 815).

A further ceremony, which precedes or follows the *puṁsavana*, is the *sīmantonnayana*, the parting of the hair of the head, which is performed on the woman when she bears her first child. Various utensils (in due order or at option) are necessary for the purpose; the quill of a porcupine furnished with three white spots, and a branch of the Udumbara tree or *Ficus indica*, bearing an even number of unripe fruits, are prescribed by all texts. The former served to trace the parting, the latter was as a rule tied afterwards to the woman. Players on the lute concluded the ceremony with songs; and among these, according to the statement of some texts (cf. Hillebrandt, *Rituallitteratur*, pp. 43, 44), was to be found a verse giving the name of the native stream. The customs were clearly very different in the different families. Gobhila, for example, makes no mention of the lute-players, but represents Brahman women as sitting with the young wife, and addressing to her auspicious words, such as 'mother of heroes,' 'mother of living sons.'

He enjoins also the cooking of rice and sesamum, upon which the woman has to look. She is asked, 'What do you see?' and answers, 'Descendants.' Many of these customs have not as yet received any ethnological illustration, and need to be explained by comparison with the similar practices of other peoples.

The actual *delivery* takes place in a separate house or room, into which the male members of the family have no right of entrance. At the door a fire is lighted to provide for ordinary purposes as well as to keep off evil spirits. Hiraṇyakeśin (ii. 2, 8) directs that at the time of delivery a bowl of water should be placed at the woman's head and a Tūryantī plant at her feet; and enjoins the performance of various ceremonies with the recitation of texts, one of which is actually found in the Rigveda (v. 78, 79), to relieve and expedite the birth. Whether the several acts are due to a superstitious or to a medical motive is often difficult to determine, owing to the close relation between medicine and magic. Different plants are employed as embrocations or internal remedies; others are merely hung up, or given to the woman for good luck; and fruits with a name of masculine gender are put into her hand. One text (cf. *Saṁskārararatnamālā*, p. 827) prescribes a definite amount of sesamum oil to be stirred from left to right with blades of Dūrvā grass, a part given to the woman to drink, the rest poured on the *yoni*, and the blades placed in her hair. The *Yantraprakāśa* ordains for the time of delivery a diagram of nine compartments, in which are entered from the N.E., N., N.W., etc., in succession the numbers 8, 3, 4, etc.

If the *fœtus is obstructed*, a medical prescription (cf. Jolly, *l.c.*) lays it down that the vagina is to be fumigated by means of the skin of a black snake or with certain plants, or a particular plant given into the woman's hand. Various embrocations facilitate the coming away of the after-birth, and the same purpose is served also by a decoction in which has been steeped, as the most curious medicine, the right ear torn from a living male ass. Continual fumigations with offerings of sesamum and rice serve to drive away the evil spirits which at that time imperil the life of the woman and her newborn child. Whenever the attendants enter they must throw fresh fuel on the fire. The climax of danger is reached on *the sixth day*, which up to the present time in India is dedicated to the Goddess of the Sixth. This day is especially perilous, because on it, or shortly after, the child is exposed to tetanus through unskilful severing of the navel-cord (Jolly). The *Bālatantra* (quoted in the *Saṁskārararatnamālā*, p. 846) knows of more detailed regulations, intended to ward off or conciliate this *Ṣaṣṭī* and other hostile goddesses. It is prescribed that men with swords in their hands shall keep watch, women sing, lamps be kept burning, weapons and clubs laid in the house of the woman, while the father repeats *om* and the *vyāhṛtis*, etc.

For the *newborn* child ceremonies of 'animation,' 'endowment with understanding,' 'tendering of the breast,' and 'naming' are observed. At the first the father must thrice exhale and inhale over the child, or whisper into his navel or right ear some texts relating to a long life. Brahmans are stationed towards the five directions of the heavens, and have to say in order *prāṇa*, *vyāna*, etc. Before this act the boy is fed with a food compounded of butter, honey, and certain other materials. This last as well as the former 'animation' are ceremonies which go back to a remote time, and, as Weber (*Indische Streifen*, 1868, iii. 170) and Speijer (*Jātakarma*, p. 103) have shown, are found also among other peoples. Hiraṇyakeśin's instructions are to take gold, an axe and a stone, to hold the boy over them, and give expression to good wishes for his life. Further ceremonies are recognized by the medical texts (Jolly, 'Medicin,' *GIAP*, § 43, p. 58).

The *endowment with understanding* consists in thrice whispering into the ear of the child the words, 'May the god Savitṛ grant wisdom,' or another text, or the word *vāch*; or in placing butter in his mouth with a golden vessel, while reciting the text, 'May Mitra-Varuṇa grant thee understanding.'

The third ceremony is the first formal *tendering of the breast*, when the father lays the boy on the breast of the mother. The fourth is the important *nāmakaraṇa*. On the giving of the name many peoples have laid great stress (Brinton, *Religions of Primitive Peoples*, 1897, p. 93 ff.; cf. also Kroll, *ARW*, viii. Suppl. p. 49 ff.); and this is no less true of the Indians, who give explicit directions in the ritual and astronomical texts. The ceremony takes place usually on the tenth day. The phonetic value of the chief name is of great importance, and all minutiæ demand attention. The second name is an astronomical name, which may be formed by derivation by means of a suffix, or by simple masculine inflexion of the name of the constellation (Phalguna, from Phalgunī; Hillebrandt, *Rituallitteratur*, § 15). See NAMES.

Immediately after the giving of the name, the woman rises up, and this may therefore be regarded as the closing ceremony of the birth-rites.

LITERATURE.—S. C. Bose, *The Hindoos as They are*[2], Calcutta, 1883, p. 22 ff.; W. Crooke, *Popular Religion and Folk-Lore of Northern India*, new ed., 2 vols., London, 1896, i. 264, 277, the Bibliography in vol. ii. 327 ff.; A. Hillebrandt, 'Rituallitteratur Indische Opfer und Zauber,' Strassburg, 1897 [*Grundriss der indoarischen Philologie und Altertumskunde*, iii. 2]; J. Jolly, 'Recht und Sitte,' Strassburg, 1896 [*ib.* ii. 8], and 'Medicin,' Strassburg, 1901 [*ib.* iii. 10]; Monier Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hinduism*[4], London, 1891; F. S. Speijer, *de Ceremoniis apud Indos, quæ vocatur jātakarma*, Lugdun. Batav., 1872; 'Saṁskārararatnamālā,' in *Ānandāśramasaṁskṛta-granthāvali*, Poona, 1899, 2 vols., which contain a collection of data from earlier and later sources, which have been largely drawn upon in the present article. The original texts are translated in *SBE*, vols. xxix. xxx., 'Gṛhya-Sūtras,' tr. by H. Oldenberg and F. Max Müller; vols. ii. xiv. 'Sacred Laws of the Aryas,' tr. by G. Bühler; vol. vii. 'Institutes of Vishnu,' tr. by J. Jolly; vol. xxv. 'Manu,' tr. by G. Bühler; vol. xxxiii. 'Minor Law-Books,' tr. by J. Jolly.

A. HILLEBRANDT.

BIRTH (Hindu, popular).—A Hindu woman, when the time of her delivery is at hand, lies in a room on the ground floor, on a cot which must be strung with hempen cord, and not with the cotton tape which is used for ordinary beds. In the room is placed some iron article (iron being a powerful averter of evil), and the woman lies with her head to the north or east, as do all Hindus, for the other cardinal points are dangerous. Should the delivery be delayed, it is believed that, in spite of the precautions taken, the powers of evil are in the ascendant, and, with a view to bringing their working to nought, the lying-in woman is advised: (*a*) to sell that part of the floor on which her cot stands, so that the evil spirits may be led to believe that they have to do with the purchaser (the midwife), who on account of her very low caste is immune from evil; (*b*) to call upon the name of the household god, or the family *guru* (spiritual guide), or of some *satī* (woman who has immolated herself on the pyre of her husband) who is famous on account of her act of wifely devotion; (*c*) to drink the water with which a charm, written by a Brahman, has been washed off, or that in which the feet of her husband, her mother-in-law, or a young virgin have been washed; (*d*) in regions in which rice forms the staple diet of the people, to step seven times over the rice-pounder, this being supposed to hasten labour.

In many cases there is bound on the belly of the lying-in woman a charm, written by a 'skilful man.' This may be a double equilateral triangle, or a collection of magic words such as this:

hrôm hrôm hrôm	hrôm	hrôm hrôm
hrôm	Name of the woman is written here.	klôm klôm
klôm	hrôm	kôm kôm

The above charm is so powerful, that, were it bound on the woman's loins, instead of on her belly, she would never be delivered; so the present writer was assured.

As soon as the child is born, it is placed in a grain-sifting tray, in which have been put cow-dung, ashes, turmeric, and a few coins, and is sprinkled with water. If it be a man-child that has been born, a brass tray is beaten to scare away evil spirits; and as this is never done on the birth of a girl, whose sex protects her against evil, the men of the family know when a boy is born, and fire guns to show their joy. Until the placenta is expelled, every one in the lying-in room must keep silence, lest the placenta again ascend into the womb. As soon as the after-birth is expelled, the child is washed with warm water, dried, and laid on the cot beside the mother, after the midwife has passed her little finger into its nostrils and anus, to widen these apertures so that the child may not suffer from shortness of breath or constipation. The umbilical cord is tied in two places, about 4 cm. from the navel, and cut between these with an iron knife, or a strip of the outer skin of the bamboo, as soon as the placenta is expelled. The placenta is then put into a hole which has been dug in a corner of the room, and a fire is lighted on the spot and kept burning for four or five days. While the placenta is being disposed of, the head of the lying-in woman is bound up, and she is fumigated with the smoke of the burning seeds of *Carum copticum*, which have been thrown on a brazier. This is placed under her cot, and is kept there, however hot the season of the year, for ten days. The doors and windows of the room are kept shut, and light is given by an oil-dip lamp, which is kept alight night and day. As the clothes soiled by the discharges incidental to delivery are not removed till the fourth or fifth day, the state of the atmosphere of the lying-in room, when the shade temperature is 41° C., may be guessed. The woman may drink only of a decoction of ginger, cloves, and the seeds of *Carum copticum* and *Helicteres isora*, in which have been boiled some copper coins. The pot in which the decoction is prepared is touched by seven boys if the infant be a boy, and by seven unmarried girls if it be a girl; these children receive sweetmeats for their services.

When the astrologer, to whom news of the birth has been conveyed, comes to the house, he takes the data on which the calculation of the child's horoscope is to be based, and fixes the time at which the infant is to be put to the breast for the first time, and that at which the mother may be fed: for four days if she have borne a boy, and for five if she have borne a girl, she will be allowed only sweetmeat balls made of coarse sugar, long pepper, ginger, coco-nut, saffron, gum acacia, etc. Her ordinary food she may not have, because during this period the low-caste midwife stays in the room with her.

On the fourth or fifth day the soiled clothes are removed from the room and given to the washerman to be washed. The mother and child are then bathed by the midwife in water in which the leaves of the Nim (*Azadirachta indica*) have been boiled, after which she takes some of the water in the hollow of her right hand, and waves it seven times, with the sun, round the head of the mother, in whose lap the child lies, and then throws the water away in the direction of the door of the room. In some castes this water-waving, which is designed to avert evil, is done only three times. Afterwards the mother sits on the cot, from which the soiled bedding has been removed, with the child in her lap, and dries her hair in the smoke of the seeds of *Carum copticum*, which have been thrown on the brazier: the hair is believed to be a favourite point of entrance of evil into the body. On this day all the earthen pots that are in the house are thrown away, and a feast is given, to which men of low caste are invited, as on the tenth day after a death (see DEATH [Hindu]). Of the food prepared for this feast the mother is given a small quantity, and on the following day she returns to her ordinary diet, the midwife being dismissed and her place taken by the barber's wife, who does not live in the lying-in room, as the midwife did during her term of office; but the mother may not eat after sunset, the time at which the influence of evil is most to be feared, until thirty days have elapsed from the date of her delivery.

On the tenth day the astrologer brings the horoscope of the child, and on it are put some blades of grass, on which are sprinkled a few drops of water, and then water with which turmeric has been mixed; then a few grains of uncooked rice are scattered on the horoscope, and the name of the child is chosen by the father from a few names, appropriate to the time of birth, which the astrologer reads out. This name becomes the ceremonial name of the child, whose ordinary name is that given to it by a certain woman-member of the family, whose relationship varies in different castes.

After the tenth day the family barber is sent round to announce the birth to friends and relatives at a distance. He presents to those to whom he bears the news sweetmeats made of coarse sugar, clarified butter, almonds, raisins, coco-nut, etc., which have been prepared at the house in which the birth took place; and it is taken to be a grave insult to omit to send these sweetmeats to any one who can claim the right to receive them.

From the fourth or fifth day till the thirtieth day after the birth of the child, it may be bathed only on Wednesday or Sunday; on the other days of the week its body is anointed with sesamum oil, with which some castes mix turmeric, which from its colour is an averter of evil.

LITERATURE.—H. A. Rose, 'Hindu Birth Observances in the Punjab,' in *JAI* xxxvii. (1907) p. 220; W. D. Sutherland, in *Münchener med. Wochenschrift*, 1906; and the literature appended to the previous article.

W. D. SUTHERLAND.

BIRTH (Jewish).—I. Biblical.—(1) *Notions and practices surrounding childbirth.*—The mystery of birth and procreation is euphemistically expressed in the Bible by 'knowing.' 'And Adam knew Eve his wife; and she conceived, and bare Cain' (Gn 4^{1}), is the first statement in the Bible regarding conception and birth, though a little earlier the condition is laid down, 'I will greatly increase thy pain and thy conception; in pain thou shalt bring forth children' (Gn 3^{16}). Nothing further is found in the Bible as to the first stages of human life, before it enters the world in a concrete form. Many speculations were rife at a later period about these stages, and legends have been handed down concerning the life of the child in the mother's womb. The pains and pangs of travail are often referred to by the prophets, and used in a figurative sense to express the throes of a new birth of nations and of the heavens. According to Ex $1^{15ff.}$, specially trained women assisted in childbirth, which took

place on the birth-stool, on which the midwives had to look, in order to ascertain whether the newborn babe was a male or a female. Moreover, we learn that the 'Hebrew women are not as the Egyptian women; for they are lively, and are delivered ere the midwife come unto them' (Ex 1^{15-19}). Cases of difficult and dangerous births are, however, also recorded in the Bible, in some of which the issue was fatal to the mother. Such was the case with Rachel (Gn 35^{17}), and with the wife of Phinehas, who died in giving birth to a son; for she heard, whilst in the throes of delivery, of the untimely death of her husband (1 S $4^{19ff.}$). While still in the womb, children, according to Biblical tradition, were believed to be fully conscious: Jacob and Esau 'struggled together within her' (Gn 25^{22}); and, when Tamar was delivered of twins, the children came out, not like Jacob holding the heel of Esau in his hand, but one put out his hand first, and then drew it back, and then the brother came forth first (Gn $38^{28f.}$). Other cases of irregular birth and their treatment will be dealt with later on. For it is necessary to follow up the references, as much as possible, in some historical order, treating the Biblical period practically as one for our purpose.

(2) *Fruitfulness a blessing.*—To have a large family was (and is still) considered a great blessing. The very first blessing mentioned in connexion with the creation of man is: 'Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth' (Gn 1^{28}); and the references throughout the Bible to this blessing of a large family and to the reverse—the misfortune of childlessness—are numerous. That woman is praised in the gates who has a large family, especially of sons (Pr 31^{28}), and the barren sits as a mourner in the midst of the festive gathering (1 S 1^{7}). Rebecca, Rachel, and Leah, Hannah and Peninnah, and others are cases in point. Barrenness and widowhood stand on the same plane; both are objects of pity and commiseration. No wonder, therefore, that from the very beginning means were sought to remove this reproach and to get children. The *dûdā'îm* of Gn $30^{14ff.}$ have been identified with mandragora, a fruit credited with specific qualities for fruitfulness. But in the Bible the belief is more prominent that, by means of prayer and intercession, barren women could obtain children. Isaac entreated the Lord on behalf of Rebecca, because she was barren (Gn 25^{21}). When Rachel was angry with Jacob, he replied: 'Am I in God's stead, who hath withheld from thee the fruit of the womb?' (Gn 30^{2}); and later on (30^{22}): 'And God remembered Rachel, and God hearkened unto her, and opened her womb.' Similarly in the case of Hannah (1 S 1). The same agency could work also in the opposite direction, and close the womb of the once fruitful, and render them barren. So, when Abraham prayed to God, 'God healed Abimelech, and his wife, and his maidservants; and they bare children. For the Lord had fast closed up all the wombs of the house of Abimelech' (Gn $20^{17f.}$).

No other means are mentioned in the Bible for assisting women in obtaining children. Nor do we find remedies or precautions mentioned, or aught else, preceding the birth. The children were, no doubt, born on the floor of the house. The child lay first on the ground. Then it was washed in water, rubbed with salt, swathed in swaddling clothes, and given to the mother to be suckled (Ezk 16^{4}). Occasionally a wet nurse is mentioned in the Bible, like Deborah the nurse of Rebecca (Gn 35^{8}), or the mother of Moses, who was taken by the daughter of Pharaoh to suckle the child found in the river (Ex 2^{7-9}).

(3) *Uncleanness of the mother.*—The birth of a child made the mother unclean, in the first place, for seven days; and then, if it was a son, thirty-three days; and if a daughter, sixty-six days. At the end of that period lustration or purification took place, and the woman brought an offering to the Temple (Lv $12^{2ff.}$).

(4) *Primogeniture.*—Although the mother is unclean after giving birth, none of that uncleanness attaches to the newborn child. On the contrary, the firstborn, that which 'openeth the womb,' is consecrated to God, be it human, be it animal. The firstborn enjoyed special privileges, and already, in the patriarchal time, had the right of leader. He probably had also preference in inheritance above the other members of the family (cf. Jacob and Esau). In the last dispositions of Jacob (Gn 49), Reuben is deprived of his privileges of primogeniture; and, although not expressly stated, the double portion, which, according to the Mosaic legislation, was given to the firstborn, is there given to Joseph. This is made evident in 1 Ch 5^{1}. The firstborn at a certain time was invested with sacramental rights; later on, his place was taken by the Levites. The male firstborn was originally the family priest. The dedication, as in the case of Samuel, was evidently to the service in the Temple. Traces of sacrifice of the firstborn male, practised by the nations living in Palestine, are found in the Bible, but were condemned by the Law. Since the Levites took the place of the firstborn, these were 'redeemed' at the completion of thirty days after birth (see art. REDEMPTION). The succession to the throne and to the office of high priest went to the firstborn, with the exception of Solomon, who took the place of Adonijah (1 K $1^{11ff.}$), and of Eleazar through the death of his elder brothers (Lv $10^{1ff.}$). The priestly character of the firstborn has to a certain extent been retained in the service of the Synagogue, where, in the absence of Levites, a firstborn present washes the hands of the *Kohanim* (descendants of Aaron) before they ascend the rostrum in front of the Ark to bless the congregation.

(5) *Naming the child.*—After an indefinite period, ranging from one to three years, the child was weaned, and the occasion was celebrated by some public festivities (Gn 21^{8}, Ex $2^{9f.}$). From the time of Abraham onwards the male child was circumcised on the eighth day, but it is not clear from the Biblical account whether the name was given on that occasion. In many instances the name was settled before the birth of the child, and had a symbolical meaning; and on other occasions it had a commemorative character, being connected with events at the birth. Examples of the former are Isaac (Gn 21^{6}), Immanuel (Is 7^{14}), or Jezreel (Hos 1^{4}); of the latter, the twelve sons of Jacob—nay, his own name and that of Esau, etc. Nowhere is a definite date mentioned for the giving of the name. Nor do we find, except in rare cases, a change of name; *e.g.* when a king ascends the throne, his name is sometimes slightly or altogether changed. In the case of girls, names of animals are often taken as prototypes: thus *Rachel*, *Tamar*, *Zipporah* ('lamb,' 'palm tree,' 'bird'), in addition to other symbolical names. In later times, but still within the period covered by the Bible, the grandson often gets the name of the grandfather, such as (2 S 8^{17}) Ahimelech, son of Abiathar, son of Ahimelech.

A few more details concerning birth and early infancy could be gleaned from the Bible, but they would not carry our knowledge much further. The above brief sketch was absolutely necessary for the understanding of the development which took place in the course of subsequent centuries. The Biblical data form the starting-points or the justification for legends, beliefs, and practices which cluster round the birth of children. Each of their stages is governed entirely by the details found in the

Bible. Some have been greatly expanded; others have been interpreted in a peculiar manner; and for a number of practices borrowed, no doubt, from other nations, or survivals of popular habits and moods, a support has been sought in the verses, and precedents found in, or read into, the Bible. The people did not study the Scriptures with any critical intent, and what is found written down therein was the hallowed example. The way in which we may feel inclined to interpret those facts did not obtain with the people. It is now for us to follow that tradition in the spirit in which it was understood and accepted by the people, and upon the lines along which it developed.

2. Post-Biblical.—The second period, stretching from the 1st cent. down to modern times, embraces a variety of practices, of which few may claim universal acceptance. Some may have belonged to one country only or to one period; others were perhaps more widely spread. A good many of these practices are now known only from books, and are little followed in modern life. Others have not yet been sufficiently sifted and verified as to the extent to which they are followed. They cover a large area—Western Asia, North Africa, and the whole of Europe. In some instances it can be proved that a more modern author has simply copied older texts, and embodied these in his collection. An endeavour will here be made to present the data in some chronological order, taking first the references found in the Mishna and the Talmud and other older Rabbinical writings from the 1st to the 5th cent., and then proceeding to works from the 6th to the 18th, finishing with a few quite modern practices, following, as far as possible, the order of the Biblical data.

(1) *Beliefs connected with the pre-natal period of the child's existence.*—The mystery of birth is now no longer veiled. In Talmudical times the notion emerges that a special angel, 'Lailah,' presides at the very beginning of conception, and through his intermediation the embryo is brought before the Divine throne, where his future is decided upon, his station in life is determined, and also whom he is going to marry. At the bidding of God, a spirit enters the sperm, and then it is returned to the womb of the mother. There the child lies folded up with its head between its knees. Two angels watch over it. A light burns over its head, by which it sees from one end of the world to the other. In the morning an angel carries it into Paradise, and shows it all the righteous who had lived a good life in this world; and in the evening he takes it to hell, and shows it the torments of the wicked. Finally, he orders the child to come forth, and he strikes it, thereby extinguishing the light, and causing it to forget whatever it had seen whilst in the womb of the mother (cf. *Chronicle of Jerahmeel*, ed. Gaster, ch. ix. pp. 19 ff. and lxiii ff.). A later legend adds that the indenture on the upper lip under the nose is the place struck by the angel; hence that indenture. Whatever the child hereafter learns is merely a remembrance of the knowledge acquired during its life as an embryo. Another equally ancient treatise contains an anatomical description of the gradual formation of the body of the child and the changes during gestation. But, in spite of the direct Divine influence assumed here on the shape of the child, other traditions say that external influences, especially at the monthly lustration, had a decided effect upon the shape and the mentality of the offspring. An ancient legend, preserved in many versions, tells how the superhuman beauty of the high priest Ishmael was due to the fact that his mother had returned to the bath, time after time, after meeting first a pig, then a dog, and then an ass. Each time after such an animal which would have had an evil influence had met her, she returned, until at last Metatron, the Angel of the Face, came and met her on the way home, and she then conceived and bare a son as beautiful as the countenance of that angel. The meeting with a dog has the effect of making the child's face like a dog's; that with an ass would make the child stupid; and that with a pig would cause the child to have unclean habits. For that reason, R. Johanan placed himself at the gate of the bath-house, so that the women returning home should look at him, who was renowned for his beauty. As a proof of such influence is adduced the experiment of Jacob with the sheep (Gn 30^{39}). The black wife of an Ethiopian king was delivered of a white child; the father suspected the mother, but, having been asked by R. 'Akiba whether there were white images in his bed-chamber, he answered in the affirmative. This, then, said R. 'Akiba, was the reason why she had given birth to a white child. The same motive appears in the *Ethiopica* of Heliodorus. Other ailments in children are also due to the carelessness or callousness of the parents during the period of impurity. Leprosy is one of the results, and dumbness and deafness, as well as other infirmities. A woman may not cut her nails during the period of her impurity and drop them on the ground, lest a man tread on them and be stricken with boils. The children may also be so affected during gestation as to be changed into animals or birds, or even locusts; whereupon the woman miscarries, and her ritual status is determined by the degree of human form which the thing born has (Mishn. *Niddah*, iii. 2; cf. Ch. M. Horowitz, *Uralte Toseftas . . . aus dem 2–5 Jahrhundert*, Krakau, 1890, *passim*).

(2) *Fruitfulness.*—Means are mentioned to prevent barrenness. The women, we are told, mocked the wife of Manoah (Jg 13), and said to her: 'If you wish to get children, take the skin of a fox, burn it in fire, take the ashes and mix them with water, and drink of that water three days, three times each day, and you will get a child' (Horowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 19). 'If a man is bewitched, and cannot bathe (ritual or lustration bath?), a recipe is given, consisting of garlic and onions and the root of *kala* and the tail of *remusa* fried on the fire; leek is boiled, and the other ingredients are mixed with the leek-water; the patient drinks of this mixture for three days, and is cured' (*ib.* p. 22 f.). A pregnant woman, in order to avoid miscarriage, must not take hot baths. She must not eat green vegetables, as they affect the heart of the baby; nor may she eat salt food or fat substances, or the child will be dull; but she must eat small fish and mustard (*ib.* p. 28).

(3) *Assistants at childbirth*, etc.—In addition to midwives, medical practitioners are now mentioned as assisting in the delivery of women. We hear also of operations which took place when the child was in a dangerous position or was dead: incision for the extraction of the child, or dismemberment of the fœtus. The physician was exempt from many legal obligations when attending women in childbirth. He could break the Sabbath, and all other ordinances were considered abolished in the case of a woman in labour. The primary function of the physician was to place the woman on the birth-stool, and to make all the preparations necessary for a safe delivery. In case of twins, his word decided which was first born. Very little is mentioned in the writings of the period of means for easing difficulties of labour; but, being of a more popular nature, they have, no doubt, been preserved in later writings in which the popular element predominates. The newborn babe was treated as in olden times; but we learn now, from the 1st cent. onwards, of the existence of cradles. The name of the cradle is suggestive, for it is identical with

'trough'; and it is customary to this very day in the East to use troughs for cradles. It is mentioned only in writings of Palestinian origin (Mishna and Tosefta), and in one instance a glass cradle is mentioned (Tos. *Kelim*; *Baba bathra*, vii. 12, ed. Zuckermandel, p. 598).

(4) *Danger from demons*, etc.—Dangers not mentioned in the Bible now surround the baby and the mother immediately after the birth of the child. The notion of demons possessing the mother and then affecting the health of the child appears for the first time in the literature of that period, and the terror of these demons and the desire to drive them away or to counteract their evil influence grows steadily. In Tobit the demon Asmodæus possesses the damsel and prevents her from becoming the wife of any mortal. Every bridegroom wedded to her is killed on the night of the marriage, and only Tobit succeeds in driving the demon away by fumigating the bride with the liver of a fish. By this fumigation the charm is broken. This is then an example to be followed in later times on every occasion of difficult labour, as well as on breaking charms, or on driving away those evil spirits which haunt the chamber and bring ills on the mother and the child.

Prayers, which now assume a mystical character and become in time talismans and amulets, are also efficacious in laying the power of the evil spirit, and, according to a Talmudical legend, the Sanhedrin succeeded in capturing the demon of lust or amorous passion, the 'evil inclination' as it is termed. The consequence was that three days afterwards not an egg could be found in the whole of Palestine to feed a woman in childbed. Whereupon they merely blinded the demon in one eye and released him (*Sanh.* f. 64*a*). They resorted also to prayer, we are told, to avert the terrible ill of croup or other like disease of the throat. The cause of many of these diseases was ascribed to the influence of evil spirits. Lilith is the head of the female demons, and is mentioned as the chief cause of all the ills that befall children. Originally identified with the Incubus and with a demoniac first wife of Adam, she became in the course of time the demon who bewitched, stole, changed, and killed the children as well as the mother in childbirth. Another demon mentioned is Agrath, the daughter of Mahlath. (In both cases the etymologies are transparent. Lilith is the 'night demon' and Agrath the 'roof demon,' daughter of 'illness.') A child that is born in the likeness of Lilith is described as being like a human being, but with wings on its back (*Niddah*, 24*b*). No mention is made of the means of protecting mother and child, although no doubt they must have resorted to some magical amulets and also to other conjurations and mystical operations. Another demon Shimdon (or Ashmadon, 'Destruction') is mentioned, who, according to a legend, was met by a child of the giants that lived before the Flood, whom the mother had sent to bring her a knife for cutting the navel. The demon then said to the newborn giant baby: 'Go and tell your mother that the cock has crowed, otherwise I would have struck and killed thee'; to which the baby replied: 'Go and tell your mother that my navel has not yet been cut, otherwise I would have struck and killed thee' (*Genes. Rabb.* ch. 36, § 1). Various demons lay in wait for the newborn child. There was none, however, so dangerous as the above-mentioned Lilith. This demon plays an important rôle in the subsequent development of superstitious practices. If one might infer from the practice mentioned in the Mishna (*Ḥullin*, iv. 7), the *secundines*, or after-birth, must have been used for some superstitious purpose, very likely to prevent miscarriage. It is forbidden to bury at cross-roads or to hang up on a tree the after-birth of the miscarried first-born of an animal, for that would be of the 'ways of the Amorites' (*i.e.* superstitious practices of the heathen). We shall see later on the use made of it. It was also preserved as a remedy for some unnamed illness of children (*Shab.* f. 129*b*).

With the material at our disposal it is difficult to trace the influence of these evil demons (Lilith, Agrath, Shiddin, etc.) further back than the 1st cent., although some of them are found in the Apocryphal literature of the preceding centuries, and the legends are so widely spread among Jews and non-Jews that the roots may lie much further back than the known literary monuments. Lilith is, as stated before, also the demon Incubus, and men are warned not to sleep in ruins lest they fall a prey to lascivious demons and engender children, for female demons are anxious to join human beings and to obtain children from them. Lilith was originally the first wife of Adam, or, according to a different tradition in the *Zohar*, the woman that came up from the deep of the water (Tiamat?) and together with her innumerable company hovered round the body of the newly-created Adam, until the real wife (Ḥavvah) was created, when she was driven away by an angel and sent back to the surging sea. According to a third version, she was the real wife of Adam for a hundred years during the time when he was living in disgrace, and then brought forth demons and evil spirits. Being afterwards driven away, she retained a hatred for man, and lies constantly in wait for man, either to join him in wedlock or to destroy his offspring. In order to frustrate her evil designs, a man must utter the following conjuration before he joins his wife: 'Thy garment has become rent, it is loosened, it is loosened. Thou mayest neither come in nor go out, nothing for thee and no share for thee. Return, return, the sea is stormy, its waves are calling for thee. I lay hold of the share of God, I wrap (cover) myself with the holy king.' And the man has to cover his face and that of his wife whilst speaking thus; and after finishing the conjuration he has to pour clear water round the bed and he will be safe from attacks from Lilith (*Zohar*, Leviticus, fol. 19*a*). Another conjuration which has become the basis and prototype of all other conjurations of Lilith and evil child-stealing demons and witches is that found in the story of ben Sira, in which we have also a version of the virgin birth, for the mother of ben Sira is reported to be the virgin daughter of the prophet Jeremiah. In this story the son of the king was dying without any apparent reason, and he then wrote out an amulet with the names of certain angels upon it, which he explained as follows: Together with Adam, a wife was created from the earth. Considering herself his equal, she refused to obey Adam, and in a moment of rage uttered the ineffable name of God and flew away to the borders of the ocean. At the request of Adam the Lord sent three angels after her to bring her back, and, if she refused to obey, to threaten her with the death of a hundred of her children each day. The angels went after her, and found her at the waters through which the Israelites were to pass when going out of Egypt. They threatened to drown her in the waters of the sea. She implored them to spare her, and in return, as she had the power to hurt male children up to the eighth day of their birth, and female up to the twentieth, she swore unto them that she would not go near the house or hurt the child or the mother where she should see the names of these angels written up. They released her after she had taken that oath; and it was for this reason that ben Sira wrote the names Sinoi, Sinsinoi, Semangelaf, on an amulet and hung it up in the room where the child was, thus driving Lilith away and preventing her from further molesting it (*Alphab. Ps-Siræ*, etc., Steinschneider, f. 23*a-b*; M. Gaster, 'The Child-stealing Witch,' *Folklore*, xi., 1900, pp. 129–162).

(5) *Amulets, charms*, etc.—The amulet is no doubt a later stage. It is preceded, as a rule, by the very act of conjuration in which the conjurer utters those words, and through a process common to all magical operations identifies himself with those angels, and drives away the evil spirit by the account of another operation in which the demon had been vanquished by those powers. From the spoken recital we descend to the written amulet, in which the writing is considered sufficient to terrify away the demon. All the other amulets, like those used in the cases of bewitching or for protection, have gone through the same process, whether they be connected with sterility or birth, or with the protection of mother and child from evil eye and evil spirits, whether it be to facilitate the labour or to increase the difficulty, to prevent man from joining his wife or to untie the magical knots. For we are proceeding now to the third period, or the second section of the second period, from the 6th to the 18th century. Sympathetic remedies, together with medical and magical recipes, appear now in the writings of the 6th century and onwards. Ancient Greek medical

practices and recipes, popular superstitions and customs, were then gathered up and introduced into the medical science of the Arabs, together with all the popular beliefs and practices of the East, and to a certain extent also those of some of the nations of the West, with whom they came into contact. Translated into Greek (Byzantine) and into Latin, these magical, sympathetical, and medical compilations spread among the nations of Europe. Books of recipes and amulets, *Iatrosophiai*, as well as manuals of leechcraft, abound also in mediæval Jewish literature. Most of them are still preserved in manuscripts. What has been printed from the second half of the 17th cent. onwards is mere reprint, and often very faulty, from older MSS. By the aid of manuscripts (mostly in the present writer's possession) we can go back at least to the 12th or 13th cent., but no doubt they contain materials which are far older and may be of extreme antiquity. We are not concerned here with purely medical prescriptions, though it is often difficult to draw the line between the dispensary proper and magical or sympathetical recipes. Nor can we pay any attention here to the astrological horoscopes and nativities, or to prognostications from the influence of the astral bodies, as to the importance ascribed to days and months. Though intimately connected with *births*, these prognostications and nativities have remained the domain of the astrologer, and have seldom if ever formed part of popular practices. A selection of the latter culled from writings ranging from the 6th to the 18th cent. may now follow. Only such have been selected as have enjoyed great popularity and have been found repeated in MSS of diverse origin. Some hail from Spain, others from Italy and Turkey; some from Damascus and Yemen, and not a few from Germany. In all twenty-five MS compilations have been used.

The bewitching of bride and bridegroom may start from the day of marriage. 'Tie three knots during the ceremony, and the bride will be forbidden to her husband so long as those knots remain untied'; or, 'Make a thread of wool on a live sheep and say, while twisting the cord:

"Shurah, Shura, Shabrur; I tie N. against the woman N. with the knot with which God tied night and day, and I tie him in every language and with every word by which a tie can be made under heaven and earth which cannot be loosened. And so long as I do not untie it, N. shall not be able to approach the woman N. I seal these knots with the seal of King Solomon, with which he sealed the demons in the copper vessel and cast them into the sea. And similarly shall no man be able to untie these knots but me."

If he afterwards wishes to break the charm, he must kill a hen, drop the blood upon the knots, and untie them, and the charm will be broken.' Or, 'Three knots made by the woman in her girdle, when with her husband and he not knowing, it will affect him so long as the knots remain tied,' etc. More numerous are the recipes for breaking this tying. 'On both sides of a new-laid egg the verse from 2 S 22[37] "Thou enlargest my footsteps," etc., is written. Cut it in two with a knife or a dagger with which a man has been killed, give each one a half to eat, draw the picture of a small tree on uterine vellum, tie it on his left arm, put some quicksilver into a nutshell and tie it on his right arm, then tear a hole in the woman's shirt, etc., and the charm will be broken.' Or, 'Take flour from a "living" mill, mix it with the mud of the river (or rain-water), make a cake of it, (write on it v.[2] of Ps 2,) bake it on a new fire, and eat it.' Or, 'Pass a stick through a hole made in the door, burn it on coals and fumigate self and wife.' Or, 'Let the tied man go to the field, loosen an ass tied by its foot, take the rope with the knot and burn it, and drink of the ashes mixed with water or wine.' Or, 'Tie the right-foot sandal of the bridegroom to the left foot sandal of the bride, fumigate with sulphur, pour water into them, shake the water from one to the other, and let both drink of it, and the charm will be broken.' The symbolical meaning of all these recipes requires no explanation. On the other hand, some practices like throwing the shoe after bride and bridegroom may find here an unexpected explanation.

The wearing of a dead man's tooth, or the fumigation three times with the tooth or bone of a dead man, seems to have been a universally acknowledged remedy against the 'tie.' Rubbing with raven's brains or with ox-gall is also recommended, the latter mixed with sesame oil. All these recipes and more are found in MSS of the 14th cent., and in some cases are ascribed to authors of the 11th or 12th, *e.g.* Aben Ezra, and even to Asaf of the ninth!

The remedies for removing barrenness and for furthering conception may be divided into two groups: one, the use of amulets and charms; the other, sympathetic magic and medicine. The mediæval and ancient pharmacopœia shrinks from nothing, and in superstitious practices there is no room for æsthetical considerations. The women were so anxious to get children that they would use anything that they thought would further generation. Objectionable and nauseating decoctions and sublimations abound in all these collections, and fumigation, mentioned in the Book of Tobit and practised no doubt long before his time, is resorted to on a large scale. Animal dung and droppings are often recommended by Galen and other ancient writers, and adopted by practitioners down to the time of Quincy's dispensatory. They are found in Arabic and Jewish 'dispensaries' also. But less objectionable ingredients are found which would further conception or remove sterility:

'Take the bone found in a stag's heart, put it into a leather bag sewn up with red silk, fasten on it red silk strings, and tie it round the neck of the woman on a Monday or Thursday before sunrise, and arrange it so that the bag may hang from the strings down to the navel, and take care that the knot is on the back of her neck. A man must hang that amulet on the woman, and she will bear children.' Or, 'Take a big spider, put it into a small wooden case of equal size, stop the opening with the bark of the same tree or with the shell of a nut, and carry it round the neck.' Or, 'Take the first milk of a goat before the kid had touched the udder, make a small cheese of it, put it into a new linen cloth, and tie it upon the left arm; it must never be taken off, and the woman will then bear children.' Or, 'The dried stomach of a hare, bear-gall, ammonica and myrrh, pounded and mixed with butter, taken for two days in broth, will help in getting children.' Or, 'Dip a paper in menses' blood, tie it round a fruit-bearing tree, and say: "I give thee my illness and my infirmity, give thou me thy power of bearing fruit."' Or, 'Make a decoction of bear's or wolf's meat as much as a bean. If the animal is male the child will be male, and if it is female the woman will give birth to a daughter.'

A favourite remedy next to the hare's stomach was the plant 'ox-tongue,' later on confused with the real tongue of an ox, and a decoction of either is recommended. Or, 'Ashes of burnt fox-skin, drunk twice a day in water for nine consecutive days, promote generation.' Or, 'A fish found within a fish, dried and pounded, has the same effect if taken for three nights in wine.' 'Two wings of a raven worn by a woman when with her husband will cause her to conceive.' 'If a woman is anxious to get sons, she must ask a shepherd to get the after-birth of a cow, dry it, and pound it, and drink the powder in wine.' Another remedy is 'to obtain the navel of another woman's child, to burn it, and drink the ashes in wine.' To ascertain whether a woman will always be barren, put an unopened gall in a soft linen rag for three days over her womb, and if afterwards a worm is found in the gall, it is a sign that she is by nature sterile; if the worm be red, then there is no help for her sterility.

If a woman wishes to procure barrenness or to stop bearing children, then 'let the scissors with which the navel of her child has been cut be stuck

in the ground. So long as the scissors remain in the ground, she will have no children.'

Or, 'If the plate out of which a woman has taken her first meal after delivery is placed face downward under her bed, it will prevent her from conceiving until it be turned face upward.' Or, 'Pick up a grain that has dropped from the mouth of an ant, and tie it on the left thigh, and it will prevent child-bearing.' Or, 'The first tooth dropped by a child picked up before it touches the ground, and fastened round the neck, set in silver or gold, will have the same effect.' 'The wearing of a cat's paw out off from the live animal stops fertility.' Carrying of a hare's heart (or hare's droppings) will have the same result. Or, 'Sew into the hem of her shirt, in the front, the ashes of a wolf's heart.' Or, 'Extinguish three live coals in her menstruation blood, and bury them. If this charm is to be broken, the coals must be taken out and thrown into a burning fire.'

Great care is then taken to prevent the mother from mishap caused by various agencies. Of the diverse methods employed, a few may now be mentioned.

'Mare's milk, boiled with virgin wax and then kneaded and put in a bag of buckskin, or of pure linen, and placed on the navel, will prevent miscarriage.' Or, 'Wearing of an eagle-stone' (*aëtites*) (*Shab.* f. 66*b*). Or, 'Drink three days in the morning and in the evening milk of a pregnant ass.' Or, 'Wear a ring made of the stag's bone.' Or, 'The heart of a hare taken out alive.' Or, 'White and red corals pounded and drunk in wine or taken with egg for three consecutive days.' Or, 'A ruby hung round the neck.' Or, 'A dead scorpion tied up in crocus-green cloth, and fastened on to the skirt.' Or, 'A ring with the image of a scorpion engraved on it, worn by the woman, will prevent miscarriage.' Or, 'A girdle made of snake's skin or of that of a she-ass, worn round the waist.' Or, 'An eggshell of a hatched chicken, burnt and powdered and drunk, prevents miscarriage.' Invaluable in preventing miscarriage is declared to be the stone 'enkuntra,' which is found in the field, looks like glass, has a hole in the middle, and is of the size of an egg. If worn, it is infallible in its effect.

All these are mere prophylactic measures. The real crisis begins with the travail of delivery. Here also the danger of the evil spirits is greater, and amulets and incantations are far more numerous than in the previous stages of conception and gestation. Some of the incantations may now be mentioned:

'When a woman is in difficult labour, whisper in her ear: "The angel Michael walking on Mount Sinai heard loud screaming and weeping. He said: O Lord, what is the reason for that screaming and weeping which I hear? And the Lord replied: A doe in the pangs of labour is weeping and screaming; go and tell her. Come forth, come forth, come forth, the earth is seeking thee."' Or, 'Write certain letters on a potsherd, put it on the woman, and say: "In the name of Ansel, who hears women in labour, hearken also to this woman, and let the child come forth in peace and in life. Amen."' Or, 'Write on the four corners of a piece of linen (or, take a basin of still water and say over it) in the presence of the woman: "The gate of heaven was opened, and down came three (seven) angels with three (two) rods in their hands—one was white, the other was red, and the third black. The white one struck the heavens, and the rain came down; the red one struck the sea, and it parted; the third, the black one, struck the woman and brought forth safely child and after-birth." And (give the woman to drink of the water),' or, 'Wash the cloth in sweet water, give her the water to drink, and put the cloth on her head until she is safely delivered.'

Of general use has been another set of amulets and incantations with the verse Ex 11[8] written on pure parchment, beginning and ending with, 'Go forth' and 'I will go forth,' etc. Or, an amulet is prepared with letters in nine squares, which, in whichever way read, have the numerical value of 15, probably=one of the names of God, 'Jah.' Also the words 'Kur, kur, kur' are either written or repeated to the woman in labour; or, permutations of the Aramaic word *puk*, which also means 'go forth.' Permutations of the Tetragrammaton are also found in some amulets, and even the names 'Immanuel,' 'Soter,' and 'Salvator,' often mutilated beyond recognition, are used as sacred names, written on pure parchment, and placed beside the woman in labour; or, variations of 'Sator arepo,' etc. As a supreme remedy in very difficult cases, the scroll of the Law or an ancient copy of the Pentateuch is brought from the Synagogue, and taken into the room where the woman is in pains of delivery. In addition to amulets and conjurations, other means were employed for easing the labour and ejecting the child or the after-birth.

'The woman must drink water gathered at cross-roads.' Or, 'Another woman's milk lapped from the palm of her hand; in some cases, oil.' Or, 'a decoction made of the scrapings or the grime off the sheath of the butcher's knife.' Or, 'Soak the *afikomin* (*i.e.* the piece of Passover cake reserved for the end of the meal), and put it into her mouth. She must be careful not to eat it, and it will ease difficulties of labour.' Or, 'Tie the herb *Vives* under the sole of her left foot.' (No doubt the plant mentioned here is *Vitex*, 'chaste tree.') 'A magnet tied to the left thigh; or sea sponge or red alum has the same effect, when tied on the left thigh.'

Of all herbs and plants none rivals in efficacy the mythical *Eisenkraut*, or *Eisenhart*, as it is called in German. It is akin to the mythical 'Mandragora,' and has great powers to destroy charms and to prevent every evil occurrence. In modern German botany the name stands for 'Verbena' (vervain). Another plant used is the Artemisia, or mugwort, on the stomach or on the thigh. Similarly, 'Dust from under the threshold of the room, wrapped in a piece of cloth and put on the womb.' Or, 'The woman is to keep between her teeth the right horn of a goat or hart.' Or, ashes of silkworms. Or, scraped ivory in wine or water eases difficult labour. We shall pass over the numerous ingredients recommended for fumigation; they belong mostly to the unsavoury class of remedies already referred to. The same are prescribed also in cases where the child dies unborn, and the mother is in grave danger. Drinking of such nostrums, as well as fumigation, was resorted to.

'If a child born appears to be dead, pass a sieve over its face to and fro and it will revive.' Or, 'Cover it with the after-birth' (*Shab.* f. 134*a*). 'If the mother wishes to satisfy herself as to whether the child is alive or dead, she must look into a basin filled with oil, and if it is alive she will see her face in it; if not, she is to put her five fingers into a plate filled with honey, and lick them one after the other, and then drink the honey dissolved in warm water, and the dead child will be ejected with ease.' 'If the woman drinks a decoction of "Sharlel," i.e. *Salvia horminun* (common sage), it will assist in the ejection of the after-birth.' Or, 'The eating of garlic and doves' brains mixed with honey and boiled together in water.'

But the difficulties of labour may be due also to evil influences, for 'the burying of a pomegranate in the room of the woman will prolong the labour and prevent the birth of the child. The only remedy is to remove the pomegranate.' 'The stone found in a viper's head hung on a woman will prolong labour and prevent birth.'

As soon as the child is born, both mother and child are exposed to the evil demons, who are anxious to injure the child and to obtain possession of it, sometimes even bodily, and substitute for it a changeling. Every possible precaution is then taken to frustrate the action of the demons, and to grant as much protection as possible to the newborn babe. Lilith is the chief demon, but hosts of other witches prowl about, and must be kept at a distance. Conjurations play the principal part. A circle is drawn round the walls of the chamber and on the floor, and in it the names of the three dreaded angels, 'Sinoi, Sinsinoi, and Semangelaf,' are written. These were the angels mentioned above who were sent to punish Lilith, and to whom she promised not to come near the house, or the woman and child, wherever these names should be found. A long conjuration is also written on the parchment or paper containing the names of these angels, and hung round the four posts of the bed in which the woman lies, or fastened to the curtains. The conjuration, a modification of the ancient charm against the demon Aveziha, occurs in almost every collection of Oriental and Eastern European charms.

'This child-stealing or -killing witch, then,' so the conjuration runs, 'is met by the prophet Elijah, who stops her in her roamings, and asks her whither she is going. She answers that she is going to a certain house where a baby has been born, to eat its flesh, to drink its blood, to crush its bones, and to destroy it. Threatened by the prophet, she promises not to

go near that or any house where her names are known, written down, or hung up; and she gives to the prophet the list of her 18 or more mysterious names.'

In ancient variants she is known as the demon Lilith, 'Striga' or 'Strigla'; the name is next changed into 'Estrelia,' or 'Strelia Margarita,' and then to the 'Star Margarita.' But Lilith is the more common and the more prominent name. This amulet, once universally used, is still used throughout the east of Europe (Austria, Russia, Rumania, Turkey) and almost everywhere in the East (India, Syria, Arabia, etc.) as quite a common practice among the Jews. The book *Raziel*, containing the description of the holy circle and the pictures of those angels, is in some parts of Poland and Russia placed in addition under the pillow of the woman. But it is not the mother the demons are after; it is the baby. And the effect of the bewitching is seen in the crying of the child for no apparent reason, in its wasting away, and in its untimely death.

'If the mother sees a woman whom she suspects of being a child-eating witch, she must put her left fist into her mouth, and say: "Thou and thy head are of a swine, thou art unto me a dead bitch, the after-birth of thy mother be in thy mouth,"' and she must repeat it three times, and that woman will have no power to hurt her. 'King Solomon asked the demon Ashmedai what should be done to a child that was constantly crying, and the demon said: "Cut a strip of the saddle of an ass first met in the morning, and place it under the child's pillow."' Another remedy against bewitching: 'Buy a new pot from the maker, and pay the price he asks; buy also an open lock. Take still water, wash the baby in it, and pour it into the pot, which must be placed under the bed of the mother, and the open lock in her bed. At the slightest suspicion of an attack on the part of an evil spirit, the mother locks the lock, and puts it upon the child, then some of the water is sprinkled over the child's face, and, without speaking, the water is poured out at the crossing of roads, and the pot replaced under the bed.' Vervain and 'ruta' are the plants which, if put upon the child, are sure to drive evil spirits away. Or, 'The eye of an old black cock put on the right side of the child, the cock's comb under its pillow, and close to the child the white stones found in a hen's stomach.' Or, 'Hang round its neck a bone which a dog has dropped from its mouth.' Or, 'Take some of the earth upon which the child has fallen immediately upon its birth, before either father or mother has seen it, and tie it round its waist for thirty days, and the child will always be safe from trouble and accidents.' Or, 'Take dust from under the threshold (or, over the door), and mix it with the mother's milk, and put it on the baby's head, and it will sleep peacefully.' 'To break the charm of a bewitched child, take a little raven from its nest before it can fly, burn it on the fire, pound the ashes, mix them with milk, and give it to the child before it has started sucking, and it will be safe.' Or, 'Hang a crystal or emerald over the child, and it will be safe.'

As late as the year 1707 the *secundines* burnt, and the ashes given in milk, were believed to destroy the charm of a wasting child. Or, a bag made of it, with snapdragon, St. John's wort, and other flowers put in it and hung round the child's neck, was considered a powerful amulet against bewitching. It must be understood that the 'evil eye' is also considered as a form of bewitching; but *no* reference is made to the 'evil eye' in *any* of *all* the ancient MSS. This notion and name appear for the first time in the 18th century. In modern times, to which we are turning now, most of these latter practices seem to have disappeared. A gold coin is hung in the cap, against the evil eye or any other evil spirit (Turkey and Rumania), or a satchel with blue beads and 'ruta' over the bed. Regarding changelings, a story is told of a famous Rabbi of the 18th cent., who was invited to be present on the occasion of a circumcision. (All the attacks of the demons are concentrated upon the period from the birth of the boy to the eighth day—the day of the circumcision.) Driving from his place to the house, he met on the road a large number of demons and witches, feasting and dancing round that very baby. He ordered his servant to bring him there, and then seven knives, seven saws, two loaves of bread, and seven slippers. He stuck a knife in each slipper, took his own off, washed his hands, and uttered the great Name. The witches and demons melted away and left the baby behind, which he took and brought back to its parents. There he uttered another holy Name, and lo! the baby which the mother had been keeping with her in bed turned into a bundle of straw. 'When a child laughs in its sleep it is a sign that Lilith or some other evil spirit is playing with it,' and it must be awakened by snubbing the nose. In Rumania it is believed that an angel is playing with the child. The child's clothes must not be left outside over night; an owl drops its spittle or a feather on them, and it changes into a long hairlike worm, which enters the body and tortures the child (Egypt). By conjuring it, it comes out of the body in the form of black points, which must be carefully removed (Egypt). Neither mother nor baby is left alone all the eight days. On the eve of the eighth day children come with their teacher and read certain portions of the Law (the Shema', Dt 6^4), and they are regaled with sweets and with bags of peas salted and peppered (Rumania and Poland). The baby is not put into the cradle before the sixth day (the naming day), and is kept all that day on the knees of an assistant woman (Turkey, India, etc.). Before the baby is laid in the cradle, almonds and raisins are put in, and the cradle is gently rocked. The almonds, etc., are then given to other children. Under the pillow the book of Psalms is laid, and under the mattress a sword or horse-shoe (India). A lying-in woman must not see any one all the week (Turkey). Over the bed a satchel is hung, containing a blue bead, some garlic, and a piece of broken glass (Salonica and Palestine). On the Friday before the circumcision similar practices are observed to those on the eve of the circumcision, and visitors are entertained.

If it should happen that a woman is losing her children, then 'she is to go to a bitch, and put her foot on a puppy, and say three times: "Take the dead and give me the living." Then she is to take the puppy and carry it close to her body, with its head to her right and its feet to her left side, and go to the water and loosen her clothes, and let the puppy drop into the water and say three times: "Give me the living and take the dead." This must be done when the woman is in the ninth month.' Or, 'Go to a dried-up nut-tree and bore a hole just over the head, and put into that hole some of the cuttings of the nails of fingers and toes and some hair, and ram a peg into that hole, and say: "I conjure thee, evil spirit, to remain for ever locked up in this tree, and no longer to be able to hurt me."' Or, 'Make a ring from the silver got from nine young maids under age, and put it on the ear of the child immediately after birth before it has been picked up from the ground, and it will live.'

The rocking of an empty cradle causes the premature death of the child, and the walking over a child or its crawling between the legs of another person causes its growth to be stunted (Rumania and Russia). Very few lullabies, if any, have been preserved. As a rule, the mother rocks the child to sleep to some popular tune. Within thirty days the chances of bewitching and changing diminish, or are considered to have entirely disappeared.

(6) *Primogeniture, naming.*—The firstborn must be redeemed within thirty days. He is believed to have some curative powers. If he treads on the back of a person suffering from lumbago or other joint-diseases, he drives the illness away (Rumania). Some of the duties and privileges of the firstborn prescribed by the Bible are still maintained, and on the eve of Passover he is expected to fast in remembrance of the death of the firstborn of the Egyptians. In some marriage settlements the male offspring is the object of an important clause regulating matters of inheritance and succession.

Among the Ashkenazic (German) Jews a child often takes the name of the grandparent, or of a dead relative. Among the Sephardic (Spanish and Eastern) Jews the parent's name is often given to the child. The former believe that it is an evil omen to name a child after a living person. In cases

of dangerous illness the name is often changed, thereby suggesting a re-birth or change in the destiny of the patient.

LITERATURE.—i. *MANUSCRIPTS.*—Most of the material is taken from the medical and magical MSS in the writer's possession, chiefly from the oldest and the fullest. The following is a list of those used, arranged according to antiquity and importance: Cod. 1055 (probably of the 14th cent., North Italy); Cod. 315 (Oriental Spanish hand, 17th cent.; contains also the work attributed to Aben Ezra); Cod. 444 (Ital., 17th cent., 2 vols., i. with 1231 recipes, and ii. with more than 500); Cod. 676 (Germany, 14th or 15th cent., medical treatises, etc.); Cod. 443 (Tunis, 1775, upwards of 400 recipes copied from older MSS); Cod. 177 (Syria, 15th–16th cent., with very ancient Babylonian material); Cod. 118 (Germany, 16th–17th cent., with old German conjurations; upwards of 400 recipes); Cod. 700 (Germany, 17th cent., many hundreds of recipes); Cod. 932 (Germany, hundreds of recipes—some German and the conjuration of the 'Eisenkraut'); Cod. 358 (Morocco, 19th cent., very full); Cod. 466 (Spanish origin, written in Bulgaria 16th cent., more than 400 recipes); Cod. 464 (Italy, 18th cent., with 308 recipes, many from Aben Ezra and other ancient authorities); Cod. 462 (Italy, 17th cent., with 200 recipes); Cod. 128 (Yemen, 18th–19th cent., some Arabic, others Hebrew, very full); Cod. 603 (Turkey, 19th cent., Hebrew, and some in Spanish). Codd. 40, 194, 438, 451, 677, 702, might be mentioned, for they also contain medical, magical, and sympathetical recipes and a number of amulets referring to birth, etc.; also Cod. 134 (Montefiore College, Ramsgate, of the 14th cent.).

ii. *PRINTED LITERATURE.*—For Bible: Winer, *RWB*, *s.v.* 'Kinder.' For Talmudic period: I. Lamperonti, *Paḥad Yitsḥaḳ, passim*; J. Hamburger, *RE* ii., Leipzig, 1883, *s.v.* 'Geburt,' p. 254 ff.; Gideon Brecher, *Das Transcendentale . . . im Talmud*, Vienna, 1850, p. 207 ff.—For modern times: J. Buxtorff, *Synagoga Judaica*, Germ. ed. 1738, p. 81 ff.; M. Grunwald, *MGJV*, Hamburg, i., 1898, p. 90 ff., v., 1900, p. 63 ff. And the following Hebrew works, partly reprints from ancient MSS: Anonym., *Toledoth Adam*, last ed., Lemberg, 1875; B. Benas, *Amtaḥath Binyamin*, Wilmersdorf, 1716; Anonym., *Miṭ'alot Eloḳim*, Lemberg, 1865; David Tevele, *Beth David*, Wilmersdorf, 1733; Anonym., at end of *Urim Ve-Tumim*, Dyhrenfurt (s.a.); S. Pelungian, *Sefer ha-Zechirah*, Hamburg, 1709; H. Palache, *Refuah ve-ḥayim*, Smyrna, 1874; Reuben b. Abraham, *Seguloth*, Jerusalem, 1865; Moses b. Israel Benjamin, *Yalḳut Moshe*, Munkacy, 1894; and one of the most curious collections in Jewish-German of a certain Jeh. Hentchin, *Matsil Nefashoth*, Prag. 1651 (Amsterdam, 1651), agreeing in many points with Cod. 118. M. GASTER.

BIRTH (Muhammadan). — Among Muslim peoples the birth of a child, or at least of a male child, is an event of the first importance. It is especially so to the mother, because a barren wife is held in no regard by husband or relatives. Women therefore resort or resorted to various charms and superstitious rites, even to stepping across the corpse of a decapitated criminal and anointing their persons with his blood, in the hope of becoming fertile; and the intentional avoidance of children by husband or wife is practically unknown, though at the time of Muḥammad such avoidance was permitted to men who did not desire offspring from slave concubines (*Mishkāt al-Maṣābīḥ*, tr. Matthews, 1810, vol. ii. pp. 96–98). The ceremonies attending a birth are numerous, but it is not always easy to distinguish those which are essentially Muslim, *i.e.* handed down from the days of the Prophet, from those which are exotic and are derived from local customs and foreign superstitions. The birth-ceremonies of Muslims vary in different countries, and scarcely any of them, except the *'aqīqah*, rest upon the recorded precepts of Muḥammad; but there is a general agreement in the chief observances, which shows that they are to be ascribed to the usual practice of the Arabs at the time of the promulgation of Islām. Two or three days before the expected date of the birth, the midwife (*dāyah*) brings to the house of the woman to be confined the groaning-chair or 'birth-throne' (*kursī al-wilādah*), upon which the birth is to take place, for Muslim women are delivered sitting. The chair, which belongs to the midwife, is covered with a shawl or embroidery, and *ḥinnā* flowers or roses are tied with an embroidered handkerchief to each of the top corners of the back. As soon as the delivery is safely accomplished, the by-standers trill the *zagharīt*, or lulliloo (as in the tale of King 'Umar b. al-Nu'man in the *Alf Lāylah wa Lāylah*; cf. Burton, ed. Smithers, 1893, i. 401). The child is at once wrapped in white linen, or linen of any colour but yellow, and the father or, in his absence, some other man (but never a woman) repeats the call to prayer (*adhān*) in the infant's ear, or the *adhān* in its right ear and the nearly identical *iqāmah* in its left ear. This is done in imitation of Muḥammad himself, who is related to have acted thus on the birth of his grandson Ḥasan (*Mishkāt*, *ut sup.* ii. 316). Another custom, based upon the same authority, is for some learned man to suck a date or some sweetmeat and put it into the baby's mouth and rub it on its palate, whereby the sucker's wisdom is hoped to be communicated (*Mishkāt*, ii. 315; Herklots, *Qanoon-e-Islam*, 1822, p. 6). Among the well-to-do the mother retires to her bed for from three to six days; but poor women scarcely rest at all after their delivery. Meanwhile rejoicings begin at once; but these are much more festive for the birth of a son than of a daughter. The men recite the *fātiḥah* (Qur. ch. i.) and receive presents. Dancing men and girls assemble and perform before the house, and sometimes the father entertains his friends on each day of the week succeeding the happy event; but usually the seventh day (*yaum al-subū'*) is that chosen for the chief festivities. Lane (*Mod. Egyptians*[6], 1860, ch. xxvii. p. 504 f.) has described the ceremonies of the seventh day as practised in Cairo about 1835:

> 'On the . . . seventh day after the birth of a child the female friends of its mother pay her a visit. In the families of the higher classes *'Awālim* [*'Ālmahs*] are hired to sing in the *ḥarīm*, or *Ālātiyah* perform, or *fiqis* recite a *ḫatmah* [of the Qur'ān] below. The mother, attended by the *dāyah*, sits on the *kursī al-wilādah* [birth-chair], in the hope that she may soon have occasion for it again; for her doing this is considered propitious. The child is brought, wrapped in a handsome coloured shawl or something costly; and, to accustom it to noise that it may not be afterwards frightened by the music and other sounds of mirth, one of the women takes a brass mortar [*ḥaun*] and strikes it repeatedly with the pestle, as if pounding. After this the child is put into a sieve and shaken, it being supposed that this operation is beneficial to its stomach. Next it is carried through all the apartments of the *ḥarīm*, accompanied by several women or girls, each of whom bears a number of wax candles, sometimes of various colours, cut in two, lighted, and stuck into small lumps of paste of *ḥinnā* upon a small round tray. At the same time the *dāyah* or another female sprinkles upon the floor of each room a mixture of salt and seed of the fennel-flower, or salt alone, which has been placed during the preceding night at the infant's head, saying, as she does this, "The salt be in the eye of the person who does not bless the Prophet," or "The foul salt be in the eye of the envier." This ceremony of the sprinkling of salt [*rashsh al-milḥ*] is considered a preservative for the child and mother from the evil eye; and each person present should say, "O God, bless our lord Muḥammad!' The child, wrapped up and placed on a fine mattress, which is sometimes laid on a silver tray, is shown to each of the women present, who looks at its face, says, "O God, bless our lord Muḥammad! God give thee long life," etc., and usually puts an embroidered handkerchief, with a gold coin (if pretty or old, the more esteemed) tied up in one of the corners, on the child's head or by its side. This giving of handkerchiefs is considered as imposing a debt, to be repaid by the mother, if the donor should give her the same occasion; or as the discharge of a debt for a similar offering. The coins are generally used for some years to decorate the head-dress of the child. After these *nuqūt* [wedding presents] for the child, others are given for the *dāyah*. During the night before the *subū'*, a water-bottle full of water (a *dauraq* in the case of a boy, or a *qullah* in that of a girl), with an embroidered handkerchief tied round its neck, is placed at the child's head while it sleeps. This, with the water it contains, the *dāyah* takes and puts upon a tray and presents to each of the women, who put their *nuqūt* for her (merely money) into the tray. In the evening the husband generally entertains a party of his friends.'

On the same seventh day (or on the 14th, 21st, 28th, or 35th day after birth) the child is named, though this is often done a few hours after its birth, without any special ceremony; and the rite of *'aqīqah* is to be observed, together with the shaving of the child's head, though both are commonly neglected at the present day. The *'aqīqah* is enjoined by a tradition of Muḥammad,

who said, 'An *'aqīqah* must be observed at the birth of a child; then slay a goat on its behalf and shave its head'; and again, 'The *'aqīqah* for a son is two goats, and for a daughter one, either male or female'; and Buraydah related: 'We used, in times of Ignorance, when children were born to us, to slay goats and rub their heads with the blood. Then, when the religion of Islām came, we slew a goat on the seventh day, and shaved the child's head, and rubbed saffron upon it' (*Mishkāt, ut sup.* ii. 315, 316; Abū-Dā'ūd, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Arab. text, ii. 36). The *'aqīqah* is properly the hair of the newborn infant, but the term is applied by metonymy to the sacrifice made on its shaving (Lane, *Arabic Lexicon, s.v.* "Aqīqah"). It may be a ram or a goat, or two for a son and one for a daughter. The animal must be a male yearling and without blemish, according to Abū-Dā'ūd (Hughes, *Dict. of Islām*, art. 'Children'). The rite is held obligatory by Ibn Ḥanbal, but the founders of the three other orthodox schools regard it as unimportant, in spite of Muḥammad's example and the tradition prescribing the *'aqīqah* (or, as he preferred to call it, *nasīkah*). The person sacrificing should say, 'O God, verily this *'aqīqah* is a ransom for my son such a one; its blood for his blood, and its flesh for his flesh, and its bone for his bone, and its skin for his skin, and its hair for his hair. O God, make it a ransom for my son from hell-fire.' A bone of the victim should not be broken. A leg should be given to the midwife, but the *'aqīqah* should first be cooked with water and salt without any part being cut off, and part should be given to the poor (Lane, *loc. cit.*, and *Thousand and One Nights*, note 24 to ch. iv. [1859 ed., vol. i. p. 277]). 'It is a sunneh ordinance, incumbent on the father, to shave, or cause to be shaved, the head of his child, and to give, in alms to the poor, the weight of the hair in gold or silver' (Lane, *Thousand and One Nights, ib.*). Circumcision is also specially approved when performed on the seventh day; but in practice it is usually postponed to the fifth or sixth year, or even much later.

On the fortieth day, as a general rule (not universally observed, however), the purification of the mother is completed, and she goes to the bath; and on the same day the infant is introduced to its rocking cradle, and *ḥarīm* festivities take place. The various additional ceremonies, many of them common to Hindus as well as Muslims, observed in India, may be read in Herklots (*op. cit.*); those commonly witnessed in Turkey in Europe are very fully described by a Consul's wife in *The People of Turkey*, edited by the present writer, 1878, vol. ii. pp. 1–10; but most of these are merely amplifications or variations of the customs described above.

With regard to evidence of birth, the testimony of one woman, be she the midwife or another, in addition to that of the mother, is required, according to Ḥanafī law, to prove that the child is the offspring of the mother; but the father's sole testimony is accepted for his paternity. Further evidence is required, however, when the mother is passing her term of *'iddah* after a complete divorce (Hamilton's *Hidāya*, 1791, iii. 134; Hughes, *Dict. of Islām*, art. 'Birth').

LITERATURE.—The literature has been sufficiently cited in the article. STANLEY LANE-POOLE.

BIRTH (Parsi).—1. The birth of a child is a very auspicious event in a Parsi house. It was so also in ancient Persia. According to the *Vendīdād* (iv. 47), Ahura Mazda says: 'I prefer a person with children (*puthrānē*) to one without children (*aputhrāi*).' Even the very ground where a man lives with his children is allegorically described as feeling happy (*Vend.* iii. 2). Cultivation and a good supply of food to people are recommended, because they make mankind healthy and able to produce healthy progeny (*Vend.* iii. 33). To be the father of good children was a blessing from the Yazatas like Tishtrya (*Yasht* viii. [*Tīr*] 15), Mithra (*Yasht* x. [*Mihir*] 65), Haoma (*Yasna* ix. 4, 7, 10, 13, 22), and Atar (*Yasna* lxii. 10; *Vend.* xviii. 27), and from the Fravashis (*Yasht* x. [*Mihir*] 3; *Yasht* xiii. 134). To be childless was a curse* (*Yasna* xi. 1, 3). Domestic animals, when ill-fed and ill-treated, cursed their masters that they might be childless (*Yasna* xi. 1). Childlessness was something like a punishment from heaven (*Yasna* xi. 3; *Yasht* x. [*Mihir*] 38, 108, 110). Kingly splendour (*kavaēm khvarēnō*) was associated with those who were blessed with children (*Yasht* xix. [*Zamyād*] 75). A Zoroastrian woman often prayed for a good, healthy child (*Yasna* ix. 22). A Zoroastrian man and woman prayed before their sacred fire for a good, virtuous child (*Yasna* lxii. 5; cf. *Vend.* iii. 33). A woman without a child was as sorry as a fertile piece of land that is not cultivated (*Vend.* iii. 24). She prayed for a husband who could make her a mother of children (*Yasht* v. [*Ābān*] 87; *Yasht* xv. 40).

Among the Achæmenians, a wife who gave birth to many children was a favourite with her husband, who did not like to displease her in any way (Herodotus, ix. 111). Children being the choicest gift of God, their lives were, as it were, pledged by parents for the solemn performance of an act (Herodotus, vii. 10). We read in Herodotus (i. 136) that 'next to prowess in arms, it is regarded as the greatest proof of manly excellence to be the father of many sons. Every year the king sends rich gifts to the men who can show the largest number, for they hold that number is strength.' Strabo also says a similar thing (xv. 11). We learn from the writings of the Christian martyrs of Persia that, for the above reasons, the ancient Persians did not like the prohibition against marriage among the Christians in the case of holy young Christian girls.

2. Thus we see that an ancient Zoroastrian considered the birth of a child a great event in his life. The modern Parsis have, to a great extent, inherited the desire. When the wife has conceived, it is considered to be an event of joy in the family. According to the Avesta, the women, on finding themselves enceinte, prayed for a safe delivery and for healthy children (*Yasna* ix. 22). They mostly prayed before Ardvī Sūra for an easy delivery (*Yasht* v. [*Ābān*] 87), and then for a copious supply of milk at their breast for their children (*Ārdvī Sūra Nyāyish*, 3). The allusion to these prayers suggests that there must have been some formal ceremonies accompanying them, but we do not know what they were.

Coming to later Pahlavī-Parsi books, we find that the *Shāyast lā-Shāyast* (x. 4, xii. 11) directs that, when it is known that a woman has become pregnant, a fire should be maintained most carefully in the house.† The house or family that does not keep the fire of the house properly has less pregnancy of women in it (*Shāyast lā-Shāyast* xii. 3). The *Sad-dar* (xvi. 1) also gives this direction.‡ We have the remnant of this injunction in the present custom that, among the modern Parsis, on the occasion of the completion of the fifth and seventh months of pregnancy, a lamp of clarified butter is lighted in the house by some families. The reason assigned for this is that the fire so kindled in the house keeps out *daēvas*, i.e. evil influences, from the house. A fire or a lamp

* Cf. the blessings and the curse of Cambyses (Herodotus, iii. 65). Cf. also those of Darius (*Behistun Inscriptions*, iv. 10, 11).

† *SBE* v. (1880) pp. 316, 343.

‡ *Ib.* xxiv. 277.

is even now taken to be symbolical of the continuation of a line of offspring. For example, it is not rare to hear, even now, words like these: *Tamārō cherāg roshan rahē*, i.e. 'May your lamp be always burning.' This benediction means, 'May your son live long, and may your line of descent continue.'

3. According to the Avesta (*Vend.* xv. 8), a woman in the state of pregnancy is to be looked after very carefully. It is wrong for the husband to have sexual intercourse with her in her advanced state of pregnancy, which, according to the Rivāyats, commences with the fifth month.* She must abstain from coming into contact with any dead or decomposing matter, even with a thing like a tooth-pick, which may contain germs of disease (*Shāyast lā-Shāyast* x. 20, xii. 13; *Sad-dar* xvii. 2; *SBE* v. 323, 344, xxiv. 278).

At times, some families direct the priests to say certain prayers, and generally to recite one or two of the *Yashts*, during the whole or a part of the period of pregnancy.

4. The modern Parsis have no religious ceremonies or rites during the pregnancy of the women. On the completion of the fifth month of pregnancy, a day is celebrated and known as *panchmāsiun*, i.e. 'the day of the fifth month.' Similarly, a day is observed on the completion of the seventh month, and is known as *agharni*. These days are observed only in the case of the first pregnancy. They are not observed in accordance with any religious injunction or with any religious ceremonies or rites. The expectancy of a child being a joyful event, as said above, these days, especially the seventh-month day, are observed as joyous occasions, when the woman who is enceinte is presented with suits of clothes by her parents, relatives, and friends, and especially by the family of her husband. The husband is in turn presented with a suit of clothes by the wife's family. Sweets are sent out as presents by the husband's family to the bride's house and to near relatives and friends. Among these sweets, one prepared in the form of a coco-nut has a prominent place. A coco-nut signifies a man's head, and so it is a symbol of fecundity. Some of the customs observed on these occasions are more Indian in their origin and signification than originally Persian or Zoroastrian.

5. The first delivery generally takes place in the house of the wife's parents. A room, or a part of the room, generally on the ground-floor, is set apart for the purpose. As the *Vendīdād* (v. 46) says, the place for delivery must be very clean, dry, and least frequented by others. It appears that in ancient times such places were specially provided in Parsi houses on the ground-floor. Parsi houses in those times had generally spacious ground-floors that were used for all purposes. The upper floors were low, and were rather like lofts than storeys. So the ground-floors provided proper places for delivery as enjoined in the *Vendīdād*. But, as with changed circumstances, Parsi houses of to-day are not what they were before, and as, at present, in storeyed-houses, the ground-floor in big towns is generally the worst part of the house, it is properly condemned as a place unfit for delivery.

6. In the case of a house or a place where no delivery has taken place before, religious-minded persons generally take care that a religious ceremony takes place in it before the delivery. In other words, they get it consecrated. A priest or two say and perform the *Āfringān* prayer and ceremony in the place. At times even the *Bāj* prayer is recited (cf. Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta*, 1893, ii. 723 ff., 686 ff.).

* Cf. Anquetil du Perron, *Zend-Avesta*, 1771, ii. 563.

7. On the birth of a child, a lamp is lighted and kept burning for at least three days in the room where the woman is confined. The *Sad-dar* (ch. xvi. 2) speaks of three days. It says: 'When the child becomes separate from the mother, it is necessary to burn a lamp for three nights and days—if they burn a fire it would be better.'* Some people keep the lamp burning for ten days, and some for forty days, which is generally observed as the period of confinement. The *Shāyast lā-Shāyast* directs that the lamp must be placed in such a position that no one can pass between it and the newborn child (ch. x. 15). It further says that ten women may be in attendance at the time of delivery, five of them to wait upon the mother and five upon the newborn child to look after its cradle. The child is directed to be besmeared with a mixture of sulphur and the juice of a plant (ch. x. 16). The day-time is preferred to the night-time for child-birth (*Shāyast lā-Shāyast* xii. 7).

8. On delivery the mother is enjoined to remain apart from others. She must not come into contact with fire, water, or any of the furniture of the house (*Vend.* v. 45–49).

The *Sad-dar* (ch. lxxvi. 1–5)† enjoins that 'she should not wash her head for twenty-one days, nor put her hand again on anything. . . . After the twenty-one days, if she sees herself in such a state that she is able to wash her head, she washes her head. And, after that, until the coming on of the fortieth day, it is requisite to abstain from the vicinity of a fire and anything that is wooden or earthen; it is also requisite to abstain from everything of her cooking and pot-boiling. Afterwards, when it is forty days, she is to wash her head, and it is proper for her to do every kind of work. Till the lapse of a second forty days it is not proper for her husband to make an approach to her, for it is a great sin, and it is possible that she may become pregnant a second time, as within a period of forty days women become very quickly pregnant.'

In the case of those who give birth to still-born children it is enjoined in the *Vendīdād* (v. 55 f.) that they must remain separate for twelve days. This period has been latterly extended, as directed in the later Pahlavi and Persian books, to forty days in all cases of delivery. Nowadays a Parsi woman has generally forty days of seclusion after her delivery. The *Sad-dar* (ch. xvi. 4) says, 'During forty days it is not proper that they should leave the child alone; and it is also not proper that the mother of the infant should put her foot over a threshold in the dwelling'‡ (*i.e.* leave the house).

9. Some families observe the fifth day after birth, known as *patchori* ('the fifth day'), and the tenth day, known as *dasori* ('the tenth day'), as gala days; but these days have no religious signification whatever.

10. During these forty days the woman must remain in a state of isolation. She must not come into contact with anybody or with any part of the ordinary furniture of the house, especially wooden furniture and linen articles. Her food is to be served to her on her plate by others. Those who have to come into contact with her have to bathe before they mix with others. Formerly, even the medical attendant had to do so, but nowadays the salutary rule is more honoured in the breach than in the observance. The original injunction seems to have been intended to observe 'purity' in order to prevent the spread of puerperal fever and other such diseases to which women in this state are subject.§

* *SBE* xxiv. 277. † *Ib.* xxiv. 339 f. ‡ *Ib.* xxiv. 277.

§ See the chapter on 'Maternity and its Perils,' in Mr. Havelock Ellis's *The Nationalisation of Health*, 1891, pp. 23–143. It says that in England and Wales, where 4500 women die every year in child-birth, 'about 70 per cent. of this mortality is due

11. At the end of the forty days, the period of confinement, the woman has to purify herself by a bath before mixing with others. At first she takes an ordinary bath, and then goes through what is called *nān* * (a contraction of the Sanskrit word *snān*), which is a sacred bath. A priest, generally the family priest, administers this bath with consecrated water. Even those who have come into contact with the woman during the days of her accouchement have to go through a ceremonial purificatory bath.

12. All the bedding and clothes of the woman used during the forty days of her seclusion after delivery are rejected from ordinary use. They are enjoined to be destroyed, lest they carry and spread germs of disease among others. But nowadays that injunction is not strictly followed. They are now given away to non-Zoroastrian poor people of the sweepers class.

13. Formerly a mother in child-birth first drank a few drops of the sacred Haoma (*q.v.*) juice, squeezed and consecrated in a Fire-temple. The new-born child also was made to drink a few drops of this juice (*Shāyast-lā-Shāyast* x. 16). Anquetil du Perron refers to this religious custom as prevalent in his time (*Zend-Avesta*, ii. 564). In the *Haoma Yasht* (*Yasna* ix. 22) Haoma is said to give fine healthy children to women who give delivery. Haoma was emblematical of immortality; hence this custom. Now, however, the custom is rarely observed, and, in place of the Haoma juice, a sweet drink made of molasses or sugar is given to the child as the first auspicious drink.

LITERATURE.—*SBE* v. 316 ff., 343 f., xxiv. 277, 339 f.; A. V. Williams Jackson, *Persia Past and Present*, 1906, p. 378; Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta*, 1893, ii. 686 ff., 723 ff.; Anquetil du Perron, *Zend-Avesta*, 1771, ii. 563; W. Geiger, *Civilization of the Eastern Iranians*, Eng. tr. 1885, i. 53; *BG* vol. ix. pt. ii. p. 183 ff.

JIVANJI JAMSHEDJI MODI.

BIRTH (Teutonic).—All the Teutonic peoples made a rigorous distinction between legitimate and illegitimate birth. They granted the full rights of consanguinity and tribal membership only to the children of legitimate unions, that is, to the offspring of a free father and a free mother joined in lawful wedlock. Whenever a child was born, it was laid upon the ground by the midwife in attendance upon the mother, and this practice is reflected to this day in the Scandinavian terms for midwife, *jordgumma*, *jordemoder*, 'earth-mother.' This rite has maintained its ground in many branches of the Teutonic stock (cf. A. Dieterich, *ARW* viii. 7 ff.); it originated in the old belief that the soul, and therefore the life, of the child issues from 'mother earth,' and that the child derives its vitality therefrom. The next step on the midwife's part was to lift the child up—hence the German term for 'midwife' *Hebamme*, O.H.G. *hevianna*—and hand it to the father. If the latter wished to acknowledge and maintain the infant, he took it in his arms, but he retained the right to condemn it to exposure. This right could be exercised in cases where the child was feeble or deformed, or when the father was in doubt as to its legitimacy—a situation which often arose at the birth of twins, the popular belief being that such an event implied the mother's unfaithfulness; or, again, if it had been predicted that the child's existence threatened the father with danger or misfortune, or even if he felt himself unable to maintain the child. The father's prerogative, however, was annulled by law after the introduction of Christianity, though various fairy-tales assume its survival down to the present day. But even in heathen times the father's decision had to be made within a few hours after the birth, for once the child had taken nourishment, milk or honey, in however small quantities, or had been laved with water, it was regarded as belonging to the family, and shared equal rights with every other individual within the same. Traces of this primitive heathen ordinance are still found in the Christian period; thus, the child's capacity to inherit sometimes dated only from its baptism, while the *wergeld* of an unbaptized child was sometimes reckoned at half the usual amount. Exposure was likewise illegal if the child had received its name. The name was usually given by the father, and at the ceremony (Icel. *nafnfestr*) a presentation was made to the child, while occasionally the blood-relations held a feast (*barnsöl*). The child was generally named after some deceased member of the family, preferably the grandfather on the mother's side, as it was believed that the name carried with it the personal qualities of its original bearer (cf. G. Storm, *Arkiv for nordisk filologi*, ix. 199 ff.). If the father, upon whom these various legal functions devolved, died before the child was born, his place was taken, according to the most ancient usage, by the entire group of his blood relations, frequently augmented by some relations from the mother's side, and these chose one of their number to act as guardian and discharge all legal obligations in regard to the child. The same procedure was observed when the father had been proclaimed an outlaw; in the eye of the law the mother was then a widow and the child an orphan. If the father was unable to be present at the birth, the mother had to decide whether the child should be acknowledged or exposed.

A somewhat different course was adopted in the case of illegitimate birth. The children of slaves were themselves slaves from birth, and belonged to the owner of the mother. In primitive times, distinctions were made amongst the illegitimate children of free parents, and the Old Norse language had special designations for the different classes: thus *hornungr* signified the son of a free mother (*frilla*) with whom the father cohabited, though not in wedlock; *hrísingr*, the son of a free mother with whom the father's relations were clandestine; *þýborinn*, the son of a free father by a slave. These distinctions, however, were gradually done away, and disappeared first of all in Iceland. In regard to the illegitimate, the first step was to find out who the father was; and when this point had been decided, the child, even in early times, acquired the right of inheritance—though in a limited degree—and a claim to the father's protection. Moreover, it frequently happened that the child was received into the family bond (Icel. *ættleiðing*), and this transaction, especially when there were no children of lawful birth and capable of inheriting, was celebrated with feasting and high ceremonial. In all cases it was the duty of the father, or his family, to maintain the child till maturity was reached.

The event of birth became the nucleus of many curious practices and superstitions. In many districts of Germany, Britain, and Scandinavia, there prevails to this day the custom of lighting fires or candles round about the newly-born (cf. Liebrecht, *Zur Volkskunde*, 31), in order to prevent

to puerperal fever,' and that 'almost the whole of this mortality might be avoided.' It is the careless medical practitioners and midwives that are responsible for this mortality, because they do not preserve 'purity,' and carry germs from one woman in confinement to another. The midwifery writers of old said to their disciples: 'Thine is a high and holy calling; see that thou exercise it with purity.' In the enjoined isolation of the Parsi women during their confinement, the original intention seems to be that of observing 'purity.' Some of the later Pazend and Persian writers have not properly understood the original good intention of the early writers, and so have carried the rigour of isolation too far. But, anyhow, the original intention of isolation is intended for the 'purity' referred to by old midwifery writers.

* See art. PURIFICATION (Parsi).

their falling under the power of evil spirits. The same purpose was served by piercing the door or the door-post with a knife, placing some article of steel—a pair of scissors, a key, a horse-shoe, etc.—in the cradle, hanging amulets round the child's neck, stopping the keyholes, or keeping out cats or any old woman who was suspected of having the 'evil eye.' In some places it was the custom to put salt under the child's tongue to prevent its being bewitched. These prophylactic expedients were deemed necessary till the time of baptism, as it was during this period that the demons directed their practices against the child, and tried to put a changeling, a babe of their own, in its place. The immediate surroundings of the child were meanwhile tabu. On the other hand, every possible effort was made to secure good fortune for the newly-born. Special importance was ascribed to the umbilical cord, and to the bladder-like membrane or 'caul' with which some children are born, such children being regarded as the favourites of fortune. The caul was carefully preserved and sewn into the child's clothing, thus ensuring success in all its future undertakings. From this, indeed, developed the Old Norse belief in an attendant spirit, the *fylgja*, which accompanied the person wherever he went. The dried umbilical cord was in course of time given to the child with a meal of eggs, in the expectation that the child would thereby become shrewd and intelligent; or it was sewn into the clothing, as a means of making its possessor clever and capable. Amongst the Teutons, as amongst many other races, great emphasis was laid upon the young tree which was planted on the day of the child's birth, and was thenceforward regarded as his tree of life. The fortunes of the tree ran parallel with those of the child, and from this notion arose the belief in a person's tutelary tree (Swed. *vård-träd*). When it chanced that an animal was born in the homestead on the same day as the child, it was believed that the former, during its whole life, stood in the closest relationship to the latter. The animal was named after the child, and became his constant associate.

Widely diffused throughout the entire Teutonic area are the mythical stories regarding the goddesses of destiny, who appear at the birth of a child and determine his future. Their function is indicated by their names: thus, in Old Norse they are called *urðir*, 'the powers of destiny'; in English, 'the weird sisters'; Anglo-Saxon, *mettena*, 'those who measure out'; Middle High German, *Gaschepfen*, 'the makers.' From early times the sisters were reckoned as three in number, but sometimes also as seven or thirteen, and frequently the part assigned to one of them is to deal out misfortune to the infant. Norse poetry speaks of them as *nornir*—a word of doubtful etymology. They are represented as spinning maidens, who at the child's birth wind his thread of life—his fate; and accordingly, possessing as they do a foreknowledge of the destiny of men, they acquired at length a prophetic character.

The birth of a child was an occasion upon which a part of special importance was played by the myths regarding the origin of children. The thought underlying nearly all these myths was the belief that children come from 'mother earth.' One proof of this is supplied by the primitive heathen practice, already referred to, of laying the child upon the ground immediately after birth. In many parts of Germany and the Norse countries children were supposed to come forth from hollow trees, as these, according to popular notions, were connected with the interior of the earth. Similar ideas were also held about lakes, ponds, and wells. In South Germany various lakes and fish-ponds are known as *Kinderseen*, 'children's lakes'; while, more particularly in Central Germany, there are many *Kinderbrunnen*, 'children's wells,' in which the goddess Frau Holle was believed to keep in charge the souls of children before their birth. Other places of origin were marshes and fens. The prevailing belief in many districts was that children are drawn out of the water and carried to their mothers by water-fowl, especially the stork and the swan, while in other parts they were supposed to issue from caverns or mountains. In Pomerania, for example, we find 'swan-stones' and *Adebarsteine*, 'stork-stones,' and children obtained from these were called 'swan-children' (Jahn, *Volkssagen aus Pommern*, 390). From heathen times comes the belief that children are the men of a former day, re-born into the world. They had passed their intermediate period in an animal form. According to a popular superstition in South Germany, they had been flying around as butterflies. We thus see that these various notions regarding the origin of children are related in the closest way to the primitive Teutonic belief regarding the soul.

LITERATURE.—Brunner, *Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte*[2] (Leipzig, 1906), i. 101 ff.; von Amira, *Grundriss der germ. Philol.*[2] (Strassburg, 1900), iii. 164 ff.; Maurer, *Über die Wasserweihe des germ. Heidenthums* (Munich, 1880); 'Die unächte Geburt nach altnordischem Rechte,' in *SBAW*, philos.-hist. Klasse (1883), pt. i.; 'de Expositione infantum apud veteres Septentrionales,' in *Saga af Gunnlaugi Ormstungu*, ed. A. M. Hafniæ (1775), 194–219; Rochholz, *Alemannisches Kinderlied und Kinderspiel* (Leipzig, 1857), 279 ff.; Wuttke, *Der deutsche Volksaberglaube der Gegenwart*[2] (Berlin, 1869), § 579 ff.; Mannhardt, *Der Baumkultus der Germanen und ihrer Nachbarstämme* (Berlin, 1875), 45 ff.; Frazer, *GB*[2] iii. 391 ff.; J. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*[4] (Göttingen, 1875–78), i. 335 ff., and *Rechtsaltertümer*[4] (Leipzig, 1899), i. 627 ff.; F. Panzer, *Beiträge zur deutschen Mythologie* (Munich, 1855), ii. 119 ff.

E. MOGK.

BIRTH-DAYS.—

The custom of commemorating the day of birth is connected, in its form, with the reckoning of time, and, in its content, with certain primitive religious principles. It is the most conspicuous example of commemorative ritual. Its essence is the repetition of the event commemorated. As culture develops, this primary meaning is obscured by various accidents.

In the lower culture, what is reported of the Congo tribes applies generally: 'no record is kept of birth or age.'* The Hupas of California take no account of the lapse of time, and consider it a ridiculous superfluity to keep a reckoning of age. They guess at a man's years by examination of the teeth. One will say, 'I have good teeth yet.' The only epochs noted are those of babyhood, boyhood or girlhood, youth, manhood or womanhood, and the state of married man or woman, old man or old woman.† The Omahas have a superstitious objection to counting, and therefore never note a person's age.‡

The earliest lunar reckoning produced the seven-day week, the lunar month, and the lunar year, thus providing machinery for the expression of any ideas involving repetition of events. Parallel with these dates, and of earlier origin, are seasonal epochs, marked by changes in vegetation, and also the epochs of human growth, as noted above.

The day of birth itself may be first considered. At an early stage of chronology the influence of ideas of luck is brought to bear upon dates. Every people has its own list of ominous objects and circumstances. In highly developed popular religions the result is a dualism affecting the whole life of man. Of the Cambodians we read that the idea of luck dominates their entire existence.§

* H. Ward in *JAI* xxiv. 291.
† S. Powers, *Tribes of California*, 76 f.
‡ Long and James, *Expedition to the Rocky Mountains*, 1823, i. 214, 235.
§ E. Aymonier, *Le Cambodge*, 1900–04, i. 53.

The religion of the Baganda is described as a religion of luck.* Among the Tshi people of West Africa each person has his lucky and unlucky days.† In the week of the Asabas of the Niger the days for marketing, for work, and for rest vary for each individual according to the particular *ju-ju* decided for him by the medicine-man.‡

As the circumstances attending the moment of birth are auspicious or inauspicious, so are those attending the day. Any object or circumstance distinguishing it may affect the destiny of the child. When days are marked, they acquire permanent or varying characteristics which automatically influence the event. The Malagasy, who possess an elaborate doctrine of fatalism (*vintana*), mark a certain number of days in each month as lucky or unlucky. The *vava*, or first days, of some months are especially disastrous to children then born, in some cases to the offspring of the people generally, in others to those of the royal family. A child born on an unlucky day, and dying young, is said to have 'too strong a *vintana*.' Formerly, children born on unlucky days were put to death by being buried alive. In modern times this infanticide is commuted to an ordeal, offering, or 'expiatory bath,' the water being buried instead of the child. In one clan of the Sakalavas all children born on a Tuesday were put to death. In the Bara tribe a child was put to death if born on a day which was unlucky to both father and mother; if the day was unlucky for one parent only, the child's life was spared. In the Tanale tribe one particular month was peculiarly unlucky for birth.§

With the rise of astrology comes the development of the horoscope and similar forms of augury. In origin such practices are a species of sympathetic magic; the intention is to influence events, or to assist nature, and the method employed is the rehearsal or artificial previous reproduction of the desired result. The Central Americans possessed an elaborate code of 'signs of the day,' applying to each day of each cycle of twenty days, the *cempohualli*, of which the year was a multiple. Horoscopes were prepared from these signs for the day and hour of birth. Every Mexican bore through life, as a species of personal name, the sign of his birth-day.‖ The Burmese predict a man's character and destiny according to the day of the week on which he is born and the constellation which rules it. The name of the child must begin with one of the letters belonging to the birth-day.¶ The Asabas of the Niger often name a child after the day of its birth.** In China the hour and the day of birth are regarded as being very important. A child born between the hours of 9 and 11 will have a hard lot at first, but finally great riches.†† The Hindus possess an elaborate astrological system of nativities connected with lucky and unlucky days.‡‡ In Madagascar nativities are drawn up from the position not of the stars, but of the moon. This method is earlier; later cultures prefer the star of nativity. The Tshi peoples name children after the day of the week.§§ The Muhammadanized Swahili consider it lucky to be born on Friday, the Muhammadan festival. Children then born are named 'son' or 'daughter of Friday.'* In German folklore Sunday is lucky as a birth-day, particularly the Sunday of the new moon. This idea is connected with growth. 'Sunday children' are supposed to be able to see spirits, or to see in the dark.†

The principle of repeating an event after its occurrence is an inversion of sympathetic magic. Whereas in the ordinary form of magic the coming event is influenced and ensured by previous rehearsal, in this inverted form it is reproduced in order to repeat the original advantages and to effect their continuance. The idea is naturally suggested by the recurrence of the same external or chronological conditions. These were closely bound up with the original event, and are therefore supposed to influence it: they are further supposed to carry it with them, and therefore require its repetition. The intention varies as the event. In the case of the repetition of birth the intention is a renewal of the life acquired by the original birth. Such ideas are illustrated by the general custom of celebrating the renewal of the year. The ritual is designed to renew not only the life of nature, but also the life of men, and at the same time to discard the old life, now regarded as decay and death. The seasonal changes of growth, connected early with the phases of the moon and the path of the sun, naturally fostered such ideas. As individualism developed they were applied to the life of each man. But the important point for the earlier periods is that these annual renewals of nature and life in general practically amounted to universal or social birth-days.

To illustrate the first of these points, we may instance the Hindu festival *saṁvatsarādi*, which celebrates the beginning of the year.

'The chief features of the day are the reading of the new almanac and hearing the forecast of the events of the New Year. New clothes also are worn when procurable, and the food partaken of during the day is, as far as possible, composed of new materials, *i.e.* new grain, pulses and such like, for this is a feast of ingathering. One dish, which must be partaken of by all who wish for good luck during the year, is a conserve composed of sugar, tamarind, and the flowers of the *neem* or *margosa* tree (*Melia Azadirachta*), which is then in full flower. The bitter taste of this is not much relished as a rule; but it is necessary that at least a small portion of the dish should be eaten. This seems to be analogous to the English idea that it is necessary to eat mince-pie at Christmas or at the New Year.'‡

In the next place, such festivals, surviving as they do into the highest stages of evolution, are in the early stages universal birth-days. The Malagasy custom is significant. In the lunar year of Madagascar, time is popularly reckoned by the annual great feast *fandroana*. Remarkable longevity is denoted by the phrase that a man has seen three *fandroanas* at the same season of the year. Thus he might see it in spring at the age of 7, again when 40, and again when 73. We are expressly informed that a man's age is reckoned not by his years, but by the *fandroana*.§

The Japanese supply an instructive case of compromise between the social and the individual birth-day. The first of January, the commencement of the New Year,

'may be considered the universal birth-day, for they do not wait till the actual anniversary of birth has come round to call a person a year older, but date the addition to his age from the New Year. The 61st birth-day is the only one about which much fuss is made. This is because the old man or woman having lived through one revolution of the sexagenary cycle then begins a second round, which is in itself an extraordinary event, for the Japanese reckon youth to last from birth to the age of 32, middle age from 32 to 40, and old age from 40 to 60. A child is born in December 1901. By January 1902 they talk of the child as being 2 years old, because it has lived through a part of two separate years.'‖

* Roscoe in *JAI* xxxii. 72.
† A. B. Ellis, *The Tshi-speaking Peoples*, 1887, p. 220.
‡ J. Parkinson in *JAI* xxxvi. 317.
§ L. Dahle in *Antananarivo Annual*, xii. 460; J. Sibree, *Madagascar*, 279 ff.
‖ Sahagun, *Historia general*, 239 ff.; E. J. Payne, *History of the New World called America*, 1892, ii. 325 ff.; H. H. Bancroft, *NR* ii. 271.
¶ Shway Yoe (J. G. Scott), *The Burman*, 1882, i. 4, 6.
** Parkinson, *loc. cit.*
†† Dennys, *Folklore of China*, 1876, p. 8.
‡‡ Dubois (ed. Beauchamp), ii. 382 ff.; Monier Williams, *Brâhmanism and Hindûism*, 372 ff.
§§ Ellis, *loc. cit.*

* Velten, *Sitten und Gebräuche der Suaheli*, 13; Sibree, *loc. cit.*
† Ploss, *Das Kind*, ii. 88, 89.
‡ J. E. Padfield, *The Hindu at Home*[2], 165.
§ W. Ellis, *History of Madagascar*, 1838, i. 447, 448.
‖ B. H. Chamberlain, *Things Japanese*[4], 1902, p. 62.

In the Chinese religion of piety we find a remarkably explicit illustration of the principle of the renewal of life on the anniversary of birth. 'The birth-day celebration is a peculiar institution,' though not attended with much éclat till after the age of 15. Each person has an annual festival, and every tenth year after reaching 50 an extraordinary celebration. Especially honoured is the 61st birth-day. The Emperor on his birth-day is supposed to acquire 10,000 'longevities.' The courts of justice are closed, and a general amnesty is proclaimed. The ordinary person on his birth-day receives 'longevity presents,' and his friends wish him long life. With the express purpose of prolonging life, a dish of vermicelli in remarkably long strips is eaten. Of particular importance is the 'longevity garment.' This is a handsome robe, embroidered in gold characters with the word 'longevity.' It serves at death as the man's shroud. It is generally a present from the children, and is given to the parent on his birth-day. He wears it then, and on all festive occasions, in order to acquire long life, 'it being generally acknowledged among the Chinese that it is extremely useful and necessary on the birth-day to absorb a good amount of vital energy in order to remain hale and healthy during the ensuing year.'*

The Coreans celebrate the 61st birth-day in the Chinese fashion. On ordinary birth-days new clothes are worn, and a feast is prepared for friends of the family.†

The Burmese offer on their birth-days, celebrated weekly, candles representing the animals connected with the day of the week. The offering is an act of worship at the pagoda.‡

The Central Americans celebrated birth-days with a feast given to the friends of the family. Presents were offered them on their departure.§

Among the Tshi natives of West Africa, a man's birth-day is sacred to his *kra*, or 'indwelling spirit.' If a man is rich, he kills a sheep, if poor, a fowl, and prepares a feast. In the morning, when he washes, he provides himself with an egg, and some new fibre of the kind used as a sponge. He then stands before the calabash containing the water, and addresses his *kra*, asking for its protection and assistance during the coming year, as he is about to worship it, and keep that day sacred to it. He then breaks the egg into the calabash, and washes himself with the fluid; after this he puts white clay on his face, and puts on a white cloth. Members of the higher classes, kings and chiefs, keep sacred to the *kra* the day of the week on which they were born. Thus Kwoffi Kari Kari, having been born on a Friday, made it a law that no blood should be shed on that day.‖

The ancient Persians celebrated birth-days.¶

In ancient Egypt the birth-days of the kings 'were celebrated with great pomp. They were looked upon as holy; no business was done upon them, and all classes indulged in the festivities suitable to the occasion. Every Egyptian attached much importance to the day, and even to the hour, of his birth; and it is probable that, as in Persia, each individual kept his birth-day with great rejoicings; welcoming his friends with all the amusements of society and a more than usual profusion of the delicacies of the table.'**

In modern Persia the birth-days of Muhammad and 'Alī, as in Islām generally, are duly honoured. For ordinary persons, however, the New Year's feast is the only real festival.††

Among the modern Jews, the 13th birth-day of a boy is celebrated as a family feast, this date being his religious majority.*

The preceding accounts introduce some secondary principles. The idea, inseparable from festivals, of holiday or rest, combines with the wish to avoid consuming energy and vitality, and to assimilate the same by means of food and drink. A further principle is that of a propitious commencement of an epoch as influencing the whole. At a late stage such ideas are obscured, and an ethical principle arises. This is, in Western culture, faintly suggested by the phrase, 'turning over a new leaf' at the New Year or on the birth-day. In Catholicism, it is more marked in combination with the birth-day of the individual's patron saint. In early Christianity each anniversary was a step towards the new life commencing at death.

The idea of renewal, as we saw, is in the early stages emphasized by the weekly phases of the moon. Thus we get the principle of the octave. One of its earliest applications is the celebration of the seventh day after birth, on which, among various peoples, the name is given or some ritual operation is performed.

The principle of the octave is actually applied at times to produce a weekly birth-day. This has been instanced in West Africa and Burma. A good many recorded birth-days are probably not annual, but weekly or monthly. The ancient Syrians celebrated a monthly birth-day.†

These considerations lead up to some peculiarities of reckoning or commemoration which have influenced the custom. The Apache father makes a note of each moon that follows the birth of a child. A large mark is made for the 10th month.‡ The Mayas celebrated as the birthdays of their children the first step taken, the first word spoken, and the first thing made.§ The Ovaherero reckon a man's age from the time of his circumcision, not counting the previous period. A man is called after the *otyiondo* of his circumcision. Those circumcised at the same time are *omakura*, 'persons of the same age.'‖ Such methods of reckoning age are convenient for the savage, who has little use for any more accurate reckoning. Other such epochs, which at a certain stage are the only 'birth-days,' are weaning, initiation, and marriage. The Baganda reckon a man's age by the reigns of the chiefs. 'It was in the reign of so and so that I was born.'¶

In the lower cultures names are curiously parallel and interchangeable, so to say, with dates. The Central Australians have each a name denoting age in relation to others, but have no annual reckoning. The Maori had one name given at birth, a second at puberty, a third on his father's death, and others whenever he performed some achievement.** An Aht will change his name perhaps ten times in ten years, and celebrate the event each time with a feast.†† In connexion with change of name there is the idea of renewal.

An early application of the principle of commemoration is 'the feast of the dead.' All the ideas connected with the spirits of the departed find expression here. In early religion these celebrations are as frequent and as important as any annual festival. In Oajaca great ceremonial attended the anniversary of the birth of great lords after their death. The belief was that the soul wandered about for many years before entering bliss, and visited its friends on earth once a year ‡‡

* J. Doolittle, *Social Life of the Chinese*, 1866, ii. 217 ff.; J. J. M. de Groot, *The Religious System of China*, i. 61, 62.
† Griffis, *Corea*, 1882, p. 295.
‡ Shway Yoe (J. G. Scott), *The Burman*, i. 6.
§ Bancroft, *op. cit.* ii. 288.
‖ A. B. Ellis, *The Tshi-speaking Peoples*, 156.
¶ Herodotus, i. 133, ix. 110.
** Wilkinson, *Ancient Egyptians*, iii. 368.
†† Polak, *Persien*, 1865, i. 338.

* Roubin in *JE*, *s.v.* † 2 Mac 67.
‡ Hrdlička in *American Anthropologist*, vii. 490.
§ Bancroft, *op. cit.* ii. 662.
‖ *South African Folklore Journal*, i. 43.
¶ Roscoe in *JAI* xxxii. 72.
** R. Taylor, *Te Ika a Maui*[2], 1870, p. 156.
†† G. M. Sproat, *Savage Life*, 1868, p. 264.
‡‡ Bancroft, *op. cit.* ii. 623.

The Hindus observe the new moon of the month, *Bhādrapada* (September–October), in honour of the dead. On this day the head of a family must perform prescribed ceremonies for the preceding three generations.' The celebration is for such of the dead as may not have received the usual rites of sepulture. The fact shows, by negation, that the commemoration is the repetition of the event. The annual *śrāddhas* are well known. Their object is to 'assist the departed spirit in the various experiences it will have to pass through. At the same time, the one who duly performs these rites and ceremonies thereby lays up merit for himself and his family, which merit will be duly carried to the credit of his account hereafter.' One *śrāddha* is to provide the spirit with an 'intermediate body.' Another indicates the union of the dead with his immediate ancestors. The monthly *śrāddhas* commence on the 30th day after death. An annual ceremony is performed on the anniversary of the death.*

A slight shifting of the point of view will show the parallelism between such practices as the Hindu and the early Christian principle that the birth-day of the martyr was the day on which he died. The death-day of the faithful was regarded as their birth into a new life. The 'natale' *par excellence* was the day of death. It was a nativity to a glorious crown in the kingdom of heaven. Tertullian observes that St. Paul was born again by a new nativity at Rome because he suffered martyrdom there. Such *natalia* were contrasted with 'natural birth-days,' as spiritual in opposition to worldly. The 'birth-days' of martyrs, celebrated at the grave or monument, had a profound influence on the development of ecclesiastical institutions. The celebration was a service, at which the Communion was received. The ethical principle involved was imitation of the martyr, repetition in others of his life and death. The *fasti* of martyrs were gradually compiled, and churches were erected over their bones, the bones sometimes being replaced under the altar.†

The festivals of gods are frequently their birth-days. Thus the Hindu festival *Śrīrāmajayantī* celebrates the birth-day of Rāma, the seventh incarnation of Vishnu. The image of the god is adorned and carried in procession. Pilgrimage is made to the temple. *Kṛṣṇajayantī* is the birth-day of Kṛishṇa, and is one of the most popular of the annual festivals. The *Bhāgavata* describing the life of the god is read on that day. *Vināyakachaturthī* is the birth-day festival of Ganeśa. Every house sets up an image of the god, before which lights are placed. A *mantra* of consecration, *pratiṣṭā*, is pronounced, on which the spirit of the god enters the image.

In such acts we see a ritual re-creation of the divinity, a repetition of his birth.

At this feast, artizans worship their tools, and students their books, placing them before the image. Ganeśa is the god who is invoked in all undertakings, and who helps man on his way.‡

In Christianity the birth-day of Christ is only less important than the Passion and the Resurrection. Even here the social aspect of religion is prominent, and, by a coincidence, the date finally decided upon is that celebrated in paganism as the annual birth-day of the Sun, just as the weekly day of the sun, the Christian Sunday, was the weekly birth-day of the Solar Deity, and in Hebrew mythology the first day of Creation.

LITERATURE.—*HDB* and *EBi*, *s.v.* 'Birthday'; Bingham, *Christian Antiquities*, 1840; J. J. M. de Groot, *The Religious System of China*, 1892 ff.; A. B. Ellis, *The Tshi-speaking Peoples*, 1887; J. E. Padfield, *The Hindu at Home*[2], 1908; B. H. Chamberlain, *Things Japanese*[4], 1902.

A. E. CRAWLEY.

BIRTH-DAYS (Greek and Roman).—Birth-day celebrations are to be met with in antiquity from a very early date. Æschylus presupposes them when he makes Apollo receive on his birth-day his oracle as a present from Phœbe (*Eumenides*, 6–8). Birth-days were celebrated with prayers, sacrifices, and banquets, and it was also the custom to offer presents to the person whose birth-day it was (*e.g.* a book, *Anthol. Pal.* ix. 93). Sometimes those who were born on the same day of the month formed a society, and called themselves τετραδίσται, εἰκαδίσται, etc. Later, it was frequently the custom for such societies to celebrate the birth-days of members of distinction, or these members themselves left an endowment to enable their associates to celebrate their birth-day even after their death. Such a posthumous celebration was called γενέσια, whereas the celebration during a man's lifetime was termed γενέθλια (schol. Plato, *Alcibiades*, 121 C). Plato's birth-day was celebrated by the Academy on the 7th of Thargelion, because Apollo was supposed to have been born on that day; and in other cases as well the celebrations of birth-days were fixed for sacred days (Plut. *Theseus*, 36; the Athenians mention the 8th of a month as the birthday of Theseus, ἐκ Ποσειδῶνος γεγονέναι λεγομένῳ· καὶ γὰρ Ποσειδῶνα ταῖς ὀγδόαις τιμῶσιν). From the time of the Diadochi we often hear of the celebration of the birth-days of kings, and from the time of Cæsar, of those of emperors (there is an important inscription which indicates that in Asia Minor the year began with the birth-day of Augustus [*Athen. Mitt.* xxiv. 288]), when festivities, games, etc., took place. The same honour was also extended to empresses and princes.

These honours passed from persons to cities: thus in Rome the *Palilia* was celebrated as the *natalis urbis*. More especially were such honours transferred to the gods: Athene was supposed to have been born on the 3rd of a month, Hermes on the 4th, Apollo on the 7th, and so on. In these cases the festival must always have been the *prius*, the birth-day the *posterius*. It often happens that the birthday of the god and the *natalis templi* coincide (Cic. *ad Att.* IV. i. 4, *CIL* xii. 3058).

LITERATURE.—Chr. Petersen, 'Ueber die Geburtstagsfeier bei den Griechen,' in *Jahrb. f. klass. Philol.*, Suppl. ii., 1857; W. Schmidt, *Geburtstag im Altertum*, Giessen, 1908.

W. KROLL.

BIRTHRIGHT.—See INHERITANCE.

BISHOP.—See MINISTRY.

BISMILLĀH.—1. **Meaning and early usage.**—*Bismillāh(i)*, an Arabic expression signifying 'in the name of Allah,' was borrowed by Muḥammad from the religious phraseology of Jews and Christians,* and was formulated by him in full as follows: *bismillāhi-r-raḥmāni-r-raḥīmi*, 'in the name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful.' Muḥammad employed the phrase both in its shorter and in its complete form as an introductory formula, designed to connect the beginnings of action with the devout remembrance of God, and it is probable that, while still resident at Mecca, he recommended his adherents to use it in a similar way. In the Qur'ān he represents Noah as summoning the faithful to enter the ark with the words, 'Bismillāh ("in the name of Allah") be its voyage and its landing' (xi. 43); and, similarly, a letter purporting to have been written by King Solomon to the Queen of Sheba opens thus: '*Bismillāhi-r-raḥmāni-r-raḥīmi*' (xxvii. 30). Probably, too, he began his own ceremonial discourses, as collected in the Qur'ān,

* Padfield, *op. cit.* 165, 217, 225.
† Bingham, vii. 340 ff., 350 f., 422.
‡ Padfield, *op. cit.* 178 ff., 181, 183.

* Nöldeke, *Gesch. d. Qorâns* (Göttingen, 1860), p. 88 [[2] (published by F. Schwally) 116 f.].

with the phrase, and the redactors of the sacred volume, in prefixing it (in plenary form) to the various *sūras*, evidently regarded it as a prefatory formula having Muḥammad's own sanction. We cannot divine the reason of its omission from the 9th *sūra*, although the Muslim exegetes show no perplexity in the matter, and provide several explanations, as may be found in commentaries to the Qur'ān. The earlier theologians of Islām were at variance with each other regarding the question whether the *bismillāhi*-formula at the beginning of the *sūras* was to be considered an article of revelation, *i.e.* an utterance of God, or an item proceeding from the Prophet himself; but eventually the former alternative carried the day, and it came to be held that everything between the two covers (*bāina-l-daffatain*) of the book, including, of course, the prefatory formula of the *sūras*, was the word of God.

It is recorded that, before Muḥammad arose, the heathen Quraish made use of the sacred formula *bismika Allāhumma* ('in thy name, O God') for a similar purpose—a statement which is certainly credible, though we have no evidence to test it by. According to Arabic tradition, which delights to associate every particular custom with the name of an individual founder, the person who introduced the use of this phrase into Mecca was Umayya b. Abi-l-Ṣalt, the reputed author of many apocryphal poems which promulgated monotheistic and Biblical ideas before the time of Muḥammad. Umayya is said to have learned the formula, as a potent talisman against the evil influence of demonic powers, from the lips of a Christian hermit, and to have made personal trial of it.* But as he was an older contemporary of Muḥammad, and survived the latter's entrance upon his public career, the older formula cannot, agreeably to the above tradition, have been in use long before the Prophet's day. It is even said, indeed, that Muḥammad himself had employed it, but that the revelation of certain verses in the Qur'ān (xi. 93, xxvii. 30) induced him to substitute for it, first the shorter, and then the longer, form of the *bismillāh*.† Nevertheless he would appear, according to Muslim tradition, to have sometimes resorted to the earlier Meccan formula even at a later period;‡ thus in a treaty which he made with the people of Mecca near Ḥudaibiyah in A.H. 6, he deferred to the vigorous opposition they offered to the new formula introduced by him, and quite readily sanctioned the use of the Quraish '*bismika Allāhumma*' as a heading to the document.§ '*Allāhumma*' is also approved as an invocation of God in Muslim petitions.

We may regard it as historically established that rescripts drawn up by Muḥammad's instructions, contracts concluded between him and tribes which yielded him their allegiance,‖ and even records of a more private character,¶ were usually prefaced by the plenary form of the *bismillāh*.** Thereafter its insertion in similar documents as a prefatory formula became part of the religious practice of the adherents of Islām.†† Official records from the early age of Islām, preserved either as transcriptions in historical works, or, more authentically still, as originals on papyrus sheets, always begin with the *bismillāh*. It is also found on textile fabrics and other products of industrial art.‡‡ In bilingual (Arabic-Greek) documents, which were common, especially in the Egyptian province, till far on in the Umayyad period, the Greek portion contains a translation of the formula, the shorter appearing as ἐν ὀνόματι τοῦ θεοῦ, while the plenary form expands this with the words τοῦ ἐλεήμονος φιλανθρώπου.§§

In accordance with the common Arabic practice of giving a convenient name to formulas by the device of omitting some of their constituent letters (as, *e.g.*, *ḥamdala* for '*al-ḥamdu lillāhi*,' *ḥay'ala* for *ḥayya 'ala-ṣ-ṣalāti*, etc.), the *bismillāh* is contracted to *basmala*, which is also a verb meaning 'to utter the *bismillah*'; and the use of the formula is also referred to as *tasmiya*, the invocation of the name (*ism*) of God.

2. Ceremonial use.—The *bismillāh* acquires a special ceremonial significance as the formula of benediction pronounced before slaughtering animals for food—a usage which, without doubt, was suggested by the Jewish law enjoining the utterance of the *b'rākhā* before killing and eating. The relevant injunction in the Qur'ān is found in vi. 118, 121: 'Eat of that over which the name of Allah hath been pronounced if ye believe in His signs' . . . 'Eat not therefore of that on which the name of Allah hath not been named, for that were certainly sin.' From this passage was argued the obligatory use of the *tasmiya** before slaughter; and, similarly, it was required that the benediction in Allah's name should precede the eating of the flesh of animals prescribed for that purpose. Even in the chase (v. 6) it was imperative to utter the name of Allah before releasing the falcon or the hound, and only on this condition could the quarry be afterwards used as food.† In pursuance of a hermeneutic practice of later Muhammadan theologians, certain theological schools attenuated the character of this absolutely binding ordinance to that of a mere wish, and in this way the omission of the actual utterance of Allah's name before the act of killing did not necessarily proscribe the use of the animal for food. If, for example, the observance of the regulation had been inadvertently neglected, the food might still be partaken of without misgiving—for, of course, the thought of Allah is never absent from the devout heart. But it is obvious that these interpretations and practical accommodations are at variance with the actual language of the injunction as given in the Qur'ān—a fact emphatically insisted upon in the teaching of the more rigid and literalistic interpreters of the book.‡

Another question of ceremonial relating to the use of the *bismillāh* arises in connexion with the Muḥammadan ritual of prayer (*ṣalāt*). The latter, as is well known, begins with the recitation of the 'opening' *sūra* of the Qur'ān (*al-fātiḥa*), whose first sentence is the *bismillāh* in its complete form. It has been from early times a subject of debate in the schools of the law whether this introductory phrase should be spoken aloud (*jahran*) or in an inaudible whisper—a controversy connected in its origin with the disputed question already referred to, viz. whether the *bismillāh* is to rank as Divine revelation or not. Most of the orthodox schools decided that the formula might be uttered in an undertone,§ but the Shāfi'ites, and especially the Shī'ites, demand that it be spoken in an audible voice.‖

3. Everyday use.—Having dealt with the use of the *bismillāh* in ceremonial functions and in im-

* *Aghānī*, iii. 189; Mas'ūdi, *Prairies d'or*, i. 142; cf. Schulthess in the *Nöldeke-Festschrift*, 74, n. 5.

† Ibn Sa'd in Wellhausen, *Skizzen u. Vorarbeiten*, iv. (Berlin, 1899), 6, 9 (text), 104 (tr.).

‡ Leone Caetani, *Annali dell' Islam*, ii. (Milan, 1907) 222.

§ Ibn Hishām, ed. Wüstenfeld, 747.

‖ Examples in Nöldeke-Schwally, *op. cit.* 117, n. 1.

¶ *e.g.* a note regarding the distribution of the wheat brought as booty from Khaibar (Ibn Hishām, 776, 778 ff.).

** L. Caetani (*op. cit.* i. 395, ii. 793) doubts the authenticity of this prefatory formula in documents given by Muslim historians.

†† *e.g.* in the *Testament of 'Abdallāh b. Mas'ūd*, in Ibn Sa'd, Ṭabaqāt, III. i. 112, 113.

‡‡ Karabacek, 'Zur arabischen Alterthumskunde, ii. Die arabischen Papyrusprotokolle,' in *SWAW* cixi. (Vienna, 1908) 85 ff.

§§ *e.g.*, in the bilingual documents in Karabacek, *op. cit.* 63–67; O. H. Becker, *Papyri Schott-Reinhardt*, i. (Heidelberg, 1906), 109 ff.; *ZA* xxii. 150, 170–178.

* But without *al-raḥmān al-raḥīm*, as it was not thought right, when taking away life, to name 'the Compassionate Merciful' (*ZDMG* xlviii. 95, n. 1).

† *Muwaṭṭa*, ii. 356.

‡ Cf. the present writer's *Die Zāhiriten* (Leipzig, 1884), 75 ff.

§ It is expressly recorded of 'Omar II. that, when leading in prayer, he did not pronounce the *bismillāh* of the *fātiḥa* audibly (*lā yajharu*) (Ibn Sa'd, v. 246, 25). The Khalīf al-Musta'in was accused by his opponents of double-dealing, because he spoke the *bismillāh* of the *fātiḥa* inaudibly when in Sāmarra, but elsewhere hypocritically uttered it aloud (Ṭabari, *Annales*, iii. 1683, 3 ff.).

‖ On this question see the present writer's 'Beiträge zur Litteraturgesch. der Schī'a u. d. sunnitischen Polemik,' *SWAW* (1874), 15 ff., 86.

portant affairs of public and private life, we proceed to speak of a view which sprang up in Islām at a very early period, and soon established itself in everyday practice—the view, namely, which finds expression in a proverb commonly regarded as a saying (*ḥadīth*) of the Prophet: *Kullu amrin dhī bālin lā yubtada'u bi-dhikri*-llāhi fahuwa abtaru*, i.e. 'every matter of importance which is begun without mention of God is maimed.' This maxim was taken by devout adherents of Islām as their warrant for the practice of inaugurating every action† by ejaculating a *bismillāh*. The prophet is traditionally reported to have said that Satan sits behind every one who mounts an animal without first having uttered the formula.‡ Its use as a blessing before meals is regarded as of special importance, and on social occasions the saying of the *bismillāh* by the head of the household intimates to the guests that the repast is to begin.§ Nor must the *tasmiya* be omitted when a person enters or leaves a house, or puts on his clothes.‖ The practice is felt to be in accordance with the thought of Qur'ān xxxiii. 41: 'Remember Allah with frequent remembrance'—a maxim highly approved in Islām. The idea that the utterance of God's holy name involves an impiety never found a footing among the Muslims, who are wont to say, rather, that if we love a person we often mention his name (*man aḥabba shay'an akthara dhikrahu*).¶

4. Superstitious ideas and use.—The deep significance and the sacred character with which Islām invested the *bismillāh* led at length to its being pressed into the service of folk-lore, mysticism, and even magic. It was said that God had inscribed it upon the breast of Adam, the wing of the angel Gabriel, the seal of Solomon, and the tongue of Jesus.** The Creator has written the sacred words upon His works. The imaginative eye can sometimes trace the formula in the veins of the leaf or the varied colourings of the butterfly's wing, where nature has imprinted it in mystic (Syriac) characters. The written and oral application of the *bismillāh* possesses talismanic virtues. When the soul in its death-struggle is striving to escape from the body, the angel of death brings from paradise an apple upon which is inscribed the formula, or the angel himself writes it upon the palm of the dying man, whose agony is alleviated by the sight of it, and whose soul then yields itself to the angel.†† The *bismillāh* serves also as a means of defence against the baneful effects of the evil eye, and other malign influences of occult forces. It is a popular notion amongst Muḥammadans that the *jinn* are easily offended, as, for instance, by human encroachment upon their haunts, by pouring out hot water, etc.; but if a man feels that he has provoked their resentment, he may drive them away by uttering the *bismillāh*.‡‡ Similarly, in order to render his goods proof against the *jinn*, he uses the phrase as a charm when he shuts the door, or stores articles of food in their appropriate receptacles, or lays down his clothes at night. An article protected in this way is called *musammā* (commonly pronounced *musemmī*), *i.e.* 'something over which has been named (the name of Allah).'*

The *bismillāh*, by reason of its prophylactic virtues, is deemed specially serviceable as an inscription for amulets, and, in general, as an accessory of practical magic.† Copious illustrations of this are to be found in the *Shams al-ma'ārif* of al-Būnī (†A.H. 622, A.D. 1225) and works of a similar nature. The Muslims also construct magic squares, and distribute the words of the *basmala* in magical combinations amongst the various compartments.‡ Al-Būnī is also the author of a monograph dealing specially with the use of the formula for magical purposes (*Faḍā'il al-basmala*).§

5. Calligraphic usage.—Mention ought finally to be made of a certain convention in the method of transcribing the *bismillāh*. When the Muslim calligraphist writes the formula for a ceremonial purpose, he imparts a peculiar form to its first word by way of signalizing, as it were, the exceptional character of the phrase as a whole. The vertical stroke of the initial letter *bā* (ب) is considerably prolonged in an upward direction, and slightly curved; then, the *'alif* (of *'ism*) being omitted altogether,‖ the *sīn* (س) is placed immediately after the *bā*, while the final letter *mīm* (م) is connected with the *sīn* by a line drawn far beyond the usual length (بســـــــــم). The Muḥammadan scribes would appear at a very early date to have introduced yet another alteration in the written form of the *bismillāh*—a peculiarity of common occurrence in MSS. Here the tips of the third letter *sīn* (س) disappear entirely, as well as the *'alif*, and the initial *bā* (ب) is joined to the final *mīm* (م) by a long horizontal line thus: بـــــــم. The antiquity of this usage is indicated by an incident recorded in Ibn Sa'd, viz. that 'the Khalīf 'Omar b. 'Abd al-'Azīz dismissed a certain scribe (*kātib*) from his office because he wrote *bism* without inserting the *sīn* distinctly' (*walam yaj'al al-sīn*).¶

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given in the footnotes.

I. GOLDZIHER.

BLACKMAIL.—The word 'mail' is derived from the Norman-French *maille*, which is used in the Act of 1335, 9 Edward III. c. 3 in the sense of 'half-penny.' We find three meanings assigned to this term.

1. Legally, blackmail refers to rents reserved in labour, cattle, or produce. In mediæval times rent was uniformly paid in kind—a custom that persisted in France down to the days of the great French Revolution. The Black Death and the Peasants' Revolt gave a powerful impetus to the transformation of English agricultural life, and among the results was the substitution of payment in money for payment in kind. In Scotland and Ireland, and indeed in the rest of Europe, this substitution was not effected till a comparatively late date. For rent in kind were substituted 'white rents,' which were reserved in 'white money,' or silver. In the Middle Ages there was a great scarcity of the precious metals, and this doubtless assisted in prolonging the existence of the old method of payment. The discovery of silver in

* Originally *bi-ḥamdi*, with reference to the glorifying of God by formulas beginning with *al-ḥamdu lillāhi*.

† Including that mentioned by Buchārī, *K. al-wuḍū*, No. 8.

‡ Damīrī (Būlāq, A.H. 1284), *s.v.* 'Al-dābba,' i. 399.

§ Lane, *Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians*[5] (London, 1871), i. 183.

‖ Traditional sayings in Nawawī, *Kitāb al-Adhkār* (Cairo, A.H. 1312), 11–12.

¶ *RHR* xvi. 164; *ZDMG* li. 265.

** E. Doutté, *Magie et religion dans l'Afrique du Nord* (Algiers, 1909), 211.

†† Al-Suyūṭī, *al-Durar al-ḥisān fi-l-ba'th wa-na'īm al-jinān* (Cairo, A.H. 1324).

‡‡ In North Africa, A. Bel, *La Population musulmane de Tlemcen* (Paris, 1908), 23 (from the *Revue des études ethnographiques et sociologiques*).

* Lane, *op. cit.* i. 287; *Arabian Society in the Middle Ages* (London, 1883), 41.

† Reinaud, *Monumens musulmans du cabinet de M. le duc de Blacas* (Paris, 1828), ii. 3–6.

‡ Doutté, *op. cit.* 212.

§ Brockelmann, *Gesch. d. arab. Litteratur*, i. (Weimar, 1898) 497

‖ This is a Massoretic practice.

¶ Ibn Sa'd, v. 270, 14.

South America helped forward the movement from status to contract, with the result that white rent paid in current coin or white money (*mailles blanches*) began to replace the black rent. In Scots law the rents of an estate were called 'mails' or 'maills,' while 'Blanch Holding' and 'Mail' for rent are somewhat similar terms for this old custom. Camden (*Rem.* 205), explaining black money, says, 'What that was I know not, if it were not of Copper, as *Maill* and *Black-maill*.' Coke refers to 'Work-days, rent cummin, rent corn, etc. . . . called *Redditus nigri*, black maile, that is, black rents.' Blackstone supports Coke's explanation of *redditus nigri* (cf. Camden, (*Rem.* 1605, p. 205; Coke, *Inst.*, 1642, ii. 19; Blackstone, *Com.*, 1768, ii. 43; Burn, *Justice*[29], 1845, iii. 214). In this sense the term 'blackmail' is obsolete.

2. Historically, it is the tribute in corn, cattle, other kind, or money—here we are coming to the newer form—levied from the farmers and small owners in the border counties of England and Scotland, and along the Highland border, by free-booting chiefs in return for immunity from pillage. The border counties chiefly affected were Northumberland, Cumberland, Westmoreland, and the bishopric of Durham. Sir Walter Scott in *Waverley* (i. 222) represents one of the better aspects of this custom when one of his characters remarks, 'The boldest of them (*i.e.* the freebooters) will never steal a hoof from any one that pays blackmail to Vich Ian Vohr.' It is somewhat remarkable to find how wide-spread is the use of the word 'mail' with the meaning of 'rent' or 'tribute.' In Irish *mal* signifies a rent or tax. In Armoric *mal* signifies such wealth as is acquired by the strong hand; while in Afghanistan the contributory levy on a village is called *mallia*. Blackmail sometimes denotes the money taken by the harbingers or servants, with their master's knowledge, for abstaining from enforcing exactions like coin and livery. They made up for the abstinence in these places by plundering in others. Curiously enough, we find that in Ireland in the 14th cent. black money or blackmail indicates certain coins of an inferior kind authorized to pass current.

In 1552 Archbishop Hamilton (*Catech.*, 1884, 98), in reference to the forays of the border chieftains, mentions, 'Quhay takis ouer sair mail, ouer mekle ferme, or ony blake maillis, fra thair tennands'; while about 1561 R. Maitland, in *Thievis Liddesd.* vi., describes the 'commoun taking of blak maill.' On both sides of the Border severe Acts were passed to put an end to these depredations. Under the Scots king, James VI., the measure of 1597 describes how 'diuers subjects of the Inland, takis and sittis vnder their assurance, payand them black-maill, and permittand them to reif, herrie, and oppresse their Nichtbouris.' In 1601—a memorable year in economic legislation—an English Act of Parliament also notes that 'sundry of her Maiesties louing subjects within the sayed (*i.e.* the four northern) Counties . . . have been inforced to pay a certaine rate of money, corne, cattell, or other consideration, commonly there called by the name of Blacke maile.' The 43 Eliz. c. 13, s. 1, made the levying or paying of this blackmail a felony without benefit of the clergy. The *Termes de la Ley* informs us that 'Blackmail is a word used in 43 Eliz. c. 13, and it signifies a certainty of money, corn, cattell, or other consideration, given by the poore people in the north parts of England, unto men of great name and aliance in those parts, to be by them protected from such as usually robbe and steal there.' Cowell in his famous Law Dictionary, *The Interpreter*, notes that 'these robbers are of late years called Moss-troopers.' The depredations of the Border chieftains, in spite of these repressive measures, did not cease till towards the end of the 17th century. In 1707 an 'Address from Cumberland' in the *London Gazette* points out that 'there is, now, no Debatable Land to contend for; no Black Mail to be paid to the Leaders of the Robbers, as a Ransom' (cf. Blackstone, *Comm.* iv. 263).

3. The term is now usually applied to offences called in French *chantage*, that is, the extortion of money, or other valuable consideration, by intimidation, by the unscrupulous use of official or social position, or of political influence or vote, by persons upon those whom they have it in their power to help or injure. In one sense the Border robbers have passed away, but in another sense they are with us still. For the organized forms of the Camorra of Naples, the Mafia of Sicily, the Black Hand of the United States, and the Highbinders of China are largely blackmailing bodies. Their methods and rules of procedure are much the same as those of the outlaws of old. Like them, the Black Hand, for example, levy blackmail, kidnap men or their children and hold them to ransom, murder their victims in cold blood if the ransom be not forthcoming, and terrorize the surrounding population into tacit complicity. In private life the only hope of resisting the blackmailer is to refuse to pay the first time he makes his demand. Mr. W. E. Gladstone was accosted late at night by an unfortunate woman to whom he gave alms. A man, who saw him speaking to her, stopped the statesman and attempted to levy blackmail. Mr. Gladstone kept him in conversation till a policeman came in sight, when he at once gave the blackmailer in charge. In English common law it is a misdemeanour to threaten to publish any libel upon any other person, directly or indirectly, if the act is done with the intent to extort any money or other valuable thing. The punishment is imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for three years. It is a felony to demand of any person, with menaces and without any reasonable cause, any property, and the punishment thereof ranges from penal servitude for life to a period not less than three years. The truth or falsehood of a threatening accusation, whether of crime or misconduct, is absolutely immaterial: the accused cannot set up truth as a justification of his conduct. The French and German codes deal with blackmailing in an equally stern manner. The latter states that, if the extortion is committed by violence against a person, or with the application of threats, the author is to be punished like a robber.

LITERATURE.—The authorities are quoted in the article.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

BLASPHEMY (Gr. *βλασφημία* = (1) an ill-omened or profane utterance, a light or rash prayer; (2) a slander, or any defamation; (3) impious speech against God. Oppos. *εὐφημία*).—1. **Blasphemy as a sin.**—Blasphemy as a sin and an ecclesiastical offence is peculiar to the Jewish and the Christian religion and to allied monotheistic cults. For, though the religions of Greece and Rome, and indeed of most countries, were far from viewing with equanimity the utterance of words which might offend any of their gods, yet the abhorrence caused by such utterances was due mainly to a fear of the disasters which the offended god might be expected to inflict on the whole tribe of which the offender was a member. The trial of Socrates would illustrate this, since he was accused of 'teaching men not to receive the gods whom the city acknowledged, and of having new gods' (Plato, *Apol.* 24 B). Under English common law this offence would have been the subject of an indictment for blasphemy, but the freer Greek spirit treated it as an offence against the welfare of the State. Similarly, in the charge brought by Pythonicus against Alcibiades (Thucydides, vi 53),

that he had divulged the mysteries of Eleusis, the gravamen was not so much that the act was an offence against the gods as that it was dangerous to the community. The Roman criminal law appears to have had no provision against blasphemy, apparently because, 'in spite of the intensity of Roman religious feeling, the religion of the State was always absolutely subject to the political authority' (Hunter, *Roman Law*, 1880, p. 10), and hence an offence against religion was once more not so much a sin as a crime. Persons who introduced new kinds of worship, unknown to custom or reason, disturbing weaker minds, were to be punished—if persons of rank, with deportation; if not of rank, with death.

2. In the Old Testament.—It is to the Jewish and Christian law (with their off-shoots), then, that we have to look for the creation of the offence of blasphemy. We omit the 'contempt' for God referred to in Mal 1^6, the dishonour done Him by withholding the offerings due to Him in Mal $3^{8.9}$, the swearing falsely by His name in Lv 19^{12}, the sin 'with a high hand' of Nu 15^{30} (cf. 2 K 19^{22}), the reviling (or murmuring against) the Elohim of Ex 22^{28}, since, though these all are directed against God, they do not rise to the height of the specific sin of blasphemy. A record, however, of this sin is found in Lv 24^{11}, where a man of mixed breed 'blasphemes the Name.' In this case doubt seems to have been felt about the prescribed penalty, for the offender was put back until 'the mind of the Lord' could be ascertained. This was found to fix the penalty of death by stoning, and the law was then promulgated: 'He that blasphemeth the Name of the Lord, he shall surely be put to death, and all the congregation shall certainly stone him' (v.^{16}). This was the only kind of reproach against God which was punishable with death at the hand of man, lower kinds (such as those referred to above) being left to the judgment of God. For post-Biblical Jewish usages see next article.

3. In the New Testament.—The offence of blasphemy is referred to frequently in the NT: in the case of the sin against the Holy Ghost (Mk $3^{28ff.}$); in the case of the man whose sins were pronounced by Jesus forgiven (Mt 9^3, Lk 5^{21}), when the scribes accused Him of blasphemy; when the Jews declared the saying 'I and my Father are one' to be blasphemous (Jn $10^{33.36}$); when Jesus declared Himself at His judgment (Mk 14^{64}); St. Stephen was accused of speaking 'blasphemous words against Moses and God' (Ac 6^{11}); in Ac 13^{45} and 18^6 and Ro 2^{24} the Jews in their turn are accused of blasphemy; in Ac 26^{11} St. Paul accuses himself of making the Christians blaspheme. The word occurs five times in the Pastoral Epp. (1 Ti 1^{20} $6^{1.4}$ and Tit 2^5 3^2), once in James (2^7), and nine times in the Apocalypse (2^9 $13^{1.5.6\,bis}$ $16^{9.11.21}$ 17^3). From these passages it appears that any expression was considered blasphemous which was wrathfully, despitefully, or contemptuously directed against God, His being, or goodness, which arrogated His attributes for a creature, which opposed a truth revealed by Him, or opposed an institution of which He was the author.

4. In Church history.—The feeling and the judgment expressed in these passages were taken over by Christianity, and enforced, after its union with the civil power, by temporal pains and penalties. The *Novellae* of Justinian (lxxvii. 1) relate that some

'used blasphemous expressions and swore by God, and so provoked Him to anger, and that it was enjoined on such men therefore to abstain from such blasphemies, and from swearing by the hair, or by the head, and similar expressions; for, seeing that blasphemies against men went not unpunished, far less would blasphemies against God. If, in spite of this admonition, any one committed the offence of blasphemy, he was to suffer the extreme penalty of the law' (*Corp. Jur. Civ.*, ed. Schöll, 1895, vol. iii. p. 382).

In the Middle Ages the ecclesiastical court was the principal authority for the punishment of blasphemy, the temporal power being called in, when required, to enforce the judgment of the court ecclesiastical. Thus in a decree of Gregory IX. it is laid down that, if any one shall have presumed to loose in public a blasphemous tongue against God, or any one of His saints, or, in special, against the Blessed Virgin, he shall be condemned by the bishop to public penance at the church door for seven Sundays, being on the last Sunday deprived of his shoes and outer clothing, to fast and give alms. In default he might be excommunicated and deprived of Christian burial, and be subjected to a fine by the temporal power (*Decret. Greg. IX.*, lib. v. tit. 27, c. 2; *Corp. Jur. Canon.*, ed. Richter-Friedberg, ii. 830).

Charlemagne had already incorporated in the law of the Empire the Christian law against blasphemy, and given his sanction to the principle that God Himself was injured by blasphemy, and that He would visit the offence on all the people, thus ingeniously uniting in one the older pagan and the newer Christian sentiment. Louis le Débonnaire followed him with laws against blasphemy which inflicted the death penalty. Philip Augustus fulminated against those who swore: 'Tête bleue!' 'Corbleu!' 'Ventrebleu!' 'Sang bleu!' Offenders, if noble, were to be fined; if *roturiers*, they were to be put into a sack and drowned. St. Louis ordered that offenders should be branded on the forehead, and if they repeated the offence, should have their tongue and lips pierced. With this agrees the ordinance of Henry III., which enacted that, for the first four offences, a blasphemer should be committed to prison on bread and water; for the fifth offence, he should have the under lip slit; for the sixth, he should have it so slit that his teeth were to be seen; for the seventh, his tongue should be bored; and for the eighth, he was to be put to death. It was, indeed, about the end of the 15th cent. that blasphemy was most severely punished; but from that date onwards the feeling has gradually gained ground that God is not a Being who can be injured by man's insults, and that, when blasphemy is punishable, it is as an offence against society.

The Scholastic treatment of blasphemy calls for a short notice. Defining blasphemy, with Gury, as *locutio Deo injuriosa*, or, with Suarez, as *verbum maledictionis, convicii seu contumeliae in Deum*, it divides it into 'immediate' when directed against God Himself, and 'mediate' when it attacks Him through His Word, His Church, His officers, sacraments, or saints. It is in its form threefold, 'heretical' when it involves a false doctrine, 'imprecative' when in the form of a curse, or merely 'abusive' (*probrosa*). Materially, it is threefold: (1) when it attributes to God what is not His; (2) when it deprives Him of what is His; and (3) when it assigns to the creature what belongs to the Creator—the first two of which St. Thomas declares to be but the affirmative and negative sides of the same truth, and the last to be a subdivision of the first. Blasphemy is a mortal sin, as being contradictory to charity; nay, it is the greatest of all sins, seeing that it adds to a denial of the faith a detestation in the will, and is aggravated by its outburst into words, as, on the other hand, faith is augmented by love and confession.

5. As a crime.—It has been already stated that a milder judgment on blasphemy has during the last four or five centuries gradually been ousting the feeling which finds expression in Lv 24^{16}. The change, however, has been of slow growth. So

late as A.D. 1656 we find, for instance, a poor mad Quaker, James Nayler, for allowing himself to be honoured as Jesus Christ, sentenced by the House of Commons to be put in the pillory, whipped from Westminster to the Old Exchange, again placed in the pillory, to have his tongue bored, his forehead branded with 'B,' then taken to Bristol, there again whipped, and then sent to Bridewell to remain until Parliament should release him. Again, in 1812 an unhappy bookseller, Daniel Isaac Eaton, of Ave Maria Lane, London, was sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment and to the pillory for publishing criticisms on the Bible story, after the manner of Thomas Paine. It is noticeable that Lord Ellenborough, in sentencing Eaton, did so on the express ground that 'the Christian religion is the law of the land, and must be protected as the law.' It was held blasphemy in the Court of Exchequer in 1729 to maintain publicly that the character of Christ is defective, and His teaching misleading, and that the Bible is no more inspired than any other book. In 1868, George Jacob Holyoake was sentenced to six months' imprisonment for oral blasphemy—for saying after a lecture in reply to a challenge: 'I do not believe there is such a thing as a God.' The law of England is still sufficiently severe against blasphemy. 'It is, indeed, still blasphemy,' according to Mr. Justice Erskine, 'punishable at common law, scoffingly or irreverently to ridicule or impugn the doctrines of the Christian faith.' On the other hand, 'if the decencies of controversy are observed, even the fundamentals of religion may be attacked without a person being guilty of blasphemous libel' (Lord Chief Justice Coleridge).

The net result of the slow process of change which has been going on for centuries in men's minds on this, as on all kindred subjects, is that blasphemy has become the technical name for a particular offence against the State. It is a crime against the peace and good order of society; it is an outrage on men's religious feelings, tending to a breach of the peace. As an indictable offence it is described by Blackstone to be 'denying the being or providence of God, contumelious reproaches of our Saviour Christ, profane scoffing at the Holy Scripture, or exposing it to contempt or ridicule' (Stephen's *Commentaries*[18], iv. 185). But though the existing law of England still embodies the tradition which regards blasphemy as a sin, and upholds the Christian religion, in practice it treats it as an offence against the peace and good order of society. It is open to anybody to call in question any article of religion, provided that his method of expression is not obnoxious to the authorities. In France the same practical state of things prevails; for, though its Code does not prohibit blasphemy as such, it yet prohibits it as an offence against good order. In Germany public blasphemy is punishable with one to three days' imprisonment; but the blasphemy must be public, coarsely expressed, and offence must actually have been caused (*Deutsches Reichsstrafgesetzbuch*, § 166). The Austrian law is stricter, and the offender may suffer imprisonment for a term ranging from six months to ten years (*ib.* §§ 122, 123, 124). In the United States the law of blasphemy is essentially the same as in England, being based on English common law and early statutes.

Thus Christian Europe and America have brought the wheel full circle round to where it was in Seneca's day, when that distinguished pagan could write:

'We are far from what we ought to be if we do not think of God as possessing all things, bestowing freely all things. Why do the gods bestow on us their bounty? It is their nature to do so. The man who thinks that they do no harm because they are unwilling errs They cannot. They can neither inflict injury nor receive it. For to harm and to be harmed go together' (*Ep.* 95, ed Haase, 1873, iii. 307).

To this it is only necessary to add the remark that, while the legal definition of blasphemy as an indictable and statutory offence is precise, the word itself has in literature and common parlance, as is natural, a wider and looser meaning. Thus, Jefferies (*The Story of my Heart*[2], 1891, p. 125) writes: 'I believe all manner of asceticism to be the vilest blasphemy—blasphemy towards the whole of the human race.' Ruskin (*Stones of Venice*, I. i. 37) speaks of 'representations of Christian subjects which had become blasphemous under the treatment of men like the Caracci'; and Bacon in his *Advancement of Learning* has the phrase 'blasphemy against learning.'

LITERATURE.—In addition to authorities quoted, cf. art. 'Blasphemy' in *HDB*, *EBi*, *JE*, and Wetzer-Welte's *Kirch. Lex.*; G. M. Mackie, 'Blasphemy,' in *ExpT* xx. (1909) 439; van Espen, *Ius eccl. univ.* ii. 256 ff.; Jarcke, *Hdbch. des gem. deutsch. Strafrechts*, ii. 27–46; for abnormal temptations to blasphemy, Alfonso M. de Liguori, *Theol. Mor.*, 1840, i. 4, n. 121 ff.; A. Koch, *Moraltheol.*, 1905, p. 362 ff.; Mishna, *Sanh.* 7. 5 and 56*a*; Odgers, *Libel and Slander*[4], 1905, pp. 446–455; Stephen, *Digest of Criminal Law*, 1883, p. 125 f.; Cobbett, *State Trials*, 1809 ff., v. 821 ff., xxxi. 931; St. Thom. Aq., *Summa theolog.* II. ii. qu. 13, 14.

W. F. COBB.

BLASPHEMY (Jewish).—All subsequent Jewish notions on the subject of blasphemy were derived, in their main principles, from the incident narrated in Lv 24[10-23]. In the course of that passage the general rule is enunciated (v.[16]): 'And he that blasphemeth the name of the Lord, he shall surely be put to death; all the congregation shall certainly stone him: as well the stranger as the home born *when he blasphemeth the name* shall be put to death.' Rabbinic tradition (already represented in the Targum) interpreted these italicized words to mean that, to render blasphemy a capital crime, the offender must actually pronounce the name of God, accompanied with disrespect, the nature of which is not defined. The reverential reluctance to *name* God even in worship grew up early, and, as is well known, is already exemplified in Psalms, Chron., and the LXX. The blasphemer who used the prevalent substitutes for the name of God was subjected to flagellation (*Sanh.* 56*a*). The writer of Pentateuchal scrolls was required to place his mind in a devotional attitude when writing the name of God, and in certain cases when he made an error in writing the name, the mistake was irremediable, and the whole column on which the error occurred was withdrawn from use (*Soferim*, ch. iv.). The name itself could not be obliterated. The only individuals who lawfully uttered the name were the priests. The priestly benediction (Nu 6[22-27]) is introduced by the words, '*Thus* shall ye bless the children of Israel,' and closes with the phrase, 'And they shall put *my name* on the children of Israel.' These commands, it was held, compelled the priests to utter the name as written, and made a substitute unlawful (*Soṭa*, 37*b*; *Sifri* on Nu 6[22]). It is recorded that sages communicated the pronunciation of the name to their disciples once in seven years (*Ḳiddushin*, 71*a*). Again, it is reported in a tradition that the priests themselves, after the death of Simon the Just, discontinued the pronunciation of the Tetragrammaton in the blessing (*Yoma*, 39*b*; *Menaḥoth*, 109*b*). The high priest, however, continued to pronounce the name on the Day of Atonement, amid the prostrations of the people (Mishn. *Yoma* iii. 8, etc. According to the Tosefta *Yoma* ii., the high priest uttered the name ten times on the fast).

This reluctance to utter the name of God was paralleled by a similar objection to hearing the name uttered. In the blasphemy trial, as described in the Mishna (*Sanh.* vii. 5), the witnesses were not allowed to repeat the actual blasphemy in their evidence against the accused; but when on a *prima*

facie case the capital charge was proved, then before sentence of death was promulgated one of the witnesses was required to utter the actual blasphemy with which the accused was charged. The judges rose to their feet and rent their garments—the statement of the Mishna thus fully confirms the report in Mt 26^{65}. According to Josephus (*Ant.* IV. viii. 10), a Jew was forbidden to blaspheme a heathen deity. Besides incurring the death penalty, the blasphemer was, in the Rabbinic view, regarded as excluded from Paradise (*'Abodā zārā*, 18*a*; Mishn. *Sanh.* xi. 1. In the latter passage this deprivation is, according to Abba Saul, incurred by any one who utters the Tetragrammaton). The Talmud asserts that the offence of blasphemy greatly increased when the death penalty for blasphemy was abolished with the loss of Jewish jurisdiction (see vol. i. p. 130^b. It may be interesting to add that Eleazar ben Zadok, a contemporary of Josephus, relates that as a child he saw the unchaste daughter of a priest burnt on bundles of grape-vines [Mishn. *Sanh.* vii. 2; Talm. fol. 52 *a–b*]. This the Talmud regards as having been the act of a Sadducean, not of a Pharisaic, court). Yet, despite this supposed increase in the prevalence of blasphemy, we find a strong abhorrence of everything which showed disrespect to the Deity. Rabbinic theology actually included blasphemy among the offences prohibited by natural law; this is the meaning of its inclusion in the seven Noachian prohibitions (with adultery, murder, idolatry, and so forth [*Sanh.* 56*a*]). Moreover, the stern moral denunciation of *profaning the name* (חלל השם) was the outcome of this range of ideas. To *profane the name* came to imply all forms of irreverence, of private insincerity, and of public disrespect for morality and religion. 'For him who has committed this sin there is no power in repentance to suspend the punishment, nor in the Day of Atonement to atone, nor in suffering to purify' (*Yoma*, 86*a*)—full forgiveness was attained only when the sinner died (cf. Schechter, *Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, p. 329). Profaning the name was thus something more than mere blasphemy, for of blasphemy we are emphatically told that repentance suffices to atone (*Pesikta Kahana*, 163*b*).

In the Middle Ages the blasphemer, it was held, ought to be excommunicated (*Responsa of Geonim*, ed. Müller, 103). The current Jewish Code requires the auditor of a blasphemy to show his feeling of revulsion by rending his garment (*Shulhan 'Arukh*, *Yoreh Deah*, 340, 37). Naturally, however, as public opinion has tended to weaken the efficiency of excommunication, so it has become less and less usual to take any practical notice of the offence of blasphemy. Blasphemy in the older view had been an act of rebellion, parallel to Korah's; it was a 'stretching out of the hand to the root' of religion. But such acts of rebellion are no longer punishable, and the Synagogue has shown itself as disinclined as any other organization to attempt the punishment. See HERESY.

I. ABRAHAMS.

BLASPHEMY (Muhammadan).—Blasphemy is regarded by Muslim jurists as one of the most convincing proofs of unbelief. If a Muslim has been guilty of this heinous sin, he is to be put to death as an apostate unless he is willing to repent (cf. art. APOSTASY [Muhammadan]). All utterances expressive of contempt for Allāh Himself, for His names, attributes, laws, commands, or prohibitions, are to be considered as blasphemy. Such is the case, for instance, if a Muslim declares that it is impossible for Allāh to see and to hear everything, or that Allāh cannot endure to all eternity, or that He is not one (*wāḥid*), but only 'one of three,' etc. All scoffing at Muhammad or any of the other prophets or apostles of Allāh is also to be regarded in Islām as blasphemy.

Unbelievers who have obtained permission to reside within the domain of Islām (the so-called *dzimmīs*) are in like manner forbidden to use, in the presence of Muslims, disrespectful expressions about Allāh or His apostles, or about the dogmas and institutions of Islām. For instance, they may not testify publicly that Jesus was the Son of God. The unbeliever who is guilty of blasphemy in the eye of Muslim law is not, however, put to death, but expiates his offence by *ta'zīr* (a penalty determined by the judge, according to circumstances).

TH. W. JUYNBOLL.

BLESSEDNESS.

Buddhist.—See ARHAT, NIRVANA.
Chinese (E. H. PARKER), p. 672.
Christian (J. C. LAMBERT), p. 675.
Greek and Roman.—See CHIEF GOOD.
Hindu.—See BRĀHMANISM.
Muhammadan (D. B. MACDONALD), p. 677.

BLESSEDNESS (Chinese).—**1. Perhaps the best way of arriving at some preliminary notion of the conceptions of blessedness cherished by the Chinese is to examine in the first instance their methods of ordinary speech, which can easily be traced back in spirit to the utterings of antiquity. When a Chinaman asks an acquaintance how he fares, the stereotyped reply is: 'I depend upon your happiness,' or 'Thanks to you.' In matters of greater gravity, the Emperor or any other of his subjects, official or otherwise, will say: 'Thanks to the shade of my ancestors' happiness, I am,' etc. When two or more persons are thrown together in pursuit of a common interest, whether it be marriage, partnership, political sympathy, or what not, it is the practice to say and to assume that the individuals, or the families to which the individuals immediately concerned belong, 'have a predestination,' *i.e.* have some spiritual affinity which is continued from the anterior existence into the present existence. The word *yüan*, here translated 'predestination,' was extended in later times to signify spiritual sympathy or connexion in the present life, and even in the future life: its original meaning is a 'hem,' 'collar,' 'connecting thread'; hence a 'reason,' 'to follow up,' 'to climb up.' After the advent of Buddhism in the first century of our era, the old term *yin-yüan*, or 'because clue,' was adapted to the *nidāna*, or 'causes and effects' connecting past existences with present (Eitel, *Handbook of Chinese Buddhism*^{2}, 1888, p. 84); and so now in popular usage the Buddhist idea is usually connoted in the mind of the speaker or writer. But, none the less, the basic notion really takes its origin in the ancient ancestor-worship of the Chinese, one of the most elementary principles of which was that no happiness could exist in this life unless the spirits of the dead were conciliated by living representatives through sacrifice, prayer, and duty. In other words, blessedness can exist securely on earth only under the shadow or protection of the Spiritual Abode above. When a man enters into conversation with a stranger, and the interview develops sympathetic interests on both sides, one will say to the other: 'We two have a *yüan*'—meaning, 'it was already planned out before our birth that we should meet,' even if only to buy and**

sell a horse, though the expression belongs rather to matrimonial arrangements. One friend will often write to or hail another as 'old generation elder brother,' the more ordinary term being 'old brother' simply. The addition of the word *shi*, meaning 'generation,' 'world,' or 'hereditary,' (for it signifies all three), delicately suggests for the past a subtle spiritual connexion running, it may be, through more than one world.

Like other nations, the Chinese have never been able to conceive conscious Deity otherwise than in the shape of man. Man has ever conceived of himself as a being above all animals, and thus he cannot but imagine the Deity in the highest conceivable shape. Hence it is scarcely to be wondered at that the Chinese have always conceived the Spiritual Abode to be a mere reproduction of the present earthly abode; its denizens being subject to the same feelings and passions, and divided into the same ranks and classes as here on earth.

One of the most ancient Chinese documents we possess, the *Hung-fan** (B.C. 1100), or 'Great Plan,' thus enumerates the 'Five Blessednesses': Long Life, Wealth, Serenity, Love of Virtue, and Object achieved at Death. This idea of blessedness in the present world is still found, after running an unbroken course of 3000 years, in the popular speech of to-day. Thus, if a Chinese wishes 'a happy New Year,' the reply is: 'May you be promoted; may you have sons; may you live rich and distinguished days!' On almost every door-post or lintel in the empire, at least when the New Year comes in, if not at most other festive times, may be seen the two words 'happiness' and '(old) age.' These two undoubtedly take premier rank among the Five Blessednesses in the Chinese mind: the love of virtue (which in China has nothing whatever to do with sobriety and continence) decidedly takes second rank; but still it is there, and most respectable Chinese, after the immediate necessities of life have been obtained, take a keen pleasure in doing what we should call 'kind acts.' The 'object achieved at death' may reasonably be held to include a proper provision of sons and grandsons for the adequate continuation of the family chain, or 'dying at the zenith of success,' *i.e.* dying with ambition or desires fully achieved—a stock Imperial phrase in reference to deceased statesmen. The ideal picture of Chinese happiness has been best given in many shapes by G. É. Simon (once French Consul at Foochow) in his pretty and sympathetic little work, *La Cité chinoise*, published in the year 1890: such pictures as he draws may be daily seen by any one who travels extensively over the more primitive districts of China, whither 'progress' has not penetrated. The grandest ideal of all blessedness is 'five generations in one hall,' *i.e.* great-grandfather, grandfather, father, son, and grandson—if possible, each with his wife still living—all in the same homestead; the old people calmly smoking their long metal pipes, giving advice, and sipping tea in the comfortable protected corners; the younger generations exposing themselves to the elements and doing the hard work; all the males assembling in the hall (or threshing-floor, according to season) for common meals; all the females decorously confining themselves to the 'inner apartments' (often merely a curtained-off space) or secluded gardens; each generation tenderly caring for the seniors' wants; each venerable man mildly but confidently authoritative to those below him, as he individually is perfectly deferential to his own parent or parents. In the field hard by is the ancestral cemetery; perhaps only the graves of an off-branch are there; possibly those of ten or twenty ancestors, ranged right and left of the 'first (migrating) ascendant.' In any case the book of genealogy for remote ancestors can be found, when needed, somewhere in China. There is little luxury in the ideal Chinese life: no boarded floors; no ceilings or papered walls; no glass or linen; no expensive wines or smart reception rooms. As a rule, the life, no matter how high the retired official may be, is what may be termed 'farm life.' Plain cotton clothes; plenty of rice, pork, and vegetables; good plain cookery; fine clothes for ceremonial occasions stowed away in chests; bedizenments for the women; pigs, poultry, ploughing cattle (seldom carts or horses); manure in heaps (or even plastered to the walls); fish and hams, or pemmican, drying and being smoked in the rafters; stiff chairs or benches; easy demeanour to servants and slaves; and, above all, perfect democracy and entire absence of snobbery: age is the only 'quality'; money counts not. Of late years newspapers have been added to the modest store of 'good books'; and (too often, alas!) so has opium been added to the mild tobacco, rice spirit, and tea of antiquity. (Tobacco, by the way, only dates from about A.D. 1500, and tea from A.D. 600.) Comfortable, healthy griminess may be said to represent well-to-do Chinese country life: baths and sanitary arrangements are, of course, entirely absent, and no one seems one penny the worse.

Here clearly we have long life, wealth, peace, and death with honour. But where does love of virtue come in? Well, a good family is neighbourly, hospitable, and friendly; even foreigners are courteously received as equals, so long as they behave themselves prudently, and so long as evil rumours have not preceded them. Kindness to slaves (who in any case are usually indistinguishable by strangers from free men) is a great Chinese characteristic. A mandarin of rank does not mind a slave lighting his pipe for him; he will sleep on the same mattress with that slave in a travelling boat; he is courteous to him in speech—so long as there is no fault to check. Kindness to animals is another Chinese trait: perhaps negative rather than positive—not fussy solicitude, but negligent easy-going tolerance, subordinate, however, to practical human needs. A country squire of the above described type will associate with equals and inferiors at the temple—he does not mind much whether it be a Buddhist, Taoist, or other temple. He has his own ancestral buildings for the settlement of family disputes; sometimes the whole village or town belongs to one single family-name, or two family-names; the village temple consequently suffices for more general interests. Mandarins are not by any means all bad: the local squireen endeavours none the less to avoid official friction, and to keep his village free of tax-collectors' exactions and the police harpies, who are unpaid, and 'live on their warrants.' Local self-government is universal; so long as the land-tax is paid, order and decency are maintained along the roads, and (latterly) so long as a reasonable tax, or, at all events, the customary tax, on commercial movement is not evaded. The virtuous paterfamilias promotes schools, maternity establishments, charities generally, and favours 'arbitration' in lieu of law. The elders may, as a rule, in council compound or hush up any crime but treason and parricide, so long as they agree, and so long as the mandarin has not the case officially brought before him. Religion in China is ignored rather than cultivated, and the priests (Buddhist and Taoist), though treated politely, especially if they are fairly educated men, are regarded as quite an inferior caste; yet their services are conventionally sought even

* See *SBE*, vol. xvi. p. 420 ff.; and Chavannes, *Mémoires Historiques*, vol. iv. pp. 280–281; also Mayers, *Chinese Readers' Manual*, p. 312.

by orthodox Confucianists when there is death in the house. If unprovoked religious observance is indulged in at all, it usually takes the form of a play at the village temple, when both sexes assemble for the combined purposes of consulting the oracles, praying for rain or children, and hearing historical dramas, and also for formal social intercourse generally. Admittance is free to all, and the local rich man pays the itinerant company.

2. Having now examined the question as to how far the idea of earthly blessedness is discernible from the ordinary conversation of social life, we come to more general, if undefined, principles, one of which is that a happy existence on earth involves no spiritual comfort derived from supernatural considerations, but takes into account solely human desires, passions, dislikes, and fears, as they are born in us, and as they are and ought to be regulated by *li*. What this *li*—usually translated 'rites' or 'propriety'—is, it is not so easy to define verbally as to realize mentally; but it may be called the Law of Nature and Right as seen by the collective wisdom of the highest human types, as understood by tradition, and as laid down by the Emperor (and his lieutenants) as Vicegerent of Heaven. The past life and the future life are the same thing; that is to say, life in heaven is exactly the same as life on earth, except that what the Chinese poets call the 'stinking bag,' or body that contains the human soul or spirit, must be considered as midway between the two. Every individual, though begotten of his father, really comes spiritually from the past life, where the souls of his ancestors are, and returns to the future life, whence his own soul contemplates his descendants on earth: the link is an unbroken one. The duty to ascendants and descendants is the same, though in a different set of phases, as is the duty to one's self; the past, the present, and the future are thus merged in one; the idea of 'time' does not come in at all. The intense anxiety to possess a male heir (by adoption of agnates, or, if none, of cognates, failing a natural heir) is now made intelligible, as also is the extreme punishment of 'cutting off posterity,' which leaves 'uneasy ghosts' to wander about for ever without dutiful attention. What heaven is, of course, no one knows, ever did know, or (in our present state of knowledge) ever can know; but such as it is, it is in the Chinese mind a place where sentient individuals in the shape of human beings conduct affairs, whether as emperors, officials, freemen, or slaves; and, as we have already shown, nothing higher than a human being, or a sentient being with human feelings, has ever or could ever have been conceived of. It is often even uncertain whether heaven is viewed as a place or as a person; or say, rather, 'Heaven forbid' and 'who art in heaven' are Chinese as well as Christian. The 'Spirit of Heaven' and the 'Emperor Above' are often convertible terms. There is but one life. The ancestor in the past is miserable unless he be tended; the mortal in the present is, or ought to be, miserable unless he tends, and unless he secures legitimate born or unborn links to tend himself when he is dead.

Hence the ancestor must always be kept informed, with due fasting and purification, of the successes and failures of the representative individual, be he ruler or ruled; and the ancestor's spirit clings to his special wooden name-tablet standing in the family temple; nor will he accept the sacrificial offerings, or evince his approval of what is done, unless things are conducted in accordance with *li*. Failure to render ghostly service to the spirits is liable to bring on mundane disaster in the shape of inundations or other irregularities of nature. But the spirits of any given family will accept sacrifice only from the legitimate representatives of that family; hence the enormity of cutting off for ever the only persons or links able to continue the family chain of life. Then only it is that Heaven steps in, finds that the virtue has gone out of its former *protégé* or nominee, and confers the vicegerency upon another ruling house: the same thing, *mutatis mutandis*, for private persons. This position is well illustrated in the year 516 B.C., when the ruler of Confucius' State took to flight in consequence of internal revolts (see *Tso Chwan*, ch. 42, p. 2). One of his ministers said: 'I do not know whether it be that Heaven has abandoned the country, or whether the country has committed some great offence against the ghosts and spirits.' It was necessary for a ruler—were he Emperor, king, vassal-prince, or what not—to have a domain before he could sacrifice to the spirits of his ancestors; and thus in ancient China the fiefs were at first subdivided indefinitely, and the domain gave a name which grew into a family name, or, as we say, a surname. Hence we find sacrifices to the gods of the land, the harvests, the rivers, mountains, and the frontiers, all concurrent with the personal sacrifice to ancestors. Dispossessed princes of previous dynasties were rarely cut off without mercy. Not only were their persons spared, but an estate, however insignificant, was conferred upon their lineal representatives by the ruling power favoured by Heaven's new choice, and these representatives were received as guests and peers by the Emperor when they presented themselves to do homage for their holdings. Except under circumstances of great provocation, it was considered impious to cause the extinction of a family, and thus to put a stop to the ancestral sacrifices. That sacrifice to ghosts and spirits can be viewed as distinct from and inferior to the sacrifices to the Emperor Above is instanced by a case in the year B.C. 482 (*Tso Chwan*, ch. 48, p. 20), when an official of Confucius' vassal-State was detained in captivity by the semi-barbarous State lying to its south. Though the State in question was ruled by the same family as the then Imperial family of China, and also the same family as that ruling over Confucius' State, the aboriginal population was still half savage, and even the Chinese rulers had become corrupted by popular spirit-worship and local superstitions. The captive orthodox minister accordingly said, well knowing this superstitious weakness: 'You had better let me go to take part in the sacrifices to the Emperor Above, which my master, the ruling duke, has to render at this season; otherwise the priest of the temple will hurl imprecations against your king!' The device succeeded.

3. It was manifestly considered doubtful whether the dead really had any exact knowledge of what was transpiring on earth; for in B.C. 502 a royal maiden of North China, who found herself dying in the above-named semi-barbarous kingdom, said: 'If the dead really possess any knowledge, please bury me where I can at least see my own native land.' A year before that, a semi-barbarous general, who was about to set fire to the enemy's camp, in which the bodies of many of his own slain also lay, asked, when remonstrated with: 'What does it matter if I burn their bones? If the dead really possess knowledge of what goes on here, then we can sacrifice to them afterwards, and thus give them satisfaction.' As is well known, Confucius himself, whilst adopting a respectful attitude towards the traditional 'nether' world (as we and they still popularly call it), declined to discuss spiritual beings, saying: 'We know little enough of man in this life, without troubling ourselves with theories about the other.' It cannot be too often repeated that in ancient China there

was no word of any kind for 'religion'; none for a public 'church'; none for 'temple' or 'priest,' as distinct from ancestral halls and precentors for Imperial worship; always except and in so far as the doctrine of continuity, through ancestors and descendants, with the past and future spiritual states may have left an inference in the mind. The nearest approach to religion was *li*, the written character expressing which idea is made up of the two separate signs signifying 'spiritual being' or '*themis*' as a radical notion, and 'a sacrificial vessel' as supplementary idea. Consequently, in figuring out for themselves an ideal for blessedness in this life, no idea of collective worship; no notion of a single jealous God; no need for praise, self-denial, confession and pardon of sin; no yearning for holiness as evinced by continence, abstinence, humility, joy in everlasting salvation or Divine grace, etc., ever even remotely entered the Chinese mind. Blessedness in the flesh was purely human, and spiritual blessedness in the past or future was—and this only doubtfully or agnostically—supposed to be the same thing.

4. It was reserved for the philosopher Lao-tse, an archivist at the Imperial Court, who lived during the 6th cent. B.C., a generation before Confucius, and who took the democratic and simple view of a life ushered in by civil strife and commercial activity, in contrast to Confucius' conservative and courtly definitions of *li*, to define for the first time in what ideal blessedness consisted. Like his rival Confucius, he worked entirely on old texts. Both philosophers ignored spiritualist views, and attempted to restore social order in the Chinese federation by interpreting exactly the same ancient texts, each in his own 'advanced' way. Even the word 'teaching,' which since the arrival of Buddhism in China, early in the first century of our era, has come to signify 'religion' or 'faith,' was not yet applied to these diverging interpretations, which were simply styled 'craft,' 'scheme,' or 'plan,' *i.e.* the plan of life, the plan of government, the plan of ancestral continuity. The old *Tao*, or 'way,' which now for the first time began to substitute in men's minds individual blessedness for collective blessedness, or, to use Sir Henry Maine's words, to substitute contract for status, took quite a new form in Lao-tse's hands. The old *Ju* (still meaning 'Confucianists') were the intellectuals of China, according to the *li* theories as developed by the then reigning Imperial dynasty (B.C. 1122–B.C. 255), whose statutes combined in one indivisible idea law, religion, life, government, social decency, war, and punishment. This was *Tao*. Just as *Tao* took a narrower meaning when Lao-tse defined it, so *Ju* took a narrower meaning when Confucius specialized it.

Lao-tse's summing up, literally translated, is as follows:

'My ideal is a series of small States with small populations. Let them possess an army machine of moderate size, but not be too ready to use it. Let them place a proper value on their lives, and refrain from distant migrations. Then, though they will be possessed of boats and carts, there will be no one to ride in them; though they will be possessed of arms and cuirasses, there will be no need for arraying them. Let the people revert to the old *quipo* system of records, enjoy their food, take a pride in their clothes, dwell in peace, and rejoice in their local customs. Each State would be within easy sight of the other; the sound of each other's hens cackling and dogs barking would be heard across. The people of each State would live to a good old age, and would have no movement of intercourse with neighbouring States.

'True words are apt to be not liked; pleasant words are apt to be untrue. Good or beneficent men do not wrangle, and wranglers are apt not to be good men. Those who know best do not range over many subjects, and those who range most widely do not know best. The highest form of man cares not to accumulate: so far as he uses his resources for others, he increases his own store; so far as he gives them to others, he has the more for himself. The Providence of Heaven benefits and does not injure; the Providence of the highest form of man takes action without self-assertive effort.'

Since the importation into China of Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Manichæism, Muhammadanism, Nestorianism, Catholicism, and Protestantism, respectively, the doctrine of rewards and punishments in a future life has naturally entered more and more into the Chinese imagination; and, of course, to a certain extent the ideas of holiness and blessedness in this life have become correspondingly modified. But the intellectual classes are still largely swayed by the more materialistic philosophy of Lao-tse and Confucius, and it is very doubtful whether the religious enthusiasm which once revolutionized Europe has ever touched, or will ever touch, the trained Chinese intellect; *a fortiori* is it doubtful whether blessedness on earth will ever become less human than it is now, or more of a temporary preparation for supposed everlasting blessedness in eternity.

LITERATURE.—Confucius's *Ch'unts'u*, or 'Springs and Autumns,' enlarged ed. known as *Tso Chwan*; *Shû King*, or 'Book of History'; *Shih King*, or 'Book of Ballads'; *Li Ki*, or 'Book of Rites'; and *Tâo Teh King*, the Taoist classic of Lao-tse—all translated in the *SBE*.

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BLESSEDNESS (Christian). — As distinguished from happiness (*q.v.*), blessedness denotes a state of fruition that is purer and deeper, and free from the accidents of time and circumstance to which happiness is exposed. In modern literature the distinction is familiar; Carlyle recognizes it when he writes, 'There is in man a Higher than Love of Happiness: he can do without Happiness, and instead thereof find Blessedness!' (*Sartor Resartus*, 132). But it is one that goes back to pre-Christian ages; one that, whether verbally expressed or not, has always been discerned more or less clearly from the time when men began to analyze the data of the ethical life or to reflect upon the realities of religious experience. What specially concerns us, seeing that the word 'blessedness' in Christian usage is an inheritance from the employment of the word 'blessed' in the NT, and that 'blessed' in the EV of the NT is a rendering of the Gr. μακάριος, is to notice that in Greek poetry and philosophy a distinction was made between εὐδαίμων as 'happy' and μάκαρ or μακάριος as 'blessed.' The gods of Olympus were the μάκαρες θεοί as raised above the storms and tumults of the earth (Homer, *Odys.* vi. 46); the dead were the μάκαρες θνητοί as delivered now from its griefs and cares (Hesiod, *Op.* 14); the abodes of departed heroes were the μακάρων νῆσοι, the 'islands of the blest' (*ib.* 171). εὐδαίμων, on the other hand, was applied to those who experience the ordinary well-being and happiness that are open to mortals in a world of change and chance; and sometimes it is expressly distinguished from the higher term μακάριος (Aristotle, *Eth.* I. x. 14).

For the Christian point of view it is significant that, while μακάριος is a word of frequent employment in the NT, εὐδαίμων is never found. This may be partly explained by the fact that to a Jewish mind εὐδαίμων had come to be burdened with a sinister connotation. A 'demon' was not the good and friendly 'genius' of the Greek imagination, but an evil spirit by whom men were tormented or urged on to their destruction. But the full explanation lies deeper, and must be sought in the fact that Jesus Christ introduced into the world a new and higher conception of felicity for which 'blessedness' alone is the appropriate term.

To understand Christ's doctrine of blessedness genetically, we must compare it not with Greek ideas upon the subject, but with those which we find in the OT and in contemporary Jewish thought. To a pious Israelite of the earlier history, length of days and earthly prosperity were the con

stituents of blessedness, which was saved from degenerating into a mere equivalence with pagan notions of happiness, by the fact that these outward blessings were regarded as tokens of the Divine favour, the rewards bestowed upon righteousness, and so were associated with feelings of religious gratitude and trust. A larger knowledge of the ways of God with men (Job, Pss 37. 73), and reflexion, above all, upon the experiences of the Exile, shattered those naive conceptions, and drove the best minds in Israel to look for blessedness elsewhere than in present prosperity. There were some pious hearts which, in the midst of trouble, were able to grasp by the sheer energy of faith the profound idea of a blessedness which consists in committing one's way to Jahweh, in loving His Law, and humbly accepting His will (Ps $1^{1, 2}$ 2^{12} 40^{4} $84^{5, 12}$ 112^{1}, Hab $3^{17ff.}$). But for the vast majority the powers of faith needed the reinforcement, which came gradually through the prophetic teaching, of the great Messianic hope of a coming Kingdom of righteousness and peace, in which the faithful should be abundantly rewarded and Israel attain to a blessedness of outward power and glory corresponding to that of inward trust and joy.

Once lighted up in the Jewish heart, this hope of a Messianic blessedness never ceased to burn. But by the time of Christ the pure radiance with which it glows in the writings of the great prophets had changed into a duskier flame, for men had come to think far less of spiritual benefits and obligations than of outward glory and material privilege. It was against this Jewish background that Christ appeared with His new doctrine of blessedness, which must be determinative for all Christian ideas upon the subject. The *locus classicus* here is His proclamation of the Beatitudes (Mt 5^{3-12}, Lk 6^{20-23}); but His teaching elsewhere serves to illuminate the principles there laid down, which are further illustrated by the Apostolic elucidation and enforcement of His words.

1. In its fundamental nature Christian blessedness appears as *an inward spiritual experience.* In setting forth His doctrine regarding it, Jesus vindicated the high idealism of those poet-saints of the OT who had risen to the point of understanding the blessedness of the man who makes Jahweh his trust, while at the same time He repudiated the prevailing popular conceptions as to the blessings of the Messianic Kingdom. In Mt. the list of the Beatitudes begins and ends with a declaration of the blessedness that lies in possessing the Kingdom of heaven ($5^{3, 10}$); and that Divine Kingdom, Jesus affirms elsewhere, is to be sought within the heart (Lk $17^{20f.}$): it is a kingdom, St. Paul explains, of righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost (Ro 14^{17}). In the Fourth Gospel we have further light upon the true essence of the Christian *summum bonum*, when 'eternal life' appears as the constant equivalent for the Synoptic 'kingdom of God,' and when this eternal life is described as the result of knowing the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom He hath sent (Jn 17^{3}), *i.e.* of knowing the Father through the Son ($14^{8f.}$). It is in the richness and intimacy of its peculiar spiritual content that Christ's doctrine of blessedness rises far above the thoughts of the most spiritual of OT saints. Those holy men of old had discovered the blessedness of trusting in the God of Jeshurun, of realizing that the eternal God was their refuge, and that underneath were the everlasting arms (Dt $33^{26f.}$); but they did not know God as Christ revealed Him, they did not know Him as the Father. It is in those experiences of filial trust and love and fellowship, which result from knowing God through Jesus Christ as our God and Father, that the essence of Christian blessedness lies.

2. But, while spirituality is the inmost quality of Christian blessedness, *natural blessings are not excluded from its scope and content.* There was nothing ascetic or dualistic in Christ's teaching upon this subject, though traces of a leaning in that direction appear in the writings of St. Paul, *e.g.* in some of his utterances regarding marriage (1 Co $7^{1, 8, 9}$; but ct. Eph $5^{25ff.}$). Unquestionably Jesus put spiritual goods above everything else, and taught that to these all natural desires and affections and all concern for earthly benefits must be subordinated, even, when necessary, to the point of utter sacrifice (Mt $5^{29f.}$ 16^{26}, Lk 14^{26}). But He freely recognized the intrinsic worth of the things that are naturally desirable, and their right to a place in any ideal of blessedness. He did not frown upon those familiar enjoyments and activities that belong to the ordinary conception of happiness, but showed again and again His own appreciation and approval of them. He loved the beautiful in nature (Mt $6^{28ff.}$), He gave the sanction of His presence to the joys of social intercourse (Mt 11^{19}, Lk $5^{29ff.}$, Jn 2^{2} 12^{2}), He saw in the work of field and house and market fitting types of the things of the Kingdom of heaven (Mt $25^{14ff.}$, Mk $4^{3ff.}$, Lk 13^{21}), He set forth marriage as the ideal relationship between the sexes (Mt $19^{4ff.}$), and delighted in the charms of little children ($18^{2ff.}$ $19^{13ff.}$). So also He taught His disciples to pray for their bread (Mt 6^{11}, Lk 11^{3}), and forbade them to be anxious about food and raiment, not because these things are unworthy of their concern, but because their own faith in the Divine Fatherhood ought to assure them that their Father in heaven knows that they have need of all these things (Mt $6^{31ff.}$). St. Paul, who in his larger and more inspired moods breaks away from the limitations of his lingering asceticism, puts into a sentence the whole matter of the harmony in Christian experience between the earthly and the heavenly blessings, as having their common source in the Divine love, when he exclaims, 'For all things are yours . . . and ye are Christ's, and Christ is God's' (1 Co $3^{21ff.}$; cf. Ro 8^{32}).

3. Christian blessedness is *a present reality.* To the seers and prophets of the OT the day of Messianic gladness had been a far-off vision. To the men of Christ's own time it was a prospect near at hand. But to both, the Kingdom with all its blessings still lay in the future—a hope and a promise, but not an actual experience. Jesus declared that the Kingdom of God was come, that its blessedness was already present. 'Theirs is the kingdom of heaven' was the first word and the last in that great charter of beatitude which He announced to His disciples (Mt $5^{3, 10}$). And the Kingdom being come, its blessedness is come, for the substance of that blessedness, as follows from its spiritual nature already referred to, does not need to be postponed till the arrival of a millennium on earth or the entrance into a Paradise of bliss in the future world. At the heart of it there lies the present and immediate assurance of God's Fatherly love, blessing us with all spiritual blessings and daily loading us with earthly benefits as well (Mt 6^{33}). And if some much-desired blessings are withheld, as oftentimes they are, God's children know that it is He who withholds them, and that nothing can separate them from His love. The best gifts, at least those in which the very soul of blessedness lies, are not withheld from those who seek first the Kingdom of God. The Heavenly Father comforts all such in their sorrows (Mt 5^{4}), satisfies their hunger for righteousness (v.^{6}), crowns them with His mercy (v.^{7}), grants them the vision of His face (v.^{8}), calls them His children (v.^{9}). And when men know and realize that God is their Father and that they are His children, the light of the eternal strikes with a redeeming and transforming power upon all the

things of time, and even on earth the days of heaven begin.

4. But Christian blessedness has its eschatological aspect also, and *looks to the future world for its perfect consummation.* 'Great,' said Jesus in the last Beatitude, 'is your reward in heaven' (Mt 5^{12}, Lk 6^{23}); and probably the eschatological idea is the uppermost, though not the only one, in the second of the series, where future comfort is promised to those who mourn (Mt 5^{4}). We have seen that Jesus did not ignore earthly goods, or treat them as if they were not to be desired, and that He found place for them accordingly in His doctrine of blessedness. Similarly, He did not ignore earthly ills, or ask His followers to face them with a Stoical apathy or to profess that they were agreeable things. On the contrary, pain was always painful to Jesus and sorrow sorrowful, and His presentation of blessedness includes the promise of a state from which they shall at length be utterly excluded. They are to be borne, it is true, with a kind of solemn gladness for Christ's sake and for righteousness' sake (Mt 5^{12}), and their fruitful effects upon the development of character under earthly conditions are not to be lost sight of (Jn $15^{2.8}$). But the full and rounded idea of Christian blessedness implies a condition of existence from which they have disappeared. Bacon expressed a half-truth only when he named prosperity as the blessing of the Old Testament and adversity as the blessing of the New (*Essays*, v.). Adversity is not presented in the NT as a blessing in itself, but only as a means to an end—the end being a blessedness from which every element of adversity has been taken away. The joy which a Christian can feel in pain is a joy not in the pain itself, but in the experience of the Divine love working through it, and in the assurance of a heavenly compensation (cf. Ro 8^{18}, 2 Co 4^{17}, He 4^{9} $12^{22.23}$ 13^{14}). Aristotle found a more exact name for happiness in a certain unimpeded energy of the soul, and admits that this requires a perfect life as its condition (*Eth.* I. vi. 15, 16), and that calamities become disqualifications for that blessedness which constitutes happiness of the highest kind (I. xi. 14). Christianity assures us of true blessedness even here and now in a world of sorrow and pain; but it also has the promise of a 'perfect life' when no disturbing or depressing influences shall impede the energies of the soul, and when God 'shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain; for the former things are passed away' (Rev 21^{4}).

LITERATURE.—Titius, *Die NT Lehre von der Seligkeit* (1895 f.); Wendt, *Teaching of Jesus* (1892), i. 184–256; Massie, in *Expositor*, 1st ser. ix. 345 ff., 459 ff., x. 48 ff. (1879); Newman Smyth, *Chr. Ethics*[2] (1893), ch. ii.; Votaw, in *HDB*, Ext. Vol. 14 ff.; Kähler, art. 'Seligkeit,' in *PRE*[3]; Fairbairn, *City of God*[3] (1889), 317 ff.; Oehler, *Theol. of OT* (Eng. tr. 1883), § 246; H. Schultz, *AT Theol.*[5] 1869, p. 370 f.; B. Weiss, *Bibl. Theol. of NT* (Eng. tr. 1882–83), §§ 144, 149c, 157*d*; Bousset, *Jesu Predigt in ihrem Gegensatz zum Judentum* (1892).

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BLESSEDNESS (Muḥammadan).—In Islām, even more than in Christianity, theology and the religious attitude have become specifically mystical. Besides the knowledge of Divine things traditionally handed down (*naql*) from the teachings of the prophets, and revealed to them by inspiration (*waḥy*), there is also an almost universally accepted minor inspiration (*ilhām*) open to all mankind, and especially found in the *walīs*, the 'saints' (lit. 'friends, associates, of Allah'). It is called, broadly, 'unveiling' (*kashf*), and is a direct, individual perception of the unseen in ecstasy, the culmination of a series of psychological conditions arising in the soul without apparent effort or cause. These immediate, unreasoned, and underived states of consciousness are called, in Muslim theology, *aḥwāl*, 'states,' 'conditions,' and pass from mere feelings of joy or sorrow, elation or depression, through auditory and visual hallucinations to absolute ecstasy, where language fails and there comes a 'passing away' (*fanā*) from the self and a union with Allah, which some, but wrongly unless only a metaphor is meant, have called 'fusion of being' (*ḥulūl*), 'identification' (*ittiḥād*), and 'union' (*wuṣūl*). If these terms be used literally, they indicate a pantheistic position, but they can also be used carelessly as mere approximations to a description of the feeling of the moment, and, at most, as equivalent to *tawḥīd*, 'unifying,' *i.e.* perception of Allah's absolute unity.

The most general term for this ecstasy or state of religious emotion and bliss is *wajd*, which means literally a finding, perceiving, experiencing, either by the physical senses or by the intellect. Thus it can be applied to the reaching and perceiving of the Divine by the direct operation of the inner spiritual being. But *wajd* and words cognate to it have also derived meanings which greatly complicate the terminology and lead to various plays on their different senses, and even to theological positions based on these plays. Thus *wajd* means also 'loving' and 'grieving,' because these are fundamental emotions which are 'experienced.'

Further, from the idea of 'finding' has been developed the vocabulary of 'existence.' *Mawjūd* means 'that which is found,' and thence has become the normal word in Arabic for the existent, whether absolute or contingent; and *wujūd*, which, in the first instance, meant simply 'finding,' has become the abstract 'existence.'

Such double- and triple-meaninged sentences as the following thus became possible:—'*Wajd* [finding or ecstasy or love] is losing of *wujūd* [existence or finding] in the *mawjūd* [the existent or the found].' 'He is rested by means of his *wajd*, not by means of the *mawjūd* in his *wajd*.' 'He who in his *wajd* is in the presence of the *mawjūd* is absent through the *wujūd* of the *mawjūd* from his *wajd*, and his *wajd* becomes a case of *wujūd*.' 'Sometimes my *wajd* would move my emotion; then he who is *mawjūd* in my *wajd* would cause me to lose the sight of my *wajd*.' '*Wajd* moves to emotion him whose rest is in *wajd*; but *wajd* is lost in the presence of the Real' (*al-ḥaqq*; see *Dictionary of Technical Terms used in the Sciences of the Musulmans*, p. 1454 f.). The reality and nature, for the Muslims, of this religious ecstasy, and the bliss therein experienced, will be made far more clear by the narrations and descriptions in Macdonald's 'Emotional Religion in Islam,' in *JRAS* for 1901, pp. 195–252, 705–748, and for 1902, pp. 1–28, and his *The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam* (Chicago, 1909), ch. vi. to end.

For the place and handling of these ideas in the system of Muslim theology the following brief abstract of the 6th Book of the 4th Division of al-Ghazālī's *Iḥyā* will probably suffice. (The Division is that of 'Saving Matters,' and the Book 'The Book of Love and Longing and Friendliness and being Well Pleased,' in vol. ix. p. 544 to end, ed. of the *Iḥyā* with the commentary of the Sayyid Murtaḍà, Cairo, 1311.)

After a preface explaining how Allah keeps the minds of His saints from the tinsel of this world, and, uncovering His glories to them at one time, and veiling them at another, keeps them between ecstasy and despair, acceptance and rejection, plunged in the sea of the knowledge of Him, and consumed in the fire of the love of Him, love of Allah is stated to be the last and loftiest of the stages of the spiritual life. There is nothing beyond it except what is its fruit, or before it except what is an introduction to it. Yet some divines, because it, as they assert, occurs so seldom, deny its existence, and say that it means only perseverance in obedience to God, and that love in itself is impossible except between beings of the same kind or likeness. These deny also all the companions and sequents of love.

But the whole Muslim community believes that the love of Allah is an absolute duty (*farḍ*). How, then, can it be non-existent or explained away

as meaning obedience? Obedience rather follows love. Further, the Qur'ān (ii. 60, v. 59) speaks of love of and by Allah, and in tradition the Prophet defines faith as loving Allah and His apostle more than aught else. Many other traditions and sayings of the saints follow to the same effect. He who loves Allah has no thought for heaven or hell. At the Last Day, when the peoples are summoned, each in the name of its prophet, the lovers of Allah will be summoned thus: 'Hither unto Allah, O ye Saints of His!' They will not be delayed for any judgment. 'When the believer knows his Lord, he loves Him, and when he loves Him he turns to Him; he looks not on the world with the eye of lust, nor on the world to come with the eye of carelessness; that sweetness occupies him in this world, and soothes him in that to come.'

But what is the essence of love, and what are its causes and conditions? Especially, what is the meaning of the love of the creature for Allah? Love is a natural turning to an object which gives pleasure. It springs from perceptions and varies with them, being either from sense-perception, or, in man alone, from that spiritual perception whose seat is in the heart. The pleasure through it is the most complete and absolute. Some have held that it is unthinkable that any one should love another than himself for the sake of that other, and without any happiness accruing to the lover apart from the perception of the beloved. That, however, is an error; it is both thinkable and takes place. A man loves by nature, first, himself for the continuance and perfection of his self; then he loves another than himself, because that other serves the same purpose and benefits him. Thirdly, he loves a thing for its own sake, not for any happiness that it brings; but the thing itself is his happiness, like the love of beauty, simply for itself. So, if it stands fast that Allah is beautiful, He must certainly be loved by him to whom His beauty is revealed. Beauty is of different kinds, and is not sensuous only: beauty of mental and moral qualities can be loved. But, lastly, there is often a secret relationship of souls between the lover and the beloved, and it suffices. It follows, then, that the Being worthy of love, in the absolute sense, is Allah only. If any one loves another than Allah, and does not do so because of a relationship of that beloved to Allah, his love can only imply defective knowledge of Allah on his part. When the Prophet is loved, or the pious, that is because these are beloved and lovers of Allah. The previously stated causes of love all meet in Allah, and are not joined in other than Him. As to the soul-relationship, the Prophet said: 'Souls are armies divided into bands: those which know one another agree, and those which do not, disagree.' Such an inner kinship of ideas exists between the soul and Allah. Part of this relationship can be expressed in words and learned from books, and consists in travelling on the path, and making the self over in the Divine likeness and imitating the Divine qualities. But another part, peculiar to mankind, cannot be so taught, and is only hinted at in various phrases in the Qur'ān and traditions. Thus in Qur'ān xvii. 87, 'They will ask thee about the spirit (*rūḥ*), say, "The spirit is my Lord's affair."' Also (xv. 29, xxxviii. 72), 'Then when I had formed him and blown into him of my spirit . . .'; therefore the angels worshipped Adam. Also (xxxviii. 25), 'We have made thee [David] a representative (*ḫalīfa*) in the earth.' So, too, in a tradition from the Prophet, 'Allah created Adam in his own form (*ṣūra*),' which certainly does not mean external form. So, too, in another tradition Allah says to Moses, 'I was sick, and thou didst not visit me'; to which Moses, 'O my Lord, how was that?' And Allah replies, 'My creature, so and so, was sick, and thou didst not visit him: hadst thou done so, thou wouldst have found me with him.' This kinship comes to the surface only through supererogatory acts of devotion (*nawāfil*). Allah has said in a tradition: 'When a creature does not cease drawing near to me through supererogatory acts of devotion, I love him; and when I love him, I become his hearing by which he hears, and his seeing by which he sees, and his tongue by which he speaks.' But here it is time to draw the rein of the pen. At this point men divide, and some see only an external resemblance, while others speak of 'identification' (*ittiḥād*) and 'fusion of being' (*ḥulūl*)—both views being false. The kinship is real, not metaphorical, but can be known only by experience.

In the human heart there is a property of apprehension, named variously 'the Divine light,' 'reason,' 'the inner insight,' 'the light of faith.' Its nature impels it to apprehend the essences of all things; and in that is its delight, even as the other human apprehensions have their delight in exercising their functions. But, as the things apprehended rise in the scale,—the external senses, the inner apprehension, etc.,—so does the delight in them. Of necessity, then, the knowledge of Allah is the greatest delight of all. How great it is can be known only by experience, although the stories are many of the ecstasies of His saints. It pre-occupies them so that neither the fear of the Fire nor the hope of Paradise has any weight. Their entire desire is to know Him in this world, and to behold His face in that to come, which is the great felicity. Yet, even in this world, some have so purified their hearts that they have become partakers, in the flesh, of these unspeakable joys. Such are called by men mad and unbelieving, for their speech passes the limit of reason.

Two things strengthen this love of Allah. First, that the ties of the world be cut from the heart, and the love of any other thing be taken out of it; and, secondly, that the knowledge of Allah and the spread of that knowledge in the heart, and its rule over the heart, be strengthened. Thus can men differ in the love of Allah and the consequent felicity.

But though Allah is the most conspicuous and manifest of beings, and though knowledge of Him might be expected before any other knowledge, yet we find that exactly the opposite is the case. There are two reasons for this: first, His invisibility, and, secondly, His too great conspicuousness. His is the case of the sun and its light; men are confused by it like bats. If the sun never set, and darkness never covered the earth, we should never know that light is. So man is, as it were, confused by all creation crying out with Allah. In a homely parallel, he is like the dullard who was riding upon his ass and looking for it at the same time.

Again, that men have a longing (*shauq*) for Allah is a proof that there is love of Allah. Love goes before longing. Longing is seeking for that which is loved, and which is thus perceived in one way but not in another. In the case of human beings, this may be because the beloved is remembered in absence, or, being present, is incompletely perceived. Both these reasons hold of Allah. Even by the most experienced saint the veil can never be entirely removed in this world, and even in the world to come Allah can never be entirely known. The stories in the lives of saints about this love-longing and its joys and sorrows are very many.

But what is meant by the love of Allah for His creatures? That He does love them is plain from divers passages in the Qur'ān (*e.g.* ii. 160, 222, v. 21, 59, lxi. 4) and many traditions. 'Love' is a word applied first to human relationships, and

secondly to Allah. But when words are so transformed, the meaning is always changed. They can never mean the same thing in man and in Allah. In man, love is an inclination of the soul to something that suits it, that is lacking in it, and from the gaining of which it expects profit and pleasure. All that is impossible in Allah, the Perfect, the Unchanging, who can contemplate nothing but Himself and His own acts, as there is nothing else in existence. Love, then, in Allah means: (1) the removal of the veil from the heart of the creature that he may see Allah; (2) the giving of power to the creature to draw near to Allah; and (3) Allah's willing this from all eternity. For Allah's love of a creature is from eternity, inasmuch as it is related to His eternal will, which requires that the creature in question should be given the power to follow the path that brings him near to Allah. But His love is, in time, in relation to the action which draws away the veil. So there is no change in Allah, or drawing near by Allah, or supplying of a lack in Allah. These terms apply only to the creature. And the signs of Allah's love are the trials which come upon creatures. If any one loves Allah and is sorely tried, he may know that Allah loves him, and is drawing him near through these trials.

And whether a creature, on the other hand, really loves Allah can be told by the fruits of love, which show themselves in his heart, and on his tongue, and in his limbs. He should be in love with death, for the lover does not shrink from the journey to the beloved. He should joy to be killed in the path of Allah. Yet, sometimes, love of family and children brings dislike of death, although there is also in one's heart some love of Allah. Or he may desire to remain longer in the world, in order to prepare himself to meet Allah. There is no weakness of love in that. Even with moral weaknesses there may be love of Allah in the heart. But sure signs of that love are delight in the thought (*dhikr*) of Allah, in prayer, and in the Qur'ān. So the lover loves everything connected with the beloved, even to the dogs of her tribe. And a sign of weakness in such love is delight in companionship with others than Allah.

'So friendliness (*ins*), fear (*khauf*), and longing (*shauq*) are among the effects of love; only, these effects differ in the lover according to his contemplation, and according to what is predominant in him at the time. Whenever gazing at the Extreme Beauty from behind the veil of the Unseen predominates, and the lover fears that he may fall short of reaching the Pinnacle of Majesty, then his heart is aroused to search, and is disquieted and hastens. That state of disquietude is called "longing," and is related to a thing which is absent. But when there predominates in the lover joy in nearness and witnessing of things present, through what has resulted from unveiling, and his contemplation is limited to examining the beauty thus present and unveiled, not turning to what he does not perceive, thereafter his heart rejoices in what it observes, and its rejoicing is called "friendliness." But if his contemplation be of the Divine qualities of might and self-sufficing and lack of solicitude, and if the possibility of discontinuance and distance present itself, then his heart is pained with this apprehension, and his pain is called "fear." So these states follow these observations, and the observations are due to causes which necessitate them, and they cannot be prevented.'

'Friendliness,' then, is this rejoicing of the heart in the contemplation of Divine beauty. It sometimes reaches the point of delight where there is no trace left of longing or of fear of change. The lover, then, is intimate with Allah, but strange with all others. He is alone when in company, and accompanied when alone. Yet some have denied all these things, and have said that they would involve that Allah is like to man (*tashbīh*). They have even said that there could be no approval (*riḍā*) of Allah on the part of man; there could only be patience. All which is mere ignorance and a taking of the shell for the kernel.

When this friendly intercourse is unclouded by absence or fear, it sometimes produces a confidentiality which reaches so far that the lover makes merry and plays with Allah (*inbisāṭ, idlāl*). Yet if the unworthy attempt this, it leads them straight to destruction.

A story is added of a certain unknown negro saint, Barḥ, in the time of Moses. When rain failed the children of Israel for seven years and no one could move Allah to send it, he—discovered to Moses by inspiration—procured it at once by a prayer full of familiarity and daring. Allah then explained to Moses 'He makes me laugh thrice every day.' It all depends upon who does a thing, and how and in what mind he does it.

Next, being well pleased (*riḍā*) with Allah's decrees is the loftiest of the stages of the spiritual life. Yet to most it is obscure, and to him only who is taught of Allah is the veil removed from it. Some have denied that there can be *riḍā* in anything which opposes the sensual inclination, or in the different trials of the soul. There man cannot pass beyond patience. Others contended that *riḍā* should apply to everything, even to crimes, sins, and unbelief, for everything was the action of Allah. Others, again, contended that perfect *riḍā* meant to abandon prayer and to keep silent as to sins, not exposing them or rebuking them.

But many passages in the Qur'ān (v. 19, ix. 73, 101, lv. 60, lviii. 22, xcviii. 8) speak of Allah as being well pleased with His creatures, and His creatures with Him; and the blessedness of His creatures in His being well pleased with them is reckoned better than Paradise itself. So, too, there are many traditions of the blessedness of those who are well pleased with Allah. The meaning of Allah's being well pleased with His creatures is somewhat like the meaning of Allah's loving His creatures; but created things cannot comprehend its real essence.

That this state of being well pleased with Allah enables men to overcome trials is because the state is a result of love, and the blow of the beloved does not hurt. Or the pain may be felt, but recognized as necessary, and to be welcomed and accepted, like the wound inflicted by a surgeon, or the toil of a merchant who travels in search of gain. And even as mortal love enables the lover to bear and rejoice and have pleasure in anything, however painful, so with the love of Allah.

One said: 'If He were to make me a bridge over Hell, that the creatures might pass over me into Paradise, and if He were then to fill Hell with me in expiation of His oath* and in exchange for the creation, I would love that as proceeding from His judgment and be well pleased with it as coming from His oath. That is the stage I have reached of being well pleased with Him.' Of such stories and expressions there are many.

Nor does prayer (*du'ā*) to Allah mean that the creature is not well pleased with what His Lord does. Prayer, although petition, is an act of devotion and an assumption of an attitude of need and dependence before Allah. He has praised it in the Qur'ān, *e.g.* xxi. 90. Similarly, it is right to blame evil deeds, those who commit them, and the causers of them. Those who are well pleased with such things are blamed in the Qur'ān (ix. 88, 94, x. 7). Indeed, believers are expressly warned not to take as friends evil-doers and unbelievers, Jews and Christians (Qur. iii. 27, iv. 143, v. 56, ix. 23, lx. 1). Allah has covenanted with the believer that he should hate the hypocrite (*munāfiq*), and with the hypocrite that he should hate the believer; and whom a man loves and accompanies, with them will he be raised at the Last Day.

The confusion on this point has arisen entirely from not distinguishing between the part in actions which belongs to Allah and the part which belongs to man. There are these two aspects in every action. The action is of Allah, but the man who is the agent accepts it and makes it his own. Thus we can view it with favour and with dislike at once. When one who is our enemy and the enemy of our enemy dies, our feeling is similarly

* An allusion to several passages in the Qur'ān (vii. 17, xi. 120, xxxii. 13, xxxviii. 85) in which Allah threatens to fill Hell with His creatures.

mixed. This is al-Ash'arī's doctrine of *iktisāb*, 'acceptance.' Al-Ghazālī then attempts to clarify this hopeless problem with a long illustration which need not be reproduced here. It belongs only very indirectly to this rubric. His final point is that when the Prophet forbade to leave a town in which the plague had appeared, that did not mean that a believer, in fleeing from a place of gross sin, was showing lack of pleasure in and acceptance of the will of Allah. Such was not the point of the Prophet's prohibition. It was meant rather to prevent all the healthy people from leaving the sick to perish. And flight from the possibility of sin is not away from Allah's will, but proceeds from it. It is a moot point among the learned as to who is the most excellent—the man who loves death that he may go to Allah, or the man who would rather live that he may serve his Master, or the man who says that he has no choice, but will be well pleased with that which Allah chooses for him.

LITERATURE.—All books on Ṣūfiism contain some material for this subject. Scattered through *The 1001 Nights* are stories of Saints, etc., also to the purpose. The following are more special references (but the only satisfactory materials are still in Arabic alone): Asin, *La Psicología según Mohidin Aben-arabi*, Paris, 1906 (extract from vol. iii. of *Actes du xive Cong. Intern. d. Orient.*); also 'Psicología del éxtasis en dos grandes misticos musulmanes,' in *Cultura Española*, Feb. 1906; Carra de Vaux, *Gazali*, Paris, 1902, p. 218 ff.; *DI* under 'Love' and 'Sufi'; Margoliouth, 'Contributions to the Biography of Abd al-Kadir of Jilan,' in *JRAS*, for April, 1907, p. 267 ff.; Merx, *Idee u. Grundlinien einer allgemeinen Gesch. der Mystik*, Heidelberg, 1893; Nicholson, 'Historical Enquiry concerning. . . . Sūfiism,' in *JRAS* for April, 1906, p. 303 ff.; Palmer, *Oriental Mysticism*, Cambridge, 1867; Weir, *Shaikhs of Morocco*, Edinburgh, 1904; also the two treatises of the present writer referred to above.

D. B. MACDONALD.

BLESSING.—See CURSING AND BLESSING.

BLEST, ABODE OF THE.

Primitive and Savage (J. A. MACCULLOCH), p. 680.
Buddhist (LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN), p. 687.
Celtic (J. A. MACCULLOCH), p. 689.
Christian.—See CHILIASM and STATE OF THE DEAD (Christian).
Egyptian.—See SOUL-HOUSE.
Greek and Roman (F. W. HALL), p. 696.
Hindu (H. JACOBI), p. 698.
Japanese (J. A. MACCULLOCH), p. 700.
Muslim.—See MUHAMMADANISM.
Persian (L. H. GRAY), p. 702.
Semitic (G. A. BARTON), p. 704.
Slavonic (J. A. MACCULLOCH), p. 706.
Teutonic (J. A. MACCULLOCH), p. 707.

BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Primitive and Savage).—I. Introduction.—The idea of the future life entertained by many peoples is frequently a complex one; in other words, various conceptions are held simultaneously. Thus among one people it may be thought that the spirit lingers round or re-visits its old haunts, that it passes to another region, and that it transmigrates into an animal or is re-born. This, while due in part to the fluidity of primitive belief and the apparent lack of any perception of contradictory ideas, may also result from the fact that it is often thought that a man possesses several souls, to each of which a different *rôle* is assigned after death. Sometimes, however, these concurrent ideas are less contradictory. The soul leaves the other world to return for a time to the grave or the village, while transmigration occurs only after a sojourn, longer or shorter, in the spirit-world. The conception of the future state will be discussed in a separate article (see STATE OF THE DEAD); here we shall confine ourselves to the idea of it as a blissful region, or to the conception of a region of happiness open to a few favoured mortals. Such ideas have not been universal; while, again, when the belief in a future life is lacking or is vague, the Elysium idea naturally is also vague or lacking. The simplest idea of the life of the spirit in another region after death is that of a mere continuance of the earthly life without change. This conception prevails among several peoples. It is to such a continuance theory that we must trace the idea of life beyond the grave as fuller and ampler than life on earth or of an Elysium state. Such a fuller life is, of course, generally expressed among savages in terms of savage life—there will be better hunting and fishing, and plenty of food; the huts will be larger, and all bodily desires will be amply fulfilled. What caused this transition can only be suggested. Since, in the continuance theory, the chief was still a chief, the slave a slave, and all who possessed wealth or power or tribal lore still retained these, this would naturally lead to the idea that for some at least—the chief, the medicine-man or priest, the wealthy—things would be better than on earth. Again, it may have been thought that the gods would be kinder to those who had observed their cult and ritual more carefully, or that those who had distinguished themselves on earth as warriors or by great bravery would be rewarded. Here we approach the dawn of more strictly retributive ideas. Such qualities as are approved among savages—bravery as opposed to cowardice, observance of tribal laws, and the like—have an ethical tinge; while even among savages, though morality may be lax from our point of view, certain moral ideas are inculcated, and they who observe them are said to be approved by the gods. This does not necessarily mean that the 'good' man, from the savage point of view, is always rewarded after death, but in many cases this belief is entertained, while the 'bad' are supposed to be punished. Hence, though in some cases the influence of a higher religion with a retributive system may have affected savage eschatology, there are others in which the development of such a system has proceeded spontaneously and apart from outside influence. When we add to all this the fact that greater powers are generally attributed to the spirit after death, it will easily be seen that men might readily come to believe that the spirit's opportunities of exercising them would be greater, and its surroundings, along with its capacity of enjoyment, would be more ample. While, then, the continuance state is often deemed a better one than earthly life, one in which different lots are assigned to different classes of men, there arises the idea of different states or places of existence, some perfectly happy, some no better than on earth or even more miserable.

Other ideas may quite well have produced the conception that life after death was blissful. Man's experience of the miseries of this world and his instinctive desire for happiness may have suggested a blissful other-world as an offset to this earth. The same experience led him to form myths of a Golden Age in the past, in which we occasionally meet with the idea that gods and men lived together or had free intercourse with each other. These may have suggested the idea that such a state still existed, and that it would be restored to man after death. Here the belief is sometimes expressed, that men will be with the gods after death, or will return to the region subterranean

or heavenly, whence they originally came. There is also the belief (expressed in many myths of the origin of death) that man is naturally immortal, and that pain, unhappiness, hunger, and thirst are unnatural. Hence they will no longer exist beyond the grave (see AGES OF THE WORLD, FALL). But such a state of the blest, especially when it is the abode of gods or immortals, is often reserved only for a few, while these sometimes pass thither without dying. It may also be believed in as a state apart from the ordinary abode of the dead, whether that is blissful or otherwise, though occasionally it is a mere region of the other world.

The continuance theory does not always develop in these directions, and sometimes it is held that life after death is for all a tame copy of earthly life, a dim, poor, shadowy replica of the present. This is common among West African tribes, and is found also among the Greeks and Semites, though with all these there is usually the idea of a blissful abode of divine beings.

The locality of the blissful region varies. Sometimes, probably as a result of inhumation or cave-burial, it is an underground region. Or, again, it is simply another distant part of the earth—frequently the east or west—or an island, perhaps because men believe that after death they will go to the region whence their ancestors migrated, or because the sun is supposed to pass through the place of the dead. Or it is on a mountain, probably because mountains are thought to support the sky, above which, in turn, the blissful abode is also located. Hence men are sometimes buried on mountains, while the custom of cremation may mark the change to the conception of a heavenly world whither the spirit floated when set free by the fire. Or, again, the planets, sun, moon, and stars, are held to be the abode of the blest, while many primitive folk believe that stars are the dead transformed.

In many cases the blissful region, like the world of the dead generally, is reached only after a long and toilsome journey, over mountains and rivers, over the bridge of death, while many obstacles and dangers are met with, and various supernatural enemies are encountered. Occasionally these dangers and obstacles are intended to try the worth of the spirit, and if it fails to surmount them, it cannot reach the blissful abode. Possibly, however, these trials and dangers are reminiscences of similar experiences in the old migrations of a tribe, traditionally handed down and made part of the experience of the dead where they were supposed to return to some former dwelling-place of the tribe.

Whatever ideas are held concerning the abode of the dead are strengthened and amplified by dreams, in which the soul is thought to have visited it; or when the medicine-man claims the power of going thither, and returns with a vivid description of its character; or by myths telling of visits of the living to that land, their sojourn there, and their return (see § 7).

2. The lowest peoples.—We know nothing of the exact nature of the eschatology of pre-historic man. But from the funeral *mobilier* of interments in the Stone Age, and from the elaborate customs of sepulture in its later periods, we may be certain that some continuance theory existed, whether of the body or of the spirit, in the grave or in another region. Whether it was blissful or not cannot now be known (see MacCulloch, *ExpT* xvii. [1906] 489). On the beliefs of the lowest peoples surviving now or within recent times, our information is more extensive, and, though it has been surmised that some of their eschatological ideas have been assimilated from Christian sources, there is little reason to doubt that on the whole they are original. The belief of the **Tasmanians** was vague, yet they looked forward to a happier life in which they would untiredly and with constant success pursue the chase, and for ever enjoy the pleasures which they coveted on earth. Contact with the white man suggested to them that they would 'jump up white men' on an island in the Straits (H. Ling Roth, *Aborr. of Tas.* 1890, p. 69). The religious ideas of the **Australian** tribes have sometimes been exaggerated by uncritical observers, but there is no doubt that among many of them a belief in a happy other-world was found. Of the tribes of West Australia little is known, while among the central and northern tribes a belief in perpetual re-incarnation existed universally (Spencer-Gillen[b], 491); but among those scattered over the south-east region the belief in a future happy life 'beyond the great water' or in the sky is generally found (Howitt, 438).

This is a land like the earth, and is sometimes called 'the gum-tree country,' but is more fertile, well watered, and abundantly supplied with game, while everything is better than in this world; and the spirits live there as they did on earth. Considerable freedom is ascribed to them, and they can also wander freely about the earth. Sometimes, as the Ngarigo and Wolgal believe, the spirit is met by the *quasi*-divinity Daramulun, who lives with the ghosts. The path to sky-land is by the rays of the setting sun or by the Milky Way, sometimes itself the dwelling of the ghosts (tribes on the Herbert River) and regarded as a water-course with fruit-groves and all desirable things; and there are many legends regarding its former accessibility by a tree or other means (Howitt, 434 ff., 474; *JAI* ii. 269, xiii. 187 ff., 194). The tribes around the Gulf region believe in a happy life in *Yalairy*, and a spirit above who looks after them there. Yalairy is reached by the Milky Way and is 'a good land, a nice place, full of beautiful, shady trees,' with plenty of water and abundance of game. It is usually thought of vaguely as beyond the stars, and the natives have no dread of going there (Palmer, *JAI* xiii. 291).

Something corresponding to the division caused elsewhere by rank, ritual observances, etc., is found among a few tribes. The Wakelbura thought that right-handed men went to the sky, left-handed men underground, while the island paradise of certain tribes round Maryborough is reached only by the 'good,' and those who show excellence in hunting, fishing, etc. (Howitt, 473, 498). Among the Gulf tribes the custom of knocking out two front teeth is connected with their entry to the sky-world. Those who have submitted to this custom will have bright, clear water to drink, others will have dirty or muddy water (*JAI* xiii. 291). Such beliefs may explain the retributive ideas ascribed to some of the tribes, though the fact that the great Being believed in by all these groups is supposed to be a kind of moral governor may have occasionally led to a retributive eschatology (see ABORIGINES, § x; Howitt, 504; *JAI* ii. 268–9). Thus the Baiame of certain tribes lives in Bullemah, the land of rest, a floral paradise of beauty and of plenty, where good spirits go, and can save from Eleänbah-wundah, the abode of the wicked (Parker, *More Aust. Legendary Tales*, London, 1898, 96, and cf. Lang's *Introd.* p. xxi).

The **Andaman Islanders** believe that beneath the earth is a jungle world (*chaitan*), where the *spirits* of the dead dwell and hunt the spirits of animals and birds. Between earth and sky is a cane bridge, over which the *souls* of the dead go to paradise, while the souls of those who have committed such sins as murder go to a cold region called *jereglar-mugu*. But all souls will finally be re-united with their spirits, and will live permanently on a new earth in the prime of life. Sickness and death will be unknown (Man, *JAI* xii. 161–2; but cf. Temple, *Census of India*, Calcutta, 1903, iii. 62).

Among the primitive pagan tribes of the **Malay** peninsula, **Semang**, **Sakai**, and **Jakun**, there is a considerable belief in retribution; the wicked, often identified with those who fear to meet the terrible beings of the soul-bridge, are condemned to a wretched existence, though sometimes they are submitted to a process of purification and permitted to enter Paradise. Paradise is a place for all others; it is situated in the firmament, and entered from the west. It is 'a glorified "Avilion," an "Island of Fruits," from which all that was noxious and distressing to man had been eliminated' (Skeat and Blagden, *Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula*, 1906, i. 13).

The Semang and Jakun divide the firmament into three tiers; the two upper tiers are the Paradise of the blest, filled with wild fruit-trees. Some of the tribes make the moon the 'Island of Fruits,' which, in some songs, is preceded by a 'Garden of Flowers.' The choicest heaven is reserved for the old and wise.

Among the western Semang the island of fruit-trees is reserved for souls of *B'lians* ('medicine-men'); all others, save the wicked, go across the sea to a land of screw-pines and thatch-palms (*ib.* 186–7, 207–8). All souls, according to the Sakai, are purified in the infernal regions by 'Granny Langut,' after which they cross a great chopper over boiling water. The wicked fall in; the good finally proceed to the island of fruit-trees (*ib.* 239 ff.). Among the Jakun, the Blandas think that in the Island of Fruits souls of the old become young; there is no pain or sickness there, and plenty of well-water. The Besisi locate it in the moon; it contains every kind of fruit-tree; there is perpetual feasting, and souls lie in idleness, or play musical instruments. The good alone are admitted to it. According to the Mantra, souls pass to Fruit Island in the west and live in harmony and enjoyment, feasting on its delicious fruits, marrying and having children. Pain, disease, and death are unknown. Souls of men who have died a bloody death go to Red Land, a desolate region, but obtain food from Fruit Island (*ib.* 293, 298, 321; *Jour. Ind. Archip.* i. 325).

The burial rites, especially of chiefs, among the Bushmen of S. Africa show a belief in the continuance of life; but their ideas are scantily recorded. Of the tribes living on the banks of the Gariep there is a myth of a paradise called *Too'ga* whither all go after death, and a safe journey is ensured by cutting off a finger-joint (Clow, *Nat. Races of S.A.*, 1905, i. 129). Equally vague are the notions of the Hottentots, who believe that there is a land above the sky-vault where things go on as on earth. Their divinity Tsui-goam lives in a beautiful heaven. Spirits of the dead exercise power over men and have a better insight into all matters; but whether they live in the land beyond the sky does not appear, though stars are the souls or eyes of the dead. The rites of interment also show a strong belief in the soul's continuance (Hahn, *Tsuni-goam*, 1881, pp. 23, 85, 105, 112 ff.; Fritsch, *Eingeborenen Süd-Afrikas*, Breslau, 1872, p. 338).

Among the Eskimos of Greenland the general belief was that there were two regions: (1) in a cold sky or over-world, with hills and valleys and a heaven; the souls dwelt in tents on the shore of a lake with plenty of fish and fowl, though it is also said to have been a place of cold and famine; (2) in an underground domain of the god Torngarsuk, a blissful place with sunshine and perpetual summer, with water, fish, and fowl in plenty, while seals and reindeer were caught without trouble or found boiling alive in a great kettle.

Various accounts ascribe different causes for the presence of souls in either region. Thus the upper region is said to be for witches and the wicked, or again for all souls except those of great and heroic men, of those who had suffered much on earth, perished at sea, or died in childbirth. On the other hand, the destiny of the soul depended on the treatment of the body. If it was laid on the ground before death, it went downwards; if not, upwards. A terrible journey to the underground region had to be undertaken, and some souls perished on the way (Nansen, *Eskimo Life*, 1893, p. 233 ff.; Crantz, *Grönland*, 1765, p. 258; Rink, *Tales and Trad. of the Eskimo*, 1875, pp. 37, 42).

3. **Polynesia.**—In Polynesia, while occasionally an abode of bliss for all is met with, as in the Mitchell Group, Niutao, and Nanumanga, in the heavens, or in Nukupetau, underground (Tia [Turner, *Samoa*, 1884, pp. 281, 286, 288]), in general there were different states allotted according to conditions of rank or class, while some were retributive, depending, however, upon ritual obedience rather than upon moral considerations. A subterranean other-world is frequently met with, while at the same time an abode in the heavens, the moon, in the west, or on an island is allotted to certain persons. In Samoa, Pulotu was under the sea, where the spirits bathed in 'the water of life' and became lively and bright, with no trace of infirmity, while the aged became young. This region was a replica of earth, but chiefs became pillars in the house of Saveasiuleo, its lord—an honour proudly anticipated by them before death. There was also a belief that chiefs and grandees went to the heavens, which opened to receive them (Turner, 257 ff.; Gill, *Myths and Songs of S. Pacific*, 1876, p. 168). In the Hervey Group Avaiki was a hollow underground region whither all who died a natural death went to be eaten and annihilated by Miru. Warriors, after being swallowed by Rongo, climbed a mountain and thence went to a cheerful abode in the heavens, where, dowered with immortality and decked with flowers, they danced and enjoyed themselves, looking down with contempt on the wretches in Avaiki. This Elysium of the brave consisted of 10 successive heavens, and was the home of Tangaroa, the god of day. But in Raratonga warriors lived with Tiki underground, in a beautiful region with shrubs and flowers of undying fragrance, eating, drinking, dancing, and sleeping. Their admission here depended on their having brought a suitable offering (Gill, 18, 152 ff., 170). In the Society Islands, while the people descended to Po, members of the Areoi society, chiefs, and those whose families could afford sufficient offerings, went to the aerial paradise of perfumed Rohutu, where, amid beautiful scenes, every sensuous enjoyment was open to them. Neglect of certain rites and offerings might, however, debar them from it (Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*[2], 1832, i. 245, 352, 397, 403). The Sandwich Islanders thought that souls went to Po, the place of night, where they were eaten, though some became immortal spirits by this process. A few went to the underground paradise of Miru and Akea, while chiefs were led by a god to the heavens. This underground paradise was level and beautiful, and everything grew of itself. In Miru's part, souls amused themselves with noisy games; in Akea's there reigned a solemn peace (Ratzel, *Hist. of Mankind*, 1897, i. 315; Ellis, i. 366; Jones, *Sandwich Is.*, Boston, 1843, p. 42). For the spirits of the dead in Savage Island there was an underground region called Maui, but their favourite place was the land of Sina in the skies (Turner, 306). Another account says that the virtuous passed to *Ahonoa*, Everlasting Light, the virtues being chastity, theft from another tribe, and slaughter of enemies (Thomson, *JAI* xxxi. [1901] 139). In Bowditch Island the common people went to a distant region of delights full of fruits and flowers, where they enjoyed feasting and dancing. Kings, priests, and their families went to the moon and enjoyed all sorts of pleasures, the moon itself being their food (*JAI* xxi. [1891–2] 51; Turner, 273). *Bolotu* was the Elysium of the Tonga Islanders, an island of gods and spirits of chiefs and men of rank. Flowers and fruits when plucked were immediately replaced; and dogs, when killed, came to life again. This exquisite region was not open to the people, whose souls died with their bodies. The Maori subterranean Hades, *Po* or the *Reinga*, is variously described. Sometimes it is regarded as a gloomy state with disgusting food, again as an excellent land like earth, visited by the sun, with rivers, good food, and many villages and people. It was also thought to be divided into several compartments, the lowest being the worst. Thither went all of lesser rank. Po was personified as a goddess, and in it was the living fountain in which the sun and moon bathed and were renewed. Great chiefs and heroes went to one of the heavens after death, or became stars. There was, however, some uncertainty as to whether the spirit went up or down, or remained near the body. *Karakias*, or prayers, aided its ascent. Reinga is described by one writer, probably confusing it with the sky-abode of chiefs, as a beautiful heaven where all things were abundant, with constant calm, perpetual sunshine and gladness (Nicholls, *JAI* xv. [1885], 200; see also Shortland, *Traditions of N.Z.*, 1854, ch. 7, *Maori Rel. and Myth*, 1882, pp. 45, 52; *JAI* xix. [1890] 118–9; Taylor, *Te Ika a Maui*, 1855, pp. 103, 186, and *passim*).

Retribution was not strictly ethical, but ritual and ceremonial, as some of the above cases have shown. When the friend of a dead man in Nanumea gave a great funeral feast, the deceased was admitted to a heavenly land of light and clear waters; if not, he was sent to darkness and mud (Turner, 292). Entrance to *Mane*, the western paradise of Tamana, with its clear streams and abundant food, depended on an even number resulting when pebbles were thrown by the dead man's relatives. An odd number caused the spirit to be annihilated (*ib.* 294). In Pukapuka of the Hervey Group, Vaerua ate spirits which had committed ceremonial offences; all others went westwards to the house of Reva, where they passed a blissful existence. In Aitutaki, spirits which were provided with a coco-nut escaped by a ruse from being eaten by Miru, and went to the pleasant abode of Iva, where they feasted on the richest food and the finest sugar-cane (Gill, 171, 175). In Netherland Island, however, 'souls of the honest, kind, and gentle went and lived in light in Heaven. The thief, the cruel, and the ill-tongued went to a prison of darkness under the earth' (Turner, 301).

4. Dayaks, Papuans, and Melanesians.—The Dayaks exhibit a great diversity of beliefs, and the general disposition towards a retributive view, as well as the minute divisions of the future state, may owe something to Hindu or Muhammadan influences. More purely native beliefs are seen in the occasional idea that the other-world is a copy of this, or is open to all, or that a better fate awaits those who die a violent death or women dying in childbirth.

The Sea Dayaks of Sarawak believe in simple continuance. The dead build houses and make paddy fields; they are subject to the same inequalities as the living. But they can bestow on the living amulets and medicines of magical power (Ling Roth, *Natives of Sarawak and Borneo*, 1896, i. 213). Others, like the Sibuyows, think that six states are passed through, the wicked—thieves and great criminals—being punished in the first. Eventually the final heavenly state—beautiful, peaceful, and happy—is reached. The streets are clean and regular, the houses perfectly formed. There are lakes and rivers, gardens with fruit-trees and flowers, and the people are happy and rich. This place is enclosed by a great wall, while at a distance the souls of Malays have a *Kampong* (Brooke, *Ten Years in Sarawak*, 1866, i. 55). The Dusuns, the Idaans, and other tribes place paradise at or near the top of a mountain which all souls ascend, and which is guarded by a fiery dog or some other monster. The wicked try unsuccessfully to ascend it (Pryer, *JAI* xvi. [1886] 283; Ling Roth, i. 220). The tribes of the Barito, Kapuas, and Kahaian river-basins have a similar belief. The entrance to the other-world is on a mountain peak. It has rivers rich in fish; in its midst is a sea surrounding an island on which grows a tree with pearls for fruit, golden blossoms, and fine cloth for leaves. It also furnishes the Water of Life, which the souls drink to become youthful (this is also effected by bathing in the sea). While the souls retain the positions of this world, all are free from care, every desire is followed by abundant fulfilment, and there are all kinds of enjoyments and rich gems and gold. Souls, however, eventually die, returning to the earth and entering a fruit or leaf, etc. Thieves, unjust chiefs, and those who turned a good into a bad cause are excluded from these enjoyments (Grabowsky, *Inter. AE*, ii. 184 ff.; Ling Roth, citing Schwaner, ii. pp. clxx ff., cc). The Malanaus made the other-world resemble this, with seas, rivers, and sago plantations; but those who had died a violent death had a separate paradise from those who had died a natural death. Souls finally died, to reappear as worms, etc. (de Crespigny, *JAI* v. 35). Various places were allotted to the souls in the belief of the Kayans, according to the manner of their death. Those who died a violent death and women dying in childbed mated in *Long Julan*, where they had all their wants supplied, did no work, and all became rich. Those who were drowned went to *Ling Yang*, a land of plenty below the rivers, where all property lost in the waters became theirs. A place of wretchedness was reserved for suicides (Hose, in Ling Roth, i. 220).

Among the Papuans of New Guinea and the adjacent islands there is a general belief in a future state, shown by the elaborate funeral ceremonies and by explicit beliefs. But these beliefs vary in different regions, and the other-world is located now on an island, now in the sky, now underground. Sometimes it is open to all, sometimes to those only who comply with various ritual observances; or, again, there are various places according to the manner of death. It is conceived as a region of light and happiness; friends are reunited; hunger is unknown, and the souls enjoy an existence of hunting, fishing, and feasting.

In the Woodlarks all souls whose bodies have been tatued go to the island of *Watum* by way of a serpent bridge, and enjoy to the full all the pleasures of life, the women cultivating and cooking food for their idle lords (Thomson, *British N.G.*, 1892, p. 184; Haddon, *FL*, 1894, p. 318). In the western islands of Torres Straits the abode of the dead was in a mythic island called *Kibu*, where ghosts sat twittering on the tree-tops; but those of the best men, greatest warriors and skull-hunters, were better off (Haddon, *JAI* xix. [1890] 318). In the eastern islands the spirit went under the sea to *Beg*, and eventually to the island of *Boigu*, being conducted thither by Terer, the first man from whose body the skin was scraped off. Here every one was happy and bright, had plenty of food, and did no work. The death ceremonies comforted the mourners, and gave them assurance of immortality (Hunt, *JAI* xxviii. [1899] 8; *Rep. Cambridge Exp. to Torres St.*, Cambridge, vi. [1908] 45, 128, 252–3). The Elema tribes of the Papuan Gulf, New Guinea, thought that those who died fighting went to the sky-land of the god of war, and could also roam about and annoy their enemies. Various localities were assigned to those dying a natural death, while those who were murdered or killed by crocodiles or snakes became wandering spirits (Holmes, *JAI* xxxii. [1902] 428). Other tribes entertain different ideas. Some think that all spirits live in *Tauru*, a glorious place where the souls welcome the newcomer, and where hunger is unknown. A similar western paradise called *Raka*, the place of plenty, is believed in by the Motu-motu people; but here only those whose noses are pierced enter it (Chalmers, *Pioneering in N.G.*, 1883, p. 169). In other districts the soul, or *möhs*, goes underground, and must cross a great water by a ladder. Here it meets a spirit which demands its earring and armband. If the soul has not these the ladder is tripped up, and the *möhs* falls into the water, whence there is no return. Otherwise it is met by two *möhs*, which conduct it to the subterranean villages where the ghosts dwell. They can re-visit their former home and bring good or ill luck (*Inter. AE*, xiii. 47).

Throughout Melanesia, while future life is a reflexion of life on earth, there is a general disposition to ascribe greater happiness to chiefs and warriors, and a greater amount of power to the disembodied spirits. But here also attention to ritual obtains a special reward, and there is an approximation to retribution. The place of the dead is an island (Solomon and Loyalty Islands) or underground (New Britain, Santa Cruz, New Hebrides, Fiji). Sometimes there are different places for different classes, or according to the manner of life or death, and in general all these regions of the dead are reached with difficulty.

The people in the north of New Britain believe that souls which have enough shell-money to offer to the god can enter a desirable paradise called *Tingenalabaran*, but those which have not are sent to a bleak region. The Sultkas of the south coast have a subterranean paradise, *Mlol*, to which those only who can prove their life to have been satisfactory are admitted (Pullen-Burry, *Trans. 3rd Cong. Hist. Rel.* i. 84).

In the Solomon Islands the island of the dead is easily reached by ghosts which have their noses pierced (Florida), or have their hands marked with a conventional design, lacking which they are annihilated (Ysabel). There are houses, gardens, and canoes in these island abodes; the ghosts bathe, and their laughter is heard. In some cases the common ghosts turn into white ants' nests and are eaten by more vigorous ghosts, who also at last undergo the same transformation (Codrington, *Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, 256 ff.). Similar beliefs are held in other islands of the group.

An underground world is believed in from the Torres Group to Fiji: and its usual name from Torres Islands to New Hebrides is *Panoi*. The Banks Islanders think there are divisions in *Panoi* for different classes of ghosts, *e.g.* youths dying in the flower of their age inhabit a more pleasant region with flowers and scented plants in abundance; or, according to the manner of death, there are places set apart for the souls. Sometimes murderers, sorcerers, and adulterers are excluded from the better *Panoi*, a good place where ghosts enjoy life and live in harmony. *Panoi* contains villages, houses, and trees with red leaves, and is a beautiful place. A great and bright feast on earth is compared to the ordinary life there. Men dance, sing, and talk, but there is no fighting. Life is happy if empty; there is no pain, sickness, or work. In some islands ritual observances determine the nature of existence there—a man with unpierced ears cannot drink water, the untatued cannot eat good food (Codrington, 273–288). In Aneiteum (New Hebrides), the place of spirits, Umatmas, has two divisions, 'for good and for bad,' the bad being thieves, murderers, and liars. The former division is characterized by plenty of good food (Turner, 326).

In Fiji the way to the place of souls, *Mbulu*, was long and dangerous, and ritual and ceremonial observances decided the lot of the dead. Ghosts of bachelors were annihilated; all other ghosts had to be approved by Ndengei, great warriors especially gaining his favour. In *Mbulu* punishments were

awarded to those who displeased the gods, those who had not their ears bored or were not tatued, or had not slain an enemy. Those who lied about themselves were struck down; some were eaten by the gods. Hence there were divisions in *Mbulu*, and of these *Mburotu* was the most Elysian. Here scented groves and pleasant glades and an unclouded sky were found, and an abundance of all that was most desirable to a native. Its delights were such that the word was commonly used to describe any great joy. A native song says, 'Death is easy . . . death is rest' (Williams, *Fiji*, 1858, i. 243 ff.). Mention is also made of a paradise of the gods, to which certain mortals were admitted by privilege (*ib.* i. 114).

5. **Africa.**—An Elysium conception is but slightly developed among the peoples of Africa, partly because some tribes have a vague idea of a future life, some, like the Dinka and Bari, believing in utter extinction (Hollis, *The Masai*, Oxford, 1905, p. 307), partly because with many others the belief in transmigration and re-incarnation is very strong. The cult of ancestors is, however, general, and shows that some kind of future existence is commonly believed in, though it is not definitely outlined, and many profess ignorance of its nature. But as the spirits of the dead are so often the gods of the living, and are adored as great spirits, this must argue that their lot, or that of the more important of them, is better than on earth, though expression of this is rare. Where a future state is described, it is most usually a heavenly or subterranean place where all go, and where the distinctions of rank, etc., still continue.

Thus, among the Nilotic Negroes, the Ja-luo hold that the spirits go up to the sky (Johnston, *Uganda*, 1902, ii. 779). Among the Nandi it is held that all, good and bad, go underground (Hollis, *Trans. 3rd Cong. Hist. Rel.*, Oxford, 1908, i. 87). With the Gallas, wood that has been burning a little is put on the grave, and if it grows, this denotes that the spirit is happy in the other-world (Macdonald, *Africana*, 1882, i. 229). The general belief of the West African Negroes is in an underground shadow world where the king is still king, the slave a slave, and the conditions and occupations of earth are continued in a ghostly form. The sun shines there when it sets here, and there are mountains, forests, rivers, plants, animals, villages, etc. There are pleasures and pains, but every one there grows backward or forward into the prime of life, and there is no diminution of strength or bodily waste. Among the Yoruba-speaking peoples it is called *Ipo-oku*, 'The Land of the Dead'; among the Tshi, *Srahmandazi*, 'The Land of Ghosts'; and the general opinion of it is summed up in the proverb, 'One day in this world is worth a year in *Srahmandazi*' (Kingsley, *Travels in W.A.*, 1897, pp. 488, 578; Ellis, *Tshi-speaking Peoples*, 1887, p. 157 f., *Yoruba-speaking Peoples*, 1894, p. 127; Burton, *Dahome*, 1864, ii. 156). These ideas are also found among the Bantu tribes of W. Africa, though their notion of the locality of the spirit-world is vaguer—it is underground or all around. It is free from certain bodily limitations, and the rich or persons of rank form a special class of spirits, the *awiri*. Probably since contact with white men a belief has arisen in 'white man's land' beneath the sea, whither some of the dead go and find a happy future, becoming white (Nassau, *Fetichism in W.A.*, 1904, pp. 56 ff., 237; Kingsley, 519; *JAI* xiii. [1884] 475). Much the same may be said of the Eastern Bantus. All spirits live, but how employed or where no one knows (*JAI*, 1892–3, xxii. 116). The spirit-world is peopled in much the same way as this, but we hear in some tribes of Mulungu assigning their places to the dead, though there is no idea of retribution (but cf. Waitz, *Anthrop.*, Leipzig, 1860, ii. 425 [souls of good men go to Mulungu, among the Ba-Ngindo]), and that the spirits 'go on high.' Among the Bondei the souls go to Mlinga, a divine mountain, entering by a brass door. There is recognition beyond the grave, and the spirit lives with its dead relatives. Spirits are worshipped as gods, and have great influence on earthly affairs, while sometimes the ghost of a dead chief will have a mountain as his residence (Macdonald, i. 60, 67–9, 108, 297; Dale, *JAI* xxv. 232). A more definite Elysium conception appears with the Kimbunda of S.W. Africa, in whose *Kalunga*, or world of the dead, there are feasting, plenty of women, hunting and dancing, while life goes better than in this world (Magyar, cited by Tylor[2], ii. 77). The conceptions of the southern Bantus are also vague, though some hold that the spirit ascends to heaven or 'goes home' (Macdonald, *JAI* xx. [1891] 120–1). With the Zulus, while there is much doubt as to the position of the spirit-world, there are clear references to an underground region of spirits where Unkulunkulu is. Stories tell of visits paid by the living there, and of its landscapes like those of this world, its villages, cattle, etc. This belief is now much mingled with the idea that the *amatongo*, or spirits, appear on earth as snakes. Even in this the differences of rank are continued, chiefs appearing as poisonous, common people as harmless, snakes (Callaway, *Rel. of the Amazulu*, 1884, *passim*, *Nursery Tales . . . of the Zulus*, 1868, i. 316 ff.). The Basutos also locate the spirit-world underground. Some say that it has green valleys and immortal speckled cattle—an Elysium idea—but generally it is thought that the shades wander calmly and silently, without joy and without grief. There is no idea of retribution, though this may have existed formerly (Casalis, *Les Bassoutos*, Paris, 1859, pp. 261, 268).

The idea of rank, etc., determining the state of spirits is curiously held among the Masai. Souls of common people are annihilated, but those of the rich or medicine-men become sacred snakes, while spirits of certain great people go to heaven (Johnston, *op. cit.* ii. 832; Hollis, 307–8). Merker, however, states that the good are admitted to a paradise full of all beautiful and glorious things. Luxuriant grazing-grounds with cattle, alternate with seas, rivers, and cool groves, whose trees are hung with the rarest fruits. Souls live without trouble, pain, or labour, re-united to their departed relatives. Evil-doers are sent to a waterless waste (*ZE* xxxv. [1903] 735).

Retributive ideas are said to exist among some Negro tribes, though the evidence must be received with caution. Souls of good men ascend to heaven, sometimes by the Milky Way, the path of the ghosts, in the belief of the Krus, Scherbros, and Odschi, the evil being punished (Waitz, ii. 191). But Bosman's account of the beliefs of the Guinea Negroes on this subject shows what 'goodness' means here. There is a judgment of souls after death: the good, viz. those who have strictly observed ceremonial and religious laws, and thus have not offended the gods, are sent to a happy and pleasant Paradise; offending souls are slain or drowned (Pinkerton, *Voyages*, xvi. 401). Among the Agni also, souls of the good begin a new life analogous to this after death (*L'Anthropologie*, Paris, iv. [1893] 434), and this is said to be true of some of the tribes on the Upper Congo, who think that *Longa*, the nether world, is tenanted by souls of the good (Weeks, *FL* xii. [1901] 184). It is not improbable that a belief in a future judgment is taught in the Secret Societies of W. Africa.

6. **North American Indians.**—While the tribes of North America occasionally represented the future life as a mere copy of this, *e.g.* the Maricopas, the more general conception was that it opened out a richer, fuller, and happier state to all, or to warriors, men of rank, the rich, etc., or to the good; for more than among other savage races the American tribes had developed the idea of future retribution on ethical grounds. In some cases the division between good and bad shows a Christian colouring, and the native belief may simply have been that certain souls alone could enter the happy state, others being debarred, *i.e.* those who died a violent death, those who were too feeble to encounter the dangers of the soul-journey, cowards, or those for whom sufficient offerings had not been made at their tomb. But in other cases those who are debarred or are sent to a gloomy region are wicked, they have committed offences against tribal law, and are a plague to society, as among the Delawares, Blackfeet, and Ojibwas.

Where a state common to all was believed in, it was thought to continue all the pursuits of earthly life under absolutely untrammelled conditions. Hunting and fishing were pursued without difficulty, and always with success. There would be neither want nor sorrow. The woods, lakes, streams, and plains would not only be more beautiful, but would swarm with every desirable creature. The 'happy hunting grounds' were the natural paradise of hunting tribes, and there they dwelt with the chief divinity or 'great spirit' in supreme felicity. Many poetical and sensuous descriptions of this land are to be found in the myths of various tribes, but all things in it were as incorporeal as the spirit itself, 'the hunter and the deer a shade.' Generally it was thought to be in heaven, the Milky Way forming the way thither, as with the Clallams, some N. Californian tribes, the Iroquois, and the Winnibagoes (*NR* iii. 522; Macfie, *Vancouver Island*, 1865, p. 448; Morgan, *League of the Iroquois*, 1851, p. 176; Schoolcraft, *Ind. Tribes*, Philad., 1853–6, iv. 240). Or it was in the region of the rising sun, or on a mountain (the Mojaves, *NR* iii. 526). The Navahos thought it was below the earth, whence men had once come forth. There all things grew luxuriously, and the spirits enjoyed peace and plenty (*NR* iii. 528).

Among many tribes bravery in war as well as rank earned for men the abode of bliss, while the medicine-men taught that it was a recompense for success in life (Copeway, *Ojibwa Nation*, 1847, p. 32). Cowards and common people were debarred or might enter Elysium only after a long period of

suffering. With the Ahts, chiefs and warriors went to the beautiful heaven of Quawteaht, untroubled by storms and frost, revelling in sunshine and abundance of game. All others went to the subterranean kingdom of Chayher (Sproat, 209). The western paradise of the Ojibwas and the southern of the Chinooks were open only to brave hunters and warriors. The Ojibwas thought of it as a great village in a fine country, with continual amusements and dances, and plenty of food. War was unknown; the hunter obtained his prey without the fatigue of pursuit (Jones, *Ojebway Inds.*, 1861, p. 104). Chiefs and medicine-men among the Virginian tribes went to a western paradise of perpetual happiness, where they smoked, danced, and sang with their forefathers; all others were annihilated (Pinkerton, *Voyages*, xiii. 14, 41). The Natchez, the Tensas, and the Apalaches held that chiefs and warriors went to reside in the glorious land of the sun (Müller, *Amer. Urreligionen*, Basel, 1855, p. 66 ff.). Far more elaborate in such divisions was the eschatology of the ancient Mexicans, who assigned the dead to three regions. The emperor, nobles, and fallen warriors were borne eastwards to the paradise of Huitzilopochtli, where honeyed flowers and luscious fruits abounded in shady groves, and rich hunting parks awaited the happy spirit. They accompanied the sun daily in triumph to the zenith, and then returned to their blissful Elysium. Finally, they were transformed into birds with golden plumage. Women dying in childbed were also admitted to this paradise, and, dressed as warriors, escorted the sun from the zenith. An earthly paradise free from sorrow, and abounding in every kind of fruit and vegetable, was open to those dying of certain diseases, to the drowned, and to sacrificial victims. This was the perpetual summer land of Tlalocan. Mictlan, a gloomy underground or northern region, was assigned to all who died from any other cause (Reville, *Rel. of Mexico and Peru*, 1884; Sahagun, *Hist. Gen.*, *passim*).

In some of these instances bravery and cowardice determine the fate of the soul. This approaches to an ethical distinction according to the native moral standard, and doubtless underlies many of the instances usually cited of more strictly retributive justice. Thus, with the Nez Percés and some Haidah tribes, the wicked and those who had not died the warrior's death were sent for a time to a desolate region before being admitted to the land of light, the paradise of slain warriors in the heavens, with its gift of perpetual youth, its cedar and shell houses, its delicious fruits, its repose (*JAI* xxi. [1891] 17; Macfie, *Vancouver Is.* 457). Again, ritual goodness rather than ethical must often be understood, as among the Nicaraguans, whose paradise of slain warriors, the blissful abode of the gods in the East, was open also to those who had obeyed the gods (*NR* iii. 543). But sometimes offences against morality are particularly mentioned as debarring men from bliss. Women guilty of infanticide and murderers of a fellow-tribesman were excluded from the Blackfeet paradise (Richardson in Franklin, *Second Expedition*, London, 1828), while the thief and murderer among the Okinagans, cowards, adulterers, thieves, the greedy, the idle, and liars among the Ojibwas, liars and thieves among the Delawares, were excluded from the abode of bliss (*NR* iii. 519; Jones, 102–3; Brainerd, *Life and Journal*, Edin. 1908, p. 503). We hear also among the Chippewas of the soul being examined, those with whom good predominated being borne to the enchanted island paradise, while others sank for ever in the waters (Dunn, *Oregon*, 1844, p. 104). Such a discrimination between good and bad is found among the Eurocs, Yumas, Choctaws, Pawnees, New England tribes, and Mayas, and the character of their Elysium is described with much monotony of language.

To the Eurocs it is a region of bright rivers, sunny slopes, and green forests, beyond the earth, the chasm being crossed by a pole from which the wicked fall (*NR* iii. 524). The Yumas placed it in a happy valley hidden in the Colorado (*ib.* 527). The beautiful paradise of the Choctaws lay behind a dark river in the west (Catlin, *N. Am. Ind.* 1842, ii. 127). More unique was the Mayan paradise, where the good lay in tranquil repose under the beautiful *yaxche* tree, eating and drinking voluptuously (*NR* iii. 541). But most typical of the Indian paradise is the description found in an Algonquin myth of a hunter who went to the land of souls in the south to recover his bride. The path became ever more beautiful as he went on. He reached a lodge, where he had to leave his body; his soul bounded through the shadow-world and crossed the lake where the spirits of the wicked met their fate. Now he reached the happy island of souls where there was never cold or tempest, or any need to labour, for the air itself nourished the souls, and where, amid eternal sunshine, they wandered through the blissful fields (Schoolcraft, i. 321). See also AMERICA.

7. South American Indians.—Of the numerous tribes of S. America, taken as a whole, it is difficult to generalize concerning their ideas of a happy other-world. The earlier beliefs of some of the Christianized tribes have not been recorded. Certain tribes simply believed in the soul hovering round the grave, others in transmigration; others, like the Abipones, were ignorant of the soul's status after death (Dobrizhoffer, *Abipones*, 1822, ii. 75, 269). We can speak only of a number of tribes concerning whom information is not lacking. Of these it may be said that, while the other-world life continued the conditions and circumstances of life here, and though it may occasionally have been regarded as disagreeable (Müller, 286), yet it was more frequently looked forward to as being happier and pleasanter (Spilsbury, *Trans. 3rd Cong. Hist. of Rel.* i. 94). Some tribes believed in a general place for all the dead; others in a separate place for chiefs, men of rank, or brave warriors. Retributive conceptions had scarcely arisen even in the higher tribes, or, where they have been alleged, they may be traced to missionary influence. The journey to the other-world was one of great danger and difficulty; its situation lay in the sky, in the west, or on the earth's surface, or was underground.

Among the tribes for whom the future life was one of bare continuance of the present for all alike, in a region where they hunted, fished, and rejoined their forefathers, may be mentioned the Matacos and Muyscas (in a region underground [Baldrich, *Las Camarcos Virgenes*, Buenos Ayres, 1890, p. 12; Reclus, *Univ. Geog.* xviii. 173]), the Bakairi, Calino, Yaguas, Ucuapes, Mbocobi, and Arawaks (Koch, *Inter. AE*, xiii. [Supp.] 120, 121, 122; D'Orbigny, *Voy. dans l'Amer. mérid*, Paris, 1839, iv. pt. 1 ['L'Homme Américain'], 233; Reclus, xix. 112).

The other-world was conceived of by numerous tribes as a happy Elysium. In Hayti the Indians thought that the spirits had as their place of sojourn the valleys of the western part of the island, dwelling in the clefts of the rocks by day, and coming out at night to enjoy the delightful fruits of the *mamey* trees. They rejoiced in the shady and flowery arbours of these beautiful valleys (Müller, 174). The Puri Indians placed Paradise in a pleasant wood full of *sapucaja* trees and game, where the soul was happy in company of all the deceased (Spix and Martius, *Travels in Brazil*, 1824, ii. 250). Many of the tribes of Chili placed their paradise across the sea towards the setting sun, and mythically described it in terms of their ideas of the highest bliss (Pöppig, *Reise in Chili*, Leipzig, 1835, p. 393). The Patagonians located it in vast underground caverns, where their deities dwelt, and whither they went to live with them. Abundance of cattle and liquor was found there, and the dead enjoyed an eternity of drunkenness (Falkner, *Patagonia*, Hereford, 1774, pp. 142–3). More usually a heavenly or a western paradise awaited the Indian.

In this place of all sensuous delights enjoyed to the full, they would take pleasure in everything which they had desired or possessed on earth. It was endowed with glorious hunting grounds and fishing streams and rich forests. Or they fed on rich fruits, which required no toil or labour of cultivation. Life there was restful and peaceful, without suffering or grief, and with the added delights of drinking, feasting, and dancing. There they met all their dead relatives, and their wives existed in beauty and youthfulness. Such were the beliefs of the Guarayos, Guaranis, Chiriguanos, Araucanians, Yuracaris, Ottomaken, Apiaca, Warraus, Bahairi, Guajiro, Pampas tribes, and others (D'Orbigny, 109–110, 164, 337, 342, 347; Molina, *Chili*, Leipzig, 1791, p. 72; Castelnau, *Expédition dans les parties centrales de l'Amér.*, Paris, 1850, ii. 314; Schomburgk, *Reisen*, Leipzig, 1847, ii. 446; *Ausland*, 1865, p. 338). The Saliva Indians placed their paradise in the moon, and thought of it as a place without mosquitoes (Tylor[3], ii. 70).

A division according to rank is met with among the Guaycuras, who thought that chiefs and medicine-men hovered round the moon and went to regions of pleasure and enjoyment (Martius, *Zur Ethnog. Amer.*, Leipzig, 1867, i. 233). More usually bravery, as opposed to cowardice, merited the abode of bliss. Among the Chiriguanos, brave warriors and good fathers went to an earthly paradise full of delight and feasting, with abundance of women and *chicha*, where they devoted themselves to singing and dancing (Koch, *op. cit.* 119). The Caribs of the Antilles believed that spirits of brave warriors dwelt in pleasant islands like those of their own land, abounding in delicious fruits. There all their wishes were fulfilled; they feasted and danced, and had their enemies as their slaves. Cowards, on the other hand, would become slaves to the Arawaks. It was also believed that warriors went to the sun or became stars. Im Thurn says that the present Caribs of the mainland think of the spirits as remaining near their present dwellings, while some hope to become white men or go to Sky-land, a copy of this world, whence their ancestors came (*Indians of Guiana*, 1883, p. 359 ff.; Rochefort, *Isles Antilles*, Rotterdam, 1681, p. 430). Some of the Pampas tribes believed that in the heavenly abode of Pillan warriors enjoyed eternal drunkenness, broken only by great hunts, in which they slew so many ostriches that their feathers, falling down, formed the clouds (Reclus, *Prim. Folk*, n.d., 105). Goodness and virtue are sometimes expressly mentioned as meriting paradise, but on examination this proves to mean savage bravery. Thus the Tupinamba thought that after death those who had lived virtuously, *i.e.* who had avenged themselves on and eaten many enemies, would go behind high mountains, where they would dance in beautiful gardens with their ancestors (Lery, *Voyage fait en la Terre du Bresil*, La Rochelle, 1578, p. 262). So, too, among the Chibchas, good men were those who fell in war, and they, with women dying in childbed, enjoyed a blissful future (Koch, 128). In the same way may be interpreted the respective beliefs of the Yaier, that those who 'lived well' went to heaven; of the Yaruros, that the good went to a place where they enjoyed divine food; and of the Wazanos, that, while the souls of common people went to heaven, the good attained to a superior region, where they found beautiful women, rich hunting grounds, and continuous feasts, and did no work, but spent the night in merry dances (Koch, 127). Among the ancient Peruvians there was no distinction between good and evil beyond the grave. While the bulk of the people went to a dreary underground region, a heavenly paradise was the lot of the higher classes. The Incas went to the dwelling of the Sun, their father; nobles and great warriors were received in the heavenly world of Haman Pacta, where their happiness consisted in perfect freedom from evil, in repose and peace, and they were waited on by the wives and slaves who had been put to death with them (Müller, 402–3; Prescott, *Peru*, 1890, p. 42).

8. **Sky-land.**—Among most of the peoples whose conceptions of an abode of the blest have been discussed, there is also frequently found a belief in a happy world of other beings, often divine, above the sky. Man peopled the upper region, of which the sky seemed to be the floor, with the creatures of his imagination. Especially was this the case when his world of the dead was situated elsewhere. Thus the Zulus, believing in an under world of spirits, thought that above the blue sky, conceived as a rock, was a heavenly country, the abode of a remote powerful being and of a nation of heavenly men (Callaway, *op. cit.* 63, 117 ff., 393 ff., *Nursery Tales*, i. 152, 316). Again, as the sky seemed to rest on earth at the horizon, or on lofty mountains, or even on high trees, so in many myths all these form means by which Sky-land can be reached. Or it rests on pillars, or may be reached by a bridge, a ladder, a rope, etc. There is little doubt that these ideas survive in tales of the Jack and the Beanstalk cycle (see *CF* 432; BLEST, ABODE OF THE [Slavonic]; BRIDGE). Medicine-men often claim to visit that land, either by some of these means or by a bodily or spirit flight, just as they also claim the power of visiting the world of the dead. This is a very common belief in Australia (Spencer-Gillen[b], 629; Howitt, 388, 391). In one case, when the flowers withered because Baiamai left the earth, the *wireenuns* ascended a mountain and were carried to the sky, where they were allowed to carry off the fadeless flowers of the heaven-land (Parker, *More Aust. Legend. Tales*, 84).

Legends of culture-heroes ascending to the sky-land, and returning thence with the elements of civilization or performing other feats, are of frequent occurrence in the lower culture.

In a Melanesian instance, the hero reaches the upper world and teaches the Sun's children to make fire and cook (Codrington, 366). An earthly son of Tui Langa, king of the sky, went thither by a magic tree, according to a Fiji legend, and learnt there how to slay the local gods (*FLJ* v. 256). In a Polynesian story, Losi ascends to the sky and compels its people to give him shoots of *taro*, *'ava*, and the coco-tree, hitherto unknown on earth (Turner, 105). *Si Jura*, in a Dayak myth, climbs to the Pleiades by a magic tree, and learns the secret of rice cultivation (Ling Roth, *op. cit.* i. 307). In other cases, of which there are many variants, the hero ascends above the sky and captures the sun, compelling it to go more slowly in its course (*CF* 439 ff.; Turner, 200). There are also many American Indian tales of visits paid to the land of the Sun above the solid rocky vault of heaven (*19 RBEW* 252, 436, 440).

Other heroes visit Sky-land to obtain a wife, or to regain her, or to dwell with her there.

In Samoa, Lu ascended to Tangaloa's beautiful place of rest in the sky, and was given his daughter as wife (Turner, 13). In many tales, when a mortal has captured a daughter of the sky who has descended to earth, she sometimes returns thither; but he follows her and regains her, sometimes remaining there. Of this there are Maori and other Polynesian, Melanesian, and Malay versions (Grey, *Polynes. Myth.*, 1908, p. 42, Codrington, 397; Tylor, *Early Hist. of Mankind*,[2] 1875, 346), while the idea recurs in European and other variants of the Swan-maiden cycle. There are also several versions of the story of a hero going to the sky to dwell with his immortal wife, or with some other relative, usually then becoming immortal (Grey, *op. cit.* 58; Farrer, *Primitive Manners and Customs*, 1879, p. 256 [Algonquin]; Cole, *IA*, 1875 [Santal]; Brett, *Legends . . . of British Guiana*, n.d., 29).

These stories may be compared with another large group in which visits to the world of the dead are paid to obtain a boon, to regain a lost wife, etc., or to a vague under world or fairy region (*CF* 45, 438).

Other myths tell of an earlier Golden Age when gods and men dwelt together on earth or in heaven, or how the ascent to the sky was easily accomplished by some of the means already mentioned. But this at last came to an end, and the means of intercourse was broken off (see FALL, § ii. 3 and 18).

Thus the Eskimos, the Voguls, and the Hurons have myths of the peopling of the earth by a pair from heaven (Nanson, *op. cit.*

259 ff.; Lang[2], i. 181). Many myths of the Algonquin tribes tell of a woman cast out of heaven, from whom men are descended (Brinton, *American Hero-Myths*, Philad. 1882, p. 54). In other cases those who come to earth from the sky lose their immortality (*Tongan* [Mariner, ii. 115] *Cingalese* [Forbes-Leslie, *Early Races*, Edin. 1866, i. 177]; *Uganda* [Johnston, ii. 704]; *Fanti* [Smith, *Nouveau Voyage de Guinée*, 1744, ii. 176]), or can never return thither because of some accident (*Negroes* [Ratzel, ii. 354]; *Caribs*, etc. [Im Thurn, 377; Brett, 103, 107]). These are akin to another group, mainly S. African and American Indian, in which men ascend to earth from an under world (Casalis, 254, 261; *M* i. 225; Knortz, *Aus dem Wigwam*; *CF*, p. 447; *9 RBEW*, p. 16). This upper or under world is occasionally the paradise where men hope to go after death. Intercourse with the sky-land being broken off through the destruction of the means of ascent or descent is exemplified in myths from Australia, Polynesia, and Fernando Po (Spencer-Gillen[b], 628; Turner, 199; Kingsley, *op. cit.* 507). Cf. also a Kirghiz legend of former intercourse with the people of a mountain, where fruit trees bear all the year round, flowers never wither, women are always beautiful and young, death, cold, and darkness are unknown, and all are happy, whereas men on earth are now miserable (Sven Hedin, *Through Asia*, 1898, i. 221). A funeral chant among the Basutos suggests the existence of a bright and happy sky-land, whither men cannot go (Casalis, 256).

9. Reviewing these primitive notions of a state of the blest, we see that, even where they suggest a reward for goodness, the delights of Paradise are mainly sensual, or at least sensuous. A suggestion of more spiritual conceptions may be seen, perhaps, in the thought that the blest now dwell with a god or gods, or in the poetical descriptions of the beauty of the land. But any true spiritual outlook is generally wanting, and the ethical conception of this Elysium as a reward for righteousness is not found in such religions as those of Mexico and Peru, where the belief in sin as an offence against the gods was comparatively well developed.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works cited, see Tylor[3], chs. 12, 13; R. M. Dorman, *Origin of Primitive Superstitions*, Philadelphia, 1881: Koch, *Inter. AE*, Supplement, Leyden, xiii. [1900], 'Zum Animismus der Südamerikanischen Indianer'; E. L. Moon Conard, *RHR* xlii. [1900] 244 ff., 'Idées des Indiens Algonquins relatives à la vie d'outre-tombe.'

J. A. MACCULLOCH.

BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Buddhist).—From an orthodox Buddhist point of view * it must be said that the only 'blessed' are the saints who have entered absolute nirvāṇa. Owing to their approximation to this goal, the epithet may be applied, by anticipation or metaphor, (1) to the saints who are to enter nirvāṇa at the end of this present life (*i.e.* who possess nirvāṇa-on-earth [see artt. ARHAT † and JĪVANMUKTA])—this is Little Vehicle; (2) to those who have taken the 'vow' of becoming Buddhas, and meantime enjoy the joy of 'giving' and of saving creatures—a joy more pleasing than is the savour of nirvāṇa itself (see art. BODHISATTVA)—that is Great Vehicle. Nevertheless, there is place in both Vehicles for categories or abodes of the Blessed.

I. Little Vehicle.—The 'heavens' of the Little Vehicle have been, for the greater part, adopted and adapted from Brāhmanic or Hindu belief. To understand the exact position of the Buddhist thinkers, the following is of importance.

The fundamental characteristic of the True Law, its historical and dogmatic ground and root, is the conviction (intuition or belief) that no 'existence' whatever can be *absolutely* happy. Such, it appears to the present writer, is the real significance of the Buddhist pessimism—a topic open from every side to serious mistakes (see art. PESSIMISM).

Like Aupanishadic Brahmans, Buddhists (*i.e.* Buddhist monks, *bhikṣus*, not laymen, *upāsakas*) aim at perfect and eternal happiness; they feel, or profess to feel, disgust for any sort of transitory happiness, and without consideration for sensual joys, here or hereafter, they press on the road (*mārga*, *pratipad*) that leads to nirvāṇa, to eternal refreshment. But there is certainly some sort of happiness in the world of becoming, in the 'wheel of transmigrations' (*bhavachakra*). The brute creation itself is not devoid of agreeable sensations; men are sometimes at ease; gods are by definition the possessors of bliss.

No adherent of the Buddhist teaching ventures to doubt the happiness and the power of the gods. Monks (*bhikṣus*) think that they have to strive for something far better than paradises (*svarga*); nevertheless, as is clear from Aśoka's lapidary sermons, as well as from many passages of the Pāli canon of Scriptures, Buddha and Buddhists (monks and laymen) lay great stress on the retribution of deeds in a further life. The Master commended the doing of good actions (in order to be re-born as a happy man or as a god), avoiding bad actions (in order to avoid unhappy human existences, animal births, or hell); and, for the wise, the avoiding of both good and bad actions: abstinence from desire and from action (the latter for producing and securing the former) being necessary to holiness, to nirvāṇa. Birth in heaven often appears as a progress towards emancipation, although, as will be seen, men alone, not gods, can enter the path of release.

It must be borne in mind that (1) human happiness is always mixed with suffering (as human birth is produced by mixed actions, 'black' and 'white'); (2) sensual pleasures always turn to suffering; (3) every pleasure is an obstacle to supreme beatitude, as it enforces clinging to existence. Therefore no one who has seen the truths (*i.e.* who has entered the stream of release, *srotaāpanna*) can strive after transitory and ambiguous rewards.

1. Amongst men, two categories are worth noticing: (*a*) the inhabitants of the Northern continent (Uttarakurudvipa, Auttarakaurava [see art. HYPERBOREANS]);* (*b*) the 'wheel-kings,'† or universal monarchs (*Chakravartin*), who embody the Indian ideal of earthly sovereignty. Men indeed, —as it is forcibly said by the scholiasts,—but possessing supernatural faculties and powers, although they live on earth, they feel themselves at home in the atmospheric or heavenly regions. Their body is characterized by the 'marks' (*lakṣaṇa*) of the 'great beings' (*mahāpuruṣa*, 'great man,' 'great male'—a name of Viṣṇu); they conquer one, two, three, or the four continents,‡ have successful wars with goblins of all kinds and even with gods, enjoy the possession of the 'seven treasures' (elephant-treasure, wife-treasure, etc.); they reign with justice, but not without kingly pride. Nevertheless, like ordinary men, they are susceptible of becoming disgusted with transitory life (although they live for centuries!) and of

* The reader is aware that this expression always involves subjective appreciation.

† Arhats are styled *visuddhideva*, 'purity-gods'; contrasted with kings, *sammutideva*, 'opinion-gods,' and gods, *upapattideva*, 'born gods' (*Vibhaṅga*, p. 422).

* The analogy between the Hyperboreans and the 'men of the Northern continent' has been pointed out by Sp. Hardy (*Manual of Budhism*, p. 14), who gives a brief description of this continent. We may observe that, amongst many characteristics (longevity, everlasting youth, no premature death, no death in embryonic state, living from the Desire-Tree, re-birth as god or as man, etc.), the Auttarakauravas are 'moral by nature' (*prakṛtiśīla*); they 'have all things in common, and have no private rights'; they do not commit bad actions (*akuśalakarmapatha*), but do not free themselves from 'thirst relative to agreeable objects' (*kāmāvacharī tṛṣṇā*); there is no 'restraint' (*saṁvara*), because there is no 'rule' (*śāsana*). Therefore there is no entrance on the Path of release; and Bodhisattvas are not born there (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, *Ātānāṭiya suttanta* [Grimblot, p. 335]; *Mahāvastu*, i. 103; Wassilieff, *Buddhismus*, p. 248).

† On the Chakravartins see *Mahāsudassanasutta*, tr. by Rhys Davids, *SBE* xi. 238; Senart, *Essai sur la légende du Buddha*; *Divyāvadāna*, pp. 210–224: the standard text (Chinese sources) is named by Takakusu, *JPTS*, 1905, p. 117. The Chakravartins have a place in the scholastic theory of the 'stages of a Bodhisattva' (see art. BODHISATTVA) [the *Śikṣāsamuchchaya* states that they 'save the beings' (p. 175, 10)]. W. Hopkins, like Ed. Hardy and others, believes that the idea of an universal monarch is post-Aśokan (*Great Epic of India*, New York, 1901, p. 396, n. 2).

‡ But, like Buddhas, two Chakravartins cannot coexist. Like Bodhisattvas, they enter their mother's womb with full consciousness.

entering the path of salvation.* Such is not the case with the Hyperboreans and the gods.

2. The various schools differ, however, on this last point,—conflicts of scholastic views are the crux of Buddhist dogma,—but the common opinion is that there is no *brahmacharya* ('chastity,' 'life of holiness') amongst gods.† Heavenly beings do not forget that they owe their actual 'promotion to godship' to former good deeds, and their 'morality' is therefore strongly established against sinful delusions.‡ But, being re-born for joy, they cannot, as it seems, fully or profitably realize the truth of suffering—which is the root of the Buddhist holiness. Gods, we say, are possessors of bliss, but (it is not an easy task to reconcile these contradictions) they know that their happiness will come to an end when the treasure of merits shall be exhausted; and they are therefore troubled by anxiety (*pariṇāmaduḥkhatā*) §—the more so that, owing to the mysterious law of retribution, a god may be re-born as a beast or as an inhabitant of hell (see art. KARMA).

Gods are of different kinds. Without attempting a general survey of the matter, we must distinguish: (1) Sensual heavens (*kāmadhātu*), where sexual pleasure exists. But sexual union, in the celestial spheres, is not what Buddhists call *grāmadharma*, 'rural practice,' 'secular practice.' Gods enjoy pleasure and beget by simple contact, touching the hands, looking or smiling at one another, etc.‖ On the cosmical disposition of these blissful realms, see art. COSMOLOGY (Buddhist). (2) Material heavens (*rūpadhātu*), inhabited by gods liberated from sexual enjoyment; sensations of taste and smell are also absent, sometimes consciousness too. (3) Non-material heavens (*arūpyadhātu*), with four stages of perfection; it is difficult to say if they ought to be understood as 'abodes' (since there is no matter) or 'subjective states' (since they are depicted as successive storeys). Their common characteristic seems to be the gradual loss of consciousness. Like the 'material heavens,' they are truly Buddhist combinations or fancies, being inhabited by saints who have not realized in the inferior stages the absolute freedom from thought and desire necessary to release, and who must wait for some centuries in the happy and transitory unconsciousness of the 'non-material' worlds, before merging into the happier and definitive freedom of nirvāṇa. Heavens above sensual realms—which have only been 'Buddhized' a little—are no more than prolonged trances, analogous, but for their limits, to the trances of the holy life (see art. DHYĀNA).

II. Great Vehicle.—The piety of the so-called 'new' Buddhism has evolved paradises very like the Christian or the Vaiṣṇavite abodes ¶ of the Blessed. The happiness is now of a purely spiritual nature (in contrast with the *svargas*, inhabited by sensual gods and nymphs), and essentially devotional (in contrast with the self-culture and unconscious blissfulness which are the chief elements of the 'orthodox' Buddhist meditations). Such a paradise is the *Tuṣita*-heaven (the realm inhabited by the gods *Tuṣitas*, 'the satisfied ones'), the regular abode of the future Buddhas of our world during their last existence but one. There reigned Śākyamuni, then named Śvetaketu, before his last birth; there now reigns and preaches Maitreya, the future saviour.* But, as a rule, 'paradises' are not a part of our world (*lokadhātu*), as is the *Tuṣita*, but special realms, ruled by excellent Buddhas who have at last realized their 'vow' of creating worlds free from suffering. Their number is, of course, infinite (see art. COSMOGONY [Buddhist]),† but in the 'compound of cosmos' which we inhabit (*sahālokadhātu*) the most celebrated are: (1) the paradise of the East, under the rule of the Buddha Bhaiṣajyaguru (the 'Master of remedies,' the 'Healing Teacher');‡ and especially (2) the 'Happy [universe],' *Sukhāvatī* [*lokadhātu*], of the West, where, from every quarter of the worlds, blissful creatures are born from lotuses before the Buddha Amitābha and the Bodhisattvas Mahāsthāmaprāpta and Avalokiteśvara (see art. AVALOKITEŚVARA). To be accurate, the 'Happy universe' is not an everlasting paradise. The Blessed who there enjoy the privilege of seeing the radiant body of the Buddha, and of hearing his preaching, are candidates for Buddhahood; Amitābha's heaven is a blissful purgatory and a school, not only a place of retribution. But, from a practical and historical point of view, the *Sukhāvatī*, as said before, is the exact counterpart of the Vaiṣṇavite paradise.§

We have few Indian documents dealing with the devotional practices arising from such a conception of everlasting life in Amitābha's presence. But Chinese and Japanese sources, ancient and modern,

* See *Mahāsudassanasutta*.

† See *Kathāvatthu*, i. 3, iii. 10; Rockhill, *Life of Buddha*, p. 191; Wassilieff, *Buddhismus*, pp. 247, 255; *Abhidharmakośa*; cf. *Milinda*, tr. by Rhys Davids, *SBE* xxxv. p. 31. A future Buddha is never re-born in one of the highest heavens (*Majjhima*, i. 82), as their inhabitants are 'fixed' (*niyata*) for the 'nirvāṇa of Arhata.' On the salvation of gods, cf. 'Vedânta,' *SBE* xxxviii. 457.

‡ Literally: 'The roots of merit cannot be broken, as it happens, for men,' because they are firm believers in *kārma*.

§ On the 'suffering' peculiar to gods, see, for instance, Nāgārjuna's *Friendly Epistle*, tr. by Wenzel, *JPTS*, 1886, p. 27, and *Karuṇāpuṇḍarika* (*BTS*), p. 24 ff.

‖ A good summary will be found in Sp. Hardy, *Manual*; Beal, *Catena*, p. 68. It is worth observing that such gods as the Thirty-three (a category of sensual gods inherited from Vedic times) have now for sovereign the mother of Śākyamuni, re-born as a male deity. It would be impious to suppose that his retinue indulge in sensual pleasures!

¶ Amongst Vaiṣṇavite paradises, the Cow-world (*goloka*) and the *Vaikuṇṭha*—a kingdom in the Northern Ocean (compare the Hyperboreans) or on the eastern peak of mount Meru (compare the heaven of Indra and the Thirty-three)—are more celebrated in later times than the *Śvetadvipa*, 'the white island'—'a sort of Atlantis situated in the extreme North, beyond the Sea of Milk' (Barth, *Religions*, p. 193), well known from the *Mahābhārata*, inhabited by monotheistic saints very like the future Bodhisattvas of Amitābha's paradise. In all these peaceful abodes the Blessed enjoy the vision and the actual presence of their god, and the successive degrees or savours (*rasa*) of devotion, friendship, filial affection, ecstatic susceptibility (Barth, *op. cit.* p. 225). It is not difficult to be re-born there (see Barth, p. 228, and cf. art. AVALOKITEŚVARA and MAHAYANA).

* Mention of Maitreya as the next Buddha, the Buddha to come, who will make many converts, whereas Śākyamuni had only a small retinue, occurs in the Pāli Canon of Scriptures (see Oldenberg's *Buddha*, 5th Germ. ed., p. 164)—a fact hitherto ignored. It is quite natural that Buddhists, *i.e.* 'orthodox Buddhists,' aspire to be born in his kingdom, before having the good fortune to hear his forthcoming announcement of the Law (5000 *Anno Buddhæ*). Both forms of Maitreya's worship are frequent in Chinese sources (Pilgrims; the later is canonic in ecclesiastical professions: 'to hear the preaching under the Dragon-Flower-Tree,' Chavannes, *JA*, 1908, i. 505), and, together with iconographic evidences (images of Maitreya; see Grünwedel-Burgess, *Buddhist Art*), show that special regard was paid to the Tuṣita heaven. See Julien, *Vie et voyages de Hiouen-Thsang*, p. 345 (wanting in Beal's *Records*, but see his *Buddhism in China*, p. 112, London, S.P.C.K. 1884); I-Tsing, *Religieux éminents*, tr. Chavannes, p. 72, Paris, 1894; Foucher, *Art gréco-bouddhique du Gandhāra*, i. 285 (tuṣitakāya = varabhavana = 'the best abode'), Paris, 1905.

† Every future Buddha aims at possessing (*i.e.* creating by his exertion) a Happy Universe, 'free from bad destinies,' *i.e.* inhabited by saints, gods, and men; see *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, p. 382 (*apāyaparisuddhi*).

‡ See Edkins, *Chinese Buddhism*, p. 235 (London, 1880).

§ The earliest documents are the *Sukhāvatīvyūha*, the *Sūtra of Amitāyus* (*SBE*, vol. xlix.), and the *Saddharmapuṇḍarika* (see art. AVALOKITEŚVARA, p. 258[b] note * and note ‡‡; also Beal, *Catena*, p. 378). Nāgārjuna (Nanjio, 1180, and Watters, *On Yuan Chwang*, ii. p. 205) and Aśvaghoṣa (Suzuki, *Awakening of Faith*, Chicago, 1900, p. 146) teach re-birth in Sukhāvatī. There is no reference to this paradise in the books of the Little Vehicle: the mention in *Mahāvastu*, iii. 462, 10, is from the colophon; see Rhys Davids, *JRAS*, 1898, p. 423. A Japanese picture is found in Grünwedel-Burgess, *Buddhist Art*, p. 176; see p. 195, l. 4, and Grünwedel, *Mythologie der Buddhismus* (Leipzig, 1900), p. 118. Sukhāvatī (also Sukhākara [*Lotus*, *SBE*, vol. xxi. ch. xxiv. 30]) has been compared with the Western paradises of the Brahmanic literature (Sukhā, Nimlocanī), by Max Müller (*SBE*, vol. xlix. p. xxii), and with the *Insulæ Fortunatæ* and the Gardens of the Hesperides, by Kern (*Lotus*, *loc. cit.*).

have much to say about Amitābha's sects, monks and laymen; the pious death of the adepts, led to the West by angels or Bodhisattvas; the prayers for the dead, etc.*

LITERATURE.—The literature is contained in the article.

LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Celtic).—The Celtic doctrine of the future life is discussed elsewhere (see CELTS, § xvi.). This article deals with the Celtic belief in a happy Other-world, or Elysium, which, as will be seen, was not necessarily the abode of the dead.

1. Names of the Celtic Elysium.—These names are sometimes of a general character, sometimes they particularize the situation of this happy land. Of the former are Mag Mor, 'the Great Plain'; Mag Mell, 'the Pleasant Plain'; Tír n' Áill, 'the Other World'; Tír na nÓg, 'the Land of Youth'; Tír Sorcha, 'the Shining Land'; Tír na mBeo, 'the Land of the Living'; Tír Tairngiri, 'the Land of Promise' (perhaps a Christian derivative). Of the latter are Tír fa Tonn, 'Land under Waves,' I-Bresail, 'the Land of Bresal,' and 'the Isle of the Men of Falga,' which denote Elysium as an isle beyond the sea. Falga is an old name for the Isle of Man ('Rennes Dindsenchas,' *RCel* xv. 449), which was connected with the god Manannan, who appears as lord of the over-sea Elysium. If the Goidels occupied Britain before passing to Ireland, they may have regarded Man as '*par excellence* the Western Isle, the home of the Lord of the Other-world' (Meyer and Nutt, *Voyage of Bran*, London, 1895, i. 213). To this period may belong the tales of Cúchulainn's raid upon Falga (considered as the Other-world), which were afterwards carried to Ireland (see § 6*f*).

2. Various aspects of the Irish Celtic Elysium.—Some of these titles show that Elysium was regarded from different points of view; it was beyond the seas, or it was under the waves. But an examination of the tales which refer to it shows that there were at least two other aspects: it might be located in the *sid* or the hollow hills, or it might be a mysterious land revealing itself suddenly on the earth's surface and entered through a mist. Reserving a consideration of these different localities till later, we shall here summarize the more important tales in which the Other-world appears. These tales mainly describe the visit of mortals to that land. Some of them belong to the Mythological, some to the Cúchulainn, some to the Ossianic cycle. The MSS in which they are found are frequently among the earliest known to Irish palæography, but there is no doubt that many of the tales are of a greater antiquity, and that all of them, if not actually composed in pagan times, are based upon pagan ideas, upon story-germs current before the rise of Christianity.

(*a*) The *Island Elysium* conception is found in several tales, and is also current in existing folk-lore. The story of the 'Voyage of Bran' (found fragmentarily in the 11th cent. *Book of the Dun Cow* [= *LU*], and complete in 14th–16th cent. MSS [Meyer and Nutt, *Voy. of Bran*]) tells how Bran hears mysterious music and falls asleep. On waking he finds a silver branch with white blossoms. Next day, as he is sitting with his men, a mysterious woman appears singing the glory of the land over seas, its beauty, its freedom from pain and death, its music, its wonderful tree. It is one of thrice fifty islands to the west of Erin, and there she dwells with thousands of 'motley women.' Before she disappears, the branch leaps into her hand. The poem then describes Bran's sailing with his comrades, his meeting with Manannan mac Lir, crossing the sea in a chariot, his arrival at the Island of Joy where one of his men remained, his coming to the Land of Women, the welcome they received, the dreamlike lapse of time, the food and drink which had for each the taste he desired. Finally, it recounts their home-sickness, the warning from the queen not to set foot on Erin, how one of them leapt ashore there and became a heap of ashes, how Bran from his boat told of his wanderings, and then disappeared for ever (the tale of 'Oisin in Tír na nÓg' [see FEINN CYCLE, § 5] has several points of resemblance to 'Bran,' especially in the fate which overtook Oisin when he set foot on Erin).

In the Cúchulainn cycle the story of 'Cúchulainn's Sickness' (found in *LU*) relates the temporary union of the hero with the goddess Fand, deserted by her consort Manannan. She will become his mistress if he will help her sister's husband Labraid against his enemies in Mag Mell. Cúchulainn's charioteer Laeg visits the place, and it is from his report that we learn the nature of the Other-world, where Labraid lives in an island frequented by troops of women, its different trees with marvellously nourishing fruits, its inexhaustible vat of mead. It is reached with magic speed in a boat of bronze. Thither goes Cúchulainn, vanquishes Labraid's enemies, and remains a month with Fand. Then he returns without hurt to Ireland, where he has arranged a meeting with Fand. At that meeting his wife Emer is present, and mortal and goddess strive to retain his love. The difficulty is solved by the sudden appearance of Manannan, for whom Fand's love returns (*LU* 43 ff.; Windisch, *Irische Texte*, Leipzig, 1880, i. 205 ff.; Leahy, *Heroic Romances*, London, 1905, i.; D'Arbois, *Cours de Litt. Celt.*, Paris, 1892, v. 170 f.). Here Labraid, Liban, and Fand, though dwellers in an island Elysium, are called *sid*-folk, *i.e.* they are of the *sid*, or Underworld. The two regions are partially confused, but not wholly, since Manannan is described as coming from his own land (*i.e.* the true island Elysium) to woo Fand. Apparently Labraid (who, though called chief of the *side*, is described in terms which leave little doubt that he is a war-god) is at enmity with Manannan's hosts, who suffer defeat at Cúchulainn's hands.

In the Ossianic cycle, besides the story of Oisin (see above), there is a description of the Land of Promise over sea, where Diarmaid had been nurtured by Manannan himself, in the story of the 'Gilla Dacker' (see Joyce, *Old Celt. Romances*, London, 1894, 222).

Of greater importance is the tale called 'Echtra Condla' (*LU* 120[a]; Windisch, *Irische Gram.*, Leipzig, 1879, 120; D'Arbois, v. 384). Connla, son of Conn, king of Ireland (A.D. 122–157), is visited by a goddess from the immortal land of Mag Mell. Her people dwell in a *sid*, or mound, and are called *Aes side*, 'men of the mound.' Thither she invites him to come, and departs leaving him an apple which supports him for a month without growing less. In a month she returns and tells Connla, who has been filled with desire of her, that the immortals invite him to join them. She bids him step into her crystal boat and come with her to the Land of Joy where dwell only women. He does so, and in a moment disappears for ever from the sight of his father and his druid who has vainly tried to exercise his spells against the woman. Here again, we note a confusion between the Underground and the Over-sea Elysium.

(*b*) *Tír fa Tonn*, 'Land under Waves,' occurs with greatest distinctness in the tale of Laegaire mac Crimthainn (*Book of Lismore*, 15th cent., O'Grady, *Silva Gadelica*, 290). Fiachra of the

* See J. J. M. de Groot, *Sectarianism and Religious Persecution in China* (Amsterdam, 1904). The *Kāraṇḍavyūha* has some fine theories on the death of the pious (see art. ADIBUDDHA).

men of the *síd* appears among the men of Connaught assembled at Loch Naneane, and implores their help against his enemies, whose chief Goll has abducted his wife. Laegaire and 50 men dive into the Loch with him, and reach a wonderful land, with marvellous music, and where the rain is ale. They and the *síd*-folk attack the fort of Mag Mell, and defeat Goll. As reward they each obtain a woman of the *síde*, and remain in the land for a year. Then they yearn to return, but are warned not to descend from horseback on Erin. Arrived among their own people, they describe the wonders of Tír fa Tonn, and in spite of being implored to remain, they return thither, and are seen no more. Here, too, the Underworld and Tír fa Tonn are scarcely distinguished, and its divine hosts, as in the tale of Cúchulainn, are at war (see for another account of Tír fa Tonn, entered from a well on an island over-sea, the 'Gilla Dacker' in Joyce, 253).

(*c*) *The síd world* pure and simple is described in the Story of Mider and Etain, found in the 11th cent. MS *LU*. Mider, having discovered his divine consort Etain in her re-birth as a mortal, married to king Eochaid, appears to her and tries to regain her by describing Mag Mór, the great plain, the immortal land, its music, its beauty, its heady ale, its deathless folk, its eternal youth. Ultimately Etain, who has no recollection of this land, flies away with Mider, both in the form of birds. Eochaid's druid finally discovers Mider's underground *síd*. Eochaid captures it, and takes away his wife (*LU* 129; *Ir. Texte*, i. 113 ff.). This tale amply illustrates the belief that the gods, the Tuatha Dé Danann, were living in underground *síd*, in which they finally became the fairies of popular lore, to whose mounds, exactly like Mider's *síd*, mortals often paid visits. These *síd* were simply Elysium localized in definite places on Irish soil.

(*d*) 'The Adventures of Cormac mac Airt' (found in 14th and 15th cent. MSS, but probably connected with a tale of the same title mentioned in the old epic list) well describes the fourth conception of the Other-world. A divine visitant, with a branch bearing nine apples of gold which, when shaken, made sweetest music, appeared to Cormac. He at once asked for this branch whose music dispelled all sorrow, but for it he had to give up wife, son, and daughter. In a year he desired to see them, and set out to seek them. As he journeyed he found himself enveloped in a mist, through which he came to a house where a strange pair offered him hospitality. These proved to be Manannan and his consort. The god then brought in a pig, each quarter of which was cooked in the telling of a true tale. While the third quarter was cooking, Cormac told of the loss of his wife and children; whereupon Manannan, after sending Cormac to sleep, opened a door and they appeared. Finally he produced a cup which broke in pieces when a lie was told, but became whole again when a true word was spoken. To prove this, Manannan said that Cormac's wife had now a new husband. The cup fell in pieces. Then the goddess declared that Manannan had lied, and it was restored. Next morning all had disappeared, and Cormac and his family found themselves in his own palace with cup and branch by his side (D'Arbois, ii. 326; Windisch, *Ir. Texte*, iii. 1, 183). Cf. also 'Baile an Scail' (O'Curry, *MS Mat.*, Dublin, 1861, p. 388), where out of a mist a mysterious horseman appears to Conn and leads him to a palace in a plain where he reveals himself as the god Lug, and where appears also a woman called 'the Sovereignty of Erin.' Beside the palace is a golden tree. This magic mist, from which appears a supernatural being or which encloses a supernatural dwelling, recurs in many other tales, and it was in a mist that the Tuatha Dé Danann first appeared in Ireland.

3. **Various aspects of the Brythonic Elysium.**—A certain correspondence to these Goidelic beliefs is found in Brythonic story, but here the Elysium conception has been considerably influenced by later Christian ideas. The name given to Elysium is *Annwfn*, which means 'an abyss,' 'the state of the dead,' 'hell,' etc. (Silvan Evans, *Welsh Dict. s.v.*). But in the texts relating to Elysium, *Annwfn* does not bear any likeness to these meanings of the word, save in so far as it has been confused by redactors of the tales with the Christian hell, *uffern*. In these tales it appears as a region on the earth's surface or an over- or under-sea world, in which several of the characteristics of the Irish Elysium are found—a cauldron, a well of drink sweeter than wine, animals greatly desired by mortals, which they steal (see § 7), while it is of great beauty, and its people are not subject to death or disease. Hence the name *Annwfn* has probably taken the place of some earlier pagan name of Elysium.

(*a*) Annwfn in the tale of Pwyll, which forms the earliest reference to it in Welsh literature (Loth, *Mabinog.*, Paris, 1889, i. 27), is ruled by a king, Arawn, who is at war with his rival Hafgan, and obtains the assistance of Pwyll, who defeats Hafgan, by exchanging kingdoms with him for a year. It is a delightful land, where merriment and feasting on the choicest food and drink go on continually, and it has no subterranean character, but appears to be conceived of as a province adjoining Pwyll's kingdom.

(*b*) Annwfn is also the name of a Land under Waves or Over Sea, called also *Caer Sidi* ('the revolving castle,' cf. the *Ille Tournoiont* of the Graal romances, and the revolving house in Celtic saga and *Märchen*), about which are 'ocean's streams,' and which is reached by a long voyage. It is 'known to Manawydan (Manannan) and Pryderi,' just as the Irish Elysium was ruled by Manannan (Skene, *Four Ancient Books of Wales*, Edin. 1868, i. 276). Another 'Caer of Defence' is beneath 'the ocean's wave' (Skene, i. 285). Hence the two ideas were probably interchangeable. The people of this land are free from death and sickness, and in it is 'an abundant well, sweeter than white wine the drink in it' (Skene, i. 276). There also is a cauldron, 'the cauldron of the chief of Annwfn,' that is, of the lord of Elysium, like that of the Dagda, which is stolen away by Arthur and his men. A similar cauldron is the property of the people of a water-world in the *Mabinogion* (see § 6 *f*).

(*c*) Finally, the description of the mysterious island of Avallon, even though this was later identified with Glastonbury, whither Arthur was carried to be healed of his wounds, completes the identification with the Goidelic Elysium. No tempest, no excess of heat or cold, no noxious animal troubles it; it is blessed with eternal spring, and with fruit and flowers which require no husbandman's labour; it is the land of eternal youth unvisited by death or disease. It possesses a *regia virgo*, more beautiful than her beautiful maiden attendants; she cured Arthur of his wounds, hence she may be identified with the Morgen of other tales, while she and her maidens resemble the divine women of the Irish isle of women (Chrétien, *Erec*, 1933–1939; Geoffrey, *Vita Merlini*, 41; San Marte, *Geoffrey*, 425).

The identification of Avallon with Glastonbury is probably post-pagan (Loth, ii. 215, 264, 360), while the names applied to Glastonbury—Avallon, *Insula Pomonum*, *Insula vitrea*—may be primitive names of the island Elysium. William of Malmesbury (*de Ant. Glaston. Eccl.*) says that *Insula Pomonum* is a translation of a native name. *Insula Avalloniae*, which he connects with the Brythonic *avalla*, 'apples,' because Glastenig

found an apple tree there. The name might therefore have been connected with marvellous apple trees, similar to those of the Irish Elysium. But he also suggests that it may have been derived from a certain Avalloc, who lived there with his daughters. This Avalloc is evidently the same as the Rex Avallon (Avallach) to whose palace Arthur was brought and healed by the *regia virgo* (San Marte, 425). He may therefore have been a mythical lord of the Other-world, and his daughters would correspond to the maidens of the isle (see Rhys, *Arth. Legend*, 336). He also derives Glastonbury from an eponymous founder Glastenig, or from its native name Ynesuuitron ('Glass-island'). This name re-appears in the passage cited from Chrétien, in the form, 'l'isle de voirre.' Giraldus (*Spec. Eccles.* ii. 9) explains the name from the glassy waters which surrounded Glastonbury, but we may see in it an early name of Elysium (cf. Merlin's glass house, *Triads*, iii. 10; the glass fortress attacked by Arthur, *Merlin*, 680, and by the Milesians, Nennius, § 13; the glass bower of Etain (CELTS, § 5), and the glass mountains of Teutonicmy thology and folk-tale).

4. Origin of the Celtic Elysium conception.—Most mythologies tell of a Golden Age in the remote past, when men were happy and when the gods lived with them (see AGES OF THE WORLD, FALL). Man's imaginative faculties as well as his acute sense of the misery of his earthly existence may have led him to believe that this happy state still existed somewhere in distant space as did the Golden Age in distant time. Wherever it was, it held endless joys; it was in a special sense the land of the gods or of some gods; thither some favoured mortals might penetrate. This was the germ of the Elysium conception as we find it in many mythologies as well as the Celtic; but with the Celtic people, poetic, imaginative, sensuous, yet spiritual, it took forms of great beauty. In some mythologies this Elysium is simply the world of the dead; but it is extremely doubtful whether it is so in Celtic mythology. Perhaps the Celtic myth of man's early intercourse with the gods may have taken a twofold development. In the one instance the land to which he hoped to go after death was that lost land, conceived as a subterranean region. In the other it was no more recoverable; men would not go there after death; but favoured mortals might be invited thither during life. It was thus clearly distinguished from the land of the dead, however joyful that might be. But this question requires separate consideration (see § 5). In Ireland it was held that after the conquest of the Tuatha Dé Danann, the gods, by the Milesians, they had retired within the hills or mounds (*sid*). But it agrees with the more primitive aspects of Celtic religion, as an agricultural cult, to suppose that some at least of the divinities, the fruitful Earth-divinities, had their abode beneath the earth, which, as the home of the gods, would be conceived in the loftiest terms. Thence man had perhaps originally come, and thither he would return after death. To this extent, therefore, the Underworld of the Earth-divinities was also the place of the dead. The later association of the gods with hollow hills and mounds was but a continuation of the belief in this divine Underworld, only it seems obvious from the tales that these hollow hills, or *sid*, had become simply an Elysium state, not a state of the dead. These were, on the whole, still conceived as going to some region under the earth. There are no data to show when the conception of a distant Elysium arose among the Celts. It may have been first suggested to them, while still on the Continent, by the setting sun: far off there was also a divine land where the sun-god sank to a blissful rest. On reaching the coast it was inevitable that they should imagine this divine land to be over seas, in some happy island such as they saw on the horizon. That island might be still associated with the sun-god, but it was more naturally connected with the god of the sea. Hence the position of Manannan in these Elysium tales. The under-world Elysium and the over-sea Elysium were conceived in identical terms, and the same set of names applied indifferently to either. Perhaps the locating of Elysium in the *sid* may simply be due to the tendency to give a local habitation and a name to every mysterious region as time goes on. To this identity also may be assigned the mingling of the *sid*-folk with the over-sea Elysium in certain tales already noted.

The idea of a world beneath the waters is common to many mythologies, and, generally speaking, it owes its origin to the animistic belief that every part of nature has its indwelling spirits. Hence the spirits or gods of the waters were thought of as dwelling far below the surface under a divine king or chief. Tales of supernatural beings appearing out of the waters, the custom of throwing sacrifices therein, the belief that human beings were inveigled into the waters or could live with these beings beneath the waves, all are connected with this primitive animistic idea. Among the Celts, however, that water-world assumed the aspects of Elysium; it was a divine land like the over-sea Elysium. Hence in later story it became a fairy world. It is visited by mortals, who find there precisely the same sensuous joys as in the island paradise; it also has names in common with it. Tír fa Tonn is also Mag Mell. Hence in many popular tales it is hardly differentiated from the island Elysium; over-sea and under-waves have become practically synonymous. Hence, too, the belief that such water-worlds as the Irish I Bresail, or the Welsh fairy-lands, or sunken cities off the Breton coast, rise periodically to the surface and would remain there permanently, like an island Elysium, if some mortal could fulfil certain conditions (Girald. Camb. ii. 12; Hardiman, *Irish Min.*, London, 1831, i. 367; Rhys, *Celt. Folklore*, Oxford, 1901, i. 170; Sébillot, *Folk-lore de France*, Paris, 1904, ii. 56 ff.).

The Celtic belief in Tír fa Tonn is closely connected with the current belief in submerged towns or countries, which is perhaps found with greatest detail on the Breton coast. Here there are legends of several such towns, but most prominent are those which tell of the city of Is, which was submerged with all its people and still exists beneath the sea, where (or occasionally on the surface of the waves) it may still be seen. It was submerged as a punishment, because of the wickedness of its people or of Dahut, its king's daughter, who sometimes still seeks the love of mortals (Sébillot, ii. 41 ff.). Elsewhere in Celtic regions precisely similar legends are found, and the submersion is the result of a curse, or of the breaking of a tabu, or of neglect to cover a sacred well. The best example is that of the town covered by the waters of Lough Neagh (see Girald. Camb. *Top. Hib.* ii. 9; Rhys, *Celt. Folk-lore*; Kennedy, *Legend. Fictions*, London, 1866, 282). There is little doubt that one important fact lies behind these various legends, viz. the tradition of actual cataclysms or inroads of the sea, such as the Celts encountered on the coast of Holland. Once formed, it was inevitable that these legends should intermingle with those of the divine water-world.

The idea that the Other-world is on the same plane as this world, or temporarily locates itself there, and is hidden in a mist, is probably due to the belief in the magic power of the gods. One of the commonest pieces of druidic magic was the causing of a mist to effect concealment, and it was natural to believe that the gods could do the same. Behind that mist, for some definite purpose, the divine Elysium was temporarily located, with all its marvellous properties, as in the story of Cormac (and also in folk-tales where fairyland is thus revealed to mortals; see *RCel* vii. 289; Kennedy, 108, 179), or from such a mist supernatural beings frequently emerged to meet mortals. In such

cases the mist may simply have concealed the *sid* of the gods, from which the messenger emerged, or to which the mortal, misled by the mist, was introduced. Such appearances from a mist often occurred on a hill (Loth, *Mab.* i. 38; Campbell, *West Highland Tales*, Edin. 1890, Nos. 38, 52; *Scott. Celt. Rev.*, Paisley, 1885, i. 70). On the other hand, there may have been an existing belief that the divine world was invisibly co-extensive with this world, since in recent Welsh and Irish belief fairyland is on the same plane as this earth and interpenetrates it; men may interfere unwittingly with it, or have it suddenly revealed to them, or be carried into it and made invisible (Rhys, i. 230; Curtin, *Tales of the Fairies*, 158).

5. **Was the Celtic Elysium the land of the dead?**—In most of the tales Elysium is a land where there is neither grief nor death, a land of immortal youth and peace, filled with every kind of sensuous delight. In a few tales, however (the Mabinogi of Pwyll, Sick-bed of Cúchulainn, Laegaire mac Crimthainn, Doel Diarmaid, Diarmaid in Tír fa Tonn), while the sensuous delights are still the same, the inhabitants are at war with each other, invite the help of mortals, and are sometimes slain in battle. But in both these groups Elysium is the land of the gods, of supernatural beings, a land to which a few favoured mortals are admitted while still in life. It is never described as the world of the dead, nor do its people ever appear to be the dead. These two conceptions of Elysium, (1) a land of peace and deathlessness, (2) a land where war and death occur, may be both equally primitive. The second may simply have been formed by transferring to the divine world the actions of the world of mortals, as a direct result of anthropomorphism. It would also be on a parallel with the conception of the world of the dead, which was likewise a replica of the life of mortals in this world. But men may early have felt that the gods were not as themselves, that their land was a state of peace and immortality. Hence the creation of the legend of the peaceful Elysium. The two conceptions may have existed side by side, but apparently the more peaceful one found most favour with the people. Mr. Nutt (*Bran*, i. 159) thinks that the other conception may be due to Scandinavian influence acting on existing tales of the peaceful, deathless Elysium; but from the fact that the wars of divine beings occupy a prominent part in the mythological and Ossianic cycles of the Irish Celts, this is doubtful. Or again, the peaceful Elysium may have been the product of the Celts as an agricultural people, since it is 'a familiar, cultivated land,' where the fruits of the earth are produced without men's labour, where there are no violent storms or excess of heat or cold—precisely the fancies which would appeal to a toiling, agricultural people, while the more warlike Elysium may have been produced among the Celts as a warlike people, appealing to their warrior instincts. What is certain is that the inhabitants of Elysium are supernatural beings; chief among them are the well-known figures of Celtic mythology, but the others have every trace of divinity. D'Arbois, Rhys, and others, however, maintain that the Celtic Elysium is the world of the dead. Elsewhere will be found reasons for the belief that the *orbis alius* (Lucan, *Phar.* i. 457), whither the dead went, was not necessarily an island, but a subterranean region. Or, if it was an island, it was not the island Elysium (see CELTS, § xvi.).

D'Arbois' theory of Elysium as the state of the dead rests mainly upon a difficult passage in *Echtra Condla*, which is interpreted by him in a way which seems somewhat wide of its true meaning. The sense of the passage seems to be: 'The Ever Living Ones claim thee. Thou art a champion to Tethra's people. They see thee every day in the assemblies of thy fatherland, among thy familiar loved ones.' D'Arbois assumes that Tethra, the Fomorian king, is ruler of Elysium, and that after his defeat by the Tuatha Déa, he, like Cronus, took refuge in Elysium, where he now reigns as god of the dead; while by translating *ar-dot-chiat* ('they see thee,' 3rd plur. pres. ind.) 'On t'y verra,' he maintains that Connla, by going to Elysium, will be seen among the gatherings of his dead kinsfolk (D'Arbois, *Cours de Litt. Celt.* ii. 119, 192, vi. 197, 219, *Les Druides*, Paris, 1906, 121; *RCel* xxvi. 173). But it is impossible to take 'Thou art a champion to Tethra's people' as meaning that Tethra is a god of the dead. It appears to mean simply that Connla is a mighty warrior, one of those whom Tethra, a Fomorian war-god (*LU* 50*a*; Cormac, *Gloss. s.v.* 'Tethra'), would have approved, while 'Tethra's mighty men' used elsewhere ('Dialogue of the Sages,' *RCel* xxvi. 27 ff.) seems to be a conventional phrase for warriors. The rest of the goddess's words imply either that the immortals from afar, or Tethra's mighty men, see Connla in the assemblies of his fatherland in Erin, among his familiar friends. Dread death awaits them, she has just said, but the Immortals desire Connla to escape that by coming to Elysium. Her words do not imply that Connla will meet his dead ancestors there; moreover, if the dead went to Elysium, there would be little reason for inviting a mortal there while still alive. Thus this tale, like all other Elysium tales, gives no ground for the contention that Elysium is the place of the dead. Moreover, the rulers of Elysium are the Tuatha Déa or the *sid*-folk, never a Fomorian like Tethra. ('Tethra' is glossed as *muir*, 'sea,' by O'Cleary [Stokes' *Cormac*, *s.v.* 'Tethra'], and Cúchulainn speaks of the sea as 'the plain of Tethra' [*Arch. Rev.* i. 152], but we cannot infer from these that he was ruler of an over-sea Elysium, and the passages are probably derived from the association of the Fomorians with hostile sea-powers (see under CELTS, § v.).

D'Arbois' assumption that 'Spain' in Nennius' account of the invasions of Ireland (*Hist. Brit.* § 13), and in the Irish texts generally, means the land of the dead, and that it was introduced in place of some such title as Mag Mór or Mag Mell by 'the euhemerizing process of the Irish Christians' (ii. 35, 134, 231) is equally groundless. In other documents which have been subject to euhemerization these titles remain unchanged; nor is there any proof that a document, now lost according to D'Arbois, said that the invader came from or returned to Mag Mór. Once, indeed, Tailtiu is called daughter of Mag Mór, king of Spain (*Book of Leinster* [= *LL*] 8. 2); but here a person is intended. It is much more probable that there was a connexion between Ireland and Spain from early times, both racial and commercial (Reinach, *RCel* xxi. 18; Siret, *Les Premiers Ages du Metal dans le Sud-Est de l'Espagne*, Antwerp, 1887), while perhaps some of the Goidelic invaders reached Ireland from Spain or Gaul. This connexion, traditionally remembered, would be sufficient to account for these references to Spain. It was further supported by the fact that early maps and geographers made Ireland and Spain contiguous (Orosius, i. 2. 71); hence in an Irish tale Ireland is visible from a tower in Spain (*LL* 11. 2). The word 'Spain' was used vaguely, but it does not appear to have meant Elysium or the land of the dead.

6. **Characteristics of the Celtic Elysium.**—(*a*) Nothing can exceed the romantic beauty of this land as described in the tales, and in nearly every one this is insisted on by the messengers who come from it to mortals. The beauty of its landscapes, —hills, cliffs, valleys, sea and shore, lakes and rivers,—of its trees, of its inhabitants, of its birds, is obviously the product of the imagination of a people keenly alive to natural beauty. And borrowed from the delight which the Celt took in music is the recurring reference to the marvellous music which everywhere swells in Elysium. It sounds from birds on every tree, from the branches of the trees which lull to forgetfulness the favoured mortals invited thither, from marvellous stones, from the harps of divine musicians. In Elysium, as the visitant says to Bran, 'there is nothing rough or harsh, but sweet music striking on the ear.' Probably no other race than the Celtic has, in describing the joys of the other world, so spiritualized the sensuous joys of sight and hearing, or imagined anything so exquisitely beautiful.

(*b*) Certain of the tales which deal with an island Elysium make it evident that it was composed not of one but of several islands, 'thrice fifty' in number, according to the *Voyage of Bran*, though this may be a later conception. One of these is frequently described as 'the island of women' or 'of ever-living women,' though in some instances there appear to be other inhabitants also. These women give their favours to Bran and his men, or to Maelduin and his company ('Voyage of Maelduin,' *RCel* x. 63), and in both these cases the number of women exactly equals that of the mortal visitors. Similar 'islands of women' occur in *Märchen* still

current among Celtic peoples, and actual islands were or are still called by that name—Eigg in the W. Highlands (Martin, *West Isles*, London, 1716, 277), Groagez off the Breton coast (Sébillot, ii. 76). Similar islands of women are known to Chinese, Japanese, and Ainu folklore (Burton, *Thousand Nights*, Benares, 1885 ff., x. 239; Chamberlain, *Aino Folk Tales*, London, 1888, 38), to Greek mythology (Circe's and Calypso's islands, cf. the land of the Amazons), and to ancient Egyptian conceptions of the future life (Maspero, *Hist. anc. des peuples de l'Orient*, Paris, 1895, i. 183). They were also known elsewhere, and we may therefore assume that in making such an island a part of their Elysium, the Celts were simply making use of something common to universal folk-belief. It may, however, owe something to the memory of a time when women performed their rites in seclusion, a seclusion which is perhaps hinted at in the references to the mysterious nature of the island, its inaccessibility, and its disappearance once the mortals leave it; to these rites men may have been admitted by favour. We know that Celtic women performed such rites on islands (Strabo, IV. iv. 6; cf. Ploss, *Das Weib*, Leipzig, 1885, ii. 70, artt. BIRTH [Celtic]), and CELTS, xiii. 1).

This may have originated the idea of an island of divine women as part of the Elysium belief, while it would also heighten the sensuous aspects of that Elysium. Love-making, in effect, had a considerable place in the Elysium tales. Its divine inhabitants sought the love of mortals, goddesses of men, gods of women (cf. the tales of Bran, Connla, Oisin, etc., of Manannan seeking the love of Tuag [*RCel* xvi. 152]; Mider, that of Etain). The mortal desired to visit Elysium because of the enticements of the divine visitant, regarded by later Christian redactors of the tales as a demon (see 'Cúchulainn's Sick-bed,' D'Arbois, v. 216). On the other hand, the love-making which goes on among the people of Elysium, even in documents edited by Christian scribes, is said to be 'without sin, without crime' (*Bran*, § 41).

(*c*) Besides their beauty, the characteristic of the inhabitants of Elysium which is emphasized in most of the tales is that they are immortal, or ever-living. Elysium is *Tír na mBéo*, 'the land of the living'; its people 'look for neither decay nor death'; they are eternally youthful. The general belief among primitive races is that death is an accident befalling men who were naturally immortal; hence freedom from that accident naturally characterizes the people of the divine world. But, as in many mythologies that immortality is more or less dependent on the eating or drinking of some food or drink of immortality, so it is in certain Celtic tales. Manannan, in the tale of Cormac, had immortal swine, which, killed one day, came to life the next; and with the flesh of these he is said to have conferred immortality on the Tuatha Dé Danann. This was also conferred by the drinking of Goibnui's ale, which either by itself or with the flesh of swine formed his immortal feast (O'Grady, *Silva Gadel.* ii. 385; O'Curry, *Atlantis*, iii. 389). Besides conferring immortality, the food of the Other-world was inexhaustible, and whoever ate it found it to have precisely that taste which he preferred. The fruit of certain trees of Elysium was also believed to confer immortality and other qualities. Cúchulainn's servant, Laeg, tells of 150 trees which he saw growing in Mag Mell; their nuts fed 300 people (D'Arbois, v. 170 ff.). The apple given by the goddess to Connla was inexhaustible, and he was still eating it with her when another favoured mortal visited Elysium—Teigue, son of Cian. 'When once they had partaken of it, nor age nor dimness could affect them' (D'Arbois, v. 384; O'Grady, ii. 385). Apples, crimson nuts, and rowan berries are specifically said to be the food of the gods in the 'Pursuit of Diarmaid and Grainne' (Joyce, 314). Through carelessness one of the berries was dropped on earth, and from it grew a tree, three of whose berries eaten by a man of a hundred years made him a young man. To keep mortals from touching it they set a Fomorian giant to guard it. With this may be compared the dragon-guarded rowan tree in the tale of Fraoch (Leahy, *Heroic Romances*, i. 36, with many variants elsewhere); its berries had the virtue of nine meals, added a year to a man's life, and healed the sick. At the source of all Irish rivers were supposed to grow hazel trees with crimson nuts, which fell into the water and were eaten by salmon. If these salmon were caught and eaten, the eater would obtain knowledge and wisdom (O'Curry, *Manners and Customs*, ii. 143). But the stories in which these hazels are mentioned show that they grew in Elysium, and their berries were the food of the gods, which a mortal might not eat without incurring danger (*RCel* xv. 457; Windisch, *Irische Texte*, iii. 213). In other cases the trees of Elysium are much more marvellous; they have silver branches (*Bran*); they have golden apples (*Cormac*); they produce wonderful music, which sometimes causes sleep and oblivion.

(*d*) As these various nuts and fruits were prized in Ireland as food, and in some cases, perhaps, were used to produce an intoxicant, it is obvious that they were, primarily, a magnified form of earthly trees. But all such trees were doubtless objects of a cult before their produce was generally eaten; they may have been totem trees, and their fruit eaten only occasionally and sacramentally. If so, this would explain why they grew in the Other-world, and why their fruit was the food of the gods. Whatever man eats or drinks is generally supposed to have been first used by the gods, like the Hindu *soma*. Miss Hull points out that, in some tales, the branch of a divine tree becomes a talisman leading the mortal to Elysium; in this resembling the golden bough plucked by Æneas before descending to the under world (*FL* xii. 931). But this is not the primary function of the tree. On the other hand, Mr. A. B. Cook is of opinion that the branch is derived from the branch borne by early Celtic kings of the wood or representatives of the Sun-god, while the tree is an imaginative form of the trees which incarnated a vegetation spirit (*FL* xvii. 158). But, again, it is the fruit of the trees as the food of the gods on which the greatest stress is laid in all the tales. When mortals eat it, it has the effect of conferring immortality upon them; in other words, it makes them of like nature with the gods, and this is doubtless derived from the primitive idea that the eating of food given by a stranger produces kinship with him. Hence to eat the food of gods, of ghosts, of fairies, binds the mortal to them, and he cannot leave their land. When Connla ate the apple, he desired to go to the Other-world, and could not leave it once he was there: he had become akin to its people. In the stories of Bran and Oisin, they are not said to have eaten the divine food, but the primitive form of the tales may have contained this incident, and it would explain why they could not set foot on earth unscathed.

(*e*) The inhabitants of Elysium are also invisible at will—a true mark of their divinity. They make themselves visible to one person only out of many present with him. Thus Connla alone sees the goddess, his father and the druid with him do not see her; and, when Manannan comes to recall Fand, he is invisible to Cúchulainn and those with him. This agrees with what Mider says to Etain:

'We behold, and are not beheld' (Windisch, i. 133).

(*f*) In most of the tales of Elysium, and in other stories about the gods, a magical cauldron has a prominent place, as it also has in tales of semi-historical personages. Such a vessel was the inexhaustible cauldron of the god Dagda, which came from Murias, probably some over-sea world (*RCel* xii. 57), or the vat of inexhaustible mead described in 'Cúchulainn's Sick-bed.' Whatever was put into such vessels satisfied every one, no matter how numerous the company might be (O'Donovan, *Battle of Mag Rath*, Dublin, 1892, 50). Such a cauldron was stolen by Cúchulainn from Mider, lord of the isle of Falga (the over-sea Elysium), along with several cows (*LL* 169*b*); and in what is perhaps another version of this tale he obtains an inexhaustible cauldron from the daughter of the king of Scath (Hull, *Cuch. Saga*, 284). Similarly, in the Welsh poem called 'The Spoils of Annwfn,' Arthur steals a cauldron from Annwfn; its rim was encrusted with pearls, voices issued from it, it was kept boiling by the breath of nine maidens, it would not boil a coward's food (Skene, *Four Ancient Books of Wales*, i. 265). In the Welsh story of Taliessin we learn how Tegid Voel and Cerridwen lived in the midst of lake Tegid (*i.e.* 'the Land under Waves'). Their son was so ugly that Cerridwen resolved to boil a cauldron of science and inspiration for him. For a year and a day it must boil till 'three drops of the grace of inspiration' were yielded by it. Gwion was set to stir it, and by accident obtained the inspiration himself (Guest's *Mabinogion*, London, 1838, iii. 321 f.). Finally, in the story of Branwen, daughter of Llyr, her brother Bran gave to the king of Ireland a cauldron into which if any slain man were thrown, he would be restored to life the next day. The cauldron had been given to Bran by two beings, a man and woman, who came out of a lake ('Land under Waves') (Loth's *Mabin.* i. 65). The three properties of the cauldron—inexhaustibility, inspiration, regeneration—may be summed up in one word, fertility; and it is significant that the god with whom such a cauldron is expressly associated, Dagda, should be a god of fertility (see, further, CELTS, § v.). But we have just seen it associated, directly or indirectly, with goddesses,—Cerridwen, Branwen, the woman of the lake,—and perhaps this may point to an earlier cult of fertility associated with goddesses, and later transferred to a god. The cauldron as a regenerator would be significantly connected with a goddess, since woman as the fruitful mother early suggested to man the idea of the fruitful Earth-mother, who was also frequently a goddess of love. Elton had already concluded that Branwen was a goddess of love (*Origins of English History*, London, 1882, p. 291). The cult of fertility was usually associated with orgiastic and indiscriminate love-making, and it is not impossible that the cauldron may have symbolized fertility, like the Hindu *yoni*. Again, the slaughter and cooking of animals were usually regarded as sacred acts in primitive life. The animals were cooked in enormous cauldrons, which were found as an invariable part of the furniture of every large Celtic house (Athen. iv. 34; Diod. Sic. v. 28; Joyce, *Soc. Hist.*, London, 1903, ii. 124). The quantities of meat which they contained may have suggested magical inexhaustibility to people to whom the cauldron was already a symbol of fertility. Thus the symbolic cauldron of a fertility cult was merged with the cauldron used in the religious slaughter and cooking of animal food. The cauldron was used in other ritual acts, sacrifice, divination, etc. Strabo, vii. 2. 1, referring to the Cimri, but this may also have been a Celtic usage; *Brehon Laws*, i. 195; Jullian, *Recherches sur la rel. gaul.*, Bordeaux, 1903, 44). Like the food of men which became the food of the gods, the cauldron of this world became the marvellous cauldron of the other world; and, as it then became necessary to explain the presence of such cauldrons on earth, myths arose, telling of how they had been stolen from the divine land by mortals. In other cases, however, its place is taken by an equally magic vessel or cup stolen from supernatural beings by the heroes of the Feinn saga or the heroes of *Märchen*. Here, too, it may be noted that the Graal of Arthurian romance has affinities with the Celtic cauldron. In the 'Conte du Graal' of pseudo-Chrétien, a cup comes in of itself and serves all present with food. This is a simple conception of the Graal; in other poems its sacrosanct character is heightened, until at last it became the chalice in which Christ instituted the Holy Sacrament. But in certain of its qualities it presents an unmistakable likeness to the Celtic cauldron—it supplies the food which the eater prefers, it gives perpetual youth. There is little doubt that the Graal is simply a fusion of the pagan Celtic cauldron and the chalice of our Lord's blood (see Villemarqué, *Contes populaires des anciens Bretons*, Paris, 1842; Nutt, *Legend of the Holy Grail*, London, 1888).

(*g*) Sensuous as are many of these characteristics, they yet have a spiritual aspect which must not be overlooked. Thus the emphasis placed on the beauty of the land, its music, its rest, its peace, its oblivion, is more spiritual than sensual, while the dwelling of favoured mortals there with divine beings is suggestive of that union with the divine which is of the essence of all religion. Though some who are lured there seek to leave it, others do not return, while Cúchulainn's charioteer Laeg says that he would prefer it to the kingship of all Ireland (Windisch, i. 219), and his words are elsewhere re-echoed by Laegaire mac Crimthainn. On the whole, then, it may be said that, of whatever elements it was composed, the conception of the Celtic Elysium was the imaginative shaping of man's instinctive longing for peace and rest. He hardly expected to obtain these beyond the grave, for there life went on as here, although that future state was one which had no terrors for him. A few great personages might reach Elysium after death, as an obscure passage in Plutarch (*de Defectu Orac.* 18) may hint (see under CELTS, § xvi. 5), but it was shut to all save a few favoured mortals who might be carried there in life. And possibly the hope that he might be so favoured of the gods buoyed up the Celt as he dreamed over this distant Elysium.

7. The Celtic Elysium and the gifts of civilization.—In the opinion of the Celts, as of many other peoples, wisdom and culture belonged first of all to the gods, by whom they were given to, or from whom they were stolen by, man. Examples of this have already been found in the tales in which a mysterious cauldron is stolen from the Otherworld (§ 6). It is also hinted at in the tales of divine trees guarded from mortals, and in the belief in the hazels of wisdom which endowed mortals with supernatural wisdom and knowledge. But when men came to domesticate animals, it was believed in course of time that the knowledge of domestication or, more usually, the animals themselves had come from the gods; only, in this case, the animals were of a magical, supernatural character. Such a belief underlies the stories, already referred to, in which cows are stolen from their divine owners by Cúchulainn. In the tale of 'Nera's Adventures in the Other-world' (*RCel* x. 226), Nera obtains a wife and several kine from the *sid* of Cruachan; and similarly Tulchine, who took a wife from the Land of Promise, obtained

her favourite calf also by interceding with the goddess Morrigan (Stokes, *RCel* xvi. 62). In the *Mabinogion* (Loth, i. 122 ff.) the swine given to Pryderi by Arawn, king of Annwfn, and hitherto unknown to man, are stolen from him by Gwydion, Pryderi being the son of Pwyll, a temporary king of Annwfn (§ 3), and therefore, perhaps, originally one of the lords of Elysium. But though this raid was successful, the poem of 'The Spoils of Annwfn' says, 'Stout was the prison of Gweir in Caer Sidi, Through the spite of Pwyll and Pryderi, No one before him went into it.' Gweir is probably identical with Gwydion (Rhys, *Hib. Lect.* 250), and this poem may then refer to another version of the myth in which the hero was unsuccessful, and was detained a prisoner in Elysium, to which imprisonment the later blending of Annwfn with Hades gave a doleful character. In the *Triads* (Loth, ii. 215), Gweir is one of the three paramount prisoners of Britain. There is also reference in a late Welsh MS to a white roebuck and a puppy (in the *Triads* [Loth, ii. 259] a bitch, a roebuck, and a lapwing), which were stolen by Amathaon from Annwfn, and which led to the battle of Godeu between Arawn and Gwydion. In this battle Bran, fighting on the side of Arawn, could not be vanquished until Gwydion had guessed his name (*Myvyrian Arch.*, London, 1801, i. 167). The introduction of the name-tabu proves the story to be archaic. In some of these tales the animals are transferred to earth by a divine or semi-divine being, in whom we may see an early Celtic culture-hero. The tales themselves are attenuated forms of an earlier series of myths, which probably showed how all domestic animals were at first the property of the gods. An echo of these is still preserved in *Märchen* describing the theft of magical cattle from fairies. In the most primitive form of the myths the theft was doubtless from the under world of the gods of fertility, which was also connected with the place whither the dead went. But when the gods were also located in a distant Elysium, it was inevitable that some tales should tell how the theft was connected with that far-off land rather than with the land of under-earth divinities. But in neither case was the theft from gods of death, but from gods of life and fertility with whom all man's blessings were. So far as the Irish and Welsh tales are concerned, the thefts seem to be mainly from Elysium.

8. **The lords of Elysium.**—In Irish accounts of the *síd* world, the god Dagda appears to have the supremacy, which was wrested from him later by the Mac Oc. But in a probably later version we learn that, Dagda being dead, Bodb Dearg divided the *síd* among the gods, and Manannan gave them the gift of immortality (see CELTS). But in tales of the *síd* world, each owner of a *síd* is accounted lord of that particular *síd*, which for the time being eclipses all others. The one great under world of gods of fertility has now become a world of many underground *síd*. In Welsh tradition the lord of Annwfn, wherever it is situated, is Arawn, but his claims are contested by a rival. In Irish tradition Manannan mac Lir is associated with the over-sea world or with the 'Land of Promise,' while Elysium itself is called 'the land of Manannan' in the *Voyage of Bran*. Manannan was probably a god of the sea, and it was easy to associate the over-sea world, 'around which sea-horses (*i.e.* the waves, the god's mythic steeds) glisten,' with him. But, again, as this land lay towards the setting sun, and in some of its aspects may have been suggested by the glories of the sunset, the sun-god Lug was also associated with it. But he hardly takes the place of Manannan; he comes from Manannan's land, with Manannan's sons and ramed with his weapons, to aid the gods, but Manannan still remains lord of Elysium (Joyce, *Old Celt. Romances*, 37).

9. **Elysium and Paradise.** — While the tales already dealt with are mainly re-mouldings of earlier pagan originals, which may have been handed down orally, or are based upon the materials of pagan belief, they have in many ways been influenced by Christian ideas, although their main incidents are purely pagan. But in another class of tales, which may have had pagan originals, the Elysium conception recurs, and finally ends in becoming the Christian paradise or Heaven. These are the *Imrama*, or 'Voyages,' of which that of Maelduin, found partly in the 11th cent. *Lebor na hUidre*, and in complete form in 14th to 16th cent. MSS, still moves in a pagan atmosphere. Here the voyage is undertaken for the purpose of revenge; but the travellers reach a number of strange islands unpeopled, or peopled by men and women, by animals, or by monsters. One island closely resembles the Isle of Women in the pagan Elysium. Besides the Isle of Laughter, found also in *Bran*, there is an Isle of Weeping, and in this we approach the idea of a place of penitence. Another island, guarded by a fiery rampart, is peopled by beautiful human beings feasting and singing—an approach to the Christian paradise. The Isles of Weeping and Laughter are also found in the *Imram hua Corra*, where also is the island of the Miller of Hell, mentioned simply as a miller in *Maelduin*. Thus, even in *Maelduin* the use of the pagan materials is indeterminate, and the Elysium conceptions have become vague. Elsewhere, as in the *Voyage of Snedgus and Mac Riagla*, the journey is undertaken as a pilgrimage, and the Christian atmosphere is more pronounced. One island has become a kind of intermediate state, and in it dwell Elijah and Enoch and a multitude of others 'without sin, without wickedness,' waiting for the day of judgment. Another island is nothing less than the Christian Heaven viewed from an ecclesiastical standpoint. Finally, in the *Voyage of Brandan* the pagan elements have practically disappeared: there is an island of Hell and an island which is the Christian paradise or Heaven. In these *Imrama*, the number of islands visited may be compared to the thrice fifty islands of *Bran*, whether this be a later conception of the pagan Elysium or not; the old idea of a mortal lured thither by a goddess has disappeared, and the voyage is undertaken for a specific purpose—revenge or a pilgrimage. Another series of tales, in which a visit is paid to Hell and Heaven in a vision (*Adamnan's Vision*, *The Tidings of Doomsday*, etc.), are purely Christian products, but it is remarkable that the joys of heaven are described in terms of the pagan Elysium. There is unimaginable beauty, music, absence of sickness, of pain, of death; there is no age, decay, or labour. The whole description of heaven has a sensuous, material aspect which reflects that of the old pagan stories. In the latter text there are two hells; besides heaven there is a place for the *boni non valde* which corresponds to the island where dwell Enoch and Elijah in the *Voyage of Snedgus*. The conception of this island, which is not heaven, may be borrowed directly from the pagan paradise. The connexion of the pagan Elysium with the Christian paradise is also seen in the title of *Tír Tairngiri*, 'the Land of Promise,' which is applied to the heavenly kingdom or to the land flowing with milk and honey, as in glosses (7th or 8th cent.) on He 6^{15}, where *regnum coelorum* is explained as *tír tairngiri*, or He 4^{4}, where Canaan is so called, and notably on 1 Co 10^{4}, where the heavenly land is called *tír tairngiri inna mbéo*, 'the land of promise of the living ones': thus apparently equalling it with the *tír na mbéo* of

'Connla's Voyage.' If *tír tairngiri* was not already a title of the pagan Elysium, it was now applied to it in several instances through the influence of this identification.

See Zimmer, 'Brendan's Meerfahrt,' *ZDA* xxxiii. The *Imrama* of Snedgus, Maelduin, and Ua Corra are edited and translated by Stokes in *RCel* ix., x., xiv. *Adamnan's Vision* is edited and translated by Stokes, Calcutta, 1866; cf. C. S. Boswell, *Irish Precursor of Dante*, London, 1908; the *Tidings of Doomsday* is in *RCel* iv. 243. Cf. also chs. 4 and 8 of Nutt's *Bran*.

10. Elysium in later folklore.—Most of the aspects of the pagan Elysium re-appear in folk belief almost unchanged. The under or *síd* world is now fairyland; mounds, forts, and raths are fairy-dwellings into which mortals are sometimes inveigled, and where all the characteristics of the earlier divine world are found—magic lapse of time, marvellous beauty, magical properties. Similarly a marvellous over-sea land is still a commonplace of Celtic *Märchen* and Celtic belief. Tír na nÓg is still a living reality to the Celt. Within that fabled land are the mystic and magic things of folk-tale—the fountain of youth, healing balsams, life-giving fruits. It is peopled by marvellously beautiful women, or it is connected with fairy folk. Sometimes it is visible only to favoured persons, or it is sunk beneath the waves, and comes to the surface only at intervals. But in whatever form it is found, it is obviously linked on to the actual Elysium of the pagan Celtic world.

In the 11th cent. Irish documents, from which our knowledge of Elysium is mainly drawn, and which, of course, imply a remote antiquity for the material of the tales, the *síd* world is still the world of divine beings, though these are beginning to assume the traits of fairy folk. But probably among the people themselves the change had already been made, and the *síd* world was simply fairyland. In Wales the same change had early taken place, as is witnessed by the story of Elidorus enticed by two small people into a subterranean fairyland. This is fully told by Giraldus Cambrensis (*Itin. Camb.* i. 8). For the over-sea fairyland see J. F. Campbell, *Popular Tales of the West Highlands*, London, 1860–62; MacDougall, *Folk and Hero Tales*, London, 1891; Howells, *Cambrian Superstitions*, Tipton, 1831; Sébillot, *Folk-Lore de France*, Paris, 1904, ii.; Kennedy, *Legendary Fictions*, London, 1866; or any collection of Celtic *Märchen*.

LITERATURE.—Translations or epitomes of most of the texts relating to the Other-world will be found in Windisch and Stokes, *Irische Texte*, Leipzig, 1880–1900; D'Arbois de Jubainville, *Cours de Littérature Celt.* ii., Paris, 1884; S. H. O'Grady, *Silva Gadelica*, 1892; Joyce, *Old Celtic Romances*[2], London, 1894; A. Nutt and K. Meyer, *Voyage of Bran*, London, 1895; Rhys, *Celtic Heathendom*, London, 1888, *Arthurian Legend*, Oxford, 1891; A. H. Leahy, *Heroic Romances of Ireland*, London, 1905; E. Hull, 'The Idea of Hades in Irish Literature,' *FL* xviii. 1907.

J. A. MACCULLOCH.

BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Greek and Roman).—i. Greek.—In the Homeric poems the gods alone are immortal. Nowhere in the older strata of the poems is immortality an attribute of man. Complete life for him exists only on earth and in the light of the sun, and only with the complete union of soul and body. When separated from the body, the soul passes out of this world into a shadowy, powerless existence, which is nowhere expressly stated to be eternal. The idea of an earthly paradise, *i.e.* an abode of bliss upon earth, where life is continued in full vigour without the sharp severance between soul and body which death requires, is an attempt to find a more comforting solution of the problem of an after-life. A solution so naive does not long remain an article of belief in Greece except among the ignorant vulgar. In the history of religion the idea is absorbed by the belief in immortality, which was soon fostered in Greece under the influence of imported mystical tenets and of philosophic systems founded upon them. The earthly bliss, which at best could be attained only by the favoured few, is transmuted into the heavenly bliss, which is promised after death to all who have lived uprightly. In the history of literature the idea survives as a beautiful fancy which is cherished by poets and often serves in later times as a basis for the romantic reconstructions of human society in which the Greeks found a melancholy consolation for some of the darkest periods in their national life.

1. *Homer, Hesiod, and the Epic cycle.*—In Homer, as the gods alone are immortal, so they alone can confer immortality. Their favourite heroes, always of divine descent, have such immortality conferred upon them by the drinking of nectar or the eating of ambrosia, and are thereupon translated either to heaven or to an earthly paradise such as the Elysian plain. The most striking instance of such an earthly translation is to be seen in *Od.* iv. 561, where Proteus prophesies to Menelaus:

'But it is not thy destiny, O Menelaus, *child of Zeus*, to die and meet thy fate in horse-pasturing Argos. The immortal gods will send thee to the Elysian plain and the verge of the world where fair-haired Rhadamanthys dwells, where life is easiest for man. No snow falls there, nor any violent storm, nor rain at any time; but Ocean ever sends forth the clear, shrill blast of the West wind to refresh mankind; *because thou hast Helen to wife and they count thee to be son-in-law to Zeus.*' (Cf. Eur. *Hel.* 1676 ff.).

Here it should be noted that Elysium is on earth and not in Hades. It is the counterpart of Olympus, the mountain-home of the gods, described in almost the same words in *Od.* vi. 43–45. Further, Menelaus is not beatified as a reward for his merits. Like Rhadamanthys, he is of kin to Zeus. The blissful existence in Elysium which is conferred by the gods upon their kin is an exceptional privilege, exactly parallel to the eternity of pain which they inflict upon their enemies in Erebos (*Od.* xi. 576 ff.). The conception of Elysium in Homer is poetical rather than religious. The heroes who have passed thither exert no influence upon the world of men that they have left behind. The gods transfer to them none of their own prerogatives save immortality. The conception is an extension of the other ideals of blissful, though mortal, existence that are found in Homer—chiefly in the *Odyssey*, which is permeated by a peaceful spirit characteristic of men who have enjoyed undisturbed quiet long enough to value it, and foreign to the martial temper of the *Iliad*. Of such ideals the most noteworthy are the idyllic lands of Phæacia (*Od.* vii. 81), of the island of Syrie, the home of Eumæus (*Od.* xv. 403), and idyllic peoples such as the Abioi (*Il.* xiii. 6) and Ethiopians (*Il.* i. 423).

This enchanting fancy of an earthly paradise became an integral part of Greek thought once it had been incorporated in the Homeric poems. The common people of Greece were accustomed to the idea of 'translation' in the worships of such heroes as Amphiaraos and Trophonios, who had passed, while yet alive, to a life below the earth. The 'translation' of heroes, so rare in Homer, is of common occurrence in the post-Homeric Epic. In the *Cypria*, Iphigeneia is rescued by Artemis, carried to the land of the Tauri and rendered immortal (Proclus in *Epicorum Graec. Frag.*, ed. Kinkel, p. 19). In the *Æthiopis*, Memnon is translated by his mother Eos to her home in the East and made immortal by Zeus at her request (*ib.* p. 33). In the same poem, Achilles is saved from death by Thetis and conveyed to the magic island of Leuke (*ib.* p. 34). In the *Telegoneia*, the latest of such Epics, Telegonus, the son of Odysseus and Circe, brings the bodies of Penelope, Odysseus, and Telemachus to his mother, who confers immortality upon them in her home in Ææa (*ib.* p. 58).

Thus far the idea of an earthly paradise is developed at the will of each particular poet. The fortunate heroes have no common home, but are transferred to magic lands which are alike in nothing else save that they are beyond mortal ken. The various strands of fancy are woven together into a consistent whole by Hesiod, in whose poems we meet with the expression 'The Isles of the Blest' for the first time. In *Op. et Di.* 170 ff., after

the description of the three races of Gold, of Silver, and of Bronze, follows a fourth race better than the race of Bronze—the heroes or demigods who fought at Thebes and at Troy. Of these, some died, others were settled by Zeus at the world's end in the Islands of the Blest, 'where the earth produces sweet fruit for them thrice in the year.' As in Homer, they are completely severed from the world of men, and have no influence upon it. In Hesiod, further, they are heroes of the past, their tale is numbered, and no accessions to their ranks can come from the fifth degenerate race that is now on earth.

2. Pindar is far removed from the simple theological standpoint of Homer and Hesiod, but he is far too great a poet and prophet to reject a beautiful religious idea. He renders it wider and deeper. Whether from personal convictions, which had grown upon him during his repeated visits to Sicily since 477, or from a desire to satisfy his Sicilian patrons such as Gelo, Hiero, and Theron, who were hierophants of chthonic worships, he accepts a number of the dogmas of Orphic and Pythagorean mysticism, among which he finds a place for the popular belief in the Islands of the Blest. Pindar, on the one hand, represents the traditional belief that a full immortality can come only from the continued union of soul with body, a union to be secured only by Divine intervention (*e.g.* Ganymede, *Ol.* i. 44, x. 104; Amphiaraos, *Ol.* vi. 14, *Nem.* ix. 24 ff.); but he has also absorbed the belief that the soul is no mere *Doppelgänger* of the body but is Divine in origin (frag. 131, 'the likeness of eternity is left: for that alone comes from Heaven'). It is immortal, but confined in a mortal body, owing to the 'ancient sin' (frag. 133, *παλαιὸν πένθος*). After the death of the body it is judged in Hades for its deeds on earth. The wicked are condemned to Tartarus; the good pass to the home of the pious (*χῶρος εὐσεβῶν*). Only after three lives of purity have been completed on earth (*Ol.* ii. 68 ff.) is the ancient sin atoned for. Thereupon, in the ninth year after its last arrival in Hades (see Rohde, *Psyche*[2], ii. 211), the soul ascends to the world above for the last time, to become incorporate in kings, heroes, and wise men. Such souls are then freed from the trammels of the earth and find a home in the Island of the Blest, where under the rule of Kronos they live in communion with the earlier heroes, such as Peleus, Cadmus, and Achilles (*Ol.* ii. 86; frag. 133). Here the life of bliss is no longer an earthly paradise in the earlier sense. The Island is in Ocean, it is true, but can be reached only through death and through lives of purity lived upon earth.

3. There are scattered references to the belief in its original form found in later writers. Cadmus and Harmonia are transferred to the Land of the Blest (*μακάρων ἐς αἶαν*), in Eur. *Bacch.* 1339 ff.; Achilles and Diomedes live in the Island of the Blest, according to the scholion on Harmodios (Bergk, *Carm. pop. fr.* 10). According to Plato (*Symp.* 179 E), Achilles is in the Isles of the Blest. Others find his home on the Elysian plain (Apoll. Rhod. *Arg.* iv. 811) or in Leuke (see below), where he has Medea to wife, according to Ibycus the melic poet of the 6th cent. (*schol.* Apoll. Rhod. iv. 814), or, according to others, Iphigeneia (Antoninus Liberalis, 37) or Helen (Pausanias, iii. 19. 11–13). For further references see Rohde, *Psyche*[2], ii. 369, note 2.

A naive belief that it was possible to discover these fortunate lands long continued. The most striking instance is the resolve of Sertorius to sail for the Atlantic isles in the search for happiness (Plut. *Sert.* 8. 9; Sallust, *Hist.* i. frag. 102, Maurenbrecher). Geographers often placed them in the unknown, and therefore mysterious, West, where (akin to them in idea) was the garden of the Hesperides, with its golden apples of immortality (cf. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Herakles*[1], ii. 129; Eur. *Hippol.* 732 ff.). They are in West Africa, according to Strabo, i. 3, iii. 150, and Plin. *HN* vi. 202 ff. Others placed them in the centre of Libya (Herod. iii. 26) or in the Antipodes (cf. Serv. *Æn.* vi. 532). The home of Diomedes was found in the Tremiti islands in the Adriatic (Strabo, vi. 283, 284). Leuke, the isle of Achilles, was placed in the Euxine (Alcæus, *Fr.* 48[b]; Pind. *Nem.* iv. 49; Eur. *Andr.* 1232 ff., *Iph. T.* 420), at the mouth of the Danube (Paus. iii. 19. 11), and was counted as one of the Isles of the Blest (cf. Plin. *HN* iv. 93, 'Insula Achillea, eadem Leuce et Macaron dicta'). Similar legendary lands are placed near the Indian Ocean (cf. Aristophanes, *Av.* 144; Æsch. frag. 192, Nauck). For further attempts see Hesychius *s.v.* 'Lesbos,' and Suidas *s.v.* 'Rhodos.' A parody of the belief will be found in Lucian's *Vera Historia*, ii. 6 ff. The inscriptions containing references to the Elysian plain and the Isles of the Blest may be consulted most conveniently in G. Kaibel's *Epigrammata Graeca, ex lapidibus collecta*, Berlin, 1878. But here it is no question of earthly bliss. The Blessed Isles (*Ep.* 649. 2), the Elysian plain (*Ep.* 414. 8), the *χῶρος εὐσεβέων* (*Ins. Gr. mar. Æg.* i. 141), are not of this world, but only testify to a life beyond the grave to which the righteous can aspire. The Epigram on Regilla, the wife of Herodes Atticus (1046. 8), *μεθ' ἡρῴῃσι νέναται ἐν μακάρων νήσοισιν ἵνα Κρόνος ἐνβασιλεύει*, is merely a literary adaptation of the older belief.

4. *The Romance writers.*—The best account of these will be found in Rohde's *Griechische Roman*[2], pp. 178–260). The political downfall of Greece, which began in the 4th cent. B.C., and the widespread disasters which accompanied it, led men to seek relief from the hopelessness of present affairs in the freedom of fanciful speculations. Social reformers, whether politicians or philosophers, embodied their ideas in sentimental romances—a branch of literature which developed naturally out of the old sagas (*e.g.* the tale of the Argonauts) and the stories of fabulous adventure and ethnographical curiosities which had long been popular in Greece. As early as Solon we find a comic description of a land of good things (Bergk, *Poetae Lyrici*[4], frag. 38). But the first serious philosophical romance comes from Plato, who portrays his ideal of earthly perfection in the State of 'Atlantis.' The ground-plan of this is sketched in the *Timaeus* (cf. esp. 20 D–25 E), and was to be completed in the *Critias*. Theopompus (*c.* 333 B.C.) made a similar attempt. In the eighth book of his *Philippica* he introduced a description of an ideal country called 'Meropis' with its cities *Machimos* and *Eusebes*—the first a town of warriors, the second the abode of peace and justice. A more philosophic work was 'The Hyperboreans' of Hecatæus of Abdera, a philosopher at the court of Ptolemy I., and a pupil of the sceptic Pyrrho. Pyrrho's philosophy was less a theory of doubt than a conviction that the whole world of things was unworkable, and that a calm indifference was the only feasible rule of conduct. His pupil's romance on the Hyperboreans, who live in the island of Helixoia, in the Northern Ocean, seems to have been prompted by similar views. Amometus, a contemporary of the first and second Ptolemys, travelled outside the range of native mythology, and based his romance of the Attacori (Plin. *HN* vi. 17, § 55) upon the Indian legend of the happy land of Uttarakuru, north of the Himalayas (cf. Lassen, *WZKM* ii. 63, 64). Euhemerus of Messana, the friend of king Cassander (*c.* 306 B.C.), finds his Utopia in the island of Panchaia in the Indian Ocean. Iambulus (of uncertain date, but earlier than the age of Augustus) finds an Island

of the Blest near the equator. The popularity of such romances is sufficiently shown by the travesty of them given by Lucian in his *Vera Historia*. Their influence extended beyond Greece, since the description of the Essenes in Josephus (*BJ* II. viii. 11) is held to show traces of Greek colour.

ii. Roman.—The idea of an earthly paradise was never native to Roman thought. A belief in immortality was always an integral part of the Roman religion. With the assurance of an after-life in the world of spirits, colourless though it might be, the practical Roman had no need of such a conception. Such references to the belief as are found in Latin literature are importations from the Greek: *e.g.* Plautus, *Trin.* 549: 'Fortunatorum memorant insulas, Quo cuncti qui aetatem egerint caste suam, Conveniant.' The beautiful description in Horace, *Epodes*, xvi. 39 ff., is suggested in all probability by the story of Sertorius mentioned above. See also STATE OF THE DEAD (Greek and Roman).

LITERATURE.—E. Rohde, *Psyche*[2], 2 vols., Freiburg, 1898, and *Der Griechische Roman*[2], Leipzig, 1900; L. Preller, *Griechische Mythologie*[4], ed. C. Robert, Berlin, 1887-94; Dieterich, *Nekyia*, Leipzig, 1893. F. W. HALL.

BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Hindu).—The Hindus believe that there was, and is still, a place of bliss on earth, a kind of earthly paradise, inaccessible to men, and far far away from our part of the earth. But the idea, frequent among many savage tribes and some civilized peoples, that the brave and the virtuous go to such a place on their decease, seems not to have been current in ancient India. For already in the Rigveda the abode of the dead who in life have done pious deeds is said to be in heaven above, and, according to the Atharvaveda, the wicked receive their punishment in the hell below.* And in later Sanskrit literature heavens were multiplied to such an extent that the souls of the deceased were amply provided for, and required no dwelling place on earth such as the Islands of the Blessed of the ancients. The Indian belief in a place of bliss cannot therefore have developed from an earlier one in a heaven on earth; but we shall postpone our inquiry into the probable origin of this belief till we have described it in all its details. We must, however, define this place of bliss more accurately as one believed to be still in existence, in order to distinguish it from the state of bliss which obtained in the Golden Age, when the whole earth, newly come into existence, was, as it were, all one abode of the Blessed.† In the Sanskrit epics, the Purāṇas, and the classical literature the *Uttarakurus* are regarded as the Blessed, and their land as an earthly paradise which is localized in the far North.

1. **Site of Uttarakuru.**—It will be convenient first to set forth the Pauranic opinion on the site of Uttarakuru, since it is the most explicit one. According to the Purāṇas, the earth, of which India forms part, is a circular island, or rather insular continent, of enormous dimensions, called Jambūdvīpa. There are six more such islands, Śākadvīpa etc., which, however, are not connected with our present subject. In the centre of Jambūdvīpa rises Mount Meru, 84,000 *yojanas* above the surface of the earth. The whole continent is divided by six parallel mountain ranges, running due east and west, three south of Meru and three north of it. The southernmost range is the Himālaya, and the segment of the disc of the earth lying to the south of it is Bharatavarṣa, or India, and some countries known to the Indians. The counterpart of Bharatavarṣa, *i.e.* the segment to the north of the northernmost range, Śṛṅgin, is Uttarakuru. It may be mentioned that the other *varṣas*, or strips of land between the several mountain ranges, are also inhabited by fabulous people; the model of them all seems to have been the Uttarakurus. From the position of the country of the latter it is clear that they were regarded as the antipodes of men, if it be allowed to apply this term to an earth figured as a disc.

In the *Bhīṣma Parvan*, adhy. v. and vi., in a part of the *Mahābhārata* of a decidedly Pauranic character, we meet with a somewhat different description of the earth, called here Sudarśana instead of Jambūdvīpa. The number, arrangement, and names of the mountain ranges is the same as in the Purāṇas, but the names of some of the *varṣas* are different, and those of the two most northern ones are omitted. In viii. 10, however, the most northern segment is called Airāvata, not Uttarakuru, which, by the way, is also the case with the Jains; yet the excellence of the country and the happiness of the inhabitants of Airāvata are exactly like those of the Uttarakurus as described in a preceding chapter. In this account (vi. 13) the land of the Uttarakurus is stated to lie at the northern side of Meru, or near the centre of the disc of the earth. Round Meru, we are told, are grouped four *dvīpas*, lit. 'islands,' but, according to the commentary, countries surrounded by a broad river; these islands are Uttarakuru N., Bhadrāśva E., Jambūdvīpa S., Ketumāla W. Here we must distinguish, it seems, two accounts: the Pauranic account, which is made the basis of the description of the earth; and, combined with it, an older one, which places Meru in the ocean, and the four insular continents round it.* Here, too, Jambūdvīpa is the abode of men, and Uttarakuru that of the Siddhas.

What the present writer considers the earlier of these two accounts is actually the idea underlying the Buddhist system of geography. There Meru rises from the ocean, round it are seven concentric circular mountain ranges separated from each other by ring-shaped seas, and beyond them, in the vast ocean known to men, are four insular continents—Jambūdvīpa S., Pūrvavideha E., Uttarakuru N., and Aparagodāna W. Jambūdvīpa, the abode of men, is of a triangular shape, and Uttarakuru, the abode of the Blessed who live 1000 years, forms a square.†

The Jains, whose geography has been developed on the same lines as that of the Purāṇas,‡ also place the Uttarakurus near the centre of the Jambūdvīpa, between Gandhamādana and Mālyavat, two spurs of Mount Meru running N.W. and N.E.§

In such parts of the epics as do not yet exhibit the fully established system of Pauranic geography, the Uttarakurus are placed in the extreme North, in the borderland of the inhabited or known earth. In the *Digvijayaparvan* of the *Sabhāparvan* of the *Mahābhārata* (ii. 28), Arjuna's conquest of the northern countries is related. After having passed the Himālaya and the fabulous mountains Niṣkuṭa and Śvetaparvata, and having vanquished many mythical people, Arjuna reaches the north of the country Harivarṣa. There he is warned not to proceed further, because the region beyond

* A. Macdonell, 'Vedic Mythology' (in *Grundriss der Indo-arischen Philol. und Alterlumskunde*), Strassburg, 1897, p. 167 ff.

† See art. AGES OF THE WORLD (Indian) in vol. i. p. 200 ff.

* The Purāṇas also mention those four countries, substituting, however, Bhārata for Jambūdvīpa, and likening them to the petals of a lotus whose pericarp is Mount Meru. Sometimes they seem to be regarded as countries in Ilāvṛta or the middle *varṣa*, sometimes as islands lying off the coast of Jambūdvīpa in the great ocean. The efforts of the Purāṇas to explain result in worse confusion.

† C. F. Köppen, *Die Religion des Buddha und ihre Entstehung*, Berlin, 1857, vol. i. p. 232 f.

‡ *Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra*, by Umāsvāti, ch. iii., tr. in *ZDMG*, vol. lx.

§ *Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra*, ed. *Bibliotheca Indica*, Calcutta, 1903, Appendix, p. 28 f.

is that of the Uttarakurus: 'he that entereth it, if human, is sure to perish.' In the *Rāmāyaṇa* (iv. 43) we meet with a description of the North where the monkeys are despatched in search of Sītā. There many fabulous mountains and places, which do not form part of the Pauranic system of geography, are mentioned. In the North sun and moon cease to shed light, and even farther north live the Uttarakurus.* Their country is bounded by the Northern Ocean, in which rises Mount Somagiri, scarcely accessible even to gods.

Notwithstanding the prevalence of Pauranic geography during the classical period and some centuries before it, some faint knowledge of an actual tribe of Uttarakurus, somewhere on the slopes of the Himālayas, seems to have continued even then. Lassen † has drawn attention to some notices in the Epics and classical writers where the Uttarakurus are not regarded as a fabulous people. Important in this regard seems to be a passage in the *Vanaparvan* of the *Mahābhārata*, iii. 145, where the Uttarakurus are placed south of Kailāsa. Mr. Pargiter, commenting on a passage in the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* ‡ where the (Uttara) Kurus are mentioned among the people 'who rest against the Mountains,' has the following note which sums up the whole question under discussion:

'They seem to have been the stock from which the Kurus of Madhyadeśa separated off, for the period when Dhṛtarāṣṭra and Paṇḍu were born is described as a Golden Age, in which both branches of the Kurus engaged in happy rivalry (Ādi-P. cix. 4337–46); but the wistful recollections of their ancient home idealized it afterwards into a blissful land, where fancy gave itself free scope (Rāmāy., Kiṣk. xliv. 82–115). They seem to have occupied the uppermost valley of the Indus near its sources, with Kailāsa lying beyond (Vana-P. cxlv. 71025–35); and fervid imagination also placed them close to Mount Meru on its north side (Bhīṣma-P. vi. 207–8, and vii. 254), or in the region Harivarṣa, and declared men could not enter their sacred land (Sabhā-P. xxvii. 1054–8). They are described as living in primitive happiness, and women had the utmost freedom there (722, 4719–23; and Rāmāy. *loc. cit.*).'

The first mention of the Uttarakurus is contained in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*. In viii. 14 we read: 'hence all people living in northern countries, such as the Uttarakurus, Uttaramadras, are inaugurated for living without a king (*vairājyam*), and called Virāj, *i.e.* "without king."' § Here the Uttarakurus seem to be a real people, *i.e.* one with which the Indians, at the time of the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, were actually acquainted, or, at least, of which they had some kind of positive knowledge; for the very name *Northern Kurus*, and the fact that they are mentioned jointly with the Northern Madras, proves that these peoples of the North were regarded as related by kinship to the well-known Indian tribes of the Kurus and Madras. But the Uttarakurus were already looked upon as superior beings, for in the same *Brāhmaṇa* (viii. 23) it is declared that Uttarakuru 'is the land of the gods, no mortal can conquer it.' ‖

It must be added that Ptolemy (vi. 16) mentions a mountain, people, and town of the name of *Ottorokorra*, which obviously stands for Uttarakuru; but he places Ottorokorra in Serica or China. Whatever may have been his reason for doing so, he apparently regarded them as a real, not a mythical people. And so did Pliny (vi. 20), who mentions them under the name of *Attacori*, and places them near the Phruri and Tochari. On the other hand, many fables seem to have been told of them. For Pliny says: 'de iis privatim condidit volumen Amometus, sicut Hecataeus de Hyperboreis.' Megasthenes seems to intend the Uttarakurus by his Hyperborei * who live 1000 years, for this is the length of life of the Uttarakurus according to the Buddhists.

2. Description of Uttarakuru.—The classical passages about the land and the inhabitants of Uttarakuru are *Rāmāyaṇa* iv. 43 and *Mahābhārata* vi. 7, of which we subjoin a translation:

In *Rāmāyaṇa* iv. 43 it is said that in the farthest North sun and moon at last cease to shine; and if you still proceed you come to the river Śailodā, whose water, according to the Bengal redaction of the text, turns into stone the man who touches it. 'On either bank of that river grow reeds, called *kichaka*, which carry the Blessed (*Siddhas*) to the opposite bank and back. There is Uttarakuru, the abode of the pious, watered by lakes with golden lotuses. There are rivers by thousands, full of leaves of the colour of sapphire and lapis lazuli, and the lakes, resplendent like the morning sun, are adorned by golden beds of red lotus. The country all round is covered with costly jewels and precious stones, with gay beds of blue lotuses of golden petals. Instead of sand, round pearls, costly jewels, and gold form the banks of the rivers, which are covered with trees of precious stones, trees of gold shining like fire. The trees always bear flowers and fruits, they swarm with birds, they are of a heavenly smell and touch, and yield all desires; other trees bring forth clothes of various shapes. [Here we omit four verses pronounced spurious by the Commentator.] All the inhabitants do pious deeds, all are given to love, all, dwelling together with their wives, have their desires fulfilled. There one always hears the sound of song and music mixed with gay laughter, pleasant to all creatures. There is none who does not rejoice, none whose desires are not fulfilled; and every day those pleasant qualities grow brighter.' The text of the Bengal redaction is much more detailed, and contains some additions which are out of place there, but on the whole it is in the same strain. Besides the items given above, there are mentioned rivers flowing with milk which form a deposit of boiled rice, and trees on which grow beautiful maidens hanging down from their branches.

The description of Uttarakuru in *Mahābhārata* vi. 7 runs thus in Protap Chandra Roy's translation: 'On the south of the Nīla mountain and the northern side of Meru are the sacred Northern Kurus, which are the residence of the Siddhas. The trees there bear sweet fruits, and are always covered with fruits and flowers. All the flowers (there) are fragrant, and the fruits of excellent taste. Some of the trees, again, yield fruits according to the will (of the plucker). There are, again, some other trees that are called milk-yielding. These always yield milk and six different kinds of food of the taste of Amṛta itself. Those trees also yield clothes, and in their fruits are ornaments (for the use of man). The entire land abounds with fine golden sands. A portion of the region there, extremely delightful, is seen to be possessed of the radiance of the ruby, or of the lapis lazuli, or other jewels and gems. All the seasons there are agreeable, and nowhere does the land become miry. The tanks are charming, delicious, and full of crystal water. The men born there are dropped from the world of the celestials. All are of pure birth, and all are handsome in appearance. There twins (of opposite sexes) are born, and the women resemble Apsaras in beauty. They drink the milk, sweet as *amṛta*, of those milk-yielding trees (already mentioned). And the twins born there (of opposite sexes) grow up equally. Both possessed of equal beauty, both endued with similar virtues, and both equally dressed, both grow up in love like a couple of *chakravākas*. The people of that country are free from illness, and are always cheerful. Ten thousand and ten hundred years they live, and never abandon one another. A class of birds called *bhāruṇḍa*, furnished with sharp beaks and possessed of great strength, take them up when dead and throw them into mountain caves. One more item must be added. In the following chapter it is narrated that on the south of Mount Meru there grows the gigantic Jambū tree Sudarśana, from which the name of *Jambūdvīpa* is derived. It touches the very skies, and bears fruits of 1115 cubits circumference. 'In falling upon the earth these fruits make a loud noise, and then pour out a silvery juice on the ground. That juice of the Jambū, becoming a river, and passing circuitously round Mount Meru, cometh to (the region of) the Northern Kurus. If the juice of that fruit is quaffed, it conduces to peace of mind. No thirst is felt ever after; decrepitude never weakens them.'

Most Purāṇas give no detailed descriptions of the Uttarakurus, for the number of fabulous peoples inhabiting the other *varṣas* beyond the Himālaya is very great in the Purāṇas, and all these peoples live in a state of happiness denied to the human race.† They were in some degree the equals of the Uttarakurus who, though still regarded as the blessed race, lost something of the interest originally attached to them. There is, however, a description of Uttarakuru in the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* ‡ which is apparently based

* Even in later Pauranic myths we meet with the belief that the sun does not shine in the land of the Uttarakurus; *e.g.* Saṇjñā, the wife of the Sun, escaped in the shape of a mare in order that her husband might not discover her (*Harivaṁśa*, 561 ff.; *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*, ch. 77).

† *Zeitschr. für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, vol. ii. p. 65 ff.

‡ See his translation of that Purāṇa in the *Bibliotheca Indica*, Calcutta, 1904, p. 345.

§ M. Haug, *The Aitareya Brahmana*, Bombay, 1863, vol. ii. p. 518.

‖ *Ib.* p. 527.

* Schwanbeck, *Megasthenis Indica*, Bonn, 1846, p. 117.

† See *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*, tr. p. 282. ‡ Tr. p. 389.

on that contained in the passage of the *Mahābhārata* given above; some details added to it are of no importance.

The principal points in the above accounts of the Uttarakurus seem to be the following. They are a race of superior beings, called *Siddhas*, neither gods nor men. Exempt from suffering, caused by illness or old age, through the juice of the miraculous Jambū tree, they lead a long life of happiness and sensual pleasures, and after death their corpses are removed by miraculous birds to mountain caves. Their country is situated far north, at the border of the known world, and it is made inaccessible to man either by its own virtues or by the petrifying river Śailodā which encircles it. To this picture the *Mahābhārata* adds some traits borrowed from the description of the Golden Age given in the Purānas.* For the Uttarakurus are said to feed on the juice of milk-yielding trees, and to be born as twins, of opposite sexes, who form a couple, just as was the case with primitive men in the first *kṛtayuga*. A similar tendency to ascribe to the Uttarakurus the condition of primitive mankind may be discovered in another passage of the *Mahābhārata*,† where it is stated that originally all women had sexual intercourse with whomsoever they pleased, and that this state of things still prevails in Uttarakuru.

Now assuming, as we are entitled to do, that there was in early times a race of Kurus, related to their famous namesakes in Madhyadeśa, but living outside the limits of India proper, it is easy to imagine how they came to be regarded as the Blessed and their country as a place of bliss. For people look with a kind of awe on neighbouring tribes of whom they have but slight knowledge, and they are wont to ascribe to them superior magical powers, as the Finns do to the Lapps; hence the Uttarakurus, probably, have come to be regarded as *Siddhas*, which term originally denotes one who has acquired *siddhi*, i.e. perfection or magical power, by means of *yoga*. But there was also another factor at work: almost everything connected with the Himālaya seems to partake, in some degree, of the sanctity and even divine character which the Hindus attribute to that gigantic mountain range. When, therefore, the Uttarakurus, whose memory was kept alive and heightened by the fame of their powerful relations, the Kurus of Madhyadeśa, came to be looked upon as superior to common men, their country, situated in the sacred Himālaya and hallowed by it, naturally was imagined as a kind of earthly paradise, full of wonders and free from ills, where the happiness of primitive mankind lingered on to the present day.

This theory of the origin of the belief discussed in this article appears to the present writer preferable to the older opinion, viz. that Uttarakuru was the original home of the Kurus of Madhyadeśa, and that 'the wistful recollections of it idealized it afterwards into a blissful land, where fancy gave itself free scope.' For the belief in question was not restricted to the Kurus, but was common to all Indians; and, besides, such recollections of their ancient home presuppose an intense love of their country, which seems inconsistent with the nature of half-nomadic tribes. At least no such recollections can be instanced from any other of the numerous Indian tribes who all, in some remote past, migrated to India from beyond its borders. See also STATE OF THE DEAD (Hindu).

LITERATURE.—Besides the works quoted in the notes, see Lassen, *Indische Altertumskunde*, vol. i. p. 516 ff. (2nd ed. p. 612 ff.), 1847–61, and *Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, ii. 59 ff.; Scherman, *Materialien zur Gesch. der ind. Visionslitteratur*, 1893.

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* See art. AGES OF THE WORLD (Indian) in vol. i. p. 200 ff.

† *Ādiparvan*, cxxii.

BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Japanese).—**1.** The ancient native religion of Japan, Shinto, had little to say regarding a future life, and the old records or sacred books are practically silent on the subject. The clearest reference to the state of the dead occurs in the *Nihongi* (*Trans. Jap. Soc.* Supp. I. i. 296, London, 1896), where the dead Tamichi appears from his tomb as a serpent and kills his enemies. 'Therefore the men of that time said, "Although dead, Tamichi at last had his revenge. How can it be said that the dead have no knowledge?"' Shinto, in its later developments, has been influenced by Buddhism regarding the future state of the dead. The earlier texts frequently refer to an under world called *Yomi* ('darkness'), the Root-country (*Ne no kuni*), or Bottom-land (*Soko no kuni*). This neutral-tinted Hades is called 'a hideous and polluted land' (*Nihongi*, i. 24), and one prayer invokes protection against 'the unfriendly and savage beings of the Root-country' (Aston, *Shinto*, London, 1905, p. 187). But, though it is not stated to be the region of the dead, the word *yomi* appears to have been used metaphorically for the grave or the state of the dead. There are gods in Yomi, and some of them descended there after death, like Izanami, whom her husband, Izanagi, tried to rescue, according to a myth resembling that of Orpheus and Eurydice (Chamberlain, *Ko-ji-ki*, Yokohama, 1883, p. 36; *Nihongi*, i. 24; for other tales of descents to Yomi, see Aston, 106, 181; Joly, *Legend in Japanese Art*, London, 1908, p. 11). This myth may simply be a reflexion of the belief that mortals, when they died, went to Yomi. Native writers on Shinto have identified Yomi with the state or place of the dead (Dazai Jun [1680–1747], *Trans. Third Inter. Cong. Hist. Rel.*, Oxford, 1908, i. 163; Motoöri [1730–1801]; Aston, 55), but the question is obscure. Generally the gods of Yomi are divinities of death, disease, pestilence, and poverty, and in a *Norito*, or Ritual, offences are described as sent to Yomi by the god Ibuki-do nushi (Aston, 302). In later times, Yomi is regarded as a place of punishment, and is identified with the Buddhist Jigoku, or hell (Joly, 117; Aston, 54, 367).

2. Heaven.—As in most primitive forms of eschatology a difference is made between the future state of men of rank, power, and wealth, and that of the masses of the people, so it was probably in Japan. Izanagi, who was not immortal, after his futile attempt to regain Izanami, died, and went, according to one account, to an island; but, according to another, to heaven, and dwelt in the palace of the Sun. The 'plain of high heaven' is also the place where great men, heroes, mikados, and the like are said to go, there to dwell with the gods. This is in accordance with the later deification of men, whether living or dead (mikados, wise, virtuous, and heroic men), who would then be associated with the heavenly deities, as a class of lesser gods. Later Shintoism, adopting Chinese views of the soul, maintains that, at death, the *kon*, the positive spirit or *yang*, goes to heaven (Aston, 52). *Ame*, or heaven, where the gods dwell, is minutely described in the early records. It lay just over the earth, and was connected with it by the 'floating bridge of heaven' (perhaps the rainbow), and supported by a pillar, though the wind-gods are also described as the pillars of heaven. The tranquil river of heaven is the milky way, where the gods assemble. It has mountains, caves, valleys, streams, groves, fields, trees, and flowers, and all kinds of grain. The rock-cave of heaven, whither the sun-goddess on one occasion retired, is particularly referred to, as well as the rare jewels, the marvellous mirror, and the splendid robes hung on the sacred *sakaki*

tree to tempt her forth. The scenery of the 'plain of high heaven' is that of earth on a more beautiful and extensive scale. (For these details, see *Ko-ji-ki* and *Nihongi*.) Tales of mortals ascending to the sky and remaining there, either through magical powers or by divine favour, are common (Joly, 163, 295).

3. The Eternal Land.—*Toko-yo no kuni*, the Eternal Land, is sometimes spoken of as the place whither certain persons go after death, *e.g.* the god Sukunabikona and a brother of Jimmu, the first Mikado (Aston, 54, 117). This Eternal Land is sometimes identified with Korea or China. From it Tajima Mori brought a fragrant fruit, the orange. The land lay across the sea and took ten years to reach, and on his return he said, 'This Eternal Land is no other than the mysterious realm of gods and genii, to which mortals cannot attain' (*Nihongi*, i. 186–7). In a well-known popular tale the Eternal Land is identified with the palace beneath the waves of the Dragon King of the Sea.

Urashima, having rescued the king's daughter, went thither with her and remained for three years. At the end of that time he left, promising to return, and was given a box which his wife forbade him to open. Having reached his home, he found that over 300 years had elapsed and he was thought to be dead. Forgetting the injunction he opened the box, when a light puff of smoke came from it. This was his soul, and he fell dead (Joly, 382; Aston, 52).

The Eternal Land is also identified with Hōraisan, an island paradise of which Japanese legend and art have much to tell. Hōraisan is the land of everlasting life, where stands Fusan, the mountain of immortality. On it grows a wonderful tree with roots of silver, a trunk of gold, and fruits of rare jewels. The finest flowers and fruits, all unfading, grow there; eternal spring reigns; the air is always sweet, the sky always blue. The place is rarely found by mortals, though many have sought it, for it is visible only for a moment afar off.

One favourite story tells how Wasobiowe reached it after long voyaging and was met there by Jofuku, another mortal visitor, who had fled from a tyrannical emperor under pretence of seeking the herb of immortality, and had found life so pleasant in Hōraisan that he had no wish to return. Wasobiowe also remained there for two hundred years, which lapsed away as in a dream. All things remained as in a perpetual present; there was neither birth, sickness, decay, nor death. The island was peopled by wise men and beautiful women, the elect of the gods, and with them he passed the years with laughter, music, and song. But he tired of this unvarying sweetness and calm, and longed for death or escape. Finding no means of dying, for death was impossible there, he trained a giant stork to carry him, and at last fled away on its back. After many other wanderings he returned to Japan to tell of the wonders of Hōraisan (Brauns, *Jap. Märchen*, Leipzig, 1885, 146; Rinder, *Old-World Japan*, London, 1895, 79; Joly, 126, 239, 386).

4. Western Paradise of Japanese Buddhists.—Several influential sects of Buddhism in Japan, though their teaching is rejected by many other Japanese Buddhists, owe their popularity to their doctrine of the Western Paradise of Amida. This doctrine of Northern Buddhism was first introduced into Japan in definite form by the Jō-dō Shu, or 'Sect of the Pure Land,' and it is plainly expressed in one of the books of the Northern Buddhist canon, honoured and widely read by these sects, the *Hok-ké-kiō*, the Japanese name for the *Saddharma Puṇḍarīka*, an extremely rhetorical and imaginative work. The founder of the Jō-dō sect in Japan was the Buddhist saint, Hōnen (1133–1211), the fundamental tenet of his teaching being belief in the power of the saviour Amida, Lord of Sukhāvatī, the land of purity and bliss in the West. This teaching was based on that of the Chinese founder of the sect, Zendō. Entrance to the pure land of Amida after death was made to depend upon belief in, and repetition of, prayer to Amida; and this simple doctrine, easily understood, at once became popular. According to Hōnen,

'Perfect bliss Amita would not have till he knew that all who would invoke him might be saved. This is his primal vow. Every sentient being has the chance of being saved, since he is living in enlightenment. Whoever calls earnestly upon his name, will enter that realm of purity. Amita Buddha, as in a vision, he shall see coming to him, and at death he shall welcome him with all his saints; nor shall obstacles nor demons keep him back' (Anesaki, 'Hōnen, the Pietist Saint,' *Trans. Third Inter. Cong. Hist. of Rel.*, Oxford, 1908, i. 124 f.).

Even more emphatically is faith in Amida alone taught by the Shin-shiu, or 'True Sect,' which also holds out the reward of the Western Paradise, painting its delights in more attractive colours, while it teaches that not merely at death does Amida take the believer under his protection to conduct him to paradise, but even now, immediately upon his profession of belief. The Nichiren Sect, on the other hand, teaches that a man must work out his own salvation. Amida dwells in this blissful Western Paradise or Pure Land, called Sukhāvatī, as ruler of the blessed dead. In it, said Hōnen,

'There shall be no distinction, no regard to male or female, good or bad, exalted or lowly; none shall fail to have Pure Life, after having called, with complete desire, on Amita. Just as a great stone, if on a ship, may complete a voyage of myriads of miles over the great waters, and yet not sink; so we, though our sins are heavy as giant boulders, are borne to the other shore by Amita's primal vows, not sinking in the sea of birth and death' (Anesaki, i. 125).

The Pure Land is open to all who wish to be re-born there, and this blissful existence is thus made easy for all to whom the necessary discipline for the final attainment of Nirvāna presents endless difficulties, while it has taken the place of Nirvāṇa in practical thought. The Pure Land is thus described in the *Saddharma Puṇḍarīka*:

'There no women are to be found; there sexual intercourse is absolutely unknown; there the sons of Gina, on springing into existence by apparitional birth, are sitting in the undefiled cups of lotuses. And the Chief Amitābha himself is seated on a throne in the pure and nice cup of a lotus, and shines as the Sāla-king' (Kern, *SBE* xxi. 417).

The same work also states that any female, after reading and learning its twenty-second chapter ('Ancient Devotion')

'will, after disappearing from earth, be re-born in the world Sukhāvatī, where the Lord Amitāyas, the Tathāgata dwells, exists, lives, surrounded by a host of Bodhisattvas. There will he (who formerly was a female) appear seated on a throne consisting of the interior of a lotus; no affection, no hatred, no infatuation, no pride, no envy, no wrath, no malignity will vex him.' He becomes a Bodhisattva, his equal is not to be found in the world, including the gods, with the only exception of the Tathāgata (*ib.* 389 ff.; cf. 251–254).

Again, those who write and keep this Sutra

'shall, when they disappear from this world, be re-born in the company of the gods of paradise, and at that birth shall eighty-four thousand heavenly nymphs immediately come near them. Adorned with a high crown, they shall as angels dwell amongst those nymphs' (*ib.* 435).

Vivid descriptions of the Western Paradise abound in the larger and smaller *Sukhāvatīvyūha*, works which are of authority to the Pure Land and Shin-shiu sects (*SBE* xlix. pt. ii., Oxford, 1894). In the smaller work, birth in the Land of Bliss occurs if the name of Buddha Amitābha is merely repeated for a few nights before death; and it asserts that birth there is not a reward and result of good works in earthly life (*op. cit.* 98 f.). But in the larger work the doctrine of merit is not thus neglected. According to both works, the Happy or Blissful Land is a state where there is neither mental nor bodily pain, for pleasure is universal; the name of hell is unknown, and the length of life there is immeasurable. It is adorned with terraces, and enclosed on every side with the four gems, gold, silver, beryl, and crystal. It contains lotus lakes adorned with gems, on their banks grow trees of gems, in their waters float lotus flowers of various colours. There are great rivers of different kinds, with waters of different sweet odours, bearing up flowers of different perfumes and adorned with different gems. The dwellers there bathe in the waters, which rise exactly to the height they desire, and are exactly of the temperature they prefer. Exquisite music is

caused by the flowing of the rivers, by the trees and bells, by innumerable birds singing in concert. Every one born in that land is endowed with strength, dominion, and accumulation of virtue, and obtains dress, ornaments, gardens, palaces, and every enjoyment of touch, taste, smell, and sound. Whatever food they desire they enjoy without even tasting it. Or if they desire musical instruments, or ornaments, or a palace, these appear before them; and in such palaces they dwell and enjoy themselves, surrounded by myriads of Apsarases. Language and metaphor are exhausted in these two works to set forth the bliss of this glorious, fertile, and beautiful Paradise. Probably the original source of the conception of the Land of Bliss was the Brāhmanic teaching regarding the city of Varuna in the west, sometimes called *Sukhā*, or 'the Happy' (Max Müller, introd. *SBE* xlix. pt. ii. p. xxii). Many Japanese works have been composed on the Western Paradise of Amitābha.

See, further, Buddhist section of this article, p. 687[a].

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J. A. MACCULLOCH.

BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Persian).—The Persian tradition concerning an abode of the blest on earth has given rise to much confusion through its wide-spread interpretation as a Flood legend, an additional element of complication being the divergent theories regarding the original character of its hero, the Indo-Iranian Yama-Yima. In view of this confusion it seems best to give first, without comment, the data of the Avesta and Pahlavi literatures, then the spread of the belief to other religious systems and its possible parallel in Norse mythology, and finally to discuss the meaning of the legend.

1. Data of the Avesta, etc.—The earliest source for the Iranian legend of the abode of the blest on earth is the second part of *Vendīdād* ii., which falls into two parts, 1–20 treating of Yima and his Golden Age, and 21–43 devoted to Yima's *vara*, or enclosure, which will here be considered as constituting the abode of the blest.

This chapter may be summarized as follows (cf. also the analysis on the basis of textual criticism and the tr. by Geldner in Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, xxv. 179–192). Yima was the first of mortals, excepting Zoroaster, to whom Ahura Mazda taught his religion (1–2); but on his confession that he was 'neither formed nor learned to remember and to sustain the faith,' Ahura Mazda urged him 'to further creatures, to increase creatures, and be the protector, guardian, and overseer of creatures,' to all of which Yima agreed, declaring that 'in my kingdom there shall be neither cold wind nor hot, neither disease nor death' (3–6). In the first 300 years of Yima's reign 'the earth was full of cattle small and great, of men, and dogs, and birds, and fires red and blazing,' so that he was compelled to go further south and enlarge the earth by a third (8–11). In 600 years he was forced to enlarge the earth by two-thirds, and in 900 years by three-thirds, still proceeding southward (12–20). Here ends the first section of the chapter. In the second part, which here concerns us more immediately, Ahura Mazda and the 'spiritual angels' meet Yima and the 'best men' in the holy region of Airyanam Vaējō, which may perhaps be identified with Azarbaijan (Jackson, *Zoroaster*, New York, 1899, pp. 193–197),* and here the Deity warns Yima (21–24) of the coming of terrible winters (on the translation of this difficult passage see Bartholomae, *Zum altiran. Wörterb.*, Strassburg, 1906, p. 98 f.). Yima is accordingly commanded to make a *vara* a *čaretu* (according to the tradition, 2 miles) square, which should serve as an abode for men and cattle, and in which should be running water in a course a *hāðra* (according to the tradition, 1 mile) long, with birds along its banks. To this *vara*, moreover, should be taken the germs of cattle, human beings, dogs, birds, fires, all animals, all plants, and all foods, and these germs should be in pairs (*miθwaire*) and undecaying 'all the time that these men shall be in the *varas*' (*vareṣva*, possibly, however, only a *plurale majestatis*); while no sort of deformity, disease, or iniquity should here be found (25–29). In the upper part of the *vara* were to be nine streets (*pereθwō*), in the middle six, and in the lower three, the first containing 1000 germs of human beings, the second 600, and the lower 300; and the *vara* was also to have 'a shining door, having its own light on the inner side' (30) as well as 'houses, and a cellar, and a forecourt, and a bastian, and a circumvallation' (26). This *vara*, which was to be constructed by being 'stamped apart with the heels and dug asunder with the hands' (31), was accordingly made by Yima (32–38). The illumination of the *vara* was from 'lights self-determined and world-determined (*i.e.* eternal and transitory). Only once (each year) does one behold the setting and the rising stars, and moon, and sun; and they think that what is a year is (but) a day. When 40 years have elapsed, from two human beings are born two human beings, twins, both male and female; so (also) of them that are of animal kind. And these human beings, who are in the *vara* that Yima made, live with most happy life' (40–41). The religion of Ahura Mazda was brought to the *vara* by the bird Karshiptar (the spiritual lord of all birds and acquainted with speech; cf. *Bundahišn* xix. 16, xxiv. 11), and the temporal and spiritual lords are Urvatat-nara (one of the three earthly sons of Zoroaster and the head of the agricultural class; cf. *Bundahišn* xxix. 5, xxxii. 5) and Zoroaster himself (42–43).

The remaining Avesta material of relevance in the present connexion adds little to the main source just summarized. Airyanam Vaējō is described as the first country created by Ahura Mazda (*Vendīdād* i. 2), and in it, as a region pre-eminently holy, sacrifice was offered by Zoroaster (*Yašt* v. 104–106, ix. 25–27, xvii. 45–47; see also Jackson, *loc. cit.*), and even by Ahura Mazda (*Yašt* v. 17–19, xv. 2–4); and there are a number of allusions to the Golden Age of Yima's reign, though the first section of *Vendīdād* ii. shows that this Golden Age is a tradition separate originally from that of the *vara*, to which it forms a *quasi*-prelude (see *Yasna* ix. 4–5; *Yašt* ix. 8–11, xv. 15–16, xvii. 28–31, xix. 32–33; *Aogemadaēčā*, 94–95; cf. also the Pahlavi *Jāmāspī-Nāmak*, ed. and tr. Modi, Bombay, 1903, p. 113 f.).

The Pahlavi literature adds considerable information to our knowledge of the Persian abode of the blest on earth. The account given in *Vendīdād* ii. is summed up briefly in *Dīnkarṭ* VII. i. 20–24. *Būndahišn* xxix. 14, states that '[the enclosure] formed by Yim is in the middle of Pārs, in Sruvā; thus, they say that what Yim formed is below Mount Yimakān' (see West, *SBE* v. 120, note 5, and Justi, *Bundehesh*, Leipzig, 1868, p. 143); but *Dīnā-ī Māīnōg-ī Khraṭ* lxvi. 15–19, says that 'the enclosure formed by Yim is constructed in Aīrān-vējō, below the earth'* (so also *Būndahišn* xxxii. 5, and the Persian *Rivāyat*, ed. and tr. Sachau, *JRAS*, 1868, p. 229 ff., esp. p. 253), adding that there men lived 300 years. The same treatise describes the blessedness of Airyanam Vaējō (xxiv. 17–35), where, despite the evils of many serpents and ten months of winter, men live 300 years, with one child every 40 years, keeping the primitive faith, and virtuous.

The real *crux* in the interpretation of the *vara* is constituted by the passages *Dāṭistān-ī Dēnīk* xxxvii. 94–95; *Dīnā-ī Māīnōg-ī Khraṭ* xxxvii. 27–31; *Bahman Yašt* iii. 55 (and its Persian paraphrase; cf. West, *SBE* v. p. lix); *Dīnkarṭ* VII. ix. 1–4, and *Jāmāspī-Nāmak*, tr. Modi, p. 118.

The most complete of these passages, with which all the rest agree, is *Dāṭistān-ī Dēnīk* xxxvii. 94–95 (tr. West, *SBE* xviii. 109 f.): 'One (of the proofs of the ultimate triumph of Ahura Mazda over Ahriman) is this, that is, even that prodigious devastation of which it is declared that it happens through the rain of Malkôsh, when, through snow, immoderate cold, and the unproductiveness of the world, most mortals die; and even

* Airyanam Vaējō is also identified by Darmesteter (*Le Zend-Avesta*, Paris, 1892–93, ii. 5–6) with Arrān, the modern Karabagh in Trans-Caucasia, and by Marquart (*Ērānšahr*, Berlin, 1901, p. 155) with Chorasmia; but, as Bartholomae very pertinently remarks (*Altiran. Wörterb.*, Strassburg, 1904, col. 1314), 'es ist nicht zu bestimmen, wohin man es verlegt hat.'

* West (*SBE* xxiv. 109, note 8) takes this to imply 'that its position could no longer be discovered on earth.' The passage *Vendīdād* ii. 31–32 should, however, be considered in this connexion.

the things attainable by mortals are attended with threatenings of scarcity. Afterwards—as among the all-wise, preconcerted remedies of the beneficent spirit such a remedy was established that there is one of the species of lands that is called "the enclosure formed by Yim," through which, by orders issued by Yim, the splendid and rich in flocks, the son of Vivangha, the world is again filled—men of the best races, animals of good breeds, the loftiest trees, and most savoury foods, in that manner came back miraculously for the restoration of the world; which new men are substituted for the former created beings, which is an upraising of the dead.'

The tables of Zoroastrian chronology drawn up by West *SBE* xlvii. 28–31) show that the accession of Yima took place *anno ante religionem* 2717=3347 B.C., that he was slain *anno ante religionem* 2000=2630 B.C., and that the winter of Malkôsh (Avesta Mahrkûša) was to take place in the century *anno religionis* 1400–1500=A.D. 770–870, so that the *vara* of Yima would have lasted over 3500 years.

2. In other religious systems.—The legend of Yima's *vara* was borrowed by Mandæanism, and has also been claimed to exist in Judæo-Christian apocalyptic literature. In the former system, according to oral traditions collected by Petermann and Siouffi (Brandt, *Mandäische Religion*, Leipzig, 1889, p. 154), the earth, after the depopulating catastrophes of the end of the world, will be re-peopled from משונית כושמא, a mysterious and invisible, but transitory, locality upon the earth, where dwell perfectly righteous, religious, and happy men who die without pain. Other sources locate this mystic world either beyond the northern mountain range, or, as in the scanty and late allusions in the *Genzâ* (r. 29, 18; 302, 18; 338 ult. –339, 5), regard it as floating in the clouds (Brandt, *op. cit.* pp. 37 f., 53, 60 f.). In this Mandæan משונית כושמא Brandt (*op. cit.* p. 154) sees, probably rightly, a reminiscence of Yima's *vara*. As regards the Judæo-Christian borrowing, it will be sufficient to refer to Böklen, *Verwandtschaft der jüd.-christl. mit der pars. Eschatologie*, Göttingen, 1902, pp. 136–144, who mentions Commodian's *Instructiones*, II. i. 20 ff., and *Carmen apologeticum*, 941 ff., the *Narratio Zosimi*, ch. 10, as well as the *Ethiopic Conflicts of the Holy Apostles*, even though it seems to the present writer that the resemblances here noted by Böklen are too general in character, and too near akin to what would naturally occur to one describing a place of ideal bliss, to be positively claimed as borrowed from Iranian belief. An analogue to the legend of Yima's *vara* has been sought, as common property of the Indo-Germanic peoples, by Rydberg (*Teutonic Mythology*, Eng. tr., London, 1906, pp. 306–390, esp. pp. 379–388) in Norse mythology. With the *vara* he compares the Norse *Jörð lifanda manna* ('earth of living men'), or *Ódáinsakr* ('acre of the not-dead'), a land either subterranean or on the surface of the earth, but in either case almost impossible for living men to reach. In this realm, which was ruled by Gudmund (Mimir) and enclosed by bulwarks that no disease, death, or age could surmount, and where none could die, men lived many generations (cf. also Meyer, *German. Mythol.*, Berlin, 1891, pp. 126 f., 134 f.). Furthermore, the final cataclysm will be preceded by the *fimbolvetr*, a three years' winter with no summer, during which Lif and Lifthrasir ('Life' and 'Immortality') conceal themselves in Hoddmimer's grove, whence, after all the rest of mankind have been destroyed, they will emerge and re-people the earth (Söderblom, *La Vie future d'après le mazdéisme*, Paris, 1901, pp. 204–221; de la Saussaye, *Religion of the Teutons*, 1902, p. 351 f.; see also below, p. 709 f.). While Christian elements have almost certainly been incorporated in this Norse account (de la Saussaye, *loc. cit.*; Meyer, *op. cit.* p. 163), and though it would be, in the present writer's opinion, a scarcely warranted assumption to suppose that the Norse and Iranian traditions form part of an Indo-Germanic religion, it may be, nevertheless, that the two legends of an earthly abode of the blest serve to illustrate each other. Arising independently and under different conditions, they might yet be parallel in their psychological development.

The most important question of parallelism, however, is with India. Yima, as is well known, is an Indo-Iranian figure, finding his counterpart in the Indian Yama (cf. Spiegel, *Arische Periode*, Leipzig, 1887, pp. 243–256). The original nature of Yama has been the subject of much speculation (cf. the data and references in Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, Strassburg, 1897, pp. 171–174); but, in the writer's opinion, it may be regarded as admitting of little doubt that, whatever theosophical and even astro-mythological attributes were given him, he was, primarily, as the *Atharvaveda* (XVIII. iii. 13) says, 'he who of mortals was the first to die' (*yo mamâra prathamo mârtyânâm*). He is thus the king of the dead (*Rigveda*, IX. cxiii. 7 ff., x. 14), for whom 'may Yama there mete out abodes' (*'trâ yamaḥ sâdanâ te minotu*, X. xviii. 13), 'there' obviously being his realm in 'the inmost recess of the sky' (*avarodhanaṁ divaḥ*, IX. xiii. 8). But this realm of 'King Yama' is not the *vara* of Yima, the one being celestial, and the other, as we have seen, terrestrial. The two have in common only the one point, that Yama-Yima is their king, the nexus evidently being that, to the Indian, Yama, as the first mortal, is king of all who later die; while, to the Iranian, Yima, as the primeval man, fittingly was king in the Golden Age, and so ruler of the abode of the blest as well.

The *vara* of Yima has, however, been brought into direct connexion with Indian legend by Reinaud (*Mémoire sur l'Inde*, Paris, 1849, pp. 346–350), who identifies it with the mythical city of Yamakoṭi ('Yama's Castle'), mentioned in late Sanskrit astronomical works. This material is summarized by al-Bîrûnî (*India*, tr. Sachau, London, 1888, i. 267 f.), who states, on the basis of the Hindu astronomers, that 'in the four cardinal directions with relation to this line [which divides the earth into dry and wet halves] there are four great cities: Yamakoṭi in the east, Romaka [Rûm, Byzantium] in the west, Laṅkâ [usually identified with Ceylon] in the south, Siddhapura [a mythical "City of the Blest"] in the north. . . . When the sun rises over the line which passes both through Meru and Laṅkâ, that moment is noon to Yamakoṭi, midnight to the Greeks, and evening to Siddhapura. . . . A man in Yamakoṭi observes one identical star rising above the western horizon, whilst a man in Rûm at the same time observes it rising above the eastern horizon.' Yamakoṭi is the antipodal point to Rûm (*ib.* pp. 272, 303), and 'is,' according to Ya'qûb and al-Fazârî, 'the country where is the city Târa [Reinaud would read Bârah (=Vâra) for Târaḥ, *i.e.* بارة for تارة] within a sea. . . As *koṭi* means "castle" and Yama is the angel of death, the word reminds me of Kangdiz, which, according to the Persians, had been built by Kai Kâ'ûs or Jam [Yima] in the most remote east, behind the sea, . . . for *diz* means in Persian "castle," as *koṭi* in the Indian language' (*ib.*, p. 303 f.). Kangdiz (the Kanha of *Yašt* v. 54) is, however, distinctly described as separate from Airân-vêj, so closely associated with the *vara* (*Bûndahišn* xxix. 4 f., xxxii. 5; *Dînâ-i Mâînôg-i Khraṭ* lxii. 12–15; *Sad Dar* x. 7), and as 'in the direction of the east, at many leagues from the bed of the wide-formed ocean towards that side' (*Bûndahišn* xxix. 10). Hyde (*Hist. religionis veterum Persarum*, Oxford, 1700, p. 173) records, from a manuscript of the *Almagest*, a mythical city of Jamgard ('City of Yama=Yima') on the equator to the extreme east; and Abul Fidâ describes Jamkût, or, as the Persians called it, Jamgard, as on the equator, to the extreme east, and antipodal to the (classical) Islands of the Blest (Reinaud, p. 350). Yamakoṭi seems to the present writer to be a specifically Indian development. At all events, the data do not appear to him to warrant any real connexion or kinship between Yamakoṭi and Yima's *vara*—the location is too different, the chronological difficulties in any hypothesis of connexion are too great, and the development of Yama and Yima in India and Iran is too divergent from the Indo-Iranian period onward to render plausible the theory of actual relationship of the two mythical places, which, after all, can no more be localized than can the 'seacoast of Bohemia.'

3. Meaning of the legend.—The view is widely current that the story of Yima and his *vara* is a legend of the Deluge—a theory defended with much learning by Kohut (*ZDMG* xxv. 61–68), Usener (*Die Sintflutsagen*, Bonn, 1899, pp. 208–212), Geldner (Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, *loc. cit.*), Winternitz, ('Flutsagen des Alterthums und der Naturvölker,' in *Mittheilungen der anthropol. Gesellschaft in*

Wien, xxxi. 328 f.), Darmesteter (*op. cit.* ii. 19 f., iii. pp. lviii–lx), and Lindner ('Die iran. Flutsage,' in *Festgruss an Rudolf von Roth*, Stuttgart, 1893, pp. 213–216). This hypothesis is untenable, as has been shown by Bishop Casartelli (*Philosophy of the Mazdayasnian Religion under the Sassanids*, Eng. tr., Bombay, 1889, p. 198 f.), and especially by Söderblom (*op. cit.* pp. 167–222, where will be found a rich collection of parallels and full citation of authorities on both sides). Not only is the *vara* of Yima eschatological in purpose, and existing for centuries, but certain other chosen heroes, as Windischmann observes (*Zoroastr. Studien*, Berlin, 1863, pp. 244–249), are also immortal on this earth (*Bundahišn* xxix. 5 f.), though their domains do not constitute, merely because of their personal immortality, any abode of the blest.

The Iranian legend of Yima, who is far more real than his Indian counterpart, is, in the present writer's opinion, more primitive than the Vedic view itself, even though the Iranian records are, in their present form, of a late period, probably a round millennium posterior to those portions of the *Rigveda* which deal with the apotheosized Yama. The Iranian tradition may also be of more than eschatological significance, for it would seem to be a blending of two *motifs*, the Golden Age and the Abode of the Blest, plus a migration tradition of distinct value. The first two *motifs* have already been sufficiently discussed, but a brief note may be appended on the story as a migration legend. Airyanam Vaējō, the scene of the Golden Age of Yima (see above, p. 702[b]), was, despite its sanctity and beauty, a land where, as the *Vendīdād* states (i. 3), 'there are ten winter months, two summer months. . . . There is the centre of winter, there the heart of winter.' From this region, according to *Vendīdād* ii., Yima, after 600 years, was forced by increase of population to go southward, and to repeat the process after 900 years. This can be explained only as the southward migration of the Iranians (very probably, indeed, of the Indo-Iranians), and it would seem as though the tradition which locates the *vara* in 'the middle of Pārs' marks this place as the centre of the Iranian peoples when they ceased their wandering. At the same time Airyanam Vaējō was retained in memory as the realm of the Golden Age, and in it, by a transfer of thought which would not be unnatural, was localized the *vara*, the abode of the blest. The migration thus suggested would serve to confirm the theory, now so generally held, of the wandering of the Indo-Iranian stock from the early home of the Indo-Germanic races in Europe through Armenia into north-western Persia, and so south through the mountain passes leading to the Panjāb. This wandering, too, accounts for the fame of Yima as a builder of cities, among them Sārū or Hāmadān, Ctesiphon, and the ruin still known as the Taḳt-i Jamšīd, or 'Throne of Jamshīd,' at Persepolis (Justi, *Iran. Namenbuch*, Marburg, 1895, p. 144; Windischmann, *op. cit.* p. 36; Mirkhond, *Hist. of the Early Kings of Persia*, tr. Shea, London, 1832, p. 104 f.; Jackson, *Persia Past and Present*, New York, 1906, p. 310).

LITERATURE.—This has been given in detail in the article.

LOUIS H. GRAY.

BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Semitic).—In the earliest period known to us the dead were all thought to go irrevocably into the under world, and to remain there perpetually. The life of the under world was most gloomy and unattractive, and it was shared alike by all, regardless of their conduct in this life. Among the Semites this view prevailed until within a century or two of the Christian era. While this conception was entertained, the 'blest' were believed to be those happy primitive men who had lived in the Golden Age, when there was no sin or misery, and when the gods had been on familiar terms with men. Men had then dwelt in the abode of the gods.

The earliest literary expression of this view is found in Gn 2 and 3, a part of the J document (9th cent. B.C.). Some of the material of this document is, however, far older, and reflects as its still recognizable original the picture of a primitive Semitic oasis in Arabia. The garden is the oasis. It is known to be the dwelling of deity by the striking contrast between its luxurious vegetable life and the surrounding desert. The tree of knowledge and of life grows in its midst. This is the palm.* God comes and walks there as in a park; there man and woman dwell without labour or suffering. God, men, and animals form one primitive community, and each talks with the others. Men have not yet begun to beget children or to wear clothing. In other words, the state of blessedness here pictured is thought to be anterior to the dawn of civilization. There are many reasons for believing that this conception is a half-distorted recollection from primitive Semitic days. It corresponds with the main features of that primitive Semitic civilization in which a cult peculiarly Semitic was evolved. Traces of this cult are found in every Semitic nation.† Some of the conceptions of this primitive paradise are also traceable in widely separated Semitic sources. The conceptions just described are found in the earlier stratum of the Biblical story (for there are two strata, one by J^1 and the other by J^2). This older stratum consists of Gn $2^{4b-9.\ 15-25}$ $3^{1-19.\ 21.\ 23}$. In this form of the narrative there was but one tree, and the only indication in this portion that the story had anything to do with Babylonia is the fact that the garden is called 'Eden,' a word evidently identical with *edennu*, the Bab. word for alluvial plain. In the portion afterward added by J^2 (Gn 2^{10-14} $3^{22.\ 24}$), the garden is definitely located in the region of Babylonia by the mention of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.‡

Although the Babylonian literature thus far recovered contains no complete story parallel to this one, many of the elements of this narrative are found in Bab. poetry and art. Thus in the Gilgamesh epic there is a story of a primitive man, Eabani, who was made, like Adam, of a bit of earth or clay, and who lived a primitive life, without clothing, among the animals until he was enticed away by a woman (cf. *KB* vi. 121–129). The palm as the sacred tree appears in various forms, sometimes naturally drawn, and sometimes greatly conventionalized, in all periods of Bab. and Assyr. art, from archaic seals to late palace decorations. From Eridu, where there was a sacred palm tree, comes the story of Adapa, who was defrauded of food which would have made him like a god (cf. *KB* vi. 93–101). The cherubim, which in Genesis guard the entrance to Eden, have their counterpart in the winged lion and bull deities which in Mesopotamia guarded the entrance to palaces and temples. It is clear, therefore, that the elements of this primitive story were known in Babylonia. Perhaps the original story reached the Hebrews by way of that country,

* See Barton, *Semitic Origins*, 93–96.

† See Barton, *op. cit.* chs. iii.–vii.

‡ As to the identity of Gihon and Pison, views diverge. Delitzsch (*Wo lag das Paradies?*) identified these with two canals, one of which was near Babylon, holding that Cush was the Kassite country to the east of the Persian Gulf. Haupt (*Ueber Land und Meer*, 1894–1895, No. 15) identified the Pison with the Red Sea and the Gihon with the Nile, regarding Cush as Nubia. Hommel (*Aufsätze und Abhandlungen*, 326–340) identifies all the rivers except the Euphrates with wadys in Arabia. Gunkel holds all the rivers to be heavenly rivers suggested by the Milky Way (*Genesis*, p. 33).

for the primitive oasis is changed into a garden, the name of which is Babylonian.

It seems that a form of this story was naturalized at Tyre—a form in which Tyre, or the temple there, was regarded as Paradise. Our witness to this is the prophet Ezekiel (28^{12-17} $31^{8, 9}$). As the story was preserved in Tyre, or at least as Ezekiel conceived it, Paradise was a garden, but it was situated on a mountain. Its tree was no longer a palm, but a cedar. In this garden were many precious stones, and, if we may connect with it Ezekiel's description of a holy mountain in ch. 47, a river flowed out of it. Ezekiel's picture modifies the primitive conception of the oasis still more than does the account in Genesis. It corresponds strikingly to the description of the sacred abode of Humbaba, the god of Elam, in the fifth tablet of the Gilgamesh epic. In connexion with that was a grove of sacred cedars. Out of the mountain on which it was situated a sacred river ran, and here divine voices were heard (cf. *KB* vi. 437, 441, 573). Cuneiform inscriptions recovered at Susa in recent years show that the sign for cedar tree was there a part of their deity's name. Probably this portion of the epic, or the story which lies behind it, had influenced the Tyrian conception of Paradise. This primitive paradise was thought by both Babylonians and Hebrews to have been lost by the dawn of civilization. In Genesis a serpent tempted woman to eat the fruit of the sacred tree, and she effectually tempted man. The motive is that they may become like gods, knowing good and evil. 'Knowing good and evil' in Dt 1^{39} is equivalent to having reached the age of puberty. The result of the sinful act of Adam and Eve is that they perceive that they are naked, *i.e.* become conscious of sex. Clothing is invented, and child-bearing begins.* It is clear, therefore, that this story connected the loss of the Golden Age with the dawning of the consciousness of sex. The Midrash Rabba, *Genesis*, § 20, holds that the serpent was an emblem of the sexual passion. Their sacred tree, the palm, was also bi-sexual, and its fertilization was a sacred act.† Whether the serpent and the tree were or were not consciously used because of symbolic significance, one element in the Biblical story—and it is the most important element—was the idea that primitive paradise was lost by the union of man and woman.‡ The story of Eabani, quoted above, shows that this conception was present in Babylonia also. Probably, therefore, this was the primitive Semitic view.

In Babylonia there was also another conception of the abode of the blest. It is found in a document much older than the J narrative, but it is culturally of a later origin than the story of Paradise. According to this conception the abode of the gods is an island in the sea. On this island Par-napishtim, the hero of the Bab. deluge, and his wife had been admitted to dwell, and thither Gilgamesh was permitted to make a journey, from which he returned. The road to this island was a long journey, in the course of which one came to a great pass in the mountains of *Mashu*. This was guarded by scorpion-men. After this pass came a long road of midnight darkness. At last one came out to a 'park of precious stones,' after which a bitter river had to be crossed. Next came the 'waters of death,' beyond which the divine island lay (*KB* vi. 211–229). It was formerly thought that the *Mashu* mountains were to be looked for in Arabia, as was the 'park of precious stones,' that the 'bitter river' was the Persian Gulf, that the 'waters of death' were the Arabian sea, and that the happy isle lay to the south-east of Babylonia (cf. *KB* vi. 467, 469. 473). Jensen, however, has proposed a different view. He now holds that the mountains of *Mashu* were the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon ranges; that the 'park of precious stones' was on the Phœnician coast; the Mediterranean was the 'bitter river'; the 'waters of death' lay to the westward of the Straits of Gibraltar; and the abode of the gods was in the Atlantic Ocean (cf. *KB* vi. 575 ff. and *Gilgamesch-Epos in der Weltliteratur*, i. 24, 34, and Map ii.). This view has been accepted by Zimmern (*KAT*^{3} 573 ff.). One strong reason in Jensen's mind for this view is his belief that the Gilgamesh epic is based on a sun myth, and the sun travels from east to west. Gilgamesh was told, it is true, when he was desirous of crossing the dreadful waters, that only Shamash (the sun) crossed them. In favour of Jensen's view, too, is the fact that Ezekiel speaks of a garden in which are precious stones at Tyre. This would correspond to Jensen's location of the 'park of precious stones.' The conception of the abode of the blest just outlined is intermediate between that embodied in the story of the Garden of Eden and that which is described below. The story of primitive Paradise held that man once had a blest abode with the gods on earth, but had lost it. The Par-napishtim and Gilgamesh stories hold that it is still possible that one or two ancient heroes may have attained the happy isle, and found a blest abode with the gods.

A third view as to the abode of the blest on earth developed among the Jews in the two centuries before Christ, in connexion with the Messianic hope. It was believed that the Messianic kingdom would be established, but the living Israelites to enjoy it were but few in comparison with the great host that had died. The author of Is 26, therefore, writing about B.C. 334, declared that departed Israelites should be raised from Sheol (Is 26^{19}) to share in this kingdom. This reversed the time-honoured conception with reference to the dead, and was by no means universally accepted, as Ps 88^{10} and 115^{17} show. It was, however, accepted by the author of Enoch 1–36, who wrote B.C. 200–170, and who thought that dead Israelites would be raised to enjoy a Messianic kingdom of peace and justice. This kingdom on the earth would in itself be an abode of the blest. Its capital was to be at Jerusalem (25^6). Those who attained it would enjoy lives like the patriarchs (25^6), or everlasting lives (5^9), though 'everlasting' is elsewhere defined as five hundred years (10^{10}). (For later conceptions of the Messianic kingdom as an abode of the blest on earth, see MESSIAH and KINGDOM OF GOD.)

When the Messianic kingdom would come, however, was uncertain, and this writer accordingly conceived of another earthly abode for the blest until the resurrection should occur. In ch. 22 he gives an extended description of the under world. This he pictures as divided into four parts. One of these is for the very wicked, another for the less wicked, another for the good, and the last for the supremely good. There are thus thought to be two subterranean abodes of the blest in Sheol. All these dead, except the very wicked, are to be raised. Sheol is but a temporary abode for all except the most desperate; but while there the good enter in some degree upon their delights, and the wicked upon their torments. Although this elaborate

* See Jastrow, 'Adam and Eve in Babylonian Literature,' *AJSL* xv. 193–214; Barton, *Semitic Origins*, 93 ff.; and Whatham, 'The Outward Form of the Original Sin,' *Amer. Jour. of Rel. Psychology*, i. 268–287.

† Barton, *op. cit.* 78 ff., 92 ff.

‡ The word 'Paradise,' by which Eden is frequently called, is of Iranian origin. In Avesta it is *pairi-dažza*, 'encircling wall' (Vend. iii. 18). It passed into Neo-Babylonian, Aramaic, post-Exilic Hebrew, Neo-Hebrew, Armenian, Persian, Kurdish, Greek, and Arabic as a word for a park or splendid garden. In the OT it is found in Neh 2^8, Ca 4^{13}, Ec 2^5.

division of the under world into four parts is found in no later writer, the conception that the righteous, while waiting there, entered upon their anticipated enjoyments, appears in at least one later apocalypse (cf. 4 Ezr $7^{75\text{-}121}$).* This abode of the blest was, however, temporary; they occupied it only while awaiting the resurrection. In later Judaism, the abode of the blest is thought to be in a Messianic kingdom of so supernatural a character that it can hardly be called earthly, and it is often thought to be in heaven, while in the Qur'ān Paradise has become altogether heavenly. The conceptions of the Jewish heavenly abode combine elements from the earthly Garden of Eden with elements taken from the sacred city, Jerusalem, while the Muhammadan Paradise is a transfigured oasis.

Amid the tangle of conceptions met with in Egypt, where myths from the different nomes mingled inextricably after having kept their separate existence for many centuries, four conceptions as to the abode of the blest can be traced. None of these preserves, like the primitive Semitic story of Paradise, the memory of a far-off oasis. The people of each nome seem to have thought that their god created the world and mankind, and all thought of man as having always lived by the Nile (cf. Maspero, *Dawn of Civilization*, 156 ff., and Steindorff, *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, 35 ff.). In Egypt, however, there was thought to have been a Golden Age, when the gods lived on familiar terms with men, and men were happy and blest. This age of gods and demi-gods corresponds in general to the Semitic traditions of Paradise. Two other conceptions place that abode of the blest on earth, while the third puts it in the heavens. We are concerned here only with the earthly abodes.

According to the earliest of these, the dead lived in the cemeteries, which were for the most part on the edge of the desert to the west of the Nile, and were veritable cities of the dead. There they formed communities by themselves, each ruled over by a special spirit or deity. Life here was lived under the same conditions and the same form as life in the land of the living. Each needed his body, which was preserved by mummifying, and each needed food, drink, and the various utensils which had been of use in life. Death had, however, petrified all—the child remained a child; the man, a man; the greybeard, a greybeard. The same organization existed there which existed among the living—the man ruled the wife, was served by servants, performed the same duties and engaged in the same recreations as when alive. For the most part the dead remained in the narrow confines of their own city, but by day they might leave their narrow house to roam over the earth. They were then subject to the same dangers of attack from enemies, poisonous snakes, scorpions, and crocodiles as when alive. The dead grudged the living their happiness, and at times came back to interfere with them. Their great opportunity was sickness, when special charms were needed to ward off their influence.†

This conception made no distinction between the good and the wicked dead. It regarded all as going to one place. It corresponds with the non-ethical conception of the early Semites, except that the abode of the dead was placed in the western desert instead of in the under world. Another Egyptian conception, also non-ethical, regarded the abode of the dead as in the under world. Beneath the flat earth lay another region called *Duat*. By day this region was dark and gloomy; but at night, when the sun had set upon the earth, this nether land was illuminated by its rays. Like Egypt, it was characterized by the flowing of a long river through its midst, on either bank of which were deep caverns in which the dead dwelt. When the sun arrived in this land at night, there was thought to be great rejoicing. 'The departed who are in their halls, in their caverns, praise the sun; their eyes are opened, their heart is full of felicity when they behold the sun; they shout for joy when his body is over them.'* It was only as the Osiris myth transformed early Egyptian ideas of eschatology that an ethical element was introduced, and an abode of the blest, as distinguished from the wicked, was conceived. The idea of its location was, however, indistinct. It was sometimes placed vaguely in the West, but was more often thought to be in heaven.

See also STATE OF THE DEAD (Egyptian).

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GEORGE A. BARTON.

BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Slavonic).—The ideas of the pagan Slavs concerning the state of the dead are known to us only from indirect testimony and from the evidence of surviving folk-belief. While some mediæval chroniclers deny that the Slavs had any conception of a future life (which is unlikely), others freely assert it, and there is no reason to doubt the existence of definite beliefs on the subject (see Schafarik, *Slav. Alterthümer*, Leipzig, 1843, i. 538; ANCESTOR-WORSHIP [Slavonic]). Three existing words denote the abode of the dead—*Nav*, *Raj*, and *Peklo*. The two last now denote heaven and hell respectively, but *Raj* evidently denoted originally a pagan paradise. *Nav* denotes the place of the dead in one chronicler, who says that 'Krok went into the *Nav*,' while the god of the dead, or Pluto, is called *Nya* by the Polish chronicler Dlugosz, who says that the people ask him to carry them after death 'in meliores inferni sedes.' *Nav* may have denoted the abode of the dead in its general aspect. *Peklo*, though it now means hell, seems originally to have denoted a subterranean place of warmth. *Raj* is still known as the eastern home of the sun beyond the ocean, perhaps an island, where the souls of little children dwell, playing among the trees and gathering golden fruits. Spirits not yet embodied and spirits after their disembodiment also live there. It is the place where birds and insects go in autumn, and there are stored the types and seeds of all things on earth. No winter or cold winds are known there. These are the reflexion of earlier pagan ideas of paradise. Folk-belief also speaks of the Isle *Buyán*, itself synonymous with *Raj*. It also is the home of the sun, as well as of the mythological personifications of nature powers, of mythical animals, *e.g.* the snake older than all snakes, and of the divine maiden Zaryā, who sits under a dripping oak. Here is also the magic stone Alatuir, referred to in many charms, from beneath which flow mystic rivers with healing powers. A

* See also R. H. Charles, *Eschatology, Hebrew, Jewish, and Christian*, p. 295.

† See Steindorff, *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, p. 116 ff.

* See Steindorff, *op. cit.* p. 126 ff.

sacred city hidden beneath deep waters, reached by 'Baty's road,' and inhabited by the Holy Elders (the dead), is spoken of.

But there must also have existed ideas of a mountain abode of the dead or a heavenly paradise reached by a mountain of glass or iron, difficult to climb. The nail-clippings of the dead man, or bear's claws, were buried with him to enable him to climb it. Among the Poles exists the belief that lost souls must climb it as a punishment; when they have reached the summit, they slip down again (Grimm, ii. 836). According to some forms of this myth, the glass mountain crowned with a golden palace stands in the midst of a great orchard in the paradise of souls, and they ascend it by means of the bear's claws (Mannhardt, *Germ. Mythen*, Berlin, 1858, p. 330). The mountain recurs in Slavonic and other European folk-tales, in which the hero rescues a princess, or gains the hand of a fair being from its summit (*CF*, p. 442).

Certain folk-tales, peculiar to the Slavs, speak of a mysterious land above the sky, wherein dwell beings or animals of supernatural character and magic power, while in this land are great wealth, many magical objects, and abundance of food. Thus one story describes it as possessing a mill which gives out pie, cake, and a pot of stewed grain; another, a hut with walls of pancakes, benches of white bread, and a stove of buttered curds. In another the stove is garnished with sucking pigs, geese, and pies, and everything which the soul can desire. This sky-land is visited by mortals who climb up a magical bean- or pea-stalk, or a great oak, as in our Jack and the Bean-stalk tales, and generally the visit is resented (Ralston, *Russ. Folk-Tales*, London, 1873, p. 291 ff.; *CF*, p. 435). This upper world of riches and plenty is not said to be an abode of the dead, but the tales may have been derived from pagan conceptions of an Elysium in the sky, where the gods and the blessed dwelt. This is also suggested by the belief, still current, that the soul must make a journey after death, across the sea, on foot, or by the rainbow or the Milky Way, to the region of the dead. The two last are obvious survivals from pagan beliefs regarding a journey to a heavenly paradise.

Rites in honour of the dead, still in use, include chants of a purely pagan character, in which the souls, having eaten and drunk, are begged to return to heaven. In pagan times the burial rites were all-important, as, until they were completed, the dead could not start on their long journey. Existing funeral songs and tales show that the beliefs regarding the state of the dead were of different character, or were perhaps held simultaneously. The dead continue to dwell in the grave (an idea which passes over into the vampire belief [see VAMPIRE]), or wander round their old home, or exist in a separate region. But, whatever beliefs were held, the state of the dead was apparently of a sensuous character. Married people continued to dwell together, and to a dead bachelor a maiden was allotted to be his wife in the other world. In such a case she was formerly put to death (cf. Schrader, *Totenhochzeit*, Jena, 1904, and see above, p. 22 f.).

The belief in a happy eastern region of perpetual warmth and light beyond the ocean in the place whence the sun came was widely current among the Slavs. Such a belief is still found; and this region is sometimes thought to be tenanted by the Rakhmane, who abstained from flesh, and led a holy life. The Rakhmane are obviously the Brāhmans, and the traditions may be derived from apocryphal writings.

LITERATURE.—W. R. Ralston, *Songs of the Russian People*[2], London, 1872; L. Leger, 'Études sur la Mythologie slave,' *RHR* xlii. 1 ff., Paris, 1900, *La Mythologie slave*, Paris, 1901; de la Saussaye, *Lehrb. der Religionsgesch.*[3] ii. 583, Tübingen, 1905.

J. A. MACCULLOCH.

BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Teutonic).—1. Introduction.—The hints supplied by myth, folk-belief, and occasional passages of existing texts, suggest that, in earlier times and probably for a long period, the state of the dead was not definitely formulated in Teutonic belief. The funeral *mobilier* as well as statements in the texts regarding burial shows that life after death continued the life on earth. The dead may have been supposed to dwell in the tomb, and the soul to flit in the air or to frequent the grave, while souls of warriors continued to fight in the air. Conceptions of a more permanent sort may, however, have arisen quite early and ultimately gained ground. When the dead were committed to the waves, this suggests that their abode was over-sea, and the passage in Procopius (*de Bello Goth.* iv. 20) about fishermen, subject to the Franks, rowing souls over by night to Brittia, may be a reminiscence of such a belief. But we find also a more general belief in the dead living in their barrows or burial-mounds, or in hills—they 'die into the hills. There they feast in happiness, and occupy themselves with the good of their surviving kindred, and their presence in these howes, or hills, is a source of blessing to the neighbourhood (Vigfusson and Powell, *Corpus Poet. Boreale* [=*CPB*], Oxford, 1883, i. 415 ff.). Nor is it unlikely that some of the gods, *e.g.* Odin, had also their abode at first there, several mountains being sacred to Odin (Grimm, i. 152). Odin was especially the god of dead warriors, and their abode may at first have been with him in hills, since later tradition represents great heroes as slumbering in hills, sometimes, as in the case of King Charles, in the Odenberg, with Odin (Grimm, iii. 953 ff.). These heroes may represent the dead warriors of pagan belief, or the gods themselves considered as mountain-dwellers. Again, the souls of dead warriors are seen issuing from and returning to a mountain (*ib.* 954). Thus the warrior host in the mountain may be an earlier form of the warrior host in the heavenly Valhalla (Simrock, *Handb.* 189).

In the Elder and Younger Eddas the conceptions of Hel, the under world of the dead, and Valhalla, the warriors' heavenly abode, are met with. Both may have been developed from the belief that the dead lived a subterranean existence in the barrow or in hills. Hel, 'the hollow place,' would be an extension of the hollow hill or barrow, and a similar development of the under world from the grave is met with in Celtic belief (see CELTS), while the transition from a hill as the abode of warriors to a sky-Valhalla would easily be made, the sky being frequently supposed to rest on hills.

Vigfusson and Powell consider that the idea of Hel as the abode of the dead cannot be clearly reconciled with the early belief in the dead living in their barrows (*CPB* i. 420). Rydberg (*Teut. Mythol.*, London, 1889, p. 505) reconciles the two views by showing that, in Teutonic belief, man did not consist simply of body and soul, but of 'a combination of factors, which in death could be separated,' so that the dead could at the same time descend to Hel and inhabit the grave-mound. This is in accordance with primitive and even Egyptian ideas of man's personality, and of various regions or states for the different parts of his being after death. At the same time, the ideas of the barrow and of Hel seem rather to represent different strata of belief.

The subterranean region of Hel may at first have been considered as the abode of all the dead, not excluding warriors, even Balder going there when he was slain, and, as late as Widukind of Corvei, the poet exclaims after a battle, 'Where might there be a Hel so great as to contain such a multitude of the slain?' (Grimm, ii. 801). But side by side with this we find the idea, whether of later Viking origin or not, that warriors have a separate abode. They it was, perhaps, rather than all the dead, who were conceived as dwelling with Odin in the hill, or, as in the Edda, in the heavenly Valhalla.

2. Was Hel an abode of the blest?—Hel is usually

regarded as a dismal and gloomy abode; but it is only in the Younger Edda that this is definitely stated, and it is not improbable that the influence of Christian beliefs may be traced here. The references in this Edda are three in number, and they vary each from the other. All-father has given to man a soul which will live and never perish. Right-minded men will live with him in Víngólf; wicked men fare to Hel, and thence into Niflhel which is beneath in the ninth world (*Gylfaginning*, § 3). Víngólf is later described as the fair hall of goddesses, and it may be synonymous with Valhalla (§ 14; Grimm, ii. 820). Here the distinction is an ethical one, and Niflhel rather than Hel is the abode of the wicked. This corresponds, on the whole, with the description of the fate of men after the final catastrophe:

'Many abodes are there then good, and many bad: best is it to be in Gimlé in heaven with Surtr; and great store of good drink is there for them who drink with joy in the hall called Brimir; it stands also in heaven. That is also a good hall which stands on Nítha-fells wrought of red gold; it is called Sindri; in this hall shall abide good men and well-minded.' The wicked—murderers and perjurers—suffer fearful torments in Ná-strand (*Gylf.* § 52).

This description is borrowed from the Völuspa, where it is not clear whether it refers to a state of things after the catastrophe which two mysterious beings alone survive. The sibyl sings:

'I see a hall, brighter than the sun, shingled with gold, standing on Gimlé. The righteous shall dwell therein and live in bliss for ever. Northward on Nídavöllir stands a hall of gold for Sindri's people. On Okolnir stands another called Brimir, the giants' drinking-hall.' Ná-strand is here also the abode of the wicked (*CPB* i. 201; cf. ii. 627).

The third reference describes the goddess Hel as cast into Niflheim, with power over the nine worlds, and sharing those abodes of gloom and hunger with those who die of sickness or old age. Warriors, on the other hand, go to the blissful Valhalla (*Gylf.* § 34, 36 ff.). Here there is no ethical distinction.

The eschatological system set forth in Völuspa depends for its value on the views taken regarding that poem. Bugge's hypothesis of its dependence on Christian and classical sources is hardly tenable (*Studier over de nordiske Gude- og Heltesagns oprindelse*, tr. by Brenner, Munich, 1889). More probable is the view taken by Jónsson (*Den oldnorske og oldislandske Litteraturs Historie*, Copenhagen, 1894, 1901), that it is the product of a pagan poet using pagan myths, but, while combating Christianity, unconsciously writing under Christian influences. The better minds among the pagan Norse may already have felt their way to such eschatological ideas as he sets forth.

In the Elder Edda, *Vafthrúdnis-mál* and *Grímnismál* (*CPB* i. 67, 70) describe Valhalla, and the former says of Niflhel: 'hither die the men from Hel (a second death).' Thus Hel is not a place of punishment, though Niflhel may be. Nor is Hel definitely stated in the Elder Edda to be a place of gloom. Ná-strand and Niflhel, places of punishment, may thus be identical, and it is not impossible that the Younger Edda has confused Hel and Niflhel, while here and in the Völuspa Gimlé and the other halls of the righteous may be identical either with Valhalla or with Hel, considered as a place of bliss. In *Balder's Doom*, Odin rides through the under world along a road through grass-grown plains to the mighty hall of Hel, and finds there the walls decked with shields, the benches strewn with mail-coats, and the mead standing ready brewed for the hero (*CPB* i. 182). Nothing is said of the gloom of Hel here, or in the story of Hermódhr's visit there to rescue Balder, where he crosses a river over a golden bridge (*Gylf.* § 49). Again, since men die from Hel to Niflhel, it is obvious that the former is a better place than the latter. Niflhel is the Hel which is surrounded by fog and gloom; Hel itself therefore cannot be so surrounded. In *Skírnirs-mál*, Gerda is told that she will suffer misery within the Na-gates (corpse-gates), and will sit on Are's perch looking longingly Hel-wards (*CPB* i. 114)—a passage suggestive of Hel as a place of bliss. In *Sonatorrek* the poet describes his dead son as having entered 'the path of Bliss' and gone to 'the City of the Bees-ship' (*CPB* i. 278–9), or to 'the world of the gods' (God-heim). The references are obscure, but may point to the usual abode of the dead or Hel.

An examination of the passages referring to the Ash Yggdrasil and its roots is significant. In *Grímnis-mál* it is said that under one root dwells Hel, under a second the Frost-giants, under a third 'mennzkir menn' (mortal men, *CPB* i. 73). But in *Gylfaginning*, § 15, one root is with the Asa, and there is Urd's fountain; one is over where Ginunnga-gap was, and there is Mimir's spring; the third is over Niflheim, and under it is the fountain Hvergelmir. By an obvious misunderstanding, one root is placed with the Asa, *i.e.* in Heaven (cf. Simrock, 36). But, as all the roots are in the under world, this root may correspond to that which *Grímnis.* places in Hel, and here in consequence is Urd's fountain, guarded by the Norni, who sprinkle the tree with its holy water (*Gylf.* § 16; cf. *Völuspa*, *CPB* i. 195), so that it may not wither or rot. Urd is possibly the equivalent of the goddess Hel (Rydberg, 308; Simrock, 340). The third root is in Niflheim, the place of punishment; the second, in Ginunnga-gap, must be midway between the others. Beneath it is Mimir's spring of mead, giving inspiration, wisdom, and poetry. Mimir drinks it every day; from it Odin obtained wisdom; and with it the root is watered (*Gylf.* § 15, *CPB* ii. 623). Here, too, must be placed Mimir's or Hoddmimer's Grove, where two human beings, Líf and Lífthrasir, are hidden away during the Monster-winter which precedes Ragnarök. They are fed on the dews which drip from Yggdrasil, produced from its being watered by Urd's fountain. They alone survive the final catastrophe, and from them a new generation will spring to re-people the renewed earth (*Vafthr.*, *CPB* i. 67; *Gylf.* § 53). Hence these, rather than men on the surface of the earth, may be the 'mennzkir menn' dwelling under a root of the tree. Líf and Lífthrasir, progenitors of the new race which is to people the new earth, 'green and fair, whose fields increase with sowing,' while 'all sorrows shall be healed,' must be pure and sinless. But that forest-clad earth rising out of the deep may simply be Mimir's grove, the hidden and sinless paradise hitherto in the under world.

Hel may thus mean the whole under world, exclusive of Niflhel, and in this sense it appears by no means as a place of gloom. This is already suggested by the passages cited from the poems; but when we add to this the facts that in the under world are Mimir's fountain of immortal mead, his grove of sinless beings, afterwards to be the glorious renewed earth, Urd's fountain beneath the ever-green branches of the ash, its waters 'so holy that everything which comes into this spring becomes as white as the skin which lieth within and cleaveth to the egg-shell' (*Gylf.* 16), and that the hall of Hel is decked for Balder's coming and furnished with mead, the suggestion becomes well-nigh a certainty.

To Urd's well the gods ride over Bifröst bridge to a daily judgment (*Gylf.* § 15; cf. *Grímnis.*, *CPB* i. 73). According to *Gylf.* they ride upwards from Asgard to Heaven; but as Asgard is in Heaven, and, as we have seen, Urd's well is situated in the under world, they must ride downwards. This Thingstead is not that held in Asgard, and Rydberg (p. 330 ff.) has shown that the gods come down daily to judge the dead who arrive there daily, and appoint them their places in Valhalla, in Hel, or in Niflhel. From definite statements, we know what crimes were punished in the other world—offences against the gods and against kinsmen, murder, adultery, perjury. Thus among those who did not pass to Valhalla—those dying a natural or straw death, practisers of the

peaceful arts of life, women and children, all who had pleased the gods, all who had been true to the claims of kindred, all who had kept themselves free from those gross sins—must have been awarded the bliss of the under world. All such could, 'with a good will and without fear, await death,' knowing that their course of life would 'do them good when they are dead' (*Sonatorrek*, *CPB* i. 280; cf. i. 42, 279, ii. 628; *Gylf.* [Loke] § 50, 52). To them were allotted the blissful regions of the under world —the 'green realms of the gods' (*Hakonar-mál*, *CPB* i. 264; cf. Rydberg, 319), with their hidden grove, their holy fountains, their 'paths of bliss.' Probably, too, they were given a draught which made them forget sorrows and gave them strength, composed of the liquids of those fountains, and drunk from the horn whence Mimir quaffed the mead of his well (*CPB* i. 197; cf. the mead which awaits Balder, and the 'costly draughts' which the dead Helgi drinks, i. 143). The mysteriously engraved horn from which Grimhild makes Gudrun drink and forget her wrongs, may be a late reminiscence of this draught of oblivion. The draught was composed from Urd's strength, ice-cold sea water, and the liquor of the Son, and on the horn are engraved unreaped corn ears from 'the land of Hadding,' the under world (*CPB* i. 34). See, for this section, Rydberg, 218 ff.

3. **Valhalla.**—Though Valhalla may be 'simply a Wicking faith, lasting some three generations at most,' and opposed to the strong family affection of the Northern heathen (*CPB* i. Introd. ci, 421), yet it is also noted in old Teutonic belief, in the conception of dead warriors dwelling in Odin's mountain. Valhalla was one of the dwellings of Asgard, the heaven of the gods, situated in Gladsheimr 'where the gold-bright Valhalla towers' (*Grímnis.*, *CPB* i. 70). To it all brave warriors hoped to go, though later tradition suggests that warriors who had committed 'nithing' actions or lived wickedly were excluded (Rydberg, 349). They were conducted thither by the Valkyries, who also waited upon them there. Valhalla was entirely a warrior's paradise; its beatitude was not that of peace, but of war. There the dead warriors dwelt with Odin, who welcomed them, ordering the benches to be got ready, the goblets prepared, and the wine brought by the Valkyries (*Eiriks-mál*, *CPB* i. 260). Descriptions of Valhalla are found in *Grímnis-mál* and in the Younger Edda. It is raftered with spears, it is decked with shields, its benches are strewn with coats of mail. A wolf hangs before the western door, an eagle hovers over it. The goat Heiðrun bites at the branches of the tree Learad (perhaps Yggdrasil), and from her teats runs mead which fills a vat every day, enough to satisfy all the warriors. The hart Eikthirnir bites at the branches, and from her horns fall drops which form the rivers on earth. So great was Valhalla that it possessed five hundred and forty doors. Every day the warriors, fully armed, issued from the gates to amuse themselves in combat with each other, returning to feast and drink heavenly mead from the cups presented to them by the Valkyries. They ate the flesh of the boar Sæhrimni, which was sodden every day and became whole again at even. Beside Valhalla stood Vingólf, the Hall of Friends, the abode of the goddesses. Grimm (ii. 820) points out that Vingólf is, in one poem, used synonymously with Valhalla, while it is also the name given in the Younger Edda (*Gylf.* § 3) to the place where the good and right-minded shall dwell after death. With Odin is associated Freyja, whose dwelling is called Folk-vangr, and who chooses one half of the slain, Odin the other. Elsewhere, however, it is dead women who expect to join Freyja (*Egils saga*, ch. 78). With the goddess Gefjon, who resembles Freyja, dwelt all who died virgins (*Gylf.* § 35; for Valhalla, cf. § 36, 38 ff.; *Grímnis-mál*, *Eiriks-mál*, and *Hakonar-mál*, *CPB* i. 70 ff., 260, 262).

4. **Elysium in folk-belief and saga.**—The Glasberg, or glass mountain, of *Märchen* and poetry, which in Slavonic belief represents an earlier conception of a mountain paradise, may be derived from Slavonic sources, or may be a misunderstanding of *Gladsheim*, but it may also be a purely Teutonic belief, since the Norse *glêrhiminn*, 'glass heaven,' is a paradise to which heroes ride (Grimm, ii. 820), and the mountain abode of the dead has already been met with. Beautiful subterranean meadows, reached through a well where Frau Holle dwells, also occur in *Märchen*, and are associated mainly with elves and kindred beings. Popular belief describes souls of the dying fluttering as butterflies or birds in these meadows (Grimm, ii. 829). These are doubtless reminiscences of the under world place of the dead, and with them may be compared the Rosengarten of mediæval poetry, now churchyards, now a kind of paradise. A series of more elaborate tales, analyzed by Rydberg, are certainly reminiscent of earlier pagan belief, and preserve many of the aspects of the under world already met with. In these travellers set out to seek *Ódáinsakr* or *Jörð lifanda manna*, the Land of Living Men, situated in one tale in the east, but more usually in the north, and apparently underground.

These tales in their present form belong to the period between the 12th and 14th cent., and are mainly found in Saxo and in the sagas. Gudmund is ruler of the Glittering Plains, situated in the north or Jötunheim; he and his men are heathen, and of a vast age. After his death he was worshipped by his people as a god. Ódáinsakr is situated in his land, and is 'so healthy that sickness and age depart, and no one ever dies there' (*Hervararsaga*, Rydberg, 210–11).

(*a*) In the Flatey-book (14th cent.) Helge Thoreson is described as journeying to the north, where, lost in a forest, he met twelve maidens, one of them being Gudmund's daughter, Ingeborg. With them he stayed three days, and on leaving was given chests of gold and silver. Next Yule night he was carried from his home by two men, re-appearing a year later with them. The strangers gave king Olaf two golden horns as a gift from Gudmund. They were filled with wine and given to the strangers to drink, the wine having been previously blessed by a bishop. The heathen messengers cast the horns away, and disappeared with Helge amidst great confusion. One year later Helge re-appeared with his eyes plucked out. He had spent many days happily in Gudmund's realm, but king Olaf's prayers had made it impossible for Gudmund and Ingeborg to keep him. The latter plucked his eyes out, lest any mortal maiden should fall in love with him (Saxo Grammaticus, *Danish History*, London, 1894, Introd. lxviii; Rydberg, 210).

(*b*) Saxo relates that king Gorm set out to seek a mysterious treasure land in the north ruled by king Geirröd in the under world. After passing through many dangers, they were met by Geirröd's brother Gudmund, who led them along a river till they reached a golden bridge. This he warned them not to cross, as the region beyond was not open to mortals. Continuing up the river, they reached Gudmund's hall, where, warned by their pilot Thorkill, they refused to touch food or drink lest their memory should be lost, and they should have to remain with Gudmund's people for ever. Gorm also refused Gudmund's daughter in marriage. But four of his men fell victims to the charms of the women of this land, and became imbeciles. Gorm also refused the delicious fruits of Gudmund's garden. The party were now conducted across the river, and reached Geirröd's realm, a foul and evil place, full of miserable folk, some of them punished by Thor. Finally, they reached a place where they saw cisterns of mead, a vast decorated horn, and other treasures. Some of the party seized these treasures, which changed to swords and serpents and slew them. In another place, other treasures, including a rich mantle, were seen. Thorkill himself seized the mantle, when the place rang with shrieks, and the party was attacked by its inhabitants. Only twenty of them returned to the river and to Gudmund, who vainly tempted them to remain with him. They finally returned home in safety (Saxo, 344 ff.; Rydberg, 212).

(*c*) Saxo has also preserved the story of king Hadding. One winter's day he saw a woman rise out of the ground, with fresh herbs in her lap. Hadding desired to know where such plants could grow in winter. Wrapping him in her mantle, she drew him underground, through a region of fog and darkness, till they reached a river where spears and weapons were tossed about. On one side of it they met some noble beings, clad in rich robes.

Passing them, they reached a sunny region (the Glittering Plains), whence the woman had obtained the flowers. On the other side of the river, which was crossed by a bridge, were seen the souls of dead warriors playing at battle. Finally, they came to a mysterious place, surrounded by an impassable wall. This was the land of life. The woman wrung the neck of a bird and threw it over the wall, when it was at once restored to life (Saxo, 37; Rydberg, 216).

(*d*) A saga in Flatey-book tells of king Erik, who with a large company set out to seek Ódáinsakr in the far east. They finally reached a river, with a bridge guarded by a dragon. Erik and one of his men rushed at the dragon, and were swallowed by it. But they found themselves in a beautiful flowery plain, with rivers of honey, and full of sunlight. They travelled through, finding no inhabitants, and reached a tower suspended in the air, with a ladder leading up to it. They entered the tower, and found in it a room carpeted with velvet, a table with rich food in gold and silver dishes, and two beds. Convinced that they had reached Ódáinsakr, they ate and drank and slept. During his sleep Erik was visited by his guardian angel, who told him this was Ódáinsakr, or Jörð lifanda manna. This region lay near the Christian paradise, which was so glorious that, compared with it, Ódáinsakr seemed a desert. Here they were permitted to remain six days, and then they returned home.

Late as these stories are, they are yet so near to the pagan age of the north that, in spite of possible classical literary and Christian influences, they preserve much of the earlier eschatology. Ódáinsakr is clearly differentiated from the Christian paradise, while Gudmund and his people are pagan. The river with its golden bridge has already been met with in the pagan descriptions of the under world, and in these tales its further side seems to be tenanted by the souls of the dead, while in the Hadding story the dead warriors fighting suggest a reminiscence of Valhalla. The evil region in the story of Gorm may reflect the tortures of Niflhel, while the place with its cisterns of mead, the richly decorated horn, and the treasures, are reminiscent of the Eddaic descriptions of the blissful under world. Rydberg (228 ff.) also identifies Gudmund with Mimir, and shows reasons for believing that Ódáinsakr, within the Glittering Plains, the mysterious walled place in the Hadding story, and the tower in the Erik saga with its two beds, are the equivalents of Mimir's grove, where Líf and Lífthasir, progenitors of the new race of men, are preserved. To them would appropriately belong the title 'living men,' and to their hidden grove that of *Jörð lifanda manna*. 'In Gudmund's domain there is a splendid grove, an enclosed place, from which weaknesses, age, and death are banished—a Paradise of the peculiar kind that is not intended for the souls of the dead, but for certain *lifandi menn*, yet is inaccessible to people in general. In the myth concerning Mimir we also find such a grove' (Rydberg, 231). Thus, while this Elysian land of Gudmund's, with its deathless Ódáinsakr, is one of beauty and joy, to which daring mortals may penetrate and receive a welcome, it is closely connected with the realms of the dead—Hel, Valhalla, and Niflhel,—unlike the Celtic Elysium. Unlike the latter, too, it is not a land of the gods, but of a giant race, and is associated with Jötunheim; it is not an island Elysium, but a northern and subterranean one (cf. Nutt and Meyer, *Voyage of Bran*, 1895, i. 308; BLEST, ABODE OF THE [Celtic]). The idea that the food of this region is dangerous to mortals corresponds with the universal belief that to eat the food of the dead or of fairies is dangerous.

5. The divine Elysium.—In the Golden Age of the gods, before they lost their happy state through the Titan maids from Jötunheim, they dwelt in Iðavöllr, where they raised high places and temples, setting forges, fashioning treasures, shaping tongs, and making tools. 'They played at tables in the court and were happy, they lacked not gold' (*Völuspa*, *CPB* i. 194). But after the restoration they dwell in Iðavöllr once more, and it is said to be 'where Asgard was before' (*Völuspa*, *ib.* i. 201; *Gylf.* § 53).

See also STATE OF THE DEAD (Teutonic).

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BLINDNESS. — 1. Definitions. — 'Blindness' signifies inability to see, or absence of the sense of sight; hence, figuratively, want of discernment, or defective intellectual, moral, or spiritual sight. 'Word-blindness' is an acquired condition in which a person loses the power of reading written or printed words, although he can see objects; thus the letters on a printed page can be seen but are not recognized. 'Mind-blindness' is an acquired condition in which objects can be seen, but fail to be recognized by the sense of sight. 'Half-blindness' is a condition in which there is loss of one-half of the field of vision of one eye, or more commonly of both eyes.

2. Causes of blindness.—Blindness may be due to lesions of the eye, of the conducting path from the retina to the brain, or of the brain itself.

(1) *The eyes.*—Blindness may result from a loss of transparency of the cornea (nebula, leucoma), of the lens (cataract), of the vitreous humour; from effusion of blood or pus into the anterior or posterior chambers; from occlusion of the pupil; from various affections of the choroid and retina; from changes following increased intra-ocular tension (glaucoma). Destructive inflammation of one eye, such as often follows injury, is apt to be followed by a similar inflammation of the other eye (sympathetic inflammation). Ophthalmia neonatorum, an infectious inflammation contracted during birth, is the chief cause of blindness in early childhood.

(2) *The conducting paths.*—Inflammation of the optic nerve (optic neuritis) is an important cause of blindness. It commonly ends in atrophy (white atrophy) of the optic disc or beginning of the nerve within the eye. Grey atrophy of the disc, also a cause of blindness, is a primary degenerative condition, not resulting from inflammation.

The optic nerves pass back from the eyes and meet at the optic chiasma, at the base of the brain, where a re-arrangement of their fibres takes place in such a way that the fibres from the outer half of each retina pass into the optic tract of the same side, while the fibres from the inner half of each retina pass into the optic tract of the opposite side. The result of this is that, while a lesion destroying the continuity of one optic nerve causes total blindness of the corresponding eye, a lesion of one optic tract results in blindness of the corresponding half of each retina. Thus destruction of the right optic tract causes blindness of the outer (right) half of the right retina, and of the inner (right) half of the left retina. Blindness of the right half of each retina results in blindness of the left half of the field of vision, and this condition is called left-sided half-blindness or hemianopsia.

(3) *The brain.*—The fibres of the optic tract pass into the occipital lobe of the brain, and destruction of the visual centre in either occipital lobe produces hemianopsia just as in the case of the optic tract. Destruction of both visual centres would cause double hemianopsia, that is to say, complete blindness. Lesions of the left occipital lobe, but not of the right, may also be attended, according to their extent, by 'word-blindness,' or 'mind-blindness'—conditions which have already been defined. This difference between the effect of lesions of the left and of the right side of the brain is simply an example of the general fact that all the speech functions (speaking, reading, writing) have their special centres in the left side of the brain only. Apart from affections of the special centres for vision, gross lesions in any part of the brain may cause blindness by setting up optic neuritis.

3. Statistics of blindness.—The proportion of blind among the general population is much greater in tropical than in temperate regions. In temper-

ate regions generally the proportion is about 1 in 1000. In civilized countries the proportion of blind shows a steady decrease in recent years. Thus in the United Kingdom in 1851, 1 person was blind in every 979. The proportion has now fallen to 1 in 1285. Owing to occupation there are more males than females afflicted with blindness.

The following statistics are taken from the census tables of 1901, and refer to England and Wales:

		Males.	Females.
Persons	32,507,843	15,728,613	16,779,230
Blind	25,317	13,136	12,181
,, (1891)	23,467	12,281	11,186
Blind from childhood	4,621	2,468	2,153
,, (1891)	4,005	2,194	1,811
Blind, Deaf and Dumb	58	36	22
Blind and Dumb	23	14	9
Blind and Deaf	389	144	245

4. Psychology of the blind.—In comparing the blind with normal individuals, it must be remembered that the great majority of the blind lost their sight in adult life. In such persons we are not likely to find any special mental peculiarities, beyond their personal reactions to their misfortune. It is quite different when sight is lost in early childhood. The whole course of mental development must be profoundly modified in cases where the acquisition of knowledge, the training of the intellect, and the formation of tastes and habits must proceed without the faculty of vision playing any part in the process.

Perhaps one of the earliest peculiarities to be noticed in blind children is a tendency to bodily inaction. The blind child is often content to sit quite still for considerable periods of time, at an age when a normal child would not be still for an instant. The games of blind children are often lacking in animation. Of course there are many individual exceptions to this statement, but a tendency to inaction is general, and seems to be most marked in those whose blindness is total, so that the sense even of light is lacking. This sluggishness of body is usually ascribed to the absence of the stimulating effect of light. There is no doubt that light is a very powerful stimulus to the nervous system, and children who spend much time in imperfectly-lighted rooms are usually languid and feeble. Another factor in the case, however, may be the natural tendency of the guardians of a blind child to restrict its movements and anticipate its wants in case of its meeting with some injury if left to itself.

This tendency to muscular repose doubtless reacts upon the mental state. As an anonymous writer on this subject expresses it, the blind, as a class, are 'seldom characterized by that rapidity and intensity of mental action, that keenness of penetration, which pierces at once to the very heart of a matter,—that *vivida vis animi* which is the characteristic of the highest genius. Their intellects are in general cautious, calm, deliberative, slow, distinguished rather by soundness than by brilliancy. . . . The fact that their attachments are generally of a calm and equable kind, formed on judgment and "right reason" rather than upon those inexplicable attractions which so often bind others together; the infrequency with which they seem to give way to strong impulses of affection, and a certain want of geniality and expansiveness which has often been noted in them,—may also, no doubt, in fact be attributed to the same cause' (*National Review*, 1860, p. 92).

The blind depend upon the sense of touch to so large an extent for their knowledge of the outer world, that tactile sensibility becomes developed by constant practice to a very high degree of acuteness, and many astonishing things are related of the discriminative ability of some blind folks. Blind people have been able to play cards by means of small marks upon the cards which they were able to distinguish, but which escaped the eye and touch of those who saw. The sensibility of the fingers is greatly improved by practice, and blind people often take special care to keep the epidermis of the finger tips soft in order that their delicate susceptibility may be preserved. The lips and tip of the tongue, naturally more sensitive than the fingers, are often made use of by blind persons in cases where the fingers are unable to perceive sufficiently clearly. The skin of the face often becomes very sensitive to the proximity of solid bodies, and the tympanic membranes are credited with the power of rendering perceptible vibrations of the atmosphere too slight to be recognized as sound.

Mr. W. Hanks Levy, a blind writer, gives an interesting account of his own power of recognizing neighbouring objects. 'Whether within a house or in the open air,' he says, 'whether walking or standing still, I can tell, although quite blind, whether I am opposite an object, and can perceive whether it be tall or short, slender or bulky. I can also detect whether it be a solitary object or a continuous fence; whether it be a close fence or composed of open rails; and often whether it be a wooden fence, a brick or stone wall, or a quick-set hedge. I cannot usually perceive objects if much lower than my shoulder, but sometimes very low objects can be detected. . . . The only part of my body possessing this power is my face; this I have ascertained by suitable experiments. Stopping my ears does not interfere with it, but covering my face with a thick veil destroys it altogether' (*Blindness and the Blind*, London, 1872).

Some writers on the blind make the curious assertion that they have no sense of space, that they live only in time, that their little world is circumscribed by the narrow circle which they can span with their own arms. This assertion, however, seems to be altogether preposterous, and is sufficiently refuted by the facts quoted above from Mr. Levy. The delight blind people often take in travelling, especially with a companion who can describe the scenery passed by, is also opposed to the idea. Blind men may even enjoy mountaineering, and a blind man who had been to the top of Mont Blanc wrote to the papers recently stating that no one could have enjoyed the view more than he had done. There is no doubt, of course, that a blind man's conception of space must differ greatly from our own, but a conception of space derived from touch, from movement, and from sound, he certainly has.

Sounds, also, cannot fail to play an important part in giving to the blind a sense of the beyond; and where we think of an object getting smaller as it recedes in the distance, a blind man would think of the modification produced by distance in the sound. When a blind man is out walking, the variations and mutations of familiar sounds constitute a source of interest and pleasure. The distance of objects can often be gauged with wonderful accuracy, and a case is quoted of a blind gentleman who could practise archery with considerable expertness, his aim being directed by a bell placed behind the target.

Conversation is naturally a source of great pleasure to the blind, and, indeed, it means even more to them than to us, because they rely upon their auditory impressions to furnish that commentary upon the speaker's words which we find in the play of expression. It is a curious trait in the blind that they seem to take a special pleasure in descriptions of the visual appearance of things. In their conversation they make much use of visual imagery, and always speak of going to see places and things. No doubt the impressions from which they are necessarily for ever shut out have for that very reason a special attraction. A well-known teacher of the blind tells the writer that there is no subject in which his pupils manifest greater interest than the study of optics.

The general characteristic of the mind of the blind is rather curiously described as synthetical

by some writers, and as analytical by others. W. James, *e.g.*, writes (*Princ. of Psych.* ii. 203):

'The blind man's construction of real space differs from that of the seeing man most obviously in the larger part which synthesis plays in it, and the relative subordination of analysis. The seeing baby's eyes take in the whole room at once, and discriminative attention must arise in him before single objects are visually discerned. The blind child, on the contrary, must form his mental image of the room by the addition, piece to piece, of parts which he learns to know successively.'

On the other hand, M. Dufau speaks of the mind of the blind as characteristically analytical. If we compare the manner in which the seeing and the blind acquire a knowledge of some object, for example, a plant, we find that the former 'casts a glance upon it, envelops it with a look, and his task is done; he has a general idea of it with which he generally contents himself, because it is sufficient to enable him to recognize and to name the object. The blind man, on the contrary, is obliged to examine, to touch with the utmost care, the stalk, the branches, the leaves; to acquire, in short, a complete and detailed idea of the plant, without which it would be impossible for him to distinguish it from others. Thus it is that necessity makes analysis a habit to him, which retards his acquisition of knowledge, but at the same time renders it more positive and more certain' (Dufau, *Des Aveugles*, 1850, p. 43).

Although these two descriptions at first appear somewhat opposed to each other, it is obvious enough on consideration that both are true so far as they go. In building up his conception of the world about him, the blind man must analyze, and, having analyzed, he must put together. The two processes are carried out by him much more carefully and systematically than by the seeing, and the results are carefully pondered. It is doubtless owing to this natural tendency to analysis and re-construction that the blind owe their wonderful power of observation, and to the same tendency we may trace the fact that science seems to attract the educated blind much more strongly than imaginative literature or poetry.

Cases of blind persons recovering their sight in adult life are not numerous, and such as are known have naturally attracted a good deal of interest. This interest has to a great extent centred around what is known as Molyneux' problem. This was as follows:

'Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere, . . . so as to tell, when he felt one and the other, which is the cube, which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere placed on a table, and the blind man be made to see; query, whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could distinguish and tell which is the globe, which the cube?' (see Locke, *Essay*, II. ix. 8).

To this query Molyneux himself answered in the negative, and Locke agreed with him. A contrary opinion was expressed by Dr. Franz and Sir W. Hamilton, and the former had an opportunity not long afterwards of testing the soundness of his views. His patient when operated on was seventeen years of age, and he was familiar with geometrical figures. When some of the early confusion following the operation had passed off, he was shown a vertical and a horizontal line, and these he was able to name correctly; but on being asked to point out which was the horizontal line, he indicated the wrong one, afterwards correcting himself. This error evidently means that no association had yet been found between the senses of sight and touch. He was next shown an outline of a square, 6 inches in diameter, within which was a circle, and within this a triangle. He was asked to describe these figures, and after careful examination, he succeeded in doing so correctly.

A recent case of the same kind has been described by Dr. A. Maitland Ramsay of Glasgow. This was a young man of thirty, totally blind from birth, but able to distinguish day from night. For some days after the operation of removal of the lenses the patient appeared quite dazed, and could not realize that he was seeing. The size of everything in the ward seemed very much exaggerated, and on that account he had great difficulty in interpreting what he saw. When asked to distinguish between a ball and a brick, he looked at them attentively for a considerable time, his hands meanwhile moving nervously, as if he were trying to translate what he saw, by comparing it with an imaginary tactile impression, and then he named both correctly. He explained that he was so much in the habit of handling objects that he had come to have a 'notion in his mind' regarding the form of things.

5. The education and care of the blind.—The Jewish code contains special beneficent enactments regarding blind persons; such as, 'Thou shalt not . . . put a stumblingblock before the blind, but thou shalt fear thy God' (Lv 19^{14}). The idea, however, of making the care of the blind a public charge is quite modern, although as long ago as 1265 one institution for the blind was founded, the Hospice des Quinze Vingts, wherein St. Louis IX. provided for the needs of three hundred knights who had lost their eyesight in the Crusades.

The first idea of educating the blind by means of the sense of touch appears to have originated with Valentein Haüy, a native of Picardy, about the year 1783. Haüy's first pupil was a blind beggar, whom he paid to receive instruction. The practicability of teaching the blind to read from raised characters having been proved, public interest was aroused, and Haüy was able in 1785 to found the first 'School for the Young Blind.' Haüy afterwards visited St. Petersburg, at the invitation of the Government, to superintend the establishment in that city of a similar institution. The Liverpool School for the Blind was founded in 1791, and was followed two years later by the Edinburgh Blind Asylum, which became one of the most successful schools of the kind in the world. The success of these schools has led to the multiplication of such institutions all over the civilized world. The instruction given in most of them is of a mixed character, the pupils being taught to read from raised characters, and receiving lessons in the usual school subjects, while their future is kept in view, and instruction is provided in different trades, whereby they may maintain themselves in after life. A few schools provide an education of a more special kind, such as the Normal College and Academy for Music.

The method of teaching the blind to read has had an interesting evolution. Haüy originally made use of the script form of the Roman letter. Subsequently quite a number of forms of embossed type were introduced. The first of these was brought forward by James Gall, of Edinburgh, in 1827. He made use of the Roman letter, but for ease of recognition, all the curves were changed to angles. In this type there was published in 1834 the Gospel of St. John. The first Gospel was printed in raised type for the blind. Other modifications of the Roman letter were introduced by Howe, Alston, and Fry. Various stenographic and phonetic systems were also brought forward, but were discarded on the ground that they did not teach correct spelling.

To get over the difficulty sometimes experienced in passing from one line to the next, Frere introduced his ingenious return line. The finger travels along one line from left to right and is then guided by an embossed curve to the line below, which is read from right to left. On this lower line the characters are printed in the reverse way, in order that the finger, moving in the reverse direction, may meet them in the same order as when reading from left to right.

Moon's type, which became very popular, is a modification of the Roman character, but arbitrary signs are also made use of. Frere's return line is adopted, but the characters are not reversed in the return lines. Moon's type is still made use of to some extent, and the Gospel which blind men may be seen reading in the streets is commonly printed in it. It has, however, two great drawbacks. Books printed in this type are very expensive; and they are very bulky. A single Gospel, for example, fills a large volume.

This multiplicity of types was naturally attended by many inconveniences. A blind man who learned to read one type could not read books published in another, and a book printed in any of the embossed types could obtain a circulation only among the blind who were acquainted with that type. Accordingly, a number of gentlemen founded The British and Foreign Blind Association, and set themselves to find and bring into general use the type best adapted to the needs of the blind. This

they found in none of the varieties to which we have referred. Their researches resulted in the introduction into England in 1868 of a type which had been invented by a blind Frenchman forty years before. This type, which is now in general use, is called the Braille, after Louis Braille, its inventor. The advantages claimed for it are: that the letters are easily recognized; that they can be written by the blind themselves in such a way as to be legible to themselves or other people who know the characters; that books can be printed in much smaller bulk and at a much smaller cost than in the case of other types for the blind.

The principle of the Braille system is very simple. The letters are formed of raised dots of which the maximum number is six, arranged in three pairs

placed one above another— : : Any of these dots

may be omitted, the letters of the alphabet, punctuation marks, and a number of other signs being formed by one, two, three or more of the dots variously arranged, as may be seen in the alphabet printed below. It will be noticed that neither of the two dots constituting the lowest pair is present in any of the characters of the upper line; each of the characters of the second line resembles the character immediately above it, plus one of the lowest dots; while the characters of the third line differ from those above only in the presence of both dots of the lowest pair. This arrangement obviously greatly reduces the difficulty of learning the symbols.

The Braille characters have also been adopted for the printing of music, so that a blind musician can learn a new piece of music by following the score with one hand while he plays the keys with the other.

A large number of standard works have now been published in the Braille type, and are sold at a moderate price. At the Edinburgh School for the Blind, a monthly magazine, *Hora Jucunda*, has been published since 1893. It was started and edited by Mr. W. H. Illingworth, a former headmaster of the school. Each number contains sixty large pages of interesting and amusing matter, and a piece of music; and the price is one shilling. The British and Foreign Blind Association also publishes magazines in Braille.

Mr. J. W. M'Laren, of Edinburgh, recently invented a method whereby the printing of books in Braille type is greatly simplified, and the cost vastly reduced. The Braille Printing and Publishing Co., St. Giles Street, Edinburgh, was founded to print books by this new method, and for some time a magazine for the blind, the *Braille Weekly*, was published every Saturday at the price of one penny. Dr. John Brown's famous story, *Rab and his Friends*, printed by the new method, was issued at the price of sixpence. The story occupies fifty-two quarto pages. As books of this class naturally depend upon a very limited public for circulation, it would be a good thing if some central publishing company could not only stock all the books printed by this method, but control the class of books to be published, and prevent overlapping and the same book being printed by different people.

Writing in Braille characters is carried out by means of a writing frame. The paper is covered with a piece of brass containing a double row of oblong perforations. By means of a stylus, each letter is impressed upon the paper through one of the perforations. To read the writing the paper must be reversed, when the depressions produced by the stylus will be felt by the finger as raised dots.

When the blind wish to write so as to be read by the seeing, they may use a pencil and a guiding frame. Some blind persons who lost their sight in adult life have become very expert at this kind of writing, but for those who have been blind from childhood there is no doubt that the best plan is to use a typewriter. Here the expense may be an objection, but this has been got over by Mr. Illingworth, who recommends for the purpose a cheap form of typewriter which costs only a few shillings. In this instrument the rubber type projects from the under surface of a revolving disc, and, by placing on the upper surface above each letter the corresponding character in Braille, the blind pupil can easily find the letter he needs, bring it into place, and print it on the paper. It will be noticed that, by using a typewriter, the blind scribe actually writes in a character with which he may not be acquainted, and is thus saved the trouble of learning two totally distinct alphabets. It is curious to recall the fact that the Braille type was violently opposed on the ground that the letters were entirely arbitrary symbols, as if the characters of the Roman or Greek alphabets were anything else. Obviously, it is no more confusing for the blind to call a couple of dots the letter *b* than it is for the French to call a cabbage a *chou*.

Arithmetic is taught to the blind by means of a

The Braille Alphabet and some Contractions.

(The large dots represent the raised points of the Braille letters).



tablet containing rows of octagonal holes. A peg can be placed in any of these holes, in eight possible positions representing the numbers 1 to 8; to obtain 9 and 0, the peg is inverted and placed in positions 1 and 2. The two ends of the peg, of course, differ so as to be readily recognizable by touch.

A somewhat similar device is made use of for teaching algebra. Raised maps are used for geography, and models and natural objects are freely used for class purposes.

6. **The care of young blind children.**—When sight is lost in early childhood, a good deal can be done by judicious foresight to assist the teacher, when the child is old enough to go to school. Teachers of the blind complain that, when children come to them, they do not know how to use their hands; that they are lacking in confidence, and can do nothing for themselves; that their muscles are soft and weak; and that, in short, a great deal of time has to be given to exercises and gymnastics intended to train the muscles and the sense of touch before education, in the school sense, can be started. These faults depend very largely on the fact that the child's relatives, not unnaturally, have done everything for him. They have dressed him, washed him, and fed him. They have led him from place to place. They have perhaps never thought of giving him toys to play with. They have prevented him from going about by himself, for fear of accidents. In some cases they have even kept the child in bed for years, or taken him about only in a perambulator, in case he might hurt himself. Such treatment, although kindly meant, is really cruel to the child. The proper course of procedure is quite the opposite. The proper method of dealing with a young child who is blind may be expressed in a sentence: *Treat him exactly as if he could see.* The child should have toys to play with as soon as he can grasp. When he can creep about, he should be allowed to do so. He should be expected and encouraged to walk as soon as other infants. As soon as he can move about, he should be allowed to explore the room for himself, and discover the properties of the furniture it contains. While care should, of course, be taken to prevent any serious accidents (dangerous places such as stairs or fires being guarded), obstacles should not be taken out of the child's way, nor should he be warned if he is going to walk against something. No doubt, it is very difficult for any kindly person to see a blind child in the act of walking against a chair, without quickly stopping him or snatching the chair out of his way; but if the child is ever to gain confidence, and to be able to walk about freely without fear of running into walls and lamp-posts, he must learn by hard experience in his nursery days. So, also, as the child gets older, he should be encouraged to feed himself; to undress, and later to dress himself; to fold his clothes, and put them away; to put his toys away when he has finished playing with them, and to fetch them for himself when he wants them. He should be taught to use his hands in every possible way. Many of the kindergarten occupations are useful for this purpose, and the sorting and threading of beads is valuable as affording a training in sensitiveness to the finger tips. The handling of small beads is a useful preparation for the later study of Braille.

7. **Advice to those likely to lose their sight.**—When blindness occurs from disease in later years, the loss of sight is usually gradual, and, after it is known that ultimate blindness is inevitable, months, or even years, may elapse during which some sight remains. Persons so affected should be advised to set about training their other senses, and especially the sense of touch, without delay. The Braille alphabet can soon be learned, and, in practising reading, the sight which remains will be of great assistance. Braille writing should also be systematically practised. Various everyday tasks, such as dressing and undressing, should be practised with the eyes closed. When any real difficulty presents itself, of course, the eyes may be opened for a moment, but, as far as possible, the sufferer should try to accustom himself by degrees to the life he will before long have to live, so that, when the day of total darkness does come, it will not find him wholly unprepared.

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BLISS.—See BLESSEDNESS and BLEST (ABODE).

BLOOD.—1. Physiological and Psychological.—Blood consists of a fluid portion, known as plasma, and of corpuscles (white, red, and 'platelets'), the latter forming its nutritive element. 'Average blood may be regarded as consisting of $\frac{2}{3}$ plasma and $\frac{1}{3}$ corpuscles' (Huxley, *Physiology*, p. 105). The inner function of the blood has been compared by physiologists with the outer function of the air and food supply. 'It is absolutely essential to the life of every part of the body that it should be in such relation with a current of blood that matters can pass freely from the blood to it, and from it to the blood, by transudation through the walls of the vessels in which the blood is contained' (*ib.* p. 116). Thus, the blood is literally the vehicle of life throughout the organism, and this function is discharged by means of its constant circulation from the left lower cavity of the heart through the arteries, and back through the veins to its right upper cavity. The nourishment of the blood itself is derived by absorption from the food which enters the intestines; the venous blood is changed into arterial blood by absorption of oxygen through the lungs, this second or pulmonary circulation being maintained from the right lower cavity of the heart to its left upper cavity. It is evident that the true function of the blood could not be understood until its circulation was demonstrated, as was done by Harvey in his *Exercitatio*, published in 1628 (Foster, *History of Physiology*, 1901, p. 42). Of this circulation the ancient world was ignorant, and consequently of the precise ministry of the blood to life. Aristotle (B.C. 384–322) 'knew only of its direct passage from the heart to the extremities, and of its movement to the brain and return. . . . The brain, being the coldest organ of the body, performed the function, Aristotle supposed, of reducing and regulating the temperature of the blood' (Hammond, *Aristotle's Psychology*, p. 227 n.). Galen (A.D. 130–*c.* 210) taught that the liver converts food into crude blood, giving it the 'natural spirits.' In the heart, some of this blood is mixed with air drawn from the lungs, and by the innate heat of the heart is laden with 'vital spirits' (Foster, *op. cit.* p. 12 f.). This was the accepted doctrine for thirteen centuries, until the dawn of modern physiology. The pulmonary circulation was described by Servetus in 1546, and, probably in dependence on him, by Realdus Columbus in 1559 (*ib.* p. 30 f.); whilst Cæsalpinus, a little later, 'recognized that the

flow of blood to the tissues took place by the arteries and by the arteries alone, and that the return of the blood from the tissues took place by the veins and not by the arteries (*ib.* p. 35). Fabricius described the valves of the veins in 1574 (*ib.* p. 36). But his pupil, William Harvey, was 'the first to demonstrate the circulation of the blood. . . . The essential feature of Harvey's new view was that the blood through the body was the same blood, coursing again and again through the body, passing from arteries to veins in the tissues, and from veins to arteries through the lungs, heart, suffering changes in the substance and pores of the tissues, changes in the substance and pores of the lungs' (*ib.* p. 47). Thus, the long-established doctrine of 'spirits' was discredited, and the study of physiology separated from that of pseudo-psychology.

But primitive man did not need to wait for Harvey in order to be taught the significance of blood in relation to life. However ignorant he might be of the precise relation, common observation showed the dependence of life on the blood within the body of man or animal. Loss of blood meant loss of strength, and a man's life seemed to drain away with the blood from a mortal wound. Thus Homer can speak either of the soul (*ψυχή*, *Il.* xiv. 518) or of the blood (*αἷμα*, xvii. 86) as passing away through the inflicted wound (cf. Robinsohn, *Psychol. der Naturvölker*, p. 18; Gruppe, *Griech. Mythol. und Religionsgesch.* p. 728); the identity is affirmed explicitly, *e.g.*, amongst the Hebrews, in the phrase 'the blood is the life' (Dt 12^{23}, where 'life' is literally 'soul'); and even a thinker like Empedocles could regard blood as the seat of thought or perception (Rohde, *Psyche*[2], 1898, ii. 176; Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*[2], 1908, p. 288). For us, however, to repeat 'the blood is the life' means something quite different from the early usage, and the difference is of fundamental importance for the subject before us. By such a phrase we should imply that blood is essential to the living activity of the organism, and that life is not possible without blood. But primitive thought meant to assert that the life *is* the blood, and *vice versa*: when the blood left the body, *it carried the life with it*. Thus, in the Qur'ān, xcvi. 2, God is said to have created man from clotted blood; in Burma this is kept and eaten on special occasions (Elworthy, *Evil Eye*, 1895, p. 112). This is the explanation of the numerous customs that illustrate the perils and powers of blood for the ancient mind; this is the key to many important institutions. To the modern mind, blood which has left its organism is no more than any other fluid, except for a certain amount of sentiment, which may be itself an inheritance from the past; but for the ancient mind, blood, even when shed, was still perilous and potent, full of latent life, and capable of working on persons or things in contact with it. The illustration of these ideas belongs to the following sections; here it remains to show, by instances selected from a very large material, the nature of the idea of a blood-soul. The Arabs used the word for 'soul,' *nafs*, cognate with the Heb. *nephesh*, in the sense of blood. 'When a man dies a natural death, his life departs through the nostrils . . . but when he is slain in battle "his life flows on the spear point"' (Robertson Smith, *Rel. Sem.*[3] p. 40 n.). Belief in the blood-soul explains their custom of not washing the slain, and of burying the Muslim 'martyrs' in their blood, according to Muhammad's commands at Uhud (Wellhausen, *Reste arab. Heidentums*[2], p. 178, n. 3). Robinsohn quotes a remarkable story of an Arab newly-married man attacked, when with his wife, by an overpowering force. He thereupon killed her, smeared himself with her blood, and fought till he fell, by this means uniting her soul with his own (*op. cit.* p. 25). Similarly, we may read of the Australian initiation custom, after circumcision: 'The boy was lifted up, and standing above the two Thungallum men, allowed some of the blood to drip down on to their backs, thus establishing a special friendly relationship between himself and them' (Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 372; further examples collected by Frazer, *GB*[3] i. 356). Or we find that the Caribs 'sprinkle a male infant with its father's blood to give him his father's courage' (H. Spencer, *Sociology*, i. 116). We even find that amongst the West African natives the skeletons of Ashanti kings are washed with the blood of human victims (Ellis, *The Tshi-speaking Peoples*, p. 168)—doubtless to impart soul-life to the dead. Another group of examples shows us the use of blood as a substitute for life (Tylor, ii. 402), and the wide-spread avoidance of blood as food is by some peoples explicitly traced to the identity of the soul and the blood (examples collected in Frazer, *op. cit.* i. 353). So natural, indeed, is it among primitive people for death to come by blood-shedding that 'it is always held uncanny in Africa if a person dies without shedding blood' (Kingsley, *Travels in West Africa*, p. 524); in other words, the blood is the normal and visible soul. What may be the precise relation of this blood-soul to other ideas of soul, such as its identification with breath or shadow, is probably left quite indeterminate in most cases. Skeat cites a curious Malay belief which connects the blood-soul with the shadow-soul through a small snail. 'Among the grass in the shadow of a grazing animal these creatures are to be discovered, and if one of them is crushed, it will be found to be full of blood, which has been drawn in a mysterious way from the veins of the animal through its shadow' (*Malay Magic*, p. 306).

2. The perils of blood are a natural result of that idea of the blood-soul which has just been indicated—'the almost universal belief that blood is a fluid in which inheres mysterious potency, no less dangerous when misused than efficacious when properly employed' (Moore, *EBi*, art. 'Sacrifice,' § 43). It is with the former aspect that we are first concerned, and its most obvious example is that tabu on blood as food with which the OT makes us familiar; cf. 1 S 14^{32-35}, where we see that the blood, which is too perilous and mysterious to be man's food (Smend, *AT. Rel.-gesch.*[2] p. 142), must be offered on the sacred stone to Jahweh before man can eat the flesh with impunity. The prohibition of blood as food meets us, as a definite law, in Dt $12^{16.\ 23-25}$ 15^{23}; here it is not offered in sacrifice, but when animals are slain for ordinary food it is to be poured out on the ground; for the same prohibition in the Priestly Code, cf. Gn 9^{4}, Lv 3^{17} $7^{26.\ 27}$ 17 *passim*, 19^{26}. Frazer cites examples of the same tabu from the customs of Esthonians, American Indians, Romans, Arabs, and Papuans (i. 353). Further, the perils of blood are well illustrated in the precautions taken by many peoples in killing men or animals. It is not the actual killing, but the literal shedding of blood which constitutes the danger, since blood actually shed means mysterious soul-power let loose. Consequently, the actual shedding of blood in killing is to be avoided, if possible; this is probably the explanation of many curious methods of judicial execution (Kingsley, *Travels in West Africa*, p. 525; Frazer, i. 354 f.; Jevons, *Introd. Hist. Rel.* p. 73 f.) which in themselves might seem simply refinements of cruelty. To remind us that the peril is in the actual blood shed, not in any moral element of guilt incurred, we find the same unwillingness to shed blood in the case of animals amongst the Wanika and Damaras of Africa (Frazer, i. 357),

with the result that cattle are stoned to death or suffocated. Where blood is actually shed, various means are used to draw the charge of the shell, so to speak, before it can explode. One has been indicated above in the practice of putting the blood on a sacred stone or altar, and reference will be made to it again when the place of blood in sacrifice is considered (p. 719a). Another plan is to cover the blood with earth or dust; Doughty met with an example of this, interesting because the blood was the man's own: 'Thâhir, cupped in the head, neck, and back, felt lightened; he covered the blood with a little heap of dust, and one who came in asking, "What is this heap?" he answered, "Blood which I have buried"' (*Arabia Deserta*, i. 492). Or the blood may be sucked, or else deposited in some special place; both are illustrated by one of the Australian rites of sub-incision, in which the boy is made to suck the blood on the knife, whilst the blood from the wound falls on a piece of paper bark. 'The blood was taken in the paper bark to the boy's mother, who buried it in the bank of a water pool so as once more to ensure the growth of the lilies' (Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 368). In other circumstances, the blood that has been shed may require expiation (cf. Dt 21^{1-9}), and the blood-stain may be cleansed away by the use of other blood (Lang, *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, i. 275). Finally, the perils of blood, already seen in the prohibition of blood as food, and in avoidance of or precautions in blood-shedding, find a third group of illustrations in the elaborate rules affecting the blood of menstruation and childbirth. The fear of women's blood in these cases, no doubt because regarded as specially mysterious and potent, is wide-spread amongst primitive peoples (examples in Frazer, i. 361). Elaborate care is taken by the Arunta and Ilpirra tribes of Australia, for example, to dispose of the blood of the first menstruation (Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 460). Crawley (*The Mystic Rose*, p. 212), whilst admitting that the obvious vehicle of contagion in such cases is blood, questions the truth of making this central in the tabu of women; and it is frequently true that various ideas operate and concentrate in one primitive custom. But none can doubt that the perils of blood are illustrated by the wide-spread tabu on women at certain times.

3. The powers of blood have been implied already in its perils. But the same ideas which make men ordinarily shrink from contact with blood may evidently cause them to resort to it on extraordinary occasions, as a specially potent means of influence. They are willing to accept the risk for the sake of the end in view. Only a few representative cases can be given here: further illustrations may be found in the chief works on anthropology, or in Strack's *Das Blut*, which gives many examples and copious references. One of the most obvious ways in which the psychical energy of blood can be assimilated is by drinking it. 'Blood may be given by young men to old men of any degree of relationship and at any time with a view to strengthening the latter' (Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 461). Amongst the same Australian peoples, blood may be given also to the members of an avenging expedition; to secure unity of purpose and to exclude treachery, it may even be forcibly administered to an outsider (p. 462); special meetings of reconciliation are also accompanied by blood-drinking (*ib.*). Many primitive peoples drink the blood of enemies in order to secure their strength (Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, p. 102; Robertson Smith, *Kinship*[1], p. 284 [ed. S. A. Cook, p. 296]; Trumbull, *The Blood Covenant*, pp. 126–134). Sometimes the special purpose of blood-drinking is religious inspiration (Trumbull, *op. cit.* pp. 139–142), especially in connexion with a sacrifice, when the fresh blood of the victim is drunk (Frazer, *op. cit.* i. 133 f.). The result is frequently seen in the usual phenomena of possession. The religious idea underlying this practice will be discussed when blood-covenants (see § 4) in general have been considered; here it is sufficient to name this wide-spread practice in illustration of the powers of blood. Another way of imparting these powers is by external application of the blood. 'It is a very common thing for a young man to open a vein in his arm and allow the blood to sprinkle over the body of an older man, the idea being to strengthen the latter' (Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 598). Among some primitive peoples, the blood of relatives is allowed to fall on a corpse, probably with the idea of reviving it or imparting life to it (cf. Howitt, p. 451). From such use of blood to promote physical or psychical strength, it is an easy transition to the use of blood as medicine. For example, amongst the people just named, 'it is a very common practice to give both men and women blood to drink when they are ill' (Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 599). From the time of the Romans down to our own time, there has been a wide-spread belief that epilepsy could be cured by drinking blood (Robinsohn, *op. cit.* p. 27). An established cure for leprosy, from ancient Egypt down into the Middle Ages, was the blood-bath (Trumbull, *The Blood Covenant*, p. 116 f.). Many curious examples are collected by Strack (pp. 27 f. and 36–40) of these and similar customs. The patient may even be given his own blood to drink (*op. cit.* pp. 40–43). We find also cases approximating to the use of charms, like the Chinese custom, in times of pestilence, of writing sentences in human blood to be fastened on the door-posts for protection against disease (Trumbull, *The Threshold Covenant*, p. 71). Not only human but also animal blood occurs frequently in the primitive pharmacopœia (Strack, pp. 55–57). It is, of course, difficult to separate ancient medicine from ancient magic. In regard to the magical uses of blood, some belong to it in common with hair, nail-parings, etc., as having been in close connexion with the body: thus 'ancient Peruvian sorcerers destroyed their victims by acting on blood taken from them' (H. Spencer, *Sociology*, i. 264). The use of blood at the various totem ceremonies of Australia is midway between the magical and religious uses. But special mention must be made of the use made of the blood of menstruation for both medicinal and magical purposes (Strack, pp. 28–32)—a use we might expect in view of the perils specially attaching to this blood. The further powers of blood are illustrated throughout this article, in regard both to human and to superhuman relationships, and underlie innumerable blood-rites and blood-sacrifices. One of the most striking of these is the blood-baptism of Mithraism (*q.v.*). Here it remains only to point out the extension of the powers of blood to many blood-like things. The tabu on blood extends to many blood-coloured objects (Jevons, p. 67: 'The savage believes that the same terrible consequences—whatever they may be—which ensue on contact with blood, do actually and really follow on contact with things which by their colour . . . remind him thereof'). So, amongst West African natives, 'every spot where the earth is of a red colour is believed to be, or to have been, the place of abode of a Sasabonsum; and the red colour is supposed to be caused by the blood of the victims destroyed by him' (Ellis, *op. cit.* p. 35; cf. Tylor, i. 406). We may trace the same range of thought in the ideas attaching to the red heifer (Nu 19^{2a}) or to the robin redbreast; and in the practice of smearing the body with red earth (Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 464). This last is probably a substitute for blood. For other

customs, especially the natural and frequent use of wine as the blood of the grape, cf. Trumbull, *The Blood Covenant*, p. 191 f.; Frazer, i. 359.

4. **Blood-covenants.** — The previous sections illustrate that primitive conception of blood on which all later ideas and institutions rest. We have now to notice some of the more important of these ethical and religious developments of the primitive idea. In the first place, there is the wide-spread practice of the blood-covenant between man and man. In its direct and primitive form, this is essentially the union of one life with another by actual exchange of blood, the exchange being made either by drinking or by transfusion. Many instances of this practice are collected by Trumbull in his elaborate monograph, *The Blood Covenant*; he draws examples from Africa, Asia, America, Europe, and Oceania, and claims that it is fundamental in all primitive life (p. 96). Certainly the practice is a natural development of the idea that blood is life. On its physical side, the practice is still retained in civilized communities in the medical operation of transfusion: 'men or dogs, bled to apparent death, may be at once and effectually revived by filling their veins with blood taken from another man or dog' (Huxley, *Physiol.* p. 117). The difference is that the primitive man did this, and still does it, not for physical only, but also for psychical ends, which he does not separate from the former. 'The inter-commingling of the blood of two organisms is, therefore, according to this view, equivalent to the inter-commingling of the lives, of the personalities, of the natures, thus brought together' (Trumbull, *op. cit.* p. 38). Both the primitive practice and the primitive idea may be modified in various directions. On the one hand, some substitute for blood, such as wine, may be introduced; on the other, the idea of life-union may appear in the weaker form of union in a particular oath or pledge (cf. Doughty, *Arabia Deserta*, ii. 41: 'sheykhly persons at Aneyza have told me that "el-Kahtân in el-Yémen do confirm their solemn swearing together by drinking human gore").' For a collection of such blood-oaths, cf. Strack, *Das Blut*, pp. 21–25. See, further, BROTHERHOOD (artificial).

5. **Kinship.** — It has seemed to many that the idea of union by blood through the blood-covenant is simply a particular case of the idea of union by blood as underlying kinship in general, the only difference being the substitution of artificial means for natural. Jevons, referring to the fact that Muslim women do not veil themselves in the presence of 'blood-brothers' any more than before other blood-relations, remarks: 'it faithfully preserves the primitive view that the blood-brotherhood thus established is not a relationship personal to the two parties alone, but extends to the whole of each clan: my brother is, or becomes, the brother of all my brethren; the blood which flows in the veins of either party to the blood-covenant flows in the veins of all his kin' (*op. cit.* p. 99; cf., however, p. 170). Benzinger, also referring to Semitic races, which so richly illustrate the ideas of blood, remarks: 'Relationship is participation in the common blood which flows with equal fulness in the veins of every member of that circle; on this idea rest all the rights and obligations between the individual and his clansmen' (*EBi*, col. 2672). Such an identity of kinship with blood-relationship is to us self-evident: the terms are convertible, for the life of the father and the life of the mother are combined in the child born from their physical union. But it is by no means so certain as is frequently assumed that the fundamental idea of kinship is blood-relationship. The whole range of birth ideas amongst primitive peoples often differs widely from our own. By various Australian tribes we find 'the idea firmly held that the child is not the direct result of intercourse, that it may come without this, which merely, as it were, prepares the mother for the reception and birth also of an already-formed spirit child who inhabits one of the local totem centres' (Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 265). In another part of the same country, a different view is held: 'The child comes from the man, and the woman only takes care of it' (Howitt, p. 255). Amongst the West Africans, 'the Awunas, an Eastern Ewe tribe, say that the lower jaw is the only part of the body which a child derives from its mother, all the rest being derived from the ancestral *luwoo* (the Tshi *kra*). The father furnishes nothing' (Ellis, *The Yoruba-speaking Peoples*, p. 131 n.). Westermarck (*Hum. Mar.* p. 106) cites from Carver the case of a North American tribe who ascribed the soul to the father and the body to the mother. These ideas, in their many varieties, at least remind us that the idea of blood-relationship has far less physiological support in the primitive mind than in our own. Further, we may ask whether the analysis of the idea of kinship into one of identity of blood is itself natural to the primitive mind, and does not belong to a somewhat later stage of development. Crawley argues that 'habitual proximity and contact is the strongest and most ordinary tie, and is earlier in thought than the tie of blood' (*The Mystic Rose*, p. 452); he further contends that 'the theory that the "blood covenant" and the similar marriage ceremony are intended to cause the blood of the tribe to flow in the veins of the new member is based on late legal fictions' (*ib.* p. 376). Westermarck, criticizing the hypothesis of an original promiscuity, shows reason to doubt that 'the denomination of children and the rules of succession really were in the first place dependent on ideas of consanguinity' (*op. cit.* p. 107). Even where blood-relationship is emphasized, as in Arabia, it may be significantly linked with parallel ideas, such as meal-communion. 'The Arabic community rests on a natural basis . . . those who belong together are connected in the first place through blood; in the second place, however, through the fact that they eat and drink, live and travel together; without this, blood would soon lose its power' (Wellhausen, *Reste arab. Heidentums*[2], p. 193). On the whole, it seems in accordance with primitive habits of thought to regard the idea of blood-relationship as a specialization of the general theory and practice of early kinship. See, further, BROTHERHOOD (artificial).

6. **Blood-revenge.**—At first sight it may seem difficult to explain the universal practice of blood-revenge, except from the standpoint of a primitive sense of the blood-tie underlying kinship. When the blood of a kinsman has been shed, it seems most natural to assume that the tie of blood impels his nearest relative to slay the slayer. But, in the light of what has been said, we may regard the motive which animates the avenger of blood as complex. There is, first, the fact that presents itself from the powers and perils of blood. Blood has been shed, perilous power has been liberated, and something has to be done if those in the vicinity are to escape the consequences. 'The principle that blood must be atoned for by blood has inspired in every part of the earth the endeavour to avenge a murdered kinsman' (Bastian, *Der Mensch in der Geschichte*, iii. 1; he collects many examples in pp. 2–36). There are, further, the natural obligations and feelings of those whose lives have been closely linked, which make a kinsman the most likely person to desire the 'wild justice' of revenge. The union of these two

motives, the psychical and the personal, as they may be called, issues in the familiar features of blood-responsibility, as presented in early forms of society. For example, amongst West African tribes, 'revenge, especially for bloodshed, is everywhere practised. It is a duty belonging first to the "ijawe" (blood-relative), next to the "ikaka" (family), next to the "etomba" (tribe). . . . Formerly it was indifferent who was killed in revenge, provided it was some member of the murderer's tribe. Naturally that tribe sought to retaliate, and the feud was carried back and forth, and would be finally settled only when an equal number had been killed on each side. . . . At present, blood is not always required, but formerly no money would have been accepted as a sufficient penalty' (Nassau, *Fetichism in West Africa*, pp. 19, 20). This example may be taken as the normal type. In course of time various modifications arose, tending to take vengeance out of the hands of the individual, and to put it in charge of the whole community, whilst various plans were adopted, such as the well-known 'cities of refuge' among the Hebrews, to differentiate the cases of wilful and accidental manslaughter (cf. Dt 19^6). The original entire lack of distinction between the two is significant of the attitude of the primitive mind to the whole matter; it is the actual shedding of blood that is in question, not the modern idea of abstract justice. The same attitude comes out even more significantly in the ideas held about blood-shedding in the case of animals. 'The primitive hunter who slays an animal believes himself exposed to the vengeance either of its disembodied spirit, or of all the other animals of the same species, whom he considers as knit together, like men, by the ties of kin and the obligations of the blood feud' (Frazer, ii. 389, where examples are given). Finally, we may see the whole principle which underlies blood-revenge well illustrated in some modern survivals. The following account is given by Curtiss from native information (*Primitive Semitic Religion To-day*, p. 191): 'In the neighbourhood of Nablus it is customary, when a reconciliation has been made between the murderer and the avenger of blood, for the murderer to kill a goat or a sheep. He then kneels before the avenger with a red handkerchief tied about his neck. Some of the blood of the animal slain is put on the palms of his hands. The avenger draws his sword and intimates that he could take his life from him, but that he gives it back to him.' See also BLOOD-FEUD.

7. **Blood and the spirit-world.**—In tracing the developments of the ideas of the powers and perils attaching to blood, as they are seen in blood-covenants, blood-relationship, and blood-revenge, we have considered those ideas as affecting the relation between man and man only. But it is evident, from the fact that the spirit-world is generally conceived on anthropomorphic lines, that this important group of ideas would be applied to the unseen world, and that blood would come to occupy an important place in religious as well as in social life. The remainder of this article is therefore concerned with the place of blood in religion. The natural starting-point is afforded by the thirst of departed souls for blood, of which the visit of Odysseus to Hades supplies the classical example (*Od.* xi. 34 f.): 'But when I had besought the tribes of the dead with vows and prayers, I took the sheep and cut their throats over the trench, and the dark blood flowed forth, and, lo, the spirits of the dead that be departed gathered them from out of Erebus. . . . I drew the sharp sword from my thigh and sat there, suffering not the strengthless heads of the dead to draw nigh the blood, ere I had word of Teiresias' (Butcher-Lang's tr., p. 173). This eagerness of the dead to revive their strength by drinking that blood which is life is the best explanation of the frequent practice of pouring blood into the grave or tomb by means of a tube or funnel (examples in Jevons, p. 51 f.), or of the various forms of blood-offering to the dead (p. 52 f.), which may take the form of more or less serious mutilations on the part of the mourners (p. 191). But other spirits than those of departed men are eager for blood on similar grounds. So we meet with belief in the vampire. 'Inasmuch as certain patients are seen becoming day by day, without apparent cause, thin, weak, and bloodless, savage animism is called upon to produce a satisfactory explanation, and does so in the doctrine that there exist certain demons which eat out the souls or hearts or suck the blood of their victims' (Tylor, ii. 191; he cites various examples, pp. 191–194; for some modern cases, cf. Strack, *Das Blut*, p. 65). As a particular example may be mentioned the Malay vampire known as the *Penanggalan*, 'which is believed to resemble a trunkless human head with the sac of the stomach attached to it, and which flies about seeking for an opportunity of sucking the blood of infants' (Skeat, *Malay Magic*, p. 320, cf. p. 328). But other temporarily or permanently disembodied spirits have the same tastes and powers. So the West African natives believe that witches live almost entirely on the blood which they suck from children at night (Kingsley, *Travels*, p. 490). It need hardly be said that the difficulty we feel in connecting an immaterial spirit with material blood does not exist for the primitive mind, which knows no such antithesis; indeed, spirits are sometimes thought to yield blood (Robinsohn, *op. cit.* p. 167).

From such general beliefs we may pass to the various practices by which the spirit-world is approached through blood. Perhaps the best and simplest example of contact with the spirit-world made by blood is afforded by its use in Australian totemistic ceremonies. In connexion with the Unjiamba flower-totem, the blood of one of the young men is sprinkled freely on a stone, which is supposed to represent a mass of Unjiamba flowers, after chants have been sung, 'the burden of which is a reiterated invitation to the Unjiamba tree to flower much, and to the blossoms to be full of honey' (Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 184). In connexion with the Okira or kangaroo-totem, a similar ceremony is performed to increase the number of kangaroos, after which the young men at once go out to hunt them (*ib.* p. 201). In this case, the stone 'represents the spot where a celebrated kangaroo of the Alcheringa (*q.v.*) went down into the earth, its spirit part remaining in the stone which arose to mark the place' (*ib.* p. 462). These blood ceremonies are specially instructive, because they show the potency of blood in making a vital connexion with the 'supernatural' world, quite apart from any of the theories of sacrifice developed at a later stage of religious thought. It is of importance to emphasize this, lest we misread primitive forms of 'sacrifice' such as that offered to the Yoruba god, Ogun, when a human victim is slain; 'the entrails are exposed before the image, and the body suspended from a tree. The victim is slain by having his head struck off upon the stool of Ogun, over which the blood is made to gush' (Ellis, *Yoruba-speaking Peoples*, p. 68). The relation of the blood to the god may be regarded as an extension of its relation to the departed spirit of a man; it is summed up in the address to one of the gods in the Egyptian pantheon: 'Hail, thou who dost consume blood' (*Book of the Dead*, CXXV. 13). In other cases, however, we meet with a less direct presentation of the blood to the deity. Thus Ellis

writes: 'In 1881 a slight earthquake shock threw down a portion of the wall of the king's residence in Coomassie. The king, Mensah, consulted the priests as to what should be done, and the latter declared that the damage was the act of Sasabonsum, and that the ruined portion must be rebuilt of mud (*swish*) moistened with the blood of virgins. Fifty young girls were accordingly slaughtered, and the wall was rebuilt with *swish* kneaded in their blood' (*The Tshi-speaking Peoples*, p. 36). This instance serves as a transitional case to a very large number of what may be called blood-beginnings. These are far too numerous to be noticed in any detail, but in general it may be said that primitive peoples begin anything new, a new work or building, a new relation, such as marriage, by the shedding of blood (cf. Trumbull, *The Threshold Covenant*, *passim*; Skeat, *Malay Magic*, 143, 232; and many books of travel, etc.). For example, to take the case of a single people, Doughty found such customs amongst the Arabs in connexion with new building, and the breaking of new soil: 'Malignity of the soil is . . . ascribed by the people of Arabia to the ground-demons, *jan*, *ahl el-ard*, or earth-folk. Therefore husbandmen in these parts use to sprinkle new break-land with the blood of a peace-offering: the like, when they build, they sprinkle upon the stones, lest by any evil accidents the workmen's lives should be endangered' (*Arabia Deserta*, i. 136; cf. ii. 100, of a new building; ii. 198, of a new well; i. 452, of new booty). It is of interest to find the old custom surviving even in modern Palestine. 'When the ground was broken for the railroad from Beirut to Damascus, ten sheep were placed in a row, their throats were cut, their blood flowed down upon the ground, and the flesh was given to the poor' (Curtiss, *Prim. Sem. Rel.* p. 184).

8. **Sacrifice.**—The important place of blood in man's connexion with the spiritual world is paralleled by its position in the sacrificial ritual of organized religion. The disposition of blood in the most primitive forms of sacrifice shows clearly its central significance, and no theory of sacrifice can be regarded as satisfactory which places blood at the circumference rather than at the centre. Moore, in his valuable article on 'Sacrifice' (*EBi*, col. 4217) summarizes his detailed survey of the OT system by saying: 'From first to last the utmost importance attaches to the disposition of the victim's blood. Indeed, it may be said that this is the one universal and indispensable constituent of sacrifice. . . . This use of sacrificial blood is older than the offering of part of the victim by fire, and is the necessary antecedent of the feast, its religious consecration. The offering or application of the blood cannot very well be regarded as a gift to God, or as a mere incident in the preparation for a communion meal.' It does not fall within the scope of the present article to offer a discussion of the rival theories of sacrifice (*q.v.*); but it may be pointed out that the argument of the previous sections, drawn from a wider field of anthropological evidence, fully supports the above statement. According to Tylor (ii. 375–410), 'sacrifice is a gift made to a deity as if he were a man. . . . The ruder conception that the deity takes and values the offering for itself, gives place on the one hand to the idea of mere homage expressed by a gift, and on the other to the negative view that the virtue lies in the worshipper depriving himself of something prized' (p. 376). That such views do arise in the history of sacrifice is, of course, undoubted, but there is grave reason to doubt whether they can be called in any sense a part of primitive culture. The gift-theory of sacrifice is criticized by Jevons on other grounds, as being of comparatively late application (*Introd. Hist. Rel.* pp. 223–225). Here we may note that the conception of blood as a gift itself involves some explanation of its selection, and forces us back to a more primitive standpoint. Amongst the Arabs, the chief form of sacrifice was the slaughtered animal (Wellhausen, *op. cit.* p. 114); and the genuine Arab ritual consists in pouring out the blood, or else smearing it on the sacred stone (p. 116). This special appropriation of the blood to the deity can be paralleled from many peoples. Thus the West Africans 'eat the meat of the sacrifice, that having nothing to do with the sacrifice to the spirits, which is the blood, for the blood is the life' (Kingsley, *Travels*, p. 451). 'In an expected great evil the gateway is sometimes sprinkled with the blood of a sacrificed goat or sheep. The flesh is not wasted; it is eaten by the villagers' (Nassau, *op. cit.* p. 93). The reason for this appropriation has been suggested in the previous sections of this article; it springs from the powers and perils of blood. On the one hand, we have already seen that blood is used as a vital link between man and the spirit-world—a usage with which various views of its precise potency might be connected; on the other hand, the very perils of blood, which so often cause its prohibition as food, and its tabu in other ways, suggest that the sacred stone will serve as a lightning-conductor does, by drawing off the latent peril. This view is practically that held by Moore in the article referred to: 'The common root of these diverse uses and restrictions is the almost universal belief that blood is a fluid in which inheres mysterious potency, no less dangerous when misused than efficacious when properly employed. In the outpouring of the blood at the sacrificial stone we may perhaps recognize the feeling that this is the safest disposition of it, as well as the belief of a somewhat more developed theology, that it belongs to the deity of right' (*EBi*, col. 4218). Such disposal of the blood, starting from a genuine and deep-rooted primitive motive, would form a nucleus round which the later usages and ideas would easily cluster. Ancient psychology draws no hard and fast line between the blood-soul of the animal and that of the man; totemistic ideas confirmed the identity of the man with the animal he offered, and the communion with the deity obtained by the blood which was the life would be a very real thing to the primitive worshipper. The later ideas of substitution depend on a deepening ethical experience; and they, too, equally with the idea of homage, can find a basis in the offered blood. All these are natural developments, interpreting the primitive rite anew to the needs of each age; nor do the perils and powers of blood become inoperative on human thought till men learn that the only perfect communion with God belongs to the perfectly obedient will, and that they who would worship the Father must worship in spirit and in truth. See, further, art. ANTI-SEMITISM, BLOOD-FEUD, BROTHERHOOD (artificial), EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT, INITIATION, SACRIFICE.

LITERATURE.—P. Cassel, *Die Symbolik des Blutes*, 1882 (Berlin); Strack, *Das Blut im Glauben und Aberglauben der Menschheit*, 1900 (München); Procksch, *Über die Blutrache bei den vorislamischen Arabern*, 1899 (Leipzig); Clay Trumbull, *The Threshold Covenant*, 1896 (Edinburgh), also *The Blood Covenant*, 1887 (London); Robinsohn, *Psychologie der Naturvölker*, esp. 18–28 pp. (no date, Leipzig); Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*[2] (Index, *s.v.* 'Blood'), 1894 (London); Curtiss, *Primitive Semitic Religion To-day* (criticism of theory that the sacrificial meal is the oldest form of sacrifice, p. 218 f.), 1902 (London); Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas* (Index, *s.v.* 'Blood'), vol. i. 1906, vol. ii. 1908 (London).

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BLOOD-BROTHERHOOD.—See BROTHERHOOD (artificial).

BLOOD-COVENANT.—See BLOOD, p. 717.

BLOOD-FEUD.

Primitive (L. H. Gray), p. 720.
Aryan (O. Schrader), p. 724.
Celtic (J. L. Gerig), p. 725.
Greek (I. F. Burns), p. 727.
Hindu (J. Jolly), p. 729.
Muslim (Gaudefroy-Demombynes), p. 730.
Roman (I. F. Burns), p. 731.
Semitic (A. H. Harley), p. 731.
Slavonic (O. Schrader) p. 733.
Teutonic (E. Mogk), p. 735.

BLOOD-FEUD (Primitive).—One of the most wide-spread phenomena of primitive, and even of comparatively advanced, jurisprudence is the blood-feud. This, while subject to the most manifold gradations, may be defined, in its typical aspect, as that principle of ethnological jurisprudence whereby an entire family (more rarely clan or tribe) is made liable to retaliation and reprisals in kind by another family (or clan or tribe) against which a member of the former family (or clan or tribe) has committed a deadly offence (generally murder, less commonly rape or abduction). It is, in other words, the *lex talionis* exercised between families (more rarely clans or tribes), often including those connected with them by any form of blood-covenant; it is communal vengeance, as distinguished from individual revenge. Its ultimate foundation is, indeed, personal retaliation; but, in proportion as the family develops, the principle of the blood-feud grows in importance, until it reaches its climax in the modern tenet that an entire government is bound to require punishment for injury done to one of its citizens by another nation or by a member or members thereof. On the other hand, just as in the latter case concessions or pecuniary compensation normally take the place of demanding life for life, so in relatively primitive jurisprudence, murder, rape, and other grave offences may frequently be commuted in various ways; the blood-feud is replaced by the *wergeld* (see below).

The essentially communal nature of the blood-feud carries with it the corollary that, among many peoples, one unprotected by ties of family, clan, or tribe may be injured in person or possessions without risk of blood-vengeance, unless he has received artificial kinship by some form of blood-covenant or enjoys the status of guest, which in itself constitutes in great measure a temporary *quasi*-adoption into the family (very rarely into the clan or tribe) of his host. This explains the fact that many peoples rob or kill strangers with impunity and without any sense of wrong-doing, although among themselves they may have the highest regard for the possessions and lives of their fellows, as among the Polynesians, where the property of strangers was held to belong to the gods of the land, so that it could be seized and the owners killed with impunity by those among whom the strangers in question had come (Mariner, *Tonga Islands*, London, 1818, i. 308; Mathias G . . ., *Lettres sur les îles Marquises*, Paris, 1843, p. 106).

The blood-feud is, among many peoples, a sacred obligation, to which the kinsmen of the murdered man are in duty bound, as among the African Bakawiri (Leuschner, in Steinmetz, *Rechtsverhältnisse von eingeborenen Völkern in Afrika und Ozeanien*, Berlin, 1903, p. 23). To such a degree is this concept carried that it is often believed that the soul of the murdered man finds no rest until blood-vengeance has been exacted, as among the Australians and Papuans (Kohler, in *ZVRW* vii. 363, 376), and the African Banaka, Bapuku, Diakite Sarrakolese, and Washambala (Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 51; Nicole, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 132; Lang, *ib.* p. 257). He who does not perform blood-vengeance when he should is despised, not as a coward, but as a recreant to the demands of religion and duty, as among the Negro Akka (Monrad, *Gemälde von der Küste von Guinea*, Weimar, 1824, p. 90 f.) and Felups (Park, *Reise in das Innere von Afrika*, Hamburg, 1779, p. 20), the South American Arawaks (Schomburgk, *Reise in Britisch Guiana*, Leipzig, 1847, i. 157), in Australia and New Guinea (Kohler, in *ZVRW* vii. 364, 376; Grey, *Journal of Two Expeditions in North-West and West Australia*, London, 1841, ii. 240), and in the Indonesian islands of Leti, Moa, and Lakor (Riedel, *De sluik- en kroesharige rassen tusschen Selebes en Papua*, The Hague, 1886, p. 370). In at least some cases the object of the blood-feud appears to have been sacrifice of the murderer or his kin to the *manes* of the victim, thus explaining the rule of the South American Tupi that the relatives of the murdered man should strangle the slayer on the very spot of his crime (Featherman, *Social History of the Races of Mankind*, London, 1887–90, iii. pt. 2, p. 340). This usage finds its antithetical parallel in the North American Indian adoption of the murderer in his victim's stead (see below, p. 722[b]). The women are often described as especially assiduous in demanding the inauguration of the blood-feud, as among the Iroquois, Florida Indians, Caribs, and Brazilians (Lafitau, *Mœurs des sauvages amériquains*, 16mo ed., Paris, 1724, iii. 149–151).

The degree of kinship involved in the duty of satisfying blood-vengeance varies widely. In its greatest extent any member of the family, clan, or tribe to which the murdered man belonged may kill any member of the family, clan, or tribe of the murderer, as in New Guinea, where the murderer himself is not killed (von Hasselt, in *ZE* viii. 193; cf. the Australian Dieri custom of killing the eldest brother of the offender rather than the offender himself [Howitt, p. 327]), and among the African Somali and Bakawiri (Haggenmacher, in *Petermann's Mittheilungen*, Erg. x. No. 47, p. 31; Leuschner, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 23). Elsewhere the feud may be restricted to totem-families, as among some Australians and the South American Goajiros (Kohler, in *ZVRW* vii. 364, 382). In its extremest form the blood-feud prevailed generally in Polynesia, especially in New Zealand (Angas, *Savage Life in Australia and New Zealand*, London, 1847, ii. 171; Thompson, *The Story of New Zealand*, London, 1859, i. 98). In Polynesia, if the offender escaped, his whole family paid the penalty in his stead (Wakefield, *Adventure in New Zealand*, London, 1845, ii. 108); in Tonga and Samoa, where wergeld was accepted only rarely, all kinsmen of the offender were killed if they could be found (Shortland, *Traditions and Superstitions of the New Zealanders*, London, 1854, p. 224); and in New Zealand the kinsmen of a murdered man often killed in revenge the first man on whom they chanced, whether friend or foe (Dieffenbach, *Travels in New Zealand*, London, 1843, ii. 127).

The blood-feud may, however, be restricted to certain members of the households of the murderer and the murdered—a system widely prevalent in Africa. Where the matriarchate is in force, only those related on the mother's side are involved, and where the patriarchal system has been developed, only those on the father's side. Accordingly, among the African Barea and Kunáma the son

avenges the death of a mother or uterine sister, the nephew his maternal uncle or aunt, and the maternal uncle his nephew or niece; but the son does not avenge his father, or the father his son. Among the Felups, on the other hand, as in Akkra, on the Gold Coast, the eldest son is the avenger of his father (Post, *Afrikan. Jurisprudenz*, Oldenburg, 1887, i. 61 f.). Similar rules prevail for the maternal side among the Goajiros and Australians (Kohler, in *ZVRW* vii. 382, 364; Bastian, in *ZE* vi. 305). If, however, the matriarchal and patriarchal systems are confused, these differentiations no longer hold, as among certain Brazilian tribes (Post, *Anfänge des Staats- und Rechtslebens*, Oldenburg, 1878, p. 182). An interesting sidelight on the primitive legal status of the wife is afforded by some of the laws of the blood-feud, which show whether she is regarded as having become the property of her husband or is held still to belong to her original family (cf. the twofold theory of the status of the individual in more highly developed polity, p. 723[b]). From the latter point of view she is avenged, among the Bakawiri and Washambala, by her own blood-kinsmen, not by her husband (Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 23; Lang, *ib.* p. 257), this being the reverse of Banaka, Bapuku, and pagan Bambara practice (*ib.* pp. 49, 89); while among the Diakite Sarrakolese of the French Sudan the husband may avenge his wife when duly authorized by the *ḳādī*, whereas if he does not request this privilege the duty devolves upon her kinsmen (Nicole, *ib.* p. 132). In West Africa the blood-feud 'is a duty belonging, first, to the "ijawe" (blood-relative), next to the "ikaka" (family), next to the "etomba" (tribe). The murdered man's own family takes the lead,—in case of a wife, her husband and his family, and the wife's family; sometimes the whole "ikaka"; finally, the "etomba"' (Nassau, *Fetichism in West Africa*, New York, 1904, p. 19). In the African Sansanding States the right of blood-revenge belongs to the agnates of the murdered man in the order of their inheritance (Fama Mademba, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 89). Among the African Washambala, the blood-feud, which they exact only for murder, is directed against the offender and his wife, while his children are enslaved and his property is plundered (Lang, *ib.* p. 256 f.); and among the American Shawnee, in case wergeld was refused and the murderer could not be seized, his nearest kinsman was slain in his stead by the kinsmen of the murdered man (Featherman, *op. cit.* iii. pt. 1, p. 183), this being a *quasi*-analogue to the Dieri practice of substitution, to which attention has already been drawn (for the very different principle of substituting the murderer for the victim, see below, p. 722).

An interesting example of what may be called a ceremonial blood-feud is afforded by the Australian *pinya* (the *atninga* of the Central Australians), a sort of *posse comitatus*, which may hunt down the murderer or (as already noted) his eldest brother. In lieu of actually killing a victim, however, the *pinya* may subject the murderer to a milder penalty. Thus, among the Mukjarawaint, in a case of blood-feud, a headman 'appointed a spot near at hand where the expiatory encounter should take place that afternoon, it being agreed that so soon as the offender had been struck by a spear the combat should cease. Then the offenders stood out, armed with shields, and received the spears thrown at them by the dead man's kindred, until at length one of them was wounded. The Headman of the Garchukas then threw a lighted piece of bark, which he held, into the air, and the fight ceased. If it had been continued there would have been a general fight between the two totems' (Howitt, p. 335). This practice is wide-spread in Australia (Howitt, p. 335 ff.).

Artificial kinship, as noted above (p. 720), is also frequently reckoned in satisfaction of the blood-feud. Thus, among the Polynesians, brothers artificially created by blood-covenant were bound to require blood-revenge if one was killed, even though he fell in battle, which normally abrogates the necessity of such vengeance (Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*[2], London, 1832, i. 290); and similar principles were observed among the Araucanian Pehuenche of South America (Post, *Grundlagen des Rechts*, Oldenburg, 1884, p. 69). The relation between host and guest often carries similar obligations with it, as among the African Barea and Kunáma (Munzinger, *Ostafr. Studien*, Schaffhausen, 1864, p. 477), as does that between patron and client, as among the Barea and Bogo (Munzinger, *op. cit.* p. 243, and *Ueber die Sitten und das Recht der Bogos*, Winterthur, 1859, p. 43); so that among the African Takue wergeld is readily accepted for a murdered kinsman, but blood-revenge is exacted for the killing of a guest or client (Munzinger, *Ostafr. Stud.* p. 208).

Certain limits are, however, normally observed in the blood-feud. Men in full vigour are usually alone concerned. Women are, for the most part, exempt, as are children and aged men, among the Indians of Brazil (Post, *Anfänge*, p. 175), although some peoples, as the Sudanese, spare children only until they are old enough to bear arms (Marno, *Reisen im Gebiete des blauen und weissen Nil*, Vienna, 1874, p. 200), the same practice prevailing among the Nissan Islanders of the Bismarck Archipelago (Sorge, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 418) and the Marshall Islanders (Senfft, *ib.* p. 449). Other tribes, as the Nuforese of New Guinea and the African Banaka and Bapuku, render even women and children liable (von Hasselt, in *ZE* viii. 93; Kohler, in *ZVRW* vii. 376; Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 49). In like fashion the Caribs mercilessly slaughtered children (Labat, *Voyage aux isles d'Amérique*, The Hague, 1724, ii. 109), and the South American Tupinimba even extended the blood-feud to the child begotten by a prisoner of war, who, before being killed, was made to consort for this very purpose with a woman of his captors' tribe, the offspring being brought up expressly for slaughter (Schmidt, in *ZVRW* xiii. 297, 317). Some peoples, as the Makassars, forbid blood-feud between those of different rank, the inferior being entitled only to blood-money (Wilken, *Het strafrecht bij de volken van het maleische ras*, The Hague, 1883, p. 7); while in the Sansanding States one superior in rank is not liable to blood-feud for the murder of his inferior, unless robbery was the motive for the offence (Fama Mademba, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 88 f.).

Within the family the blood-feud has no existence, punishment here being meted out by the authority of the head of the family—a principle also observed in the clan and tribe; although, as the sense of blood-kinship decays in the last two divisions, it naturally becomes increasingly difficult for an interclanal or intertribal blood-feud to arise.

The blood-feud is most generally begun, as has been noted, by murder, which may be entirely unintentional, as among the Australians, the Marshall Islanders, and in the Egyptian Sudan (Kohler, in *ZVRW* vii. 363, xiv. 443 f.; Marno, *op. cit.* p. 200), or committed in self-defence, as among the Bedawin (Kohler, in *ZVRW* viii. 254), or committed even by a person irresponsible for his acts, as among the African Ondonga and the Nissan Islanders of the Bismarck Archipelago (Rautanan, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 341; Sorge, *ib.* p. 418). The wide-spread belief in magic as the cause of death frequently leads to inquiry of the sorcerer as to the identity of the murderer and the consequent object of the blood-feud, as in Africa (Post, *Afr. Jur.* ii. 145 ff.), among the Nissan Islanders (Sorge, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 418), and the Dieri of South-East Australia (Howitt, p. 326), and in Central Australia generally (Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 490). The Bagobo of South Mindanao even made the medicine-man liable to the blood-feud on the ground that he had failed to avert death from the murdered man

(Schadenberg, in *ZE* xvii. 12). But, as the feeling of blood-kinship diminishes, a distinction is drawn between murder and manslaughter, the former still requiring blood-vengeance, while atonement may be made for the latter by a lesser penalty, or the offence may be commuted by wergeld, as in the Sansanding States and among the Diakite Sarrakolese of the French Sudan, the Washambala (Fama Mademba, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 89; Nicole, *ib.* p. 132; Lang, *ib.* p. 257), the Narrinyeri of South-East Australia (Howitt, p. 341), and the Papuans (Kohler, in *ZVRW* xiv. 380 f.). In case of offences other than murder, primitive jurisprudence varies extremely. Among the African Barea and Kunáma, and in Akkra, mere bodily injury does not render the offender liable to the blood-feud (Munzinger, *Ostafr. Stud.* p. 502; Monrad, *op. cit.* p. 98), as it does, for instance, in Montenegro (Wesnitsch, in *ZVRW* ix. 54; Miklosich, *Blutrache bei den Slaven*, Vienna, 1887, p. 21), while the African Bogo regard such injury as shedding half the blood of the injured part, so that half the price of blood-revenge is required (Munzinger, *Bogos*, p. 81). Sexual offences, as infringing property rights (see art. ADULTERY), are sometimes subject to the blood-feud, notably adultery (Post, *Studien zur Entwicklungsgesch. des Familienrechts*, Oldenburg, 1889, pp. 355–359), fornication (the African Takue, Marea, and Beni-Amer [Munzinger, *Ostafr. Stud.* pp. 208, 245, 322]), and abduction (New Caledonians and Samoans [Post, *Anfänge*, p. 214]).

Since a true blood-feud is a family, clanal, or tribal affair, it can, properly speaking, be ended only by a solemn agreement between the families, clans, or tribes concerned; so that, if these will not consent to peace, the feud may persist for generations until one of the parties to it is annihilated, as among the Bagobo (Schadenberg, in *ZE* xvii. 28), the Manyuema and Balégga (Post, *Afr. Jur.* i. 84; cf. *Anfänge*, p. 175f., *Geschlechtsgenossenschaft der Urzeit*, Oldenburg, 1875, pp. 159 ff.), and the Malagasy islands of Nossi-Bé and Mayotte (Walter, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 391). A war of fourteen years' duration was waged between the North American Indian Passamaquoddies and Micmacs because, while the two tribes were visiting each other, the son of the Passamaquoddy chief became enraged and killed the son of the Micmac chief, who refused every offer of reconciliation, even the life of the boy murderer (Leland and Prince, *Kulóskap the Master*, New York, 1902, p. 25 f.). Sometimes, however, as among the Australians, a blood-feud is satisfied if the offender be merely wounded (cf. above, p. 721[a]; Howitt, pp. 336, 342; Kohler, in *ZVRW* vii. 365).

For a typical example of the termination of the blood-feud the ceremonies of the African Barea and Kunáma may be cited (Post, *Afr. Jur.* i. 67, his account being based on Munzinger, *Ostafr. Stud.* pp. 501 ff.). When a day has been fixed for the settlement of the feud, the murderer chooses a protector in the hostile village, to whom he sends durra to make beer. On the day appointed, all the villagers, except the family of the murdered man, go out to meet the murderer, whom they safeguard in their midst until he reaches the house of his victim. He enters the house and slaughters a barren cow to the *manes* of the murdered man, whose brother meanwhile grasps the cow's head. The murderer and his victim's brother then drink beer out of the same horn and eat meat from the same platter; each gouges out an eye of the slaughtered cow; and they exchange clothing so long as they sit together. The blood-price is then paid, and the murderer is escorted to his protector's house, while the family of his victim gives half the slaughtered cow as a feast to the village. The murderer must still shun the village for a year, but at the expiration of this time he again visits the kinsfolk of his victim, and is henceforth their closest kinsman and friend. In computing the blood-price, the number of those slain on each side is reckoned, and equality is secured by the payment of any difference in money or its equivalent, as among the Bogo and Somali of Africa (Munzinger, *Bogos*, p. 79; von der Decken, *Reisen in Ost-Afrika*, Leipzig, 1869–71, ii. 330) and the Bauro of the Solomon Islands (Post, *Anfänge*, p. 182), while under such circumstances the Maori returned the heads and booty which they had taken (*ib.* p. 183). The treaty is often still further strengthened by marriages between the two parties, as among the Bogo and Beni-Amer (Munzinger, *Bogos*, p. 82 f., *Ostafr. Stud.* p. 322). Among the Banaka and Bapuku the blood-feud can cease only when an equal number have been killed on each side (Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 49).

The true blood-feud in its primitive form excludes all possibility of commutation by money or its equivalent. This extreme form is, however, comparatively rare, even the African Ondonga, who kill man for man, woman for woman, and child for child, having a fully developed system of wergeld (Rautanan, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 341). With the decline of the sense of blood-kinship and the concomitant decay of early family law, commutation of blood-revenge becomes increasingly easy. Many peoples, like the Ondonga just mentioned, hold that murder may be punished either by blood-feud or by wergeld, at the option of the injured party, as among the Haidah of the Pacific coast (*NR* i. 168), the Papuans and Marshall Islanders (Kohler, in *ZVRW* vii. 376, xiv. 446), the Malays (*Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch-Indië*, 1851, ii. 15), and the African Bogo, Tuareg, Galla, Bakawiri, and Diakite Sarrakolese (Munzinger, *Bogos*, p. 80; Duveyrier, *Les Touaregs du nord*, Paris, 1864, p. 428; Cecchi, *Fünf Jahre in Ostafrika*, Leipzig, 1888, p. 79; Leuschner, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 23; Nicole, *ib.* p. 132). In the Sansanding States in Africa the murderer, who may not be harmed by any but the avenger of blood, is alone exposed to the blood-feud, although both he and his agnates are liable for wergeld (Fama Mademba, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 89). Among the Nissan Islanders of the Bismarck Archipelago the somewhat curious rule is observed that, after blood-revenge has been exacted, the party executing it pays the other party a wergeld to secure final settlement of the feud, thus obviating a series of reprisals on both sides (Sorge, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 418). Elsewhere, as among the Bantu (Kohler, in *ZVRW* xv. 56), acceptance of proffered wergeld is compulsory.

The supersession of the blood-feud by the wergeld is lucidly exemplified by the usage prevailing among the American Iroquois and Algonquins, which may be summarized as follows from Lafitau (*op. cit.* ii. 185–193). The people of each 'cabin' (i.e. *hodensote*, or 'long house') exercised jurisdiction over their own members, so that, if one killed another belonging to the same 'long house,' the village assumed that the deed had been done for good and sufficient reasons, and that in any case it was none of their business. If, on the other hand, the murder was committed by a member of another 'long house,' village, tribe, or stock, all those who had been connected with the slain man united to 're-make the spirit' [*refaire l'esprit (c'est leur expression)*] for the kinsmen of the deceased, while at the same time every effort was exerted to save the murderer's life and to protect his kin against the vengeance of the kin of the murdered man. One of the chiefs now offered 60 presents [cf. the similar Huron custom recorded in 1636 by Lejeune (*Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents*, Cincinnati, 1896–1901, x. 215–223, cf. also xxxiii. 239–249), 'the least of which,' according to Lejeune, 'must be of the value of a new beaver robe']. The first nine of these, which were for the immediate kinsmen of the deceased, were the most costly, each often being 1000 beads of wampum; and the remainder, which were displayed on a pole, represented all that the dead man had used while alive. If blood-vengeance had been executed before this wergeld had been proffered, it was the avengers who were bound to offer these presents, while the kinsmen of the murderer were released from all liability. At an earlier time the Huron had not only exacted the giving of presents, but had also required the murderer to remain beneath the putrefying corpse of his victim (which was elevated on poles) as long as the kinsmen of the murdered man desired. If the presents were not acceptable, the murderer himself was given, in addition to the wergeld, to the kinsmen of his victim, whose place he was to take. Although he was occasionally rejected, he usually came to be regarded exactly as the man whom he had slain; and Lafitau also adds, though without vouching for the statement, that further south the murderer was required to marry the wife and adopt the children of the slain man, thus clearly showing the substitution-motive in lieu of the sacrifice-motive (cf. p. 720[b]) in blood-revenge—a principle occasionally observed by the Algonquin Abenaki (Featherman, *op. cit.* iii. pt. 1, p. 96). Sometimes a murderer was even adopted as a son by the mother of his victim (Tanner, *Mémoirs*, Paris, 1835, ii. 227).

Where the parties concerned have their own option as to whether the blood-feud shall be terminated by wergeld or some other means, outside authorities may not interfere, as among the

Araucanians and Greenland Eskimos (Post, *Anfänge*, p. 174), and the African Bogo, Barea, Kunáma, and Marea (Munzinger, *Bogos*, p. 79, *Ostafr. Stud.* pp. 499, 242), and Msalala (Desoignies, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 280); but, if reconciliation proves impossible, the blood-feud remains in force. The offender often flees, a certain amount of start frequently being allowed him, this being 3½ days among the Bedawin (Post, *Studien*, p. 125; Kohler, in *ZVRW* viii. 253). He must then remain in exile, either until reconciliation has been effected, as among the Barea, Kunáma, and Teda (Munzinger, *Ostafr. Stud.* p. 501; Nachtigal, *Sahara und Sudan*, Berlin, 1879–89, i. 448), or until his offence has been outlawed by the lapse of a definite period of time, this being 5 years among the Felups (Bérenger-Féraud, *Les Peuples de la Sénégambie*, Paris, 1879, p. 293) and 1 year among the Californian Nishinam (Kohler, in *ZVRW* xii. 409). Here the blood-feud comes into immediate connexion with the jurisprudence governing the right of asylum (*q.v.*), but among some peoples, as many American Indian tribes, murder was the one and only offence that could never be outlawed (Loskiel, *Gesch. der Mission der evangel. Brüder unter den Indianern in Nord-Amerika*, Barby, 1789, p. 20; Morse, *Report to the Secretary of War on Indian Affairs*, New Haven, 1822, appendix, p. 99; Featherman, *op. cit.* iii. pt. 1, p. 440), so that the Creek harvest-festival in July or August brought amnesty for all offences except murder (Kohler, in *ZVRW* xii. 409).

By degrees the acceptance of proffered wergeld becomes compulsory, but if the offending party be unable to pay this, the blood-feud may, as primitive kinship-feeling decays, still be commuted in a variety of ways. Thus the offender may become the slave of the family, clan, or tribe that he has injured, as in Makassar, Saranglao, and Gorong (Wilken, *op. cit.* p. 24 f.; Riedel, *op. cit.* p. 156), and among the African Diagara (Hecquard, *Reise an der Küste und in das Innere von Westafrika*, Leipzig, 1854, p. 104); or he may become the slave of the chief of the tribe in question, as among the Malays of Menangkabau (Wilken, *op. cit.* p. 22); or of him who paid the blood-money, as in West Timor (Riedel, in *Deutsche geograph. Blätter*, x. 234). This form of punishment is also the penalty for many other offences (see SLAVERY). In Akkra, on the other hand, he who could not pay the wergeld was exposed to the extreme consequences of the blood-feud (Bosman, *Viaggio in Guinea*, Venice, 1752, ii. 91; Müller, *Die afr. auf der Goldküste gelegene Landschaft Fetu*, Hamburg, 1676, p. 116).

As soon as any mode of reconciliation or commutation becomes permissible between a murderer and the family, clan, or tribe of his victim, the decay of the blood-feud begins. It has already been seen that the commonest method of such reconciliation is by the payment of certain sums to the kinsfolk of the murdered man. Potent as is such wergeld in diminishing the scope and frequency of the blood-feud, other factors are still more powerful. With increasing civilization the predominance of the family and clan becomes less and less, while that of the tribe (and ultimately of the nation and State) becomes greater and greater. The blood-feud, which is at first absolutely essential if family is to be prevented from encroaching on family, is seen to be detrimental to the larger development of the embryo State, and measures of ever-increasing severity are taken to check and suppress the blood-feud, until at last it wholly disappears as a recognized institution. The struggle is, however, long and stubborn. The primitive State may hand the offender over to the kinsmen of his victim, that they may either execute blood-revenge or obtain reconciliation in any way they please, as among the Iroquois, Batak, Malays of Menangkabau, Pogghi Islanders, and African Bornu, Wadai, and Unyoro (Post, *Studien*, p. 128, *Anfänge*, p. 184); or the nearest kin of the murdered man may be appointed the official executioner of the murderer, as among the Galla (Cecchi, *op. cit.* p. 79) and Malays (Post, *Bausteine für eine allgemeine Rechtswissenschaft*, Oldenburg, 1880–81, i. 157), any anticipation of official sanction on the part of the avenger of blood being a punishable offence in the Sansanding States (Fama Mademba, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 89). In this way the place of the primitive avenger of blood is ultimately taken by a regular State executioner, as among the Malays of Nias (Wilken, *op. cit.* p. 22). Even in ancient Greece the State took cognizance of murder only when duly qualified kinsmen of the murdered man had lodged a formal complaint against the murderer.

Often there is a double system of punishment for murder and other grave offences—execution by officers of the State or blood-feud, as among the African Washambala (Lang, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 256); while, in case the system of commutation has come into effect, a certain amount of the wergeld may belong to the State, the remainder appertaining as damages to the kinsmen of the murdered man. On the other hand, the non-Muhammadans in the Sansanding States give the entire amount to the king, whereas Islāmitic law awards the whole wergeld to the injured family (Fama Mademba, in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 89), thus showing in epitome the antithetical status of the individual as belonging, in the one case, to the State, and, in the other, to the family (cf. the twofold theory of the status of the wife, above, p. 721). A murderer may often escape the blood-feud by voluntarily surrendering himself to the State; but if he will not do this, the blood-feud is officially sanctioned. Increasing limitations are, however, imposed by the State. The blood-feud is restricted to a brief period: three days in Johor (Wilken, *op. cit.* p. 7), or *in flagrante delicto* among the Arabs of the Red Sea coast (Klemm, *Kulturgeschichte*, Leipzig, 1843–52, iv. 149); while, in Makassar, if a murderer succeeded in reaching the judge, he was safe from blood-feud, and had only to pay the wergeld (Wilken, *op. cit.* p. 6). Elsewhere, as in Johor, the avenger of blood must make formal declaration of his intention before the judge (Post, *Bausteine*, i. 150). An especially potent restriction on the blood-feud is found, as already noted, in the system of asylum; and finally, with the more perfect development of the State, aided by a higher concept of religion (though, as a matter of fact, Christianity alone has contributed to this end), the blood-feud itself becomes murder and a crime, instead of a sacred and praiseworthy duty, and so is suppressed and disappears, surviving only in such stagnant phases of civilization as are still revealed from time to time by Sicilian *vendettas* or the feuds of the 'mountain whites' of Kentucky and Tennessee.

LITERATURE.—Frauenstädt, *Blutrache und Totschlagsühne*, Leipzig, 1881; Kohler, *Zur Lehre von der Blutrache*, Würzburg, 1885; Steinmetz, *Ethnol. Studien zur ersten Entwicklung der Strafe*, Leyden, 1894, i. 361–406, and *Rechtsverhältnisse von eingeborenen Völkern in Afrika und Ozeanien*, Berlin, 1903; Post, *Geschlechtsgenossenschaft der Urzeit*, Oldenburg, 1875, p. 155 ff., *Ursprung des Rechts*, Oldenburg, 1879, p. 87 ff., *Anfänge des Staats- und Rechtslebens*, Oldenburg, 1878, p. 172 ff., *Bausteine für eine allgemeine Rechtswissenschaft auf vergleichend-ethnol. Basis*, Oldenburg, 1880–81, i. 142 ff., *Afr. Jurisprudenz*, Oldenburg, 1887, i. 57 ff., *Studien zur Entwicklungsgesch. des Familienrechts*, Oldenburg, 1889, pp. 133 ff., and *Grundriss der ethnol. Jurisprudenz*, Oldenburg, 1894–95, i. 226 ff., ii. 246 ff. On the last-named work the present art. is largely based. A large amount of source-material is contained in *ZVRW* (cf. the index to i.–xx., *s.v.* 'Blutrache,' and such artt. as Kohler's summary of the North American Indian blood-feud, xii. 405–411, and Schmidt's summary for South America, xiii. 315–318). Much

may also be gleaned from travels and such general works as Waitz-Gerland, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, 6 vols., Leipzig, 1860–77.

LOUIS H. GRAY.

BLOOD-FEUD (Aryan).—*Introduction.*—The institution of the blood-feud may still be traced among all Aryan peoples: first, as it exists up to the present day among the Afghans and the Albanians, in Corsica and Sardinia, and among the Southern Slavs; secondly, at least in the older tradition, where it is clearly preserved, among the Greeks, Teutons, Celts, and the Western and Eastern Slavs; thirdly, with only scanty traces, among the Indians of the Veda, the Iranians of the Avesta, and the Romans. Its primitive Aryan signification lies in the etymological correspondence of Av. *kaēnâ*, 'punishment,' 'revenge' (New Pers. *kîn*, 'enmity,' 'hate,' 'anger')=Gr. ποινή, 'blood-revenge' and '*wergeld*.' Probably it may also be connected with Ir. *cáin* (from **coini-**)='emenda,' *i.e.* 'damni reparatio,' 'satisfactio de iure læso vel de iniuria illata.' The verb which underlies these substantives is Skr. *chi*, *cháyate*, 'punish,' 'avenge'; Av. *či*; Gr. τίνομαι, τίνυμαι, τίνω, 'obtain compensation,' 'punish,' 'give compensation.' Compare also τίω, 'estimate a value,' 'honour.' The following characteristic features of the primitive Aryan period may be established from the identity of customs among individual tribes.

1. The obligation of blood-revenge is always attached to definite circles of relationship, which may be designated family or clan. Within this circle the blood-feud descends first of all from father to son.

For the Celts, cf. Giraldus, *Cambriae Descriptio*, cap. 17: 'Genus super omnia diligunt, et damna sanguinis atque decoris acriter ulciscuntur: vindicis enim animi sunt et irae cruentae, nec solum novas et recentes iniurias, verum etiam veteres et antiquas velut instantes vindicare parati'; and Walter Map, *De nugis curialium*, Dist. ii. cap. 22, § 96 (*ap.* Walter, *Das alte Wales*, p. 135, note 1): 'Ut moris est, vadem se offert pro iuvene tota cognatio, et cavere iudicio sisti.'—For the Teutons, see Tac. *German.* cap. 21: 'Suscipere tam inimicitias seu patris seu propinqui quam amicitias necesse est: nec implacabiles durant. Luitur enim etiam homicidium certo armentorum ac pecorum numero, recipitque satisfactionem universa domus, utiliter in publicum, quia periculosiores sunt inimicitiae iuxta libertatem.'—For the Russians, cf. *Russkaja Pravda of Jaroslav Volodimêrič* (1018–1054): *Judicium Jaroslavi, filii Vladimêri*: 'Si interfecerit vir virum, ulciscatur frater fratrem, vel pater vel filius vel fratris filius vel sororis filius. Si vero nemo est, qui eum ulciscatur, solvendae sunt pro capite octoginta grivnae, si est principis vir,' etc. See below, p. 734[a].

In Homer the sons and grandsons, father, brothers, and brothers' sons (ἀνεψιός) and the ἕται (ἑταῖ) are mentioned as avengers of blood: the last-named is an expression which probably belongs to the pronoun-stem *sve-*, *svo-*, and so means much the same as the Latin *sui*. Once we find in place of ἕται the word ἀοσσητῆρες (*Odyss.* xxiii. 119), from ἀοσσέω, 'help.' This in turn is derived from a word corresponding with the Latin *socius* (**svekjo-s*), namely, *ἀ-σFοκ-jo-ς=*a-ossco-* (ἀ as in ἄ-λοχος, 'bedfellow'), which is perhaps connected with *sve-*, *svo-*, *suus*, but is also capable of another derivation (cf. Walde, *Lat. Etymol. Wörterbuch*, p. 579).

2. As a result of this obligation to blood-revenge, we find a state of feeling between two families or clans which among West Teutons is technically called in Old High German *fêhida*, Anglo-Sax. *fæhð*, Mid. Lat. *faida* (O.H.G. *fêch*, Anglo-Sax. *fáh*, from **poiko-s*=Ir. *oech*, 'enemy'); in the Slavonic languages, Old Slav. *vražida* (Old Slav. *vragŭ*, 'enemy,' Old Pruss. *wargs*, 'bad'). The opposite conception to this in the Germanic languages is O.H.G. *fridu*, Anglo-Sax. *friðu*, Old Nor. *friðr*, **pritu-* (Skr. *priyá-*, 'dear,' Goth. *frijôn*, 'love'); in the Slavonic, Russ. *mirŭ*, 'peace' (Skr. *mi-trá-*, 'friend,' Lith. *mýlimas*, 'beloved,' Russ. *mí-lyj*, 'dear'). Fundamentally, therefore, peace and friendship (*i.e.* on the old view, relationship; cf. Schrader, *Reallex. s.v.* 'Freund und Feind') are identical conceptions. The Goth. *gafriþôn* and the Russ. *primiriti* both mean 'to restore to a state of peace' (O.H.G. *fridu*, Russ. *mirŭ*), 'to reconcile.' It is characteristic that *mirŭ* had already in Old Russ. acquired the meaning of 'community,' for the community (the tribe) composed of various clans is, in normal conditions, a sphere of peace and friendship which can only for a longer or shorter period be interrupted or broken by the *faida* or *vražida*. Conversely, it may be suggested that the Greek εἰρήνη, 'peace,' is to be derived from εἶρη, 'assembly,' 'place of assembly,' and that this word (from **vervâ*) is to be connected with Old Russ. *vervĭ*, 'community.' It is the community so designated that, according to the *Russkaja Pravda* of the 13th cent., is liable in certain cases for the payment of the *wergeld*, and thus perpetuates the solidarity of the old clan. The Greek εἰρήνη would thus be the (normal) condition of peace reigning in the community.

* A star before a word signifies that the form does not occur but is inferred.

According to this explanation of εἰρήνη, it must be admitted that the supposed initial *F* has not as yet been traced either in Homer or in the Greek dialects; but the latter are clearly influenced strongly by the Attic form of the word, which lacks the digamma. Moreover, **vervâ* (with prothetic vowel) may have become first **è-FερF*η and then εἰρη.

Hence the present writer is inclined to believe that the conception of peace among the Aryan peoples originated primarily in view of the internal condition of the community (the tribe), and not with reference to external foes, with whom, indeed, in olden times there was no regular peace, but merely a cessation of hostilities (cf. Schrader, *Reallex.*, *s.v.* 'Krieg und Frieden'). On Latin *pax* and Goth. *gawairþi*, 'peace,' see below (4). On the punishment of offences occurring *within* the family or clan see ARYAN RELIGION, above, p. 50.

3. The blood-feud was especially occasioned by the murder of an individual belonging to another clan, and, in a secondary degree, by bodily injury or insult. It is noteworthy in numerous old Aryan codes of law that the killing of a thief caught red-handed or of an adulterer detected *in flagrando* was exempt from punishment, *i.e.* in the language of primitive times it did not occasion a blood-feud (cf. Schrader, *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*, ii.[3] 406, and ARYAN RELIGION, above, p. 50).

4. There existed among all Aryan peoples the possibility of buying off the blood-feud by means of a *wergeld*, and thereby bringing it to a peaceful conclusion.

For the Greeks, *e.g.*, cf. Homer, *Il.* ix. 631:

καὶ μέν τίς τε κασιγνήτοιο φονῆος
ποινὴν ἢ οὐ παιδὸς ἐδέξατο τεθνηῶτος·
καί ῥ' ὁ μὲν ἐν δήμῳ μένει αὐτοῦ, πόλλ' ἀποτίσας,
τοῦ δέ τ' ἐρητύναι κραδίη καὶ θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ,
ποινὴν δεξαμένου.

For the Teutons see the passage from Tacitus, *Germania*, quoted above, 'nec implacabiles durant,' etc.

Proof that this possibility existed even in the most primitive Aryan period is to be found in the identity between the Old Indian term for the *wergeld*, namely, *vâira-*, *vâira-dêya-*, *vâirayâtana-*, and the Anglo-Sax. *wêre*, Mid.H.G. *were* (*weragelt*)—both being related to Skr. *vîrá-*, Lat. *vir*, Goth. *wair*, 'man.' Here the Old Russ. *vira*, 'wergeld,' must be mentioned, though the views of philologists waver as to whether it was originally related to the Indian and German words or borrowed from the latter (cf. L. von Schröder, 'Indogerman. Wergeld,' *Festgruss an Roth*, p. 49). The most probable supposition is that the Skr. *vâira-*, Anglo-Sax. *wêre*, and Old Russ. *vira*, exhibit various stages of change of the radical vowel of the original Aryan term for 'wergeld.' Moreover, the above cited equation, Av. *kaēnâ*=Gr. ποινή, no doubt indicates that in the primitive period, as among the Greeks, the custom existed of buying off blood-revenge by payment of a *wergeld*. Similarly, we find in Slavonic languages the above-mentioned *vražida*, 'hostility,' 'revenge,' used also to mean the compensation by which homicide was expiated. Cf. also Cymr. *galanas*,

originally 'hostility' (*gâl*, 'foe'), and then 'wergeld'; and the Mid. Gr. *φόνος*, properly 'murder.' Lat. *pœna*, 'compensation,' and then 'punishment,' probably exhibits a borrowing from the Gr. *ποινή*.

At an early date prices or rates of *wergeld*, more or less fixed, must have been evolved. So in Old Indian sources (cf. Schrader, *Reallex.* p. 102) we find a hundred cows mentioned as the rate of compensation for a man (*vâiram*); and Tacitus also, in the passage already cited, says: 'luitur homicidium *certo* armentorum ac pecorum numero.' 'From the rates stated, the general underlying principle emerges that the *wergeld* of bondsman, freeman, and noble were in the following proportion of ½ : 1 : 2; that is, 75 – 150 – 300 shillings or oxen' (Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, iv. 327). For the rates among the Slavs see below, p. 734. What was demanded for the murdered, wounded, or insulted man by the clan, or by himself, constituted his 'value' or 'price,' and the recovery of this price by his friends and the recognition of the same by his foes constituted his 'honour.' This evolution of ideas is clearly stamped upon the languages that concern us. The Gr. *τιμή*, derived from *τίνω* mentioned above, signifies primarily 'revenge' (*ἕβη Ἀγαμέμνονος εἵνεκα τιμῆς Ἴλιον εἰς εὔπωλον*, Hom. *Od.* xiv. 70, 117); then 'indemnity for injury,' 'compensation' (*ἄτιμος*, like *νήποινος*, denotes a person who may be slain without need for compensation); then 'honour.' Precisely similar is the development in the meaning of *cēna*, a word common to the Slavonic languages. The word corresponds exactly to the Gr. *ποινή* (**qoinâ*), and thus signifies in the first instance 'revenge' and 'wergeld.' Then it takes over the meaning of 'price' and 'honour' (Old Slav. *cēniti* exactly answers to the Gr. *τιμάω*; so Schrader's *Reallex.* p. 835 f., and now Berneker, *Slav. Etym. Wörterbuch*, p. 124). In this connexion we find also the explanation of the hitherto unintelligible Gothic word *gawairþi*, 'peace,' mentioned above. The word has nothing to do with *wairþan* (Germ. *werden*), but is connected with *waírþi*, 'value,' 'worth.' Consequently its proper meaning is 'general agreement about the worth or value of a person,' the union and the resulting state of peace between two clans. It is noteworthy also that the first instance of the word *paciscor*, which underlies the Lat. *pax*, 'peace,' occurs in that passage of the XII Tables (viii. 2) which is the clearest survival in Roman tradition of the system of blood-revenge which once prevailed in that quarter as well: 'Si membrum rupit, ni cum eo pacit (agree about the value), talio esto.'

Thus we see that two of the most important conceptions of civilization—peace and honour—are at least in part rooted in the ideas that centre in blood-revenge and its buying off by the *wergeld*.

5. Among most Aryan peoples we find it the custom for the murderer, after his bloody deed, to flee from the country for a longer or shorter period, presumably in order that in the interval the anger of the hostile clan might abate and the terms of reconciliation become easier. It still remains uncertain whether this custom is to be assumed as existing even in primitive times, when renunciation of tribal connexion was almost a matter of life and death (cf. Schrader's *Reallex.* p. 835).

6. The fighting out or the amicable settlement of the blood-feud is, as we have seen, from the beginning exclusively the affair of the two hostile clans. Notwithstanding, perhaps the realization of the danger incurred by the whole clan owing to feuds of long duration (cf. above, Tacitus, *Germ.* cap. 21: 'periculosiores sunt inimicitiae iuxta libertatem') may have at an early period ensured efforts upon the part of the race, in their assemblies under the direction of the king (Skr. *râj-* = Lat. *rex*, Ir. *rí*), towards the amicable settlement of clan feuds. A settlement of this description would naturally, even in primitive times, be accompanied by a long succession of solemn ceremonies. We have ample information on this point as regards especially the Slavonic world (see below, p. 734 f.). Everywhere in Europe two factors tended towards the restriction and ultimate eradication of the blood-feud: first, the *State*, that is, the absorption of the old clan and race-constitutions into the political composition of a State based on the principle of territory and no longer of consanguinity; and, secondly, the *Christian Church*, which offered sanctuary even to murderers. See art. ASYLUM.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given in the article.

O. SCHRADER.

BLOOD-FEUD (Celtic).—1. **Terminology.**—The usual word in Old Irish is *fích* ('feud,' 'fight'), *fichim* ('I fight'), cognate with Lat. *vinco*, etc. In the *Acallam na Senórach* (Windisch, *Ir. Texte*, Leipzig, 1880–1905, iv. pt. i. p. 47), we learn that at the feast of Tara, which lasted six weeks, *nech fala ná frithfala do thabairt* ('neither feud nor cross-feud to be given'). The Irish *fala* is for *fola*, gen. of *fuil* ('blood'), perhaps connected with Welsh *gweli*, Cornish *goly*, Breton *gouli* ('wound'); but cf. Henry, *Lex. bret.*, Rennes, 1900, p. 139. For 'vengeance,' 'revenge,' we have the Irish *díguil*, Welsh *dial* ('vindicta,' 'ultio'), Cornish *dial*. The Irish *éric* ('composition') is probably for **er-icca*, **per-yecca* ('full payment,' 'perfect cure' [d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Études sur le droit celtique* = *Cours de litt. celt.* vii., Paris, 1895, p. 88]). Finally, the Irish *díre* ('duty'), in *coirp-díre*, is the same as the Welsh *dirwy*, *dirui* ('mulcta'), *dír* ('necessary'), Irish *dír* ('just,' 'due,' etc.) [Stokes, *Urkelt. Sprachschatz*, Göttingen, 1894, p. 148].

2. **History of the blood-feud among the Celts.**—That the institution of the blood-feud was in existence among the early Celts is obvious from the numerous references to it in ancient Irish literature. One of the best known instances is found in the *Fotha Catha Cnucha* ('Cause of the Battle of Cnucha').

Cumall, the royal warrior of Ireland, carried off Murni, daughter of the druid Tadg, because her father had refused him permission to marry her. Tadg complains to Cond, supreme king of Ireland, who, according to the *Annals of Ireland by the Four Masters* (ed. O'Donovan, Dublin, 1848–51, i. 102–121), reigned from 122 to 157 A.D. Cond, furious at the insulting words of Tadg, sends soldiers to take possession of the girl. Cumall refuses to surrender Murni, and is killed by Goll, son of Morna. In attempting to avenge Cumall, Luchet succeeds only in wounding Goll in the eye. Goll kills Luchet; and, to quote the Irish, *is desin robói fích bunaid eter maccu Morna ocus Find*, 'it is from that, then, that there was an hereditary feud between the sons of Morna (descendants of Goll) and Find (the son of Cumall).' Furthermore, after the death of Cumall, Tadg not only refuses to receive his daughter Murni, but orders her to be burned because she is pregnant. Accordingly she invokes the protection of Cond, and gives birth to a son, Find. When this son arrives at a suitable age, he offers to his grandfather, Tadg, the following: *cath no comrac oenfir . . . no lanéraic a athar do thabairt dó*, 'a battle or a duel or full *éric* (for the murder) of his father to be given to him.' Tadg accepts the last, and is obliged to give the castle and grounds in Almu to Find (*RCel* ii. 36, etc.).

Again, in the *Longes mac n-Usnig*, Conchobar, the great king of the first epic cycle—*i.e.* about the beginning of the Christian era (Hyde, *Lit. Hist. of Ireland*, London, 1899, p. 243)—has the three sons of Usnech treacherously murdered after having promised them protection. The three heroes, Fergus, Dubthach, and Cormac, who had guaranteed their safety, set to work to avenge their murder. First they murdered four of the immediate relatives of Conchobar, and, later, when attacked by him, killed three hundred of his men and their wives, and burned the royal palace at Emain. With 3000 men they sought refuge at the court of Ailill and Medb, king and queen of Connaught, and continued their feud against Conchobar for sixteen years (Windisch, *op. cit.* i. 75–77). Cinaeth hua Artacain, who died in 975 ('Annals of Tigernach,' *RCel* xvii. 259) had a more complete account of this story, which stated that Conchobar, in retaliation for the murder of his relatives, killed Gergenn, the son of Illad (Windisch, *op. cit.* ii. 2, p. 119). Numerous other

examples could be cited, such as *Aided Conroi*, in which the murder of Conroi is avenged by his sons (d'Arbois, *Epopée celtique en Irlande = Cours de litt. celt.* v., Paris, 1892, p. 327 f.); the death of Conchobar, where Mesgegra, king of Leinster, is avenged (O'Curry, *Lectures on the Manuscript Materials of Ancient Irish History*, Dublin, 1878, p. 637 f.); *The Voyage of Mail Duin*, in which the hero is taunted for not avenging his father's death (Stokes, *RCel* ix. 459, etc.), etc.

In the *Ancient Laws of Ireland*, some of which, such as the *Senchus Mór*, date as early as the 7th century (Hyde, *op. cit.* p. 589), we find murder classed under two heads—necessary murder (*marbad dethbire*), and unnecessary murder (*marbad indethbire*). Necessary murder is unpremeditated, or, if premeditated, is accomplished through duty of vengeance. Unnecessary murder is for motives of gain (*Anc. Laws*, iii. 68, ll. 12–14; iv. 248, ll. 25–26). In the case of the first, no composition, or *éric*, was required if the murder was the result of vengeance. According to the *Ancient Laws* (iv. 252–4), 'when the murder of a member of the *derbfine* (*i.e.* of any relative of the *geilfine* or *derbfine*) is to be avenged by the death of the murderer, the family of the murdered has a right to the *coirp-díre* ("body-price") and the *enech-lann* ("honour-price"); if, however, it has received this *éric* before exercising vengeance, it must, after taking vengeance, make full restitution of this price.' The duty of vengeance was imposed upon the nearest relatives of the victim—upon the *geilfine* and *derbfine* (d'Arbois, *Droit celtique*, p. 186). To understand these terms, we must remember that the Irish family was divided into four groups, consisting of seventeen persons in all: *geilfine, derbfine, iarfine*, and *indfine* (*Anc. Laws*, i. 282, ll. 23, 27; p. 272, l. 23). To the *geilfine* belonged the father, son, grandson, and brother of the murdered; while to the *derbfine*, besides the above five, were added the grandfather, paternal uncle, nephew (son of the brother), and cousin-german (cousin to the fourth degree in the paternal line). In addition to the above eight persons, three others could take vengeance on the murderer. These three were the foster-father, whose *dalta*, or pupil, was murdered; the adoptive father, whose *mac faosma*, or adopted son, was killed; and the (maternal) uncle, when the son of his sister (*mic mna*) was the victim of the murderer (*Anc. Laws*, iv. 244, ll. 20–22). So, in ancient Ireland, the blood-feud was fostered by the duty of vengeance. We have indications of its existence as late as the 16th cent., in the celebrated feuds between the chief Manus O'Donell and his son, between the Earl of Thomond and his uncles, etc. (Moore, *Hist. of Ireland*, London, 1835–46, ii. 367). As in Scotland, the most usual causes and consequences of the later feuds were the destruction of crops and the driving-away or houghing of cattle belonging to persons occupying lands to which others alleged a claim. One of the most celebrated cattle-raids in Irish literature is the *Táin Bó Cualnge*, or the Cattle-Raid of Cooley (ed. Windisch, Leipzig, 1905). Sir Walter Scott in his *Waverley* (ch. xv.) describes a similar expedition undertaken by twelve Highlanders.

In Wales, where, as the testimony of Giraldus of Cambray and Walter Map shows (see above, p. 724a), the blood-feud once flourished, the Roman conquest brought about the suppression of both the duty of vengeance and the payment of *éric* for murder. The *Lex Cornelia de sicariis* of Sulla (B.C. 81) and the laws of Caesar and Augustus (*Lex Julia de vi publica* and *de vi privata*) imposed severe penalties upon those who went about bearing arms with the intention to kill (Rein, *Das Criminalrecht der Römer*, Leipzig, 1844, pp. 409–14, 752, etc.). On this account, no doubt, the Welsh *dirui* or *dirwy* changed its meaning from *éric* ('composition') to '*mulcta*' ('fine paid to the State'). After the departure of the Romans, while the *éric* was re-established, the duty of vengeance failed to assume its former force. This was in part due to the fact that the *cenedl*, or clan, was already to some extent disintegrated as early as the 10th cent. (Rhys and Brynmor-Jones, *The Welsh People*, London, 1900, p. 196). The feuds between the clans were largely superseded by the warfare between the petty kingdoms. But that the duty of vengeance was not looked upon unfavourably is manifest from several statements in the Dimetian Code, which was probably redacted under Howel in the 10th cent. (Rhys, *op. cit.* p. 181).

According to this code, 'if there is in a *cenedl* an ecclesiastic or an idiot, he is neither to pay nor to receive any part of the *galanas* ("body-price")'; and 'no vengeance is to be exercised against any one of these for *galanas*, neither are they to avenge a relation that is killed.' Furthermore, if a *cenedl* 'commences paying the *galanas* of a person killed, and the whole be not paid, and if on that account one of such kindred stock (*cenedl*) be murdered, the *galanas* for that individual is not to be paid; neither is anything to be restored of what had been paid on account of the first.' Finally, if 'an innocent person is accused of murder and neglects to seek justice, and if he be killed on account of it, nothing is to be paid for him' (*Anc. Laws of Wales*, London, 1841, i. ch. i. p. 199 f.; cf. also ii. ch. viii. p. 214, etc., for cases in which the law 'exonerates the avenging').

But it was especially among the Scots that the blood-feud raged with ferocity. From the 12th cent., when the *sept* or clan first appears as a distinct feature in the social organization of Scotland (Skene, *Celtic Scotland*[2], Edinburgh, 1890, ii. 303), until the 17th cent., there was no cessation of clan-feuds. When there were no sweeping feuds involving the most prominent families, such as Huntly against Argyll, or Stewart against Hamilton, the minor chiefs were fighting among themselves (Lang, *Hist. of Scotland*, Edinburgh, 1902, ii. 541, etc.). The usual method was for a laird or yeoman to gather his henchmen and make a raid on some estate to which he alleged a claim, or for other reasons sometimes very insignificant. They would trample down the crops, hough the cattle, and drag the women about by their hair, killing all who might resist (Lang, *loc. cit.*). Such cases were most frequent. In fact, the volume of the Privy Council Register for 1613 contains no fewer than 42 feuds then running, not including those in the Highlands and Islands. Even ministers of the gospel were sometimes so swayed by their passions that they took part in these ferocities.

One of the most noted of these feuds was that of the Colquhouns and the Macgregors, which culminated in the battle of Glenfruin in 1602. According to Birrell's diary (2nd Oct. 1603), sixty widows of the slain Colquhouns rode on white horses before the king at Stirling, each bearing in her hand a pike upon which was displayed the bloody shirt of her dead husband. A long and deadly feud was that between the Scotts and Kerrs, of which Sir Walter Scott speaks in his *Lay of the Last Minstrel*. This feud began with the battle of Melrose in 1526. As a consequence, Sir Walter Scott was assassinated in the streets of Edinburgh in 1552. In order to staunch this feud, which was sapping the life-blood of these two great families, a bond or contract was made between them in Edinburgh on 23rd March 1564, in which they agreed to cease hostilities (Pitcairn, *Criminal Trials in Scotland*, Edinburgh, 1833, iii. 390, etc.). But it accomplished nothing, for the feud was still raging in 1596 (cf. also Campbell, *Clan Traditions*, London, 1895).

3. **'Éric,' or composition.**—Cæsar attests the fact that the payment of *éric* was an established custom among the primitive Gauls. In speaking of the importance of the druids in ancient Gaul, he says: 'Nam fere de omnibus controversiis, publicis privatisque, constituunt; et, si quod est admissum facinus, si caedes facta, si de hereditate, si de finibus controversia est, iidem decernunt; praemia poenasque constituunt (*de Bell. Gall.* vi. 13). The earliest mention of this institution in Ireland is found in the *Confessio* of St. Patrick, where he says: 'censeo enim non minus quam pretium quindecim hominum distribui illis.' Tirechan, writing in the 7th cent., explains this statement of Patrick by adding 'animarum' after 'quindecim' (Stokes, *Tripartite Life*, London, 1887, ii. 310, 372). Furthermore, an Irish council of about the 7th

cent. decided that, in default of the family, the king himself might be held responsible for the payment of the *éric* (Wasserschleben, *Ir. Kanonenversammlung*[2], Leipzig, 1885, p. 170).

In Ireland, the *éric* was divided into two classes: the *coirp-díre*, or 'body-price,' and the *enech-lann*, or 'honour-price' (or *log-eneich*, lit. 'face-price,' Breton, *enep-uuert*; cf. Ernault, *Gloss. moyen-bret.*, Paris, 1895, p. 794). The *coirp-díre* was exacted in the case of unnecessary murder, or in necessary murder when not prompted by vengeance. The *enech-lann* was exacted in the case of bodily injury, insult, etc., and would, therefore, be necessarily included in the *coirp-díre*. In regard to the latter, the family had the choice of surrendering the criminal as property (*in féronn*) to the family of the murdered, or of giving land for his crime (*Anc. Laws of Ireland*, iv. 246, ll. 25–26). But, continue the *Ancient Laws*, 'each one dies for his premeditated crimes when he has not found the *éric*' (iv. 250, ll. 16–17). Thus, in the case of unnecessary murder the criminal was the sole debtor. But in necessary murder the criminal and his *geilfine* were held responsible for the payment of the *éric*. In default of the *geilfine*, the other three groups of the family found themselves involved (*ib.* i. 260, ll. 1–3; p. 274, ll. 12–13). The *coirp-díre* was fixed, consisting of *secht cumula*, 'seven female slaves' (iii. 70, ll. 7–8). The criminal was obliged to pay the *aithgin* ('slave of restitution'), and his share both of the six other slaves and of the *enech-lann*. If his *geilfine* could not supply the rest, the *derbfine* would pay three-fourths, and the *iarfine* and *indfine*, one fourth, *i.e.* three-fourths of a fourth by the *iarfine* and one-fourth of a fourth by the *indfine* (*ib.* iii. 330, l. 710; p. 68, ll. 15–18). In the later history of Ireland, the *éric* for murder became more variable, and was paid in cattle or other property. It was continued as late as the beginning of the 17th cent., notwithstanding the efforts of the English to stamp it out (Hayne, 'Observation on the State of Ireland in 1600,' in the *Irish Eccles. Record*, Dec. 1887; for a more complete study of the *éric*, cf. d'Arbois, *Droit celtique*).

As the *coirp-díre* required the *enech-lann* in Ireland, so, in Wales, the murderer was obliged to pay both the *galanas* ('body-price') and the *saraad* ('disgrace- or honour-price'). The *galanas* varied according to the rank of the person killed. Thus the *penkenedl*, or clan-chief, was valued at 189 cows; an *uchelwr*, or high man, noble, at 126 cows; a *penteulu*, 'man with a family without office,' at 84 cows; and so on down to the *caeth*, 'slave of the island,' at 1 lb. of silver and 4 cows. The *galanas* of a woman was always one-half of that of a man (Rhys, *op. cit.* p. 228 f.). In regard to the payment of the *galanas*, one-third fell upon the murderer and his father and mother, he paying twice as much as his parents. Furthermore, if he had children liable to pay, he paid two-thirds of his own share, and his children one-third. The remaining two-thirds of the whole *galanas* was paid by the relatives on the father's and mother's side, the father's kinsmen paying two-thirds and the mother's one-third. In regard to receiving the *galanas*, one-third fell to the lord for exacting it; one-third to the father and mother and their children and the children of the murdered; and one-third to the other kinsmen in the proportion as described above (*Anc. Laws of Wales*, i. 227, ii. 199–200, etc.).

In Scotland, according to the *Leges inter Brettos et Scottos*, which were codified under David I. (1124–53), the worth of the king's person is valued at 1000 cows; of the king's son or earl, 150 cows; of the earl's son or thane, 100 cows; of the thane's son, 66⅔ cows; of the thane's grandson or *ogtiern*, 44 cows and 21⅓ pence; while the *carle* or *villein* was valued at 16 cows (Robertson, *Hist. of Scotland*, 3 vols., London, 1831, App. ii.; Lang, *op. cit.* i. 81; Skene, *op. cit.* iii. 218, etc.).

4. Duel.—The duel was often the means of obtaining justice among the Celts. The canonical collection referred to above attributes to St. Patrick two decisions prohibiting the debtor from resorting to arms to prevent a creditor from levying a distress (d'Arbois, *Droit celtique*, p. 45 f.). But the individual could engage in a duel only with the knowledge and consent of his family and his chief. If he fought without their consent and was killed, the victor would be obliged to pay full *éric* to his family, unless he could prove that the murdered man had provoked him to fight (*Anc. Laws*, iii. 302, ll. 1–3; p. 296, ll. 19–21). So, on the Border of Scotland, trial by combat served often as a proof of guilt or innocence; and Sir Walter Scott notes a feud between Thomas Musgrave and Lancelot Carleton which was settled in this manner in 1603 (*Lay of Last Minstrel*, Note x.).

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given fully in the course of the article. JOHN LAWRENCE GERIG.

BLOOD-FEUD (Greek).—Blood-feud, or blood-revenge, is a widely diffused custom of primitive society, of which some instances still survive, as in the Corsican vendetta, and of which numerous traces are to be found in history and literature. It arises, as a rule, through a violation of rights practised by a member of one family against a member of another (A. H. Post, *Familienrecht*, p. 134). The breach of rights may take widely different forms, but its normal instance is that of murder, or at any rate homicide, and to this attention is confined in the present article. The parties primarily involved in such a feud are, on the one hand, the nearest kinsman of the slain man, and, on the other, the slayer; but the responsibility extends beyond these to the circle sometimes of their families, in a wider or narrower sense, sometimes of their entire respective clans (cf. *e.g. EBi*, *s.v.* 'Goel,' col. 1745). In many cases revenge can be satisfied only with the death of the slayer, or of one of his kin, but in others reconciliation is effected on the basis of compensation in money or kind. In every case vengeance is felt as a sacred duty. Its aim is largely, no doubt, to maintain the honour and integrity of the family or clan, and so far it has an ethical rather than a religious significance. But it is probable that blood-revenge has in every case, at least originally, been regarded also as a duty towards the spirit of the slain, and, as the tendance of the dead implies the recognition of spiritual beings and readily passes into worship, the blood-feud has to this extent a religious basis. By the Greeks certainly, in historic no less than in pre-historic times, vengeance on the murderer was regarded as a duty to the slain, and one of a religious kind. And probably the chief interest of the subject before us is the clear light which it sheds upon a whole world of thought and feeling which is in marked contrast with generally current conceptions about Greek religion.

1. Homer.—In Homer there are abundant traces of the custom. We read of Orestes avenging his father (*Od.* iii. 306), though this is the less usual case of blood-feud *within* the family, and of the understood right and duty of any man to avenge a brother or a son (*Il.* ix. 632; *Od.* xxiv. 434). In one instance (*Od.* xv. 273) the responsibility for vengeance falls also on the slain man's ἕται, who are usually understood to be his clansmen. This view is supported by the facts that ἕται are distinguished from cousins (ἀνεψιοί) in *Il.* ix. 464, and that in Attic law the duty of prosecuting a

murderer passed in case of need to any member of the murdered man's phratry (Rohde, *Psyche*, p. 260–261 n.). When an act of homicide has been committed, under whatever circumstances,—for these do not seem to have affected the issue in the society which Homer depicts,—its author is sometimes represented as fleeing into a strange land, where he seeks the protection of a man of influence. So Patroclus finds refuge in the house of Peleus, and Lycophron in that of Ajax (*Il.* xxiii. 85, xv. 431). In other cases the feud is ended by means of a recompense, or ποινή, mutually agreed on by the two parties. That this often happened is shown by the passage (*Il.* ix. 632 ff.) where Ajax, after trying in vain to disarm the resentment of Achilles against Agamemnon, continues, 'Why, even from the murderer of a brother, or for his own dead son, a man accepts, it may be, a ransom, and so he (the murderer) stays in his own town, after paying a large fine' (Paley's tr.). Of what took place on such occasions we have a vivid picture in *Il.* xviii. 498 ff. There, in a scene upon Achilles' shield, the two parties to a blood-feud first engage in a wrangle as to whether the amount agreed on has actually been paid, and afterwards bring their quarrel before a council of elders, while in the midst are placed two golden talents, which, at least on one interpretation, represent the ποινή, or fine claimed.

Among all these references to the blood-feud in Homer, nothing, it will be seen, is said about the spirit of the slain man, while the settlement by means of a fine is obviously treated as a matter in which the living only are concerned. And this is in harmony with the general view, which the Homeric poems present to us, of the state of the dead. Where the blood-feud is animated by a desire to appease the dead man's spirit, the latter is conceived as a powerful being bent on revenge, able and also ready to wreak his vengeance on the kinsman who neglects his interests. But the faith described in Homer is of a different order. Its dead are strengthless beings, ineffectual shadows of the living. There is, however, good reason to believe that this was not the oldest Greek faith. Even in Homer we meet once and again with what seem to be outcrops from an earlier stratum of belief. Thus at the funeral of Patroclus (*Il.* xxiii. 138 ff.), the hair which Achilles lays in his dead friend's hand, the jars of honey and oil, the slaughter of beasts and captives, and the burning of these together with the corpse, the night-long pouring of wine upon the earth, and the oft-repeated call to Patroclus, together with many other features of the story, all point to a vivid belief in the reality and nearness of the departed spirit which contrasts sharply with the usual Homeric representation; while, as Rohde observes (*Psyche*[2], p. 17), the whole series of offerings belongs entirely to the class which we may regard as oldest, and which meets us later in numerous instances of Greek ritual observed in the worship of under-world powers. The offerings which, in *Od.* xi. 49 ff. (the 'Nekuia'), Odysseus promises to the departed spirits point in the same direction. But, if such was the earliest Greek conception, the deepest motive of the blood-feud, in the Homeric age weakened or lost sight of, may well have been the slain man's demand for vengeance. And that this was actually the case is indirectly proved by the fact that in Homer the consequences seem to be the same for unintentional as for intentional homicide. The equalization of these two, says J. H. Lipsius (*Das attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren*, Introduction, p. 7), affords clear proof that the fundamental aim of the blood-feud was not punitive justice, but satisfaction to the slain.

2. Classic age.—When now we turn to the classic age, this aspect of the blood-feud occupies the forefront of the picture. Vengeance on the homicide is primarily reparation offered to the dead, and as such it is a religious act.

(1) *Poetry.*—In Æschylus' *Eumenides*, Orestes is pursued by no earthly avenger of blood, but by the Erinyes, who are representatives at once of the dead and of the old religious order. At first, in all probability, they were nothing but offended ghosts, the angry spirits of the slain, and hints of this original character are to be found in Æschylus (cf. *e.g.* J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, p. 223 ff.). In the main, however, as seen in his pages, they are rather the personified curses that attend the shedding of kindred blood. The personality of the slain is merged in that of the malignant demons who act as the ministers of his revenge. The same natural shifting of ideas, and the same fundamental conception of the slain man's enmity, are seen in the use of the word προστρόπαιος, which in the sense of an avenging power is applied by the orator Antiphon at one time to the dead man's spirit, at another to his ghostly champion, as in the phrase ὁ προστρόπαιος τοῦ ἀποθανόντος (*Tetr.* 3, β, 8). Sometimes, as in Sophocles (*Trach.* 1202) or Euripides (*Iphig. in T.* 778), the outraged spirit is described by the epithet ἀραῖος, a dealer of curses.

(2) *History.*—So far we have been dealing chiefly with the fancies of poets. But the same view of a slain man's enmity, and of his satisfaction as a religious act, is met with when we turn to the practice of the law courts and examine the developments of the blood-feud in historic times. When the clan develops into the State, the blood-feud inevitably passes under its control and is regulated in accordance with its interests. Greece was no exception to this rule, and we have evidence of laws relating to homicide in various Greek States. But while in the case of other States our information is only fragmentary, the procedure at Athens, though obscure in some points, is illustrated by copious references, especially in Plato, Aristotle, and the Attic orators. To enter at all fully into the Attic process would carry us beyond the limits of this article. But it will be sufficient to note its salient points. In the first place, the legal process meant a mitigation of the unreasoning vengeance of the primitive blood-feud. We have seen that originally the circumstances which led to homicide were immaterial. Its law is sufficiently expressed in what the chorus in Æschylus (*Choeph.* 310 ff.) characterize as 'a thrice hoary saying': 'Blood-stroke for blood-stroke must be paid. Doer of wrong must suffer.' But from time immemorial Athens had separate courts for the trial of wilful murder, of accidental, and of justifiable homicide. The tribunal for the trial of murder in the strict sense was the Council of the Areopagus, which exercised that function right onwards from the time of Solon, or, according to others (*e.g.* C. W. C. Oman, *Hist. of Greece*, p. 111), from the dawn of the Athenian constitution. Furthermore, a law of Draco (*c.* 620 B.C.) enacted that vengeance in certain cases, including adultery, should not be followed by a legal penalty (Pausan. IX. xxxvi. 8). But if from one point of view the law mitigated, from another it restored, the rigour of the ancient blood-feud. It did so by forbidding the ποινή, or money settlement, of which we have seen examples in the laxer practice of the Homeric age (cf. *e.g.* Demosth. *Aristocrat.* 28). This is by no means always the case when blood-revenge passes out of the hands of private persons (cf. *e.g.* Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, i. 484). It might, indeed, be thought that this strictness in the Attic law was due to the supposed interest of the State, but the true explanation is doubtless to be found in the view

advanced by Rohde, among others, that the State regulated the murder suits on the basis of the old family blood-feud, and that its chief object was the satisfaction, not of the State, but of the invisible powers. These positions we shall now proceed to illustrate.

That the State process grew out of the blood-feud is first of all indicated by the fact that it was the nearest relatives of the murdered man, and only in special cases more distant kinsmen, on whom devolved both the right and the obligation to prosecute. It was a duty for whose neglect in the case of wilful murder a man might be himself arraigned by a fellow-citizen (G. F. Schömann, *Antiq. of Greece*, p. 471, Eng. tr.). And this naturally arose from the fact that the duty to prosecute was regarded as also a duty to the dead, and thus as a religious duty, the neglect of which brought pollution upon the State and involved the risk of dearths and other calamities. For we have in the next place to note that the thought of the murdered man's vengeful spirit, and of other ghostly powers who jealously watched over his interest, was a living force in Athens even in historical times, shaping the course of justice, and moving the ordinary man to superstitious fear. To take the latter point first, the thought of the dead spirit's claim was a force to which the orator knew how to appeal in capital trials. So the relatives are said by Antiphon *βοηθεῖν τῷ τεθνεῶτι*, 'to succour the dead' (*Or.* i. 31; *Tetr.* 1, *β*, 13), and sentence on the murderer is described by him as *τιμωρία τῷ ἀδικηθέντι*, 'vengeance to the wronged' (*Or.* v. 58, vi. 6). In one of his speeches, composed for a fictitious case, he makes his clients address the jury: *ἀντὶ τοῦ παθόντος ἐπισκήπτομεν ὑμῖν*, 'we implore you on behalf of the dead' (*Tetr.* 3, *γ*, 7). In the next place the sense of a religious duty to the dead is apparent in the several steps of the judicial procedure. It is the archon-basileus who presides at the trial for homicide, the magistrate who inherited the peculiarly religious duties of the kingship; again, at the outset of the process, both parties have to swear by the Erinyes and other under-world powers to the justice of their cause. And lastly, we may note the procedure enjoined by law in the case of one condemned to temporary exile for an act of unpremeditated homicide. When the period of his exile had elapsed, and when he had been formally reconciled to the relatives of the slain, he had still to undergo a ritual purification from the stain of bloodshed ere he could share in the worship either of the State or of the family, and he had to make expiatory offerings to the spirit of the dead.

It will be seen that the conceptions here regarded as underlying the blood-feud, which have been attributed to the earliest Greek age and which are clearly reflected in classic times, contrast sharply with the picture of the Homeric age which lies between. The problem presented by this contrast can scarcely be ignored in dealing with the blood-feud, but it is one on which we can here only touch. It can probably be best explained by the composite racial elements that went to the making of the Greek nation. It is, of course, to be supposed that the feebler conception of the spirit-world reflected in Homer's pages, and the more untroubled gladness in life, were an actual feature of the age in which he lived. But they were the characteristics of a conquering Achæan stock, and not of the earlier population. The latter, who had no great poets to express the spirit of their religion, still clung to their local cults, and thought of the dead as mysterious powers, able to bless or curse the living. Even Homer, as already seen, is not without trace of this earlier belief. A similar hint may be found in Hesiod, whose 'daemons' are the souls of the men who lived in the earliest or golden age (*Works and Days*, 121). And Porphyry (*de Abstin.* 4. 22) records how Draco enjoined the Athenians to honour the dead heroes of their country *according to the custom of their fathers*. The old faith never died, and at last, owing especially to the teaching of the Delphic oracle, its gloomier views about the under world became, as we have seen, a dominant force in religion, and helped to shape judicial procedure.

There was, indeed, in Greek religion another and very different world from this, a realm of serene piety, radiant with images of the Olympian gods. But beneath it, in an opposition which paganism could not fully overcome, was a world of gloom and misgiving, haunted by the thought of evil, and of powers whose law was justice untempered with mercy. Of that world the study of the blood-feud, and of its reflexion in the thought and practice of the classic age, affords us impressive examples.

LITERATURE.—W. Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in early Arabia*[2], 1903, pp. 25 ff., 55 f.; art. 'Goel' in *HDB* and *EBi*; A. H. Post, *Familienrecht*, 1890, pp. 113–136; K. F. Hermann, *Lehrbuch d. griech. Antiquitäten*[6], 1889, vol. i. §§ 64, 65; G. F. Schömann, *Griech. Alterthümer*[4] (by J. H. Lipsius, 1897, p. 508 ff.); Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, cf. vols. i. ii. iv.; Meier-Schömann-Lipsius, *Der attische Process*, 1887, p. 376 ff.; J. H. Lipsius, *Das attische Recht u. Rechtsverfahren*, 1905, Introduction; G. Glotz, *La Solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel en Grèce*, 1904; P. Wilutzky, *Vorgesch. d. Rechts. Prähist. Recht*, 1903, pt. iii. ch. vi. 'Blutrache, Anfänge des Strafrechts u. des Prozesses'; J. Kohler, *Zur Lehre von d. Blutrache*, 1885; S. Herrlich, *Die Verbrechen gegen d. Leben nach attisch. Rechte*, 1883; Thonissen, *Le Droit pénal de la république athénienne*, 1876; E. Rohde, *Psyche*[2], 1898; Eichhoff, *Über die Blutrache bei d. Griechen*, 1873; K. O. Müller, *Aesch. Eum.* pp. 64 ff., 139 ff.; Jane E. Harrison, *Proleg. to the Study of Greek Religion*[2], 1908; Greek literature, esp. Homer, the Tragedians, Plato (*Laws*), Aristotle (*Politics*), and the Attic orators.

I. F. BURNS

BLOOD-FEUD (Hindu).—Indian legislation had early reached the stage in which the right of private war, and the obligations arising from the blood tie everywhere recognized among the Teutonic tribes, had been superseded by the view that repression of murder and violence was a function of the State. The peace-preserving power of the king had become predominant, and we have to go back to Vedic literature if we would meet with some slight traces of the *wergeld*, or composition, once paid as a compensation for manslaughter to the relatives of the victim. It appears that a hundred cows were considered in Vedic times the ordinary amount of the *wergeld* to be paid for killing a man. The somewhat obscure hints in the Vedic *Saṁhitās* may be supplemented by the more explicit statements contained in the *Dharmasūtras* of Baudhāyana and Āpastamba, where the fines to be paid for manslaughter are declared to have the removal of hostility for their object. Cows and other cattle were, no doubt, the earliest kind of money in India, and the payment of a hundred cows for manslaughter corresponds to the bride-price, which likewise consists of a hundred cows. Gradually, as the priestly influence made itself more felt, the compensation to be paid to the family came to be converted into a money present to the Brāhmans. This is the standpoint of the more recent lawbooks of Manu, Yājñavalkya, and others. At the same time, the kings took cognizance of all crimes committed in their kingdoms. Punishment was personified as the protector of all creatures, formed of Brahman's glory (Manu, vii. 14), and that king only was said to attain to paradise in whose dominion there existed neither murderer nor thief nor other offender (*Viṣṇu*, v. 196). Nevertheless, the ancient custom of blood-revenge did not become entirely extinct, and various instances of it are recorded down to comparatively

recent times. Thus in Kolhapur, before it came under British superintendence, murderers were sometimes compelled to make compensation to the family of the victim. Land thus given in compensation was called *khunkat*. In Kāthiāwār, various forms of blood-revenge were known to occur even in the 19th cent.; *e.g.* the avenger abandoned the village and acted in a hostile manner against the whole community (*baharvatia*). In Rājputāna, Prince Jait Sing received 26 *bīghās* of land as a compensation, called *moond-kati* (blood-money), for the murder of some of his Rājputs. A landed proprietor in Mewār, whose father had been murdered, was given five villages belonging to the murderer. The inhabitants of certain border Districts in Gujarāt, between whom and their neighbours in Rājputāna an unceasing feud raged, used to have from time to time peaceable meetings with the latter, when the number of persons killed, women kidnapped, and cattle lifted on both sides, was ascertained, and a compensation in money paid for the surplus by the other party.

LITERATURE.—Roth, 'Wergeld im Veda,' in *ZDMG* xli. 672–679; Bühler, 'Das Wergeld in Indien,' in *Festgruss an R. v. Roth*, Stuttgart, 1893; *Bombay Gazetteer*, viii. 325, 329, xxiv. 267; Jolly, *Recht und Sitte*, Strassburg, 1896, § 44; Sir R. West, 'The Criminal Law and Procedure of the Ancient Hindus,' in *Ind. Magazine*, Westminster, 1893. J. JOLLY.

BLOOD-FEUD (Muslim).—Among the Arabs, as among the other Semitic races, the blood-feud (*qawad*), retaliation (*qiṣāṣ*), vengeance (*thār*), is a general institution. Attested by pre-Islāmic documents, confirmed by the Qur'ān (ii. 173 and iv. 94), and codified by the jurists, it is a living custom among the Bedawīn, and is practised in its primitive form. We get this information from the observations collected in Syria by several authors, especially Burckhardt and Jaussen; and it is to them that we must go to study our subject. In the written Muslim law the blood-feud is only a chapter of criminal law.

A man is killed; he must be avenged. At first, it seems to be for religious reasons: a human being who has died without having accomplished, in peace or war, certain rites of passage, could never find peace in the grave; the dead man's blood 'cries,' in the form of an owl which disturbs the repose of his family, and which cannot be appeased except by another's blood. Then it seems also for economic reasons: the family and tribe of the dead man are weakened in comparison with the family and tribe of the murderer; the injured social group demands compensation.

Sometimes vengeance is immediate: a murder is committed in an encampment; it is known who the murderer is; the men rush on his tents, kill everybody they meet, slaughter the animals, and burn or break everything belonging to the murderer. But these immediate reprisals are often impossible, and then, it appears, some rites which are not very definitely stated take place. The nearest relative of the victim dips his shirt-sleeve (*reden*) in the spilt blood and hoists it up at the top of a lance. During a space of three days the avenger has no communication with anybody. The pre-Islāmic heroes used to subject themselves to various tabus at this time: Imru'l Qais took an oath to drink no wine, to eat no food, neither to wash nor to anoint his head, and to have nothing to do with women, until the day when his vengeance would be complete. It seems very probable that this was not altogether a voluntary tabu, because Duraid ibn as-Sama acted in the very same way.

Vengeance is taken, as a rule, by the nearest relative of the victim; but all the male members of his family to the fifth generation have the right of vengeance on the murderer and his relatives to the fifth generation.

The murderer, however, obtains the protection of his tribe or of an influential *shaikh*; and if the family of the victim, supported by their tribe, follow up their vengeance, they become involved in an everlasting war, made up of isolated murders and renewed vengeance. It is not often that a murderer is left alone at the mercy of his enemies. Sometimes, however, a *shaikh* will refuse to protect a man whose repeated assassinations are an annoyance to the tribe, or who has committed a murder in dishonourable circumstances. In such cases, the *shaikh* makes proclamation through the whole tribe that he 'shakes his mantle' (*infirāṣ 'abatih*) against him. The outlaw may then be slain with impunity by any one, even by a member of his own tribe. Sometimes a Bedawī proclaims the *infirāṣ 'abatih* on himself. He makes a tour through the whole tribe with a stick in his hand and a white flag flying from the top of it. Determined to avenge himself for a personal injury by a murder, he is trying in this way to take measures beforehand to restrict the consequences of his action to his own head.

As a rule, the murderer, being protected by his tribe, escapes the immediate vengeance of the family of his victim; but he remains none the less under a constant dread of it, which disturbs the life of his tribe as well as his own. After a few weeks, he sends a representative to the victim's family to make proposals. These are rejected, because the family are in honour bound to get the blood that is to satisfy the dead. Some months pass. The two tribes are tired of a situation that trammels all their social relations. An interview is arranged in the *shaikh's* tent, at which the representative (*wakīl*) of the murderer appears in supplication before the principal family-chiefs. On his knees, he avows three times that he has the victim 'at his house.' Then the victim's nearest relative declares himself ready to make peace, but only on condition of receiving an enormous ransom (*diya*) of young girls, camels, mares, sheep, money, arms, etc. The *wakil* consents to everything, no matter how exaggerated and impossible of fulfilment the conditions enumerated by the avenger may be. Then the *shaikh* intervenes, and, calling on the names of various intercessors, asks for the reduction of the different elements of the *diya* in succession; the avenger consents to this more or less generously, and peace is concluded. Pardon (*'afu*) is, so to speak, exchanged for the *diya*. In certain tribes the *diya* always includes two young girls of the murderer's family or tribe; the avenger keeps them to himself, or gets them married at will. Lastly, peace is guaranteed by the nomination of two hostages (*kafīl*) for each side, and a white flag is hoisted on a stick. Sometimes they proceed to a final ceremony of burying the blood. When the family of the murderer are unable to pay the *diya*, they go into voluntary exile.

The amount of the *diya* is not usually the object of discussion except between tribes who live in close relations of kinship, or, at least, neighbourhood; for others there is a fixed amount (*mudda*). In ancient Arabia, the *diya* of a free man was a hundred camels, and that is the figure adopted by the *sunna*; the legal writings determine the lists of beasts to be chosen, in accordance with the ancient customs. For this *mudda*, which, in practice, can be applied only among nomads, has been substituted a sum of 1000 or 1200 drachmas, according to the country. Some people have preserved customary *muddas* which do not agree with the price fixed by the *sunna*: one allows fifty sheep and fifty *mejidi*; others, a thousand piastres along with the murderer's weapon and some sheep, two or three hundred *mejidi*, forty camels, etc.

The prescriptions of the Qur'ān (ii. 173), the

meaning of which, however, is difficult to settle, sanctioned a scale of values in accordance with the social importance of the victims—freemen, slaves, or infidels. Is it possible that Imru'l Qais, when claiming a hundred human lives for his father's blood, was conforming to an old *mudda* binding on chiefs? The *mudda* for a woman was fixed by the *sunna* at half of what was due for a man of the same social status. The Bedawī tribes of Syria, on the contrary, fix the *mudda* for a woman at four times that for a man: eight girls or their dowry, or sixty camels. For a pregnant woman, they add to her own *diya* the *diya* of the child.

The governments and jurists have set themselves to give a character of public right to private vengeance. The penalties are pronounced by a magistrate, according to written rules, in solemn forms of procedure in which the witnessing plays a preponderating part. Sentences are executed by public authority.

The modes of action are the same in the retaliation for wounds. This consists in inflicting a wound on the criminal identical with the wound he gave his victim. But here again the *diya* comes in; and the application by competent authority of the physical penalty or the money-fine is one of the most important matters of Arab criminal law.

LITERATURE.—Jaussen, *Coutumes des Arabes au pays de Moab*, Paris, 1908, pp. 220–232; G. Jacob, *Altarabisches Beduinenleben*[2], Berlin, 1897; J. L. Burckhardt, *Notes on Bedouins and Wahabys*, London, 1830, ii. 148–157.

GAUDEFROY-DEMOMBYNES.

BLOOD-FEUD (Roman).—That blood-feud existed in primitive times in Italy as elsewhere is certain both from analogy and from actual traces, but the latter are scanty compared with those found amongst the Greeks. The reason lies in the comparatively modern character of Roman civilization when it emerges into the light of history. Roman history is illustrated by no such authentic picture of a primitive age as is contained in Homer. And when we turn to the arrangements of Roman law, we find little or no such reflexion of primitive ideas relating to the blood-feud as in the law-courts of Athens. But both in law and tradition the traces, if not very abundant, are clear.

The legend recorded by Plutarch (*Rom.* 23, 24) about Titus Tatius and the envoys from Laurentum points unmistakably to the usage in question. Friends and kinsmen of Tatius slew the envoys when on their way to the king; and, on his refusing to deliver up the culprits, he was himself killed by the relatives of the murdered men. Soon afterwards the gods punished both Rome and Laurentum with a plague, which was stayed only when the murderers on both sides were surrendered and punished. The last statement suggests a public, indeed a legal execution, so that we may agree with the verdict of Mommsen (*Rom. Hist.* i. 158): 'This story looks very like a historical version of the abolition of blood-revenge.'

Another echo of the blood-feud comes to us in the tradition that Numa enjoined the offering of a ram (doubtless through the kinsmen to the *manes* of the slain) in cases of involuntary homicide. What Prof. Muirhead (*EBr*[9] xx. 680*b*) calls 'a re-enactment in illustrative language' of the same law appears in the words which, according to Cicero, occurred in the XII. Tables, 'si telum manu fugit magis quam jecit, arietem subicito.' In this case the object clearly is to stay a legal prosecution; but the original object of such a law, and that as late perhaps as the time of Numa, must have been to impose a limit on the blood-feud in the case of accidental homicide, while still in the case of wilful murder suffering it to proceed unchecked (*EBr*[9], *loc. cit.*). But a more direct reminiscence of the blood-feud is to be found in the part which the kinsman of a slain man was expected to take in the prosecution of the murderer. So stringent was the obligation to institute the trial, that failure to do so disqualified a man from inheriting any of the property of the deceased. Thus in Rome as in Athens, the judicial procedure reflects the family aspect of the original blood-feud. On the other hand, the legal treatment of homicide showed how completely among the Romans the claim of the State superseded that of the family to execute justice on the criminal. For homicide was dealt with, and that even earlier than the XII. Tables, as a breach of what the jurists called the public law, which dealt with offences against the State, while the private law dealt with matters directly affecting the interest of individuals.

A word may be added as to the earliest meaning of the word *poena*. It corresponds to the Greek ποινή, and occurs in a similar sense in the XII. Tables in the sentence 'si iniuriam faxit alteri, viginti quinque aeris poenae sunto.' *Poena* is here the equivalent in money of the revenge sought for, and it might be supposed to indicate the existence in earlier times of a manner of settling the blood-feud such as was customary in the Homeric age. That such a custom was also familiar to the Italians is from the nature of the case probable, but is not supported by the use of the word *poena*, which is simply borrowed from the Greek in the general sense of compensation. Moreover, the passage in the XII. Tables refers to compensation for personal injury, and has therefore no connexion with the blood-feud (for an interesting account of the relation between *poena* and ποινή see Karlowa, *Röm. Rechtsgeschichte*, ii. 790).

LITERATURE.—J. Muirhead, art. 'Roman Law,' in *EBr*[9] xx. 669; Th. Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, 1868–75, esp. vol. i., *Röm. Strafrecht*, 1899, and *Zum ältesten Strafrecht der Kulturvölker*, 1905; Clark, *Early Roman Law: Regal Period*, 1872; O. Karlowa, *Röm. Rechtsgesch.* 1901, ii. 790.

I. F. BURNS.

BLOOD-FEUD (Semitic).—The feeling of kinship is the basis of the tribal system of primitive Semitic societies; kinsmen are really 'brothers' through their participation in a common blood, and this social bond is enforced by the law of blood-revenge. Tribal blood has fallen to the earth with the killing of a member of the group. The necessity for revenge arises when any member has perished at the hand of one of another group; the sanctity of its blood has been invaded thereby. On the other hand, if one kinsman has slain another, it is not cause for blood-revenge; either he is outlawed, as Cain (Gn 4[10ff.]) from his kin (though here by Jahweh), or is put to death, originally without shedding of blood, by the whole kin, that it may rid itself of an impious member.

The custom was doubtless of a religious character. Its persistence may be taken to support this. The members are one kin with their god; they are of his blood. His rights are violated therefore by the murder of one of their number, and he requires of them that they seek vengeance, on pain of his displeasure and consequent withdrawal from communion with them, as signs of which they would interpret any physical calamities that might befall them. It is a sacred duty a man may not renounce. The voice of blood, too, cries out from the ground for vengeance. There is a familiar idea in Arab poetry that his spirit in the shape of a bird rises from the head of the unavenged and cries, 'Give me to drink' (viz. blood).

Only tribal life offers the necessary conditions for blood-revenge: (1) the solidarity of the tribe or family (a larger group than with us, which is explained later), in which each individual is answerable for the other; and (2) the autonomy of the tribe.

The religious motive is not always present, but

esprit de corps is so real that tribal honour is always alert in pursuit of vengeance. In many instances the slain man's kin retaliated till a manifold vengeance was obtained. The Song of Lamech (Gn $4^{23f.}$), that if Cain be avenged seven times Lamech shall be avenged seventy-seven times, may be taken as showing that the vendetta did not always stop at the person of the murderer. But the principle of blood-feud is 'a life for a life.'

A person who has shed other than kin-blood is not at all regarded as impious, for only the blood of kin is sacred. He has involved all his kinsmen in the consequences; but they, if possessed of true tribal instinct, will not yield him up to the avenger. Any member of the aggrieved group may retaliate upon any member of the other, and satisfaction be obtained. But such summary justice does not always conclude the matter, and retaliation may follow retaliation indefinitely.

1. **Responsibility within a narrower circle.**—The family, not in the minor dimensions that obtain with us, but embracing all the descendants of a great-great-grandfather, early began to enter as a unit into the reckoning, and family feeling, which eventually affected the structure of Semitic society, and gave it a set towards disintegration, assumed a first importance. Blood-revenge now becomes primarily the concern of the family, so that the nearest relative is he who should undertake it: the *gō'ēl*, therefore, in Israel. Among the Arabs the brother and the son in almost equal measure were obliged to avenge. The tribe (*ḥayy*) usually, however, in its narrower sense of an aggregate of families that move *en bloc* from place to place and bear the same name, assumes the duty only when the family cannot from its weakness obtain vengeance. This intention of asserting the honour of the tribe may draw into the field of battle the manslayer's tribe, and war may demand a heavy toll of lives. The passive solidarity of the tribe also weakened before this narrower principle of relationship; the avenger preferred to retaliate upon some person within the fifth degree of consanguinity—a usage still in force among the Bedawīn. Another consequence of this growth of the family-idea may be noted. Certain of these smaller social units, by reason of bravery or for other such cause, became a kind of aristocracy, and from this was chosen the chief of the tribe. Not every life was held to be compensation for one of this class; in early Arabia 'a nobleman for a nobleman' was the rule.

2. **Modifications.**—(1) *Protection.*—A man in fear of an avenger might flee for protection to a member or the chief of another tribe. Moses, *e.g.*, found refuge with Jethro (Ex $2^{15f.}$). In Arabia, by taking food or drink with a tribesman, or even by pitching his tent so that 'tent-rope touches tent-rope,' the fugitive secures for himself his protection, and, especially in earlier times, that of the whole tribe. In pre-Islāmic times this relationship between protector and protected varied: it might be temporary or permanent and hereditary, or promise might be made to protect against a definite enemy, or all his enemies, or against death itself, *i.e.*, if the stranger were slain while under his protection, the host would undertake to pay blood-money to the next-of-kin. The *jār*, or protégé, ceases to be under any obligation to his own tribe, and enjoys the same rights as any member of that to which he is now attached. It is the proud boast of a tribe that it is always able to defend its refugees; a weaker, however, under fear of attack from a stronger, may refuse to admit one to protection, or may refer him elsewhere. Sometimes the protector claimed the right to dismiss a *jār* at will.

(2) *Asylum.*—In Arabia a manslayer was unmolested by his pursuer within certain sacred areas, pre-eminently the *ḥaram* of Mecca, within the tent, or if he pitched his tent over the grave of an ancestor. In ancient Israel the altar afforded shelter to any one who had shed blood, but by the later time of the Book of the Covenant it availed only the unintentional homicide. Certain cities of refuge were provided for in the later law-codes, and these also are further distinguished from the asylums of the Arabs in that they secured from violence only, and not from justice. See ASYLUM.

(3) *Holy Seasons.*—During the four holy months blood-revenge and war were prohibited by the Arabs.

(4) *Oracle.*—The authority of the oracle, communicated through the lot, may originally have had considerable influence. That of Hubal in Mecca was famous; questions requiring 'yes' or 'no' might be settled, and it might also decide who was to undertake vengeance.

(5) *Oath.*—Through the *qasāma*, or 'oath of purgation,' among the Arabs proof was supplied where otherwise none could be offered. Helpers, usually fifty in number, in the oath must swear to the innocence of one accused of murder, or to his blood-guiltiness. The helpers need not have been eye-witnesses. The proper application of the *qasāma*, however, was when a man was found slain. The nearest community had to swear they were not the murderers. In Israel the nearest community professed its innocence through its elders, and made atonement for the blood which had been shed by laying the guilt upon an animal (Dt 21^{1-9}), for it was a fearful thought to the Hebrew that blood should go unavenged (Job 16^{18}).

(6) *Blood-wit.*—The principle of commuting the right of blood-revenge by a fine, which has been recognized by many peoples (Greek ποινή, Saxon *wergeld*), has not been universal among the Semites. The acceptance of a surrogate was forbidden to the Hebrews (Nu 35^{31})—a fact which is evidence of the increasing sense of personal worth under the growing social order. Arabs, with a fine instinct of tribal honour, reckoned it dishonourable to compromise in any degree the blood of a kinsman, but the consciousness of weakness might recommend such a course to a tribe. The material advantages to be gained by its acceptance also exercised some influence. Many tribes required, as a condition of such compromise, that the offender or a near relative should enter the tent of the avenger and place his life at his disposal, thus acknowledging the latter's ability to avenge if he wished. A person of repute, either an outsider or a member of one of the two tribes seeking a settlement, may be called in to arbitrate, but his authority is only moral. Certain tribes had a fixed tariff: that of a hundred female camels was common, is still in force among some Bedawīn, and was renewed by the Wahhābīs. But haggling is frequent. The *wergeld* may be paid by the manslayer; but often it exceeds his resources, and his near relatives or his friends may contribute, or an assessment may be levied on the whole tribe, or the chief may be called on; for, whereas in early time the booty was divided equally, a fourth came to be set aside later into a kind of State-treasury under him for the entertainment of guests, the support of widows and orphans, and the payment of blood-money. The recipients were the nearest relatives of the murdered man—the brother and the son, therefore, whose duty it had been to avenge him. If a *jār* were killed, his relatives, and not his protector, received the *wergeld*.

With the passage from nomadic to agricultural, settled life, local connexion begins to oust genea-

logical, the regional grouping gradually weakens the feeling of blood-community, and revenge for the slaying of kin, which is opposed to nomad custom, becomes possible (Gn 27^{42}, 2 S 14^{7}). Laws of social justice arise, and impartial tribunals of State-life are instituted which remove the infliction of penalties out of the individual's hands, and distinguish between murder and homicide. In Babylonia, courts for the punishment of offences were early set up; the *jus talionis*, but not blood-revenge, was admitted. The code of Ḥammurabi makes exception in favour of unintentional homicide (§ 207 f.). In course of time, after their settlement in Canaan, the Israelites lost their tribal organization, and during their subsequent history the laws of vengeance passed beyond the primitive state of blood-feud and acquired an ethical character. Their law-codes represent an intermediate stage between the nomadic custom of direct vengeance and the criminal proceedings of developed State-life. All three make the distinction (not found in Homer, though made later when the community took into its hands the right of the avenger), between murder and homicide, and provide for the unintentional homicide lest he should fall a victim to the avenger's hasty passion; he is secure from the *gō'ēl* at any altar of Jahweh (Ex $21^{13f.}$), or at the Cities of Refuge (Dt $19^{2ff.}$, Nu $35^{14ff.}$). Ancient custom is preserved in this, that the avenger, and not the State, must take the initiative in protecting the interests of the aggrieved by bringing the case before the elders (Deut.), or the congregation (P), and must carry out the death penalty. The Deuteronomic code indicates the growth of individual responsibility in stating that the criminal alone is responsible for his misdeeds (Dt 24^{16}). The *gō'ēl* was known in Israel certainly down to the time of David (2 S 14^{11}). To Jahwism is due much of the credit for modifying this custom, though it did not abolish it. Jahweh came to be regarded as the *gō'ēl* who had redeemed Israel from bondage, to whom blood cried out, and who avenged it through His representatives with the people, viz. elders, kings, and priests.

In Syria the Syro-Roman law-book of the 5th cent. A.D. (§ 74, Paris Manuscript) forbids the avenger to kill the manslayer, and requires that the accuser hand over the guilty person to the authorities.

Muḥammad found the principles of blood-revenge too deeply rooted to be overthrown, and it gained recognition under his theocratic régime (*Qur.* xvii. 35). The religious community had both active and passive solidarity, being obliged to avenge one of its members slain and to protect a Muslim manslayer against the unbeliever. Further, he made the manslayer alone responsible for his deed, and distinguished between murder, fatal assault, and unintentional homicide. In the case of the first the *talio* was allowed, but blood-money could be accepted; in the others it must be accepted (Ibn Hišām, pp. 341–343, 821, ed. Wüstenfeld; al-Wāqidī, 338, ed. Wellhausen). But the modern Bedawī has preserved the nomadic institutions of the tribal system and the blood-feud from the transforming influence Islām would otherwise have exercised. With him the laws of vengeance for murder and homicide are the same. There is no need to regard the blood-feud as an altogether barbarous practice with nothing beneficent. Travellers in the peninsula claim that it is a salutary institution which has prevented tribes from exterminating each other, that it stays the plunderer's hand from shedding blood, and permits the traveller to risk himself in the desert. It is likely to remain as long as nomad life is regulated by custom.

LITERATURE.—Kohler, *Zur Lehre von der Blutrache*, 1885; artt. 'Goel' in *HDB*, *EBi*, and *JE*, and 'Gericht' in *PRE*²; A. P. Bissell, *The Law of Asylum in Israel*, 1886; A. H. Post, *Entwicklungsgesch. des Familienrechts*, 1890, pp. 113–137; Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage*², 1903, 22–24, *cf.* 36–39 [² 25–27, 41–56], *Rel. of the Semites*², 1894, *passim*; Procksch, *Über die Blutrache bei den vorislam. Arab.*, 1899; Patton, *AJTh*, Oct. 1901; S. A. Cook, *The Laws of Moses and the Code of Ḥammurabi*, 1903; *PEFSt*, 1897, p. 128 ff.; Burckhardt, *Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys*, 1830; Jaussen, *Coutumes des Arabes au pays de Moab*, 1908.

A. H. HARLEY.

BLOOD-FEUD (Slavonic).—Among Slavonic peoples the institution of the blood-feud may still be traced in good authorities, throughout all its history, alike when it was in full force and in the varying stages of its gradual decay.

1. Slavonic terminology.—The art. BLOOD-FEUD (Aryan) has already discussed the three expressions—Old Slav. *vražida*, not only 'enmity,' 'blood-revenge,' but also 'compensation,' 'fine'; Old Russ. *vira*, 'wergeld,' then 'State-compensation'; and *mirŭ*, 'peace.' Here should be added Old Slav. *glava*, properly 'head,' and *krŭvi*, properly 'blood'—words which are used in numerous Slavonic tongues to signify the manslaughter (deed of blood) which is to be avenged by the blood-feud. The Russian expression for 'revenge' is *mĭsti*, *mesti*, *místiti*, *mstiti*, which may be assigned to the same category as Latin *mūto*, from **moito*,* 'change' (cf. in Sicilian Gr. *μοῖτος*, 'retaliation'), or perhaps also may be compared with Gr. *μῖσος*, 'hatred' (*μισεῖν*, 'hate,' **mits*-). An interesting designation of inter-tribal conflict is to be found in the Polish word *walka* (Czech *válka*, 'war,' White Russ. *valka*, 'struggle'). It is perhaps possible that the Lat. *ulciscor*, 'I avenge,' hitherto unexplained, should be connected with it (cf. Walde, *Lat. Etymol. Wörterbuch*). Finally, mention should be made of the Servian *vjera* (Old Slav. *vĕra*, cf. Lat. *vērus*), 'truce,' properly the pledge given to the hostile clan to undertake no hostile action against them during a specified period (Mid. Lat. *treuga*).

2. Instances of the blood-feud among particular Slavonic peoples (principally based on Miklosich, *loc. cit. infra*).—The latest survival of the blood-feud in full vigour was among the *Southern Slavs*, where it persisted longest in *Dalmatia* and *Montenegro*. In the last named it was not till the year 1855 that it was rooted out by the stringent measures taken by Prince Danilo. Till that date the blood-feud was looked on as the sole means of preserving order and justice. Its characteristics may be described as follows: Blood-revenge is resorted to in cases of murder, wounding, and insult, and is considered a religious and sacred duty to the murdered man. It is especially the women who give the stimulus to vengeance. The mother lays the infant in the cradle to sleep upon the blood-stained shirt of the murdered father, and, as the boy grows up, she ever and anon presents this ghastly object to his view. Every male member of the clan is under the obligation to avenge (*bratstvo*, properly 'brotherhood,' cf. Gr. *φρήτρη*, *φρατρία*, *φράτηρ*, 'brother'): first the eldest son; if there are no sons, the brother. If the man to be hunted down by the blood-feud dies, his liability is inherited by his nearest relative, so that sometimes it is the sons and grandsons who finally fight out the quarrels of their fathers and grandfathers. The chief object is to slay the murderer, or, if this is not possible, his next-of-kin—his brother, father, son, and so forth. Blood-feud also occurs inside the clan—a later and degenerate type of revenge. The woman, and, strangely enough, the man who has been taken under protection by a woman, are inviolable. In the earliest times the man flees after the murder to another district, or at least avoids meeting the hostile clan in the church or elsewhere. During the peril of war the clan-feud is allowed to rest; but, according to Rovinskij

* A star before a word signifies that the form does not occur, but is inferred.

(*op. cit. infra*, 63), it may happen that a clan living in deadly enmity with another clan forms an alliance with a national foe (the Turks or Arnaut): '*pleme* ("tribe" composed of several *bratstva*) and *rod* ("relationship") in this instance are rated higher than nationality and religious faith.' It is only by an expiation which includes the payment of the price of blood and a humiliating ceremony on the part of the guilty man (see below) that the blood-feud comes to a bloodless end. The duty of revenge extends to the whole clan; it is only the clan and not individual members of it that can conclude peace. In the assemblies of the people (*sbor, skupština*) a question often discussed is that of the settlement of feuds of many years' standing which threaten the general peace. On the expiation of the offence hostility is forgotten, and a man's honour is not wounded by virtue of his act of expiation. On the other hand, the law of Prince Danilo, mentioned above, decrees that the murderer cannot buy his pardon by any blood-payment, but is to be shot; if he flees, his property is to be confiscated; he is banished from the country, and, if in spite of this he returns, he may be killed with impunity by any Montenegrin.

When we turn to the *West Slavs*, it is in *Poland* that we find the longest persistence of the institutions of the blood-feud in full vigour. Even in the 14th cent. the Polish nobility (*šljachta*) was divided into a vast number of family-societies and brotherhoods for war which made use of an escutcheon common to all, and had a common battle-cry (*proclama*). These societies were based on an actual or symbolical relationship. The cohesion between members with one and the same escutcheon was exemplified: (1) in the right of the relatives of a murdered man to enforce the blood-payment from the murderer; (2) in the right to redeem patrimonial estates belonging to the family if they had been sold to a stranger without the express consent of the relatives of the seller (cf. Rovinskij, p. 141 note). But there is historical evidence of the existence of these family feuds (*walka*, see above) not only among the noble families, but also among the peasant classes subject to them.

Finally, in the case of the *East Slavs*, the *Russians*, we have at our disposal evidence very old and weighty, but, it must be admitted, very obscure in details.

The oldest and weightiest authorities are as follows: (1) *Chronica Nestoris*, ed. Fr. Miklosich, cap. xlv.: 'vivebat Vladimêrus (980–1015) in timore dei. Et multiplicata sunt homicidia, et dixerunt episcopi Vladimêro: ecce, multiplicati sunt homicidae, cur non punis (*kazniti*, used of the State penalty) eos? Ille vero dixit eis: timeo peccatum (*grěchů*, "sin": Vlad., like the people of Montenegro, holds the blood-feud to be a religious obligation). Illi vero dixerunt ei: tu constitutus es a deo ut punias malos et ut diligas bonos, oportet te punire homicidam, sed cum inquisitione (*sů ispytomů*, "by investigation"). Vladimêrus vero sublatis compositionibus (*otvergů viry*, "abolished the wergeld") coepit punire homicidas. Et dixerunt episcopi et seniores: bella multa, at si compositio (*vira*) permansura est, in armis et in equis fiat. Et dixit Vladimêrus: ita fiat. Et vivebat Vladimêrus secundum institutionem (*po ustrojenniu*, "according to the constitution") patris et avi.'—(2) *Russkaja Pravda of Jaroslav Volodimêrič* (1018–1054), cf. p. 724ᵃ, above. *Judicium Jaroslavi, filii Vladimêri*: 'Si interfecerit vir virum, ulciscatur (*mstiti*) frater fratrem vel pater vel filius vel fratris filius vel sororis filius. Si vero nemo est, qui eum ulciscatur, solvendae sunt pro capite octoginta grivnae, si est principis vel tiunus principis ("official"): si vero est russus vel satelles principis vel mercator vel *jabeshnikŭ* (also an official) vel *tiunus boljari* (*boyar* official) vel *mečnikŭ* ("sword-wearer") vel *izgoj* (a man attached to no class or rank) vel *slovennikŭ*, quadraginta grivnae solvendae sunt.'—(3) The *Pravda* of the 13th cent. (*ap.* Ewers, *Das älteste Recht der Russen*, p. 814): 'After Jaroslav, his sons Isjaslav, Swjatoslav, Wsewolod, and their men, namely, Kosnjatschko, Perenjeg, Nikifor, now came to an agreement and did away with the custom of head for head (*oshložiša ubijenie za golovu*; for the meaning of *golova* see above), replacing it by permission to buy off the penalty by martens (*kunami*, i.e. with marten-skins): but every other ordinance of Jaroslav was confirmed by his sons.' 'If any one kills a prince's man in an assault with violence, and the manslayer (*golovnikŭ*) is not discovered, then a *wergeld* of 80 *grivnae* is to be paid by the district (*verví*) in which the head of the murdered man is lying: on the other hand, if the victim is one of the (common) people (*ljudinŭ*), then 40 *grivnae*.'

The development of the custom, apart from special points, is on the whole clear. Until Vladimir's time there undoubtedly reigned a system of unrestricted blood-revenge in Russia, just as there did in Montenegro down to the time of Prince Danilo. Under the pressure of the clergy, Vladimir attempted to proceed against the murderer by means of State penalties (*kazna*), but he soon returned to the customs of his ancestors. The later chronicler did not see clearly the almost unmistakable meaning of this. Jaroslav was the first to impose a restriction upon blood-revenge by limiting it to certain spheres of kinship; and, if these could not produce an avenger, a compensation (*vira*, the old term for the *wergeld*, though the expression does not actually occur in this passage) of 80 or 40 *grivnae* was exacted — no doubt to the advantage of the princely exchequer. The sons of Jaroslav completed their father's work by enacting that every deed of blood might be redeemed by the payment of marten-skins, though it is not clear who received the skins — the Prince, the injured man, or both. If the murderer was unknown, the district (*verví*, see above) in which the head of the murdered man was found was responsible for the *virnoje* (formed from *vira*)—an arrangement which still clearly recalls the joint liability of the clan with regard to the *wergeld* (see above). From the various rates of penalty mentioned in the above and other passages of the *Russkaja Pravda*, the calculation has been held to be justified (cf. L. von Schröder, *Festgruss an Roth*, p. 50) that the *wergeld* for the murder of a free Russian (*ogniščaninŭ*, 'householder') would come to about the value of a hundred cows, and that in this respect, too, the customs of ancient India (see above, pp. 725, 729) and of ancient Russia coincided. But it must be admitted that the ground on which such a calculation is based is very insecure. (For the most ancient evidence for the existence of blood-revenge on Slavonic soil, see Mauricius, *Strateg.* xi. 5; cf. ARYAN RELIGION, above, p. 51ᵃ.)

3. Expiatory usages at the amicable settlement of a blood-feud.—When the hostility between two clans was to be terminated by payment of the *wergeld*, there was also a long series of solemn ceremonies of expiation, about which we have ample information for the Slavonic and especially the South Slavonic world (cf. Miklosich, *op. cit.* 176 f.). The *Archiv f. slav. Philologie*, xiv. 141 ff., contains a detailed account (not yet embodied in the work of Miklosich) of a ceremony of expiation among the South Dalmatian Slavs. Its characteristic features are as follows:

The two clans of the Bojkovići and Tujkovići in the extreme south of Dalmatia, where the blood-feud remains a living force down to the present day, have been on hostile terms for years, because in the year 1877 Ivo Bojković in a quarrel shot Stoj, a member of the Žeci family (of the clan of the Tujkovići). The murderer has long been dead, but there are two sons, Jovo Bojković and Jovo Zec, who now (in the year 1890) are sufficiently grown up to be able to fight out their fathers' quarrel. Matters, however, do not come to that pass. After long protracted negotiations the Bojkovići are induced to admit themselves to be in the wrong and to allow Jovo Zec the right of choosing twenty-four arbitrators (*Dobri-ljudi*, 'good people'). These lay down the following conditions of peace: Jovo Bojković is to pay Jovo Zec and his brother Niko a little over a hundred sequins as the price of blood for the murdered man. Here we must add (according to Jovanović, 'Montenegrinische Rechtsgeschichte,' in *Ztschr. f. vergleich. Rechtswissenschaft*, xv. 184) that the price of the victim is decided by the number of 'bleedings,' and that twelve 'bleedings' (estimated, as a rule, at twelve sequins) constitute a deathblow. Further, the arbitrators stipulate that Jovo Bojković shall provide a meal for Jovo Zec and his party up to the number of three hundred and offer him twelve 'sponsorships,' i.e. send him twelve children, to whom Zec and his people are to stand as godfathers or sponsors. Moreover, twelve great and twelve small 'brotherhoods' (*pobratimstvo*, 'artificial relationship') are to be established

between the two parties; and, lastly, the instrument of death is to be surrendered to Jovo Zec according to the established customs. The twenty-seventh of August is the day appointed for the fulfilment of all these provisions. The ceremonies to be performed on this day take place partly in front of the house of Zec, but chiefly in the common place of assembly. Above all, it is before or in the house of Zec that the matter of the twelve sponsorships is concluded. The women of the Bojkovići, conducted by two of the arbitrators, appear with cradles on their heads containing the children, and now twelve men of the family of Zec take up the position of godfather to these. A secondary object of the presence of the women may have been (see Jovanović, *op. cit.*) to touch the heart of the chieftain of the hostile clan by their weeping and wailing. The programme of that part of the expiation which is carried out in the common place of assembly is far more extensive. First, both parties take their stand, like two hostile armies, at a distance of about a hundred metres from each other. 'After a short, silent pause, a small group appears on the side of the Bojkovići. The son of the murderer, dressed in a white shirt, barefooted and without a cap, creeps forward on all fours, carrying across his neck a long musket, the instrument of death, which two arbitrators, also without head-covering, hold by its two ends. Thereupon Zec runs quickly to meet them in order to cut the humiliating spectacle short. He approaches Bojković rapidly to raise him to his feet, while at the same time the latter kisses his feet, chest, and arms.'

The formation of the stipulated twenty-four brotherhoods is followed by the banquet, with the guests seated in a strictly regulated order; but Jovo Zec and the twelve men who have assumed the duties of sponsor touch neither food nor drink—to show that the reconciliation is not yet quite complete. It is not until the end of the meal that the payment of the debt is made in coins carefully wrapped in paper and laid on a dish. But still the arbitrators declare that the payment is not yet complete, and, amid the deep wails of the women, the Bojkovići must gradually place all their costly weapons on a large metal dish in front of Zec. At length Zec summons his new kinsman, and says: 'I give back to thee everything (in the first instance the weapons are meant): may the death of my father be pardoned to thee, and all that has happened be forgotten; in future may there be between us brotherhood, peace, and love! I will not retain thy blood-money, nor will I take from the table the white rags (the money wrapped in paper), I return to thee this also.' In this instance, then (though of course not in all), the whole material side of the blood-expiation evinces itself as only a symbolic action. Especially with regard to the weapons there was no doubt a certainty from the first that they would be given back. At the close of the proceedings one of the arbitrators mounts the table and reads the decision of the twenty-four judges aloud; he then hands it over to Zec, who in turn gives it to Bojković.

LITERATURE.—F. Miklosich, 'Die Blutrache bei den Slaven,' *Denkschriften der kais. Ak. der Wissensch.* philos.-hist. Kl. xxxvi. 1, Vienna, 1887 (with copious bibliography); cf. also Rovinskij (Russ.), 'Montenegro Past and Present,' ii., *Sbornik of the St. Petersburg Acad. of Sciences*, 1897, vol. lxiii. (cf. esp. chs. 1 and 2, *passim*). Rovinskij is also our authority for the foregoing description of the South Dalmatian expiation, of which he was an eye-witness. See, further, S. Ciszewski (Polish), *Wróżda i Pojednanie* ('Blood-feud and Duel'), Warsaw, 1900 (also contains an extensive bibliography).

O. SCHRADER.

BLOOD-FEUD (Teutonic).—Early Teutonic law made no provision for punishment in the modern sense of the word. The function of avenging crime belonged to the kindred of the person wronged, or else the tribe expelled the criminal from their league of peace, and declared him an outlaw, thereby depriving him of the common right of protection in life and property. 'Feud' is the name given to the hostile relations between two individuals, families, or tribes. The special case of the blood-feud emerged when any member of the social group was culpably slain or robbed of his honour. Here the cult of the dead came into play. It was a common superstition among the Teutons that the murdered man would find no rest, and would appear as a *genganger*, 'one who walks again,'* so long as his death was not avenged. If the slayer was caught red-handed, he might be put to death forthwith; but if he escaped for the time, it was frequently required that the sentence of outlawry should be pronounced in name of the tribe before the aggrieved family set forth to track the culprit. But, just as the kindred of the person killed held together for a common purpose, so did that of the criminal; and accordingly cases of individual blood-revenge often developed into family feuds, of which numerous instances are furnished by the Norwegian-Icelandic sources. Not infrequently these feuds ended in an act of combined incendiarism and massacre. The slayer was surprised in his own house by a night attack; his enemies surrounded the building with combustible materials, and set the whole on fire, so that he and his entire household perished in the flames. The extent to which the blood-feud might become a conflict between families is shown by the fact that sometimes one of the near relatives of the actual slayer was forced to fill the place of the latter as the object of retribution. As a rule, indeed, the policy of vengeance was not only carried out, but actually planned, by the tribe as a whole. The tribe also chose the leader or champion of the feud, and this step was at once followed by the public proclamation of the vendetta. The blood-feud was at length superseded by the imposition of a fine upon the guilty party, and in a case of killing this was known as the *wergeld*, or 'man-money,' by which the slayer redeemed himself from the sentence of outlawry. The completion of this expiatory compact was followed by the reconciliation of the warring groups, and the proclamation of the oath of peace which closed the feud. Many of the Teutonic peoples, however, and especially the Norse and North German tribes, maintained the practice of the blood-feud for certain crimes even after the principle of compensation had been introduced, and, indeed, till far on in the Middle Ages. This was particularly the case where the honour of a female of the tribe had been violated by adultery or rape. It was the introduction of the Roman penal code which in the end dislodged popular belief in the policy of the feud.

* 'The spirits o' the dead may walk again' (Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, III. iii. 16 f.).

LITERATURE.—Wilda, *Strafrecht der Germanen* (Halle, 1842); Geib, *Lehrbuch des deutschen Strafrechts*, i. (Leipzig, 1861); Schröder, *Lehrbuch der deutschen Rechtsgesch.*[4] i. (Leipzig, 1903); Brunner, *Deutsche Rechtsgesch.*[2] i. (Leipzig, 1906) 221; v. Amira, in *Grundriss der germ. Phil.*[2] iii. 191 ff.; v. Bar, *Gesch. der deutschen Strafrechts u. der Strafrechtstheorien* (Berlin, 1882); F. Dahn, *Bausteine*, 2nd ser., 'Fehdegang u. Rechtsgang d. Germanen' (Berlin, 1880), 76 ff.; Frauenstädt, *Blutrache u. Totschlagsühne im deutschen Mittelalter* (Leipzig, 1881); Telting, *Over de Sporen van oudgermaansch Strafregt in de* 'Germania' *van Tacitus* (The Hague, 1887); Cannaert, *Bijdragen tot de Kennis van het oude Strafrecht in Vlaenderen* (1835); His, *Das Strafrecht der Friesen im Mittelalter* (Leipzig, 1901); Brandt, *Forelaesninger over den norske Retshistorie*, 2 vols. (Christiania, 1883); v. Amira, *Das altnorwegische Vollstreckungsverfahren* (Munich, 1874); Bring, *De judicio homicidii sec. jura Suigothiæ vetusta* (Lund, 1820); Taranger, *Udsigt over den norske Retshistorie*, i. (Christiania, 1899); Binding, *Die Entstehung d. öffentlichen Strafe im germanisch-deutschen Recht* (Leipzig, 1908); Kohler, *Zur Lehre von der Blutrache* (Würzburg, 1885).

E. MOGK.

BOASTING.—Boasting is too extended and assertive a human failing to require defining. In quality it is simple, and appears even to require simplicity of character, of the type set forth in Proverbs, in which to flourish. Nevertheless, it has a history and a literature of its own; it is an interesting and instructive psychological phenomenon; it has grave moral aspects and extensive moral ramifications; it has a bearing on religion strangely subtle for a defect of character which is apparently so direct and blatant.

1. **Historical.**—That boasting began early, continued late, and drew attention to itself among all races in all times, language alone would suffice to prove. Few languages are satisfied with terms merely descriptive, unless—like Lat. *glorior*, Ger. *prahlen*, or Eng. 'self-glorification'—they be large-sounding, resonant words. Most languages are more concrete and figurative. Loudness of speech produces the Heb. תה, Gr. *καυχάομαι*, and probably our 'brag'; and spaciousness of speech the Gr. *μεγαλαυχέω*, and our 'tall-talk.' To good lungs is added the noisiest of musical instruments, 'to blow one's own trumpet,' and Fr. *fanfaronnade*. The idea

of scattering words at large seems to have produced the Lat. *jacto*, as well as our slang expression 'throwing the hatchet.' The names of persons with special gifts in this direction have been annexed, as Gr. ἀλαζών, a 'landlouper,' and Fr. *gasconnade*. Most of these words suggest that, at some period of their history, they have passed through the stage of being slang, and it is still slang which is busy coining words to express new gifts and new developments in boasting. John Bull, judging by his reputation in Europe, had small need of assistance; yet, as an artist both in the thing itself and the power to describe it, he is thought to have been outstripped by his cousin Jonathan. As the result of their partnership, no language is richer than English, so that we have almost as many terms for a boaster as Arabic for a lion. 'Spread-eagle,' 'bounder,' 'cock-a-hoop,' and others equally forcible and picturesque, show that boasting still exists and flourishes, and still attracts attention.

Nor is language the only record of boasting. There may be few matters of our civilization in which it had no hand, but on *dress* in particular its influence is perennial. The motives of comfort and decency are still only superinduced upon the primitive motive of display. That is only a visual boast—an assertion of our own superiority and the resources we can command, though, when the display was in war-paint, the braggadocio was less diluted. The boast which clothes itself in satin is more complex than that which wears only scalps, but at bottom it may be still the old naked assertion of power to subject other people, and it may be at the same sacrifice of better things. This more subtle combination of boasting with other elements constitutes its whole subsequent history.

A still greater triumph than dress boasting can claim. Without undue use of its own gifts, it may claim to have created *literature*. One of the most ancient jewels embedded in the OT is the Song of Lamech (Gn $4^{23f.}$), which is nothing but sheer, blatant bragging. Lamech, by the skill of his son Tubal-cain, is the first of men equipped with a slaughtering tool. He brandishes his weapon and calls on his womenkind to attend to him—a fundamental and primitive element in self-glorification:

> 'Adah and Zillah, hear my voice;
> Ye wives of Lamech, hearken unto my speech:
> For I slay a man for wounding me,
> And a young man for bruising me:
> If Cain shall be avenged sevenfold,
> Truly Lamech seventy and sevenfold.'

This is the beginning of songs, and it contains all the primitive elements of boasting—arming of the male, bluffing of one's foes, joy in seeing oneself reflected in the mirror of one's own praise. Then what are the Babylonian and Assyrian, and in scarcely a less degree the Egyptian, monuments, if not boasting? A devout ascription to the god does not hinder it from being very human bragging, even to the extent of developing into what much boasting has been since—namely, lies. When it is truth, it is carefully edited truth. The same primitive motives for boasting as appear in the war-paint of the savage and the Song of Lamech, unblushingly and loudly proclaim themselves on the monuments. The refrain is always, 'I am an irresistible, death-dealing person, good to follow, terrible to oppose.'

Perhaps all conquest is simply a boast in this power to destroy. Hence the justification of Pascal's saying, that Alexander might be excused for swaggering about the world conquering, on account of his youth, but a middle-aged person like Cæsar ought to have had more sense. In any case the ancient motives are still modern, for they never were stronger than in Napoleon, some of whose despatches have scarce more reserve than an Assyrian monument.

Yet in matters of taste, if not of modesty, the progress of time has effected some change. A speech by Cicero to-day would still not ignore the speaker, but its self-praise would not be quite so direct and open-hearted. Boasting is no longer what Montaigne calls 'an inconsiderate affection with which we flatter ourselves.' The restraint upon it by ceremony of which he complains still prevails. 'We are nothing but ceremony: ceremony carries us away, and we leave the substance of things: we hold by the branches and quit the trunk. Ceremony forbids us to do things that are lawful and natural, and we obey it: reason forbids us to do things unlawful and ill, and nobody obeys it. I find myself here fettered by the laws of ceremony; for it neither permits a man to speak well of himself nor ill.' As he proposes to speak of himself, in spite of ceremony, he says, 'We will leave her here for this time.' And with that view of the case many still agree, whensoever they find it expedient to be their own trumpeter. Self-praise may be no honour, but it may be great profit, if effectively done. Many will agree with Tristram Shandy that it is a very unpleasant thing to have to praise oneself, but it is better than doing a good deed and getting no praise for it at all. As the Assyrian added Ashshur to his name and then was free to boast of his prowess as he chose, so the modern adds '& Co.,' after which it is quite correct to proclaim his integrity, his possessions, his pre-eminence in his own department of things above all his fellow-mortals. And the same is sometimes true when, in partnership, he vends his wisdom or his religion. This boasting in company and boasting in the name of Ashshur are less different than might at first be supposed. Ashshur was the tribal god, and tribal boasting in every age has had special licence and esteem. The predatory instinct, or at least the instinct of self-defence, showing itself in the sense that, if other people brandish their weapons, we must do it still better, is manifest in both. With this may be taken the most extended and calamitous of all modern forms of boasting—social rivalry. It is the supreme attempt to gain the kingdom of heaven by commercial boasting in partnership, the usual result being, as Peabody expresses it, to supply 'the soil in which the malaria of domestic infelicity most easily spreads' (*Jesus Christ and the Social Question*, 1901, p. 178 f.).

2. **Psychological.**—Boasting, being an exaggerating and placarding of one's own worth, is a very simple outcome of vainglory. Nevertheless, the vainglory does not always work in the same way, and is by no means always the same psychological phenomenon. Shakespeare has put two finished braggarts into Henry IV.,—Falstaff and Glendower,—but, except in the mere fact that both boast loudly, they have no real kinship even in their boasting. Falstaff's boasts are 'like the father that begets them: gross as a mountain, open, palpable.' Partly his boasting is the habit of a loud, ungirt nature, disguising its consciousness of unworth by inflated self-praise, and partly it is sheer love of the art of exaggeration and decoration. When he describes himself in the character of the ideal counsellor as 'a goodly portly man i' faith,' he is not greatly disturbed or perhaps astonished to have it turned into 'a devil haunts thee in the likeness of an old fat man.' Glendower, on the other hand, takes himself with utter seriousness:

> 'These signs have marked me extraordinary,
> And all the courses of my life do show
> I am not in the roll of common men.'

Falstaff delights to blow his own trumpet, not out of any respect for himself, but because he is on the

easiest terms with himself. Glendower's ego, on the other hand, lives in state, and suffers no familiarities even with himself. His boasting, therefore, is not so much an enjoyment as a duty. This difference in boasting shows that we are no more all on the same terms with ourselves than we are with other people, which separation of ourselves from ourselves, even in the very act of sounding our own praise, deserves more consideration than psychology has yet given it.

Another psychological difference indicated by Falstaff and Glendower is that some men turn in upon themselves to boast, while others go as far afield as possible. Glendower illustrates the former. Nothing interests him which does not touch himself directly, and a thing is great simply because it is his. He is the sort of person who in modern life thinks that what he does not know is not knowledge. Falstaff, on the other hand, is ready to associate himself with anything with which he can invent the most shadowy association. While Glendower sheds his glory upon the outward world, Falstaff is ready to shed all the glory of the outward world upon himself. Here, then, are two amazing qualities in human nature —one the power to boast without requiring anything but ourselves to boast about, and the other the power to drag everything into some relation to ourselves which will glorify us. Prof. James (*Psychology*, i. 329) puts vainglory in the middle of the manifestations of social self-estimation which belong to the empirical self. That is to say, it has to do with the 'fame which in broad rumour lies,' and with the self which has things and does things, and transacts its business in the eyes of men. The phenomenon of boasting reminds us how this ego can withdraw itself or expand itself, —how it can be all the circumference or the mere centre. A man may scorn all worthy things, and boast in the rest simply because they are his; or he may, though the puniest citizen, feel himself embodied in the skill and daring of his general. The person who claimed an interest in Germany because his cousin played the German concertina is scarcely an exaggeration of what goes on in sober earnest every day. Both types of boasting are caricatures of the genuine power of the ego, of that which ought to create in us wonder and reverence —its presence in all experience, its possession of all experience, its power to isolate itself from what does not interest it, its value to itself above all it possesses and knows. Boasting is only a misuse and perversion of the true greatness and range of the soul. Egotism, after all, must not be neglected when we study the ego. Hume complains that he never can catch himself without a perception (*Treatise on Human Nature*, ed. Green and Grose, vol. i. p. 534); he never, that is, can catch himself unoccupied and alone. Had he attended to the inflating of all experience in the might of the ego, he might have discovered the still more wonderful fact that he never could catch a perception without himself, and he might have been led to see, as Kant did, that it manifests itself to us by a more direct interest than if it allowed itself to be seen keeping house at home and quite solitary.

Finally, boasting is a phenomenon which sheds light on the relation of our personality to other personalities. It is a curiously mixed relationship. Every boaster would shrivel if he did not think his boast woke some response in the minds of other people. He will boast of anything if only he thinks some one will admire him for it. Moreover, it shows a curious trust that minds around him are like his own, and yet that they are not like. If the boaster thought others quite like himself, he would not expect them to be interested in him, but in themselves; yet, being prepossessed by himself, he is unable to allow for this change of perspective. Thus boasting is curiously social and anti-social, curiously interested in one's neighbour while ignoring him for himself.

The relation of a man to his own mind and to his neighbour's is still more curiously illustrated by a third type of boasting. Though the most vainglorious of all, its motive is not vainglory or any form of vanity, but simply fear. According to Prof. James's classification of the self, it would belong, not to social self-estimation or even to personal vanity, but to another order of things altogether—to material self-seeking. No motive is simpler or more self-regarding than fear. Nevertheless, the boasting which springs from it illuminates in a singular way the complex relations, both with a man's own self and with his neighbour, which may accompany the simplest and most selfish motives. In relation to oneself it is a form of auto-suggestion, and nothing shows better what that form of legerdemain can and what it can not do. It is crowing to keep one's courage up, and, so long as it can crow without feeling danger at its windpipe, it succeeds. After that it exaggerates the danger, not the courage. In relation to one's neighbour it is bluff. The hypothesis it goes on is that other people are as easily terrified as the braggart himself. The hypothesis, when applied to the proper cases, works efficiently; but when, as frequently happens, it is applied to the wrong cases, boasting, like cursing, comes home to roost. All this Shakespeare has embodied in ancient Pistol, in whom the very boy observes 'a killing tongue and a quiet sword.' When his courage is lowest his boast is loudest. If Fortune allows him to meet another coward, he brags a ransom into his pocket; but if she cheats him with the appearance of simplicity and he foolishly encounters a lion, boasting only brings cudgels on his back and raw leeks into his stomach.

3. Moral.—That boasting is a perversion of what is great in human nature becomes plainer when we estimate it in relation to moral values. By way of caricature, boasting is a sort of double of the moral personality. Boasting may, of course, be of mere prowess, as when the Assyrian king boasts of the number of his fellow-men he has impaled, or the German student of the rapidity with which he can empty glasses of beer. Even so, however, it proceeds in some way on the belief that worth lies in the will. Just because a due estimate of ourselves ought to be moral, and boasting can turn the attention from the use of the powers to the mere possession of them, it has always been confusing to the moral judgment. Nay, boasting may be a direct attempt to surprise and corrupt the moral judgment into a false verdict. Hence it has in all ages been one of the greatest defences of a debased and impenitent conscience. Could the Assyrian kings have continued to be so cruel if they had never gloried in it on stone? Would the Restoration have been so corrupt if licentiousness had never been a matter to boast of? Would the French Revolution have lost so readily its hope of peace and brotherhood had Napoleon possessed less genius for military swaggering?

No man who boasts much can well hearken to duty at all. Words of boasting, above all other words, do 'give too cold a breath to action.' Why should one toil to cover himself with the painful garment of virtue if he can do it easily and far more spaciously with the garment of self-praise? Moreover, when one has boasted much, it is usual to perform little, and, when the real battle begins, to be, like Falstaff, 'a coward on instinct.'

That is the rule, yet there are many and great exceptions, as the example of Napoleon may remind us. There are men who, like the great showman,

'advertise well, and come up to their advertisement.' This raises the question where boasting ends and right self-trust begins. Would great swelling words not be boasting if afterwards they were turned into deed? Is there no boasting till our self-praise is baseless? Is it only immoral when it is empty? Is Montaigne right when he says: If a man be Cæsar, let him boldly think himself the greatest captain in the world? Is he also to proclaim it as well as think it? Napoleon did so, and we cannot deny that even his saying what he thought of himself may have contributed to his success. Are we to regard valid boasting as simply part of Emerson's advice: 'Trust thyself: every heart vibrates to that iron string'?

The ancient Greek ethics would probably have said, Yes. The 'magnanimous man' of Aristotle's *Ethics* is not quite free from a certain moral swagger as he walks about among his less fortunate fellows. Moreover, much of our modern ethic has returned in theory, as it has long done in practice, nearer to the Greek ideal than to the Christian. Is not the essence of the new ethic to glory in our nature and carry our head high on our shoulders?

The question is whether this attitude shows knowledge either of morality or of human nature. Cæsar's case may be doubtful; but if a man were Shakespeare, would he proclaim himself the greatest poet in the world? Instead, we find him desiring

> 'this man's style and that man's scope,
> With what I most enjoy contented least.'

He knows well enough his powers, but his imagination ranges so far beyond them that he never dreams of making them a boast. Is he not the greater that his greatness reacts thus upon his opinion of himself? Boasting indicates a shrivelled imagination as well as a shrivelled conscience. Hence only the destroyer can boast largely. Did Napoleon ever boast of himself as a great legislator, as he did of being a great conqueror? The creative mind must ever be too conscious of the limitation of its powers in comparison with the greatness of its aim. Were it only because of his knowledge of human nature, therefore, we cannot think of Shakespeare boasting. Moreover, the man who knows the human mind will know too well the bias of one's good opinion of oneself to put even his modest thoughts of himself into words. This self-restraint in expression is no hypocrisy, but a very important part of the task of seeking a just judgment of ourselves—one which shall make due allowance, as it were, for the adjustment of our compasses. As a matter of experience, until a man has made this adjustment, there is small likelihood that he will find his true sphere and walk steadfastly and bravely in it. Boasting is in too great haste to succeed; its confidence lacks reality; as social pretence it is destructive of all real geniality. It is, in short, a poor inflated, deceptive, and, at bottom, terror-stricken pursuit of things which are of no real and abiding value, to the detriment of all that is most sacred and most blessed in life.

Just as the claim of self-assertion in the name of genius only requires sufficient genius to set it at nought, so its claim in the name of morality only requires sufficient morality to exclude boasting. Imitation, Kant says, has no place in morals. Conscience, in Emerson's words, should be no conformist, no sycophant. It must be autonomous, or it is corrupt. But, like the greatest of poets, the true moral man withdraws, by that very obedience to the Divine within him, into a sanctuary where loud words of boasting would be mere desecration, and where he can only bow his head and adore. Not till self is taken up into this higher reverence does it begin to be admirable, and then it has other things to admire besides itself. The moral law thus takes the place of the poet's imagination, and shows man such high demands that he who contemplates it can see himself only as an unprofitable servant.

4. Religious.—Boasting, like other elements in human nature, may be studied in relation either to man's primitive struggle or to his ultimate goal. Seen from the latter point of view, it would appear to be simply a confusion of spiritual values, and, as such, an enemy of all true religion. Yet it is a foe which is often of religion's own household. It may be an attempt by auto-suggestion to create for us an image of ourselves which shall serve us in place of God. By that device it enables us to ignore the fundamental problems of religion—our utter feebleness and our utter dependence. Religion is also a self-valuation, but it is a valuation in face of the things which boasting is a device to ignore. Yet there is sufficient kinship between the two to have developed in all religions a self-satisfied Pharisaism, which thinks its own self-esteem must be the measure of God's approval; and boasting would not be so irreligious, were it not for this kinship with the elements in man which religion meets.

According to Ritschl, the very essence of religion is a transcendent estimate of spirit as measurable by no extent and no duration. Faith in God lives by the experience that a thing so weak as the human spirit can be made mighty against time and chance and the bigness of the world. And there is something in the humblest religious man which corresponds to that estimate. Sainte-Beuve (*Port Royal*) says something like this:—There is a hope and a self-esteem in the humility of the Christian which makes pale the pride and ambition of Alexander. But the point is that they are held in humility, in remembrance of God, in the knowledge that we have nothing we have not received, that by the grace of God we are what we are. Thus, and thus only, can men say with the Apostle, 'Where is boasting then? It is excluded' (Ro 3^{27}). The task of all true religion is to effect this exclusion. If, however, it should fail, man turns God Himself into the long shadow of his own self-praise, and that is the culmination and acme of all boasting.

The strange element in genius which Goethe has called 'the demonic' stands in a suggestive way between the trust of humility and the trust of vainglory. Take as examples: 'You carry Cæsar and his fortunes,' and Napoleon's saying, 'The world still turns for us.' They are too self-reliant to be religious, too reliant upon destiny to be boastful. A change in the proportion, and they would be the sayings of braggarts or of saints. Yet Cæsar's and Napoleon's confidence, in face of success and backed by armies, is a small thing compared with the confidence of the humblest of the prophets, faced by disaster and backed by nothing but the Unseen. 'See, I have this day set thee over the nations and over the kingdoms, to pluck up, and to break down, and to destroy, and to overthrow; to build, and to plant' (Jer 1^{10}). All that religion seeks is this change of proportion. Boasting is excluded, and yet the world still turns for us, for all things work together for good to them that love God (Ro 8^{28}); the frailest vessel carries us and our fortunes, for neither life, nor death, nor any created thing can separate us from the love of God; we can trust ourselves and be neither 'mendicant nor sycophantic,' for he that is spiritual judgeth all things (1 Co 2^{15}). Above all, the end of Christianity is to make goodness the goal of all ambition and the measure of all worth, and yet to save men from degrading merit into a boast, or giving it any place at all as merit between us and God.

LITERATURE.—In the OT boasting is regarded as the fruit of ignorance of God and of one's own soul. In 1 K 20^{11}, 2 Ch 25^{19}, Ps 49^{6} 52^{1} 94^{4} 97^{7}, Pr 25^{14} 27^{1} its folly, danger, and impiety are set forth. In James the OT way of treating the evil re-appears, esp. in 4^{6}; but in the rest of the NT, and especially by St. Paul, it is opposed on religious rather than on moral grounds, as the opposite of that humble trust in God's grace which is the only assurance of safety and peace. The Greeks were almost as much alive as the Hebrews to the danger and impiety of boasting. Perhaps it belonged to the Greek temperament that, under the temptation of prosperity, *hybris*, 'insolence,' readily appeared and speedily expressed itself in vaunting. In *The Makers of Hellas*, by E. E. G., 1903, this point is touched on in various connexions, most fully under 'Pindar,' pp. 349–353. On the advertising element in Greek rhetoric, see Hatch, *The Influence of Greek Ideas on the Christian Church*[5], 1895. Besides the essay of Montaigne referred to in the text, and more important, is Bacon's essay, *Of Vainglory*, wherein with much worldly wisdom the advantages of boasting have full justice done them. 'Glorious men are the scorn of wise men, the admiration of fools, the idols of parasites, and the slaves of their own vaunts.' Modern writers, for the most part, deal with vanity and self-exaltation as an inward feeling only, either not seeing that every feeling is changed by passing into utterance or taking it for granted that, in this age of publicity and education, good taste and the fear of man would prevent it. The boaster has therefore been left almost exclusively to the novelist, who has made free use of the picturesque braggart. Those who occur to the mind most readily are Scott's creations, nearly all of whom display their art on a background of rather hypocritical religion. All Psychologies attend to the phenomenon of self-assertion, but rarely realize its tendency to display itself in speech. In the *Principles of Psychology*, by William James (2 vols., London, 1891), self-satisfaction as a primitive emotion is discussed in the section on 'Self-feeling,' i. 305. Paulsen (*A System of Ethics*, London, 1899) distinguishes between pride, which wishes to be somebody, and vanity, which wishes only to appear somebody. In several books, *e.g. A Manual of Psychology*, by G. F. Stout (1899), the relation of boasting to the pathology of the mind is recognized, but nothing is made of it, and the matter ends purely physiologically. The older Evangelical preachers dealt frequently with such subjects as salvation without boasting; *e.g.* in Simeon's *Works* (1832) there are three such sermons: iii. 423, xvi. 603, xvii. 297. Modern sermons tend to deal more with motives, but F. W. Robertson's Sermon (iii. 1) on 'The Tongue' is interesting, because it indicates the relation of boasting to slander and persecution. Cf. also *Cathedral and University Sermons*, by R. W. Church (1892) [in Serm. 4, a discussion of the modern equivalent of the Greek *hybris*]; and suggestions in Newman's *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, 1868 (i. 162: 'Profession without Ostentation,' and viii. 17: 'Vanity of Human Glory').

J. W. OMAN.

BOAT.—See SHIPS AND BOATS.

BODHISATTVA (in Sanskrit literature).—

Introduction: (1) Etymology, (2) Little Vehicle.
I. Principles conducive to Buddhahood.
II. Controversy (Little Vehicle): Is a Bodhisattva a supernatural being?
III. Stages in the career of a Bodhisattva.
IV. Spiritual life of a candidate for Buddhahood.

INTRODUCTION.—(1) *Etymology.*—*Bodhisattva* is usually translated 'one whose essence is perfect knowledge' (*sattva* = 'essence,' 'own nature,' *svabhāva*). It is very possible that this was the original meaning of the word; historically, however, *bodhisattva* = 'one who is on the way to the attainment of perfect knowledge' (Monier-Williams, *Dict. s.v.*), *i.e.* 'a future Buddha.' As a matter of fact, according to the native Lexx., *sattva* = *chitta*, 'thought,' *vyavasāya*, 'decision,' 'determination'; and a Buddhist commentator explains it as an equivalent of *abhiprāya*, 'intention,' 'purpose'; thus we should have *bodhisattva* = 'one whose intentions (or wishes) are fixed on perfect knowledge.' *

This last translation is correct so far as (1) the Bodhisattvas of the Little Vehicle, and (2) the inferior Bodhisattvas of the Great Vehicle are concerned. But we shall see that there are also Bodhisattvas 'whose essence is perfect knowledge.' The *Prajñāpāramitā* in 2500 articles supports this view, and furnishes us with the curious equation: *rjes-su rtogs-pai sems-dpa* = *anubuddhasattva*, contrasted with *skye-bai sems-dpa* = *utpannasattva* and *abhisaṁskārasattva* (see *Madhyamakāvat.* xiv. 10).

There are a few analogous formations, but they seem to be exclusively Buddhist: (a) *Jñānasattva*, 'one whose essence is knowledge' or 'intelligence'—an epithet of Mañjuśrī, and in Mysticism a common appellation of very great magicians or ascetics; (b) *Vajrasattva*, 'one whose essence is diamond' or 'thunderbolt' (see vol. i. p. 99, and art. TANTRAS); (c) *Śrībodhisattvas*, 'holy' or 'sacred Bodhisattvas,' the honorific prefix being added to make a distinction between the Bodhisattvas of certain mystical categories; (d) *Vajrabodhisattvas*, with the same significance (see art. TANTRAS); (e) although the usual Tibetan translation is *byaṅ-chub sems-dpa*, the reading *rdzogspai byaṅ-chub sems-dpa* (*Madhyamakāvat.* p. 79. 3) is sometimes found, which points to an original *sambodhisattva*.

(2) *Little Vehicle.*—According to the doctrines of the Little Vehicle, there have been only a few Buddhas. The Pāli sources enumerate thirty-four previous to Śākyamuni, but the last six names alone occur in the Nikāyas and agree with the Sanskrit lists. Although plurality of Buddhas is certainly an ancient dogma, attested not only by this coincidence of both traditions, but also by epigraphic evidence (Bhārhut [*q.v.*]), there is no indication in the oldest literature that Śākyamuni or his immediate disciples called upon the faithful to follow in the steps of former Buddhas, and themselves to become Buddhas. Śākyamuni is the Master or the god; he is not, properly speaking, a model. The faithful ought to become *arhats*, i.e. to quench the passions by abstinence, to subdue the fire of thought by the exercise of the four ecstasies (*dhyānas*), and thus to destroy the seed of re-birth (see art. ARHAT). Thenceforward speculation on the character and career of the future Buddhas has no very marked practical interest; its value for religion consists only in the light which it throws on the transcendent virtues of the Buddha.

Let us recall the essential characteristics of the most ancient theory. It is found almost complete in the biography of Śākyamuni.* Four *asaṅkhyeyas* (incalculable periods, see art. AGES OF THE WORLD [Bud.]) and a hundred thousand ages (*kalpas*) have passed since the future Śākyamuni, who then bore the name of Sumedha, discovered the way to nirvāṇa through the attainment of arhat-ship; but at the sight of the Buddha Dīpaṅkara, then 'reigning,' he renounced immediate nirvāṇa in order to become a Buddha, and thenceforward he was a Bodhisattva. This is his vow (*praṇidhāna*) or supplication (*prārthanā*, *abhinirhāra*). Dīpaṅkara proceeds to ascertain whether the vow will be fulfilled, and announces that in the distant future Sumedha will be the perfect Buddha Śākyamuni. This is the prophecy (*vyākaraṇa*).† Sumedha now knows that he is a seed of Buddha (*buddhabīja*), a young shoot of Buddha (*buddhāṅkura*), and with firm resolution he seeks and practises the ten virtues (*pāramitā*)‡ that make a Buddha. His 'career' or 'course' (*charyā*) continues through numerous re-births, animal, human, and divine. At last the future Śākyamuni is re-born in a high heaven, as king of the Tuṣita gods; and it is there that, a hundred thousand years before the attainment of the Bodhi, an acclamation (*halāhala*) of the gods arises foretelling the sure success of the future Buddha.§ Leaving the throne of the Tuṣitas,

* See *Bodhicharyāvatārap.* p. 421, 15 (*tatra* [*bodhau*] *sattvam abhiprāyo 'syeti bodhisattvaḥ*); *Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 182, 18 f., *bodhisattva* = *bodhiniyatasattva*; other etymologies, *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, xix. 76 f.

* The chief source is very late. It is the *Introduction to the Jātaka* (5th cent. A.D., ed. Fausböll, tr. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Birth Stories*, 1880, and Chalmers, 1895). See Rockhill, *JAOS* 18, i. 1; Spence Hardy, *Manual*, p. 88; and Kern, *Manual*, p. 65.

† *i.e.* the *Dīpaṅkarajātaka*, so famous in the literature, the Chinese records, and the sculptures. See Foucher, *Art gréco-bouddhique*, i. 278. In the *Mahāvastu*, the future Śākyamuni is called Megha; in the *Divyāvadāna*, Sumati. When the future Buddha has been *vyākṛta*, he cannot turn backward; he is *niyata*, 'definitely assured of becoming Buddha.' In the Great Vehicle, mention is made of the 'appointment,' 'qualification' to Buddhahood given to the candidate by the Buddhas. Such a 'qualified' man possesses 'causes of success' (*pūrvajinakṛtādhikāra* = *hetusampanna bodhisattva*); and such 'qualification' can be styled 'benediction' (*adhiṣṭhāna*). There is a second *vyākaraṇa*, styled 'great,' in the eighth stage (see *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, xix. 35).

‡ See below, p. 740.

§ There are therefore three stages: the vow (*abhinirhāra*), the prophecy (*vyākaraṇa*), and the acclamation (*halāhala*). According to Sp. Hardy (*apud* Kern), the stages are: intention (*manas*), vow (*praṇidhāna*), pronouncing that vow (*vākpranidhāna*), revelation (*vivaraṇa*). On the systems of the *Mahāvastu* and the Great Vehicle, see p. 744 ff.

he is born in the womb of Māyādevī,* and lives, in human form, his last existence; under the Tree he attains to Bodhi; at Bodh Gayā he enters nirvāṇa.

We must not, however, overlook the important fact that the schools of the Little Vehicle, not only in Ceylon but also in India proper (Sautrāntikas, Vaibhāṣikas, etc.), have survived the rise of the Great Vehicle, and naturally they have profited by the advance of speculation. The *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* (MS of the Asiatic Society, fol. 263) expresses itself as follows, concerning Arhats as compared with Bodhisattvas: 'Having expelled self-love from the series of *saṃskāras* that constitutes their pseudo-individuality, they develop an interest in the affairs of others, an interest born of compassion, and they destroy all pain. The ordinary man (*madhya*), i.e. the Pratyekabuddha, and the Śrāvaka (candidate for arhat-ship) desire merely deliverance, that is to say, an end of suffering, and not happiness during the existences of the *saṃsāra*; because this temporal happiness is an abode of suffering. The superior man (*śreṣṭha*), i.e. the Bodhisattva, wishes, at the cost of personal sufferings, temporal happiness (*ābhyudayika*) for others, and the definite end of suffering, which is supreme happiness (*niḥśreyasasvabhāva*); or he desires for others supreme and temporal happiness (*sukham ābhyudayikanaiḥśreyasikam*), and for himself the definite end of suffering, *i.e.* Buddhahood, as a means of realizing this service of others.'

The modifications or improvements introduced into the above doctrines either by different schools of the Little Vehicle or by the Great Vehicle are of several kinds. They may be grouped under four heads, the discussion of which will complete the present article: (1) accurate determination of the elements of Buddhahood, *i.e.* principles conducive to Buddhahood (*buddhakāraka dharma*); (2) determination of the character of the Bodhisattva—is he a 'hyperphysical' being? can he retrace his course?; (3) determination of the successive stages in the career of the future Buddha; and (4) practical organization of the life of a disciple regarded as a candidate for Buddhahood.

I. PRINCIPLES CONDUCIVE TO BUDDHAHOOD.—The Bodhi,† Enlightenment, Perfect Knowledge, is not the exclusive possession of Buddhas.‡ All beings who achieve deliverance, whether as Pratyekabuddhas or as Arhats, can accomplish their aim only if the 'sight of the truth' has destroyed in them the conception of the ego, the idea of existence and non-existence, the desire for existence and for non-existence, etc. But the *bodhi* of the Buddhas, or *samyaksambodhi*, includes not only the possession of the truth indispensable to salvation, but also omniscience (*sarvajñatva*), universal knowledge (*sarvākārajñatva*), and consequently omnipotence. The Perfect Buddha owes these unique prerogatives to his prolonged meditations (which have given him insight into the principles of everything, with power to subject them to his will), and to his infinite merits of charity, patience, etc.

In ancient Buddhism, the Buddha seems to differ from the Arhats especially in that he has discovered the true way of salvation, while the Arhats learn it from his lips; and from the Pratyekabuddhas in that he undertakes to teach this truth. The difference, however, is more fundamental, as will be seen below in the study of the *lokottara* doctrines (see below, p. 741). The ten virtues ascribed to the future Buddha, or perfect virtues, are in the Little Vehicle: (1) almsgiving, (2) morality, (3) renunciation of the world (*nekkhamma*), (4) wisdom or knowledge, (5) energy, (6) forbearance or patience, (7) truthfulness (*sachcha*), (8) resolution (*adhiṭṭhāna*), (9) charity or benevolence (*mettā*), (10) indifference, equanimity (*upekkhā*).* That there is nothing systematic here is evident. It is different in the Great Vehicle.

The Bodhisattva, or future Buddha, who would attain Bodhi, must therefore practise the six 'transcendent' virtues or *pāramitās*.† By this word is to be understood, properly speaking, *prajñā*, 'knowledge,' or 'wisdom.' *Pāramitā*, taken as an adjective, means 'arrived at the other side' of transmigration, *i.e.* at nirvāṇa. Knowledge alone, however, or insight into the truth, allows the destruction of the germ of existence. The other *pāramitās*, or the virtues of charity (*dāna*), morality (*śīla*), and patience (*kṣānti*) deserve the name only as their merit is applied to the attainment of Buddhahood. They are called natural (*laukika*) when they are not illuminated by knowledge, for example, when the charitable man believes in the substantial reality 'of the mendicant, the alms, and the donor'; they are said to be supernatural (*lokottara*) when knowledge becomes their guide, 'just as a man possessed of sight leads a group of the blind to the desired place.' It is essential, for instance, that charity be practised without any idea of the substantial reality of the three elements of almsgiving (giver, alms, mendicant), or rather, without even admitting the momentary reality of these three elements (*trikoṭipariśuddhā maitrī*).

There is another classification given: *karuṇā* (pity) or *maitrī* benevolence) directed towards (1) creatures (*sattvālambana*), or (2) the 'dharmas' (*dharmālambana*), or (3) without object (*anālambana*) [*Śikṣās*. 212. 12]. It may be assumed that, etymologically at least, the second stage is practised by a man who has recognized the nothingness of the ego (*pudgalanairātmya*), but still believes in the reality of the elements constituting this apparent ego (*dharmasvabhāva*). The books of the Prajñā draw a distinction between the Bodhisattva 'who perceives things' (*aupalambika*) and the Bodhisattva who does not perceive them, thus discarding the second stage (see art. MAHĀYĀNA).

The virtues of charity, morality, and patience constitute the equipment of merit (*puṇyasambhāra*) of the future Buddha. They are sustained by the virtue of energy (*vīrya*). They bear fruit, more and more excellent in the course of time, and at last realize what is called the 'material body' (*rūpakāya*) of a Buddha, whether it be the body adorned with the thirty-two signs, etc., exhibited by Śākyamuni (see below, p. 742[b]), or rather the so-called beatific body (*saṃbhogakāya*, 'body of enjoyment') which the Buddhas exhibit in paradises to the hosts of Bodhisattvas worshipping them.

The virtue of knowledge (*prajñā*) is sustained by energy and nourished by the virtue of meditation or contemplation (*dhyāna, samādhi*). We have seen that it illuminates and guides the so-called virtues of merit (*puṇya*). On the other hand, it cannot exist without these virtues. In fact, not only does knowledge require a pure 'field' wherein to be born and develop, but it also requires practical exercise. The abstract theoretical view of the nothingness of the ego (*pudgala*) and of the nothingness of things (*dharmas*) cannot destroy the illusion which makes us believe in the ego and things, unless the growing exercise of charity teaches us to sacrifice our goods, our bodies, and our lives. Science constitutes the equipment of knowledge (*jñānasambhāra*), which is the real cause of what is called the 'body of law of a Buddha' (*dharmakāya*; see artt. ĀDIBUDDHA, MAHĀYĀNA), that is to say, 'a series of perfectly pure principles' (*anāsravadharmasantāna*), 'empti-

* On this descent and the miracles of the uterine life, see Windisch, *Buddhas Geburt*, p. 110 f.

† Authorities: *Madhyamakāvatāra*, *Bodhisattvacharyāvatāra*, *Lalitavistara* [list of the 100 *dharmālokamukhas*, p. 31 ff., tr. by Kern, *Gesch.* I. 405; this will probably be thought less systematic than the arrangement in the texts cited above. It will be observed (35. 2) that the four *sambhāras* were later reduced to two]. The scholastic explanation of the problem would lead us too far. A summary of it will be found in Kern, *Manual*, pp. 62 and 67. On the development of the theory of the Bodhipakkhiyas within the Little Vehicle from the ancient sūtras to Buddhaghoṣa, see C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Vibhaṅga*, p. xiv f.

‡ See, Kern, *Manual*, 61, n. 4; Oldenberg, *Buddha*[2], 321. In the art. MAHĀYĀNA the question will be discussed whether it is possible to arrive at deliverance by way of arhat-ship, and, incidentally, whether all beings are destined to become Buddhas.

* See Kern, *Manual*, p. 66; Childers, p. 335. Each of these ten virtues has three degrees: *upapāramitā, pāramitā, paramatthapāramitā*, e.g. with regard to almsgiving: (1) giving of external goods, (2) sacrifice of limbs, (3) sacrifice of life. One of the canonical books (*Chariyāpiṭaka*), not one of the oldest, 'containing thirty-four short Jātakas turned into verse' (Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, p. 176), gives examples showing how Śākyamuni practised all these virtues.

† See F. W. Thomas, *JRAS*, 1904, p. 547; *Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 30; and *Muséon*, 1907, p. 278. A cognate form is *pāramī*; and there is also *paramatā*, 'excellence,' which forms a sort of play upon words. On the system of the ten *pāramitās* in the Great Vehicle, see below, p. 748.

ness devoid of support' (*nirālambā śūnyatā*), in other words, empty aimless thought, the quiescence of intelligence which is nirvāṇa.*

Each of the *pāramitās* bears fruits relative to the Bodhisattva and to creatures. Giving endues the Bodhisattva with a Buddha body and 'causes to ripen' (=converts) avaricious beings; morality causes him to escape evil destinies and converts immoral beings; patience suppresses all wickedness, all selfishness, all pride, and converts wicked creatures, etc. (*Lal.* 34 ff.).

The *pāramitās*, however, are often regarded as having for chief, nay for only, aim to 'mature the qualities of a Buddha' in the Bodhisattva who practises them. But we must not overlook the important fact that a future Buddha acquires the quality of Buddha not for himself but solely for the good of creatures. If he accumulates so much merit, knowledge, and sovereignty, it is in order to put them at the service of beings, as much in a direct way, by his own activity when he is a 'Bodhisattva become Tathāgata,' as in an indirect way, by the efficacy of his 'vows' after he has entered nirvāṇa. It is expedient, however, that henceforth the future Buddha should labour in the service of beings, that he should be engaged in 'maturing beings,' anticipating the task which later on he will perfectly accomplish. This is the part played by the four *saṅgrahavastus*, or 'topics leading to the sympathy of creatures'; which are: giving, kindly address (*priyavāditā*), putting into practice rules of altruism (*arthacharyā*), practising ourselves the virtues we recommend to our neighbours (*samānārthatā*).† This charitable activity is so important that the Bodhisattva is worthy of the name for the simple reason that he devotes himself to it.

From the preceding definitions there follows, as we shall see, the whole system of the career of the Bodhisattva (*bodhisattvacharyā*). The thought of illumination, or *bodhichitta*, that is to say, 'the thought of becoming Buddha for the salvation of creatures,' is its primary cause and basis. This thought has, of course, antecedents: in the first place, the practice of good from selfish motives, either for the sake of temporal rewards (*i.e.* in celestial re-births, etc.) or with a view to nirvāṇa; and then, the desire of the good of others for their own sake, which already distinguishes the future Bodhisattva (however great his faults otherwise) from the future Arhats.

This thought is essentially born of compassion (*karuṇā*) and emptiness (*śūnyatā*). If there were no compassion, as in the Little Vehicle, we should have to do merely with an egotistical saint. If there were no recognition of emptiness, the compassion would be much more shallow and liable to change, for where belief in the 'ego' exists, how can any one prefer his neighbour to himself? He may perhaps in a moment of exaltation, but not permanently. But the teaching of the Buddhas is there placed providentially within reach of the 'good' (*sādhu*), and they produce thoughts of compassion, however imperfect these may be. This teaching then purifies and enlarges the compassion by giving it an aim, viz. the acquirement of the Bodhi, and a support, viz. the recognition of emptiness and the explanation of the world which it implies.

The Bodhisattva studies, cultivates, conquers, ripens, takes hold of the highest 'concentrations' of Voidness, of Wisdom, but he does not 'realize' them (*na sākṣātkaroti*); otherwise he would obtain nirvāṇa as a Śrāvaka or as a Pratyekabuddha (see *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, ch. xx.).

II. CONTROVERSY OF THE LOKOTTARAVĀDA.—The controversy on the metaphysical character of the Bodhisattva certainly goes back to one of the most ancient periods of Buddhist speculation. We are acquainted with it only in so far as we are informed concerning this speculation itself at its beginning, that is to say, our knowledge is very imperfect. One of the most ancient schisms (*bheda*, as the Buddhists call it) was connected, according to unanimous tradition, with the question whether the Buddha is *lokottara*, *i.e.* 'superior to the world,' 'supernatural,' 'hyperphysical.'

* It is in this way that the Buddhists have endeavoured to assure the stability of their system, and to reconcile the serious antinomy of the two dogmas: 'Nothing exists,' and 'We must work, labour, suffer for our neighbour.' It is certain, says a Mādhyamika philosopher, that our neighbour does not exist; but the Bodhisattva cherishes within himself this illusion (*moha*) that he must become Buddha for the salvation of creatures; if not the only way, yet it is the best way to destroy the illusion of the ego and of suffering (see artt. MAHĀYĀNA, MĀDHYAMIKAS, VIJÑĀNAVĀDINS).

† This explanation of these words is borrowed from the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*; for variations in the wording and definitions, see Kern, *Manual*, p. 67, n. 6; Burnouf, *Lotus*, p. 405; Minayeff, *Recherches*, p. 278, and below, p. 750[a].

The meaning of the word *lokottara* (Pāli *lokuttara*) in this connexion can be ascertained. As a rule, in the current language of theology, 'superior to the world' in contrast to *laukika*, 'worldly,' refers to what leads to nirvāṇa, what belongs to the Buddhist saints as such; it is a question of meditation, ecstasies, merit, etc. [The Bodhisattva is said to enter the *lokottara gati* when he reaches his first 'stage.'] It is most probable that the word has a distinct signification here, susceptible of shades of meaning, not admitting of definite determination, but which would certainly be unfairly pressed, if, in harmony with certain views of the Great Vehicle, we were to understand it to mean 'superior to the triple world of concupiscence, of material beings without concupiscence, of beings free from matter,' 'superior to the world of becoming,' escaped from the *saṃsāra*, or entering therein only by celestial magic, as the Kṛṣṇa of the *Bhagavadgītā* (see below). But it would be a much more serious mistake to give to the word *lokottara* the meaning attributed to it by Pāli scholars, that the Buddha is 'superior to the world' because, although of this world, he is not defiled by the vices of the world. The schools which are heretical from the orthodox Pāli standpoint meant quite a different thing by *lokottara*, otherwise the question of its significance would never have been raised, and it would be incomprehensible that a school should be characterized, or should describe itself, as 'affirming the Buddha's superiority to the world' (*lokottaravādin*).*

We ought to be cautious not to introduce too much exactness into the ancient views of the Order, and, to say the least of it, not to outrun the development of Buddhist doctrine. We may say that the traditional data and the earliest views regarding Śākyamuni, before as well as after the conquest of the Bodhi, were capable of being arranged, if not in two systems, yet on the lines of two opposing movements or tendencies. According to one of these, which we may call *rationalist*, and which manifests itself in the Vaibhajyavādin Schools, Pāli or Sanskrit, etc., Śākyamuni, born after the manner of men, became an Arhat by the conquest of truth, and his sole superiority consists in this conquest effected by his own power. Given the philosophical and atheistic antecedents of Buddhism, 'no metaphysical superiority over other beings could belong to the Buddha by virtue of his birth; only as being greater, more strenuous in his efforts, was it reserved to him to trace out that path wherein others have nothing to do but to follow. In a certain sense we may say that every disciple who is pressing on to holiness is also a Buddha equally with his Master.'† In reality this standpoint is not strictly maintained by any sect, and the Pāli canon, which otherwise represents rationalist doctrines, is far from exhibiting perfect euhemerism. But by the comparison of features scattered throughout this canon as well as elsewhere, we find traces of a very violent reaction against the tendency which we shall call *mythological* and *theological*.

One text says that the conception of Śākyamuni was not independent of the intercourse of his father and mother—a fact which contradicts a universally accepted doctrine.‡ There are set forth, as characteristic of the Mahāsāṅghika-Lokottaravādin School, the doctrines (1) of the Bodhisattva's descent into the maternal womb in the form of an elephant, (2) of the miracles of the uterine life (the Bodhisattva does not pass through the ordinary forms of the embryo, etc.), (3) of the birth through his mother's side: three doctrines which are admitted in the Pāli books (the first with certain modi-

* Buddhists naturally maintain that the doctrine was originally one, and that the 'heretical' views arose much later in the course of the centuries. This opinion, on other grounds, is far from being altogether mistaken (see artt. MAHĀYĀNA, SECTS [Bud.]). In the present case, we may reasonably hold that the conflicting doctrines are both very old, or, if we prefer, primitive. See the definition of *lokottara*, *Atthasālinī*, pp. 218-4; and on the confusion of Bodhisattva and Bhagavat, see Oldenberg, *Buddh. Stud.* 642.

† See Oldenberg, *Buddha*[5], 381.

‡ The only canonical Pāli texts that treat, with any detail, of the conception, the uterine life, and the birth of the Bodhisattva, are, if the writer is not mistaken, *Majjhima*, iii. 118, and *Digha*, ii. 12; see also *Aṅguttara*, ii. 130 (Kern, *Man.* 13, n. 2). In all the texts the Bodhisattva is *aupapāduka*, that is to say, he becomes incarnate by his own wish, and without regard to the ordinary laws of conception (to deny the existence of such beings is a great heresy, *Digha*, i. 55). The only exceptions are (1) the Tibetan *Abhiniṣkramaṇasūtra*, where the Bodhisattva *seems* to choose the moment of the loves of Śuddhodana and Māyādevī to study the country, the caste, and the woman in whom he is to become incarnate [see Foucaux, tr. of *Lalita.*, 1848, p. xxi; references to *Dulva*, iii. 449, where Rockhill's interpretation (*Life*, p. 15) seems less correct; see also *Milinda*, p. 75, which is not so explicit]; (2) *Lalita*, p. 87, where unbelievers are condemned; and (3) such texts as collected by Windisch, *Buddhas Geburt*, p. 142. The Bodhisattva chooses Śuddhodana as his father, let us say as his 'putative' father, because Sumitra 'is too old, not able to beget children, and he already has too many sons.' That such statements prove nothing is evident from the fact that they occur in the *Lalitavistara*. On the other hand, it is only in the *Mahāvastu* that the virginity of the mother of Buddha is asserted.

fications),* but which must have been disputed, or the Mahāsāṅghikas would not have given them such an important place. We are told elsewhere that it is a great mistake 'not to give Buddha the highest praise, to teach that the perfect Buddhas have nothing that differentiates them from the world, and not to proclaim that the perfect Buddhas are superior to the world.'†

To these negative evidences must be added the well-known biographical facts that the future Buddha left his home only under the pressure of external influences, that he gave himself up to the guidance of ignorant teachers, and became addicted to useless austerities; further, that, after having become Buddha, he did not resolve to preach the Law until he was entreated by Brahmā, that he was, in part at least, under the influence of former sin,‡ that at first he wished to preach the Law to some friends who were already dead, and that he died at last from the abuse he had made of pork.§ Some venture to say that his premature death is the punishment of an ancient murder (according to the *Suvarnaprabhāsa*). But, on the other hand, we have express declarations of the Master, showing that he is superior to the world: 'I am not a man, a god. . . . Know, O Brāhman, that I am a Buddha'; and again: 'Born in the world, brought up in the world, I have risen, and I dwell above the world.' Whence it follows that Śākyamuni, born as a man, has, by the conquest of the Bodhi, obtained a transformation of his nature; he is no longer a man, he is not an Arhat, he is a Buddha.

Neither of these texts—the second (*Saṁyutta*, iii. 140 and elsewhere) is quoted by the Vetulyakas to support their docetic views (*Kathāvatthu*, xviii. 1, see below, p. 743[a]), the first (*Aṅguttara*, ii. 88) is mentioned by Kern (*Manual*, p. 64)—is, of course, altogether conclusive. Neither the author of the *Kathāvatthu* nor Prof. Oldenberg would admit the *lokottara* interpretation. Oldenberg says in so many words that Kern has misunderstood the meaning of the saying, 'I am not a man . . . I am a Buddha.' The present writer believes that, whatever may be its genuine meaning, it could lead to the conclusion that Buddha's humanity is apparent only. It is a dogma of the Little Vehicle that Śākyamuni, since he became a Buddha, possesses 'nirvāṇa-with-residue' (*sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*); he is *parinirvṛta*, that is to say, altogether passionless, *ergo* not a man. Such is the interpretation of Buddhaghoṣa (Oldenberg). But a Buddha is not only free from passion, he is free from thought, the Bodhi being, as well said by M. Oltramare, 'hyperconsciousness' or 'non-consciousness' (*prajñāpāramitā*). Therefore the visible frame, the audible words, the whole of the personality that we call a Buddha, is only a show contrived by the compassionate resolution formed by the future Buddha. We shall not say that the author of the saying, 'I am not a man . . .' foresaw such a development of the *lokottara* Buddhology; but he opened the door to it, and, in any case, his testimony destroys the hypothesis of a primitive Buddhism altogether euhemerist.

Reference may be made (1) to the faculty that Śākyamuni possesses of living for many centuries down to the end of the age of the world (*Dīgha*, ii. 118); (2) to his 'transfiguration' (*ib.* p. 134); and especially (3) to his power of assuming the aspect of his auditors: 'When I used to enter into an assembly of many hundred nobles [or *brahmans*, householders, gods, Māra-gods, Brahma-gods], before I had seated myself there . . . I used to become in colour like unto their colour, and in voice like unto their voice. . . . But they knew me not when I spoke, and would say, "Who may this be who thus speaks? a man or a god?" Then having instructed them, . . . I would vanish away. But they knew me not even when I vanished away; and would say, ". . . a man or a god?"' (*ib.* p. 109; Rhys Davids, *SBE* xi. 48). The Buddha Śākyamuni is neither a man nor a god; he *appears* as a man or as a god; he is a Buddha; he is above and outside of existence.

Śākyamuni, then, was born as a man. It is, in fact, an ancient belief that every future Buddha, in his last existence (*charamabhavika bodhisattva*) must assume human form, at one time as a Kṣatriya, at another as a Brāhman.* He is, however, a very extraordinary man. And the question arises, To what extent has he taken possession of the exceptional prerogatives of the Buddhas, before the conquest of the Bodhi?

From the time of his birth Śākyamuni possesses the thirty-two marks (*lakṣaṇa*, *lakkhana*) of the 'great man' (*mahāpuruṣa*), and the eighty secondary signs (*anuvyañjana*). [Sanskrit authorities in *Dharmasaṅgraha*, p. 53 f.; *Mahāvastu*, ii. 29, 213 f.; *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, III. v.; Pāli authorities in *Majjhima*, ii. 136; *Dīgha*, ii. 17.] These marks, to which E. Senart has devoted very careful study (*Légende du Buddha*), whatever may be their historical, mythological, or dogmatic explanation, establish mysterious relations between the Buddha and Viṣṇu. Although the name *mahāpuruṣa*, which is the current designation of Viṣṇu, is applied, in Buddhism, to the eight classes of Āryas (*srotaāpattiphalapratipannaka*, etc., *Madhyamakavṛtti*, xxiv.; cf. *Chullavagga*, xii. 2, 5), the marks are ascribed only to universal sovereigns (*chakravartins*), and to Bodhisattvas in their last existence. To an experienced eye, however, the marks of the former are quite distinct from those of the latter (see *Lalitavistara*, ed. Lefmann, 106, 6; *Rgya-cher-rol-pa*, 93, l. 19, and the emendation proposed, mistakenly, in the present writer's opinion, by E. Senart, *Légende*, 88 n.).

[It must be added that, if Buddhas alone possess the 'marks' in their perfection, the future Buddhas possess the same in germ-state and 'ripen' them for centuries; see *Lotus*, viii. 18; *Bodhicharyāvatāra*, vii. 44; *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, III. v.; *Abhidharmakośa*, Soc. As. 219*b*.]

But if Śākyamuni, before the Bodhi, is a very extraordinary man, universal sovereigns, and especially those who reign over the four continents (*chāturdvīpaka*), are no less superhuman; they are nevertheless men. It remains to be seen whether the body that Śākyamuni showed to gods and men on this earth was a real body or an illusion. This question now demands an answer so far as possible.

One of the schools, the Lokottaravādin Mahāsāṅghikas of the Madhyadeśa† (a half-Sanskritizing sect of the Little Vehicle), teaches not only that the Buddhas have nothing in common with the world (*lokena samam*), that everything about them is supernatural (*lokottaram*), that, if they seem to think, speak, act, and suffer like us, it is merely by condescension, in order to conform outwardly to our weakness (*lokānuvartana*),‡ but also that the Bodhisattvas are in no way born from father and mother, that they are produced by their own powers (*svaguṇanirvṛtta*), that their mothers (and their wives also) are virgins, and that, if they come forth from their mothers' right side without injuring her, it is because their form (*rūpa*), i.e. their body, is entirely spiritual (*manomaya*, 'made of mind'), *i.e. quasi*-immaterial. And a sect, the Ekavyavahārikas, closely connected with the Lokottaravādins of the *Mahāvastu*, maintain that there is no matter (*rūpa*) in the Buddha.§

It is evident, therefore, that the manifestation in this world of the marvellous being who reigned among the Tuṣita gods was not in reality what it seemed to be. The Bodhisattva, after all, assumed merely an empty appearance of humanity in condescension to the ways of the world (*lokānuvar-*

* It is generally said that the mother of Buddha *dreamt* that a white elephant with six tusks entered her womb (*Jātaka*, p. 50; Rockhill, *Life*, p. 15; also *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, fol. 219); in the *Lalita*, p. 55, the Bodhisattva is transformed into an elephant. On the Bhārhut medallion representing the 'descent of Bhagavat' (Plate xxviii.), see Minayeff, *Recherches*, p. 146; Oldenberg, *Buddh. Studien*, p. 642; Foucher, *Art gréco-bouddhique*, i. 291.

† *Mahāvastu*, i. 96.

‡ On this point, which is open to dispute, see *Milinda*, 134; Rhys Davids, i. 190; cf. *Mahāvastu*, i. 169, 6. It is certain that the 'Pāli' Buddha is not free from suffering.

§ With regard to this obscure subject see Fleet, *JRAS*, 1906, p 881.

* *Lalita* (p. 88) explains that, if the Wheel of the Law were to be moved by a god, i.e. if Buddha were to appear as a god, men would feel discouragement.

† This sect, which we shall discuss presently (see below, p. 744), is comparatively well known to us through the *Mahāvastu*, one of its canonical books, edited by E. Senart (see A. Barth, *Journal des Savants*, Aug.–Oct. 1899, from which we borrow freely), and also through the *Kathāvatthu* and the works of Vasumitra and Bhavya on the sects (see Wassilieff, *Buddhismus*; Rockhill, *Life*).

The Buddhist *Madhyadeśa*, 'central region,' lies to the East of the Madhyadeśa properly so called. It is in reality the *Prāgdeśa*. For the boundaries see *Mahāvagga*, v. 13, 12 (in Kern, *Man.* 13, n. 3).

‡ *Mahāvastu*, i. 167, 15 ff. The same formula (*eṣā lokānuvartanā*) is familiar to the Pūrvaśailas who apply it to the contradictory doctrines taught by the Buddha. It is in order to put himself into touch with the faithful that he preaches doctrines serviceable (*pudgala*, *skandha*, etc.), but in reality false (see *Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 814).

§ Rockhill, *Life*, p. 188. On the mind-made body, see the discussion in Poussin, *Opinions sur l'histoire de la dogmatique bouddhique*, Paris, 1909, p. 258.

tana). The body which he shows to men and gods conceals its true nature from the 'worldly' mind. One may go further, and say that this body is only an illusion. Certain heretics of the *Kathāvatthu* (xvii. 1),* forerunning the Great Vehicle, say that it is not true that Śākyamuni descended in person into the womb of Māyā; he merely sent down to this world a double of his person, or, rather, a phantom. According to the *Daśabhūmika*, and also (a fact which has not been sufficiently noted) the *Lalitavistara* (p. 36) the Bodhisattva does not come down to the earth; he does no more than 'show' (*sandarśayati*) his descent, his sojourn in the womb of Māyā, his conquest of the Bodhi, and nirvāṇa.† In the *Lotus of the True Law* and in later systems the Buddha thus manifests himself on several occasions, appearing as a 'Bodhisattva in his last birth' (see artt. LOTUS OF THE TRUE LAW, ĀDIBUDDHA, etc.). This theory of the apparent descents, *avatāras* of the *quasi*-eternal Tathāgata, is the last phase of the *lokottaravāda*. According to *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, Śākyamuni, even in the Tuṣita-heaven, is a phantom, a 'contrived body' (*nirmāṇa*).

According to another theory, less categorical, the Law has been preached by Ānanda (*Kathāvatthu*, xviii. 1). This means that Śākyamuni, although he was a real man, flesh and bones, nevertheless remained, since the Enlightenment, in a definite state of concentration or trance (*samādhi*, *dhyāna*); and can a being in *dhyāna*-state speak? We know from *Kathāvatthu* and from Bhavya that schools were at a loss to settle this question. Doctors who deny the power of speaking to the 'concentrated' saints assume that Buddha caused Ānanda or even the walls of the preaching-room to preach the Law (Kumārila in *Tantravārttika* has good jokes on this strange hypothesis; according to the Great Vehicle such wall-preaching is a case of *nairmāṇikī ṛddhi*). Elsewhere the organ of preaching is the smile of Śākyamuni, or the light that arises from his *ūrṇā* (white hair between the eyebrows). Elsewhere Śākyamuni is credited with having uttered a few words: each disciple heard them with the developments his own disposition allowed.

Together with the problem whose various solutions have just been expounded, and which centres round the Buddha and the Bodhisattva 'arrived at his last existence' (*sannikṛṣṭa bodhisattva*), there is another, almost as important, concerning the Bodhisattva during the course of his long career. Is he a 'saint' or an 'ordinary man'? Legend supplies contradictory and confused answers.

According to the Introduction to the *Jātaka*, it is only after having acquired arhat-ship, i.e. the right of entering nirvāṇa at his next death, that Sumedha (the future Śākyamuni) conceives the idea of becoming Buddha. The quality of Bodhisattva is in his case somehow grafted on to the quality of Arhat. Without examining how far this is compatible with the conquest of arhat-ship which Śākyamuni, born as an ordinary mortal, will once more make under the Bodhi tree, we see that Buddhists inquired if all the accounts concerning the previous existences of Śākyamuni are compatible with the possession of sainthood. Assuming that the concept of Bodhisattva ought to be brought within the framework of the doctrine of the path to sainthood, Buddhists further asked whether a Bodhisattva is necessarily a saint (*ārya*), or whether he remains, at least at the beginning of his career, an ordinary man (*pṛthagjana*), what grade he occupies in sainthood, *srotaāpatti*, the first, or arhat-ship, the fourth grade, and at what time he attains to those grades.

The Great Vehicle has answers to these questions, and to many others subsidiary to them (see III.). The Little Vehicle, besides the evidence of the Mahāsāṅghikas (see *ib.*) supplies only a few documents sufficiently detailed on the nature of the future Buddhas, but they are late. All the Bodhisattvas who have taken the vow to become Buddhas 'are exempt from births in the *avīchi*, with the ghosts (*pretas*), among the lower animals; in their human births they possess all the organs of the senses; they are neither women nor eunuchs; they are never guilty of mortal sin; they do not lose sight of the doctrine of action and its fruits; in their divine births they are never insentient gods, etc.; bent upon renunciation, with no attachment to existence or non-existence, they walk as acting for the world's welfare, fulfilling all the perfect virtues.'‡

This passage denies that the Bodhisattvas who have taken the vow can be guilty of mortal sin,* or that they can deny the law of the retribution of actions, and thus destroy their 'root of merit'; but it admits that they can be guilty of sins entailing evil destinies, *e.g.* re-birth into the wombs of higher animals, and probably into certain kinds of hells.† The same impression is given us by the short and contradictory notices which we possess concerning the Haimavatas.‡ They hold that the Bodhisattvas are *pṛthagjanas* whose most notable characteristic is freedom from the spirit of malice or wickedness (*abhidhyāchitta*); but are not exempt from error (*moha*) or desire (*rāga*). The Sautrāntikas were undoubtedly of the same opinion (Wass. 276, *ad finem*). Tradition, in fact, was very clear about the animal existences of the Bodhisattva and the various sins he had committed during the course of his existences.§ These, it is true, may be explained without admitting the idea of any imperfection. This is undoubtedly what is done by the Mahāsāṅghikas. 'The Bodhisattvas,' they say, 'are free from desire and malice (*vyāpāda*, *vihethana*); whenever they choose, they are born in lower forms of existence for the benefit of creatures' (Wass. 237 [260]; cf. Rockhill, 188). The climax of this method of interpretation with a religious tendency is found in the Mahāyāna literature. There we see the Bodhisattvas 'rushing into the Avīchi like swans into a lotus pond.'‖ And why? To save creatures; because the future Buddhas in the fervour of their compassion have taken upon themselves 'the whole burden of the suffering of all creatures'; because they have declared, 'I am taking upon my body the heap of sorrows which their deeds have accumulated, in order to bear it in the regions of hell. Would that all creatures who dwell there might escape.'¶

It is not difficult, however, to reconcile these antinomies. All that is needed is the recognition of two kinds of Bodhisattvas. The legends in which the future Buddha appears in an animal form, etc., belong to the initial stage of his career. The lofty deeds of generosity, the sacrifice of life, etc., belong to a period during which he heroically practised the virtues. Finally, when Bodhisattvas are described as playing the part of a universal providence, and reigning in Paradise, like Avalokita (see art. AVALOKITEŚVARA), the reference is to future Buddhas who have almost attained Bodhi and have gained very high 'spheres' or 'stages.'

III. BHŪMIS, OR STAGES IN THE CAREER OF THE BODHISATTVA.**—The scheme of the Bodhisattva's career is modelled on that of the career of the *śrāvaka*, or disciple of the Little Vehicle.

We are expressly informed about this in various sources.†† The Śrāvaka, after receiving instruction from the Buddha, labours long before attaining, after sixteen successive victories over the passions, the first stage or first 'storey' (*bhūmi*)‡‡ of the way (*mārga*), namely, the position of *srotaāpanna* (=he who has entered the course). Thence he ascends to the states of *sakṛdāgāmin*, *anāgāmin*, and lastly *arhat*. According to another account, there are eight stages: the *srotaāpanna* who possesses the 'fruit' of entrance into the course is distinguished from the *pratipannaka*, or candidate qualified for this fruit,

* These heretics are, according to the commentary, the Vetulyakas. Minayeff has noticed that this sect is much later than the traditional but disputable date of the *Kathāvatthu* (B.C. 246). On Vetulyakas and the Great Vehicle, see *JRAS*, 1907, p. 482.

† See p. 745[a].

‡ *Jātaka*, Introd. vv. 252–258, quoted by Kern, *Man.* 67, n. 2.

* The Mahāsāṅghikas assert the same thing of the *srotaāpanna*, Wassilieff, 240 (264).

† See *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 39, 7, on animal births, births in hell, etc., of persons who practise charity but violate the 'Pentalogue.' Cf. below, p. 744[b].

‡ According to Vasumitra (Wass. 278); Bhavya ascribes different doctrines to them (Rockhill, 190).

§ On the animal births of the Bodhisattva, from the dogmatic point of view, see *Kathāvatthu*, xxiii. 3, *Jātakamālā*, xxxiii. 3, and sources quoted by Hopkins, *JAOS*, 1906, p. 464; Wassilieff, p. 168. According to *Sūtrālaṅkara*, as long as the future Buddha has not acquired a 'stage' (see below, p. 746[a]), his re-births are fixed by his acts, good or bad (*kammavasena*). Afterwards he is re-born according to his 'vows' (*praṇidhāna*) for the welfare of beings. At the end, his re-births are only apparent (*vibhutvādhipatyena . . . upapatti*). In Grünwedel, *Myth.* p. 199, statistics will be found of the various re-births of the Bodhisattva Śākyamuni according to the *Jātakas*. He was three times a Chaṇḍāla, once a dice-player, once a jackal, etc. A Bodhisattva cannot be a woman: 'At the same instant . . . the female sex of the daughter of Śāgara disappeared; the male sex appeared and she manifested herself as a Bodhisattva' (*Lotus*, Kern, p. 253; but see p. 257; *Si-do-in-dzou*, p. 123, etc.). In the Pāli Jātaka, the Bodhisattva is never a female; but that this rule is modern is proved by the sculptures of Bhārhut (see Foucher, *Les représentations des Jātakas*, p. 38).

‖ *Bodhicharyāvatārapañjikā*, p. 340, 13 (viii. 107), *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*, p. 360, 8.

¶ *Śikṣās.* p. 280.

** *Bhūmi* = 'stage,' or 'storey' (of a house), or 'category' (for instance, *Divyāvadāna*, p. 230. 28). The *Lotus* has once *dhāraṇi* = *bhūmi*, xvi. 3, see Kern, *ad loc.*, and the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, *dhātu*, *avinivartanīyadhātu*.

†† *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 13, 6; *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, II. iv.

‡‡ The term *bhūmi* is used in the Pāli *Abhidhamma* (see C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology*, p. 82) as equivalent to *magga*, 'way.'

and so on. Consequently there are eight noble individuals (*āryapudgalas* or *mahāpuruṣapudgalas*). Moreover, scholastics regard the future *śrāvakas*, who are not yet qualified for the possession of fruit (let us style them *pratipannakas* to *srotaāpattipratipannakatva*, 'candidates for the first candidateship'), as belonging to a preliminary stage or *gotrabhūmi*. Although the Schools disagree on this point, the general opinion is that not only the *arhat* but also the *srotaāpanna* cannot fall from the stage which he occupies.*

The most ancient systematic doctrines concerning the career of the Bodhisattva seem to have been the following:—

There is a preliminary stage, during which he still, properly speaking, is only a 'future Bodhisattva,' and this is succeeded by three other stages.

(1) The preliminary stage is called *Prakṛticaryā*,† 'the period during which the innate qualities show themselves,' and which begins when the future Bodhisattva plants the roots of merit which later he will apply to the conquest of the Bodhi.

(2) The second stage is that of the Bodhisattva who for the first time conceives the thought of Bodhi (*prathamachittotpādika*), or 'who merely steps into the Vehicle' (of the Bodhisattvas; *prathamayānasamprasthita*), or again 'the beginner' (*ādikarmika*), 'who is eager to start on his journey' (*gantukāma*), but who has not yet set out.‡

(3) The Bodhisattva 'who follows out the practice or career of the Bodhisattvas' (*bodhisattvacharyāñ charan*), who adopts a career 'in conformity with the vow' (*anulomacharyā*), 'who is on the march' (*gantṛ*), 'who is endowed with practice' (*charyāpratipanna*).

(4) The Bodhisattva who dwells 'in the stage from which there is no return'§ (*avinivartanīyā bhūmi*). It was at the beginning of this period (*anivartanacharyā*) that the future Śākyamuni received the prediction (*vyākaraṇa*) from Dīpaṅkara (*Mahāvastu*).‖

These and similar divisions, although they are known chiefly through the works of the Great Vehicle, contain nothing that is opposed to ancient ideas; they constitute merely an advance upon the views expounded by the commentator of the *Jātaka* (see above, p. 739). It seems to be otherwise with the 'stages of the Bodhisattva' as understood afterwards.¶ On the one hand, the teachers of the Great Vehicle sometimes regarded the doctrine of the *bhūmis* as their special right (*Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 23); on the other, the Hīnayānists reproached their opponents with having invented the ten *bhūmis*. The latter, a Tibetan writer tells us, replied that a sect of the Little Vehicle, the Mahāsāṅghikas, possessed a book, the *Mahāvastu*, in which was set forth a theory of the ten *bhūmis* (Wass. 262 f.). On this point, as on several others, the School 'of the Great Assembly' seems to have become separated from the ancient sects and to mark the transition between the two Vehicles. Its *bhūmis*, however, are not the same as those of the Mahāyāna [all of which, being exempt from return, should be put under (4) of the above enumeration]. So far as we can judge, they present this characteristic, that the first seven are only a subdivision of '*charyās*' (2) and (3) of the preceding enumeration, the last three alone being exempt from 'return.'

The account of the *bhūmis* in the *Mahāvastu** seems to be independent of the authorities of the Great Vehicle, although it has some points of contact with the *Daśabhūmaka* and the *Lalitavistara*. Unfortunately, this account is confused, fragmentary, and perhaps contradictory. We possess on this point information supplied by Chandrakīrti, who, as we shall see, complicates rather than illuminates the problem. Reference should be made to E. Senart's analysis, from which we sometimes venture to differ.

The [future] Bodhisattva, who has not yet conceived the thought of the vow of Bodhi (*praṇidhichitta*), possesses the privilege that his sins are punished only during seven births, pain in the end being reduced to headache (*śīrṣaparitāpa*; cf. *Bodhicharyāv.* i. 21] (i. 104, 5). The first *bhūmi* is produced by the thought of Bodhi: 'May we become perfect Buddhas' (80, 5). This thought immediately destroys previous sins, literally, 'covers' them (104, 3; cf. *Bodhicharyāv.* i. 13). Nevertheless, the Bodhisattva of this stage and of the six following is an 'ordinary man' (102, 13 and 78, 11). He is regarded as an Ārya (*prāptaphala*), because his vow is not that of ordinary men (*prākṛtapuruṣa* = *pṛthagjana*, 80, 15);† but his works are mixed with good and evil (102, 9). In theory he does not encounter evil destinies; murder, theft, etc., do not lead him to hell. Nevertheless, should he deny the existence of the Āryas (*āryāpavāda*;‡ here it is chiefly Buddhas and Bodhisattvas that are concerned), he will be re-born in a 'particular hell' (*pratyekanaraka*) instead of being re-born in the Avīchi, in a Preta with a small body (as opposed to the Pretas with large bodies, who accordingly suffer more from hunger), or among the higher animals (as opposed to the *kṣudratiryagyoni*).§ He will never be an asura, or a woman, or a eunuch. But if he commits a mortal sin, the murder of a Bodhisattva, of a Śrāvaka (= Arhat), of a Srotaāpanna, or of a Pratyekabuddha, he will go to hell (102, 12–104, 3).

It is said that, for scholastically expounded reasons, such and such a Bodhisattva will never be able to pass from one *bhūmi* to the next. The Bodhisattvas destined to proceed uninterruptedly (*avaivartikadharma*) seem to be distinguished from the others, and perhaps the above-mentioned privileges are reserved for them.

From the beginning, however, of the eighth *bhūmi*,‖ the works of the Bodhisattvas are perfectly pure. 'They must be honoured with the worship rendered to the perfect Buddhas, they must be regarded as perfect Buddhas' (105, 13), for from this moment they cannot fall (*anivartiya*). They are Chakravartin kings; they teach the Law (107, 8). It is a curious fact that, whereas the names of the first seven *bhūmis* remain without any point of connexion in the literature, for the eighth we find *janmanideśa* (?), which recalls the *janmabhūmi*, 'birth-stage' of the *Daśabhūmaka* (*i.e.* where one chooses his birthplace); then, *yauvarājyabhūmi* (stage of the prince associated with the reigning sovereign), which is attested by the

* This is the most complicated problem of Buddhist scholasticism (see *Saṃyutta*, v. 360). Here it may be mentioned that the *Lotus* states that some Bodhisattvas will obtain Buddhahood after four, three, two births, or after one birth (xvi. 5 f., and Kern, *ad loc.*; there is confusion of the Bodhisattvas with the Śrāvakas).

† A term, derived from the *Mahāvastu*, corresponding to *gotrabhūmi* (see below, 745).

‡ According to the texts of the Great Vehicle quoted in *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*, 212, 12 and 313, 19; this stage corresponds to the *praṇidhānacharyā* of the *Mahāvastu*, and to the *adhimuktichāryābhūmi* of *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and *Sūtrālaṅkāra*.

§ See especially *Aṣṭasāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā*, ch. xxii.

‖ Instead of 'career,' or 'stage without return,' the text, *Śikṣās.* 212, 12, has 'Bodhisattva possessing the *anutpattikadharmakṣānti*.' We shall see that it is necessary to attain the eighth *bhūmi* in order to possess this *kṣānti*, while all the *bhūmis* (including the first) are 'without return,' at least according to modern authorities (see below, 745[a] and 747).

¶ The idea which is contradictory to the Little Vehicle is not the subdivision of the Bodhisattva's career into several periods, but (1) the practical meaning of this teaching: everybody has to become a Bodhisattva; and (2) the nature attributed to the Bodhisattva 'dwelling in the *bhūmis*,' a kind of God-Providence, multiplying his various manifestations of form in all the universes, etc. The Bodhisattvas of the *Mahāvastu* do not appear to have this nature, even in the higher worlds (see next col., n. †, and p. 748[a]).

* See E. Senart's Introduction to the edition of the text (i. xxv f.), and A. Barth, *Journal des Savants*, 1899.

† The sentence, i. 78, 11, is very complicated: *prathamāyāṁ bhūmau bodhisattvāḥ pṛthagjanā iti prāptaphalā bhavanti iti dakṣiṇīyāś cha lokānāṁ virochenti*. E. Senart translates (p. 437): 'The Bodhisattvas who are in the first *bhūmi*, ordinary men though they were, secure the acquisition of fruits, and on that account become the object of the reverence of all people . . .' But he sums up (p. xxvii): 'The Bodhisattvas at this stage are still ordinary men.' And, with regard to the Bodhisattvas of the seventh *bhūmi*, we have (p. 102, 3) *sāmante pṛthagjanatāye*, which the present writer, like E. Senart (p. 457), understands to mean 'in consequence of their position as *pṛthagjanas*.' It would be necessary, therefore, to interpret the first passage (78, 11) thus: 'The Bodhisattvas are ordinary men, but they are worthy of the world's respect as if they were saints.' Unfortunately, Chandrakīrti (*Madhyamakavṛtti*, xxiv. 5) informs us that 'the scholars of the Madhyadeśa, following the arrangement of stages taught in the *Mahāvastu*, claim that the Bodhisattva dwelling in the first stage possesses the *darśanamārga*,' that is to say, has obtained the fruit of the *srotaāpatti*.

‡ The formula of the *Abhidharmakośa* is as follows: 'There are no Arhats in this world.' It implies a rejection of the True Law (*saddharmapratikṣepa*), and seems inseparable from the denial of the morality of actions and of their fruit: *nāsti dattam . . .* etc. See *Dīgha*, i. 55.

§ Cf. above, p. 748[a].

‖ We are told (i. 105, 4) that the Jātakas, and the heroic charities too, refer to the eighth and following *bhūmis*. This is very strange.

Madhyamakāvatāra; and, finally, *abhiṣekabhūmi* (royal unction), examples of which are very numerous.*

The final attainment (*paripūraṇa*) of the tenth *bhūmi* results in the descent of the Bodhisattva, who now desires to become man (which will open to him the way to Buddhahood), into his mother's womb, and the prosecution of the well-known human career.

The close parallelism should be noticed between *Mahāvastu*, i. 142, and *Lalitavistara*, 36, 1–4. The remarkable difference is that, according to the latter text, the anointing allows the saint to 'show'† (*sandarśanatā*) his descent, birth, entrance into religion, . . . and the great nirvāṇa; whereas these nine exploits of the Buddha are regarded as real, and not apparent in the *Mahāvastu*, however *lokottaravādin* it claims to be.

In the system of the Mahāyāna or of the Pāramitās (*pāramitānaya*) ‡ there is a very clear distinction between the first seven stages and the last three, but this distinction does not seem to be based on the same principle as that of the *Mahāvastu*. From the first '*bhūmi* of the Bodhisattvas' the future Buddha is assured of final success.§ Yet it seems almost certain that the Mahāyāna began with the conception of the *Mahāvastu* or one similar, for the eighth world in it bears the name of *Achalā* (immovable), 'because it cannot be removed,' or again (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*) that of *Niyatabhūmi*, 'world in which the faithful will surely (attain the state of Buddha).' Various notices lead us to believe that the possession of the *anutpattikakṣānti*,‖ which is the essence of the eighth stage, and produces the 'prediction' (*vyākaraṇa*), is not separable from the *avaivartikabhūmi* or *avinivartanīya*°, the 'stage without return.'¶

We are now able to follow the 'stages' in detail, as understood by the teachers of the Great Vehicle. The material may be subdivided into three heads: the future Bodhisattva, the first seven stages, and the last three stages.**

1. First Period: *The future Bodhisattva.*—We have seen that, according to the Introduction to the *Jātaka*, the future Śākyamuni was almost ripe for arhat-ship, when the sight of the Buddha Dīpaṅkara caused the thought of becoming Buddha to arise within him. It is after taking the vow of Bodhi that he examines the virtues necessary to a Buddha. All this is rather poor psychology; for nothing is more opposed to the career of the Bodhisattva than the state of mind of an Arhat, isolated from everything, from his neighbour as from himself. The future Buddhas, let us rather say, are recruited from men who have not entered the path of the Arhats, and whose spiritual temperament is not yet determined (*aniyatagotra*).††

These men do not, however, immediately decide, for the sake of the welfare of creatures, for their temporal happiness and their salvation in nirvāṇa, to make the very great sacrifices that the career of a Bodhisattva entails. Therefore, before taking the vow of Bodhi, a period unduly called a '*bhūmi*' passes, which is preparatory (*parikarma*°, *upacārabhūmi*) to the Bodhisattvabhūmis, and is subdivided into *gotrabhūmi* and *adhimuktichāryābhūmi*.*

(1) *Gotrabhūmi*† is a stage of preparation (*Laṅkāv.* 68, 8). Just as, even in the egg, the embryo which is to become the wonderful bird Garuda differs from all other birds in the embryonic state, so the future Bodhisattva (*bhaviṣyad*°) belongs, even before his spiritual birth, to the family (*gotra*) of the Bodhisattvas. He possesses a certain 'disposition' which predisposes him to the vow of Bodhi. He possesses certain innate (*i.e.* acquired during the course of former existences) qualities (*prakṛti*°) which incline him to compassion; for compassion is the essential element in the vow of Bodhi. He is kind and good (*bhadra*). Incapable of committing a mortal sin (for these are, above all, sins of hatred),‡ he avoids also the heresies which would condemn him for eternity;§ but he commits sins of love (*rāga*). Everyday experience, in fact, shows numerous examples of good and generous men forgetting themselves, *e.g.* in passion. These men, although ignorant and guilty, belong to the race of Bodhisattvas.

(2) *Adhimuktichāryābhūmi.*—The dispositions of which we have been speaking bear their natural fruits in the Buddhist disciple. His enthusiasm is not for the egotistical calm of the Arhat, but for the generous goodness of the Buddha. In him are born 'aspirations' (*adhimuktī*) towards the state of Buddha. In him, if we prefer to put it thus, is born the thought of Bodhi (*bodhichittotpāda*); but this thought is only in germ, in the state of seed, of cause (*hetubhūta*); there is nothing to show that it will ripen. Among a thousand persons who possess it at this state, says the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* (61, 9), are there two, is there even a single one, who will carry it to maturity? A person thinks of becoming Buddha (*a*) because some preacher invites him, or (*b*) because he hears Buddhahood praised, or (*c*) because he thinks of the miraculous body of Buddha, or (*d*) because he has compassion for creatures (*Śikṣās.* 8, 8). This last motive alone is pure; but, even when it is predominant, it is one thing to begin the vow of Bodhi, another to carry it out (*ārabdha, pratilabdha*). The good thoughts (*adhimukti, adhimokṣa, adhyāśaya*) of the disciple are like arrows shot forth in the darkness, which have very little chance of hitting the mark. His good works are few in number (*parittakarin*), full of omissions and imperfections (*chhidrakarin*), casual and unregulated (*aniyatakarin*). He has to reflect and wish (*pratisaṅkhyāna*) in order to do good. He is called 'Bodhisattva mounted on a chariot drawn by oxen' (*paśurathagatika*), to indicate the slowness and uncertainty of his success (*Śikṣās.* 7, 1). His unconstrained love is given to himself; it is only by reflexion that he cares for the welfare of others. His nature leaves him at the mercy of his inclinations. His knowledge of truth (*prajñā*) is slight, and derived entirely from listening to the Law and from reflexion: the direct penetrating sight of meditation (*bhāvanā*) is entirely wanting in him. Nevertheless, by the repetition of 'aspirations,' and by more and more studious practice of the good works which they involve, the disciple, during three periods, succeeds in purifying these very aspirations (which will henceforth be called *adhyāśayas*), and, when they are pure, he rises from the *adhimuktichāryā* stage to enter the stage 'where aspirations are pure' (*śuddhādhyāśaya*).‖ See, however, p. 747ᵃ.

2. Second Period: *The first seven stages of the Bodhisattvas.*—The stage called *śuddhāśayabhūmi* (or *śuddhādhyāśaya*°), and more commonly the 'Joyful' (*pramuditā*), is, properly speaking, the first *bhūmi* of the Bodhisattvas. (Until now the disciple was only a future Bodhisattva.) It is also the first in the classical list of the ten *bhūmis*. We shall see that it does not

* This consecration evidently takes place in the Tuṣita heaven, for there are certain qualities which the Bodhisattva does not possess until 'after the Tuṣita' (see *Mahāvastu*, i. p. xxxvi).

† See above, p. 743ᵃ, and below, p. 747ᵃ, n. ‡.

‡ Also in the Tantras (*mantranaya* in contrast to *pāramitānaya*).

§ The Bodhisattva 'who has attained a stage' is contrasted with the one who is tossed about in the *saṃsāra*, lifted up by the thought of Bodhi, held down by his sins (*Bodhicharyāv.* iv. 11). Nevertheless Chandrakīrti (*Madhyamakāvatāra*, 51) seems to foresee that a predestined Bodhisattva (*niyata*, see p. 739ᵇ, n. †) may indulge in an angry thought. In the present writer's opinion the passage should be interpreted thus: 'And if, *to suppose what is against all probability*, a predestined bodhisattva should happen to produce an angry thought.'

‖ See p. 744ᵃ, n. ‖.

¶ *Lalitavistara*, 35, l. 21, and *Śikṣās.* 318, 19, compared with *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, 60.

** Authorities.—(1) *Aṣṭasāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā*, xvii ff. (2) *Daśabhūmaka*, or *Daśabhūmika sūtra*, of which there exists a recension, augmented by Prākrit verses, called the *Daśabhūmiśvara*, one of the nine Dharmas of the Nepālese literature. Numerous quotations by Śāntideva (*Śikṣās.*), Prajñākaramati, etc., show the importance of this book, which seems to have been translated into Chinese A.D. 205–316. [See Nanjio, 105, 110.] It is utilized by (3) the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, a text-book of the Yogāchāra (or Vijñānavādin) school, (4) the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, a work of Chandrakīrti the Mādhyamika teacher (see p. 748), (5) the *Sūtrālaṅkāra* of Maitreya-Asaṅga.

†† See *Aṣṭasāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā*, p. 33, 17, *ye to avakrāntāḥ samyaktvaniyāmaṃ na te bhavyā anuttarāyāṃ samyaksambodhau chittam utpādayitum*, 'Persons who have entered "ascertainment to arhat-ship" [more accurately "the state undoubtedly leading to *srotaāpatti*"] cannot produce the thought of becoming Buddhas; . . . nevertheless I joyfully approve them if they come to produce such thought.' It is noteworthy that the *Prajñāpāramitā* uses the phrase *samyaktvaniyāma* just as the Nikāyas do (see *Saṃyutta*, Index, p. 54), and contrasts it with *bodhisattvaniyāma* (p. 322, 5). On *niyāma*, see p. 746ᵃ, n. *, p. 747ᵇ, n. *, and Wogihara on Bodhisattvabhūmi.

* This is the account of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, but there is no doubt that the Mādhyamikas recognized these distinctions. See *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*, vii. 8, viii. 8; *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 13. 12.

† The Little Vehicle also knows of a *śrāvakagotra*, 'having the disposition of a future arhat.' Here *gotrabhūmi*=*bodhisattva-gotrabhūmi*.

‡ Cf. below, p. 751ᵇ. The *Mahāvastu* seems to admit mortal sin in the Bodhisattva; see p. 744ᵇ.

§ Heresy which destroys the root of merit, the denial of the fruit of actions (see art. KARMA). See p. 744ᵇ, n. ‡.

‖ To complete this description it would be necessary interpret and comment *Mahāvyutpatti*, § 32.

differ from the *anivartanīyabhūmi*, 'the stage from which there is no "return,"' which was discussed above. It is in the 'Joyful stage,' according to a prediction of Buddha, that Ānanda is to be re-born under the name of Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Great Vehicle.

The 'Joyful stage' corresponds to what is called in the Little Vehicle the 'first fruit': the disciple is now no longer an 'ordinary man' (*pṛthagjana, prākṛtapuruṣa*) but a saint (*ārya*), one of the elect (*niyāmāvakrānta*);* for, having brought 'worldly' (*laukika*) meditations (*dhyāna*) to their perfection, he has entered the 'supernatural' career (*lokottaragati*). He is a 'graded Bodhisattva' (*bhūmisthita*), or, more correctly, he is a true Bodhisattva (*paramārthabodhisattva*), and he will certainly become a Buddha. He already possesses in a high degree all the qualities which will develop in the subsequent periods.

The description of this first stage, borrowed by the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* from the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, is developed according to a scheme which recurs in all the succeeding stages. We give it in detail so that its scholastic character may be noted.

(1) The 'stage' is produced, in a soul whose intentions or aspirations are pure, by the 'formation of the thought of Bodhi' (*chittotpāda*)—a thought which is the pure expression of charity (*dānapāramitā*) or of compassion (*karuṇā*). The thought of Bodhi is here 'absolutely fixed,' and is thus distinguished from the thought as it exists in the preparatory stage. Entirely personal and sincere, the result of meditation (*bhāvanā*), *i.e.* resting on an intuitive view of truth, it consists of the vow of the Bodhisattvas in all the fullness of disinterested generosity—a vow which will never be abandoned or altered under any circumstances, and which will have Bodhi as its end, embracing as it does all the intellectual qualities of the Perfect Buddhas and all the works which they are to accomplish.

Destined to Buddhahood (*sambodhiparāyaṇa*),† the disciple realizes that he is 'born into the family of the Buddha,' and his joy knows no bounds; joy of affection for the Buddhas who have begotten him to this spiritual birth, joy in the feeling that he is devoting himself to the realization of the task of the future Buddhas, and joy in his goodwill towards all creatures.

For him the five terrors (*bhaya*)—terror relative to the necessities of life, to an evil reputation, to death, to unhappy re-births, and to the 'assemblies'—disappear. As he has 'produced' the vow that the sins of all creatures should 'ripen' in him (*ātmavaipākya*), *i.e.* wishing to bear the burden of the sins of others in the hells and elsewhere, he is henceforward free from all evil re-birth. Knowing that there is no one better than he in this world, no one who is even his equal, why should he be afraid of meeting any 'assembly' whatever?

(2) He binds himself by the 'great resolves,' which are independent of limitations of time or space (*mahāpraṇidhāna*),‡ and purifies them: to render homage to the Buddhas; to preserve and preach their Law; to ascend to the 'great nirvāna,' after having performed all the works of a Buddha since his descent from the Tuṣita; to produce thoughts for the purification of all the 'stages' and the fulfilment of all the perfect virtues in order to that end; to ripen all creatures for Buddhahood; to pass through all the universes for the purpose of listening to the Buddhas there; to purify all the 'fields of Buddha' (that is to say, to make of them so many Sukhāvatīs); to enter the Great Vehicle; to act and preach for the salvation of beings with full success and without error; without abandoning for an instant his own path, to exhibit the birth as a *pṛthagjana*, the entrance into the religious life, the miracles, the conquest of Bodhi, the putting of the law into motion, and the great complete nirvāna.*

(3)–(4) The disciple possesses ten qualities 'which purify the stage in which he dwells,' and 'which purify the ten stages.' Becoming more and more perfect, they enable him to ascend from stage to stage: faith, compassion, affection or goodwill, generosity or disinterestedness, indefatigability, acquaintance with the doctrinal books (worldly and Buddhist), knowledge of the world (or of men), modesty in a two-fold form (reverence for self and reverence for others), power and endurance, and the worship of the Buddhas.

(5) Enjoying the sight of the Buddhas described in the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* (see MAHĀYĀNA), and, in general, of all the Buddhas of every region,—this because of (*a*) the strength of his loving faith, and (*b*) the resolution, made by these Buddhas when they were Bodhisattvas, that they would be visible—he worships these Buddhas, listens to the Law, practises the Law, applies his merits to the acquisition of Buddhahood, and 'ripens' creatures for Bodhi by means of the 'elements of popularity' (*saṅgrahavastu*, see pp. 741[a], 750[a]). All his actions are called 'purifiers of the roots of merit.'

(6) While he dwells in this stage the Bodhisattva is, in all his births, a 'sovereign king of a continent.' Deprived of all egoism, he frees all creatures from egoism.†

(7) Power.‡—Whatever act he undertakes, it is in order to reconcile creatures to himself, and always with thoughts connected with the Buddha, his Law, and his Order; it is always with the thought: 'May I become the first of beings (*i.e.* a Buddha), in order that every creature may have recourse to me for every good.' And all his undertakings succeed. He has the energy required § to leave wife and belongings, to enter on the religious path, and, having entered,§ to conquer a hundred Bodhisattva-trances every second, to perceive a

* The murder of a *niyāmāvakrānta* is a capital sin (*ānantarya*); see *Mahāvyutpatti*, 123. 3: *niyatabhūmisthitasya bodhisattvasya māraṇam*, and cf. on the same topic *Abhidharmakośav.* which has *niyatipatita bodhisattva* (MS. As. Soc. fol. 331*a*). As observed on p. 745[a], the eighth stage is sometimes called *niyatabhūmi*; but, according to the gloss, the reference is to the third *niyati* (see p. 747[b], n. *). Discrepancies in sacred books as to the stage which confers *niyāma* (*niyati*), 'predestination to Buddhahood,' led the scholastics to specify different kinds of 'assured psychological progresses.' The *niyāma* of the 8th stage confers assurance of obtaining and never losing *anābhogatā* and *anutpattikadharmakṣānti* (see below, p. 747[b]); it is the 6th *niyatipāta* of *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, xix. 88.

† This phrase occurs in the Nikāyas (see *Saṅyutta*, Index) and in Aśoka's edicts (see Senart, i. 132, 186, ii. 223). Here, as observed by Prof. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues*, i. 190, *sambodhi* = arhat-ship, and nothing more. On the *vyākaraṇa*, 'prediction,' that the future Arhat gives to himself, see *Saṅyutta*, v. 359.

‡ The *praṇidhānas* are innumerable. They are summed up in the ten great ones (*mahā**), which are all included in the *samantabhadra**, 'universally propitious resolve.' On the *praṇidhāna*, its subdivisions and its virtues, see *Dharmasaṅgraha* cxii., *Bodhicharyāvatāra*, ix. 36.

* This somewhat incoherent list of 'resolves' is cited in *Śikṣās*. 291, 11 f., and summed up in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. The last 'resolve' shows that the Mahāyānists did not believe in the *reality* of the 'Bodhisattvas in their last existence.' If the present writer's interpretation of the text *Śikṣās*. 295, 5 is correct, it shows also that Śākyamuni was believed to have been born as a *bāla*, 'an ignorant person,' 'a fool.'

† In the subsequent stages the Bodhisattva is successively sovereign king of the four continents, Śakra, Suyāma, Santuṣita (a variant of the word Tuṣita, common in the ancient literature), Sunirmitavaśavartin. . . . To each stage corresponds a certain virtue which the Bodhisattva makes prevalent in the more and more wide-spread kingdom in which he reigns. These virtues are successively the *pāramitās* (see below, p. 748).

‡ The description of the *prabhāva*, or 'power,' of the Bodhisattva is the same in the succeeding worlds, except that the numbers increase. In the *Daśabhūmaka* we find the series 100, 1000, 100,000, 100 koṭis (koṭi = 10,000,000), 1000 koṭis, 100,000 koṭis, 100,000 nayutas of koṭis (nayuta = 100,000 koṭis of koṭis), the number of the atoms in a hundred thousand times ten great universes, etc. The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* is more moderate, but it gives numbers only for the first seven worlds, 100, 1000, 100,000, 10,000,000, or a koṭi, 100 koṭis, 1000 koṭis, 100,000 koṭis.

§ This clause is wanting in the description of the higher *bhūmis*.

hundred Buddhas, to know the magical beings that these Buddhas animate and the blessing they shower on the Bodhisattvas, to make a hundred universes tremble, to go to these in his bodily form or to enlighten them by his brilliance, to display them to creatures, to ripen a hundred creatures for Bodhi (by means of a hundred magical beings),* to live for 100 *kalpas*, or ages of the world (if he chooses),* to know a hundred *kalpas* in the past and the future, to comprehend (or accumulate, *pravichinoti*) a 'hundred mouths of the Law' (*dharmamukha*),† and to show a hundred bodies ‡ (magical bodies of Buddhas), each of them surrounded by a hundred Bodhisattvas.

This last description, which the technical literature of the Yogâchâras (*Bodhisattvabhûmi*) borrows from the *Daśabhûmaka*, is represented in the *Madhyamakâvatâra* (a Mâdhyamika book) only by a single sentence: 'The Bodhisattva, in the first stage, can make a hundred universes tremble'; but this sentence implies the rest. According to the two schools of the Great Vehicle, every 'graded' Bodhisattva is a very great magician.

The passage from one *bhûmi* to the following (*bhûmer bhûmyantarasaṅkramaṇa*; see *Lalita*, 35, 22) takes place in accordance with a scheme which is always the same. Each 'stage' consists essentially in the development of ten certain qualities—the perfection, the complete realization (*paripûrṇatva, prakarṣagamana*) of which constitutes the beginning of the next stage, and gives rise to ten new qualities, at first very weak, whose perfect maturity will constitute a third stage, and so on.

For this reason, there are ten 'right dispositions' (*samyagâśayas*) in the first stage (1. not contradicting the teachers, *gurus*, etc., 2. living on good terms with the Bodhisattvas who are experiencing the same stage, 3. remaining master of one's thought by subduing passions and temptations, etc.) which, being infinitely pure, enable him to pass into the second stage, or rather constitute the second stage. The latter is termed 'the world of the Bodhisattvas whose dispositions are pure' (*śuddhâdhyâśaya*).

There are ten 'applications of the mind to the intellectual dispositions' (*chittâśayamanaskâra*) which realize the third world, ten 'entrances into the sight of *dharma*' (*dharmâlokapraveśa*; cf. the *dharmâlokamukha* of the *Lalita*) for the fourth, ten 'equalities of pure dispositions' (*viśuddhâśayasamatâ*) for the fifth, ten 'equalities of the Law' (*dharmasamatâ*) for the sixth, ten 'excellent beginnings of a new way nourished by learning and skill in the means' (*upâyaprajñâbhinirhṛtamârgântarârambhaviśeṣa*) which cause him to pass into the seventh, which consists in the culture of ten 'sciences introductory to the real truth' (*paramârthâvatârajñâna*).

But although these *bhûmis* are more and more rich in qualities and knowledge, they are all essentially the thought of Bodhi.

The first seven stages together constitute the 'active' career of the Bodhisattva, during which he exercises himself, and his acts imply movement and intellectual work (*prâyogikacharyâ, sâbhogaº, sâbhisaṁskâraº*). § The seventh marks the completion of this career, and the preparation for passing into the career which is free from movement and 'intellectuation,' the so-called career of knowledge and supernatural virtues (*jñânâbhijñâcharyâ*; cf. *Lalita*, 35, 5).

The *Bodhisattvabhûmi*, utilizing in other respects the data of the *Daśabhûmaka*, but organizing them according to a well-known scheme of the Little Vehicle (cf. the *Visuddhimagga*), establishes the following distribution: Stages i.–vii. constitute the *charyâpratipattibhûmi*, 'stage of exercise.'

Second stage. The Immaculate (*vimalâ*). Practice of Morality (*adhiśîla*).

Third stage. The Illuminating (*prabhâkarî*). Reflexion (*adhichitta*).

Fourth stage. The Radiant (*archiṣmatî*). Knowledge (*adhiprajñâ*), first part: cultivation (*i.e.* meditation) of the *bodhipakṣya dharmas*.

Fifth stage. The Invincible (*sudurjayâ*). Knowledge, second part: cultivation of the noble truths (*satya*).

Sixth stage. The Turned towards (*abhimukhî*). Knowledge, third part: cultivation of dependent origination (*pratîtyasamutpâda*).

Seventh stage. The Far-going (*dûraṅgamâ*), which sums up the six preceding stages, and includes especially the fruits of the sixth, the full development of the intelligence of the Bodhisattvas (*bodhisattvabuddhivichâra*), the complete absence of regard for the particular (*nirnimitta*), and the constant possession of meditation of annihilation (*nirodhasamâpatti*). Now the Bodhisattva dwells at the apex of existence (*bhûtakoṭivihâra*), but he does not realize annihilation (*nirodhaṁ sâkṣâtkaroti*). And yet, just as a Chakravartin king, although unsoiled by humanity, is nevertheless a man and not a god (Brahmâ), so he has not yet escaped from the domain of passion (*kleśa*). Desire, in connexion with the consciousness he has of his actions (*abhisaṁskâra*), and with 'the act of turning oneself' (*âbhoga*) towards an object, has not yet passed away. He is not subject to passion (*na saklešaḥ*) in the sense that any passion whatsoever would work in him; he is not free from passion (*na niḥkleśaḥ*) because he desires the knowledge of a Buddha, and because his intentions (of universal salvation) are not fulfilled.

Nevertheless, being in possession of the perfect qualities of Bodhisattvas, he is superior to the Arhats and the Pratyekabuddhas. Above him there are only the Bodhisattvas of higher worlds and the Perfect Buddhas.

The intentions or aspirations (*adhimukti*) of the Bodhisattva, even when he is only on the threshold of his course (*âdikarmika*), are pregnant with the Bodhi and the salvation of all beings. Therefore he is very much superior to the Arhats and the Pratyekabuddhas. These, however, are in enjoyment not only of freedom from desire (*vîtarâgatva*), but also of lofty intellectual attainments. Therefore, during the first six *bhûmis*, the Bodhisattva is inferior to them. From this point of view, he surpasses them only on entering the seventh stage. Such is the teaching of the *Maitreyavimokṣa* and the *Daśabhûmaka* (*Madhyamakâvatâra*, 18–20).

3. Third Period: *The last three stages of the Bodhisattvas.*—The eighth 'stage' is called the Steadfast, or rather the Immovable (*achalâ*).* Its characteristic is the possession of that supreme virtue called the *anutpattikadharmakṣânti* ('upholding the doctrine of the non-production of things'). †

The Bodhisattva is free not only from all *nimittagrahaṇa* ('particular and eager act of attention'), but also from all *âbhoga* ('turning towards, taking into consideration'). He is immovable. His actions, of body and of voice as much as of mind, are infinitely numerous, merciful, and fruitful, but are in a sense foreign to him, for the idea of duality, of being and non-being, of self and non-self, has perished for him; as also all movement (*samudâchâra*) connected with or belonging to the Buddhas, the Bodhisattvas, nirvâṇa, or the Arhats.

The Buddhas must also intervene to prevent such a Bodhisattva from entering nirvâṇa. They do so by virtue of the vow which they made formerly when they were Bodhisattvas, for since they have become Buddhas all activity has ceased for them. They remind the Bodhisattva of the eighth stage that his task is not accomplished, that he still needs many things in order to be a Buddha: 'Your "patience in the real truth" (*paramârthakṣânti*) in order to become Buddha is excellent; but you possess neither the ten powers

* The words in parentheses are wanting in the *Daśabhûmaka*.

† The same as the well-known *dharmâlokamukha* (*Lalita*, p. 31, Kern, i. 405). See next note.

‡ 'To show a hundred bodies,' the phrase of the *Daśabhûmaka*, is replaced in the *Bodhisattvabhûmi* by the words: *skandhadhâtvâyatanâdikânâm dharmamukhânâm kâyaśatam darśayati* (?).

§ The phrase *avabhâsabhûmi* (*Laṅkâvatâra*, 68. 6) possibly refers to the first seven stages.

* Other names are: stage of the royal prince (*kumâraº*), stage without return (*anivartya*), stage of nirvâṇa, 'settled' stage (*niyatabhûmi*: *tasyâm trîṇiyânyitipâtapatito bhavati*; see p. 745ª, and p. 746ª, n. *). In iconography, Bodhisattvas always appear with royal ornaments. The title of Mañjuśrî, *Kumâra*, is well known.

† On this *kṣânti*, also called *paramârthakṣânti*, see below p. 751.

nor the four abilities. . . . See how infinite are our bodies, our knowledge (*jñāna*), our kingdoms, our glory. You must acquire the same; you must appease those who are not appeased, convert those who are not converted,' etc.

It is for this reason that the Bodhisattva remains in existence. Without activity of body, voice, or mind, enjoying the ripe fruits of all his previous conduct, he develops marvellously. Formerly it was in his single body that he pursued the career of a Bodhisattva; now he multiplies (or divides) his body infinitely (*apramāṇakāyavibhakti*); he knows and surveys the whole universe.* He possesses the sovereignties (*vaśitā*), and ripens and blesses the creatures, etc.

The ninth stage, 'stage of the Good Ones' (*sādhumatī*), 'of the prince imperial' (*yauvarājya*),† is produced by the enthusiasm of the Bodhisattva, who is not content with the 'tranquil deliverances' (*śāntavimokṣāsantuṣṭi*), and who acquires the knowledge called *pratisaṁvid* (cf. *paṭisambhidā*), especially all that concerns the teaching of the Law (*pratibhāna*, see *Lalita*, 35, 19).

The tenth stage, 'Cloud of the Law,' is called also the 'stage of Consecration' (*abhiṣekabhūmi*) or 'stage of the Arrival at the End' (*niṣṭhāgamanabhūmi*). The Bodhisattva becomes worthy of the royalty of the Law, which will make him equal, or almost equal, with the Buddhas. He realizes the last of the *samādhis* ('contemplations'), that of 'the excellent consecration in omniscience' (*sarvajñānaviśeṣābhiṣeka*). The Buddhas consecrate him.‡ He acquires innumerable 'deliverances,' 'magical formulas,' or 'contemplations' (*dhāraṇīs*), supernatural powers. He receives the excellent rain of the True Law, and, having himself become a 'cloud of the Law,' he is sending upon creatures the good rain which lays the dust of passions and causes the growth of the harvest of merits; he is still a Bodhisattva, and renders homage to the Buddhas, as we see in the *Lotus of the True Law*; but, to use the strong expression of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, he is a Bodhisattva who has become Tathāgata (*tathāgatās tathāgatabhūtāś cha bodhisattvāḥ . . . dharmam deśayanti*).

A word must be said in conclusion with regard to the stage of the Buddhas (*buddhabhūmi*) or 'the universal splendour' (*samantaprabhā*), or 'stage of non-appearance' (*nirābhāsa*, *Laṅkāv.* 49), as opposed to the stages in which something is shown to the mind (*avabhāsa*°). It is beyond the scope of this article to examine the Buddhology of the Great Vehicle (see art. MAHĀYĀNA), but the question may be asked what is the difference between a Buddha and a Bodhisattva who has arrived at the end (*niṣṭhāgata*). We are assured that this difference is very great, but it is capable only of metaphorical expression. The knowledge of each of them is infinite in its aim and its methods, but the Buddha excels the Bodhisattva as a lamp of superlative brightness (*suviśuddha*) excels a bright lamp, as sight in broad daylight excels sight in semi-darkness, or even (and this seems to go further) as the newly-born child excels the embryo, etc. (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*, III. vi.).

The *Madhyamakāvatāra* of Chandrakīrti, the greatest Mādhyamika authority known to the present writer on this subject, gives a slightly different idea of the stages of the Bodhisattvas. Without claiming that the difference is a fundamental one—it is difficult to pass judgment upon such literature—we recapitulate here the information it contains, by way both of complement to, and of rectification of, the foregoing statement:

Chandrakīrti establishes an intimate connexion § between the *bhūmis* and the perfect virtues (*pāramitās*), which exist in all the 'stages,' but which assume predominance in turn.

(1) The Joyful stage (*pramuditā*) is the domain of charity (*dāna*)—charity, which, as we have seen, is not perfect until it is fertilized by knowledge of the void.

(2) The Immaculate stage (*vimalā*) is the domain of morality (*śīla*). The saint accumulates the 'ten good paths of action' infinitely pure—which is not the case in the preceding period. This purity consists especially in the absence of the conception of the ego. Belief in the ego, considering as real the abstention from murder, the person who abstains and the person who is not murdered, is the 'want of morality of those who practise morality.'

(3) In the Shining stage (*prabhākarī*) the Bodhisattva 'shines' by patience. Anger is the only evil that can in a moment destroy the merits accumulated during centuries. The saint acquires the four trances (*dhyāna*), the four 'immeasurables' (*apramāṇya*), and the five supernatural powers (*abhijñā*). He diminishes and reduces to nothing desire, hatred, and error, and triumphs over them in the world.

(4) The Radiant stage (*archiṣmatī*) is the domain of energy (*vīrya*) which helps towards the perfecting of good works, intellectual and moral, and especially towards application to the thirty-seven virtues connected with the Bodhi (*bodhipakṣikadharma*), and also the complete surrender of the idea of 'mine.'

(5) In the Invincible stage (*sudurjayā*) meditation or ecstasy (*samādhi*, *dhyāna*) predominates. The Bodhisattva, safe from demons, meditates on and understands the four noble truths (*ānulomikī kṣānti*), or, what comes to the same thing, relative truth and real truth (*saṁvṛti* and *paramārthasatya*) (see p. 751).

(6) The 'Turned towards' stage (*abhimukhī*), the domain in which *prajñā* (or knowledge) reigns, is thus named because the Bodhisattva, understanding 'dependent origination,' is turned towards the principles of the Perfect Buddhas. The *prajñā* predominates in him. He obtains the *nirodhasamāpatti* ('destruction-trance'), which was not possible before, on account of the non-predominance of the *prajñā* and the pre-eminence of charity, etc. Who then may be taught the profound doctrine of dependent origination, *i.e.* vacuity (*śūnyatā*), which alone gives a meaning to all other teaching? Those who, though they are 'ordinary men,' show sincere and profound enthusiasm on hearing of vacuity. In them there dwells in germ the intelligence of the Perfect Buddhas, and the love, which they will develop for this teaching that satisfies the mind so well, will be a pledge and a reason for morality, charity, patience, etc. The teaching will be imparted by a Bodhisattva arrived at the first stage, the Joyful world, or, more correctly, the teacher, in his interpretation of the Scripture, will be governed by the exegesis of Nāgārjuna, a Bodhisattva in the first stage.

(7) In the Far-going stage (*dūraṅgamā*), together with the perpetual 'ecstasy of annihilation,' there prevails the perfection of skill in the means (i.e. *upāyakauśalapāramitā*),* these means leading towards (i.) the acquisition of the Bodhi, (*a*) compassion, (*b*) knowledge of the elements of existence, (*c*) desire for Bodhi, (*d*) non-surrender of existence, (*e*) immaculate sojourn in existence, (*f*) burning energy; and (ii.) the 'ripening' of creatures, (*a*) making their insignificant roots of merit bear great fruit, (*b*) implanting in them great roots of merit, (*c*) removing all obstacles to the law of the Buddha, (*d*) enabling them to enter the Great Vehicle, (*e*) causing them to ripen in the Great Vehicle, and (*f*) leading them to deliverance.

(8) In the Immovable stage (*achalā*) predominates the virtue of resolves (*praṇidhānapāramitā*).† The Bodhisattva is no longer in the world of becoming (*saṁsāra*), but, by virtue of his sovereignty over things (*praṇidhānavaśitā*), he appears in the universe in various aspects. His resolves are perfectly pure, that is to say, the resolves which he has formed during the course of his active career all bear their fruit, as if he were really acting.

(9) In the Sādhumatī the Bodhisattva is called 'good' (*sādhu*). Development of the *balapāramitā* takes place, *i.e.* of the ten powers of a Buddha.

(10) In the 'Cloud of the Law' there is *jñānapāramitā*, excellence and predominance of the knowledge of a Buddha.

The *Sūtrālaṅkāra* (xviii. 47, see also xx. 10 f.) gives the following scheme:

(1) *Adhimuktichary-ābhūmi.*—*Sambhāra* (equipment, exertion, preparation) in order to enter a true *bhūmi*, to become a Bodhisattva.

(2) *Bhūmis* i.–vi.—*Sambhāra* towards *animittatva* (absence of particularized and eager attention), which is obtained in the

(3) viith *bhūmi*. There is *sambhāra* towards *anābhogatā* (absence of turning oneself), which is obtained in the

(4) viiith and ixth *bhūmis*. There is *sambhāra* towards *abhiṣeka* (consecration), which is obtained in the

(5) xth *bhūmi*. There is *sambhāra* to

(6) *Buddhabhūmi*, or *niṣṭhāgamana*, 'arriving at the goal.'

IV. SPIRITUAL LIFE OF THE BODHISATTVA, A FOLLOWER OF THE GREAT VEHICLE.—The question now presents itself: What is the connexion between the follower of the Great Vehicle who aspires to Buddhahood, but who is, properly speaking, only a future Bodhisattva residing in the *gotra* or *adhimukticharyā bhūmi*, and the real Bodhisattva in possession of one of the ten stages, and to what extent does the former participate in the 'perfect virtues'? The disciple, however humble he may be, must apply himself to the double task of merit

* Cf. the *adhikāriṇas* in *Vedānta*.

† And also *niyatacharyābhūmi*. *Yuvarāja*, 'heir-apparent associated with the reigning sovereign in the government' (Monier Williams).

‡ See vol. i. p. 96b. *Lalita* has *sarvajñajñānābhiṣeka*.

§ This connexion is pointed out in the *Daśabhūmaka*, but almost entirely neglected in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.

* The description is borrowed from the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.

† See above, p. 743b, n. §.

and knowledge, in which are included all the virtues that make a Buddha. He participates directly and practically in the first seven 'stages,' being generous, moral, patient, energetic, meditative, studious of the doctrine, and skilled in the means to be employed in saving others. If the 'sovereignties' (*vaśitā*), the powers, and the knowledge of a Buddha are beyond his reach, he can always make a sort of imperfect imitation.

Śāntideva, a 7th century theologian, who is at the same time a writer of merit, has left a work entitled *Introduction to the Career of the Bodhi*, or *Introduction to the Practice of the Bodhisattvas*, in which, summing up some traditional doctrines and the speculations of his own time, he gives no place to ambitious theories, scholastic and mythological, regarding the 'stages.' Bodhisattvas in possession of stages, great Bodhisattvas (*bodhisattva mahāsattva* or *mahābodhisattva* or *daśabhūmīśvara bodhisattva*) intervene only as protecting and helpful saints. Grouped round the Buddha, they constitute the third 'jewel' (*ratna*), *i.e.* the Order (*saṅgha*) which, in the Little Vehicle, includes the whole of the monks. They are, therefore, closely associated with the Buddha and the Law, which are the first two 'jewels' in the formulas of homage and refuge. They fulfil an even more important part than the Buddha, being regarded as more merciful and more active. But, the more exalted they are, the less eager for the moment is the disciple to take his place beside them in the *bhūmis*. He is only a beginner (*ādikarmika*), subject to falls, uncertain of success, relying far more on the favour of the Buddhas and the Bodhisattvas than on his own powers and merits.

1. **Initiation or conception of the thought of Bodhi.**—Every disciple of the Mahāyāna aspires, by charity, to become a Buddha. He has to take the vow of Bodhi and assume the obligations and rule of life of the future Buddhas (*bodhisattvasaṁvara*). As if to mark more clearly the difference between the two Vehicles, he is not obliged, as are the followers of the Little Vehicle who are candidates for arhat-ship (*śrāvakayāna*), to enter monastic life. Legend informs us that the future Śākyamuni was often called 'householder' (*gṛhapati*), and Śākyamuni was in fact married. But there are Bodhisattvas who leave home (*pravrajita*) and add to the obligations of the Bodhisattvas the obligations of monks. These constitute a rule (*vinaya*), framed after the pattern of the Vinayas of the Little Vehicle, and will be discussed in art. MAHĀYĀNA (*bodhisattvaprātimokṣa*). Monks are more fit than the laity to practise certain virtues, less fit to practise certain others. Consequently the entrance into religion will depend upon the temperament and the merit acquired by the disciple. He must in some way have the 'vocation' in order to have the right to become a monk.

The disciple (1) reflects, either by himself or under the direction of a teacher, on the advantages of the vow of Bodhi, (2) performs pious works with a view to purifying his soul, and (3) undertakes the vow of Bodhi.

(1) 'The sin accumulated in my former existences, accumulated in all creatures, is infinite and omnipotent. By what power can it be conquered if not by the thought of Bodhi, by the desire to become Buddha for the salvation of men? This totally disinterested desire is infinitely sacred. It covers a multitude of sins. It assures happiness during the round of existences. It is a pledge of the supreme happiness of the Buddhas for one's self and one's neighbour. All honour to the Buddhas whom everybody quite naturally loves, and who have as their sole aim the salvation of men!'

(2) 'I worship the Buddhas and the Bodhisattvas in view of undertaking the vow of Bodhi (*vandanā*). Possessing nothing, by reason of my sins, how can I render unto them the worship (*pūjā*) which is their due? I beg them to accept this whole universe which I offer them in thought. But I am wrong, I do possess something, I give myself unreservedly, by pure affection, to the Buddhas and to their sons, the divine Bodhisattvas. I am their slave and, as such, have no more danger to fear. Of all dangers, the greatest is that which comes from my sins. I know how harmful these sins are, I deplore them, I acknowledge them (*pāpadeśanā*). I see and you see them as they are, pardon them!'

(3) 'But enough of myself. Let me belong entirely to the Buddhas and to creatures. I rejoice in the good actions which, among ordinary men, for a time prevent evil re-births. I rejoice in the deliverance gained by the arhats. I delight in the state of Buddha and Bodhisattva, possessed by the Protectors of the world (*puṇyanumodanā*). I entreat the Buddhas to preach the Law for the salvation of the world (*adhyeṣaṇā*). I entreat them to delay their entrance into nirvāṇa (*yāchanā*). All the merit acquired by my worship of the Buddhas, my taking of refuge, my confession of sins, etc., I apply to the good of creatures and to the attainment of the Bodhi. I wish to be bread for those who are hungry, drink for those who are thirsty (*pariṇāmanā*). I give myself, all that I am and shall be in my future existences, to creatures (*ātmabhāvapariṭyāga*). In the same dispositions as those in which the former Buddhas were when they undertook the vow of Bodhi, and just as they carried out the obligations of future Buddhas, practising in their order the perfect virtues, in these dispositions I conceive the thought of Bodhi for the salvation of the world, so also I shall practise in their order my obligations (*chittotpāda*, or vow, *praṇidhi*).'*

This, together with the necessary preliminaries, constitutes what is called the 'production of the thought' (*chittotpāda*, a shortened form of *bodhichittotpāda*). The *guru* solemnly declares, in presence of all the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, that N. . . . has produced the thought and taken the vow. Now the disciple is a beginner (*ādikarmika*), a neophyte, 'a seed of Buddha,' 'a young shoot of Buddha' (*buddhabīja*, *buddhāṅkura*). Of course the 'production of thought' in question belongs to the domain of the *adhimuktichāryā* (see above, p. 745[b]), and is only an imitation or a reduction of the all-pure 'production of thought' which constitutes the so-called 'Joyous stage.'

The series of pious deeds (*bhadrachāryā* = 'auspicious practice') just mentioned (from 'adoration,' *vandanā*, to 'prayer,' *yāchanā*) forms not only 'the introduction to the path of the Bodhisattvas,' the entrance into the Vehicle which leads to Buddhahood, but also a daily ritual (*vidhi*), the daily food of the spiritual life, and, to express it technically, the triple element (*triskandha*)† which must be set in motion three times a day and three times a night: (1) confession of sins, with its preliminaries of adoration and worship, (2) acquiescence or rejoicing in good, and (3) prayer with a view to securing the preaching of the Law and delaying the entrance of the saints into nirvāṇa. The application of merits (*pariṇāmanā*) and the vow (*praṇidhi*) complete the ritual of worship (*pūjāvidhi*) which is called 'supreme worship' (*anuttarapūjā*), and is termed quintuple, sextuple, or decuple, according to the elements into which it is broken up.

2. **Protection, growth, and purification of the thought of Bodhi.**—The disciple has undertaken the thought of Bodhi; he must not lose it, but he must purify and increase it by exercise. He must add the practice (*charyā*) to the vow (*praṇidhi*). There is therefore a double duty which may be traced to a single principle: (*a*) vigilance on the thought of Bodhi (*bodhichittāpramāda*), and (*b*)

* These formulas of Śāntideva (*Bodhicharyāvatāra*) are well known. They recur in a more or less changed or abridged form in the *Dharmasaṅgraha* (see p. 3, note), in the *Svayambhūpurāṇa*, p. 117 f. (with some alterations in a monotheistic direction; see ADIBUDDHA), in some Tantras, e.g. *Chaṇḍamahāroṣaṇa*, iv. 5, in Nepalese manuals and anthologies like the *Ādikarmapradīpa* and the *Kriyāsamuchchaya* (MS Dev. 110, fol. 35; Foucher, *Iconographie*, ii. 8; see Poussin, *Études et Matériaux*, 106 and 226; and, on the Chinese authorities, Chavannes, 'Les Inscriptions chinoises de Bodh-Gayā,' *RHR* xxxvi. 1).

In the *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*, p. 280 f., Śāntideva gives information about his authorities, the most important being the *Bhadracharyā*, 'propitious practice,' a work in Gāthā dialect, which exists in the original, in Tibetan, and in Chinese (Nanjio, 1142; translated A.D. 746–771), then the *Akṣayamatisūtra* (Nanjio, 74; trans. A.D. 265–316), the *Ratnamegha* (A.D. 503), etc. It would be useful to trace in the literature of the Little Vehicle, at least the commentaries of Buddhaghoṣa on the 'taking of refuge' (*Sumaṅgalavil.* p. 231 f.), the first allurements of the Bhadracharyā. Apart from the thought of becoming Buddha, we find there what forms the essence of our ritual, viz. the offering of oneself to the Buddhas (*attasanniyyātana*). As regards confession of sins, the part it plays in ancient Buddhism is well known. In art. KARMA will be found an account of the part it takes in the remission of sins, according to the doctrines of the Great Vehicle.

† There are several works entitled *Triskandhaka*, 'work on the three elements.' One of them is devoted to the present subject (see Nanjio, 1090, trans. A.D. 590, *Bodhicharyāv.* v. 98–99, *Śikṣās.* 290, 1; Takakusu, *I-Tsing*, p. 75, note). Another treats of morality, devotion, and wisdom (cf. *Itivuttaka*, § 59, *Kandj. Mdo*, xxiii. 17). It is difficult to identify *Mahāvyut.* 65, 59.

continued watchfulness over mind and body (*samprajanya*).

(*a*) The Bodhisattva has bound himself by a formal promise in presence of the Buddhas and of all creatures. If he breaks this promise, he will lose himself, or, if he is saved, it is solely through the goodness of the Buddhas. Tossed about by the power of sin and by the thought of Bodhi, dragged downwards by the one, exalted by the other, he will require a long period before attaining to a Bodhisattva stage. Now is the time when he must make an effort, must avail himself of his birth as man, privileged, as by a miracle, to hear the preaching of the Law (which takes place in this world only at long intervals), endued with faith (*śraddhā*) which makes him able to exercise himself in well-doing, and possessed of a 'day of health' to enable him to avoid incurable diseases, *i.e.* sin. For the hells retain their prey a long time. If any one falls into them, as one continues to sin there, it is a miracle if he ever escapes. It is necessary, therefore, to fear hell (*saṁvega*), to wage a desperate warfare with the passions, and to observe the rules (*śikṣā*) of morality.

(*b*) But how can he keep the rules, if he does not keep watch over his fictile thought? Thought, like an elephant in rut, must be bound to the post of the Law by the memory of the Law (*smṛti*) and constant and careful watching (*samprajanya*). And the benefit of this mastery, of this taming of thought 'which goes where it is wished, and stops when it is wished,' is two-fold: not only will faults against morality be avoided, but power will be obtained to practise the perfect virtues, which are only thought, beginning with charity: the desire to give outweighs everything, even when no gift is actually possible, etc.

The disciple, being master of his thought, will be able to practise the perfect virtues (*pāramitā*), that is to say, the first six. Śāntideva does not concern himself with the virtues of *praṇidhāna*, *bala*, and *jñāna*, which belong actively only to the Bodhisattvas of the superior stages; his examination is restricted to generosity, morality, patience, energy, meditation, and knowledge.

The means or resource (*upāyakauśalya*) is nothing else than generosity, which aids the disciple to understand vacuity (*prajñā*), and the understanding of vacuity which helps him in the practice of giving, and enables him to conquer his passions. When he knows that nothing exists, he knows that sins are not sins. When he has the good of others in view, all sins are permissible (see *Śikṣās.*, 164, 16).

3. Virtue of giving (*dāna*) or compassion (*karuṇā*, *kṛpā*), or, if the term be preferred, of charity, is, as we have seen, the cardinal principle in the career of the Bodhisattva. If any one aspires to Buddhahood, and not to arhat-ship, it is because he thinks: 'My neighbour suffers his pain just as I suffer mine; why should I be anxious about myself, and not about him?'* The result is that the *dāna* whose highest expression is found in the 'production of the thought of Bodhi,' although it is the humblest of virtues,† is nevertheless the most important.‡

'The merciful man may commit sin, when, by the eye of knowledge, he perceives some advantage therein for his neighbour.' Not only ought meditation and the pious deeds of a meditative kind to be abandoned in order to practise charity; even the vow of chastity binding on monks, it is said, was violated by a certain Bodhisattva in his compassion for a woman. Compassion is therefore the great resource (*upāya*) in the sense that, every consideration whatever being laid aside, it saves the Bodhisattva from all dangers, and atones for all the faults of which he may be guilty.§ It is also the supreme means (*upāya*) of conciliating creatures (*saṅgrahavastu*), expressing itself in liberality, almsgiving, affability, and obligingness, and sharing the joy and the sorrow of others.‖ It is because he possesses this benevolence (*maitrī*), because he makes use of it to convert the creatures, that the Bodhisattva deserves to be called by that name (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*, I. viii.). But whatever the virtue of generosity may be, it must not stand in the way of its aim, must not be unreasonable or excessive (*atityāga*). It is especially after he has conquered a stage that the Bodhisattva is able to be useful to creatures, and his charities must not form an obstacle to his spiritual career, unless it be to help some Bodhisattva more capable of benefiting beings than he is himself. Moreover, there is a gradation among gifts: to give one's flesh is good, but to give spiritual food, to preach the Law (*dharmadāna*), is certainly better. It is not necessary to follow Śākyamuni's example and allow one's self to be devoured by a tigress, when safety (*abhayadāna*) can be otherwise won for men, and they may be ripened for Bodhi.*

4. Morality or virtue (*śīla*).—The essence of *śīla* is self-preservation (*ātmabhāvarakṣā*) for the sole purpose of benefiting creatures. Neither a *preta* nor one condemned to re-birth in hell can be of service to others. It is necessary, therefore, to make sure of good re-births, in order to undertake the career of a Bodhisattva. For this purpose, morality must be practised. It is no less necessary to avoid scandal. Every future Buddha, however great his sins, must be revered by men: if they despise him, as a fire covered with ashes, they run the risk of hell. By inquiring after the preachers of the Law, by never forsaking 'spiritual friends,' by keeping constant watch over the state of soul and body, he succeeds in avoiding all harmful actions (*anarthavivarjana*) and fruitless motion (*niṣphalaspandana*), and in preserving good deeds (*puṇyarakṣā*).

The Great Vehicle, however, distinguishes the virtue of abstention (*nivṛttiśīla*), which was the whole *śīla* of ancient Buddhism, from positive virtue (*pravṛtti°*); and it does not set apart the *pāramitās*, which have no practical existence the one without the other. The following account, which is offered as a specimen (according to *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, I. ix.), ignoring a host of scholastic details, will give an idea of moral theology, as the Yogāchāras understood it. It will be noticed that all the 'perfect virtues' are examined according to the same subdivision.

i. What is morality or virtue (*śīlasvabhāva*)? Not to violate the rule. It has four elements: (1) shame (*apatrāpya*) with regard to others, (2) purity of intention and modesty (*hrī*) with regard to one's self, (3) reformation after transgression, and (4) regard for the Law (*ādara*), which keeps the Law ever present in the mind (*smṛti*).

ii. Morality in general (*sarvaśīla*) has two aspects: as regards householders (*gṛhipakṣagata*) and monks (*pravrajitapakṣagata*). It has three elements: (1) observance of the rules of life (*prātimokṣasaṁvara*), which apply to seven categories of persons, monks, nuns, catechumens (*śikṣamāṇa*), novices (*śrāmaṇera*), and the laity of both sexes; showing disregard for the pains and pleasures of the world, like a king undismayed by the loss of his kingdom (as a monk, the Bodhisattva does not take delight even in honours duly conferred on him; he loves solitude even in the midst of the clergy, is severe towards his own faults, lenient towards others, etc.); (2) accumulation of salutary principles (*kuśaladharmasaṅgraha*) with a view to enlightenment, devotion to study, reflexion and meditation, respect for the teacher, ministry to the sick, confession in presence of the Buddhas, the Bodhisattvas and the brethren (*sahadhārmika*), patience, etc.; (3) morality applied to the conquest and consequently to the conversion of one's neighbour; association with neighbours in their good and useful undertakings, and in their troubles and sicknesses, giving them right teaching, advice, and exhortation concerning worldly and supernatural things, gratitude and requital for help received, deliverance from fear, soothing the pain that results from want of enjoyments, bestowing the necessaries of life on the destitute, gathering dis-

* See *Bodhicharyāv.* vii. 90 *f.*

† Because, in principle at least, it is tainted with error and passion. It presupposes the belief in the existence of the person who has pity, of the person to whom something is given, and, lastly, of alms (see above, p. 740b). It also includes emotion and desire. From another point of view, generosity does not save a man from hell, as morality does, but it 'qualifies' re-birth. A 'moral' miser will be re-born as a man, but as a man miserable indeed; a generous sinner will be re-born as an animal, but as a noble animal, as an infernal being, but in a special and tolerable hell, etc.

‡ Pity is the only virtue to which he must apply himself. The others will follow of themselves. See *Āryadharmasaṅgīti*, quoted *ad Bodhicharyāv.* ix. 76.

§ See the important texts cited in *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*, 164, 8 *f.*

‖ See Kern, *Manual*, p. 67, and above, p. 741a and n. †.

* For some interesting details see *Bodhicharyāv.* v. 83–87. On the giving of flesh, cf. *Mahāvagga*, vi. 23, and Takakusu, *I-Tsing*, p. 198. The gift of the Bodhisattva is thus defined in *Abhidharmakośa: samyak sambodhyarthaṁ sarvasattvārthaṁ cha*, in opposition to the gift of gratitude, of hope, to the gift made with a view to heaven, to reputation, to the 'ornament of thought,' etc. On the legends of the charity of the Bodhisattva see *Jātakamālā*, ix. and *passim*.

ciples by generosity, etc., behaving according to the rules laid down (on drinking, etc.) when there is no trouble, compliance with the thoughts of men who need conversion (*chittānuvartanā*), having recourse when necessary to punishments, by mystical wonders giving them visions of hell, causing Vajrapāṇi or some other mighty Yakṣa to appear when some listener ventures to doubt his word, or showing portents, multiplying his personality, passing through walls, rocks, etc.

Casuistry offers some curious details, logically deduced from the definition of the Bodhisattva. There are certain acts, wicked in themselves (*prakṛtisāvadya*), which, committed with good intention by a Bodhisattva 'skilled in the means,' not only are not culpable, but are even highly meritorious. When he sees a robber given to murder, and not shrinking even from the murder of Śrāvakas or Bodhisattvas, the saint will kill him, thinking at the same time: 'It matters little if I am condemned to hell, but may this sinner avoid hell.' [In the same way, wicked kings may be dethroned; those who take the property of the Buddhist church or violate *stūpas* may be deprived of the fruit of their robberies, lest in their pride of possession they increase their sin still more. Directors also (*vaiyāpṛtyakara, ārāmika*) who waste the property of the Order must be set aside.] For the same reason unchastity is permissible when due to compassion, in order to prevent a woman conceiving hatred—but not in the case of a married woman; nor does this rule apply to monks. Similar exceptions are allowed on all the other commandments of morality.*

iii. Difficult virtue (*duṣkara*) is practised (1) when a man leaves high estate, sovereignty, or pleasures, to take the vows of a Bodhisattva; (2) when he is in poverty and distress, and yet takes them; and (3) when he practises such a high degree of watchfulness and care that he hardly ever commits even a small sin.

iv. All-round virtue (*sarvatomukha*). From this point of view morality is quadruple: (1) acquired (*samātta*), in so far as the vows taken are of three kinds (ii. 1–3); (2) natural (*prakṛti°*), in virtue of which the Bodhisattva, by the very excellence of his character, acts purely in thought, word, and deed; (3) practised; the virtue practised in former births endows him with the power to resist evil and to love good; (4) associated with the expedients, *i.e.* with the four 'elements of popularity.'

v. Virtue of a good man (*satpuruṣa°*): (1) he is virtuous, (2) he inspires others with virtue, (3) he praises virtue, (4) he shows sympathy for those like-minded, (5) when he falls into sin he makes due restitution.

vi. Omni-form virtue (*sarvākāra*) is of thirteen classes, divided into two groups of six and seven respectively: (1) turned towards enlightenment, (2) clear through assuming all the precepts, (3) placed in sinless joy because free from the two extremes of luxury and asceticism, (4) perpetual, (5) firm, (6) possessed of virtue's ornament and itself the ornament of virtue; and (1) negative virtue (*nivṛtti°*) in abstaining from murder, etc., (2) positive (*pravṛtti*), by the accumulation of merits with a compassionate aim, (3) watchfulness in guarding both the negative and the positive, (4) 'ripening' the marks of a Great Man (*i.e.* of a Buddha), (5) reflexion (*adhicchitta*), (6) fortunate re-births, (7) the welfare of others.

vii. Abstaining from all action hurtful to others, having regard to the principle, 'Do not to others what you would not have others do to you' (*vighātārthikaśīla*).

viii. Virtue as pleasant in this world as in the next. It includes four kinds of pure actions: (1) forbidding to men what ought to be forbidden them, (2) allowing what ought to be allowed, (3) gaining the sympathy of others, and (4) reproving them—the virtue of morality associated with generosity, patience, energy, contemplation, and knowledge.

ix. Purified virtue is ten-fold; it is especially 'well-taken,' for the monastic vow is taken in order to obtain the Bodhi and not to secure sustenance; it is attentive, surrounded by good aspirations (for there is no question of meriting heaven), orthodox (conforming to Buddhist rules), free from exaggeration, looseness, or asceticism, and leads to nirvāṇa. It confers various blessings: grace and acceptance by the Buddhas (*Buddhaiḥ samanvāhriyate*), death in serene joy, re-birth among Bodhisattvas equal or superior in merit, still more perfect morality in the future, etc.

5. Patience (*kṣānti*).—Patience is three-fold: endurance of suffering (*duḥkhādhivāsanākṣānti*), of injuries (*parāpakāramarṣaṇa°*), of insight into the law (*dharmanidhyāna°*; cf. *Majjh.* ii. 175). This last heading (=*dharmeṣu samyakṣantīraṇa°, Bodhisattvabhūmi*, I. vi.) is divided in the books of the Great Vehicle into three stages: *ghoṣānugā, anulomikī, anutpattikadharmākṣānti*.

The Pāli *Abhidharma* (*Vibhaṅga*, 325 and 328) shows (1) that *kṣānti*† is equivalent to *diṭṭhi* (*θεωρία*), *ruchi* ('pleasant adhesion'), *mati* ('understanding'); (2) that *dharmanidhyānakṣānti* is the same as [*satya*] *anulomikakṣānti*, that is, regarding all things as fragile, grievous, and insubstantial, in conformity with the four noble truths; and (3) that this *kṣānti* is produced either by teaching (which corresponds to the *ghoṣānugā kṣānti*), or by reflexion (which is, properly speaking, the *ānulomikī kṣānti* of the Skr. texts). There remains the *anutpattikadharmakṣānti*,* of which no trace is to be found in the Pāli *Abhidharma*, and which consists in supporting the view that 'things are not produced,' that they not only have no substantial reality, but that even their production by causes is only an illusion.†

The name of patience applied to 'insight into the law' is justified from a double point of view: (1) resistance and resignation of mind are necessary to the acceptance of the doctrine of the non-existence of things: those who do not 'uphold the profound teaching' (*gambhīradharmakṣānti*) are numerous; (2) this estimate of the reality of things is an essential element of patience in the ordinary sense.

Śāntideva, however, pays little heed to scholastic distinctions. He summarizes, in an eloquent but hardly systematic account, the reasons that justify patience from the philosophical point of view, and make it an essential element of the spiritual life.

Impatience or anger is the greatest of sins, especially for a Bodhisattva, who, by definition, is a 'being of goodness.' It destroys all merits. Even during the earthly life it causes great unhappiness. Anger must be destroyed, and the discontent, born of desire or of dislike, that nourishes it. What is the use of discontent?

Suffering is the common lot of men; there is plenty of occasion to get accustomed to it, and it loses, by custom, all its bitterness; it is very useful, as it arouses pious fear of sin, pity for sufferers, love for Buddhas who deliver from it, disgust for existence, both perishable and penible

Anger, again, is not aroused by physical suffering, because we know that it is caused by the trouble of the bodily humours (cf. the medical theory of the Greeks). It is also foolish to be angry with men who injure us, for (1) they are acting merely under the influence of causes, and (2) in the first rank of these causes are the wicked deeds of our previous existences. 'My enemy takes a stick to beat me and I have assumed this body, liable to be wounded, and destined to be beaten. Far from being angry with my enemy, I ought to consider him almost as beneficial as the Buddhas, for he affords me the opportunity of practising patience, and forgiveness of wrongs, which blots out my sins. Am I to make this principle of salvation the cause of my condemnation? Let us rather pity our enemies who ruin themselves by their anger, and let us think of means of saving them in spite of themselves, as the Buddhas do. As for anger provoked by slander, loss of property, etc., it is particularly absurd; so also is anger against the enemies of our religion, iconoclasts,' etc.‡

Envy requires special attention, for the envious man makes use of clever artifices to throw a veil of honesty over his selfish feelings. We must also get rid of the gross illusion that inspires the words, 'My enemy is an obstacle to my good works.' Is there a more meritorious work than patience? What does it matter if my enemy tries to injure me? He is none the less my benefactor. How can we have our sins pardoned by the Buddhas, how can we please the Buddhas, except by loving the creatures, and by doing good to our most cruel enemies? So long as creatures are suffering there is no joy for the compassionate Buddhas. They identify themselves with creatures. It is the Buddhas themselves who appear to us in human form.

6. Energy (*vīrya*).—The virtue of energy or 'effort for good' (*kuśalotsāha*) is necessary for the acquirement of merit and knowledge. Its enemies are (1) weakness (or incapacity of body or thought), (2) attachment to the pleasures of this world, and (3) discouragement (or want of resolution) and its result, self-contempt.

To conquer these enemies it is necessary (1) to meditate on the dangers to which we are exposed. 'I am in the

* See art. MAHĀYĀNA on the *Prātimokṣa* of the Bodhisattvas, which is entirely devoted to these regulations.

† It would be going beyond the limits of this article to detail the various *kṣāntis* in the path of the *srotaāpannas*, and of the *kṣāntis* regarded as high states of abstraction belonging to 'worldly' (*laukika*) meditation.

* See p. 744ᵃ, n. 1, and p. 747ᵇ.

† See artt. MĀDHYAMIKAS and MAHĀYĀNA.

‡ Cf. de Groot, *Code du Mahāyāna*, p. 109, which commands men to defend with arms the Buddhas, the Church, and the State; and preceding column.

power of the passions, like a fish in the hands of the fisherman, for I am in the net of re-births, threatened by death and by the guardians of the hells. Thou hast boarded this vessel, which is the human state; cross the river of suffering; thou fool, this is no time to sleep; when and at what cost wilt thou find this vessel again?' (2) To despise pleasures, which come to fruition in suffering, and to taste the excellent joy of good works. (3) To remember what Śākyamuni said: 'These supreme Buddhas, Śākyamuni, Dīpaṅkara, etc., were insects, flies, and little worms; it was by exerting themselves that they acquired the illumination of a Buddha, so difficult to obtain.' 'Now I have already gained the human estate; the most difficult part is accomplished! The task of the Bodhisattvas is distressful, but the hells are far more distressful. After all, however, is it really distressful? The Buddha is a clever physician; by degrees he accustoms us to making the greatest sacrifices with ease, and besides "the future Buddha is free from all bodily pain, for he has cast sin aside, and he is free from sorrow, for he realizes the truth of the nothingness of the ego." * By his good works the Bodhisattva tastes ever-increasing joys, superior to those of the Buddha entering nirvāṇa. He arrives at nirvāṇa more quickly than the future arhats (*śrāvakas*).' †

To increase his 'energy' (*vīryavardhana*) the Bodhisattva manœuvres his 'armies,' which are:

(1) Desire (*chhanda* or *śubhachchhanda*), the root of all merit: 'What a sublime task I have undertaken in the destruction of all my vices, all the vices of the world, and the endowment of myself and my neighbour with every good quality! . . . Those whose works are all good are re-born in the Paradise of Amitābha.' (2) Pride (*māna*), (*a*) the pride of work, 'it is upon me that all difficult and mean works devolve; let every creature cast his burden of work upon me'; (*b*) pride against the passions: 'Son of the Lion of Conquerors, shall I be the slave of the passions (*upakleśa*)? The most humiliating and most exacting of the passions is pride'; (*c*) pride of power or endurance (*śakti*): the Bodhisattva is inaccessible to the passions (*saṅkleśa*). ‡ (3) Joy (*rati*), by virtue of which, when he has finished one task, he plunges into another, like the elephant, under the midday sun, into the lake. 'He whose happiness is in action itself' seeks in action nothing but action. (4) Abandonment (*muktī*): he must measure his powers before undertaking a task, and stop when his powers fail. (5) Exclusive application (*tātparya*), especially in all that concerns the means of avoiding the blows of those clever adversaries, the passions. It is a duel, in which the Bodhisattva is armed with the memory of the law of Buddha. If he happens to get wounded (for what fight is without wounds?) he grieves, and reflects: 'What shall I do to prevent this occurring again?' (6) Self-mastery (*ātmavidheyatā*): 'Never does he forget the Buddha's sermon on attention (*apramāda*). He keeps his mind and his body alert and easily managed, so that he may be ready at any time and for any thing even before it is necessary to begin. As the seed of the cotton-plant obeys the wind, coming and going under its impulse, so, in body and thought, the Bodhisattva directs himself according to his will. It is thus that magical powers are obtained, and all happiness.'

7. Contemplation (*samādhi*) or meditation (*dhyāna*).—Contemplation or concentration of thought, which, as we shall see, is indispensable to merit and knowledge, presupposes the simultaneous action of two factors: isolation of the body (*kāyaviveka*), *i.e.* life in retirement; § and isolation of thought (*chittaviveka*), *i.e.* indifference to all worldly desires.

These are theories very favourable to literary development, and have always prevailed widely among Buddhists. Śāntideva deserves great praise for treating them with much eloquence, and especially for being satisfied with sixteen verses to describe the dangers and penalties of a worldly life 'in the midst of fools,' ten verses to exalt the life in the forest 'with the trees which are good naturally, and whose sympathies are easily gained'; but he requires thirty-eight to deter us from love, the source of so much shame and sin, which can be explained only by an aberration of mind, a sickly passion for impurity.

All the meditations here recommended to the Bodhisattva are merely the putting into action of the meditations on impurity (*aśubhabhāvanā*, *kāyasmṛtyupasthāna*), on cemeteries, etc., which belong to the Little Vehicle. But the Great Vehicle adds a note which is peculiar to it: 'What painful efforts have been needed from the beginning of time for this body, ordained to an inevitable re-death, so mean in comparison with the spiritual body of the Bodhisattvas, and doomed to tortures in hell! Not the millionth part of these efforts and sufferings are necessary to attain Buddhahood. The sufferings of those who are subject to desire are immeasurable and barren.'

The mind is therefore absorbed in contemplation, being detached (*vivikta*). It is able to penetrate the ideas to which it is about to be applied, and to be deeply penetrated by them. This is, properly speaking, *dhyāna* ('meditation,' 'ecstasy'). The Buddhists have constructed a very large number of systems of meditation, which all aim at leading to the possession of knowledge or wisdom (*prajñā*). None of them is foreign to the rule of the Bodhisattvas. By 'perfection of contemplation' may be meant (1) practice of the *dhyānas* and the *samāpattis* of ancient Buddhism; (2) study of the four truths, and of the two truths (relative and absolute); this is the theory of Chandrakīrti in the *Madhyamakāvatāra*; (3) meditation on impurity in order to destroy the vice of passion, on kindness to destroy hatred, on dependent origination to destroy error, or, further, on four 'subjects of mindful reflexion' (*smṛtyupasthāna*), or, in general, on all the doctrines of the *prajñā*, that is to say, which relate to the true nature of things. *

In the *Bodhicharyāvatāra* Śāntideva adopts the very original plan of subordinating the virtue of meditation to the active virtues of charity, humility, and patience. On this subject, usually so dry and wearisome to Europeans, he displays all the heat and emotion appropriate to a homily. There was, however, no better way of introduction into the Vehicle of the Bodhisattvas. Although meditation on the nothingness of the ego, etc., seems to result, and in the Little Vehicle really does result, in apathy and nirvāṇa, by destroying the activity of the mind bent on the objects of knowledge (*jñeyāvaraṇa*), Śāntideva maintains that it begins by putting itself at the disposal of the active virtues which destroy passion (*kleśāvaraṇa*). The nothingness of the ego does not warrant us in remaining inactive; we find in it a reason for sacrificing ourselves for our neighbour. And soon, by a just compensation, this practice of abnegation, destructive of attachment and hatred (*rāga*, *dveṣa*), results, much more surely than selfish meditation pursued for its own sake, in purging the mind of error (*moha*); that is to say, since every idea, as such, is erroneous, abnegation 'purifies' the mind by emptying it (*moha=jñeyāvaraṇa*, *śuddha=śūnya*).

Śāntideva's plan is so 'orthodox,' and at the same time, so far as can be judged, so original, that it will be well to give a detailed analysis of this part of his book, in which there is much to be commended.

The disciple must practise (1) the *parātmasamatā*, the equality of self and neighbour; (2) the *parātmaparivartana*, the substitution of neighbour for self. Each includes a clear insight into the real nature of things, and, if the energy (*vīrya*) is strong enough to ensure their perfect practice, they include, in addition, all the merits of a Bodhisattva.

(1) *Parātmasamatā*, making no difference between self and neighbour, is the essence of the obligations of a future Buddha (*bodhisattvasaṁvara*). (*a*) As the body is composed of different parts united together so that the hand takes care to protect the foot, in the same way, in this manifold world of living beings, joy and sorrow are common to all. What joy means for me, it means the same for others. It is the same with suffering. I must do for others what I do for myself. I must destroy my neighbour's sorrow, just because it is sorrow like my own. I must serve my neighbour, because he is a living being as I am. (*b*) If any one should object, 'My neighbour's sorrow is his sorrow, not mine,' the reply is, 'What you call *your* sorrow is such only by an illusion; there is no permanent ego in you, but a series of intellectual phenomena (which series does not exist in itself, any more than a row of ants), or an aggregate of phenomena with no individual unit. There is

* Properly speaking, the saint is free from suffering only when he has attained the 'suppression of all attachment' (*vītarāgatva*). The consequences of sin make themselves felt in two ways: (1) grief (*vipākaphala*), which produces increase of compassion for others; (2) tendency to sin (*niṣyandaphala*), which is destroyed by patience (see *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 29, 10 and 50, 1).

† See Mahāyāna.

‡ Pride, *māna*, *mananā*, *manyanā*, *abhimāna* (to believe wrongly that one is destined to Buddhahood, to rely on ascetic practices and despise others) is a capital sin, worse than murder, etc. Māra endeavours by all means to produce such delusion in the 'beginning' Bodhisattva (*achirayānasamprasthita*).

§ It must be borne in mind that the 'isolation of the body' is not the true 'isolation'; that solitary life involves many spiritual dangers, namely, pride, absence of 'spiritual friends' (*kalyāṇamitra*); that living in the village is more fit for the charitable Bodhisattva than the forest, the natural abode of the *Pratyekabuddha* (*Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, p. 891, 11).

* See Śāntideva, *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*, xii-xiv.

therefore no existing being to whom we can attribute sorrow, of whom we can say "*his* sorrow," or who can say "*my* sorrow."' Why then contend with suffering, if there is no sufferer? Because all the schools agree on this point. If it is necessary to contend with it, contend with it, whatever its nature; if it is not necessary, do not make distinction, and occupy yourself exclusively with your own. (*c*) But why undertake the painful duty of a future Buddha? This duty is not painful, but if it were, yet, should the suffering of one individual put an end to the suffering of several, it is a duty to undertake. It is for this reason that the future Buddhas, whose spirits are fortified in the 'equivalence of the self and the neighbour,' and for whom personal joy is nothing but sadness when their neighbours are suffering, plunge into the Avīchi hell to take the place of the condemned there. The deliverance of creatures causes the river of their thoughts to overflow into an ocean of joy. Their cup of happiness is full. Nirvāṇa, in comparison with this, is insipid. If, therefore, you do good to your neighbour, do not boast about it, or admire yourself, or expect a reward; you are only doing what is quite natural.

(2) *Parātmaparivartana.*—It is owing to the influence of false judgments, repeated during the course of existences, that we attach the illusory notion of self to this product of heterogeneous elements called the body. Why not rather consider our neighbour as our 'self,' and, as far as the body is concerned, regard it as foreign to ourselves? It is really very simple. The disciple treats his neighbour as people of the world treat their 'self'; he treats his 'self' as they are accustomed to treat their neighbours. Śāntideva develops this argument with real eloquence and sincere humility. He says: 'I shall regard myself as a stranger, and I shall find my real self first among the most humble. Then I shall practise pride, for the sake of others, and I shall envy without shortcoming or hesitation. How honoured, I shall say, is this self, and I am not; he is rich, praised, happy; I am poor, despised, unhappy; it is evidently because he is great in this world, and I am small, destitute of good qualities. But have I really no good qualities? If I have not, should not he toil to cure me of my vices? If he is unable to cure me, why does he despise me? Because of his excellent virtues? What matters it to me if he is holy only for his own sake? Has he compassion only for the unfortunates who are about to be overcome by evil destinies? And yet, in the pride of his virtues, he claims to excel among the saints.' In this way the Bodhisattva energetically voices the complaints of the sinful and wretched poor whom a monk is only too apt to despise; and, while excusing his neighbour, he eagerly seeks every occasion to humble himself. Thus our only enemy is our selfish 'ego'; 'Renounce, O my thought, the foolish hope that I have still a special interest in you. I have given you to my neighbour, thinking nothing of your sufferings. For if I were so foolish as not to give you over to the creatures, there is no doubt that you would deliver me to the demons, the guardians of hell. How often, indeed, have you not handed me over to those wretches, and for what long tortures! I remember your long enmity, and I crush you, O self, the slave of your own interests. If I really love myself, I must not love myself. If I wish to preserve myself, I must not preserve myself.'*

8. Knowledge, or *wisdom,* as it is usually called by Europeans (*prajñāpāramitā*),† is the supreme virtue. It is the application of the mind to the knowledge of the truth, to the knowledge of what is (*tattva*). By a direct effort it destroys false views concerning self and nature, and its complete possession is identical with nirvāna. Only Buddhas possess it at the state of fruit (*phalabhūtā*); Bodhisattvas cultivate its germ (*hetubhūtā prajñā, bījabhūtā*). As the *prajñā* of the Mahāyāna is strongly contrasted with the *prajñā* of the Little Vehicle, and as, on the other hand, it is differently understood by the two great Mahāyānist schools, it will be more conveniently examined in detail in artt. DEPENDENT ORIGINATION, MAHĀYĀNA, MĀDHYAMIKAS, VIJÑĀNAVĀDINS. For Bodhisattva in Pāli literature, see JĀTAKA.

* The *parātmasamatā* and the *parātmaparivartana*, which are practically no more than a translation of the doctrines of the *prajñā*, purity, according to the author referred to, the virtue of energy. They also purity generosity, morality, and patience.

† The definitions of the word *prajñāpāramitā* appear contradictory. The *prajñā*, being in a general way the exact knowledge of all things (*sarvadharmeṣu yathāvadvyavasthānajñāna*), is called *prajñāpāramitā* in so far as it bears on the real nature (*paramārthagrahaṇapravṛtta*), and *jñānapāramitā* in so far as it comprehends the world of appearances in its relative truth (*saṃvṛtigrahaṇa*). (See *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, III. iv.). [The Bodhisattvas acquire first *lokottara jñāna*, i.e. *prajñā* (which assures them of final nirvāṇa), then *laukika jñāna*, i.e. *jñāna* (which endows them with all the privileges of a Buddha in order to help fellow-beings); see *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, xiv. 42.] But our authors do not feel satisfied with this definition, and we find, *inter alia*, the following commentary: *prajñā* is (1) Buddhist philosophy (*adhyātmavidyā*), (2) dialectics (*hetuvidyā*), (3) medical art, (4) grammar, (5) technical arts (*śilpakarma*). (See *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, I. xiv.)

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given fully throughout the article. L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

BODOS.—1. Name and language.—The generic term 'Bodo' is now, for convenience, applied to all peoples speaking the Tibeto-Burman group of languages. Ethnologically, the true Bodo race exists, in a more or less pure state, all over Assam proper (the Brahmaputra Valley), in Koch Bihār and Northern Bengal, and in the valley of the Surmā river, now part of Eastern Bengal. It is probable that the low semi-Hinduized caste of Chaṇḍāls or Nāmasūdras (now recognized as Hindus) are in fact of Bodo origin; but this cannot be settled till further ethnographical inquiries have been made. In the plains the Bodos have become largely Hinduized, and have intermarried freely with Āhoms (*q.v.*) and other races. But even in the plains, and mingled with Hinduized neighbours, there are large communities of Bodo people, still speaking their Tibeto-Burman language and preserving the simple animistic superstitions of their race. Those of them who live among the Bengalis of North Bengal are by them styled 'Mech' or 'Mleccha,' that is, 'Welsh' or 'barbarian.' But the name has long lost its contemptuous signification, and is placidly accepted by the people themselves as their tribal title. Their Mongolian type of feature and dark-blue clothes, not less than their language and religion, mark them off from their white-clad Hindu neighbours. Adjoining them are the Koch, now mostly Hinduized, and justly proud that, in the person of H.H. the Mahārājā of Koch Bihār, they are ruled over by a dynasty which once conquered nearly the whole of the ancient kingdom of Prāgjyotispur (see ASSAM). Beyond the Koch tribe, eastwards, come the true Bodos or 'plains Kachārīs' (as the English call them), who dwell in the *terai*, or submontane tract, under the hills of Bhutān, known as the Kachārī Dwārs or passes. It was from these people that B. H. Hodgson took the title of Bodo, for they call themselves Boṛo-nī-fisā, 'sons of Boṛo,'* or 'sons of the Man.' (It should be noticed that most of the aboriginal tribes of the N.E. frontier of India have no specific name for themselves. They are 'men.' Other races are Bengali-men, English-men, China-men, etc.) There are about 300,000 of these people still unabsorbed by Hinduism. Mixed with the true Bodos on the borders of Assam and Bengal are some 30,000 Rābhās, speaking a similar language, but holding themselves superior, apparently owing to a somewhat larger infusion of Western blood. These are a finer and stronger race, and at one time supplied recruits to the regiments formerly raised in Assam. In the central mountainous mass of Assam, between the Nāgās on the East and the Khāsis on the West, are about 16,000 people speaking a form of the Bodo language. This branch call themselves Dī-mā-sā.† They are now totally separated from the lowland Bodos; and Endle, the recognized authority, says that their speech now differs from that of the Boṛo-nī-fisā as widely as Italian differs from Spanish. This branch of the family once founded a powerful kingdom, first at Dimāpur in the Brahmaputra Valley, and, when driven thence

* The o in Boṛo is short, something like that in English 'hot,' or rather like that in 'dog.' The central ṛ is sometimes pronounced ḍ.

† The ancient appellation of the hills inhabited by the Dīmāsā in Sanskrit authors is *Hiḍimbā*; and it is probable that *Dimā* is the name of the former capital Dīmā-pur and in Dīmāsā is derived from (Hi)ḍimbā. 'Kachār' is properly the name of this hilly region. The portion of the valley of the Surmā now called Kachār did not form part of the dominions of the Kachārī Rājā till the 17th cent., when it was acquired by him as the dowry of a Tippera princess whom he married.—C. J. Lyall.

by the invading Āhoms (see ASSAM), at Maibang in the centre of the Hills, and afterwards at Khāspur in what is now the British District of Kachār.*

In the district of Nowgong and the adjoining hills are some 3000 Hojais whose name is probably derived from the Bodo word Hā-jō (*i.e.* 'earth-high,' 'mountain'), and means 'hill-folk.' They are very similar to their neighbours the Lālangs, about 40,000 in number, on the southern slope of the Gāro hills; and in the adjacent parts of the plains district of Mymensingh are about 8000 Haijongs—another name evidently derived from the word Hā-jō. Finally, there are two great isolated highland groups of Bodo people in the hills respectively called after them—those known to us as the Gāros and Tipperas. The former now constitute the British District known as the Gāro Hills, while the Tipperas are inhabitants of a semi-independent mediatized State ruled over by a Hinduized dynasty which intermarries with the royal family of the similar State of Manipur, which lies between Eastern Bengal and Upper Burma. The Gāros are 150,000 and the Tipperas about 105,000 in number. In Upper Assam are a few communities, small in numbers, such as the Chutiyas, Morāns, etc., whose speech, so far as they have not adopted Hinduism and Assamese, is of the Bodo type, that is, an agglutinative language which has learned inflexion from contact with the Indo-European Assamese. The verb is still modified by agglutinated infixes, but in other respects the language resembles Western languages in having acquired even such linguistic luxuries as adverbs, relative clauses, and a (rarely used) passive voice.

2. Origins.—Of all these peoples and their origins there is no written record. They totally lack the historical instinct so characteristic of their Āhom conquerors. Their physical aspect renders it likely that they came from beyond the mountains to the N.E. of the Assam Valley. The Morāns, the most easterly branch of the race, and perhaps the latest settlers in Assam, have indeed a tradition that they came from Maingkaing in the Hukong Valley on the upper reaches of the Chindwin river.

The story goes that there once dwelt there three brothers named Moylāng, Morān, and Moyrān. Moylāng, the oldest, remained in Upper Burma; Moyrān, the youngest, migrated into Nepāl, and was there lost; whilst Morān, the second brother, is said to have crossed the Pātkai pass, the route of many subsequent invasions, and to have settled on the Tiphuk or Diphuk river, where he became the ancestor of the tribe which bears his name.

Linguistic and ethnographical inquiries may some day trace some connexion between the Bodo-speaking peoples and one or other of the races in Upper Burma, but the link is still missing. It is certain, however, that some 2000 years ago or more, Bodo peoples must have covered the whole of the Assam Valley, the greater part of Northern Bengal, and the Surmā Valley. The most significant sign of their presence in this area is the Bodo element in the names of the rivers, such as Dikho, Diphlu, Dipru, Dibong, etc., also traceable in such names as the Tista, or Dista, near Darjiling, the Tiphuk in Upper Assam, and the Tipai, or Dipai, in Kachār. (The word *di* or *dŭi* in Bodo means 'water' or 'river.') Those of them who settled in the rich, soft, malarious plains underwent the degeneration which seems to have been the fate of all settlers in Eastern India, and were conquered by successive invasions from East and West. Those who took refuge in the mountains, such as the Dimāsā, Gāros, and Tipperas, became a scattered and half-savage race. The Gāros alone, so far as we know at present, adopted or carried with them the practices, common among the Nāgās, of internecine warfare and head-hunting. Under British rule, however (within the last forty years, that is), they have settled down to agriculture and commerce; and, owing to the efforts of American Baptist missionaries, a great part of the Gāro tribe is already converted to Christianity.

* The name Kachāri now generally given to the Bodos and Dimāsā by Hindus is derived from this kingdom of Kachār (see previous footnote).

3. Religion.—There is but little that can be said of the religious ideas of the Bodos as a whole, except that they are of the animistic type. All the branches of the Bodo family follow a religion of fear, and are haunted by many gods or spirits, who have to be propitiated by offerings of food, etc. Within historical times the Chutiyas of Upper Assam were wont to offer human sacrifices at their famous copper-roofed temple at Sadiya; but this habit may have been due to imitation of the sacrificial habits of Śāktist Hindus. The majority of the Bodos of the plains are singularly mild and inoffensive people; and though they are much given to making offerings of fowls and goats to various deities, especially, it is significant to note, on the occasion of harvest and other festivals, these are apparently excuses for feasting and merrymaking, occasions on which there is much consumption of boiled pork and rice-beer. There are indications of a now decaying belief in totems, and among the Bodos of Northern Assam there are septs, for instance, calling themselves Mosā-ārŭi, 'sons of the tiger,' who go into mourning for a whole day, fasting the while, if a tiger happens to be killed in their vicinity. So also there are those who belong to the clan of the sacred cactus, the Siju (the *Euphorbia*), and are proud to call themselves Siju-ārŭi. And there are many others. There seems to be no belief in a supreme deity or creator. Among the Western Bodos, gods are freely borrowed from the Hindu pantheon, one of the most popular of these being Kuvēra, the god of wealth. The plains Bodos are a simple, agricultural, and far from avaricious race, and the extent to which Kuvēra figures in their folk-tales and legends is certainly curious.

The matriarchate is unknown, and the father is an extremely good-natured and easy-going head of a contented and simple family. The tribes are mostly endogamous, if the expression can be used of people who marry very much as European peasants do. There is no child-marriage, and pre-nuptial chastity is the rule rather than the exception. There are signs to show that marriage by capture was once the rule; but nowadays marriages are the result of an elopement, followed by the payment of a fine to the girl's relatives, or of a definite arrangement between the parents of the young people, which results in a present offered to the bride's parents, or else a term of service on the bridegroom's part in his father-in-law's house.

Running rivers and water-courses are held in high respect and honour; and the dead are either buried or cremated (if their relatives can afford the necessary fuel) near streams. A woman is laid on seven layers of fuel, and has seven such layers placed over her. A man has only five such layers. So, when a male child is born, the umbilical cord is severed with five cuts with five separate bamboo knives. A female child is separated from its mother by seven cuts. Not enough is known of the superstitions of the people to enable us to offer any explanation of these mystical numbers. Like other animistic peoples, the Bodos are great believers in amulets, divination, and omens; and though they have no professional priests, they employ wise women, who work themselves into a frenzy, and when in that state are able to tell what gods ought to be propitiated in order to ward off or heal pestilence or failure of crops.

There is a crude belief in a future life. When a body is buried, a reed or bamboo tube is led from

the corpse's mouth to the outer air, so as to enable the spirit to breathe if he will, and the dead man's favourite food is placed for a time near his grave. Grown-up people will not touch these offerings, but children take them without scruple. Spirits, as in the case of many tribes in Eastern India, cannot cross water without help; and if a funeral party has to cross a river, a string is suspended across it to enable the spirit to follow the body or return if it desires to do so.

In short, the Bodos of the plains are a very simple and guileless race. They live on a soil which yields them rich reward for comparatively easy toil, and, as their wants are few, they lead a joyous and childish existence. Like other human children, they are occasionally given to fits of sulks, are very clannish, very obstinate, and somewhat suspicious of more intellectual and ingenious races. But they readily make friends with kindly and sympathetic Europeans; and, with the sole exception of the Gāros (now also rapidly coming under gentler influences), they have long ago lost the martial tendencies the race must once have possessed. They have much of the genial joviality of the Burmese, and are extremely addicted to feasts, junketings, and all manner of merrymaking. Their language has now been investigated with much thoroughness, but a systematic inquiry into their ethnographical position and their beliefs and customs still remains to be made.

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J. D. ANDERSON.

BODY.

Introductory (H. WHEELER ROBINSON), p. 755.
Buddhist (J. H. BATESON), p. 758.
Christian (J. C. LAMBERT), p. 760.
Egyptian (G. FOUCART), p. 763.
Greek and Roman (W. CAPELLE), p. 768.
Hebrew (I. ABRAHAMS), p. 772.
Hindu (J. JOLLY), p. 773.

BODY.—1. **Primitive ideas.**—Primitive ideas about the human body have an importance far greater than that which belongs to most other groups of anthropological data. They do not simply illustrate the attitude of the primitive thinker to the natural world and its invisible powers; they show us what he thought of himself. For the sharp distinction which modern thought, at least in its unreflective forms, is accustomed to draw between body and mind was quite foreign to his way of thinking. He did not think of body as the 'organ' of mind; his body was himself, possessing attributes of various kinds, which we have learnt to analyze into physical and mental groups, but which he learnt to class and explain from a different standpoint. All the mental states and physical activities of which he was conscious were part of himself, that is, the products of his body; even the soul, when it emerges as a distinct idea, is frequently identified with the breath or blood. This 'physiological psychology' is, of course, a special case of the general inability of the primitive thinker to reach abstractions, and of a general tendency to find concrete support for his thinking. But the tendency was developed and accentuated by that ignorance of anatomy and physiology which prevailed until the last few centuries. Not only primitive but ancient thought in general had no adequate knowledge of the nervous system and the psychical function of the brain; whilst ignorance of the function of the heart in the circulation of the blood (till 1628) made natural the ascription to it of such psychical attributes as its central and obviously important place might suggest. In fact, there can be few organs of the body which have not received at some time, and among some social group or other, credit for psychical activities.

The proof of these statements is cumulative, and can be gained only from the study of such collections of anthropological material as Tylor's *Primitive Culture* and Frazer's *Golden Bough* afford. Reference may be made, however, to the following groups of facts, as types of the evidence to be expected.

(1) *The custom of eating particular organs of animals, or of other men, in order that the special qualities supposed to be connected with these organs may pass into the eater.* Thus among certain African tribes: 'Whenever an enemy who has behaved with conspicuous bravery is killed, his liver, which is considered the seat of valour; his ears, which are supposed to be the seat of intelligence; the skin of his forehead, which is regarded as the seat of perseverance; his testicles, which are held to be the seat of strength; and other members, which are viewed as the seat of other virtues, are cut from his body and baked to cinders. The ashes are carefully kept in the horn of a bull, and, during the ceremonies observed at circumcision, are mixed with other ingredients into a kind of paste, which is administered by the tribal priest to the youths' (Frazer, *GB*[2] ii. 357, where a large number of similar cases is given).

(2) *The nature of certain ordeals and penalties, chosen in relation to the supposed hidden psychical qualities of certain parts of the body.* The history of witchcraft abounds in examples, but the field is much wider. Thus, Lady Anne Blunt reports concerning an Arab dispute as to the parentage of a child: 'The matter, as all such matters are in the desert, was referred to arbitration, and the mother's assertion was put to the test by a live coal being placed upon her tongue' (*A Pilgrimage to Nejd*, i. 10). A probable Biblical example is found in the jealousy ordeal of Nu 5, on which see Gray's 'Numbers' (in *ICC*), p. 48, for a note contributed by the present writer. As an example of the same principle applied to punishment, we may take Law 218 from the Code of Hammurabi: 'If the doctor has treated a gentleman for a severe wound with a lancet of bronze and has caused the gentleman to die, or has opened an abscess of the eye for a gentleman with the bronze lancet and has caused the loss of the gentleman's eye, one shall cut off his hands' (Johns' tr. p. 46). This is clearly not a case of *lex talionis*, or the doctor's eye would have been extracted; penalty is exacted from the hands whose inherent vice led them astray.

(3) *The physical qualifications for special offices and activities, especially when these consist in mutilations.* Thus, amongst certain tribes of Central Australia, the essential mark of the medicine-man is a perforation in his tongue, mysteriously caused in the ceremony of his initiation. If the hole closes up during his year of probation, he loses his professional status (Spencer-Gillen[2], pp. 523, 525). Since such perforation can serve no practical end, we must assume that the object is to set free, in some way deemed efficacious by primitive thought, the member which the medicine-man will need most for professional incantations. This is probably one out of many cases of mutilation which are to be explained as the partial dedication of certain organs to those invisible powers capable of resenting their use. Thus, circumcision admits of no explanation, *valid for primitive thought*, which does not apply to the closely related rite of sub-incision, both being connected with the period of puberty (*ib.* p. 251 f.); but both receive adequate explanation, *for primitive thought*, as a propitiatory preparation for the safe use of the organ. A parallel mutilation to that of the medicine-man is recorded by Howitt (p. 747): 'A mother amputates the little finger of the right hand of one of her female children as soon as it is born, in token of its appointment to the office of fisherwoman to the family.'

(4) *Beliefs of superstition and magic about particular organs.* One of the best known cases is that of the evil eye. How physical the influence was conceived to be is shown by the superstition reported as fact by Aristotle; 'When women look into a very clear mirror after their menstrual flow, the mirror's

surface becomes covered with a bloody cloud; and if the mirror is new the stain is hard to remove, but if it is old, the removal is easier' (*On Dreams*, p. 237 of Hammond's tr.). It is significant, also, for the present argument, that early medicine discusses the treatment of the separate parts of the body as though they were so many isolated units; see, for example, the Anglo-Saxon 'Leech-Book of Bald,' of which a summary is given by Payne (*English Medicine in the Anglo-Saxon Times*, p. 40). This corresponded to the popular idea of disease. Euting writes of present-day Bedawin: 'Every disease is located in a particular part of the body, and for every part of the body there is a special medicine, which the doctor requires only to take out of his chest and dispense. A special diagnosis of the disease, or the personal production of the patient, is not considered necessary' (*Tagbuch einer Reise in Inner-Arabien*). In this connexion should be named the well-known Babylonian belief in demonic influences, which is in accordance with the localization of psychical function in various physical organs (cf. also the theory of mutilations as outlined above). 'Almost every part of the body is threatened by an evil demon; the ashakku brings fever to the head, the namtar threatens the life with pestilence, the utukku affects the neck, the alu the breast, the ekimmu the hips, the gallu the hand, the rabissu the skin' (Jeremias, *Hölle und Paradies bei den Babyloniern*, p. 18).

Such illustrations, which might be multiplied to almost any extent, sufficiently prove the identity, for the primitive thinker, of the sciences we clearly distinguish as physiology and psychology. This confusion is of fundamental importance for the study of primitive and ancient ideas of personality, and is frequently neglected by those who undertake to interpret ancient thought, particularly by interpreters of the Old Testament. Its further examination belongs to the subject of ancient psychology. Here, we are concerned with the evolution of a distinct science of the body, and with its present problems for psychology and religion.

2. **Evolution of physiology.**—It is plain that a sound knowledge of anatomy was necessary before an accurate physiology could be reached; yet of this Sir William Turner remarks: 'Amidst the general obscurity in which the early history of anatomy is involved, only two leading facts may be admitted with certainty. The first is that previous to the time of Aristotle there was no accurate knowledge of anatomy; and the second, that all that was known was derived from the dissection of the lower animals only' (*EBr*[9], *s.v.* 'Anatomy'). The most notable name before Aristotle is that of Hippocrates (B.C. 460–377), who does not distinguish vein from artery, and nerve from sinew; 'he represents the brain as a gland, from which exudes a viscid fluid; that the heart is muscular and of pyramidal shape, and has two ventricles separated by a partition, the fountains of life—and two auricles, receptacles of air; that the lungs consist of five ash-coloured lobes, the substance of which is cellular and spongy, naturally dry, but refreshed by the air; and that the kidneys are glands, but possess an attractive faculty, by virtue of which the moisture of the drink is separated, and descends into the bladder. He distinguishes the bowels into colon and rectum' (*l.c.*). Aristotle (b. B.C. 384) has confused notions of the nerves, and, though he connects the blood-vessels with the heart, he has no idea of the circulation of the blood. He regards the brain as the organ of cooling (*On Sleep*, ch. iii.). 'The heart is at once the physiological and psychical centre of man. . . . To Aristotle the brain is merely a regulator for the temperature of the heart; the brain is bloodless and cool, and the blood and warm vapours from the heart rising to this are lowered in temperature' (*Psychology*, Hammond's tr., p. xxiv; for the reasons which led Aristotle astray, see Ogle, *On the Parts of Animals*, p. 168 n.). Galen (b. A.D. 130) is the first certain user of vivisection, and his writings are 'the common depository of the anatomical knowledge of the day' (an account of his physiology is given by Foster, *History of Physiology*, p. 12 f.). No work of great importance in physiology was done between Galen's time and the 16th cent., when the *Fabrica Humani Corporis* of Vesalius was 'the beginning not only of modern anatomy, but of modern physiology' (Foster, *op. cit.* p. 10, who traces the development of physiology through the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries). In the 19th cent. that knowledge of the nervous system was elaborated from which the problems of the modern psychologist take their rise.

3. **Body and Mind.**—The problem of the relation of body to mind is of fundamental importance to a large group of sciences. 'Since the dawn of modern philosophy in the *Meditations* of Descartes, the question of the relation of body and mind has been continuously under discussion' (Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ii. 4). The chief difference between ourselves and the primitive thinker is that we have narrowed the problem to the relation between the nervous system (more especially the cerebral cortex) and consciousness. The full discussion of this problem, however, belongs more properly to the articles on BRAIN AND MIND, MIND, and PSYCHOLOGY.

A summary review of the positions taken by some typical thinkers will serve to introduce the modern aspect of the problem. Descartes (1596–1650), starting from the existence of the self as the thinking thing, and arguing to the existence of body (in general) as the extended thing, maintained, though in marked contradiction to the general principles of his system and to his treatment of animal consciousness, the interaction of mind and body in man. He assigned their point of contact to the pineal gland—a small body about the size of a cherry-stone, which lies between the upper quadrigeminal bodies of the brain, and is connected with the optic thalami—since some such single organ seemed necessary in order to combine impressions from the double sense-organs (*Les Passions de l'âme*, art. xxxi. f.). Here, as the chief seat of the soul, he supposed mind to influence body, and body mind. Geulincx (1625–1669)—cf. Malebranche (1638–1715)—abandoned the theory of interaction for that of 'occasionalism,' which asserts that God causes the changes in the body corresponding with those in the mind, and *vice versa*. Leibniz (1646–1716) introduced the conception of 'pre-established harmony,' which rejects both interaction and occasionalism in favour of a Divinely created correspondence of mind and body, like that of two clocks keeping perfect time. Spinoza (1632–1677) made the problem more distinctly metaphysical by his treatment of thought and extension as simply different attributes of the one substance, God. This metaphysical monism asserts that 'mind and body are one and the same thing, conceived at one time under the attribute of thought, and at another under that of extension' (*Ethica*, pt. iii. prop. ii. Schol.). Hume (1711–1776) emphasized the mystery of the union of mind and body (*Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding*, vii. pt. i.), and argued against the alleged causality of mind in relation to body. Huxley (1825–1895) extended the hypothesis of Descartes as to animals into the realm of human consciousness. Whilst holding that 'all states of consciousness in us as in them are immediately caused by molecular changes of the brain-substance,' he considered that 'in men, as in brutes, there is no proof that any state of consciousness is the cause of change in the motion of the matter of the organism'; the consequence is that 'our mental conditions are simply the symbols in consciousness of the changes which take place automatically in the organism' (*Collected Essays*, i. 244).

Huxley's theory forms one of the various modern solutions of the problem; but a theory which reduces

conscious experience (including activity) to a series of epiphenomena or 'by-products' is not adequate to explain that experience; whilst the denial of mental causality is founded on the unproved assumption that the universe is mechanical. This is shown most ably by Ward (*Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Lects. xi. xii.), who in the same context discusses Clifford's 'mind-stuff' theory, and the Neo-Spinozism of the 'double-aspect' theory. The chief modern lines of explanation of the relation of mind and body are those of interactionism, automatism, and parallelism: 'interactionism, asserting that the causal influence runs in both directions—in sensation from the body to the mind, in volition from the mind to the body; automatism, maintaining that it runs in one direction only—always from the body to the mind; and parallelism, denying all causal influence and holding the relation to be of a different nature.'* It should be noted that psycho-physical parallelism is frequently a purely descriptive term, to denote the correlation of the phenomena of consciousness with physiological (nervous and cerebral) processes, together with the real distinction between the two series. In this sense, it is doubtless true to say that 'this is the most generally accepted view of the relation between mind and body at the present day' (Baldwin, ii. 258). The much larger metaphysical problem of the relation of mind and matter cannot be discussed on the narrow stage of the present article (see artt. on MIND and PHILOSOPHY). However completely we might show the dependence of consciousness on the mechanism of the cerebral cortex and the nervous system generally, there would remain the apparent fact that psychical and physical processes are disparate. We must not hastily assume that the laws of the one can be applied without question to the other. The principle of the conservation of energy, however important as a working formula in the physical sciences, has mathematical validity but not philosophical application. On the other hand, we are not at liberty to interpret the causality of mind as though it were the interference of a new *quasi*-physical force with the working of that particular part of the physical system which forms the human body. The problem is in miniature, therefore that of the relation of God to the universe, where we have also to reconcile the existence of natural law with real causality; its further consideration belongs to this larger arena. See, further, art. BODY AND MIND.

4. **Problems for religion.**—There remains to be noticed, however briefly, the group of problems, arising in connexion with the human body, for the student of religion, which receive fuller discussion in special articles. (1) The controversy as to man's place in nature (see art. ANTHROPOLOGY) is now chiefly of historical interest, so far, at least, as *the relation of man's body to the animal world* is concerned. The modern theologian is usually ready to accept the clear verdict of the scientist that, 'judged by his structure, Man is undoubtedly a vertebrate animal of the class Mammalia' (Duckworth, *Morphology and Anthropology*, p. 12). In exact zoological classification he forms the Family Hominidæ in the Sub-Order Anthropoidea in the Order Primates in the Section Eutheria of the Sub-Class Theria of the Class Mammalia. In point of structure, that is, his nearest relatives are the Gibbons, Orang-utans, Chimpanzees, and Gorillas. This does not mean that these animals actually belong to man's ancestry. 'It is practically certain that the modern Simiidæ did not themselves figure in the ancestry of Man, and that they are themselves specialized in a high degree, more specialized in many ways than the Hominidæ and more specialized than their own ancestors' (Duckworth, *op. cit.* p. 543). On Man, 'specialization of the cerebrum has conferred an altogether exceptional development of self-consciousness (*op. cit.* p. 545) . . . the future modification of the cerebrum will be largely dependent on its blood-supply, which in turn is related to the quality of the cardiac muscle and various physiological factors . . . on what may, in the widest sense, be termed hygienic conditions' (*op. cit.* p. 546). If we grant, however, this physical relationship of man with the lower animals, it seems hardly possible to deny the psychological. The close correlation of the extent to which brain and nerve are elaborated in them with the observed degree of their intelligence is found to continue upwards to man himself; if the series is more or less continuous on the anatomical and physiological side, it is natural to expect that the corresponding psychical series knows no hard and fast line. This expectation is confirmed by the study of comparative psychology: 'Throughout the range of the sense-experience, common to men and animals, their emotional states are of like nature with ours. . . . It is the framing of ideals, not merely as products of conceptual thought, but also as objects of appetence and desire ever beckoning him onwards and upwards towards their realization, that is distinctive of man as man' (Lloyd Morgan, *Introd. to Compar. Psychology*, pp. 365, 379). The practical bearing of this may be seen from the standpoint of biology. The balance of power between the activity of any organism and its control by the environment is continually altering in favour of the former. 'Increasingly we find the organism—be it bird or mammal or man—much more master of its fate, able to select its own environment in some measure, able to modify its surroundings as well as be modified by them' (J. A. Thomson, *Heredity*, p. 517). In the case of man, this fact has been strikingly expressed by a leading biologist, who calls him 'nature's insurgent son' (Ray Lankester, *The Kingdom of Man*, ch. i.). 'If we may for the purpose of analysis, as it were, extract man from the rest of Nature of which he is truly a product and part, then we may say that Man is Nature's rebel' (*op. cit.* p. 26). Such a conception of man, given, it should be noticed, from the purely scientific point of view, is an implicit recognition of the right of the psychologist and of the theologian to consider man apart from nature, and to claim for him that unique place in the universe which the higher religions, and especially Christianity, demand. We need hardly hesitate, then, to agree with what Huxley wrote in 1863:

'I have endeavoured to show that no absolute structural line of demarcation, wider than that between the animals which immediately succeed us in the scale, can be drawn between the animal world and ourselves; and I may add the expression of my belief that the attempt to draw a psychical distinction is equally futile, and that even the highest faculties of feeling and of intellect begin to germinate in lower forms of life' (*Man's Place in Nature*, ed. of 1894, p. 152).

(2) *The relation of the body to the conception of personality* obviously requires some re-statement in the light of the general acceptance of an evolutionary view of man. Hebrew thought in its earlier form was unable to conceive any continuance of personality apart from the body; even in the theology of the later Judaism the same idea survives in the characteristic insistence on the resurrection of the body as essential to life beyond death. Over against this stands the Platonic emphasis on the immortality of the soul, which assigns to the body a quite subordinate part. The attitude of St. Paul differs from both: while

* Strong, *Why the Mind has a Body*, p. 2 (an elaborate discussion of the problem from the standpoint of 'panpsychism'). In regard to the view that thought is a function of the brain, see below, 4 (2).

he conceives a body to be necessary to personality, he awaits deliverance from this present body in which sin and death reign, and the development of a spiritual or 'pneumatic' body, more suited to regenerated human personality (1 Co 15[44], 2 Co 5[1ff.]). In the early Christian Church, we gain light on the relation of 'soul' and body from the various doctrines as to the origin of the soul (see art. SOUL), viz. pre-existence (Origen), traducianism (Tertullian), which taught that the soul was begotten with the body, and creationism, which may be regarded as the final normal doctrine, holding that each soul was created by God at birth without any mediation. The second of these, viz. traducianism, has clearly the most contact with the conceptions of modern biology (though its naive distinction of soul and body is no longer possible). The subsequent nature of the individual man, physical and psychical, is now known to be conditioned by the chromosomes contributed by spermatozoon and ovum respectively in the process of fertilization. When we ask what this conditioning may imply, this genetic problem, like the purely psychological one noted above, brings us face to face with ultimate questions. It is useless to ask what the fertilized ovum may 'contain'; all we can say is that from this source, or through this channel, flows the whole life of man (see art. LIFE). The subsequent emergence of self-consciousness in the infant, with all that this implies, lifts the whole problem into a realm beyond the physical. This is the consideration with which we ought to approach the problem as it meets us in the outgoing of man's life. That his personality depends on the body for its present development and expression cannot carry with it any prejudice against the continuance of personality when the body has been resolved into its chemical elements—unless we have silently begged the whole question of the relation of mind and body. As James has urged so forcibly (*Human Immortality*, p. 24 f.), even though we say 'thought is a function of the brain,' it still remains open to us to maintain that the function is not productive, but permissive or transmissive; in other words, that consciousness finds an organ for its expression in the brain, and is limited rather than produced by its present physical conditions. In this connexion, it is attractive to follow St. Paul's line of thought, and to think of some other 'spiritual' body, which may express more adequately man's personality in that life beyond death, which the highest spiritual life here itself demands (see art. IMMORTALITY).

(3) *The conception of the human body in ethical thought and its treatment in practical morals* have given rise to a third important group of problems. It is easy for a dualistic conception of man's nature to carry the philosophic opposition of spirit and matter, soul and body, into the ethical sphere; so we may trace the transition from the Platonic view of the body as the prison-house of the soul* to Philo's conception of all matter as evil (cf. Pfleiderer, *Philosophy of Religion*, iv. 5), and to the well-known dualism of the Gnostics and the Manichæans. Such a view is brought home to the practical consciousness of men by the fact that the most intense moral conflicts, especially at the threshold of manhood, are often those between the natural passions of the body and the higher claims of reason and conscience. An evolutionary view of man would explain this conflict as part of the process of man's upward development from a purely animal life; but a dualistic philosophy also provides an explanation. As a practical consequence we have the principle of asceticism (*q.v.*), prominent in Oriental religions generally, especially in Buddhism, though not belonging to Judaism, except in the peculiar and late developments of the Essenes and the Therapeutæ. In certain forms of Greek philosophy, notably Pythagoreanism, and the later Neo-Platonism, asceticism was made the condition of deeper philosophic and religious meditation. In Christianity, its special developments are connected with Monasticism (*q.v.*). For the general doctrinal view of the body in relation to evil, see BODY (Christian), 3 (*a*), and SIN. In contrast with these applications of dualism, it may be urged that the scientific view of the body is also the truest from a religious standpoint: 'Our body is an integral part of our human personality' (Illingworth, *Christian Character*, p. 146).

* In practice, Plato insists on the proper cultivation of the body 'for the sake of the soul' (*Rep.* bk. iii. 410).

LITERATURE.—*ANTHROPOLOGY*: see list under article of that name, which should itself be consulted in regard to man's place in nature. *PHYSIOLOGY* (early history of): Turner, art. 'Anatomy,' in *EBr*[9]; Foster, *History of Physiology* (Cambridge, 1901). *PSYCHOLOGY*: the relation of mind and body is discussed in most of the general literature of the subject (see list under art. PSYCHOLOGY), but the following in particular may be named: Bain, *Mind and Body* (1873, London); Huxley, *Animal Automatism* (1874, in *Collected Essays*, Eversley series, 1904, London); Le Conte, *Evolution and its Relation to Religious Thought*[2], ch. iv. (1891, London); James, *Principles of Psychology*, chs. v. and vi. vol. i. (1891, London); Münsterberg, *Grundzüge der Psychologie* (1900, Leipzig); Royce, *The World and the Individual*, vol. ii. Lect. v. (1901, New York and London); Baldwin, art. 'Mind and Body,' in *Dict. of Philos. and Psychol.* vol. ii. (1902, New York and London); Villa, *Contemporary Psychology*, ch. iii. (Eng. tr. by Manacorda, 1903, London); Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*[2], vol. ii. (1903, London); Strong, *Why the Mind has a Body* (1903, New York and London); Stout, *Manual of Psychology*[2], Introd. ch. iii. (1901, London); Calkins, *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy* (1907, New York and London).

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BODY (Buddhist).—The Buddhist attitude towards the body has been summed up as follows: (1) the body, whether of men or of higher beings, can never be the abode of anything but evil; (2) final deliverance from all bodily life, present and to come, is the greatest of all blessings, the highest of all boons, and the loftiest of all aims.[1]

The body is regarded as an 'impure thing and foul.' It is likened to a wound, a sore. It has to be borne about, but, because of its character, there must be no clinging to it. It is thus borne about 'for the sake of righteousness.'[2] The body is the 'old worn-out skin of a snake.'[3] It is a 'dressed-up lump, covered with wounds . . . wasted . . . full of sickness . . . a heap of corruption.'[4] All evil passions proceed from the body.[5] There is no pain like the body; hunger is the worst of diseases, the body the greatest of pains.[6] The weakness of the body is sometimes emphasized—it is fragile, like a jar; in death it will 'lie on the earth, despised, without understanding, like a useless log.'[7]

It is 'disgust' (*nibbidā*) for the body that is the motive for *pabbajja*—that is, the 'going forth' from house life into religious life—and also for the layman to sit loose to the things of the world. Gautama was led to 'go forth' for this reason.[8] He used to consider with himself the facts of age, disease, etc., until he determined to escape them. A later amplification of the same idea is the story of Gautama's driving through the town, and seeing an old man, a sick man, and a corpse. According to Buddhist teaching, the object most calculated to produce this 'disgust' is the human body itself, living as well as dead. The *Vijaya Sutta* is 'a reflection on the worthlessness of the human body'; a follower of Buddha sees the body only as it really is, and consequently goes to

[1] Monier Williams, *Buddhism*, 1889.
[2] *Questions of King Milinda*, bk. iii. ch. 6, § 1 (*SBE* xxxv.).
[3] *Sutta Nipāta*, 17 (*SBE* x.).
[4] *Dhammapada*, ch. xi. p. 147 f. (*SBE* x.).
[5] *Sutta Nipāta*, 269.
[6] *Dhammapada*, ch. xv. p. 202 f.
[7] *Ib.* ch. iii. p. 40 f.
[8] Copleston, *Buddhism*, 1892, p. 123 *et passim*.

nirvāṇa.[1] The noble Yasa left his house because he saw the female musicians asleep—'one would think it was a cemetery one had fallen into.'[2] Mental exercise of this description is frequently given as a specimen of right meditation. The idea of a 'corpse eaten up by worms,' etc., is to be kept before the mind when a good point of meditation occurs.[3] Yet bodily deformity, physical infirmity, or a maimed limb disqualified for *pabbajja* ordination.[4]

The idea of 'disgust' with the body is set forth in Gautama's 'burning' fire-sermon, delivered on a hill, Gayāsīsa, near Gaya:

'Everything, O monks, is burning. The eye is burning; visible things are burning. The sensation produced by contact with visible things is burning—burning with the fire of lust (desire), enmity, and delusion, with birth, decay, death, grief, lamentation, pain, dejection, and despair. The ear is burning, sounds are burning; the nose is burning, odours are burning; the tongue is burning, tastes are burning; the body is burning, objects of sense are burning. The mind is burning, thoughts are burning. All are burning with the fire of passions and lusts. Observing this, O monks, a wise and noble disciple becomes weary of (or disgusted with) the eye, weary of visible things, weary of the ear, weary of sounds, weary of odours, weary of tastes, weary of the body, weary of the mind. Becoming weary, he frees himself from passions and lusts. When free he realizes that his object is accomplished, that he has lived a life of restraint and chastity, that re-birth is ended.'[5]

One of the difficulties in the way of right thinking, without which nirvāṇa cannot be attained, is lack of training in the 'management of the body,' which, with lust, ill-will, delusion, wrong-doing, and lack of training in conduct, or thought, or wisdom, causes the thinking powers to be brought into play with difficulty, or to act slowly.[6] It is the 'eye of flesh' which prevents perfect insight, and only by its removal can the desired end be obtained.[7]

The body is the sphere of suffering:

'Now, this, O Bhikkus, is the noble truth concerning suffering: birth is attended with pain, decay is painful, disease is painful, death is painful. Union with the unpleasant is painful, painful is separation from the pleasant, and any craving that is unsatisfied, that, too, is painful.'

It is also the body which is the origin of suffering. The 'noble truth' on this subject has been summed up by Professor Rhys Davids as 'the lust of the flesh, the lust of life, and the love of the present world.'[8]

According to the teaching of Buddha, suffering, subjectively, is desire, in all its varied forms. But desire originates from the body.

'Buddha said: "Passion and hatred have their origin from this (body); disgust, delight, and horror arise from this body; arising from this body, doubts vex the mind as boys vex a crow."[9] "For him whose greediness for name and form is wholly gone, O Brāhmana, for him there are no passions by which he might fall into the power of death."'[10]

Objectively, suffering lies in embodiment, or matter, and consequently the human body is looked upon as a contemptible thing.[11]

Complete release from suffering is possible only by emancipation from body and matter. Therefore the 'elements of existence' (*upadhi*) must be destroyed.

'Knowing the step (of the four truths), understanding the Dhamma, seeing clearly the abandonment of the passions, destroying all the elements of existence (*upadhi*), such an one will wander rightly in the world.'[12] 'The elements of existence (*upadhi*) are overcome by thee (Buddha).'[13] 'He who, being ignorant, creates *upadhi*, that fool again undergoes pain; therefore let not the wise man create *upadhi*, considering (that this is) the birth and origin of pain.'[14] 'Mettagû says: "I delight in these words of the great Isi; well expounded, O Gautama, is (by thee) freedom from *upadhi*."'[15]

Emancipation from bodily form is therefore the *summum bonum* of Buddhism, the ultimate goal of all aim and effort.

'Seeing others afflicted by the body, O Piṅgiya,' so said Bhagavat, '(seeing) heedless people suffer in their bodies, therefore, O Piṅgiya, shalt thou be heedful and leave the body behind, that thou mayest never come to exist again.'[1] 'Seeing men seized with desire, O Piṅgiya,' so said Bhagavat, 'tormented and overcome by decay, therefore thou, O Piṅgiya, shalt be heedful and leave desire behind, that thou mayest never come to exist again.'[2] 'As a flame blown about by violence of the wind, O Upasiva,' so said Bhagavat, 'goes out, cannot be reckoned (as existing), even so a Muni, delivered from name and body, disappears, and cannot be reckoned as existing.'[3] 'For him who has disappeared there is no form, O Upasiva,' so said Bhagavat, 'that by which they say he is, exists for him no longer; when all things (*dhamma*) have been cut off, all (kinds of) dispute are also cut off.'[4] 'By the noble the cessation of the existing body is regarded as pleasure.'[5] 'Through countless births have I wandered,' said Gautama, 'seeking but not discovering the maker of this my mortal dwelling-house, and still, again and again, have birth and life and pain returned. But now, at length, art thou discovered, thou builder of this house (of flesh). No longer shalt thou rear a house for me. Rafters and beams are shattered, and, with destruction of desire (*taṇhā*=thirst), deliverance from repeated life is gained at last.'[6]

Though the constant endeavour and ultimate hope of the Buddhist is to escape from corporeal existence, Gautama clearly teaches that the body is to be cared for. Desire for the pleasures, and the formation of good habits, which minister to the real self, are inculcated; and pursuit and conduct which contribute to this end are to be cultivated.

(1) Suicide is forbidden;[7] food is to be used in moderation;[8] the use of intoxicating liquors is prohibited;[9] no wrong has to be done with the body;[10] health is the greatest of gifts;[11] food is to be enjoyed;[12] the eating of flesh is no defilement;[13] every bodily act has to be carefully watched over, words measured, manner gentle, thought collected, rejoicing in heart.[14]

(2) Stress is continually laid upon self-control; the 'forest of lust' has to be cut down;[15] bodily anger and sins of the body have to be forsaken;[16] sensual pleasures must not be clung to;[17] they who 'suffer loss' are they who are fond of society, the lazy;[18] sloth is 'the taint of the body';[19] earnestness is the path of immortality;[20] sins of the body will work out their bitter fruit even in this life.[21]

(3) No living thing is to be killed; weapons and sticks must be laid down; no hurt is to be done to another;[22] neither the feeble nor any other being is to be despised;[23] there must not even be the wish to harm another;[24] the great law of love must influence the Buddhist in every relationship of life.[25] Even *pabbajja* is prohibited unless the permission of father and mother is obtained, for

'the love for a son cuts into the skin; having cut into the skin, it cuts into the hide; having cut into the hide, it cuts into the flesh; having cut into the flesh, it cuts into the ligaments; having cut into the ligaments, it cuts into the bones; having cut into the bones, it reaches the marrow, and abides in the marrow.'[26]

In the *Sutta Nipâta*, the *Âmagandha Sutta* contains an account of what defiles a man. It bears comparison with Mt 15[11, 17-20]. It is not the eating of flesh which defiles, but destroying living beings, stealing, falsehood, worthless reading, adultery, unrestrained enjoyment of sensual pleasures, mercilessness, illiberality, intimacy with the un-

1 *Sutta Nipâta*, ii.; *Vijaya Sutta*, p. 82 (*SBE* x.).
2 *Mahâvagga*, i. 7. 2 (*SBE* xiii. 103).
3 *Angut.* iv. 14 *et passim*.
4 *Mahâvagga*, i. 71 (*SBE* xiii. 224 f.).
5 *Ib.* i. 21.
6 *Questions of King Milinda*, iv. 1. 20.
7 *Ib.* iv. 1. 48.
8 *Dhamma-Kakka-ppavattana-Sutta*, § 5 (*SBE*, vol. xi. p. 142).
9 *Sutta Nipâta*, p. 270.
10 *Ib.* p. 1099.
11 *Vijaya Sutta*, p. 82.
12 *Sutta Nipâta*, p. 878.
13 *Ib.* p. 546.
14 *Ib.* p. 1050.
15 *Ib.* p. 1056.

1 *Sutta Nipâta*, p. 1120.
2 *Ib.* p. 1122.
3 *Ib.* p. 1072.
4 *Ib.* p. 1075.
5 *Ib.* p. 761.
6 *Dhammapada*, ch. xi. p. 153 f.
7 *Questions of King Milinda*, iv. 4. 13.
8 *Dhammapada*, i. 8.
9 *Ib.* xviii. 247; *Sutta Nipâta*, pp. 244, 263.
10 *Dhammapada*, xx. 281.
11 *Ib.* xv. 204.
12 *Sutta Nipâta*, pp. 238–251.
13 *Ib.* p. 241.
14 *Questions of King Milinda*, iv. 1. 2.
15 *Dhammapada*, xx. 283.
16 *Ib.* 231.
17 *Sutta Nipâta*, p. 175.
18 *Ib.* pp. 90–114.
19 *Dhammapada*, xviii. 241.
20 *Ib.* ii. 21.
21 *Questions of King Milinda*, iii. 1. 1.
22 *Sutta Nipâta*, p. 393; *Questions of King Milinda*, iv. 3. 35.
23 *Sutta Nipâta*, 145–7.
24 *Ib.* p. 147.
25 *Questions of King Milinda*, iv. 4. 16.
26 *Mahâvagga*, i. 54–5 (*SBE* xiii. 99f.).

just, etc. If this long category of sins against the body, and against others, characterizes the life,

'neither the flesh of fish, nor fasting, nor nakedness, nor tonsure, nor matted hair, nor dirt, nor rough skins, nor the worshipping of fire, nor the many penances in the world, nor hymns, nor oblations, nor sacrifice, nor observance of seasons, purify a mortal who has not overcome desire.' *

LITERATURE.—See the references in the footnotes.

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BODY (Christian).—1. The New Testament generally.—The New Testament ideas on the subject of the body are rooted firmly in the soil of Old Testament teaching (see Gn 2^7, Ps 63^1, Ezk $44^{7.9}$, Mic 6^7). From the minds of the writers anything like a dualistic antithesis, such as we find in Greek philosophy, between body and soul, matter and spirit, is far removed. As in the older Scriptures, the unity of the human personality is the fundamental feature in the conception of man. At the same time this unity is recognized as resting upon an underlying duality; man is conceived of as a complex being with a lower and a higher part, by one of which he is linked to the life of nature, and by the other to the Spirit of God.

In the Hebrew psychology 'flesh' (בָּשָׂר) was the prevailing name for man's earthly part, and 'spirit' (רוּחַ) for his heavenly part, while 'soul' (נֶפֶשׁ) was the union of the two in the living creature (see esp. Gn 2^7). There was no proper Heb. term for 'body,' precisely because the Hebrews, with their psycho-physical ideas of personality, did not feel the need for a special word to denote the bodily organism considered by itself. When we come to the NT we find a somewhat different order of terminology, which has come in through familiarity with the LXX version, and is thus indirectly due to Greek influences. 'Soul' (ψυχή) and 'spirit' (πνεῦμα) are now frequently used in senses that can hardly be distinguished, to express the whole inward or spiritual nature (*e.g.* Lk $1^{46.47}$, Ph 1^{27} [RV]). The term 'body' (σῶμα), again, has now come into general use, and is employed in connexions which make it practically synonymous with 'flesh' (σάρξ; cf. 1 Co 5^3 with Col 2^5, 2 Co 4^{10} with v.^{11}). But, even so, body and soul, flesh and spirit, are not used in the sharply antithetic fashion of the Greek philosophic dualism. If the terms are Greek, the ideas are still Hebrew. In the NT a soul ordinarily means an embodied soul, and a living body is always conceived of as an ensouled body. The emphasis within the idea of personality, it is true, now falls more emphatically on the inner and spiritual side; existence, and even a blessed existence, is consistent with separation from the body—St. Paul thinks of an absence from the body which is yet a presence with the Lord (2 Co 5^8). But the old Hebrew view of the essentiality of the body to human nature in its completeness is asserted afresh in the doctrine of the resurrection, which had become familiar to later Jewish thought, and asserted now more emphatically than before, through being carried over from the present world of things seen and temporal into the unseen and eternal realities of the world to come.

2. Christ and the Gospels.—When we descend to particulars, it may be said that there are two great lines of evidence which are of paramount importance for the NT doctrine of the body. The first comes from Christ and the Gospels. And here, as everywhere in the NT, the evidence points in two directions, one part of it serving to exalt more than heretofore the worth and dignity of man's physical nature, the other to show the subordination of that nature to the claims and uses of his spiritual being.

(1) In the first place, we find in the revelation of Christ and in the records of His teaching *a wonderful exaltation of the body.*—(*a*) The fundamental fact here is found in the Incarnation itself, in the Word made flesh (Jn 1^{14}), in the Son of God becoming the man Christ Jesus (Mt 11^{27} etc.). In the OT the flesh is dignified as being brought into a living unity with the spirit, the dust of the earth with the breath of life that comes from God (Gn 2^7). In the NT the flesh is raised to a dignity unspeakably higher, by the habitation in it and incorporation with it of the very Word of life (1 Jn $1^{1.2}$).—(*b*) The sinless life of Jesus is another illuminating truth. For this life without fault or stain, lived in the body, disposes at once and utterly of any idea that there is something essentially evil and degrading in the possession of a physical nature as such. It shows that body is not hostile to spirit, but that, on the contrary, the two may be joined together in a solidarity so true and harmonious as to become a perfect instrument for doing God's will upon earth.—(*c*) Very significant, too, is the fact of Christ's joy in living, and His freedom from that ascetic temper which is nothing else than dualism in one of its practical forms. He 'came eating and drinking,' and was so far removed from a false spiritualism, with its one-sided otherworldliness, that His enemies even accused Him of sensuality (Mt 11^{19}). He loved the scenes and shows of nature as they spread themselves before His eyes, and, so far from treating them, like some good men, as cunning traps for the unwary soul, saw in them tokens of God's presence and foreshadowings of the things of the Kingdom of heaven (Mt $6^{26ff.}$ 13 etc.).—(*d*) Parallel with this was His constant recognition in other men of the value and claims of the physical nature. He never sought to ignore or disparage what belongs to man's natural life; He came, as we read in the Fourth Gospel, not to kill or steal or destroy, but that we might have life, and might have it abundantly (Jn 10^{10}). The works of healing, which formed so large an element in His public ministry, are the standing proof of this attitude of Jesus to the physical life of man. Here, too, must be considered—as contradicting ideas which afterwards took possession of the mind of the Church—His vindication of marriage as forming a part of the Divinely appointed order of human society (Mt $19^{4ff.}$; cf. Jn $2^{1ff.}$); and further, as flowing from His approval of marriage and parenthood, His loving recognition of little children, and the place He assigned to them in the Kingdom of God (Mt $18^{1ff.}$ $19^{13ff.}$).—(*e*) The resurrection of Jesus Christ and His ascension to glory are the culminating proofs offered by the NT of the value and dignity of the human body. He not only partook on earth of our human frame, but, when He re-appeared on the further side of death, resumed a life of physical conditions (Mt 28^9 etc.), and carried the human body with Him to the right hand of God (Lk 24^{51}, Ac 1^9). For the Christian doctrine of the body this is the truth of highest significance—making the doctrine one that applies to both worlds—that, as on earth so also in heaven, as in His humiliation so also in His exaltation, Jesus Christ continues to live the life of the body as well as the life of the spirit.

(2) But, side by side with this exaltation of the body, the evidence which comes to us from Christ and the Gospels points always to (*a*) *the subordination of the body to the soul.* Although by word and deed, by the facts of His history and the very constitution of His Person, Christ asserted the worth of man's physical nature, it was a fundamental part of His teaching that what is highest in our personality must be sought in the inner nature, and that the body must be kept in a due subjection to the authority of the spirit. 'Fear not them,' He said, 'which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul' (Mt 10^{28}; cf. Lk 12^4). And in some of His most solemn utterances He taught that the outward world, which makes so strong an appeal to our physical senses, is worth nothing whatever in comparison with those spiritual interests and possessions on which our truest life depends (Mt 16^{26}, Mk $8^{36f.}$, Lk 12^{15-21}). He was no teacher of asceticism, as has been said, but He declared, nevertheless, that God's Kingdom and righteousness were the first things which His disciples must seek (Mt 6^{33}), and that those who are engaged in this high quest may sometimes find it needful to pluck out the right eye or to cut off the right hand ($5^{29f.}$). And whatever further meaning lies enfolded in His agony in Gethsemane and His death upon the cross, they were at all events an affirmation

* *Sutta Nipâta*, pp. 238–248.

for all time of the truth that the life of the body must be freely yielded up whenever this becomes necessary to the fulfilment of the Divine purpose, and that the spirit must be willing even though the flesh is weak (Mt $26^{39ff.}$).—(*b*) Again, the evidence points to *the provisional character of the earthly body*. Christ sanctioned marriage, as we have seen, and declared it to be an ordinance of God's appointment; but when the Sadducees endeavoured to discredit the doctrine of the resurrection of the body by pointing out a perplexing situation to which it might lead under the Jewish marriage law, He declared that, 'when they shall rise from the dead, they neither marry, nor are given in marriage; but are as angels in heaven' (Mk 12^{25}). Clearly this was an announcement of a resurrection life very different from the present life in flesh and blood. It implies the possession of a body more spiritualized than the present one, and adapted to conditions far removed from those of our earthly life. And what was thus foreshadowed by Christ's words was ocularly proved to His disciples by His post-resurrection appearances. It was the same body they had laid in the tomb which now presented itself to them in living form, so that they could not fail to recognize their Lord (Ac 1^3 2^{32}). And yet it was a different body—freed from the familiar earthly limitations and possessed of new and higher capacities and powers (Lk $24^{31.\ 36.\ 51}$, Jn 20^{26}). The spiritual had so interpenetrated the natural and subdued it to its own uses, that the natural body of Jesus had become a spiritual body. The invisible world was now its proper home, and it was only when He chose to 'materialize' Himself (as a student of psychical research would say), to 'manifest Himself' (as the author of the Fourth Gospel expresses it, Jn $21^{1.\ 14}$), that His disciples were able to perceive Him by their natural senses. It was in this spiritual body that the risen Christ ascended to His Father. And it is this spiritual body of the risen and ascended Christ that becomes for His disciples the type of that glorious body which, in their case also, is to take the place of the present body of humiliation (Ph 3^{21}).

3. **The Pauline anthropology.**—The second great line of evidence comes from the Pauline anthropology. It is here that we find the great bulk of the direct NT teaching on which the Christian doctrine of the body is based. Now, in regard to St. Paul it has often been assumed that his anthropological ideas were determined by Hellenistic influences, and that he sets up a hard dualism between matter and spirit, between body and soul (cf. Holtzmann, *NT Theol.* ii. 14 f.). But so far is this from being a correct statement of his position, that it might rather be affirmed that the Apostle is nowhere more closely in line with the OT psychology than in his teaching on this very subject. For him, too, as for the other writers of the NT, human nature is not an irreconcilable antithesis of matter and spirit, but a psycho-physical unity of soul and body, in which, however, the body, as the part that links man to nature, takes a lower position than the soul or spirit, by which he comes into relation with heaven and God. St. Paul's doctrine will become apparent if we consider his utterances on the relation of the body to sin, to death, to holiness, and to the future life.

(*a*) *The body and sin.*—It is at this point that the argument for a positive dualism in the Pauline teaching, due to Greek influences, appears most plausible. There can be no question that the Apostle often speaks of the body and its members, not only as instruments of sin, but as a seat and fortress of its power (*e.g.* Ro $6^{12.\ 19}$ $7^{5.\ 23f.}$)—a way of speaking, however, which is neither Greek nor dualistic, but has its roots in OT teaching, and is the direct result of an acute ethical experience. But it has been further alleged that St. Paul recognizes in the body the very source and principle of sin (Pfleiderer, *Paulinismus*, 53 ff.). The argument depends on the interpretation given to the word 'flesh' (*σάρξ*) in those passages where the Apostle, passing beyond the ordinary non-ethical use of the word (Ro 2^{28}, 2 Co 4^{11}), employs it in an ethical sense in contrast with 'spirit' (*πνεῦμα*). According to this argument, *σάρξ* in such cases simply denotes the physical or sensuous part of man, in which St. Paul finds a substance utterly antagonistic to the life of the spirit, and one whose working makes sin inevitable. But the objections to this view are overwhelming. When St. Paul in Gal $5^{19ff.}$ gives a category of the 'works of the flesh,' the majority of the sins he enumerates—for instance, idolatry, hatred, heresies, envying—are spiritual, not physical or animal, in their nature. When he charges the Corinthians with being 'carnal' (*σαρκικοί*, 1 Co 3^3), it is not sensuality that he is condemning, but 'jealousy and strife.' His doctrine with regard to the sanctification of the body, as a member of Christ and the temple of the Holy Ghost ($6^{15.\ 19}$), would have been impossible if he had regarded the principle of sin as lying in man's corporeal nature; and equally impossible his belief in the absolute sinlessness (2 Co 5^{21}) of one who was born of a woman (Gal 4^4). Nor could he have given so high and constant a place, in his doctrine of the future life, to the hope of the resurrection, if he had conceived of the body as the *fons et origo* of evil in man. He would rather have been driven to long for its utter dissolution, and to centre his hopes for the eternal future in a bare doctrine of the immortality of the soul.

The Pauline antithesis of flesh and spirit, then, cannot be interpreted as amounting to a dualistic opposition between man's body and his soul, his material and his immaterial elements. Here, as everywhere else in Scripture, the real antithesis is between the earthly and the heavenly, the natural and the supernatural. The Apostle uses 'flesh' to denote man's sinful nature generally; and his reason for doing so, doubtless, lies in the fact that by the law of ordinary generation it is through his flesh that the individual is linked on to the life of a fallen and sinful race, and so comes to inherit a corrupt nature. St. Paul's teaching at this point is in line with the great saying of Jn 3^6, 'That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit' (cf. Laidlaw, *Bible Doctrine of Man*, 119). St. Paul's 'carnal' man is the same as his 'natural' man who receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, and is thus distinguished from the 'spiritual' man in whom a supernatural and Divine principle has begun to operate (1 Co $2^{13ff.}$; cf. $3^{1.\ 3}$).

But while St. Paul does not find in the body the very principle of sin, he does regard it as in a special sense the lurking-place and instrument of evil. When he speaks of the old man being crucified with Christ that 'the body of sin' might be done away (Ro 6^6), when he longs for deliverance from the 'body of death' (7^{24}), when he refers to 'the law in our members' which wars against 'the law of our mind' (v.^{23}), it seems evident that he recognizes an abnormal development of the sensuous in fallen man, and regards sin as having in a special manner entrenched itself in the body, which becomes liable to death on this very account (Ro 6^{23} 7^{24}), and throughout man's earthly life is a constant source of weakness and liability to fall. Hence his determination to buffet his body and bring it into subjection (1 Co 9^{27}); his summons to Christ's people to mortify the deeds of the body (Ro 8^{13}, cf. Col

3[6]); his appeal to them not to allow sin to reign in their mortal bodies, but to present their members as instruments of righteousness unto God (Ro 6[12ff.]).

(*b*) *The body and death.*—It is in accordance with those dualistic conceptions which by and by entered into the Church through the influence of heathen philosophy, and which still colour Christian thought as well as Christian language, that death should be spoken of as if it were a liberation of the soul from its bondage to corporeal conditions, whereby it escapes into its natural element of pure spirituality. St. Paul, at all events, never speaks thus about death. His strong sense of the weakness of the flesh and its subjection to the powers of evil leads him, it is true, to describe the body as a tabernacle in which we groan, being burdened. But he immediately hastens to explain, 'not for that we would be unclothed, but that we would be clothed upon, that what is mortal may be swallowed up of life' (2 Co 5[4]). It is not deliverance from the body that he longs for, but the deliverance of the body from the constraint of evil, its complete redemption and transformation, and perfect adaptation in consequence to the life of the spirit. To the Apostle that separation of soul and body which we call death was not something natural, but something profoundly unnatural. According to his original nature, man was not made to die. It was not part of the Divine purpose in his creation that the solidarity of body and soul should ever be dissolved. But the entrance of sin into the world changed every human prospect; and death is the wages of sin (Ro 6[23]). But just as Christ, by His Spirit dwelling in us, can subdue the power of sin, so also can He gain the victory over death—the culminating demonstration of sin's power, and man's last enemy (1 Co 15[26]). In Christ we have the promise of a body not only raised from the grave, but redeemed from the power of evil, and thus capable of the great transfiguration from a natural body into a spiritual body (v.[44]), from 'the body of our humiliation' into a conformity to the body of Christ's glory (Ph 3[21]).

(*c*) *The body and holiness.*—St. Paul's view of the body as an essential part of the human personality is seen further in connexion with his teaching on the subject of holiness. In the Church at Corinth, whose members breathed an atmosphere saturated with heathen influences, there had sprung up the strange, perverted doctrine that, as the body is not a part of man's true personality, all bodily acts are of the nature of *adiaphora*, or things morally indifferent. Fornication stood on the same level as eating and drinking; it was a mere physical act, natural to man as an animal creature, but having no real bearing on the independent and higher life of the soul (1 Co 6[13ff.]). The idea is one that has appeared again and again in Christian history, for dualistic notions regarding the body tend almost as readily to sensualism on the one hand as to asceticism on the other (cf. the Ranters in the days of the Puritan revival; see R. M. Jones, *Studies in Mystical Religion* [1909], 477). The Apostle's answer to all such degrading views was to set up his doctrine of the bodily holiness of a Christian man. The body, he said, is for the Lord, and the Lord for the body (v.[13]); your bodies are the members of Christ (v.[15]); your body is a sanctuary of the Holy Spirit (v.[19]). In his view, the life of the human spirit, by which we are linked on to Christ Himself and to the Spirit of God, is joined indissolubly to that physical life which finds its manifestation in the bodily members. And so, when the Spirit of God takes up His abode in a man, the body of that man, as well as his spiritual nature, undergoes a process of sanctification, as day by day there pass

> 'Through all this fleshly dress
> Bright shoots of everlastingness.'

And yet this exalted view of the communion and fellowship of the body in the spiritual life of man, and its sensitiveness to the powers of sanctification, did not blind the Apostle to the fact, taught him by his own ethical experience, that in the fallen nature even of a Christian man the body is weak and tainted, and ready to become the instrument of temptation and an occasion of stumbling. In this temple of the Holy Ghost there are dark corners where evil spirits linger, and from which they can never be utterly expelled until in death the wages of sin have been paid. If ever there was a spiritually-minded man, St. Paul was one, but even he was deeply conscious of the infirmity of the flesh (Ro 6[19]), and felt the need of subduing his own body, lest, after all, he should become a castaway (1 Co 9[27]). And so, side by side with the truth that the body is a Divine sanctuary, he sets forth in his doctrine of holiness the demand that sin should not be allowed to reign in our mortal bodies that we should obey it in the lusts thereof (Ro 6[12]).

(*d*) *The body and the future life.*—Here, again, two lines of thought emerge in St. Paul's teaching—an overwhelming sense, on the one hand, of the worth of the body for the human personality; and, on the other, a clear recognition of its present limitations and unfitness in its earthly form to be a perfect spiritual organ. The proof of the first is seen in his faith in the resurrection of the body. The Pharisaic Judaism in which he was brought up had come to hold the hope of the resurrection of the dead (Ac 23[6ff.]), but that was a dim and pallid hope compared with the living and shining assurance which Jesus Christ had begotten in his heart. To him the resurrection of Christ was a fact of the most absolute certainty (Ro 1[4], 1 Co 15[3ff.]). And that fact carried with it the knowledge that the dead are raised (v.[13ff.]). When he writes of immortality (1 Co 15[35f.]), he does not mean, like Plato, the immortality of the soul (*Phædo*, liv. ff.), but the immortality of the whole man. He believed, no doubt, that the soul, as the centre of the personality, could survive the shock of separation from the body (2 Co 5[8]). But he thought of it as existing then in a condition of deprivation and incompleteness, for which he uses the figure of being 'unclothed'; and he does not regard it as attaining to the fullness of the life and blessedness of the future world until its 'nakedness' has been 'clothed upon' (v.[2ff.]). But, while he believed in the resurrection of the body, St. Paul did not believe in the resurrection of the present body of flesh and blood (1 Co 15[50]). He looked for a body in which corruption had given place to incorruption (v.[42]), in which weakness had been succeeded by power (v.[43]), in which what is mortal had been swallowed up of life (2 Co 5[4]), and humiliation had been changed into glory (Ph 3[21]). He was fully alive to the disabilities which the spirit has to suffer from its union with a body that is weak, earthy, and perishable, and his doctrine of the resurrection includes the assurance that when the dead in Christ are raised—of the physical resurrection of others he has little to tell us—it will not be in the old bodies of their earthly experience, but in new ones adapted to a heavenly condition of existence (1 Co 15[47ff.]), bodies that are no longer *psychical* merely, *i.e.* moving on the lines of man's natural experience in the world, but *pneumatical* (v.[44ff.]), because redeemed from every taint of evil and fitted to be the perfect organs of a spiritual and heavenly life.

4. **The Christian doctrine of the body.**—Taking

the NT as our source and norm, we thus find that the Christian doctrine of the body follows two main lines. (1) There is a recognition of the body as *an essential component of a complete human personality*. In the fullness of his being, man is conceived of not as a purely spiritual entity, but as an embodied spirit. This is the evidence of the Bible from beginning to end—from the story of the Creation in Genesis (2[7]) to the Apocalyptic vision of the sea giving up its dead that they may stand before God to be judged according to their works (Rev 20[13]). It is a doctrine that finds confirmation in the teachings of modern science, alike from the psychical and from the physiological side. For, if physiology has been compelled to admit the presence in man of a spiritual essence which lies beyond the range of its processes and tests, psychology has no less had to admit that the psychical, as we know it, stands in a close and constant relation to the physical. It is in keeping, therefore, with both Biblical and scientific truth that the Christian doctrine of the body should recognize and maintain the rights and dignities of man's physical being for the life we are now living, and should proclaim the great hope of the body for another life which is to come. The body is recognized as having its rights. Its natural instincts are to be treated, not as if they were implanted in us only that they might be suppressed and crushed, but as designed to lawful fulfilments on the lines of that great affirmation, 'All are yours; and ye are Christ's; and Christ is God's' (1 Co 3[22f.]). The world belongs to the Christian; and the joy of living in it and opening the heart through the senses to all its pure delights is part of his inheritance. Those natural relationships which lie at the foundation of our social existence, and which depend fundamentally upon our physical constitution—the love of husband and wife, of parent and child, of brother and sister—find a firm sanction in the Christian gospel of the body. And as the rights of the body are recognized, so also are its dignities. Even the present body of our humiliation, with all its weakness, its bias towards evil, its mortality, is sacred—sacred as being an essential part of that humanity which found in Jesus of Nazareth its pure and perfect expression, sacred in a more personal sense because the living Christ enters into it by His Spirit, makes it His temple, quickens it with His own life, and begins the work of subduing it to His own likeness. And the Christian doctrine of the body has also its promise for the future life. For, in the Christian view of the matter, the separation of body and soul at death is an unnatural condition. Without the body, the human soul is deprived of something that belongs to its true constitution, and is incapable of the highest activity and blessedness. From this limitation of his capacities and powers man is to be delivered by the 'redemption of the body' (Ro 8[23])—not its resurrection merely, but its complete redemption from all the defects of its earthly condition, involving a transformation and exaltation of its very substance.

There is no place in the Christian doctrine of the resurrection for those crude materialistic ideas, which were once so general, of a restoration of the selfsame particles of which the earthly body was composed. The spiritual body is to differ widely from the natural body (1 Co 15[37]). An inherent identity, it is true, must connect them, or we could not speak of a resurrection at all; but the identity will be one of vital principle and organic form, not of material substance, as St. Paul seeks to show by his figure of the grain of wheat which dies and springs up again to more abundant life (v.[36ff.]). The body of the risen and exalted Jesus is at once the promise and the type of the spiritual body in the case of His people (vv.[23. 49], Ph 3[21]).

(2) But with all its emphasis on the rights and dignities and glorious prospects of the body, the Christian doctrine fully recognizes that *man's physical nature is his lower part*, that it is subject to evil tendencies, that it needs to be steadily subordinated to that higher life of the spirit by which we are brought into conscious relation with God. The world, which appeals so mightily to man's senses, is of much less value to him than the life of his own soul. His natural relationships, however dear, the very life of the body itself, however precious to the self-preserving instinct—all must be surrendered to the higher claims of the Divine Kingdom. Of these great truths Jesus Christ was the solemn prophet; by these He shaped the steps of His own earthly career; His body nailed to the Cross of Calvary was the tremendous example of their reality. The body, in short, has its duties as well as its rights; and it is always its duty to be the servant of the spirit. In the interests of the body, Christianity has sometimes had to raise its testimony against the exaggerations of a one-sided spiritualism, but it is much more frequently called on to protest, in the interests of the soul, against a materialistic way of envisaging our life in the world. There was a time when monastic asceticism, with its contempt for the body, became a positive danger to the Church. The danger now lies rather in a cult of the body which threatens the very life of the soul, whether that takes the form of a craze for athleticism and games which leaves little room for the growth of intellectual and spiritual interests, or of an æstheticism absorbed in the culture of the finer senses and in a pursuit of 'art for art's sake,' or of that mere vulgar love of pleasure by which, in all ages, the heart has been drawn away from the love of God. The Christian doctrine never fails to remind us that the body needs to be watched and curbed, and sometimes to be subdued. It warns us that, even in the case of those in whom the work of bodily sanctification has begun, the day of bodily redemption still lies in the future. It is hardly so optimistic in its view of the present relation to each other of the two parts of human nature as to say with Browning, in 'Rabbi Ben Ezra': 'Nor soul helps flesh more, now, than flesh helps soul.' On the contrary, it recognizes the truth to ethical reality that lies in the teaching of Jesus Christ and of His great Apostle as to the soul's perpetual primacy, and the need for a constant and vigilant superintendence of the body's promptings. But it looks for a day of perfect reconciliation, when the two elements of human nature, now so often at variance, shall at last perfectly accord, and the redeemed body shall be the ready organ and the exact expression of the informing soul.

LITERATURE.—Relevant sections in Laidlaw, *Bible Doct. of Man*, 1879; Delitzsch, *Biblical Psychology* [Eng. tr. 1867]; and the *NT Theologies* of Holtzmann, Weiss, and Beyschlag. See, further, Dickson, *Flesh and Spirit*, 1883; Müller, *Christian Doct. of Sin* [Eng. tr. 1877], i. 295–333; Orr, *Christian View of God and the World*, 1893, 160ff., 228ff.; H. W. Robinson, 'Heb. Psychology in relation to Pauline Anthropology,' in *Mansfield College Essays*, 1909; Wendt, *Teaching of Jesus* [Eng. tr. 1892], i. 156; Paget, 'Sacraments' in *Lux Mundi*, and *Spirit of Discipline*, 1891, 80ff.

J. C. LAMBERT.

BODY (Egyptian).—1. Man.—1. What we understand by 'body' was to the Egyptians simply the last and heaviest of the material coverings which together form a human being. The flesh, *aufu* ('flesh' in the sense of the sum of the physical elements that compose the human body), was neither of a different nature nor of a different texture from the other elements contained within and completing the person. All the elements possessed weight and were perceptible, though in varying degrees; and if on ordinary occasions they were not all visible or palpable, that was simply a circumstantial detail and not due to any essential difference. Magic often enabled men to see and handle these elements.

The *ka*, or 'double,' for example, was only a second body enclosed within the *ǰait*, lighter, more subtle or more airy, but composed, piece by piece, of the same elements as the body proper. The texts that refer to the future life (see DEATH, etc. [Egyptian]) prove conclusively that the *ka* in the other world was constituted, in every detail, like the body of flesh which it had occupied on earth.

The *ḫaibit*, or 'shadow,' was also only a third kind of body, still more airy, still more subtle, yet of the very same structure as the first two elements of the series.

The *khu*, or 'ghost,' long misled Egyptologists, through their relying upon hymns or over-refining texts of the Theban period. Books of pure magic or of funeral magic show us that the *khu* was originally only a kind of body, still more agile perhaps than the other three, and practically similar to the body attributed to *jinn* and fairies in the wonderful literature of the Arabs, or to the body that the modern Bantus suppose to exist inside the body of flesh.

The list is not exhausted by these four names: the primitive Egyptians, like a number of modern uncivilized peoples, had a very complicated idea of the human body. A striving after simplicity came only as the slow result of very long periods of effort; and the point at which we first gain clear impressions of the notions cherished by the Egyptians is still, in spite of the antiquity of the texts concerned, far removed from the starting-point. Glimpses of the primitive notions are caught and they have been re-constructed, but there is no direct contact with them. By the time of the historical period several of the multiple bodies composing a single being had been eliminated by speculation or by experience; and it is hard to conjecture, for example, what the *sâhu* can have been. It is to no purpose that the theology of the Thebans (and with it several Egyptologists of our day) thinks to find in it a designation of the 'spiritual body,' opposed in eschatology to the double, the shadow, or the soul. There are also very distinct traces in the ancient texts of an earlier time when the *ḫaït* and the *sokhim* were two of the bodies of the living man. But as yet we do not know clearly what was their exact nature.

The conjunction of all these bodies made a human being. What we call death was only the sunderance of them, and was always ascribed, as among primitive peoples, to some violent cause, arising from the personal act of an evil being (see art. DEATH). What kept all these bodies together in a unity during life was something more subtle, lighter, more active than any of them, something which constituted, at least approximately, the *personality* or the *self*. There is no race that has not tried to penetrate more or less into the definition of the latter; and there is no inquiry that has given rise, in primitive religions, to speculations so strange and, sometimes, so painfully complicated. As for the Egyptian, he thought to find its nature and power in what he called the *ran*, which we translate so unsatisfactorily by the word 'name.' The 'name'—we must be content to use this very ambiguous equivalent—is quite different from the body, since the whole series given above is only, as has been said, a sort of 'gamut' of increasingly fluid bodies.

The nature of the 'name' in itself is too important to receive due treatment here incidentally. The theory of the 'name' is in reality the fundamental basis of more than half of the religious ideas of Egypt. It will be discussed fully under art. NAMES (Egyptian). Here we shall merely say as much regarding it as is necessary in order to understand the Egyptian 'body.'

As far at least as we can gather, 'names' were originally what we may call 'kernels' of energy, vibrating, perhaps luminous (of course, material), distinct from and incapable of dissolving into one another. They had their own peculiar vitality, in the midst of the great chaotic mass of primordial things. The solar theologies, such as that of Heliopolis, revised and corrected by that of Hermopolis and Amarna, regarded them as originally emanations, vital waves proceeding from the rising sun. These entities, distinct and irreducible, then 'clothed' themselves, so to speak, in more or less visible or weighty coverings, which are these bodies of which we have spoken, the heaviest and most material of the latter being what we moderns mean by the 'body.' How was this 'clothing' brought about? Was it by a kind of solidification of the cosmic dust which somehow condensed the materials of physiological life round the 'names'? If Egypt seems to have had a confused idea of some answer of this kind, she naturally could formulate it only haltingly, with incoherences and *lacunae*, like so many strange systems of primitive or uncivilized peoples in other parts of the world. The historical period tried to introduce some appearance of cohesion into the existing system. It got hold of the early legends about the cosmogonies and, amongst them, of the legend of the god Thôth. Thôth (= *Tahuti*, 'the Speaker') had 'proclaimed' the world. The sounds of his voice had attracted round about their groups of syllables coverings of flesh and bone, of wood, of stone, or of other substances; and the whole together had constituted the creation. Thus revised by theology, the nature of the 'name' became something less fantastically barbarous; on closer examination, the *ran*, or 'name,' was something like a bundle of energetic waves, 'rhythmic' waves, with their special characteristics—and particularly 'numbers,' which the voice can reproduce if there is 'attunement.' One cannot help remembering that, many centuries later, Pythagoras made 'numbers' the basis of his system, and it is only reasonable to wonder what part ancient Egypt played in this.

The theology of Hermopolis claimed that, after the creation organized by the 'names,' the world of bodies and beings thus set in progress continued and reproduced itself by its own activity. This theology is too indefinite for our taste. Perhaps this is due mainly to the fact that nine-tenths of the Egyptian religious writings that we possess to-day treat only of gods or of the other world. The information we get from such texts is enough, however, to let us see that the vital principle of the body, this *ran*, which constitutes the inmost essence and the personality, *pre-existed* before the body and its physiological elaboration by the parents of the new being. We do not know very well where it came from according to the idea of the Egyptians, or what it was before the existence of a body for it to inhabit. But we gradually arrive at an understanding, by studying the birth-ceremonies (or the ceremonies of the coronation of kings, which give them a new soul), and we get a glimpse of the combination of vital and celestial energies from which it apparently arose. Horoscopes, or the supposed relations between the condition of the world at the birth of an individual and his 'name'; the care taken to determine the pronunciation of the name conferred on a newborn child according to the natural phenomena in evidence at his appearance; the anxiety to connect the syllables, whose pronunciation thus makes his 'self,' with divine persons, with 'names' of gods—these things all enable us, if not to re-construct Egyptian thought as a whole, at least to imagine almost exactly what it was. At the birth of a child the Egyptian sought by every means to discover to which group of higher forces the 'name' belonged which had just formed the person of the new being. He aimed at reproducing with his voice its vibrations and pronunciation, so as to join it again, in incantations or prayers, to the higher beings whose protection must be obtained or whose destiny must be pursued.

And as the Egyptian tried to do this for his own children, so he also tried to get to know the 'names' of the gods or of formidable beings. The hermetical books, or the books connected with the treatment of the dead, taught these names; and those who knew them exercised indisputable power over those who bore them (see art. NAMES [Egyptian]).

The 'name' and the series of 'bodies' (the body of flesh, the double, the shadow, the ghost, and the *sâhu*) together constituted a complete being. These were not, however, enough to form a *living* being. As yet there was only a being capable of living, only the *possibility* of life. In these religious systems, what we shall call, for want of a better name, the 'exercise of life' does not result *ipso facto* from the junction of the body or bodies with the soul or what takes its place. It is the product of forces peculiar to the being to be animated, and it is enough if the being that these powers are going to animate is completely fitted to receive them. This is shown very clearly, moreover, by reference to the statues—those artificial bodies—fashioned by the hand of man, which are nevertheless treated in Egyptian religion precisely like real bodies. The most ancient rituals show us that it was usual to perform a series of magical operations to enable the eyes of a statue to see, its ears to

hear, its nose to breathe, its mouth to eat, and the other organs to fulfil their functions. And if the historical period has preserved only traces—though certain traces--of many of these old rituals, it has at least kept intact the long ceremonial of 'the opening of the mouth' (*uap-ro*). We need not study these rituals here, since they deal only with artificial bodies created by religion for the service of its gods, its kings, or its dead, or with bodies made by the magicians for the service of their 'magic spells': dolls or images of men and animals in wax, wood, earth, etc., made into 'living bodies' by the sorcerers, the thaumaturgists (cf. Rollin, Harris, Leyden, and Turin Papyri). But the way in which the Egyptians conceived the necessity of enabling a statue to use its organs, after making a soul enter into it, is nevertheless a proof of what it is of interest to keep in mind for our present study, viz. that the union of the animist principle, *ran*, with its coverings was not enough to initiate life.

Life itself (*aonkhu*) was the result of the entrance into the body of those vital breaths which exist in all Nature, and which the air carries and the breeze (*nifu*) wafts to the faces of beings. They enter by the nostrils, not by the mouth. Like the majority of African races at the present day, the Egyptians breathed through the nose; and in their language the breath of the nostrils was synonymous with life. It is always to the nose, and never to the lips, that the gods or kings in iconography hang the chains or bundles of 'handled crosses,' which are intended to signify, by a play of pictorial words, the breaths of life. Thus they penetrated within the coverings which constitute the body. It was supposed that there they mixed with the blood, in the form of a kind of gas or bubbles, and circulated by the blood-vessels through the whole human system. Under their beneficent influence, the 'vessels swelled up and worked regularly.' Life accordingly served to maintain the conjunction of the various bodies adjusted within each other and the 'name.' It was, therefore, as necessary to the 'name' as to the series of bodies.

We usually translate the Egyptian phrase *sonkhu ran* by 'give life to the name of. . . .' The translation is somewhat poetical and seems to be connected with ideas familiar to us. But it is only an approximation. The literal sense is 'make the *self* breathe the breaths,' and this leads us to conceptions far removed from ours.

2. Once we leave the medical point of view, Egypt has preserved very few details as to her ideas of the body during its existence on earth. For although we have from the point of view of medicine a veritable superfluity of documents (we need only note among others the Berlin, Ebers, and Amherst Papyri, and those found by Petrie in the Fayyūm), the other Egyptian writings have little to do with the *living* body. All the moral and religious literature is exclusively occupied with what happens to the body at its physical death, with whatever has a bearing on burial, funerals, or fate after death. The popular tales or the writings of pure magic remain as a relative source of information on the subject.

It could hardly be otherwise with a religious civilization which evolved the above-mentioned conception of life and of individuals. Bodies composed in the way described cannot, either in rituals or in treatises, be brought into connexion with subjects that bear on ethics, morals, or the respective values or opposition of the soul and the body. Theories like asceticism, for example, or systems of the type of metempsychosis, avoid by their very definition the Egyptian thought of the classical period. Hence the information as to the living body that we derive from the monuments and the religious texts of Egypt will be confined to specifications as to how the body may be affected by disease or cured (and this belongs to the domain of medicine); or how the body is to be adorned, clothed, or tatued (and this is almost exclusively a matter of archæology); or incidentally we shall find detailed information about such and such a part of the body, and about such and such a group of religious ideas or pure superstitions attached to a specified organ. Thus, in connexion with a special literary episode or magical operation, the texts tell us in passing what the Egyptian ideas were in regard to the various specified organs of the body; and these are the only particulars that are of any interest in our present study.

We need not attempt to give a full account here. Certain elements of the body are scarcely mentioned by the Egyptians outside of medical treatises. In the latter, on the other hand, we find long lists of 'the twenty-two vessels of the head, the two vessels of the breast,' etc. As regards the rest of the writings, when it is said of the *heart* (*hāti*, lit. 'the beater') that it is opposed in the economy to the *liver* (*nashmit*, lit. 'the motionless'), the entire subject is exhausted, or nearly so. Of other members or organs we know a little more. Thus, the *eyes* have a special magical power; they fascinate and overpower by the fluid they dart forth; they repel harm or evil spirits if they fix on them first; magic by philtres and spells can increase their keenness exceedingly—even to the extent of enabling its favoured ones to see what the eyes of mortals do not in ordinary circumstances distinguish: invisible spirits, characters written inside a sealed roll, and innumerable other things. The *mouth* is an ever possible entrance for demons, phantoms, and spirits, who are always prowling round people and trying to get into their bodies. The magic or cognate writings carefully note this constant danger, and it is undoubtedly one of the strongest reasons that led the Egyptian to breathe by the nose. It is well known that, amongst many uncivilized peoples, kings and chiefs have a great aversion to being seen during meals. A long time ago the true explanation was offered—an explanation based on primitive ideas, namely, the dread lest spirits and malignant influences might enter by the mouth. It is very probable that the Egyptians shared this fear; and if conjecture is right, although it cannot be proved formally for the kings, the idea is clearly seen in the anxiety displayed in the meal served almost secretly in the interior of the *naos* to the living bodies which are the statues of the gods.

Other parts of the system are the seats of more distinct manifestations or principles. The integrity and healthy state of the *bones* are apparently one of the conditions essential to the harmonious working of the vital functions. The Egyptians seem to have had a strange idea that the disorganization of the system attacked by illness or death began in the bony structure, the marrow of which constituted somehow or other a vital reserve of special force. But this special point has received little attention as yet, and what has just been said is suggested with the greatest reserve, pending more minute study of the ancient religious texts.

We are a little more certain, on the other hand, of the Egyptian idea that the *top of the vertebral column* was the precise point at which certain magic fluids or certain energies could penetrate into the body. The bestowal of the vital or healing fluid (*sā*) by the gods or their representatives laying their hands on this point of the neck, is a scene reproduced in thousands of examples in the Egyptian monuments; it is enough to mention it here. The *inside of the skull* is the chief *habitat*

of that sort of agile principle which the Egyptian calls *bâ*, and which is represented sometimes in the form of a lapwing or a wading-bird, sometimes in the likeness of a bird with a human head; it was thought sometimes to show itself in the form of a bee. We translate it by 'soul' (*q.v.*); but that is only a rough approximation, given only because it is necessary to have a translation. The *bâ* is neither one of man's bodies nor a kind of radio-active substance like the *ran*; we can hardly compare it to anything but those little genii or 'spirits,' sometimes one, sometimes several, that so many savage peoples locate in the nape of the neck of the human being. The primitive Egyptian believed also—and the texts have preserved the trace of it—that a man had several *bâ* (plur. *biu*) as he had several *ka*. At the historical period, this complicated privilege was reserved for the gods and their heirs. This 'soul,' moreover, was so material that dread gods could sometimes catch it and feed upon it.

All this is only approximate translation, and necessarily so, when we attempt to reproduce in our precise modern terminology material distinctions and ideas conceived according to information and initial data so different from ours. Thus it is usual to translate the Egyptian word *ab* by 'heart,' although the *ab* of the human body is quite a different thing. 'Inside' is a word with a distinctly less dignified sound; but it has the merit of being a more faithful rendering. The *ab* is something not well analyzed, but with exact enough limitations. It is, in short, the belly—meaning by that the stomach and the intestinal apparatus, and to a certain extent the heart, considered from the point of view of shocks which the emotions may cause in it. This 'inside' is the seat of another special kind of 'soul,' distinct from the *bâ* soul. It is an obscure soul, connected specially with all the manifestations of feeling and passions—impulsive, the generator of movements and of good or bad actions. What is certain is that it is a soul with its own peculiar existence and activity. Originally, at least, it existed on its own account—until the time when the progress of Egyptian thought and its striving after psychological unity made it a sort of appendix to the true 'self' (for more detail, see art. HEART). If the Egyptians had precise ideas on its origin, it would appear that the soul of the *ab* was believed to come from the vital substance of the mother (cf. *Book of the Dead*, ch. xxxvi.). The ancient texts published at the present time are not of sufficient number to give us an exact appreciation of the ideas attached to the *jasu* (vertebræ ?), the *bakasu* (kidneys ?), and the *samiu seiu* (viscera ?). We can only guess that some vital reserve force was located in these parts. It was chiefly conceived under the form of 'powers,' 'knowledge of magic names,' and other sensitive or mental manifestations, as material emanations and, to a certain extent, as a kind of special soul.

The rest of the individual is not marked by anything of special interest. The superstitions attaching to the hair, the ears, the teeth, the hands and feet, are only details, and do not bear so much upon the fundamental magic of the religious ideas as upon popular superstition, the contents of which are dissolved and re-fashioned at all periods. We should note only the continual care to protect the various parts of the body, as with magic armour, against the possible attacks of evil spirits: hence the customs relating to amulets, talismans, tatuing, etc., some of which are combined, in the period of civilization, with the taste for physical adornment, and give rise to the greater part of jewellery (necklaces, bracelets, rings, etc.) and perfumery (pastes, paints, unguents, etc.). Circumcision is connected with this group of ruling ideas, but it will be treated in a special article because of its importance (see art. CIRCUMCISION).

To complete our survey of ideas relating to the human body, we note the following: (*a*) The link between the various material bodies may be temporarily broken during the earthly life, under the influence of certain forces voluntarily employed or involuntarily submitted to by man. A magician, for example, can by means of set formulas send his 'ghost' or his 'double' far away to perform some deed or other. Or it may happen to an ordinary mortal—usually during his sleep—that his 'double' leaves his body and shows itself in some other place, in the form of a body of flesh and bones more or less visible and tangible. As among all peoples, dreams and apparitions are the pseudo-experimental proofs of these ideas, and the Egyptian notions about sleep, lethargy, and syncope differ very little from those found almost universally.

(*b*) During the whole of its terrestrial life the body is subject to whatever astral or natural influences prevailed on the day when it made its appearance in the world—and this independently of the influences to which the 'name' is submitted, and of which we have spoken. The calendar, the horoscopes, the thousand particulars noticed at the moment of birth, may serve to determine this influence and, to a certain extent, may make it possible to charm away ill-luck (cf. Sallier Papyrus). The study of them determines what precautions must be taken when the conjunction of evil influences proper to such and such a body shows itself anew.

(*c*) Both during the terrestrial life of the body of flesh and after it, the fragments taken from its substance, its perspiration or its excretions, retain to a certain degree the force of the vital fluid of the whole individual. In Egypt, therefore, as in so many nations, we find those beliefs in the virtues of nail-parings, hair- or beard-clippings, and of the cloth soaked in the perspiration of some individual, which played such an important part in magic and necromancy. The fluid emanation of the living body may even communicate something of the life and powers of an individual to the clothing he has worn, and especially to ornaments, arms or badges that he has had in his hands. This idea, which can be found among several African peoples, appears even more clearly in regard to objects connected with the king's attire. He communicates to them a sort of divine power similar, *e.g.*, to the power given by the king of Dahomey to his cane or his sceptre.

3. A last remark is necessary in connexion with these characteristics of the body among the ancient Egyptians. When investigating the idea cherished by any one of the non-civilized races as to the body, we are able to determine its characteristics accurately enough, because we have under our eyes a population in most cases restricted in number or area, and because, as a rule, we know it only at the very time when we are examining it. But we must not forget that, in the case of Egypt, we are dealing with a civilization which has, in time and space, had several different religions, each with its own evolution. These ideas of the body are distributed throughout a historically ascertained series of thirty-eight centuries, having behind it, according to the traditional texts, a pre-historic mass of documents impossible to evaluate, but certainly the product of a considerable number of centuries. Further, these ideas have never at any one period been the same in the whole of Egypt. The Heliopolitan did not form the same conception of the body as the Theban, the Hermopolitan, or the Mendesian. Consequently it is not the absolute

theory of the Egyptian ideas on the body that is given in this article. It is rather a general view, in which it is possible to shade off or accentuate details, according as one is trying to picture the ideas concerning the body of an Egyptian of the Ptolemaic period, a Saite, a Theban, a Memphite, a Thinite, or a man of the pre-Thinite period of some province in the Nile valley. But if we desire to gather from the whole the essential physiognomy, and to look for the distinct characteristics of the primary notions, we shall come very near an exact expression of the early Egyptian ideas on the body if we say that it is a confused conglomeration of substances similar in nature, but of different qualities, defined as independent of each other, but in fact continually united by the 'name.' The whole is set in motion by a multiplicity of 'spirits,' with no fixed mutual cohesion, and originally peculiar to a certain part or physical manifestation of the individual. Upon the whole, it is a body very similar to what is revealed to us by scientific inquiry (if not alike in every point, at least identical in the main) among the least civilized peoples of our times, such as some specimens of the non-Aryans of India, the Battaks, the Caribs, the most backward of the Bantu group, etc.

ii. **Animate creatures or inanimate objects.**—It would appear that, in a general way, without entering into exact details, the rest of the *bodies* in the sensible world were considered as having the same texture as the human body. This applies not only to animals, but also to vegetables, and even to such things as a stone, a rock, an expanse of water, or any object made by man. The religious, magic, and popular literatures present sure examples with reference to the 'double' or the 'name' of a tree, a pillar, or a staff—to mention only these cases. The only restriction that must be noted is that, since it was dealing with objects of less interest than men, theological speculation took less trouble to describe their nature accurately, and to reconcile the contradictory data of their origin. One thing is certain, viz. that there was no essential difference in the structure of all things in the material world—from the inanimate object to man. All are, *a priori*, of the same organization, down almost to the degrees of their qualities.

iii. **Gods.**—1. In a country like Egypt this same unity naturally applies to divine beings. In fact, there is no dogmatic definition marking off the deity. The gods originate, not owing to the possession of characteristics different from the rest of beings and things, but simply owing to more remarkable manifestations of the actions and forces common to them and these others.

The body of the gods was quite the same as that of men, both in its economy and in its peculiar characteristics. It might be larger, more resistant, more rapid in its movement, more durable, less vulnerable, and more difficult to catch sight of. It was not said to be imperishable, or endowed with ubiquity, or proof against sickness, pain, and wounds. Its substance had the same advantages and defects as the human substance. Its specific characteristics of weight, dimensions, colour, qualities of flesh and bone, do not form the subject of a group of formal theories in any of the Egyptian texts. But the literature and ritual mention innumerable particulars in passing, and these are ample compensation for the omission. The Pyramid texts, for example, or the hymns of the historical period, provide abundant stores of the material in question. On the other hand, contrary to the generally accepted idea, neither the popular tales nor the legendary lore merit any more confidence in this respect, as sources of information on the religious ideas, than would be inspired among us by the more or less entertaining tales that bring in the devil, the saints, or God the Father.

The 'Tale of the Two Brothers' does not clear up the Ennead; the statement of a magic papyrus, that Osiris was more than seven cubits in height, is not an article of faith; and upon the strength of the 'Story of the Old-age of Ra' we are not to believe that the body of the aged sun was made of precious metals, or that the sun-god 'shivered with cold and slobbered.' In the same way, the symbolism of the iconography is not to be taken literally, and gods like Osiris or Amon of Amentit, with black, blue, or green flesh, do not stand for a fact accepted by theology, but simply represent a means of expressing an idea. But this idea, it must be granted, was not always the same. Thus Osiris with the green flesh might, according to the period in view, stand for re-birth, re-verdure, or even for the decomposition of the flesh of dead gods. With this same symbolism, possessed of no absolute value, we may connect also the body of flesh (*aufu*) attributed to the Evening Sun, or the complex body of Osiris of Dendereh.

If we leave out of account all these appended or artificial elements, the body of the Egyptian gods seems, on the whole, to have been exactly the same as we have found the body of men to be. The gods have a body of flesh, and they have a shadow, though there is little mention of the latter in the texts (chiefly the shadow of Ra or of Aten). Above all, they have several 'doubles' (*kau*) and several 'bird-souls' (*biu*). It was even held, at a certain time, that they had seven 'bird-souls' and fourteen 'doubles'—this, from all accounts, because of the magic and mystical virtue of these numbers. Their manner of nourishment and of movement, and in general all the functions of their body, are just the same as those we know of for men (leaving out of count, of course, all that has to do with their artificial bodies or 'supports of the double'—their statues). Their extreme swiftness, the keenness of their senses, their absolute dimensions, and their resistance to death are differences of fact, as has just been said, but not of organization. Their longevity was, *de facto*, indefinite, but it was not held theoretically that they were eternal (see DEATH). It was generally thought, at least in Heliopolis, that they drew from 'the basin of the fluid *sâ*' one of the secrets of their resistance to death.

2. There remains, however, a problem ill solved, or, rather, ill stated. The human being necessarily possesses only one body of flesh—one single combination of bodies. But we see that the Egyptian god possessed several bodies simultaneously, each one of them animated by some of his 'souls,' and by a part, or rather an emanation, of his 'name.' On the other hand, other texts or pictorial representations seem to imply that the divine beings have only one single combination of bodies. This is an important matter, touching as it does upon questions like the original formation of the gods and totemism.

Historical examination of the religions of Egypt fails to discover any indication that the personality of such and such a god was originally distributed among several bodies. Still less was it distributed throughout the entire species of some animal or vegetable under the characteristics of which this god was represented. On the other hand, it follows from the initial data as to the nature of beings, that the possession of several bodies animated by one and the same 'self' is not at all impossible. The 'name' (*q.v.*), while still remaining *one and entire* in each specimen of a being, may locate itself in several bodies, and in each of them may be one of the momentary subjective 'aspects' of one and the same entity. This is confirmed, in the religious monuments of Egypt, by the various epithets added to the principal name of the god. Each one expresses the detailed, local energy or quality of a distinct body belonging to one and the same god.

Stated in this way, the question becomes above all a question of fact, to which it is not possible to

give one single reply, because the Egyptians themselves have given more than one. We must make distinctions according to the importance of each god, and according to the period in view. Thus the humblest and most ancient gods, restricted to a single manifestation of energy or charged with a single definite and limited act, have no need of more than one body. Such deities as Selkit the Scorpion and Marit-Soghru the Serpent, so far as we know, had only one body. On the other hand, when similar attributes fused two or more deities originally geographically independent into a single god, the new deity thus formed kept as many bodies as it had formerly for the separate gods of whom it was composed. A tree-goddess like Nuit, for example, had as many bodies as there had been tree-goddesses with the same character and same rôle, before the one single Nuit developed.

More important gods originally incarnated in separate persons led to the formation of a deity single in 'name,' but necessarily provided with several bodies. Thus Thōth, at once monkey and ibis, was able to live in several bodies. *A fortiori*, the gods with important national functions or with a cosmogonic rôle, being the product of syncretism, and being the combination of a great number of original gods, animated a sometimes very considerable number of bodies at the same time. An Amon-Ra, conceived as possessing simultaneously the attributes of the demiurge sun Minu, the hawk Harmakhis of Heliopolis, the ram and the gander of Thebes, could not but live a complete unity in each of these varieties of material body.

The series extends then, by previous definition, from the simple single body to the multiplicity that has no limitations. But it is a *historical* fact, and not the outcome of any religious theory. As a rule, there was at first only one body for every divine 'name.' Then the attributes ascribed to certain beings among those regarded as more specially divine grew in importance and brought about fusions. In cases where by elimination (or subordination of the secondary characteristics of the beings originally distinct) the new god completely annihilated the personality of those whom he absorbed, he continued to have only one body (*e.g.* Mihit Oirit). Where, on the other hand, it was impossible to fuse the characteristics of the original gods into a perfect amalgamation (as in the case of Hathor), the composite deity retained as many bodies as it preserved distinct aspects. To enumerate all the possible combinations, it would be necessary to re-construct the whole history of Egyptian mythology. All that it is possible or necessary to explain here is the mechanism; we need not go into all its practical applications.

There is a sort of counter-evidence that the above is the case, and that the possession of a plurality of bodies by the god is only a result of fact, and does not mark a superiority of nature attributed to them dogmatically. We refer to the series of ideal gods imagined by theology. When the latter created deities by systematic deduction or by personification of functions—deities conceived in human form, like Maat or, later, Imhotep—it gave them only one body. Created in a homogeneous manner, they do not require other bodies, no matter how complex or lofty their attributes. The cult of Aten at Amarna and that of Hapi the Nile-god, with apparent divergencies chiefly of a literary kind, belong to this scheme of formation.

In conclusion, the case of the divine animals worshipped in the temples does not conflict with the above view. On the contrary, it indirectly confirms it. It is known that the 'sacred' animals, which, by the way, are a relatively late introduction into Egypt, are not the bodies of the gods, but beings sharing by simple veneration the regard due to the gods. The animal-god worshipped in the sanctuary (*e.g.* Apis, Mnevis, Knumu of Elephantine, Sukhos [Crocodile] of Ombos, the Ram of Mendes) is the only copy, the only true body of the local god on earth—to the exclusion of similar animals. This does not mean that the Egyptians thought they had in the sanctuary the one and only body of the god, but that they had the one and only *duplicatum* of it. In fact, the world was supposed to be divided into two great halves, symmetrical in every part. Each of the great national gods (we need not take the trouble to reconcile so many contradictory data for the lesser gods) had his kingdom in the other world, and in this world possessed a part of Egypt that corresponded to that kingdom. His body dwelt in the other world; but his 'name' animated an exact replica of this body in this human world—a perishable temporary representation, which is the divine animal worshipped in the sanctuary. To the divine cow of Dendereh, to the ram of Elephantine, to the hawk of Ermonthis, *e.g.*, there corresponded in the kingdoms of the other world a cow, a ram, and a hawk really alive, really divine, with bodies fashioned alike, perhaps gigantic, though Egypt has given no precise information on this point. One thing is certain, viz., that they sometimes showed themselves to the eyes of mortals. As to the exact sojourn of the one body of the gods in the other world, it should be said that here again there has been a succession of beliefs. The most ancient of them show us the gods living sometimes in the other world, after the fashion of the world of men, sometimes in the celestial world. The assimilation of earlier and later beliefs in homogeneous groups has gone far in developing the multiplicity of bodies belonging to one and the same god; and the solar theories of Heliopolis, with the course of Ra in his bark, have given far greater importance to the stellar bodies of the divine beings.

LITERATURE.—If we exclude what belongs to medicine, eschatology, and the disposal of the dead, the data as to the Egyptian body are scattered all over the field of Egyptological literature, the *living* body never having been the object of a special monograph. Only a few parts of it have been studied separately, but without synthesis. We may mention specially: Amélineau, *Prolégomènes, à l'étude de la religion égyptienne*, Paris, 1908, p. 403 ff.; Birch, 'On the Shade or Shadow,' in *TSBA* viii. 386; Budge, *Gods of the Egyptians*, London, 1904; Le Page Renouf, 'On the true Sense,' etc., in *TSBA* vi. 494; and esp. Maspero, *Histoire* [tr. 1894–1900] i. 108, 112, 146, 212, 215, 217 (where there are notes giving the principal references); also the first two volumes of his 'Études de Mythologie et d'Archéologie,' in the *Bibliothèque égyptologique*, Paris, 1893.

GEORGE FOUCART.

BODY (Greek and Roman).—**1. Anthropological.**—(1) *Body and soul.*—Among the Greeks, as among most other races, the distinction between body and soul—the natural dualism of mankind—can be traced to a very remote antiquity. This distinction took shape in the primitive mind as a result of its experience of certain peculiar facts. It is maintained by H. Siebeck,* who on this point differs from such scholars as Rohde and Gomperz, that the most potent factor in the development of this dualism is that succession of inner and outer experience undergone by primitive man—as by the child of to-day—in connexion with his own body. To the undeveloped consciousness the body is at first simply a thing among things, precisely like a stone or a tree. It is only by degrees that the growing mind, in consequence of internal and external sensations, as, for instance, bodily pain or hunger, acquires the idea of the body as the medium between self-consciousness and the outer world. An important constituent of naive dualism, no

* *Gesch. d. Psychologie*, 1880, i. 6 ff., with reference to the facts of empirical psychology as discussed by Volkmann, *Lehrbuch d. Psychologie*, 1876, ii. § 106.

doubt, lies here; and so far Siebeck is right. But a number of other factors, which, to be sure, Siebeck does not ignore, must also be taken into account; as, for example, the ofttimes rapid transition from life to death, the experience of dreaming, or of fainting, 'possession,' sudden emotions and their resultant involuntary actions, and, finally, the ecstatic trance. These were also the facts which in the dawn of Greek history generated the idea of a possible *separation between body and soul*; thus the soul might well seem to be temporarily withdrawn from the body in the case of dreaming, swooning, or ecstasy, and permanently so in the case of death, when the body returns to its original elements.*

The distinction between the visible and corporeal man and his invisible indwelling *Doppelgänger*, the *ψυχή*, is presupposed also in the Homeric poems. Here, however, the ideas of body and soul have assumed a special complexion. All the activities, mental or other, of the human personality, such as feeling, thought, volition, exertion, are regarded as being possible only so long as body and soul are united; in fact, they are in the strictest sense functions of the body. *μένος*, *νόος*, *μῆτις*, *βουλή*, and *θυμός* also, are bodily faculties or powers, and although they can assert themselves only while the *psyche*, at once the 'second ego' of man and the principle of his animal life, remains within him, yet they are in no sense evolved from the inherent capacities of the soul as such, which has absolutely no share in the waking activities of man.† The spiritual and psychical faculties which are localized in the various organs, and especially in the diaphragm (*φρένες*) of the living person, appertain entirely to the body. The idea of a life apart from the body, *i.e.* independent of the union of body and soul, simply lay outside the range of Homeric thought. Here it is the body rather than the soul around which the supreme interest circles—a phenomenon quite intelligible in a naive and frankly sensuous age, free as yet from all reflexion about a possible closer relation between body and soul in a living and waking man. Hence even the lifeless body is repeatedly spoken of as the true self (*αὐτός*), and set in contrast with the *psyche*.‡ A well-known passage is *Iliad*, i. 3 f.: πολλὰς δ' ἰφθίμους ψυχὰς Ἄιδι προΐαψεν ἡρώων, αὐτοὺς δὲ ἑλώρια τεῦχε κυνέσσιν οἰωνοῖσί τε δαῖτα (cf. also xxiii. 65 f., 105 ff.). (Now and then, it is true, the *psyche* that is speeding towards Hades, or already dwelling there, is distinguished by the name of its erewhile living possessor, or, it may be, is even spoken of as if it were himself in person (cf. Rohde, i. 5 f.); but the latter idea is largely evanescent in the mind of the poet.)

(2) *The dead body.*—Of the cult of the dead which at one time prevailed throughout the Hellenic world, as elsewhere, the Homeric poems show isolated traces only; and it is one of the enduring triumphs of Rohde to have discovered these and set them in their proper light. The ideas underlying this cult, which, though but faintly recognizable in Homer, was universally diffused among the Greeks in the post-Homeric age, and in fact down to the end of the ancient period, invested even the *dead body* with a certain interest. The soul of the departed was supposed to be fettered to the resting-place of its former bodily integument. The worship of ancestor or hero had its seat in the place where his bones had been laid. There alone—with some special exceptions—did the soul continue in an active state.

According to Homer, however, whose notices regarding the cult of the dead are sporadic and imperfectly understood even by himself, the soul of the departed finds no rest (in Hades) till the corpse is burned. So long as this act is neglected, the soul still retains a consciousness of events upon the earth; while, once the body has been cremated, the soul is banished to the depths of Erebus. The original purpose of the practice of cremation, in fact, was to guard against the return of the released soul to the land of the living—an idea, however, which has become quite obscured in Homer. The paramount interests of the poet, indeed, lie with those who still enjoy the light of the sun, and not with the dead at all. In his unsophisticated mode of thought, he regards—all unconsciously—the living and waking man with his bodily and mental attributes as a single whole, and similarly all the spiritual and psychical activities of man are evolved from the *body*. So far, therefore, the Homeric point of view, as contrasted with that of the philosophers and theologians of a later age, may be called an unreflective monism.

2. **Religious and ethical.**—(1) *Orphism.*—Homeric views regarding body and soul, and their relation to each other, find their sharpest possible contrast in the ideas which, germinating in the ecstasy of the Dionysan cult and the psychical experiences evoked there, or, again, in the principles of *katharsis*, received their definitive form among the Orphic sects. According to the latter, there obtained not only an irreconcilable dualism between body and soul, but also a profound difference in value. The soul was no longer, as in Homer, the phantom counterpart of the man, making its influence felt in the acts of dreaming, swooning, or dying; it was now regarded as intrinsically of Divine origin, uncreated and imperishable, and as having been immured within the body in expiation of its guilt.

See Plato, *Cratyl.* 400 B C (Diels, *Frag.*[2] ii. 1. 473, No. 3; cf. Abel, *Orphica*, frag. 221): καὶ γὰρ σῆμά τινές φασιν αὐτὸ (the body) εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς ὡς τεθαμμένης ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι· καὶ διότι αὖ τοῦτῳ σημαίνει, ἃ ἂν σημαίνῃ ἡ ψυχή, καὶ ταύτῃ σῆμα ὀρθῶς καλεῖσθαι· δοκοῦσι μέντοι μάλιστα θέσθαι οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα, ὡς δίκην διδούσης τῆς ψυχῆς, ἕν δὴ ἕνεκα δίδωσιν, τοῦτον δὲ τὸν περίβολον ἔχειν, ἵνα σῴζηται δεσμωτηρίου εἰκόνα. Cf. *Phædo*, 62 B, and Diels, in reference to Philolaos, frag. 14 and 15. The body is accordingly the grave or prison-house of the soul, which in its present life is in a state analogous to death. It is therefore the aim of the Orphics χωρίζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐθίσαι αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγείρεσθαί τε καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι (*Phædo*, 67 C; cf. Diels on Heraclitus, frag. 115).

(2) *Pythagoreanism.*—In regard to the process by which such ideas, so alien, apparently, to the natural temperament of the Greeks, as of mankind in general, gained a footing in Greek thought, the reader may consult the art. ASCETICISM (Greek). It will be sufficient here to emphasize the fact that the ideas in question, wholly un-Hellenic as they may appear, exerted a profound influence upon many Greek philosophers, and even, as we may infer from what has been said (above, p. 81), upon early thinkers like Pythagoras and his disciples. Definite evidence of this influence, it is true, first emerges in the case of Philolaos (*c.* 440 B.C.), who, in referring to the Orphics, writes as follows: μαρτυρέονται δὲ καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ θεολόγοι τε καὶ μάντιες ὡς διά τινος τιμωρίας ἃ ψυχὰ τῷ σώματι συνέζευκται καὶ καθάπερ ἐν σώματι τούτῳ τέθαπται (frag. 14; cf. the passages given by Diels in connexion with frags. 14 and 15). We need not be surprised, therefore, to find Archytas (*c.* 400–350 B.C.) making allusion to the battle against sensual pleasure (ἡδονή, the *voluptas corporis* of Cicero) (cf. Diels, *Frag.*[2] i. 252, 30 ff.), which the early Pythagoreans

* *Iliad*, vii. 99, xxiv. 54.

† Taken purely by itself, the soul has at best a shadowy existence, not worthy of the name of 'life' at all, and destitute even of the attribute of self-consciousness.

‡ It is a significant circumstance that Homer has no proper term for the *living* body. His usual word for it is δέμας, which, however, connotes only the figure, the outward visible form; cf. δέμας πυρός. In Homer σῶμα always denotes the *dead* body.

regarded as the worst of plagues, impeding the soul in its endeavours to reach its celestial home, and causing it to forget its high descent.*

That Empedocles likewise held a similar theory of the relation between body and soul may be inferred from what is said in ASCETICISM (Greek) (above, pp. 81[b], 82[a]) regarding his indebtedness to Orphism and Pythagoreanism. Direct reference to the point, however, is found only in a single fragment of his writings (126, cf. Diels): *σαρκῶν ἀλλόγνωτι περιστέλλουσα χιτῶνι.* We may well suppose that similar views were cherished by several other thinkers and poets who were more or less influenced by Orphic or Pythagorean doctrines. This was certainly the case with Pherecydes of Syros.† In Heraclitus also (frag. 4. 96) we may trace a certain disparagement of the body, though he does not, like the 'theologians,' regard body and soul as antagonistic to each other, but rather as subsisting in a state of constant interchange (frag. 36; cf. 76, 77). Adumbrations of this idea are also found in Pindar (frag. 131, Böckh).

(3) *Plato.*—It was a matter of vast significance, however, that the cardinal ideas of the Orphic-Pythagorean schools should have been assimilated by Plato, and wrought into the fabric of his philosophy. The way in which the founder of Western idealism interpreted the relation of the human body to the imperishable soul is known to every reader of the *Phædo*. As we have already given, in the art. ASCETICISM (Greek), a brief exposition of the leading ideas in Plato's system of philosophical and theological thought, we confine ourselves here to the most indispensable points.

The human soul occupies a peculiar position between the sensible and the supersensible world. Though itself uncreated, *i.e.* of Divine origin, it is drawn into the vortex of becoming. It does not rank as an Idea, but is at best 'most like' one, participating in the Idea of life. In the pre-mundane existence of the soul, while dwelling amongst gods and spirits like itself, it has beheld the 'super-celestial realm,' and the world of real being, but in consequence of a decline in its cognitive faculty, and an ascendancy in its impulses of desire, it has been drawn down to the earth, and has fallen into corporeality.‡ Particulars will be found in the famous allegory in *Phædrus*, 246 B ff. But although body and soul are fundamentally disparate in character, the body and its impulses exert a strong and persistent pressure upon the immortal sojourner within. By the time when the soul enters upon its earthly life, it has completely forgotten its pre-existence and the world of Ideas in which it formerly lived. Its knowledge of truth is now impeded by the illusory impressions of sense-perception, while the body, by means of its impulses, and the desires and affections to which they give rise, wields a most dangerous influence over the soul, deranging its capacity for thought, and wholly perverting its judgment regarding the true good.

Cf. *Phædo*, e.g. 64 ff., especially 66 B-D: . . . . *ἕως ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν καὶ συμπεφυρμένη ᾖ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ μετὰ τοιούτου κακοῦ οὐ μή ποτε κτησώμεθα ἱκανῶς οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν· φαμὲν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές. μυρίας μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀσχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τροφήν· ἔτι δὲ ἄν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν· ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπίμπλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, ὥστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονῆσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν· καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτου ἐπιθυμίαι. διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γίγνονται, τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἀναγκαζόμεθα κτᾶσθαι διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δουλεύοντες τῇ τούτου θεραπείᾳ, κ.τ.λ.* Cf. 83 B-D.

Irrationality, fierce passions, grave disorders of the soul, may in fact proceed from the body or from the conditions that at any time prevail therein (cf. especially *Timæus*, 86 B ff.). In sober truth, the body is the source of all that harms the soul. For although evil may be the soul's own act, she would have no promptings to evil-doing were she not imprisoned in the body (cf. Zeller, II. i. 871). Every misfortune, every guilty deed in human life, emanates in the last resort from the latter. As a result of her union with the body, the soul herself becomes polluted, and, in fact, unless she resists the propensities of the flesh, she may even assume a *quasi*-bodily character (*σωματοειδές*, cf. *Phædo*, 83 D), just as the sea-god Glaucus was deformed by wrack and shells to the point of unrecognizability. In this way the majority of mankind are drawn aside from their true end in life. For the fall into the corporeal state lays upon the soul the task—in reality her only task—of purging herself as effectually as possible, even in this life, from the contamination induced by her connexion with the body (*Phædo*, 67 C D), by overcoming and keeping permanently in subjection not alone the impulses of sense, but all appetites and affections whatever: she must, in a word, strive after an inward deliverance from the world of the flesh and the senses. Only so does she become free to apply herself to those imperishable treasures beside which the visible world dwindles to nothingness; only so can the soul yield herself to that philosophy which, by means of dialectic and in virtue of her 'reminiscence' of things aforetime seen, develops her faculty of cognizing the sphere of true being, of the Ideas, so leading her into the right way towards her proper home and at last to God Himself.

Such in outline is the doctrine of Plato—a harsh and rigid dualism: here, the world of illusion and illusive values, beneath which nothing permanent exists; and there, the goods which never fade away, and which constitute the whole aim and object of philosophy. This dualism was, it is true, somewhat mitigated in Plato's later life (see above, p. 83[a]), but again and again in innumerable passages of his works, even in the *Timæus*, where its presence involves a flagrant inconsistency, it breaks forth in triumph.

The speculations of Plato, aided as they were by the incomparable literary craftsmanship with which he gave them expression, had an enormous influence on subsequent thought. His dualism, and in particular his view of the body as the ultimate root of all, or at least of innumerable, evils in human life, as an enemy against which the soul must fight, and as an unclean and defiling thing from which she must rid herself as soon and as thoroughly as possible, produced a profound effect even upon such of the ancient thinkers as did not accept the Orphic-Pythagorean-Platonic

* Cf. Diels, *Frag.*[2] i. 252, 30 ff., 280, 44 ff., 288, 12 ff.—Sensual pleasure, by later writers frequently spoken of as *ἡδονὴ σωματική*, to distinguish it from spiritual pleasures, was vehemently repudiated, not only by the adherents of a rigidly dualistic anthropology, but also by the Cynics and the Stoics. The body being the source of pleasure, we find Xenophon (*Memorab.* i. 2. 23) insisting upon the necessity of constant exercise in *σωφροσύνη*. On the other hand, Aristippus, the founder of the Cyrenaic school, declared sensual pleasure to be a good, though with certain qualifications (Diog. Laert. ii. 90; Zeller, II. i. 356 ff.). The high value ascribed by Epicurus not merely to pleasure in general, but even—in spite of all his saving clauses—to bodily gratification, as the source of happiness, is tellingly shown in frags. 67, 70, 409 (Usener). His standpoint is far removed from that of Plato, and we need not wonder that Posidonius in particular so vigorously assailed his doctrine.

† Diels, *Frag.*[2] II. i. 505 f. No. 5; see also Gomperz, i. 71 f.

‡ Its entrance into the body is the result of an 'intellectual fall'; for, according to Plato's original view (in the *Phædrus*), the soul, even in its pre-mundane state, had three *εἴδη*, *i.e.*, not only the *λογιστικόν*, but also the *θυμοειδές* and the *ἐπιθυμητικόν*, of which the last two cramp the first, and, still clinging to the soul after death, are the cause of its attachment to the world of sense and its tendency to further incarnation (*Phædo*). On the other hand, according to the *Timæus*—a much later work—the entrance of the soul into the material realm takes place in pursuance of the Divine order, being designed to animate the world of the visible. On this interpretation the two inferior capacities of the soul arise out of its union with the body, ust as again they pass away with the latter at death.

doctrine of the soul. We may also venture to assume, notwithstanding the absence of positive testimony, that a theory regarding body and soul akin to that of Plato prevailed in the Old Academy. It is at all events certain that such a view was held by Xenocrates (frag. 20 H), as well as by Philip of Opus and Heracleides Ponticus, and probably even by Aristotle in his earlier years.

(4) *Aristotle.*—With riper experience, however, Aristotle abandoned his master's dualistic standpoint, save in regard to one important feature, and advanced to an entirely different conception of the relation between body and soul, a conception which stands in the closest connexion with his metaphysical teaching about the relations of matter (*ὕλη*) and form (*εἶδος*), of potentiality (*δύναμις*) and actuality (*ἐνέργεια, ἐντελέχεια*). Here we come upon the pregnant idea of the 'organic,' which Aristotle was the first to formulate. An object is said to be organic when its parts are 'instruments' (*ὄργανα*) for the realization of the end for which the nature of the object as a whole is designed. A whole of this character, however, is manifestly framed with a view to life or animation, and accordingly the organic and the animate are but different designations for the same thing. The human body, as indeed the body of any *ζῷον*, attains its realization only in virtue of the soul. The soul is the *εἶδος* (the principle of form working from within outwards) *σώματος φυσικοῦ ζωὴν ἔχοντος δυνάμει* (*de Anima*, ii. 1. 412 A, 20 ff.). The 'end' of the body is the soul, which realizes itself, and at the same time realizes life, in the body and its organs (*de Partibus Animalium*, i. 5. 645 B, 14 ff.). Apart from the soul the body is but a corpse. It is therefore the entelechy of the body . . . *οὐ τὸ σῶμά ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' αὕτη σώματός τινος, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οἳς δοκεῖ μὴτ' ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι μήτε σῶμά τι ἡ ψυχή* (*de An.* ii. 2. 414 A, 14 ff.); cf. ii. 4. 415 B, 7, *ἔστι δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ ζῶντος σώματος αἰτία καὶ ἀρχή*. Body and soul in a living man may well be distinguished as concepts, but they cannot be dissociated in actual fact. The two form an inseparable synthesis, like the material and the form of a ball of wax, or like the eye and the sense of sight. In the words of Eucken, 'the soul forms with the body a single life-process.' When man dies, his body is deprived of its function as a purposive organism.*

The idea of a dissonance between body and soul, as propounded by the theologians and Plato, is therefore quite foreign to the philosophy of Aristotle. It is true that the latter regards the *νοῦς*, the thinking spirit, as coming from without (*θύραθεν*) to the 'soul,' to that life-giving power which controls and conditions the organism, and combines within itself the physical and the psychical; and here no doubt we come upon an inconsistency in the Aristotelian psychology, a residue of theological and Platonic speculation. Nevertheless there is for Aristotle no opposition between the *νοῦς* and the living body, so that the presence of the former constitutes no end in human life relative to the body.†

(5) *Stoicism.*—Among the earlier Stoics, notwithstanding their monism, we find a certain leaning towards the dualistic theory of body and soul. A characteristic utterance is that of Cleanthes (*Stoicor. Veter. Fr.* i. fr. 529 [Arnim]), who speaks of man as a frail and fleeting thing, needing help at every turn

καθάπερ τροφῆς καὶ σκεπασμάτων καὶ τῆς ἄλλης τοῦ σώματος ἐπιμελείας, πικροῦ τινος τυράννου τρόπον ἐφεστῶτος ἡμῖν καὶ τὸν πρὸς ἡμέραν δασμὸν ἀπαιτοῦντος καὶ εἰ μὴ παρέχοιμεν ὥστε λούειν αὐτὸ καὶ ἀλείφειν καὶ περιβάλλειν καὶ τρέφειν νόσους καὶ θάνατον ἀπειργοῦντος.

The truly decisive step, however, was first taken by Posidonius (first half of the 1st cent. B.C.), the second leader of Middle Stoicism, upon whom the influence of Plato is once more clearly marked (cf. p. 85[a]). He holds that the body, that *inutilis caro* * *et fluida, receptandis tantum cibis habilis*, is an impediment to the heaven-born soul, pining in her prison-house for her ethereal home. To deliver the soul as far as possible from the body even in this life, to shun as the pestilence the lusts and appetites that originate in the body—this is the paramount task of mankind. The body acts as a clog upon the Divine capacity of knowledge possessed by the spirit, which, however, escapes its bonds and wins an ampler insight in dreams, when the body lies asleep as if dead, as also in ecstasy, when the soul forsakes the body, but fully and finally in death itself. At death the soul of the wise, no longer in thrall to the sensuous, will soar to the celestial sphere, and will gain a profound knowledge of the ultimate causes of all existence. On the other hand, the soul of one who has given a loose rein to the lusts of the body must after death long pursue a wandering course, and must undergo manifold pains and purgings. But the soul's conflict with 'this flesh' is protracted and sore, and calls for unflagging effort.†

The Platonic mysticism of Posidonius wrought with great effect upon Cicero, and with greater still upon Seneca. But although the writings of Seneca frequently reflect the dualistic theory of Posidonius, from whom in fact he borrows freely in numberless passages, his own view differs in some degree from that of the Greek thinker. Seneca's theory probably finds its best expression at the beginning of the 14th letter to Lucilius:

'Fateor insitam esse nobis corporis nostri caritatem. Fateor nos huius gerere tutelam. Non nego indulgendum illi: serviendum nego. Multis enim serviet qui corpori servit, qui pro illo nimium timet, qui ad illud omnia refert. Sic gerere nos debemus non tamquam propter corpus vivere debeamus, sed tamquam non possimus sine corpore. Huius nos nimius amor timoribus inquietat, sollicitudinibus onerat, contumeliis obicit. Honestum ei vile est, cui corpus nimis carum est. Agatur eius diligentissime cura, ita tamen, ut cum exiget ratio, cum dignitas, cum fides, mittendum in ignes sit.' Cf. *Ep.* 78. 10; 120. 14–18.

There is something very peculiar in the depreciation and contempt with which the human body is regarded by Epictetus, whose views of mankind in general, notwithstanding his Stoic principles, reveal a strong tinge of dualism. Over and over again the *Dissertations* reveal a curious scorn of the body, and, in fact, as we might expect, from the influence of Cynicism upon Epictetus, he often gives a crudely Cynic expression to the ideas promulgated by Plato and Posidonius. A telling instance of this is found in frag. 23. The body is by nature dead, mere clay and filth; irretrievably abandoned to innumerable vicissitudes, to all, indeed, that happens to be 'stronger'; it is a hindrance to our independence of the external; it does not belong to us, but is an *ἀλλότριον*. Man is

* The teleological point of view was first applied to the human body by Diogenes of Apollonia, through the influence of Anaxagoras. It is set forth in popular form by Socrates in Xenophon, *Memorab.* i. 4. 5 ff., and in a truly scientific style by Aristotle, *e.g.* in *de Partibus Animalium*, iv. 10. 686 A, 25 ff., 687 A, 7 ff. Popular views regarding it re-appear after the middle period of Stoicism; cf. Cicero, *Nat. Deorum*, ii. 134–146.

† As regards Aristotle's physiology, which we cannot deal with here, it may be noted that he regarded the activity of the soul as being connected with the natural heat of the body, this heat being combined with the blood as the animating breath or *πνεῦμα*. Aristotle placed the central organ of psychical life in the heart, while Alcmæon, Democritus, and Diogenes of Apollonia, like Plato, had identified it with the brain. The influence of Aristotle long prevailed to keep the earlier and correct view in the background.

* So Seneca (*Ep.* 92, 110) renders the Greek *σάρξ*, a word which seems to have been applied to the body in a disparaging sense first of all by the Orphics (cf. Empedocles, frag. 126; Wilamowitz on Euripid. *Herakl.* 1269). This usage is next found sporadically among the Tragedians; also in Plato and Platonizing thinkers.

† Cicero, *Tusc. Quæst.* i. 38, 44, 110, *de Leg.* i. 60, *de Div.* i., *de Rep.* vi.; Virgil, *Aen.* vi. 724 ff. (on this see Norden); Seneca, *Ep.* 65. 16 ff.; 92. 110; 102. 23 ff., *Quæst. Nat.* i. 3 f., iii. 18, *ad Marc.* 23 ff.; Galen, *de Plac. Hipp. et Plat.* v. 448 f. (Müller).

'a soul carrying a corpse.' To the wise man, indeed, his body is of no concern.* Above all, the body is a permanent obstacle to happiness, since it stands in the way of virtue, which is in reality the only good. Something more than the influence of Plato or Posidonius, or of the Stoa, is required to explain such hatred of, and disdain for, the body as we find in Epictetus; and it is possible that his experiences with his own decrepit frame may have given some bitterness to his sentiments.

To the high-souled Marcus Aurelius likewise, though, like Epictetus, he was a professed adherent of Stoicism, there exists a keen antagonism between body and soul, and he too speaks repeatedly of the body in tones of passionate scorn. He reprobates it especially as the source of carnal appetite, and as tending to inveigle the soul. He welcomes death because, among other reasons, the soul, whether she then 'is dispersed,' or becomes extinct, or is re-absorbed into the universal soul, is at least released from the body (Stich, 71, 4 ff.). A markedly dualistic tendency appears also in his general views regarding man, though he rejects the belief in a continued personal existence after death.

(6) *Neo-Pythagoreanism and Neo-Platonism.*—Another evidence of the persistent influence of Posidonius, and through him of Plato, upon a later age is to be seen in Neo-Pythagoreanism, which became widely diffused throughout the ancient world, especially in the first three centuries of our era. It has already been shown (above, p. 86) how in this school the Orphic-Pythagorean-Platonic conception of the body as the prison of the soul, conjoined with the notion of matter as the cause of all evil, was resuscitated in intensified form. Similarly, as regards Neo-Platonism (Plotinus), we would refer the reader to the account given on former pages (86[b], 87[a]), merely supplementing it here with an instructive passage regarding mankind from *Enneads*, 47. 10 K:

. . . διττὸν οὖν τὸ ἡμεῖς, ἢ συναριθμουμένου τοῦ θηρίου ἢ τὸ ὑπὲρ τοῦτο ἤδη· θηρίον δὲ ζωωθὲν τὸ σῶμα· ὁ δ' ἀληθὴς ἄνθρωπος ἄλλος ὁ καθαρὸς τούτου τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχων τὰς ἐν νοήσει, αἳ δὴ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ χωριζομένῃ ψυχῇ ἵδρυνται, χωριζομένῃ δὲ καὶ χωριστῇ ἔτι ἐνταῦθα οὔσῃ, κ.τ.λ.

(7) *Popular ideas.*—Popular notions about the relations of body and soul, and about the nature and functions of both — such ideas, namely, as actually took shape among classes of Greek and Roman society outside the influence of philosophy and theology—were practically identical with those of Homer, according to whose simple and unschooled thought the living man forms an undivided unity of matter and spirit. It was only in a later age that, among the Romans in particular, wider circles of society, especially in the large towns, came to be infected with Epicurean and materialistic views, holding that the soul, being but a more subtle matter diffused through the body, and forming the incorporating principle of life, perishes with the material frame. The harshly dualistic theory of human life, however, allied with the conviction that the body is a thing impure and obnoxious,—as enunciated by Plato and Posidonius, by Seneca and Plotinus,—had a potent influence upon ancient, and thence upon mediæval, Christianity, and indeed its effects persist even to the present day.

LITERATURE.—For 1: Nägelsbach, *Homer. Theol.* (Nuremberg 1840); Siebeck, *Gesch. d. Psychol.* (Gotha, 1880), i. 15 ff.; Zeller, *Phil. d. Griech.* i.[5] (Leipzig, 1892); Rohde, *Psyche*[2] (Freiburg i. B., 1898), i.; Gomperz, *Gr. Denker*[2] (Leipzig, 1903) i. 1 ff.

For 2: Rohde, *op. cit.* ii.; Gomperz, *op. cit.* i. 71 f., 103 f.; Zeller, *op. cit.* i. 450 ff., ii. 1[4] (1889), ii. 2[3] (1879), iii. 2[4] (1903); Windelband, *Gesch. d. alten Philos.*[2] (Munich, 1894), 164 ff., *Gesch. d. Philos.*[3] (Tübingen, 1903) 121 f., 188, *Platon*[4] (Stuttgart, 1905) 124 ff.; Eucken, *Lebensanschauungen d. grossen Denker*[5] (Leipzig, 1904), 31 ff., 54; Heinze, *Xenokrates* (Leipzig, 1892), 150 ff.; Ritter-Preller, *Hist. Phil. Græcæ*[7] (Gotha, 1888); Siebeck, *Aristoteles* (Stuttgart, 1899); Schmekel, *Philos. d. mittl. Stoa* (Berlin, 1892) 243, 276, 400 ff.; Wendland, *Die hellen.-röm. Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zu Judentum u. Christentum* (Tübingen, 1907), 84 ff.; Corssen, *de Posidonio Rhodio*, (Bonn, 1878); Diels, *Herakleitos von Ephesos* (Berlin, 1901), *Frag. d. Vorsokratiker*, i.[2] (Berlin, 1906), ii. 1[2] (1907); Abel, *Orphica* (Leipzig, 1885); Hicks, *Aristotle's 'de Anima'* (Camb. 1907); *Epicteti Dissertationes*, ed. H. Schenkl (Leipzig, 1898); *Epictets Handbüchlein der Moral*, ed. W. Capelle (Jena, 1906); *Mark Aurel.*, ed. Stich[2] (Leipzig, 1903); *Plotini Opera*, ed. A. Kirchhoff (Leipzig, 1856).

W. CAPELLE.

BODY (Hebrew).—To the Hebrew, man was a unity. 'Man's body was of the dust, whilst the breath of God was the principle of life within him; but man himself was the single product of these two factors' (F. C. Porter, 'The Yeçer Hara' in *Yale Bibl. and Sem. Studies*, 1901, pp. 91–156). Jewish theology never seriously admitted a dualism. Even when it adopted the doctrine of the 'two impulses,' the good and the evil *yetser* (יֵצֶר), the good impulse did not inhere in the soul, the bad in the body. 'The parallel between St. Paul's contrast of spirit and flesh, and the Rabbinic contrast of the good and evil impulses, is remote and insignificant' (*ib.*).

The same conception of unity is expressed in many ways. 'Three partners there are in the formation of man: God, father, mother' (Bab. *Niddah*, 31*a*). Even more significant is the well-known parable of the Blind and Lame:

'A human king had a beautiful garden, in which were some fine early figs. He set in it two watchmen, one lame and the other blind. Said the lame man to the blind, "I see some fine figs, carry me on your shoulders and we will get the fruit and eat it." After a time the owner of the garden came and asked after his figs. The lame man protested that he could not walk, the blind that he could not see. So the master put the lame man on the blind man's back and judged them together. So God brings the soul and casts it in the body [after death] and judges them together' (*Sanh.* 91*a–b*).

Body and soul thus form one whole, and the persistence in later Jewish thought of the belief in the bodily resurrection was in part, at least, due to the impossibility of separating body and soul, even in the aspect of immortality.

The wonderful structure of the body, its delicate adaptations to ends, was the subject of admiration as an expression of the Divine wisdom. This finds its analogue in the liturgy of the Synagogue in a remarkable benediction, which is recited daily in the morning prayers, and is repeated after the normal functions of the body:

'Blessed art thou, O Lord our God, King of the universe, who hast formed man in wisdom, and created in him many orifices and vessels. It is revealed and known before the throne of thy glory, that if one of these be opened, or one of those be closed, it would be impossible to exist and to stand before thee. Blessed art thou, O Lord, who healest all flesh and dost wondrously' (Singer, *Authorized Daily Prayer-Book*, p. 4. The benediction is Talmudic: *Berak.* 60*b*).

Though the Jews, especially from the Maccabæan period, were strongly opposed to the Greek games and culture of the body, and felt an especial aversion to nude exposure, they had a keen appreciation of physical beauty, not only in women, but in men. The stature of Judas Maccabæus was glorified, and the beauty of various Rabbis is specially recorded (especially Johanan b. Nappaha, *Berak.* 20*a*; cf. Emil G. Hirsch's remarks in *JE* ii. 617). In the mediæval Heb. poetry (imitating the language of the Song of Songs) there is at once a thorough-going eulogy of female beauty and an application of sensuous phraseology to the mystic relations between man and God.

The body was in the Rabbinic view originally a shapeless mass (*golem*); it was a-sexual, or rather bi-sexual, and only later became differentiated (see the early chapters of the Midrash, *Genesis Rabba*). The number of the limbs (or bones) was calculated as 248, and of nerves (including sinews and even blood-vessels) 365, corresponding to the affirmative and negative precepts of the Law (which were enumerated as 613). Adam's dust was taken from all quarters of the globe (*Sanh.* 38*a*), to express the unity of human nature

* For the sake of one's fellow-men, however, and on grounds of good taste, bodily cleanliness, in contrast to the slovenliness of the Cynic, is urgently insisted upon (iv. 11. 9 ff.).

The provision of food, drink, and attire was regarded as a religious duty (Maimonides, *Mischne Tora*, '*Deôth*' v.). Bodily cleanliness was similarly regarded; and as part of the 'Law of Holiness,' dietary restrictions and ablutions were prescribed. From the middle of the 2nd cent. A.D. hand-washing before meals became general. Washing in the early morning was older. During ablutions pietists would avert their eyes from their own bodies. The bodily secretions were not unclean until they separated from the body; in the latter case ablution was rigidly enforced. Special communal baths have always been provided in Jewish settlements. The Biblical conceptions as to the defilement caused by dead bodies were continued in later Judaism. But the great bulk of the early Rabbinic laws as to ritual purity applied only to priests or to Israelites about to participate in Temple rites. Maimonides sums up the Rabbinic rulings as follows (*ib.* '*Tumath Okhelim*' xvi. 9):

'It is permitted to every one to touch an unclean thing, and thereby to become unclean. For Scripture only forbids priests and Nazirites from becoming unclean by touching a dead body: hence it is inferred that everybody else may become unclean. And even the priests and Nazirites are only forbidden to become unclean through a *human* corpse. Every Israelite is enjoined to be clean at the time of the festivals, in order that he may be able to enter the temple, and eat holy food' (Montefiore, *Hibbert Lectures*, 1892, p. 476, note 4; Büchler, *Der Galiläische 'Amha'ares*, chs. i.–v.).

Some exalted ideas in relation to the body and its stature and proportion were derived from an anthropomorphic interpretation of the text that man was made in the image of God (Gn 1^{27}). The bodily sign of the covenant is discussed under CIRCUMCISION.

LITERATURE.—Besides sources already noted, see L. Löw, *Die Lebensalter in der jüd. Literatur*, 1875; M. Joseph, *Judaism as Creed and Life*, 1903, p. 364; art. 'Body in Jewish Theology,' in *JE* iii. 283.

I. ABRAHAMS.

BODY (Hindu).—The Sanskrit terms denoting the various parts of the body agree remarkably with those of the other Aryan languages—a circumstance which renders it probable that a certain knowledge of anatomy may have been part of the common heritage of Aryan nations. Their acquaintance with anatomy would seem to have extended to the internal organs, such as the heart, liver, lungs, bile, kidneys, etc. The ancient Hindu sages have improved and extended this traditional knowledge. Thus, in a hymn of the Atharvaveda (x. 2) on the creation of man, which is supposed to belong to the most ancient portion of that venerable collection, we have a careful and orderly enumeration of the several parts of the skeleton. The hymn consists of a series of questions, such as these:

By whom were fixed the two heels of man? By whom was the flesh constructed? By whom the two ankle-bones; by whom the slender digits; by whom the apertures; by whom the two sets of long bones in the middle? How did they (the *devas*, or gods) make the two ankle-bones of man below, and the two knee-caps above? How many *devas*, and who among them, contributed to build up the bones of the breast and the cartilages of the windpipe of man? How many disposed the ribs of the two breasts; who, the shoulder-blades? Who pierced the seven apertures in the head: the two ears, two nostrils, two eyes, the mouth? Whoever first constructed that brain of his, the brow, the facial bone, the cranium, and the structure of the jaws, and, having done so, ascended to heaven—who, of the many *devas*, was he?

The composition of this hymn is ascribed to a certain sage called Nārāyaṇa, the same to whom the famous Rigvedic hymn (x. 90) on the sacrifice of man (*puruṣasūkta*) is attributed, in which the four classes of priests, nobles, husbandmen, and serfs are declared to have sprung from the mouth, arms, thighs, and feet of the Primeval Male, or original source of the universe. Some ancient medical formulæ, which occur in some of the earliest Sanskrit tracts on medicine, are also supposed to have been proclaimed by this Nārāyaṇa.

Descending from the Vedas to those early pantheistic compositions, the Upaniṣads, we meet, in the *Garbha* (or *Embryo*) *Upaniṣad* with an interesting description of the constitution and growth of the human body, which is said to consist of the five elements—earth, water, fire, air, and space or ether. From cohabitation, a small compact mass is produced, which, within a month, becomes a solid lump of flesh. The head is formed after two months; the feet are developed after three months; the ankles, belly, and thighs, after four months; the spine, after five; mouth, nose, and eyes, after six months; the soul (*jīva*) enters the fœtus in the seventh month; it becomes altogether complete in the eighth month.

The later systems of philosophy assign to each person two bodies—an exterior or gross body (*sthūla-śarīra*), and an interior or subtle body (*sūkṣma-śarīra*, or *liṅga-śarīra*)—much as Pythagoras claimed a subtle ethereal clothing for the soul, apart from its grosser clothing when united with the body. Indian philosophers had to admit the existence of a subtle body, in order to make the process of migration after death intelligible, according to the Indian doctrine of metempsychosis. The subtle body is that which cleaves to the soul in its migration from existence to existence. According to the Vedānta system, this subtle body arises from the so-called *upādhis* ('conditions'), and consists of the senses of the body (*dehendriyas*), both perceptive (*buddhīndriyas*) and active (*karmendriyas*), and of mind (*manas*), intellect (*buddhi*), sensation (*vedanā*), implying beyond itself the *viṣayas*, or objects required for sensation. Its physical life is said to be dependent on the vital spirit (*mukhya prāṇa*), and on the five *prāṇas*, or specialized spirits. According to the Sāṅkhya system, the subtle or inner body, which is, of course, invisible, is formed of eighteen elements. The coarse material body consists either of the earth only, or of the four or five coarse elements, and is made up of six coverings—hair, blood, flesh, sinews, bones, and marrow. In some systems, each organ is connected with its own peculiar element, the nose with the earth, the tongue with water, etc.

The whole subject of anatomy is treated at great length in the vast medical literature of ancient India. The Indian theory of the skeleton, in particular, has been transmitted to us in three different systems, one of which, the anatomical system attributed to the mythical sage Ātreya, while agreeing in the main with the statements quoted above from the Atharvaveda, is also found in several later non-medical Sanskrit works, notably in the celebrated law-book of Yājñavalkya. In its original shape, as restored by the researches of Dr. Hoernle, this enumeration of human bones seems to have been made up of the following thirty items:—(1) 32 teeth (*danta*); (2) 32 sockets (*ulūkhala*) of the teeth; (3) 20 nails (*nakha*); (4) 60 phalanges (*aṅgulī*); (5) 20 long bones; (6) 4 bases of the long bones; (7) 2 heels; (8) 4 ankle-bones; (9) 4 wrist-bones; (10) 4 bones of the fore-arms; (11) 4 bones of the legs; (12) 2 knee-caps; (13) 2 elbow-pans; (14) 2 hollow bones of the thighs; (15) 2 hollow bones of the arms; (16) 2 shoulder-blades; (17) 2 collar-bones; (18) 2 hip-blades; (19) 1 pubic bone; (20) 45 back-bones; (21) 14 bones of the breast; (22*a*) 24 ribs; (22*b*) 24 sockets of the ribs; (22*c*) 24 tubercles fitting into the sockets; (23) 15 bones of the neck; (24) 1 windpipe; (25) 2 palatal cavities; (26) 1 lower jaw-bone or chin; (27) 2 basal tie-bones of the jaw; (28) 1 bone constituting nose, prominences of the cheeks, and brows; (29) 2 temples; (30) 4 cranial pan-shaped bones:—total, 360. The large excess of this number over the some 200 bones in the adult human skeleton, which are distinguished by modern anatomy, is principally due to the fact that, besides including

the teeth, nails, and cartilages in the category of bones, the Indian sages counted prominent parts of bones, such as are now known as processes or protuberances, as if they were separate bones. Allowing for these modifying causes, the views of the early Indian anatomists are surprisingly accurate, which seems to be due to the fact that they were acquainted with the practice of human dissection, allowing bodies to decompose in a river, and taking them out after decomposition had set in, when they were very slowly scrubbed with a whisk made of grass-roots, or hair, or bamboo, or bast, and every part of the body examined, as it became disclosed in the process of scrubbing.

Besides the bones, there are 210 joints (*sandhi*) in the body. The joints of the extremities, jaw, and vertebræ are movable (*chala*); all the rest are immovable (*sthira*). There are 900 ligaments (*snāyu*), *i.e.* sinews and nerves; 500 muscles (*peśī*); 700 veins (*sirā*). Besides the veins, there are other vessels or canals called *dhamanī* and *srotas*, all of which proceed from the navel, which resembles the root of a water-lily, and is the root of the vessels of all living animals. This notion seems to have been derived from the appearance of the vessels in their fœtal state. There are six principal limbs: the two arms, the two thighs, the head with the neck, and the trunk or middle portion. Attached to these are 56 minor limbs. The trunk contains 15 organs, such as the heart, the liver, the lungs, the spleen, the two breast-glands, the bladder, the smaller intestines, the larger and grosser intestines, the adeps-bearing duct, etc. There are in the body 10 *añjalis* (a certain measure consisting of two handfuls) of water, 9 *añjalis* of juice (*rasa*), 8 *añjalis* of blood, 7 *añjalis* of stools, 6 *añjalis* of phlegm, 5 *añjalis* of bile, 4 *añjalis* of urine, 3 *añjalis* of adeps, 2 *añjalis* of fat, 1 *añjali* of marrow, ½ *añjali* of brain, ½ *añjali* of the essence of phlegm, ½ *añjali* of semen. Of weak or sensitive parts (*marman*) in the body, which have to be avoided in operations, there are 107, which are accurately described. In some varieties of these, instant death ensues on their being wounded; in others, the person when wounded dies after a few days, or when the external substance has been extracted; in other varieties, lameness, or only pain, is produced. The seven essential parts or elements of the body (*dhātu*) are: chyle or juice (*rasa*), blood (*rakta*), flesh (*māṁsa*), fat (*medas*), bone (*asthi*), marrow (*majjā*), and semen (*śukra*). When there is inequality of proportions between these constituent elements of the body, the person becomes subject to pain or destruction. Hence that has to be regarded as the proper medicine which restores the elements simultaneously to their normal condition by diminishing the increased and increasing the diminished ones. For keeping up the harmony of the elements of a person in health, food is prescribed in various forms, endued with proper attributes. The three humours of the body—air (*vāyu*), bile (*pitta*), and phlegm (*kapha*)—are more important even than the seven elements for the preservation of a healthy and normal condition of the body. Of these humours (*doṣa*), air or wind is dry, cool, light, soft, and always flowing more or less quickly, so as to convey the elements or essential parts over the body; bile, which is situated principally in the stomach, is a hot, bitter, oily fluid, of a blue colour, and sour, and produces animal heat; phlegm is white, heavy, oleaginous, cooling, moist, sweet, and is conveyed by air through the vessels. Most diseases are due to an abnormal increase or decrease of one of the humours. There exists an unmistakable similarity between this Indian theory and the ancient Occidental theory of four humours in the human body. Blood (*rakta*) is sometimes mentioned as a fourth humour in India, as it is in Western medicine.

The supposed parallelism between the microcosm and the macrocosm is also to be found in Indian thought. Thus, as the universe consists of earth, water, heat, air, ether, and Brahman, which is unmanifest, even so Puruṣa, or the male, is said to be made up of six ingredients: the form is earth; the liquid secretions are water; the animal heat is heat; the life-breaths are air; the hollow places are ether; the inner self is Brahman. The self or soul is an emanation from God or the Universal Soul, from which it springs in the same manner as sparks do from a red-hot ball of iron.

LITERATURE.—Hoernle, *Studies in the Medicine of Ancient India*, part i. 'Osteology,' Oxford, 1907; Max Müller, *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, London, 1899; Wise, *Commentary on the Hindu System of Medicine*, London, 1860; Sir Bhagvat Sinh Jee, *A Short History of Aryan Medical Science*, London, 1896; J. Jolly, 'Medicin,' in vol. iii. of the *Grundriss d. indo-ar. Philol. u. Altertumskunde*, Strassburg, 1901; *Charaka Saṁhitā* (Eng. tr.), by K. Avinash Chandra Kaviratna, Calcutta, 1871 ff.; *Yājñavalkya Smṛiti* (Eng. tr. and notes), by V. N. Mandlik, Bombay, 1880; Deussen, *Sechzig Upanishads des Veda*, Leipzig, 1897.

J. JOLLY.

BODY AND MIND.—1. The problem of the relation between body and mind has occupied philosophers and scientists since the dawn of thought, and to many it appears no nearer to solution now than then. It has been named the central problem of all philosophy, fundamental alike in the theory of knowledge, in ethics, and in religion. Not less fundamental, however, is it for psychology and for physical science; for the point of view from which we regard mental development, the changing forms of nature, animal life and evolution, will be radically different according as we do, or do not, attribute to mind a controlling or directing part in the process of change and growth. The question of the *relation* between body and mind cannot be discussed apart from the question as to the *nature* of the two factors, and the difference between them. Both are really metaphysical questions; that is to say, the solution put forward will necessarily be incapable of scientific verification; but it should be such as to give a rational account of the possibilities of knowledge, of individual and race progress, of ethical and religious life.

2. Whether we are dealing with the special relation between the individual mind and the individual body, or with the general relation of finite mind to matter, there are three possible solutions of the problem:—(1) That matter or body is the 'real' or 'substantial' thing, while mind is its product, or in some way dependent upon it both for its existence and for its qualities—the solution of Materialism. (2) That mind alone is real or substantial, and that matter or body is its appearance, its manifestation, or in some other way dependent upon it for existence and quality—the solution of Idealism, and of Spiritualism. (3) That mind and matter are equally *real*, and independent entities; or equally *unreal*, as the two 'aspects,' 'appearances,' 'sides' of one and the same reality. The former is Dualism, the latter 'Scientific Monism' or the Philosophy of Identity. There are of course many shades of difference and many overlappings in the different views that have actually been held. The divergencies are especially apparent when a given principle is applied to the relation between the finite body and the finite mind. Thus, even when we regard body as unreal, it is clear that 'my' body is not the manifestation of 'my' mind, but is to a large extent at least independent of it; therefore one may quite well speak of 'my' body—meaning the mind of which the body is a manifestation,—as acting upon 'my' mind, and yet remain a spiritualist or idealist. Here then we have a second basis of division, the lines crossing

the former ones: the relation between finite mind and finite body may be either (*a*) that of *complete dependence*, as when the mind is regarded as the 'secretion of the brain,' or as an 'epiphenomenon,' a by-product of physical process; (*b*) that of *parallelism*, the two series, mental and bodily, corresponding step for step, element for element, with each other, but never acting upon each other; or (*c*) that of *reciprocity* or *interaction*, mental processes being the condition of bodily, bodily of mental processes. The last is the 'natural' standpoint. We regard ourselves as causing bodily movements by our will, and as receiving sensations and perceptions from physical objects which act upon our bodily organs. It is also the standpoint of Dualism on the one hand, and of several forms of Spiritualism or Idealism on the other.

3. It is necessary here to refer only to one of the many forms of Materialism, that in which the mental is regarded as an *effect* of physical processes, although in itself immaterial; or again as not strictly an effect, but as a by-result, an accidental accompaniment, of material processes. Matter—the physical universe—is upheld on this theory as the permanent, eternal, unchanging, over against which mind is as one of the changing and temporary phenomena, adding nothing to the whole, forming no essential part of it, existing merely, as it were, for the delectation of some imaginary spectator. (1) What is fatal to any such reduction of mind to a secondary place is the first principle of Epistemology, viz. that matter or body is given only as *idea* or *content of consciousness*; it cannot be the *source* of that which is a presupposition of its own existence. It is an actual inversion of the true order of things, therefore, to place matter first and mind second. Not only is it not a justifiable inference that matter may be the source of mind; it is not even a possible thought; it is a form of words without meaning. (2) The second difficulty the view has to face is that of the incomparability of mind and matter; they contain no common characteristic except that of change in time; in other respects, as the Cartesians pointed out, every attribute of mind may be denied of body, and *vice versa*. Thus matter occupies space, has form, resistance, etc., while mind is wholly non-spatial in itself, has neither place nor any other spatial determination. Applied to our present question, the disparateness of mind and body means that the one could not be a cause of the other, in the sense of its source or origin. It does not necessarily mean, however, that the one could not *act* upon the other. The objection applies on the materialist assumption that nothing is real but matter; if so, then the psychical must be a quality, or other determination, of body. It is this consequence that is inconsistent with the accepted disparity of bodily and mental processes.* (3) The view is also inconsistent, however, with a third characteristic of mental life, the 'unity of consciousness': no possible *physical* process or combination of processes can be pointed to which is an adequate explanation or ground for this fact. The Ego or Subject of mental states, as conscious of its impressions, and of the relations (of succession, etc.) between its impressions, is a presupposition of all knowledge, all perception, and even of all sensation. There is nothing in the nervous system, for example, to which so weighty a rôle can be attributed; there is not even a real unity in the organism at all. In itself, on the materialist's own theory, matter consists of infinite atoms (or other elements) in endless flux, and all unity or combination exists only (*a*) as a physical resultant of the movements of several atoms or groups of atoms acting together upon a single point, or (*b*) as a teleological conception in the mind of an observer. Even the animal organism is not in itself a unity as a physical congeries; it is a unity only by virtue of its sum of physical forces, or by virtue of its (ideal) tendency towards a purpose or end, the mere conception of which implies a mind. Hence there is no unity except for a mind; and any attempt to reduce mind to matter or to a mere effect of matter is self-contradictory.

4. The doctrine of Psycho-physical Parallelism is liable to the same objections. This view implies, as the idea underlying all its forms, that (1) the two series of events, mental and physical, run alongside of, but in independence of each other; there is no cross action from the one upon the other; (2) each moment or state of consciousness has a physical moment which 'corresponds to it'—its correlate in the bodily sphere. The theories of parallelism diverge, however, from this point. (*a*) To some *every* physical event or state has its mental correlate (universal animism), while to others the mental 'corresponds' only to certain specialized physical structures and processes, viz. those of a nervous system, and in particular those occurring in the cortical centres of the brain of the higher animals. The parallelism is to some limited, to others unlimited. (*b*) To some again, not every mode and characteristic of consciousness has its physical correlate, but only the elementary states—the sensations, feelings, etc.; while the syntheses, activities, and above all the *values*, norms, ideals, 'meanings' of mental life have no physical correlate. To others the parallelism is universal on this side also. (*c*) To some there is causal activity within each series, bodily producing or effecting bodily process, and mental mental, but body not affecting mind, nor mind body; while to others there is no causality in the *mental* series at all, changes of mind depending on the changes of body, with which they directly correspond.

5. A number of scientists and psychologists, including Wundt and Jodl, would limit the *extent* of parallelism. Mind is correlated with body, but only under certain conditions, or where a certain complexity of organic structure—a central nervous system like that of man—has been achieved in the course of evolution and development. Others, among whom are Fechner, Spencer, Haeckel, Höffding, and Paulsen, make the parallelism universal: mental life is the correlate of bodily life, mental change of bodily change, that is, of movement. Hence, wherever there is motion there is also mind, and wherever there is mind there is also physical motion. The two series, as Spinoza taught, are parallel throughout the whole extent of each; for every mental there exists a physical correlate, for every physical a mental; the motion of the atom or other physical element has, as its 'inner' side, a phase of feeling, of sensation, of will. The complexity of the human mental life is in direct correspondence with the complexity of the physical substratum, the nerve and brain organs and the processes that occur in them. There is unbroken continuity first of all in the 'evolution' of inorganic forms, next in that of plant and animal forms, and finally in the development of the individual organism; and this holds both of body and of mind. Thus in mind we pass from the simplest 'feeling,' the correlate of the atom-movement, to the highest thought or act of intelligence, the correlate of a process in the cortex of the hemispheres of man, without a change of kind. Causal relations nowhere exist, however, between the one series and the other.

6. There can be little doubt that for a parallelist theory the larger scheme is the more consistent. In *partial* parallelism we have continuity in the

* Dr. Ward and Professor Binet, from different points of view, have criticized the principle of the disparateness of mind and matter. See reference below.

physical series, where every event depends upon a previous physical event out of which it arises; on the mental side there is no such continuity, but while the psychical processes are occasionally connected with each other in continuous trains of thought, etc., there are on the other hand constant breaks or gaps in the series. In sleep or other forms of unconsciousness, in the animal life prior to the growth of the higher brain centres, in the transitions from one line of thought to another—in all these cases, there are stages of unconsciousness between, or prior to, the conscious moments. How, if we keep only to the mental series, are these gaps bridged—through what causal agency are the transitions made? The answer must be, either through the body, or through some constant supernatural agency or 'pre-established harmony.' The latter alternative will not readily be accepted by scientists, and as a matter of fact the former is frequently adopted, as by Huxley, for example, although it is inconsistent with the principle of parallelism. Wundt, on the other hand, although partial parallelism is put forward as a 'working hypothesis,' finds himself compelled, when in his Philosophy he attempts a *rationale* of mental life as a whole, to postulate continuity between the successive states of the individual mind, to postulate sensation, feeling, and will, not only in the lower organisms, but even in the inorganic world itself. If there is complete continuity on the one side, as Biology and Geology assume there is on the physical, there must be complete continuity also on the other side, the psychical.

7. We have seen that the question of *causality* on the psychical side is also a subject of difference between parallelists. It is admitted that there is relation of cause and effect between successive states of a material system, such as the bodily organism is. Is the same true of the mental series? It would seem that it must be, if parallelism is to hold, but there are heavy penalties to face for the admission. The chain of causes and effects on the physical side is a mechanical one, each link following its predecessor by a blind necessity which is quite regardless of the ideals, desires, or judgments of the mind connected with the body. If causality on the mental side holds, and if each link is attached to its corresponding link on the physical side, then the time-order must be the same in both; therefore the mental life, the course of development, the history of the soul must also be the subject of a blind mechanism; or, *per contra*, if the mind is self-determining, if it has spontaneity and originality of action, freedom to choose and to act according to norms or ideals of value, then the physical organism cannot be subject to the blind necessity that science assumes. Its laws are not inexorable, and the most confident expectations based on centuries of past experience may be suddenly disappointed. In other words, either mental life is wholly determined by an influence which governs it from the beginning of its history, or the attainment of scientific truth about the physical world is impossible.

8. From this dilemma some have sought to escape by denying that there is any causal link between mental states; there is 'transversal' causation, from body to mind, as well as 'longitudinal' causation from body to body, but there is neither longitudinal nor transversal causation in the other two directions, viz. from mind to mind, or from mind to body. In order to justify the very subordinate rôle attributed to the mind, it is argued that the principle of causation demands the experience of a uniform and invariable sequence between cause and effect, and that no such experience is possible with regard to the sequence of bodily upon mental states, or of mental upon mental. In reply it may be said (1) that the origin of the idea of causality is to be found in our direct experience of mental activity, and especially in activity directed outwards upon the body. The first idea of causality (and it remains at the root of the ideas of causality in modern science) is that causation is spiritual or mental; body, on the other hand, is dead inert matter, and has no spontaneity, no source of movement in itself. Accordingly some modern theories of science seek to dispense altogether with the idea of causation. But (2) 'transverse' causality, from body to mind, is inconsistent with parallelism, and means a return to Materialism; it makes mind a function of body.

9. Probably the most consistent form of parallelism is Monistic Parallelism, which regards the physical and the mental as two sides or aspects of one and the same reality. It is not always clear, either in Spinoza, its originator, or in his modern followers, whether by the one reality is meant an unknown x behind both body and mind, of which they are the diverse 'appearances' or 'manifestations,' or whether the reality is simply their identity, the same being which appears *to itself* as a conscious unity—a mind—appearing *to others* as an extended manifold—the body. In either case, as is almost inevitable, the primacy is found to be given to mind. Thus the unknown x becomes a conscious mind. After all we are conscious *both* of our 'own' minds, *and* (through sense-perception) of our 'own' bodies. But our cognition of the body is a mental process, and we become aware of the body only in and through such a process: the mind therefore is a presupposition of the body; the body is a mode or manifestation of mind. Similar reasoning applies to the second standpoint. The body stands in a two-fold relation to the mind: (1) it is the *object* of knowledge, or of a particular kind of knowledge, and (2) it is the accompaniment, the *condition*, apparently, of every case or instance of knowing, or of any other mental process. A given sense-perception has (*a*) its object in the physical world—say the flight of a bird through the air—and it has (*b*) a physiological process in the brain of the individual as its accompaniment and apparent condition. With which of the two is the mental process 'identical'? If with the brain process, then the possibility of knowledge remains wholly unaccountable. The 'knowing' of an external object by the mind is a mental act to which no physical parallel can be given, and therefore mind has a much wider reach than body. It has rarely been suggested that the mental process is identical with the perceived object, in this case the flight of the bird. Schuppe, indeed, attempts to combine both object and brain process with the mental process in an ingenious way: 'I see, because my eye sees, or because I am this seeing eye, so my motor nerve wills, because I will, because I am this motor nerve' (*Das Grundproblem der Psychologie*, p. 60). That is, both sensation and volition, being mental, are also bodily processes, the Ego or mind being identical with the body. I am therefore the same thing as the content of my perceptions, and the same thing as the object of my volitions. But if the connexion between eye and brain is cut, I no longer see, however healthy the eye itself remains; and, again, what I see almost always differs widely from the picture in the retina or in both retinæ. It is not the eye, but eye plus optic fibres plus optical brain centre, that is the 'organ' of sight. Now, whatever similarity there is between the picture on the retina and the seen object, there is none between the brain process and the seen object; hence the dualism between physical *object* of knowledge and physical *basis* of knowledge re-emerges; a mind

stands always in this double relation to body, and therefore cannot be regarded *simpliciter* as identical with the individual organism to which it 'belongs.'

10. Parallelism leads almost of necessity to an atomistic conception of consciousness. The apparent function of consciousness as the uniting and unifying bond of successive mental states or processes has no physical correlate, and therefore must be rejected as unreal. Neither the body nor the nervous system is a unity in itself; each consists of an aggregate of cells, molecules, atoms or other elements. Still less possible is a physical correlate for the freedom, spontaneity, originality, which the individual mind claims for itself; this also, therefore, must be denied. But psychological atomism — 'psychology without a subject' — and psychological mechanism alike fail to do justice to the most fundamental facts of consciousness. Consciousness appears neither as a *sum* nor as a *series* of states (cf. James, *Principles of Psychol.* i. 159 ff.; and Lotze, *Microcosmus*, i. 2. 1), but as the unity of such a sum or series—a unity also which is *in* each of the parts, and without which none of the parts or elements could exist. A series which is conscious of itself *as* a series is an absurdity (cf. T. H. Green's polemic against Mill and Hume). It is not necessary to go back to the old view of the Ego as the *source*, the principle or cause, of its own states: but even as the *subject of experience*, every conscious mind is something more than any or all of the 'states' or 'processes' of which it is conscious. In particular, the advance from 'lower' to 'higher' mental achievements, from simple to more complex mental life, as from sensation to perception and from perception to thought, is possible only on the assumption of a directive activity of the mind, an activity which cannot possibly inhere in, or belong to, the elementary states or simple processes themselves, out of which the higher forms are derived.

11. The chief advantage of Parallelism as a hypothesis is undoubtedly the same as that of the 'Twofold Truth' of an earlier philosophy; it enables its adherents to side with the materialists from one point of view, with the spiritualists from another. Both systems, it is held, may be true; each at least may present one aspect of the 'ultimate' or 'absolute' truth. On the one hand, all actions—the evolution, the growth, the adaptations of organisms to their environment—are determined by a blind mechanism, each phase succeeding each by a necessity which is absolute; that is to say, from each situation there is one and only one development possible, and that is the development which actually occurs. An action — a form of behaviour—is explained only in terms of physiological, that is, ultimately, physical and chemical processes. Design, selection, choice, feeling, desire, emotion play no part in the world's activity—*from this point of view*. On the other hand, seen from the inner side, this necessity becomes freedom and spontaneity; the mechanism of the atoms, the movement of the molecules, become desire and judgment, feeling and will: the organism is a personality, and determines its own ends, its own life. To the Cæsar of science are rendered the things which are Cæsar's—the conservation of energy, the reduction of the whole life of the universe to chemical, electrical, and mechanical processes; and to God the things that are God's—the spiritual life with its struggles and falls, its ideals and its redemptions. The question is not, however, whether there is any advantage in this theory; there certainly would be, if it were true: but is it even thinkable? Are we not using bare terms, without any meaning behind them, when we speak of the *same* reality as being at once determined from without, and self-determining? A man has an alternative of going abroad for a holiday or remaining at home for his work; he 'decides' for the latter. Now it has a perfectly clear meaning if we say that the man's 'choice' and action are really determined by his structure, as it has come to be through physical heredity and environment. It has also a perfectly good meaning to say that his choice is free, is an expression of his mental character, of the ideals by which he is attracted; but it has no meaning whatever to say that it is *both* determined *and* free. Whichever form of parallelism is adopted, a given bodily action has its mental correlate, which is either the same *in reality* as the bodily action, or is at least its necessary correspondent. Whatever laws govern the existence of the one must also govern the existence of the other: if a physical process c is a necessary sequent of a and b, then its corresponding mental process C must also be a necessary sequent, not merely of mental A and B, but *also* of the physical series a b.

The use of the term 'appearances' or 'aspects' is misleading. Aspects or appearances presuppose an observer; who is the observer in the case of body and mind? He must be some being who is neither mind nor body; yet, as a knowing being, he must be mind. Thus we come back to our starting-point: mind has priority over body; body is the appearance of mind. This, however, is *not* parallelism.

12. The alternative is *interaction*—the assumption that body acts upon mind, and mind upon body. Unfortunately, such a theory is subject to objections of great force from the points of view both of the physicist and of the spiritualist.

(1) If action of any kind takes place from the mental upon the physical world, or *vice versa*, then the principle of conservation of energy cannot be maintained. No means exists by which the amount of energy lost by the brain in effecting a sensation, or added to the brain in a volition, may be measured. *Some* energy must presumably be lost, however, when a physical process is the condition of a mental impression: there cannot remain the same quantity in the body, since, in fact, the action of the body is found to be different, according as there has or has not intervened a conscious process. Again, the same stimulus does or does not give rise to consciousness, according to its intensity, *i.e.* according to the force with which it acts upon the nerve-centres; in the case of subliminal stimuli we can only assume that the energy expended is not sufficient to effect the change in consciousness. The principle of conservation has two sides (cf. Wundt, *System der Philos.*[2] p. 483)—(α) that the total amount of energy in the physical universe remains always the same, and (β) that, when work is done by any *physical* system, the amount of energy lost must be fully compensated for (however different the form it takes—heat, electricity, light, motion, etc.) by the gain of the other physical systems affected by the work. The second part of the principle may be accepted apart from the first; it has, however, no bearing on the relation between mind and body. The first part is more purely hypothetical, and need not be admitted by psychology, if inconsistent with the facts of that science. It has been suggested (α) that the mind may alter or affect only the *direction* of energy or of its transformation, not its amount (von Hartmann, etc.). But in matters of energy and force the two things, quantity and direction, cannot be separated from each other. Again, (β) the balance may always be maintained between the amount taken away and the amount added in the various operations between mind and body. This, however, is again a recourse to miracle, or to some

mystical pre-established harmony. The only defence possible is to admit the charge, but to deny that the action complained of is a crime. The principle of conservation is a hypothesis formed to explain certain phenomena of the inorganic world, verified as far as experience has gone (although now being called in question) for these only; not verified at all for organic processes, such as growth and reproduction, still less for those physical actions which we ascribe to mental influence. It has also been suggested (by Stumpf, for example, and from another standpoint by Fechner) that we may regard mental activity as itself a form of *energy*; that the physical energy expended in the central nervous system is transformed into an equal quantity of mental energy, and *vice versa*. What we call mental energy certainly increases with physical health, and especially with the health of the brain; it decreases with the degeneration or decay of the brain. It is questionable, however, whether the term 'energy' in the two cases is really being used in the same sense, as it must if there is to be equivalence between the two kinds.*

(2) It may be said that the action of body upon mind is inconceivable; that the only forms of action given to us in experience are either (*a*) of body upon body, or (*b*) of the mind upon itself. The first we have from external, the second from internal perception. Berkeley and Hume, however, long ago disposed of the view that we ever directly experience the action of body upon body; and Hume also questioned the assumption that we are conscious of, or have any direct knowledge of our own mental activity. Causality may be a presupposition of experience; it is certainly not given *in* experience. On the other hand, the 'uniform succession' which we regard as the cue for the application of this category is found far more frequently between mental and bodily processes than between mental and mental, or between bodily and bodily. If causation is a mystery, it is as mysterious in the action of two bodies upon each other as in the action of the mind upon the body; if it is a 'fundamental principle' of thought, it may be applied in the latter case with more assurance than in the former.

(3) But how, it may be said, is mind to set about its action upon body. A 'voluntary' movement starts, let us say, in certain brain cells, and proceeds outwards to the muscles. How does the mind, an immaterial substance or subject, set this process going? Somewhere the push must be given, or the spark applied. How is it done? Here the difficulty of the disparity of mind and body presents itself with great, and for many, it appears, with overwhelming force. It is not, however, in principle any more curious or incomprehensible than that body should 'correspond' to mind, whatever may be taken as the meaning of that mysterious word; not more so than that one reality should appear as two totally disparate entities, as Monism assumes. Somewhere or other we must arrive at an unexplained and, perhaps, inexplicable fact of experience; and for interaction, this local action of mind upon body, with the converse qualitative action of body upon mind (as when a given, definitely localized, nerve process gives rise to a sensation of red, while another, differently localized, gives rise to a sensation of cold or of bitter), marks that point.

Body may 'ultimately' prove to be mind, and yet the relation between a finite body and 'its' mind be one of interaction. A system of this nature is contained in Professor Busse's critical and thorough study of the subject. We have seen that our own and all other bodies are given to us, and are known by us, only as contents of consciousness, as actual or possible sensation, perception or thought, while various social experiences forbid us to regard them as 'merely' our *individual* or *subjective* impressions. We may conclude, then, that our own body and other bodies, which we only gradually learn to distinguish from our own, are appearances to us of mental or spiritual realities—realities distinct from and independent of ourselves, yet akin to us; that these realities differ widely from each other, and from us, in the degree of mental development at which they have arrived, and of which they are capable; that they affect or influence us only through that entity or system of entities which appears to us as 'our' body, and that they in turn are influenced by us only through the same intermediary. Thus our body is not the 'manifestation' or 'outer aspect' of our mind, but is relatively independent of it, being the 'manifestation' of another, or other minds. On the other hand, our mind's development is bound up with that of the body, which is so intimately connected with it. What we may regard as in a special sense the growing-point of the body throughout life, namely, the brain, has its structure, its organization, in large part determined by the actions of our mind, by which it becomes a more and more perfect instrument for the realization of our desires and our ideals, whether high or low. It may be held also that the gradual failure of powers with old age or the temporary failure with illness or fatigue—failure which, though primarily physical, seems to reach to the very core of the mind's being—is defect not of the player, but of the instrument on which he plays, and through which alone his genius can find fitting expression. See BRAIN AND MIND, MIND, SOUL.

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BOEHME.—I. *LIFE.*—Jacob Boehme (sometimes spelt Behmen), called the 'Teutonic Theosopher,' was born in November 1575, in the village of Old Seidenburg, near Görlitz, in Upper Lusatia, which in his time seems to have belonged to Bohemia, though in 1635 it was transferred to Saxony, the Elector of which was Boehme's protector during the later part of his life. The parents of Boehme

* On the whole question of the validity of the principle of Conservation of Energy, and of its bearing on the problem of Mental Causality, see Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, especially Lect. vi.

were poor pious folk, who trained up their son in their own (the Lutheran) faith and in a knowledge of the Scriptures. The only education he got was of the most elementary character. At an early age he was put to tend cattle, with other children of the village, and, while thus employed, had his first remarkable experience. Having climbed (says Martensen) to the top of a mountain called the 'Land's Crown,' he saw 'a vaulted entrance composed of four red stones, and leading into a cavern. When he had toiled through the brushwood that surrounded the entrance, he beheld in the depths of the cave a vessel filled with money. He was seized with an inward panic, as at something diabolical, and ran away from the spot in alarm. Subsequently he often returned to the spot, accompanied by other boys. But entrance and cavern had vanished.'

After this, he was apprenticed to a shoemaker in Görlitz, and had another strange experience. While he was in charge of the shop during his master's absence, a stranger entered and priced a pair of boots. The lad, thinking he had no authority to sell, tried to get out of the difficulty by naming a prohibitive price; but the stranger paid it, and, after having gone out into the street, turned and called in a loud voice, 'Jacob, come forth!' Surprised that his name should be known, Jacob went out to him; when the stranger, fixing on him a penetrative gaze, said, 'Jacob, thou art yet little, but thou shalt become great, and the world shall wonder at thee. Therefore be pious and fear God, and especially read diligently the Holy Scriptures; for thou must endure much misery and poverty and persecution; but God loves and is gracious unto thee.' After this Jacob became still more serious and devout. Unable to endure the ribald and profane language of his mates in the shop, he felt obliged to reprove them, whereupon his master turned him out, saying he would have no 'house-preacher' to stir up strife. Jacob now entered upon his *Wanderjahr*. In the course of his travels he discovered into how many warring sects the Protestant party was split up, and how fierce and uncharitable were their contentions. They seemed to him as Babel, and he has much to say about this Babel in his writings.

At the end of his wanderings, he returned to Görlitz, and in 1599 married the daughter of a tradesman, with whom he lived happily for twenty years, and by whom he had four children. Now further visions came. When he was sitting one day in his room, his eye caught the reflexion of the sun's rays in a bright pewter dish. This threw him into an inward ecstasy, and it seemed to him that he beheld the inward properties of all things in nature opened to him. It was one of his ideas that the quality of everything is expressed by its shape, colour, scent (which he calls its 'signature') to such as have eyes to see. Ten years later, he had another 'opening' which went much further, and showed him the inwardness of all manifestation, how it arose, and its meaning and end. He felt an inward impulse to write down what had thus been revealed, not for publication—for he felt himself too simple to teach others—but (as he says) for a memorial to himself, so that, should the power of interior vision fail, he might have a record of what he had seen, and thus hold it permanently. The book he now wrote was the *Aurora, or Morning Redness*, and was the cause of the commencement of that persecution which for so many years embittered his life. The work was, of course, in manuscript. The written copy chanced to be seen by a nobleman, Carl von Endern, who had called on him. Being greatly pleased with it, the nobleman begged permission to borrow it for a short time, and then, without Boehme's consent, had some copies of it made. One of these happened to fall into the hands of the Pastor Primarius of Görlitz, Gregorius Richter, a violent man and inflated with the dignity of his office. He attacked Boehme in a sermon on 'False Prophets.' Boehme, who was in church, went to him afterwards and most meekly begged to know in what he was wrong. But Richter would not hear a word, and the next day went to the Town Council and demanded Boehme's expulsion, threatening them with the vengeance of God if they refused. A decree of banishment was passed, and no time was allowed him to wind up his affairs and make arrangements. Boehme meekly submitted, saying, 'Yes, dear Sirs, since it cannot be otherwise, it shall be done.' There is some difference of statement as to what happened after this. Martensen says that the next morning the Council sent to recall him, and told him he might continue to live in Görlitz if he would give up writing books and stick to his trade. This he undertook to do, and for five years abstained from writing, though much troubled in conscience as to whether he ought not to obey God rather than man. At the end of this time, conscience and the entreaties of friends triumphed, and he again began to write, and was then finally banished. Others say that the Council offered to revoke the sentence of banishment, but implored him—for the sake of the peace of the town—to remove away of his own accord, and that he did this.

It is certain that, when banished finally, he went, on a citation for heresy, to Dresden. Here the Elector appointed six learned doctors to examine him and report as to whether he ought to be protected or punished. His answers seem to have produced a striking effect on these men. One is reported to have said, 'I would not take the whole world, and condemn this man.' Another replied, 'How can we judge what we have not understood?' He seems to have returned to Görlitz, after this examination, under the protection of the Elector, against which even the rancour of Richter could do nothing. His fame as a man of interior wisdom drew to him many learned men and noblemen.

At the house of one of his noble friends, in Silesia, he fell into a fever which developed into gastric disease. He felt a premonition of his end, and asked to be carried back to Görlitz. Here he was attended by his old friend, Dr. Kober. After an illness of a fortnight he asked for the last Sacrament. Richter was dead, but the new minister held similar opinions, and refused to administer it unless Boehme would subscribe the Lutheran Confession of Faith. This he immediately did, and the Sacrament was administered. On the night of Sunday, Nov. 21st, 1624, he called his son, Tobias, and asked him whether he heard the sweet music. Tobias said he did not, and his father bade him open the door, when he must surely hear it. He asked the hour, and, being told it was after two o'clock, he said, 'My time is not yet: three hours hence is my time.' At six in the morning he bade them all farewell; and saying, 'Now I go hence to Paradise,' he quietly departed.

II. *Boehme's System.*—1. **His doctrine of origins.** — Boehme's system goes back to the beginning, to the time when the Divine Being first proceeded to manifestation. To attempt to go behind this, he says (*Three Principles*, xiv. 84), confuses the mind. He also says (*ib.* v. 19) that the origin of things ought not to be inquired into at all: yet since sin has now arisen, and we find ourselves fallen from the glory of God, we *must* know how sin arose, or we cannot know the remedy for it. And we cannot know how sin arose without opening the mystery of the process to manifestation, and the arising of the second, or contrary,

Will, and the seven Forms of Nature, and how the two eternal Principles—darkness and wrath of the first, and light and love of the second—arose, and this present world of the third Principle which stands between the two, and is qualified in good and evil. The ability to open this mystery is ours only when we are led by the guidance of the Holy Spirit; but as we are (in our deepest spirit) out of the Divine, we are able (in this spirit) to penetrate so far; for every spirit can see back into 'its own Mother,' but no further (*ib.* ii. 1).

Of the state before manifestation, all we can say is the following. The Supreme Spirit (whom we call 'God') was in a state which Boehme calls the 'Still Rest.' In Him was active one only Will, which, being one, did nothing but only BE, in one state and without any happening. All that afterwards came into manifestation through the process about to be described was in Him in a state inchoate and purely subjective. There was yet no creature to know Him and rejoice in the knowledge, and find the highest delight in the recognition of His Power and Goodness. All was yet pure potentiality; all were in Him as undifferentiated elements in the content of His Being, and knew not themselves or each other. In short, all was Essence in the simple Being of the Deity as a One Will, and there was no *existence*.

It is clear that such a statement as the above is derived as an impression from abstract considerations (arising in the nature of the case) as they must appear to our highest metaphysical perception. Boehme does not claim that such a presentation is a full and complete account of so stupendous and mysterious a matter, but only that it is the best we can yet see. To him it was probably presented in mystic vision; but we, lacking this, can only follow him with our best thought. It cannot really be as described, for we are obliged to think and speak in terms of time and space: and in God these are not. Boehme saw this fact clearly, and often warns us that, though he is compelled to speak in these terms, we must remember that the transcendent Fact is otherwise. If we think at all, we must think in these terms; and there is no harm in so doing so long as we bear in mind that the transcendent Fact is only feebly apprehended, and never in any way comprehended, by our thought. Therefore, while we have to speak of a time before manifestation, we must remember that this is only by a logical necessity, arising from our present limitation, and not a full presentment of the Fact.

When manifestation was to take place, the first necessity, says Boehme, was that a second and contrary Will should arise. This Will is not a new thing in God, for, as to His content, He changes not. It is again a logical necessity, because out of a one Will no 'manifoldness' can come, no conflict or strife or dramatic interest. So we must say that a second Will arose, and the immediate result of its arising was a darkening of the primal and, till now, universal light. Even light cannot be known consciously as such if there is nowhere any darkness. And as we know and appreciate only through experience of a contrary, and God has made us thus, the presumption may very well be that there is something in Him which answers (though in a far-off and exalted way) to this law of our minds to which we know no exception.

Immediately upon the darkening there arose the first Form of Nature, which Boehme calls *Harshness*.* This is the principle of hardness, close holding of itself to itself, and resistance to modification—a strongly conservative principle. The second Will must produce the contrary of the first—darkness, overshadowing, drawing together, hardening. Spiritually it is the power of self-centredness, self-satisfaction; of that inertia which resists conviction of sin, submission to the will of God, and love of the brethren.

Immediately on the arising of this Form, the first Will, disliking the darkness, seeks to turn back again to the light. But this it cannot do without reversing the Will to manifestation, which is impossible. Thereupon arises the second Form of Nature, *Attraction*. It is the reverse of the first. It seeks change and new combinations, and will let nothing alone—the principle of dissatisfaction and unrest. Spiritually, it is that which forces us into ceaseless activity, whereby we enter into experiences, and so (in the end) work out our *reductio ad absurdum*.

Out of the conflict of the first two Forms arises the third, *Bitterness*. It may be easier to catch the ideas of these first three Forms if we call them (in modern terminology) *Homogeneity*, *Heterogeneity*, and *Strain*. The Strain, or tension, arises from the contrariety and opposition of the first two. It is the bitterness of dissatisfaction which, as to the darkness, expresses itself in discontent and complaining, but, as to the light, becomes discontent with our own sin, sorrow for it, and tears of penitence.

Out of the Strain, as it increases in intensity, there arises the fourth Form, *Fire*. At this point, the operation being carried on reaches the degree at which a self-consciousness arises, with a sense of own will and choice. At this point also the evolution divides into two contrary directions, and it is within the power of the consciousness to decide which of the two it will take. The Fire at first is a cold, dark fire which can burn and hurt, but cannot purify—like an iron heated to just below redness. As it burns and the Strain increases, it grows in heat till it reaches redness, which is a light of low illuminating power, and shows things very dimly. Such is the light of the external man, and the light is the quality of the self-consciousness, which in this case is full of greed, wrath, and pride.

But if the evolution goes on in the right way, then the dull glow of the Fire grows stronger and stronger, until it passes into the fifth Form, *Light*. This is the true Divine Light, and 'makes manifest' things as they really are. When this Light arises, the Fire sinks down from its horrible raging, and becomes only a meek and pleasant warmth, giving all its power to the Light. Thereupon the first three Forms also change their character and become gentle and soft and harmonious. It is as though in the Light they first *see* their true function and purpose in the great work, and are content to fulfil it, and cease to express themselves as they are in themselves (in own self-will) without regard to the end they are there to produce. It is the change which (in modern terms) would be called the passing from self-consciousness to cosmic consciousness; when, instead of thinking of the universe as made for our self, we think of our self as made for the universe. Thus we rise to a higher grade of being and a truer joy than the self-fulfilment of our own small wishes and loves could ever give us.

The sixth Form of Nature Boehme calls *Sound*. The quality—first fixed towards good by the arising of the Light—now begins to express itself to perception. The manifold ways in which this expression is effected — by speech, cries, colours, scents, tastes, feeling, lightness, heaviness, and so on—are what he means by Sound.

The seventh and last Form of Nature he calls *Figure*. Here the whole 'thing,' thus having attained its being in Essence, now puts on a shape, a body, fit to be its full and perfect expression, and a mansion of the six Forms. Hence as the evolution has gone on in rightful order, arise all forms of beauty, all fair colours and sweet

* One of the difficulties in following Boehme arises from the fact that, in different passages, he calls these Forms of Nature by different names, according to different points of view. Thus he sometimes calls the first a *hard attracting*, though he calls the second *attraction*. He means that the first attracts so hard itself to itself that it attracts nothing else, while the second seeks to attract other things to itself, but does not attract itself to itself. The essential idea of the Forms will soon become clear upon patient study.

scents and pleasing sounds; and the creature stands marked with the 'signature' of God, a being to His honour and glory and its own indescribable delight.

But should the evolution proceed from the fourth Form in the false direction, that is, should the will elect to stand in self-will, and prefer might, power, anger, to meekness, humility, and love, then its light is but the dull, red glow of the fire; its sound is discordant and harsh, and its figure repulsive and monstrous. For the first three Forms are the real *bases* of Becoming, and originate the Essence which becomes substantial in the sixth, and embodied in the seventh. If these first three are not modified by the arising of the divine Light in the fifth, they must remain expressed in their own self-quality of fierce rage and fury, and the creature of which they form the basis will be of like nature and signature. It is in the fourth Form that the great choice has to be made whether the Fire shall be the fire of 'self,' which consumes, or the fire of 'love,' which illuminates.

It is absolutely necessary, says Boehme, that the first three Forms shall be there; without their presence no creature can come to being. They are the power to 'being' in every mineral, plant, and animal. But they should never be allowed so to be known or manifested as that their essential 'own self quality' should have any influence in determining the quality manifested. We know that Love is strong, the very strongest of all things; but in Love this strength is never on the surface. As soon as Love strives to 'force,' it ceases to be Love; when it keeps the strength in a hiddenness, and shows as its seen quality only meekness and gentleness, then the unseen base makes the meekness and gentleness strong. But should the creature despise the meekness, and resolve to compel and force others to love it, then the force, being shown, can no longer act as a base, and the supposed force becomes the weakest of all things, because devoid of its basal strength.

Nevertheless, it is in the power of all creatures, from human upwards, to open the first three Forms, and make this quality their quality. This Lucifer did. He was created a Throne-Angel, but allowed the might of the Fire to become dominant in him, and despised the meekness and self-surrender of the light of love. Hereupon his light went out, not, as afterwards happened to Adam, into a hiddenness, but into absolute extinction. The meek love of God, which alone could re-kindle it, *that* he has despised, and now stands in eternal rejection from the Light, shut up to the Fire he has chosen, and in which alone he is capable of finding joy. He is now God manifested as to the first Principle, as Jesus Christ is God manifested as to the second; for Christ is the true Light, and the Devil is the apparent Darkness. Each abides eternally in his own Principle.

Of these Principles, it is now time to speak. There are three: two eternal, and the third temporal. The first Principle is the dark world of the Anger, in which the first three Forms stand open and operative in giving quality, and the last three are hidden. The second Principle is the light world in the Love, where the first three Forms are not allowed to give quality, but remain practically hidden, while the last three alone qualify. Between these two stands the third Principle, this Present World—which had a beginning and will have an end. The first Principle is all evil; the second is all good; the third stands in good and evil. While man is in it, both the two eternal Principles seek to press into him; the dark world strives to draw him down into it, and the light world strives to lift him up into it. He stands between the two, and to whichever of them he here inclines his imagination, to that he will hereafter belong (Boehme says eternally). For there is no open way from the first Principle to the second save through the third, which stands open to both; and when this temporary world of the third Principle has passed away, no passage will remain, and the two will be so absolutely shut off from each other that each will seem *all that is* to itself, and be unconscious of any other.

2. Doctrine of Sin and of the Fall.—Sin, in Boehme's system, is really a false imagination. But, as our imagination defines the real for us, the concept is much stronger than it might sound. If the false imagination lasts eternally, we are eternally in Hell. If a true imagination lasts eternally, we are eternally in Heaven. For nothing short of the power of God, co-operating with the consenting will of man, can enable man to alter his imagination; that is, his consciousness of his state and surroundings, of what is real and of what is not.

The problem of the origin of Evil has long perplexed students of Divine wisdom. Boehme seems scarcely to be conscious of those aspects of the problem which press upon many hearts and minds at the present day. He simply throws the whole blame and responsibility on the perverted will of a creature (Lucifer), and this only removes the difficulty one step further back. Nevertheless, his system contains a remarkable suggestion of a solution.

He is careful to assure us that God (as He truly is, as He appears to an imagination formed in, and by, the Light) is never angry and never punishes. Seen by such an imagination, what looks to its opposite like punishment appears as loving warning and guidance. But the false imagination cannot but think of God as like itself; therefore it takes God's mercy for His wrath, and His guidance for revenge. All the six Forms of Nature have come out from God, and so the first three (which, when manifested, appear as wrath, anger, jealousy) are in Him, only in Him they are *never* manifested. Boehme commonly needs careful interpreting. He calls the first Principle the Principle of the Father, and the second that of the Son. But he adds that in reality the Father is never apart from the Son. We see, therefore, that what he really means is that, *if* the Father should (by a false imagination) be thought of as existing alone, and apart from the Son, He must (by such an imagination) be known as wrathful, angry, jealous. And, as such an imagination exists, He must speak to it in the terms of its own apprehension. But in Himself, as known by a true (because Divinely illuminated) imagination, He is all Love and Goodness.

Sin arises when the first three Forms are brought out of the hiddenness, not merely to look at (as will be explained further on), but to be tasted and *known*, and their own self-quality accepted as our quality. But as to the transcendent reality, they *are never thus brought out.* The transcendent reality is known to man only through his imagination. When illuminated by the Light, his imagination rightly pictures to him the reality; but when not so illuminated, the reality is wrongly pictured, and what he imagines to be the fact is the reverse of the fact. Therefore sin is possible only if a false imagination be possible; and can take on an appearance of reality only in such a false imagination. Thus at once sin is, and is not. When it is said, 'God cannot look upon sin,' the expression is more profoundly true than we suspect. He sees it, not as a positive thing Himself has made, but as the imagination of the thought of the heart of a creature who is unaware that the light in him is darkness. The fact is not

as the false imagination pictures it, and the thing pictured exists nowhere save in the false imagination. That gives it reality to the man whose imagination it is, but cannot make it actually real.

But however unreal the *content* of the false imagination may be, the false imagination itself is real. It was real to Boehme because he believed that, if not rectified in this life, it would eternally abide; for there is no better test of the real than the fact that it abides. If we might eliminate this idea of its eternity, the problem would be solved, for sin would then be but as a passing madness, and Hell and Earth but an episode in the eternity of Heaven.

Boehme lays down this clear principle (*Myst. Mag.* I. vi. 12), 'that the fullness of joy might know itself, the keen tartness of the Source [that is, of the first three Forms] must be a cause to the Joy; and the darkness, a manifestation of the Light; that so the Light might be manifestly known, which could not be in the One.' But how can this be, if the first three Forms are never to be explored? Here again Boehme offers us a key.

'The outward spirit and body was unto the inward as a *Wonder* of Divine manifestation, according to the Fire-dark and Light world, a mirror of the great Omnipotence and Omniscience of God, and the inward was given to it for a ruler and guide. As God plays with the time of this outward world, so likewise the inward, Divine man should play with the outward in the manifested wonders of God in this world, and open the Divine wisdom in all creatures, each according to his property; so likewise in the earth, in stones and metals, in which also there is a twofold Essence, viz. one from the original of the Fire-dark world, and one of the original of the holy Light world. All this was given him for his play' (*Myst. Mag.* I. xvi. 9–11).

Through the clumsy (and, to some, repellent) wording,* it is not hard to catch the suggestion here contained. The first three Forms are the sole causes of variety in the manifestations. As the first or second or third predominates—which is possible in an infinitely varying series of grades or degrees—so the variation arises. Thus out of these Forms arise the *wonders*. These may be looked into—by a will so set in the Will of God that it is in no danger of wanting to do more than look, never to taste or *know*—with perfect safety and propriety. We should *play* with them, as little children play at 'shop,' without ever dreaming of making it the serious business of the whole life. They play for the time, and then let it go, and so shut it up again. The harm is where the will is so unstable that from looking it passes to longing after, and from this to tasting and proving; so that the might of the Fire-world gains a hold, and moves the being to put his whole imagination into this 'play,' whereby from play it passes to earnest, and surrounds the whole life, and becomes its one desire. Then the true imagination becomes as dead, the spiritual perception closes, and the being lives henceforth in the world of its false imagination, and knows no other.

The consequence of sin, in Boehme's teaching, is a disturbance of the relations of the parts to the All. Man should be to the lower creatures what God should be to him. Over him God should have sole dominion, and over them he should have sole dominion. Thus, through all the infinite multiplicity of the external expressions of the Divine properties, one Will should be dominant—the will of man in whom God's Will is dominant. Thus God would be (virtually) *All in All*. All the creation would then be in true harmony and temperature, each would love and serve the rest, and no antagonistic will would arise to introduce strife and discord. The elements whence strife arises, and the strife itself, might be known as a *speculation* (in the old sense of 'looking into'), but never as an actualization. Such was the first world of the Temperature, before Lucifer's and Adam's fall.

The outer process whereby the Fall was effected was, as the first and initiatory step, the sin of Lucifer, who was pleased with the might of the Fire in the fourth Form, and rejected the meekness of the submission in the Divine Light, which would otherwise have qualified the might. Secondly and directly, it was the act of our first parents in eating of the forbidden fruit.

Only a hasty, general sketch of Boehme's teaching as to this can be given here. Adam was created out of the two Principles—he had an external out of the Ens of the Fire-source, and an internal from the Ens of the Light-source. The former is the masculine element, the latter the feminine. The two sex-elements were united in one form, which was that of a masculine Virgin. The Fall had a preparation and a culmination. The preparation was that the bi-une being, Adam, felt 'alone.' He should have 'propagated magically' through the union of the two elements in himself, for he was a two-in-one (*i.e.* both 'him' and 'them,' as he is called in Gn 1[27]). He would thus have 'multiplied' and found companionship. But this he proved unable to do. The true 'help meet for him' was *in* him, but he looked around instead of within. Therefore the woman-element must be externalized that he might become conscious of it. But this could not be done in the true, Divine imagination which was in full rapport with the transcendent Fact. He is therefore caused to fall into a 'deep sleep,' and in this lower grade of imagination finds the internal externalized. They are still in Paradise, but now in danger; and are warned of it. They are not to inquire into the nature of good and evil; for now, their imagination being in a degree false, they are likely to wish to do more than *speculate*; they may want to *know*. God alone may *know* good and evil (see Gn 3[22]). Thus the Tree of Life to the bi-une Adam becomes the Tree of Temptation to the divided Adam and Eve. The danger now was that they should desire after a *good* which they could understand from and in themselves and not from and in God, a *pleasure* which in this same way they could feel to be such, and a *wisdom* which would make them not submissive to the One Will but possessed of a will of their own, and an imagination arising from the sight of their own eyes. This false imagination instantly became operative, but not as they had hoped. The Divine perception went into a hiddenness and virtually died in them; and as they had known themselves only in this imagination, *they* virtually died and arose to *newness* of life, but as the change was downwards, it would be newness of *death* rather than of life. The body of the heavenly One Pure Element disappeared (if, indeed, it had not done so before in the falling into a deep sleep), and they have now a body of four elemental, corruptible matters, made (as science tells us) 'bone for bone, muscle for muscle, and nerve for nerve' like the beasts that perish. Instantly also the result reacts through nature. The Divine element, which before had budded through the earth and produced fruits wholly good, now withdraws into the hiddenness, and the earth bears 'thorns and thistles,' and only such grains and fruits as contain—with the good of nutriment for the animal body—the evil which through digestion and excretion has to be separated and cast out, the like of which could never be in heaven where no corruption can enter. Disease and sickness manifest themselves, poison manifests itself in certain plants, and a fierce and savage nature in some of the animals. Thus the Fall of man infected the whole 'dominion' he should have ruled as God's vicegerent; so that now 'the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together,' in an own self-will which manifests *as it* will, and not in submission to the will of God.

3. Doctrine of Regeneration.—St. Paul declares that the creation was thus subjected to 'vanity' in hope that it should 'be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God' (Ro 8[21]). Lucifer's fall was beyond remedy, says Boehme; Adam's was not. Lucifer imagined into the first Principle (which is eternal); Adam only into the third. He desired to know good and evil; Lucifer had said, 'Evil, be thou my good.' Thus Adam introduced into his mind a false knowledge which yet did not entirely obliterate, but only obscured, the true, so that he yet can know evil as evil; while Lucifer knows evil as good. Therefore Adam died, not to the entire ability to know good, but only to the true, Divine perception which knows *only* good. But though he died to this, it did not die to him: it went into a hiddenness, but is still there as a latent potentiality in him, though at first he is so completely unaware of it that it is as if it were not in him at all. His state is rather a logical than an absolute death; it is practically absolute as far as his consciousness goes, but his consciousness does not embrace the whole content of reality.

* Boehme was an uneducated man, and often bemoans the fact, saying that he could have expressed himself better had he been better educated.

His natural life is a life in death, and if the dead life is to come to real life, it can only be through that whereby we come to this life—a birth; therefore (as our Lord said to Nicodemus) 'ye *must* be born anew' (δεῖ ὑμᾶς γεννηθῆναι ἄνωθεν).

The power to this New Birth is the power of God through the life and death of Christ who came down into our false imagination (but not into its dominance) to 're-tincture' the disappeared Divine nature that stood as dead, that it might again spring forth to newness of life. He brought the true imagination into the false, and showed it to us visibly in His life and character; whereby we may catch the idea that ours is not the true, and so come to desire the true. Then He leads us in the one way to the recovery of the true, by leading us to the Cross, whereon we must (in and with Him) crucify the false which lies over and obscures the true; then the true arises necessarily and becomes our new imagination, that is, our new 'self' and life.

The promise given to our first parents of the Treader on the Serpent, though not immediately fulfilled—not, indeed, till many centuries afterwards—availed to preserve the Divine nature in man from doing more than disappear, from actually abandoning him. It remained hidden and uncognized, but it was there; till the fullness of time, when Christ was born of a pure Virgin. The necessity for the Virgin-birth lies in this, that the male seed is from the Fire-source, and the female from the Light-source; so the special nature of the Fire—a hard-set selfhood—is less present in the female than in the male (*Myst. Mag.* I. xxiii. 43). Thus our Lord was born, not of 'bloods' (*i.e.* a divided parentage) nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God; that is, of the heavenly Water and of the Spirit; and thus must we again be 'born anew.' All through His life He re-acted the part of Adam, only He stood where Adam fell. He stood in the forty days' fast, and refused to eat of the earthly substantiality (though it looked 'good for food'); refused to long after earthly adulation and worship (though it seemed 'pleasant to the eyes'); refused to act from the outer wisdom of the serpent (though it would have given Him the external dominion and glory of this world).

Thus He gained the power required. But, to avail ourselves of His salvation, we must enter into His death by utterly refusing the threefold temptations of the world, the flesh, and the Devil; that is, the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life. Through His power we can now put the self-will again into the hiddenness, and so bring out of the hiddenness, and live in, the meekness in which He ever lived. Thus we regain what Adam lost—the high glory of being so one with God that He dwells in us as our will, and what He wills seems to be what we will. When this central Will is inoperative, myriads of conflicting wills arise, for men and all creatures do then 'what is right in their own eyes,' and all peace and harmony is destroyed. The world is plunged in conflict, everything is 'out of joint'; and all this for the sake of a false idea of *freedom*, the glamour of which seduces us, but which proves a more horrible bondage than 'His service,' which alone is 'perfect freedom.'

A powerful aid to the regeneration is found in 'Christ's Testaments,' Baptism and Holy Communion. In each it is not the outward element that profits, but the inward. If the new life has arisen in the soul, then it perceives the inward in the outward element, and it is the inward water which cleanses, and the inward sustenance which feeds, the inward man. In all earthly matter of the four elements the inward One Pure Element lies hidden from the outer man, but open to the inward, first through faith, afterwards actually.

Many other points in Boehme's system might be noticed, but enough has been said to give an idea of the general trend of his theosophy. His terminology constitutes the greatest difficulty in understanding him. Many of his learned friends were students of Alchemy, and one of them induced him to read the works of Paracelsus. He thus became acquainted with the terms of Alchemy, and uses them constantly, to the perplexity of his readers. For he saw in them a meaning beyond the outward, and no one will catch his real purport who cannot detect the spiritual allusion underlying the terms used. To him the *Magnum Opus* seemed a magnificent symbol of the 'maximum opus' of regeneration. The transmutation of the base metal into the perfect stands for the transmutation of the fallen, external nature into the unfallen internal in which man was originally created in the image and likeness of God. And the process through solution, purification, and re-fixation marvellously exemplifies the spiritual process, through putting the false imagination to death, purification through the Spirit, and the re-creation of the 'new man.'

III. *BOEHME'S IMPORTANCE AND INFLUENCE.*—The philosophical value of Boehme lies in his suggestion that in all 'things' as cognized by human apprehension there must exist a hidden and a manifested element. If both are explored, they can appear only as absolute contraries, evil and good. Yet what is required is not to annihilate one that the other may exist alone, but to unite the strength (without the quality) of the evil (which, without its quality, is not evil but strength) to the quality of the good, making the former the unseen, unmanifested, basal power of the latter. For, while evil is manifested as such, good lacks the basal might which would make it irresistible (as the very presence of the evil proves). What is wanted, therefore, is not the destruction of one of the two terms, but such a change of relation between the two as shall virtually reduce them to one. This is the Hegelian triad of Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis; and absolutely on all fours with this is Professor G. Boole's formula (*Laws of Thought*), 'Universe of thought equals Unity,' most graphically represented by his suggested expression, $x + \text{not } x = 1$.

The religious value of Boehme lies in his clear and unmistakable teaching as to the nature of true regeneration and the true Christian life. Many who will fail to understand his cosmology will find him lucid and most helpful here.

In England, Sir Isaac Newton, William Law, William Blake, and others have been students of Boehme; in France, Louis Claude de Saint-Martin; in Germany, Hegel, Schelling, Schopenhauer, J. G. Gichtel, and many others.

LITERATURE.—The principal edition in English of Boehme's works is a translation in 4 large quarto vols., of dates 1763, 1763, 1772, 1781. The chief works are: *The Aurora, or Morning Redness* (1612), *The Three Principles of the Divine Essence* (1619), *The Threefold Life of Man* (1620), *Answer to Forty Questions concerning the Soul* (1620), *Signatura Rerum* (1621), *Mysterium Magnum* (1623). Of these the last is, perhaps, the most important. There are a number of shorter writings, *e.g.* Apologies and Epistles. Of editions of Boehme's works in the original, the first issued is said to have been by the son of his old opponent Richter, in 8 vols. A more complete edition was published in 1675, and another by J. G. Gichtel, in 10 vols., in 1682. *Jacob Boehmes sämmtliche Werke, herausgegeben von K. W. Schiebler*, 6 vols., was issued at Leipzig in 1831–46, and another edition in 7 vols. in 1840–47. Of importance are also Hamberger's *Die Lehre des deutschen Philosophen Jacob Böhmen* (Munich, 1844); Claassen's *Jakob Böhme, sein Leben und seine theosophische Werke* (3 vols., Stuttgart, 1883–86). A new edition of Boehme's works, ed. C. J. Barker, has begun to appear (London, 1909).

Of modern works on Boehme's system may be noted: F. C. Baur, 'Zur Gesch. der prot. Mystik,' in *Theol. Jahrbb.* 1848–49; Peip, *Jakob Boehme* (Leipzig, 1860); von Harless, *Jakob*

Boehme und die Alchymisten (Berlin, 1870); Martensen, *J. Boehme: Theosophische Studien* (1882); Fuchs, 'Beiträge zu einer richtigen Würdigung J. B.'s,' in *Beweis des Glaubens* (1883); Schönwälder, *Lebensbeschreibung Jakob Böhme*, (Görlitz, 1897); A. J. Penny, *Introd. to the Study of J. B.'s Writings* (New York, 1901); A. Whyte, *Jacob Behmen: An Appreciation* (Edinburgh, 1895); 'Excerpts from Boehme,' with interpretative comments, in the present writer's magazine, *The Seeker*, *passim* (London).

G. W. ALLEN.

BOGOMILS.—The Bogomils were a sect of dualistic heretics whose doctrines clearly declare their kinship with the Paulicians and Euchites or Messalians (*q.v.*). Mainly to the former may be ascribed their peculiar form of Dualism, and to the latter their specifically ascetic element. Both these earlier movements took root in Thrace during the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries—exotics from their native soil in the Eastern Byzantine provinces (Armenia, Mesopotamia, and N. Syria). They flourished most among the people of Slavic race, particularly the Bulgarians. Here they passed through a process of intermingling and local modification which issued in a system relatively new and strange,[1]—whose adherents increased rapidly though secretly, and are known to have been called Bogomils in the beginning of the 12th cent., if not from the middle of the 10th.

The origin of the name has been usually found in the frequent use by them of the two Slavic words *Bog milui*, 'Lord, have mercy.'[2] A more likely explanation derives it from *Bogumil*, 'Beloved of God,' in which case it may be taken to denote the idea of a pious community analogous to the (later) 'Friends of God' (*q.v.*) in Germany.[3] But not less probable is its derivation from a personal name. Two early Bulgarian MSS have been discovered which are confirmatory of each other in the common point that a 'pope' Bogomile was the first to promulgate the 'heresy' in the vulgar tongue under the Bulgarian Tsar Peter, who ruled from 927 to 968. This would seem to afford a surer clue to the name, and (if correct) puts back the active emergence of the movement to the middle of the 10th century.[4]

Euthymius Zigabenus (died after 1118) is the main source of what is known about the Bogomils. His account is given in titulus, or chapter, xxvii. of the work Πανοπλία Δογματική[5] which he devoted to the refutation of twenty-four different heresies. He was a favourite of the reigning Emperor Alexius Comnenus; and a story told[6] by Anna, daughter of the latter, shows how he came by his information. Alexius, having invited the physician Basilius, chief apostle of the sect, to Constantinople, induced him, under an affectation of sympathetic interest, to make a free statement of his doctrines; meanwhile a stenographer, hidden behind a curtain in the room, took down a verbatim report of the conversation, and at the end of the interview the curtain was raised. In this way Basilius found himself ensnared and self-accused. His doctrine thus craftily obtained is set out by Euthymius (*PG*, vol. cxxx.) under 52 heads, of which the main are as follows:—

(1) The Bogomils rejected all the Mosaic books of the OT, but accepted as canonical the Psalms and the Prophets. In addition, they accepted the four Gospels, the Acts of the Apostles, the Epistles, and the Apocalypse,[1] assigning a peculiar sacredness and authority to the Gospel of John. So far as Moses was used, it was as allegory to support their own views. A favourite book was the apocryphal 'Visio *or* Ascensio Isaiae.'

(2) While accepting the Gospel-history, they did so not altogether in its literal sense—Christ's history, *e.g.*, was regarded as a symbolical clothing of higher facts—and they held, moreover, that its meaning had been falsified by the Church. Chrysostom, in particular, seemed to them a falsifier.[2] Nor would they have anything to do with the 'grammarians,' whom they classed as scribes and Pharisees.

(3) They taught a Sabellian conception of the Trinity, saying that all three names—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—apply to the Father; and that in the end, when Son and Spirit have done their work, they will flow back into the Father. God was represented as human in form, though not corporeal. They pictured the Father as the ancient of days (*ὡς γέροντα βαθυγένειον*), the Son as an adolescent youth (*ὡς ὑπηνήτην ἄνδρα*), and the Spirit as a beardless youth (*ὡς λειοπρόσωπον νεανίαν*).[3]

(4) God's first-born son was Satanael (the Satan of the NT), the highest of the spiritual beings, his Father's universal vicegerent. Tempted by his pride, however, he sought to set up an Empire of his own, and drew after him a great company of the angels. Cast down from heaven on this account, but not yet deprived of creative power, he made a new heaven and a new earth.[4] They held that Satanael also made man, but could not do more than fashion his body. For life or spirit he had to fall back upon God, whose help he besought and obtained on condition that from the human race the places of the fallen angels in heaven should be refilled. So God breathed into man's body the breath of life. But Satanael, moved by envy of man's glorious destiny, repented of his promise. He seduced Eve; and Cain, their offspring, became the principle of evil in humanity. This principle prevailed over the good principle represented by Abel, the child of Adam and Eve.[5] By its aid he imposed himself upon the Jews as the Supreme God. Moses unwittingly acted as his instrument, and the Law—which begat sin—was his fatal gift. Thus all men, save a few,[6] were led astray. Then the good God intervened. In the 5500th year after the creation of the world, a spirit called the Son of God, the Logos, the Archangel Michael, the angel of the Great Council (Is 9[6]), came forth from Him, entered the world in an ethereal body by the channel of Mary,[7] and proceeded to overturn his evil brother's kingdom. Satanael plotted and brought to pass his death—unaware that, being bodily in appearance merely, he could not be affected by any physical pains. When, therefore, Jesus showed himself after the resurrection in his true heavenly form, Satanael

[1] For a good analysis of the elements, traditional and original, which made up the system, see article by Zöckler on 'Die Neu-Manichäer,' in *PRE*[3], and Karl Müller of Giessen's review of Döllinger's *Beiträge zur Sectengeschichte des Mittelalters* in *ThLZ* (1890), No. 14.

[2] This is the Greek interpretation, and is given by Euthymius Zigabenus (titulus xxvii. of his Πανοπλία δογματική).

[3] Zöckler favours this, and says it is thus a 'wohl Spezialbezeichnung der Perfecti der Secte, die sich wohl gern "Freunde Gottes" (*θεόφιλοι*) nannten.' With this, too, would agree their own self-description as *Χριστιανοί*, *Χριστοπολῖται* (Euthymius Zigabenus, *contra Phundagiatas* [in Migne, *PG* cxxxi. col. 48]; Anna Comnena, *Alexias*, lib. xv. [*ib.* vol. cxxxi. col. 1177]).

[4] See 'L'hérésie des Bogomiles en Bosnie et en Bulgarie au moyen âge,' in *Revue des Questions historiques* (1870), essay by Louis Leger, pp. 479–517. Bogomile = Theophilus, and was (thinks M. Leger) the 'pope's' second (assumed), name, his first perhaps being Jeremiah. They were also spoken of as *Fundaitae* (*φουνδαΐται*), *i.e.* purse-bearers, from *funda*, 'purse' or 'bag,' with reference apparently to a habit of begging their way from place to place like the Friars (see Euthymius Zigabenus, *s. Phundagiatas* (in *PG*, vol. cxxxi. col. 47).

[5] *PG*, vol. cxxx.

[6] Anna Comnena, lib. xv. § 487 (*PG*, vol. cxxxi.).

[1] § 1. 'Sapientia enim, inquiunt, aedificavit sibi domum, septemque columnas substituit, *i.e.* (1) Psalterium, (2) sexdecim Prophetae, (3–6) quattuor Evangelia, (7) res ab Apostolis gestae, omnes epistolae, Apocalypsus.'

[2] Eth. Zig. *c. Phundagiatas* (*PG*, vol. cxxxi. col. 53).

[3] §§ 2, 3, 23.

[4] § 7. *εἶπε, Γενηθήτω στερέωμα, καὶ ἐγένετο. Γενηθήτω γῆ καὶ γῆδε, καὶ γεγόνασιν ἅπαντα.*

[5] §§ 6–10.

[6] § 8. 'Eos nimirum, qui in genealogiis Evangelii secundum Matthaeum et secundum Lucam recensentur.'

[7] § 8. 'per aurem Virginis dexteram.'

had to acknowledge defeat His divine power departed from him. He lost the angelic syllable (*El*) in his name, and became Satan only. Christ then ascended into heaven and took the seat of power once held by Satanael. His own place among men was hereupon taken by the Holy Spirit—produced by the Son as the Son by the Father.[1]

(5) The twelve Apostles were in a spiritual sense the first creation of the Spirit; and the true successors of these, in whom alone He continues to dwell, are the Bogomils and their converts. As habitations of the Spirit they spoke of themselves as parents of God.[2]

(6) People of the true faith cannot die, but may be said 'tanquam in somno transmutari.'[3]

(7) Their own place of assembly (*synagogam*) they called Bethlehem, because there Christ, or the Word of God, is truly born and the true faith preached.[4] All other so-called sacred temples are the home of demons.[5]

(8) Accordingly their attitude to the 'Church' was hostile throughout. Quoting Mt 4[13] ('and leaving Nazareth, he came and dwelt in Capernaum'), they applied the term 'Nazareth' to the 'Church,' reserving 'Capernaum' to themselves.[6] All the Beatitudes were spoken concerning them, not the 'Church';[7] and not to the latter has been given the power to cast out demons or do any wonderful work.[8] As to the Sacraments of the Church, its Baptism is that of John, not Jesus, of the water, not the Spirit; and those who come to it are Pharisees and Sadducees.[9] For John the Baptist was a servant of the Jewish God, Satanael. They despised also the Church's doctrine and practice of the Lord's Supper.[10] It seemed to them a sacrifice to evil spirits. Their own conception made the Supper merely symbolical of communion with Christ as the bread of life come down from heaven—a consistent outcome of their Docetism. Equally consistent was their protest against the worship of the Virgin Mary, of the Saints, and of images.[11] When the Church attempted to rebut the protest by appeal to the miracle-working virtue of relics, they did not deny the miracles, but ascribed them to the evil spirits which attended the so-called Saints in life,[12] and were permitted to go on working after their death. Similarly the power of the crucifix over the demoniacal world was not denied in some cases, but was set down to the fact that the crucifix is a symbol welcome to evil spirits, inasmuch as it was the cross by which they were fain to have compassed the death of Christ.[13]

(9) On the ground that the demons, under Satanael, possess a certain power for an appointed time,[14] and that it is permissible to secure safety from unjust treatment by doing them outward honour, they took part in Church worship.[15] But they had their own secret 'conventicles' and a definite mode of initiation. After the candidate had made ready by confession of sins, fasting and prayer, the president laid the Gospel of John on his head, and together with the brethren invoked the Holy Spirit and repeated the Lord's Prayer.[16] A probationary period of strict abstinence followed. Then, if approved, he came a second time into the assembly, when, with his face toward the east, the Gospel of John was again laid on his head, the brethren touched his head with their hands, and sang together a hymn of thanksgiving. It is admitted by their enemies that the moral ideal set before the candidates was a high one. They were to keep the precepts of the Gospel, and fast[1] and pray, and be pure in life and compassionate and humble and truthful and loving to one another, and without covetousness.[2] Nor is there any evidence that the charge of hypocrisy and secret vice had any foundation in fact. The Bogomil practice, as well as standard, seems to have been far above the average level, and to have had no small effect in attracting those whom the corruptions of the Church repelled.

(10) The monk and physician Basilius seems to have been the first martyr of the sect. He did not recant the confession obtained from him in the manner already described, and was led away to prison. This was about 1111, at which time he had governed the community of the Bogomils for 40 years. In 1119 he died at the stake.[3] Many others were 'ferreted out' by the combined zeal of Alexius the Emperor and Nicholas the Patriarch—especially (it is said) from among the laity and clergy of Constantinople. Some abjured their 'errors' under threat of punishment or promise of reward; some remained firm and went to lifelong imprisonment.[4] But the heresy lived on for centuries—the same in substance everywhere, though modified in detail here and there. A strong influence on its side was the monk Constantine Chrysomalus, whose writings were condemned by a synod at Constantinople in 1140. Another synod at Constantinople in 1143 deposed two Cappadocian bishops as Bogomils—a sign that the heresy had spread to Asia Minor. About 1230 the Patriarch Germanus complained of its wide-spread activity in the capital, and of the success with which its emissaries wormed themselves into private houses and made converts. In Bulgaria, most of all, it held its ground, and did so in the form of an organized Church-community. Distinct traces of this are met with as late as the second half of the 14th cent., and the smaller societies into which it separated are traceable to a much later time.

LITERATURE.—Michaelis Psellus, *Dialogus de Daemonum energia seu operations contra Manetum et Euchitas seu Enthusiastas*, chs. ii.–v. (Migne, *PG*, vol. cxxii.); Euthymius Zigabenus, Πανοπλία Δογματική, ch. xxvii. (*PG*, vol. cxxx.), and *contra Phundagiatas* (*PG*, vol. cxxxi. coll. 47–57); Anna Comnena Alexias, lib. xv. §§ 486–494 (*PG*, vol. cxxxi.); Louis Leger, 'L'hérésie des Bogomiles en Bosnie et en Bulgarie au Moyen âge,' pp. 479–517, in *Revue des Questions historiques*, vol. viii. (1870); Neander, *Church Hist.* viii. 851; Zöckler, art. 'Neu-Manichäer,' in *PRE*[3], vol. xiii.

FRED. J. POWICKE.

BOHEMIAN BRETHREN. — See HUS, HUSSITES.

BOLDNESS (Christian).—'Boldness' (παρρησία) is used in the NT to describe the perfect confidence which the Christian, depending upon Christ and His work, has in his approach to, and in all his dealings with, God. Three passages may be cited as illustrating the idea: (i.) Heb. 4[16] 'Let us therefore draw near with boldness unto the throne of grace'; cf. Heb. 10[19], Eph. 3[12]. (ii.) Heb. 10[35] 'Cast not away therefore your boldness, which hath great recompense of reward'; cf. Heb. 3[6]. (iii.) 1 John 4[17] 'Herein is love made

1 § 5. Neander (*Church Hist.* viii. 855) makes them say that the Holy Spirit was an emanation from the Father.
2 § 22. 'Aiunt suos omnes in quibus Spiritus sanctus habitat, Dei parentes et esse (πάντας θεοτόκους καὶ εἶναι).'
3 § 23. 4 § 28. 5 § 18. 6 § 34.
7 § 35. 8 § 13. 9 §§ 16 and 31.
10 § 17. 'Mysticum, venerandum sacrificium contemnunt atque despiciunt.'
11 § 11. 12 § 12. 13 § 14.
14 Until the end of the 7000th year (the seventh secn).
15 § 20–21. (*a*) *The Lord said* (in one of their Apocryphal Gospels): 'Daemonia colite, non ut vobis prosint, sed ne obsint'; (*b*) 'omni ratione saluti vestrae consulite'; cf. § 25.
16 The 'Pater Noster' was the only prayer they thought it right to use (§ 19). They recited it 7 times daily and 5 times nightly.

1 The Bogomils fasted three times weekly—'secunda et quarta et sexta die' (§ 25).
2 § 26.
3 In the Hippodrome at Constantinople (see Anna Comnena, lib. xv. [*PG* cxxxi. coll. 1181–6]).
4 *Ib.*

perfect with us, that we may have boldness in the day of judgment'; cf. 1 John 3^{21}. In (i.) the 'boldness' denotes the perfect confidence with which the Christian approaches God in this present world; in (ii.) the confident expectation, or joyful and hopeful assurance, which he has with regard to his future relationship with God; in (iii.) the boldness, conceived as existing in the future, denotes the absence of fear, or the simple confidence, which the Christian will experience in the day of judgment. Of this boldness certain important facts require to be stated.

1. It was a new ingredient put into the religious consciousness by Christianity, and is a distinctive feature of the Christian faith. To come *boldly* to the throne of grace is a new and living way (Heb. 10^{19}). This can be seen by a comparison between the way in which man approaches God under the OT dispensation, and the way in which the Christian approaches Him under the new covenant. In the OT man approaches God with fear and trembling; he stands afar off 'at the nether part of the mount' (Ex 19^{17}); even 'Moses said, I exceedingly fear and quake' (Heb. 12^{21}); in the NT man approaches with boldness 'the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem,' 'God the judge of all,' and 'Jesus the Mediator of a new covenant, and the blood of sprinkling' (Heb. 12^{22-24}).* It will be found, too, that in this matter of boldness the Christian religion is distinct, not only from the Hebrew, but from all other religions. Fear and shrinking rather than boldness and confidence are, universally, the concomitants of the natural man's approach to the Unseen and Eternal. The Christian alone has boldness of access to the throne of God.

2. The ground of Christian boldness is Christ, and especially His atoning work; it is not any virtue or grace which the Christian may have in himself or of himself; the virtue and grace of Christ constitute the sole ground of boldness. In Christ the Christian has a great High Priest with whom alone he can boldly approach the throne of grace (Heb. 4^{14-16}, Eph. 3^{12}; cf. Rom. $5^{1, 2}$); in Christ's blood he has a sacrifice for sin with which he can boldly enter the Holy Place (Heb. 10^{19}). In 1 John $4^{17, 18}$ the love of God is perfected in the Christian's boldness, and perfect love casts out all fear; but the perfect love of God is, according to this Epistle, embodied in Christ and His propitiatory work (1 John 4^{10}), so that 1 John falls into line with Hebrews and Paul in making Christ and His work the ground of Christian boldness. Whether the Christian had in Christ and Christ's work valid grounds for his spiritual confidence is a question whose discussion does not lie within the scope of this article, but it is a simple historical fact that on the ground of Christ and His work, and united to Christ and Christ's work by faith, the Christian found a new standing—one of confidence and joyful assurance—before God, and exhibited it to the world.

3. Christian boldness is not inconsistent with humility and reverence before God. The Christian is bold when he realizes the perfect and sufficient right which he has in Christ to approach God, but humble when he realizes that this right is not in himself at all but in Another. And for the grace which has given him such boldness and freedom of access he can feel nothing but grateful reverence. In the Christian consciousness, boldness and humility are met together, confidence and reverence have kissed each other.

4. Christian boldness must be distinguished from certain other forms of courage or audacity. (i.) From the audacity which defies all authority, which fears neither God nor man, and which leads a man to be and to do whatsoever he will. Such audacity is not boldness towards God (1 Jn 3^{21}); it leads away from God. It is irreligious and immoral in its tendency, and exercises itself in the sphere directly opposite and opposed to the sphere of Christian boldness. (ii.) From the courage or confidence which is due to an imperfect or incomplete conception of God. Where God is conceived as pure clemency or simple kindness, and as having a forgiveness so easy to grant that it amounts to an indifference to sin, He can be approached with a certain boldness, which, however, is but the courage of a moral ignorance and spiritual blindness as to the true character of God, and is very different in religious quality from the boldness of the man who holds God to be so holy that, apart from a perfect High Priest and a sufficient sacrifice, he dare not approach Him. (iii.) From courage in the face of difficulty, or danger or opposition in the world. From such natural courage the spiritual boldness of the Christian differs in several respects. The spheres of their exercise are different. Natural courage exercises itself in the world of phenomena, Christian boldness is towards God and exercises itself in the world of spiritual realities. Then natural courage requires for its exercise danger or difficulty, Christian boldness has no difficulty or danger to face, for all difficulty of approach to God has been removed by Christ. Natural courage takes risk, Christian boldness feels no risk; it has 'full assurance.'

5. But, while Christian boldness is in itself distinct from natural courage, it was doubtless the secret and source of the marvellous bravery which was shown by members of the Apostolic community in face of danger and death.* Perfect love casts out all fear, first the fear of God, and then of everything in God's world.

6. This article would not be complete without a reference to the boldness of Jesus. In the Fourth Gospel boldness is mentioned seven times as characteristic of the bearing and speech of Jesus (cf. Mk 8^{32}). Then it need only be mentioned that confidence and assurance were supremely evident in the attitude of Christ towards God. Notice His attitude at the grave of Lazarus, or as He draws near to the Cross.

For boldness in general sense, see COURAGE.

LITERATURE.—The lexx. *s. vv.* παρρησία, and παρρησιάζεσθαι; E. A. Abbott, *Johannine Gram.* 1917; the Comm., esp. A. B. Davidson and Westcott on *Hebrews* and Westcott on *1 John*; also art. ACCESS in the present work and in *HDB.*

D. RUSSELL SCOTT.

BOMBAY.—The Presidency of Bombay, the most western of the provinces of India, takes its name from that of its capital city, which is believed to be derived from the title of the local goddess, Mumbā or Mambā Devī, interpreted to mean Mahā-Ambā, the great Mother-goddess of the non-Aryan population. Her shrine, which once stood on the site now occupied by the Esplanade at Bombay, was removed to the Bhendī Bāzār in the native city, where she still receives the offerings of her worshippers. The Presidency, as now constituted, consists of scattered groups of districts lying along the W. coast of the Peninsula, from lat. 13° 53′ to 28° 29′ N., and includes an area of 188,745 square miles, and a total population of 25,124,235.

The religious conditions of a great Indian province have been discussed in some detail in the case of Bengal (wh. see); and separate articles dealing with the more important divisions, sacred places, and castes in the Bombay Presidency illustrate so many phases of the local religious

* The passage He 12^{18-24} powerfully presents the contrast between the old (OT) and the new (NT) way of approach to God, though the actual word 'boldness' does not occur.

* παρρησία is used of the boldness which the Apostles showed in bearing and speech (Ac 4^{13}); παρρησιάζεσθαι is used frequently in the Acts of the fearless preaching of the gospel.

beliefs that it is unnecessary to discuss them in detail (see, for instance, AMARNĀTH, BARODA, DWĀRKA, ELEPHANTA, ELLORA, GIRNĀR, GODĀVARĪ, GOKARN, KISTNĀ, NARBADĀ, PALITĀNA, SOMNĀTH; and, for castes and tribes, BAIRĀGĪ, BANJĀRA, BHĪLS, DRAVIDIANS (North), MAHĀR, RĀJPUT, RĀMOSHI, YOGĪ). In this article, therefore, it is proposed merely to give a general sketch, historical and descriptive.

1. **Environment and its influence upon religion.**—In the case of Bombay, perhaps more clearly than in other provinces, the varied environment of the people has influenced their religion. The Presidency consists of several regions widely differing in climate, fertility, and accessibility to external influences, as well as in the ethnical origin, history, and character of their population.

(*a*) *Sind.*—Thus, beginning from the extreme west, we have the valley of the Indus, the climate of which, owing to its prevalent aridity and the absence of the monsoons—a condition relieved only by a great system of artificial irrigation—ranks among the hottest and most variable in India. By its situation it was specially exposed to the attacks of the Arabs from the west, which began early in the 8th cent. A.D., and rapidly reduced the delta to submission. The original population consisted of an Aryan race with a non-Aryan substratum, leavened by an important element derived from foreigners, including the Ephthalites or White Huns, whose incursions ceased not long before the armies of Islām appeared upon the scene. The permanent result of the Arab invasions has been that, at the present time, rather more than three-fourths of the population are Musalmāns.

(*b*) *Cutch, Kāthiāwār, and Gujarāt.*—Farther east come Cutch (Kachchh), Kāthiāwār, and Gujarāt: the first almost an island, severed from the mainland by the Rann, half desert, half morass; the second a peninsula, stretching westward to the Arabian Sea; the third a fertile plain, watered by the rivers Narbadā and Tāptī—the Garden of India, as it used to be called before its recent devastation by famine. This region was from the earliest times exposed to invasion from the north of India. The inscription of the Satrap Rudradāman, engraved on the rock of Girnār in Kāthiāwār, records the establishment, in A.D. 150, of the Śaka or Scythian dynasty, known as that of the Western Satraps. Kāthiāwār and Gujarāt seem to have been the most southerly tracts which came under the rule of these foreigners, and the theory advanced by Sir H. Risley (*Census Rep.* 1901, i. 514), that a well-marked Scythian element can be identified in the population of the Deccan, will not bear examination.

(*c*) *The Konkans.*—The remaining seaboard districts of the Presidency, included under the general name of the Konkans, are separated from the central region by the barrier of the western Ghāt range, which, until it was pierced by British road and railway engineers, formed a permanent obstacle to communication between the coast and the interior. This portion of the western seaboard was from the most ancient times the seat of a flourishing trade, and formed the centre of commercial and intellectual intercourse between India and the nations of the West. Perhaps as early as 1000 B.C. trade routes were established between its ports and those of the Red Sea. Communication with the Gulf of Persia and the cities in the Tigris-Euphrates valley certainly started not later than 750 B.C., and probably dates from a much earlier period. About the beginning of the Christian era, commerce was opened between Gujarāt and Rome; a colony of Jews from Yemen is believed to have reached Kolāba in the 6th cent. A.D.; the Parsis, driven from Persia by the advancing armies of Islām, landed at Sanjan in the Thāna district in A.D. 775. The long line of Christian missionaries to W. India begins with Pantænus (189–90);* and the seed planted by him and his successors continued to grow until the Portuguese, established in Goa in 1510, steadily undertook the conversion of the native races which fell under their control. This continuous intercourse between this part of India and the West must have profoundly affected the religious beliefs of the people. To it, with some measure of probability, has been attributed the growth of the conception of lively faith in a personal Godhead, which is a leading tenet of the Vaiṣnava sect. This, however, is strenuously denied by Hindu writers (see BHAKTI-MĀRGA).

(*d*) *The Deccan.*—In direct contrast to the seaboard is the scantily watered, comparatively unfertile, plateau known as the Deccan (Dakkhin, Skr. *Dakshiṇa*, 'that on the right hand,' 'southern'). While the barrier of the W. Ghāts divides it from the coast region, it is separated from N. India by the Vindhyan and Mahādeo ranges, and in ancient times was specially isolated by the tract of forest country known to the ancient Hindus as Daṇḍakāraṇya, which has been identified with Mahārāshṭra, the region now occupied by the Marhaṭa (Marāthā) people. This in early Hindu legends is said to have been occupied by fierce demons (Rākshasa), in other words, the non-Aryan tribes who resisted the pressure of the new civilization from the north, and were closely akin to races like the Kunbī, the predominant element in the present population. In the Deccan the sturdy peasantry were much less accessible to priestly control than the less manly races of the seaboard. In Gujarāt the preservation of the original Hindu beliefs was due chiefly to the Rājput aristocracy, largely recruited from Huns and Scythians admitted to Hinduism; the wealthy trading classes devoted themselves to the building and endowment of temples; even at present among the laity there is found a sectarian fervour absent in other parts of the Presidency. The condition of religious thought in the Deccan was and is very different. Here there is a lower general average of wealth, culture, and religious devotion. The population is more scattered, and is absorbed in the care of the precarious crops which alone the soil produces. Consequently, like the practically minded Jāṭ of Upper India, the Deccan Kunbī or Marhaṭa, *parcus deorum cultor et infrequens*, cares little for the Brāhman, whom 'the wider political education of the Deccan and the freedom from the competition of other literate classes have led to prefer the occupation of the layman to the segregation of his own fraternity in religious institutions' (Baines, *Census Rep.* 1881, i. 128). The Marhaṭas are of opinion that the spiritually-minded Brāhman should not interfere in secular affairs; and those 'who devote their lives to the study of what Hindoos conceive the divine ordinances are held in great esteem; but otherwise, in the Mahratta country, there is no veneration for the Bramin character' (Grant Duff, *Hist. of the Mahrattas*, 5). Śivājī, the founder of the Marhaṭa State, steadily pursued the policy of appointing Brāhmans to the highest civil posts in the administration; and the Peshwa, or Marhaṭa Mayor of the Palace, was always a Brāhman. Thus the modern Marhaṭa

* It is possible, however, that the 'India' of Pantænus was really S. Arabia (*PRE*[3] xiv. 627); cf. Servius, *ad Georg.* ii. 116 'sed Indiam omnem plagam Aethiopiae accipiamus,' and see Lipsius, *Apokryphe Apostelgeschichten und Apostellegenden*, II. ii. 63–65, 132–135; Möller, *Lehrb. der Kirchengesch.* i. 108. On the other hand, it is tolerably certain that Christianity entered India before 200; cf. Lassen, *Ind. Alterthumskunde*, ii.[2] 1118–1128; Aiken, *The Dhamma of Gotama the Buddha and the Gospel of Jesus the Christ*, 288–297; Hopkins, *India Old and New*, 140 f., 167; Bergh van Eysinga, *Ind. Invloeden op oude Christelijke Verhalen*, 118–120.

Brāhman is reared to cherish the tradition that his forefathers directed the policy of the last independent Hindu State in the Peninsula; and looks with jealousy on the Government which has replaced it. Poona has become a centre of restless intrigue, to which much of the recent disloyalty in Bengal, and in particular the modern deification and cult of Sivājī, can be clearly traced. Next to the Kāśmīrī, the Marhaṭa Brāhmans are perhaps the most capable Hindus in the Empire (T. C. Arthur [A. T. Crawford], *Our Troubles in Poona and the Deccan*, 1897, *Reminiscences of an Indian Police Official*, 1894).

2. Lingāyats.—The independence of Brāhman authority, which is characteristic of the Marhaṭa, was possibly one of the main causes of the growth of the remarkable Lingāyat sect, which will form the subject of a separate article. They have their own priests, and have long severed all connexion with the Brāhmans. But the old leaven is still working, and they now exhibit a tendency to revert to Brāhmanical Hinduism, with which they claim their creed to be coeval, and are attempting to apply the fourfold caste organization of Manu to their social divisions (Enthoven, *Census Rep.* 1901, i. 387).

3. Extension of Brāhman influence into S. India.—The process of bringing that portion of the Peninsula which lies S. of the Narbadā within the Brāhmanical fold probably began with the peaceful settlement of Brāhmans on the eastern and western coasts. This may have occurred at an early period, when the Aryans had worked their way into the Sind delta and Gujarāt on the one side, and down the lower Ganges valley on the other. In Bombay the movement further south was effected either by the sea route or along the western coast districts, where the mountain ranges diminish in altitude and melt into the alluvial plains of Gujarāt, the valleys of the Narbadā and the Tāptī. The advance into the Deccan was checked by the natural obstacles already referred to, and probably occurred at a period long subsequent to the movement along the coasts. Prof. Bhandarkar, by an examination of the early grammarians, has shown some reason for believing that the Aryans had acquired no knowledge of Southern India before the 7th cent. B.C.; that up to this time their advance had been along the coast districts; but that by B.C. 350 they had become acquainted with the country as far south as Tanjore and Madura (*BG* i. pt. ii. 141). These conclusions cannot be regarded as definitely established, and the view that the Brāhmanism of S. India is of comparatively recent origin has been disputed by Hindu writers. But the theory of a comparatively late introduction of Aryan culture fits in well with the existing facts, and it involved important consequences. Not only have the local Dravidian languages held their ground, but art and general culture have developed on original lines. Still more is this the case in the domains of religion and politics. The new-comers found well-organized communities and ancient kingdoms in occupation of the country. The forms of belief characteristic of the non-Aryan races retained their influence over the minds of the people. The early Tamil literature shows that the evolution of religion in the south took a shape very different from that which is, in the case of the northern races, more familiar to students of the development of Hinduism (V. Kanakasabhai, *The Tamils Eighteen Hundred Years Ago*, 1904, p. 227 ff.).

4. Buddhism.—The extension of Buddhism into the region south of the Vindhyan range was the work of Aśoka (*c.* B.C. 272–231; see AŚOKA). Two copies of his fourteen edicts have been found on the W. coast; one, fragmentary, at Sopāra or Sūrpāraka in the Thāna District, N. of Bombay the second, nearly complete, on the Girnār hill, E. of the town of Junāgarh in Kāthiāwār (Smith, *Asoka*, 103). The discovery of three copies of the minor Rock edicts in the Chitaldrūg District of Mysore shows that his authority extended as far south as that kingdom (Rice, *Mysore*[2], ii. 499).

The progress of the three rival faiths, Buddhism, Jainism, and Brāhmanism, is recorded in a series of monuments, the rock-cut halls and temples of W. India, of the greatest historical and religious importance.

'When their story is carefully examined, it appears that they are spread pretty evenly over more than a thousand years of the darkest, though most interesting, period of Indian history; and throw a light upon it as great or greater than can be derived from any other source. In addition to these claims to attention, the western caves afford the most vivid illustration of the rise and progress of the three great religions that prevailed in India in the early centuries of our era and before it. They show clearly how the Buddhist religion rose and spread, and how its form became afterwards corrupt and idolatrous. They explain how it consequently came to be superseded by the nearly cognate forms of Jainism and the antagonistic development of the revived religion of the Brāhmans. All this, too, is done in a manner more vivid and more authentic than can be obtained from any other mode of illustration now available' (Fergusson-Burgess, *Cave Temples*, 166).

More than nine-tenths of the caves at present known are found within the limits of the Bombay Presidency. The view once held, that they are in some way connected with the monuments of Egypt, is now rejected; and their abundance on the W. coast is due simply to the fact that the geological formation of that region, with horizontal strata of amygdaloid and other cognate trap-formations, generally of considerable thickness and uniformity of structure, and with their edges exposed in perpendicular cliffs, favoured the construction of such excavations to serve as halls, temples, or monasteries (Fergusson, *Hist. of Indian Arch.*, 1876, 107).

Many of these caves are described in separate articles (see AJANTA, KĀNHERI, ELLORA, NĀSIK); and therefore it is only necessary to say that, as a whole, they fall into two groups, though naturally the same site was occupied by successive builders, and accordingly the distinction of schools of Buddhist belief is not always rigidly observed. The first group represents the Hīnayāna school, the earlier form of Buddhism. This includes the caves at Junāgarh and other sites in Kāthiāwār, dating from B.C. 250 to the Christian era; those of the Konkans and Deccan, all S. of Bombay, dated between about B.C. 200 and A.D. 50; those E. of Bombay, in the range of the W. Ghāṭs, dated between B.C. 250 and A.D. 100; those at Junnar, Nāsik (wh. see), and the earliest of the Ajanta (wh. see) group, which are of various ages, ranging from B.C. 100, and including examples of the Mahāyāna, or later school, as late as the 7th cent. A.D.; those at Mārol and Kānheri (wh. see) near Bombay, between B.C. 100 and A.D. 150. The second group, that of the Mahāyāna school, extends from the 4th nearly to the 8th cent. A.D., and includes the hall at Junāgarh, the later specimens of the Ajanta series, and those at Aurangābād and Nāsik.

These monuments bear eloquent testimony to the religious fervour, generosity, and taste of the rulers, nobility, and merchant princes who provided funds for their excavation and decoration. Their endowments must have supported a large number of monks. The Buddhist pilgrim, Fa-hien, who began his travels in A.D. 399, gives a lively account of the monastery at Kānheri, and describes the magnificence of the festal decorations, the beauty of the relic-shrines, the nightly illuminations, the rich endowments of the community (Beal, *Fah-hian*, 55, 76, 178). Hiuen Tsiang, a later pilgrim, who in A.D. 641 visited the capital (probably Nāsik) of the great king Pulakeśin II.,

who came to the throne about A.D. 608, found some hundred religious establishments (*saṅgharāma*), containing about 5000 monks (Beal, *Si-yu-ki*, ii. 257). But even at this time Buddhism was in a stage of decay. Possibly the picture which the same writer gives of the famous establishment at Amarāvatī (wh. see) is true of other foundations of the same kind. 'For the last hundred years there have been no priests (*dwelling here*) in consequence of the spirit of the mountain changing his shape, and appearing sometimes as a wolf, sometimes as a monkey, and frightening the disciples; for this reason the place has become deserted and wild, with no priests to dwell there' (*ib.* ii. 223)—a metaphor possibly referring to the hostility to the faith which was then growing up among the forest tribes. Inscriptions of the Rāshṭrakūṭa period at Mālkhed show that in the 9th cent. A.D. Buddhism was still a living religion, favoured by the authorities in W. India; but that at that time its chief rival, Jainism, was contributing to that change of feeling which ultimately caused its downfall (Fleet, *BG* i. pt. ii. 406). It certainly existed in a weakened form in the Deccan as late as the first half of the 12th century.

5. Jainism.—The history of the rise of Jainism—a faith contemporary with the rise of, and resulting from the same causes that gave birth to, Buddhism—is comparatively obscure; and very little is known concerning the process by which it attained a high position in W. and S. India for several centuries. The Jains of the Bombay Presidency are at present represented by two classes: the first, comprising the merchants of Gujarāt, who are remarkable chiefly for their extreme tenderness to animal life, as is shown by the hospitals (*pinjrapol*) established in the chief cities for all sorts of creatures; and the Mārwārī Banyās of Mārwār in Rājputāna, who are generally money-lenders and immigrants into the Deccan. The second group includes a class of cultivators found chiefly in the Belgaum and Dhārwār districts of the Karṇāṭa or S. Marhaṭa country. The first division is connected with the northern centres of the faith, in Rājputāna and Gujarāt, such as Mount Ābū (wh. see) and Palitāna (wh. see). The second group, that of the southern Jains, represents the relics of a belief which was once the State religion of a large part of S. India. In Mysore, according to Rice (some of his conclusions have been disputed by Hultzsch), it seems to have preceded the teaching of Buddhism by the missionaries of Aśoka, and here it continued to be the official religion of certain dynasties and kings throughout the first ten centuries of the Christian era. Here the three rival faiths, Buddhism, Jainism, Brāhmanism, appear to have existed side by side. In the 8th and 9th centuries A.D. an active revival of Brāhmanism in the form of Liṅga-worship resulted from the missionary labours of Kumārila and Śaṅkarāchārya, which raised Śaivism to a position of superiority over its rivals. In like manner, in the 12th cent. the Vaiṣṇava sectarianism gained ground, and, through the teaching of the reformer Rāmānujāchārya, dealt a deathblow to Jainism. After this the adherents of the Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva doctrines seem to have effected some kind of compromise, of which the form Harihara, uniting the cult of Hari (Viṣṇu) and Hara (Śiva), was the outer symbol. The almost contemporaneous growth of the Liṅgāyat sect, which popularized the Śaiva cultus, led to the final decay of Jainism as a leading faith in this region, while the later forms of Vaiṣṇavism absorbed all that remained of Buddhism (Rice, *Mysore*[2], i. 459 f.).

6. Development of Brāhmanism.—It would be an error to suppose that Brāhmanism suffered a complete collapse during the ascendancy of Buddhism and Jainism. The excavators of many of the Buddhist caves bear names derived from Śaivism, and in the great cave at Bādāmī a Vaiṣṇava temple of the 6th cent. A.D. still survives. Some of the Śaiva caves go back to the 2nd century. But it is only in the 4th cent. that they become common, and nearly all the Hindu caves of later date belong to that sect. The work of Brāhmanical cave-excavation seems to have almost ceased in the 8th century. The methods by which the original Buddhist models were adapted to the Brāhmanical cultus are described by Fergusson-Burgess (*Cave Temples*, 399 f.). The next important architectural development was due to influence from S. India, and resulted in the construction of the remarkable Kailāsa rock-temple in the reign of the Rāshṭrakūṭa king Kṛishṇa (Kṛṣṇa) I. about A.D. 760 at Ellora (wh. see; Smith, *Early Hist.*[2] 386 f.). The Jains also undertook the excavation of cave-temples, but at a later date than those of the Buddhists or Brāhmans, none of these Jain works being apparently dated earlier than the 7th century. The most important are at Ellora (Fergusson-Burgess, 490 ff.).

7. Modern Hinduism.—At the Census of 1901 the Hindus numbered 19,916,438 (78·4 per cent of the total population). Here, as in other parts of India, the line between Animists and Hindus cannot be clearly drawn. The faith of the higher classes of Hindus shows the prevailing characteristics of Hinduism: a polytheism replaced by an enlightened pantheism, and that absence of dogma which is the best asset of Hinduism. This, however, applies only to the more intelligent classes. Apart from the forest tribes, whose creed is pure Animism, the lower stratum of the people still preserves its primitive animistic beliefs, obscured, and to some extent modified, by the veneer of Brāhmanism. Bathing in holy rivers and pilgrimages to the tombs of deified heroes and saints are the chief modes by which purification from tabu and spiritual advancement are believed to be attained. The sacred stone haunted by some spirit, the holy tree or other natural object, the abnormal shape of which indicates that it is occupied by a spirit, the ecstatic possession of the village seer or medicine-man, the various devices by which the spirits of the household dead are brought into communion with the living, or the malignant ghosts of the murderer or his victim, and of the man killed by a tiger or snake, are repelled or controlled—these are the chief elements of the popular cultus. The forces of evil are ever in conflict with those of good, and there is little or no trust in a benign, fatherly Providence.

Sectarianism is imperfectly recognized in the statistics. So far as the Census returns go, the Śaivas or Smārtas, with the kindred Pāśupati, Śaṅkarāchārya, and similar sects, number about 3 millions; while the Vaiṣṇava sects, such as those of the Rāmānuja, Vallabhāchārya, Mādhavāchārya, and Vīravaiṣṇava, number only half a million. In addition to these, affiliated to the Śaivas, come the Liṅgāyats, numbering 800,000. Many influences may have affected the accuracy of the returns; but, at any rate, the vast majority of the Hindu population were ignorant of the sect to which they belonged, or did not care to record it.

The most important and interesting development is that of the Vallabhāchārya sect of the Vaiṣṇava group, to which Kṛishṇa (Kṛṣṇa) is the chief object of worship. The immorality of the Mahārājās or heads of this community has attracted much attention since the notorious case decided by the High Court of Bombay ([Karsandas Mulji], *History of the Sect of the Maharajas*, 1865).

8. **Jains.**—Jains, who number 535,950 (2·1 per cent. of the total population) are here, as usual, divided into Digambaras, who worship naked idols and their spiritual preceptors (*gurus*); Śvetāmbaras, who dress and adorn their images; and Dhūndhiyas, who are opposed to the worship of idols, venerate their preceptors, and dress in white, wearing a linen mouth-band to prevent possible injury to animal life. In Gujarāt, the headquarters of the Jains, the Śvetāmbaras are in excess of the other sects.

9. **Animists.**—As has been already remarked (§ 7), the enumeration of Animists, who in 1901 numbered 94,845 (0·4 per cent. of the total population), is incomplete, and merely includes those members of some forest tribes who are most completely, in beliefs and cultus, separate from Hindus. Of these tribes the most numerically important are the Kolī, Bhīl, Varlī, Ṭhākur, Dublā, and Kāṭhkarī. They are most numerous in the Districts of Pānch Mahāls, Thar and Pārkar, Thāna, Surat, and Khāndesh. A full account of the Bhīl beliefs will be found in a separate article, and that on the Northern Dravidians gives a general sketch of the forms of Animism which prevail among these tribes.

10. **Muhammadans.**—Muhammadans in the whole Presidency number 4,567,295 (17·9 per cent. of the total population). Their numbers show a tendency to increase, not so much as the result of any special propaganda, but rather because they have been less exposed than Hindus to the stress of plague and famine. For the interesting class of Bohorās or Bohrās, see SECTS (Muhammadan). The Khojas (Pers. *Khwājah*, 'honourable') are remarkable as tracing their origin to Ḥasan Ṣabāḥ, who in the beginning of the 11th cent. A.D. founded the Order of the Fidawī or Fidāī, 'the devoted ones,' known to Europeans as the Assassins (Arab. *ḥasshāshīn*, 'eaters or smokers of the intoxicating hemp drug'), of whom and of their leader, known as Shaikh-ul-Jabal, 'The Old Man of the Mountain,' many marvellous tales are told (Marco Polo, ed. Yule[1], i. 132 ff.; *EBr*[9] ii. 722 ff.; art. ASSASSINS). Their spiritual leader is the Aghā Khān, the descendant of a refugee from Persia, who commands great influence among his followers. Except in Gujarāt and Sind the Shī'ite element is small, and in many districts is confined to the Bohorās and Khojas (for a full account of the origin, customs, and beliefs of the Khojas, see *BG* ix. pt. ii. 36 ff.). A more recent development is that of the Aḥmadīyah sect, followers of Mīrzā Ghulām 'Alī of Kadiān in the Gurdāspur district of the Panjāb. The founder repudiates the necessity of *jihād*, or war against the infidel; traces a parallel between himself, as Messiah or Imām, and the Founder of the Christian faith; claims that his advent was foretold, and that he is charged with the duty of laying the foundations of general goodwill and peace upon earth. On the whole, this sect supplies an interesting example of the influence of Christianity upon Islām (Enthoven, *Census Rep.* i. 69; Rose, *Census Rep. Panjāb*, i. 143).

11. **Jews.**—The Jewish colony in the Presidency numbers 10,860. Like those further south in Cochin, they are divided into a 'white' and a 'black' section. The former claim to be the descendants of the original colonists, whom Dr. J. Wilson, on the ground that none of their names is later than the Captivity, and that all their Scriptures are of early date, believed to represent the Lost Tribes. It is now generally supposed that they came from Yemen in the 6th cent. of our era. Their own traditions fix their exodus in the 2nd cent., while other accounts place it as late as the 15th. The 'white' Jews do not eat, drink, or intermarry with the 'black' section, who are believed to be later converts from Hinduism. The Bombay Jews call themselves Banū-Isrāīl, 'children of Israel,' in preference to Yahūdī, which is the general designation of the race in N. India. In their houses, on the upper part of the right door-post, is placed a box containing a parchment scroll inscribed with a verse from the OT, so fixed that through a hole the word 'The Almighty' (*El Shaddai*) can be read from the outside. Their synagogues contain parchment copies of the Pentateuch (*BG* xi. 85 f., xiii. 273 f.). See art. BENE-ISRAEL.

12. **Christians.**—Christians number 204,961 (1·11 per cent. of the total population). They fall into several groups. The most numerous are the Roman Catholic inhabitants of the old Portuguese settlements now included within British territory, who were originally converted from Hinduism by missionaries from Goa. Those of good birth were admitted to *connubium* by the Portuguese. Though the names of all the Christians of this description are Portuguese, it is only among the upper classes that there is any trace of foreign blood, and here, even, it is now rare. The name of Indo-Portuguese, which is sometimes given to them, is scarcely acknowledged among themselves; and though the higher families speak Portuguese as the home-language, the rest habitually use either Konkanī-Marāthī or English. The lower classes continue to follow the hereditary occupations of the castes to which their Hindu ancestors belonged, while the upper have taken to the learned and clerical professions.

'In spite of rumours that have occasionally been heard within the last half century, those who have lived amongst these classes give evidence of the reality of their adherence to the faith of their adoption. There is a very prevalent confusion between Christians of this description and those of Goa. Both are Roman Catholics by persuasion, and both bear Portuguese names, and are under the supervision of priests of that nation. Beyond this the likeness ceases. The Native Christians that come from Goa are mostly domestic servants, an occupation never undertaken by Christians from other districts' (Baines, *Census Rep.* i. 51).

Including recent converts, the Roman Catholics in 1901 numbered 106,655—not far short of half the total Christian population. The remainder are more recent adherents, whose adoption of the faith is the work of various missionary societies, those attached to the Anglican communion numbering 35,614. While the Roman Catholics have slightly fallen in numbers between the last two decennial enumerations, the total number of Christians has increased from 158,765 to 204,961, the rise being greatest in those districts where the pressure of famine has been most severe, an indication that their numbers have been largely recruited from famine waifs supported in missionary orphanages.

LITERATURE.—The best authorities are Sir J. Campbell, *Bombay Gazetteer*, 27 vols. (1873–1904), of which the most useful are those dealing with the general history (vol. i. pts. i. ii.) and those describing the population of Gujarāt (ix. pts. i. ii.); and the *Census Reports*: J. A. Baines, 1882; W. W. Drew, 1892; R. E. Enthoven, 1902. The following also deserve attention: J. Wilson, *Indian Caste* (1877), useful but fragmentary; Major E. J. Gunthorpe, *Notes on the Criminal Tribes of the Bombay Presidency* (1882); A. W. Hughes, *Gazetteer of Sind*[2] (1876); J. Forbes, *Oriental Memoirs* (1813, 2nd ed. 1834); A. K. Forbes, *Rās Mālā, or Hindoo Annals of the Province of Goozerat*[2] (1878); Dosabhai Framji Karaka, *History of the Parsis* (1884); Karsandas Mulji, *History of the Sect of the Maharajas* (1865). For the political history, see V. A. Smith, *Early History of India*[2] (1908); J. Grant Duff, *History of Mahrattas*[3] (1873). For the religious architecture, J. Fergusson and J. Burgess, *The Cave Temples of India* (1880), and numerous memoirs by the latter writer in collaboration with H. Cousens in the *Progress Reports of the Archæological Survey of W. India*. These *Progress Reports*, vols. i. to ix. in the Imperial Series, numbered i.-v., xxiii., xxiv., xxxii., xxxiii., extending to 1905, have practically superseded the older books, such as Sir T. C. Hope, *Surat, Bharoch, and other Cities of Gujarat* (1866); J. Fergusson and P. Meadows Taylor, *Architecture at Beejapoor*; *Architecture in Dharwar and Mysore* (1866). Among the early travellers, the following, published in the Hakluyt Society series, may be referred to (the dates are

those of publication, not of the voyages): D. Barbosa, *Coasts of E. Africa and Malabar in 16th cent.* (1866); P. della Valle, *Travels in India* (1892); J. H. van Linschoten, *Voyage to the E. Indies* (1885); *India in the XVth Cent.* (1857); F. Pyrard de Laval, *Voyage to the E. Indies*, (1887–90); L. Varthema, *Travels in Egypt, Syria, Persia, India, Ethiopia*, etc. (1863). Other useful travels are: J. Ovington, *Voyage to Suratt* (1696); J. Fryer, *New Account of E. India and Persia* (1698).

W. CROOKE.

BON CHOS.—See TIBET.

BONES.—It may help us to understand the important place occupied by bones in primitive psychology and religion if we recall the nature of their development. 'Osseous tissue . . . consists essentially of an animal matter impregnated with calcium salts' (Huxley, *Physiology*[5], p. 307). 'At a certain period of embryonic life there is no bone in any part of the body. . . . Microscopic examination shows that the calcareous salts are deposited in the intercellular substance' (*ib.* p. 557). Minute passages in a bone allow of its permeation by nutritive fluid, so that 'throughout life, or at all events in early life, its tissue is the seat of an extremely active vital process' (*ib.* p. 311). These facts were, of course, unknown to primitive thought, but they are in some measure paralleled by the early ascription to bones of special psychical significance. Thus we find the words for 'soul' and 'bone' etymologically connected among the Iroquois (*esken*, 'bone,' *atisken*, 'soul'), and the Athapascans (*yani*, 'bone,' *iyune*, 'soul') (Arnett in *Amer. Jour. Psychol.* 1904, xv. 149). Every one is familiar with the frequent references to bones in the OT, where the ascription of sensation to them is not a mere figure, but springs from the definite idea of their inherent vitality, and of the *quasi*-consciousness diffused through them and the whole body (*e.g.* Job 4[14], Jer 23[9], Ps 35[10]). The story of Eve's origin, and the phrase 'bone and flesh,' used of relationship,* are also significant. Many popular beliefs witness to the same idea; 'the bones of a murdered man are said to have given out fresh blood when handled by a murderer as long as twenty years, or even fifty, after the murder' (Trumbull, *The Blood Covenant*, 1887, p. 146). Conversely, the life supposed to be still resident in bones can be renewed by anointing them with blood (Jevons, *Introd. Hist. Rel.*, 1896, p. 52). Tylor collects examples of the way in which bones of dead relatives are cared for, and talked to, as though still conscious (ii. 150 f.); he gives them as cases of the fetish-theory, but they are ultimately to be explained as products of primitive psychology.

Funeral customs in general usually yield illustrations, even though more or less obscure, of the same standpoint. A good example out of the great multitude available is afforded by the elaborate burial rites of certain Australian tribes (Spencer-Gillen[b], pp. 530–546). The body is left on a tree-platform until the flesh has disappeared from the bones.† The skeleton, except an arm-bone, is then buried, without being actually touched. The arm-bone, in which the spirit of the dead is supposed to be present, is wrapped up in paper-bark, and figures in various complicated ceremonies. These conclude with the breaking and burial of the arm-bone. 'When once this ceremony of breaking the bone, which they call *anbiringa-tjinta*, has been performed, and the bone deposited in its last resting-place, the spirit of the dead person, which they describe as being of about the size of a grain of sand, goes back to its camping-place in the Wingara, and remains there in company with the spirit parts of other members of its totem until such time as it undergoes reincarnation' (*ib.* p. 542). Here the elaborate ceremonial is performed in order that the bone may be broken and the spirit released, without injury to the living or the dead. With this we should compare such a custom as prevails in an African tribe of the Ogowe. 'With a very material idea of a spirit, they seek to disable it by beating the corpse until every bone is broken. The mangled mass is hung in a bag at the foot of a tree in the forest. Thus mutilated, the spirit is supposed to be unable to return to the village, to entice into its fellowship of death any of the survivors' (Nassau, *Fetichism in West Africa*, 1904, p. 234). We may trace a parallel belief in the title 'Crusher of bones,' applied to a member of the Egyptian pantheon (*Book of the Dead*, ch. cxxv.), though here we meet the idea that the bones must be preserved intact in order to ensure resurrection, and the crushing of the bones is conceived as a penalty for falsehood. An ordinary mummy is no more than 'skin and bones.' The preservation of the bones is the dominant practice,* we may say the universal one, where the relations with the dead include more than fear and shrinking. Thus the Carrier Indians (*q.v.*) obtain their name from the practice of their widows, 'who carry the charred bones of their dead husbands about with them in bundles' (Frazer, *GB*[2] iii. 227 n.[3]).† The practice may survive in a modified form, disguising itself as a simple desire to possess some memorial of the dead. Thus 'the Japanese, after taking a lock of hair, a finger-nail, or the *inkobo* (a bone in the throat), which they send back to relatives, burn their dead' (Fox, *Following the Sun-Flag*, 1905, p. 87). A further development is seen in the addition of the skeleton, or part of it, to the family fetish, where the fetish practices prevail (Nassau, p. 325). Bones so kept, and imagined to retain the psychical powers of the dead in a form available for use, claim a natural place in primitive medicine and magic. Australian aborigines use bones in working a magic spell on an enemy (Howitt, p. 359). The Tasmanians attached human bones to the parts of the body affected by disease (Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 1902, p. 108). The miracle described as following the contact of a dead man with the bones of Elisha (2 K 13[21]) shows the same belief. Robertson Smith (*Rel. Sem.*[2], 1894, p. 448) refers to the custom of the heathen Arabs, which consisted in fastening unclean things, dead men's bones and menstruous rags, upon children, to avert the *jinn* and the evil eye; he remarks that 'when we find bones, and especially dead men's bones, used as charms, we must think primarily of the bones of sacrifices' (p. 382). Such bones would, of course, possess a special virtue for their users; but their sacrificial character is not essential to such a use, which is amply explained by the psychical theories of primitive thought.

A continuation of the magical theory of bones is seen in the veneration of relics of the saints. One of the earliest and best known examples is that

* The Tungusian word for 'family' is *sŏk*='bones' (Radloff, *Aus Sibirien*, ii. 32).

† For an African method of obtaining the bones rapidly, see Ellis, *Tshi-Speaking Peoples*, 1887, p. 268: 'The chief who falls in battle is lightly buried, and water is poured on his grave many times a day, for some weeks. The bones, thus becoming clean, are taken out and deposited in a chest.'

* On the other hand, Ashurbanipal enumerates the bones of an enemy among his spoil (Jastrow, *Bab.-Assyr. Rel.* p. 602); cf. Am 2[1].

† Bones play an important part in many folk-tales dealing with the renewal of life in the dismembered dead (*CF*, pp. 91–95, 100 f.), doubtless because, as MacCulloch says, 'the bones, as less subject to decay than the flesh, may have seemed to early men the basis of a renewed life.' While some of these tales declare that, if a single bone be lacking, the person revived will be correspondingly deficient, others express the belief that only a portion of the skeleton (especially the spine; cf. the Roman beliefs concerning the *os sacrum*) will be sufficient to restore the entire person to life. As early as the palæolithic age skeletons were carefully preserved in Gaul, where they were frequently coloured, either in whole or in part (especially the skull), with red pigment—a usage still observed by the Alfurus of Ceram, and by certain South American, Papuan, and Australian tribes (Renel, *Les Religions de la Gaule avant le Christianisme*, 1907, pp. 49–51, 53 f.).

of Lucilla of Carthage, who habitually kissed a martyr's bone before partaking of the Eucharist (cf. *DCB*, *s.v.* 'Lucilla'). Newman quotes Theodoret, with apparent approval of his theory of the virtue of the bodies of martyrs: 'And though each body be divided, the grace remains indivisible; and that small, that tiny particle is equal in power with the Martyr that hath never been dispersed about' (*Development of Chr. Doctrine*, p. 374). This may be accepted as a true statement of primitive theory, especially in regard to the bones, as being the parts most easy to preserve; it is paralleled in the devotion of Greek cities to the supposed bones of their respective heroes (Rohde, *Psyche*, i. 162). Primitive thought, however, applied the theory on a wider scale, and included animal as well as human bones. 'Among the Kalang of Java, whose totem is the red dog, bride and bridegroom before marriage are rubbed with the ashes of a red dog's bones' (Frazer, *Totemism*, p. 33). We frequently meet with the belief that the bones of animals slain in the chase must be carefully dealt with, to secure their resurrection and the future supply (Frazer, *GB*[2] ii. 415 f.). Sometimes the soul of the dead animal is thought to be aware of the fate of its bones, and the future success of the hunter depends on its proper propitiation (*ib.* p. 405).

From various customs in regard to bones, Frazer infers that 'it is a rule with savages not to let women handle the bones of animals during their monthly seclusions' (note on p. 221, vol. iii., where various customs are collected). On the other hand, among certain Indian tribes we find girls at puberty carrying bone implements, with which to scratch themselves, and with which to drink. The girl then drinks water through a tube made of the leg of a crane, a swan, or a goose (*ib.* p. 213). Here the virtue of the bone, no doubt, protects the supply of water from the perilous influence of her condition.

Amongst the many other usages in which bones figure may be mentioned the bonfire (originally 'bone-fire,' cf. Jevons, p. 150, and Skeat's *Dict. s.v.*), the practice of fastening the bone of a murdered man on to the spear that is to avenge him (Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 554), and even the use of a cleft bone as a token, noticed by Doughty (*Arabia Deserta*, 1888, ii. 360).

LITERATURE.—This has been given in the article. See also under art. PSYCHOLOGY.

H. WHEELER ROBINSON.

BONFIRE.—See FIRE.

BONI HOMINES (corrupted into Bononii or Bonosii).—See PERFECTI.

BOOK OF LIFE.—The science of the Semitic East was based upon the axiom that the constitution of this lower world corresponds to that of the heavens above, as seen in the cosmos and its cycle. The whole course of events upon the earth, it was believed, was prefigured in the cyclical phenomena of the higher spheres. On its mythological side, therefore, the doctrine could postulate the existence of celestial tablets on which were inscribed both the wisdom of heaven and the history of earth.

1. **The books (tablets) of wisdom.**—(1) *Babylonia.*—According to Babylonian science, the process of the world realizes itself in æons, which arise out of the primal sea; and this world-ocean, accordingly, is regarded as the seat of Divine creative wisdom. The mythical representative of the primal sea was, in the previous æon, Mummu (Damascius: Μουμις = νοητὸς κόσμος; cf. *bît mummu*, 'the house of wisdom' [Rawl. 5, 33*a*]); in the present æon he is called 'Lord of Water' (*i.e.* of the ocean, which was regarded as ZU-AB, 'house of wisdom'). He is therefore 'father of the gods,' 'creator of Adapa, the first man' (*zer amelûti*, 'seed of the human race'), who, as the 'sagacious one' (*Atrahasis*), receives from his creator wisdom, but not eternal life. The tutelary deity of all who are endowed with wisdom and art is Ea. He is 'the god of wisdom, of potters, smiths, singers, priests, of Kalû-mariners, jewellers, stone-cutters, metal-workers.' A Bab. text (*Cuneiform Texts*, xv. 50) speaks of the *šipru* (= Heb. סֵפֶר, 'book') of the god Ea, the duty of studying which falls specially upon the king. Ea is also the source of the wisdom of the priests, *e.g.* the 'secret of heaven and earth' which was acquired by Enmeduranki, the progenitor of the prophetic priests of Babylon; the 'secret of Ea' and the 'word from the ocean' are mentioned in the Bab. ritual-tablets (cf. also the table of commandments below, p. 793).

The myth of Ea has come down to us in legendary form from the χαλδαικὴ ἀρχαιολογία of Berosus, the priest of Marduk (*Fragm.*, ed. Lenormant, No. 1 from Alexander Polyhistor = *FHG*, ed. Müller, ii. 496, frag. 1, 3; Euseb. *Chron.* i., ed. Schoene, 13 f.). The present writer has reproduced the legend in Roscher, iii. 577 ff., as follows:

'It is recorded that a great multitude of the people of different races who inhabited Chaldæa were gathered together in Babylon, living the unruly life of beasts. In the first year there came forth from the Erythræan Sea, at the place where it touches Babylonia, a being endowed with reason and having the name Oannes. Its body was in all respects like that of a fish, but from beneath its fish's head protruded a second head, of human shape. It had also the feet of a man, these having been formed from its tail, and it had a human voice. An image of it had survived till that time. This creature, he continues, lived by day amongst human beings without taking food, and conveyed to them the knowledge of written characters, the sciences (μαθημάτων), and sundry arts; it taught them regarding the peopling of cities and the erection of temples, the introduction of laws and the measuring of land; it instructed them in the sowing and the ingathering of crops, and, in a word, in all that pertains to the satisfaction of men's daily needs (ἡμέρωσις). No further discovery in such matters has been made since that time. At sunset the creature sank once more in the sea, and spent the night in the water, for it was amphibious. Other beings of similar nature appeared at a later time (coming forth likewise from the Erythræan Sea, as is added by Syncellus in another report), regarding which Berosus purposes to write in his history of the kings. Oannes, however, also wrote a book (λόγος) dealing with origins and the formation of States, and this he delivered to mankind.'

The idea of such a book presents itself once more in the passage treating of the destruction of the world by the Flood, *i.e.* the return of things to their original condition in the primeval ocean, and the restoration of the world. Berosus narrates that Kronos commanded Xisuthros to frame a record, in written characters, of all things in their beginning, middle, and end, and to deposit this in Sippar, *i.e.* the 'book-city.' After the Flood the children and kinsmen of Xisuthros migrated to Babylonia, carried away the writings from Sippar, and at the command of their head disseminated them amongst mankind.

(2) *Egypt.*—The notion of a primordial Divine wisdom inscribed in books is found generally amongst the peoples of antiquity. In Egypt, as in Babylonia, the first age of the world was supposed to have been in a special sense the era of wisdom. The representative of the Divine wisdom, according to the Egyptians, was Thoth (corresponding to the Bab. Nabû [= Nebo], the Divine scribe of Marduk, who received wisdom from his father Ea), the amanuensis of the gods, and it was he who conferred the arts of speech and writing upon mankind. The texts of the Book of the Dead were regarded as the 'Books of Thoth.' In ch. 64 the text is traced back to a discovery in On (Heliopolis), where it had been transcribed 'in the very handwriting of the god' during the reign of King Menkara (Brugsch, *Rel. der Ägypter*, 20 f.). A Leyden papyrus (see Lange, *Berl. Akad. d. Wissensch.* [1903] 602 ff.), containing a prediction of a time of blessing and a time of curse, says that the latter will be ushered in by 'the opening of

the secret places, and the purloining of the books of the sanctuary.' The priests, as bearers of revelation, are called 'scribes of the book of God.' A memorial-stone in Abydos preserves a record of what Rameses IV. had learned in the house of life (cf. the Bab. name of a temple *E-ti-la*, 'the house of life') from his constant study of the books. The text of this contains the mystical teachings regarding Osiris. Here it is said that the majesty of Thoth stands beside Rê and Osiris for the purpose of executing their Divine commands (Erman, *Egyptian Religion*, p. 80; A. Jeremias, *Im Kampfe um den alten Orient*, i. 67). With this agree the statements of classical writers, who represent Thoth as the founder of theology and political economy, of the sciences and the arts. Clement of Alexandria enumerates forty-two 'Books of Thoth,' of which the first ten, or those of the prophet, treat of the law and of the gods, the following ten contain regulations regarding sacrifices and feasts, and the third ten the mystical cosmography; the next four embrace astronomy and the science of the calendar, two contain hymns about the gods and the kings of primeval times, while the last six deal with the science of medicine. Brugsch (*op. cit.* 449 f.) is of opinion that he can trace in part the titles of these books in a hieroglyphic text of the temple of Edfu.

(3) *Persia.*—The books of the Avesta also claim to constitute a Divine book, and it appears to the present writer that they may be brought under our present category. According to Haug, Avesta means 'knowledge,' *i.e.* Divine knowledge; its root, like that of Veda, being *vid*. Ahura Mazda together with Asha formed 'the word of bliss' by the agency of Vohu Manô (i.e. *logos*, corresponding to Marduk, the son of Ea), and revealed it to Zarathushtra, who diffused the Divine teaching amongst men (cf. *Gâthâ*, *Yasna* xxix.). According to *Vendîdâd* II., Yima, the first man, was chosen for the task of preserving the celestial truth upon the earth. The religious system of Zarathushtra purports to be an attack upon error, and a return to the truth and knowledge issuing from the original wisdom revealed by Ahura Mazda (cf. *Gâthâ*, *Yasna* li. 13, xliii. 3, liii. 2, xxxi. 2). In *Gâthâ*, *Yasna* xlviii., he who knows the secret doctrine is praised as a true teacher; possessing the power of Vohu Manô he is equal to Mazda himself in intelligence.

(4) *India.*—The early Aryan religion of India and the Indian systems of religion allied thereto consider the Veda ('knowledge') as the primal wisdom. True, such a statement merely expresses a theory, for the hymns of the Veda are partly of a secular character, and first acquired their religious significance from their association with sacrificial worship. It is an article of belief that the Vedas were composed by the ten *ṛṣis*, or wise men of the world's first age. Even the Upaniṣads ('secret doctrines'), the spirit of which is altogether characteristic of India, lay claim to a direct connexion with the primordial wisdom of the Vedas; while the Law-book of Manu (*Mânava Dharmaśâstra*) professes to be a revelation which the first man Manu received from the Deity. The doctrine of the ages of the world (*q.v.*) given in the *Mahâbhârata* and in the Law-book of Manu asserts that in the Golden Age the Veda existed in a perfect form, and that in each of the three succeeding ages one quarter of the Veda, and therewith one quarter of perfect righteousness, has been lost.

(5) *China.*—The State-religion of Confucius, as established by the Han dynasty (B.C. 206–A.D. 220) is based upon nine canonical works (five *king*, or 'webs' of wisdom, and four *shu*, 'books'), in which the primordial wisdom, from the period of the mythical emperors of the remote past, is believed to be codified. This is quite in accordance with the attitude of Kung-tse, the great reformer Confucius, who professed to be no more than 'the wooden clapper whom Heaven had made use of' to redeem the people from their degeneracy by resuscitating the institutions of ancient days.

(6) *Islâm.*—In Islâm, Muhammad is regarded as the 'Seal of the Prophets' (Qur'ân, xxxiii. 40), the last infallible messenger of Divine revelation. In the Muhammadan faith, therefore, the Qur'ân ranks as the book of heaven. The Mahdism prevalent among the sects looks to the coming Mahdis as prophets who will cleanse the truth of the original revelation from all error. Only in a few sects has the prophet lost the distinction of being 'the Seal of the Prophets,' and sunk to the level of a mere forerunner.

With this Oriental conception of the book of the primeval revelation of God is closely connected the tendency of the Jewish Synagogue towards the theory of the verbal inspiration of Scripture.

2. The book of destinies.—In Oriental science the analogue of the cosmos is the cycle. The conception of space is equivalent to that of time (cf. *'olâm*, 'æon'; Talmudic *'olâm*, 'world'). The revelation of the Deity in the cosmos and the cycle is seen in the starry sphere, and especially in the movement of the heavenly bodies. A Bab. name for these bodies is *ṣitir ṣamê*, *ṣitirtu ṣamê*, 'the writing of heaven.'

According to Seneca (*FHG* i. 510), Berosus says that in Chaldæan science 'all things take place in harmony with the movements of the stars.' Cf. Job 38[33] 'Knowest thou the *huḳḳôth* of the heavens?': the parallel clause, on the principle that the earthly is a reflex of the heavenly, reads, 'Or canst thou set their dominion upon the earth?' See also Qur'ân, xlv. 1–4: 'The revelation of the *Book* is from God . . . for in the heavens and on the earth are the signs for believers. Likewise in your own nature, and in all manner of beasts in every place . . . and in the succession of night and day, and in the supplies which God sends from heaven and with which He gives life to the earth when dead, and in the change of winds'; cf. xvi. 16: 'For by the stars are they guided.' Jewish literature, *e.g.*, *Mo'ed Qâṭon*, 28*a*, has it that 'long life, children, and food depend not upon merit, but upon the stars.'

In the teaching emanating from Babylon the heavenly bodies (sun, moon, and five planets) that move in the zodiac are in a special sense the interpreters of the Divine will. The zodiac forms the book of revelation proper, while the fixed stars, grouped in constellations which are regarded as 'correspondences' to the phenomena of the zodiac, are, so to speak, the commentary on the margin.

Cf. H. Winckler, *Forschungen*, iii. 198. In Arabic the constellations lying outside the zodiac are called *bayaniyyât*, *bayan* meaning a 'commentary' on the margin of a book. According to Qur'ân xv. 5 ff. the *mysteries of the Divine will* lie in the *zodiac*. With reference to the 'interpreters' (ἑρμηνεῖς), cf. Diodor. Sic. ii. 30, who reproduces the 'Chaldæan doctrine.' The name of the temple-tower *E-ur-imin-an-ki* would seem to signify 'House of the messengers of the commands of heaven and earth,' and in that case may apply to the planets; cf. A. Jeremias, 'Das Alter der babylonischen Astronomie' (*Im Kampf um den Alten Orient*, iii.[2]).

In the cosmic mythology of Babylon the revelation of heaven, which is made manifest in the cycle of the world, is known as *tup šimâti*, 'tables of destiny.' These are borne upon the breast of the ruler of the world's destiny. Hence we should probably assume the existence of *two* heavenly tablets; not only 'the commands of the gods,' but also 'the *life* of men' is written thereon. In the myths concerning the war against the chaos-dragon

and the restoration of the world, the victor and demiurge receives the tablets as his reward (see below, 'the book with seven seals' [Rev 4 f.], which the *ἀρνίον*, having won the battle, has power to open). In the Bab. Creation Epic they were, during a previous æon, in the possession of Kingu, the partner of Tiâmat. The narrative relates how Tiâmat delivers them to him with the words: 'Let not thy decree be changed; the word of the mouth stands firm.' Then Marduk receives them as the reward of conflict and victory. Elsewhere it is En-lil, the cosmic representative of the zodiac, who appears as the holder of the tablets of destiny. Or they are sometimes held by Nebo, the Divine recorder of destiny. In an exorcism-text (King, *Assyrian Magic*, No. 22) he is called 'the bearer of the tablets of fate,' and in other passages 'the writer of the All, who holds the style of the tablet of fate' (Rawl. 52). The day for the determination of destiny is New Year's Day. On this day is reconstituted the cycle of the year, which represents in miniature, as was believed, the cycle of the æons. The conqueror of the power of darkness is, as 'the one who determines destiny,' the possessor of the tablets of fate. In the *parak šimâti*, the chamber of destiny, from the 8th to the 11th of Nisan, the destinies of the year are determined with the assistance of the gods, whose statues are conveyed in wheel-barges to the sanctuary of Marduk. This mythical conception seems to have become matter of fact within historic times, in the act of casting lots by the king (the Assyrian king says: *puru akrur*, 'I cast the lot'), *i.e.* in a ceremonial inquiry regarding destiny.

The same notion survives in the practice of inquiring after one's destiny on New Year's eve, and also in that of taking the twelve holy nights (one for each month) as times for 'dreaming of one's destiny. The Bab. spirit of the idea is particularly preserved in the Talmudic conception (discussed in next col.) of the New Year's festival as the occasion on which the Divine determination of destiny is made.

In applying the doctrine of the celestial tablets of destiny to individuals, Bab. texts make mention of one particular tablet on which is inscribed the duration of life, the happiness of mankind (and on the other hand the curse, or shortening, of life). The construction of tablets of this kind is specially ascribed to Nabû, the Divine recorder in the chamber of destiny. Thus Ashurbanipal in a hymn (cf. Jeremias, art. 'Nebo,' in Roscher) says to Nebo: 'My life is written before thee.' His brother Šamešš̆umukîn speaks thus: 'May Nabû, the tablet-writer of E-sagil, write upon his tablet the days of the life of him [who honours my inscription] for long duration.' Nebuchadrezzar says: 'O Nabû, declare upon thy tablet, which fixes the *pulukku* of heaven and earth, the long duration of my days; write it for my posterity.' Antiochus Soter expresses himself thus: 'O Nabû, by thine august stylus, which establishes the *pulukku* of heaven and earth, may my salvation be made sure, through thy holy decree.'

The same conception has doubtless given rise to the 'tables of good works,' in which, according to IV R, 1118*b*, entries are made; also to the 'tables of sins' mentioned in ritual texts from Babylon, which are to be 'broken in pieces'; and to 'the tables of transgressions, misdeeds, anathemas and imprecations, which are to be cast into the water' (cf. H. Zimmern, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis der bab. Religion*, pp. 23, 125). We may also mention here a table (*Cun. Texts*, xiii. 29 f.) which contains injunctions regarding sacrifice, prayer, and friendship, though it perhaps belongs rather to the group of tablets of Divine wisdom dealt with above:

'In thy learning (?) look at the table:
The fear of God brings forth grace,
Sacrifice gives increase of life
And prayer [cancels] sin.'

The idea of a celestial process of reckoning in connexion with the most important festival of the calendar, viz., New Year's Day, which, as the inception of a new cycle, exhibits the renewal of the world on a small scale, had an influence upon Jewish religion after the Exile. Thus, in the tractate *'Arâkhîn*, 10, it is written:

'The ministering angels inquired thus of God, "Lord of the world, why do the Israelites, on New Year's Day and the Day of Atonement, utter no song of praise (הלל) before Thee?" God answered them, "When the king sits upon the throne and passes judgment, and the *Books of Life* and *of Death* are set open before Him, then may the Israelites feel themselves disposed to sing a song of praise before Me—at a time when it shall appear fitting for them to give themselves to repentance."'

In the New Year's tractate *Rôsh Hashshânâ*, 16*a*, it is said, 'Everything is decided on New Year's day, and the judgment is sealed on the Day of atonement.' In this case the 'judgment' signifies the fortunes of the year, as the context refers, amongst other things, to the fruits of the field.

Allied with the above in idea, though of a different character, is the conception of a reckoning kept in heaven of men's good and evil deeds, and of their lot in life and death. This may have been suggested by the public lists on which the names of citizens were enrolled. But we must not summarily dismiss the theory of a link with the book of destiny, for even the drawing up of such lists was brought into connexion with New Year's Day, the feast of destiny. According to Jerus. *Rôsh Hashshânâ*, Rabbi Johanan (*c.* 260 A.D.) knows of three registers—of the good, the bad, and the undecided, respectively—which are unrolled at New Year. Jubil. xxx. 20 (cf. xxx. 22) speaks thus: 'He is enrolled in the tables of heaven as a friend and a just man.' In the Book of Enoch the central figure appears as a 'heavenly recorder,' and shows to a nicety the very characteristics of the Nabû, the heavenly scribe of the Babylonians. He holds possession of the celestial tables, and reads what is written therein of the deeds of man. Cf. Enoch 47^3 104^1 'Your names are written down before the majesty of the exalted one'; 108^3 'the Book of Life and the Books of the Saints.'* The same thought is adopted in those Christian Apocalyptic writings which have been influenced by Judaism. According to the *Apocalypse of Sophonia*, the angels sit at the gate of heaven and write the deeds of men upon the rolls of a book; while *Apocal. Pauli*, 10, says that at the evening hour in heaven all things that men have done during the day are written down by the angels.

Within the canon of Scripture we find mention of the heavenly book, as the book of destiny, in the two outstanding apocalyptic writings, viz. Daniel and Revelation. In Dn $7^{9ff.}$ the seer beholds *the books opened* before the great council in heaven presided over by the Ancient of Days. In face of the assembly is fought out the battle against the beast which utters great words—a characteristic feature of the conflict with the dragon. The warrior and victor is the heavenly man. After his victory he is brought before the Ancient of Days, 'and there was given him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all peoples, nations, and languages should serve him: his dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom that which shall not be destroyed.' The conqueror receives as his reward the sovereignty of the world in the new æon, and the power of determining destiny.† Here too, therefore, the books are books of destiny.

* Again, however, in ch. 89 f., Enoch appears as the recorder of the doings of the seventy shepherds of the people; and, in the *Ascensio Jesaiae*, of the registers of the heavenly Jerusalem.

† Such is the connexion to which the present writer desires once more to draw special attention (cf. his *Der AT im Lichte des alten Orients*, on this passage). The connexion with the

This comes out still more clearly in the companion picture of Revelation, where the conflict with and the victory over the power of darkness are transferred to the historical appearance of the crucified and risen Christ. It is He who has conquered the dragon, and who therefore sways the destinies of the world, and His *parousia* will bring about the final victory over the dragon, and usher in the new and glorified era of the world.

Rev $4^{1ff.}$ introduces us once more to the council in heaven.* God sits upon the throne, and to right and left, in two semicircles, sit the twenty-four elders, in priestly robes and with crowns on their heads. He that sits on the throne holds in His hand a *book-roll* having seven (pendent) seals, which indicate the seven sections of the roll.† 'Who is worthy to open the book, and to loose the seals thereof?' This simply means: 'Who is worthy to sway the destinies?' The Christ who is to be glorified comes forward. In this vision His victory and exaltation (Mt 28^{18} 11^{27} 2^{9}) are portrayed with the imagery and colouring of the ancient Oriental myth of the conflict and victory of the year-god, who as the reward of his success receives the book of destiny, *i.e.* the command of the world, and who is therefore loudly praised in the council of heaven (for details see Jeremias, *Babylonisches im NT*, 13 ff.): 'Worthy art thou to open the book, and to loose the seals thereof.' A similar signification attaches to Rev 21^{27}, where the *Book of Life* is in the possession of the Lamb. In $5^{9f.}$ we have the song of praise sung by the heavenly council. In its form the song resembles that accorded to Marduk, who after his victory over Tiamat received fifty names of honour (cf. 'the name above every name,' Ph 2^{9}), as also that given in the Egyptian myth to Horus in the hall of the gods after his victory over Set, the representative of the power of darkness: 'Welcome, Horus, son of Osiris, the courageous, the justified, son of Isis and heir of Osiris.'

Mention of a book of destiny in which are written the fortunes of the individual is made in Ps 139^{16} 'Thine eyes saw me when I was yet unformed, and there was written in thy book all the days that were still to be'; cf. also Ex 32^{32} 'Blot me out of the book which thou hast written'; and Ps 69^{28} 'Let them be blotted out of the book of the living, that they be not written with the righteous.' The last-mentioned passage might also come under a different heading, that, namely, of the heavenly list-making already touched upon (p. 794[b]); and it is this group to which we must refer Is 4^{3}, which speaks of those who in Jerusalem are 'written unto life,' as also Mal 3^{16} with its mention of a 'book of remembrance' before Jahweh, in which are written those that fear Jahweh and have respect to His name.

The two ideas of a heavenly book of life and a heavenly register of names find expression also in the NT. The book of life in which the destinies of men are inscribed is referred to, not only in Rev 5 and 21^{27}, as already noted, but also in Rev 13^{8} and 17^{8} 'the book of life' in which names are 'written from the foundation of the world'; cf. 3^{5} 'I will in no wise blot his name out of the book of life' (one of the seven variants of the promise given at the close of the messages to the Churches, to assure him that overcometh in the strife that he shall be saved in the transformation of the world).

The book of destinies, in miniature form, so to speak, is spoken of also in Ezk $3^{1ff.}$ and Rev $10^{8ff.}$ The two passages are essentially the same in character. Ezekiel must eat the roll of a book, and it was in his mouth as honey for sweetness. The roll contained the intimation of God's will, which the prophet is required to convey to the captives in Babylon, and the Spirit carries him thither through the air. In Rev $10^{8ff.}$ John is made to eat up the little book which the angel carried in his hand. It is to taste like honey in his mouth, but to cause pain within. In it are written the destinies 'concerning many peoples and nations and tongues and kings' which he is to proclaim.

The heavenly registers are suggested by Lk 10^{20} 'Rejoice that your names are written in heaven'; Ph 4^{3} 'the rest of my fellow-workers, whose names are in the book of life'; and He 12^{23} 'the general assembly and Church of the first-born who are enrolled in heaven.'

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myth underlying the representation shows this quite clearly: the conqueror of the dragon receives power over the destinies and the dominion of the world.

* Cf. *Shemoth Rabbâ* on Ex 4^{22}, with a reference to Is 24^{23}: 'One day shall God assemble the elders of Israel as on a threshing-floor; He will sit at the head of them all as the president of the court, and administer justice to the peoples.'

† Cf. the seven tablets in the *Dionysiaca* of Nonnus, each of which bears the name of one of the seven planets.

BORNEO.—See INDONESIA.

BOUNDARY.—See LANDMARK.

BOURIGNIANISM.—See SECTS (Christian).

BOY.—See CHILDREN, INITIATION, PUBERTY.

BOYCOTTING.—This is a modern name for a practice as ancient as civilization itself. The name is derived from the experience of one Captain Boycott, a land agent in the employment of Lord Erne, an Irish landlord who in 1880 came into conflict with the agrarian societies in the district in which he lived, in County Mayo, Ireland. It is a method of social ostracism, informally applied by public opinion, and may be carried to almost any length. The term, which has been adopted in a wide sense into French (*boycotter*) and German (*boykottiren*), is used as implying any measure of avoidance of or holding aloof from those judged, by organized or unorganized public opinion, unworthy of social intercourse. It may vary from the schoolboy's 'sending to Coventry' to the extreme measures adopted in Ireland during the days of the land agitation. In so far as boycotting is the expression of individual aversion, the law can take no cognizance of it; but when it is decreed by an association, or organized body of men, it becomes a criminal offence under the law of conspiracy, and in Ireland has been treated as such. A boycotted person in Ireland was cut off from all intercourse with his fellows: no one could work for him, or rent land from him, or supply goods to him, associate with him, or help or assist him in any way, under penalty of being subjected to the same treatment; and this treatment was decreed for landlords and their agents who, in the opinion of the local agrarian association, had treated their tenants harshly.

The boycott, as has been said, is as ancient as civilization itself. The outcast or the outlaw from primitive social communities was simply subjected to the extreme form of boycotting, and had neither security of life nor chance of justice. *Ostracism* in the Greek world was a survival of primitive tribal law dressed up in a constitutional form. *Excommunication* by the Church in the Middle Ages, since it affected civil as well as ecclesiastical privileges, was a tremendously powerful weapon in the hands of the Church; but in modern times, with the separation of Church and State or the subordination of the Church to the State, ecclesiastical excommunication has been deprived of much of its terror, because it no longer affects civil rights. Excommunication, however, is the privilege of every society or association, which may expel or discipline those of its members it considers unworthy; and conflict with the State can arise only when civil rights are affected or the

victim is deprived of contract privileges. The State, which has uniformly set its face against all authorities which intervene between it and its subjects, has always regarded boycotting with suspicion; but in a modified form the right to boycott is inherent in the social nature of man. It is one of the forms in which public opinion expresses itself, and is liable to all the excesses and lack of uniformity to which public opinion itself is liable. Organized boycott alone is of sufficient importance to require State interference; or at least is alone sufficiently definite to permit of responsibility being brought home to individuals.

In the economic world the boycott has been extensively used by Trade Unionists (cf. the *Economic Journal*, vol. i. 'The Boycott as an Element in Trade Disputes'). When accompanied by violence, the boycott is a criminal offence at common law in the United States; and even where there is no violence or intimidation, many States hold that the boycott is criminal; and at the present time (1909) a case which will decide this question is pending in the United States Supreme Court. Efforts have been made by Consumers' Leagues in America and similar associations elsewhere to apply a partial boycott to the products of sweated industries, and to the establishments in the retail trade where the employer does not show sufficient consideration for the welfare of his hands.

LITERATURE.—G. L. Bolen, *Getting a Living*, 1903, ch. ix.; J. Mitchell, *Organized Labor*, 1903, ch. xxxiii.; *U.S. Industrial Commission Report*, xvii.; W. M'Donald, in *Irish Theological Quarterly*, i. (1906) 333; P. Marshall, *ib.* i. 435; J. Kelleher, *ib.* ii. (1907) 72; T. Slater, *ib.* ii. 242.

JOHN DAVIDSON.

BOYS' BRIGADES.—Organizations of boys, military in form, moral in purpose. Their ultimate origin is remote. Boys have played at soldiers ever since fighting began, and have been moulded by their play. For many years, up to 1880, Mr. John Hope, an Edinburgh lawyer, carried on a corps of 'Cadets,' which regularly numbered some hundreds of boys. They had uniforms, arms, and a band. Mr. Hope's purpose was to enforce Protestant principles and abstinence from drink and tobacco, and generally to cultivate manliness. This pioneer corps deeply influenced many generations of boys.

The Boys' Brigade proper was instituted in Glasgow by Lieut.-Col. Sir W. A. Smith, of the Volunteer force there. He was a teacher in a mission school, where discipline was difficult, and hooliganism incipient. He adopted the military metaphor, as did General Booth, with some differences. In 1883 the first Company of thirty boys was formed, and drilled in martial exercises, and in the Bible. A red rosette was the first uniform, but caps, belts, haversacks, etc., were soon introduced, and dummy arms. So successful was the movement that before the end of 1908 there were, in the United Kingdom, between 1300 and 1400 such Companies, with 6,000 officers, and 60,000 boys. The world-figures, at the same time, were 2,300 Companies, including over 10,000 officers, and 100,000 boys. There are, besides, Episcopal, Roman Catholic, and Jewish adaptations of the idea, whose figures are not included here. The objects of the brigade are: 'the advancement of Christ's Kingdom among boys, and the promotion of habits of obedience, reverence, discipline, self-respect, and all that tends towards true manliness.' The Bible-class is central. Every boy must attend it, or lose membership in the Brigade. In many companies there is development in the direction of ambulance work, gymnastics, music, etc. The more fully organized corps have become many-sided Clubs for boys.

The Boy Scouts is a kindred organization. Lieut.-General Baden Powell, C.B., is its founder. Its beginning was practical, in 1889, in Mafeking, S. Africa. The town was under siege, General Baden Powell commanding the defence. That men might be released to strengthen the firing line, a corps of boys was enrolled. They kept look-out, acted as orderlies, and carried messages, often under fire. Very good reports are given of their usefulness and courage. The plan was acclimatized in Great Britain, for purposes of moral training. But it is 'peace-scouting' that is taught. Mr. E. Seton Thompson has floated successfully a similar organization in the United States, especially among the Indians. Now there may be seen in and around most towns groups of Scouts, marching, signalling, camping. Statistics are estimates; for the movement is elastic. When a 'patrol,' a squad of five or seven, is trained to efficiency, its members are encouraged to enlist patrols of their own. These are usually linked into 'troops,' but are sometimes independent. They may be connected with Churches or Boys' Brigades. The ideals held up are: 'to be loyal to God, and to the King; and to help other people at all times.' Observation of Nature, self-reliance, and chivalry are inculcated. The manual of the movement is *Scouting for Boys*, by the General. Its sub-title is 'A Handbook for Instruction in Good Citizenship,' which sufficiently describes its scope. The Scouts are put upon their honour to be clean and kind in language and in habits. Clubrooms in winter and camps in summer are used for the ends in view.

The Life Brigade is, in idea, an offshoot of the Boys' Brigade. Its aims are identical, and so are some of its modes. But it strongly opposes the militarism of the earlier body. It organizes girls as well as boys, but without the martial element. Like the other, it uses ambulance work, gymnastics, music, etc., to attach its members to itself, and for training in Christian principles and character. It thus provides bright, healthy nucleus-centres of good citizenship. It is extending, especially under those who hold strong views on the subject of peace. Its watchword is 'Life-saving.' Its president is Rev. Principal J. B. Paton, D.D., Nottingham.

The answer of the promoters of the earlier work to their critics is that the military element is formal, not essential; that there is less and less of it proportionally as the corps grow in the Club direction; and that what there is of it is 'in defence, not defiance.'

LITERATURE.—*The Boys' Brigade Manual*, Glasgow, 1908; Baden Powell, *Scouting for Boys*, London, 1909; *Boys' Life-Brigade-Code*, London, 1909.

THOMAS TEMPLETON.

BRAHMĀ.—See BRĀHMANISM, p. 810.

BRAHMAN.—The philosophical system of the Vedānta adopts as its aim the search after Brahman, and makes this the central point of its teaching. The loftiest conception of Brāhman speculation is there set forth, and handed down from generation to generation. It is, however, only the climax of a long intellectual development, the beginning of which may be traced in the Rigveda, the most ancient poetry of early India. And for the religious and philosophical history of that country the word *brahman* possesses at least an equal significance with that of the term λόγος for Christianity. There is contained in it, as Roth says, the religious development of India during thirty centuries.

It is difficult to grasp the original meaning of the word; for as early as the Rigveda it appears endowed with various meanings, and cannot be identified precisely with any of our conceptions.

The Indian thought is hardly adequately expressed either in the definition of Roth, 'the devotion which manifests itself as longing and satisfaction of the soul, and reaches forth to the gods,' or in general, 'every pious utterance in the service of God'; or in that of Deussen, 'aspirations and cravings after the Divine.' It is Haug's merit to have made it clear that everything which recalls the Christian ideas of 'devotion' or 'prayer' is wholly foreign to the Indian *brahman*, and that the entire sacrificial act was no more than a kind of magic, which compelled the gods to gratify the wishes of their worshippers.

The word *brahman*, from which *brāhmaṇa* is etymologically derived, meets us as early as the time of the Rigveda. Accented on the first syllable (*bráhman*), it is neuter; oxytone, *i.e.* with an accented ultima (*brahmán*), it is masculine. The neuter denotes the object or the thing; the masculine the person who is endowed with or possesses the *bráhman*. With no little probability research inclines now to the view that the fundamental meaning of the word is neither 'devotion' nor 'prayer,' but 'magic'; and that its origin is to be sought in a primitive and rude stratum of human thought, from which it was gradually developed into an expression for the loftiest conception formulated by Hinduism. On the assumption that the word denotes 'magic,' 'witchcraft,' Osthoff has compared it, in his very able work, with the ancient Irish *bricht*, 'magic,' 'magical spell,' and has endeavoured to find the real fundamental idea in the meaning 'formula,' 'fixed mode of expression.' To these words the ancient Icelandic and ancient Norwegian *bragr*, 'poetry,' 'art of poetry,' is akin; and thus the Indian *bráhman*, or the Celtic *bricht*, may be the 'ceremonially conceived' word on which Jacob Grimm lays stress as the essential requisite of the magic, if it is to be effective.

The etymology of *brahman* is obscure. Besides the uncertain possibility of a derivation from the rare root *bṛh*, 'to speak,' earlier writers referred to the root *bṛh*, 'to grow,' from which *barhis* is taken, and thus connected *brahman* with the Iranian *baresma* (see BARSOM). But, as Osthoff shows, this combination is improbable, since words derived from the root *barh* on the European side exhibit an *l* (*e.g.* Prussian *po-balso*), and *brahman*, if derived from *barh*, could not be related to *bragr*.

Haug has collected the numerous explanations of Sāyaṇa. The latter interprets *brahman* as meaning: (*a*) food, food-offering; (*b*) the chant of the Sāma singer; (*c*) magical formula or text, mantra; (*d*) duly completed ceremonies; (*e*) the chant and sacrificial gift together; (*f*) the recitation of the *hotṛ* priest; (*g*) great. The first of these interpretations is not confirmed by the numerous verses of the Rigveda in which *bráhman* occurs, and must be abandoned as erroneous; while in favour of the others various arguments may be advanced.

As early as the Rigveda, *bráhman* appears not as a possession common to all men, but as the religious property of a narrow circle. It is still far from being exalted to a position of superiority over gods and priests. Rather it is to gods,* and to the chanters and *ṛṣis* of the ritual† that it owes its rise. It is 'new,' had 'hitherto not yet' existed, or comes into being from the fathers. It originates from the seat of the *ṛta*,‡ springs forth at the sound of the music of the sacrifice,§ begins really to exist when the Soma juice is pressed and the hymns are recited,‖ at the *savana* rite at the sacrifice, bearing the name *kṛta-brahman*,* and endures with the help of the gods even in battle;† Soma is its guardian.‡ Haug is therefore justified in his conjecture that 'in the Rigveda it denotes a mysterious power which can be called forth by various ceremonies,' and in the definition which he gives of it as 'the magical force which is derived from the orderly co-operation of the hymns, the chants, and the sacrificial gifts.' The pious *brahmakṛt* is contrasted with the *brahmadviṣ*, who has only blame for the performance of the *brahman*.§ It is a purely spiritual force, as may be inferred also from such verses as Rigv. viii. 3. 9: *tat tvā yāmi suvīryaṁ tad brahma pūrvachittaye*, 'I entreat thee for that power, for that brahman, in order that thereby I may discern beforehand'; ii. 2. 10: *brahmaṇā vā chitayemā janāñ ati*, 34. 7; vi. 75. 19, etc. It is exalted over *vāch*, 'speech,' which reaches as far as the *bráhman*.‖

It is altogether probable that in many individual instances *bráhman* denotes the hymns, religious formulæ, or chants themselves, which are the source of this magical power. But the present writer has found it impossible to establish this meaning with certainty in the particular verses. The verbs which are associated with the word *bráhman* are numerous: *arch*, 'to praise'; *īr*, 'to incite,' 'raise'; *taks*, 'to cut'; *kṛ*, 'to make'; *jinv*, 'to incite'; *pra bhar*, 'to deliver'; *ud yam*, 'to raise'; *yuj*, 'to yoke'; *śaṁs*, 'to recite'; *stu*, 'to praise'; *hu*, 'to sacrifice.' These describe the activity of *different* priests; while on the other hand *bráhman* in many instances is co-ordinated with *uktha*, *gir*, *dhī*, *mati*, *manman*, *stoma*, and other words. It is said in Rigv. vii. 43. 1, that 'the unequal *bráhmāṇi* of the pious spread abroad on all sides at the sacrifice like the branches of a tree.'

But even if *bráhman* should be found to be a frequent synonym for hymn, formula, and other products of the mental life, its application is from early times not limited to these. The Taittirīya Saṁhitā says that the hymns and the texts are limited, but the *bráhman* has no limits;¶ and it is therefore intelligible how, as early as the Upaniṣads, the word assumes a profound philosophical meaning in direct opposition to the purely liturgical part of Brāhmanism. *The bráhman frees itself* again from the mere externalities of the ritual, which have gradually gathered around the centre of magical power, and, released from all these fetters of the sacrifice, is developed into the loftiest conception of Hinduism, the central point of all thought, into *the* Brahman, which is essentially pure, unchangeable, and eternal, and in which all things have their issue and their end.

Vedic times conceived of a 'lord of *bráhman*,' the god *Bṛhaspati* or *Brahmaṇaspati*. In opposition to the older view, which saw in the latter a form of Agni, modern authorities, following Roth and Haug, prefer to regard him as a pure abstraction. In Haug's belief, Bṛhaspati is a 'paramount priest of the Brāhman theology'; Oldenberg describes him as 'the domestic priest (*purohita*) of the gods, the heavenly personification of the priesthood, in so far as the latter has the power and function of influencing the course of events by prayer and magical incantation.'** Pischel, again, has placed him by the side of Indra, who has in him his *purohita*, as in ancient India the earthly king had by his side his *brahmán-purohita*, the domestic priest skilled in magical art.†† These views, so far as they are based upon a pure abstraction, are

* *devatta*, Rigv. i. 37. 4; *brāhmā kṛṇoti Varuṇaḥ*, Rigv. i. 105. 15; *ṛ*. 61. 7, etc.
† Rigv. i. 165. 14, 177. 5; vii. 22. 9, 28. 2, 31. 11; x. 89. 16, etc.
‡ *pra brahmaitu sadanād ṛtasya*, Rigv. vii. 36. 1.
§ viii. 69. 9. ‖ vi. 23. 5.
* i. 47. 2; vii. 22. 9, 29. 2, 43. 1, 70. 6.
† i. 129. 4, 152. 5, 7; viii. 37. 1.
‡ vi. 52. 3. § vi. 52. 2.
‖ *yāvad brahma viṣṭhitaṁ tāvatī vāk*, x. 114. 8.
¶ Taitt. Saṁh. vii. 3. 1. 4. ** *Religion des Veda*, p. 66.
†† *Gött. Gel. Anz.*, 1894, p. 430 ff.

mistaken, inasmuch as they are opposed to an important passage of the Rigveda, — *bṛhaspatiṁ sadane sādayadhvaṁ . . . dama ā dīdivāṁsaṁ hiraṇyavarṇaṁ sapema*,*—which treats unmistakably of the establishment of a sacrificial fire on the hearth; and in the light of this passage, which in itself is entirely unexceptionable, and cannot be regarded as late, the question whether Bṛhaspati in the Rigveda is an abstraction or not must be answered in the negative. If Bṛhaspati is a name for the fire, the reference in every case into which magic enters can only be to the ancestral fire on the south of the place of sacrifice where the Brahmán sits. Sometimes, it is true, Indra and Bṛhaspati are brought into close connexion, the former as the king the latter as his *purohita*, but the inference is clearly that we are as little compelled to regard Bṛhaspati as an abstraction as Indra. Indra-Sūrya corresponds to the Kṣatra, the moon to the Brāhman. It is asserted in Rigv. x. 90. 13 that 'the moon is born from the *manas*,' and statements to the same effect are found in the Aitareya and Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣads.† We meet with the comparison in Dhammapada, No. 387, where *ādicco* corresponds to the *saṁnaddho khattiyo*, and *candimā* to the *jhāyī brāhmaṇo*, and similarly in Raghuvaṁśa, xi. 64. When, therefore, ethnography points to 'the dread wizard moon, pursuing its work in the darkness, continually changing its aspect,'‡ it is quite natural for the southern fire, which witnesses magical art and is usually represented as a half-moon, to receive the name of Bṛhaspati, and for the moon also as lord and divine patron of all magic. Haug's view that Bṛhaspati was 'a precursor of the god Gaṇeśa' cannot be established. In later times Bṛhaspati lost his original significance and became a name of the planet Juppiter, just as the name of the Aśvins, when their original meaning was forgotten, was transferred to a constellation.

Bṛhaspati is the heavenly *brahmán*, the prototype of the earthly. He arouses the gods by means of the sacrifice, and, according to one passage of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, bears the sacrifice to men who had become faithless. An examination of all the passages in which the masculine *brahmán* is found shows that it denotes in general a distinct class, if not a caste, with their dependents, and is frequently used in direct contrast with the king. And the masculine also, like the neuter *bráhman*, is brought into close connexion with *vāch*.§ As early as the Rigveda those who undertake one or other of the priestly offices are termed Brāhmans, and only in a few instances are we to understand by *brahmán* a definite *class* of priests, co-ordinated with the hotṛ, adhvaryu, or udgātṛ.‖ In one passage only, where Agni is addressed as Brahman, who takes his seat on the seat of men, does the latter appear to rank higher than the hotṛ.¶ With these exceptions, however, no special statement is found in the Rigveda which would assign to the *brahmán* duties distinct from those of the hotṛ or adhvaryu. We read nothing either of a special priest of magic or of the *brahmán* of the later ritual, whose function it was to apply his superior knowledge to the superintendence of the sacrifice as a whole, and to make atonement for the mistakes of the individual priests. Thrice the word *vad* is used of his action. But just as the general practice of magic is older than the particular forms of sacrifice known to us, so the magician also is older than the other officials of the Indian ritual, which was raised above the sphere of ordinary magic without ever losing its association with it. There is no ground for supposing that the *brahmán* named in the few passages referred to, and co-ordinated with the hotṛ, adhvaryu, etc., is other than the precursor of the *brahmán* of later times. 'There is no doubt,' writes V. Henry (*La Magie*, p. 37), 'that the earliest brahma of India was nothing more than the sorcerer and medicine-man, the retailer of the remedies and charms of the Atharvaveda or Brahmaveda.' Here again, also, the conservative character of Indian development shows itself: it does not break with the past, but retains it even under changed conditions. Although the hotṛ, adhvaryu, and udgātṛ, with their higher literary or musical accomplishments, were placed in the forefront, and the artificial and dramatic routine of the sacrifice overshadowed the primitive magical rules of the *brahmán*, the ancient *pūjārī* of India was nevertheless not banished from the sacrificial ground, but retained his place as 'physician of the sacrifice,'* lingering in the neighbourhood in order to make good all its defects by virtue of his secret magical art. His mere presence, more than the hymns of the hotṛ or the chants of the udgātṛ, by means of the magical fluid with which he is endowed, preserves for the sacred rite the character of mystery, and maintains the sacrifice in effective order.

A later age credited him also with wider literary knowledge. There was provided for him a special book of ritual, and the Atharvaveda, the magical practices of which harmonized closely with his character, was devoted especially to him. It was even required that he should be acquainted with all the Vedas.† His position, moreover, south of the place of sacrifice,‡ near to the southern fire which was dedicated to the fathers and the demons and employed for magical practices, is a further indication of the original character of the pūjārī; and it was only gradually that there came to be assigned to him a higher literary rank.

All members of the Brāhman caste, according to their qualifications, were, as it seems, eligible to undertake the duties of a hotṛ, udgātṛ, adhvaryu, brahman, or purohita. Apparently, however, one or the other office was held by preference by certain families. We know that the office of the brahman was claimed in the most ancient times by the Vasiṣṭhas, and later by the Atharvans. It is said in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, xii. 6. 1. 41, and Taitt. Saṁh. iii. 5. 2. 1 ff., that the Vasiṣṭhas were originally in sole possession of certain formulæ which were essential for the performance of the duty.§ It is worthy of notice that to the god Varuṇa, who is closely associated with the bráhman,‖ more numerous hymns are dedicated by the Vasiṣṭhas in their maṇḍala than by other poets. The pre-eminent efficiency of their bráhman is emphasized by the hymn Rigv. vii. 34, while in iii. 53. 12 the Viśvāmitras praise their bráhman as protecting the Bharatas. Bloomfield has attempted to show how the Atharvans came to put forward their especial claim to the office.¶

We recur now to the abstract form of the word. The attempt to find a unity behind the multiplicity of the Vedic gods, to discover an all-comprehending first principle, makes its appearance as early as the hymns of the Rigveda, and is there linked with the names of Prajāpati, Viśvakarman, and Puruṣa. It is first in the Śatapatha

* Rigv. v. 43. 12.
† Cf. Deussen, *Sechzig Upanishads*, Index, s.v. 'Mond.'
‡ Oldenberg, *Vedaforschung*, p. 72.
§ *brahmāyam vāchaḥ paramaṁ vyoma*, Rigv. i. 164. 35.
‖ Rigv. ii. 1. 2; iv. 9. 3; vii. 7. 5, 53. 11; and esp. x. 71. 11.
¶ Rigv. vii. 7. 5.

* Aitar. Brāhm. v. 34.
† *brahmā sarvavidyaḥ sarvaṁ vedítum arhati*, Yāska, i. 8.
‡ See Caland, *Wiener Zeitschrift f. K. M.* xiv. 120, 124.
§ Weber, *Ind. Studien*, x. 34; Hillebrandt, *Ved. Myth* i. 262. 111.
‖ *brahmā bṛnoti varuṇaḥ*, Rigv. i. 105, 15.
¶ *Grundriss der Indo-Arischen Philologie*, II. B. §§ 33, 34.

Brāhmaṇa that we find the neuter brâhman exalted to the position of the supreme principle which is the moving force behind the gods. 'The thirty-three gods,' it is said in Śatap. Brāhm. xii. 8. 3. 29, 'have Bṛhaspati as Purohita, but Bṛhaspati is Brahman, therefore the meaning is, They have the Brahman as their Purohita.' Brahman is identified at one time with the wind, at another with the prāṇas (see BREATH), and at another with the sun. In a hymn, which has been preserved only in fragments, the epithet of 'born first in the east' is applied to him, and he is described at its close as creator and first principle of the universe, who brings the gods and the universe into being. Here, however, he is only the firstborn of creatures (*prathamaja*), not yet 'self-existent' (*svayambhu*). We recognize still the connexion with the view of the Rigveda in passages like Śatap. Brāhm. x. 2. 4. 6, which represents yonder sun as resting upon the seven-syllabled Brahman, and adds: 'the Brahman is seven-syllabled, ṛc is one syllable, yajus two syllables, sāman two syllables, and what is left over and above subsisting in Brahman that is two-syllabled; therefore this is the entire seven-syllabled Brahman.' And in another passage Brahman is identified with the syllable *om*, which is the essence of the whole Veda. In some parts of the Brāhmaṇa literature we still see clearly, as Deussen shows, Prajāpati holding a position above the Brahman of which he is creator, while in others Prajāpati, as 'Brahma Svayambhu,' creates this universe, and in a third series the mind (*manas*) which creates Prajāpati originates 'from the non-existent,' and is itself identified with Brahman. In the cosmogony of the later books of the Śatap. Brāhm., Brahman has been exalted to the position of the supreme first principle, which, itself without beginning, creates the universe: 'Brahman in truth was this universe at the beginning; it created these gods.'*

This thought was taken up by the Upaniṣads, which made it their aim to search out the Brahman, and to impart the knowledge of it. Here religion passes into the wide arena of that philosophy which, in the Vedānta system devoted to the *Brahmavidyā*, has consistently and fully expounded the doctrine of Brahman, and has taught the unity of Brahman and the universe.

By the side of the all-comprehending Brahman, which in its philosophically refined and abstract form became the central point of Indian thought, later times conceived of a personal Divine creator Brahmā. At the present day he appears to be a god of very secondary or theoretical importance, and plays no part in the popular life. Crooke points out that only one temple, that in Puṣkara, is sacred to him. His image has four faces,† and he holds a drinking-vessel in his hand; he is usually represented also with four arms. His wife is Sarasvatī, a logical result of the ancient connexion of *brâhman* and *vâch*. But though his personality is now obscured behind the more vividly conceived Viṣṇu and Śiva, the form of Brahmā is of great antiquity. Belief in him pervades the entire Mahābhārata, as Holtzmann shows, in its later as well as in its earlier portions. Brahmā is omniscient; he is acquainted with the past, present, and future, and with his counsel supports the gods, who turn to him in perplexity. He is creator, sustainer, and destroyer of the universe, which is by him continually produced anew. From him proceed the castes, the regular orders; and he is usually exalted above the gods, although there are not wanting passages which subordinate him to Viṣṇu or Śiva. He is a popular figure also in the Pāli texts. He appears, for example, before the Buddha in order to move him not to withhold from the world the knowledge he has won. He accompanies the latter's entrance into Nirvāṇa with moral reflexions, and occupies the position of a ministering attendant who, for example, holds the white sunshade over the Buddha. We meet, however, not seldom with more serious traits, which afford evident proof of his connexion with the conception of the Brāhmaṇas. The history of this connexion has not hitherto been investigated; and little therefore on the subject can here be advanced. In the Kevaddhasutta of the Dīgha Nikāya,‡ Brahmā is referred to as 'the great Brahman, the unsurpassed, the observer of all things, the lord of all, the father of all beings past and future,' etc., and he is described as the one who can answer the question as to the ultimate fate of the four elements. Brahmā draws near, and a bright light goes before him, announcing his approach. He is, however, obliged to explain to Kevaddha that the gods are mistaken in regarding him as omniscient, and that only the Buddha can answer that question. Here Buddhist assumptions necessitate his subordination to the Tathāgata; but in other passages, as in the Brahmajālasutta,* this subordination is not apparent, but the relation of the *nicco dhuvo sassato aviparināmadhammo brahmā* to the Brāhmaṇical conception is still more immediate. It would be worth while to examine these relations more closely, and to endeavour from the elaborate creations of Buddhism, with its numerous Brahma heavens and Brahma gods, to extract the ancient kernel which its wealth of fancy has thus luxuriantly overlaid and concealed from view.

* Śatap. Brāhm. xi. 2. 3.
† Bṛhatsaṁhitā, § 58.
‡ Digh. Nik. xi. 6. 7.

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BRĀHMANISM.—I. *DEFINITION AND DIVISIONS.*—The word 'Brāhmanism' seems originally to have been used, and popularly still to be understood, to denote the religion of those inhabitants of India who adored Brahmā as their Supreme God, in contradistinction to those who professed Buddhism, and, in more recent times, Muhammadanism. But this is founded upon a misconception. Brahmā was never universally worshipped (cf. preceding col.); and his acknowledgment as the supreme God is not even a true, still less a prominent, characteristic of Brāhmanical religions and sects. The characteristic mark of Brāhmanism is the acknowledgment of the Veda as the Divine revelation.

In Brāhmanism thus defined we may distinguish two forms of religious development. The earlier one is the religion taught in the *Brāhmaṇas* (the ritualistic books forming the greater part of Vedic literature); it is, strictly speaking, a part of Vedic religion. The later forms of Brāhmanism are a new departure, and are only to a small extent developed from the religion of the *Brāhmaṇas*; they appeal to the Vedic Scriptures, more especially the *Upaniṣads* (perhaps even forging new ones), in order to build up a theosophy of their own, while in their cult they worship partly Vedic deities,—changed, however, in character,—partly deities of post-Vedic origin or growth. In these forms of Brāhmanism there is an important non-Vedic element, which, however, cannot be said to be non-Brāhmanical; for the beliefs and practices of which this new religion is made up were shared by Brāhmans and, to some extent at least, modelled by them. This element may be called 'Hinduistic.' When it became all-important, and when the influence of the Brāhmans on its formation grew less and less, Brāhmanism merged into Hinduism—by which term it has become customary to denote the modern phase of the religious development of India.

The religion of the *Brāhmaṇas* is but a continuation of that of the *Yajurveda Saṁhitā*, and thus comes under the head of Vedic religion (*q.v.*). We must take cognizance of it here, in so far as it influenced the growth and development of later

* Digh. Nik. i. 2. 3, p. 13.

Brāhmanism. The *Brāhmaṇas* are almost entirely concerned with sacrifice. Indeed, the most orthodox school of Vedic theologians, the Mīmāṁsakas, go the length of maintaining that the sole aim of revelation is to teach the doctrine of sacrifice (*karman*). The Mīmāṁsakas are the representatives of the *Karma-mārga* ('way of works'), the doctrine which declares that the highest end of man is to be realized by works, *i.e.* by sacrifices and other observances taught in the Veda. Theirs is an extreme view which, however, fairly well presents the meaning of the *Brāhmaṇas* themselves, or, to be more accurate, of the greater part of every *Brāhmaṇa*. But this does not apply to the last chapters of, or appendixes to, some *Brāhmaṇas* called *Āraṇyakas*, or to certain independent treatises with similar contents, called *Upaniṣads*, which are the latest works of Vedic literature. For these texts contain philosophical speculations which for the most part are entirely unconnected with sacrifice; and on these texts another school of Vedic theologians, the Vedāntins, have based their theosophical systems. The Vedāntins are the oldest representatives of the *Jñāna-mārga* ('way of knowledge'), or the doctrine which declares that the *summum bonum* is to be obtained through knowledge. There is a third 'way,' the *Bhakti-mārga* (*q.v.*), which declares that love of, or devotion to, God leads to the highest goal. This doctrine was developed later than the 'way of works' and the 'way of knowledge,' but it became the most important one for practical religion, especially in more recent times.

The Hindus themselves have divided their religions into these three classes, according to the three 'ways' explained above; it is therefore necessary that we too should take cognizance of their classification, which, on the whole, well presents the facts and the historical development of religious thought in India.

II. *RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS.*—1. The first form of Brāhmanism, as already stated, is mainly a religion of ceremonies and observances; it is chiefly concerned with sacrifice, compared with which devotion and moral duties are of so little importance to the authors of the ritualistic books that they scarcely ever mention them. Of course, the religion of the priests belonged, strictly speaking, to that exclusive class only; it was not the religion of the people at large, or even that of the upper classes, though it was admitted by the latter, in theory at least (and is so generally down to recent times), to be the most sacred, the revealed religion. Its influence on the religious development in India should not be underrated; in order rightly to understand the latter, we must have a clear notion of the nature of the Vedic sacrifice. It is not offered to a god with the view of propitiating him or obtaining from him welfare on earth or bliss in heaven; these rewards are directly produced by the sacrifice itself, *i.e.* through the correct performance of complicated and interconnected ceremonies which constitute the sacrifice, and which are more of the nature of magic than of worship. Though in each sacrifice certain gods are invoked and receive offerings, the gods themselves are but instrumental in bringing about the sacrifice or in completing the course of mystical ceremonies composing it. Sacrifice is regarded as possessing a mystical potency, superior even to the gods, who, it is sometimes stated, attained to their Divine rank by means of sacrifice. In the *Brāhmaṇas* there are scattered many statements about this mystical potency—sacrifice in the abstract. The general notions contained in them have been combined by Martin Haug in a description of sacrifice which we shall transcribe from the introduction to his edition of the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (Bombay, 1863), p. 73 f.:

'The sacrifice is regarded as the means for obtaining power over this and the other world, over visible as well as invisible beings, animate as well as inanimate creatures. He who knows its proper application, and has it duly performed, is in fact looked upon as the real master of the world; for any desire he may entertain, if it be even the most ambitious, can be gratified; any object he has in view can be obtained by means of it. The *yajña* (sacrifice) taken as a whole is conceived to be a kind of machinery, in which every piece must tally with the other, or a sort of great chain, in which no link is allowed to be wanting; or a staircase, by which one may ascend to heaven; or as a personage, endowed with all the characteristics of a human body. It exists from eternity, and proceeded from the Supreme Being (Prajāpati or Brahmā) along with the *Traividyā*, i.e. the three-fold sacred science (the *Ṛik* verses, the *Sāmans*, or chants, and the *Yajus*, or sacrificial formulas). The creation of the world itself was even regarded as the fruit of a sacrifice performed by the Supreme Being. The *Yajña* exists as an invisible thing at all times; it is like the latent power of electricity in an electric machine, requiring only the operation of a suitable apparatus in order to be elicited. It is supposed to extend, when unrolled, from the *Ahavanīya*, or sacrificial fire, into which all oblations are thrown, to heaven, forming thus a bridge or ladder, by means of which the sacrificer can communicate with the world of gods and spirits, and even ascend when alive to their abodes. The term for beginning the sacrificial operations is "to spread the sacrifice"; this means that the invisible thing, representing the ideal sacrifice which was lying dormant, as it were, is set in motion, in consequence of which its several parts or limbs unfold themselves, and thus the whole becomes extended. This ideal sacrifice stands in the closest relationship with all the sacrificial implements, the sacrificial place, and all the sacred verses and words spoken during its actual performance. The sacrifice being often represented as a kind of being with a body like that of men, certain ceremonies form his head, others his neck, others his eyes, etc. The most important element in a sacrifice is that all its several parts should tally, and that consequently there should be nothing in excess, and nothing deficient in it. This harmony of the several parts of the sacrifice constitutes its *rūpa*, i.e. form. The proper form is obtained, when the *mantras* which are repeated are in strictest accordance with the ceremony for which they are repeated, or (if the sacrifice lasts for several or many days) when they have the characteristics of the respective days. If the form be vitiated, the whole sacrifice is lost. Mistakes being unavoidable on account of the extremely complicated ritual, the sacrificer was to be attended by a physician in the person of the Brahma priest. Each mistake must be made good by a *prāyaśchitta*, i.e. penance, or propitiatory offering.'

It is obvious that the dignity of the gods could not but be lowered in the opinion of those who had such exaggerated notions about the nature and importance of sacrifice. And, as a matter of fact, the gods descended from the high position they once had held in the esteem of the Vedic poets, and came to occupy quite a subordinate rank. The degradation of the once popular gods is a marked feature of later Brāhmanism, and we can trace its effect on the development of Indian religion in many important facts, as will be explained in the sequel.

The religion of the period of the Rigveda did not lack germs which, duly developed, would have raised the conception of the Deity to a higher level. Not only, during its last stage, had a Father-god, Prajāpati, become the object of speculation and adoration, but even before that time it had become a habit of the poet-priest to ascribe the attributes, functions, and powers of several gods to that particular one whom he was for the time invoking. This tendency to identify many gods with one has been called by Max Müller 'henotheism' or 'kathenotheism.' It is conceivable that henotheism might, in the end, have led to monotheism, or at least to a purer form of religion than the old Vedic polytheism. But in the *Brāhmaṇa* period the priests cared less to exalt the personal gods than to emphasize the momentous dignity of the impersonal sacrifice. The conception of the Deity as embodied in the Vedic gods was first debased by the ritualistic preoccupation of the priests; and the degradation of the gods was consummated by the superstition of the vulgar. But the same cause which diminished the dignity of the ancient gods gave rise to a new idea of God as Controller and Lord of man and the universe. The constant occupation of the priests with sacrifice and the symbolical interpretation of the meaning of the rites and ceremonies produced those ideas,

described by Haug, about sacrifice as a paramount power, the essence, as it were, of the whole world; and such ideas prepared the Indian mind to admit a First Cause, a kind of impersonal God. This movement appears in full vigour in the *Āraṇyakas* and *Upaniṣads*; in these works we behold a spectacle unique in the history of religion, viz. the search for a Supreme God after the popular gods had proved to be false.

During the *Brāhmaṇa* period the theologians had always been searching for those cosmical, physical, and psychical phenomena and forces which, as they thought, were symbolized in the rites and appurtenances of sacrifice. Thus they arrived at a crude and unsystematical knowledge of these potencies, and a rough kind of estimate of their importance. The earliest parts of the *Āraṇyakas* and *Upaniṣads* contain several attempts at a systematic arrangement of the physical and psychical forces, first in connexion with some part of the ritual, and then in various other allegorical directions. There is a gradual advance in these fanciful attempts at classification; the several items are arranged according to their dependence upon one another, till that one is reached from which all others are believed to be derived.

It is impossible to sketch, even in outline, these attempts, which frequently contradict one another; but it may be remarked that the series of cosmical or physical phenomena and the psychical are often treated apart, and afterwards placed in parallelism. Thus we frequently meet with such symbolic equations as the following: body = earth, speech = fire (*agni*), eye = sun (*āditya*), breath (*i.e.* the principle of life, *prāṇa*) = wind (*vāyu*), ear = quarters of the heavens, mind = moon, etc. At the head of either series is placed that element or power which is regarded as the most subtle, the most sublime. Before the end of these speculations was definitely reached, 'breath' was usually placed at the top of the psychical series, while the same position in the cosmical series was occupied sometimes by 'wind,' sometimes by 'space.'

2. But speculation did not rest satisfied with such results; it postulated something more subtle still than anything we are cognizant of—the Real (*sat*), the Immortal, which is beyond the sun, where the Blessed go who no more return to the earth. The name given to this mysterious power is Brahman (*q.v.*), which originally may have meant 'prayer' [but see above, p. 797[a], near top], but already in the Atharva Veda and other Vedic texts (see Muir, *Original Sanskrit Texts*, iii. 378 ff.) it denotes the primitive deity, who is identified with the Supreme God, the Upholder of the world. Brahman is the infinite, the unchangeable, the eternal, the absolute; it is pure Being, on which all that exists depends, and from which it derives its reality. Brahman cannot be defined; it is expressly and repeatedly stated that all known attributes of things must be denied of Brahman, which therefore can be described only by negations (*neti neti*, 'no no'). In Brahman is reached the ultimate end of the series of cosmical and physical powers—its First Cause.

This advance in speculation seems to have proceeded step by step with another, concerning the series of psychical phenomena and powers, the ultimate member of which came to be designated as Ātman (*q.v.*). *Ātman* originally meant 'body' or 'person.' Being used also as a reflexive pronoun, it came to denote the Self, as the principle which constitutes the identity of an individual, that on which the whole of the physical and psychical functions of an individual depend, and from which they derive their reality. *Ātman* is therefore the transcendent Self or Soul. Frequently it is identified with the space within the heart. *Brahman* and *Ātman* mark the greatest heights which speculation reached; the one in the cosmical order of things, the other in the psychical. To comprehend their nature, and to investigate the relation subsisting between them, is the chief object, the ever-recurring theme, of the fully developed speculation of the *Upaniṣads*. Brahman is declared to be the innermost essence of all things, animate and inanimate; it abides in them unknown to them, and controls them from within; hence it is called *antaryāmin* ('controller from within'). Brahman, as immanent in us, is declared not to be different from our *ātman*. The *Upaniṣads* insist on the non-difference of the Brahman and Ātman; but it may be doubted whether thereby absolute identity is meant, so that the *ātman* would cease to exist individually when it has been joined to Brahman. On this point there is great diversity of opinion among the interpreters of the *Upaniṣads*—the Aupaniṣadas or Vedāntins.

These philosophers endeavoured to deduce from the *Upaniṣads* their true teachings, and to show that they formed a self-consistent system. The older view seems to have been that followed by Rāmānuja, viz., that souls, though essentially one with Brahman, still retain some kind of individuality of their own when joined to him, and that the world has the same relation to Brahman as the soul has to the body. The younger view expounded by Śaṅkara has, however, become the prevailing one among philosophers; it maintains that Brahman alone is real and everything else is an illusion (*māyā*), and that the souls on reaching Brahman are completely merged in him and cease to exist individually. The advocates of both views adduce passages in their favour from the *Upaniṣads* themselves. The truth seems to be that the authors of the *Upaniṣads* held various opinions on the points which form the basis of the different schools of Vedānta.

However this may be, the great achievement of the *Upaniṣads* is to have established the firm belief in a transcendent Cause of the world, an impersonal and un-moral God mysteriously identical with our Self. This new idea of a pantheistical Deity has nothing in common with, and cannot therefore have been developed from, the popular notions of the Divine nature as represented by the old Vedic gods. Brahman, in particular, is outside the category of good and bad; it is an unmoral deity as it is an impersonal one.

The theosophical movement, which found expression in the *Upaniṣads*, was not restricted to a school of philosophers, though one great sage, Yājñavalkya, had a great share in establishing the final doctrine of Brahman. Nor were these speculations the exclusive property of priests or Brāhmans; for kings are mentioned who 'knew the Brahman' and taught their knowledge to Brāhmans; and even women took part in the discussions about the nature of Brahman. It cannot be doubted that the ideas of Brahman and Ātman formed the principal interest of intellectual and religious life in India during the period of the *Upaniṣads*; they became one of the chief factors which brought about the new phase of Brāhmanical religion, for 'Brahmaism,' if we may adopt this term to denote the theosophical ideas taught in the *Upaniṣads*, has been made, by most founders of sects and religions in India, the philosophical basis of their teachings.

3. Another factor which greatly influenced religious life in India, and contributed in a high degree to give it its peculiar character, was asceticism (*q.v.*). The religion of the priests, being concerned chiefly with sacrifice and sacraments, cannot have satisfied the religious wants of the people, especially of men of strong religious feelings, who have always formed a numerous class in India. In sacrifice, hired priests played the active part, and the sacrificer but a passive one; but a religious man will always desire to exert himself for the attainment of perfection according to the light that is given him. There was a way open, a means of satisfying religious wants, known by the name of *tapas* and practised from time immemorial; for ascetic practices form already an important part of primitive religion, and are imposed as a duty on the shamans and medicine-men of uncivilized peoples. Already in the Rig Veda (x. 136) ascetics (*munis*) are mentioned who boast of their magical powers. And later, in the *Brāhmaṇas*, we meet with them under the name of *śramaṇas*, who are mentioned in conjunction with Brāhmans as their rivals (cf. Patañjali, *ad Pāṇini*, ii. 412. 2). We get a distinct view of these ascetics in much later times, when the ascetic practices had been refined and reduced to a kind of system. The principal methods were the following: silence, various postures of the body and of the limbs, fasting,

regulation of the breathing, self-mortification, and contemplation. By such means, which are denoted by the word *yoga* (*q.v.*), the ascetic (or *yogin*) strove to propitiate a god and to induce him to grant the boon he solicited (*varada*), or he attempted to gain superhuman powers. At all events he acquired merit by his *tapas*, and was looked upon by all as a saint. It deserves to be noted that in the Epics the *Ṛiṣis* of old are generally regarded as holy men, not so much on account of their offering sacrifices as on account of their severe penance; they are superhuman *yogins*, not deified priests. We see thereby that the religious ideal of the Epics was no longer that of the *Brāhmaṇas*.

This change will also become evident, if we consider the four *āśramas* (*q.v.*), or stages into which the religious career of the Hindus was divided about the end of the Vedic period. The first stage is that of the *brahmachārin*, or disciple, who learns the Veda; the second, that of the *gṛhastha*, or married householder; the third, that of the *vānaprastha*, or old man, who retires to the woods and lives there the life of a hermit; the last, that of the *bhikṣu* (*yati*, *sannyāsin*), or religious mendicant. Now the *bhikṣu* is an ascetic by profession, who is never to return to common life, but most of his ascetic practices he has in common with the *yogin*. The high value set on asceticism is acknowledged in principle when ascetic life is made the last stage of the religious career. During the period of the *Brāhmaṇas*, 'religious' men seem to have passed the last part of their life as hermits in the woods; for their use were destined, as the name indicates, the *Āraṇyakas* (*q.v.*), which formed the last chapters of, or were appendixes to, the *Brāhmaṇas*. In later times, however, the *āśrama* of the hermit fell into disuse, and now it is practically abolished; while at the same time the *āśrama* of the ascetic gained in importance, and was chosen by all those who adopted a religious life. This changed relation between the *āśramas* indicates that the ascetic ideal finally supplanted the older ideal represented by sacrifice.

There have always been two kinds of *yoga*. The one, now called *haṭhayoga*, is practised in order to obtain magical powers; the other, *rājayoga*, for the attainment of spiritual perfection. In the latter, the higher *yoga*, *dhyāna* ('contemplation') is regarded as the most effective means for attaining the desired ends, while the other ascetic practices are enjoined as a preparatory course only. By *dhyāna* is produced a kind of superhuman knowledge, intuition, we may call it, on the strength of which the wildest fancies have been accepted as truths. The Jaina Umāsvāti lays it down in his *Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra*, ix. 37, that by means of *dhyāna* the structure of the universe becomes known. But the chief use to which *dhyāna* was put was the discovery and comprehension of religious truths, and it is therefore regarded by orthodox as well as by heretical teachers as the noblest of all religious exercises.

The refined *yoga* gave rise to the first systematical philosophy, the *Sāṅkhya* of Kapila—a theory, if not invented for the purpose, at least well adapted to account for the efficacy of *yoga* in general, and of contemplation in particular. We might call it a system of natural religion; for it was regarded as a *Smṛti*—a title which is given to works of an authority inferior only to that of the Veda. Hence the *Sāṅkhya* theory of evolution, combined with the doctrine of the *Upaniṣads* on Brahman, has, ever since the *Mahābhārata* and the *Purāṇas*, been put in requisition to solve religious problems and to explain the relation between God and the world; it has thus exercised the greatest influence on later Brāhmanical theology.

In conclusion, the bearing of asceticism on ethics must be pointed out. In India, ethics is not regarded as an independent branch of philosophy or of religion, but as preparatory to the exercise of the highest religious practice, *dhyāna*, which leads to emancipation. It is therefore not to be wondered at that the fundamental moral precepts should have first been formulated in ascetic circles; for they are set forth as the five great vows binding on all *bhikṣus*. Four of these five vows, viz., not to kill, not to steal, not to lie, and not to commit adultery, are common to all orders of ascetics, orthodox as well as heretical. Whatever may have been the actual state of morality in India at the time under consideration, it is evident that the principal moral laws had been clearly grasped, notwithstanding the indifference of the priests to ethics.

The *summum bonum* is defined as emancipation (*mokṣa*, *mukti*, *nirvṛti*). In the *Upaniṣads*, emancipation, union with Brahman, is frequently mentioned and praised as the end to be desired; but it does not yet appear in the same light as in later times, as the only real good. In the *Upaniṣads* there is scarcely a trace of that pessimism which henceforward becomes the most characteristic and dominant feature of Indian philosophy and religion. Theoretical pessimism was first taught in Brāhmanical philosophy by Sāṅkhya-Yoga; it is also the keynote of Jainism and Buddhism—religions which have largely borrowed from Yoga. The logical outcome of pessimism, always associated with it, is the doctrine of liberation as the *summum bonum*. If mundane existence, this phenomenal world, the Saṁsāra, in which the soul is born again and again, is essentially bad, and if the soul fettered to the Saṁsāra experiences infinite pain and no happiness that is not vitiated with and inseparable from suffering, then indeed the true aim must be the definite release from the Saṁsāra, *i.e.* the reaching of a state subject to no change and suffering. This absolute state is reached in *mokṣa*, *mukti*, *nirvṛti*, or *nirvāṇa*. To teach the way to *mukti* is the aim of most of the philosophical and religious systems of India after the Vedic period; they profess to open a way to salvation for those who are wearied with the continual suffering produced by mundane existence.

III. *MYTHOLOGY*.—The religious and philosophical ideas, the rise of which has been sketched in the preceding part of this article, were at the same time so many factors in the forming of the mythology of the Brāhmanical period. This mythology is not the exclusive property of the priests or of the Brāhmans; it may be described as the sum of those myths and legends which were current among the Indians of higher culture, and which found expression in general Sanskrit literature, chiefly in the Epics and the *Purāṇas*. It inherited, from the preceding period of the Veda, the principal gods. Theoretically they remained what they had been believed to be before, but practically there was a marked change. Some of the deities invoked in the hymns of the Rig Veda were forgotten, and those who were retained generally lost much of their pristine dignity, owing to the exclusively sacrificial interests of the priest as explained above; only a few were promoted to a higher position. Besides these, some new gods were received into the Hindu pantheon. The majority of the Vedic gods lost their share in popular worship without ceasing to be considered powerful deities. This brought about a changed conception of these gods in two ways: (1) The anthropomorphic element in their character was greatly developed, since it was not to the priests, but to poets and legend-mongers that the care of mythology was now entrusted. (2) The gods generally became departmental divinities to a

much greater extent than before. This fact is most striking in some cases where gods have attributed to them definite functions with which in the Rig Veda they had but a very slight, if any, connexion. Thus Varuṇa became the ocean-god, while in the Rig Veda his connexion with water seems to be more of an accident. The Vedic Savitṛ is not a proper sun-god; in later mythology he is identical with Sūrya, and represents the heavenly luminary. Soma, whose character as moon-god in the Rig Veda is still controverted, is acknowledged as such in Brāhmanical mythology, and Yama in like manner appears as the ruler of the nether world. This tendency to distribute the departments of nature among the gods, clearly discernible in most cases, prevented the gods from becoming little more than holy names after they had ceased to be worshipped by the people.

The Vedic gods who continue to be generally acknowledged in the Brāhmanical period are Agni, Indra, Savitṛ, Soma, Vāyu, Varuṇa, Yama, and the Aśvins; and, in addition to them, Prajāpati, Viṣṇu, and Rudra. The three last named, who became the Supreme Gods, will be considered towards the end of this article; we shall treat first of the other gods borrowed from the Veda, and next of the principal new gods who originated or came to the front in post-Vedic times.

1. **Vedic gods.**—Agni is, in the Rig Veda, the personification of the sacrificial fire; he, therefore, was the god of the priests and the priest of the gods. The Vedic conceptions of Agni are partly retained and occasionally revive in later mythology. Thus he represents Brahmanhood just as Indra represents the *kṣatriya*, or warrior-class; he is the leader of the gods, who are therefore *agni-purogama*. The common synonyms of *agni*, 'fire,' in classical Sanskrit, viz. *vahni*, *hutavāhana*, *hutāśana*, are derived from Vedic conceptions of Agni. But, on the whole, the later Agni is simply a personification of the element fire. Therefore he is spoken of as having wind for his charioteer (*vātasārathi*), and smoke as a banner (*dhūmaketu*). The various aspects of fire occasionally appear as traits of Agni's character, as will be seen in the legends related of him. Some forms of fire, especially as the terrible and destructive element, seem to have been worshipped under other names. According to the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, Agni was called Bhava by the Vāhīkas, Śarva by the Eastern people. He was also called Paśūnām pati ('lord of beasts') and Rudra. This seems to indicate that the *popular* worship of Agni was early transferred to deities of the Rudra type. It may be questioned whether there were any temples of Agni, and whether he received worship except in Vedic sacrifices.

Agni is present in every fire; therefore it was possible to relate legends of many Agnis and to make out genealogies of them (*Mahābhārata*, iii. 219–222, and differently *Vāyu Purāṇa*, i. 29). This accounts also for the fact that contracts were made in the presence of fire; for thus Agni, the omniscient god, was a witness to the contract. Fire, in a mysterious way, resides in all creatures; it is recognized as the cause of digestion. Therefore Agni is an omniscient god. The following legends will give an idea of Agni's position in later mythology:

Agni was created by Brahmā, and invested by him with his functions. But Aṅgiras was, on account of his austerities, considered superior to Agni. Therefore the god wanted to lay down his office, but Aṅgiras dissuaded him from retiring, and was therefore adopted by him as his son (*Mahābhārata*, iii. 217). Aṅgiras' son was Bṛhaspati, from whom the race of Agnis, mentioned above, is derived.

In the Rig Veda, Bhṛgu, or the race of Bhṛgus, is said to have kindled Agni for the establishment and diffusion of fire on earth; but in the *Mahābhārata* the relation between Agni and Bhṛgu is strangely changed. Bhṛgu had been created by Brahmā from the fire at Varuṇa's sacrifice. His wife was Pulomā. While she was pregnant, the Rākṣasa Puloman visited her during her husband's absence, and falling in love with her wanted to carry her off. He asserted that he had been betrothed to her before she married Bhṛgu, and he called Agni to witness. The god declared that the Rākṣasa had, indeed, first chosen her, but that she had been bestowed by her father on Bhṛgu, who with Vedic rites made her his wife. Then the Rākṣasa, in the shape of a boar, carried her off. But during the flight Pulomā miscarried, and the child dropped from her womb; wherefore, he was called *Chyavana*. At the same time the Rākṣasa was reduced to ashes. Upon learning that Agni had made Pulomā known to the Rākṣasa, Bhṛgu pronounced on Agni as a curse that he should devour all things (become 'the all-eater,' *sarvabhakṣa*). Agni, out of resentment, now withdrew from all sacrifices, but was at last induced by the entreaties of the gods and Ṛṣis to make Bhṛgu's curse come true, and again to receive the offerings for the gods (*Mahābhārata*, i. 5 ff.; see, further, art. BHRIGU).

The retirement of Agni from the world, his hiding in the ocean, in the earth, in plants, especially the Śamī (used in fire-rubbing), is more than once spoken of in the *Mahābhārata*. Some animal always betrayed Agni to those who sought him, and he laid as a curse upon the betrayer some defect which characterizes the animal in question. But it may be doubted whether these speculations formed part of a general belief. The same may be said about his parentage, or rather origin, which is variously stated according to particular Vedic ideas. He is one of the eight Vasus, their leader, just as in later Vedic texts.

Agni's wife is Svāhā, daughter of Dakṣa. He jointly with Śiva was father of Skanda, as will be related below. We hear occasionally of other offspring of Agni, among which the best known name is that of the sage Agniveśa. In one case, however, he became connected with epic history through his relation to the dynasty of Māhiṣmatī on the Narmadā.

Duryodhana, king of Māhiṣmatī, had by Narmadā a beautiful daughter called Sudarśanā, with whom Agni fell in love. In the guise of a poor Brāhman he asked her in marriage. But, her father not consenting, he withdrew from the sacrificial fire. He then made himself known, and received the maiden on condition that he should always be near the king. Agni's son by Sudarśanā was Sudarśana, who as a householder vanquished Death (*Mahābhārata*, xiii. 2). In another place (*ib.* ii. 31) this story is told differently. Nīla, king of Māhiṣmatī, had a beautiful daughter who used to stand near the sacrificial fire and fan it. Thus Agni became enamoured of the damsel, and the fire would not burn unless agitated by the breath from her lips. One day the god, in the guise of a Brāhman, visited the girl, but he was discovered by the king and ordered to be executed. Then Agni revealed himself to him, and Nīla gave him his daughter in marriage. The god henceforth aided the king in battle, so that his troops became invincible. So it happened that Sahadeva the Pāṇḍava on his *digvijaya*, or conquest of the world, could not overcome Nīla till Agni allowed the king to submit.

Another local legend in which Agni plays the principal part is the burning of the Khāṇḍava forest. It is connected with the main story of the *Mahābhārata*, and is there (i. 222 ff.) told thus. Agni had feasted twelve years, during king Śvetaki's sacrifice, on butter, and he afterwards refused to eat the offerings of other men; he accordingly grew feeble, and complained about it to Brahmā, who advised him to burn the Khāṇḍava forest and to feed on the creatures dwelling in it, who were enemies of the gods. Agni in the guise of a Brāhman accosted Arjuna, who together with Kṛṣṇa was sitting on the bank of the Yamunā, and asked his permission to devour the Khāṇḍava forest, which was protected by Indra. He procured for Arjuna the bow *gāṇḍīva*, and gave Kṛṣṇa his discus. He then set the wood on fire, while Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna, posted at either end of the forest, hindered the animals from escaping and the gods from injuring Agni. Thus the whole forest was burned down, the fire lasting a fortnight. It is twice stated that Agni had once before burned down this forest. Probably this story has no mythological bearing; it seems to be a legendary account of the clearing of the forest when the city Khāṇḍavaprastha, which was selected as their capital by the Pāṇḍavas, was founded.

It may be mentioned that, in the *Mahābhārata*, Dhṛṣṭadyumna is regarded as an incarnation of Agni; as is Nīla, the monkey, in the *Rāmāyaṇa*.

Agni is one of the eight *lokapālas*, or guardians of the four cardinal and the four intermediate points of the compass, and presides over the south-east, which is accordingly called *Āgneyī diś*. He is usually represented in pictures as riding on a ram, but his epithets *chhāgaratha* and *chhāgavāhana* point to the he-goat instead of the ram. There seems to have been no definite idea about his figure except that he had seven tongues, the names of which are already given in the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, i. 2, 4. He has a great many names; indeed, all words for 'fire' may be used to designate Agni; the more common ones are *Hutabhuj*, *Hutavāhana*, *Vahni*,

Anala, Pāvaka, Kṛśānu, Vibhāvasu, Jātavedas, Hiranyaretas, etc. (*Amarakośa*, I. i. 1. 48 ff.). See, further, Adolf Holtzmann, *Agni nach den Vorstellungen des Mahābhārata*, 1878.

Indra (Śakra) in Brāhmanical mythology is the ruler of heaven, and represents the *kṣatriya*, or warrior-class. He is supposed in a passage of the *Nalopākhyāna* to receive visits from kings, his colleagues on earth. In another passage (*Mahābhārata*, i. 197) the office of Indra is stated not to be permanent; there were other Indras before him, and there will be after him. In Buddhist works he is frequently called *Sakko devānam indo*, 'Śakra, the Indra of the gods,' just as in classical Sanskrit *indra* at the end of a compound denotes a superior individual of its class. Indra is always in terror lest some saint should by severe austerities wrest his power from him; and when there is a danger of this kind, he sends one of the *apsaras*, or heavenly nymphs, to seduce the saint from his ascetic exercises. Still he is regarded as the powerful lord of heaven and the chief of the gods; but, in comparison with the Supreme Gods—Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva—he, like the remaining gods, occupies but a second rank. We may therefore assume that, before the rise of the Supreme Gods, Indra held the first rank in popular belief. There was a popular festival held in his honour—the erection of Indra's pole (*indradhvaja*)—which is described in the *Kauśikasūtra* and at a late period by Varāhamihira (*Bṛhatsaṁhitā*, ch. 43). Though there are no temples of Indra, at least in more modern times, his images and niches dedicated to him are met with in temples of other gods, and so he may be said to receive a kind of indirect worship. The same remark applies to other gods to whom no temples are dedicated.

Indra's weapon is the thunderbolt (*vajra*); the rainbow is called 'Indra's bow.' He rides on the elephant Airāvata, or in a heavenly car driven by his charioteer Mātali. His capital is Amarāvatī, his palace Vaijayanta; his park, situated on the north of Mount Meru, is Nandana; in it grows the Pārijāta tree (which was torn from it by Kṛṣṇa and planted in Satyabhāmā's garden). He is the regent of the East. Indra's wife is Indrāṇī, usually called Śachī or Paulomī, daughter of the Asura Puloman, whom he slew. His son is Jayanta.

Indra has a thousand eyes, which may be interpreted as the stars of the firmament; but in legendary mythology they are explained differently. Indra seduced Gautama's wife Ahalyā, and therefore the saint laid upon him the curse that his body should be covered with a thousand marks resembling the female organ; when Gautama relented, he changed these marks into eyes. According to another story, the thousand eyes originated when Indra was gazing on the heavenly nymph Tilottamā (*Mahābhārata*, i. 211).

Many stories are told of Indra, some of which have developed from Vedic myths. His most famous deed, the slaying of Vṛtra, is variously told. According to one version of the story (*Mahābhārata*, xii. 342), Viśvarūpa or Triśiras, Tvaṣṭṛ's son, was *purohita* of the gods, but he favoured also the Asuras, to whom he was related through his mother. Hiraṇyakaśipu, the leader of the Asuras, brought him over to his party, and dismissed his *hotṛ* Vasiṣṭha, who thereupon cursed him to the effect that he should be killed by a being hitherto not existing (Viṣnu in the shape of a man-lion). Triśiras, in order to aggrandize the Asuras, practised severe penance; but heavenly nymphs sent by Indra succeeded in seducing him from his austerities. This aroused him to great wrath, and he began to utter powerful spells, by virtue of which his size increased immensely. With one of his mouths he drank all the soma, with the second he devoured all the offerings, and with the third he drank up the energy of Indra and the gods. Reduced to weakness, the gods asked, on the advice of Brahmā, the Ṛṣi Dadhīchi for his bones, from which the thunderbolt was produced. With this weapon, which was pervaded by Viṣṇu's energy, Indra slew Triśiras. From the corpse rose a mighty Asura, named Vṛtra, who became Indra's enemy, but was at last killed by him with the thunderbolt (cf. Muir, *Original Sanskrit Texts*, v. 230 ff.).

According to another version of the same story (*Mahābhārata*, v. 10), Indra killed Vṛtra in the twilight with the froth of the sea. For the Brāhmans had conferred upon Vṛtra the boon that he might not be killed by any weapon, either by what was dry or what was wet, either in the daytime or at night. According to a third version (*ib.* iii. 100), Vṛtra is not connected with Tvaṣṭṛ; he is a mighty Asura who leads the Kāleyas against the gods. It is in this emergency that Dadhīchi yields up his bones, from which Tvaṣṭṛ forges the thunderbolt. According to a fourth version (*ib.* xii. 281 f.), the cause of Vṛtra's defeat was a dreadful fever, Śiva's energy, which entered the demon and weakened him.

By the killing of Vṛtra, Indra was polluted with the heinous sin of Brahmanicide (*brahmahatyā*), and he fled in great terror to the end of the world. There he entered water, and concealed himself in the fibre of a lotus. The gods then placed Nahuṣa, Āyus' son, on the throne of Indra. But Nahuṣa at last came to ruin through his inordinate desire of Śachī (see AGASTYA). The gods discovered Indra's retreat, and Bṛhaspati cleansed him by a horse-sacrifice from the *brahmahatyā*, which was distributed amongst women, plants, etc. Indra was then reinstated as ruler of the heavens (*Mahābhārata*, v. 11 ff.).

Indra slew many demons besides Vṛtra, such as Bala, Namuchi, Jambha, Pāka, etc. From the victory over these he derives some of his names—Balasūdana, Pākaśāsana, etc. An instance of his hostility to the Daityas is supplied by the following myth: When many sons of Diti had been slain, she asked her husband Kaśyapa for a son who should kill Indra, and Kaśyapa granted her request on condition that she should strictly preserve purity for a thousand years. Once, however, she slept in an impure position, with her feet upwards. Indra availed himself of this opportunity, and, entering Diti's womb, cut into seven pieces the child with which she was pregnant. Thus originated the seven Mārutas, or regents of the winds (*Rāmāyaṇa*, i. 46 *f.*).

A curious myth frequently alluded to in classical literature, but found already in the *Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā* (i. 10, 13), relates that Indra cut the wings of the mountains, which originally flew about like birds, but then were forced to settle down for ever. Only Maināka, son of Himālaya and Menā, escaped this fate; he concealed himself in the ocean, and was protected by Sāgara.

In some legends Indra appears as the opponent of other gods. When the Ṛṣi Chyavana was giving the Aśvins a share of the soma-libation as a reward for having made him young again, Indra tried to prevent him. But Chyavana paralyzed his arm and created a huge monster Mada (intoxication). In great fright Indra then yielded, and *mada* was distributed over women, wine, dice, and the chase. In the story of Mada a trait of the Vedic Indra survives, viz. his habit of getting drunk; in classical mythology the god who is given to drunkenness is Baladeva, brother of Kṛṣṇa. On Indra's rivalry with Kṛṣṇa turns the story of his deluging the land of the Vrajas. But Kṛṣna kept off the rain and protected the land by holding up on his finger Mount Govardhana. On another occasion Kṛṣṇa carried off the Pārijāta tree, which belonged to Śachī, and defeated Indra, who with his forces had come to hinder him. Indra, who is also called Meghavāhana, was defeated in battle by Rāvaṇa's son Meghanāda, who from this victory came to be named *Indrajit*.

Here we must make a remark of more general application. When the ancient gods ceased to appeal to the masses of the people in that form in which they were represented in the Veda, the same god under a particular aspect became in some cases popular, and was hence regarded as a separate god, demigod, or as a hero connected somehow with the original god. A popular godling, with functions similar to those of an ancient god, grew up as a kind of duplicate of the latter; or, if he was not accepted as a god proper, he came, by the anthropomorphic influence of epic poetry, to be regarded as a hero, whose resemblance to the ancient god was explained by the assumption that he was an incarnation of that deity. Such a process, inferred from the result, is assumed in a number of cases, which will be adverted to below.

Thus Arjuna is, according to the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (II. i. 2. 11), a mystical name of Indra; and he was, according to Pāṇini (iv. 3. 98), worshipped just as Vāsudeva was. But Arjuna is one of the principal heroes of the *Mahābhārata*, and is intimately connected with Indra; he stays five years in Indra's heaven, and there learns the use of the magical weapons (*Mahābhārata*, iii. 41 ff.). He is, however, not regarded as an incarnation of Indra, as his name *Aindri* would lead us to expect, but of Nara, a somewhat ill-defined deity. Arjuna is the enemy of Karṇa, a son of the Sun, and kills him. Similarly, in the story of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, Vālin, Indra's son, is the enemy of Sugriva, son of the Sun; but here he is killed by the latter (iv. 16 ff.). In popular belief there seems to have been a hostility between Indra and the sun-god: a trace of such a belief, though a very faint one, may perhaps be found in the Vedic reference to a conflict of Indra with Uṣas, the goddess of dawn (*Rigv.* IV. xxx. 8–11).

The sun-god (Āditya, Savitṛ, Sūrya, etc.).—In Vedic times there were several sun-gods; in later

times they are all merged in one, who is called indiscriminately by their names—Sūrya, Savitṛ, Mitra, Aryaman, Pūṣan,—besides bearing such names as Āditya, Vivasvat, Vikartana, etc. He continued to be a popular god even after the rise of the supreme gods: temples were dedicated to him, sects acknowledged him as the highest deity, and hymns were composed in his honour, of which the *Sūryaśataka* by Mayūra, Bāṇa's son-in-law, is a deservedly admired poem of classical Sanskrit literature. The enumeration of his 108 names in *Mahābhārata*, iii. 3, proves his popularity in the period of the great epic.

The sun originated in the beginning from the Veda; he contains the Veda, is the glory of the Veda, and is called the Supreme Soul. Mythologically he is the son of Aditi, Kaśyapa's wife. Aditi invoked the sun for a son who should vanquish the Asuras, and became pregnant through a ray of the sun. She brought forth, in due course, an egg which became the sun Mārtaṇḍa.

Viśvakarman, who is regarded as a Prajāpati, gave his daughter Saṃjñā to the Sun for wife. She bore him two sons, Manu Vaivasvata and Yama, and one daughter, Yamī or Yamunā, the river of that name. Now, the splendour of the sun was so great that Saṃjñā could not bear to look on him. She therefore substituted for herself Chhāyā, her shadow, and, thus deceiving her husband, she went to her father's; but, as Viśvakarman was determined to send her back to her husband, she fled in the shape of a mare to the Uttarakurus. Meanwhile Chhāyā bore to the Sun two sons, Sāvarṇi and the planet Saturn, and a daughter, the river-goddess Tapatī, afterwards mother of Kuru. Chhāyā preferred her own children to those of Saṃjñā, and thus the Sun detected the fraud committed by his wife. He went to Viśvakarman and asked him to reduce his splendour, so that Saṃjñā might bear his light. Viśvakarman therefore put him on his lathe and pared down the body of the sun by a sixteenth part. From the parings were formed Viṣṇu's disc, Śiva's trident, and other weapons of the gods. The Sun, learning from Viśvakarman the retreat of his wife, went in the shape of a horse to the land of the Uttarakurus. There he met Saṃjñā, who, not allowing him to approach her from behind, turned her head towards him. From the breath of their nostrils were produced the two Aśvins, hence called *Nāsatyas*, and from the semen of the horse was born Revanta, chief of the Guhyakas.

A well-known myth explains the eclipses of sun and moon. When, by the churning of the ocean, the *amṛta*, the drink of immortality, had been produced and was being drunk by the gods, an Asura named Rāhu, in the guise of a god, got hold of it. The sun and the moon perceiving it, informed Viṣṇu, who at once cut off the head of Rāhu before the *amṛta* had gone down his throat. Therefore the head only of Rāhu became immortal. Since that time Rāhu hates and pursues the sun and moon, and when he gets hold of them swallows them.

The sun-god plays an important part in epic history. His son Manu Vaivasvata became the progenitor of mankind, and his grandson Ikṣvāku was the founder of the Sūryavaṁśa or the solar race of kings, to which Rāma belongs, and which forms the subject of Kālidāsa's poem *Raghuvaṁśa*. Karṇa, the leader of the Kauravas and the antagonist of Arjuna in the *Mahābhārata*, is his son. For Kuntī before her marriage with Pāṇḍu invoked the sun-god and bore him a son, Karṇa, who was born with a golden coat of mail and golden earrings. Afterwards, Indra in the guise of a Brāhman induced him to exchange this miraculous armour for the never-erring spear with which he killed Ghaṭotkacha. At last he was killed by Arjuna. Karṇa was probably a local variety of Sūrya (perhaps as the sun doomed to die), and from a god became an epic hero. In the *Rāmāyaṇa* the monkey-king Sugrīva is a son of Sūrya; he was first exiled by his brother Vālin, son of Indra, but afterwards he vanquished Vālin, with the help of Rāma, who from an ambush pierced him with an arrow. This story also seems to be based on a myth in which Indra and Sūrya were presented as rivals. Sūrya rides in a car drawn by seven horses (*harit*); his charioteer is Aruṇa, the dawn, who tempers the excessive splendour of the god.

An ancient variant of the sun-god is Garuḍa, the divine king of birds, on whom Viṣṇu rides. The myth which relates the birth of Garuḍa is perhaps the most perspicuous of Indian nature-myths. It is thus related in the *Mahābhārata*, i. 16 ff.:

Kadrū and Vinatā (representing dark night and waning night), daughters of Dakṣa, were both married to Kaśyapa. Kadrū laid a thousand eggs, Vinatā two. After 500 years the eggs of Kadrū burst, and out came a thousand snakes (Nāgas). Then Vinatā grew impatient, and opened one of her eggs; it contained a bird whose upper part only was developed—*Aruṇa*, the dawn. He became the charioteer of Sūrya. After another 500 years the second egg of Vinatā burst, and yielded an enormous bird—*Garuḍa*, the devourer of snakes (*i.e.* darkness). He at once took to his wings to seek for the food assigned him by the ordainer of all. By this time Vinatā had become the slave of her sister Kadrū. For the sisters had wagered as to whether the divine horse Uchchaiḥśravas was white or black, and Kadrū by fraud had won the bet, which stipulated that the loser should become slave to the winner. Thus Garuḍa, too, became the servant of the snakes, and had to obey their commands. They promised, however, to set him free, if he brought them the *amṛta* (which in this account is confounded with the soma). After many adventures Garuḍa came to the place where the *amṛta* was kept, vanquished the guardian-gods, extinguished the fire which was burning round the *amṛta*, overcame all obstacles, and succeeded at last in carrying off the *amṛta*-soma. In vain Indra hurled his thunderbolt at him; it brought down only one feather of the bird. Indra then entered into friendship with him. Garuḍa placed the *amṛta* on the ground strewn with *kuśa* grass, and invited the snakes to partake of it. While they bathed, as is the custom to do before meals, Indra carried off the *amṛta*. Garuḍa was rewarded for his deed by Viṣṇu, who chose him for his service as the bird on which he rides, and assigned him his standard to rest upon.

This myth, the latter part of which can be traced back to the Rig Veda, leaves no doubt that the sun is meant by Garuḍa, and consequently darkness by the snakes, his food. Apparently Garuḍa was never regarded as the equal of Sūrya, who therefore engrossed the whole sun-worship; still Garuḍa's claim to worship was recognized by making him the servant and companion of Viṣṇu, who from being a solar deity had been promoted to the rank of a Supreme God. Garuḍa is also called *Suparṇa*, and it may be remarked that there is a class of Suparṇas, or bird-genii, who frequently figure on ancient sculptures. He is also identified with *Tārkṣya*, originally a distinct mythical being, figured either as a bird or as a horse, and apparently representing the sun. Garuḍa seems, therefore, to be a combination of different divine forms of the sun represented as a winged being.

Soma, the moon-god.—As a departmental god, Soma represents the moon; but since he is identified with the Vedic god Soma, who especially represents the sacred soma-juice, the functions of the latter are also ascribed to the moon-god. Hence he is the sovereign of the stars as well as of the plants and of the Brāhmans; and in poetry his rays are said to consist of *amṛta*. Though he was a deity of great holiness, he seems scarcely to have received popular worship as a separate god; at least no temples seem to have been dedicated to him. (The famous shrine at Somanātha was sacred to Śiva, and so was Somatīrtha in Śrīnagara; see Stein, *Kalhaṇa's Chronicle of Kaśmīr*, ii. 450.) The moon is said to have been produced either from the eye of Atri, son of Brahmā, or, together with other precious things, at the churning of the ocean. He married the 27 Nakṣatras, daughters of Dakṣa, *i.e.* the 27 mansions of the moon. But he preferred the beautiful Rohiṇī (Aldebaran), and neglected his remaining wives. Dakṣa fruitlessly blamed him for his neglect of duty towards them, and at last he cursed him to the effect that he should die of consumption. So the moon began to wane, and at the same time all creatures grew weaker and weaker. Then Dakṣa mitigated his curse to the effect that the moon should alternately wane and wax every month. At full moon only a trace of his illness remains; it is the dark spot on his disc in the shape of a hare. His cure was brought

about by bathing at Prabhāsa, where the Sarasvatī falls into the western ocean.

From Soma sprang the Somavaṁśa, or lunar race of kings. Soma carried off Tārā, the wife of Bṛhaspati, though Brahmā bade him restore her to her husband. Uśanas, the teacher of the Asuras and the enemy of Bṛhaspati, together with the Asuras sided with Soma in the conflict between them and the gods. At last Soma was compelled to give up Tārā. After some time she gave birth to a boy whose parentage was doubtful; and she declared, when coerced, that he was the son of Soma. The boy was named Budha (the planet Mercury), who afterwards married Ilā, daughter of Manu. Their son was Purūravas, with whom the lineage of lunar kings begins.

The moon plays an important part in the ancient belief about the life after death. The souls of the deceased are supposed to go to the moon, and assembling there cause her waxing. At full moon, the moon sends some spirits on to the world of Brahmā (*devayāna*), and sends the rest as rain down to the earth to be born again (*pitṛyāna*). Their stations on both paths are variously stated (see Deussen, *System der Vedānta*, 1883, pp. 392, 409, 475).

Vāyu (Vāta Māruta) is the divine personification of wind, the fourth element of the Indians, which, it should be noted, constitutes as breath the principle of life; Vāyu has therefore power also over the animal world. He presides over the North-west. Since the invisible element of wind does not easily lend itself to anthropomorphism, scarcely any myths are told of Vāyu; nor did the god receive popular worship. He was too much of an abstraction to appeal to the religious feelings of the people. But there were *popular* wind-gods, variants of Vāyu as it were, who in epic language were therefore styled sons of Vāyu or Māruta. One of them is Hanumat, the valorous monkey of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, who jumped the ocean and brought Rāma tidings from his bride Sītā; he is now the tutelary god of all village settlements. The writer of the present article believes that he is connected with the monsoon (Jacobi, *Rāmāyaṇa*, p. 132). Another son of Vāyu is Bhīma of the *Mahābhārata*, the second of the five Pāṇdava brothers. There are traces in his character which seem to indicate a demonic origin. He is frequently brought into relation with the Rākṣasas; he not only fights them, but he marries the Rākṣasī Hiḍimbā, by whom he has a son, the famous Ghaṭotkacha. He is a ravenous eater (*vṛkodara*), and is of great fierceness; he tears open the breast of his enemy Duḥśāsana and drinks his blood. He may have been a godling, a personification of the destructive power of the storm, before he became an epic hero.

There is a plurality of wind-gods—the Maruts, who formed seven tribes descended from the seven parts into which the embryo of Diti was split by Indra (see above), or into which the semen of the sage Maṅkaṇaka was divided (*Mahābhārata*, ix. 38). In the Rig Veda the Maruts are the companions of Indra, in later mythology of Vāyu; the word, however, may lose its special meaning and denote gods in general.

Varuṇa in Brāhmanical mythology is the ruler of the waters and the god of the ocean. He still carries the noose, and is called Prachetas, as in the hymns of the Rig Veda; but his Vedic characteristics, except those relating to water, are forgotten or only occasionally remembered. For instance, his association with Mitra comes out only in a legend relating the origin of Vasiṣṭha (Maitrāvaruṇa; see *Rāmāyaṇa*, vii. 56 f.). He resides in the ocean. But there is also a world of Varuṇa, the Varuṇaloka, situated somewhere below the earth; it is full of wonders, and in it reside Varuṇa, his son Puṣkara, and all his progeny. This Varuṇaloka would seem to suit the Vedic Varuṇa better than the later ocean-god. To the latter belongs the miraculous umbrella (*Mahābhārata*, v. 98). Mention is made of a bow of Varuṇa, from which originated the *gāṇḍiva*, the bow he gave to Arjuna. Wine (*surā*) is called *vāruṇī*, i.e. 'belonging to Varuṇa'; and the goddess of wine, Vāruṇī, who appeared at the churning of the ocean, is regarded as Varuṇa's daughter or his wife.*

There is, however, another god of the sea, Sāgara, distinct from Varuṇa. It was Sāgara, not Varuṇa, who appeared to Rāma when he wanted to force his passage through the sea; and in romantic tales of the Middle Ages the god of the sea is called Sāgara, not Varuṇa.

Yama, in the Rig Veda a deified hero, has become in Brāhmanical mythology the dreaded god of the nether world, the sovereign of the damned, and the regent of the South. He is the son of the sun-god Vivasvat, brother of Manu and Yamunā. His messengers fetch the souls of dying men and lead them to Yama's hall, where Chitragupta the recorder reads the account of their deeds, and the god sits in judgment upon them. Yaṃa is called also Mṛtyu, Kāla ('death'), Antaka, Kṛtānta ('maker of an end'), Pretarājā ('king of ghosts'), Pitṛpati ('lord of the manes'). He carries a rod (*daṇḍa*) or a noose (*pāśa*), and rides on a buffalo. Yama is frequently introduced in epic stories. The best known instance is his meeting with Sāvitrī, to whom he granted the restoration of her husband to life; the episode of the *Mahābhārata* which relates this event is reckoned one of the gems of the great Epic.

In a less awful aspect Yama appears as *Dharmarājā*, 'king of law.' As such he seems occasionally to have been confounded with the god Dharma, the personification of justice, the father of Yudhiṣṭhira.

The Aśvins have lost, in Brāhmanical mythology, whatever cosmical element they had in the hymns of the Rig Veda. They continue to be regarded as beautiful youths and physicians. Their names are now given as Nāsatya and Dasra—originally epithets applying to either of them. Their origin from the breath of Saṇjñā and Sūrya has been mentioned above (under 'sun-god').

The best known story related of them is their cure of Chyavana, the old husband of Sukanyā, the beautiful daughter of king Saryāta. They wanted to seduce Sukanyā, but she would not consent, and as a boon they consented to make her husband young again. The Aśvins were rewarded for this by being admitted to a share of the soma. The details of this legend differ in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* (see Muir, *op. cit.* v. 250 ff.). Another cure wrought by the Aśvins is told in *Mahābhārata*, i. 3: they restored eyesight to Upamanyu, who had fallen into a well and there invoked them in an interesting hymn.

With epic history the Aśvins are connected in the *Mahābhārata* as the fathers of Sahadeva and Nakula, the twin sons of Mādrī; and in the *Rāmāyaṇa* they are the fathers of the monkeys Dvivida and Mainda.

Finally, we must mention Bṛhaspati, who, in the hymns of the Rig Veda, is invoked as a god, the impersonation of the power of devotion; in Brāhmanical mythology he is not a god in the proper sense of the word, but rather a divine sage. He is the teacher (*guru*) and household priest (*purohita*) of the gods; he is identified with Vāchaspati ('lord of speech'), and with the planet Juppiter. According to *Mahābhārata*, iii. 217 ff., he is the son of Aṅgiras, and from him is descended the family of Agnis. His wife is Tārā (see above under 'Soma'). Bṛhaspati's rival is Kāvya Uśanas or Śukra, teacher of the Asuras, who is identified with the planet Venus.

* An incident which is thought to show some resemblance between Neptune and Varuṇa is related in *Mahābhārata*, iii. 115. Varuṇa gave to the sage Richīka a thousand white horses, which Gādhi demanded of him as the price for his daughter Satyavatī.

Most of the gods treated of hitherto have this in common, that, though fully recognized in mythology, they lost more or less of their importance as popular gods. It was different with two old gods, *Viṣṇu* and *Rudra*, and with the youngest of Vedic deities, *Prajāpati*. They advanced to the position of Supreme Gods, and the first two became the highest objects of worship. Before we treat of the rise of these three gods, we must complete our description of the Indian pantheon. First we shall treat of the post-Vedic gods of similar rank to those inherited from the Vedic period, then of minor divine beings, and of saints.

2. Post-Vedic gods.—(*A*) *Those of high rank.*—To the post-Vedic period must be assigned **Kumāra**, the war-god (called also Skanda, Kārttikeya, Guha, Mahāsena, etc.). He is first mentioned in the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad*, vii. 26. 2, where he seems to be identified with the sage Sanatkumāra. His origin, however, must be looked for in popular belief, which seems to have varied a good deal in details respecting the war-god, as will be seen in the sequel. Kumāra is regarded as the general (*senāpati*) of the gods. His introduction as a new god was probably due to a change in the government of Indian States. Originally the king was both ruler in peace and leader in war, but afterwards the office of general became distinct. When this institution had become generally recognized, it was thought necessary, as we may assume, that there should be in heaven too a *senāpati* as well as a king. And since the *senāpati* frequently succeeded in supplanting the king, and the latter was often justified in being jealous of the former, it is but natural that Indra should at first try to suppress Kumāra, as is told in the narrative of the latter's birth.

The myth of the birth of Kumāra is variously related (*Mahābhārata*, iii. 225 ff., ix. 44 f., xiii. 84 ff.; *Rāmāyaṇa*, i. 36 f.), his father being given both as Śiva and as Agni, his mother as Umā, Gaṅgā, and quite a number of minor deities. These rival claims to his parentage had to be settled, and this was effected by the assumption of a sort of joint parentage, and by making some of the female deities his nurses or adoptive mothers.

The most generally adopted account of Kumāra's birth is as follows: The gods were afraid that from the embrace of Śiva and Pārvatī a being would be produced whom the world would be unable to bear, and therefore they entreated Śiva not to discharge his vital seed. However, part of it had already come forth, and this was taken by Agni and thrown into the Gaṅgā. But the latter could not retain it, and threw it on the slope of the Himālaya into a thicket of reeds (*śaravaṇa*). There it was transformed into a fine boy, who was found by the six Kṛttikās (the Pleiades). As each of them desired him to be her own son, he assumed six faces, and sucked their breasts simultaneously. Hence he is called Kārttikeya and Ṣaṇmukha. [In point of fact, the name Kārttikeya seems to be derived from Kārttika, the first month of autumn, when, on the cessation of the monsoon, the roads became practicable, and kings were wont to set out on war expeditions.] According to another version, the Kṛttikās were formerly the wives of the seven Ṛṣis[2] (for the Indians knew that there was a seventh star in the Pleiades, though they usually counted but six). Agni fell in love with the wives of the Ṛṣis, and Svāhā, his own wife, becoming aware of it, assumed the form of one of these ladies, approached Agni, and cohabited with him; she then brought Agni's semen to a golden lake, and threw it therein. This she repeated five times, for she was unable to assume the form of Arundhatī, the faithful wife of Vasiṣṭha. The remaining six Ṛṣis forsook their wives, who were transferred to the sky as the Kṛttikās.

The feats of Kumāra which are most generally known are the killing of the Asura Tāraka, and the splitting of Mount Krauñcha in the Himālaya. When Tāraka had vanquished the gods and was oppressing them, they asked Brahmā for a leader, and were told by him that only from the seed of Śiva would be produced the future conqueror of the mighty Asura. Śiva, however, was still an anchorite, practising severe austerities in the Himālaya. Kāma, the god of love, was now called upon to cause Śiva to fall in love with Umā (or Pārvatī), the beautiful daughter of Himālaya. He succeeded in his undertaking, but was reduced to ashes by the fire issuing from the eye on the forehead of Śiva, who was in great wrath when he became aware that Kāma had dared to disturb him in his ascetic exercise. Śiva was, however, won by the graces and merits of Pārvatī, and finally married her. These incidents form the subject of Kālidāsa's famous poem, *Kumārasambhava*. The rest of the story, telling how Kumāra was born, has been given above. The new-born Kumāra was installed general of the gods, engaged in battle with Tāraka, and killed him.

On another occasion, the Daitya Bāṇa, son of Bali, attacked the gods from the mountain Krauñcha, but he took shelter in the mountain when Kumāra assailed him. The latter pierced the mountain with his javelin, split it in twain, and killed the demon. Thus an opening was effected for the geese and other birds on their passage to the north. The same incident is variously stated by different authorities (see Wilson, *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, 1865, ii. 118 note).

The wife of Kumāra is Devasenā, a daughter of Brahmā. Her desire to get a husband superior in strength to the rest of the gods was, according to one account (*Mahābhārata*, iii. 224), the original cause of the birth of the war-god. Kumāra rides on the peacock, the son of Suparṇa.

The strange myth about the birth of Kumāra appears to be best interpreted on the assumption that in different parts of India there were several popular godlings of the war-god type, and that these have been combined into the one Kumāra, the war-god common to all Indians. But this process of amalgamation has left traces, which cannot be mistaken, elsewhere than in the strange myths related above. For there are three variants or alter-egos of Kumāra, viz. *Viśākha*, *Śākha*, and *Naigameya*. The first of these is known to have received popular worship (Patañjali, *ad Pāṇini*, v. 3. 99); he originated from a wound which Indra inflicted upon Kumāra, the new-born. From the same wound issued a great number of *kumāras*, and *kumārīs*, goblins, who spirit away little children (*Mahābhārata*, iii. 228, where two more brothers, Śiśu and the goat-faced Bhadraśākha, seem to be assigned to Kumāra). The war-god has a great retinue of monstrous followers, male and female, of whom long lists are given in *Mahābhārata*, ix. 45 f. He was probably in the beginning conceived as the representative of a whole class of uncanny spirits somehow connected with fire, and was afterwards promoted to the position of a war-god, equal in rank with the ancient gods. His worship seems once to have been fairly general; at present he is worshipped chiefly in the south, where he is known under the name of Subrahmaṇya.

Another son of Śiva, or rather of Pārvatī, is **Gaṇeśa**. Originally he seems to have been conceived as the 'remover of obstacles,' as his names *Vināyaka* and *Vighneśa* indicate. As such he is figured with an elephantine head; he carries in one of his hands (*paraśupāṇi*) an axe, or one of his tusks, which has been broken off; he rides on, or is attended by, the rat, the animal which finds its way to every place. As 'remover of obstacles,' he is invoked at the beginning of all books, and thus in a secondary way he became the god of learning, especially of pandits and clerks. He is the latest of all Brāhmanical gods, for he is not mentioned in the *Rāmāyaṇa* and some of the older *Purāṇas*; and he was absent from the original *Mahābhārata*. He is first mentioned in Yājñavalkya, i. 270, 289, 293, as a demon taking possession of men, and thus hindering their success, but furthering them when propitiated. The name *Gaṇeśa* or *Gaṇādhipa* designates him as the leader of the Gaṇas, or followers in the retinue of Śiva. Yet he is not, as a rule, represented as leading the Gaṇas, whose actual leader is Nandi. But there is a class of demons, Vināyakas (see *Petersburg Dict.*, *s.v.*), who probably were represented by the new god Gaṇeśa. It deserves to be noted in this connexion, that, in the Rig Veda (II. xxiii. 1), Bṛhaspati is addressed as *gaṇānāṁ gaṇapati*; and Bṛhaspati, who is identified with Vāchaspati, is something like a Vedic counterpart of Gaṇeśa as a god of learning.

Gaṇeśa is the son of Śiva and Pārvatī, or rather of the latter, for he was produced from the unguents with which the goddess

had anointed herself. With the water of her bath they were conveyed to the mouth of the Ganges, and were there imbibed by Mālinī, a goddess with the head of an elephant. She gave birth to a boy who had four arms and five heads of an elephant. Gaṅgā chose him for her son, but Śiva declared him to be the son of Pārvatī. He reduced his five heads to one, and enthroned him on Añjanagiri as the 'remover of obstacles.' These details are given in the 18th canto of the *Haracharita* by Jayadratha, a native of Kashmīr, in the 13th cent., who professes to have composed his work from older sources. In the *Brahma Vaivarta Purāṇa*, the third book of which contains an account of Gaṇeśa, it is narrated that Gaṇeśa's head fell off when Pārvatī in the pride of her heart invited the planet Saturn to look at her baby, and that Viṣṇu afterwards substituted for it the head of an elephant. Gaṇeśa is figured with one tusk only (*ekadanta*). The loss of the other is variously accounted for. It was cut off, according to the *Śiśupālavadha*, i. 60, by Rāvaṇa; according to the *Brahma Vaivarta Purāṇa*, iii. 40, by Paraśurāma; and he lost it, according to the *Haracharita*, xviii. 23, through a bet with Kumāra as to who should go most quickly round the earth. Besides the particulars of his figure mentioned already, he has an exceedingly big belly. In his four hands he carries, according to Jayadratha, a tusk, a rosary, an axe, and a sweetmeat; in some pictures he carries a manuscript in one hand.

Kubera or Vaiśravaṇa, the 'lord of treasures' (*vitteśa*), 'king of the Yakṣas,' and 'regent of the north,' is already mentioned in the Atharva Veda as chief of the 'good people' (*puṇyajana*), or 'other people' (*itarajana*), and as concerned with 'concealment' (through hidden treasures).*

In the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* and in later Vedic texts he is mentioned as king of the Rakṣas, and in the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, i. 31§, as lord of wishes and as possessor of a wonderful car (apparently the later Puṣpaka).

In later mythology he is the king of the Yakṣas as well as of the Kinnaras and Guhyakas, while the Rākṣasas are the subjects of his half-brother, Rāvaṇa. According to the *Rāmāyaṇa* (vii. 3 ff.), he is the son of Viśravas, and grandson of Pulastya, Prajāpati's son.

Viśravas had two wives, Devavarṇinī, daughter of Bharadvāja, and Kaikasī, daughter of Sumāli. By the former he had one son, Kubera; by the latter Rāvaṇa, Kumbhakarṇa, Vibhīṣaṇa, and Śūrpaṇakhā.† Viśravas gave Kubera for his residence the town Laṅkā, built by Viśvakarman on Mount Triḳūṭa in the southern ocean. But Rāvaṇa expelled him from Laṅkā, and made it his own capital. Kubera then, by the advice of Viśravas, took up his residence on Mount Kailāsa, and became the regent of the north. But his connexion with the south, to which the above legend refers, was perhaps suggested by the name of the southernmost river of India, the Kāveri; for *Kāveraka* or *Kāberaka* occurs already in the Atharva Veda as a patronymic derived from Kubera. In support of this conjecture it may be mentioned that the name of the town Trichinopoly is popularly explained as *Triśiraḥpalli*, according to Lassen (*Ind. Alterthumskunde*, 1873, i. 160)='town of Kubera,' for *Triśiras* is also a name of Kubera.

Kubera's town is Alakā, his park Chaitraratha; he has nine treasures (*nidhi*). He rides on a man (*naravāhana*); this curious item seems to indicate some near relation to men, and the same is suggested by his epithet or name *Ṛṇdharman*, which probably refers to his quality as bestower of riches (*śrīda*). His son is Nalakūbara, whose wife Rambhā was ravished by Rāvaṇa (*Rāmāyaṇa*, vii. 26). Kubera, as we have seen, was believed from very early times to preside over the guardians of treasures, who, it would seem, were originally called *rakṣas*, and later—to distinguish them from the devilish *rakṣas*, the disturbers of sacrifices—had been named *yakṣas*. As chief of the Yakṣas, he was supplanted, as far as popular worship is concerned, by Maṇibhadra, who is already mentioned in the *Rāmāyaṇa* (vii. 15), but who occurs chiefly in popular tales.

A god who is very frequently referred to in classical Sanskrit literature is the god of love, Kāma (Manmatha, Madana, Kandarpa, Smara, Ananga, etc.). Originally Kāma is 'desire,'—not of sexual enjoyment only, but of good things in general,—and as a personification of desire he is invoked in Atharva Veda ix. 2; but in another hymn of the same Veda (iii. 25) he is already conceived as the god of sexual love, in which function only he is known to later mythology. His parentage is variously stated, but usually he is regarded as the son of Dharma and Lakṣmī. His wife is Rati, the impersonation of sexual enjoyment; his friend and companion, Madhu, the first month of spring. Two sons of Kāma are occasionally mentioned, Harṣa and Yaśas.

The ideas entertained about Kāma may be gathered from his emblems and attributes. He carries a bow formed of flowers (*puṣpachāpa*); the string of this bow consists of bees, and the arrows of flowers (*kusumaśara*). There are five such arrows (*pañchabāṇa*), allegorically representing the infatuating powers of love (*śoṣaṇa*, *mohana*, etc.). He has on his banner the dolphin or a fish, denoting procreative power (*makara* or *matsya-ketu*); or he carries a flower in his hand (*puṣpaketana*). He is often spoken of as *ātmabhū* or *chittajanman*, 'born of the mind,' and was therefore called *anaṅga*, 'bodiless.' This latter quality is accounted for by a well-known myth mentioned above in connexion with the birth of the war-god.

Śiva reduced Kāma to ashes; he will get a new body, according to *Kumārasambhava*, 4, 42, at the wedding of Śiva and Pārvatī. But, according to the *Harivaṁśa* (9263 ff.), Kāma was re-born as Pradyumna, Kṛṣṇa's son. The baby had been stolen by Śambara, whose wife Māyāvatī brought him up. The latter, however, was Rati, who had assumed the form of Māyāvatī in order to deceive the Asura, and thus to cause his destruction by Pradyumna (*ib.* 9475 ff.). Apparently Pradyumna is but a variant of Kāma, or, to be more accurate, a god of love popular in those tracts of India where the worship of Kṛṣṇa prevailed. Kāma has also been identified with Māra, the tempter and devil of Buddhist legend: hence, in later Sanskrit, Māra becomes a synonym of Kāma.

Some of the *goddesses* of Brāhmanical mythology have already been mentioned in connexion with the gods whose consorts they are: Svāhā, wife of Agni, Śachī, wife of Indra, Saṁjñā, wife of Sūrya. The most important goddess, Pārvatī, will be considered when we come to treat of Rudra. Lakṣmī or Śrī is the consort of Viṣṇu; but she seems originally to have been an independent deity impersonating beauty and wealth. She rose from the ocean when the gods and demons churned it for the production of *amṛta*, and then she was made over to Viṣṇu. But we meet also with different statements: she is the daughter of Bhṛgu and Khyāti, or has been produced from the lotus which grew out of Viṣṇu's forehead; she is the wife of Prajāpati, or of Dattātreya, or of the sun-god, or of Dharma to whom she bore a son Kāma. As the goddess of beauty, she is intimately connected with the lotus, the most beautiful flower of India; she is called after it Padmā or Kamalā; she is enthroned on a lotus, and holds one in her hand. As Fortuna, she is the fickle goddess, who stays nowhere long; according to *Mahābhārata*, xii. 225, 228, she lived once with the Dānavas, then with the gods, and with Indra. From an abstraction Śrī seems to have become a deity, just as occasionally abstract nouns are used as names of gods or goddesses representing the abstract idea in question, *e.g.* Hrī, Dhṛti, Kīrti, etc.

The origin of Sarasvatī was different. From being a river-goddess in the Rig Veda she became the goddess of wisdom and eloquence, and as such she is most frequently invoked by the poets of classical Sanskrit literature. She has been identified with Vāch, 'speech,' and as such she is the wife of Brahmā; she is further identified with Bhāratī, a separate goddess invoked in Vedic hymns. She is also called Śāradā, whom the inhabitants of Kashmīr regard as the guardian of their country, hence called Śāradāmaṇḍala (Stein, *Kalhaṇa's Chronicle of Kaśmīr*, ii. p. 286). Poets speak of the hostility of Lakṣmī to Sarasvatī; for wealth and learning seldom go together.

The principal river-goddess of India is the Gaṅgā, who has lent her sanctity, as it were, to

* *Puṇyajana* in classical Sanskrit is synonymous with *yakṣa* and *rākṣasa* (Hemachandra's *Abhidhānakośa*, 187 and 194).

† The genealogy is stated somewhat differently in *Mahābhārata*, iii. 274 f.

many smaller rivers which are fabled to be miraculously connected or identical with her. The Gaṅgā flows in heaven as Viyadgaṅgā or Mandākinī (the milky way), on earth as the most sacred river, and in the lower world as the Pātālagaṅgā; she is therefore called *Tripathagā*, 'going in the three worlds.'

King Bhagīratha, the great-grandson of Sagara, induced the celestial Gaṅgā to come down from heaven to earth and from the earth to the lower regions, in order to purify the ashes of the 60,000 sons of Sagara burnt by Kapila; hence she is called *Bhāgīrathī*. Śiva caught the river up in his matted hair in order to check the impetus of her fall. The river then entered Jahnu's sacrificial enclosure and was drunk up by him; but at last he discharged her from his ear, wherefore she is regarded as his daughter and called *Jāhnavī*. These legends are told at length in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, i. 38–44; another account of her descent is given in the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*, ch. 55. Gaṅgā is also said to come forth from the toe of Viṣṇu. In the *Mahābhārata* (i. 98 ff.) she is the first wife of King Śantanu and the mother of Bhīṣma. It has been said above that Kumāra is considered to be her son. Mythologically she is the eldest daughter of Himālaya and Menā.

In conclusion, it may be added that there are several other sacred rivers or river-goddesses; *e.g.* Yamunā (Kālindī) is the daughter of Sūrya, and so is the Tapatī (a younger sister of the goddess Sāvitrī); Narmadā (Revā) is a daughter of the moon.

The *enemies* of the gods are the **Asuras, Daityas, and Dānavas.** In the Rig Veda, *Asura* is an epithet of Varuṇa and other gods, which has been rendered 'mysterious being.' But in later times *asura* denotes the enemies of the gods (*sura*), and the word is derived from *sura* with *a* privative, while in point of fact the word *sura* is artificial, and has been abstracted from *asura*. The Asuras are the elder brothers of the gods, both being sons of Prajāpati. They continually waged war with the gods, and frequently got the better of them; some of them even acquired the sovereignty over the whole world, till at last they were slain by Indra, Viṣṇu (hence called *Daityāri*), or some other god. They dwell in the nether world, in magnificent palaces. As enemies of the gods, they are regarded as wicked demons; but, as mere rivals of the gods, they are not necessarily bad. So they have for their teacher and spiritual guide a great saint, Śukra, the son of Bhṛgu, who has been mentioned above in connexion with his antagonist Bṛhaspati, the teacher of the gods. The Asuras occasionally appear in a better light in epic stories, and still more frequently in popular tales. In popular belief they seem to have come to be looked upon simply as superhuman beings, very much like the Vidyādharas; *e.g.* there is a small romantic epic in the *Kathāsaritsāgara* (eighth book), in which they side with the hero of the story. In classical mythology there is no difference between Asuras, Daityas, and Dānavas, and these words are usually synonyms; but originally the Daityas and Dānavas are subdivisions of the Asuras, the former being the sons of Diti, the latter of Danū.

(*B*) We must now speak of *the different groups of divine beings who rank below the gods.* Some of them are, on the whole, not unfriendly to men, others are decidedly wicked, demons or devils. We shall treat first of the former. The most popular class seems to have been the **Nāgas** (Sarpas, Uragas), dragons or snake-gods; and snake-worship prevailed in India from the beginning of the classical period downwards. Nāgas are figured on numberless sculptures all over India, and in popular tales they and their beautiful daughters play an important part. They are, however, almost absent from Vedic literature. In epic and classical literature they are said to dwell in Pātāla, the nether world, which is imagined to be full of marvels; there is situated their city Bhogavatī. At the beginning of the *Mahābhārata* we have what may be called a snake-epos, which relates the destruction of the snakes through the sacrifice of Janamejaya; there are introduced Airāvata, Vāsuki, Takṣaka, Śeṣa and others well known in Sanskrit literature. Śeṣa (Ananta) has been promoted to a higher rank; he is represented as supporting the earth on his expanded hoods, and he has become a servant of Viṣṇu, who rests on him while sleeping on the ocean. Baladeva, the brother of Kṛṣṇa, is believed to be an incarnation of Śeṣa. The snakes are the sons of Kadrū, or of Surasā, one of the divine mothers. It has been related above (under 'sun-god') that Garuḍa is their enemy and devours them, whence it has been concluded that the Nāgas represent darkness which is dispelled by the sun. But there is another aspect of the Nāgas which was more important for the imagination of the people; they were probably regarded as guarding or possessing treasures, and assuming the shape of snakes. The Nāgas were held in awe and reverence, but they were not regarded as demons.

Older than the Nāgas are the **Gandharvas.** They are already known in the Rig Veda, where, however, usually but one Gandharva is mentioned. They are a class of superhuman beings fond of women, and possessing a mysterious power over them. In the *Mahābhārata* they frequently appear very much like the Yakṣas, and their king Aṅgāraparna or Chitraratha is a friend of Kubera (whose park is called *Chaitraratha*). But usually they are represented as divine musicians and as living in Indra's heaven; from them the Sanskrit name for 'music,' *gāndharva*, is derived. It may be mentioned that the *fata morgana* is called 'town of the Gandharvas' (*gandharvanagara*).

The mistresses of the Gandharvas are the **Apsarases,** heavenly nymphs of wonderful beauty. They too belong to the court of Indra, and they are employed by him to seduce saints when they become a danger to his sovereignty through their severe penance. The effect of their successful interference is usually the birth of some great man or woman; *e.g.* Menakā seduced Viśvāmitra and became mother of Śakuntalā. In other stories some Apsaras incurs the displeasure of some god, and by his curse is born on, or banished to, the earth, where she marries some great man. Thus Urvaśī became the wife of king Purūravas; their adventures form the story of Kālidāsa's play *Vikramorvaśī*. The most famous Apsarases are Tilottamā, Rambhā, Urvaśī, Ghṛtāchī, Menakā, and others, but there are millions of them, and they are held out as a reward to warriors who fall in battle.

The **Yakṣas, as a class of superhuman beings,** are of post-Vedic origin, though the word *yakṣá* as a neuter occurs in the Rig Veda (on its meaning see *Vedische Studien*, iii. 126 ff.). As *yakṣan* means 'magical power,' *yakṣá* probably means etymologically 'being possessed of magical power'; and this was without doubt the meaning of the feminine *yakṣiṇī*. The original conception of the Yakṣas would therefore be much the same as that of the later Vidyādharas—a word which etymologically and actually means 'possessing spells or witchcraft.' The Yakṣas are brought into close connexion with the Rākṣasas, as stated above under 'Kubera,' though the Yakṣas are generally not unfriendly to men, and the Rākṣasas are. (Still there are instances of wicked Yakṣas and of kind Rākṣasas.) Both Yakṣas and Rākṣasas are also called *puṇyajana*—a name of the subjects of Kubera in the Atharva Veda. It has been assumed above that there were originally two sorts of Rakṣas; the one, guardians of treasures, were identified with the Yakṣas, and the other are the well-known disturbers of sacrifice usually called Rākṣasas; thus the apparent confusion between Yakṣas and Rākṣasas would become intelligible.

Very much like the Yakṣas are the Guhyakas. They too are followers of Kubera; they guard treasures and live in mountain caves. Mythical beings of similar character are the Kinnaras, divine songsters, who have a human body and the head of a horse, while the Kimpuruṣas have the body of a horse and a human head. Both Kinnaras and Kimpuruṣas are followers of Kubera, and they are frequently identified with one another. The Kinnaras are occasionally confounded with the Gandharvas.

Other classes of mythical beings who are frequently mentioned, but not described in detail, are the Chāraṇas, divine panegyrists; the Siddhas, beneficent ghosts; and the Sādhyas.

The Vidyādharas deserve a fuller notice. In the older popular tales, especially in Pāli literature, the Yakṣas are the principal superhuman beings; in the younger popular literature (represented by the *Bṛhatkathā*) they are supplanted by the Vidyādharas, the most human-like of all inferior divine beings. They live under kings and emperors (*chakravartins*) of their own, in towns on the northern mountains, just like men, with whom they have much intercourse and even intermarry. Men can also be received into their community and acquire sovereignty over them. They possess superhuman powers, especially the faculty of moving through the air, and of assuming by their *vidyā*, or witchcraft, any shape at will (whence they are also called *Khechara*, and *Kāmarūpin*). The Vidyādharas seem to have been at the height of popularity during the early centuries of our era; there is a Prākrit poem by Vimalasūri, the *Padmacharita*, which belongs to that time; in it the Rākṣasas, the Yakṣas, the Monkeys, etc., of the *Rāmāyaṇa* are declared to be different tribes of Vidyādharas.

Among the malicious superhuman beings the Rākṣasas are the most prominent. In the Rig Veda they are mentioned in the neuter form *rakṣas* as fiends who disturb the sacrifice and injure the pious. They are possessed of enormous power, especially at night, when they prowl about (*rātriñchara*) and devour their victims (*kravyāda*, *kauṇapa*); they are of hideous appearance, but are able to assume different shapes. The Rig Veda seems to distinguish *rakṣas* ('evil spirits') and *yātudhānas* ('ghosts'), but in later language *Yātudhāna* is synonymous with *Rākṣasa*. Originally equal in rank to the Yakṣas, the Rākṣasas have become more conspicuous than in ancient mythology, apparently through the influence of epic poetry. For in the *Rāmāyaṇa* Rāvaṇa, the king of the Rākṣasas, his brothers, etc., are the powerful enemies of Rāma; thus the Rākṣasas were invested with a new personality which they retained in the imagination of the Hindus. In the *Mahābhārata*, Bhīma's son Ghaṭotkacha is a Rākṣasa who fights on the side of the Pāṇḍavas. He and Vibhīṣaṇa, the virtuous brother of Rāvaṇa, and his successor on the throne of Laṅkā, are instances which prove that the Rākṣasas, like the Asuras, were not always looked upon with unmitigated horror.

Piśāchas are not unlike, and occasionally are confounded with, the Rākṣasas; they are hideous and bloodthirsty monsters who haunt wild and desert places. In the Rig Veda there is once (I. cxxxiii. 5) mention of a Piśāchī, a spirit supposed to be connected with the will o' the wisp; the Piśāchas as wicked spirits frequently occur from the Atharva Veda downwards. It may be remarked that a Prakrit dialect, in which the original *Bṛhatkathā* was written, has been named after them Paiśāchī.*

Bhūta is the most general term for sprites; thus *Bhūtabhāṣa*, the 'language of the Bhūtas,' is synonymous with *Paiśāchī*. But frequently they are mentioned as a separate class, in juxtaposition with other classes of wicked spirits. Pretas are the ghosts of the deceased, who are not received among the *manes*. They play a more important part in Buddhist literature than in the Brāhmanical Sanskrit literature. In later times, especially in popular works, they seem to have been supplanted by the Vetālas, wicked goblins who haunt cemeteries and animate dead bodies; they belong to the last phase of the development of demonology, inaugurated by the *Bṛhatkathā*, in which the Vidyādharas are the leading figures.

(*C*) We shall now speak of *heroic men*. Most important figures in Brāhmanical mythology are the famous Ṛṣis of old, the traditional authors of the Vedic hymns, and ancestral founders of the Brāhmanical *gotras* or gentes. These holy men, saints or sages, were looked upon as possessing superhuman powers which made them almost equal, and in some cases even superior, to the gods. We may distinguish three classes of Ṛṣis: *devarṣis*, i.e. Ṛṣis of the gods or living among them, *e.g.* Nārada; *brahmarṣis*, i.e. priestly Ṛṣis, *e.g.* Vasiṣṭha, and indeed the greatest number of them; and *rājarṣis*, i.e. Ṛṣis of royal origin, *e.g.* Viśvāmitra. Besides, the Ṛṣis belong to different periods: some lived in the beginning of the world and took an active part in creation, as Dakṣa, Kaśyapa, Marīchi; others belong to a more recent period, as Manu, Vyāsa, Vālmīki, etc. An ancient group are the seven Ṛṣis (identified with the seven bright stars of Ursa major); but the names are differently given. The oldest list is: Gautama, Bharadvāja, Viśvāmitra, Jamadagni, Vasiṣṭha, Kaśyapa, and Atri. A common one is: Bhṛgu, Aṅgiras, Viśvāmitra, Vasiṣṭha, Kaśyapa, Atri, and Agastya. From the *Mahābhārata* we get a different list: Marīchi, Atri, Aṅgiras, Pulaha, Kratu, Pulastya, and Vasiṣṭha. The stories and legends of which the Ṛṣis are the heroes, or in which they play an important part, are very numerous, especially in the Epics and the *Purāṇas*, far outnumbering the myths told of the gods.

The ideas entertained about the Ṛṣis have changed considerably in the course of time in correspondence with the change of the religious ideal. Originally they owed their exalted position to the fact that they were believed to have revealed the sacred lore, the whole of Vedic religion, which, it will be remembered, is concerned chiefly with sacrifice. But in the epic period the sacrifice was no longer the religious ideal; it had been supplanted by *tapas* or *yoga*, 'asceticism,' in the opinion of the people at large. Therefore the Ṛṣis began to be regarded less as experts in the sacrificial art than as great ascetics, who by means of severe austerities and deep meditation had acquired superhuman power and such sanctity that their utterances were infallible and their curses must take effect. In popular opinion they are *yogins* rather than priests; they are saints and sorcerers at the same time; but, of course, elevated to the highest rank.

3. The three Supreme Gods—Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva—occupy a peculiar position in the Hindu pantheon, highly exalted above the rest of gods and divine beings. A detailed description of them would be out of place in the present article. In a sketch of Brāhmanical mythology only the causes and processes by which they were promoted to the highest rank can be dealt with.

Brahmā, the creator of the world, is the Prajāpati, Pitāmaha, Hiraṇyagarbha of the Vedas and *Brāhmaṇas*. He had his origin and basis in speculation rather than in popular cult, and therefore he did not appeal, in spite of his sublime character, to

* Pischel, 'Grammatik der Prakrit Sprachen,' *GIAP* i. 8, p. 37 f.; Lacôte, *Essai sur Guṇāḍhya et la Bṛhatkathā*, pp. 40–59.

the religious feelings of the masses. Hence the worship of Brahmā has become all but extinct, and the worshippers of Śiva or Viṣṇu, in whatever form they adore their favourite deity, form the overwhelming majority of the Hindus. Notwithstanding these sectarian tendencies, the three Supreme Gods are regarded, in principle, as of equal dignity and forming as such a kind of triad, which in the doctrine of the *Trimūrti* has been acknowledged since about the 5th cent. A.D. There were contradictory elements already in the conception of the Prajāpati of the *Brāhmaṇas*. For sometimes he is identified with the universe, and described as the source out of which creation evolved; sometimes he is regarded as a secondary deity subordinate to Brahman (Muir, *op. cit.* v. 391 ff.). The same holds good with the Brahmā of later mythology: Brahmā proceeded from Brahman, the First Cause; and, on the other hand, he is, in a vague way, identified with it, whence he is called *svayambhū* ('self-born') or *aja* ('unborn'). The generally received opinion, as given in Manu i. 5 ff., comes to this: Svayambhū rose from primeval darkness, created the waters, and deposited in them a seed; this became a golden egg, in which he himself was born as Brahmā or Hiraṇyagarbha. But, according to another opinion, contained already in the famous *Puruṣasūkta* of the Rig Veda (x. 90), the Puruṣa was in the beginning, and from him the world originated. The deity rising from this Puruṣa is called *Nārāyaṇa* (*i.e.* 'descended from Nara,' the primeval male)—a name which is also coupled with Puruṣa in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*. Thus Nārāyaṇa is identified with Brahmā (in the above quoted passage of Manu). But usually Nārāyaṇa is identified with Viṣṇu, and thereby Brahmā's claim to paramount superiority was contested. There was still another cause which detracted from Brahmā's significance as creator. For part of the creation, notably of men, gods, and divine beings, was transferred to secondary Prajāpatis: Dakṣa, Marīchi, Atri, and other Ṛṣis whose progeny is detailed in cosmogonic myths and legends of the Epics and the *Purāṇas*. Thus many causes were at work to reduce the importance and dignity of Brahmā and to deprive him of active devotion. The reason which the Hindus allege in explanation of this fact is Brahmā's incest with his daughter Vāch ('speech'), by which the creation was brought about. Still the idea of creation and of fate is personified in Brahmā, and in this character he is universally acknowledged by all classical writers down to modern times.

While Brahmā-Prajāpati retires step by step from the superiority over all gods accorded to him in the *Brāhmaṇas*, the reverse development obtains in the case of Viṣṇu. In the Rig Veda he is not one of the prominent gods; there he is chiefly extolled for the three steps with which he encompassed the universe. But it should be remarked that in the Rig Veda he is intimately associated with Indra as his friend and companion, while in classical mythology he is styled Indra's younger brother (*Indrānuja*). As this kind of relationship is little in keeping with Viṣṇu's paramount rank, it must be regarded as a relic of the preceding period, when Indra was still greatly superior to Viṣṇu; and, at the same time, it seems to indicate a dim consciousness of the fact that a part of Indra's character or functions had been transferred to Viṣṇu. For Viṣṇu becomes in classical mythology what Indra had been before, namely, the slayer of demons, the *Daityāri*. On the whole, however, Viṣṇu's position in the *Brāhmaṇas* is the same as before; he is regarded as the equal of the other gods, not yet their superior. But the *Brāhmaṇas* record only the views of the priests; popular opinion may have differed from theirs, although ignored by them as not worthy of notice (cf. Muir, *op. cit.* iv. 156 ff.). It should, however, be observed that in the *Brāhmaṇas* Viṣṇu is repeatedly identified with the sacrifice—an honour which he shares with Prajāpati. He seems gradually to have usurped some positions formerly occupied by Prajāpati, and thus to have arrogated to himself the superiority which Vedic speculation had assigned to his rival. Thus Nārāyaṇa is, according to Manu, identical with Brahmā, but afterwards Viṣṇu is Nārāyaṇa. In the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* it is said that, 'having assumed the form of a tortoise, Prajāpati created offspring'; and, according to the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*, Prajāpati in the form of a boar raised the earth from the bottom of the ocean (Muir, *op. cit.* pp. 27, 39, 52 f.). But common opinion ascribes these feats to Viṣṇu in his tortoise and boar *avatāras*.

Here we meet for the first time with the theory of incarnations, which in the course of time passed into a generally adopted doctrine, and enabled Vaiṣṇavism to absorb popular cults by declaring the objects of their worship to be *avatāras* of Viṣṇu. Probably the tortoise and the boar were originally popular theriomorphic deities worshipped by the masses (including Brāhmanic families), and were afterwards elevated by the same Brāhmans to a higher rank by assuming them to be forms of some recognized god. Traces of this process seem to be recognizable in the case of the boar and tortoise *avatāras* of Prajāpati. For in the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*, as we have seen, Prajāpati assumed the form of a boar and raised the earth; but, in a passage of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, it was the boar Emūṣa who raised the earth, and was then favoured by Prajāpati for his deed. Here we have two different attempts to connect a god worshipped under the shape of a boar with Prajāpati. Something similar occurs in the case of his tortoise *avatāra*; for it is first said that Prajāpati took the form of a tortoise, and then this tortoise *kachchhapa* is identified with Kaśyapa, one of the secondary creators. We observe in both cases a certain indecision: the theriomorphic god was at first *hesitatingly* identified by members of the priestly class with one of their great gods. Afterwards, when the theory of *avatāras* was firmly established, it furnished a ready means of legitimizing popular godlings and heroes. Thus the fish *avatāra* of Viṣṇu and that of the man-lion may be accounted for by the assumption that idols of such shapes had been the objects of popular worship.

The fifth *avatāra* of Viṣṇu as a dwarf (*Vāmana*) is of peculiar interest. For in this incarnation Viṣṇu conquered the world by three steps, for which feat he is chiefly extolled in the hymns of the Rig Veda, although neither there nor in the *Brāhmaṇas* is he said to have done this in the shape of a dwarf. That notion may have developed from the myth itself, for, compared with such *giant* steps, the body of the god may well have appeared *dwarfish*; or there may have been some popular god figured as a dwarf, with whom it was thought convenient to identify Viṣṇu. At any rate, the fact that the principal feat of Viṣṇu was not ascribed to the god himself in his own person, but to an incarnation of him, proves that at the time when this opinion became current Viṣṇu had been promoted to a much higher rank than belonged to the Vedic Viṣṇu who, strange to say, was then regarded as an incarnation (viz. the dwarf) of the Supreme Viṣṇu who was radically not different from him.

The next *avatāras*—Rāma Jāmadagnya, Rāma Dāśarathi, Kṛṣṇa, and Buddha—are of a different kind, and belong to the time when Vaiṣṇavism had become a dominant form of Indian religion, and when the universally received doctrine of incarnation made it possible to imprint on independent cults a Vaiṣṇavite stamp. Rāma Jāmadagnya is the hero of legendary story, the other Rāma of epic history. But it is a well-known fact that in the original part of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, i.e. in Books ii.–vi., Rāma is not yet conceived as connected in any way with Viṣṇu; but after he had become, through epic poetry, the favourite of the people, he was made the object of devotion and worship by being declared to be the incarnated Viṣṇu. In Kṛṣṇa, a Rājput hero has coalesced with a shepherd-god (Govinda) into a new deity; he appears first in the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad* (iii. 17, 6)

as a human teacher who knew the Brahman; in the *Mahābhārata* he is already acknowledged as Viṣṇu in a human form, though frequently he is still described as a human hero. The worship of Kṛṣṇa-Vāsudeva must have been highly popular about the beginning of our era, for it gave rise to the curious Jaina doctrine of the 9 Vāsudevas, 9 Baladevas, and 9 Prativāsudevas, who play such an important part in the hagiology of the Jainas, even as early as some of their canonical books. And in later times the worship of Kṛṣṇa and that of Rāma are the two prevailing forms of Vaiṣṇavism. The recognition of Buddha as an *avatāra* of Viṣṇu is a proof of the popularity of Vaiṣṇavism and its assimilating energy even with regard to a hostile sect.

Most of the creeds which have been merged into Vaiṣṇavism were of un-Brāhmanical origin; *i.e.* they did not grow out of Brāhmanism, but were in the end brahmanized. The gods, godlings, or heroes, whose cult was the object of those creeds, were probably *gṛhadevatās*, or *iṣṭadevatās*, worshipped by families belonging to various castes and classes, inclusive of Brāhmans; their identification with Viṣṇu, which probably was due chiefly to Brāhmans, elevated them to a higher sphere and ennobled their cult. But what principally legitimized these Vaiṣṇavite forms of religion as Brāhmanical, or as in harmony with the Veda, was the adoption of Brāhmanical theosophy as their theological foundation. Viṣṇu (Nārāyaṇa, Vāsudeva) was declared to be one with the Supreme Spirit, the Brahman of the *Upaniṣads*; the creation and destruction of the world were explained in accordance with the Vedānta and Sāṅkhya philosophies. The ascetic ideal is still acknowledged, and knowledge continues to be regarded as an important means of reaching emancipation; but a new way of salvation is now proclaimed, the 'way of love' (*bhaktimārga* [*q.v.*]): love of, devotion and entire submission to, God is the shortest and surest way to union with Him. One of the earliest and most perfect products of this movement is the famous *Bhagavad-Gītā* (*q.v.*), which forms part of the *Mahābhārata*; it has become a canonical text for all Vaiṣṇavite sects. A later authority for them is the *Vedānta Sūtra*, which almost every founder of Brāhmanical sects feels obliged to interpret in such a way that its teachings shall be in perfect harmony with his own doctrines.

Rudra-Śiva became in the Brāhmanical period a Supreme God, the highest god according to the Śaivites as Viṣṇu is the highest god according to the Vaiṣṇavites. In the Rig Veda, Rudra (the Howler) is the father of the Maruts or Rudras (wind- or storm-gods), but no distinct cosmical function is ascribed to him; he is principally regarded as a malevolent deity who by his shafts brings disease and death on men and cattle. A plurality of Rudras, the host of Rudras, is frequently mentioned in the following period, and has never been forgotten; in classical mythology the number of Rudras is eleven, but in addition to them Rudra is surrounded by hosts of spirits, called his *gaṇas* and *pramathas*. He thus appears as the leader of troops of beings greatly inferior, yet similar, to himself; it may therefore be assumed that from the beginning he was the representative of a class, or rather classes, of evil spirits, and that the many Rudras whom the *Śatarudrīya* mentions have all been blended in the conception of the one Rudra, who is present in woods, streams, desert places, etc. A similar process seems to have gone on in the later Vedas and the *Brāhmaṇas*; for other terrific gods, notably various forms of Agni, conceived not as the sacrificial fire but as the destructive element, have been combined with the original Rudra. As mentioned above, the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* states that Agni was called *Śarva* by the Prāchyas, and *Bhava* by the Vāhīkas; but in the Atharva Veda, Bhava and Śarva are distinct gods, similar to Rudra, while, as early as the *Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā*, Bhava and Śarva occur as names of Rudra, and in classical literature they are common synonyms of Śiva. It is therefore a plausible conjecture that other names or epithets of Śiva, besides *Bhava* and *Śarva*, originally denoted distinct deities who were blended with him into one great god, Mahādeva. Thus his epithets Nīlagrīva, Śitikaṇṭha, Nīlalohita, of which the two first names occur already in the *Śatarudrīya* of the *Vājasaneyī* and *Taittirīya Saṁhitās*, belong to fire (as first pointed out by Weber, *Indische Studien*, 1850–98, ii. 20), and designate some forms of a fire-god merged in Rudra.

Giriśa and similar epithets of Rudra in the *Śatarudrīya*, which have become names of Śiva in later mythology, seem to indicate that he was identified with the mountain-sprite, or that he absorbed, as it were, into his character the anonymous mountain-goblins born of the imagination of hill tribes in India and other parts of the world. Rudra-Śiva is therefore intimately connected with the mountains, especially with the Himālaya; indeed Megasthenes remarks that Dionysos (Śiva) is worshipped in the hills, and Herakles (Kṛṣṇa) in the plains. His character as god of the mountains may have made him the favourite god of the people of Southern India; but a more potent cause was probably the 'devil-worship' common to all Dravidians, which prepared them for the adoration of Bhūteśa. For he is also the *Bhūteśvara*, the lord of ghosts in general (*bhūtas*), and especially of those who haunt cemeteries. Connected with the latter are the sorcerers, *yogins*, who practise their awful rites in places haunted by such spirits, and were imagined thus to acquire power over them. Śiva is also the master of the yogins as *Yogīśvara*, and hence is believed to practise *yoga*. The garland of skulls which Śiva wears, the corpse on which he is seated, the terrific shape in which he is adored as Mahākāla, the destructive god of time, death as well as the vanquisher of death (*Mṛtyuñjaya*)—all these items are so many indications that Śiva was regarded first as the ruler, and then as the representative of the vast and various classes of demonic beings who were created in the imagination of the superstitious by the fear and awe inspired by everything relating to death and the dead.

Though the concept of Rudra-Śiva seems to have had an almost unlimited power of assimilating, and thereby absorbing, kindred spirits and godlings of the popular creed, still gods of a well-defined personality or of distinct functions were not subject to this process of assimilation, however like they might be to Śiva in character and perhaps even in origin. Thus Kumāra and Gaṇeśa, notwithstanding their striking affinity with Śiva, have not been merged in Mahādeva.

It will have been remarked that most of the elements which coalesced with Rudra were malicious spirits; still Śiva is not an exclusively malignant deity. Probably it was thought that as leader and king of those spirits he might be appeased, and thus the harm apprehended from his subjects be averted, just as a chief of robbers is bought off by blackmail (Rudra is called 'lord of robbers' in the *Śatarudrīya*). Therefore he is given auspicious names as *Mṛḍa* (cf. Pāṇini, iv. 1, 49) and *Śiva*, 'the Gracious'; the latter has become the most usual name in classical mythology.

Finally, mention must be made of a prominent feature of the Śiva-cult, viz. that he is worshipped under the form of the *liṅga* or *phallus*. It can hardly be doubted that phallic worship was once a wide-spread popular cult in India, but how it came

to be connected with Śiva we are at a loss to understand. But a curious mythological parallel may be noticed in this connexion. Śiva impersonates death as *Mahākāla*, but he is also the vanquisher of death as *Mṛtyuñjaya*; similarly he impersonates the generating power worshipped in the *liṅga*, but he also destroys the god of sexual love, Kāma.

Śiva's consort, Rudrāṇī or Mṛḍānī, is known by many names, as Devī, Umā, Gaurī, Pārvatī, Durgā, Bhavānī, Kālī, Kapālinī, Chāmuṇḍā. Unlike the wives of other gods, she is a very prominent figure in classical mythology, and may be said to be scarcely inferior to Śiva himself. Her equality of rank with her husband is naively expressed in the dual form of this divinity, the *Ardhanārīśvara*, of which one half is male and the other female, representing the right side of Śiva and the left of Devī. The great number of names of this goddess and the diversity of her character (benignant, awful, cruel, horrible) render it probable that, like Śiva, she is a combination of many deities. One of her names, *Kumārī* (Kanyakumārī in *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, 10, 1, 7),—after which the southernmost point of India, Cape Comorin, is supposed to have been called since the time of the Periplus,—seems to be given her as a female counterpart or equivalent of Kumāra, probably as the representative of the Kumārīs who ensnare little children. Malignant spirits are of both sexes; the representative of female sprites must be a goddess, as they could not well coalesce with a male deity. Therefore, if Kumāra be the representative of the Kumāras, Kumārī may be assumed to be the representative of the Kumārīs. Similar may have been the origin of Ambikā, who in the *Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā* is called the sister of Rudra, but in later mythology is Śiva's wife; for *Ambikā* means 'little mother'; and there are superhuman beings, both benignant and malignant, called 'mothers' (*mātaras*), who are connected with Kumāra; therefore Ambikā may be assumed to be the representative of the mothers, just as Kumārī is that of the Kumārīs.

As Śiva is Lord of the Mountains (*Giriśa*), so is his spouse Lady of the Hills (*Pārvatī*). According to classical mythology, Śiva married Umā, daughter of Himālaya; but in the *Kena Upaniṣad*, where she is first mentioned (iii. 25), Umā Haimavatī appears as a heavenly woman, conversant with Brahman. Apparently she was originally an independent goddess, or at least a kind of divine being, perhaps a female mountain-ghost haunting the Himālayas, and was later identified with Rudra's wife. A similar mountain-goddess had her home in the Vindhyas; she was of a cruel character, as might be expected from a goddess of the savage tribes living in those hills. Her name is Vindhyavāsinī, and she too is identified with Śiva's wife. Other names of the latter indicate some connexion with Agni (as was first pointed out by Weber, *Indische Studien*, i. 237, ii. 188 f.), for Kālī and Karālī are names of two of the seven tongues of Agni (*Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, i. 2, 4); and these seven tongues of Agni may be assumed, with some probability, to have been originally female demons representing fire as the destructive and voracious element, since they are also names of Durgā as the object of a bloody sacrificial worship. Finally, a plausible guess of Weber with regard to Durgā may be mentioned. He is of opinion that this goddess is connected somehow with Nirṛti, the Vedic goddess of all evil, by which assumption the terrific character of Durgā would be accounted for. At any rate, it can scarcely be doubted that several goddesses or female demons from different parts of India, and worshipped by different classes of people, have in the course of time been combined into one great goddess, the spouse of Śiva, who was adored as his *śakti*, or 'energy.' In the case of Śiva and Devī the syncretistic tendency of mythology as a most powerful factor in the formation of Indian gods is beyond question; but the same factor has also been at work, as we saw above, in the case of the sun-god, of Kumāra, and perhaps of Gaṇeśa.

The cult of Rudra-Śiva and of his consort, originally, perhaps, chiefly the property of tribes loosely or not at all connected with Brāhmanical society, has in course of time been fully brahmanized, in the same way as the cult of Viṣṇu and his *avatāras*, by being based partly on the doctrines of the Upaniṣads, partly, however, on independent systems of Śaiva philosophy. Thus the worship of the two Supreme Gods, Viṣṇu and Śiva, under a great variety of shapes, represents the highest form of religion of Brāhmanical India; but at the same time some sects claiming to worship the same Supreme Gods are addicted to debauchery and gross immorality, and thus exhibit religion in its most degraded form.

In conclusion, it may be remarked that we have left out of sight the great un-Brāhmanical religions, Buddhism and Jainism, which must be treated in separate articles; yet it cannot be doubted that they have in many ways influenced Brāhmanism. Buddhistic ideas, especially, have been adopted and adapted by Brāhmanical thinkers and religious men, and they survived in their systems and creeds long after Buddhism itself declined and decayed in India.

Besides the elements of religious life described in this article, there were other social forces at work which had a great influence upon the development of Brāhmanism, viz. the system of caste and the organization of the family. But as these subjects have an interest of their own, distinct from their religious aspect, they must be treated in separate articles.

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H. JACOBI.

BRĀHMA SAMĀJ.—1. Introduction.—The Brāhma Samāj (*Brāhma Samāja*) is a theistic reforming movement, springing from Hi duism, which appeared in Calcutta about eighty years ago, and has had rather a changeful and ventful history, in the course of which it has exercised a large influence in Bengal and slighter influence in other parts of India. The name, 'Brāhma Samāj,' is a Bengali phrase which may be tra ıslated 'Society of Brahman,' *Brāhma* being an adjective formed from *Brahman*, a neuter substanti e used in Hindu philosophical language for 'God,' whether conceived as the impersonal Divine Being of the stricter Vedānta or the personal God of Rāmānuja's system. *Samāj* usually means a society that is an organism rather than a mere association. The name shows that the movement has close connexions with the religious past of India. This is true, first, in the sense that much that has b en taught in the Samāj has come straight out of ancient Hinduism; and, secondly, in the sense tha it is but one of the latest of a very long series of attempts to produce a pure spiritual religion which mark Hindu history almost from the beginning.

The Upaniṣads themselves are the deposit of the first great movement in the direction of pure spirituality. The Vedānta and Yōga systems and the theistic sects known as Bhāgavatas, Pāśupatas, and Pāncharātras followed; and the *Bhagavad-Gītā* is the expression of a similar movement in Kṛṣṇa-worship. The modern *Bhakti* movements both in North and in South India, with their literature in the various vernaculars, had similar ends in view. But the impact of Europe, and especially of Christianity, started new currents of religious thought of great force during the 19th century. Of these the earliest is the Brāhma Samāj. Later came the Ārya Samāj (*q.v.*) and other movements of less importance. Towards the close of the century there came a great revival of orthodox Hinduism. The Brāhma Samāj is not only the earliest of the group, but is also a much more direct and legitimate result of Christian influence than the others.

2. History of the movement: antecedents.—Ram Mohan Ray (*Rāmamōhana Rāi*) (1772–1833), who founded the Brāhma Samāj, was the son of a Bengali Brāhman landowner, and received, in addition to the ordinary school education in Bengali, a thorough training in Persian and Arabic, which brought him into contact with Muhammadan thought. Consequently, when he was only fifteen years of age, his outspoken condemnation of idolatry led to his having to leave his father's house. He travelled in Tibet learning Buddhism, settled at Benares to master Hinduism, and, finally, through the study of English and intimacy with an Indian civilian named Digby, became acquainted with Christianity. Thereafter, in 1804, he gave expression to his religious convictions in a pamphlet in Persian, *Tuḥfatul Muwaḥḥiddīn*, 'a Gift to Deists.' It is a brief and arid argument against all formal religions, and in favour of deism. For some ten years after this he held a financial position under Government, and gave most of his energy to his duties, amassing a fortune for himself the while; yet he continued his religious inquiries and discussions in his leisure, and suffered a good deal of persecution in consequence.

In 1814, now a man of forty-two, he left the service of the Company and settled in Calcutta. Fourteen years of varying experimental effort followed—effort spent in the study of Hindu philosophy and Christianity, in the publication of pamphlets and books, and in struggles for social reform. Shortly after settling in Calcutta, he established (in 1815) the *Ātmīya Sabhā*, or Spiritual Association. Meetings were held weekly, at which texts from the Hindu Scriptures were recited, and hymns composed by Ram Mohan and his friends were chanted; but the society did not last long. He published translations of the *Vedānta-sūtras* and of certain Upaniṣads, in Bengali and English. Then followed, in 1820, *The Precepts of Jesus, the Guide to Peace and Happiness*, being a catena of passages from the teaching of Jesus. It is as deplorable as it was inevitable that Christian missionaries should have condemned this most remarkable work, pregnant as it was with prophecy for the religious future of the Hindu people.

Ram Mohan early made the acquaintance of the Serampore missionaries, and indeed gave them both advice and help in the translation of the New Testament into Bengali. Questions arose as to the meaning of certain passages, and collaboration ceased; but one of the missionaries, the Rev. W. Adam, sided with Ram Mohan, and finally became a Unitarian. In consequence of this a Unitarian Committee was formed in Calcutta, consisting of four Indians and six Europeans; and Adam became the pastor and missionary of the society. A house was rented, and Unitarian services were conducted in it in English. A press was founded, and a good deal of literature was put into circulation. Educational methods were also used. Ram Mohan found most of the money required for the work. These efforts were carried on for several years, but with little success. The attendance at the services dwindled to almost nothing; and in the other parts of the work Ram Mohan's autocracy rendered Adam's position practically impossible. The Mission collapsed.

3. First period, 1828–1841: Ram Mohan Ray: Deism.—The failure of the Mission was the occasion of the birth of the Samāj. At the suggestion of two friends, Ram Mohan decided to start an Indian service. A house was rented in Chitpore Road, and the first meeting was held on 20th August 1828. The name at first was *Brāhma Sabhā*, but it was soon altered to *Brāhma Samāj*. Besides Ram Mohan himself, the leading spirits were, first the wealthy triumvirate, Prince Dwarka Nath Tagore (*Dvārakanātha Thākur*), Kali Nath Ray of Taki, Jessore (*Kālinātha Rāi*), and Mathura Nath Mullick of Howrah (*Mathuranātha Mullick*), and then Prasanna Kumār Tagore (*Prasannakumāra Thākur*), Chandra Sekhar Deb (*Chandrasekhara Deva*), and Ram Chandra Bidyabagish (*Rāmachandra Vidyāvāgīśa*). The society met every Saturday evening from 7 to 9. The service was divided into four parts: the recitation of texts from the Vedic hymns, the reading and translating into Bengali of passages from the Upaniṣads, the delivery of a sermon in Bengali, and the singing of hymns accompanied with instrumental music. Only Brāhmans were allowed to lead in the service. Two Telugu Brāhmans were set apart for reciting the hymns, while Utsabananda Bidyabagish (*Utsavānanda Vidyāvāgīśa*) was appointed to read from the Upaniṣads, and Ram Chandra Bidyabagish to translate them into Bengali.

The attendance from the outset proved satisfactory, there being usually sixty or seventy persons present. Ram Mohan insisted that the worshippers should wear suitable dress, and went so far as to prescribe a definite costume. The utmost care was taken to keep the whole proceedings within the bounds of Hinduism. The Vedas were chanted from a sort of ante-chamber, so that they might not be polluted by contact with the vulgar. This was not merely a diplomatic move. The leader was deeply impressed with the need of making the movement genuinely national, and he believed he was restoring Hindu worship to its pristine purity. Yet now, as before, his advocacy of spiritual religion brought him much opposition and persecution. The new society had a very loose organization: there were the four reciters and a secretary, but there were no conditions of membership. The finances were found partly by subscription, the rest being supplied by Ram Mohan himself and the Prince.

It is plain on the very surface that the movement was largely inspired by Christianity. The weekly congregational worship (now first introduced into Hinduism), consisting of the reading of the Scriptures, a sermon, and the singing of hymns, is quite sufficient proof. Prayer seems to have had a very subordinate place, if it had any place at all, in the service; but that is sufficiently explained by Ram Mohan's deistical turn of mind, and by the absence of prayer from the Hindu philosophical systems.

Already the forces of reaction were organizing themselves against Ram Mohan. To fight the *Brāhma Sabhā* and Ram Mohan's social crusade, the *Dharma Sabhā*, or Religion Association, was formed, and a newspaper was published to support the orthodox cause.

Very soon after the founding of the society a site was bought in Chitpore Road, and a building, specially designed for the use of the Samāj, was erected. It was opened on the 23rd of January 1830, a date which has ever since then been celebrated annually by all Brāhmas with great enthusiasm. The Trust Deed of the building is rather a remarkable document. The following extract will be read with interest:

'To be used . . . as a place of public meeting of all sorts and descriptions of people without distinction as shall behave and conduct themselves in an orderly sober religious and devout manner for the worship and adoration of the Eternal Unsearchable and Immutable Being who is the Author and Preserver of the Universe but not under or by any other name designation or title peculiarly used for and applied to any particular Being or Beings by any man or set of men whatsoever and that no graven image statue or sculpture carving painting picture portrait or the likeness of anything shall be admitted within the said building . . . and that no sacrifice . . . shall ever be permitted therein and that no animal or living creature shall within or on the said premises be deprived of life . . . and that in conducting the said worship and adoration no object animate or inanimate that has been or is . . . recognized as an object of worship by any man or set of men shall be reviled or slightingly or contemptuously spoken of . . . and that no sermon preaching discourse prayer or hymn be delivered made or used in such worship but such as have a tendency to the promotion of the contemplation of the Author and Preserver of the Universe to the promotion of charity morality piety benevolence virtue and the strengthening the bonds of union between men of all religious persuasions and creeds.'

Religion was the chief, but by no means the only, interest of Ram Mohan's active mind. He was an eager social reformer, and worked hard against polygamy, and in favour of the marriage of Hindu widows. But no social question stirred him so much as *satī*, the burning of Hindu widows. For the abolition of this inhuman custom he wrote and spoke and toiled for many years, and finally had the joy of seeing it put down by Lord Bentinck on the 4th of December 1829, six weeks before the opening of the Brāhma building.

Now that the battle against *satī* was won, and the Brāhma Samāj not only established but comfortably housed in a building of its own, Ram Mohan thought he might safely carry out his long meditated plan of a voyage to England. He had written to his friend Digby about this project as early as 1817. Many reasons would unite to urge him to go. Realizing to the full the meaning of the introduction of Christianity and of European thought and method into India, he was naturally most eager to see with his own eyes the land and the people which were destined to help so largely in the rejuvenation of his own. There were also a number of questions on which he hoped to influence the Government at home, notably the great problem of the renewal of the Charter of the East India Company. The old Emperor of Delhi, now a pensioner of the Company, wished him to plead his cause with the home authorities, and with this in view gave him the title of *Rājā*. Ram Mohan undertook the task.

Before sailing for England in November 1830, Ram Mohan appointed three trustees to look after the Samāj: Mahārājā Ram Nath Tagore, Kali Nath Munshi, and his own son, Radha Prasad. Visambar Das became secretary. The services were conducted as before; only the day of meeting was changed from Saturday to Wednesday; and this rule obtains in the old building to this day. In arranging to cross the ocean, Ram Mohan took great care to preserve his caste. He took two Hindu servants with him, one of them being required to cook his food in accordance with caste regulations.

Ram Mohan, now Rājā Ram Mohan Ray, was received in England with the greatest warmth and honour by the public generally, by leading Unitarians and other religious men, and by the chief statesmen of the day. He exercised a much greater influence than he could have ever hoped to do; and at the same time came into such close living touch with the best in English life as to be deeply influenced himself. But, to the great sorrow of his friends, he was taken ill, and died at Bristol on the 27th of September 1833.

He was a man of unusually wide sympathies and of large judgment. He realized, as very few men did in his day, the immeasurable results that were destined to flow from the association of England with India, and believed that India would reap very great good therefrom. He also looked forward to India's becoming a Christian country: the exact meaning of this prophecy is discussed below. On the other hand, he realized to the full that no real blessing could come to India by the mere adoption of Western things unchanged. India, he said, would inevitably remain Indian. No gift from the outside could be of any real value except in so far as it was naturalized. His long bold struggle, on the one hand, for religious and social purity, for educational progress and journalistic freedom, and his brilliant literary work and unchanging fidelity to Indian ideals, on the other, had made him not only the most prominent of all Indians, but the one man able to stand between Indians and Englishmen as interpreter and friend.

His death caused dismay in the infant Society which he had left behind in Calcutta, and many of those who at first took part in its work fell away. Prince Dwarka Nath remained a staunch friend, but the chief stay of the whole work was Ram Chandra Bidyabagish, who took charge of the services. Yet the cause steadily decayed. Had it not been for the liberality of the Prince, the current expenses could not have been met.

In 1838, however, five years after the great leader's death, Prince Dwarka Nath's youthful son, Debendra Nath Tagore (*Devendranātha Thākur*) passed through a very decided spiritual change, which made him a consecrated man for the rest of his life. He was then twenty years of age. Next year he gathered a few serious-minded young men round him and formed the *Tattvabōdhini Sabhā*, the 'Truth-learning Association.' They met once a week in his house for the discussion of religious questions, and once a month for worship.

4. Second period, 1841–1865: Debendra Nath Tagore: Indian theism.—In 1841, Debendra and his friends joined the Brāhma Samāj, and the young man was soon recognized as leader. Then the tide turned, and a new period of growth and fruitful labour opened for the Samāj. The *Tattvabōdhini Sabhā*, however, was not merged in the Samāj, but continued to do most valuable work as its auxiliary for many years. A Vedic school, the *Tattvabōdhini Pāthsāla*, was opened, to train young men as Brāhma missionaries, but also with a view to arrest the progress of Christianity, now making considerable headway in Calcutta under Duff's leadership. From beginning to end Debendra wished to be a Hindu, and, unlike Ram Mohan, believed that India had no need of Christ. In 1843 the society's monthly paper, the *Tattvabōdhini Patrikā*, the 'Truth-learning Journal,' began to appear. It was edited by a friend of Debendra, Akshay Kumār Dutt (*Akshāyakumāra Datta*), one of the greatest of Bengali prose-writers, and soon became a very influential paper, leading many thinking men towards the main ideas of theism.

Debendra saw that the Samāj required to be more carefully organized; that, if it was to be a permanent and growing influence, it must have a regularly appointed ministry and definite rules of membership. By the end of 1843 he had drawn up what is known as the Brāhma Covenant, a short series of solemn vows to be taken by all who

wished to become members of the Samāj. The most important of these vows were promises to abstain from idolatry and to worship God by loving Him and by doing such deeds as He loves. The old reciter, Ram Chandra Bidyabagish, was now formally set apart as *āchārya*, i.e. 'minister'; and Debendra and twenty of his friends solemnly took the vows of the Covenant before him. The conscientious observance of these vows involved a good deal of trouble and difficulty. Debendra himself had to leave the paternal mansion and wander in the fields when any of the domestic ceremonies were being performed, as they were full of idolatry. At the same time a brief form of prayer and adoration, known as *Brahmōpāsana*, *i.e.* 'worship of Brahman,' was compiled, and became the norm for the services. This introduction of prayer is a most noteworthy point.

The work of the Vedic school began to bear fruit. By 1844, Debendra was able to send out a number of young missionaries, and *samājes* began to appear outside Calcutta. From time to time Debendra himself also travelled and preached in the chief towns of the north, from East Bengal to the Panjāb. By the year 1847 the number of covenanted Brāhmas had grown to 647.

The Samāj tended to become a Vedic sect. In 1845 the *Tattvabōdhini Patrikā* declared that the Vedas were the sole foundation of their belief; and in 1846, Debendra said: 'We consider the Vedas, and the Vedas alone, as the standard of our faith.' But many serious questions arose about the text, the interpretation, and the inspiration of the Vedic hymns and the Upaniṣads. Duff had twitted Brāhmas with believing in the infallibility of the Vedas. Consequently four scholars were deputed to go to Benares so that each might study and copy one of the four Vedas and might return to Calcutta with the fruit of his labours.

Debendra steeped himself in the Upaniṣads, and compiled from them in 1850 a volume of extracts for use in the services of the Samāj. This volume, named *Brāhma Dharma*, 'Religion of Brahman,' contains what is known as the *vīja*, or 'seed,' a brief outline of Brāhma doctrine in four statements; the *Brahmōpāsana*, or order of service; and then a selection of passages from the Upaniṣads, followed by passages from other Hindu books. Later an exposition of Brāhma doctrine was added by Debendra.

Meanwhile the results of the labours of the four Vedic students had become available. After much discussion the doctrine of the infallibility of the Vedic literature was abandoned, and it was decided that only those parts were to be accepted as true which harmonized with pure theism. As Keshab Chandra Sen afterwards said, 'The Vedas were thrown overboard by Babu Debendra Nath Tagore, and the Brāhma Samāj bade farewell to Vedāntism.' This happened in 1850. The Samāj thus found itself without an authoritative sacred standard, and was thrown back on natural religion. This raised the whole problem of religious knowledge. At first no definite theory was advanced, but within a few years the leaders found it possible to express themselves; and the Brāhma doctrine came to be this, that our knowledge of God has two sources, *Nature* and *Intuition*.

The faith of the Samāj at this time may be summed up in the following six propositions:

(1) God is a personal being with sublime moral attributes.
(2) God has never become incarnate.
(3) God hears and answers prayer.
(4) God is to be worshipped only in spiritual ways. Hindu asceticism, temples, and fixed forms of worship are unnecessary. Men of all castes and races may worship God acceptably.
(5) Repentance and cessation from sin is the only way to forgiveness and salvation.
(6) Nature and Intuition are the sources of knowledge of God. No book is authoritative.

It is noticeable that the doctrines of the Fatherhood of God and the immortality of the human soul had not as yet found their way into the creed.

The Samāj had proved itself a progressive movement; but circumstances were now approaching which were destined to accelerate the rate of progress for a time. In 1857 a young man named Keshab Chandra Sen (*Keśavachandra Sena*) joined the Samāj. He was not a Brāhman, but belonged to an influential and well-to-do family of the Baidyā caste and of the Vaiṣnava sect of Hinduism, and he had received a good modern education. He had suffered from religious melancholy, but through prayer had found peace. For two years he took no active part in the work, but from 1859 he threw himself into it with great energy. Keshab Chandra Sen had to endure serious persecution for the sake of his faith. Debendra took a great liking to this gifted young man, while Keshab looked up to Debendra with love and reverence. From this time they enjoyed five years of strenuous, yet happy and harmonious, work together.

The Brāhma Vidyālaya, or School, was opened—a sort of informal Theological College. Keshab lectured in English on the philosophy of Theism, while Debendra discussed in Bengali the theology of the Brāhma Samāj, with the double result that Brāhma doctrine was more clearly formulated, and a number of young men received a very useful theological training. Keshab's capacity as a lecturer in English became known, so that he frequently addressed audiences both of Brāhmas and of others in Calcutta, in English, and occasionally took a tour in the country.

The year 1860 produced large results in social reform. Keshab formed the *Saṅgat Sabhā*, or 'Friendly Association,' the meetings of which were now devotional, now given up to the discussion of pressing questions both religious and social. The findings of this enthusiastic group of young men greatly influenced Debendra himself. As a result of the reasons urged by them, he gave up wearing the sacred Brāhmanical thread. He also took up the whole question of domestic ceremonies. Every noticeable event in Hindu family life is marked by the careful performance of ancient traditional rites, all of which are tainted with references to the gods of Hinduism and with idolatrous practices. Debendra set to work to purge his own family of idolatry; and also worked out, for the use of the Samāj, new or modified rites whence everything heathen and idolatrous had been eliminated. These are known as Brāhma rites; the manual is the *Anushṭhān Paddhati*; and Brāhmas who use them in their families are known as 'Anushṭhānic Brāhmas.' At Keshab's suggestion the Samāj also began to follow the example of Christian philanthropy, and gathered money and food for the famine-stricken.

After leaving college, Keshab had obtained a post in the Bank of Bengal. In 1861 he gave this up in order to devote his whole time and energy to the work of the Samāj. Several of his followers belonging to the *Saṅgat Sabhā* followed the example of his self-sacrifice, among them his life-long friend and biographer, Pratāp Chandra Mozoomdār (*Pratāpachandra Majumdār*). The *Indian Mirror* was started, that the movement might have an English journal for the expression of its views; and the Calcutta College was founded—the earliest attempt made by a native of India to found a college for English education.

Next year (1862) Debendra resolved to honour his brilliant young friend by giving him the place in the Samāj which his great capacities deserved. Hitherto only Brāhmans had been

allowed to lead in the services; and while Debendra himself was the *āchārya*, or 'minister,' the other two who took part in the services were called *upāchāryas*, or 'under-ministers.' Debendra decided to ordain Keshab, non-Brāhman though he was, and to give him the full title *āchārya*. It was also arranged that henceforward no 'minister' should be allowed to wear the sacred thread. The steady pressure of rational principles, urged largely in the *Saṅgat Sabhā*, had brought Debendra to this notable advance. Keshab had to struggle and to dare before he succeeded in being allowed to bring his young wife, in defiance of all Hindu custom, to the solemn service in which he was set apart as *āchārya*; but his courage produced fruit, for from this time Brāhmas began to give their wives more liberty, and the uplifting of the women of India was thus helped onward. From this time Debendra was known as the *pradhān āchārya*, or 'chief minister.'

Two years later, Keshab took a more extended tour. Among other places he visited Bombay and Madras, and was received with so much honour and enthusiasm that he was able to draw men out who afterwards founded *samājes* in these great cities. His brilliant success on this tour, and the wide outlook which the journey gave him, first suggested to his mind the idea of a Society representing the whole of India—a Brāhma Samāj of India.

But the pace at which affairs were moving was too fast for some of the older members, and Debendra himself began to be afraid that Keshab and the other progressives would lose spiritual religion in their zeal for change. As we have seen, Debendra had gone a long way in the matter of reform; yet there were several points on which his Hindu prejudices had not given way. He disliked inter-caste marriages, and he could not endure the marriage of widows. Then the two men looked at the whole matter from different points of view. Debendra regarded social questions as secondary in comparison with religion, and wished to initiate no change unless it was absolutely necessary. This explains his unwillingness to drive men by regulation to give up the sacred thread.* Keshab, on the other hand, saw clearly that the social health of the people demanded radical change. There were also religious differences. Debendra's was a deeply devotional nature, but he was still Hindu in temperament, and the great facts of sin and repentance did not obtrude themselves much in his prayers or his teaching; while Keshab was keenly alive to the ethical side of religious experience, and was daily coming more under the influence of Christ.

During Keshab's absence on his long tour, the more conservative spirits gained an increasing hold of Debendra; two parties began to appear more distinctly in the Samāj, and suspicion was soon rife between them. Attempts were made to heal the breach, but without result. Debendra was determined to resist Keshab. The cyclone of 5th Oct. 1864 so damaged the building that it became necessary to hold the services in Debendra's house, and he took the opportunity to allow *upāchāryas* wearing the sacred thread to officiate.† Keshab and his party protested, but received no satisfaction. Finally, they sent Debendra what was really an ultimatum. It contained three points, but only one had any significance, viz. the old demand that no man wearing the sacred thread should be allowed to lead the devotions of the Samāj. Debendra felt it to be his duty to refuse; and Keshab and his party withdrew, leaving all the property of the Samāj behind them. The date was Feb. 1865. Keshab was only twenty-seven years of age, and Debendra, who had already been a religious leader for twenty-four years, was only forty-seven. He had still forty years of life before him. At this time there were only a few *samājes* in existence outside Calcutta.

5. Third period, 1865–1878: Keshab Chandra Sen: universal theism: the two Samājes.—Keshab did not organize a new Samāj at once, but spent some eighteen months in seeking to rally sympathy and supporters to his cause. He had carried the *Indian Mirror* with him. He started a vernacular paper called *Dharma Tattva*, 'the Truth of Religion,' in opposition to Debendra's paper, the *Tattvabōdhini Patrikā*. Both were used vigorously in favour of his party. He toured in East Bengal and lectured in Calcutta. Early in 1866 a copy of Seeley's *Ecce Homo* fell into his hands, and greatly stimulated his thought. He was already deeply impressed by Christ; this made his heart overflow. He delivered a lecture on 5th May in the theatre of the Medical College on 'Jesus Christ: Europe and Asia.' It is no theological discourse, but a manly appeal to his fellow-countrymen and to Europeans to listen to the teaching of Christ and to imitate Him. The most notable point in the address was the calling of attention to the fact that Jesus was an Asiatic. Keshab got at the heart of his audience by the appeal founded on that telling fact. He speaks of Christ's 'extraordinary greatness,' His 'supernatural moral heroism'; but nowhere does he depart from the strictest theistic position. Yet the enthusiasm for the character of Christ and the very high estimate of His influence which the lecture expressed led many to believe that Keshab was about to become a Christian. At least one young man was won by this lecture to the spiritual life, and afterwards to the position of a Brāhma missionary—Pyari Mohan Chundhuri.

On 11th Nov. 1866 a meeting was held to form the new society. It was opened with a rather startling religious service. Besides the usual prayer and hymns, it included the reading of passages from the Hindu, Christian, Muhammadan, Zoroastrian, and Confucian Scriptures. Keshab's distinctive ideal, the rising above the limitations of the Hindu system to a rational faith which should give complete social and intellectual freedom, was thus set forth in a way which no one could misunderstand. His immediate object, however, was to receive the adhesion of all Brāhmas in every part of India to the organization which he proposed to form. Hence the following resolutions, which were put to the meeting and carried unanimously:

(1) That the Brāhma Samāj of India be established for the admission of all Brāhmas, and for the wide propagation of the religion.
(2) That this association be bound to preserve the purity and universality of its religion.
(3) That people of both sexes, believing in the fundamental principles of Brahmaism, shall be admissible as members.
(4) That mottoes and maxims agreeing with the principles of Brahmaism be gleaned and published from the religious writings of all nations.
(5) That a vote of thanks be given to Debendra Nath Tagore for the unflagging zeal he has ever exhibited, and the indefatigable labour he has undergone, for promoting the progress of the religion.

Keshab was appointed the secretary of the Samāj, and the further organization was left altogether in his hands. From this date onward, then, we have two societies—Debendra's organization, hereafter known as the *Ādi Brāhma Samāj*, or original society, and Keshab's new body, the *Bhāratvarshīya Brāhma Samāj*, or Brāhma Samāj of India.

* The equivocal position of Debendra's family makes his defence of caste practice the more piquant. They have Brāhman birth, wealth, and high character; yet they are known as *Pirali* Brāhmans, for the family was outcasted long ago on account of some contact with Muhammadanism.

† Pratap puts this event in 1865, Lemard's chronology would put it in 1863, but the cyclone gives us the true date.

As to the balance of the two parties, Mr. P. C. Mozoomdar writes: 'The Pradhān Āchārya had a number of elderly adherents, and his accomplished sons, some of whom were of the same age as Keshab, helped his cause energetically. But there is no doubt that Keshab's enthusiasm and genius drew all the youth and intelligence of the community, and his important reforms attracted the sympathy of influential outsiders.' The new organization won to itself many earnest men hitherto unattached to the Samāj, including a number of outstanding personalities whom Keshab had influenced during his tour in Bombay and Madras.

In accordance with the fourth resolution as given above, a selection of texts from the Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, Christian, Muhammadan, and Chinese Scriptures was made and published, in 1866, under the title *Ślōkasaṅgraha*, i.e. 'A Collection of Verses,' for use in the service of the Samāj.

As Keshab's party did not yet possess a building of its own, weekly services were held in his house in Colutola Street. The closer relation which the new body sustained to Christianity was indicated in these services being now regularly held on *Sunday*; while, to show their continued sympathy with the old Samāj, the leaders still attended the weekly service there on Wednesday.

One of Keshab's chief cares was to form *the Mission Department*. His young comrades, who had been members of the *Saṅgat Sabhā* (see above), became the missionaries. Including himself, there were at this time seven or eight, the chief others being Pratap Chandra Mozoomdar, Gaur Gabinda Ray, Mahendra Nath Bose, Bejay Krishna Goswami, and Aghar Nath Gupta. They were each and all of them attached by the closest personal ties to Keshab, for he had been the means through which they had entered into the joy of the new life. His enthusiasm and self-sacrifice laid hold of them. They gave up all worldly prospects, and accepted a life of poverty, strenuous work, and persecution. But there was practically no organization. Consequently, while each man's relation to the leader was all that could be desired, their relations with each other were governed neither by regular rule nor by personal attachment. In spite of this, however, things went fairly well at first. The missionaries went preaching and teaching in the city and the country, and many individuals were won for the cause, while here and there a new Samāj was formed. But there were frequent quarrels among the missionaries, personal animosities, divisions on principle and on method; and their leader was powerless to overcome them. He pleaded and waited patiently for peace and bound each man to himself, but could not compose differences.

The great breach with the original Samāj depressed Keshab. He was very lonely in his separation from his friend and benefactor, Debendra. This sadness and loneliness threw him back on God. In prayer and fervent adoration he found new strength. He drew the missionaries and many others into his devotions, and with them held long daily services in his house. Here the heart of the new Samāj was formed; here the members were united by common prayer and consecration into a working body. Keshab himself passed into an experience of religious feeling such as he had never had before—not even at his conversion. He had always prayed, but prayer now became to him one of his chief joys and necessities. In this new experience Keshab freely drew from the Vaiṣnavism which was traditional in his family, and also from Christianity. The old Hindu word *bhakti*, which includes both love to God and faith in Him, became one of the watchwords of the movement. Vaiṣnava modes of worship were also introduced, musical instruments, originally used in Chaitanya's propaganda, being employed to accompany the singing of hymns. The Vaiṣnava *nagarkirtan* (i.e. 'town-praise'), or procession through the streets with flags flying and drums beating, with chorus-singing and dancing, was taken over and used with success. In the midst of this tempest of devotion, Keshab drew up a *Liturgy* for the services of the Samāj, which is still very widely used. Another most useful feature, first elaborated at this time, is the holding of annual festivals, when the whole day is spent in fervid prayer and worship. The *Brahmōtsava* ('Feast of Brahman'), the day of rejoicing in the Lord, was first held on 2nd Nov. 1867. So the anniversary of the opening of Ram Mohan's building, which is regularly celebrated by all Brāhmas, became the *Māghōtsava* (festival of the month *Māgha*); and the opening of Keshab's building later led to the keeping of a third annual day in August, the *Bhādrōtsava* (festival of the month *Bhādra*). Nor did this satisfy Keshab's longing for fellowship with God: a little house was found about twelve miles from the city, where he and the missionaries were accustomed to retire periodically to spend the time in reading, prayer, and meditation, under rigorous rules of self-denial.

In 1867, Keshab delivered a lecture in Calcutta on 'Great Men.' It seems to have been meant partly to correct the misapprehensions created by his lecture on 'Jesus Christ: Europe and Asia,' partly to give expression to his latest convictions on the subjects of Inspiration and Revelation. His utterances on this occasion again caused a great deal of questioning and excitement. Debendra recognized two sources of knowledge of God—Nature and Intuition; Keshab added a third—God in history, speaking through great men. It was surmised that he regarded himself as one of the great men he had spoken of, one sent by God on a special mission, and therefore to be followed, honoured, and obeyed. Early in 1868 he left Calcutta on a wide tour, accompanied by a number of his young helpers. The first place visited was Monghyr. His eloquence, his fervid piety, and his new Vaiṣnava methods took the place by storm, and there was a great outburst of religious emotion. Here some of his followers began, in accordance with the supposed ideas of his lecture on 'Great Men,' to prostrate themselves before him and treat him with special honour. Others protested vigorously against this '*guru*-worship'; and a serious division began to show itself in Keshab's Samāj. The leader said he did not wish for these demonstrations; yet he did not rebuke those who practised them. As a result two of the missionaries left him. From Monghyr he passed on to Simla, where Lord Lawrence, drawn to him by his lecture on Jesus Christ, received him with great kindness, and discussed with him the details of a law which he proposed to pass with regard to Brāhma marriages. On the 22nd of August 1869, Keshab's building, styled the *Mandir* (Temple), in Machua Bazaar Street, was opened for public worship with great rejoicings. Several noteworthy men, destined to be leaders, joined the Samāj at this time.

Shortly after the opening of the Mandir, suddenly, without any warning, Keshab announced that he intended to proceed to England. His friends were considerably astonished at his proposal, for, as there was no organization, the whole work of the Samāj depended on him personally, and no one knew how things would get on without him. Keshab arranged in general how the work was to be distributed, the duty of editing the *Indian Mirror* being laid upon Pratap. The visit to England won him many new friends, and greatly extended both his experience and his influence.

He was received with the utmost cordiality, and addressed large audiences all over the country. The Queen gave him an audience. What impressed him most of all that he saw in Britain was the Christian home.

On his return to Calcutta in Nov. 1870, Keshab set himself to advance social reform in several directions. A new society was started, 'The Indian Reform Association,' and five departments of effort were resolved on: Cheap Literature, Charity, Female Improvement, Education, Temperance. Work along several of these lines was started under the Samāj, especially a Normal School for girls, the Victoria Institution for women, an Industrial School for boys, and the *Bhārat Āśram* (Indian Refuge), a sort of club-home, in which family life was cultivated, and women and children educated. A Bengali paper, the *Sulabh Samāchār* ('Cheap News'), was published weekly at one farthing, and did a great deal to stimulate native journalism. In connexion with all this social activity, we must note the passing of the Brāhma Marriage Act in 1872, largely as a result of Keshab's advice and agitation.

Pratap Chandra Mozoomdar had meanwhile been steadily growing in experience and strength. In 1873 he published his most noteworthy book, *The Oriental Christ*, which shows great spiritual insight, and also demonstrates how completely the author's own religious life depended on Christ. The following year he paid his first visit to England, and was very well received.

In 1873, Keshab further defined his position with regard to Revelation and his own place in the Samāj by a public lecture on Inspiration. Inspiration, he declared, is the other side of prayer. Man asks; God gives. Inspiration is not God speaking by fits and starts, but a perpetual breathing of His spirit.

He felt very distinctly that opposition was developing against him within the Samāj. There were three main causes: his autocracy, his doctrine of *adesh* (*ādeśa*), and his attitude towards the emancipation of women. He ruled the whole Samāj as sole authority, and many believed that his lecture on 'Great Men' was meant to suggest that he had a right to demand obedience; the party opposed to him was democratic, and wished to establish a constitutional government in the Samāj. By *adesh* Keshab meant the direct command of God laid upon him by special revelation at certain definite moments in his career. To his opponents these special revelations were both blasphemous and dangerous. They were also eager to give their women more liberty, and to allow them to participate in university education; while Keshab was opposed to both ideas. He feared that such freedom as is enjoyed in Europe would be most dangerous in India, and desired to secure for young girls a very quiet training, to fit them for the life of the home, rather than the same education as their brothers were receiving.

Keshab was only too conscious of all that was going on, and in consequence fell once more, in 1875, into his old melancholy. Once again, however, he fought his way to light through prayer and consecration. He called his followers around him, and, declaring that the Samāj was becoming immersed in the world, called for *vairāgya*. This is an old Vaiṣṇava word meaning 'separation,' separation from the world. He called for new asceticism, for fresh vows of poverty, and himself led the way. The daily services in his house now became longer than ever, and a settled habit in Keshab's life. His followers responded to his leadership as loyally as ever, ready to do all that he was ready to lead them into. A little later he arranged them in four groups, calling them devotees of *yōga*, *bhakti*, *jñāna*, *seva*, according as their chief method of devotion was mystic union with God, love, knowledge, or service. The first three are genuine Hindu ideas; the last he took from Christianity.

But the self-consecration of the central party failed to draw the opposition back to allegiance; and soon an act of Keshab not only convinced them that all their surmises were justified, but led to an open schism. The young Mahārājā of Kuch Bihār, a Native State in North Bengal, had been carefully trained as a minor under English officials. These men were most anxious that he should marry a girl who would be a help and not a hindrance to him; and the proposal was made that he should marry Keshab's daughter. The Mahārājā and the girl were both under age, and the Mahārājā and his family were Hindus. Now Keshab had been fighting against child-marriage and heathen-marriage, and had even seen his convictions worked into the Brāhma Marriage Act of 1872. Consequently, as soon as the proposal was made public, Brāhma opinion made itself very distinctly heard against it. But Keshab believed that God had told him to go on with the wedding; and having, as he believed, received satisfactory guarantees that the wedding would really be only a betrothal, so that the parties would not live together until they came of age, and that the marriage ceremonial would contain nothing idolatrous, he gave his consent. But whether through misunderstanding or through deceit, what Keshab expected was not carried out. He allowed himself to be hustled in the matter, and idolatrous ceremonies were introduced in defiance of his wishes. Keshab returned to Calcutta covered with shame. There could be only one result. He had flouted public opinion and had dishonoured his own principles. The opposition now became insistent that he should be deposed from his position in the Samāj. A meeting was held, but no business could be transacted. Attempts were made to seize the Mandir, but failed. So the protesters, a large body of intelligent influential men, left the Samāj.

The Ādi Samāj from 1865 to 1878.—There is very little to say with regard to the Ādi Samāj; for it was left with only a small group of supporters at the time of the secession, and the lost ground was never recovered. Just about the time when Keshab left, ladies were present for the first time at the Anniversary, and they have since attended the services. In 1872, Debendra gave up the active management of the Samāj, and betook himself to religious retirement, his son Dvijendra (*Dvijendranātha Thākur*) being appointed *āchārya* in his place; yet until the day of his death he kept in close touch with the work of the Samāj.

Statistics.—In 1878 there were already 124 *samājes* in existence, most of them connected with the Brāhma Samāj of India. When the second schism took place, a majority of the provincial *samājes* sympathized with the protesters.

6. Fourth period, 1878–1884: three Samājes: Keshab's ritualistic theism.—Those who left Keshab in 1878 were, as we have seen, a numerous body of men, most of them men of character and influence. Nearly all the missionaries, a number of the other leaders, and a section of the rank and file remained with him; but a large part of the church went out. It was decided to establish a new Samāj. All the provincial *samājes* were consulted; and, with the approval of the majority, a meeting was held in the Town Hall, and the following resolution was passed:

'That this meeting deeply deplores the want of a constitutional organization in the Brāhma Samāj, and does hereby

establish a Samāj to be called the *Sādhāran Brāhma Samāj*, with a view to remove the serious and manifold evils resulting from this state of things, and to secure the representation of the views and the harmonious co-operation of the general Brāhma community, in all that affects the progress and well-being of the Theistic cause and Theistic work in India.'

An organization was sketched, consisting of four officers and a committee containing representatives of the provincial *samājes* as well as of the Calcutta society. Services were begun in temporary rooms, and arrangements were soon commenced for the erection of a building. The name *sādhāran* means 'general,' and is clearly meant to suggest the catholic and democratic nature of the new Samāj. An English and a Bengali magazine were started to represent the views of the society. Only those who were willing to sever themselves so definitely from idolatry as to give up caste and adopt Brāhma rites at their domestic ceremonies were counted as members of the Samāj.

One fact of great importance remains to be noted. The Samāj had many able men, but no single man of religious genius like Ram Mohan, Debendra, or Keshab. Pandit Siva Nath Sāstrī was their most prominent man, but he did not dwarf the others. While the Samāj may not have grown so rapidly as it would have done had it been under a great leader, this circumstance has made the evolution of a workable free government a much simpler problem. Four missionaries, Pandit Siva Nath Sāstrī being the leader, were set apart for the work of the Samāj; and a large number of educational and religious activities were commenced. A great deal of attention was given to female education. On 22nd Jan. 1881 the new Mandir *in* Cornwallis Street was opened.

The creed of the Sādhāran Samāj is the same as the creed of the original Samāj (given above under 4), with the addition of the three following articles :

(7) God is the Father of men, and all men are brothers.
(8) The soul is immortal and its progress eternal.
(9) God rewards virtue and punishes sin. His punishments are remedial and not eternal.

Keshab's Samāj.—During the first two years after the division there is not much to note in the history of Keshab's church except his lectures. He first of all discussed publicly the question, 'Am I an inspired prophet?' and gave a negative answer, but declared himself in the same breath to be 'a singular man,' with special relations with heaven. 'The Lord said I was to have no doctrine, no creed, but a perennial and perpetual inspiration from heaven.' In another lecture he dealt again with Christ, definitely saying, 'There is such a thing as divinity in Christ,' but explaining his words by the doctrine of Divine humanity. The most important pronouncement, however, of this time was a proclamation, issued as a direct message from India's Mother. He thus announced for the first time his adhesion to the doctrine of the Motherhood of God. It was that most eccentric yet most interesting ascetic, Ram Krishna Paramhansa, who brought Keshab to believe the doctrine.

But if these first two years were quiet and uneventful, 1881 opened in a different way. At the Anniversary in January, Keshab appeared, with twelve of his missionaries around him, under a new red banner, on which were inscribed the words, *Naba Bidhan* (*Nava Vidhāna*, 'New Dispensation'). On a table lay the four great Scriptures of the world : the Hindu, the Buddhist, the Christian, and the Muhammadan. He proclaimed the Brāhma Samāj to be God's latest dispensation, His new gospel sent to complete and to harmonize all existing religions, and himself and the twelve around him to be the God-appointed apostles of the movement. Henceforth Keshab's Samāj was known as the Church of the New Dispensation.

At a later meeting the Twelve were solemnly ordained for their duties. They were now Keshab's twelve apostles ; and they met regularly under his presidency as the Apostolic Durbar. Strict vows were laid upon them. Four of the apostles were selected, to each of whom was entrusted the study of the Scriptures of one of the four great religions. Orders were also arranged for women and girls, for men and for boys. Each Order was a consecrated Brotherhood or Sisterhood, and was under strict vows.

But the most striking innovation was the introduction of a number of picturesque ceremonies from Hinduism and Christianity. The purpose was to adapt theism to the comprehension and imagination of the common people. Several well-known Hindu sacrifices were performed in the Mandir, and by means of mystic explanation were harmonized with Brāhma belief. Baptism and the Lord's Supper were introduced, and became integral parts of New Dispensation ritual, their symbolism being explained in accordance with Keshab's ideas. Fantastic pilgrimages to various prophets and leaders were imagined and acted, and belief in the possibility of communion with these saints of former days was encouraged. A sort of Calendar of the Saints was arranged, so that at fixed times all the faithful might concentrate their thoughts on the same individuals. Next year a Mystic Dance was introduced ; and, a little later still, Keshab appeared before his people as a juggler, performing magical feats with tree-leaves, beads, stones, with the Cross, the Crescent, the Trident, and other symbols, illustrating the equally marvellous jugglery of New Dispensation theology. All this eclecticism and ritualistic show naturally widened and deepened the gulf between Keshab and the large party who had left his church.

In 1882 his doctrine underwent a further extension, or at least an unfolding. Christ had been declared 'divine' in his lecture on 'India asks, Who is Christ?' He now taught the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, declaring that the one God existed as the Father, the Son, and the Blessed Spirit.

'In this plane figure of three lines you have the solution of a vast problem. The Father, the Son, the Holy Ghost ; the Creator, the Exemplar, the Sanctifier ; I am, I love, I save ; the Still God, the Journeying God, the Returning God ; Force, Wisdom, Holiness ; the True, the Good, the Beautiful ; *Sat, Chit, Ānanda* ; Truth, Intelligence, Joy.'

He similarly adapted Hindu polytheism to Brāhma belief, speaking of the analytic process by which the idolater selects an attribute or attributes of the Eternal for his particular use, and the synthetic process whereby the theist reaches the One God of the whole earth.

The great leader passed away on 8th Jan. 1884. He was a man of great natural gifts. He had imagination, intellect, eloquence ; and he had in a very high degree the electric personality, the piercing speech, and the dramatic action which make the brilliant leader. But it was not these things that most impressed his followers. What conquered them was his devotional life, his religious fire, the depth and sincerity of his moral and religious nature. It was this that made them follow him through everything, despite all his faults. For Keshab, having won them by moral forces, led them by the passion and strength of his religious feeling, not by any intelligible movement of reason. He had enough insight and imagination to enable him to present a case with great force ; but he was no quiet, convincing thinker, far less a system-builder. His teaching, especially during the last period, is a collection of powerful but disjointed ideas, a heap of sparkling stones instead of a building. He had singularly

little organizing power. In all the work he controlled, every activity depended upon his personal relationship to the worker. Hence, as soon as the personality was withdrawn, the whole combination fell in pieces. In spite of the simplicity and generosity of his nature, there was a strain of deep reserve, not to say concealment, in his character, which caused him trouble with those who loved him most: he did not realize the wisdom of sharing his mind with his colleagues. This trait partly explains the confidence with which he uttered some of his later declarations of belief, and the amazement with which they were received. They had probably been a long time in his mind before he gave utterance to them.

The late Registrar of Calcutta University, Mr. K. C. Banurji, always maintained that Keshab died a Christian, that in the last few months of his life his mind changed. Mr. Banurji was very intimate with Keshab, and he was not the man to speak without serious evidence; his confident affirmation must therefore not be abruptly dismissed as untrue. On the other hand, Keshab maintained such a consistent attitude to Christ throughout his life, and, despite his reserve, was so little likely to change on a point of such importance and not tell his friends, that it is difficult to believe that Mr. Banurji was not mistaken.

Pratap Chandra Mozoomdar was absent on his second tour in the West, visiting Europe and America, when Keshab died—a circumstance which complicated the situation in Calcutta seriously.

In order to complete the creed of the New Dispensation Church, three articles require to be added to the nine of the Sādhāran Samāj:

(10) God is a Trinity in Unity—Father, Son, and Spirit. God is Mother as well as Father.

(11) Brāhmaism is not a new religion, but the essence of all religions, the one universal faith; the Brāhma Samāj is God's latest Dispensation; and the missionaries are the God-appointed apostles of the new gospel.

(12) Knowledge of God comes through *Inspired Men* as well as through *Nature* and *Intuition*. He reveals His will on occasion to His servants by command, *Adesh*.

Statistics.—When Keshab passed away, the number of *samājes* all told was 173. There were said to be about 1500 covenanted members, and about 8000 adherents.

7. Fifth period, 1884-1909: progress of the Sādhāran Samāj.—During this period both the Ādi Samāj and the New Dispensation Church have declined. Indeed, the old Samāj is now almost a family affair. Keshab's apostles still hold bravely on, but they have a comparatively small following in Calcutta, and their relationships with *samājes* outside are not very definite. With Keshab's death the New Dispensation at once became a staid body with an unchanging theology, like the other two branches: the contrast between this period and Keshab's last quinquennium is very marked. When he passed away, the development of Brāhma doctrine ceased. Indeed, a blight seems to have fallen on all three Societies; for during the last quarter of a century no theological work of any importance has appeared, although hymn-writing still flourishes.

The Sādhāran Samāj.—This has gone forward, not changing much in matters of faith or of practice, but slowly growing in numbers and in influence. The absence of a great leader robs their annals of great events; and we need not linger over the various difficulties they have had to encounter in working out and maintaining a constitutional government. We shall therefore merely sketch the position of the Samāj of to-day.

The affairs of the Samāj are controlled by the General Committee, which consists of 63 members, representing Calcutta and the rest of India in about equal proportions. The officers are a president, a secretary, three assistant secretaries, and a treasurer. These, with 13 others, chosen by the General Committee, form the Executive. The general work of the Samāj throughout India as well as in Calcutta is conducted by the missionaries, with their two auxiliaries, the Sadhan Asram (*Sādhana Aśrama*) and the Sebak Mandali (*Sevaka Mandali*). Pandit Siva Nath Sāstrī, though now well advanced in years, is still [1909] their chief missionary. He represents the Hindu side of the Samāj. Beside him there stands a young man of considerable promise, Hem Chandra Sircar, who was trained in Manchester New College, Oxford, and represents the Christian element. There are nine other missionaries. Sita Nath Tattvabhushan, a well known Vedāntist, is their chief educationalist and philosopher. The *Brāhma Vidyālaya*, or Brāhma School, is a Theological Institution for training young missionaries. The Sadhan Asram, or 'Work Refuge,' is a hostel attached to the Mandir; but the phrase is now more frequently used of the group of students and other workers residing in the Asram who form a society for practical service. Their work ranks next in importance after that of the missionaries. Similar societies have been formed in a few places outside Calcutta. Several notable laymen render the Samāj large assistance in the Sebak Mandali, or 'Lay-workers' Union.' The Samāj possesses a press in which its publications are printed, the *Indian Messenger* and the *Tattva Kaumudi*, i.e. 'Moonlight of Truth,' being the two journals. There are 43 provincial *samājes* formally affiliated with the central organization, and as many more in fellowship, although not affiliated. There are 1044 initiated members in all; but large numbers of men and women are practically members, though they have not been initiated. The activities of the Calcutta congregation, besides the Sunday services, are the Sunday School; the Sañgat Sabhā, which meets weekly and discusses religious questions; the Theological Society; the Students' Weekly Service, which, though not organically connected with the Samāj, is conducted in the Mandir every Saturday evening, and draws many students to theism; the Brāhma Girls' School; and the City College.

The New Dispensation Samāj.—After Keshab's death, those members of the Apostolic Durbar who were in Calcutta met and declared that Keshab was still their leader, and that no one could ever take his place in the Mandir. But other members of the missionary body who happened to be absent, notably Pratap Chandra Mozoomdar, seriously objected to this decision, and the mass of the members stood with them. Keshab's family, on the other hand, wished to treat the Mandir and Keshab's pulpit as a sort of family preserve. Pratap, who was by far the best known of the missionaries, and the only one at all fitted for being the leader of the Samāj, wished to be elected to take Keshab's place. But the Apostolic Durbar would not agree to do that or anything else. On the one side, then, stood the quarrelling missionaries; on the other, the members, begging them to be reconciled and to make arrangements for the work and the worship of the Samāj; and so affairs have continued ever since. The old personal quarrels which Keshab was unable to put down, and which were prevented from breaking up the Samāj only by his personal influence, came uppermost, and ruined everything. For a time the laity took the Mandir into their own care, and conducted the services, excluding the missionaries from control, because they would not agree. There have been many attempts at reorganization and as many failures. Once at least the police had to be called in. There has been no open schism, but there has been constant dis-

union; and to-day three competing services are conducted under the name of the New Dispensation every Sunday; and even so there are some members who refuse to attend any one of the three.

The active work of the Samāj was thus brought almost to a complete standstill, and growth became impossible. The New Dispensation counts for less and less in the life of India.

Pratap Chandra Mozoomdar, who was often spoken of as the leader of the Brāhma Samāj, never became the acknowledged leader even of the New Dispensation Church. His name and influence were far greater in England and America than they ever were in Calcutta and India. Failing to obtain Keshab's position, he went into semi-retirement, editing his paper, *The Interpreter*, and writing elsewhere occasionally, but seldom doing any missionary work for the Samāj except when he appeared to deliver the annual address in the Town Hall. His appearance at the Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893 still further widened his reputation, and he was always a welcome speaker on Calcutta platforms, but he was scarcely a religious force in the city. He passed away in 1905. His funeral demonstrated in a very remarkable manner, to one observer at least, what a large number of fine intellectual men were still connected with the New Dispensation Church. Every one seemed fit to be a leader.

Since Keshab's death the fantastic elements of his later teaching and practice have not been obtruded on the public. The tendency is towards simplicity except on one point: the death of Keshab is celebrated annually as the day of the 'Ascension of the Master.'

To-day there are still a number of the old missionaries connected with the Samāj, notably Gaur Gabinda Ray, Mahendra Nath Bose, Pyari Mohan Chaudhury, but they do not pull together. Christ is one of several causes of division among them. Then there are a number of younger men who take a prominent place, especially Prof. Benoyendra Nath Sen, who is a very finished speaker, and Pramatha Lal Sen, who is an acceptable preacher, and does a good deal of work among young men.

Besides the Sunday services, the publishing work of the Samāj and the educational activities are still kept up. There is a hostel for students. The missionaries do a good deal of visiting, keeping the flame burning in families.

The Ādi Samāj.—The history of the original Samāj during the last quarter of a century is very little more than the doings of Debendra Nath Tagore and his phalanx of gifted sons. Yet there are a few societies outside Calcutta which retain their connexion with the Ādi Samāj. The theology of the Samāj has remained stationary since the schism of 1865. Debendra gave up his position after more than thirty years of service. For thirty-three years more he lived the life of a religious recluse; for he survived until 1905. He was almost exclusively under Hindu influence, his master being Rāmānuja. To him ancient India was the cradle of all that was pure in morals and religion. So powerful was Hindu thought in his life, that up to the very end he never definitely told his disciples that he had given up the doctrine of transmigration, as practically all Brāhmas have done. He was never known to quote the Bible, and in his printed sermons no reference to the teaching of Christ is to be found. The direct communion of the human soul with the Supreme Spirit was the most salient point in his teaching. His public life proved him to be a man not only of religious genius and intellectual capacity, but of a peculiarly noble and generous character. His long retirement added to the spell he had thrown over the minds of his fellow-townsmen. By common consent he was called the *Maharshi*, i.e. the great *ṛṣi*, or saintly seer. The bleached complexion and massive architecture of his face still revealed, a few months before his death at the age of eighty-seven, the lofty spiritual nature and the sensitive heart which had done so much in the far-away years.

The provincial samājes.—These continue to grow slowly in number and influence. A few are still in closer sympathy with the Ādi Samāj than with the more progressive bodies; a number belong in doctrine and worship to the New Dispensation order, but a great and increasing majority have their closest connexion with the Sādhāran Samāj. These distinctions, however, count for far less in the country than they do in the metropolis; and a missionary is certain to receive a warm welcome almost anywhere, no matter to which of the branches he belongs. The Prārthanā *samājes* in Western India, though not organically connected with the Brāhma Samāj, are on terms of close friendship and fellowship.

These societies vary largely both in size and vitality. A number have a considerable membership, own their own building, and do a good deal of work. Their activities follow the lines laid down in the older bodies. They have their weekly religious service, usually on Sunday, and sometimes a prayer-meeting besides. Keshab's original *Saṅgat Sabhā* ('Friendly Society') was copied in the Sādhāran Samāj in Calcutta, and the example has been very generally followed elsewhere. It is a sort of Wesleyan class-meeting. The annual festivals are celebrated with enthusiasm. A library and some simple missionary work complete their religious activities. But they consider their work incomplete, if they do not advance education, especially for girls. Some form of philanthropic work is usually attempted also.

It will probably conduce to clearness if we represent the theological affinities of the three *samājes* graphically:

(1) God is a personal being with sublime moral attributes.
(2) God has never become incarnate.
(3) God hears and answers prayer.
(4) God is to be worshipped only in spiritual ways. Men of all castes and races may worship God acceptably.
(5) Repentance and cessation from sin is the only way to forgiveness and salvation.
(6) Nature and Intuition are the sources of knowledge of God. No book is authoritative.

Creed of the Ādi Samāj.

(7) God is the Father of men, and all men are brothers.
(8) The soul is immortal and its progress eternal.
(9) God rewards virtue and punishes sin. His punishments are remedial and not eternal.

Creed of the Sādhāran Samāj.

(10) God is a Trinity in Unity—Father, Son, and Spirit. God is Mother as well as Father.
(11) Brāhmaism is the universal religion; the Brāhma Samāj is God's latest Dispensation; and the missionaries are His apostles.
(12) Knowledge of God comes through *Inspired Men* as well as through *Nature* and *Intuition*. He reveals His will on occasion to His servants by command, *Ādesh*.

Creed of the New Dispensation Samāj

8. **Characteristics of the movement.**—(*a*) *Width of diffused influence, narrowness of effective range.*—The Brāhma Samāj, while claiming to be a world-wide movement, and actually making its voice heard in Europe and America, has not succeeded in extending its effective service beyond India, has made no deep impression outside the province of its birth, and even where it is strongest has touched only the educated class. There is a Brāhma Mission to hill tribes in Bengal, and a Prārthanā Samāj Mission to the depressed classes in Bombay, but nowhere has the movement taken a serious hold of the common people. It is a remarkable fact that in 1901, when the Samāj was already seventy-three years old, only 4050 inhabitants of India were returned as Brāhmas in the Census papers. This, in the case of a really indigenous movement, which has had three men of high religious genius amongst its leaders, is very noteworthy.

(*b*) *Influence on India.*—The Samāj has exercised a very great influence on religious opinion all over India. The work of the Samāj has also had a good deal of weight, especially in Bengal, in the matter of social reform. But the number of those who have been induced to become real theists by the Brāhma propaganda is certainly disappointingly small. The great success of the revival within Hinduism has operated powerfully to check the drift to Brāhmaism; for men are now inclined to believe that they can get as much spiritual religion in Hinduism as in Brāhmaism, and that social reform is almost as possible within as without the camp.

(*c*) *Debt to Christianity.*—Brāhmaism owes a large debt to Christianity. The primal impulse came largely from Christianity; Brāhma methods are almost without exception Christian; Brāhma criticism of Hindu social wrongs is simply Christian criticism; and large masses of Keshab's religious and moral teaching were taken direct from Christ, and still fertilize Brāhma thought and conduct in the Sādhāran as well as in the New Dispensation Samāj.

But the Church in India also owes a considerable debt to Brāhmaism. The latter has done much to open the Hindu mind to serious monotheism; has helped to break down prejudice against Christ; like John the Baptist, has prepared the way for Christianity in more than one centre; and has drawn out of Hinduism into spiritual religion many an individual who has finally found peace in the Christian Church.

(*d*) *Relation to Hinduism and Christianity.*—The official doctrine of the Samāj puts Hinduism and Christianity in the general catalogue of particular religions as opposed to Brāhmaism, which is regarded as the absolute and universal religion. But in actual fact these two religions hold an altogether different position. They are the sources of Brāhmaism. A careful survey of the doctrines that have been professed in the Samāj will show that there is not one which has not been drawn either from Hinduism or from Christianity. The frequently repeated assertion that Brāhmaism is the essence of all religions is without any basis in fact. The Brāhma system is drawn from Hinduism and Christianity.

The next point to note is how these twin sources are related to each other in the product. The most cursory glance will convince any one that the Hindu and the Christian elements stand side by side, neither controlling the other. Indeed, the controlling principle throughout has not been revelation, whether Hindu or Christian, but rationalism;* and the elements taken from Hinduism and Christianity have been selected as being in harmony with the dominant rationalistic idea. The only complicating circumstance is this, that the rationalism has not remained constant, but has altered in the course of the history; under Ram Mohan taking its colour from Deism, under Debendra from Rāmānuja, under Keshab from Unitarianism in the earlier period, from Christianity in the later. Hence the clear distinctions between the *samājes* to-day.

The way in which all this came about is also clear. There were two points on which Ram Mohan and Keshab, the two creative leaders, were thoroughly convinced: (1) that Christ would yet be supreme in India;* (2) that the future religion of India would be Indian and loyal to Hinduism. On both these points, we may be certain, history will justify them. It was in the inference they drew that they went wrong. Believing that the future religion of India would be loyal both to Christ and to Hinduism, they imagined that they had only to bring the two together and the result would be the future religion of India. They both failed to see that essential Hinduism and essential Christianity can no more mingle than oil and water. Had they lived later, they would not have made the mistake; for they were men of open mind; and the science of religions would have revealed the truth to them.

Hinduism is ancient not only in age, but in character. It enshrines a very early conception of the universe—a conception which men's minds have now outgrown. This is to the effect that time and matter and souls are as eternal as God; the world is a never-ending series of meaningless, self-repeating changes; matter is the seat of all evil, and nature does not reveal God; men in the world are spirits in prison, and their only hope is release from its toils.

Christianity, on the other hand, brings us a conception of the universe which modern men can believe, and which stimulates and invigorates man's life in every direction: God is the loving Father; men are His children; the world is God's good world, prepared for the disciplining of His children; progress, not repetition, is the inner secret of the world-process.

These two conceptions cannot be reconciled or brought to act in harmony; the one excludes the other. The history of the Samāj supplies a clear illustration of the truth. Ram Mohan and Debendra endeavoured to keep the Samāj within the limits of the old religion, but the outcome of the history has been to drive Brāhmas to stand outside the caste system altogether and to avoid most scrupulously the touch of Hindu sacerdotalism and worship. In no other way can the health and strength of the community be secured. The Ādi Samāj has withered, because it has attempted to remain within the caste system—has attempted to graft Brāhmaism upon Hinduism. The Christian elements in the Brāhma faith are hopelessly antagonistic to the Hindu system. So Brāhmas to-day are as completely outside Hinduism as Christians are.

Thus Ram Mohan and Keshab were wrong in thinking that a new, vigorous, modern religion could be created merely by placing a few of the leading ideas of Christianity alongside of a few of the leading ideas of Hinduism and allowing the two to come together on equal terms. In order to reach the end in view, two things are indispensably necessary: (1) The supremacy of Christ must be frankly and ungrudgingly accepted. Only

* This became explicit in 1850, when the authority of the Vedas was abandoned.

* Cf. Ram Mohan Ray's *Precepts of Jesus*; the last chapter of Miss Collet's *Life and Letters of Raja Ram Mohan Roy*; and Keshab's two lectures on 'Jesus Christ.' Pratap's position was precisely the same; see *The Interpreter, passim.*

in this way can a system be secured which modern men can accept, and which will produce a healthy modern nation. Rationalism is sterile in India as elsewhere. (2) Christ must be set forth as coming not to destroy Hinduism, but to fulfil it; not as the enemy, but as the consummator of the religion. For, while the basal conceptions of the Hindu system are utterly opposed to Christianity, all the highest and holiest things in it—all that the modern thinking Hindu feels he cannot turn his back on, all that Ram Mohan, Debendra, and Keshab wished to conserve, everything that has vitality and growth in it—all this arose in reforming movements, eager spiritual struggles to transcend the traditional Hindu system. Within the pale of Hinduism these lofty spiritual aims have never had a chance to realize themselves. It is only in Christianity that a free open field for their development is found. Hinduism must die into Christianity, in order that the best that her philosophers, saints, and ascetics have longed and prayed for may live. Thus the truth with regard to the long controversy between Brāhmaism and Christianity is that the missionaries were right in insisting on the supremacy of Christ, and the Brāhmas were right in insisting that Hinduism should not be treated as a weed.

LITERATURE.—The best brief outline of Brāhma history is found in Monier Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hinduism*[3], London, 1887, pp. 475–528. There are four longer narratives: Leonard, *A History of the Brāhma Samāj*, Calcutta, 1879; Mozoomdar, *The Faith and Progress of the Brahmo Somaj*, Calcutta, 1882; F. Lillingston, *The Brahmo Samaj and Arya Samaj*, London, 1901; and Slater, *Keshab Chandra Sen and the Brāhma Samāj*, Madras, 1884 [the first two interesting but inaccurate, the last two reliable, and the last containing numerous extracts from the writings of Keshab Chandra Sen]. For further detail consult the following biographies: Collet, *The Life and Letters of Raja Ram Mohan Roy*, London, 1900; *The Autobiography of Maharsi Devendranath Tagore*, translated from the original Bengali, with an introduction by Satyendranath Tagore, Calcutta, 1909; Mozoomdar, *The Life and Teachings of Keshub Chunder Sen*, Calcutta, 1887; and *Heart-Beats by P. C. Mozoomdar with a Biographical Sketch* by S. J. Barrows, Boston, 1894; the monograph, Sastri, *The New Dispensation and the Sadharan Brahma Samaj*, Madras, 1881; the works of the leaders: *The English Works of Raja Ram Moham Ray*, edited by J. C. Ghose, 2 vols., Calcutta, 1885–87; *The Complete Works of Raja Ram Mohun Roy, Sanskrit and Bengali*, Calcutta, 1880; Keshab Chandra Sen, *Lectures in India*, 2 vols., London, 1901; *The Brahmo Somaj: Keshab Chandra Sen in England*, Calcutta, 1881; Mozoomdar, *The Oriental Christ*, Boston, 1883; the collections of texts, *Brāhmadharma*, Calcutta, 1850, and many editions later; *Slokasaṅgraha*, Calcutta, 1866, and many editions later; the Year Books, the Annual Reports, and the Periodicals.

J. N. FARQUHAR.

BRAHŪIS.—See BALUCHISTĀN.

BRAIN AND MIND.—**1. Historical.**—That the brain of man is that part of his bodily organism which is in immediate connexion with his mind—whatever the intimate nature of that connexion may be—is to-day an accepted fact. That it has not always been so may be seen from the number of words in our own and in other languages which appear to connect mental and moral qualities with the heart, with the stomach, and even with the kidneys and bowels. In early Greek speculation, Alcmæon of Crotona (beginning of 5th cent. B.C.), a reputed pupil of Pythagoras, is referred to as holding that sense-impressions are combined together in the brain, which receives them through certain avenues (the nerves), and constructs out of them 'memory, opinion, and science'; and that the controlling centre (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν) of the body resides in the brain (Diels, *Frag. d. Vorsokratiker*[2], i. 101 f.). Hippocrates also and Democritus were credited with a similar belief. It was partially adopted by Plato, who placed the reasoning portion of the soul in the head, passion in the heart, and desire in the lower part of the body (*Timæus*, 69–72). According to Aristotle, the soul, as the *entelechy* of the body, was correlated with its every part; while the brain was an inert mass, the function of which was to cool the blood for the heart (*de Part. An.* ii. 7).* Galen (2nd cent. A.D.) recognized the dominant part played by the brain as the centre of the nervous system, by which the 'vital spirits' were distributed over the body; but it was in the ventricles or spaces rather than in the substance of the brain that he placed the 'seat of the soul' (*de Usu Partium*, lib. 8). These or similar views prevailed until the beginning of the 17th cent., when the anatomy of the brain began to be more clearly understood through the work of Varolius and others. From this date the tendency was to subdivide the brain, and to ascribe to separate centres the different mental functions; the most comprehensive attempt of this kind being the phrenological system of Gall and Spurzheim (1810). Their system was deficient, however, both in psychological analysis and in scientific proof: they referred different moral and intellectual characters to different areas of the surface—and underlying parts—of the brain, and assumed that the skull with its 'bumps' followed closely the outline of the brain. Causality, Combativeness, Philoprogenitiveness, the Sense of Language, and Calculation are a few out of their thirty-eight promiscuously grouped 'faculties.' A reaction followed with Flourens, who taught (in his *Recherches expérimentales*†) that the whole brain is the organ of mind, that loss of or injury to any part of it weakens its general function, *i.e.* lessens the degree of mental activity, but does not remove any *special* function. It was not until 1861, when Broca published his paper *Sur le Siège de la Faculté du Langage articulé*, that the theory of special localization began to take a new and more adequate form. The researches of Hitzig, Munk, Meynert, Flechsig, and many others in Germany, and of Ferrier, Horsley, Schäfer, etc., in England (see Literature at end of this art.), have, since 1870, gone far to establish the doctrine on a sound basis, although its interpretation is still disputed.

2. General relationship.—The general correlation between brain and mind is established partly by comparative, partly by pathological, data. (*a*) In closely allied animal species, it is found that the relative weight of the brain or corresponding ganglia increases with the complexity of the life of the animal, with its adaptability to new surroundings—in short, with all that is summed up in the vague term 'intelligence.' A striking instance is the ant's brain (the *corpora pedunculata*), which in the worker ant is very large, in the queen ant much smaller, and in the male ant almost absent; while activity and 'intelligence' are proportionately distributed (Forel). The correlation is closer still if, instead of weight, the surface-area of the brain is taken. In higher animals the nerve-elements are massed in the grey matter, the *cortex*, of the brain; and by means of *fissures* and *sulci*—dippings and foldings of this outer 'bark' into the substance of the brain—the surface may be enormously extended without a proportional increase in volume or weight. In the main, also, if animals of different species, but of approximately the same size and of similar *habitat*, are compared, the brain increases in relative weight (or surface-area) as the rank of the animal in the scale of evolution is higher. Nearest (but *longo intervallo*) to man in this respect come the anthropoid apes.

In the development of the brain with *age* in the human individual a similar comparison is found to hold. As the mental capacities improve, the brain

* ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐγκέφαλος εὔκρατον ποιεῖ τὴν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ θερμότητα καὶ ζέσιν (Berlin ed. 652 a. 24).

† *Recherches expér. sur les propriétés et les fonctions du système nerveux*, 1824, [2]1842. Cf. his *Phrenology Examined*[2], 1845, tr. Meigs, 1846.

grows in volume until about the age of fifteen, when it reaches a certain maximum relative weight; after this *development* takes the place of *growth*, the brain-elements entering into more and more complex relation with each other, but without much increase in size or number. From the age of fifteen there is a gradual decline in relative weight. In general, also, a lower value has been found for the *average female* than for the *average male* brain, alike in weight, in surface-area, and in thickness of cortex. This is true even when allowance is made for the differences in relative size of body. Various interpretations of the fact may, however, be given. Lower races also show, on the average, lower standards of brain-weight. Individual men of markedly superior intellectual powers have in many cases been found to possess brains in which there was more than average development of the brain surface, the *sulci* being cut deeper, and having more numerous ramifications than in the normal man. The brains of Gauss and Helmholtz are well-known examples. On the average, 'eminent men' tend to have higher than the normal brain-weight; at the same time some great personalities have had skulls of relatively small brain-capacity for their race; and *vice versa*, it has been remarked, many persons of large skull capacity have been inmates of our poorhouses and prisons. The factors making for development, more especially the all-important one of *opportunity for exercise*, are, of course, co-determining elements with the initial growth-capacity itself. The actual development attained in adult life is a resultant of many diverse factors. It is to be noted especially that, apart from its correlation with mind, the brain has important functions that are purely physiological; it regulates the movements of the body and of its different members, and especially it regulates the nutrition, and other processes of metabolism, which take place in the particular organs of the body. Accordingly, such factors as body-weight, stature, mobility, rate of metabolism or vitality, and plasticity stand in intimate relation to the brain-capacity of the organism. Biologically considered, intelligence falls under 'plasticity'; it is a function by which the organism adapts itself readily to new surroundings or situations, and by which it carries over the experience of the past into the present, to the advantage of itself or of its species.

(*b*) The argument from the pathology of mind and of brain points in the same general direction, viz. to the conclusion that mental capacity on the one hand, mental vivacity on the other, are correlated with the development and with the functioning—healthy or the reverse—of the brain. No responsible physician now regards mental perturbations as anything but *symptoms*, that is, as consequences or effects, of which the immediate cause, whatever the primary or ultimate cause may be, is a defect or disease of *the brain*. The disease may be (1) *developmental*, the result of a defective start-off in life, owing to which the brain does not reach its full growth, or grows disproportionately, or is more sluggish in its working than the normal or average brain (as in imbecility), or is more unstable, and therefore unfit to cope with a great crisis in life such as the onset of puberty, for example, constitutes. The disease may be (2) *adventitious*, the result of any one of the innumerable strains and stresses to which the brain is liable from bodily disease, accidental injury, excessive use, the abuse of stimulants, etc.; or (3) *degenerative*, an accompaniment of *decay*—the wearing out of the brain or of part of the brain in old age, while the body as a whole remains relatively healthy. Again the cases are recognized as falling into two broad divisions, according as they derive from organic, structural defects or changes of the brain, or from merely functional changes — changes depending on the nutritive or other chemical processes in the brain or in any part of it. But mental pathology has by no means advanced so far as to be able to foretell the changes that will be found at death in any given form of insanity: there may be no visible degeneracy at all, and, *per contra*, the brain of a person dying in perfect sanity, according to the judgment of his neighbours, may show marked signs of organic defect. Numerous cases are recorded in which very extensive degenerations of the brain, even to the whole of one of the hemispheres, have been found without any mental defect having been remarked during the subject's lifetime. While this is admitted, however, it only alters our interpretation of the correlation between mind and brain; it does not throw any doubt upon the existence of a correlation.

3. **Elements of the central nervous system.**—The morphological element in the cortex or grey outer layer of the brain is the *neurone*. It consists of (1) the cell-body, (2) the *dendrites* or short branching outgrowths, (3) the long axis-cylinder. There are numerous different forms of cell. Thus, as many as eight different layers may be distinguished in some parts of the cortex from without inwards, each marked by the presence of a characteristic form of cell. The largest are the pyramidal cells, which are most numerous in the motor-zone, and measure from 50 to 120 μ.* In the body of the cell is a nucleus, and often within this can be distinguished a nucleolus. The nucleus undergoes marked changes under exhaustion, as does also the form of the cell. From the cell branch out, usually in several directions, a number of protoplasmic fibres, giving off collaterals at right angles, and ending (as do the collaterals also) in basket- or bush-like masses of fine terminal fibrils: hence the name *dendrites*. One of the prolongations of the cell is, however, of a different nature. It is the axis-cylinder, or axone, issuing usually in a direction different from that of the dendrites. The axones form the white fibres of the brain and spinal cord; each is protected or isolated by a sheath of connective tissue, and a layer of myeline—a fatty substance—between the fibre and the sheath. It is this myeline that gives the white appearance to the nerve-fibres, and it has been shown that it is formed only with the actual functioning of the nerve-cell. Thus Flechsig has determined, through this fact, the successive dates at which in life the different 'brain-centres' become active. The axis-cylinder or axone is the true nerve-process, *i.e.* that by which the excitation is conveyed to the brain from a sense-organ, or to the muscle from a brain-centre, or between two such brain-centres themselves. Some of the fibres are of great length, running in some cases from the cortex down to the foot of the spinal cord. The dendrites, with their shorter processes and basket-work endings, may be regarded as the receptors, the means through which the excitation of one element is transmitted to another.† There is no continuity, according to the prevailing view, between the endings of one cell and those of another, the fibres in all cases ending freely, but usually in the close neighbourhood of, or perhaps in contact with, those of another cell or group of cells. On the other hand, it has been shown that the fibrils of the axone are continuous, passing *through* the nerve-cells to the various dendrites or branches.

The function of the cell-body seems to be mainly either (*a*) that of a nutritive centre, or (*b*) that of a store-house of energy. Distributed between and among the nerve-cells are cells of the *neuroglia*, or supporting tissue.‡ The axones, as has been said, become medullated fibres, passing either vertically downwards to the lower brain and spinal cord (projection-fibres), or horizontally along to the neighbouring centres, or across by way of the *corpus callosum*—the central commissure of the brain—to the other hemisphere. The nerve-fibres are either afferent (centripetal) or efferent (centrifugal), the former leading *to* the cortex from the lower brain or spinal cord, and being ultimately connected through other neurones with the sense-organs, the latter leading *from* the cortex to the lower brain and spinal cord, and finally, through connecting links, to the muscles, the glands, the viscera, or other organs of the body. Experiments show that the direction in which the current of excitation will flow is not dependent upon the *nerve-fibre* itself, but upon the *connexions* at either end. Thus an afferent fibre may be transformed into an efferent fibre. The law of the Specific Energy of Nerve-fibres (Johannes Müller) was interpreted as implying that a given nerve-fibre, no matter by what means or at what point in its course it was stimulated,

* μ=1/1000th millimetre.

† Energy is transmitted *to* the cells through the dendrites, and *from* the cells through the axis-cylinder (v. Gehuchten); Golgi regards the function of the dendrites as that of taking up food from the blood-vessels.

‡ Various other functions have been suggested for the neuroglia. Cajal regards the expansions and contractions of its cell as conditions of sleep and of waking respectively.

would give rise to its proper sensation, or would contract its given group of muscles, or cause secretion in its given gland, whatever its particular function might be, and that this specificity was inherent in the fibre itself. Later it was thought to depend upon the brain-centre in which the fibre ended; but there can be little doubt that Wundt is right in his view that it is the peripheral organ, sensory or muscular, that determines in the first instance the character of the reaction, and that the peripheral organ in its turn has been gradually developed in adaptation to the physical stimuli acting upon the organism, which in their sum make up its environment. This is true at least of the *origin* of such paths. Thus, when an electric current sent through any part of the optic nerve gives rise to a sensation of light, this is because the excitation first runs backward to the eye, and there sets up in the retina the changes which are normal conditions of visual sensation.

The neurone, like all other living substance, is subject to conditions of growth and decay: its growth and development are determined by moderate use, its decay and degeneration by excessive use or by disuse. Stimulation causes first of all an increase in volume, and a change of internal structure; later the cell branches out in various directions, until a fairly active cell may have innumerable ramifications—prolongations, collaterals, and brush-like terminals: in this development may be found the physical basis of *practice*, of *memory*, of *mental growth* generally. The effect of drugs or poisons (with which *fatigue* must be classed) is to cause a diminution of volume, and withdrawal of the processes, followed, if prolonged, by other more radical changes. Activity seems to determine reflexly an increased flow of blood to the parts involved,—processes of waste and repair take place more rapidly; if there is excessive activity, however, the continued flow of blood may cause permanent injury of various kinds according to the tissue affected. On the other hand, impaired activity, as in fatigue, reflexly produces diminished flow of blood to the parts involved: the neurones contract in volume and withdraw their pseudopod-like expansions. This is probably the condition of which sleep is the expression. It is noticeable that unconsciousness appears to arise alike from excessive *loss* of blood from the brain (anæmia), and from excessive *flow* of blood to the brain (hyperæmia), the result of which is probably a check to the pulse of the blood (*stasis*). The immediate cause of many mental diseases also is said to be the morbid accumulation of blood in special parts of the brain (Luys, after Forbes Winslow).

4. The special centres: localization of functions.—The complexity of the grey matter of the brain, its numberless cells, the endless tracery of interlacing fibres being understood, the question arises: What is the precise relation of the neurone to mental function? Does the activity of the neurone determine consciousness, and have different neurones different parts to play in giving rise to different mental contents or ideas?

Since 1861, as has been said above, a mass of evidence has been collected which goes to show that not merely does the *general* health and capacity of the mind depend upon the integrity and healthy functioning of the brain, but that also *special* mental functions or capacities are dependent upon certain localized areas or regions of the upper brain. In particular, it has been shown that the capacities to receive and co-ordinate 'impressions' from the different sense-organs—the impressions which are the physical correlates of sensations and perceptions—are connected with definite brain 'centres,' as are also the powers of effecting or voluntarily carrying out movements of the different parts of the body. In the year mentioned, Broca published the paper whose title is given above (p. 824[b]); he claimed to have found that in cases of aphasia—a disease symptomatized, in its pure form, by loss of the power of articulate speech, without any defect in the general intelligence, or any paralysis of the vocal muscles—a small portion of the third frontal convolution of the *left* hemisphere is almost always affected. It was afterwards added that in *left-handed* persons, if aphasia occurs, the injury will be found in the corresponding part of the *right* hemisphere. Since then, many other forms of partial loss of mental powers have been studied both as to their symptoms during life, and as to the state of the brain at death. Again, evidence has been collected since 1870 (Hitzig) from various experiments upon animals. The methods have been (1) the extirpation of smaller or larger portions of the brain, with observation of the animal's behaviour after recovery; (2) the stimulation of the naked brain at different points, with observation of the movements made; and (3) the study of the degeneration of tracts running between the brain and the sense-organs or muscles, after a given portion of the brain has been excised. More recently, our knowledge of the connexion of the nervous elements in the different parts of the brain and spinal cord has been greatly extended by newer methods of section-making and of staining. As a result we obtain a scheme like the following:—

The centres for consciousness, intelligence, and will, as distinct from the centres for reflex and automatic movements and co-ordinations, are located in the cortex or outer grey mantle of the hemispheres; they are usually classified as (1) *sensory centres*, (2) *motor centres*, and (3) *association centres*.

(1) Of the *sensory* centres, that for Sight is placed in the occipital or hindmost *lobe*, more especially in the parts lying about the *calcarine fissure*; that for Hearing in the first and second convolutions of the *temporo-sphenoidal* lobe; that for Smell in some part or all of the so-called *limbic lobe*,* seen on the internal and inferior aspects of the hemisphere; that for Taste perhaps in the lower part of the *temporal lobe* (but on this there is no agreement among anatomists); that for Cutaneous Sensations—including under this title what is called common or general sensibility, organic sensibility, muscular sensibility, sensibility to touch, to temperature, to pain, etc.—is, as might be expected, the most extensive and least definable of all the centres: the tentative conclusion of Bianchi is that its centre is the wide area lying about (and below) the *Rolandic zone*, but that within this there are various centres of 'greater functional intensity'; these vary greatly, both in position and in development, in different individuals (*Text-Book of Psychiatry*, 57).

(2) The so-called *motor* centres, the stimulation of which gives rise to limited movements of different limbs according to the part stimulated, and injury or disease of which is in man connected with limited paralysis of different parts of the body, lie within the area described above as that of common sensibility; but there are also one or two smaller 'centres' in other parts of the cortex. The principal motor zone is that which lies close to the fissure of Rolando; according to most recent views (Sherrington, etc.), just *in front of* and *in* the fissure itself, but not passing behind it, *i.e.* in the ascending frontal convolution, and parts of the first, second, and third frontal convolutions; also, on the inner side of the hemisphere, parts of the marginal convolution, and of the *Gyrus fornicatus*. It is from these parts of the cortex that the great band of white pyramidal fibres issues, passing inwards and downwards between the grey masses of the mid brain (the *Optic Thalamus* and the *Lenticular Nucleus*) to the lower brain, where the greater part of those fibres which 'serve' the limbs of the body cross over ('decussation of the pyramidal fibres') to the side opposite to that from which they set out. Probably all the true motor or efferent fibres, except possibly those of the trunk of the body, cross over at some point in their course, whether through the various commissures or connecting bands between the hemispheres themselves, or in the *Pons* and *Medulla Oblongata* of the lower brain, or in the spinal cord. Thus injury to the motor zone of the right hemisphere is followed by total or partial paralysis of some of the muscle-groups on the left side of the body, and *vice versa*. The motor zone, like the band of pyramidal fibres passing through the internal capsule, has been subdivided into smaller centres. From the front of the brain backwards to the fissure of Rolando, lie

* *Gyrus fornicatus* and *G. hippocampi*.

the centres for movements of head, trunk, and leg, in that order; from the top, downwards towards the fissure of Sylvius, the centres for movements of trunk and leg, of shoulder, arm, hand, and face. In a cross-section of the internal capsule the efferent fibres lie in a similar order—those for the head in front; next, those for the arm; and, finally, those for thigh, knee, foot, and toes.

In what sense are these 'psychical' centres, *i.e.* points at which physical stimulation gives rise to mental impression, or at which mental activity initiates physical action? The first scientific view, held to some extent by Munk, was that the *individual* cell was the *seat* of the sensation or mental image; images were, so to speak, stored up in the cells, much as electric energy may be stored up in an accumulator, and were touched off by stimulation coming either from the periphery (sensation proper) or from other centres of the brain (the memory-image). The destruction of the cell wholly removed the power alike of sensation, of recognition, and of recall in memory; the cutting of the path from the sense-organ to the cell removed the power of sensation, but left the memory intact; and the disconnecting of the cell with other regions of the brain made the memory-recall (recall by association of ideas) impossible, although the power of sensation remained. Some cells were sensory, *i.e.* end-points at which nerve-process was transformed into conscious sensation; others were motor, *i.e.* starting-points at which conscious volition was transformed into nerve-process. This simple 'corpuscular' theory has no longer many supporters.

(i.) The distinction between sensory and motor centres is questioned. The motor centres were held to be those at which movement might be initiated voluntarily or spontaneously, their destruction involving the loss of such power, while the movements could still be reflexly excited, through the lower brain or spinal cord centres. To the idea of such special motor centres objections are urged, both from the physiological and from the psychological sides. It is now known that innumerable sensory fibres lead from the muscles and joints to the brain, and that the muscular sensations derived from these—sensations of the extent, duration, complexity, resistance, etc., of the movements carried out, or being carried out—play a very important part in the formation and development of our ideas of space, of objective reality, and even of our consciousness of personal identity. If from any cause we cease to feel a movement that is in course of completion, the co-ordination becomes imperfect, and indeed absolute paralysis may occur. Quick, emotional speakers frequently show this in a slight degree; both the 'thick' speech and the imperfect control of the limbs in drunkenness must be largely attributed to the same cause. *Locomotor ataxia* springs mainly from disease of the posterior columns of the spinal cord, *i.e.* the sensory nerve-columns; the patient can stand and walk correctly so long as his eyes are open, but collapses when he closes them; he has no longer any sensory consciousness of the position of his limbs, and therefore his movements are paralyzed. The paralysis that occurs in dreams, the failure of actual movement during them, is largely due to a similar cause; not being conscious of the position of our limbs, we have no basis for movement. Accordingly, the motor zone may be really a *sensory* zone, as Goltz, Schiff, Munk, and others hold; or a *senso-motor* zone, as Luys, Luciani, and Horsley maintain. The paralysis that appears after injury may spring not from inability to *innervate* the muscles, *i.e.* to originate and co-ordinate the various contractions or extensions required, but from inability to *feel* the muscles in play, or to form an image of their position—a necessary antecedent to their voluntary control. It may be said, then, that the whole of the cortex is sensory in its functions; there is no doubt that in development it is closely connected with the *posterior*, i.e. the *sensory*, portion of the spinal cord; the strictly motor centres for the co-ordination of movements would then lie in the cerebellum and lower brain.* On the other hand, neither psychology nor histology offers grounds for any fundamental division between sensory and motor processes. (*a*) Every sensation is at the same time a feeling and an effort, every idea is an emotion and a desire. Consciousness is invariably accompanied by changes occurring in the muscular system, in the glands or viscera, as well as in the external muscular system. Every change of consciousness reverberates through the body, and issues outwards in action, *i.e.* every idea is *ideo-motor*. (*b*) There is no break or change apparent in the structure or prolongation of the cells as we pass from a 'motor' to a 'sensory' zone: the large pyramidal cells may be more frequent in the former, but they are not absent in the latter; the fibres are alike throughout, and it is even possible, as Apathy and Bethe hold, that the fine fibrils which make up the fibres are continuous throughout their course in the whole central system. If so, there is no real centre anywhere—no seat either of the soul generally, or of any special faculty or function of it. There is no end-point at which *nerve-process* comes to a stop and *sensation* begins; no starting-point at which volition is transformed into motion. Consciousness must be a correlate not of the functioning of this or of that part of the brain, but of its functioning as a whole. The action of the brain is equivalent to that of a higher and more complex reflex-centre, like the centres of the spinal cord. It performs similar functions also, viz. (*a*) it isolates the excitations, rendering them both more rapid and more effective; (*b*) it co-ordinates movements with greater delicacy of adjustment to different sense-impressions; (*c*) it co-ordinates movements with more effective adjustment (*a*) to the condition of the organism as a whole (fatigue, hunger, satiety, etc.); and (*β*) to the results of the immediate or of the past experience of the individual and of the race. This is the view which, though in a less extreme and materialistic form, is becoming generally accepted. The 'centre,' on this theory, would merely be an important *junction*, not a *terminus*, in the cerebral system. Its injury disorganizes the system, and does so in a definite way for each centre, just as the break-up of the railway lines at Perth would cause a different kind of disturbance and affect different systems from the break-up of the lines at Carstairs.

(ii.) A second point of dispute is whether there are different 'centres' for *sensation* and for *imagery*, respectively, within the same field of experience. Certain facts of mental pathology, and results of experiments on animals, suggest that the sensory cell or group of cells is distinct from that which underlies the memory-image.† In the case of vision, for example, two forms of blindness arise from disease or injury to the visual zone: in the one the subject is completely blind (cortical blindness); in the other he is able to see, but fails to recognize the most familiar objects (psychic- or soul-blindness): thus a dog no longer recognizes its master, its food-dish, or its kennel, except by smell. The failure to recognize might arise from one of two causes, either (*a*) the connexion had been cut between the visual region and the regions correlated with other sensations and memories, hence the sense-impression could not

* Cf. Donaldson, p. 260.

† See Ward's 'Assimilation and Association,' *Mind* [N.S.], vols. ii. and iii.

arouse its associate ideas—in other words, it could not be understood; or (*b*) the memory-image cells of the given objects had been destroyed, and hence the earlier experiences were no longer capable of revival; or, finally, both might have occurred. In man, the failure to *recognize* scenes and persons formerly familiar (psychic blindness) has occasionally occurred, while the power to *recall* visual images and other memories was unaffected. Hence three *pure* forms of mental defect may occur in connexion with injury to the occipital lobe: (α) sensory or cortical blindness, (β) perceptual or psychic blindness, and (γ) visual amnesia, loss of memory for visual images (while the power of recognition remains intact). Corresponding defects are found in connexion with hearing also, and with touch and muscular impressions.* Finally, either of the two last forms may be *partial* or limited; the most important case of such limited blindness is that called verbal blindness—loss of the power to recognize, *i.e.* to read and understand, written or printed words in one's own language. The part of the brain usually affected in such cases is the *angular gyrus*, and the *supramarginal convolution*. This, accordingly, is described as the visual word-centre. There are four such centres, two 'sensory,' and two 'motor.' Of the former, the second is the auditory word-area (called Wernicke's area), in the first temporal convolution; with it is connected the recognition and understanding of heard speech, of spoken words. The two others are the *articulo-motor* area (Broca's centre, referred to above), at the foot of the third frontal convolution; and the *graphomotor* area in the second frontal convolution. Injury to these centres gives rise, in the one case, to loss of the power to utter speech, in the other, to loss of the power to write, in one who has already acquired it. All four centres are located on one side of the brain only—the left side (except, it is said, in left-handed people, with whom the speech-centres are on the right side of the brain). Pure or unmixed forms of any of the mental diseases referred to as aphasia rarely occur, but when they do they are sufficiently striking. Thus a patient may be able to speak, to write and to read, intelligently, and to hear sounds of all kinds, but cannot understand words spoken to him in his own language. This is pure acoustic (sensory) aphasia. It is obvious that persons, blind deaf-mutes, for example, who have learned to read by touch, and to speak with the fingers only, will have different centres from the normal ones, viz., a sensory centre for *tactual* word-images, and a 'digito-motor' centre for gesture and word-making. The language-centres, as is clear from their position, are merely extensions of the ordinary centres for (*a*) visual, auditory and tactual impressions; and (*b*) the kinæsthetic impressions of mouth and throat or hand movements.

It has been supposed, however, that the different *horizontal* layers of the cortex may have diverse functions corresponding to sensation, percept, and image. Both the psychological analysis and pathological evidence prove that the image is not simply a fainter copy of the sensation; it is not even a 'composite' picture derived from a number of successive sensations of the same kind. Thus, the idea that the image corresponds to a weaker excitation of the same nerve-cell or group of nerve-cells as that with which the sensory-impression was connected is no longer seriously held. There is, and can be, no memory of a pure sensation: memory is of a percept, and therefore of a sensation only so far as it forms part of a percept, that is, part of a complex total group or series of impressions. Again, the simplest perception involves elements belonging to more than one sense-region, taste *plus* odour sensations, visual *plus* muscular impressions, and the like; on the other hand, the same sensation enters into innumerable combinations with others, both of its own and of other kinds. A memory image differs from its corresponding percept not only in *content*, i.e. in containing fewer of the characters of the real objects than were perceived in the direct experience, but also in its *accompaniments*—in the absence of those factors which give 'reality' to the percept, the bodily sensations from the accommodating muscles of the sense-organs, and from the limbs, which have reflex tendencies to action in the presence of every 'real' experience. It is true that what is 'real' to me may not be real to my neighbours, in which case my supposed perception is in fact an imagination: it is for me, however, indistinguishable from a perception, and is acted upon as one, simply because it has all the marks of one.

Thus, the differences in brain structure and function which might be supposed to correspond to the differences of sensation, perception, and memory are the following:—(α) *Complexity*: the sensation is correlated with the smallest group of cortical elements, confined to a small more or less definitely localized area; the perception with a larger number, belonging to different areas; the memory-image with a still larger number. The connexions with motor centres in the lower brain are probably equally diverse, and have the same rising scale of complexity. (β) A result of these factors is the *functional* difference, that sensation, perception, memory correspond to cortical processes which are increasingly difficult to excite, which offer a *greater resistance*, therefore require an increasingly strong stimulus, unless where habituation has weakened their resistance-force; which are more unstable, more dependent upon the condition of the body, or of the brain, as a whole, therefore more uncertain; the reaction or response taking a longer time, being more complex and modifiable according to a wider range of conditions, as we pass from sensation to perception, and from perception to imagery. Being the most unstable, the physical basis of the memory-image is also the most likely to suffer, both from chemical deterioration of the blood supply to the brain (as in fatigue, illness, senile decay, etc.), and also from any physical shock to the cerebral system. So in an electrical system, the more numerous the 'connexions' the more likely is a derangement to occur, and the more serious is it when it does occur.

(3) Some writers have gone farther still in their localization, and have determined centres of *association* (Flechsig), of *attention*, of *intelligence*, or of *apperception* (Wundt). Certain regions of the cortex lying between the various sensory centres, and especially the greater part of the frontal lobes, have no special functions that are determinable either by stimulation or by excision in animals, or by the comparison in man of mental symptoms during life with *post-mortem* examination of the brain after death. If defect is obvious at all, it appears to be general: the animal is stupid, irresponsive, mentally sluggish; it lacks spontaneity, and liveliness in its actions. In man, the onset of dementia in old age, or after some severe shock, is frequently found to have been conjoined with extensive degeneration of the frontal lobes. Again, it is here in the main that the wide difference between the human and the lower animal brain is most marked, while Flechsig has shown that in a child's brain the connexions of the sensory areas

* Thus in Heubner's case the subject could repeat any word spoken to him, but could not understand its meaning. It was a mere blur of sound. His 'hearing centre' was found to have been isolated by a lesion, *i.e.* its connexion with other centres had been destroyed.

with the sense-organs and with the lower motor centres are complete a considerable time before the connexions between the frontal lobe cortex and other parts of the brain are perfectly formed. Microscopic examination also shows that these areas have innumerable connexions with the different sensory areas, as well as with the opposite hemisphere and with the lower centres; the former connexions are the so-called 'association fibres.'

The power of abstraction or generalizing, which is the basis of *intelligence*, consists in (*a*) the summarizing of similar experiences, (*b*) the combination of diverse experiences, (*c*) the bringing of these results to bear upon new experiences (adaptation). The main process by which this is achieved is the formation of a type-idea, a representative idea of some kind, of which the *name* is the concrete symbol or counter. Whether the name be a spoken, written, or printed word, or a mere gesture, is immaterial: its relation to the type-idea, and to the many experiences from which the type-idea has been derived, is the same. The name may not be essential to the type-idea, but it is necessary to its communication and to its development: it gives it the necessary fixity and stability. The simplest assumption, accordingly, for the physical basis of intelligence appears to be that of a hierarchy of cell-groups; group V (visual, in the occipital lobe) is connected with group A (auditory, in the temporal lobe) through an intermediate group I (in the intervening or some other area): the excitation of the whole system, V-I-A, gives a combination of the visual and auditory images. Thus, when I see a bell, the excitation of the cortical area V, on which the perception directly depends, passes on to I and A, and thus gives rise to the thought of the *sound* of the bell. There can be no doubt that the great difference between human and animal intelligence depends upon the greater readiness with which these 'associations' are formed, and the rapidity with which they can be called up. It may readily be granted that in the synthesis of diverse sensations and memories into ideas and thoughts, an increasing number of connexions are laid down between different groups of neurones; and central stations will come into existence between the different regions, uniting them with each other and with remoter parts. In this sense, and in this sense only, the frontal lobes may be regarded as the centre for intelligence; they form the largest or most extensive of these intermediary regions.

Diseases and defects of the frontal lobes are frequently accompanied by defective power of attention or concentration (cf. Ribot, *Psych. de l'Attention*), suggesting that this region is the 'centre of Attention.' It is said, however (Schäfer, *Text-Book of Physiology*), that only 20 per cent. in a large collection of cases of injuries, involving the frontal lobes alone, showed evidence of intellectual deficiency accompanying the physical defect. In Goltz's dogs, loss of intelligence was apparent whether the *front* or the *hind* parts of both hemispheres were removed. In the former case, however, the animal became savage and ill-tempered; in the latter, it became gentle and good-natured. What is lost, according to Flechsig (1896), by degeneration of the frontal lobes, is the idea of the self as capable of action—personal interest in outer or inner events, the power of volition, of directing the attention upon this or that. In other words, the frontal lobes, as Wundt implies in calling them the apperception-centres, represent central stations by which new connexions, connexions based on individual experience, are formed between the various particular centres, by which impressions are grouped and correlated, not according to their kind, but according to their bearing on the purposes and aims of the individual. An animal deprived of the frontal lobes can no longer make use of its acquired skill or experience; it falls back to the level of instinctive action and perceptual consciousness. A human being in whom the frontal lobes are undeveloped remains at the level of the infant in intelligence, although he may, should he live, show the instincts and passions of the man.

We may conclude: (i.) that so far as consciousness is concerned the brain areas are *primitively indifferent*. In the nature of things there is nothing to prevent cases occurring in which the so-called visual area is found to be in the service of the auditive consciousness; as a matter of fact, relatively wide variations do occur in the positions of the different centres.

(ii.) In the course of development, a centre is formed not as a *terminus a quo* or as a *terminus ad quem*, but as a connecting station, by which, *e.g.* afferent and efferent fibres may be brought into relation with each other, according to the needs of the organism.* The evolution of the brain as the great *locus* of these connecting points has brought it about that the principal stations are mainly within the same neighbourhood in different individuals. Organic selection also has determined that the right side of the body should be 'served' by the left side of the brain, perhaps because a right limb is more frequently and extensively exercised than a left limb, while the blood is more rapidly and effectively circulated through the left hemisphere (as Wundt suggests): the right *limb* requires more frequent renewal of its material, etc., which the left *brain* is more able to supply. Hence functions which are not bilaterally developed, such as those involved in speech, the appreciation and production of music, mathematical calculation, etc., are also relegated to the left side of the brain. (Language was primitively gesture, involving chiefly actions of the *right* hand.)

(iii.) The localization is not fixed, however, even for the individual. (*a*) Some peculiarity of training may lead to the adoption of the right hemisphere as the field with which the functions of speech, etc., are correlated, or may cause a dislocation of particular centres.† (*b*) After injury to a centre, and the loss of any particular mental ability, the loss may be made good by practice, by re-learning or the like, and thus a new centre becomes trained for the functions which the defective centre performed. This *compensation*, or *vicarious functioning*, may take place either through neighbouring areas or through the symmetrically opposite region in the other hemisphere taking over the function. (*c*) It must be added that in man this compensation is limited in range: if a sensation area is completely destroyed, no recovery of the corresponding sensibility takes place; but the patient may learn to use other sensations to replace those he has lost, as guides for action. Thus a person who has become blind in one half of the field of vision (hemianopsia) cannot after a short time be distinguished in his actions from a normal individual. In the case of higher functions, as thought and speech, the patient may re-build his knowledge upon new material: a 'visualist,' whose visual imagery has been taken from him, and who accordingly has lost the ability to read, may re-acquire it

* Cf. Foster, p. 1060, on the cortical motor area and pyramidal tract: 'We are driven to regard them rather as links, important links, it is true, but still links, in a complex chain.'

† Cf. Bateman, p. 350, on the variations in the 'centre' for language; Foster, p. 1065: 'The passage of nervous impulses . . . is not rigidly and unalterably fixed by the anatomical distribution of tracts of fibres.'

by using the sensations of movement as his materials, and correlating these with the optical impressions. (*d*) In comparing different animals in regard to the effect of excising portions of the brain, it is found that the lower the animal stands in development, the more complete is the recovery from loss of any particular brain-organ likely to be; in other words, the remaining parts more rapidly take up the functions of those removed, and in this case the lower brain-centres appear to act as vicarious organs as well as the neighbouring and symmetrically opposite centres. Even the apparently complete loss of the cerebral lobes from both hemispheres may not permanently destroy the sensibility or general capacity of the dog. Substitution and compensation are rarer in the monkey than in the dog, rarer and less complete in the dog than in the rabbit, in the rabbit than in the pigeon, etc.

(iv.) When new impressions are received, or new ideas formed, it may be supposed that some new portion of the cerebral cortex becomes functionally active: this probably occurs through its entering into contact with other cell-groups. The undeveloped portions of a child's or of an uncultured person's brain cannot, of course, be wholly *in*active, but they remain simple in structure and form; with use they put out prolongations, and enter into touch with others, while at the same time they become more highly differentiated within themselves; with deficient exercise of a developed cell, the opposite processes of contraction and degeneration set in. It may be added that exercise appears to increase the vitality of the brain, and hence the vitality of the body as a whole (Donaldson, chs. 16 and 17). Capacity for work or exercise depends in its turn on interest, and finally on the will of the subject. Hence the remarkable freshness and vigour of intellect which some men have shown even in extreme old age (Thomson, p. 274).

This leads to the final question, *Which is primary, the brain or the mind?* Does the brain with which he is born determine the character and capacity of each individual, or do his character and capacity, *plus* the environment in which he is set, mould and form the brain into an efficient instrument for themselves? There can be no doubt that, as in all such cases, *both* questions may be answered in the affirmative. A child born with an imperfect brain can never achieve a rational mind, and the man with the most perfect brain will *tend* to be foremost in his occupation (which may be that of a philanthropist or that of a 'sharp') and neighbourhood. But the greatest weight in individual life, and the *whole weight* in evolution, must be laid on the two factors of opportunity and use. That is to say, the mind itself and the environment determine between them the structure of their intermediary—the brain. Consciousness is correlated not with any limited section of the brain, but with the whole brain, indeed with the whole nervous system. We may go further and say that consciousness is a response to the functioning of the whole living organism; and that the mind, through the feelings and the will, is '*dynamic*' to the whole organism; in other words, that the action and reaction we have postulated between body and mind are between body *as a living whole* and mind as a *unity*, as an unextended system of qualitative determinations and tendencies. As de Sanctis has said, 'an idea cannot be the uniform and invariable product of a pyramidal cell (the *psychic* cell of Cajal): it exists only at the moment of its appearance, and for the appearance there is required the synergic concurrence of almost all the elementary activities of the brain, *i.e.* the functioning of manifold systems of all kinds of neurones' (*Fenomeni del Contrasto*, pp. 75, 76 note). Cf. Loeb, ch. 17: 'The cerebral hemispheres act as a whole and not as a mosaic of a number of independent parts.' The anatomical localization of fibres is not a 'psychic localization of functions.' This is especially true of the higher ideas, abstract and general ideas, ideas of relations, etc. The formation, the use and the adaptation of a general idea involve not a single group of cells in the frontal lobes or elsewhere; but systems in different parts of the cortex, some acting with greater intensity, some with less, and so in a gradually decreasing scale, all parts of the nervous organism being more or less affected. The localization of functions means that certain parts of the cortex have by their primitive connexions with sense-organs or muscles or both, and by their use in the life of the individual, become centres more readily excitable by particular forms of stimulation. The destruction of such a centre renders the corresponding process impossible until a new area has been educated, *i.e.* has been brought into connexion with the same sensory or muscular organs as the original area. In many cases this may no longer be possible. A large part of the brain may, however, be destroyed without any gap in the mental field, or any serious defect in the mental capacity being observable. A case is reported in which the whole of the right hemisphere was affected, the front portion being entirely void of grey matter, and the remainder degenerate; yet the only symptom manifesting itself was a paralysis of the left side; this had begun ten years before death (Bailey, 1889 [reported by Thomson, p. 63 f.]).

In general, the *degree* of consciousness appears to be correlated with the amount of resistance which is overcome. Learning new ways is always accompanied by intense consciousness, as shown by the concentrated attention it involves, while it also involves a large expenditure of energy, as shown by the readiness with which fatigue occurs. The more familiar the action becomes, the less the intensity of consciousness, until the latter may be wholly latent, as in many of the automatic actions the civilized man goes through in the course of a day. This does not mean that the nerve-process has been 'short-circuited,' that it takes place through lower, reflex centres, and therefore by shorter paths; it means rather that with the same path the resistance is less, and therefore the current flows more rapidly. On the other hand, whatever increases the resistance increases the intensity of consciousness involved in the action. Many poisons, whether of external or internal origin, have this effect. In some forms of insanity, the simplest actions—speaking, walking, or dressing—are accompanied by vivid and painful consciousness, and at the same time by such extreme physical exhaustion that the patient soon becomes quite unable to carry them out. In such cases a very strong stimulus may occasionally overcome the great resistance, and the normal reaction takes place. Thus an overwhelming emotion has been known to do so.

In verbal amnesia, a parallel instance is that known as Wolff's case (cf. Loeb, p. 281).* The patient in this case could not tell the names of objects or their qualities except when some actual sensation was given him: thus he could not say whether sugar was sweet unless he *tasted* it, or whether snow was white or black, unless he *saw* it. Mainly it was the visual sensation that was most effective; but in general the most vivid or most striking sensation was that which was required to arouse the idea or memory. An umbrella, for example, could be named only when it was seen *open*.

We may conclude, then, that the brain-connexions vary in the greater or less resistance they offer to excitation; that consciousness is a correlate of

* For another case see Bateman, p. 103.

high resistance; habituation, automatic action, of low resistance: and the higher the resistance, the stronger the impression that is required to 'touch off' the conscious process as a whole in any given case. In amnesia of all kinds, the most *complex* mental achievements or the most *recent* memories are the first to fail: thus a Bohemian peasant learnt German when he entered the army; after some time, at sword practice, his brain was accidentally pierced; his German failed him, but he retained the power of speech in his native tongue (Adamkiewicz; for other cases see Bateman p. 188). In such cases the brain-associations which are least firmly fixed (either because of their recentness or because of their complexity), *i.e.* those which offer greatest resistance to excitation, are those which first fail in their functions; and in recovery from the disease or injury the order is the reverse, the last memories to return being those of the events immediately preceding the illness, etc. These are only a few of the phenomena which make it certain that the relation between mind and brain is functional, not structural, except so far as structure follows and is determined by function; that the general function served by the upper brain is to correlate the results of past individual experience, as the lower brain correlates those of race-experience, with present and immediate needs and situations, *i.e.* retention and co-ordination; but that individual mental activity is the essential condition both of retention and of co-ordination; that, accordingly, the brain is mainly the instrument, the means, rather than the cause or condition, of mental development.

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BRANCHES AND TWIGS.—Branches and twigs are used in a variety of rites and ceremonies, and their use is generally conditioned by the sacred nature of the trees from which they are taken, though this is not always the case.

1. Ritual.—In the ritual of primitive peoples, other ceremonial articles being few in number, branches and twigs have a prominent place. Thus, among the Australian tribes, they are used in a great variety of rites. In the fire ceremony of the Warramunga tribe, huge torches are prepared, made of saplings 15 feet long, thickly encased in a mass of gum-tree twigs; while another part of the ceremony consists in the erection of a long pole to which gum-tree twigs are attached. The men of the tribe at this rite enter a *wurley* made of boughs, and sing there for hours. Bunches of similar twigs are also attached to different parts of the body (Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 380 ff.). At mourning ceremonies, widows of the dead man mourn under the shelter of a bough *wurley* (*ib.* p. 521). In these tribes the dead are often left on a platform of boughs erected on a tree (*ib.* p. 517). Further, at the totem ceremonies of the Kingilli tribe, each performer wears on either thigh what is known as a *tjintilli*. This consists of a central stick, about a yard long, to which are attached a number of leafy green gum-twigs (*ib.* p. 198). A bamboo, to which is tied a leaf of the sago-palm, is used by some tribes in New Guinea to indicate tabued articles (Haddon, *Head-Hunters*, London, 1901, p. 270 f.). But at higher levels, branches and twigs are variously employed. Thus in Japan, at the festival of first-fruits, a place for the *inami-dono*, or rice fruit hall, is chosen by divination and marked out at the four corners by twigs of the sacred evergreen tree, hung with tree fibre. In the setting apart of a portion of rice field, two *sakaki* twigs are planted (Aston, *Shinto*, London, 1905, p. 269). In the Hindu village ritual-marriage of Śiva and Pārvatī, clay images of the divinities are attached to the ends of forked branches, the prongs of which are stuck into heaps of grass and flowers (*IA* xi., 1882, p. 297 ff.). The pious Hindu also uses for the ceremony of teeth-cleaning a twig or small stick, which is cut fresh every day (Monier Williams, *Rel. Thought and Life in India*, London, 1883, pt. i. p. 376). Again, Pliny says of the Celts that they used oak branches in nearly all their ceremonies (*HN* xvi. 44). At the Greek Olympic games the victors' crowns were made of branches of sacred olive, cut with a golden sickle by a boy whose parents were both alive (schol. on Pindar, *Olymp.* iii. 60). The Jews, during the feast of Tabernacles, connected with the ingathering of the fruits of the land, dwelt in booths made of branches of olive, pine, myrtle, willow, palm, and of 'thick trees' (Lv $23^{40ff.}$, Neh $8^{14ff.}$). It is probable that this custom arose out of the practices of an earlier cult of vegetation (see § 5).

2. Lustration.—In lustration, branches and twigs form a natural, and therefore a primitive, form of asperger for sprinkling water or blood over the worshippers, or over sacred objects. In such a ceremony their use is doubtless wider than can now be ascertained, as the method of sprinkling is not always clearly reported. At the native baptismal ceremony in Polynesia, the priest asperged the child with a green branch or twig dipped in water, to the accompaniment of archaic prayers (Tylor[3], ii. 430; BAPTISM [Ethnic], § 7). Lustration ceremonies among the Romans were frequently performed by means of branches of laurel or olive. Ovid speaks of the moistened laurel bough sending forth the sprinkled water at the *Palilia* (*Fasti*, iv. 721 ff.), and describes the rites at the fountain of Mercury, where traders sprinkled themselves and their goods with a dripping laurel branch dipped in its waters (*ib.* v. 663 ff.). Among the Semites, branches and other parts of sacred trees were used for lustrations (W. R. Smith, p. 178). Certain of the sprinklings in the rites of purification used by the Hebrews were performed by a bunch of hyssop. Thus, water was sprinkled with hyssop by a ceremonially clean person over the persons and things which had come in contact with a corpse (Nu 19^{18}). Hyssop and cedar wood, the latter probably in the form of a twig, were also used in the ritual of cleansing the leper or the leprous house (Lv 14); and, in the account of the origin of the Passover, a bunch of hyssop is ordered to be dipped in the blood of the lamb, and used to strike the lintel and doorposts (Ex 12^{22}; cf. also He 9^{19}, Ps 51^{7}). In Scandinavia the blood of sacrificed animals was collected in bowls and sprinkled over the altar, temple walls, and people by means of *blautteinar*, or sortilege twigs (Vigfusson and Powell, *Corpus Poet. Boreale*, Oxford, 1883, i. 403 f.; Simrock, *Handb. der deutschen Myth.*, Bonn, 1887, p. 509; de la Saussaye, *Rel. of*

the Teutons, Boston, 1902, p. 376). Sometimes sacred twigs were placed in water which was to be used ritually, as in the Lapp ceremony of baptism, in which sacred alder twigs were used in this way (Tylor[3], ii. 437; cf. BAPTISM [Ethnic], § 7 [5] and [8]). In other cases, a branch is used by itself as a means of purification. In the New Hebrides, it suffices to draw a branch down the body to remove the contagion or defilement (*JAI* xxiii. 12), or, as in Japan, at the new moon ceremonies a branch of *sakaki* is waved in token of the purification of sins (Aston, p. 292). Scourging or beating with branches, whose sacred or magical virtues are supposed to drive away evil influences, is not uncommon (see AUSTERITIES, § 5; de la Saussaye, p. 376; Frazer, *GB*[2] iii. 98, 126–133, 217 ff.).

3. **Sacrifice.**—In sacrifice, branches and twigs are frequently used. In the more primitive forms of sacrifice by fire, the fire is naturally fed with branches. But occasionally branches and twigs of some sacred tree are thrown upon the fire or are burned for purposes of purification or to bring good luck. Instances are found in the burning of cedar and hyssop in the Hebrew sacrifice of the red heifer (Nu 19[6]), the Roman custom of throwing laurel on the sacrificial fire or on the hearth (Granger, *Worship of the Romans*, London, 1895, p. 305; Ovid, *Fasti*, iv. 741), the Hindu feeding of the sacred hearth fire every morning with pieces of consecrated wood generally taken from the *Palāśa-tree* (Monier Williams, pt. i. p. 366), etc. Reference may also be made to the images, made of osiers, within which human victims were consumed by fire among the Gauls (Cæsar, *de Bell. Gall.* vi. 16). For probable late survivals of this custom, see Frazer, *GB*[2] iii. 320 ff. Branches or twigs of sacred trees sometimes accompany offerings; thus, in Scandinavia, twigs were cut from special kinds of trees, and these, interwoven with flowers, were afterwards fastened to the tails of animals intended for sacrifice (de la Saussaye, p. 376). A Hindu instance is that of the balls of rice used in the funeral ceremonies, in which sprigs of the *Tulasī* plant are inserted (Williams, p. 302). Or, again, they are offered as sacrifice, as in the case of the Japanese *kedzurikake*, wands of elder or willow, whittled at the top into a mass of shavings, which are also symbols of deity and fetishes (Aston, p. 191 ff.). Among the Ainus similar wands of willow or lilac, called *inao*, are both sacrifices and fetishes (Batchelor, *The Ainu of Japan*, London, 1892, p. 87 ff., *The Ainu and their Folklore*, London, 1901, p. 92 ff.; see also AINUS, § 23 ff.).

4. **Divination.**—In certain processes of divination the use of branches and twigs occurs. Tacitus says of the ancient Germans that, in order to consult lots, they cut off the twig of a fruit-bearing tree and made it into little wands. Upon these they put distinguishing marks and scattered them at random upon a white garment (*Germania*, ch. 10). These twigs, whether or not the marks on them were runes, are probably connected with the Norse sortilege twigs, or consecrated chips used in divination, and the Frisian *tein*, or twigs, used for casting lots in judicial procedure (de la Saussaye, p. 394; Vigfusson and Powell, p. 411; Simrock, p. 531). For a similar Celtic instance see CELTS, § xiii. (4). Here, too, may be noted the widespread use of the divining rod, a forked twig, usually of hazel. The forks of the twig are held, one in each hand of the seeker, and the twig twists in his grasp when he arrives at the spot under which what he seeks is concealed (Barrett, 'The so-called Divining Rod,' in *Proc. Soc. Psych. Research*, 1897; Lang, *Making of Religion*, London, 1898, p. 164 ff.; Baring Gould, *Curious Myths of the Middle Ages*, London, 1868, p. 55 ff.; see also DIVINATION).

5. **Vegetation-cults.**—Many folk survivals show the uses of branches and twigs in connexion with vegetation-cults. Under various names (Jack-in-the-Green, etc.) and at various times puppets are made of green stuff, twigs, and branches; or selected persons are clad in green boughs, leaves, and flowers, and undergo various ceremonies. These represent the old tree-spirit, or spirit of vegetation, though now no longer regarded in that light by the folk. At such times, also, especially after the ceremony of 'carrying out death,' boughs are cut and brought home to the village, and these have also some connexion with the spirit of vegetation. Many instances of these are collected by Frazer (*GB*[2] i. 214 ff., ii. 82 ff.) and by Grimm (*Teut. Myth.* pp. 769, 772, 775, 784 ff.). The power of the tree-spirit is communicated also to the fields by placing a branch in the furrow, or by carrying branches round the fields, and it is also conveyed to houses which are decked with branches at the times of the old pagan festivals, May-day and Midsummer, and, under Christian influences, at Christmas—probably a survival of the practice at the festival which began the winter season (Elworthy, *The Evil Eye*, London, 1895, p. 103; Brand, *Popular Antiquities*, London, 1870, i. 71, 121, 125, 173, 174, 246 f., 288 ff.; Grimm, pp. 778, 786; *GB*[2] iii. 276 f.; for decking houses at weddings and funerals, and for Palm Sunday customs, see Brand, i. 71, ii. 71 ff., 175). The connexion of the branch with the vegetation- or fertility-spirit is seen in an Irish instance when a bough set up on the house on May-day is supposed to produce plenty of milk during the summer (Brand, i. 131). Branches or twigs from trees regarded as sacred, the rowan, the elder, etc., were placed on houses, stables, sheepfolds, and barns as a protection against evil spirits, witches, and other evil influences. They were also placed in boats, or carried on the person as a talisman. These practices occur very widely in modern European folk custom (*GB*[2] iii. 132, 261, 265; Elworthy, p. 347; Brand, i. 151; MacCulloch, *The Misty Isle of Skye*, Edinburgh, 1905, p. 237). But that it is derived from ancient paganism is shown by similar practices among pagan peoples (Ovid, *Fasti*, iv. 721 ff., vi. 151 ff.; de la Saussaye, p. 376 f. [Scandinavians]; Monier Williams, p. 296 [Hindus]; for the Parsi custom see BARSOM). The Midsummer and other bonfires, as well as the need fire, were fed by branches, twigs, and leaves of oak, especially in Celtic and Teutonic districts (Grimm, p. 605); in the case of need fires, nine sorts of wood were used in Sweden and elsewhere (Grimm, p. 607; *GB*[2] iii. 270, and *passim*). Through these fires cattle were driven, and burning brands or branches were carried through the fields or villages, and set up in the fields (*GB*[2] iii. 313; Brand, i. 215; Grimm, p. 621; de la Saussaye, p. 375 ff.). New fires were lit on the hearth with blazing brands from these fires or with branches lit at their flames (*GB*[2] iii. 245). Brands were also taken from the bonfires and kept in houses or in cattle-sheds, as preservatives against thunder and lightning, fire, and other evils, or were carried about for luck (*ib.* p. 254 ff.). In some cases walnut branches are carried by the people in procession round the fire or passed over it, and then placed on the cattle-sheds, or the backs of cattle are singed with a hazel-twig lit at the fire, or birch boughs are thrown into the fire, in Russia, to cause the flax to grow to the height of the boughs (*ib.* pp. 275, 284, 291). The fires are sun-charms, and the brands have the virtues of the fire and the sun, which they impart to field, house, or hearth, promoting growth of crops, warding off evils, bringing luck, etc.

Connected with the cult of sacred trees was the practice of hanging sacrificial offerings upon their

branches. This practice has occurred wherever tree-worship is found, or where worship took place in sacred groves (see art. TREES; and, for particular instances from South America, New Zealand, and among the Dayaks, cf. Tylor[3], ii. 223 f.; for the Semites, cf. W. R. Smith, p. 169; for the Scandinavians, cf. de la Saussaye, p. 356; and for the Celts, Jullian, *Recherches sur la Religion gauloise*, Bordeaux, 1903, p. 55). Among the Japanese, presents to a superior were delivered attached to the branch of a tree (Aston, p. 215).

In the ritual of healing at sacred wells, a rag which has been in contact with the patient, or part of his clothing, is hung on the branches of a sacred tree near the well, either as an offering or as a magical means of conveying the disease to the tree or of bringing the sufferer within the healing influence of the tree-spirit (see Tylor[3], ii. 150; Brand, iii. 10). Sacred wells are also decked with green boughs on certain occasions, *e.g.* Holy Thursday and the day of the saint to whom the well is dedicated (Brand, iii. 9).

Where sacred trees are venerated, either in actual cult or in late folk-survivals, it is considered sacrilegious to break even a twig from them. To do so will be followed by a punishment, misfortune, or ill-luck. The same is true of trees growing on graves (Tylor[3], ii. 115 [Malagasy]; W. R. Smith, p. 169 [Semites]; Elworthy, p. 99 [Livonians]; Brand, iii. 13 [Celts]; Mackenzie, *Ten Years North of the Orange River*, Edinburgh, 1871 [Bechuanas]).

Branches are also used in rain magic in a variety of ways, probably because the tree-spirit was originally believed to have influence over the weather. Thus, among the Congo people, mounds are covered with branches of trees and fetish-ornaments. Round these mounds a priest walks, muttering incantations (Reade, *Savage Africa*, London, 1863, p. 363). Pausanias mentions a temple on Mt. Lycæum, whose priest had power to produce rain by throwing an oak branch into a fountain (viii. 38). In Gaul, a naked virgin standing up to her knees in the river was asperged by her companions with branches dipped in the water, as a charm to produce rain (Grimm, p. 593).

The ceremonial cutting of the mistletoe from the oak by the druids, and its use in magico-medical rites, are described by Pliny (*HN* xvi. 44). Frazer connects this rite with the Scandinavian myth of Balder, slain by the mistletoe, and with the plucking of the bough from a tree in the sacred grove by the slayer and successor of the priest of Nemi. The mistletoe was regarded as the soul of the oak, and had to be plucked before the tree, in which dwelt the spirit of vegetation, could be destroyed, or the human representative of the same spirit could be slain (*GB*[2] iii. 446 ff.; FESTIVALS [Celtic]). Mistletoe is also ceremonially plucked in modern folk-custom in Scandinavia, and elsewhere in Europe (*ib.* p. 343). For the bough which had to be plucked by Æneas, before his descent to the under world, see Virgil, *Æneid*, vi. 203 ff.; and for the magic silver boughs of Celtic myth with their precious fruits, see BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Celtic).

See also BARSOM.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given fully throughout the article. J. A. MACCULLOCH.

BRAWLING.—The word 'brawling' is technically used in English Law for the offence of quarrelling or creating a disturbance in a place of worship, churchyard, or burial-ground. The word is derived from the French *brailler*, 'to be noisy,' which gives the main idea of the term, viz. the disturbing of people at their devotions.

1. **Legal.**—Brawling is a branch of sacrilege, though the latter term is now usually confined to the robbery of churches. The punishment for sacrilege in most countries up to the date of the French Revolution, and later, was death. In England, sacrilege involving the taking of goods from a church or chapel remained a capital offence till 1835, being abolished by statute 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 81. Brawling, however, had always been treated more leniently. The most vindictive of the English 'brawling' statutes requires merely that the offender shall be adjudged to have one of his ears cut off, or (what a comment on the customs of the period!), if he have no ears, to be marked and burned in the cheek with a hot iron having the letter F, whereby he may be known and taken for a fray-maker and fighter; in addition, of course, to the usual excommunication.

With reference to this law, it must be said that the Act was passed in 1552, a time of great religious disturbance, when the change of religion was taking place in England, and that there had been a good deal of open fighting with weapons, even in churches; so that strong measures were necessary. It must also be said that these barbarous penalties applied only to persons who actually smote with a weapon or drew a weapon with intent to smite. Those who merely 'smote' without weapons, or only 'chided,' received much lighter punishment.

This Act (5 & 6 Edw. VI. c. 4) remained on the statute-book till 1829, in company with many other statutes of our Draconian code. The principle, however, still exists that disturbances in sacred places deserve greater punishment than those occurring elsewhere; in fact, some acts of disturbance which are commendable if done in another place are criminal if performed in church; for example, arrests by virtue of legal process. This principle seems to be recognized in all countries, and in France during the Revolution protection was extended to religious services of all kinds.

In England, at present, brawling by a layman, which by the Act of 1860 (23 & 24 Vict. c. 32) is defined as being riotous, violent, or indecent behaviour in a place of worship (as also molestation of a minister while celebrating any divine service in church), is no longer punishable by the ecclesiastical courts, but as a civil offence it is a misdemeanour under several statutes. The penalty under 52 Geo. III. c. 155 is £40; under 23 & 24 Vict. c. 32, £5. The statute 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100 § 36 enacts as follows:

'Whosoever shall, by threats or force, obstruct or prevent, or endeavour to obstruct or prevent, any clergyman or other minister in or from celebrating divine service or otherwise officiating in any church, chapel, meeting-house, or other place of divine worship, or in or from the performance of his duty in the lawful burial of the dead in any churchyard or other burial-place, or shall strike or offer any violence to, or shall, upon any civil process, or under the pretence of executing any civil process, arrest any clergyman or other minister who is engaged in, or to the knowledge of the offender is about to engage in, any of the rites or duties aforesaid, or who, to the knowledge of the offender, shall be going to perform the same or returning from the performance thereof, is guilty of a misdemeanour, and, being convicted thereof, is liable to two years' imprisonment with or without hard labour.'

The offender may also be fined and required to give sureties (*ib.* § 71).

Also, by the Burial Law Amendment Act, 1880, provision is made to prevent improper conduct at burials.

Under 23 & 24 Vict. c. 32, any constable or churchwarden of the parish has power to apprehend the offender and take him before a justice. There is an appeal to Quarter Sessions from a conviction under this Act.

A man may be convicted for brawling, although acting in the *bona fide* assertion of a claim of right, and that independently of the question whether the claim is a good one or not (*Asher* v. *Calcraft* [1887], 18 Q.B.D. 607).

It was held, by London Quarter Sessions, that under this Act the behaviour must be really riotous, violent, or indecent; mere protests in words are not sufficient.

In a case where in a Church of England church a crucifix was placed on the altar steps and the congregation crawled up, two by two, to kiss it, and a person present took up the crucifix and said (holding it above his head) in a loud voice: 'In the name of God I protest against this idolatry,' it was held that violent conduct or brawling was not proved (*Kensit* v. *Ross* [1898], 62 J.P. 489).

But, on the other hand, in a case which went to the Divisional Court, where, in answer to the invitation in the ordination service a statement was read in a perfectly orderly manner, this

was nevertheless held to be brawling (*Kensit* v. *St. Paul's Chapter* [1905], 2 K.B. 249).

A minister of religion can commit the offence of brawling as well as a layman (*Vallancey* v. *Fletcher* [1897], 1 Q.B. 265), and may, if a minister of the Church of England, be punished in the ecclesiastical instead of in the civil court (*Girt* v. *Fillingham* [1901], P. 176). This is obvious if he indulges in an open quarrel or wordy warfare in the sacred place; but he also commits the offence if he uses violent language, unsuitable to public worship, either in the course of his sermon or at any other part of the service, or 'improves the occasion' against individual members of the congregation in a violent or scolding manner.

Instances of this have come before the courts in the case of clergymen of the Church of England, who are strictly bound (during prayers), by the Acts of Uniformity, to the words prescribed for use. Thus in one case a clergyman interpolated, when reading the lesson, the following: 'I have been accused by some ill-natured neighbour of making alterations in the service; I have done so now and shall do so again, so mark.' In another case the clergyman paused in the service to deliver a long address in a chiding, quarrelsome, and brawling manner, in which passages like the following appeared: 'You were perhaps surprised at the pause I made at the end of the prayer [in the Litany], but it reminded me of my enemies.' 'Some one in the congregation has had the audacity to write to the archdeacon.' 'Who has had the audacity to do this?' 'Some one has committed perjury against me.' 'Another of my enemies has written a letter to the bishop full of falsehoods.' Such conduct is punishable.

The object of the laws of England is well put by Sir John Nicholl in the case of *Palmer* v. *Roffey*, 2 Addams 144. It is to protect the sanctity of those places and their appurtenances set apart for the worship of the Supreme Being and for the repose of the dead, in which nothing but religious awe and Christian goodwill between men should prevail, and to prevent them from being converted with impunity into scenes of human passion and malice, of disturbance and violence. The sacredness of the place being thus the object of this protecting law, it is no part of a legal inquiry, when more than one person is implicated in the transaction, which of the two persons so implicated is more to blame or which of them began the quarrel. Each who engages in it violates the law; each is bound to abstain from quarrelling, chiding, or brawling in the sacred place. Therefore, as Blackstone (*Commentaries*, iv. 145) says, 'mere quarrelsome words, which are neither an affray nor an offence in any other place, are penal here.'

Churchwardens, however, and also constables may, for the purpose of maintaining order during Divine service, eject disturbers; and churchwardens may take off a person's hat if, on being asked, he refuses to remove it; and, it has been said, may whip boys who play in church during or immediately before service. But such action might be attended with awkward consequences in these days (*Burton* v. *Henson* [1842], 10 M. & W. 108; *Worth* v. *Terrington* [1845], 13 M. & W. 781; the Church of England canons of 1604, Nos. 19, 85, and 111 may also be consulted). It has, however, been decided that a churchwarden has no right forcibly to prevent an inhabitant from entering the church for the purpose of attending service, on the ground that in his opinion there is no room (*Taylor* v. *Timson* [1888], 20 Q.B.D. 671).

2. Ethical.—From the ethical point of view there may be considerable difference of opinion on the question, Is brawling, that is, the disturbance of other people's worship, under any circumstances justifiable? The answer will depend largely on the view taken of the ethical standard of right and wrong. Those who think that the law of the particular country is the only standard, and must be obeyed, can easily answer this question. The laws of many civilized countries now protect all public worship from disturbance and all ministers of religion from molestation, and the answer in those countries would be—No.

Those who find the will of the Deity expressed in the Bible, and regard this as the ultimate standard, have a more difficult task. It is undoubted that many instances of 'brawling' are commended in Holy Writ. For example, there is the case of Moses, who at a 'feast to the Lord' (Ex. 32^5) took the golden calf which the Israelites had made, and burnt it in the fire, and ground it to powder and strewed it upon the water, and made the children of Israel to drink of it (v.^{20}). Further OT examples are numerous—the destruction of the high places and the altars of the priests of Baal at various times; and of the brazen serpent by king Hezekiah. It is true these cases raise points as to the rights of heads of States. But from the abstract point of view they involve questions of sacrilege and brawling.

To come to the NT, we may mention (with all reverence) the action of Jesus Christ, who went into the temple of God and cast out all them that sold and bought there, overthrowing the tables of the money-changers and of them that sold doves. These people were in the house of God by lawful authority; the doves were no doubt required for sacrifice. Our Lord's reason was founded on the law: 'It is written,' He said, 'my house shall be called the house of prayer; but ye have made it a den of thieves.' Such a plea would not be admitted in a modern court of justice. It is a clear case of 'brawling' according to modern ideas.

The third point of view is that of people who think that the law of their particular Church or sect is the ultimate test. The Church of Rome has undoubtedly taught, and its adherents have acted on the opinion, that it is proper not only to disturb devotions which are contrary to its tenets, but also to molest and even to put to death ministers of religion and others who teach doctrines inconsistent with theirs. Members of religious bodies of this type would undoubtedly hold that 'brawling' at the command of their religious superiors is not only justifiable, but virtuous. Their sense of duty is of that kind which would burn the body to save the soul.

Lastly, there is the point of view of those who think that the ethical standard is a certain fitness, suitability, or propriety in actions as determined by our understanding or reason (Bain, *Mental and Moral Science*, p. 430) or, in Kant's words, that people should act in such a way that their conduct might be a law to all beings. It is conceived that all those who hold this view would approve of the laws of England practically as they now stand; that is, that, although a person may be constrained by an overpowering sense of duty to put down false religion, illegality, and wrong, he must not take the law into his own hands, and act so as to disturb, annoy, or injure his fellow-men. *Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.*

LITERATURE.—Most of the law-books deal with brawling, but not completely: amongst others, B. Whitehead, *Church Law*[2], London 1899, and Lord Halsbury, Laws of England, 1909. Stephens' *Laws relating to the Clergy*, London, 1848 (*s.v.* 'Brawling and Smiting'), is the fullest, but its date precludes the new statutes and cases. Archbold, *Criminal Law*, 1905, gives statutes and cases to that date. The encyclopædias also have short articles, the best being Larousse, *Grand Dict. Univ.* Paris, 1875, *s.v.* 'Sacrilège.' The ethical view is almost always ignored.

BENJAMIN WHITEHEAD.

BRAZIL.—The area enclosed by the confines of the present Republic of Brazil contains four principal ethnological stocks—the Arawak, the Carib, the Tupi-Guarani, and the Tapuya. But many of the sub-sections of these races overlap into territory outside the boundaries of Brazil proper, so that the information in this article must be taken as referring to the religious con-

ceptions of those four families as a whole, and not to those of them who are strictly confined to the territories of the Republic.

The status of religious conception among the native tribes of Brazil is not very far advanced in the scale of belief. It consists mainly of a crude anthropomorphism. Indeed, it may be said that the distinction between the natural and supernatural has not yet been realized by them. Many of the agencies by which they believe the universe to be ordered are of a human or *quasi*-human character. They appear to be, for the most part, incapable of the abstract thought required to conceive of an eternal spirit, and their ideas of a Supreme Being are of the faintest. The general theogony of the Tupi, for example, though extremely hazy, appears to consist in the primal idea of a universal maternal agent. Fetish and animistic beliefs are also widely prevalent; and, as in nearly every religion of the lower cultus, the explicit (or comparatively explicit) belief is accompanied by an extraneous and confused body of semi-legendary superstition, such as a belief in demons and evil spirits of the forest, river, and mountain. These last vary in their characteristics according to locality, and in the course of generations several may have attained the distinction of godhead, if the name may be applied to entities few of whose attributes appear to be truly supernatural. It may be said that the religious conceptions of all four families mentioned above are on a similar level, and that certain beliefs are common to all.

1. **The Arawaks.** — The Arawak tribes are widely distributed over an area extending from the River Paraguay to the extreme north of the South American continent, and they have contributed largely to the formation of the existing stocks inhabiting the Antilles and Bahamas groups. It is generally admitted that they originated in the northern part of the continent; but their nomadic traits, and the ready manner in which they have intermingled with other stocks, have caused marked differentiation between the various tribes belonging to the family. At the present day most of them have ceased to be nomads, and are engaged mainly in hunting and fishing; certain of them, however, exist on an agricultural basis. Their principal divisions are: *Northern group*—Maypures, Atorais, Wapisianas, and other insignificant confederacies; *Southern and Western Groups*—Piris of the Uccayali River, Minanhas of the Jurua River, Canamaris of the Purus River, Manaos of the Rio Negro, Custenaús, Vaurás, Mehinakus, Yualapiti (all of the River Xingu territory), and Guanas, dwelling on the left bank of the Upper Paraguay.

(1) *Cosmogony.*—The Creation and Flood myths of the various Arawak tribes bear a close resemblance to those generally current throughout the South American continent; that is, they assume a twofold destruction of the world prior to its present condition. Thus the Arawaks of Guiana believe that Aimon Kondi scourged the world with fire, from which the survivors sought refuge in subterranean dwellings. Then a great flood followed, from which Marerewana and his followers saved themselves in a canoe. Such a Flood-myth is practically identical with that of the Quichés of Guatemala, as found in the *Popol Vuh*, the sacred book of that people, and in the mythologies of many other American races. That man originated in a subterranean world is a belief widely disseminated among the Arawaks. There death was unknown, but the ruler of mankind chanced to discover the upper world, and, returning, warned his people that, though sunlight was there, so was death. Many, despite the warning, sought the upper air; but multitudes are still believed to exist in bliss far below. Another Arawak version of the Creation asserts that the Great Spirit, having completed the heavens and earth, seated Himself on a huge silk-cotton tree by a river side, and cut off pieces of its bark, which He cast all around. Those which touched the water became fish, those which touched the air, birds; and those which alighted upon the earth became animals and men. The Arawaks of Guiana are almost wholly in a condition of totemism.

(2) *Theogony and ritual.*—The theogony of many of the Brazilian tribes clusters round the cult of the god Jurupari, which is best exemplified by that phase of it practised by the Uapes. This cult is invested with the utmost secrecy, but has been fully examined by Coudreau and Stradelli. The name Jurupari (*Juru-para-i*) signifies 'Issue from the mouth of a river,' and the myth of his birth states that he was born of a virgin who possessed no sexual parts. She, however, conceived through swallowing a draught of *cachiri*, or fermented liquor, but could not be relieved of her offspring until, when bathing, she was bitten severely by a fish called 'Tarire,' when Jurupari was born. He grew speedily to manhood, and one day invited the men of the tribe to partake of a great bowl of *cachiri*; but the women refused their assistance in its manufacture, and thus gained his ill-will. Their children likewise incurred his enmity through eating the fruit of the *uacu* tree, which was sacred to him; and for this offence he devoured them. Enraged at the loss of their children, the men of the tribe surrounded him, and cast him into a fire, from the cinders of which sprang the *paxiuba* palm, which the Uapes believe to be his bones. Whilst it was still night, the men cut down this tree, and fashioned it into sacred instruments, which it is ordained the women of the tribe must never see. Should a woman of the Uapes set eyes upon any of the sacred symbols of Jurupari, she is at once poisoned.

This exclusion of women from the secret rites of the worship of Jurupari seems to point to some remote totemic origin of which all but the mere remembrance has been lost. There would appear to have been an ancient apprehension among the Uapes that Jurupari, who was regarded by them as more of a demiurge than a god proper, might exercise upon the women of the tribe 'le droit d'un dieu.' Indeed, a myth exists which relates how one woman who had in her possession the sacred symbols was violated by Jurupari, and that the exclusion of the women from his worship dates from that event.

On the days upon which the worship of Jurupari is to be celebrated, the men proceed from the place of his adoration on a tour of the surrounding district, playing loudly upon pipes and flutes. Upon hearing the 'Jurupari music' the women shut themselves up in their houses, and do not emerge again until they are certain that all risk of their beholding the procession is over. The men then return to the headquarters of the priests, where the sacred symbols are exposed to view. These are the *macacaraua* and the *paxiuba*. The former is a black cloak without arms, descending to the middle of the body, and made of monkeys' hair interwoven with hair cut from the heads of virgins immediately after their arrival at puberty. The *paxiuba* is a portion of the palm-tree of that species, about the height of a man, and some ten centimetres in diameter. By a device consisting of holes bored in the part of the tree beneath the foliage, its leaves are made to tremble by the breath of the priest who evokes it.

The principal religious ceremony in the worship of Jurupari is the *Dabucuri*, or initiation of the young men. This occurs six times in the year, as follows: the *assaby* on Jan. 1; the *ucuqui* on Feb. 2; the *miritz* on March 3; the *pataud* on May 4; the *umari* on July 5; and the *uiga* on Nov. 6. Of all these indigenous fruits the Indians make intoxicating beverages. These are freely

partaken of in the accompanying revels, which are of the most riotous description. On the day of the festival those who have arrived at manhood are painted in black and red. They chant mournful melodies, whilst the *pagés*, or priests, join them in marriage to women of the tribe, who are then sent into the forest. Three men in barbaric costumes then carry in the *paxiuba*, and several Indians disguised as Jurupari dress in the *macacaraua* and symbolize the god's myth. The *paxiuba* horn is then sounded, and the women return. Mutual flagellations commence, and the proceedings degenerate into a saturnalia. Jurupari is invited, but replies through the mouth of the *pagés* that he dare not be present, as, if he were to have relations with a woman, he would 'be changed into a serpent.'

The demiurgic nature of Jurupari is indicated by his relative position to Tupan, a primitive deity common to many Brazilian tribes. The Tupan of the Indians of the period immediately subsequent to the discovery of Brazil was by no means a beneficent deity, but typified the thunder, or any agency terrible or majestic. The first missionaries in the southern part of Brazil identified Tupan with God the Father, and the Christian reminiscences which we discover in the Jurupari cult doubtless had their origin in the old missionary idea of Tupan. The *pagés* differ regarding the identity of Tupan. Some regard him as a species of All-father, whilst others construct a vague hierarchy from Jurupari the Terrible, the Tupan of the Indians ('the Good'), and the Tupan of the Whites ('the Mighty'). Jurupari is not at strife with Tupan, but rather supplementary to him; for whereas the former has a local and precise significance, that of Tupan is vague and general. Tupan, it is said, created Jurupari 'for evil.' When he visits the earth, Jurupari is always his guide. Jurupari dwells with Tupan in heaven; and if in life the men of the Uapes have honoured the cult of Jurupari, they go to dwell with him after death. If they have not done so, they perish on the long road from earth to heaven. The women who behold the sacred symbols go to Bichiu, a place inhabited by inferior spirits—a species of purgatory; but if they have not thus offended, they go to the heaven of Jurupari. Tribes akin to the Uapes believe that those women who see the symbols are changed at death into serpents or crocodiles. In the heaven of Jurupari the dead hunt, fish, drink *cachiri*, and make sacred symbols. Grief and ennui are unknown. Those men who are lost on the route finally arrive at a hell, a badly-defined, shadowy extension of earth, where they continue the terrestrial life.

The Arawaks have a wholesome dread of evil spirits and forest-giants, which they designate *canchemar*. They have also a Jurupari of the Forest, an evil and malignant being, who, however, appears to bear no relation to the demiurge of the same name.

(3) *Priesthood.*—Among the Uapes the sacerdotal caste of the *pagés*, or priests, is strongly organized in a hierarchy, and is subdivided into the *uarassu*, or adepts, the *assu*, or arch-priests, and the *mirim*, or neophytes, who are very numerous. The secret of their organization is little known and well guarded. It is, in fact, a species of freemasonry, and candidates are initiated into the several degrees by similar processes. The *pagés* are also doctors, but, above all, exorcists. They possess magical formulæ, which vary with each tribe. Certain *pagés* act as mediums to demons whom they profess to have in their service, and others undertake invocation of the dead. The thoroughness with which they carry out their purely religious duties is remarkable. Even the children are examined and interrogated by them in secret regarding the cult of Jurupari. In fact, the initiation of the layman into that cult lasts during the entire period of his life. Although the *pagés* resort to symbolism, they are not fetish worshippers, and distinguish strongly between the symbol and the being it symbolizes. The *macacaraua* is not Jurupari, they say. It is his 'figura' (*rangaua*). The Guaycurús of Paraguay possess a similar religious order, whom they call *Vünägeneté*, and who act principally as exorcists of the evil in man, which they designate *nanigo gigé*. They believe that the goat-sucker bird and the screaming vulture act as messengers from the dead to the priest, between whom and the deceased persons of the tribe there is frequent communication. They also practise exorcism by fumigation. The dualism which the *pagés* of the Puris profess was in all probability communicated to them by European missionaries (Spix and Martius).

2. The Caribs.—The Caribs, one of the first American races to come under the notice of the European discoverers, were until recently supposed to be confined to Venezuela, Guiana, and the Antilles; but von den Steinen met with tribes cognate to them in speech and physiological characteristics in the very heart of Brazil—the Bakairi and Nahuquas of the Upper Xingu, which he regarded as the Carib cradle-land. They were, *par excellence*, the maritime race of America, and in their great sea-canoes extended their piratical voyages to Cuba and Haiti, and permanently occupied some of the Lesser Antilles. On the mainland they were in possession of the shore west of the mouth of the Orinoco, nearly to the Cordilleras. From their name is derived that of 'cannibal,' owing to their custom of eating human flesh. Most of the present-day Caribs are nominally Christians.

(1) *Mythology.* — The Caribs of the Antilles regarded the earth, which they called Mama Nono, as 'the good mother from which all things come.' Their mythological ideas corresponded with their degree of civilization, which was extremely primitive. The first ancestor of the Caribs created his offspring by sowing the soil with stones, or with the fruit of the Mauritius palm, which sprouted forth into men and women. They believed that a multiplicity of souls inhabited one body, and that, wherever they might detect a pulsation, a soul was present. All these, however, were subordinate to one principal spirit enthroned in the heart, which alone would be transported to the skies at death (anon. *Voyage à la Louisiane fait en 1720*). The seat of the deceased was named by them *Hueyu Ku*, the Mansion of the Sun, where, as in the Mexican paradise, the barbaric idea of bliss was to be attained. With the Caribs of the mainland, some shadowy belief in resurrection seems to have obtained, as they were most punctilious in preserving the bones of their ancestors, which, after having cleaned, bleached, and painted them, they kept in a wicker basket full of spices suspended from the doors of their dwellings.

They possessed a culture-hero, Tamu (Grandfather), who was also known as 'Old Man of the Sky.' He appears to have been almost identical with the Nahuatlac Quetzalcoatl, the Quiché Gucumatz, and the Mayan Cuculcan, in that he was of light complexion, came from the east, and, after having instructed the Caribs in agriculture and the primitive arts, disappeared in the direction whence he came. Brinton believed him to be identical with the Zumé of the Guarani of Paraguay, and Ehrenreich with the Kanu of the Arawaks (a culture-hero), and the Kaboi of the Karayas. In the legend of the latter he dwelt

with their ancestors in the under world until a bird, the *Dicholophos cristatus*, by its call, led them to life and light in the upper world. With the Caribs the sun and moon shared sovereignty with the earth as the supreme beings of the Universe. It is almost certain that the god Hurakan (from whose name is derived our word 'hurricane'), who figures in the Quiché *Popol Vuh* as 'the Heart of Heaven,' the supreme god, was of Carib origin, although it is possible that he may have been borrowed by the Caribs from the indigenous tribes of the Antilles; but von den Steinen gives the Carib form as *ye'lo*, 'thunder,' whence Island-Carib *toüallou*.

(2) *Priesthood.*—Although the Carib religion was of an extremely primitive type, it was well organized by a hereditary class of shamans called *piayes*, similar to the *pagés* of the Arawaks, to whom the Caribs were probably ethnologically related. This class exercised unlimited power, and, besides performing the very elaborate religious rites appertaining to their worship, were, as with the Arawaks, exorcists.

3. **The Tupi-Guarani.**—This stock, so called to show the ethnic affinity existing between the Tupi of Brazil and the Guarani of Paraguay, originally advanced in a northerly direction from the River Plate region, and drove the Tapuyas from the coast lands, which it thenceforth occupied as a maritime people. It is now represented by tribes occupying various belts of country in a territory so vast as that between the rivers Maroni in French Guiana, to the north, and the Plate, to the south. In Guiana the principal divisions are the Oyampi and the Émerillons, in Brazil proper the various tribes of the Central Plateau, and in Paraguay the Guarani. These various tribes were at one time addicted to cannibalism, but large numbers have become converted to Christianity, although many still retain their ancient beliefs. They speak a dialect of the ancient Tupi language, called the Lingoa Geral, which was standardized by the early Portuguese missionaries for their own uses, and gradually became the general tongue of the Amazonian tribes. Tupi branches are also found in Argentina and Uruguay.

(1) *Cosmogony.*—A certain magician, Irin Magé, is credited by the Eastern Tupi with the creation of seas and rivers, and at his intervention Monan, the Maker or Begetter, withdrew the *tata*, or Divine fire, with which he had resolved to destroy the world. An early account (Hans Staden, 1550) states their belief in a destruction of their ancestors by a powerful supernatural enemy called Mair, who sent upon them an inundation, from which only a few were saved, by climbing trees and hiding in caves—a variant of the *Popol Vuh* legend. The same authority gives the names of three brothers—Krimen, Hermittan, and Coem—from whom they claimed descent; and the Guarani speak of four brothers, and give two of their names as Tupi and Guarani, parents of the tribes called after them respectively. These four brothers are identical with similar quartettes in other American mythologies, and typify the cardinal points of the compass.

(2) *Theogony.*—The theogony of the Tupi is a simple nature-worship, although much confusion exists among authorities as to its constituents. The Vicomte d'Itabayana sees in Tupi belief the quality of dualism (a rare occurrence in American religions), and gives it as his opinion that Toru-shom-pek, the sun, stands for their principle of good, and Toru-guenket, the moon, for their evil principle. The latter is supposed to fall periodically and wreck the earth; and all baneful influences, such as thunders and floods, proceed from her. Magalhães (*O Selvagem*) is of opinion that Tupi theogony rests on the primal idea that all created things have a mother or maker, who is responsible for the general scheme of animate and inanimate matter. There are, further, three superior deities, to whom are apportioned the making of the various natural families. These are Guaracy, the sun, creator of all animals; Jacy, the moon, creator of plants; and Perudá or Rudá, the god of love, who promotes the reproduction of human beings. Each of these is assisted by inferior beings. Subordinate to the sun are Guirapuru, who has charge of the birds; Anhanga, who protects the field game; Caá-póra, who protects the forest game; Uayará, who guards the fishes. Under Jacy are Saci Ceréré (in South Brazil) Mhoitatá, the fire-snake, who protects the country from fire; Urutaú, the phantom-bird; and Curupira, the guardian of the forests. Subject to Rudá are Cairé, the full moon, and Catití, the new moon. Each of these, in turn, has as many inferior assistants as the Indians admit classes; and these are served by as many beings as the Indians admit species, and so on, until every lake and river and kind of animal or plant has its protective genius or 'mother.' Brinton describes this polytheism as 'simple animistic nature-worship.' Though this may be said to apply to the Tupi race in general, its standards undoubtedly vary with locality; and this fact accounts for the seemingly widely differing accounts of Tupi theogony furnished by its several investigators.

With the Guarani, the southern branch of the Tupi, belief and worship appear largely to cluster round the figure of the god Zumé, a culture-hero, probably identical with the Carib Tamu. He, like other American culture-heroes, 'came from the East'; but the Guarani, according to the myth, grew so tired of his sententious advice and constant patronage, that they tried to drive him away with arrows. These, however, he caught, and hurled back upon his tormentors, and, dividing the waters of a neighbouring river by his Divine power, he walked to the other bank dryshod, and disappeared from view. He indicated to the Guarani his intention of returning in order to gather them into towns, and rule them in peace. Zumé is, of course, like the Mexican Quetzalcoatl, the Man of the Sun, the civilizing agent. He has been identified with Cemi, an Antillean deity, and his worship is found under various guises throughout South America.

A less mild personage is Tupa or Tupan,* the god-in-chief of the Tupi proper of Brazil. The earliest notice of this god is that of the missionary Père d'Evreux, who directly compares him with God the Father. He alone of the four brothers survived the Flood, and became the highest divinity of the Tupi, ruler of the lightning and the storm, whose voice is the thunder. He is, indeed, the Tupan of the Uapes, who, although of Arawak stock, have been deeply influenced by Tupi and Carib beliefs. Anhanga, the protector of field game, is sometimes opposed to him as an evil principle; but it is vain to affect to discern dualism where the notion of divinity is so slight, and that of anthropomorphism so strong. In any case, it cannot be an ethical dualism, but merely the opportunist invention of the priestly caste (see remarks on American dualism in Brinton's *Myths of the New World* and Spence's *Popol Vuh*). There is not wanting evidence, however, that Tupa was also a 'culture-hero,' who latterly attained godhead. He is credited with teaching the Tupi the use of fire, the *pisang*, and the cane, as well as with instructing them in agriculture.

(3) *Inferior spirits.*—Many of the Amazonian

* The name is derived by Tatevin (*Anthropos* ii. 269 f.) from *tuba upaym*, 'Father of All.'

tribes of the Tupi have an elaborate system of myths clustering round the tortoise—a favourite figure in South American folklore. In these many inferior spirits are the principal actors, the most important of them being Kurupira, the wood-demon, and Oiara, the water-sprite. Paituna, 'the wonder-monkey,' is no simian, but the son of a woman belonging to a tribe of females with only one husband. He possesses miraculous powers, which he uses to discomfit his enemies in an amusing manner.

4. The Tapuyas.—The Tapuyas or Ges tribe are the oldest of the Brazilian races. They are best known perhaps by their name of Botocudos, from a lip-peg (*botoque*) which they wear. They are found on the eastern slopes of the Cordilleras, from the peninsula of Goajira in the north to the borders of Chili, and in large numbers in Eastern Bolivia. Their principal divisions are the Karayas, the Kayapos, and the Suyas of the rivers Xingu and Araguaya. They have not as yet realized the distinction between the natural and the supernatural. The universe is kept together or disturbed, as the case may be, by human or *quasi*-human agencies. The Karaya Flood-myth relates that the hostile demon Anatiwa originated the Deluge, and sent fish to pull down those who had taken flight to the hill Topirapé. The Ges attributed the re-building of the earth to the water-hen Saracura, which fetched earth to the hills, where those saved from the Flood congregated, so that the area of safety might be enlarged. The Karaya ancestral god, Kaboi, led his people from the under to the upper world by the cry of a bird. All these myths, though in circulation among the various tribes of the Tapuya family, have their counterparts in many other American mythologies. It cannot be discovered, however, whether or no the Tapuya tribes worship those 'deities' to whom they give the credit of creating the cosmos. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that they do not. 'They have,' says Brinton, 'no definite religious rites, but are careful to bury the dead, and have a belief that the spirit of the departed survives and wanders about at night (*Amer. Race*, p. 144). They are firm believers in metempsychosis, and the appeasement by mimicry of those vague powers who cause natural phenomena. Thus they shake a burning brand and shoot arrows at the sky to appease the powers of the storm. Semi-religious dances are common among them. They are, in fact, on the borderland between totemic practice and the anthropomorphism which generally succeeds it, as is proved by the circumstance that a sub-stock, the Tucanos, take their name from the toucan bird which they adopted as the totem of their tribe.

LITERATURE.—1. *THE ARAWAKS*: E. im Thurn, *Among the Indians of Guiana* (1883); Coudreau, *Études sur les Guyane et l'Amazonie* (1886); Stradelli, 'La leggenda dell' Iurupari' (*Bol. de la soc. geogr. Ital.*), 1890, pp. 659 ff., 798 ff.; Brett, *Legends and Myths of the Aboriginal Indians of British Guiana* (1868).—2. *THE CARIBS*: Karl von den Steinen, *Die Bakairi Sprache* (1892), *Unter den Naturvölkern Zentral-Brasiliens* (1894); Müller, *Amer. Urreligionen* (1855); de la Borde, *Religion des Caraïbes* (Paris, 1674).—3. *THE TUPI-GUARANI*: Barboza Rodriguez, *Exploração do Rio Jamundá* (1875); 'Poranduba amazonense' (*Ann. d. Bibl. nac.* xiv., Rio, 1890); Couto de Magalhães, *O Selvagem* (1874); Guevara, *Hist. del Paraguay, Rio de la Plata y Tucuman* (1836); d'Orbigny, *L'Homme américain* (1850).—4. *THE TAPUYAS*: Ehrenreich, 'Über die Botocudos' in *ZE*, 1887, 1 ff.; Keane, *On the Botocudos* (1883).
General works are Ehrenreich, 'Beiträge zur Völkerkunde Brasiliens' (*Veröff. des Mus. fur Völkerkunde*, Bd. ii. Heft 1/2), 'Die Mythen und Legenden der Süd-Amer. Urvölker' (Suppl. to *ZE*, 1905); and the several interesting but rather out of date works of C. F. P. von Martius.

LEWIS SPENCE.

BREAD.—See FOOD.

BREATH.—Breath consists of air alternately drawn in and expelled from the lungs, and constitutes a vital element in man's spiritual as well as in his physical being. As a manifestation of existence, breath is frequently used, among many peoples, as synonymous with 'life,' 'spirit,' and 'soul.' The force of these several meanings becomes clear, for example, from such passages in the Bible as Gn 2^7, 1 Co 15^{45}, and from the various designations for 'breath,' 'spirit,' 'soul' in Hebrew (*ruaḥ, nephesh, nĕshāmāh*), Greek (*πνεῦμα, ψυχή*), Latin (*animus, anima, spiritus*), and Old Church Slavic (*duchŭ*, 'breath,' 'spirit,' *duša*, 'soul'; cf. Lithuanian *dausos*, 'air'). This is equally true of the kindred designations in other languages, even in savage tongues (see Tylor,[3] i. 433). The natural association, moreover, of the breath and breathing with the spiritual phenomenon of inspiration is seen in such a passage as Jn 20^{22}, where Jesus breathed upon the disciples when imparting to them the gift of the Holy Spirit. Cf. also Job 4^9 33^4, Is 11^4, Ezk $37^{9f.}$, and artt. SOUL, SPIRIT.

In classic times, among the Greeks and Romans, there were current a number of well-recognized ideas (all of them perfectly natural) which show the wide-spread and normal association of breath and air as the vital principle. Philosophers started with the postulate that the soul was drawn into the body with the first breath at birth, and they sometimes made the kindred element, wind, a vital factor in generation (*e.g.* Chrysippus, cited by Plutarch, *de Stoic. Repugn.* xli. 391; also Dio Chrysos. *Borysth. Orat.* xii. 387; cf. also the *αὖραι ζωογόνοι* of *Anth. Pal.* x. lxxv. 4, the *πνοαὶ ψυχοτρόφοι* of *Hymn. Orph.* xxxviii. 22, and, in general, Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, i. 753–764). In connexion with death, moreover, the Romans regarded it as a religious duty that the nearest relative should catch the last breath of the dying, at the moment when the vital spark was leaving the body, in order to ensure the continued existence of the spirit (see Vergil, *Aen.* iv. 684; Cic. *Verr.* ii. 5. 45; Ovid, *Metam.* xii. 424). A somewhat similar custom formerly existed among the Seminole Indians of Florida; and the fancy of the Tyrolese peasants saw the soul out-breathed like a little white cloud at death (cf. Tylor, *l.c.*). This receives still stronger exemplification among the Athapascan Tahkali, who bring breath into direct connexion with transmigration. When one is either dead or dying, the medicine-man lays his hands on the breast of the individual in question, and then places them on the head of a kinsman of the dead or moribund. The medicine-man now breathes through the hands thus imposed, and the next child born to the kinsman of the dead man is held to have received the soul of the deceased, whose rank and name he assumes (Waitz, *Anthropologie*, iii. 195). Among some of the Tupi-Guarani tribes of South America, medicine-men frequently endeavour to effect cures by breathing on the diseased or injured part, and at certain ceremonies they blow tobacco smoke on the warriors, saying, 'Receive the spirit of bravery, wherewith ye conquer your foes' (*ib.* p. 419).

None of the nations of the world, however, paid so marked attention both to the physical side of breathing and to the psychical phenomena connected with it as did the early Hindus. By them breathing was regarded as one of the sciences, and the regulation of respiration in connexion with ascetic and ritual practices was of paramount importance; nor has the art disappeared in India to-day. In early times, as shown by the philosophic treatises of the Upaniṣads, careful observers, who were imbued with the idea of the importance of controlling the vital breath, had faithfully counted the normal number of respirations *per diem*, and found the average to be 22,636 inhalations and exhalations (*Amṛtabindu Upaniṣad*, 33), or 21,606 (*Haṁsa Upaniṣad*, 4), a round 21,600

(*Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*, p. 175, 4), or again 21,000 (Rāmatīrtha in his notes on *Maitrāyaṇa Upaniṣad*, vi. 1); see Deussen, *Sechszig Upaniṣads*, pp. 656 n. 4, 675 n. 2; Ewing, 'Hindu Conception of the Functions of Breath,' in *JAOS*, xxii. 264. This calculation (about 15.9 respirations per minute) answers well to the modern computations made by Western scientists, who estimate the normal breath of the healthy adult to be between 16 and 20 respirations a minute. The meditative calm and the unsurpassed self-control of the Hindu ascetic, it must be remembered, would tend to reduce the frequency of respiration, and thus justify the lower figure as claimed.

Hindu devotees and philosophers not only made these statistical observations of respiration in connexion with their religious practices and their recluse life of self-abnegation, but they also distinguished various phases of the breath-element, and assigned a particular function to each. The spiritual and religious aspect of breath is to be recognized as early as the Vedas and Brāhmaṇas, but it reaches its full development in the Upaniṣads, where it assumes a paramount place.

In Sanskrit the cardinal words relating to breath and breathing are all derivatives of the root *an*, 'breathe,' 'respire' (cognate with Gr. ἄνεμος, Lat. *animus*, Goth. *us-anan*). The principal word for 'breath' in general is the derivative *prāṇa* (from *an* with prefix *pra*). This word heads the fivefold list (sometimes known as the *prāṇa*-series), consisting of *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna*, and *samāna*, under which the early Hindu physiological and psychological views grouped breath in its various functions.

Much attention has been devoted to studying this fivefold series of *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna*, *samāna*. The most thorough of the Western investigations of the subject are those by Deussen and especially Ewing, in the works alluded to already, and quoted with full titles at the end of this article. So painstaking and exhaustive an examination as that made by Ewing (*op. cit.* 250–275, 305) proves that the first member of the series, *prāṇa*, breath in general, designates either the double process of respiration or, more particularly, 'in-breathing,' 'inhalation,' as contrasted with 'out-breathing,' which is designated more especially by *apāna*, 'exhalation,' 'exspiration.' These two words, *prāṇa* and *apāna*, occur very often together (frequently united in a *dvandva*-compound), and are used to denote the composite act of respiration. This very frequency of occurrence has caused their common long *a* (which is etymologically correct in composition of the vocalic prefixes *pra*, *apa*, with *an*) to be assumed analogically by the other three members of the group (in which the long *a* is not authorized by composition of the consonantal prefixes *vy*, *ud*, *sam*, with *an*). As to the meanings assigned, it should be noted, however, that Deussen maintains that *prāṇa* sometimes signifies 'exspiration' (*Aushauch*), and *apāna*, 'inspiration' (*Einhauch*); see his *Allgem. Gesch. d. Philos.* I. i. 294–305, I. ii. 248–252, I. iii. 69–72, 441, 492, 605, 627, 649, and his *Das System des Vedânta*, 359–364. Ewing (*op. cit.* 292) strongly combats the point. His own investigations, moreover (*op. cit.* 275–276), tend to show that *apāna* denotes not only 'out-breathing,' but also the physiological breath-functions of that part of the body below the navel.

The term *vyāna*, lit. 'breathing apart,' appears to denote a permeating or abiding breath-factor which forms a sort of connecting link between *prāṇa* and *apāna*, though separate from them, and occupies also the interval between respirations (see Ewing, *op. cit.* 277–303). Deussen's rendering of the word is 'interspiration' (*Zwischenhauch*). The other two terms, *udāna* and *samāna*, are less frequent in occurrence and more obscure in significance. They seem to have to do with the function of breath in connexion with digestion. Deussen's renderings are 'up-breathing' (*Aufhauch*) and 'all-breathing' (*Allhauch*); see his *Philos. of the Upanishads*, 279–280. Ewing's various allusions to these last two breath-elements of the *prāṇa*-series (*op. cit.* 260–287) should be compared.

In modern times the Hindu *yogi*-ascetics and certain of the advanced native thinkers of India still look upon breathing as a science to be cultivated under competent teachers. The practice of appropriately regulated breathing, they maintain, affects not only the vital activity, but also the mental activity, and produces corresponding psychic results. The complete control of the vital breaths, even to suspending the breath for a considerable length of time, brings with it a mastery over all the forces that govern both mind and body. For some of the claims still made by living exponents of these views, reference may be made to the writings of **Rāma Prasād** and the Swāmi Abhedānanda, cited below.

LITERATURE.—The full titles of the chief works alluded to in this art. are: Ewing, 'The Hindu Conception of the Functions of Breath—a Study in Early Hindu Psycho-physics,' in *JAOS*, xxii. 249–308, New Haven, 1901; Deussen, *Allgem. Gesch. der Philos.* i. (3 parts), Leipzig, 1894–1908, his *Sechszig Upanishads des Veda*, Leipzig, 1897, also *Das System des Vedânta*, 359–364, Leipzig, 1883, and *The Philosophy of the Upanishads* [Eng. tr. by Geden, pp. 274–280, Edinburgh, 1906]; Tylor, *Primitive Culture*[3], i. 431–433, London, 1871 [[4]1903]; Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, Königsberg, 1829; Waitz, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, iii., Leipzig, 1862; Rāma Prasād, *Nature's Finer Forces* (Science of Breath), Bombay, 1890; Abhedānanda, *How to be a Yogi* (Science of Breathing), pp. 125–160, New York, 1902.

A. V. WILLIAMS JACKSON.

BRETHREN OF THE COMMON LIFE.—

1. Founders.—The Brethren of the Common Life represent one of the most successful of the many efforts made during the Middle Ages for the revival of piety. Some of their external arrangements were similar to those of the Beghards and Beguines, but their organization was more closely connected with the system and discipline of the Church, as was intended by their founders, Gerard Groot and his chief disciple, Florentius. Gerard (1340–1384) was the son of Werner Groot, a wealthy citizen and magistrate of Deventer. He took his degree at the University of Paris, acquiring a considerable reputation for talent and attainments, and then settled at Cologne, which had long been a celebrated seat of learning, and subsequently became a university town. Here he combined the pursuit of study with worldly amusements, and became very popular among his associates. Converted by the efforts and prayers of a former friend, named Henry Kalkar, the prior of a Carthusian monastery, he completely changed his mode of life. Throwing off his elegant clothes, he assumed the simplest and humblest dress, while for his inward improvement he withdrew for three years into a Carthusian monastery, where he spent his time in meditation and self-discipline. He also visited the saintly Ruysbroeck, prior of the monastery of Grünthal, to whose spiritual influence he owed much of the progress of his soul. After five years he came forth as an evangelizing preacher of great force and persuasiveness, full of zeal for the revival of truly spiritual religion among the people at large, and anxious for the reform of the monks and clergy. He was ordained deacon, but never regarded himself as worthy of the priesthood. For three years and a half he went about preaching in Holland and the Netherlands, with the result that he drew many souls out of worldliness and sin and led them to holiness of life. His success, and his severe condemnation of the laxity of the clergy, however deserved, led to opposition to his preaching; and the Bishop of Utrecht was persuaded to

silence him, by withdrawing licences to preach from deacons. An appeal was made to the Pope, but it is uncertain whether this was successful, for Groot died soon after, in his 44th year. He was prematurely cut off by the plague, caught while visiting a sick friend. But he had had time, with the help of his foremost disciple, Florentius, to plan arrangements for confirming his converts in Christian ways. These two good men sought to establish Brotherhoods and Sisterhoods, in which those who had been rescued from worldliness might find refuge, and they decided on the foundation of some monasteries which might serve as a support and means of guidance to the inmates of the Houses, and might also offer a model of monastic reformation. The movement received the name of the 'moderna devotio.' Groot had some years before his death given over his own spacious house to the town authorities of Deventer as an abode for widows and maidens who should live together in piety and good works. The Brotherhoods were also begun at Deventer, while the first monastery was established at Windesheim. It was Augustinian, and became the centre of several new and many reformed monasteries. The next was founded on Mount St. Agnes, near Zwolle. A brother of Thomas à Kempis was the first prior of the latter, and Thomas himself, after his education at Deventer, spent his life in it as a monk.

2. Regulations. — In common with all pious persons in the mediæval Church, Groot regarded the career of the monastic regulars as the highest; but his societies were intended as a link between the monks and the people, and his Brotherhoods and Sisterhoods formed a kind of modified monasticism without any vows. Their members, living a common life in their respective houses, were to work for their maintenance, to give what they could save to the poor and sick, and to interest themselves in the religious teaching of the young. The members of a Brotherhood were drawn from various classes. The educated copied books, as was done in monasteries, and, later on, attended to printing them, while those who had been brought up to handicrafts practised these for the benefit of the House. The hours of prayer and of attendance at Mass were diligently observed. There were several priests in each house, besides the lay members. The head of the community was called 'rector,' and implicit obedience to him was required. Under him was the 'procurator,' who was general manager. Various offices, such as those of librarian, sacristan, warden of the infirmary, down to the humbler ones of tailor, baker, and cook, were distributed among the Brethren. Besides being called *Fratres vitæ communis*, the brothers acquired several other appellations, such as *Fratres bonæ voluntatis*, from their benevolence, and *Fratres cucullati* from their cap or head-dress, and they were often called Lollards by their enemies, though they had no real connexion with that sect. Owing to their educational labours, they also acquired the designation of *Fratres Hieronymi*, 'Brothers of St. Jerome,' who was regarded as a patron of learning. The dress of the Brothers was black or grey; for priests and clerics it went down to the feet, for lay brethren to the knee; and a black cap was worn on the head. The under garment was washed every month in summer, every two months in winter. On entrance into the society each man could deal with his property as he liked; but if he once gave it over to the House, he could not withdraw it in the event of his leaving. The Brothers rose at half-past three in the morning, and went to bed at nine in the evening. During the day an interval was allowed for repose. Dinner was at ten o'clock, supper at five. At meals the Scriptures or the *Lives* of the Saints were read, the Brothers taking a week each, from the seniors downwards. Meat might be eaten on Sundays, and other days except Fridays and fast days. Their drink was one little mug of beer of the small size out of which wine was usually drunk (Dumbar, *Analecta*, i. 14). Many members of the society injured themselves by excessive fasting, in a degree not required by the rules. Constant industry, according to the previous training of each man, was inculcated; and where there was a farm or garden, outdoor labour was required. All these activities of the Brothers contrasted favourably with the begging habits of the friars, who were mostly living in idleness, and became in consequence the bitter enemies of the Brothers; while the domestic work of the Sisterhoods and their instruction of girls made them appear to great advantage as compared with the degenerate nuns. It might well be supposed that these hard-working and devout societies would have been commended of all men, but the friars succeeded in raising much opposition against them, while among the people at large the reverence which was felt for the regular and long-established monastic orders, bound by lifelong vows, was not bestowed upon the more secular system of the new society, till eventually they were known by their fruits and became respected for their good deeds. It was doubtless better for them not to be thought much of, at any rate at first, as they were thereby guarded from the temptation to pride which beset the old religious orders. The opposition, however, was carried to the verge of persecution, for at the Council of Constance a Dominican named Grabow accused the Brethren of the Common Life, and maintained that it was a mortal sin to form a community without the vows of poverty, obedience, and chastity. They were, however, defended by their friends and supporters, the Windesheim monks, and also by Gerson. The Council condemned Grabow, and offered him the choice of retractation or the stake. Several Popes also had the good sense to support the Brotherhoods and Sisterhoods by their rescripts.

3. Influence on education.—The eventual estimation of the Brothers among the people at large was mainly promoted by their devoted efforts on behalf of the religious education of boys. At their first centre, Deventer, they boarded many of the scholars who attended the noted school already existing there, or obtained hospitality for them among devout widows or benevolent burghers. Their religious teaching was mainly given in their Houses, but some of their scholars rose to be assistant teachers, or 'lectors,' in the school, and thus their work and influence became blended with the secular parts of education. Similar arrangements were made in the many other towns to which the educational work of the Brotherhoods rapidly extended. There was no opposition in those days to the religious side of education. On the contrary, the authorities of towns in Holland and Germany frequently invited the help of the Brothers, and induced members of their Society to settle in their midst, providing houses for them. In some places they were entrusted with the reorganization of the schools. Distinguished and pious schoolmasters, such as Hegius at Deventer and John Cele at Zwolle, were in close touch with the Brothers, and there can be no doubt that not a few of the latter became teachers of classics as well as of religion. When the culture brought in by the Renaissance, with its revived study of Greek, extended to Germany, through the energy of Rudolph Agricola and others, it gradually won over members of the Brotherhoods, and added thereby to the effectiveness of their educational labours. In some of the schools there were more

than a thousand scholars, and the spectacle of devoted men giving their best energies to bringing up the rising generation in true religion and sound learning gave new hope to all who had the good of their country at heart. At the same time it must be admitted that it was the aim of the Brothers not only to produce good laymen and priests, but also to recruit the monasteries with more earnest novices; and Erasmus complains that they unduly pressed their youths to enter monastic life. This was certainly not the case with Florentius, but it may have been so later on; and we must remember that Erasmus was induced by the desire of his guardians to become a monk, because they had wasted his patrimony, so that he was somewhat prejudiced.

It has been sometimes stated that the Brothers founded schools of their own, but this is a mistake; for instance, Erasmus was not educated in schools belonging to them, as has been usually alleged. He attended the public schools, while boarding with the Brothers and receiving religious teaching from them. Their educational labours continued for about a hundred and fifty years, when most of the schools in which they had taught came under the influence of the Jesuits. The Lutheran Reformation occasioned the Roman Catholic movement that has been called the Counter-Reformation. This was led mainly by the Jesuits, and their pushing and aggressive methods eventually superseded the more modest and quiet work that the societies founded by Groot and Florentius had carried on.

In connexion with the name of Florentius Radewin (1350–1400), we have to notice the boyhood of Thomas à Kempis (1380–1471) before his entrance upon the life of a monk in the Augustinian monastery of Mount St. Agnes. Very early in life Thomas was sent to the school of Deventer, and was brought into connexion with the saintly Florentius, who had, for the sake of being near Gerard Groot, given up higher ecclesiastical emoluments to become one of the Vicars of the collegiate Church of St. Lebuin. He was, after Groot's death, the recognized leader of the societies that Groot and he were establishing, but he did not become at first the Rector of the House at Deventer. He had accepted that office by the time à Kempis applied for admission, and his winning and gracious manners and a natural dignity of bearing had given him a predominant influence for good. He befriended the youthful à Kempis and placed him with a devout widow, receiving him for a part of the time into his own house. It is not too much to say that we owe the spiritual meditations written by à Kempis to the effect on his after life of the saintly character of Florentius. Among many such writings the *Imitatio Christi* is usually included; and if, as we fully believe, the authorship of that well-known book of devotion is rightly ascribed to him, the debt we owe to the revered teacher of his early days can hardly be over-rated. Thomas himself has commemorated Groot and Florentius and some of the early Brethren in a remarkable work, which has long been bound up with his other writings in the edition of Sommalius. In this he gives most interesting details of his spiritual Father and Rector, as well as of other members of the House. A short sketch of a youth of his own age, named Arnold of Schoonhoven, who was his model of piety, closes these valuable memoirs. They are also interesting as affording one among many evidences of the *Imitatio* having been composed by à Kempis. Dr. Hirsche, in his *Kritisch-exegetische Einleitung*, brings forward a number of quotations to show the similarity of many expressions in these biographies to those in the *Imitatio*. And it may be added that the lives of the founders and brothers so recorded afford an impressive realization of the precepts of that manual of devotion, and exhibit a spirit of piety which belongs to the same lines of religious thought. It is scarcely too much to say that the *Imitatio* cannot be fully understood without a perusal of these records.

4. Doctrines.—The remarks just made bring us to the question as to the doctrinal limitations of the Brothers and their kindred monks. Groot was a firm adherent of all the dogmas of the Roman Church, and had even been called *malleus hæreticorum*, 'the hammer of heretics.' When the saintly Ruysbroeck expressed himself, as Groot thought, with too great freedom in the direction of mysticism, he opposed his sentiments. Yet if we take the word 'mysticism,' which may be used in many senses, as meaning the personal and inward realization of spiritual truth imparted by the Holy Ghost as contrasted with a mere outward and formal religion, we shall find it present in the teaching of Groot and Florentius and in that of à Kempis; and some of the Windesheim monks were even more definitely mystics. Yet none of the earlier Brothers would have allowed himself to question any belief that was a part of the Papal system. And those writers are wrong who have maintained that the Brethren of the Common Life were 'Reformers before the Reformation.' In one respect, indeed, they were reformers, but they never intended to be so in the sense that we associate with Protestantism. This point was their advocacy of encouraging the laity to read the Scriptures in the vulgar tongue; but they did so without any doubt occurring to them as to the Bible being fully consonant with Roman doctrine. They wished laymen to study Holy Scripture for their personal improvement, and frequently gave informal addresses to them in their houses on passages of the Bible, and especially on those that bore on practical duty. Among the Brothers at Deventer, Gerard Zerbolt, one of the librarians, was the strongest advocate of translations of Holy Writ and of prayers being supplied to the lay-folk in the vernacular; and his arguments are well worthy of study in the treatises that he put forth, and which still exist.

When, later on, the Lutheran Reformation began to make progress, the Brethren of the Common Life were found, as was natural, on the side of the Papacy; yet in time the new doctrines made their way into some of the Houses, and individual members were won over by them. After a while several of the Brother-houses went over entirely to the Reformed faith, and that at Wesel received the warm approbation of Luther himself.

The welcome given in many towns to the greater freedom of doctrine promised by the Reformers damaged the continuance of Brother-houses in which the Roman teaching was still maintained; but a few here and there survived for a long time; and while the educational work passed either to the Protestants or to the Jesuits, some Brother-houses lingered on till suppressed by Napoleon Bonaparte. The Sister-houses, begun in the first instance by Groot himself at Deventer, became widely extended, and accomplished good work in the training of girls, as well as in copying books, in miniature painting, and in the humbler offices of household duty. The Superior was usually called 'Martha,' and one of the most impressive of the treatises of Thomas à Kempis is an encomium on the duties and influence of a woman who thus cares in practical matters for the welfare of the devout. There was usually a priest attached to the Sister-houses who acted as ruler and confessor. Among the most remarkable of the latter was Brinckerinck, who ruled Groot's house for women at Deventer. Some of his addresses to the Sisters still exist, and are full of helpful words of encouragement for the spiritual life. A good many of the Sisters eventually joined Augustinian nunneries.

It has been stated that the monasteries of Windesheim and St. Agnes, and others afterwards established, were a part of Groot's scheme, and remained in close sympathy with the Brothers. A *Chronicle of Windesheim*, by Busch, a contemporary of à Kempis, contains many references to Groot and Florentius, and extracts from their letters, which show that the spiritual teaching in both these parts of Groot's system was identical, and that Florentius, when Rector of the House at Deventer, exercised the greatest care as to recommending Brothers to take the vows at Windesheim, or elsewhere, fully knowing the danger it had been to monasteries to receive persons who had no adequate vocation for lifelong devotion. The *Chronicle of Mount St. Agnes* was written during

his life by à Kempis, and a touching notice of his death is added at the close by another hand.

LITERATURE.—I. *ORIGINAL SOURCES.*—The most readily available of these are the lives of Gerard, Florentius, and others, by Thomas à Kempis, in the editions by Sommalius, in the 17th cent., of the works of à Kempis (earlier editions: *Opera et libri vitæ*, Nuremberg, 1494, and *à Kempis opera*, Antwerp, 1574; Eng. tr. *The Founders of the New Devotion*, by J. P. Arthur, Lond. 1905); also Thomas à Kempis, *Chronicon canonicorum regularium Montis S. Agnetis* (Eng. tr. *Chroniole of Mount St. Agnes*, by J. P. Arthur, Lond. 1905–1906); J. Buschius, *Chronicon Windeshemense*, Antwerp, 1621, re-edited by Karl Grube, with the *Liber de reformatione monasteriorum*, Halle, 1886 (an indispensable source for the study of Gerard Groot, and the Brothers and monks influenced by him); and a tr. of Gerald Zerbolt's *Beatus vir* and *Homo quidam*, by J. P. Arthur, London, 1908.

II. *MODERN LITERATURE.*—Delprat, *Verhandeling over de Broederschap van G. Groote en over ten invloed der Fraterhuizen*, Utrecht, 1830 (revised ed. Arnheim, 1856); Acquoy, *Het Klooster te Windesheim en zijn invloed*, 1875–1880; Hirsche, *Kritisch-exegetische Einleitung in die Werke des Thomas von Kempen*, Berlin, 1873; artt. on 'Gerard,' 'Florentius,' and others in *PRE* (3 editions); artt. on 'Brüder des gemeinsamen Lebens' in *PRE*[1] (Ullmann), in *PRE*[2] (Hirsche), and in *PRE*[3] (Schulze). Of these, the article by Hirsche goes the deepest, Schulze treating chiefly of the outward development. See also K. Grube, *Groot und seine Stiftungen*, Cologne, 1883. One of the most valuable treatises on the characteristics and work of the Brotherhood is that by E. Möbius, Leipzig, 1887. Bonet-Maury, *Gérard de Groote*, Paris, 1878, contains a useful list of Gerardic writings, and extracts from them. Kettlewell, *Thomas à Kempis and the Brothers of the Common Life*[2] (abridged), Lond. 1885, will be found useful, but does not contain the more recent criticism and information. An interesting sketch of the Brethren of the Common Life is contained in Neale's *History of the Jansenist Church of Holland*, Oxford, 1858. Sir Francis Cruise, *Thomas à Kempis: a Visit to the Scenes in which his Life was spent*, Lond. 1887, contains a very valuable list of the bibliography and literature of the whole subject. A further list of original sources is given in S. Harvey Gem, *Hidden Saints: the Brothers of the Common Life*, London, 1907.

S. HARVEY GEM.

BRETHREN OF THE FREE SPIRIT.—This name has been given to mystic-pantheists who emerged in the 13th cent., were associated with different sects such as the Beghards, and continued generation after generation down to the 16th century. Mosheim found, as he thought, their characteristic doctrines in writings of the 11th cent.; but it is safer to connect the origin of the Brethren with a speculative movement of the 13th century. At the beginning of that century there was a philosophical revival, which was quickened by Aristotelianism mixed with Neo-Platonism and introduced to the West in an Arabic dress. Under its influence David of Dinant indulged in speculations tending to pantheism; and at the same time Almaric of Bena, also affected by the Oriental Aristotelianism, set forth mystic doctrines which were accounted pantheistic and therefore dangerous to religion. At Paris in 1204, Almaric was charged with teaching 'quod quilibet Christianus teneatur credere, se esse membrum Christi, nec aliquem posse salvari, qui hoc non crederet.' On an appeal to Rome he was condemned; and it is evident, therefore, that his teaching must have had some meaning other than the mystical union of the believer with Christ, since it was judged to be heretical.

Thomas Aquinas, enumerating three errors regarding the being of God, distinguished between David of Dinant and Almaric:

'Alii autem dixerunt deum esse principium formale omnium rerum, et haec dicitur fuisse opinio Almaricanorum. Sed tertius error fuit David de Dinando, qui stultissime posuit deum esse materiam primam' (*Summa*, I. iii. 8).

Though the men were both dead, a Council of Paris in 1209 condemned their works; and it was asserted that Almaric had inspired the dangerous doctrines of the Almaricians, as they were called. Among these doctrines this was set forth:

'Pater in Abraham incarnatus, Filius in Maria, Spiritus Sanctus in nobis quotidie incarnatur—omnia unum, quia quidquid est, est deus.'

Further, the Almaricians were accused of teaching that now, in the time of the Spirit, salvation in no way depends on the sacraments of the Church, and that what are accounted sins of the flesh are not sins if done through love. It was not likely that these men would escape the censure and punishment of the Church, and a persecution directed against heretics was begun in Paris in 1210, and in 1212 was raging in Strassburg. Among those who perished at Strassburg were *Ortliebenses*, a name derived from Ortlieb, whose teaching marked him as a follower of Almaric.

These men were hardly entitled to be considered speculative thinkers, but none the less there were elements of pantheism and mysticism in their principles. They maintained that the uncreated universe is eternal, and that, while there is no resurrection of the body, immortality is for all. The Trinity was represented in some mystic fashion by three members of their community. They were not charged with carnal practices, but they roused ecclesiastical opposition by repudiating the sacraments and ordinances of the Church as unnecessary for men united with God. In 1215, at the fourth Lateran Council, the theories of Almaric were once more condemned, and condemned with the full authority of the Church. The mystic-pantheistic doctrines set forth by the Almaricians were not crushed, however, by the persecution of 1210, by the Lateran decree, or by a persecution which took place in 1216, as they were wide-spread, and had reached even the Waldenses, in the middle of the century, when they were attacked by Albertus Magnus. The opposition of Albertus did not stay the progress of these doctrines, and they began to affect the Beguines and Beghards, who, though they had long enjoyed the blessing of the Church, were exciting suspicion by their fanatical laudation of poverty. In these communities, prophets or teachers appeared who taught that God could best be served in freedom of spirit, and they and their converts were known as 'Brethren of the Free Spirit.' The orthodox Beghards and Beguines suffered from the evil reputation of the heretics, and the Franciscan spirituals, often confused with the Beghards, suffered in the same way.

It is difficult to determine the circumstances under which the name of 'Brethren of the Free Spirit' was adopted or applied, and also to discover the author of the phrase. Lea in his *History of the Inquisition* (ii. 321) says:

'Even the orthodox Cæsarius of Heisterbach [died *c.* 1240] argues that much is permitted to the saints which is forbidden to sinners; where is the Spirit of God, there is liberty—have charity and do what thou pleasest. When the fatal word had once been spoken, it could not be hushed to silence.'

In an episcopal letter of 1317, quoted by Gieseler (*Lehrbuch*, III. vii. 90), the writer enumerated the errors of those

'quos vulgus Beghardos et Schwestrones nominant, ipsi vero et ipsae se de secta liberi spiritus et voluntariae paupertatis parvos fratres vel sorores vocant.'

The name, whatever its origin, was directly associated neither with pantheism nor mysticism, but with the liberty of which Cæsarius of Heisterbach wrote, and for which Pauline authority was claimed. Yet this liberty was asserted not as mere licence, but as the natural right of men with the Divine Spirit.

The logic of the doctrines of the Brethren is intelligible. God is what is, and men, being of Him, come from and return to Him. There is therefore neither purgatory nor hell, and the sacraments and ordinances of the Church are unneeded. As man is essentially Divine and is able through contemplation and withdrawal from things of sense to know himself united with God, he can in his freedom do what God does, and must act as God works in him. There is therefore for the free man neither virtue nor vice. God is all, and all is God, and all is His; and men are therefore free to take or beg their bread, so that they

may not be entangled through labour in the things of sense. Intelligible though the logic may be, the doctrines contradicted the dogmas, and led to a violation of the practices, of the Church, with the destruction of morality. The same Cæsarius of Heisterbach who had a plea for liberty condemned the men who indulged in it (*de Miraculis*, v. 22):

'Maximam etiam blasphemiam ausi sunt dicere in Spiritum Sanctum, a quo omnis munditia est et sanctitas. Si aliquis est in Spiritu Sancto, aiebant, et faciat fornicationem, aut aliqua alia pollutione polluatur, non est ei peccatum, quia ille spiritus qui est Deus, est in eo, ille operatur omnia in omnibus.'

Mosheim (*Instit.* II. v. 11) quotes the following from *de Novem Rupibus*, a private book of the Brethren:

'Moreover, the godlike man operates and begets the same that God operates and begets. For in God he worked and created heaven and earth. He is also the generator of the eternal word. Nor can God do anything without this man. The godlike man should, therefore, make his will conformable to God's will, so that he should will all that God wills. If, therefore, God wills that I should sin, I ought by no means to will that I may not have sinned. This is true contrition. And if a man have committed a thousand mortal sins, and the man is well regulated and united to God, he ought not to wish that he had not done those sins; and he ought to prefer suffering a thousand deaths rather than to have omitted one of those mortal sins.'

An indictment of a Beghard in 1367 is recorded by Döllinger in his *Sektengesch. des Mittelalters* (ii. 386). The charges may have been exaggerated, but they show at least what could be urged against the Brethren. The accused had declared, it was alleged,

'quod talis homo liber redditur impeccabilis et potest agere quidquid vult et sibi placet, et si natura inclinaret ad actum venereum, potest licite ipsum perficere cum sorore sua vel matre et in quocumque loco sicut in altari; et dixit quod magis naturale est talem actum venereum exercere cum uxore sua carnali quam cum alia muliere, propter affinitatem naturae; et subjunxit quod perfectus liber a se licentiat virtutes sub tali distinctione, quod homo liber non est sub lege quocunque, nec tenetur ad statuta ecclesiae nec praecepta qualiacunque, quod talis est liber spiritu id est *ein fry Geist*, quod idem est quam homo liber, et statuta et praecepta ecclesiae debent saltem tenere grossi homines, id est homines sub lege existentes, quos ipse grossos homines appellat.'

The ecclesiastical councils of the 14th cent. condemned from time to time the doctrines of the Brethren, and the Inquisition added many of them to the number of its victims. One of those who suffered death (in 1310) was Marguerite de Hainault, described as *béguine clergesse*. She was charged with teaching that the soul absorbed in Divine love could yield without sin or remorse to all demands of the flesh. At the end of the century (in 1397), Nicholas of Basel, the most noted of the Brethren of his time, was burned, along with two of his disciples, at Vienna by the Inquisition. The famous Eckhart, the founder of the German Mystics, was harassed by the Inquisition, and, but for his natural death, might have perished as a heretic. John XXII. condemned twenty-eight articles said to be founded on Eckhart's teaching, and among these were the assertions of the common divinity of God and man, and of sin and virtue as the same in the sight of God. The accused, however, was not alive to defend himself. The famous company of the Friends of God sprang from the Brethren, Lea asserts (*op. cit.* ii. 365); but he admits that they 'avoided the deplorable moral extravagances of the parent sect.' Tauler was careful in his sermons to mark the difference between his doctrines and those of the Brethren, and the author of the *Deutsche Theologie* condemned theories which were those of the Brethren.

In the 15th cent. the Brethren, thanks to the Inquisition, were less active than they had been in the 14th; but amidst the Hussite troubles there was evidence of them in Bohemia, where the name of *Beghard* was modified to *Picard*. In 1453, Pope Nicholas V. ordered the wandering Beghards to ally themselves to the Tertiaries of the Mendicant Orders, and thus many of the Brethren, or those professing the doctrines of the Free Spirit, were brought under rule. Even then, however, the doctrines were not altogether suppressed, for in 1492, Friar John of Moravia was crushing Hussites and Beghards; and in the Libertines of the Netherlands, France, Germany, and Switzerland who flourished in the 16th cent., and even in some of the Anabaptists, were found doctrines and practices associating them with the Brethren of the Free Spirit.

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J. HERKLESS.

BRETHREN (Plymouth).—In the 2nd quarter of the 19th century the State Churches in Great Britain were worldly and dead; the Dissenters were orthodox and cold; the great Evangelical Revival was on the wane. Edward Irving had translated Ben Ezra's book, *The Coming of Messiah in Glory and Majesty*. He had been greatly moved by it, and was preaching that the Lord was coming. This had stirred people of all classes, and it seemed like the midnight cry: 'Behold the Bridegroom cometh.' It was in the midst of this state of things that the movement of Brethrenism originated (1827). The first 'Brother' was Edward Cronin, a doctor, who felt that true Christians, being one body in Christ, ought to be welcomed to the Lord's Table, wherever His Table was spread. But the movement received its impulse and direction from men far excelling Cronin in gifts and power. Anthony Norris Groves, a missionary to Syria and India, suggested to John Gifford Bellett, a lawyer: 'This, I doubt not, is the mind of God concerning us, that we should come together in all simplicity as disciples, not waiting on any pulpit or ministry, but trusting the Lord will edify us together by ministering to us, as He sees good, from ourselves.' This idea got hold of Bellett's mind, and was the germ of the movement. With Francis Hutchinson, John V. Parnell (afterwards Lord Congleton), and others, he organized a meeting in Hutchinson's house, to which Cronin came. In 1830, at Parnell's suggestion, they removed to a large room in Aungier Street, Dublin, so that they might be more of a testimony. Another eminent man associated himself with them, John Nelson Darby. Born at Westminster, London, November 18th, 1800, he graduated with honours at Trinity College, was trained for the law, but forsook it for a clerical career, and became a curate in Co. Wicklow, where he was reputed a saint on account of his holy life. He was now in the prime of life; his intellectual abilities were of the highest order; his piety was sincere and deep, while his power to hold men under his influence was the wonder of his foes and the admiration of his friends. The way in which he controlled the Brethren for fifty years exemplifies this.

Groves asserted that ordination to preach was not needed by a spirit-gifted minister; Cronin, that there was only one church-membership, viz. the body of Christ; while Darby, in a pamphlet written in 1828 (while he was a clergyman in the Irish Church), entitled 'The Nature and Unity of the Church of Christ,' set forth the principles of gathering to the Lord's name and the Church's union with Christ. Thus, Cronin, Groves, Bellett, Parnell, and Darby were the founders of the movement. It would be difficult to determine the relative influence of the first four, but, undoubtedly, Darby was the great leader and teacher.

To the company in Aungier Street many were

added between 1830 and 1832. At first they did not think of separating from the Churches around. This came as the result of their principles and practice, and when they increased in power and numbers. Darby visited Oxford in July 1830, where he met, amongst others, B. W. Newton and G. V. Wigram, both of whom came under his influence and power. A meeting was formed at Plymouth. Newton and other able men ministered there for years. From it the name 'Plymouth Brethren' was derived, while from Darby the name 'Darbyites' was received. Newton had a speculative mind, was grave and earnest, and became the most prominent leader at Plymouth. George Müller, brother-in-law to Groves, was the co-pastor with Henry Craik at Bethesda Chapel, Bristol. Both these and their congregation, in a measure, adopted the principles of the Brethren. A few brethren joined them, and one meeting was formed, but most Brethren now think this was a mistake. A gathering was formed at Rawstorne Street, London, and meetings sprang up both in England and Ireland. Between 1832 and 1838 meetings to study prophecy were held in Lady Powercourt's mansion, Co. Wicklow. They were attended by eminent clergymen, and Darby, Bellett, and Wigram went to them, and took part in them.

From 1830 to 1835 the movement swept on. J. L. Harris, a clergyman, joined the ranks of the Brethren. He edited their first magazine, *The Christian Witness*, to which Darby, Bellett, Newton, S. P. Tregelles and other writers contributed. It set forth the doctrines of Brethrenism with vigour and freshness (1834–40). A tract depôt was begun, from which issued a steady stream of tracts. The clergy became alarmed as several of their order joined the movement, which was at first, undoubtedly, a 'better-class' movement, containing lords, ladies, and officers not a few. The people were evangelized with great zeal; lay preaching was held to be the duty of all who had received grace and gift, and in the open air and in meeting-rooms the doctrines of Brethrenism were expounded. Separateness from the world was necessary; for the Lord was at hand, and every one must be ready to meet Him.

Groves went on a mission to Baghdad, and then laboured in India, with the result that many Anglo-Indians became disciples of the new faith. On returning to England, however, he found a stricter system of fellowship existing than when he left. He wrote to Darby protesting against this, but it was too late, for his own words to Bellett had raised a force which he could not now control.

Darby evangelized in Ireland, and visited Switzerland, where his success was phenomenal. The Evangelical Revival had taken place. He preached the Atonement of Christ, His Resurrection, Intercession, and Second Coming. He engaged in controversies with the Wesleyans and with Church leaders. Seventy companies of Brethren were gathered in Switzerland. He also visited France and Germany, where he gained many disciples. His labours extended, with intervals of visitations to England, several years. A reference to the first vol. of his *Letters* will show his great activity. Later, he devoted his attention to Germany, and translated the New Testament, and afterwards the Old, into German. G. Müller visited Germany in 1843. Ministering amongst the Baptists, he spread the tenets of the Brethren in the Fatherland.

Meanwhile, Newton remained at Plymouth, but, unlike Darby and others, never heartily adopted the doctrine of the Spirit's presence in the assembly, but set up what Tregelles called 'a modified Presbyterianism,' which was self-elected, and confined the services of prayer, praise, teaching, and rule to himself and those associated with him at Plymouth.

This was to be the model for all meetings, and an effort was made to carry it out. He denied the immediate return of the Lord, teaching that certain events must take place before He did come. He discouraged brethren who held opposite views from ministering. His lectures, copied in manuscript, were circulated widely amongst a select few. J. L. Harris and others, helpless to combat this state of things, left Plymouth. It was at this time (1845) that Darby returned. He had borne with Newton's views on the Second Coming, but would not tolerate the setting aside of the Spirit's presence in the Church, for that Darby viewed as the re-establishment of the clerical system that the Brethren had left in the Churches around. Darby maintained that by Newton's clerical control the Spirit was displaced in the assembly. He protested against this, but Newton and his supporters would not yield. Darby and many others withdrew from communion, and, after waiting from March till December, they broke bread apart from the Newton party at Raleigh Street, Plymouth. Indignation against Darby was intense. He had broken the unity of the Brethren, and they, who had testified to unity, were now in disunion. Darby's contention was that he 'could not maintain union to support evil,' and that 'truth was more to him than friends, religious reputation, or unity.' Two years' controversy followed, in which the leaders took part. Charges against Newton's writings and his rule in the Plymouth assembly were interwoven with the main issue, viz. the 'Spirit's freedom to use whomsoever He pleased in the assembly while gathered to the Lord's name for worship and ministry.' This was what Darby and his followers contended for, and it was this that Newton and his associates resisted. Round this same question of clericalism many later disputes arose and caused divisions.

In 1847, Newton's opinions on the sufferings of Christ came to light. He had taught, amongst a select body of disciples, that our Lord, being a man and an Israelite, was born relatively under the curse of God, which rested on the human race generally, and on Israel specially, on account of their having broken the Law and rejected their Messiah; and that, from childhood to His baptism in Jordan, Christ was obnoxious to the wrath of God, but escaped much on account of His prayer and piety. When Newton's views became known, they were rejected by the mass of the Brethren, and many of his former supporters, such as Soltau, Batten, Dyer, and Clulow, abjured their errors, and confessed they had been under the delusion of Satan as to their doctrines, and in supporting Newton. Newton made a confession, which was considered insufficient, and withdrew his tracts, which he never re-issued, for re-consideration. He admitted that in expressions he was wrong, and that in one particular he had erred, viz. in contending that our Lord was under Adam's federal headship. The meeting at Ebrington Street, Plymouth, was broken up. Newton removed to London, modified his views considerably, and formed a church of which he became minister, having no fellowship with any other religious body. He wrote largely on Prophecy, and in his writings there are passages of great literary beauty. He died in 1899, aged 92, having outlived all his compeers.

It was Newton's teachings that caused the first division amongst Brethren, which took place at Bethesda in 1849. Müller and Craik refused to allow a congregational judgment on Newton's

tracts. Several who had sympathized with Newton's views, and two Brethren who had imbibed his teachings, were received by the Bethesda congregation. It is a moot point whether Müller and Craik knew of the views of those disciples of Newton who did not openly promulgate them. Their reception called forth from G. Alexander and sixty others a vigorous protest. Müller and Craik would not allow the congregation to judge and condemn Newton's tracts until it adopted a paper called 'The Letter of the Ten,' signed by themselves and eight other leaders, and to which some of Newton's sympathizers adhibited their names. This paper committed the Church to a neutral position, and defined for years the ecclesiastical position of those afterwards called 'Open' Brethren. It became a document of discord, and a barrier to fellowship between the two great sections of the Brethren. Bethesda assembly adopted the paper, and retained the ministry of their pastors, who had threatened to resign unless this were done. To Darby, Wigram, Dorman, and others the position thus taken up was wrong, and they would not tolerate it. Darby was branded as a schismatic, and severely attacked. The result was that the dispute affected all the meetings throughout the land. Bethesda assembly, with its pastors, now took up the question. Seven meetings were held before the end of the year, as a result of which some of those who had supported Newton withdrew from fellowship, in order to relieve the Church from its dilemma. Two of these, on retiring, in a paper read to the congregation, declared that Newton was fundamentally sound. With some others they attempted to form a congregation, but failed, and were afterwards re-admitted to Bethesda on their confessing that they had erred in leaving. By Darby and those who agreed with him this was not considered a proper judgment of the evil doctrines. Müller and Craik both condemned Newton's doctrines, and declared that, if Newton's teachings were right, then Christ would require a Saviour Himself. But their judgment came too late, as what might have prevented a schism in July could not heal the division in December.

When Bethesda had judged the question in this fashion, Darby called on Müller with a view to reconciliation; but the accounts of the interview differ essentially, as can be seen by comparing Darby's letter to J. S. Oliphant with Müller's letter to an unknown correspondent in 1883. Darby issued a letter to all the Brethren condemning Bethesda, and calling upon all assemblies to reject her principles. He denounced as evil 'The Letter of the Ten,' which, he said, permitted association with a heretical congregation by allowing persons coming from it to have fellowship, provided they had not imbibed the evil doctrines. And this the Exclusive Brethren hold with inflexible strictness to this day. Fellowship with meetings where evil doctrines are held is repudiated, and no one is allowed fellowship unless he is sound doctrinally, and leads a godly life.

Henceforward Müller devoted himself to evangelical and philanthropic labours. He continued to be co-pastor at Bethesda. During the later years of his life he went on evangelical tours, and died on 10th March 1898, greatly honoured.

Müller and his followers took a definite stand against Darby, and the division became permanent. The Müller party was in the majority at first. J. L. Harris, W. H. Soltau, Lord Congleton, and other leaders sided with Müller, and stood for 'Open' principles, declaring them to be the original views of the Brethren. The Open Brethren devoted themselves to gospel work. Spurgeon called them a 'simple evangelical race.' They made converts in large numbers. They have had a number of earnest teachers and evangelists. Their books and tracts have been circulated in millions during the past fifty years.

Several attempts have been made to effect reconciliation with their Exclusive friends, one especially by Henry Bewley in 1870–71, but all have been unsuccessful. As late as 1892, the Exclusive Brethren in Grant's fellowship in America were approached with a view to reunion. In 1906, however, Bethesda adopted a declaration which had been drawn up in 1894 by fourteen leaders on their own responsibility, and was now signed on behalf of the Assembly by eleven Brethren. It explained and modified some of the objectionable statements in 'The Letter of the Ten,' and had as its object a union with G. W. Heath and his associates who sought the re-union of all sections of Brethren. This movement is still in progress.

Amongst the Open Brethren disputes have been few. Their principal dispute, which took place in 1892, was over what is called the 'Needed Truth' question. The majority rejected the 'Needed Truth' principles, which were: (1) complete separation from all Christians not in their own fellowship; (2) only those baptized after conversion to be allowed to break bread; (3) elders in the oversight to be recognized in the place of rule over the assemblies. The movement has not been a success, as many of the 'Needed Truth party have returned to the 'Open' fold, and in 1904 a dispute arose causing division amongst that party. The 'Open' Brethren are active and earnest, fraternize freely with other Christians, and do not evoke the same opposition as the 'Exclusives.' Their meetings are numerous, being established in nearly all large towns. It is generally admitted that in writers they are poorer than the Exclusives; still they have had some able writers, such as Thomas Newbery, editor of a valuable edition of the Bible, J. Denham Smith, W. Lincoln, Arthur Pridham, W. H. Soltau, etc.

From 1849 to 1879 the Exclusive Brethren had a period of prosperity. In 1849, G. V. Wigram commenced their chief organ, which extended to 18 vols. (1849–81), the *Present Testimony*. To it Darby contributed his 'Synopsis of the Books of the Bible,' and other writers gave of their best. It was in 1845 that William Kelly, the son of an Ulster squire, and a graduate with highest honours in Classics at Dublin, joined the movement. After having edited *The Prospect* (1848–50), he, in 1856, took up the editorship of the *Bible Treasury*, which he conducted for fifty years. To it Darby, Stoney, Mackintosh, Denny, Grant, Bellett, and others contributed, and, though its editor has passed away, it is still issued, and is the oldest organ of the Brethren. All their chief doctrines and controversies have been discussed in its pages. It was in it that Kelly's 'Commentaries' first appeared. W. H. Dorman edited the *Girdle of Truth*, 10 vols. (1855–66); J. B. Stoney conducted *A Voice to the Faithful* for thirty years; and C. H. Mackintosh, who had been engaged in scholastic work, and had given it up (1853), wrote *Notes on the Pentateuch*, which has had a wide circulation, and has greatly popularized Darby's views. There were many other publications during this period of great activity, which strengthened the Exclusive movement; and a ceaseless circulation of books and tracts went on. The Revivals of 1857–60 and 1870 got a considerable impetus and colouring from the Brethren, and, ultimately, many of the converts joined their assemblies. A band of young officers resigned their commissions, devoting themselves to evangelizing and teaching. England, Ireland, Scotland, Canada, and the

United States came under their labours, and to this day some of these continue teaching the tenets of the Brethren, such as E. Cross and J. W. Smith.

Darby and Wigram visited foreign parts again and again. Though small at first, Darby's success in America was considerable. He influenced two men, viz. F. W. Grant and Dwight L. Moody. Grant joined the Exclusive Brethren's fellowship, and became their foremost author and leader in America, and meetings were established in most of the great American centres. In 1864, Dr. W. Wolston came to Scotland. Then there were meetings only in Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Aberdeen, but, chiefly through his labours and those of others, gatherings sprang up all round, though many have died out since. Another man, William Reid, a Scottish clergyman, helped the movement greatly. He edited the *British Herald*, which had a wide circulation, and in it were inserted the choicest writings of the Brethren. In 1864, Bellett died. His piety and writings (which have been called prose-poems) left a deep impression on the Brethren, and greatly moulded their theology. It is worthy of note that, amid all the bitter controversies of those days, he was beloved by all parties. In 1872, Wigram visited Australia, where he gained many converts, and where, to this day, the tenets of the Brethren are taught and believed in.

From 1849–79 might be termed the flowing tide of the Exclusive movement. Though attacked and assailed on all hands, they steadily increased in numbers. Between 1858–66 controversy arose regarding some articles on the 'Sufferings of Christ' contributed by Darby to the *Bible Treasury*. W. H. Dorman and P. H. Hall charged him with holding views similar to Newton's. He offered to retire from fellowship, but the mass of the Brethren refused to regard him as a heretic. The controversy was bitter. Dorman, Hall, and others retired from communion, but formed no party. A host of writers attacked the Brethren. Darby, Kelly, and others replied vigorously. Darby's views were eventually adopted, and the controversy died down. Two other small disputes of no consequence occurred, one at Jersey, the other at Sheffield. Then in 1876, at Ryde, Isle of Wight, a dispute arose regarding marriage within the prohibited degrees. A clergyman, named Finch, who had left the English Church, and had broken bread in London, would not, on his return to Ryde, identify himself with the Ryde meeting because of its state, but, with some others, broke bread apart. In 1879 the aged Dr. Cronin, while on a visit to Ryde, broke bread with the Finch party. This brought the matter to a climax. On returning to London, Cronin was challenged for his action. As he affirmed that he was right, his act became a question for judgment. The Kennington meeting, though slow to judge, condemned his act, and on 31st August 1879 he was excluded from fellowship. It is generally conceded that serious blunders were committed during this dispute, with which the question of baptism mingled; and, as a result of it, the Ramsgate meeting divided into two parties, called after the names of the places at which they met, viz. Guildford Hall and Abbotshill. Finally, a letter commending a person from Guildford Hall was presented at Park Street, London. That meeting, after considering the case, decided to receive that person. This entailed the rejection of Abbotshill. Kelly, with others, maintained that this judgment was wrong, and would not accept it, even though his old leader Darby was the adviser. The result was that Blackheath, where Kelly resided, with other meetings, rejected the Park Street judgment, upon the plea that it was not the voice of all the London meetings, which hitherto had always acted in unison. A new section of Brethren was formed, led by Kelly, and marked by very exclusive principles. They have not increased in numbers, and in 1899 a revolt, led by W. W. Fereday, took place on the question of freedom in preaching the gospel; but he has since joined the Open communion, and the movement is dissolved.

Kelly died at Exeter on 27th March 1906. Next to Darby he was perhaps the greatest amongst the Brethren. As a scholar, an expositor, and a controversalist, he stood high, and had a clear and convincing style of expression. When he died, the *Times* and many religious magazines proclaimed him the 'Nestor' of the Brethren. His works are highly spoken of by such scholars as Ewald, Westcott, and Sanday. In the British Museum catalogue his works fill ten pages. On the suggestion of the Archbishop of York, he presented his unique library, weighing 17 tons, to the town of Middlesborough.

Darby died on 29th April 1882. He felt keenly the Kelly division, as can be seen from one of his last letters to the Brethren, in which he requested them not to attack Kelly. His writings extend to 50 vols., and he translated the Bible into English, German, and French.

A small division, occasioned by S. O'Malley Cluff, took place in 1881, but the party is now nearly extinct.

In 1882, after fifty-five years spent amongst the Brethren, the aged Dr. Cronin died. He was marked for his piety and fervour. Previously (in 1879) Darby's trusted friend, G. V. Wigram, had passed away. He was the editor of the *Englishman's Hebrew and Greek Concordances to the Old and New Testaments*, a work of accuracy and scholarship on which he spent a fortune, and in the production of which he received invaluable help from the learned Tregelles, who had been identified with the Brethren in their early days, but had disagreed with their judgment in the Newton case.

When Darby died, J. B. Stoney, whose religious ideas and teaching were said to be High Church, became leader in Britain; while, in America, F. W. Grant, who had put forth, while Darby was alive, some views on the 'Old Testament Saints having life in the Son,' and had affirmed that 'the man in the seventh of Romans was sealed by the Holy Spirit,' became leader. Darby had borne with Grant's views, but now that Darby was gone, fault was found with them, especially by Lord A. P. Cecil. Grant published his views in a pamphlet, which was severely criticized by W. J. Lowe and A. C. Ord. In 1884, Cecil and Alfred Mace, the evangelist, visited Montreal, where they condemned Grant's views, and, with a majority of the Montreal meeting, pronounced him a heretic, and excluded him from communion. This action affected only America and the few followers of C. E. Stuart in England. Most of the American meetings sided with Grant, and the Grant company prospered greatly. Mace in 1905 tendered a confession to the Grant Brethren for his rash act, lamenting that the man he had chiefly wronged was dead. Grant's death in 1903 prevented his completing his *Numerical Bible*, a work of considerable merit. He was beloved and honoured by those amongst whom he had laboured for forty years.

In 1885 a dispute took place at Reading. C. E. Stuart, a learned Brother, published a pamphlet on 'Christian Standing and Condition.' This provoked a controversy mingled with a petty local quarrel, and brought about the separation of

Stuart, with a small body of followers in England and some in the north of Scotland. The party has not grown, and Stuart died in January 1902. It is now generally thought that, if the pamphlet had been left alone, it would have passed into oblivion, and this division would have been averted. The Grant section in America and the followers of Stuart are now joined in fellowship.

During the last ten years of Stoney's leadership there was associated with him F. E. Raven, who went even beyond Stoney in pressing the subjective side of truth. About 1890, Raven expressed views such as that 'eternal life is not imparted to the saint; it is a sphere in which he lives in the love of God,' and is distinct from the new birth; Christ did not manifest eternal life to the world, but only to His own; 'Eternal Life' is not a title of Christ prior to incarnation, and the righteousness of God in 2 Co 5^{21} is future. Irreverent expressions concerning Christ's infancy were used by some of Raven's followers. These were condemned, but, nevertheless, a separation took place at Bexhill. This assembly refused to receive from Greenwich a person commended in the usual way, and cut off Raven and his meeting from fellowship. The Bexhill decision was upheld by W. L. Lowe, H. H. MacArthy, C. Stanley, and others in England, and by A. H. Rule and others in America; while, on the Continent, C. Brockhaus and many Dutch, French, and Swiss Brethren refused Raven's views. In England the division was serious. In France, Germany, and Switzerland the Brethren practically as a whole rejected Raven's doctrines.

At a conference in 1895, Raven questioned the ancient formula, 'the unity of His Person,' when applied to Christ's being God and man in one Person. His definition of Christ's Person was 'a Divine Person in human condition.' He affirmed that the Incarnation did not change or add to the Person of the Son. These and other assertions caused trouble. W. T. Turpin, a gifted Brother, who had long been in fellowship, retired from the Brethren; and many of their best men, though still remaining in communion, did so with much misgiving. Raven's teaching was severely criticized by Brethren outside his own communion, such as E. A. Thomas (Australia), F. W. Grant (America), and W. Kelly (England). Raven did not press his views, but his followers did. His visit to America in 1898 caused a division at Minneapolis. The extremists pressed his views too much, and some English Brethren supported E. Acomb, who opposed Raven; but most of the London leaders upheld Acomb's opponents. A small number were recognized as being in fellowship by the London Brethren in July 1905. These had all accepted Raven's views. J. S. Oliphant and Mace protested against the reception of this party, and would not withdraw their protest; so they were excluded from fellowship by the London leaders. It was at this time that Mace joined G. W. Heath in his attempt to amalgamate the different companies of Open and Exclusive Brethren.

Another storm burst after Raven's death. Several evangelists were preaching with considerable freedom, claiming the right to act on their own responsibility in their work. This was pronounced 'looseness and independency.' J. Taylor, of New York, set forth the view that 'we are saved by Christ and what He has established down here, viz. the Church or House of God.' A brother named James Boyd visited Taylor, and thereafter judged Taylor's views to be semi-Romanism. He wrote criticizing Taylor's errors. A controversy ensued. Boyd was called upon to withdraw his tract, or retire from fellowship. He would do neither, and in this he was supported by a great many Brethren in the north of England.

In 1905–7 a local dispute arose at Alnwick, Northumberland. That meeting was 'broken to pieces,' it was said, 'by its own folly.' Efforts were made to effect a reconciliation. At the end of two years (1907), Glanton and the neighbouring assemblies, with the concurrence of most Brethren in the district, decided to receive any person who had judged himself and sought reconciliation with his Brethren at Alnwick. This had been the practice of Brethren hitherto; but those who opposed Glanton's action in so doing pronounced this an infringement of the principle of 'local responsibility' and an interference with the Lord's rights. A few withdrew from fellowship at Newcastle and South Shields, and so forced on a crisis. An effort was made to suspend fellowship with the Northumberland meetings, as they were said to be 'in confusion.' This principle of 'suspending fellowship' was resented in many places; and, finally, when a sister from Whitley Bay presented a letter of commendation at George Street, Edinburgh, the Brethren there refused this principle of 'suspended fellowship,' and received her. There was a secession in consequence, and those opposed to Glanton formed a new meeting. The London Brethren were called upon to consider the rival claims of the two companies in Edinburgh, when a sister presented a letter to a London meeting, and most of the London meetings decided that Glanton infringed the principle of 'local responsibility,' extinguished the Alnwick assembly, and 'usurped the Lord's functions' in so doing. This decision, carried into effect 31st August 1908, cut off Glanton, Edinburgh, and all other meetings associated with them. W. T. P. Wolston's pamphlet, 'Hear the Right,' gives the history of this last division, and deals in detail with all the contributory causes that led to it.

Such is a very brief outline of the history of the Brethren. Forty years ago their early dissolution was prophesied; but they are still, though divided, a living force. Their religion is a simple one. The Bible to them is an infallible and living book; Christ is an all-sufficient and living Saviour; God is a loving Father revealed in the Son of His bosom; salvation is a reality, and can be known now; Heaven with its glories, and the everlasting Kingdom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, are proclaimed, and believed in; the Lord's Coming is the great object of hope; the world is under the judgment of the Cross, and men must be saved from impending doom; Hell and eternal punishment are realities; the world's politics, philosophy, and mere social reform advocated for the betterment of the world are but the whitewashing of a house built on sand, or the attempted renovation of a system morally corrupt; their mission is not to save the world but to save people out of it, and while passing through it the Christian is to live soberly, righteously, and godly; his business is to get right and keep right in his soul with God; it is his duty to obey the powers that be, save only when the civil government interferes with his conscience in obedience to God's command. The Brethren all take the place of the Christian priesthood, and gather to the Lord's name. They look for His Holy Spirit to guide some brother to break the bread, pray, or minister, in subjection to the Lord in the midst. Women are not allowed to speak in the assembly. Their teachers minister by lecture or Bible-reading; their pastors care for and tend the flock, while their evangelists preach the gospel. In the present condition of the Church they do not believe in appointing elders, seeing that their meeting is but a fragment of the body of true

Christians resident in their own locality, and some who might be elders are in the churches around. If, however, in their meetings there be men possessing the requisite qualifications, these are thankfully owned and honoured, though not officially appointed. Statistics of Brethren cannot be ascertained, but they form a good proportion of the Christian community in Britain and America and on the Continent.

LITERATURE.—The clearest statement of the general views of the Brethren is found in Darby's *What I Learn from Scripture*, which was revised by Wm. Kelly in his *Bible Treasury*, and is published by Morrish, London, as a tract. The following is a select Bibliography from hundreds of books and pamphlets, and gives both sides of their disputes, and what is written against them:—For the general history of the Brethren: W. B. Neatby, *A History of the Plymouth Brethren*, 1901; J. S. Teulon, *History and Teaching of the Plymouth Brethren*, 1883; A. Miller, *The Brethren: their Rise, Progress, and Testimony*, c. 1877. For the Plymouth Question: J. N. Darby, *Narrative of Facts, Proceedings at Rawstorne Street*; Lord Congleton, *Reasons for Leaving Rawstorne Street*. On the Sufferings of Christ: Wm. Trotter, *The Whole Case of Plymouth and Bethesda*, 1898. On Bethesda: G. V. Wigram, *The Present Question*, 1848–9; H. Groves, *Darbyism, its Rise and Development: A Review of the Bethesda Question*, 1867; J. N. D., *The Sufferings of Christ*; W. H. Dorman, *The Close of Twenty-eight Years of Association with J. N. D.*, 1886. On the Law and the Righteousness of God: J. N. D., *Brethren and Their Reviewers*; S. P. Tregelles, *Five Letters of the Recent Denials of Our Lord's Vicarious Life*, 1864. On the Ramsgate Question: J. H., *A Fresh Testimony . . . Ecclesiastical Error . . . an Epitome of the Ramsgate Sorrow*, 1882. On Grant and Montreal: *Narrative of the Facts at Montreal*, 1884; E. C. L. and E. Crain, *Statement of Separation*; F. W. Grant, *Letter on the Montreal Division*. On Reading: C. B., *The Reading Question, the History and Review*; F. H. B., *A Concise Statement of the Reading Question*. On F. E. Raven, or the Bexhill Division: F. E. R., *Papers on Eternal Life*, etc.; H. A. Hammond, *Record of Some Correspondence, Documents, and Facts*, 1890–1. On the attempted union of Open Brethren with Grant: F. W. Grant, *What is the Present Position of Open Brethren?* 1888. On the second Raven trouble: F. E. R., *Readings and Lectures in United States and Canada*, 1898–1902; Wm. Kelly, *F. E. R.'s Heterodox on Eternal Life and other Divine Truths*; F. W. Grant, *Retracings of Truth*; E. A. Thomas, *Refutation of False Doctrine, being Truth for the Time* (No. 3). On the American and English troubles: J. S. Oliphant, *Minneapolis*, 1905; J. Taylor, J. Pillatt, and others, *Readings at Chicago, Dec. 1904 and Jan. 1905; Letters from J. Boyd on American Teaching*, 1908, 1909; W. T. P. Wolston, *Hear the Right; Two Letters by H. Vinal on the Glanton Question*. On 'Needed Truth' and Open Brethren Dispute: *Brief Statement of the Doctrines of Holy Scripture* (views of the 'Needed Truth' party). For attacks on the Brethren generally (of these there are many, but the following are the strongest): W. Reid, *Plymouth Brethrenism Unveiled and Refuted*, 1880; *The Plymouth Brethren, their Rise, Progress, Practice, and Doctrines*, a lecture by Edward Dennett, 1871. To this, Dennet himself replied later when he became a Brother, in his *The Step I have taken*, 1876. See also J. C. L. Carson, *The Heresies of the Plymouth Brethren*, 1870; Thomas Croskery, *Plymouth Brethrenism*, 1879.

JOHN M'CULLOCH.

BREVIARY.—See LITURGIES.

BRIBERY.—See CORRUPTION.

BRIDE, BRIDEGROOM.—See MARRIAGE.

BRIDGE.—To the awe with which primitive man regarded the flowing of a wide, deep river, effectually barring his access to the opposite side, may be traced an extensive series of superstitious and religious practices current in former ages, and still observed in modified forms to-day. The subject may be approached under the following three postulates: (i.) To all early races, rivers were part of a Divine scheme for delimiting frontiers, for apportioning territories to the different races of mankind, and for obstructing the interference of district with district. Rivers accordingly acquired a semi-sacred character, and each stream had its tutelary divinity. The torrent that foamed across man's path was the vomit of a local demon. (ii.) To interfere with what the gods had laid down as a natural boundary, to bridge the stream which had been intended to act as a barrier to the insatiable and the restless curiosity of man, was a daring, nay, a sacrilegious act. In the event of a bridge being built, therefore, the local river-spirit must be appeased by some compensating sacrifice. (iii.) Once this sacrifice has been made, and the river-spirit been placated, the bridge becomes in a sense sacred. It is the aim of this article to trace out the ramifications of these three fundamental ideas.

i. THE PRIMITIVE CONCEPTION THAT EACH STREAM HAD ITS RESIDENT DIVINITY OR RIVER-SPIRIT.—It is beyond the scope of this article to marshal the evidence in support of this first notion. The conception that each stream had its protecting divinity, whose majesty must not be trifled with, was a very common one in Greek and Roman mythology. The customary emblematic representation of the idea in Greek art was that of a figure of an old man with a long beard, clothed in blue garments, and crowned with a chaplet of reeds. He is usually depicted reclining upon an urn from which water continually flows, and, as the river-god, he was supposed to dwell by preference in the caverns and deepest recesses of the river's bed. His care of the river extended to its pollution, and Homer (*Iliad*, xxi. 136 ff.) has described the resentment of the two rivers of Troy, the Scamander and Simois, against Achilles, when he presumptuously profaned their waters. (For further illustration of the hostility of a river-spirit if his majesty be insulted and his quiet disturbed, see J. Rhys, *Celtic Folklore*, ii. 425–430; W. Gregor, *Folklore of the North-East of Scotland*, pp. 66, 67; *Trans. Asiatic Soc. of Japan* for Ainu river-gods and goddesses; J. Abercromby, 'Beliefs and Religious Ceremonies of the Mordvins,' in *FLJ* vii. 72; also *Annales Archéol.* tom. ix. pp. 107–108; and for the idea of the impiety of disturbing natural boundaries, cf. Horace, *Carm.* i. 3. 21: 'Nequicquam deus abscidit Prudens Oceano dissociabili Terras, si tamen impiae Non tangenda rates transiliunt vada').

ii. THE APPEASING OF THE OFFENDED RIVER-SPIRIT.—1. Was this observed in connexion with the Pons Sublicius?—The necessity of some expiatory sacrifice to the river-god, when a bridge was built across the stream, defying his supremacy, seems to have been recognized at a very early period. The early history of Rome shows traces of it. Probably not more than three bridges were erected over the Tiber before the end of the Republic. Of these the most ancient and by far the most famous was the *Pons Sublicius*.* Erected by Ancus Martius to unite Rome to his new fortification on the Janiculum, it was probably situated at the Forum Boarium, not far from the broken arches of the Ponte de Rotto (Livy, i. 33; Dionys. iii. 45, ix. 68; Plut. *Numa*, 9). Down to its latest days, the entire structure, including every bolt and fastening, was constructed of timber [for the reason for this see p. 855]. On the Ides of May (Ovid says the day before), an annual procession of Pontifices, Prætors, and Vestal Virgins marched to this bridge. On the way they visited the so-called 24 *Sacella Argeorum* (chapels), and from them carried away a corresponding† number of *Argei*. These *Argei* were puppets or effigies made of bulrushes, and stuffed so as to represent bodies of old men bound hand and foot. The Flaminica Dialis, the priestess of Juppiter, was present, dressed, not in her customary bridal attire, but in mourning garb. To the accompaniment of the chanting of appropriate hymns and prayers, the puppets were lifted by the Vestal Virgins and flung into the river from the parapet of the bridge (Dionys. i. 38; Ovid, *Fasti*, v. 621 ff.; Plutarch, *Quæst. Rom.* 32 and 86). Of a custom so peculiar,

* From the *sublica*, or piles, on which it was built.

† Dionysius gives 30 as the number.

the Roman antiquarians suggested various explanations:—

(*a*) The *Sacella* were reported to be the graves of the Greeks who came to Italy with Hercules, and the *Argei* were his followers. Though settled in fair Italy, they entertained tender memories of sweet Argos; and, as each hero died, he bequeathed to his friends the sacred duty of throwing his body into the Tiber that it might be transported by the waves to the far-off shore of his fatherland. The rush-made image was the later substitute for the dead body of the early Greek (Ovid, *Fasti*, v. 656). The ancient etymology of *Argei* from Ἀργεῖοι is supported by Mommsen (*Staatsrecht*, iii. 123).

(*b*) The second explanation of the practice was that it was the harmless survival of an earlier and ruder epoch, when old men, above the age of sixty, being considered useless for military service, were cast into the stream and drowned. Though Ovid acknowledges that this traditional explanation was an old one, he nevertheless indignantly repudiates it as a slander on the humanity of his ancestors. Such practices, however, were not unknown in the ancient world. That those past their prime, and afflicted with the increasing infirmities of age, should thus be put to death, was not considered incompatible with filial piety, but rather in the line of kindness, and even of patriotic duty to the State (Cæsar, *de Bell. Gall.* vi. 16; Tac. *Germ.* 9 and 39; cf. also art. OLD AGE).

In later days there arose a belief that the *pons* from which these old men were flung was a more innocuous structure than the Pons Sublicius. On the day of the Comitia, a number of polling-booths were erected in the forum, or wherever the voting was to take place. These booths, or *septa*, were entered by a narrow passage or plank termed *pons* or *ponticulus*, and, when the voter had received his *tabella*, or voting-ticket, out of one of the large vases called *sistæ* or *cistellæ*, he passed along the *pons*, and emerged from the booth by a corresponding 'bridge' on the other side (Cicero, *in Pison.* 15. 40, *pro Plancio*, 6, *pro Harusp. resp.* 20). Festus (p. 334, *s.v.* 'Sexagenarii') argues that, though the aged men were free from the burden of active service for the State, they jealously retained their right to vote. The younger men accordingly were annoyed, and, as their seniors went up the *pons* to record their vote, they raised the cry, which became proverbial, that the old men should be thrown from the bridge ('sexagenarios de ponte'). Ovid (*Fasti*, v. 634) states that the youths actually threw the old men from the bridge (see Cic. *pro Roscio Amerino*, 35. 100; Varro, *apud* Lactant. *Inst.* i. 21. 6). But as these voting *pontes* were comparatively late institutions, and the proverb is a very old one, it would seem after all that the bridge referred to was not the plank of the Comitia polling-booth, but the more fatal Pons Sublicius. The fact, however, remains that parricide was always looked on with horror by the Romans, and it is hard to see how the practice should have passed into a yearly ceremony.

(*c*) By others the rite was regarded as a relic of the time when human sacrifices were general. Ovid states that it was believed by some that Hercules was the first to throw into the stream as sacrifices to the river-god, not living citizens, but fictitious bundles of straw. That human sacrifices were not infrequent in the early days of the Republic is shown by the evidence collected by Merivale (*Hist.* iii. 35). O. Müller (*Etrusker*, ii. 20) believes that the practice was introduced into the Roman cultus from Etruria. It continued down to A.U.C. 657, when Cn. Corn. Lentulus and P. Licin. Crassus, as consuls for the year, made a law which, for the future, prohibited any such human sacrifices. There is, therefore, nothing inherently impossible in the notion that the Pons Sublicius was the scene of primitive human immolation. J. G. Frazer points out (*JPh* xiv. [1885] p. 156, note) that, in early Rome, bridges, being novelties, were viewed with suspicion. They were an insult to the river-god, inasmuch as 'they robbed him of his food by carrying dry-shod over his head the people who, in the course of nature, would have been drowned at the ford.' Thus arose the practice of yielding to Father Tiber a yearly compensation, at first of living citizens who were flung into the river, but later of substitutes in the form of stuffed effigies of old men.

On the other hand, W. Warde Fowler (*Roman Festivals*, p. 112 ff.), in an elaborate analysis of the ancient rite, arrives at the conclusion that the ceremony was dramatic rather than sacrificial, and had primarily to do with the annual purification of the land. He dwells upon the presence at the rite of the Pontifices, and especially of the Vestals, on whom lay the duty of throwing the puppets into the stream, the idea being that the food and nourishment of the State depended on an accurate performance of their duties. He points to the presence and the dress of the Flaminica Dialis, who appeared in this garb only on those great occasions of purification that marked the conclusion of one season, and the beginning of a new season which must be entered on with great care. It was something akin to Adonis-worship, which in Egypt was observed in the same method by the immersion in water of a puppet accompanied by wailings. Mannhardt (*Ant. Wald- und Feldkulte*, p. 276) mentions a Russian practice in which figures of straw, dressed in female clothing, are laid on a bier, carried to a lake or river, torn up, and thrown in, while the spectators hide their faces and wail; and again, in another district, on the same day (June 29th), an old man is carried out of the town, as a symbol that spring has gone, and is followed by *women* singing mournful songs, and indulging in gestures of grief.* Mannhardt (*Baumkultus*, chs. iii. iv. v.) gives many instances from mediæval and modern times of the practice of similar rites, showing that the place of the puppet is sometimes taken by a sheaf, a small tree, or a man or boy dressed up in foliage or fastened in a sheaf. In almost every case the puppet is ducked in water or sprinkled, though sometimes it is burned or buried. The Bavarian *Wasservogel* was an effigy which was carried round the fields at Whitsuntide and then thrown from a bridge into a stream. There is still extant a law passed in A.D. 1351 forbidding the ducking of persons at Erfurt at the Easter or Whitsuntide festivals. Warde Fowler follows Mannhardt in maintaining that all this is a symbol of the departure of winter, and the arrival of the fruitful season. In support of this theory he points out that, while the old Roman practice was to throw in 'old men,' it is a curious coincidence that the name of the puppet thrown in at Whitsuntide at Halle is 'der Alte.' The German puppet, again, is *white*, and the Roman effigy bore a name Ἀργεῖοι, which is probably derived from a root *arg* (seen in *argentum*), meaning the *white* ones (=the old ones). This explanation, however, though it explains some things very aptly, and fits in with some otherwise obscure details, fails to give any satisfactory reason why *a bridge over a river* should be the scene of the purification of the *land*, or why in each case there should be *water*, and the casting of a puppet into a *stream*. We come back, therefore, to the view, supported by a multitude of corroborative facts, that the casting into the stream in early times of a live victim, and the substitution in later ages of effigies, were due to a belief in the necessity of placating the river-spirit, whose majesty was offended by a structure spanning his waters, the very object of which was to rob him of his toll in human victims.

2. This root-idea of the necessity of a sacrifice traced to modern times.—The wide-spread nature of this custom will be recognized from the following instances. Herodotus (ii. 90) states that the priests of the Nile-god claimed the right to bury with high honours all bodies drowned in the river, 'as being something more than human.' The god had claimed them, and they were his property. Maspero (*Dawn of Civilization*, p. 39) describes the sacrifices to the river at Silsileh on the rising of the Nile. See also Lane (*Mod. Egyptians*, ch. xxvi.) for the *'arooseh* (bride)—the virgin thrown into the river as a sacrifice to obtain a plentiful inundation. Picart (*Cerem. and Relig. Cust. of the World*, 1733, iii. 87) refers to the practice of the savages on the Mississippi of sacrificing prisoners to the genii who preside over the waters. Compare also the yearly sacrifice of a girl to the spirit of Niagara. When a man is drowning in a river, it is a common saying in Germany that 'the spirit of the stream is getting his yearly victim' (Grimm, *Deutsche Mythol.* p. 409). There is a legend that the spirit of the river Ribble, in York-

* In Silesia, as late as the 16th cent., according to Guagnin (*Sarmatiae Europeae descriptio*, fol. 105), on March 17 of each year, being the anniversary of the destruction of the pagan idols by Mieczyslaw I. (962–992), 'pueri in villis et oppidis ex more recepto simulacrum quoddam ad similitudinem mulieris conficiunt, oppidoque turmatim egressi quandam cantionem ingeminantes simulacrum illud de ponte in flumen praecipitant.' This would seem, however, to be merely a sort of Guy Fawkes celebration of the destruction of paganism. In this general connexion it should be noted that Gruppe (*Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte*, p. 821) holds that such ceremonies as those associated with the *Argei* were originally rain charms.

shire (known as Peg o' Nell), demanded a victim every seven years (W. Henderson, *Folklore of the Northern Counties*, p. 265); and the American Indians have a tradition that the Falls of Niagara must have two human victims annually. The notion, however, is very prominently brought out in the following connexions:—

(*a*) *Sacrifices necessary at the foundation of bridges.*—A legend is current about London Bridge that, in order to render the structure secure, the stones were besprinkled with the blood of little children. When the broken dam of the Nogat was repaired in A.D. 1463, the peasants were advised to throw in a living man. They seized a beggar, made him drunk, and buried him (Tylor, *Primitive Culture*[3], i. 104). In 1843, on the erection of a new bridge at Halle, it was widely believed that the structure ought to have had a child built into it (Grimm, *op. cit.* p. 956). The builder of the 'Loh-Family Bridge' at Shanghai experienced some difficulty in laying the foundation. He vowed to Heaven 2000 children if the river-spirit would allow the stones to be laid properly. The divinity (she was a goddess on this occasion) replied that she would not require their lives, but that the number named would be attacked by smallpox. The epidemic actually broke out, and half the number died. It is a Chinese belief that a bridge built without attention to these religious observances will bring about a visitation of smallpox. In Tibet, when smallpox is raging, the inhabitants of the villages as yet untouched by the disease try to stay its progress by placing thorns on the bridges to terrify away the evil spirits who bring the plague. Those who die of the disease are thrown into the rivers (Annie W. Marston, *The Great Closed Land* [Tibet], p. 41). At Hang-Chow, a tea-merchant cast himself into the river Tsien-tang as a sacrifice to the spirit of the dykes which were constantly being washed away (Moncure D. Conway, *Demonology and Devil-lore*, 1879, i. 204). In 1872 there was a scare at Calcutta when the Hooghly Bridge was built. The Hindus imagined that the spirit of the river would consent to have its majesty invaded only on condition that each pier of the structure was founded on a layer of children's heads (A. B. Gomme, *Traditional Games of England, Scotland, and Ireland*, i. 346 ff.; G. L. Gomme, *Folklore Relics of Early Village Life*, p. 29). In 1890 the *Pall Mall Gazette* reported that heads of unwary travellers in China were being cut off, and £10 was being paid for each head by the Department of Public Works in order that they might be built into the foundations of the piers of a number of new bridges that were in course of erection. It was stated that such was the terror of the coolies that for no money could they be induced to carry fares to the suburbs at night. (For a similar story see *Nature*, April 30, 1896, under title 'Megalithic Folklore,' by S. E. Peal, Sibsagar, Assam, March 27.) Among the popular traditions of Albania, there is one to the effect that human beings were formerly buried under the foundations of important bridges. Throughout the Greek East there is a current belief that every building has a resident spirit, and every stream a resident genie, which goes by the name of the στοιχεῖον. It is believed that the man whose shadow falls on the first-laid stone of a house will die within the year, and his shadow, remaining in the building, becomes its στοιχεῖον; hence the practice of sacrificing fowls and sheep at the beginning of any important construction to avert danger from the workmen. 'But sometimes, instead of killing an animal, the builder entices a man to the foundation-stone, secretly measures his body, or a part of it, or his shadow, and buries the measure under the foundation-stone, or he lays the foundation-stone upon the man's shadow. It is believed that the man will die within the year' (B. Schmidt, *Das Volksleben der Neugriechen*, p. 196 f., quoted by J. G. Frazer, *Golden Bough*[2], i. 291). Until a sacrifice has been offered to this spirit, no bridge will be allowed to stand secure. A bridge so secured is termed 'stoicheion-built' (στοιχειοθεμελιώμενα), and legends regarding such bridges are everywhere met with. Some of the Greek folk-songs are famous, *e.g. The Bridge of Adana in Kappadocia*: 'All day long they built the piers: by night they fell in ruins.' The builders are at their wits' end. They know that the bridge will never stand until a living spirit is given to it in sacrifice. But who is willing to be thus offered? The engineer entices his wife to the edge of the excavation for one of the piers. He drops his ring into it, and induces his wife to fetch it up:

> 'Then down goes she, and down goes she, steps forty-two descends she,
> And fall upon her as she goes of stones a thousand litras,
> And throw they down upon her, too, of earth a thousand spadefuls.'

As she dies, she calls out:

> 'Hear thou my words, Yiannáki mine, let not the world rejoice thee,
> Three only sisters once were we, we were three sisters only;
> The one did build the Danube's bridge, the second the Euphrates,
> And I, I too, the murdered one, the bridge build of Adana' (Lucy M. J. Garnett and J. S. Stuart-Glennie, *Greek Folk Poesy*, 1896, p. 71).

The same legend is current in Italy as regards the Bridge of Arta, which collapsed till the master-builder walled in his wife. With her dying curse, however, she prophesied that the bridge would always tremble (*ib.* p. 81). The same story is told of the 'Lady's Bridge' in Peloponnesus (*ib.* p. 70) and the 'Trembling Bridge' near Canea in Crete. So engrained is the belief in the necessity of such sacrifices, that it is alleged that in Zacynthus the inhabitants would still kill a human victim if they were not deterred by fear of the law's vengeance (B. Schmidt, *op. cit.* p. 197 ff.). The idea that underlay the old Roman substitution of rush-men for human victims is still observable occasionally in different parts of the world; and to this day sacrifices of a less dreadful character than that of human beings continue to be offered to the water-spirits of Austria and Germany (Th. Vernaleken, *Mythen u. Bräuche des Volkes in Oesterreich*, 1859, p. 168; A. D. Wuttke, *Deutscher Volksaberglaube*[2], 1900, § 429).

(*b*) *The 'bridge-sacrifice' a part of the widespread belief in the necessity of a 'foundation-sacrifice' for all structures.*—This placating of the river-spirit is thus in strict harmony with the almost universal belief in the necessity of a sacrifice as a rite preliminary to the erection of all buildings. Thus the Picts are said to have bathed their pre-historic foundation-stones with human blood to propitiate the spirit of the soil (Forbes Leslie, *Early Races of Scotland*, i. 149). Mackinnon (*Culture in Early Scotland*, p. 53) asserts that 'even after the humanizing doctrines of Jesus had become the popular creed, the power of this grim rite occasionally asserted itself in the practice of slaying or burying a victim, before or during the erection of a building, in the belief that only thus could it be made secure' (see also Gaidoz, *Mélusine*, iv. 16). A Thuringian legend is extant that, to make the castle of Liebenstein secure and impregnable, a child was bought from its mother for hard cash, and walled into the foundations. The wall of Copenhagen sank during its erection as fast as it was built. The workmen took an innocent little girl, set her on a chair at a table with toys and eatables, and then twelve master-

masons closed a vault over her. The wall thereupon was completed and stood firm (Tylor, *Primitive Culture*[3], i. 104 f.). There is a Servian legend that three brothers combined to build the fortress of Scutari, but were baffled by the demons, who razed by night what it had taken 300 masons to erect by day. At last the fiends were appeased by the immolation of the wife of the youngest of the three, who happened to be the first to come with food for the workmen (*ib.*). When Vortigern was erecting a strong fort in Snowdon, what the workmen built in one day was always swallowed up in earth the next night. The king consulted Merlin, who advised that the stones and mortar should be sprinkled with the blood of a child born of a mother without a father (Nennius, *Mon. Hist. Brit.* p. 67; also Selden's note to Drayton's *Polyolbion*, p. 158). In Adamnan's *Life of St. Columba* (Reeve's tr. 1857, p. 203) there is the following naive yet significant statement:

'Columkille said then to his people, "It would be well for us that our roots should pass into the earth here." And he said to them, "It is permitted to you that some of you go under the earth of this island to consecrate it." Odhran arose quickly, and then spake. "If you accept me," he said, "I am ready for that." "O Odhran," said Columkille, "you shall receive the reward of this: no request shall be granted to any one at my tomb unless he first ask of thee." Odhran then went to heaven. He (Columkille) then founded the church of Hy.'

Thus the spirits of the soil of Iona were propitiated, whereas till then they had overthrown by night what had been erected by day (see Scott's *Minstrelsy of the Scott. Border*, note to the 'Court of Keeldar' and 'Glenfinlas'; Innes, *Eccles. Hist.*; Pennant, *Voyage to Scotland*, i. 286 ff.; Joyce, *Social History of Ancient Ireland*, i. 284 ff.).

Human skeletons have been found under foundations of the round towers in Ireland (*FLJ* i. 23). A Highland tradition relates that, when the workmen had assembled to lay the foundation of Tigh-an-Torr, in Western Ross-shire, they caught the first person who chanced to pass, and buried him under the foundation-stone. At the laying of the foundation of Redcastle, a red-haired girl was buried alive under the stone (Haddon, *The Study of Man*, 1898, p. 354; see also MacBain, *Celtic Mythology and Religion*, pp. 45, 46; Stokes, *Revue Celtique*, ii. 200, 201; Windisch, *Irish Grammar*, p. 139). Fitzstephen, in his account of London in the 12th cent., mentions that, when the Tower was built, the mortar was tempered with the blood of beasts (A. B. Gomme, *Tradit. Games*, p. 346 f.). Formerly in Siam, when a new city gate was being erected, it was customary for a number of officers to lie in wait and seize the first four or eight persons who happened to pass by. These were then buried alive under the gate-posts to serve as guardian-angels. The *Ceylon Observer* of Jan. 27th, 1887, had a paragraph in which it was stated that the schools in Colombo were empty, many children were missing, and parents were afraid to let their offspring venture out of doors, because the report had got abroad that 350 boys under the age of 12 were required as sacrifices to propitiate the deity who was responsible for the crack in the great Maligakanda reservoir (*FLJ* v. 260). For further illustrations of this 'foundation-sacrifice' idea see Gerard, *The Land beyond the Forest* (Transylvania), ii. 17; H. Clay Trumbull, *The Threshold Covenant*, p. 47; Macalister in *PEFSt*, 1904, p. 16, where a plate shows a skeleton of a woman discovered at Gezer as a foundation-sacrifice in a pre-Israelitic Palestine town; Rodd, *Customs and Lore of Modern Greece*, p. 168; *FLR*, vol. iii. pp. 282–283, vol. iv. pp. 124, 186; *FLJ*, vol. i. pp. 23–24, 92; Bowring, *Servian Popular Poetry*, p. 64; Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*, pp. 972, 1095; St. John, *Far East*, i. 46. See also art. FOUNDATION.

(c) *The primitive heathen 'river-spirit' becomes the 'devil' of Christian times.*—In the Christian centuries the heathen idea of a water-spirit, or genius of the river, gave place to the conception that the devil assumes guardianship over all streams. And yet there was a wide-spread belief that the jurisdiction of the devil extended no further than the middle of a running stream (cf. Burns, *Tam o' Shanter*). He has accordingly a special antipathy to bridges, as was the case with his ancient prototype. Numerous, therefore, are the legends to be found over all Europe attached to so-called 'Devils' Bridges,' narrating how the Evil One would not allow the bridge to be erected until he had received payment of an offering like that of Iphigenia. In Herzegovina the Muslims regard the office of a civil engineer with pious horror, and curse a new bridge when they pass it. It is to them the symbol of the devil's presence, and the token of an unholy compact between the Evil One and the architect (A. J. Evans, *Through Bosnia and Herzegovina*, p. 314). Like his predecessor the river-spirit, the devil, however, was sometimes cheated of his due. Many of the more ancient bridges of Germany and Switzerland have legends attached to them narrating how the hard conditions laid down by the great enemy (whose tale of victims by drowning was cut short by the erection of a bridge) were successfully evaded.

The Montafon bridge in the Tyrol and the bridge at Ratisbon are illustrations. In the case of the latter, the architect was apprenticed to a master who was building the Cathedral. He laid a wager that he would bridge the Danube before his superior laid the cope-stone of the church. After many failures, the apprentice entered into a compact with the devil, who appeared to him in the garb of a friar. The devil undertook to build fifteen arches of the bridge, on the understanding that he would get the first three living creatures that crossed the bridge. The work was completed in time. The wily apprentice sent across the bridge a dog, a cock, and a hen. The devil in wrath tore the animals to pieces and disappeared. A procession of holy monks passed over the bridge and rendered it safe, and in proof of the reality of the story the figures of the three animals are still triumphantly shown, carved upon the bridge (Moncure D. Conway, *op. cit.* vol. i. p. 204; Tylor, *op. cit.* i. 106; for other instances in Germany, see Grimm, *op. cit.* p. 853). Goethe (*Faust*, ii. 4, Hayward's tr.) makes Mephistopheles say:

'My wanderer on faith's crutches hobbles on
Towards the Devil's Bridge and Devil's Stone.

A French legend of another 'Pont du diable' describes how an apple was thrown along a newly-finished bridge, and a cat allowed to go in chase of it. The devil was again thus cheated. Principal Rhys has kindly favoured the writer with a similar legend from Wales. 'The devil bargains with an old woman who wants the bridge built, to have as his pay the first creature that crosses the bridge, and expects thus to get the old woman herself. But she takes her dog with her, and throws a piece of bread before her. The dog rushes after it over the bridge, and the devil does not score in the end.' Cf. Longfellow (*The Golden Legend*, Canto v.), who describes the Devil's Bridge at Pilatus, near Lucerne:

'And the Devil promised to let it stand,
Under compact and condition
That the first living thing which crossed
Should be surrendered into his hand,
And be beyond redemption lost.
At length the bridge being all completed,
The Abbot, standing at its head,
Threw across it a loaf of bread,
Which a hungry dog sprang after,
And the rocks re-echoed with peals of laughter
To see the Devil thus defeated!'

It is the same idea which appears in the practice of building *empty* coffins into walls in Germany; in the walling of a *lamb* instead of a child under an altar in Denmark to ensure the stability of the church; in the killing of 12 *sheep*, and placing their heads under the foundations of the pillars of a new bridge over the Arcen in Albania (J. G. von Hahn, *Albanesische Studien*, 1854, i. 161); in the sacrifice of a *chicken* in place of a girl as a foundation-sacrifice in Borneo (Haddon, *op. cit.* p. 355). For further illustrations see Garnett, *Women of Turkey*, ii. 286; Alexandri, *Ballades de la Roumanie*, 1855, under 'The Monastery of Argis'; Tylor, *op. cit.* i. 106 f., with references to the custom in Galam in Africa, in Polynesia, in South Asia, in Japan, and in Tenasserim.

It is clear from these myths that the idea of regarding the devil as the actual architect of the bridge is a later development. The early conception that the devil merely allowed the erection of the structure on payment of a solatium passed into the idea that the devil himself was the builder,

and must have his payment accordingly. A still more developed form of the notion of diabolical or infernal power being invoked in the rearing of a bridge is seen in Froissart (*Chron.* i. 391), who tells how, in A.D. 1381, when the Duke of Anjou was besieging a strong castle on the coast of Naples, a necromancer (doubtless with the help of the devil) built a bridge which carried ten soldiers abreast, until one that passed over the bridge 'made the signe of the crosse on hym, then all went to nought, and they that were on the bridge fell into the sea.' A companion tale is told of the rearing and the destruction of the 'Kelpie's Bridge,' or Drochaid-na-Vouha, at the mouth of the Dornoch Firth (see Miss Dempster's 'Folklore of Sutherlandshire' in *FLJ* vi. 172 [1888]), where the exclamation of an admiring countryman, 'God bless the workmen and the work,' caused the infernal labourers to vanish, and the magnificent golden bridge to sink into the waves.

(*d*) *Survival of the idea of sacrifice to the river-spirit in modern children's games.*—One of the most curious survivals of the ancient custom is seen in many modern children's games. The singing game known as 'London Bridge' has many variants in the different localities where it is played, but fundamentally the theme is the same:

'London Bridge is broken down,
London Bridge is broken down,
London Bridge is broken down,
My fair lady.'

Mrs. Gomme, in her *Traditional Games of England, Scotland, and Ireland*, has analyzed this rhyme very thoroughly. She shows that the song describes the difficulty encountered in building the bridge by *ordinary* means, and that it asks many questions how the structure is to be reared. At last the children seize a 'poor prisoner,' to whom they say, 'Off to prison you must go.' The prisoner in the game is actually 'caught,' and 'released' on payment of a forfeit. The game is thus a curious survival of the old-world notion that a bridge could stand secure only by the death of a 'prisoner,' or, if need be, of his substitute. It is thus allied to the στοιχεῖον folksongs of the Greek Orient. Prof. Léon Pineau has suggested in regard to another children's game, a very popular French '*ronde*,' which commences:

'Sur le pont de Nantes,
Sur le pont de Nantes
Un bal est affiché . . .'

that this game relates to 'a ritual dance on the occasion of a human sacrifice to the divinities of the water' (quoted in Haddon, *op. cit.* p. 356).

(*e*) *Transference of the dread associations of bridges to the 'Bridge of Judgment' in the under world of spirits.*—So firmly lodged in men's minds was the conviction that the erection of a bridge implied some kind of preliminary transaction with supernatural powers by way of satisfying their animosity, that, in view of the life beyond the grave, similar conceptions were held regarding the river of death. In the lower world of Shades will there not be a bridge to be crossed, a bridge spanning the dark stream of death, nay, it may be, the very mouth of hell itself? The idea became a fixed belief in nations far sundered geographically. The river-spirit, who in the upper world demanded an adequate satisfaction in the event of his stream being crossed by a bridge, was represented in the lower regions sometimes by the devil, sometimes by stern guardian-angels. The primitive conception of human sacrifices as an offering to the river-god developed in later ages into the belief that the devil received as his prize all who could not successfully pass the ordeal of crossing the narrow bridge.

Sale (*Koran*[2], 1825 Prel. Disc. § iv. p. 121) describes how integral a part of Muhammadan theology this is. The Muslims hold that those who are to be admitted into Paradise will take the right hand way, and those who are destined to hell-fire will take the left; but both of them must first pass the bridge (called in Arabic *al-Ṣirāt*) which is laid over the midst of hell, and is finer than a hair, and sharper than the edge of a sword. It seems very difficult to conceive how any one can stand upon it. The bridge, moreover, is beset on each side with briars and hooked thorns, which will, however, be no impediment to the good, who will pass with wonderful ease and swiftness, like lightning on the wind, Muhammad and the Muslims leading the way. The wicked, what with the slipperiness and extreme narrowness of the path, the entangling of the thorns, and the extinction of the light which directed the faithful to Paradise, will soon miss their footing, and fall down headlong into hell, which is gaping beneath them (Pocock, *Specim. Hist. Arab.*, pp. 282–289). Other Muhammadan legends affirm that this awful bridge stretches between the Temple of Jerusalem on the W. and the Mount of Olives on the E., while between lies the Valley of Hell (the Valley of Jehoshaphat). The pious will be upheld, as they cross, by an angel who will hold them by a single lock of the head ('Shasheh'), but the wicked will fall into the Valley el-Jehennam beneath. Although the bridge of *al-Ṣirāt* is not mentioned in the *Qur'ān*, it is much elaborated in later Muhammadan eschatology, where it is described, in addition to the details already given, as in length a journey of 3000 years, 1000 ascending, 1000 level, and 1000 descending, while fire shoots up about it a journey of 40 years. While, as already noted, the righteous pass over it like a flash of lightning, less perfect Muslims take longer periods in proportion to their guilt, some requiring 25,000 years to complete the journey. Yet other sources make the bridge to consist of seven arches, each a journey of 3000 years, and during the passage all but the most righteous suffer agonies from the fire of hell (cf. Wolff, *Muhammedanische Eschatologie*, pp. 109, 114 f., 148 f.; al-Ghazālī, *Perle précieuse*, ed. and tr. Gautier, pp. 43, 69–70, 72–73; Rühling, *Beiträge zur Eschatologie des Islam*, pp. 27, 58, 63).

The Muhammadan bridge of al-Ṣirāt was borrowed from the Parsi *Chinvatperetu*, or 'Bridge of the Decider,' mentioned repeatedly both in the Avesta and in Pahlavi literature (Bartholomae, *Altiran. Wörterbuch*, col. 596 f.; Gray, *Muséon*, new series, iii. 160 f., 163–165; Modi, *JRASBo* xxi. 49–65; Scherman, *Materialien zur Geschichte der indischen Visionslitteratur*, p. 105 f.; Söderblom, *Vie future d'après le mazdéisme*, pp. 92–96). This bridge, which stretches from the 'Peak of Judgment' (*Chakāṭ-ī Dāītīh*), in Airān-Vēj, to Alburz, is described as follows (*Dāṭistān-ī Dēnīg*, xxi. 1–7): 'As it were, that bridge is like a beam of many sides, of whose edges there are some which are broad, and there are some which are thin and sharp; its broad edges are so large that its width is twenty-seven reeds, and its sharp sides are so contracted that in thinness it is just like the edge of a razor. And when the souls of the righteous and wicked arrive, it turns to that side which is suitable to their necessities, through the great glory of the creator and the command of him who takes the just account.' The Parsi concept of the 'Bridge of the Decider' has also been borrowed not only in Mandaism (Brandt, *Mandäische Religion*, p. 195), but also in the *Yalqut* to Isaiah, § 359 (Kohut, *Jüdische Angelologie und Dämonologie in ihrer Abhängigkeit vom Parsismus*, 1866, p. 70), and perhaps, as Böklen (*Verwandtschaft der jüdisch-christlichen mit der parsischen Eschatologie*, 1902, p. 37 f.) suggests, in 2 Es 7[6ff.].

It is not impossible that the bridge of the dead is found in Indian literature as early as the

Upaniṣads (Scherman, pp. 117–119), and it is certain that the belief in such a bridge occurs in Chinese Buddhism, and among the Jews of the Caucasus, the Transylvanian Gypsies, the modern Greeks, the Badaga of the Nīlgirī Hills, the Solomon Islanders, the Gold Coast Negroes, etc. (*ib.* pp. 99, 102–110), as well as in New Caledonia (cf. above, vol. i. p. 493[a]). The belief thus found in Zoroastrian, Jewish, Muhammadan, and Indian circles, as well as in other parts of the world (see also below), would seem to be a later and modified analogue of that primitive conception of the trial of the soul after death, which is seen in many early religions. We recognize the same underlying features in the Egyptian myth of the weighing of the scales before the bar of Osiris, and in the Greek fable of the judgment of the soul by Minos, Æacus, and Rhadamanthus in the under world. Cf. Dante, *Hell*, Canto v. 4 ff. (Cary's tr.):

> 'There Minos stands,
> Grinning with ghastly feature: he, of all
> Who enter strict examining the crimes,
> Gives sentence, and dismisses them beneath,
> According as he foldeth him around:
> . . . . . in his turn
> Each one to judgment passing, speaks, and hears
> His fate, thence downward to his dwelling hurl'd.'

In Tooke's *Pantheon* (Edin. 1791, p. 242) there is a curious and grotesque plate of the Hades of the Greek imagination, with Charon ferrying his fares across the Styx, Cerberus the three-headed dog guarding the passage, while in the distance there is a *bridge* with three individuals on it, who pass thereby from the flames of hell to the pleasant woods of Elysium. So also in ancient Celtic mythology there was cast over hell a bridge of exceeding narrowness (sometimes a mere cord), which souls were obliged to traverse if they hoped to reach the mansion of light beyond. This was 'The Brig o' Dread, na brader than a thread' (Baring-Gould, *Curious Myths of the Middle Ages*, p. 248; Rhys, Hibbert Lect. on *Celtic Heathendom*, p. 450).

There is a Hindu analogue to this belief in the Indian Baitaraṇī (*q.v.*), or swift River of Hell, flowing with blood and filth, which can be crossed only by holding a cow's tail. Aynsley (*Indian Antiq.*, May 1886) learned that the Hindus of Chamba, in the Panjāb, have a bridge over which every corpse must pass on its way to the burning *ghât* beside the river. Though there is a safe road by which the procession may travel, the corpse is invariably carried over a perilous causeway, only 18 inches wide, without a protecting balustrade. In the Solomon Islands there is a kindred belief. At Bogotu, in Ysabel, is a little island called Laulau. On the top of the island is a pool of water, Kolapapauro, and hither all departed spirits of men and women must at death repair. Across the pool lies a narrow tree-trunk, and along this bridge all souls must advance. Bolafagina, the Master-Spirit, examines their hands to see if they have the mark cut upon them (a conventional outline of the frigate bird) which admits them to his company. Those who cannot pass the ordeal are hurled from the bridge into the gulf beneath and perish (R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, p. 257). A similar idea is prevalent among the Chinese in Formosa. With them the good pass over a narrow bamboo bridge to a paradise of sensual enjoyment; the wicked fall from the bridge into a bottomless pit of torment (Forlong, *Faiths of Man*, i. 340). One of the beliefs of the New Zealanders is to the effect that at death the soul on its way to Reinga (= Hades) has to pass a river called Wairotane, the keeper of which places a plank for him to go over. Sometimes the guardian spirit will not permit him to cross, but with friendly violence drives him back to the world he has quitted, in order that he may take care of the family he has left behind (Taylor, *New Zealand and its Inhabitants*, p. 103). In another legend of the same race, a tree has its top pulled down by ropes, so that, when released, it rebounds to the sky, and forms a swinging bridge. The soul that is ready for translation mounts the perilous structure, clings to it, and is swung up into heaven (K. M. Clark, *Maori Tales and Legends*, 1896).

The same ideas of a dread river, and a still more dreadful bridge, are to be found in Scandinavian mythology. In the romance of Hermód, the hero rides nine nights and days through dark and deep valleys, and sees nothing till he comes to the river Gjöll (='the sounding one'), when he steps on to the Gjallar Bridge, which is plated with shining gold. Its guardian maid, Modgud, who asks him his name, says that the day before five arrays of dead men had passed over the bridge, 'but the bridge sounds not less under thee alone, and thou hast not the colour of dead men; why ridest thou here on the way of Hel,' which 'lies downward and northward?' (du Chaillu, *The Viking Age*, 1889, i. 34; Mallet, *North. Antiq.*, 1859, p. 448). Here, as in Vedic India, we find the belief that this bridge of the dead can be crossed in safety by one who, having given a cow to the poor whilst on earth, will find himself provided with a cow at this dread passage, which will carry his soul in comfort across the gulf. In Friesland, the name given to the Milky Way, which was reckoned the Way of Souls, was the Cowpath ('Kaupat') (see Mannhardt, *Die Götterwelt der Deutschen u. Nordischen Völker*, 1860, p. 51). Hence of yore the funeral custom arose in Sweden, Denmark, Upper and Lower Germany, and England, that a cow should follow the coffin to the graveyard. Till recent times this custom was continued on the Continent, being accounted for on the ground that the cow was a gift to the priest for saying masses for the dead man's soul, or for preaching his funeral sermon (Kelly, *Curiosities of Indo-Europ. Tradition and Folklore*, 1863, p. 320). In England, when pagan sacrifices had been abolished, the cow was similarly devoted to pious uses, under the name '*saul-sceat*' (=soul-shot), or mortuary payment.

But, having passed Gjallar Bridge, and entered Hel (one of the nine Scandinavian under worlds which stood under Ygdrasil, the mystic ash), there was no way to heaven but by a still more precarious bridge. This was the famous *Bifröst*, or the Bridge of the Asar, connecting earth with Asgard, the home of the gods (Bifröst, from Icelandic *bifa*= tremble, and *rost*=path, the tremulous or aerial bridge, the rainbow; Mallet, *op. cit.* p. 548; Brewer, *Dict. of Phrase and Fable*, p. 133). According to the Eddas (§ 27), by this rainbow bridge from heaven to earth the gods daily descended, passing on horseback over it to sit in judgment in the under world on the souls of men brought before them. The red of the rainbow is the burning fire which keeps back the frost and mountain giants from entering Asgard. But, lest other giants should attempt to scale the heights of heaven by this bridge, at the foot, on Himinsbjörg ('heaven-mountain'), sits Heimdall, the watchman of the gods, with his terrible dog Garm. (Cf. the 'Great Dog' of the North Amer. Ind. legends, and the fact that the baying of a dog is currently held throughout northern lands to be coincident with, or prophetic of, death.) Heimdall needs less sleep than a bird; he can see equally well by night and by day 100 leagues away; he hears the grass growing and the wool on the sheep's back. But there will come a day when all his watchfulness will be in vain. Strong though the bridge be, and 'constructed with more art than any other work,' it will be stormed and destroyed by the sons of Muspell. These giants, led by Surtur (the 'black'), with a sword brighter than flame, will advance against heaven with irresistible might. In vain will Heimdall blow his Gjallar-

horn, the sound of which will be heard throughout all worlds. The wild horde will swarm up Bifröst on horseback, and attempt to break into Asgard. In the awful onslaught the tremulous bridge will break into a thousand pieces, and the end of the world will have come (Mallet, *op. cit.* pp. 95, 408–452; Crichton and Wheaton, *Scandinavia Ancient and Modern*, 1838, i. 91–95).

The conception of the rainbow as a bridge between earth and heaven, over which the gods descend and ascend, is found also among the South Sea Islands (see the adventures of Oro in Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, 1829, i. 313). Perhaps also the 'Floating Bridge of Heaven' in Japanese legends is derived from the same conception (see W. G. Aston, *Shinto, the Way of the Gods*, 1905, p. 87; and Sir E. J. Reed, *Japan: its History, Traditions, and Religions*, 1880, i. 30).

This notion of a bridge in the unseen world over which the soul at death must pass was imported into mediæval Christianity from paganism, and became an essential part of its stock of beliefs. In *St. Patrick's Purgatory* (Wright's ed. 1844, ch. iii.) it is told how the pilgrim made a tour through hell in person, how he crossed the narrow bridge that spans the river of death, how he turned about on a great wheel of fire, how he passed the devil's mouth over the awful bridge, and thus at last reached Paradise (Tylor, *op. cit.* ii. 55; Baring-Gould, *op. cit.* p. 237). A bridge is likewise a prominent feature in the mediæval Visions of Alberic, St. Paul, Tundale, and Thurcill; and the same idea is met with in the 'Lyke-Wake Dirge' (a dirge which continued to be sung in Yorkshire till A.D. 1624), the funeral chant of the North Country, which tells of the passage over the dreadful bridge of death:

> 'From Whinny-moore when thou may passe,
> Every night and alle;
> To Brig o' Dread thou comes at laste,
> And Christe receive thy saule.
> From Brig o' Death when thou art paste,
> Every night and alle;
> To Purgatory fire thou comes at laste,
> And Christe receive thy saule.'

(J. C. Atkinson, *Glossary of Cleveland Dialect*, p. 595; cf. Scott, *Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border*, ii. 367; Tylor, *op. cit.* i. 495; Kelly, *Indo-European Folklore*, p. 115, who quotes the dirge in full; Becker, *Contribution to the Comparative Study of the Medieval Visions of Heaven and Hell*, pp. 44, 76, 83, 90, 97.)

The conception is found even amongst North American Indians, either as one of their primitive myths or as a distorted belief derived from their early intercourse with Roman Catholic peoples. The Hurons and Iroquois tell of some whose spirits, travelling in dreams, have returned to earth to tell what they have encountered in the world of ghosts—the river of the dead with its snake-bridge, or swinging log, at the far end of the bridge the Great Dog, and in the distance the villages of the dead (Tylor, *op. cit.* ii. 50). Brebeuf, an early Jesuit missionary, tells of the Indian belief in the tree-trunk which bridges the river of death, and how some of the dead, as they cross it, are attacked by the Dog that guards it, and made to fall into the abyss (*ib.* p. 94). Yet the myth underwent the same natural modification as it had experienced in the Old World. The passage of the bridge came to signify the ordeal whereby the good and the evil were sifted. Catlin (*North Amer. Ind.* ii. 127) refers to the Choctaw idea that souls at death travel far westwards to where the long, slippery, barkless, pine-log, stretching from hill to hill, bridges over the deep and dreadful river: the good pass safely to a beauteous Indian Paradise; the wicked fall into the abyss of waters, and go to dwell in a dark, hungry, wretched land (for further American Indian data, see above, vol. i. p. 435; for similar beliefs among the Ojibwas and the Minnetarees of North America, see Tylor, *Early Hist. of Mankind*, p. 360; and on the ideas of the Aztecs and the Euroks of N. California, as well as the Indians of South America, see Brinton, *Myths of the New World*, 1876, pp. 108, 247 ff.).

In presence, therefore, of a belief, wide-spread and deeply rooted in the mediæval mind, that there existed a bridge in the under world over which every soul must pass, it is not surprising that men should have formed the theory that at this bridge there takes place a conflict between the devils on the one hand and the good angels on the other for the possession of each man's soul. This was an integral part of the Parsi faith. When a soul arrives at Chinvat Bridge the gods and the unclean spirits fight for possession of it. If it be one of the righteous, it is defended by other pure souls, and by the dogs that guard the bridge (*Fargard* vii. 52). A curious reminiscence of this is seen in a children's game, which is played all over Europe and America, and is everywhere fundamentally the same. Newell has described it as it is played in America (*Games and Songs of American Children*, New York, 1884, p. 204), and shows how it is a variant of the game described above (p. 852) as 'London Bridge.' Haddon (*op. cit.* p. 357) points out that in Swabia the two keepers of the 'Golden Bridge' are called respectively the 'Devil' and the 'Angel'; in France the game is known as 'Heaven and Hell'; in Italy the name of the sport is 'Open the Gates.' The gates are those of the Inferno and Paradiso. St. Peter is the keeper of the one, St. Paul of the other. 'When the destiny of the last child is decided, the two girls who represent the keepers of the bridge break their arch of lifted hands and move in different directions, followed by their subjects, while the criës and shrieks of the players condemned to the Inferno contrast with the pathetic songs and sweet cadences of those destined to the happiness of Paradise.' He further points out that the game is mentioned by Rabelais (c. A.D. 1533) under the name of the 'Fallen Bridge.' In German versions the keepers are called 'Devil and Angel,' 'King and Emperor,' or 'Sun and Moon.' In this latter form the game has been one of the few kept up by the Germans of Pennsylvania, who call it 'The Bridge of Holland' (*Die holländische Brücke*). An Irish version of it obliges the little girls to dress as angels, while one personates the devil. The bridge, which is actually constructed of sticks and boards, is made to fall repeatedly, and this is ascribed to the devil. At last a victim is caught, and is made to undergo a test whether he will be the devil's captive or not, by being obliged to walk on a straight line drawn on the ground. And thus we find the idea of the necessity of a tribute to the river-spirit in the case of the erection of a bridge—an idea current in the very earliest ages of the world—perpetuated to-day amongst ourselves in the games which our children play.

iii. THE SEMI-SACRED CHARACTER OF THE BRIDGE, SUBSEQUENT TO THE PLACATING OF THE RIVER-SPIRIT.—This is the third stage in the growth of opinion. Once the sacrifice has been offered, and the river-spirit or devil been placated, the bridge itself takes on an air of sanctity. Can it be some kindred idea which lies at the root of the Japanese custom of bridge-divination (*hashi-ura*)? The end-post of a bridge is a *wo-bashira*, *i.e.* a male pillar or phallus, and, as persons pass over the bridge and engage in conversation, stray words overheard from their talk are interpreted by the inquirer, who sits beside the post, as an indication from the gods of what is desired to be learned. The bridge is a place where it is believed 'sacred' influences are felt (see W. G. Aston, *Shinto, the Way of the Gods*, p. 341).

It is probably from this sacrosanctity of bridges that we may find:—

1. The origin of the name 'pontifex' as the primitive 'priest-engineer.'—It stands to reason that the appeasing of an offended river-spirit could be accomplished only by one who was cognizant of the right method of propitiating the divinity. The rites must be conducted by him who was most deeply instructed on these profound subjects, in other words, by the priest. He alone could interpret to his fellow-men the demands of the river-god, and he alone could prescribe the proper ritual for appeasing him. But in primitive times not only religious but also almost all technical and scientific knowledge was the exclusive possession of the priestly cult. Public works requiring skill in mathematics, engineering, and mechanical contrivances, were therefore nearly all the product of priestly brains and priestly hands. What more natural, then, than that the name 'pontifex,' 'bridge-builder' (from *pons* and *facio*; see Smith's *Gr. and Rom. Ant.* 939 f.), should arise, suggesting in itself the twin functions of a servant of religion and a civil engineer? This simple explanation of a word round which much mystery has gathered is probably the true one. The priest whose business it was to placate the river-divinity was originally also the architect of the bridge; and in later years, when the two functions were separated, and there came to be civil engineers who were not priests, the name still clung to the original possessor of the word, and hence we have 'pontifex,' 'pontifical,' 'pontiff,' all of priestly significance (cf. Milton for the old connotation of the word:

> 'Now had they brought the work by wondrous art
> *Pontifical*, a ridge of pendent rock
> Over the vexed abyss'
>
> [*Paradise Lost*, x. 312 ff.]).

2. This furnishes a reason why the Pons Sublicius was always of wood.—The priestly mind is essentially conservative, and the first form of the bridge was jealously preserved through all succeeding ages. We have every reason to believe that this bridge was the first which spanned the Tiber. It was the erection of this wooden structure by some priest-engineer in pre-historic times (tradition assigns it to the reign of Ancus Martius [Livy, i. 33]), who defied and appeased the river-spirit, which originated the title 'pontifex.' But no sooner was the bridge successfully reared, and Father Tiber placated by some sacrifice, than the structure acquired a semi-sacred character, and was ever afterwards regarded as holy (see Dionys. ii. 73, iii. 45; Plut. *Numa*, 9; Serv. *ad Virg. Æn.* ii. 166). The idea of its holiness was perpetuated through succeeding centuries by the fact that its upkeep and repair were undertaken solely by the College of Pontifices, of whom the head was the Pontifex Maximus; while its sanctity is further attested in that neither bolt nor bar nor nail of iron entered into its construction, which was entirely of oak (see the passages quoted in Jordan's *Topographie der Stadt Rom im Alterthum*, 1885, I. i. 396; Varro, *Ling. Lat.* v. 83; Pliny, *HN* xxxvi. 15; Tac. *Hist.* i. 86; Seneca, *de Vita Beata*, 25). The conservative priestly mind could tolerate no change. 'In the history of man iron is a modern innovation as compared to bronze and still more to wood and stone; therefore, like every innovation, it is offensive to the gods' (so Frazer, *JPh* xiv. [1885] p. 157 note, who adduces many examples of the prejudice and hatred with which iron is regarded by the old deities in countries as far sundered as Scotland and Korea, Cappadocia and Morocco; he refers also to the Hebrew practice, Dt 27^5). It was therefore a religious notion, traceable to the innate conservatism of the priestly mind, which maintained the practice of allowing no iron to invade the virgin purity of this old wooden bridge.

If this way of accounting for the sacred character of the Pons Sublicius be the correct one, a number of competing theories are ruled out of court. Mommsen supposes that it was owing to the political exigencies of the Roman commonwealth that the bridge was always kept in its primitive wooden condition—that the bridge might be the more easily broken down at the approach of an enemy. Undoubtedly the legend of how Rome was saved by Horatius Cocles keeping back the Etruscan enemy under Lars Porsena, while the Romans hewed down the wooden structure behind him, lends countenance to this view (Livy, ii. 10; a fine bronze medallion of Cocles and the Sublician bridge of the time of Antoninus Pius is figured in Fröhner's *Méd. de l'Empire Rom.* 1878, p. 60). J. H. Middleton (*Ancient Rome in 1888*, 1888, p. 484) and Dennis (*Cities and Cemeteries of Etruria*, i. 14) adopt similar views, the latter asserting that, as the Tiber was the natural rampart of Rome, the Pons Sublicius was kept as a wooden drawbridge until all fear of invasion was removed by the conquest of Etruria and by the downfall of Hannibal. Thereafter, stone bridges were erected, as the principle of the arch had been known for centuries before, and had been applied in the construction of the Cloaca Maxima (see also Marion Crawford, *Ave Roma Immortalis*, i. 6, ii. 127). But this theory fails to account for the perpetuation of the practice of retaining the bridge in its primitive wooden form and avoiding the use of iron. It is therefore the religious, rather than the political, reason, to which we are confined, as the true explanation.

3. Transference of the name 'Pontifex' to the pagan and Christian Emperors and latterly to the Popes.—With the passing of the Republic into the Empire, the office of Pontifex Maximus was conferred on Augustus (13 B.C.) by the vote of the Senate; and thus the supreme sanction of religion lay in the grasp of him who wielded the Imperial sword. It was held that under no circumstances could there be more than one Pontifex Maximus, and this rule was never violated until Pupienus Maximus and Balbinus were named joint-Emperors by the Senate (A.D. 238). The rule having been broken, it was never afterwards observed. Frequently the junior colleague of an Emperor was styled Pontifex Maximus equally with his senior, and the legend occurs on their medals and coins. When Christianity became the official religion of the Roman State, the Christian Emperors carried over the title into their adopted religion. Seven Christian Emperors assumed the name, ensigns, and prerogatives of Sovereign Pontiff, until finally Gratian refused to wear the Pontifical robe (see Gibbon, ii. 394 [Bury's ed.], and note on the testimony of Zosimus).

The next step was the transference of the title to him who claimed to be spiritual head of the Christian Church, though the exact date at which the name was first applied to the Bishop of Rome cannot now be traced. (There is a very doubtful affirmation in Tuker and Malleson, *Handbook to Christian and Eccles. Rome*, iv. 334, that the title was first given to Pope Leo I. [A.D. 440–461].) The first prominent application of the title is from the pen of Tertullian (*de Pudicitia*, c. i.) in an ironical sentence addressed to the Roman Pontiff: 'Audio etiam edictum esse propositum, et quidem peremptorium. Pontifex scilicet Maximus, quod est episcopus episcoporum, edicit.' The correspondence of Cyprian shows no trace of the recognition by the African Church of the exclusive right of the Bishop of Rome to the title. Indeed, in a petition to Boniface, Bishop of Carthage, A.D. 525, the monks there address him as 'Christi venerandus Pontifex' (*Thomassin*, ed. Bourassé, ii. 366). Similarly Hilary of Arles was styled 'summus Pontifex' by Eucherius, Bishop of Lyons (Migne, *Patr. Lat.* l. 773). The term is first applied directly to a bishop of Rome, when Anastasius, on the ordination of Pelagius I. to that dignity, wrote (A.D. 555): 'et ordinaverunt eum pontificem' (Migne, *op. cit.* cxxviii. 611). There is abundant evidence (adduced in Smith's *Dict. Christ. Ant.* ii. art. 'Pontifex') to show that in all the succeeding centuries down to the 11th, many prelates in different countries of Europe

were styled 'Pontifex,' and that 'Maximus' was added where the see was more important and distinguished. But gradually, with the growth of the Papacy in power and worldliness, the title was centred in the Pope; and from the 11th cent. to the present day the name which was originated, perhaps by Ancus Martius in the early ages of the world's history, to designate the engineer-theologian who bridged the Tiber and placated the offended river-spirit, has been limited to the Pontiff who to-day sits in the Vatican, and overlooks the spot where the Pons Sublicius once stood.

4. **The Church assuming control of bridges.**—Bridges finally became sacred objects. The Church took bridges into her sacred keeping, and they became surrounded with many religious associations. The German Emperors of the Holy Roman Empire had to reiterate thrice a royal oath to maintain the liberties of Rome, 'at *the bridge*, the gate, and on the stairs of the Vatican' (Gibbon, vii. 211 [Bury's ed.]; Gregorovius, *Geschichte der Stadt Rom im Mittelalter* [Eng. tr.], iv. 59). Bridge-building became a part of religion, a pious and meritorious work before God. In 1189 a regular Order of Hospitallers was founded in Southern France, under Pope Clement III., by St. Benezet, under the name of the 'Bridge-Builders' (*Frères Pontifes, Fratres Pontifices*). The object of the Order was the building of hospices and bridges at points where pilgrims crossed the large rivers, and for the ferrying of pilgrims over the streams. A hospital of this Order at Avignon at an early period built the celebrated bridge of which four arches still survive. As a badge they wore a pick upon their breast. Their constitution was modelled upon that of the Knights of St. John; and as the association gradually dissolved in the 13th cent., most of their number found their way into that Order (Kurtz, *Church Hist.* [Eng. tr.] ii. 76; Grégoire, *Recherches historiques sur les congrégations hospitalières des frères pontifes*, Paris, 1818).

To leave money to build a bridge came to be reckoned an act of great piety. In many cases the funds bequeathed were administered by priest-engineers, whose names have been permanently associated with the structures which they erected (cf. the origin of London Bridge built by the priests of St. Mary Overie from money dedicated by the daughter of a ferryman [Allen, *Hist. and Ant. of London*, ii. 454 ff.]). Sometimes, however, the bridges of the Middle Ages were erected from the sale of indulgences. Hutchinson (*Hist. of Cumberland*, i. 283) records: 'In the year 1360 a bridge at Great Salkeld was taken away by floods; for the repairing and re-edifying of which Bishop Welton published an indulgence of 40 days.' The Bishop of Durham (1311–1316) was fond of this practice, as the registry of his episcopal chancery shows. There are frequent entries such as the following: 'His lordship grants 40 days' indulgence to all who will draw from the treasure that God has given them valuable and charitable aid towards the building and repair of Botyton Bridge' (*Registrum Palatinum Dunelmense*, ed. Hardy, in *Rolls Series*, 1875, i. 615, 641 [quoted in Jusserand, *English Wayfaring Life in the Middle Ages*, p. 41]). Similar cases might be cited from Devonshire and other records (see Walford, 'Bridges, their Hist. and Literary Associations' in *TRHS* [new series], 1884, p. 364). Prof. Hume Brown gives the facts for Scotland (*Scotland in the Time of Queen Mary*, 1904, p. 60).

Most of the bridges erected by priests had a chapel attached, built as part of the structure. Nearly all the early bridges on the Continent and in Britain were adorned with these chapels, *e.g.* that at Wakefield over the Calder in the time of Edward III.; that over the Wye at Monmouth, still extant; that over the Avon at Bath; and the first stone London Bridge erected in 1205, on which the chapel was dedicated to St. Thomas à Becket (see Walford and Jusserand, *opp. citt.*). As a curious perpetuation of the ancient Roman idea that the duty of keeping the bridge intact was a religious obligation resting on the sacerdotal orders, the priests attached to these mediæval chapels were enjoined, as an indispensable part of their office, to keep the bridge in repair (Allen, *London*, ii. 458 note; see also Ritson, *Gammer Gurton's Garland*). Perhaps the most remarkable of all these mediæval chapels is that at Droitwich, in Cheshire, where the high road passes through the chapel, and divides the congregation from the reading-desk and pulpit (Fosbrooke, *Cyc. of Ant.* p. 147; Nash, *Worcestershire*, i. 329). These bridge-chapels were not used exclusively for devotional purposes. The chapel of the old Norman bridge over the Aire at Leeds was utilized till the middle of the 18th cent. as a cloth market, and the traders were summoned to the spot by the ringing of the chapel bell. In 1276 an ordinance of the Common Council of the City of London forbade the holding of a market on London Bridge. But, on the other hand, Philip the Fair of France in 1304 ordained that the Public Exchange of Paris should be held on the Great Bridge there, as it was anciently accustomed to be (see *Gephyrologia* [1751], the basis of Rees' *Cyclopædia*; *of Arts, Sciences, and Lit.* 1819). As a still further development of this sacredness attaching to bridges, the ancient Danes are said to have erected bridges as a pious memorial of their deceased friends. Olaus Wormius in his *Monumentorum Danicorum*, 848 (A.D. 1643), states that two or three persons built a bridge on the island of Foesoe in Denmark, not only to preserve their own names to posterity, but also to commemorate that of Jotheimnt, who had converted them to Christianity. Others have erected bridges to express their gratitude for rescue from drowning.

Thus with the placating of the river-spirit, the defeat of the devil, and the hallowing of their structure by their association with the monastic orders, mediæval bridges eventually became shrines, and with the erection of chapels on them, the process of rehabilitation was complete. The ill-omened structure of antiquity grew into the holy and sacred sanctuary of the Middle Ages, and memories of their religious character have lingered to the present day. Bridges are no longer objects of censure, hated of God and devil alike, but holy spots, across which even material blessings may pass. It is over a golden *bridge* at Bingen that German tradition asserts that the spirit of Charlemagne annually crosses the Rhine, whenever a season of unusual plenty betokens that the vineyards and cornfields of Germany have been supernaturally benefited. Thus Longfellow sings (*Sonnet on Autumn*): 'Thou standest, like Imperial Charlemagne, upon thy Bridge of Gold'; and again (*The Golden Legend*, Canto v.):

> 'God's blessing on the architects who built
> The bridges o'er swift rivers and abysses,
> Before impassable to human feet,
> No less than on the builders of cathedrals,
> Whose massive walls are bridges thrown across
> The dark and terrible abyss of Death.
> Well has the name of Pontifex been given
> Unto the Church's head, as the chief builder
> And architect of the invisible bridge
> That leads from earth to heaven.'

LITERATURE.—The writer is acquainted with no work which deals with the whole subject. He has to express his indebtedness to Dr. J. G. Frazer for kind references to other literature bearing on certain aspects of the question, besides the excellent note referred to above in his article in *JPh* xiv. [1885

p. 156. W. Warde Fowler's *Roman Festivals of the Period of the Republic*, 1899, well repays very careful study, though the writer of this article has felt obliged to dissent from his verdict on the ceremonies at the Pons Sublicius. Much valuable information will be found in Mannhardt's *Baumkultus*, 1875; Grimm's *Deutsche Mythologie*[2], 1844; and Tylor's *Primitive Culture*[3], 1891. The literature on 'foundation-sacrifices' is cited in the text. Mrs. Gomme's work on *Traditional Games*, 1894–98, is full of suggestive material, which has been worked over by Haddon, *Study of Man*, 1898. Many references to other literature are given in Scherman, *Materialien zur Geschichte der indischen Visionslitteratur*, Leipzig, 1893, pp. 102–119. G. A. FRANK KNIGHT.

BRIEFS.—See BULLS AND BRIEFS.

BRINDĀBAN (Skr. *vrindāvana*, 'grove of the sacred basil tree,' *ocymum sanctum*).—A town situated on the right bank of the river Jumnā, in the Mathurā District of the United Provinces, lat. 27° 33′ 20″ N.; long. 77° 42′ 10″ E. The place is held sacred as the scene of many adventures in the life of Kṛishṇa. It has been computed that there are as many as one thousand temples within the limits of the town, of which four are of special interest—those of Govinda Deva and Gopīnātha, dedicated to Kṛishṇa, as a god of cattle and companion of the Gopī milkmaids; Madan Mohan and Jugal Kishor, representing him in his youthful and erotic character. The temple dedicated to Govinda Deva, built about A.D. 1590, is the most impressive building that Hindu religious art has ever produced, at least in Northern India. 'The body of the building,' says Growse (p. 241), 'is in the form of a Greek cross, the nave being 100 ft. in length and the breadth across the transepts the same. The central compartment is surmounted by a dome of singularly graceful proportions; and the four arms of the cross are roofed by a waggon vault of pointed form, not, as is usual in Hindu architecture, composed of overlapping brackets, but constructed of true radiating arches as in our Gothic cathedrals.' The design has suggested to some authorities the influence of the Jesuit missionaries which was considerable in the court of the Emperor Akbar. If this were really the case, 'the temple would be one of the most eclectic buildings in the world, having a Christian ground-plan, a Hindu elevation, and a roof of modified Saracenic character.' But it is most improbable that Jesuit missionaries assisted in planning a Hindu temple, and, as Growse remarks, there are earlier Hindu temples which display a similar design. Fergusson regards this as 'one of the most interesting and elegant temples in India, and the only one, perhaps, from which an European might borrow a few hints.' The temple of Madan Mohan is in a ruinous condition, and the idol has been removed to Karaulī in Rājputāna. That in honour of Jugal Kishor was built in the reign of the Emperor Jahāngīr, about A.D. 1627. Among the modern temples, that erected by the Seṭh bankers of Mathurā is one of the most remarkable. It follows the Madras style, with the lofty *gopuras*, or gate-towers, characteristic of the great fanes of Southern India. It was built during the years 1845–1851. It contains a *rath*, or processional car, of the god, an enormous wooden tower in several stages, with monstrous effigies in the corners, in which he is taken once a year in procession from his temple to a neighbouring garden, where a pavilion is erected for his reception (Growse, 260 f.). Every event in the life of Kṛishṇa is the occasion of a local festival, of which Growse (*ib.* 267) enumerates forty-six.

LITERATURE.—Growse, *Mathurā, a District Memoir*[3] (1883), ch. viii., where illustrations of the more important sacred buildings will be found. The Govinda Deva temple has been described by Fergusson, *History of Indian and Eastern Architecture* (1899), p. 462 ff. W. CROOKE.

BROTHERHOOD (Artificial).

[P. J. HAMILTON-GRIERSON.]

1. 'Relationship' in ordinary acceptation means connexion by birth or marriage. Accordingly, it is usual to describe blood-brotherhood, adoption, and the ties formed by sponsorship, fosterage, and the like as 'artificial relationships.' Nor, indeed, is this description open to serious objection, provided that we do not leave two facts out of sight—the fact that, in the process of their evolution, artificial relationships do not always follow the same course as natural relationships, and the fact that what seems artificial to us may, and often does, seem perfectly natural to uncivilized man.

We propose to treat the subject under the following heads:

i. *The ceremony establishing brotherhood.*
  (*a*) *Where blood is employed* (§§ 2–17).
  (*b*) *Where blood is not employed* (§§ 18–29).
ii. *Where the relation is due to force of circumstances* (§§ 30–31).
iii. *The institution among the Southern Slavs* (§§ 32–43).
iv. *The institution in Roman and Byzantine law and in modern Greece* (§ 44).
v. *Where the compact is entered into with women, dead persons, supernatural beings, or animals* (§§ 45–46).
vi. *What persons are bound by the compact* (§§ 47–48).
vii. *What purposes are served by the compact* (§§ 49–50).
viii. *What legal consequences flow from the compact* (§§ 51–52).
ix. *General observations on the nature and history of the institution* (§§ 53–56).

i. The ceremony.—(*a*) *Where blood is employed.*

2. Livingstone (*Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa*, London, 1857, p. 488) describes the rite as practised by the Balonda and shows us its most usual characteristics. 'The hands of the parties are joined . . .; small incisions are made on the clasped hands, on the pits of the stomach of each, and on the right cheeks and foreheads. A small quantity of blood is taken off from these points in both parties by means of a stalk of grass. The blood from one person is put into one pot of beer, and that of the second into another; each then drinks the other's blood, and they are supposed to become perpetual friends or relations. During the drinking of the beer, some of the party continue beating the ground with short clubs, and utter sentences by way of ratifying the treaty. The men belonging to each then finish the beer. The principals in the performance of "*Kasendi*" are henceforth considered blood-relations, and are bound to disclose to each other any impending evil.' In some cases the parties drink one another's blood undiluted. Thus, among the people of Rubunga, the 'brothers' bent their heads, and sucked the blood from each other's arms (Henry M. Stanley, *Through the Dark Continent*, London, 1878, ii. 286); and a like practice prevails among the Rokka of Flores (A. Bastian, *Indonesien oder d. Inseln d. malayischen Archipel.* pt. iv.: 'Borneo u. Celebes,' Berlin, 1889, p. 65), in Syria (H. C. Trumbull, *The Blood Covenant*, London, 1887, p. 5) and Madagascar (W. Ellis, *History of Madagascar*, London, 1838, i. 187–188), among the Karens of Burma (R. M. Luther *ap.* Trumbull, *op. cit.* p. 313), the Wanyoro (J. A. Grant, *A Walk across Africa*, London, 1864, p. 271), and the people of Comana (Jean sire de Joinville, *Histoire de S. Louys . . . enrichie de nouvelles observations et dissertations historiques . . . par Charles du Fresne, sieur du Cange*, Paris, 1668, p. 94). Baldwin, Count of Flanders, reproached the Greeks with so far accommodating themselves to the manners of the barbarians, with whom they made alliances, as to drink their blood (*ib.* Diss. xxi.); and Tacitus (*Ann.* xii. 47 [Church and Brodribb's tr.]) says of the Iberians and Armenians that it was the custom for their princes, whenever they joined alliance, to unite their right hands and bind the thumbs together in a tight knot; then, whe

the blood had flowed into the extremities, they let it escape by a slight puncture and sucked it in turn. Further, Herodotus (i. 74 [Rawlinson's tr.]) tells us that, when they took oath, the Medes and Lydians made a slight flesh wound in their arms from which each sucked a portion of the other's blood. Among some of the Australian tribes 'the drawing and also the drinking of blood on certain special occasions is associated with the idea that those who take part in the ceremony are thereby bound together in friendship and obliged to assist one another' (Spencer and Gillen, *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, London, 1904, p. 598; *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, London, 1899, p. 461). The parties to the rite drink one another's blood, or sprinkle one another with their blood (see below, § 49). So, too, in ancient Ireland, parties to a league are said to have ratified it by drinking each other's blood—a custom derived from the heathen, who were wont to seal their treaties with blood (Giraldus Cambrensis, *Typogr. Hib.* iii. 22).

3. Sometimes the blood of the 'brothers' is mixed with some other liquid—water, wine, beer, or spirits; and of this practice instances are supplied by the natives of Timor (H. O. Forbes, *A Naturalist's Wanderings in the Eastern Archipelago, 1878–1883*, London, 1885, p. 452) and of Bohol (M. de Zuñiga, *An Historical View of the Philippine Islands* [tr. by Maver], London, 1814, i. 67; see also *Relation by Loarca*: 'The Philippine Islands,' ed. by Blair and Robertson, Cleveland, Ohio, 1903, v. 161–163), of Amboina, of Leti, Moa, and Lakor, of the Babar Archipelago, of Wetar, of Ceram, and of Tanembar and Timorlaut (J. G. F. Riedel, *De sluik- en kroesharige Rassen tusschen Selebes en Papua*, The Hague, 1886, pp. 41, 396, 342, 446, 128–129, 284), by the Bali of North Cameroon (Hutter, 'Der Abschluss von Blutverwandtschaft u. Verträgen bei d. Negern d. Graslands in Nordkamerun' in *Globus*, 1889, lxxv. 1), the Balonda (D. Livingstone, *op. cit.* p. 488; H. Wissman, etc., *Im Innern Afrikas*, Leipzig, 1888, p. 151), the Wanyamwesi (J. Kohler, 'Das Bantu-recht in Ostafrika' in *Zeits. f. vergl. Rechtsw.* xv. 41), the Kimbunda (L. Magyar, *Reisen in Süd-Afrika in d. Jahren 1849 bis 1857*, tr. from the Hungarian by J. Hunfalvy, Budapest and Leipzig, 1859, i. 201–202), the Kayans (S. St. John, *Life in the Forests of the Far East*[2], London, 1863, i. 116), and the Scythians (Herod. iv. 70).

4. The 'brothers' do not always drink each other's blood. Sometimes they sprinkle it over one another (Spencer and Gillen, *Northern Tribes*, pp. 598, 372; see below, § 49). It is smeared by the Karens over their lips (Luther, *op. cit.* p. 313), while the Wachaga wipe it on a piece of flesh, which each of the parties thrusts several times into the mouth of the other (Kohler, *op. cit.* p. 40). A somewhat similar practice is found in Uhehe (J. Thomson, *To the Central African Lakes and Back*, London, 1881, i. 243–244). In Uganda and Bukoba each of the 'brothers' dips a coffee-bean from a pod containing two in his blood, and presents it on the palm of his hand to the other, who must take it up with his lips (J. Roscoe, 'Further Notes on the Manners and Customs of the Baganda' in *JAI*, 1902, xxxii. 68; Kohler, *op. cit.* pp. 40–41). And, among the Kayans of Borneo, the blood of the parties is either mixed with some other liquid and drunk, or is rolled up with a cigarette and inhaled with the smoke (S. St. John, *op. cit.* i. 116).

5. At Mruli, a coffee bean (C. T. Wilson and R. W. Felkin, *Uganda and the Egyptian Soudan*, London, 1882, ii. 41); among the Swahili, a hen's liver (R. Niese, 'Die Personen- u. Familienrecht d. Suaheli' in *Zeits. f. vergl. Rechtsw.* xvi. 240); and among the Wazaramo, Wazeguro, Wasagara (R. F. Burton, *The Lake Regions of Central Africa*, London, 1860, i. 114), and Masai (M. Merker, *Die Masai*, Berlin, 1904, p. 101), a piece of flesh, are eaten, smeared with the 'brother's' blood. Among some of the tribes to the south of the Welle, a piece of sugar-cane, with which the blood of the parties has been wiped off, is chewed and the fibres are blown over the wound. At the same time each 'brother' declares the motives which induce him to enter into the compact, and the obligations which he binds himself to perform, and imprecates evil on the breaker of the bond (W. Junker, *Travels in Africa during the Years 1879–1883*, London, 1891, p. 405; see below, § 56).

6. This last instance introduces us to the performance of the rite by way of inoculation, which in many cases takes the place of blood-drinking. Grant (*op. cit.* p. 108 f.) gives the following description of this form as practised by the Wanyamwesi

'The process between Bombay and the Sultan's son, Kee enga, may be mentioned. My consent having been given, mat is spread, and a confidential party or surgeon attends on each. All four squat, as if to have a game at whist; before them are two clean leaves, a little grease, and a spear-head; a cut is made under the ribs of the left side of each party, a drop of blood put on a leaf and exchanged by the surgeons, who rub it with butter twice into the wound with the leaf, which is now torn in pieces and strewn over the "brothers'" heads. A solemn address is made by the older of the attendants, and they conclude the ceremony by rubbing their own sides with butter, shaking hands, and wishing each other success. Ten rounds of ammunition are then fired off, a compliment from each of the four drums is sounded, and they parade the village all the afternoon. . . . An Uganda lad, the magician of the Sultan, made brotherhood with Rehan, the cook, by cutting marks on his chest and rubbing in the fat of lions.'

Similar usages are said to prevail among the Wajiji (Burton, *op. cit.* i. 114), on the Congo, and in other parts of Africa (H. M. Stanley, *The Congo*, London, 1885, i. 385, ii. 24, 29, *Through the Dark Continent*, i. 493; H. Ward, *Ethnographical Notes relating to the Congo Tribes*, 1895; *JAI* xxiv. 291; V. L. Cameron, *Across Africa*, London, 1877, i. 333).

7. In Scandinavia, men made brotherhood by letting their blood flow together in a footprint and mingle where it fell ('The Long Lay of Brunhild, in *Corpus Poeticum Boreale*, G. Vigfusson and F. York Powell, Oxford, 1883, i. 308), or by 'going under the turf,' a ceremony of which an account is given in *The Story of Gisli the Outlaw* (from the Icelandic by G. W. Dasent, Edinburgh, 1896, p. 23). We are told that Gisli and the three men who were to make oath along with him

'cut up a sod of turf in such wise that both its ends were still fast to the earth, and propped it up by a spear, scored with runes, so tall that a man might lay his head on the socket of the spear-head. Under this yoke they were all four to pass. . . . Now they bleed each a vein, and let their blood fall together on the mould whence the turf had been cut up, and all touch it; and all afterwards fell on their knees, and were to take hands, and swear to avenge each the other as though he were his brother, and to call all the gods to witness.'

Several explanations of this curious ceremony have been suggested. In Jacob Grimm's opinion (*Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer*[3], Göttingen, 1881, p. 119), the 'brothers,' by placing themselves underneath the turf and falling on their knees, appear to indicate their abasement before the Higher Powers, and their solemn purification from the world. Konrad Maurer (*Die Bekehrung d. norwegischen Stammes zum Christenthum*, Munich, 1855–1856, ii. 170–171, 229) regards the rite as an ordeal of which the purpose was to secure the performance of the promises made. And this view seems to receive some support from the following passage:

'This was then the ordeal at that time, that men should pass under the earth-collar; that is, a turf was carven out of a field. The ends of the turf shall be fast in the field, and that man who was to undergo the ordeal should pass thereunder. . . . So was he cleansed who went under the earth-collar, if the turf fell not

upon him' (*The Story of the Laxdalers*, done into English by R. Proctor, London, 1903, ch. xviii.).

M. Pappenheim (*Die altdänischen Schutzgilden*, Breslau, 1885, p. 18 ff.), however, points out that this ceremony was used not only in making brothers and in ordeals, but in cases where an offence had been committed and the offender was required to humble himself by going under the turf, as a condition precedent to the acceptance of a composition. He holds that one explanation will not suffice for all three cases, and he explains the use of the ceremony in making brothers—the mixing of the blood with the earth—as symbolical of the common origin of the brothers. They are children of one womb—born of one mother, the earth (see also Vigfusson and Powell, *op. cit.* i. 423).

8. Muir (*Life of Mahomet*, London, 1858, i. p. ccxlvi) tells us that, in a dispute among the Koraish, the men of one party solemnized their compact by dipping their hands in blood, while their opponents dipped their hands in perfume and rubbed them upon the Ka'ba. Robertson Smith (*Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*, new ed. London, 1903, pp. 57–59) says that at Mecca in historical times a life and death covenant was solemnized by an oath, each of the parties to which dipped his hands in a pan of blood and tasted its contents; and he expresses the view that these forms are variations of one and the same rite—the rite in which the contracting parties drank or tasted one another's blood. He shows (*op. cit.* p. 59, note 1) that in some instances water or fruit-juice was substituted for blood; and in this connexion it is interesting to notice Herodotus' (iv. 172 [Rawlinson's tr.]) statement regarding the Nasamonians that, 'when they pledge their faith to one another, each gives the other to drink out of his hand; if there be no liquid to be had, they take up dust from the ground, and put their tongues to it' (cf. W. Crooke, 'The Hill Tribes of the Central Indian Hills,' in *JAI* xxviii. 241). It may be that the practice of ratifying an agreement to take part in a common undertaking by shaking hands dipped in blood (Hector Boethius, *Scotorum Historiæ*, Paris, 1526, lib. ii. fol. xviii *b*; cf. § 15 below), and that of drinking human blood, attributed to conspirators at Rome (Sall. *de Conj. Cat.* 22; Plut. *Vit. Publicolæ* iv. [both statements are regarded as unreliable by T. Mommsen, *Römische Forschungen*, Berlin, 1864, i. 332, n. 1]), and in China (Trumbull, *op. cit.* p. 43), are truly adaptations of the primitive institution of 'making brothers' (see below, § 15).

9. With the form of the rite in which the hands are dipped in blood Jacob Grimm (*op. cit.* p. 194) compares the dipping of weapons in blood, mentioned by Herodotus (iv. 70 [Rawlinson's tr.]) in the following passage:

> 'Oaths among the Scyths are accompanied with the following ceremonies: a large earthen bowl is filled with wine, and the parties to the oath, wounding themselves slightly with a knife or an awl, drop some of their blood into the wine; then they plunge into the mixture a scymitar, some arrows, a battle-axe, and a javelin, all the while repeating prayers; lastly the two contracting parties drink each a draught from the bowl, as do also the chief men among their followers.'

So, too, the Benuas, in making alliances or in taking solemn vows, 'dip their weapons into a mixture of which blood forms the principal ingredient' (T. G. Newbold, *Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca*, London, 1839, ii. 395). Lucian (*Toxaris*, 37), in his account of the Scythian form, gives the additional fact that the parties, having dipped the points of their swords in the blood, held them together. It would seem that this touching of swords signified the union of the parties; and this view is corroborated by the curious practice of scraping the spear-shafts and musket-stocks of the 'brothers' on a banana-leaf, and dropping these scrapings, with a pinch of salt and a little dust from a pod, upon the wounds (Stanley, *The Congo*, ii. 24, 89; cf. Hutter, *op. cit.* p. 1 ff. as to the Bali of North Cameroon, and see § 13 below). It seems that scrapings of wood from the stool of a chief add strength to an oath (A. B. Ellis, *The Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast of West Africa*, London, 1887, p. 198). A similar explanation appears to apply to the ceremony of sword-biting practised by the Kanowit Dayaks. According to St. John (*op. cit.* i. 55),

> 'a pig was placed between representatives of two tribes, who, after calling down the vengeance of the spirits on those who broke the treaty, plunged their spears into the animal, and then exchanged weapons. Drawing their knives, they each bit the blade of the others, and so completed the affair.'

So, too, the Garos swear to observe peace by biting each other's sword, and seal the compact by putting food into each other's mouth and pouring beer down each other's throat (E. T. Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, London, 1872, p. 62). It is of interest to note in this connexion that the Norman lawyers explained the word 'wapentake' in reference 'to the formal recognition of the local magistrate by touching his arms' (W. Stubbs, *The Constitutional History of England*[2], Oxford, 1885, i. 96). This ceremony is described in a law of Edward the Confessor (c. 33) as follows:

> 'Ipse vero erecta lancea sua ab omnibus secundum morem fœdus accipiebat; omnes enim quotquot venissent cum lanceis suis ipsius hastam tangebant et ita confirmabant per contactum armorum, pace palam concessa.'

Du Cange (*Glossarium mediæ et infimæ Latinitatis*, ed. L. Favre, Niort, 1883, *s.v.* 'Arma' [Arma mutare]) understands that it was thus that the subjects of the early kings of England made themselves 'fratres conjurati,' bound to cherish and protect one another and to join in preserving the kingdom from its enemies. G. Tamassia (*L'Affratellamento*, Turin, 1886, p. 32, note 2), however, cites authority to show that what is described is not an *armorum conjunctio*, but a *modus per strepitum concussorum armorum plebiscita condendi* (see Grimm, *op. cit.* p. 770 f.; Tac. *Germ.* xi., *Hist.* v. 15).

10. Sometimes the parties to the compact hold the ends of a forked branch, while one of them cuts it in two, or while a medicine-man draws their blood (Stanley, *The Congo*, ii. 88, 104). It is observed by C. A. L. M. Schwaner (*Borneo, Beschrijving van het Stroomgebied van d. Berito*, Amsterdam, 1853, i. 214–215) that, in the district of Borneo with which he deals, a third party hacks through the branch held by the 'brothers,' and at the same time pronounces imprecations upon the oath-breaker. In view of the whole circumstances, it seems not improbable that the act of holding had a twofold significance. In the first place, it symbolized the union of the parties (it had the same meaning as the contact of swords in the Scythian ceremonial), and, in the second place, it was a ritual act similar to the act of holding an animal while it is being slaughtered for sacrifice. An instance of this sacrificial ceremony is supplied by the Kumi of Chittagong. Among them, the parties to the covenant hold the ropes by which a goat is secured. One of their number stands over it, holding a fighting *dâo*. He takes a mouthful of liquor from a cup and blows it over the parties and the victim. Then he raises his *dâo* and invokes the river-spirit, while he pulls some hairs from the goat and scatters them to the winds. With one stroke the head is severed from the body, and the blood is smeared on the foreheads and feet of the 'brothers' (T. H. Lewin, *Wild Races of South-Eastern India*, London, 1870, p. 228). Among the Bali and the Dusuns, and in Shira (see below, §§ 13, 17, 21), the act of holding or touching the victim forms part of the ceremony.

11. Trumbull tells us of a curious Syrian form of the rite. The parties publicly announce their reasons for entering into the compact. These declarations are written down in duplicate; and each 'brother,' having smeared his copy with the other's blood, and having uttered the wish that the deceiver may be deceived by God, wears it suspended from his neck or bound to his arm 'in token of the indissoluble relation' (*op. cit.* p. 5 f.; see below, § 21).

12. Probably Grimm (*op. cit.* p. 194; cf. Livy, i. 32) is justified in referring to the notion of union brought about by an exchange of blood both the 'hasta sanguinea praeusta' of the Romans—the symbol of the declaration of war by a united people—and the 'Fiery Cross' of the Scottish Highlanders—the half-burnt stake dipped in blood which called the clans to arms against a common foe.

13. A group of observances in which the introduction of weapons forms a prominent feature seems to be susceptible of a different interpretation. Forbes (*op. cit.* p. 452) tells us that at Timor the contracting parties slash their arms, and collect the blood in a bamboo, into which *kanipa* (coarse gin) or *laru* (palm-wine) is poured. Having provided themselves with a small fig-tree, they adjourn to some retired spot, taking with them the sword and spear from the *Luli* chamber of their own houses, or from the *Uma-Luli* of their *suku*, if between large companies. Planting there the fig-tree, flanked by the sacred sword and spear, they hang on it a bamboo receptacle, into which—after pledging each other in the mixed blood and gin—the remainder is poured. Then each swears, 'If I be false, and be not a true friend, may my blood issue from my mouth, ears, nose, as it does from the bamboo!', the bottom of the receptacle being pricked at the same moment to allow the blood and gin to escape. The tree remains and grows as a witness to the contract. With this tree of witness Trumbull (*op. cit.* p. 316 ff.) connects—erroneously, we venture to think—the blood-stained 'Fiery Cross' and a similar symbol made use of in Southern Arabia (see A. von Wrede, *Reise in Hadhramaut*, Brunswick, 1870, p. 197 ff.; see above, § 12). It is not uninteresting to note that the planting of a tree, which, at Timor, is an accessory only, is, among the Karens of Burma, in itself constitutive of the bond of brotherhood (Luther, *op. cit.* p. 313). Trumbull (*op. cit.* pp. 266 ff., 316) refers in this connexion to the planting of trees in ancient Israel; but the Israelitish practice seems to be susceptible of an altogether different explanation (see Robertson Smith, *Rel. Sem.*[2], London, 1894, p. 185 ff.). What then was the purpose served by the introduction of weapons? It may be that it was the same as that of planting the tree; and, in support of this view, an instance from Madagascar may be cited. W. Ellis (*Hist. of Madag.* p. 188 ff.), in describing the ceremony of the *fatidrá* (a form of the blood-rite), says that

'to obtain the blood, a slight incision is made in the skin covering the centre of the bosom, significantly called *ambavafo*, "the mouth of the heart" . . . Some gunpowder and a ball are brought, together with a small quantity of ginger, a spear, and two particular kinds of grass. A fowl also is procured; its head is nearly cut off; and it is left in this state to continue bleeding during the ceremony.' The parties then join in pronouncing a long imprecation upon the oath-breaker, in which occur the following invocations: 'Oh the mouth of the heart! Oh the ball! Oh the powder! Oh the ginger! Oh this miserable fowl weltering in its blood!' And then follows the statement: 'If we keep and observe this covenant, let those things bear witness.'

Take again Hutter's (*op. cit.* p. 1 ff.) account of the ceremony among the Bali of North Cameroon:

It seems to consist of two parts—the making of 'brothers' and the making oath to keep the covenant. The parties, holding kola and pepper in their open hands, interchanged promises of mutual friendship and assistance. The kola and pepper were chewed and eaten, and the blood of the 'brothers' was mixed with palm-wine and drunk by each. Then followed the second part of the rite. Bullets were produced, and, while imprecations were being pronounced upon the oath-breaker, a trench was dug. Each 'brother' pricked his arm, and the bullets, some scrapings of redwood, together with several fetish articles, human bones, and two bleeding human ears were thrown into the trench. It was filled up and a flat stone was placed upon it. Upon this stone a ram was slaughtered by one of the 'brothers,' while the others held it fast, its blood falling on the stone and trench. Some of the blood was mixed with wine in a calabash into which bullets were dropped; and the contents of the calabash were emptied out on the trench. Then the 'brothers' poured wine on the trench, and, having set a jar containing redwood on the stone, they rubbed one another's arms and breasts with the wood, while words of magic were being said. Lastly, kola and pepper and horns of wine were distributed among the followers and attendants.

The view that the articles thrown into the trench and the stone placed upon it serve as 'witness' of the compact, derives support from the practice of the Chinhwans in making oath. They dig a hole in the ground, place a stone on it, throw earth at one another with loud cries, and cover the stone with earth; and by these acts they signify that, like the stone in the ground, their word or oath remains unalterable (Kisak Tamai, 'Die Erforschung d. Tschinwan-Gebietes auf Formosa durch die Japaner' in *Globus*, 1896, lxx. 93 ff.). A very similar form of oath is found among the Bendowen Dusuns. According to F. Hatton's account (*North Borneo*, London, 1885, p. 201 f., cf. pp. 203, 207), the whole tribe assembled, and, the ground having been cleared for a space of about twelve yards, a hole was dug, a foot in depth, a large water-jar was placed in it, the earth dug out of the hole was thrown into the jar, and the old men called upon their god. A stone was then placed near the jar, and the old men declared by fire, represented by a burning stick, by water, which had been poured into the jar, and by earth, that they would be true to all white men. The divinity was then summoned by shooting an arrow into the air; and the guns of the Europeans were placed upon the jar, out of which each man took a little earth.

14. But weapons are not infrequently introduced into the ceremony for a different purpose; they are 'invoked,' that is to say, 'to punish treachery' (D. M. Smeaton, *The Loyal Karens of Burma*, London, 1887, p. 169). When two villages in Ceram wish to make friendship after a war, the inhabitants of one come into the other bringing gifts, and are entertained with food and drink. While they are eating, a large bowl of liquor is prepared. The elders add some drops of pigs' or chickens' blood; and the chiefs wound each other and let their blood flow into the liquor. The elders stir the potion with a sword, a spear, arrows, and, in later times, with the muzzle of a musket. Then one of them comes forward and imprecates evil upon the oath-breaker, the other feasters show their concurrence by signs, the chiefs of the two parties begin to drink the liquid, and the rest of the company drink after them. On a set day a feast is given in the other village, and the bond is then regarded as inviolable. This solemnity is called *pela* (Riedel, *op. cit.* p. 128 f.). Riedel does not give the terms of the imprecation, nor does he state the purpose for which the weapons are introduced. It is, however, instructive to observe that, in the Ceramese procedure, by way of oath for the discovery of crime, a *parang* and a little arrow-rust are introduced along with other symbols, and that an imprecation is pronounced upon the guilty person to the effect, *inter alia*, that his throat shall be cut with a *parang* and his body pierced with arrows (*ib.* p. 116). Further, in the Tanembar and Timor-Laut Islands, in making brothers, sea-water, palm-wine, and other ingredients, together with a small stone, or tooth, are poured into a bowl and mixed with the blood of the contracting parties. Dudilaa is invoked as witness to the covenant, and evils are imprecated upon the breaker of the bond. He shall be unstable as the sea, weak as a man drunk with palm-wine, and the like. Then the parties drink the liquor, and the stone or tooth is broken in two and preserved as a memorial or 'witness' (*ib.* p. 284). It is thought that these practices throw some light upon the symbolical meaning of weapons in the *pela* ceremony (see also Riedel, *op. cit.* p. 396, as to brother-making at Leti), and that a similar explanation applies to the two instances which

follow. Among the Wazaramo, Wazeguro, and Wasagara, the candidates for brotherhood seat themselves opposite to one another, their bows and arrows being placed across their thighs, 'whilst a third person waving a sword over their heads vociferates curses against any that may break the brotherhood' (Burton, *op. cit.* i. 114); and to the westward of Lake Tanganyika, after the transfusion of blood by inoculation had been completed, one of the proxies held a sword resting on his shoulder, while the other went through the motions of sharpening a knife upon it, both joining in pronouncing imprecations upon the oath-breaker (Cameron, *op. cit.* i. 333). A somewhat similar act formed part of the ritual among the Wakikuju, and was followed by imprecations (v. Höhnel, *Zum Rudolph-See und Stephanie-See*, Vienna, 1891, p. 341 f.; A. Arkell-Hardwick, *An Ivory Trader in North Kenia*, London, 1903, p. 147).

15. It is, of course, plain, from some of the examples of the ceremony with which we have been dealing, that the blood employed is not always that of the contracting parties (see C. Hose and W. McDougall, 'The Relations between Men and Animals in Sarawak,' in *JAI*, 1901, xxxi. 209; cf. p. 185). In very many cases it is that of their proxies (Livingstone, *op. cit.* p. 488; J. Thomson, *Through Masai Land*, new ed. London, 1887, p. 88; Cameron, *op. cit.* i. 333; Stanley, *Through the Dark Continent*, ii. 146, 332). Sometimes the 'brothers' shake hands, after having dipped them in the blood of a slaughtered animal (J. M. Schuver, *Reisen im oberen Nilgebiet*, Ergänzungsheft, No. 72, to *Peterm. Mitth.* p. 50), or they are marked with its blood—the blood of a pig among the Kiniahs (St. John, *op. cit.* i. 117, 75), of a goat among the Kumi of Chittagong (Lewin, *op. cit.* p. 228), of a goat or a heifer among the Shendoos (*ib.* pp. 315, 322). Sometimes they smear their lips with blood drawn from a bullock's ear (*Le Tcheou-Li, ou Rites des Tcheou*, tr. from the Chinese by E. Biot, Paris, 1851, i. 126, ii. 247 f.). Or the blood may be that of a human victim, either stupefied with drink, as among the wild tribes of Mexico (H. H. Bancroft, *The Native Races of the Pacific States of N. America*, London, 1875, i. 636, 637; see below, § 48), or slain, as among the Danoms of Borneo (Schwaner, *op. cit.* ii. 77).

16. Some of these ceremonies are plainly sacrificial, and recall to us Herodotus' account of the formation of blood-brotherhood among the Arabs (iii. 8 [Rawlinson's tr.]). He tells us that,

'when two men would swear a friendship, they stand on each side of a third: he with a sharp stone makes a cut on the inside of the hand of each near the middle finger, and, taking a piece from their dress, dips it in the blood of each, and moistens therewith seven stones lying in the midst, calling the while on Bacchus and Urania.'

Robertson Smith identifies these divinities with Orotal and Alilat (*Rel. Sem.*[2] p. 316), and observes that at Mecca, within historical times,

'the form of the oath was that each party dipped their hands in a pan of blood and tasted the contents. . . . The later Arabs had substituted the blood of a victim for human blood, but they retained a feature which Herodotus had missed, they licked the blood as well as smeared it on the sacred stones. . . . The seven stones in Herodotus are, of course, sacred stones, the Arabic *ansāb*, Hebrew *maṣṣēbōth*, which, like the sacred stones at the Ka'ba, were originally Bætylia, Bethels or god-boxes.' He adds that the essence of the rite was that the parties 'commingled their blood, at the same time applying the blood to the god or fetish so as to make him a party to the covenant also' (*Kinship*, etc., pp. 57, 59, 60).

17. In some of these sacrificial rites an exchange of garments or weapons or gifts forms a part. Thus St. John (*op. cit.* i. 117), in speaking of the Kayans, says that

'they sometimes vary the ceremony, though the variation may be confined to the Kiniahs, who live farther up the river, and are intermarried with the Kayans. There a pig is brought and placed between the two who are to be joined in brotherhood. A chief addresses an invocation to the gods, and marks with a lighted brand the pig's shoulder. The beast is then killed, and, after an exchange of jackets, a sword is thrust into the wound and the two are marked with the blood of the pig.'

So, too, among the Wachaga, an exchange and re-exchange of clothing enter into the rite (Kohler, *Das Banturecht*, p. 40). Among the Kanowit Dayaks, 'a pig was placed between the representatives of the two tribes, who, after calling down the vengeance of the Spirits on those who broke the treaty, plunged their spears into the animal and then exchanged weapons' (St. John, *op. cit.* i. 55). Again, among the Dusuns, an exchange of weapons followed the ceremony, in which, having invoked his god, the chief and the traveller held the head and legs of a fowl, while a third person almost severed its head. The movements of the dying fowl were taken to indicate the intentions of the parties. Lastly, guns were fired and presents were given (Hatton, *op. cit.* p. 195; see below, § 20).

(*b*) *Where blood is not employed.*

18. We shall now proceed to consider the cases in which the use of blood does not enter into the ceremony; and, first of all, we shall deal with instances where the exchange of food forms an essential element in the ritual. Thus, among the Mapuches the compact is made by an exchange of names, one of the parties at the same time presenting a lamb to the other to be eaten by him (E. R. Smith, *The Araucanians*, New York, 1855, pp. 261, 262; see also E. Pöppig, *Reise in Chile, Peru, u. auf die Amazonenströme während d. Jahre 1827–1832*, Leipzig, 1835, i. 384 f., as to the Pehuenches). The Reschîât of Lake Rudolph make 'brothers' with strangers by eating pieces of the liver of a sheep together (A. Donaldson Smith, *Through Unknown African Countries*, London, 1897, p. 297; according to v. Höhnel, *op. cit.* p. 657, 660, they spit upon the sheep and pour milk upon it; see below, § 21); and of the Abors it is said that they 'hold as inviolate any engagement cemented by an interchange of meat as food. This is called *sengmung*. Each party to the engagement must give to the other some animal to be killed and eaten; it is not necessary that they should eat together, or that the feast be held at the same time' (Dalton, *op. cit.* p. 25). The latter part of this statement recalls the account of the Mapuches, given above, and that of the *magus* ceremony among the Khoi-Khoin. The parties to the rite last mentioned must be relatives. A man, for example, may enter into it with his sister's son or daughter. On a day fixed, the nephew sends a ewe or a cow to his uncle's house, where it is slaughtered. The ceremony itself is called *gao nais* ('navel-cutting'). The animal is divided between uncle and nephew, each of whom eats his share apart from the other—generally in his own house. The blood boiled with the kidney-fat forms the ceremonial food (cf. A. W. Howitt, *The Native Tribes of South-east Australia*, London, 1904, p. 751), and of it only the parties and their nearest relatives partake, the rest of the flesh being eaten apart by strangers. After the meal the uncle gives the nephew his hand, promises to be a father to him, and asks him not to injure him in any way. Some days afterwards the uncle gives a feast in return. He slaughters an animal in the house of his sister—the mother of the man with whom he is entering into the *magus*—and afterwards gives him the best of his cows. The covenant draws the ties of relationship more closely together, but does not form a new bond (C. Wandrer, 'Die Khoi-Khoin oder Naman,' in H. S. Steinmetz, *Rechtsverhältnisse von eingeborenen Völkern in Afrika u. Ozeanien*, Berlin, 1903, p. 315 f.). The Beni take the oath of friendship by 'chopping juju.' A kola nut is placed on a brass tray with water poured on it. One of the parties touches himself with the

water and nut and eats part of it. Then the other party eats the remainder of it (R. H. Bacon, *Benin, the City of Blood*, London, 1897, p. 100). Again, among the Karens of Burma, brotherhood is made by eating together, or by planting a tree, or by exchanging blood. Of those methods, the first is said to be of but little binding force, being a mere agreement to abstain from hostilities for a certain time (Luther, *op. cit.* p. 313). The Bauris, Bagdis, and Mahilis admit into their caste men of any caste ranking higher than their own, on the candidate paying a small sum of money to the headman and giving a feast. He must taste a portion of the food left by each of the guests (H. H. Risley, *The Tribes and Castes of Bengal: Ethnographic Glossary*, Calcutta, 1891, ii. 41). Among the Māls, he must give a feast, and drink water into which the headman has dipped his toes (*ib.* p. 49). When a man of the Murmi—a Mongolian caste in Nepāl—desires to make another man his brother, he intimates his feelings; and if these are reciprocated, presents are exchanged. A day is fixed for the ceremony, at which a Brāhman officiates. The men face one another, each with a rupee at his feet. They exchange the rupees, and each daubs the other's face with the mixture of rice and curds used in the marriage rite. The proceedings end with a feast. The tie thus formed is regarded as equivalent to that of actual kinship. 'The adopted brothers may not address or speak of one another by name, nor may they talk to each other's wives, even though these may have taken part in the ceremony. Their descendants, again, are supposed not to intermarry till seven generations have passed' (*ib.* p. 111). A somewhat similar account is given of the Limbus (*ib.* p. 16).

19. With the usages as to eating may be compared what Herodotus (iv. 172 [already quoted]) says of the Nasamonians: 'When they pledge their faith to one another, each gives the other to drink out of his hand; if there be no liquid to be had, they take up dust from the ground, and put their tongues to it.' In making friendship with the Wakikuju, the two parties threw water on their heads and caught and drank it as it fell (v. Höhnel, *op. cit.* p. 315 f.); and it is said of the wild tribes of the Naga Hills that, when peace is concluded between the villages after a war, the chiefs meet face to face on opposite sides of a table raised on the roadside about eight feet from the ground, and approached on either side by a broad ascent, and exchange bamboo mugs of wine (R. G. Woodthorpe, 'Notes on the Wild Tribes inhabiting the so-called Naga Hills,' *JAI* xi. 211).

20. Not infrequently the bond is constituted by an exchange of garments or weapons. Thus, in Tahiti, the natives made friends by taking off a great part of their own clothes and putting them upon the voyagers (J. Cook in J. Hawkesworth, *An Account of Voyages in the Southern Hemisphere*, London, 1773, ii. 251). It is said of the villagers of the Gangotri valley in the country of the Teri Rājā, that with them an exchange of caps is as certain a mark of friendship as an exchange of turbans between two chiefs in the plains (F. Markham, *Shooting in the Himalayas*, London, 1854, p. 108); and a similar statement is made regarding the Khamtis (H. B. Rowney, *The Wild Tribes of India*, London, 1882, pp. 162, 163); while the Masai are said to conclude peace by an exchange of clothing (Merker, *op. cit.* p. 101). Edmund of England entered into an intimate alliance with king Cnut by exchanging clothing and arms (du Cange, *Glossarium, ut cit. supr.*); and, according to the same authority (Diss. xxi. in Jean sire de Joinville (*ut cit. supra*), where many other instances will be found), it was the practice of the Saracens to make friendships by an exchange of arms. The case of Glaucus and Diomede (Hom. *Il.* vi. 235; see Tamassia, *op. cit.* p. 6 ff.) is, of course, familiar. Again, it is said of the Khamtis that 'by an exchange of weapons even the most deadly enemies become fast friends, and if one falls in fight, it is the duty of the other to avenge him' (Rowney, *op. cit.*); and Dalton (*op. cit.* p. 20) gives a like account of the Mishmis.

21. Sometimes the compact is formed by exchanging pieces of a slaughtered animal. Thus the Reschiât (see Donaldson Smith, *op. cit.* p. 297, referred to above, § 18) hang strips of its paunch on the necks of those with whom they are making friendship (P. Paulitschke, *Ethnographie Nordost-Afrikas, Die materielle Cultur d. Danâkil, Galla, u. Somâl*, Berlin, 1893, pp. 249, 250), while the headman spits and whispers (v. Höhnel, *op. cit.* p. 660). Joseph Thomson gives an interesting account of a somewhat similar practice in Shira:

'A goat was brought, and, taking it by one ear, I was required to state where I was going, to declare that I meant no harm, and did not work in *uchawi* (black magic), and, finally, to promise that I would do no harm to the country. The other ear was then taken by the Sultan's ambassador, and he made promise on his part that no harm would be done to us, that food would be given, and all articles stolen returned. The goat was then killed, and a strip of skin cut off the forehead, in which two slits were made.' The Sultan's representative 'taking hold of this, pushed it on my finger by the lower slit five times, finally pushing it over the joint. I had next to take the strip, still keeping it on my own finger, and to do the same for' him 'through the upper slit. This operation finished, the strips had to be cut in two, leaving the respective portions on our fingers' (*op. cit.* p. 88).

The missionary Rebmann, who received this token of friendship from the king of Kilema, calls it 'kishogno' (J. L. Krapf, *Travels in Eastern Africa*, London, 1860, p. 238). Thomson's description of the rite explains what is said of the Wakamba—that the 'brothers' exchange rings made of the skin of a sacrificial victim, which they have eaten together (J. M. Hildebrandt, 'Ethnographische Notizen über Wakamba und ihre Nachbaren' in *ZE* x. 386). Further, Trumbull (*op. cit.* p. 66) quotes an Indian authority ('Tod's Travels,' *Journal of the Indian Archipelago*, Singapore, 1851, No. 32) to the effect that among the Rājput races of India women adopt a brother by the gift of a bracelet; and with this custom may be compared the Slavonic practice of tying the 'brothers' together (see below, § 37).

22. Sometimes the ceremony consists in the application of saliva (see above, §§ 18, 21). The Southern Somali spits on his right hand and rubs it on the forehead of his friend to indicate that he is a fellow-tribesman; and among the Oromó, a like ceremony seems to entitle the guest to tribal rights (Paulitschke, *op. cit.* p. 246). In the old days, the Masai spat at the man with whom they swore eternal friendship (S. L. and H. Hinde, *The Last of the Masai*, London, 1901, p. 47); and, among the Dyoor, 'spitting betokens the most affectionate good-will; it was a pledge of attachment, an oath of fidelity; it was to their mind the proper way of giving solemnity to a league of friendship' (G. Schweinfurth, *The Heart of Africa*, tr. by E. E. Frewer, London, 1873, i. 205). A similar practice is said to prevail in Guiana (Lawrence Keymis, *Second Voyage to Guiana in the year 1596*; R. Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations . . . of the English Nation*[3] . . . London, 1598–1600, iii. 677), and in the Bissagos Archipelago, off Senegambia (E. S. Hartland, *The Legend of Perseus*, London, 1894–1896, ii. 264); and Grimm (*op. cit.* p. 194) observes that the old northern symbol of concluding peace was not blood but saliva (see Hartland, *op. cit.* ii. 258 ff., where many instances in which saliva is employed are collected).

23. A remarkable form of the practice is spoken to by Taplin (in J. D. Wood's *Native Tribes of*

South Australia, Adelaide, 1879, p. 32 ff.). He says in his account of the Narrinyeri that

> there appears to have existed a sort of traffic between the tribes on the Murray and those near the sea, and a curious sort of provision is made for it, the object of which may be the securing of perfectly trustworthy agents to transact the business of the tribes—agents who will not by collusion cheat their employers and enrich themselves. . . . When a man has a child born to him, he preserves its umbilical cord by tying it up in the middle of a bunch of feathers. This is called a kalduke. He then gives this to the father of child or children belonging to another tribe, and those children are thereafter ngia-ngiampe to the child from whom the kalduke was procured, and that child is ngia-ngiampe to them. From that time none of the children of the man to whom the kalduke was given may speak to their ngia-ngiampe or even touch or go near him; neither must he speak to them.'

We learn from the same authority (Taplin, in E. M. Curr, *The Australian Race*, London, 1886, ii. 254) that, 'if one ngia-ngiampe sees another in need of anything, he or she must send a supply of it if possible; but yet there must never be any direct personal intercourse between the two.' Sometimes the relation is entered into for a time only by dividing the kalduke and giving a part to each. When these parts are returned to the original owner, the relation ceases (Taplin, in J. D. Woods, *op. cit.* p. 33).

24. Many instances may be cited in which the compact is made by an exchange of names. This is the form observed by the Mapuches, one of the parties to the exchange at the same time presenting a lamb to the other, to be eaten by him.

> 'The giving of a name establishes between the namesakes a species of relationship which is considered almost as sacred as that of blood, and obliges them to render to each other certain services and that consideration which naturally belongs to relatives' (E. R. Smith, *op. cit.* p. 262; see also Pöppig, *op. cit.* i. 384 f. as to the Pehuenches).

At Shupanga, on the Zambesi, the exchange of names with men of other tribes is not uncommon. The parties to the transaction regard themselves as close comrades, owing special duties to each other ever after; and each is entitled, if he visits the other, to food, lodging, and other friendly offices (D. and C. Livingstone, *Narrative of an Expedition to the Zambesi and its Tributaries, 1858–1864*, London, 1865, p. 149). In Ugogo names are exchanged as a pledge of friendship (C. T. Wilson and R. W. Felkin, *op. cit.* i. 60), and the practice is common in Polynesia (Hawaii [J. Cook and King, *A Voyage of Discovery to the Pacific Ocean in the years of 1777–1780*, London, 1784, iii. 17], Huahine [J. Cook, in Hawkesworth, *op. cit.* ii. 251]). It is said to be in use in the Marshall Islands (C. E. Meinicke, *Die Inseln d. stillen Oceans*, Leipzig, 1875–1876, ii. 342; A. von Chamisso, in O. von Kotzebue, *A Voyage of Discovery into the Southern Sea and Beering's Straits*, London, 1821, iii. p. 172, affirms that the friend is obliged to give his wife to his friend, but is not bound to avenge him); and it is found in the islands of Torres Straits (see *Reports of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits*, 1904, v. 125, 131 f.; see also J. B. Jukes, *Narrative of the Surveying Voyage of H.M.S. 'Fly,'* London, 1847, i. 209 f., where it seems that the exchange forms a bar to marriage between one of the parties and the sisters of the other), and among the Caribs (*Histoire naturelle et morale des Iles Antilles de l'Amérique*[2], Rotterdam, 1681, p. 513), the Chopunnish (M. Lewis and W. Clarke, *Travels to the Source of the Missouri River . . . in the years 1804–1806*, new ed., London, 1815, iii. 254), the Spokanes (Bancroft, *op. cit.* i. 285, note), the Shastika Indians (S. Powers, *Tribes of California: Contributions to N. American Ethnology*, Washington, 1877, iii. 247), and the Chugachigmiut of Alaska (N. Porlock, *A Voyage round the World . . . in 1785–1788*, London, 1789, p. 254; J. Meares, *Voyages made in the years 1788 and 1789, from China to the N.W. Coast of America*, London, 1790, p. 365). It was at one time in use on the Lower Murray (G. F. Angas, *Savage Life and Scenes in Australia and New Zealand*, London, 1847, i. 59) and in New Zealand (J. S. Polack, *Manners and Customs of the New Zealanders*, London, 1840, ii. 131). Of the natives at Wide Bay, Queensland, it is said (H. S. Russell, 'Exploring Excursion in Australia' in *JRGS*, 1845, xv. 314) that 'they rub their noses with their finger and mention their name, and you are then expected to follow the example by rubbing your nose and mentioning your name; then rub noses again with names exchanged.' The Kingsmill Islanders make friendship by rubbing noses and exchanging names (C. Wilkes, *Narrative of the U.S. Exploring Expedition during the years 1838–1842*, London, 1845, iv. 51); and de Sainson gives a very similar account of the ceremony at Tonga (J. Dumont d'Urville, *Voyage de la Corvette 'L'Astrolabe': Histoire du Voyage*, Paris, 1830–1833, iv. 349). The Vanikoros exchange names and presents (*ib.* v. 329); and the same usage prevails in some parts of New Guinea (W. W. Gill, *Life in the Southern Isles*, London, 1876, p. 233; J. Chalmers and W. W. Gill, *Work and Adventures in New Guinea, 1877–1885*, London, 1885, pp. 42, 99). As to making 'brothers' with animals by exchange of names, see below, § 46.

25. Among the Yahgans of Cape Horn, artificial ties of friendship are constituted by an exchange of gifts, and by painting the face and body in a distinctive fashion. The friends assume the names of blood-relationship—uncle, brother, cousin, or nephew—and behave themselves as if they were really akin (T. Bridges, 'Mœurs et Coutumes des Fuégiens,' tr. by P. Hyades, *Bulletin de la Soc. d'Anthrop. de Paris*, 1884, ser. iii. vol. vii. p. 182). And this practice is not confined to males; for women, unconnected by blood, often call themselves sisters, and act as such in all the conduct of life (P. Hyades and J. Deniker, *Mission du Cap Horn, 1882–1883*, Paris, 1891, vii. 238). So, too, among the Ovaherero, persons of the same sex are frequently united in a formal association (*omapanga* or *oupanga*). The men have their wives in common, and are entitled to use each other's property in time of need; while married as well as unmarried women join the sisterhood (G. Fritsch, *Die Eingeborenen Süd-Afrikas*, Breslau, 1872, p. 227; G. Viehe, 'Die Ovaherero,' in S. R. Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 304; see also J. Kohler, 'Recht d. Herero' in *Zeits. f. vergl. Rechtsw.* xiv. 298–299). An interesting parallel to these female associations is furnished by the Oräons. 'When two girls feel a particular penchant for each other, they swear eternal friendship and exchange necklaces, and the compact is witnessed by common friends. They do not name one another after this ratification of goodwill, but are "my flower" or "my giu" or "my meet to smile" to each other to the end of their lives' (Dalton, *op. cit.* p. 253). A like custom exists among some of the Papuan tribes on the north coast of New Guinea (J. Kohler, 'Recht der Papuas' in *Zeits. f. vergl. Rechtsw.* xiv. p. 366), and in certain districts of the Abruzzi (E. S. Hartland, *op. cit.* ii. 218 f.). As to similar usages among the Southern Slavs see below, § 34.

26. Among the North American Indians, we find many examples of companionships in arms. Thus, of the Kongas and Omahas it is said that 'the young men are generally coupled out as friends; the tie is very permanent, and continues oftentimes through life' (Edwin James, *Account of an Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains . . . in the years 1819–1820 . . . compiled from the notes of Major Long* . . . London, 1823, i. 117, 235; see also W. J. McGee, 'The Siouan Indians,' in *Fifteenth Annual Report of the Bur*

eau of Ethnology to the . . . Smithsonian Inst. 1893–1894, Washington, 1897, p. 178); the existence of a similar institution has been noted among the Wyandot (*First Annual Report . . . 1879–1880*, Washington, 1881, p. 68), and the Iroquois (P. F. X. de Charlevoix, *Histoire de la Nouvelle France*, Paris, 1744, vi. 14); and J. Adair (*The History of the American Indians*, London, 1775, p. 190) says that the Cherokees 'reckon a friend in the same rank with a brother both with regard to marriage and any other affair of social life.' In Fiji,

'instances of persons devoting themselves specially to arms are not uncommon. The manner in which they do this is singular, and wears the appearance of a marriage contract: and the two men entering into it are spoken of as man and wife, to indicate the closeness of their military union. By this mutual bond the two men pledge themselves to oneness of purpose and effort, to stand by each other in every danger, defending each other to the death, and, if needful, to die together. In the case of one of the parties wishing to become married in the ordinary style to one of the other sex, the former contract is duly declared void' (T. Williams and J. Calvert, *Fiji and the Fijians*, ed. G. S. Rowe[2], London, 1860, i. 45–46).

Further, the custom of joining in companionships for mutual defence prevails among many of the Afghan tribes:

'Individuals enter into engagements to support each other in specific enterprises, or in all cases that may arise. These alliances are called Goondees, and they may include any number of persons. The connexion between two persons in the same Goondee is reckoned stronger than that of blood. They are bound to give up all they have, and even their lives, for each other. A Goondee between two chiefs is not dissolved even by a war between their tribes; they may even join in the battle, but as soon as the contest is over their friendship is renewed. Goondees also take place between tribes' (M. Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul . . .* new ed. London, 1839, ii. 4).

With these brothers in arms we may compare the Celtic 'Soldurii' and 'Ambacti,' whom Cæsar (*de Bell. Gall.* iii. 22, vi. 15) mentions.

27. Throughout all Circassia there exist fraternities and extensive associations, the members of which 'are bound mutually to protect each other, and assist in paying the fine of individuals who may commit manslaughter or other crimes.' In travelling, the members enter one another's houses 'as freely as if they were brothers in reality' (J. S. Bell, *Journal of a Residence in Circassia during the years 1837–1839*, London, 1840, i. 84). All the members of a fraternity are regarded as springing from the same stock; and not only they, but their serfs, are precluded from intermarriage (*ib.* p. 347).

28. J. Macgillivray (*Narrative of the Voyage of H.M.S. Rattlesnake*, London, 1852, i. 310) noted at Evans Bay, Cape York, the existence of an association between certain whites and certain natives, by which the latter appeared to be bound to assist the former and care for their safety. The native was said to be the white man's *kotaiga*—the term being derived from the Kowrarega word for 'younger brother.' The Kowrarega is an Australian tribe, altered by contact with the Papuans of the adjacent islands so as to resemble the latter in most of their physical, intellectual, and moral characteristics (Howitt, *op. cit.* pp. 3, 11). We are not told how this relation was entered into, or whether it subsisted between natives, as well as between natives and whites. It may be that it is to be classed not with blood-brotherhood, but rather with those associations for the purpose of mutual assistance in trade of which an example is furnished by the Klaarwater Hottentots in their intercourse with some of the Bechuana tribes (W. J. Burchell, *Travels in the Interior of South Africa*, London, 1824, ii. 555; cf. R. F. Burton, *op. cit.* ii. 55; and J. Chapman, *Travels in the Interior of S. Africa*, London, 1868, i. 97, note).

29. In this connexion a curious belief of the Algonquins may be mentioned. They regarded the mingling of the bones of deceased relatives and friends as constituting a bond of friendship between their descendants (S. de Champlain, *Œuvres*, ed. by C. H. Laverdière, Quebec, 1870, v. 305), and Adair (*op. cit.* pp. 183–184) seems to indicate that the same notion prevailed among the Choctaws. He adds that they reckoned it irreligious to mix the bones of a relative with those of an enemy or even of a stranger (cf. Robertson Smith, *Kinship*, pp. 314, 315).

ii. Where the relation is due to force of circumstances.

30. Hitherto we have been considering artificial relations into which the parties enter by choice. We now turn to relations which are brought about by force of circumstances, and not by the volition of the 'brothers.' Livingstone (*Missionary Travels and Researches*, p. 526) tells us that he became blood-relation to a young woman by accident. As he was removing a tumour from her arm, he was spattered with blood from one of the small arteries. 'You were a friend before,' she exclaimed, 'now you are a blood-relation.' Some of the Papuan tribes on the north coast of New Guinea recognize the existence of a friendly bond between those who have been circumcised at the same time, especially between two youths who have occupied the spirit-house together. After the ceremony, they address one another no longer by name, but as 'my man' (J. Kohler, 'Recht d. Papuas' in *Zeits. f. vergl. Rechtsw.* xiv. 366; cf. Brooke, *op. cit.* ii. 224). Again, the rite of circumcision (*boguera*) is observed by the Bechuanas and all the Kāfirs, south of the Zambesi. All the boys between ten and fourteen or fifteen are made the life-companions of one of the sons of the chief. The members of the band (*mopato*) recognize 'a sort of equality and partial communism ever afterwards, and address each other by the title of *molekane*, or 'comrade.' When a fugitive comes to a tribe he is directed to the *mopato* analogous to that to which in his own tribe he belongs and does duty as a member' (Livingstone, *op. cit.* pp. 147–148; see E. Casalis, *Études sur la langue séchuana*, Paris, 1841, p. 70, as to the Basutos). Again, among the Kurnai, all the youths who have been initiated at the same time are brothers, and ever afterwards address each other's wife as 'wife,' and each other's children as 'child.' The tie thus formed is one of great strength, binding together all the contemporaries of the various clans (L. Fison and A. W. Howitt, *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, Melbourne, etc., 1880, pp. 198–199). With this tie may be compared the relation between lads and those who operate on them in the initiation ceremonies (Spencer-Gillen[2], pp. 248, 260). In some of the islands of Torres Straits, boys who are mates in the initiation ceremony may not marry each other's sisters (*Rep. of Camb. Anthr. Exp. to Torres Straits*, v. 211). It may be noted that at Nukahiva, professional tatuers were bound, under sanction of a tabu, to support those of their fellows who came to be in need (G. H. von Langsdorff, *Voyages and Travels in various parts of the World during the years 1803–1807*, London, 1813, i. 121).

31. Among the Wakamba, the relation of protector and protégé is one of extraordinary intimacy. The fugitive who touches the penis of his enemy becomes thenceforth entitled to his protection and to that of his tribe; and so strong is the bond between them, that the protégé is made free of the house and the wife of his protector (Hildebrandt, *loc. cit.* p. 386 f.). A form of oath in use in ancient Israel (Gn $24^{2f.}$ 47^{29}; H. Ewald, *Die Alterthümer d. Volkes Israel*[3], Göttingen, 1866, p. 26) and the Kāfir mode of making a vow (H. Somerset, *Adventures in Caffraria*, London, 1858, p. 180) may be recalled in this connexion, as well as a practice of some Australian tribes in swearing

friendship (G. Grey, *Journals of Two Expeditions of Discovery in North-West and Western Australia*, London, 1841, ii. 342; cf. Spencer-Gillen[b], pp. 556, 560; but see R. Brough Smith, *Aborigines of Victoria*, London, 1878, i. 514). Hildebrandt says further, that if a fugitive can succeed in putting his lips to a woman's breast, he thereby creates an indissoluble bond between himself and her tribe, which is thenceforth bound to protect him (*loc. cit. supra*).

iii. The institution among the Southern Slavs.

32. We now propose to turn to a centre of the institution—to the countries of the Southern Slavs, where it is a living force admitted within the walls of the sanctuary by the recognition of the Christian Church. Here we shall meet with many forms, of which some are familiar and some are novel; and we shall commence with an instance in which blood-drinking plays a part. According to a Bosnian authority quoted by F. S. Krauss (*Sitte und Brauch d. Südslaven*, Vienna, 1885, p. 628), the priest offers up a prayer in which he dwells upon the reciprocal duties of the 'brothers.' He makes them kiss one another, and repeat after him the words of a solemn oath. Then the younger brother scratches his arm so as to draw a few drops of blood, which he mixes with wine. The brothers drink the liquid and the compact is sealed. Krauss doubts the accuracy of this account, but S. Ciszewski (*Künstliche Verwandtschaft bei den Südslaven*, Leipzig, 1897, pp. 60-68) accepts it as reliable, and adduces corroborative evidence from many other quarters. (See § 40 below.)

33. We are told (M. Chopin et A. Ubicini, *Provinces danubiennes et roumaines*, Paris, 1856, i. 197, cited by Ciszewski, *op. cit.* p. 32) of a brotherhood 'per arma,' known to Montenegro and Bulgaria. The two men who wish to enter into the compact go to a church, accompanied by several friends as witnesses. They lay their arms crosswise on the floor, and, after swearing that now they are united in life and death, take them up and exchange them. If one dies, his weapons pass to the survivor.

34. According to Medacović (cited by Ciszewski, *op. cit.* p. 33), the bond in Montenegro is one not of friendship only but of relationship—the parties to it are looked upon as actual brothers. He distinguishes three grades, of which the first is called the 'little brotherhood.' It is constituted by a kiss thrice repeated. The 'brothers' exchange gifts; and he who first expressed the wish to perform the rite entertains the other. 'Brothers' of this first degree may determine to form a still more intimate relation, and in such a case the ceremony is one of greater solemnity. They call a priest to say a prayer while they stand under the stola, and, having drunk wine from the chalice to which they set their lips at the same time, they eat a crumb of the bread, receiving the Eucharist in both kinds according to the observance of the Eastern Church. Having kissed the cross, the evangels, and the holy pictures, they kiss one another thrice; and he who proposed the union entertains the other. Presents are exchanged, and the men are brothers until death. So, too, women, married as well as single, enter into similar friendships by drinking wine together, kissing one another, and exchanging gifts. A. Fortis (*Viaggio in Dalmazia*, Venice, 1774, i. 58 ff.) tells us that he was present in the church of Perušić when a union between two young Morlak girls was solemnized on the steps of the altar. He observes that in his day friendships of this sort between persons of different sexes were less common than they had been in the past. According to Krauss (*op. cit.* p. 641), the 'sisters' are always together—in church, at work, and in amusement. They wear similar clothes and ornaments, and address one another as 'little sister,' 'my gold,' 'my little fawn.' No relationship could be more intimate or more affectionate (see § 25 above, where parallel instances are noted).

35. In some parts of Croatia the bond seems to be formed without wine-drinking or witnesses; while, in Northern Bulgaria, the rite exhibits the characteristics of a family gathering, without the intervention of the Church. In some districts the ceremony resembles that of a marriage (Ciszewski, *op. cit.* pp. 35–36).

36. All the old ritual books prescribe the same, or nearly the same, formalities. The parties stand before the altar, the elder on the right, the younger on the left. The priest hands a candle to each. Each lays his right hand on the Gospels, and holds a cross in his left. According to another form, they stand before the altar with crosses and candles in their hands. The priest utters a prayer, in which the importance of the act is emphasized, the reciprocal duties of the brothers are laid down, and God's blessing is invoked upon them. Then the priest exchanges the crosses and candles which the brothers are holding in their hands, and reads to them certain passages of Holy Writ; and the brothers kiss the Gospels and embrace each other. It is only in Bulgaria that the exchange of candles and crosses takes place (*ib.* p. 37).

37. It is customary in one of the districts of Bulgaria for the priest to tie the men together with a small cord which he uses in saying Mass. He then takes off his vestments, and lays them on their heads; and, after having said a prayer suitable to the occasion, he sprinkles them with holy water, and, untying the cord, bids them kiss hands, telling them that they are henceforth brothers in spirit. This ceremony takes place at the end of Divine service, when the church is empty (*ib.* p. 38; see § 21 above, where parallel instances are noted).

38. Among the Bulgarians of Prilep, after the ceremony in church is over, one of the brothers entertains his relatives, with the other brother and his relatives, gifts being distributed among all who are present. A few days afterwards a similar meal is provided in the house of the other brother, and gifts are again distributed. All those who have received these gifts are henceforward regarded as relatives, and may not intermarry; and this kind of union may be contracted by men with men, by men with women, or by women with women (*ib.* p. 39).

39. In Little Russia, brotherhoods and sisterhoods are formed by swearing eternal friendship upon a holy picture, by drinking wine, and by exchanging gifts. In some parts of Russia a meal, to which the whole company is invited, completes the ceremony; and the brothers make it the occasion of an exchange of presents—very often of their baptismal crosses. Their children may not intermarry (*ib.* pp. 54–59).

40. From Servia, Croatia, and Bulgaria we are supplied with notices of ceremonies by which temporary bonds of brotherhood and sisterhood are constituted. These bonds continue from year to year, and form an actual relationship and a bar to intermarriage (*ib.* pp. 41–47). Parallel instances have been observed in Italy and among the Poles and Czechs (*ib.* pp. 48–50). In Servia and Croatia these unions are formed on St. John Baptist's day by the exchange of willow crowns and gifts and kisses. In Southern Bulgaria, on the same holy day, the brothers exchange bunches of twigs, with needles like the pine, in presence of their invited guests, and, having pricked themselves, suck each other's blood in order to show the intimacy of their union. Thenceforward they treat one another as if they were blood-relations. After this exchange of blood they approach the hearth and place their

feet upon it, the guests at the same time beginning the feast. Then the brothers embrace one another, kiss hands, and, exchanging the bunches of twigs, drink out of the same bowl. They give one another presents, and visit their friends and relatives. Upon the corresponding day of the next year the compact is renewed—the elder brother, who on the previous occasion was the younger brother's guest, being now his host (*ib.* p. 44 f., and see § 32 above).

41. In Bulgaria, a bond of brotherhood subsists between children who have been christened in the same water. Brothers or sisters born in the corresponding month in different years, and also twin children, are regarded as so intimately connected that the death of one involves that of the other. A ceremony is therefore necessary to break this connexion, and the person who performs it becomes, in consequence of his act, the brother or sister of the child saved from death. On similar grounds there is said to be a like tie between the person who rescues another from death by drowning, or on the battlefield, and the person rescued; between pilgrims who exchange certain kindly offices; between foster-brothers; and between those who attend upon a bride and bridegroom on the occasion of their marriage (Ciszewski, *op. cit.* pp. 4–22, 101 ff.).

42. Ciszewski (*op. cit.* p. 84 ff.) supplies two instances in which the relation was entered into in obedience to a Divine command; and Krauss (*op. cit.* p. 633) states that, if a man dream that he has made brotherhood with another, he will deem the latter's refusal to form the union as the bitterest of insults. In the ordinary case the dream becomes a reality, and the parties shake hands, kiss one another, and exchange gifts (see below, § 46).

43. Another form of brotherhood mentioned by Ciszewski (*op. cit.* p. 72 ff.) and Krauss (*op. cit.* p. 632) is that made between a man who is in extreme danger and another to whom he appeals for help in the name of God and St. John, at the same time taking him solemnly for his brother. An interesting example of this variety of the relation is given by Krauss (*op. cit.* p. 638). A girl who has to go over the mountains alone may invite the first man she meets to be her brother. He is bound to guard her as if she were his own sister; and, were he to illtreat her, he would be regarded as a criminal against Heaven.

iv. The institution in Roman and Byzantine law and in modern Greece.

44. It is interesting to notice the attitude which the Roman lawgivers assumed towards this institution. A rescript of the emperors Diocletian and Maximian (§ 7 c. *de Hered. Instit.* 6. 24) is in the following terms:

'Nec apud peregrinos fratrem sibi quisquam per adoptionem facere poterat. Cum igitur quod patrem tuum voluisse facere dicis irritum sit, portionem hereditatis, quam is adversus quem supplicas velut adoptatus frater heres institutus tenet, restitui tibi curae habebit praeses provinciae.'

It seems clear that this rescript proceeds upon a confusion of the institution of brotherhood with that of adoption, and that the former, which was completely foreign to Roman ideas, was treated as if it were a monstrous form of the latter and declared to be of no force. The same view received effect in a collection of Syro-Roman laws (*Syrisch-römisches Rechtsbuch*, revised and edited by K. G. Bruns and E. Sachau, Leipzig, 1880), which belongs to the 5th cent. of our era. One of its provisions declares that, if a man wishes to write a compact of brotherhood with another so that they shall hold in common all that they possess or shall acquire, the law forbids it, and annuls the written compact. For their wives are not common, and their children cannot be common. So, too, the Byzantine lawyers of the 11th cent. refused to recognize ἀδελφοποιία, or ἀδελφοποίησις, or ἀδελφοποιητία as binding. It was forbidden by the Church, especially to her monks; and the argument against it which found most favour was that of an archbishop of Bulgaria in the 13th century: ἡ θέσις μιμεῖ τὴν φύσιν, ἡ φύσις δὲ υἱὸν ἐπιγιγνώσκει διὰ γεννήσεως, ἀδελφοποίταν δὲ οὐδαμῶς. Still, the ceremony was practised frequently and in many places; and although the Church forbade it, it was always celebrated with the Church's rites. Like sponsorship, it constituted a πνευματικὴ ἀδελφότης, and created a marriage bar between the parties to it, and, according to some authorities, between their children (Bruns and Sachau, *op. cit.* pp. 255-256; Tamassia, *op. cit.* p. 63 ff.; Robertson Smith, *Kinship*, p. 160). It played an important part in the Greek war of independence, and is said even now to survive in certain districts of Greece (J. Kohler, 'Studien über die künstliche Verwandtschaft' in *Zeits. f. vergl. Rechtsw.* v. 438; Ciszewski, *op. cit.* p. 69).

v. Where the compact is entered into with women, dead persons, supernatural beings, or animals.

45. We have seen that the compact is not confined to males. Thus, among the Southern Slavs, men enter into it with women (Krauss, *op. cit.* pp. 619, 624, 638, 640), and women with women (*ib.* p. 641); and female associations are likewise found among the Yahgans, the Orāons, in certain districts of the Abruzzi, among the Papuans on the north coast of New Guinea, the Ovaherero (see above, § 25), and the Swahili (Niese, *op. cit.* p. 240). Nor are these compacts always confined to mortals, if we may rely on the evidence of Bulgarian folk-tales and of the modes of address used by the fishermen of Ragusa to those whom they regard as witches (Ciszewski, *op. cit.* pp. 69–71; cf. Frazer, *Golden Bough*[2], London, 1900, iii. 380, note). In some cases the bond seems to be formed with a dead enemy. Thus, among the sea Dayaks, his head is brought on shore with much ceremony. For months after its arrival

'it is treated with the greatest consideration, and all the names and terms of endearment of which their language is capable are abundantly lavished on it; the most dainty morsels are thrust into its mouth, and it is instructed to hate its former friends, and that, having been adopted into the tribe of its captors, its spirit must be always with them; sirih leaves and betelnuts are given to it,—and, finally, a cigar is frequently placed between its ghastly and pallid lips. None of this disgusting mockery is performed with the intention of ridicule, but all to propitiate the spirit by kindness' (H. Low, *Sarawak*, London, 1848, p. 207).

46. This curious ceremony recalls to us the treatment of the dead bear by some of the Canadian Indians. According to Charlevoix (*op. cit.* v. 173), as soon as he has killed a bear, the hunter puts the mouthpiece of his lighted pipe between its teeth, blows into the bowl, and, having filled the animal's jaws with smoke, adjures its spirit not to resent what has happened nor thwart him in his hunting expeditions. With this account that of the festival of the bear among the Ainus may be compared (I. L. Bird, *Unbeaten Tracks in Japan*, London, 1880, ii. 97–98), and also that of Macrae ('Account of the Kookies or Lunctas' in *Asiatic Researches*, London, 1803, vii. 189) as to the revenge which the tribesmen take on the tiger, and even on the tree by which a relative has met his death (cf. E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*[4], London, 1903, i. 286). In a Malagasy folk-tale we read of a bad man who was blood-brother of certain beasts (*FLJ*, London, 1883, i. 309); and in Sarawak a man sometimes dreams that he has become blood-brother of a crocodile by going through the regular ceremony and exchanging names. Thereafter he is quite safe from crocodiles (C. Hose and W. McDougall, *op. cit.* p. 190 f.; see above, § 42).

vi. What persons are bound by the compact.

47. In some cases the compact is obligatory only

upon those who have personally become parties to it. In Timor and Borneo, and among the Wachaga, a chief may represent his tribe, but a simple tribesman binds himself only (Forbes, *op. cit.* p. 452; Schwaner, *op. cit.* i 214–215; Kohler, 'Das Banturecht,' *loc. cit.* xv. 40). Nor does the bond reach further in the *fatidrá* of Madagascar, in the old Northern ceremony of 'going under the turf,' in the companionships in arms of the American Indians, the Fijians and the Afghans, in the brotherhoods of the Syrians of the Lebanon (see above, §§ 13, 7, 26, 11) and of the Swahili (Niese, *op. cit.* p. 240), in the friendships of the Polynesians, Yahgans, Orāons, and the natives of the Abruzzi, and the Celts (see §§ 52, 25, 2, 8).

48. In many instances the participants in the rite bind not themselves only, but other persons on behalf of whom they act. Thus, among the Karens of Burma, 'the chief stands as the representative of the tribe, if it be a tribal agreement; or the father as the representative of the family, if it be a more limited covenant' (Luther, *op. cit.* p. 313); and in Timor, the parties may be the representatives of families or tribes or kingdoms (Forbes, *op. cit.* p. 452). Chiefs bind their tribes amongst the wild peoples of the Naga hills (Woodthorpe, *op. cit.* p. 211), the natives of the Bismarck Archipelago (E. Sorge, 'Nissan-Inseln in Bismarck-Archipel.' in Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 405), in Borneo (Schwaner, *op. cit.* i. 214), and among the Wachaga (Kohler 'Das Banturecht,' *loc. cit.* xv. 40). Sometimes the chiefs take the principal parts in the ceremony, while their followers join only in its later stages; as, for example, by drinking what remains of the diluted blood, by participating in a common feast, or by receiving gifts from the 'brothers'; so with the Scythians (Herodotus, iv. 70), Balonda (Livingstone, *Missionary Travels and Researches*, p. 488 f.), Ceramese (Riedel, *op. cit.* pp. 128–129), and Bulgarians (see above, § 38). In other cases the tribe is represented by a certain number of tribesmen (Garos and Kanowit Dayaks [see above, § 9], Bali of N. Cameroon [Hutter, *loc. cit.* p. 1]). A very curious instance of the representation of a tribe by a single tribesman is given by Bancroft (*op. cit.* i. 636–637). He says of certain Mexican tribes, that if one of them wished to make 'a close connexion, friendship, alliance, family or blood relationship' with another, its members seized a man of the latter tribe, and, having made him intoxicated, pierced his ears with awls and smeared themselves with his blood.

It is, of course, sufficiently obvious that the blood-brother of a chief may, in the general case, at all events, rely upon the good offices of the subjects of his protector, *e.g.* among the Kimbunda (Magyar, *op. cit.* i. 445). Among the Arabs, 'the compact is primarily between two individuals, but the obligation contracted by the single clansman is binding on all his "friends," *i.e.* on the other members of the kin' (*Rel. Sem.*[2] p. 315; see Herod. iii. 8, quoted above, § 16). By the Southern Slavs each participant is recognized as a near relative by the kinsmen of his chosen brother, the brotherhood being regarded as a true relationship (Krauss, *op. cit.* p. 624; Ciszewski, *op. cit.* pp. 99–101); and, among the Somali and Oromó, a stranger admitted to friendship becomes entitled to all the rights of a tribesman (Paulitschke, *op. cit.* p. 246).

vii. What purposes are served by the compact.

49. It is clear from what has already been said that the rights and duties which spring from this relation are not the same in all cases. In some the bond amounts to little more than a formal declaration of mutual goodwill. Thus the friendships between girls among the Orāons and in certain districts of the Abruzzi are strong and intimate, but they create no new tie (see above, § 25). The *magus* ceremony is confined to relatives; it strengthens the natural bond, but does not form a fresh one (see above, § 18); while, among the Swahili, the sole effect of the relation is to establish an obligation between the members to help one another in time of danger (Niese, *op. cit.* p. 240). In other cases the brotherhood seems to effect a complete identification of interests, as, for instance, in the case of the Polynesian *taio* (see below, § 52). It may, however, be affirmed that it is of the essence of the obligation imposed upon the parties to act towards one another faithfully and helpfully as true friends and loyal brothers. Thus we find, among some of the Australian tribes, that

'the drawing and also the drinking of blood on certain special occasions is associated with the idea that those who take part in the ceremony are thereby bound together in friendship and obliged to assist one another. At the same time it renders treachery impossible' (see above, § 2).

The same authorities add that the men taking part in the *atninga* avenging expedition of the Arunta tribe

'assembled together, and, after each one had been touched with the girdle made from the hair of the man whose death they were going out to avenge, they drew blood from their urethras and sprinkled it over one another' (Spencer and Gillen, *The Northern Tribes*, p. 598, cf. p. 556 ff.). 'Sometimes, for the same purpose, blood is drawn from the arm and drunk, and on rare occasions a man, declining thus to pledge himself, will have his mouth forced open and the blood poured into it' (*ib.* p. 598).

Among the Hungarians of the 9th cent. the chief men, in taking the oath of fealty to the chief, signified, by shedding their blood into a single bowl, that the blood of the oath-breaker should be shed as theirs had been (J. G. Schwandtner, *Scriptores rerum Hungaricarum*, Vienna, 1746, i. 6). Again, it is said of the Karens that, when individuals, villages, or clans unite in confederacies,

'the contracting parties bind themselves by drinking spirits in which the blood of both has been mixed, and in which a number of weapons have been dipped. The blood of each is supposed to live as an agent or ambassador in the blood of the other, and thus to prevent treachery. The weapons are likewise invoked to prevent treachery' (Smeaton, *op. cit.* pp. 168–169).

The same notion underlies the brotherhood between the king of Unyoro and his servants, especially his cooks (*Emin Pasha in Central Africa*, ed. G. Schweinfurth, Eng. tr., London, 1888, p. 78), the oaths of those making a league or conspiracy, and the *ngia-ngiampe* relation of South Australia (see above, §§ 2, 8, 23). So, too, among the Melangkaps, the object of making brothers by exchange of gifts was to ensure that the Europeans should not cease to be friendly and injure the natives when at a distance from them (J. Whitehead, *Explor. of M. Kina Bahu, N. Borneo*, London, 1893, p. 123).

50. The members of the companionships of the old Norsemen were bound to avenge one another as if they were truly brothers (see above, § 7), and a like obligation is imposed on those who have entered into brotherhood in Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Bosnia (Ciszewski, *op. cit.* p. 89). Among the Wyandot, the youthful braves 'agree to be perpetual friends to each other, or more than brothers. Each reveals to the other the secrets of his life, and counsels with him on matters of importance, and defends him from wrong and violence, and at his death is chief mourner' (*1 RBEW*, p. 68; see § 26 above, where references to similar statements regarding other tribes will be found). So, too, the Afghan tribesmen who join in 'goondees' for mutual defence and support are regarded as more than natural brothers (see above, § 26); and the Fijian brotherhood in arms wears the appearance of a marriage contract (*ib.*)—a characteristic which may be compared with that of the bond of the 'nazil,' which can be dissolved only by the formula of triple divorce (R. F. Burton, *First Footsteps in East Africa*, London, 1856, p. 124). The parties to the blood-rite among the Balonda become 'perpetual friends and relations' (Livingstone, *Missionary*

Travels and Researches, p. 488); and it has been observed (Wilson and Felkin, *op. cit.* ii. 41; cf. Grant, *op. cit.* p. 271; F. L. James, *The Wild Tribes of the Soudan*[2], p. 91) that, if an African be your blood-brother, you may really trust him. 'This contract is never broken.' Among the Somali and Oromó, the saliva ceremony secures to the stranger a tribesman's rights (Paulitschke, *op. cit.* p. 246), while, among the Karens, the blood-covenant

'is of the utmost force. It covers not merely an agreement of peace or truce, but also a promise of mutual assistance in peace and war. It also conveys to the covenanting parties mutual tribal rights. If they are chiefs, the covenant embraces the entire tribes. If one is a private individual, the immediate family and direct descendants are included in the agreement. I never heard of the blood-covenant being broken. The blood-covenant gives even a foreigner every right which he would have if born a member of the tribe' (Luther, *op. cit.* p. 314).

viii. What legal consequences flow from the compact.

51. In certain cases the relation of brotherhood operates as a bar to marriage. Thus it is said of the Cherokees (see above, § 26) that they 'reckon a friend in the same rank with a brother, both with regard to marriage and any other affair of social life.' So, too, Lery ('Historia navigationis in Bresiliam,' cap. 16, in De Bry, *Americae tertia pars*, Frankfort, 1592) says that among certain Brazilian tribes

'nemo eorum matrem, sororem, vel filiam in uxorem ducit; reliquorum ratio nulla habetur; patruus neptem ducit; atque ita deinceps. Tamen . . . nemo filiam aut sororem sui *Atourassap* matrimonio sibi jungere potest. Is autem *Atourassap* dicitur cujus tanta est cum quodam necessitudo ut bona inter utrumque sint communia.'

In some of the islands of Torres Straits a man may not marry the sister either of his particular friend or of his comrade in the ceremony of initiation (Haddon, *JAI* xix. 411–412, 315, 356); nor may those intermarry who take part in the *pela* ceremony of Ceram, or in the friendly associations of individuals or villages at Wetar (Riedel, *op. cit.* pp. 128–129, 446–447; see above, § 14). Among the Murmi a similar bar subsists between the brothers (see above, § 18); it is said of the Kanakas of the Bismarck Archipelago, that if two chiefs enter into an artificial relationship, their peoples are precluded by the closeness of the connexion from intermarriage (Joachim Graf Pfeil, *Studien u. Beobachtungen aus der Südsee*, Brunswick, 1899, p. 26); and a like prohibition affects those who are *ngia-ngiampe* to one another, and the brothers and even the serfs of a Circassian fraternity (see above, §§ 23, 27). Ciszewski, to whose work reference must be made for details, observes that, among the Southern Slavs, the institution of brotherhood is giving way to the influence of modern ideas; and that, if we were to gather from the different districts the various notions held regarding its legal and social consequences, we should be able to construct a complete scheme of the stages through which it has passed. Thus, in some cases, the relationship does not constitute a bar to marriage; in some, it makes a marriage impossible not only between the parties to the rite, but between their children; while, in Prilep, it precludes marriage not only between the parties and between their children, but between those of their relatives who participated in the distribution of gifts at the time of the ceremony (Ciszewski, *op. cit.* pp. 86, 94, 99–100; see above, § 38). We have in the last case, as Ciszewski observes, an interesting example of a collective brotherhood. The rite is performed by the representatives of the two kindreds; but that the relatives are also included in the association by accepting presents from the principals is shown by the fact that they may not intermarry.

52. According to Forbes, if one of the members of a Timorese brotherhood comes to the other brother's house, he 'is in every respect regarded as free, and as much at home as its owner. Nothing is withheld from him; even his friend's wife is not denied him, and a child born of such a union would be regarded by the husband as *his*' (*op. cit.* p. 452). By the terms of the compact of the *fatidrá* the brothers enjoyed community of wives and property; although, in later times, and in the case of Europeans, those obligations may not have been treated as literally binding (Ellis, *History of Madagascar*, i. 190). So, too, the members of the *omapanga* of the Ovaherero, and, according to A. von Chamisso, 'brothers' in the Marshall Islands have their wives in common (see above, §§ 25, 24); and in the countries of the Kimbunda, and among the Wakamba, the brothers exercised mutual privileges over wives and property (Magyar, *op. cit.* i. 201–202; Hildebrandt, *op. cit.* p. 387). Ellis (*Polynesian Researches*, London, 1831, iii. 124) observes that the wife of every individual is the wife also of his *taio*, or friend; and an earlier authority (W. Wilson, *A Missionary Voyage to the S. Pacific Ocean in 1796–1798, in the ship 'Duff,' commanded by Capt. James Wilson*, London, 1799, p. 359), in making a similar statement, adds that a *taio* 'must indulge in no liberties with the sisters or the daughters, because they are considered as his own sisters, and incest is held in abhorrence by them; nor will any temptation engage them to violate this bond of purity.' Further, it is said, on the testimony of Lieut. Corner, a previous observer, that the relation of *taio* formed between persons of different sexes operated as an absolute bar to all personal liberties. The later missionaries, however, doubted the accuracy of Corner's evidence, at all events in regard to the Tahitians of their time (*ib.* cf. § 43 above). Lastly, the provisions of the Syro-Roman law (see above, § 44) point to a compact, the parties to which held their wives and children in common.

ix. General observations on the nature and history of the institution.

53. We have seen in the preceding pages that the form of the rite by which the bond is constituted is not always one and the same. In some cases the use of blood is the only requisite; in some it is an essential element; in some it is a mere accessory; and in some it does not enter into the ceremony. And the question presents itself—Is the blood-rite the original type of which other forms are variations, or is it itself but one of the forms in which the need of man for union with, and security against, his fellow found expression? It is, no doubt, true that, in many instances, the use of the blood, while it is of the essence of the solemnity, is accompanied or followed by some other ritual act or acts, such as an exchange of food or weapons or garments or other gifts; and it has been argued that a form in which the performance of such act or acts is sufficient without the use of blood for the completion of the rite is a maimed form, which has lost what was originally essential and retained only what was originally of secondary importance. Such an explanation, however, hardly meets the case: for it does not account for those modes of entering into the compact with which the blood-rite is never found in connexion. It suggests, of course, that even in those cases the use of blood at one time formed part of the ceremony; but there is no evidence to that effect. Now, in the instances which we have adduced, we have found that the parties to the compact are brought together in a great number of different ways. They exchange blood or wine or food or names or garments or weapons or rings of the skins of sacrificial victims or gifts of some sort or kind. Or they dip their hands or their weapons in one another's blood or in the blood of the sacrifice, or shake hands smeared with blood, or let the blood mingle as it falls to the ground. Or they join in holding the victim during the sacrifice, or hold branches while an imprecation is being pronounced or blood

is being let. Or one of them rubs the other with his saliva; or a father makes his child *ngia-ngiampe* to another's child. Or, lastly, the union may be due to community of aim and interest, as in the case of companions in arms; or to circumstances beyond the control of the parties, as in the case of those who are initiated together, or associated as operator and patient in the performance of the initiatory rite; or to the pressure of an overwhelming necessity, as in the case of the fugitive and his protector. It is to be observed that it is quite in accordance with primitive ideas to regard 'the nature of anything as inhering in all its parts' (H. Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, London, 1879, ii. § 346), even when the parts are separated from it (cf. E. Durkheim, 'La Prohibition de l'inceste et ses origines,' *L'année sociologique*, i. 51); and to treat as parts of a man's substance not only his blood, saliva, umbilical cord, sweat, and other *excreta*, hair, nail parings, and the like, but also his garments, weapons, and name. To our thinking, blood is, weapons are not, vitally connected with the man himself; but, to the mind of the savage, the connexion is of the same quality in either case.

As an illustration of this mode of thought, it may not be out of place to indicate here a feature of primitive 'giving' which sharply distinguishes it from its modern counterpart. It is hardly an exaggeration to say generally of uncivilized man what has been said of the Western Eskimo—that 'a free and disinterested gift is wholly unknown to him.' The gift is regarded as an investment, and a return is expected (see P. J. H. Grierson, *The Silent Trade*, Edin., 1903, p. 18). But it seems probable that this conception has its origin elsewhere than in the desire to lose nothing by the transaction. It is rooted rather in the notion that, unless a return be made, the recipient obtains a power over the donor which he may use to the latter's injury. 'Payment,' says Hartland (*op. cit.* ii. 75; cf. Crawley, *op. cit.* pp. 236–245, 256–257), 'is always held to neutralise a witch's power over a person through something received from him'; and instances are not wanting in which savages have refused to touch the articles set out by traders for their acceptance, until the latter have taken what was offered to them (see GIFTS). Accordingly, an exchange of weapons no less than of blood is regarded as an exchange of very substance, and as establishing between the parties 'an actual community of nature' (H. Spencer, *loc. cit.*; see Hartland, *op. cit.* ii. 55–116, 442 and *passim*). This community is brought about not only by an interchange of externals, but by the devotion of the parties to a course of conduct which demands an absolute identity of aims and interests, or by outward circumstances which force them into an intimate contact. In other words, they enter voluntarily or involuntarily into a relation in which each is regarded not by way of metaphor or fiction, but in very truth, as the *alter ego* of the other. Now, it has been said that, according to primitive notions, blood-brotherhood 'is not a relationship personal to the two parties alone, but extends to the whole of each clan: my brother is, or becomes, the brother of all my brethren; the blood which flows in the veins of either party to the blood-covenant flows in the veins of all his kin' (F. B. Jevons, *Introduction to the History of Religion*[2], London, 1902, p. 99; cf. W. R. Smith, p. 315).

We seem, at first sight, at all events, to be in the presence of two conflicting theories. First of all, we have what we may call the 'identity-theory,' which regards the bond as personal to the parties to it, and explains the blood-rite not as the typical form, but as one of many forms; and, secondly, we have what we may call the 'kinship-theory,' which regards the bond as a union of kins, and explains all forms, other than that of the blood-rite, as variations, or modifications, or deteriorations of it (see Hartland, *op. cit.* ii. p. 248 ff.; esp. p. 257). It must be admitted that the evidence which bears upon the claims of those rival views is, in some respects, very imperfect. Not infrequently we are supplied with full details of the ceremonies performed, while we are left wholly in the dark as to the legal incidents of the bond. In other cases, we are told what is its operation, but not a word is said as to the ritual accompanying its formation. For example, we have no facts before us to show how the compact was constituted in the case of the Brazilian *Atourassap*, or in that of the Ovaherero *omapanga* (see above, §§ 51, 25). At the same time, facts are reported which seem to be hardly reconcilable with the 'kinship-theory' as stated. It is, for instance, clear that in many cases the obligations undertaken bind only those persons who are parties to the compact. Thus, the Yahgans of Cape Horn enter into formal friendships by exchanging gifts, by painting themselves in a distinctive fashion, and by assuming one or other of the titles of blood-relationship (see above, § 25). There is no evidence to show that the reciprocal rights and duties of the friends extend to persons other than themselves, or that, by assuming such titles, they mean to do more than emphasize the intimacy of the relation between them. And that this is their meaning is made the more probable by a somewhat analogous instance from Fiji, where comrades in war 'are spoken of as man and wife, to indicate the closeness of their military union.' So, too, the compact which subsists between those who are companions in arms, or who have exchanged names, or who are *ngia-ngiampe* to each other, seems to be strictly personal, even where they are regarded as subject to certain marriage prohibitions, as among the Cherokees, some of the islanders of Torres Straits, the natives of Tahiti, and the Narrinyeri (see §§ 26, 24, 51, 23). The effect of the *lacu*-relationship will be noted below.

In the cases already mentioned, blood is not used in the ceremony; but there are cases in which it is used, and in which only the parties to the bond are affected. We have, for example, the temporary blood-bond, such as that which unites the members of a league, or of an Arunta punitive expedition (see above, § 2). In either instance, its purpose is to prevent treachery; in neither is it productive of a union of kins; and the same observations apply to those who join in 'going under the turf' (see above, § 7). In Timor and Borneo, and among the Wachaga, while a chief may represent his tribe, a simple tribesman binds himself only; and other examples of a like limitation have already been given (see above, § 47). In some of these cases the parties are entitled to share in one another's most sacred rights (see above, § 52); and that these privileges are not necessarily connected with the use of blood in the constitution of the bond, appears from the instance of the Polynesian *taio* and that of the Wakamba fugitive (see above, §§ 52, 31). At the same time it is quite true that sometimes they are found as consequents of a paction solemnized with blood, as in the cases of the Kimbunda and of the natives of Timor and Madagascar (see above, §§ 3, 13, 52). Thus friend is identified with friend; each is entitled to share the other's wife and property; each must regard and treat the other's sisters and daughters as if they were his own. At the same time, the relation is, in its inception at all events, a union of individuals and not a union of kins. The case of the Wakamba is peculiar. The fugitive, by a solemn act, acquires a right of participation in his pro-

tector's wife and house, and a claim on the support and assistance of his protector's tribe (see above, § 31). Here the relation extends beyond the parties to it, and is at the same time accompanied by privileges which are strictly personal to them. It may be thought that this instance presents to us the two theories in combination—the theory that the parties are made one, with the result that they, and they alone, enjoy certain intimate rights; and the theory that they are made kinsmen, with the result that the fugitive can rely upon the assistance of the tribe to which his protector belongs. This view receives some confirmation from a curious mode of peace-making practised by the Masai. One of their women proceeds with her infant to the border of the tribe with whom peace is to be concluded—the Kahe, for example—and meets there a Kahe woman with her infant. The women exchange their children in the presence of witnesses, and each puts the stranger child for a moment to her breast. Then each takes back her child, and each, having been cut by one of the witnesses, smears the blood from her wound on a piece of a bullock's heart and thrusts it into the other's mouth. During these proceedings the Masai representative and the Kahe headman make protestations of mutual goodwill, and imprecate evil upon the breaker of the compact (Merker, *op. cit.* p. 101). Here we have a rite compounded of an adoption ceremony and a brotherhood ceremony; and this instance suggests an explanation of the fact that among the Mapuches, a father, by making a stranger his son's *lacu*, or namesake, adopts him into his family (E. R. Smith, *op. cit.* pp. 260–262; see above, § 24). The parties become relatives by virtue of an exchange of names, and of giving food and eating what is given; and it may be that, in this case, the first of the theories above mentioned has yielded to the second—that the 'kinship-theory' has displaced the 'identity-theory.' Further, it is not without significance that, so far as we know, the blood-rite, as productive of a relationship which extends to the whole clan, is not to be found among the rudest peoples, such as the Yahgans of Cape Horn, the Botocudos, the Andaman Islanders, the Semangs, and Aetas, the Kubus of Sumatra, the Veddas of Ceylon, the dwarf races of Central and Western Africa, the Hottentots and Bushmen, and the natives of Australia, while the use of blood and other *media* is found among some of them in the formation of compacts creative of rights and duties which affect only the persons immediately concerned.

54. Plainly it is matter of no small difficulty to determine what is the relation of these two theories to one another; and, accordingly, we shall content ourselves with an attempt to indicate the direction in which the evidence points. Now, it seems to show that the relation with which we are dealing was not primarily and essentially a relation of kins. We are not concerned to affirm or deny that the tie which held men together in the earliest times known to us was the tie of blood. What we do assert is that primarily and essentially this relation was strictly personal to the parties to it. They might be forced into it by the pressure of external circumstances, or they might enter into it of their own free will. They might be kinsmen, as we count kinship, or they might be strangers in blood. But, whether akin or not, they were somehow brought into a contact so intimate that they became, in the eyes of their fellows, possessed of a common nature. The logical result of this community was that each of the parties became entitled to the rights and subject to the disabilities of the other. Each had a right to share the other's wife and property; each was precluded, wherever marriage of a sister by a brother or of a daughter by a father was prohibited, from marrying the other's sisters or daughters. These marriage bars, even if they did not owe their origin to a recognition of the principle of blood-relationship, were plainly susceptible of being referred to it, and accounted for by it, when it came to be recognized; and this explanation would appear most natural when the use of blood entered into the formation of the bond. Accordingly it would hardly be matter of surprise that, where circumstances favoured the change, the 'kinship-theory' gradually encroached upon the 'identity-theory' and finally usurped its place.

55. What, it may be asked, is the nature of the sanction which supports the compact? It cannot have escaped observation that, in many instances at all events, the institution with which we are dealing closely resembles an oath or an ordeal (see above, § 7). An oath consists in general of two parts—of an asseveration that what is said is true, or that what is undertaken will be performed, and an imprecation of evil by the person taking the oath upon himself, if he prove forsworn. Sometimes a divinity is invoked not merely to bear witness to the oath, but to punish the oath-breaker. Sometimes mere things, such as weapons, are introduced into the ceremony to symbolize the evil which will fall upon the perjured person—he will be cut down with a sword, or pierced with an arrow, or run through with a spear. What Polybius (iii. 25) says of the oath with which the treaties between Rome and Carthage were solemnized is very instructive. The Carthaginians swore by the gods of their country. The Romans swore 'in accordance with ancient custom' and in addition by Mars and Quirinus. He who made oath 'according to ancient custom' took a stone in his hand and said—'If I keep faith, may I fare well; but if I knowingly deceive, then may I, while all other men are assured of their right to their country, their laws, their gods, and their sepulchres, be alone cast out as I now cast out this stone'; and, with these words, he cast the stone away. It seems plain that we have here an account of two forms. In the later form the gods are invoked to be witnesses to the oath, and to punish the oath-breaker. In the earlier form the gods are not invoked, and the stone is thrown away to signify the fate of the false swearer (see H. A. A. Danz, *Der sacrale Schutz*, Jena, 1857, p. 13 ff.; O. Schrader, *Reallexikon d. indogerm. Alterthumskunde*, Strassburg, 1901, p. 168; cf. Grimm, *op. cit.* p. 897; B. W. Leist, *Græco-italische Rechtsgeschichte*, Jena, 1884, pp. 226 f., 703 f.). In many instances an act of touching is an essential part of the ceremony. Thus, in the Indian form, the man who took the oath by touching himself drew down the powers of evil upon his head (Schrader, *op. cit.* p. 167); and, in old Germany, he must touch some object which brought him into relation either with the gods whom he invoked, or with the punishment which followed upon perjury. In Scandinavia the oath-breaker touched a ring smeared with blood and consecrated to a divinity; and it was in accordance with a very ancient German practice that a man swore by his sword; while Christians swore by the cross, by relics, and by book and bell (Grimm, *op. cit.* p. 895 f., where many other forms will be found). Sometimes an animal was slaughtered to show how the perjurer would be dealt with—'Juppiter populum Romanum sic ferito, ut ego hunc porcum hic hodie feriam; tantoque magis ferito, quanto magis potes pollesque' (Livy, i. 24. 8). See on oaths A. H. Post, *Grundriss d. ethnologischen Jurisprudenz*, Oldenburg and Leipzig, 1895, ii. 478 ff., and art. OATHS.

56. When we turn to the bond of friendship, and

examine the cases in which blood is employed in its constitution, we find varieties in form, remarkably similar to those which we have been discussing. Sometimes the gods are adjured to punish those who break the compact (see above, §§ 10, 11), or simply to be witnesses to it (see above, §§ 7, 13, 14, 16). Sometimes they are made parties to it (see above, §§ 8, 16), or are invoked while an animal is being slaughtered (see above, §§ 10, 17). In other cases, the parties touch the blood (see above, §§ 7, 8), or dip their weapons in it (see above, §§ 9, 14), or touch or hold an animal while one of them slays it (see above, §§ 10, 13). Weapons or other articles are often introduced into the ceremony either as a 'witness' of the compact (see above, § 13) or as a symbol of the punishment which awaits the breaker of it (see above, § 14, and cf. § 33); and imprecations are frequently pronounced without any direct appeal to a supernatural power (see above, §§ 9, 10, 13, 14, 53). In some cases, as among the Bali, the rite consists of two parts,—of a blood-rite effecting the formation of the bond, and of a blood-rite with the operation of an oath,—while, in other cases, as among the Bendowen Dusuns, the oath stands alone (see above, § 13). There are instances, however, in which the ceremony consists of drinking or sprinkling blood without invocations or imprecations (see above, §§ 2, 49). In this connexion, Junker's (*op. cit.* p. 405; see above, § 5) account of the rite as practised by certain tribes south of the Welle is very instructive. The parties sit opposite to one another. A scratch is made on the chest of each, and a drop of blood is squeezed out. Each wipes the blood off the other with a piece of sugar-cane, which he chews, and the fibres of which he afterwards blows over his wound. At the same time, he repeats the points which have induced him to enter into the compact, and which are to be kept sacred; and at the end of each clause he adds the solemn words: 'If thou dost not hold to this, may my blood destroy thee' (cf. § 49). Here, then, we have an instance of a relation in which blood is the medium not only of formation, but of punishment (see Westermarck, *MI*, London, 1908, ii. 206 ff., 566 ff.). We have, in other words, an example of the operation of the principle which underlies the oath and the ordeal. That the same principle operates in cases in which the blood of the parties is not employed appears from such instances as that of the Beni, where the parties make friendship by eating portions of the same fruit or vegetable, and touching themselves ceremoniously with it before they eat (see above, § 18); or as that of the natives of Shira, where the 'brothers' hold a goat while it is being slaughtered, and fit rings of its skin upon one another's fingers (see above, § 21). A further confirmation is furnished by the cases in which the formation of the compact is due not to the volition of the parties, but to the force of external circumstances. The bond between them is of so intimate a character—the union between them is so complete—that its rupture cannot fail to be productive of evil consequences to the man who breaks it; and thus the sanction has its origin not in the intention of the parties, but in the essential character of the relation. It may well be that, in many instances, the sole punishment which awaits the false 'brother' is that which follows a breach of tribal custom or an outrage on public opinion. Still, it appears to be not improbable that, even in these instances, tribal custom and public opinion owe their force to a sanction of the nature indicated above.

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P. J. HAMILTON-GRIERSON.

BROTHERHOODS.—Brotherhood, in its literal sense, is the condition in which a male person is descended from the same father or mother as one or more other persons; full brotherhood, that in which he is descended from the same father and the same mother as one or more other persons. Thus the sons of Jacob by his two wives and by their two handmaids together address their unknown brother Joseph: 'Thy servants are twelve brethren, the sons of one man in the land of Canaan' (Gn 42[13]). In theology, the term is metaphorically applied in two senses: the general sense in which all men are brethren, sometimes limited to those who are of the same faith, as when St. Peter says, 'Honour all men; love the brotherhood' (1 P 2[17]); and the particular sense in which it signifies persons living together in artificial communities as natural brothers live together in families before they leave the family home to establish families of their own. The ideal of brotherhood is one of the closest of all human relations—the only one that implies equality—there being no difference between brothers other than that arising from age.

The system of living in cloistral communities with a religious object belongs to the Brāhman religion, and was adapted by Sākyamuni to the Buddhist religion, and has been largely imported into Christianity. Under it, men have retired from the world by hundreds and by thousands. The grand Buddhist monastery of Nālanda, consisting of six convents, had ten thousand monks. They employed themselves chiefly in the study of the books of their religion and of science, especially medicine and arithmetic. In Ceylon, the monks take upon them vows not to kill, not to rob, to observe celibacy, not to lie, not to drink strong liquors, not to take food after noonday, not to dance or sing or make music; to use no perfumes, unguents, or ornaments; to have no luxurious bed or chair, and never to possess gold or silver. The general idea involved in these communities or brotherhoods is that of a simple and studious life, devoted mainly to the contemplation of religious subjects, and existing in circumstances of self-denial and asceticism—an ideal which has rarely been maintained for long in its original vigour.

The Buddhist monastic system has been practised from ancient times in Tibet. The monastery is there termed *gompa*, or 'solitary place.' Lhasa, the centre of religion in Tibet, was till recently inaccessible to Europeans, although it had been visited by Sarat Chandra Das and other Hindus. One of the most ancient and famous of the monasteries in the neighbourhood is that of Samye, visited by Chandra Das in 1882. It contains a chief temple, Wu-tse, four minor temples, and eight lesser shrines, the dwellings of the monks being in a two-storeyed building near the chief temple. The grand monastery of Tashi-Lhumpo is another, and a sketch of it has been published by the Royal Geographical Society. Here the monks are summoned by a trumpet to the great hall for prayers at 3 a.m. At the lamasery of Yarlung Shetag live 40 monks and as many nuns, whose children are brought up to succeed them. This is allowed because of the loneliness of the situation of the lamasery. In the *gompas* at Lhasa there are said to be 15,000 lamas, and in the province of Amdo nearly 30,000 in 24 lamaseries; and it is estimated that one-seventh of the entire population belong to the priesthood. The lamasery of Kumbum has

temple covered in with tiles of gold, in commemoration of Tsongkapa, a Tibetan saint.

In the British provinces of Little Tibet, monasteries exist, which are thus described: The monastery at Kee in Spiti has the appearance of a hill-fort crowning an eminence. That at Kyelang in Lāhul stands on the projecting spur of a mountain side, distant from all other habitations, at an elevation of more than 12,000 feet above the level of the sea, and is approached by a steep and difficult path, which at some seasons is dangerous. In the spring of 1874 a monk and a nun were buried in an avalanche while walking up this path. In the richer monasteries in Tibet proper are extensive wardrobes of great value. Along the walls of the galleries are arranged numerous praying wheels. On one side of the hall is a wheel 5 feet in diameter, on each revolution of which a bell is struck. Outside the main building are the cells of the brethren. Col. Paske witnessed the performance by the monks of Kyelang of what is termed by him a spirit dance. The abbot took his position, attended by a band of musicians, who played loudly, when a party of 30 or 40 monks entered attired in grotesque costumes and wearing masks; after an excited and noisy dance, they retired to change these costumes.

The Tibetans take off their hats when they pass a monastery and shuffle past it on their knees. In these circumstances, it is easy to understand that the monks have acquired great political power.

In Siam, the monasteries are recruited from every class of society, especially the higher classes, and every son of a respectable family spends a year in one of them—a system which reminds one of that of the lay brethren in several English orders.

The account given by Herodotus (ii. 37) of the Egyptian priests implies that they lived in communities. He says: 'They are of all men the most excessively attentive to the worship of the gods, and observe the following ceremonies. They drink from cups of brass, which they scour every day; nor is this custom practised by some and neglected by others, but all do it. They wear linen garments, constantly fresh washed, and they pay particular attention to this. They are circumcised for the sake of cleanliness, thinking it better to be clean than handsome. The priests shave their whole body every third day, that neither lice nor any other impurity may be found upon them when engaged in the service of the gods. The priests wear linen only, and shoes of *byblus*, and are not permitted to wear any other garments or other shoes. They wash themselves in cold water twice every day and twice every night; and, in a word, they use a number of ceremonies. On the other hand, they enjoy no slight advantages, for they do not consume or expend any of their private property; but sacred food is cooked for them, and a great quantity of beef and geese is allowed each of them every day, and wine from the grape is given them; but they may not taste of fish. . . . The service of each god is performed, not by one, but by many priests, of whom one is chief priest; and when any one of them dies, his son is put in his place.'

It was in Egypt that the monastic movement in Christianity commenced. It is alleged that Frontonius established the first 'laura' in the year 151 at Nitria. In the early part of the 4th cent. the movement had taken root. It is said that the sanctity of St. Anthony attracted so many monks to his neighbourhood that he had to undertake the direction of them. St. Pachomius also, who died in 348, was head of a community; and that under Apollonius consisted of 500 individuals. The name *Dêr el-Bahari* signifies 'the convent of the North.'

From Egypt the practice speedily spread to Rome and to Gaul; and, when Augustine came to England, he found Celtic monks established there. Abbot Gasquet enumerates not fewer than 21 different orders.

They are distinguished into five classes as follows:—(1) Four orders of monks: the Benedictines, established at Monte Cassino early in the 6th cent. A.D.; the Cluniacs, dating from the 10th cent.; the Cistercians and the Carthusians, from the 11th. (2) Three orders of Canons Regular: the Augustinian, the Premonstratensian, and the Gilbertine. [The last is the only order originating in England, and was established in 1148.] (3) Two military orders: those of the Knights of St. John and the Knights Templar. (4) Four orders of Friars: the Dominicans, or Black Friars; the Franciscans, or Grey Friars; the Carmelites, or White Friars; and the Austin Friars. [These were all introduced into England in the 13th cent., and are commemorated in London by the names of places where their houses formerly stood.] (5) Eight lesser orders of Friars: the Brethren de Penitentia; the Pied Friars at Norwich; the Brethren of St. Mary de Arens at Westminster; the Brethren de Domine; the Trinitarian Friars; the Crutched Friars; the Bethlehemite Friars; the Boni homines. [These all date from the middle of the 13th century.]

The expression 'brotherhood' was also anciently applied to Gilds. The popular assemblies in the Cinque Ports are styled Court of Brotherhood and Guestling. Before the passing of the Judicature Act in 1873, the judges and serjeants-at-law together constituted the Society of Serjeants Inn, and the serjeants were always addressed by the judges in court as 'brother.'

See COMMUNISTIC SOCIETIES, MONASTICISM.

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E. W. BRABROOK.

BROTHERLY LOVE (Buddhist).—See LOVE (Buddhist).

BROTHERLY LOVE (Christian).—The principle of brotherly love was not first enunciated by Christianity. Exponents of earlier systems had given it notable expression, both among Gentiles and among Jews (see, *e.g.*, Ex 23^4, Lv 19^{18}, Dt 22^{1-4} 24^{10-15}, To 4, etc.; cf. art. 'Brotherly Love' in *JE*). Even the 'Golden Rule' had been anticipated, at least in a negative form (see Allen on Mt 7^{12}), and the association of the Christian with the Jewish doctrine is openly declared both by our Lord (Mt 7^{12} 22^{40}) and by His Apostles (Ro 13^{8-10}, Ja 2^8). In the earlier dispensation, however, the conception was narrowed by racial prejudice. For the practical realization of what was there implicit we must turn at once to the words of Jesus Himself.

1. **The teaching of Jesus.**—(*a*) The teaching of Jesus not only inculcates the duty of brotherly love (Mt $5^{21-24.\ 38-48}$ 7^{12}, Mk 10^{42}, Lk 10^{27} etc.), but assigns to it the utmost emphasis. From His doctrine of the Divine Fatherhood He leads us to infer the doctrine of human brotherhood (see the use of ἀδελφός in Mt $5^{22.\ 23}$ 7^3 $18^{15.\ 35}$ etc., and cf. 23^8). The love of our neighbour is placed side by side with our love of God as the supreme obligation of religion (22^{34-40}); and so inseparable are the two, that in Christ's portrayal the heavenly love finds in the earthly love alike its truest expression and its unerring criterion (25^{40}, Mk $9^{36.\ 37}$, Lk $6^{32ff.}$; cf. Jn 13^{35} $15^{10.\ 12}$). No formal devotion grants

exemption from the claims of justice and mercy (Mt 23^{23} 15^{6}). To be wrong in one's relations with a brother is no less than to be wrong in one's relations with God ($5^{23, 24}$ 25^{45}).

(*b*) There is a noble universalism in the love thus enjoined by our Lord. In His thought the term 'neighbour' loses all such limitations as in the earlier Jewish interpretation were imposed by national or personal animosity. It embraces all men (7^{12}) irrespective of race (Lk 10^{25-37}), of social status ($14^{12, 13}$), of character (Mt 5^{43-48}), and even of personal relationships (5^{44}, Lk 6^{27}). While the wider human brotherhood itself includes an inner brotherhood of discipleship (Mk 3^{35}, Jn 13^{34} 15^{12}), all children of the common Father have a place in the one great fraternity of love.

2. The Apostolic writings.—(*a*) The prominence assigned to brotherly love in our Lord's own teaching is re-asserted in that of His Apostles. Frequent exhortations are found in the Epistles reminding the early Christians of the obligations it involves (see, *e.g.*, Ro 12^{10}, He 13^{1-3}, 1 P 1^{22}, 1 Jn 3^{11} 4^{21}). So well known, indeed, are those obligations, that in one place there is almost an apology for allusion to them (1 Th 4^{9}). Whether viewed from the standpoint of worship (*θρησκεία*) or from that of piety (*εὐσέβεια*), love is to be the inevitable outcome of religion (see Ja 1^{27}, 2 P 1^{7}), and all that is implicit in it St. Paul sets himself carefully to expound (1 Co 13). Its practical influence in the life of the Church is to be seen in its power to place master and slave upon equal terms (Philem ^{16}), and in the adoption of 'brother' as an acknowledged term both of address (see 1 Th 1^{4} etc.) and of reference (1 Co 8^{13}, Ja 1^{9}, 1 Jn 2^{9}). Even so specific an expression as 'the brotherhood' appears to have been recognized before A.D. 64 to signify the body of Christian believers (1 P 2^{17} 5^{9}).

(*b*) The brotherly love thus required or assumed is regarded as essential to the Christian life. Its obligation is 'the royal law' (Ja 2^{8}). Its absence nullifies all other virtues (1 Co 13^{1-3}); its presence implies fulfilment of all duty (Ro 13^{8-10}, Gal 5^{14}). It is, in fact, the pledge of a live faith (Ja 2^{14-18}), and the criterion of true sonship (1 Jn 2^{9-11} $3^{10, 14}$ 4^{7} 5^{1}). In all this the servants' doctrine is as their Lord's.

(*c*) It has been disputed, however, to what extent the Apostles are also at one with Christ in their conception of the scope within which this law of love holds sway. In favour of a distinction between the two points of view, it may be argued: (*α*) that the prevalent sense of *ἀδελφός* in the NT is that of 'fellow-Christian'—a restricted meaning which is sometimes markedly imposed by the immediate context (see, *e.g.*, 1 Co 5^{11} 6^{6}); (*β*) that the love required frequently refers to the brotherhood of believers only (Ro 12^{10}, 1 Th 4^{9}, He 13^{1}, 1 P 1^{22} 2^{17} 3^{8}); and (*γ*) that, even in the report of our Lord's own teaching, the universalism of the Synoptic Gospels has, in the Fourth Gospel, been merged in the more limited conception (see Jn 13^{34}, 15^{12}). On the other hand, it is quite clear, from such injunctions as are found in Gal 6^{10} and 1 Th 5^{15}, that the Apostolic law of love towards men possessed an application as broad as humanity itself, and the specific reference of Ro 12^{20} shows that not even enemies were excluded from its operation. The teaching of Jesus, therefore, has not really been limited by His followers. The utmost that can be maintained is that the Apostles thought of two separate circles of brotherhood—the inner circle, which comprised their fellow-believers, and the outer circle, in which all mankind were allowed a place. They themselves specifically distinguish these two degrees of fellowship (see Gal 6^{10}, 2 P 1^{7}). Yet, though there may be special stress upon the more limited love, the wider love is recognized as its natural outgrowth and its perfect fulfilment (see 2 P 1^{7}).

3. The practice of the Early Church.—Certain special forms, in which the brotherly love of the first Christians found expression, call for particular mention at this point. (*a*) *The Love-feast and the Lord's Supper.*—The early disciples used to share in a common meal, which was intended not only as a means of assisting the poorer brethren, but also as a manifestation of the Church's unity of spirit (see Ac $2^{42, 46}$ 6^{2} 20^{7}, and Tertullian's famous passage, *Apol.* 39). At first these love-feasts were connected with the Lord's Supper (see 1 Co $11^{20ff.}$, and Ign. *Smyr.* 8; and cf. art. AGAPE). But it was not long before the association of the two meals led to serious abuse (1 Co $11^{20ff.}$, Jude ^{12}, 2 P 2^{13})—a fact which, along with the Roman government's suspicion of all secret societies, led, in the 2nd cent., to their ultimate separation (see Pliny's Letter to Trajan, 96). Even after the separation, however, the Lord's Supper, as well as the Agape, would constitute an expression of the disciples' common brotherhood (see 1 Co 10^{17}). In the 18th cent. John Wesley made an interesting attempt to revive the love-feast in his own societies, and in an attenuated form it still survives among them.

(*b*) *Hospitality.*—The circumstances of the age in which Christianity had its birth rendered hospitality a practical necessity. It is not surprising, therefore, that the early Christian literature lays stress on this particular application of brotherly love. The entertainment of strangers was the duty not merely of the 'bishop' (1 Ti 3^{2}, Tit 1^{8}), but also of the ordinary disciple. In certain Scriptural injunctions its exercise is confined to the case of fellow-Christians (1 P 4^{9}, 3 Jn $^{5-8}$); but the absence of restriction in other places shows that the broader conception of the duty was also appreciated (Ro 12^{13b}, He $13^{1, 2}$, 1 Ti 5^{10}; Clem. Rom. 1). See HOSPITALITY.

(*c*) *Charity.*—The practice of liberality towards the poor was another expression of the Church's brotherhood. As was natural, this was directed mainly to relieving the necessities of fellow-disciples (Ro 12^{13a}, He 6^{10}, 1 Jn $3^{17, 18}$, and probably Ac 9^{36}), although the limitation is not always named (see He 13^{16}). A signal illustration of such charity is found in St. Paul's collection for the saints at Jerusalem (Ro 15^{25}, 2 Co 8^{1-15} etc.). See CHARITY.

(*d*) *The 'communism' of the Early Church.*—It was in connexion with such care for the poorer brethren that an experiment was undertaken which has sometimes been described as the 'communism' of the Early Church. 'And all that believed were together, and had all things common; and they sold their possessions and goods, and parted them to all, according as any man had need' (Ac $2^{44f.}$; cf. also 4^{32}). We must be careful, however, not to exaggerate the significance of this beautiful manifestation of brotherly love.

'There is,' in the words of Peabody (*Jesus Christ and the Social Question*, p. 24), 'no evidence that what is reported of the little company at Jerusalem became in any degree a general practice, as though enjoined by the teaching of Jesus. No other instance of communal ownership is cited in the Book of Acts; but, on the other hand, the mother of Mark continues to own her home in Jerusalem (Ac 12^{12}), and voluntary relief is sent from Antioch by "every man according to his ability" (11^{29}). The Apostle Paul knows nothing of such communistic regulations (2 Co 97, 1 Co 16^{2}). . . . In short, the communism of the day of Pentecost, like the gift of tongues described in the same chapter, was a spontaneous, unique, and unrepeated manifestation of that elevation and unity of spirit which possessed the little company in the first glow of their new faith. Still further, this sharing of each other's possessions, which was thus for the moment a sign of their perfect brotherhood, was even then no formal or compulsory system.' (See Ac 5^{4}; cf., further, art. COMMUNITY OF GOODS.)

It is probable that the disappointment of the hope of a speedy Parousia, the rapid growth of the Church, and the presence of unworthy members in the Christian community, prevented the repetition or the expansion of this experiment (see J. H.

Moulton's essay in *The Social Teaching of the Bible*, pp. 214–216).

4. **Later development.**—The history of the world's social progress, since the days of the Apostles, has been largely that of the leavening of human life with the principles of brotherly love inherent in the Christian gospel. It is to its spirit that we owe the abolition of slavery, the cleansing of the prisons, the care of the sick poor, the suppression of infanticide, the exaltation of womanhood, the improvement in conditions of labour, and, in general, the birth of our modern concern for the down-trodden masses dwelling in our great cities. And, as men look forward to future progress, working towards a reformed society securely based upon truth, justice, and mercy, it is in the gospel of Christian brotherhood that the adequate motive-power is to be sought. Only when the universal brotherhood of man is acknowledged as an inevitable inference from the universal Fatherhood of God, only when the world's law of greed and hate is vanquished by the Christian law of service and love, will the principle of love have received its perfect fulfilment, and the City of God at length have been built upon earth.

LITERATURE.—Harnack and Hermann, *The Social Gospel* (1907); Peabody, *Jesus Christ and the Social Question* (1901); Westcott, *Social Aspects of Christianity* (1887); Findlay, *Fellowship in the Life Eternal* (1909); Keeble (ed.), *The Social Teaching of the Bible* (1909); artt. 'Brotherly Love' and 'Love' in *HDB*, and 'Brotherhood' and 'Love' in *DCG*.

H. BISSEKER.

BROTHERS AND SISTERS.—See FAMILY.

BROTHERS OF THE COMMON LIFE, etc.—See BRETHREN OF THE COMMON LIFE, etc.

BROWNING.—See POETRY (Christian).

BROWNISM.—1. **Life of founder.**—Brownism derives its name from Robert Browne, third son of Anthony Browne of Tolethorpe,* Rutlandshire. Born about 1550,† of his earlier years nothing is known, but he appears to have entered Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, in 1570, and to have graduated in 1572.‡ The college at that time was noted rather for licence than for learning or seriousness.§ The university, however, as a whole was a centre of Puritan influence; and Browne, yielding to this, became one of those 'known and counted forward in religion.'‖ In other words, he was concerned about 'the woeful and lamentable state of the Church,' and its need of a further reformation. He 'debated' those things 'in himself and with others,' and 'suffered some trouble about them'¶ from opponents. Then, at some indefinite time after 1572, he taught 'schollers' for the space of three years**—having a 'special care to teach religion,' and keeping them 'in such awe and good order as all the townsmen where he taught gave him witness.' Moreover, he still 'bent himself to search and find out the matters of the Church'; he 'laboured to put in practice all he found, both in his school and the town'; †† in consequence, 'he got himself much enmity of the preacher,' and was 'presently discharged.' For a time, however, he continued to teach 'with great good will and favour of the townsmen ‡‡ till' an outbreak of the plague occasioned his recall home to Tolethorpe. Next, with his father's leave, he returned to Cambridge, not for study so much as with the hope of staying 'his care' about the absorbing Church question. To this end he resorted to Mr. Richard Greenham, rector of Dry Drayton, 'whom of all others he heard say was most forward.'* Mr. Greenham allowed him—'with others'—to expound in his house 'that part of Scripture which was used to be read after meals'; and, contrary to law, did not forbid him to teach 'openly in the parish.' This led to his being 'moved' by 'certain in Cambridge,' 'and also with consent of the Mayor and Vice-Chancellor,' to his preaching in Cambridge. He was not unwilling, but was checked by his objection to receiving the Bishop's 'license and authority.' He could go so far as to be 'tried' (*i.e.* examined) by the Bishops, and to 'suffer their power, though unlawful, if in anything it did not hinder the Truth.'† But he would not admit their right to authorize or ordain him; and when Archbishop Grindall's 'seals were gotten him by his brother'‡—apparently three times over—he lost the first, burned the second, and, though he kept the third by him,§ openly declared that they meant nothing to him. He preached to his Cambridge congregation for 'about half a year,' but refused to take charge of them, because 'he saw the parishioners in such spiritual bondage that whosoever would take charge of them must also come into that bondage with them.' This confirmed him in the principle which had gradually been growing clear to his mind, that 'the Kingdom of God was not to be begun by whole parishes, but rather of the worthiest were they never so few';‖ and, failing to convert the people to a like view, he 'sent back' the 'stipend' they had 'gathered' for him, 'and gave warning of his departure.'¶ His next sphere was in Norfolk—where some very forward** were said to be. He lodged with Robert Harrison,†† master of an hospital in Norwich; but went out from that city on preaching tours which roused the whole neighbourhood, and soon embroiled him with the Bishop.‡‡ Another result, however, was the gathering of a 'company' who agreed to join

* The family is described as 'ancient and worshipful.' For full accounts of it, see *Transactions of the Congregational Historical Society*, vol. ii. no. 3.

† An inference from the fact that he was over 80 at the time of his death in 1633.

‡ Masters, *History of Corpus Christi College*, p. 9. There is some uncertainty, as two others of the same name entered—the one in 1557, the other in 1565.

§ See Strype's *Parker*, 1821, bk. iii. (sub. 1548).

‖ See his own *True and Short Declaration* (unpaged). A copy is in the *Congregationalist* for 1882; the original is in the Lambeth Library.

¶ *Ib.* ** *Ib.* †† Perhaps Stamford.

‡‡ Tradition says Islington, but his residence there was some time after he 'conformed' in 1585. The statement (Strype's *Parker*, bk. iv., sub. 1571) that he became chaplain to the Duke of Norfolk before 1571 is due to the confounding of him with another Robert Browne, the Duke's messenger, often mentioned in the State Papers and Acts of Privy Council between 1571 and 1591. Nor is there any proof of his identity with the Browne cited in connexion with 'Undertree's Plot' (*ib.* bk. iv., sub. 1574), nor yet with the Brown (of Trinity College) 'convented' before the Vice-Chancellor for Puritan leanings in 1572 (*ib.* bk. iv.).

* Rev. Richard Greenham, 'a man renowned for his care, pietie and paines; and for his singular dexteritie in comforting afflicted consciences' (see dedication of works to James I. [1612]).

† *True and Short Declaration.*

‡ Most likely his eldest brother Philip, made incumbent of Little Casterton in 1591 (a family living), and deprived in 1604 for conformity. Two seals were issued—on 6th and 7th June 1579 respectively—one a Dismissory Letter, and one a Licence to preach (Burrage, *The True Story of Robert Browne*, 1906, p. 5).

§ Later he parted with it (*i.e.* the Bishop's licence) to a Justice of the Peace, who delivered it to the Bishop of Norwich. But apparently he was not ordained.

‖ *True and Short Declaration.* This shows that Browne did not borrow his conception of a Church, but worked it out for himself.

¶ About the same time he 'fell sick,' and during his illness was served by an 'officer named Bancroft' (Richard, future Archbishop) with the Bishop's letter forbidding him to preach.

** Immigrants from the Low Countries were numerous in and near Norwich—including some Anabaptists (Blomefield, *Norfolk*, 1805–10, vol. ii. pp. 282, 292–3). Lollard influence was also strong (see, *e.g.*, map in Trevelyan's *England in the Age of Wyclif*, 1899, p. 352).

†† A Cambridge associate whom he converted to his views. They went to Middelburg together, and there disagreed. He died before 1588 (Bredwell, *Rasing the Foundations*; see also Strype's *Parker*, bk. iv. cap. 35).

‡‡ See his (*i.e.* Freke, Bishop of Norwich) letters to Burghley, April 19 and August 2, 1581 (Lansdowne MSS, xxxiii. 13, 20). Burghley was a *distant* kinsman to Browne.

together, on the basis of his teaching, for Church fellowship, by means of a solemn covenant to the following effect: *

(1) That they would 'keep and seek agreement' one with another under Christ's laws.

(2) That they did choose, and would obey, certain to 'teach them and watch for the salvation of their souls,'—having had due 'trial and testimony' of their fitness.†

(3) That they would hold regular meetings for 'prayer, thanksgiving, reading of the Scriptures, exhorting, and edifying—either by all *men* which had the gift, or by those who had the special charge before others.'

(4) That they would allow any member of the Church to 'protest, appeal, complain, exhort, dispute, reprove, etc., as he had occasion, but yet in due order.'

(5) That they would 'further the Kingdom of God in themselves, and especially in their charge and household, if they had any; or in their friends and companions, and whosoever was worthy.'

(6) That they would observe the rules agreed upon 'for gathering and testifying voices in debating matters'; 'for an order of choosing teachers, guides, and relievers'; 'for separating clean from unclean'; 'for receiving any into the fellowship'; 'for presenting the daily success of the Church and the wants thereof'; 'for seeking to other Churches to have their help bring better reformed, or to bring *them* to reformation'; 'for taking an order that none contend openly, nor persecute, nor trouble (the Church) disorderly, nor bring false doctrine nor evil cause (into it)—after once or twice warning or rebuke.'

This took place at Norwich,‡ probably early in the spring of 1581, and marks the formation of the first Church of its kind in England.§ The 'covenant' here described presents a rough outline of Brownism on its positive or constructive side; its negative or aggressive side may be illustrated by Browne's own report‖ of a conversation which he had with his colleague Harrison some time before. From this it appears that Browne (showing himself more extreme in some points than Harrison) maintained that 'preachers who submit themselves to the popish power of the Bishops, or any way justify or tolerate it,' cannot 'do duty as lawful pastors and preachers'; that 'Parishes guided either by such preachers or by the Bishops' and their 'officers' cannot 'be lawful and the Churches of God'; that such preachers cannot really 'beget faith by their preaching,' neither can they really 'call or win men to goodness,' nor can any profit be got from their 'blind reading of chapters and the (Church) service.' With these convictions fierce invectives against the preachers came naturally. Here, *e.g.*, is a specimen: 'Therefore say no more ye wicked preachers that ye hold the foundation, or that ye preach. For what is it worth to say unto Christ, "Hail, King of the Jews," and bow the knee before Him, when you cast your filthy disorders and popish government as dung on His face. You have not yet gathered the people from the popish parishes and wicked fellowship, neither have planted the Church by laying the foundation thereof . . .' Declamation in this strain made a sensation. The common people of Bury St. Edmunds and thereabout heard him gladly, and 'assembled themselves to the number of a hundred at a time in private houses and conventicles to hear him.'¶ But it also led to his imprisonment by the Bishop 'upon complaint made by many godly preachers for delivering unto the people corrupt and contentious doctrine.'¶ Released at the instance of his kinsman Burghley,** and straightway resuming what he considered his mission, he presently found himself 'a prisoner at London.'* Harrison, too, was imprisoned† with others of the Church. So 'at last, when divers of them were again imprisoned, and the rest in great trouble and bondage out of prison, they all agreed and were fully persuaded that the Lord did call them out of England.'‡ The place selected (possibly because of Thomas Cartwright's congregation there) was Middelburg;§ and thither the greater portion‖ of the Norwich 'company,' including Browne and Harrison, transferred themselves — near the end of 1581. In Middelburg Browne's ideal seems to have encountered little or no outward hindrance, but it broke down woefully under the stress of inward disabilities.¶ Two years later, Browne, sore at heart but keeping a bold front, was on his way to Scotland—accompanied by just four or five men and their families. The rest of his career need not be dwelt upon. Landing at Dundee, he reached Edinburgh by way of St. Andrews on Thursday, 9th January 1583–4, and was soon in trouble. On three successive Tuesdays he appeared before the Edinburgh Presbytery—maintaining (on the 14th) that 'witnesses at baptism were not a thing indifferent, but simply evil'; alleging (on the 21st) that 'the whole discipline of Scotland was amiss'; and acknowledging (on the 28th) the authorship of certain books exhibited. Out of these Mr. James Lawson and Mr. John Davidson were deputed to gather the articles deemed erroneous for presentation to the King—Browne, meanwhile, being, it would seem, held in custody. But His Majesty, assuredly rather to spite the Presbytery than to befriend Browne, let him go free.**

After some months he appears to have returned to Stamford; then to have gone abroad, leaving his wife behind; and then again to have come back to Stamford. This was about March 1585; and in the autumn of the same year, October 7th, he betrayed the crushing effect upon him of several months' imprisonment by a promise of 'conformity' to the Established Church.†† Next day he set out for Tolethorpe, bearing a letter of intercession from Burghley to his father. Here he lived, under paternal surveillance, till February 1585–6, when his father, not having found him sufficiently docile, asked and obtained leave to remove him 'to Stamford or some other place.' Whether Browne actually removed is doubtful—since there is proof that later in the year (April 19th, May 5th, June 25th) both he and his wife were three times cited—on a charge of non-attendance at church—in the Bishop of Peterborough's Court by the churchwardens of Little Casterton, the parish in which Tolethorpe Hall is situated.‡‡ The next certain fact is his appointment on November 21st as schoolmaster in St. Olave's Grammar School, Southwark§§—an uneasy situation, which he had vacated before June 20, 1589, when Burghley solicited Howland, Bishop of Peterborough, for his re-admission 'into the ministry' and 'some ecclesiastical preferment,' on the ground that he 'hath now a good time' been an obedient son of the Church.‖‖ Two years later, 'on the

* See *True and Short Declaration*, pt. ii.

† This implies that Browne (as pastor) and Harrison (probably as teacher), etc., were then chosen.

‡ Browne speaks of his 'coming to Norwich, and how the company *there* joined together.'

§ The Independent Church of Richard Fitz (1571) hardly (perhaps) deserves the name, and the next was not formed till 1592, in Nicholas Lane, London.

‖ *True and Short Declaration.*

¶ Freke's letter to Burghley (April 19, 1581), Lansdowne MSS, xxxiii. 13.

** Letter to Freke (April 21, 1581). See Fuller, *Church History*, vol. v. p. 63 (Brown's ed.).

* *True and Short Declaration.*

† Harrison, *A little Treatise upon the first verse of the 122nd Psalm . . .*, 1583, Introduction (Lambeth Library).

‡ *True and Short Declaration.*

§ After Scotland and 'Jersey or Guernsey' had been pro proposed and waived aside by Browne (*ib.*).

‖ Some remained behind and still continued as a Church called the 'Elder Sister' (see George Johnson, *Discourse of some Troubles*, 1603).

¶ *True and Short Declaration*, pt. iii.

** Calderwood, *History of the Kirk of Scotland*, iv. 1–5.

†† See Burrage, *op. cit.* pp. 29–31, 37–39. The 'five points' to which he subscribed practically cover the whole ground of 'conformity'; and imply a thoroughly broken spirit at the time.

‡‡ Burrage, *op. cit.* p. 41.

§§ An exact transcription of the (drastic) terms of his engagement is printed by Burrage, *op. cit.* pp. 44, 45

‖‖ Lansdowne MSS. ciii. 60.

30th June 1591, Robert Browne, clerk, was admitted and instituted to the rectory of the ecclesiastical parish of Little Casterton in the county of Rutland and diocese of Peterborough'—of which parish his eldest brother, Francis Browne, then occupant of Tolethorpe Hall, was the patron.* Finally, on September 2, 1591, he became 'rector' of the parish of Achurch-cum-Thorpe, Waterville, in Northamptonshire; 'was admitted to the holy orders of deacon and priest' on the 30th of the month;† and here (perhaps excepting one obscure period of ten years) he lived out the remaining forty-two years of his existence. He died in Northampton gaol, and was buried at St. Giles' Church of that town on October 8th, 1633.‡

2. Principles.—Though Browne had receded from some of his extreme views and taken office in the Church he had so bitterly condemned, there is proof § that he still held to the essentials of his Church theory; and if this be taken as evidence of conscious insincerity, it may be remembered at least, by way of extenuation, that, to quote his own words, he was 'broken . . . much with former troubles,'‖ that the influences brought to bear upon him in his weakness were of exceptional force,¶ and that the limited extent of his 'conformity' seems to have been generally understood.**

Some indication of the principles connoted by the term Brownism has already been given. But a more systematic statement is desirable.

(1) First, then, it should be said that Brownism concerned itself merely with a doctrine of the Church. Theologically, Browne was even severely orthodox†† in the current Calvinistic sense. Equally so were his successors.‡‡

(2) With Protestants generally, of the consistent sort, he accepted the Scriptures as the sole rule of Christian faith and practice—unaffected by the traditions of men, including those of the Early Fathers.

(3) Starting from this basis, he came to the conclusion that the Protestant Churches (particularly the English Church), while Scriptural as to their faith, were far from Scriptural as to their practice. Reformed up to a certain point, the English Church had stopped short of the full Reformation which was demanded if it would correspond to the NT model of a Church. Many even of the more 'forward' Puritans stopped short of this—pleading as a sufficient excuse that the needed reforms were not to be had without concurrence of the civil power, and that till such concurrence was forthcoming they could only 'tarry.' Here Browne took his stand. He thought the evils arising from an imperfect Reformation of the Church so great and pressing, that the very existence of Christianity called for the instant removal of them. Since, too, the will of Christ—made clear in the NT—necessitated their removal, to plead for delay on the ground of a 'Prince's' unwillingness was intolerable disloyalty to Christ. The Prince is supreme in his own sphere, but his sphere is not the Church. He is 'to rule the commonwealth in all outward justice, to maintain the high welfare and honour thereof with outward power, bodily punishment, and civil forcing of men.' He is also to 'look to' the Church so far as 'outward provision and outward justice' are concerned: for it is of his 'charge' 'because it is *in* a commonwealth.' But the Prince has no manner of right to compel the Church to be, or to remain, what Christ forbids. Nay, he has no right directly to 'compel religion' at all, *i.e.* 'to plant churches by power, and to force a submission to ecclesiastical government by laws and penalties.' If a true Church is already established, the Prince either is or is not a member of it. If he is, then—as God is no respecter of persons—he is, like every other member, subject to its discipline. If he is not, and has no mind to further or favour its establishment, then those who are Christ's freemen must proceed without him; and even though he should oppose them to the uttermost, they must go on just the same. Thus it appears that separation from a false Church, or from one persistently corrupt, in order to set up and realize the pure and true, is a right which the Prince dare not withhold, and a duty which the 'faithful' dare not decline.

Such is the pith of Browne's *Treatise of Reformation without tarying for anie*, which he wrote and printed at Middelburg in 1582. Not without reason has it been called* the first plea in English for the Church's independence of the State and essential autocracy. But on the Continent he had been more than anticipated by the Anabaptists;† for, in one respect at least, his plea, as compared with theirs, presents a remarkable limitation, viz. that he seems to permit, if not to oblige, the Prince—after the example of 'the good kings of Juda'—not indeed to 'force the people by laws or by power to receive the (true) Church government,' but yet, when once they had received it, to keep them to it, and even to 'put them to death' if 'then they fall away.' How entirely subversive this might become of his whole position—supposing him serious—Browne did not pause to reflect.

(4) Published at the same date and place, and (in some copies) bound up with the *Treatise*, was a *Catechism* to which the *Treatise* was meant to serve as an introduction. Its title began, 'A booke which sheweth the life and manners of all true Christians . . .,' and if the *Treatise* urged the instant need of proceeding to establish the true Church, this sets forth the character of the Church to be established. In some points it obviously agrees with the Presbyterian ideal, as expounded, *e.g.*, by his contemporary Cartwright. The conception of the sacrament is the same; its permanent officers are the same—Pastor, Teacher, Elders, Deacons, Widows—and also its description of their functions; and it makes the same demand for 'discipline.' But there are notable divergences. Thus the definition‡ of a Church is much more strict—'a companie or number of beleevers which by a willing covenaunt made with their God as under the governement of God and Christ, and keepe his lawes in one holy communion.' Again, it was more democratic. From first to last the people of the Church, as just described, are accounted supreme. This appears (*a*) in the

* Burrage, *op. cit.* p. 65 f. † *Ib.* ‡ *Ib.* p. 72.

§ In a MS of his recently found in the British Museum by Mr. Champlin Burrage, and edited by him for the Congregational Historical Society. It is in the form of a letter to his uncle Mr. Flower, is dated 31st December 1588, and contains the passages quoted by Dr. Bancroft in his famous '8t. Paul's Cross' sermon of the following February.

‖ See the aforesaid MS, where he speaks of having been imprisoned 23 times.

¶ *e.g.* the breakdown of his Church experiment at Middelburg, his bad state of health, his loneliness, the pressure brought to bear upon him at home and by Burghley, etc.

** Bredwell, *e.g.*, assumes this in his *Rasing of the Foundations of Brownism*, 1588.

†† Cf. Questions 2–34 of his *Booke which sheweth the life and manners of all true Christians*, 1582.

‡‡ Cf., *e.g.*, their *Confession of Faith*, 1596.

* See, *e.g.*, Walker, *Creeds and Platforms of Congregationalism* (New York, 1893), p. 12.

† *Ib.* for the Anabaptist position; see § 35 of the (Mennonite) Confession quoted by Walker (p. 5). The latter's date is 1609, but it expresses their earliest views. See also pp. 15–17 for possible influence of Anabaptists on Browne. Dexter's opinion seems nearest the truth 'that Browne owed nothing to Anabaptist influences, and that he was a disciple of no one' (*Congregationalism as seen in its Literature*, p. 103).

‡ The first words are—'Christians are a companie. . . . Browne did not believe that Christians could be such and live apart from Church fellowship.

declared equality of all the members as regards spiritual privilege: 'Everie one of the church is made a Kinge, a Priest, and a Prophet under Christ, to upholde and further the kingdom of God, and to breake and destroie the kingdome of Antichrist and Satan.' (*b*) In the mode of appointing and ordaining officers. These must first be tried by the whole Church as to their 'guiftes and godlines.'* If, indeed, a man has already given proof of his 'gifts and godliness' by the right gathering of a church, then those composing that church, or those who afterwards join it, must tacitly receive him 'by obedience' as their 'guide and teacher.' But if a church already planted is in need of any officer, then the free and clear 'consent of the people' 'gathered by the elders or guides' must precede his appointment. (*c*) In the power of the Church as a whole to discipline and even depose unworthy officers. (*d*) In the right of the Church, through its own 'elders or forwardest,' to recognize its officers by ordination 'as called and authorized of God.' Usually this is done 'with prayer and imposition of handes'—but as to the latter it 'is no essential pointe of their calling,' and ought to be left, when it is 'turned into pomp or superstition.' (*e*) In the fact that, while the holding of 'synodes or meetings of sundrie churches' may be expedient, it is voluntary. Their use is to enable the stronger churches to help the weaker in 'deciding or redressing of matters' when such help is sought or when it is evidently needed.*

(5) Brownism, as thus outlined, became the accepted platform of all the early Separatists. Younger leaders like Henry Barrow, John Greenwood, Francis Johnson, and Henry Ainsworth may have varied the emphasis, cleared away ambiguities, or given to this or that principle a more rigorous and detailed application; but, notwithstanding their vehement desire to repudiate† all connexion with Browne or his name, it could not reasonably be denied that he was 'the shop of their store and the steel of their strength.'‡ Proof of this lies to hand in their writings, particularly in a series of authoritative documents which they issued for the chief Separatist Church during the first twenty years of its existence.§ Only on one point of importance has there seemed room for doubt, and here the difference between Browne's teaching and that of Barrow seemed great enough to warrant a description of the latter as 'Barrowism.' This point is the eldership and its relation to the Church. According to Dexter, the teaching of Barrow presents the Church as having power to elect the elders, but not to control them or 'seriously limit their action' or remove them from office for any cause whatever. Thus he practically destroyed the Church's self-government, and erected the eldership into 'a ruling oligarchy,' whereas Browne made it a pure democracy.‖ But against this view may be set Barrow's explicit statement of the contrary. 'I never thought,' he says in one place, 'that the practice of Christ's government belonged only to those officers. I rather thought it had been their duty and office to have seen this government faithfully and orderly practised by all the members of the Church, . . . so that if these officers or any of them transgress, *the Church reserveth power to every member freely (according to the quality of the offence and the rules of the word) to admonish and reprove the whole, to censure and excommunicate such officers so offending.*' No less conclusive is the evidence of a document published in 1596 under the title, *A true confession of the faith and humble acknowledgment of the alegeance which wee hir Majesties subjects falsely called Brownists doo hould towards God and yeild to hir Majestie.*' It emanated from the Separatist Church formed in London, 1592, and soon afterwards exiled to Amsterdam. This Church had Francis Johnson for pastor, and Henry Ainsworth for teacher—joint authors of the Confession, and both disciples of Barrow. Thus its words on the point in question may be taken as Barrow's own. But these say decidedly:

'That as every Christian Congregation hath powre and commandement to elect and ordeine their own ministerie according to the rules prescribed, and whilest they shal faithfully execute their office to have them in superaboundant love for their worke sake—to provide for them, to honour them and reverence them, according to the dignitie of the office they execute: so have they also powre and commandement when anie such defalt, either in their lyfe, doctrine or administration breaketh out, as by the rule of the word debarreth them from, or depriveth them of their ministerie, by due order to depose them from the ministerie they exercised; yea, if the case so require and they remayne obstinate and impenitent orderly to cut them off by excommunication.'†

Johnson, it is true, drew off from this position and split the Church by urging a strictly Presbyterian view of the eldership.‡ But a majority of the people adhered to Ainsworth in his strenuous defence of the confessional view—which he calls the Church's 'ancient faith'—and he had also the warm support of John Robinson§ with his church at Leyden. A more plausible case of difference between Browne and Barrow seems to lie in their respective ways of speaking about the relation of the Civil Power to the Church. For, while Barrow declares it to be 'the office and duty of Princes and Rulers . . . to suppress and root out of their dominions all religions, worship, and ministries'‖ other than the true, Browne's language is certainly more restrained. But here also the contrast is less in reality than in appearance. One drastic assumption of his has already been noted. And the following from his reply to Mr. Cartwright¶ is not so very far short of Barrow's position:

'If the commonwealth (as it ought) had long ago taken from the ministry those tenths and popish livings, then Jericho being once destroyed (I mean the antichristian churches put down) had not so soon been built again. . . .'

Nor did he show himself (previous to his conformity) less extreme in a third point—his practical attitude towards the establishment. Barrow's attitude is perfectly explicit in the *Confession* of 1596 (Art. 32), which calls upon all who 'will be saved' to come forth with speed from this antichristian estate; upon all its ministers 'to give over and leave' their unlawful offices; and upon all people of what sort or condition soever to withhold their goods, lands, money or money worth

* *Catechism*, questions 55, 118–119, 55–58, 119, 51.

† Cf., *e.g.*, Barrow and Greenwood's outburst during the 'conferences' with London ministers (April 1590). The one says: 'We are no Brownists. We hold not our faith in respect of any mortal man, neither were we instructed by him, or baptized into his name, until by such as you were so termed.' The other says: 'Browne is an apostate, now one of your Church.' Yet it is probable that Greenwood at least had been influenced by Browne (see the writer's *Henry Barrow*, p. 13), and both must have read his writings.

‡ Bredwell, *Razing the Foundations*, Introd.

§ See end of article.

‖ See Walker, *Creeds and Platforms*, p. 81 f.

* See the present writer's *Henry Barrow* (p. 106) for this and other references. The only argument alleged to the contrary seems to be one drawn from the 'silence' of what is called the London Confession of 1589: 'A true description out of the Word of God of the visible Church.' But the absence of specific reference to the point may be explained by the ideal character of this document. It is a declaration rather than a Confession.

† §§ 23, 24.

‡ He defends it in his latest book, *A Christian Plea* . . . (1617), pp. 306–16. But he had been advocating it since 1609 (see present writer's *Henry Barrow*, pp. 254 ff., 288 ff.).

§ See his *Justification of Separation* . . . *against Mr. Richard Barnard his invective* . . . (1610), where, *re* the 6th error alleged by Mr. Barnard, he goes into the question with great thoroughness. Johnson replied in his *Answer touching the Division* (1611), p. 27; and Robinson rejoined—at Ainsworth's instance (see the latter's *Animadversion to Mr. Clifton's Advertisement* [1613], pp. 111–117).

‖ Henry Barrow, *Platform*, 1590 (unpaged).

¶ *An answer to Mr. Cartwright his letter* . . ., p. 20.

from the maintenance of its false ministry and worship. Browne's was the same. It is, *e.g.*, the burden of his letter to Mr. Cartwright that you cannot communicate with a false Church without partaking in its pollution; and so neither the true Church as a whole nor any 'part' or 'member' of it ought to communicate.* Perhaps the utmost which can be conceded to him is that he may not have forbidden absolutely a casual 'hearing' even of prelatic ministers or attendance at their services, as did the authors of the *Confession*.†

Brownism of the strictest type — that which pushed its differences‡ from the Church of England to the forefront—found a temporary asylum in Amsterdam and turned out unequal to the test of experience. In Leyden—under the leadership of John Robinson, who at first was as thoroughgoing§ as Barrow or Ainsworth, but became with time increasingly tolerant—it learnt to lay the greater stress on constructive elements;‖ and to develop these in a form of church-life which could bear translation to the shores of New England, and there plant the germs of a vigorous democratic Church-State. In England it ran a somewhat similar course. Stripped of its harshest features, it was accepted from the hands of John Robinson by Henry Jacob (1563?–1624), who 'gathered' at least some of the scattered 'remnants' of the London congregation of 1592 and organized (on a semi-Separatist basis)¶ what has been called the first distinctively Independent Church in England. But the name 'Brownism' did not die out. It lived on as a descriptive or abusive epithet of 'all and sundry' who, for whatever cause, broke away from the National Church. Nor did the extreme views originally suggested by the name cease to win vehement and consistent advocates.** These appear from time to time far down the 17th century.†† Indeed, such advocates have never been absent altogether from the ranks of English Nonconformity. But, on the whole, it may be said that Brownism has survived only on its nobler side; and that its essential witness has been continued and fulfilled in the principles which give life and power to modern Congregationalism.

See also art. CONGREGATIONALISM.

* P. 70. Cf. p. 52: 'For the reading ministry is abominable wickedness,' etc., and in *Treatise upon 23 Matt.* § 'against Parish Preacher.'

† And he would not have thought of going Barrow's length in his argument for the total destruction of 'church buildings' which called forth Hooker's stately protest in *Eccles. Polity*, bk. v. ch. 3, pp. 12–17.

‡ See *The Points of Difference*, under 14 heads, published in 1603 (reprinted in Walker, *Creeds and Platforms*, pp. 77–80).

§ The stages are indicated by (*a*) *A Justification of Separation*, 1610, (*b*) *Religious Communion Public and Private*, 1614, (*c*) *A Just and Necessary Apology*, 1625, and (*d*) *A Treatise of the Lawfulness of Hearing Ministers in the Church of England*—printed in 1634 but written some years before.

‖ Cf. the curiously Erastian and studiously negative 'Seven Articles' prepared for submission to the Privy Council in 1618 and signed by Robinson and William Brewster (reprinted by Arber, *Story of the Pilgrim Fathers*, pp. 280–81).

¶ See *A Confession and Protestation of the Faith of Certain Christians in England*, 1616, reprinted in Hanbury, *Historical Memorials relating to Independents*, i. 293 ff.

** See *A Necessitated Appeal Humbly tendered to the High Court of Parliament, by such as are commonly (but unjustly) called Brownists.* Its date is May 1645, and its subscription runs: 'The meanest and unworthiest servants of God the free Churches of Christ resident in and about this city' [London] (Manchester New College Library, Tract No. 55*a*). In the Lambeth Library (40.2.24) is a pamphlet of 1640 entitled 'Information for the Ignorant. . . . Containing a few observations upon 1 Cor. 10, which do strongly prove it to be absolutely sinful to hear the word preached in any false estate or assembly whatsoever.' To which is added (in a P.S.) a 'Public challenge made by N.E. to all the Nonconformists or Reformists in Old and New England and Holland in the behalf of the total Separation.'

†† See *More Work for the Dean* (1681), by Thomas Wall, an answer to Stillingfleet's *History, Nature, and Pleas of the Present Separation from the Church of England*, strongly defensive of Barrow, Greenwood, and Peury, whose cause is said to be still that of 'many thousand Protestants' in England.

LITERATURE.—i. *BROWNE'S WRITINGS.*—A list of these so far as known up to April 1906 is printed in Champlin Burrage, *The True Story of Robert Browne* (1906), p. 74 f. The most important are those numbered: (3) *A Booke which sheweth the life and manners of all true Christians*, Middelburg, 1582; (4) *A Treatise of Reformation without tarying for anie*, Middelburg, 1582, reprinted by Congregational Historical Society, 1903; (5) *A Treatise upon the 23 of Matt.*, Middelburg, 1582 or early in 1583 (a satisfactory account of these, with full titles, is given by Burrage, pp. 17–25); (8) *A True and Short Declaration both of the gathering and joyning together of certaine persons: and also of the lamentable breach and division which fell amongst them*, Middelburg, ?1, 1583?; (18) *An Answer to Mr. Cartwright's Letter for joyning with the English Churches*, 1584–85 (?) (MS printed and published at London, before Oct. 7, 1585); (19) *A Reproofe of certaine schismatical persons and their doctrine touching the hearing and preaching of the Word of God* (MS of 31 folio pages, 1588 [?], discovered by Burrage at the Lambeth Library in 1905 and since published [London, 1907] as the *Retractation of Robert Browne, Father of Congregationalism*). The schismatical persons are taken to be Henry Barrow, John Greenwood, and their congregation. No doubt is expressed on this point—or any as to its authenticity. But the present writer is not convinced of the latter, at least. (22) *A Letter written to Mr. Flower*, Dec. 31, 1588–89 (MS in the B.M., published at London [Memorial Hall], 1904, under the title *A New Year's Guift*; the printed copy contains a narrative of the finding of the MS by Burrage in 1901).

ii. *BROWNE'S LIFE.*—All previous biographies are superseded by Champlin Burrage, *The True Story of Robert Browne*, Oxford, 1906, together with two papers in *Transactions of the Congregational Historical Society*—'Robert Browne's Ancestors and Descendants' (vol. ii. No. 3) and 'New Facts Relating to Robert Browne' (vol. ii. No. 4)—both by F. Ivas Cater. Dexter's study of Browne, however, in his *Congregationalism of the last three hundred Years, as seen in its Literature* (1879), pp. 61–128, is still valuable.

iii. *EARLY BROWNIST LITERATURE.*—The words of Robert Harrison (d. 1585?), Henry Barrow (1550–1593), John Greenwood (d. 1593), John Penry (1559–1593), Henry Ainsworth (1571–1622), Francis Johnson (1562–1618), John Robinson (1576?–1625), Henry Jacob (1563–1624), for which see Dexter, *Congregationalism of the last three hundred Years* (Bibliography, pp. 8–32), and T. G. Crippen, 'Early Nonconformist Bibliography' in *Transactions of Congregational Historical Society*, vol. i. Nos. 1, 2, 3.

iv. *MODERN LITERATURE.*—Histories of Congregationalism, *passim*, particularly Dexter, *op. cit.*; R. W. Dale, *Hist. of Eng. Congregationalism*, 1907; E. Arber, *Story of the Pilgrim Fathers*, 1897; J. Brown, *Pilgrim Fathers of New England*, 1895; F. J. Powicke, *Henry Barrow*, 1900; W. Walker, *Creeds and Platforms of Congregationalism*, 1893; A. Mackennal, *Story of the English Separatists*, 1893, and *Sketches in the Evolution of English Congregationalism*, 1901.

FRED. J. POWICKE.

BRUNO.—1. Life.—Giordano Bruno was born in 1548 in the ancient township of Nola, not far from Naples. At the latter town he studied, and in 1563 he entered the monastery of the Dominican order there as novice. It was at this time that he took the name of Giordano, his original name having been Filippo. In 1572 he became priest. Early in his monastic career charges of heresy had been brought against him, and these were renewed in 1576. Bruno escaped to Rome, and thence, hearing of his excommunication, made his way to North Italy. Earning a livelihood by various means and in various cities, he finally crossed the Alps, and in 1579 reached Geneva. There he attended the Protestant services held by an Italian pastor, and thus became formally a member of the Protestant community, although he does not seem to have entered into full communion or to have adopted the Calvinist confession of faith. A violent dispute with a Professor of Philosophy at the Genevan Academy led to his departure from the city in the autumn of the same year. He passed to Lyons and thence to Toulouse, where for two years he lectured on Aristotle and other subjects, being elected (by vote of the students) to a chair at the University. We next find him at Paris, in one of the Colleges of which he lectured (as extraordinary professor). Here he published two works on the Art of Memory (a subject concerning which he had been interviewed by the king, Henry III.), and a curious comedy, *Il Candelaio*. Apparently he fell into disfavour at the University, and in 1583 he crossed the Channel and came to London. There, after a three months' stay in Oxford, where his reception was the re-

verse of cordial, he took up his abode in the house of the French Ambassador, Mauvissière, probably as a secretary, and remained till 1585, when the Ambassador returned to Paris. During his stay in London, Bruno had some acquaintance with Sir Philip Sidney (to whom he dedicated a number of his writings), Fulke Greville, Florio, and others of the literary men and courtiers of the time. Seven of his most important works, six being written in Italian, were published in London at this period, although false names are usually given on the title-page for the place of publication. These works included the dialogues *La Cena de le Ceneri* (1584), *De la Causa* (1584), *De l'Infinito* (1584), *Spaccio de la Bestia Trionfante* (1584), and *De gli Eroici furori* (1585). At the same time he had already begun the Latin works which were completed in Germany, so that his stay in England represents a period of extraordinary productiveness. With Mauvissière he returned to Paris in October 1585, but was compelled to leave it again in the following summer.

At this time he made an attempt at reconciliation with the Church, his hope being that he might be allowed to return without renewing his monastic obligations. The negotiations were broken off, however, and he made his way to Protestant Germany, settling for another brief period at Luther's city of Wittenberg. Here he associated with the then dominant Lutheran or Reformed Church party, was welcomed by the University, lectured on such subjects as the *Organon* of Aristotle and Lullism—avoiding dangerous topics—and continued his philosophical writings. With the overthrow of the Lutheran by the Calvinist party in 1588 he was compelled once more 'to take to the road.' With varying fortunes he visited Prague, Helmstadt, Frankfort, Zürich, and again Frankfort, where he remained from March 1591 till a fatal chance led him to Italy in the autumn of the same year. During this period he published various works: the *120 Theses adv. Peripateticos* (Paris, and also Wittenberg), the *Oratio Valedictoria* at Wittenberg, the *Oratio Consolatoria*, or Funeral Address on Duke Julius, at Helmstadt, and two mathematical writings at Prague. The Latin poems (with prose commentaries), which contain the sum and final statement of his philosophy, the *De Minimo*, *De Monade*, and the *De Immenso*, were published at Frankfort along with a mnemonic work, the *De Imaginum Compositione*, in 1591. In response to an invitation of the patrician Mocenigo, who wished to learn his art of memory and his supposed magical powers, Bruno re-entered Italy in August 1591.

He was again anxious to be reconciled to the Roman Church, and to be allowed to live and write at peace as a layman, being curiously unconscious of the reputation his writings had built up for him. No doubt he trusted also to Mocenigo's influence for protection. In May 1592, Mocenigo, who had not obtained the secret knowledge he expected, denounced him to the Inquisition at Venice. In the process that followed Bruno at one point made solemn abjuration of all errors and heresies of which he had been guilty, and later made entire submission, throwing himself on the mercy of the court. Meantime, however, Rome had intervened, demanding that the heretic be sent to the Papal court. For political reasons Venice yielded, after considerable dispute and under strong pressure; and in February of 1593, Bruno entered the prison of the Inquisition at Rome. For some unknown reason no further steps were taken till January 1599—a most unusual delay. The process was then renewed and carried on to December of that year; but the unfortunate man, refusing to recant any of his philosophical opinions, or to acknowledge the right of the Church to dictate in matters of philosophy, was condemned to death in the usual cynical formula, and, on 17th Feb. 1600, was publicly burnt alive in the Campo dei Fiori, where the statue by Ferrari now stands. Bruno suffered not for the Protestant religion or indeed for any form of religion, but for Science, and for the freedom of the scientific spirit from the Church.

2. **Works.**—Apart from the comedy of *Il Candelaio*, and one or two occasional works such as the Orations at Wittenberg and at Helmstadt, Bruno's works fall into three groups, viz. (1) commentaries and summaries; (2) works on the Art of Memory and the Art of Knowledge; (3) philosophical works.

(1) The first group includes expository and critical accounts of Aristotle's *Physics*, the posthumous collections *De Magia*, the *Medicina Lulliana*, and perhaps a number of the accounts of the Lullian Art of Knowing. (2) Such works as the *De Compendiosa Architectura* (1582), the *Lampas Combinatoria* (1587), and the posthumous *Lampas Triginta Statuarum* present in various forms a scheme, based on the writings of Raymond Lully (13th cent.), for the analysis of thought, and its reduction to a few elementary concepts, from which, with their combinations, all possible knowledge might be discovered, retained, and imparted. Leibniz also, and others after him, devoted some attention to this idea of a Universal Art of knowing or discovering truth by thought alone, or, more strictly, by the manipulation of words. Along with these works may be placed the *De Umbris Idearum* (1582), *Cantus Circaeus*, *Sigillus Sigillorum* (1583), and other works on the Psychology and supposed Art of Memory, upon which Bruno laid great stress, but to which the familiar criticism applies, that what is good is old, and what is new is worthless. (3) The main philosophical works, Italian and Latin, have been enumerated above under their short titles; there remains to be added only the *Summa Terminorum Metaphysicorum* (1609, the first part having been previously published by itself in 1595). The *Cena* introduces us to the Copernican theory of the universe, and Bruno's extension of it; the *Causa* gives the metaphysical basis; the *Infinito* places the new cosmology in a fuller light, and criticizes the prevailing theory and its Aristotelian origins; the *Spaccio* and *Cabala* (1584) deal with the ethics and religion of the common man; while the *Eroici furori* give those of the speculative philosopher, imbued with the true *amor Dei intellectualis*. Finally, in the Latin poems the system receives unity and finish; its relations with, and its advantages over, previous theories are expressed in clear and dignified, if not inspired, verse. There is no doubt also that in these later works Bruno comes nearer to a spiritual Monadism such as that of Leibniz, while in the earlier writings he teaches rather a Pantheism of a Neo-Platonic type.

Bruno has been called the Philosopher of Astronomy (Riehl, p. 28). What is new in his teaching is his whole-souled adoption of the theory of the universe foreshadowed by Copernicus, and already in Bruno's time being established by the astronomical discoveries and calculations of Tycho Brahe, Kepler, Galileo, and others. Early in his studies he became dissatisfied with the prevailing philosophy of the Church,—Aristotelianism,—and turned with fresh interest to the cosmic speculations of the pre-Aristotelian thinkers, and to the mystical imaginations of the Neo-Platonists. These, with the Scholastics, orthodox and unorthodox, the alchemists, the astrologers, and finally Cardinal Nicolaus of Cusa, last of the

Mediævals and first of the Moderns, were the chief influences that determined Bruno's thought, and gave his philosophy its strange confusion of old and new, of crass superstition and daring speculation, of dull pedantry and vivacious originality, of ignorant folly and supreme insight.

(*a*) *The physical universe.*—The universe is infinite, without bounds, everywhere the same in nature or kind, everywhere diverse in its individual forms or modes. Its centre is at once everywhere and nowhere; it is all centre or all circumference; or again its centre is relative to the spectator; thus to us the earth appears the pivot about which the universe revolves, but in precisely the same way, said Bruno, the inhabitant of the moon would regard the moon, and the inhabitant of the sun the sun, as the centre of his world. Each sun, each star, each planet is a world like our earth, with living beings in its air, on its soil, in its fire and its waters; but the worlds are of two kinds, each complementary to each, each necessary to the other's existence; the two kinds are the suns, including the fixed stars, and the earths or planets, including the comets. The latter revolve about the former, as the earth about the sun, but the suns themselves are also in motion. Nowhere is there any permanence or fixity in Nature; all these worlds are alive, are living beings, and the condition of life is change. Permeating the whole universe is the ether, which Bruno thought of as a formless fluid, a passive, yielding, yet unchangeable, medium through which light, heat, and bodies pass without loss of force. Underlying all movement, small or great, is spirit or soul; all things have soul; the ether itself Bruno sometimes identifies with the Soul of the Universe. Again, since Nature is everywhere the same, everything is implicitly or potentially the whole universe; and what it is implicitly it strives to become explicitly or in actuality. Thus every *element* passes, in the course of its history, through every portion of the universe, and every *composite being* becomes, by gradual change, every other nature or thing. Thus suns and earths, like all other beings, have had a beginning in time and will decay and perish in time. Nature never repeats herself; that is, there are never at a given moment of time two forms or things exactly alike, and nothing is ever for two successive moments the same: nowhere is there a perfectly straight line or a perfect circle or arc of a circle. There are three kinds of monads, *i.e.* of simple substances or elements, according to Bruno: (1) God, the Supreme Unity, Monad of Monads; (2) the soul, the substance or spirit of the composite body; and (3) the atom, the simple element of body or matter. All are immortal, each soul passing, as has been said, through every type of body the universe contains. In this metempsychosis there is, however, a possibility of progress; the soul has it in its power to rise gradually to higher and higher types of being, until it approaches unity with God and is absorbed into the eternal life of the Divine being.

(*b*) *God and Nature.*—Relatively to us God has two modes of existence and two ways of access. As a transcendent Being, outside of and prior to the universe, its Creator and Source, He is accessible only to faith through revelation; He cannot be approached by reason or by thought. As an immanent Being, the soul, spirit, or inner nature of the universe, which is His image or expression, He is knowable by sense, understanding, and reason in gradual approximation. As the soul of the universe He is in all and every part; all things are one, and the one is God. Indeed, in the earlier phase of Bruno's Pantheism the individual or finite being has no real existence at all; it is not a part or a division or even a special mode or expression of the Divine or world-soul; it is simply the world-soul itself in a particular aspect. Again, in the infinite (*sub specie aeternitatis*, in Spinoza's phrase), there is neither less nor greater; a man is no higher, no nearer God than an ant, a star than a man; all values are relative to the finite standpoint. In the Infinite, as Nicolaus of Cusa taught, all opposites, including good and evil, coincide; liberty and necessity, the possible and the actual, power and will, will and thought or idea, all these in God are one. Hence the universe that exists is the *only possible* universe, and because it exists it is also a *perfect* universe. But again Bruno's maturer thought compelled him to recognize gradations in value, in spite of himself. In law, natural and moral, in the beauty and order of Nature, God is more fully, more adequately, expressed than in any single being or individual thing (*Op. Lat.* i. 2, p. 316).

(*c*) *Ethics and religion.*—The end and aim of a Church is the same as that of a State; it is social and practical—the security of the community, the prosperity and well-doing of its members. Dissension and strife are dangerous to the State, hence the need of an authoritative doctrine, and the enforcement of its acceptance and of outward conformity with it; but the Church has no right to go further, to interfere with the pursuit of knowledge, of truth, which is the object of philosophy or science. Thus the Bible teaches not science but morality, an ideal of conduct. No discovery therefore may be condemned because it conflicts with a supposed statement of fact in the Bible. God does not need the worship of men, He cares nothing for what they say or think of Himself, but only for what they do to each other, *i.e.* for their happiness. Thus all worship, all religion has a purely practical and human end. The ordinary man must be governed by authority, by fear of punishment, whether in this life or in the next; ignorance and bodily pleasures are his paradise. He must live by faith. But the wise or heroic soul is able to attain, through reason, and through the love with which it is inspired, to the knowledge of and to eternal union with the Divine. Thus Bruno comes in the end to the same conception as that with which Spinoza concluded his Ethics—the *amor Dei intellectualis*. His philosophy of religion is a rationalism, but limited always by a belief in the Transcendence of God, by which the sphere of faith is separated from that of reason, and indeed remains, as Bruno sometimes saw, above it.

3. Influence.—Although his writings were placed upon the Index in 1603 and became very scarce, and although in his lifetime he aroused antagonism wherever he went, Bruno nevertheless had many followers in England, in France, and in Germany. No doubt his Lullian works formed the first attraction, but through them his philosophical ideas received an entrance into current thought. The influence was general rather than special; the courage, independence, and enthusiasm with which he defended the new and lofty conception of the universe and of Nature in its relation to God made themselves felt and were imitated. Traces of his teaching may be found in Bacon, in Descartes, and above all in Spinoza and Leibniz, with both of whom he has many doctrines in common. Except, however, for the somewhat mistaken admiration of the English Deists, he was generally neglected until the German idealists re-discovered him in the first half of the 19th century. Ample amends has now been made by his countrymen in the study of his writings, their careful editing, and complete publication; and a multitude of monographs upon his life and phil-

osophy have appeared during the last thirty years in various languages.

LITERATURE.—1. *WORKS*: *Opera Latina*, 1879–1891, State edition, 3 vols., with Introduction, etc., Naples; *Opere Italiane*, ed. Lagarde, 2 vols., Göttingen, 1888; *Opere Italiane* (philosophical works only), ed. Gentile, 2 vols., Bari, 1907–8. 2. *PHILOSOPHY*: F. Tocco, *Le Opere Latine di G. B. esposte e confrontate con le italiane*, Florence, 1889, also *Le Opere Inedite di G. B.*, Naples, 1891, and 'Le Fonti piu recenti della Filosofia del Bruno' (*Acad. dei Lincei*, Rendic. ser., v. i.). Many other references will be found in these and in the following. 3. *GENERAL WORKS ON BRUNO*: Christian Bartholmess, *Jordano Bruno*, 2 vols., Paris, 1846–7; Domenico Berti, *Giordano Bruno da Nola*[2] (with documents), 1889; H. Brunnhofer, *G. B.'s Weltanschauung und Verhängniss*, Leipzig, 1882; I. Frith, *Life of Giordano Bruno*, London, 1887; A. Riehl, *Giordano Bruno*, Leipzig, 1900; J. L. M'Intyre, *Giordano Bruno*, London, 1903; G. Gentile, *Giordano Bruno nella Storia della Cultura*, Milan, 1907.

J. L. M'INTYRE.

BRYANITES.—See METHODISM.

BUDDHA, LIFE OF THE.—Gautama, the Buddha (Pāli *Gotama*), the founder of the Buddhist faith, which at one time numbered in all probability more adherents than any other form of religious belief, was born in or about the year 560 B.C., in the Lumbini Grove, near the ancient town of Kapilavastu, the ruins of which lie hidden beyond the British border in the dense *tarai* region of south Nepāl, a few miles north of the Basti District of the United Provinces. The place of his birth, unknown and unidentified before, was determined by the discovery, in the year 1895, of a pillar erected there by the Buddhist Emperor Aśoka (*q.v.*) during a pilgrimage which he undertook for the purpose of visiting and worshipping at the chief sites made sacred by the presence and acts of the Buddha while he lived upon earth. The route which he followed led him from his capital city of Pāṭaliputra (Patna [*q.v.*]) to the Lumbini Grove and Kapilavastu, Bodh Gayā, Sārnāth, near Benares, Śrāvasti, Kuśanagara, and other sacred sites, the exact position of some of which is still uncertain; and at each place he appears to have set up a pillar or built a *stūpa* commemorative of his visit and of the incident in the Buddha's life of which it had been the scene. The inscription on the Lumbini Grove pillar is perfect, and the letters as clear and legible as on the day they were inscribed; of a few words, however, the meaning is uncertain:

'The king Devānampiya-Piyadassi, when he was twenty-years-anointed, did [*this place*] the honour of coming [*here*] in person. Because Buddha was born here, the Śakya saint, he caused a stone surrounding and screening wall to be made, and a stone pillar to be set up. Because the Blessed One was born here, he made the village Lummini free of rent and entitled to the [*king's*] eighth share [*of the grain*].'*

The name *Gautama*, by which the future Buddha was known, is perhaps derived from that of Gotama, the ancient *ṛṣi*, or seer, to whom are ascribed some of the hymns of the Rigveda. He becomes *buddha*, or *the Buddha*, the 'enlightened' or 'wise,' only after his attainment of perfect wisdom under the Bo-tree. Other titles given to him are *Śākyamuni*, 'the sage of the Śākyas'; *Siddhārtha*, 'he who has accomplished his aim'; and *Tathāgata*, 'he who has arrived at the truth.' His father was named Śuddhodana, the chieftain or prince of a Śākya clan, who ruled from Kapilavastu over a small kingdom in the N.E. part of the United Provinces and the neighbouring District of southern Nepāl; and his mother, Māyā or Mahāmāyā, is said to have conceived him after a dream in which she beheld the future Buddha descending from the heaven, and entering her womb in the form of a white elephant. Hence the elephant is sacred to all Buddhists. Māyā herself, according to the tradition, died within seven days after the birth of her son, and was carried to the *Trayastriṁśa* heaven of Indra, whither the Buddha himself ascended later, to give her instruction in the Law.*

In the *Jātaka* (*q.v.*) the story of the life and experiences of the Buddha in his earlier existences is narrated, and how the characteristics and perfections of a Buddha were exhibited by him in patience, self-sacrifice, and the other virtues. As the time drew nigh for him to enter the world in this the final birth, the gods themselves prepared the way before him with celestial portents and signs. 'Earthquakes and miracles of healing took place; flowers bloomed and gentle rains fell, although out of season; heavenly music was heard, delicious scents filled the air, and the very water of the ocean lost its saltness and became sweet and refreshing.' Before his birth also the prophecy was uttered concerning him, that he would become either a Universal Monarch (*chakravartin*), or, abandoning house and home, would assume the robe of a monk, and become a Buddha, perfectly enlightened, for the salvation of mankind; and he himself, in the *Tuṣita* heaven, before consenting to undertake the office, makes the 'five great observations,' in order to determine the right family in which to be born, the right continent,† the appropriate district,‡ the proper time, and the predestined mother of the Buddha. He is accordingly conceived in the womb of Queen Mahāmāyā, and she is delivered of a son in the Lumbini Grove, under the shade of a Śāl-tree, a branch of which bends down to her, that she may grasp it with her hand. The body of the child bore at birth the thirty-two auspicious marks (*mahāvyañjana*) which indicated his future greatness, besides secondary marks (*anuvyañjana*) in large numbers. The chief of the divinities, including Indra, were in attendance, and the boy was received by four Brahma angels. Immediately also he uttered the 'shout of victory,'§ taking seven steps forward, and finding in none of the ten directions a being equal to himself. At the same moment his future wife was born, and also the sacred Bo-tree, under which he was destined to attain Buddhahood.

In many of the legends the young Gautama performs marvellous feats of strength. His father also, mindful of the prophecy that he would retire from the world, surrounded him with all manner of luxury and indulgence, in order to retain his affections, and prevent him from undertaking a vow of solitariness and poverty. In particular, he endeavoured to keep from him the 'four signs,' the sight of which, it had been announced, would move him to enter upon the ascetic life.

'Then said the king, "What shall my son see to make him retire from the world?"
"The four signs."
"What four?"

* The translation is that of J. F. Fleet in *JRAS*, 1908, p. 486; cf. p. 823, and *ib.* 1909, p. 760 ff.; V. A. Smith, in *IA* xxxiv. [1905], p. 4, gives a rendering that differs only in details. For a facsimile and transcription see G. Bühler, *Epigr. Ind.* v.; V. A. Smith, *Aśoka* (1901), p. 145, etc. Earlier articles and discussions will be found in *JRAS*, 1897, *et al.*, and in the references in V. A. Smith, *op. cit.* Not far from the Lumbini (Rummindei) pillar there was found, near the village of Nigliva, a second pillar of Aśoka, with an imperfect inscription recording his visit to the *stūpa* of Koṇāgamana (Skr. *Kanakamuni*), one of the four Buddhas of the present age (Kakusandha, Koṇāgamana, Kassapa, and Gautama himself; Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, p. 32 *et al.*; V. A. Smith, *op. cit.* p. 145). Other pillar-inscriptions are known; see art. AŚOKA.

* Rockhill, *Life of the Buddha*, p. 80 f.; Warren, *op. cit.*, p. 42 ff. The story of the virginity of Māyā, the mother of the Buddha, is late, and owes its inspiration, it can hardly be doubted, to Christian sources. According to L. de la Vallée-Poussin, the doctrine is asserted in the *Mahāvastu* (*q.v.*) but not elsewhere (cf. above, p. 741[b] and note ‡).

† 'In three of the continents the Buddhas are never born; only in the continent of India are they born.'

‡ *Madyadeśa*, the Middle Country.

§ In two of his previous existences the Buddha is said to have spoken at birth—the *Mahosadha* and *Vessantara* existences (see *Jātaka*, i. 53, quoted in Warren, p. 47). The ten directions are the zenith and nadir, with the four cardinal and the four intermediate points.

"A decrepit old man, a diseased man, a dead man, and a monk."

"From this time forth," said the king, "let no such persons be allowed to come near my son. It will never do for my son to become a Buddha. What I would wish to see is my son exercising sovereign rule and authority over the four great continents and the two thousand attendant isles, and walking through the heavens surrounded by a retinue thirty-six leagues in circumference." And when he had so spoken he placed guards for a distance of a quarter of a league in each of the four directions, in order that none of these four kinds of men might come within sight of his son.'*

On successive occasions, however, issuing from the palace, he is confronted by the four signs the sight of which fills him with amazement and distress; and, realizing the impermanence of all earthly things, he determines to forsake his home and take refuge in the forest for solitary meditation, and 'to obtain the highest immortality.' His resolution is strengthened by the appearance of the attendant women of the palace, whom he finds asleep in all manner of uncomely attitudes;† and he pays a final visit to his wife and child in the inner chamber, checking himself in his desire to waken and bid them farewell, lest their entreaties and caresses should avail to turn him from his fixed purpose. He is said to have been twenty-nine years old when he thus made the 'Great Renunciation.' On his horse Kaṇṭhaka he left the city by night, and miraculous signs accompanied his departure, in the same manner as when he had been born. The gods themselves silenced the neighing of his steed, lest the city and its warders should be aroused; and bore up the horse's hoofs, preventing them from touching the ground; while the city gates, heavy with bolts and bars, opened noiselessly to him of their own accord.‡ And Māra, the prince of evil, sought to win him back by the promise of universal dominion, which he should immediately obtain.

On the further side of a broad stream Gautama dismissed his horse and attendant, the latter seeking permission, which was refused, to remain with him;§ and the two returned to the city, to announce that their master had finally and for ever renounced the world. The prince himself proceeded alone and on foot to Rājagriha (Rājgir), whose king greeted him as the future Buddha, and obtained from him a promise that, after gaining enlightenment, he would re-visit his kingdom and give him instruction in the right knowledge. Thence he made his way to Uruvelā (Skr. *Urubilvā*, the great or wide-spreading Bel-tree, the wood-apple), a village or grove near Gayā, and there in the company of five ascetics entered upon a course of extreme self-discipline, carrying his austerities to such a length that his body became utterly emaciated and lost all its brightness and grace; finally, he fell down senseless and was believed to be dead. For six years the 'Great Struggle' continued, at the close of which, becoming convinced that the truth was not to be won by the way of asceticism, he resumed an ordinary course of life as a beggar living on alms. These six years are said to be 'like time spent in endeavouring to tie the air into knots.' His companions, however, the five ascetics, now deserted him, because they regarded his action as a proof of faithlessness to his principles, and departed to the Deer-Park at Benares.

There followed the assaults of Māra, who with his hosts endeavoured by every means, first by violence and then by varied allurements, to distract his attention and turn him from his purpose. Seated under the Bo-tree on a couch or platform of grass, on its eastern side and facing the east, Gautama remained steadfast and immovable, taking no notice of the showers of rocks and darts which, as soon as they reached him, turned into flowers. Here he resolved to remain — 'Never from this seat will I stir, until I have attained the supreme and absolute wisdom.' The period of the temptation closed with sunset, when the army of Māra was finally driven off in utter defeat. During the following night, in deepest meditation, the desired knowledge and the perfect state were attained, and Gautama became *Buddha*, 'the enlightened one,' to whom all the secrets of the universe were laid open—omniscient.

'A legend relates that in the first night-watch he gained a knowledge of all his previous existences; in the second, of all present states of being; in the third, of the chain of causes and effects; and at the dawn of day he knew all things.'*

During the seven weeks spent under the Bo-tree, he is said to have been miraculously sustained on an offering of milk-rice, brought to him by a woman of Uruvelā, named Sujātā, and neither to have moved from his place nor to have taken any further nourishment. Until this time he had been merely a *Bodhisattva* (*q.v.*), one who is destined to gain supreme wisdom, on the way to Buddhahood but not yet perfectly enlightened.

For a discussion of the doctrine or truth which the Buddha thus believed himself to have grasped, and which he made it his business henceforth to preach, see art. HĪNAYĀNA. 'All existence involves suffering; suffering is caused by desire, especially the desire for continuance of existence; the suppression of desire therefore will lead to the extinction of suffering; this deliverance can only be effected by the Noble Eight-fold Path.' These are the *āryasatyāni*, or Noble Truths, the four terms of which are *duḥkha*, 'pain'; *samudaya*, 'cause'; *nirodha*, 'suppression'; *mārga*, 'way' or 'path.' The same four truths or axioms are propounded in the Sāṅkhya philosophy (*Mahāvagga*, i. vi. 19; *SBE* xiii. 95 f., etc.; see also R. Garbe, *Sāṅkhya und Yoga*, Strassburg, 1896, p. 18, and art. SĀṄKHYA).

With regard to the events immediately succeeding the Buddha's attainment of omniscience, the traditions are more than usually divergent. That which is perhaps the best attested, and most generally finds expression in Buddhist art, represents him as spending in succession seven days under the Bo-tree, in deep meditation, 'enjoying the bliss of emancipation'; the same period under the 'Goat-herd's Banyan' (*ajapāla*), where a Brāhman is said to have approached him with the request that he would define the characteristics of a true Brāhman; the Buddha replied that he only could justly claim the name who was 'free from pride, free from impurity, self-restrained, wise, and who has fulfilled the requirements of holiness.' A third week was spent under the *Muchalinda*-tree, from beneath which Muchalinda, the serpent-king, came forth, and spread his hood as a canopy over the Buddha to protect him from the wind and heat, the storm-cloud and the rain; and, finally, a fourth period of equal duration was spent under the *Rājāyatana*-tree, whence he returned to the Banyan. Thus were completed four periods of seven days. During the last week, two merchants, moved by a divine suggestion, approached the Buddha, and with respectful salutations offered him food, rice-cakes, and honey. The gift was accepted, and received in a bowl (or four bowls of stone), presented to him at the moment by the four divinities that guard the four quarters of the globe.† The merchants declared their faith in the Buddha and his Law,‡ and begged to be received as disciples. Their request was granted, and they thus became the earliest lay-disciples in Buddhism.

After his return the Buddha is represented as

* *Jātaka*, i. 56, in Warren, p. 53. The story of the four signs recurs in all the narratives of the Buddha's early years (cf. *e.g. Buddha-Charita*, bk. iii.). It would seem to be one of the best-attested of the early traditions, as it is most characteristic.

† Cf. the description of Hanuman's visit by night to the palace of Rāvaṇa in Ceylon, finding his wives asleep (*Rāmāyaṇa*, v. 10); and the similar story of the noble Yasa (*Mahāvagga* i. 7).

‡ *Buddha-Charita*, v. 80 ff., etc.

§ According to one form of the tradition, the horse died of grief on the spot, and was re-born as a god in the *trayastriṁśa* heaven.

* Monier-Williams, *Buddhism*, p. 34; cf. Warren, p. 82.

† *Mahāvagga*, i. 2–4; cf. Warren, p. 83 ff.

‡ Employing the 'two-refuge' formula, because the *saṅgha*, the order of monks, was not yet instituted.

debating in his mind whether he should undertake the wearisome and thankless task of communicating to men the profound truths which he had thus perceived. Brahmā appeared to him, and with reverential obeisance recalled him to high office and duty, reminding him of the misery and ignorance of mankind, who, if they do not hear the doctrine preached, cannot attain to salvation. The Buddha assented; but a further doubt arose to whom he should first proclaim his doctrine with the assurance that they would understand. He decided that the five ascetics with whom he had previously lived in the practice of austerities should be the first to receive the new teaching. He therefore sought them out in the Deer-Park, *Isipatana*, at Benares, and to them delivered his first sermon, or brief exposition of doctrine, 'setting in motion the wheel of the Law,'* and founding 'the highest kingdom of truth.' The *bhikṣus* accepted the truth, and at their own request were duly ordained, becoming the first members of the Buddhist Order (*saṅgha*) of monks.

The number of the disciples rapidly increased; and Gautama sent forth his monks on missionary tours hither and thither, bidding them wander everywhere, preaching the doctrine (*dharma*), and teaching men to order their lives with self-restraint, simplicity, and chastity. Of these, his earliest converts, two of the most renowned were Sāriputta and Moggallāna (*Maudgalyāyana*), members of an ascetic community resident at that time at Rājagriha, who received the truth from the lips of the monk Assaji, one of the five original disciples; he taught them the substance of Buddhist doctrine, explaining that he himself, being only a novice, was unable to expound it at length.

'Of laws or principles that originate from a cause, the cause of these the Buddha hath declared, and also the destruction of them. Thus the great Teacher (Monk) hath spoken.†

The recitation of these words by the venerable monk Assaji is said to have aroused in the mind of the hearers a clear understanding of the fact that 'whatever is subject to origination is subject also to cessation or destruction.'‡ They were thereupon admitted into the Order by the Buddha himself. Both are recorded to have died before their Master. Other disciples, whose names and actions fill a large place in the early chronicles, were Upāli, who recited the text of the *Vinaya* at the first Council after the Buddha's death; Kāśyapa (Kassapa) or Mahā-Kāśyapa, the president of the Council, for whose coming the cremation of the body of the Buddha was delayed; and Ānanda (*q.v.*), his cousin and favourite attendant, who seems to have watched over him during life with closest care, and to have been nearest to him at death. Others of high birth became lay-disciples. And there were also female followers, who, later, were permitted to form themselves into an Order of Buddhist nuns (see art. MONASTICISM [Buddhist]).

Thereafter the Buddha spent a life prolonged, according to the tradition, over forty-five years, in itinerating from place to place, and preaching the doctrine to all who would listen. The details of his journeyings, as recorded in the chronicles, are not of much interest; they seem to have been confined mainly to the kingdom of Magadha,* and especially the country around Rājagriha and Śrāvastī;† but are traditionally said to have extended also far into the north-west of India and the Panjāb. During the whole of this period he appears to have had no settled dwelling-place, although gifts of land and buildings were made to him by wealthy disciples; the most extensive and important of these apparently were the Jetavana park and monastery at Śrāvastī—the gift of Sudatta or Anāthapiṇḍika, who bought it from Jeta, the king's son, at the cost of covering the ground with gold pieces. Jeta retained a portion, and built thereon a *vihāra* for the monks; whence the whole estate was known as *Jetavana*, the grove or park of Jeta. In the rainy season (*Vassa* [*q.v.*]) it was his wont to abstain from travelling, ostensibly lest the animal and insect life which then abounded should be inadvertently injured or destroyed; but partly also, no doubt, because of the physical difficulty which the heavy rains placed in the way of much movement.‡ The doctrines which he taught seem generally to have been received with approval, often with enthusiasm, although opposition was at times aroused. His chief rival was Devadatta, a cousin of the Buddha, who is represented as being jealous of his influence and popularity, and as repeatedly seeking to compass his death. Devadatta had been received into the Order at the time of a visit which Gautama paid to Kapilavastu in the sixth year of his ministry, but had never been a sincere believer. The final attempt which he made to poison the Buddha was frustrated, and he himself, for making a false profession of faith, fell down into hell, where he was condemned to remain for an entire world-cycle.

At the age of over eighty years, according to the tradition, at the close of a long life devoted to teaching and preaching, Gautama Buddha realized that the time drew near for him to die, to leave his disciples and his work, and to attain *parinirvāṇa*,§ final or perfect *nirvāṇa*.

The authoritative account of the death of the Buddha, as related by the Southern School of Buddhism, is contained in the *Mahā-Parinibbāna Sutta* of the *Digha-Nikāya*, the 'Book of the Great Decease,' translated by T. W. Rhys Davids in *SBE*, vol. xi.; Warren, pp. 95–110. See art. LITERATURE (Buddhist). The narrative from Tibetan sources is given by W. W. Rockhill, *Life of the Buddha*, pp. 132–147. The date of his death has been discussed at great length, and by many scholars. The Sinhalese reckoning, representing the tradition of the South, places the event in the year 544 or 543 B.C.; but it seems certain that this is too early. More than fifty years ago, Sir A. Cunningham (*Bhilsa Topes*, London, 1854), from a full consideration of all the available data, gave his decision for the year 477 B.C. Prof. Max Müller arrived at the same conclusion (*SBE* x.[2] p. xliii ff.; *History of Sanskrit Literature*[2], pp. 262 ff., 299), which was endorsed by Dr. Bühler. Others, as Westergaard and Kern, bring the time of his death down to a considerably later period, *c.* 370 B.C. The most recent essay in favour of a yet earlier date is by the Indian scholar P. C. Mukherji, who argues for the early part of the 6th century (see review in *JRAS*, 1900, p. 568 ff.). There can be little doubt that Sir A. Cunningham's date is very near to the truth. Dr. Fleet re-examines the whole question with great care in *JRAS*, 1909, pp. 1–34, endeavouring to determine the precise day of the year on which the Buddha died, which he concludes to have been Oct. 13th, 483 B.C. Cf. also M. de Zilva Wickremasinghe in *Epigr. Zeylanica*, i. 142 n. 7, 156 f.

Accompanied by Ānanda, the Buddha then came

* *Dharmachakrapravartana* (Pāli *Dhammachakkappavattana*); see *SBE* xiii. 94 ff., and the references there given; Kern, *Indian Buddhism*, p. 23. The wheel is a continually recurring symbol in Buddhist art; the original intention probably was to represent as well the perfection of the doctrine, the circle denoting all-rounded completeness, as its unceasing, unresting progression. The sermon itself, as given in the texts, is a manifesto of Buddhist doctrine, inculcating the avoidance of the two extremes of a life of sensual pleasure or of ascetic self-mortification, and urging the pursuit of the 'Middle Path' which leads to insight, supreme wisdom, and nirvāṇa.

† *Ye dharmā hetu-prabhavā hetum teṣām Tathāgataḥ hy avadat teṣāñcha yo nirodha evaṁ-vādī Mahāśramaṇaḥ*—the Buddhist creed or confession of faith. (Cf. *SBE* xiii. 144 ff.; Kern, p. 25; Warren, pp. 87-91.)

‡ *Mahāv.* i. 23; cf. Warren, p. 87 ff.

* Beal, *Siyuki*, ii. 82 ff.; cf. art. MAGADHA.

† Legge, *Fā-Hien*, p. 55 ff.; Beal, *op. cit.* ii. 1 ff. The site of Śrāvastī was identified by Cunningham with Sahet Mahet, in the Gonda District of the United Provinces, and this identification has been confirmed by recent discoveries (see *JRAS*, 1908, pp. 971 ff., 1098 f., 1909, p. 1061 ff.; *IGI*, *s.v.*). There is a description of Śrāvastī from Sinhalese sources in W. Geiger, *Liter. u. Sprache d. Singhalesen*, Strassburg, 1901, p. 14 f.

‡ Vassa was also observed by the Jainas, and in this respect apparently both sects followed the earlier practice of the Hindu monastic orders.

§ Pāli *parinibbāna*, see art. NIRVĀṆA; *nirvāṇa* is a state attainable and attained during life, and was enjoyed by the Buddha himself and by many Buddhist saints; *parinirvāṇa* is reached only at death, with the dissolution of the bodily frame.

to the *Śāla*-tree grove *Upavartana* at Kuśanagara,* in the country of the Mallas. There, by his direction, a couch was spread between two *Śāla*-trees, with its head to the north, on which he lay down 'on the right side after the manner of a lion, and placing foot on foot remained mindful and conscious.'† The trees bloomed out of season, and scattered their flowers on him as he lay. His last hours were spent in giving counsels and directions to Ānanda and the assembled monks. Subhadra also, a wandering ascetic, was admitted to his presence, listened to his teaching, and was converted, thus becoming 'the last disciple made by the Blessed One himself.' Finally, he invited his disciples to state any doubt or difficulty felt by them with regard to the teaching of the Buddha or the rules of the Order, that he might remove it; and bade them regard his Doctrine and Discipline as their teacher after he was gone. Three times the question was repeated:

'"It may be, brethren, that some brother has a doubt or perplexity respecting either the Buddha or the Doctrine or the Order or the Path or the course of conduct. Ask any question, brethren, and do not have to reproach yourselves afterwards with the thought, Our Teacher was present with us, but we failed to ask him all our questions."

And when he had thus spoken the brethren were silent.

. . . . . .

"It may be, brethren, that it is out of respect to the Teacher that ye ask no questions. Then let each one speak to his friend."

And when he had thus spoken the brethren were silent.

Then the venerable Ānanda spake to the Blessed One:

"How wonderful a thing it is, Reverend Sir, and how marvellous! Verily, I believe that in this whole assembly of the brethren there is not one brother who has any doubt or perplexity respecting the Buddha or the Doctrine or the Order or the Path or the course of conduct."

"With you, Ānanda, it is a matter of faith, when you say that; but with the Tathāgata, Ānanda, it is a matter of knowledge that in this whole assembly of the brethren there is not one brother who has any doubt or perplexity respecting either the Buddha or the Doctrine or the Order or the Path or the course of conduct. For of all these five hundred brethren, Ānanda, even the most backward has become converted, and is no longer liable to be born in a state of suffering, but is assured of final salvation."

Then the Blessed One addressed the brethren:

"And now, brethren, I take my leave of you; all the constituents of being are transitory; work out your salvation with diligence."

This was the last word of the Tathāgata.

Thereupon the Blessed One entered the first trance (*dhyāna*); and rising from the first trance, he entered the second trance; and rising from the second trance, he entered the third trance; and rising from the third trance, he entered the fourth trance; and rising from the fourth trance, he entered the realm of the infinity of space; and rising from the realm of the infinity of space, he entered the realm of the infinity of consciousness; and rising from the realm of the infinity of consciousness, he entered the realm of nothingness; and rising from the realm of nothingness, he entered the realm of neither perception nor non-perception; and rising from the realm of neither perception nor non-perception, he arrived at the cessation of perception and sensation.'‡

The same process is then repeated in reverse order until the first trance is again reached. Thence he passes successively to the second, third, and fourth. And at the close it is said:

'And rising from the fourth trance, immediately the Blessed One passed into Nirvāṇa.'

In the Mahāyāna school of Buddhism a mystical doctrine of three bodies (*kāya*) of the Tathāgata is taught—the *dharmakāya*, or body of the Law, *sambhogakāya*, or body of perfect bliss, *nirmāṇakāya*, the illusory or apparitional body. The first is said to be discernible in the whole air of the Tathāgata, the second in the whole air of a Bodhisattva, the third in the air of different pious men. The underlying idea would seem to be that of completing the connexion, or chain of evolution, between the living earthly Buddha and his spiritual or mystical counterpart, invisible in the heaven.*

A curious tradition, the origin of which it is not easy to trace, represents the death of the Buddha as due to over-indulgence in 'dried boar's flesh,† at a feast which Chunda, the blacksmith, had prepared for him and his disciples. Recognizing the danger of the dish, Gautama refused to allow the others to partake lest they should suffer injury, and gave orders that what was left over should be buried in the ground. In view of the Hindu aversion to a meat diet, or the taking of life in any form, it is hardly likely that the tradition is a mere invention of later times. It is more probable that the preparation consisted of some vegetable or root, perhaps truffles; a 'boar's delicacy,' or favourite food; or the name of some dish prepared for the feast may have been confused in course of time with 'boar's flesh' or 'pork.' The refusal to permit his disciples to share was then invented to exalt his magnanimity, and to account for the fact that he alone suffered after the meal. If this were really the case, his great age would itself be a sufficient explanation. It should be noticed also that in the Tibetan books no reference is made to the pork, although the last feast in the Buddha's honour is described as in the Pāli narratives.‡

The death of the Buddha, like his birth, was accompanied by signs and portents from heaven; and the spirits of the earth and sky united in lamentation with his disciples and the men of Kuśanagara. The Mallas of the town paid due honour to the corpse, with processions and garlands and music, for a space of six days. On the seventh the body was carried by eight of their chieftains to a shrine outside the city, on the east, where a funeral pyre was raised of sweet-scented woods. The Malla chiefs, however, were unable to set fire to the pile; and it was explained to them that the final ceremony of cremation must await the arrival of Kāśyapa, who with five hundred brethren was at that moment approaching Kuśanagara. When Kāśyapa reached the shrine, he saluted with reverence the Buddha's corpse, and with his companions passed thrice round the funeral pile, bowing down in homage. The pyre then spontaneously began to burn; and, after the flames had done their work, they were again miraculously extinguished.

The bones and relics that remained from the fire were claimed by the Mallas of Kuśanagara (Kusinārā), on the ground that the Buddha had died in their territory. Others, however, advanced claims to a portion; and the danger of strife was allayed only by the remonstrances of a Brāhman, Drona (Doṇa) by name, who, at the instance of the Mallas themselves, undertook to distribute the relics. An eightfold division was made, as follows: (1) Ajātaśatru, king of Magadha; (2) the Lichchhavis of Vaiśālī; (3) the Śākyas of Kapilavastu; (4) the Bulis of Allakappa; (5) the Koliyas of Rāmagrāma; (6) a Brāhman of Vethadīpa,§ whose name is not recorded; (7) the Mallas of Pāvā; (8) the Mallas of Kuśanagara. Further, the earthenware vessel (*kumbha*), in which the relics had been gathered together after cremation, was given to Drona himself; and to the Mauryas (Moriyas) of Pipphalīvana, who, after all the relics had been distributed, sent a message demanding a share, were granted the

* The scene of the Buddha's death has not been certainly identified; according to Fa-Hien, chs. xxiii., xxiv., it lay 25 *yojanas* east of Kapilavastu (cf. Beal, *Siyuki*, ii. 31 ff.). Sir A. Cunningham identified the site with the village of Kasiā, about 40 miles east of Gorakhpur, in the United Provinces, where there are extensive Buddhist ruins; but doubt is thrown on the correctness of his conclusions by recent discoveries and investigations. See V. A. Smith in *JRAS*, 1902, p. 139 ff.; J. F. Fleet, *ib.* 1906, p. 907 and note; J. H. Marshall, *ib.* 1907, p. 993 ff., with plate showing excavations at the great monastery; *IGI*, *s.v.* 'Kasiā.'

† The attitude and scene are represented from sculptures, *e.g.* in A. Grünwedel, *Buddhist Art in India*, 1901, p. 119 ff.

‡ *Mahā-Parinibbāna Sutta*, vi. 1. 6–11; *SBE* xi. 112 ff.; Warren, p. 108 f.; Kern, p. 44 f.

* See Rockhill, *Life of the Buddha*, p. 200 ff.; L. de la V. Poussin in *JRAS*, 1906, p. 943 ff., and art. Ādibuddha in vol. i. p. 97 ff.

† *Sūkara* (*śūkara*) *maddava*, *Parinibb. S.* iv. 16 ff., *SBE* xi. 71 ff. J. F. Fleet (*JRAS*, 1906, pp. 658, 881 f.) suggests 'the succulent parts, tit-bits, of a young wild boar' (*maddava*, Skr. *mārdava*, 'softness,' 'delicacy' [*mṛdu*]).

‡ Rockhill, p. 133 f.

§ Probably represented, according to Dr. Vogel, by the ruins at Kasiā; see *JRAS*, 1907, p. 993 ff.

embers of the fire. Thus there were altogether ten portions, and over each a cairn (*stūpa*) was erected and homage paid. These buildings remained for many years centres of pilgrimage, and were visited not only by Buddhists of India, but by pilgrims from distant lands.* In one form of the narrative the Emperor Aśoka is said to have undertaken a re-distribution of the relics among 84,000 *stūpas*, which he built. One of the original *stūpas*, however, that at Rāmagrāma (5), he was unable to violate, being prevented by the spirits (*nāgas*) that watched over the cairn.

At Piprāwā (Piprāhavā, Piprāhwā), in the United Provinces, excavations were made some years ago in an ancient mound and relic chamber; and among the objects discovered was a large stone box, containing steatite vases (one of which bore a short inscription), pieces of bone, gold leaf, jewels, beads, etc. The inscription when read was understood to describe the relics enclosed in the vase as those of the Buddha himself; and it was inferred that these fragments of bone were the actual portions of the body of Gautama, preserved after cremation, over which was erected the *stūpa* which had now been re-discovered. Dr. Fleet, however, interprets the inscription differently; and understands it to refer, not to the founder himself, but to the Śākyas, his kinsmen, many of whom, according to the tradition, were massacred, and their city wholly or partially destroyed, in revenge for a slight put upon the neighbouring king of Kosala.† In either case the inscription would seem to carry with it the identification of Piprāwā with Kapilavastu, the capital of the Śākyas.

The discovery is also reported of the ancient *stūpa* built near Peshāwar, according to the reports of the Chinese pilgrims, by Kanishka,‡ which they describe as the finest in India. Buddha himself, when travelling in the country, is said to have prophesied to Ānanda that on that spot, four hundred years after his death, a king named Kanishka would raise a great *stūpa* in his honour, 'which will contain many various relics of my bones and flesh.'§ Many marvels are related concerning the fulfilment of the prophecy, and both Fa-Hien and Hiuen-Tsiang record the presence in former times of the almsbowl (*pātra*) of Buddha in that country. Two large mounds lying east of the city have been identified as the site of the great building erected by Kanishka, and excavations have been carried on for the last two years, under the direction of the Archæological Survey of India. Under one of the mounds were found 'remains of an enormous monument, which proves to be the lost pagoda, so minutely described by the Chinese travellers.'‖ In a relic-chamber was discovered a casket containing small fragments of bone, which may therefore be portions of the remains of Gautama himself. The magnificence of the monument indicates the importance attached to the sacred relics which it was intended to enshrine. And the tradition recorded by Hiuen-Tsiang proves that in his day they were believed to be actual relics of the Founder of Buddhism.

* *Parinibbāna Sutta*, vi. 51-62.

† *JRAS*, 1906, p. 150. Dr Fleet reads the text, and translates as follows: *Sukiti-bhatinaṁ sa-bhagiṇikanaṁ sa-puta-dalanaṁ iyaṁ sailā-nidhane Budhasa bhagavate sakiyanaṁ*, 'Of the brethren of the Well-famed One, together with (their) little sisters (and) together with (their) children and wives, this (is) a deposit of relics; (namely) of the kinsmen of Buddha, the Blessed One.' Earlier interpretations understood the reference to be to a relic-shrine of the Buddha himself, set up by his Śākya brethren. See Fleet's article, *loc. cit.*, in which he discusses the inscription; and for a description of the original discoveries, *ib.* 1898, p. 474, etc.; Mukherji, *Antiquities in the Nepalese Tarai*, 1897; cf. Fleet in *JRAS*, 1905, p. 679 ff.; and on the identification of Kapilavastu, W. Vost, *ib.* 1906, p. 553 ff.

‡ Legge, *Fā-Hien*, ch. xli.; Beal, *Siyuki*, i. 97 ff.

§ Beal, *l.c.*, p. 99.

‖ *Times*, 17th Aug. 1909; see *JRAS*, 1909, p. 1056 ff.

Among the prophecies uttered by the Buddha was one concerning the future of the religion which he established, and its ultimate decline and disappearance from the earth. The declaration is contained in the *Anāgata-Vaṁśa* ('Narrative of Coming Events'), and was given at Kapilavastu in response to a question by Sāriputta. The history of the future Buddha, Maitreya (Pāli *Metteyya*), is described; then at long intervals after his own death will occur the 'five disappearances': of the attainments, when his disciples will rise to ever higher degrees of sanctity; of the method, when the knowledge of the precepts and the way of salvation shall be lost; of learning, when the sacred texts themselves shall be forgotten; of the symbols, the monastic robe, bowl, etc.; and at the close of five thousand years 'the relics will begin to fail of honour and worship, and will go wherever they can receive honour and worship. But as time goes on they will not receive honour and worship in any place. Then . . . the relics will come from every place . . . and having congregated together at the throne under the great Bo-tree . . . will teach the Doctrine. Not a single human being will be found at that place; but all the gods from ten thousand worlds will come together and listen to the Doctrine, and many thousands of them will attain to the Doctrine. . . . Then they will weep, saying, "From henceforth we shall be in darkness." Then the relics will put forth flames of fire and burn up . . . without remainder.'*

[The subject of Barlaam and Josaphat, which was referred to this article by a cross-reference at BARLAAM, it has been found more convenient to treat in a separate article under the title JOSAPHAT.]

LITERATURE.—*The Buddha-Charita of Aśvaghosha*, ed. by E. B. Cowell, Oxford, 1893, tr. *SBE*, vol. xlix., Oxford, 1894; *Fo-sho-hing-tsan-king*, a Life of Buddha by Aśvaghosha, tr. from Sanskrit into Chinese by Dharmaraksha, A.D. 420, and from Chinese into English by Samuel Beal, *SBE*, vol. xix., Oxford, 1883; *Buddhist Suttas*, *Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta*, tr. from Pāli by T. W. Rhys Davids, *SBE*, vol. xi., Oxford, 1887; *Vinaya Texts*, *Mahāvagga* and *Chullavagga*, tr. from the Pāli by T. W. Rhys Davids and H. Oldenberg, *SBE*, vols. xiii., xvii., xx., Oxford, 1881-1885; *Jātaka*, or *Stories of the Buddha's Former Births*, tr. from the Pāli by various hands, 6 vols., Cambridge, 1895-1907; R. Spence Hardy, *Manual of Budhism*, new ed., London, 1880, and *Legends and Theories of the Buddhists*, new ed. 1881; E. Senart, *La Légende de Buddha*[2], Paris, 1882; P. Bigandet, *Life or Legend of Gaudama, the Buddha of the Burmese*[3], London, 1880; W. W. Rockhill, *Life of the Buddha and the Early History of his Order, derived from Tibetan Works*, London, 1884; Sir Monier Monier-Williams, *Buddhism*, London, 1889; E. Windisch, *Māra und Buddha*, Leipzig, 1895; H. C. Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, Cambridge, Mass., 1896, ch. i.; H. Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, Strassburg, 1896, pp. 12-46; E. Hardy, *Buddha*, Leipzig, 1903; H. Oldenberg, *Buddha, sein Leben, seine Lehre, und seine Gemeinde*[4], Berlin, 1903 (Eng. tr., *Buddha: his Life, his Doctrine, his Order*, London, 1882); H. Baynes, *Way of the Buddha*, London, 1906; T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, New York, 1907; *Travels of Fā-Hien*, tr. by J. Legge, Oxford, 1886; *Siyuki, Buddhist Records of the Western World*, tr. by S. Beal, 2 vols., London, 1906.

A. S. GEDEN.

BUDDHAGHOṢA.—This was the name of several members of the Buddhist Order. It will be sufficient here to deal with the best known among them, the celebrated author and scholar who flourished early in the 5th century A.D.

1. **Life.**—The authorities regarding the life of Buddhaghoṣa the Great are as follows. In the first place, certain important portions of his works have already been published. The few details they contain as to the life of the author are the only contemporary records of it that have survived. Secondly, Dhammakitti, in the middle of the 13th cent. A.D., wrote a continuation of the *Great Chronicle* (tr. in Turnour's *Mahāvaṁśa*, p. 250 ff.) of Ceylon. In it he inserted an account, in thirty-three couplets, of the life and work of Buddhaghoṣa. It is not exactly known from what sources this account was drawn; but it probably gives

* Warren, pp. 482-485.

the tradition as preserved at the Great Minster in Anurādhapura (*q.v.*) in written documents now no longer extant. Thirdly, we have a life of Buddhaghoṣa, written in Pāli, in the middle of the 16th cent., by a Burmese *bhikṣu* named Mahā Maṅgala. It is of a legendary and edifying character, and of little independent value. The title is, *Buddhaghos-uppatti* ('Advent of Buddhaghoṣa'); and the text has been edited and translated by James Gray. The results to be obtained from these sources will best be stated chronologically.

In the introductory verses to his commentary on the *Dīgha* (ed. Rhys Davids and Carpenter), Buddhaghoṣa says that he compiled it in accordance with the opinions of the Elders at the Great Minster; and that since he had already, in his *Visuddhi Magga* ('Path of Purity'), dealt with certain points, he would omit these in his commentary. Lastly, he says that the authorities on which he relied were in the Sinhalese language, and that he reproduces the contents of them in Pāli. In his commentary on the *Vinaya* (quoted *JRAS*, 1871, p. 295) he gives the names of some of these Sinhalese works. They are the Great Commentary, the Raft Commentary (*i.e.* written on a raft), and the Kurundī Commentary (*i.e.* the one written at Kurunda Veḷu). In his commentary on the *Parivāra*, Buddhaghoṣa states (*teste* Gray, p. 12) that he studied these three under Buddhamitta. In his *Attha-sālinī* (ed. Müller), Buddhaghoṣa also quotes as his authorities these and other commentaries written in Sinhalese; refers frequently to his own *Visuddhi Magga*, and twice at least to his commentary on the *Vinaya*; and mentions otherwise (apart from the canonical works) only the *Milinda* and the *Peṭakopadesa*.*

These meagre but important details show conclusively that Buddhaghoṣa worked at a date subsequent to that of the two books last mentioned, under the auspices of the scholars at the Great Minster in Ceylon, and on the basis of materials written in Sinhalese.

The authority next in point of date explains how this was supposed to have occurred. It tells us that, during the reign in Ceylon of Mahā-Nāma (who ascended the throne A.D. 413), there was a young Brāhman born in India who wandered over the continent maintaining theses against all the world. In consequence of a discussion that took place between him and Revata, a Buddhist *bhikṣu*, he became interested in Buddhist doctrine, and entered the Order that he might learn more about it. It was not long before he became converted, and wrote a treatise entitled *Jñāṇodaya* ('Uprising of Knowledge'); and also an essay entitled *Atthasālinī* ('Full of Meaning'), on the *Abhidhamma* manual included in the Canon under the title *Dhamma-saṅgaṇī*. On Revata observing that he contemplated a larger work, he urged him to go to Anurādhapura, where there were better materials and greater opportunities for study, and make himself acquainted there with the commentaries that had been preserved in Sinhalese at the Great Minster, with a view to re-casting them in Pāli. Buddhaghoṣa agreed to this, went to the Great Minster, studied there under Saṅghapāli, and when he had mastered all the subjects taught, asked permission to translate the commentaries. The authorities of the School gave him two verses as the subject of a thesis, to test his ability. What he submitted as this thesis was the work afterwards to become so famous under the title of *Visuddhi Magga*. This proved, with the assistance of good fairies, so satisfactory that his request was granted. Then, according to the chronicler, 'he translated the whole of the Sinhalese commentaries into Pāli.'

* See the references given in Mrs. Rhys Davids' *Buddhist Psychology* pp. xx–xxv.

We need not take every word of this edifying story *au pied de la lettre*. We know, for instance, that it was not the whole, but only a part, though a very important part, of the Sinhalese commentaries that he reproduced in Pāli. Other scholars, some of whose names we know, while some are not yet known, reproduced other parts of it. The work was by no means a translation in the modern sense. It was a new work based on the older ones. And the intervention of the fairies (*devatā*) is only evidence of the curious literary taste of the time of the poet. But, in the main, the story bears the impress of probability.

The *Buddhaghos-uppatti* takes over this story, telling it with many flowers of speech and at greater length. It adds a few details not found in Dhammakitti's couplets, giving, for instance, the names of Buddhaghoṣa's father and mother as Kesī and Kesinī, and the name of the village they dwelt in as Ghosa. Both the authorities locate it at Gayā in Magadha, near the Bo-tree. The *Gandhavaṁśa* (*JPTS*, 1896, p. 66) adds that Kesī was the family chaplain (*purohita*) of King Saṅgāma. The *Saddhamma Saṅgaha* (*JPTS*, 1890, p. 55) gives the additional detail that Buddhaghoṣa worked at his translations in the Padhānaghara, an apartment to the right of the Great Minster. The Sinhalese chronicler concludes his account with the simple statement that Buddhaghoṣa, when his task was accomplished, returned home to India, to worship at the Wisdom tree. The Burmese authorities (quoted by Gray in his introduction) all agree that he went to Burma. This is merely a confusion between our Buddhaghoṣa and another *bhikṣu* of the same name (called more accurately Buddhaghoṣa the Less), who went from Ceylon to Burma towards the end of the 15th cent. (Forchhammer, p. 65).

2. **Works.**—The extant books written by Buddhaghoṣa would fill many volumes. Of these only one, and that one of the shortest, has so far been edited in Europe. The most important is probably the *Visuddhi Magga*, a compendium of all Buddhism, in three books: on Conduct, Concentration (or mental training), and Wisdom respectively. Henry C. Warren has published an abstract of this work (*JPTS*, 1891); and a complete edition, with translation, introductions, and notes, is in preparation for the Harvard Oriental Series. The rest are all commentaries. Those on the four great *Nikāyas*, on the *Abhidhamma*, and on the *Vinaya*, would each fill three or four volumes. A late authority, the *Saddhamma Saṅgaha* (*JPTS*, 1890, p. 56), gives 137,000 lines as the extent of these six works. Another late authority, the *Gandha-vaṁśa* (*JPTS*, 1896, p. 59), in giving a complete list of Buddhaghoṣa's works, mentions in addition commentaries on the *Pātimokkha*, *Dhammapada*, *Jātaka*, *Khuddaka Pāṭha*, and *Apadāna*, adding on p. 68 the *Sutta Nipāta*. This list probably errs both by excess and by defect. It does not include the *Attha-sālinī*, which we now know, from the edition published by the Pāli Text Society, to have been written by him, and it does include the commentaries on the *Dhammapada* and the *Jātakas*. Now we have before us the text of the introductory verses to each of these works. In each case the author describes the circumstances under which, and names the scholars at whose instigation, he undertook and carried out the work. In neither case is any reference made to Buddhaghoṣa. In both style and matter each of these books differs from the other, and from such portions of the works of Buddhaghoṣa as are accessible to us. In the similar cases of Nāgārjuna and Śaṅkara, works not written by them have been ascribed to famous writers. The tradition of Buddhaghoṣa's authorship of either of

the books above named has not as yet been traced back earlier than the 10th cent.; and, for the above reasons, it is at present very doubtful. A large number of short quotations from Buddhaghoṣa's commentaries have been printed by the editors of the various texts with which he deals; and sixty consecutive pages from the historical introduction to his commentary on the *Vinaya* have been edited by H. Oldenberg (*Vinaya*, vol. iii.). Rhys Davids and Carpenter have published one volume, out of three, of the *Sumaṅgala Vilāsinī*, his commentary on the *Dīgha*. And one complete work by him, the *Attha-sālinī* above referred to, has been edited by E. Müller. This turns out to be, not the essay under that title said by Dhammakitti to have been composed in India, but another work written in Ceylon subsequently to the *Visuddhi Magga* and the six great commentaries. It is doubtless an enlarged edition of the essay, and the latter has therefore not been preserved. Manuscripts of the undoubted works of Buddhaghoṣa, containing the texts, sufficient to fill some twenty-five volumes more, are extant in European libraries; and the Pāli Text Society, having completed its edition of the canonical works, is now engaged on the publication of these.

3. General conclusions.—Buddhaghoṣa's greatest value to the modern historian is due largely to the limitations of his mental powers. Of his talent there can be no doubt; it was equalled only by his extraordinary industry. But of originality, of independent thought, there is at present no evidence. He had mastered so thoroughly and accepted so completely the Buddhist view of life, that there was no need for him to occupy time with any discussions on ultimate questions. In his 'Path of Purity' he gives, with admirable judgment as to the general arrangement of his matter, and in lucid style, a summary of the Buddhism of his time. There is no argument or discussion. In his six great commentaries—those on each of the four *Nikāyas*, containing the Doctrine; on the *Vinaya*, containing the Canon Law; and on the *Abhidhamma*, containing the advanced Psychology—he adheres to one simple plan. He first gives a general introduction—dealing mainly with literary history—to the work itself. To each of the more important Dialogues, or *Suttas*, he gives a special introduction on the circumstances under which it was supposed, when he wrote, to have been originally spoken, and on the places and the persons mentioned in it. He quotes in the comment on the *Sutta* every word or phrase he considers doubtful or deserving of notice from a philological, exegetical, philosophical, or religious point of view. His philology is far in advance of the philology of the same date in Europe, and his notes on rare words are constantly of real value, and not seldom conclusive. He gives and discusses various readings he found in the texts before him; and these notes, together with his numerous quotations, go far to settle the text as it lay before him, and are of great service for the textual criticism of the originals. Of the higher criticism Buddhaghoṣa is entirely guiltless. To him there had been no development in doctrine, and all the texts were the words of the Master. He is fond of a story, and often relieves the earnestness of his commentary with anecdote, parable, or legend. In this way, without in the least intending it, he has preserved no little material for the history of social customs, commercial values, folk-lore, and belief in supra-normal powers. His influence on the development of the literary faculty among Buddhists throughout the world has been very considerable. It is true, no doubt, that the method adopted in his commentaries follows very closely the method of those much older ones preserved in the Canon; but the literary skill with which he uses it is a great advance, more especially in lucidity, over the older documents.

LITERATURE.—*Atthasālinī*, ed. E. Müller (*PTS*, 1897); *Sumaṅgala Vilāsinī*, ed. Rhys Davids and Carpenter (*PTS*, 1886); *Mahāvaṁsa*, ed. G. Turnour (Colombo, 1837); *Buddhaghosuppatti* (ed. J. Gray, London, 1892); *Digha*, ed. Rhys Davids and Carpenter (*PTS*, 1899, 1903); E. Forchhammer, *Jardine Prize Essay* (Rangoon, 1885); Mrs. Rhys Davids, 'Buddhist Psychology' (*RAS*, 1900).

T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

BUDDHISM.—The character of Buddhism varies according to the country in which it prevails, so that a general sketch would be of very little value. The origin of Buddhism has been given in the article BUDDHA; its early developments will be described in two articles, one on the HĪNAYĀNA, or Little Vehicle, the other on the MAHĀYĀNA, or Great Vehicle. Then the Buddhism of each country will be separately treated under the name of the country. See BHUTĀN, BURMA, CENTRAL ASIA, CEYLON, CHINA, INDIA, JAPAN, JAVA, KOREA, SIAM, TIBET. See also SECTS (Buddhist).

BULGARIANS.—See BOGOMILS.

BULL.

Egyptian.—See ANIMALS, EGYPTIAN RELIGION.
Greek and Roman.—See ANIMALS, TAUROBOLIUM.
Hindu.—See ANIMALS, VEDIC RELIGION.
Semitic (A. H. SAYCE), p. 887.
Teutonic (C. J. GASKELL), p. 889.

BULL (Semitic).—The wild bull (Assyr. *rîmu*, Heb. *rĕ'ēm*) was found in Mesopotamia, whence it wandered into Babylonia and the level parts of Palestine, while the domesticated short-horned ox seems to have been indigenous in Western Asia before the rise of Bab. civilization. Further south, in Arabia and the Sinaitic Peninsula, the country was unsuitable for cattle, and sheep took the place of oxen. This fact is important in view of the general opinion of anthropologists that the original home of the Semitic race was Arabia.

In Babylonia, figures of bulls guarded the approach to a temple, house, or garden. They were believed to protect the building from the entrance of evil spirits, and were often represented with wings, to which, in the Assyrian period, a human face was added. Colossal figures of them in stone or metal, called *lamassi* (from the Sumerian *lamma*), were placed on either side of the entrance. At times they were represented on the gates or walls as goring the enemy. The Semitic Babylonians included them among the *šēdi* (Heb. *shēdîm*), or 'spirits,' partly beneficent, partly evil, with which the air was filled. Among the Sumerians, however, they had the specific name of *alad*. Ashurbanipal, in describing his destruction of Susa, states that he 'broke in pieces the *šēdi* (written *alad*), the colossal bulls (*lamassi*) which guarded the temple,' and 'removed the raging wild bulls that adorned the gates'; and in the legend of Chedorlaomer (?) we read that, when Bel determined to bring evil upon his temple at Babylon, 'its *šēdu*,' or guardian-bull, departed from it, and so allowed the Elamite to enter and destroy the sanctuary. The guardian-bulls were also known as *kirubi*, and corresponded with the cherubim which stood at the entrance to the Garden of Eden, protecting 'the way of the tree of life' (Gn 3^{24}). In a list of Bab. deities, the

names of 'the two divine bulls' of Ea of Eridu are given (*WAI* ii. 56, 59–60).

A bilingual hymn in Sumerian and Semitic (*ib.* iv. 23), addressed to 'the bull' who is 'the offspring of Zu,' the storm-god, describes it as 'the great bull, the supreme bull which treads the holy pasturage . . . planting the corn and making the field luxuriant.' 'Between his ears,' it is added, 'is the mouth of the deep,' or 'sea,' a great basin of water which stood in the court of a Bab. temple. As there is also a reference in the same hymn to 'the twelve gods of copper,' we are reminded of the 'sea' of Solomon's temple which 'stood upon twelve oxen' (1 K 7^{25}).

Among the Babylonians the bull symbolized strength, and hence was a synonym for 'hero'; it was probably on this account that the spirit which protected the gate was supposed to have a bull-like form. For the same reason Jahweh of Israel was compared to a wild bull (Nu 23^{22} 24^{8} etc.), and it is possible that the *abbîr* of the OT should be rendered 'bull' rather than 'mighty one.'

According to the Epic of Gilgamesh, Anu, the god of heaven, created a bull to avenge the insults offered by Gilgamesh to his daughter Ishtar, and to punish the hero by devastating his country and destroying his countrymen. The bull is called an *alû* (a word of Sumerian origin), and its horns are described as being of lapis lazuli, and of enormous size. The bull, however, was killed by Gilgamesh and his companion, in consequence of which, it would seem, Gilgamesh was afflicted with disease, while his companion suffered a premature death. The bull was really the constellation Taurus or the star Gud-ana, 'the bull of heaven'—a name which goes back to the age when the vernal equinox coincided with the entrance of the sun into Taurus. Jensen believes that it was a storm-god before being thus transplanted to the sky, and that a connexion was assumed between *alû*, 'the bull' and *alû* (Sumer. *alâ*), 'a storm-demon' (*Assyr.-bab. Mythen und Epen*, 1900, p. 452). The suggestion is supported by the fact that the bull is called the son of the storm-god (see above), and that it was a symbol of Hadad-Rimmon, the god of the air and the thunderbolt. Hadad is often depicted standing on the back of a bull. Hadad, however, was known in Babylonia as *Amurrû*, 'the Amorite god,' and it is therefore possible that his association with the bull was derived from Northern Syria. A recollection of the bull as a malevolent storm-deity may survive in the Mithraic representation of the sun-god slaying a bull.

In Northern Syria, where Hadad, the Cilician *Sandes*, was specially worshipped, the bull was his sacred animal. When the worship of the god under the name of *Juppiter Dolichenus* ('Juppiter of Dolichê') was transplanted to Rome, monuments were erected to him on which he is figured standing on a bull, with a double-headed battle-axe in one hand and a thunderbolt in the other. At Hierapolis (*Membij*), the successor of Carchemish, he was throned upon bulls as his consort was upon lions (Lucian, *de Dea Syria*, 31), and bulls were among the sacred animals kept in the court of the temple. On the stele of Esarhaddon found at Zinjerli he also stands upon a bull, and the same is the case in the rock-sculpture of Maltaiya (Place, Pl. 45) to the N.W. of Mosul. The earliest known representation of the god in a similar position is upon Babylonian seal-cylinders of the age of Hammurabi.

Further south the association of the bull with the supreme Baal can also be traced. Europa was carried from Phœnicia by Zeus, *i.e.* Baal, under the form of a bull; and the Cretan Minotaur was termed 'Asterius,' pointing to a belief in a connexion between the bull and the Phœnician *Ashtoreth*. Bulls of iron existed in the sanctuary of Zeus Atabyrius in Rhodes which may have owed their origin to Phœnician influence; and Silius Italicus (*Punica*, iii. 104 ff.) refers to the 'cornigera frons' of Milichus or Melkarth. The name (Ashtoreth-) *Karnaim* seems to imply the existence of a cow-headed Ashtoreth; and a cow is found on an early Bab. seal-cylinder as a symbol of Ishtar. A cow-goddess naturally presupposes a bull-god. On a Nabatæan monument a bull represents a god whom Sachau identifies with Kaẓiu or Kasios (*PSBA*, 1896, p. 1056).

According to Ex 32, a golden 'calf,' or more correctly a bull, was made by Aaron during the absence of Moses on Mount Sinai, and was worshipped by the Israelites as a visible representation of the God who had brought them out of Egypt. At a later date, Jeroboam set up images of bulls in the sanctuaries of the Northern Kingdom, where they were adored as likenesses or symbols of Jahweh. This Israelitish worship of bulls has been thought to have been derived from Egypt. But against this it is urged that the Egyptians worshipped the living animal, and not the image of it. The objection, however, is not convincing, since votive images of the Egyptian bulls Apis and Mnevis are numerous, and the Semitic equivalent of Egyptian beast-worship would have been image-worship. But the bull-worship of the Northern Kingdom was unknown in Judah, and it is therefore probable that it was derived from Northern Syria, Jahweh being identified with Hadad.

The bull-worship even of the Semites in Northern Syria was probably of foreign origin. The divine bulls of Babylonia were originally Sumerian, and the names applied to them by the Semitic Babylonians were borrowed from the Sumerian language. On the other hand, Hittite influence was strong in Northern Syria, and 'the bull-god' was one of the chief Hittite deities in whose honour images of bulls were dedicated. At Eyuk, near Boghaz Keui, a bull, mounted on a pedestal, is represented as being worshipped; and among the Phrygians the stealing of an ox was punished with death (Nic. Damascenus, 148, ed. Orelli). Asia Minor, in fact, was a land of cattle-breeding and agriculture, where the ox which drew the plough was held in special veneration. When an anthropomorphic conception of the deity was introduced from Babylonia, the human god accompanied by the animal took the place of the animal alone as an object of worship. The cuneiform tablets from the Assyro-Babylonian colonies near Kaisariyeh show that this must be dated at latest in the Hammurabi age.

It would thus appear probable that Northern Syria was the meeting-place of a twofold Sumerian conception of the bull: as a beneficent guardian of the homestead, and a malevolent storm-demon—derived in the one instance from the character of the domesticated animal, and in the other from that of the wild bull—and the Hittite worship of the bull-god as the protector of the cultivated land. Sumerian beliefs in regard to the bull were adopted by the Semitic Babylonians, and the association of the bull with the Syrian Hadad would have been the result of foreign influences. Bull-worship, in short, would seem to have been unknown to the early Semites, as indeed must necessarily have been the case if their primitive home was Arabia. It is significant that the Heb. word for 'wild bull' is borrowed from Babylonian, and is not found, at all events in that sense, in Arabic. The custom of hanging up *bucrania*, or ox-heads, above the doors of houses, moreover, was not Semitic. It was derived from the belief in the protecting powers of the divine bull, and, like the Bab. *lamassi*, of

which they were a survival, the *bucrania* prevented the entrance of evil spirits into a house, as a horse-shoe is still supposed to do in certain parts of England. The custom was naturally prevalent throughout Asia Minor, and the bull's head frequently makes its appearance on Cyprian seal-cylinders of the early Copper Age. The custom was also known to the Nubian settlers in Egypt in the time of the XIIth and following dynasties, from whom the usage, described by Herodotus (ii. 39), of making an ox-head a scapegoat, may have been derived (see also Dt 21^{4-6}). In Arabia and Palestine the apotropæic use of the *bucranium* was practically unknown.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the authorities cited above, see Baudissin, *Studien zur sem. Religionsgesch.*, Leipzig, 1876, i.; Sayce, *Hibbert Lectures*, London, 1891, pp. 289–93.

A. H. SAYCE.

BULL (Teutonic).—Plutarch in his life of Marius (cap. 23) states that the Cimbri took with them on their expedition into Italy a brazen bull, on which they were accustomed to swear solemn oaths. Apart from this, there is little evidence for the sacred character of cattle among the Teutonic races, beyond the fact that they were used for sacrifice. A primitive cult of the cow would appear to be reflected in the Edda account of the creation of the world, where the cow Audhumbla exists before either gods or men, and plays an important part in their origin. There is, moreover, in the saga of Olaf Trygvason, a curious legend, which relates that a certain Ogwald worshipped a cow, which he took everywhere with him, and which at his death was buried beside him in a second cairn. The only addition to these vague indications is the statement of Tacitus (*Germania*, 40), that the sacred car of the goddess Herthus was drawn by yoked cows; and it may be noted that in the Middle Ages oxen drew the chariots of the Merovingian kings.

C. J. GASKELL.

BULL-ROARER.—'Bull-roarer' is the English name (Germ. *Schwirrholz*) of a common toy in the country districts of Great Britain and the Continent. It is merely a thin slat of wood, with a hole for the insertion of a string, and is usually either oval or oblong in shape and pointed at the extremities; sometimes the edges are serrated. Tied to a string, and the string firmly held, the bull-roarer is swung round, and produces a kind of muffled roar. The mystic or magical connexions of the bull-roarer in Europe will be noticed later; we must first consider its very important part in the religion of the most backward races. It has been most carefully studied among the aborigines of Australia, and its uses are analyzed by Père P. W. Schmidt in his paper 'Die Stellung der Aranda' (Arunta), in *ZE*, 1908, Heft 6.

Beginning with the Arunta, in the exact centre of Australia, we find a people who, in one region described by Spencer and Gillen, have no conception of a sky-dwelling superior being, or 'All-Father'; while in the area studied by Strehlow the sky is understood to be tenanted by a magnified man, Altjira, called *mara* ('good'), but as indifferent to mankind as they are to him. In this tribe, as in most others where initiations of the boys exist, the bull-roarer is swung by the men at the secret ceremonies; the noise warns the women to keep at a distance, and they are told that the roar is the voice of a being named Twanyirika. The long absence of the boys while their wounds are healing is explained by the circumstance that Twanyirika 'enters the body of the boy after the operation and takes him away into the bush until he is better.'* The operation over, the boy is shown the bull-roarers (always carefully concealed from women), and his elder brother comes to him with a bundle of Churinga, saying, 'Here is Twanyirika, of whom you have heard so much, they are Churinga [sacred things] and will help to heal you quickly.' The boy is told that women of his tribal kin will be slain if he lets them see the bull-roarers.*

So far, Twanyirika seems to be a mere bogle, in whom the initiated do not believe. Among the tribe next to the north of the Arunta, the Unmatjera, the boy is told, before being circumcised, that Twanyirika will carry him away if he reveals any of the secrets of initiation.† After the process of sub-incision he is told to swing the bull-roarer, while in the bush, or else another *arakurta* (youth circumcised, but not yet sub-incised), '*who lives up in the sky*, will come down and carry him away. If this *arakurta* hears the *luringa*—that is, the noise of the bull-roarer—he says, "That is all right," and will not harm him.'‡

This idea of a sky-dwelling being, concerned with the initiations, is not found among Spencer's branch of the Arunta; the being of the Unmatjera is not an All-Father; nor are the Unmatjera known to have any belief in an All-Father. This notion of a sky-dweller, however, forms a link with the belief of the Loritja or Luritcha tribe, whose lands march with those of the Arunta on the east. They believe in a celestial and powerful being, Tukura, who has no concern with ethics or any interest in men, but does perform ceremonies like those of the tribe, involving the use of the bull-roarer, and the initiation of celestial young men. Tukura is known to the women, as is Altjira, the sky-dweller of Strehlow's Arunta, or Aranda; but Altjira does nothing but hunt, eat, and amuse himself. Among the Loritja, beings named Maiutu play the part of Twanyirika; one cuts off the heads of the boys, sticks them on again, and is slain; another receives food from the boys. He has a sharp-pointed leg-bone, like Daramulun among the Wiradjuri of the south-east, and Daramulun is, with them, the being of the bull-roarer, but subordinate to the sky-dweller, or All-Father, the ethical Baiame.§

North of the Arunta are the Kaitish tribe, who are but half-converts to Arunta ideas. They believe in an All-Father, Atnatu, who 'arose up in the sky in the very far back past, . . . made himself, and gave himself his name.' Before the Alcheringa (*q.v.*) he drove some disobedient sons out of heaven to earth, whence he dropped down 'everything which the black-fellow has,' including bull-roarers. These sons are the ancestors of half the tribe. Two *churinga* (bull-roarers), dropped by Atnatu, became men, who, making wooden bull-roarers, imitated the sound of Atnatu's bull-roarer in the heavens, that is, obviously, thunder. They were named Tumana; they died an ill death; but now the women (who know not Atnatu) believe that Tumana plays the part of Twanyirika among the Arunta. Atnatu himself is an All-Father, insisting on ceremonies and bull-roarers, but unconnected with morals.‖

The Warramunga have no Atnatu, as far as is known; their bull-roaring being is Murtu. Murtu, like the Tumana, was killed by a dog, which could not destroy the bull-roarer, *murtu-murtu*. The spirit of *murtu-murtu* instantly sprang up in certain trees, of whose wood bull-roarers are made.¶

The N. by E. Binbinga and Anula have, or teach to the women, similar beliefs; the bull-roarer is *watamura* or *mura-mura*; the beings connected with it are Katajalina and Gnabaia. The women are told that these beings swallow the boys, and disgorge them, re-born, as initiated men. This

* Spencer-Gillen[a], 246, note 1.

* Spencer-Gillen[b], 497. † *Ib.* 388. ‡ *Ib.* 343.
§ Strehlow, *Die Aranda und Loritja Stämme*, pt. i. (1907) p. 1 *f.*; pt. ii. (1908) pp. 1, 2, 48, 49.
‖ Spencer-Gillen[b], 498 ff. ¶ *Ib.* 270–352.

form of the exoteric myth is very common, occurring even among the tribes of the south-east.*

The S.E. tribes had not the spiritual philosophy of the central and northern communities. In that philosophy primal souls are perpetually re-incarnated, or in some regions spirits, *ratapa*, emanating from the primal totemic beings, are incarnated, and, after one earthly life, retire to the isle of the dead, and are finally annihilated.† There is thus no place of rewards and punishments for souls, while the evolutionary theory (see ALCHERINGA) makes a creative being superfluous, though, as Atnatu, he survives among the Kaitish.

The S.E. tribes in parts of Queensland, and in Victoria and New South Wales, had not the spiritual and evolutionary philosophy of the northern tribes, or among them it was not dominant, and they believed in a great sky-dwelling anthropomorphic being, the maker of most things, ethical, and the source of customary laws, who gives his sanction to morals, and is invoked at the initiatory rites, where a temporary image of him is made. Like Atnatu, he is unknown to the women and children. The thunder is his voice, and the bull-roarer, imitating the thunder, is sacred. Like the central and northern tribes, those of the south-east inculcate the belief in a being closely connected with the bull-roarer, but this being is taken more seriously than in the north and centre. He is the son, or 'boy,' practically the deputy, of the superior being, the All-Father. Among the Kurnai he is Tundun (which is also the name of the bull-roarer); among the Euahlayi and Kamilaroi he is Gayandi, under Baiame; among the Wiradjuri he is Daramulun, under Baiame; but among the Yuin, Daramulun is himself the All-Father.

The functions of the bull-roarer being, with the exoteric myth that he swallows the boys and disgorges them, are practically identical with the functions of Twanyirika and Tumana and the rest in the centre and north. The Wiradjuri Daramulun, like the Maiutu of the Loritja, has a leg which ends in a sharp bone.‡ Among seven of these tribes a larger (male) and a smaller (female) bull-roarer are used: among the Kurnai the larger represents Tundun, father of the race, the smaller represents his wife; but the distinction of sex is not said to exist among the Chepara and Turbal;§ with the Chepara the small bull-roarers given to the initiates are only tokens of initiation. Mr. Howitt thinks, 'but could not be sure,' that the female bull-roarer among the Kurnai indicates ceremonies in which the women take a certain part;‖ the Parnkalla also use a larger and a smaller bull-roarer; nothing is said of their sex.¶ Among the Wiradjuri the bull-roarer (*mudjigang* or *bobu*) does not, as among the Kurnai, bear the name of the bull-roarer being, *Daramulun*. 'There is an absence in the western tribes of a belief in an anthropomorphic Being by whom the ceremonies were first instituted.'** These western tribes conform to the ideas of the Dieri, who have no known All-Father, but believe in a multitude of *Muramura*—fabulous primal beings like those of the Arunta Alcheringa. Among them only bull-roarers marked with notches indicating their use at ceremonies are sacred; others are made a joke of.†† Practically they have not been consecrated. 'Changes in custom,' according to Howitt and Spencer-Gillen, 'have been slowly passing down from north to south,' from the Arunta and Dieri to the sea at Port Lincoln, among the western tribes. The ideas of Alcheringa and evolution appear to be northern and western; the All-Father belief is southern and eastern.

Père Schmidt, who finds the bull-roarers of sex in the reports of R. H. Matthews* among the Wiradjuri and other tribes (where Howitt found nothing about sex), and of Strehlow, in connexion with the maternal totem, has a theory that the large bull-roarer represents Twanyirika, Maiutu, etc., as fathers of the race, the small their wives as the mothers of the race,† and connects this with the sun and moon myths, and a period of so-called 'matriarchate' among tribes now reckoning descent in the male line, also with the 'sex totems' (animal friends of either sex) of the Kurnai and many other Australian tribes. There is also a theory of Papuan invasions, but the whole hypothesis cannot here be criticized.‡

The bull-roarer is in general use, among the central tribes, for magical purposes, and the spiritual element of their philosophy, as regards conception, is involved, especially in connexion with the stone *churinga nanja* of the Arunta nation, which are often, but not always, shaped like bull-roarers. Elsewhere these stone *churinga*, with totemic markings, are not found in use among the Australians.

Marett has advanced the opinion that 'the prototype' of the All-Fathers 'is nothing more or less than' the bull-roarer. 'Its thunderous booming must have been eminently awe-inspiring to the first inventors, or rather discoverers, of the instrument, and would not unnaturally provoke the "animatistic" attribution of life and power to it . . . a genuine Religion . . . has sprung up out of the Awe inspired by the bull-roarer.'§

But, as we have seen, there are, even in Australia, plenty of bull-roarers where there is no All-Father. Among the Arunta, Altjira has nothing to do with the bull-roarer, nor has Ulthaana, another sky-dwelling being of the Arunta.‖ It is usually not the All Father, but his 'boy,' as Tundun, who manages the bull-roarer. Moreover, it is thunder, not the bull-roarer, which very naturally inspires awe; it is the voice of the All-Father; the bull-roarer only represents that voice. Finally, the All-Father is found all over the world, in places where the bull-roarer is unknown.

The bull-roarer is of more importance in Australian religion, myth, and ritual than elsewhere. Its use at the Greek mysteries of Dionysus was explained by the story that it was a toy of the child-god.¶ Two or three bone bull-roarers of palæolithic times have been discovered and published. Like those of the north and central Australian tribes, they are decorated with incised concentric circles or half-circles. Thus palæolithic man may have had a religion akin to that of the Australians.

Bull-roarers in connexion with religion or magic are found in South and West Africa; among the Apache and Navaho Indians of North America, and the Koskimo of British Columbia,** where the

* Spencer-Gillen b, 501.
† Spencer Gillen, and Strehlow, *ut supra*.
‡ Howitt, 585. § *Ib.* pp. 578, 582, 596.
‖ *Ib.* 628. ¶ *Ib.* 668–670. ** *Ib.* 677. †† *Ib.* 660.

* *Ethnological Notes of the Tribes of N.S. Wales and Victoria*, p. 153 f.
† Schmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 893, 901.
‡ Schmidt, 'L'Origine de l'idée de Dieu,' in *Anthropos*, 1909, pt. i.
§ *Threshold of Religion*, 1909, pp. 17–19.
‖ Strehlow, i. 1 f.; Gillen, *Horn Expedition*, iv. 183.
¶ Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, i. 700.
** To these tribes may be added the Eskimo, Kwakiutl, Arapaho, Ute, Central Californians, Pueblo, and the ancient cliff-dwellers. 'The Hopi, who regard the bull-roarer as a prayer-stick of the thunder, and its whizzing noise as representing the wind that accompanies thunderstorms, make the tablet portion from a piece of lightning-riven wood. . . . The Navaho make the bull-roarer of the same material, but regard it as representing the voice of the thunder-bird, whose figure they often paint upon it. . . . Apache, Hopi, and Zuñi bull-roarers bear lightning symbols; and while in the semi-arid region the implement is used to invoke clouds, lightning, and rain, and to warn the initiated that rites are being performed, in the humid

bull-roarer being, as in Australia, is said to carry away the young initiate. This fable is, of course, intended merely for the women and children; the boys, when initiated, discover the absurdity of the figment. Central Brazil, New Guinea, the Torres Islands, Florida in the Melanesian group, the North-West Solomon Islands, and Sumatra are all familiar with the bull-roarer.* For modern Europe, as well as for the lower culture, see A. C. Haddon, *The Study of Man*, pp. 277–327, and *GB*[2] iii. 424. In Aberdeenshire the cow-herd boys used to swing the bull-roarer as a charm against thunder.

The most astonishing parallel to the Kaitish story of a bull-roarer dropped from heaven to earth by Atnatu occurs in the following note of the present writer, which, fortunately, is dated: 'Bull-roarer in Cantyre' (Argyll) "*Srannan*, pronounced *Strantham*, the first in this quarter fell from Juppiter." Macalister, October 20, 1885.' Mr. Macalister was a Gaelic-speaking schoolmaster at St. Mary's Loch, in the parish of Yarrow, Selkirkshire, and was an aged man in 1885, full of vigour and intelligence. The parallel myth of the Kaitish was not published till 1904. For a drawing of a Maori bull-roarer, in the Christy Museum, and for an early study of the subject, see 'The Bull-Roarer' in Lang's *Custom and Myth*, pp. 29–44 (1884 and later editions). For the use of *jurapari* pipes in Brazil, to scare away the women from the rites of the men, see A. R. Wallace, *Travels on the Amazon*, 1853, p. 349.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given throughout the article. A. LANG.

BULLS AND BRIEFS.—Under this heading may be conveniently considered not only those documents of the Papal chancery which are technically so designated, but also the various other classes of 'apostolic letters' which in comparatively modern times have been increasingly employed by the Roman Pontiffs in their most important utterances. For this wider interpretation of the name 'bulls' there is excellent authority. Both bulls and briefs are in their essence Papal letters, and the *quasi*-official collection known as the *Bullarium Romanum* includes Encyclicals, Motu Proprios, and other similar constitutions which possess just the same force, as sources of the Canon Law, as the bulls, briefs, and decretals which we should primarily expect to find there (see the prefatory letter prefixed to vol. i. of the *Bullarium* of Benedict XIV.). For the same reason any calendar of Papal *Urkunden*, such as the important *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum* (from the beginning to 1198) of Jaffé-Löwenfeld (continued to 1304 by Potthast), might be correctly described as an abstract of the letter-books of the Holy See; and in point of fact the first authentic document which Jaffé has summarized, or in other words the first Papal bull, in the wider sense, of which the text is preserved to us, is the famous letter addressed by Pope Clement I. (Clemens Romanus) to the Church of Corinth. This, and two other letters of the time of Pope Cornelius, form the only complete specimens we possess of the official correspondence of the Popes down to the middle of the 4th century.

1. **Early Papal letters.**—Beginning, however, with the time of Pope Julius I. (337–352), a much larger collection of documents becomes available. This fact alone lends a certain probability to the conjecture based upon the language of the *Liber Pontificalis* (i. 205, ed. Duchesne), that a reorganization of the Papal archives took place under this pontificate. We hear of a body of officials (*schola notariorum*) and of a responsible director (*primicerius*), while only a few years later an inscription of Pope Damasus seems to speak of the construction of a special *archivium*, later called the *scrinium* (see de Rossi, 'La Bibliotheca della Sede Apostolica,' in *Studi di Storia e Diritto*, v. 340).

The natural result of the official registration of documents which all this organization seems to imply must have been to create by degrees a recognized Pontifical chancery, and to establish the use of traditional forms and customs with regard to the drafting, dating, and expediting of Papal letters, which we find fully developed at a later period. Down to the time of Hadrian I. (772–795) our knowledge of these forms is somewhat vague, and in no case founded upon the original documents themselves. For the most part the texts of which we have copies are of an epistolary or hortatory character, often mere extracts, in which addresses, salutations, and subscriptions are naturally little regarded. The earliest Papal writings known to us which have any claim to be regarded as legal instruments date from the beginning of the 5th cent., and were addressed by Pope Zosimus to the Bishops of Arles (see Mansi, *Concilia*, iv. 359; and H. J. Schmitz in *Histor. Jarhb.* xii. [1891] 1 ff.; but cf. Nostiz-Rieneck, *ZKT* xxi. [1897] 6 ff.). Still, the number of Papal letters of earlier date than the year 772, preserved to us in whole or in part, amounts in round numbers to nearly 2400, and in some cases, notably in that of Pope Gregory the Great, we can argue back to the arrangement of these letters in the *Regesta*, or letter-books, from which they have ultimately been copied. Even from an early period it seems that the Papal chancery was carefully organized, for already in the time of Gelasius I. (492–496) we find traces of the numbering of the letters in the *Regesta*, and we know that the *primicerius notariorum*, or head of the chancery, was one of the most important officials in the Roman Church. He was the Pope's counsellor (*consiliarius*), by which name he is sometimes designated, and during the vacancy of the See he exercised for the time being a supreme authority in conjunction with the archpriest and the archdeacon. We have also reason to believe that the *secundicerius*, or second in command, was regarded as holding an important post of trust.

As regards the drafting of the documents of this early period, it seems clear that they were all modelled on the type of an ordinary Roman letter. Like a Roman letter, the missive is preceded by an *intitulatio*, or formal naming of the writer, and an *inscriptio*, or naming of the addressee, this last being often coupled with a form of salutation. Thus: 'Leo Episcopus, Presbyteris et Diaconibus Ecclesiae Alexandrinae, dilectissimis filiis, in Domino Salutem.' In many cases, however, the *inscriptio* precedes the *intitulatio*, as, for example, 'Gloriosissimo et clementissimo Filio Justiniano Augusto, Vigilius Episcopus.' Gregory the Great seems to have been the first to employ habitually the formula 'servus servorum Dei' in the *intitulatio* of his letters, but this style was not at once adopted by his successors. It seems, however, to have gradually won its way back into favour, and in the Papal letters of the 8th cent. it is rarely omitted. The salutation, which was by no means always appended to the *inscriptio*, takes different forms. In the earlier letters we find simply

area it is used to implore the wind to bring fair weather. The bull-roarer is a sacred implement, associated with rain, wind, and lightning, and among the Kwakiutl, according to Boas, with ghosts' (Hough in *Handbook of Amer. Indians*, i. [= *Bulletin 30 BE*] 170 f., where further literature is given). From these American examples it appears that the bull-roarer is rather a magical instrument than a thing associated with the religious idea of a Lord of Thunder, as among certain Australian tribes.

* Frazer, *GB*[2] iii. 424. Note 1 contains a list of authorities.

'salutem'; under Julius I. (337–352), 'in Domino salutem,' and, later on, other amplifications. Pope Adeodatus (672–676) adopted the form 'salutem a Deo et benedictionem nostram,' and this perhaps paved the way for the existing usage 'salutem et apostolicam benedictionem.' At the close of the Papal letter was appended, first, the *subscriptio papae*, and, secondly, the date. The *subscriptio papae* did not take the form of what we should now call a signature, *i.e.* the writing of the Pope's own name, but consisted simply of a word of blessing and farewell. For example, 'Deus te incolumem custodiat, frater carissime,' or, more commonly, 'Bene vale, frater carissime'; but from the 7th cent. onwards the Papal missives of a more formal and legal character rarely had any other subscription than the simple 'Bene vale,' or 'Bene valete.' As for the date, which comes last of all, it was probably never omitted in the originals, though it is so often lacking in the copies which have been preserved to us. Down to the end of the 5th cent. we usually find only the day of the month and the names of the consuls, *e.g.* 'Data tertio idus Februarias, Arcadio et Bautone consulibus'; but from about 490 onwards the year of the indiction is, at first sometimes, and later on invariably, added. With regard to the body of the document, it is easy, especially with the aid of the numerous extant letters of St. Gregory the Great, to recognize the gradual introduction of certain traditional forms and phrases. The occurrence in our copies of such abbreviations as 'secundum morem,' or 'de more solito,' implies the same, and in the so-called *Liber Diurnus* a collection of Papal formularies is preserved to us, the earliest portion of which is believed to have been compiled shortly after St. Gregory's time. We meet also in these early letters, particularly from the time of Leo I. (440–461), a certain rhythmical cadence known as the *cursus*, which, after falling into abeyance for a long period, re-appears at the end of the 11th cent. (see Duchesne, 'Note sur l'Origine du *Cursus*,' in the *Bib. de l'École des Chartes*, vol. l. p. 162), and was then maintained until near the close of the Middle Ages. Finally, the document was probably written on papyrus, and had attached to it a cord, with a leaden seal, the *bulla*. As already stated, no original deeds of this period remain to us, but we have the leaden seals which must once have been attached to letters of Pope John III. (560–573), of Deusdedit (615–618), and others. These *bullae* are about an inch in diameter, and bear on one side the Pope's name in the genitive, and on the other the word PAPAE. It is, of course, from this feature that the Papal letters themselves have come to be called 'bulls'; but this designation is not used officially in any early document. The Popes speak of their own letters, or of those of their predecessors, as *litterae*, *epistola*, *pagina*, *scriptum*, or, less generally, as *privilegium*, *praeceptum*, or *auctoritas*.

2. **From 772 to 1048.**—With the accession of Hadrian I. it is convenient to begin a new period in the history of the Papal chancery, and this for two reasons: first, because the earliest specimen of an original bull—even then a mere fragment, seemingly of a letter on papyrus addressed to Charlemagne—belongs to this pontificate; secondly, because some re-organization of the chancery must have occurred at this time, the result probably of the improved political status of the Holy See, now strong in the support of Pepin and his son. Already we may begin to trace that broad division of Papal documents into two categories (see Schmitz-Kallenberg, 'Papsturkunden,' in Meister's *Grundriss*, i. 198), which is practically perpetuated in the popular locution of 'bulls and briefs,' though, perhaps, for these earlier periods it is better to retain the terminology of Bresslau, Diekamp, and Léopold Delisle, and to speak of 'privileges' and 'letters.' The latter class were, as the name imports, simply letters. They were written on sheets of papyrus of smaller size, and elaborate formulas of dating were dispensed with. Their purpose was ephemeral, and as a result the originals have almost completely disappeared, only one entire specimen (of the time of Clement II. [1046–1047]) being preserved to us. Of 'privileges,' however, though these must have been far more rarely issued, a comparatively large number of originals remain, their preservation being the natural result of the fact that they commonly conferred or confirmed a title in matters either of property or of jurisdiction. A catalogue of these early Papal documents on papyrus, twenty-three in number, has been given by H. Omont in the *Bib. de l'École des Chartes*, 1904 (cf. also Melampo in *Miscellanea di Storia e Cultura Ecclesiastica*, 1905–1907). Concerning these more formal 'privileges,' therefore, to which it is usual to give the names of bulls, we are fully informed, and their peculiarities have often been described. They are made of broad strips of papyrus, and the whole document is sometimes as much as 10 ft. long and from 18 to 24 in. broad. A wide margin is left at the top; then follows in large writing the *intitulatio* and *inscriptio*, with the formula 'in perpetuum.' The body of the document comes next in a smaller hand, and beneath it the so-called 'double date.' This consists of two distinct entries, of which the one seemingly has reference to the engrossing of the instrument, for it begins with the words 'scriptum per manus N.N.,' with the day of the month and the indiction, the other concerned with its final expedition or delivery, and expressed in the words 'Data' or 'Datum,' with month and day and fuller details of the year, 'per manum N.N.' Between these comes the *subscriptio papae*, which takes the form of the words †BENE VALETE† generally written in two lines in uncial letters with a cross preceding and another cross or SS (*subscripsi*) following. That this was at first written by the Pope's own hand is rendered probable by the fact, first, that the hand of the BENE VALETE always differs from that of the body of the document and of the dates; and, secondly, that in the cases in which we possess more than one original bull of the same Pontiff, the identity of the characters of the BENE VALETE seems well established. Further, in certain 'privileges' of Pope Silvester II. (999–1003) we find invariably added to the BENE VALETE a few words in the so-called 'Tironian notes' or short-hand, for example, 'Silvester Gerbertus Romanus episcopus subscripsi,' or 'Gerbertus qui et Silvester episcopus' (see Ewald in *Neues Archiv*, ix. 321 ff.). Still it would seem that already in the time of Clement II. (1046–1047) the practice was being given up, and that the Pope henceforth was usually content with marking a cross or other private signs beside the BENE VALETE already written there by the engrosser. Finally, the *bulla*, or leaden seal, was attached to the document, strings of hemp or silk being passed through the lower margin of the papyrus, which was folded once or twice to give greater strength, while the seal was impressed upon these strings. Down to the end of the 11th cent. the *bullae* bore nothing more than the name of the Pope on one side and the word 'papae' on the other, though the arrangement of the letters, complicated with certain crosses and dots, varied considerably. At this period also, as we may often learn from the details given in the second (or 'delivery') date of the 'privileges' just described, the chief position

in the Papal chancery was taken by an official known as the *bibliothecarius sanctae apostolicae sedis*, who no doubt was originally no more than the custodian of the archives. By degrees, however, he seems to have taken over the functions of the *primicerius notariorum*. He was generally a bishop, and soon we find him commonly invested with the title *cancellarius*. As an illustration of the kind of details given in the second dating clause, the following specimen taken from a bull of Silvester II. of the year 999 may be worth quoting:

'Data VIIII Kl. decemb. per manum Johannis, episcopi sancte Albanensis ecclesie et bibliothecarii sancte apostolice sedis, anno pontificatus domini nostri Silvestri secundi pape primo, imperante domino nostro tertio Ottone, a Deo coronato, magno et pacifico imperatore, anno quarto, in mense et indictione suprascriptis.'

Although the year of the Incarnation is not here mentioned, it is to be met with occasionally in Papal documents somewhat earlier than this. Details of this kind, which are often of great critical importance, will be found noted at the head of each pontificate in Jaffe-Löwenfeld's *Regesta* and in Mas Latrie's *Trésor de Chronologie*, 1889, pp. 1035–1148.

3. From 1048 to 1198.—After the accession of Leo IX. in 1048, the more stable traditions of the Papal chancery seem to have given place to a period of very rapid development. There was at first a good deal of chopping and changing in the forms observed, but after the lapse of about a century we find a pretty general uniformity of usage in documents of the same nature. In any case the broad distinction between 'privileges' and 'letters' still held good, though these great groups themselves have now to be divided into classes, each with characteristics of its own. To begin with the more formal and elaborate documents (the 'privileges'), the era of Leo IX. seems to have introduced the general use of parchment in place of papyrus, and possibly as a consequence of this, the employment of minuscule instead of 'Lombardic' writing; but there were also other changes which may be said to have transformed the external features of the great bulls and to have lasted down to the present day. The *subscriptio papae* ceases to consist in the writing of the words BENE VALETE, this being now represented by a monogram followed by three dots and a huge comma (see, upon this, Pflugk-Harttung in *Mittheil. Inst. Oest. Gesch.* v. [1884] 434 ff.). The comma and dots, which appear but for a short period, probably stood for 'subscripsi.' In place of the BENE VALETE, the Pope's sign manual now took the form of a 'rota' drawn in the blank space below the centre of the document, but a little to the left. The 'rota,' or wheel, derives its name from the two concentric circles, from 2 to 5 in. in diameter, inside which a cross was drawn, with the words 'scs petrus scs paulus' and the Pope's name arranged thus:

SCS	SCS
PETRVS	PAVLVS
PASCHA	LIS
PP	II

Between the concentric circles was written the Pope's motto—usually a brief text from the Psalms. That of Paschal II., for example, was 'Verbo Domini coeli firmati sunt.' Before the first word a rude cross is marked, and this at least is believed to have been done by the Pope's own hand. Between the 'rota' thus drawn to the left and the BENE VALETE monogram standing parallel to it a little to the right, the Pope's name was engrossed in the following or some similar form: 'Ego Paschalis Catholicae Ecclesiae Episcopus subscripsi.' At a somewhat later time the attestations of a certain number of Cardinals present were also written below the name of the Pope in three columns, consisting respectively of Cardinal Bishops, Cardinal Priests, and Cardinal Deacons. We may say that the 'rota' and B.V. monogram, which appear first in the time of Leo IX. and which with slight variations have lasted down to the present day, still constitute the most striking external feature of the most solemn kinds of bulls. Of the other changes connected with this period it is only needful to notice that the *Scriptum* clause, *i.e.* the date of the engrossing, disappears from all Papal documents, and that the leaden *bulla*, which was, as a rule, appended alike to 'privileges' and 'letters,' assumed under Pope Paschal II. (1099–1107) the type which it has retained ever since; that is to say, the obverse of the seal shows the busts of St. Peter and St. Paul facing each other—St. Peter to the spectator's right, St. Paul to the left, with a rude cross between them, while above their heads appear the letters S. PA. and S. PE. On the reverse we find the name of the reigning Pope in the nominative, *e.g.* 'Urbanus PP. III.' On both sides of the *bulla* are circles of dots, and there is some reason to believe that the exact number of these dots for any given pontificate was a point carefully attended to, and was meant to be used as a test of authenticity. There can be no doubt that, like the documents themselves, the leaden *bullae* appended to them were freely fabricated at a later date. Even in the British Museum *Catalogue of Seals* a number of these early *bullae* are entered (vol. vi., Nos. 21681–21698), without any indication of the fact that the examples so described are forgeries.

The tendency to reserve the more elaborate forms of authentication with 'rota,' monogram, and signatures, as above explained, for certain very solemn 'privileges' became accentuated even during this early period; and Schmitz-Kallenberg already distinguishes from them a class of 'simple privileges,' which, while of substantially the same nature as regards their inscription and contents, lack these and some other formalities. In the case of the 'letters' also, we may note two kinds, viz. the *litterae cum filo serico* (*i.e.* in which the *bulla* hangs by silken cords) and *litterae cum filo canapis* (in which hemp was employed). The authority just named also attributes to this period the first appearance of *litterae clausae*. This does not mean to say that ordinary Papal 'privileges' and 'letters' were sent to the recipient open, so that all men could read them, but only that their fastening, which seems to have been effected by the strings to which the *bulla* was attached, could be undone without mutilating the document. In the case, however, of the *litterae clausae* the parchment was so folded and the *bulla* so attached that nothing of the contents could be read without destroying the *bulla* as an authentication (see Diekamp in *Mittheil. Inst. Oest. Gesch.* iii. [1882] 865 ff.). It is possible that the use of waxen seals with the 'Fisherman's ring' may also date from this time (cf. Jaffe, *Regesta*, Nos. 5225 and 5242), but no specimen is now in existence.

4. From 1198 to modern times.—The pontificate of Innocent III. (1198–1216) marks an epoch of the highest importance in the history of the Papal chancery. From this time forward not only do the original documents exist in abundance, but the official *Regesta*, or letter-books, of which only a few fragments are known before this date, are preserved to us in an almost uninterrupted series. Furthermore, Innocent III., like the great organizer that he was, devoted special attention to this most important matter (*Nouveau Traité de Diplomatique*, vi. 168 ff.). He built new premises for the chancery, and it was no doubt due to his per-

sonal influence that a strict uniformity and an adherence to certain recognized rules are henceforth observable in all its instruments. With the greatly extended authority of the Holy See and its more frequent intervention in matters other than purely religious, the scope of the many Papal pronouncements seems to be widened. The distinguished canonist Alexander III. (1159–1181) by his *litterae decretales* (letters containing decisions of points of law submitted to him) had already built up a vast edifice of Case Law, which was soon to be published to the world by Pope Gregory IX. in the Book of the Decretals compiled under Pontifical direction by St. Raymond de Pennaforte (1234). The great mass of this material was furnished by the replies of Alexander III., Innocent III., and his two successors, Honorius III. and Gregory IX. himself; and the tone of the law-giver seems insensibly to become emphasized in all subsequent Papal utterances. Moreover, we now touch upon a period when such documents often seem to be addressed to all Christendom, and no longer consistently observe the form of letters directed to an individual or group of individuals. From this date the 'great privileges' with their 'rota' and B.V. monogram and their elaborate attestations of Cardinals become less numerous; while, on the other hand, only a few years later, under Innocent IV., we are for the first time confronted with that form of Papal document, technically and strictly known as a 'bull,' which is something intermediate between the formal 'privilege' and the simple 'letter.' In this, as in a 'privilege,' the first line is written in tall letters, but it ends not with the abbreviation IN PP. (*in perpetuum*), but with the phrase 'ad perpetuam rei memoriam,' or something equivalent, *e.g.* 'ad certitudinem perpetuam et memoriam futurorum.' There is often no mention of the person addressed; but the document concludes with certain minatory clauses, 'Nulli ergo,' etc., and 'Si quis,' etc., directed against all who may contravene what is therein laid down, ending, without any other subscription, in a simple date mentioning the place, the year of the Incarnation (but this was a later addition), and the year of the pontificate. To this document the ordinary leaden *bulla* was attached by silken cords. It was in this form that many important pronouncements were given to the world during the 13th and 14th cents., more particularly the manifestos of Boniface VIII., *e.g.* the *Ausculta fili* and the *Unam sanctam* which provoked so much resistance from their appeal to the authority of 'the two swords' and the consequent claim to far-reaching authority in temporal matters. As the initial words themselves of the bull *Ausculta fili*, directed to Philip IV. of France, would suffice to show, many of these utterances were still letters in form and addressed to individuals, but in their scope they appealed to Christendom at large.

In Innocent III.'s days some of these *quasi*-political documents took the form of 'privileges.' This was the case with the bull in which Innocent accepted and ratified the surrender by which king John made England a fief of the Holy See. But after the 14th cent. this more elaborate form of instrument—'consistorial bulls,' as they were called, from the fact that the attestations of the Cardinal Bishops, Cardinal Priests, and Cardinal Deacons were given in one of those assemblies of Cardinals in council with the Pope, known as 'Consistories'—became very unusual. It was confined, in fact, to concessions which called for special solemnity, to bulls of canonization, and to a few important constitutions such as the bull of Julius II. (18th July 1511), convoking the Fifth Lateran Council, or the confirmation of the Council of Trent by Pius IV. (26th Jan. 1564). By exception the bull conferring on Henry VIII. the title of 'Defender of the Faith' was made out in consistorial form and sealed with a golden *bulla*; but even such a document as the condemnation of the Pragmatic Sanction on 19th Dec. 1516, though decided upon in the Lateran Council itself, was executed in an ordinary bull; and it may in general be assumed that from the 14th cent. onwards, when the term 'bull' is used (as, for example, the 'bull of demarcation of Alexander VI.' determining the respective limits of the Portuguese and Spanish possessions in the Indies; the 'dispensation bull' for the marriage of Henry VIII. with his brother's widow; or the bull of Pius V. deposing Queen Elizabeth, etc.), the instrument so designated observed the following forms which for clearness' sake it will be well to recapitulate:

(1) The document begins with the Pope's name and 'servus servorum Dei' followed by a perpetuity clause or, less commonly in the case of a bull addressed to an individual, by the name of the addressee and salutation. Thus in the former case we have: 'Leo episcopus, servus servorum Dei, ad perpetuam rei memoriam'; or, in the latter: 'Leo episcopus, servus servorum Dei, dilecto filio suo N. salutem et apostolicam benedictionem.'—(2) The dating clause, which comes at the end of the whole, takes the following form and order: 'Datum Romae apud S. Petrum (or elsewhere) anno Incarnationis Dominicae MDCXX, quinto Kal. Mali, pontificatus nostri anno quinto.'—(3) To this was appended, by strings of silk or hemp, the *bulla* bearing the heads of SS. Peter and Paul, and on the other side the name of the reigning Pope.—(4) The document was engrossed upon thick parchment, in an archaic hand, which, after the modern Roman style of writing came into use, became very artificial and ungraceful, and was known as *scrittura bollatica*. During the 17th cent. this writing and its contractions became so unfamiliar that it was customary to issue a *transsumptum*, or copy in ordinary handwriting, along with the official document.—(5) After the substance of the bull, and before the dating clause, we commonly find inserted certain imprecatory clauses: 'Nulli ergo,' etc., and 'Si quis autem,' etc., though this rule was not invariable. It may be well to set down the precise form which these clauses ordinarily take: 'Nulli ergo omnino hominum liceat hanc paginam nostrae concessionis infringere vel ei ausu temerario contraire. Si quis autem hoc attemptare presumpserit, indignationem omnipotentis Dei et beatorum Petri et Pauli, apostolorum ejus, se noverit incursurum.' Sometimes these imprecatory clauses are further followed by directions as to the execution and publication of the bull, or again by clauses of derogation, beginning: 'Non obstantibus constitutionibus et ordinationibus apostolicis, privilegiis quoque et indultis,' etc.

Some of the distinctions here indicated, notably the presence or omission of the imprecatory clauses, correspond with a distinction in the bulls themselves, which in the 13th and subsequent centuries are commonly classified as either *tituli* or *mandamenta*. The *tituli* were for the most part acts of grace (*indulgentiae*), concessions of privileges, confirmations, decisions of points of doctrine or law, etc. On the other hand, the *mandamenta* represented the ordinary correspondence of the Holy See. They were orders of the Pope, commissions to conduct an inquiry or to reform abuses, letters written to communicate some important intelligence, or to invite the co-operation of temporal sovereigns, or to prescribe a line of conduct for clergy or laity. Their tenor nearly always includes the formula 'per apostolica scripta mandamus,' or 'precipiendo mandamus'—a phrase for which the words 'rogamus,' 'exhortamur,' 'monemus' are sometimes substituted. Of these two classes the *tituli*, though of less interest to the student of history, were the more solemn in form, the imprecatory clauses being rarely omitted. The writing was elegant, and carefully executed according to certain strict rules, while the *bulla* was attached with cords of red and yellow silk. On the other hand, the *mandamenta* showed both in substance and form that they were intended to serve a more temporary purpose. The writing was in a more flowing hand, less ornate and less carefully executed, the imprecatory clauses were generally omitted, and the *bulla* was attached with cords of hemp. Throughout we recognize the tendency to simplify and to make the issue of bulls, especially

those of an administrative nature, more expeditious. But though the formalities observed in the preparation of a *mandamentum* of the 14th cent. fell far short of what was needed for a consistorial bull, still even in the former the endorsements of the various officials of the chancery, mostly entered upon the *plica*, or fold of the parchment, show that it must have passed through a large number of different hands—*abbreviatores*, *scriptores*, *registratores*, and finally the department of the *bullatores*, who affixed the seal (see Baumgarten, *Aus Kanzlei und Kammer*, Freiburg, 1907). No wonder we find that under the pontificate of Eugenius IV. (1431) a new form of Papal letter of a more summary kind was instituted by the Holy See, and that henceforth this was commonly employed in all matters requiring despatch.

This was known as a 'brief,' and it soon almost entirely took the place of the earlier *mandamentum*. A brief was a document written upon fine vellum, and sealed, not with a leaden *bulla*, but with a wax seal bearing the imprint of the 'Fisherman's ring.' It was written in a fine cursive Roman hand, and at the head occurs simply the Pope's name standing by itself thus:

EUGENIUS PP. IIII.

Immediately below this, the Pope greets the addressee in the vocative, according to his rank and condition, *e.g.* 'Dilecte fili,' or 'Carissime in Christo fili,' or 'Venerabilis pater in Domino,' etc., with the salutation 'salutem et apostolicam benedictionem.' In constitutions of a more solemn and permanent character we often find, instead of this greeting, the formula, also already long familiar in bulls, 'ad perpetuam rei memoriam.' Another distinctive feature of briefs is the final clause expressing the date. It almost invariably takes this form: 'Datum Romae apud Sanctum Petrum, sub annulo Piscatoris, die IX Novembris MDXCII pont. nri. anno primo.' In contradistinction to the dating of bulls, which generally, though not invariably, at any rate down to the pontificate of Innocent XII., is to be referred to the years of the Incarnation, beginning 25th March, the years are here to be understood as those of the Nativity. Beneath the date the name of the Cardinal Secretary of Briefs is usually written as an attestation of authenticity.

With regard to the form of instrument chosen, let us note that this has little to do with the importance or binding force of any Papal pronouncement. The decretals, upon which the fabric of Canon Law was largely built up, almost invariably took the form of lesser bulls, *i.e.* simple letters or *mandamenta*. The first known *Bulla in Coena Domini*, containing the 'Reserved Cases' of the Holy See, issued by Urban V. in 1364, was a *mandamentum*. No doubt there was at times a very natural wish to impart some extraneous solemnity to documents of dogmatic importance. For example, the constitution of Benedict XII., beginning 'Benedictus Deus' (29th Jan. 1336)—which decides a controversy regarding the Beatific Vision, and contains the notable formula, 'Hac in perpetuum valitura constitutione auctoritate apostolica definimus'—was issued as a *titulus* with imprecatory clauses. The dispensation for the marriage of Henry VIII. with his brother's widow was drawn up first in great haste, and secretly transmitted to Spain as a brief, while it was afterwards more publicly expedited as a bull; but the brief, its authenticity once admitted, was of just the same force as the bull. So again, Benedict XIV., when compiling the first volume of his own pontifical acts, and sending it officially to the University of Bologna as a collection of authoritative rulings in the Canon Law, declares that it contains 'nostras Constitutiones, videlicet Bullas, et aliqua Brevia, Litteras Encyclicas et alia huiusmodi,' making no distinction between the authority attaching to these different instruments. So, in more modern times, the Society of Jesus, suppressed by Clement XIV. with a brief, was restored by Pius VII. in a bull; while Leo XIII. used a bull to re-establish the Catholic hierarchy in Scotland, though Pius IX., twenty-eight years before, had issued only a brief to effect the same purpose in England. The seal with the 'Fisherman's ring,' which is the distinctive mark of the brief, was formerly always impressed upon red wax within a loop formed by a twisted strip of parchment, and arranged in such a way that the seal served at the same time to close and secure the folded sheet of vellum to which it was affixed. The 'Fisherman's ring' is mentioned in 1265 as used by the Pope to authenticate his private correspondence, and is probably much older. The earliest existing impression is said to have been discovered in the treasury of the Sancta Sanctorum at the Lateran. It belongs to the time of Nicholas III. (1277–1280), and represents St. Peter fishing with a rod and line; but the identification seems somewhat doubtful. In the later examples St. Peter is represented in a boat drawing in the net.

In quite modern times some notable modifications have taken place in the rules of the Papal chancery regarding the issue of bulls and briefs. Since 1842 the impression of the 'Fisherman's ring' upon red wax attached to briefs has given way to a stamp in red ink bearing the same device. In the case of bulls, the *scrittura bollatica* engrossed upon great sheets of parchment has for ordinary purposes been discarded—this took place at the beginning of the pontificate of Leo XIII. in 1878—and the document is now written in the same legible Roman hand which is used for briefs, while the leaden *bulla* has given way in most cases to a stamp in red ink that can more conveniently be sent by post. It is likely also that the complicated formalities, which till quite lately attended the ordinary expedition of bulls by the *via di cancelleria*, will be much simplified in consequence of the recent re-organization of the Roman Curia.

Other Apostolic Letters.—As a further consequence of the delays and complications attending the issue of bulls, another new kind of instrument came into use at the end of the 15th cent. under Innocent VIII. It was a species of brief known as a *motu proprio*, and it was without any authenticating seal. As its name imports, it professed to be a document issued by the Pontiff of his own initiative, without any instance being made to him by interested parties. The documents of this class, which continued to be very common during the 16th cent., closely resembled briefs in their general features, but there are differences in the manner of dating, and, of course, there is no mention of the 'Fisherman's ring.' On the other hand, the words 'motu proprio' are always introduced, and occur not uncommonly as the initial words of the document. For the most part these *motu proprios* were concerned with the administration, ecclesiastical or civil, of the city of Rome and the government of the Papal States, and, in contrast to the more formal bulls and briefs, were frequently couched in Italian. From the insistence which their form seemed to lay upon the Papal initiative, they were regarded by foreign governments, notably by that of France, with disfavour, and treated as an encroachment upon the liberties of the Gallican Church.

In more modern times, the Roman Pontiffs, when wishing to impart instruction to the clergy and laity of the Church over which they rule, especially in matters which require somewhat elaborate treatment, have most commonly had recourse to an

'encyclical.' As the term imports, this is in form a circular letter intended to be passed on from one to another of a group of persons, but in practice it is a letter addressed to all the bishops in communion with the Holy See, or at least to all the bishops of a single district or province. The term 'encyclical letter' has been in use from an early date, but it was not commonly adopted for Papal documents before the 18th century. Since then it has come increasingly into favour, and Pius IX., Leo XIII., and Pius X. have issued numerous and very lengthy encyclicals, dealing not only with dogmatic questions, but also with problems that are primarily social and ethical in their scope. One of the most famous of these encyclicals was that of Pius IX., *Quanta cura* (8th Dec. 1864), of which the main purport was to condemn the principles of Naturalism (*i.e.* the exclusion of religion from the government of human society), to denounce Socialism and Communism, and to vindicate the sacred rights of family life; but it is perhaps principally remembered on account of the 'Syllabus' of condemned errors which was published along with it. Leo XIII., again, published a long and very remarkable series of encyclicals, dealing with a number of modern questions, *e.g.* the encyclical *Immutabilis* (21st Apr. 1878), on the evils of the times; *Arcanum divinae sapientiae* (10th Feb. 1880), on Christian marriage and family life; *Diuturnum illud* (29th June 1881), on the origin of civil authority; *Immortale Dei* (1st Nov. 1885), on the Christian constitution of States; *Libertas praestantissimum* (20th June 1881), on true liberty; *Rerum novarum* (16th May 1891), on the Labour question; and *Satis cognitum* (29th June 1896), on religious unity. Most of these utterances have been collected and translated, *e.g.* by J. Wynne in *The Great Encyclical Letters of Leo XIII.* (New York, 1903), and by W. Eyre, *The Pope and the People* (London, 1897).

The present Pope, Pius X., has also shown special favour for this form of manifesto, and many of his instructions have taken this shape: *e.g.* his first letter to the clergy and faithful of France, *Vehementer nos* (11th Feb. 1906); and the condemnation of Modernism, *Pascendi dominici gregis* (8th Sept. 1907), with very many others. In form an encyclical is simply a letter, which in its *inscriptio* mentions the 'Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, Bishops, and other local Ordinaries,' and concludes with the Apostolic blessing and a simple date including the year of the pontificate. The Pope's name 'Pius PP. X.' appears at the foot. It is generally held by Catholic theologians that the mere fact of an encyclical being addressed to the whole of Christendom does not constitute it an *ex cathedra* pronouncement, even if it deals with dogmatic matters. The degree in which the infallible *magisterium* of the Papacy is involved must be judged from the terms used in the document itself, and from attendant circumstances. This question is discussed with some fullness in Choupin, *Valeur et décisions doctrinales et disciplinaires du Saint-Siège* (Paris, 1908).

Another form of Papal utterance which calls for notice is the 'allocution,' which is an address delivered by the Pontiff to the Cardinals assembled in secret consistory. This address is sometimes printed and published by order of the Pope, who chooses this way of making known his judgment or wishes with regard to questions, often semi-political, which are of pressing importance. But, of course, this pronouncement is not a Papal letter, and cannot even in a wider sense be classed as a bull.

The remaining words, which are used to describe documents emanating from the Papal chancery, are of a general character, and for the most part rather loosely used. For example, almost any kind of instrument may be described as a 'rescript,' but strictly the term should be limited to some form of answer to an application addressed to the Holy See. Such answers in early times often began with the words, 'Significavit nobis dilectus filius,' and ended with the formula, 'Deus te incolumem servet.' Another very general word is 'constitution,' and this may be correctly applied to any written act which determines some question submitted, or lays down a rule to be followed.

With reference to the collection of Papal bulls and letters, it is to be noted that all the extant editions of the *Bullarium Romanum*, so far as regards mediæval documents, are of a very unsatisfactory character. The *Bullarium Romanum* was originally nothing but a private compilation, first formed by one Laertius Cherubini at the end of the 16th century. Its purpose was to print certain Papal constitutions which had been issued since the formation of the *Corpus Juris Canonici*, and which, though of great importance to students of law, were not accessible in any collected form. Naturally such a work did not concern itself much with the Papal letters of remote ages. It was the recent utterances which were important for the compiler's purpose. The various editions which followed greatly enlarged the collection and brought it up to date; but even in the scholarly work of Cocquelines, who edited the great *Bullarium Romanum* (printed in Rome in 32 volumes, between 1739 and 1762), nothing but the most meagre gleanings are presented of the Papal letters issued during the first 1500 years of the Church's history. For these early letters the reader must be referred to Coustant, *Epistolae Pontificum Romanorum* (extending to the year 440), and to Thiele's continuation (which brought the collection down to 553), but, most conveniently, to the already mentioned *Regesta* of Jaffé-Löwenfeld with the continuation by Potthast (which covers the whole period from the beginning to the 14th century). Special attention has, of course, been paid to certain isolated pontificates of importance. For example, the letters of St. Gregory the Great have been edited with great care in the quarto series of the *MGH*, by P. Ewald and L. Hartmann, while the Papal letters to Charlemagne and Louis the Pious have been studied by Carl Hampe, also in the *MGH*. Again, under the title of *Italia Pontificia*, a most thorough piece of work has been undertaken by P. F. Kehr in calendaring the 'privileges' and other Papal documents connected with the churches of Italy. Further, we must note that the pontificate of Innocent III., from which time onward, as stated above, the Papal *Regesta* are preserved, marks a period of much fuller knowledge. The *Regesta* of Innocent III. and of Honorius III., in part, have been published in the *Patrology* of Migne, while that of Honorius III. has subsequently been re-edited. None, however, of these Papal *Regesta* seems to contain copies of all the bulls issued during any pontificate, and consequently the fact that any document is lacking in the official register is no sufficient proof of its spuriousness. It is probable that for such registration, constituting, as it did, an additional safeguard of authenticity in case of dispute, a fee was demanded, and that registration was denied to those who were unwilling to pay the fee. During recent years a great effort has been made to publish the *Regesta* of the remaining Popes of the 13th and following centuries. The chief work has been done by the École Française de Rome with results which may be thus summarized:

Regesta completely edited.

Benedict XI. (1303–1304), ed. C. Grandjean; 1 vol.
Nicholas IV. (1288–1292), ed. E. Langlois; 2 vols.
Honorius IV. (1285–1287), ed. M. Prou; 1 vol.

Regesta in progress.

Gregory IX. (1227–1241), ed. L. Auvray; 3 vols. (two completed).
Innocent IV. (1243–1254), ed. E. Berger; 4 vols. (three completed).
Alexander IV. (1254–1261), ed. Bourel de la Roncière and others; 2 vols. (one nearly complete).
Urban IV. (1261–1264), ed. J. Guiraud; 4 vols. (three completed).
Clement IV. (1265–1268), ed. E. Jordan; 1 vol. (nearly complete).
Gregory X. and John XXI. (1271–1277), ed. J. Guiraud and L. Cadier; 1 vol. (nearly complete).
Nicholas III. (1277–1280), ed. J. Gay; 1 vol. (begun).
Martin IV. (1281–1285), ed. ?; 1 vol. (begun).
Boniface VIII. (1294–1303), ed. G. Digard, M. Faucon, A. Thomas; 3 vols. (1 vol. complete).

Besides these, the École Française de Rome has undertaken the publication of the letters of the Avignon Popes which have reference to French affairs. Amongst these considerable progress has been made with the letters of John XXII. (1316–1334) and Benedict XII. (1334–1342). Further, the École Belge de Rome has recently begun the publication of the *Regesta* of Clement VI. under the editorship of Dom U. Berlière.

As regards England in particular, an important undertaking has been for some time in progress under the general title of *A Calendar of Entries in the Papal Registers relating to Great Britain and Ireland*. This work, begun by the late W. H. Bliss and continued by J. A. Twemlow, has now extended to nine volumes, bringing the record down to the middle of the 15th cent., and it provides short summaries in English of all documents in the Roman *Regesta* which have any reference to the British Isles.

Amongst other isolated efforts may be mentioned the Benedictine edition of the *Regesta* of Clement v. (1305–1314), and Cardinal Hergenröther's incomplete calendar of the bulls and other documents of Leo x. At a much earlier period, A. Theiner, librarian of the Vatican, published, chiefly from the *Regesta*, large numbers of Papal bulls, etc., dealing with various countries of Europe—the British Isles, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, etc., among the number. Special *Bullaria*, chiefly collections of 'privileges,' to which formerly the name *Mare Magnum* was often applied, have also been published for most of the great Religious Orders and for some of the Roman Congregations.

LITERATURE.—Regarded as a branch of the science of 'Diplomatics,' the subject of Papal bulls and briefs possesses an abundant literature. A very large number of spurious documents of this kind have always been in existence, and the detection of these has exercised the acumen of scholars from quite an early period. Naturally the Popes themselves have at various times prohibited the fabrication of Papal letters and 'privileges,' under the severest spiritual penalties; and many references to the subject will be found among the bulls of such Pontiffs as Alexander III. and Innocent III. The foundations of the true science of diplomatic criticism were laid in Mabillon's great work, *De Re Diplomatica* (1681–1704), and this was further developed and systematized a little later by his fellow Benedictines, Dom Toustain and Dom Tassin, in their *Nouveau Traité de Diplomatique*, in six volumes quarto. For a compendious modern introduction to the subject, the reader may most conveniently be referred to A. Giry, *Manuel de Diplomatique* (Paris, 1894), and to the section on Papal diplomatics contributed by Schmitz-Kallenberg to H. Meister's *Grundriss der Geschichtswissenschaft* (Leipzig, 1906, vol. i. pp. 172–230), both of which works contain ample bibliographies. Besides the treatises mentioned in the course of the foregoing article, special reference should be made to H. Bresslau's *Handbuch der Urkundenlehre*, still, unfortunately, incomplete; to Pflugk-Harttung's great collection of facsimiles, *Specimina Selecta Chartarum Pontificum Romanorum* (3 vols., Stuttgart, 1887); and to books and papers by P. Kehr, Tangl, Diekamp, Mühlbacher, and others. Many of these contributions have appeared in the *Mittheil. des Instituts f. Österreichs Geschichtsforschung*, or in the Göttingen *Nachrichten* (Phil.-hist. Classe). The newly founded *Archiv für Urkundenforschung*, edited by Brandi, also contains some most valuable work of this kind. For the practical working of the Papal chancery, the *Practica Cancellariae Apostolicae*, edited by Schmitz-Kallenberg (Munich, 1904); the work of Baumgarten, *Aus Kanzlei und Kammer* (Freiburg, 1907); and that of E. von Ottenthal, *Regulae Cancellariae Apostolicae* (Innsbruck, 1888), are of great importance. Good work of the same kind has also been done by French scholars, notably M. Léopold Delisle and the Comte de Mas Latrie.

From the legal point of view, all the larger treatises which touch on the sources of the Canon Law devote a certain amount of space to the question of Papal bulls and letters. It will be sufficient to mention here (besides the great works of Phillips, Hinschius, von Scherer, and Wernz): Maassen, *Gesch. der Quellen und Lit. d. can. Rechts*, i. (1870); J. F. von Schulte, *Gesch. der Quellen u. Lit. des can. Rechts*, 3 vols. (1875–80); A. Tardif, *Histoire des sources du droit canonique* (1887); C. Mirbt, *Quellen zur Gesch. des Papsttums und des röm. Katholizismus* (1901). Much useful information about the building up of Roman Case Law will be found in F. W. Maitland's *Roman Canon Law in the Church of England* (1898). The Catholic standpoint regarding the pronouncements of such mediæval Popes as Gregory VII., Innocent III., and Boniface VIII. may be gathered from Hergenröther's *Catholic Church and Christian State* (Eng. tr., Lond. 1876)—a work which grew out of the 'Janus' controversy; or, better, from the various articles in the *Staatslexikon* (Herder, Freiburg), edited by Bruder and Bachem, the 3rd ed. of which is now in course of publication.

HERBERT THURSTON.

BUNYAN.—1. Life.—John Bunyan, the greatest of allegorists, and also the greatest exponent of the Puritan doctrine in popular form, was born at Elstow near Bedford in 1628, and died in London in 1688. His life thus covered the troubled period of the Civil War, the Commonwealth, and the Restoration, and ended on the eve of the Revolution. His origin was humble,—'low and inconsiderable,' he calls it,—his father being a tinker or itinerant brazier. He himself adopted the same trade. He learned to read and write, 'according to the rate of other poor men's children,' but his small stock of education was quickly lost. He seems to have had a somewhat nervous and morbid childhood, disturbed by dreams and fears. About 1645, when he was still but a lad, he served as a soldier. He himself does not say on which side he was enrolled, and his biographers have either followed their own fancy in the matter or have been content to regard the point as undecided. But probably Dr. Brown's carefully considered verdict would not now be disputed, based as it is upon a survey of the local circumstances and the 'strong set of the stream in the Parliamentary direction': 'It seems scarcely likely that he would think his way to independent conclusions so wide apart from those of his neighbours, break through all the carefully kept lines of the Parliamentary forces . . . and join the Royalist army with the king' (*Life*, p. 49). Bunyan owed much to his first wife. She restored to him the simple education he had lost by disuse; and she brought to him his first impressions of practical religion. They were very poor,—'not having so much household stuff as a dish or a spoon betwixt us both,'—but she brought with her two little books. The titles of these are noteworthy. They are seeds of a harvest. One was *The Plaine Man's Path-way to Heaven, Wherein every man may clearly see, whether he shall be saved or damned*, by Arthur Dent. The other was Lewis Bayly's well-known book, *The Practice of Pietie, directing a Christian how to walke that he may please God*. These little books must have left a deep mark upon the young man's mind. The former is written entirely in dialogue form. The latter, though somewhat heavy and common-place as a whole, has near its close a long 'colloquie' between Christ and the soul, so simple, tender, and beautiful that Bunyan himself might almost have written it.* We have possibly here the germ of his love for dialogue, both in allegory and in preaching.

After his marriage there came a period of spiritual upheaval lasting about four years, and recorded with wonderful power and skill in his *Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners* (1666). This book is the key to all his other writings: it is his experience compressed; the other books are his experience writ large, for in his case, as in that of St. Paul, doctrine and experience are in continual contact. No summary can do justice to the vividness of this great little autobiography; and this period of his life, when his soul was in the throes of birth, can be suitably described only in his own words. It was a period of many difficulties about such matters as election, the day of grace, the sin against the Holy Ghost; of many sacrifices—one game and pleasure after another being given up in the hope of finding peace; of many unsatisfied yearnings and aspirations,—'Oh! how I now loved those words that spake of a Christian's calling! as when the Lord said to one, Follow me; and to another, Come after me: and oh, thought I, that he would say so to me too: how gladly would I run after him!' It was a period of swift alternations of feeling, ranging from moments of an ecstatic joy—which lasted all too short a time, and was quickly caught up again, like Peter's sheet, to heaven—to moods of morbid self-torture, as when voices seemed to tempt him to sell Christ and he persuaded himself that he had sold his Saviour.† He himself admits that there was something distraught and unbalanced in his condition at this time: 'This is the man that hath his dwelling among the tombs with the dead; that

* '. . . *Soule*: Lord, wherefore wouldest thou be lift up upon a Crosse? *Christ*: That I might lift thee up with me to heaven. *S.*: Lord, why wouldest thou have thine armes nayled abroad? *C.*: That I might embrace thee more lovingly, my sweet soule. *S.*: Lord, wherefore was thy side opened with a Speare? *C.*: That thou mightest have a way to come nearer my heart. *S.*: Lord, wherefore wouldst thou be buried? *C.*: That thy sinnes might never rise up in Iudgement against thee. . .'

† Cf. the 'Meditation upon Peep of Day' from *A Book for Boys and Girls*:

'I oft, though it be peep of day, don't know
Whether 'tis Night, whether 'tis Day or no.
I fancy that I see a little light;
But cannot yet distinguish day from night.
I hope, I doubt, but steady yet I be not,
I am not at a point, the Sun I see not.
Thus 'tis with such, who Grace but now possess,
They know not yet, if they are curst or blest.'

is always crying out and cutting himself with stones.' But the essence of his case did not lie in its morbid extremes, but in a genuine conviction of sin which was the Divine preparation for the comfort of the Cross. Gradually he found his way to peace, the two chief influences being Luther's commentary upon *Galatians*,—'most fit for a wounded conscience,'—and the ministry of John Gifford. This man had formerly been a loose liver and an officer in the Royalist army, then a physician in Bedford; finally from 1650, being now a changed man, he became the pastor of the newly formed Nonconformist congregation in Bedford. He was doubtless the prototype of 'Evangelist'; he helped Bunyan the pilgrim towards the wicket gate and the shining light, and received him into the fellowship of the congregation in 1653. From that year until 1660 the congregation met in St. John's Church at Bedford, for the experiment of a comprehensive national Church was being tried under Cromwell, and Gifford had been presented to the living of St. John's.

In 1655, Bunyan removed from Elstow to Bedford. In the same year he lost his first wife, and was also called by his brethren to open his lips as a preacher: 'They desired me, and that with much earnestness, that I would be willing at sometimes to take in hand, in one of the meetings, to speak a word of exhortation unto them.' His message proved immediately acceptable: people came by hundreds to hear him; during the period of tolerance he preached more than once even in parish churches. But the Restoration brought the Act of Uniformity. Even as early as March 1658 there had been trouble. The minutes of the Bedford church mention a meeting 'for counsaile what to doe with respect to the indictment against bro: Bunyan at ye Assizes for preaching at Eaton.' Nothing seems to have come of that, but 1660 brought his arrest and the beginning of his imprisonment. There has been much uncertainty as to the number and places of his incarcerations, but once more Dr. Brown's careful weighing of evidence must decide the matter, reinforced as it has been by the discovery of the actual warrant of arrest for his second and shorter imprisonment in the end of 1675. The first imprisonment was in the County Gaol at Bedford, and lasted for twelve years, with a break in the middle, and with a considerable amount of liberty at times, varied with periods of greater strictness. He made tagged laces for his own support; wrote *Grace Abounding* and several other books; and preached in the gaol, and occasionally outside it. The second was in the Town Gaol on Bedford Bridge: it lasted six months, and produced the first part of *The Pilgrim's Progress*. When the first imprisonment drew to a close, the prisoner found new and enlarged service waiting for him. The following appears in the records of the Bedford church for 21st Jan. 1672:

'After much seeking God by prayer and sober conference formerly had, the Congregation did at this meeting with joynt consent (signifyed by solemne lifting up of their hands) call forth and appoint our brother John Bunyan to the pastorall office or eldership. And he, accepting thereof, gave up himself to serve Christ and his Church in that charge; and received of the Elders the right hand of fellowship.'

An orchard was purchased, and a barn that stood upon it was converted into a meeting-place, which was the home of the congregation until long after Bunyan's death.

From this point onwards his fame as a preacher, aided by his growing popularity as a writer, spread far and wide. He became known as 'Bishop Bunyan,' and travelled in many directions through England. He was often in London, where crowds would gather to hear him even at 7 o'clock in the morning. Some of the secrets of his success as a preacher may be guessed from his printed sermons, even though these in their revised and enlarged form may differ somewhat from the spoken word. He used strong and simple language, —his whole mind being saturated with the English Bible. He spoke with intense conviction, especially at first, upon the guilt and power of sin: 'I preached what I felt, what I smartingly did feel. . . . I went myself in chains to preach to them in chains, and carried that fire in my own conscience that I persuaded them to be aware of.' Later he gave more emphasis to 'Jesus Christ in all His offices, relations, and benefits,' and 'the mystery of the union of Christ'; but still, he says, 'I preached what I saw and felt.' There must have been a strongly dramatic element in his preaching, as in his enlargement of St. Peter's words, 'Repent every one of you,' in *The Jerusalem Sinner Saved*:

'*Objector*: But I was one of them that plotted to take away his life. May I be saved by him? *Peter*: Every one of you. *Obj.*: But I was one of them that bare false witness against him. Is there grace for me? *Peter*: For every one of you. *Obj.*: But I was one of them that cried out, Crucify him, crucify him; and desired that Barabbas the murderer might live, rather than him. What will become of me, think you? *Peter*: I am to preach repentance and remission of sins to every one of you, says Peter. . . Oh! what a blessed *Every one of you* is here!'

And his message must have been full of a limitless pity and tenderness, the true spirit of an evangelist, the spirit of the Christ whose mercy he had tasted for himself. John Owen is said to have remarked to Charles II. that he would gladly give up all his learning for the tinker's power of reaching the heart, and it is very evident that one of Bunyan's secrets of reaching the heart was just his intense compassion. 'Mark Rutherford,' himself no mean stylist, selects the following passage from *The Heavenly Footman* as unmatched in its simple eloquence:

'To encourage thee a little farther, set to the work, and when thou hast run thyself down weary, then the Lord Jesus will take thee up and carry thee. Is not this enough to make any poor soul begin his race? Thou perhaps cryest, O but I am feeble, I am lame, etc.; well, but Christ hath a bosom; consider, therefore, when thou hast run thyself down weary, he will put thee in his bosom. He shall gather the lambs with his arms, and carry them in his bosom, and shall gently lead those that are with young. This is the way that fathers take to encourage their children, saying: Run, sweet babe, while thou art weary, and then I will take thee up and carry thee. He will gather his lambs with his arms and carry them in his bosom; when they are weary, they shall ride.'

There is more than eloquence in such a passage: there is the tenderness of a true shepherd of souls.

In addition to his wide-spread work as preacher and evangelist, Bunyan played a not unimportant part in the earlier history of the Baptist denomination, as an advocate of open communion. The church of which he was pastor had been founded upon a broad basis:

'The principle upon which they thus entered into fellowship one with another, and upon which they did afterwards receive those that were added to their body and fellowship, was *faith in Christ and holiness of life* without respect to this or that circumstance or opinion in outward and circumstantiall things.'

So runs the old church record, and both Gifford and Bunyan seem to have been in sympathy with the basis. Dr. Brown says that, though Gifford is often called a Baptist, there is no evidence to prove him such; and though Bunyan was himself baptized by immersion in the Ouse, he was drawn into controversy with some of the stricter Baptists who found fault with him for his principle of open communion. The substance of his treatise, *Differences in Judgment about Water Baptism no bar to Communion* (1673), and of various other pamphlets and passages, amounts to this—that the point is one for the judgment of the individual, and that the Church dare not reject those who are true believers, whatever their opinion on this point. 'Christ, not baptism, is the way to the sheepfold. . . . Baptism also may be abused, and is, when more is laid upon it by us than is commanded by God.' He gives us his own preference and practice

in a phrase in *The Heavenly Footman*, when, after bidding his readers beware of Quakers, Ranters, Freewillers, he adds, 'Also do not have too much company with some Anabaptists, though I go under that name myself.' It is a little surprising to find that one who bore the name 'Anabaptist' should have two of his children christened after his own immersion—one at Elstow in 1654 and one at St. Cuthbert's, Bedford, in 1672. Can it mean that neither Bunyan's first wife, nor his second, whom he married in 1660 and who proved herself during his tribulation to be a woman of some courage and character, shared his personal view, and that he did not care enough about the matter to insist upon his own preference?

2. Works. — According to the list given by Dr. Brown, based upon that of Bunyan's friend, Charles Doe, Bunyan produced in all 60 works, one for each year of his life. But this includes such items as *A Map of Salvation*, and various tracts and poetical pieces of small bulk, as well as the longer controversial, evangelistic, and allegorical works. *Grace Abounding* is referred to above. Of the others, apart from the three greatest, the most noteworthy are: *Some Gospel-Truths opened*, interesting now chiefly as Bunyan's first book, published in 1656, a fiery protest against Quaker Mysticism, clear in its style and orderly in its arrangement, but giving a hint only in an occasional phrase of the greater riches that were to come; the various books, such as *Come and Welcome to Jesus Christ*, *The Jerusalem Sinner Saved*, and *The Heavenly Footman*, which preserve for us the style and substance of Bunyan's actual preaching; his Catechism, *Instructions for the Ignorant*; and *A Book for Boys and Girls, or Country Rhimes for Children*. This last is quaint and valuable in itself, and is perhaps the *fons et origo* of a slender but sparkling literary stream which has flowed intermittently through the generations, and has not yet spent itself—witness *The Child's Garden of Verses*. Probably the modern child, accustomed to the skilful and dainty catering of R. L. Stevenson and others, would count Bunyan's verses, except in one or two cases, somewhat heavy and didactic. Yet to the boys and girls of the 17th cent. these 'rhimes' may have been almost as much of a relief and joy as R. L. S. and Edward Lear to the happier children of the later 19th century.

Bunyan's poetry has been severely criticized. It may be admitted that in verse he seldom found his liberty, and that his more extended poems are doggerel. Yet in this region Bunyan is better worth knowing than the critics would have us believe. Many of his verses are at least melodious, pithy, and memorable. And something is to be said for the poetic quality of the man who wrote the song of the Shepherd Boy, and these lines *Upon the Swallow*:

'This pretty Bird, Oh! how she flies and sings!
But could she do so if she had not Wings?
Her Wings bespeak my Faith, her Songs my Peace;
When I believe and sing, my Doubtings cease.'

The first part of *The Pilgrim's Progress* was published in 1678, the second part about seven years later. The book was an immediate and amazing success. Three editions of the first part were sold in a year, and in the second and third of these the original scheme was wisely added to — Worldly Wiseman, Mr. By-end's relations, and Giant Despair's wife being among these happy afterthoughts. In Bunyan's lifetime 100,000 copies were sold. It is the greatest of allegories. It is the fine flower of Puritan theology and experience. It may be called the first great English novel. 'John Bunyan may pass for the father of our novelists,' says Hallam. Into it, with a pen that had found freedom and mastery, he put all his marvellous powers of observation: the man who has given us Mr. Talkative and Mr. Fearing went about the world with his eyes and ears open. Into it he also put all his own experience, so rich in sorrows and in joys. The temptation is strong to suggest originals for the allegorical scenes and personages. Was Elstow Abbey the House Beautiful, and was the Slough of Despond suggested by the miry fields near Bunyan's birthplace? Was Judge Jeffreys or Sir John Kelynge the original of Judge Hate-good? Was Faithful's voice, overheard in the valley, the voice of Martin Luther? And was Christiana Bunyan's second wife and Mercy his first? These things are better left vague. But we touch the real source of the whole matter when we study Bunyan's own experience. Here, *e.g.*, is the original of the Slough of Despond in *Grace Abounding*: 'I would in these days, often in my greatest agonies, even flounce towards the promise, as the horses do towards sound ground, that yet stick in the mire.' There have been very varying judgments as to the value of the second part of *The Pilgrim's Progress*. Its geographical interest is, of course, less than that of the first, because the story leads the reader along a familiar path; and the dialogue is in places weaker. But Mr. Froude's severe disparagement is entirely misleading, if only because of the extraordinary richness of the second part as a book of character. Mr. Brisk, Mr. Honest, Greatheart, Mercy, Mr. Fearing, Madam Bubble, and the rest are inimitable and immortal. But, indeed, criticism of *The Pilgrim's Progress*, if it be based on sympathy, soon loses itself in affection. Sir Walter Scott speaks for the multitude of Bunyan's readers when he says:

'John Bunyan's parable must be dear to many, as to us, from the recollection that in youth they were endued with permission to peruse it at times when all studies of a nature merely entertaining were prohibited' (*Quart. Rev.*, Oct. 1830).*

No other book except the Bible so unites the hearts of young and old, learned and simple, the lover of beauty and the lover of sanctity.

In *The Life and Death of Mr. Badman*, published in 1680, Bunyan made an attempt to tell the opposite story, and describe a pilgrimage from bad to worse. The attempt is not very successful. It is retarded by being cast in dialogue form throughout; it is weighted with amazing anecdotes, which, however interesting from their mere incredibility, distract attention from the main story; it loses itself in tedious discussions, *e.g.*, on the difference between cursing and swearing. But the pen that created the Pilgrim had not lost all its cunning. There are many passages acute in observation and happy in expression, like the phrase about Mr. Badman's 'mournful, sugared letters' to his creditors; and the book is full of Bunyan's keen observation and knowledge of life: 'I think I may truly say that, to the best of my remembrance, all the things that I here discourse of, I mean as to matters of fact, have been acted upon the stage of this world, even many times before mine eyes.' And the book has value still as a picture of the rougher and uglier side of English life in Bunyan's time. Perhaps the author's artistic restraint is never more finely exhibited than in giving Mr. Badman a quiet and peaceable deathbed.

In *The Holy War* (1682) Bunyan rose again almost to his own loftiest level, and created another allegory second only to *The Pilgrim's Progress*. The task in this case was more difficult. Though there is more Biblical foundation for the figure of a war than for that of a pilgrimage, the former is less easy to draw out into a connected story. Defects and inconsistencies are easily observable, *e.g.*, Mansoul seems now the soul of a man, now the soul of humanity. It is dangerous also to bring

* Cf. Macaulay in his Essay on 'John Bunyan': 'That wonderful book, while it obtains admiration from the most fastidious critics, is loved by those who are too simple to admire it.'

the Persons of the Trinity into action and dialogue. But if there be defects in construction, there is not a weak page in the actual writing, and the style throughout seems mysteriously to take on a quality kindred to its theme—something of the strength of a rampart, something of the sound of a trumpet. Once more observation and experience are manifest continually. Bunyan's soldiering serves him well in his battle scenes. His heart remembers how this sort of thing is done: the evolutions of Emmanuel's army, 'the handling of their arms and managing of their weapons of war, were marvellously taking to Mansoul and me.' The new modelling of Mansoul is a reflexion of the changes that were compulsorily brought about in the civic arrangements of towns like Bedford as Commonwealth or Monarchy got the upper hand. The setting up of a ministry in Mansoul is also full of echoes of times when the ecclesiastical foundations were unsettled, and contending ideals enjoyed alternate periods of supremacy. Bunyan handles all this with exhaustless skill and ingenuity: *e.g.*, there is a whole analysis of persecution, clear and complete, packed into one corner of the plot. When the Bloodmen were taken, they were had before the Prince, and

'he found them to be of three several counties, though they all came out of one land. One sort of them came out of Blindmanshire, and they were such as did ignorantly what they did. Another sort of them came out of Blindzealshire, and they did superstitiously what they did. The third sort of them came out of the town of Malice, in the county of Envy, and they did what they did out of spite and implacableness.'

In the scheme of this allegory, there is naturally less room for character-drawing than in the other, yet who can forget that deaf and angry man, old Mr. Prejudice, or the darling of Diabolus, Captain Anything? Moreover, in the dealings between Emmanuel and Mansoul there appears, as in all Bunyan ever wrote, his passionate love for his Lord, and the Lord's love and pity for his sinful but aspiring servants.

3. Place and influence.—Bunyan's influence was immediate and enormous, not in his own denomination only, not in his own country only. *The Pilgrim's Progress* was translated into Welsh in 1688, into Dutch in 1682, into German in 1703, into French in 1685. Bunyan's empire has grown steadily with the passing generations, mainly through this his best known book: perhaps the best criterion of its extent to-day is the fact that in the summer of 1909 the Religious Tract Society announces versions in 112 different languages and dialects. Even such an edition as that produced by J. M. Neale in 1853, with insertions and alterations in the worst possible taste, designed to make the book teach a different scheme of doctrine from that of its author, is a proof of Bunyan's wide sovereignty and of the appeal he makes to minds of many different types. In addition to the qualities alluded to incidentally above—his pictorial style, uniting the young and the old; his strong, simple, Biblical English, uniting the educated and the unlearned; his knowledge of life; his faithfulness to his own deep experience; his historical position as our great exponent of Puritanism at its best—the following may be mentioned as among the secrets of an influence so wide and enduring:

(*a*) Bunyan's real *originality*.* This quality may be claimed for him even apart from the question of borrowed materials. Shakespeare can be original even when he is working over the story of some old chronicler: resurrection can be so managed as to be equivalent to creation. Much ingenuity, however, has been expended on the attempt to find a source for the Pilgrim-story. Guillaume de Guileville's *Le Pèlerinage de l'Homme* in Lydgate's version; Bernard's *The Isle of Man, or the Legal Proceedings in Manshire against Sin*; and other existing allegories or romances have been suggested as the source of Bunyan's inspiration; or it is alleged that he found his seed-thought, say, in *The Plaine Man's Path-way*, or in the letter of an Italian martyr in Foxe's *Booke of Martyrs*, which says, 'I will travel up to the New Jerusalem. . . . Behold, I have entered already on my journey.' Probably Bunyan gathered seed-thoughts everywhere, and plagiarized prodigiously from the open book of life. But the question of his literary originality is very carefully examined in the preface to Furnivall's edition of Lydgate's *de Guileville*, and the wise conclusion reached is this: 'In one Book alone, the Bible, supplemented by Bunyan's own experience, we may trace all the influences necessary for the production of *The Pilgrim's Progress*.'

(*b*) His *practical sagacity and ethical force*. Bunyan the evangelist does not altogether hide Bunyan the moralist: the two are one. 'He was securely weighted with unshifting ballast, the ballast of common sense.' The story of Mr. Badman's fraudulent bankruptcy shows how Bunyan had an eye for the insincerities and corruptions of the commercial world. Some of his counsels are startlingly close to modern problems of commercial morality: 'Art thou a seller and do things grow cheap? Set not thy hand to help or hold them up higher. Art thou a buyer and do things grow dear? Use no cunning or deceitful language to pull them down.' There is no thought more characteristic of Bunyan, in spite of his lurid pictures of the agonies of the lost, than this—that sin is hell; sin is the worm; sin is the fire; it would be better to be sinless in hell than to be a sinner in heaven.

(*c*) His *broad and genial humanity*. This shows itself in many ways,—not least in his kindly and hearty humour,—his portraits, such as those of Mr. Brisk, Talkative, Sir Having Greedy, Christiana and her comrades dancing over the fate of Giant Despair, his skill in inventing amusing and delightful names, and his way of poking fun at those whom he would gently rebuke. Still more strikingly does his breadth of humanity come out in his whole management of the Pilgrim's story. There are so few ecclesiastical waymarks that one would never guess the author's own position, and when Giant Pope is omitted the book can be used with profit and pleasure by Catholic readers. He avoids the temptation to which religious teachers of strongly marked experience often yield—the temptation to think that all others must walk in their footprints in order to be safe. This is finely brought out in the contrast between the experiences of Christian and Faithful in the first part, and in the room that is found in the second part for a rich variety of character and experience.

(*d*) *The note of the Evangel*. The most intimate and enduring secret of the hold that Bunyan has over multitudes of men is this, that he was so great a lover of men, and so passionately loyal to the supreme Lover of men. His friend Doe calls him 'a great convert'; and, because he was so great and so thorough a convert, he is a great exponent of the motives that have supreme converting power Hence *The Pilgrim's Progress* is, as Coleridge calls

* Hallam, 'that niggard of applause,' has this: 'His success in a line of composition like the spiritual romance or allegory, which seems to have been frigid and unreadable in the few instances where it had been attempted, is doubtless enhanced by his want of all learning and his low station in life. He was therefore rarely, if ever, an imitator; he was never enchained by rules. Bunyan possessed in a remarkable degree the power of representation; his inventive faculty was considerable, but the other is his distinguishing excellence.' He saw, and makes us see, what he describes; he is circumstantial without prolixity, and, in the variety and frequent change of his incidents, never loses sight of the unity of his allegorical fable' (*Lit. History*, iv. 331).

it, '*Summa Theologiae Evangelicae*.' And, in spite of the many changes of standpoint and vocabulary since Bunyan's day, he will still be for many generations to come the teacher and the friend of those who have no other explanation of their own deliverance than this: 'He hath given me rest by his sorrow and life by his death.'

LITERATURE.—The literature of this subject is now enormous. Among the biographies, that by John Brown (London, 1885; new ed. 1902) stands alone in its completeness, and in its wealth of extracts from historical sources such as the minutes of Bunyan's church. Among smaller biographies and critical studies there may be mentioned: Macaulay, *Essays*, 'John Bunyan' (1831); J. A. Froude in the 'English Men of Letters' series (1887); 'Mark Rutherford' in the 'Literary Lives' series (1905); lives by Southey (1831) and Canon Venables (1888); lectures by Dean Howson in 'Companions for the Devout Life' (1877), and by W. Robertson Nicoll in the 'Evangelical Succession' series (1884). There is also a large literature of exposition, devoted mainly to *The Pilgrim's Progress*. In addition to the older books, such as Cheever (1844), there are Kerr Bain's two volumes on *The People of the Pilgrimage* (1887)—unique in their thoroughness and in the almost too great weight of learning they bring to their task. The lecture-sermons of A. Whyte (two volumes on *The Pilgrim* [1893, 1894], one on *The Holy War* [1895], one on *Grace Abounding* [1908]), are also the product of deep knowledge, sympathy, and enthusiasm, and have done much to create a new public for Bunyan. A series of papers on *The Pilgrim* has recently been contributed by J. Kelman to *The Expository Times* (xvi. [1905] ff.). Among earlier fugitive pieces, Sir Walter Scott's review of Southey's *Life* in the *Quarterly Review*, Oct. 1830, is interesting, especially for its comparison and contrast between Bunyan and Spenser. The best vindication of Bunyan's originality is that alluded to above, in 10 pp. of the introduction to Furnivall's *de Guileville*. Bunyan's *Complete Works* have been edited by G. Offor and R. Philip, 3 vols., London, 1853 (new ed. 1862); and there are critical texts with notes and glossaries issued by the Clarendon Press, Oxford, and (the text alone) by the Cambridge University Press.

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